

Juhana Toivanen

Animal Consciousness

Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions
of the Sensitive Soul



JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 370

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ABSTRACT

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Finnish summary

Diss.

The present study investigates Peter Olivi's (1248–98) conception of various aspects of animal consciousness from the point of view of philosophical psychology. Although the study pertains to animals, human beings are not excluded: according to medieval view, there is a strong psychological continuity between human beings and other animals. Thus, the subject matter of the present study includes those cognitive operations which are understood as being common to humans and other animals: perception, psychological functions which are attributed to the so-called internal senses, and certain types of self-consciousness.

Each of the three parts of the study deals with one of these themes. Part one analyses Olivi's intentional theory of perception and situates it into larger philosophical and historical contexts. Part two deals with Olivi's view on the internal senses, which account for psychological functions that enable complex cognitive operations with regard to external objects. These functions account for animals' seemingly rational action, and they include imagination, memory, and estimative apprehension, i.e., evaluation of external objects with respect to the well-being of the percipient. Part three discusses types of self-consciousness, which Olivi attributes to animal soul. These include cognising one's body as a part of oneself, and second-order consciousness of one's cognitive activity.

The result is a detailed study of certain aspects of Olivi's thought. Olivi is considered as one of the most important yet poorly studied medieval thinkers, and his role is especially important in philosophical psychology. The present study opens new ground by conducting a detailed investigation on Olivi's thought and by examining aspects of medieval philosophical psychology that have hitherto received less attention. The most important results pertain to Olivi's conception of intentional consciousness, his understanding of the relation between conscious mind and the body, and to medieval understanding of the similarity between human beings and non-human animals.

The study is a philosophical investigation: it aims at philosophical understanding rather than historical exposition. Yet, as philosophical acuteness and historical accuracy go hand in hand in history of philosophy, the result can be described as philosophically informed and historically accurate study. Also the employed method combines philosophical conceptual analysis with methods of the science of history. The main sources include all the major philosophical works of Olivi that have been edited—most important works are *Summa quaestionum super Sententias* and *Quodlibeta quinque*.

Keywords: Peter Olivi, history of philosophy, medieval philosophy, philosophy of mind, animal psychology, consciousness, internal senses, perception, self-consciousness, intentionality

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Conducting research on mediæval philosophy is a curious business. One has to read thousands of pages of age-old texts which are difficult to understand and often very boring. One has to think quite a lot, and sometimes the ideas one thinks about are quite bizarre. One has to stare at the display and try to find a way of expressing one's thoughts in such a way that someone else might understand them. And one has to deal with the constant doubt that there may not be a point in the undertaking. Fortunately, there is a remedy that has given a sense and a reason for my research: the people to whom and with whom this book is written. Some of them have made the undertaking easier and meaningful by being co-operative and interested in my work; others have made my social life so interesting that I have been able to forget my work every now and then.

First and foremost I would like to thank Mikko Yrjönsuuri who has shown me that to be a historian of philosophy is a respectable option for a philosopher. Had he not become a member of the staff of the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, I had never realised that three areas of my interests—philosophy, history, and Latin philology—may in fact provide an opportunity for a career. Mikko is an expert who is always supportive and encouraging, and he has given me enough freedom to find my own way in the darkness of the Dark Ages.

I am also grateful to my referees, Sylvain Piron and Simo Knuuttila, whose comments and suggestions helped me to give the final touch to this book. I did not take heed of all of their advices, although now when it is already too late to change anything I can see that I probably should have done so.

I have not always found my work valuable and worth doing, and most of the time I have not felt confident in my capabilities of conducting it. These were the times when I was lucky to have inspiring colleagues and friends who have helped and supported me in various ways. Being able to talk about history of philosophy, being able to give vent to all the feelings a postgraduate must face when (s)he is writing a dissertation, and being able to discuss life, the universe, and everything—these possibilities have been invaluable for me. Thanks to Jari Kaukua, Vili Lähteenmäki, Mika Perälä, Susanna Niiranen, Taneli Kukkonen, Filipe Silva, Minna Koivuniemi, and all the colleagues in Jyväskylä and within the research units *History of Mind*, and *Philosophical Psychology, Morality, and Politics*. Not to mention "Juha Mieto," and a certain penguin. Two of my friends deserve a special mention: Mimosa Pursiainen and Ulla-Maija Matikainen, who have prevented me from climbing too high in the ivory tower of university philosophy and tried to convince me of the usefulness of looking at the stars instead. I hope that I have given you back even a tiny part of all I have received from you.

Being a philosopher does not pay off financially, but it has given a living. It is obvious that without financial support I could not have devoted my time to accomplish this study. Thus, I want to express my gratitude to the leaders of the research units HoM and PMP for believing in me. They have made exceptionally long contracts and believed—almost without reason, it seems to me—that I will meet the hopes that are placed on me. A grant from Nyyssösen säätiö has made certain important things possible.

I am indebted to Jessica Slattery for language editing and proofreading the present study; it goes without saying that the remaining mistakes are due to my stubbornness.

During the first year of my postgraduate studies the library of my *alma mater* offended their own rules in my favour. I promised to thank them for their flexibility. Now the promise is delivered.

I am not only a philosopher; I am a son, a husband, and a father as well. I am grateful to my parents, because they taught me to philosophise in the first place. Their philosophical attitude towards things they value in life, their fondness of discussion, and their unquestioning support in my choices—however stupid they may have been—have driven me to where I am. I am also thankful to my own family. Johanna, Katariina, and Irene have supported and loved me, and they have been patient with me almost all the time. They have also kept me in touch with the everyday life. Some things simply cannot wait, and sometimes it is not a good time and place to start philosophising. When a child is hungry, you feed her, and you think about ontological problems later.

Finally, I would like to thank my grandfather who has taught me three things: First, given the opportunity one should try to become more than a pig farmer. Second, no matter what one ends up doing—be it farming pigs or writing a dissertation on medieval philosophy—one should do it to the best of one's abilities. Third, pigs really are clever creatures.

Lintukoto, Jyväskylä
September 2, 2009

If someone should think that the study of the rest of the animal kingdom is an unworthy pursuit, then he must hold entirely the same view about himself.

Aristotle, *De partibus animalium*, 645^a27.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>II Sent.</i>	Petrus Ioannis Olivi, <i>Quæstiones in secundum librum Sententiarum</i>
<i>AFH</i>	<i>Archivum franciscanum historicum</i>
<i>AHDLMA</i>	<i>Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge</i>
<i>AT</i>	C. Adam & P. Tannery, eds., <i>Œuvres de Descartes</i>
<i>Canon</i>	Avicenna, <i>Canon of Medicine (al-Qānūn fī'l-tibb)</i>
<i>CCSL</i>	Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
<i>Conciliator</i>	Pietro d'Abano, <i>Conciliator differentiarum philosophorum et precipue medicorum</i>
<i>DA</i>	Aristotle, <i>De anima</i>
<i>De Gen. ad litt.</i>	Augustine, <i>De Genesi ad litteram</i>
<i>De lib. arb.</i>	Augustine, <i>De libero arbitrio</i>
<i>De quant. an.</i>	Augustine, <i>De quantitate animæ</i>
<i>De veritate</i>	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Quæstiones disputatæ de veritate</i>
<i>DT</i>	Augustine, <i>De Trinitate</i>
<i>Ep.</i>	Petrus Ioannis Olivi, "Epistola ad fratrem R."
<i>Impugnatio</i>	Petrus Ioannis Olivi, "Impugnatio quorundam articulorum Arnaldi Galliardi"
<i>Mem.</i>	Aristotle, <i>De memoria et reminiscencia</i>
<i>Ordinatio</i>	John Duns Scotus, <i>Ordinatio</i>
<i>OTh</i>	William Ockham, <i>Opera Theologica</i>
<i>PA</i>	Aristotle, <i>De partibus animalium</i>
<i>PL</i>	J.-P. Migne, ed., <i>Patrologiæ Cursus Completus, Series Latina</i>
<i>Quæst. de an.</i>	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Quæstiones disputatæ de anima</i>
<i>Quæst. de virt.</i>	Petrus Ioannis Olivi, <i>Quæstiones de incarnatione et redemptione, Quæstiones de virtutibus</i>
<i>Quæst. de nov.</i>	Petrus Ioannis Olivi, <i>Quæstiones de novissimis</i>
<i>Quodl.</i>	Petrus Ioannis Olivi, <i>Quodlibeta quinque</i>
<i>Responsio prima</i>	Petrus Ioannis Olivi, "Responsio quam fecit Petrus [Ioannis] ad litteram magistrorum, præsentatam sibi in Avinione"
<i>Responsio secunda</i>	Petrus Ioannis Olivi, "Responsio fratris Petri Ioannis [Olivi] ad aliqua dicta per quosdam magistros Parisienses de suis Quæstionibus excerpta."
<i>Sent. De sensu</i>	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato</i>
<i>Sent. DA</i>	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Sentencia libri De anima</i>
<i>Shifā' De an.</i>	Avicenna, <i>Avicenna latinus, Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus</i>
<i>ST</i>	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Summa Theologiæ</i>
<i>Sens.</i>	Aristotle, <i>De sensu et sensibilibus</i>
<i>Somn.</i>	Aristotle, <i>De somno et vigilia</i>
<i>Summa</i>	Petrus Ioannis Olivi, <i>Summa quæstionum super Sententias</i>
<i>Super Gen.</i>	Petrus Ioannis Olivi, <i>Lectura super Genesim</i>
<i>Super Isaiam</i>	Petrus Ioannis Olivi, <i>Postilla super Isaiam</i>

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ABSTRACT

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ABBREVIATIONS

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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

It is a scientific fact that human beings are animals. Genetically we are almost identical to other primates and the evidence for the psychological and behavioural similarity between human beings and other animals is continually increasing, as ethologists make new discoveries. Nowadays it is extremely difficult to find a single feature or ability which would set us apart. Still, we tend to conceive of ourselves as beings who differ from other animals—not only because we are accustomed to thinking that our psychological and other abilities differ in degree from those of other animals—but especially because we conceive of ourselves as qualitatively different. Despite scientific evidence, we have adopted a profound cultural conception of a radical disparity between human beings and other animals. Just growing up in our western culture teaches us to believe that we differ radically from beasts. We do not learn what exactly constitutes the difference perhaps just because there is no single aspect that would do so, but somehow we learn to think that the difference exists.

This cultural conception of a radical difference between human beings and other animals does not often find its expression in explicit statements. If asked, most adult people would probably acknowledge that we are animals—although there are certainly also those who openly deny this. We must go deeper to find an expression of our conception: we have to pay attention to our intuitive reactions, to our values, and to our feelings. Even though we may confess that there is not much of a difference between humans and higher primates, we do not conceive of primates as we conceive of other people. We react differently to human beings than we do to animals, and we value animals less; although cruelty to animals makes many of us feel sorrow and disgust, it does not bring about the same moral sentiments as does cruelty to human beings. I do not want to claim that it should; I want to point out that even though we learn in schools that scientifically we are animals, before that we somehow also learn that there is a radical difference between human and non-human animals and that in the end the latter conception affects our action and choices more than the former. It is the latter conception that is manifested in our way of living, in our values, and in our intuitive reactions and feelings.

What are the origins of our cultural conception of the difference between human beings and other animals? Why do we consider animals as being radically different from ourselves? The answers to these questions are difficult to find because the story is complicated and probably quite ambiguous. However, it seems to me that one thing is certain: the difference has not always been a part of our cultural imagery—at least in the form it has taken today. In the course of history, people have conceived of the relationship between human beings and other animals in different ways, and past people have not always shared our preconceptions.

A striking effect of an alternative conception of the status of non-human animals is the once conventional practice of trying non-human animals in courts of justice¹. During the Middle Ages (and beyond²), animals were commonly put on a trial because of the crimes they had committed: for example, rats were prosecuted for destroying the crop, swine and dogs were charged for murder, a cock was accused of laying an egg, insects were brought to trial for devouring the vineyards. The variety of species of trialled animals and their alleged crimes is vast. The prosecuted animals were sometimes sentenced to death, sometimes excommunicated, and sometimes imprisoned, but—interestingly enough—they were not always found guilty. Thus, although one might be tempted to think that the practice was only ceremonial, it was not. It was not obvious beforehand that the outcome of the trial would turn out to be detrimental to the prosecuted animal, and during the processes the culprits were considered as much persons in the face of the law as any human being.³ The extant records of animal trials show us that the difference between men and beasts was conceived of differently in the medieval field of jurisprudence than it is done today. Also the laymen—farmers whose fields had been ravaged by mice, wine growers whose vineyards had been devastated by noxious insects, and parents whose children had been devoured by murderous swine—the ordinary people who laid the charges against animals must have understood these creatures in a way that differs from our modern per-

¹ This curious practise has received little attention from modern scholars. The most important studies are William Ewald, "Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?" *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 143:6 (1995): 1891–1905; E. P. Evans, *The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals* (London/Boston: Faber and Faber, 1987) (originally published by William Heinemann, London: 1906); and Walter Woodburn Hyde, "The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modern Times," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 64:7 (1916): 696–730.

² The practise prevailed well beyond the Middle Ages. The majority of the cases, reports of which are still extant, are from the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries. However, we cannot conclude that it was more common to try non-human animals in the Early Modern period than in the Middle Ages on the basis of extant reports because in the Middle Ages the registers of the courts were imperfectly kept and also because the archives have been destroyed either partially or totally (Evans 1987, 137). It is probable that the registers from the Early Modern period simply survived better than those of the Middle Ages.

³ Ewald 1995, 1902–5; Evans 1987, 18–20, 37–50, 153–4, 298–303. Evans lists cases of animal trials between the years 825 and 1906 (*ibid.*, 265–86). However extensive the list is, it seems to contain only the cases in which the accused were found guilty (*ibid.*, 136).

spective. It seems bizarre to us that animals were tried in the justice system, but medieval people did not see anything odd in this practice⁴.

As non-human animals were treated—to some extent at least—on a par with human beings, so human beings were considered to be animals. Philosophers of the Middle Ages, especially from the 13th century onwards, tended to follow the Aristotelian definition according to which human beings are rational animals: our rationality may mark us apart from other animals, but we are *animals* nevertheless. We shall see below that this was not only a terminological issue but that the typical medieval approach was to hold human beings and other animals as quite similar to each other from a psychological point of view as well. It is, to be sure, possible to emphasise our rationality and to neglect our animality even within the Aristotelian framework, but (at least arguably) the general approach in the Middle Ages was somewhat distinct from the modern one, in which the difference is more salient. Thus, even from a philosophical point of view the difference between human beings and other animals was not very radical for medievals because they understood human beings as rational animals and, as such, quite similar to other animal species.

To be sure, medieval philosophers and theologians did not think, at least unanimously, that there were absolutely no differences between human beings and non-human animals. Above all, human beings were usually taken to be the only bodily creatures who have or are capable of having a relation with God because their rationality was seen to mark humans off from the rest of the bodily creation. One may say that there are exceptions to this thinking as well. For instance, tradition has it that Franciscus of Assisi preached to beasts and considered them as confrères, as fellow worshippers, and praisers of God⁵. Franciscus is, of course, a radical case in many respects, and his attitude towards non-human animals cannot be taken as a typical medieval way of thinking. Even so, the issue of seeing animals in light of their relation to God or lack thereof itself shows a radical disparity between modern and medieval thinkers.

At the present state of scholarship, it is not possible to understand exactly how medieval people conceived of the relation between human beings and other

⁴ In fact, as bizarre as it seems, animals are occasionally prosecuted even today. In 2008 there have been at least two cases which have caught the attention of media—and judging from the tone of the reports they have done so only because they are considered amusing to the audience. See *Thomson Reuters*, “Macedonian court convicts bear of stealing honey,” March 13, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL13835831>; *Sky News*, “Donkey Sent to Prison For Attack,” May 20, 2008, <http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,30200-1316536,00.html>. A definitive judgement about how these cases should be understood would require a thorough reading of the court documents, and that goes beyond the scope of this book. However, one may point out at least one difference between the case of the Mexican donkey and medieval juridical processes against animals: the donkey was held as a pledge until the owner paid the bill, whereas in the Middle Ages the owner of a sentenced animal was not held responsible for its actions. Quite the contrary, sometimes the owner was even remunerated for the loss of the executed beast (Evans 1987, 155).

⁵ As, for instance, in Bonaventure’s *Legenda Sancti Francisci*. See Bonaventure, *The Life of St. Francis of Assisi*, ed. and transl. Manning (Rockford: Tan Books and Publishers Inc., 1988), VIII, 78–84.

animals⁶. However, already on the basis of the foregoing evidence, it is quite clear that the boundary was drawn very differently than it is nowadays—regardless of whether we draw it on the basis of our cultural conception, which places a radical disparity between the two, or on the basis of scientific evidence, which diminishes the difference yet does not incite us to try rats for alleged crimes. There simply is too much we haven't yet sussed out. The lacunæ in our knowledge exist in the field of the history of ideas because we do not know (and perhaps never will, at least comprehensively) how medieval people conceived of themselves and the animals with which they lived.

But there are also lacunæ that can be filled more easily. Philosophers and theologians wrote a vast amount of literature that pertains to philosophical psychology, and much of the material can be approached from the point of view of the differences and similarities they saw between human beings and other animals. Yet this has not been done sufficiently. Although medieval philosophical psychology has recently been a subject of lively scholarly attention, we still do not know enough about medieval conceptions of the psychological functions which were understood to be common to human beings and other animals.⁷ By examining these conceptions, we obtain a finer understanding of the medieval way of conceiving the distinction between human and non-human animals, and this better enables us to critically reflect on our own preconceptions.

In the present study, I shall make a modest contribution to filling the latter lacuna by examining the thought of one of the most interesting and original philosophers of the latter half of 13th century, namely, Peter of John Olivi (1248–98)⁸. Why Olivi? In short: because his role in the transition from medieval to Early Modern ways of thinking is so important. Although modern scholarship on medieval philosophical psychology has mainly concentrated on Thomas Aquinas, it is nowadays acknowledged that from the perspective of later developments the thinkers from the Franciscan order are far more significant. Within the lesser brothers, there are two philosophers who have been extensively stud-

⁶ For historical perspectives on this topic, see, e.g., A. N. H. Creager & W. C. Jordan, eds., *The Animal/Human Boundary: Historical Perspectives*, Studies in Comparative History (University of Rochester Press, 2002); Jennifer Ham & Matthew Senior, eds., *Animal Acts: Configuring the Human in Western History* (NY/London: Routledge, 1997); Alain Boureau, *L'Empire du livre: Pour une histoire du savoir scolastique (1200–1380). La raison scolastique II*, Histoire (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2007), 187–99.

⁷ Philosophical discussions concerning the similarities and differences between human beings and non-human animals have been studied to some extent. See Richard Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate*, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 54 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1993); Thierry Gontier, *L'Homme et l'animal: La philosophie antique* (Paris: PUF, 1999).

⁸ I shall not provide a historical narrative of Olivi's life, for it has been sufficiently presented elsewhere. I advice those who are interested to read at least the following studies: David Burr, "The Persecution of Peter Olivi," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 66 (1976): 1–98; Sylvain Piron, "Censures et condamnation de Pierre de Jean Olivi: enquête dans les marges du Vatican," *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome-Moyen Âge* 118:2 (2006): 313–373, <http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00179543/fr/>; Carter Partee, "Peter John Olivi: Historical and Doctrinal Study," *Franciscan Studies* 20 (1960): 215–260.

ied, namely, John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham; but there are two others on whom Scotus and Ockham appear to be leaning. These two stand out as original thinkers who initiated changes that ultimately were to alter the way we see ourselves and the world we live in. They are Roger Bacon and Peter Olivi. The transformation of natural philosophy into science owes much to Bacon, and Olivi's significance in the field of philosophical psychology cannot be exaggerated. Olivi belongs to first generation of Franciscan scholars who had a fair knowledge of Aristotelian natural philosophy—for instance, he seems to be one of the earliest Franciscans to comment on Aristotle's *Physica*⁹. However, as Olivi thinks that arguments from authority do not have a place in philosophical discussions, he considers Aristotle's ideas with a critical eye: philosophical argumentation concerning human cognition has to be grounded in experience. This phenomenological approach leads Olivi to present original ideas (some of which are inspired by Augustinian philosophy) and makes him appear as an astonishingly modern thinker in psychological issues. In order to see how important a figure Olivi is in the field of philosophical psychology, one needs only to point out that the rise of voluntarism, often attributed to the thought of Scotus and Ockham, was initiated by Olivi's lengthy discussions concerning the freedom of the will. However, other aspects of his philosophical psychology anticipate later developments as well. As we shall see in the course of this study, his way of conceiving the mind and consciousness and their relation to the body appear to contain threads which will eventually become more salient in the Early Modern period.

Scholarly interest in Olivi's thought has increased significantly during the last ten years, but he is still a poorly known figure, and studies concerning his ideas are considered more than welcome. This applies also to the subject matter of the study at hand. Some aspects of Olivi's philosophical psychology have been discussed to some extent in the literature¹⁰, but there are themes that re-

⁹ Sylvain Piron, "The Formation of Olivi's Intellectual Project," *Oliviana* 1 (2003), <http://oliviana.revues.org/document8.html>.

¹⁰ See Séraphin Belmont, "Le mécanisme de la connaissance d'après Pierre Olivi, dit Olivi," *La France franciscaine* 12 (1929): 291–323, 463–487; Efrem Bettoni, *Le dottrine filosofiche de Pier di Giovanni Olivi*, Pubblicazioni dell'università cattolica del S. Cuore, nuova serie, 73 (Milano: Societa editrice "Vita e pensiero", 1959); Christopher J. Martin, "Self-Knowledge and Cognitive Ascent: Thomas Aquinas and Peter Olivi on the KK-Thesis," in *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment*, ed. H. Lagerlund, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 5 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 93–108; Vincenzo Mauro, "La disputa de anima tra Vitale du Four e Pietro di Giovanni Olivi," *Studi medievali* 38, fasc. 1 (1997): 89–138; Robert Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle-Ages* (Cambridge: CUP, 1997); Robert Pasnau, "Olivi on the Metaphysics of Soul," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 6 (1997): 109–132; Robert Pasnau, "Olivi on Human Freedom," in *Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248–1298): Pensée scolastique, dissidence spirituelle et société*, ed. A. Boureau & S. Piron, Études de philosophie médiévale 79 (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 15–25; François-Xavier Putallaz, *La connaissance de soi au XII^e siècle: De Matthieu d'Aquasparta à Thierry de Freiberg*, Études de philosophie médiévale 67 (Paris: Vrin, 1991); Katherine H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250–1345* (Leiden/NY/København/Köln: E.J. Brill, 1988); Juhana Toivanen, "Peter Olivi on Internal Senses," *British Journal for the History of Philos-*

main to be studied—themes such as the cognitive functions of the sensitive soul, consciousness and the human/animal boundary. Olivi is a significant thinker in this respect—not only because he is decidedly interested in psychological questions generally, nor only because his role in the development of a new conception of human will and, consequently, in the rise of the voluntarist movement, which leads him to explore minutely the distinction between human beings and non-human animals. Olivi’s thinking is significant also, because he extensively addresses questions that concern those psychological capacities which were understood as being common to human beings and other animals in the Middle Ages. For, medievals took it that there is a psychological area which belongs to all animals, human and non-human alike. In order to fully understand what this common area is, we must begin by discussing one of the most distinguished features of the medieval approach to psychology, namely, the tendency to conceive of psychological activity in terms of faculties of the soul. This helps to define the topic of the present study, and it also paves the way for a unifying strand throughout.

One of the salient features of medieval philosophical psychology is that the soul is conceived of as having a structure. Mental operations and processes are not attributed to a unitary and unextended mind but to different faculties of the soul. These faculties operate with relative independence, and they all have their own specific functions: for example, the faculty of sight accounts for seeing; the faculty of imagination accounts for cognitive operations that pertain to absent or even non-existent objects; the intellect accounts for understanding the essential features that are common to many individuals of a certain species. In essence, every psychological function is attributed to a distinct faculty of the soul; this approach to psychology is commonly referred to as “faculty psychology”.

At the beginning of the Early Modern era, due to the rise of a mechanistic way of explaining many processes that were earlier attributed to the soul, it became common to criticise scholastic psychology by arguing that it is of no avail to postulate a distinct faculty to the soul to account for each of a being’s abilities. When we see that some creature is capable of crying, for example, it does not lead us far if we conclude from this that the creature has a faculty of crying.¹¹ This kind of criticism may have been appropriate at the time, but it misses

ophy 15:3 (2007): 427–454; Ivo Tonna, “La ‘pars intellectiva’ dell’anima razionale non è la forma del corpo (Dottrina di Pierre Jean-Olieu [Olivi] sull’unione tra anima e corpo),” *Antionianum* 65 (1990): 277–289; Mikko Yrjönsuuri, “Free Will and Self-Control in Peter Olivi,” in *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, ed. H. Lagerlund & M. Yrjönsuuri, *Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind* 1 (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 2002): 99–128; Mikko Yrjönsuuri, “Types of Self-Awareness in Medieval Thought,” in *Mind and Modality: Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of Simo Knuuttila*, ed. V. Hirvonen, T. J. Holopainen & M. Tuominen (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 153–69; Mikko Yrjönsuuri, “The Soul as an Entity: Dante, Aquinas, and Olivi,” in Lagerlund 2007a, 59–92; Mikko Yrjönsuuri, “Perceiving One’s Own Body,” in Knuuttila & Kärkkäinen 2008, 101–16.

¹¹ For instance, Descartes employs this line of criticism against the method of explaining the action of natural things by postulating substantial forms as explanans. See, e.g., Descartes’ letter to Regius (AT III, 506). I thank Vili Lähteenmäki for pointing out this passage to me.

the central idea of faculty psychology. After all, faculties were not postulated arbitrarily but rationally only after their existence was found to be necessary by a philosophical analysis of mental processes. The central idea behind the medieval approach to psychology is that complex mental processes can be analysed and divided into more specific sub-processes which interact with each other and perhaps even causally trigger one another into action. These sub-processes are attributed to different faculties of the soul, and the faculties are understood as the smallest units by which the soul performs its operations. In this way, faculty psychology enables a detailed analysis of the interaction between the various mental sub-processes because it treats them not only as isolated units but also from the point of view of their interrelationships.

Thus, by conceiving of mental activity as being performed by relatively independent faculties of the soul and concentrating on an analysis of their operations and interactions, medieval philosophical psychology can be viewed as a project of charting the “mental architecture” (as Peter King has called it¹²) of human beings and non-human animals. The soul has a structure; mental space is constructed out of faculties of the soul¹³.

There are several ways in which the faculties of the soul can be divided and grouped. The basic distinction is the Aristotelian tripartite division of kinds of souls: the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellectual. Each of these types comes with a different set of faculties. The faculties of the vegetative soul, however, are not relevant to this study for the simple reason that they are not psychological or mental (in the modern sense of these terms): they account for growth, taking on nutrition, and generating offspring—functions that are common to all living beings, including plants. By contrast, the faculties that accompany the sensitive and the intellectual souls are psychological, and as such they are a component of the mental architecture. These can be further divided into two groups, namely, cognitive or apprehensive faculties and appetitive faculties. The former group of faculties is responsible for the ability to acquire information about the world, and the latter group accounts for the being’s engagement with and activity in the world. By these two distinctions we can arrive at a fourfold division of the psychological faculties of the soul:

	Cognitive	Appetitive
Sensitive soul	sensory cognition	sensory appetite
Intellectual soul	intellectual cognition	intellectual appetite (the will)

With this fourfold division, it is easy to point out the thematic scope of this study: I shall concentrate on the upper left section, i.e., to those cognitive functions that go with the sensitive soul. This section, “sensory cognition”, can be further divided into two clusters of faculties, namely, the external senses (sight, hearing,

¹² Peter King, “The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism,” *Vivarium* 46:3 (2008), 253–74.

¹³ Note that the soul itself was not necessarily understood as being constructed out of faculties of the soul. The metaphysical relation between the soul and its faculties is one thing; the psychological or mental structure of the soul is quite another.

taste, touch, and smell) and the so-called internal senses, which account for the higher cognitive processes of the sensitive soul. The psychological functions that these faculties perform include all the different modalities of sensation, conscious perception, the ability to imagine absent sensible things, the ability to fantasise about unreal things (unicorns and the like), the ability to apprehend external objects in relation to one's well-being, and memory. These psychological functions and the faculties of the soul which go with them and by which they are realised form the topic of the present study.

To put it another way, the present study concerns the cognitive functions that are available to human and non-human animals alike: the cognitive function that is specific to human beings—reason—is excluded. This does not, however, mean that human cognition is entirely left out—quite the contrary: the title of the work is not meant to include only non-human animals but all the animals, human and non-human alike. This point cannot be over-emphasised. As I already indicated, medieval philosophers followed Aristotelian taxonomy and thought that human beings are animals—rational animals, to be sure, but animals nevertheless. According to them, humans are ensouled bodily beings, and even their rationality is based to a great extent on the lower cognitive capacities shared with other animals¹⁴. Humans' mental lives are very similar to those of other animals because the intellectual soul provides the same set of psychological capacities as the sensitive soul of non-human animals (with the one exception of the intellect, which is lacking from the latter). Speaking figuratively, we can say that the mental space of human beings was understood as being otherwise similar to that of non-human animals, but the former has an additional wing or arch which is missing from the latter. This is a generalisation, to be sure, since many medieval philosophers thought that—to continue with the metaphor—the additional intellectual part of the mental space is kitted out with windows, which enlighten the whole space, including the parts which are otherwise similar in human beings and non-human animals. That is to say, many thought that all the psychological functions of human beings are somewhat different from those of other animals because the sensitive faculties of the human soul and those of the animal soul are not exactly alike.¹⁵

One might think, following this lead, that because Scholastic philosophy demarcates animality from humanity in rather specific terms—by attributing reason

¹⁴ Although medieval philosophers took up their cudgels for and against pure empiricism, they were quite unanimous in thinking that human beings need empirical information that comes through the sensitive faculties of the soul in order to be able to perform rational thinking. The disputed issue was whether rational thought is completely based on abstraction from sense data, or it requires that our minds be illuminated from above in addition to receiving sense data through the senses. See, e.g., Joseph Owens, "Faith, Ideas, Illumination, and Experience," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny & J. Pinborg (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), 440–59; Leen Spruit, *Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, vol. 1, *Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions* (Leiden/NY/Köln: E.J. Brill, 1994).

¹⁵ A famous proponent of this line of thought is Thomas Aquinas, who thinks that at least the highest faculties of the sensitive soul function differently in human beings than in non-human animals. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, ed. P. Caramello (Turin: Marietti, 1948–50) (hereafter *ST*), I.78.4.

to human beings and denying it to animals—the distinction between human beings and animals would have also been conceived of as clear-cut. From a certain point of view this is true, but in the Middle Ages the distinction was not so much based on essences but on activity: if one lives the life of an animal, one is an animal; and only by performing the functions that are specifically human does one become truly human¹⁶. Now, from a psychological perspective there are two specifically human actions: intellectual understanding and free choice. All of the other psychological functions of human beings were thought to be more or less identical to those of non-human animals. From these ideas it follows that, as Gregory Stone aptly (yet rather provocatively) puts it: “The difference between animals and humans is that *animals cannot do metaphysics* [...] Humans transcend their animality only insofar as they participate in that science. In brief, of all humans, *only the theorist is not a beast.*”¹⁷ Or, if we want to emphasise more the other side of the coin, we may say that only when a human being exercises her freedom does she become something more than a mere beast. And although the medieval conception of freedom is a multifaceted one, it was commonly thought that freedom requires quite a lot. For instance, it is not clear that an acting because of an emotional impulse counts as free. Quite the contrary: freedom requires overcoming and controlling emotions. In other words, most human beings are most of the time very much like animals because in their normal everyday lives they do not engage much in theoretical understanding or free choice in the sense that medieval philosophers comprehended these operations. Only by engaging in intellectual activity or by making free choices does one separate oneself from the beasts. In this respect, the dividing line between humans and beasts is clear, but every individual human being may be situated on either side of the line; one may be a human being in the morning and an animal in the afternoon, at least concerning one’s mental activity.

It is noteworthy that even when the difference between human beings and non-human animals was emphasised, there remained a general tendency to see a strong psychological continuity between them. The differences between human beings and higher animals were considered minor; the prevailing idea was that there is much more in common than there are differences between these two sets. As Gareth Matthews has argued¹⁸, it was not until Descartes that human psychology was radically separated from animal psychology. Before that, the prevailing idea was that all beings form a continuum with no sharp discontinuities or radical disparities¹⁹.

¹⁶ Joyce E. Salisbury, “Human Beasts and Bestial Humans in the Middle Ages,” in Ham & Senior 1997, 9–21.

¹⁷ Gregory B. Stone, “The Philosophical Beast: On Boccaccio’s Tale of Cimone,” in Ham & Senior 1997, 27.

¹⁸ Gareth B. Matthews, “Augustine and Descartes on the Souls of Animals,” in *From Soul to Self*, ed. M. J. C. Crabbe (London/NY: Routledge, 1999): 94–5; See also Gareth B. Matthews, “Animals and the Unity of Psychology,” *Philosophy* 53:206 (1978): 437–454.

¹⁹ The classical study of the idea of continuity in the scale of nature is Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1936).

This idea is well reflected by Aristotle, who thinks that the shift from plants to the simplest of animals is vague and comes only in degrees. The tripartite division of types of souls is clear-cut, but Aristotle expressly thinks that ensouled *beings* cannot be easily sorted into three distinct groups. Rather, there are always cases which are difficult to classify.²⁰ Interestingly, the idea of continuity applies also to psychology. In psychological issues, philosophers before Descartes adhered to—to use Matthews' expression—a "Principle of Psychological Continuity" (Matthews 1999, 95). According to this principle, the shift from irrational to rational animals involves no radical psychological discontinuity. Human beings have much in common with non-human animals, and almost all of the psychological operations and processes that we are capable of can be found also in higher animals, at least in forms that resembles much the ones we have. It seems to me that medieval thinkers in general, being adherents of Aristotelian and Augustinian thought, accepted the basic insight of their sources of inspiration, which is the psychological continuity between non-human animals and human beings.

One especially interesting aspect in light of psychological continuity relates to consciousness. Since the Early Modern period, it has not been evident that non-human animals are conscious at all. Whatever Descartes himself thought about animal consciousness, some of his ideas—the controversial relation between thinking and consciousness and the denial of thinking to all creatures save human beings—were soon understood as entailing at least the possibility that animals are not conscious²¹. The idea that animals are mere mechanical automata became a possible stance to take.

Due to this slow and large scale change that took place during and after the 17th century, the existence of animal consciousness needs argumentation. However, it seems to me that this has not always been the case. I propose as a working hypothesis that in the Middle Ages the issue would have appeared absurd because it was a basic assumption that the acts of the soul's cognitive faculties make the subject conscious of the object of those acts. For instance, when an external object actualises the potency for seeing in the eyes, the subject becomes conscious of that external object.

We have to be careful, however, because the concept of consciousness is by no means well-defined. Even a glance at modern discussions concerning consciousness shows that the cluster of phenomena it covers is rich: intentionality, phenomenality, reflexivity, selective attention, selfhood, experiential ownness, experiential unity, and so forth—all these aspects are taken to be important for understanding what consciousness is. Already, this multifaceted quality reminds

²⁰ Aristotle's examples of these borderline cases include ascidians, sea anemones, testacea, and sponges. For Aristotle's idea of the continuous scale of nature, see *Historia animalium* VII.1, 588^a16–^b3; *De partibus animalium* (hereafter *PA*) IV.5, 681^a10–28; *De generatio animalium* III.11, 761^a15–31.

²¹ For discussion about Descartes' conception of consciousness, see Lilli Alanen, *Descartes's Concept of Mind* (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard UP, 2003), 78–83. Whatever Descartes thought about consciousness in non-human animals, it is clear to him that they do not have souls or minds in the sense human beings have them. See, e.g., Descartes' letter to Regius (AT III, 369–70).

us to use the concept cautiously. Another problem is that medievals did not have a single equivalent concept to consciousness. The term ‘consciousness’, a derivative from the Latin *conscientia*, received a technical philosophical meaning during the 17th and 18th centuries. Before that, consciousness was not an explicit topic of philosophical inquiry. However, these problems do not undermine the fact that medieval philosophical texts are a rich source of material relating to the phenomena that are nowadays treated under the term consciousness. Some of the roots of our notion of consciousness go back to the Middle Ages (and even beyond), and in this sense we can say that medieval philosophers were interested in questions related to consciousness—even though they did not necessarily think that all these phenomena could be gathered under one and the same concept.²²

Thus, when I employ the concept of consciousness and suggest that medievals in general thought that human and non-human animals are conscious beings, I am not claiming that medieval philosophers used the same concept or that their theoretical interests were similar to ours. Nor am I claiming that consciousness was an explicit topic of discussion for them. Rather, I mean that medieval philosophers discussed the phenomena we nowadays treat as more or less relevant features of consciousness, and their discussions contain ideas about human and non-human animals as being intentional creatures who are capable of self-reflexivity and who have a first-person experiential and phenomenal consciousness about the things that actualise their cognitive faculties²³. Olivi serves as a good (arguably the best) example of this. An analysis of Olivi’s views concerning the cognitive functions of the sensitive soul shows us that he discusses many aspects of consciousness. The intentionality of cognitive activity, phenomenal consciousness, reflexivity, and to some extent also questions concerning selfhood, experiential oneness, and experiential unity—all these are present in Olivi’s thought.

The general claim about medievals taking human and non-human animals as conscious beings remains a hypothesis—as, in fact, does the claim about

²² For discussion, see Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki & Pauliina Remes, “Introduction,” in *Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy*, ed. S. Heinämaa, V. Lähteenmäki & P. Remes, *Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind* 5 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 1–26.

²³ See Part I, Chapter 6.2. I am not alone in thinking that medieval philosophers would have agreed that the activity of the cognitive faculties of the soul provides consciousness. For instance, Robert Pasnau suggests that: “When premodern philosophers try to explain the various forms of cognition (sensory and intellectual), they take for granted that they are trying to explain what we call consciousness.” (Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae Ia 75–89* (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 197.) Unfortunately in this connection Pasnau does not specify what he means by the term “consciousness”. See also Pasnau 1997b, 122, where it is stated that: “[Olivi and Ockham] agree [...] that our perceptions have a certain phenomenological feel.” Eleonore Stump also finds a kind of consciousness in Aquinas’ and Ockham’s discussions concerning cognition, and although she employs terminology that refers more to access consciousness than to phenomenal consciousness, it seems that she has in mind the kind of phenomenal feel that is usually connected with phenomenal consciousness (Eleonore Stump, “The Mechanisms of Cognition: Ockham on Mediating Species,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, ed. P. V. Spade (Cambridge/NY/Melbourne/Madrid: CUP, 1999), 169–81).

the generality of the psychological continuity between human beings and non-human animals in premodern times—because in order to establish these claims one should conduct research that goes well beyond the scope of this study. However, even though these claims cannot be defended in their full generality in this context, one of the aims of this study is to argue that Olivi adheres to both of them.

This may sound a staggering assertion. Olivi is not the first medieval philosopher who comes to mind as a proponent of the similarity between human beings and non-human animals. He was not particularly interested in animals because in the domain of psychology his main concern was to arrive at a philosophically respectable account of *human* psychology that would not threaten the fundamental doctrines of Catholic faith as he understood them. From this point of view it is only natural that he occasionally makes asides such as the following: “This difficulty would require a more extensive consideration and explication, but I do not care much about it; in the present question we are discussing only the human body directly, since its investigation concerns the Catholic faith in some way.”²⁴ Olivi does not care to find answers to problems that concern only animals because the issue does not bear any theological significance. Analysing animal psychology was of secondary importance for him at least generally, in his main projects and interests.

Moreover, Olivi does not deviate from the common medieval position concerning the differences between human beings and other animals. According to him, human beings are capable of many psychological processes that are not available to other animals: we are intellectual, and most importantly we are free—and the kind of freedom Olivi attributes to human beings he utterly denies to all other bodily beings. There are also other important ways in which Olivi sets human beings apart from other animals: for instance, humans are immortal and spiritual beings, who are capable of morality and of having a relation with God. Other animals lack all this. The reader must bear this in mind, lest she or he be misled by the limited scope of this study. This study deals precisely with those psychological functions and faculties which are common to human beings and non-human animals, and therefore it may appear that Olivi beholds these two groups as very alike. This is not the case if we consider the entire picture—in fact, there are reasons why Olivi can be blamed for widening the conceptual disparity between human beings and other animals because according to him these two kinds of creatures differ greatly from an ontological point of view. Above all,

²⁴ “Hæc autem difficultas maiori indigeret tractatu et explicatione, sed de ea non multum curo, quia in quæstione hac non loquimur directe nisi de corpore humano, quia huius inquisitio spectat aliquo modo ad catholicam fidem.” (Petrus Ioannis Olivi, *Quæstiones in secundum librum sententiarum*, ed. B. Jansen, Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica mediæ ævi IV–VI (Florence: Collegii S. Bonaventuræ, 1922–26) (hereafter *II Sent.*), q. 53, 224.) On one occasion Olivi betrays his stance towards the values of human beings and non-human animals by saying that one intellectual mind is more valuable than infinite number of brute animals (Petrus Ioannis Olivi, *Quæstiones de incarnatione et redemptione, Quæstiones de virtutibus*, ed. A. Emmen & E. Stadter, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Mediæ Ævi XXIV (Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1981) (hereafter *Quæst. de virt.*), q. 2, 140.

Olivi's enthusiasm for voluntarism, and his assigning a special status to human beings because of their freedom separates humans radically from other animals.

Still, Olivi accepts the Aristotelian taxonomy and says explicitly that human beings are animals²⁵. He writes extensively about the psychological faculties of the sensitive soul and about other topics which are relevant also to animal psychology. And although according to him the gulf between human beings and other animals is wide, it is crossed by a bridge, which consists of psychological faculties that are common to all animals, including human beings²⁶. Even though Olivi raises human beings up to a distinct position among created beings, he does not see any radical discontinuity between the psychology of non-human animals and human beings. When it comes to the psychological processes that are common to humans and other animals, the differences are minor if they exist at all. There are also several reasons to believe that he understands animal consciousness much in the same terms as he understands human consciousness. In other words, even though Olivi thinks that there are significant differences between

²⁵ See, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 73, 67; Petrus Ioannis Olivi, *Quæstiones de novissimis ex summa super IV Sententiarum*, ed. P. Maranesi, *Collectio Oliviana VIII* (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventuræ ad claras aquas, 2004) (hereafter *Quæst. de nov.*), q. 7, 160; Peter of John Olivi, *On Genesis*, ed. D. Flood (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2007) (hereafter *Super Gen.*), 88. Moreover, Olivi employs the term *animal perfectus*, and it is clear that he counts human beings as such (*II Sent.* q. 62, 590–1). When considering Olivi's views on various matters, a caveat is in order. For it is not a simple task to decide whether Olivi accepts certain ideas he presents, or whether they are presented just for the philosophical reason of making it explicit that things can be understood in many ways. Olivi himself, in his apologetical writings, says that there are many philosophical ideas that he recites only, without adhering to them (Petrus Ioannis Olivi, "Responsio fratris Petri Ioannis [Olivi] ad aliqua dicta per quosdam magistros Parisienses de suis Quæstionibus excerpta," ed. D. Laberge in *AFH* 28 (1935) (hereafter *Responsio secunda*): 405. There are a number of ideas and arguments that Olivi presents as not being his own. He distances himself from them by stating that some unnamed authors (*quidam*) have held those views. However, the concession Olivi makes in his apologetical writings may be just a prudential measure, and it is often rather easy to see which ideas Olivi favours, despite his strategy of presenting them so as to conceal his own view. In some cases it can even be shown that Olivi in fact adheres to the view of *quidam*. I shall indicate in due course when it is not clear whether a certain view is Olivi's or not. Moreover, I do not think that it is necessary to know what Olivi himself thought of as the right way of thinking. Sometimes it is enough that an idea is presented: it may change the way people think even though it is not originally presented as the correct way of thinking. For discussion, see David Burr, "Olivi and the Limits of Intellectual Freedom," in *Contemporary Reflections on the Medieval Christian Tradition*, ed. G. H. Shriver (Durham, N.C.: Duke UP, 1974): 195–6; Burr 1976, 42–44; David Burr, "Petrus Ioannes Olivi and the Philosophers," *Franciscan Studies* 31 (1971): 41–71; François-Xavier Putallaz, *Insolente liberté: Controverses et condamnations au XIIIe siècle*, Vestigia 15 (Fribourg/Paris: Éditions universitaires Fribourg Suisse/Éditions du Cerf Paris, 1995), 127–62; Partee 1960, 254–6 provides a useful collection of quotations, in which Olivi discusses his own strategy and relation to philosophical matters.

²⁶ It has been argued that medieval conceptions of the higher cognitive faculties of the soul could be relevant also for modern discussions concerning animals' ability to have beliefs and other mental states that are close to rational (Cyrille Michon, "Intentionality and Proto-Thoughts," in *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, ed. D. Perler (Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 2001), 325–342).

human beings and other animals, he also thinks that there are also significant similarities between these types of creatures.²⁷

In the present study, Olivi's conception of the cognitive functions of the sensitive soul will be discussed. Given that these functions are so numerous, it should not come as a surprise that the investigation covers a diversity of topics and does not aim at establishing only one claim. The three parts, into which this study is divided, deal with distinct subject matter, contribute to different discussions, and contain their own internal arguments and claims. In spite of this, the three parts form a unified whole: they all shed light on Olivi's conception of the various types of sensory cognition and of the psychological functions the sensitive soul provides.

Moreover and most importantly, there is a unifying strand that goes through the whole work. This strand is related to Olivi's way of understanding how consciousness functions. Perhaps the best way of understanding what I mean by this is by considering again the medieval conception of the soul/mind as being structured. According to the medieval view, the sensitive or intellectual soul provides a "mental space" which has a great deal of structure because it is constructed out of the faculties of the soul. Psychological functions are attributed to these faculties in such a way that each of them has its own psychological role, and they all have certain kinds of relations to each other. In this way, different psychological processes take place in different "regions" of the mental space.

This kind of conception of the soul/mind²⁸ differs radically from the more

²⁷ Interestingly, Olivi once even says that higher animals (such as dogs and lions) are almost capable of *amor amicitiae*—which for him is basically possible only for intellectual beings (*Il Sent.* q. 111, 282). To be sure, he denies that it is a genuine kind of *amor amicitiae*, but it seems that he thinks that the phenomenal feeling these animals have towards their masters comes pretty close to human friendship. This shows clearly how Olivi is willing to adhere to the principle of psychological continuity.

²⁸ There is a tricky terminological problem with regard to the concepts of soul and mind: if we want to avoid a flagrant anachronism, we cannot attribute the modern concept of mind to medieval discussions without qualifications because the concept simply does not have any equivalent there. First, in the medieval context the term *mens*, which is commonly translated as "mind", does not convey the same meaning as the modern term "mind". In medieval philosophy, the term *mens* was often employed—following Augustinian usage—to denote the intellectual (and incorporeal) part of the human soul and its functions, the intellect and the will. (This usage is especially manifest in *De Trinitate*; see also, e.g., Aurelius Augustinus, *De libero arbitrio*, ed. W. M. Green, CCSL 29 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970) (hereafter *De lib. arb.*), 1.8–9.) In other words, the scope of the term *mens* is stricter than that of "mind" because it does not include all mental processes, such as perception or emotions. Second, we cannot equate the modern concept of mind with the medieval concept of *anima* either. This is because medievals attributed to *anima* functions that we do not consider as mental. *Anima* is an Aristotelian form and as such quite a different "thing" from the modern mind: in addition to psychological operations, it accounts for vital functions such as growth, nutrition, and reproduction, and thus the functions of *anima* include much that is not mental. The scope of the term *anima* is broader than that of "mind". Understood in this way, *mens* is a part of the *anima*—and "mind" is not identical with either one of them. Rather, it crosses the medieval distinction by encompassing the functions of *mens* and some functions of *anima*. (The confusion stems, as is well known, from Descartes' identification of *mens* and *anima*. See, e.g., René Descartes, *Responsio ad quintas objectiones* (AT VII, 356).) For

prevailing conception since Descartes; he conceived of the mind as being unextended and indivisible. The mind to Descartes does not have parts: “And the faculties of willing, sensing, understanding, etc., cannot be said to be its parts because it is one and the same mind which wills, senses, and understands.”²⁹ This is an ontological claim, to be sure, but it applies also to the way the mind operates. The unextended and indivisible mind undergoes all the psychological acts, whatever they are. In this way all the psychological acts are bundled together, so to speak: for example, perception, understanding, and volition are—to use Descartes’ expression—modes of thought. In other words, all psychological processes are equal to thinking, and although they may have different names (due to some differences in their contents), they are not structured in the same way as in the scholastic paradigm of faculty psychology. Rather, they are on a par with each other. Although they have different statuses—some of them are “pure” thoughts and depend on the mind alone whereas others require the stimulation of bodily organs—they do not take place on different levels but belong to the mind. Some psychological processes (such as emotions) take place in the brain, but they are also consciously experienced, and as experiences they are in the mind: it is the same unextended and indivisible mind which perceives, experiences emotions, and understands universal truths.³⁰

It is especially important to note that Descartes attributes consciousness to the mind and understands the body only as a mechanical device. For instance, perception of pain in the foot takes place in such a way that a destructive change in the foot causes a mechanical movement in the nerves between the foot and the brain. This movement causes changes in the brain, and the mind perceives these changes as a pain that occurs in the foot. The bodily change in the foot is mechanically transmitted to the brain, and only after this may it be consciously

discussion, see, e.g., Henrik Lagerlund, “Introduction: The Mind/Body Problem and Late Medieval Conceptions of the Soul,” in Lagerlund 2007a, 3–4; John P. Wright & Paul Potter, “Introduction,” in *Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*, ed. J. P. Wright & P. Potter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 9; John P. O’Callaghan, “Aquinas’s Rejection of Mind, Contra Kenny,” *The Thomist* 66 (2002): 15–59; Mary T. Clark, “De Trinitate,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. E. Stump & N. Kretzmann (Cambridge: CUP, 2001.), 97; Gerard O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind* (London: Duckworth, 1987), 7–8. To avoid this terminological problem, I shall, whenever possible, use the technical expression “faculties of the soul” with appropriate qualifications to single out the parts of the soul I want to discuss. However, despite the aforementioned problem, I shall also use the term “mind” in a modern sense to pinpoint those functions of *anima* which would nowadays be labelled psychological or mental. Thus, as I use the term “mind”, it refers to volitional, cognitive, and appetitive functions of the soul regardless of whether or not they were thought to be actualised and realised in bodily organs (i.e., whether or not they are functions of *mens*). In this way, perceptual faculties, internal senses, the sensitive appetite, the intellect, and the will are included; and the vegetative functions of the soul are excluded.

²⁹ “Neque etiam facultates uolendi, sentiendi, intelligendi etc. eius partes dici possunt, quia una et eadem mens est quæ uult, quæ sentit, quæ intelligit.” (René Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia* 6 (AT VII, 86).)

³⁰ See, e.g., René Descartes, *Principia philosophiæ* I.9 (AT VIII, 7–8); *ibid.*, 32 (AT VIII, 17); *ibid.*, 53 (AT VIII, 25); Alanen 2003, 79–80.

perceived by the mind. In a similar manner: whatever takes place in the body, it is the unextended entity-like mind that provides the subject with consciousness about these changes³¹, and the connection between the mind and the body is located in the brain. There need not even be an actual harmful change in the foot. If the nerve between the foot and the brain is moved in a similar manner as to when there is such a change, the subject perceives pain in the foot, despite the fact that in reality there is nothing in the foot that causes the experience of pain. (Descartes, *Meditationes* 6 (AT VII, 86–7).)

When we look at medieval texts, we see a completely different kind of picture. The conscious mind is not related to the body solely *via* the brain. It is—to state it somewhat provocatively—dispersed throughout the body. Conscious experiences are acts of the soul, and they may be realized in all the parts of the body. This view becomes apparent if we concentrate on the psychological functions that take place in bodily organs. The functions of the sensitive soul are the Aristotelian forms of different parts of the body, and whenever a faculty is actualised, the subject becomes conscious of the object that has actualised it. If the faculty of sight of a cat is actualised by the visible qualities of, say, a mouse in a corner of the kitchen, it sees the mouse and becomes consciously aware of it. And if my foot is heated by fire, my sense of touch senses the excessive heat, and I feel pain. The reason for these occurrences is the fact that the acts of seeing and feeling are acts of the faculties of *the soul*. In other words, in order for me or the cat to become conscious of the contents of the cognitive acts that take place in our bodily organs, it is unnecessary for that information to be transmitted to any centralised command centre, as it were. The mind or consciousness is not related to the body as it is in Descartes' picture. Rather, the perceptual qualities of an external object are already available to a conscious subject when they actualise one of the faculties of the soul, and the faculties are not confined to an entity-like mind but dispersed throughout the body.

We can see this kind of picture for instance in Avicenna's (Ibn Sīnā, c. 980–1037) works, who—despite his substance dualism—does not think that the soul-body relationship functions as it does in Descartes' works. When an act of a faculty of the soul takes place, it is realised in a bodily organ (given that it is a faculty that uses bodily organs) and thus located somewhere in the body. The contents of the act are already phenomenally present to the subject because the act in question is an act of the soul of the subject. The connection between the soul and the body is not located in the brain, so to speak. Moreover, information from one faculty does not have to reach any other faculty of the soul in order for the subject to become conscious of that information³². It suffices that the first faculty

³¹ It must be noted, however, that Descartes is clear that the subject does not become conscious of those changes as being physiological changes in the body. Rather, the physiological changes appear to me as a painful experience. The subject does not perceive harmful changes in the foot, but she perceives pain.

³² Note, however, that Avicenna considers the perceptual capacity of the soul as essentially one. The information from various external senses actually *reaches* a centre because all the external senses converge in a central faculty of perception, the common sense (*sensus communis*). See Avicenna, *Avicenna latinus, Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, ed. S. van

is a faculty of the soul of the subject. The soul itself, as a whole, accounts for the unity of different conscious experiences. This becomes clear from the following passage:

Again, we say “when I perceived such and such a thing, I became angry”, and it is a true statement, too. So it is one and the same thing which perceives and becomes angry. [...] Then most probably the truth is that when we say “I perceived and became angry”, we mean that something in us perceived and something in us became angry. But when one says, “I perceived and became angry”, one does not mean that this occurs in two different things in us, but that something to which perception transmitted its content happened to become angry. Now either this statement in this sense (in which we have interpreted it) is false, or the truth is that what perceives and what becomes angry is one and the same thing. But this statement is manifestly true (i.e. in the sense in which we have interpreted it). Then, what becomes angry is that very thing to which the perceptive faculty transmits the content of its perception. Its being in this status, even though it be body, is not due to its being body alone; it is then due to its being in possession of a faculty by which it is capable of combining both these things. This faculty not being a physical one must be the soul itself. Thus the substratum in which both these qualities inhere is not the whole of our body, nor any two organs of our body, nor yet a single organ in so far as it is a physical organ; so the conclusion is that the combining substratum is soul itself or body inasmuch as it possesses soul, the combining substratum even in the latter case really being the soul, which itself is the principle of all these faculties.³³

Riet (vol. I, Louvain/Leiden: E. Peeters/E. J. Brill, 1972; vol. II, Louvain/Leiden: Éditions orientalistes/E. J. Brill, 1968) (hereafter *Shifā' De an.*), IV.1, 5. For discussion, see Chapter 3.1 below. In this study, I shall discuss Avicenna's ideas to some extent, not only to make comparisons to Olivi's thought, but also to shed light on it. The choice is justified by the central role Avicenna's psychology played in the 13th century, and even though Aristotle becomes increasingly central for understanding medieval thought towards the end of the century, Olivi's thinking is in many respects closer to Avicenna's than to Aristotle's. For Avicenna's influence on psychological theories of medieval Latin philosophers, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West: The formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300* (London/Turin: The Warburg Institute/Nino Aragno Editore, 2000).

³³ Avicenna, *Avicenna's Psychology: An English Translation of Kitāb al-najāt, Book II, Chapter VI with Historico-philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on the Cairo Edition*, transl. F. Rahman (London: Oxford UP, 1952), 15, 65–6; See also *Shifā' De an.* V.7, 158–60. For a more detailed exposition of this passage—one that supports my reading—see Jari Kaukua, *Avicenna on Subjectivity: A Philosophical Study*, Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 301 (Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2007), 82–5, <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-39-2772-1>. The allusion to a *faculty* that combines perception with becoming angry should probably be understood not as referring to any of the faculties of the soul but to a capability that really belongs to the soul as a soul. It must be noted, however, that Avicenna's stance is ambiguous because sometimes he attributes the unifying function to one of the faculties of the soul, namely, to the estimative faculty (*Shifā' De an.* IV.1, 11; *ibid.*, 3, 35; For discussion, see Deborah L. Black, “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations,” *Topoi* 19 (2000): 60–1).

Perceiving and becoming angry are acts of different faculties of the soul and they are realised in distinct organs of the body (perception in the eyes and in the brain, and anger in the heart). These two psychological events appear to the subject as things that happen to her because the soul itself accounts for unitary consciousness. There does not have to be a single faculty of the soul that would bring about the apparent unity and consciousness. Essentially, this means that my ensouled body and its psychological activity accounts for consciousness.

Thus, from the point of view of the mind/body relationship the picture is quite dissimilar to Descartes' depiction. A harmful change in the foot appears to the subject as pain because the soul is present in the foot; not because the mind apprehends the changes in the foot only insofar as information about those changes is transmitted to the brain and pineal gland, as is the case in Descartes. Moreover, Avicenna seems to think that although the soul has distinct faculties, there does not have to be one single faculty that accounts for different kinds of acts (i.e., acts of different faculties) being experienced as belonging to the same subject. The soul itself as a whole accounts for the unitary nature of our experience. This also means that consciousness is not a function of one of the faculties of the soul but concomitant with the acts of all the faculties of the soul.

This idea appears also later, in medieval Latin philosophy. We can find it, for instance, in an influential psychological treatise, written by an anonymous Master of Arts in about 1225. Although the author does not explicitly address the issue, he appears to think that each faculty of the soul provides consciousness of the objects of its own acts. We can see this especially when he discusses the faculty of imagination, which accounts for imagining absent things and seeing dream images when we are asleep. An act of the imagination brings about a consciousness of images of objects that are not actually present. For cognising an absent object, it suffices that the imagination acts alone, and when this occurs we are conscious of imagining things that are not really present. Imagination provides consciousness. However, the author accounts for things often appearing as real and actually present in dreams by explaining that when we are asleep our imaginative acts leap from the imagination to the cognitive faculty that accounts for perception (the so-called common sense); the imaginative acts thereby actualise the common sense. When this happens, the activity of the common sense provides us with the fallacious experience of perceiving an object *via* external senses and as a real, present, external thing, and this is why dreams appear as reality.³⁴ Ergo, the acts of the common sense provide phenomenal consciousness

³⁴ Anonymous, *De anima et potentiis eius*, ed. R. A. Gauthier in "Le traité *De anima et de potentiis eius* d'un maître ès arts (vers 1225), introduction et texte critique," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982): 44–7. For an English translation of the text, see Anonymous (Arts Master c. 1225), *The Soul and Its Powers*, in *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, vol. 3, *Mind and Knowledge*, ed. & transl. R. Pasnau (CUP 2002), 9–34 (especially p. 27). It has been claimed that Aquinas also would adhere to this way of conceiving of consciousness as concomitant to all the faculties of the soul. Robert Pasnau argues that in Aquinas' theory of perception conscious perception of external objects (or, to be more precise, sensible qualities of external objects) is provided by the external senses alone, and as such an act of the common sense would be redundant for a consciousness of

too. Although the consciousness provided by the acts of the common sense has a different kind of phenomenal feel than that provided by the acts of the imagination, because the former acts depict the object as being present, whereas the latter depict it as being absent, they both count as phenomenal consciousness nevertheless. This explanation of dreaming shows us that there is no single centre which accounts for consciousness. Rather, every faculty of the soul endows the subject with a certain type of consciousness or conscious awareness about the objects of its acts: acts of imagination bring about fancies, and acts of the common sense bring about perceptions. Both kinds of acts make the subject conscious of their objects, i.e., make the object appear in the phenomenal experience of the subject.

Olivi stands in a peculiar relation to both of these views. On the one hand, he is clearly a medieval thinker: the soul is constituted by its faculties, and the sensitive faculties of the soul are located in different organs and parts of the body. When these faculties act, the acts are realised in the organs, but at the same time they are already in the soul: the act of sensing heat in the foot takes place in the foot, but nothing has to be transmitted anywhere in order for the act to be present in the soul (see, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 49, 12). On the other hand, however, Olivi makes an interesting and important move when he discusses the need for paying attention in order to perceive things in our perceptual reach. Namely, he thinks that the soul has a kind of centre that accounts for selective attention and thus brings about consciousness of the objects which fall within this attention. There is one faculty in the soul which is responsible for these functions, namely, the highest cognitive faculty of the soul. The highest cognitive faculty functions as the centre of phenomenal consciousness in the soul, and consciousness occurs in a centralised location, so to speak. Thus, in order for a being to perceive the heat in its foot it is not sufficient that the act of sensing the heat is present in its soul *via* the sense of touch. It must also be brought into the consciousness of the subject, and Olivi thinks that this is done by the activity of the highest cognitive faculty of the soul. The highest cognitive faculty of the soul must act in relation to other faculties in order for the subject to become conscious of the acts of those faculties and the objects thereof. For instance, in order for the cat to become conscious of the mouse in the corner, it is not sufficient that its faculty of sight receives information about the mouse. To be sure, it is necessary that perceptual information from the mouse reaches its eyes one way or another (or,

the sensible qualities to be possible (Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, 195–8; Pasnau refers to *ST I.78.4 ad 2*). It needs to be mentioned that this interpretation goes against the common reading of Aquinas, as Pasnau himself notes. Pasnau also points out that if his interpretation is correct, Aquinas' view differs from that of Avicenna, who, after all, thinks that conscious perception takes place in the common sense. However, the difference cannot be put in terms of "centralised consciousness" (in the case of Avicenna) and "decentralised consciousness" (in the case of Aquinas), for even though Avicenna thinks that conscious perception takes place in the common sense, this is only because he does not make a distinction between the common sense and the external senses: they are both aspects of one and the same perceptual capacity (see footnote 32 above). As we have seen, Avicenna attributes, at least arguably, consciousness to the soul as a whole, not to some centralising faculty thereof.

to be precise, its faculty of sight reaches the mouse somehow), but in addition to this the highest cognitive faculty of the cat's soul must direct its attention to the faculty of sight, to its activity, and through it to the mouse. Only then does it consciously perceive the mouse.³⁵

In this respect, the picture Olivi presents resembles much Descartes' view. Actually, Olivi's stance comes astonishingly close to ideas presented in the Early Modern period. The highest cognitive faculty of the soul provides the subject with a centre of phenomenal consciousness, which is very much like Descartes' mind—if not ontologically, at least functionally. In fact, there are ontological affinities as well, but the functional similarities between Olivi's way of conceiving of consciousness and Descartes' mind are more striking. According to Olivi, every human being has an immaterial "mind", the intellectual part of the soul, which ultimately accounts for all modalities of consciousness from the simple perception of certain perceptual qualities in external objects to the abstract thinking of mathematical calculations. It does not perform all psychological acts because some of them are produced by other faculties of the soul (and this is a difference from Descartes), but it does apprehend the acts when they take place in the other faculties of the soul, and it does make the subject conscious of them and the contents thereof. In this way, all conscious activity involves the highest cognitive faculty.

Interestingly, Olivi's conception of consciousness also resembles the Stoic idea about *hegemonikon*, an octopus-like command centre of the soul, which extends itself to different parts of the body and receives information from various external senses. In the Stoic view, *hegemonikon* accounts for consciousness in much the same way as the highest cognitive faculty in Olivi's theory.³⁶ This comparison between medieval philosophical ideas and those of the ancient Stoics may sound astonishing. However, Stoic ideas were not extinct in the Middle Ages. The works of Lucius Annæus Seneca (c. 4 BC–65 AD) were widely read and commented on in the Middle Ages, and he was the most well-known and respected Stoic thinker at the time. He was especially appreciated in Franciscan circles; for example, Roger Bacon wrote a textbook on ethics, *Moralis Philosophia*, which was largely based on certain works of Seneca³⁷. The appreciation of Seneca

³⁵ Interestingly, Daniel Dennet criticises the idea about consciousness existing in a single point—an idea he takes to be of a Cartesian origin. His contention is that we cannot locate consciousness within any single point or even area of the brain. (Daniel Dennet, *Consciousness Explained* (Boston/NY/Toronto/London: Back Bay Books, 1991), 101–11.) In a way, Olivi comes quite close to this view because he refuses to locate the highest cognitive faculty within any part of the brain: in human beings it is not in the brain at all, and in the case of non-human animals the whole brain functions as the organ of the highest cognitive faculty. By contrast, Olivi's idea is to find a single point *within the soul*, a point which accounts for consciousness, as we shall see in the course of this study.

³⁶ See, e.g., Anthony A. Long, *Stoic Studies* (Cambridge/NY: CUP, 1996), 224–49; Håvard Løkke, "The Stoics on Sense Perception," in *Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. S. Knuutila & P. Kärkkäinen, *Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind* 6 (Springer, 2008), 35–46; Spruit 1994, 54–9.

³⁷ Roger Bacon, *Rogeri Baconis Moralis philosophia*, ed. F. Delorme & E. Massa (Turici: In *Ædibus Thesauri Mundi*, 1953).

was undoubtedly roused by his (most certainly forged) correspondence with the apostle Paul, which was then thought to be authentic.³⁸ In addition to Seneca, there were other sources through which Stoic ideas were available to medieval thinkers. Cicero's works (especially *De officiis*) contain a considerable number of them, particularly in the field of ethics. And when we take into heed that Stoicism greatly influenced Christian thought in general and Augustine in particular, we can understand how pervasive the influence of Stoicism was³⁹. And yet it was mostly invisible because Stoic ideas were not recognised as such by medieval philosophers. This is one of the reasons why the presence of Stoicism in medieval thought is hard to trace. However, as Gerard Verbeke states, any study that wishes to reveal Stoic influences in medieval philosophy "cannot, of course, be limited to a collection of literal quotations. It must recognise doctrinal influences in order to uncover the perhaps indirect penetration of the Stoic legacy into medieval civilisation." (Verbeke 1983, 15.) I fully agree with him, and therefore I do not think that the lack of explicit references is an insurmountable problem in every case.

The topic of this study, however, is not to trace doctrinal influences either from Stoicism to the Middle Ages or from Middle Ages to Early modern era—however important it would be to produce a clearer picture of these historical developments as well. From this point forward, I shall leave aside the allusions to the similarities between Olivi and Descartes on the one hand and between Olivi and the Stoics on the other and concentrate on Olivi's thought.

One issue needs to be explicitly mentioned before I move on to present the overall structure of the book at hand. For, I shall argue that there are reasons to think that according to Olivi centralised consciousness does not belong only to human beings. Non-human animals are also endowed with a similar psychological structure. They too have one faculty which provides them with consciousness. The ontological basis of animal psychology and consciousness is quite different from the one which Olivi attributes to human beings, but the functional role of the highest cognitive faculty of the soul is rather similar in these two types of creatures. This functional similarity accentuates the psychological continuity between human beings and other animals. Even the way in which consciousness is brought about is very similar in both cases.

Olivi's conception of consciousness as a function of a single faculty of the soul is the unifying strand of the present study. Each of the three parts, into which this study is divided, deals with subject matter of its own, and the arguments

³⁸ Gerard Verbeke, *The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought* (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 8–11; For the presence of Stoicism in medieval thought, see also Marcia L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition From Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*, vols. 1–2, 2nd edition (Leiden/New York/København/Köln: E.J. Brill, 1990); Sten Ebbesen, "Where Were the Stoics in the Late Middle Ages?" and Calvin Normore, "Abelard's Stoicism and Its Consequences," both published in *Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations*, ed. S. K. Strange & J. Zupko (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 108–131, 132–147.

³⁹ Augustine knew Stoic thought very well and in many respects was influenced by Stoic philosophy. For an extensive presentation of Augustine's use of Stoicism, see Colish 1990, vol. 2, 142–238.

and ideas presented in one part are not always closely related to those presented in the other two; but in addition to contributing to different discussions, all three parts aim at analysing Olivi's conception of consciousness as a function of a single faculty of the soul. It is not necessary to present a detailed summary of every chapter of this study here, because each of the three parts will begin with an introductory chapter, which includes such a summary. What follows is a general overview of the contents of each of the three parts and of how they are related to the idea of the centre of consciousness.

In Part I, I shall assess Olivi's theory of perception. After laying out the foundations of Olivi's theory—with an analysis of his conception of the sensory faculties of the soul and their mutual relationship—and discussing his criticism towards the so-called species theories of perception which were prevailing at the time I shall analyse Olivi's theory, which he presents as an alternative. Olivi was an innovative thinker, and as he opposed some of the most fundamental principles of earlier conceptions, he elaborated on a theory of perception that can be taken as an intentional theory. It contains many interesting features. For instance, Olivi accentuates the active character of perception and finds a way of discussing phenomena such as intentionality of consciousness and the role of conscious attention in perception. It is also interesting that the theory Olivi puts forth incorporates some elements that betray very clearly his dualistic anthropology. Even though Olivi works hard to avoid falling into the pitfalls of radical dualism in his anthropology, he allows for sensations in a disembodied soul. This concession already questions the role of the body in perception. In fact Olivi's theory, if analysed downright, carries some dualistic strands within it.

However, the most important feature of Olivi's theory in light of the general aim of this study is his conception of perception as a process in which the faculties of the soul are active. Perception is not a passive reception of sensible qualities, but an active process, and perceptual consciousness requires that the subject directs her attention to the senses and through them to the external world. Olivi emphasises (in an Augustinian tone) that we do not perceive everything that is in our perceptual field. If our attention is directed to, say, our memories of past events or to a conversation we happen to be having, even apparent changes in our visual field go unnoticed. We become conscious only of those things to which we direct our attention or which are so intense that they catch our attention.

This idea is closely related to Olivi's conception of conscious perception as a function of one of the faculties of the soul because accordingly one pays attention to the things towards which the highest cognitive faculty of the soul is intentionally directed. Moreover, the subject perceives different things only if this faculty produces an act of apprehension in relation to them. In this way, perceptual consciousness requires the activity of the highest cognitive faculty of the soul. Part I shows that Olivi's theory of perception draws heavily on this kind of conception of a cognitive centre of the soul. Finally, differences between perception in non-human animals and human beings are taken to the fore in order to point out that despite certain ontological differences, these two kinds of beings are functionally similar to each other when it comes to perceptual processes.

Part II is devoted to the higher cognitive functions of the sensitive soul. These include not only such aspects of sense perception that cannot be accounted for by appealing only to the external senses—such as combining the sensible qualities that are perceived by different external senses with each other and perception of perception—but also other post-sensory capacities. Animals seem to have imagination and memory, and they are capable of apprehending things in relation to their own well-being. These and similar functions that inhere in the area between simple perception and intellectual understanding were traditionally attributed to the so-called internal senses (*sensus interiores*). Part II discusses Olivi's view on them.

The idea about the centre of consciousness can also be found in Olivi's treatment of the internal senses. Namely, Olivi denies the difference between the internal senses and attributes all of the higher cognitive functions to the common sense, which is the highest cognitive faculty of the sensitive soul. One of the reasons Olivi proposes this idea is his willingness to ensure the psychological and experiential unity that we experience while we perform or undergo different kinds of psychological processes: despite the diversity in my mental activity, every psychological process I undergo appears to me as an experience I am having. To use Olivi's expression, "the same I who understands, wills and sees."⁴⁰ Within the soul there is a centre which provides a unitary experience when we are performing various kinds of psychological processes. The same idea applies to non-human animals, and in their case Olivi accounts for the experiential unity by appealing to a common foundation of all the higher cognitive functions. He conceives of these functions as acts of one and the same faculty of the soul, the common sense. The common sense performs all the higher cognitive functions, and this common source of psychological processes accounts also for the experiential unity which is phenomenally evident to humans. Part II provides a detailed discussion about Olivi's conception of these functions.

Finally, Part III concentrates on certain aspects of Olivi's understanding of self-cognition. The main argument is that the common sense provides non-human animals with types of self-cognition that resemble intellectual and reflexive self-consciousness available to human beings. In this way, Part III is a continuation of Part II: it deals with the most refined functions of the common sense. Self-cognition is conceptualised as a special kind of cognitive relation in which the subject and object poles of an intentional cognitive act happen to be the same, i.e., the highest cognitive faculty of the soul brings forth an act that is intentionally directed to the cognising subject herself as a bodily and conscious being.

According to Olivi, a bodily being is capable of perceiving its own body by the sense of touch in such a way that the body is apprehended as a genuine part of the cognitive subject—as a part of the self. In addition to bodily self-perception, Olivi discusses reflexive self-consciousness of the intellectual soul. He thinks that the human mind is capable of forming a reflexive act that pertains to the mind itself. He takes this to be a necessary precondition for experiencing one's mental activity as one's own—as something that appears to the subject in her phenome-

⁴⁰ "[...] ego idem qui intelligo volo et video [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 54, 280.)

nal experience. Experiential unity between various kinds of cognitive acts and experiential “ownness” of those acts requires self-consciousness, which is acquired by the highest cognitive faculty of the soul. Although Olivi discusses these ideas almost exclusively with respect to the intellectual soul, there are several reasons to think that the same kind of psychological function is attributed to the common sense in the case of non-human animals. In other words, the most refined function of the common sense appears to be an ability to provide experiential unity and an experience of being the phenomenal subject of all the cognitive activity that the soul performs. This requires a certain kind of reflexivity from the part of the common sense. These types of self-cognition—bodily self-perception, its relation to an animals’ ability to strive for self-preservation, and various kinds of reflexive self-consciousness—are analysed in detail. By analysing Olivi’s ideas concerning these matters, we can see how they are affected by the idea of the centre of consciousness and how the distinction between the conscious mind and the body is anticipated in the medieval context, in which the body is unanimously conceived of as a genuine part of the self.

Despite its historical significance and philosophical originality, Olivi’s thinking was neglected by scholars for a long period. The first decades of the 20th century witnessed the initial wave of serious scholarly interest in his philosophy, and as a result the critical editions of some of his major works were prepared. Interest in Olivi’s thinking continued after this first wave but remained somewhat in the margins, until very recently. Within the last ten years or so, the scholarly community has increasingly focussed on it, and nowadays it is generally acknowledged that Olivi is a very important figure in the history of philosophy and that his ideas are philosophically very innovative and interesting. Knowledge about his thinking is rapidly increasing. Still, there is much work to be done in order to obtain a clear understanding thereof.

In the present study, I have used only those works of Olivi’s, which are available as modern editions. Only about ten years ago, this would have been a considerable demerit, but at the moment the situation is much improved. As a result of the new enthusiasm in Olivi’s thinking, a considerable number of his works have been edited. This gives good ground for an Olivi scholar to draw a coherent picture without going through the pains of reading manuscripts. From the point of view of the present study, the single most important work is Olivi’s question-commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, the so-called *Summa quaestionum super Sententias* (hereafter *Summa*), the second book of which has been edited completely in *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, and the major part of the fourth book in *Quaestiones de novissimis*⁴¹. Other works of importance

⁴¹ As I have already indicated, I shall refer to the second book of *Summa* as *II Sent.* followed by the number of the question and page numbers. However, the fourth book is referred to as *Quaest. de nov.*, simply because the numbering of the edited questions do not follow the original in *Summa*. For the original numbering, see Antonio Ciceri, *Petri Ioannis Olivi opera: Censimento dei manoscritti*, Collectio Oliviana I (Grottaferrata: Editiones collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1999), 103–13.

are his *Quodlibeta quinque*⁴² and the apologetic writings he wrote when the orthodoxy of some of his ideas was questioned⁴³.

To conclude this general introduction, let me briefly summarise what I take to be the general contribution of the present study. It is twofold. First and more obvious is the contribution to the field of the history of philosophy and/or to the history of ideas. The explicit intention of this study is to give a detailed, philosophically motivated and historically accurate analysis of Olivi's thought concerning the cognitive functions of the sensitive soul⁴⁴. By hopefully accomplishing this aim, the study will increase our knowledge of the philosophical psychology of one of the most interesting thinkers of the 13th century.

However, if a study that pertains to the history of philosophy is striving not only to be historical but also philosophical, it must include another dimension besides being a historically accurate (re)presentation of the thinking of a dead philosopher. This other feature is often less explicit but clearly more philosophical. It seems to me that there are altogether three philosophical goals to which a historical study may aim.

In rare cases, ideas taken from the history of philosophy may contribute directly to modern discussions in the field of philosophy. By accepting this utility of

⁴² Petrus Ioannis Olivi, *Quodlibeta quinque*, ed. S. Defraia, Collectio Oliviana VII (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 2002) (hereafter *Quodl.*).

⁴³ Petrus Ioannis Olivi, "Responsio quam fecit Petrus [Ioannis] ad litteram magistrorum, praesentatam sibi in Avinione," ed. D. Laberge in "Fr. Petri Ioannis Olivi, O. F. M. Tria scripta sui ipsius apologetica annorum 1283 et 1285," *AFH* 28 (1935): 126–30 (hereafter *Responsio prima*); *Responsio secunda*; and Petrus Ioannis Olivi, "Epistola ad fratrem R.," ed. S. Piron, C. Kilmer & E. Marmursztejn, *AFH* 91:1-2 (1998): 33–65 (hereafter *Ep.*).

⁴⁴ Thus, the present study falls somewhere between the first two genres of the history of philosophy which are distinguished by Richard Rorty in his well-known article (Richard Rorty, "The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres," in *Philosophy of History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy*, ed. R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind & Q. Skinner (Cambridge: CUP, 1984), 49–75), namely, historical and rational reconstruction. On the one hand, I aim at a historically accurate reconstruction of Olivi's thinking, but on the other hand the topics of discussion are (at least partly) motivated by modern interests; in some cases I endeavour to point out certain consequences of Olivi's ideas which he did not explicitly take into consideration. Thus, I tend to agree with Rorty when he states that the different genres are usually mixed within any particular book on the history of philosophy (*ibid.*, 68). Moreover, I do not think that drawing consequences from the ideas of a past author necessarily implies that anachronisms will result, as Quentin Skinner seems to claim in his groundbreaking and much discussed article on the methodological issues in the field of history of philosophy and ideas (Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8:1 (1969): 9–10). For instance, when we say that a given theory is contradictory by pointing out that it contains claims that are not compatible with each other, we are drawing conclusions that are not explicitly present in that theory, and this is not imposing an anachorist reading of the text. Similarly, when I say, for instance, that Olivi puts forth an intentional theory of perception or that he discusses self-cognition, I use concepts that either did not exist at the time, or at least had a different meaning than they have today. Olivi himself did not use concepts such as "intentional theory of perception" or "self", yet I am still not guilty of anachronism—at least not a problematic one—because it is legitimate to use modern concepts and ideas in analysing historical texts (indeed, it is inevitable) just as long as we do not say the author himself would have used them and as long as we do not impose a false interpretation of the texts.

the history of philosophy, I do not claim that there are some “perennial problems of philosophy”, nor that past authors would have addressed the same philosophical problems that we do nowadays. Past ideas usually cannot be brought directly to modern discussions and they cannot be taken as direct answers to modern problems. Rather, sometimes a solution presented by a historical author—meaningful only in the context in which it was first raised—inspires a modern reader to generate new ideas, which are not necessarily present in the original text. Thus, even misunderstandings of a historical texts may yield important changes in the way we think⁴⁵. In addition to this, historical studies may transform the way we conceive important questions and possible answers to them. Our ways of thinking may be changed by interpretations of historical ideas, and as a result the historical questions and answers may become relevant again. This is what has happened, for instance, in the case of Aristotelian virtue ethics, which is nowadays a respectable option in modern discussions concerning moral philosophy⁴⁶.

Another philosophical result of doing a historical study—a study which tracks those slow processes in which the worldviews of people living in each era were formed and transformed—is the demonstration of how these processes shaped our own ways of thinking. A historical study may tell a story that facilitates our understanding of why we think the way we do and what the important factors are in the development of our ways of thinking.⁴⁷

Finally, a historical study may reveal that our preconceptions and ways of conceiving the world are not unquestionable and necessary, but historically contingent. By obtaining a deep understanding of a *different yet rational* way of thinking, we may realise that it is possible to conceive of the world and ourselves in a very different manner. Seeing the contingency in our ways of thinking, and questioning the necessity of the principles onto which we base our assumptions, opinions, and intuitions—can there be anything more philosophical? And the history of philosophy may be a useful instrument that facilitates in seeing and questioning. A past idea may serve as a kind of a mirror from which we can see more clearly our own subconscious preconceptions, and a better understanding of the features of our own thinking makes it possible to undertake the philosophical project of questioning them. (Skinner 1969, 52–3.) These three philosophical aims are ambitious, to be sure, and I do not claim that the present study hits upon any of them; but if this study reaches even half way, or gives occasion for someone else to write a more comprehensive story, I shall be content.

⁴⁵ Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is a good example of such an innovative misunderstanding.

⁴⁶ One important factor in the new coming of virtue ethics was Alasdair MacIntyre’s influential work *After Virtue*, which draws heavily from an Aristotelian approach (Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

⁴⁷ This kind of approach is clearly present, e.g., in Foucault’s idea of genealogy.

Part I
Theory of Perception

2 INTRODUCTION

Perception is the most fundamental cognitive relation we have to the world around us. Without the ability to perceive, we would be hindered from all other types of cognitive activity as well. The importance of perception was emphasised also by medieval philosophers. Especially in the latter half of the 13th century, after the incorporation of Aristotelian and Arabic natural philosophy into university curricula, it became typical to think that even though we are intellectual beings capable of understanding the intellectual structure of the world we nevertheless need our senses in order to actually do so. Empirical information was taken to be necessary for rational understanding. Also, other psychological processes were thought to be based on perception: we can remember only things we have perceived before, and even though we are able to imagine things that we have never perceived we can do so only insofar as the imagined things are constructed out of perceptual features that we have perceived before. Moreover, our emotional life was thought to require perception, since our emotions were thought to be necessary related to things we are familiar with through sensations. In short, perception was taken to be a foundation for all our cognitive and psychological activity.

The ability to perceive is also important from the point of view of the psychological continuity between human beings and other animals. Aristotle already thought that animals are distinguished from plants by the ability to perceive. Even though not all species of animals have all the five external senses that the higher animals have, the capacity of perception is endowed by the sensitive soul, and as such it is common to all animals. To be an animal is to be capable of perception, and in this regard there is no difference between rational and irrational animals.¹ Human beings and non-human animals have basically the same psychological capacity of perception.

Medieval philosophers share this Aristotelian view. Generally speaking, they think that when it comes to perception, there are only minor differences between human beings and higher animals such as dogs, wolves, sheep, snakes,

¹ *De sensu et sensibilibus* (hereafter *Sens.*), 1, 436^b10–13; *De anima* (hereafter *DA*) II.3, 414^a29–^b5; *ibid.*, III.12, 434^a30–^b9.

and the like. All these creatures are endowed with the same set of external senses, and thus their cognitive relation to the external world is basically quite similar to ours. To be sure, medieval thinkers know that the acuteness of the senses varies between different species of animals, but this is understood by them only as a matter of quantitative difference, not a qualitative one.

All this applies also to Olivi's thought. He accepts the fundamental role of perception and in this respect the similarity between human and non-human animals. However, when it comes to the details of Olivi's theory of perception, it is clear that he deviates from the theories of perception that prevailed at the time. In this first part of the study, I shall discuss Olivi's theory of perception from various points of view beginning from his conception of the faculties of the soul that are responsible for perception, and ending up with a discussion concerning the differences and similarities he sees between human and animal perception.

To begin with, Olivi thinks in keeping with a long tradition, that the perceptual capacity of higher animals (including human beings) is divided into five external senses: vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. In addition, according to him the sensitive soul provides one so-called internal sense, the common sense (*sensus communis*), in which all the different perceptual aspects converge. Olivi takes it that the external senses are distinct from each other. They are not different modalities of one perceptual capacity, but they must be understood as separate faculties of the soul. Moreover, he claims that the common sense is distinct from the external senses. The relation between the external senses and the common sense will be the focus of Chapter 3, which deals with the foundations of Olivi's theory of perception in terms of the faculties of the soul. In that chapter, I shall point out that Olivi argues in favour of a clear distinction between the perceptual faculties of the soul but that despite this distinction he sees a close functional relation between them.

After sorting out the basics of Olivian faculty psychology, I shall concentrate on Olivi's own theory of perception², which can be understood as a critical reaction to the species theories of perception that were prevalent at the time. According to the species theories, perception is basically a passive process in which the object actualises the passive faculties of perception by a so-called sensible species (*species sensibilis*). Olivi's critique towards the species theories will be the topic of Chapter 4. Instead of the species theory, Olivi puts forth his own theory which can best be understood as an intentional theory of perception. He turns the Aristotelian picture, which emphasises passivity of perception, upside down and incorporates Neoplatonic elements into his theory. He emphasises that we perceive only if we pay attention to our environment and concludes on the basis of this that rather than being passive recipients we are active participants in the process of perception. Even though the two first chapters also deal with Olivi's view to some extent, his theory will be addressed in detail in Chapter 5.

² The topic has been dealt with in Pasnau 1997b, 121–4, 130–4, 168–181; Tachau 1988, 39–54; Spruit 1994, 215–24; Belmont 1929, 295–9, 463–72. A classical presentation of the historical development of theories of vision is David C. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

The idea that consciousness is a function of a single centre—the highest cognitive faculty of the soul—will be discussed in Chapter 6, where I shall analyse in detail the functional relation between the external senses and the common sense and the role of attention in the process of perception. I shall argue that even though Olivi distinguishes external senses from the common sense, he does not think that the acts of the external senses provide consciousness to the subject. Rather, conscious perception, which makes the subject actually perceive the objects she perceives, is a function of only one faculty of the soul. In the case of non-human animals, this faculty is the common sense. The acts of the common sense provide the subject with consciousness of the intentional objects of those acts, and by intentionally directing this highest cognitive faculty of the soul to different external senses (which amounts to directing one's attention) the subject becomes conscious of different perceptible qualities, which are attained through the external senses. However, Olivi's view seems to entail another type of consciousness which can be called "peripheral consciousness". Even when the subject does not pay attention to her surroundings, there seems to remain a kind of undetermined peripheral consciousness which does not suffice for conscious perception of external objects but enables the subject to notice patent changes in her surroundings and direct her attention to them so as to consciously perceive them.

The next two chapters of Part I are dedicated to the manifestation of dualistic currents in Olivi's theory of perception (Chapter 7), and the apparent mind-body problem which emerges on the basis of this dualism (Chapter 7.4). In these chapters I shall show how Olivi's theory of perception leads him to the brink of functional dualism and even commits him to a sort of a mind-body problem. Although Olivi is keen to reject flagrantly dualistic anthropological views, I shall argue that many features of Olivi's theory of perception betray the dualistic strand of his anthropology. The main reason why Olivi's theory of perception entails a functional dualism is because of his idea about perception as a psychological process which takes place in the soul and is tied to bodily processes only accidentally. External objects are capable of causing some kind of physiological changes in the organs of the senses, but in the end these changes do not have anything to do with perception. Perception is brought about by the soul, and even though acts of perception are realised as physiological changes in the organs of the senses, these changes are not necessary for perception. In other words, perception is activity of the soul, and the body has only a subordinate role in the process—in fact, it is not even necessary to have a body in order to be able to perceive. This way of conceiving perception is suggestive of a radical mind-body problem, and I shall claim that Olivi can (and indeed must) be understood as a rare bird who not only recognises the possibility of separating perception as a mental process from the physiological changes that take place in the body but also suggests that the latter may be unnecessary for perception; at least their role is questionable. Thus, Olivi adheres to a kind of functional dualism and leaves the functional connection between the body and the soul quite explicitly open.

Finally, Chapter 8 deals with Olivi's conception of perception in non-human animals. The central question of that chapter is how non-human animals are

supposed to perceive given Olivi's adherence to the active nature of perception, which seems to require a spiritual soul that is capable of existing without the body. It will turn out that, in fact, Olivi sees only minor psychological differences between human and animal perception regardless of the radical metaphysical dissimilarity of the souls these kinds of creatures have.

3 FACULTIES OF PERCEPTION

3.1 Five External Senses

In order to understand Olivi's theory of perception it is necessary to first consider the foundation on which his theory is based, i.e., to see how he conceives of the faculties of perception¹. In typical medieval fashion, Olivi approaches perception as being the actualisation of certain potencies or faculties of the soul. These faculties are the external senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch—and the common sense. The external senses provide information about the sensible qualities of external objects². These sensible qualities are the proper objects of the external senses: for example, colours in the case of sight and sounds in the case of hearing. The information that is acquired through the senses is received in the common sense, which combines all the various sense modalities and forms a unified perceptual experience out of them. But what exactly is the relation between these faculties of the soul? External senses are located in distinct organs of the body, but are they distinct from each other also in the soul?

There are two possible ways to construe the relation between the various external senses on the one hand, and between the external senses and the common sense on the other. Either these faculties are considered not as many distinct faculties but as one perceptual capacity, which has different modes of acting (represented by the external senses); or they are understood as separate faculties, which can, at least in principle, act independently from each other. In the first case, there is only one faculty in the soul, and it is somehow diversified to perform different kinds of sensations in the various organs of the senses. For instance, although Aristotle is not explicit on the matter, it is widely accepted among modern scholars that he did not understand the five external senses as being independent faculties, but rather as—to use a famous metaphor that was

¹ This and the following chapter are largely based on *II Sent.* qq. 60–62, 570–596, in which Olivi deals with the relation of external senses to each other and to the common sense.

² We shall see in Part III, Chapter 19.2 that in Olivi's view the sense of touch is an exception to this rule.

introduced by Alexander of Aphrodisias—radii of a circle, the centre of which is the *koinē aisthēsis* (which is the predecessor of the faculty that was to become the Latin *sensus communis*). There is only one perceptual capacity, and it perceives different qualities as if through different channels. The external senses represent separate modes in which the *koinē aisthēsis* perceives external things, and they are not independent faculties.³ The activity of any of the external senses is, in this view, also the activity of the centralised perceptual capacity, and there is no point in asking where, or in which faculty, perception takes place. This reflects, to be sure, the fact that Aristotle does not approach the issue from the point of view of faculty psychology.

However, the same idea was adhered to also by later thinkers within the tradition of faculty psychology. Avicenna, for instance, thought that there is only one perceptual capacity in the soul and that the external senses are only different aspects of it: “And this power is the one that is called the common sense, which is the centre of all the senses, and from which branches are drawn and to which the senses return, and it is that which truly senses.”⁴ The external senses are not independent faculties but branches of the common sense, and the soul does not contain many faculties of perception but only one, the common sense. The common sense receives different perceptual qualities through the channels of the external senses. Activity of any of the senses is in fact also activity of the common sense. The perceptual capacity as a whole does the perceiving.

In contrast to Avicenna, many Latin scholars of the 13th century adhered to the alternative view according to which the perceptual power of the soul is not one. The soul includes many distinct perceptual faculties, which are not only situated in different organs but are also distinct from each other in the soul. One

³ The most important passages in which Aristotle presents the idea of the unity of the perceptual capacity are *DA* III.1–2; *ibid.*, 7; *Sens.* 7, 449^a5–19; and *De somno et vigilia* (hereafter *Somn.*), 2, 455^a12–22; For discussion, see, e.g., Charles Kahn, “Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle’s Psychology,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 48 (1966): 52–9 (reprinted in *Articles on Aristotle 4: Psychology & Aesthetics*, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield & R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth 1979): 1–31); Juha Sihvola, “The Problem of Consciousness in Aristotle’s Psychology,” in Heinämaa, Lähteenmäki & Remes 2007, 49–65; The metaphor of the radii of a circle was first suggested by Alexander of Aphrodisias (Cristina D’Ancona, “Degrees of Abstraction in Avicenna: How to Combine Aristotle’s *De anima* and the *Enneads*,” in Knuuttila & Kärkkäinen 2008, 47–71); For discussion about later developments of Aristotelian ideas, see, e.g., Simo Knuuttila, “Aristotle’s Theory of Perception and Medieval Aristotelianism,” in *ibid.*, 8–17.

⁴ “Et hæc virtus est quæ vocatur sensus communis, quæ est centrum omnium sensuum et a qua derivantur rami et cui reddunt sensus, et ipsa est vere quæ sentit.” (*Shifā’ De an.* IV.1, 5.) The idea about *spiritus animalis* as a physiological vehicle for the psychological powers of the soul, which was employed by Avicenna among others, goes well with the idea of one perceptual capacity: *spiritus animalis* comes from the brain and is diffused to the sense organs through the nerves. It receives different *complexiones* due to the organs in which it exists. In this way, there is one spirit which is essentially the same, but it is diversified to different functions by the organs. (See, e.g., Alain de Libera, “Le sens commun au XIII^e siècle: De Jean de La Rochelle à Albert le Grand,” *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 4 (1991): 483; Ruth E. Harvey, *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (London: The Warburg Institute, University of London, 1975), 21–30.)

of the reasons for this change was probably related to discussions concerning the perception of perception, which was considered as an essential feature of the ability to perceive. The idea that no sensitive faculty is capable of apprehending its own activity was widespread, and these ideas together seem to require that the faculty that perceives the activity of the senses must be distinct from them.

In the 13th century, Aristotle was sometimes interpreted as being a proponent of the view that the external senses and the common sense are distinct faculties of the soul. This is quite understandable, given that Aristotle oftentimes discusses the external senses as if they were distinct faculties, and he even provides a criterion for distinguishing the faculties of the soul which may be taken as entailing the distinction thereof. This criterion, widely employed by medieval Aristotelians (e.g., Aquinas), is based on the differences in the objects of apprehension. It claims that the faculties of the soul are diversified by their acts, which are in turn diversified by the objects that cause the acts.⁵ If there are two kinds of objects (e.g., two perceptual qualities), they are apprehended by two distinct kinds of acts, and these acts must be brought about by two distinct faculties. Thus, the difference of faculties can be inferred from the difference of objects: for every distinct kind of object there is a distinct faculty which pertains to it. Colour and sound are different kinds of sensible qualities, and therefore they are apprehended by different faculties: colours actualise the faculty of sight, and sounds actualise the faculty of hearing. This criterion was used not only to separate different modes of perception from each other (seeing from hearing) but also to indicate that there must be several faculties in the soul that perform these functions. Colours and sounds do not directly affect the same perceptual capacity but they pertain to different faculties (sight and hearing) and affect the common sense only through them.

Following this lead, Aquinas appears to think that the external senses differ from each other and from the common sense. There are altogether six perceptual faculties in the soul: five external senses and the common sense. These are in reality distinct from each other, and the activity of the external senses is not the same as the activity of the common sense.⁶

⁵ See, e.g., *DA* II.4, 415^a16–22; The idea about the priority of objects to acts and acts to faculties was in general use in the Middle Ages. See, e.g., Anonymous, *De potentiis animæ et obiectis*, ed. D. A. Callus, in “The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text,” *Reserches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952): 147–8; *ST* I.77.3.

⁶ See, for example, *ST* I.78.4; Thomas Aquinas, *Quæstiones disputatæ de anima*, ed. B.-C. Bazán, *Sancti Thomæ de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, 24.1 (Rome/Paris: Commissio Leonina/Les Éditions du Cerf, 1996) (hereafter *Quæst. de an.*), q. 13; Thomas Aquinas, *Quæstiones disputatæ de veritate*, cura et studio fratrum prædicatorum, *Sancti Thomæ de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, 22.2 (Romæ ad sanctæ sabinæ, 1972) (hereafter *De veritate*), q. 15.1 arg. 3 & ad 3; Occasionally Aquinas employs the metaphor of a circle and radii thereof (see, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Quæstiones de quolibet*, ed. R. A. Gauthier, *Sancti Thomæ de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, 25 (Rome/Paris: Commissio Leonina/Éditions du Cerf, 1996), VII.1.2 ad 1; Thomas Aquinas, *Sentencia libri De anima*, ed. R. A. Gauthier, *Sancti Thomæ de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, 45.1 (Rome/Paris: Commissio Leonina/Vrin, 1984) (hereafter *Sent. DA*), 3.6), but he also explicitly denies the theory that the faculties are the same (*Sentencia libri De sensu et*

Thus, the question Olivi addresses is the following: is there only one faculty or are there several faculties of perception in the soul? He dissents from the view of Avicenna and agrees with Aquinas and others, since he clearly does not accept the unity of the perceptual faculties of the soul. He argues that the external senses are not different aspects of one perceptual capacity and denies the association of the common sense with the external senses.⁷ The common sense and the external senses are separate faculties that differ from each other due to their particular and distinct modes of acting.

However, it is not as evident that Olivi accepts the criterion, as employed by Aquinas, for instance, to distinguish between the external senses: namely, inferring the plurality of the faculties from the plurality of kinds of perceivable objects. At the outset, Olivi seems to straightforwardly reject this idea: he claims that each of the external senses is capable of apprehending objects which belong to different species and genera. The bright light of the sun, the dim light of a candle, and the various colours are all apprehended by the faculty of sight. Sight also perceives transparency (*perspicuitas transparentium*), which belongs to yet another genus than that of light and colour. Similarly, other senses are capable of apprehending various kinds of objects that belong to different genera.⁸ In this way it seems that we cannot conclude from the differences in objects that there are distinctions of the external senses because it is possible for one and the same faculty to apprehend different kinds of objects. Sight senses objects that belong to different genera; yet it is only one faculty.

However, if we look closely at Olivi's discussion, we see that in fact he does not reject the criterion of distinguishing faculties on the basis of the diversity of their objects completely. We shall see below that he does not apply it to the higher cognitive faculties of the sensitive soul (the internal senses)⁹, but despite his avowal of the diversity of the kinds of objects that can be perceived by each of the external senses, he employs the criterion to make distinctions between the senses. Eyes do not hear noises nor do they smell odours, rather, they apprehend only the objects of sight, and similarly all the other senses have their proper objects:

sensato, cura et studio fratrum prædicatorum, Sancti Thomæ de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, 45.2 (Rome/Paris: Commissio Leonina/Vrin, 1985) (hereafter *Sent. De sensu*), 1.18). For discussion, see Pasnau 2002, 195–6 & n26.

⁷ *II Sent.* q. 60, 569–73; *ibid.*, q. 62, 586–96. Olivi actually occasionally employs Avicenna's illustration and speaks as if the external senses were branches of the common sense (*ibid.*, q. 51 app., 194; *ibid.*, q. 62, 592). However, it is clear that he does not accept the idea that there would be only one perceptual capacity, which would receive different modes of acting from the different sense organs: the faculties of the soul are not limited by their organs (see especially *ibid.*, q. 62, 592–3; *ibid.*, q. 51 app., 158–9). See also Chapter 3.2 below.

⁸ “[...] non omnis diversitatis speciei vel generis obiectorum probat vel includit diversitatem potentiarum nostrarum; alias tot erunt in nobis potentiæ intellectivæ quot sunt species et genera scibilium. Secundum hoc etiam quilibet sensus particularis esset plures potentiæ, quia nullus est quin habeat plura obiecta diversorum generum; lux enim et color differunt genere. Multa etiam sunt species et genera sonorum, et multa sunt genera tangibilium et gustabilium.” (*II Sent.* q. 55, 292.)

⁹ See Part II, Chapter 11.1.

Sense experience proclaims the plurality of the senses and the faculties of the senses in three ways. First is the restriction of the senses to certain objects and certain acts. For we see that the faculty which is in the eye cannot perceive sounds, smells nor flavours, and neither can the sense of hearing perceive light or colours but only audible [qualities].¹⁰

On this superficial level, objects indicate that there is a difference of faculties. The external senses are distinct from each other because they pertain to different kinds of objects.

We have to be careful, however, for it is not apparent how extensively Olivi thinks this idea can be applied. He admits that sounds cannot be seen nor colours heard, certainly, but this does not yet prove that he would adhere to the criterion as such. It seems to me that the crucial question is, whether he thinks that the objects which are apprehended by one of the external senses have some underlying similarity or not. There are two options: either Olivi thinks that the objects of one sense are somehow similar to each other, in which case he might approve the criterion according to which different senses can be distinguished from each other on the basis of their objects; or the objects themselves do not have anything in common, in which case the criterion does not apply. In the former case there would be one faculty for one kind of object because all the objects of one faculty would fall under one common denominator. In the latter case there would be no common denominator between the different objects of one faculty and thus the *raison d'être* of the faculty could not be inferred from the unity of its objects.

One thing needs to be noted at the outset. Whatever the case may be, the various kinds of objects that pertain to one of the external senses have at least one thing in common, namely, they are all apprehended by one and the same faculty. It is not obvious that colours, transparency, and light have anything else in common, but Olivi seems to take it for granted that they are perceived by sight. The question is whether or not this is the only thing they have in common.

Olivi discusses at length a common denominator or common feature (*communis ratio*) to which all the objects of one faculty must pertain. If such a common denominator can be found, it will give the required unity to the objects of one faculty, and therefore it will account for their being apprehended by one and the same external sense. In many passages, Olivi seems to say that despite the diversity of the objects which can be apprehended by one sense (light, colour, and

¹⁰ "Quod pluralitatem sensuum et potentiarum ipsorum sensualis experientia clamat et hoc quoad tria. Primum est ipsorum limitatio ad determinata obiecta et ad determinatos actus. Videmus enim quod potentia quæ est in oculo non potest percipere sonos nec odores nec sapes, nec auditus lucem et colores, sed sola audibilia." (*II Sent.* q. 60, 570-1.) However, Olivi limits the application of this criterion. Not every kind of difference between objects forces us to conclude that the faculties that apprehend them must be distinct from each other: "[...] diversitas potentiarum tunc potest ex diversitate obiectorum accipi, quando una earum est essentialiter limitata ad unum genus obiectorum et alia ad aliud. Ab illa etiam generali unitate obiectorum potest argui unitas potentia, ad cuius totalem ambitum potentia secundum ultimam et substantialem specificationem suam sumpta attingit, et hoc uno modo sibi substantiali et specifico et non pluribus substantialibus modis diversi generis vel speciei." (*II Sent.* q. 61, 583.)

transparency in the case of sight), there must exist a real unity between these objects. He admits that we do not know what the common denominator is; we simply know that it exists because we apprehend a diversity of objects by the same external sense. Moreover, at one point Olivi seems to state that the common denominator is a real property of the objects.¹¹ Understood in this way, there really is something in the objects themselves which makes them similar to each other so that they can be perceived by one of the external senses. The fact that different kinds of objects fall under the scope of one faculty would in this case be only an indicator of some underlying similarity in the objects themselves. If we perceive two very different things by one sense, it means that these objects have something in common, even though we do not necessarily know what it is.

Olivi was meticulous in his attempt to find the common denominator in the case of every external sense, but he fails—except for in the case of the sense of touch. This is interesting, given that it was precisely the sense of touch which was so often a difficult issue for medieval philosophers. There was an ongoing discussion concerning the unity of the sense of touch, and no consensus was reached on whether it should be considered as one faculty or as a genus of several faculties. The number of external senses was regarded as disputable because it was thought that the qualities that are perceptible by the sense of touch (hardness/softness, heat/cold, etc.) are so different from each other that it is problematic to relate their perception to a single faculty. The unity of the other senses was generally considered unproblematic.¹² Olivi's thinking is an exception in this regard. He made an ingenious move by claiming that the common denominator which gathers together the various qualities that are perceived by the sense of touch is their effect on the organ of touch (i.e., flesh or the whole body of the perceiving subject) and its well-being. All the qualities which are apprehended by touch affect the body of the percipient in ways that either perfect or destroy it, and that is why those qualities are perceived by one and the same sense. The sense of touch is

¹¹ This is what Olivi seems to say in *II Sent.* q. 61, 584: "Igitur sufficit quod ex specificatione potentiae seu ex aliquo uniformi respectu ad eam sumatur una communis ratio omnium obiectorum suorum quae respectu immediatorum obiectorum aliquam naturam vel proprietatem realem ponit in obiectis secundum quam conveniunt, licet illa saepe sit nobis incognita et innominata, nisi solum per respectum ad potentiam cuius sunt obiecta, iuxta quod omnia obiecta visus vocamus visibilia et auditus audibilia et tactus tangibilia. [...] Præterea, perspicuitas transparentium differt genere a luce et colore, et tamen ipsa vere videtur a visu penetrante et cernente perspicua. Quia tamen sub uno aspectu aspiciunt visum et aspiciuntur ab eo, ideo in una communi ratione visibilitatis conveniunt."

¹² See, e.g., *Shifā' De an.* I.4, 83–5; Avicenna, *The Canon of Medicine (al-Qānūn fi'l-tibb)*, ed. L. Bakhtiar, transl. O. C. Gruner & M. H. Shah (Great Books of the Islamic World, inc., 1999) (hereafter *Canon*), 8.1, §§554–5, 163. The same approach applies also to 13th century authors. For instance, Pietro d'Abano's thorough and well-known work *Conciliator differentiarum philosophorum et precipue medicorum* (Venice: Juntas, 1565), fol. 64^{va}). By contrast, the work does not contain a similar discussion with regard to the other senses, at least on the basis of the index of the renaissance edition. See also, e.g., Jean de la Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, ed. P. Michaud-Quantin, *Textes philosophiques du Moyen Age XI* (Paris: Vrin, 1964), II.4.

one faculty exactly because its objects have a common denominator, a property that makes them similar to each other in the relevant respect.¹³

Finding a common denominator in the case of the other senses is more problematic for Olivi. He argues that in the case of sight the common denominator is unknown to us: we only know that it exists because we apprehend all the visible objects by sight. The same goes for the other senses. Thus, it seems that Olivi wants to adhere to the view that there must be some common denominator in the objects of each of the senses. Although we do not know what the common denominator is, it must exist because otherwise there is no reason for the unity of each of the senses by which the diverse objects are perceived. Light and colour must have something in common because they are seen, but colour and sound apparently do not have anything in common because they are not perceived by one and the same faculty. Thus, the objects of one sense must have something in common. However, if we look closely at what Olivi says in the following passage, where he most explicitly addresses the issue, we get a confusing picture about the nature of this common feature:

The species and genera of sounds are manifold, and various are the genera of touchable and tasteable [qualities]. One might say that they are not so diverse that they would not be univocally under some common denominator of some very general or subaltern genus. But this too is false because a ray or radiation of light that issues forth from fire or from the sun is not univocal with it [viz the light from which it issues] but only analogical, and still they both [viz the ray and the light] are apprehended by sight. Therefore, it suffices that they converge in some analogous property [...] But what are these properties in themselves? Not all of them are known to us or have a name, except in relation to the faculty to which [the apprehension thereof] belongs. For instance, when we say that the property of visibility is that in which all visible [qualities] converge in relation to sight, and the property of touchability is that in which all tangible [qualities] converge in relation to touch [...]¹⁴

Olivi evidently denies that all of the objects of sight can belong to the same *genus generalissimus*: radiation of light is only analogous to the light from which it issues. Hence, in the end it seems that there is not need for any similarity in the

¹³ *II Sent.* q. 61, 579, 585; Yrjönsuuri 2008, 101–16. Olivi’s conception of the sense of touch is dealt with in detail in Part III, Chapter 19.2.

¹⁴ “Multa etiam sunt species et genera sonorum, et multa sunt genera tangibilium et gustabilium. Si dicatur quod non sunt sic diversa quin in aliqua communi ratione alicuius generis generalissimi vel subalterni univocentur: etiam hoc est falsum, quia radius seu radiositas lucis igneae vel solaris non habet univocationem cum ipsa, sed solum analogiam, et tamen utraque visu apprehenditur. Sufficit ergo quod in aliqua una ratione analogica conveniant [...] Quaecunque autem sint secundum se huiusmodi rationes: nobis tamen in omnibus non sunt notae vel nominatae nisi solum per respectum ad potentiam cuius sunt; ut cum dicimus quod ratio visibilitatis est illud in quo conveniunt omnia visibilia respectu visus, et ratio tangibilitatis est illud in quo respectu tactus omnia tangibilia conveniunt [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 55, 292–3; See also *ibid.*, q. 64, 606.)

qualities that are apprehended by one sense, and therefore the only common denominator is that the objects are perceived by one faculty. The objects of sight are only analogous to each other; in reality the sole thing that connects the different objects of one faculty is the fact that they are apprehended by one and the same faculty. There is no underlying similarity within the objects themselves, not even a similarity that remains unknown to us.

If we take this idea seriously, it seems that Olivi attempts to find a common denominator to account for the unity of the objects of each of the senses, but being unable to do so in every case he makes recourse to the faculties. He points out that the faculties simply apprehend the objects that are proper to them. Thus, despite his principally positive stance towards the criterion of distinguishing external senses from each other on the basis of their objects, Olivi seems to end up with approaching the issue from the point of view of faculties and their acts, modes of acting, and types of acts. The common denominator to which all the objects of one external sense pertain is taken from the faculty and its mode of perceiving. For instance, every object we see has the common denominator of being visible to us, and visible objects do not necessarily have anything more in common. All in all, Olivi's stance remains somewhat unclear, and it seems that he does not make up his mind on this matter.

Taking this ambivalence into consideration, we can say that if Olivi thinks that there is no unifying feature in the objects of one faculty, and the only common denominator between them is the fact that they all are apprehended by the same faculty, his view lacks the philosophical acuteness which is typical of him. The criterion of distinguishing faculties from each other on the basis of the differences in their objects requires a real unity within all the objects of each separate faculty if it is intended to demonstrate anything. Had Olivi appealed only to this criterion when arguing that external senses differ from each other, we could accuse him of circular argumentation. Take the following premises:

1. External senses differ from each other because every sense pertains to its proper objects, which differ in kind from the objects of other senses.
2. The proper objects of one external sense have nothing else in common than the fact that they are apprehended by the same sense.

From these we cannot conclude anything about the distinctness or unity of the senses. There is no more reason to think that the sight that sees a coloured surface is the same faculty as the sight that sees light than there is to think that the sight that sees a coloured surface is the same faculty as the sense of smell that smells apples. If there is no other explanation for the unity of the objects of one of the senses but the fact that they fall under that sense, inferring the distinctness of faculties from the distinct types of objects they pertain to is not valid reasoning. However, if the fact that different kinds of objects pertain to one and the same faculty is only an indicator of some underlying similarity in the objects themselves, the reasoning is valid, but even in that case it remains unavailing.

