Jyrki Ruohomäki

"Could Do Better"

Academic Interventions in Northern Ireland Unionism

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Cover photo: Unionist mass demonstration against the Anglo-Irish Agreement 23.11.1985.
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ABSTRACT

This thesis starts with the problem of the role of the academics, scholars and intellectuals in Northern Ireland: What is the role of an academic, as a representative of a non-partisan or politically non-committed science in Northern Ireland, in which the political division between the mutually hostile political ideas of Ulster unionism and Northern Ireland nationalism literally penetrate almost all areas and discussions in the society? My thesis is that this political separation into two main agendas also must be reflected in the study of the Northern Ireland conflict, and secondly that the scholars themselves must also have a political aspect present in their activities as scientists. The analysis is limited to the role of the scholars and intellectuals in Northern Ireland unionism, and the same phenomena in reference to Irish nationalism is only briefly touched. By science this study refers namely to social and humanist sciences.

As a theoretical framework I use predominately Max Weber and his ideas of the differences and similarities that science and politics and a scientist and a politician have. Weber is also read through the interpretations presented particularly by Kari Palonen. I will also link this study to a wider debate on intellectuals. The primary material that has been analysed consists of texts produced by scholars and intellectuals, such as textbooks and articles, but also a more combatant, as politically more committed material by the same people, such as manifestoes and other non-academic writings. The method of the study is textual analysis, manifested in the application of a reading strategy which searches for the political in a text that is often written as apolitical.

The time frame of the study goes from the early 1970's and the start of the Northern Ireland "troubles" to the Belfast Agreement of 1998. The main interest is, however, concentrated on the 1985-1998 era.

Keywords: Ulster unionism, Northern Ireland, politics of science, conflict studies

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIA   Anglo-Irish Agreement. An agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland governments signed 15th November 1985.

BICO   British Irish Communist Organisation. A political group in the 1970's based on accommodating the ideas of Marxism and Northern Ireland unionism.

CEC   Campaign for Equal Citizenship. A political campaign led by the Belfast barrister Robert McCartney from the mid 1980's to the early 1990's.

DSD   Downing Street Declaration. See JDP.

DUP   Democratic Unionist Party. Historically, and during the timeframe of this study, the smaller one of the two main unionist parties. The DUP is known of its religious bias in comparison to the other main unionist party, the UUP. The DUP was led by its founding member Dr. Ian Paisley 1971-2008 and currently by Peter Robinson.

GFA   Good Friday Agreement (officially known as the Belfast Agreement). An Agreement reached between the majority of the political parties in Northern Ireland 10th April 1998 to set up a devolution on a power sharing basis. Ended the era of the Northern Ireland governance through the Anglo-Irish Agreement institutions.

IGC   Intergovernmental Conference. A political institution set up in the Anglo-Irish Agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland governments to deal with political, security and legal matters and promote cross-border co-operation. Fiercely criticized by the unionists as an embryo for joint authority over Northern Ireland by the two governments.

INLA   Irish Nationalist Liberation Army. A Marxist Republican paramilitary group.

(P)IRA (Provisional) Irish Republican Army. An armed wing of the Republican movement.

JDP   Joint Declaration on Peace (aka the Downing Street Declaration). Presented by the British and Irish governments on 15th December 1993 to give a blueprint of the contents of the future peace settlement in Northern Ireland.

NIFR   Northern Ireland Forum Report. The declaration of the "pan nationalist" Northern Ireland forum in 1984 in which all nationalist parties "rejecting violence" (this wording excluded Sinn Féin) took part.

SDLP   Social Democratic and Labour Party. The constitutional and a more moderate, nationalist party in Northern Ireland. Led by its founding member John Hume 1979-2001 and currently by Mark Durkan.

SF   Sinn Féin (ourselves alone). The Republican political party, with the political goal of a united Ireland. Commonly understood as the political wing of the IRA. Led by Gerry Adams from 1983.

UDA   Ulster Defence Association. A loyalist (refers commonly to the militant unionism) paramilitary group, founded in 1971. Sometimes uses the name Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) as its *nom de guerre*.

UFF   Ulster Freedom Fighters. See UDA.

UKUP   United Kingdom Unionist Party. A relatively small "right wing" unionist party founded in 1995 and led by Robert McCartney.

UPRG   Ulster Political Research Group. A think tank of the paramilitary UDA.

UUC   Ulster Unionist Council. Political organisation formed in 1905 to fight against the Irish Home rule. Nowadays known as the highest party organ of the Ulster Unionist Party.

UUP   Ulster Unionist Party. Sometimes referred also as the Official Unionist Party (OUP). The UUP is commonly understood as the more moderate and the more secular of the two main unionist parties, and during the timeframe of this study it was the largest party in Northern Ireland. Led by James Molyneaux 1979-1995, by David Trimble 1995-2005 and since 2005 by Sir Reg Empey.

UVF   Ulster Volunteer Force. A loyalist paramilitary group, with historical roots going to the Ulster Volunteers founded in 1912 to mound an armed struggle against the Irish Home Rule.

QUB   Queen's University, Belfast.

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1   INTRODUCTION

1.1   Foreword: An intimate stranger

The fundamental starting point of a study, somewhat simplified, occurs when a scholar discovers a problem, or an anomaly which seems to be in conflict with the previously held information about the nature of the world. The scholar then proceeds to gather more information of the phenomena, and reflects this information to the theories that are applicable. The starting point of this study, the moment when I made an observation which seemed to be in conflict with my previously held information, or at least seemed so interesting that it forced me to learn more about it, can be traced some years back to the time I was spending my Erasmus year (2001) as an undergraduate in Queen's University of Belfast and to the observations I made there of the relations of science and politics in respect to the Northern Ireland conflict.

As an undergraduate visiting Northern Ireland, what struck me most about the scientific material produced on the Northern Ireland conflict, was the vastness of different explanations and viewpoints of an issue I had thought to be very simple and straightforward. In addition, it was very exiting to see that in Northern Ireland, ideas and concepts taken from the field of political science had a different, and a more visible role to play in everyday politics. Theories of consociational[1] democracy, for example, developed by Dutch scholar Arendt Lijphardt, were not only used by students of political science, but were on the everyday agenda of daily newspapers, when the political institutions of the post-Belfast Agreement era were set up. When I continued my exploration, the question of whether political science was something that could be used as material for building political arguments also in everyday politics soon arose.

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[1]   Consociationalism is a term brought into the lexicon of divided societies by Arend Lijphardt. Consociationalism means institutionall power sharing in a single state divided between segments of society defined by ethnicity, religion and/or language.Examples include Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland. (Reynolds, 1999, 617)

Obviously this was happening all the time, not something unique for Northern Ireland, but still the phenomena was something which struck me as highly interesting. Had the Northern Ireland conflict penetrated the cadres of science, so that people from the science community were using their expertise as scholars to contribute to this conflict, not simply as outside observers and advisors, but as active agents who had positioned themselves on the nationalist/unionist dichotomy? That is, had they committed themselves to a certain standpoint, or to a certain normative doctrine that was political in a sense of daily politics. And if so, what did this mean to the idea of a scholar, a concept that seemed loaded with the notion of objectivity and detachment? From that revealing moment on the process towards this study began, and I am pleased to have found a niche in this multitude of explanations, not yet so well studied. In addition, I feel that taking up this study has also given me the opportunity to shed light on questions that are overlooked, and through this I believe I can make a genuine contribution to the study of the Northern Ireland conflict.

This provokes the question of my own position. As it seems that it is impossible to be a commentator of the Northern Ireland conflict from a perspective of an outside observer, where does this put me? Is this study a part of the same genre of politicking scholars of which I am studying? Not quite. I see my role as a well informed- or "an intimate stranger" who is, through this study, engaging in a conversation with at least two types of audience. First of all my study has the particular audience of the Northern Ireland scholars, to whom I wish to put forward the ideas of this study. Because I wish to take part in this specific discussion of Northern Ireland politics, a reader who is not an expert of this context may find some parts of this study difficult, as they delve into the specific jargon of Northern Ireland politics and studies. Another question is whether I can claim such a role and be taken seriously as an expert of Northern Ireland politics. For this question the answer obviously lies in the quality of this work.

The second, but not secondary, audience of this study is a more general one. As I am about to start answering to the question of how scholars are active in politics in the specific context of Northern Ireland, it is clear to me, that this study also has the potential to interest readers who are not so interested in or familiar with the Northern Ireland conflict. Indeed my own position as a scholar is a dual one. On the one hand I claim to have the closeness, or intimacy of the subject I am approaching, but on the other hand I cannot escape the fact that I am a native Finnish scholar working on a thesis on Northern Ireland written in a non-native language. I have the distance to the subject not necessarily all Northern Ireland scholars have, which has its obvious advantages and disadvantages. The *Verfremdungseffekt* is more natural to me as a scholar, than to someone who has lived in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict, because for me separateness from Northern Ireland is something I cannot escape from. I am fully aware that with these maxims I also link with a certain University of Jyväskylä genre of political science, with its tradition of

offering an outside, but well informed, look to a specific foreign context in effort of saying something of value and originality[2].

The metaphor of an intimate stranger is a classical setting of anthropology, described in more detail in such classical accounts as those of Hortense Powdermaker's *Stranger and Friend* (1966) and more recently in George E. Marcus's article "Intimate Strangers" (Marcus 2002). In the latter case the intimate stranger metaphor is explicitly in reference to academic sub-cultures and the relationship, or lack of a relationship, between the natural and human sciences. Of course also others than anthropologists have paid attention to the problems of distance and objectivity that the metaphor expresses. For example Dominic LaCapra in *History in Transit* (2004) argued for a view that stresses the contemplation of the scholars own history and premises; the "baggage and purposes" as Norman Porter (Porter 1996, 1-21) calls them in one of the key works to be analysed in this study.

However, it is my opinion that it would be impossible for an author to completely declare all commitments and subject positions and I would not want that to become a norm in social sciences. Some reflections can do no harm, but as some of the commitments are surely unconscious even to the author, I do not think that this kind of declaration could ever be exhaustively done. Attempts for such might just raise the suspicions of a reader. Although this work is definitely not an example of "anthoropoligized" political science or even close to being a multi-disciplinary work, it is still good to acknowledge that the metaphor I use as well as the setting of myself as an intimate stranger requires perhaps some personal reflections. These are far from the level of a classical anthropologist, present in *Stranger and Friend* in which Powdermaker provides a detailed description of her background as well as personal thoughts, with some information given of her mentors as well (namely of Bronislaw Malinowski). Still, I think that some personal reflections are beneficial in this work, at least in a sense that LaCapra means when he speaks of the importance of being aware of the unescapable personal projections that the author of a study brings to it (LaCapra 2004, 71).

I was uneducated about the Northern Ireland conflict when I started my six months as an Erasmus student at Queen's University Belfast in the spring of 2001. I had always wanted to spend some time abroad during my studies and I chose Belfast, mostly because of the exotic echo that the city gave. I was eager to learn about the Northern Ireland conflict, which at that point I still considered to be quite straight forward. When I continued my studies, I discovered the nuanced complexities of Northern Ireland behind the first hand impressions, and soon I became very interested in the conflict, particularly from

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[2]   See for example Korhonen 1992, Nyyssönen 1999; Pulkkinen 2003; Vaarakallio 2004; Kauppinen 2006. The most impressive Finnish effort of studying something as a "familiar foreign country" has been the Finnish conceptual history of political concepts *Käsitteet Liikkeessä* in which the authors took it as their premise to look at Finland and the Finnish concepts as a foreign country, although the writers were all Finnish natives.

the perspective that political science offered to it. This was partly due to the education I received at Queen's but also a result of the informal and social gatherings with the university students and other inhabitants of the city, who sometimes presented more stark perspectives than the academic world provided me. After my Erasmus months were over I stayed in Belfast over the summer working as an intern in an independent think thank *Democratic Dialogue* writing an analysis of the 2001 Westminster elections from the perspective of Northern Ireland politics. The people at the Democratic Dialogue probably expected a more traditional election analysis with facts and figures, but as I was given free hands I wrote my work from the perspective of the difference between the election rhetoric of the Northern Ireland parties. Although it was not articulated in the paper, this was definitely my first exercise as an "intimate stranger". My work was subsequently published by the Democratic Dialogue (Ruohomäki 2001) and its difference in terms of perspective was noted with acceptance.

After my return to Finland I quickly graduated with an MA thesis about a Russian poet Vladimir Majakovsky. Right after my graduation I had no plans of continuing my studies, but after working some time outside the university I felt the interest to come back, and after managing to secure funding I started this work in 2004. Since then this work has given me the opportunity to visit Northern Ireland numerous times, but my visits have had the perspective of a scholar writing a PhD thesis about a particular question in Northern Ireland politics and my position there has obviously been different. I have taken part in few undergraduate conferences in Northern Ireland, first in June 2004 and also to the Irish Political Studies Associations (IPSA) general conference in 2005. The key visit providing the backbone of this work was during the fall of 2005 when I spent a semester as a visiting scholar at Queen's University's school of politics. During that time I talked with most of the academics mentioned in this work, including professors Arthur Aughey, Richard English Henry Patterson and Graham Walker. They all read my research plan and commented on the original draft introduction of this work. These discussions provided essential background information, although I have not used the interviews in this work.

After that time I have had reasonably little interaction with the Northern Irish academics, apart of some personal relationships. This has been partly because the nature of my work is such that I have considered it necessary to keep some distance, particularly to people whose works I analyse specifically. During my scholarly visits to Queen's I have made some personal relationships with the other scholars at the school of politics with whom I have obviously had also discussions considering this thesis. Nevertheless, I have not come near the type of "conscious tensions" that Powdermaker is describing that would have forced me to face the anthropologist's choice of either getting involved or standing aside and observing (Powdermaker 1966, 188-189).

I believe that I have been able to keep the position of an informed outsider while the interactions with the culture and people of Northern Ireland have increased. Obviously as this work is dealing with the arguments made for the

sake of keeping the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland this is the side of the story with which I have become most accustomed to. I would not agree that this has made me a protagonist of the unionist cause, or that this work would be an act of unionist minded politicking, or that it would be about disproving the unionist arguments either. I believe that I have not, even unconsciously, committed myself and this study to any such normative doctrine that would have a role in Northern Ireland politics. Still, at the same it is as impossible for this work to escape its political aspect, as is the case with any other work. An intimate stranger is a metaphor which does not only liberate but also limits. Therefore it is important to be aware that these limitations do exist as every study benefits when one's own subject positions are out in the open.

Obviously my relationship to Northern Ireland is not the only such subject position. I must also acknowledge that the perspectives and limitations are set for this work by the specific way of doing political science to which I have committed myself. The choices made are conscious choices, through which I commit myself to a particular method that inevitably steers the course of this work. This is obviously a matter which relates to all studies in terms of the perspectivist choices the scholar makes through the selection of research questions, material and the methods of study.

In the end, after being aware of my position, as well as the limitations and benefits that come with, I believe that through self reflection, I can take advantage of my position and use the closeness-distance dichotomy that my persona has in relation to the subject of this study. Being conscious of my natural abilities and disabilities gives me a certain advantage to a scholar who is engaging in a study from a more strictly Northern Irish politics point of view, or to a scholar who is approaching the question of scholars in politics from a more theoretical perspective. I believe that through my identity as an "intimate stranger" I can present a study which is interesting from the point of view of both of my audiences.

This position of a person discovering that being a stranger gives one the opportunity to experience oneself and ones existence more powerfully, yet sustaining the analytical ability in respect to ones surroundings is beautifully captured by Philip Larkin (Larkin 2003) in his poem *The Importance of Elsewhere.* I also recognize the same sentiments Larkin expressed towards Ireland and separateness presented in his poem. Like Larkin I feel that while I undoubtedly am separate in relation to Northern Ireland, I am nevertheless not unworkable, but able to say something with value.

> Lonely in Ireland, since it was not home,
> Strangeness made sense. The salt rebuff of speech,
> Insisting so on difference, made me welcome:
> Once that was recognised, we were in touch
>
> The draughty streets, end-on to hills, the faint
> Archaic smell of dockland, like a stable,
> The herring-hawker's cry, dwindling went
> To prove me separate, not unworkable.

> Living in England has no such excuse:
> These are my customs and establishments
> It would be much more serious to refuse.
> Here no elsewhere underwrites my existence.

1.2 Research objectives and some theoretical considerations

1.2.1 Objectives

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine interventions by scholars who have in some way committed themselves to the political doctrine of Northern Ireland unionism or are, more generally, sympathetic to the unionist cause. This is what I mean by "academic unionist politicking". The time frame of the study is roughly from 1971 to 1998. I say roughly, because I reserve the option of stepping out this timeframe, as it suits the purposes of this thesis. The time span is selected to cover the latest phase of "the Troubles[3]" as far as it coincides with the phenomena of unionist academic politicking, which I am looking at. There are some reasons to why I will stop roughly at 1998. First of all it limits the time scale to follow neatly the most important political process in Northern Ireland in the 1990's, the peace process culminating in the Belfast Agreement of 1998. As the intellectual politicking, the speech acts, which I am studying, are in many cases directly attached to that process, either commenting on it, challenging it, or even invalidating it, the process itself offers a natural and functional reference point. However, this is not the only reason for limiting the time frame. I discovered during the process of this study that unionist academic interventions had a golden age, and the character of the phenomena is in some sense deflating. The number of interventions exploded after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, and they peaked somewhat between 1989 and 1995. This touches on both the quantity and quality of these interventions. This does not mean that they have altogether stopped, or that they are a bygone phenomena, absent at present. However, the arguments in the core of this phenomenon were relatively public by the signing of the Belfast Agreement, and in many cases already before. Certainly since then, these arguments have frequently been restated either in their original form, or with some updating. This of course does not take away the fact that they are still scholarly interventions to ongoing debates, but it would make little sense to carry out this thesis *ad infinitum* with describing the argument in slightly different contexts set apart by the chronological passing of time.

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[3]   "The Toubles" is a term used to describe the latest phase the Northern Ireland political violence starting from the late 1960's. It coincides for example with the campaign of the Provincial IRA 1969-1997 as well as with the subsequent activities of the loyalist paramilitaries advocating the status of Northern Ireland as a part of the UK. Also late in 1969 the British army was deployed to Northern Ireland, and therefore was one participant of the troubles.

It is best to use the Aristotelian division of speech into three different aspects to describe my intentions, and what I am specifically looking at. According to Aristotle an argument consists of ethos, pathos and logos, out of which ethos describes aspects of the argument that make it trustworthy and reliable. The character of the speaker, being an expert on the matter under consideraton, or a known philosopher is one part of the ethos. Pathos is an aspect of the argument that raises the listeners interest by various means such as appealing to them emotionally, while logos is the subject matter of the argument. According to Aristotle, a good speech is delivered when the speaker is by character someone who can be trusted, and who is considered immaculate (ethos), who can inspire their audiences' emotions in the direction the speaker wants (pathos) and who is also able to present grounds and evidence to back his view (logos). When all three of these aspects are in place in the argument the person speaking has the best possibility to convince his audience to take the action desired by the speaker. From this composition the interest of this study falls primarily to the ethos, that is the character of the speaker and how this character is been presented in the argument and how it is used to increase the power of the argument. Nevertheless, as ethos pathos and logos are all present in an argument, concentration on the nature of the ethos does not take away from the importance of pathos and logos. For instance academic ethos can be considered to carry presumptions of cool and controlled pathos and a specific kind of logos.

According to Aristotle, we are more inclined to believe people who are decent in all things, but especially so when the things at hand are such that they can be argued and disagreed about (Rhetoric I 2, 1356a 5-15). So, Aristotle does not see the character of a person speaking as irrelevant and indifferent to the speech he was delivering. Contrary it is essential *who* is speaking. Hannah Arendt also stresses this, as she argues that: "In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world…" (Arendt 1958, 179). The speech conveys the distinct nature of the speaker to the audience, as without the disclosure of the agent in the act (of speech) the speech looses its nature as action, which, Arendt argues, happens when human togetherness is lost, making speech "mere talk[4]" (Arendt 1958, 180).

From this it is easy to make a link between the figure of a scholar and the importance of the ethos of the speaker. A scholar is by definition a person who is considered to be trustworthy and speaking from a detached position. At least this is an implication easy to make. This is where I am concentrating. I am looking at texts composed by people who are considered, or who consider themselves to be, trustworthy and decent of character and who apply this

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[4] Human togetherness is lost, according to Arendt, in modern warfare, or more generally "when people are only for or against other people". In these circumstances speech is only used as a means to achieve a certain objective, and not as action, in a sense that Arendt understands action, as something requiring the character of unexpectedness. (Arendt 1958, 175-181)

position in their argument. So, it is primarily this aspect, the character, or ethos, of the speaker, which will classify any certain text as a material for this study. The character of the person has to be academic, or a scholar both very widely interpreted, or that one is taking part in the discussions from the position of an expert. This does not, however, mean that this thesis is about checking and correcting the statements made by the authors that I introduce. That would be beside the point.

1.2.2 Demarcation between science and politics

It is sometimes assumed that the role of the scholar is to find the "truth" of the matter and not to make specific political suggestions of his own. But, at least in the case of social scientists, if it is so that the political life surrounding the scholar inevitably directs the questions and problems that occupy her does not this already mean that the outcome of this thinking process is an intervention not only in terms of science but also in terms of daily politics? In the case of Northern Ireland it would be, in my mind, bold to assume that a political scientist working in that context, with the themes present during the conflict, could distance oneself so that the happenings of the political life would have no impact on her work at all. In addition, I would argue that it would be equally bold to think that political science dealing with Northern Ireland would not be political by nature. Most people, I believe, would agree with the first but perhaps not with the second statement. However, that is my thesis. The political science of Northern Ireland is not only political science but also a form of political speech with the same tendency toward political impact as any political speech. And to make clear: I argue that this goes with the rest of the world too. To some extent non-partisan political science is impossible in Northern Ireland and it is surprising that this fact has not been more widely discussed, since surely acknowledging this would also help to steer the attitude towards the conflict more realistically and analytically.

I believe that this thesis is beneficial for shedding light on the Northern Ireland conflict from a new perspective, as I argue that this thesis can reveal aspects of science and politics and also of the role of the scholars in a more general way. Northern Ireland offers a good place to examine the relationships of a scholar and politics and science and politics, offering a hard empirical backbone that makes the argument of this study more convincing than mere theorizations on the subject. Nor does the empirical nature take away the possibility of generalisations, although the possibility of generalisations as such is not a necessary prerequisite in determining the value of this work. At this point I also want to make clear that, if not stated otherwise, I will use the term *science* to refer predominately to *social science*, or more explicitly to

Geisteswissenschaft[5], even in my general references in respect to the relations of science and politics.

The use of science as an authority to pursue any particular goal should be faced with the same criticism that can be expected towards any kind of authority worship. It goes without saying, that when we apply the historical perspective to almost any strand of science we can observe that doctrines and paradigms that were considered solid or even "truth" are being, sometimes completely, reversed through time. Nevertheless it is not uncommon to find statements from scholars who declare that the purpose of science is to seek the "truth". Sometimes these people compose the "truth party" in intra science contestations. Kari Palonen has argued that what is meant by science should be understood differently from the declarations of the "science believers" and should be considered from a perspective which acknowledges science as one type of playing field in which contestations are being made, upheld and provoked, and where no-one can have any prior knowledge of the rules or the goals of the game. This "perspectivist" view of science strongly acknowledges that science and politics are not separate, but intermingled. In relation to science as a religion of the "truth party" of "science believers" one should consider oneself as an "atheist" with an understanding of the rhetorical nature of the jargon of science believers. (Palonen 2002, 66-67)

What does this mean in terms of an individual scholar? It means that instead of seeing oneself as a completely "detached" scholar we should see her as a scholar/politician. This does, however, not mean that we should put any moral judgement upon that scholar. On the contrary, by placing the assumptions of the scholar standing outside politics we can liberate the scholar to political action that is natural for her without the fear of moral judgement. Obviously, the nature of a scholar as a scholar/politician does not mean that her work as a scholar would be any less distinguished. It still falls under the same scientific scrutiny as always.

This does not, however, mean that science and politics are the one and the same. There is still a distinction to be made between science and politics, a distinction through which science can be considered as "imperfect" politics. This is shown also in Max Weber's separation between *Wertfreiheit-* and *Wertbeziehung* (Weber 1917). This division for Weber is not related to the distinction between a scholar and a politician, but this distinction will also be illustrated through *Wertfreiheit/Wertbeziehung*. Both the scholar and a politician share *Wertbeziehung* is a sense of a normative commitment, but for a scholar this means rather the way a scholar reflects something as interesting and worthwhile to study. *Wertfreiheit* on the other hand refers to the idea that the scholar is non-committed in respect to what should be done in regards to the conclusions that she makes in her study. The starting points of a scientific study are already set by *Wertbeziehung*, as the perspectives of the study are

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[5]   "Geisteswissenschaft" is more accurate than "human sciences" since the German term excludes disciplines such as sport physiology , and includes disciplines such as history or other humanist sciences.

selected, and only the conclusions left open. In other words, the scholar engaged in a study limits her options voluntarily in a way strange to a politician, who is tied by the context in which she is operating. The realities of the actual political situation are not, however, limiting the options of the scholar who can radically disengage herself from them. The scholar can freely speculate with different options without committing to any, and is indeed veering away from such an act, while a politician must operate with a limited set of options and must routinely commit themself to them. A practical example of this type of commitment can be a membership of a political party. Whereas the scholar does not have to mind the limitations set by the party membership, the politician has to take them into account in her activity, to be attached so to speak. In this respect *Wertfreiheit* can be understood as the scholar's detached nature in relation to the committed politician. However, for Weber, value relation (*Wertbeziehung)* is primarily a reference to the way in which the scholar, through selection of perspective, methods, material, and so forth, is in many ways committed in analysis of society, or whatever is being studied, to a certain conclusion already at the start of the study (Weber 1904, 170). This does not, however, take away the contingency or the possibility for the politician to choose how to act or the scholar to carry out a study as she wishes (*Wertfreiheit*). *Werbeziehung*, however, already makes objective science impossible in the sense that objective science would be completely free of perspectives. To choose a subject that one finds interesting is already a perspectivist choice. The scholar, however, cannot say what *should* be done as this would mean patronizing some political agents and take us back to the "science as a religion" thinking. The political agent is always autonomous in reference to the scholar. So, no matter what kind of formulations and suggestions the advisors, experts and theorists give, the political agents, the unionist politicians in this case, will always have the last word (Palonen 2005a, 356-357). (Palonen 2002, 67)

The unionist scholars discussed in this work are politicizing different themes by showing the space of politicking in them. In this sense their actions are a type of situational analysis for the unionist politician. The texts of the unionist academics and other literati are also speculations with options that may not be clearly visible for the unionist politicians. These speculations can be interpreted as suggestions and attempts to politicize new areas, raising up neglected perspectives and arguing for possible new ones. These can be taken as "wild" suggestions coming outside daily politics, to test different approaches and techniques in Northern Ireland politics, with an elusive agenda of supporting the unionist cause. For example, the unionist minded academics may be seen realizing that a certain type of politics is not paying off any more, and then suggesting a shift to avoid the unionist politics being forced into a blind alley. These suggestions are then either listened to or not. In either case, the independence of the academics from the strains of "daily politics" can provide them with means to suggest radical breaks from traditions, conventions and norms, which the unionist politicians might have been accustomed to follow.

When speaking of the academic and other literati engaging politically, the concept of an intellectual cannot be escaped. Up till now I have discussed scholars engaging in politics, by this I broadly mean university-level academics. To certain extent this can be limiting, and therefore it is better that we can take the concept of an intellectual as our working tool as well, though intellectual is an elusive concept, it nevertheless is beneficial by the fact that everyone can be intellectual, at least so some of the leading figures of the debate claim. The sociological, social or economical position of a person does not necessarily constitute their role as an intellectual. Designating someone as intellectual is also difficult. No-one can be nominated to work as an official intellectual of Finland, Ireland or the UK and get paid of it, for example. The attributes that make an intellectual are elsewhere. So, as we speak of scholars we predominately speak of expert politicking, when we speak of intellectuals we speak of a different type of politicking, yet both can take part in the same debate. Again, the point must be made that it is the ethos of the author of any given text that is essential. It would be too daring and intellectually false to label everything presented in this dissertation as an example of intellectual politicking, primarily because the term is seldom used, with a few key exceptions, in dealing with the academics engaging in politics in Northern Ireland. There is no intention to start labelling them as such either. The subchapter two looks more closely at this issue.

The demarcation of politics and science discussed above, can also be used as a powerful rhetorical strategy. As the ethos of a scholar, or an intellectual, is such that what the scholar/intellectual says is taken more seriously, one reason for this might also be that the scholar is using depoliticization as a rhetorical (and a political) strategy by nominating some arguement as apolitical and respectively suggesting something an opponent says is political. In this case science, in the sense of apolitical "fact", works as a type of God term[6], which gives tremendous benefit for the speaker who can convince the audience that their words are the truth but her opponent is merely being political, politicking. Here we see the concept of the political also used in its pejorative sense. As Carl Schmitt has said (Schmitt 1963 [1932], 21) depoliticizing is a highly intense move in politicking, as the very act of designating the adversary as political and oneself as apolitical is in effect an intense way of pursuing politics[7]. So, both the scholar and the opponent in any given example may be politicking in exactly the same way, although the

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[6] The God term is familiar from the work of Kenneth Burke. According to Burke the God term of the western capitalist societies is money, which can be used as a rhetorical knock out argument through which one can explain or justify all kinds of actions taken. The rivaling Marxist concept for western "money" God term is "inevitability" (Burke 1969, 355-366)

[7] In Wahrheit, ist es, wie sich unten noch öfters zeigen wird, eine typische und besonders intesive Art und Weise, Politik zu treiben, daß man Gegner als politisch, sich selbst als unpolitisch (d.h. hier : wissenschaflich, gerecht, objektiv, unparteiisch usw.) hinstellt (Schmitt 1963 [1932], 21). Translation: As will still be seen below, designating the adversary as political and oneself as nonpolitical (i.e., scientific, just, objective, neutral, etc.) is in actuality a typical and unusually intensive way of pursuing politics (Schmitt 1976, 21).

scholar is presenting the politicking of her opponent in a negative way to strengthen the effect of her own politicking. Because of the position of the scholar as an expert, the use of depoliticization as a rhetorical strategy comes naturally for her. To look at what is been hidden and portrayed as apolitical is perhaps even more interesting a question than the more often posed research question of looking into what has been politicized and how.

Is an intellectual trying to deny the fact that she is acting politically, or that the message is political, or that the subject has a political aspect? Activities such as these all bear very strong rhetorical aspects. By denying the political nature of one's act, an intellectual is depicting oneself as detached and clearly speaking the crystal gospel of science, untainted by the stains of political life, yet while of course, at the same time being political in every sense of the word. In relation to this aspect the whole intellectual debate is divided, with some being protagonists of the politically engaging intellectuals, indeed saying that it is the prerequisite of being an intellectual to act politically, while some argue that intellectuals have to remain outside politics and concentrate on truth and objective science.

The additional strength of a particular utterance from a (falsely) claimed apolitical premises can be significant, especially in the strongly bipolar politics of Northern Ireland. Theoretically it could be argued to have a great advantage if one can position oneself, or ones message, above that particular northern Irish dichotomy. But is this even possible in real life and especially in a society where non-partisanship seems to be impossible? Much depends on the message. If one really wants to make an impact on some particular area of the Northern Ireland politics, it is not necessarily wise to position oneself as completely impartial because utterances coming from either of the political blocks in Northern Ireland can be easily dismissed as irrelevant. That is why the context of the utterance has a highly significant role. In some contexts an utterance coming from the seemingly neutral zone can be beneficial, but in some contexts they are irrelevant. Examples of this in Northern Ireland politics can be seen in the struggle of the Alliance Party[8]. The Alliance party claims to stand above the unionist/nationalist dichotomy, but this has been set in doubt repeatedly since the party's origin. This aside, its role in the Northern Ireland politics has been left marginal, as the major division line of Northern Ireland party politics has dictated the political agenda. This does not mean that the Alliance party would

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[8] The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) was founded in 1970 in the midst of the developing Northern Ireland crisis. The party's main objective was to work as a bridge between the Protestant and Catholic communities, although as it accepts the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as a part of the UK it is often labeled as unionist. The biggest triumphs of the party were in the 1970's when the party received 14,4 % of votes in the District Council elections in 1977 and in 1979 Westminster elections when the party leader Oliver Napier came close to being elected as MP of East Belfast. The polarization of the political situation, due partly to the Republican hunger strikes, led to the decline of the party in the 1980's and its support was in the late 1980's and early 1990's from 7-10 percent, with a tendency of going down. The last two elections in 2005 (Westminster) and 2007 (NI Assembly) the party received 3,9 and 5,2 percent of votes.

not have had the ability to raise up and politicize questions that otherwise might have been overlooked, but if and when the prime objective of every political movement is to collect power shares and supporters, the Alliance Party can hardly be called a success.

To avoid writing a miniature political history of Northern Ireland from 1971 to 1998 it has been my goal to limit the political history to a minimum, although its presence is essential. Also, in the case of Northern Ireland studies, writing a non-biased pocket history of the "Troubles" is quite hard as most of the issues in the conflict are controversial even in terms of their study. This puts some inevitable strain for the reader. Therefore, rather than simply giving out day-to-day chronology of political events I will try to shed a light on numerous contexts under the large umbrella of the peace process.

As mentioned above, this thesis is also meant for the specialists of Northern Ireland politics, for this reason the context presented can in some cases be strenuous for a reader who is not such an expert, and efforts are made to help such a reader. It is also important to make a note already at this point, that not all contexts are limited to Northern Ireland. It is interesting, for example, to observe how global debates on recognition that started in the early 1990's, found their way to Northern Ireland in the form of concept building for the peace process; or how the break up of Yugoslavia found its way to the rhetoric of unionist minded think tanks. The speech acts made in the context of the Northern Ireland political debate might also have a secondary context, or vice versa.

In this type of study the key question is always which are the voices that are selected to represent a certain debate or phenomena a scholar is trying to describe, conceptualize and analyse? The danger is making the selection in a way which distorts the image towards the direction the scholar wants to show, and mutes voices that should be heard. It is impossible of course to reproduce all the texts that can be categorised under the label unionist academic politicking and offer them to a reader. Therefore, a selection has to be made, and it necessarily carries with it a level of subjectivity on my part. I have gone through a number of scholarly texts commenting on Northern Ireland with an intention of finding the political in them. I have, however, concentrated on publications having an academic bearing. By this I mean texts that primarily fit the stencil of academic work; textbooks, articles etc. In addition, there are some texts that are especially interesting. These include the publications of an intellectually led unionist think tank the Cadogan Group, pamphlets and manifestoes, which have contributions by academic unionists, but also political speeches that combine scientific material such as political theory in their argument building. These form the primary sources of this study.

One area of research material, which I have paid least attention to, are texts in newspapers, magazines or other dailies in spite of the fact that many scholars inclined towards unionism have contributed to this type of discussion. While it would have proven the fact that these people are active commentators with well based opinions, I am more interested in the way science and politics

is put together in the argument building of intellectual unionists; in how these interventions actually happen and what these speech acts look like, when observed on the level of rhetorical and textual analysis. Newspaper clippings are included in the study as far as they complement it. The most important qualifying factor is the nature of the text, and not on what type of paper it is on, in essence the ethos described earlier. One important principle which I have tried to follow is the avoidance of *ex post wisdom*, meaning that I have avoided analysing the texts at hand through later historical developments. It is my hope that with these ground rules I have not perverted the picture of the intellectual politicking, and that by this focus have succeeded in giving the thesis a more in depth analysis.

1.2.3 Academic interventions as linguistic action

For Quentin Skinner linguistic action is a counter concept for meaning and a key part in his thesis to search for the intentions that are an elemental part of any particular utterance, instead of trying in vain to unveil some kind of a "meaning" of a text. Skinner is rehabilitating the performative action of the agents, their doings, to counter the search for a meaning, allegedly superseding mere words. Instead of concentrating only on *what* is said, with an idea that some kind of pure meaning of the utterance could somehow be traced, it is more fruitful to look at *how* and *why* something is said. With this in mind I will look at the intentions of the unionist scholars in their political interventions, not only what is said and when. (Skinner 1996, 8; Palonen 2003a, 32-33) The focus is not on meanings or impacts as they are in this respect irrelevant.

This study links with the wave of political studies following the linguistic turn, with its idea presented in quotes such as: "There are no textual references which can be taken as given and not interpreted and no interpretations which cannot be contested (Hänninen & Palonen 1990, 8)". A textbook is not simply a textbook and an article is not simply an article, equipped only with a "primary", or first hand interpretation, but either of them can also be interpreted as (deliberate) speech acts in another contexts and debates. This is also a study which underlines the importance of texts, perhaps at the expense of other research material, but as M.M. Bakhtin says "Where there is no text, there is no object of study, and no object of thought either" (Bakhtin, 1986, 103). In terms of the weight given to particular contexts in which a particular text, or speech act, is given, we follow Quentin Skinner's lead: "Political life itself sets the main problems for the political theorist" (Skinner 1978, xi). The aspect of the phrase that inspires me, is in the implication that the political theorist is not someone who is completely detached from the political contexts in which they are living, and that their theorizations are to be interpreted as problem solving attempts for particular political problems. This does not, however, take away the possibility of generalisations. While this is not a thesis about any political theorist or political theory, this quote is illuminating, because it is the interconnection between the political life of Northern Ireland and the actions of the unionist intellectuals that are the focus of the thesis. These two cannot be

separated, and that is why the analysis builds on the contexts in which these texts are written. We need to understand why a certain proposition has been put forward if we wish to understand the proposition itself (Skinner 1988, 274). By situating the texts, or propositions, in their appropriate contexts and thus reading out the illocutionary forces of those texts the thesis does that. These texts are rhetorical moves in arguments, and sometimes even in multiple arguments tangled with each other.

The English language provides us with a conceptual horizon offering four different aspects to the noun **politics**, with **policy** referring to the regulating aspect, **politicking** to performative aspect, **polity** to a metaphorical space and **politicization** to an act of opening something as political (Palonen 2003b, 171). From these policy-politicking and polity-politicization form the respective conceptual pairs (ibid.)[9]. Politicization and politicking are the activity concepts that come into consideration when describing the linguistic action of the academic unionists. The latter has its known pejorative connotations. My intention is not to use the word in its pejorative sense, or to cast moral judgements by it. On the contrary I seek to use politicking strictly to describe a political action in its performative sense. Politicization is a term in place specifically when looking at how the unionist academics are opening up new areas, or playing fields, for political action. Obviously these opening are not always successful and the political action through which these openings are attempted can be termed as politicking.

The background of the methodology used in this thesis is the speech act theory developed by J.L. Austin. In general Austin separated statements, which are limited to actual facts, and performative utterances, speech acts, which allow one to "do things with words". Austin spoke of the "illocutionary forces" or the "force" in an 'illocutionary' act in contrast to general 'locutionary' act. In illocutionary act the performance is *in* saying something and not *of* saying something (Austin 1973, 98-101). By this Austin means that in illocutionary act there is a force in the utterance that must be separated from the basic, context free meaning of the utterance. However, these illocutionary forces do not refer to the consequences of the utterance. That is the function of perlocution. Illocution is the force and action in a given utterance and perlocution its *intended* consequence. But these two cannot be separated in a clear cut way and both of them have to be considered when looking at a particular utterance at hand. A different matter in addition to the above would be the *actual* consequences of a given utterance. This is something this thesis will not pursue, because it would be very difficult to trace a certain result back to a specific speech act. (ibid.)

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[9] Palonen has (2003, 175) reformulated these four aspects through Weber as follows: "*Politicization* names a share of power, opens a specified horizon of chances in terms of this share, while *politicking* means performative operations in the struggle for power with the already existing shares and their redistribution . *Polity* refers to those power share that have already being politicized but have also created a kind of vested interest that tacitly excludes other kinds of shares, while *policy* means a regulation and coordination of performative operations by specific ends and means."

Politicking, to which I have chosen to call the linguistic action in which the texts under analysis are engaged in, is political action in the performative sense and thus as a concept related to the Austinian speech act theory. However, I am not using the term "speech act" in a strictly Austinian sense, due to the fact that it would be hard to see "speech act" constituting much more than a few sentences. My use of the term "speech act" is wider, as I use it to describe the intention of the author of the speech act to provoke action by the utterance, to do things with words. This is similar to the way Bakhtin defines the text as a single utterance with two aspects: its plan (intention) and the realization of this plan (Bakhtin 1986, 104). Bakhtin gives the possibility of looking at how things are done with texts and not only with words. Though speech act as a term does not occur frequently in the analysis it is still important to remember Austin's and Bakhtin's frameworks in the background.

It would be extremely difficult and not very analytical to map out the extent that these academic or intellectual interventions have impacted the Northern Ireland politics, or to be more specific to various contexts that they have addressed. As mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter, my interest is in the intentions, not on the "impacts" or "meanings" For instance, while looking at some concepts, the "parity of esteem" to give an example, we must also analyse a battle, or a contestation, going on around that concept. It is sometimes interesting to follow through some of these interventions to trace their tales in the debates in Northern Ireland. There is a connection between politics in the peace process and the politics in the social science debates, and sometimes these two intermingle. At the end of the thesis the Belfast Agreement will be discussed with the intent of seeing, if these debates and issues have left any imprints on that particular text.

Let us return to the question of truth or validity in relation to rhetorical strategy of showing "truth" as something characteristic of science, and thus separating science from politics, with politics being portrayed as tough contests and of struggle for power without emphasis on the truth. To elaborate this issue requires dealing with the question of the relation of truth and the specific texts presented here. Discussion can be easily turned into the question of whether the writer has got the "facts" straight or does she *really* understand the nature of the conflict. This is an example of intra science rhetoric, with its "truth parties" discussed earlier, and speaking of "the facts" is an argumentative strategy to establish one's point. Unfortunately it is not very helpful, and easily distracts the discussion from the more interesting aspects or in many cases from the point of the argument in hand. An example of critical analysis of one particular debate in which whether one has got "the facts" straight was a consistent argumentative theme is provided by Alan Finlayson as he goes through the academic discussion on the parades issue, which links with the *recognition* debate dealt in this work in chapter 8.5 (Finlayson 2006)[10]. I will, in most cases,

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[10]   To name another example, Feargal Cochrane and Paul Dixon had an interesting debate of the claimed symmetrical isolation of Northern Ireland in terms of both London and Dublin. That this phenomenon was happening was Cochrane's

restrain myself from testing the validity of the arguments analysed here. The validity or truth, if it even can be considered to be "out there", is in any case besides the point of this thesis.

1.3   Unionism: a concept in terminal decay?

The history of unionism in Ireland is one of simplification, retreat and retrenchement.
Alvin Jackson

When we speak of unionism the same criticisms, that goes with all "isms" is needed. "Unionism" is not necessarily a very analytical concept and can hide much more than it reveals. Therefore, I will try to describe unionism so that the persons, ambitions and objectives that constitute the concept of unionism are clearly indicated. When speaking of unionism I am referring, when not stated otherwise, explicitly to the *Northern Ireland unionism*, as unionism is obviously something that has existed elsewhere also, all-Ireland unionism being the closest example. In addition, unionism as an idea of supporting the United Kingdom or a particular attachment to it, and as one type of universal Britishness is something not limited even to the British Isles, as unionism as a "universal" idea is attached to the history of British colonies worldwide. A wider history of unionism would therefore have to take into account the American independence, (de)colonisation etc.

"Unionism" or "unionists" are not agents of political action, only individual people with unionist tendencies are. Is there such a thing as unionist politics, for example? Not necessarily, but if we do not give "unionism" or "unionists" too much explanatory power by building collective subjects that prevent the analytical scrutiny of the theme of this thesis, the concepts can be of benefit. Therefore, I will next illustrate what has broadly been said of unionism and unionists. At best this is a compilation of different explanations and viewpoints, as unionism is very much a concept under constant contestation. All this is probably familiar to a reader accustomed to unionism, but I hope that for other readers this would be beneficial. Much of what I say can be contested with good arguments, but nevertheless it is good to start even with a narrow view to what has been said of unionists and to the political thought of unionism and even how unionist ideology has been described.

Unionism is a political idea dedicated in keeping the constitutional link between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. The term, when used in the Irish context, refers to the Act of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland that formed the United Kingdom of those two political entities in 1800. The original Union of Great Britain and Ireland was reduced to a Union of Great Britain and

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argument, backed with statics and other empiric evidence. Paul Dixon disagreed and the subsequent debate in the *Political Studies* was largely based on competing empirical evidence, "the facts". (Cochrane 1994; 1995; Dixon 1995)

Northern Ireland in 1914 when the 26 counties of southern Ireland left the union with the Irish Home Rule. The partition was finalised in 1921, when two separate polities of Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State were formed.

Unionism formed as political thought, which the Protestants living in Ireland used to combine their Irishness, based on their place of residence, to their general ethos of Britishness as manifested in customs and beliefs (Boyce 2001, 22). This means, that the identity of a person can be both Irish and British, depending on the aspect that is stressed. This applies to places as well; geographically speaking Belfast is an Irish city as it is situated on the island of Ireland, but at the same time it is in political terms British. Besides debates, this duality also invokes sometimes hilarious dilemmas. One of the best examples of the latter was a British television-comedy Ali G, in which the lead character played by Sacha Baron Cohen was interviewing the press officer of the Democratic Unionist Party Sammy Wilson. When Ali G asked Mr Wilson "*So, is* (sic) *you Irish*", Mr Wilson answered adamantly, *No! I'm British*, to which Ali G replied, *So, is you here on holiday*? This dialogue underlines two different understandings of unionism, with the more traditional and stricter version denying everything Irish and a more modern and flexible drawing a difference between an identity and an idea. Having attended a few stand-up comedy nights in Belfast, I have noticed that political jokes are not feared by the Northern Irish comedians either and the jokes made are also rich in self irony.

The core of the unionist reading of the Northern Ireland problem, and at the same time their self-understanding is crystallized in two propositions by John Whyte as follows:

> (1) There are two distinct peoples in Ireland, unionist and nationalist (or Protestant and Catholic); and (2) the core of the problem is the refusal of nationalists to recognize this fact and to accord to unionists the same right of self-determination as they claim for themselves. Far from seeing Britain as the core of the problem, unionists tend to see the mainland British as unreliable allies who are too prone to give in to the nationalists. (Whyte 1990, 146)

Whyte's work *Interpreting Northern Ireland* is important in terms of being one of the few collections of the multitude of explanations offered of the Northern Ireland conflict. It goes through a vast amount of publications and other data to reconstruct the different ways Northern Ireland has been approached. For the purposes of this dissertation it nevertheless has some defects as far as it traces unionist interpretation of the conflict. Whyte reduces the unionist argumentations into a few key lineages and then compares those to academic studies on unionism. For example, for the unionist argument that the Irish Republic is in essence a Roman Catholic state with an ethos hostile to pluralism i.e. Protestant faith goes the unionist logic, Whyte answers with a collection of data either supporting or challenging this argument. This, however, misses the point of this thesis. I am not out to find out is the unionist argument building, or the unionist identity based on some "truth" that can be objectively recovered through science, nor, for the matter of fact, do I believe that that type of project would be even meaningful. How can one actually define whether there is one

or two nations, or peoples, in Ireland anyway? This is why this thesis considers concepts and ideas like "the two nations" as rhetorical structures, or metaphors in political use. "Two nations" is a par excellence example of a rhetorical construction giving legitimacy to the unionist role in Northern Ireland, and the question whether the two nations idea had any foundations is in that respect irrelevant (Todd 1993, 198-199). But at the same time I stress that I do not mean that these rhetorical constructions are mere rhetoric either.

The foundation of unionism as a political idea dates back to the start of the Irish Home Rule debate in the late 19th century. One of the key questions of these debates was what was meant by the concept of the Union, and clearing that out gave shape to the political unionism (O'Day 2001). In 1886 Conservative and Liberal unionists formed a political alliance to fight against the threat of Irish nationalism and the impending Home Rule. This pact reached its fulfilment in 1905 when the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) was formed as a political organisation for the anti-Home Rule movement. The UUC has since acted as an umbrella organisation to the heterogeneous political family of unionism, to coordinate the various strands of unionism, as unionism has always been diverse and loosely tied around the concept of the union. The UUC also meant the localisation of unionism. Unionism was from than on, organisationally and in terms of popular support, a phenomena concentrated in Ulster. Therefore it can be argued that the UUC represented a prototype for a Northern unionist parliament, which came into existence after the partition in 1921 (Jackson 2001, 124). Subsequently the UUC evolved to form the core of the dominant unionist party The Official Ulster Unionist Party, nowadays known as the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP).

Since the dawn of unionism its relationship to Protestantism and especially to Protestant organisations such as the Orange Order has been difficult, as there has always been a tension between secular unionism and the more culturally oriented unionism. On many occasions secular unionism, sometimes reluctantly, turned to the strong organisational base offered by the protestant organisations, swallowing its secular ethos. Religion and politics have intermingled through the influence of the protestant heritage organisations since the Home Rule debates, which can be seen in the anti-Home Rule slogans as "Home Rule is Rome Rule". Also during the period before the Second World War the influence of Orangeism was strong[11]. (Patterson & Kaufman 2007; Jackson 2001, 118)

In a strict sense unionism as a political idea would not exist without the presence of Irish nationalism, as unionism is and has been a reaction to the threat posed by Irish nationalism and the Roman Catholic Church, which has

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[11] This can be seen for instance in the much quoted and politically used utterance of the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland James Craig in Stormont 1934 "I have always said that I am an Orangeman first and a politician and a member of this parliament afterwards" (Harbinson 1972, 137). This quote also highlights the protestant nature of the unionist rule and makes understandable the reluctance of the nationalists to take seats in Stormont and to participate in the local parliament.

given unionism its second antithesis. The *bête noir* of unionism has always been the Roman Catholic Church, which has been portrayed as a threat to the multidominational character of the unionist way of life. Religious antagonism has been easy, since the community of unionism, from its birth period of 1886-1920, has been a Protestant one (Todd 1993, 197). The unionist rhetoric has emphasised the link between the church and the state in the Republic of Ireland, which is seen as hostile to the individual liberty. While this in historical perspective is not completely without grounds, the point still is that the rhetoric of unionism has, while being highly critical towards the state and church in the Republic, at the same time underlined its own religiosity (Hennessey 2005, 8-9). If we take it that unionism can be reduced to this antagonism, it follows that it is debatable whether unionism has any ideology or a belief structure beyond it. However, it is possible to have the political core of an ideology based on reaction and still have a consistent, although heterogeneous, political philosophy. Beyond antagonism as a core, unionism is constantly open to contestation and reinterpretation, much due to its heterogeneous nature. (Walker 2004, 8-22)

Nevertheless, it is questionable whether unionism can be called a theory or is it more accurately named a political strategy, doctrine, programme or a form of allegiance. In my mind to call unionism a theory is erroneous. One of the reasons for the ambiguity around unionism might well be the lack of intellectual writers, who could have created a systematic dogma for unionism. Common to the development of unionism as a political idea has been, that it has been systematised mostly during the eras of crisis. These eras have, according to Jennifer Todd, been especially 1886-1920 and 1970-1990. In the first period mentioned the idea of unionism was emerging and came to be defined in a systematic way from multiple different sources, while during the latter period (which is, in my opinion, cut short by Todd) unionism began to splinter (Todd 1993, 190-191). This is in one sense also the premise of this study, as I will look at the suggestions presented by the unionist scholars and intellectuals during such a time of crisis. Unionism, as a loose web of different compilations of political motives, denominations, hopes and fears, bears many strong contradictions, and the political thought of unionism, if one can make such a generalisation, has always been a very eclectic one (Boyce 2001, 34).

At the core of unionism lies its problematic relationship to Great Britain. Unionists have considered Great Britain both as a protector and a spiritual home as well as an unreliable ally. Unionist politicians have been adamant in their stance, that the constitutional link between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom must be kept, but on the other hand these same politicians have been quick to revolt against the democratic decisions of the Union polity, if those decisions have been understood to threaten the existence of that union. This dichotomy has provoked questions on the nature of the unionist loyalty on Great Britain: Is the unionist loyalty conditional or unconditional? Are the revolting unionists violating the parliamentary sovereignty of the United Kingdom state? The most famous study seeking an answer to this question has

been David Millers *Queen's Rebels* (1978). Without going to Miller yet, a quick answer by an academic unionist, to which I will also return more deeply, is that behind the idea of the claimed unionist conditional loyalty is the mistake of thinking of the United Kingdom as a *unitary* state, when it is a *union* state (Aughey 2001a, 309-310).

In terms of constitutional relationship to Britain, unionism has applied three basic strategies, integration, autonomy and independence. These three options can be read from the start of the unionist history, as the unionists were ironically forced to seek autonomy of Northern Ireland while originally campaigning against it, when it was presented in the form of the Irish Home Rule. The grounds for the somewhat ambivalent relation of the unionist political thought towards England or the United Kingdom has its roots in an era prior the Home Rule debates. As England, to the disappointment of the Protestants living in Ireland, refused to annex Ireland to the Union, which England already had with Scotland and Wales, unionists developed a contract theory, with an in built conditional element: If England would violate the contract, the contract could be called off. In unionist politics this has proven to be important, as even after the Union was established in 1800, the idea of a contract did not leave unionist politics. (Boyce 2001, 19)

Loyalty has been in the centre of the unionist political question setting, as by loyalty one refers not only to the loyalty of the unionist people towards the Crown of the United Kingdom, but also to the loyalty, or disloyalty of the (Northern) Irish nationalists towards that Crown and the political institutions of Northern Ireland (Hennessey 1996, 128)[12]. The ambivalent relation of unionists towards Britain is highlighted in the constant fear of alienation. The political strategy of the unionist regimes has concentrated on preventing the birth of a polity, separate from the rest of the United Kingdom, and it has always been very important for unionists to emphasise the Britishness of Ulster. Fear of isolation is substantial to the unionist *siege mentality*, and signs of isolation or British abandonment have often been sought (Cochrane 1994).

The era of autonomous Northern Ireland was the era of complete unionist hegemony. The setting up of the Stormont parliament constituted a change in the unionist political thought, as the localisation of unionism also meant the triumph of its more exclusivist strand, as the more diverse all Ireland forms of unionism died off (Jackson 2001). The unionist regime occupied the Stormont parliament with majority rule, refusing any power to the Roman Catholic minority. The unionist policy was therefore very instrumentalist. It used the institutions of the Northern Ireland state as bulwarks against Irish unity, and the idea of the Catholic-nationalist fifth column was very strong behind these practices (Buckland 2001, 212). Due to a unionist siege mentality certain basic civil rights for the Roman Catholic people in Northern Ireland were denied

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[12] The fact that the sovereign (the Crown) of the United Kingdom is a Protestant one by definition in the royal coronation oath is a significant explanation of the matter that the unionists have often stressed their allegience to the Crown of the UK, instead of the Parliament for instance.

under the perceived threat of the Irish nationalists. Northern Ireland then became "a cold house fort the Catholics[13]". This effectively eliminated the possibility of a more inclusive, or "constructivist", as Andrew Gailey calls it, tradition of unionist politics to emerge (Gailey 2001, 234). In short, one central unionist rhetorical strategy, in terms of controlling the history, has been that the formation of the unionist diktat state is legitimized as an act of communal self defence.

The unionist dominance did not necessarily happen out of a pure necessity, as clear opportunities for more inclusive and legitimate rule were missed. The most evident of these was during the era after the World War Two, when the emergence of the British welfare state gave the unionist regime real opportunities to win over the Roman Catholic minority. Although the clear welfare advantages north of the border would have given this effort a real boost, nothing happened, as under the Prime Minister Sir Basil Brooke, economic and social development was shadowed by the political stagnation. The inability of the unionist regime to develop a more inclusive polity is also very understandable, since the political power of autonomous Stormont was an option decided by the British, and a direct rule from London over Northern Ireland would in many instances probably have proven to be a better alternative as the unionists were trapped with institutional power they did not want in the first place (Buckland 2001, 218). (Patterson 2007, 118-120).

However, as both the British and Irish governments did not show a great interest towards the administration of Northern Ireland, the unionist regime could continue unhindered until the 1960's, when Northern Ireland had its share of the sweeping global youth/student movement. The civil rights movement mobilising Catholic masses put the unionist regime under a challenge it did not survive, and after a series of serious disturbances the British government prorogued the Stormont parliament and the Northern Ireland autonomy in 1971, replacing it with a direct rule by the British government.

Independence as a third optional strategy for unionism has never been fully used, but it has sometimes been hinted at by some politicians from the unionist right. We can define unionism as an idea claiming that Northern Ireland should sustain some kind of link to Great Britain and remain outside the Republic of Ireland, but a determination going much deeper than that, would raise numerous problems. Common to the different phases that unionism has gone through has been the reaction to crisis. In the event of crisis the heterogeneous nature of unionism has always surfaced and led to restructuring of the unionist political machine. The crisis that culminated in the prorogation of Stormont and the stripping of power from the unionist regime led to the splintering of the unionist political map and to the introduction of numerous new parties. Likewise during the times of stagnation and minor political changes the unionist unity has held steadfast.

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[13]   Ulster Unionist Party leader David Trimble in his Nobel Peace Prize Lecture in 1998 (http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1998/trimble-lecture.html).

Suspicion felt towards Great Britain, and the motives of its Northern Ireland policy, accelerated after the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 (Catterall & McDougall 1996). This suspicion has dealt with unionist rule of predominantly sectarian and populist nature (Bew, Gibbon, Patterson 2002, 184). On the other hand, as autonomy was something the Northern Ireland unionists never wanted in the first place, their use of the devolved powers was very cautious. The Northern Ireland unionist governments in fact tried as much as possible to affirm the province's British identity and to prevent the birth of a particular Northern Ireland polity (Walker 2004, 77). This has been termed by historian Brendan Clifford as "masterfull inactivity" (Clifford 1987, 1-2). Suspicion was not felt only towards the British, but the biggest threat and somewhat of an 'enemy within' thinking was felt towards the nationalist minority. It is important to notice that while the unionists accused the nationalists of disloyalty and of wanting to dismantle the state, which were also used as arguments against political empowerment of the Catholics, they nevertheless resented very strongly the idea of Catholics joining the unionist parties, although this would have given added legitimacy to the Northern Irish state (Hennessey 2005, 19). The lack of politically participating Catholics was recognised but no-one wanted to do anything about it. In this sense the statement of the leader of the Evangelical Protestant Society Norman Porter that politics and religion cannot be separated in the North as well as in the South was revealing (Hennessey 2005, 31).

From the British point of view, the collapse of the Northern Ireland state in 1971 had dramatically changed the situation, and the usefulness of unionism had radically diminished when the British could no longer trust the actual governing of the province to the unionists (Bew, Gibbon, Patterson 2002, 185). The major weakness of the unionist political thinking was at that point that they did not have any alternative strategy to the exclusivist political regime they had held. Majority rule, which meant in practice the re-establishment of the unionist hegemony, was seen as the only option. The unionist politicians therefore failed to read and to react to the motives of the British and Irish governments, who could not let the Catholic political mobilisation unattended (ibid.). Subsequently, in the 1970's the unionist political broad church split between the two unionist constitutional megatrends; integration and independence, as Ian Paisley the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) argued for a full integration to the British political system, and the Vanguard Party, which was another splinter party from the OUP went in the other direction suggesting independence (Bew, Gibbon, Patterson 2002, 186). For some, the fall of Stormont in 1972 indicated that the unionist project, in which the unionists had tried to create a polity in which all the strands of unionism would have been represented in harmony, had failed and what was ahead was more splintering, instability and a gradual loss of political power (Todd 1993)

2 INTELLECTUALS, SCHOLARS AND POLITICS: SOME DEBATES

In this chapter I will go briefly through the key points of the intellectual discussion, while paying special attention to the different views that have been given to the role of the intellectuals in politics. After that I will go to a specific case of intellectuals in Britain. As this is not a study of Northern Ireland unionist *intellectuals*, which would be too limiting. I will then return to Max Weber and to the relationship between scholars and politics and science and politics. I will conclude this chapter by looking at the history of intellectual and scholarly politicking in Ireland and Northern Ireland, with a view also to the natural nesting places of scholars, the universities. As the heart of this thesis is the contemporary academic interventions, I will not discuss them in this chapter, however, at the end of this chapter, I will take a look at the history of such a phenomenon in Ireland and Northern Ireland and to what has been generally said of unionism and intellectuals.

2.1 Intellectuals: detached observers or engaged commentators

Not all academics and scholars are intellectuals, and it might be, that most intellectuals are something other than academics or scholars. To be an intellectual does not require one to be an academic, or to possess similar certain clear cut attributes that the hierarchy of the academic world requires. This is the most obvious difference between intellectuals and scholars, of which the latter group is dominant in this study. However, it is useful to present some of the intellectual discussion, as it gives some valuable aspects to the particular case that we are looking into. This debate also sheds light on the question of the characteristics required for an intellectual.

The term "intellectual" is open to various definitions and contestations. In a sense by defining it we must also assign a certain understanding of the role of the intellectuals. The first one to use the term was the novelist Henri Bérenger

(Collini 2006, 20). He used it as a means of describing educated men who enter politics. The term became more widely used in the French Dreyfus affair, in which a Jewish artillery officer, Alfred Dreyfus was accused of treason and convicted in highly suspicious and questionable circumstances in 1894. Émile Zola, one of the Dreyfus case "intellectuals", wrote an open letter "J'accuse!" to President Félix Faure, which was referred in an editorial comment by Georges Clémenceau as 'la protestation des intellectuels'. Other intellectuals involved in the Dreyfus case included Henri Poincaré, Lucien Herr and Julien Benda. So, in the "first" usage of the term the idea of "meddling" and taking a political stand was already central. (Collini 2006, 21).

The politicization of the scandal led to the reopening of the case in 1899 and eventually to the rehabilitation of Dreyfus. The scandal divided the French society in a new way, which can not be reduced to left/right division, although one often hears of the "leftist" Dreyfusards and the "rightist" anti-Dreyfusards. The description is more accurate when the left/right attributes are omitted. Among the key figures of the Dreyfusards were many notable "intellectuals" who were defined as men with high intellectual achievements taking a stand outside their usual area of expertise. Subsequently, central in many intellectual analysis has been the separation of human life into spheres, as it has been debated, whether the "correct" sphere of an intellectual is in the cultural or in the political sphere. In my mind, such a division is arbitrary, and what is interesting is more the question of the attributes required from an intellectual, and the constituting action required of becoming an intellectual.

The first influential study discussing the role of the intellectuals is *La Trahison Des Clercs* (1927) by one of the former Dreyfusards and a Jew Julien Benda. Benda's argument is that an intellectual should remain detached as a protagonist of some type of pure reason, and abstain from any activity that is outside one's natural space in the realm of science. Therefore Benda denounces the "meddling" intellectual by calling the emerging political role of the *clercs*[14] as treason. Benda sees the intellectuals in the original Dreyfus affair as the guardians of justice, and not as political agents. Apparently for Benda, what the intellectuals of the Dreyfus affair were doing was not political and the defence of Dreyfus was for Benda an expression of reason and morality above politics. (Benda 1969, 44-51) When considered as a political thinker, Benda was therefore a new platonic dilettante.

Benda argues that after the Dreyfus affair the intellectuals took up a completely different position in a society, as they no longer wanted to distance themselves from the secular passions and to remain "outside". For Benda the

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[14] The original French word clerc is problematic to translate. In the English edition the term is translated as clerk, although the English title of the book is "The Treason of the Intellectuals", therefore translating the clerc as intellectual. For the purposes of my work I will use the word intellectual also when discussing the ideas of Benda, since the problem raising from the inaccurate translation is not that evident since I am discussing the aspects of the concept especially in relation to political activity, and not making a textual study on the concept itself. Benda himself was using the concept of clerc in the medieval sense to describe an educated class.

greatest sin for the intellectual is taking part in politics, which for Benda symbolises the world of passions and irrationality in contrast to the rational world of science, in which the intellectual remains inside one's natural sphere. For Benda "politics" is very much a synonym for partisan political activity, especially attached to nationalism. Therefore, in addition of blaming intellectuals for treason against humanity, Benda is also being highly anti-political and "politics" has a very strong pejorative meaning for him. "Remaining outside" carries such a high prestige for Benda, that he states that every intellectual praised by a laymen is a traitor not only to his strata of intellectuals, but to the whole society and world (Benda 1969, 51). (Benda 1969, 44-51)

The context for Benda's criticism explaining his intentions was provided by the fear of raising patriotism and nationalism, and the threat they were seen to create to the ideal of a cosmopolitan intellectual. Benda attaches particularistic patriotism especially to the German nation and to the rise of the German political power, threatening the former hegemony of France. Benda was horrified by the German admiration of Nietzsche, Kant, Hegel and Wagner, and the subsequent announcement by the German teachers that every other civilization would perish. Benda argues that this led to a birth of a new type of German invented nationalist intellectual. This new politically attached intellectual, according to Benda, provoked patriotism and xenophobia and was responsible for the loss of the spirit of intellectual cosmopolitanism. The biggest blame Benda sheds on the historians who have put history "at the service of party or national passion" (Benda 1969, 72) and dislocating it from the canon of impartial, cosmopolitan and humanist sciences. Benda argues that attached intellectuals achieved a "*divinization of politics*", which displaced morality for politics being "the most important achievement of the modern clerk and a great turning point in the history of a man" (ibid. 108-109). Benda sees also the Church as an accomplice to this treason as it no longer stands against separatism and particularism in the Christian world (Benda 1969, 86).