However, this is not the only criterion Olivi uses to distinguish between the external senses. He employs other criteria, and because he approaches the issue

from the point of view of the faculties and their modes of acting, he is in a position to draw distinctions between the external senses without fallacious reasoning. In other words, the criterion by which Olivi separates the faculties of the soul from each other is based on the different types of acts that different faculties produce: "It is impossible for a created being to be a principle of acts or effects, which belong to different genera, by one power; thus we deem the faculties of the soul to be essentially distinct because they have different acts."¹⁵ It is obvious that the difference in the acts is not due to the objects they pertain to (even though, as we have seen, in many cases this is also true). Olivi's idea about what makes the acts different becomes clearer if we look at the following passage:

[...] even though one faculty can produce acts which differ in species, it cannot produce acts which differ in genera. This is because acts receive their species from the objects or from their relation (*habitudine*) to the objects, but they receive their genus from the faculty. [...] An illustration of this (although not completely similar) can be given in the case of light, which is generated by the sunlight. It receives different shapes from vases that participate in the light while retaining the unity of specific clarity, which it receives from the sunlight.¹⁶

This passage accentuates again that Olivi approaches the issue from the point of view of the faculties. Perceptual acts are defined mainly by the faculties, whereas the objects play only a minor role in specifying the acts: they distinguish different kinds of acts a faculty has from each other, but they do not make the acts so different that they would have to belong to separate faculties. Thus, from the difference in objects we cannot infer a difference in faculties. Neither can we infer a difference in faculties from a difference between acts, as long as the acts themselves belong to one genus which they receive from the faculty. What Olivi has in mind here is that every faculty has its own proper mode of apprehending, which is peculiar to it. The faculty of sight sees; the faculty of hearing hears; the intellect grasps things intellectually. As long as different kinds of acts and objects fall under one mode of apprehending, the faculty to which they belong is the same.

¹⁵ "Impossibile est enim in aliquo creato quod secundum eandem virtutem sit principium diversorum actuum vel effectuum diversorum genere; unde potentias animæ per actus diversos iudicamus esse diversas secundum essentiam." (*II Sent.* q. 50, 31.)

¹⁶ "[...] quamvis actus differentes specie possent esse ab eadem potentia, non tamen genere; quoniam actus speciem sortiuntur ex obiectis seu ex habitudine ad obiecta, genus vero a potentia. [...] Exemplum autem huius, licet non omnino consimile, potest dari in lumine genito a luce solari quæ varietatem figurarum accipit a vasis lumen ipsius participantibus, retinendo unitatem claritatis specificam quam trahit a luce solari." (*II Sent.* q. 54, 275–6.) The point of the illustration is that sunlight illuminates several dissimilar vases, and thus generates shiny surfaces of different shapes. These "lights" are of a different species because they are shaped differently; but they remain in the same genus of light because they are all generated by the sun. Similarly, the acts of one faculty belong to the same genus (of acts of seeing, or acts of understanding, for example), but they can be different in kind due to the difference of objects they pertain to.

Olivi's emphasis on the faculties is most clearly present in his third argument in which he holds the five external senses as distinct from each other¹⁷. Namely, he argues that the acts of different senses, considered in themselves, differ from each other:

The third [proof] is the sensible diversification of the acts of hearing and seeing, taken in themselves and in an absolute manner, and likewise of the other acts of different senses. Namely, hearing differs sensibly from seeing—not only because it is about such [scil. visible] object but also because hearing as hearing differs from seeing as seeing. In other words, these acts belong sensibly to different species already due to the nature (*ratio*) they have solely from their faculties, without various specifications which they receive afterwards from their special objects, according to which vision of black differs specifically from a vision of white. Thus, if *per impossibile* the same sound would be visible to the eyes, audible to the ears, and tasteable to taste: still seeing it would differ specifically from hearing and tasting it, and it would not be heard by the eyes, but only by the ears, and it would not be seen by the ears, but only by the eyes.¹⁸

The five external senses differ from each other because their acts or modes of acting differ from each other. The crucial point in this passage is that even if *per impossibile* all the external senses would apprehend one and the same quality, each of them would apprehend it in a way proper to it and not in the ways that are proper to the other senses.

Thus, even though we can, to some extent, judge by the objects that the five senses are separate faculties, the fundamental difference between them is not due to their objects but to their modes of apprehension. Seeing is activity of its own kind, and it differs from hearing and tasting because hearing and tasting are different kinds of apprehension. It is also important to note that Olivi appeals to our experience in this matter: the difference between the modes of apprehension is not an abstract matter but an experiential fact. In a way, Olivi's starting point is our experience of the different modes of apprehension we are capable of. This experience attests to the differences between the senses, which are then confirmed also by the differences between the objects of the senses.

Thus, in principle Olivi accepts the criterion that different kinds of objects require different faculties, since he employs it—at least to some extent—in the

¹⁷ The other two criteria are those discussed above: different external senses pertain to different kinds of objects, and they are realised in different organs.

¹⁸ "Tertium est sensibilis diversificatio actuum audiendi et videndi secundum se et absolute sumptorum, et sic de aliis actibus diversorum sensuum. Nam audire, non solum in quantum est talis obiecti, differt sensibiliter a videre, immo etiam audire, in quantum audire, differt a videre, in quantum videre. Quod est dicere quod huiusmodi actus sensibiliter differunt specie secundum solas rationes quas a solis suis potentiis habent absque diversis specificationibus quas postmodum a suis specialibus obiectis accipiunt, iuxta quod visio nigri differt specie a visione albi. Unde si per impossibile idem sonus esset visibilis ab oculo et audibilis ab aure et gustabilis a gustu: adhuc videre ipsum differt specie ab eius auditu et gustu, nec audiretur ab oculo, sed a sola aure, nec videretur ab aure, sed a solo oculo." (*II Sent.* q. 60, 571–2.)

case of external senses. However, he does not present it as comprehensive and, arguably, does not benefit from it. He simply begins with the faculties that human beings and higher animals have and ends up claiming that there must be some common denominator between the objects of a particular external sense. In the case of touch he finds the common ground, but in the case of the other senses he has to recourse to the senses themselves, to their different kinds of acts, and also to our experience of this difference. The decisive factor which differentiates the faculties of the soul from each other is their way of apprehending, or their modes of acting. This is an interesting difference from Aquinas' approach, for instance, which contends that we have to begin with the objects of perception, then go on to the acts, and finally contend with the faculties of the soul: the order is from objects to acts and from acts to faculties. Olivi reverses this order because he thinks that the distinctness of faculties and their activity is prior to the distinctness of the objects they pertain to. We have the five perceptual faculties, and their differences are evident to us; furthermore, it is not crucial that we are incapable of knowing why certain objects are apprehended by one and the same faculty.

3.2 The Common Sense and the External Senses

Let us now turn to the relation between the external senses and the common sense.¹⁹ Question 62 of the second book of Olivi's *Summa* is devoted to this issue. In that question, Olivi asks whether the common sense is the same faculty as the external senses, and his answer is clearly negative, even though at the outset his discussion seems to go somewhat off the declared topic. The arguments he presents in his *responsio* are designed to prove the existence of the common sense as a faculty which is behind and in control of the external senses, apprehending their acts, and combining the information that is provided by them. None of the arguments give any reason for the distinction of the common sense from the external senses. This apparent perplexity can, however, be accounted for by taking into heed Olivi's idea about the distinctness of the external senses. A few questions earlier (in question 60) Olivi has already shown that the external senses differ from each other. His rejection of the Avicennian idea of a single perceptual capacity, which has different modes of perceiving that are realised as the five external senses, is already evident on the basis of question 60. It is therefore sufficient for him to prove the necessity of the existence of a faculty that somehow brings together the different external senses. This faculty cannot be any of the external senses because they are not capable of apprehending the acts and objects of the other senses. Hence, it is clear that Olivi understands the combining faculty, the common sense, as a faculty that differs from the external senses.

However, the relation between the common sense and the external senses is more complicated than it seems at the outset. In his response to the counter-

¹⁹ The topic has been discussed also by Bettoni 1959, 380–9.

arguments, Olivi takes up the question of the mutual relationship between the perceptual faculties and draws a vague picture. He begins by pointing out that the organs of the external senses are rooted in the heart and brain, which are the organs of the common sense²⁰. This, as Olivi remarks, has led some to think that the common sense and the external senses are not essentially different faculties, but the external senses are rather like streams flowing from the fountain of the common sense (*II Sent.* q. 62, 592). In other words, Olivi refers again to the Avicennian view, according to which there is only one perceptual capacity, which is limited to different modes of acting in different organs of the senses, and he claims that this idea is based on the physiological connection between the primary organs (brain and heart) and the organs of the external senses.

Olivi does not accept this view. He puts forward a few counter-arguments, which are of a metaphysical nature, and concludes that the external senses and the common sense are numerically, specifically, and essentially different from each other²¹. But he continues and says something quite idiosyncratic and even frustrating, namely, that there is something in common between his own view and the one he is opposing:

However, both explanations agree in that the common sense is in the five external senses, and those five are in it by a kind of radical unity of essence or by an essential connection and coexistence. And so, even though the common sense is principally in the heart and in the brain, nevertheless its secondary and subsidiary existence is in all the organs of the five external senses and in all the parts thereof. And similarly, the senses of sight, hearing, taste, and smell are not in their proper organs in such a way that their existence would not extend as radically (*conradicabiliter*) all the way to the radical organ of the common sense. And no wonder because their organs are not unextended nor simple. Quite the contrary, they are composed of and combined with diverse [parts] and stretched radically all the way to the brain and to the heart by mediation of the brain, inasmuch it is the organ of the common sense [...]²²

²⁰ “[...] organa quinque sensuum seu organizatio ipsorum procedit a corde et cerebro et iterum in illa sicut in radicem suæ substantiæ impendent et reflectuntur seu recolliguntur.” (*II Sent.* q. 62, 592; see also *ibid.*, q. 51, 123.) For more details on Olivi’s view concerning the localisation of the common sense, see Part II, Chapter 11.1, footnote 8.

²¹ Olivi points out that the essence of every sense is to be essentially ordered to its objects, which requires that it is differentiated from the others by substantial differences. Substantial differences change species, and thus the senses belong to different species and cannot be one faculty. See *II Sent.* q. 62, 592–3.

²² “Uterque tamen modus in hoc concordat quod vel per quandam radicalis essentiæ identitatem vel per essentialem cohærentiam et coexistentiam est sensus communis intra quinque sensus et ipsi quinque in eo. Et ideo, licet sensus communis principaliter est in corde et in cerebro, nihilominus eius secundaria et supprincipalis existentia est in omnibus organis quinque sensuum et in qualibet parte illorum. Et consimiliter visus vel auditus et gustus et odoratus non sic sunt in suis propriis organis quin eorum existentia conradicabiliter attingat usque ad radicale organum sensus communis. Nec mirum, quia organa eorum non sunt punctalia nec simplicia, immo ex diversis composita et connexa et usque ad cerebrum radicaliter pertingentia illoque mediante pertingunt ad cor, prout est organum sensus communis [...].” (*II Sent.* q. 62, 593–4.) Olivi still uses the metaphors of streams flowing from a

The faculties differ from each other, and still they overlap physiologically: the common sense extends to the organs of the senses, and the external senses stretch to the brain and thence to the heart. Olivi thinks this overlapping is necessary, because otherwise the common sense would not be able to apprehend the acts of the senses immediately when they take place (see, for example, *II Sent.* q. 51, 132; *ibid.*, q. 58, 502–3). It seems that although Olivi considers the common sense as essentially distinct from the external senses because its functions (apprehending the objects and acts of the senses, governing, and controlling the senses, accounting for unitary consciousness, and providing a self-image—I shall discuss more about all these functions below) are such that they cannot be performed by any of the external senses or even by all of them together, he does not think that the bodily realisation of the common sense should be completely disconnected from the organs of the external senses.

Olivi's discussion about these matters is unfortunately far from comprehensive, but the overall picture is that the external senses and the common sense are distinct faculties—although the boundary between their organs is vague. The faculties are distinct from each other because the external senses are essentially different from each other due to their separate modes of sensing, and yet there is a need for a governing faculty that brings the senses together—a faculty that cannot be an external sense. The boundary between the organs, however, is not precise. The external senses are not confined to their proper organs, but are within the sensory nerves and even in the brain²³. Similarly, the common sense extends towards the organs of the external senses. This is slightly confusing because the concession to the rivalling Avicennian view seems to somewhat undermine the entire effort of making a distinction between the common sense and the external senses. This idea about the vague boundary may reflect the medieval medical theory, according to which the refined and fine matter called *spiritus animalis* flows in the ventricles of the brain and from there to the sensory nerves and organs of the senses²⁴. It is impossible (or at least highly arbitrary) to point out a certain point at which this carrier of the sensory powers changes into another faculty. Olivi, however, does not relate his idea to any physiological considerations, so we are left with nothing but conjectures²⁵.

It is noteworthy that Olivi does not consider it a problem that two distinct faculties are actualised in one and the same organ. For instance, he thinks that

fountain, and centre and radii of a circle: “[...] nam sensus communis est superior sensibus particularibus, et tamen isti radicanur in illo quasi sicut rivi in suo fonte et sicut diversæ lineæ radiosæ in suo puncto generali et fontali.” (*ibid.*, q. 51 app., 194.) He also repeatedly calls the common sense a radix of the external senses (for example, in *ibid.*, q. 62, 592). As I have already stated, this terminology was employed generally. See, e.g., *ST I.78.4 ad 1*.

²³ “[...] virtutes sensuum particularium radicaliori modo respiciunt cerebrum et nervos interiores quam organa exteriora, ut oculos, aures, nares et consimilia; et tamen actus earum aliquo modo respiciunt prius et immediatus exteriora organa quam interiora, licet non ita radicaliter.” (*II Sent.* q. 51, 114; see also *ibid.*, q. 58, 510; *ibid.*, q. 73, 97.)

²⁴ For a clear presentation of the medical theory of *spiritus animalis*, see Harvey 1975.

²⁵ Note, however, that he explicitly adheres to the idea that sensitive powers are carried by *spiritus animalis*. See *II Sent.* q. 49, 9; *ibid.*, q. 50 app., 69–70; *ibid.*, q. 51, 112; *ibid.*, q. 58, 494, 506; *ibid.*, q. 59, 528, 550; *ibid.*, q. 62, 595; *ibid.*, q. 73, 97; *Quodl.* I.4, 17.

the sense of touch exists in the whole body, including the organs of other external senses: it is realised, for example, in the eyes because we feel the pressure and puncture if our eyes are pressed or pricked. (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 167.) In this way, two faculties may be realised in one and the same organ. Moreover, he seems to think that in simple animals, such as worms (*annulosi vermes*), there is no difference between the organs of touch (which is the only external sense that the simplest animals have) and the organ of the common sense because worms do not have a central organ which could be appointed as its seat. Even so, he seems to think that even in the case of worms these faculties differ from each other. (*II Sent.* q. 62, 590; *Quæst. de virt.* q. 5, 260.) In other words, in the case of worms and other very simple animals the common sense and the sense of touch are realised in the same organ, and still they can be considered as distinct faculties. In this way, Olivi does not think it is a problem that two faculties exist physiologically in the same organ or are realised in the same matter. This applies to the common sense and the external senses also in the case of higher animals and human beings because the boundaries of the organs of these faculties are crossed and a certain physiological limit of one faculty cannot be located.

We may consider why Olivi thinks that external senses must be separate from the common sense. One reason is that he approaches the question of unity and distinctness from the point of view of the soul and not from the point of view of physiology. It is quite clear that faculties cross the boundaries of organs in all possible ways: there are faculties that are realised in multiple organs (the common sense is both in the heart and in the brain) and there are organs that incorporate many distinct faculties (e.g., the external senses and the common sense in the brain, or the senses of touch and sight in the eyes). Even though Olivi sometimes appeals to physiology when he discusses the difference between faculties of the soul, physiological facts are clearly of a secondary importance for him. The soul is composed of different faculties, and the reasons for holding two faculties as separate from or identical with each other are either related to psychological considerations or to metaphysical considerations of the soul. Perhaps we can say that even though it is quite difficult to understand *how* two distinct faculties can be realised in the same matter, the psychological processes they bring about are clearly distinct from each other. For instance, an act of seeing is psychologically quite different from pain in the eye, and these two processes can take place independently of each other. It seems that the psychological difference and the possibility of independent activity are good enough reasons for Olivi to conclude that there must be two distinct faculties, even within the same organ²⁶.

Despite the separation of the common sense from the external senses, Olivi thinks that there is a close functional relation between these faculties. The common sense—to which Olivi attributes perception, very much in the same way as Avicenna as we saw in the passage cited above—perceives external objects only

²⁶ Although it is not completely apparent whether the latter idea (a possibility of independent activity) can be applied to the distinction between the common sense and the external senses because at the outset Olivi seems to think that the external senses cannot function unless the common sense functions as well. See Chapter 6.2 below.

through the external senses and their acts. The only thing it apprehends directly is the activity of the senses. By apprehending the acts of the senses, it apprehends also the external objects:

It must be known first, therefore, that the common sense cannot immediately apprehend any real and present object except for the acts of the external senses, by which it apprehends the objects of those acts. This is because the acts of the senses cohere with their objects and take them into themselves in such a way that by apprehending the act the object of that act is also apprehended.²⁷

Thus, the common sense needs the external senses, which it uses to perceive external objects. It is the centre in which all the external senses converge, but it does not apprehend anything external directly by itself. This accentuates Olivi's conception of the common sense as being a centre of perceptual awareness. The acts and objects of the external senses are apprehended by the common sense, and this makes the subject conscious of external objects and also of the acts of sensing. At the outset, this idea seems to lead into a representational theory of perception, but we shall soon see that this is not what Olivi has in mind. Rather, his critique towards the theories of perception which prevailed at the time is partly aimed at the alleged representationalist currents in those theories. Olivi's idea appears to be that the common sense, being the centre of perceptual consciousness, somehow uses the external senses in order to reach the external objects. It does not perceive the external object *in* the acts of the senses but *by* them. In order to understand this idea, however, we must first consider Olivi's criticism towards the theories of perception which he thinks lead into representationalism and endanger the freedom of the will.

²⁷ "Sciendum ergo primo quod sensus communis nullum obiectum reale et praesentiale potest immediate apprehendere nisi tantum actus particularium sensuum per quorum actus apprehendit obiecta eorum; quia actus eorum sic cohærent suis obiectis et sic tenent illa intra se quod eo ipso quo apprehenditur actus apprehenditur eius obiectum." (*II Sent.* q. 62, 594; see also *ibid.*, q. 61, 582–3; *ibid.* q. 32, 588–9.) To be precise, the common sense is capable of apprehending also *actuales aspectūs* (a term which I shall discuss later, in Chapter 5.3) of the external senses, and even reflexively its own acts (*ibid.*, q. 62, 595). The question of the reflexivity of the common sense is dealt with in Part III, Chapter 20.3.

4 CRITICISM OF SPECIES THEORIES OF PERCEPTION

Olivi is known as the first thinker to present a thorough criticism of the so-called species theories of perception that were prevalent at the time he developed his own thought. He criticises some of the central tenets of these theories and concludes with a complete rejection of them due to the problems he sees in certain focal issues—especially problematic according to Olivi is the assumption that we and our cognitive faculties are passive in the process of perception. His rigorous attack against these theories is partly motivated by his fear that the belief in the passivity of the faculties of the soul endangers the freedom of the will by making it more acceptable that the will too is a passive power. Still, it is evident that his interest in theories of perception (and theories of cognition in general) is not just subordinate to his theological and philosophical worries concerning absolute freedom. Rather, he is interested in these theories in their own right as well. Olivi develops his own theory of perception with an eye on the problems in earlier theories, especially in species theories, and he is fully aware that the theory he proposes in their stead is a novel challenge to them. Therefore, in order to understand his alternative approach, we must begin by outlining some of the central tenets of the theories he opposes and then move on to see on what grounds he rejects them.

Even though I shall discuss the theories Olivi opposes to some extent, my intention here is not to give a comprehensive and detailed analysis of any single theory of perception for two reasons. First, given the diversity among the 13th century discussions on the topic it would be misleading to present any one of them as the prevailing theory or as “a typical medieval view” against which Olivi reacted. This would hinder the understanding of the fact that Olivi wrote at a time that witnessed a lively discussion of several authors who all proposed their own theories. The Aristotelian influence was heavy in all the rivalling theories of perception during this time, to be sure. However, Arabic innovations, especially in the development of a new perspectivist approach to vision, and even Neoplatonic ideas of the activity of the soul in perception played a role in the resulting variety of different theories. In other words, there simply was no single theory

that can be labelled *the* medieval theory of perception. Markedly, there was no single theory that can be labelled *the* species theory of perception. Rather, there was an assortment of competing theories which have something in common but which differ in many details. Thus, there is no point in portraying a single theory of perception to serve as a background and as an aid in understanding Olivi's theory because the background is too complex.

Second, Olivi's criticism itself is aimed at very general principles of these competing theories. Even though the main targets of his attack are probably Roger Bacon and other developers of a new perspectivist theory of perception (the so-called perspectivists)¹, he does not have only one particular theory in mind. His criticism is directed against all kinds of theories of perception which have certain fundamental principles in common. It is these common principles that he mainly rejects, and by criticising them he refutes also the theories which are based on them. Thus, in order to understand Olivi's critique and the basic principles of his view, it is necessary to take up here only those features which are fundamental to the rivalling theories and which Olivi explicitly opposes.

With this in mind, the most important and pervasive feature at the base of Olivi's criticism is the overall approach that is common to many medieval theories of perception, including the new perspectivist theories and those which are more strictly Aristotelian. According to this approach, the cognitive faculties of the soul are passive recipients of external stimuli. The process of perception is depicted as the cognitive faculties of the soul "being acted upon" by external objects: an external object actualises a potency inherent in the soul. The actualisation of a perceptual faculty amounts to perception. This idea raises a problem, since it was commonly assumed that an agent must be present to the recipient to act on it. Taking this into consideration, one might ask how the objects of sight are meant to actualise the potency to see in the eyes: it is pertinent to ask, for example, how the colours of a distant object, say, of a mouse reach the eyes of a cat that is chasing it. And we should also consider what makes the cat's act of seeing an act that is about the mouse? Arguably, there must be some kind of causal link between the mouse that the cat sees and the cat's faculty of sight.

Many 13th century authors appealed to the so-called sensible species (*species sensibiles*) when they dealt with the aforementioned questions. There were, certainly, different possible ways of understanding the ontology of the sensible species, the details of the process which explains the causal link between the object and the perception thereof, and how the sensible species actualise the perceptual faculties. The basic idea, however, was that the sensible species bring the information of the perceptual qualities of the objects to the external senses as the species actualise the senses. The sensible species are images, similitudes, likenesses, or forms which account for the causal link between perceived objects and the faculties of perception; they fill the causal gap and cover the distance between the object and the faculty, and they bring about acts of sensation. Species were sometimes understood as kinds of corporeal entities that actually travel from ob-

¹ Tachau 1988, 39–40; Olivier Boulnois, *Être et représentation: Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (XIII^e–XIV^e siècle)*, Épiphée (Paris: PUF, 1999), 56–67.

jects to the organs of the senses; some claimed that they are accidental forms of objects and that the same form that exists as colour on the surface of the objects actualises the transparent medium (illuminated air and water) and the faculty of perception. Perspectivists such as Bacon argued that the sensible species are multiplied in the medium: the perceptible quality of the object generates a species in the adjacent medium. This species, in turn, generates a further species in the contiguous part of the medium along a straight line. The propagation of the species is a process of successive actualisation of the medium, and when the species happens to meet a sense organ it actualises the cognitive faculty that is realised in the organ; this is an act of sensation.² This idea became quite popular, and even those who did not agree with the idea of the multiplication of species oftentimes accepted the existence of sensible species as an explanation for the connection between the senses and the objects of sensation. The perceptible qualities of objects do not affect the senses directly, but still there is a causal connection between the objects and the cognitive faculties due to the mediating device of the sensible species. Then again, many medieval authors thought, in an Aristotelian manner, that the sensible species are received in the cognitive faculties without matter, and they expressed this by claiming that the sensible species have a spiritual or intentional existence in the medium and in the cognitive faculties—an idea that they took from Averroës. The idea behind this is that, say, the colour of an external object does not make the medium between the bodily organ and the object coloured, and the eyes do not become red when a red apple is seen. Thus, the form of redness has a different kind of existence in the medium and in the eye than in the apple. Different authors understood the notions of reception without matter and spiritual existence in different ways, but the overall idea remains the same.³ This list of different ways to understand what sensible species are and how they function is not meant to be exhaustive, but it points out that despite the differences in details, there are some rather stable elements that are shared by many theories of perception.

In order to obtain a slightly more substantial picture of the theories Olivi opposes, we may have a short look at Aquinas' view. I do not intend to claim that

² For the reception and development of the perspectivist account which introduced the idea of the multiplication of the species *in medio*, see Tachau 1988, 3–26; For discussion of the history of the theory of perception as a reception of a sensible form, see, e.g., Martin M. Tweedale, "Origins of the Medieval Theory That Sensation Is an Immaterial Reception of a Form," *Philosophical Topics* 20:2 (fall 1992): 215–31. The idea about the multiplication of species comes from Grosseteste (Lindberg 1976, 94–102), but its main developer was Roger Bacon. See also Spruit 1994, 1–255: although he is mainly concerned with the theories concerning intelligible species, he discusses also medieval views on sensible species to some extent. Olivi discusses the multiplication of species in *II Sent.* q. 26, 446–64 and seems to deny it, but as we shall see, the issue is not central to his own view.

³ For discussion and references, see Knuuttila 2008, 8–17. However, Bacon understood the sensible species as corporeal entities: although they can occupy the same physical space in the medium without interfering with each other, they do not have a spiritual being. Bacon's view had little effect, though, and the idea about spiritual being prevailed in the Middle Ages. (Calvin G. Normore, "The Matter of Thought," in *Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. H. Lagerlund, Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 126–7.)

Aquinas would have been the main target of Olivi's criticism; quite the contrary, but Aquinas presents some of the central ideas in an easily digestible form, as he describes the process of perception as follows:

A sense is a passive power meant to be changed by an external sensible object. This external source of change is the per se object of sense perception, and where it differs the nature of the sense power differs. But there are two sorts of change within things, natural and spiritual. Natural change is when the form of the source of change is received into the subject of change according to a natural existence, as heat is absorbed by something being heated. Spiritual change is when the form of the source of change is received in the subject of change according to a spiritual existence, the way the form of a colour is in the eye, which does not thereby become coloured. An operation of a sense involves a spiritual change by which the intention of the sensed form comes to be within the sense organ. Otherwise—supposing natural change accounted for sensation—all natural bodies would sense when they are altered. But in some senses, namely sight, there is spiritual change only. In others, along with spiritual change, there is natural change as well [...]⁴

From our point of view, the crucial ideas in this passage are the passivity of the senses, the spiritual existence of the perceptible forms (i.e., the sensible species), the conception of perception as being acted upon by a sensible species, and the overall approach of perception as a process that begins from the object and ends up with the actualisation of the cognitive faculties of the soul. Aquinas' theory as well as the theories of other medieval Aristotelians are—to use David Lindberg's well known classification (Lindberg 1976)—intromissive theories, which emphasise the passivity of perception: external objects affect our sense organs and/or cognitive faculties, and this amounts to perceiving. The same approach is present in the theories of the perspectivists, such as Roger Bacon. One impor-

⁴ "Est autem sensus quædam potentia passiva, quæ nata est immutari ab exteriori sensibili. Exterius ergo immutativum est quod per se a sensu percipitur, et secundum cuius diversitatem sensitivæ potentiæ distinguuntur. Est autem duplex immutatio: una naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale, sicut calor in calefacto. Spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale; ut forma coloris in pupilla, quæ non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formæ sensibilis fiat in organo sensus. Alioquin, si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora naturalia sentirent dum alterantur. Sed in quibusdam sensibus invenitur immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in visu. — In quibusdam autem, cum immutatione spirituali, etiam naturalis [...]" (*ST* I.78.3.) The translation is taken from the Blackfriars edition (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiæ* vol. 11 (Ia. 75-83), Paperback edition, ed. T. Suttor (Cambridge: CUP, 2006)), but I have made small emendations to it. A well known controversy over Aquinas' conception of the relation between spiritual existence and cognitive operations has ensued in modern scholarship. The problematic idea is that on the one hand it seems that Aquinas identifies spiritual existence with cognition, but on the other hand, if he does it seems to follow that the medium also cognises. For discussion, see Chapter 7.1 below; For Aquinas' theory of perception, see, e.g., Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (London/NY: Routledge, 2003), 244–76; Pasnau 2002, 171–99; Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind*, Topics in Medieval Philosophy (London/NY: Routledge, 1993), 31–40.

tant difference between Aquinas and the perspectivists is that the latter are not as clear about the sensible species' mode of existence in the medium and in the sense organs. For instance, Bacon seems to understand species as corporeal entities, although they may be called spiritual because they cannot be perceived (Tachau 1988, 22–3). Olivi rules out this possibility by claiming that it leads to untenable consequences, but the crux of Olivi's criticism is that regardless of whether the species are corporeal entities or have a spiritual existence (whatever that means), they cannot account for the perceptual process.⁵

It is important to note that the idea in Aristotelian species theories of perception is not to introduce sensible species as a kind of representational object which would be the immediate object of a cognitive act. Rather, a sensible species is a theoretical postulate which accounts for the causal relation between the external objects and cognitive faculties. Sensible species are not immediate objects of cognition, but causal intermediaries by which perception occurs, and the object that is perceived is in reality the external object itself. In this way, these theories at least pretend to avoid representationalism and adhere to direct realism.⁶

This, however, is one of the points Olivi clings to. Being probably the first scholastic philosopher to question their existence (Tachau 1988, 27), he sternly attacks theories that employ sensible species; he claims that if species were to be understood as representations of external objects, they would necessarily be the primary and immediate objects of our cognition⁷ and that if perception were to occur by the mediation of sensible species, we would actually be hindered from perceiving external objects altogether. In other words, Olivi argues that some of the species theories lead into epistemological problems of representationalism.

However, it is important to note that Olivi does not think that this kind of critique applies to all versions of species theory. When dealing with Olivi's theory of cognition and the critique that Olivi directs towards species theories, Robert Pasnau claims that: "Olivi's strategy is to advance through a series of ever-more-serious charges against the species theory. His attack culminates in the claim that the theory would leave us epistemologically isolated from the external world." (Pasnau 1997b, 236.) It seems to me that Pasnau is only partially right. Even though the charge of representationalism is an important part of Olivi's critique, he does not claim that *all* species theories are representationalist theories. Instead,

⁵ Tachau 1988, 43–6. Olivi takes up the two possible ways of interpreting the metaphysics of the species—i.e. that they have an *esse naturale et sensibile* or an *esse intentionale et spirituale et simplex*—in *II Sent.* q. 73, 87.

⁶ The standard interpretation of Aquinas' theory of perception goes along these lines. See, e.g., Kenny 1993, 35–6. This interpretation has been questioned in Pasnau 1997b, 195–219. Pasnau's claim, to put it shortly, is as follows: Aquinas thinks that sensible species are objects of perception and not just causal intermediaries. Pasnau has further supported his reading in Robert Pasnau, "Id quo cognoscimus," in Knuuttila & Kärkkäinen 2008, 131–49, but his interpretation is not generally accepted.

⁷ In many contexts, Olivi discusses intellectual and sensitive cognition without making a clear distinction between the two, and he rejects species theory in both cases. To my mind, this reflects his idea that human beings are conscious of the objects they perceive by their intellects (See Part III, Chapter 18.1). The distinction between intellectual and sensory cognition is not significant from this perspective.

he discusses many versions of species theories (and also other kinds of theories of perception, which do not make use of sensible species), and refutes only some of them on the basis that they lead to epistemological isolation.⁸ The views that Olivi discusses and rejects are the following (*II Sent.* q. 58, 461–2):

- (A) Cognitive acts are produced directly by the objects.
- (B) Cognitive acts are produced by species, which are caused by objects. This claim has two versions:
 - (B1) Species are the only efficient causes of cognitive acts.
 - (B2) Species and faculties are both efficient causes.
- (C) Cognitive acts are produced by species, which are produced by the faculties of the soul⁹. This claim also has two versions:
 - (C1) The role of the object is not specified.
 - (C2) Objects must excite the faculties to produce the species.

The focal point of Olivi's discussion of these theories of cognition is to question the widely accepted assumption that faculties of the soul (other than the will) are passive in relation to their objects, i.e., the faculties are actualised by their objects one way or another. Olivi thinks that the main reason some have come to think that the will is a passive power is a belief of the passivity of the other faculties of the soul: "My impression is that the main reason many have come to believe that our will is completely passive has been and is that they take it to be certain that all the other faculties [of the soul] are passive."¹⁰ By undermining this belief, Olivi bolsters his own thesis that the will is an active faculty.¹¹ This line of criticism applies to the theories belonging to groups (A) and (B), and the critique of

⁸ Pasnau also recognises that Olivi's critique of this kind applies only to certain versions of species theory (Pasnau 1997b, 238–9.), but he does not deal with Olivi's reaction to other versions of species theory, thus leaving an impression that Olivi opposes only representationalist theories of cognition.

⁹ According to Spruit 1994, 219, Matthew of Aquasparta and Roger Marston held this view. See *ibid.*, 228–31, 235–7. However, the source of this view may also be Robert Kilwardby's *De spiritu fantastico*, in which Kilwardby presents an active theory of perception. According to him, the soul forms in itself a similitude of the object that causes changes in the sense organs and then perceives the similitude by a reflexive act. See José Filipe Silva, "Robert Kilwardby on Sense Perception," in Knuuttila & Kärkkäinen 2008, 87–99.

¹⁰ "Quia autem illud quod meo iudicio super omnia movit multos ad credendum quod voluntas nostra sit totaliter passiva fuit et est hoc quod pro firmo tenent omnes alias potentias esse passivas." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 461.)

¹¹ Tachau 1988, 39–40. Because Olivi's principal motivation to present an alternative theory of perception was to ensure the freedom of the will, it is natural that he does not hold fast to the criticism he presents against species theories of perception. This is especially true in his apologetical writings (*Responsio prima*, *Responsio secunda*, and *Ep.*) but also in *Summa*. In *Responsio prima* 10, 128, and *Responsio secunda*, 404–5 Olivi concedes that these questions are only philosophical and that he does not care how they should be understood; in *Ep.* 13, 55–6 he points out that in *Summa* he only presents the views of some other thinkers. These statements are in agreement with his wording in *II Sent.* q. 58: he uses impersonal expressions when he presents his alternative to the species theory, and he explicitly says that it is presented only to show that the freedom of the will can be defended also in that way

representationalism that troubles the latter group is subordinate to Olivi's worry about the passivity of the faculties of the soul. Theories of the type (C) are rejected because ultimately they make the species superfluous: perceptual processes can be accounted for without employing the species.

Although I shall present the main lines of Olivi's criticism against all these different types of theories, I shall concentrate on his charge against (B)—that is, against the types of species theories that I have been discussing above—because it is the most relevant to this study, it contains the most philosophically interesting features, and because his arguments against the other types, as Katherine Tachau describes: “remain sketches, a skeleton begging for flesh on the bones.” (Tachau 1988, 48–9.) It is important to acquire a general impression of the skeleton as well, but because the rejection of the other types of theories is less important for my purposes, I do not intend to present Olivi's discussions in full detail but to concentrate on the general lines that reveal features of Olivi's own approach.¹²

Olivi rejects the theories of the type (A) by claiming that if cognitive acts were caused or produced solely by external objects, the acts should be attributed to the objects and not to the cognising subject. He seems to think that any activity belongs properly to the agent and not to the recipient, i.e., to the active party which brings them about and not to the passive recipient of the activity. Thus, his claim amounts to saying that if the acts of seeing by which a cat acquires a sensation of a mouse and a bowl of cream are caused only by the mouse and the bowl in such a way that the faculty of sight of the cat has nothing to do with the production of these acts, we should say that the mouse and the bowl are seeing, not the cat. Moreover, he argues that an act receives its essence completely from the agent that produces it, and thus there would be no reason to think that only human and non-human animals are capable of cognition if the action of the objects were sufficient to produce a cognitive act. A perceptual object should in this case, in principle, be capable of bringing about an act of cognition not only in our cognitive faculties but in everything else it happens to act upon.

Although Olivi's arguments are perhaps not very convincing, it is clear that he thinks it necessary to give at least some role to the cognitive faculties of the

(*II Sent.* q. 58, 461, 515). It is, however, quite clear that Olivi prefers his alternative account of perception because on another occasion he writes that: “[...] actus cognitivus efficiatur ab ipsa potentia tanquam a vi activa, probatur. Primo eisdem rationibus quibus probatur quod voluntas est potentia activa. Nam et principales rationes, quibus philosophantes conantur probare potentias cognitivas non esse activas sed passivas, non minus probant hoc de voluntate. Et tamen ex hoc sequitur destructio libertatis ac per consequens et omnis boni moralis [...]” (*ibid.*, q. 74, 124.) That is, the arguments which prove the passivity of other faculties of the soul *necessarily* apply also to the will. Since he is not prepared to allow the passivity of the will, he must also reject the passivity of other faculties and thus deny species theories. Olivi also explicitly adheres to his alternative account of perception and to the criticism against species theories (*ibid.*, q. 72, 17; *ibid.*, q. 73, 63–103). In this way the arguments Olivi presents in questions 58 and 72–74 (of which I shall speak more below) give us firm ground to conclude that it is Olivi himself who conceives of all the faculties of the soul as active in regard to their objects and that Olivi upholds his criticism of species theories despite the impersonal manner in which he presents it.

¹² Olivi's rejection of the views (A), (B), and (C) can be found in *II Sent.* q. 58, 463–77; See also *ibid.*, 487–9; *ibid.*, q. 73, 83–103; *ibid.*, q. 74, 122–4.

soul in the process of perception. He supports this idea also by appealing to our intimate experiences. When we have acts of perception (or intellection, for that matter), we feel that we are active in their production. The acts come from us, not from objects. As we shall see, this idea becomes important for him when he discusses his own view about the activity of the faculties of the soul. On the basis of these arguments, which remain rather sketchy, Olivi comes to the conclusion that the idea that external objects are the sole cause of cognitive acts must be rejected.

Theories of the type (B) receive the most versatile treatment of all the theories Olivi opposes¹³. Although his critique against such theories is largely based on his claim that they lead to problems of representationalism and ultimately leave us in epistemological isolation, this line of criticism is not the only one he advances. For instance, in opposition to (B1) he repeats the idea that if the acts were completely produced by the species, there would be no reason to say that *we* perceive since any activity must be attributed to the agent rather than to the recipient—in this case to the species generated by the perceptual object. Thus, he appeals again to the idea that our cognitive faculties must have some role in perception. His rejection of (B2) is more complicated, for it comes in many versions since the role of the species can be understood in many ways. Olivi presents altogether four options: a sensible species is a partial cause of a cognitive act, a disposition without which a faculty cannot bring itself to act, a representation of the object, or a proximate cause of a cognitive act with the faculty being the ultimate cause. None of these satisfy Olivi, and he shortly criticises all of them by pointing out technical and metaphysical problems. Just to show what kind of arguments he utilises, we may take one up that he presents against the idea that species are dispositions which enable the cognitive faculties to bring about their own acts: to Olivi dispositions are lasting modifications of the faculties whereas species cannot remain in them after the object that causes them is removed from the scope of the cognitive faculty. Thus, Olivi draws a conceptual distinction between a species and a disposition, and thus rejects the idea that they are the same. This and other arguments that are similar in kind prove, in his eyes, that species cannot be even partial efficient causes of our cognitive activity.

We can see already from this argument that Olivi opposes many versions of species theories that fall within the general lines of (B) and that different versions are rejected on different grounds. It seems apparent, however, that the main targets of his charge are the species theories I outlined in the beginning of this chapter: the perspectivist theories which depict species as corporeal entities that are multiplied in the medium, and the Aristotelian theories in which the species have spiritual existence both in the medium and in the soul. As he puts it, species can be understood in two ways: “Some also say in accordance to this that every sensible object generates two kinds of species: one having a natural and sensible being and the other having only intentional, spiritual, and simple being”¹⁴. The

¹³ The following discussion is in many ways indebted to Pasnau 1997b, 236-47.

¹⁴ “Iuxta quod et quidam dicunt quod a quolibet obiecto sensibili gignitur duo genera specierum, una scilicet habens esse naturale et sensibile et alia habens solum esse intentionale et spirituale et simplex [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 73, 87.)

first option must be rejected because it fails to explain everything it purports to explain: a corporeal species can perhaps account for the rectilinear propagation of light and vision, but it falls short of being able to bring about a cognitive act. Only a spiritual and unextended species may be capable of producing a spiritual and unextended act of cognition¹⁵. In more precise terms, a corporeal species cannot function as a representation of an external object. This brings us to Olivi's critique against representationalist theories of perception. For the other way to conceive of the metaphysics of the sensible species—namely, to take them as simple and spiritual entities—makes them capable of representing external objects. But even the species theories in which species are understood in this way cannot be true, according to Olivi, because he is convinced that this way of understanding the species leads to serious problems, which ultimately tear an epistemological gap between us and the external world.

As I already pointed out, one of the many versions of (B2) claims that species are needed as representations of external objects. This is the version of species theory that receives the most attention and sharpest criticism from Olivi¹⁶. His starting point is that the main reason species are postulated is that they represent external objects: "[...] [species] are not needed to represent an object, and still this is for what they seem to be needed the most"¹⁷. However, we may ask what it means that a species is a representation. In the medieval context, being a representation can be understood in two ways, as Pasnau has pointed out. According to the first view—which he calls a sophisticated theory of species—a sensible species is not a representational object of cognition, but rather it is a cognitive state by virtue of which a cognitive faculty and its act represent an object from the external world. According to the other version, the so-called naïve species theory, the species functions as a representational object which is a kind of a sign that represents an external object to a cognitive faculty. (Pasnau 1997b, 195–7, 238.) The former view comes very close to the reading of Aquinas I depicted above: the species is not apprehended as an object, but it is a theoretical postulate *by which* the external object is perceived. It is a representation only insofar as a cognitive act that is caused by it represents an external object to the cognising subject. Thus, in this view the species is not an object which is apprehended by a cognitive faculty. By contrast, the latter view is a rather straightforward version of the representationalist theory of perception, in which the species is an object of apprehension that represents the object that has generated it. According to this view, an external object is apprehended only indirectly by a direct apprehension of the species that represents it.

Now, Olivi's criticism towards species theories is mostly aimed against the naïve version of the theory. This reflects his own understanding of the perceptual process. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, he thinks that the cognitive fac-

¹⁵ *II Sent.* q. 73, 83–4. For discussion see Tachau 1988, 43–7; Normore 2007, 130–1.

¹⁶ Olivi criticises representationalist version of species theories in many places. At least the following are important: *II Sent.* q. 58, 469–70; *ibid.*, 487–502; *ibid.*, q. 74, 122–3.

¹⁷ “[...] [species] non exigitur ad repræsentandum obiectum, et tamen hoc est illud pro quod magis videbatur exigi.” (*II Sent.* q. 74, 122.)

ulties of the soul are active and that they must be intentionally directed towards an object before they can bring about an intentional act of perception. It seems only natural that sensible species play the role of objects in this kind of approach. I shall argue below that Olivi thinks his critique applies also to the sophisticated species theories, but let us first see what he takes to be the main problem in the naïve version of species theory.

Olivi opposes this representationalist interpretation of species theory because he thinks it entails problematic epistemological consequences. According to him, sensible species that are understood as representations through which our cognitive faculties are meant to apprehend external objects would hinder us from perceiving the objects they represent. In the end, this idea would lead to sceptical conclusions in relation to the reliability of our senses. If an act of perception were to take place by the mediation of a sensible species, the species would be the first and immediate object of our perception:

Moreover, a species would never actually represent the object to the faculty, unless the faculty regarded it by directing and fixing its gaze (*aspectum*) to it. But the thing to which the gaze of the faculty is directed is an object (*habet rationem obiecti*), and the thing to which it is first directed is a primary object. Therefore, these species would rather be objects than intermediate or representative principles. — Moreover, a faculty apprehends and cognises that thing as an object to which it directs itself, in order to regard it. So, if it regards the species, it cognises it as its object [...] and so we would always cognise the species before the thing that is in front of us.¹⁸

In this text Olivi lays out the most fundamental ideas of his criticism. A sensible species cannot represent an external object to a perceptual faculty otherwise than by being the object of perception. The only way a sensible species can affect the faculties of the soul is by becoming an object of perception, and as such it would also be the first object. It is clear that by this expression Olivi does not mean temporal priority. Rather, his idea is that the first object of perception is what is perceived as an object, and, crucially, if this is how perception takes place, the external object is not perceived at all. Thus, in Olivi's view this kind of species theory results in a complete inability to apprehend the external object because as an intermediary object of apprehension the sensible species "would rather veil the thing and impede us from seeing it as present and in itself than help us in doing so."¹⁹

¹⁸ "Præterea, nunquam species actu repræsentabit obiectum ipsi potentia, nisi potentia aspiciat ipsam, ita quod convertat et figat aspectum suum in ipsam. Sed illud ad quod convertitur aspectus potentia, habet rationem obiecti, et illud ad quod primo convertitur habet rationem primi obiecti. Ergo species istæ plus habebunt rationem obiecti quam rationem principii intermedii seu repræsentativi. — Præterea, illud ad quod aspiciendum potentia convertitur, ab ipsa potentia apprehenditur et cognoscitur tanquam eius obiectum. Si igitur aspicit ipsam speciem, ergo cognoscit eam tanquam suum obiectum [...] et ita semper primo cognosceremus speciem quam ipsam rem obiectam." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 469.)

¹⁹ "[...] potius velaret rem et impediret eam præsentialiter aspici in se ipsa quam ad hoc adiuvaret." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 469.)

Olivi's way of interpreting the naïve species theory is flagrantly representationalist. It portrays perception as similar to a case in which a person sees a painting and claims to see the thing that the painting is about. When I see one of the self-portraits of Vincent van Gogh, I do not see van Gogh but only an image of him; similarly, Olivi thinks the naïve species theory entails that when a cat sees a mouse, it does not actually see the mouse but an internal representation of the mouse—which may or may not be truthful. The representational species would be apprehended as such, and this interpretation leads to epistemological problems and even to sceptical conclusions. As I am in no position to judge whether van Gogh really looked like his self-portrait, the cat has no access to the visible qualities of the real mouse. It sees only an internal representation, and this rules out the possibility of being certain that the mouse is in fact such as it appears to the cat (or to any percipient, including human beings) in its perception. The cat's perception would be no more about the mouse than my perception is about van Gogh. Alternatively, if the external object were apprehended in itself in addition to the apprehension of its sensible species, the percipient would, as it were, see the same object twice: first as represented by the species, and then directly. This clearly is not the case, according to Olivi, and if it were, it would also prove that the external object can be seen without the mediating species. (*II Sent.* q. 58, 469; *ibid.*, q. 73, 89.)

In his criticism, Olivi also appeals to the experiential difference between various psychological operations. It is obvious that the psychological operation of imagining or recollecting an absent object is phenomenologically quite different from seeing a present object. Yet, Olivi claims that if the faculty of sight does not reach the external object but only an internal representation of it, i.e., the sensible species, this phenomenal difference would not exist:

[...] then it does not see the object as present. It sees it only in the way we say a thing is seen when it is cognised as absent by gazing at a memory species which is placed under our gaze instead of at the thing itself. In this way, all vision [...] would be like remembering or imagining an absent thing rather than seeing it.²⁰

The focal idea is that *if* perception were to take place by sensible species that represent external objects, there would be no explanation for the phenomenal difference. Given that the difference exists, perception cannot take place by sensible species.

The crucial question is: does this line of criticism apply also to what Pasnau calls the sophisticated species theory? Does it apply to the Aristotelian kind of species theories in which the species is not a representationalist object of cognition? For instance, Aquinas repeatedly states that species are not perceived at all. Moreover, there is nothing species represents the object *to*. There is no internal spectator, and the species is not a sign, painting, or an image in virtue of

²⁰ “[...] igitur non videt praesentialiter obiectum nisi solum illo modo quo dicimur videre rem, quando eam cogitamus absentem, aspiciendo speciem memorialem obiectam nostro aspectui loco rei, et sic omnis visio [...] potius erit recordatio aut imaginatio quasi de re absentis quam visio.” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 469–70.)

which something else is brought to mind. Rather, the species is a causal intermediate that explains our direct cognition of the external world. As Olivi himself makes clear, he does not have these kinds of species theories in mind when he lays down his charges concerning representationalism. This can be seen by looking at the internal structure of Olivi's critical discussion of the species theories. As I have pointed out, there are many types of species theories, all of which Olivi rejects, and when he advances to the problems of representationalism, he is explicitly discussing only the theories of the type (B2). He even explicates further what kind of theories he has in mind:

Perhaps it is said that [...] species are needed for representing the object to the faculty [...] and that an act of cognising is said to be from the species to the extent that the representation it provides is required in order to produce the act.²¹

The epistemological problems of representationalism are aimed only against this particular version of species theory, in which it is overtly stated that species represent objects to cognitive faculties, as if they were images of some kind. But can his criticism be extended to apply also to sophisticated species theories?

In a way it cannot, for Olivi himself sometimes identifies cognitive acts with sensible species and with similitudes of the objects²². So, at the outset it seems that if species are understood in the way that is suggested by sophisticated species theory, there is nothing particularly controversial in them. A cognitive act would represent an external object to the subject, and this cognitive state would be a species.

This affinity does not mean, however, that Olivi would accept a sophisticated species theory, for species theories are committed to other ideas that he finds problematic. Most importantly, Olivi denies the idea that the species—or the cognitive acts—could be produced by an external object. Even sophisticated species theories are committed to the passivity of the faculties of the soul, and Olivi cannot accept this. Thus, the concession Olivi makes concerning the identity of a cognitive act and a species is a terminological one. We may call the acts of our cognitive faculties species if we wish, but they are after all very different than the species in the sophisticated theory.

Finally, the criticism Olivi directs against theories of the type (C1) is based on the principle of parsimony. If the faculties of the soul are capable of producing a species which then brings about a cognitive act, why are the faculties not capable of producing an act of cognition in the first place? Olivi's answer is that they are. He thinks that even though not all versions of species theory lead to epistemological isolation by distancing us from the external world to the extent that we do not reach it at all, sensible species are still superfluous. If we are able

²¹ "Forte dicetur quod [...] species exigitur ad repræsentandum obiectum ipsi potentia [...] et quod pro tanto dicatur esse actus cognoscendi ab ipsa specie, quia eius repræsentatio præexigitur ad productionem ipsius." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 467.)

²² See *II Sent.* q. 58, 470–3; *ibid.*, q. 25, 439–46; *Responsio secunda*, 405; *Ep.* 13, 55–6.

to perceive external objects by the mediation of species (so that species do not veil the object from us), we are able to perceive them also without the species.²³

The same idea is also used against (C2) but in a slightly different way. Olivi begins by pointing out that the only way external objects can (even in principle) excite the faculties of the soul is by their similitudes. Understood in this way, there is no difference between (C2) and (B), and the critique against the latter applies also to the former. Moreover, in order to have any role in the process of perception, the excitative activity of the objects must somehow affect the faculties of the soul. Otherwise they are futile. Olivi thinks that there are only two options: either the soul perceives the excitation or not. In the latter case the excitation has no role whatsoever, and in the former case we fall back to the problems of theories of the type (B).

The overall idea Olivi presents to us is that if the external objects cannot be apprehended directly, they cannot be apprehended at all; and if they *can* be apprehended directly, the species become superfluous. In this way, Olivi rejects the role of sensible species in cognitive processes altogether by claiming that they are not needed in any way to account for how perception takes place. Hence, Olivi's basic assumption that leads him to discard species theories of cognition is that either species have too salient a role in cognitive processes, or they have no role whatsoever²⁴.

Still, Olivi does not reject the existence of species altogether. He accepts the existence of memory species (*species memorialis*), which are of high importance for his account of the psychological processes of imagination and recollection (see Part II, Chapters 13 & 14). Moreover, as I already mentioned, he admits that if species are considered as identical to cognitive acts, there is no reason to deny their existence—a concession that accentuates his rejection of the role of species in cognitive processes because it amounts to saying that there are no species but only cognitive acts. Finally, he accepts the species *in medio* even though he does not give them any role in cognitive processes. In this respect his explanation in one of his apologetic works, *Epistola ad fratrem R.*, is telling. He was accused of holding to the view “[t]hat things do not multiply their species, but the soul cognises them by its essence.”²⁵ Olivi explicates his view as follows:

Sight so perceptibly proves the multiplication of species in the case of sun-rays and in shining out of illuminated colours that he who denies it earns a punishment, and may God show mercy to those who have imposed this [denial] to me, for I assert this everywhere [...] I have never said that the soul cognises things by its own essence, as if it were an exemplar and similitude of all things.²⁶

²³ *Il Sent.* q. 58, 473; *ibid.*, q. 74, 122–3.

²⁴ This has been pointed out by Spruit 1994, 219. Spruit discusses Olivi's reaction to species theories of intellection, but Olivi does not see any crucial difference between sensitive and intellectual cognitions in this regard thus the same point applies to both levels.

²⁵ “Quod res non multiplicat species suas sed ab anima per essentiam cognoscuntur.” (*Ep.* 13, 55.)

²⁶ “Multiplicationes specierum in solis radiis et in refulgentia colorum irradiantium visus ita sensibiliter comprobatur, quod quasi pena indiget qui hoc negat, et parcat Deus illis qui hoc

From this passage we see that Olivi does not deny the existence of species, but we also see that he understands them in a quite different manner than does, say, Aquinas. Species *in medio* seem to be identified with beams of light, which are perceptible in themselves. For example, when the sun shines through a small window of a dark room, it is possible to see a bright sunbeam in the air of the room without seeing the sun; and if there is a stained glass in the window, its colours shine in a similar manner. Perhaps Olivi has cases like this in mind.²⁷ Clearly, this is quite a different way of conceiving the species *in medio* than Aquinas' understanding, according to which species have a spiritual existence not only in cognitive faculties but also *in medio*. By contrast, Olivi denies the possibility of a spiritual existence of species *in medio*, and he explicitly says that if the species *in medio* exist, they are corporeal²⁸. His basic assumption is—and this is the third general line of Olivi's criticism towards species theories—that corporeal and extended objects cannot produce spiritual and unextended species. And since it is not necessary to posit corporeal species in order to account for perception, the theories of the type (B) cannot be correct.

The inability of corporeal objects to produce spiritual effects is also one of the reasons Olivi refutes the possibility that external objects could have an influence on our cognitive faculties. Olivi's criticism towards theories of the type (A) is motivated by his need to support the activity of the will. This he does by presenting an alternative theory of cognition, according to which cognitive faculties are not passive but active, and they produce their own acts by themselves. In this way he opposes one of the central tenets of medieval species theories: cognitive faculties are not passive receptors of external stimuli. In a critical tone so typical of him, Olivi rejects this idea, which is central to Aristotelian theories of his time: "Aristotle provides insufficient evidence, nay, almost no evidence at all for his claim, but he is believed without reason as a god of this age."²⁹

mihi imposuerunt, cum ego hoc ubique asseram [...] Nunquam etiam dixi quod anima per essentiam cognoscat res, quasi ipsa esset exemplar et similitudo omnium rerum." (*Ep.* 13, 55; see also *Responsio prima* 10, 128.) The idea that someone needs punishment instead of argumentation comes from Aristotle (*Topics* I.11, 105^a2–9).

²⁷ See also *II Sent.* q. 73, 84.

²⁸ "[...] lux aut aliæ formæ corporales non possunt gignere speciem in aliquo puncto æris quæ sit simplex simplicitate intellectuali. Unde si aliquo modo gigneret ibi speciem simplicem, non esset simplex nisi simplicitate punctali, quæ non est extra genus quantitatis nec extra genus corporalium." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 456.)

²⁹ "Aristoteles nulla sufficienti ratione, immo fere nulla ratione probat suum dictum, sed absque ratione creditur sibi tanquam deo huius sæculi." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 482.) Olivi's opposition towards theories of the type (C) is based on the simple idea that it is unnecessary to posit an intermediate species between the faculty and its act if the faculty produces the species anyway. A faculty that is capable of producing a species that produces an act is as capable of producing the act directly, and the species in between is superfluous.

5 INTENTIONALITY OF PERCEPTION

5.1 Activity of the Cognitive Faculties of the Soul

We have now seen that Olivi's theory departs from the intromissive Aristotelian theories and the perspectivist theories that were prevalent at the time. However, Olivi does not adhere to other theories from earlier traditions either. He does not accept extromissive visual ray theories, according to which a corporeal ray of light comes out from the eyes, hits an external object, and brings about an act of perception¹. Extromissive theories were somewhat popular in antiquity, and even though medieval philosophers knew about them they did not usually regard them as a valid alternative—regardless of the fact that one important authority, Augustine, might be taken as a proponent of an extromissive theory of perception. Medieval scholastics were not unanimous as to whether Augustine had proposed an extromissive visual ray theory or not², but Olivi makes it clear that if this is Augustine's view, "it is not necessary to follow Augustine in this matter."³ This is important because Augustine is the thinker Olivi respects the most, and still he is ready to reject Augustine's ideas if they seem clearly to be untrue—and this is just the case in his theory of perception.

Although Olivi does not devote much to rejecting the visual ray theories it is important to pay attention to a few focal points in which his view diverges from them. After all, his theory incorporates some elements from the extromissive tradition. The visual ray theory that Augustine seems to assert in some of his texts is paraphrased by Olivi as follows:

[...] in this matter [Augustine] said something that nobody these days follows. One of these things is the idea of the corporeal rays proceeding from the eye all the way to the objects. He says that these rays are kinds of bodies,

¹ *II Sent.* q. 73, 59–63; For discussion about different versions of extromissive theories and the reasons they were considered plausible, see Lindberg 1976.

² Pasnau 1997b, 131. Olivi writes, in a polite manner, that: "[...] Augustinus circa actum particularium sensuum more dubitantis et hinc inde fluctuantis aliqua dixit [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 74, 113; see also *ibid.*, q. 73, 56, 61–2.)

³ "[...] in hac parte non est necessarium Augustinum sequi." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 484.)

like kinds of rods that are emitted from the eyes and invigorated by them [...] He also says that the act of vision takes place in the place where the object is seen (that is, where the rays are terminated) rather than in the eyes, whence the rays spring forth.⁴

We can see the main reason Olivi gives no proper treatment to extromissive visual ray theories: no-one adheres to them. There is no burning need to criticise them because they are not actual alternatives. However, this piece of text already includes two central ideas that Olivi explicitly rejects: the idea that something corporeal issues from the eyes and proceeds through the medium to the object; and the idea that seeing takes place in the object and not in the eye.

I shall discuss his divergence from both of these in chapters to come, but it is worthwhile understanding the main elements of his view already at this point. First, Olivi denies any real emission of corporeal particles from the faculties of the soul to external objects. He distinguishes between what he calls virtual and essential presence. The faculties of the soul must be present to their objects, but they send nothing real to them; rather, they attend to them only virtually. We shall see below that this distinction amounts to an assertion that faculties of the soul are intentionally directed at external objects and that their acts are *about* those objects. Thus, although Olivi's manner of discussing the virtual reaching out of the faculties of the soul is reminiscent of extromissive theories, it diverges from them because no real extromission takes place. Second, Olivi thinks that an act of the soul cannot be where the soul is not, and since the animal soul can only be in the body (and human soul can be only in the body when it is united to it in this life) an act of perception cannot occur at the site of the object. This is attested to by our experience as well because we feel that our acts of perception take place in the organs of our bodies and not outside our bodies.⁵ We can comprehend the reason Olivi's theory does not belong among extromissive theories: to put it simply, nothing comes out of the eyes when a being sees, rather the act of seeing takes place in the eyes of the percipient. The central supposition of extromissive theories is that the distance between the object seen and the faculty of sight is crossed by something coming out of the eyes, and Olivi straightforwardly denies this.

This does not mean, however, that there are no elements from extromissive theories to be found in Olivi's theory. We shall soon see that although he denies any real extromission, he adheres to similar ideas: Olivi postulates a virtual reach-

⁴ "[...] in hac materia [Augustinus] quædam dixit quæ nullus hodie sequitur, ut est illud de radiis corporalibus ab oculo usque ad obiecta progredientibus. Quos radios dixit esse quædam corpora quasi quasdam virgas ab oculis emicantes et ab eis vegetatas [...] Dixit etiam quod actus visionis potius fit in loco ubi est res visa, ubi scilicet terminantur isti radii, quam in loco oculi, unde scilicet erumpunt isti radii." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 482; see also *ibid.*, q. 73, 55–9.) Olivi reads Anselm of Canterbury as an advocate of this theory as well and refers to his *De veritate* 6, but he later hesitates making even this attribution (see *ibid.*, 58–9, and *ibid.*, 62, respectively). In the passage Olivi refers to, Anselm is discussing perceptual errors which he attributes not to external senses but to the interior sense. He does not seem to say anything definitive about the mechanism of sight. (Anselm of Canterbury, *Dialogus de veritate*, PL 158.)

⁵ See, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 58, 482–94 *passim*; *ibid.*, q. 73, 59–68.

ing out of the cognitive faculties of the soul and (perhaps even more importantly) the activity of the faculties of the soul in the process of perception.

The latter idea is revealing and clearly present in Olivi's critique against the Aristotelian view that perception is a manner of being affected. We have already seen some reasons Olivi departs from the intromissive Aristotelian theories, and (as I already indicated) according to Olivi the most important problem in those theories is that they consider perception as being passive reception. In contrast to this, Olivi incorporates a Neoplatonic element in his own theory: the active role of the soul in perception, which he may have taken from various sources that were well known to medieval authors, such as Augustine, Avicenna, and Nemesius of Emesa⁶. But the theory Olivi puts forth is not similar to anything presented before him, and he is well aware of its originality:

In this way they answer to the fifteen arguments [...] by which the cognitive faculties are proven to be totally passive. Although they agree with certain great doctors in some of their claims and they agree with other doctors who are also great in some other matters, still they completely disagree with everybody in other things, and as far as I know they do not agree with any solemn doctor when all ideas are taken together.⁷

Despite his impersonal mode of expression, Olivi clearly prefers the unnamed thinkers' ideas—one easily gets the impression that Olivi is just concealing the fact that the theory he presents is his own. He takes his inspiration from earlier thinkers, to be sure, but does not follow them blindly.

Now, Olivi's central idea is that the cognitive faculties of the soul are not passive but active. It is important to emphasize once more that the principal reason Olivi accentuates the active role of the soul is his willingness to secure the activity of the will, which is a necessary condition for its freedom. And activity of a faculty presupposes that it is not affected from without. This idea Olivi applies

⁶ For references, see Knuuttila 2008, 9–11 & footnote 25. Olivi's theory of perception is a clear example of his originality and his relation towards philosophical authorities. He might be labeled as an eclectic philosopher: he takes ideas from Aristotelian philosophy but uses them to promote his own Augustinian-Neoplatonic goals. Eclecticism is, however, not necessarily a pejorative label: as Carlos Bazán has pointed out, eclecticism in relation to authoritative ideas sometimes resulted in originality in the Middle Ages. We cannot expect contradictory things of historical figures; we cannot require them to be objective exegetes and original philosophers at the same time. (Carlos Bazán, "13th Century Commentaries on De anima: From Peter of Spain to Thomas Aquinas," in *Il commento filosofico nell'occidente latino (secoli XIII-XV)*, ed. G. Fioravanti, C. Leonardi & S. Perfetti, *Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale* 10 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 124.) Olivi is perhaps not the best exegete—mainly because he does not even try to be—but he is original. He willingly opposes authorities when he thinks that theological orthodoxy or philosophical soundness require him to do so. It is rather well known that his treatment of Aristotle is not reverent, but he also opposes his major source of ideas, Augustine, when necessary.

⁷ "Sic igitur respondent isti ad istas quindecim probationes [...] quibus probatur potentias apprehensivas esse totaliter passivas. Licet autem isti in aliqua parte dictorum suorum concordent quibusdam magnis doctoribus et in aliqua alia parte aliis etiam magnis: in quibusdam tamen omnino discordant ab omnibus, et in omnibus in simul sumptis cum nullo, quod sciam, doctore sollemni concordant." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 515.)

not only the will but also to all the other faculties of the soul. He devotes three questions of the second book of *Summa*, namely, the questions 72–74 to the impossibility of external objects acting on cognitive faculties. However, the basic idea which leads Olivi to reject the passivity of the cognitive faculties can be found already in question 58, where Olivi tackles not only species theories but also the general claim that external objects are efficient causes of our cognitive acts. He presents a long and complicated argument in favour of this view which he then goes on to refute. The argument culminates in a proposition which states that: “objects can act on the faculties”⁸. The strategy of Olivi’s imaginary opponent is to prove this claim by arguing that even sensible objects can produce effects that are capable of affecting our cognitive faculties, i.e., simple and unextended effects. In other words, by proving that external objects can produce effects that are proportional to our senses, the opponent strives to show that perception is a passive process in which the objects actualise the senses.

Both Olivi and his opponent concur that the crux of the issue lies with whether an external object is able to act on the *spiritual* faculties of the soul in order to be able to affect the senses. Olivi flatly denies this possibility by invoking the authority of Augustine and by providing a lengthy philosophical criticism against the arguments of the opposing view⁹. I shall not deal with Olivi’s criticism in detail, but it is important to note the core thereof: in order to affect our senses, external objects should be able to produce simple and unextended effects—be they species, which act as intermediaries in an objects’ actualising the faculties of the soul, or cognitive acts, in which case an object would directly affect the faculties by producing a simple and unextended act in the cognitive power. According to Olivi, external objects are unable to do so, and therefore they cannot actualise our senses nor be the efficient causes of our perceptual acts.¹⁰ In other words, Olivi rejects the central idea of the Aristotelian theories that depict perception as an essentially passive process in which our passive faculties are affected and actualised by external objects directly or by the mediation of sensible species. Faculties of the soul are not passive recipients of external stimuli.

Instead, all the faculties of the soul are active¹¹. Olivi thinks that this is, to use a modern expression, phenomenologically evident to us: “Moreover, we

⁸ “[...] obiecta possunt in eis agere” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 400.) The entire argument includes nine proofs of this premise, and it covers the pages 400–3.

⁹ Olivi’s argumentation is scattered throughout different questions. The most important passages are the following: *II Sent.* q. 58, 437–9, 452–6, 461–515; *ibid.*, q. 72, 18–24; *ibid.*, q. 73, 82–90.

¹⁰ *II Sent.* q. 58, 437–61. Augustine’s view is presented in pp. 437–9, and the rest of the passage is devoted to disproving the opposing view. See also *ibid.*, 489; *ibid.*, q. 72, 15–30. The crucial idea behind this argument is, of course, that even the sensitive faculties of the soul are simple and spiritual. This is how Olivi understands them to be. See, e.g., *ibid.*, q. 54, 282–3.

¹¹ For discussion, see Bonnie Kent, *Aristotle and the Franciscans: Gerald Odonis’ Commentary on the “Nicomachean Ethics”* (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1984), 200; Belmont 1929, 294. It is clear that Olivi’s discussion of the activity of the faculties of the soul includes also the sensitive faculties, such as external senses, because he explicitly deals with the senses and points out that they can be considered as active faculties. (*II Sent.* q. 58, 461–515; See also qq. 72–4.)

experience inwardly within ourselves that those acts [viz acts of the faculties of our soul] issue from us and that we really perform them."¹² It is quite typical for Olivi to draw from internal experience and base philosophical doctrines on phenomenological observations¹³. He also utilizes this method in his theory of perception. He acknowledges, to be sure, that the experience we have of our cognitive acts is, as it were, bidirectional. On the one hand, we feel that we are active in the process of perception, but, on the other hand, the external world seems to imprint itself onto our senses. In fact, Olivi believes that most thinkers who have proposed a theory of perception in which the faculties are regarded as passive recipients have been led astray because they have put too much weight on the other side of this bidirectional phenomenological experience, and neglected the other:

In addition, it must be known that the two aforementioned causes come together in a cognitive act: that is why we experientially feel in it two as if contrary features (*rationes*). For, insofar as an act comes from an internal cognitive principle, we feel that it is our act and a kind of activity of ours which issues from us and, as it were, tends towards and is directed to an object. By contrast, insofar as an act is produced by an object to which it is terminated, it appears to be, as it were, a kind of affection (*passio*) that enters us from the object and with the object, as if the object were impressed and imprinted on the innermost of our [cognitive] faculty. And almost all who have said that cognitive and affective acts flow from and are impressed by their immediate objects are moved by the latter experience, and they have not paid attention to the first one [...]¹⁴

In this way, Olivi draws attention to the active nature of our perceptions. Our cognitive faculties are active in relation to their acts and objects.

¹² "Præterea, nos intime experimur in nobis actus istos procedere a nobis et quod nos vere operamur illos." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 463–4); "[...] quia nos expresse sentimus nostros actus videndi vel cognoscendi exire seu produci a nostris intimis et hoc intime." (*ibid.*, q. 72, 24); See also *ibid.*, q. 74, 124.

¹³ A. Emmen has said about Olivi that: "He excelled in introspection, often appealed to experience, and was one of the first writers to use elements of the phenomenological method." (*The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 5, ed. P. Edwards (NY/London: Macmillan & Free Press, 1967), s.v. "Olivi, Peter John.")

¹⁴ "Ulterius sciendum quod quia ad actum cognitivum concurrunt duplex causa prædicta: idcirco experimentaliter sentimus in ipso duas rationes quasi oppositas. Nam pro quanto exit ab interno principio cognitivo, sentimus quod est actio nostra et quoddam agere nostrum a nobis exiens et quasi in obiectum tendens et in illud intendens. Pro quanto vero fit ab obiecto tanquam a terminante, videtur nobis esse quasi quædam passio ab obiecto et cum ipso obiecto intra nos illapsa, acsi ipsum obiectum esset in intimo nostræ potentiae impressum et illapsum. Et propter hanc secundam experientiam moti sunt fere omnes illi qui dixerunt actus cognitivos et etiam affectivos influi et imprimi a suis obiectis immediatis, non attendentes primam experientiam [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 72, 38.) The latter kind of experience is also genuine, according to Olivi, but it does not prove that external objects really actualise our cognitive faculties (*ibid.*, 43). Olivi accounts for this experience in a different way. I shall return to this topic below.

Now, we must consider what Olivi means by the activity of the cognitive faculties. Olivi's idea is that activity of the faculties of the soul means that they are able to produce their acts by themselves. A faculty that is actualised by something external to itself is not active but passive; and a faculty that is not actualised by something external but by itself is active. This doctrine becomes clear when Olivi endeavours to prove that the will is an active faculty. He presents altogether three different opinions. According to the first, the will is active only insofar as it is free; according to the second, it is partly active and partly passive because it must be put into motion by external objects; finally, according to the third opinion, "the will is totally active in respect to its acts in such a way that it receives absolutely nothing from the object or from the intellect. It is the sufficient, efficient principle of its own acts, both free and unfree."¹⁵

Olivi prefers the third opinion, and he applies the same definition of activity to the other faculties of the soul. However, he specifies that he does not intend to deny all passivity from the faculties of the soul: they are passive in the sense that their acts take place in the faculties themselves and thus actualise a potency inherent in the faculties. The central question is whether the acts are produced by external objects, by faculties themselves, or by both of them together.¹⁶

Importantly, Olivi does not think that activity presupposes freedom. The will is active even when it is not able to produce free acts—for example, when the subject is asleep or mentally disturbed—because even in such a state it is not actualised by anything external to it. By contrast, freedom presupposes that the will produces its own acts, i.e., that the will is active. Activity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for freedom. In addition to being active, the will has to be able to reflexively turn onto itself and move itself to act in such a way that it is also able to refrain from doing so. And even beyond this, the will has to be able to reflexively turn onto its own act of willing, which means that one has to will one's willing, at least potentially. Only then is it also free. The unfree acts of the will lack the reflexive aspects, but even they are produced by the will.¹⁷

¹⁵ "[...] voluntas est totaliter activa respectu actuum suorum, ita quod penitus nihil recipit ab obiecto nec ab intellectu, sed ipsa est sufficiens principium effectivum actuum suorum, sive liberorum sive non liberorum." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 410); "Præter hoc autem specialiter probant hoc de voluntate secundum hoc quod est non libera, quod scilicet ipsa sit activa sufficienter respectu actuum suorum, in quantum est non libera." (*ibid.*, 478.) Traditionally the relation between the faculties of the soul and the objects thereof was illustrated by saying that the faculty is like a piece of wax and the object a signet ring that imprints its image into the faculty. Interestingly, Olivi turns this picture upside down: "Esset autem huius rei clarius exemplum, si poneretur quod cera haberet intra se virtutem applicandi et imprimendi se diversis sigillis, sic quod ipsa sigilla essent solummodo termini huiusmodi applicationum et impressionum absque hoc quod aliquid agerent in ipsam ceram. Tunc enim ipsa cera posset in se producere imagines diversorum sigillorum [...]" (*ibid.*, 415–6.)

¹⁶ "Non est igitur intentio nostra hic quærere an ipsa [sc. voluntas] quantum ad hoc sit potentia passiva quod vere in se seu in sua materia recipiat actus et habitus suos [...] sed potius an actus sui sint totaliter producti ab ipsa aut totaliter ab aliis agentibus, upote, ab obiectis et consimilibus, aut partim producantur ab ipsa, partim ab aliis." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 410.) Here Olivi explicitly discusses only the will, but it becomes clear that this is the meaning of the term "activity" in relation to sensitive faculties as well.

¹⁷ "Ad actus enim liberos necessario exigitur triplex aspectus, qui esse non possunt nisi

As we have seen, Olivi applies this kind of activity to all the faculties of the soul, not only to the will. By denying that it is possible for external objects to actualise the faculties of the soul, Olivi espouses that the faculties have activity in relation to their acts. Thus, activity must be understood as pertaining to the relation between faculties, their acts, and their objects. The external senses are active in the process of perception because their acts are not caused by external objects. All the faculties of the soul are active, and that means they are efficient causes of their own acts. This does not connote that all the faculties of the soul are capable of self-reflexively moving themselves into action—at least it seems that Olivi attributes the ability to refrain from acting, when the conditions for acting are met, only to the will and not to other faculties of the soul. If the cognitive faculties of the soul were capable of refraining from acting, they should be considered free, and this is not what Olivi wants to do. Rather, it seems that producing certain kinds of cognitive acts is an intrinsic feature of the cognitive faculties. The faculties are such that when they are confronted with an adequate object, they are immediately actualised (see, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 58, 468; *ibid.*, q. 59, 552; *Quodl.* I.5, 19). The crucial idea is that the act is not efficiently caused by the object but by the faculty, but this does not presuppose that the faculty in question can refrain from acting. This is the level of activity Olivi attributes to the cognitive faculties of the soul.

5.2 Objects as Terminative Causes of Cognitive Acts

Now, since objects are not efficient causes of acts of perception a question arises: Does Olivi obviate the role of the object in perception altogether? When the cat sees the mouse in the corner of the kitchen, it seems quite natural to assume that the mouse has *some* role in accounting for the cat's seeing it. Otherwise, it seems that there would be no reason for the cat's act of seeing the mouse to pertain to that particular mouse, instead of to any other object. It could just as well be seeing Anaxagoras while looking at the mouse, if the mouse had no effect on the cat's act of seeing. At least there seems to be no reason for the act to be about the mouse rather than about any other object, unless the mouse has something to do with cat's perception thereof.

In fact, Olivi's view is not so counterintuitive that he would deny any role to the object completely. He explicitly claims that an act of perception presupposes

liberum arbitrium maneat in sublimi et potestativa et elevata consistentia super se et super suum obiectum et super inferiores potentias. Exigitur enim unus aspectus quo sit conversum ad obiectum. Et alius aspectus quo sit conversum ad se ut agens ad patiens, quia non potest se movere, nisi prius sit conversum ad se ut movens ad mobile; actus autem non est in eo liber, nisi exeat ab eo movendo se libere [...] tunc autem apparet quod movet se libere, quando potest se ab illo motu retinere. Tertius aspectus exigitur [...] quo videlicet sit conversum ad se ut ad obiectum vel saltem quod possit converti super se et super suum actum sicut super obiectum, pro eo quod nunquam aliquid volumus libere, nisi cum volumus nos velle, aut saltem cum statim possumus nos velle actum illum." (*II Sent.* q. 59, 552–3); *ibid.*, q. 58, 429; For discussion, see Yrjönsuuri 2002, 102–3, 118–21.

an object¹⁸. The cat could not see the mouse were it not running about in the vicinity of the cat and falling within its visual field. The act of seeing must be about the mouse if the cat is to see the mouse. In this way, an object is a necessary element in perception. However, since Olivi denies the efficient causal role of the object in the process of perception, he has to account for its role in some other way. We get a hint of how Olivi solves this predicament from *Epistola ad fratrem R.*:

In the question *Whether the will is an active faculty*, in an answer to an argument, I recite at length a certain position which says that the apprehensive faculties of the soul are total efficient causes of their own acts, although the objects co-operate with them not by way of efficient [cause] but by way of object. In the same place it is said that the acts of the faculties and the species which are in the intellect (*in acie intelligentie*) are the same.¹⁹

Here Olivi repeats his idea that the acts of the cognitive faculties can be understood as species. However, more important are the two other ideas he presents: external objects are not efficient causes of cognitive acts, and external objects nevertheless co-operate in cognitive processes. The faculties are total efficient causes of cognitive acts, and objects do not have any efficient role whatsoever. Still, the objects are necessary for cognitive acts to take place, and they partake in the process “per modum obiecti”²⁰. What does Olivi mean by this perplexity?

In the following passage, taken from *Summa*, Olivi gives a more detailed account of his conception of the role of objects in perception, or in cognitive processes in general:

[...] an object, to the extent that *aspectus* and acts of the faculties are terminated at it, co-operates in the specific production of them [...] Namely, a cognitive act (and *aspectus*) is directed (*figitur*) to the object and has it intentionally absorbed into itself. This is why a cognitive act is called apprehension of and apprehensive extension to the object. In this extension and absorption the act is intimately conformed and assimilated to the object. The object presents itself or appears as being present to the cognitive *aspectus*, and by an act that is assimilated to it the object is a kind of representation of itself. As an actual illumination of a spherical or quadrangular vase becomes spherical or quadrangular only because the light source generates it in conformity with the figure of that which receives and confines it; so also, because a cognitive power generates a cognitive act with a certain formative absorption

¹⁸ *II Sent.* q. 74, 115–6; See also *ibid.*, q. 72, 39; *ibid.*, q. 58, 415.

¹⁹ “In quaestione vero an voluntas sit potentia activa, in responsione cuiusdam argumenti recito diffuse quandam positionem que dicit quod potentie anime apprehensive sint tota causa efficiens actuum suorum, quamvis obiecta eis cooperentur, non per modum efficientis, sed per modum obiecti. Ibidemque dicitur quod actus potentiarum et species que sunt in acie intelligentie sint omnino id ipsum.” (*Ep.* 13, 55; the reference is to *II Sent.* q. 58, 461–515.) Remember that even though Olivi denies in his apologetical works that the view he presents is his own, there are good reasons to believe that he favoured it—at least at the time he wrote his question-commentary (see Chapter 4, footnote 11).

²⁰ Olivi explicitly points out that not everything that is necessary for producing something is the efficient cause of it (*II Sent.* q. 58, 419).

of the act to the object, and with a certain signet-like and inward (*sigillari et viscerali*) extension to the object, therefore—because it is generated thus—the act becomes a similitude and a signet-like expression of the object.²¹

The passage contains many important ideas, one of which is the *aspectus* of a cognitive faculty. For the time being, I will leave the term untranslated; before submerging ourselves into a detailed discussion of that concept let us ponder the other ideas Olivi presents in the passage, keeping in mind the question about the role of the object.

We see again Olivi explicitly stating that a cognitive act is generated by a cognitive faculty. However, an object co-operates in the production of an act by functioning as a *terminus* for an act of a cognitive faculty. Thus, the act is effectively caused by the faculty alone, but it is fixed (*figitur*) to the object and—importantly—the object is *intentionally* absorbed into the act. Olivi's manner of expressing his idea is idiosyncratic, but the idea is clear enough even on the basis of this passage: the cognitive act is intentionally directed to the external object, and somehow this intentional directedness, which is terminated at the object, makes the act a similitude of the object, thus making the percipient conscious of the external object. To use a modern expression, Olivi's theory is an intentional theory of cognition, and more precisely, it is an object-theory, very close to the one Brentano claimed to have found from his medieval sources²². A cognitive act is

²¹ “[...] obiectum, in quantum terminat aspectus et actus potentiarum, cooperetur specificæ productioni eorum [...] Nam actus et aspectus cognitivus figitur in obiecto et intentionaliter habet ipsum intra se imbibitum; propter quod actus cognitivus vocatur apprehensio et apprehensiva tentio obiecti. In qua quidem tentione et imbibitione actus intime conformatur et configuratur obiecto; ipsum etiam obiectum se ipsum præsentat seu præsentialiter exhibet aspectui cognitivo et per actum sibi configuratum est quædam repræsentatio eius. Sicut enim actualis irradiatio vasis spherici vel quadrati fit spherica vel quadrata ex hoc solo quod lux generat illam cum conformitate ad figuram sui suscipientis et continentis: sic, quia vis cognitiva generat actum cognitivum cum quadam informativa imbibitione actus ad obiectum et cum quadam sigillari et viscerali tentione obiecti, idcirco eo ipso quod sic gignitur, fit ipsa similitudo et sigillaris expressio obiecti.” (*II Sent.* q. 72, 35–6.)

²² Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. L. L. McAlister, transl. A. C. Rancurello et al. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), e.g., on p. 88–9; For discussion, see, e.g., Charles Siewert, “Consciousness and Intentionality,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2006), <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/>; I have profited also from Dominik Perler, “What Are Intentional Objects? A Controversy among Early Scotist,” in Perler 2001a, 203–26. Although Olivi speaks about the cognitive act becoming a similitude of the object, he does not mean that it would be a representation of the object, as we have seen. His idea is that the cognitive act's being about *E* must be accounted for somehow, even though it actually is about *E* directly. The act does not become an intentional object *E'* that has some kind of mental existence. It just is the intentional act of cognising *E*. Olivi's theory of cognition has been criticised by modern scholars. For example, Spruit has argued that: “Olivi, for instance, does not provide a reasonable justification for the objective reference of mental content. Since he rejects the presence of innate contents as a rationale for his peculiar view on the intra-mental production of intellective cognition, he is caught up in a ‘stalemate’ position between a static object and a dynamic mind whose intentional outward projection appears insufficiently argued for to guarantee an effective cognitive grasp of the sensible world.” (Spruit 1994, 223–4.) However, if this criticism holds in relation to Olivi, I cannot see any reason why, in principle, it would not

intentionally directed to an object, and this makes the subject of the act conscious of the intentional object of the act. There is no representational entity between the act and the object—this is what Olivi has in mind when he says that the object reveals itself to the act and, as it were, represents itself²³—and the structure of a cognitive act is such that there are no other intermediaries either: the structure consists only of an act, which is intentionally directed at the object, and an object, which is where the act is terminated. Because the act is directed to and terminated at the object, the act itself becomes a similitude of the object, and this suffices for a cognition to take place. More concretely, when the cat sees the mouse in the corner of the room, its faculty of sight produces an act of perception which is intentionally directed at the mouse. The act somehow forms itself according to the visual qualities of the mouse and becomes a similitude of it, thus making the cat see it. In this way, the role of the object in perception is salient, even though it does not function as an efficient cause of the perceptual act. Cognitive acts are intentional, and external objects function as intentional objects for these acts; to use the common shorthand, the acts are *about* the objects.

As the acts of the cognitive faculties of the soul become similitudes of the objects they pertain to, they provide the subject with perception of the objects. In other words, the content of a cognitive act is the particular external object to which the act is intentionally directed. The cat sees the mouse in the corner because the mouse functions as the end-term of the cat's intentional act of seeing the sensible qualities of that particular mouse.²⁴ The act of perception becomes a similitude of the mouse because "[...] the objects are the end-points of the faculties and their acts in such a way that the acts receive their species from them because of this kind of termination [...]"²⁵ As we have already seen, Olivi's idea is that the acts of various cognitive faculties of the soul receive their genera from the faculty and their species from the object²⁶. This means that the act of seeing

hold in relation to all intentional theories of cognition. According to Olivi, the mind is capable of intentionally reaching the external world. He does not give a detailed explanation for this ability (he seems to think that it is *sui generis*), but surely he is not the only thinker who can be blamed for thinking that the relation between the mind and the external world cannot be accounted for by appealing only to efficient causality from without.

²³ Olivi is explicit in this regard: "Præterea, nulla species ita repræsentat obiectum sicut ipsummet obiectum repræsentat se ipsum." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 469.)

²⁴ "Rursus sciendum quod quia actus cognitivus obiecti individualis est terminatus in ipsum, in quantum est hoc individuum et non aliud: ideo de essentia talis actus est quod sit propria similitudo huius individui, in quantum huius, et quod non sit similitudo aliorum individuorum eiusdem speciei, pro quanto individualiter differunt ab isto. Quod igitur actus iste repræsentet individualement rationem et proprietatem sui obiecti, non habet ex hoc quod sit in materia corporali aut ex hoc quod fluat a forma corporali ad hic et nunc limitata, sicut Aristotelici dicunt, immo potius ex hoc quod terminatur ad obiectum individuale, in quantum individuale, et hoc sub modo prædicto." (*II Sent.* q. 72, 37.)

²⁵ "[...] ipsa obiecta sic sunt terminativa potentiarum et actuum quod actus trahunt speciem ab eis propter huiusmodi terminationem [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 58, 514.)

²⁶ In Chapter 3.1; See also *II Sent.* q. 54, 275–6; *ibid.*, q. 72, 17–18, 35–40. According to Olivi, there are three ways in which something can receive its species from another thing: "[...] trahere speciem suam ab aliquo potest esse tripliciter: aut sicut a principio intrinseco et essentiali aut sicut a principio effectivo aut sicut a termino obiectivo seu obiecto termina-

the mouse is an act of *seeing* because it is brought about by the faculty of sight and realised in the eyes; it is an act of seeing the *mouse* because the mouse provides the content of the act.

The object, therefore, plays a crucial role in cognitive processes because it is a necessary end-term of an intentional cognitive act, and it defines the content of the act. But one might still consider what kind of role the object actually has. How does the object figure in the process if it does not play any causal role whatsoever? In the passage above, Olivi employs the Neoplatonic imagery of Augustine (Kent 1984, 198) and metaphorically describes how an object makes an act a similitude of itself without having any causal role. The sun shines and enlightens vases of different shapes. The light which falls upon the surface of each vase becomes similar in shape to the vases: light on the surface of a round vase is also round. Olivi thinks, reasonably, that the vase has no causal role in the generation of the light: the light on the vase is produced solely by the sun. But the light's being a particular shape is due to the object onto which it falls. In other words, the vase gives the light a shape it has on the vase, but the vase has nothing to do with the generation of the light. It does not play any causal role in generation, but once generated and projected to the vase the light becomes a kind of similitude of the vase because it enlightens its surface.²⁷ This is principally what happens in the case of cognitive acts as well, according to Olivi: an act is directed to a certain object, and its existence as a cognitive act is caused entirely by the cognitive faculty to which it belongs. But the object to which the act is intentionally directed renders the act a similitude of the object.

Even on the basis of the Augustinian imagery, it nevertheless seems that the object must have some kind of a causal role after all. It is difficult to see how an object could affect the content of a cognitive act without being a cause of some kind. How does Olivi account for this apparent causal role of the object, given that he is not willing to assign any causal role to it? In fact, on one occasion Olivi surprisingly admits that the causality of an object can be enumerated among the efficient causes²⁸, and on another occasion he places it in the genus of a final cause. However, it is clear that the former concession does not mean that the causality of an object could properly be held as efficient causality because in other places Olivi repeatedly denies that possibility.

What about the latter suggestion? Is the object a final cause of a cognitive act? Modern commentators seem to disagree on this matter, even though they do not argue strongly but seem only to presuppose their positions without paying much attention to the question²⁹. Arguably, Olivi seems to realise that he is pos-

tivo." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 414.) The acts of the faculties of the soul receive their species from objects in the third way.

²⁷ Olivi uses the same illustration in several places: *II Sent.* q. 54, 276; *ibid.*, q. 58, 415; See also *ibid.*, 452–3.

²⁸ "[...] licet obiectum [...] non habeat simpliciter et proprie rationem efficientis [...] nihilominus potest large enumerari inter causas efficientes." (*II Sent.* q. 72, 10.)

²⁹ According to Kent, the object functions as a final cause in Olivi's theory (Kent 1984, 192–5). Also Pasnau seems to think that an object is a final cause (Pasnau 1999, 20; Pasnau 1997b, 171). By contrast, François-Xavier Putallaz thinks that Olivi invents a new kind of cause

tulating a kind of causality which does not fall under any of the four Aristotelian types of causes³⁰ because when he says that the object belongs to the genus of a final cause, he actually specifies that the object should be called a *terminative cause*:

The objective cause can be properly considered as belonging to the genus of a final cause, or—if you want to call it by a more proper name—it can be called a terminative cause. For, a material cause has the true nature (*ratio*) of a cause in respect to the thing that is educed from it or received in it, although it is not properly an efficient cause of the thing. Similarly, the terminative cause has the true nature of a cause, although it is not properly an efficient cause of the actions that are terminated at it.³¹

It seems to me that, strictly speaking, terminative causality is not a species of final causality, at least in its Aristotelian meaning. A final cause is, according to Aristotle, the end for the sake of which something is done, or the realisation of a form in natural development³². The object in a cognitive process is neither. One way of expressing that *X* is a final cause of *Y*, is to say that “*X* is what *Y* is for”. By contrast, Olivi’s terminative cause could be expressed as “*X* is what *Y* is about”. The mouse is not what the cat’s act of seeing is for; it is what the act of seeing is about. At least a final cause must be understood in a wide sense, should terminative causality be included in it. By postulating this new kind of cause, Olivi is able to account for the activity of the cognitive faculties, the faculties’ being a total efficient cause of their acts, and the apparent fact that the objects somehow affect the content of the cognitive acts. On the one hand this sounds quite strange. But on the other hand, Olivi is here dealing with a mental phenomenon that Aristotelian psychology does not recognise: intentionality of cognitive acts. Because Olivi understands perception as an intentional directedness of the mind to the world, he necessarily faces the problem of accounting for the role that an object

that is distinct from the four Aristotelian causes (Putallaz 1995, 146).

³⁰ Of the four Aristotelian causes—material, efficient, formal, and final—the first two are dismissed: an object is not a material cause of a cognitive act because cognitive acts take place in the faculties of the soul (see, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 51, 113; *ibid.*, q. 58, 410.), not in the object, and Olivi explicitly denies the possibility that an object could be an efficient cause, as we have seen. An object cannot be a formal cause either because if it were it should be able to act on the soul—a position which Olivi flatly denies. In this respect, Olivi differs from, e.g., Aquinas, who thinks that an object, or its species, is a formal cause of a cognitive act. In his later writings, Aquinas also claims that the intellect’s presentation of an object is a formal cause of an act of the will. (see, e.g., *ST* I.78.3; *ibid.*, I-II.9.1.) Olivi and other franciscan voluntarists reject this latter view because they think that it would render the will unfree: the will would be necessitated by the act of the intellect (Kent 1984, 194–9). Olivi also rejects the former view, as we have seen. So, the only possibility left is that the object is a final cause of an act of seeing. Olivi seems to also deny this option, as we are about to see.

³¹ “Potest autem causa obiectiva proprie poni in genere causæ finalis aut, si propriori nomine vis eam vocare, vocetur causa terminativa. Sicut enim causa materialis habet vere rationem causæ respectu educti ex ea vel recepti in ea, quamvis non sit proprie causa efficiens eius: sic causa terminativa habet vere rationem causæ, quamvis non sit proprie causa efficiens actionis terminatæ in ipsa.” (*II Sent.* q. 72, 36–7.)

³² See, e.g., David Ross, *Aristotle* (London/NY: Routledge, 1923), 74–7.

plays in the process of perception. And although Olivi's tentative answer is perhaps not convincing, it may be valued as being one of the first serious attempts to bridge the apparent gap which arises when the mind is understood as capable of intentionally reaching the external world without any causal intermediaries.

5.3 Intentional Directedness of Cognitive Faculties

Understood in the way described above, Olivi's theory is not counterintuitive after all. Our acts of perception are produced by the senses, but their content is about the objects they pertain to. The only thing that is hard to reconcile with Olivi's view is that if we take his Neoplatonic metaphor literally, we get a confusing picture: the metaphor seems to suggest an extromissive theory in which something issues from the faculty of sight into the object and becomes a similitude of the object not in the eyes but in the object. The sun does not become triangular when it illuminates a triangle; it is the light of the sun on the surface of the triangle that does. Similarly, following the metaphor, when an act of seeing is terminated at an external object, it is not the faculty of sight that receives the perceptual qualities thereof but the act of seeing, which somehow takes place in the object.

This picture is confusing because it goes clearly against what Olivi says about perception. He thinks that an act of vision takes place in the faculty of sight which is realised and situated in the eyes, and not in the object³³. Thus, although Olivi employs the Neoplatonic metaphor, he rejects two of its central suppositions, namely, that something issues from the faculties of the soul to the objects of perception and that perceptual acts take place in the object. The metaphor helps us to understand how the object functions as a terminative cause for the acts of perception, but it leaves open one central question: how do the perceptual qualities of the object reach an act which takes place in a faculty of the soul? What kind of a link—causal or other—is there between the faculty, its act, and the object?³⁴ Had Olivi accepted some kind of causal influence coming from the object to the senses (such as sensible species), he could appeal to this influence. But, as we have seen, Olivi flatly denies all kind of intromissive influence (or at least denies that such intromission has anything to do with perception). Thus, he has to appeal to some other kind of explanation.

Olivi does have an answer to this problem. He thinks that cognitive faculties are able to virtually reach out to the objects, and appeals to this virtual reaching out when he accounts for the way in which an act of perception grasps its object:

[...] a power can be present to something either essentially or virtually. This is to say that it can be present to something in such a way that its essence

³³ As I have indicated (in footnote 5 above), Olivi takes it that the acts of the soul take place in the faculties themselves. See also *II Sent.* q. 73, 60; *ibid.*, q. 72, 12.

³⁴ In a way, the question is similar to one which can be posed to ancient extromissive visual ray theories: given that the eyes send out a visual ray which hits the object, how is the information received back into the faculty?

really is beside that thing, or in such a way that the *aspectus* of its power is so efficaciously directed to the thing that it, as it were, really touches the thing. If the power is not present to its object or patient in this second way, it cannot act, even if it were present to it by its essence or according to the first way. The visual power is present to a thing that is seen from a distance in this [second] way. [...] This [kind of] presence suffices for an act of seeing [...]³⁵

Let us postpone the discussion concerning the term *aspectus* yet a moment, for there are a couple of things that need to be addressed first. In this passage Olivi distinguishes two ways in which a cognitive faculty may be present to its object. Either it is present to it essentially, which means that there is a real connection between the faculty and its object, roughly in the way my sense of touch is in contact with the keyboard as I write this text; or it is present to its object virtually. We shall see below how the latter takes place and what the meaning is of the central term *aspectus*, but already now it is clear that the virtual presence is a necessary condition for perception. If a faculty of the soul is not virtually present to an external object, it cannot produce an act of perceiving that object. It is also a sufficient condition for perception, as the example concerning the faculty of sight shows: if the faculty of sight is virtually present to an object, it is thereby capable of producing an act in relation to the object and of apprehending it.

The term *virtual* excludes a need for real connection between the object and the faculty. The faculty of sight does not have to be in contact with the object in order to perceive it.³⁶ Olivi thinks that by this distinction between real and virtual presence he is capable of rejecting both the species theories and extromissive theories of perception. Both of these account for the connection between the faculties of the soul and their objects by appealing to a real connection. Species theories bridge the gap by postulating species as mediating entities, and extromissive theories claim that the faculty somehow goes to the object, or at least gets into contact with the object by mediation of the extromitted stuff. By contrast, Olivi thinks that it is not necessary for a cognitive faculty of the soul to be in real contact with the object at all. Somehow the faculty still reaches the object in a way that enables it to receive the relevant information from it.

This idea is very important for Olivi's theory of perception, and it figures also in his discussion of the possibility of external objects to affect the faculties of the soul. As I already indicated, Olivi takes it that even though external objects

³⁵ "[...] virtus aliqua potest esse præsens alicui aut essentialiter aut virtualiter, hoc est dictu, quod potest esse præsens alicui per hoc quod sua essentia est vere iuxta istum aut per hoc quod aspectus suæ virtutis ita efficaciter est directus in ipsum acsi realiter attingeret ipsum. Si autem hoc secundo modo virtus non sit præsens suo obiecto vel patienti, non poterit agere, etiamsi per essentiam suam seu iuxta primum modum esset præsens illi. Hoc autem modo virtus visiva est præsens rei visæ distantis ab ipsa. [...] hæc præsentia sufficiat ad actum videndi [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 58, 486–7.) Olivi applies this distinction also when he confronts an interpretation of Augustine according to which the bishop of Hippo thought that the soul is where its intention is fixed (*Ibid.*, q. 37, 657). Olivi answers that: "verba illa metaphorica sunt. Non enim sumus ibi realiter seu substantialiter, sed solum virtualiter seu intentionaliter." (*Ibid.*, 672.)

³⁶ For discussion concerning virtual reaching out, see Pasnau 1997b, 168–81 (especially 172–5).

could *per impossibilem* affect the faculties of the soul, that would not amount to actually cognising them. This becomes even more clear if we look at the following paragraph:

[...] however much a cognitive faculty is informed by dispositions (*habitus*) and species that differ from the cognitive act, it cannot proceed to a cognitive act unless it first actually tends (*intendat*) to an object in such a way that the *aspectus* of its intention is actually turned and directed to it. And so, given that a species preceding a cognitive act flows from the object, the faculty must still actually tend towards and intellectually regard (*aspiciat*) the object in addition to this; for it is not possible that it would produce a cognitive act in itself without this [tending].³⁷

In order to apprehend their objects, the cognitive faculties must tend or intend (*intendat*) to them. This is, as we have seen, one of the reasons Olivi discards the species theory of cognition: if nothing else, species are superfluous for cognition. Even if an external object were somehow capable of affecting the faculties of the soul, this would not amount to perceiving the object because a cognitive act which bears information concerning an external object becomes possible only by the soul's own activity of tending to the object. On the basis of the preceding two passages we may conclude that the virtual presence of a faculty to the object is achieved in such a way that the faculty of the soul somehow virtually tends to the object. This enables it to produce a cognitive act in relation to the object.

How does this virtual tending take place? In order to understand this we must finally take up the central term *aspectus* that figures repeatedly in the texts that deal with the functioning of cognitive faculties³⁸. If we look at the two previous passages, we see that this has a focal role in both of them. According to the former passage, virtual presence of a cognitive faculty is achieved by directing the *aspectus* of the faculty to the object. In the latter passage, Olivi speaks of it

³⁷ “[...] quantumcunque potentia cognitiva per habitum et species ab actione cognitiva differentes sit informata, non potest in actionem cognitivam exire, nisi prius intendat actualiter in obiectum, ita quod aspectus suæ intentionis sit actualiter conversus et directus in illud. Et ideo dato quod species præcurrans actionem cognitivam sit influxa ab obiecto, adhuc præter hoc oportet quod potentia actualiter intendat et intellective aspiciat in obiectum; nam impossibile est quod absque hoc producat in se actum cognitivum.” (*II Sent.* q. 72, 9–10.) Olivi discusses this idea in many places: see, e.g., *ibid.*, q. 34, 620–1; *ibid.*, q. 58, 466; *ibid.*, q. 73, 89; *ibid.*, q. 74, 123; *ibid.*, q. 76, 148; See also Pasnau 1997b, 21, 130–4, 168–81. I am aware that *habitus* does not necessarily translate as “disposition,” but at least in the case of Olivi this translation is a good one and conveys certain of his ideas well.

³⁸ Olivi also uses other terms, namely, *intentio* and *attentio* as synonyms for *aspectus*. A very illuminating text in this respect goes as follows: “Causa igitur mutui impedimenti [potentiæ] est unitas *intentionis* in qua radicanatur et a qua regulantur. Propter hoc enim nimia *attentio* auditus impedit visum, quia sensus communis nimium intendens actui et obiecto auditus cessat ab intendendo actui et obiecto visus, deficiente autem sensu communi ab intendendo actui et obiecto alicuius sensus deficit necessario et ipse particularis sensus ab intendendo suo obiecto. Eo enim ipso quo sensus communis retrahit *aspectum* suum a tali sensu, retrahitur aspectus talis sensus, pro eo quod sensus communis est radix eorum.” (*II Sent.* q. 59, 555; emphasis mine.) *Intentio* and *attentio* are used rarely, and *aspectus* figures *fere ubique*.

as a necessary condition for a cognitive act and as an explanation for the way in which the faculties of the soul tend towards their objects. But what is this *aspectus*? Unfortunately, Olivi does not provide any detailed discussion about it, and even though we can find some helpful passages and make interpretations on the basis of them, we must content ourselves with some amount of uncertainty about his final view.

At any rate, this is how Olivi defines *aspectus* on one occasion: “By this *aspectus* I mean virtual or intentional directing (*conversio*) of a faculty to an object.”³⁹ This is not particularly helpful, given that Olivi does not tell us what he means by the terms “virtual” and “intentional”. In this context “virtual” does not seem to be contrasted with real. Olivi does not want to say that the faculty would not be really directed but rather refers to the idea which was present also in the two passages cited above, namely, that the faculty does not actually cross the distance between itself and the object. When it comes to the other term, *intentio*, it seems to me that it should be taken as indicative of astonishingly modern ideas of intentionality, intentional directedness, and aboutness.

However, there are also certain apparent disparities between Olivi’s idea of intentional directedness, which he so often expresses by using the term *aspectus*, and the modern idea of intentionality as a distinctively mental phenomenon. The most striking of these disparities is the wide range of things Olivi accounts for by appealing to *aspectus*. The following piece of text is very illuminating in this respect:

[...] the *aspectus* of the inclination of fire, by which fire moves upwards, is turned towards its local end-term rather than towards the moving thing (i.e., fire). The same applies to the impulse of a thrusting stone or an arrow, according to which a motion immediately follows; for the *aspectus* of an inclination, which the catapult or the bow (*proiector*) gives to them, is vigorously turned towards the end-term of the motion. As the creator gives to the elements their inclination—the *aspectus* of which is directed to the natural place of the elements—according to which the movement of the elements naturally follows, and as the projectiles (*proiectis*) receive their [inclinations] from their movers or thrusters (*proiector*), so the apprehensive and appetitive faculties receive—from the nature or from the will—an *aspectus* which is directed towards the objects of these faculties and according to which apprehensive and appetitive acts follow.⁴⁰

³⁹ “Aspectum autem hic voco conversionem virtualemente seu intentionalem potentiae ad obiectum.” (*II Sent.* q. 59, 543.) In another place Olivi gives a similar definition. He discusses God’s ability to create and argues that God—who is the only being able to create—is able to act “nullo patiente aut obiecto terminante nec aliquo materiali ad suam actionem eget potest agere et agit absque omni aspectu, id est, absque virtuali protensione et conversione seu determinata sui applicatione ad quemcunque locum vel ad quodcunque forinsecum vel ad quemcunque realem terminum sui virtualis aspectus terminativum.” (*Ibid.*, q. 1, 7.)

⁴⁰ “[...] inclinatio enim ignis per quam movetur sursum potius habet aspectum suum conversum ad suum terminum localem quam ad ipsum mobile, scilicet, ignem. Et idem est de impulsu lapidum vel sagittarum proiectarum ad quem immediate sequitur motus; inclinatio enim data eis a proiectore aspectum suum habet fortiter conversum ad terminum

We can see that the term *aspectus* has a very wide range of usages in Olivi's writings. Heavy things have an inclination, *aspectus* of which is directed towards the centre of the Earth⁴¹, and light things have an inclination, the *aspectus* of which is directed upward. The inclination and the impulse which a stone receives from a catapult and an arrow from a bow have an *aspectus* towards the places the stone and the arrow are about to fly. In another context, Olivi says further that the light of the sun also has an *aspectus* to the objects it illuminates and that a magnet has an *aspectus* towards a piece of iron it attracts. The light of the glorified bodies of the saints and angels have an *aspectus*, which can vary in such a way that they become visible to some people while remain invisible to others who are in the same room. And finally, the organs of the senses and the faculties of the soul have *aspectūs* towards their objects—even the sense of touch and sense of taste function by directing their *aspectūs*, although it does not proceed further than to their own organs (*II Sent.* q. 58, 489).⁴² Generally, all the created powers—whether they are natural, such as the light of the sun, or belong to realm of psychology—function by *aspectus*.⁴³

motus. Sicut autem ipsis elementis datur a generante inclinatio habens aspectum conversum ad sua naturalia loca, ad quam naturaliter sequitur motus eorum, et sicut proiectis datur a suis motoribus seu projectoribus: sic potentiis apprehensivis et appetitivis datur, sive a natura sive a voluntate, aspectus conversus ad sua obiecta, ad quos sequitur actus apprehensionis vel appetitus." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 420–1; See also footnote 42 below.)

⁴¹ Olivi really thinks that the Earth is round. See *II Sent.* q. 23, 423.

⁴² See especially *II Sent.* q. 73, 76–82. The idea that all created agents must necessarily have an *aspectus* towards the patient of their action is presented by Olivi in several places. For example, he writes that: "Dixerunt enim quod virtus solis et cuiuslibet agentis in longinuum agit per virtualem aspectum seu per virtualem conversionem et directionem in longinuum, et ideo quantum ad efficaciam virtualis aspectus et directionis præsens est toti medio in longinuum protracto usque ad terminum ultra quem non potest agere. Sicut enim proiectis, quando prociuntur, datur quidam impulsus per quem habent inclinationem usque ad terminum ad quem per impulsum illum tendunt [...] sicut etiam visus aliquando dirigitur per aspectum in rem propinquam, aliquando vero ultra in longinuum et iterum aliquando ulterius, sicut in nobis sensibiliter experimur; sic isti dixerunt quod omnis virtus naturaliter agens, saltem corporalis, habet aspectum virtualem non solum ad superficiem corporis sibi immediate præsens, sed ad totum medium usque ad terminum ultra quem ab eo nulla potest sequi impressio." (*II Sent.* q. 23, 424–5; See also *ibid.*, q. 1, 12, 18; *ibid.*, q. 18, 363; *ibid.*, q. 53, 215; *ibid.*, q. 87, 202.)

⁴³ Because of this wide usage of the term *aspectus* it is not surprising that it is quite difficult to translate. Could there be a single English word that would bear all the different meanings? In discussing the *aspectus* of the cognitive faculties of the soul, Pasnau translates it as "attention" (e.g., in Pasnau 1997b, 133). In the case of the *aspectus* of the common sense and the intellect, this translation is legitimate, since the *aspectus* of the higher cognitive capacities of the soul accounts for the contents of phenomenal awareness, as we are about to see. However, the translation is also problematic because it cannot be used when discussing the natural powers. It would be odd to say that the sun directs its attention to the objects it illuminates, or that an arrow directs its attention to the target it is about to hit. One possible and rather natural translation might be to use a direct derivative from the latin word, namely, "aspect". The word has, even in modern English, a meaning that would be quite suitable. For example, we can say that a house has a southern aspect, i.e., it has a position facing southwards. Another possible translation might be "orientation". Both of these, however, are quite clumsy and lead the reader easily astray. Therefore, in order to reduce

All these various cases have something in common: an action is directed to something that is external to the acting agent. The illuminative activity of the sun is directed to the objects its light illuminates; a thrusting stone or an arrow flies towards certain location, and its inclination to fly and activity of flying are directed to those locations; a magnet attracts iron and its activity of attracting is directed to the piece of iron that is nearby; and finally, the cognitive faculties of the soul direct their cognitive activity towards the objects they cognise. The central idea is that if an agent has an ability to act on a patient through a distance, it must direct its power to that patient in order to be able to act on it. Also, if an agent is able to grasp something from an object that is not immediately in contact with the agent's power, the agent must direct its power to the object—this is how, say, vision functions. In all these cases, the power of the agent is directed towards the object in relation to which it produces an act, in which it produces an effect, or towards which it is moving.

The fact that Olivi accounts for all these cases by appealing to *aspectus* shows that he thinks that there is something fundamentally similar in all of them. Being directed towards something is essentially the same phenomenon in flying arrows as in perceptual acts. This is clearly a difference compared to modern conceptions of intentionality, where intentionality is regarded as a distinctive “mark of the mental,” as Brentano puts it. In Olivi's eyes, this kind of directedness is similar in the psychological acts of perception and in other cases in which there is a distance between the agent and the patient. It is not confined to the psychological activities of the faculties of the soul. Although he probably would admit that the cases he discusses are quite dissimilar in some respects, he emphasises the similarity of being directed to something external and acting in relation to it.

It has been argued that the Olivian idea of virtual attention, to which the term *aspectus* refers, is equivalent to action at distance⁴⁴. As far as the physical effects that are caused by distant objects, such as the light of the sun on the triangular shape here on Earth, this characterisation is just⁴⁵. However, it is important to keep in mind that the case of cognitive faculties is somewhat different. The fac-

the possibility of misunderstanding, I shall leave the term untranslated, knowing that this solution renders the text less readable and less elegant. As far as I am able, I shall use expressions such as “direct oneself,” “directedness,” and “direction,” but when these turn out to be too artless, I shall restrain myself to *aspectus*. This will be the case especially in the translations of Olivi's texts: *aspectus* is a noun, and “directedness” is a clumsy translation almost without exception.

⁴⁴ B. Jansen, *Die Erkenntnislehre Olivis* (Berlin: Duemmlers, 1921), 118, quoted in Pasnau 1997b, 174.

⁴⁵ See *II Sent.* q. 23, 424–33 for Olivi's discussion of the virtual reaching out of physical powers, such as the light of the sun. He presents two rivalling views. According to the first view, the agent acts directly on the part of the medium adjacent to it and this part acts on the next part and so on until the influence reaches the patient. In this picture the agent does not act directly on a distant patient. The other view is more like action at a distance because according to it the agent really acts directly on a distant patient. Olivi leaves the issue explicitly open and does not determine which of these views is correct. This issue, however, does not have direct consequences on Olivi's theory of perception because the cases of natural powers (such as the sun) and the faculties of the soul are somewhat different.

ulty which reaches out virtually to the object does not act at a distance. It directs itself towards a distant object and produces its own act in itself, not in the object. (See, e.g., *Quæst. de nov. q. 1, 76.*) Neither of these changes is action at a distance. And the perceived object does not act at a distance either because it does not act at all in the process in which it becomes apprehended. Thus, in the case of cognitive faculties there is no action at a distance: the faculties are capable of directing themselves to external objects and producing acts that are similitudes of the objects because they are produced in relation to those objects. In this way, Olivi's theory differs quite radically from Ockham's, who thinks that the object actualises our sensory faculties by action at a distance (See, e.g., Stump 1999, 178–95). To be sure, since the perceptual acts become similitudes of the objects to which they pertain through a distance, something must take place between the object and the faculty. Because Olivi denies that this happens by any kind of action at a distance we may say that he is in fact unable to account for this phenomenon—unless we admit that intentionality is an explanation for it. If we do admit that, we should not be puzzled about the lack of causal intermediaries between the faculties of the soul and external objects.

Although we are now in a better position to understand Olivi's idea about how the cognitive faculties of the soul direct themselves, there are still a couple of texts that are worth looking at because they clarify the picture further and attest that the interpretation advanced thus far is in line with his thought. First, Olivi explicitly states that neither the faculties of the soul nor the *aspectus* thereof really travel to the object: "[...] the essence of the visual *aspectus* always stays around the part of the organ in which its faculty is formally fixed, although it virtually extends outside or retracts inside."⁴⁶ The *aspectus* of the faculties of the soul are capable of virtually and intentionally tending towards external objects, but they do not actually cross the distance. *Aspectus* may also be retracted from the external world. This is an important idea, which I shall discuss more in Chapter 6. The basic idea is, however, that when the *aspectus* is completely retracted, the faculty is incapable of acting.

In another text of major importance, Olivi tries to explain the term *aspectus* by presenting a metaphorical illustration. It repeats many ideas we have been discussing hitherto:

[...] first we must discuss what is the *aspectus* by which a cognitive power regards its remote or nearby object, or by which a power that has influence on things (*virtus inflexiva*) regards a nearby or remote patient. In order that this be grasped by the simple-minded, I explain it by using a sensible and unsophisticated example. Just as a piece of iron is sometimes restrained like a formless mass that is wrapped in itself, and sometimes it is sharpened by stretching its parts after the fashion of a sword; likewise a cognitive faculty sometimes remains restrained and wrapped in itself in such a way that its intentional power (*vis intentiva*) is not directed to any object, and sometimes

⁴⁶ "[...] *aspectus visualis secundum suam essentiam semper stat circa illam partem organi in quo eius potentia formaliter est affixa, quamvis virtualiter protendatur ad extra vel retrahatur ad intra.*" (*II Sent. q. 32, 588*; see also *ibid.*, q. 73, 59–61.)

it is so stretched inside itself and sharpened by stretching that it becomes sharply intent on something exposed to it. This [latter] mode of existence and being (*se habendi*) I call its actual *aspectus*.⁴⁷

Olivi goes on to say that the directing of a faculty (*conversio potentiaē*) either precedes and causes the *aspectus* or is identical to it. He does not say which of these options is true: either the faculty is first directed, and this causes an *aspectus* in it, or the process of directing a faculty is the same thing as its *aspectus*. Either way, the metaphor suggests that the faculties of the soul may be like a piece of iron that is either an informed mass which is not pointing to anything at all or like a sword that points to something. The central idea is that when we see a sword, we see it as pointing in some direction, much in the same way as we see a guiding arrow pointing in some direction. Although this metaphor has its problems—one might argue that the sword (or the arrow) does not point anywhere by itself but it must be interpreted as such by an intentional mind that has acquired certain cultural ways of conceiving swords (and arrows) as such that they point in some direction—it is clear that it is meant to show how the faculties of the soul are such that they are able to be intentionally directed to different directions and objects. The faculty of sight is intrinsically an intentional faculty. It can be directed to the coffee mug on my desk, to the lake behind the window, or to this text on the screen of my computer, and it apprehends the mug, the lake, or the text, depending on the direction in which it is turned.

Finally, intentional directing of a faculty of the soul is not identical to a cognitive act but a necessary precondition for the act:

[...] it is clear that our volitional or cognitive power cannot produce a cognitive or volitive act without an accidental *aspectus* which is actually terminated at some object and that no created power can produce an act without the presence of a patient and without a virtual *aspectus* that is extended to and terminated at the patient.⁴⁸

Percipients are capable of directing their faculties without apprehending anything at all. The presence of an object is necessary for actual perception, but the directing of *aspectus* does not require an object. For instance, when someone is in

⁴⁷ “[...] est primo attendendum quid sit ille aspectus quo virtus cognitiva aspicit suum obiectum remotum vel propinquum aut quo virtus influxiva aspicit in patiens propinquum vel remotum. Ut autem hoc a rudioribus facilius capi possit, utamur ad hoc sensibili et grosso exemplo. Sicut enim ferrum aliquando recusum est velut massa informis et versus se involuta, aliquando vero per protensionem suarum partium acuitur in modum ensis: sic potentia cognitiva aliquando stat velut recusa et in se involuta, ita quod sua vis intentiva in nullum obiectum intendit, aliquando vero sic intra se protenditur et protendendo acuitur quod est acute ad aliquod sibi obiectum intenta. Hunc autem modum existendi et se habendi vocamus eius actuale aspectum.” (*II Sent.* q. 73, 63–4.)

⁴⁸ “[...] constat quod absque accidentali aspectu in obiectum aliquod actualiter terminato non potest nostra potentia volitiva vel cognitiva aliquem actum cognitivum vel volitivum producere, nec aliqua potentia creata potest aliquem actum producere absque praesentia patientis et absque virtuali aspectu in ipsum protenso et terminato.” (*II Sent.* q. 74, 130.) *Aspectus* does not belong to the genus of action (*ibid.*, q. 28, 491).

complete darkness and tries to see, she directs her faculty of sight to the external world. Yet, since her sight is incapable of reaching any object due to the darkness, she does not see anything. In such a case, the faculty of sight is intentionally directed (and thus its *aspectus* is directed to the external world), but an act of seeing cannot be achieved.⁴⁹ If the lights are then turned on, the *aspectus* reaches an object which happens to be present and is terminated at it. This enables the faculty of sight to bring about an act of apprehension which is, in turn, terminated at the object and becomes a similitude of it, thus allowing the percipient to actually perceive it.⁵⁰ We are in control of the faculties of our soul to the extent that we are able to direct them as we please, but if we happen to direct them to an object that is present, an act of apprehension follows automatically⁵¹. In other words, we can use our faculties, but we cannot voluntarily control their acts. If I direct my eyes to some object, I necessarily see it unless I turn my eyes away or close them.

We have now seen how Olivi conceives of the process of perception. Although he employs idiosyncratic terminology, his basic idea is clear enough. The faculties of the soul function in such a way that they must be intentionally directed to their objects, but this does not mean that the faculties or their acts would be actually drawn to the objects. Cognitive acts of the soul are capable of being about their objects by being virtually present to them. All in all, according to Olivi there are three elements which are needed in the process of cognising an object: the faculty of the soul which is intentionally directed at the object, the cognitive act itself, and the object at which the *aspectus* and the act are terminated. Olivi reduces the metaphysics of a cognitive act by discarding the species, thus deviating from the Aristotelian theory of his time, and putting forth an intentional theory of perception.

⁴⁹ *II Sent.* q. 73, 68–9.

⁵⁰ *II Sent.* q. 61, 577; See also *ibid.* q. 58, 473; *ibid.*, q. 32, 574; *ibid.*, q. 72, 12.

⁵¹ “[...] ad conversionem aspectus, si obiecta sint alias debito modo praesentia [...] semper sequitur aliquis actus apprehensionis.” (*II Sent.* q. 59, 552.) The faculties of the human soul are controlled and directed by the will (see, e.g., *ibid.*, q. 72, 26), and non-human animals are moved by the sensitive appetite.

6 INTENTIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

6.1 Selective Attention

One of the main reasons Olivi accentuates the need for intentionally directing the cognitive faculties is his conviction that we do not consciously perceive anything unless we pay attention to the things within reach of our perceptual capacities. He emphasises the idea—which has been discussed in the course of the history of western philosophy and which is a central topic also in modern philosophy of mind¹—that we become consciously aware of things in the external world only if we pay attention to them. Perception is, in an Augustinian manner, an active process in which selective attention plays a crucial role. Attention accounts not only for the fact that we are not aware of everything that is within our perceptual reach, but it also determines the contents of our phenomenal consciousness. The world around us is full of details, and the amount of things we may perceive is vast; selective attention creates a kind of barrier between the world and our consciousness by reducing the amount of information that is present in our conscious experience. As Olivi so strongly emphasises this aspect of the perceptual process, it is crucial to understand exactly how selective attention functions in his theory of perception.²

We can begin unfolding Olivi's thought concerning this issue by looking at the following text in which Olivi argues that the *aspectus* of a corporeal faculty is composed of a corporeal and a spiritual component:

For, an organic *aspectus* and act [i.e., *aspectus* and act of a faculty that is realised in a corporeal organ] are united and adjusted to the body in such a

¹ See, e.g., Deborah Brown, "Augustine and Descartes on the Function of Attention in Perceptual Awareness," in Heinämaa, Lähteenmäki & Remes 2007, 153–175. For modern discussions, one can begin with, e.g., J. K. O'Regan & A. Noë, "A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 24:5 (2001): 939–1011, <http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/17/bbs00000417-00/index.html> (I thank Pessi Lyyra for pointing out this article to me). See also footnotes in Brown 2007, 155–8.

² For discussion, see also Pasnau 1997b, 132–3.

way that it [viz the faculty] does not regard anything that is not corporeal, or it cannot regard anything that is not united to a body which it also regards, and it can do this only in a quasi corporeal way. For, as a sense is composed of a faculty of the soul and a corporeal organ, so its *aspectus* is composed of a spiritual *aspectus* of its faculty and a corporeal *aspectus* of its organ.³

Olivi means that two conditions must be fulfilled in order to see the mug on my desk: (1) my eyes must be directed towards the mug and (2) the spiritual *aspectus* of my faculty of sight must be directed towards the mug. The first of these conditions is quite obvious: I am unable to see the mug unless my eyes are directed in such a way that it falls within my visual field. The corporeal *aspectus* refers to this kind of directedness of the organs of the senses. The spiritual *aspectus*, by comparison, refers to the intentional directedness of the faculty of sight and ultimately to the intentional directedness of attention and consciousness. Not only my eyes but also my faculty of sight must be intentionally directed towards the mug in order for an act of perceiving the mug to become possible, and (as we shall see in a moment) not only the faculty of sight but also my attention must be directed to the mug in order for me to become conscious of it.

One of the reasons Olivi proposes this idea of a double *aspectus* is his critical attitude towards Aristotelian theories of perception. He rejects the Aristotelian supposition that perception is a passive reception of external stimuli partly by pointing out that we actually do not see everything in our visual field all the time. If the Aristotelian theory were correct—Olivi claims—we should see equally well when we actually look at some object as when we are engrossed in some other activity (such as listening to music) with the object just happening to be in front of our eyes. Sensible species do not cease from acting on our cognitive faculties when we concentrate on something, and if perception is a passive reception thereof, we should see no matter where our attention is directed.

However, in reality, if we do not pay attention to the objects in front of our eyes, we are not conscious of them. It oftentimes happens that we do not see things in our visual field. For instance, if a bird flies past my window (which is in my visual field while I write this text), I do not necessarily see it, or at least I do not become conscious of it. All that is needed for me to fail to consciously perceive the bird is that I am too intensely attending to this text I am writing, to my thoughts concerning the next sentence I am about to write, or to the music I listen to while I should be working instead. Olivi's distinction between the corporeal and spiritual *aspectūs* functions as an explanation for this phenomenon. Although my eyes are actually directed in such a way that the window and the bird fall within my visual field, there is still the possibility that my faculty of sight remains (to use Olivi's own words): "*velut massa informis et versus se involuta*" (see Chapter 5.3, footnote 47). In this case, there is the *possibility* of seeing the

³ "Nam aspectus et actus organicus sic est corpori coniunctus et conformatus quod vel nihil aspicit nisi corporeum, vel non potest aliquid aspiceret nisi ut coniunctum corpori quod et aspicit, nec potest hoc nisi cum modo quasi corporeo. Nam sicut sensus est compositus ex potentia animæ et organo corporeo: sic aspectus eius est compositus ex spirituali aspectu suæ potentia et ex corporali aspectu sui organi." (*II Sent.* q. 67, 618–9.)

bird because it is in my visual field, but my faculty of sight is not intentionally directed towards it and, therefore, does not proceed to actual seeing.

The most clear example of this phenomenon is of course a person who is asleep: even when the eyes of a sleeping person are open, she does not see what happens in her bedroom. Olivi repeatedly uses this kind of example to prove that an *aspectus* of the faculty of sight is needed in order to perceive. For example, he writes:

For, it is certain that [in the case of] a sleeper, who has his ears and nostrils open and whose sense of touch is present to the clothes that are near, species have the power to flow from the objects that are present to the open organs of the senses; yet, this is not sufficient for seeing and hearing or for the sensation of smelling and touching unless the actual *aspectus* of the senses is awake and tends there.⁴

What Olivi has in mind in this passage is that it is not enough that the organs of the senses are open to external influence. Even though external objects are capable of affecting our bodily organs by the sensible species, the reception of species would not amount to perception. When the eyes of a sleeping person are open, external objects can affect them, but the sleeper does not see anything. The reason Olivi gives for this is that an actual *aspectus* of the faculty of the soul is needed in order to perceive, and in the case of a sleeping person this is missing. In other words, the corporeal *aspectus* of the organ alone does not suffice for perception. The eyes of a sleeper may be directed to external objects, but she does not see them. This proves that sometimes things in the visual field are not perceived—a fact that calls for explanation. Olivi thinks that species theories cannot provide an explanation, but his own theory can—by appealing to the spiritual *aspectus* of the faculties of the soul.

So, the lack of a spiritual *aspectus* explains why a sleeping person does not perceive. How is this related to the need for selective attention in the process of perception? Basically, Olivi's view is that the lack of a spiritual *aspectus* is due to the fact that a sleeping person does not pay attention to her surroundings either because her consciousness is busy seeing dreams or because she is sleeping so deeply that she is completely unconscious. The directing of the spiritual *aspectus* of the faculty of sight is ultimately done by the directing of one's attention.

We can see this—and some of the details about the way in which this directing of one's attention takes place—by looking at an intriguing yet difficult passage from Olivi's *Quodlibeta*. In question seven of the first quodlibet, Olivi is faced with a question: Why are people who are half asleep (the Latin term is *semidormientes*, and I take it that it means sleepwalkers) capable of seeing, hearing, speaking, walking, and conducting other similar actions even better than when they are awake? From the point of view of a modern reader, Olivi's answer

⁴ “Constat enim quod dormiens, auribus apertis et naribus et tactu praesente vestibis sibi iunctis, habebunt fluere species a praesentibus obiectis in aperta organa sensuum; et tamen non sufficit ad videndum et audiendum vel ad sensum odoratus et tactus, nisi actualis aspectus sensuum pervigiliter ibi intendat.” (*II Sent.* q. 73, 89.)

is a bit disappointing because he misses many philosophically interesting issues that might be addressed in relation to this question. He responds shortly that these actions are possible for a sleepwalker because her common sense is active to some extent. He seems to think that the activity of the common sense is a sufficient explanation for the sleepwalker's abilities. After providing this answer, Olivi goes on to parade Augustine in support of his idea and then appeals to our experience. The basic idea he presents is that the functioning of the common sense is necessary for the activity of the external senses:

The external senses cannot be awake, and they cannot act unless the common sense acts with respect to their acts and the objects of the external senses. (Augustine says this explicitly in *Super Genesim*, book XII, chapter 25, where he states: "There can be no bodily vision without the spiritual. Spiritual vision, on the other hand, can occur without the bodily kind." By spiritual vision, he means the vision of phantasy (*fantasie*)—the text makes this explicitly clear. Namely, in the text, Augustine makes a distinction between spiritual and intellectual vision and a little further, in the subsequent chapter, he says that the spiritual vision is in between the intellectual and corporeal visions.) A sign of this is that our external senses do not perceive anything we would know, not even their most easily discernible and manifest objects, when our interior intention is totally directed and turned towards something. This is why we do not remember anything about them later unless we see or have perceived them some other time.⁵

There are a couple of issues in this text of which I would like to draw attention. First, the text gives us a more detailed picture of the way we are sometimes hindered from consciously perceiving things in our surroundings. The idea is that the external senses are incapable of acting if the common sense does not act in relation to them. Activity from the common sense is needed in order for the external senses to function. Even a sleeping person may perceive her surroundings if her common sense has some level of activity in relation to the external senses. In this case, we speak of a sleepwalker. Olivi does not say whether or not the

⁵ "Quod autem sensus particulares non possint esse uigiles, seu in suo actu, nisi sensus communis sit in actu respectu illorum actuum et obiectorum sensus particularis, dicit expresse Augustinus, XII Super Genesim, capitulo XXV, ubi dicit quod 'Corporalis uisio sine spirituali esse non potest. Spiritualis uero usio sine corporali fieri potest'. Vocat autem ibi spiritualis uisionem, uisionem fantasie, sicut ibi expresse patet. Nam ibi ponit differentiam inter ipsam et intellectualem. Et paulo post in capitulo sequenti dicit quod est media inter intellectualem uisionem et corporalem. Huius autem signum est quia, cum nostra interior intentio totaliter ad aliqua est intenta et conuersa, tunc nostri sensus particulares etiam suis obiectis patuli et aperti nihil penitus de illis percipiunt quod nos sciamus. Vnde nec de illis postmodum recordamur nisi alias uidemus aut senserimus illa." (*Quodl.* I.7, 25–6.) The passage Olivi refers to is in Aurelius Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*, PL 34, ed. J.-P. Migne (Patrologia Latina Database), <http://pld.chadwyck.co.uk/> (hereafter *De Gen. ad litt.*), XII.24.51. Translation of Augustine's text is taken from *On Genesis*, transl. E. Hill & M. O'Connell, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century I/13 (NY: New City Press, 2002).

sleepwalker has phenomenal consciousness of her surroundings, but at least she is capable of acting appropriately.

Another idea that this excerpt reveals is that sleeping persons are not the only ones who sometimes fail to be conscious of external objects. Olivi thinks that the same phenomenon takes place also while a person is awake. At the end of the passage, he supports his idea that the common sense has to have some kind of activity in order for a person to perceive her surroundings by drawing from the internal experience of not being conscious of external objects because attention is directed elsewhere—Olivi uses the expression *interior intention* by which he denotes the intentional directing of attention and consciousness. This shows that a sleeping person who does not perceive anything at all is similar to a person who is awake but intent on one thing and who fails to perceive other things around her. Olivi's idea is that the common sense must be involved in the process in order for the subject to consciously perceive the objects within the reach of her external senses.

These examples reveal an important and philosophically insightful feature in Olivi's theory, namely, the need for attending or paying attention to external senses and their objects. We are not only passive recipients of external stimuli; our consciousness is selective and active also with regard to perception. This ability and the need to selectively attend to different external senses and their objects shows that our mind is intentional in its operations. This aspect of the workings of our mind explains why sleeping persons do not perceive anything at all and why those who are awake do not necessarily notice everything that is within the reach of their senses. Importantly, in both of these cases the reason for the failure to perceive is the same: our mind is conscious only of those things to which it directs its attention.

In order to see how the activity of the common sense is related to the activity of the external senses and what the mechanism is in which selective attention functions, we may look at Olivi's discussion concerning the mutual hindrance of the external senses. Already in the previous passage, Olivi draws on our experience of not perceiving everything in our perceptual field, and he employs the idea that perception requires attention to account for the phenomenal fact that our senses hinder each other: listening to music hampers my eyes from seeing. Olivi is not by any means the only thinker who has paid attention to this fact. Perhaps the most well-known discussion comes from Augustine—I shall relate Olivi's view to that of Augustine below—but the idea appears also in other thinkers and contexts. For instance, our inability to use all of our senses simultaneously equally well is one of the reasons why the perceptual capacity was understood as unitary in an Aristotelian-Avicennian manner. It was taken to prove that we actually only have one faculty of perception which uses different channels—i.e., the external senses—to reach different perceptual qualities. Understood in this way, when the perceptual capacity uses the channel of sight excessively, it cannot at the same time use other channels to perceive, and the sounds and noises around us go unnoticed. According to this interpretation, external senses cannot be separate faculties because if they were, they would not hinder each other.

Olivi acknowledges this problem and admits that this phenomenon exists, but he does not think that it necessitates the conclusion that there is only one perceptual capacity. His explanation for the mutual hindrance of the external senses is based on directing one's attention instead of using one and the same faculty in different ways or through different channels. A strong focus on an object of one of the external senses hinders us from cognising the objects of other senses, and according to Olivi:

[...] the cause of mutual impediment is the unity of the intention (*intentionis*) in which [the faculties] are rooted and by which they are regulated. This is why excessive auditory attention (*attentio auditus*) impedes vision: the common sense which tends (*intendens*) excessively to an act and object of the sense of hearing ceases from tending to an act and object of vision, and when the common sense ceases from tending to an act and object of some [external] sense, the external sense itself also necessarily ceases from tending to its object. By the very fact that the common sense withdraws its *aspectus* from such a sense, the *aspectus* of that sense is withdrawn because the common sense is the root of them [viz the senses].⁶

Olivi employs rather fluctuating terminology, but it seems that all the terms, *intentio*, *attentio*, *intendo*, and *aspectus* refer to the directing of the *aspectus* of the common sense and denote selective attention. In the case of the common sense the term *aspectus* translates easily as "attention" because the intentional directedness of the common sense determines the contents of consciousness⁷. The idea Olivi puts forth is that the external senses hinder each other not because they are aspects of one and the same faculty but because we must pay attention to them in order for them to function. This is done by directing the *aspectus* of the common sense towards them. The necessity of the *aspectus* of the common sense accounts for the fact that the senses hinder each other since it cannot be directed simultaneously to all of them with an equal intensity. If the *aspectus* of the common sense is altogether directed away from the external senses and the objects thereof, the subject is not at all conscious of the things in her visual field nor of the noises that actually surround her, and so forth⁸. So, depending on which one of the external

⁶ "Causa igitur mutui impedimenti est unitas intentionis in qua radicanur et a qua regulantur. Propter hoc enim nimia attentio auditus impedit visum, quia sensus communis nimium intendens actui et obiecto auditus cessat ab intendendo actui et obiecto visus, deficiente autem sensu communi ab intendendo actui et obiecto alicuius sensus deficit necessario et ipse particularis sensus ab intendendo suo obiecto. Eo enim ipso quo sensus communis retrahit aspectum suum a tali sensu, retrahitur aspectus talis sensus, pro eo quod sensus communis est radix eorum." (*II Sent.* q. 59, 555; See also *ibid.*, q. 58, 484; *ibid.*, q. 62, 589–90; *ibid.*, 593–6; *ibid.*, q. 66, 613; *Quodl.* 1.7, 25–6; Toivanen 2007, 432–4.)

⁷ As I point out above (in Chapter 5.3, footnote 38), all these different terms seem to be synonymous with *aspectus*, at least in those contexts in which Olivi discusses his idea of directing one's attention.

⁸ "[...] aliquando potest esse tanta retractio quod totaliter deficit et prostratur aspectus. Et tunc nulla potest esse apprehensio nec per consequens aliquis alius actus, cum aspectus necessario præexigatur ad actum apprehensionis." (*II Sent.* q. 59, 552; see also *ibid.*, q. 62, 595–6.)

senses is in the focus of our attention, we perceive different things. We see if we pay attention to our eyes, to their activity, and to visible objects; we hear if we pay attention to our ears, to their activity, and to audible objects. The *aspectus* of the common sense is responsible for the direction to which our attention is drawn.

The preceding text shows Olivi clearly acknowledging that it is possible to not be aware of things in one's immediate surroundings not only while asleep but also while awake. In both cases, the way this takes place is the same: the person does not pay attention to one or all of her senses and their objects. Paying attention and perceiving are inextricably related because the former is a necessary condition for the latter. To put it more concretely, in order for me to see the bird behind my window I must withdraw my attention from the music which flows from my earphones and redirect it to my eyes and thus to the bird. In technical terminology, this is done by directing the *aspectus* of the common sense from the faculty of hearing towards the faculty of sight. With the co-operation of the faculty of sight, the *aspectus* is directed to visible objects within my perceptual field.

In a passage that repeats the idea of the mutual impediment of the external senses, Olivi makes it clear that the (spiritual) directedness of the external senses is rooted in the *aspectus* of the common sense:

As the faculties are naturally connected to each other, so are their radical *aspectūs*. This is why the act of vision is impeded when the *aspectus* of the common or interior sense is totally turned away from the objects and acts of vision. This happens sometimes when the whole actual intention of the interior sense is directed to an act and object of the sense of hearing, or touch, or when it is totally withdrawn inside because of slumber. Therefore, the fact that various faculties of the soul impede one another from their acts is not because they would have one simple and, as it were, point-like root of their essences but rather because of their mutual connection and because the *aspectus* of a superior faculty is related to the *aspectus* of inferior faculties, as a root is to branches.⁹

The overall picture is that the common sense can be directed towards different external senses—this amounts to directing one's attention—and the *aspectūs* of the external senses is directed towards external objects only if the *aspectus* of the common sense is directed to them. The *aspectūs* of the external senses are, in a way, extensions of the *aspectus* of the common sense.

⁹ "Sicut autem potentiae sunt sibi invicem naturaliter colligatae, sic et earum radicales aspectus; et ideo cum aspectus sensus communis seu interioris totaliter advertitur ab obiectis et actibus ipsius visus, tunc impeditur actus videndi; fit autem hoc aliquando, cum tota actualis intentio sensus interioris convertitur ad actum et obiectum auditus vel tactus vel cum per somnum tota revocatur ad interiora. Quod igitur diversae potentiae animae impediant se aliquando in suis actionibus non provenit ex una simplici et quasi punctuali radice suarum essentialium, sed potius ex mutua colligantia ipsarum et ex eo quod aspectus superioris potentiae se habet ad aspectus potentialium inferiorum sicut radix ad ramos." (*II Sent.* q. 50 app., 54.)

By appealing to the necessity of paying attention, Olivi is able to underpin his idea about the activity of perception. We are not passive recipients of external stimuli, rather, the relation of our mind to the external world is more like acting: the world is there, available for us to perceive, and we direct our intentional attention to it in a selective way. We perceive things which fall under our active attention; other things go unnoticed from us. In this way, attending to an object is necessary for perceiving it, and it seems that when attention is directed to a certain object (*via* an appropriate external sense) the subject necessarily perceives it.

6.2 Consciousness and the Common Sense

What is the exact relation between selective attention and consciousness? The question revolves around the concept of consciousness, to be sure, and modern philosophy of mind has shown that it is not a simple task to define what consciousness is. However, as I already said in the general introduction of this study, by consciousness I mean a kind of first personal phenomenal appearance: for instance, when I am conscious of my mug, the mug is phenomenally present to me in my experience. It feels something like for me to perceive the mug.

It is not easy to find any kind of discussion concerning phenomenal consciousness from medieval authors, but I do not think it is impossible either. It goes without saying that the medieval authors do not employ the same terminology as we do, and their theoretical interests often lay on matters that are not directly concerned with phenomenal consciousness—or even with philosophical psychology, for that matter. Still, we can pinpoint ideas that can be understood as pertaining to the phenomenon we are accustomed to calling phenomenal consciousness. This is not the place for a thorough discussion of this issue, and I shall not dwell upon it, but I think it is necessary to show that Olivi recognises the phenomenon. In question seven of his *Quæstiones de novissimis*, he asks whether a separated soul suffers from corporeal fire. He responds that it is heretical to think that it does not suffer, and then he goes on to present four alternative explanations as to how the suffering takes place. One of them—inspired by certain passages from Gregory and Augustine—has it that corporeal fire really burns the soul, and the suffering is due to actual burning. This is a neat solution, but Olivi does not accept it. He has many reasons to reject it, but already at the beginning of his answer he makes an interesting claim. For, he says that:

[...] although Gregory says that the fire burns the spirit and although both Peter and Augustine say that the spirits will burn and enter [a state of] eternal combustion, it is naïve to believe that [the fire] would literally burn and consume them. [...] By invisible or spiritual burning [Gregory] refers to the living experience of sensible burning. This becomes clear from what he says

next, namely: “the soul suffers not only by seeing but also by experiencing the burning.” [...] On the basis of this, it is clear that by burning and suffering from fire he means the experiential sensation and vision of fire [...]¹⁰.

Olivi thinks that the soul does not really burn. Corporeal fire cannot affect the spiritual soul directly. Still, the separated soul suffers pain because it has a “living experience of burning.” The only thing that happens to the soul is that it perceives fire and has an experience of being in pain, and it seems to me that this kind of experience cannot be anything but a phenomenal feel of being in pain. In this way, Olivi’s reading of Gregory’s text makes a reference to phenomenal consciousness. Although in this context Olivi does not mention anything about the soul’s normal perceptions when it is united to the body, his idea seems to be that perception involves this kind of phenomenal and experiential aspect also then. I can see no reason why Olivi would deny the phenomenal feel from a soul that is united to the body, if he thinks that a separated soul may have such a feel when it perceives¹¹. It feels something like to perceive, regardless of whether one has a body or not.

In Olivi’s view, the common sense plays a crucial role in bringing about acts of apprehension and the phenomenal aspects that accompany them¹². I tentatively argue in the introduction to this study that some medievals seem to think that an act of *any* of the cognitive faculties of the soul brings about consciousness of its object. When the faculty of sight acts, its object is seen and appears to the subject. Similarly, when the imagination acts, the subject becomes conscious of the thing imagined. Understood in this way, consciousness is an intrinsic function of all the cognitive faculties of the soul. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it seems that Olivi deviates to some extent from this view: consciousness requires activity of the highest cognitive faculty of the soul, and as such it is a function of the common sense¹³. The acts of the common sense are needed in order to have phenomenal consciousness about perceptual objects.

¹⁰ “[...] licet Gregorius dicat quod ignis exurat spiritum, et licet tam Petrus quam Augustinus dicant eos arsueros et in combustionem eternam ituros, nimis tamen rude est credere quod ad litteram exurantur et ardeant et comburantur. [...] Per ardorem aut invisibilem seu spiritualement [Gregorius] intelligit vivam experientiam ardoris sensibilis, sicut patet per illud quod subdit, quod scilicet ‘anima non solum videndo sed etiam experiendo incendium patiat’. [...] Ex quo patet quod cremari et pati ab igne accipit pro sensu et visu ignis experimentalis [...]” (*Quæst. de nov. q. 7*, 154–5.)

¹¹ We shall see in Chapter 7 that the differences between perceiving with a body and perceiving without a body are minor, according to Olivi. It is the soul that does the perceiving in both cases.

¹² A sign of this is that perception of pain belongs to the common sense, not to the external senses, and this probably also applies to the disembodied soul in corporeal fire. For discussion about perception of pain, see Chapter 19.2.

¹³ It must be noted that in the case of human beings it seems that the ultimate centre of phenomenal consciousness is not the common sense but the intellect which apprehends the acts of the common sense. Thus, human consciousness is actually a function of the intellect, not of the common sense. See *II Sent.* q. 37, 659; *ibid.*, q. 51, 122; *ibid.*, q. 54, 241, 280; *ibid.*, q. 58, 464; *ibid.*, q. 59, 540; *ibid.*, q. 74, 126. For discussion, see Part III, Chapter 18.

Acts of the external senses are also necessary for perceiving external objects, to be sure¹⁴. However, Olivi seems to think that external senses are only means for sensing external objects and that ultimately the acts of the common sense account for the contents of conscious experiences. The common sense must produce an act in relation to an object in order for the object to appear to the subject. An indication of this is that Olivi repeatedly writes that the common sense is the subject of the acts of perception by which external objects are apprehended. This idea can be seen, for example, from the following excerpt:

According to the different [directions of] attention (*aspectus*) which the common sense has in the brain, different acts are attained. For, according to the attention which it has towards the eyes, it apprehends visible [qualities], and following the attention towards the ears it apprehends audible [qualities]. The same goes for all the other senses.¹⁵

We see here Olivi claiming that the common sense apprehends visible and audible qualities. Its *aspectus* can be directed towards different external senses, and this enables it to form an act of perception in relation to perceptual objects. It is the proper subject of the acts of perception even though it must use the external senses and their acts to reach the external world. Thus, ultimately the common sense accounts for the acts of perception.¹⁶

From this perspective, it is noteworthy that Olivi does not think that the common sense would act only in relation to the external senses and their acts. It does not only apprehend the acts of the external senses and, as it were, see the external objects in those acts. This would lead to problems of representationalism and, as we have seen, Olivi regards these problems as serious enough to undermine the plausibility of any theory that entails them. Instead, Olivi repeatedly writes that the common sense apprehends *external objects*. His idea seems to be that the common sense is really capable of apprehending external objects—not indirectly by apprehending, say, an act of seeing but directly by apprehending the objects of sight, somehow using the faculty of sight and its act in the process. Even though the common sense cannot apprehend external objects by itself and has to employ the external senses in order to perceive them, Olivi does not think that the acts of the senses are *objects* for the acts of the common sense. They do not function as representations of external objects. This is somewhat puzzling, for it is not very clear how this idea differs from the sophisticated species theories of perception in which the species functions as a means for perceiving an external object and not as a representationalist entity which would be an object of perception. One might say that Olivi refutes some versions of species theories

¹⁴ “Sciendum ergo primo quod sensus communis nullum obiectum reale et præsentialia potest immediate apprehendere nisi tantum actus particularium sensuum per quorum actus apprehendit obiecta eorum.” (*II Sent.* q. 62, 594.)

¹⁵ “Secundum autem diversos aspectus quos [sensus communis] habet in cerebro diversos sortitur actus. Nam secundum aspectum quem habet versus oculos apprehendit visibilia, secundum autem aspectum ad aures apprehendit audibilia et sic de aliis sensibus.” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 510; see also *ibid.*, q. 32, 589; *ibid.*, q. 84, 183.)

¹⁶ Important texts in this respect are the following: *Quodl.* I.7, 25–6; *II Sent.* q. 58, 464; *ibid.*, q. 62, 589–90; *ibid.*, q. 66, 613.

but nevertheless incorporates some aspects of them into his own theory without clarifying how his own view is supposed to differ from the ones he has so sharply rejected.

Be that as it may, it is clear that acts of the common sense are needed in order for a subject to perceive external objects. It is not even clear that the external senses are capable of acting if the common sense does not act in conjunction with them. As we have seen, Olivi explicitly says that the spiritual *aspectus*, the lack of which hinders a sleeping person from perceiving things around her, comes ultimately from the common sense. He also says that without the *aspectus* of the common sense the external senses cannot act. (*Quodl.* I.7, 25–6, quoted above in footnote 5.) I shall point out below that in *Summa* Olivi resolves one specific problem by implying that there can be acts in the external senses even when the common sense does not act in relation to them, but it seems that even if he really thinks this is possible, he also thinks that the subject does not become conscious of the objects of these acts unless the common sense directs its *aspectus* towards them and forms an act of perception in relation to them. The subject is conscious only of those things in relation to which the common sense has activity, and the activity of the common sense requires that its *aspectus* be first directed to the object.

The significance of the common sense in the process of conscious perception can be seen in Olivi's accounting for the conscious attention by appealing to the *aspectus* of the common sense. As we have seen, Olivi requires that in order to perceive external objects one has to direct one's attention to the external senses and to the objects thereof. Becoming conscious of external objects requires paying attention to them, and in Olivi's technical vocabulary this is done by directing the *aspectus* of the common sense to the external senses and through them to the perceptual qualities in the world. Thus, the activity of the common sense is necessary for conscious perception, and the *aspectus* of the common sense accounts for its contents. This also holds true for the other way around: we do not perceive things which are outside the scope of the *aspectus* of the common sense. Once again, the texts in which Olivi speaks about total unconsciousness show most clearly how the directing of the *aspectus* of the highest cognitive faculty of the soul is responsible for the contents of consciousness. Consider the following text, which deals with the way the *aspectus* of the cognitive faculties may be retracted altogether:

[...] sometimes there can be such a retraction that the *aspectus* is totally missing and completely paralysed (*prostratur*). In this case, there can be no apprehension, and by consequence nor can there be any other act because the *aspectus* is necessarily needed for an act of apprehension. This applies to an infant when it is in utero—especially at the beginning of its formation—and this happens also in the deepest sleep. If the *aspectus* is not totally paralysed but retracted in a similar way without being retracted totally, then there are some acts.¹⁷

¹⁷ “[...] aliquando potest esse tanta retractio quod totaliter deficit et prostratur *aspectus*. Et tunc nulla potest esse apprehensio nec per consequens aliquis alius actus, cum *aspectus* necessario præexigatur ad actum apprehensionis. Et hoc modo contingit in infante, dum

This text is an answer to a question concerning the acts of the intellectual part of the souls of children, madmen, and sleeping persons. Olivi thinks that sometimes their intellects function (though never freely), sometimes not, and the lack of their activity is accounted for by appealing to the retraction of the *aspectus*. A few pages earlier, Olivi says that by the term “retraction” he means the withdrawing of the intentional directing of the sensitive faculties of the soul from the external world, as in the case of a sleeping person who does not see even though her eyes are open (*II Sent.* q. 59, 549–50). Thus, he means that when a faculty is completely retracted, its spiritual *aspectus* is not directed to anything at all. According to the cited passage, the *aspectus* can be retracted from its intentional directedness either partially or totally, and when it is totally retracted there is no act of apprehension whatsoever. This takes place during deep sleep and in the beginning of the foetus’ formation. This passage illustrates well that the *aspectus* of the faculty which provides a being with consciousness accounts for the contents of consciousness. If it does not extend to anything whatsoever, the being does not have any cognitive act, and hence she is not conscious, but unconscious.

While it is true that the faculty Olivi is discussing in the passage is the intellect, the same idea goes for other faculties of the soul as well. This is evident for two reasons. First, Olivi makes an important allusion to a foetus in utero: he thinks that foetuses do not have intellectual souls at the beginning of their development (*II Sent.* q. 51, 130–1), and therefore it is clear that retraction takes place also in other faculties of the soul. Second, when Olivi defines the term *retractio* he makes it explicit that he has in mind *virtutes animales seu sensitivæ*. Thus, all the powers of the soul can be retracted in such a way that they are not intentionally directed to anything at all, and if this is the case, the subject does not have any act of apprehension whatsoever.

Now, it is important to remember that the complete retraction of external senses is due to the retraction of the *aspectus* of the common sense. The external senses cannot provide any sort of consciousness to the subject if the common sense is completely retracted from them. Moreover, because the common sense may also have other acts of apprehension in which the external senses are not at all employed (e.g., imaginative acts, in which the common sense produces an act of apprehension in relation to a memory species)¹⁸, a complete lack of consciousness or an emptiness of the content of consciousness requires that the *aspectus* of the common sense is not only retracted from the external senses but also retracted totally from all other possible objects. In this way, it is clear that from a metaphysical point of view the common sense plays a crucial role in the process of acquiring consciousness.

As I have already mentioned, phenomenal consciousness was not an explicit topic of discussion for medieval philosophers, and Olivi is not an exception. However, there are many passages in which Olivi bases his views on the

est in utero, maxime in principio formationis, et hoc quidem in somno profundissimo. Si autem non totaliter prostratur, sed sic retrahitur quod tamen non totaliter, tunc aliquos actus habet.” (*II Sent.* q. 59, 552; see also *ibid.*, 549–50, 559.)

¹⁸ See Chapter 4 above, and Part II, Chapters 13 & 14.

way things appear to us in our phenomenal experience. These passages reveal that the content of phenomenal consciousness is determined by the acts of the common sense. One of the texts of this kind comes from Olivi's account of the fact that we have two eyes and thus two visual *aspectūs*, but the object still appears to us as one. Olivi explains:

Also because the uniformity of the concurrence of the double *aspectūs* of the two eyes on one and the same object appears (*occurrit*) to the common sense as if one in reality, and yet according to the duality of the eyes they are really two *aspectūs* and two visions of the same thing. This is why the common sense sensibly judges the object to be one, or rather the thing is presented through the two visions to the common sense as one, just as it is really one thing. However, the common sense readily perceives one act to be in one eye and the other in another eye, which is also why it perceives that one act of seeing is taken away, and the other remains when one of the eyes is closed.¹⁹

The point I want to emphasise here is that the content of our phenomenal consciousness is not determined by the two acts of our two eyes but by the act of the common sense which combines these acts. If the acts of sensation which take place in the eyes were to provide us with consciousness of their objects, the phenomenal experience of seeing would be quite different than it actually is. Actually, we see external objects from two angles because of the distance between our eyes. However, when we see an object we, do not see it as if from two sides or angles; rather, the object appears to us as one, and the vision of it appears to us as one even though it contains both aspects. The same idea can be put even more radically: there is an act of seeing in both eyes. If both of them were to bring about consciousness about their objects, we would have an experience of seeing *two* similar objects (or almost similar, due to the different angles from which the same object is seen). Olivi points out that this is not the case. We have an impression of seeing one object, and this is due to the act of the common sense which contains the information from both eyes. When we close one of our eyes, we see only the aspect of the object which is seen by the open eye, but when both of our eyes are open, we do not see the two aspects of the object as separate, nor do we see two objects. Rather, we see one object as if by one vision which comprises both aspects.

This experience, Olivi points out in the passage cited, cannot be accounted for without appealing to the common sense. The act of the common sense includes the information from the acts of both eyes, and our perceptual experience of the object is based on and provided by this act. The object appears to our consciousness in the way the act of the common sense presents it, not in the way the

¹⁹ "Quia etiam uniformitas concursus gemelli aspectus duorum oculorum super idem obiectum occurrit sensui communi acsi realiter una, cum tamen secundum dualitatem oculorum sint vere duo aspectus et duæ visiones eiusdem rei: idcirco sensus communis sensibilibiter iudicat esse unam, vel potius res per ambas visiones non offertur tunc sibi nisi ut una, sicut et est vere una. Sed tamen bene sentit alium actum videndi esse in uno oculo et alium in alio, unde et cum unus eorum clauditur, sentit unum actum videndi esse subtractum alio remanente." (*II Sent.* q. 73, 94.)

acts of the two eyes apprehend it. On the basis of this passage, I think it is clear that the act of the common sense is the one that is ultimately responsible for the contents of our consciousness of objects of perception.

In another important excerpt, Olivi endeavours to prove that not only the external senses, but also the common sense function by directing their *aspectūs*. There is nothing new in this claim, but the way Olivi puts it is very interesting. He claims that the common sense extends itself to the external senses and even to external objects by reaching out its *aspectus* and that this is why the acts of the common sense appear as if they were acts of the senses:

Moreover, the common sense perceives so intimately the objects of the external senses in their places that many acts of the common sense appear as acts of the external senses. This is clear because pictures of diverse clothes and members in a painting appear to us as having solidity and as being placed over each other, as if the colours of the image were solid bodies. They appear to us in this way because the estimation of the interior sense has shown this to be the case in the human beings that the painting is about. Likewise, when a burning brand is whirled in a circle, it appears as if we were seeing a kind of a circle of fire. And yet [the power of] vision does not see the circle in any instant—neither when it is made nor after it has been made—but it sees only one part of it after another and never the two at the same time. But the interior sense apprehends the circle by the memory which preserves past things and offers things that have recently been done or seen as if they take place and are seen now. There are numerous other things that are apprehended or estimated only by the interior sense, and yet they are ascribed to the external senses because of the intimacy of the interior sense with the external senses. It must be, therefore, that the virtual *aspectus* of the common sense intimately extends all the way to the acts of the external senses and even all the way to the objects of the external senses.²⁰

The idea that the common sense is involved in the perception of things that do not actually exist in the external world (such as the circle of fire that appears when a lit torch is whirled quickly around) comes from Avicenna²¹. The most interesting

²⁰ "Uterius, [sensus communis] sic intime sentit eorum [scil. sensuum particularium] obiecta in suis locis quod multi proprii actus eius videntur esse proprii actus sensuum particularium; sicut patet, cum picturæ diversarum vestium et membrorum alicuius imaginis videntur nobis varias densitates sibi invicem superpositas habere, acsi colores imaginis essent corpora spissa. Quod ideo nobis videtur, quia æstimatio sensus interioris sic probavit in hominibus quorum sunt imagines illæ. Sic etiam, cum titio ignitus sphaerice giratur, videmur nobis videre quendam circulum igneum; cum tamen visus in nullo uno instanti videat illum circulum, nec cum fit, nec post factum, sed solum unam partem videt post aliam sic quod nunquam duas simul. Sed interior sensus illum circulum apprehendit per memoriam retinentem præterita et offerentem recenter acta et visa, quasi adhuc fiant et videantur. Innumera etiam alia sunt quæ a solo sensu interiori apprehenduntur vel æstimantur, quæ tamen sensibus ascribuntur particularibus propter intimitatem illius cum istis. Oportet ergo quod virtualis aspectus sensus communis intime attingat usque ad actus sensuum exteriorum et etiam usque ad loca obiectorum suorum." (*II Sent.* q. 73, 99.)

²¹ *Shifā' De an.* I.5, 88–9; For discussion, see Kaukua 2007, 39–45; At the outset, it seems that

element in this passage—and the one I would like to draw attention to—is Olivi’s observation that even though perceiving the circle of fire is due to an act of the common sense, it appears to us as if we were really *seeing* it with our eyes. In other words, the acts of the faculty of sight do not determine the content of our perceptual consciousness. If they did, we would be conscious of the torch in one place at a time and not of the circle of fire at all because the faculty of sight does not see the circle nor the movement of the torch. Contrary to this, the content of our phenomenal consciousness is determined by the act of the common sense which combines the act of vision with a memorative act and thus provides us with a phenomenal experience of seeing a circle of fire.

It is also notable that in the end of the passage Olivi claims that the virtual *aspectus* of the common sense extends itself all the way to the objects of the external senses. It cannot do this without the external senses and their *aspectūs* but still the common sense is the proper subject of the acts of perception. All this accentuates that Olivi understands the common sense as a faculty that provides perceptual consciousness, a centre of consciousness so to speak, and that the directing of its *aspectus* amounts to paying attention, understood as a necessary prerequisite for being conscious of external objects. When the common sense brings about a cognitive act in relation to an object, the object appears to the subject as a part of her conscious experience. And if the common sense does not act in relation to an object, the subject is not conscious of it.

6.3 Levels of Consciousness

The picture I have presented above tries to capture Olivi’s understanding of a phenomenal consciousness which enables the subject to be explicitly conscious of perceived objects in such a way that she is conscious of perceiving them²². However, certain of Olivi’s ideas seem to suggest that consciousness comes in degrees: the subject may have a kind of peripheral consciousness which makes the external world somehow present to the subject without her being explicitly conscious of it.

To understand the difference between this kind of peripheral consciousness and explicit consciousness, consider the following. My perceptual field contains many things of which I am not explicitly conscious unless I pay attention to them. Still, they are present to me in a way that differs from complete unconsciousness.

Olivi’s view differs from Avicenna’s because Olivi appeals also to memory in his account of the perception of the circle of fire. However, as we shall see below (in Part II, Chapter 14), he thinks that memory is not distinct from the common sense. Thus, the allusion to memory is not as great a deviation from Avicenna’s view as it looks.

²² I use an expression that is reminiscent of second-order perception (i.e., perceiving that one perceives) on purpose, for it seems to me that when Olivi discusses second-order perception, he has in mind the kind of “being aware that one perceives.” In other words, second-order perception does not take the first-order act of perception as an object but it does render the perception conscious. See Part II, Chapter 12.3 for a more detailed discussion.

If I direct my attention to my visual field, the objects in it appear to me in such a way that I am conscious of seeing them, but even when I focus intensively on the music I am listening to, I do not become temporarily blind. Perhaps I fail to notice everything in my visual field, and the bird that flies past my window may escape my consciousness completely. Still, there is a phenomenal difference between listening to music with eyes open and listening to it with eyes closed. Although my attention is all the time equally intensively directed to music, my phenomenal experience changes when I close my eyes. When my eyes are closed, I do not have even peripheral consciousness of the visible things in front of me; when they are open, the things in my visual field are present to me in such a way that I may become explicitly conscious of them, if they catch my attention for some reason.

Olivi seems to entertain an idea about this kind of distinction between levels of consciousness, although he does not explicitly address the issue in these terms. He acknowledges that we pay attention to our environment even when we are intensively concentrating on something else: things in my visual field are present to me although my attention is directed to music. In other words, paying attention is a necessary condition for becoming explicitly conscious of objects of perception, but attention can be paid in varying degrees.

We may begin unfolding this aspect of Olivi's thinking by comparing his ideas to one of the most well known historical discussions concerning the necessity of paying attention in perception. In a famous passage from *De Trinitate*, Augustine points out that:

[...] when someone is speaking to us and we are thinking of something else, it often appears as if we had not heard him. But this is not true; we did hear, but we did not remember, because the speaker's words slipped immediately away from the perception of our ears, being diverted elsewhere by a command of the will which is wont to fix them in the memory. And, therefore, when something of the kind occurs, it would be more correct to say, "We did not remember," rather than, "We did not hear."²³

As we have seen (in Chapter 6.1), Olivi takes up basically the same issue when he presents his own way of accounting for how excessive attention to one of the external senses hinders the subject from perceiving through the other senses. On the face of it, Olivi's idea very much resembles the one Augustine suggests. There is, however, an important way in which their accounts for the phenomenon differ. Augustine does not seem to think that we would not be aware of the objects of our senses when we concentrate on something else. We do hear the words even

²³ "[...] cum sæpe coram loquentem nobis aliquem aliud cogitando non audisse nobis uidemur. Falsum est autem; audiuius enim sed non meminimus subinde per aurium sensum labentibus uocibus alienato nutu uoluntatis per quem solent infigi memoriae. Verius itaque dixerimus cum tale aliquid accidit: 'Non meminimus,' quam: 'Non audiuimus.'" (Aurelius Augustinus, *De Trinitate libri quindecim*, ed. W. J. Mountain, CCSL 50/50A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1968) (hereafter *DT*), 11.8.15; The translation is taken from *The Trinity*, transl. S. McKenna, *The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation* 45 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963).)

though we do not pay attention to them. They pass through our consciousness, but since our attention is directed elsewhere, the words do not leave any traces in the *memory*. In other words, we have a phenomenal experience of hearing, but the content of the speech slips from our mind without leaving any marks behind. In the Augustinian view, the ears do not cease from acting even though we do not concentrate on listening.

In contrast to Augustine, Olivi seems to think that ears do not function at all if attention is altogether directed away from them, and, similarly, if attention is withdrawn from the eyes, they do not see. We have already seen that in his *Quodlibeta* Olivi says explicitly that a sleepwalker can see or hear only if her common sense is awake to some extent because otherwise the external senses would not function; we have also seen that paying attention is a necessary condition for the acts of the senses; to boot, Olivi argues several times in his *Summa* that the external senses do not function unless the *aspectus* of the common sense is directed to them: “As the faculties are naturally connected to each other, so are their radical *aspectūs*. This is why when the *aspectus* of the common or interior sense is totally turned away from the objects and acts of vision, then the act of vision is impeded.”²⁴ Thus, whereas Augustine seems to think that when we do not pay attention to what we perceive, perception leaves no trace in the memory; Olivi’s idea appears to be more radical: perception itself is hindered due to the lack of attention.

In this way, Olivi’s view seems to lead to the counterintuitive consequence that if my attention is retracted from my eyes, my visual field turns black, and I see nothing. Phenomenologically this is highly implausible: when I listen to music, my vision does not appear to be completely lost. It may be true that I do not see everything in my visual field, but I surely experience that I see something.

In fact, Olivi is not committed to such a radical and implausible view. He does not think that even the strong attention of one of the senses would make all the other senses *completely* inactive. He thinks that on some level the mind is always directed to the world, and the world is present to us on some level even when we have drawn our attention away from it—this holds true even when we are asleep. The crucial point is that attention and consciousness come in degrees. When I concentrate on listening to music, I do not withdraw my whole attention from the other senses, and this allows the other senses to function even though I may not become explicitly conscious of their activity.

This idea may sound striking, given the foregoing discussion about the relation between the common sense and the external senses. Does Olivi have some kind of idea about how the faculty of sight may still function when I concentrate on listening after all? This question must be divided into two separate questions: first, does Olivi really think that the senses do not function unless the common sense acts in relation to them? And second, how are the senses capable of acting

²⁴ “Sicut autem potentiae sunt sibi invicem naturaliter colligatae, sic et earum radicales aspectus; et ideo cum aspectus sensus communis seu interioris totaliter advertitur ab obiectis et actibus ipsius visus, tunc impeditur actus videndi.” (*II Sent.* q. 50 app., 54.) See also the whole passage, which is cited above in footnote 9.

when the common sense does not act in relation to them, supposing that this is possible?

As regards to the first question, the bulk of the evidence points to Olivi thinking that if a person's attention is completely directed to listening to music, her eyes do not function, and her vision is resumed only by redirecting the attention towards the faculty of sight and the eyes (see, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 50 app., 54; *ibid.*, q. 62, 595–6). There is, however, one important problem that Olivi solves by appealing to an explanation which seems to support the view that the external senses have some activity of their own without attention from the higher faculties. The problem can be stated as follows: given that perception requires the activity of the senses and the directing of attention, how is it possible that a sleeping person can be woken up by loud noises²⁵? If we assume that the attention of a sleeping person is altogether retracted from the senses and that this retraction hinders the activity of the senses completely, there seems to be no way of accounting for the possibility of sensing external noises while asleep. And yet I do wake up when the alarm clock on my bedside table rings.

Olivi's answer to this problem goes as follows:

[...] the sensitive faculties are not retracted inside in slumber so completely that the *aspectus* which remains in them could not be terminated at vivacious objects forcefully [...] also a powerful and intense act [of an external sense] presents itself to the *aspectus* of the common sense in such a way that the common sense apprehends it most forcefully. This forceful apprehension leads the whole *aspectus* of the common sense towards the external things, and so the whole human being wakes up [...] Light would not awake closed eyes unless its brightness reached the *aspectus* of the eye through the interstice between the eyelids in such a way that when the *aspectus* of the eye is terminated at the brightness, the eye produces an act of vision in itself.²⁶

On the basis of this passage it seems that there may be acts of sensation in the external senses, even though the common sense does not pay attention to them. At least it is clear that there can be acts of sensation even if the common sense does not *act* in relation to the external senses. Even when I am asleep there remains an *aspectus* in my faculty of hearing, and this *aspectus* may be terminated at the loud noise of my alarm clock. This enables my faculty of hearing to produce an act of sensing the sound of the clock. There are acts in my faculty of hearing, and Olivi explicitly says that these acts exist before the common sense apprehends them and the sounds they pertain to. Subsequently, the acts of the

²⁵ The problem is presented in *II Sent.* q. 58, 407; See also *ibid.*, q. 72, 26, 33.

²⁶ “[...] potentiae sensitivæ non sunt ita totaliter in somno ad interiora retractæ quin a vivacibus obiectis possit ita fortiter terminari ille aspectus qui eis remanet [...] et etiam ipse actus sic fortis et intensus ita se ingeret aspectui sensus communis quod fortissime apprehenduntur ab ipso. Quæ apprehensio sic fortis totum aspectum sensus communis ad exteriora deducet, et sic totus homo evigilabit [...] Lux vero oculos clausos ad vigiliam non reduceret, nisi aliquantulum eius claritas per locum divisionis palpebrarum aspectum oculi attingeret, ut sic, aspectu eius terminato in ipsam, actum visionis in se produceret.” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 500.) See also *ibid.*, q. 62, 595.

senses are apprehended by my common sense, and I wake up when this happens. External senses are, according to this, capable of acting before the common sense acts in relation to them. On one occasion Olivi even says that the common sense is incapable of acting if the external senses do not act beforehand²⁷.

This brings us to our second question: how is this possible, given that Olivi so clearly requires that there is some kind of activity in the common sense before the external senses can function? The answer is based on a distinction between *aspectus* and *actus*²⁸. Olivi makes it clear that directing the *aspectus* and producing a cognitive act are two different things. The former is a necessary condition for the latter, but the existence of an *aspectus* is possible without the existence of a cognitive act. The *aspectus* needs to be terminated at an object of perception before the cognitive faculty can bring about an act of cognition in relation to it. As Olivi repeatedly says in *Summa*, the external senses cannot act if the *aspectus* of the common sense is altogether retracted from the senses. But if the common sense has some kind of *aspectus* towards the external senses they may function and produce acts of sensation, and, according to the passage cited above, these acts are then apprehended by the common sense.

Thus, acting in relation to something is not the same thing as directing the *aspectus* towards that thing. As the passage cited above shows, the *aspectus* of the external senses are not completely retracted from the external world even though the senses do not act when the person is asleep. Also, the common sense is capable of apprehending the acts of the senses, and therefore the common sense must be directed towards them in the same way as the external senses are directed towards the external world—even when the person is asleep. The common sense cannot be totally retracted from the external senses if it is able to apprehend their acts, and it is possible that its *aspectus* is directed to them even though it does not act in relation to the external senses.

However, one may still ask how this explanation is supposed to work, given that Olivi repeatedly speaks about the inability of the external senses to act when the *aspectus* of the common sense is retracted from them. If there remains an *aspectus* towards the external senses even when the subject is asleep, why does a sleeping person not perceive things around her? Why does intensive concentration on objects of one of the senses hinder the subject from perceiving through the other senses? This is where the levels of attention and consciousness come into play. For, there are a number of places in which Olivi discusses our ability to be attentive of our surroundings without being explicitly conscious of things around us. For instance, when he discusses the speech of angels he draws from human experience and writes:

We see in ourselves that when we are attentively turned to look at or to hear something, nevertheless we immediately hear a voice that resounds in a part

²⁷ “Sicut autem sensus communis non potest agere, nisi prius fuerit actio sensus particularis [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 31, 564); Note, however, that he does not consider here the possibility of remembering or imagining—acts which are performed by the common sense alone and as such do not require the acts of the external senses.

²⁸ See Chapter 5.3, footnotes 37, 40, and 51.

of the air from which we seem to be averted, and we hear it in such a way that the attention of our heart is drawn to it. In this way, they say, this takes place in angels (in their own manner).

As for evidence for this, it must be known that although the intellect or the faculty of hearing is directed forcefully to somewhere, nevertheless in the faculty of hearing remains some unnoticeable (*occulta*) directedness to the whole hemisphere—in such a way that if a vehement sound goes off somewhere, the faculty of hearing perceives it quickly. The faculty of hearing does not need to be directed to the sound anew because the preceding unnoticeable directedness suffices for perception. Because the sound presents itself objectively (*objective*) and powerfully to the faculty of hearing—in such a way that the faculty of hearing necessarily generates a vivacious act of hearing in itself—it [viz the faculty of hearing] draws the attention of the heart to itself and to its object forcefully. An angel's power of hearing or power that apprehends the speech of another angel must be understood [to function] similarly. It is not directed to something in such a way that there would not remain some kind of general attention (*generalis aspectus*) to other things that are present or accessible to it.²⁹

Although we do not need to care about angel speech here, it is of some importance to see how human experience serves as a simile which helps us to understand the way spiritual entities perceive and communicate with each other. From our perspective, the most important idea Olivi presents here is that even when I concentrate on looking at something, my faculty of hearing is all the time attentive to my surroundings. It pays attention in such a way that I am not explicitly conscious of its directedness nor of the actual sounds around me—they remain in the periphery of my consciousness as the directing of my hearing is *occulta*—but its attentiveness enables me to become conscious of apparent changes (such as loud noises) around me, whenever they take place. My conscious attention may be directed towards a certain thing in my visual field, but my surroundings are nevertheless present to me on some level.

²⁹ "Sicut enim videmus in nobis quod quamquam simus ad aliqua videnda vel audienda attente conversi, nihilominus si fiat aliqua vox fortis in illa parte æris a qua videmur aversi, statim audimus eam ita quod per hoc fortiter revocatur attentio cordis nostri ad illam, sic suo modo dicunt esse in angelo. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod licet intellectus vel auditus sint ad aliud fortiter conversi, nihilominus remanet in ipso auditu quedam occulta conversio ad totum emispherium ita quod si ibi fiat vehemens sonus, subito percipit illum, non preeunte aliqua nova conversione auditus ad illum, quia sufficebat ad hoc predicta conversio occulta, quia vero ille sonus objective se ingerit cum multa efficacia ipsi auditui, ita quod ipse auditus habet vivacem actum audiendi in se necessario generare, idcirco habet attentionem cordis ad se et ad suum obiectum fortiter trahere. Et consimiliter est intelligendum de potentia angeli auditiva seu apprehensiva locutionum alterius angeli, quod scilicet non est ita conversa ad alia quin remaneat sibi quidam generalis aspectus ad alia sibi presenti vel pervia." (Petrus Ioannis Olivi, "Quæstio de locutionibus angelorum," ed. S. Piron, *Oliviana* 1 (2003): §§31–2, <http://oliviana.revues.org/document18.html>; For a presentation of this text, see Sylvain Piron, "Petrus Johannis Olivi: Quæstio de locutionibus angelorum," *Oliviana* 1 (2003), <http://oliviana.revues.org/document27.html>.)

The crucial term that figures in this text is *aspectus generalis*. Olivi employs the same term occasionally in his *Summa*, and it means a kind of general directedness of the faculties of the soul which enables them to react to vehement changes within their scope and also to be directed towards external things without yet producing acts of sensation, for instance, due to unsuitable conditions which prevent the acts. The following text shows us how *aspectus generalis* is possible without an act of sensation, how it may be terminated at an object, and how this specifies the *aspectus* to a certain object and enables the faculty to produce a cognitive act in relation to that object:

It should also be said that the faculties [of the soul] have a double *aspectus*. One of them is indeterminate in relation to its objects as when we tend towards the exterior [world] in such a way that the faculty of vision is applied to seeing by the will or by nature, and the eye is awake but kept closed, or we are in darkness. Because of the unsuitable condition of the medium, or because of the impediment of some obstacle, the faculty of sight does not tend determinately towards any object. The other *aspectus* is a determination (*determinativus vel determinatio*) of the first *aspectus* because the first one is related to the other as a root to a branch and a sensation is caused from the first when an object is present. For example, given that only a man whose eyes are open would have been created before everything else and he would endeavour with all effort to tend his eyes to seeing as if there were external visible things: it is clear that in that case his *aspectus* would not be terminated at or determinately carried to any external object. If after a while all the external things (which exist now) would be created, by the same token the first *aspectus* of the eyes would be fixed at external objects.³⁰

³⁰ "Dicendum etiam quod potentiae habent duplicem aspectum. Unus est ex se indeterminatus ad haec vel illa obiecta, ut, cum oculus stat pervigil et clausis oculis vel in tenebris intendimus in exteriora, ita quod potentia visiva est a voluntate vel a natura applicata ad videndum, sed propter indispositionem medii vel propter impedimentum alicuius obstaculi non intendit determinate in aliquod obiectum. Secundus est determinativus vel determinatio primi, nam primus se habet ad secundum sicut radix ad ramum et ex primo cum praesentia obiecti causatur sensus; ut verbi gratia, detur quod solus homo apertis oculis esset ante omnia creatus et sic toto conatu niteretur per oculos intendere ad videndum acsi essent visibilia extra: constat quod tunc aspectus eius non terminaretur nec determinate ferretur in aliquod extrinsecum obiectum, et si paulo post omnia exteriora sicut nunc sunt crearentur, eo ipso primus aspectus oculi determinaretur ad obiecta exteriora." (*II Sent.* q. 73, 68–9; see also *ibid.*, q. 59, II, 543–4.) Olivi's thought-experiment resembles to some extent the so called "floating man" of Avicenna (*Shifā' De an.* I.1, 36–7). This is highly interesting because for some reason Avicenna's thought-experiment was surprisingly rarely repeated in Latin philosophy. Of course, the contexts in which Olivi and Avicenna present their thought-experiments and the argumentative roles they give to them are very different. Nevertheless, it is important to note that whereas Avicenna's flying man does not admit the existence of his body, Olivi's "man before creation" is well aware of his ability to see even though there is nothing to be seen. The man is not only created with his eyes open but he "conatu niteretur per oculos intendere ad videndum." A list of Latin authors, who quote *Shifā' De an.* I.1, can be found in Étienne Gilson, "Les Sources gréco-arabes de

The faculties of the soul have an *aspectus generalis* when they are directed in an indeterminate way and not terminated at any object whatsoever. When an object presents itself to the *aspectus*, the latter becomes terminated at the object, and the faculty brings about a cognitive act pertaining to that object. Moreover, the text from *Quæstio de locutionibus angelorum* shows us that the external senses have this *aspectus generalis* even when the common sense does not act in relation to them. Only when the faculty of hearing produces an act which pertains to a loud voice does the common sense act and thus notice the act of the sense and the object thereof.

On the basis of the similarity of the ideas Olivi presents in the preceding three texts I think that it is clear that a sleeping person and one who is awake but intensely concentrating on one particular thing are in a similar situation. Both fail to consciously perceive their surroundings (one is not conscious of anything and the other is conscious only of the thing in the focus of her mind), but still both have an *aspectus generalis* towards the whole hemisphere around them. Olivi seems, however, to fluctuate to some extent in his view. On one occasion he explicitly says that slumber takes away the *aspectus generalis* altogether³¹. This goes against his explanation for the fact that loud noises awaken creatures that are asleep. However, it seems to me that when he says this, he either has in mind a slumber so deep that the sleeper does not wake up even to the loudest noise, or he may think that even general attentiveness comes in degrees. It is one thing to be in total darkness, trying to see and quite another to be asleep and failing to see because of that. One might think that the strength of *aspectus generalis* varies between these kinds of cases.³²

We are now in a position to see what kind of role Olivi attributes to the common sense as a necessary part of the process that brings about acts of the senses. The distinction between acting and directing the *aspectus* explains how the external senses are capable of acting even when the common sense does not act. Although the common sense has to direct its *aspectus* to the senses in order for them to function, it does not have to act in relation to them. This reading neatly brings together Olivi's explanation for the fact that sleeping persons may wake up when they hear a loud noise and his repeated insistence that the external senses are incapable of acting if the common sense is completely retracted from them. I do not see any reason why Olivi would think that the common sense must *act* in relation to the external senses in order to enable their action. All he says is that the common sense has to direct its *aspectus* to them, and only then are they capable of acting.

I'augustinisme avicennisant." *AHDLMA* 4 (1929): 41–2. For discussion about the influence of the "flying man" in Latin philosophy, see Hasse 2000, 80–92.

³¹ "Generalis vero et indeterminatus aspectus datur evigilantibus, cum excitantur a somno, qui et per somnum eis aufertur." (*II Sent.* q. 72, 32.)

³² This seems to be a possible interpretation, given that Olivi thinks that we can direct our attention to the external world in various degrees at least while we are awake: "In somno enim sic retrahuntur potentiæ sensitivæ ab exterioribus ad interiora quod auribus apertis voces actualiter insonantes non audiuntur aut aperto oculo lux præsens non videtur. In vigilia etiam experimur nos per oculos vel aures nunc fortius intendere, nunc debilius, et nunc longius, nunc propinquius [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 59, 559.)

If this is correct, we must take it that Olivi formulates his idea somewhat loosely in *Quodlibeta*, where he says that the external senses are capable of acting only if there is a corresponding *act* in the common sense. This is somewhat puzzling, but on the basis of the foregoing analysis it seems rather clear to me that he really thinks that the external senses can act even when the common sense does not act in relation to them and that the *aspectus* of the common sense alone is sufficient for enabling the external senses to act. It is possible that the formulation in *Quodlibeta* is not very exact because Olivi's point there is simply to prove that the common sense cannot be completely shut off (so to speak) if the external senses function. The central idea in the passage from *Quodlibeta* is that the common sense has to have *some kind* of activity in relation to the senses. This activity must be the directing of the *aspectus*. Or, then again, Olivi may think that the common sense of the sleepwalker has to act because the sleepwalker behaves as if she were awake, and this requires that not only the external senses but also the common sense apprehend the external things.

As Olivi says, "a powerful and intense act [of an external sense] presents itself to the *aspectus* of the common sense." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 500.) Thus, the *aspectus* of the common sense is already directed to the external senses, and this enables it to notice their acts whenever they take place. The distinction between *aspectus generalis* and the *aspectus* that is specified to a certain object accounts also for the way in which the common sense is all the time attentive to the activity of the senses. When I concentrate on listening to music, my attention is directed to my ears, to be sure, but this does not necessarily mean that my attention would be completely withdrawn from my eyes. Thus, the *aspectus* of the common sense can be directed to different directions simultaneously and with varying degrees. While I am asleep, it is mostly directed at imagination (and this is why the common sense has imaginative acts and why I am conscious of dream images), and the *aspectus* of the common sense remains attentive to the external senses to a lesser degree (and this is why I hear noises if they happen to be loud enough). And when I listen to music, my conscious attention is directed towards my ears and the music—the *aspectus* of the common sense is specified by them—but at the same time neither is it completely withdrawn from my eyes due to the *aspectus generalis* which remains, and this enables me to see something (if not everything) in my visual field.

The presupposition behind this idea is that the *aspectus* of the faculties of the soul can be directed simultaneously in different directions, and we can find support for this interpretation from Olivi's texts. The *aspectus* of the faculties of the soul is, according to Olivi, composed of distinct parts which together form a *totalis aspectus*. These parts may be directed to different objects and in the case of the common sense to different external senses and their objects. Consider the following passage:

For no created power can apprehend a thing unless it actually regards that thing; but the entire *aspectus* of one faculty must have some kind of unity. [...] In this way we sensibly experience that although an eye regards simultaneously many things, it never does this except under one entire *aspectus*. This is why all the things it sees simultaneously must be related to each other

in such a way that they can be observed and apprehended under one entire *aspectus*. This kind of unity must be assigned also to the sense of touch—in the case of which it seems to be the least necessary—according to the uniformity of the continuity of its entire organ.³³

The sense of touch is an example of a faculty that can simultaneously have many *aspectūs* which are directed to different objects. Different *aspectūs* must have some kind of unity, which is provided by the unity of the whole body (which is the organ of the sense of touch), but still the faculty can be simultaneously directed in multiple directions, so to speak. For instance, I feel the pressure of the keyboard of my computer on my fingertips and the pain in my shoulders, caused by the time I have spent in front of the screen. The sense of touch has many acts and many *aspectūs* by which I am capable of feeling these things simultaneously, and the unity they have is due to these feelings existing in the same body. Olivi goes on to say that it is possible that the required unity may be due to the fact that all the different parts of the *aspectus* belong to one and the same faculty³⁴. This is probably how the different *aspectūs* of the common sense are united, but the important point I want to emphasise is that Olivi does not see any problem in the idea that one faculty of the soul can be directed in several directions and objects simultaneously. The whole *aspectus* of one faculty is composed of parts which may be directed to different things.

Moreover, Olivi thinks that to produce an act of apprehension in relation to an object does not require that the whole *aspectus* be directed to that object. The higher faculties of the soul are able to apprehend objects by using only part of their capacity and part of their *aspectus*:

In order for a noble faculty to see some object (even in order to see it perfectly) it is not necessary that it directs its entire power and *aspectus* only to that object. It suffices that it does this to such a degree that the nature of the power, the perfection of its act, and the conditions of the object require.³⁵

³³ “Cum etiam nulla potentia creata possit aliquid apprehendere, nisi actualiter aspiciat illud, totalis autem aspectus unius potentiae oportet quod habeat aliquam unitatem. [...] Sic etiam sensibiliter experimur quod quamvis oculus plura simul aspiciat, nunquam tamen hoc facit nisi sub uno totali aspectu; unde oportet quod omnia quae simul videt sic se habeant quod sub illo uno totali aspectu possint conspici et apprehendi. Et etiam in sensu tactus de quo minus videtur oportet hanc unitatem assignare secundum correspondentiam unius continuitatis totius sui organi.” (*II Sent.* q. 37, 664.)

³⁴ *II Sent.* q. 37, 665. Olivi is discussing two visions which the blessed have in Heaven: they see God, and they see things in themselves. He points out that there is a unity even between the *aspectūs* of these visions because they belong to one and the same faculty. Thus, the required unity may be due to three things: (1) the objects are located near each other and the *aspectus* of the faculty of sight has unity because of the vicinity of its objects; (2) different *aspectūs* are realised in one and the same organ (the case of touch); (3) different *aspectūs* are realised in one and the same faculty.

³⁵ “Non igitur oportet quod una nobilis potentia pro quocumque obiecto etiam perfecte videndo totalitatem suae virtutis sui que aspectus ad ipsum solum dirigat, sed sufficit quod sub tanta et tali mensura hoc faciat, quantum exigit natura illius potentiae et perfectio sui actus et conditio sui obiecti.” (*II Sent.* q. 37, 669.)

This applies not only to the intellect but also to the sensitive faculties of the soul. Thus, the common sense does not need to use all its capacity to perceive the objects of sight, and it does not have to be completely directed towards the eyes in order to see. This idea is reflected also in the passage that I cited above: “when the *aspectus* of the common or interior sense is *totally* turned away from the objects and acts of vision, then the act of vision is impeded.”³⁶ The faculty of sight becomes unable to act only if the *aspectus* of the common sense is completely retracted from it. Partial or weak attention towards the eyes—the *aspectus generalis*—is possible even when listening to music.³⁷

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we can arrive at a detailed description of Olivi’s view on the psychological process of perception which takes place when, say, the ringing of my alarm clock draws my attention, and I consciously hear it. The process may be formulated in the following way:

1. The *aspectus generalis* of the common sense is directed to all of the external senses.
2. This allows the *aspectus generales* of the external senses to be directed outward.
3. When the alarm goes off, the *aspectus* of the faculty of hearing is terminated at it.
4. The faculty of hearing brings about an act that pertains to the ringing.
5. The act of the faculty of hearing becomes the *terminus* of the *aspectus* of the common sense.
6. The common sense brings about an act that pertains to the act of hearing and the object thereof.
7. The act of the common sense makes me perceive the ringing.

The last item in this description means that I become explicitly conscious of the noise. My mind becomes focussed on it, and I know that I hear it. Then again, when there are no striking noises around me that catch my attention, and I am fully concentrated on writing this text, I am not explicitly conscious of the background noise in my study. The casual noises remain in the periphery of my consciousness until I direct my attention to them—and when I do, they become part of my conscious experience: I become conscious of hearing them. The act of the common sense is needed for this because the act of the sense of hearing alone is not sufficient to wake me up, as Olivi says in one of the passages cited above

³⁶ “cum aspectus sensus communis seu interioris *totaliter* advertitur ab obiectis et actibus ipsius visus, tunc impeditur actus videndi.” (*II Sent.* q. 50 app., 54; emphasis mine.)

³⁷ In addition to being capable of directing its *aspectus* to various dimensions simultaneously, the common sense has to be able to produce multiple acts if it is to apprehend the acts and the objects of different external senses simultaneously. Olivi thinks that it does. See, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 37, 660–1; *ibid.*, q. 79, 161–2. The common sense is able to have several acts simultaneously, and in this way it can provide consciousness of different perceptible qualities of one object (the visible and audible qualities of, say, a duck) and of different objects (a duck which is seen and a thunderclap that is heard).

(see footnote 26). The acts of the common sense are responsible for the conscious experiences of perceiving. However, Olivi thinks that even when I am not explicitly conscious of the things around me, they are present to me on some level. In this way, he makes an allusion to different levels of consciousness. Consciousness and conscious perception are functions of the common sense but only if they are understood in a strict meaning which entails that the subject is conscious that she is perceiving. I find it extremely interesting that Olivi seems to entertain some kind of vague idea of this kind of hierarchy of levels of consciousness. It also goes well with his discussion concerning second-order perception. But that is an issue that will have to wait until we arrive at the second part of this study.

7 SOUL AND BODY IN OLIVI'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION

7.1 Psychological and Physiological Aspects of Perceptual Acts

Olivi's idea of the double *aspectus* of corporeal cognitive faculties—i.e., his insistence that not only the eyes but also the *aspectus* of the faculty of sight have to be directed towards the objects of sight—and the emphasis he lays both on the active character of perception and on selective attention as necessary conditions for conscious perception reveal an interesting tension in his thought. When perception takes place, there are always two distinct yet intermingled aspects in play. On the one hand, the organs of the body play some kind of role in perception but on the other hand perception is an act of the soul. Olivi accentuates the latter thread to the extent that the role of the body becomes questionable. According to the double *aspectus* view, the organs of the body must be appropriately directed in order for us to perceive, but it is not clear that they have anything else to do with perception. Especially if we take into consideration Olivi's conception of the metaphysics of the human soul and the relation between the soul and the body, which entails a clear distinction between the two and jeopardises their substantial unity, we may ask how acts of perception take place in the organs of the body and what the relation is between bodily changes and acts of the soul.

Although this problematic applies more clearly to human beings (who are, in the end, the only bodily creatures who have a spiritual soul), my general impression is that the same tension between bodily changes and acts of the soul can also be found in non-human animals. This calls for some explanation although we have to wait until Chapter 8 before dealing with the details. From the point of view of the metaphysics of the soul, human beings and non-human animals are quite unlike each other. In addition to being a hylomorphic form of the body, the human soul is a spiritual entity, whereas the animal soul appears to be only a hylomorphic form of the body. Thus, it is less clear that the tension between bodily changes and acts of the soul can be found in non-human animals: one might think that the acts of the soul *are* changes in the body and *vice versa*. However, the

souls of non-human animals have all the relevant properties (namely, simplicity and activity) that bridge the disparity between acts of the soul and their bodily realisation, and this is why the question concerning the role of bodily changes applies also to non-human animals. This claim becomes clearer in the course of the next chapters but the reader should bear in mind that although many points are presented as if they applied only to human beings, in fact they apply also to non-human animals—either as such, or after some sort of qualification. I shall leave this theme aside for a moment and return to it in Chapter 8, because by analysing Olivi's ideas concerning human perception we can see more clearly what is at stake in the relation between the soul and the body in perception.

At a closer look, many features of Olivi's theory of perception result in a tension between bodily changes and psychological acts of the soul. His way of understanding the intentionality of cognitive acts, the necessity of paying attention, and his charge against the theories of perception which formulate of perception as a passive process of receiving information from without—all these leave the impression that perception cannot be understood as a process by which an external object causes bodily changes in the organs of the senses and that these changes, in turn, bring about cognitive acts in the soul. Rather, perception is a mental process that takes place in the faculties of the soul and it is not clear how exactly its dependence upon corporeal changes in the body should be understood. In fact, it is not unreasonable to ask whether cognitive acts are dependent upon such changes in the first place.

Approached from this perspective, it may seem that Olivi's theory has a kind of dualistic flavour. If it turns out that the organs of the body play either no role at all or at least that their role is accidental for the functioning of the faculties of the soul, we must say that his theory is suggestive of dualism. As I already mentioned, there are strong reasons to claim that Olivi's anthropological theory is committed to a certain kind of substance dualism because of his conception of the metaphysics of the spiritual human soul¹. From substance dualism, it is only a short step to reject the idea that faculties of the soul and their acts are functions of their organs. Then again, one must be careful in attributing a flagrantly dualistic conception of the relation between bodily changes and acts of the soul to Olivi. This is because he does not reject straightaway the hylomorphic view which was prevalent in his time, according to which the sensitive faculties of the soul are realised in corporeal organs as organising principles that enable certain functions. By contrast, he explicitly accepts the view that sensitive faculties are forms of corporeal organs and that they are carried by the movement of the *spiritus animalis*², and in the case of non-human animals he seems to deny substance dualism completely (which, of course, is not surprising).

¹ Yrjönsuuri 2007a, 82–9; For discussion about Olivi's conception of the metaphysics of the soul, see also Pasnau 1997a; Roberto Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes*, *Philosophes médiévaux* 2 (Louvain: Éditions de l'institut supérieur de philosophie, 1951), 333–42; Tonna 1990, 277–289; Mauro 1997, 89–138; Bettoni 1959, 263–379; Important texts include but are not limited to the following: *II Sent.* q. 16, 291–355; *ibid.*, q. 49, 1–23; *ibid.*, q. 50, 23–101; *ibid.*, q. 51, 101–98; *ibid.*, q. 59, 518–68 (esp. 537–42).

² *II Sent.* q. 59, 528, 550; *ibid.*, q. 73, 97; *Quodl.* I.4, 17; See Chapter 3.2, footnote 25.

Yet, the sensitive faculties of human beings are also forms of the spiritual entity-like soul, and Olivi seems to think that their acts are realised principally in it and only secondarily in the corporeal organs of the body. They pertain to the soul in a way that makes them less dependent on the body than true hylomorphism requires. This is roughly what we see from Olivi's double *aspectus* view: the directing of the corporeal organ of sight and the possible changes that external objects cause in it are not identical to perception; a psychological process of paying attention is needed in order to see, and the act of seeing is brought about by the soul itself. This process may also involve physiological changes in bodily organs³, but it cannot be analysed solely in terms of the movement of the body's matter because it involves changes that take place in the immaterial soul and cannot be reduced to bodily changes.

If this interpretation of Olivi's view is correct, one can accuse him of eclecticism: he tries to embrace hylomorphism and yet places even the sensitive faculties of the soul on a level that is distinct from the physiological changes in the bodily organs, as their activity is not completely reducible to these changes. In this way, Olivi's understanding of the roles of the body and the soul turn out to underpin his close-to-dualistic anthropology. When we perceive, we do not primarily undergo a certain kind of physiological change with respect to our bodily organs but perform an act of the soul which is in direct relation to the external world. It is our soul that perceives, and even though it is united to our body, the role of the body remains in the margin. The direction of influence is crucial: acts of the soul are realised as physiological changes; physiological changes are not realised as acts of the soul.

In order to obtain a full understanding of Olivi's view, it will be useful to relate his thought to a well known scholarly dispute over Aristotle's philosophy of mind, launched by a seminal paper by Myles Burnyeat some twenty-five years ago⁴. Burnyeat argues against the so-called Putnam-Nussbaum thesis which claims that Aristotelian philosophy of mind comes close to modern functionalism and is an alternative to material reductionism, on the one hand, and Platonist or Cartesian dualism, on the other. According to this functionalist reading of Aristotle, perception and other psychological operations are functions of the organs of the senses and they are necessarily realised as kinds of physiological changes of the organs. However, the same psychological function can be realised (at least in principle) in different kinds of physiological settings, and therefore psychology is not reducible to physiology. Thus, according to the Aris-

³ By physiological changes I mean changes in the material composition of the eyes as organs (i.e., changes that take place at the elementary level) and/or the flowing of the *spiritus animalis* in the visual nerves and in the eyes—changes that somehow change the eyes as corporeal objects.

⁴ The paper, which circulated widely as an unpublished draft, was eventually published as "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)," in *Essays on Aristotle's De anima*, ed. M. Nussbaum & A. Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 15–26. I am using the 1995 paperback edition, which contains also Burnyeat's further defence of his view (M. Burnyeat, "How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C? Remarks on De anima 2. 7–8," in Nussbaum & Rorty 1995, 421–34).

tote of Putnam-Nussbaum, perception is necessarily realised as a physiological change in the organs of the senses, and, similarly, other psychological operations are realised as bodily changes. A paradigm case of the relation between a bodily change and a psychological process is anger which is—according to Aristotle⁵—both a movement of matter around the heart (the blood boils) and a psychological emotion. These are not separate things but different aspects of one and the same thing, anger, which is realised on the physiological as well as on the psychological level.⁶

Burnyeat presents a rivalling interpretation of Aristotle's thought and claims that Aristotle's philosophy of mind is not functionalist in the intended sense. At the heart of his reading is the claim that the psychological operations of the soul, such as perceiving, do not involve bodily changes at all (except for the clear case of emotions), and thus—to use the standard example—seeing red does not require any physiological change in the eyes. The eyes do not turn red, nor is there any other kind of physiological change. Burnyeat's paper provoked a scholarly discussion centred on the relation between physiological changes and psychological processes. According to Burnyeat, Aristotle maintains that there is no connection because physiological changes are not needed; according to many others, psychological operations are realised in and by physiological changes⁷.

The discussion has not concerned only Aristotle's thought. From the beginning, Aquinas has been paraded to support the cases of both sides. Burnyeat argues, already in his seminal article, that Aquinas is his ally because Aquinas' reading of Aristotle is similar to Burnyeat's own reading of Aristotle (Burnyeat 1995b, 18). Nussbaum and Putnam, in contrast, argue that Burnyeat misinterprets not only Aristotle but Aquinas as well and that Aquinas also thinks that perception involves some kind of physiological change in the organs of the senses (Nussbaum & Putnam 1995, 51–5).

⁵ Aristotle is explicit on this. Anger can be viewed from two standpoints, and it can be truthfully described in two different ways. See *DA* I.1, 403^a25–403^b5.

⁶ For discussion about Aristotle's compositional theory of emotions, see Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 24–47; See also Philip J. van der Eijk, "Aristotle's Psycho-physiological Account of the Soul-Body Relationship," in Wright & Potter 2000, 57–77.

⁷ The literature defending both sides is voluminous. One might begin with the following: Stephen Everson, *Aristotle on Perception* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997); Martha Nussbaum & Hilary Putnam, "Changing Aristotle's Mind," in Nussbaum & Rorty 1995, 27–56; Richard Sorabji, "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception," *ibid.*, 195–225; Richard Sorabji, "Aristotle on Sensory Processes and Intentionality: A Reply to Myles Burnyeat," in Perler 2001a, 49–61; S. Marc Cohen, "Hylomorphism and Functionalism," in Nussbaum & Rorty 1995, 57–75; T. K. Johansen, *Aristotle on the Sense-Organs*, Cambridge Classical Studies (Cambridge: CUP, 1998); Burnyeat has further defended his reading of Aristotle in Myles F. Burnyeat, "De anima II 5," *Phronesis* 47:1 (2002): 28–90; See also Sarah Broadie, "Aristotle's Perceptual Realism," in *Ancient Minds, The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 31, suppl., ed. J. Ellis (1993), 137–59; Robert Bolton, "Perception Naturalized in Aristotle's De anima," in *Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji*, ed. R. Salles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 209–244; Victor Caston, "The Spirit and The Letter: Aristotle on Perception," *ibid.*, 245–320; For further reading, see Caston 2005, 246, footnotes 3–7.

More recently, Burnyeat has defended his reading of Aquinas and argued that according to him perception is a spiritual change in the sense organ and that this spiritual change is not material even though it is physical. His basic idea is that in the Aristotelian framework the term “physical” covers both matter and form. A spiritual change is physical because it is a change in the form of the sense organ, but it is not material because it does not involve any change in the matter of the organ. Thus, Burnyeat claims, when Aquinas argues that seeing is a spiritual change that is not accompanied by a natural (*naturalis*) change, his point is not to confine seeing to the sphere of “mental” (as opposed to physical) but simply to deny that there is any kind of material change in the eyes.⁸ The eye jelly does not become red when I see a red flag, and neither are there any other material changes. In modern parlance, cones and rod cells do not have to fire and send a neural impulse to the brain. Nothing happens in the eye, except the potency to see is actualised and the form of the eye (i.e., vision) is changed from having the potency of seeing into actually seeing the red flag—from “not seeing” to “seeing red.” Burnyeat correctly points out that in the cases of touch and taste there is also a material change—for example, my hand becomes hot when I feel the heat of fire—but this change is only accidental to the perception of heat⁹. Thus, his overall point is that in Aquinas’ theory perception does not involve any material change whatsoever.¹⁰

It has been well established that Aquinas understood perception as a process that takes place in the organs of the senses and does not belong to the soul but to the composite of the sensitive soul and the body. Sheldon M. Cohen pointed this out very convincingly in his article “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms,” which was written as a reaction against an at the time prevailing interpretation which saw Aquinas as a rather straightforward dualist.¹¹ Cohen’s point has been well taken, and nowadays there is wide agreement that Aquinas understood perception as a spiritual change—whatever that means—that takes place in the sense organ¹². Precisely *what kind* of change

⁸ Myles Burnyeat, “Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception,” in Perler 2001a, 129–53.

⁹ Burnyeat 2001, 136–7.

¹⁰ In a recent article, Mikko Yrjönsuuri has argued that Burnyeat’s view on Aquinas is basically correct but that his terminology is misleading. According to Yrjönsuuri, we should not say that Aquinas’ spiritual change is “a physical but not a material change” (as in Burnyeat 2001, 149). Yrjönsuuri writes that: “I think Burnyeat’s description of Aquinas’ theory is almost correct, but in fact we should rather say that the change at issue is material, but not physical.” (Yrjönsuuri 2007a, 76.) The issue is not only terminological but also involves philosophical aspects. For discussion, see *ibid.*, 75–82; Yrjönsuuri’s argument seems to be well grounded, but since he does not actually challenge the basic idea in Burnyeat’s interpretation, I shall refrain from discussing his view here.

¹¹ Sheldon M. Cohen, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms,” *The Philosophical Review* 91:2 (April 1982): 193–209; For the historical background of Aquinas’ theory, see Martin M. Tweedale, “Origins of the Medieval Theory That Sensation Is an Immaterial Reception of a Form,” *Philosophical Topics* 20:2 (fall 1992): 215–31.

¹² It needs to be emphasised that even Burnyeat accepts this. He adheres to Cohen’s results, but proposes that even though the change takes place in the organ, it is not a material but a formal change (Burnyeat 2001, 130, 149).

Aquinas had in mind is a more complicated issue: Cohen proposes that it is a reflection of the object seen in the pupil; Burnyeat argues in favour of a formal change of the power of vision without a concomitant physiological change in the eye¹³. It has even been suggested that although Aquinas was certain that the change takes place in the organ without involving any movement of the organ's matter, he did not develop an elaborate philosophical theory about the exact nature of the spiritual change (Yrjönsuuri 2007a, 80–1).

The overall question which modern interpreters of Aristotle and Aquinas face is that of the relation between physiological changes in the sense organs and psychological processes, such as perception. What happens when a being perceives? What kinds of changes take place? Where do they take place: in the organ, in the soul, or in the faculty?

I do not intend to participate in the discussions concerning Aristotle's or Aquinas' theories. What interests me here is Olivi's view. It seems to me that he denies that there is a straightforward relation between physiological changes and perception, even though it must be admitted at the outset that his view is not easy to comprehend. On the one hand, he clearly admits that acts of perception are "carried" by the *spiritus animalis* and thus he is more in line with Avicenna than, for instance, Aquinas, whose intention seems to have been to challenge Avicenna's theory of perception, which was based on physiology¹⁴. On the other hand, Olivi's discussion, if well analysed, shows with certainty that his idea was that the physiological changes in the sense organs and in the cavities of the brain do not cause perception. In the end, it seems that they do not have any role whatsoever in perception—at least not a direct one. Physiological changes of the sense organs are not essential parts of perceptual acts. They are, at most, concomitant to those acts, and they are caused by the acts of perception which belong to the immaterial soul. In the case of human beings, perception is principally an operation of the immaterial soul; in the case of non-human animals, the soul is not immaterial, but still the acts are first and foremost in the soul and only secondarily in the corporeal matter of the soul—as we shall see below. This is the dualistic strand in Olivi's theory of perception.

7.2 Perception as a Psychological Process

The overall view one gets from a careful reading of Olivi's ideas concerning the physiological changes in the body and their relation to the cognitive activity of the soul is that he conceives of perception primarily as a psychological process that takes place in the spiritual soul. The role of physiological changes is diminished to the extent that it becomes difficult to see why they would be needed in the first place. It is true that Olivi thinks that the cognitive acts of the soul

¹³ See Cohen 1982, 206–9; Burnyeat 2001, 149; See also John J. Haldane, "Aquinas on Sense-Perception," *The Philosophical Review* 92:2 (April 1983): 233–39.

¹⁴ Yrjönsuuri 2007a, 80–1; Hasse states that Aquinas is not interested in physiological aspects of psychology, so characteristic of Avicenna's account (Hasse 2000, 71).

are realised as physiological changes in the bodily organs, and in this way he incorporates a central element from the functionalist view. However, as he emphasises the activity of the soul in the process of perception, it seems to me that he actually denies functionalism in a rather straightforward way, if the doctrine is understood as stating that a certain kind of physiological change in the organ brings about a cognitive act and that the cognitive act is identical to the bodily changes as a function is identical to the material process on which it supervenes. For, Olivi sees the matter another way around: the kind of physiological changes that are realisations of cognitive acts cannot be brought about by anything but the acts themselves. The primacy of the acts of the soul is clear. The soul must act first (logically, if not in the temporal sense) and only then does a physiological change in the organ take place. This leaves open the option for physiological changes to be unnecessary in the end; we shall see in Chapter 7.4 that in the case of a separated soul Olivi draws this conclusion and says that the body is necessary for perception only in this life. But even in this life its role seems to be only secondary.

Especially important from this respect is Olivi's argumentation against the central presupposition of species theories of perception which claim that external objects can actualise our cognitive faculties. There seems to be two approaches available to species theories: either external objects cause physiological changes (*via species*) in the sense organs, and these changes are identical to the cognitive acts of the soul (a functionalist view); or external objects cause the cognitive acts directly in the faculties of the soul without bringing about any physiological change (the view of, e.g., Aquinas). Olivi flatly denies the latter possibility, and although he acknowledges that external objects cause some kinds of physiological changes in our body, he does not concede that they would be able to cause the kinds of changes in the organs which would be realisations of cognitive acts of the soul or which would be identical to cognitive acts in a functionalist way. Thus, external objects are incapable of bringing about cognitive acts of the soul because they cannot affect the soul directly either by affecting the soul or by affecting the organs in the relevant way. In addition to this, Olivi denies explicitly the Augustinian view that perception is an act of the soul by which the subject becomes conscious of a bodily change that is caused by an external object. These commitments reduce the role of the body in perception.

If we take a closer look at Olivi's argumentation against the possibility of the actualisation of cognitive faculties from without¹⁵, we see that his main interest lies in the relation between external objects and the spiritual faculties of the soul. He argues that objects cannot actualise the faculties of the soul, i.e., they are not capable of causing spiritual changes in the faculties. He does *not* deny the possibility of external objects causing changes in the organs of the senses. The arguments he puts forth are designed to prove that spiritual faculties are not changed from without even if their corporeal organs may be.

To understand Olivi's idea properly we need to remember that one of the strategies he employs when he launches his charge against species theories of perception is to point out that even if species theories were correct in claiming

¹⁵ See especially *II Sent.* q. 58, 437–61; *ibid.*, q. 72–74, 1–135; *Quodl.* I.4, 16–7.

that external objects affect the sense organs, this does not amount to perceiving the objects (*II Sent.* q. 73, 89). Keeping this idea in mind, the following excerpt is revealing:

[...] frequently, there are many passions in our senses that do not appear to us. This is patent in the case of a sleeper who sleeps with his eyes, ears and nostrils wide open. Passions that occur in his senses then are not actual perceptions, even though they are specifically (*secundum speciem*) the same passions that occur in those who are awake.¹⁶

In this passage Olivi repeats one of his favourite examples, which we have already discussed above: a person who is asleep or daydreaming does not perceive the objects which are present to her senses because she is not attending to them due to her condition. The reason Olivi takes up this example is that he wants to point out that the changes that external objects cause in our sense organs (in the passage, the *passiones*) are not themselves a part of the perceptual process by which external objects are apprehended.

From Olivi's point of view, there is nothing problematic in the idea that external objects cause changes in the organs. For instance, eyes can be damaged by staring directly at the sun for too long a time, and Olivi seems to account for this by appealing to an effect the sun causes in the eyes (*II Sent.* q. 58, 480; *ibid.*, q. 61, 582). The sun changes the structure of the eye in a harmful way, and the eye is damaged. But he repeatedly points out that the changes caused by external objects are not identical to perception: an organ of sense may undergo physiological changes, but these changes are not the same thing as perception, and they do not even play a causal role in perception. Thus, a physiological change in an organ does not bring about an act of perception; much less is it identical to an act of perception. This is also one of the points in which Olivi criticises some of the formulations of Augustine:

I wonder quite a bit why Augustine [...] said that "to sense external things" is the same as "to not be unaware of a passion", or "to attend to and perceive a passion" (i.e., a corporeal species which is impressed by the object not to the soul but to the body). For this would not be a perception of the object but only a perception of its effect which already exists in the body of the percipient.¹⁷

¹⁶ "[...] frequenter multae passionis fiunt in nostris sensibus quae nobis non apparent, sicut patet in dormiente apertis oculis et auribus et naribus. Passiones enim quae tunc fiunt in sensibus non sunt actuales sensus, quamvis sint eadem passionis secundum speciem cum illis quae fiunt in vigilantibus." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 484.)

¹⁷ "Satis autem miror quomodo Augustinus [...] dixit quod sentire res extrinsecas est idem quod non latere seu advertere et percipere passionem, id est, speciem corporalem ab obiecto impressam non in animam, sed in suum corpus. Nam hoc non esset sentire ipsum obiectum, immo solum esset sentire eius effectum, et hoc, prout iam existit in corpore sentientis." (*II Sent.* q. 74, 123–4; see also *ibid.*, q. 58, 484.) Olivi refers to *De musica* VI and *De quantitate animae*. See *De musica* V.9–10, and Aurelius Augustinus, *De quantitate animae*, in *Sancti Aureli Augustini Opera*, sect. I pars IV, ed. by W. Hörmann, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* 89 (Wien: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1986) (hereafter *De quant. an.*), XXIII.41.

Augustine's idea, which Olivi rejects in this passage, is that perception is an activity of the soul by which the soul becomes aware of the changes that external objects cause in the body. By perceiving these changes, the soul becomes somehow aware of the objects that cause the changes. Olivi points out that this cannot be how perception takes place, since it would amount to perceiving only the change in the body, not the object that has caused it. And although the soul is capable of apprehending physiological changes in the body, it does this by forming an act of perception, the object of which is the change. In this way, Olivi makes a clear-cut distinction between the corporeal changes caused by external objects on the one hand and perceptions on the other.

As there is nothing problematic in the idea that external objects cause changes in the physical organs of the senses, the central question for Olivi is the relation between external objects and spiritual faculties of the soul. This can be seen throughout Olivi's discussion of these matters. For instance, when he tackles the question of the relation between external objects and faculties of the soul, both the view he opposes (according to which external objects are capable of actualising the faculties of the soul) and his own view agree in their starting points: the objects must be able to produce simple and spiritual effects if they are to actualise the faculties of the soul. In this way, the common ground between Olivi's view and the view he opposes is that external objects must be able to act on *the soul*, and this would require that they be capable of producing spiritual effects. It is not enough to cause physiological changes in the sense organs.

In this way, the issue at hand is whether external objects are capable of crossing the line between the material and the spiritual—or, one might want to say, the physical and the mental. Olivi's answer is negative.¹⁸ Material objects are incapable of causing spiritual changes in the faculties of the soul and therefore they are incapable of producing sensations: "For, a corporeal species, which has location and extension, cannot produce a simple, spiritual, and vital (*vivus*) act of seeing. But the species which is generated by the object in the organ is corporeal."¹⁹ And the acts of the sensitive faculties (not to mention the intellectual ones) are spiritual and unextended: "[...] no one should believe that the acts which are called seeing and hearing are not simple acts and do not have extension in the organ [...] for we expressly sense that they are vital acts that belong to the genus of cognition—and life and cognition signify simple essences rather than extended essences."²⁰

¹⁸ The view Olivi opposes is presented in *II Sent.* q. 58, 400–3, and his answer is in *ibid.*, 437–61. Note also that question 72, which is devoted to the issue, is titled: "Quæritur primo an corpora possint agere in spiritum et in eius potentias apprehensivas et appetitivas." Thus, the starting point of Olivi's discussion is that the question concerns the possibility of external objects having spiritual effects.

¹⁹ "Quia a specie corporali situm et extensionem habente non potest produci actus videndi simplex et spiritualis et vivus. Sed species genita in organo ab obiecto est huiusmodi." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 489; see also *ibid.*, q. 73, 83–4.) By contrast, species which figure in imaginative and memorative acts are simple and unextended (*ibid.*, q. 58, 502–8).

²⁰ "[...] nullus debet credere quin actus qui dicuntur videre et audire sint actus simplices non habentes extensionem in organo [...] sentimus enim expresse quod actus vitales sunt et genere cognitionis, vita autem et cognitio essentias dicunt simplices potius quam extensas." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 479.)

What Olivi has in mind is that acts of perception belong principally to the soul and only secondarily to the body or to the organs of the faculties of the soul. This is especially clear in the case of human beings:

Posterior forms which have a natural order and sequence in relation to prior forms cannot be received in matter unless the matter is first informed by the prior forms. Similarly the acts [of the soul] can be received in the organs [of the body] only insofar as the organs are informed by the faculties [of the soul]. This is because of the natural order and sequence which the acts have in relation to the faculties. In human beings the case is different because the faculties have a double matter—spiritual and corporeal. Thus, as the faculties exist principally in the spiritual matter and secondarily in the corporeal matter, so the acts and species exist principally in the spiritual matter and secondarily in the corporeal matter.²¹

I shall not go into the details of Olivi's theory of the metaphysics of the human soul, but a few points must be dealt with in order to understand the distinction between the spiritual and corporeal matter that Olivi refers to in this passage. In his theory of the metaphysics of the human soul, Olivi adheres to the so-called doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms. Moreover, he employs the concept of spiritual matter, which he had received from the earlier Franciscan tradition. In short, the human body is constituted of corporeal matter which is informed by corporeal (*formæ corporeitatis*), vegetative, and sensitive forms. The human soul, by contrast, is made of spiritual matter which is informed by sensitive and intellectual forms. These two entities—the body and the soul—are bound together because the sensitive form informs both the corporeal body and the spiritual soul. This also means that the sensitive faculties are actualisations of both spiritual and corporeal matter. (See footnote 1 above.)

Now, Olivi claims in the passage just cited that the acts of the sensitive faculties of the soul are principally realised in the spiritual matter of the soul and only secondarily in the corporeal matter of the organs of these faculties²². He also frequently claims that the acts take place primarily in the faculties and only secondarily in the organs: "For a cognitive act is primarily and immediately in the faculty and not in the organ. This is why it cannot be in the organ in any way unless the organ is informed by the cognitive faculty by a natural priority."²³

²¹ "Quia sicut formæ posteriores quæ habent naturalem ordinem et consequentiam ad priores non possunt recipi in materia, nisi prius sit informata formis prioribus, sic nec actus possunt recipi in organo, nisi prout sunt informata ipsis potentiis propter naturalem ordinem et consequentiam quam habent ipsi actus ad suas potentias. In hominibus vero est aliter, quia ipsæ potentiæ habent duplicem materiam, spiritualem scilicet et corporalem, et ideo, sicut ipsæ principaliter existunt in sua materia spirituali et secundo in materia corporali, sic et ipsi actus et species principaliter existunt in materia spirituali, secundo in corporali." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 513.)

²² The expression *ipsæ potentiæ* refers to the sensitive faculties of the soul. This becomes clear from the context and also from the fact that the intellectual faculties are not realised in corporeal matter at all, and Olivi writes that *ipsæ potentiæ* exist secondarily in the corporeal matter.

²³ "Nam actus cognitivus primo et immediatius est in potentia quam in eius organo, unde nec

Finally, in a somewhat puzzling passage Olivi denies the literal interpretation of the idea of receiving a sensible species in the external senses according to which the eyes turn red when a red object is seen. He says that light and colour change the faculty of vision without any movement (*absque omni motu*)—I take it that by “movement” Olivi means a physiological change of the organ of the sense. By contrast to the faculty of sight, sounds change hearing, odours and vapours change smell, and flavours change taste. In all these cases there is some kind of change in the organs of the senses as well. However,

[...] in none of the mentioned four changes is the sense changed by the formal essence (*ratio*) of its object in such a way that its organ would receive the name of the object as if from a form that is produced (*educta*) in the organ and from it; for we do not say that a tongue that senses sweetness becomes sweet or that nostrils become odorous.²⁴

The sense of touch is the only external sense that literally becomes like its object: my hand becomes hot when I touch a hot flame.

This passage is puzzling since it is not absolutely clear whether it presents Olivi’s own stance or not: it comes from a question in which Olivi discusses the plurality versus the unity of the sense of touch, and it is supposed to prove that the sense of touch is one sense and not many senses. The idea is that because all the various kinds of objects that can be sensed by the sense of touch change the organ of touch similarly, they have a common denominator and thus can be apprehended by one faculty: there is no need for several senses of touch. It seems to me that Olivi accepts the unity of the sense of touch but denies that this particular argument is capable of proving the unity. Thus, I take it, the counter-arguments Olivi presents against the above line of reasoning (in *II Sent.* q. 61, 576–8) are the ones Olivi favours. This is important because in one of them he seems to say that physiological changes in the sense organs are not needed when the soul produces its cognitive acts:

It is clear that a cognitive action and a change in the sense of touch are vital and simple and belong to a different genus than that of any extended form—in this respect it is like an act of seeing and a change of vision. Therefore, to assume the specific difference of the acts and the faculties (to which these acts belong) from the corporeal movements that are more or less circumstantial to the act and to the faculty is to assume a cause from things that are accidental. This is especially clear in the case of those who think that apprehensive and cognitive acts of the senses (both external and internal) are brought about by these faculties themselves with their *aspectūs* which are fixed to their objects in such a way that the objects do not take part in the process other than by

in organo potest aliquo modo esse, nisi sit informatum per ipsam potentiam cognitivam et hoc prius naturaliter.” (*II Sent.* q. 73, 83.)

²⁴ “In nulla autem prædictarum quatuor immutationum immutatur sic sensus a formali ratione sui obiecti quod eius organum denominetur ab illa tanquam a forma in se et ex se materialiter educta; non enim dicimus quod lingua sentiens dulcorem sit facta dulcis aut nares odoriferæ.” (*II Sent.* q. 61, 576.)

being the end-terms which bring to an end first the *aspectus* of the faculty and then its cognitive act. In this case it is more clearly patent that no cognitive act requires corporeal movement [...]²⁵

We can see that although Olivi does not present this view as his own, he thinks that the redundancy of the physiological changes is an outcome of the theory of perception that he defends elsewhere.

All this shows that Olivi understands perception as a mental operation. We perceive external objects because our mind acts in relation to them. Whatever happens in our body is irrelevant from this point of view. Objects may cause some physiological changes in our body, but these changes do not account for perception, nor do they play any causal role in bringing about cognitive acts. To perceive is to undergo a psychological process, not a bodily one. This way of understanding perception is suggestive of dualism, to be sure, but I think that this is as it should be: Olivi clearly favours some sort of dualism not only with regard to the essence of human beings but also with regard to psychological operations such as perception. Moreover, this same distinction between psychological acts of the soul and physiological changes of the body that are concomitant to them applies also to non-human animals, although the underlying metaphysical ground is different for each of these two kinds of beings.

7.3 Physiological Changes and *colligantia potentiarum*

By distancing perception from the physiological changes that take place in the sense organs, Olivi diverges from the functionalist view according to which acts of the sensitive faculties of the soul are identical to physiological changes in such a way that these two are only different descriptions of the same phenomenon. However, although he places emphasis on the soul and its faculties, he does not totally deny that there is a role for the organs in the process of perception. He admits that there is a difference between the corporeal faculties, which are actualisations of the bodily organs, and the intellectual faculties, which use no organs in their operations²⁶. The sensitive faculties of the soul are forms of their bodily organs, and they use their organs in their acts.

²⁵ "Constat autem quod cognitiva actio et immutatio sensus tactus est viva et simplex et alterius generis ab omni forma extensa, sicut et visiva actio et immutatio visus. Ergo specificam differentiam earum et suarum potentiarum assumere ex corporalibus motibus plus vel minus circumstantibus hanc vel illam est assumere causam ex iis quæ sunt per accidens. Quod quidem maxime patet tenentibus apprehensivas et cognitivas actiones sensuum tam exteriorum quam interiorum effici a potentiis ipsis cum determinato aspectu earum ad sua obiecta, ita quod obiecta nihil ibi cooperantur nisi sub ratione termini terminantis primo aspectum potentiae et tandem eius cognitivum actum. Tunc enim clarius patet quod ad nullum actum cognitivum requiritur corporalis motus [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 61, 577.)

²⁶ For instance, the reason why he presents the idea of a double *aspectus* of the sensitive faculties is to make a distinction between the intellectual faculties and the faculties which use corporeal organs in their operations (*II Sent.* q. 67, 618–9).

Olivi goes so far as to claim that the organs are necessary for the sensitive faculties²⁷. In question 58 of his *Summa*, he presents altogether four different reasons for this. (1) First, the faculties do not have complete existence (*existentia completa*) without the organs. (2) Second, the *aspectus* and the virtual reaching out of the faculties is made proportional to the corporeal objects by the organs. Olivi expresses this in a peculiar way: “[...] insomuch as they are located in corporeal organs, they can have quasi-corporeal and quasi-located *aspectūs* which are, in some way, proportional to material objects (*corporibus*).”²⁸ He has in mind that the sensitive faculties function as if they were corporeal even though in reality they are spiritual faculties. For instance, I can see only those objects which fall within my visual field, and this is because the eyes render my faculty of sight “quasi-corporeal.” Olivi’s idea seems to be not only that the faculty of sight cannot function without the eyes but also that the corporeality of the eyes restricts the scope of the faculty. If the faculty of sight were not actualised in the corporeal eyes, it would be completely spiritual and as such capable of seeing not only those objects which are within the visual field but also every other visible object to which it directs its *aspectus*. The location of external objects would not affect our ability to see them in any way. Since the faculty of sight is actualised in the eyes, the location of visible objects in relation to the eyes is an important factor in defining what we can and do see, and the expression “quasi-corporeal” seems to refer to this: the act of seeing is not corporeal, but it shares some features of corporeity because of the physical organs in which it takes place. (3) The third reason the organs are necessary is that even though the matter of the organ is not an efficient principle of the acts of the soul, it takes part (*coefficient*) in the production of the acts, thus making the acts of the sensitive faculties perfect. (4) Finally, the fourth reason is that non-human animals do not have spiritual matter, and therefore the matter of the organs is needed in order to realise the acts of their faculties.²⁹

It is not clear why Olivi thinks that the first three reasons would prove that the organs are necessary for the sensitive faculties and their operations. The first reason is closely related to the commonly accepted idea that the soul needs the body for its complete existence. This idea was repeatedly used in discussions concerning the resurrection of the body on Judgement Day, which was (and is) a part of the doctrine of the Catholic Church. In order to have a complete existence, the soul must be reunited with its body, and this is one of the reasons the body must be resurrected.³⁰ In a similar vein, Olivi claims that the sensitive faculties

²⁷ “Forma enim non potest ad aliud moveri vel applicari nisi per motionem suæ materiæ, unde visiva non potest dirigi et converti ad visibilia exteriora nisi per motionem quandam spirituum in quibus fertur et organi sui.” (*II Sent.* q. 51, 112.)

²⁸ “[...] pro quanto enim sunt sitæ in organis corporeis, pro tanto possunt habere aspectus quasi corporales et quasi situales et corporibus quodam modo proportionales.” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 512.)

²⁹ *II Sent.* q. 58, 512; See also *ibid.*, q. 72, 30–3; *ibid.*, q. 74, 113–4; *ibid.*, q. 111, 272–3.

³⁰ For an extensive analysis of the medieval discussions concerning the resurrection of the body, see Caroline Bynum, *The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200–1336* (NY: Columbia UP, 1995.)

of the soul need their organs for a complete existence even though they remain in the soul also when the soul is separated from the body. They are capable of existing without the body (just as the soul is), but their existence without the organs is not complete. This idea fits well with the theological currents of the time, but it does not establish philosophically that the organs are necessary.

The second and third reasons do not seem to be conclusive either if we take into heed Olivi's own idea about the possibility of disembodied perception, about which I shall speak more below. As long as the soul is united with the body, and the sensitive faculties use their bodily organs in their operations, they need the organs. When we live in this world and our souls are united to our bodies, we do perceive in a "quasi-corporeal" way, as Olivi puts it, but it seems that the organs are not an absolute necessity after all. As we have seen, Olivi's theory of perception may be taken to entail that the faculties of the soul are capable of functioning without bodily organs. This is what Olivi himself says in another context: the sense organs are necessary for the perfect functioning of the sense faculties, but the faculties can function also without them. (See Chapter 7.4 below.) However, in question 58, in which the four reasons are presented, he seems—in a circular way—to take it for granted that as long as they are actualisations of the organs, our sensitive faculties need their organs in order to function as they do. The organs are necessary for the action that takes place in the organs, to be sure, but that does not prove that they would be necessary for the faculties as such. The redundancy of the bodily organs is attested to also by Olivi's claim that the acts of the sensitive faculties take place primarily in the spiritual matter of the soul. The necessity of the bodily organs for the sensitive faculties is of a qualified type for Olivi.