The sociological perspective to the role of the intellectuals is provided by Karl Mannheim. Mannheim sees society constituted on the division of labour. Also the social classes, and the thought of a particular social class, are the products of the social position of that class. The division of labour, and the relationship of the social class to the means of production, dictate the idea that the class has of itself. In this model, intellectuals do not constitute a single class nor do they have any kind of access to the vital functions of any other defined segment of the society. Therefore, placing intellectuals in this model seems problematic. According to Mannheim, the intellectual has to find their sociological bearings by applying the proletarian framework for its needs. As the intellectual has had to give up a former role in the society for a much smaller and less independent position, they suffer from a lowering self-esteem. The earlier, more significant, role of the intellectual was based on the idea of the intellectual as the guardian of the truth, or the clairvoyant for the rest the tribe. Mannheim draws a line of evolution from the prophets to the priestly strata,

poets and philosophers, as he argues that earlier, as prophets; the intellectuals had the possibility of interpreting the *Weltanschaung* and thus secured their own niche in society. Nevertheless, this position did not free the intellectuals to form a social group of their own, and during modernity the intellectual was reduced to a state of helplessness, as they lacked a social identity of their own. (Mannheim 1992, 101-102)

Zygmunt Bauman has also paid attention to the temporal and societal change in the role of the intellectuals. Baumann argues that the intellectual was during the modernity in a role of a legislator, but with postmodernity, intellectuals have gone through inflation ending up in a role of an interpreter. In earlier times, knowledge and information were limited so that the intellectual could inhabit the position of the guardian of the truth. Information was also different in nature. Knowledge was understood as something straightforward, which could be categorised, measured and utilized through expertise. Knowledge equalled facts, which were easier to shape in to patterns of action in the hands of an intellectual. The intellectual was in a sense a "social scientist" influencing politics through his position as the guardian and applicator of truth. The intellectual could claim to know, based on the information he was able to gather and structure about how the society should work. (Bauman, 1987)

However, as knowledge has changed its form and become more elusive, the intellectual can no longer make suggestions based on a pure reason, but has taken up the position of an interpreter, who turns to the elusive information moulding from it an interpretation of the world. Also as the state has improved its ways of maintaining social order, the need for the legislating nature of the intellectuals has lessened. The tendency of an intellectual to think that reason should be above all in determining the direction of the society has not changed, but nowadays reason is reason in a sense of being a reason to interpret, and no longer a reason to legislate. (ibid.)

Mannheim's conception of the intellectual originates from the 1860's Russian intelligentsija discussions, but ends up in the concept of *freischwebende Intelligenz*. For Karl Mannheim the change that the intellectual had to face due to the change in the society led to a crisis for the intellectuals. The intellectual realizing the lack of social identity was forced into being a social non-entity, forming no class but functioning only as intellectual strata of *a* class. The answer to this crisis was twofold: either intellectuals joined the ranks of the proletarian class or succumbed to a sort of intellectual nihilism. Manheim argues that because of the "non-entity" character of the intellectuals and their lack of common interests, the intellectuals are not capable of political activity as a class. This makes the intellectual a kind of dustbin of the sociological model. An intellectual is seen by Manheim as bouncing off the walls of a sociological model, incapable of forming a sustainable political alliances or reaching out for political goals of one's own, as all political aspirations are reducible to the aspirations of a class. Therefore, these free floating (*Freischwebend*) intellectuals lack political meaning and are doomed to seek fulfilment elsewhere. Mannheim encapsulates this idea to the term "relatively uncommitted intelligentsia".

Nevertheless, Mannheim's model suggests, that while intellectuals are "classless" they might be able to create a synthetic view of the society not depending on the distorting views of the classes (Gagnon 1987, 6-7). In this sense, the role of the intellectuals in society is to transcend the interests of the classes and seek for the impartial and abstract truth. (Mannheim 1992, 120-170)

Antonio Gramsci on the other hand argues that everyone is a potential intellectual, but also sees class free, or detached, intellectuals as impossibility.

> Every social group coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals, which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in economic but also in the social and political fields. (Gramsci 1971, 5)

So, the intellectuals have a duty to create a sense of belonging to the class they are representing. Gramsci argues that as every human has the possibility of being an intellectual and every human uses some aspects of the intellectual in everyday life non-intellectuals do not exist. In a sense, being an intellectual is for Gramsci something determined by action carried out, not by education or socio-economical status. The term "organic intellectual" is essential for Gramsci, by which he means that intellectuals are an organic element of the modern society. Gramsci also acknowledges the existence of a more traditional type of intellectual, who works, for example, in the literary or scientific profession and holds a somewhat cross-class element. These traditional types of intellectuals are challenged with the rising class bound organic intellectuals, who work as an intellectual avant-garde of their particular political classes. (Gramsci 1971, 14)

For Gramsci the relationship between the intellectuals and a political party is twofold. For some social groups, the political party is just a way for the group to elaborate its politico-philosophical existence, for which it needs the organic intellectuals to "create a theory" and a reason. For this purpose a particular type of intellectuals are created inside that social group. The intellectuals created this way do not have any other purpose beyond their organic function. This type of "organic intellectual" is one who acts inside a class, a party or does not try to create distance, be above or to be non-committed. For the organic intellectual, therefore, other intellectuals might seem suspicious. The second type of relationship between a political party and an intellectual is found when an intellectual of the traditional (i.e. not organic) type joins a political party. In that case the intellectual who enters the party is merged with the organic intellectuals of that political party. In this case the intellectual has a function of his own outside the intellectual need of the party, and the intellectual is exercising his free will in taking part to that particular party. The problem Gramsci is dealing with in the latter case is connected to the discussion of the role of the intellectuals in the revolution, or in the revolutionary communist party. In contrast to Lenin, Gramsci seems to think that it is possible for the traditional intellectuals to join the revolution, while Lenin wanted to substitute the old intelligentsia with a new revolutionary one. Gramsci argues that, in a sense, everyone in a political party is an intellectual. Since the function of a

political party is purely intellectual, no one is joining it, for example, to practice their profession therefore everyone joining must be an intellectual. (Gramsci 1971, 15-16)

Mannheim and Gramsci seem to agree that the idea of a free floating intellectual *class* is impossible, and the intellectuals will always have to be tied to a certain social class, with whom they communicate and whose aspirations intellectuals are fulfilling. In other words, the status of an intellectual is a status of a tool, lacking reason or purpose of its own. While Gramsci and Mannheim do not directly give the normative, or moralist guidelines as Benda, they do see the role of an intellectual as closely tied to the class structure of the society, that the possibilities for an independent intellectual action are scarce. The question of political action by intellectuals is answered in two ways: Autonomous political action by intellectuals is either impossible or unwanted, and indeed dangerous because it would corrupt the idea of the intellectuals, or that it is impossible, because the idea of detached, in terms of a class, intellectuals is impossible

A completely different perspective is provided by Jean-Paul Sartre, who thinks that meddling into things is the precondition of being an intellectual, and politicking is the thing that intellectuals do. For example Sartre criticizes the French post 1848 generation of abandoning the way of doing politics by writing, therefore being no intellectuals like their predecessors (Palonen 1990, 134). Sartre also has a completely different understanding of politics than Benda or Mannheim, as he sees politics as a dimension of a person, as people are condemned to politics like they are condemned to freedom (Sartre 1948). For Sartre, however, a political intellectual is someone who is politicking outside their area of expertise. Therefore a scholar who is acting as an expert in the field and pointing out to the audience that particular aspects should also be taken into consideration or pointing towards possible new areas of politicization is not intellectual in a Sartrean sense, which sees intellectual as someone working outside one's area of expertise. (Sartre 1972)

Sartrean intellectual "call for action" can be found from Vaclav Havel, who in 1986 while Czechoslovakia was still under the communist rule, wrote that:

> The intellectual should constantly disturb, should bear witness to the misery of the world, should be provocative by being independent, should rebel against all hidden and open pressure and manipulations, should be the chief doubter of systems of power and its incantations, should be a witness to their mendacity. (Karabel 1996, 205)

Noam Chomsky argues that an intellectual should remain intact from restricting outside influence, by which Chomsky is referring to material benefits, for example the grants in the university, which work to tame the intellectual. These influences can work as bribing mechanisms that subdue the intellectual so that he cannot liberate himself from this golden cage of grants and professions. Chomsky sees that this has happened to the intellectuals in the United States, and he argues, that the intellectuals should break free from these

ties and engage politically [15]. As Benda saw betrayal in the intellectual's *attachment*, Chomsky sees it in intellectual's *detachment* from politics (Foster 1996, 75). This nevertheless refers mostly to politics, as clearly for Chomsky, an intellectual should try to remain detached in reference to the bribing mechanisms mentioned above. For Chomsky "it is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and expose lies" disregarding the sphere where this activity would ever take place (Chomsky 1967, 2). (From Chomsky see for example Chomsky 1967; 1969)

2.2   Intellectuals in Britain

As my thesis is about the people who could be termed as intellectuals in Northern Ireland I will pay a special attention to the intellectual debate in Britain. This is done at the expense of the continental debate but does not reflect any idea that the British debate would be generally more interesting. The   term intellectual also has a different meaning in different contexts. Also the political role of a scholar or an intellectual has been very different in different countries. As the term intellectual is itself of French origin, it is also the case that the intellectual as a free floating and independent figure has been a predominately a French phenomenon. This goes beyond the coining of the actual terms as already the French *philosophes* were known of their absence of traditional status or function in the society, whereas in Germany the representatives of enlightenment were university professors and state officials (Bauman, 1987, 25-26). Obviously the birth of the term intellectual in the late 19th century does not mean that such activity did not exist before. One very interesting example in the Anglo-Irish context is of course Jonathan Swift (1667-1745), as his *Modest Proposal* (1729) could be considered as a prime example of intellectual politicking. However, I will look at intellectuals post the Dreyfuss affair.

In his book *The Absent Minds* (2006) Stefan Collini, a professor of intellectual history and English literature in Cambridge, maps out the role of the intellectuals in Britain as well as discusses the thesis that intellectuals have been virtually absent in Britain. Collini seeks to uncover a larger tradition behind the debate on intellectuals in Britain and puts forward the claim of their absence under question. Collini notices that this claim has been advanced mostly by those, who in other cultures would be described as intellectuals themselves. In this sense Collini asks if the "absence claim" is a product of some kind of "Dreyfus-envy", in which the socio-political situation in Britain has been such that a need for an 'oppositional' intelligentsia has been lacking. This is to say, that the British aristocracy, church and bourgeoisie have been able to

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[15]   This brings to mind also Weber's *Wissenschaft als Beruf* in which Weber describes how the different university systems of Germany and the United States create different subordinating, material and other, power relations between a young scholar starting his career and the system and its more established members (Weber 1991 [1919]).

adapt to different pressures inflicted upon them by the changes in society so that the development leading to the politicization of the intellectuals has not been 'required'. (Collini 2006, 3-6)

There have been numerous ways to explain the claimed absence of the intellectual in Britain. The conflicts with France, at the time when the British nationalism was evolving might have produced a sense of "Gallophobia", which has lead to the negation of the French view of the intellectuals as politically active and influential (Heyck 1998, 196). Another claim has been that 'theories do not influence politics in Britain'. This reduction of ideas to theories and politics to public debate is something Collini challenges (see also Heyck 1998, 196). Thomas William Heyck lists three different reasons for the sense that intellectuals have not been significant in British history: The tradition of modern British history carrying an image of non-intellectual identity, the high degree of intellectuals within the ruling elite, and the problematic multiple meanings of the actual term intellectual (Heyck1998, 193). (Collini 2006, 3-6)

In Britain a concept in competition with the term intellectual has been 'the clerisy', which was particularly used by Samuel Taylor Coleridge since 1818 (Heyck 1998, 203). The term was never taken to a public use, but nevertheless it has been considered to bear a distinctive national tradition, which perhaps with its connotations serves to explain the larger view on intellectuals in Britain. Sometimes the term was used to describe the learned men of the nation such as poets, philosophers etc. and sometimes representatives of the national church. Nevertheless the conception itself has roots in religion and describes the clericy in a role of a local vicar or a priest, without the necessity of 'speaking out', which was in fact something Coleridge explicitly did not want from the clerisy. Coleridge saw the clerisy as being supported by the nation, by which he did not mean a simple a system of scholarships, stipends or pensions but a more integral link between the nation and the clerisy. In a sense, Coleridge saw the clerisy as a modern secular and culturally emphasised substitute for the clergy (Heyck 1998, 207). For some, this has been used as an explanation for the claimed absence of the British intelligentsia. However, since Coleridge, the general view has become one that an intellectual would be someone with some sort of 'official' status, granted by the government or some kind of science community, it is argued that Britain has lacked the birth of a truly independent intelligentsia forming a counter force to the state. But looking at the "intellectual history" of Britain, by Collini, this argument seems empty. (Collini 2006, 77-79)

The intellectual activity in Britain in the early 20th century concentrated on periodicals such as the *Nation* and later the *New Age*. The first issue of the *Nation* appeared in March 1907 and gathered leading figures of literary and cultural scene in Britain. The paper mixed culture with politics when it opposed the government in the events leading to the First World War and subsequently became a nest for the anti-war poets for the later years of the war. The *Nation* had real political power, as the paper was also close to some members of the government such as Lloyd George, and Winston Churchill. Contrary to the

Nation the other intellectually significant, paper the *New Age*, had a different approach, as it tried to carry on a strategy stretched on a longer time span and whereas the *Nation* was a paper for the Liberal party leaders, the *New Age* appealed to the Labour voter. These periodicals had an important role to play in the introduction of the intellectuals to the general public and encouraging their political interaction. Periodicals had an ongoing importance and the 1960's with the *New Left Review* (NLR) with Perry Anderson as its editor for two decades was a leading example of the Marxist oriented intellectual politicking (Collini, 171-175). (Collini 2006, 93-107)

The merit of being an intellectual was nevertheless something gained with cultural achievements. This can be illustrated when we take a look at the concepts used to describe and denominate intellectuals in the 1920's. Highbrow-middlebrow-lowbrow was the best known hierarchy designed to designate the intellectual division of people, in which the highbrow was someone with extensive cultural achievements. According to Collini no one could be termed as a highbrow for having average cultural merits attached to the active politicking. Therefore the cultural achievement was a constitutive for becoming a highbrow. Further, the definite qualification action for being a highbrow was being a member of the highbrow literary society, such as the Bloomsbury group, which became almost a synonym for being a highbrow. Bloomsbury also indicates the character of intellectuals, or highbrows, as extremely localized. In England highbrows were almost completely centred in London, more precisely in Bloomsbury or Hampstead, with Virginia Woolf being a leading figure of highbrow intellectuals. Apart as localized, intellectuals of the 1920's and 1930's were *other* people, such as habitants of the previously mentioned London boroughs, or foreigners, jews, homosexuals etc., which also meant, that because of their otherness and cosmopolitan nature, their loyalties lay elsewhere. Intellectuals were something not very English in nature. This said, the presence of the intellectuals was eminent and events like the Spanish civil war, which was the *last great cause* of the leftist intellectuals, brought them also to public attention. (Collini 2006, 112-124)

In the 1960's the general outburst of leftist social criticism culminated in the *New Left Review*, which went through a change in its editorial board when the old guard was replaced by a new generation led by Perry Anderson, Robin Blackburn and Tom Nairn. The analysis of the NLR on the status of the intellectuals in Britain used the concepts and explanatory strategies of Marxism. The analysis, which was mainly the product of Anderson, found the reason for the absence of a proper intelligentsia in Britain from the distinct nature of the British society, and from its social history lacking certain key phases that could be found in continental Europe. In terms of social history and social tensions the NLR analysis argued, that since the bourgeois class had never had to challenge the Victorian social order, the regime was never forced to produce a social theory for its defence, which the intellectuals could then challenge. The NLR analysis was criticized by E.P. Thomson and others, but even Thompson shared many of the ideas with Anderson, especially the view that the lack of a conflict

between the intellectuals and the authority had prevented the need for a systematic critique by the intellectuals. Instead of a conflict between the intellectuals and the authorities on the grounds of social criticism, the conflict, or at least antagonism, has been between the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie, in which the intellectuals have assumed a role of defenders of everything English, like country houses, landscapes and non-political literature (Heyck 1998, 197). Again, when referring to the other side of the channel, this NLR sentiment can be termed as "Dreyfus envy". Anderson argued, that the British discourse lacked "the discourse of totality", which meant that there was no attempt to theorize the society as a whole, or that there was an absence of a grand theory. Although, after the publication of the Anderson analysis in 1968, the emphasis of the British sociological publications on intellectuals has been to undermine the NLR analysis, the absence claim of British intellectuals has remained. Stefan Collini's *Absent Minds?* represents the latest counter argument to this debate. (Collini 2006, 171-183)

Another concept in the British, and overall, discussion on intellectuals has been "intelligentsia", which especially Isaiah Berlin used of Britain, partly to back the absence claim. The term intelligentsia has its roots in Russia and it denotes to, at least on certain level, collective, public position taking and requires some level of organisation among the intellectuals. Berlin argues that nothing like this was seen in Britain. One point to make is also that even if intellectuals did not use power as a class in Britain, they have always been in power as members of the ruling elite, since in England the integration of the intellectuals in the ruling class has been comparatively high (Heyck 1998, 201), although the growth of the academic public sphere in the 1970's-1980's was largely Marxist (Collini 2006, 189). Turning to the 1970's and 1980's some intellectuals had an opportunity for an increased influence in the Conservative party, which had previously been more suspicious of the intellectuals. This was due to the fact that the New Left and the New Right were both creations of a different leftist and rightist think-tanks, set up to win the intellectual battle between the parties (Collini 2006, 194). This is also a phenomenon with some similarities to 1990's Northern Ireland, where the unionist scholars/intellectuals organized unionist inclined think tanks to give more vigour to the intellectual debate against Irish nationalism. In this case the models for think tanks were probably taken across the Irish sea. (Collini 2006, 183-188)

2.3   Scholars and politics

When it comes to the relations of the academic and the political, or science and politics, we cannot bypass Max Weber. Weber can on the surface be labelled easily as a representative of a crude dichotomy between science and politics, a protagonist for the idea that these two should not mix. Backing for this idea can be found in *Wissenschaf als Beruf* in which Weber explicitly argues that politics is

out of place in the lecture room and continues to make a distinction between the words used in science, in a lecture room, and those used in politics; words in the lecture room are tools to inspire creative thought, in politics they are weapons against one's enemies (Weber 1991 [1919], 24). Weber argues a distinction between answering questions posed by problems of science and answering questions of the value of individual cultures, or how one should act in a cultural community or a political association. The first cases are questions that science can give answers to, but the latter cases fall outside the lecture room, since "…der Prophet und der Demagoge nicht auf den Katheder eines Hörsaals gehören" (Weber 1991 [1919], 25).

For Weber the lecture room is a place where the lecturer is free to make his point without criticism. This is because the audience must remain silent, and is not allowed to challenge the words of the lecturer. A wise teacher must not take advantage of this situation, and must refrain from stating his personal political beliefs. This differs from politics, where words are uttered in public, and can be, and are, constantly challenged. This can of course be interpreted as an ethical guideline for teachers (Scott 1997, 53-54). However, to go deeper, this can also be seen as a remark on the nature of politics. For Weber, the ideal for politics is the parliamentary tradition of public challenge and debate, which will discussed shortly. Weber's metaphor of the lecture room can not therefore be taken simply as the last word on the demarcation between science and politics. More than that, it is a metaphor to underline the difference between a situation of free debate and that of getting the message dictated to you. In the lecture room metaphor the teacher is a teacher and nothing but a teacher, even if the students have a tendency to portray the teacher as a leader. This simply means that the teacher/scholar should not take up the role of a leader and tell the people what to do or how to live, but to remain in their specific role. (Weber 1991 [1919])

When we look at what Weber says about being a politician and being a scholar from the perspective of action, the difference between the figures of a politician and a scholar seem to evaporate. For Weber politics is a contingent struggle (*Kampf*) for power shares (*Machteil*) and the prime objective of a politician is to get support and voters, which provide the means to accomplish things. For a scholar this is not too far fetched, as a scholar also works under similar logic, and also has to convince the listeners that what is said makes sense, can be believed and supported. Both, politician and a scholar strive for power shares. (Palonen 2005b, 1). What scholars do is on the level of action therefore analogous with the politicians. Only their means differ. Also, in the intellectual interventions under discussion, it is important to keep in mind that truth and objectivity have a powerful rhetorical aspect. By appealing to them one can drive one's point more forcefully, and with a bigger chance in succeeding.

Objectivity is a notion strongly attached to Weber. However, it is debatable whether by objectivity Weber is referring to ideal that there could be some kind of absolute, pure, truth to be found by applying the scientific

method of objectivity. At least when it comes to matters of "cultural life" (*Kulturleben*), Weber himself makes it explicitly clear in the very "objektivität" article that there simply is no such thing as objective analysis.

> Es gibt keine schlechthin "objektive" wissenschaftliche Analyse des Kulturlebens oder – was vielleicht etwas Engeres für unsern Zweck aber sicher nichts wesentlich anderes bedeutet – der "sozialen Erscheinungen" unabhängig von speziellen und "einseitigen" Gesichtspunkten, nach denen sie – ausdrücklich oder stillschweigend, bewußt – als Forschungsobject ausgewählt, analysiert und darstellend gegliedert werden[16]. (Weber 1904, 170)

For Weber objectivity is explicitly not a character or an attribute of an object, a character or an attribute of a person or some kind of a golden mean to which one should follow, or an Archimedean point that can be reached. But what then does Weber mean by "objektivität"? Kari Palonen interprets Weber's notion of objectivity ("objektivität") as being a regulative idea of how the debate in science should be conducted, and not as a procedure to find the absolute "objective" truth (Palonen 2006). For Weber science is an activity of the concept building process ("Umbildungsprozess der Begriffe") in which the individual scholar is in strife (Streit) with other scholars, with a central feature of the debate being the three staged process of concept building ("Begriffsbildung") dispersion ("Auflösung") and the subsequent emergence of a new concept ("Neubildung"). This process, however, requires guidelines to prevent the scientific debate becoming a pointless quarrel, which would not be able to keep the dynamics of science ongoing. Objectivity is then needed to regulate the struggle between different perspectives, so that every perspective should have an equal chance of proving itself worthy (Palonen 2005b, 8). Palonen argues that for this purpose Weber offered the notion of objectivity, which serves as a guideline for a fair play in the scientific debate, but not as a programme of getting to the "truth". Therefore no-one can claim to be objective, as objectivity being a character of a person, when objectivity is something which regulates how debates are being carried out. (Palonen 2006; Weber 1904)

Palonen argues that Weber turns towards a parliamentary paradigm when he searches for a proper metaphor for the academic debate, to constitute what Weber called objectivity. For Weber, the English tradition of the Parliament being fundamentally a place to speak *pro et contra*, unhindered, until a resolution is found, should constitute a model for a debate in science. Weber is explicitly referring to the old parliamentary tradition in England, before any means to limit the discussions were put in use. The rhetorical principal of the parliament ensures that every proposition is thoroughly tested by the debaters before it is accepted. For Weber, this constituted a perfect analogy with the

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[16]   Translation: "There is no simple, objective scientific analysis of the cultural life or – what perhaps means something more restricted, but for our purpose certainly nothing essentially different – of "social phenomena" independent of specific and "one-sided" viewpoints from which they are – explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously – chosen, analysed and descriptively structures as research objects. (Translation: JR)

scientific debate. In Palonen's interpretation, objectivity refers to the parliamentary paradigm as constituting the rules of engagement, a fair play between the debaters, and perspectives, without implying a non-partisanship need for the people, or perspectives, engaged. The parliamentary paradigm is also in harmony with the three staged *Umbildungsprozess der Begriffe,* which, analogously with Parliament, takes place through deliberation in the debate. That the metaphor for objectivity is found in the practices of the parliament already clarifies that for Weber politics and science are in many ways analogous. This goes hand in hand with the fact that for Weber politics is an aspect present in all human life, not something confined to one particular place, a parliament for instance. Why then would science make an exception to the rule? The elements that Weber argues in *Politik als Beruf* (Weber 1919) every politician would need to have: passion (*Leidenschaf*t) sense of responsibility (*Weranwortungsgefu*l) and judgement (*Augenmass*) are the qualities of a scholar also. (Palonen 2006)

For Weber science is not something determining what a certain person in a certain situation *should* do, but a science that can "only" show different possibilities, in essence: what *could* be done[17]. This notion cuts through the analysis here as well, as I am describing the interventions of the academic unionists as actions suggesting different options or playing with different possibilities more freely than the unionist politician could. With objectivity understood as guidelines or regulations of a debate it is clear that one cannot blame a scholar of being not objective when carrying out a study with certain selected perspectives. It is perfectly acceptable to be committed to a certain normative doctrine and with the means of an academic study to show what is possible and what could be done.

In addition to Weber's and Palonen's understanding to objectivity also Dominic LaCapra's notion of objectivity is worthwhile to keep in mind throughout this thesis:

> Objectivity in a desirable sense should be seen as a process of attempting to counteract identificatory and other phantasmatic tendencies without denying, or believing one can fully transcend, them. (LaCapra 2004, 71)

LaCapra's views complements the line of thinking of Weber and Palonen and gives one additional reference point to this work in looking how one's subject positions might be written out. Is the commitment to a certain doctrine written out, like LaCapra calls for, or is it hidden and implicated only when one is able to read the work of an academic from the perspective of looking into its political aspect, or even considering the text as one type of political speech act amongst others? This is of course a conscious choice of the author and is an integral part of the rhetorical nature of any given text.

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17   "Eine Empirische Wissenschaft vermag niemanden zu lehren, was er soll, sondern nut, was er kann und – unter Umständen was er will" (Weber 1904, 151)

When I look at the scholars in Northern Ireland engaging in political activity without completely stepping away form the podium of the of a lecture room, the notion of objectivity and how this notion is been used is interesting. There is a rhetorical strategy in place where objectivity is something that has been made analogous to the facts; what the scholar is saying is taken as fact based evidence. This strategy is common and understandably effective in giving extra weight to a point. This rhetorical strategy describes science and the academic world as fundamentally apolitical, and follows the interpretation of Weber's objectivity that sees politicking in a strong contradiction with the ethos of the scholar. This strategy also builds heavily on the depoliticization of science. There is however another strategy which accepts that the scholar is no more detached than any other agent engaged in political action through words. The academic debate cannot escape the political, and, as a matter of fact *is* political debate with a different means and slightly different rules of engagement. This strategy goes together with the deeper understanding of what Weber meant by objectivity, as well as acknowledges the two way relationship between science and politics as ideas and debates can pass between them. This strategy goes together with what Weber and LaCapra mean by objectivity, as well as acknowledges the two way relationship between science and politics as ideas and debates can pass between them.

2.4 Unionist intellectuals

2.4.1 University politics in Ireland and Northern Ireland

The ideas of "intellectual unionism", political thought of unionism and the politically attached unionist scholars cannot be discussed without a brief excursion to the history of universities in Ireland, as universities are a common nesting place for intellectuals and certainly for scholars, and as such a prerequisite for any academic interventions. It is not a surprise that the process of setting up universities in Ireland has not escaped the same dichotomy of unionism/nationalism and Protestant/Catholic as everything else, and that science debates have also had a political aspect.

The first royal charter establishing a university in Ireland was received in 1592, which marked the birth of the Trinity College, Dublin. The new university was structured along the examples of Oxford and Cambridge. Trinity also had a seat in the Irish parliament. According to Atkinson (Atkinson 1969, 36) Trinity was also the first of the colonial universities and as such served as an example for Harvard (1639), Yale (1701) and Columbia (1734) across the Atlantic. Trinity College was perceived as an institution to implement the official Anglican policy and to educate the upper levels of the Irish youth in the English manner. Admission of Catholics or other Protestants than Anglicans was never formally denied, but they were nevertheless in effect excluded. As Irish nationalism started its rise in the early 19th century and intermingled more and more with

the Roman Catholic Church, a need for a nondenominational or a Catholic university along with the Anglican Trinity rose. Catholic Maynooth College was established in 1790 to answer the needs to produce educated members to the Catholic clergy. Maynooth, together with the secular Queen's colleges in 1845 in Belfast, Cork and Galway, then began to challenge the leading role of Trinity. Although the three Queen's colleges were nondenominational in the sense that they did not require any religious tests, nor did they have the same Anglican ethos as Trinity, they were clearly established on a religious basis, as Cork and Galway were primarily thought of as places of higher education for local Catholics, and the Belfast Queen's college for the substantial Presbyterian population in the North of Ireland (Boylan & Foyley 1992, 51). (ibid. 17-44)

Political science was, obviously, not among the curriculum of the Irish universities in those days. Nevertheless, teaching of "political economy" started in Trinity 1832 and in the three Queen's colleges in 1845, together with jurisprudence. Boylan and Foley argue that political economy was used first in effort to assimilate the Irish with the English by "inculcating into them the bourgeois virtues of self-interest, prudence and calculation"(Boylan & Foley, 1996, 113), but that "the weapon" of political economy was turned the other way around, as the Irish academics adopted it to the Irish context with criticism and change, forming a counterforce to the efforts of assimilation. (Boylan & Foley, 1996).

In terms of Britain as a whole, the history of the discipline of political science is somewhat hard to crystallize and no full account of the discipline in Britain has been written. Furthermore, political science may have been practiced without the actual title, so presenting a chronological order of the chairs of political science would give us little. In the 20th century the initial focus in the universities was in improving governance but as the century advanced less normative use of the political science also evolved. Prominent names in this development include Harold J. Laski (1893-1950), who was appointed as a professor of political science at the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1926 and Michael Oakshott (1901-1990) who succeeded Laski at LSE from 1950. The Political Studies Association (PSA) was established in Britain in 1950 as the first professional body devoted to the study of politics and its journal *Political Studies* started in 1953, while the other central journal *Political Quarterly* had surfaced in 1930. (Collini 2001; Collini, Winch and Burrow 1983, 365-379)

The degree granting institution to the North, Queen's University, was established in 1850. The imminent agenda behind this move was the perceived lack of higher education in Ireland, which was thought dangerous in the light of Daniel O'Connell's campaign to repeal the union between Great Britain and Ireland. The establishment of higher learning institutes could therefore be interpreted as a defensive move on behalf of the British interests in fear of the rising Irish nationalism and separatism. The Queen's colleges and the subsequent Queen's university were providing a higher education for students with mixed religious background. This was applauded by the Presbyterians,

while the more Catholic strands of Irish nationalism, namely O'Connell, condemned the "godless colleges". (Boylan & Foyley 1992, 44-55)

In 1882 the Catholic university, run by the Jesuits, became The University College Dublin, and in 1908 the three Queen's Colleges were dissolved and replaced with the National University of Ireland and Queen's University of Belfast. Trinity continued as a haven of Anglicanism in Ireland, and also developed into a bastion of southern Ireland unionism when the political battles started after the first Irish Home Rule Bill (1886). The religious tests were abolished from Trinity by 1873, though it still remained a place of Protestant Ascendancy, partly because the Catholic Church did not lift its ban on Catholics enrolling in Trinity before 1970. The ban in effect meant the church's disapproval to enrol into Trinity, but in extreme it could lead to excommunication. This led to a situation in which Trinity remained considerably longer as the Protestant university of the increasingly homogenous Roman Catholic Ireland.

Right after the British Prime minister William Gladstone had agreed to present the Irish Home Rule bill, John Tyndall a professor of natural philosophy and superintendent of the Royal Institution, London contacted Thomas Henry Huxley a well known biologist known as Darwin's bulldog, to put together a memorandum amongst the members of the Royal Society to explain the implications of Home Rule. The memorandum never materialised, but nevertheless this marked the start of a more or less unified resistance of a group of anti-Home Rule scientists, who mixed scientific arguments to day-to-day politics. Huxley himself was an experienced public discussant, since he had built a reputation defending Darwinism and agnosticism. Other known figures of the movement, sharing the sentiment of becoming ardent unionists after the introduction of the Home Rule bill, were Belfast born Lord Kelvin and George Gabriel Stokes, professor of mathematics in Cambridge. They already represented the combination of scholar and politician. (Jones 2001, 188-190)

The concern of the scientists was that the ethos of scientific modernisation in the United Kingdom would be put into jeopardy by the Irish Home Rule. The Darwinian revolution and scientific modernisation had spread also to Ireland where among others Robert Ball, Astronomer Royal of Ireland, was the leading figure of the modernisation. Modernisation was strongest in Protestant dominated Trinity College of Dublin. However, the project of scientific modernisation collided with the project of Irish nationalism, which had started to define itself increasingly through Catholicism, the church being considerably more sceptical towards scientific modernisation in general, and especially hostile towards Darwinism. The Home Rule movement demanded that the chairs of the Irish universities would not all go to the Protestant scientists, but the Protestants, who were considered foreign, were to be replaced for the benefit of a national academia of Ireland. To promote this, the universities should be made denominational, which would in effect have meant the supervision by the Roman Catholic Church. This was not acceptable for the larger part of the scientific community in Ireland, provoking the scientists to

choose sides between nationalism and unionism. It was proposed, that the National University of Ireland would incorporate Trinity, Queen's Colleges (Belfast, Cork, Galway) and University College Dublin. The new university would then bring with it a policy that would prohibit the teacher from offensive behaviour, which was interpreted by the opponents of the plan as a clause through which the Church could make an intervention to a teaching that it would not accept. It was feared that this plan would to lead to a disaster of Irish science and was fiercely opposed. To defend the freedom of the universities the Dublin University Defence Committee was formed in 1907, and it issued a manifesto warning that the division of universities on denominational grounds was erroneous. Eventually both Trinity and Queen's College Belfast (later University of) were exempt from the new National University, and, in the view of the Huxleyites, this saved the scientific modernisation in Ireland. The formation of the twenty-six county Ireland in 1922 increased the denominationalisation of education in the southern part of the island, and while the Trinity College remained independent, it faced serious financial cuts. Entering Trinity was also banned by the Catholic Church and therefore it remained an enclave of the Protestant minority way beyond the partition of Ireland. (Jones 1991, 190-202)

Of course it is difficult to determine how much the opposition of the scientists against the Irish Home Rule was purely scientific. But it is a fact that the science aspect of the Home Rule debate did offer a new angle to mould a political campaign against it. Indeed, what the anti Home Rule scientists were doing was that they were opposing Home Rule and not opposing merely the plans for a national university, for example. In this respect it cannot be argued that their campaign would have been in some sense apolitical, or merely intra science. Moreover it shows that separating these two is virtually impossible.