Still, he clearly struggles to account for the role of the organs. His intention was never to distance the soul from the body to such extent that the body would turn out to be an unnecessary or even harmful vessel and instrument for the soul (see, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 16, 336; *ibid.*, q. 51, 119; *Quodl.* V.11, 325). He is also reluctant to dismiss completely the Avicennian idea about the *spiritus animalis* as a physiological basis for the sensitive powers of the soul, received in the medical knowledge of the time—quite the contrary. Olivi readily favours that theory and clearly thinks that the physiological description of the movement of the bodily spirits in the organs of the senses, in the nerves, and in the cavities of the brain is a correct way of describing what happens in the body when a living being perceives.

Hence, from time to time he states that the sensitive functions of the soul are realised in the corporeal matter of the body. He writes for example that:

[...] the acts and the species exist principally in the spiritual matter and secondarily in the corporeal matter. For they are not in the spiritual matter absolutely but only insomuch as they are ordered and connected to the corporeal matter. This is why they [viz the two kinds of matter] have a nature (*ratio*) of one complete matter in respect to the substantial form of the soul and in respect to the acts thereof.³¹

³¹ "[...] ipsi actus et species principalius existunt in materia spirituali, secundario vero in

According to this passage, the acts of the sensitive faculties are realised both in the spiritual matter of the soul and in the corporeal matter of the organs. Perceptual acts are not completely unconnected to the body, but physiological changes in the organs of the senses are concomitant with them. In this respect, Olivi differs slightly from Aquinas who grants that physiological changes (or, to use Aquinas' own expression, natural changes) occur in the case of the sense of touch and taste but denies that they happen in the case of the other senses (*ST* I.78.3; *Quæst. de an.* q. 13). Olivi believes that physiological changes occur in the case of all of the senses.

What Olivi is advancing, it seems to me, is that the order of change is reversed compared to the Avicennian model—or to the Putnam-Nussbaum reading of the Aristotelian model—according to which an object causes bodily changes in the organs of the senses, and these changes are identical to the acts of perception, or at least the acts of perception are psychological functions that are brought about by (or supervenient on) the physiological changes³². The direction of influence is, according to this functionalist view, such that an external object causes a physiological change in the sense organ, and the act of perception supervenes on this physiological change. The emphasis is on the physiological aspect, and this is surely due to our modern way of seeing the world primarily as physical, whereas mental phenomena appear as inexplicable and call for explanation.

Olivi approaches the issue from a completely different perspective. For him (as for medievals in general) the forms are in many ways more important than the matter; for him the existence and the operations of the soul are primary to and by far more important than the changes in the body. He thinks that acts of perception are primarily acts of the spiritual soul. These acts are then realised also as physiological changes in the organs, but these changes are more like consequences of the acts of perception: “The third reason [why natural heat consumes radical humour] is that transmutations of the organs of the faculties of the soul follow from and are concomitant to the operations and passions of the faculties.”³³ The changes in the organs do not cause cognitive acts, and cognitive acts cannot be reduced to physiological changes. In a way, cognitive acts cannot be said to su-

corporali; non enim sunt in materia spirituali absolute, sed prout habent ordinem et colligantiam ad materiam corporalem. Unde ambæ habent rationem unius materiæ completæ tam respectu formæ substantialis ipsius animæ quam respectu actuum suorum.” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 513; see also *ibid.*, q. 51, 113; *ibid.*, q. 111, 272–3.)

³² For Avicenna's medically orientated theory of vision, see Hasse 2000, 119–27.

³³ “Tertia ratio [quare calor naturalis consumit humidum radicale] est ex operationibus et passionibus potentiarum ipsius animæ, ad quas sequuntur et concomitantur transmutationes variæ organorum suorum.” (*II Sent.* q. 53, 215.) Olivi writes also that: “Quemadmodum enim est in præcedenti quæstione [q. 72] probatum, impossibile est quod aliquid corporale directe influat in potentias animæ, ita quod illa influentia primo et immediate recipiatur in ipsa potentia. Ergo si potentiæ sensitivæ apprehendunt per species ab obiectis corporalibus influxas: oportebit quod primo et immediate recipiantur in organo ipsius potentiæ. Quod autem per tales non possit hoc fieri probatur multipliciter.” (*II Sent.* q. 73, 83); “Tertia ratio est ex operationibus et passionibus potentiarum ipsius animæ, ad quas sequuntur et concomitantur transmutationes variæ organorum suorum; et hinc est quod homo ex nimia continuatione actus cuiuscunque potentiæ lassatur.” (*ibid.*, q. 53, 215.) See also *ibid.*, q. 58, 479–80; *ibid.*, q. 73, 46.

pervene on physiological changes either because that way of speaking places the causal picture upside down, so to speak. One can say that even though Olivi grants the physiological realisation of the psychological acts of the sensitive faculties of the soul, he does not consider this idea as central in accounting for those acts, since the spiritual basis of the acts of the soul is already sufficient for that purpose. Perhaps the best manner of explaining Olivi's position is to say that he admits that the acts of the sensitive faculties of the soul are realised as physiological changes in the body but thinks that these changes are caused by the acts of the soul, not the other way around (see *II Sent.* q. 58, 496). To boot, this way of conceiving of psychological acts as belonging primarily to the soul can be applied also to non-human animals. As we shall see below, an animal soul is not devoid of spirituality and the acts thereof are spiritual and simple in a way that puts them on par with the acts of the human soul—despite the different metaphysics onto which they are grounded.

Olivi thinks that external objects may cause physiological changes in the organs of the body: for instance, the sun may cause damage to the eyes if it is stared at for too long. Although it is clear that these changes do not bring about cognitive acts, in some cases the impressions that external objects make on the sense organs may indirectly result in an act of perception. Physiological changes may draw the attention of cognitive faculties to the object that has caused the changes through what Olivi calls the *via colligantiae* or *colligantia potentiarum*.

This concept is very important for Olivi because it figures prominently in his account for the complicated union of the soul and the body and for the relation between higher and lower faculties of the soul. Although Olivi thinks that the sensitive part of the soul is a form of the body, he emphasises the independence of the soul to such an extent that the substantial unity of the soul and the body becomes questionable. Especially as he strictly denies that external objects can cause anything in the soul directly, the functional relation between the soul and the body seems problematic. The concept of the *colligantia* is meant to ease this problem. The central idea is that the soul and the body are connected to each other in such a way that changes in one of them bring about changes in the other “by way of a connection,” even though the changes themselves are of a distinct kind. Only indirect influence is possible: for instance, if someone were to carry my body to another room, by the same token, he would carry my soul as well; and by stabbing my body with a dagger and thus killing me, he would change the *modum existendi* of my soul without directly causing any change in it.³⁴

Although Olivi says that the primary reason for the *colligantia* is the formal union between the soul and the body (*II Sent.* q. 72, 34), he does not mean that the *colligantia* would be a hylomorphic functional relation. Bodily changes may influence the soul, but the only example Olivi gives of this influence that is even slightly reminiscent of a hylomorphic relation concerns the mutual relation between the faculties of the soul, as they are forms of the soul's spiritual matter—

³⁴ *II Sent.* q. 72, 30–3. See also *Quodl.* I.4, 15–8; *II Sent.* q. 29, 503; *ibid.*, q. 57, 369–70; *ibid.*, q. 58, 500–6; *ibid.*, q. 59, 546–54; *ibid.*, q. 72, 6–10, 15–7, 30–5; *ibid.*, q. 77, 155–6; *ibid.*, q. 87, 200–2; *ibid.*, q. 111, 270–4. For discussion, see Putallaz 1991a, 99–102; Pasnau 1997b, 177–8.

and even then he seems to think that the material changes somehow give rise to an act of the soul rather than being identical to it. Thus, even in the case of mutual influence between the faculties of the soul, Olivi seems to deny that the material changes and the psychological acts are identical. He gives two different accounts (and although it is not apparent how his discussion about the relation between the faculties of the soul is supposed to tell us anything about the relation between bodily changes and psychological processes, Olivi seems to think that it does). The first of them comes in the form of a metaphor:

Some, however, add another mode [of *colligantia*], namely, when an act of one faculty [of the soul] follows from an act of another. For example, when an act of judging in the common sense and an act of understanding in the intellect follow from an act of seeing [...] as the blade of a sword cuts by a vibrating motion which is given to its matter, so (because the matter of the faculties of the soul is the same) an act of one faculty is like a kind of movement of its matter (which is common to both faculties) by which the other faculty is as it were applied to its act.³⁵

The metaphor itself is quite difficult to understand. Perhaps Olivi's idea is that the iron from which the sword is made has two powers: cutting and vibrating. Somehow the vibrating motion of the blade makes the sword also to cut in such a way that there is a kind of connection between these two powers of the sword. Olivi sees this as a simile for the relation between the various faculties of the soul. However we understand the details of the metaphor, I think that the overall idea is clear. Namely, the crucial point in this description is that an act of one of the faculties of the soul may somehow bring about an act of another faculty or at least incite the other faculty to bring about its own act. The reason for this is that the faculties of the soul are forms of the same spiritual matter, and therefore the movement of the matter of one faculty is also the movement of the matter of the other faculties. In this way, the act of one faculty induces an act in another. Let us call this version of the *via colligantiae* (VC 1).

The other version—which we may label as (VC 2)—goes as follows:

But according to others an act of one faculty [of the soul] is never directly caused by [an act of] another because in that case it would not be an action but only a passion or a motion of the faculty in which it is caused by the other faculty and its action [...] Rather, it should be said that an act of the superior faculty follows an act of the inferior faculty like it follows its object: the inferior act causes the superior act like an object which brings to an end the superior act and the first *aspectus* of the superior [faculty].³⁶

³⁵ "Quidam autem addunt alium modum, scilicet, cum actio unius potentiae sequitur ad actionem alterius, ut, cum ad actum videndi sequitur in sensu communi actus iudicandi et in intellectu actus intelligendi [...] sicut acies gladii incidit per motum vibrationis suae materiae datum, sic, quia materia potentiarum animae est eadem, idcirco actio unius est sicut quaedam motio suae materiae communis utrique potentiae, per quam altera potentia quasi applicatur ad actum suum." (*II Sent.* q. 72, 33–4.)

³⁶ "Sed secundum alios actio unius potentiae nunquam immediate causatur ab alia; quia tunc

According to this version the act of the common sense is not caused by the act of vision, but the common sense apprehends the act of the faculty of sight as an object. The act of the lower faculty plays the role of terminative cause, in a similar manner that external objects are terminative causes of acts of the senses.

Thus, the two versions of *via colligantiae* between the faculties of the soul that Olivi takes up are the following:

(VC 1) The common material basis of two faculties transmits an act from one faculty to another.

(VC 2) One faculty forms an act, the object of which is an act of another faculty.

Olivi seems to favour (VC 2) in his explanation of the relation between different faculties of the soul and (VC 1) when he accounts for the relation between the bodily changes and the soul's apprehension thereof³⁷. To be sure, when it comes to the relation between the faculties of the soul and their organs, (VC 1) must be formulated differently because the organs and the faculties do not have a common material basis: the organs *are* the matter for the faculties. That does not, however, change the idea that material changes of the organ somehow incite the faculty to its act.

We need to be careful, however. Olivi very clearly denies that the bodily changes are tantamount to the acts of the soul. Robert Pasnau presents Olivi's idea neatly:

On his [viz Olivi's] account, a flash of lightning will make a physical impression on our eyes, and this physical impression can, through the *via colligantiae*, affect the spiritual sensory powers. But, crucially, this connection is not what brings about sensation. We see this flash, as opposed to receiving merely a physical impression from it, when we direct our spiritual attention towards it. (Pasnau 1997b, 178.)

Bodily changes may draw our attention to the external objects that are causing those changes, but this is not the same thing as perceiving those objects. If we look closely at the passages in which Olivi takes up the idea about the influence that bodily changes have on the soul, we see that he actually never says that the changes could bring about a cognitive act. Due to the *colligantia* between the soul and the body, certain kinds of physiological changes alter the way the faculties of the soul function, as, for instance, when the imaginative faculty apprehends strange visions:

non esset actio, sed tantum passio vel motio illius potentiae in qua ab altera potentia et ab eius actione fieret [...] Potius ergo debet dici quod actus potentiae superioris sequitur ad actum inferioris tanquam ad suum obiectum, ita quod superior actus causatur ab inferiori sicut ab obiecto terminante actum superiorem et primum aspectum superioris." (*II Sent.* q. 72, 33.)

³⁷ "Ulterius sciendum quod colligatio spiritus ad corpus propter quam motus vel dispositio unius redundat in alterum consistit principaliter in formali unione spiritus ad corpus tanquam ad suam materiam et corporis ad ipsum tanquam ad suam formam. [...] Utrobique autem est identitas materiae causa quare ad impressionem directe factam in corpore sequatur aliquis effectus in anima, acsi prima impressio facta in corpus esset quaedam motio ipsius animae. Est enim pro tanto motio eius, pro quanto est motio suae materiae corporalis." (*II Sent.* q. 72, 34–5.)

[...] in sleep, in frenzy, and in similar states because the spirits move in various ways in the brain. This happens when a multitude of vapours rise to the brain, and then diverse representations and new compositions of images that we have never seen or thought of arise by way of the movement of these vapours. As the organic powers undergo changes by way of the movement of their organs and the spirits in which they are carried, it is no wonder that the memorative power is moved and agitated spiritually by way of these movements.³⁸

Importantly, even in this text Olivi does not say that the movements of the spirits cause (let alone are identical to) the cognitive acts of the soul. Instead, the movements of the spirits change the images or representations that the cognitive acts of the soul are about.

Moreover, the bodily changes that lead us to perceive external causes of these changes must be apprehended by the soul—otherwise they do not have an effect on us—and this requires that our attention is directed to the body and the changes that take place in it: “[...] note that a passion which is brought about by an impulse or a sound in the sense cannot be perceived and noticed by perceiving any better, unless the *aspectus* of the power is turned toward it by a natural priority.”³⁹ The soul is able to apprehend the changes in the body—indeed, it is induced to apprehending them by the *via colligantiae*—but to apprehend a bodily change is not identical to a bodily change occurring. That is, I may apprehend the changes an object causes in my eyes, but this apprehension is an act of the soul and the changes are but an object for the act. Again, we see that there is a kind of distinction between physiological changes on the one hand and perception of external objects on the other. Even though the external objects are capable of indirectly producing some changes in our cognitive faculties, these changes are not identical to perception of the object which has caused them, nor are they identical to the perception of those changes themselves.

7.4 Perception and the Mind-Body Problem

The interpretation of Olivi’s theory of perception that I have presented raises one particularly interesting question: Does Olivi’s theory involve a kind of a mind-body problem? If perception belongs to the spiritual soul, and the physiological changes in the organs of the senses are but a concomitant of the acts of the soul,

³⁸ “[...] in somnio aut in phrenesi et consimilibus, quia spiritus diversimode commovetur in cerebro; sicut fit, quando multitudo fumositatum ascendit ad cerebrum, tunc ad commotionem huiusmodi spirituum fiunt variae representationes imaginum et novarum compositionum quas antea nunquam vidimus vel cogitavimus. Cum enim potentiae organicae ad motum organorum suorum et spirituum in quibus feruntur per naturalem colligantiam immutentur: non est mirum, si ad tales motus potentia memorialis moveatur et spiritualiter agitetur.” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 506.)

³⁹ “[...] attende quod passio per impulsum vel sonum facta in sensu ita parum posset sentiri et sentiendo adverti, nisi aspectus potentiae prius naturaliter esset conversus ad ipsam.” (*II Sent.* q. 72, 27.)

are we not in a position to question altogether the role of the body in the process of perception? And if the answer is positive, are we not bound to the problems of mind-body dualism? As I see it, Olivi struggles to tackle such problems on two fronts: he endeavours to construe a theory of the relation between the soul and the body which would not jeopardise their substantial union, and he emphasises, as we have seen, the idea that the acts of the sensitive part of the soul are realised in the corporeal organs of the body. In other words, he tries to avoid views which could be easily detected as flagrantly dualistic. However, if I am correct in my interpretation, he does not succeed in the latter enterprise because the relation between the soul and the body in the process of perception turns out to be accidental to the functioning of the soul.

Below I shall give a further argument—which I take to be conclusive—in favour of my interpretation, but before that we need to look more closely at what is at stake in the mind-body problem and in the search for it from medieval philosophical psychology in general and from Olivi's theory of perception in particular. Let me begin by specifying the mind-body problem, which I take to be of importance and interest in this context. As Henrik Lagerlund points out, it is far from clear what we are talking about when we raise questions concerning the mind-body problem. He thinks that there are (at least) four different ways in which the mind-body problem can be spelled out⁴⁰:

1. How can the mind and body have an efficient causal effect on each other (the interaction problem)?
2. How can two independent entities, the mind and the body, be united into one single thing, a human being (the unification problem)?
3. How can there be sensations in the mind without the body?⁴¹
4. How can the final causality of the mental be combined with the efficient causality of the material?

Had medieval philosophers strictly followed Aristotelian hylomorphism, these questions would not have been difficult to solve; in fact, they would not have been questions at all because (at least arguably) radical hylomorphism denies all of them—with perhaps the exception of the fourth one. If the soul were understood as being a hylomorphic form of the body and nothing else, the interaction problem and the unification problem would vanish, since there would not be two things that would influence, or be united to, each other. Moreover, the existence of sensations would require the body because the mind could not be independent from the bodily motions. To be sure, other kinds of problems

⁴⁰ Henrik Lagerlund, "Introduction: The Mind/Body Problem and Late Medieval Conceptions of the Soul," in Lagerlund 2007a, 2; see also Henrik Lagerlund, "John Buridan and the Problems of Dualism in the Early Fourteenth Century," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 42:4 (2004), 369–87.

⁴¹ Perhaps a more accurate formulation of this type of mind-body problem would be something like the following: "How can the relation between bodily changes and the qualitative feel of having sensations be accounted for?"

would arise, but they would not be mind-body problems in the same sense as the ones listed above. However, we must keep in mind that few (if any) medieval philosophers adhered to such a radical version of hylomorphism because there was a strong Neoplatonic-Augustinian undercurrent even in the case of such Aristotelian minds as Aquinas. Thinkers from the Franciscan order especially were more favourable towards notions of the soul-body relationship which could be associated with some of the four versions of the mind-body problem listed above.

Even though none of these problems were as acute to medieval philosophers as they have been to philosophers in and after the 17th century, it is rather easy to see how these problems are deeply rooted in medieval discussions. To be sure, the soul-body problem is not exactly the same as the mind-body problem since the medieval concept of *anima* is not identical with the modern notion of 'mind.' Still, there are important parallels between the modern mind-body problem and medieval discussions concerning the soul-body relationship. In particular, Olivi's anthropological view runs into various versions of the mind-body problem. His rejection of the possibility that physical reality can influence the spiritual soul (and hence the mind) is a clear example of version (1), and as he participates in the discussions of medieval philosophers' attempts to reconcile Aristotelian natural philosophy with the Christian conception of the soul as capable of existing without the body⁴², he clearly struggles with version (2) as well.

However, what strikes me as the most interesting question with regards to the medieval roots of the mind-body problem is the third item in the above list: How is a "mental" phenomenon such as perception related to the physiological changes in the body of the percipient? Or, to put it another way, how are the physiological changes in, say, an act of seeing related to the phenomenal experience of seeing? It seems obvious to us post-Cartesians that sensations (understood as a sort of qualitative feel, or as a phenomenal experience of perceiving) and physiological states of the body are different, whereas their connection is far from obvious. This is why it seems natural to us that there is some kind of problem to be explained in the relation of these two aspects of perception.

It has been argued that this version of the mind-body problem is not ancient or medieval⁴³. The most convincing line of argumentation against the premod-

⁴² The conception of the soul as being capable of existing without the body in the time in between bodily death and the Day of Judgement was established as a part of the Catholic faith during the 12th century, and during the 13th century there were debates concerning the different ways that which this kind of possibility of a separate existence could be reconciled with the emerging Aristotelian conceptions of the soul-body relation. For discussion, see Carlos Bazán, "The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas' Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism," *AHDLMA* 64, Paris: Vrin, 1997: 95–126; Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 65 (Leiden/NY/Köln: Brill, 1995).

⁴³ Wallace I. Matson, "Why Isn't the Mind-Body Problem Ancient?" in *Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl*, ed. P. Feyerabend and G. Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 92–102; Peter King, "Why Isn't the Mind-Body Problem Medieval?" In Lagerlund 2007a, 187–205; See also Caroline Bynum, "Why All the Fuss about the Body? A Medievalist's Perspective," *Critical Inquiry*

ern mind-body problem draws from the supposition that no premodern thinker conceives of perception as a mental process. Rather, they all seem to think that it either is or at least necessarily involves a bodily process. The mere possibility of questioning the relation between perception and bodily processes presupposes that perception can be taken to be something that is separable from the body, and this was not the case before the Early Modern period. For instance, Peter King argues that the mind-body problem is not medieval (it is clear that he is discussing version (3) of the problem). As he puts it, in the medieval context the question centres on the possibility of a separated soul's ability perceive. If a separated soul were to perceive, then perception would be a non-bodily mental operation, and we would have a medieval version of the mind-body problem. This is, to be sure, a radical account of the issue, but as such it captures its heart well. King's central argument is that medievals did not open the way for a medieval version of the mind-body problem because they unanimously denied the possibility of disembodied perception. He supports his claim by analysing several medieval theories of perception and pointing out that none of them attribute perception to the soul by itself.⁴⁴ Perception belongs to the compound of the soul and the body, and it is not possible to have sensations without the body; thus, the distinction between sensation and a bodily state, which is of crucial importance to the third version of the mind-body problem, disappears. On the basis of his examples, King con-

22:1 (Autumn 1995): 13–14; M. W. F. Stone, "The Soul's Relation to the Body: Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant and the Parisian Debate on Monopsychism," in *History of the Mind-Body Problem*, ed. T. Crane & S. Patterson (London/NY: Routledge, 2000), 34–5. Stone emphasises that due to the dissimilarity between the modern concept of the mind and the medieval concept of the soul we cannot assimilate the discussions of the two contexts. H. Putnam, "How Old Is the Mind?" in *Words & Life*, ed. J. Conant (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard UP, 1995), 3–7 (originally published in *Exploring the Concept of Mind*, ed. R. M. Caplan (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1986)). Putnam shortly argues that the modern concept of the "mind" cannot be found in antiquity or the Middle Ages. This is true, of course. However, Putnam's argument stems partly from his selective choice of sources: he discusses only Aristotle and Aquinas. Moreover, it is not clear to me that this is a sufficient reason to say that there is no mind-body problem in medieval philosophy. At least the claim should be qualified in some way.

⁴⁴ King starts with Ockham, continues with Scotus and Aquinas, and ends up with Augustine, who is (arguably) the best candidate for being a medieval thinker whose thought entails the mind-body problem, given the dualistic flavour of his anthropological view. Ockham seems to recognise the mind-body problem, but he does not accept the idea of a soul having perceptions without the body. See William Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem* II.10 (*Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Philosophica et Theologica ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum edita. Opera Theologica* I–X, Editiones Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventuræ (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967–1986) (hereafter *OTh*), IX, 158); See also William Ockham, *Quæstiones in librum quartum Sententiarum (Reportatio)* IV, q. 9 (*OTh* VII, 162). The same basic idea applies also to Scotus (King 2007, 193–6). Aquinas thinks that a separated soul has its sensitive faculties (see, e.g., *Quæst. de an.* q. 19), but it cannot use them without the body (see, e.g., *ST* I.77.8). Also, Augustine seems to think that perception involves bodily processes and is necessarily realised in the body. The crucial expression, or definition, can be found from Augustine's *De quantitate animæ* and it goes as follows: "[...] sensum puto esse, non latere animam quod patitur corpus." (*De quant. an.* XXIII.41; cf. *ibid.*, 48; See O'Daly 1987, 80–7.) As we have seen, Olivi refers to Augustine's expression but thinks that it is not the correct definition of perception (see p. 128, footnote 17)

cludes that: “There is no room for disembodied sensation, and hence none for a mind-body problem, even in the Platonist tradition, even in the early Middle Ages.” (King 2007, 203.)

King’s claim is a strong one. However, one may raise two kinds of criticism against it. First, while it may seem that medieval thinkers were unanimous in their insistence that the body is necessary for perceiving, that does not mean that they would not have the conceptual tools to raise and discuss the problem. One can, of course, claim that the mind-body problem is not medieval on the basis that nobody found it a particularly difficult issue, but that begs the question somewhat. If it turns out that the problem was recognised, it could be said that it was a medieval problem even though no-one would have taken it seriously. Second, if my interpretation of Olivi’s theory of perception is correct, it represents a clear counter-example of King’s case. Not only is Olivi’s theory dualistic; it also incorporates an explicit commitment to the mind-body problem in the form that King requires.

To begin with, Olivi believes (and argues philosophically) that not only is the intellectual part of the human soul created by God, but so is the entire soul. The soul as a whole, including its sensitive part, is immortal and incorruptible, and thus the sensitive faculties of the soul remain in the soul even when it is in a disembodied state.⁴⁵ This is important because it is a prerequisite for disembodied perception. If the sensitive part of the soul should perish at death, it could no longer function. To be sure, the continuation of the existence of the sensitive functions after the soul’s separation from the body does not prove that the soul would be capable of disembodied perception—e.g., Aquinas thinks that the soul contains its sensitive functions even when it is separated from the body, but he denies their usage. Hence, the crucial question is: Does Olivi think that the sensitive faculties are capable of functioning in the absence of the body?

Olivi addresses this problem in his *Quodlibeta quinque*, in a question titled: “Is our intellect capable of seeing exterior sensible things immediately without a sensitive act?”⁴⁶ It is important to note that the question at hand is not related to the Aristotelian doctrine that the intellect has to work on phantasms which are acquired through perception in its operations (the doctrine of *conversio ad phantasmata*). Rather, what is at stake here is the intellectual knowledge of particular objects, and literally—as can be seen from the wording of the question—the intellect’s ability to *see* (*videre*) or, more generally, to *perceive* particular objects. The question presupposes that the intellect is somehow capable of apprehending particular perceptible objects⁴⁷ and it concentrates on the necessity of the sensitive

⁴⁵ See *II Sent.* q. 51, 101–35 (especially p. 118); *ibid.*, q. 51 app., 152–3; *ibid.*, q. 52, 198–206; *ibid.*, q. 54, 270.

⁴⁶ “Quinto queritur an noster intellectus possit immediate uidere exteriora sensibilia, absque omni actu sensitue.” (*Quodl.* I.5, 18–21.)

⁴⁷ Olivi endows the intellect with an ability to cognise individual particular objects. See Camille Bérubé, *La Connaissance de l’individuel au Moyen âge* (Montreal/Paris: Presses de l’Université de Montreal/PUF, 1964), 100–6. The question of whether a separated soul can perceive was discussed to some extent in the latter half of the 13th century. For instance, Matthew of Aquasparta wrote an entire set of questions on the topic. Aquasparta allows the

faculties and their organs in the process of acquiring information about those objects.

A positive answer to this question would mean that the sensitive faculties are unnecessary for acquiring perceptual information; it would mean that I could see the mug on my desk without using my eyes or my faculty of sight. All I would need is my intellect to literally *see* the mug. However, Olivi's answer to this question is negative, even though he does not say so explicitly. He presents two opinions, neither of which he explicitly accepts as correct. Since he does not give a definite answer, it seems difficult to determine on the basis of this question alone which of the two opinions he prefers, but a closer look at the opinions gives us the keys to Olivi's view, after all.

According to the first opinion: "[...] no created intellect can apprehend anything corporeal without some mediating act of some sensitive power which presents the corporeal object to the intellect. However, the only fact that supports those who state this is that we experience this in ourselves."⁴⁸ The other opinion is a similar claim: we are incapable of perceiving without our sensitive faculties. The two opinions Olivi presents differ only inasmuch as the first denies to *all* created intellects the ability to see without sensitive faculties, whereas the latter allows it in the case of angels. The crucial aspect of these views is their point of convergence: they both agree that sensitive acts are needed in order to see (or to apprehend, to perceive) external objects. This shows that Olivi's answer is negative: as he develops his response, it becomes clear that even though he does not determine which of these two opinions is correct⁴⁹, he accepts what they have in common, namely, the overall idea that we need sensitive acts to perceive. Thus, even though at the outset it seems that Olivi does not give a definite answer to the question addressed in *Quodlibet* I.5 because he appears indecisive in many ways, a careful reading reveals that he in fact answers quite explicitly: the intellect is not capable of seeing external objects without sensitive acts⁵⁰.

separated soul to receive information about particular objects of this world, but he thinks that it receives the information directly by its intellect, without the mediation of the sensory faculties, because senses cannot function without their organs. See Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quæstiones disputatæ de anima separata*, ad fidem codicum nunc primum editæ cura PP. Collegii S. Bonaventuræ, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Ævi 18 (Quaracchi, Florentiæ: Ex typographia collegii S. Bonaventuræ, 1959), q. 4, 60–70.

⁴⁸ "[...] nullus intellectus creatus potest aliquod corporale apprehendere, nisi mediante aliquo actu alicuius potentie sensitive, per quem obiectum corporale intellectui offeratur. Sed isti qui hoc dicunt nihil aliud pro se habent, nisi quia ita experiuntur in nobis." (*Quodl.* I.5, 19–20.)

⁴⁹ In *Summa* he seems to adhere to the latter view (see *II Sent.* q. 67, 623).

⁵⁰ Pasnau refers to *Quodl.* I.5 and claims that Olivi "[...] takes this virtual attention to such an extreme that he is willing to allow that, theoretically, intellect should be able without sensory mediation to perceive objects in the external world directly." (Pasnau 1997b, 171.) He can be praised of drawing attention to this important text, but unfortunately he misinterprets it slightly. According to Olivi, the intellect is not able to perceive objects in the external world directly because it needs the sensory powers of the soul; what it does not need are the *organs* of the body. This becomes evident not only from *Quodl.* but also from Olivi's *Summa*. For instance, he states that: "Manifeste enim et continue sentimus quod intellectus noster nihil apprehendit de sensibilibus nisi apprehendendo aliquem actum sensitivæ qui

Importantly, this applies to souls in a disembodied state as well. The vital passage goes as follows:

Because as long as the sensitive part [of the soul] is in the body, it is not carried to (*fertur*) any object without the organs of its powers; this is why neither it nor the intellect, as long they are in the body, are capable of reaching a perceived object (*posse in obiectum expertum*) without the organs of the body. But when the rational soul together with its sensitive part is separated from the body, then it surely is capable of reaching material objects (*in corpora siue corpus*⁵¹); but it cannot reach them without its sensitive powers.⁵²

It is an experiential fact that in order to perceive external objects in this life we need not only the sensitive faculties but also the bodily organs. And after the separation of the soul from the body, we need sensitive faculties; but even though we need sensitive faculties, *we do not need the body!* The disembodied soul is capable of perceiving external objects and their perceptual qualities. It needs the sensitive faculties of the soul, but this is not a problem since they remain in the soul even after the separation of the soul from the body.

That Olivi adheres to this view is attested to by many passages in the second book of his *Summa*, especially in the appendix to question 51, which is Olivi's response to the onslaught against his theory of the human soul initiated by Vital du Four⁵³. One of the fundamental points of disagreement between these two thinkers concerns the relation between the intellectual soul and the body: Olivi argues that the intellectual part of the soul cannot be the form of the body, and du Four criticises Olivi for this. One of the rationales behind Olivi's view is that according to him the functions and operations of the soul are necessarily realised in the matter it informs. It is not possible for a form to produce acts which are not realised in the matter that is informed by that form. Thus, if the intellectual part were a form of the body, the intellectual operations of a human being would be realised in her body. (*II Sent.* q. 51, 104–11.) This would be unthinkable from

tunc est in actu et per consequens obiectum illius actus." (*II Sent.* q. 51, 122; See also *ibid.*, q. 67, 623.)

⁵¹ It seems to me that the sentence would make more sense if the expression "in corpora sive coprus" were "in corpora sine corpore": the rational soul would be capable of reaching "material objects without the body." This is, after all, what Olivi is arguing for in the passage. However, reading the passage as it stands does not change the fact that Olivi clearly states that the soul is capable of apprehending sensible objects without the body because that is just the presupposition he makes at the beginning of the sentence.

⁵² "Quia vero pars sensitiva quamdiu est in corpore ad nullum obiectum fertur absque organis suarum potentiarum, ideo nec ipsa nec intellectus, quamdiu sunt in corpore, possunt in aliquod obiectum expertum sine organis corporis. Quando autem rationalis anima cum sua parte sensitiva est separata a corpore, tunc quidem potest in corpora siue corpus; non tamen potest sine suis potentiis sensitivis." (*Quodl.* I.5, 20.)

⁵³ For a detailed account of the dispute between Olivi and du Four, see Mauro 1997, 89–138. Vital du Four's critique was erroneously attributed to John Duns Scotus and published among his oeuvre (Antonie Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006), 107–10). For du Four's text, see Ioannis Duns Scoti, *De rerum principio*, qq. VII–XII, in *Opera omnia* III, ed. L. Wadding (Lyons: Durand, 1639), 37–105.

the medieval point of view because it was commonly thought that intellectual functions of the soul are not realised in the body.

Vital du Four opposes Olivi's doctrine and questions his reasoning by pointing out that if every form were to realise its functions in its matter, then the vegetative and sensitive forms of the soul, being forms of not only the body but also the spiritual matter of the soul (as Olivi claims), would realise their functions and operations in the spiritual matter and therefore should be assigned to the spiritual soul. In other words, even a disembodied soul would be capable of nourishment, growth, and sensation. Vital takes this to be an insupportable consequence.⁵⁴

Olivi begins his answer by repeating his idea that the sensitive form informs both matters of a human being, namely, the corporeal matter of the body and the spiritual matter of the soul. He points out that this is why its operations are realised in both matters. Moreover, he draws on the idea that the sensitive faculties cannot direct their *aspectus* to corporeal objects without the aid of the corporeal organs:

And there is an example about this with regard to the brain and the organs of the senses: for all active powers require that they are beforehand proportionally brought into contact with their objects by the appropriate *aspectus* in order that they can perform their actions. But our sensitive powers do not have a sufficiently proportional *aspectus* towards sensible objects that are located in space (*sitalia*) unless they are virtually directed and brought into contact with them together with their corporeal organs.⁵⁵

So far so good. Olivi undermines du Four's critique by appealing to the necessity of corporeal matter. Hence, it seems that the soul needs the body in order to perform the sensitive functions after all. But then comes a surprise: "And this is why our sensitive [part of the soul] does not have acts outside the body *as perfect as* it would have with the glorious or imperishable body, but *it still has some act* [...]"⁵⁶ The sensitive part of the soul has acts that are more perfect when

⁵⁴ Olivi paraphrases the argument as follows: "Cum enim ista positio [sc. positio fratris Olivi] velit quod sensitiva et vegetativa hominis sint formæ materiæ spiritualis, si rationes positionis sunt bonæ, sequitur quod communicabunt suas operationes suæ materiæ spirituali, et sic materia spiritualis sentiet et nutrietur et augebitur." (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 154.)

⁵⁵ "Et datur de hoc ibi exemplum in cerebro et organis sensuum: omnes enim potentiæ activæ præexigunt per debitos aspectus proportionaliter applicari ad sua obiecta ad hoc quod possint agere suas actiones. Sensitivæ autem potentiæ nostræ non habent sufficienter proportionalem aspectum ad obiecta sensibilia et sitalia, nisi prout sunt cum suis corporalibus organis virtualiter directæ et applicatæ ad illa." (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 155.)

⁵⁶ "Et hinc est quod sensitiva nostra non habet extra corpus ita perfectos actus sicut haberet cum corpore glorioso vel incorrupto, habet tamen aliquem actum [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 155; emphasis mine.) See also *ibid.*, q. 111, 280; *Quæst. de nov.* q. 9, 167; *ibid.*, q. 12, 181–2; The idea that a separated soul can perceive and suffer pain gets a literary expression in Dante Alighieri's *La divina commedia*. Dante, seeing that the souls of the damned suffer in Inferno, asks Vergil whether their suffering is increased after they receive their bodies on the Day of Judgement: "At which I said: 'And after the great sentence—/o master—will these torments grow, or else/be less, or will they be just as intense?' // And he to me:

it informs some kind of body (either a physical body which we have in this life or an incorruptible body of the afterlife) than when it is completely without a body. Still, it has some kind of activity in the latter state as well. Olivi goes on to say that the functions of nutrition and growth cease for good in the separation of the soul from the body, but at least some of the functions of even the vegetative part of the soul continue in the disembodied state⁵⁷.

Olivi paraphrases and refutes altogether four of du Four's arguments which are designed to prove that a disembodied soul cannot perceive. The first argument is based on a supposition that perception involves sensible species which are not simple but extended. As a separated soul is simple and does not have extension, it cannot receive anything extended. From this, du Four concludes that a disembodied soul cannot receive sensible species and therefore cannot perceive. As we have seen, many fundamental features of this argument are rejected by Olivi, but his reply in this connection is not based on his critique against species theories of perception. He simply points out that du Four's argument necessarily involves a total denial of the ability of a separated soul to apprehend particular objects, and he seems to think that this is insupportable from the point of view of both his own theory and the species theories. Even if perception were to take place through sensible species, they would necessarily be simple and unextended and therefore du Four's objection does not hold. (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 157–8.)

In the second argument, du Four claims that the sensitive power of the soul receives a kind of contraction (*arctatio*) from the body and from various organs of the senses, and he claims that this accounts for the fact that the soul apprehends different kinds of objects through different senses. For instance, the eyes render the perceptual faculty capable of apprehending visible qualities. When the soul leaves the body, it loses this contraction which it had received from the body, and—strangely enough—it cannot perceive without it. Olivi objects to this by claiming that the soul and its faculties cannot receive any contraction from the body and that the operations of the soul are not different in kind when the soul is in the body from when it is outside the body. (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 157–9.)

The third argument is by far the most interesting of all the four arguments that Olivi objects to. According to du Four, human perception would be utterly different from animal perception if the sensitive part of the human soul could

'Remember now your science/which says that when a thing has more perfection/so much the greater is its pain or pleasure.//Though these accursed sinners never shall/attain the true perfection, yet they can/expect to be more perfect then than now.'" (Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri, Inferno*, transl. A. Mandelbaum (NY: Bantam Books, 2004), VI.106–11.) Vergil refers to a scientific view that the union with the body makes perception more perfect but, importantly, it is possible even without the body as the fates of the damned testify. For discussion, see Yrjönsuuri 2007a, 62–7.

⁵⁷ "Actus autem nutritionis et augmenti non est perpetuus, alias esset in corporibus beatorum [...] Sed vigorose vigere et vivere est intrinsecus et perpetuus actus vegetativæ, et hunc quidem radicalius habet in sua materia spirituali quam in corporali [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 155–6.) Olivi does not mention the function of procreation, but we may suppose that it ceases as well. What remains is the life-giving function of the vegetative form.

perceive in a disembodied state. We would not perceive in a similar way as other animals, and consequently the sensitive faculties of the human soul would be completely different from those of other animals. Human beings and beasts would be called “animals” only equivocally.⁵⁸ In other words, the psychological continuity would be broken between human beings and other animals, and this would also lead to a break in the metaphysical similarity. Du Four thinks that this is a genuine problem, and this compels us to conclude that a separated soul cannot perceive. It is quite staggering that this kind of idea appears in a 13th century text. To be sure, it is considered here as a *reductio ad absurdum*, but still du Four and Olivi clearly raise the possibility that human beings could be conceived of as creatures which are not animals in the same sense as other animals.

Olivi responds to du Four’s critique with a counter-attack. He argues that the problematic consequence du Four highlights applies rather to du Four’s own conception of the human soul in which there is no metaphysical difference between the sensitive and intellectual parts of the soul. Namely, du Four agrees with Aquinas and opposes the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms, and in his theory the essence of the intellectual soul accounts for the sensitive functions as well. Given that a human being has but one substantial form, the intellectual soul, which bestows not only intellectual but also sensitive and vegetative functions, the sensitive faculties of a human being are grounded on an intellectual bedrock. Olivi suggests that this makes the disparity between human beings and other animals far wider than what is implied by his own theory. After this, Olivi lays out his own view, which is worth citing in its entirety:

Moreover, we say that the acts that our sensitive [part of the soul] has with and without an organ do not differ in species if they are about the same formal object and from the same faculty; for, the acts do not receive their species from the organ but from the faculty and the object. Moreover, a human being differs more from every species of brute animal than from the proximate genus because all the brutes come together in the genus of irrational animals, but the human being is not in the genus of the irrational. And perhaps perfect brute animals differ from imperfect animals by another proximate genus as well—for instance, from worms and shellfish—and perhaps fish, birds, and quadrupeds differ from each other by some proximate genus. Therefore, there is no inconsistency if the acts of our sensitive [part of the soul] are in some way very unlike the acts of brutes; rather, the greater difficulty is how they converge so much that they seem to be specifically the same actions in some way. Moreover, the action of a sensitive faculty remains specifically the same both when it is separated from and when it is connected with [the body] for the same reason that the faculty remains specifically the same.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ “Quia si sensitiva hominis differt tantum a sensitiva bruti quod una possit sentire sine organo corporali, reliqua vero non, tunc videtur quod animal non possit de eis univoce prædicari; quia istæ actiones, in quantum tales, different genere ac per consequens et essentiaè potentialium suarum.” (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 157.)

⁵⁹ “Præterea, dicimus quod actus quos habet nostra sensitiva cum organo et absque organo non differunt specie, si sint eiusdem obiecti formalis et eiusdem potentiaè; non enim

Olivi's strategy is clear enough. The fracture in the psychological continuity is not a particularly burning problem for him, and he happily allows that human beings are quite different from irrational animals. On the other hand, he does not think that beasts should be conceived of as a homogenous group either. There may be significant differences between different species of animals, even to the extent that they should perhaps be regarded as belonging to different genera. One should not consider it a problem that the way we perceive differs from the way other animals perceive. Rather, it seems difficult to find a common feature between animals and human beings in the processes of perception, a feature which would explain why these two groups are regarded as similar percipients.

Because Olivi allows for this fracture in the psychological continuity, du Four's argument fails. In Olivi's view, a separated soul is capable of producing acts of perception, and these acts are similar to the ones it has in the body. This cleaves the disparity between human beings and other animals, but that disparity Olivi is willing to leave open. This shows that despite Olivi's general tendency to conceive of non-human animals as having sophisticated psychological capacities and despite his approval of the principle of psychological continuity, he allows a radical difference between humans and other animals if it turns out to be necessary for achieving other goals. This does not happen often, and it should be noted that when it does, it always occurs in such a way that the psychological capacities of animals are not downgraded but the human capacities are elevated. Animals are, according to Olivi, sophisticated creatures when it comes to their psychological life. This general approach is not affected by the acknowledgement of a possible distinction between human beings and non-human animals. In any case, here we see Olivi making a move that in a way anticipates Early Modern thinking, in which the disparity between human beings and non-human animals is considered wide. Although his conception of animals is far from the one that was to become prevalent in the Early Modern period, the idea of some kind of disparity is in some ways the same.

Finally, in his fourth argument, du Four says that if the sensitive faculties function without the body when the soul is separated from it, the organs of the body are also unnecessary when the soul is united to it. Moreover, he points out that if the activity of the sensitive faculties of the soul does not require realisation in the corporeal organs of the body, there is no reason for their lack of freedom and self-reflexivity. The idea behind this argument is that the intellectual faculties of the soul are free and self-reflexive because they are not limited by the laws of

sumunt speciem suam ab organo, sed a potentia et ab obiecto. Præterea, homo differt a qualibet specie bruti plus quam genere proximo, quia omnia bruta conveniunt in genere animalis irrationalis, homo autem non subest illi generi irrationali, et forte animalia brutorum perfecta differunt adhuc alio genere proximiori ab imperfectis, puta, a vermibus et conchilibus, et forte pisces et aves et quadrupedia differunt ab invicem alio genere proximiori. Non est ergo inconveniens, si actiones nostræ sensitivæ habeant quoad aliqua maximas differentias ab actionibus brutorum; quin potius maior est difficultas quomodo tantum conveniunt ut quoad aliqua videantur esse eadem actiones specie. Præterea, qua ratione potentia sensitiva manet eadem specie separata et coniuncta, eadem ratione et actio sua." (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 159–60; See also *ibid.*, q. 72, 46.)

corporeity, and the sensitive faculties are unfree and incapable of self-reflexivity because they are limited by their corporeal matter. Olivi's answer conforms with his other counterclaims. The body is needed to perfect the sensitive operations, and the fact that sensitive faculties are not capable of reflexivity is principally due to the essence of those faculties themselves and only secondarily caused by their organs. The soul can perceive without the body.⁶⁰

If we take Olivi's preceding ideas seriously (and it seems clear to me that we must) Olivi provides a clear and explicit counter-example to the claim that the third version of the mind-body problem is not medieval. With him we see that there is at least one exception to the rule that disembodied perception was not accepted in the Middle Ages. Olivi not only tacitly allows for it by shifting the emphasis of the theory of perception from the bodily processes to the activity of the soul but also explicitly argues for the possibility of disembodied perception. Perception is a psychological process, and it takes place in the spiritual soul. The soul is an independent entity which is not only capable of existing without the body but also of exercising its functions in the absence of the body. Olivi does not appeal to physical changes in the body in the process of perception, and even though he thinks that acts of the sensitive faculties of the soul are realised in the physical organs, as movements of the *spiritus animalis* in the sense organs and in the chambers of the brain, perception and other sensitive acts are not dependent on these changes. They do not supervene on these changes because they can be brought about without them.

Why does Olivi want to defend the view that disembodied perception is possible? One of the reasons is his conviction that the soul must also be capable of apprehending particular objects after it has ceased to be united with the body. A part of this conviction is undoubtedly the theological doctrine of purgatory, where people are supposed to entertain their past sins. Somehow they must be able to apprehend their past actions which are particular and related to particular objects. But I think that there is more to this than that. Olivi also seems to have

⁶⁰ *II Sent.* q. 51 app., 196. It is of some importance that Olivi does not consider experiencing pain as an exception. King argues that medievals understood pain as a product of a damaged or overloaded sense-organ and, as such, no more mental than any other object of perception (King 2007, 204–5). Bynum too claims that medieval “thinkers would not have understood the question (frequent in modern circles): Is pain in my body or in my mind?” (Bynum 1995b, 14.) I am inclined to think, however, that Olivi would have understood the question. According to him, a separated soul is not only capable of perceiving corporeal fire but also suffering pain caused by the perception of fire. Pain is not confined to the compound of the soul and the body because it does not require harmful changes in the body. It does not require the body at all, and thus it is a mental feeling which accompanies certain kinds of perceptions. (*Quæst. de nov.* q. 7, 149–63.) In this way, Olivi serves a clear counter-example to the claim that medievals did not attribute pain to the mind. In fact, here Olivi is in line with the condemnations of 1270 and 1277, which prohibited asserting “*Quod anima post mortem separata non patitur ab igne corporeo*” (# 8), and “*Quod anima separata nullo modo patitur ab igne*” (# 19), respectively (*Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle & É. Chatelain, vol. 1 (Paris, 1889), # 432, 486–7, and # 473, 543–55). To be sure, Olivi is alone in accepting this doctrine but he seems to be quite unique in his insistence that the soul is in *pain* which is in principle just like the pain we undergo when our corporeal body is damaged.

philosophical reasons for underlining the possibility of disembodied perception (after all, being able to *remember* one's sins would suffice in purgatory). He was an acute philosopher who undoubtedly understood his own theories. His theory of perception entails the redundancy of the body, and when he allows for disembodied perception to take place, he may just be drawing the necessary implications from his own view.

Then again, Olivi does not seem to think that there is some kind of "mind-body" problem lurking in his theory. He allows the separated soul to perceive, and does not give any plausible solution to the question: "why do we need the body to perceive in this life?" He does not consider the relation between the soul and the body in the sensitive functions as a problem that should be addressed and solved. To this extent I agree with King and others: there was no mind-body problem in the Middle Ages, if the existence of such a problem presupposes that medieval thinkers themselves would have recognised the relation between the mind and the body in perception as a problem and would have considered it as *the* problem of philosophical psychology, or even as *a* problem. They usually did not. There was a strong consensus that the question concerning the relation between the body and the soul in perception is answered easily by claiming that perception belongs to the compound of the two and that it cannot be attributed to the mind or the soul by themselves. Yet Olivi does not adhere even to this, and it is important to note that medieval philosophers did have the conceptual tools for formulating the problem, and they paid theoretical attention to it as well. In this way, it is justifiable to state that there are some precursors to this version of the mind-body problem in the Middle Ages and that we can localise Olivi's theory of perception as one place where this version of the mind-body problem is anticipated.

8 PERCEPTION IN NON-HUMAN ANIMALS

8.1 The Difference Between Human and Non-Human Animals

It may seem that the preceding discussion has deviated to some extent from the theme concerning animals. Although I have claimed that many ideas presented in it apply also to non-human animals, I have not yet given much support for this claim: I have examined human cognition and have only presumed that what is said applies also to non-human animals. This approach resembles the manner which modern scholarly works dealing with medieval (and ancient) theories of cognition often follow: they do not make explicit to which creatures these theories apply. Often modern studies are written with both eyes on human beings, and even if they take other animals into consideration, they seem to consider it unproblematic that past theories apply also to them. To some extent I think that this is as it should be, for this kind of approach reflects the way of thinking of the medieval philosophers themselves. As I have been saying, it was a truism that human beings and other animals are identical—or at least almost identical—to each other when it comes to the psychological processes that are provided by the sensitive soul, and perception is a paradigm case of these processes. This approach is especially characteristic of the Aristotelian tradition in which perception was understood as an ability that distinguishes human and non-human animals from other living beings. If a central supposition of a past theory is that there is no difference between the perceptual processes of human beings and other animals, a study that analyses that theory certainly need not specify to which creatures the theory applies.

However, in Olivi's case the situation is different. As we have seen, his theory of perception involves traits of dualism. It is based on an assumption that the perceiving subject has or even is (in the case of a disembodied soul) a spiritual entity-like soul and that the spiritual soul is responsible for the whole process of perception. In that respect, perception does not differ much from intellectual cognition. They both are: "entirely incorporeal activities carried out by incorporeal powers," as Pasnau states it (Pasnau 1997b, 176). Even though Olivi is not very

interested in providing a detailed analysis of animal perception, he occasionally touches upon the issue. For instance, as we have seen, he explicitly allows for the possibility of a dissimilarity between human and non-human perception to the extent that there might be fewer common features than differences between the two. Nonetheless, he clearly thinks that non-human animals are capable of perception and not only perception but *conscious* perception or perceptual awareness. He is not willing to disallow non-human animals the ability to perceive altogether, but given the dualistic flavour of his theory of perception and the metaphysics of the human soul on which it is grounded, it is by no means clear how the perceptual process takes place in non-human animals.

In order to fully understand what is at stake here, we need to look shortly at the essential difference between human beings and other animals as Olivi sees it. As I have already shown, Olivi argues rigorously for his distinctive view of human metaphysics according to which a human being is composed of two kinds of matter: the corporeal matter of the body and the spiritual matter of the soul, both of which are informed by several substantial forms. In contrast to this, non-human animals do not have spiritual matter¹. They are composed only of corporeal matter informed by several substantial forms: corporeal forms make up the physical body, and vegetative and sensitive forms animate it². The sensitive soul of a non-human animal is a corporeal form which is produced (*educere*) from the matter of the body by natural causes, and it vanishes when the body is dissolved³. Metaphysically, the human soul and the animal soul are totally different kinds of things: the human soul is a spiritual entity, and the animal soul is a hylomorphic form of the body of an animal.

Because the human soul is an actualisation of spiritual matter, it is capable of operations which are not possible for physical entities: it is immortal, free, self-reflexive, and so on. At the outset, it also seems that the fact that the cognitive faculties of the soul are active requires spirituality on the part of the soul. Olivi seems to acknowledge that the impossibility of an external object to have influence on the soul has its footing both on the intellectuality of the soul and on the spirituality of the matter of the soul (*II Sent.* q. 72, 17). From this, it is only a short step—indeed, apparently not a step at all—to think that the idea about the activity of the cognitive faculties does not apply to non-human animals. They do not have an intellectual soul or spiritual matter, and this seems to eliminate the possibility of activity from their cognitive capacities. Were this the case, many central aspects of Olivi's theory of perception would not apply to beasts at all.

In this respect, it is also noteworthy that the questions in which Olivi expounds most fully his theory of cognition (i.e., questions 72–74 of the second

¹ See, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 54, 282–3; *ibid.*, q. 58, 512; *ibid.*, q. 59, 542.

² Actually, Olivi is not certain if the vegetative and the sensitive forms are distinct from each other or one form (*II Sent.* q. 71, 637–44). Also, Ockham raises this question and answers that there is no need to think that they are distinct. See *Quodlibeta septem* II.11 (*OTh* IX, 164). Olivi speaks about forms and Ockham about souls, but the heart of the question is the same: does there have to be a separate principle for the vegetative functions or are they provided by the sensitive soul/form.

³ *II Sent.* q. 51, 101, 126–7; *ibid.*, q. 53, 210, 218; *ibid.*, q. 54, 270.

book of *Summa*) explicitly deal with human beings and angels, since they are placed under the heading: “Some [questions] concerning the actions which occur in the human or angelic spirit and in their faculties are about to be asked.”⁴ The title may only reflect Olivi’s biased interest which lies in the creatures who bear some theological significance, but it might also be taken as indicating that non-human animals are not included and that everything Olivi says in these questions apply only to human beings and angels.

It should be emphasised first that whatever the scope of questions 72–74 is, the term *spiritus* includes the sensitive faculties of human beings without question. In medieval vocabulary, the term *spiritus* may mean quite different things, ranging from ordinary respiration, to the intellectual part of the soul that excludes the body⁵. At the outset, it is not evident what Olivi means by the term in these

⁴ “De actionibus quæ fiunt in spiritu humano vel in angelico et in eorum potentiis aliqua quæsituri.” (*II Sent.*, vol. III, 1.) The questions included are qq. 72–86.

⁵ Medieval discussions were complicated by the fact that the term *spiritus* had so many meanings in philosophical, theological, and medical contexts. As Marie-Dominique Chenu has pointed out, there were four distinct senses in which the term was used in the 12th century (Marie-Dominique Chenu, “*Spiritus: Le vocabulaire de l’âme au XII^e siècle*,” *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 41 (1957): 223–7.):

- (1) “*Spiritus* a d’abord un sens physique. C’est le souffle, le souffle de l’air, du vent, de la respiration.”
- (2) “Puis vient le sens biologique. Là la théorie scientifique donne bientôt au mot une consistance technique. Le *spiritus* est, pour le physiologue, le principe même de la vie: *spiritus vitæ*, appelé aussi *spiritus animalis*, *spiritus physicus*.”
- (3) “Avec le sens psychique, c’est une autre filière doctrinale qui entre en jeu, mais dans le même cadre de la division *corpus-spiritus-intellectus*. Le *spiritus*, entre le corps et l’esprit, est alors considéré non du côté du corps qu’il vivifie, mais du côté de l’intelligence à laquelle il procure des matériaux. [...] *Imaginatio* se présente alors un synonyme approprié.”
- (4) “Malgré ces attaches tant scientifiques et philosophiques que religieuses, qui le tenaient au service de la signification des réalités matérielles, le mot *spiritus* devait développer de plus en plus son extension dans le domaine de la vie l’esprit’. Le dualisme simple et massif *corpus-anima* amène ici l’identification de *spiritus* et d’*anima* [...] *Spiritus* désigne alors globalement tout ce qui dans l’homme relève de l’intelligence, qu’on l’appelle raison, intellect, *mens*, et des facultés affectives correspondantes, volonté, amour.”

Instances of all these different senses can be found also from 13th century texts. For instance, Aquinas mentions (1) in *ST* I.36.1 and (3) in *ST* I.79.13. Olivi employs extensively (2), as we have seen (cf. Chapter 3.2, footnote 25). (4) can be found, e.g., from Bonaventure’s *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* II.2. An illustrative text about different meanings of the term is Jean de la Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animæ* II.54. In addition to (2), Olivi recognises the other meanings as well. On one occasion he shortly discusses the different meanings of the term *spiritus*: “aliquando sumitur anima pro sola sua parte inferiori et *spiritus* pro superiori [...] aliquando sumitur *spiritus* pro sola parte imaginativa [...] Aliquando vero sumitur pro ventu seu flatu oris, aliquando pro sola tertia persona Dei, aliquando pro tota substantia Trinitatis [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 183–4.) Here we see meanings (4), (3), and (1), plus few additional theological meanings. (See also *ibid.* q. 52, 198, and *ibid.*, q. 58, 501, for meanings (4) and (3) respectively.) However, the major distinction for Olivi is the one between *spiritus* as a kind of refined matter and physical medium by which the corporeal functions of the soul are realised in a material body (i.e., *spiritus animalis*), and *spiritus* as a spiritual substance of the intellectual soul. The latter meaning also covers other spiritual beings such as demons and angels (see, e.g., *Quæst. de nov.* q. 7, 149; *II Sent.* q. 16, 303; *ibid.*, q. 72, 1.)—all the beings which are realised in spiritual matter—and it includes all the psychological functions that belong to these beings. As Olivi uses these two without making a clear terminological difference, we must infer from the context which one he is using.

questions, but as his discussion unfolds it becomes clear that in this context he uses it so as to include all the faculties of a human soul. That is, *spiritus* is equivalent to *anima*. Olivi prefers the former term as he also wants to discuss angels who strictly speaking do not have a soul. The term is chosen in order to be able to discuss both of these creatures under one general term, but that does not mean that Olivi would have excluded the sensitive functions of human beings from his analysis. Not only do intellectual faculties of the human soul but also sensitive ones belong to the *spiritus*, and as such they are active in the process of perception. Activity, in turn, seems to require spirituality and spiritual matter. This is why the metaphysical difference between human beings and other animals leads to the problem concerning the functioning of the animal soul.

8.2 Do Non-Human Animals Perceive?

Due to the differences in the metaphysics of the soul which Olivi posits between human beings and non-human animals, we may ask whether Olivi's theory of perception applies to non-human animals.⁶ If we look at the metaphysical difference and the role it has in accounting for the activity of the faculties of the soul, it seems that it does not. But in fact it does.

A revealing text in this respect is Olivi's answer to a counter-argument which claims that external objects can affect the sensitive faculties of the soul, both human and animal, because:

[...] what is capable of [influencing] the whole substance is also capable of [influencing] its faculty [...] But the essence of the sensitive soul is produced by a corporeal power (*fit a virtute corporis*), namely, by the power of semen or the celestial bodies. Therefore, they can change the faculties of the sensitive soul, at least accidentally. But anything a corporeal object can bring about in the sensitive faculties of animals, it can bring about in our sensitive faculties because we are similar to them when it comes to accidental changes. Therefore, etc.⁷

The idea is that since the sensitive soul of a non-human animal is generated by the power of semen or by the celestial bodies (the objector may have spontaneous generation in mind, or he may refer to the influence that the celestial bodies have on a developing foetus⁸), and since the soul itself is affected by these corporeal powers, the possibility of influence from without to the faculties is not ruled out.

⁶ The issue has been shortly touched on by Mikko Yrjönsuuri, who points out that Olivi attributes some properties of spirituality to non-human animals even though they do not have spiritual matter. (Yrjönsuuri 2007a, 83.)

⁷ "[...] quod potest in totam substantiam potest et in eius potentiam [...] sed essentia animæ sensitivæ fit a virtute corporis, scilicet, a virtute seminali vel corporum cælestium, ergo possunt eius potentias variare, saltem accidentaliter; sed quod potest a corpore fieri in potentiis sensitivis animalium potest et in nostris sensitivis, quia in accidentalibus variationibus eis conformamur; ergo et cetera." (*II Sent.* q. 72, 4.)

⁸ An illuminating example of the medieval understanding of spontaneous generation and

Olivi answers this argument in the following way:

[...] a thing that generates the sensitive souls of brute animals can [influence] the faculties of the soul in a similar way as it can [influence] the substance of the soul, namely, by educating both of them from the matter. But while it can educate both of them from corporeal matter, it does not follow from this that it could directly influence either of them once they are already educated. The reason for this is the following: it educates both of them by influencing only the corporeal matter by a corporeal *aspectus* and influx. By contrast, it could influence the faculties of the soul (once they are already educated) only by a spiritual *aspectus* and influx, and this would not be immediately directed and inclined to corporeal matter but rather and primarily to the simple faculties and to the simple substance of the soul. And the reason it would be a greater and higher thing to generate a cognitive act in the soul of a beast than to educate the soul from corporeal matter is clear on the basis of this (unless perhaps the opinion of those be true who say that the souls of beasts can be made solely by God).⁹

Let us pause here to see what Olivi says in this passage. (1) First, he repeats his idea that external objects may cause physiological changes in the corporeal matter of the body. In this case the external agent is semen or a celestial body, and the effect it brings about is educating the soul and the faculties thereof from the corporeal matter of the body. (2) Second, he alludes to his idea that there is a clear-cut distinction between being able to bring about changes in the body and to do the same in the faculties of the soul. Even though external objects can influence the body and its physiological constitution, they cannot act on the soul and therefore cannot produce cognitive acts. In order to be able to do the latter, external objects should exercise spiritual influence, but they are incapable of doing that. The outcome of this passage is very interesting: external objects are not capable of causing changes in the spiritual faculties of non-human animals, no more than they are capable of causing them in the human soul. And this does not require intellectuality or spiritual matter on the part of the animal soul. It

of the influence of the celestial bodies is Pseudo-Albertus Magnus' *De secretis mulierum*. See Pseudo-Albertus Magnus, *Women's Secrets: A Translation of Pseudo-Albertus Magnus's De Secretis Mulierum with Commentaries*, ed. & transl. H. R. Lemay (NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 80–98.

⁹ “[...] eo modo quo generans animam sensitivam brutorum potest in eius substantiam potest et in eius potentiam, utramque scilicet de materia educendo. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod sicut potest utramque de materia corporali educere, quod sic in utramque iam educatam possit directe influere. Cuius ratio est: quia utramque educit influendo solum in materiam corporalem et hoc per aspectum et influxum corporalem, in potentiam vero animæ iam educatam non posset directe influere nisi per aspectum et influxum spiritualem; qui non esset immediate directus et inclinatus in materiam corporalem, immo prius et potius in simplicem potentiam et substantiam animæ. Et ex hoc ipso patet ratio quare maius et altius esset generare actum cognitivum in anima brutorum quam sit ipsam educere de materia corporali, nisi forte sit vera opinio quorundam dicentium animas brutorum non posse fieri nisi a solo Deo.” (*II Sent.* q. 72, 45.) Olivi seems to think that the souls of non-human animals are not directly created by God (*Super Gen.*, 87–88).

is starting to look as if spirituality would not, strictly speaking, entail spiritual matter after all.

Now, Olivi notices a possible further counterclaim which clarifies the picture:

Perhaps it is objected that an act and a disposition (*habitus*) of a beast's cognitive faculty are only in the corporeal matter of the faculty because the soul of a beast has only corporeal matter. On the basis of this it seems that a corporeal power can influence them. — To this it must be replied that a cognitive act and its disposition are connected by a natural priority to the substantial form of the soul and to the cognitive faculty rather than to its matter. For they can be received in the matter, especially in the corporeal matter, only through a preceding and intermediate form of the soul and its faculty, and matter, especially corporeal matter, is not capable of receiving them otherwise. This is why a power that brings about this kind of act and this kind of disposition must have an *aspectus* that is turned and lifted directly to the substantial form of the soul and to the cognitive faculty as to a primary and immediate subject of its influence.¹⁰

Although non-human animals have only corporeal matter of the body in which the cognitive acts are realised, the central doctrine of Olivi's theory of perception applies also to them: external objects cannot affect the faculties of the soul by causing physiological changes in the sense organs. This is true irrespective of whether the soul is a form of the spiritual matter or not.

It is difficult to see what Olivi means by the idea of acting on the form instead of acting on the matter which the form informs (or having an *aspectus* directed to the form instead of directing it to the matter which the form informs). We may assume that in the case of inanimate corporeal things this is impossible: to alter the form of a statue is to make changes in its matter, and to forge the matter of the statue is to change its form. Olivi tells us, however, that animated beings are different from inanimate ones in this respect. The cognitive acts of living beings can be realised in the corporeal matter of the body only insofar as the body is informed by the soul. To use a familiar example, if an eye is not informed by the faculty of sight, it is incapable of receiving an act of seeing. From this Olivi concludes that the primary and immediate subject of the act of seeing is the faculty of sight and that the act is realised only secondarily in the corporeal matter of the eye. In order to bring about an act of seeing, an external object

¹⁰ "Sed forte obicietur quod actio potentiae cognitivae brutorum et eius habitus sunt tantum in corporali materia eius, quia anima brutorum non habet materiam aliam nisi corporalem; ex quo videtur quod possunt influere a virtute corporali. — Sed ad hoc dicendum quod actio cognitiva et eius habitus prius naturaliter cohaerent formae substantiali animae et potentiae cognitivae quam suae materiae; nam non possunt recipi in materia et praecipue in corporali nisi per praeviam et intermediam formam animae et suae potentiae, nec materia, et praecipue corporalis, est aliter capax eorum. Et ideo virtus influens huiusmodi actus et habitus oportet quod habeat aspectum directe conversum et elevatum super substantialem formam animae et potentiae cognitivae tanquam super primum et immediatum subiectum sui influxus. (*II Sent.* q. 72, 45–6; see also *ibid.*, 83.)

should be able to actualise the potency to see which is (in) the faculty of sight. But external objects cannot do this. They can cause different kinds of changes in the eye but not the kind of change that is a realisation of an act of seeing. Here we see again how the direction of influence is from the soul to the body: the activity of the soul causes changes in the body and not vice versa. The formal change is not reducible to the physiological change, but when it takes place, the organ as a material body is somehow changed as well. The primacy of the formal change of the faculty is evident, but Olivi does not think that it can happen alone, without any physiological change.¹¹

8.3 The Simplicity of the Animal Soul and the *Spiritus*

The allusion to the simplicity of the animal soul in the passage cited in the previous chapter is not unintentional on the part of Olivi. He really thinks that not only are human souls but also sensitive souls of non-human animals are simple and, as such, beyond the influence of external objects:

[...] it is impossible that an extended form or essence, which is divisible with regard to the extension of its parts, is entirely the same as a simple essence, which is the same (*secundum idem*) in diverse parts of extended matter and which is not there by its diverse parts; but the essence of the sensitive soul of animals is simple in this way.¹²

¹¹ That is, it cannot be brought about without a physiological change when the soul is connected to the body. As we have seen, an act of perception is possible without any kind of change in a bodily organ when the soul is in a disembodied state.

¹² “[...] impossibile est quod forma seu essentia divisibilis secundum extensionem partium seu extensa sit omnino id ipsum quod essentia simplex quæ secundum idem est in diversis partibus materiæ extensæ et non secundum diversas partes sui; sed anima sensitiva animalium est secundum suam essentiam hoc modo simplex.” (*II Sent.* q. 31, 530–1; See also *ibid.*, 566–8; *ibid.*, q. 58, 500.) Olivi is not very consistent in the details of the simplicity of the sensitive soul. In other occasion he writes that: “Dicens autem quod forma quæ per diversas partes sui perficit diversas partes materiæ suæ est forma extensa non videtur se ipsum intelligere, quia hoc nullo modo sequitur, nisi quando partes formæ in partibus materiæ sunt sub extensione seu extensæ. Visus autem et auditus et gustus non sunt sic in partibus corporis, cum sint formæ simplices et spirituales. Præterea, quis negabit quod virtus visiva non sit secundum aliquem modum in oculo secundum quem non est in aliis partibus corporis et consimiliter de gustu et auditu et sensu communi respectu suorum organorum, etiam posito quod sint formæ accidentales? Et tamen nunquid propter hoc dicit quod sint formæ extensæ aut quod constituent unam formam extensam.” (*II Sent.* q. 54, 282–3.) It remains dubious whether the sensitive soul informs different parts of the body by different faculties (which are simple themselves and therefore do not render the sensitive soul extended) or whether the whole sensitive soul is in every part of the body as a whole. Perhaps the expression “sit secundum aliquem modum” should be read literally, in which case the whole sensitive soul would be in the whole body as a whole, but the different faculties would have different modes of existence in different organs of the body. (Question 49 of *Summa* supports this view, to be sure, but it deals expressly with the human soul.) Be that as it may, the faculties of the sensitive soul are simple and as such capable of activity, which is required for cognitive operations.

It is not easy to understand what simplicity means and how it can be applied to non-human animals—given that they do not have a spiritual entity-like soul—because Olivi is not very clear how the simplicity of the soul should be understood. It is important to note at the outset that this is partly due to Olivi's way of understanding simplicity as an explanatory factor rather than as a feature that should be explained: the simplicity of the soul accounts for many central ideas which Olivi advances in his theory of perception (such as the activity of perception) as well as his rejection of the species theories of perception. However, his conception of the simplicity of the animal soul is interesting in its own right, and by unfolding the complexities of his view we can better understand the roles of the body and the soul in perception. Moreover, we can see that Olivi's theory of perception applies also to non-human animals, and animals are capable of perceiving in the same way as human beings.

There are passages in which Olivi discusses the simplicity of the animal soul, and although they provide us with a perplexing picture, they also show that, despite the metaphysical difference between the human and animal soul, the central features of Olivi's theory of perception apply to non-human animals as well. Already, the preceding citation shows us the way the animal soul is simple: it is not divisible, and it is present in every part of the body as a whole. By contrast, corporeal matter is not simple because it can be divided into pieces, and it is extended in such a way that one part is in one place and other parts are adjacent to it.

Notably, the simplicity of the sensitive soul accounts for the ability of an animal to be the subject of cognitive acts, which are simple. The sensitive faculties of animals need corporeal matter in order to be able to bring about cognitive acts. This is because no form can act without matter, and corporeal matter is the only kind of matter that non-human animals have. Still, the acts are received in the faculties of the soul rather than in the matter of the organs:

Fourth, [the organs] are necessary for the reception of the acts. For the souls of brutes—or the faculties thereof—cannot receive the acts and memorative or imaginative species otherwise than by receiving them in the organs of the faculties. This is because their souls do not have any spiritual matter in which the acts and species could be received. However, Augustine says that they are received in the faculties of their souls because the organs are not susceptible to these kinds of simple acts or species unless they are informed by simple faculties. [...] Since the acts are simple [...] the subject which receives them must have substantial simplicity by which it can be prepared to receive and to sustain them. This is the simplicity of the soul and its faculties and the simple imposition of the faculties to the organs. Thus, insofar as the organs have one simple substantial form and one simple sensitive being, they are capable of having the nature of a single subject (*habere rationem unius subjecti*), which is, as it were, simple in relation to the acts although the organs are extended.¹³

¹³ "Quarto, [organa] sunt necessaria propter receptionem ipsorum actuum, in animabus enim

On the basis of this, it seems that spirituality, understood as “being constituted of spiritual matter,” is not the crucial factor in explaining why external objects cannot affect the faculties of the soul. Rather, it is the simplicity of the soul that serves as the explanans, and in that respect the animal soul is similar to the human soul: both are simple and indivisible even though they inform the whole body and thus have a kind of extension. The soul informs the physical body, which is extended in space, not by informing different parts of the body with different parts of itself but by informing it as a whole. In other words, the soul informs all the parts of the body, but if a part of the body is cut off, the soul is not thereby divided.¹⁴

Because the animal soul is simple and because simplicity plays an important role in accounting for the central features of Olivi’s conception of perceptual processes, it seems that Olivi sees little difference between human perception and animal perception. We can see in the preceding citation that Olivi explicitly applies to non-human animals the idea, which I discussed in the previous chapter, that cognitive acts take place primarily in the soul and not in the organs of the body. Although in the case of non-human animals the organs are necessary for cognitive activity, the primacy of the formal change that takes place in the soul puts animals on par with humans in this respect. Thus, it seems possible to apply the same theory of perception to both kinds of creatures, despite the metaphysical differences between them.

However, it is not clear how Olivi conceives of the process of perception in the case of non-human animals. On the basis of his scant remarks, it is difficult to see what the simplicity of the animal soul means, what exactly the relation is

brutorum aut in potentiis earum non possint recipi huiusmodi actus nec species memoriales seu imaginariæ, nisi per hoc quod recipiuntur in organiis earum, cum ipsæ de se non habeant aliquam materiam spiritualem in qua possint recipi. Dicuntur tamen ab Augustino recipi in earum potentiis, quia organa non sunt susceptiva huiusmodi actuum aut specierum simplicium, nisi prout sunt informati ipsis potentiis simplicibus. [...] Quia cum ipsi actus sint simplices [...] oportet quod subiectum in quo recipiuntur habeat aliquam simplicitatem substantialem per quam possit ordinari ad receptionem et sustentationem illarum. Hæc autem est simplicitas ipsius animæ et potentiarum eius et simplex informatio organorum ab eis. Unde licet ipsa organa sint extensa, prout tamen habent unam formam substantialem simplicem et unum esse sensitivum simplex, possunt habere rationem unius subiecti quasi simplicis respectu ipsorum actuum.” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 512–3.) This passage concerns non-human animals. Soon afterwards Olivi explains how the explanation is different in human beings because they have also spiritual matter (*ibid.*, 402, 500). The necessity of matter is also one of the reasons why Olivi thinks it necessary to pose spiritual matter to human soul (*ibid.*, q. 16, 312, 315–6).

¹⁴ Olivi thinks that simplicity is not a unitary concept: there are several types of simplicity. First, he makes a distinction between *simplicitas punctalis* and *simplicitas intellectualis* (or *simplicitas spiritualis*): the simplicity of the soul and of angels (*simplicitas intellectualis*) is not the same as the unextendedness of a point (*simplicitas punctalis*). The acts of the sensitive faculties of the soul belong to the former group, and Olivi makes it clear that it is possible to be simple and still occupy extended space. Second, he makes a further distinction of *simplicitas intellectualis* and a lesser degree of simplicity which belongs to the sensitive soul of an animal (although he presents this latter distinction with a qualification “dixerunt aliqui,” and really does not seem to make up his mind with regard to it) (*II Sent.* q. 31, 569). See *ibid.*, q. 37, 661–2; *ibid.*, q. 49, 8–23, *ibid.*, q. 51 app., 185; *ibid.*, q. 58, 456; *ibid.*, q. 67, 615, 617, 624.

between the animal soul and the body, and what kind of change takes place in the organs of the senses when acts of perception are realised in them. This is because he never (to the best of my knowledge) properly shows us what kind of a thing an animal soul is, and when he does say something, he cannot be credited for being especially clear. Even less clear is when he alludes to the bodily changes that take place in the organs when the faculties of the soul act. We are shown that the soul of an animal is elevated from matter but, when it is ready, its functions surpass the influence of external physical objects. Somehow its action is realised in the corporeal matter of the body, but still the acts are simple in a way that is repugnant to extended matter. How should these ideas be understood?

Olivi makes several claims which are important from the point of view of the aforementioned questions. He claims that:

1. The sensitive soul is simple, yet
2. it has formal parts by which it informs the organs of the body.
3. The sensitive soul is the form of the whole body, yet
4. it informs principally the heart and only secondarily the rest of the body, and
5. it animates the body and endows it its functions by mediation of the *spiritus animalis*.

At the outset, it seems difficult to make sense of these claims. And I admit that the first impression is not misleading: it *is* difficult to make sense of Olivi's view. However, even though the obscurities cannot be removed completely, something can be said about these claims and the questions which arise on the basis of them.

Let us begin with the first two claims. We have already seen that Olivi conceives of the sensitive soul of non-human animals as simple, i.e., non-divisible. However, he clearly and expressly argues that it has formal parts which inform the different organs of the body. The following two texts are illuminating:

Therefore they say that the soul of an earthworm (*annulosorum*) is actually simple by lack of extension and of extended parts, but, nevertheless, it really has in itself parts which relate it (*respicit*) to diverse parts of its extended body. This is why (they say) we also see in perfect animals that the sensitive soul informs one part of the body by the auditive faculty, another part by the faculty of vision, and so on with the others [...]¹⁵

¹⁵ "Isti igitur dicunt quod sic anima annulosorum actu est simplex per carentiam extensionis et partium extensarum quod nihilominus vere habet intra se partes secundum quas respicit diversas partes corporis sui extensi; unde, ut dicunt, nos videmus etiam in animalibus perfectis quod anima sensitiva aliam partem corporis informat per potentiam auditivam, aliam per visivam et sic de aliis [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 31, 569; see also *ibid.*, q. 49, 14–5; *ibid.*, q. 59, 539; *ibid.*, q. 73, 88.) Despite the impersonal expression, it is beyond doubt that Olivi accepts the idea. This is attested to by many other passages in which he explicitly adheres to the idea.

[...] a soul of a plant or a soul of an animal does not transmit all its actions to every part [of the body] [...] Therefore, I seek the cause of why it does not transmit all its actions. And certainly the cause is that not every part [of the body] has all the faculties of the soul—i.e., not every part is informed by all the faculties of the soul. For the faculty of vision does not inform the ears but the eyes; if it were to inform the ears in a similar way as it informs the eyes, it would see with the ears as well as with the eyes. Therefore, the cause of the fact that the soul does not transmit all its actions is that it does not inform every part [of the body] by the whole of its informative and active power [...] ¹⁶

These passages tell us that although the soul is simple, it has distinct faculties by which it informs the organs of the body. The rationale behind this idea is the obvious fact that the faculties of the soul are not realised in the whole body but only in their own organs. Animals see with their eyes and hear with their ears—not the other way around.

Thus, Olivi accepts both claims (1) and (2): the soul is simple and yet it informs different organs of the body by different faculties. But how can these claims be compatible with each other? Does (2) not require that the soul be extended and divisible in such a way that if you cut an eye away, the faculty of sight goes with it? Or, if the sensitive soul is truly simple, unextended, and whole in every part of the body—which means that all the faculties of the soul are in every part of the body—we may ask *how* the faculty of taste is in the eyes, especially since Olivi tells us in the preceding passage that the soul does not inform all the parts of the body by all the functions. One might perhaps interpret Olivi's idea in such a way that the sensitive soul is in every part of the body as a whole, but it does not communicate its functions uniformly to the organs. But Olivi also argues that the functions of a form are necessarily bestowed to the matter of that form¹⁷. Since the soul is composed of its faculties, it seems quite problematic to claim that it is whole in every part of the body without informing every part by all its faculties. How is it that the faculties are in the organs, if the relation between the organ and the faculty is not that of matter and its form? Therefore, it seems that Olivi cannot hold on to both claims without drifting into problems.

¹⁶ “[...] anima plantæ et animalis non communicat omnes actiones suas cuilibet parti [...] Quæro igitur causam quare non communicat omnes actiones. Et certe, causa est, quia quælibet pars non habet omnes potentias eius, id est, quia non informatur ab omnibus potentiis eius; potentia enim visiva non informat aurem, sed oculum; si enim informaret sic aurem sicut oculum, sic videret per aurem sicut per oculum. Ergo causa non-communicandi omnes actiones suas est, quia non secundum totam suam vim informativam et activam informat quamlibet pars [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 161–2.)

¹⁷ “Præterea, posito quod potentia differat ab essentia, certum tamen est quod eam semper sequetur et ibi radicabitur ubi et ipsa et eius erit cuius et ipsa. Si ergo essentia formæ intellectivæ radicatur in corpore et est forma corporis, ergo et potentiæ eius radicabuntur in corpore et poterunt dici esse potentiæ eius sicut et pars intellectiva forma earum. Hoc autem quam impossibile sit inferius ostendetur.” (*II Sent.* q. 51, 108.) “Impossibile etiam est quod forma communicet se materiæ, ut est essentia et non ut est potentia [...]” (*Ibid.*, q. 51 app., 167.)

However, by considering the next three claims (3, 4 and 5), one may come to a possible explanation of this problem within Olivi's view. According to the third claim, the soul informs the whole body. There are several arguments Olivi gives in favour of this view—in fact, he devotes an entire question to the issue—but we do not need to enter into the details of the arguments. It suffices to know that he considers it necessary that the soul informs the whole body because otherwise the integrity of the body could not be accounted for, and the body would not be alive as a whole. (See *II Sent.* q. 49, 8–10.) The soul unifies distinct parts of the body into one integrated being and vivifies the whole body. Thus, Olivi accepts (3). But he accepts also (4). The soul informs principally the heart (and other “principal” parts of the body—an expression that suggests to the brain and perhaps some other vital organs) and only secondarily the rest of the body¹⁸. True, on some occasions this claim appears to mean only that the existence of the animal soul is dependent on the principal parts but not dependent on the parts that are of a lesser importance. That is, an animal dies if its heart is pierced but stays alive if, say, its paw is cut off. So there is no apparent conflict between (3) and (4): the soul informs the whole body but the connection of the soul and the body depends more on certain organs than on others.

However, when we look more closely at some other passages which pertain more to claim (5), we find some interesting ideas and face some intriguing problems as well. When Olivi argues that the soul informs principally the heart, he seems to say something that goes against (3): the soul is diffused into the rest of the body by means of the *spiritus animalis*. For instance, in one of the arguments which is designed to prove that the soul informs all the parts of the body he says that: “Likewise, all the parts [of the body] are connected to the heart so as to participate in the life of the soul by the mediation of the heart and its influx; but the life of the soul is the same as the soul, or it is an internal and simple act of the soul which flows from it as if from an immediate form.”¹⁹ Here we see that Olivi straightforwardly says that the other parts of the body are animated only by an influx from the heart.

What does all this mean? If the soul is supposed to be the form of the body, how can it be *diffused* throughout it in any way? At the outset, it seems that this idea is utterly inconsistent with (3), according to which the soul is the form of the body. If the soul is a form of the body, shouldn't it be a kind of structural principle that makes the body the kind of body it is? Should it not be the essence of the animal? Should it not be the principle which makes an animal the animal that it is? An Aristotelian form is not diffused throughout the body in any way; it is the essence of the being, and surely to claim that the essence somehow flows

¹⁸ See, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 49, 22; *ibid.*, q. 73, 88. The idea appears also in Avicenna, *Shifā' De an.* V.7, 176–7, and it has Aristotelian background in *De motu animalium* 10, 703^a4–^b1.

¹⁹ “Item, omnes partes [corporis] connectuntur cordi, ut ipso et eius influxu intermediente participant vitam eius; sed vita eius est idem quod anima aut est actus eius internus et simplex manans ab ea sicut a forma immediata.” (*II Sent.* q. 49, 11.) In fact, this passage is ambiguous because it is not obvious whether the pronoun “eius” refers to the heart or to the soul. I take it that the first occurrence refers to the heart and the last one refers to the soul; other occurrences could in principle refer to either one of them.

from the heart to the rest of the body is to talk nonsense. So, what is the meaning of Olivi's claim?

One possible way of trying to figure out what Olivi has in mind can be found from his *Quodlibeta quinque*, where he addresses the question of "whether two bodies can be simultaneously in one place?" Aristotelian physics denies this²⁰, but Olivi does not. He answers that there are many ways in which this is possible. Let us take a closer look at one one of these ways, which is important from our perspective:

Fifth, from the diffusion of the spirits to the whole body. The vital and animal vigour is derived from the heart and dispersed to the members of the body by the spirits. Although there are channels in the body, nevertheless it seems that the spirits enter into the density of the flesh and nerves in such a way that the spirits are in the same location (*simul*) as them.²¹

This passage draws on the medieval medical theory of the *spiritus vitalis* (or *spiritus animalis*—Olivi does not seem to care about this distinction) but deviates somewhat from the standard theory: the *spiritus* is not confined to the arteries and nerves but penetrates the whole body thus vivifying it²². This is an instance of two bodies existing simultaneously in one and the same place because the *spiritus* is material, a body of a kind. It is not immaterial substance but very fine matter, and it is capable of occupying the same physical space as the corporeal matter of the body. However, even though it is matter, it does not strictly speaking obey the laws of matter because it can occupy the same physical place as, say, the muscles of the arm.

Interestingly enough, this conception of the *spiritus* comes very close to the Stoic concept of *pneuma*. Of course this is not a surprise given that the Latin term *spiritus* was originally used to translate the Stoic term, but it is somewhat staggering to find a 13th century author who does not only accept the medieval medical theory about *spiritus* but also some of the features of the distant ancestor of that theory, namely, the Stoic doctrine of pneumatic matter. This is especially noteworthy because it deviates from the generally accepted medieval version and

²⁰ See, e.g., *Physica* IV.1, 209^a5–7; For discussion, see Richard Sorabji, *Matter, Space & Motion: Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel* (London: Duckworth, 1988), 60–78.

²¹ "Quinto, ex diffusione spirituum per totum corpus hominis per quos vigor vitalis et animalis a corde ad membra deducitur; licet enim in corpore sint pori, nihilominus videtur quod spiritus etiam subintrent densitatem carnis et nervorum, ita quod sint simul cum eis." (*Quodl.* III.7, 186.)

²² For instance, Avicenna thinks that the *spiritus* is confined to the cavities of the organism (*Shifā' De an.* V.8, 175; de Libera 1991, 482–3.) The same idea is adhered to in *De differentia spiritus et animæ*, a short work which was written in Arabic by Costa ben Luca (a.k.a. Qusta ibn Luqa) probably during the last third of the 9th century and translated into Latin by John of Seville during the 12th century. The work was enormously popular in the Latin West: it circulated together with the works of Aristotle, and statutes from the middle of the 13th century attest to its use in universities. For discussion, English translation, and the edition of the Latin translations of Costa ben Luca's work, see Judith Carol Wilcox, *The Transmission and Influence of Qusta ibn Luca's "On the Difference Between Spirit and the Soul"*, an unpublished dissertation (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1985).

draws closer to the Stoic model. According to the Stoics, the soul is composed of very fine corporeal matter, *pneuma*, a special feature of which is an ability to be in the same place as the corporeal matter of the body. *Pneuma* animates the body, vivifies it, and bestows it with sensitivity.²³

Olivi seems to conceive of *spiritus vitalis/animalis* in the same way as the Stoics understood their *pneuma*. Of course he does not equate the human soul with the material spirit because that would be unheard of from a Christian philosopher living in the latter half of the 13th century, but it seems that the relation between the *spiritus* and the soul—especially the animal soul—is a very close one. We can obtain some idea of this relation by looking again at the passage (partly cited above), where Olivi says that the sensitive soul has parts which inform different parts of the animal body. Let me repeat the whole passage:

Therefore they say that the soul of an earthworm (*annulosorum*) is actually simple by lack of extension and of extended parts, but, nevertheless, it really has in itself parts which relate it (*respicit*) to diverse parts of its extended body. This is why (they say) we also see in perfect animals that the sensitive soul informs one part of the body by the auditive faculty, another part by the faculty of vision, and so on with the others [...] However, in this respect annular animals and animals whose parts live when disconnected are different from animals whose parts cannot live when disconnected: in the latter animals, all the parts of the body are virtually connected to one [part of the body], without the influence of which they cannot participate in the soul. In that one part, the power is in such a high degree of simplicity and unity that if that part is divided, it corrupts straightaway because it totally loses its power. In the former group of animals, the parts of the soul and parts of its body do not have such a unity or such a connection to any one part of the body or to the soul [...]²⁴

The immediate context of this passage is to solve the often repeated problem which arises from the observation that parts of a worm continue to live even after the worm has been torn into several pieces. The explanation Olivi gives for

²³ Scott Rubarth, "Stoic Philosophy of Mind," in *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2006), chapter 2 a–b, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/stoicmind.htm>; Dirk Baltzly, "Stoicism," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2008), chapter 3, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/>.

²⁴ "Isti igitur dicunt quod sic anima annulosorum actu est simplex per carentiam extensionis et partium extensarum quod nihilominus vere habet intra se partes secundum quas respicit diversas partes corporis sui extensi; unde, ut dicunt, nos videmus etiam in animalibus perfectis quod anima sensitiva aliam partem corporis informat per potentiam auditivam, aliam per visivam et sic de aliis [...] In hoc tamen est differentia animalium annulosorum et eorum quorum partes vivunt divisæ ab iis quorum partes divisæ vivere non possunt quod in istis omnes partes corporis continentur virtualiter ad unam sine cuius influenza animam participare non possunt. Et in illa una parte est virtus in tali altitudine simplicitatis et unitatis quod, si pars illa dividatur, statim corrumpitur, pro eo quod totaliter deficit a suo vigore. In illis vero aliis partes animæ et partes corporis eius non habent tantam unitatem nec tantam colligationem ad aliquam unam partem corporis et animæ [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 31, 569; see also *ibid.*, q. 49, 14–5; *ibid.*, q. 59, 539.)

this phenomenon is that in the case of worms the different parts of the body are not united to a single centre from which the vivifying influence of the soul is dispersed through the body, whereas in higher animals (including human beings) this is the case. Thus, if my hand is cut off, it dies because it loses its connection to my heart; but pieces of a worm do not die because their body does not have any centre which would be the primary seat of the soul. On the basis of Olivi's ideas, we can conclude that my hand dies because it does not receive the *spiritus vitalis/animalis* from the heart, but in the case of worms the *spiritus* is diffused to the whole body homogeneously and not dependent on any central organ.

This idea is clear enough. But less clear is how the idea about the dispersion of the vivifying influence of the soul through the *spiritus vitalis/animalis* can be conflated with the Aristotelian idea that the soul is the form of the body. That is, how can (3) and (5) both be true? It seems to me that they cannot, at least if (3) is understood in a strictly Aristotelian manner. The question is, then, does Olivi adhere to an Aristotelian conception of the soul and thus accept (3) in its Aristotelian guise, or does he understand the animal soul as being a corporeal spirit as the Stoics did and thus accept (5) in its Stoic guise? Or does he simply put forth an eclectic view which incorporates some features from both?

On the basis of the passages which deal with the *spiritus animalis* and the influx from the heart—not to mention, the passage from *Quodlibet* which claims that the *spiritus* occupies the whole body—one is tempted to think that Olivi in fact comes very close to presenting a Stoic view of the soul. One possible way of making sense of almost all the claims Olivi makes and to form a coherent picture of Olivi's thought is to make the following interpretation: The sensitive soul of an animal is identical to the material spirit²⁵. Understood in this way, the sensitive soul would be a substantial form of the corporeal spirit, and the relation between the soul and the rest of the body would be mediated by this spirit: the soul vivifies the rest of the body by the spirit²⁶.

Although this interpretation may seem quite staggering, there are some reasons that support it. For, we must remember that Olivi is a proponent of the plurality of substantial forms. The central feature of this doctrine is that the soul is *not* a structural principle of the body because the body is already structured by the corporeal forms before the soul is elevated from it. The sensitive soul only vivifies the body and provides it with psychological functions, such as perception. From this point of view, it is not implausible to think that the sensitive soul could be conceived of as a material spirit, especially since Olivi clearly thinks that the spirit penetrates the whole body thus vivifying it. It is possible that as the spirit exists in the same space which the body occupies, it is a "form" of the body which it "informs" by giving it a different kind of existence than the one it

²⁵ Similarly, the physiological realisation of the sensitive form of the human soul would be the corporeal spirit.

²⁶ Olivi speaks about the common sense, and says that: "Exigitur enim ad suum debitum statum debita quantitas et dispositio organi et debita dispositio et existentia spirituum animalium, pro eo quod ista, in quantum talia, sunt eius materia immediata." (*II Sent.* q. 59, 550.) This passage supports the reading that at least the corporeal realisation of the sensitive soul is the *spiritus*.

has by itself: the body is animated, and it is given life by the vivifying function of the pervasive soul/spirit.²⁷ To be sure, this usage of the term “form” deviates from the Aristotelian background to such an extent that there is not much left in common. Given Olivi’s deviation from Aristotelian psychology, this is not impossible, even though it may be implausible.

This interpretation would, however, quite nicely explain the five claims presented above. For starters, claims (4) and (5) would fit into the picture: the soul informs principally the heart because that is the place from which the spirit comes, and (5) would be a truism due to the identity of the spirit and the soul.

Moreover, according to this reading claim (1), that the soul is simple, would only mean that the same spirit is everywhere in the body as an integral whole, as it were. You cannot cut a part out of the spirit because if you cut away, say, an eye, the spirit is not diminished and it does not lose the ability to give the function of sight to a properly organised piece of matter. This provides that the spirit is capable of giving its functions to the body according to the material disposition of the parts of the body. One and the same spirit would be diffused into the whole body, and it would give different functions to the body according to the disposition of the parts of the body it is in. Depending on the disposition of the different organs (which they receive from their corporeal forms), different functions of the soul/spirit would be realised in them. If there were an eye in the foot, it would see.

Finally, this reading would also explain claim (2): different faculties of the soul are in different places of the body because they are realised in and by the organs which are capable of receiving them. In a way the apparent problem between (1) and (2) would vanish because the soul could be said to be simple due to the simplicity of the *spiritus* and to “have parts” because the same spirit causes different functions in different parts of the body.

However, Olivi does not enlighten us with any such explanation which would make it obvious what he has in mind when he speaks of the simplicity

²⁷ It is noteworthy that the idea of the corporeal spirit as a mediator between the soul and the body was a typical idea in the medieval philosophical psychology before the 13th century—and even beyond (Knuuttila 2004, 217–8; Boyd H. Hill, Jr., “The Grain and the Spirit in Mediaeval Anatomy,” *Speculum* 40:1 (1965): 64–6). This idea was later criticised by, e.g., Aquinas, who adhered to the Aristotelian conception of the soul as a form of the body. This does not, however, necessarily mean that he would have abandoned the medical theory of *spiritus* because it can be understood only as saying that the psychological functions of the soul are realised as a movement of the *spiritus* in the body. In principle, hylomorphism can be compatible with this kind of medical theory because it is possible to claim that the sensitive soul makes the body such that it contains physical spirit, the movement of which is a physiological realisation of the psychic functions. Thus, in order to support the hylomorphic theory of the soul-body relationship, Aquinas had to deny only that the soul *is* the spirit and that the spirit functions as a *mediator* between the body and the soul. Then again, Aquinas does not seem to be very fascinated by the medical theory, given that there are only three concordances of the term *spiritus animalis* (only one of them is directly related to psychological issues—although, it must be admitted, the one explicitly says that the spirit is the proximate instrument of the soul; see *Super Sent.* IV, d. 49, q. 3, a. 2) and eight concordances of the term *spiritus vitalis* in the whole *Corpus Thomisticum*.

of the animal soul. Neither does he tell us how we should relate the fact that the soul is a form of the body to the fact that it is diffused to the body through the *spiritus*. Moreover, it would require more effort and detailed reading of Olivi's scant and scattered passages if one were to defend the interpretation I presented above because it is not evident how it could be reconciled with some other ideas that Olivi proposes—especially problematic is claim (3) because it does not seem to fit into the picture at all unless its meaning is stretched beyond Aristotelian limits. Another problem is that Olivi explicitly denies the idea that the body somehow determines what functions of the soul are realised in it. As we have seen, he does not agree that the soul's operations would be contracted by the organs in which it exists²⁸. These problems are quite crucial, and they may be enough to undermine the interpretation I have suggested above. Therefore, it seems to me that either Olivi does not have a developed view on the metaphysics of the animal soul, or, if he does, it is an eclectic one and lacks philosophical coherence. This does not mean, however, that his view would be uninteresting.

Even though we cannot reach a definite answer in our search for Olivi's view of the metaphysics of the animal soul, the preceding discussion provides us with some important information. Olivi stresses the simplicity of the animal soul in order to provide non-human animals with an ability to perceive and to perform other psychological functions. Whatever the exact nature of the simplicity, one thing seems to be clear: the bodily changes which realise the acts of the sensitive faculties of the soul take place in the *spiritus animalis*, and because it is a peculiar kind of matter, it is not repugnant to simplicity. This enables non-human animals to perform simple and spiritual cognitive acts and the theory of perception which Olivi presents mainly to account for human perception applies also to non-human animals.

To sum up, even though Olivi thinks that we are essentially very different from other animals, he also thinks that the theory of perception he introduces applies to them. Perception is an active process which requires the subject to pay attention to the external world. This is true whether or not the perceiving subject has an incorporeal soul. It must be admitted that Olivi is not particularly clear when it comes to the details of animal perception, and this is partly due to the fact that his interest lies elsewhere. Non-human animals are only peripherally interesting in his eyes. However, despite the essential difference and the uncertainties that trouble the metaphysical picture, Olivi does not deviate from the principle of psychological continuity. As regards to perception as a psychological process, differences between human beings and other animals are not significant, if they exist at all. The mechanism is somewhat different, but the psychological contents of the acts of perception and the consciousness of external objects are not. In this respect, Olivi thinks that we resemble other animals to a great degree, at least as long as we live in this world with our physical bodies.

²⁸ See Vital du Four's second argument and Olivi's answer to it in Chapter 7.4, p. 147, and discussion in Chapter 3.

Part II
Internal Senses

9 INTRODUCTION

Many animals are capable of much more complex psychological operations than simply perceiving external objects' perceptual qualities. Even if we leave out intellectual understanding, there are a variety of psychological operations which are not immediately dependent on the perception of objects. For instance, we can experience in ourselves that we do not only perceive external objects, but we can also imagine and remember them when they are absent. We may also apprehend external objects as frightening and harmful or as tempting and useful, and our actions are often motivated by such apprehensions.

According to the medieval view, at least the higher animals are capable of these kinds of psychological operations as well. They can picture absent objects in their minds and remember things they have seen before. Pets and domestic animals recognise their owners and keepers. Animals also perceive external objects in a way that causes them to pursue or flee, and this seems to be possible only if they perceive something more than the mere perceptual qualities. Animals seem to be conscious of a perceived object's harmfulness and usefulness, and they regard some things as tempting, while others appear repulsive. For instance, a cat preys upon mice partly because it perceives them (or pictures them in its mind, if they are not present) as pleasant, tempting, and useful. And to use the famous medieval example, sheep apprehend wolves as harmful, and this kind of apprehension incites them to flee.

We make conclusions about the psychological capacities of animals on the basis of their actions. A sheep cowers from a wolf, a dog wags its tail when it sees its master, birds gather twigs to build nests, cats prey upon mice, and so forth. Sometimes animal action is accounted for by appealing to instincts implying that consciousness or psychological (mental) activity might not exist behind the observed action. But medieval philosophers did not think in this way. Rather, they took it that there is an affinity between the psychological processes which they attributed to human beings and non-human animals. They tended to think that if human action is accounted for by appealing to psychological processes and consciousness, the same approach must be applied to non-human animals as well. And this was precisely what they did: not only conscious perception

but also the higher cognitive functions were attributed to non-human animals and these functions were understood to be almost identical in the case of human beings and non-human animals.

In the 13th century, the discussions concerning the higher cognitive functions of the soul were conducted by using the technical term “internal senses” (*sensus interiores*). These faculties of the soul are not “internal” in the sense that they would provide perception of something that is inside the subject; rather, they account for post-sensory psychological processes which enable the subject to be conscious of features of external things that go beyond perceptual qualities and to detach from the immediate perception of things that are present. In the medieval approach, these post-sensory capacities of the sensitive soul were understood as faculties that further process the raw information received from the external senses. They form a loose hierarchy, in which the “higher” faculty processes the information it receives from the “lower”: for instance, the common sense receives information from the external senses and processes it so as to form a coherent perception which comprises all the sensible qualities provided by the various external senses. In this way, the hierarchy is not metaphysical or evaluative but refers to the order in which different internal senses come into play in the process of acquiring information from the external world. The seemingly rational action of animals is accounted for by appealing to the internal senses, which are in between immediate perception and true intellectual understanding. Another important underlying idea in medieval discussions was that for every distinct function there is a faculty of the soul which performs that function. In other words, when medievals discussed psychological functions or capacities, they attributed them to distinct faculties of the soul.

These ideas were developed during a long period of time, beginning from the first suggestive remarks made by ancient Greek philosophers and ranging all the way to medieval Arabic thinkers, the most important of which is Avicenna. They were transmitted to Latin philosophy through the translations of Arabic and Greek philosophical and medical texts, and they influenced Latin discussions especially in the 12th and 13th centuries. The historical background of the medieval Latin theories of the internal senses is dealt with in Chapter 10, which, however, summarises only general features of the discussions from before the latter half of the 13th century, for two reasons. First, the development of the theories concerning the internal senses cannot be condensed into one short chapter; it is a topic that deserves a study of its own. Thus, instead of being an attempt to draw a comprehensive and detailed picture of the historical development, the *raison d'être* of Chapter 10 is to provide an overview of the theoretical context in which Olivi developed his theory of the internal senses, and this will make it easier to understand his ideas. The second reason for the generality is the lack of knowledge about the historical discussions that formed the theories of the internal senses. The development of the theories concerning the internal senses is studied to some extent, and there are important studies which deal with medieval authors' conceptions of the internal senses. Studies also exist which bring

together the ideas of many thinkers and endeavour in this way to draw a picture of the developments and changes that took place in these theories.¹ Although our knowledge has increased, there is still much we do not know, also with respect to the 13th century discussions. This is why it is not possible to give a comprehensive presentation of the historical development of the theories of the internal senses.

After laying out some of the central ideas from the context of Olivi's discussion concerning the internal senses, I shall turn to his view. There are two places in the second book of Olivi's *Summa* which are explicitly devoted to the internal senses. The first is a short section in question 58, and the other comprises questions 63–66 (*II Sent.* q. 58, 508–11; *ibid.*, q. 63–66, 596–614). The former section is short, and it does not add anything to the picture of the latter group of questions²: both repeat basically the same arguments, and both deal with the same set

¹ Deborah L. Black, "Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions," *Dialogue* 32 (1993): 219–58; Black 2000, 59–75; David Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory and Recollection: Text, Translation, Interpretation, and Reception in Western Scholasticism*, *Philosophia Antiqua* 110 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007), 137–228; de Libera 1991, 475–496; Janet Coleman, *Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past* (Cambridge/NY/Port Chester/Melbourne/Sydney: CUP, 1992), 346–62; Carla Di Martino, "Memory and Recollection in Ibn Sinā's and Ibn Rushd's Philosophical Texts Translated into Latin in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries: A Perspective on the Doctrine of the Internal Senses in Arabic Psychological Science," in Lagerlund 2007a, 17–26; Carla Di Martino, *Ratio particularis: Doctrines des sens internes d'Avicenne à Thomas d'Aquin*, *Études de philosophie médiévale* (Paris: Vrin, 2008); Dorothea Frede, "Aquinas on Phantasia," in Perler 2001a, 155–183; Harvey 1975; Hasse 2000, 127–54; Daniel Heller-Roazen, "Common Sense: Greek, Arabic, Latin," in *Rethinking the Medieval Senses: Heritage, Fascinations, Frames*, ed. S. G. Nichols, A. Kablitz & A. Calhoun (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 2008), 30–50; Kaukua 2007, 26–30, 35–69; Jari Kaukua & Taneli Kukkonen, "Sense-Perception and Self-Awareness: Before and After Avicenna," in Heinämaa, Lähteenmäki & Remes 2007, 95–119; Simon Kemp & Garth J. O. Fletcher, "The Medieval Theory of the Internal Senses," *The American Journal of Psychology*, 106:4 (1993): 559–76; George P. Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the "Vis Cogitativa" According to St. Thomas Aquinas* (St. Louis: Modern Schoolman, 1952); Pierre Michaud-Quantin, "La classification des puissances de l'âme au XII^e s.," *Revue de moyen-âge latin* 5 (1949): 15–34; Pierre Michaud-Quantin, "Une division 'augustinienne' des puissances de l'âme au moyen âge," *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 3 (1957): 235–48; Peter G. Sobol, "Sensations, Intentions, Memories, and Dreams," in *The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan*, ed. J. M. M. H. Thijssen & J. Zupko (Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 2001), 183–198; Nicholas H. Steneck, "Albert the Great on the Classification and Localization of the Internal Senses," *Isis* 65:2 (1974): 193–211; Nicholas H. Steneck, *The Problem of the Internal Senses in the Fourteenth Century* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI, 1970); Richard C. Taylor, "Remarks on Cogitatio in Averroes' *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*," in *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition*, ed. G. Endress & J. A. Aertsen (Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 1999), 217–55; Toivanen 2007; Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophic Texts," in *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion*, vol. 1, ed. I. Twersky & G. H. Williams (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard UP, 1973), 250–314 (Originally published in *Harvard Theological Review* 28 (1935): 69–133); Rega Wood, "Imagination and Experience in the Sensory Soul and Beyond: Richard Rufus, Roger Bacon & Their Contemporaries," in Lagerlund 2007a, 27–57.

² According to Sylvain Piron's unpublished dissertation, question 58 was written before questions 63–6.

of faculties. They are the following:

1. The common sense
2. Imagination
3. Memory
4. The estimative faculty
5. The cogitative faculty

There are two characteristic features that emerge from Olivi's discussion concerning these faculties. First is that he sees almost no difference between various species of animals with respect to the internal senses: mice and men are similar to each other from this point of view. We shall see that in this respect Olivi differs from, for example, Avicenna and Aquinas, who think that human beings have a different set of internal senses from non-human animals. For Olivi, all animals are the same, and even though there may be some functional differences in the capability of lower animals' (worms and such simple creatures) *use* of their post-sensory capacities, the capacities themselves are the same. And in the case of higher animals—dogs, snakes, humans, and the like—Olivi seems to think that there are no differences at all. The other characteristic feature of Olivi's view is that he argues for the unity of the internal senses³. He thinks that one should postulate only one internal sense, the common sense, which can account for all the different psychological functions that were commonly attributed to distinct faculties. However, despite his willingness to deny the existence of several post-sensory faculties in the sensitive soul, Olivi does not think that the higher cognitive *functions* of the sensitive soul should be discarded as nonexistent or unnecessary postulates. The sensitive soul provides a set of functions which cannot be identified with each other: perceiving is not the same thing as imagining and both of these differ from remembering and the estimative process by which the relevance of an external object to one's own well-being is apprehended. Olivi thinks that these functions differ from each other from a phenomenological and a psychological point of view even though they are brought about by one and the same faculty, the common sense.

The phenomenological difference is evident upon short introspection: an experience of perceiving, say, a mouse differs from an experience of imagining one. Both of these operations are unlike remembering, and all of them may or may not be accompanied by an estimation of the mouse either as desirable or detestable (depending on whether the cognitive subject happens to be a cat or a person who is afraid of mice). Moreover, all of these functions are realised by different kinds of acts of the common sense, according to Olivi, and therefore we can find procedural differences between different kinds of acts of the common sense. This is what makes Olivi's theory particularly interesting: he denies the differentiation of the faculties but still provides a detailed analysis of the different ways in which distinct functions are realised.

³ Duns Scotus makes a similar claim (Steneck 1970, 120–3). This may reflect Olivi's influence on him.

At this point a modern reader may be confused because the question about the unity/diversity of the faculties of the soul appears quite idiosyncratic. Why is it so important a question? Probably, the idiosyncrasy is due to our own conception of the mind: it seems obvious to us that all our psychological functions have some kind of unity because they are all understood as operations of the unitary mind. If we follow this basic Cartesian assumption (as I believe we do, despite the fact that we have abandoned Descartes' mind-body dualism), the whole question of unity becomes pointless and absurd: different kinds of psychological acts are experienced as unitary because they are all acts of one unitary mind.

However, given the different framework which directs the thought of medieval authors, the unity/multiplicity of the faculties of the soul becomes an important question. Medieval thinkers accepted the idea that different psychological functions are realised in different parts of the body: acts of seeing are in the eyes, emotions are in the heart, and different cognitive operations take place in different areas of the brain. What is not obvious in this view is how these psychological acts are experienced as unitary, as belonging to one and the same subject. What brings about the phenomenal unity which is, after all, so evident to us?

The Cartesian answer was not available to medievals because their conception of the mind (i.e., the intellectual part of the soul) did not include all the psychological faculties whose acts are experienced as having unity. Of course, in the case of human beings medieval philosophers could have relied on a unifying capacity of the intellectual part of the soul (i.e., the mind): all the psychological acts that take place in different parts of the body—seeing in the eyes, pain in the foot, and so forth—would be ultimately apprehended by the intellect, and that would give them the required unity. The mind according to this view would be the phenomenological subject of all the acts, no matter where they take place in the body and regardless of whether they are acts of the part of the soul that is called the mind or not. The problem with this solution lies in its neglect of non-human animals which lack the intellect but are still capable of such complex actions that it would be difficult to deny them the alleged unity. Unifying consciousness seems to be a prerequisite for many actions that are performed by animals, and therefore the intellectual part of the soul, the mind, cannot be its sole source. We shall see in Part III of this study how this problem vexes Olivi, and what his solutions to it are in relation to self-consciousness, but right now it is important to note that the question about the phenomenal unity between different kinds of acts of the soul is relevant to medieval philosophical psychology. Since it was not manifest how the unity of experience is brought about, it was a philosophical question that needed to be addressed.

Chapter 11 is devoted to this theme. It deals with Olivi's conception of the unity of the internal senses and with the philosophical reasons for denying their plurality—reasons which are mainly based on the experiential unity between various kinds of psychological acts. We shall see how Olivi regards the traditional criteria which were commonly used to make distinctions between different cognitive faculties of the soul, and what kind of criteria he applies in his own theory. I shall also present an interpretation of the philosophical reasons for Olivi's advanc-

ing the thesis about the unity of the internal senses. One reason grows out of the fundamental idea behind faculty psychology: faculties of the soul operate with relative independence in relation to each other, and they perform certain clearly defined functions. Olivi points out that in complex psychological processes these functions come together in unitary experiences. We do not experience that we perceive by one faculty and estimate the perceived thing as harmful by another. Rather, we undergo an experience of estimative perception. Various functions are parts of a unitary experience, and Olivi thinks that this interconnectedness and experiential unity must be accounted for by attributing all the higher cognitive functions of the sensitive soul to one single faculty, the common sense. Finally, Chapter 11 also includes a discussion about Olivi's way of conceiving the relation between the soul and its faculties.

Chapters 12 to 16 are devoted to Olivi's conception of the psychological functions that the internal senses were thought to account for. The division of chapters follows Olivi's own discussion in such a way that there is a chapter for each of the internal senses which are listed above. However, as Olivi argues for the unity of the internal senses, Chapters 12 to 16 do not deal with distinct faculties but with different kinds of cognitive functions which Olivi attributes to the common sense. Thus, in these chapters I shall analyse in detail Olivi's conception of the various functions of the common sense and of the psychological processes and abilities they in fact represent. Chapter 12 covers the functions which were usually discussed in relation to the common sense: combining and comparing the information received from several external senses, perception of the so-called common sensibles, and second-order perception (i.e., perception of perception). Chapter 13 deals with imagination, Chapter 14 with memory, and Chapter 15 with so-called estimation. Finally, Chapter 16 deals with Olivi's short discussion concerning the faculty which was referred to as *cogitativa* in the Middle Ages, and it sums Olivi's idea that the common sense functions as a centre of consciousness.

10 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

There is no such thing as *the* medieval theory of the internal senses. Rather, medieval philosophers presented a multitude of rivaling theories which shared some very general features but at the same time differed from each other in the details. It is, therefore, difficult to provide even a preliminary outline which would explain how medievals understood these post-sensory faculties of the sensitive soul. Any presentation is compatible with only a few medieval theories, and the rest disagree with it. It is possible to say in a very general manner what kind of ideas were presented in relation to the internal senses, but one has to bear in mind that we would end up with a view which would probably not be accepted by any actual author, or at else the medieval authors would have added a great deal of details and correctives.

Since medieval philosophers were not unanimous on this topic, the purpose of this chapter is not to present a thorough discussion of the history of the internal senses but render Olivi's thought on this matter more comprehensible by situating it in a larger context. Thus, in this chapter I shall give a very general outline of the history of the ideas concerning internal senses. I shall also take up certain details of the views of Avicenna, Aquinas, Augustine, and the medieval medical tradition because they are important for understanding Olivi's view.

Discussions concerning the higher cognitive capacities of the animal soul—the ones that were later labeled the “internal senses”—have a long history. They can be traced back to antiquity, especially to Aristotle. In Aristotle's tripartite division of the types of soul into the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational, the sensitive soul of the higher animals provides psychological functions which go beyond simple perception. Aristotle refers to these functions by using two expressions: *koinē aisthēsis* (although this wording is not very common) and *phantasia*. Under these names, he discusses a variety of psychological processes and functions, for example, the perception of the so-called common sensibles; the capacity to combine sense data from several external senses; second-order perception, i.e., the capacity of perceiving one's own perceptions. In *Parva naturalia* he adds a further post-sensory faculty, namely, memory.¹ Even though Aristotle

¹ DA II.6, III.1–3, III.7; *Sens.* 6–7; *Somn.* 2, 455^a12–22; *De memoria et reminiscencia* (hereafter

did not present a systematic theory of these post-sensory capacities, his remarks became very influential and initiated a long tradition in which these ideas were discussed and developed further.

As Harry Austryn Wolfson has shown in his seminal article “The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophical Texts,” the discussions concerning the classification and number of the post-sensory functions of the sensitive soul continued throughout antiquity. Aristotelian ideas were systematised, and other ancient traditions, especially Galenism and Stoicism, contributed to the discussions. In this quite loose sense, it can be said that theories of the internal senses were presented already in antiquity, although the term “internal sense” was not in common use. (Wolfson 1973, 250–276; D’Ancona 2008, 47–71.)

The most important developments, however, were made by Arabic thinkers who took over the ancient theories and developed them further. Definitely the most important single figure in the development of the theory of internal senses is Avicenna. Avicenna’s theory of the internal senses was a continuation of a long tradition. He was influenced by both Peripatetic and Neoplatonic ideas, and he was also knowledgeable about the Late Ancient and earlier Arabic medical thinking that was related to the internal senses. Nevertheless, despite his indebtedness to the tradition and despite the fact that the story about the influence of Avicenna’s predecessors on his conception of the internal senses remains to be written, it is rather safe to say that he was an innovative thinker on this topic. This is admitted to by many modern scholars. Wolfson goes even so far as to claim that it was Avicenna who completed the classification of the internal senses and that his theory comprises all the psychological functions that were thereafter attributed to the internal senses². Even though I do not intend to give a comprehensive summary of the complexities of Avicenna’s theory of the internal senses, I think that it is useful to give an overview of his theory and especially of the way he classifies the internal senses by using various criteria to make distinctions between them³. This helps in understanding the context in which Olivi puts forth his own view⁴.

Mem.), 449^b4–453^b11; For discussion, see, e.g., Julia Annas, “Aristotle on Memory and the Self,” in Nussbaum & Rorty 1995, 297–311; Dorothea Frede, “The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle,” *ibid.*, 279–95; Malcolm Schofield, “Aristotle on the Imagination,” *ibid.*, 249–77; Victor Caston, “Aristotle on Consciousness,” *Mind* 111:444 (2002): 751–815; Kahn 1966; Everson 1997, 139–186; Deborah K. W. Modrak, *Aristotle: The Power of Perception* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press 1987), especially pp. 55–110; Sihvola 2007.

² Wolfson 1973, 276–7; In particular, Wolfson claims that it was Avicenna who introduced the common sense among the internal senses. However, Alain de Libera points out that the idea is present already in al-Fārābī (de Libera 1991, 478).

³ My discussion of Avicenna’s theory is confined to the ideas contained in those works which were available as Latin translations—i.e., the sixth book of his *Shifā’* and his medical work *Canon medicinae*—because my intention is not to provide a detailed picture of Avicenna’s own view but to give some necessary background knowledge about the context in which 13th century authors develop their ideas. Hence, I shall not discuss Avicenna’s theory as such but as it appeared to his Latin readers in the 12th and 13th centuries. For discussion concerning Avicenna’s view, see the relevant studies in footnote 1 above.

⁴ Hasse has argued that the Avicennian type of psychological writing became very rare in

Avicenna distinguishes altogether five internal senses, each of which accounts for a certain type of psychological function⁵. The internal senses are distinguished from each other by employing three criteria (*Shifā' De an.* I.5, 85, 88-9; Black, 2000, 59):

1. Active faculties are different from passive ones.
2. Faculties are differentiated by the kinds of objects they pertain to: faculties that pertain to sensible species are different from those which pertain to the so-called intentions (*intentiones*)⁶.
3. Receptive faculties are different from retentive ones.

By applying these criteria, Avicenna distinguishes a total of five internal senses. One of them, compositive imagination (which is called a “cogitative faculty” when it is controlled by reason), is active, and the other four are passive. The four passive faculties are marked off by the intersection of criteria (2) and (3), as follows:

	Receptive	Retentive
Sensible species	Common sense	Imagination
Intentions	Estimative faculty	Memorative faculty

After the reception of Avicenna’s works in the Latin west, this classification of the internal senses and the criteria behind it became very influential. They were not universally agreed on, but at least they served as a basis for further development.

Another important aspect of Avicenna’s theory is the list of functions which he accounts for by appealing to the internal senses. According to him, the task of the common sense is to apprehend the sensible forms which it receives through the various channels of the external senses and to combine from them a unified perceptual experience involving all the sense modalities. It also accounts for the perception of perception and some other more complex features of the perceptual process. The imagination is responsible for the ability to imagine absent things

the latter half of the 13th century (Hasse 2000, 73–9). It is true that Avicenna’s direct influence declined (without becoming extinct, it must be emphasised), but that does not necessarily mean that his psychological ideas would not have survived. They did, as Hasse rightly points out (*ibid.*, 78–9). The influence of Avicennian psychology does not end when patently Avicennian kinds of theories and theorising disappear. Rather, it should probably be said that in the first half of the 13th century Avicenna was used and absorbed into Latin philosophical psychology, and in the latter half of the century Avicennian ideas had become common: they had become a natural part of the psychological framework of Latin authors. Thus, it is possible to extract Avicennian elements from the theories presented in the latter half of the 13th century even though the theories themselves cannot be labeled Avicennian.

⁵ The following discussion is based mainly on *Shifā' De an.* I.5, 85–90; *ibid.*, IV.1–3, 1–54; See also *Canon 8*, §§554–74, 162–7.

⁶ Avicenna’s arabic term is *ma'nā*, which was translated into Latin as *intentio*. We shall see below what these *intentiones* are, but it is important to keep in mind that the medieval term should not be confused with the modern term “intention.” The medieval *intentio* does not refer to an intention to do something.

by retaining the sensible forms. Once apprehended, a sensible form is retained in the imagination and it can be brought to mind even when the object that caused it is no longer present.

Further, the basic function of the estimative faculty is to apprehend the so-called intentions, and the memorative faculty retains these intentions in a similar manner to how the imagination retains the sensible species. It is not an easy task to determine what intentions are—not least because Avicenna never defines them positively (Black 2000, 60)—but for our purposes it suffices to know that Avicenna postulates them to account for the features of cognitive activity that go beyond perceiving sensible forms but are not rational, because non-human animals have them. The best-known example which Avicenna uses to describe this kind of phenomenon is about a sheep which fears a wolf without having had a previous experience of wolves. The idea in this example is that the sheep must apprehend something more than the perceptible qualities of the wolf in order to be aware that the wolf is dangerous. It must be capable of apprehending the relevance of the wolf to its own well-being. In technical terms, the sheep apprehends (in addition to the sensible form) what Avicenna calls an intention (*intentio*). The apprehension of the intention accounts for the sheep's action: the sheep apprehends the wolf as harmful, and this triggers the passion of fear which, in turn, triggers the flight. The intention of the wolf somehow enters the sheep's cognitive system, together with the sensible form of the wolf, but the intention is not perceived by the external senses nor by the common sense. Rather, it directly affects the estimative faculty. In this way, the intention appears to be an imperceptible feature of the wolf.

The last of the passive internal senses, memory, has the same relation to the estimative faculty as the imagination has to the common sense: it retains intentions just as the imagination retains sensible forms. It is a storehouse of intentions, and it does not bring about recollection by itself—rather, recollection is a function of the estimative faculty (Di Martino 2007, 20–1). Finally, the task of the active compositive imagination is to combine the retained sensible species with each other so as to form new images, such as golden mountains and chimæras, which the subject has never actually seen before.

This description of the functions of the internal senses is by no means exhaustive—the role of the estimative faculty in particular is much more multifaceted and profound than what can be described in this connection. However, it already shows the basic structure of Avicenna's theory of the internal senses: there are as many separate faculties as there are functions that can be considered as distinct psychological processes. We see that animals act in certain ways, and on the basis of this observation we are led to conclude that there must be such-and-such psychological processes in the animal soul; and these processes or functions can be analysed into smaller units which can be considered as distinct faculties of the soul.⁷ This approach was transmitted to Latin philosophy,

⁷ As Hasse states, “[...] the four intellects [of Avicenna's theory] certainly are not ‘powers’ or ‘parts of the soul’ in the same way as the other human faculties, such as the internal senses.

and even though many details from the Latin theories diverged from Avicenna's view, there was a considerable amount of similarity between them.

One of the features of Avicenna's theory which contributed to its success in the Latin circles was undoubtedly its explanatory power at the philosophical and psychological level. But there was another factor: it was grounded on the best medical and physiological knowledge available at the time (Hasse 2000, 225–6). Avicenna was a philosopher, but he was also a physician, and in his theory of the internal senses medical and philosophical ideas go hand in hand. They do not contradict each other but are different viewpoints of the same phenomenon. To put it shortly, the psychological functions performed by the internal senses are actualisations of the soul's potencies on one hand, but they are also realised at the physiological level as the movement of the *spiritus animalis* in the ventricles of the brain. Avicenna thinks that there are three brain ventricles which are filled with *spiritus animalis*. The internal senses are located in these ventricles: the common sense and imagination are in the foremost ventricle; the compositive imagination (or cogitative faculty) and estimative faculty are in the middle ventricle; and the rearmost ventricle is the seat of memory. *Spiritus animalis* flows in these ventricles, and its movement is a physiological realisation of the psychological functions of the internal senses.⁸ This same fine matter also fills the nerves, and its movement accounts for the connection from the cognitive faculties which are located in the brain to the external senses and the rest of the body. The localisation of the internal senses into the ventricles of the brain gives an additional criterion by which the internal senses may be distinguished from each other: a faculty which is localisable in one of the ventricles differs from a faculty that is realised in another ventricle.

Arabic medical knowledge with its idea of a corporeal spirit being the physiological counterpart of psychological operations was transmitted to the Latin west through translations from Arabic medical works from the first half of the 12th century onwards. In addition to Avicenna's *Canon medicinæ*, which is a vast medical work that was translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona in the 12th century, medieval Latin authors were acquainted with works such as Costa ben Luca's highly influential *De differentia spiritus et animæ* (translated by John of Seville in the first third of the 12th century); the theoretical part of the medical encyclopædia of 'Alī ibn al-'Abbās al-Magūsī (a.k.a. Haly Abbas), known in Latin as *Pantegni* (translated by, and often attributed to, Constantinus Africanus); and the so-called

These exist independently of each other, they have their own organ, their own action and often also their own object." (Hasse 2000, 183.)

⁸ See, e.g., Harvey 1975, 21–30, 39–46. The theory of a physical spirit which fills the blood vessels and, in a refined form, the nerves and the ventricles of the brain is a Galenic theory, and it originates in the Stoic conception of *pneuma*. Galen himself did not think that the higher cognitive processes take place in the ventricles. Rather, he believed that they are housed in the cortex of the brain. However, already by the end of the Western Roman Empire, the idea that these processes are localisable in the ventricles was common. For instance, Augustine and Nemesius of Emesa adhere to this idea. (Kemp & Fletcher 1993, 560; See also Hill 1965, 63–73.)

Isagoge of Johannitius (also translated by Constantinus) just to mention few important ones⁹.

Avicenna's influence on the Latin discussions concerning the sensitive soul's higher cognitive functions was significant. One might think that his influence would have been reduced by the translations of Aristotle's works—as happened with many other philosophical topics—but this does not seem to be the case. In fact, it seems that the reception of Aristotle's works and the rise of their importance in Latin philosophy did not have a considerable effect on the discussions concerning the internal senses. The Arabic tradition, together with a few ideas from earlier Latin discussions, defined the way Aristotle was read and commented on. This is probably due to the fact that Arabic and Latin developments were considered scientifically superior to Aristotle's fragmentary remarks. A good example of the propensity of reading Aristotle through the Arabic and Latin tradition is an anonymous commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* which dates from about 1246–7 and is a reflection of a university course¹⁰. It is a purely exegetical work in which the author tries to explain the meaning of Aristotle. As Carlos Bazán points out:

The master had a fair knowledge of the Aristotelian corpus and of the Aristotelian tradition: he quotes Averroes, Avicenna and Boethius. Except for the developments concerning the internal senses, where he is indebted to the Arabic tradition, he maintains a healthy distance vis-à-vis the commentators, using them as interpretative tools to clarify some passages, but Aristotle's text remains always for him the focus of attention. (Bazán 2002, 137.)

In other words, the author endeavours to expose the true meaning of Aristotle, and while he uses other commentators, he is capable of disentangling Aristotle's ideas from later interpretations. However, he does not hesitate to interpret Aristotle's remarks on the higher cognitive capacities of the sensitive soul in light of Arabic developments. It seems that especially with regard to the theory of the internal senses, the reception and commenting on the Aristotelian corpus did not diminish the influence of the Arabic tradition, and medieval Latin theories of the internal senses were successors thereof.

This can be seen clearly by looking at one of the most well known medieval theories of the internal senses, namely, the theory of Aquinas. In fact, Aquinas did not write much about the internal senses, but as he enjoys general prominence, his view has received almost a status of *the* medieval theory of the internal

⁹ For discussion concerning the development of the medical tradition and important Arabic works, see Luis García-Ballester, "Artifex factivus sanitatis: Health and Medical Care in Medieval Latin Galenism," in *Knowledge and the Scholarly Medical Traditions*, ed. D. Bates (Cambridge/NY/Melbourne: CUP, 1995): 127–50; Danielle Jacquart, *La science médicale occidentale entre deux renaissances (XII^e s.–XV^e s.)*, Collected Studies Series CS568 (Aldershot/Brookfield: Variorum, 1997); Joseph Ziegler, "Ut Dicunt Medici: Medical Knowledge and Theological Debates in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 73:2 (1999): 208–37

¹⁰ Anonymous, *Sententia super II et III De anima* [ca. 1246-1247], ed. B. C. Bazán, *Philosophes médiévaux XXXVII* (Louvain: Peeters, 1998).

senses—which it obviously is not, given the many-faceted nature of the medieval discussions. Be that as it may, as in the case of Avicenna, my intention is not to provide a detailed reading of all the relevant passages of Aquinas' works, to discuss the minute details of his view, or to place Aquinas in his rightful place among the medieval discussions. I only present a general overview of his central ideas in order to be able to show Olivi's originality more clearly.¹¹

Aquinas accepts two of the three Avicennian criteria for distinguishing different internal senses, namely, criteria (2) and (3) of the list above. According to (2), there has to be a distinct faculty for every different kind of object, and (3) states that receptive faculties are distinct from retentive ones. By employing these criteria, Aquinas arrives at a fourfold division of the internal senses:

	Receptive	Retentive
Sensible species	Common sense	Imagination
Intentions	Estimative faculty	Memorative faculty

Aquinas follows Avicenna closely also when it comes to the functions that these faculties provide, although he incorporates elements from Averroës and Albertus Magnus (Black 2000, 66). According to Aquinas, the common sense combines the information from the external senses, and it accounts for second-order perception. Aquinas also discusses perception of the so-called common sensibles (movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number, and unity) but does not think that they are objects of the common sense. The imagination retains the sensible species and thus enables the subject to picture things in the mind. The estimative faculty apprehends intentions, and the memory retains these intentions. However, there are some notable differences between Avicenna's and Aquinas' theories. Most obvious is of course the number of faculties. Aquinas reduces the number of faculties to four by explicitly rejecting the existence of the fifth Avicennian faculty, the compositive imagination. He believes that the function of combining sensible species so as to form fantastic images is provided by the imagination.

A distinctive feature of Aquinas' conception of the internal senses is that he sees a clear difference between human beings and non-human animals. In contrast to Avicenna—and, as we shall see, in even sharper contrast to Olivi—Aquinas understands human beings and non-human animals to be unlike each other not only because human beings have intellectual capacities but also because their intellectual nature allows them to use their internal senses in more sophisticated ways. Thus, he broadens the difference between human beings and other animals, and he does this in at least three ways. First, only human beings can imagine things which they have never seen—that is, only human beings have an imaginative faculty that is capable of preparing new compositions out of sensible species that are stored in the imagination. Other animals are capable of imagining only those things that they have seen before. Second, memory functions differently in human beings than in other animals. Animal memory, Aquinas

¹¹ Aquinas discusses about internal senses in *ST* I.78.4; *Quaest. de an.* q. 13; *Sent. De sensu* 2, 109–10. For discussion, see, e.g., Di Martino 2008, 85–101; Black 2000; Pasnau 2001; Klubertanz 1952.

holds, is only a kind of storage for intentions. In addition to this, human beings are capable of recollecting past events and objects by actively searching for them in their memories, and they are not limited to instantaneous remembering. The third difference between human beings and other animals is the estimative faculty. Aquinas thinks that the estimative faculty is more sophisticated in humans than in other animals. Animals apprehend the intentions only instinctually, whereas humans do this by means of a "certain comparison" (*per collationem quandam*). The estimative faculty even has a different name in the case of human beings: Aquinas calls it the cogitative power (*cogitatio*).

Although Aquinas deviates from Avicenna's view in many ways, it is not difficult to see that Avicenna's influence is remarkable. Then again, despite the unquestionable importance of Avicenna's theory in Latin thought, it is sometimes slightly over-emphasised. For example, Wolfson seems to think that after Avicenna (and Averroës) there were only minor discussions concerning the details of the theory of internal senses and that the pluralistic idea according to which internal senses are distinct faculties was not challenged during the Middle Ages¹². This is an overstatement. Latin authors did not follow Avicenna (or Averroës) blindly. This is partly because his theory was not always understood correctly and partly because Latin philosophers dwelled in their own tradition, adding the Avicennian elements to it. Deborah Black has argued that: "it is impossible to isolate any universal features that are common to all medieval exponents of the philosophical doctrine of internal senses." (Black 2000, 68.) It seems to me that her point should be taken seriously. Rather than trying to present a history of *the* theory of the internal senses, we should acknowledge that there was a plurality of theories which shared a common approach and a number of details, but these theories differed from each other to such an extent that paying attention to the differences is as important as finding the affinities.

Even the idea of the plurality of the internal senses was not universally agreed upon. Olivi is one of the philosophers who regarded plurality with suspi-

¹² Wolfson 1973, 295–310. Wolfson presents only one medieval exception to pluralistic theories, namely, Moses Maimonides (*ibid.*, 291–2), and he dates the dissolution of the pluralistic model to the 17th century, associating it with names like Eustachius a Sancto Paulo and René Descartes. He is not the only one who dates this development to around the Early modern period: Simon Kemp and Garth Fletcher argue that the theory declined in the 16th century because of advances in knowledge of the physiology of the human brain (Kemp & Fletcher 1993, 565–8). This is probably true to the extent that medieval thinkers universally used the terminology of internal senses in discussing the higher cognitive capacities of the sensitive soul, but one should be careful in making too general claims about *the* theory of internal senses. The pluralistic approach was challenged already in the 13th century, as we shall see with Olivi, and this shows how important it is to carefully define exactly *what* was rejected in the 16th century. It would be beneficial to investigate to what extent the important psychological considerations of the theories of internal senses were actually taken over by early modern philosophers and to what extent the decline of faculty psychology was only terminological. To be sure, there are important ways it can be said that the Early Modern period diverged away from faculty psychology (especially by rejecting the physiological part of the theory), but many psychological ideas continued to appear in the writings of that time, nevertheless.

cion, but he is not original in this respect. For instance, an anonymous exposition-commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, entitled *Lectura in librum De anima* (dating from about 1245–50) illustrates the discussions which were taking place around the middle of the 13th century. The author first presents what he calls the distinction of the apprehensive faculties *secundum medicos* and he employs the threefold distinction based on the three ventricles of the brain. Then he goes on to present another approach:

Philosophers distinguish between the apprehensive powers in another way. According to them, one should say that the powers of sense, phantasy, imagination, estimation, particular opinion, and memory are substantially the same (*secundum substantiam*) and that they differ from each other by definition (*secundum rationem*). So all these powers are substantially the same as common sense and have the same organ, but they differ by definition.¹³

This is an important text because it reveals that already in the first half of the 13th century there were thinkers who considered the pluralist position—according to which the internal senses are distinct faculties—to be a mistake. All the internal senses are substantially the same, but they differ by definition. In other words, there is only one internal sense, which is capable of performing different kinds of psychological functions. The functions can be referred to by different names, and they can be analysed separately, but in reality they are brought about by the common sense. This approach converges with Avicenna's theory in many ways, but it also diverges from it by adhering to the unity of the internal senses—while at the same time approving of the division into different kinds of psychological functions that the one internal sense is capable of performing.

It seems that the question of plurality versus unity of the internal senses was an important aspect of the 13th century discussions. There were thinkers who favoured a pluralistic approach¹⁴, but there were others who were inspired by certain Augustinian ideas and emphasised the unity of the internal senses. To be sure, the Augustinian approach was combined with Avicennian (and, to some extent, Aristotelian) ideas. This shows that the philosophers of the 13th century were innovative also when it came to the reception of the theories of the

¹³ "Aliter autem distinguunt philosophi uirtutes apprehensiuas. Et secundum eos dicendum est sic quod iste uirtutes, sensus, fantasia, ymaginatio, estimatio, opinio particularis et memoria sunt idem secundum substanciam, differunt autem secundum rationem; unde omnes ille uirtutes sunt idem secundum substanciam cum sensu communi et idem est organum eorum et sensus communis, differunt autem secundum rationem." (Anonymous, *Anonymi, Magistri Artium (c. 1245-1250): Lectura in librum De anima a quodam discipulo reportata*, ed. R. A. Gauthier, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum XXIV* (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventuræ ad Claras Aquas, 1985), 441.)

¹⁴ The most well known of the pluralists is Aquinas. See, e.g., *Sent. De sensu* 2.2, 109–10; *ST* I.78.4; Wolfson points out that Aquinas once uses the expression "internal sense" as if there were only one internal sense (Wolfson 1973, 303; The passage in question is *ST* II-2.47.3). However, in that context Aquinas is not dealing with internal senses and he does not need to name the separate faculties individually. Thus, the passage does not challenge the picture of Aquinas as a pluralist with regard to the number and unity of the internal senses.

internal senses. At the present state of research, it is not possible to convey a comprehensive story about the channels from which different ideas were taken, and how the different currents were woven together. It seems rather safe to say, however, that 13th century authors used Augustine and the earlier Latin tradition in addition to Arabic sources (Wood 2007, 27–30). As a result, strikingly non-Avicennian theories of internal senses were also presented. There was no single prevailing theory. The 13th century was a time of lively debate about the higher cognitive functions.¹⁵

What I am advancing is that the typical story of the formation of the so-called theory of the internal senses is not definite. The main strand of influence goes, to be sure, in such a way that Plato's and Aristotle's remarks initiated a lively Ancient discussion which was later taken over by Arabic thinkers; and the Arabic theories were transmitted to Latin philosophers through the translations, which gave rise to Latin faculty psychology. But this channel of influence was not the only one, since there was an earlier Latin tradition which developed independently during the Early Middle Ages, and it played a role in the 13th century as well. Even though it was not common for psychological questions to be the centre of interest before the reception of Aristotle and Arabic philosophical literature—and when they were, the vantage point was usually theological and ethical—the ideas and approaches of the early Middle Ages were also employed later to some extent. Of the early medieval authors, one may mention John of Salisbury, Hugh of Saint-Victor, Thierry of Chartres, William of Saint-Thierry, Aelred of Rievaulx, Isaac of Stella, Alcher of Clairvaux, and William of Conches who contributed to the classification of the faculties of the soul.¹⁶ But 13th century authors also invoked Boethius, John Damascene, the pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima*, and Augustine himself, and the ideas of these thinkers contributed directly to later discussions. In fact, it was Augustine who coined the Latin term “internal sense” (*sensus interior*) (Wolfson 1973, 252; Heller-Roazen 2008, 37), and from him we find many ideas which influenced 13th century discussions—especially the idea about the unity of the internal senses. There is only one higher cognitive faculty which accounts for all the different kinds of psychological processes in non-human animals; there is only one faculty between the external senses and reason in man.¹⁷ Augustine's influence in ancient discussions was perhaps not

¹⁵ This is well reflected in Nicolas Steneck's dissertation, which begins with a presentation of a general picture of the theory of the internal senses. Steneck himself warns that the picture does not in fact fit with any one writer, and at times he painstakingly underlines that there were different conceptions of certain details of the theory. (Steneck 1970, 1–18.) Understandably, he does not point out all the divergent issues: there were too many of them, and a general overview would be made futile by paying too much attention to the differences in details. However, Steneck's discussion shows that even though it is a useful endeavour to present a kind of overall view of “the theory” of the internal senses, it is also a dangerous and—in the end—hopeless task.

¹⁶ See Alain Boureau, *De vagues individus: La condition humaine dans la pensée scolastique. La Raison scolastique III*, Histoire 93 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2008), 19–54; Michaud-Quantin 1949, 15–34.

¹⁷ Augustine's most detailed account of the power of the soul he calls the “internal sense” (*sensus interior*) is given in *De lib. arb.* 2.3.8–6.13. See also *De Gen. ad litt.* XII.6.15–17, XII.16.

significant, and he was not known in the Arabic world, but he is an important figure in the early medieval Latin discussions. In the 13th century, he was also considered as one of the most important Church Fathers. Therefore, it is no surprise that his conception of the *sensus interioris* contributed to the discussions of the time. Augustine is an important figure in the context of Olivi's theory.

In this way, the 13th century is a time of prolific combining of different traditions. This can be seen from almost every aspect of 13th century philosophy, including the discussions concerning the higher cognitive functions of the sensitive soul. In these discussions, Augustinian and Avicennian traditions were combined in various ways, and some medical knowledge was also incorporated. Rather than polishing minor details, the 13th century appears as a time of lively discussion, in which different theories of the internal senses were presented. From this process ensued interesting theorising about the higher cognitive functions of the sensitive soul. Among others, questions concerning the number of the faculties, the attribution of different psychological functions to different internal senses, and the relation between different faculties and functions were under discussion.

Despite the differences that can be found between the various theories of the internal senses, there are also some shared features. Most importantly, the existence of the psychological functions or processes of the internal senses was quite commonly acknowledged. Although Black seems to be correct in her claim that there are no universally accepted features in the medieval theories of the internal senses, there is a great deal of affinity within the alleged psychological processes that these theories were designed to account for. In other words, there seems to be wide agreement on the psychological functions that higher animals are capable of. The list of functions includes (at least) the following items¹⁸:

1. Combining and comparing information provided by the external senses.
2. Perception of the so-called common sensibles (often attributed to the external senses).
3. Second-order perception.
4. Retaining information provided by the external senses.
5. Imagining absent objects.
6. Compositive imagining of unreal objects.
7. Being able to evaluate things in the world in relation to one's well-being (in Avicenna's terms: apprehending intentions).
8. Retaining intentions.

For discussion, see Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* (London: Duckworth, 1987), 88–151. It is interesting to see how 13th century authors read Augustine through the Arabic psychological tradition. Augustine does not develop any explicit theory about the post-sensory faculties of the soul, but his remarks were taken as authoritative passages of support for the position that there is only one internal sense. In addition to Olivi's explicit references, Aquinas, for example, parades Augustine's idea from *De Gen. ad litt.* XII as a *quod sic* argument against his own pluralist position (*ST* I.78.4).

¹⁸ In preparing this list, I have profited from Wolfson 1973, 277.

9. Remembering past events and objects.
10. Combining all the preceding (in the same way as data from different external senses is combined).

(1) refers to the basic function of the common sense which is to compile perceptual experiences into one integral whole in such a way that when, say, the shape and colour of a duck are seen, and its quacking is heard, the two sense modalities are perceived as belonging to one and the same object: the duck. (2) is based on the idea that there are kinds of objects that can be perceived by several senses (for instance, movement, number, and figure), and this is sometimes understood as a function that is distinct from the perception of the proper sensibles (such as sounds and colours). (3) is a function that accounts for second-order perception, that is, a perception that one perceives. (4) is simply a prerequisite for being able to imagine, say, the duck when it is no longer present to the senses, and (5) is the process of imagining the duck. (6) accounts for the ability to imagine, say, a duck with a donkey's head. (7) is the function that was usually attributed to the estimative faculty: even non-human animals seem to be capable of striving for beneficial things and avoiding harmful ones, and this means that they evaluate them in relation to their own well-being. (8) is very often attributed to memory (as we have seen with Avicenna and Aquinas): somehow the cognitive system also stores intentions. (9) enables the subject to remember things that it has seen before and to bring to mind earlier events. The crucial element of this function is that the things and events are apprehended as pertaining to the past. And finally (10) is a function which accounts for the fact that apprehended objects and their intentions are somehow connected to each other in such a way that when we perceive, say, a wolf as dangerous, we do not perceive the danger and the wolf as two separate things. In this way (10) is parallel to function (1). These functions are attributed to different faculties in different theories, and not all theories include all of them.

We now have some understanding of the context in which Olivi presented his theory. When we turn to Olivi's theory, we face two important issues. First, Olivi adheres to the Augustinian view of the unity of the internal senses. His view, which he presents most fully in questions 63–66 of the second book of *Summa*, is that there is only one internal sense, the common sense (*sensus communis*), which is responsible for all the higher cognitive functions of the sensitive soul. Olivi refers to Augustine, especially to *De Genesi ad litteram*, in support of his view¹⁹ and takes his basic insight from him, but his theory is influenced by the Avicennian tradition as well. Unlike Augustine, he gives a detailed account of the different psychological operations and explains how they take place as different kinds of acts of the common sense. Second, Olivi accepts the existence of all the aforementioned psychological functions and accounts for them by

¹⁹ In his discussion concerning the number of the internal senses, Olivi refers several times to Augustine: in questions 63–66 to *De Gen. ad litt.* VII, XII.20, XII.25, XII.26, XII.33; *DT* 11.7.11–*usque ad finem libri*, XV.3; *Musica* VI; *De bono coniugali*; and in question 58 to *DT*, *De libero arbitrio* II, and *Musica* VI.

appealing to the various kinds of acts that the common sense is capable of producing. Importantly, he does not see any major difference between human and non-human animals with respect to the aforementioned psychological functions. The psychological functions of the animal soul are the same as the psychological functions of the sensitive part of the human soul. Olivi even seems to bestow animals with one form of function (6), the compositive imagination of unreal objects, which was traditionally thought to belong only to human beings. Hence, he does not depart from the Avicennian tradition by claiming that the sensitive soul would provide a different set of abilities or that higher animals would be simpler creatures than the Avicennian tradition claims. Rather, he departs from the Avicennian tradition by claiming that there is no need to posit several internal senses in order to account for the higher cognitive functions of the sensitive soul. In other words, he simplifies the structure of the soul but leaves the psychological functions intact²⁰. And he deviates to some extent from Avicenna but especially from Aquinas as he thinks that non-human animals have the same set of cognitive capacities as human beings (save the intellect, to be sure).

Before going into the details of Olivi's theory, two further issues need attention. First, Olivi does not explicitly adhere to the unity of the internal senses. Rather, he presents what he takes to be Augustine's view concerning the unity of the common sense and the imagination, and then he goes on to say that the followers of Augustine claim that the estimative faculty, the memory, and the cogitative faculty are not distinct from the common sense (*II Sent.* q. 63–6, 596–614). He uses impersonal expressions, and thus distances himself from the view he presents. However, there are good reasons to believe that he actually favours that view. Firstly, Olivi rather clearly expresses his own stand when, after presenting his interpretation of Augustine's view concerning the unity of the common sense and imagination, he writes that: "The position of Augustine is more true and more reasonable than the first opinion [according to which these are two distinct faculties], and at present this is proved by seven arguments (*ratio*)."²¹ He does not refute any of these arguments, and even though the other questions do not contain explicit approvals, they do not include criticism towards the Augustinian view either. Rather, all the arguments that go unrefuted support the Augustinian view. Secondly, Olivi presents the opinion of some unnamed philosophers (*quidam philosophantes*) who propose a pluralistic conception of the internal senses, but he systematically refutes all the arguments in favour of their view. Thus, I take it that Olivi accepts the unity of the internal senses and objects to the pluralistic position.²²

²⁰ It is, of course, a good question whether Avicenna meant to postulate a complicated structure in the soul in the first place. He was interested in the psychological functions and their relations, and the talk about different faculties was perhaps not so much an ontological commitment as it may have seemed to the authors of the latter half of the 13th century.

²¹ "Quod autem hæc positio Augustini sit verior et rationabilior priori, septem rationibus probatur ad præsens." (*II Sent.* q. 63, 598.)

²² Also Bernardus Jansen, the editor of the second book of *Summa*, thinks that Olivi approves of the Augustinian view of the unity of the internal senses. See B. Jansen, "Prolegomena," in *II Sent.* vol. II, xii.

The second question that I would like to raise before entering into Olivi's discussion is related to the view Olivi opposes. Who are the philosophers Olivi thinks he is opposing? He does not refer directly to them, and therefore their identification is problematic. Bernardus Jansen, the editor of the second book of Olivi's *Summa*, takes it (for granted) that Olivi reacts against Aquinas' theory (Jansen 1924, xii). This seems to be partially true: the objections Olivi deals with are mostly compatible with Aquinas' theory.

However, Olivi does not contradict only one particular theory, but many theories which have the common feature of being pluralistic. We can see this by looking at question 66 of the second book of *Summa* in which Olivi asks whether the cogitative faculty (*cogitativa*) differs from the common sense. He begins by presenting a view (which he then goes on to refute), according to which the cogitative faculty really differs from the common sense. Importantly, Olivi gives two versions of this position: according to some, the cogitative faculty is the highest power of the sensitive soul, and its function is to bring together the information from all the other internal senses (function (10) of the list above); according to others, this function is performed by the estimative faculty in non-human animals and by reason in human beings. In other words, Olivi objects to two different theories. The first one claims that there are five different internal senses in each creature: the common sense, the imagination, the estimative faculty, memory, and the cogitative faculty. The other claims that the cogitative power is not an independent faculty but a function that is performed by some other faculty of the soul, and thus there are only four internal senses: the common sense, the imagination, the estimative faculty, and memory. According to this view, the cogitative function belongs to the estimative faculty in non-human animals, and in human beings it is a function of the intellect. The intellect also modifies the functions of the internal senses—for instance, it controls the faculty of memory in such a way that memory gains a new name: recollection (*reminiscentia*).

On the face of it, both of these theories differ from Aquinas' view. In contrast to the latter view, Aquinas does not attribute function (10) to the intellect, and he thinks that the cogitative faculty is the human counterpart of the estimative faculty of animals. Still, it seems to me that the latter may be Aquinas' view after all. Olivi's description of it is very short and sketchy, and it is possible that the idea is not to attribute function (10) to the intellect, after all, but to say that the intellect directs the estimative faculty of human beings to the extent that it receives a new name, the cogitative faculty. Be that as it may, the former theory is clearly not Aquinas' because it posits five internal senses, whereas Aquinas accepts the existence of only four. It does not seem to be Avicenna's either because Avicenna does not attribute function (10) to the cogitative faculty—as we have seen, the cogitative faculty is just another name for the compositive imagination of human beings. Thus, it is clear that rather than opposing one particular theory, Olivi argues against pluralist theories in general. And he does this by presenting a detailed analysis of functions (1)–(10) and attributing all of them to the common sense.²³

²³ Sylvain Piron has suggested that the *philosophantes* against whom Olivi argues in the ques-

Let us now enter into the details of Olivi's view. I shall first discuss Olivi's understanding of the criteria by which the internal senses were often distinguished from each other. Then I shall move on and show how Olivi accounts for the psychological functions while regarding the sensitive soul's post-sensory capacities as essentially one.

tions concerning the internal senses (written during 1281–2 in Montpellier) may have been thinkers from the Montpellier medical school. (Sylvain Piron, "Olivi et les averroïstes," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 53-1, 2006, n26.)

11 THE UNITY OF THE INTERNAL SENSES

Olivi argues that there is only one internal sense, the common sense, which accounts for all the psychological functions which Avicennian-Aristotelian faculty psychology attributes to distinct internal senses. In order to defend his view, he rejects some of the traditional criteria which were commonly used in distinguishing different faculties of the soul from each other; certain other criteria he accepts in principle, but he denies that they could be applied to the internal senses. The topic of Chapter 11.1 is to discuss Olivi's reaction to these traditional criteria and to show why he does not accept that they could be applied to the internal senses. I shall also point out that Olivi adheres to the medical view that different cognitive processes take place in different ventricles of the brain but, nevertheless, maintains that there is only one faculty of the soul which accounts for these processes. Olivi's idea is that the common sense is a kind of a functional whole which comprises all the higher psychological processes, even though from a medical and physiological point of view those processes take place in different places of the body. The functional unity between different psychological operations was more important than the fact that different functions are localised in different ventricles of the brain.

Chapter 11.2 discusses the general reasons for Olivi's conception of the unity of the internal senses. The authority of Augustine is one of the reasons for Olivi to adhere to a unitary view of the internal senses, but it is not the only one: philosophical reasons, such as the interconnectedness of the various psychological functions, the principle of parsimony, and—to some extent—the experiential unity between the different psychological functions play a significant role and lead Olivi to simplify the faculty structure of the soul. Finally, in Chapter 11.3, I shall briefly discuss Olivi's conception of the metaphysical relation between the soul and its faculties. This helps us to understand more clearly what it means that the internal senses are not separate faculties but different functions of the common sense.¹

¹ Some of the topics of these chapters are discussed also in Toivanen 2007.

11.1 Criteria for Distinguishing Faculties of the Soul

It is easy to find medieval thinkers who treat the internal senses as distinct faculties. They present what I call the pluralistic theories of the internal senses. Proponents of the pluralistic theories usually employ several criteria by which they make distinctions between the faculties of the soul. From various theories we can gather altogether five such criteria: two of them are based on physiological considerations, whereas the other three are more of a philosophical nature.

The first of the physiological criteria is based on the idea that the faculties which are realised in different organs—or, in the case of internal senses, in different ventricles of the brain—are different faculties. This idea stems from Galen's medical observations, according to which injuries in different parts of the brain cause different kinds of cognitive disabilities: an injury in one area of the brain affects certain psychological processes but leaves others intact. Galen observed and reported several cases of head injuries and on this basis proposed a general classification of different psychological functions and their localisation in different parts of the brain. His reports influenced Greek and later Arabic medicine, and the medical theory of the localisation of psychological functions found its way also into Avicenna's writings. In this way, Galen contributed not only to medical theories but also to philosophical discussions concerning the internal senses. Thus, the physiological criterion of distinguishing different psychological faculties according to their localisation in the brain served as a background for philosophical psychology. It was so widely accepted in the 13th century that it can be regarded as a commonplace.² According to medieval understanding, there are three ventricles in the brain, and thus physiology gives reason to distinguish between three internal senses.

Philosophers, however, rarely confined themselves to such a coarse classification of the post-sensory faculties. They used philosophical criteria for making further distinctions. Yet the physiological classification of the internal senses according to their location does not contradict philosophical classifications. Rather, philosophical criteria complete the more coarse physiological classification in such a way that philosophers could propose that there are actually many internal senses in one and the same ventricle. It was only a matter of approach: physicians, being interested in the effects of physical injuries in the brain, did not have to consider the more sophisticated philosophical divisions. This seems to be Avicenna's understanding in his presentation of two different classifications of the internal senses in his *Canon*: one is presented by philosophers and the other by physicians. The former hold that the imagination and the common sense are distinct faculties, whereas the latter think that they are a single faculty (*Canon* 8.1, §557, 163–4). Avicenna does not intend to present two conflicting theories but only two different ways in which the internal senses may be understood, and he does not think that one excludes the other (Wolfson 1973, 277–80).

² For a concise presentation of these topics, see Harvey 1975.

Since this physiological criterion was commonly used, Olivi discusses it to some extent as well. The version of the physiological theory which he presents as supporting the pluralist theory goes as follows:

[...] the common sense and the imaginative faculty are in the foremost part of the brain, although the common sense is closer to the front and more to the outside. Behind these is the estimative faculty around the middle [of the brain], and the memorative faculty is behind these, near to the back of the head. In the backmost [part] is the [faculty which] moves the members [of the body].³

Olivi opposes this theory, as we shall soon see. It is interesting that the moving power is situated in the posterior part of the brain. On the basis of this scant passage, it is not absolutely clear which kind of power Olivi (or the thinker from which Olivi has taken this theory of localisation) has in mind when he speaks about *motiva membrorum*. Avicenna distinguishes the sensitive appetitive power—which is the subject of emotions and, as such, the origin of animal movement—from the power of locomotion which accounts for the contraction of muscles. The sensitive appetitive faculty was usually located in the heart because it was Aristotle’s view that the heart is the seat of the emotions, and the power of locomotion is, at least according to Avicenna, in the limbs themselves. (See Knuutila 2004, 212–255; *Shifā’ De an.* I.5, 82–3.) It seems that no matter which of these two motive faculties Olivi refers to (or even if he means to include both of them), his main target is not Avicenna or Aquinas. One possible source of this version of the localisation of the soul’s faculties may be Costa ben Luca’s *De differentia spiritus et animæ* (see pp. 161, 218), and it may have also been a common idea in medieval medicine. Another possibility is that Olivi derives this view from Augustine, who says on one occasion that there is a ventricle “behind the neck, from which all movement comes” (*De gen. ad litt.* VII.18.24; Klubertanz 1952, 52–3). Also, Jean de la Rochelle locates the general locomotive power in the backmost part of the brain, although it is infused to the limbs of the body as well⁴.

Whatever the source of this idea, Olivi accepts that different psychological functions are realised in different parts of the brain⁵. However, he does not think that this requires a distinction between the internal senses, that is, conceiving of the functions as belonging to separate faculties. Instead, he understands

³ “[...] in anteriori parte cerebri est sensus communis et imaginativa, sensus tamen communis magis versus frontem et magis ad extra, post hæc vero æstimativa quasi circa medium, post hæc vero est memorativa prope occipitium, in postrema autem est motiva membrorum.” (*II Sent.* q. 65, 607.)

⁴ Jean de la Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animæ* II.12; Jean de la Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, ed. J. G. Bougerol, *Textes philosophiques du Moyen Age XIX* (Paris: Vrin, 1995), II.4.110.

⁵ Olivi writes, for example, that: “Ex morbo igitur vel læsura postremæ partis cerebri impeditur officium quo prompte et expedite nostrum aspectum et cogitatum recolligimus ad profunda nostri cerebri et ad illa memorialia quæ ibi servantur, ex læsura vero partis anterioris et etiam mediæ læditur officium sensate discernendi et diiudicandi ea quæ de foris nobis occurrunt.” (*II Sent.* q. 66, 614.)

the common sense as a kind of a functional whole which covers all the different psychological operations of the sensitive soul. They can be localised in different parts of the brain, but there is a psychological unity between them, and due to this unity the different kinds of acts belong to one faculty. Olivi writes:

[...] like the same soul is simultaneously in all parts of its body [...] so its faculties have a large and wide circumference. This is why they are not only in one point of the body and, as it were, punctual. Rather, they inform and thus integrate diverse heterogeneous parts of their whole organs. And surely, he would be a fool who said that the sense of touch which senses coldness in the hand is a different faculty from the sense of touch which senses fire in the foot; yet the foot is more distant from the hand than the foremost part of the brain is from the middle or the backmost part.⁶

Olivi points out that faculties of the sensitive soul are extended in the body. They do not exist at a point. Organs of the sensitive faculties are corporeal, they are extended in space, and they are constituted from several heterogeneous parts. Because the sensitive faculties are actualised in corporeal organs, and their acts are realised in these organs⁷, the faculties themselves must have an extended existence in the body, even though as forms they are simple and unextended (*II Sent.* q. 54, 282–3). Once the idea is established that a sensitive faculty may be realised in all the parts of an organ of the body, there seems to be no reason to contend that the internal senses should be distinguished from each other on the basis of their different locations in the brain. The crucial idea here is that the organ of the

⁶ “[...] sicut eadem anima est simul in omnibus partibus corporis sui [...] sic eius potentiae habent grandem et latum ambitum; unde non sunt in solo puncto corporis quasi punctuales, quin potius diversas partes heterogeneas suum completum organum integrantes informant. Et certe, fatuus esset qui diceret tactum manus sentientis calida esse aliam potentiam a tactu pedis sentientis ignem; et tamen longe plus distat pes a manu quam prima pars cerebri a sua media vel postrema.” (*II Sent.* q. 66, 613.) The idea of the extension of corporeal faculties is most clear in the case of touch: “Videmus enim quod sensus non reperiuntur in organis suis nisi sub certa dimensione, ita quod oportet essentiam ipsius potentiae esse applicatam illi dimensionem. Tactus enim in diversis partibus corporis existens secundum aliam applicationem sui est in una quam in alia et in omnibus simul est quasi secundum unam continuam applicationem correspondentem et proportionalem continuitati et dimensionem materiae suae; in tantumque est ibi secundum leges dimensionis quod alium actum numero differentem habet, prout est in una parte, et alium, prout est in alia, etiam in eodem nunc. Et sic, cum nulla alia virtus organica sit in parte punctali et omnis pars corporis distincta secundum situm habeat suam actionem immediatam et quasi partialem distinctam ab actione immediata alterius partis: idem forte aliquo modo erit dare in omnibus potentiis organicis.” (*Ibid.* q. 51, 115–6.)

⁷ “Cum enim omnis actus et habitus potentiae apprehensivae sint recepti in materia ipsius potentiae—aliter enim non possunt esse in ea [...] Impossibile est autem quod ea quae sunt recepta in corpore sicut in materia vel subiecto sint omnino sequestrata a modis et conditionibus corporum. Unde in actu visus et aliorum sensuum manifeste possumus experiri quasdam dilatationes et acutiones et divaricationes et reberationes iuxta modum et legem corporalium.” (*II Sent.* q. 51, 113.) “Tertia ratio est ex operationibus et passionibus potentialium ipsius animae, ad quas sequuntur et concomitantur transmutationes variae organorum suorum; et hinc est quod homo ex nimia continuatione actus cuiuscunque potentiae lassatur.” (*II Sent.* q. 53, 215.)

common sense is the whole brain (and even the heart)⁸. One faculty has several functions in different parts of its organ, but it remains the same faculty nevertheless. This clearly shows how Olivi's point of view is psychological and philosophical. Olivi simplifies the structure of the faculties of the sensitive soul not to reject the received medical view, since he incorporates the medical theory into his own conception of the internal senses; rather, he interprets the medical theory in such a way that it becomes possible for him to simplify the structure of the faculties of the soul. This simplification is made for philosophical and psychological reasons. One might say that Olivi prefers a holistic psychological approach to the physiological approach in which more attention is paid to the localisation of the psychological functions, but he does not reject the localisation either.

Yet, Olivi does not deny that we can draw distinctions between different faculties on a physiological basis as well. He seems to accept the idea that faculties of the soul are actualisations of their proper organs. This can be seen in one of the arguments in which he endeavours to prove that the five external senses are distinct faculties: according to him, the diversity of the external senses can be discovered by noticing that they are realised in different organs. However, he does not seem to think that the substantial diversity of the organs would explain the distinctness of the faculties, since the diversity of the external senses is due to their particular modes of acting.⁹

⁸ Olivi wavers between the Galenic theory (which was further developed in Arabic medicine and accepted in the medical knowledge of Olivi's time) that the common sense is located in the brain and the Aristotelian model (accepted by Aristotelian-minded thinkers, such as Aquinas) which locates the common sense in the heart. In q. 58 of *Summa*, Olivi writes that: "[...] organum sensus communis est totum cerebrum, sicut et organum visus est oculus totus cum nervis visualibus et sicut organum sensus tactus sunt nervi sensuales per totum corpus diffuse seu totum corpus. Secundum autem diversos aspectus quos habet in cerebro diversos sortitur actus." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 510; see also *Responsio secunda*, 405.) Then again, he sometimes also remains somewhat indecisive on this matter: "Unde secundum ordinem naturæ impossibile est oculum informari a potentia visiva vel aurem ab auditiva, nisi prius naturaliter in corde vel cerebro sit sensus interior seu communis. Et consimiliter supremæ partes corporis, puta, cor et cerebrum, sunt naturaliter priores partibus inferioribus, puta, manu et pede [...]" (*Ibid.*, q. 51 app., 194; emphasis mine.) Finally, he also claims that the organ of the common sense has two roots: the heart and the brain: "In animalibus autem perfectis duplicem radicem habere noscuntur sic ad invicem ordinatam quod habent vim unius completæ radicis, et prima est fundamentalis ad secundam, secunda vero complet quod deest primæ. Prima autem est cor et secunda est cerebrum." (*Ibid.*, q. 62, 590; see also *ibid.* q. 49, 22.) The last view goes well with the medical theory of the *spiritus* which originates in the heart and flows through the veins into the brain where it is further elevated. Thus, the common sense is, in a way, located where the spirits are. Moreover, the spirits flow from the brain through the nerves to the organs of the body, and Olivi seems to extend the localisation of the common sense there too (see Part II, Chapter 3.2). Olivi appears to think that the opposition between Galenic and Aristotelian theories of localisation of the common sense can be transcended by claiming that both are correct because the spirit which functions in the brain is first generated in the heart. This was, after all, a traditional way to reconcile Aristotelian and Galenic views on the physiological seat of the cognitive faculties. However, Olivi remains somewhat indecisive on this matter, and he does not seem to follow the traditional idea (see also footnote 10 below). For discussion of the medieval debate over the location of the higher cognitive faculties of the soul, see Knuuttila 2008, 11–13; de Libera 1991, 485–9.

⁹ *II Sent.* q. 60, 571; *ibid.* q. 54, 248; See also *ibid.*, q. 73, 97, where Olivi argues that the power

When applied to the internal senses, however, this idea becomes somewhat problematic given Olivi's claim that in higher animals the common sense is realised both in the brain and in the heart: clearly, the brain and the heart are not one single organ. Olivi gives no explicit account for this idea of the common sense having a double organ: he only refers to our intimate experience, according to which even our cognitive acts take place both in the heart and the brain. He seems to think that somehow the common sense is a functional whole which transcends the distinction that one might be tempted to make because of the different organs in which it is realised¹⁰. Olivi's stance remains somewhat obscure and undeveloped, but it is clear that the commonly accepted criterion that faculties of the soul are diversified by their organs does not seem to hold, at least in the case of the common sense.

Another case in which Olivi rejects this criterion is the sense of touch. The organ of the sense of touch is the whole body, and therefore it also exists in the other sense organs—it hurts if something sticks in the eye. Olivi explains that the faculty of touch may inform the other sense organs without being the ultimate form: another external sense may inform an organ that is informed by the sense of touch, but that does not necessitate identifying the sense of touch with that other faculty. They remain two distinct faculties. (*II Sent.* q. 60, 570, 573; *ibid.*, q. 61, 578.) Thus, one cannot conclude that there is one organ for every faculty, even though in the case of the external senses the fact that there are two separate organs suggests that there are (at least) two separate faculties for them. Since the ventricles of the brain are not separate organs, Olivi breaks with the tradition of differentiating the internal senses based on their location.

The other physiological criterion is closely related to one of the philosophical criteria, as we shall soon see. The central idea in this criterion is to give support to the distinction between the receptive and retentive faculties of the soul

of vision is principally located in the node of the visual nerves from both eyes because otherwise one visual power could not inform two eyes.

¹⁰ "Secundo probat hoc [scil. quod cor sit prior radix sensui communi] intima experientia sensus qua sentimus processum motuum animalium imperari in corde et a corde. Sentimus etiam iudicarium cogitatum ad cor recolligi, quando aliquid definitive et solide iudicamus et agendum vel non agendum sententiamus, sentimus etiam radicalem consistentiam seu radicalem per se existentiam principaliter esse in corde seu in anima, prout ibi existit." (*II Sent.* q. 62, 590–1.) "[...] intima experientia comprobamus actum sensus et cogitatus esse in corde simul et cerebro, etiam eundem actum numero; nec mirum, quia non est in eis, nisi prout subsunt eidem potentiae animae et prout sunt quasi unum in illa." (*ibid.*, q. 66, 613.) Olivi may think that the common sense as a cognitive faculty is in the brain and that the heart is the seat of the sensitive appetite. In this case, the allusions to a double root of the common sense should be understood in such a way that Olivi refers to both of these faculties and considers them as a kind of a whole. This is possible, if not plausible, because he thinks that Augustine includes the sensitive appetite under the common sense (*ibid.*, q. 58, 508). However, the idea that we feel our *cognitive acts* simultaneously in the brain and in the heart is not easily adapted to this interpretation. Rather, these passages seem to attest to Olivi really locating the common sense in two organs. This stands out as an unusual idea because even though it was often said that the common sense has a double organ, the idea was that it originates in the heart (from which the *spiritus vitalis* flows) but functions in the brain (where the *spiritus animalis* exists). Olivi's idea seems to be far more radical: the common sense acts in the heart.

by claiming that there are physiological differences between the bodily organs, or seats, of these two kinds of faculties: the organs of the receptive faculties are moist and therefore easily changed, whereas the retentive faculties' organs are dry and therefore changeable only with difficulty¹¹.

Olivi ridicules this idea of a physiological difference between the receptive and retentive faculties. He begins question 63 of the second book of his *Summa* by presenting an objection which contends that some corporeal faculties are receptive because they are wet and others are retentive because they are dry (*II Sent.* q. 63, 596). Olivi's answer to this objection begins as follows:

To the first argument (*ratio*) of the other [philosophers] it must be said that it is utterly ridiculous. First, because it reduces the spiritual formation and conservation of vital and intentional species solely to the powers of the elementary qualities of moistness and dryness.¹²

This argument reveals Olivi's stance towards the physiological criterion of distinguishing the internal senses from each other. According to him, the species require spirituality and therefore cannot be reduced to the qualities of elements. It is not evident what Olivi means by spirituality in this context, but it is possible that he is drawing on the physiological theory of the *spiritus animalis* and thinking that the higher cognitive capacities of the sensitive soul are realised as the movement of this peculiar kind of matter, and thus the functions of the soul cannot be reduced to the four elements and their qualities. In other words, there is no difference between the receptive and retentive faculties in terms of elementary qualities because they all are realised as a movement of the *spiritus animalis*. Then again, he may just be saying that these operations are acts of the soul and, as such, irreducible to the qualities of matter. Whichever way we interpret his criticism, the basic idea remains the same: one cannot distinguish psychological faculties from each other by appealing to corporeal qualities.

Let us now turn to the philosophical criteria which medieval philosophers employed to make further distinctions between the internal senses. We can distinguish three such criteria:

1. Receptive faculties differ from retentive faculties.
2. Faculties that pertain to sensible species differ from faculties that pertain to so-called intentions (*intentiones*).
3. Active faculties differ from passive faculties.

¹¹ Thus Aquinas claims that: "Recipere autem et retinere reducuntur in corporalibus ad diversa principia: nam humida bene recipiunt, et male retinent; e contrario autem est de sicis. Unde, cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi corporalis, oportet esse aliam potentiam quæ recipiat species sensibilium, et quæ conservet." (*ST I.78.4 resp.*)

¹² "Ad primam igitur rationem aliorum dicendum quod valde est ridiculosa; tum quia spirituales formationes et conservationes specierum vitalium et intentionalium reducit ad solas potentias qualitatum elementarium humidi et sicci." (*II Sent.* q. 63, 601; see also *ibid.* q. 58, 508.)

As we have seen, Avicenna distinguished altogether five internal senses by appealing to these three criteria. Latin philosophers inherited these criteria from him, but they did not systematically employ all of them, and the third criterion was sometimes omitted

The first of these criteria is, in fact, the same as the second physiological criterion I discussed above, only it is considered from a different perspective. From a philosophical point of view, the underlying idea is a distinction between two kinds of psychological processes. Some psychological processes, such as perception, are related to things which are present to the subject; other processes, such as imagining, pertain to things that are absent. The soul must provide, according to one line of reasoning, principles which account for the reception of external influences and principles which account for the preservation of information in such a way that it can be later brought to mind. This distinction of psychological operations calls for a distinction of the receptive faculties from the retentive ones.

The second criterion is an application of the general Aristotelian principle that there are as many cognitive capacities as there are kinds of object to be apprehended. As animals seem to be aware of the usefulness and harmfulness of external objects and thus capable of striving for things that are beneficial and avoiding those that are to the contrary, they must apprehend something more than only the perceptual qualities of external objects. This was accounted for by claiming that they apprehend an intention that pertains to the object together with the sensible species.¹³ Thus, there is a kind of object—intention—the apprehension of which has to be attributed to a distinct faculty of the soul.

In addition, Avicenna employs the third criterion to distinguish the compositive imagination from the rest of the internal senses. It is an active faculty which produces new combinations out of sensible species that have been retained in the passive imagination. This criterion was not always repeated in Latin philosophy—Olivi does not mention it either—but the distinction between the two imaginative functions was commonly agreed upon. For instance, Aquinas accounts for the difference between the compositive imagination that is particular to human beings and the “passive” imagination of non-human animals by appealing to the intellect’s ability to refine the imaginative faculty of human beings.

Olivi does not accept any of these criteria for the case of the internal senses. Although in some sense he considers (2) and (3), he nevertheless thinks that they do not give us reason enough to conclude that there are several internal senses in the sensitive soul. Let us see what causes him to discard them.

He rejects criterion (1) on the basis that if the faculty that receives the sensible species were distinct from the one that retains it, a species that is numerically one would inform two distinct faculties at the same time, which is impossible: “The reception and conservation of species belong to the same subject and faculty

¹³ To be sure, an application of criterion (2) was also used in making distinctions between external senses which pertain to different perceptible qualities. The idea that different kinds of objects call for distinct faculties was presented already by Aristotle (*DA* II.4, 415^a16–22), and it was generally accepted.

because it is impossible for a species that is numerically one to have two subjects or to inform two faculties at the same time."¹⁴ On the face of it, Olivi's critical remark does not seem to be well grounded. At least according to some versions of the species theory of perception, the external object actualises the passive faculties of perception by the sensible species, and the latter are multiplied even in the medium between, say, the eyes and the seen object. Now, there seems to be no reason such theories should claim that a species which informs the common sense is numerically the same as the one which informs the imagination. Moreover, since pluralistic theories of internal senses can be understood as a kinds of information-processing models (Kemp & Fletcher 1993, 568), it is possible that in a manner of speaking the common sense hands over the sensible species from the external senses to the imagination.

Olivi's argument must be understood in light of his own theory of perception. As we have seen, Olivi rejects the species theory of perception and argues that perception is an act of the common sense; it is actively produced by the common sense in such a way that the external object is not an efficient cause of the act. The act of perception generates a so-called memory species (*species memorialis*) which is retained and thus enables imaginative and memorative processes, but Olivi claims that there is no need for a different faculty to account for the retentive function. As he puts it:

But the species which are immediately generated by an act of the common sense can be brought about by the common sense only in the subject of that act [...] Therefore, the memorative or imaginative species, which are brought about by the common sense, are retained only in the faculty of the common sense or in its organ insofar as it is its organ.¹⁵

It is natural to think that if a species is understood as a cognitive act, it cannot inform several faculties of the soul simultaneously.

Olivi is not as explicit in his stance towards the second criterion, according to which faculties are distinguished by the different kinds of objects with which they interact. There are two questions we must ask in order to understand Olivi's view: whether Olivi accepts criterion (2) as a general rule to make distinctions between faculties, and whether he accepts its application in the internal senses. The answer to the first question has been already touched upon in Part I, Chapter 3, where we saw that Olivi appears to employ it when he distinguishes the external senses from each other and thus we can say that in principle he accepts the criterion, although his final stand on its application to the external senses remains somewhat obscure. The same manner of thinking can be seen in his conception

¹⁴ "Quia eiusdem subiecti et potentiae est speciem recipere et eandem conservare; impossibile est enim quod species eadem numero habeat duo subiecta aut quod duas potentias simul informet." (*II Sent.* q. 63, 599.)

¹⁵ "Sed species quae immediate gignitur ab actu sensus communis non potest per eum fieri nisi in subiecto ipsius actus [...] Ergo species memorialis seu imaginaria per ipsum facta conservatur in sola potentia sensus communis aut in eius organo, in quantum est eius." (*II Sent.* q. 63, 599.) See also *ibid.*, q. 66, 613: "[...] dicendum quod ex omnibus supradictis satis patet quod receptivum et retentivum non oportet esse duas potentias animae."

of the difference between the intellectual and the sensitive faculties of the human soul. Although he thinks that a difference exists, he does not accept that it could be inferred from the objects of these faculties: “[...] the diversity of objects does not sufficiently prove the diversity of faculties unless a distinct mode of apprehending is added—this can be seen very clearly in ourselves.”¹⁶ By considering only the object, we cannot judge whether two faculties are separate in reality. This is clearly a point Olivi makes in order to claim that the intellectual faculties are distinct from the sensitive ones, even though they pertain to the same objects (see also *II Sent.* q. 51, 129).

Although Olivi sometimes alludes to criterion (2), he clearly denies its application to the internal senses. There is a simple reason for this: he does not think that intentions constitute a distinct type of object. I will not go into the details here—they are dealt with in Chapter 15—but Olivi’s basic idea is that all the psychological processes that seem to require intentions can be accounted for without them. Thus, the whole idea of positing distinct faculties which pertain to intentions becomes unnecessary because intentions do not have the independent status of being objects of apprehension. In other words, even though Olivi seems to accept that there are as many distinct cognitive faculties in the soul as there are kinds of objects to be apprehended, he is not obliged to posit several internal senses because he rejects the existence of intentions as distinct kinds of objects of apprehension. In this way he does not employ criterion (2) in the case of the internal senses.

Finally, Olivi does not at all mention criterion (3) by which the active faculties were distinguished from the passive ones. This is not surprising because it seems to appear less in Latin discussions, and especially because all the faculties of the soul are active in Olivi’s eyes.

However, given that the criterion was used by Avicenna to distinguish the active imagination, by which we can fantasise about unreal things, from the passive imagination, which functions only as a storehouse for sensible species, we may ask whether Olivi employs the criterion after all just without mentioning it. For, he claims that human beings differ from other animals in terms of their imaginative creativity—at least insofar as humans are capable of deliberately forming new images. Human beings are able to combine memory species of different objects and therefore capable of imagining things they have not seen. In addition to this, Olivi seems to acknowledge that non-human animals also are capable of forming new fantastic images when they are dreaming, although this kind of

¹⁶ “[...] diversitas obiectorum non est sufficiens ratio ad probandum diversitatem potentialium, nisi cum additur modus apprehendendi diversus, sicut in nobis maxime reperitur.” (*II Sent.* q. 54, 275.) In the immediate context of this passage, Olivi asks whether angels have separate faculties for apprehending intellectual and sensible objects, and he claims that the difference of objects is not sufficient to prove that they do have them. Also, in the case of human beings the intellect is able to apprehend particular objects, even though it apprehends them through the sensitive faculties: “[...] licet virtus superior extendat se ad omnia obiecta ad quæ inferior, non tamen ad eosdem actus producendos; unde intellectus non potest elicere istum actum qui est sentire vel vegetare.” (*Ibid.*, q. 50, 40–1.) For discussion, see Bérubé 1964, 100–6.

compositive imagination is not deliberate. Both of these types of compositive imagination differ from the basic function of the imagination which is to bring into mind things that the subject has actually perceived before.

I shall discuss the difference between these functions below (in Chapter 13), but it is important to note that Olivi does not think that there are two different kinds of imaginative faculties (as Avicenna claims). Rather, in the case of human beings the intellect is able to direct the common sense in such a way that it becomes capable of imagining things which the person in question has never seen. Also, the ability to form new images that Olivi seems to allow for non-human animals does not require a distinct faculty of the soul but is conducted by a special kind of activity of the common sense. Thus, there is no need for two distinct faculties. The common sense is used in a more elaborate way when it brings about fantastic images. Moreover, the difference between the compositive imagination and the imagining of absent things that have been previously perceived is not based on the idea that the former would be an active and the latter a passive process. The common sense is as active in other animals as it is in human beings, and it is active in all of its processes¹⁷. Thus, although Olivi acknowledges the existence of various kinds of imaginative acts, he does not require criterion (3).

It needs to be mentioned in this context that Olivi puts forth one important criterion by which two faculties can be known to be separate from each other. Namely, corporeal faculties are distinct from incorporeal ones: the intellect differs from the sensitive faculties because the former is incorporeal and the latter are corporeal. The basic idea is that sensitive faculties are realised in corporeal organs. They inform organs and use them in their acts. Since the intellect cannot be a corporeal faculty, it must differ from the sensitive faculties. Thus, two faculties differ from each other if one is realised in a corporeal organ, and the other is not. (*II Sent.* q. 67, 615–24; *ibid.*, q. 54, 248.) This is one of the most important criterions Olivi uses to make distinctions between the faculties of the soul. His conception of the freedom of the will, original in his time and influential in posterity, draws heavily on his understanding of the incorporeality of the soul's intellectual faculties¹⁸. Incorporeality is also a prerequisite for the soul's immortality according to him¹⁹.

Hence, by drawing from our earlier discussion of Olivi's conception of the diversity of the external senses and from the present discussion, we can infer altogether four criteria which Olivi uses to distinguish the faculties of the soul from each other:

¹⁷ This reflects Olivi's way of understanding the faculties of the soul as active in relation to their objects. It also reflects his understanding of the meaning of activity: that soul's faculties are active means that they produce their own acts and are not actualised by external objects. The activity does not require that the subject deliberately carry out the acts. See Part I, Chapter 5.1.

¹⁸ For a detailed view of Olivi's conception of the freedom of the will, see Yrjönsuuri 2002, 99–128.

¹⁹ See, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 51, 111–8, and the references in Part I, Chapter 7.1, footnote 1.

1. Faculties which inform diverse organs differ from each other. (There are exceptions to this rule.)
2. Faculties which pertain to different genera of objects (which do not have a common denominator) differ from each other.
3. Faculties which have different kinds of acts differ from each other.
4. Incorporeal faculties differ from corporeal ones.

None of these apply to the internal senses: the different psychological functions of the internal senses are realised in the same organ (or, if Olivi's remarks about the heart are taken seriously, this criterion fails in the case of the internal senses); they can be accounted for without appealing to different kinds of objects; they can be accounted for as instances of one mode of acting; and all the functions are corporeal as they belong to the sensitive soul (or the sensitive part of the human soul)²⁰. Instead, according to Olivi there are several reasons to claim that the psychological functions which are often attributed to the internal senses belong in fact to one and the same faculty. Let us now see what these reasons are.

11.2 The Interconnectedness of Psychological Functions and Experiential Unity

Almost all the arguments that Olivi presents in favour of his view that the common sense is the only internal sense are based on one fundamental idea: there must be a governing faculty in the soul. One faculty of the soul must be able to apprehend and judge the acts and objects of other faculties of the soul, to com-

²⁰ One typical way of judging whether two faculties are different from each other was based on the possibility of the faculties' separate existence. Since plants have vegetative faculties but not sensitive ones, the latter must be distinct from the former. Similarly, since some animals have the sense of touch but not vision, these two senses must be distinct faculties. Olivi accepts this principle. He writes: "Quantum autem ad differentiam potentialium sensitivarum ab intellectivis et vegetativarum a sensitivis præter rationes superius positas valet, quoniam inveniuntur aliquando sensitivæ sine intellectivis, ut in brutis, et vegetativæ sine sensitivis, ut in plantis [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 54, 248.) However, when this idea is applied to the difference between the estimative faculty and the common sense by pointing out that there are animals that seem to lack the estimative function ("[...] videtur autem quod in pluribus eorum [viz animalium] non sit æstimativa, immo, ut videtur, sunt omnis prudentiæ inexpertia; ergo æstimativa in tantum differt a prædictis [potentiis animæ] quod est separabilis et aliquando exclusa ab eis." (*ibid.*, q. 64, 603.)), Olivi suddenly draws upon a different explanation. According to him, different species of animals have different kinds of common senses that are endowed with different dispositions which make the operations of the common sense more or less subtle. Also, the number of external senses affects the way the common sense functions. (*Ibid.*, 606–7.) Thus, Olivi does not accept that some species of animals have more internal senses than others. All animals have the common sense which functions more efficiently in perfect animals and more poorly in lower ones.

pare them to each other, and also to control the other faculties.²¹ The necessity of a governing faculty is due to two interrelated problems which—Olivi thinks—pluralist theories must face:

1. How are the cognitive functions which are traditionally attributed to various internal senses interconnected (for example, when someone apprehends an external object and its harmfulness)?
2. How can the experiential unity between different kinds of cognitive acts be accounted for? (By experiential unity, I mean the fact that all the psychological acts, however different they may be, appear as belonging to the same subject.)

Let us begin with the first problem. Many psychological processes require the co-operation of several functions which were traditionally attributed to different internal senses. For example, when a being apprehends an external object and estimates it as harmful, two functions are employed: one accounts for the perception of the sensible qualities, and the other accounts for estimation—items (1) and (7) in the list presented above (p. 187). Olivi takes it that if these functions belong to two different internal senses, there must be an explanation for the fact that they are interconnected in the single psychological process of estimative apprehension which estimates a perceived object as harmful.

It is easy to understand the need for the different functions to connect when taking into consideration one of the essential features of the medieval theories of perception. The external senses pertain to the different perceptible qualities of external objects: the faculty of sight sees the shape and colour of an object, and the faculty of hearing hears the sound that the object makes. These qualities are, however, apprehended as belonging to one and the same external object—given that they are qualities of one object, of course. This is possible according to the medieval view only if a faculty exists which unites the information from the various senses²². This was thought to be one of the functions of the common sense: to combine the perceptible qualities from the external senses so as to provide a unitary apprehension of individual external objects. Hence, if a cat sees the shape and the colour of a mouse by the sense of sight and simultaneously hears its squeaking by the sense of hearing, these qualities (shape, colour, and sound)

²¹ One notable exception is the sixth argument in favour of the unity of the common sense and imagination, which draws on Olivi's conception of the relation between the appetitive and cognitive faculties. He argues that the appetitive power, by which we and other animals desire the objects we perceive, is the same as the one by which we desire the objects we imagine. However, since one appetitive power cannot be immediately connected to two cognitive powers, the common sense and imagination must be one and the same faculty in reality: "Quia essentialis ordo appetitivæ ad cognitivam clamat quod una potentia appetitiva non est immediate connexa potentiis pluribus cognitivis, sed soli uni. Sed appetitiva sequens sensum communem ponitur ab omnibus esse eadem cum appetitiva sequente imaginationem. Quod et ratione probatur: quia eiusdem potentia est amare et desiderare absentia et amare eadem praesentia et gaudere de eorum fruibili praesentia." (*II Sent.* q. 63, 600.)

²² The idea comes from Aristotle. See, e.g., *DA* III.2, 426^b9–22; *Somn.* 2, 455^a12–22.

are combined in the common sense of the cat. In this way the cat perceives one object, the mouse, which has a specific shape, is coloured grey, and is squeaking.

Similarly, Olivi thinks, there must be a way of accounting for the interconnectedness of the acts of different *internal* senses. In other words, there must be a way of accounting for the interconnection between, for instance, the apprehension of an intention and the object to which the intention belongs (the mouse and its usefulness or, to use the common medieval example, a wolf and its harmfulness); between an object and its “pastness” in remembering a past object; between a perceived object and the recollection of the same object in recognising a familiar object, and so forth. Olivi argues that the interconnectedness of various psychological functions presupposes that there is a governing faculty which is able to combine the information that they provide. The crucial point here is Olivi’s interpretation of the pluralist theories of the internal senses. He thinks that if the internal senses were separate faculties, they would be able to process only the information proper to each of them: for example, the common sense would apprehend only the sensible qualities of an external object and not its harmfulness, whereas the faculty of estimation would apprehend only the harmfulness and not the sensible qualities. His interpretation seems well grounded, given that the often repeated reason to conceive of these as separate faculties was that they pertain to different kinds of objects. Now, Olivi points out that the perceived object and its harmfulness are combined in the psychological process by which the subject estimates the object as harmful. The harmfulness is apprehended as a feature of the perceived object similarly to how the squeaking sound is apprehended as a quality of the mouse which is also seen through the faculty of sight.²³

The fact that the psychological functions of the internal senses are at least sometimes interconnected calls for explanation. Olivi thinks that the only possible explanation is that one faculty is able to grasp all the relevant information and to operate with it in such a way that various aspects of one object can be combined and compared to each other²⁴. In other words, there must be a governing faculty in the soul. In the case of human beings, the ultimate governing faculty is the intellect, but there must be such a combining centre in the sensitive soul as well. This is proven by the fact that non-human animals also are capable of combining different kinds of information so as to constitute a complex apprehension

²³ *II Sent.* q. 63, 599–600; *ibid.*, q. 64, 603–4; *ibid.*, q. 66, 609–11, 613; I shall discuss Olivi’s arguments in detail below, in Chapters 13–16.

²⁴ The idea that comparing and combining cannot take place between two faculties but have to be done by a single power is very central for Olivi. He uses it in many connections. For example, it proves the existence of the common sense: “Prima est, quia [sensus communis] objecta diversorum sensuum in simul apprehendit et diiudicat [. . .] Si vero dicas hoc posse per duas potentias fieri: contra hoc est, quia comparare unum alteri aut eorum mutuum differentiam et comparisonem sentire est unus actus ad duo extrema relatus et utriusque mutuum comparisonem habens pro uno obiecto; idem autem actus oportet quod sit ab una potentia.” (*II Sent.* q. 62, 587.) It is also one of the reasons there is only one intellectual faculty in the human soul: we are able to combine and compare particulars and universals, contingent and necessary things, created and uncreated things, etc., and this is possible only if it is done by one intellectual faculty which apprehends both things (*ibid.*, q. 55, 287–8).

of many aspects of one object (*II Sent.* q. 63, 600). This can be seen throughout Olivi's exposition of the internal senses, as we shall see below.

The other problem is related to the experiential unity in cognitive operations. The idea becomes clear by considering what Olivi says about the experiential unity in the case of human beings. According to him, it is an experiential fact that the higher psychological functions of the sensitive soul are performed by a single faculty: "Certainly, when we do this [viz execute different psychological functions], we do not perceive ourselves as operating now with one power and then with another. Rather, we perceive that the act and the *aspectus* of one and the same faculty varies in many ways."²⁵ Olivi seems to think that our experience would be different if the internal senses were separate from each other: when we use our external senses, we feel like we are using separate faculties²⁶, but in the case of the internal senses there is no such experience; rather, we have the contrary experience of a single faculty. In this way, Olivi lays much weight on phenomenal experience and thinks that it supports his interpretation of the unity of the internal senses.

Moreover, there is a more fundamental manner in which Olivi emphasises experiential unity. Although I shall discuss this topic more in the third part of this study, it is useful to understand already at this point. On several occasions, Olivi claims that human beings experience all of their psychological acts (including the acts of the external senses) as belonging to themselves, that is, as their own acts and experiences. Whenever one of my faculties becomes active, I apprehend its act as *my* act, an act that belongs to me, and that originates in me: to use Olivi's expression: "the same I who understands, wills and sees"²⁷ Olivi explains that this is possible only because the highest cognitive faculty, that is, the intellect, apprehends the acts of all the other faculties of the soul in such a way that they appear as belonging to the same subject as the intellect itself. Hence, Olivi appeals to a kind of centre of consciousness to account for experiential unity. There has to be one faculty of the soul to which other faculties' acts appear.

Olivi seems to think that this kind of centre of consciousness is needed also in the case of non-human animals and that it accounts for experiential unity. He does not explicitly say this—at least not as explicitly as he argues for the role of the intellect as the centre of consciousness—but some of his ideas suggest that he understands the role of the common sense in non-human animals as similar to the role of the intellect in human beings. First, as the first part of this study points out, the common sense functions as the centre of consciousness in Olivi's theory of perception. By directing the common sense different things are perceived.

²⁵ "Et certe, quando hoc facimus, non sentimus nos nunc operari cum una potentia et nunc cum alia, sed potius eiusdem potentiae actus et aspectus multiformiter variare." (*II Sent.* q. 66, 614.)

²⁶ Although perceptual awareness of the objects of perception is provided by the common sense, the external senses are used in perception, and this seems to suffice for our experience of the distinctness thereof.

²⁷ "[...] ego video vel audio sicut ego intelligo [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 58, 464.) I shall discuss this idea in Part III, Chapter 18. The relevant passages are: *II Sent.* q. 37, 659; *ibid.*, q. 51, 122; *ibid.*, q. 54, 241, 280; *ibid.*, q. 58, 464; *ibid.*, q. 59, 540; *ibid.*, q. 74, 126.

This is a significant similarity between the functions of the common sense and the intellect. Second, the idea that there has to be one faculty of the soul which accounts for the interconnectedness of the various sensory as well as post-sensory functions—that is, of the various sense modalities (like seeing and hearing) and the various functions of the internal senses (like apprehending an object and the harmfulness thereof)—shows that the animal soul has a unifying centre.

When the idea of a unifying centre of the soul is applied to the internal senses, Olivi's understanding seems to be that if the internal senses were separate from each other and all of them were to provide consciousness of the objects of their acts, the overall experience of the subject would be somehow fragmentary. The subject would not feel that the acts of the internal senses belong to the same experiencing self. Rather, every faculty of the soul would be, as it were, an experiencing subject, and there would be no unifying factor which could make the different kinds of experiences appear to the same subject (understood as a kind subject of phenomenal consciousness). From his point of view it, seems quite natural that there must be some kind explanation for the alleged unity between the various acts of the soul.

In principle, there are three possible lines of reasoning which can be adopted in order to account for the interconnectedness of the psychological processes and the experiential unity. The first of them, arguably proposed by Avicenna, is to claim that the acts of different faculties are experienced as belonging to the same subject because they belong to one and the same soul²⁸. Understood in this way, the faculties of the soul may be distinct from each other since the soul itself is the unifying factor which accounts for the experiential unity. This also solves the problem of the interconnectedness of the functions of the different internal senses because the fact that various internal senses belong to the same soul may explain how the contents of their acts come together in complex psychological operations. According to this line of thought, there is no need for a single faculty which would function as the unifying centre because the soul itself perform that role.

The second option is to consider that either the intellect or one of the internal senses functions as a governing faculty which not only combines the information from the other internal senses but also accounts for the experiential unity—function (10) of the above list (p. 188). In this way, it is possible to hold that the internal senses are separate faculties. This strategy was used by many authors who favoured a pluralistic theory of the internal senses. In different theories the governing faculty varies but the overall idea remains the same.²⁹

Finally, one can argue that there is only one internal sense in the sensitive soul. It can perform different kinds of acts which bring about all the psychological

²⁸ See General Introduction, footnote 33 for references, and note that Avicenna is somewhat ambiguous in this respect (see footnote 29 below).

²⁹ For instance, Albertus Magnus seems to think that the governing faculty is phantasy, and sometimes Avicenna seems to attribute the unifying function to the estimative faculty and not to the soul as a whole (Black 2000, 60–64; For Albertus' view, see, e.g., Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, ed. C. Stroick, *Alberti Magni opera omnia*, 7.1 (Aschendorf, 1968), 2.4.7).

processes that the two other views attribute to various internal senses. Because these acts belong to one and the same faculty of the soul, there is no need for a further explanation for the interconnectedness and the experiential unity: the fact that all the functions are actualisations of one and the same power suffices.

I shall discuss Olivi's reasons for rejecting the first option in the next chapter. The main target in his discussion concerning the unity of the internal senses is the second option, and he thinks that the third explanation is the best—at least when it comes to the internal senses. His view is based to a considerable extent on the unifying role he attributes to the common sense. It is the subject of the different kinds of acts that realise all the psychological functions which the pluralistic theories attribute to various internal senses. It is not only the governing faculty of the sensitive soul (*II Sent.* q. 66, 613) but also the subject of all the post-sensory cognitive acts. In this way, Olivi is able to account for the experiential unity and interconnectedness of different psychological functions.

One question should be addressed, however. Does Olivi actually prove that there *cannot be* more than one internal sense? Does he succeed in giving enough plausibility to his claim that the third explanation should be chosen instead of the second? On the face of it, his arguments seem to prove the necessity of a governing faculty, but they do not force us to conclude that there is only one internal sense. They do not prove that the third option is better than the second. In many arguments, Olivi's main concern is to point out that the governing faculty of the sensitive soul must be the common sense:

Moreover, if there [viz in the soul] were a faculty which is higher than the common sense, it could consider (*iudicare*) the acts of the common sense like the common sense can consider the acts of the external senses. But there are none except reason which considers the acts of the common sense.³⁰

Olivi means to convince us that the sensitive soul contains no faculty that could apprehend the acts of the common sense and make judgements about them. However, one could accept this claim and still hold that the other internal senses exist as independent faculties: the common sense just happens to be capable of apprehending the acts of the other faculties and to make judgements about them. Olivi himself does not think that *all* the faculties of the soul are one and the same: the common sense brings about all the cognitive acts of the sensitive soul save for the acts of the external senses, and the intellectual faculties of the soul are distinct from the sensitive ones (*II Sent.* q. 67, 615–24). Thus, Olivi does not apply the third explanation to the relation between the common sense and the intellect or to the relation between the common sense and the external senses. The common sense functions as a governing faculty in relation to the external senses but remains distinct from them, and the interconnectedness between the acts of the external senses is accounted for by appealing to the second explanation. Similarly, the intellect is distinct from the common sense in human beings but it performs

³⁰ "Præterea, si est ibi [scil. in anima] aliqua potentia superior sensui communi, illa poterit iudicare de actibus eius, sicut et ipse potest de actibus sensuum particularium. Sed nullam est dare præter rationem quæ iudicet de actibus sensus communis." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 509.)

the governing function and explains the unity and interconnectedness (see Part I, Chapter 3, and Part III, Chapter 18). It seems that Olivi could have also invoked the second explanation in the case of the internal senses.

But there is more to it than this. Olivi points out that the necessity of a governing faculty means that there must be a faculty that is capable of apprehending all of the soul's acts and the objects of those acts. The common sense can combine the information from the external senses because it is capable of apprehending everything they apprehend. Similarly, the governing faculty of the soul should be capable of apprehending all the information that is brought about by the activity of the other internal senses. That is, there should be a faculty which is capable of apprehending external objects, imagined objects, intentions, and the "pastness" of remembered things, and so on. It is possible that Olivi thinks that the principle of parsimony should be applied here because the existence of such a faculty would make (and actually makes) other internal senses unnecessary: they could do nothing that the governing faculty was not already capable of.³¹

On the surface, this argument seems unconvincing, given that the common sense is (according to Olivi) capable of apprehending all the objects of the external senses, but still the external senses are both necessary in the process of perception and distinct from the common sense. To be sure, Olivi's willingness to deny the need for separate internal senses stems from his conception of the psychological functions that they are supposed to perform. As we shall see, he thinks that he can account for these functions without postulating several faculties, and therefore he is liable to give up the pluralist conception in the case of the internal senses. By contrast, he cannot see how the functions of the external senses could be brought about by one perceptual faculty—and he sees even less sense in the idea that the intellect and the sensitive faculties could somehow be the same. Thus, it is precisely in the case of the internal senses that the principle of parsimony may be applied. Still, he does not seem to succeed in ruling out the possibility that there are several internal senses, one of which functions as the unifying centre. I think that his idea must have been that because we are led (by his argumentation) to admit that there must be one single faculty that is capable of apprehending the acts and objects of all the other faculties, we are at least entitled to deny the existence of the other internal senses. And because of the principle of parsimony we should do so.

In other words, the main reason why Olivi is able to argue for the unity of the internal senses is his conception of the cognitive functions that they are supposed to account for. He explains the cognitive functions in such a way that he is in a position to claim that the common sense is the governing faculty of the sensitive soul and also the only internal sense. That is, even though positing a

³¹ Olivi mentions the principle of parsimony: "Regula generalis est apud philosophos quod non debet fieri per plura quod potest fieri per unum." He acknowledges the validity of this principle but specifies it further: "[...] maior suæ rationis non est vera nisi quando æque perfecte potest fieri per unum sicut per plura." (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 190–1.) According to another formulation: "[...] superfluum autem est ponere duo vel plura ubi sufficit unum." (*ibid.*, q. 29, 499.)

governing faculty would be enough to account for the interconnectedness of the functions and the experiential unity, Olivi understands the acts that realise the different functions in such a way that they cannot possibly belong to separate faculties. However, I shall postpone the detailed discussion of the different psychological functions which the common sense provides until later. Before that we must briefly touch upon the relation between the soul and its faculties.

11.3 Faculties as Constitutive Parts of the Soul

In order to understand one of the reasons for Olivi's denial of the first of the explanations discussed above—namely that the interconnectedness of the acts of the internal senses and the experiential unity are provided by the fact that the faculties belong to one and the same soul—we must briefly consider his conception of the relation between the soul and its faculties. He construes his conception in relation to two opposing theories. According to the first theory, the faculties of the soul are identical with the essence of the soul, and they are identical with each other to the extent that the faculties differ from each other only with respect to the different objects and acts, not essentially. According to the other theory, the faculties of the soul differ from each other and from the substance of the soul in such a way that they are accidents of the soul.³²

Olivi rejects both of these theories. As we have seen, he does not accept the absolute identification of the soul's faculties, and thus he rejects the first theory (to be sure, his denial is not this straightforward but that does not have to concern us here). The other theory receives a more versatile treatment. I shall not go into the details, but it needs to be pointed out that it is rejected not only on metaphysical grounds but also by appealing to the contents of our self-consciousness and to experiential considerations by which Olivi points out that our relation to our mental faculties is so intimate that the faculties cannot be accidents.³³

Olivi finds a middle ground between these two views. He argues that: "faculties are constitutive parts of the soul. They differ from the soul as parts differ from the whole, and they differ from each other as a part differs from another part or as a hand differs from another hand."³⁴ Due to his conception of the re-

³² Olivi presents the first theory in *II Sent.* q. 54, 236–43, and the second in *ibid.*, 230–6, 248. The latter seems to be the view of Aquinas, as he contrasts the faculties of the soul and the essential features and/or the essence of the soul, thus rendering the faculties accidents or properties (*proprietates*) of the soul. See *Quæst. de an.* q. 12. For discussion and references, see King 2008; Boureau 2008, 131–54; Partee 1960, 251–3; Bettoni 1959, 389–97.

³³ Olivi's argumentation against the first theory can be found in *II Sent.* q. 54, 243–8, 273–83, and he argues against the second theory in *ibid.*, 248–52, 260–72. He also rejects a view which is quite similar to his own: the substance of the soul is the root of its faculties in such a way that the faculties are the same as the substance of the soul, but they are different essentially and by definition. Bettoni points out that this is Bonaventure's view (Bettoni 1959, 393; see also Boureau 2008, 136–45). Olivi's critique against Bonaventure is grounded on certain metaphysical problems he sees in it. See *ibid.*, 253–6.

³⁴ "[...] potentia sint partes animæ constitutivæ et quod ita differunt ab anima sicut pars a

lation between the soul and its faculties, Olivi cannot accept that the soul itself functions as a unifying principle between the various faculties. The soul simply is nothing besides its faculties. From this point of view, it is only natural that Olivi so forcefully endeavours to point out that there must be a governing faculty:

[...] when many forms come together in the same matter, there must be a superior one which presides over all the others, reigns over them, and connects them together; otherwise they would not come together in a proper order and with a stable unity. But [...] the formal essences of the soul's faculties are formal parts of the soul. Therefore, there must be one faculty in the sensitive soul of animals which presides and reigns over all the others³⁵

One of the important consequences of Olivi's conception of the relation between the soul and its faculties is his denial of the doctrine of the relation between the body and the soul which was adhered to not only by Aquinas but also by one of Olivi's main contemporary opponents, Vital du Four. According to their views, the soul can inform the body by its essence without informing it by its faculties—the point was, of course, to enable the incorporeality of the intellectual powers while securing the substantial union between the soul and the body. Since Olivi thinks that the faculties of the soul constitute its substance, it is inevitable that he denies the possibility of the soul informing the body by its essence without communicating its faculties to the body.³⁶

In a characteristic way, Olivi combines his view on the relation between the soul and its faculties to his conception of the role of the acts as the most important criterion by which faculties of the soul are distinguished or identical. His commitment to the partial identifying between the faculties of the soul and the soul's essence leads him to say that the soul is composed of the faculties. The faculties are forms which come together to constitute one complete form, the soul, but still they remain separate faculties. Now, Olivi presents a possible counter-argument which he then goes on to refute:

Perhaps someone wants to infer from this that since one entire form of the soul is integrated from the diverse forms of the faculties, one entire faculty is integrated from them for the same reason. To this it must be said that if the acts of the diverse parts of the same whole were to come together in constituting one action—in the same way as the parts come together in constituting a whole—then they would integrate a nature (*ratio*) of one active principle for

suo toto, a se ipsis vero sicut pars a parte vel ut manus a manu." (*II Sent.* q. 54, 253; see also *ibid.*, 258–9; *Ep.* 6, 50.)

³⁵ "[...] quando plures formæ in eadem materia concurrunt, oportet dare unam omnibus superiorem et omnibus præidentem omnesque regentem et connectentem; alias non concurrerent sub debito ordine et sub stabili unitate. Sed [...] formales essentiæ potentiarum animæ sunt partes formales ipsius. Ergo in sensitiva anima animalium oportet dare unam potentiam omnibus aliis præidentem omnesque regentem [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 62, 589.)

³⁶ "[...] in tota parte intellectiva non est dare alias formas aut formales essentias quam formas et formales essentias potentiarum. Ergo ab ea non poterit communicari aliud esse corpori quam esse formale potentiarum eius." (*II Sent.* q. 51, 108.) For discussion, see Mauro 1997, 89–138 (especially pp. 126–7).

the same reason that they integrate one nature of a being. Because this does not happen, it does not follow that they integrate one nature of a faculty as they integrate one being. "Faculty" is predicated with respect to acting, but "form" or "essence" is predicated with respect to being. And so, if the whole assemblage of actions is considered as being one complete action, then the whole totality of faculties is considered as being one complete ability [...]³⁷

The faculties constitute one complete form which is the soul, but they are separate faculties because they do not act as one. Thus, if one faculty of the soul is able to act without the other, the two are separate. By contrast, if a detailed analysis of a certain psychological operation shows that it is not actually constituted from many acts but from only one (or if many acts are brought together in one act), we can conclude that the whole process belongs to one faculty. This is how Olivi conceives of the psychological functions traditionally attributed to several internal senses: acts which realise the functions are interconnected in such a way that they either are not many acts in reality or they come together to constitute one act which combines many functions. The former takes place in an estimative apprehension by which, for instance, a sheep apprehends a wolf as hostile. The latter takes place in, for example, an act of recognition because the act combines an act of perception with an act of recollection.

³⁷ "Si quis vero ex his vellet inferre quod qua ratione ex diversis formis potentiarum integratur una totalis forma animæ, eadem ratione ex eis integratur una totalis potentia: dicendum quod si actiones diversarum partium eiusdem totius sic concurrerent in unam actionem constituendam sicut ipsæ partes concurrunt ad unum totum constituendum, tunc qua ratione integrant unam totalem rationem entis, integrarent rationem unius principii activi. Quod quia non est sic, ideo non sequitur quod sic integrent unam rationem potentia sicut integrent unum ens. Potentia enim dicitur per respectum ad agere, forma vero vel essentia per respectum ad esse; ac tum, si tota congeries actionum sumatur pro una plena actione, tunc et totum collegium potentiarum sumetur pro uno pleno posse, iuxta quod et communiter dicitur quod integrant unum totum virtuale seu potestativum." (*II Sent.* q. 54, 259.)

12 THE COMMON SENSE

12.1 Traditional Functions of the Common Sense

Ever since Aristotle wrote his *De anima*, philosophers interested in psychological questions have taken seriously the idea that there must be a kind of unifying centre in the sensitive soul. In the later tradition this centre came to be classified among the internal senses, and in the Latin West it was named the common sense (*sensus communis*). The functions which were commonly discussed in relation to the common sense were the following: the combining and comparing of the information received through the different external senses, the apprehension of the so-called common sensibles, and second-order perception, that is, the perception of the acts of the external senses. The topic of this chapter is to analyse Olivi's conception of these functions.

One way of understanding what is at stake in the first of these functions is to consider that it serves as an explanation for the unity of perceptual experience. We perceive colours by sight, sounds by hearing, odours by the sense of smell, and so forth. However, our experience of the objects in our environment is not fragmentary. We do not perceive different perceptual qualities—proper objects of different external senses¹—as if they have nothing to do with each other but, rather, in conjunction with each other. We perceive external objects which are of a particular colour, produce a particular sound, and smell a particular way. The qualities we perceive are united, and (at least arguably) the unity in our perceptions is not something we infer from the fact that different aspects of a perceptual experience seem to be related to the same object. We do not judge that all these different qualities must belong to one and the same object, rather the unity is somehow present in our perception from the outset.² Somehow the information

¹ The proper objects of the external senses are colour for sight, sound for hearing, etc.

² This reading is inspired by Michael Tye's article "The Problem of the Common Sensibles," in *Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities*, ed. R. Schumacher (forthcoming), <http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/tye/ProblemOfCommonSensibles.pdf>.

from the various external senses is combined so as to provide us with the consciousness of an object with all of its perceptual qualities. This combining cannot be accomplished by any of the external senses because sounds cannot be seen more than odours can be heard or colours smelled. There must be a unifying centre for the external senses. This unifying centre is the common sense.³

In a similar fashion, we are capable of distinguishing different perceptible qualities from each other. We are able to tell that black is not white. In principle this does not, however, require anything more than the faculty of sight. Sight alone sees that a black surface and a white surface are different in colour. But in addition to this intrasensory discrimination, we are capable of making intersensory distinctions by, to use a familiar example, distinguishing white from sweet. None of the external senses can perform this distinguishing because no external sense can apprehend the proper objects of the other senses. The common sense makes the distinction between the proper objects of the different external senses and thus distinguishes the different sensible qualities from each other.

The second function which was traditionally discussed in relation to the common sense is the apprehension of the so-called common sensibles. Medieval philosophers received from Aristotle (through a long tradition, to be sure) the idea that in addition to the proper sensibles of each of the external senses, there are also other kinds of things that can be perceived, namely, common sensibles. Aristotle's criterion for distinguishing proper from common sensibles is simple: proper sensibles are those qualities which can be perceived by only one of the external senses, and common sensibles are the features which can be perceived by at least two of the external senses. According to Aristotle, the common sensibles are movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number, and unity⁴.

Later authors usually thought (probably in line with Aristotle's intention) that the common sensibles are not perceptible in themselves. They are perceived along with the proper sensibles which the external senses apprehend. Thus, Avicenna argues that there cannot be a separate sense for sensing the common sensibles because such common sensibles cannot be apprehended without apprehending some of the proper sensibles. Aquinas makes substantially the same claim.⁵ Their idea is that in order to perceive the common sensible, say, to see the size of a wall, one has to see a wall which is of a certain size. Since colourless things cannot be seen, the wall can be seen only by seeing its colour. The perception of the size of a wall is subordinate to seeing its colour. This is why the perception of a proper sensible is necessary for perceiving a common sensible.

Then again, it has been pointed out that Albertus Magnus attributes (in his early works) the perception of the common sensibles to the common sense, not to the external senses, and the same goes for Roger Bacon (Steneck 1970, 58, 67–8;

³ These examples as well as the ones in the next paragraph are presented already by Aristotle, and the argument for the existence of a unifying centre of perception based on them comes from him as well. These ideas were extremely popular in medieval thought.

⁴ *DA* II.6, 418^a18–20; *DA* III.1, 425^a14–20; *Sens.* 1, 437^a8–9.

⁵ *Shifā' De an.* III.8, 281–283; *ST* I.78.3; de Libera 1991, 482; Robert Pasnau, "Sensible Qualities: The Case of Sound," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 38.1 (2000): 27–31.

Wood 2007, 35–6; Di Martino 2008, 69–84). According to them, size and other common sensibles are not actually seen, rather they are perceived only by the common sense. Whether or not there is a genuine disagreement between the view presented by Avicenna and Aquinas on the one hand and the one adhered to by Albertus and Bacon on the other cannot be addressed here⁶. What I want to emphasise is that the ability to perceive the common sensibles is an operation that was discussed in relation to the common sense in the 13th century. In fact, one of the major questions that was addressed in mid-century discussions concerning the common sense is whether the common sensibles are perceived by the common sense or by the external senses (de Libera 1991, 483–4, 490–2). Medieval authors also sometimes made additions to Aristotle’s list of the common sensibles. For instance, Roger Bacon added the following: distance, orientation, corporeity, continuity, separation, roughness, smoothness, density, rarity or transparency, shadow, obscurity, beauty, and ugliness. (Wood 2007, 35.) This—rather striking—example attests to the fact that the Aristotelian framework was not accepted as such. All of the framework’s details were under discussion in the 13th century.

Finally, the ability of having second-order perception was widely discussed in the Middle Ages. The idea that beings who are capable of perception are also capable of perceiving that they perceive was inherited from the tradition stretching down from antiquity: Aristotle argued that perception involves not only an awareness of a perceived object but also of an act of perception itself⁷. When we see something, we are conscious of both the object we see and the fact that we see the object—even though the latter is not necessarily explicitly present in our phenomenal experience.

In medieval discussions, one of the most pervasive questions was whether this second-order perception is provided by the same act by which the external object is perceived, or whether it requires a distinct act which somehow has the direct act as its object. In other words, is second-order perception of the acts of perception an intrinsic feature of the acts themselves or something distinct? Those who argued that the perception of perception needs two acts—the direct act by which the object is perceived and the reflexive act by which the direct act is perceived—typically attributed the reflexive second-order act to the common

⁶ One might think that both allow for the necessity of perceiving proper sensibles, but the latter deny that the external senses can also perceive the common sensibles. The pattern would be reminiscent of the Avicennian idea of apprehending intentions: they come to the soul *via* sensible species but are not apprehended by the senses. This would be a genuine difference between these two views. Then again, at least Avicenna would probably find the whole question bizarre because he thinks that the common sense and the external senses are only aspects of one perceptual capacity. The central question which should be asked in relation to these thinkers is: “What does ‘sensing something by an external sense’ mean?” It is not obvious that Avicenna and Aquinas would think that the external senses could sense the common sensibles *without* the common sense. Thus, the relation between the external senses and the common sense is a crucial issue. But, as I said, it is not an issue to be discussed here.

⁷ *DA* 3.2, 425^b12–25; *Somn.* 2, 455^a12–21; *Sens.* 2, 437^a27–28. For discussion, see, e.g., Everson 1997, 141–8; Caston 2002, 751–815.

sense. Understood in this way, an external object is seen by an act of the faculty of sight, and the act of the faculty of sight is perceived by a distinct act of the common sense. The rationale for this distinction was the alleged fact that the external senses are incapable of reflexively turning onto themselves. I cannot see my eyes, and therefore I cannot see the acts that take place in my eyes either. As the discussion evolved, the participants came to present ideas which are very close to (if not identical with) modern distinctions between pre-reflexive phenomenal experiences of acts and reflexive attention directed to the same acts. The idea behind this distinction is that we experience our cognitive acts as our own, and thus we are aware of the acts themselves without reflexively focussing on those acts as objects—indeed, it has been lately argued that this kind of pre-reflexive awareness of one's own cognitive acts is a necessary prerequisite for being conscious of the objects of these acts⁸. Whether one becomes conscious of one's own cognitive acts by just having these acts, or by a second-order act that takes the first act as an object, is and was a disputed question. Tellingly, nowadays there is no more agreement on this matter than there was in the Middle Ages. Both views are and were constantly defended.⁹

Those who favoured the view that reflexive acts are separate from the direct acts of perception usually attributed second-order perception to the common sense. This is in line with what Aristotle seems to say in his remarks concerning the issue¹⁰. In fact, medieval authors were quite unanimous on this matter. However, this raises one particularly interesting question which concerns the object of second-order perception. What does the common sense perceive when it provides the subject with an awareness of occurrent perception? If we take it that a second-order act is actually distinct from a first-order act—as for instance Olivi

⁸ Dan Zahavi, *Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1999).

⁹ See, e.g., *DT* 15.12.21–2; Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, 2.4.7; *De veritate* 10.10; *ST* I.78.4 & 87.3; *II Sent.* q. 79, 158–69; Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem* I.14 & II.12 (*OT* IX, 78–82, 165–7); Anonymous (tentatively attributed to John Buridan), *Quaestiones De anima, de prima lectione*, in *Le Traité de l'âme de Jean Buridan*, ed. B. Patar, *Philosophes Médiévaux* 29 (Louvain-la-Neuve/Longueuil: Éditions de l'I.S.P./Les Éditions du Préambule, 1991), III.11, 461–5; Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*, vol. 2, ed. S. Castellote (Madrid: Editorial Labor, 1981), disp. 6, q. 4. For discussion, see Mikko Yrjönsuuri, “The Structure of Self-Consciousness: A Fourteenth-Century Debate,” in Heinämaa, Lähteenmäki & Remes 2007, 141–52. Modern literature on this topic is quite voluminous. One may begin with Zahavi 1999, and David M. Rosenthal, *Consciousness and Mind* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).

¹⁰ Especially in *Sens.* 2. However, it must be noted that Aristotle probably did not think that direct acts and the reflexive acts are different. Since he conceived of the perceptual capacity as essentially one, as we have seen (in Part I, Chapter 3.1), he would probably say that a direct act (by which an external object is seen) is an act of the perceptual capacity as a whole, and as such it is discussed under the term *koinē aisthēsis*. Thus, even though Aristotle might have been read as saying that the perception of perception belongs to the common sense, he does not necessarily mean that it is different from a direct act of perception. This explanation is, of course, open to other thinkers as well. Hence, second-order perception was not attributed to the common sense only by those who favoured the idea that a direct act differs from the act by which a direct act of perception is perceived.

thinks it is—it does not seem plausible that the object of the second-order act would be the same external object as is perceived by the first-order act. With this option ruled out, there remains at least two alternatives, at least in Olivi's system: either the common sense perceives the physiological changes that take place in the organs of the senses when they act, or it perceives the acts themselves as they exist in the faculties of the soul. I shall discuss Olivi's stance on this below.

Now, let us turn to Olivi and see what he has to say about these three functions. I shall begin by shortly looking at his remarks on the question concerning the common sensibles, then I shall discuss second-order perception, and finally I shall consider the functions of combining and discerning between different kinds of perceptual acts and their contents.

12.2 Perception of the Common Sensibles

Olivi breaks little ground with respect to the above-mentioned functions but follows the lines of antecedent discussions, taking sides with some authors and opposing some others. This is especially clear in the comments he makes in relation to the common sensibles and the apprehension thereof. The comments are scarce: I have found only one passage that is directly related to the matter. Olivi's near silence on this matter may reflect a wider development, namely, a decline of importance of the questions concerning the common sensibles. Judging on the basis of Olivi's work and that of another important figure of the latter half of the 13th century, John Duns Scotus, who does not discuss the common sensibles either (Steneck 1970, 110), one gets the impression that at that time perception of the common sensibles was not a significant topic for philosophical investigation, at least not in Franciscan circles. To be sure, it is too hasty to reach a final judgement based on such scant evidence, but at least it is clear that Olivi does not consider the issue as an important one.

However, as I already mentioned, Olivi is not silent about the common sensibles. When dealing with the external senses and their distinctness from each other, he presents a counter-argument according to which the external senses do not differ from each other because they apprehend: "the place, magnitude, unity or plurality, and continuity or discontinuity of their objects."¹¹ Even though the list does not correspond perfectly to Aristotle's set of common sensibles¹², it is clear that the items in the list are portrayed as such. Thus, the objection draws on the idea that the common sensibles are common, meaning they can be apprehended by several external senses rather than just by one. The gist of the argument is that since the common sensibles can be apprehended by more than one exter-

¹¹ "[...] situm sui obiecti et magnitudinem et unitatem vel pluralitatem et continuitatem vel discontinuitatem." (*II Sent.* q. 60, 570.)

¹² In comparison to the one in *DA* III.1, Olivi's list lacks movement, rest, and figure, and adds location. Moreover, it seems that Olivi divides number and unity into two opposites (number into unity and plurality; unity into continuity and discontinuity).

nal sense, the senses cannot be understood as essentially distinct faculties: rather, as one perceptual capacity.

Now, as we have seen, Olivi does not accept the substantial unity between the external senses, and thus he is obliged to refute this argument:

[...] the same faculty apprehends its proper object as well as the circumstances under which the proper object is presented to the faculty and the circumstances according to which the *aspectus* of the faculty reaches them. This is not to apprehend two objects but the one object of the faculty under certain circumstances (*unum circumstantiatum*). In this way, all the senses apprehend the place and quantity of their proper objects not as if these were objects in themselves (*habeant per se rationem obiecti*) but only inasmuch as they are circumstances of the proper object of the sense in question.¹³

The common sensibles that appear in this passage include site, quantity, and figure. It is a scant list which lacks not only many Aristotelian items but also some of the items presented in the above-mentioned objection to which this passage is a response. This proves, to my mind, that Olivi's intention here is not to present an exhaustive list of the common sensibles but only some illustrative examples. We cannot know, therefore, on the basis of this passage what the common sensibles are according to him.

Olivi also points out that the common sensibles are not in fact common to several external senses because we do not perceive the same common sensibles by different senses. Both the eyes and the ears can sense the quantities of their proper objects—the eyes see the size of a certain coloured surface, and the ears hear the volume of a certain voice—but the quantities they apprehend are not numerically the same quantities. The eyes do not see the quantity of a voice, and it is impossible for the ears to hear quantities of visible objects. Therefore the “sameness” of the “common sensible” is just an impression. (*II Sent.* q. 60, 573. Note, however, that Olivi does not explicitly adhere to this view.)

This observation already suggests that Olivi departs from the idea that the perception of the common sensibles is something over and above the perception of the proper sensibles. He construes the perception of the former in an interesting way. He thinks that the common sensibles are not objects of perception, rather, conditions under which the external objects are perceived. When a cat sees a mouse in the corner, it sees the grey colour of its fur. However, it does not see the grey colour as such, but it sees it as located in a certain place, as having a particular figure, as being in movement, and so forth. In other words, the visible qualities of the mouse are conditioned in many ways: among other things, the

¹³ “[...] eiusdem potentiae est apprehendere suum proprium obiectum et illas circumstantias eius sub quibus sibi offertur et secundum quas ab aspectu potentiae attingitur, nec hoc est apprehendere duo obiecta, sed suum unum circumstantiatum. Et hoc modo quilibet sensus apprehendit situm vel quantitatem sui proprii obiecti, non quasi habeant per se rationem obiecti, sed solum prout sunt circumstantiae proprii obiecti huius sensus vel illius.” (*II Sent.* q. 60, 572–3.)

grey colour has figure, it is located in a certain place, and it moves. The cat sees the mouse by seeing its colour, but seeing the colour of the mouse entails also seeing the conditions under which the mouse exists at that moment.

Olivi therefore not only accepts the idea that the common sensibles cannot be perceived without perceiving some proper sensible; he also denies the common sensibles the status of an object. It is not so much that the cat could not see the mouse's location without seeing its colour—even though that is true also. Rather, it cannot see the mouse's location as such because location is not an object that can be perceived. What it sees is the mouse (or, to be precise, the grey colour of its fur) at a specific location.

The same goes for the other common sensibles: the cat could not see the figure, size, movement, or any other such thing without seeing the colour which is apprehended by its perceptual system under these conditions. Presumably, Olivi also thinks that the proper sensibles cannot be perceived without apprehending at least some of the common sensibles, since he claims that the proper sensibles are presented to the senses and to the *aspectus* under these conditions. That is, the cat could not see the colour of the mouse without seeing it in a specific location, and so on. Proper sensibles are the objects of perception, but they are necessarily conditioned by what are known as common sensibles. This means also that because the common sensibles as such are not objects of perception, their apprehension is not something that the common sense would add to the sensation of a proper sensible. The perceiving of the common sensibles is not a function of the common sense. Rather, this function is carried out by the external senses themselves—although as far as Olivi thinks that the functioning of the external senses and conscious perception require the activity of the common sense, this distinction cannot be applied to his thought without qualifications.

12.3 Second-Order Perception

Olivi discusses also the possibility of second-order perception. His most extensive treatment of second-order cognitive acts concerns only the acts of the intellectual level of the soul, that is, knowing and loving (*II Sent.* q. 78 & 79, 157–70), but occasionally he discusses the same phenomenon also on the sensitive level, and thus we are able to draw a reliable picture of Olivi's conception of the perception of perception. It needs to be said at the outset that this topic is relevant also from the point of view of Olivi's ideas concerning self-cognition, and therefore certain aspects of second-order awareness of one's acts of perception are not dealt with here but in Part III of this study. In this chapter, I shall discuss only second-order perception by which animals become conscious of the acts of their external senses; by contrast, the third part analyses Olivi's ideas that pertain to the possibility of a reflexive apprehension of the acts of the common sense. Moreover, this chapter deals with the phenomenological aspects of perception which

seem to be a result of second-order perception, whereas in Part III I approach the issue from the point of view of second-order consciousness, by which the subject is in a way conscious of herself as the subject of conscious perception.