Although Queen's University Belfast was originally set to serve the Presbyterian population, dense in the north, it has always been a nondenominational independent university governed with its own Senate Queen's and has never functioned either as "the national university of Northern Ireland" or as a Presbyterian or a Protestant university. Nevertheless, the strong protestant resistance towards Home Rule in the North, and finally the partition of Ireland in 1921 obviously contributed to the fact that Queen's adopted a unionist ethos. The role of Queen's University has been quite insignificant in the politics of Northern Ireland, although it has not escaped from the sectarian tensions as the Student Union elections, for instance, have been heated. This goes, in addition, to prove that Queen's University has not discriminated or segregated but that conflicts have had the freedom to emerge. In the civil rights unrest of the late 1960's Queen's students composed a significant body, as will be described later. Belfast born Mary McAleese, the current president of Ireland, is a Queen's alumni and a former professor, who raised the hatred of the unionists when she, as Vice-Chancellor of the university, backed the campaign to ban the playing of the United Kingdom national anthem "God Save the Queen" from Queen's graduation ceremony in 1997. After the decision

some even suspected that Protestants would have to face a certain "chill factor" when enrolling at Queen's (Cormack, Gallagher and Osborne 1997, 79). Another known former Queen's academic is UUP's former leader David Trimble, who taught in the Department of Commercial and Property Law and also served as its head of department in 1980-1989.

Northern Ireland's second university, The New University of Ulster, was set up in 1968 in Coleraine, neglecting the second biggest city of Northern Ireland Derry/Londonderry[18], in which the Catholic/nationalist population had the majority. The new university was set up in Coleraine despite the fact that Magee University College already existed in Derry/Londonderry and which the Catholic community hoped would become the second official university of Northern Ireland. The decision of the unionist government caused fury in the Catholic population, and was one incident more to turn Northern Ireland towards the subsequent political collapse. Magee University in Derry/Londonderry was incorporated to the New University of Ulster as one campus, with others in Coleraine (administrational centre), Belfast and Jordanstown, and the University, which is currently the biggest in all Ireland, was named University of Ulster in 1984.

There is little information on the denominational structure of the student body in the Northern Ireland universities, as the latest such date was published in 1909. It seems, however, that Catholics have been underrepresented until the 1980's (Callagher 1989, Section 8). But judging from some unionist minded comments, since the 1990's there has even been a fear of the flow of the unionist intelligentsia from Northern Ireland, since many of the young people with Ulster Protestant backgrounds choose the mainland UK institutions of higher education instead of the Northern Irish universities (Godson 2004, 359-360). This has also contributed to the, claimed, increasingly anti-British "environment" at Queen's University (Godson 2004, 360).

2.4.2 Unionism, an idea without an intellect?

Previous study regarding unionist intellectuals is scarce, at least when we narrow the scope to studies which have specifically discussed unionist intellectuals under that term and their activities as the activities of an intellectual. It seems the denial of the existence of such a thing as a unionist intellectual is more common. Someone who raises this denial is Tom Nairn, mentioned earlier as one of the notable Marxist intellectuals of Britain and the editor of the *New Left Review*. Nairn argues that "bible fundamentalism and Union Jackery made impossible the development of a normal national intelligentsia" and that the unionist community can be described as lacking an

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[18]   The official name of the city with nationalist majority is Londonderry, but the nationalist prefer to use the name Derry (Anglicisation of the Irish original *Daire*) and also the city council has decided to use that name. The politically correct way of avoiding the politics of naming is to use the term Derry/Londonderry, which I have chosen.

intellectual class (Nairn 1977, 241). A more interesting and coherent argument, still arriving at much the same conclusion, is from a sociologist Liam O'Dowd, to which we turn now because during this thesis I will turn to O'Dowd as a reference point on numerous occasions.

O'Dowd understands the term "intellectual" as someone who is part of the *intelligentsia*, a sociologically defined educated class, including academics, and those in managerial jobs and so on. Intelligentsia serves as the soil for the growth of intellectuals, who are born when they start concerning themselves with social questions beyond their professional role, and start acting politically. O'Dowd states that while unionism has intelligentsia it lacks intellectuals. The reason for this, argues O'Dowd, is the tendency of the unionist educated strata to take a more technical area of expertise than the more humanist oriented Irish nationalist intelligentsia. Therefore, the Northern intelligentsia has become predominantly technical and apolitical whereas the southern intellectuals are more humanist oriented and political. Because of this, even the few intellectuals that are born will not reach any status of importance. Therefore O'Dowd sees unionism and unionist political culture as characterized by marginalised intellectuals. The marginalisation is the outcome of the nature of the unionist politics as predominately popular politics. Unionist politics have always stressed the importance of popular support for the sake of intellectual debate. Irish nationalism, on the contrary, has given a much more prominent role for its intellectuals, making nationalism more comprehensible and rhetorically superior to unionism. In other words the bad press and a misunderstanding of unionism, is a reason for its failure to utilize its intellectual potential. Or more starkly, like O'Dowd points, unionism does not have a philosophy worth intellectual dwelling. (O'Dowd 1991, 153-160)

O'Dowd and Nairn seem to share the presumption that the development of nationalism is essential for the development of intellectuals, and the lack of a proper nationalism in the North of Ireland is what makes a unionist intellectual impossibility and the Irish nationalist intellectuals axiomatic. O'Dowd accepts nationalism as a basis for one's identity without questioning and confronting the criticism nationalist thinkers have received. One of these is Ernest Gellner's remark that the theorists of nationalism have never played in the intellectual First Division (Gellner 1983, 124). O'Dowd, however, argues that whereas nationalists were able to construct a "normal" imagined community through extensive debate led by the nationalist intellectuals, the unionists were left to take onboard the "frequently racist ideology of British imperialism in the nineteenth century"[19]. O'Dowd also makes a contrast between North and South on the grounds that only the latter can be argued to form a nation. Therefore, the existence of a Northern national ideology is an anathema to O'Dowd. The tragedy for the North was that through partition the northern people were cut

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[19]   This thinking can obviously be heavily criticized on the basis of it being a case of *La Trahison Des Clercks*. This point is made not only by numerous people who could be termed as Northern Ireland intellectuals, but also some in the south of Ireland, most notably Conor Cruise O'Brien (see for example O'Brien 1988).

off from the more politically oriented, debating and enlightened intellectuals of the south. For unionists, there was no nation to build, so their intellectual invention was the state, and its focus was not in constructing a civil society or a polity, but in advancing the capitalist development (O'Dowd 1996, 17). O'Dowd does not, however, explain how was it possible that the Southern Irish state became a state with theocratic features equipped with the archaic, agrarian based economy and ultra conservative legislation with the type of humanist intellectual drive he describes. Northern Ireland, O'Dowd argues, build its identity on Orangeism, wiping out the possibility of a civilised political debate in the North. Although O'Dowd is heavy on his arguments for the lack of reason behind unionism, he is not alone, since the argument that unionists do not have intellectuals to develop a political philosophy or a systematic political thinking is a shared also by other scholars (e.g. Todd 1993). (O'Dowd 1991, 161-163)

O'Dowd argues that because unionism lacked intellectuals, its political culture came to rely on popular power. Unionism did not feel the need to articulate or self-reflect. Until the civil rights protests in the 1960's that put unionism in crisis, unionism could reign without intellectually thought out political philosophy, resting on absolute state power. The Irish nationalist intellectuals have on the other hand served as a vanguard in numerous ways in the re-structuring of the nationalist ideology and politics, as the unionist community has not felt the need to "mount a sustained ideological offensive to either establish, or maintain their state" (O'Dowd 1991, 167). So, in the unionist dictated state there has not been a role for political intellectuals. O'Dowd's criticism comes close to the larger claim of the absence of the British intellectual, especially the Marxist argument that intellectuals in Britain do not exist, because there has not been a necessary conflict between them and the state (Heyck 1998, 197). Further, O'Dowd sees the 1990's phenomenon, where unionist scholars activated, and which one might interpret as a unionist intellectual renaissance, as a sign of a final withdrawal from the thought that there could ever be an intellectually defensible unionist case (O'Dowd 1996).

For O'Dowd the main problem seems to be, that as Northern Ireland unionists do not constitute a nation, Northern Ireland, or the unionist community, cannot have active intellectuals. For O'Dowd the political intellectual seems to be rigidly tied to the idea of a nation state, and as O'Dowd denies the possibility of Northern Ireland constituting one, there cannot be any intellectuals as well. The problem is that this removes the possibility of a more open understanding of intellectual involvement in Northern Ireland, and in my mind works against the empirical evidence.

A completely different perspective is offered by John Wilson Foster, who, it must be added, is among the people that can be termed unionist intellectuals, a unionist inclined Professor of English literature. Foster does not succumb to the detached notion of an intellectual, but he nevertheless accuses the Irish intellectuals of jumping on the nationalist bandwagon and turning themselves into instruments of the Irish pan-nationalist project. In a way Foster sees the Irish nationalist intellectuals in a Gramscian way as organic part of Irish

nationalism, and perhaps even O'Dowd can be seen to represent the same thinking as the stresses the link of nationalism and intellectual activity. Foster, nevertheless, also criticizes the intellectuals in Northern Ireland, for working in favour of the British government's design to mould the unionist psyche for the Irish unification. For Foster, intellectuals are not engaging independently, like they should, but manufacturing consent from the premises given by someone else (the British government). This project of creating false consciousness is made in tandem with the political process supporting unification, and is illustrated in acts like the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Where O'Dowd sees nationalism, or at least the concept of a nation, as a positive or even requirement for the existence of intellectuals, Foster interprets the same thing completely different. For him intellectuals need to engage themselves, but they should do that for more noble causes than for the sake of nationalism. Obviously Foster is referring especially to the Irish case. For Foster, unionism as an idea or a theory is defendable, but the problem is that there is hardly no-one defending it. (Foster 1996)

Beyond O'Dowd's and Foster's discussions in terms of intellectuals and ideology, unionism has been discussed interestingly by John D. Cash (Cash 1996), from the perspective of psychology, especially psychoanalytical theory. Cash's study is something that could be referred to in terms of a unionist political crisis and its reflections to ideology and political identity, because it strongly differs from the mainstream studies, but instead of straight references it has served more as a background reading, due to its very different theoretical premises.

Even from this fragment of the small intellectual debate in Northern Ireland we can see one thing: the debate on intellectuals, their purpose and status in the society, has actually turned into a debate on the validity of the partition of Ireland. To put it bluntly, arguments for and against in the intellectual debate are also arguments for and against the existence of the Northern Ireland state.

3   A PRELUDE IN RED: MARXISM AND CIVIL SERVANT POLITICKING

3.1   Marxism; green, red and orange[20]

The intellectual interventions and scholars acting politically are obviously not cases without history. Broadly speaking the intellectuals have had a role throughout the history of the "Northern Ireland question" or indeed the "Irish question". However, it is not my purpose to map out the whole history of intellectuals in Ireland and Northern Ireland for this dissertation. But there is a place from which I must start. This is the Marxist debates of the 1970's, which represented a point of origin for the intellectual engagement I am looking into. Some of the arguments familiar to the intellectuals involved in the "New unionism" movement of the 1990's were already voiced in the 1970's, and indeed, the persons behind these arguments are frequently the same. Still, the context is not identical and we have to separate these two phases from each other. But we cannot analyse the latter without knowing the former and that is why analysis starts from the 1970´s and its discussions. The context of the Northern Ireland politics behind the thought of the revisionist Marxist scholars of the 1970's has very recently raised in an article by Robert Perry (Perry 2008). Perry concentrates particularly on Paul Bew and Henry Patterson and on their "political project" to combat the classic nationalist Marxist understanding with a more unionist Marxism, which Perry calls "anti nationalist Marxist school of thought" (Perry 2008, 121). One answer to why the 1970's scholarly debate was done through Marxism is that the Marxist and anti-imperialist thesis supported Irish nationalism in such a hegemonic way that also the counter arguments needed to come inside Marxism.

Still, to argue that the 1970's the debate on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and on the political crisis that was at hand was done *solely*

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[20]   This wording is found in McGarry & O'Leary 1995.

through Marxism is erroneous. But if one looks through the British journals of political science since the partition of Ireland in 1921, a debate that is similar to the 1970′s Marxist debates cannot really be found. For instance, Scottish nationalism is a theme widely debated on the pages of *Political Studies* while Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland or nationalism as such in the context of Northern Ireland is not touched. Of course the argument against united Ireland on the grounds of the Roman Catholic nature of the Republic is there now and then, but political science and its theorists are not used as an argument building material in a similar way to the 1970′s debates based on Marxism.

However, non-Marxist studies existed. For example, from the twelve books reviewed by a Belfast academic John Whyte in one issue of the *American Political Science Review* in 1976 only one can be considered as leaning to Marxism (Eamon McCann′s *War and an Irish Town*). Nevertheless most of the writers in the review were living outside Northern Ireland (McCann being again the exception) and as the focus of this dissertation is the academics in Northern Ireland, the Marxist debate and especially aspect of politicking that was especially strong in the debate conducted through Marxism cannot be bypassed. In essence this meant that one tried to prove the validity of a point by building an argument to follow the Marxist dogmas. The theory was interpreted to suit one's agenda. This lead to a comical situation where we can identify among the debaters "green" Marxists who used Marx to argue for the unification of Ireland and "orange" Marxists who argued contrary that from the point of view of orthodox Marxism Northern Ireland should remain a part of the UK. One can also speak of "red" unionists who were similar to "orange" Marxists in their view that NI should remain in the UK, but who saw the actions of the state and the evolution of the modes of production in Ireland as more central than whether the desire for unification is a plot of the Irish nationalist bourgeoisie or not. In the classic Marxist writings national questions are considered to belong to the capitalist world as nations are more or less fabrications that hide the unity of the working class transcending national boundaries. Because of this, finding a solution to any ongoing ethnic conflict via the application of Marxism has not been a success.

The Marxist politicization of the academia in Northern Ireland can be argued to start in the 1970′s in line with the revision of the interpretation of the Irish question. Before that, the academic discussion had concentrated on constructing different defences for nationalist or unionist arguments, without interaction to each other, or the politicization of the political theory itself. The Marxist politicking that started in the 1970′s was different, as in it the unionist revisionist Marxists began to operate with the same conceptual tools that the traditional nationalist Marxists had used earlier.

The traditional nationalist Marxist interpretation of the Irish question was formulated by James Connolly (1870-1916) and can be compressed like this: The prime objective is the struggle for workers victory. However, this victory can not be achieved without a struggle for national independence, since socialism can not be built in Ireland without a total break from Britain. Home Rule for all

Ireland would eradicate the difference between Protestant and a Catholic, since Irish people constituted one unitary nation, and the unionist self consciousness was in essence fabricated by the oppressive and imperialist British. The unity of the Irish working class must be maintained at all costs, since the only thing capable of destroying the harmonious future was the partitioning of Ireland. The partition would keep alive the national question at the expense of the class question. The partition would therefore mean a 'carnival of reaction in both North and South'. The conflict was also seen as local, instead as part of a larger struggle between Marxism and capitalism which made it possible to see the solution simply in the British withdrawal (Smyth 1980, 33). (Connolly 1987 (1910); Whyte 1990, 176-177)

Doctrines that can be derived from this analysis are that the unionist people in Ireland are basically just duped by the British to work against their real calling as the members of the unitary Irish nation. In short, for traditional Connollyte Marxist the unionists were working under "false consciousness" and unionism as an ideology or political idea was more or less a fabrication by the British imperial oppressor. Furthermore, classes, the prime social movers of the Marxist analysis, were not working in their "usual roles" in Ireland for various reasons discussed below. Thus the Irish conflict had become a "classless conflict" in which the divisions were determined, not by a class, but by different religions and nationalisms. Although Connolly was not a full member of the Irish nationalist family, as people such as Patrick Pearse, Eamon De Valera, Michael Collins and other agents in the early 20th century, he nevertheless worked in alliance with them, as Marxism and nationalism shared the goal of casting off the British influence.

A concept explaining the failure of nationalism and socialism in the North was "class alliance". This referred to the presumed class alliance between the bourgeois employer and the protestant worker, designed to keep the Catholics out of the skilled jobs, thus creating something termed as the Protestant "labour aristocracy". This was seen by the Marxists as a reason why the most advanced industrial labour force in Ireland did not turn to socialism in the north, as the Marxist theory would have demanded. The class alliance between Protestants also ensured that neither nationalism nor socialism was able to penetrate the Protestant masses (Lysaght 1980, 19). However, the class alliance was seen as dependent upon the British connection, so by removing the British, the protestant worker would see the fundamental juxtaposition of capitalism and socialism and turn to the latter (Smyth 1980, 42). To complete the picture, we must also remember that in the 19th century the class alliances that nationalism was able to pull together in Ireland prevented the rise of socialism in Ireland so the failure of socialism, if one can speak of such, was not only a northern phenomena[21].

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[21] Whereas socialism failed as an idea to unify the people for one common goal in Ireland, nationalism succeeded. This was finalised by John Stewart Parnell (1846-1891) who succeeded in politicization of the land reform and combining it to the Catholic bound cultural nationalism. This united the social classes in Ireland for one

In the 1970's the classic Marxist position went through the process of splintering, and the Marxist political field saw the emergence of many Marxist groupings with different perspectives on Northern Ireland. One of the most active was the *People's Democracy* (PD), whose leading figures were a later "semi-academic" Michael Farrell and a civil rights activist Bernadette Devlin, who gained a global reputation as the voice of the oppressed Catholics. The left in Northern Ireland was as splintered as anywhere, and other leftist movements included such as the *Workers Party*, which was the outcome of the split between the Official and the Provisional IRA. The Workers Party later split further and the largest segment was named the "Democratic Left". One of the most visible academics involved in both the Workers Party and the Peoples Democracy was Paul Bew, who later became one of the biggest names in the study of Irish politics. Bew, now Baron Bew, was a student radical of his time and subsequently became a full fledged academic with a Ph.D. from Cambridge and a current professor of politics at Queen's University of Belfast. Bew has later served also as an informal advisor of the Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble (Richards, 2004).

The People's Democracy was founded in 1968 by the students of Queen's University of Belfast and its main "ideologist" was Farrell, who later became a straightforward Marxist IRA supporter. When we look at the PD pamphlet *The Struggle in the North* (1972), by Farrell, the argument of the movement is in line with the traditional Marxist interpretation, seeing the oppressive actions (gerrymandering[22] or inequality in terms of employment or housing) of the unionist state straightforwardly as actions of the oligarchic state to divide the working class, in order to prevent its unification (and slide towards Irish nationalism) and to purge potential traitors (Catholic nationalists) from the Orange state. In People's Democracy's pamphlet Connollyte conceptualization of Northern Ireland, where the unity of the working class is prevented by the oppression of the capitalist oligarchs, is used to legitimize the nationalist politics challenging the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland state, and the unity of the working class is taken as a face value, with the implication of the fabricated nature of the unionist political consciousness. (People's Democracy, 1972)

The key publication of the nationalist Marxist view was perhaps Farrell's provocatively named *Northern Ireland: The Orange State* (1976), which essentially condemns the existence of the Northern Ireland state as a creation for the need

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single cause of nationalism, thus making empty the aims of socialists, such as Connell later, to find unity in the working classes. (See for example English 2006)

[22] The word "gerrymander" is after the governor of Massachusetts Elbridge Gerry (1744-1814) and is most often used to refer to fixing of electoral boundaries so that a desired section of the electorate is given the majority. The word is a portmanteau of the words Gerry and salamander referring to the salamander like electoral district conceived in Massachusetts during Gerry's governorship. In Northern Ireland the most notorious example of gerrymandering was in the town of Derry/Londonderry in which the majority in the town council was secured for unionists by drawing the boundaries of the constituencies so that the unionists could win the majority of the seats with fewer total votes than the nationalists.

of the British imperialist held together by the unholy alliance of capitalists and protestant labour aristocracy controlled through semi-racist organisations like the Orange Order. Farrell saw Northern Ireland as completely unreformable, and united socialist Ireland as the only viable long term objective. (Farrell 1976)

The backbone of the nationalist Marxist interpretation of the conflict was the claim that the conflict was between the colonial and imperialist oppressor (Britain) and the progressive, unitary working class of Ireland[23]. The actions of Britain throughout history were explained as the British state following a divide and rule strategy, which included the use of the unionist people as agents of oppression and domination. The explanation rested on the 'one island, one nation' thesis of the traditional nationalism. This was questioned by a new type of a red variant of unionism: *British and Irish Communist Organisation* (BICO), which was influential in Northern Ireland, but almost completely unknown anywhere else. BICO came to the conclusion that economic development had produced two nations in Ireland, with separate identities and aspirations and the malign intentions of the British state had nothing to do with that development. (BICO 1971, 1972a).

The 'two nations[24]' theory itself was familiar from the unionist rhetoric of the 19th century, but the way in which it was reconceptualized, using the framework of Marxism, and contrasting economic development north and south, in contrast to argument building through race, character, work ethics and origin, was a new type of unionist defence. Before this reformulation of the unionist case, the argument of the two nations had rested on a myth of unionist racial superiority. This prodded the Irish left to unitarily support nationalism, which was considered as a far more progressive political idea. Therefore, the inversion of the 'one nation' thesis on the grounds of Marxist political theory was a huge coup for the unionist camp. BICO reversed the nationalist Marxist analysis, by arguing that the exogenous cause of the Northern Ireland conflict was the reactionary irredentism of the Irish state, not the oppressive colonialism of the British Empire. This 'orange' Marxism argued that the class interest and progressive politics of the Northern Ireland working class was therefore best served by the Union (McGarry & O'Leary 1995, 148). In the case of BICO it is important to notice that the main incentive for dispelling the 'one nation' theorema for the 'two nations' could very likely have been the desire to break

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[23] The term imperialist is a tricky one, and we are in a danger of anachronism when dealing with it. We have to remember, that imperialism as a term and idea did not necessarily carry the negative baggage it currently does. One example of this is that the Ulster Unionist Council (the highest party organ of the UUP) report for the year 1940 started with a tribute to Prime Minister Lord Craigavon: "a great Ulsterman, a great Irishman, a great Imperialist" (Walker 2004, 87), so imperialism was something to be merited of and congratulated of.

[24] Miller (1978) indicates that the explicit political theory of two nations was born in England with the columns by W.F. Moneypenny in The Times 1912. The concept was then picked up by the unionist sympathizer Prime Minister Bonar Law. Moneypenny's articles were published in 1913 entitled *The Two Irish Nations*. However, as Gibbon (1975) and Hennessey (1993) point out, already before the birth of the "two nations" concept a political idea of the separateness of the Ulster Protestant people from the Irish Catholics was applied in politics.

the nationalist argument instead of getting to the "facts" of the social formation of Ireland, as its opponents at the time claimed (Smyth 1980, 34-37). Especially as such it is an interesting act of politicking through theory in the context of 1970's Northern Ireland.

Many features of the BICO analysis are ones that can be found throughout the academic unionism of Northern Ireland. BICO´s pamphlet *On the Democratic Validity of the Northern Ireland State* (1971) neatly crystallises the constitutional basis of the unionist resistance on anti-partitionism. The pamphlet starts almost in a constitutional manner:

> The State of Northern Ireland forms a part of the United Kingdom state, with certain local autonomous powers, by the will of a large, stable majority of its population, who constitute a distinct Irish nationality. It is not retained within the U.K. against the will of the people by a British Army of occupation. (BICO 1971, 1)

Here the basic questions of the nature of the Northern Ireland state and its relation to the British and Irish states are encapsulated in few sentences. Northern Ireland is called a state as is the United Kingdom, thus giving legitimacy of the existence of the Northern Ireland polity, in contrast to the nationalist claim that there cannot be a functioning state of Northern Ireland, culminating in the comment made few years later by the Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Charles Haughey that Northern Ireland is a failed political entity. The status of Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom is seen as voluntary and positive, not as a relation between the oppressor and the oppressed as in the Marxist nationalist claims. The important thing about this rhetorical positioning is the cementing of the constitutional validity of Northern Ireland. Then follows the attack on the ideological front:

> Since Northern Ireland remains part of the U.K. by virtue of the clearly expressed will of the large and stable majority of its population, a revolutionary strategy, whether socialist or anti-imperialist, which is based on the assumption that it is forced to remain in the U.K. by a British Army of occupation against the will of the people, will necessarily have reactionary effects. (ibid.)

This is a direct repeal of the claim of the Marxist nationalist groups, such as the People's Democracy, which argued the contrary, that the British Army was the force keeping the unionist 'dupes' from rejoining their nationalist counterparts and seeing their true identity as Irish. The BICO claims, that this vision is not advancing the cause of socialism, and on the contrary that it is harmful for the cause of socialism in Ireland. BICO counters the nationalist arguments by using the same ideological foundation of Marxism, thus making the arguments much more efficient.

The BICO analysis continues by stating that one can separate two different nationalist struggles in Ireland. The first is the struggle of the Northern Ireland nationalists for civil rights. This struggle is on its basis socialist and must receive the full support of other socialist and revolutionary forces in Northern Ireland. However, there is also another struggle, which is led by the nationalist bourgeoisie; the objective of which is the unification of Ireland for the benefits

of the bourgeoisie. This struggle is harmful and must be opposed by all progressive forces. Breaking down the national boundaries is not something to be opposed as such, but only when it is done for the interests of the nationalist bourgeoisie. If breaking down the national boundaries would be done with the mutual consent of the people of Northern Ireland, it would not be objectionable. This is the hard core unionist consent principle situated in a Marxist framework of ideas. (BICO 1971, 3)

Civil rights for the Catholics from these premises is something that the BICO supports, but they are also making clear on what grounds the participation of the Catholics in the governance of Northern Ireland could take place:

> Participation in the Northern Ireland government could only be possible for a Catholic political movement which did not make anti-Partitioning its main political platform, and which was not by a definition an oppositionalist party in the North, serving the aims of Southern bourgeois nationalism. (BICO 1971, 4)

This is very close to the old and constantly resurfacing unionist idea that the nationalist cannot be trusted a role in the politics of the Northern Ireland if they do not pass some kind of "loyalty test", or at least acknowledge that they do not wish for the abolition of the Northern Ireland state. With this element in place, the essence of the BICO argument is familiar from the early unionist rhetoric. What is interesting about BICO is that it challenges the often repeated statement that unionism as an ideology is very rigid and inflexible (For examples see Todd 1987, Cochrane 1997, 35-88). This might be the case in terms of the core arguments and their endurance, but at least unionism proves its flexibility in a sense that it can exist not only in British conservatism, which has always been its closest political home, but also in other ideological structures. It is very interesting how the key principles of unionism can be posed in different theoretical contexts.

BICO represented the same strategy as the nationalist "green" Marxists, an attempt to appear as a vanguard for the working classes of their respective communities. "Orange" Marxism of the BICO also demonstrated how Marxism was applied as "a weapon in an ethnic conflict" (McGarry & O'Leary 1995, 148) and therefore it offers an interesting and important stepping stone for the future development of the academic unionism and its various applications of political philosophy for the defence of unionism.

Peter Gibbon's *The Origins of Ulster Unionism: The Formation of Popular Protestant Politics and Ideology in Nineteenth-Century Ireland* (1975) is often described as the first Marxist analysis of the development of unionism, since it is more systematic and relies more on Marxist theory and concepts derived from that theory, than the earlier Connolly tradition or the BICO publications. Gibbon asks why unionism developed into a regional and sectarian ideology and why it concentrated and condensed into a political mass movement particularly in Ulster? Methodologically Gibbon conducts his study by using the concept of political economy and sub-concepts derived from it. Gibbon argues the development of two political economies by pointing to multiple

dualisms is Irish society on the religious, political, economical or social grounds. He is pointing out, that all these dualisms overlap and correlate with the division of the mode of production between north and south, which produced two types of economical and political systems on one island. The internal division of unionism, of which Gibbon was one of the first to point out academically, can be explained by using the same methodology. Gibbon was also among the first to draw attention to the class alliance nature of the relations inside the protestant/unionist community. Unionism served the interests of both the northern capitalists and the northern protestant workers who both felt threatened by the raising Catholic nationalism. Northern Ireland was also the only place where this type of alliance could be accomplished with the end product being a unionist state. This contributed to the fact that in order to survive unionism had to become parochial (Walker 2004, 47). (Gibbon, 1975)

Red unionist interpretation by Gibbon provoked criticism from the traditional nationalist strand of Marxism, criticizing Gibbon of misusing Marxist theory, and grounding his explanation of the development of the two nations on the fabricated differences of socio-economic relations (Smyth 1980). The relation to Britain, which Gibbon saw as contingent, was also questioned on the more traditional Marxist grounds, by arguing that it was a planned colonialist intervention. These arguments also repeated the claim that unionism is a product of the British oppressor (ibid.). Gibbon's view of the unionist movement as a diverse product of its followers' different interests was declared false, by repeating the traditional nationalist claim, that unionism was a unitary and homogenous movement steered by the interests of the capitalists (Farrell 1980, 17).

Bew, Gibbon and Patterson continued the "red unionist" revision of Irish Marxism in their *The State in Northern Ireland 1921-1972: Political Forces and Social Classes* (1979), which concentrated on the argument of the internal division of unionism, thus at the same time explaining the evolution of the movement stemming from the pro-imperialist and anti-nationalist politics. Their article "Some aspects of nationalism and socialism in Ireland: 1968-1978" (1980) also offers a compact critique of the central green Marxist thesis, from a more unionist inclined perspective. The authors claim in *The State in Northern Ireland*, that by failing to acknowledge the diversity and depth of the unionist thought, the Irish Marxists lost their momentum of uniting the Irish working class under the same banner. This mistake was largely the fault of James Connolly and the other Irish Marxists. With this argument the inversion was complete: The Irish nationalist Marxist argument blaming unionists for the partition, and the division of the working class, was turned around: Now the ones to blame were the nationalists who failed to see unionism in its true character and caused the division of the pan-Irish working class. The weakness of the nationalist argument describing unionists as marionettes, given privileged position in the fabricated state of Northern Ireland only to buy their loyalty for the oppressive purposes of Britain (e.g. Farrell 1980, 81) was repealed by giving logic and reason for the unionist existence, and, most importantly, this was done by using

the same lexicon of Marxism as the nationalist counterpart. (Bew et.al. 1979; Bew et.al. 1980)

The central thesis of *State in Northern Ireland* is found also in its "sequel" *The British State & the Ulster Crisis* (1985) in which Bew and Patterson further argue that the nationalist claim of the unreformable nature of Northern Ireland is false, on the grounds that this reform has never been tried, partly because of the inconsistent (and therefore un-imperialist) strategies of the British state. Bew, Gibbon and Patterson claim, that because the unionist state has been an instrument in setting up the unionist hegemony does not mean that the Northern Ireland state would be incompatible with the equality of Catholics (Bew, Gibbbon and Patterson 1980). This neatly questions the nationalist argument stating that the Northern Ireland state is 'a failed political entity', and returns the ball to the British with a request for a more consistent policy. It is evident that this type of claim also has political implications.

The Marxist analysis by Bew, Gibbon and Patterson differs from the "orange" Marxism in a sense that it takes the state and its functions as the lynchpin of its analysis of the development of Northern Ireland sectarianism, to counter the possibility of a class conflict. The writers argue that the task of the capitalist state is to disorganize the working class in order to maintain its exploitation. Therefore, as when in 1932 the Protestant working class showed signs of class alliance with the Catholic workers the state reacted by the exclusion of the Catholic workers and creating conditions for sectarianism. Further on, the writers explain the late sixties 'O'Neilism'[25] to be, not a liberal reaction against sectarianism, but as an act to appease the Protestant working class voting en masse for the Northern Ireland Labour Party, thus creating a split in the Unionist Party. Bew, Gibbon and Patterson's conclusion is that the progressive forces promoting socialism in Northern Ireland can be found most visibly in the ranks of the Protestant working class, which also happens to be very resilient with its opposition to the united Ireland. Therefore the Union must be supported if one wants to believe in the progress of socialism. A key publication of the Marxist discussions of the 1970's from all angles is also *Ireland: Divided nation, divided class* by Bob Purdie and Austen Morgan (ed.) (Purdie & Morgan 1980) which includes articles from all strands of Marxist thought applied to Northern Ireland. (McGarry & O'Leary 1995, 145-147)

Although it is very difficult to pinpoint whether the "orange" Marxists or "red" unionists accomplish anything politically, it is safe to argue that the phase of Marxist politicking can be seen as a catalyst for future developments, as the arguments present in the Marxist debates did surface in the 1980´s and 1990's, especially in the electoral integration movement led by the *Campaign for Equal*

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[25] Terence O'Neill succeeded Lord Brookeborough as the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland in 1963. After he resumed power he engaged in a politics of detente and argued a desire to better the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, as well as the relations between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. The turmoil in the unionist constituency due to O'Neills reform policy led to his resignation in 1969.

Citizenship (CEC). The 1970's Marxist debates constitute a phase of history during which the Northern Ireland intellectuals clearly aimed for the vanguard of their communities, nationalist or unionist, but not for the working class as a whole. (McGarry &O'Leary 1995, 161). Even Marxism could not penetrate that dichotomy.

3.2 Expert politicking: "Ulster Today and Tomorrow"

One interesting publication in the academic debates of the 1970's was *Ulster Today and Tomorrow* (UTT) (1978) by Ulster academic and long serving Stormont civil servant John Oliver. The book was outside the mainstream academic debate dwelling on Marxist ideas. Instead Oliver put together a collection of different analysis on the Northern Ireland situation, on unionism and nationalism together, in addition to illustrating a massive amount of different policy suggestions. *Ulster Today and Tomorrow* could be considered as a prototype of coming unionist academic interventions, because it portrayed a style which became the norm a decade later. Oliver himself surfaced again later in 1991, when this type of expert politicking became more regular (Oliver 1991). The book was a product of a British independent non-party think tank Political and Economical Planning (PEP), which was founded in 1931 and was influential in the formation of the National Health Service (NHS), for example. The think tank merged with the Centre for the Study of Social Policy (CSSP) the same year of the Oliver publication to form the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) of today.

Ulster Today and Tomorrow is sometimes (O'Dowd 1991, 76) bundled together with the so called 'new unionist' movement or 'new unionism', whatever is meant by this elusive concept. However, it is obvious that this type of bundling is problematic already in terms of the contextual differences between 1978 and 1990's, of which the latter is referred by some commentators as the era of the 'new unionism'. Nevertheless, similarities can be found also. One is the clearly articulated crisis of unionism. This was to become the key motivation of many unionist minded academics and is clearly evident in UTT also. In this respect, the increased intellectual activity goes with political crisis, as the intellectuals and academics start to offer solutions for breaking out of the deadlock. This trend is visible throughout this thesis. Another similarity to the 1990's is a certain type of constitutional uncertainty that was lingering above Northern Ireland in 1978 and more visibly after the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. The third similarity is the structure and rhetoric of the publication, which shares the attributes of the "textbook" politicking will be referred to later when speaking of the numerous unionist publications in the early and mid 1990's. But here these similarities will be dealt with in more depth, since seeing UTT as a trendsetter for later unionist interventions is interesting and not far-fetched idea, requiring further illustration.

The wording of the Foreword of the book is revealing:

> The author, though patently setting out his ideas in a balanced and systematic manner, is careful not to lay claim to any special quality of impartiality. (UTT 1978, v) The author makes no claim to total objectivity or detachment, for he would be the fist to say that he has been influenced by the traditions, the education and the social forces that shaped his upbringing. (Oliver 1978, 3-4)

This indicates a break from the Marxist strand of the discussions, which sometimes included an outspoken and clearly articulated claim of objectivity (e.g. Farrell 1976), but more often did not raise this question at all, keeping to the ideals of science outside and independent of politics. Oliver makes no such claim, and his positioning is mirrored almost exactly eleven years later in one of the key publications of the unionist intellectual interventions that this dissertation discusses.

It is not necessary to go in depth to the analysis of Oliver, more than to acknowledge that the issue in 1978 was already a question of what sort of devolution would be suitable for Northern Ireland, as the ideas of integration, independence or united Ireland were even more unrealistic for Oliver in 1978 than they were after the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Speaking through the different aspects of the concept *politics*, Oliver's book consists mostly from policy statements, but the nature of the book is highly political in its suggestions as Oliver strongly takes the unionist view. Therefore the book can be interpreted as an act of unionist politicking.

It is however interesting for later examination to notice, that the arguments for ruling out a united Ireland are those based primarily on the felt fear towards the claimed theocratic nature of the Irish Republic. In addition, the rigid policy on human liberties epitomised in issues such as abortion, censorship, divorce and contraception are used with economical arguments to make the case against unification. Oliver does not see a chance of any type of unification (simple unification, forming a "new" all-Ireland state, or a new federal Ireland) taking place, because of the well argued and solid opposition of the Protestant unionists. Therefore, the only viable option would be in acceptance of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and finding a solution in which the people representing the two traditions there would find a way to live together. The acceptance of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom is of course the premise of all *unionist* political thinking. The unionist bias can also be seen in Oliver's analysis of the IRA as a force dedicated in driving a wedge between the Protestants and Roman Catholics, and in his belief that the IRA would also continue its activities in the unified Ireland against its government (Oliver 1978, 59). (Oliver 1978, 21-24)

Although from the early 1970's the thrust of politics was towards devolution, Oliver does not discard the full integration with Britain. Whereas the various unification of all-Ireland based solutions were considered utterly unrealistic (Oliver 1978, 21), integration was something, which could not be abandoned on the basis that the public would not accept it (Oliver 1978, 8). The

arguments for integration were those to become familiar in the unionist camp for integration in the late 1980's, that is that integration would lessen the tensions between the opposing factions in Northern Ireland by putting an end to the politics structured on two sectarian blocks. From the unionist point of view the biggest lure of integration has always been the way in which it permanently settles the constitutional question.

> The simplest step would be for both the majority and the minority to put the past behind them and to decide to do three things: to recognise the state, support its institutions and accept the enforcement of its laws. Recognition would have to be without mental reservations, support whole-hearted and acceptance unequivocal.
> But in a majority-minority situation the minority will not be content with this passive role and will wish to exercise political influence. (Oliver 1978, 25)

This would mean the de facto recognition of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. An act, which neither the northern constitutional nationalists (SDLP) nor the Republic of Ireland had equivocally done till 1978. As a policy statement this does not come far from the unionist argument of cementing the constitutional question, and does lag far behind of any compromise. In essence, Oliver does not see any problem in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. The only problem is in how this should be executed in real life.

> The unionist philosophy is much less [than nationalism] known and is largely misunderstood, even though it is a perfectly valid and honourable one based on pioneering spirit, stern moral values, hard work, religious liberty, loyalty to Britain and the Crown, the maintenance of the British connection and the cherishing of British ideals. (Oliver 1978, 68)

Again, the resonance with the things forthcoming is striking. The definition of the unionist values is interesting. Oliver does not elucidate any of these values shared with the nationalists. The values connected to Britain and to the constitutional link are obviously dividing the two, but rhetorically the definition of unionism also makes nationalism come out as morally suspicious, lazy in terms of work ethics, theocratic and exclusive and obviously hostile to Britain. This very much follows the propagandist stereotype of the 'Ulster folk[26]' in contrast to their adversaries, the Catholics. (Oliver 1978, 68)

While Oliver sees the foundation of the unionist philosophy as healthy and valid, he argues that it is in more need of reevaluation than the Irish nationalism.

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[26]   After the 1886 Home Rule for Ireland Bill, which did not pass, a vast amount of texts defining the virtues of an Ulsterman were produced by Northern Ireland writers. These virtues included: industry, decency and loyalty. This marked the era when the tern Ulster Scot, which referred to the Scottish origin of the people in Northern Ireland, was replaced by the term Ulster -man, -woman, -folk etc. This could be considered as a starting point for the creation of a Northern Irish unionist political identity, especially as these virtues were used to separate the unionist "Ulsterman" from an Irish nationalist. (Walker 2004, 7; Gailey 2001, 231)

> The unionist philosophy has become disastrously stuck in a setting appropriate no doubt to earlier times, when intransigence was the response to continuing threat and exclusiveness justified by smouldering rebellion. It is largely for that reason that legitimate unionist governments from 1921 till 1972 remained tongue-tied in so many important ways and that their energetic and expensive campaigns in Great Britain and North America were less than convincing. Spokesmen were hesitant, unsure and reticent because deep down they had no assurance that they could speak frankly for unionism. In so far as unionism had become in practice a defensive stance and in so far as it was buttressed by attitudes of Protestant ascendancy, unworthy electoral practices and unfair discrimination, then its spokesmen were unable to do justice to the real merits of their case and to the undoubted achievements of their regime, both central and local, in bringing prosperity and progress to the people. (Oliver 1978, 68)

Oliver argues that the philosophy of unionism is not the problem, but the problem is that the politicians putting that philosophy in use have lost their grasp on it and turned unionism into a defensive and supremacist political strategy, instead of looking into its solid belief structure for guidance. Oliver sees the main problem in Northern Ireland as the poor articulation of unionist politics, not that unionism would be unworkable, or would, as an idea, contribute to of the political deadlock in Northern Ireland. From the main bulk of the academic literature of unionism in the 1970's *Ulster Today and Tomorrow* is an exception. It does not fall behind in being political, in contrast it openly admits it. The obvious distinction is of course that it is a policy analysis not an academic book dwelling on the history of unionism, and therefore it is able to present an interesting analysis of the root cause of the Northern Ireland problems. One of the most interesting ones of those discussed by Oliver is the claim that the cause of unionism has been blurred by the actual politics of unionism. Oliver also fits to the idea of an intellectual or scholar being in a position to speculate with different options more freely than a politician. Not surprisingly, the political aspect of Oliver's book is best revealed when looking at which options he is raising up and which he is neglecting.

4 THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT AND ITS CHALLENGE TO THE UNIONIST POLITICS

> What has passed for politics in Northern Ireland is a sorry business, of which many people in both communities are rightly ashamed. It is the game of Protestants versus Catholics. It is a mixture of sectarian huckstering and control by political patronage. It is a mean and uninspiring sectarian conflict, out of which nothing can be develop, even if it were allowed to continue for a second hundred years.
> -Robert McCartney

The Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985 was the most important single event in launching the era of heightened unionist intellectual activity. It caused serious ruptures to the unionist party machines and caused the politics of unionism to stall. This gave the possibility for new unionist movements to emerge and challenge the traditional unionist rhetoric. The political events starting in the early 1980's and getting their catalyst from the AIA led to the situation where the unionist politics were in a state of a deadlock in many ways, and in many senses the intellectual and academic interventions can be read as suggestions for breaking out of this deadlock. In this sense knowing the basics of the Northern Ireland politics of that era is essential.

This chapter will discuss the political context of the mid- to late 1980's and the political thought of the key Northern Ireland political parties through analysis of their discussion papers as the primary material. This chapter will also introduce the Campaign for Equal Citizenship (CEC) which served as a continuation of the 1970's red unionism in a sense that it concentrated in building an apology of unionism on the basis of a secular defence, discarding the arguments laid on religion or culture, thus trying to illustrate unionism in a more universal and positive way. The ideas of British liberalism were central in the line of arguments of the CEC, especially in terms of its key figure Belfast lawyer Robert McCartney. The CEC can be seen as the repetition of the BICO in its effort to place intellect in the avant-garde of the unionist politics, and whereas BICO did not gain much support electorally, the CEC came close to getting McCartney to Westminster.

4.1   The rising republicanism

Refusing any devolution initiatives which included real power sharing with the nationalists was the main theme of the unionist politics in the 1970's. Unionist politicians were determined to keep the majority rule, which would have returned them to absolute power in Northern Ireland, and with this as their imperative the unionists could overthrow numerous power sharing initiatives by the British government between 1971 and 1985. (Cochrane 1997, 15; Catterall & McDaougall 1996, 3).

Perhaps the most visible show of power and capability of mass mobilisation was the massive strike which ended the Sunningdale power sharing experiment. This successful unionist strategy of employing masses gave the unionist politics a sense of security and strength, which was later to prove to have been overstated. Retrospectively the Sunningdale experiment can be taken as a failure in many aspects, not only because the unionists refusal to budge, but also because of the too rigid and triumphant nationalist strategy. It is arguable that a more moderate approach by the joint nationalist negotiation partners, the Irish government and the northern nationalist parties, might have saved the Sunningdale deal. The tragedy of Sunningdale was, that as it was unacceptable to the majority of the unionist constituency, it also hampered the possibilities for a reformist unionist politics for decades, since it led to the conclusion that compromise would lead to the downfall of any particular unionist leader, as it did for the unionist premier negotiating the Sunningdale agreement, Brian Faulkner. Sunningdale also showed that the unionist electorate was not yet willing to make symbolic concessions in order to gain substantially in practice. The well known phrase of the Unionist Prime Minister Brian Faulkner that the institutional representation of the Republic in the form of the Council of Ireland in Northern politics was "necessary nonsense", and did not hinder the fact that the deal might have cemented the constitutional status quo of Northern Ireland, did not carry much weight when the massive unionist strike caused its collapse.   (Patterson 2007, 232-233)

The failures to find a political solution in Northern Ireland came in tandem with the increasing politicization of the Catholic masses. The Catholic mobilisation was also fuelled by the failures of the British security policy in containing the unrest caused by the Catholic civil rights movement, and the refusal of the unionist administration to address the issue of discrimination (Patterson 2007, 191-193). Events, like the Bloody Sunday in Derry/Londonderry in January 1972, drove the young Catholic men from the constitutional nationalism provided by the civil rights movement and later the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) towards the more radical republican organisations like the provisional IRA or the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Subsequently the republican Sinn Féin was organised as the political wing of the provincial IRA. The republican paramilitaries also proved their effectiveness in practice. The Conservative Party conference was

bombed in Brighton in 1984 (IRA) and the murders of the Northern Ireland spokesman of the Conservative party Airey Neave and Earl Mountbatten, both killed in 1979 showed that politicians and members of the royal family were also among the targets (Bew & Patterson 1985, 111-112). Events like Brighton also increased the determination of the British government, particularly the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, to find a security solution in Northern Ireland.

Inside the Northern Ireland constituency, Sinn Féin started its electoral triumph with the huge propaganda victory it secured with the hunger strike campaign of 1980-1981. The hunger strikes were a clear political defeat to the Thatcher government in Britain, Northern Ireland and also internationally. The propaganda victory of the republican movement helped in its modernisation process and smoothed the evolution of Sinn Féin into a winning electoral machine. The hard face that the British government showed in terms of the hunger strikes predisposed the government not to crack under the unionist induced pressure, after the unionist outrage of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Bew & Patterson 1985, 116). The victory of Sinn Féin in the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly elections and in the 1983 Westminster elections increased the fear felt by many that militant republicanism was now unstoppable (Bew, Gibbon, Patterson 2002, 204). This obviously improved the negotiation position of the Irish government in relation to Thatcher, who was under pressure to do something to solve the security situation in Northern Ireland (ibid.). Although the success of the constitutional SDLP in the European elections of 1984 showed that the republican surge had already peaked, the political process with the coming Anglo-Irish Agreement had developed to the point where it could not be stopped (Bew & Patterson 1985, 125). In addition the British government was under "green" pressure from the United States, led by influential Speaker of the Senate Tip O'Neill with the aid from senators Kennedy and Moynihan (Bew & Patterson 1985, 112).

The British policy towards the unionist parties was in no way homogeneous. Ian Paisley of the DUP, who had just received a personal victory in the European elections, was courted by the British government and at one point it seemed that the two might find a solution they could agree on. Paisley's opinion on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland had waivered from full integration in 1971 to the possibility of some level of independence in 1973 (Patterson 2007, 229). The publically perceived consensus between the British government and Paisley was nevertheless false, and required both to evade some of the less desired aspects of the other. It was questionable whether the British government and the DUP could in practice share ground on the new British peace initiative the Atkins talks 1979-1980, as Paisley stood adamant with his pro majority rule stance. The tactic nevertheless derailed the Official Unionists who were clear cut in their hostility towards the Atkins initiative (Bew & Patterson 1985, 114).

The confusion of the Conservative Party policy towards Northern Ireland decreased its effectiveness, as well as harmed its relationship with the unionist

parties. This was largely due to the assassination of the party spokesman for Northern Ireland Airey Neave who had been the mastermind behind the Conservative integrationist strategy, in the 1979 election manifesto. Neave's assassination by the IRA in the same year influenced the shift in the party policy (O'Leary 1997, 664-665). Once Thatcher became the Prime Minister the previous commitment to administrative integration was abandoned. The governmental White Paper in 1979 seemed to stress the improvement in inter-governmental relations of Northern Ireland and the UK, as it also ruled out any discussion of an "Irish dimension[27]" (Bew & Patterson 1985, 113). This change broke the bond between the integration oriented Ulster Unionist Party and the British government in the favour of Paisley's DUP, as it also led to the resignation of the SDLP leader Gerry Fitt who would have continued the dialogue with the unionists, even without any Irish dimension on the table (Bew & Patterson 1985, ibid.). Fitt was replaced by John Hume, who was considered more dogmatic on the need of an Irish dimension in any proposal (ibid.). The UUP with its leader James Molyneaux boycotted the Atkins talks out of bitterness to the change of British government policy, thus provoking more of the shift by the Thatcher government to favour Paisley (Walker 2004, 229). The British move towards the inter-governmental solution after the collapse of Atkins was downplayed especially by Molyneaux, which gave Paisley the opportunity to dwell on unionist fears, by painting pictures of joint authority of Northern Ireland by the UK and Irish governments (ibid.). The result of the general passiveness and disunity of the unionists was that when the Anglo-Irish Agreement finally came, they were unprepared.

4.2 Situation analysis, unionist and nationalist

Based on the electoral success of Sinn Féin (SF) and the SDLP's more nationalist emphasis, it could be argued that the political forces of unionism and nationalism were moving further apart in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, there was some important dialogue namely in the form of two discussion papers published by each faction, the *New Ireland Forum Report*, by the constitutional nationalists in 1984 and the Ulster Unionist Party's answer to it, the *Way Forward* published the same year. The DUP also gave its own reaction to the New Ireland Forum Report titled *Ulster: The Future Assured*, but its tone was somewhat different and less dialogical. The origin of the New Ireland Forum can be seen as a defensive manoeuvre of the SDLP to counter SF's electoral success (Cochrane 1997, 5) or as a modernisation act by the Republic's Fine Gael/Labour coalition government (O'Leary and Arthur 1990, 43). In the perspective of all-Ireland nationalism the purpose of the *New Ireland Report* was

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[27]   Broadly speaking the "Irish dimension" means some kind of institutional presence of the Irish Republic in the administrative and constitutional solution in Northern Ireland.

to prove to the constituencies north, south and internationally, that constitutional nationalism could still provide an alternative to pursuing political aims through violence (Neumann 2004, 136).

The Forum Report did not present a departure from the traditional nationalist arguments. Since the détente politics of the Irish Taoiseach Sean Lemass (Taoiseach 1959-1966), the outspoken policy of the Irish Republic on Northern Ireland had been that of seeking reunification through peaceful means. This was also understood to be a long term (decades) project, as spelled out in the Northern Ireland policy document by the Irish Department of External Affairs in 1969. The same paper acknowledged that the confessional nature of the Irish state was clearly an obstacle for unification in the minds of the northern Protestants and reforms would have to be taken in order to convince the people in the north that their liberties would be safe in unified Ireland (Patterson 2007, 177). However, the two strands of Irish constitutional nationalism north and south were diverging as the northern Social Democratic and Labour Party had to take a more aggressive stand, in a fear of losing to the emerging Republican challenge offered by Sinn Féin.

The propositions of the Forum were, that the constitutional situation should be regarded from the perspectives of unitary Irish state, federal/confederal state between the North and South and a joint authority, in which the responsibilities on the governing of Northern Ireland would be divided between the Republic and the United Kingdom. When compared to the official policy of the Irish state, the findings of the Forum seem outdated, while it is also striking that nothing of the revisionist ideas that were beginning to influence the professional Irish history writing were present in the Forum[28]. (NIFR 1984)

The analysis of the situation by the Ulster Unionists in *The Way Forward* is different. UUP sees as the biggest problem preventing progress the fact that the government of the United Kingdom has asserted as an essential principle that only a plan that enjoys cross community support could be accepted as the basis for devolution and that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland will remain locked within the United Kingdom until the majority of the people in Northern Ireland decide otherwise. These two principles are in conflict, as according to the unionists, the nationalist community is not willing for devolution on a majority rule basis. Further, the essentials of the conflict lie in the crossing aspirations of the two communities, effectively making it impossible for them to share a cabinet, since the other part of the forced power sharing coalition would evidently oppose the whole nature of the state. It was the view of the Ulster Unionists, that the interest of the nationalists is not so much in the devolution, but in the withdrawal of the British guarantee on the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. The purpose of this strategy is seen by the unionists as twofold, first to lead the unionists into breaking up the union and secondly in

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[28]   The key book is of course Roy Foster's *Modern Ireland 1600-1972* published in 1988, so some years after the NIFR, but as I have shown in the previous chapter the debate the revision of the nationalist dogmas was ongoing, at least in the North.

removing the obligation felt by the British government to uphold it. The Forum for a New Ireland is seen as "an integral part of that strategy". The answer of *The Way Forward* is therefore no constitutional changes, but a bill of rights to secure the rights of the nationalist minority population. The key phrase of the document is the line "Only rights can be guaranteed, not aspirations". This goes to the heart of the unionist stand, arguing that the aspiration of political Irishness must not and cannot be given guarantees, as that would undermine the whole existence of the Northern Ireland state. (The Way Forward (WF) 1984)

The input of the Democratic Unionist Party to the debate around the Forum report and the ongoing 'rolling devolution' had less merits in reading the political dynamics of the time. Whereas the UUP's paper at least acknowledged, although not with acceptance, the commitment of the British government to give nationalists a role in the devolution, the DUP refused to include this in its proposition. The DUP's *Ulster: The Future Assured* starts by condemning the political violence of the provisional IRA and warning that any form of devolved governance will attract a violent response from the republicans, committed to destroying any government it was not a part of. (Ulster: The Future Assured, (UFA) 1984)

The main strategy of the DUP paper is to prove power sharing unworkable and it does this with an interesting rhetoric by contrasting power sharing with 'normal' parliamentarism. Whereas in a normal parliament the government is formed by a willing coalition and is under a constant scrutiny of the opposition, in the power sharing government the coalition is 'forced' in a sense that it is formed from, for example, the two biggest parties in each of the unionist or nationalist 'block'. Further, the First (or Prime) Minister is selected from the biggest party and the Deputy First Minister comes from the biggest party of the other block and the ministerial posts are then divided accordingly by using a mathematical system, the D'Hondt principle or another means[29]. With this formula the role of the opposition is not as strong as in the British parliamentary system and the government is not responsible to the parliament in the same way it would be in a "normal" majority government. The DUP's point is that majority rule would be the only workable form of government for Northern Ireland, simply because its dynamics are far superior to those of a power sharing government. The DUP paper of course misses the point that a power sharing cabinet does not necessarily have to be forced, as the closest such example at the time of the writing was the Sunningdale executive, which indeed was a voluntary coalition of the pro agreement parties. (ibid)

The DUP believes, contrary to the history of 50 years, that it would not be impossible for the nationalist parties to negotiate into a position in which they could become a government party in coalition with other political forces, i.e. unionists, in a majority government. The majority government would not then

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[29]   This is the way power sharing is organized in Northern Ireland currently under the Belfast and St. Andrews Agreements. Other possibilities and suggestions obviously exist.

mean exclusion from the political power for the nationalists. As interesting and elaborate the DUP's proposal is, it is also a document of how out of touch the right wing of the unionists was at the doorstep of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and how they were unable to produce thinking which would have benefited them in the negotiations leading to the Agreement. As both of the unionist parties failed to consider the political reality of the Northern Ireland situation, especially how it looked from the British position, they were heading to the point in which they would become outmanoeuvred. (ibid.)

4.3   The Anglo-Irish Agreement

Continuous effort of successive British governments prior 1971 had been to keep Northern Ireland off the political agenda and let the unionist regime take care of the province as they wished (Catterall & McDougall 1996). The fall of Stormont in 1972 and the numerous failures in power sharing attempts had proved this line to have been a failure (ibid.). As it also became evident that the Catholic population could not be satisfied politically without some level of participation by the Irish Republic, a new British strategy for the inclusion of the Irish Republic in the matters of Northern Ireland was inevitable. The first sign of the turn was seen in the British government White Paper *Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals* in 1973, which stated that the new Northern Ireland administration should be based on power sharing between unionists and nationalists, to have some level of "Irish dimension" i.e. some level of co-operation between Belfast and Dublin, and that all this should have the acceptance of the Irish government (Patterson 2007, 230). Although the Conservative White Paper of 1979 was a temporary departure from this, broadly speaking these three elements remained similar the same all the way to the Belfast agreement of 1998.

The first formal meeting between the governments did not promise well, as Thatcher rejected all the three solution models which the pan nationalist New Ireland Forum had produced in her famous "out, out, out" speech (Cochrane 1997, 11). The shock that the speech caused for the Irish negotiators is somewhat surprising, since the same answer was already given by the Secretary of State Douglas Hurd a month earlier in the Brighton party conference (Bew & Patterson 1985, 133).

The political pressure for arrangement in Northern Ireland was nevertheless so extensive that the two governments overcame the negotiation difficulties and the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed at Hillsborough Castle on the outskirts of Belfast on 15th November 1985. The constitutional status of Northern Ireland is spelled out in the first article, where the "two Governments affirm that any change in status of Northern Ireland could only come about with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland". The Governments also recognised that the present wish of that majority was against

any change in that status, but if that fact was ever to change towards a united Ireland, the two governments would not stand in the way of that will. Article two of the Agreement not only established the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), through which the governments were to negotiate political, security and legal matters and promote cross-border co-operation; it also acknowledged that the Republic of Ireland has a consultative role in Northern Ireland, in essence that it can "put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland", whilst the final responsibility in terms of decisions and administration is retained by the United Kingdom Government. Articles 5-10 further specify the areas where article two is applicable, while article three defines the practicalities of the IGC. The Agreement also states a wish for a future devolved power sharing government for Northern Ireland. In the absence of a power sharing agreement, the Republic of Ireland would work as a guarantor of the rights of the nationalist minority. (The Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985)

Looking at the interests of the Anglo-Irish Agreement signatories it can be argued that the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, because Britain identified with a greater common interest with the Republic than with the unionists (Cochrane 1994, 383.) To claim, that this was a clear indication of cultural alienation between London and Belfast, or that it demonstrated that the Union had became a "loveless marriage", is a longer leap, but nevertheless one that has been stated by scholars (e.g. Cochrane 1994, 383; O'Dowd 1997, 671).

The first response of the unionist parties was shock and pulling ranks together against the two perceived outside aggressors, London and Dublin. The unionist reading of the Agreements two central articles was that Britain had abandoned Northern Ireland by formally declaring that if and when the nationalist population outgrows the unionists, or in other ways succeeds in winning the majority, the British government would not oppose a united Ireland. This was interpreted by the unionists as a clear statement by the British government of the un-Britishness of Northern Ireland, and as an act of breaking up the Union. Article two was seen as a manoeuvre towards joint authority, in which the Irish Government was given free ticket into the government of Northern Ireland. Further, the Intergovernmental Conference was seen as a tool for making the unionist population accept the unification. As a defence against the unionist reading of the Agreement, Thatcher argued that article one confirms the position of Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom, recognizing the legitimacy of the unionist position, and also makes the Irish Government for the first time accept the constitutional Britishness of Northern Ireland (Neumann 2004, 127). In fact the Irish Government had enacted several acts, which could be interpreted as acknowledgements of the position of Northern Ireland under international law[30]. Also Dublin's recognition for the consent principle required for any change in the position of Northern Ireland

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[30] The signing of the Boundary Commission report, which declared the Northern Ireland borders in 1925, and its later validation in the League of Nations and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Helsinki 1975 are the strongest examples.

had been affirmed in almost every meeting between the two governments, at least since the fall of Stormont (ibid.). In that sense the unionist claim, that they received nothing in response to giving even a symbolic role for the Irish government in the matters of Northern Ireland was valid. Interestingly the constitutional recognition which the Agreement gave to Northern Ireland was criticized also in the Republic, where it was seen as violating the Republic's constitution which declared geographical limits of the Irish Republic to cover all-Ireland. This led to a situation, in which the constitutional aspects of the Agreement where downplayed by both of the signatories (Cochrane 1997, 23-24).

Finding their unity, the unionist parties' first manoeuvre turned the Northern Ireland Assembly into an institution to combat the Agreement by suspending its normal activities and transforming it into a *Committee of the Government of Northern Ireland*, that started to produce a detailed analysis of the Agreement from the unionist point of view. As all the nationalist parties boycotted the former Assembly, it came to an end working as a tool to manifest the unionist rhetoric (see O'Leary, Elliott and Wilford 1988). The first report of the committee was published in January 1986 concentrating on judging the IGC as an "embryo" for joint authority (Cochrane 1997, 30). The unionist parties orchestrated the resignation of all their MP's from Westminster, thus forcing the subsequent elections to be a referendum on the Agreement, showing the refusal of the unionist majority to accept it. The by-elections held in January 1986 turned out to be a disaster and did not have any impact on Thatcher to review the Agreement, for while the unionist parties increased their share of the vote, and in that sense made their point, they also lost one of their seats to the nationalist SDLP. As the media concentrated on this turnover, the result in terms of public relations was not what the unionists wanted (Cochrane 1997, 143).

Other means to battle the Agreement were a petition to Queen Elizabeth II, a legal challenge in the Republic, civil disobedience, boycotting of local councils and a general strike on a 'Day of Action' in March 1986. All of these strategies proved more or less failures and they have since been reviewed critically (Cochrane 1997, passim). The slogan "Ulster says No" applied in the campaign illustrated unionists in a negative light (Walker 2004, 235). The naïve political strategy of the unionists which gave themselves no negotiation space before or after the Agreement and relied solely on defiance to prove their point towards London, can only be explained by lack of imagination, with relied on tactics used with success earlier, as with the Sunningdale agreement in 1974. Partly because of the failure in tactics and because of the forced amalgamation of the heterogenous unionist camp their front started to disintegrate in tandem with the progressing diminishment of their political power (Walker 2004, 236-237). The failure of strategy can be traced to the leader of the UUP James Molyneaux, who did not notice the hugely different political context of 1984 to that of 1974, with republican hunger strikes and the electoral surge of Sinn Féin as well as the constantly shaping joint British-Irish agenda (ibid.). According to

Cochrane the prime reason for the lack of effect in the unionist response was to be found in the ideologically heterogeneous nature of the unionist parties, which could not be accommodated in the campaign (Cochrane 1997, passim).

In terms of the unionist internal divisions the anti-Agreement campaign is revealing. The era of the direct rule with its "fiscal benevolence" by the British exchequer had created a unionist middle class inclined towards the social and political life of contemporary Britain. This middle class were more similar to their kin across the Irish sea, than in the 1970's when the unionists stood more united against the mainland political initiatives. This time, however, although the unionist middle class was eager to show their antipathy towards the Hillsborough accord [31] , they were also afraid that they would estrange themselves from the British metropolitan societies. This becomes strikingly obvious in James Molyneaux's denunciation of the mayhem than the more radical elements of the unionist community showed on the "Day of Action". Middle class unionists still wanted to say no, but in a more dignified and elegant form. This internal criticism and splintering inside the unionist constituency made room for political ideas originating outside the UUP headquarters on Glengall Street, Belfast. (Coulter 1997, 123-125)

4.4 Robert McCartney and the Equal Citizenship Movement

As the unionist opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement showed little effect, the solidarity which the unionist parties had found after the signing of the AIA quickly began to crumble. The unionist parties were ideologically very heterogeneous, but had a history of successful campaigns, where they could successfully present a unified force. But because of differences inside the unionist electorate, the solidarity was unlikely to last for long, and already in 1986 unionist politics started to move toward mutually exclusive political programmes. The big trend was towards integrationism, but with different emphasis. In terms of intellectual influence the most interesting pressure group was the *Campaign for Equal Citizenship* (CEC), which was led by Belfast born barrister Robert McCartney, who formulated the ideas later taken on and further developed by the leading figure in the intellectual defence of unionism Arthur Aughey. Some of the rhetoric McCartney used to construct a new defence for unionism spilled over to the academic world and resurfaced a few years later in Aughey's seminal work on academic politicking. McCartney is therefore important because he can be seen as a catalyst for the politicization of the scholars and intellectuals, or to be precise in the increasing engagement of the scholars. (Cochrane 1997, 99)

Robert McCartney emerged as a potential leading figure of the Ulster Unionist Party in the early 1980's. He was a charismatic figure, who could

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[31]   A synonym for the Anglo-Irish Agreement

successfully take advantage of his personal history, rising from the protestant stronghold Shankill Road to the Bar. McCartney was welcomed by the UUP, as the party had a problem of losing the support of the well educated, and for this problem McCartney seemed to provide an answer. McCartney argued that unionists were lacking a sophisticated rhetoric, with which they could challenge the narrative of the Irish nationalism, which, in terms of public perception, had gained the hegemony in discussion. As the leader of the Campaign for Equal Citizenship McCartney argued that the reason for the provincial and sectarian politics of Northern Ireland was in its exclusion from the political system of the United Kingdom. This had led the people to bunker themselves behind political parties based on sectarian division rather than engaging in a constructive political debate on ideological premises. Integrationism was appealing to the well educated strata and the liberal minded 'mid-Ulster' voters, who did not want to identify themselves with the sectarian politics of the unionist parties. (McCartney 1986). (Walker 2004, 232-233)

4.4.1 Philosophical politicking: "Liberty and Authority in Ireland"

If we compare the argumentation of the two unionist parties and McCartney's the difference is striking. The two unionist discussion papers dealt with above make their point by trying to unfold the malign intentions of the Irish nationalists or the contradictory politics of the UK, which are   blamed for the Northern Ireland troubles (UUP), or they simply refuse to make compromises refusing devolution and accepting only devolution with majority rule (DUP). Although McCartney was an insider of the UUP and one of the persons who wrote the UUP's manifesto *The Way Forward,* his own argumentation is very different from the cautious text of that paper. This can be seen as an indication of the strong influence of the party leader James Molyneaux, who favoured a cautious and conservative minimalist approach. While previous discussions by the unionist parties had debated devolution and integration and resisted power sharing with the nationalists, McCartney's break from the traditional unionists thinking is epitomized in his pamphlet *Liberty and Authority in Ireland* (1985). In the pamphlet McCartney draws a distinction between the northern and southern states in Ireland, portraying Northern Ireland as a nest and protector of civil liberties while the Republic of Ireland is described as an example of authoritarian and anti-liberal rule. These differences are due to the different ethos of the two states, and as the northern ethos is grounded on liberalism it is by far superior to the Roman Catholic ethos of the south. This distinction, argues McCartney, is the best defence for unionism, as unionism can be portrayed as a protector of secular and liberal ideals, and not as a parochial and religiously bigoted thought.