That said, we must begin by asking why Olivi thinks that it is necessary to posit the capability of perception of perception in the first place. The context in which he takes up this issue has to do with the distinction between the common sense and the external senses, and he endeavours to prove that the sensitive soul must provide a common unifying centre in which the external senses converge. After presenting two arguments in favour of this view, Olivi invokes Augustine's authority and cites approvingly from the second book of *De libero arbitrio*. The citation is worth repeating here in its entirety:

It is obvious that the interior sense perceives not only the objects of the five senses but also the external senses themselves. An animal would not move itself to pursue or flee from something unless it perceived its own perceiving, for example, in seeing. The animal could never open its eyes and look around to find what it wanted to see unless it perceived that it did not see that thing with its eyes closed or stationary. But if it perceives that it does not see when it is not seeing, it must also perceive that it does see when it is seeing, because it is not the same appetite that moves the eyes when it is seeing as when it is not seeing. This shows that it perceives both.¹⁴

The crucial idea in this argument is that an intentional action would not be possible without perceiving one's perceptions or lack thereof (by intentional action I mean an action that has a certain purpose, for example, satisfying some desire or preserving one's life and well-being). According to the above example, when an animal desires to see something but its eyes are either closed or directed in such a way that it does not see the desired object, it opens its eyes and keeps turning its head and eyes until the object is in view. What is required for it to be able to act like this? How does the animal know to open its eyes in order to satisfy its desire

¹⁴ "Manifestum esse per sensum interiorem non tantum sentiri obiecta quinque sensuum, sed etiam ipsos. Non enim bestia aliter moveret se appetendo aliquid vel fugiendo, nisi se sentire sentiret, verbi gratia, in visu. Nam aperire oculum et movere aspiciendo ad id quod videre appetit nullo modo posset, nisi oculo clauso vel non ita moto se illud non videre sentiret. Si autem sentit se non videre, dum non videt, necesse est quod etiam sentiat se videre, dum videt, quia videns non movet oculum cum eo appetitu cum quo movet, quando non videt et per hoc iudicat se utrumque sentire." (*II Sent.* q. 62, 588–9.) Olivi's citation is not verbatim, but it conveys well the meaning of the text that it draws on, namely, Augustine's *De lib. arb.* 2.4.10. Augustine's text goes as follows: "Arbitror etiam illud esse manifestum, sensum illum interiorem non ea tantum sentire quæ accepit a quinque sensibus corporis, sed etiam ipsos ab eo sentiri. Non enim aliter bestia moueret se uel adpetendo aliquid uel fugiendo, nisi se sentire sentiret, non ad sciendum, nam hoc rationis est, sed tantum ad mouendum, quod non utique aliquo illorum quinque sentit. Quod si adhuc obscurum est, elucescet, si animaduertas quod exempli gratia sat est in uno aliquo sensu, uelut in uisu. Namque aperire oculum et mouere aspiciendo ad id quod uidere adpetit nullo modo posset, nisi oculo clauso uel non ita moto se id non uidere sentiret. Si autem sentit se non uidere dum non uidet, necesse est etiam sentiat se uidere dum uidet, quia, cum eo adpetitu non mouet oculum uidens, quo mouet non uidens, et indicat se utrumque sentire."

to see? Augustine's answer is that the animal must perceive that it does not see. If brute animals were not able to perceive that they do not see when their eyes are closed, they would not open their eyes in order to see. And, the argument goes on: since they are capable of perceiving that they do not see when they actually are not seeing, they must be able to perceive that they see when they do so.

The heart of Olivi's argument, which Augustine is supposed to support, is very close to its inspiration:

[...] there must be some faculty in the sensitive soul (*in sensu*) of even brute animals which apprehends the acts of the external senses—which they [viz the senses] cannot do themselves [...] For, there must be an appetitive power which controls the movements of animals and moves them by commanding them in one direction one moment and in the opposite direction the next moment; it could not do this unless it were accompanied by a faculty which tells it all its commands and the mode of commanding. Therefore, as it is necessary that the appetitive power controls all the bodily members and senses which it leads to their acts or detaches from them, it is likewise necessary that it is assisted by a judging [faculty] which makes judgements in relation to all of their [viz the bodily members and senses] acts, notices their pleasures and pains, and prefers or shows a preference of one over the other.¹⁵

The basic idea behind Olivi's argument is that animal action is governed and ultimately caused by the sensitive appetite, which is the appetitive faculty of the sensitive soul and the seat of emotions and desires¹⁶. However, since the sensitive appetite is not a cognitive faculty, it cannot have the necessary information for directing a subject's actions by itself. It needs the common sense to provide the information on the basis of which it does this directing. The common sense is the cognitive faculty that provides the consciousness of those things that become objects for the acts of the sensitive appetite. This means that when, say, a dog desires a piece of meat, it cognises the meat by the common sense and the meat thus cognised becomes an object for the desire. But as the previous passage tells us, Olivi thinks that in addition to providing information of external objects, the common sense must bring about a consciousness of the activity of the senses. Otherwise animals could not apply their senses to different objects according to their desires. In this way, Olivi's argument is similar to that of Augustine, even though it remains something of a stub: a desire to see a certain kind of object in the external world results in the eyes moving because the subject is conscious that

¹⁵ “[...] oportet in sensu, etiam brutorum, aliquam potentiam dare apprehendentem actus particularium sensuum, quod ipsi facere non possunt, saltem sic plene, sicut oportet per aliquam potentiam fieri. Oportet enim dare aliquam potentiam appetitivam, imperantem motum animalium et imperando moventem nunc ad hoc nunc ad oppositum; quod facere non potest, nisi habeat secum aliquam potentiam sibi dictantem omnia quæ imperat et imperandi modum. Ergo sicut illam appetitivam oportet dominari omnibus membris et sensibus quos ad suos actus applicat vel ab eis retrahit: sic oportet unam iudicativam sibi assistere quæ de omnibus actibus eorum iudicet et eorum delectationes vel dolores advertat et alteram alteri præferat vel præferendam ostendat.” (*II Sent.* q. 62, 587–8.)

¹⁶ For an extensive study of medieval conceptions of emotions, see Knuutila 2004, 177–286.

it does not see that kind of object at that moment. Intentional action presupposes perception of one's perceptions.

This is how the argument goes. However, it is still not easy to see what Augustine and Olivi have in mind when they argue for the necessity of the perception of perception for intentional action. What does "to perceive one's sensations" actually mean? In the case of human beings, we could perhaps say that second-order perception is tantamount to having propositional knowledge of one's acts of sensation. This conception would mean that whenever I form a second-order act, the object of which is the direct act of sensing, I would direct my attention to my perception itself and deliberately think about what is going on in my mind when I perceive external objects. Olivi thinks that this is possible, but it seems to me that this is not what he has in mind when he discusses second-order perception. First, this kind of reflection of one's acts of perception requires the intellect, and as such it is not perception proper. Second, at least Augustine's original text makes it clear that the idea is not to attribute knowledge, or even the perception of a first-order act as an object, to animals. There is no reason to suppose that Olivi's idea would have departed from Augustine's even though Olivi is less explicit on the matter.

Hence, the first-order act of sensation is not something an animal is conscious of as an object. Rather, the perception of perception (i.e., the awareness of a first-order act) is a necessary part of the conscious experience as a whole. It figures in the phenomenal experience somehow, but it is not present in a similar way as are the objects of the first-order acts of sensation. An animal sees an external object, and an awareness of the act of seeing is part of the perceptual consciousness of that object but is not an object of perception itself.

We may ask what kind of role second-order perception has and what kind of consciousness it brings about. It seems to me that there are two ideas that are accounted for by appealing to second-order perception. First, if my analysis of the conscious perception of external objects (which is presented in Chapters 6.2 and 6.3) is correct, second-order perception renders the subject explicitly conscious of the object of the first-order act of sensation—it causes her to wake up to the sound of an alarm clock, for instance. The subject is only peripherally conscious of the sound before the common sense forms a second-order act of perception, and when it does, the subject consciously notices the object.

The other feature of phenomenal experience that a second-order act brings about is related to the mode of sensing. Second-order perception seems to provide a kind of consciousness of the psychological process by which the subject cognises external objects. Perception involves not only a consciousness of the external object but also of the way in which the external object is apprehended, and this is necessary for intentional action.¹⁷

Let me illustrate this interpretation with an example. Suppose a bird desires a worm but sees nothing because its eyes are shut. As it has an actual desire of a worm, it must be conscious of a worm—it was commonly thought in medieval times that desire necessarily entails an object—and the only way it can

¹⁷ This idea is supported by Olivi's conception of dreaming. See the discussion below, in Chapter 13.1.

be conscious of a worm is by imagining it. Now, in this case the content of the phenomenal consciousness of the bird includes only the worm as it imagines the object of its desire. The imaginative act provides the bird with the consciousness of the worm, but without adding anything else to the bird's consciousness, we cannot account for the action of the eyes opening, at least if Augustine and Olivi are correct. As Augustine points out, the bird has to be aware that it does not see, if it is to open its eyes. The desire to find the worm turns into the action of opening the eyes only if the bird is aware that it does not see. Thus, it is not enough to posit a consciousness of an object; it is necessary that the bird be aware of the mode in which the object is cognised (i.e., by imagining) and of the way in which it is not cognised (i.e., by seeing).

Let us further suppose that when the bird opens its eyes, it sees a dog. Now the content of the bird's consciousness includes the worm and the dog. We can think that the bird has an image of a worm and an image of a dog in its mind. However, if it were not conscious of the acts that bring about the consciousness of these objects, it would lack the consciousness of the modes in which it is conscious of the dog and the worm. And if it were not conscious that it sees the dog and imagines the worm, it would not be able to do anything.

This analysis, I take it, is the crux of the argument that Augustine and Olivi put forth. In order for perception to turn into action, one must be conscious not only of the object of perception but also of the way in which the perceived object has entered the cognitive system, so to speak. So, we must add a further level to the bird's consciousness: it must be conscious not only of the worm as such but of the worm as imagined (and not perceived). Similarly, it must be conscious not only of the dog as such but of the dog as perceived (and not imagined or remembered or anything similar). In other words, we must add the consciousness of the acts by which the objects are apprehended. When this level is added, the content of the bird's phenomenal consciousness is much richer. Not only it is conscious of the dog and the worm but also of the acts by which it is conscious of the two animals. The bird becomes conscious that it is conscious of the dog by seeing, and therefore it knows that it must move its eyes in order to eliminate the sight of the dog to see the worm.¹⁸

In this way, to be conscious of an external object is not sufficient for taking action: animals must be conscious also of the mode by which they are conscious of the object. They perceive that they see (instead of hear) the desired object. Only by being conscious of the mode of apprehension is a being capable of using its faculties appropriately.¹⁹ However, this does not entail that first-order acts of

¹⁸ According to Eleonore Stump, Aquinas' theory of perception involves some problems, one of which is that it cannot account for the phenomenal distinction between imagination and perception. Being conscious of a perceived object takes place in such a way that the phantasy is actualised by a sensible species; and imagining occurs exactly in the same way. (Stump 1999, 170–8.) I do not want to take position on whether Stump has interpreted Aquinas correctly, but it is interesting to note that Olivi seems to account for this problem by the ability of second-order perception which makes the distinction phenomenally available to the perceiver. See also Chapter 13 below.

¹⁹ This interpretation is supported also by Olivi's discussion of the unity between the common sense and the imagination (*II Sent.* q. 63, 600). He argues that non-human animals

sensation are taken as objects in themselves. As I claimed above, second-order consciousness only figures in the experience by adding something to the apprehension of an external object. The bird does not attentively perceive its first-order acts. Its attention is directed to the external objects, and second-order perception only enables it to be conscious of the external objects “as seen” or “as imagined”.

According to Olivi, the perception of perception belongs to the common sense and not to the external senses. This is because he thinks that the external senses are incapable of reflexively turning upon their own activity (see, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 58, 495). As I have argued in the first part of this study, Olivi thinks that by apprehending the acts of the external senses and through them the external objects, the common sense provides the subject with explicit phenomenal consciousness of the objects of those acts. This takes place in such a way that the common sense turns its attention to the senses and their acts and produces an act of perception which somehow simultaneously pertains to the external object and to the first-order act in the faculty of sight. And in this way, the act of the common sense functions as a second-order act of perception, the object of which is the first-order act in the faculty of sight. By the aid of this first-order act of seeing, the act of the common sense enables the subject to apprehend the external object. The subject is provided with a phenomenal consciousness of the external object. In addition to this, the second-order act of the common sense provides consciousness of the act of seeing itself, thus making the subject conscious of the object *as seen*.²⁰

Olivi clearly thinks that the second-order acts of the common sense are different from the direct acts of the external senses. This observation is supported by the fact that he understands the common sense as being distinct from the external senses and also because he is inclined to think that reflexive acts are different from direct acts even at the intellectual level²¹. He is generally inclined towards deeming second-order acts of cognition as separate from first-order acts, and his considerations concerning the relation between the common sense and the exter-

are conscious that the objects they imagine or remember are not present to the senses. This attests that he conceives of animals as capable of being conscious not only of the objects but also of the mode in which these objects are presented to them.

²⁰ *II Sent.* q. 49, 12; *ibid.*, q. 62, 594–6; *ibid.*, q. 63, 599–600; *ibid.*, q. 79, 162. See also *ibid.*, q. 73, 94 (cited above, on p. 107), where Olivi points out that when we close one of our eyes, the common sense perceives that the act of seeing that was in that eye ceases from existing, and the act of seeing in the other eye remains. This shows that the common sense provides consciousness not only of the perceived object but also of the acts of sensing and that this kind of consciousness is an essential feature of the process of perception. Otherwise, the phenomenal experience of perceiving an external object would not change when one eye is closed: after all, we do still see the object with the other eye. If perception were to entail only consciousness of an object, the closing of the other eye should not make any difference.

²¹ In his discussion concerning the sameness of the direct act and the reflexive second-order act at the intellectual level, Olivi presents arguments in favour of both positions but does not strongly adhere to either of them. Although he slightly prefers the view that the acts are distinct, it seems that the main reason for this preference is Augustine’s authority: there are no compelling philosophical arguments for either direction. (*II Sent.* q. 79, 158–170.) Olivi reads Augustine’s stance from *DT* 15.12.21–2

nal senses confirm this. The common sense apprehends the acts of the external senses by producing acts that are different from the acts of the external senses. However, there is no need for two different acts in the common sense, one of which would apprehend the external object (with the aid of the act of the external sense) and the other the act of the external sense. Rather, it seems that Olivi's idea is that the common sense apprehends the act of the external sense *and* the external object by one and the same act, thus providing consciousness of the object and of the way in which the object is presented to consciousness. (*II Sent.* q. 62, 594.)

What exactly is the object of the second-order act of the common sense? Olivi gives us a confusing set of answers to this question, but on the basis of his view of the relation between physiological changes and cognitive acts, which I discussed above (in Chapter 7), the answer should be clear: the common sense apprehends the cognitive act, which is the actualisation of the potency to see (hear, or touch, etc.) and, as such, primarily a psychological change in the faculty of the soul and not a physiological change in the sense organ. I shall not enter into the details of Olivi's view here but only point out the important passages in which he deals with the issue and the principal ideas he presents. It must be noted that he does not address this question explicitly anywhere, and therefore we must (once again) rely on passages which figure in arguments that are designed to prove other things; thus, their argumentative role varies and is never explicitly related to our question. Moreover, Olivi is not very clear on the matter, as usual.

That said, here are the texts: (1) "Likewise, by the common sense we intimately perceive all the acts of the particular senses, their changes, and their appropriate or inappropriate dispositions."²² (2) "[...] a power that is impressed on a body can have an *aspectus* only towards those things that are present to the body in some bodily manner. This is why the common sense apprehends the acts of the external senses only insofar as the acts exist in their organs and are in some manner present to the organ of the common sense [...]"²³ (3) Nevertheless, in *II Sent.* q. 62, 594–6 Olivi says that the common sense apprehends nothing but the acts and *aspectus* of the external senses and that the movement of the *spiritus* in the eyes is apprehended by the sense of touch. (4) Also, he says explicitly: "But the common sense apprehends these acts [viz the acts of pain and pleasure] and also all the acts of the external senses which likewise seem to be simple and spiritual. Therefore, it seems that that by which they are apprehended by the common sense is simple and spiritual."²⁴ (5) And, finally, we must consider passages such

²² "Item, nos per sensum communem intime sentimus omnes actus sensuum particularium et immutationes eorum et debitam vel malam dispositionem ipsorum." (*II Sent.* q. 49, 12.)

²³ "[...] nulla virtus corpori impressa potest habere aspectum nisi ad ea quae ipsi corpori modo quodam corporali sunt praesentia, unde licet sensus communis apprehendat actus sensuum particularium, hoc tamen non fit, nisi prout ipsi existentes in suis organo fiunt praesentes aliquo modo organo sensus communis [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 59, 538.)

²⁴ "Sed isti actus apprehenduntur ab ipso sensu communi et etiam omnes alii actus sensuum particularium qui consimiliter videntur esse simplices et spirituales. Ergo videtur quod illud per quod apprehenduntur a sensu communi est simplex et spirituale." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 503.)

as *II Sent.* q. 61, 582–3, where Olivi says that the sense of touch apprehends the changes of its own organ (i.e., the whole body) but not the pain and pleasure that result from those changes. The reason for this is that the sense of touch is incapable of apprehending its own acts—the common sense apprehends them.

The first and the second passages still seem to indicate that the common sense apprehends also the physiological changes in the organs and the physiological dispositions thereof. The first passage is supposed to show that the soul is in the whole body, and thus the changes and dispositions which the common sense apprehends may be understood as being changes and dispositions of the *organs*—it is not absolutely certain how the references of the pronouns should be read. One possible reading of the second passage is that the common sense apprehends the physiological changes of the organs. However, it seems to me that in the latter passage Olivi only wants to rule out the possibility that the common sense could perceive something completely incorporeal, and he wants to point out that there has to be some sort of connection between the brain and the organs of the external senses in order for the common sense to be capable of perceiving the acts of the latter. The central idea in the first text is not that the soul would apprehend the body (although it does so as well) but that it apprehends the acts in the whole body—whatever that means. At least it is clear that the physiological changes (such as the movement of the *spiritus* in the sense organs) is not perceived directly but by mediation of the sense of touch—this is what passages (3)–(5) tell us. On the basis of these passages, it seems to me that we may conclude that the common sense does not directly perceive the physiological changes of the sense organs. Rather, it perceives the simple and spiritual acts of the senses. This means that it perceives the acts of the soul's faculties as psychological operations rather than as physiological changes. This is in fact what one would expect Olivi to say, since it is by the acts of the common sense that living beings become conscious: it would be strange if Olivi were to say that animals are conscious of the movement of the spirits in the organs. They (and we) are conscious that they (and we) perceive, and physiological changes are apprehended only insofar as they are painful or pleasant, and even in this case they are apprehended through the sense of touch. Let me postpone the details of this analysis, however, and move now to the final function of the common sense, namely, its role as the unifying perceptual centre of the sensitive soul.

12.4 The Common Sense as a Unifying Centre

The common sense enables beings to perceive different perceptual qualities of one and the same external object in a way that renders perception unified. When a cat is prowling for a mouse, it sees a grey colour, smells an exciting scent, and hears squeaking. The content of the cat's experience includes the proper sensibles of all these three external senses, but it perceives them as being qualities of one and the same external object, the mouse. Similarly, the difference between the

proper sensibles of each of the external senses is apprehended by the common sense. None of the external senses can carry out these operations because they apprehend only their own proper objects and are incapable of apprehending the objects of the other senses (*II Sent.* q. 60, 571). Hence, Olivi thinks that the experiential unity and the comparison of different proper sensibles belongs to the common sense:

[the common sense] apprehends and discerns objects of the diverse external senses simultaneously. No external sense can do this [...] If you say that this can be done by two faculties, [I answer] against your claim that to compare one thing to another—or to perceive their mutual difference and comparison—is one act which is related to two extremes and has the mutual comparison as one object. And one act must come from one faculty.²⁵

Olivi's idea is that two separate faculties (such as sight and hearing) cannot account for the mutual comparison between the objects of those faculties. There must be a common unifying centre which enables the comparison, and this centre is the common sense. In this way, Olivi accepts the common medieval understanding that one of the functions of the common sense is to combine and compare the objects of the external senses. In this respect he does not say anything new.

We can find, however, certain interesting ideas from Olivi's discussion of this function of the common sense. For, it is important to note that his way of understanding the role of the common sense as a unifying centre accentuates its function as being the provider of consciousness: one does not become conscious of external objects by the activity of the external senses alone. The common sense and its activity are needed. This idea is clearly presupposed when Olivi states how the common sense compares different perceptual qualities to each other because the common sense must perceive the *objects* of the external senses in order to be able to perform this operation. It is not sufficient that the external senses apprehend external objects. The common sense must apprehend those objects as well, if it is to combine and distinguish the information it receives through the external senses. This idea is clearly visible in the following passage:

We can find also a third [genus of the combination of the soul's acts, namely] the combination of several acts of different natures (*ratio*), to wit, when the common sense judges that an act of hearing and a sound that is heard differ from a vision of light. For this act is composed of three acts. Two of them are as if material in respect to the third. Namely, the common sense must apprehend the objects and acts of both vision and hearing. But the apprehension of one is different from and belongs to other species than the apprehension

²⁵ “[sensus communis] obiecta diversorum sensuum in simul apprehendit et diiudicat, quod nullus exteriorum sensuum potest [...] Si vero dicas hoc posse per duas potentias fieri: contra hoc est, quia comparare unum alteri aut eorum mutuam differentiam et comparationem sentire est unus actus ad duo extrema relatus et utriusque mutuam comparationem habens pro uno obiecto; idem autem actus oportet quod sit ab una potentia.” (*II Sent.* q. 62, 587.)

of the other. In addition to this, there is an apprehension or discernment of the distinction which is between them. And as there cannot be a union or composition of extremes without these extremes (although union and composition is really different from them), so there cannot be an apprehension of a diversity or concurrence of many objects without the aforementioned double apprehension of them. And as these two acts are connected under the third act, they bring about one complete act of full judgement with the third act.²⁶

We can see that the common sense is the subject of perceiving not only the acts of hearing and seeing but also sound and light. Moreover, the cited text shows explicitly that the common sense is capable of performing several cognitive acts simultaneously. All this attests to Olivi conceiving of the role of the common sense as a provider of consciousness, and therefore he sees consciousness not as a function of all the faculties of the soul but as a function of the highest cognitive faculty, which is the common sense in the case of non-human animals.

At this point it is important to be absolutely clear on one thing: the unifying of different cognitive acts necessarily belongs to one faculty according to Olivi. His point in the previous passages is that the mutual comparison of two cognitive acts presupposes that those acts somehow take place in one and the same faculty. Even the common sense is incapable of uniting and comparing the objects of the external senses unless it perceives them by its own acts. The common sense cannot judge that white is not sweet if whiteness and sweetness are apprehended only by the external senses. Instead, the common sense must perceive whiteness and sweetness by apprehending them through the acts of the external senses, and only by doing so it is capable of making a judgement. The common sense perceives the acts of the external senses by producing cognitive acts which take the acts of the external senses as their objects. By producing these acts it makes the subject conscious of both the objects and the acts of the senses, in the way described above. The acts that bring about consciousness of the external objects remain distinct in the common sense, but because they are actualised in one and the same faculty, they can be compared to each other. This comparison is done by a third act of the common sense.

This is an important idea in many ways. Not only does it confirm that the common sense functions as the centre of consciousness, but in addition to this it is one of the main reasons Olivi thinks that the internal senses cannot be separate faculties (as was seen in Chapter 11.2). Olivi's strategy in the questions which are

²⁶ "Invenitur etiam tertio ibi compositio ex pluribus actibus diversarum rationum, ut, cum sensus communis iudicat actum auditionis et sonum auditum differre a visione lucis. Actus enim iste ex tribus actibus est conflatus. Quorum duo sunt quasi materiales respectu tertii; nam oportet quod sensus communis apprehendat utraque obiecta, visus scilicet et auditus, et actus eorum. Apprehensio autem unius est alia et alterius speciei ab apprehensione alterius. Et præter hoc est ibi apprehensio seu diiudicatio diversitatis quæ est inter ea. Et sicut unio vel compositio extremorum non potest esse sine eis, quamvis realiter differrat ab eis: sic nec apprehensio diversitatis aut convenientiæ plurium obiectorum potest esse sine præfata duplici apprehensione ipsorum. Et hinc est quod illi duo actus, ut sunt sub tertio connexi, faciunt cum tertio unum totalem actum pleni iudicii." (*II Sent.* q. 79, 162.)

devoted to the unity of the internal senses is to point out that the functions of the internal senses necessarily include an act of the common sense by means of which a subject becomes conscious of an object. The apprehension of an object is an essential feature of all the other functions which were traditionally attributed to other internal senses. The activity of the common sense is, therefore, an essential part of these functions.

Given Olivi's conviction that two cognitive acts can be brought together or related to each other only if one and the same faculty somehow apprehends both, either there must be a superior faculty that apprehends the acts and the contents of the acts of the common sense and combines them with the information which is provided by the other internal senses, or the common sense apprehends also the information which was typically attributed to the other internal senses. In this way, Olivi extends the application of the idea that unifying and making a comparison between two different types of objects must belong to one faculty: it applies not only to the proper objects of the external senses but also to the higher psychological functions. The common sense must be the subject of all these functions. And to these functions I shall now turn, as they are the subject matter of the ensuing chapters.

13 IMAGINATION

13.1 The Imagination and Its Objects

The next faculty Olivi introduces in his discussion about the unity of the internal senses is the imagination. He conceives of the role of the imagination slightly differently than many important figures before him, even though there are also significant similarities between Olivi's ideas and those presented in the earlier tradition. One of the similarities is the general idea that the imagination accounts for the ability to apprehend absent objects. Thus, for example, Avicenna claims that the imagination (*imaginatio*) retains sensible species and accounts for the ability to imagine things that are no longer present for the external senses to perceive. This is one of the functions that was often attributed to the imagination. Another function is the ability to imagine fantastic things that either do not exist at all or at least have never been perceived by the subject, such as golden mountains and chimæras. Usually the imagining of these kinds of objects was thought to take place by combining sensible species with each other. Such fantasising was sometimes understood as a function of the imagination, and sometimes it was attributed to yet another internal sense. For instance, Avicenna thinks that fantasising is a function of an active imaginative power (*imaginativa*), which is distinct from the passive imagination. All animals have both, but the active compositive imagination functions in a more elaborate way in human beings. Aquinas, by comparison, argues that these two functions belong to one and the same faculty, the imagination (*phantasia sive imaginatio*). Both human and non-human animals have this faculty, but Aquinas explicitly denies that non-human animals could fantasise about things that they have never seen: this operation is possible only for human beings. (*Shifā' De an.* I.5, 87–89; *ST* I.78.4.)

Olivi's theory is similar to that of Aquinas to the extent that Olivi discusses both of these functions under one general term and does not even consider the possibility that they might be two distinct faculties¹. He acknowledges that both

¹ In contrast to Aquinas, however, Olivi prefers the term *imaginativa*, often without connecting it to any noun.

human and non-human animals are capable of imagining absent objects and that human beings can also deliberately fantasise about things which they have never seen. In other words, Olivi's conception of the psychological functions which can be called imaginative follows the tradition closely. But this is where the similarities end. First, Olivi thinks that it is unnecessary to postulate a separate faculty for performing these functions. Both of them belong to the common sense. Second, he understands the process of imagining an absent object in a way that differs radically from the traditional idea that the imagining of absent objects is conducted by the same faculty that retains the sensible species. As Olivi discards the sensible species, it is natural for him to reject also the role of the imagination as a storehouse of species. Third, he attributes the ability to imagine unreal objects (or objects that the subject has not seen before) also to non-human animals. He seems to think that there are two kinds of fantasising: one is deliberate and possible only for human beings, whereas the other happens spontaneously, for example, in dreams. This is an idea which he may have received from Avicenna and, as such, not a deviation from the traditional understanding; but it is a deviation from Aquinas' downgrading of animals.

The distinctness of Olivi's conception of imagination is clear if we look at the way he thinks the imagining of absent objects takes place. He thinks that even if the imagination were a separate faculty from the common sense, it would not function as Avicenna and Aquinas claim. He discards the imagery of a storehouse, which was often applied to the imagination, and claims that the imagination does not retain anything. The task of the imaginative processes is not to store anything but to provide the subject with a consciousness of absent objects. This presumes, to be sure, that the images or representations of these objects must be retained somewhere, namely, in the memory. The common sense forms imaginative acts which are intentionally directed to kinds of internal representations of absent objects. These representations are not stored in the imagination, as in Avicenna and Aquinas, but in the memory.

In this way, imaginative acts are quite similar to acts of perception. Both are produced by the common sense, and both are intentional cognitive acts which bring about consciousness of their objects. Thus, we may ask: what is their difference? According to Olivi, intentional cognitive acts are structured in the following way: (1) a faculty (which is the subject of the cognitive act) causes (2) an act that is intentionally directed at (3) an object. Since the faculty is the same in both cases, the difference must be due either to the act or to the object. As we have seen, Olivi thinks that different kinds of acts of the soul are diversified because they belong to different faculties of the soul and, to some extent, because they pertain to different kinds of objects. Thus, the distinction between the imaginative and the perceptual acts of the common sense must be due to the difference in the objects, as the faculty which produces them is the same. The acts of perception are directed at external objects, and the imaginative acts are directed at so-called memory species (*species memorialis*):

[...] cognitive acts are produced by a faculty but not only by its bare essence. Rather, an actual *aspectus* which actually is terminated at an object is required

in every act. [...] Therefore, when an external thing itself is not the object of an *aspectus*, it is necessary that some memory species be the object of the *aspectus* instead of the thing. The memory species is not a principle of the cognitive act except in the manner of being a terminative and representative object [...]²

It is important to note that memory species are functionally not like the sensible species which figure in the species theories of perception. Olivi does not think that they would be principles which actualise the soul's cognitive faculties. Rather, the role of the memory species in the process of imagination is exactly the same as the role of an external object in perception: it functions as an object, as a *terminus* of the cognitive act. The imaginative acts are not caused by the memory species; they are *about* the memory species. As the memory species are representations of external objects³, the subject becomes conscious of these objects by directing the *aspectus* of the common sense to them (*II Sent.* q. 74, 115–6).

In this way, the difference between imaginative and perceptual acts of the common sense is subtle. The only difference is that the former pertain to mental representations of objects, whereas the latter are about external objects that are present to the senses. One and the same mind just concentrates on different things, but otherwise the acts are similar.

13.2 The Imagination as a Function of the Common Sense

Let us now look at some of Olivi's arguments in favour of his thesis about the unity of the imagination and the common sense. The underlying rationale of identifying these faculties is twofold: the receptive faculties should not be distinguished from the retentive ones (on the basis of this feature alone)⁴, and the imagining of absent objects is a psychological process that is so similar to perception that it is plausible that they are produced by the same faculty.

In addition to these general ideas, Olivi presents a host of other arguments. Only two of them are relevant to our inquiry here. The first argument is based on Olivi's idea that there can be only one faculty in the soul which apprehends all the acts of the other faculties and the objects of these acts. Olivi writes:

² “[...] actus cognitivus efficiuntur a potentia, non tamen per solam nudam essentiam eius, immo in omnibus exigitur actualis aspectus super obiectum actualiter terminatus. [...] Et ideo, quando res exterior per se non obicitur aspectui, oportet quod loco rei obiciatur aspectui aliqua species memorialis, quæ non est principium actus cognitivus nisi solum per modum obiecti terminativi et repræsentativi [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 74, 113; For more details, see *ibid.*, 115–117); “[...] species memoriales in quas tunc aspicit aspectus imaginantis [...]” (*ibid.*, q. 58, 504.)

³ See, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 74, 119, 121–2; Putallaz 1991a, 121.

⁴ “Ergo species memorialis seu imaginaria per ipsum facta conservatur in sola potentia sensus communis aut in eius organo, in quantum est eius. Ergo eius subsequens inspectio et cogitatio est eiusdem potentiae, in quantum est activa.” (*II Sent.* q. 63, 599.)

For, if the imaginative [faculty] is distinct from the common sense and superior to it (which it must necessarily be if it is distinct because it is posterior), then it must control the common sense in its act and consider (*iudicet*) its act and the acts of the inferior senses. This is obviously false and ridiculous.⁵

The point of this argument is that the imagination cannot be different from the common sense because if it were, it should be able to apprehend also the acts and objects of the common sense. Olivi takes it that it is more reasonable to think that imaginative acts belong to the common sense than to attribute the apprehension of the acts of the common sense to an imaginative faculty. There must be, even in the sensitive soul, a superior faculty that is capable of apprehending all the soul's acts and of providing consciousness of the objects of these acts, and Olivi thinks that this faculty is the common sense.

The other important argument which Olivi presents is based on the interconnectedness of the psychological functions. On the one hand, there are certain psychological functions that were often attributed to a distinct faculty of the imagination, like the imagining of absent objects. On the other hand, there are functions which were unanimously attributed to the common sense, like the perception of present objects *via* the external senses. Olivi thinks that if we can find a psychological process in which acts from these two groups are compared to each other, we have by the same token good reason to think that these two are functions from one and the same faculty. And Olivi is quick to find such a case:

For, the act of discerning that an imaginary species is not an external object but something else is higher than the mere imagining of the object. But the discernment is brought about by the common sense because this [*viz* the difference between an imagined and a real object] is discerned only while awake, and it occurs in such a way that the one who discerns notices that the image of the absent object is not situated outside the external senses or apprehended by them. Therefore, it is necessary that the same faculty compares the act of imagining to the acts of the external senses and perceives and deems a sensible difference between them. However, it is clear that apprehending the acts of the senses—when they occur—and considering them belong only to the common sense. Therefore, apprehending the acts of the imagination and considering them belong to it as well. This is, to my mind, the most powerful argument among the aforementioned because it is proved also by constant internal experience.⁶

⁵ “Quia si imaginativa est alia a sensu communi et superior illa, quod utique oportet, si est alia, quoniam erit posterior: tunc oportet quod ipsa regat sensum communem in suo actu et quod iudicet de eius actu et de actibus sensuum inferiorum. Quod aperte est falsum et ridiculosum.” (*II Sent.* q. 63, 598–9.)

⁶ “Quia actus, quo species imaginaria discernitur non esse ipsa res extra, sed esse aliud ab ipsa, est altior quam sola imaginatio eius. Sed illa discretio fit per sensum communem, quia hæc non discernitur nisi in vigilia, fitque per hoc quod discernens advertit illam imaginem rerum absentium non obici extra ipsis particularibus sensibus nec per eos apprehendi. Ergo oportet quod eadem potentia comparet tunc actum imaginandi ad actus exteriorum sensuum et quod sensibilem diversitatem sentiat et iudicet inter illos. Constat autem quod

According to this argument, to imagine an object and to discern that an object is imagined (and not perceived) are two different things. Normally, when a being imagines something, it (or she or he) is able to tell whether it imagines or perceives that thing. Olivi claims that this presupposes that it is conscious of the activity or inactivity of its senses: if the object is apprehended by the external senses, the subject is conscious of the object, but it is also conscious that it is perceiving the object. Similarly, if an object is apprehended by imagining, the subject is able to tell that the object is imagined because it is conscious that it *does not* perceive the object at that moment. Apparently, Olivi thinks that second-order perception is necessary for being able to distinguish imagined objects from perceived ones. If second-order perception of the activity/inactivity of the senses would lack for some reason, the subject could not tell the difference between, say, a mouse in front of its eyes and the same mouse as it appears to the subject when it is imagined.

The consciousness of the external senses' activity/inactivity belongs to the common sense. Therefore, the common sense takes part in the discernment of imaginative processes from perceptual ones. Now, if we suppose that the imagination is a distinct faculty from the common sense, we must conclude that when a being is conscious of the objects of its imagination as imagined, it is using both its imagination and its common sense. However, this is the point in which Olivi employs his criterion that the comparison between two cognitive acts and their contents is necessarily carried out by one faculty. One faculty has to apprehend both the imagined object and the inactivity of the senses. Otherwise the phenomena of imagining things and being conscious that they are imagined rather than perceived could not be accounted for. Hence, either there must be a superior faculty that apprehends both the acts of the common sense as well as the acts of the imaginative faculty, or one of these faculties apprehends not only its own acts and objects but also those of the other. From here it is only a short step to Olivi's first argument, which I presented above: the highest faculty cannot be the imagination. The common sense must be capable of apprehending imagined things, and this makes the imagination an unnecessary postulate. The principle of parsimony seems to be at work here.

Olivi takes up still another possible refutation to his argument that the psychological process of imagining an absent object as absent belongs to the common

solius sensus communis est apprehendere actus sensuum, dum fiunt, et iudicare de eis. Ergo et eius est apprehendere actus imaginationis et iudicare de eis. Et hæc ratio meo iudicio est inter prædictas fortissima, quia et experimento interno et assiduo comprobatur." (*II Sent.* q. 63, 599–600.) This is the text that most clearly accounts for the phenomenal difference between perception and imagination without appealing to an idea which was later employed by Ockham, namely, the differentiation of intuitive from abstractive cognition—Eleonore Stump argues that even though the distinction was probably not invented in order to account for this problem, in effect it does so (Stump 1999, 181–8; For discussion, see also Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, vol. I, Publications in Medieval Studies 26/1 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 501–6). We see that Olivi's idea is different and that it is explicitly associated with the problem of accounting for the difference.

sense. What if the common sense and imagination are distinct faculties and the comparison between the act of the common sense and the act of the imagination is carried out by the intellect? This would account for our ability to apprehend absent objects as absent without necessitating us to discard the difference between the common sense and the imagination: the intellect would be the unifying faculty in which all the other acts of the soul converge.

Olivi answers tersely that non-human animals also are capable of distinguishing absent objects from present ones:

For when a dog prefers a visible and present bone to a better bone (which it remembers and also desires) because it sees that the latter is not present; then it certainly discerns sensibly between absent and present. Likewise, when the dog returns to its master and his home, then it certainly remembers its master and perceives well that the thing which it remembers is not present because otherwise it would stay in place and would not proceed further to the master as it would to an absent thing. Therefore, it then clearly perceives that the thing which is presented in remembrance is not externally present, but absent.⁷

Olivi's reply points out that not only human beings but also non-human animals are conscious of the objects they imagine or remember not being present to their senses. We can see this simply by observing how animals behave. The counter-argument fails because it denies this ability to non-human animals: the comparison of and the interconnecting between various psychological processes cannot be done by the intellect—at least in the case of animals.

The cited passage is highly interesting, not only because it shows us again the degree of sophistication that Olivi attributes to the psychological processes of non-human animals but also because it confirms three interpretations of Olivi's thought that I have been discussing hitherto. First, it accentuates that Olivi understands the common sense as being the centre of consciousness in the case of non-human animals. It incorporates once more the idea that the common sense is the subject of the acts of the soul whose objects appear in their consciousness. Imagining and remembering cannot be brought about by distinct faculties because imagined and recollected things must be consciously present to animals—otherwise their actions cannot be accounted for. And imagined and remembered

⁷ "Quia quando canis præfert os visibile et præsens alteri ossi meliori memorato et etiam desiderato, quia videt illud sibi non sic adesse: utique tunc sensibiliter discernit inter absens et præsens. Item, quando redit ad suum dominum et ad domum eius: tunc utique recordatur de domino et bene sentit quod illud de quo recordabatur non est sibi præsens, quia tunc staret in illo et non procederet ultra ad illud tanquam ad absens. Ergo tunc aperte sentit quod illud quod sibi in recordatione offertur non est sibi extrinsecus præsens, sed absens." (*II Sent.* q. 63, 600.) Olivi uses the example of non-human animals which are capable of remembering absent things and which for this reason seek them out also in strikingly different contexts: see Petrus Ioannis Olivi, "Postilla super Isaiam," in *Peter of John Olivi on the Bible: Principia quinque in sacram Scripturam, Postilla in Isaiam et in Ad Corinthios*, ed. D. Flood & G. Gál (NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1997) (hereafter *Super Isaiam*), Prima pars, 204, 20–25.

things are present because they are imagined and remembered by acts of the common sense.

Second, it supports my reading of the phenomenal content of the second-order acts of perception, which I presented in Chapter 12.3 above. Olivi makes a clear distinction between being conscious of a cognitive act's object and being conscious also of the mode in which the object is present to the subject. If the dog were not conscious of its home as being absent, it would not attempt to go there, and it would stay where it is even if it were conscious of its home by imagining it. But it does not stay where it is because it *is* conscious that home is far away. The mere imagining of home is not sufficient for accounting the dog's action. It must be conscious of the way in which its home is present in its consciousness as well. This information comes from the common sense, which either perceives that the senses are not functioning at all or at least that their activity is not producing the image of home. In other words, the phenomenal description of the subject being conscious only of an object differs from the phenomenal description of the subject being conscious also of the process by which the object is present in its consciousness. Second-order perception accounts for the phenomenal difference.

The third important aspect of the passage is that it shows us the phenomenal difference between the imaginative and perceptual acts of the common sense: when imagining an object, the subject is conscious that the object is not being perceived (or, it is conscious of the object-as-not-perceived), and this is a part of the imaginative process as a whole. Undergoing an imaginative process is phenomenally different from perceiving. However, sometimes this difference does not exist: during a vivid dream one often is not conscious that the images one sees are not real and present to the senses.

13.3 Dreaming

When we are dreaming, we oftentimes are not conscious that what is happening to us in our dream is not real. Quite the contrary: we get an impression that reality is such as we dream it to be. Medieval philosophers usually thought that dream images are brought about by the same psychological process which accounts for our ability to form images in our minds and to bring absent things before our minds while we are awake. Dreaming is imagining, but it is a sort of imagining in which the subject is not conscious that she is imagining: the phenomenal difference between imagination and perception does not exist.

Olivi's conception of dreaming closely follows this medieval approach. He thinks that when we dream, we see dream images because our common senses are active and produce imaginative acts. He also endeavours to explain how the phenomenal difference between imagining and perceiving disappears while we sleep. Olivi's most extensive discussion concerning dreaming appears in a question which considers various explanations for the alleged fact that human beings are not free when they are asleep, in a state of madness, or children. According

to Olivi, the intellectual part of the soul can function to some extent also when a person is dreaming, mad, or a child, but it is not capable of producing free acts. The reason for this is that in these states the will is incapable of full reflexivity, and this causes changes in the operations of the intellect as well.⁸

We need not delve into the details of Olivi's view on this view in its entirety because it is mostly irrelevant to our present inquiry. Yet some of the passages in Olivi's discussion are highly interesting. When he addresses the causes which render freedom impossible for persons who are asleep, he provides us with a clear picture of his conception of dreaming. This picture helps us to see the role of the imaginative acts of the common sense and how they differ phenomenologically from the acts of perception⁹. It needs to be emphasised that non-human animals also dream according to Olivi (*II Sent.* q. 58, 506). Thus, the following ideas apply to them as well.

Dreaming is a state in which the common sense has only imaginative acts. These acts are directed at memory species, but they are not about the species as species, that is, as representations. The phenomenal content of an imaginative act is not a species as such but an object which is represented by the memory species. When a human (or animal) is dreaming without being conscious that she (or it) is dreaming, the dream image is not distinguished from a real object: "[...] when a thing is apprehended through a species and in the species as if through its image, it is not distinguished from the thing as something that is actually in itself, or as it is, present to the external senses."¹⁰ This means that the subject apprehends things in her dreams as if they were external things and not just images of those things. But this is not due to the nature of the species because:

[...] to apprehend a species as a thing (*species ut rem*) can be understood in two ways: [...] or because the species appears as if it were the external thing, a species of which it is. [...] If in the second way, it is clear that this [kind of apprehension] does not arise from the species in any other way than the species presenting itself to the gaze of the imagination (*aciei imaginationis*) or the intellect, instead of the external thing. But it does this every time a human being cognises something by it. Therefore, if [this kind of apprehension] were to arise from the species, human beings would always fall into the aforementioned error.¹¹

⁸ *II Sent.* q. 59, 530–54; *Quodl.* I.6–7, 22–6; *Super Gen.*, 125–6; Alain Boureau, "Pierre de Jean Olivi et le semi-dormeur: Une élaboration médiévale de l'activité inconsciente," *Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse* 48 (1993): 231–238.

⁹ The important passages are *II Sent.* q. 59, 534–6, 549–50, 553–7, 559, and 565.

¹⁰ "[...] res, prout est sic per speciem et in specie tanquam per suam imaginem apprehensa, non distinguatur a re, prout est quiddam actu in se ipsa aut prout est extrinsecis sensibus oblata." (*II Sent.* q. 59, 535.)

¹¹ "[...] apprehendere species ut rem potest intelligi dupliciter: aut [...] aut quia species videtur esse ipsa res exterior cuius est species. [...] Si vero secundo modo, constat quod hoc ex parte speciei esse non potest, nisi solum per hoc quod ipsa exhibet se aciei imaginationis vel intellectus loco ipsius rei exterioris. Sed hoc facit semper, quandocunque homo per eam aliquid cogitat. Ergo si ex parte eius hoc esset, semper incideret homo in supradicto errore." (*II Sent.* q. 59, 535.)

The content of an imaginative act does not in itself differ from the content of a perceptual act. When something is imagined and there are no other kinds of cognitive acts in the common sense—such as a second-order perception of the inactivity of the senses—the subject is not conscious that she is only imagining. Consciousness about the imaginative nature of the object of our imaginative act comes from some other source: the memory species and the act of imagining do not provide us with that sort of consciousness. As we have already seen, to be conscious of an imagined object as imagined requires that the common sense apprehends the activity/inactivity of the external senses and becomes thus capable of comparing the imagined object to the information it receives from the senses¹². A capability for second-order perception is necessary for being conscious of the imagined thing as being imagined.¹³

We can see that Olivi allows for no phenomenal difference between perceptual and imaginative acts if they are considered as such. If *per impossibile* there were an act of perception without a second-order perception of the act of perception, we could not tell the difference between a perceived object and an imagined object. The content of our consciousness would be the same in both cases: we would be conscious of the object and nothing else. It would not appear to us “as seen”, or “as imagined”.

It is difficult to conceive of what kind of phenomenal experience this kind of apprehension would be. Even dream images do not qualify as illustrative examples because when we dream, we apprehend objects as if we see, hear, or perceive them otherwise. Perhaps we can try to picture what kind of experience this “pure” consciousness of an object would be by trying to imagine something as vividly as possible while attempting to forget that we are conscious of the fact that we are not perceiving it. This seems impossible—which is probably one of the reasons why so many philosophers have been so convinced that perception necessarily involves the perception of perception. Also, Olivi thinks that even though we sometimes imagine things without being conscious that we are imagining them (when we are dreaming), it is impossible to perceive anything without being conscious that we are perceiving that thing. And even when we are imagining without being conscious that we are imagining, we are not conscious of the object as such. We are necessarily deceived that the object we are conscious

¹² Question 59 of *Summa* proves that in human beings the faculty that makes the comparison is the intellect, and question 63 tells us that the intellect needs the common sense in order to be able to apprehend the activity of the external senses.

¹³ Interestingly, Olivi acknowledges that sometimes even in our dreams we are conscious that we are not perceiving but imagining. This happens when we dream, but at the same time we are conscious that the things we see are in fact dream images. However, he calls this experience *dreaming* that one is dreaming (“homo in somnis aliquando somniat se somniare”) advisedly, for he argues that being conscious of having a dream is in itself a dream. Although it seems to us that we are awake to some extent when we are conscious that we are only dreaming, Olivi thinks that we are not: we are asleep by definition. Being conscious of having a dream is a dream as well, and we mistakenly perceive that we are awake to some extent. We make this mistake because we are asleep and not awake. Olivi’s argument can be found from *II Sent.* q. 59, 565.

of is an object of our perception¹⁴. We can err that we perceive something, but when we actually perceive, we cannot err that we are imagining the thing we perceive. In this way, the phenomenal difference between the perceptual and imaginative acts of the common sense pertains to a second-order consciousness of the way in which the objects of those acts are present to us. This second-order consciousness is concomitant with the psychological processes of perceiving and imagining, even though it can be missing from the latter in exceptional situations, for example, when one is dreaming.

13.4 Creative Imagination

In addition to being capable of imagining absent objects which have been previously perceived, human beings can also imagine things that are not real, such as golden mountains and chimæras. That said, even human beings cannot imagine anything completely outside their earlier experiences because what has not been present in the senses cannot be imagined: people who are blind from birth are as incapable of imagining the visible qualities of a normal mountain as they are incapable of imagining the visible qualities of a golden mountain (Olivi points this out in *II Sent.* q. 74, 121). But from within our previous experiences, we can imagine just about anything. However, Olivi does not delimit this ability only to human beings: non-human animals imagine things which they have never seen before at least while they are asleep, and thus Olivi attributes the compositive imagination to them as well.

Olivi gives two slightly different accounts for this psychological function. Let us begin by looking at a citation from question 58 of the second book of *Summa*:

We experience in ourselves that we can put together a species with another almost infinitely, and thus we can compose and think in ourselves infinite compositions of images which we have never seen before. This is clear when we imagine golden mountains or a chimæra and so forth, and when we are imagining one undivided stone or mountain and suddenly we imagine that it breaks into many parts in many ways, or when at one time we imagine it

¹⁴ This has to do with Olivi's idea according to which the *aspectus* of the common sense is directed also to the external senses even when we imagine things (*II Sent.* q. 51, 112; *ibid.*, q. 63, 600–1). His idea is that we imagine colours, sounds, smells, etc., and these sensible qualities are imagined as if they were seen, heard, smelled, etc. This idea requires that the *aspectus* of the common sense is directed to the senses in addition to being directed to the memory species. We can understand Olivi's idea if we look at another case in which Olivi accounts for the content of our consciousness by appealing to two *aspectūs* that are directed at two things: he explains that when we see some object through stained glass, the object appears as having the colour of the glass because the *aspectus* is partly terminated at the glass, but "most of it" goes (virtually) all the way to the object we see (*II Sent.* q. 37, 667; *ibid.*, q. 58, 506). In a similar vein, the object we imagine is imagined as seen, heard, etc., because one *aspectus* is directed to the object and another to the eyes.

still and at another time intensely moving, as it were, before our eyes. [...] the formation of these compositions and divisions takes place both in the memory and in the imaginative gaze (*acie imaginantis*). For the gaze of the imagination (*acie imaginationis*) which is controlled and moved by the intellect can be applied to memory species in such diverse ways that we imagine them differently than they exist.¹⁵

The core of Olivi's view becomes clear from the first line: take a memory species of a mountain and conjoin it with a memory species of gold. *Voilà!* You have just imagined a golden mountain. An imaginative act of the common sense may pertain to several memory species simultaneously, and when it does, we become conscious of an object in which those species are combined with each other.

The details of this process are, however, less clear. Olivi says at the end of the foregoing passage that the composition of the imagined objects takes place both in the memory and in the imagination. Given that these two are actually one and the same faculty, or rather functions of the common sense, it is not absolutely clear what this distinction means. However, by a detailed reading we can try to make sense of Olivi's idea. The central notions are the *acies imaginationis*—by which Olivi seems to mean the *aspectus* of the common sense—and the memory understood as a kind of a storehouse of memory species. Even though the imagination and the memory are the same faculty, they denote different functions of the common sense. When Olivi says that composition takes place both in the imagination and in the memory, his idea is that the memory species are combined in the memory *prior to* apprehending them and *during* the process of apprehending them. In this way he gives two slightly different accounts of the compositive imagination, and he also seems to take both as sufficient in themselves and as alternatives to each other to some extent. Supposing that the image of a mountain and the image of gold were already merged in the memory when I direct my attention there, I would then become conscious of the golden mountain. And supposing that the images were merged in the process of imagining, I would then become conscious of the golden mountain too. Both accounts are sufficient for saving the phenomenon.

Let us see the details of these two ways of fantasising. A good starting point for such an inquiry is the following text:

Compositions and divisions of this kind are and take place first in the act of cognition, which regards simultaneously several memory species and brings

¹⁵ "Experimur enim in nobis quod quasi infinitis modis possumus unam speciem cum altera componere et sic infinitas compositiones imaginum quas nunquam foris vidimus intra nos formare et cogitare, sicut patet, quando imaginamur montes aureos vel chimæram et sic de aliis et quando imaginantes unum integrum lapidem vel montem subito imaginamur eum frangi in multas partes et multis modis aut quando modo imaginamur eum stantem modo fortiter currentem quasi coram oculis nostris. [...] formationes istarum compositionum et fractionum fiunt tam in memoria quam in acie imaginantis. Acies enim imaginationis per intellectum ducta et mota potest ita diversimode applicari ad species memoriales quod eam imaginabitur aliter quam sit." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 504–5.)

them together. This kind of act generates then a species by which we remember it. Or perhaps, as the will moves the gaze of cognition (*acies cogitantis*) to look at various memory species, it simultaneously moves the sinus (*sinum*) of the memory and the species thereof; and according to the manifold movements, new compositions and divisions of the species in the memory are brought about, for in dreams the species seem to be moved and made available by a natural priority before they are seen by the dreamer. However, I do not care about this difficulty because it does not have relevance to the question at hand whether these compositions and divisions are brought about by the changing movement of the *aspectus* which looks at the species, or by the movement of the virtual parts of the memory and the species which inform them, or by both of the movements occurring simultaneously.¹⁶

Here we clearly see the options. The first option is that the *aspectus* of the common sense takes first one memory species (a mountain) and then another (gold) as an object. In this way, the act of the common sense pertains to two different memory species, a mountain and gold, and the subject becomes conscious of the combination of the two. After this kind of imaginative act, the memory may contain a memory species of the imagined golden mountain, and subsequent imaginative acts may use this memory species (*II Sent.* q. 58, 505).

The second option is that the memory species become merged before they are “looked at”. The species of a mountain and the species of gold are merged to each other in the memory before we become conscious of them. Understood in this way, the memory contains a species of a golden mountain before we take it as an object of our apprehension. Olivi provides dreaming as an example of a case in which this explanation seems better suited, and this gives us reason to think that the difference between the two accounts can be described in such a way that merging the species during the process of imagining would be deliberate, whereas merging them in the memory prior to imagining would be non-deliberate. Olivi remains unconcerned about the choice of these options and says that they both may be applicable. Thus, he seems to take a middle position between the two possible accounts: fantasising may take place either by merging the species unintentionally in the memory or by deliberately merging them while imagining. Sometimes it happens in one way and sometimes in another.

When we return to question 58, we see that this is the view Olivi finds the

¹⁶ “Huiusmodi autem compositiones vel divisiones primo sunt in et fiunt in actu cogitantis et varias species memoriæ simul aspicientis et conferentis, ac deinde ex tali actu gignitur species per quam de ipsa recordamur. Vel forte, sicut voluntas movet aciem cogitantis ad varias species memoriæ contuendas: sic simul cum hoc movet sinum memoriæ cum suis speciebus; et secundum quod diversimode movet, fiunt novæ compositiones aut divisiones specierum in memoria, nam et in somnis prius naturaliter videntur moveri species et offerri, antequam a somniantem videantur. Sed de hac difficultate non curo, quia ad propositam quæstionem non refert an fiant huiusmodi compositiones et divisiones per variam motionem aspectus super species contuendas, aut per motum virtualium partium memoriæ cum speciebus quibus informantur, aut per utrumque motum simul factum.” (*II Sent.* q. 74, 121–2.)

most appealing¹⁷. The memory species are merged both in the common sense during their cognition, and in the memory prior to their being cognised. The first takes place when a human being deliberately fantasises about some unreal object. The intellect is capable of directing the common sense in such a way that it can be directed to several memory species simultaneously (or in such a way that there is an imperceptible interval), and when this happens, the common sense forms a cognitive act that pertains to both of these species:

This is why it seems to a human being that in these kinds of compositions the *aspectus* or the gaze of cognition takes one species or one thing and puts it on another—although sometimes this happens so quickly that there does not seem to be any preceding movement, and the composition or the image that is thus composed seems to appear suddenly before the cognitive regard.¹⁸

This is what happens when we consciously decide to imagine a golden mountain. Then again, sometimes the species are merged to each other prior to their being cognised, and involuntarily:

[...] it is not inconvenient that the memory can have kinds of virtual movements in itself [...] For, perhaps the memory (as informed by one species) can be brought into contact with itself (as it exists under another species) by a kind of a virtual movement in such a way that one species is seen as if it were placed over another—like a skin were placed over a skin.¹⁹

Further in the text, Olivi tells us why he thinks that this latter option must also be accepted. His idea is that when we are asleep or if we are insane, we do not fantasise about unreal things on purpose. Rather, the *spiritus animalis* flows in our brain in an uncontrolled manner, and this flow forms new kinds of compositions of the memory species, which are retained in the memory. Thus, when our attention is directed to the memory, we suddenly see things that we have never seen before.

In this way, Olivi may be read as making a distinction between two different kinds of compositive imagination. One is controlled by reason; the other is involuntary, does not require intellectuality on the part of the subject, and is based on a

¹⁷ This interpretation goes against another that I have argued for elsewhere (Toivanen 2007, 441–2). I concentrated too much on Olivi’s understanding of this process as it applies to human beings who deliberately imagine unreal objects and failed to notice that the other option (the movement that takes place in the memory) applies to other animals as well as to human beings who are either asleep or mad.

¹⁸ “Unde et in huiusmodi compositionibus videtur homini quod aspectus seu acies cogitantis accipiat unam speciem seu unam rem et ponat eam super alteram, quamvis aliquando hoc ita subito fiat quod nullus motus videtur ibi præcessisse, sed ipsa compositio seu imago sic composita subito videtur ante conspectum cogitantis apparuisse.” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 507; for more details, see *ibid.*, 505–7.)

¹⁹ “[...] non est inconveniens, si ipsa memoria potest habere in se quasdam virtuales motiones [...] Forte enim ipsa memoria ut tali specie informata potest per quendam modum virtualem applicari ad se ipsam ut sub altera specie existentem, quod videbitur una species quasi super altera posita, acsi pellis super pellem poneretur.” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 505–6.)

rather coarse physiological basis. He does not discuss these two as distinct functions as explicitly as one might wish. However, already on the basis of the two different types of compositive imagination it seems clear to me that this is how he thinks. Moreover, the following excerpt supports this reading to the extent that I dare to say that there remains no doubt about Olivi's stance:

And, according to Augustine, new visions and new dreams may appear to animals in this way [viz in the latter way, according to which the combining of the species takes place in the memory]. Augustine proves this [by pointing out] that this is the reason why sleeping [dogs] suddenly bark: something which excites them to bark appears to them. In human beings, the combining occurs *in addition to this* because the imagination is controlled by the intellect [...]²⁰

In this passage, Olivi says that in human beings there are two ways the fantasising takes place: by the guidance of the intellect *and* by the physiological changes that bring about new combinations of memory species. He also clearly says that the latter of these processes applies also to non-human animals when they are asleep and dreaming. Interestingly, Olivi appeals to Augustine and not to Avicenna to support the idea that some kind of compositive imagination can be attributed to non-human animals. After all, Avicenna is more likely to be the origin of the distinction between the deliberate and the involuntary uses of the compositive imagination. However, regardless of the source of Olivi's idea, the fact that he attributes the compositive imagination to non-human animals reveals that he conceives of them as being more elaborate creatures than, say, Aquinas does—especially because there seems to be no necessary reason for Olivi to attribute this ability to beasts. The ability to compose new images out of those which the subject has previously perceived does not account for any observed animal behaviour, save the barking of a sleeping dog. But then again, this kind of behaviour could be accounted for without appealing to the *compositive* imagination. The attribution of the compositive imagination to non-human animals shows that Olivi's starting point is that human and non-human animals are similar to each other. If there is no reason to deny this similarity, it must be accepted.

²⁰ "Et secundum hanc viam possunt secundum Augustinum aliquando apparere nova visa et nova somnia animalibus, probans hoc quod hac de causa aliquando, dum dormiunt, subito latrant, quia aliquid apparet eis quod eos commovet ad latrandum. In homine autem *ultra hoc* contingit istud, pro eo quod imaginatio ducitur ab intellectu [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 58, 506; emphasis mine.)

14 MEMORY

14.1 Memorative Functions

Sometimes it is difficult to understand how medieval (not to speak of ancient) philosophers understood psychological functions. This is partly due to the metaphysical subtleties of their theories and to the distance between their conception of the physiological aspects of these functions and the modern understanding of human and animal physiology. But even if we set the metaphysical and physiological details aside and attempt to understand the kinds of psychological processes that past authors discussed under the label of “memory,” for example, we may be troubled. For instance, Avicenna and Aquinas conceive of memory as a kind of a storehouse where the so-called intentions (*intentiones*) are preserved. As it is difficult to understand the notion of *intentio*, it is also difficult to understand what kinds of psychological phenomena these thinkers have in mind when they talk about memory. Even though their theories contain much that is in common with the modern concept of memory, we should not be too hasty in emphasising the similarities at the cost of differences. We must be careful, therefore, in interpreting these past authors’ understanding of mental abilities.

In certain respects Olivi’s conception of memory is easier to understand. To be sure, the metaphysical (not to mention physiological) background of his view is medieval through and through and as such alien to us, but the psychological functions that he analyses under the heading of memory are quite straightforward because he does not appeal to the concept of ‘intention’ in his discussion. In this way, he diverges from the Avicennian framework. The functions Olivi discusses are:

1. Retaining memory species.
2. Remembering absent objects from the past.
3. Recognising a present object as being previously apprehended.

Olivi explicitly distinguishes functions (1) and (2)¹, and although he does not

¹ “Quod autem memorativa ab ipso non differat probant, et primo, prout memorativa dic-

treat (3) as an independent function—it is a special case of (2)—it is useful to consider them separately.

As one might expect, Olivi argues that these functions should not be considered as belonging to a faculty that is separate from the common sense; they can be construed as attributable to the common sense. The outcome of his interpretation is that functions (2) and (3) are acts of the common sense that are about past things and events. They occur when we turn our attention to the memory species which are stored in the memory (although the memory as a storage unit is not actually distinct from the common sense). In this way, Olivi understands remembering as an intentional act of cognition which is about memories, instead of external objects. We have memories stored within our minds, and we remember them by directing our attention to them. This is, generally speaking, the way Olivi understands the memorative functions of the common sense.²

Let us now look at the details of Olivi's view. I shall deal with each of the three memorative functions one at a time, and I shall take up Olivi's argumentation that is in favour of the unity between the memory and the common sense. At the end of this chapter, I shall also discuss Olivi's view concerning the difference between memory and imagination.

14.2 The Retention of Memory Species

As we have already seen, the retaining of the so-called memory species (*species memoriales*) is vital for Olivi's interpretation of the imaginative function of the common sense. These species should not be understood as being similar to the sensible species which figure in many medieval theories of perception. The Olivian memory species are images, similitudes, or representations of external objects. They are not formal or efficient causes of cognitive acts. Rather, they serve as the objects of intentional cognitive acts: "Memory species, by contrast, serve only as objects, in which the act and *aspectus* of the faculty terminate and represent the absent object to them [...]"³ Their role in the cognitive process of

itur illa quæ elicit actionem recordandi. [...] Secundo probant hoc specialiter de memoria specierum retentiva. De qua quidem planum est quod ad eam non spectat nisi solum speciem memorialem recipere et retinere; unde nulla actio sentiendi vel intelligendi est ab ea, in quantum tali, nisi solum pro quanto fuit de obiecto, id est, de specie quæ tenet locum obiecti." (*II Sent.* q. 66, 609–11.)

² It should be noted that Olivi accepts that human beings have also an intellectual memory (*II Sent.* q. 54, 281; *ibid.*, q. 58, 485–6; *ibid.*, q. 59, 522–3, 561; *ibid.*, q. 74, 114–7; *ibid.*, q. 44, 734–41; See, however, *ibid.*, q. 66, 612–3). I shall not discuss his conception of it here, but it is good to note that he does not seem to make a clear-cut distinction between the memorative functions of the sensitive soul and those of the intellectual soul—very much in the same vein as he is not very clear about the difference between the cognitive acts on the intellectual and sensitive levels.

³ "Species vero memoriales serviunt tantum de obiecto terminante actum et aspectum potentiae et repræsentante eis obiectum absens [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 74, 119; see also *ibid.*, q. 58, 469–70.) Memory species are similitudes, images, or representations (*ibid.*, q. 36, 653; *ibid.*,

imagining and remembering is similar to the role of external objects in perceptual acts. Cognitive acts which are produced by the common sense can be about both external objects and memory species.

In discussing memory species, Olivi employs the familiar imagery of a piece of wax and a signet ring.⁴ His idea is that a cognitive act leaves traces in the memory in a similar way as a signet ring leaves its image on wax when imprinted. The trace that a cognitive act leaves is a memory species: “[...] every memory species is generated by some actual cognition of an object, as the figure of a signet ring is generated in wax by an actual imprinting of wax into the ring or ring into the wax.”⁵ Olivi specifies his view further and explicitly says that memory species are caused by the acts of the common sense: “species, which are retained in the sensitive memory, are generated in it by an act of the common sense”⁶, and the memory is completely passive in this process⁷. Also, imaginative acts of the common sense may generate a species in the memory (*II Sent.* q. 58, 505).

It may appear as if Olivi attributes the traditional function of the imagination, namely, the retaining of sensible species, to memory—or to the common sense as memory. However, the difference between Olivi’s view and the traditional one is more profound. Although the memory retains memory species, it cannot be understood as being the counterpart of the imaginative faculty which appears in Aquinas’ or Avicenna’s theories because Olivi’s conception of memory species differs from their conception of the sensible species considerably.⁸ Mem-

q. 59, 534–6; *ibid.*, q. 72, 26; *ibid.*, q. 74, 122–3; *ibid.*, q. 75, 142). Even though the imagery Olivi uses pertains mostly to vision and visible qualities, memory species can represent all aspects of perceptual cognition (see, e.g., *Super Isaiam*, Prima pars, 214, 20–35.) See also Putallaz 1991a, 121.

⁴ The imagery of a seal and wax was employed already in antiquity. See Plato, *Theætetus* 191^c–192^a; *Mem.* 1, 450^a30–5. (To be sure, Plato’s work was not available to medievals.)

⁵ “[...] omnis species memorialis generatur per aliquam actualem cognitionem obiecti, sicut sigillaris figura ceræ fuit genita per actualem impressionem ceræ in sigillo vel sigilli in cera.” (*II Sent.* q. 74, 116.)

⁶ “Præterea, species retentæ in memoria sensuali generantur in ea per actum sensus communis.” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 509; *ibid.*, q. 63, 599.) Repeated cognitive acts help to make the memory species stronger, and a lack of cognitive acts pertaining to a certain object leads to oblivion (*ibid.*, q. 66, 612).

⁷ “Dicunt enim quod sicut ad primas impressiones agentium educuntur aliqua in materia patientis de potentia eius quæ remanent post absentiam impressionis, sicut in cera remanent figuræ post actualem impressionem sigilli: sic ad actum sensus communis educuntur in memoria species quasi de potentia eius [...] et ideo possunt remanere in ea post absentiam actuum sensus communis. Unde isti memoriam nullo modo ponunt activam respectu huiusmodi specierum, sed solum passivam, sicut nec cera est respectu figurarum quas retinet.” (*II Sent.* q. 58, 507–8; see also *ibid.*, 486; *ibid.*, q. 66, 611.) It becomes clear from the context that despite the impersonal expression this is Olivi’s view.

⁸ Olivi’s departure from the traditional view becomes apparent also from his conception of *intentiones* which are not stored in the memory. I shall discuss his view in detail in the next chapter, but one thing needs to be said already here. Namely, Olivi occasionally seems to accept that memory can serve as a storehouse of intentions. He says, for instance, that: “Nullaque est ratio quare intentio præteriti non possit occurrere somnianti sicut et ceteræ intentiones quæ in memoria continentur.” (*II Sent.* q. 59, 556.) However, this text and others of the same kind must be understood as imprecise formulations because his conception

ory species have much in common with sensible species, but they do not have the same explanatory function in Olivi's theory as the sensible species have, say, for Aquinas.

Memory species represent the individual objects whose apprehension generated the species in the first place:

Again, it must be known that because a cognitive act pertaining to an individual object is terminated at that object, as it is that individual and not another, the essence of the act is to be a proper similitude of that individual (as that individual). It is not a similitude of other individuals of the same species, insofar as they differ from that individual in their individuality (*individualiter*). The act represents the individual nature (*ratio*) and the quality of its object [...] because it is terminated at an individual object as an individual in the aforementioned way. Then again, a memory species which has been left by the act has this [feature of representing an individual object] due to the act which has caused it and which the memory species represents insofar as the act is or was terminated at such an object.⁹

Olivi's idea can be found in the following example: I saw my coffee mug for the first time when I received it as a gift from my friend. The perceptual act by which I saw it was terminated at the mug, and this is why I saw that mug and not any other. The act pertained to the individual mug that I had just received. This act generated a memory species which was a representation of the individual mug and not of any other mug. This specificity is why I can remember *my* mug at will by directing my attention to the memory species of my mug. Similarly, when a dog sees its master for the first time, its perceptual act is terminated at the master. This act generates a memory species which is a representation of the individual human being that happens to be the master of the dog and not of any other human being. This is why the dog can remember its master.

Until now it has seemed as if the memory were separate from the common sense. Olivi's way of discussing the function of retaining the memory species draws heavily on an apparent distinction between the common sense and the memory. He repeatedly says things like "an act of the common sense generates a memory species *in the memory*," as if these were two separate faculties. However,

of intentions is such that they cannot possibly be stored anywhere, as we shall see. The citation comes from Olivi's argument that the memory functions also while the subject is asleep. He is not analysing the details of the memorative acts of the common sense, and therefore he simply dismisses the details of his developed view. Moreover, if we believe Piron's dating, question 59 of *Summa* was written before questions 65 & 66, which means that Olivi may have developed his views in the meantime.

⁹ "Rursus sciendum quod quia actus cognitivus obiecti individualis est terminatus in ipsum, in quantum est hoc individuum et non aliud: ideo de essentia talis actus est quod sit propria similitudo huius individui, in quantum huius, et quod non sit similitudo aliorum individuum eiusdem speciei, pro quanto individualiter differunt ab isto. Quod igitur actus iste representet individualement rationem et proprietatem sui obiecti [...] [habet] ex hoc quod terminatur ad obiectum individuale, in quantum individuale, et hoc sub modo praedicto. Species vero memorialis ex tali actu relicta habet hoc ex ipso actu a quo est causata et quem exprimit, prout ipse actus est vel fuit in tale obiectum terminatus." (*II Sent.* q. 72, 37.)

Olivi's discussion about the unity of the internal senses includes also a question about the unity between the common sense and the memory, and even though the function of retaining memory species is perhaps the best candidate for not belonging to the common sense, Olivi is explicit in this regard: these two faculties are identical with each other, and the function of retaining the memory species belongs to the common sense. His conviction is partly based on his rejection of the distinction between receptive and retentive faculties (*II Sent.* q. 66, 613), but he also takes it that there is no reason to suppose that a separate faculty would be needed in order to account for function (1) of the list above:

As the faculty which receives an act of perceiving or understanding—and which receives a disposition (*habitus*) that the act leaves and causes—is not absolutely (*simpliciter*) different from the faculty which produces the act, except that it acts by its formal [principle] and receives by its material [principle] [...] In the same way, the faculty which receives and retains the species (which the aforementioned act leaves) is the same as the one that produces the act, and the former differs from the latter only in the aforementioned way.¹⁰

The faculty that forms a cognitive act is the same as that which retains the memory species caused by this act, and therefore the retaining memory is nothing but the common sense itself: "This is why an act of the interior sense generates a species in its sensitive memory, that is, in the retentive and material sinus of the same faculty to which the act belonged [...]"¹¹. The idea that the memory species are retained in the material sinus of the faculty is quite interesting. We should, however, be careful here: in another context Olivi uses much effort to prove that memory species must be simple and unextended. Memory species cannot be bodily changes in the brain because as such they could not be objects of imaginative acts (which are simple and spiritual), represent things in the way they do, or be so numerous. (*II Sent.* q. 58, 500–4.) It seems that we have to appeal either to spiritual matter or to *spiritus animalis* which provide the *sinus materialis* in which the memory species are retained. The simplicity of the memory species enables Olivi also to claim that when a human being dies, his/her memory species do not cease to exist: they are preserved in the spiritual matter of the soul. (*II Sent.* q. 58, 513.) The damned are, therefore, capable of remembering things that they have experienced in this life. This idea can be also used to explain how separated souls are capable of facing their past sins in Purgatory.

¹⁰ "Sicut autem potentia receptiva actus sentiendi vel intelligendi et habitus ex illo actu relictus et causatus non est simpliciter alia a potentia effectiva ipsius actus, nisi solum quod per suum formale agit et per suum materiale recipit [...] sic potentia receptiva et retentiva specierum relictarum ex actu prædicto est eadem cum potentia effectiva illius actus, differens solum ab illa modo prædicto." (*II Sent.* q. 66, 611.); "Unde per actum sensus interioris generatur species in sua memoria sensuali, hoc est, in capaci et materiali sinu eiusdemmet potentiae cuius fuit ipse actus [...]" (*Ibid.*, q. 74, 116.)

¹¹ "Unde per actum sensus interioris generatur species in sua memoria sensuali, hoc est, in capaci et materiali sinu eiusdemmet potentiae cuius fuit ipse actus [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 74, 116.)

A final point which should be noted is that Olivi does not consider memory species as dispositions (*habitus*)¹². The rationale for this is that dispositions take part in the production of acts. Olivi thinks that dispositions modify the faculties in such a way that facilitates the faculties' producing acts that correspond with the dispositions. Dispositions are, Olivi claims, efficient principles of cognitive acts, whereas memory species are but the objects of these acts. Memory species do not facilitate bringing about cognitive acts, and, importantly, they do not determine what kind of acts pertain to them. The same memory species may be the object of different kinds of acts of remembering. For instance, a cat may find a mouse that represented by a memory species agreeable whereas someone who is afraid of mice may remember exactly the same mouse as disagreeable, and *that* is due to the cats and the person's different kinds of dispositions, or *habitus* the cat and the person who is afraid of mice have (I shall explain this idea in detail below). The memory species itself does not account for the differences in reactions, which proves that memory species are not identical with the dispositions of the common sense. (See *II Sent.* q. 74, 118–9; *ibid.*, q. 66, 612–3.)

In this way, Olivi denies that there is a real distinction between the common sense and the memory as a storage space of memories or memory species. There is no need to attribute a distinct faculty to fulfil this function because it can be accounted for by appealing to the common sense.

14.3 The Remembrance of Past Objects

The second function in the list presented above—remembering absent objects from the past—is also a function of the common sense according to Olivi. We are capable of remembering past objects, and so are many other animals, but this capability does not require a separate faculty. When a dog remembers a bone that it has seen before, it is conscious of an absent bone that is no longer present to its senses. This way of understanding the process of remembering renders it quite similar to imagining, since in both processes the subject becomes conscious of an absent object. We have already seen that Olivi thinks that this kind of consciousness is brought about by an act of the common sense which is directed and terminated at a memory species that functions as a representation of an object. This is how Olivi interprets the psychological process of remembering, and he attributes it to the common sense.

Olivi's conception of remembering must face a possible counter-argument, though. For, when we remember something, we remember it as something that pertains to the past. When we remember a particular object or event, we remem-

¹² For instance, Ockham came to think in one of his explanations for memorative cognition that remembering is due to a *habitus* (Allan B. Wolter & Marilyn McCord Adams, "Memory and Intuition: A Focal Debate in Fourteenth Century Cognitive Psychology," *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1993): 182–9). As I already mentioned, in Olivi's case the term *habitus* translates well as "disposition."

ber that it took place at a certain point of time. And even if we do not necessarily remember the exact time and place where we encountered the remembered object, we still remember it as something that we have experienced in the past. Following this lead, one way of understanding the workings of memory is to consider that its proper function is to apprehend “pastness”—or even past and future, in which case the memory would serve as the faculty which provides us with the consciousness of time. We would be conscious of the past and future as distinct from the present by employing our memory. Olivi takes up this interpretation as a *quod non* argument and duly refutes it (*II Sent.* q. 65, 607). His argumentation is of particular interest because it helps us to understand in detail what kind of psychological process remembering is and why it must be a function of the common sense.

Olivi acknowledges that remembering pertains to past things. However, he points out that it is impossible to apprehend pastness as such: “[...] pastness is not a property (*ratio*) which can be apprehended without the thing to which it is attributed.”¹³ We can remember only past things and events, not the pastness as detached from these things and events:

Likewise, it is impossible to comprehend something as being present or from the past without by the same token apprehending the thing to which the presence or the pastness is attributed. Therefore, the faculty which recollects that some thing is from the past and that it has seen the thing before apprehends two things simultaneously, namely, the thing and the pastness of that thing. But to apprehend a thing as absent belongs to the imaginative power, and to apprehend it as present belongs to the common sense with some external sense connected to it. Therefore, etc.¹⁴

This observation is the reason the memory is not distinct from the common sense. Olivi’s argument is once again based on the idea that a unity at the level of the psychological operations is taken as indicative of a unity at the level of the faculties. When I remember what I ate yesterday, I remember my meal. This remembrance is done by imagining the meal. Or, if I recognise today’s meal as being the leftovers from yesterday, I do so by perceiving the food. In general, when one remembers something, one necessarily imagines the thing that one remembers. This proves, according to Olivi, that the process of remembering necessarily involves an act of the common sense, as he has already argued that imagination is a function of the common sense.

¹³ “[...] præteritio enim non est ratio apprehensibilis absque re ipsa cui attribuitur.” (*II Sent.* q. 66, 613.) Even though it is possible to understand time and therefore also to understand pastness intellectually, this is not what is at stake in Olivi’s discussion. Remembering a past thing and apprehending pastness as something that pertains to that thing (i.e., to remember a thing as being from the past) are something that do not require intellectual capacities.

¹⁴ “Item, impossibile est aliquid accipi ut præsens vel præteritum, quin eo ipso apprehendat id cui attribuit præsentiam vel præteritionem. Ergo potentia quæ recolit hoc vel illud esse præteritum et se illud hactenus vidisse apprehendit simul duo, scilicet, ipsam rem et suam præteritionem. Sed istam rem ut absentem apprehendere est potentia imaginativæ, ipsam vero ut præsentem apprehendere est sensus communis cum aliquo sensu particulari sibi connexo. Ergo et cetera.” (*II Sent.* q. 66, 610.)

Olivi does not bother to repeat the continuation of his argument, but it may be useful to expound the “ergo etc.” Olivi’s argument is the same one that he uses to argue that the imagination and the common sense are identical with each other: if we can find a psychological operation that involves two different kinds of psychological acts, either they are produced by two distinct faculties, in which case there must be a superior faculty which apprehends and combines the contents of both of the acts; or the acts belong to one and the same faculty. This argument applies also to the memory. Remembering something involves the apprehension of an object (either by perceiving or by imagining) and knowing that the object has been perceived before. There are two possible explanations. Either, (1) the common sense cognises an object, and the memory apprehends its pastness. Then these two are combined so as to bring about an apprehension of the object as an object that the subject has perceived before. In this case, the common sense and the memory are distinct faculties, and combining their acts must be accounted for one way or another. Or, (2) the common sense apprehends both the object and its pastness. In this case, there is no need for a further explanation of their unity within the experience of the subject.

Olivi rejects the first explanation, and he does not consider it as a problem that the common sense is capable of apprehending the pastness of an imagined object. Remembering is a psychological process that can be attributed to the common sense: “Likewise, the property of pastness (*ratio praeteriti*) is nothing other than ‘to have once been present.’ Therefore, the same faculty apprehends the properties of presence (*ratio praesentis*) and pastness.”¹⁵ Elapsed time does not change the mechanism of being conscious of a certain object. An act of the common sense provides consciousness of an object when an object is present; likewise, when the object is no longer present to the senses, the common sense provides consciousness of it as it was present to the senses. This is remembering. In other words, Olivi diminishes the independent status of “pastness” because he denies that it is something separable from objects. Whether or not cognised objects are apprehended as past or present, the objects themselves do not differ. Pastness does not add anything to the objects, and it is not an object that can be apprehended in itself. (I shall discuss “pastness” more in Chapter 14.5 below.)

14.4 The Recognition of Familiar Objects

In addition to retaining memory species and remembering past things, Olivi discusses to some extent a third memorative function, namely, recognising a perceived object. Some of his arguments for the unity between the common sense and the memory are based on the process of recognition rather than on remembering. Moreover, it is one thing to remember an absent friend and quite another to perceive a person and recognise her. Therefore it is useful to discuss these func-

¹⁵ “Item, ratio praeteriti non est aliud quam aliquando fuisse praesens. Ergo eiusdem potentiae est apprehendere rationem praesentis et rationem praeteriti.” (*II Sent.* q. 66, 610.)

tions separately, although Olivi does not explicitly treat recognition as a distinct function; rather, he seems to consider it as a special case of remembering—the difference between remembering and recognising is that recognition takes place only when a familiar object is perceived, while remembering does not require that an object be present. Olivi’s idea is that when something is recognised, it is apprehended simultaneously in two different ways: it is perceived and remembered. When I recognise a friend, I both see and remember her; and when a dog recognises its master, it perceives and remembers him at the same time.

We can see from the following illuminative argument how Olivi understands recognition:

They prove that the memory does not differ from the common sense, first, inasmuch as the memory means that which elicits the act of remembering. For when a dog recognises its master, it compares the master seen at that moment to the master it had seen before. The same applies to whatever road it follows as being previously known and familiar to it, dismissing the other roads. Therefore the faculty which compares these to each other apprehends them both simultaneously. But the faculty which actually apprehends that it sees the master at that moment is the common sense. Therefore, the same faculty apprehends that it has seen the master before, and this is the same as to remember.¹⁶

Olivi’s intention is to argue that remembering belongs to the common sense, and he does this by pointing out that in the process of recognition one and the same faculty perceives an external object and remembers that the object has been perceived also earlier. The argument reveals how recognition and remembrance are related to each other: recognition includes an act of remembering.

Recognition is, therefore, a complicated process in which an object is apprehended simultaneously in two different ways. It is perceived by a perceptual act of the common sense, and it is remembered by an act of the common sense which is directed at a memory species that represents the object. These two can be related to each other because they are acts of one and the same faculty, the common sense¹⁷. It seems, however, that the process should not be understood in such a way that the dog first sees its master, then begins searching in the memory for an image that fits the master, and only after finding a match recognises him. Olivi probably thinks that there is no temporal sequence or active searching in the memory. When recognition takes place, the common sense somehow evokes

¹⁶ “Quod autem memorativa ab ipso non differat probant, et primo, prout memorativa dicitur illa quæ elicit actionem recordandi: Quia quando canis recognoscit dominum suum, tunc confert ipsum ut nunc visum ad eundem ut prius visum, et idem est de quacunque via quam reliquis dimissis sequitur tanquam sibi prius notam et assuetam. Ergo potentia conferens ad invicem illa apprehendit simul utrumque. Sed illa quæ actualiter apprehendit se tunc dominum suum videre est potentia sensus communis. Ergo illa eadem apprehendit se prius vidisse illum, hoc autem est idem quod memorari.” (*II Sent.* q. 66, 609–10.)

¹⁷ It seems that the comparison is made by yet another act of the common sense. See *II Sent.* q. 79, 162, where Olivi argues that the act that compares two other acts is distinct from both of them.

an image of an object in the memory and compares it to the external object. All this takes place simultaneously with perception.¹⁸

We can now see that the memory is nothing but the common sense itself according to Olivi. His conviction is that none of the memorative functions can be separated from the psychological operations which provide consciousness of different kinds of things. Moreover, memories are preserved by the same faculty which was initially responsible for the apprehension of the things that the memories are about. In this way, Olivi accounts for all the memorative functions as being functions of the common sense.

14.5 The Difference Between Memory and Imagination

Before concluding the discussion about Olivi's conception of memorative functions, we must address what should be a natural question at this point: What is the difference between memory and imagination? Of course, inasmuch as memory is the label for the function of retaining memory species, the division of labour is clear: imaginative acts bring about consciousness of absent objects, and the memory stores representations of absent objects. But if we consider the acts of remembering and imagining, the case is less clear. If imagining is nothing other than having a mental act, the object of which is generated in the memory by a previous experience and retained there as a species, is there a place for proper remembering after all? Again, if every imaginative act is directed at some memory species, does imagining not turn out to be remembering in such a way that it is impossible to imagine anything without at the same time remembering it? Are imagining and remembering one and the same psychological process?

It was a common idea that it is impossible to imagine anything which has not been perceived. But this does not mean that to imagine an object is the same thing as to remember it because it is an evident fact that these processes are phenomenally different. Therefore, the question about their sameness or distinctness is justified.

It is clear that even though Olivi argues that the memory and imagination are not distinct faculties, he sees a difference between imagining and remembering. Imaginative acts are not memories. This becomes clear when we take into account the other function of imagination which was commonly attributed to human beings, namely, the ability to combine memory species to form the fantastic images of golden mountains and other similar things. It is obvious that we are not able to remember a golden mountain because we have never perceived such a thing. Thus, there is a difference between imagining and remembering, or at least

¹⁸ However, Olivi does not, to the best of my knowledge, address this issue anywhere. The reason why it seems to me that active searching from the memory is not what Olivi has in mind in this argument is that it was customary to think that active searching from memory requires intellectuality. The distinction between active recollection and passive remembrance as well as the attribution of the former only to intellectual beings was received from Aristotle's *De memoria et reminiscencia*.

there is a difference between compositive imagination and memory. Still, given that both imaginative acts and acts of remembering are intentional cognitive acts of the common sense, and that both are directed at and terminated at memory species, there seems to be nothing which distinguishes them from each other. Does Olivi provide us with any clue to account for the phenomenal difference?

The answer is, after a fashion, yes. Olivi provides a clue—in fact many clues, even though he does not address the question explicitly anywhere or provide a direct answer. To wit, there are at least two features which can be interpreted as constituting the difference between the functions of imagining and remembering. The first of them was already hinted at in the previous discussion: imagined objects appear as “timeless,” whereas remembered objects appear as pertaining to the past. The property of pastness (*ratio præteriti*, or *præteritus*) is somehow present when we remember but not when we imagine. The other difference is related to Olivi’s way of understanding the acts of remembering as pertaining not only to the remembered objects but also (and even primarily) to the cognitive acts by which they were cognised.

Let us begin with the first possible difference. As we have seen, dream images which occur to us when we are asleep are imaginative acts of the common sense. Now, Olivi asks whether we are able to remember anything while we sleep. His answer is—in opposition to some followers of Aristotle—positive. Olivi himself reveals that the Aristotelians he is opposing have found support for their view from Aristotle’s *De memoria et reminiscencia* because they read Aristotle as stating that to remember is to apprehend a species as a species¹⁹, that is, to apprehend an image of an object as an image and thus to be conscious that a remembered object is not really present. In dreams we often take the images we see as real objects, and so, according to this definition of remembering, we cannot remember anything when we are dreaming. Olivi does not accept this definition of remembering; he claims that it is a misinterpretation of Aristotle’s text²⁰. He argues that we are able to remember while we sleep:

In dreams we are disposed towards familiar and unfamiliar things differently. We cannot assume familiar things to be familiar (for example a friend as being a friend or a familiar place as being [our] own) unless we maintain firmly by the memory that we have frequently associated with them. Also we could not perceive unfamiliar things as being strange unless we experience in our memory that we have not seen or experienced those things. [...] Therefore, in dreams I can well remember a thing through a species, since the thing is apprehended as not being present and as not being in front of the external senses through an intention of pastness (that is, through an apprehension of past things).²¹

¹⁹ *II Sent.* q. 59, 524. The passage Olivi refers to is probably *Mem.* 1, 451^a15–16.

²⁰ “Quod autem ad hoc pro ratione affertur quod ad hoc quod memoremur oportet apprehendi speciem ut speciem: non hoc ita dicit Aristoteles, sed potius quod oportet ut species apprehendatur ut species rei præteritæ, hoc est dictu, ut per eam apprehendamus rem ut præteritam.” (*II Sent.* q. 59, 556.)

²¹ “In somnis etiam aliter afficimur ad assueta, aliter ad insolita. Assueta autem non pos-

Even in dreams I am able to remember my friends and to imagine persons who are unknown to me. The difference is the property of pastness according to which the image of my friend is apprehended but which is not concomitant with the image of the stranger. The friend is apprehended as a person that I have seen before, and this is to apprehend her with the property of pastness. Otherwise, the functions of the imagination and recollection seem to be similar: to remember a thing is to imagine it, but pastness marks a difference between these functions since it accompanies only the acts of remembering.

Nevertheless, the pastness which accompanies the image of the friend does not actually signify any real entity. There is no “thing” attached to the memory species or to the act when one remembers. The property of pastness is, as Olivi defines it, nothing but apprehending a past thing as being from the past. Thus it seems to me that when Olivi writes about the property of pastness, he is not making a metaphysical claim but a phenomenological one. Pastness is a phenomenal feeling which is present in memories, and memories differ from imagined things because it feels different to remember than to imagine. Undeniably this marks a genuine difference, but then again it merely describes the difference and does not give an explanation for it. One can still ask *why* the property of pastness is present in some imaginative acts and not in others. Thus, even though the property of pastness clearly contributes to the difference between imaginative and memorative acts, it is not very helpful in our effort of understanding the difference.

What about the other possibility of accounting for the difference between imaginative and memorative acts, namely, the idea that memories pertain primarily to past cognitive *acts*? Olivi presents some very interesting remarks with respect to this idea, and it is worthwhile looking at them as they provide a possible explanation for the difference between memorative and imaginative acts. I emphasise that Olivi does not present the passages I draw from as explanations for the difference between memory and imagination; they serve other purposes. Still, they contain valuable information about Olivi’s conception of remembering.

Let us begin with Olivi’s definition of remembrance, which he gives in passing: “Therefore, the same faculty apprehends that it has seen that thing before, and this is the same as to remember.”²² Now, if we look closely at this definition, we see that it includes an element of self-apprehension—indeed, we see that self-apprehension is the core of remembering. When an animal remembers a thing that it has previously seen, it actually apprehends that *it has seen* the thing before (*apprehendit se prius vidisse illum*). This is due to the generation of memory species

sumus tunc assumere ut assueta, sicut verbi gratia amicum tanquam amicum et locum assuetum tanquam proprium, nisi per memoriam tunc firmiter teneremus frequenter nos conversatos fuisse cum istis. Insolita etiam non sentiremus tunc nobis esse extranea, nisi in memoria nostra experiremur talia a nobis non fuisse visa vel experta. [...] In somnis igitur bene possum memorari rem per speciem, quia per intentionem præteritionis, per hoc scilicet quod apprehenditur præterita, apprehenditur ut non præsens et sic ut non exterius sensibus obiecta.” (*II Sent.* q. 59, 556.)

²² “Ergo illa eadem apprehendit se prius vidisse illum, hoc autem est idem quod memorari.” (*II Sent.* q. 66, 610.)

which is caused by acts of the common sense:

It is evident that the aforementioned species [viz memory species] are generated by these acts [viz acts of the common sense]—not only because they remain after these acts are carried out, and they are not brought about without these acts, but also because they represent primarily these acts and only subsequently their objects by these acts. This is obvious when we remember that we have seen or heard something. For, as an act of the common sense is included in these acts [...] so a memory of the act of the common sense is included in the memory of these acts.²³

When the dog remembers something, it remembers primarily the past cognitive act by which it cognised the object of its memory in the first place. Suppose that the dog perceives an object *O* by a cognitive act *A* at time *T*. The act *A* generates a memory species, which represents primarily *A* and only secondarily *O*. When the dog remembers *O* anew at time *T*₁, it becomes primarily conscious of *A* and remembers *O* only through *A*. To put it in a more simple way, when the dog saw its master for the first time, the act of perception generated a memory species which represented primarily the act of seeing the master and the master only through it. Now, when the dog remembers what the master looked like when it encountered him for the first time, it actually remembers itself seeing him. The master is the object of its remembrance but only because it remembers itself having seen him.

Understood in this way, memory pertains more to events or psychological processes than to external objects. The dog can imagine its master without recalling the first time it saw her, but if it wants to perform a proper act of remembering, it has to remember itself seeing her at a particular time and place. If the time and place are isolated from the image of the master, the dog is not remembering but imagining her.

It has been argued that to understand memory as a process that primarily pertains to one's previous cognitive acts is a distinctive move made by John Duns Scotus²⁴. It is true that Scotus argues explicitly that this is how memory functions, but on the basis of Olivi's remarks it seems that he was not the first to propose such a theory. In fact, it seems that even Olivi cannot be praised (or blamed) for being the first; rather, it appears to have been a common idea to include one's own cognitive acts as being partial objects of memorative acts ever since Aristotle²⁵.

²³ "Quod autem prædictæ species generentur per huiusmodi actus patet non solum ex hoc quod post actus huiusmodi relinquuntur nec absque huiusmodi actibus fiunt, sed etiam ex hoc quod primo repræsentant huiusmodi actus ac deinde quod per ipsos eorum obiecta, sicut patet, cum recordamus nos vidisse vel audisse hoc vel illud. Sicut enim in his actibus includitur actus sensus communis [...] sic in memoria istorum actuum includitur memoria actus sensus communis." (*II Sent.* q. 74, 116–7.)

²⁴ Wolter & Adams 1993, 175; For Scotus' view, see John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV.45.3, ed. and transl. in Wolter & Adams 1993, 193–230. Also David Bloch sees novelty in Scotus' view of two objects (the object and the experience) of memory (Bloch 2007, 220–5).

²⁵ Aristotle suggests that memories at least may involve not only a remembered object but also the cognitive activity by which it was apprehended in the past (*Mem.* 1, 449^b18–24).

Then again, it seems that Olivi (and Scotus) emphasise in a novel way that one's cognitive acts are the *primary* objects of remembrance. In this respect Olivi's suggestion may be taken as an original contribution.

The difference between memorative and imaginative acts seems to be related to being conscious of the cognitive act by which a remembered object was first cognised. By imagining, one becomes conscious only of an object, whereas remembering includes also being conscious of an earlier act. This difference can be seen, for instance, when Olivi refers in an approving manner to Aristotle and writes: "That is why according to him it is not remembrance when I think (*cogitem*) of a donkey with no qualification (*absolute*) [which means not thinking] of a donkey as being from the past or a donkey with respect to some past apprehension, namely, by thinking that I have seen it sometime before."²⁶ According to this text, to think of a donkey in an absolute manner is not to remember a donkey. Instead, to think of a donkey as, say, something one saw yesterday is to remember the particular donkey one saw yesterday.

By contrast, the imagining of a donkey is not about any particular individual donkey. When one imagines a donkey she does not have any particular donkey in mind but a kind of a generic donkey:

[...] when we intend [to see something] or think beforehand [about seeing something], we never think about this thing by a species by which things can be seen, but only by the memory species by which we can imagine or remember absent things or by which we can think about them beforehand. So it is not necessary that a vision of a thing precedes a vision of a thing since sometimes we intend to see only in a general or universal way; like when I want to see a donkey or to get some wine, I do not have to think about this or that particular donkey or this or that portion of wine—it suffices that I think about them generally.²⁷

When we intend to see a donkey, our mental activity is not the same as cognising

However, there is no consensus on how this passage should be understood. For discussion and references, see Bloch 2007, 83–4. Also, Aquinas says that an animal remembers simultaneously that it has perceived in the past and that it has perceived some sensible object (*ST* I.79.6).

²⁶ "Unde secundum eum non est memorari, si cogitem de asino absolute, non de asino, ut est præteritus, seu de eo per respectum ad aliquam apprehensionem meam iam præteritam, cogitando scilicet me eum aliquando vidisse." (*II Sent.* q. 59, 556.) It may seem that Olivi is here dealing with the intellectual level as he uses the verb *cogito*. Yet the context shows with certainty that he has sensitive cognition in mind. Thus, the absolute manner of cognising refers to an imaginative act. An imagined donkey is not a universal donkey because it does not represent universal "donkeyness". However, it does not represent this or that individual donkey either. It represents, as it were, a generic donkey because it stands for any donkey.

²⁷ "[...] quando hoc intendimus vel præcogitamus, nunquam hoc præcogitamus per species per quas res videri possunt, sed solum per species memoriales per quas res absentes possumus imaginari vel rememorari vel recogitare. Et ita non oportet quod visio rei præcedat visionem rei, quia aliquando hoc non intendimus nisi in generali seu in universali; utpote volens videre asinum vel emere vinum non oportet quod præcogitem in particulari hunc vel illum asinum vel hoc vel illud vinum, sed sufficit quod in generali." (*II Sent.* q. 36, 634.)

an individual donkey. In order to direct our attention to our environment with an intention to see a donkey, it suffices that we intend to see a donkey in general. This shows that according to Olivi it is possible to imagine an object that does not represent any particular individual.²⁸

It seems rather safe to say that Olivi has an idea about the difference between the imagination and the memory. Although he does not explicitly address the issue, he occasionally takes up ideas that are related to it and thus allows us to see that there is a clear distinction between these two psychological processes: memories pertain to a subject's earlier cognitive acts, whereas imagined things are not about the past and do not pertain to a certain individual object. The details of the processes which cause this difference remain somewhat obscure, but it seems to me that Olivi has all the material needed for accounting for the difference, even though he never actually considers it as an issue worth dealing with. For him the more important question is the unity of the common sense and the memory. And, as we have seen, he is quite clear about that.

²⁸ Note, however, that Olivi also explicitly states that memory species cannot be universal, i.e., they cannot represent universal quiddities (*II Sent.* q. 74, 116). In other words, he points out that although we are capable of imagining donkeys in general, we cannot imagine the essence of donkeyness. Generality and universality are different things.

15 ESTIMATION

15.1 Harmfulness and Usefulness

The estimative faculty is often considered as the most interesting of all the internal senses because many features of sensitive cognition that relate to it are found philosophically interesting even today. Being one of the highest and most refined cognitive functions of the sensitive soul, estimation was understood as a faculty that is between pure sensation and reason, and it plays an important role in accounting for cognition both in human and non-human animals. It accounts also for an animal's ability to perceive things in its surroundings in a way that reveals the relevance of these objects to the well-being of the animal, and thus it figures prominently in medieval theories of action. In addition, many authors—most notably Avicenna—assigned a multitude of other cognitive functions to estimation: accidental perception (e.g., perceiving a white thing as sweet), the governing of the animal soul, and even certain types of self-awareness. Deborah Black has argued, however, that Latin philosophers usually simplified the role of the estimative faculty and ignored some of the key ideas that were present in Avicenna's theory of estimation.¹ Even so, the estimative faculty remains an interesting part of the medieval theories of the sensitive soul's higher cognitive functions.

Due to the elusive role that the estimative faculty plays in medieval psychological theories, it is not easy to provide a concise description of it and of the functions that were attributed to it. Medieval authors disagreed on the role of estimation: they attributed to estimation various functions and conceived of its relation to the soul's other faculties in different ways. Understanding what kind of faculty estimation is and what its functions are is made difficult by the concept of intention (*intentio*)². A well-known and widely used Avicennian idiom

¹ Black 2000, 59. Then again, Hasse praises medieval scholastics for understanding the notion of *intentio* much better than most modern philosophers and historians of philosophy (Hasse 2000, 128).

² Note that the intention in question here is not the one Olivi referred to when he spoke of the directing of the common sense. Olivi uses the term *intentio* (at least) in two different

has it that the estimative faculty apprehends intentions which are imperceptible to the senses but account for an animal's ability to perform seemingly rational actions. Avicenna, however, never properly defined what the intentions actually are (Black 2000, 60). He was content with providing some illustrative examples of cases in which it seems necessary to posit a cognitive activity that somehow surpasses the simple perception of proper and common sensibles. One of these examples is particularly important from our perspective because it became so popular in Latin philosophy: A sheep wanders peacefully in a meadow, when suddenly a wolf appears in its vicinity. The sheep runs away immediately, although it has never seen a wolf—let alone had an opportunity to learn by experience that wolves are dangerous and harmful to sheep. This kind of behaviour calls for explanation because it is not obvious how the sheep is capable of conceiving the wolf as dangerous or harmful. This example conveys the idea that the estimative faculty accounts for an animal's ability to apprehend which things in its surroundings are useful and which are harmful as well as its ability to act appropriately in relation to the things it encounters. The estimative faculty enables this operation by apprehending the intentions which are somehow related to the harmfulness or usefulness of the perceived objects.

The example of the sheep and the wolf was widely used and continually repeated during the 13th century. It played an important role when scholastics conceptualised the role of estimation. Therefore, in many cases, the ability to perceive harmfulness/usefulness remained a central explanandum for the estimative faculty.³ Olivi employs the example of the sheep and the wolf in his discussion concerning the estimative function as well, and he understands estimation solely as a psychological operation that makes human beings and non-human animals capable of perceiving external objects in terms of their usefulness/harmfulness. This makes the task of presenting Olivi's conception of the estimative function in many ways much easier than it is to analyse, say, Avicenna's conception of estimation. We can leave out the complexities that are present in Avicenna's intricate theory, and we can also ignore the problems that come from the fusion of the Avicennian conception of intentions with the other conceptions that were available to Latin philosophers. In short, we can concentrate on the single idea of estimation as a psychological function that provides beings with consciousness of the usefulness/harmfulness of objects in their environment.

There are many features of the traditional way of conceiving of estimation which Olivi accepts. He thinks that animals are able to apprehend the usefulness/harmfulness of the things they perceive, and thus they are capable of performing the psychological function of estimation. He does not deny the existence

senses: it may mean the attention of the common sense (as, for example, in *II Sent.* q. 59, 555, quoted above on p. 88), or it may refer to the affective properties, such as harmfulness or usefulness (as, for example, in *ibid.*, q. 64, 603). As question 64 shows, Olivi uses also the term *ratio* as a synonym for *intentio* in the latter sense.

³ As Avicenna never positively defined intentions and as Latin philosophers had access to strikingly different conceptions of intentions (Black points out that in Averroës "the association of intentions with affective properties, such as friendliness and hostility, disappears entirely." (Black 2000, 62.)), they proposed different variations.

of the estimative psychological function, and in this way he is in line with the standard medieval view. However, Olivi denies the existence of a separate estimative faculty and attributes the estimative function to the common sense. He thinks that estimation can be explained by a special kind of apprehension of external objects. When a sheep perceives a wolf, its common sense produces an act of perception which is about the wolf. This act, however, is a special kind of perceptual act because it provides consciousness not only of the perceptual qualities of the wolf but also of the harmfulness thereof. This kind of act we can call an estimative act of the common sense. Let us now see in detail how this type of act occurs, what kind of act Olivi takes it to be, and how he justifies the attribution of it to the common sense.

15.2 Estimative Dispositions of the Common Sense

Olivi thinks that estimative acts are ultimately based on pleasure and pain that are apprehended by the common sense. The common sense apprehends external objects and the acts of the external senses, but it apprehends also pleasure, pain, and the overall well-being of the body: “[...] the apprehension of that which is pleasurable or painful to the senses and the apprehension of the perfection or destruction of the body belong only to the common sense with the five external senses that are connected to it.”⁴ This idea is based on Olivi’s innovative and interesting way of understanding the sense of touch as a faculty which senses primarily the state of the body of the subject and only secondarily the external objects that cause changes in this state (Yrjönsuuri 2008, 101–16; I shall discuss this topic in detail in Part III, Chapter 19.2). The sense of touch senses the state of the body, and the common sense provides a kind of bodily self-consciousness through the acts of the sense of touch. In this way, the common sense provides the subject with consciousness of the state of the body, and this kind of consciousness includes all the pains and pleasures of the body and of the external senses.

The ability to apprehend the pains and pleasures of the body and the external senses is crucial for the estimative function because Olivi thinks that estimation is nothing but the apprehension of the painfulness or pleasurability of an object. We tend to estimate that things which cause pain are harmful and should be avoided. From this perspective, it seems only natural to associate the estimative function with perception of pain and pleasure. Olivi claims that we do not have to attribute an estimative faculty to the sensitive soul because the ability to perceive the pain and pleasure of the body suffices to account for avoiding and pursuing objects that cause them:

Moreover, when the common sense perceives a pain in the hand—caused by burning—does it not say to the appetite that the fire should be avoided as be-

⁴ “Sed solius sensus communis cum quinque sensibus sibi connexis est apprehendere delectabile sensui vel poenale et perfectionem sui corporis vel consumptionem.” (*II Sent.* q. 64, 604; see also *ibid.*, q. 58, 502–3.)

ing painful and destructive? And does not the appetite straightaway follow its dictate, order a flight, and flee? And conversely, when a dog perceives by the common sense that it enjoys some food greatly and is refreshed by it, does it [viz the common sense] not then say and judge that the food should be eaten? And doesn't the appetite straightaway order this and move the mouth towards the food?⁵

The common sense apprehends an external object as well as the pain or pleasure that the object causes. On the basis of this information, it is capable of estimating whether the object should be avoided or striven for. Burning one's hand in fire is painful, and eating a delicious meal is pleasurable and refreshes the whole body. The common sense is capable of apprehending these experiences, and therefore it is unnecessary to attribute a separate faculty of estimation to perform the estimative function. An object that causes pain is estimated to be harmful, and one that causes pleasure is estimated to be useful.

So far so good. However, it does not require much ingenuity to find a counter-argument which could rebuff Olivi's idea: the sheep does not suffer pain from the vision of the wolf—at least it does not seem intuitively correct to suppose that it does. Now, if the sheep does not feel pain when it sees the wolf, it should not be able to estimate it as harmful either. Yet the whole point of the example of the sheep and the wolf is that it differs somehow from situations in which an object causes pain and is thus avoided because of the perceived painfulness. The sheep estimates that the wolf is dangerous and should be avoided even though the vision of the wolf does not harm the sheep. Olivi's way of conceiving of the relation between the perception of pain and the estimative function does not seem to account for the fundamental problem that the estimative faculty was postulated to solve in the first place.

Olivi is aware of the possibility of this kind of criticism. He construes his theory in such a way so as to account for the sheep's action in the wolf's presence. In order to see how Olivi manages this explanation, we need to look at two issues. First, we must understand what kind of act the estimative act of the common sense is because, in fact, Olivi does not require that the subject always suffer from or take pleasure in the perception of an object in order to estimate whether it is harmful or useful—even though ultimately this kind of estimative perception is based on the perception of pain/pleasure. Second, we must take into consideration how Olivi accounts for the innateness of some estimative acts.

⁵ "Præterea, quando sensus communis sentit dolorem in manu ex eius adustione causatum: nunquid tunc dictat appetitui illum ignem esse sibi fugiendum tanquam poenalem et consumptivum? nunquid etiam ad eius dictamen appetitus mox imperat fugam et fugit? Et e contra, quando canis per sensum communem sentit se valde delectari et refici ex tali cibo: nunquid tunc dictat et iudicat illum esse comedendum? nunquid etiam mox appetitus hoc imperat et movet os ad cibum?" (*II Sent.* q. 64, 604-5.); "Præterea, æstimativa non videtur differre ab ipsa [scil. sensu communi], quia cum omnes potentiæ apprehensivæ possint apprehendere convenientiam vel disconvenientiam suorum obiectorum, æstimativæ autem non attribuat aliud nisi apprehendere intentionem convenientis seu utilis et nocivi, sensus autem communis apprehendendo offensas et complacentias sensuum particularium sufficienter hoc possit. Ergo et cetera." (*ibid.*, q. 58, 509-10.)

That is, we have to understand how he accounts for action that could be labeled as being instinctual.

The example dealing with the burning hand which Olivi mentions in the passage cited above is illustrative. It shows clearly how estimation is ultimately based on the perception of pain/pleasure. Still, it is clear that we do not have to burn our hand every time we see fire in order to estimate it to be dangerous and harmful to our well-being. How can this experiential fact be consistent with Olivi's theory? In order to render his thought intelligible, I shall expand upon his own example. Let us suppose that a child sees a lit candle for the first time in her life. She advances towards the candle and, being curious, tries to grasp the flame with unfortunate consequences.

Now, an Olivian interpretation of this case goes as follows: The child perceives the flame, its heat, and her burning hand by her common sense. The common sense apprehends that fire is harmful to the hand and to the well-being of the child's body. The preceding passage has it that the common sense "says" this to the sensitive appetite which, in turn, moves the hand away from the fire. The child hopefully learns that one should not play with fire, and it is precisely this learning that is important for understanding how estimative acts function. Only those who have learnt that fire causes pain are capable of estimating that it would be painful without experimenting to see what happens when the hand is put into the fire. This example reveals that learning is an important factor in the process of estimative perception, and in this respect the way Olivi understands the metaphysical basis of estimative acts of the common sense is central to his view. Learning that fire is harmful takes place in such a way that the estimative perception with which the child perceives the fire and the pain caused by the fire generates a disposition (*habitus*) in her common sense. The disposition affects subsequent apprehensions of fire, and when the child perceives fire anew, she perceives it as harmful and painful even when she sees it from a distance and does not actually suffer pain at that moment of perceiving. The estimative aspect of the perception of fire is caused by the disposition which was formed in the first unfortunate encounter with fire. Olivi duly acknowledges that this kind of learning is possible also for non-human animals, and so he attributes the ability of learning also to them⁶.

Olivi's manner of conceiving the function of estimation has certain strengths. We tend to see things in light of our previous experiences, and we estimate things to be useful or harmful on the basis of our past experiences. It is true that the example of the sheep and wolf was raised exactly to show that sometimes estimation takes place without previous experience. Sheep were noticed to flee from wolves *even when they had never seen them before*. Does this remark not cause prob-

⁶ "Quando etiam canis per doctrinam et assuessionem acquirit aliquos habitus in suo sensu communi et appetitu, ita quod habitualiter amat et aestimat multa quæ prius non amabat vel odiebat nec noverat: tunc utique habitualis amicitia et prudentia eius potentiis et organis acquiritur differens a suis actibus qui cito recipiuntur et transeunt." (*II Sent.* q. 63, 601; see also *ibid.*, q. 66, 610.) On this point Olivi contradicts Aquinas and agrees with, e.g., Avicenna and Jean de la Rochelle (Knuuttila 2004, 220, 248; Black 2000, 69; See Jean de la Rochelle, *Summa de anima* II.4.101).

lems for Olivi? Surely, it is supposed to prove that experience and learning cannot account for all of the estimative apprehensions.

This question brings us to the second important for understanding Olivi's theory correctly: some estimative acts seem to be innate and instinctual. Olivi thinks that he is capable of accounting also for instinctual action by his conception of estimative acts. He simply claims that some estimative dispositions of the common sense are innate: "[...] there are many habitual estimations generated and bestowed by both experience and nature in human beings and in brute animals."⁷ The disposition of the sheep to estimate wolves as harmful is bestowed by nature, and as such it is instinctual⁸.

After making these moves, Olivi is in a position to argue that estimation is nothing but an apprehension that is affected by a disposition: "[...] because the estimative faculty adds nothing to the common sense or to the imagination except for certain habitual estimations or some dispositions which determine or incline it to estimate in one way or another."⁹ In other words, estimation is a habitual way of apprehending external objects in relation to one's own well-being. The psychological process is similar in the case of the child who has learnt to see fire as harmful and in the case of the sheep who avoids the wolf. Both the child and the sheep perceive an external object by their common senses, and they apprehend these objects as harmful due to the dispositions they have in relation to them. The only difference is the origin of the disposition: it is bestowed by nature to the sheep and by experience to the child. Moreover, there are both innate and acquired dispositions in human beings as well as in non-human animals. Some dispositions are innate and others are based on experience, and although different species of animals may have different kinds of innate dispositions which make them perceive different things as useful or harmful, there is no discontinuity between human beings and non-human animals in this respect.

15.3 Estimative Perception

Olivi confines the estimative function to the sensitive soul. He thinks that all animals are endowed with it and that estimative acts belong to the common sense, which is a faculty of the sensitive soul. Moreover, estimation is a psychological process that occurs in a similar way in human and non-human animals. It is part of perception, not an intellectual cognition that occurs in addition to perception. Particularly, it should not be understood as a kind of practical reasoning. When I think that: "Oh, there is a precipice. It seems to be quite sheer and deep. I

⁷ "Quod dico, quia tam in homine quam in brutis sunt multæ habituales æstimationes tam a consuetudine quam a natura genitæ et inditæ." (*II Sent.* q. 64, 603.)

⁸ It should be noted that I do not think that "instinctual" necessarily means "unconscious," and I do not think that Olivi does so either.

⁹ "[...] quia æstiativa nihil addit supra sensum communem et imaginativam nisi solum quasdam habituales æstimationes vel quasdam dispositiones determinantes aut inclinantes ad sic vel sic æstimandum." (*II Sent.* q. 64, 604.)

should not go too near the edge, for I may fall, and that would be harmful to me," I am not estimating, but reasoning. When I truly *estimate* the precipice to be dangerous, I perhaps feel a little dizzy and become afraid just from seeing it without any process of rational thinking in my mind¹⁰. And when I am careful of not putting my hand in fire, I do not necessarily have to reason that if I did so, my hand would burn, and that would be painful. I perceive fire as something that should be avoided, and the harmfulness of fire is an integral part of my perception. Or, to put it in yet another way, should anyone be confronted with a wolf in the wilderness, he or she would be terrified before having time to think. The perception of a wolf is enough to cause fear, and thus—given that estimating the wolf as dangerous precedes becoming afraid of it—estimation is not a result of a process of practical reasoning. We do not have to reason that the wolf may be dangerous to us because we perceive it as such. Estimation is immediately present in the perception itself.