McCartney conceptualizes the political dilemma of Ireland from a totally different basis than the arguments of the mainstream unionist parties. He argues that the reason and logic for the unionist majority rule can be found from the superior unionist political thought, which has its foundation in the

British liberalism. Unionism is not to be defended by simply repeating "No Surrender", but much more effectively by using political theory of liberalism. This McCartney does this by applying the liberal theory of John Locke especially through the reading Isaiah Berlin. The main unionist parties concentrated their responses to the Anglo-Irish Agreement by condemning the acts of the British state and in describing the Roman Catholic nationalist conspiracy designed for a "creeping unification". The arguments they used were also mostly drawn from the daily politics, such as the devolution or the Inter Governmental Conference and its Maryfield secretariat. McCartney thus raised the discussion to a more universal level:

> The determination to preserve absolute categories or ideals at the expense of human lives and happiness is found in equal measures not only in the political extremes of left and right, but in other less evident centres of authority in Ireland like the churches. Sabbitarianism and laws against contraception are examples of this absolutist determination. (McCartney 1985, 7)

If we look at the discussion papers produced before and after the Anglo-Irish Agreement, we can identify the arguments of nationalists and unionists. The nationalists see the 1920 settlement and the subsequent partition as the root cause for the Northern Ireland problems (NIFR, 1984). The unionists emphasise the conflict between different aspirations, the aspiration to Britishness in contrary to the aspiration to Irishness, and the harm that the inconsistent policy of the British state has inflicted (Way Forward, 1984). McCartney puts the question on a more abstract level. He argues that the conflict is really about different political and philosophical beliefs, which he epitomizes through reading of Isaiah Berlin and especially Berlin's *Two Concepts of Liberty* -essay (Berlin 2002 [1958]). McCartney argues that the Republic of Ireland as a polity and Irish nationalism as a political idea are constructed on the positive aspect of freedom, where freedom is seen as a freedom of being part of something. Unionism on the other hand is founded upon the negative aspect of freedom. (McCartney 1985, 5-7)

McCartney argues that the positive sense of freedom in the ethos of Irish nationalism is manifested in the Republic's tendency to "preserve absolute categories or ideals at the expense of human lives and happiness". McCartney does not leave his claim to be a mere abstraction, but ties it rhetorically very skilfully to the abortion legislation of the Republic and to the 1980's referendums in the Republic. In the mid 1980's more and more women travelled to Great Britain for abortion. The two referendums in the Republic on abortion in 1982 and 1992, and on divorce on 1986 and 1995 were in the words of McCartney "bitter" and "divisive" (Ferriter 2005, 716). During the referendum campaigns, Ireland witnessed the revival of Catholic politics with Catholic intellectuals[32] claiming, that liberal abortion legislation would turn the

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[32] Perhaps the Irish nationalist intelligentsia in work in a sense O'Dowd referred to. See 2.4.2 Unionism, an idea without an intellect.

Republic back to a province of the UK (Ferriter 2005, 717) [33] . Therefore McCartney argues that the influence of the Catholic Church to the politics in the Republic of Ireland and to the civil liberties of the people in the Republic was not disappearing[34]. In fact it could be argued to grow. The practical application of Berlin's conceptualisation is therefore:

> A comparison between the application of these principles [no power, even that of the majority can be regarded as absolute, and that the individual liberty of men should be inviolable] in a pluralist United States and the concerted and sustained attempts to frustrate them in the theocratic ethos of the Republic of Ireland dramatically illustrates the degree to which negative freedom has been a casualty at the hands not only of irredentist nationalism, but also of a highly conservative Irish hierarchy. (McCartney 1985, 8)

McCartney argues that as the Republic of Ireland became independent under crisis, it was necessary to create a distinctively independent and sovereign state with its own strong national ethos. The main building block for this ethos was found in the Roman Catholic Church, and so the ethos of the Roman Catholic Church became the ethos of the Irish Republic, giving the new state a character of "political imperative hostile to pluralism" [35]. Religious homogeneity and

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[33]   However, McCartney fails to state that the abortion legislation in Northern Ireland is not as liberal as in the mainland UK. While going to press in 2008 the debate in Northern Ireland on abortion legislation is still fierce and the division lines are drawn, and not only between unionists and nationalists. Recently Iris Robinson from the Democratic Unionist Party, and the wife of the present (2008) First Minister of Northern Ireland Peter Robinson, called in a BBC Radio Ulster debate program arguing against the liberalization of the Northern Ireland abortion legislation. Mrs. Robinson argued that it is the "duty of Government to uphold God's law" and therefore not to liberalize the abortion legislation, stirring a huge debate in Northern Ireland (http://www.bbc.co.uk/northernireland/nolan/phonecallarchive/ quoted 17.9.2008). This debate is very interesting also because it is a good example of a topic that is not politicized on the unionist/nationalist dichotomy.

[34]   Historically it is hard to deny the influence that the Catholic Church had in the politics of the Republic. Among clearest examples is the hostile reception that the Beveridge report of the UK received by the Church in the Irish Republic in the late 1940's. The welfare improvements suggested in the report were resisted by the Roman Catholic Church, which feared they would lessen the integrity of the family. The same resistance faced plans for child benefits and even mild modernization for the divorce legislation. Obviously, at the same time the effects were clearly seen as a major blow to the cause of anti-partition and played a part in increasing downplaying of the anti-partition agenda by the Irish government. (Patterson 2007, 89-95). The referendums blocking the new and more liberal legislation in the 1980's were easy to use as a proof that the core ethos of the Republic had not changed. Indeed, the ball was on the side of the court of those who argued the counter.

[35]   It is hard to deny that the Church was used as an instrument in creating the imagined community of the Republic of Ireland. This tendency was visible, for example, in the 1937 constitution, which also laid a territorial claim over Northern Ireland in its article two and three, and which was in use the time of McCartney's arguments. One telling change in the 1937 constitution in contrast to the earlier 1922 constitution is in the opening. Whereas the 1922 constitution opens up with a declaration that all the powers of the government is derived from the people, the 1937 constitution replaces this with the line "In the name of the Most Holy Trinity from Whom is all authority and to whom, at our final end, all actions of both men and state must be referred". In addition, the article 44 separately recognized "the special position" of the Roman Catholic Church in the state. (Buckland 2001, 221)

cultural consensus were the norms of the new state, and the rights of the individual were subordinate to the homogeneity of the polity. Therefore the claim of the *New Ireland Forum* that the rights of the Protestant people were, and would be, always guarded in the Republic, and that their co-existence has been "considerable, if not total, success" (NIFR 1984, 6) is for McCartney unbelievable. (Walker 2004, 233). McCartney argues that because the ethos of the Republic of Ireland is build on an exclusive strand of nationalism, progress cannot be expected, as the polity of the Republic is flawed on its foundations. Here McCartney turns again to Berlin: (McCartney 1985, 9-11)

> According to Berlin the historic fusion of nationalism with the doctrine of the supremacy of the state created an idea of nationhood which possesses four major characteristic, characteristics which, on any objective view, nationalist Ireland clearly displays. Nationalism, it must be emphasised, is an ideology which is quite distinct from the concept of patriotism. It requires a conviction that men belong to a particular human group of which the individual parts are shaped in their character and can only be fully understood in the group context. A context defined by common territory, customs, culture, laws, folk memories, language, artistic and religious expression, all of which shape not only the individual human beings but their purposes and their values. The preoccupation of Irish nationalists with their national territory, the national language, the gaelic cultural identity and a constitution framed around a national religion is undeniable. To suggest that national boundaries have no academic currency, that Ireland historically was never a nation or that modern gaelic culture is largely a product of nineteenth century romantic revival is to speak heresy. (McCartney 1985, 11)

McCartney links nationalism to Irishness and patriotism to the Northern Irish unionist way of life. The Northern Protestants are no nationalists, but patriots. The separateness of Northern Ireland from the rest of Ireland is not argued on the grounds of race or origin, like through the use of "Ulsterfolk", but on the basis of differences between the political beliefs in the two political entities. In Northern Ireland the polity is constituted upon the choice of the individual to choose a cultural identity of one's one, but in the Republic of Ireland the only way to become a full member of the polity is to choose the identity of the Irish nationalist. McCartney's argument is flawed in a sense that it fails to recognize that in fact the state of Northern Ireland follows exactly the same logic. Without the acceptance of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as a part of the UK and its existence as a separate state, one cannot be a member of the Northern Irish polity with full civil rights.

McCartney goes into a detailed description of the workings of the Irish nationalist ethos in the political organisations of nationalism and republicanism, especially those of the IRA and Sinn Féin. McCartney argues that the IRA terrorists and punishment beaters are simply carrying out action which is the logical conclusion of the political imperative of the Irish state. The logic and action of the IRA is a direct derivative of the monoculture tendency of the political thought of Irish nationalism. McCartney underlines this point by drawing an analogy between soviet communists and Sinn Féin, as them both share the logic of eliminating other parties standing in their way. For McCartney, Sinn Féin is the purest example of the Irish nationalist ethos at

work. For Sinn Féin the equivalent of the state of communism is the nation state of Ireland, and the political strategy of Sinn Féin is analogical to the construction of the Soviet State. Like the soviet communists, Sinn Féin is not afraid to use violence to mould the masses to accept its ideology (McCartney 1985, 19-20). It would therefore be inconceivable to grant equal rights of expression to the hostile and dangerous ideas of Irish nationalism. (McCartney 1985, 9-11)

By building his case for unionism on its pro civil rights stance, McCartney has to deal with the historical fact that full civil rights were denied to the Roman Catholic people during the Stormont administration 1921-1972. McCartney counters this by stating that the era of Stormont was a case of "defending freedom by denying freedom" (McCartney 1985, 6). He argues that as the state has a right to curb the freedom of the citizens in order to protect equality, justice, security or public order, it therefore had no other choice but to exclude the Catholics from exercising political rights to the full. Because the nationalist minority did not accept the legitimacy of the state in which they lived, they would have used their rights to end the existence of the Northern Ireland state. As this would have led to the deterioration of freedom and civil rights for the majority unionist population, the only option was the unionist majority rule.

> The basis of the argument for past or present emergency legislation is that it is required by the majority to defend their freedom to determine by whom they will be governed as well as how they are to be governed. Such laws are, to a degree, a reflection of majority rule and what is conceived by that majority as the ultimate freedom. (McCartney 1985, 7)

The quote above is interesting. McCartney legitimizes the unionist majority rule with its undemocratic policies by describing it as analogous with a state in emergency. The implication is that strong and undemocratic measures were necessary in defending freedom and liberties. This brings to mind Carl Schmitt who said that the political is bare in the times of emergency. Interestingly, McCartney does not limit the time span of the emergency in Northern Ireland. He does draw parallels between Northern Ireland and the Second World War Unites States, where the Japanese immigrants were put in detention camps as a way to secure the state and liberty for the majority. In this analogy the Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland obviously represent the Japanese. The state of emergency in Northern Ireland has, under these premises, been continuous from the birth of the Northern Ireland state in 1921, and McCartney is at least implicitly arguing that nationalists must not be given the right for the expression of their political aspirations, if this would put the liberty of the majority in jeopardy. The only way for the Roman Catholic minority to free themselves from this political exile is to disclaim their political identity as Irish nationalists and their political aspiration of Irish unification.

McCartney argues that as this has not happened the devolution is unthinkable, as the reasons for the political exclusion of the nationalists have not gone away. Instead of following the mainstream unionist rhetoric against

power sharing, McCartney makes his case on a more universal level. The reason for the existence of the Union is not in securing the Protestant tradition, but securing the liberty that comes with the superior political ethos of the Union. In this way McCartney seeks to rationalise the unionist rhetoric and distance it from the ineffective cultural antagonism (McCartney 1985, 6-7)

McCartney's rhetoric differs from the 1980's unionist rhetoric. Consider, for example, the speeches of Paisley, which build on the need to protect the cultural heritage of unionism, especially emphasising its cultural roots, orangeism and Protestantism. The UUP, which is the more secular of the unionist parties, was not immune to the type of argumentation that stressed the cultural differences and the importance of orangeism and Protestantism in unionism. McCartney argues that the unionist defence should not be built on defending cultural autonomy. On the contrary McCartney maintains that the only difference that matters between unionism and nationalism is not culture or blood, but the difference between their stand to the state and civil liberties. Instead of concentrating on this, the unionist politicians have sunk in the language dictated for them by the (Northern) Irish nationalists, giving the Irish nationalist the upper hand and hegemony in the discourse and agenda setting in Northern Ireland. McCartney contends that unionism is not to be effectively defended by arguments resting on culture, race or nation but by taking the debate to the political foundations of unionism and nationalism.

But unionism is not a monolith, as McCartney recognizes. Unionism has its own strand of "irrational unionists" who simply say no to Catholic ascendancy, without any believable arguments. But in addition to this McCartney argues that unionism also has a strand of the heritage of the English enlightenment and the English nationalism of the 17th and 18th centuries. This unionism, contrary to the Irish nationalism, is old, and has been allowed to evolve with the other strands of old European nationalisms. In this evolution process the unionist nationalism has learned to emphasise freedom and humanism at the expense of uniformity and exclusion. To illustrate this "unionist nationalism" McCartney uses John Locke and the concept of "nationalist enlightenment":

> No man has such complete vision and knowledge that he can dictate the form of another man's religion. Secondly, each individual is a moral being responsible before God and this presupposes freedom. Thirdly, no compulsion that is contrary to the will of the individual can secure more than an outward conformity. (McCartney 1985, 22)

To defend these principles, the actions of the unionist hegemony, which have "circumscribed the individual liberty of others within the metaphorical city", have been justified. (McCartney 1985, 22-24)

McCartney's the prime argument for the Union is that the Union is guaranteeing the civil liberties that would be lost if Ireland was to be united. This is because, as McCartney states, the Republic of Ireland is a theocratic anti-liberal state with a collective ethos hostile to the liberties of the individual. The case for Union is not to be made on the differences of blood and origin of the

people in Ireland, but on differences between the political beliefs of unionism and nationalism. In another example from the *Liberty and Authority in Ireland,* McCartney seeks support for his arguments from the statement of a Roman Catholic Archbishop Cathal Daly and his submission to the New Ireland Forum:

> In an effort to placate northern Protestants, Bishop Daly stated [quote in quote]:
>
> *What we do here and now declare and declare with emphasis, is that we would raise our voices to resist any constitutional proposal which might infringe or might imperil the civil and religious rights and liberties cherished by northern protestants.*
>
> The implications of this declaration bear examination. It appears to imply quite positively that northern protestants presently have rights and liberties which are not available in the Republic to anyone including their co-religionists. Are northern protestants to be allowed contraception, divorce, abortion in limited circumstances, but these rights are not to be available to southern protestants or catholics living anywhere in the united Ireland? If such civil and religious rights and liberties are so cherished as to be protected, why should they not be currently available in the Republic and who or what interest group would oppose their implementation? (McCartney 1985, 17-18)

If the prime representative of the Roman Catholic state ethos of the Republic of Ireland himself admits that the people in the north enjoy a broader individual liberties than the people in the south, does the unionist case need any more arguments to prove its point, McCartney seems to be asking. McCartney reduces civil rights to family politics and sexuality as if they were the only ones, which are a recurrent unionist themes to divert the discussion from the Catholic grievances in Northern Ireland to the failures in the Republic and to the dangers of united Ireland.

4.4.2 "What must be done": The normative doctrine of McCartney

The solution offered by McCartney's Equal Citizenship Campaign for the troubles in Northern Ireland was integration to the British political system. The CEC argument was that the devolution created an abnormal situation, in which the people of Northern Ireland were not allowed to take part in the decision making. As the UK citizens in Northern Ireland do not have the possibility to vote for the parties forming the government of the United Kingdom, it follows they do not have in practice any say on its actions. It means also that the civil service appointed by the UK government does not enjoy the democratic legitimacy granted by the people of Northern Ireland. To correct this, the British parties need to organise and participate in elections in Northern Ireland, argued the CEC. The CEC was found in May 1986 and its first general conference was held November 1st 1986, a year after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In the conference Robert McCartney outlined the ideas of the movement in his

speech titled *What Must be Done: A programme for normalising politics in Northern Ireland*[36]. (McCartney 1986a, passim)

The root cause of the Northern Ireland problems was, according to McCartney, that Northern Ireland was denied the possibility of "normal" politics, as the people of England refused to keep the province included in the political system of the Great Britain (McCartney 1986a, 1). This was hardly anything new for McCartney, if anything it was yet another example of the ambiguous suspicion felt towards the United Kingdom state by the unionists. McCartney spells out his idea of politics and what has passed as politics in Northern Ireland.

> What do we know of politics? We are told condescendingly by our rulers in Stormont Castle that we are an integral part of the United Kingdom. But we have been bred outside the political system of that state. And our political controllers are intent on ensuring that successive generations of our children will also be bred without the politics of the state of which they are said to be citizens.
> What has passed for politics in Northern Ireland is a sorry business, of which many people in both communities are rightly ashamed. It is the game of Protestants versus Catholics. It is a mixture of sectarian huckstering and control by political patronage. It is a mean and uninspiring sectarian conflict, out of which nothing can be develop, even if it were allowed to continue for a second hundred years. (McCartney 1986a, 1)

The integration into British political system would, according to McCartney, force the sectarian parties to clarify their ideological basis: Was the DUP capable of constructing its politics on issues other than the maintenance of the Protestant ascendancy? Would the unionist parties reform their ideology and argumentation, be based in British liberal ethos and pluralism instead of cultural distinctions? Would the unionist parties be able to see more profound political goals than securing the continuation of the political hegemony? Would the SDLP acknowledge that its present politics was putting the united Ireland above any other questions, and that it therefore was in a state of ideological vacuum? McCartney argued that since Northern Ireland is a divided area with multiple ideas, religions and cultures, it is probably the only area in the United Kingdom totally unsuitable for devolution. Therefore, integration was the only option to end the sectarian division (McCartney 1986b, 7). (McCartney 1986a, passim)

McCartney argues that the root of the conflict lies the problem that politics has been forced to follow the Protestant/Catholic division, thus making it impossible to meet or solve conflicts on neutral ground. Politics on secular basis has been absent. The exclusion of the people from "normal" politics has been deliberate, for the reasons of political expediency aspired by the British or the parties grounded on sectarian division in Northern Ireland. The logical

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[36] The title rhetorically links McCartney with a long tradition of What is to/should/must be done –literature with perhaps its most famous example being Lenin's "What is to be Done?" (Что делать?) (1901), which was of course a homage to the "original" "What is to be done" (also titled Что делать?), a utopian novel by a russian radicalist Nikolai Chernyshevky (Николай Гаврилович Чернышевский) published 1863.

conclusion, argues McCartney, of this exclusion of the Northern Ireland people from "normal" politics is the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which he sees as an act to cement the bipolar nature of the Northern Ireland conflict. This would allow the British and Irish government to govern Northern Ireland together, above the people of Northern Ireland engaged in a state of mutually hostile deadlock. The goal of McCartney is to liberate the people of Northern Ireland and to create a unitary, normal, workable polity where political decisions could be made on pluralist and secular grounds. (McCartney 1986a, 2-3)

The CEC defined integrationism as a right of the Northern Ireland people to fully take part in the UK politics, including joining and representing the British parties. The integrationism of the CEC can be termed as "electoral integrationism" to separate it from the minimalist integration supported by the UUP leadership, namely James Molyneaux and Jonathan Powell, whose view was that Northern Ireland could remain under direct rule of the British government, while the "domestic" policy could be handled by the unionist and nationalist parties in Stormont. The unseen element of electoral integrationism in unionist politics was therefore its desire to see British parties organise and contest elections in Northern Ireland, which was obviously a hostile thought in the minds of the leadership of the unionist parties (Hennessey 1996, 181). The line taken by McCartney and the CEC has obviously some serious weaknesses. Clearly the sectarian tensions already existed before the partition of Ireland in 1921. In fact they caused the partition. Therefore to believe, that conflict with its roots going back hundreds of years could be annulled through integration into the UK political system is not viable. McCartney's arguments for full integration also fit nicely with the arguments that the Irish nationalists should abandon their aspiration for a united Ireland, at least in terms of political manifestation, because when Northern Ireland would be a part of the electoral system of the UK, the nationalist parties could be more easily marginalised. Civil rights movements slogans were recycled by integrationists and left wing intellectuals with unionist sympathies who did not necessarily want to be identified with the unionist parties. However, in the UUP leadership the ideas of the CEC were brutally marginalised.

The logic driving the efforts of the British and Irish governments in the Anglo-Irish Agreement was to encourage the parties in Northern Ireland to agree on devolution. As we have seen, this has been the long trend of the British policy since the start of the direct rule. Devolution, from the perspective of McCartney and the CEC, however, had a sinister echo. McCartney argued that devolution would possibly mean a civil war in Northern Ireland, as the province was not suitable for devolution. Nevertheless, as the dynamics of the political process of Northern Ireland was moving in another direction, the space for renewed cry for integration did not have the space needed. (McCartney 1986a, 4; McCartney 1986b, 7)

The *de facto* end for the CEC came before the 1987 British general elections, in which the leadership of the unionist anti Anglo-Irish campaign wanted to show a united face. McCartney refused to step down from his candidacy in

favour of the united unionist candidate and was expelled from the Ulster Unionist Party, breaking the link between the UUP and the CEC[37]. This was seen by some of McCartney's supporters as an indication that unionism remained in its doomed strategy of defending the Protestant ascendancy instead of building on McCartney's secular arguments (Lynch[38] 1987, passim). However, the McCartney strand of electoral integrationism had its moment, when the Conservative party decided to establish constituency organisations in Northern Ireland, although their success in the 1993 European elections was poor (Hennessey 1996 183-184). (Walker 2004, 238)

The CEC had nevertheless succeeded in activating the "mid-Ulster" unionists, many of them well educated, who saw in McCartney a fresh alternative to traditional unionist politics. These people were unionists for the reasons McCartney had pointed out, and saw themselves as the carriers of the British liberal tradition, or more precisely because they had grown up in the cultural sphere of Greater Britain, and always considered the Republic of Ireland a foreign country. London was their capital in every sense, not Dublin. These people were described as the Ulster British tradition of Unionism (Todd, 1987), and were to get another chance when the unionist party machine went into resuscitation after the inevitable failure of the Anglo-Irish campaign.

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[37]   McCartney among others had been a member in both the Ulster Unionist Party and in the Campaign for Equal Citizenship and contesting elections made this dual membership in practice impossible.

[38]   A former BICO member

5 UNDER SIEGE: THE EMERGENCE OF THE ACADEMIC POLITICIAN

> The identity of Unionism has little to do with the idea of the nation and everything to do with the idea of the state.
> -Arthur Aughey

5.1 A committed scholar

Arthur Aughey, a political scientist from the University of Ulster, is a seminal figure in the academic politicking in Northern Ireland. Aughey's *Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement* was published in 1989, at a time when the unionist campaign against the Agreement had proved a failure, and the unionist constituency had started to ask why this had happened. The book is an openly political interpretation of the recent history and tactics of the unionist politicians. Aughey argues that unionist politics lack effect in delivering its message, and in addition that the message that has been put out is the wrong one. To correct this, Aughey calls for the reorientation of the unionist politics. In terms of his role as the author and scholar Aughey discards the notion of the objective scholar and claims that:

> Events can never speak for themselves. Events must be judged, assessed and interpreted and it is absurd to believe that they can have any status apart from the effort of the intellect. (Aughey 1989, vii)

The above quotation is a direct reference to the Marxist debates of the 1970's, explicitly to the introduction of *Northern Ireland: The Orange State* (1976), by a Marxist nationalist historian Michael Farrell. Farrell argued in the introduction of his book, that his work was not political but was simply laying out events to be judged objectively. Farrell described himself as a detached intellectual, standing outside the political struggles. Nevertheless, as shown in chapter 2 discussing the Marxist debates, Farrell was of course being political in the very

sense of the word. He just did it through the rhetorical strategy of depoliticization, or more accurately by naming what he was arguing as non-political. Aughey, instead, openly declares being political, even partisan. He does not hide his unionist sympathies and his work is not out to find compromise or truth, but to challenge the understanding of unionism, formulating a new and solid defence for it. Aughey links with the political aspect of an intellectual, whereas Farrell describes himself as an intellectual in the sense of an outsider. Aughey shares Max Weber's idea of science as something debatable, and not as something consisting of "facts". The very quote "Events can never speak for themselves" is very Weberian as it connects with the idea that there is not some "truth" to be found, which could even manifest itself somehow in a very *Wie es eigentlich gewesen* –spirit.

Under Siege can be seen as a commitment to a certain Wertbeziehung, which is unionism, and then providing a particular situation analysis by introducing some means to proceed politically; of what could be done for unionism in the particular context of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Aughey's book works on a two different levels. It is a critical commentary of the current unionist politics, commenting on the past mistakes, but also giving directions of where to go in the future. But the work is also political in its reading of the academic literature on unionism, as Aughey discusses several dogmatic conceptualizations of unionism. This is done in order to replace them with a unionist ethos, which Aughey terms as the character of unionism. The character of unionism can be seen as an ideological constellation, which the unionist politicians should learn to apply in their argument building. Aughey's aim is therefore to engage politically also in academic terms, so that the academic discussion would contribute to a better understanding of the conditions for the realization of the unionist doctrine. The book is a political intervention being as political in terms of science as in terms of daily politics. This double intervention has a unitary political purpose: the defence of the Union. Aughey also published an article on the academic misinterpretations of unionism, which is basically the argument of Under Siege in a denser format. Aughey's idea of working as a scholar providing academic ammunition for the unionist politicians is spelled out more straightforwardly in the article:

> Unionist politicians have been very bad at arguing the case for the maintenance of the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. They have neglected to explore the positive virtues of the idea of the union and allowed their opponents to take the ideological initiative. Of course there is much in unionist politics, as in any other doctrine, that is not worth defending. But apart from the parochial stupidities which have overlain it, the idea of the Union remains as an appropriate principal for the accommodation of communal difference in Northern Ireland. The argument of this article is that this idea is defensible in terms that are rational and coherent and that the compatibility of unionism with contemporary political notions has been constantly neglected. The purpose of this article is to assess three popular and influential interpretations of unionism and to criticise their assumptions…The understanding developed in the criticism of these theories will attempt to establish those enduring features of the idea of the Union which are relevant to addressing the present political crisis in Ulster. (Aughey 1990, 188)

The skills of the unionist politicians are not blamed as such, but the politicians have to be educated or advised, and this is a task that Aughey sees fitting for the scholar. The implication is also that the rhetorical and argument building skills of the unionist politicians are not enough, they will also need substance, which is again provided by the scholar. Aughey argues that the unionist politicians did not succeed in formulating what they wanted or to legitimate their want to others. They also, in Aughey's opinion, failed to analyse the conditions that would be needed for a successful unionist programme. Aughey does not see the scholar, or a theorist, as a politician, but as a counsellor to the politician as Macchiavelli in *Il Principe*. Or more precisely in a Weberian way as someone in a position to speculate and to suggest more freely than the politician could.

The structure of *Under Siege* is that of a situation analysis as Aughey goes through the political history of the AIA in detail and from different angles, with suggestions and recommendations towards different political action. As such it is very much a work of someone who sees himself as a scholar, not a politician, but as a scholar who is not by far detached in terms of political beliefs but every bit as political as the politician.

5.2   A critique of the unionist politician

Aughey is linked to the political discourse of Northern Ireland unionism through the *Campaign For Equal Citizenship* and Robert McCartney. The CEC thesis of electoral integration was supported widely amongst the unionist academics, such as Aughey, historian Henry Patterson and political scientist Paul Bew (see for example Bew & Patterson 1987).

Aughey and McCartney are similar on a many different levels. They both share a critical stance towards the politics of the main unionist parties. They both offer the diagnosis that the campaign against the Anglo-Irish Agreement had been ineffective, not because the odds had been against it, but because it had been marked with ideological confusion. They both point out that the missing foundation is in the political philosophy of British liberalism, not in Ulster nationalism as the politicians building on the foundation of traditional unionism were suggesting. What makes the difference between McCartney and Aughey, however, is that while McCartney directs his criticism towards the unionist politics and is appealing to the voter, Aughey is engaging in a political debate also through the rhetoric of science. Aughey detects faults not only in the daily politics of unionism but also in the study of unionism, thus showing that when politics is understood as an aspects of something politics is everywhere. Again, a very different notion of politics than for instance Farrell had. However, the biggest difference between Aughey and McCartney is of course the obvious one: McCartney is a politician and Aughey an academic. Although both can engage in political activity, Aughey does it more for the

"general good" of unionism, whereas McCartney is out to get votes. Therefore the premises for politicking are different. Aughey could be termed as a scholar politicking and McCartney as a politician skilled in political theory, and a one who uses his skill innovatively in argument building.

Aughey argues that unionist politics are in crisis and that the Anglo-Irish campaign is not working. The reason for this is that the unionist political thinking and strategy has concentrated too much in seeking the return of unionist majority rule in the Stormont administration. Therefore the unionist politics have neglected to react to the change in the political parameters. The unionist politics have been based on denial in a situation where simple denial and a show of force are no longer effective. As Aughey argues in 1991, the response of the unionist politicians to crisis and change has been a failure.

> If unionism is a much misunderstood political doctrine then unionist politicians must carry most of the burden of culpability. Indeed it is quite remarkable how they have come to take it for granted that they are the guardians of a faith which has been universally travestied, denigrated and abused. Like flat-earthers they have responded not with a rational and considered response but with a self-righteousness founded on inner truth, the evident justice of their cause. This may be magnificent but it is not politics. It stresses even more the anachronistic tone of unionist discourse and its apparent inability to strike a harmony with contemporary political values (Aughey 1991, 1-2).

In short, the unionist politicians have failed to be political, and are failing to see the extrinsic factors that set the stage for political action are not set in stone, but can be changed. (Aughey 1989, vii)

> Concentration upon the iniquities of others has often been an excuse for political self-indulgence. The usual consequence of political self-indulgence is political irrelevance. What is well known as the "inarticulateness" of unionism is really only the manifestation of this inadequacy of discourse. If unionist politicians are only prepared to formulate arguments appropriate to their determinations, then it may be no wonder that others are reluctant to listen to them sympathetically. In other words, the way in which unionists have presented their own case, or failed to do so, has in no small measure contributed to their sense of isolation and ineffectiveness. This does not imply that there exist no extrinsic factors (what some prefer to call objective conditions) which have worked and continue to work against unionism. However, any political engagement is essentially one of faith; not only faith in one's own values but also faith that advocacy and organisation can significantly alter "objective conditions" in one's favour.
>   No one doubts the unionist faith or the ability of unionist politician to mobilise support. What have been questionable are the politically intelligible and defensible principles which have shaped such activity. It may be argued, of course, that these principles are not a matter of choice but the inescapable condition of unionism as a historical phenomenon. Such fatalism is another escape from reality and in practice has often meant that unionist politics has been reduced to its most paranoid and emotional elements. (Aughey 1989, 1)

Aughey's notion of politics is interesting and challenges the rigid and limited understanding of politics in the unionist political tradition. As Todd (Todd 1987) has argued, politics have had a very sinister echo in the traditions of unionism, as politics is seen more as a necessary evil, than as a creative and positive action. In certain strands of Protestant unionism, or loyalism, political

concepts are even parallel to the religious concepts, as the religious concept of sin is being parallel with the political concept of nationalist threat (Todd 1987, 5). Even in the more liberal strands of unionism, politics and morality are closely intertwined, and politics are deducted from the set of morally accepted principles, such as liberty and progress (Todd 1987, 16). If we accept Todd's argument, as I do, what Aughey is doing is quite remarkable as he is suggesting completely new ways of unionist thinking. Aughey sees politics as a positive force, not as a necessary evil. Aughey is also stressing the point that no matter what the objective conditions might seem to be, there always is a possibility for political action. So, for example, the choice of political action taken up by the joint unionist parties to oppose the Anglo-Irish Agreement was not the only choice in a situation with limited room to manoeuvre. Other choices did exist, but the people deciding upon the tactic failed to take advantage of them.

The unity of unionism, due to its collective siege mentality, gives the unionist parties' a reliable and secure base. This makes mass mobilisation for political purposes easy, which is why it has been the dominant strategy in unionist politics, also in the campaign against the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Aughey, nevertheless, argues that the downside of the easy mobilisation has been that it has left the unionist politicians intellectually lazy. The political manoeuvring inside the unionist party block and between the unionist parties has been restricted, with the unionist politician hardly trying to challenge the nationalist rhetoric, or the parameters of the debate set by the nationalist discourse. In essence, the mass mobilisation as a tool in politics has been used under false premises and for the wrong goals. Because the unionist mass manifestations have been based on negative imaginary ("Ulster says no!") and exclusion, unionism has lost the chance it might have had if the mobilisation had been done by emphasising the positive aspects of the unionist tradition. For Aughey, this is also the only way unionism can successfully challenge the intellectual hegemony of Irish nationalism. *Under Siege* is therefore very much a strategy guide for unionist politics. (Aughey 1989, 1-2)

From everything above Aughey reasons that the only person capable of following through the strategy necessary is Robert McCartney, who represents for Aughey the hope of revitalisation of the unionist politics. The political thought of the two are very close to each other, and in many senses Aughey's book can be read as an elaboration of the concepts McCartney offered in the Equal Citizenship Campaign. Aughey's conceptualizations and arguments can be debated and they can be dismissed on empirical or scientific grounds, but in this dissertation I am focusing on his work as an act of academic politicking. The only thing that matters in terms of this study is how Aughey takes academic debate with contemporary politics and uses them in his rhetoric, and even more, how he is acting as a scholar politicking. Aughey is providing an ideological backbone to McCartney, with the aim of influencing the unionist politics. This is what is makes Aughey interesting and a herald of the scholarly interventions in Northern Ireland. Aughey celebrates the fact that McCartney has been able to challenge the nationalist arguments by building a unionist

defence on "intelligent and justifiable universalisation of unionist values" (Aughey 1989, 12). McCartney's argument of the positive and negative aspects of freedom as manifest in the two distinctive political ideas of Irish nationalism and Northern Ireland unionism are echoed in the cornerstones of the argument building of the unionist scholar. Aughey puts this in terms of the economical impossibility of the Irish unity, the politically illiberal nature of the Irish state and the role of the Roman Catholic church in it:

> Their [unionists] concern for self-determination was not one of positive ethnic, religious or national special pleading. Rather it was a negative one; namely, that British citizens ought not to be compelled against their will to become part of an economically backward, politically authoritarian and religiously exclusive Irish state. (Aughey 1991, 9)

5.3 Critique of the academic study of unionism

In terms of its academic aspect Aughey's intervention is in turning over three central arguments made of the ideological nature of unionism. These arguments have been so powerful in the academics discussion on unionism that they have almost formed a "paradigm" in the study of unionism. At least they can be seen as hegemonic arguments in that discussion, or as something Aughey sees worthwhile to criticize. The central arguments of this "paradigm" are that unionism as an identity is confused, and at least to some extent doomed (Todd, 1987), that unionism is dependant on religion and cannot be understood apart from Protestantism (Bruce, 1986, 1987) and that unionism is confused and paradoxical in terms of its political placement. This is shown in the confusion of unionism in terms of loyalty (Miller, 1978).

The first of these critiques begins with the seminal article *Two Traditions of Unionist Political Culture* (1987) by political scientist Jennifer Todd argues that unionism is ideologically divided in two different political cultures *Ulster loyalism* and *Ulster Britishness.* Todd starts from the *Imagined Communities* by Benedict Anderson (1983), arguing that the imagined communities of these two different traditions differ. Ulster loyalism has as its primary imagined community the community of Northern Protestants, as Ulster Britishness imagines Greater Britain as its community. Todd sees the tradition of Ulster loyalism as doomed, because as a closed and rigid political belief system it is not equipped to survive the inevitable change in politics. The more elastic Ulster Britishness, on the other hand, might survive if it elaborates its capability to cherish its Irish aspect. Todd's thesis has been hugely influential and many Northern Ireland studies tend to take it for granted. Todd's article has also been sometimes understood as a political recommendation, which goes to the bigger question of the relation between politics and social sciences in Northern Ireland. Aughey criticizes this reading of Todd, in which scholarly work is understood as a political recommendation (Aughey 1997c, 17). Interestingly this argument seems to be in contrast with the role Aughey is taking for himself in *Under Siege*,

where he explicitly wishes his academic book to be taken as instruction for political action, a choice of rhetorical strategy by Aughey. (Todd 1987)

Contrary to Todd, Aughey argues that unionism is not divided into two traditions in terms of its political culture, but shares a single political idea based on British liberalism. Not surprisingly, Aughey contradicts Todd's reasoning that only the Ulster British unionism and its ability to embrace its un-escapable Irish aspects, offers unionism a chance of survival. If this would ever happen, Aughey contends it would be political capitulation of unionism. The competing conceptualization of unionism as presented by Aughey, the *character of unionism,* offers an idea at once coherent, rational and defensible, as well as modern and diverse. The only problem for Aughey being that it has not been understood or utilized in unionist politics. (Aughey 1989, 2-3)

The character of unionism can be conceptualized through three aspects of unionism: Protestantism, identity and loyalty. The task of the unionist leadership is to "at any given point to draw upon those resources that seem appropriate to the task in hand" (Aughey 1989, 3). Thus the academic debate is not limited to the scholars, but can, and should be utilized by politicians. Political theory as in the case of theory on unionism is not a case of apolitical theorizations, but in many senses analogous to the daily politics. Unionism has been distorted, not only in politics, but also in scholarly debates claims Aughey. The logic of the argument is that the task of the unionist politician is to understand and use the liberal foundation of unionism in political argumentation in practice, it is Aughey's duty as a unionist scholar to correct the distorted image unionism has in science. From Aughey's committed perspective he can provide both the situational analysis and if needed explicit propositions of what a possible unionist doctrine would need to succeed. Although Aughey does not describe himself as a politician[39], this is probably more due to the narrow meaning Aughey gives to the word, while his actions are the de facto actions of a politician. For Aughey literally, the place of politics is a sphere or a field, perhaps an element in a discourse, but not an aspect that also could be found in the work of a scholar. On the other hand, his departure from the idea of pure and objective intellect in the preface of *Under Siege* does seem to indicate, that Aughey sees science and politics to be closer and also overlapping. Of course also in the Weberian sense a scholar is not a politician and in that sense Aughey's distinction of himself as not a politician is acceptable. However, his actions as a scholar are, in my mind, highly political. It seems that although Aughey does not name the political aspect of science as politics he does recognize its existence and importance. In any case, it does not of course have any meaning if an agent is naming his actions as politics, as this is in no means required for the action itself to be constituted as politics. (ibid)

The second of the critiques stems from terms of social science discussion on religiosity of unionism Aughey's key reference point is Steve Bruce, a

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[39]   This comes out almost hilariously in one of the most party political pamphlets by the unionist academics *Selling unionism* (1995). In the pamphlet Aughey argues "*Since I am not a politician and poor at practical suggestions…*" (Aughey 1995c, 13).

sociologist, whose book *God Save Ulster* was published in 1986. The argument Bruce makes is that unionist politics cannot be fully comprehended without understanding the importance of religion (Bruce 1986). Aughey interprets this one step further as he sees Bruce's claim to be that the core of unionist ideology is evangelical Protestantism, and that ultimately "the Northern Ireland conflict is a religious conflict" (Aughey 1989, 6). Bruce also makes a significant difference between Irish nationalism and Northern Ireland unionism as he argues that whereas nationalism has "dispensed with" Catholicism and can survive and evolve on its own, unionism remains captive to religious idiom (Bruce 1986, 258). Aughey counters this claim by turning it upside down and arguing that the nationalists can identify with the Irish state, rather than the Roman Catholic Church precisely because the state is so saturated by the Roman Catholic faith than the state and religion cannot be separated (Aughey 1989, 7).

Aughey argues that the public perception of the religious aspect of unionism has been largely negative and unionism has been portrayed as saturated with religious bigotry. This negative portrait, continues Aughey, is especially found in the British general public and is due to the heritage of warnings of religious dogma most commonly related to Thomas Hobbes. Aughey argues that the failure to understand the religious aspects of unionism is due to the fact that the British general public has lost its memory of the reformation, while it is still celebrated in unionism. The religious aspect of unionism must therefore be viewed with the context of Roman Catholicism, so that unionism does not represent the Protestant faith as such, but the positive elements that Protestantism has in contrast to Catholicism. Whereas the Roman Catholic ethos represents the authority of the church, the Protestant ethos represents liberalism. The fact that this divide no longer exists in the collective mind of the British general public, does not mean that it would not be remembered, or would not have meaning in Northern Ireland. The political outcome of the reformation has been the desire of the unionists to remain in pace with the British modernism and not go back to the Catholic ethos represented by the Irish state. Religion in unionism is therefore not a negative thing, as argued by the scholars Aughey opposes, but a celebrated virtue. In fact, the Roman Catholic minority of Northern Ireland have, by keeping with the union, been able to harvest the benefits of the civil liberties of the British state. (Aughey 1989, 3-10)

Aughey argues that unionist identity is neither in crisis nor flawed, as claimed in the hegemony of the nationalist discourse. The perception of unionism as either of those two is largely due to the fact that unionism has been portrayed through the looking class of nationalism. Unionists have been fooled to define themselves using the vocabulary and inner logic of nationalism. This has left some misguided unionists to follow through the logic and ideas about distinctive "Ulster identity" and come up with the possibility of an independent Northern Ireland (Aughey 1989, 14). For Aughey, this is succumbing to a nationalist game. Instead, the unionists should understand that their identity

can not be reduced to nation, as unionism is a rational political idea, an idea of the citizenship and the state, not of religion or nation. In terms of identity Aughey therefore reverses the notion of unionist identity as based on Protestant supremacy and replaces it with an image of multifaceted modern identity, transcending the limitations of nationalism: "*The identity of Unionism has little to do with the idea of the nation and everything to do with the idea of the state*" (Aughey 1989, 18). By describing themselves as British or manufacturing an Ulster identity the unionists are aspiring to something which is not there (Cochrane 1994, 383). Instead unionists have different identities from which to choose, including cultural identity as Irish. In terms of party politics it is easy to argue that Aughey is condemning the politics of Paisley *in toto*, without him explicitly needing to say it, through undermining its religious base and its culture-religious logic of independent Northern Ireland. (Aughey 1989, 11-18)

If we follow through Aughey's thinking we can see that by separating the concept of nation from unionism Aughey is anchoring unionism to an idea, which frees it from its commitment to the Union with Britain. By this I do not mean that breaking up the Union would be an idea which Aughey even plays with. Instead, by placing the locus of unionism with the British political philosophy Aughey frees unionism from their interpretations as reductions of the Crown or the political institutions of Great Britain. The United Kingdom state itself is something, which, according to Aughey, cannot be understood through the concept of substantive identity but through the concepts of citizenship and law (Aughey 1989, 17-18). Locke's ideas again bind Aughey and McCartney together, although Aughey is resigning from any form of nationalism more strongly than McCartney, who advocated the matured English nationalism as an alternative to the Irish one (McCartney 1985, 22-24). By detaching the unionist sense of loyalty from attributes such as the nation, the Crown or the political institutions of the UK and attaching it to the ethos combining the people (primarily) on the British Isles, Aughey is able to avoid the difficulty unionist politics faced when unionists had to swear allegiance to the British state and deal with the fact that the British policy (as in the AIA, for example) was undermining the very foundation of that allegiance. This way Britain, in a sense of a political agent, such as the British government, is no more the guarantor of the political interests of the unionist people, but their interests are to be guaranteed by the superiority of their political idea. (Cochrane 1994, 382)

The third issue is an important question of loyalty which Aughey touches upon, as unionism has been accused of confused loyalty in terms of its political allegiance. The defining work in this respect has been *Queens Rebels* (1978) by David Miller. Miller's book was an attempt to explain the 1970's civil unrest of the unionists, mainly the failure of the Sunningdale power sharing, by mental and political history of the collective body of the unionist people, although Aughey's critique of Miller fails to take notice of the heavy influence that the end of the 1970's political contexts had on Miller's question setting. Miller's study works also as a type of compilation of the loyalty discussions of

unionism, including discussing the suspicion unionism feels towards the Irish nationalists, sparked by their refusal of allegiance to the Crown and the Northern Ireland state (see Hennessey 1996).

Miller is asking how it is possible that unionists metaphorically swear allegiance to the United Kingdom state, but refuse to honour the democratic decisions of that state, referring to the 1970's failed power sharing experiments where the unionists by relying on mass mobilisation collapsed the negotiated settlements. Miller concludes, that the conditional aspect of the unionist loyalty can be explained via the theories of the social contract between the sovereign and the people. The defining element in the unionist politics is a band of unionist people, understanding themselves as being in a contract relationship to the Crown. This contract binds both partners to honour Northern Ireland's position as a member of the United Kingdom. When the contract is broken a revolt might follow. For Miller, the causality between a broken contract and a revolt is almost absolute, as he is reflecting the contract theory through the events in Northern Ireland. Therefore Miller interprets the contract theory as being in the background for the process that led to the revolt against the Sunningdale, as the unionist people interpreted the actions of the British government to have broken the contract. Miller argues that as the band is the only mode of polity among unionists, it is impossible for the unionists to come to a power sharing agreement with the nationalists, who are considered to be outside the band and its natural enemies. The point Miller makes is that the unionist band would not exist without Irish nationalism keeps the band together. The resistance towards nationalism is therefore the single most important thing keeping the band together. (Miller 1978)

Miller argues that unionism can be understood as a form of nationalism, but as a nationalism which does not share the nation with Britain or England, but is a form of nationalism confined to Northern Ireland. If unionists truly felt a part of the British nation, they would not challenge the decisions made by the British nation, and by themselves as part of it (Miller 1978, 162). The fact that Northern Ireland Protestants/unionists are not British, in terms of their experienced sense of nationhood, is also implicitly recognized by both London and Dublin (Miller 1978, 158). Miller argues that the state of Northern Ireland, if it could exits more autonomously, would be a very volatile construction, since it could not incorporate the Catholic minority and create a proper nation state. Miller's central argument is therefore that unionism is a case of incoherent nationalism, which does not feel attached to any nation in sense of the "modern world". Miller insists on keeping the idea of a nation and the ideology of nationalism as a necessary building block of any state. As unionism fails this test, it is to be seen as an insufficient political idea for a state. In this sense Miller gets quite close to the traditional Irish nationalist claim that the state of Northern Ireland is an un-reformable, "failed political entity". In general Miller in his interpretations shares a common sociologist's desire for a higher level of coherence that the scholar of politics does, which also partly explains Aughey's

unease with it. (Miller 1978 ; For the summary on the loyalty literature see Cochrane 1997, 71-74 and for its two main aspects see Hennessey 1996)

When followed through, Miller's argument diminishes the bond between unionists and the United Kingdom, since the actions of unionists would betray them as not really being a part of what they claim to be. One clear cut example of this estrangement is in the formation of Ulster Volunteer Force in 1913 as a part of the Ulster Unionist Councils strategy of opposition against the Home Rule, underlining the conditionality of the unionist loyalty (Patterson 2007, 2). Aughey, on the contrary, claims that the United Kingdom state, in essence the Thatcher government, has been disloyal to the union, as the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed without consulting the unionist people, and the subsequent reaction can therefore only be understood as an act of defence against the disloyalty carried by the UK state. Aughey questions Miller's understanding of the UK state, which, argues Aughey, cannot be based on loyalty to the nation as for such the British state is much too diverse. There is no British nation, only British citizens (Aughey 1989, 24). Also, as can be predicted, Aughey criticizes the way Miller reduces unionism to a mere confused form of proto nationalism or a nationalism seeking a nation. Aughey argues that the natural reference point for unionism is citizenship and the question of nationality does not have anything to do with the core beliefs of unionism. From this it also follows, that since unionism is not based on the exclusive paradigms of Irish nationalism, but is superior in its capability to harvest an inclusive polity, Miller's contention that the unreformable nature of the unionist state is thus revoked. As nationalists can feel affinity to the civic principles of unionism, a state based on these principles would be superior to another based on the exclusive political identity of Irishness, as nationalism essentially is incompatible with the modern idea of the state (Aughey 1989, 22). Again Aughey argues, that the essence of unionism is somewhere else than in the concepts and ideas of nationalism. (Aughey 1989, 18-28).

> However, it is constitutional insecurity that speaks universally to unionists. This has predisposed them towards a political vision that has meaning for them, a vision that helps to resolve their dilemma. Unionists may never read John Locke, the American Founding Fathers or Thomas Hobbes – nevertheless, their assumptions are the same. (Aughey 1989, 21)

It is my understanding, that the academic debate Aughey engages in is not only an academic debate, but another aspect of a political intervention. The direct challenge given to the contemporary unionist politics is backed by arguments made on the level of the unionist ideology, identity and character, giving more weight to the argument. What Aughey is in fact arguing, is the complete reversal of the unionist politics, and the discarding the erroneous belief structure, behind the unionist arguments. Instead of exclusive "unionist nationalism", the unionist case should be built on inclusive British liberalism. Aughey seems to be convinced that proper understanding of unionism as a political thought is enough to answer the crisis of unionist politics, and unionism does not require a rethinking as such. But to properly understand

unionism, the unionist politician must be educated. In this sense Aughey's relation to language, speech and discourses is not merely instrumental or subordinate to "hard politics" or "policy", but more Austinian in a sense of doing things with words, as the Union clearly either wins or loses the battle through words and discourses, and its salvation does not lie in the mobilisation, or resilience of the unionist people.

Aughey was not alone in his project to construct a rational belief foundation for unionism, and in his belief that this was the only option if unionism ever wanted to be taken seriously. Therefore *Under Siege* had a positive response among the unionist minded academics who shared Aughey's view on unionism, as well as his critical stance on the unionist politics that unionism had taken on since the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Some of these academics saw in Aughey a new positive voice of unionism (Kennedy 1990). In essence the act of anchoring unionism in the foundations of British liberalism in order to present it in a more inclusive and positive terms than before seemed to be largely accepted as a way forward amongst the leading figures of the unionist academics. However, the most important was the division between the inclusive belief base of unionism and the exclusive and narrow minded Irish nationalism. Aughey was, nevertheless, criticized for downplaying the substantive cultural identity[40] of unionism and its implications in order to give unionism a more appealing, inclusive and secular core. This defect was was dealt with by a fellow academic unionist Colin Coulter, a sociologist who presented a modified version of the "Character of Unionism" in his similarly titled article in 1994.

Analysis of Coulter of the political situation of Northern Ireland and the requirements it gives to unionist politics echoes Aughey five years earlier:

> The outbreak of the present troubles, in contrast, exposed unionists as ideologically inarticulate and introspective. The unionist community has frequently proved incapable of expounding its point of view in terms either intelligible to the outside world of consonant with the discourse of modern liberal democracy. (Coulter 1994, 1)

The message of Aughey and Coulter was that as the unionist community, i.e. the unionist political parties had failed, it was time for the academics to step in, and show the way forward. The academics were described as the medium, which sets unionism back in tune with the rest of the modern liberal democracies. The unionist academics were also keen to show mistakes in the arguments stating that unionist political culture was anti-intellectual, and unionism as a political thought had failed to locate itself in the curriculum of established political ideas such as liberal democracy, socialism and nationalism (see especially O'Dowd 1991). For Coulter, the writings of McCartney and Aughey represented a longed "intellectual renaissance" inside the unionist community (Coulter 1994, 14).

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[40]   Predominately that the strong support of Paisley and the political aspect of Evangelical Protestantism and their relation to the secular unionism a la Aughey were not adequately explained in Aughey's thinking.

Coulter's own input to this renaissance is strongly built on Aughey, as Coulter more or less repeats the critique of the study of unionism on which Aughey builds his own "character of unionism". Coulter's purpose is not as straightforwardly political as Aughey's, as Coulter limits himself to the critique of the study of unionism, he nevertheless acknowledges the political implications that better understanding of unionism brings. One reason for this is obviously, that while *Under Siege* was published for a wider audience, Coulter is presenting his case in a professional journal, *Irish Political Studies*. The biggest departure of Coulter in relation to Aughey is that Coulter recognizes the malign aspects that the various cultural identities in unionism. For Coulter the problem is not in explaining away the sectarian hostility in the marching crowds of the Orange Order or the nature of Protestant fundamentalism. For Coulter this all has to be accepted in the name of the unionist diversity. Denying the cultural aspect of the unionist identity for the sake of liberalism, as Aughey in Coulter's mind does, is an act of self-betrayal for Coulter. Therefore, Coulter encourages social scientists to discard the illusory search for the essence of unionism and to accept the fact that unionism has many faces. For Coulter this works as a way to invalidate the critique of the academics hostile to unionism by claiming that they have only succeeded in describing one aspect of unionism, like conditional loyalty in the case of Miller, and evangelical Protestantism in the case of Bruce. Similarly Coulter criticizes Aughey for putting too many hopes in emphasizing the link of unionism and British liberalism, described by Coulter as the wonderland of political thought. (Coulter 1994)

Aughey was a herald for a certain type of academic politicking. After *Under Siege* academic political interventions became much more common. This can be seen nominalistically as the type of rhetoric used by academic unionists was named as "new unionism" (e.g. O'Dowd, 1998) or that the academics were seen even as a type of avant-garde of the liberal unionism. The avant-garde notion is debatable, as it could well be attached to political agents like the BICO, CEC or Robert McCartney who were political, in a sense of party political and electoral, or having a clear cut organisational basis, contrary to the unionist scholars and intellectuals who did not compose a political party, for instance. This brings to mind especially Gramsci with his idea of the "organic intellectuals" being needed to serve as an intellectual avant-garde of a particular group, or for Gramsci, obviously a class. Of course the unionist intellectuals could not be termed as "organic intellectuals" in a sense that they would have no other purpose than to serve as "theory producers" for the need of a certain group, but they would be considered in the Gramscian way as traditional intellectuals lining up for the unionist cause from their own free will. In other words they would not be created by the unionist strata to fulfil a certain purpose.

As I will show, some of the scholars did want to align themselves with Northern Ireland politics with comments stressing the change of the conflict and subsequent need for intellectuals to get engaged (Aughey 1995c, 12).

However, it must be pointed out that liberal unionism or liberal unionists were not concepts that were introduced for the first time in the post- Anglo-Irish Agreement climate. Both concepts have been widely used to describe the more secular strands inside the Official Unionist Party (UUP). The mode of the academic politicking, nevertheless, continued its evolution so, that the next step was to be expert politicking in which, for example, unionist economists substantiated the futility of Irish unity on the grounds of economy.

Under Siege was a call for the unionist academics to engage themselves, and in Sartrean terms transform themselves from academics into intellectuals. Aughey's call to arms came in tandem with a process which seemed to indicate that the fixed constitutional position of Northern Ireland, which was the focal point of unionist political thinking, was in jeopardy. On 9th November 1990 UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter Brooke stated in a speech that Britain had no selfish, strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland. Stating the obvious should not perhaps have caused any particular ramifications, but nevertheless this seemed to work as an indicator that Britain had swallowed the nationalist hook and was preparing to assume a role as a persuader of the unionist population towards unification. Again, what was actually said was not that important. Many would argue that what Brooke said had been obvious for some time (Walker 2004, 241; English 2006, 381), but what was important was the different interpretations one could make out of Brooke's utterance. Brooke's aim was to get a new round of negotiations going towards a new agreement, which would replace the Anglo-Irish Agreement and would involve both the unionists and the nationalists in the power sharing arrangement. The process towards the Belfast Agreement had begun, and the unionist politics were liberated from the stagnation they had suffered. The unionists did not necessarily have a disadvantageous position, as one of the incentives that Thatcher had, in directing Brooke for a round of negotiations, was the disappointment over the estrangement of the unionists. After all, at least on a rhetorical level Thatcher had shown unionist sympathies[41]. On a bigger scale Thatcher was disappointed by the lack of security co-operation with the Republic, which had been the biggest British incentive behind the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The unworkable Anglo-Irish agreement together with the changed political context in Northern Ireland gave momentum towards a new constitutional arrangement. (Patterson 2007, 318).

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[41] "Northern Ireland is as British as Finchley" argued Thatcher in an election rally already in 1981.

6   TEXTBOOK POLITICS

> In the interests of objectivity and detachment, contributions have been sought from established academics and specialists, and not those actively involved in party politics. (Barton & Roche 1994, 1)

6.1   Challenging the nationalist interpretation

As Aughey represents the strand of academic politicking, which was trying to formulate a better case and defence for unionism, the early 1990's also saw the birth of an academic unionism, which was out to overthrow the nationalist understanding of the Northern Ireland conflict it claimed hegemonic. This type of academic unionism was reactive in the sense that its purpose was to convince the audience that what they had been used to hearing of Northern Ireland was politically coloured and only a step away from the nationalist propaganda. This type of politicking was typically expert generated, as the authors picked a claim from their own area of expertise, which was then proved false. In this chapter I will take a look at this mode of academic interventions calling it "textbook politics". This type of academic influence also had similarities with the Marxist debates of the 1970's, where the unionist academics were rewriting the history of Ulster unionism with a purpose of giving it logic and meaning. In textbook politics the politicking aspect is less obvious than in outright political pamphlets, manifestoes and declarations, and it can be more easily argued that it is not even there. However, it is my premise that it would be a mistake to bypass this textual genre, because in the end, it is by nature as political as the examples previously discussed. The themes selected for these textbooks, and how they are discussed, reveal their political nature, surpassing the seemingly apolitical veil that the textual genre of a textbook is giving.

The aim of this "textbook politics" was to improve the bad public image unionism got in the British Isles and internationally. This "fact" was especially articulated by the unionist academics themselves (See for example Barton & Roche 1994, vii). One of the clearest themes that this type of intervention

discussed, was, broadly speaking, the Catholic grievances during the civil rights movement period, such as discrimination in housing, employment or administration and gerrymandering. The best examples of this strand of academic interventions are: *The Northern Ireland Question: Myth and Reality* (MR) (1991), its "sequel" *The Northern Ireland Question: Perspectives and Policies* (PP) (1994) and the "concluding" *The Northern Ireland Question: Nationalism, Unionism and Partition* (1999) all edited by Patrick J. Roche, an economist from the University of Ulster and Brian Barton a historian from Queen's University, Belfast. The books consist of articles by writers coming predominantly from the two universities and the civil service of Northern Ireland. Arthur Aughey is also amongst the writers, repeating the thesis of *Under Siege,* that "the idea of the union as one which transcends such outdated concepts as nationalism" (Aughey 1991 in *Myth and Reality*, 16).

I am not arguing that the unionist "textbook politics" is abusing history, in such a way that the authors would pervert the "facts" or present false "truths", or that their conclusions would have no merit, even in terms of science. Although O'Dowd, for example, classifies these books under the label "more politically focused new unionist thinking" (O'Dowd 1998, 71) they might also be considered to compose a compilation of apolitical academic articles, and indeed are categorised as such by the authors. My point, however, still is that as science is not immune to politics, apolitical textbooks in Northern Ireland cannot exist. The articulated objective of the authors such as Aughey, Barton and Roche is, however, to offer reality in place of the myth offered by the Irish nationalists:

> Lee's [Irish historian Joseph Lee] book [Ireland: Politics and Society 1912-85] is an example of a failure to liberate the understanding of unionism and the politics of Northern Ireland from nationalist mythology and stereotype despite some decades of 'historical revisionism 'in Ireland.[…]The objective of this book is to substitute analysis for myth in the understanding of the tragedy which has engulfed Northern Ireland for over two decades. (Barton & Roche 1991, vii)

The notions of objectivity and detachment are even more clearly highlighted in *Perspectives and Policies*:

> The volume does not attempt to offer a solution to the problem [of the Northern Ireland question]. Rather the intention has been to identify and dissect the individual elements of which it is composed and thereby to illuminate the complex issues involved and the obstacles blocking their resolution. In the interests of objectivity and detachment, contributions have been sought from established academics and specialists, and not those actively involved in party politics. (Barton & Roche 1994, 1)

Objectivity and detachment is something that is highlighted, not rejected, as the work of the authors of the *Myth and Reality* is labelled as *analysis* and contrasted to the nationalist history writing and understanding of Northern Ireland, termed as *myth*. This dichotomy is present already in the title as the writers are offering reality in place of a myth. The attempt to portray the work of the writers of the books as apolitical "reality" or detached and objective is obviously a move applying the strategy of depoliticization and as such a very intense way of politicking in itself (Schmitt 1991 [1932], 21) . Politics is

understood in a very strict sense as party politics in effort to intensify the selected depoliticization strategy, but it is very hard to understand how these books would really be taken as apolitical or non-committed.

The rhetorical strategy of the textbook politics is different from the openly political intervention made by Aughey in *Under Siege*, in which Aughey explicitly denounced the idea of an unattached scholar, while *Myth and Reality* and *Perspective and Policies* make a virtue of the same idea. This shows the diversity and pluralist nature of the phenomenon under investigation. It also shows that multiple rhetorical strategies were deployed in delivering the message which remained essentially unchanged. Obviously the whole act of "identification and dissection" of the central elements of the Northern Ireland conflict is highly political, as by doing this the authors name the problems from their own particular point of view.

Myth and Reality can be interpreted as a single act of constructing a narrative to compete with the hegemonic nationalist vision of Northern Ireland. In this narrative the history and the ideologies of unionism or nationalism are contested and defined differently than in the hegemonic nationalist narrative. Using *Myth and Reality* as an example, consider that not all contributors are unionist, or even Northern Irish. But it is the political implications that this type of publication has that are interesting, even more so when this motif is spelled out as in the case of *Myth and Reality*. The authors separate as a myth the hegemonic understanding of Northern Ireland conflict, and argue to be replacing it with reality. This kind of attempt for a "paradigm shift" in the context it was published does not escape the political, no matter how narrowly the term is understood.

Perspectives and Policies follows the line of *Myth and Reality* in setting its aim in giving an alternative vision to the Northern Ireland question. In *Perspectives and Policies*, however the emphasis is not in setting straight the narrative of Northern Ireland conflict and challenging its claimed nationalist hegemony. The outspoken purpose of *Perspectives and Policies* is to sketch the political situation and to suggest possible roads to political solution, however without naming any. *Perspectives and Policies* completes the analysis of *Myth and Reality* in a way that while *Myth and Reality* is a revisionist evaluation of Northern Ireland political history and politics *Perspectives and Policies* offers an assessment of the key political agents of Northern Ireland from a particular unionist point of view, while also giving some suggestions of the directions that unionists should conduct their politics. Although this analysis of the role and the actions of the British parties, for example, is not as clearly "textbook politicking" in a way that a revisionist history writing might be, I will still go through it because it offers a situation analysis from a particular unionist intellectual viewpoint. This situation analysis can therefore be interpreted as a reading device for the unionist politician of the political context, and therefore also as information from which suggestions for politics could be derived. This way it links with the notion of a scholar being in a position to speculate and suggest different strategies for the agents in daily politics.

6.2 Discrimination: one sided or mutual?

The essential "nationalist myth" that many the authors of textbook politicking wish to denounce is that the Stormont administration had been profoundly undemocratic, discriminative and so deeply flawed that Northern Ireland as a state had always been a "failed politically entity", impossible to repair. Obviously denouncing this would be crucial in order to get legitimacy for any further government in Northern Ireland, and this is why the control of history in this sense was vital. The writers, Christopher Hewitt in the case of *Myth and Reality*, acknowledge that some form of discrimination has taken place, at least in terms of local councils, education, employment etc, but also point out various mitigating factors to explain what had happened. In terms of gerrymandering, or local council employment it is shown that there was discrimination taking place, but that it happened in the nationalist dominated councils also; similarly both Catholic and Protestant companies practiced discrimination[42]: "That discrimination against Catholics by Protestant councils did occur on occasion is undeniable. Equally undeniable is the fact that Catholic councils also discriminated" (Hewitt 1991, 22-23). Note that the attribute "on occasion" is used only when speaking of the Protestant discrimination.

The unbalance of the workforce at Queen's University of Belfast (Protestant majority), which is termed by the nationalists as injustice is explained away as being the outcome of the UK wide principle of academic employment, and not a result of discrimination towards the Catholics (Compton 1991, 44). More generally, the negative bias towards the Catholic job seekers can also be explained by the fact that Protestants are taken to be better employees, the latter argument made by using the works of Marx, Weber and Tennyson as a intellectual basis (Compton 1991, 48). The structural factors explaining employment differences are so varied that religion alone can not be taken as an explanatory factor in discrimination, argues Professor Paul Compton (QUB), specialized in demographic geography (Compton 1991, 70). The political implications of the two rivalling dogmas of the history of Northern Ireland are clear:

> Lying at the root of the political strife in Northern Ireland is the unresolved status of the province and the continuing determination of Irish republicans to create an all-Ireland polity. The economic grievances of Catholics are tangential to this in so far as the basic problem would still be with us even if these grievances could be resolved. They nevertheless serve the purpose of directing attention away from the real nature of the Northern Ireland conflict and gain much sympathy for the Catholic case, both throughout the British Isles and internationally. (Compton 1991, 75)

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[42] The obvious reference point is the speech by the Northern Ireland premier (1943-1963) Sir Basil Brooke that whereas the Protestant and Orangemen companies employ Roman Catholics they should "wherever possible employ good Protestant lads and lassies".

In short, the argument of depoliticization politics follows the lines of: what the nationalists are doing is politics by the mishandling the "facts" and what the unionist academics are doing is setting the record straight, without any political ambitions.. For the authors of this strand of unionist politicking the strategy was to re-focus the debate from past grievances, and pass the guilt of making the politics of Northern Ireland unworkable to nationalists, for it was them who made Northern Ireland a failure due to their stubborn refusal to accept the democratic legitimacy of the Northern Ireland state.

It is reasonably safe to conclude that evidence quite clearly points out that discrimination against the Roman Catholics did happen. Why this happened and what were the underlying goals behind the discriminative measures taken is, however, another question. These questions have not yet been exhaustively answered. It is clear that funding for the development of nationalist dominated areas such as Derry/Londonderry were at some points, most clearly in the 1960's, scarce, but whether this resulted from the unionist thought that the area was a lost cause for unionism and behind it would have been a deliberate plan to run down the area west of the river Bann is another matter. In other cases discrimination was more subtle, for example the post World War Two Prime Minister Sir Basil Brooke seemed to consider it fair that the Catholics should have an equitable portion of the public administration jobs, although he reserved the top positions for Protestants (Patterson 2007, 127). Nevertheless, it is clear that these issues were debated already in the 1960's, and after the huge impact the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, discriminative politics were less easy to masquerade. (Hennessey 2005, 37-38 ; 68-69)

6.3   Rewriting history

It is clearly articulated (e.g. Compton 1991, 75) that the unionist academics wish to redirect the public attention to the root cause of the political strife, which, they argue, is the constitutional status of the Northern Ireland state. Evidently this is where the writers believe they have the upper hand. At least from the unionist point of view, it seems that the control over history is given a great deal of meaning. Most evidently the narrative of *Myth and Reality* is a task of rewriting history and overcoming the rhetorical limitations the claimed hegemony of the nationalist discourse sets to the unionist defence. Rewriting history and annulling the dogmatic understandings of the past, calls for expertise and the presence of an intellectual, as events cannot be presented without them, as Aughey stated in the opening of *Under Siege*. As in the introduction of *Myth and Reality* Roche and Barton call for the liberation of politics of Northern Ireland and the understanding of a unionism free from the nationalist mythology and stereotyping (Roche & Barton 1991, vii). Aughey asks, with critique also towards the unionist side: "Why should unionism be in this defensive position in the first place and why has it neglected the battle of

ideas?" (Aughey 1991, 2). The liberation of unionism from the limitations imposed on it and the subsequent "battle of ideas" is something in which the scholar has an important role.