This interpretation of the estimative process captures Olivi's thought well, as he understands estimation as a special case of perception. When an animal has an estimative perception of an object, it apprehends something more than just the perceptual qualities thereof. It apprehends something that is not immediately present to the external senses. For instance, when a sheep apprehends a wolf as harmful, it apprehends something over and above the perceptual qualities of the wolf. However, Olivi thinks that estimative perception is not the only type of perceptual process which causes a subject to be conscious of something that is not immediately present to the external senses. Estimation is a special case of perception, but it is also a special case of perceiving something over and above perceptual qualities. Take, for example, the following passage in which Olivi argues that there may be dispositions within the common sense:

You may object to some of the aforementioned [arguments] by saying that the common sense is not susceptible to any inclination or habitual disposition (*habitus vel habitualis dispositionis*). In opposition to [your objection] is first Augustine who says and proves by experiments (in *Musica* VI) that some people acquire from the frequent practice of evaluating and tasting wines a better cognisance for more easily judging the good or bad quality of wines and the superiority and inferiority thereof. Likewise, he says that an affection for discerning the harmonies of voices and a capacity for doing it quickly and easily is generated and increased by the practice of singing and listening to various songs and that it is not only in the common sense but also in the sense of hearing.¹¹

¹⁰ It needs to be emphasised that becoming afraid is not the same thing as estimating the precipice as dangerous. In fact, it is difficult to find an estimative aspect in a phenomenal experience. It "feels something like" to undergo a perception, and it definitely "feels something like" to have an emotion in relation to a perceived object; but it is not evident that there is something between these two aspects of experience. Still, scholastics thought that it must be posited in order to account for the psychological process from perception to emotion.

¹¹ "Si vero contra quaedam praedictorum obicias quod sensus communis non est susceptivus

Although this passage comes from question 64 of *Summa* in which Olivi deals with the estimative function of the common sense, it seems to me that his intention is not to present the tasting of wine and the hearing of harmony as instances of estimative perception. Rather, he wants to point out that dispositions may exist within the common sense (and even in the external senses) in order to justify his idea that estimation takes place by dispositions of the common sense. There is a metaphysical affinity between tasting wine, hearing harmonies, and estimative perception because all are brought about by dispositions of the common sense; all are instances of perceiving something over and above the perceptual qualities of external objects.

When we taste wines, we do not reason whether they are of a good quality. We taste the quality. The sensation of the goodness or shoddiness of wine is not something that comes after the sensation of taste but an intrinsic part of it. Now, it would be nonsensical to claim that someone has to be accustomed to drinking wine in order for her to ascertain whether a certain wine tastes good or bad. All of us are equally capable of distinguishing for ourselves wines that taste good from wines that taste bad. It seems clear, therefore, that when Olivi talks about the goodness or superiority and badness or inferiority, he does not refer to the immediate experience that might be represented by clauses like: "Oh, this tastes good!" or "This tastes bad." He does not mean only the good or bad taste as we experience it but refers to the overall quality of the wine, the tasting of which requires a cultivation of one's sense of taste: the "objective" quality of the wine, so to speak. This is clear, because Olivi is drawing our attention to the better ability to distinguish superior quality wines from those inferior in quality, and this kind of ability is acquired only through continuous experience. Only those people who have trained their senses of taste are able to distinguish wines of high quality from those that are less so. But anyone who has a sense of taste—be it cultivated or not—tastes whether any given wine tastes good to her.

The latter of Olivi's examples is more revealing in this respect. A musician distinguishes dissonance better than a layman—for instance, a trained guitarist is more capable than a layman of hearing whether a guitar is in tune or not—and this ability is a consequence of the cultivation of the faculty of hearing that the guitarist has undergone during the long years of his training. I think that this example reveals quite well what Olivi is after in his argument in the above passage: the perception of the concordance of tones is not something that comes in addition to the perception of these tones, and it is not something about which a musician reasons on the basis of the perception of the tones. The perception of

alicuius habitus vel habitualis dispositionis: contra hoc est primo Augustinus, VI *Musicae*, dicens et experimentis probans quod aliqui ex frequenti usu probandi et gustandi vina acquirunt maiorem peritiam faciliter iudicandi bonitatem vel malitiam vinorum ac meliorem et peioritatem eorum. Et consimiliter dicit quod ex usu cantandi et cantus varios audiendi non solum in sensu communi sed etiam in sensu auditus gignitur et augetur aliqua affectio et discretio ad concordantias vocum subtilius et facilius discernendas." (II *Sent.* q. 64, 605; see also *Quæst. de nov.* q. 7, 159.) Olivi is not completely consistent when it comes to the seat of the dispositions which allow us to, say, better judge the quality of wines. In q. 70, 632 he says that such dispositions belong to the sense of taste.

the concordance is the perception of the tones. A musician perceives sounds in a different way than a layman, and the difference exists precisely at the level of perception.

At the risk of repeating myself to the excess, I shall take up one more passage which well illustrates Olivi's manner of understanding the role of the dispositions of the common sense in perception. There are two issues that must be clarified before looking at the passage. First, it is taken from Olivi's argumentation of proving that the common sense is capable of acquiring dispositions. This is important because the passage deals with the process of learning to read. As human beings are the only animals that are capable of reading, it may appear that Olivi is discussing an intellectual operation. However, this is not the case. The context in which the discussion appears and the argumentative role it has leave no room for doubt: Olivi refers to a sensory process that is necessary for the ability to read, namely, the perception of letters as letters and words as words. Understanding the message of a text may be an intellectual process, but it is based on a certain kind of perception—a perception which enables the reader to recognise letters and words. This kind of perception is in principle possible for non-human animals too—although Olivi probably thinks that they do not often learn to recognise letters because that kind of ability is of little use to them, as they are incapable of understanding the meaning of letters. In other words, in the following passage Olivi does not refer to any kind of intellectual operation but to the way the dispositions of the common sense change the content of perception.

Second, the following passage does not deal with estimative perception. As I already mentioned, an estimative act of the common sense is a special case of perception in which the percipient becomes aware of something more than the sensible qualities of a perceived object. Olivi takes up another kind of perception which is affected by a disposition. As his idea clarifies how the dispositions in general influence perceptual acts, it also helps to understand how estimative dispositions figure in perception. Learning to perceive letters as letters is a good example also because it does not involve emotions. Oftentimes it is difficult to see the exact role estimation plays because it is so easily confused with the emotions it arouses. However, estimative perception is not an emotional reaction but a cause of emotion. The apprehension by which the sheep estimates that the wolf is harmful can be distinguished from the fear that it causes, but it is difficult to grasp the exact nature of the estimative perception without appealing to the emotional response it evokes. The following example clarifies how dispositions of the common sense affect perceptions, and as it does not involve any emotions, it clarifies how estimative perception figures in a perceptual process. Now, Olivi writes as follows:

Moreover, is not the keenness of sensory judgement for judging its objects more keenly and easily improved by frequent exercise? Surely when children have learned the letters, learned to compose syllables and words from the letters, and learned to read hymns, they have a sensory disposition (*habitus*) to quickly judge and discern everything they read—in such a way that we call some of them slow and dull and others sharp and prompt. Also, the

sight of many people is made sharper by a frequent reading of fine letters, and by contrast the sight of many people is made thicker by a continuous reading of gross letters in such a way that it is rendered inept in discerning and reading fine letters quickly.¹²

Modern readers of medieval manuscripts may confess that one becomes more efficient in distinguishing the letters and the words of a particular hand simply by reading a lot of text from that hand. Learning one handwriting, however, does not necessarily make one an expert on all other handwriting (although it surely helps in the process of learning a new hand). Olivi provides us with a good reminder of the fact that this principle applies also to medieval readers of manuscripts: at least judging on the basis of his example, it was not always easy for them to read the writing of their contemporaries.

What I would like to draw attention to, however, is how this passage sheds light on Olivi's way of understanding the role of the dispositions of the common sense in perception. They influence the content of perception. Learning to distinguish letters from each other—either when trying to learn how to read in one's childhood, or when trying to make sense of a certain handwriting—generates dispositions in the common sense. These dispositions affect the subsequent perceptions by helping the process of recognising different letters. Thus, where an illiterate child sees only a meaningless set of lines when he sees the sign 'A,' a child who has already learned the letters is quick to see this constellation of lines as being the letter A, and a literate adult is actually incapable of perceiving in the constellation anything but the letter A. You can try, but I presume that you are unable to do so. However much you try to see 'A' as a meaningless collection of lines, you see it as a meaningful letter. The letter seems to jump out of the constellation, and it is extremely difficult to not see it. The perceptual qualities that we see contain nothing but a black colour which has certain shape: we see three black lines in a certain arrangement in relation to each other. But our perceptual experience is richer because we actually cannot help but see the black shape as the letter A. By seeing these perceptible qualities, we see something over and above them—we see the black shape as a letter. In this way the perception of the sign 'A' as the letter A has become a part of our perception.

Similarly, when a normal literate adult person reads, she does not need to combine the letters of each word so as to see the word which is composed of them. She does not read 'p', 'u', 'e', 'l', 'l', 'a', and then combine from these the word 'puella'. Rather, she sees the word as a whole.¹³ The combination of letters is seen as a whole word, and this is really a perceptual process. So, even

¹² "Præterea, nunquid acumen sensualis iudicii in suis obiectis acutius et facilius iudicandis iuvatur per frequens exercitium? Certe pueri, quando didicerunt litteras et ex litteris syllabas et dictiones componere et legere psalmos, habent sensualem habitum cito diiudicandi et discernendi quæque legenda, ita quod quosdam dicimus in hoc tardos et dueros, quosdam vero acutos et promptos. Multis etiam per frequentem lecturam subtilis litteræ acuitur visus et e contra pluribus ingrossatur per continuam lecturam litteræ grossæ, ita quod ex hoc redduntur inepti ad subtilem litteram celeriter discernendam et perlegendam." (*II Sent.* q. 64, 605.)

¹³ A loss of the ability to recognise words as wholes is a failure of recognition called *pure alexia*,

though Olivi is discussing learning to read—which he most certainly thinks of as a process that requires intellectual capacities—he does not restrict the process to the intellectual level. To understand the meaning of the word ‘puella’ requires the intellect, but to see it as a word or as a some kind of a meaningful whole—in contrast to seeing only a meaningless mishmash of lines and curves—is possible through a habituation of the perceptual system. We can learn to recognise the words of a foreign language without knowing their meaning. If those words are difficult to read, we have to spell them a few times, but after that we start to see them as wholes; yet we may still not understand them.

Now, Olivi thinks that estimation is a perception which is affected by a disposition. Thus, it is a similar kind of process to the one which allows us to perceive letters, and as such it enables human and non-human animals to perceive something over and above the perceptual qualities by perceiving those qualities.¹⁴ This conception of the estimative function as an integral part of perception can be applied to the cases of the child and the sheep who both see something as harmful. The child, who has already experienced the heat of fire by burning her finger, sees fire as painful and harmful. Similarly, the sheep sees the wolf as harmful and dangerous. The estimative function that is active in these perceptions affects their phenomenal contents in such a way that both the child and the sheep see something more than the sensible qualities of the fire and the wolf. They perceive them as a musician hears tones or an adult sees familiar words: a musician hears tones as being in concord; a literate adult sees lines and curves as words; a child sees fire as painful; and the sheep see the wolf as dangerous. The only difference between these cases is that seeing something as a letter or as a word, and hearing tunes as forming a harmony do not count as estimative perceptions because they are not related to the well-being of the percipient (although the musician may disagree because he may be hurt by a dissonance). To the best of my knowledge, Olivi does not present a comprehensive list of features whose apprehension is accounted for by the estimative dispositions of the common sense. However, on the basis of his examples we can see that at least the apprehension of usefulness (*utilitas*), harmfulness (*nocivitas*), uselessness (*inutilitas*), hostility (*inimicitia*), and friendliness (*amicitia*) count as estimative perceptions (*II Sent.* q. 64, 602–5).

and it is often accompanied by a specific kind of a brain damage. Patients with this deficit are capable of identifying letters, but when they are presented with a written word, they have to read it letter by letter—a process that reduces the speed of reading considerably. This seems to attest to the idea that in normal literate adults the perception of words is a top-down process. For an introductory treatment of this issue, see, e.g., Edward E. Smith et al., *Atkinson & Hilgard's Introduction to Psychology*, 14th ed. (Wadsworth, 2003), 167–70.

¹⁴ Further evidence for the claim that dispositions account for perceiving something over and above the perceptual qualities can be found from a passage in which Olivi discusses the difference between memory species and dispositions. He points out that dispositions affect the way we consider the objects of our thoughts. Thus, a Jewish and a Christian both may think of Jesus, but only the latter thinks him as Christ. The difference is due to the disposition of Christian faith which is present in the latter but not in the former. (*II Sent.* q. 74, 118–9.) This example, I take it, shows that dispositions change the way objects are conceived, and it is only a short step to adapt this same principle to the sensitive level.

Considering the foregoing analysis, it is not surprising that Olivi denies the existence of a separate estimative faculty. The estimative function is a part of perception, and it enriches the content of perception in many ways. As such, it presumes an act of perception: it is impossible to perceive any object as being harmful or useful without perceiving the object:

[...] since the intentions of usefulness, uselessness and the like cannot be apprehended by any faculty unless it at the same time apprehends the sensible or imaginary forms to which these intentions belong [...] For, when a sheep estimates that a wolf is hostile towards the sheep itself, it is necessary that it apprehends the thing that it judges to be hostile; for, to apprehend only the property (*ratio*) of hostility is not to apprehend that the wolf is hostile. [...] Therefore, when the wolf is absent and [the sheep] actually estimates this [viz that the wolf is hostile], then the act and the faculty of the act must apprehend the absent wolf in an imaginative way. Then again, when the wolf is seen or heard as being present and the sheep estimates and judges that the wolf is hostile, the act and the faculty apprehend the form of the wolf as a subject of the hostility by way of the common sense. This makes it clear that the faculty [viz estimation] is one and the same as the imagination and the common sense.¹⁵

A sheep perceives a wolf as being harmful, and it is incapable of apprehending usefulness without apprehending an object to which it belongs or without apprehending an object that has a property of harmfulness. More generally, we apprehend objects as useful/harmful by perceiving, imagining, and (presumably) remembering¹⁶, and we are incapable of apprehending usefulness and harmfulness as such without apprehending the objects to which they belong. In this way, the basic idea behind Olivi's argumentation in favour of the attribution of the estimative function to the faculty of the common sense is the same which we have already encountered in our preceding discussions of the imaginative and memorative functions: the estimative function must belong to the common sense because in our experience the estimative content (harmfulness/usefulness) and the perceptual content (the object) are conjoined. This calls for a unifying factor, and

¹⁵ "[...] intentiones utilis et inutilis et consimilium non possunt ab aliqua potentia apprehendi, nisi in simul apprehendat formas sensibiles vel imaginarias quarum sunt huiusmodi intentiones [...] Quando enim ovis aestimat lupum sibi esse inimicum, oportet quod apprehendat illam rem quam sibi iudicat inimicam; apprehendere enim solam rationem inimicitiae non est apprehendere lupum sibi esse inimicum. [...] Ergo quando lupo absente hoc actu aestimat, tunc oportet quod ille actus et eius potentia per modum imaginativae apprehendat ipsum absentem. Quando vero ipso praesentialiter viso vel audito ipsum esse sibi inimicum aestimat et iudicat, tunc per modum sensus communis ille actus et eius potentia apprehendunt formam lupi ut subiectum illius inimicitiae. Ex quo patet quod illa potentia est una et eadem cum imaginativa et cum sensu communi." (*II Sent.* q. 64, 603–4.)

¹⁶ Olivi mentions the function of imagining an absent object in this context because he thinks that estimation does not concern only perceived objects: it is also possible to estimate an imagined and absent object to be useful or harmful. He does not say whether it is possible that remembering involves an estimative element, but I cannot see any reason why he would deny it.

Olivi thinks that the interconnectedness between these two psychological functions can be accounted for if the acts of perception and the estimative dispositions are attributed to one and the same faculty, the common sense. Thus, Olivi's idea is that since the other functions of the common sense and the function of estimation are so closely linked to each other that they are both needed in estimative acts, they are actually not acts of two different faculties, but of one.

Olivi's way of conceptualising the estimative function is different from certain other well-known theories, such as those put forward by Avicenna and Aquinas especially if these two are understood as thinking that intentions are kinds of imperceptible properties that inhere in the objects of perception. Olivi explicitly takes up and rejects the view that intentions are formal objects of the estimative faculty. He does not indicate the source of this idea, however, and although it is possible that he is opposing either Avicenna or Aquinas, even this is not clear because it is not obvious how these two thinkers understood intentions. What should be clear on the basis of the preceding discussion is that Olivi does not think that intentions are special kinds of objects of apprehension. Rather, they can be conceived of as relations. The following passage is illuminating in this respect, although the terminology is somewhat confusing: Olivi employs the term *ratio* instead of *intentio*. We should not be confused by this terminological inconsistency, however. As it is clear that *ratio* stands here for features such as usefulness and harmfulness, it seems that Olivi uses it as a synonym for *intentio*—this, in effect, underlines that he does not conceive intentions as special types of objects of cognition. Let us now look at the text:

Second, the properties (*ratio*) of usefulness and friendliness and their opposites are comprehended with regard to what is pleasant or painful to the senses and with regard to the perfection or destruction of one's own subject. For, "useful for us" means that which can contribute to our pleasure or perfection; "useless" means that which cannot do this; "harmful" means that which can do the contrary, and we call "hostile" that which has a manifest desire for what is bad for us. In contrast, we perceive as our friend that which we perceive to be favourable for our good and sociable. Therefore, these [properties] cannot be apprehended by any faculty unless with respect to the preceding [features]—for example, something is apprehended as useful for this or that pleasure, for evading this or that punishment, or as useful for the perfection of oneself, of one's relatives (*suorum*), or of one's friends. But only the common sense (together with the five external senses that are connected to it) apprehends that which is pleasant or painful to the senses and the perfection and destruction of one's body. Therefore, the common sense apprehends the relations (*respectus*) of the preceding intentions.¹⁷

¹⁷ "Secundo, quia rationes utilis et amicabilem suorumque contrariorum accipiuntur ex respectu ad delectabile sensui vel poenale et ex respectu ad perfectionem proprii subjecti vel consumptionem. Utile enim nobis dicitur quod ad aliquam nostram complacentiam vel perfectionem cooperari potest, inutile vero quod hoc non potest, nocivum vero quod ad contraria potest, inimicum vero nobis dicimus quod ad nostrum malum habet promptum affectum, per contrarium vero sentimus illud nobis esse amicum quod nostro bono

An intention is nothing but the relevance of an object to the well-being of the subject. An object is harmful to the subject if it causes her pain or destruction, and it is useful if it causes her pleasure and perfects her. Intention is nothing but this usefulness/harmfulness. However, since nothing is useful as such but only in relation to something, to apprehend the usefulness of an object requires not only the apprehension of the useful object but also the apprehension of that to which the object is useful. Moreover, usefulness/harmfulness of an object is based on its sensible effects, namely, on the pleasure and perfection or the pain and destruction it causes. To perceive an intention of harmfulness is to perceive an object and, by the same token, to become conscious of its ability to cause pain to the percipient.

From this, we can see that an intention of harmfulness is not an independent property of an object. Harmfulness is in the object insofar as the object has the relevant properties of causing pain. A wolf is a carnivorous beast with sharp teeth and a strong jaw, and the intention of harmfulness is nothing above these properties; it simply is these properties as apprehended by a subject who has learnt to apprehend these properties as painful and destructive or who innately apprehends them as such. The intention of harmfulness is unintelligible without some kind of recourse to the subject pole of the harmful relation between the subject and the object: things are not harmful in themselves but only in relation to something. In this way it can be said that an intention is a relation between the subject and the object. Olivi himself writes, that:

[...] since the intentions of useful, useless, and the like cannot be apprehended by any faculty unless it at the same time apprehends the sensible or imaginary forms to which these intentions belong; that is because [intentions] mean only some relational states (*respectivas habitudines*) of those forms.¹⁸

The estimative function can be accounted for without appealing to a special type of object, and the intentions of usefulness, harmfulness, and the like are relations between the percipient and the object perceived.¹⁹

sentimus esse benevolum et sociale. Ergo hæc non possunt per aliqua potentia apprehendi nisi in respectu ad prædicta, puta, quia apprehenditur ut utile ad delectationem hanc vel illam vel ad vitandam hanc pœnam vel illam vel utile ad perfectionem sui vel suorum vel amicorum. Sed solius sensus communis cum quinque sensibus sibi connexis est apprehendere delectabile sensui vel pœnale et perfectionem sui corporis vel consumptionem. Ergo eius est apprehendere respectus prædictarum intentionum." (*II Sent.* q. 64, 604.)

¹⁸ "[...] intentiones utilis et inutilis et consimilium non possunt ab aliqua potentia apprehendi, nisi in simul apprehendat formas sensibiles vel imaginarias quarum sunt huiusmodi intentiones; quia dicunt solum quasdam respectivas habitudines illarum formarum. [...]" (*II Sent.* q. 64, 603.) Also, the following texts are relevant: "[...] huiusmodi relativæ intentiones non sunt altiores suo ultimo fine, ex cuius respectu et ordine habent ipsis animalibus rationem utilis vel nocivi, amici. Præterea, ipse amor ovis ad agnum, quem sentit agnus eius per sensibilia signa, quæ sentit in ove, non est minor aut ignobilior respectu in ipso fundato, immo et forte idem est sentire unum quod et reliquum." (*Ibid.*, 606); "Memorari intentionum æstimabilium illasque memoriter retinere non potest fieri sine retentione et memoratone illarum rerum vel formarum quibus huiusmodi intentiones attribuuntur et quarum sunt respectus [...]" (*Ibid.*, q. 66, 611.)

¹⁹ Olivi's conception of intentions and the estimative function is very much like John Duns

It is rather easy to see how Olivi's understanding of the essence of estimative acts turns them into kinds of accidental perceptions²⁰. When an estimative apprehension of an object takes place, a being becomes conscious not only of the properties which some of its external senses grasp at that moment but also of other properties which it does not actually perceive by the external senses at that moment. When the subject does not actually come into contact with an object but, for instance, perceives it from a distance or imagines it, the perception or imaginative rendering does not cause pain or pleasure. Fire, seen from a long enough distance, does not even heat, let alone burn. However, in these cases too, the subject may apprehend the object as (potentially) pleasurable or painful, useful or harmful. Thus, the subject perceives the sensible qualities of the object and habitually perceives some properties indirectly.

In this way, estimation is like accidental perception: something is perceived (the visible qualities of fire or the visible qualities of a wolf), and something else (the harmfulness of fire to the body or the harmfulness of a wolf to the well-being of the percipient) is apprehended through the perceived qualities—not directly, but accidentally. Thus, the sheep perceives the wolf, and even though it does not feel pain from the vision, it apprehends the wolf as able to cause pain—it apprehends the wolf as painful, so to speak. Estimation is basically nothing but this kind of apprehension.

Scotus' ideas. Simo Knuuttila has pointed out that Scotus' view was a deviation from the received view. (Knuuttila 2004, 266–7.) Therefore it seems possible that Scotus was influenced by Olivi's work—either already when he was lecturing at Oxford, or when he was revising the lectures during his stay in Paris. The passage to which Knuuttila refers is Scotus' *Ordinatio* III.15, q. un., 34–7 (Ioannes Duns Scotus, *B. Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia IX. Ordinatio. Liber tertius, dist. 1–17*, ed. Commissio scotistica (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Vaticanis, 2006)), and it seems that Scotus prepared the revision of book III while he was in Paris in the beginning of the 14th century (Thomas Williams, "Introduction: The Life and Works of John Duns the Scot," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. T. Williams (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 9). To be sure, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate the influence because avowing one's indebtedness to Olivi was not considered desirable at the time—Olivi's own order had demanded confiscation and incineration of Olivi's works in 1299 (Burr 1976, 74). In *Quodl.* III.2, 171–5, Olivi argues that a relation does not add anything real to a substance. For discussion, see Alain Boureau, "Le concept de relation chez Pierre de Jean Olivi," in Boureau & Piron 1999, 41–55.

²⁰ This thread had been present in theories concerning the estimative faculty ever since Avicenna (Di Martino 2008, 111–21; Black 2000, 61–68).

16 COGITATION: A CENTRE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Olivi's discussion of the cogitative faculty (*cogitativa*) is remarkably short. He briefly takes up and refutes a view that the cogitative faculty accounts for the interconnectedness of all the functions of the internal senses (i.e., function (10) of the list presented on p. 187). We have already seen that one of the possible ways of explaining how the consciousness of an object and the harmfulness thereof can be combined so as to become the consciousness of a harmful object is to attribute the function of combining all the information from other faculties of the soul to one of the internal senses. Similarly, various other psychological operations require the collaboration of several of the higher cognitive functions, and according to the view that Olivi challenges, the combining of the information from different faculties is done by the cogitative faculty.

This text describes the view that Olivi is about to refute:

Does the cogitative faculty which combines and compares all the acts and objects of the aforementioned [faculties differ from them]? It is the opinion of some of those mentioned earlier that it differs from the aforementioned faculties. For, they say, to bring everything together belongs to a faculty that is superior to other faculties and common to all of them. This is why some call it logical (*logistica*), that is, rational—because in comparison to the others it, as it were, participates in the order of reason. And they say that it exists in the middle part of the brain, so to speak, as a mediator, conferrer, and collator of everything. Some of them say, by contrast, that estimation suffices for this in beasts, whereas in human being reason (which moves and governs those other faculties completely) is sufficient together with them.¹

¹ "Quantum etiam ad septimum, an scilicet cogitativa quæ omnium prædictarum [potentiarum] actus et obiecta componit et confert [differat a prædictis potentiis]. Est quorundam prædictorum opinio quod differat a prædictis. Quia, ut dicunt, conferre omnia est potentiæ superioris et communis ad omnes; unde et a quibusdam logistica, id est, rationalis vocatur tanquam præ ceteris participans ordinem rationis. Dicuntque quod est in medio cerebri tanquam omnium mediatrix et collatrix seu comparatrix. Quidam vero ex eis dicunt ad hoc in brutis sufficere æstimativam, in homine vero cum his sufficit ratio istas altius movens et regens." (*II Sent.* q. 66, 609.)

The cogitative faculty is depicted as the unifying centre of all the other faculties. Then again, Olivi also takes up other versions of this same fundamental idea: according to some, the estimative faculty accounts for the combining in non-human animals, and in human beings it is done by reason. The basic idea in all these versions, however, is the same: one of the faculties of the soul brings together all the separate functions that are necessary for accounting for more complicated forms of cognitive activity.

Olivi does not spend much time in refuting this view since his discussion of the unity of the common sense and the other internal senses has already sufficiently undermined it. There is no need for a distinct combining faculty because all the higher psychological functions belong to the common sense. The function of combining the information from various internal senses is unnecessary if there are not several internal senses. Moreover, the function cannot be confined to reason alone because in that case animals would not be capable of psychological operations that require the combining of various functions². Even if the functions of apprehending, operating, and governing the acts of different faculties belong to reason in human beings, the very same functions must be attributed to some faculty of the sensitive soul so that the operations of irrational animals can be explained. And this faculty cannot be estimation because Olivi has already argued that there is no such independent faculty.

Olivi concludes his exposition on the unity of all the internal senses by highlighting one salient idea which runs through the whole discussion:

It becomes clear from the foregoing that if some sensitive faculty combines and compares all the objects of the aforementioned [faculties] to each other, it is the common sense. Certainly, it is necessary that the common sense—which combines and compares everything—apprehends and controls everything. It is as capable of doing this when we actually perceive sensible things and when we imagine them as absent.³

Olivi attributes to the common sense the ability to apprehend all the things which were often attributed to the other internal senses as apprehending. In this way the common sense functions as a combining centre which apprehends everything there is to apprehend in the sensible realm: the acts of the external senses, the sensible qualities of external objects, the images of absent objects, the pastness of foregone events, the harmfulness/usefulness of present and absent objects, the

² Olivi points out that non-human animals, young children, and insane people are capable of higher cognitive functions even without the use of reason: “Et quidem hoc aequaliter clamat experientia qua in brutis intellectu carentibus videmus huiusmodi potentias sensitivas et etiam in infantibus et amentibus quod sunt actus earum absque actu intellectus.” (*II Sent.* q. 67, 616; see also *ibid.*, q. 63, 600.)

³ “Ex praedictis autem patet quod si aliqua potentia sensitiva omnia obiecta praedictarum ad invicem componit et confert, quod illa est sensus communis. Et certe, oportet quod illa, quae omnia componit et confert, omnia apprehendat et regat, nec minus hoc poterit, dum res sensibiles sentimus actu quam dum eas imaginamur absentes.” (*II Sent.* q. 66, 613.); “Ergo in sensitiva anima animalium oportet dare unam potentiam omnibus aliis praesidentem omnesque regentem [...]” (*Ibid.*, q. 62, 589; see also *ibid.*, 587.)

state of the body and the external senses, and so forth. It is also able to combine the information it receives through the various psychological acts. In short, the common sense provides non-human animals with consciousness of everything which is needed in order to account for their behaviour. It is the governing centre of the animal soul.

It should now be clear that Olivi is construing the psychology of the animal soul in such a way that there is one faculty which functions as the unifying centre and provides consciousness of all sorts of things to the subject. Different psychological functions are realised as different kinds of processes. These processes differ from each other phenomenally, psychologically, and to some extent also essentially: imaginative acts differ from perceptual acts because they pertain to different objects; estimative perception involves a disposition of the common sense, and so forth. All these psychological acts belong, however, to one and the same faculty of the soul. In this way there is a common foundation for all of them, and they share an essential unity. This unity is required because otherwise many psychological operations that are composed of multiple basic functions would not be possible. At least there should be one governing faculty which accounts for the unity—and this is superfluous in the eyes of Olivi because he thinks that it is possible to account for all the psychological functions by appealing only to the activity of the common sense.

Olivi clearly thinks that a phenomenal unity also is a prerequisite for being able to conduct the kind of operations that are possible even to non-human animals. Animals must be conscious of external objects and the harmfulness thereof, and there has to be a kind of phenomenal unity in the animals' experiences of these things. Otherwise they could not act appropriately. Different aspects of things in the world are present to an animal's consciousness and appear to it as parts of its phenomenal consciousness. This perceiving is possible because they have the common sense, the most pervasive function of which is to provide a conscious "mind" to non-human animals. In a way, the common sense provides experiential subjectivity and a kind of conscious self to a non-human animal. Animals are experiential and phenomenal subjects of the cognitive activity that pertains to all the various features of the world and also of the animal itself. To this subjectivity and the consciousness thereof we shall now turn.

Part III
Self-Cognition

17 INTRODUCTION

Although there is no Latin equivalent to the noun 'self,' medieval philosophical psychology contains much discussion that pertains to what we call the self and self-consciousness¹. Medievalists employed various grammatical structures to express themselves: for instance, the pronoun *ipse* and the reflexive pronoun *se* are much used (*se cognoscere* for self-knowledge, *se apprehendere* for self-apprehension, etc.). In opposition to certain modern approaches, medieval philosophers were interested in the ability to be conscious of the various things that are part of the cognising subject herself as a whole: the soul, the body, and the acts and dispositions of this compound. Thus, self-consciousness was typically approached through a threefold division which distinguished the knowledge of the soul's essence, the soul's *habitus*, and the soul's acts. In addition to these explicitly addressed topics, certain others were occasionally touched upon: the experiential unity of the soul, the experience of the ownness of the soul's acts, and bodily self-consciousness.

Olivi is one of the most innovative and original medieval thinkers when it comes to the different types of self-cognition. Self-consciousness as Olivi understands it does not differ radically from other forms of consciousness. It is achieved much in the same manner as is the consciousness of things that are external to a conscious subject: self-consciousness is a result of a cognitive act, and as such it shares the general features which belong to a cognitive act. As we have seen in previous chapters, Olivi's conception of the structure of a cognitive act is as follows: a cognitive faculty produces an act which is intentionally directed at

¹ A comprehensive study of medieval theories of self-consciousness remains yet to be written but there are many important studies that discuss the matter: Boulnois 1999, 151–221; Crabbe 1999; Sylvain Piron, "L'expérience subjective selon Pierre de Jean Olivi," in *Généalogies du sujet: De Saint Anselme à Malebranche*, ed. O. Boulnois (Paris: Vrin, 2007), 43–54; François-Xavier Putallaz, *Le sens de la réflexion chez Thomas D'Aquin*, *Études de philosophie médiévale* 66 (Paris: Vrin, 1991); Putallaz 1991a; Richard Sorabji, *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death* (Chicago/Oxford: University of Chicago Press/Oxford UP, 2006); Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989) (Taylor does not deal with medieval thought, however); Yrjönsuuri 2006, 153–69; Yrjönsuuri 2007a.

an object and which provides the subject with consciousness of that object. There are only three elements in this process: (1) the cognitive faculty, (2) the object, and (3) the intentional act. Because every cognitive act is produced by one of the faculties of the soul, the faculty in question can be considered as the subject of the act. Thus, the structure of cognitive activity can be depicted as follows:

$$S \rightarrow O$$

where S refers to the cognitive faculty, the arrow represents the intentional act, and O stands for the cognised object.

Various types of self-consciousness, as Olivi understands them, can also be put into this general scheme of a cognitive act. A being becomes conscious of herself² by an intentional cognitive act. This occurrence comes about in basically the same manner as the consciousness of an external object. The question is: What makes it *self*-consciousness? What distinguishes it from other cognitive acts? One possible way of answering this question appeals to the object of the cognitive act. Whereas other cognitive acts are directed at external objects or internal representations of those objects, the acts of self-consciousness pertain to the cognising subject. Being conscious of things other than the subject itself is not deemed as self-consciousness because these other things are not part of the subject; when a cognitive act pertains to the subject, the result is an act of self-cognition.

From this idea it is only a short progression to consider that the special characteristics of an act of self-consciousness is the *identity* between the subject and the object, and, consequently, the *reflexivity* of the act. Understood in this manner, the subject and the object would not be different things but one and the same thing, and the acts that provide self-consciousness would be special cases of cognitive acts. Their structures would not differ from those of cognitive acts in general: a cognitive faculty forms an act that is intentionally directed at the object which just happens to be the subject of the act. The structure could be depicted as follows:




where S is both the subject and the object of the reflexive intentional act, and the act is represented by the curved arrow.

This manner of understanding self-consciousness applies to certain types of self-consciousness—most notably the direct self-consciousness that the human mind has of itself. The human mind apprehends itself such that the subject and the object are the same, the act is reflexive, and the mind cognises itself as itself. However, Olivi claims that the mind apprehends many other things as appearing as parts of the same self to which the mind belongs. For instance, a conscious

² Actually, I should write "A being becomes conscious of her/him/itself" because the forms of self-consciousness discussed here are not confined only to human beings. For brevity's sake, I shall not repeat all the pronouns. The reader should bear in mind that everything discussed here applies to non-human animals as well unless explicitly stated otherwise.

mind does not apprehend the living body of a subject as something external or alien but as a part of the whole that is the self. In cases like this, there is no strict identity between the subject and the object, and the cognitive acts are not reflexive in the full sense of the word because they are not about the mind itself; rather, they are about the body of the subject. The self, which is the object of self-cognition, comprises not only the mind but the whole living being, although the subject of the acts of self-cognition is the mind, or—to put it in terms of faculty psychology—one of the faculties of the soul. In other words, consciousness is centralised and unextended, but the self is not. And the self extends beyond the limits of the conscious mind because it includes the living body of the subject as well. Thus, Olivi's understanding of the process of self-cognition might be put in the following way:



where *S* is the highest cognitive faculty of the soul, and *O* is an external object. *A* refers to acts of the other faculties of the soul, and *B* represents the living body of the subject. The things which are encircled belong to the cognising subject as a whole, and they are apprehended as being parts of the self. In this way, the requirements of reflexivity and identity do not apply to all types of self-consciousness, but the intentional structure does.

Conceptualising the acts of self-cognition from the point of view of their intentional subject-object structure enables us to approach the phenomenon of self-consciousness from two perspectives: by concentrating either on the subject pole or on the object pole. The first perspective is taken in Chapter 18, which analyses the idea of the soul's conscious centre and discusses it in relation to two fundamental phenomenological phenomena which are central for understanding Olivi's conception of various types of self-consciousness: (1) psychological activity is experienced as having a kind of unity, which means that the experiencing subject apprehends all her psychological activity as being performed by a unitary self; and (2) the experiential ownness which is a kind of phenomenal feel that accompanies all the psychological acts and allows the subject to experience them as her own. These two experiential features of psychological activity are central for Olivi's conception of self-consciousness, and they seem to apply to non-human animals as well. I shall argue that when it comes to the experiential unity and the ownness which are present in psychological acts, the role of the common sense in non-human animals is almost identical to that of the intellect in human beings. As the common sense functions as the conscious centre of an animal soul, it also brings about these fundamental phenomenal features of conscious experiences.

In Chapter 18, I shall also address a question about the limits of the self. Olivi thinks that consciousness is a function of one of the soul's faculties, but conscious subjects experience themselves as wholes which include their bodies and all the things that belong to them. We do not identify ourselves as conscious

minds but as bodily beings. The unextended mind may cognise itself, but it can cognise also the body of the subject as being a part of the self, and thus the self is extended beyond the mind.

Chapter 19 approaches the phenomenon of self-consciousness from the perspective of the objects of the acts of self-cognition. Living beings apprehend their own bodies as parts of themselves, and thus the body may become an intentional object for cognitive acts. However, the body is different from external objects because it is not apprehended as something alien, but as oneself. I shall present Olivi's theory of the sense of touch as a faculty by which living beings apprehend their own bodies. The immediate object of the sense of touch is its own organ, that is, the body, and thus the sense of touch is a self-reflexive faculty; however, it lacks certain features of genuine reflexivity which Olivi confines to spiritual faculties of the soul. Non-human animals also are capable of apprehending their own bodies, the functions of the different parts of their bodies, and the importance of these parts to the well-being of the animal as a whole. In other words, animals have a self-image. This image is a necessity for self-interested life, and without this quite sophisticated kind of self-consciousness, animals could not avoid harmful things and pursue those which are beneficial.

Finally, in Chapter 20, I shall point out that the common sense of non-human animals is capable of a certain level of reflexivity which comes close to the reflexivity of the intellect in human beings. Olivi seems to attribute the experiential ownness which is concomitant with cognitive activity also to non-human animals. As his way of accounting for the experiential ownness presupposes a certain kind of genuine reflexivity, the common sense must be capable of this as well. Animals are conscious of their own consciousness to some extent because if they were not, they would not experience their own perceptions, imaginative acts, or any of their cognitive activity as being their own. In other words, their phenomenal experience would lack the phenomenal feel of being the subject of their own cognitive acts. Olivi attributes to the common sense an ability to cognise its own activity, and thus he allows a certain level of self-reflexivity to animal consciousness as well. This does not, however, mean that there is no difference between human beings and non-human animals in this respect. Human beings are, according to Olivi, capable of apprehending their own minds directly. Thus, human beings can conceive of themselves as conscious minds prior to any sort of cognitive activity that is directed at things other than the mind itself. Non-human animals seem to lack this ability, and their reflexivity entails only the experiential ownness in relation to the cognitive acts that pertain to external objects. Moreover, human beings differ from non-human animals due to the freedom of the human will which is capable of reflexively moving itself to act. Freedom requires a special kind of reflexivity, and it marks the greatest difference between human beings and non-human animals.

18 CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF

On the face of it, the question “Who is self-conscious?” or, more exactly, “Who is the subject of self-consciousness?” seems absurd. The obvious answer is: “I am” (whoever the “I” happens to be). However, from a point of view of faculty psychology the question concerning the subject of self-consciousness is justified, and it is also relevant for understanding Olivi’s thought. Olivi thinks that every psychological act is experienced as belonging to a unitary subject who has the experience of being the owner of all these acts. By considering self-consciousness from the point of view of this kind of experiential subjectivity, we are able to see that Olivi understands consciousness and experiential subjectivity as something that is provided by one of the soul’s faculties, namely, the highest cognitive faculty. The topic of Chapter 18.1 is to point out that Olivi’s work contains explicit discussions concerning this kind of experiential subjectivity, and it shows how his conception affects how he understands the experiential and phenomenological unity of consciousness and the experiential ownness that accompanies all conscious experiences.

In Chapter 18.2, I shall argue that the role of the common sense in non-human animals is almost identical to the role of the intellect in human beings: the common sense provides the experiential subjectivity that accounts for the experiential unity and ownness by being the seat of all cognitive acts. Thus, Olivi seems to think that non-human animals experience their psychological activity and bodies as their own in a similar manner as do human beings. This affinity on the psychological level is based on a different metaphysical grounding—the animal soul is quite different from the human soul—but the mechanism that accounts for the psychological unity and experiential ownness is the same. This interpretation draws from previous parts of this study but appeals also to textual evidence. All this, I hope, will substantiate the interpretation that Olivi understands human and non-human animals as being similar to each other even when it comes to self-consciousness.

Finally, in Chapter 18.3 I shall point out that although Olivi theorises about experiential subjectivity, he does not intend to identify this kind of subjectivity with the self. The whole being—the compound of the soul and the body—is the

self. The body of a subject is apprehended as belonging to the same self that all the psychological acts belong to, and in this way the limits of the self go beyond the conscious mind. The living body is a genuine part of the self as well.

18.1 The Experiential Unity and Ownness of Psychological Acts

As a typical medieval thinker who is committed to some form of faculty psychology, Olivi thinks that all the cognitive acts are produced by some faculty of the soul. I become conscious of my coffee mug by a cognitive act which is produced by a faculty of my soul. Similarly, an act of self-consciousness is, strictly speaking, not an act that comes from me as a whole being; it is an act of one of the faculties of my soul. In this respect, the key notion turns out to be *consciousness*. Only those faculties which provide a subject with consciousness are potential candidates for being subjects of the acts of self-consciousness, and according to Olivi there is no plurality of such faculties in one soul; as I have been claiming hitherto, he thinks that there is only one such faculty in each soul.

To understand Olivi's idea, let him speak for himself. On one occasion he presents an argument which is meant to prove that the soul does not contain multiple cognitive faculties but only one and that this faculty is identical with the substance of the soul. The argument is very illuminating because it draws upon an idea about the experiential unity between various psychological functions of the soul and the experiential unity of the self:

Likewise, we truly say: "I see, understand, and will." But that by which we say and see this inside ourselves is one faculty because the predicate and the subject, and the whole proposition by which we say: "I, the same, see, and will" is formed and apprehended by the same faculty. Therefore, the faculty which says: "I see" is the same as that which says: "I will or understand." But this cannot be the case, it seems, unless one and the same faculty is the principle of these acts and unless it is completely the same as the subject (*suppositum*) which is called "I." Ergo etc.¹

Olivi approves of everything other than the purported consequence of this argument. Above all, he accepts that there is an experiential unity between various kinds of acts of the soul:

[...] I concede that it is by one faculty that we say inside ourselves: "The same I who understands, also wills and sees," namely, by the intellectual

¹ "Item, nos vere dicimus: 'ego video, intelligo et volo'; sed illud per quod hoc intra nos dicimus et videmus est una potentia, quia oportet quod prædicatum et subiectum et tota propositio qua dicimus: 'ego idem video et volo' ab eadem potentia formetur et apprehendatur; ergo eadem est potentia quæ dicit: 'ego video' cum ea quæ dicit: 'ego volo vel intelligo'; sed hoc non potest esse, ut videtur, nisi una et eadem potentia sit principium istorum actuum, et nisi sit idem omnino quod ipsum suppositum quod dicitur ego; ergo etc." (*II Sent.* q. 54, 241.)

faculty. It is capable of saying this because it apprehends its own subject (*suppositum*) and its own acts as well as the acts of the other faculties. However, it can do this without being the whole subject, and it can do this even though the acts of the other faculties are not elicited by it.²

There are a number of highly important and interesting aspects in these cited passages. I shall discuss three of them in detail. First, I shall analyse what exactly the difference is between Olivi's view and his opponent's and point out how Olivi takes the experiential or phenomenal unity of the self as a fundamental starting point. Second, I shall point out that Olivi thinks that the experiential unity is provided by the highest cognitive faculty of the soul, which is, as it were, a conscious centre to which everything appears. Third, I shall examine the experiential "ownness" which accompanies various types of experiences.

By looking closely at the two excerpts cited above we can see that the core of the disagreement between the argument Olivi rejects and the one he proposes in its stead lies on the metaphysical level. The question is whether there are many faculties in the soul or only one. Olivi does not agree with the idea that all the faculties of the soul are identical with each other³. Despite this disagreement, however, both of these views have something in common: both take experiential unity as a starting point and consider it as an unquestionable truth.

I really do feel that every experience that I undergo⁴ belongs to one and the same subject, to "me." In the cited passages, this experiential fact is accounted for by two different explanations. The former argument—the one Olivi rejects—has it that the identity between the faculties of the soul is necessary for the experiential unity. According to that line of thinking, we would not experience all the acts of our soul as being our own, or as belonging to the same self, unless they were brought about by one and the same faculty of the soul. We would experience only the acts of one of the faculties as belonging to us—to the phenomenal subject of consciousness—and the acts of the other faculties would lack this feeling. Or perhaps the self would appear as fragmented, as it were. Because we have

² "[...] concedo unam esse potentiam per quam intra nos dicimus 'ego idem qui intelligo volo et video', scilicet, potentiam intellectivam quæ hoc dicere potest apprehendendo suppositum suum et actus tam suos quam aliarum potentiarum. Hoc autem potest fieri absque hoc quod ipsa sit totum suppositum et absque hoc quod actus ceterarum potentiarum ab ea eliciantur." (*II Sent.* q. 54, 280.) There are several other passages which make use of the same idea: *ibid.*, q. 37, 659; q. 51, 122; q. 54, 241; q. 58, 464; q. 59, 540; q. 74, 126.

³ I discuss this in Part II, Chapter 11.3; Note, however, that Olivi does indeed require some kind of unity between the faculties of the soul because all the faculties of the human soul are united to each other as they are forms of the spiritual matter of the soul. See *II Sent.* q. 16, 323.

⁴ In the cited passages, the experiences are seeing, willing, and understanding. In other places one of the explicitly mentioned experiences is eating. It is also evident, as we shall see, that all the bodily processes (such as waving one's hand, feeling pain, feeling hungry, and so forth) are experiences that Olivi could list in addition to eating, seeing, willing, and understanding. This is why I have chosen to call the processes that a being undergoes and experiences as being her own by the common name "experiences": it would not make much sense to call eating a "psychological process" (although digestion is a process that is conducted by a faculty of the soul).

the experience of a unity between different kinds of acts, the faculties of the soul must be identical to each other. Thus, according to this argument, the experiential unity requires that the faculties are the same.

The core of Olivi's argument is to deny this claim. His point is that an experiential unity does not require a unity between the faculties. It requires that there be only one faculty which provides the unitary consciousness to a subject⁵. This faculty provides consciousness of not only its own acts but also of the acts of other faculties of the soul. In this way, Olivi distinguishes between the metaphysical unity of the faculties of the soul and psychological experiential unity. The latter is possible without the former.

The other important idea that I want to emphasise with respect to the above texts is how Olivi's manner of accounting for experiential unity reflects his manner of understanding consciousness as being a function of one faculty of the soul. The soul has a kind of centre which renders our experiences unitary. It is "I" who sees and understands because both of these experiences appear to the conscious centre of my soul. The faculty that provides me with this unitary consciousness must of necessity be the highest (cognitive) faculty of my soul according to Olivi. The reason for this necessity is that the inferior faculties of the soul are incapable of apprehending either the acts or the objects of the superior faculties⁶. I may experience myself seeing and understanding. The acts of seeing are performed by the sensitive part of my soul, and the understanding belongs to the intellectual part. That is to say, seeing and understanding belong to and are produced by different faculties of the soul. However, Olivi claims that because I experience all these actions as *my* actions—as actions that belong to one and the same self, which is me—it is necessary that *one* faculty regards both understanding and seeing as actions that belong to the same subject, namely, me. The sensitive faculties of the soul cannot perform an act of understanding, and they cannot apprehend intellectual acts and objects. Therefore the intellect must apprehend the acts of the soul's other faculties as well and conceive of them as belonging to the same subject as itself. The highest cognitive faculty accounts for the experiential and phenomenal unity which we experience regardless of the distinctions between different faculties of the soul.

⁵ Actually, it is not completely certain that the intellect is the only faculty which provides consciousness to human beings. In many passages, Olivi seems to think that the acts of the common sense make their objects appear to the subject. However, it is possible that these passages are loosely formulated, since Olivi so clearly emphasises the role of the intellect as the unifying factor in the human soul. At least the psychological unity between the various acts of the soul is achieved by the intellect, regardless of whether the acts of the common sense bring about consciousness by themselves or not.

⁶ "[...] experimentum intimum et certissimum quo intra nos sentimus sensitivam teneri et regi et dirigi a parte superiori tanquam aliquid in sua natura intime plantatum; in tantumque sentitur esse plantata in radice superioris partis nostræ quod radix nostræ subsistentiæ, ipsa scilicet pars superior, sentit intime et dicit actus sensitivæ esse suos. Unde dicit: ego qui intelligo video vel comedo; et utique non potest dicere nisi per potentiam intellectivam, quia nulla alia potentia potest apprehendere utrosque actus nisi ipsa." (*II Sent.* q. 51, 122.)

The third important idea from the above cited passages is the experiential ownness which is present in all of a being's conscious experiences—the experiential ownness of all the psychological acts that take place in one's soul. Olivi appeals to the experiential unity between the soul's various acts, and besides the fact that different kinds of acts are experienced as belonging to the same subject, the subject experiences them as his own in a strong sense. This idea is presented more explicitly in the following passage:

[...] but all the faculties or many of them are very often (almost always) in their acts. For often when I see, I simultaneously hear, smell, touch, and taste. Also the common sense runs about discerning these faculties and their objects simultaneously with them. Therefore, I notice all these acts and their objects by the intellect at the same time, and in addition to this I notice (or can notice) myself thinking about (*me intelligere*) them [...] I also always notice with respect to all of these that they are my acts and, by consequence, I always apprehend myself to be the subject (*suppositum*) of these acts. Therefore, the intellect apprehends simultaneously any plurality of the acts and their objects.⁷

All the psychological acts of the soul are experienced by their subject such that they belong to the subject. Because Olivi refers not only to the acts but also to the objects of those acts, I take it that his idea includes not only a reflexive second-order consciousness about one's own acts ("I know that I see") but also a kind of simultaneous pre-reflexive consciousness that accompanies the conscious experiences, that is, a kind of first personal appearance of the objects to the subject. The intentional content of a cognitive act appears in the consciousness of a subject as something she is cognising at the moment the act occurs. The subject cannot be mistaken about the fact that those experiences belong to her (and not to somebody else). I shall further analyse this idea in detail below, but it is important to note already that this experiential ownness of one's acts and the contents of those acts is a feature that is provided by the highest cognitive faculty of the soul, as it is the faculty which makes the subject conscious of those things. I experience the content of my consciousness as something that appears to me, and in this way there is an element of self-cognition (however primitive) in my cognitive acts.

I shall provide an example of experiencing ownness to render the idea more understandable. I may see a cup on my table, I may remember what I ate yesterday, and I may imagine a chimæra. All these things (the cup, the meal, and the chimæra) appear to me, and they are present in my consciousness. As far as I am conscious of these things, I have a privileged access to them as being my experiences. I can doubt whether the cup really exists in front of me, but I cannot doubt

⁷ "[...] sed sæpissime et quasi semper sunt omnes vel plures potentiaë in suis actibus, sæpe enim simul cum video, audio, odoro, tango, et gusto, simul etiam cum quolibet horum currit sensus communis diiudicans quemlibet horum et eorum obiecta; ergo tunc simul per intellectum advertam omnes huiusmodi actus et eorum obiecta, et tunc iterum advertam et advertere possum me intelligere ea [...] in omnibus etiam istis semper advertam illos esse actus meos ac per consequens semper apprehendam me esse suppositum illorum actuum; omnem igitur pluralitatem actuum et obiectorum suorum apprehendit simul intellectus." (*II Sent.* q. 37, 659; see also *ibid.*, q. 76, 145–9.)

that I have the experience of seeing the cup. Moreover, I can doubt many things within my experience, but I cannot doubt that it is I who has the experience of seeing the cup. The same goes for other cognitive acts: I cannot help experiencing the memory of yesterday's meal as a memory that appears to me, and when I imagine a chimæra, it is me to whom the chimæra appears. This experience is the phenomenal ownness that accompanies my cognitive acts and which is also related to the experiential unity: I may be conscious of various things, but my consciousness itself is, as it were, unitary and one. Every phenomenal experience and everything that appears to me is present in my consciousness, and my consciousness is fundamentally the same even though the content of my experience is about different kinds of things. These are, I take it, the ideas Olivi is discussing when he refers to experiential unity and ownness as phenomenologically evident features of our consciousness.

To sum, the passages cited above present Olivi's conception of the experiential unity of the self. In me, this experiential unity is caused, according to Olivi, by one of the faculties of my soul which apprehends the acts of other faculties as belonging to me. I experience that it is I who sees because my intellect—which provides me with unitary consciousness and functions as the phenomenal subject of my consciousness—apprehends my act of seeing and the object that I see through it. By claiming in this manner that consciousness is a function of a single faculty of the soul, Olivi secures the phenomenal unity of our experience. The point he emphasises is that we do not experience ourselves as fragmented but as unitary agents. All of my actions appear to me as *my* actions in a strong sense; I experience my act of seeing as well as the bodily motion of my hand as belonging to me, and this experience of ownness is provided to me by my intellect.

Now, Olivi claims that all the aforementioned experiential features of our consciousness can be safeguarded without appealing to a unity between the faculties of the soul. Although the intellect is a distinct faculty and does not produce all of our psychological acts, we can have a unitary experience because the intellect functions as the unifying factor within our souls. However, it seems to me that Olivi's point is not that it would be impossible for the experiential features of consciousness to be accounted for by a unity of the faculty that brings them about. When such a unity can be accepted—as is the case with the common sense in non-human animals because it carries out all of their psychological activity—the experiential unity and ownness are accounted for by the same token. Instead, Olivi is arguing that *despite* the distinction between the intellectual and sensitive faculties of the soul, the experiential unity can be safeguarded; when there is no plurality of distinct faculties, the unity is unproblematic.

In other words, Olivi appears to be claiming that experiential unity is possible only if

- (a) there is a single faculty which apprehends all the acts of the soul as originating from the same subject and belonging to the same self; or
- (b) all the acts of the soul originate from the same faculty and belong to it.

The former explanation applies to the case of human beings, whose intellect accounts for the unity, and I shall argue that the latter applies to the case of other animals⁸. The common sense is the seat of all the acts that realise different psychological functions in non-human animals, and there is no reason to think that it would not provide the experiential unity and ownness in the case of non-human animals in a similar manner as does the intellect in the case of human beings. In fact, there are a number of reasons which together point in the direction that the role of the common sense is similar to the role of the intellect in this respect. Hence, I shall argue that the common sense functions as a unifying centre between the various acts of the soul, that it provides non-human animals with an experiential unity of the self, and that it provides experiential ownness to the acts of animals. The psychological functions that pertain to the subject pole of self-consciousness are the same in non-human animals as they are in human beings. The story changes only with regard to the faculties which realise these functions.

18.2 The Role of the Common Sense

There are several reasons for thinking that the common sense performs the function of providing experiential unity and phenomenal ownness to non-human animals just as the intellect provides it to human beings. My interpretation of this affinity between human and non-human animals draws partly from previous parts of this study, and it can also be supported by textual evidence. We have seen in the course of this study that Olivi conceives of the common sense as the centre of the animal soul—as the centre which provides non-human animals with phenomenal consciousness of the objects of its cognitive acts. It also accounts for the fact that various psychological functions are interconnected when animals perform a complex psychological operations. I shall first analyse these ideas anew from a slightly different perspective than the previous parts of this study and thus endeavour to show that Olivi does not see any radical difference between the common sense and the intellect with regard to these functions.

When Olivi presents his idea of the intellect being the centre of the soul which apprehends all the acts of the other faculties of the soul as belonging to the same self, he is not discussing this feature of experience as if it belongs specifically to human beings. The cognitive activity of non-human animals is also accompanied by experiential ownness, and they experience their consciousness as unitary. I shall support this claim by further discussing the two explanations for the experiential unity and the phenomenal ownness that I have presented above: Olivi has recourse to the intellect as being capable of apprehending the acts of the sensitive faculties of the soul only because the intellect does not bring those acts

⁸ To be sure, the acts of perceiving external objects (seeing, hearing, etc.) are performed by the external senses and not by the common sense. Thus, the first alternative applies to the perceptual activity of non-human animals and the second to the higher cognitive processes.

about by itself. In the case of non-human animals, there is no need for this kind of explanation because the common sense is the subject of all the cognitive activity.

Let us look at how far we came in Parts I and II⁹. Above all, the idea about the common sense being the centre of the sensitive soul which provides consciousness to non-human animals is important in this connection. According to Olivi's conception of perception and perceptual consciousness, the common sense is responsible for providing the consciousness of perceived objects. The *aspectus* of the common sense is directed to the external senses which, in turn, are directed to an external object. This activity amounts to directing one's conscious attention to the object and enabling the common sense to bring about an intentional act of perception about it. By this process a subject becomes conscious of an intentional object of an act of the common sense. The common sense is the centre of consciousness in non-human animals, and as such it performs the same role as the intellect in human beings.

In a similar vein, the common sense is the subject of the higher cognitive functions of the animal soul, and it enables non-human animals to cognise various other things in addition to objects of perception. In short, the acts of the common sense bring about a consciousness of their intentional objects, be they external objects or memory species. When an animal imagines different things, some of the acts of its common sense are directed at the memory species which function as the *termini* of those cognitive acts. This operation enables the animal to be conscious of the things that the memory species represent. Moreover, the dispositions of the common sense affect the acts of the common sense and thus account for the consciousness of certain additional features that are not immediately present in the objects as perceptual qualities. These features include especially the harmfulness/usefulness of the cognised object to the cognising subject.

One of the main reasons Olivi argues for the existence of a unifying centre in the animal soul is the alleged interconnectedness of the cognitive functions of the soul. There are many complex psychological processes—such as perceiving something as harmful to one's own well-being—which call for a simultaneous co-operation of many cognitive functions. The subject must be conscious of the information provided by various psychological sub-processes simultaneously, and it must be able to combine and compare all the information received through them. Olivi thinks that the best way of accounting for this interconnectedness of the psychological functions is to attribute them to one faculty of the soul. In this manner, his explanation for the interconnectedness of the psychological acts is based on the idea that all these acts belong to one and the same faculty. This kind of unity does not exist in human beings, whose intellectual capacities are distinct from the sensitive ones, and therefore the faculty psychological background is somewhat different in these two cases. However, this difference does not necessarily entail that the psychological and experiential aspect of conscious experiences should be different for human beings than for other animals.

In sum, Olivi renders the common sense as the centre of consciousness in non-human animals. The common sense is the highest cognitive faculty of the

⁹ The most important chapters are Part I, Chapter 6, and Part II, Chapter 11

soul, and it enables the subject to be conscious of the intentional contents of its acts. As such, it plays the same unifying and consciousness-providing role as the intellect does in human beings. It is the unifying centre of the animal soul almost in the same way as the intellect is the unifying centre of the human soul. The acts of the common sense make the subject conscious of the intentional objects of those acts, the objects appear to the subject in compliance with the type of the act the common sense produces, and the content of the consciousness of an animal is determined by acts of the common sense. This idea is important because it shows that Olivi does not see much difference between the roles of the common sense and the intellect in their providing consciousness and accounting for the most fundamental features of consciousness. In my estimation, it is possible that this similarity also pertains to the experiential unity and phenomenal oneness—one would expect that Olivi would have mentioned this extension of the idea and rejected it, had he thought that these features of experience make an exception.

Keeping this similarity in mind, it is very important to note that the question of experiential unity becomes an issue for Olivi because he formulates such an evident metaphysical distinction between the intellectual and the sensitive faculties in order to secure the freedom of the human will. He is obliged to account for the phenomenal unity in human beings because the metaphysical distinction renders it questionable. The idea that there is one faculty of the soul which prepares for a phenomenal unity by apprehending the contents of the acts of the soul's other faculties is taken up only to resolve the problematic issue of accounting the phenomenal unity in the case where there are several distinct faculties. In other words, Olivi needs to take recourse in this idea only in the case of human beings. As we have seen, the case of non-human animals is much easier in this respect: all the higher cognitive functions, including conscious perception, belong to the common sense. This makes it unnecessary to provide an explanation for a phenomenal or experiential unity at the sensitive level of the soul: the unity of the faculty that realises different functions accounts for it already.

To be more precise, it seems to me that the ideas about experiential unity and oneness are so fundamental for Olivi (and his opponent alike—see the passages cited above, in Chapter 18.1) that for him they would have been unproblematic, had he not felt compelled to make an essential distinction between the soul's intellectual and sensitive faculties—which he makes, after all, for completely different philosophical reasons¹⁰. Nowhere does he question the existence of these phenomena. On some occasions, he raises doubts about whether these ideas can be safeguarded in the case of human beings, but even then the doubts are not

¹⁰ The reasons Olivi thinks it necessary to make the distinction between the intellectual and sensitive faculties of the soul cannot be explained properly in this context. The basic idea, however, is rather simple: Olivi wants to secure the substantial unity of the human being (i.e., to make sure that the spiritual soul and the body are both substantial parts of a human being and that the compound of the two is a substantial one) and the freedom, immortality, and intellectuality of the human soul. The former requires that the sensitive faculties of the soul are forms of the body, and the latter presupposes that the intellectual faculties are *not* forms of the body. This discrepancy leads to a kind of separation of the two parts of the soul from each other. For references, see Part I, Chapter 7.1, footnote 1.

Olivi's own but belong to a counter-argument that he later refutes. He always accepts the experiential unity as an unquestionable experiential truth.

This assessment is why it seems to me that if the argument that experiential unity requires a unity between the soul's faculties was applied to non-human animals, Olivi would have accepted it. Non-human animals have a unitary consciousness because all of their cognitive activity is brought about by one faculty. The internal senses are not distinct from each other, and therefore Olivi has no need to account for the experiential unity of consciousness in the case of non-human animals; it is already accounted for by the reduced number of faculties of the soul and by attributing all of the cognitive functions to one and the same faculty, the common sense. The only reason for Olivi to raise the issue at all is to give plausibility to his interpretation of the soul's metaphysics, enabling a distinction between the sensitive and intellectual parts of the human soul.

Textual evidence can support this interpretation of the similarity between the common sense and the intellect. It seems that Olivi intends for his claim about the relation between the superior and inferior faculties of the soul to be a general one and not applicable only to the case of the intellect's relation to the sensitive faculties. Let us see how he formulates his idea in one of the most important passages considering the matter:

In addition, as soon as an inferior faculty apprehends something, a superior faculty apprehends its act in such a way that it perceives the act as originating from its own subject (*supposito*). The superior faculty perceives this in the case of the act of the inferior faculty almost in the same way as it does in the case of its own act. This is why we say by the intellect: "I see or hear, just as I understand." But if the acts were [caused by] the objects, this could not veraciously be so, and there could be no equally good reason (*ratio*) for the fact that the superior faculty is so strongly moved to an apprehension of the act of the inferior faculty merely because the act is in the inferior faculty. [...] And so the act of the inferior faculty is so intimately present to the *aspectus* of the superior, and similarly to the power which produces it, that the superior faculty notices and perceives in its own manner the acts of the inferior faculty as intimately and as quickly as its own acts.¹¹

We can see that Olivi begins by arguing that the superior faculties necessarily and always apprehend the acts of the inferior faculties as belonging to the same subject of the acts of their own faculties. This idea is presented first as a general claim, and then applied to the case of the intellect. This presentation may be

¹¹ "Præterea, statim cum una potentia inferior aliquid apprehendit, statim superior potentia apprehendit actum illius et hoc modo quod sentit illum actum exire a suo supposito, ita quod fere hoc ita sentit de actu inferioris potentiae sicut et de suo proprio actu. Unde ita dicimus per intellectum: ego video vel audio sicut ego intelligo. Sed si actus sunt ab obiectis, non poterit hoc veraciter esse, nec poterit dari æque bona ratio quare superior potentia fortissime movetur ad apprehendendum actum inferioris potentiae eo ipso quo actus ille factus est in ipsa potentia inferiori. [...] Et ideo actus inferioris potentiae ita est intime præsens aspectui superioris et consimiliter virtus ipsum producens quod suo modo ita intime et ita cito advertit et sentit eos sicut et suos." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 464)

meant to show that the idea applies to the case of the common sense and to the external senses as well. To be sure, one should take care not to read too much into the order of presentation in this passage. It is not certain that the general claim at the beginning of the passage is meant to be as general as it looks after all. It may well be that Olivi is simply accounting for the experiential unity in the case of human beings and just happens to be stating the solution in general terms without actually considering that it could be applied also in the case of non-human animals. Still, I think that one ought to take what Olivi says seriously. On the basis of the foregoing discussion there should be no reason to doubt that Olivi's general claim is meant to be as general as it looks. The burden of proof belongs to the one who wants to argue that Olivi does not mean exactly what he writes.

There are more persuasive internal reasons for acknowledging that Olivi's present claim applies also to the sensitive level and not only to the relation between the intellect and the common sense. First, the example that incorporates the intellect is clearly just a clarificatory aside. The passage appears in Olivi's discussion about the activity of the soul's cognitive faculties—including the sensitive ones—and Olivi's point is to argue that external objects cannot actualise the soul's cognitive faculties. His intention is to present this argument as generally applying to all the faculties of the soul. Second, Olivi employs terminology that pertains to the sensitive realm when he says that: "the superior faculty notices and *perceives*" the acts of the inferior faculties. This wording clearly suggests that not only in the case of the intellect but also in the case of the common sense does the superior faculty apprehend the acts and objects of the inferior faculties in such a way that they appear as belonging to a unitary subject.

Another text which supports this reading is as follows:

Also, one could not show how [the intellect] is capable of apprehending intimately and necessarily the acts of the sensitive [part of the soul] immediately when they occur and their radical origin, unless the intellect is (in its own manner) related to the sensitive [part] as the common sense is related to the external senses. For the reason why the common sense apprehends immediately and necessarily the acts of the external senses is that the external senses are rooted in the organ of the common sense and maintained by it, as an inferior form and power are maintained by a superior form and power.¹²

Here, Olivi explicitly depicts the relation between the common sense and the external senses as being similar to the relation between the intellect and the common sense. The intellect apprehends the acts and objects of the soul's sensitive faculties in a similar way to how the common sense apprehends the acts and objects of

¹² "Non etiam erit dare quomodo [intellectus] possit intime et necessario apprehendere actus sensitivæ, statim dum fiunt, et originem radicalem eorum, nisi suo modo intellectus se habeat ad sensitivam sicut sensus communis ad particulares. Idcirco enim sensus communis statim et necessario apprehendit actus sensuum particularium, quia ipsi sensus particulares radicanur in organo sensus communis et tenentur ab eo, sicut forma et virtus inferior tenentur a forma et virtute superiori." (*II Sent.* q. 51, 123.)

the external senses. This passage is relevant because it is taken from a context in which Olivi argues that the sensitive form of a human being must also be a form of the soul's spiritual matter because otherwise certain phenomenal facts about our experiences could not be accounted for, and one of these phenomenal facts is the experiential unity between the soul's sensitive and intellectual acts. That is, a sensitive form must be a form of spiritual matter because otherwise we would not experience the acts of understanding, eating, and seeing as being acts of the same self.

Olivi's argument goes roughly as follows:

1. Experiential unity is a phenomenal fact, and as such, evident;
2. Experiential unity requires that a sensitive form be a form of spiritual matter;
3. Therefore, the sensitive form is a form of spiritual matter.

The crux of the cited passage is that a sensitive form must be rooted (*radicor*) in the intellectual part of the soul, and the relation between the common sense and the external senses is taken as a model for the required type of relation. It seems that even though the intention of this comparison is primarily to point out the metaphysical similarity of these relations, at the same time the comparison strongly suggests that the experiential unity is similar in these two cases. The experiential unity requires an explanation in the case of the relation between the intellect and the sensitive form because there seems to be a wider disparity between these two, but the relation between the common sense and the external senses serves as a simile in Olivi's explanation of the kind of relation he has in mind: the relation is a connection on the faculty level that operates as a foundation for the phenomenal fact of experiential unity.

The final passage that supports my reading comes from question 58 of the second book of *Summa*, from the section in which Olivi presents a shorter version of the argument in favour of the unity of the internal senses. The manner in which he begins his exposition of the philosophical arguments is illuminating:

For, as we see that the same intellectual faculty apprehends that which is reported to it by the senses and that which is retained in its memory (when it directs itself to them), so it seems that one and the same faculty apprehends that which the external senses announce and that which is retained in the sensory memory.¹³

Olivi presents this idea as a proof for the unity of the internal senses. He refers to our experience of the unitary nature of our experience: we see (*sic*) that it is one and the same faculty that makes perceived objects and remembered things appear to us, and this is taken as indicative of the same structure existing on the

¹³ "Sicut enim videmus quod eadem potentia intellectus apprehendit ea quæ per sensus sibi nuntiantur et ea quæ in sua memoria retinentur, quando ad ea se convertit, sic videtur quod eadem potentia sit quæ apprehendit illa quæ annuntiant sensus particulares et ea quæ retinentur in memoria sensuali." (*II Sent.* q. 58, 509.)

sensitive level. According to this passage, the experiential unity is provided by the common sense (supposedly in the case of non-human animals).

It should now be apparent, I hope, that experiential unity and oneness, which are brought about by the intellect in the case of human beings, belong also to non-human animals due to the central role of the common sense in animal psychology and due to its place in the faculty psychological structure of the animal soul. Olivi conceives of the explanation for experiential unity somewhat differently in the case of human beings from that of non-human animals because in the latter it is based on a stronger unity: all the higher cognitive functions are performed by one and the same faculty. Human beings experience all of their cognitive acts as having this sort of unity as well, but this is due to the unifying role of the intellect, which apprehends the acts of the sensitive faculties as belonging to the same subject or the same self to which the intellect also belongs. In this respect, the relation between the intellect and the sensitive part of the soul resembles the relation between the common sense and the external senses because in both of these cases the experiential unity is brought about by the highest cognitive faculty of the soul which apprehends the acts and objects of its inferiors.

18.3 Limits of the Self

It would be tempting to suppose that our quest for finding “the self” in Olivi’s thought has ended in our encounter with the faculties that are the subjects of the acts of consciousness—that is, the intellect in the case of human beings and the common sense in the case of non-human animals—especially taking into heed the fact that these faculties function as unitary centres which cause all of the soul’s acts to appear to a subject as being her or its own. If we say that the highest cognitive faculty of the soul provides a being with a conscious mind which serves the purpose of being the phenomenal subject of consciousness, which undergoes all of the being’s conscious experiences and conceives of them as being its own, why not equate this conscious mind with the self? Why can I not say that I am my mind, and my mind is my self?

In a sense I can. It seems that we can, to some extent, assert that it would not violate some aspects of Olivi’s theory of self-consciousness to claim that the self can be identified with the mind. From a phenomenological point of view, the subject pole of cognitive activity is the conscious mind of a being. The mind is the phenomenal subject of consciousness to which all the conscious experiences appear. It conceives of them as belonging to itself. To the extent that one can identify oneself with one’s conscious mind, it is possible that the mind is the self. This conception of the self sounds quite Cartesian, but I think that this interpretation is as it should be: from the point of view of the phenomenal conscious subject, Olivi’s conception of the single unextended centre of consciousness *is* quite Cartesian, although there are, to be sure, more differences than similarities between the theories of these two thinkers.

However, this is not the whole picture. The main point of Olivi's argument concerning the experiential unity between various acts of the soul indicates that the self covers not only the mind but also other things. Even though the conscious centre is a function of one of my soul's faculties, I apprehend by it many other things as belonging to the same self which is me. The conscious self does not conceive only of itself but also of other faculties of the soul as being parts of the self. The conscious centre is only a part of the whole subject, and Olivi thinks that the subject as a whole is the self. For instance, my act of seeing does not belong to my intellect, and yet I cognise it as something that is performed by me. Olivi's main idea is that everything that the mind conceives of as being a part of the same self to which the mind belongs really is part of the self. I am more than my mind (understood as the phenomenal subject of consciousness); I am the living being with a body and all the faculties of my soul which are actualised in my body. The self has a conscious centre, but since the body and the other parts of the soul are apprehended as parts of the same subject, the self covers them as well.

Perhaps the best formulation Olivi gives of this idea goes as follows:

[...] I apprehend (by my reason) myself seeing and perceiving just as I apprehend myself understanding and willing in such way that I apprehend and perceive (by my reason) that it is the same who sees and understands, namely me. This perception would be false, unless these actions truly were from the same subject (*suppositum*) which is called "I."¹⁴

The whole living being is the "I," the self, and still the phenomenal subject of consciousness, the mind, is the one to which all that takes place in the body and in the various faculties of the soul appear. Naturally it apprehends all the acts that it performs as being its own but it is capable of apprehending also other things as belonging to the same complete subject which is properly the self. The living body and the acts of other faculties of the soul belong to the group of things that the mind conceives of as belonging to the whole self.

Understood in this manner, the self includes everything the mind apprehends as being a part of the same subject. The self is not unextended consciousness but expandable. It may expand to cover the mind, the various faculties of the soul, and the body—in some traditions even family, society, and mankind as a whole have been understood as potential parts of the self through an ethical development of one's self-image¹⁵. What this example shows is that the concept

¹⁴ "[...] sic per rationem apprehendo me videre et sentire sicut et me intelligere et velle, ita quod per rationem apprehendo et sentio eundem esse qui videt et intelligit, me scilicet. Qui sensus falsus esset, nisi vere sint ab eodem supposito quod dicitur ego." (*II Sent.* q. 59, 540.)

¹⁵ Yrjönsuuri 2006, 166–8; This idea is especially apparent in ancient Stoicism: see Brad Inwood, "Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century AD," in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 151–183; Anthony A. Long, *Stoic Studies* (Cambridge/New York: CUP, 1996), 250–85; For discussion about the multifaceted concept of "self," see also Richard Sorabji, "Soul and Self in Ancient Philosophy," in Crabbe 1999, 8–32; Sorabji 2006, 17–53. This formulation is reminiscent of an idea, popular throughout the history of philosophy, according to which one's friend is another self (Olivi mentions this idea in *II Sent.* q. 57, 320).

of self is not well defined but multifaceted and flexible. This sort of extentionism is true of Olivi's conception of the self as well. On the one hand, the phenomenal subject of consciousness is a result of a function of one of the soul's faculties and as such it is like an unextended mind with which one may identify oneself; on the other hand, one may also apprehend other things such that they are parts of the self.

In a respect, there are two senses of the self in Olivi's thought, and this is where the intentional subject-object structure of cognitive acts becomes helpful. The self can be considered as the experiential "I" that figures in all conscious experiences as being the phenomenal subject of consciousness and the subject pole of cognitive activity. But the self can also be considered from the point of view of the object that is cognised as the self, and from this point of view the self is the whole living being. Every living being is capable of apprehending its own soul (with some qualifications, about which I shall speak below) and body, and they are apprehended in such a way that they appear as parts of the whole subject that is the self.

The latter manner of understanding the self fits well with the medieval world view because it attributes a more salient role to the body. Medieval thinkers in general did not accept the identification of oneself with the soul. Medievalists were not Platonists in this sense. Even though there is a strong dualistic current in Olivi's thinking, he would have felt uncomfortable with a conception of the self that leaves the body as external to it. In general, in the Middle Ages the body was understood as being so central to human beings that any sort of identification of the human being with the soul only—not to mention the mind—would have been rejected outright¹⁶. The body was understood as a substantial part of a human being, not least because of the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body. Thus, it is perfectly natural that Olivi takes it to be part of the self as well. I am not only my conscious mind; my body is also a part of myself. Conceived of in this way, the self includes not only the conscious mind but also the living body. Both the mind and the body of the subject are genuine parts of the self, and they cannot in reality be separated: in some sense they are the same entity only viewed from different perspectives. My hands are a part of me as well as my feet; the "I" who conceives these as belonging to itself is the phenomenal subject of consciousness, but the hands and feet are genuine parts of me also. They are part of the bodily self that I am.

In this way, we have finally turned to the object pole of the acts of self-consciousness. The highest cognitive faculty of the soul provides a being with a

¹⁶ The idea that a human being is identical with the mind or soul was known as a Platonic doctrine, and it was commonly rejected not only by academic philosophers and theologians but also by Church authorities. For instance, Stephen Tempier, in the well-known list of forbidden teachings issued in 1277, prohibits from teaching: "That the intellect is a form of the body only as a seaman of a ship, and that it is not an essential perfection of a human being." ("Quod intellectus non est forma corporis, nisi sicut nauta navis, nec est perfectio essentialis hominis." (Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, #7, p. 544; see also #118 & 119, p. 550.)) This means, in effect, that the intellect and body must be in substantial union with each other and that a human being cannot be identified with the mind only.

mind, which is the subject pole of self-cognition. The mind, in turn, apprehends different things, and some of them it apprehends as belonging to the self. The most notable example of these things is the body of the subject. The next chapter shows how the body figures in Olivi's conception of self-cognition.

19 BODILY SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

19.1 The Body as Part of the Self

One can be conscious of one's own body for example by looking at it. This looking at the body, however, does not count as self-consciousness proper, since my vision of my hand does not in principle differ in any way from my vision of your hand; if I look at my arm when it is numb, I may wonder to whom it belongs. In this case I apprehend my arm as an external object, not as a part of me. By bodily self-consciousness, I mean a special relation which I have with my own body: I am conscious of it as being me or at least as being a part of me. I am conscious of my own body as my body in a way that differs from my consciousness of external objects like mugs, birds, and the hands of other people. Moreover, I am conscious of my body even if I do not perceive it through any of the external senses. I do not have to see my arms and hands in order to know their position. In modern discussions, this phenomenon is referred to by the term proprioception, but this kind of bodily self-consciousness was not completely unknown to ancient and medieval authors either¹. We shall see that Olivi discusses types of perception which are very similar to modern proprioception (it goes without saying that he

¹ Of the ancient authors who discuss bodily self-consciousness, Lucius Annæus Seneca (c. 4 BC–65 AD) deserves a special mention. Especially, the ideas that Seneca presents in his letter 121 to Lucilius (Seneca, Lucius Annæus, *L. Annæi Senecæ ad Lucilium Epistulæ morales*, vol. 2, ed. L. D. Reynolds, *Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1965), 516–22) are important and highly interesting from the point of view of this study, as they pertain to bodily self-consciousness. For philosophical studies on the Stoic idea of bodily self-consciousness, see Inwood 1984, 151–183, and Long 1996, 250–85. They deal mainly with Hierocles' ideas of self-consciousness, but most of these ideas can also be found in one form or another from Seneca. I am tempted to think that this letter may have even directly influenced Olivi even though there is no certain proof of this influence. Note, however, that Sylvain Piron has pointed out a reference to a now lost work of Olivi's which may have been a commentary on Seneca's letters (Sylvain Piron, "Les oeuvres perdues d'Olivi: essai de reconstitution," *AFH* 91:3-4 (1998): 388–389; The work is mentioned also by Partee 1960, 257). To be sure, Olivi found this idea also in Augustine, especially from *De lib. arb.* 2.3.8–6.13.

does not employ the modern term, and it needs to be mentioned that he conceives of it as a function of one of the external senses, the sense of touch).²

I claimed in the previous chapter that the living body is conceived of as being part of the self according to Olivi. However, given Olivi's close-to-dualistic anthropology in which a human being is composed of two separate entities—a spiritual soul and a corporeal body (for references, see footnote 1 on p. 122)—we may have some doubts concerning this claim. Could it be that Olivi deems that the spiritual soul is the real self and that the body is something that *belongs* to the self rather than something that is actually part of the self? Olivi writes that: “[...] I apprehend and perceive (by my reason) that it is the same [one] who sees and understands, namely me. This perception would be false, unless these actions truly were from the same subject (*suppositum*) which is called ‘I.’”³ Is it impossible to think that the term ‘subject’ refers only to the soul? After all, the acts of seeing take place primarily in the spiritual soul, and the acts of understanding are not realised in the body at all. If this interpretation were true, the self would turn out to be the spiritual soul which, after all, is independent of the body at least to the extent that it can exist in separation from it and function almost perfectly without it. Even Olivi's contemporaries saw problems in his conception of the relation between the soul and the body: he was accused of depicting too wide a discrepancy between the intellectual soul and the human body and thus weakening the unity between the two, or even jeopardising their substantial union⁴. All this conjecture prepares the way for asking whether Olivi really conceives of the body as being part of the self, or whether the body is just something which belongs to the self—a possession, vessel, clothing, ship, or any other of the notorious metaphors that have been used to describe a non-substantial relation between the soul and the body.

The first point that should be noted against this approach is that the question: “whether the body is or belongs to the self?” is motivated by a modern point of view, as Mikko Yrjönsuuri has pointed out (Yrjönsuuri 2006, 154). In modern discussions concerning the relation between the mind and the body, the emphasis is on the mind and the main question is: “How can the mind be embodied?” Most 13th century theories approach the issue from other direction. For them, the starting point is the body, and the central question is: “How can a body be ensouled?” The world is full of physical bodies: stones, trees, animals, human beings, and so forth. Some of them are alive and thus ensouled, and the major issue was to account for this. One might even say that in a typical 13th century view not only non-human animals but even human beings are understood as being

² The present chapter draws from Yrjönsuuri 2006, and Yrjönsuuri 2008.

³ “[...] per rationem apprehendo et sentio eundem esse qui videt et intelligit, me scilicet. Qui sensus falsus esset, nisi vere sint ab eodem supposito quod dicitur ego.” (*II Sent.* q. 59, 540.) See also *II Sent.* q. 58, 466, where Olivi states that: “Præterea, quomodo ego scio illud quod species in intellectu meo existens scit? Non enim videtur quod illud quod est notum huiusmodi speciei quod propter hoc sit notum *substantiæ mentis meæ quam significat hoc pronomen ‘ego’* [...]” (emphasis mine).

⁴ As we saw in Part I, Chapter 7.4, Vital du Four initiated a fierce attack on Olivi's conception of the soul.

first and foremost bodies—ensouled bodies, to be sure, but bodies nevertheless. The body was commonly conceived as a substantial part of a living creature, and this applies both to human beings and to non-human animals. As I have already mentioned, one of the most important reasons for acknowledging the body was the firm belief that Christian philosophers held in the resurrection of the body on Judgment Day. The body was seen as an important and essential part of a human being, not something external or accidental to her. Even though the relation between the body and the soul was a much debated topic, and there were as many different ways to construe the relation as there were different conceptions of the soul⁵, the substantial unity of the body and the soul was esteemed as having high importance: human beings were thought to be bodily beings, not accidentally but substantially. This idea applies even more to non-human animals, as they were commonly understood as hylomorphic entities without immortal souls.

It must be admitted that Olivi is not the fiercest proponent of the bodily nature of human beings. One of the most controversial aspects of his anthropology is precisely the status of the body and the relation between the soul and the body. It was questioned during his lifetime⁶, and it has been suggested that when the Council of Vienne⁷ condemned the view that the rational or intellectual soul is not a form of the body, the intention was to forbid asserting, defending, and accepting *Olivi's* theory about the relation between the soul and the body. This suggestion is open to dispute, though, because Olivi is not mentioned by name in the decree; it condemns a doctrine, not a person. In any case, it is not evident that the condemned doctrine is actually the one that Olivi had proposed some thirty years earlier and defended after that against various charges.⁸

⁵ For an overview of the different conceptions of the soul-body relation, see Bazán 1997, 95–126; Dales 1995.

⁶ In the year 1283, Bonagratia of St. John in Persiceto, the minister general of the Franciscan order, ordered a commission of seven Parisian masters and bachelors to examine Olivi's writings. The commission came up with a document, the so-called "Letter of the seven seals" (*Littera septem sigillorum*), which consists of twenty-two articles stating the orthodox view on various matters about which Olivi was thought to be mistaken. Article 8 pertains to the relation between the rational soul and the body, and it goes as follows: "Item anima rationalis secundum quod est rationalis, est forma corporis humani, nec propter hoc sequitur quod non sit substantia vel quod sit extensa vel mortalis vel quod nihil, cum conferat corpori esse immortale; et contrarium est erroneum." (P. G. Fussenegger, ed., "Littera septem sigillorum" contra doctrinam Petri Ioannis Olivi edita," *AFH* 47 (1954): 52.) Olivi was censured, but only a few years afterwards, in 1285, he was rehabilitated. In 1299, soon after Olivi's death, the minister general John of Murrovalle condemned Olivi's works again. For discussion, see Burr 1976, 35–44, 67–74; Piron 2006a.

⁷ *Pace* Pasnau (Pasnau 1997a, 110–1), the Council of 1311–12, summoned by pope Clement V, was not held in Vienna but in Vienne, which is nowadays a commune of France, located some 30 kilometres south of Lyon.

⁸ The condemnation goes as follows: "[...] reprobamus [...] quod quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tamquam haereticus sit censendus." (Clement V, "Fidei catholicae fundamentum," in *Enchiridion symbolorum: Definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, ed. H. Denzinger & A. Schönmetzer (Barcelona/Friburg/Rome: Herder, 1976), 902 (p. 284).) Olivi's name does not appear in the decree, and thus there have been disputes whether the condemnation was aimed

Be that as it may, Olivi himself thinks that his view is philosophically sound and that it does not offend the officially accepted theological doctrines concerning the metaphysics of a human being. As can be seen from his answers to the accusations he faced during his lifetime, he is strict in claiming that there is a substantial union between the intellectual soul and the body: “[. . .] I know perfectly well that to say that the intellectual part [. . .] does not constitute one being and one substance together with the human body is very dangerous to the faith.”⁹ He also embraces the Aristotelian hylomorphic view that animals are nothing but living bodies. To boot, he explicitly argues against Plato, Origen, and the Pythagoreans and says that the body is not an obstacle or a disadvantage to the intellectual soul¹⁰. In short, he accepts the idea of a substantial union between

at him—especially because it is not evident that the condemned doctrine is the one Olivi defends. For discussion, see Jansen 1924, vii–xv; Bettoni 1959, 370–9; Partee 1960, 241–51; Tonna 1990, 277–289; Mauro 1997, 89–138 (especially p. 138, footnote 181); Pasnau 1997a, 110–1; Burr 1976, 73–80; Piron 2006a, 39–51 (I am using the page numbers of the pdf file, not the printed article). Even though I do not intend to participate in the discussion concerning the relation of the condemnation to Olivi’s thought, I suggest a distinction that might be helpful in this regard. We must consider two questions separately from each other: it is one question whether the condemnation was *intended* to counter the Olivian theory of the relation between the soul and the body and quite another whether the condemnation *actually succeeds* in disapproving Olivi’s theory. The former question concerns historians, and the latter is a philosophical question. It seems to me that this distinction has not been made sufficiently in the literature, since the tendency has been to defend Olivi against these charges and to point out (correctly in my view) that the wording of the condemnation misses Olivi’s complicated theory and that it does not *in fact* condemn it. From a historical point of view, it does not make much difference whether the condemnation actually fits Olivi’s doctrine or not, especially if the authorities of the time thought that it did. In other words, the condemnation may be about the Olivian theory, even though a philosophical analysis reveals that it is not. Be that as it may, it is clear that Olivi’s own doctrine about the union between the soul and the body was understood as problematic. This view is especially supported by the controversy between Vital du Four and Olivi.

⁹ “[. . .] bene enim scio quod dicere quod pars intellectiva [. . .] cum corpore humano unum ens et unum substantiam non constituat, est valde periculosum in fide.” (*Responsio secunda*, 155.) See also *Responsio prima* 8, 128; *Ep.* 7, 50–1; *II Sent.* q. 50 app., 47–101; *ibid.*, q. 51 app., 136–98.

¹⁰ *II Sent.* q. 51, 119. In *Quodl.* V.11, 325 Olivi denounces the Manichæist view that the union of the soul to the body is harmful to the former. Then again, it must be noted that there are passages which somehow modify this picture as they show that Olivi does not regard the body highly. This can be seen especially in Olivi’s understanding of the role of the body in transmitting original sin. There is no need to discuss Olivi’s view in detail, but it is enlightening to see how he downgrades the body in quite a radical manner in this context. To put it shortly, Olivi deems original sin as being inherent in the body of a human being: the soul gets infected by original sin when it enters the body. Now, one might ask, does God not act badly in infusing the soul into such a body—a good soul gets contaminated by sin only because it is infused in a body? As Olivi puts it in one counter-argument: “Ex prædictis autem patet responsio ad quandam aliam obiectionem quæ solet dari, scilicet, quod si quis scienter poneret pomum vel vinum in luto, ipse diceretur ipsum foedasse et non bene fecisse ponendo illud in loco tam vili. Sic videtur posse dici de Deo. — Dicendum enim quod illud non potest nec debet dici, quando agens habet rationem et intentionem optimam hoc faciendi [. . .]” (*II Sent.* q. 112, 303.) The objection identifies the soul with wine and the body with a chamber pot which contaminates the wine that is poured into

the body and the soul and thinks that the body is a substantial part of a human being. The subject which is called “me” is the composite of the soul and the body; the self is not identical with the soul but with the body-soul compound.

This idea can be seen also in another context. When Olivi argues in favour of the doctrine that the soul informs the whole body, he makes two interesting statements which show his stance towards the relation between the self and the body. He writes that: “Likewise, a human being perceives that he (or a certain vital subsistence of his) exists in the whole body taken together,” and just a few lines below we find him claiming that: “[...] and again, [this is proved by] the affection with which a human being naturally loves all the parts of his body—not as external and alien to his nature but rather as intrinsic parts of himself.”¹¹ The whole body is informed by the soul, and this is proven by phenomenological observations: one perceives herself to exist in the whole body and feels an affection towards her body to the extent that it appears as a part of herself. In short, Olivi does not conceive of the living body as a part of the external world, as a mere dwelling for the true self, but as a genuine and substantial part of the self. The body is not something we have; it is something we *are*. And clearly this principle applies *a fortiori* to non-human animals.

The conception of humans and other animals as essentially bodily beings influences Olivi’s conception of self-consciousness: the consciousness of one’s own body is the most fundamental type of self-consciousness. Moreover, bodily self-consciousness does not require any specifically human abilities, and therefore non-human animals are as capable of acquiring it as are human beings. Even the most simple animals such as worms and shellfish have the necessary faculties for bodily self-consciousness, as we shall see. In what follows, I will discuss mainly Olivi’s conception of self-consciousness in non-human animals because from this perspective we can see how it is realised on the sensitive level. One should bear in mind that most of what will be said applies also to human beings due to the similarity between human beings and non-human animals: both are bodily creatures and bestowed with a sensitive (part of the) soul.

19.2 Perceiving the Body by the Sense of Touch

According to Olivi, the most primitive type of self-consciousness is the perception that pertains to the living and ensouled body of a cognising subject. He conceives

it. Now, even though Olivi denies the conclusion (i.e., he thinks that God does well in infusing the soul into the body), he does not criticise the allegory. The body appears as a bad vessel which does no good to the soul, although the final outcome of this union may be beneficial. Yet one should not overemphasise this passage and other similar ones since Olivi’s intention here is not to present a comprehensive anthropological view.

¹¹ “Item, homo sentit se ipsum seu quendam vitalem subsistentiam suam in toto corpore simul sumpto existere.”; “[...] et rursus affectus quo homo naturaliter diligit omnes partes corporis sui non tanquam extrinseca et aliena a sua natura, sed potius tanquam intrinsecas sui partes.” (*II Sent.* q. 49, 12–3.)

of animals as capable of being conscious of their own bodies as their own, and he thinks that this kind of self-consciousness is necessary for animals to be able to live and operate in their environment.

How is the body apprehended? Olivi's innovative answer is that the sense of touch (*sensus tactus*) apprehends the body. Olivi's conception of the sense of touch differs radically from the Aristotelian teaching, which was popular also in the latter half of the 13th century¹². In short, Aristotle thinks that the five external senses perceive qualities that are external to us. Moreover, he claims that a medium is necessary for the functioning of all the senses. For instance, the sense of sight can perceive external visible qualities, but it cannot perceive objects that are in direct contact with the eyes because there is no medium that transmits the information from the objects to the eyes. (*DA* II.7, 419^a12–23.) Aristotle considers sight as a paradigmatic case of sense perception, and he wants to apply the same theoretical principle to the other four senses. Especially in the case of touch, however, there are certain problems. We have to be in direct contact with the objects we feel by the sense of touch, and this requirement makes the idea of a medium problematic. In *De anima*, Aristotle solves the problem by claiming that the organ of the sense of touch is not the skin or the whole body but the heart, and the flesh of the body functions as a medium that conveys the information from an external object to the heart and to the faculty of touch¹³. In this way, the purpose of the sense of touch is to sense external objects, and the body of a perceiver has a similar function as the air or water in the case of seeing. Crucially, the body itself is not perceived at all by the sense of touch.

Contrary to this Aristotelian model, Olivi thinks that animals are capable of perceiving a number of phenomena that are not external to them but take place inside their own bodies. In fact, external objects are perceived only because they cause changes in the body. The sense of touch is primarily a faculty of self-perception, and it provides information of external objects only secondarily. A good starting point for understanding Olivi's conception of the sense of touch is a list of the diverse phenomena that we can perceive by it:

First, because the sense of touch apprehends many things which differ in kind (*genere*) as much as the objects of other senses differ from each other, such as heavy and light, hot and cold, moist and dry, hard and soft, dense and fine, and also a manifold of dispositions and disorders of its proper organ

¹² At the present state of scholarship, it seems that Olivi was original in his way of breaking off with the Aristotelian tradition and conceiving the sense of touch as a faculty that pertains not only to external objects but primarily to the body of the perceiving subject. However, there are other authors with traces of similar ideas. For instance, Yrjönsuuri points out that Pietro d'Abano presents a view that the sense of touch is capable of apprehending pain and pleasure not caused by any external object (Yrjönsuuri 2008, 105–6). See Pietro d'Abano, *Conciliator*, f. 117^{va}–118^{ra}.

¹³ *DA* II.11 422^b34–423^b27; *Sens.* 2, 439^a1–4. As Yrjönsuuri points out, in *PA* II.1, 647^a19–21, and *PA* II.8, 653^b24–30 the flesh is depicted both as the organ and as the medium of touch (Yrjönsuuri 2006, 157, footnote 5). For discussion on Aristotle's conception of the sense of touch, see Cynthia Freeland, "Aristotle on the Sense of Touch," in Nussbaum & Rorty 1995, 227–48.

and of the whole body. Namely, we seem to perceive by the sense of touch the catarrhs in indigestion, in inflation, and in aposteme; the febrile heats; the emptiness and the needs of the body; the fullness of the body in satiety; the various itches of the flesh; the agile mobility or the opposite tardity of the members; the enduring vigour or vague weakness of the members; and the wounds or integrity of the members and the pains and pleasures that these cause. All these differ from each other as much as they differ from colours or sounds.¹⁴

The aim of this argument is to show that there must be several different senses of touch because the things perceived by touch are so dissimilar to each other that there seems to be no reason to attribute the perception of all of them to one faculty. Olivi does not approve of the intended conclusion of this argument, but he agrees with the list of the things that are perceptible by the sense of touch.

The list is very interesting. By close inspection, we see that it begins with five pairs of contraries: heavy and light, hot and cold, moist and dry, hard and soft, and dense and fine. These are the standard objects of the sense of touch in the Aristotelian tradition. In addition to these qualities of external objects, the list includes a number of internal sensations in the sense that they take place inside our bodies: we can perceive that we are hungry, that our backs itch, and various symptoms of disease, just to mention few illustrative examples. Moreover, some of the items in this list are reminiscent of the modern concept of proprioception, and certain other passages reveal that Olivi attributes the perception of the posture of one's own limbs to the sense of touch¹⁵. Also, the rise of the body temperature caused by running can be perceived in this way (*Quodl.* II.13, 150). The apprehension of these diverse phenomena is attributed to the sense of touch.

Now, one may ask—as does the objector in the above passage—whether there really is something in common between all these phenomena, something that justifies thinking that they can be apprehended by one and the same faculty. This question is the immediate context in which Olivi discusses his conception of the sense of touch. It seems that in the end he commits himself neither to the position that the sense of touch is one faculty nor to the contrary position that the

¹⁴ “Primo, quia multa per tactum apprehenduntur quæ non minus differunt genere quam obiecta diversorum sensuum, utpote, grave et leve, calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, durum et molle, densum et subtile, et item multiplex dispositio et indispositio proprii organi et totius corporis; nam gravedines indigestionum et inflationum et apostemationum et calores febriles et corporis inanitatem et indigentiam et satietatis plenitudinem et varios pruritus carnis membrorumque agilem mobilitatem vel contrariam tarditatem eorumque constans robur ac inconstantem debilitatem eorumque scissuram vel integritatem ac dolores et delectationes ex his causatas videmur sensu tactus sentire, quæ utique non minus ab invicem differunt quam differant a colore vel sono.” (*II Sent.* q. 61, 574.) The ultimate source of this idea may be Avicenna's *Canon*, which discusses various types and causes of pain and makes it evident that pains are caused by a manifold of harmful changes in the body, and some of these changes are due to disease. See *Canon* 10.18, §929–10.19, §960, 246–52.

¹⁵ See, for instance, *II Sent.* q. 61, 580; *ibid.*, q. 87, 199. For discussion concerning the differences between Olivi's account and the modern concept of proprioception, see Yrjönsuuri 2008, 111–12.

sense of touch is a genus for several species of the sense faculties by which different kinds of qualities are perceived. However, he succeeds in finding a common denominator which makes it possible for all the sensations to be apprehended by one faculty. The common denominator is the fact that all these sensations affect the body in a special way. The sense of touch is capable of apprehending the state of the body because the proper object of the sense of touch is the body of the perceiving subject and the state thereof: “[...] the proper object of the sense of touch is the intrinsic state of its own organ, and thus all the things which change or affect the organ intrinsically are objects of the sense of touch [...]”¹⁶ Even external objects are apprehended by perceiving the changes they cause in the body (*II Sent.* q. 61, 578–9; Yrjönsuuri 2008, 108–12). In this respect, Olivi’s manner of explaining how the sense of touch functions and revealing its proper object is clearly non-Aristotelian. The sense of touch is a faculty which senses primarily the condition of its own organ, that is, “almost the whole body of an animal,”¹⁷ and consequently the things that change the state of the body. As such, it is a faculty of bodily self-perception.

Olivi further specifies that the sense of touch is an evaluative faculty in the sense that it apprehends only those changes and states of the body which are relevant for the well-being of the body:

[...] the object of touch is the whole genus of forms of which the appropriate or inappropriate consistency of an animal’s body may be constituted. And if you wish to specify this idea to the human sense of touch, the object of the human sense of touch is the whole genus of forms which may perfect or forsake the consistency of a human body.¹⁸

This evaluative aspect of the sense of touch is distinctly visible in Olivi’s discussion of the perception of pain and pleasure, which comes astonishingly close to Descartes’ idea briefly summarised in the general introduction of this study. His idea is, perhaps surprisingly, that the sense of touch does not sense pain and pleasure. It senses only the bodily changes which are relevant to the well-being of the body and consequently to the subject as a whole. These changes are then perceived as painful or pleasant by the common sense:

[...] one faculty of touch is capable of [sensing] all those objects by the same capacity (*rationem*) by which it is essentially ordered to perceiving the internal state of its own organ and the things that are agreeable or disagreeable to it. However, they exclude pain and pleasure from the aforementioned [objects of touch] because as the sense of touch cannot perceive its own act except perhaps very incompletely (*semiplene*), so it cannot perceive the pains and

¹⁶ “[...] proprium obiectum tactus est intrinsecus status sui organi, et ideo omnia illa quæ ipsum intrinsecus variant vel afficiunt sunt obiecta sensus tactus [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 61, 578.)

¹⁷ “[...] fere totum corpus animalis est organum tactus [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 61, 581.)

¹⁸ “[...] obiectum tactus est totum illud genus formarum ex quo corporis animalium debita vel indebita consistentia constitui potest. Et si vis hoc ad tactum humanum specificare, obiectum tactus humani est totum genus formarum ex quo consistentia corporis humani perfici vel destitui potest.” (*II Sent.* q. 61, 585.)

pleasures that are consequent of and concomitant with its acts. Rather, this belongs to the common sense [...]¹⁹

Olivi suggests, therefore, that we can mark make a conceptual distinction between a perception of an external object, a perception of a change in the body that is caused by an external object, and a perception of the painfulness or pleasantness of this change. For instance, when someone puts her hand in a burning flame, the flame heats her hand. The sense of touch senses the rising temperature because of its relevance from the point of view of the hand's well-being. When the temperature reaches high enough and the hand starts to be destroyed, the common sense perceives the act of the sense of touch (i.e., the sensation of the heat) and the object of that act (i.e., the heat in the hand) as painful. As we have seen, this kind of perception is identical to the estimative perception of fire as being harmful, and it causes a desire to pull the hand out of the fire, which, in turn, causes the hand to move back. The distinction between sensing a change in the body and perceiving this change as painful reflects Olivi's manner of understanding the common sense as the centre of consciousness. He understands pain to be a phenomenal experience which requires consciousness. Pain is not an object of perception but a subjective feel that is concomitant with certain kinds of perceptions²⁰.

The idea that emerges from Olivi's discussion of the sense of touch is that it is a faculty which is necessary for self-preservation. Every being that is capable of striving for self-preservation—at the most basic level, this is nothing but avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure—must of necessity have the sense of touch; otherwise, the relevant bodily changes for well-being could not be apprehended. A being can apprehend pain and pleasure only if it has the capability of self-perception, and the perception of pain and pleasure are necessary prerequisites for avoiding pain and striving for pleasure. From this point of view, it is not at all surprising that Olivi attributes the sense of touch—in good Aristotelian fashion—to all species of animals. It is the only external sense that all animals have.²¹ In

¹⁹ “[...] una potentia tactiva potest in omnia illa obiecta per illam unam suam rationem per quam est essentialiter ordinata ad sentiendum internum statum sui organi et conformia vel difformia sibi. Excipiunt tamen a prædictis dolorem et delectationem, quia sicut tactus non potest sentire suum proprium actum nisi forte valde semiplene, sic non potest sentire dolores vel delectationes consequentes et concomitantes suum actum, sed potius hoc spectat ad sensum communem [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 61, 583.) Olivi is not consistent with this idea, however, and on some occasions he seems to think that the external senses are capable of apprehending pain and pleasure. In *II Sent.* q. 58, 503 he claims that the acts of pain and pleasure are in the external senses. However, immediately after this statement he goes on to say that these acts are apprehended by the common sense, which may mean that according to Olivi the experience of being in pain or in pleasure is brought about by the common sense after all. See also *Quæst. de nov.* q. 1, 107–8, 112.

²⁰ In *II Sent.* q. 70, 635 we find a very interesting discussion concerning the hunger and suffering that hunger causes. One of Olivi's points is that the sense of touch senses the emptying of the body, and the common sense apprehends this phenomenon as painful.

²¹ See, e.g., *DA* II.2, 413^b1–9; *DA* II.3, 414^b3–5; *DA* III.12, 434^b10–24 mentions taste as well, but Aristotle thinks that taste is a sort of touch. Olivi accepts the idea that all the animals must have at least the sense of touch, as he seems to accept without question the idea that:

addition, every animal has the common sense, even though in some cases it is not easy to distinguish it from the sense of touch: in the most simple animals, such as worms, the common sense and the sense of touch exists in the same material organ (which actually is the whole body) because worms and the like do not have a central organ that could serve as the seat of the common sense (*II Sent.* q. 31, 569; *ibid.*, q. 62, 590). In this way, Olivi attributes a rudimentary form of bodily self-consciousness to all animals. He does not conceive of bodily self-consciousness as something that requires highly elaborate psychological abilities. Rather, it is fundamental for every animal's existence.

19.3 Two Types of Reflexivity

One interesting problem arises from Olivi's conception of the sense of touch being a faculty that senses the state of its own organ. *Prima facie* it seems that this ability requires reflexivity from the sense of touch: it must be capable of reflexively turning towards its own organ in order to be able to apprehend the state thereof. This requirement is a problem not only because it was a medieval truism that corporeal faculties are utterly incapable of self-reflexion but also because Olivi himself says so on many occasions. He even grounds some of the basic ideas of his anthropology, such as the plurality of substantial forms, on the idea that corporeal faculties are not self-reflexive.

Olivi's solution to this manifest problem is intriguing: he makes a distinction between two types of reflexivity. On the one hand there are intellectual, free, and incorporeal faculties which are capable of what I shall call "genuine reflexivity"; on the other hand, some corporeal faculties (the sense of touch and the common sense) are capable of a lower type of reflexivity, which I shall call "rudimentary reflexivity." The idea in rudimentary reflexivity is that some corporeal faculties can form an intentional cognitive act which is directed to the organ of the faculty but not to the faculty itself as a psychological capacity. These faculties are, therefore, reflexive, but in a different manner than genuine reflexivity, since genuine reflexivity allows for more complicated self-relations. Let us shortly see what Olivi says about the reflexivity that I call genuine before going into the details of rudimentary reflexivity.

Olivi examines reflexivity fairly extensively in his writings, mainly on the questions which deal with self-consciousness and the freedom of the will. This treatment is due to the emphasis he puts on the intellectual and voluntary reflexivity of human beings. Olivi's prime contribution to the history of the philosophy of mind is his revolutionary view of the human will and its ability to reflexively move itself to act. This idea is the first and foremost principle of Olivi's philosophical anthropology: the freedom of the will, understood as the will's power to be the origin of human action. (See Yrjönsuuri 2002, 99–128.) By being capable of genuine reflexivity, the will can self-reflexively direct itself towards itself and

"animal est animal propter sensum tactus." (*II Sent.* q. 54, 251–2.)

freely choose to cause itself to will things. As Olivi conceives it, the freedom of the will requires that the will be a self-mover (See Part I, Chapter 5.1). In order to enable this, Olivi maintains that the intellectual soul of a human being must be spiritual and unextended (*II Sent.* q. 51, 101–198) because an entity can reflexively turn towards itself only if it is not corporeal or extended in space. This kind of reflexivity—genuine reflexivity—can take place only when the subject and the object of an act are the same in a very strict sense. They must not differ from each other either essentially or by location. These conditions limit the scope of genuine reflexivity to non-corporeal faculties, and thus it is reserved for unextended spiritual entities like angels and intellectual souls: the intellectual faculties of human beings are capable of it but corporeal faculties (and thus non-human animals) are not.

One of the reasons to deny that genuine reflexivity takes place in corporeal creatures and faculties is Olivi's conception of the essence of corporeal matter. It was commonly believed in the Middle Ages that corporeal matter is unable to turn towards itself. As Olivi puts it:

According to this [i.e., if the intellectual form were a form of the body], it could not reflexively turn towards itself, since [if it could] then corporeal matter would have to be able to be reflexively turned towards itself. But it is not possible for corporeal matter to directly turn towards something that is not external to itself—not only essentially but also with respect to position and location; this is why a part of the body cannot directly turn towards itself but only to another part that is close to it.²²

Olivi argues that the intellectual form of a human soul cannot be a form of the corporeal body because intellectual faculties are reflexive, and he explains that corporeality does not allow for reflexivity. He explicitly adheres to the view that corporeal matter is unable to reflexively turn towards itself. Therefore, it is evident that all of the corporeal faculties (i.e. faculties which are instantiated in corporeal organs) are incapable of reflexive acts. All of the faculties of the sensitive soul are like this²³. Furthermore, the inability to be reflexive is not only due to the corporeal nature of the sensitive faculties. The nature and essence of the sensitive soul is itself non-reflexive: “Moreover, it is not only due to the organ that [the sensitive form] is not free and self-reflexive; rather, it is principally and essentially due to its own essence and nature.”²⁴ The essence of the sensitive faculties

²² “Secundum hoc etiam non posset reflectere super se, quia tunc oportet quod materia corporalis posset reflecti super se. Impossibile est autem quod materia corporalis possit immediate converti nisi ad aliquid quod est extra se non solum secundum essentiam, sed etiam secundum positionem et situm; unde pars corporis non potest converti immediate ad se ipsam, sed solum ad partem aliam sibi propinquam.” (*II Sent.* q. 51, 112.)

²³ “Quantum autem ad differentiam potentiarum sensitivarum ab intellectivis et vegetativarum a sensitivis præter rationes superius positas valet, quoniam inveniuntur aliquando sensitivæ sine intellectivis, ut in brutis, et vegetativæ sine sensitivis, ut in plantis, et etiam quia istæ sunt perfectiones organicæ et actus materiæ corporalis operantes secundum aspectum corporalem, quod est impossibile dare in intellectivis.” (*II Sent.* q. 54, 248.)

²⁴ “Præterea, [forma sensitiva] non habet ex solo organo quod non sit libera et super se reflex-

themselves is such that they are non-reflexive, and the corporeality of the organs clinches the case.

We have to be careful, however. A close reading of these two passages—a reading that takes into consideration the context as well—shows that Olivi's intention is not to deny reflexivity altogether from the sensitive faculties but to deny the *similarity* between the sensitive faculties and the intellectual ones with regard to reflexivity. He wants to clarify that the sensitive faculties are not capable of the same kind of reflexivity which is attributed to the intellectual part of the soul. The only conclusion that can be made on the basis of these two passages is that non-human animals are incapable of genuine reflexivity. This point is important because if Olivi were to deny reflexivity from the sensitive faculties altogether, his conception of the sense of touch as a self-reflexive faculty would be utterly inconsistent and could not be defended.

Olivi easily accounts for the ability of the sense of touch to provide information concerning its own organ. The sense of touch perceives certain kinds of changes in its own organ because it is capable of what I call rudimentary reflexivity. Despite the preceding quotes, Olivi does not think that no kind of reflexivity takes place in the sensitive faculties of the soul. It is evident that he attributes a special kind of reflexivity to the intellectual faculties of the human soul, but occasionally he also mentions a lower type of reflexivity which can be found in some of the sensitive faculties, and the sense of touch is one of them. As we have seen, the sense of touch senses primarily the state of its own organ. This sensing requires some kind of reflexivity. The following passage tells us how Olivi construes the difference between genuine reflexivity and the rudimentary reflexivity which is attributed to the sense of touch (as is typical for Olivi, he does not present the idea as his own, even though he clearly prefers it):

Again, they say that although organic agents cannot turn reflexively towards themselves in a simple and intellectual way—which the intellect and the will are capable of—nonetheless they can do this in a less perfect way. [...] But insofar as the sense of touch senses more inwardly than the other senses, it turns its own and its organ's virtual *aspectus* inwardly back to its own organ. Nevertheless it cannot turn it back to the intrinsic and spiritual essence of the faculty or to the intrinsic act of the faculty, since that belongs properly to the superior faculties.²⁵

iva, immo principalius et essentialius habet hoc ex sua propria essentia et natura." (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 196.) Self-reflexivity is possible only by means of another object that is external to the faculty: "[...] quia natura est omnis agentis creati, saltem corporalis, quod dirigat aspectum virtutis suae ad extra, unde communiter non dirigit ad intra nisi per reflexionem factam ab aliquo extrinseco." (*Ibid.*, q. 53, 215.)

²⁵ "Rursus dicunt quod licet agens organicum non possit super se simpliciter et intellectualiter reflecti sicut possunt intellectus et voluntas: nihilominus possunt aliquo imperfectiori modo. [...] Pro quanto autem tactus intimius sentit quam ceteri sensus, pro tanto virtualement aspectum suum et sui organi intimius reflectit super suum organum. Non tamen potest ipsum reflectere super intrinsecam et spiritualement essentiam ipsius potentiae nec super eius intrinsecum actum, quia hoc est proprium potentiarum superiorum." (*II Sent.* q. 61, 581–2.) In fact, Olivi considers another possibility, namely, that the sense of touch, as it exists in one

In this manner, Olivi makes a definite distinction between two types of reflexivity. The intellectual faculties are capable of turning reflexively towards themselves in a “simple and intellectual way” and the sense of touch in a “less perfect way.” His idea is that since the acts of the sense of touch are intentional, and the sense of touch senses primarily the state of its own organ, it must be able to reflexively turn towards its own organ. However, rudimentary reflexivity differs from genuine reflexivity in one important way. Faculties that are genuinely reflexive are able to turn reflexively towards their own essences and their own acts, whereas rudimentary reflexivity allows only for turning reflexively towards the organ, not towards the essence of the faculty or the acts. We see that Olivi again makes a distinction (which carries with it a hint of dualism) between a faculty and its bodily organ, even though the faculty is a form of the organ. The acts of the sensitive faculties are realised as changes in their bodily organs, yet sensing the bodily changes is not identical to sensing the faculty’s acts.

In my estimation, the idea of this distinction can be understood by concentrating on two different viewpoints from which an act of sensation can be approached. Let us take a simple example from the realm of another external sense: vision, in relation to which an act of seeing a coffee mug takes place. From a phenomenal point of view, an act of seeing a mug is a lived experience by which one becomes conscious of the perceptual qualities of the mug. However, the act of seeing can be approached also from a physiological point of view. As we have seen, Olivi adheres to the medieval medical theory that an act of seeing involves certain changes in the organs of sight, the eyes, and also in the nerves which connect the eyes to the brain. The same act of seeing can be approached from these different points of view. It includes both aspects: the phenomenal consciousness of an object and the physiological changes in the eyes. An act of seeing that takes place in my eyes can be described as my seeing the mug on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a flowing of the *spiritus animalis* (plus, perhaps, some other changes).


Now, let us assume that the faculty of sight is one of the sensitive faculties that is capable of rudimentary reflexivity. In this case, a being can see its eyes without using a mirror. Although Olivi thinks that the eyes are incapable of reflexively turning towards themselves (*II Sent.* q. 58, 495), on a few occasions he considers the possibility of attributing rudimentary reflexivity to the eyes of Christ and the blessed in heaven²⁶. This kind of speculation illustrates well the difference between the two viewpoints from which an act of seeing can be ap-

place of the body, perceives the state of the adjacent part of the body and not the part which is its own seat. However, it seems that he favours the view which attributes rudimentary reflexivity to the sense of touch. At any rate, he does not consider it to be a particularly problematic idea to defend.


²⁶ “Nam sensus noster non potest reflecti nisi secundum exigentiam corporalis aspectus sui organi, cuius est non posse immediate dirigi vel reflecti nisi super corporale et situale. Unde etiamsi corporalis aspectus oculi beati absque omni intermedio speculo vel speculari super se reflectitur: non reflectitur immediate nisi super corporalia eius.” (*II Sent.* q. 67, 624.) See also *ibid.*, q. 61, 581, where Olivi says that the eyes of Christ may be able to reflexively see themselves without a mirror.

proached. For, even if the faculty of sight were able to reflexively turn towards itself, it would only be capable of seeing the organ and the changes that take place in it; it could not see the acts that take place in the faculty of sight.

In order to understand what is the crucial idea in this restriction, let us further suppose that the faculty of sight were capable of having two acts of seeing simultaneously. First, let us suppose that there is a direct act *A* by which the mug *O* is seen and that the realisation of this act is the physiological changes in the eyes *A'*:



Let us further suppose that there is another act *B*, which is reflexively directed to the eyes. Now, by the reflexive act *B* the faculty of sight would see how the spirits flow in the eye (*A'*), as the direct act *A* takes place in the organ. But the reflexive act *B* would not allow any sort of sensation of the essence of the faculty of sight, and, more importantly, by it one could not see the object *O* of the direct act *A*. The reflexive act *B* would only allow perception of the physiological changes *A'*, not perception of the phenomenal experience which is provided by the act *A*. This idea could be depicted as follows:



This example is, to be sure, an imaginary one in many ways: the faculty of sight is not reflexive, and Olivi thinks that the movement of the spirits in the eyes is apprehended by the sense of touch (*II Sent.* q. 62, 595). However, it seems to me that this idea is roughly what Olivi has in mind when he claims that the sense of touch may turn reflexively towards its own organ but not towards its own essence or acts. It can provide information about the state of its own organ but not about its own essence or acts: it does not feel what kind of sense it is; it does not feel that it senses; and it does not feel what it is like to feel. The apprehension of all these phenomena belong to the common sense. The common sense perceives the acts of the external senses, and it perceives the acts of the sense of touch as painful or pleasant, and—if I am correct in my analysis of second-order perception (see Part II, Chapter 12.3)—it conveys also some kind of information about the faculty of touch. Of course, the common sense does not convey any rational knowledge about the essence of the external senses, but it does apprehend something about the way in which different external senses sense, and in this restricted formulation it perceives the essence of the sense of touch.

The common sense appears to be capable of rudimentary reflexivity²⁷. It is, however, difficult to see what kind of consciousness the reflexive acts of the

²⁷ "Et hinc est quod licet sensus communis apprehendat spirituales et sensitivos actus sensuum, non tamen facit hoc nisi cum quodam aspectu corporali organi sui ad organa sensuum aut etiam ad organum proprium, prout aliquo modo forsitan reflectitur in se ipsum." (*II Sent.* q. 67, 619.)

common sense provide. It does not seem reasonable to claim that by the reflexive acts of the common sense we and other animals could be conscious of the changes in the brain. I, for one, am constantly ignorant of those changes. It seems to me that this conclusion is not what Olivi is after when he attributes a kind of reflexivity to the common sense. This difficulty is why I shall argue below (in Chapter 20.3) that he attributes to the common sense a kind of reflexivity that does not reach to the level of genuine reflexivity but still provides something more than a mere apprehension of the state of the organ.

Before going into that discussion, however, we must engage in two other ideas which pertain to the bodily self-consciousness provided by the common sense, namely, self-image and its relation to self-preservation.

19.4 Self-Image and Self-Preservation

One of the most refined which functions Olivi attributes to the common sense is the function of providing a self-image. The common sense provides a bodily self-image which renders non-human animals capable of self-preservation that exceeds the simple ability to avoid pain. Animals can evaluate the different parts of their bodies as having different values, and thus they can protect the most important members of their bodies at the expense of others in order to save their lives. Moreover, according to Olivi the ability to avoid things that do not cause an immediate threat but which are still apprehended as harmful to the well-being of the perceiver requires self-consciousness. These types of self-consciousness are preconditions for self-interested action.

As we have seen, the sense of touch enables bodily beings to perceive their bodies and the well-being thereof, and the common sense adds an evaluative element: the bodily state is perceived as painful or pleasant. However, this process does not account for all the ways in which non-human animals behave. Olivi points out that animals act in ways which are in-explicable by bodily self-consciousness, and he achieves this by way of an illustration. The example he presents is about a dog or a snake which sacrifices a member of its body in order to save a vital organ, such as the head:

Therefore, as it is necessary that the appetitive power controls all the bodily members and senses, which it leads to their acts or detaches from them, it is likewise necessary that it is assisted by a judging [faculty] which makes judgements in relation to all their acts [viz the bodily members and senses], notices their pleasures and pains, and prefers or shows the preference of one over the other. Moreover, when a dog or a snake sacrifices one of its members in order to save its head or sacrifices some part in order to save the whole, then it prefers the whole over the part and the head over the other member. Therefore, these animals must have some common faculty which shows simultaneously both extremes, their mutual comparison, and the preference of

one over the other—although it does not do this with the same fullness and altitude of reflexive judgement as does the intellect.²⁸

The idea Olivi presents in this passage is that the two highest faculties of a non-human animal work together and enable the animal to act as it does. The sensitive appetite provides an impulse to the bodily members and senses—moves them to their acts—but this kind of control and use requires some kind of consciousness of the members, the senses, their functions, and their well-being. This consciousness is brought about by the common sense, which apprehends the pains and pleasures of the body and provides evaluative information of the relevance of different parts to the survival of the animal.

In this way, animals are capable of evaluating their various parts. A dog sacrifices its paw in order to save its head. Therefore, it is not only conscious of its body and the condition thereof when harmful and painful changes occur, but it is also conscious of the purpose and functions of the different parts and their relevance to its life *before* any such changes occur in the body. When a dog is beaten with a stick, it does not wait until the stick hits its head. It blocks the blow with its paw before the stick strikes and before it feels pain from the blow. The animal's action is not caused by pain, rather it is grounded on some kind of consciousness of the head's higher value to the well-being of the animal. We can imagine that the animal has a kind of image of its own body in its common sense—a bodily self-image. This image contains the body as a whole, the different parts and organs, and the functions of these parts and organs. This self-image accounts for the appropriate using of the bodily members and senses, and it accounts for the idea that in addition to being conscious of their bodies and the condition thereof, non-human animals are conscious of themselves as functional bodily wholes. They are conscious of the different functions of their bodily parts and organs, and this consciousness is required for appropriate action. (See Yrjönsuuri 2008, 113.)

Furthermore, it seems to me that by writing that an animal may sacrifice a part of itself in order to save the whole (*pro conservatione totius exponit aliquam partem*), Olivi means that animals have some kind of consciousness of themselves as living beings²⁹. Here, the term *totus*, whole, cannot signify only the bodily whole of the animal because if a part is taken out, the whole does not survive as a whole. Therefore, I interpret that by “whole” Olivi means the composite of

²⁸ “Ergo sicut illam appetitivam oportet dominari omnibus membris et sensibus quos ad suos actus applicat vel ab eis retrahit: sic oportet unam iudicativam sibi assistere quæ de omnibus actibus eorum iudicet et eorum delectationes vel dolores advertat et alteram alteri præferat vel præferendam ostendat. Præterea, quando canis vel serpens pro conservatione capitis exponit aliud membrum aut pro conservatione totius exponit aliquam partem, tunc præfert totum parti et caput alteri membro. Ergo oportet in eis esse aliquam communem potentiam quæ in simul ambo extrema et mutuum eorum comparisonem et unius ad alterum præferentiam ostendat, quamvis non cum illa plenitudine et altitudine reflexivi iudicii cum qua fit hoc ab intellectu.” (*II Sent.* q. 62, 587–8.)

²⁹ Interestingly, the perception of oneself as a living being is the main feature of the direct self-consciousness that Olivi discusses in relation to his conception of the two different types of self-consciousness in human beings (*II Sent.* 76, 145–9; Putallaz 1991a, 95). I shall return to this topic in Chapter 20.1 below.

the soul and body. If the dog sacrifices its paw, it remains alive, and therefore the composition is not destroyed. If, by contrast, the dog loses its head, the composite of the soul and body—the whole—is destroyed as the dog dies.

Of course, being irrational creatures, animals cannot use conceptual language, and they cannot apprehend “a soul” and “a body” as constitutive parts of a whole (regardless of whether they are distinct or distinguishable only conceptually in the case of non-human animals) since this is an intellectual manner of conceiving of a living body of an animal. However, animals are conscious of themselves as living bodies, and they are also conscious that if the principal parts (such as the head and the heart) are destroyed, they cease to be “wholes,” living bodies.

That Olivi deems animals as being capable of apprehending that they are alive is attested to by a quotation from Augustine’s *De libero arbitrio* which Olivi incorporates into his discussion about animal self-preservation. In the immediate context of the quotation, Olivi has just presented the idea of a dog which knows to sacrifice its paw instead of its head. He goes on to cite Augustine to support his own view. In the quoted passages, Augustine provides some reasons to grant animals second-order perception. After presenting these reasons, Olivi goes on to add one more citation:

And he [viz Augustinus] adds: “But it is not so clear whether this life, which perceives that it perceives material objects, also perceives itself—except that everyone who considers the matter will realise that every living thing flees from death. Since death is the opposite of life, it must be the case that it perceives itself because it flees from its opposite.”³⁰

Augustine’s idea—which Olivi seems to accept, judging from his silent approval of this passage—is that the fact that animals strive to preserve their lives is proof of their consciousness of themselves as living beings. The mere possibility of self-interested action presupposes both the consciousness of one’s own body and the consciousness of oneself as a living being. I shall return to the mechanism of this latter type of consciousness below and argue that it is closely connected to Olivi’s idea about the direct self-consciousness of the human mind. Before that, however, let us look at yet one more text in which self-consciousness figures as a necessary condition for self-interested life.

Olivi’s conception of the estimative function of the common sense shows that he grants that non-human animals are capable of cognising external objects as being harmful or useful. We have seen this in Part II, Chapter 15. However,

³⁰ “Et subdit [scil. Augustinus]: ‘Sed utrum hæc vita quæ sentit se sentire corporalia sentiat etiam se ipsam, non ita clarum est, nisi quod se quisque interrogans invenit omnem rem viventem fugere mortem. Quæ cum sit vitæ contraria, necesse est ut vita etiam se ipsam sentiat quæ contrarium suum fugit.’” (*II Sent.* q. 62, 589; The translation of Augustine’s text is prepared on the basis of Thomas Williams’ translation of *De lib. arb.*) Olivi cites quite verbatim, for the original text goes as follows: “Sed utrum et se ipsam hæc uita sentiat, quæ se corporalia sentire sentit, non ita clarum est, nisi quod se quisque intus interrogans inuenit omnem rem uiuentem fugere mortem; quæ cum sit uitæ contraria, necesse est ut uita etiam se ipsam sentiat, quæ contrarium suum fugit.” (*De lib. arb.* 2.4.10.)

when I presented Olivi's conception of the estimative function, I did not investigate one crucial aspect of his view because it is more relevant in the present context. When Olivi presents all of the necessary elements for apprehending something as being useful or harmful, he adds an interesting aspect of self-cognition:

[...] since the intentions of usefulness, uselessness and the like cannot be apprehended by any faculty unless it at the same time apprehends the sensible or imaginary forms to which these intentions belong; that is because [intentions] mean only some relational states (*respectivas habitudines*) of those forms. For, when a sheep estimates that a wolf is hostile towards the sheep itself, it is necessary that it apprehends [1] the thing that it judges to be hostile; for to apprehend only [2] the property (*ratio*) of hostility is not to apprehend that the wolf is hostile. This is why it is necessary that the animal at the same time apprehends—besides the two preceding things—[3] itself as the end (*terminum*) of that hostile relation.³¹

As we have seen, there are many interesting ideas in this passage. For one, here Olivi states that animals have the ability to apprehend the intentions of other beings, and he interprets intentions as useful or harmful relations between things. An interesting idea follows from this interpretation: if one is to be conscious of a relation, one has to be conscious of both of the end-terms of the relation³². Even though the sheep perceives the harmfulness as being a feature of the wolf (the sheep sees the wolf as a dangerous beast), the harmfulness is actually a relation between the wolf and the sheep. A bear does not fear the wolf because the relation between the bear and the wolf is not similar to the relation between the sheep and the wolf. Thus, the last clause seems to signify that the sheep has to have some kind of self-consciousness in order to be able to perceive the wolf as being dangerous to itself. The sheep's fear presupposes that the sheep has self-consciousness. In this way, Olivi deems that self-consciousness is a prerequisite for apprehending the harmfulness and usefulness of other things.

Unfortunately, Olivi does not state in detail what exactly animals are conscious of when they are conscious of themselves as being the end of a relation. Nevertheless, it is evident that he intends to emphasise that self-consciousness is a necessary prerequisite for self-interested life, that is, it is necessary for self-preservation. Even the simplest animals avoid being hurt and strive for their well-being and self-preservation.

Every feature of bodily self-consciousness (as Olivi puts it) exists for the preservation of the being. A living being is conscious of its own body and the

³¹ “[...] quia intentiones utilis et inutilis et consimilium non possunt ab aliqua potentia apprehendi, nisi in simul apprehendat formas sensibiles vel imaginarias quarum sunt huiusmodi intentiones; quia dicunt solum quasdam respectivas habitudines illarum formarum. Quando enim ovis aestimat lupum sibi esse inimicum, oportet quod apprehendat illam rem quam sibi iudicat inimicam; apprehendere enim solam rationem inimicitiae non est apprehendere lupum sibi esse inimicum. Unde etiam ultro duo praedicta oportet quod simul apprehendat se tanquam terminum illius hostilis respectus.” (*II Sent.* q. 64, 603.)

³² This idea holds true especially because the relation does not add anything real to the end-terms themselves. It is not something that can be apprehended by itself because it does not have existence in reality. See Boureau 1999, 42–55.

state thereof from the viewpoint of the well-being of the body or of the whole living being (*II Sent.* q. 61, 585). Feeling pain and pleasure are related to the well-being of the body—these feelings are, in a sense, the motivational aspects which are related to the state of the body. Further, the consciousness of the functions of different parts and organs of the body and the evaluative aspects of this consciousness are attributed to living beings because they seem to be capable of sacrificing a non-vital parts in order to stay alive; this self-preservation is also the reason why Olivi thinks that animals are conscious of themselves as living beings. And finally, all animals can be conscious of themselves as being on one end of a relational intention so that they can avoid dangers and strive for advantageous things. Therefore, animals must be self-conscious if they are to strive for self-preservation. Non-human animals do everything they do for the sake of self-preservation³³, and a sophisticated type of self-consciousness is a precondition for self-preservation.

The above analysis shows that Olivi does not think that basic forms of self-consciousness are exclusively meant for beings created high in the hierarchy of beings. Every being that possess a sense of touch, a consciousness through the common sense, and an ability to strive for self-preservation also has bodily self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is an essential feature which separates plants from animals; it is not a feature which separates human beings from other animals. Olivi assigns self-consciousness an important role in animal psychology.

³³ “Primo, ex prædominio amoris super omnes affectiones animæ; nam ipsa est omnium radix et causa efficiens et finalis, nam ex amore et propter amorem et propter eius amatum, puta, in animalibus propter amorem sui proprii suppositi suæque naturæ, facit animal omnia quæ facit.” (*II Sent.* q. 69, 628.)

20 ANIMALS AND SECOND-ORDER CONSCIOUSNESS

Bodily self-consciousness has received less attention in the course of the history of western philosophy than certain other types of self-consciousness. Mostly, it has been overshadowed by a topic that has been considered far more interesting—at least judging from the amount of theoretical discussion that has been devoted to it from antiquity to our own days—namely, various types of consciousness of the mind¹. We are conscious of our bodies as being parts of ourselves, but we are also capable of reflexively turning towards our own minds by focussing our attention on our mental acts and, arguably, even on the mind as such. The question that has intrigued many philosophers is: How is all this self-consciousness possible?²

This focus of interest applies also to Olivi. Although he has many interesting ideas about bodily self-consciousness, he concentrates more on various types of self-consciousness that pertain to the mind rather than to the body. Modern scholarship has found Olivi especially interesting when it comes to his way of conceptualising the different types of self-consciousness of the human mind³, and

¹ As I have already indicated (in the General Introduction, footnote 28), the terminology here is very problematic. Recall that I use the term 'mind' in a modern sense so as to include not only intellectual operations but all sort of psychological processes, such as perception, emotions, imagination, thinking, etc. As such, it can be applied to non-human animals insofar as they are capable of these processes. When I say that medieval philosophers think that animals have a mind of some kind, I do not claim that they would have agreed that animals have *mens*; rather, I mean that they think that non-human animals have a consciousness which is similar to human consciousness.

² To be precise, I do not want to claim that there is a perennial "problem of the self-conscious mind" that has remained exactly the same throughout the ages. At different times the issue has been discussed in different conceptual frameworks. This variation of scope has influenced not only the answers that philosophers have provided to the problems concerning self-consciousness but also the questions and problems that they have understood as being important. The phenomena that we group under the term "self-consciousness" have been conceptualised in various ways, and some aspects of these conceptions have not always received theoretical attention. Still, I think, we can rather safely say that there is a long tradition of philosophical discussion which deals with self-consciousness.

³ Putallaz 1991a; Boulnois 1999, 167–74; Yrjönsuuri 2006; Yrjönsuuri 2007a; Yrjönsuuri

even though the topic of the present study is not directly connected to these ideas (given that they are particular to the human mind), I shall begin this chapter by briefly remarking on his distinction between the mind's direct self-consciousness and the theoretical knowledge that the mind can have of itself.

After explaining this distinction, I shall address the main topic of this chapter which is to argue that even though Olivi seems to distinguish non-human animals from human beings by attributing to human beings the ability to be directly conscious of their own minds, he in fact attributes a certain level of direct self-consciousness also to non-human animals. I shall point out that the experiential ownness which is concomitant with cognitive acts requires that the mind be able to reflexively apprehend its own activity. This reflexivity is a central feature in Olivi's conception of direct self-consciousness, and I shall make the case that it also applies to non-human animals. The difference between non-human animal and human self-consciousness is that the latter are capable of being directly conscious of their minds while the former are capable of having second-order cognition of their cognitive activity.

20.1 Direct Self-Consciousness and Rational Analysis of the Mind

In question 76 of the second book of *Summa*, Olivi addresses the question: "Quomodo anima se cognoscat." The entire question can be viewed as a critical reaction to an Aristotelian theory of self-consciousness and as an attempt to conceptualise different types of self-consciousness that take place in the mind. Even though Olivi does not name the "cultores Aristotelis" whom he opposes—this probably reflects the fact that there were many of them, and Olivi wanted to argue against ideas, not philosophers—we can recognise the view he rejects as the one that Aquinas preferred (although Olivi's immediate source of this view is probably Arnaud Gaillard—see below, p. 328).

I shall not go into the details of Aquinas' theory of self-consciousness⁴, but there is one particularly important principle in his theory which needs to be taken up here. For, according to Aquinas the mind cannot be conscious of itself directly. Following a popular medieval reading of Aristotle (issued from Averroës⁵), he conceives of the human mind as analogous to the *materia prima* in one respect: as *materia prima* is a pure potency in relation to sensible forms, so the human intellect is a pure potency with respect to intellectual forms. On the basis of this analogy, Aquinas argues that because only actual things can be cognised, the mind must

2008; Piron 2007; Christopher J. Martin, "Self-Knowledge and Cognitive Ascent: Thomas Aquinas and Peter Olivi on the KK-Thesis," in Lagerlund 2007a, 93–108.

⁴ For an extensive presentation of Aquinas' theory, see Putallaz 1991b.

⁵ Putallaz 1991a, 147; "Et cum ista est diffinitio intellectus materialis, manifestum est quod differt apud istum a prima materia in hoc quod iste est in potentia omnes intentiones formarum universalium materialium, prima autem materia est in potentia omnes iste forme sensibiles non cognoscens neque comprehendens." (Averroës, *Commentarium Magnum In Aristotelis De Anima Librum Tertium*, 387–8.)

be brought into actuality if it is to acquire self-consciousness. The mind is actualised by its thoughts which pertain to things other than the mind, and therefore the mind cognises itself only through its acts, and direct self-consciousness is impossible. The following passage summarises Aquinas' stance well:

Anything knowable is such in so far as it is actual [...] Likewise it is clear that the intellect as having knowledge of material things knows only what is actual. This is the reason it only knows primary matter as proportionate to form [...] Now the human intellect only comes under the class of intelligible things as a potential being—in the way that primary matter is in the class of sensible things—hence its name, possible intellect. Accordingly therefore, considered in its essence, it is potentially understanding—thus it has, of itself, the power to understand but not to be understood except in so far as it is actualized. [...] However, since it is connatural for our intellect in the present life to look to material, sensible things, as said before, it follows that our intellect understands itself accordingly as it is made actual by species abstracted from sensible things by the light of the agent intellect, which is the actuality of intelligible objects and by means of them, also of the possible intellect. Therefore our intellect knows itself, not by its essence, but by its activity. And this in two senses. First, speaking particularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives himself to have an intellectual soul from the fact that he perceives himself to be intellectually acting. Second, speaking universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from the nature of the intellect's activity.⁶

The mind has to first think of something other than itself and thus acquire a degree of actuality; the mind cognises itself to the extent that it is thinking of something else. On the basis of this cognition, it can rationally analyse what kind of principle it must be, as it is capable of having thoughts. In this manner, self-consciousness is possible only indirectly.⁷

⁶ "Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque cognoscibile est secundum quod est in actu [...] E similiter intellectus manifestum est quod, in quantum est cognoscitivus rerum materialium, non cognoscit nisi quod est actu: et inde est quod non cognoscit materiam primam nisi secundum proportionem ad formam [...] Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium: unde possibilis nominatur. Sic igitur in sua essentia consideratus, se habet ut potentia intelligens. Unde ex seipso habet virtutem ut intelligat, non autem ut intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit actu. [...] Sed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro, secundum statum præsentis vitæ, quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat, sicut supra dictum est; consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere animam intellectivam, ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere. Alio modo, in universali, secundum quod naturam humanæ mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus." (*ST* I.87.1.) The translation is taken from the Blackfriars edition, but I have made small emendations to it.

⁷ Putallaz argues that Aquinas' developed view is more complex and includes several dif-

One of the reasons to adopt the Aristotelian model and to deny direct self-consciousness is the obvious fact that we do not know exactly what kind of thing the mind is. Olivi presents this argument as one of the strongest supports in support of the Aristotelian model. The mind, the argument goes, cannot be directly conscious of itself because if it were there would not be so many different views about the nature of the mind. Some philosophers have conceived of the mind (or, to be precise, the soul⁸) as fire, some have regarded it as a corporeal form and, as such, perishable, and yet others have conceived of it as a separate entity that is not substantially united to the body but only dwelling within it. Because all these conceptions of the essence of the mind have been defended, the possibility of direct self-consciousness must be denied.

Olivi, however, thinks that the denial of direct self-consciousness is a mistake. Inspired by Augustine's *De Trinitate*, leaning on earlier Franciscan tradition, and also believing to have found support for his view from Anselm of Canterbury's *Monologion*⁹, he formulates an original distinction between two kinds of self-consciousness in the mind. The mind can be directly conscious of itself, and this direct self-consciousness must be distinguished from rational knowledge that the mind can have of itself. Direct self-consciousness provides the mind with the infallible knowledge that it is a living thing (*res*) and the subject of all the psychological acts which take place in it. But this information is all that direct self-consciousness provides. The mind does not know its own essence or properties by direct self-consciousness. It does not know what kind of a thing it is. Let us see how Olivi formulates the difference:

[...] it must be known that the soul knows or is able to know itself in two ways. The first of them is by a way of experiential and, as it were, tactile sensation. In this way, the soul indubitably perceives that it exists, lives, cognises, wills, sees, hears, and moves the body, and the same goes for other acts of the soul, the principle and subject of which the soul knows and perceives itself to be [...] The other way of knowing itself is by reasoning, by which the soul investigates the genera and differences which it does not know in the first way. [...] This reasoning begins from those things which the soul knows and possesses as first, infallible, and indubitable principles by the

ferent types of self-consciousness (Putallaz 1991b; For Aquinas' view, see, e.g., *ST* I.87.1; *De veritate* 10.8; *ibid.*, 1.9; *Sent. DA* 3.5). It is nevertheless evident that the view presented here is how Aquinas reads Aristotle (Boulnois 1999, 153–60 and footnote 3 on p. 160.)

⁸ Olivi's discussion concerning self-consciousness involves terminological confusion, which I have already mentioned: he refers to the mind (*mens*) and the soul (*anima*) interchangeably. Sometimes it is the soul and sometimes it is the mind which knows itself.

⁹ Olivi refers to *DT* 9.11–12 and to Anselm's *Monologion* 33. The crucial passage in *Monologion* goes as follows: "Nam nulla ratione negari potest, cum mens rationalis seipsam cogitando intelligit, imaginem ipsius nasci in sua cogitatione; immo ipsam cogitationem sui esse suam imaginem, ad eius similitudinem tamquam ex eius impressione formatam. [...] Habet igitur mens rationalis, cum se cogitando intelligit, secum imaginem suam ex se natam, id est, cogitationem sui ad suam similitudinem quasi sua impressione formatam; quamvis ipsa se a sua imagine non nisi ratione sola separare possit. Quæ imago eius verbum eius est." (Anselm of Canterbury, *Monologion*, Lateinisch-Deutsche Ausgabe, ed. & transl. F. S. Schmitt (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1964), 134–6.)

first mode of knowing—namely, that it is a living thing and a principle and subject of all the aforementioned acts. If the soul is perspicacious, it argues on the basis of this that it transcends everything that is corporeal. However, in order to argue this correctly and perspicaciously the soul has to know the defective nature of bodies and corporeal objects and the sublime nature of the aforementioned acts of the soul, and then compare the sublime perfections of the aforementioned acts to the defective nature of bodies. Thus, the soul must first investigate the natures of bodies and aforementioned acts. And because acts and images of the external senses are necessary for us to know the natures of bodies [...] ¹⁰

In contrast to the Aristotelian model, Olivi claims that the starting point of the mind's rational knowledge of its own essence is direct self-consciousness, not the activity of the mind. The mind's knowledge of its own essence must be analysed rationally by comparing the facts that are received by direct self-consciousness to the knowledge of the intellectual structure of the external world which is gathered by the mind through experience. In this way, the mind does not fully know itself, even though it is conscious of itself directly, and thus it must conceive of its own essence by making inferences.

By this distinction Olivi is able to solve the problem of there being a diversity of opinions about the nature of the mind. The diversity of opinions has led many philosophers to think erroneously that the mind does not cognise itself directly at all: if it did, there would be no such diversity of conceptions. Olivi clarifies that the possibility of error does not perish even though the mind cognises itself directly. One can be certain that one is a living thing and differs from all inanimate objects, but since precise knowledge of the nature of the mind is fallible—it must be reasoned out by comparing the mind to knowledge of the things other than itself—one can be mistaken about the essence of the mind. The source of errors concerning the nature of the soul is the rational analysis and comparison of the mind to the other entities of the world, the knowledge of which is acquired through the senses. (*II Sent.* q. 76, 146–7.)

¹⁰ “[...] sciendum quod anima scit se vel potest scire duplici modo. Primus est per modum sensus experimentalis et quasi tactualis. Et hoc modo indubitabiliter sentit se esse et vivere et cogitare et velle et videre et audire et se movere corpus et sic de aliis actibus suis quorum scit et sentit se esse principium et subiectum. [...] Secundus modus se sciendi est per ratiocinationem per quam investigat genera et differentias quæ per primum modum non novit. [...] Incipit ergo [ista ratiocinatio] primo ab iis quæ per primum modum sciendi tanquam prima et infallibilia ac indubitabilia principia de se novit et tenet, puta, quod ipsa est res viva et principium et subiectum omnium actuum prædictorum. Ex hoc autem, si est perspicax, arguit se transcendere omne corporeum. Quia tamen ad hoc recte et perspicaciter arguendum oportet se scire defectivam naturam corporum et corporalium et sublimem naturam prædictorum actuum animæ ac deinde comparare sublimes perfectiones prædictorum actuum ad defectivam naturam corporalium: ideo oportet animam prius investigasse naturam corporum et prædictorum actuum. Et quia ad sciendas naturas corporum sunt nobis necessarii actus exteriorum sensuum et imagines [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 76, 146–7); The idea that the intellect is capable of reflexively turning towards itself is presented by Olivi in many contexts. See, e.g., *Quæst. de virt.* q. 1, 9.

Of these two types of self-consciousness, the rational analysis of the mind's (or the soul's) essence does not directly concern us here. However, I think that a few remarks are in order.

First, by distinguishing two types of self-consciousness Olivi moves the focus of the discussion from the rational knowledge of the mind's essence to direct self-consciousness. There is nothing problematic in the rational analysis of the mind's essence. We are capable of rationally analysing what kind of entity the mind is, and according to Olivi this analysing is carried out in essentially the same manner in which the Aristotelians claim. This kind of rational analysis is actually something we would nowadays hesitate to call self-consciousness. It is not obvious how this sort of reasoning pertains *to me* because it provides general knowledge of the mind's essence, and this knowledge applies to *my* mind only indirectly. However the matter is understood today, Olivi in fact seems to think that a rational analysis of the mind's essence is indeed self-knowledge in the full sense: it pertains primarily to the mind (or soul) of the cognising subject, and only indirectly to the minds (or souls) of other people¹¹. By emphasising the mind's ability to directly cognise itself, Olivi shifts the focus to what philosophers after Descartes have been accustomed to calling self-consciousness (Yrjönsuuri 2008, 113–4). For him, the crucial issue is to prove that the mind is capable of a direct acquaintance of itself, and in the context of self-consciousness the rational knowledge of oneself is of secondary importance for him.

Second, when we look closely at Olivi's distinction between the two types of the mind's self-consciousness, we see that there is nothing *intellectual* in direct self-consciousness—at least it is not obvious that there is. To be sure, Olivi is discussing types of the human mind's self-consciousness, and thus it is only natural that he seems to be presenting direct self-consciousness as pertaining specifically to human beings. However, he expresses his idea by alluding to the sense of touch, and he does not state that the mind understands or knows itself; he states that the mind perceives (*sentit*) itself. Furthermore, the argumentative role that direct self-consciousness plays in Olivi's rejection of the Aristotelian theory of self-consciousness does not require that it be intellectual by its nature. We are certain that we live and are the subjects of our psychological operations. This certainty is a sufficient basis for a rational analysis about the essence of the mind, but non-human animals are also conscious of themselves as living beings and subjects of their psychological activity. Thus, even if we grant that direct self-consciousness is intellectual in the case of human beings, it is intriguing that when it comes to the contents of direct self-consciousness, the infallible consciousness that we have of our own minds is similar to the consciousness that non-human animals have of themselves.¹²

¹¹ Olivi's idea is that because rational analysis of the soul's essence is based on direct self-consciousness, it does not apply primarily to the souls of other people. Rather, we infer from the action of other people that they probably have souls which are just like ours. One is immediately reminded of Augustine's *DT* 8.6.9.

¹² Note that Olivi's list of actions which are experienced as being one's own consists almost

20.2 Direct Self-Consciousness and Experiential Ownness in Animals

Can we say, then, that non-human animals are capable of the type of direct self-consciousness that Olivi describes in question 76? To be sure, the souls of animals are not spiritual entities, they do not contain an intellectual part, and therefore animals cannot cognise themselves as conscious minds or spiritual entities. But is it possible that Olivi conceives of non-human animals as being capable of having the same kind of self-consciousness as do humans? Understood in this way, animals would be conscious of themselves as living bodily beings, and they would experience their acts as being their own. The only difference would be that human beings would be capable of inferring from this kind of self-consciousness the further knowledge that the self-conscious mind must be an unextended and spiritual mental entity which differs radically from corporeal things. It seems to me that this conception is roughly what Olivi has in mind¹³, but there is one problem with this interpretation: Olivi is quite clear that direct self-consciousness requires genuine reflexivity. The highest faculty of the soul must be capable of reflexively turning towards itself as a faculty, and only this ability enables the subject to cognise her own mind directly. This requirement can be seen, for instance, when he writes about the process of direct self-consciousness: "The soul has this self-knowledge by an immediate directing of its intellectual *aspectus* towards itself and its own acts." (*II Sent.* q. 76, 146.) This statement is almost verbatim to the description of genuine reflexivity. Since the sensitive faculties of the animal soul are incapable of genuine reflexivity, it seems that there is no way to attribute direct self-consciousness to non-human animals.

Let us suppose for a moment that the common sense is incapable of the required type of reflexivity and that it does not provide non-human animals with direct self-consciousness as described by Olivi. What would non-human animals lack in this case? What kind of consciousness would human beings have that would be lacking in non-human animals? From a metaphysical point of view, the difference is simple to describe: the intellect, being capable of genuine reflexivity and direct self-consciousness, can direct its attention reflexively to itself as a faculty and to the acts that take place in it. The common sense cannot do either.

Psychologically speaking, the difference may be stated in terms of second-order consciousness of one's own consciousness. The acts of a being's highest cognitive faculty provide it with consciousness. Thus, when there is a thought concerning, say, global warming in my mind, I am conscious of the intentional object of this thought. I think about global warming because a thought concern-

exclusively of sensitive operations. The most likely source of Olivi's idea, namely Augustine's *DT* 10.10.14 also contains a list of actions that are undoubtedly experienced as one's own, but it consists mainly of intellectual operations.

¹³ I therefore tend to agree with Yrjönsuuri who states that: "My general impression of Olivi's theory of self-reflexive freedom is that he would have seen no major difference between our normal human states of awareness and those of a dog." (Yrjönsuuri 2008, 113.)

ing it is actualised in my intellect. As I am capable of genuine reflexivity and direct self-consciousness, I can focus my attention on my thought concerning global warming, and thus become conscious of my consciousness: I am conscious of being conscious of global warming. I may have second-order consciousness of my own consciousness. Moreover, according to Olivi I can be conscious of my mind as a “thinking thing” even when I do not think about anything. This kind of consciousness is what animals would lack if our supposition were true. They cannot reflexively apprehend what is going on in their minds, and they cannot cognise themselves as conscious minds, because the common sense seems to be incapable of genuine reflexivity and direct self-consciousness.

This interpretation seems fair enough, and it has also been suggested by other scholars¹⁴. However, the whole picture is more complicated. By a close inspection of Olivi’s thought, we see that a total denial of direct self-consciousness to animals would force us to conclude that animal consciousness lacks more than only second-order consciousness of their consciousness. For one, the structure of Olivi’s argumentation in favour of the possibility of direct self-consciousness is such that direct self-consciousness is a prerequisite for being conscious of oneself as a living being and for experiencing one’s psychological acts as one’s own (I shall point out below why Olivi thinks this is so). Now, if I am correct in my claim that Olivi understands non-human animals as being capable of both of these, he must attribute at least some degree of direct self-consciousness and consequently some degree of genuine reflexivity to non-human animals as well.

This is in fact what he does. He finds the complete denial of higher forms of reflexivity from the common sense to be an untenable position. There are a number of passages in his writings that attribute to the common sense a kind of reflexivity that goes well beyond the rudimentary reflexivity which only enables turning towards the faculties’ organs. These passages are sufficiently unambiguous so as to give reason to conclude that the common sense is, after all, able to reflexively turn towards itself in a manner that enables at least some of those features that direct self-consciousness enables for human beings. I shall take up the important passages in due course. At the moment, it is enough to emphasise that the ideas about animal consciousness that Olivi explicitly works with would appear as inexplicable, if we were to deny direct self-consciousness to animals. The reflexivity that Olivi attributes to the common sense seems to be of a sort that enables direct self-cognition, which in turn accounts for the experiential ownership of the psychological acts that take place in the common sense, and the perception of oneself as a living being.¹⁵

In sum, as non-human animals do experience their psychological operations (perceiving, imagining, remembering, etc.) as their own, apprehend themselves as living beings, and can—at least to some extent—reflexively apprehend what is

¹⁴ Yrjönsuuri 2008, 113. Yrjönsuuri does not go into the metaphysical details, but his general view seems to be that Olivi thinks that animals lack consciousness of their consciousness.

¹⁵ I have in mind especially the passage about the dog which has a self-image that enables it to sacrifice its paw instead of its head (*II Sent.* q. 62, 587–8, cited above on page 314). See footnote 25 below for more references.

going on in their consciousness, the common sense must be capable of a higher type of reflexivity than that of the sense of touch, which is capable only of rudimentary reflexivity. Olivi does attribute some level of genuine reflexivity to the common sense, and thus he seems to think that non-human animals are at least on some level directly conscious of themselves.

I use the expression “at least on some level” to underline that I am not arguing that Olivi sees absolutely no difference between the reflexivity of the intellectual mind and the reflexivity of the common sense. The human mind is capable of a kind of freedom that differs radically from anything that can be attributed to non-human animals. This difference is important because Olivi’s conception of freedom is based on a special kind of reflexivity that he attributes to the human will: it is capable of reflexively *moving* itself to act. It is a self-mover because it is capable of the highest form of reflexivity—even the intellect is incapable of the kind of reflexivity that enables freedom. (Yrjönsuuri 2002, 102–3, 118–21; Yrjönsuuri 2008, 113; *II Sent.* q. 51, 115.) However, there seems to be a difference between the common sense and the intellect with respect to their ability to reflexively turn towards themselves as well. The attribution of a kind of reflexivity that surpasses rudimentary reflexivity to the common sense does not mean that the common sense would be able to apprehend itself as fully as does the intellect, and it is apparent that Olivi wants to maintain a distinction between the intellect and the common sense in this respect (see, e.g., *II Sent.* q. 67, 624). Rather, it seems that Olivi entertains an idea about three levels of reflexivity (Yrjönsuuri 2008, 112–4). On the basis of certain of Olivi’s passages—about which I shall discuss below—and especially due to his overall conception of the contents of the consciousness of higher animals, we can see that there is a kind of reflexivity between genuine reflexivity, which enables human beings to be free and intellectual, and rudimentary reflexivity, which allows the sense of touch to apprehend the state of its own organ.

In order to understand fully why I think that Olivi attributes a middle grade of reflexivity to the common sense, we have to take a few steps back and return to the idea about the experiential ownness that accompanies all the psychological acts that take place in the soul. Experiential ownness is by far the most evident example of a feature that Olivi attributes to non-human animals which requires a certain level of direct self-consciousness and therefore requires a higher type of reflexivity from the highest faculty of the soul.

Let me briefly repeat what the experiential ownness entails. According to Olivi, experiential ownness accompanies all the cognitive acts of the soul. The subject who undergoes different psychological processes has a subjective feel of the objects she sees, flavours she tastes, and thoughts she entertains as being seen, tasted, and thought by her. Acts of the soul are accompanied by this kind of experiential ownness. I shall repeat one of the most illustrative texts as a reminder of the idea:

[...] but all the faculties or many of them are very often (almost always) in their acts. For, often when I see, I simultaneously hear, smell, touch, and taste. Also, the common sense runs about discerning these faculties and their

objects simultaneously with them. Therefore, I notice all these acts and their objects by the intellect at the same time, and in addition to this I notice (or can notice) myself thinking about (*me intelligere*) them [...] I also always notice with respect to all of these that they are my acts, and, by consequence, I always apprehend myself to be the subject (*suppositum*) of these acts. [...]¹⁶

Every time I cognise something, I experience the cognitive act as mine, and I experience that I am the subject of that act.

The role of the experiential ownness that is concomitant with cognitive acts is very important in Olivi's conception of direct self-consciousness. We have seen, in Chapter 18, Olivi arguing that every time a subject becomes conscious of a cognitive act and the object thereof, she is conscious that she is the one who is having the experience of being conscious of that object. She is conscious that the object appears to her, and she is conscious that she is the subject of the experience and psychological act that brings about this experience. However, in that context I postponed the question of how Olivi thinks this kind of experience is brought about. Now it is time to raise this question which is important in itself but even more crucial for our quest for understanding Olivian animal psychology. By analysing Olivi's conception of experiential ownness and by seeing what kind of argumentative role it plays in his discussion about direct self-consciousness, we can see clearly (or as clearly as possible, given that we are trying to understand *Olivi's* thought) that at least some level of direct self-consciousness is a prerequisite for experiential ownness.

Experiential ownness plays a crucial role in Olivi's conception of direct self-consciousness. Olivi takes it as indicative of the mind's ability to cognise itself directly. His idea is that in order to be able to conceive of one's cognitive acts as being one's own, one has to be directly self-conscious beforehand. In a passage from question 76 of the second book of *Summa*, partly cited above, he expresses this idea in the following way:

The first [way in which the soul knows itself] is by way of experiential and, as it were, tactile sensation. In this way, the soul indubitably perceives that it exists, lives, cognises, wills, sees, hears, and moves the body, and the same goes for other acts of the soul, the principle and subject of which the soul knows and perceives itself to be. And this happens to the extent that it cannot actually know or consider any object or any act without every time knowing and perceiving itself to be the subject (*suppositum*) of the act by which it knows and considers them.¹⁷

¹⁶ “[...] sed sæpissime et quasi semper sunt omnes vel plures potentia in suis actibus, sæpe enim simul cum video, audio, odoro, tango, et gusto, simul etiam cum quolibet horum currit sensus communis diiudicans quemlibet horum et eorum obiecta; ergo tunc simul per intellectum advertam omnes huiusmodi actus et eorum obiecta, et tunc iterum advertam et advertere possum me intelligere ea [...] in omnibus etiam istis semper advertam illos esse actus meos ac per consequens semper apprehendam me esse suppositum illorum actuum [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 37, 659; see also *ibid.*, q. 76, 145–9.)

¹⁷ “Primus [modus quo anima se scit] est per modum sensus experimentalis et quasi tactualis. Et hoc modo indubitabiliter sentit se esse et vivere et cogitare et velle et videre et audire

Olivi's manner of stating his idea is perplexing because at the outset it seems that direct self-consciousness is identified with the second-order perception of one's psychological acts. This reading would mean that direct self-consciousness is nothing but perceiving one's mental acts. However, he does not make such an identification. Quite the contrary, he is explicit that the mind can cognise itself directly without being actualised by any other cognitive act than the one by which it cognises itself. We can see this by looking at another passage which shows that he attributes to the human mind an ability to cognise itself directly without any intervening cognitive activity functioning as the object for the acts of self-cognition:

In the first mode of knowing three things are required. The first is the presence of the object, which is the mind itself. The second is that the *aspectus* of its intellect is reflexively directed or converted towards [the mind] itself. The third is the act of knowing, which is an image of the mind according to Augustine.¹⁸

Only three elements are required for the mind to become conscious of something: (1) an object must be present, (2) intentional attention must be given to the object, and (3) an act of cognition must occur which makes the mind conscious of the object. Following Augustine, Olivi thinks that nothing is more present to the mind than the mind itself. Moreover, the mind is capable of directing its attention to itself, and when it does, an act of cognition pertaining to the mind is formed in the mind. The mind cognises itself directly and immediately. Especially important is the lack of any reference to a direct first-order act of the mind: there is no need for any direct act (i.e., an act that pertains to things other than the mind) in the mind in order to render the mind conceivable to itself.

The argumentative role of experiential ownness in the description of the process of direct self-consciousness is different. Olivi discusses the experiential ownness of one's cognitive acts only to show as clearly as possible that human beings can be directly self-conscious. The allusion to the ownness of direct cognitive acts is not meant to be a description of the process of becoming directly conscious of one's mind; rather, it is a way of showing that direct self-consciousness must be postited in the first place.

This idea can be seen by a close inspection of Olivi's discussion in question 76, but there is another text that is much clearer and also definite in this respect: in *Impugnatio quorundam articulorum Arnaldi Galliardi*, Olivi endeavours to refute certain views of his rival and adversary, Arnaud Gaillard¹⁹. Article 19 of *Impug-*

et se movere corpus et sic de aliis actibus suis quorum scit et sentit se esse principium et subiectum. Et hoc in tantum quod nullum obiectum nullumque actum potest actualiter scire vel considerare, quin semper ibi sciat et sentiat se esse suppositum illius actus quo scit et considerat illa." (*II Sent.* q. 76, 146.)

¹⁸ "In primo autem modo sciendi exiguntur tria. Primum est praesentia obiecti, quod est ipsa mens. Secundum est aspectus sui intellectus super se ipsam reflexus seu conversus. Tertium est ipse actus sciendi, qui secundum Augustinum est imago mentis." (*II Sent.* q. 76, 148.)

¹⁹ Petrus Ioannis Olivi, "Impugnatio quorundam articulorum Arnaldi Galliardi, articulus

natio is highly interesting from our point of view. Its subject matter is related to Gaillard's discussion of whether "scientia evacuetur in patria." Olivi points out that Gaillard follows a medieval Aristotelian view, according to which all thinking requires phantasms. Olivi takes this idea to be a grave error and after rallying some authorities (Augustine and Richard of St. Victor) to support his cause, he devotes the main part of the article to a philosophical analysis of the nature of intellectual knowledge and especially intellectual self-cognition.

Olivi deems the mind's cognition of itself to be an example of the type of knowledge that is acquired without phantasms. The mind cognises itself without having any phantasm that would represent the mind. In other words, he discusses the mind's direct self-consciousness. One of the most interesting aspects of his presentation is his idea that one has to be conscious of oneself in order to apprehend one's psychological activity as being one's own:

[T]he infallible certainty of one's own existence indicates this [viz that cognition does not require phantasms]. For, a human being knows so infallibly that he exists and lives that he cannot doubt it. But if a human being would not know that he exists and lives otherwise than through phantasms, a doubt concerning these could arise—and with good reason because phantasms could not represent these things directly and uniformly but only indirectly and dissimilarly, and they could not do this per se and primarily but only by a manifold of comparison and reasoning. This is why the proponents of this position say that we arrive at the cognition of our own minds and our intellectual faculties by [cognising] their acts and at cognition of the acts by cognising objects. For we conjecture by reasoning that the acts by which we cognise objects are derived from some faculty and substance, and they are in some subject. So, in this way we discover that we have some faculty from which the acts are derived. However, if someone were to examine this manner [of cognising one's own mind] very closely, he would find out not only that some uncertainty may occur in it but also that by this way we could never be sure that we exist, live, and understand. For although we would be certain that these acts are derived from some faculty and are in some subject,

19," ed. S. Piron, *Oliviana 2* (2006), <http://oliviana.revues.org/document52.html> (hereafter *Impugnatio*) (Piron warns that the edition is not critical, though.) According to Sylvain Piron, the first scholar to draw attention to this piece of text was Olivier Boulnois (Sylvain Piron, "Petrus Johannis Olivi, *Impugnatio* quorundam articulorum Arnaldi Galliard, articulus 19," *Oliviana 2* (2006), <http://oliviana.revues.org/document52.html>; See Boulnois 1999, 167–174). Later its importance in the emergence of a concept of modern subject has been emphasised by various authors (Étienne Balibar, Barbara Cassin & Alain de Libera, "Sujet," in *Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: Dictionnaire des intraduisibles*, ed. B. Cassin (Paris: Robert-Le Seuil, 2004), 1240–1243; Piron 2007, 43–54). Olivi wrote *Impugnatio* at the end of 1282 as a contribution to a controversy between himself and his old adversary and rival, Arnaud Gaillard. Both of these young franciscans collected lists of doctrines of the other which they thought to be susceptible to error and presented them to the minister general of the order, Bonagratia of St. John in Persiceto. As a result, certain of Olivi's ideas were censured by his own order in 1283. For the historical background of *Impugnatio*, see Piron 2006a; Piron 2006c; Burr 1976, 35–44.

how could we know from this that we are the subject and that the faculty is ours?²⁰

Olivi begins by showing that our knowledge about the fact that we are alive is indubitable and that the indubitability of this fact cannot be accounted for in the Aristotelian theory of self-consciousness; Olivi takes this deficiency to be a serious flaw. The most interesting argument comes at the end of the cited passage. Olivi presents the Aristotelian framework according to which the mind first cognises an external object, then infers from this kind of cognition that there must be a cognitive act by which the object is cognised. Further, from the indirect cognition of the cognitive act, the mind infers that there must be a power that is capable of having cognitive acts. Olivi notes that this picture fails to acknowledge one crucial element: even if we were to conclude that because an object is cognised, there must be a cognitive power that carries out the process, we could not know that the power belongs to us and that we are the subjects of the cognition.

To be sure, Olivi does not think that this kind of experience would be possible. In reality, when a subject cognises an object, she cannot be uncertain of whether or not the occurrent cognition belongs to her. Anyone who cognises an object knows that it is her own cognition and not someone else's. Instead of raising such curious doubts in relation to the experiential ownership of cognitive activity, Olivi wants to do just the opposite: he wants to draw attention precisely to the indubitability of this ownness and to the immunity against error in attributing cognitions to oneself. Since I cannot seriously doubt that it is I and not somebody else who sees a glass of wine on a table, the cognitive act of seeing the glass must be accompanied by a kind of experiential ownness. Olivi argues that the Aristotelian model does not account for the apparent ownness that is present in our cognitive activity. It seems to me that Olivi is quite right in pointing out that a process of inferring the necessary principles behind cognitive activity—the Aristotelian kind of self-knowledge—abstracts from self-cognition and is like any other kind of abstract reasoning. The process itself does not include anything which would make it different from, say, reasoning about the necessary principles that underly the existence of the world. The process lacks any reference to oneself as a subject. To that extent, Olivi's idea that there must be some kind

²⁰ "Septimo hoc ostendit certitudo infallibilis sui esse. Scit enim homo se esse et vivere sic infallibiliter quod de hoc dubitare non potest. Si autem homo non sciret se esse et vivere nisi per fantasmata, posset inde non immerito dubitatio suboriri, cum illa non possint hoc representare directe et uniformiter, sed valde indirecte et difformiter, nec possint hoc per se et primo, sed solum per multiplicem collationem et ratiocinationem. Unde et auctore huius positionis dicunt quod nos devenimus in cognitionem nostre mentis et nostre potentie intellective per actus eius, et in cognitionem actuum per cognitionem obiectorum. Coniicimus enim ratiocinando quod actus illi quibus obiecta cognoscimus manant ab aliqua potentia et substantia et sunt in aliquo subiecto, et sic per hunc modum deprehendimus nos habere aliquam potentiam a qua manant. Si quis autem bene inspexerit istum modum, reperiet quod non solum potest in eo contingere aliqua dubietas, sed etiam quod nunquam per hanc viam possumus esse certi nos esse et nos vivere et intelligere. Licet enim certissimus quod illi actus manant ab aliqua potentia et sunt in aliquo subiecto, unde per hoc sciemus quod illud subiectum sumus nos et quod illa potentia est nostra?" (*Impugnatio* 19.10.)

of self-consciousness involved in our cognitive activity is philosophically very insightful.

The next paragraph of *Impugnatio* provides us with an idea of how Olivi himself thinks experiential ownness is brought about:

For I never apprehend my acts (namely, the acts of seeing, speaking, and so forth) in any other way than by apprehending myself seeing, hearing, cognising, and so forth. And this apprehension seems to be naturally preceded by an apprehension of the subject (*suppositum*) [...] We apprehend our acts only as being predicated or attributed to us—also when we apprehend our acts by an internal sense, and when we, as it were, experientially distinguish between the substance from which they are derived and in which they exist on the one hand and the acts themselves on the other. This is why we sensibly perceive that these acts are derived from and dependent on the substance and not the other way around, and that the substance is fixed and permanent in itself, whereas the acts are continuously in the making.²¹

The central idea in this passage is that in order to apprehend one's acts as being one's own, one has to apprehend oneself first. The subject of the cognitive acts must be apprehended directly and independently of the direct acts which pertain to the external objects. This apprehension of the subject is required for apprehending direct acts as being one's own. We are conscious of our minds, and whenever a direct act of cognition takes place in our minds, we apprehend it, and we apprehend it as an act of our mind. In this manner, all our cognitive activity has the experiential ownness which makes it appear as being our own.

We see that Olivi's idea about the relation between direct self-consciousness and experiential ownness is such that the former enables the latter. He repeats the same idea (with lesser clarity) in the now familiar question 76 of *Summa* where he shortly points out how the mind—or, in this case the soul—has the experience of being the subject of all the cognitive acts that take place in it:

The soul has this self-knowledge by an immediate directing of its intellectual *aspectus* towards itself and its own acts. The *aspectus* remains always and continuously directed towards the soul, as long as it is in ever-vigilant use (*pervigili usu*) of the free will (*liberum arbitrium*).²²

²¹ "Nunquam enim apprehendo actus meos, actus scilicet videndi et loquendi et sic de aliis, nisi per hoc quod apprehendo me videre, audire, cogitare et sic de aliis. Et in hac apprehensione videtur naturali ordine preire apprehensio ipsius suppositi. [...] Actus autem nostri non apprehenduntur a nobis nisi tamquam predicata vel nobis attributa; quando etiam nos apprehendimus nostros actus quoddam interno sensu et quasi experimentaliter distinguimus inter substantiam a qua manant et in qua existunt et inter ipsos actus; unde et sensibiliter percipimus quod ipsi manant et dependent ab ea, non ipsa ab eis et quod ipsa est quoddam fixum et in se manens, ipsi vero actus in quodam continuo fieri." (*Impugnatio* 19.11.)

²² "Hanc autem scientiam sui habet anima per immediatam conversionem sui intellectualis aspectus super se et super suos actus. Qui quidem, quamdiu est in pervigili usu liberi arbitrii, semper et continue stat super eam conversus." (*II Sent.* q. 76, 146.) The allusion of the use of the will's free choice is probably meant to rule out people who suffer from

The idea that Olivi puts forth is that the soul is, as it were, all the time scanning itself. The soul apprehends itself even when there is no other cognitive activity in it, and when a cognitive act takes place in the soul, the soul apprehends the act as its own act. Thus, experiential ownness is an indicator of a more profound and constant type of self-consciousness of the soul. It does not have to decide to reflexively turn towards itself because it is automatically doing so anyway.²³

20.3 The Reflexivity of the Common Sense

If my claim about the similar roles of the common sense and the intellect holds true—that is, if the common sense provides non-human animals with an experiential ownness that is concomitant with their cognitive acts—the common sense must be capable of a more than rudimentary reflexivity which only allows for cognitive activity that relates to the organ of the common sense. For, if the common sense does not have some properties of genuine reflexivity and direct self-consciousness, there is no way animals could experience their cognitive activity as being their own. At most they could apprehend the acts of their external senses as their own, but that does not suffice because the higher cognitive acts (such as conscious perception and imagination) do not take place in the external senses, rather they occur in the common sense. And if the common sense cannot reflexively apprehend itself and the acts that take place in it, the cognitive activity of animals lacks the experiential ownness which is achieved only by being capable of such reflexivity.

mental disorders. Some mentally ill persons are not capable of correctly reflecting on their psychological systems, and they make mistakes, e.g., by apprehending acts of the imagination as acts of the senses (*II Sent.* q. 59, 553–4). Now, it seems odd that Olivi makes the reservation. It does not seem plausible that persons who cannot tell the difference between imaginative and perceptual acts would not experience these cognitive acts as being their own; even split personalities and schizophrenics experience (at least arguably) their occurrent cognitive acts as being their own, even though their experiences may lack temporal coherence (meaning that acts that take place at different times may be experienced by different “persons”). Since Olivi thinks that madness is caused by detrimental changes on the sensitive level, even the tentative exclusion of mentally ill persons from the group of beings who experience their cognitive acts as being their own would not necessarily have the consequence that non-human animals would be excluded as well. Their sensitive faculties function properly and do not involve fallacious judgements concerning the way in which different things are apprehended. See *II Sent.* q. 59, 549–51. For discussion, see Vesa Hirvonen, “Mental Disorders in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology,” in Hirvonen, Holopainen & Tuominen 2006, 174–9.

²³ We see that Olivi does not make a difference between the mind’s direct self-consciousness which is achieved by a decision to focus on one’s own mind and the direct self-consciousness that is a constant feature of the mind itself. Some of the passages in question 76 seem to refer to the former (e.g., the passage cited in footnote 18 above) and others to the latter (e.g., the passage cited in the present paragraph). It seems that since the process is similar from a metaphysical point of view, the two coincide: by trying to form an image of one’s mind, one does not achieve anything that would not have been present in one’s experience already.

It is true that Olivi's overall denial of genuine reflexivity from the corporeal faculties (i.e., the faculties that are realised in corporeal organs) seems to allow no room for attributing genuine reflexivity to the common sense. Moreover, he often argues that direct self-consciousness requires not only genuine reflexivity but also freedom (*II Sent.* q. 57, 324–5). These restrictions should be unambiguous: non-human animals are incapable of direct self-consciousness and, consequently, they do not apprehend themselves as living beings, and their cognitive acts are not accompanied by experiential oneness.

My general impression is, however, that Olivi seems unsatisfied with the consequences of these restrictions. He does not rest with the strict distinction between the two kinds of reflexivity that I presented above. Although it is evident that he does not attribute genuine reflexivity in the full sense to the common sense, on many occasions he suggests that the common sense is capable of a reflexivity that goes beyond rudimentary reflexivity and shares some features of genuine reflexivity. Take, for instance, the following passage:

And so, this does not prove that the common sense would apprehend something that is present—other than the acts and *aspectus* of the external senses—except insofar as it perhaps reflexively turns towards its proper act sensibly and incompletely (*semiplene*).²⁴

Olivi says that the common sense may reflexively turn towards itself *semiplene*. It is capable of a kind of reflexivity that goes beyond rudimentary reflexivity. Unfortunately, Olivi does not define exactly what kind of reflexivity he has in mind—it is possible that he never worked out a final view on this matter—but he seems to indicate that there is a kind of middle level of reflexivity which can be attributed to the common sense. And it is my impression that the reason for introducing this consideration is his willingness to provide non-human animals with an analogous kind of consciousness to that of human beings.

There are a number of passages in which Olivi discusses the reflexivity of the common sense²⁵. Two of them are especially important: one is related to Olivi's idea about the self-image that animals have in their common senses, and the other is the text just cited. I shall begin with the former.

In question 67 of the second book of *Summa*, Olivi asks whether the human intellect contains all the sensitive faculties. This question, in effect, confronts the Thomist doctrine of the unity of the substantial form, and the controversial issue is whether an intellectual form can be considered as a form of the body. Olivi's answer is negative because he cannot see how certain features of the intellect could

²⁴ “Et ideo ex hoc non probatur quod sensus communis apprehendat aliquid praesentiale praeter actus et actuales aspectus particularium sensuum, nisi forte pro quanto super suum actum proprium sensualiter et semiplene reflectitur.” (*II Sent.* q. 62, 595.)

²⁵ *II Sent.* q. 67, 615–6 & 624; *ibid.*, q. 62, 595; *ibid.*, 587–9 (see p. 314, footnote 28, and p. 220, footnotes 14 & 15); *ibid.*, q. 67, 619 (see p. 312, footnote 27); *ibid.*, q. 111, 270–1. In *ibid.*, q. 58, 421, Olivi suggests that in addition to the will other faculties (note the plural) of the soul may be capable of reflexively turning towards themselves, and on some occasions he seems to think that it is possible to attribute the middle level of reflexivity even to the external senses (*ibid.*, q. 61, 583; *Quaest. de nov.* q. 1, 107–8, 112).

be safeguarded, were it a form of the body. One of these features is the intellect's ability to reflexively turn towards itself (*II Sent.* q. 51, 111–6). However, in one of the *quod sic* arguments Olivi presents a contrary idea that is highly interesting:

[I]t is not inconvenient that the intellect is able to reflexively turn towards itself and its own act even though it is an organic faculty [i.e., a faculty that is a form of a bodily organ]; for, the common sense apprehends the simple acts of the external senses although it is an organic faculty. And it is also proven above that the common sense reflexively turns towards itself and also upon its own subject (*suppositum*) by pointing out that a dog or a snake chooses (*præligit*) to expose to death a less important part in order to save the whole and more radical and noble part of itself. The animal cannot do this unless it discerns the whole from the part and the more radical consistence of its life from the less radical one in its sensory judgement. The same is proven by Augustine, in *De libero arbitrio* II [4.10], where he explicitly teaches this and argues for it.²⁶

A close reading of this text shows that it contains two claims. First, it points out that a corporeal faculty can apprehend simple (and spiritual) acts because the common sense can apprehend the acts of the external senses which are simple and spiritual. Second, it draws from Olivi's own idea about the self-image that the common sense contains: the common sense is capable of reflexively turning towards itself and towards the whole subject. If it were not, dogs and snakes would be unable to protect their vital parts by sacrificing less important ones. Taken together, these claims are intended to prove that the common sense is capable of apprehending itself and its own acts—not only the movement of the *spiritus animalis* in the brain but also its own simple and spiritual acts, that is, the cognitive acts from a psychological point of view. In other words, the crux of the argument is that the common sense is capable of genuine reflexivity and not only a rudimentary one. Because the common sense is a faculty that is realised in a corporeal organ, the argument goes, reflexivity and corporeality do not contradict each other; therefore it is possible for the intellect to be a form of a corporeal organ or the body as a whole while still being a reflexive faculty. This possibility, in turn, would render it plausible that in human beings there are no multiplicity of substantial forms but only one intellectual form, which would account for the sensitive operations as well.

Olivi's answer to this argument is somewhat unsatisfying because he does not respond to the latter claim, that is, to the idea about the reflexivity of the

²⁶ "Sexto, quia non est inconueniens quin intellectus, quamvis sit organicus, possit reflecti super se et super suum actum; quia sensus communis, quamvis sit organicus, attingit simplices actus sensuum particularium. Et etiam probatum fuit supra quod reflectitur super se et etiam super suum suppositum per hoc quod canis vel serpens præligit partem viliorem morti exponere pro salvando toto et parte sua radicaliori et nobiliori; quod non potest, nisi suo sensuali iudicio discernat totum a parte et radicaliorem consistentiam suæ vitæ a minus radicali. Quod et ibidem probatum est per Augustinum, II *De libero arbitrio*, hoc expresse docentem et argumentantem." (*II Sent.* q. 67, 615–6.) "Probatum fuit supra" refers to *ibid.*, q. 62, 587–8.

common sense—at least not as explicitly as one would hope. I cite the whole answer because quite a thorough reading is required in order to understand what Olivi says and does not say in it:

The answer to the sixth argument is also clear on the basis of the foregoing because the reflexive turning of any of the senses towards themselves or towards sensitive acts is much inferior in comparison to free and intellectual reflexivity. For, our senses cannot be reflexively turned in any other way than according to the restrictions (*exigentiam*) of the corporeal *aspectus* of their organs, which can immediately be directed or reflexively turned only towards corporeal and localised things. This is why the corporeal *aspectus* of the eye of the blessed—granted that it could reflexively turn towards itself without any mediating mirror or mirror-like object—would immediately and reflexively turn only towards the corporeal [aspects] of it. However, the spiritual *aspectus* of the common sense, which is connected and fixed (*invisceratus*) to the corporeal *aspectus* of its organ, apprehends immediately the sensitive acts insofar as they are in corporeal organs and incorporated in a corporeal *aspectus*. And if the faculties of the external senses can in some way perceive their own acts, then they can regard and apprehend them in the aforementioned way.²⁷

The first point that should be noted in Olivi's answer is that he does not tell us what he thinks about the reflexivity of the common sense. This is probably because his main concern in this context is only to repudiate the idea that the intellectual part of the soul could be a form of the body, and in order to do so it is enough to point out that any corporeal faculty is at most capable of apprehending acts that are realised in corporeal matter. External senses, were they capable of turning towards themselves reflexively, would only sense their organs; when the common sense apprehends the acts of the external senses, it apprehends them as they take place in the organs of the senses. Thus, Olivi wants us to believe that if the intellect were a form of the body, it would have a lesser degree of reflexivity than it does in reality. Unfortunately, Olivi remains almost completely wordless about the exact difference between the degrees of reflexivity of the intellect and the common sense. He argues that because the common sense (being a corporeal faculty) cannot apprehend anything that is not realised in a corporeal organ, it does not reach to the heights of intellectual reflexivity. But he does not reveal what it lacks in comparison to the intellect, and he does not reveal what it is capable of in comparison to the external senses. Olivi's only revelation in this regard,

²⁷ "Ad sextam etiam patet ex supradictis, quia reflexio cuiuscunque sensus super se vel super actus sensitivos est valde infima respectu reflexionis liberæ et intellectivæ. Nam sensus noster non potest reflecti nisi secundum exigentiam corporalis aspectus sui organi, cuius est non posse immediate dirigi vel reflecti nisi super corporale et situale. Unde etiamsi corporalis aspectus oculi beati absque omni intermedio speculo vel speculari super se reflectitur: non reflectitur immediate nisi super corporalia eius. Spiritualis tamen aspectus sensus communis suo corporali aspectui sui organi connexus et invisceratur attingit immediate actus sensitivos, prout sunt organis corporeis et corporalibus aspectibus incorporati. Et si potentie partialium sensuum possunt aliquo modo sentire proprios actus, tunc illos aspiciunt et attingunt modo prædicto." (*II Sent.* q. 67, 624.)

at the beginning of his answer, is that there is a distinction between two levels of reflexivity, but this information is not very helpful because the distinction lacks all the details we would like to know.

One thing, however, is certain. The common sense *is* capable of apprehending the spiritual and simple acts of the senses²⁸. Even though Olivi repeatedly points out that it must employ the corporeal *aspectus* of its organ and that it apprehends the acts only insofar as they are realised in the corporeal organs of the senses, there is not doubt that the common sense apprehends the acts as psychological. Our awareness of the physiological changes (concomitant with the psychological acts) in our perceptual system is deficient—indeed, even nonexistent—but we are conscious of our acts of sensation because the common sense perceives them. So, there is a clear-cut difference between the common sense and the external senses: only the former can apprehend the psychological acts of the senses. The question is: Does the common sense also have the ability to apprehend its own acts in this way?

It seems to me that we can read the passage at hand in two ways. Either: (1) Olivi equates the common sense and the external senses when it comes to self-reflexivity. The common sense, as far as it is capable of self-reflexivity, apprehends only its own organ and the physiological changes (probably the flowing of the *spiritus animalis*) in it. As such, it is capable only of rudimentary reflexivity and does not allow for any consciousness about its own psychological acts. Or: (2) he does not equate the common sense and the external senses; rather, he thinks that the common sense is capable of more than rudimentary reflexivity and that it is able to apprehend its own acts as well as the acts of the external senses, although it is not capable of full genuine reflexivity which is confined to the intellectual part of the soul.

In my estimation, the latter interpretation is the correct one. Before presenting my rationale, however, I must answer a possible counter-argument which occur to a careful reader. In Chapter 19.3, I referred to the very same passage that I am analysing here and claimed to have found a description of rudimentary reflexivity from it. In his answer to the *quod sic* argument, Olivi says that even if the eyes of the blessed could turn reflexively towards themselves, they would not see the psychological acts of the faculty of sight but only the eyes as corporeal organs. Olivi's answer might be read as stating that the case of the common sense is identical and that it is incapable of apprehending itself and the acts that take place in it. In other words, if my interpretation of the idea of the eyes of the blessed holds true, does it not support interpretation (1) for the whole passage?

In my opinion, it does not. Rather, Olivi—for some reason—leaves the whole question about the reflexivity of the common sense aside. He is completely silent about the dog and about the supposed ability of the common sense to reflexively perceive itself and its own acts. He provides no good explanation for how this kind of reflexivity should be understood. What he does reveal in his answer is that the reflexivity of the senses is inferior to the reflexivity of the intellect, that corporeal faculties must employ the corporeal *aspectūs* of their organs, that

²⁸ We have seen this in Part II, Chapter 12.3, where I discussed Olivi's conception of second-order perception.

the external senses would sense only their organs if they were capable of reflexivity (the eyes of the blessed), that the common sense also employs the corporeal *aspectus*, that the common sense perceives the acts of the senses only as they are realised in their organs, and again that if the *external senses*²⁹ were capable of reflexivity, they would only apprehend their organs. Olivi produces a number of points, but the only information he provides about the reflexivity of the common sense is that it must employ its corporeal *aspectus* and that its reflexivity is of an inferior type in comparison with intellectual reflexivity. In other words, in the cited passage he tells about rudimentary reflexivity of the external senses but *not* about the reflexivity that is required in order to account for the self-interested action of the dog.

Already, this clarification is a moderate proof in favour of interpretation (2), according to which Olivi thinks that the common sense is capable of apprehending its own acts and not only the concomitant changes in the organ of the common sense. Moreover, there is one further proof which I take to be valuable, even though it is indirect and therefore not conclusive. We have seen that the *quod sic* argument Olivi refutes incorporates a reference to the second book of Augustine's *De libero arbitrio*, and even a quick survey of that book reveals that the reference is most likely to the fourth chapter³⁰. In Chapter Four, Augustine raises the question of whether or not the interior sense perceives itself, and he answers positively. Now, in his own answer Olivi remains silent about Augustine's idea, but we have already seen that he accepts it in another context—namely, in the passage where he presents the idea about the dog and the snake which are capable of preserving their lives by sacrificing non-vital parts of their bodies. I take it that because Olivi does not state any reservation in relation to Augustine's idea, he accepts it: the common sense is capable of apprehending itself, and this apprehension provides the consciousness about itself being the part that is necessary for staying alive. The common sense *discernat radicalior consistentia suæ vitæ* (as the *quod sic* argument puts it). This assessment requires that the common sense must be able to reflexively apprehend more than its own organ. It has to be conscious of its own life, itself, from a psychological point of view.

In sum, the *quod sic* argument and Olivi's answer to it can be interpreted as stating that Olivi holds the common sense as being capable of reflexively turning towards itself in a way that differs from the rudimentary reflexivity of the sense of touch. He clarifies that the reflexivity of the common sense is of an inferior type compared to intellectual reflexivity, but the idea about self-interested life requires a kind of self-consciousness that pertains also to the faculty that provides consciousness to animals.

The other text which presents the common sense as being capable of a middle level of self-reflexivity—the one that I already cited above—is explicitly related to the perception of the acts of the common sense. In the immediate context

²⁹ Note that in the last clause of the cited passage, Olivi emphasises that he is dealing with the external senses: “si potentiae *partialium sensuum* possunt aliquo modo sentire proprios actus” (emphasis mine).

³⁰ *De lib. arb.* 2.4.10. The editor of *II Sent.*, Bernardus Jansen, refers to Chapters 3 and 4. Also Chapters 5 and 6 are worth reading.

of this passage, Olivi is arguing that the common sense directly apprehends nothing but the acts and *aspectūs* of the external senses. Everything else is perceived through the acts of the senses. After presenting this view and tackling a possible counter-argument, Olivi continues and adds, rather surprisingly, that the common sense “reflexively turns towards its proper act sensibly and incompletely (*semiplene*). But in that case the act towards which it turns first has something else as its object.”³¹

This point is a strange addition, given that Olivi’s intention is simply to reject the idea that the common sense is able to apprehend something directly and by itself. The addition plays no argumentative role whatsoever, and this renders it even more valuable and interesting. It shows that Olivi endows the common sense with an ability to reflexively apprehend its own acts. He says here, as in other places, that the reflexivity of the common sense is not reflexivity in the full sense, and there is no doubt that he means to make a distinction between the genuine reflexivity of the intellect and the type of reflexivity which can be attributed to the common sense. But it is also evident that Olivi is not attributing only rudimentary reflexivity to the common sense. He is talking about the perception of the acts of the external senses, and they are perceived by the common sense as simple and spiritual psychological acts: the common sense brings about the consciousness of the contents of sensations and it could not do this unless it were capable of apprehending the spiritual acts. And he applies the same kind of perception to the acts of the common sense itself.

Interestingly, Olivi makes a reservation. The common sense is capable of apprehending its own act, but the act that is apprehended must have something else as its object. In other words, Olivi insists that the common sense must be actualised by a direct act which is intentionally directed at some external object (*via* the acts of the senses), and only this direct act can be perceived by a reflexive act of the common sense. It is not completely apparent what this reservation is meant for because Olivi (once again) does not elaborate upon the issue. However, if we compare this idea to Olivi’s conception of genuine intellectual reflexivity, we can come up with a plausible interpretation. As we have seen, the human mind can cognise itself without being actualised by any direct cognitive act. The mind is capable of directing its *aspectus* towards itself and forming an image of the mind. This apprehension is what Olivi denies from non-human animals. The common sense cannot reflexively apprehend itself unless it is actualised by a direct act, and therefore it cannot provide consciousness about itself as a cognitive faculty. It is only capable of apprehending the direct acts that are realised in it, and as such it provides consciousness about itself as perceiving, imagining, remembering, and

³¹ “[...] super suum actum proprium sensualiter et semiplene reflectitur. Sed tunc actus ille super quem reflectitur habuit primo aliquid aliud pro obiecto.” (*II Sent.* q. 62, 595.) John Duns Scotus allows the common sense to perceive its own acts, and he is more explicit than Olivi about the mechanism in which this happens: from the acts of the common sense a species flows to the external senses, and the common sense can perceive this species. Since the species carries some kind of information about the act that has produced it, the common sense perceives its own act. However, it does not do this perceiving reflexively. (Steneck 1970, 114–5.) Thus, Scotus’ view differs from Olivi’s.

so on. Moreover, the reservation seems to deny that the common sense can apprehend a reflexive act by which it apprehends a direct act because Olivi says that the act which the common sense is capable of apprehending must have *something else* as its object. This analysis shows that the common sense can produce a second-order cognition about a direct first-order act but not about any further higher order acts.

On the grounds of the foregoing discussion, I believe we can make the following conclusion: the common sense is capable of a reflexivity which allows it to apprehend the direct cognitive acts that take place in it and that are intentionally directed at external objects or memory species. Even though this ability does not equate with the direct self-consciousness Olivi attributes to the human mind, it suffices to render non-human animals conscious of their own cognitive acts and bestow them with experiential ownness. Animals experience not only the acts of their external senses as their own but also the acts produced by the common sense, that is, the acts of conscious perception, imagination, recollection, and so forth.

Despite my interpretation, the whole picture remains somewhat confusing. The passages which attribute to the common sense a middle level of reflexivity seem to contradict all the other passages in which Olivi clearly states that the sensitive faculties cannot turn reflexively towards themselves. Olivi probably never worked out a coherent view on this matter, and if this is the case, it requires daring interpretation to state any general claims about his thought. For one, I think that one should not underestimate the influence of the context in which Olivi presents the ideas that seem to contradict each other. The most restricted requirements for reflexivity come from those questions in which Olivi argues for his anthropological and voluntaristic views, that is, for the plurality of substantial forms and the absolute freedom of the will. It is not surprising that in these instances he formulates quite a clear distinction between the intellectual and the sensitive parts of the soul and states that the latter is utterly incapable of certain operations of the former. Then again, the passages in which Olivi seems to undermine a strict distinction come from the questions which deal with sensitive operations. The context influences the rigour of Olivi's declarations, and it seems that the ideas about the reflexivity of the common sense are afterthoughts which never develop into a full-blown theory.

There is, however, one possible line of thinking which may account for the apparent conflict between Olivi's statements. The problem lies, it seems to me, in Olivi's inability to make a clear distinction between two types of second-order apprehension of cognitive acts. On the one hand, experiential ownness requires that the acts that take place in one's mind (or in the common sense) are apprehended by a second-order act of cognition which somehow has the mind and the acts that take place in it as its objects. Olivi makes it apparent that this kind of reflexive second-order apprehension is automatic and does not require that the subject pay explicit attention to what is going on in her mind. On the other hand, it seems to me that we should distinguish this kind of reflexive activity from an explicit introspective apprehension of one's own cognitive acts. We are capable

of directing our attention to our own thoughts (or perceptions, or whatever mental activity we are currently having) in such a way that we take them as objects of contemplation, and Olivi thinks that we can do the same in relation to our minds. When we do so, we directly apprehend our own minds. This apprehension is what I call explicitly attending to our cognitive acts or to our mind: the acts and/or the mind are taken as objects of a higher-order cognitive act.

Olivi himself seems to accept this kind of distinction, even though he does not pay theoretical interest to it³². Yet when he refers to the direct self-consciousness that the human mind has of itself and the apprehension of the acts that take place in the mind, he does not make it apparent which one of these types of second-order apprehension he has in mind. This lack of clarity reflects, to be sure, the fact that he construes both in a similar manner from a structural point of view: the mind is intentionally directed towards itself, and it apprehends what takes place in it. This directedness accounts for experiential ownness, but it is also the way in which we explicitly attend to the acts of our mind.

Now, I am inclined to think that when Olivi states (in the passage cited above) that the common sense apprehends its own acts *sempiternè*, he means that it is incapable of producing a cognitive act that would bring about an explicit cognition of the direct act. According to this reading, non-human animals would be capable of apprehending their cognitive acts, as it were, automatically. They would experience the acts as belonging to them—as including the experiential ownness—but they could not pay attention to the acts themselves as cognitive acts. If we accept this interpretation, we can say that when Olivi denies the reflexivity of the sensitive faculties and sets intellectuality and freedom as prerequisites for reflexivity, he is in fact referring only to the higher types of reflexivity which allow intellectual and free creatures to apprehend their own minds and pay explicit attention to their own cognitive acts. This interpretation would leave room for a middle level of reflexivity which could be attributed to the common sense and to non-human animals.

Whether we accept this interpretation or not, it is evident that Olivi indicates no great disparity between human beings and non-human animals in terms of self-consciousness. Most of the time, the manner in which we are self-conscious is possible for non-human animals as well. The difference lies mainly in our ability to focus on ourselves and on our own minds as mental entities. As Olivi sees it, self-consciousness does not constitute the criterion of there being a clear-cut distinction between non-human animals and human beings. Animals are self-conscious much in the same way as human beings, and this principle applies not only to the contents of bodily self-consciousness but also to the contents of the consciousness that is attributable to all sensitive creatures.

³² For instance, on one occasion Olivi writes about things that belong to the intellect and states the following: "Sexto probatur hoc ex his quæ sunt communia omni intellectui [...] est etiam eis commune reflecti super se et super suos actus et eos reflexive apprehendere eosque sensibiliter experiri seu palpare." (*II Sent.* q. 55, 288.) There seems to be two kinds of apprehension of one's own mental acts: reflexively attending to the acts that take place in one's mind, and simply having the acts in one's mind which means nothing but that they are consciously experienced.

21 CONCLUSION

Medieval philosophers understood human beings as animals. In their view, a large portion of psychological capacities and activities are equally distributed among the animal kingdom. Of course, they also saw differences between human beings and non-human animals. Human beings are animals that may sometimes involve themselves in activities which are not possible for other animals: they can use universal concepts, intellectually understand the world they live in, and lead their lives with a kind of freedom that is supposed to be unattainable for other animals. Yet according to medieval views, these peculiarly human activities do not play as important a role in human life as one might think. The choices humans make are not necessarily free, and cognitive processes do not necessarily involve the use of the intellect. Most of the time, human beings live the lives of animals; the psychological processes behind their conduct is not radically different from those of other animals. The differences that medievals saw between human beings and other animals come in within a general framework of psychological continuity and similarity.

By looking at the history of philosophical psychology from the point of view of this alleged *similarity* between human and non-human animals, we get a better picture of past authors' conceptions of human beings as beings who occupy the highest peak of a continuum, which extends downward all the way to plants if not to inanimate nature. It is noteworthy that much of medieval philosophers' interest lies in the psychological functions that tie humans to this psychological continuum. This conception differs radically from the Early Modern idea of animals as automata—as machines that lack consciousness.

We have seen in the course of this study that Olivi adheres to the medieval conception of human beings as animals and that he does not deviate from the idea of a psychological continuity between human beings and other animals. Animals are conscious beings—and by conscious I mean that their cognitive activity is intentional, based on selective attention, accompanied by experiential ownness, and unity, and that they are also capable of reflexive self-relations to some extent. Moreover, the psychological processes that the sensitive soul provides for non-human animals are more or less identical to those that the sensitive part of

human beings provides for them. Although Olivi makes certain important moves and puts forth ideas which widen the conceptual disparity between human beings and non-human animals—such as his new voluntaristic conception of the freedom of the will, his view on the possibility of intellectual cognition of particular things, and his explicit commitment to the possibility that human perception differs from non-human animal perception (*II Sent.* q. 51 app., 157, 159–60)—he clearly favours the similarity between these two types of creatures when it comes to the cognitive activity that relates to the surrounding world. He is perhaps not particularly interested in animal psychology, but it is clear that he does not downgrade non-human animals in favour of human beings.

Olivi's conception of the similarity between human and non-human animals applies also to the way he accounts for consciousness. I began this study with some speculation about Olivi's place in the transition from medieval to Early Modern ways of conceiving of consciousness and the relation of consciousness to the body, and I think that now we are in a position to see more clearly what makes him an interesting thinker in this respect. According to the medieval approach, the soul has a structure: it contains various faculties which have certain kinds of relations to each other. Some of these faculties are realised in different parts of the body, as is, for instance, the faculty of sight in the eyes, the sense of touch in the flesh (according to Olivi, at least), and the common sense in the brain (and perhaps in the heart). This means that an act of the soul by which, say, a puncture in a hand or paw is felt takes place in the hand or paw; but at the same time it is already in the soul because the soul is present in the hand or paw. Moreover, as some medieval authors seem to think that acts of all the faculties of the soul provide the subject with consciousness about their objects, the act of the sense of touch is alone capable of making the subject conscious of the object of that act—in other words, the act of the sense of touch by which the puncture is felt makes the percipient aware of the harmful change in her hand or in its paw.

If we compare this to the Early Modern mechanistic picture, we see an interesting difference. When there is a puncture in the hand, information of this puncture is mechanically transmitted into the brain and only then does it enter the mind or the consciousness of the perceiving subject. If the connection between the hand and the brain is cut off for some reason, the subject remains unaware of the puncture. Consciousness requires that something takes place in the brain. One way of putting the difference is to say that in the Middle Ages the body is pregnant with consciousness, whereas in the Early Modern view the body is a mechanical device devoid of consciousness.

Olivi stands somewhere in between these two views. According to him the acts of the sensitive faculties of the soul are realised in bodily organs, but in addition to this he thinks that there is only one faculty of the soul that brings about consciousness, namely, the highest cognitive faculty of the soul. In order for the subject to become consciously aware of an object—say, a cat to consciously perceive a puncture in its paw—it is not enough that the sense of touch produces a sensation pertaining to the puncture. In addition to this, the highest cognitive

faculty of the subject, the common sense or the intellect, has to be involved in the process. Consciousness is centralised, as it were; it is a function of the highest cognitive faculty of the soul. The cat consciously perceives the puncture in its paw only when it directs its attention to the paw and to the puncture, and this is done by an intentional directing of its common sense and by an act thereof. Although Olivi does not deviate from the medieval understanding of the relation between the soul and the body, his way of locating consciousness in one of the faculties of the soul and thus, so to speak, “centralising consciousness” appears as an important move which resembles the Early Modern idea of the relation between the mind and the body.

One of the central claims of this study is that Olivi sees no difference between human and non-human animal consciousness in this respect. Even though Olivi is primarily interested in human beings and does not discuss non-human animal cognition as much as he discusses human cognition, the parallels between non-human animals and human beings are clear. This applies also to the way he accounts for conscious perception, other cognitive processes that are common to human beings and other animals, and also to the idea of centralised consciousness.

It is true that neither Olivi nor other medieval philosophers pay explicit attention to these issues. They do not employ concepts like “phenomenal consciousness” or “psychological continuity”. They do not explicitly discuss the idea that all the faculties of the soul bring about consciousness, and the questions concerning psychological continuity between human beings and non-human animals are more or less implicit in their discussions. My impression is that the former topic has not become an explicit topic of philosophical inquiry because it was considered so obvious—medievals in general thought that animals are conscious beings very much like us. The latter topic, on the other hand, might have been put forward and in some ways it was, especially when those psychological capacities which were attributed to the sensitive soul were under discussion. By a close reading we can see that both of these themes appear in various contexts—never in an explicit manner, but they appear nevertheless. Theories of perception, for instance, often contain many ideas about the alleged similarity between human and non-human animals, as well as about consciousness, attention, and their relation to the body, to the soul, and to the faculties of the soul. Also, discussions concerning the internal senses are valuable when we want to find out what medievals thought about psychological continuity—Olivi’s theorising about the internal senses especially opens up his understanding of consciousness as a function of one of the faculties of the soul. And if we want to see where (if anywhere) medievals really saw the line between animal consciousness and types of consciousness that can be attributed only to human beings, we have to turn to the discussions concerning self-consciousness or self-cognition; for the most fine-grained distinctions within various types of consciousness are made there.

In this study I deal with Olivi’s thought within all these contexts. First of all, his theory of perception, which is in itself innovative and original, shows that

Olivi does not see any radical discontinuity between human perception and non-human animal perception. As beings who acquire information from the external world, humans are similar to non-human animals. It is true that in Olivi's understanding the nature of the human soul differs greatly from the nature of the animal soul: the human soul is an independent spiritual substance that is united to the body only by its sensitive functions, whereas the animal soul is a hylomorphic form of the body. Moreover, as Olivi's conception of perceptual process is such that perception is first and foremost an act of the soul that is only secondarily realised in the body as a movement of the *spiritus animalis* in the organs of the senses and in the brain, one might think that perception would be different in the case of human beings from the case of non-human animals. But Olivi sees only minor differences between human and non-human animal perception. In both cases perception is an active and intentional process, in which the percipient pays attention and thus directs her (or its) intentional consciousness to the external world thereby becoming conscious of the things within her (or its) perceptual reach. Although from a metaphysical point of view there are certain differences, basically the psychological process is the same.

The similarity between human beings and other animals is even more apparent when it comes to the higher cognitive functions that the sensitive soul provides—imagining, recollecting, and perceiving external things as harmful or useful, and so forth. These post-sensory cognitive capacities of the soul account for animals' (human and non-human) ability to cognise their surroundings in such a way that they are capable of leading a successful life. Olivi does not make any categorical difference between human and non-human animals with respect to these psychological capacities. He admits a possibility of gradation because he thinks that different species of animals may be more or less sophisticated when it comes to these psychological processes, but this is only a matter of degree: there are no clear-cut disparities between different species. We all have the same basic cognitive powers, and any differences do not exist so much in between human and non-human animals but between very simple animals (such as worms) and higher animals (such as dogs and humans).

In fact, Olivi even attributes to non-human animals cognitive functions which were sometimes denied to them in medieval philosophical psychology. For instance, animals are—according to him—capable of one kind of creative imagination, and their reactions to external threats and benefits are not merely instinctual but oftentimes based on experience and learning. Moreover, Olivi argues for the unity of the internal senses—that is, he denies the existence of several post-sensory cognitive faculties of the sensitive soul and claims that there is only one, the common sense, which accounts for various psychological processes that human and non-human animals are capable of. This idea shows that Olivi understands the cognitive processes of non-human animals as similar to those of human beings: in both kinds of creatures there is a centre of the soul which accounts for phenomenal consciousness. It also explains the interconnection of various cognitive operations, such as the perception of an external object and the harmfulness thereof, and accounts for the experiential unity that exists

between various kinds of psychological processes: perception, imagining, and remembering appear as belonging to one and the same subject, and in the case of non-human animals Olivi appeals to the unifying role of the common sense in order to account for this.

The unity of the internal senses is very interesting also from the point of view of the unity of the “mind.” For Olivi, the mind is essentially one, indivisible, and capable of performing quite different kinds of psychological functions. In the Early Modern period, it was customary to accuse scholastic faculty psychology of fragmentating the mind into several faculties which are, in a way, *too* independent: their plurality jeopardises the psychological unity of the subject. By contrast to this kind of typical scholastic approach, Olivi argues for a unity of the “mind” already within non-human animals by claiming that they have only one faculty of the soul—the common sense—which accounts for different kinds of psychological acts and brings about consciousness of various things. Animal consciousness and animal minds are fundamentally indivisible despite of the differences in the cognitive processes they comprehend and bring about.

The alleged similarity between human beings and non-human animals is most striking in the context of self-cognition because the capability of self-cognition is often considered as one of most clear differences between these two kinds of creatures. Although Olivi attributes to the human mind a special kind of reflexivity and thus the capacity of being directly conscious of itself, there are many other types of self-consciousness that he attributes also to non-human animals. Even in self-cognition there is no clear-cut difference. First, all animals (including human beings) perceive their own bodies by the sense of touch, and Olivi’s discussion of this ability resembles the modern idea of proprioception. The sense of touch (together with the common sense) allows animals to be conscious of their own bodies as part of themselves, and this amounts to saying that they have bodily self-consciousness. Second, animals have a kind of self-image by which they are aware of the different parts of their bodies and the importance thereof to their well-being and survival. This point also calls for a kind of consciousness of themselves as living beings. In addition to these types of bodily self-consciousness, animals are conscious of themselves when they perceive external objects as being harmful or useful to them. Finally, animals are conscious to some extent of their consciousness as well. This idea is quite radical, since being conscious of one’s consciousness was commonly thought to require a kind of reflexivity that is not possible for corporeal beings. Only the incorporeal human mind was supposed to be capable of reflexively turning onto itself. However, Olivi attributes to the common sense a kind of reflexivity that allows it to bring about a second-order consciousness that pertains not only to the acts of the external senses—which amounts to second-order perception—but also to its own acts by which the animal is conscious of various things.

Thus, we have seen in the course of this study that the trend of seeing a strong psychological continuity between human and non-human animals exists in Olivi’s thought. From a metaphysical point of view human beings and non-human animals are very different kinds of beings, but from the point of view of

psychology the differences are small. Especially when we look at the cognitive side of psychological activity, the continuity is apparent; in order to find radical differences we must turn to those aspects of human existence which are related to freedom, moral responsibility, and the relation to God. Olivi believes that human beings are different from other animals not so much because they are capable of more complex cognitive relations with themselves and to the external world (although that holds true to some extent also) but mainly because humans are free agents, capable of directing their actions in light of morality, and capable of setting goals for themselves. The human will is a self-reflexive faculty which is able to freely move itself to will whatever it wills to will, and thus humans have the ability to decide what kind of life to pursue and what kind of things to value; but when pursuing the lives they have chosen, humans are practically like other animals.

The freedom of the will stands as the defining feature that sets human beings apart from other animals. On one occasion, Olivi says that if human beings did not have free decision (*liberum arbitrium*), they would be “nothing but intellectual beasts.”¹ They would lose none of their cognitive capacities—they would remain rational animals—but due to the loss of their freedom they would cease to be what they truly are: persons who are capable of directing their own lives by their own free decisions. Human beings would still stand above other animals because they would be intellectual, but that would not actually make much of a difference in Olivi’s eyes. In fact, he thinks that: “[...] if somebody were given an option to choose which of these he wants to be less namely, whether he wants to be reduced to an animal or to pure nothingness, everyone would want to be nothing [...]”² It is better to be nonexistent than to be an animal. Olivi’s approach is very important because it is a new opening in the history of human self-understanding: by emphasising the ability of an individual human being to lead a personal life in which she may pursue things she values by her will, it opens up the way for a radically individualist conception of human beings. As we all know, this trait has become central in humans’ self-image. But at the same time it is important to emphasise that Olivi was not a modern individualistic thinker. A human’s freedom is crucial to her happiness and life as a human person, but so is the freedom of other people: “[...] many think that they would want to cease from existing as much as they want to live here eternally without friendship (*amicabili societate*).”³ As true friendship is based on mutual love, and what is truly loved is the freedom of one’s friend, the freedom of others becomes as crucial to one’s own happiness as one’s own freedom (*II Sent.* q. 57, 319–20).

As Olivi construes the difference between human beings and other animals in terms of freedom, he does not have to emphasise the difference in any other

¹ “Nec mirum, quia, ut ita dicam, id quod proprie sumus, personalitatem scilicet nostram, a nobis tollit nihilque amplius nobis dat nisi quod simus quaedam bestiae intellectuales seu intellectum habentes.” (*II Sent.* q. 57, 338.)

² “Unde si cui daretur optio in quod minus vellet redigi, scilicet, in unum animal aut in purum nihil tantum: unusquisque vellet esse nihil [...]” (*II Sent.* q. 57, 334.)

³ “multis videtur quod tantum vellent non esse quam in eternum hic vivere sine omni amicabili societate.” (*Quaest. de nov.* q. 6, 133.)

way. There is no need for him to argue for the distinctiveness of human beings with respect to their cognitive capacities because animals lack the only capability that matters in the end: they are not free. This point, it seems to me, is the underlying reason Olivi elevates the psychological capacities of animals in many ways; and at the same time this is the point in which Olivi widens the disparity between human and non-human animals in a radical way. Humans are radically distinct from other animals due to their freedom, but at the same time they are very much alike in other respects. The reason Olivi downgrades human animality is not related to a psychological discontinuity between human and non-human animals. Continuity is clear, and the common psychological basis forms an important part of the mental lives of human beings. The *value* of human life lays in freedom, but if we are to understand human and non-human mental life properly, we must take into heed cognitive activity as well. And in order to understand humans' place in the world, it is necessary also to understand the manifold ways in which human beings are similar to non-human animals.

YHTEENVETO (FINNISH SUMMARY)

Keskiaikaisen maailmankuvan mukaan ihminen on yksi eläinlaji muiden joukossa. Suuri osa ihmisen psykologisista kyvyistä ja toiminnoista ei eroa oleellisella tavalla muiden kehittyneempien eläinten vastaavista kyvyistä. On totta, että keskiajalla ihmistä pidettiin monella tavalla erityislaatuisena eläinlajina, koska ihminen määriteltiin *rationaaliseksi* eläimeksi. Rationaalisuutensa ansiosta ihmiset kykenevät toimintoihin, jotka eivät ole muille eläinlajeille mahdollisia: käyttämään yleiskäsitteitä, ymmärtämään rationaalisesti itseään ja maailmaa jossa elävät, sekä valitsemaan tekonsa vapaasti ja olemaan siten moraalisia olentoja. Nämä ainoastaan ihmisille kuuluvat kyvyt eivät kuitenkaan keskiaikaisen maailmankuvan mukaan näyttele niin vahvaa roolia ihmisten tavallisessa elämässä kuin voisi olettaa. Ihmiset eivät yritä koko ajan ymmärtää tieteellisesti ympäröivää maailmaa eivätkä ihmisten teot aina pohjautu sellaiseen vapauteen, jota keskiaikaiset ajattelijat olisivat yksimielisesti pitäneet aitona tahdonvapautena. Hieman yleistäen voidaan sanoa, että suurimman osan ajasta ihmiset elävät eläimen elämää: he havainnoivat ympäristöään ja toimivat siinä halujensa ja tunteidensa mukaan. Keskiaikaisen käsityksen mukaan tämänkaltainen elämä perustuu psykologisille kyvyille, jotka eivät olennaisesti eroa eläinten vastaavista kyvyistä. Voidaankin sanoa, että keskiaikaisen ajattelutavan mukaan ihmisten ja muiden eläinten välillä vallitsee selkeä psykologinen jatkuvuus. Erot ihmisten ja eläinten välillä on upotettu yleiseen yhtenäisyyttä korostavaan viitekehykseen.

Käsillä oleva tutkielma tarkastelee keskiaikaista filosofista psykologiaa näkökulmasta, jossa ihmisten ja muiden eläinten samanlaisuutta ei pidetä toisarvoisena seikkana, vaan keskeisenä piirteenä. Tämä lähtökohta auttaa meitä ymmärtämään paremmin menneiden ajattelijoiden näkemystä ihmisistä olentoina, jotka ovat elollisen luonnon muodostaman jatkumon huipulla. Elollisen ja elottoman välillä on jyrkkä kuilu, mutta kaikki elolliset olennot – kasvit, eläimet ja ihmiset – ovat pohjimmiltaan toistensa kaltaisia olentoja. Elollisen luonnon perustavanlaatuisuudesta samankaltaisuutta ilmentää eurooppalaiseen ajatteluun 1200-luvulla juurrutettu Aristoteelinen näkemys, jonka mukaan kasvit, eläimet ja ihmiset ovat sielullisia olentoja, joiden sielut ovat pohjimmiltaan samankaltaisia. Tämän näkemyksen mukaan sieluja on kolmea eri tyyppiä: kasvisielu, eläin-sielu ja rationaalinen (ihmisen) sielu. Kaikki elolliset olennot ovat sielullisia, ja jokainen sielutyyppi sisältää alemman sielutyypin ominaisuudet. Kasvisielu mahdollistaa ravinnon hyväksi käyttämisen, kasvamisen ja lisääntymisen. Eläin-sielu mahdollistaa näiden toimintojen lisäksi ympäristön aistimisen, tunteet ja ympäristössä liikkumisen. Ihmissielu antaa edellisten lisäksi kyvyn abstraktiin ajatteluun. Vaikka eri sielutyyppit mahdollistavat erilaisia toimintoja, niiden yhteiset piirteet ja toiminnot ovat kuitenkin pohjimmiltaan samanlaisia. Eläimet havaitsevat ja tuntevat samalla tavalla kuin ihmiset, koska ihmissielun alemmat kyvyt ovat samanlaisia kuin eläin-sielun vastaavat kyvyt.

Työn aiheena on Petrus Ioannis Olivin käsitys niistä sielun kognitiivisista kyvyistä, jotka ovat keskiaikaisen ajattelutavan mukaan ihmisille ja muille eläimille yhteisiä. Olivi syntyi Sérignanissa, Languedocissa, vuonna 1247 tai 1248. Hän liittyi fransiskaanisääntökuntaan kaksitoistavuotiaana, ja sai sitä kautta jat-

ko-opintoihin tarvittavan tieteellisen, filosofisen ja teologisen peruskoulutuksen. Olivi lähetettiin opiskelemaan Pariisin yliopistoon (n. vuonna 1267) ja hän suoritti siellä teologian maisterin tutkintoon vaadittavat opinnot. Myöhemmällä urallaan Olivi toimi opettajana nykyisen Ranskan eteläosissa sekä Firenzessä. Olivi ajautui uransa aikana opillisiin ristiriitoihin oman järjestönsä kanssa. Hän onnistui puolustamaan itseään menestyksekkäästi, mutta pian hänen kuolemansa jälkeen – joka tapahtui vuonna 1298 – fransiskaanijärjestö kielsi hänen teostensa käyttämisen ja vaati niiden takavarikointia. Vaikka esimerkiksi Johannes Duns Scotus ja William Ockham omaksuivat monia Olivin ajatuksia, tieto Olivin merkityksestä jäi vähitellen pimentoon, ja hänet löydettiin uudelleen vasta 1900-luvun taitteessa. Vaikka Olivin ajattelua ei ole tutkittu siinä määrin kuin sen merkitys edellyttäisi eikä sitä tunneta vieläkään yleisesti, keskiaikaisen filosofian tutkijoiden piirissä Oliviä pidetään erittäin kiinnostavana, tärkeänä ja omaperäisenä ajattelijana, jonka jälkivaikutus on kauaskantoinen: hyvänä esimerkkinä tästä voidaan pitää hänen käsitystään tahdonvapaudesta, joka on radikaalilla tavalla uudenlainen ja joka vaikutti voimakkaasti voluntarismin syntyyn.

Olivin ajattelun omaperäisyys näkyy myös siinä millä tavalla hän ajattelee ihmisille ja muille eläimille yhteisten kognitiivisten kykyjen toimivan. Olivi lähestyy tätä aihetta keskiaikaisen kykypsykologian näkökulmasta. Kykypsykologiksi kutsutaan lähestymistapaa, jossa elollisten olentojen erilaisia psykologisia prosesseja analysoidaan ikään kuin ne koostuisivat suhteellisen itsenäisten, autonomisten ja toisistaan erillisten sielun kykyjen mahdollistamista funktioista. Tämä lähestymistapa mahdollisti monimutkaisten psykologisten prosessien pilkkomisen pienempiin osiin joiden olennaisia piirteitä ja keskinäisiä suhteita voitiin analysoida yksityiskohtaisesti. Yleisesti ajateltiin, että ihmisille ja muille eläimille yhteisiä eläinsielun (tai sensitiivisen sielun) kognitiivisia kykyjä on useita: viisi ulkoista aistia (näkö, kuulo, tunto, haju ja maku) ja vaihteleva määrä niin kutsuttuja sisäisiä aisteja (*sensus interiores*). Jälkimmäinen termi viittaa kognitiivisiin kykyihin, jotka mahdollistavat erilaiset psykologiset toiminnot, joita ei voi selittää pelkkien ulkoisten aistien toiminnalla. Tällaisia toimintoja ovat esimerkiksi kyky kuvitella asioita jotka eivät ole juuri sillä hetkellä havaittavissa, kyky muistella menneitä tapahtumia, sekä kyky havaita ympäristöään siten että pystyy reagoimaan itselle hyödyllisiin ja haitallisiin asioihin asianmukaisella tavalla. Olivi ajatteli – aivan kuten monet muutkin keskiaikaiset filosofit – että kaikki eläinlajit kykenevät ainakin jossain määrin tämänkaltaisiin psykologisiin toimintoihin.

Tutkielma jakautuu kolmeen osaan. Ensimmäinen osa käsittelee Olivin teoriaa aistihavainnoista, ja keskeisenä väitteenä on, että Olivi käsittää havaitsemisen intentionaalisen prosessina, jossa havaitsija kiinniittää aktiivisesti huomionsa ulkoiseen maailmaan ja tulee sitä kautta tietoiseksi niistä asioista joihin hänen huomionsa kohdistuu. Olivi kritisoi vallalla olleita havaintoteorioita, joiden mukaan havaitseminen on passiivinen prosessi, ja painotti mielen aktiivisuutta. Aktiivisuuden ja intentionaalisuuden nostaminen keskeisiksi piirteiksi ennakoikiinnostavalla tavalla eräitä moderneja havaintopsykologiaa koskevia filosofisia keskusteluja. Olivin havaintoteorian yksityiskohtainen analysointi tuo myös kiinnostavalla tavalla esille hänen filosofisen antropologiansa ytimessä olevan sielun ja ruumiin välillä vallitsevan dualismin. Mielen ja maailman välinen intentionaa-

linen suhde on sellainen, että vaikka ruumista tarvitaan havaitsemiseen – kukaan ei näe ilman silmiä –, ulkoisten kappaleiden havaitseminen on kuitenkin periaatteessa mahdollista ilman sitä. Vaikka Olivin havaintoteoriaa on tutkittu aikaisemminkin, käsillä oleva tutkielma tuottaa aikaisempaa yksityiskohtaisempaa tietoa ja avaa uusia näkökulmia Olivin ajatteluun.

Toisessa osassa tarkasteluun otetaan Olivin näkemys sisäisistä aisteista, joiden avulla oli tapana selittää erinäiset aistihavainnon ylittävät psykologiset prosessit. Monista aikalaisistaan poiketen Olivi ajatteli että sisäisiä aisteja ei ole monta vaan ainoastaan yksi, niin kutsuttu yleisaisti (*sensus communis*), jonka oli perinteisesti ajateltu vastaavan ainoastaan havaintokokemuksen yhtenäisyydestä ja toisen asteen havainnosta, joka mahdollistaa tietoisuuden omista havainnoista. Olivin mukaan kaikki muut sisäiset aistit – *imaginativa*, *memoria*, *æstimativa* ja *cogitativa* – ovat vain yleisaistin erilaisia funktioita. Olivi esittää yksityiskohtaisen analyysin näistä funktioista ja pyrkii osoittamaan, että ne edellyttävät yleisaistin toimintaa ja että niitä on mahdotonta ymmärtää ilman sitä. Yleisaisti toimii ikään kuin eläinsielun kokoavana keskuksena, jossa ulkoisten aistien tuottama informaatio yhdistyy monimutkaisempien funktioiden tuottamaan informaatioon ja mahdollistaa siten erilaiset monimutkaiset psykologiset prosessit. Koska yleisaistin on kyettävä käsittämään kaikki tämä informaatio, ei muita erillisiä kykyjä tarvita. Olivi myös painottaa kokemuksellista ykseyttä erilaisten psykologisten toimintojen välillä ja pyrkii tällä tavoin tukemaan omaa näkemystään vetoamalla inhimilliseen kokemukseen.

Kolmannen osan aiheena ovat itsetietoisuuden eri muodot siltä osin kuin ne ovat yhteisiä ihmisille ja muille eläimille. Kykyä itsetietoisuuteen on toisinaan pidetty ihmisten erityispiirteenä, mutta Olivi ajattelee että myös eläimet ovat tietoisia itsestään. Eläimet eivät kykene refleksiiviseen itsetietoisuuteen, jossa mieli tulee tietoiseksi itsestään tietoisena mielenä, mutta eläimilläkin on ruumiillista itsetietoisuutta sekä käsitys eri ruumiinosien sijainneista, funktioista ja tärkeydestä. Tämän lisäksi Olivi vaikuttaa ajattelevan että eläimet kykenevät toisen asteen tietoisuuteen omista tietoisuudentiloistaan, sillä ainoastaan tämänkaltainen toisen asteen tietoisuus mahdollistaa kokemuksellisen omuuden joka liittyy kaikkiin psykologisiin toimintoihin.

Tutkimuksen keskeinen väite on että Olivi pitää eläimiä tietoisina olentoina. Vaikka Olivi ei käytäkään tietoisuuden käsitettä siinä mielessä kuin sitä nykyfilosofiassa käytetään, on tärkeä huomata että hän käsittelee monia ilmiöitä, joita pidetään nykyään tietoisuuden osatekijöinä. Intentionaalisuus, fenomenalisuus, refleksiivisyys, omuuden kokemus ja huomion kiinnittämisen merkitys havaintoprosessissa ovat Olivin filosofista psykologiaa käsittelevien kirjoitusten keskeisiä aiheita. Tarkastelemalla historian saatossa käytyjä filosofisia keskusteluja näistä tietoisuutta konstituovista piirteistä voimme huomata, että vaikka tietoisuus (edellä mainitut osatekijät kattavana ilmiönä) ei ole välttämättä kaikkina aikoina ollut filosofisen analyysin kohteena, monista tietoisuuteen liittyvistä ilmiöistä on käyty syvällistä filosofista keskustelua jo ennen modernia aikaa. Olivi pitää eläimiä tietoisina olentoina siinä mielessä, että hän ajattelee edellä mainittujen tie-

toisuuden piirteiden kuuluvan kaikille sellaisille elollisille olennoille, jotka kykenevät havaitsemaan ympäristöään.

Käsillä oleva työ kuuluu filosofian historian alaan ja on pohjimmiltaan filosofinen. Se tähtää enemmän filosofiseen ymmärtämiseen kuin aatehistorialliseen tarkasteluun. Toisaalta on muistettava, että filosofian historian saralla filosofinen terävyys ja historiallinen tarkkuus ovat toistensa edellytyksiä. Tässä tutkimuksessa pyritäänkin ymmärtämään Olivin filosofisia kantoja siten, että historiallisen kontekstin ymmärtäminen on osa filosofista ymmärtämistä ja sen apuväline. Tämä edellyttää paitsi alkukielisten lähteiden käyttöä, myös metodologista asetelmaa, jossa filosofinen käsiteanalyysi ja historiatieteen menetöt tukevat toisiaan. Lähteinä tutkimuksessa on käytetty moderneja editioita Olivin keskeisistä filosofisista teoksista. Tärkeimpinä niistä voidaan mainita *Summa quæstionum super Sententias* ja *Quodlibeta quinque*, sekä muutamat kirjoitukset joissa Olivi polustaa itseään häntä vastaan esitettyjä syytteiden edessä.

Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan keskiaikaisen filosofisen psykologian piirteitä, joita ei ole tähän asti riittävästi tutkittu, ja siten työ tuottaa uutta tietoa keskiaikaisesta filosofisesta psykologiasta. Tärkeimpinä tuloksina voidaan mainita lisääntynyt tieto Olivin käsityksistä, jotka koskevat intentionaalista tietoisuutta, mielen ja ruumiin suhdetta, sekä ihmisille ja eläimille yhteisiä psykologisia prosesseja. Vaikka Olivi erottaa monella tapaa ihmiset muista eläimistä, hän kuitenkin hyväksyy keskiaikaisen käsityksen, jonka mukaan ihmiset kuuluvat samaan jatkumoon muiden eläinten kanssa.

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