The authors of the *Myth and Reality* collectively purge unionists from discrimination in housing, employment, voting as well as gerrymandering. Some blame still remains, but everything is rationalised as acts of defending the state. How could it be anything else, as the unionists never had any plans for a Protestant state as Aughey argues (Aughey 1991, 9)? It was never the intention of the unionists to form self-government, and the Stormont parliament was something the unionists were forced to take as the lesser evil. Aughey argues that the unionist politicians of the 1920's are exceptional in a sense that they were "reluctant to accept power", and that they had no desire to 'dominate' Catholics in the pursuit of loyalist self-determination. Aughey repeats the claim made by historian Brendan Clifford, a pioneer of the unionist intellectuals, that the unionist regime was a regime of "masterful inactivity", which did everything it could to prevent Northern Ireland from being estranged from Great Britain and becoming a state of its own (Clifford 1987, 1-2). In effect, as Aughey formulated his point four years later, "*Westminster forced unionists to accept the necessary evil of devolved government*" (Aughey 1995a, 15). This, again, is recycling the *Campaign for Equal Citizenship* rhetoric (See e.g. McCartney 1986a, 1-2). Aughey's reasoning goes that as the motif for dominating the Catholic minority cannot be found in the Protestant supremacism, because one does not exist, the only explanation for the misgivings of the unionist regime must be the defence of the Protestant British ethos. The acts of discrimination are legitimized and explained as necessary and civil, as they were put in place in defence of a more novel and liberal way of life. (Aughey 1991, 10-11).

Another rhetorical strategy in the "history debate" was in pointing out the position of Protestants in the south of Ireland, and contrasting the difficulties they had with the experiences that nationalist had in Northern Ireland. Between 1911 and 1926 the 26 counties of what was to become the Republic of Ireland lost 34 percent of its Protestant population. This massive immigration was the most impressive displacement of people seen in the British Isles. Whereas the unionist intellectuals can term the era of Stormont, with some justification, as an act of necessity, or as "defending freedom by denying freedom" the fate of the southern Protestants in the Irish Civil War is more straightforwardly described, as being the victims of "ethnic cleansing"[43] (Hart 1996, 92). With the mid 1990's context, during the break up of Yugoslavia, for instance, the choice of the term "ethnic cleansing" is striking. Juxtaposing the grievances of Protestants and Catholics is obviously a political move;

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[43]   The census carried out in the Republic on Ireland in 1926 showed that roughly a third of the Protestants that were living in the 26 counties of the Republic had left since 1911. Along with other statistical data this can be taken as a proof that there was a strong sectarian edge in the Irish revolution, being present for example in the fact that Protestants seem to have suffered far more than their share of the population in the Irish War of Independence. (Patterson 2007, 15)

nevertheless this type of juxtaposition was central in rewriting the history of unionism and nationalism. As Whyte (1990, 151-154) has shown, numerous studies indicate that the claim that Protestants were mistreated in the south is overblown. This is, however, beside the point, as we are not trying to find a "truth" to the matter but are interested of the political and rhetorical aspect of the unionist revisionist history writing.

What is remembered is constantly being renegotiated and contested, and by framing the history of Ireland scholars can influence the contemporary political debate. Do we choose to remember the undemocratic nature of the Stormont regime, the Protestant mass migration from the Republic of Ireland, or the ambivalent policy of the Southern State towards the remembrance of the Armistice Day (Leonard 1996), it is a political decision, providing a changing context to build arguments.

In terms of the Armistice Day remembrance the documented hostility (ibid.) in the South towards the people who wished to commemorate the Great War balances the sheet of cultural oppression. This idea cannot be excluded when we look at the topics covered in the unionist history writing of the 1990's. If the nationalists had an argument stating that they had been culturally depressed for decades in the North, the unionists had a counter argument that they had served the same fate in the Republic. Both, the nationalist reading of their suffering in Northern Ireland and the unionist reading of the neglect of the unionist traditions in the Republic, are symmetrically locked in the past, failing deliberately to acknowledge the changed attitudes north and south of the border. As the nationalist claims of the dictatorship nature of the unionist state might have been out of touch with the present, so were the unionist claims that the history of Ireland as a part of the UK was not fully accepted (e.g. Walker 2000, 111-112).

6.4   Shining the shield of unionism

Besides history, the *Myth and Reality* contributes to the discussion on the nature of unionism, thus continuing in Aughey's footsteps by challenging the representation that unionism had been given in academic debates and daily politics. Whether unionism is a secular ideology or simply a political manifestation of Protestantism is intensely debated, and remains a politically significant question. The works of Steve Bruce have underlined the special link between the Presbyterian faith and the Democratic Unionist Party of Ian Paisley (Bruce 1986, 1994), thus giving unionism a reputation as a religious ideology. In *Myth and Reality*, however, much stress has been put on the heterogeneous nature of unionism in its relation to religion. The article in *Myth and Reality* by Boal, Campbell and Livingstone, all from the Department of geography of QUB, is based on a survey mapping the Protestant identity, and was carried out amongst the Protestant churchgoers in Belfast. The survey included questions

from party affiliation to attitude towards Roman Catholicism and the Irish Republic to the acts of self definition.

> The Ulster Protestant mosaic is held together politically by a common opposition to the possibility of an absorption into a state perceived as both theocratic and republican. Opposition to common 'enemy' may be necessary but not sufficient source of unity, however. (Boal, Campbell, Livingstone 1991, 126)

Interestingly, however:

> It must immediately be recalled, however, that there are other matters about which there exists among our respondents a consensus that is quite remarkably unanimous, as to, for example, their self-assigned identity, and how they believe their fellow British citizens 'across the water' perceive them. Thus, the great majority express both a strong sense of Britishness, and an equally great desire to further sharpen that self-designation by incorporating an Ulster gloss: They are also as certain that mainland Britons see them as in some sense Irish. But opposition to Irish unification is the politically crucial area of unanimity and consequently it is not surprising that arrangements such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement are regarded as nothing less than an intrusion of Trojan-Horse proportions into the body politic. (Boal, Campbell, Livingstone 1991, 128)

The selection of the topics reveals what the unionist scholars feel they need to defend. Unionism was seen to be labelled as a religious ideology based on denial and fear towards the Roman Catholic Church. The emphasis of the British aspect of the unionist identity is made to show to the reader the secular nature of unionism. The use of metaphor is revealing. Northern Ireland is depicted as a body politic under threat by a Trojan-Horse of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The quote depicts unionists united against a common enemy, the Roman Catholic ethos of the Irish state. However, this implicitly shows that unionism as a political doctrine is as exclusive as the unionists claim Irish nationalism to be. Again academic unionism does not represent critical re-thinking but is making the division lines clearer.

A seminal work in the reinterpretation of unionism is *Unionism in Modern Ireland* (UMI), which was published in 1996, a time of changed political context also in unionism due to the loyalist ceasefires of 1994 and the changing of the guards inside the UUP, which lifted David Trimble as the leader of the moderate unionism. *Unionism in Modern Ireland* is edited by Richard English and Graham Walker, both political scientists at Queen's University and it combines articles on unionism written by several young scholars. It builds on the work of unionist academics such as Gibbon, Bew or Aughey (English & Walker 1996, xii). It situates itself to the discussion, where the idea of unionism is hanging between the tensions of secular unionist politics, which the UMI clearly represents, and the exclusivist cultural identity politics. The themes of the book encapsulate the questions with which various scholars in the unionist camp were engaged. Its themes cut through the late eighties to the signing of the Belfast Agreement and are the core of the explanation to the engagement of intellectuals into unionist politics. Answers to the problems facing unionism were scientifically researched and a vigorous study of unionism. In essence, the

articles in the *Unionism in Modern Ireland* illustrate the unionist feeling of being intellectually misunderstood. Ian McBride, a contributor to the book, expresses the collective unionist feeling thus:

> Ulster Unionism is commonly portrayed as irrational, backward and deviant. While Unionists have resisted any accommodation with Irish nationalism, the argument runs, their conditional loyalty to the Crown has obscured the emergence of a genuine sense of Britishness. The Union is usually interpreted as a tactical alliance designed to maintain colonial privileges rather than *bona fide* expressions of emotional commitment to British culture and values. At the same time, loyalists have failed to invent their own distinctive Ulster nationality; consequently they are unable to articulate their political demands in the respectable language of self-determination. Instead Ulster Protestants seem trapped within religious and political attitudes derived from the seventeenth century: one historian [Charles Townshend] has written that the sense of community shared by Ulster Protestants is best seen as 'an arrested development towards modern nationalism'. (McBride 1996, 1)

This is a description of a situation requiring an engagement of the unionist intellectual. The diagnosis of McBride can be read as a call to challenge these presumptions and release unionism from the dogmatic analysis by Irish nationalism. McBride is arguing, like many others, that unionism is something secular, liberal and positive. In the project of the academic intellectuals this was done through reinterpreting history and focusing on the positive aspects of the unionist political thought, at least in the rhetorical sense.

The question of modernisation was not new to unionism, but interesting allegories can be drawn between the unionism of the early 20th century and the unionism of the late 20th century, as unionism had gone through periods of rhetorical modernisation also earlier (Walker 2004, 109). Every time the question was of how much modernisation could be sustained without losing power, and most importantly, how far could the unionist party family drift from its fundamental basis before disintegration (Walker 2004, 67)? All and all, we must also remember the differences between moderation of rhetoric and argumentation and moderation in actual grounding political beliefs[44].

Definitely the question whether unionism should go to the direction of the Orange Order, or more broadly, to embrace its religious or cultural aspect, or to lean towards its secular and civic strands have existed throughout the history of unionism as a political thought, as Burnett (1996) has shown. However, secular unionism can of course be conservative and reactionary, not only cultural or religion based unionism.

Unionism in Modern Ireland includes an interesting article by Richard English, in which he addresses the "science struggles" so far, discussing both

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[44] For example the unionist rhetoric had from time to time drifted away from emphasizing the cultural differences between Protestants and Roman Catholics to focusing on economic arguments. This obviously does not necessarily reflect a change in thought but an understanding of what kind of argument is the most effective one. This can be seen in the rise of the economic rhetoric in unionism in the late 1940's and later, when the Irish Republic could easily be seen as a worse option for the Northern Irish people on the perspective of economics. (See e.g. Walker 2004, 109)

the representation of unionism and Irish nationalism. Through English the scholarly debates on unionism and Irish nationalism appear old, and the nationalist interpretations of unionism are to be challenged in a more analytical way by the unionist scholars. English is in line with Aughey in stating that science is not separate from politics, and that these two are intermingled. This differs from the grand rhetorical strategy of textbook politicking, which stressed the difference between science and politics in its move of depoliticization.

English argues, that in terms of nationalist agenda, the mixing of science and politics can be seen in how the "nationalist camp" of the Irish scholars have rigidly held on to the claim that Ireland as one island accommodates only one nation[45]. The whole understanding of the Irish history has played in favour of the nationalist argument and while this has obviously powered and structured the policy of the Irish government, it has moulded the policy orientation of the British political parties (Roche 1994). English claims that in a sense Irish nationalist history writing has served as a repository for arguments that the Irish politician could have applied in their policy of unification. So, English is arguing that the nationalist scholars have always acted politically and that the Irish history writing is political. Nevertheless, he is not making a moralist or a normative judgement but an analytical revelation with, I argue, a full understanding of the similar (as being political) nature of his own text. (English 1996, 220)

English asserts that scholarly debates do not demand a uniformity of outlook (English 1996, 223). In other words science is at least on a functional level similar to politics, from which it follows that the rhetoric of science is another form of political rhetoric. English argues that in the intra science discussion, recent unionist inclined study has challenged the nationalist understanding of unionism and given unionism a more resilient and spontaneous outlook from the puppet creation painted by the nationalist scholar. For example, the nationalist denial of the existence of division in Ireland has been challenged and proven wrong. For English this indicates that the nationalist claim of the non-sectarian and inclusive nature of Irish nationalism must be wrong, otherwise why would there exist such a division if Irish nationalism as an idea could accommodate the political aspirations of the Protestant people also? In this English follows other scholars, such as Conor Cruise O'Brien (eg. O'Brien 1988, 201-202), in arguing that in the partition of Ireland there was nothing artificial, as the partition simply followed the demarcation line already existing via history, traditions and demography, and as long as republicanism either in its hard or soft modes, as O'Brien puts it, is the state ideology of the Irish Republic there is little to do to convince the northern Protestants for unification. (English 1996, 223-228)

English also argues against the Irish nationalist claim, that unionism is essentially anti- or non-intellectual, or that unionism is a profoundly

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[45] The fear of Home rule was the first catalyst for establishing the "two nations, or one?" debate in the late 19th century. For the origins of this debate see Hennessey 1993.

supremacist political thought. Intellectualism is proved, argues English, in the current renaissance of unionism and unionist political thought (of which English is undoubtedly a part of himself), and the claim of unionist supremacism is proven wrong by many unionist scholars, Aughey in particular, who have pointed out that the fear of being inferior is in the heart of unionist political thought. English does not, however, ask whether supremacism and inferiority could both be attributes of unionism, only manifested differently and in different contexts. (English 1996, 223-228)

English argues that a major mistake in studying unionism and nationalism is that they have often been portrayed as analogous. English follows Aughey in stating that unionism differs from nationalism in terms of the key concepts on which it relies. Whereas nationalism is a political thought based upon the principle of self determination, unionism is more concerned with matters linked to the concept of the state, with citizenship as its key reference point instead of the national identity. The asymmetry between unionism and nationalism seems to represent a key argument for unionism. Unionism does not represent an alternative for issues concerning Irish nationalism, but supports the maintenance of "multi-national, multi-faith, multi-ethnic UK state". This is the central argument of unionism separating it from Irish nationalism. Attempts to simplify and change the central argument of unionism by producing false analogies between unionism and nationalism only work to blur the essence of unionism, English explains. At the same time these attempts play in favour of the nationalist argument. For English, the role of the unionist scholar seems to be in fighting against these misconceptions and bringing intellectual clarity and force into the political debates on and of unionism. (English 1996, 230)

6.5   Critique and suggestions for the unionist politicians

Until now I have discusses textbook politicking from the perspective of it being an articulated act of correcting the false accusations of the nationalist dominated discourse, the politicking being done therefore essentially by rhetoric stressing the need for replacing myth with reality. In this next subchapter the perspective changes, as I discuss how the unionist scholars saw unionism being portrayed by unionists, with a certain level of criticism now laid for the unionist politician. After this I will also describe the way unionist scholars saw the policies of the British parties and the suggestions they deducted from these findings.

In his contribution to the *Perspectives and Policies* Arthur Aughey analyses the relationship of Ulster unionism, British Conservatives and British conservatism, a familiar theme to Aughey already from *Conservatives and Conservatism* (1981) (co-edited by Aughey with Philip Norton). Conservatives is the political party of choice for the unionists in terms of British politics, as unionist MP's are often affiliated with the Conservatives. The conservativeness

of unionist politics, however, has handicaps in Northern Ireland. Aughey argues, that unionists too easily concede the upper hand in an argument with nationalists, simply because the nationalists have an advantage in terms of language and style of politics. Whereas the language of unionism is seeking permanence (as in the search for a permanent constitutional solution) the language of nationalism, by seeking to change the present state of things, seems more dynamic and active. The unionist politics are about finality and permanence, whereas the nationalist politics are about correcting and changing the injustice of partition. Therefore inside the nationalist language lies an element of movement and dynamics, which is lacking from the political language used by unionist politicians. The more dynamic language of nationalism is so powerful in contrast to the unionist language, that it can overcome the challenge posed to it by challenging discourses. As unionism is rhetorically attached to immobilism, nationalists have grasped that "movement is all". This disparity had its political outcome in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which signified for Aughey a triumph for the nationalist interpretation of Northern Ireland and a significant defeat to unionism[46]. Aughey argues that the whole structure and logic of the AIA was a product of the fact that the Northern Ireland conflict was understood and conceptualized through the nationalist discourse and nationalist lexicon. (Aughey 1994a, 53-56)

Aughey identifies two strategies of resistance. The trauma of AIA in effect forced a change in the political strategy of unionists. In addition to the first strategy, opposing the Agreement simply by rejecting it, the unionists also had to develop a second strategy to better articulate their interests and be more active in political engagement. These two tendencies of resistance and active engagement constituted the unionist politics post the Agreement (Aughey 1994a, 57). Aughey does not criticize the 'Ulster Says No' campaign as such, because he says that it was necessary to complement the more subtle politics of re approaching the British side, from which unionism had been estranged in the AIA process. The 'Ulster Says No' campaign, with its stark refusal to accept the Agreement and allow it to self destruct, had its link to the unionist core ideology of resistance. For Aughey this is acceptable, as, he argues, a passive appearance that the unionists adopted may sometimes be the best tactic in politics. (Aughey 1994a, 62-63)

The second and more active strategy began to emerge in the 1987 Westminster elections, and was aiming to the renegotiation and replacement of the Agreement. This strategy was constitutionally dangerous, since it held the fact that in order to negotiate the unionists would have to, in some sense, accept the legality of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which would provide the framework for any new negotiations. This would require unionists to have at least some level of connections towards the Irish Republic, and therefore to acknowledge that the Republic could have some say in the matters of Northern Ireland.

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[46] For a more in depth analysis of the unionist use of language see 8.8 "Selling Unionism".

According to Aughey, neither of these tactics was clearly selected or articulated by any of the unionist parties, but they were nevertheless applied simultaneously. This contributed to the loss of effectiveness in the unionist politics. The latter, a more dialogical, strategy started subsequently to win over after Peter Brooke launched his round of negotiations in 1989. (Aughey 1994a, 64-65)

Another difficult point that the unionist scholars, including Aughey, often raised were Articles Two and Three of the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland. These articles, from the Constitution of 1937, laid territorial and jurisdictional claim to Northern Ireland. The Articles were part of the tonal shift of the Eamon De Valera's policy of distancing the Irish Republic from the British past (Patterson 2007, 20). Together with the Article 44, which recognized the 'special position' of the Roman Catholic Church in the Republic, they formed a key deterrent for unionists, but also provided them with ammunition to accuse the Republic of expansionism. Unionist demand has been that these Articles must be removed from the Constitution prior any real progress in Northern Ireland can be achieved. These articles were working, according to Aughey, as a hunting licence for the IRA, which could claim its legitimacy based on the territorial claim given by the only Constitution on the island of Ireland that the IRA recognized. A change in the Irish Constitution in this respect would put the legitimacy of the IRA under question. Nevertheless, Aughey argues that the problem was that logically by agreeing to discuss the contents of the Constitution of the Republic the unionists are at the same time suggesting that they are willing to discuss the terms of entering the Republic. This shows the colossal amount of paranoia, or the tremendous level of precision, that finding a usable terminology and language in Northern Ireland required. (Aughey 1994a, 71-72)

From this dual strategy of unionism Aughey built his vision of the coming round of negotiations from the unionist perspective. Aughey sees two probable negotiation tactics. The first one he terms "realistic" and attaches it to the UUP leader James Molyneaux. This strategy seeks to renegotiate the Anglo-Irish Agreement and to modify its structures to serve a (unionist) majority rule. This strategy is contrasted with a different, and for Aughey a more active and imaginative strategy, of 'new regionalism'. This strategy Aughey relates to a younger man in the UUP leadership, David Trimble. In this strategy the position of Northern Ireland would be tied to the UK wide debate on Constitutional reform that was ongoing. This way the active language of the Constitutional reform would be connected to the resistant language of traditional unionism, therefore making it more appealing to the audience and overcoming the mobility/immobility dichotomy, which Aughey saw as harmful for unionism. Here we find a perfect example of a scholar openly and publicly speculating with different options and, after weighting the possibilities, ending by recommending a certain strategy. Aughey does not commit himself to a specific policy, nor does he try to dictate one to the unionist

politicians. But he is making a detailed suggestion of how, in his opinion, unionists should do politics if they were to succeed. (Aughey 1994a, 72-74)

For Aughey the idea of the union is not best served by simply keeping to the old tactics of 'No surrender', but, he argues, the unionists must face the fact that politics is about winning and losing, and that effective rhetoric and the art of persuasion are something that unionists can not escape in politics. Unionists must choose their tactics to best serve these demands. Without a change, the language of unionism is losing to the dynamic and quasi-progressive rhetoric of Irish nationalism. More active argumentation, says Aughey, could be constructed by combining in rhetoric the ongoing process of Constitutional reform with the traditional unionist goal of keeping the union. Aughey argues that rhetoric building on culture, tradition or religion is out of place, and he advocates a more secular and modern approach to the challenges facing unionist politics. (ibid.)

It must be remembered that politics had a very negative echo in unionism. As Todd has shown (Todd 1987, 10-11) especially the more culturally oriented tradition of Ulster loyalism sees politics as a continuation of a religious battle between good and evil. Politics is in this respect reduced to winning or losing. Religious allegories are strongly present, as the battle against Irish nationalism is equated to religious battle of good versus evil. Todd argues that political concepts and ideas often have only instrumental value in unionist politics, as they are mere tools to be used in combating the nationalist enemy. Aughey is therefore asking that unionists free themselves from this negative imagery and learn to embrace the possibilities politics give. Aughey argues that unionist politicians are not without blame for the misconception of unionism, as they must carry the burden of the misrepresentation and misunderstanding of unionism (Aughey 1991, 1)

6.6   Unionism and the British parties

The unhappy attitude which the unionist literati felt towards the British parties was evident in their publications. Unionists wanted to be recognized as members of the UK wide polity, some, like the CEC, even hoped to see British parties organise in Northern Ireland. However, the British parties did not share the unionist wish for cohesion. This is seen in the analysis of the conservative party strategy in Northern Ireland by Aughey in *Perspectives and Policies*. The picture Aughey shows is bleak, looking from the unionist side. The conservative party has, according to Aughey, estranged itself from the Northern Ireland unionists, and a sister-party like unity which once existed is no more. At the same time the status of Northern Ireland and the value given to the Union has continually diminished. From Thatcher's famous "Northern Ireland is as British as Finchley" remark, which Aughey claims was an overstatement already in its time (1981), the Conservative party policies in

Northern Ireland have turned into a reminder of the status of Gibraltar and are heading towards that of Hong Kong. The political estrangement between the Tories and the Northern Ireland unionists is, from the unionist point of view, highlighted in the Anglo-Irish Agreement process, in which the Agreement received almost unanimous acceptance from the Conservatives, while it was thrashed by the unionists. Nevertheless, Aughey sees some hope as the Tory backbenchers succeeded in a "peasant rebellion" to allow the electoral organisations of the Conservative party to organise in Northern Ireland. This, and the indications that the Conservative politics might be moving towards seeing citizenship as a key concept on which to build the UK politics, rather than any form of British nationality, might provide a useful link in the future. In other words, Aughey is stressing the importance of the unionist politics keeping pace with the UK discussions, and he is especially stressing the importance of the concept of the citizenship becoming paramount in them both. (Aughey 1994b)

The British Labour party has always been a lesser ally to the cause of the unionism. As Paul Bew and Paul Dixon demonstrate, the Labour party policy has been leaning towards the Irish unification, although this stance has gone through some moderation. The Labour policy has been described by Bew and Dixon to stand on a two pillar strategy of harmonisation and reform. This strategy is designed to "eradicate the material and political bases and causes of sectarianism and is explicitly designed to help produce consent for Irish unity" (Bew & Dixon 1994, 156). The authors, nevertheless, believe that at least the harmonisation aspect of the Labour strategy is unlikely to work, since eradicating the boundaries between north and south is likely to come across heavy resistance from the unionist population. Any reformation of the Northern Ireland political system itself is also seen as insufficient to cause any Constitutional change. The authors criticize the Labour policies of carrying too much baggage from previous assumptions made by the Labour party on Northern Ireland. According to authors, this should be replaced by a serious research. What is giving hope to the unionist point of view is nevertheless the fact that the Labour party congress vote on withdrawal from Northern Ireland had gone down steadily from 1981 to 1991. To sum up, while the Conservatives have been moving further from their previous policy of a strong union, the Labour is at the same time backing away from its previous support on unification. (Bew & Dixon 1994)

6.7   Unionist evaluation of the Irish nationalism, north and south

The academic unionists urged the unionist politicians to highlight the secular and inclusive nature of unionism, and to contrast it to Irish nationalism, which they portrayed as sectarian, exclusive and heavily influenced by the Roman Catholic Church. The demonization of the Irish nationalism is a central theme in

almost any academic unionist publication post the Anglo-Irish Agreement. I argue that it was important from the unionist point of view, not only to analyse Irish nationalism to condemn it but also to learn the dynamics of Irish nationalism in order to develop an effective and sustained campaign against it. Through this idea, I interpret the strand of textbook politicking concentrating on Irish nationalism as an effort to answer to these demands. It can be considered as a "know thy enemy" literature for a person who already is a unionist and as an act of unionist counterattack for someone who is looking at textbooks as a source of information.

In *Perspectives and Policies* Irish nationalism and the politics of the Republic is analysed by Brian Girvin, who at the time of the publication was a head of European Studies in University of Cork in the Republic of Ireland. Girvin is currently (2008) a professor of comparative politics at the University of Glasgow. Although Girvin cannot necessarily be considered as unionist he is, as a critic of Irish nationalism a useful ally for unionism. In this respect he is reminiscent of Conor Cruise O'Brien, who is a civil servant, intellectual and a protagonist of unionism in the Republic of Ireland[47].

Articles Two and Three of the Irish Constitution, stating the claim for the whole of Ireland, were always mentioned in the unionist analysis of Irish nationalism prior to the Belfast Agreement, in which they were removed. Girvin raises them as an example which manifests the nationalist holy right for self-determination, and its application on an all-Ireland basis resulting in anti-partition agenda. According to Girvin this notion was also cherished by the Irish Taoiseach Sean Lemass, who was otherwise hailed as a great moderniser of Ireland. Nevertheless, again from Girwin's perspective, the constitutional strand of Irish nationalism was winning the battle with the more hard line republican nationalists who supported the use of physical force in their search for the ultimate goal of unification[48]. The violence which erupted, returned the Irish Republic to the old clause claiming that the solution to the problem was unification, although there were earlier signs that the Irish part of the conflict was beginning to realise that they could not escape coming to terms with the unionist population. (Girwin 1994, 14).

Girvin shows how the influence of the northern SDLP has been strong on the Irish government, especially after the power sharing attempts crashed in the 1970's. Because of the SDLP influence, the nationalist analysis of Northern

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[47] Useful ally in the sense of seeing nothing arbitrary in the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, not in the sense of desiring the return of the Union of Great Britain and Ireland (as a whole). O'Brien has been especially critical towards the nationalist ethos of the Republic, which O'Brien argues is sustaining the legitimacy of IRA's activities in the North. He has been especially critical towards nationalist politician Charles Haughey (Irish Taoiseach 1979-81; 1982; 1987-1992). See e.g. O'Brien 1988, 199-213.

[48] The dual nature of Irish nationalism with its moderate constitutional and more radical republican tradition is a matter that many scholars have pointed out. The changes through time in terms of which one of these strands has the upper hand is been studied for example in Richard English' *Irish Freedom: The History of Irish Nationalism* (2006).

Ireland has remained unchanged in the Republic also. Girvin argues that the Irish nationalists still believe that the British and their interests towards Ireland are to blame for the conflict, and the key to solve it, is therefore the removal of the British from Ireland. This analysis leaves the unionists the role of only a passive bystander. The old school nationalist thinking was exemplified in the Irish Taoiseach Charles Haughey of the Fianna Fail who rose to the head of government in 1979, after a moderation period of Irish nationalism. Haughey's traditionalism gave unionism only two choices: to negotiate the terms of unification or to have the British and the Irish governments to dictate them for them (Girvin 1994, 19-22).

Irish constitutional nationalism became more moderate when Garret FitzGerald followed Haughey as Taoiseach in 1982. Girvin argues that FitzGerald understood that the unionists would have to be convinced that their rights are secured also in unified Ireland. His attempts to modernise the Irish society would also alleviate the fears felt by the northern unionists. Unfortunately for FitzGerald, his policy to change the heavy legislation on abortion and divorce did not pass, since his plans were resisted by the majority in subsequent referendums. For Girwin this shows that in the Irish society people are not ready to give up values, which are understood as essential to the Irish identity. Through the failure of FitzGerald's modernisation, the influence of the church and the "unmodern" nature of the Irish ethos can then be seen as essential to the Irish identity and to the ethos of the state. Therefore, it is not a surprise that we have seen almost all the academic unionist writers bring up this issue. Girvin supports their conclusions. (Girvin 1994, 24)

Girvin sees three periods in the evolution of the constitutional nationalism in Ireland since the start of the 1980´s. The first of these was the challenge to fundamentalism, lasting from 1980 up to the New Ireland Forum of 1984. A key change that occurred during this time was that the Irish government realised that the unionist population must be addressed, and that also an internal solution in Northern Ireland could be accepted, in separation to seeing unification as the only long term solution. The second phase (1984-1990) Girwin calls neo-fundamentalism. It begins from the *New Ireland Forum* of 1984, which Girvin sees, like the unionist commentators, as a manifestation of classic Irish nationalism. The third period begins in 1990 from the Irish Supreme Court ruling on the Articles two and three of the Irish constitution, stating that they are not in contradiction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and includes a serious reappraisal by the nationalist political parties. (Girvin 1994, 24-25)

In 1993 John Hume, leader of the SDLP and Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin came together for a series of talks that concluded with the so called Hume/Adams initiative. Unionists rapidly interpreted this manoeuvre as an emerging pan-nationalist front, which would have been alarming, since we remember the deep division between the political representatives of constitutional and republican traditions of Irish nationalism. Girvin agrees that the Hume/Adams initiative is dangerous from the unionist point of view, as it rejects the possibility of an internal solution and returns to the classic argument

of Irish nationalism, claiming that in the long term Ireland must be united by excluding Britain and the British influence from Ireland. In this reading, SDLP's John Hume accepts the classic position of the republican nationalism, in which the unionist ideology and identity are seen as fabrications of false consciousness installed by the British. Girvin argues that Hume has distanced himself from his earlier moderate approach seeking an internal settlement. Interestingly, while the nationalists and republican parties in Northern Ireland then seemed to move away from moderate nationalism, the Irish government seemed to take the role of the moderate, as Girvin contrasts the speech of the Irish foreign minister Dick Spring in the Dail with the Adams/Hume initiative and highlights the positive and more constitutional aspects of the former. (Girvin 1994, 43-48)

From the unionist point of view, Girvin sees as positive the fact that the *Downing Street Declaration,* which I will deal in detail shortly, indicated that the Irish government had accepted that the unwillingness of the Northern unionists to join the Irish Republic had to be addressed. In essence, what Girvin is saying is that in the Republic the nationalist parties are beginning to understand that the unionists cannot be side-tracked in a search for a settlement in Northern Ireland. However, it seems at the same time that the nationalist parties in Northern Ireland were not that open minded but were returning to the classical axioms of Irish nationalism. From the perspective of unionist politics this was important to notice. (Girvin 1994, 43-48)

Elsewhere (Irish Review 15; (1994), 70-78) Patrick Roche offers another an analysis that complements the recent evolution of the Irish nationalism. Roche re-states the usual unionist claim that Irish nationalism is based on flawed perception of Northern Ireland, which is crystallised in the nationalist claim of there being one nation in Ireland and that the unionism is a fabricated ideology, which, argues Roche, are both inversions of historical reality. What is interesting in Roche's article, however, is that it claims that the nationalists have *de facto* conceded in their politics that unionist consent is required for any change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland, and that the key to the nationalist political strategy is to induce that consent for unification. This would be done by getting Britain to discard its neutral status and move to the position of an advocator of Irish unity. In reading of the political situation Roche probably is accurate and his policy suggestion for the unionist parties argues that they must do everything in their power to prevent this from happening. In practice, the nationalist strategy could be seen working in the Mayhew talks of 1992, where the SDLP policy, supported by the Republic, was that the Anglo-Irish structures should be altered to 'transcend' the Agreement in the direction of Irish unity. The first stepping stone in the nationalist strategy would be joint authority. (ibid.)

Roche does not succumb to hopelessness facing the nationalist scheme he has outlined. On the contrary, he describes how the nationalist policy in the Republic and in Northern Ireland has descended to an ambiguity so deep that the policy itself is facing collapse. Roche argues that the heart of the nationalist

politics in the Republic lies in a self deception due to the fact that the actual policy has been partitionist, with *de facto* recognition of the unionist consent principle. Despite this, desire for unification is still maintained on the level of rhetoric for the sake of the support for the northern SDLP. (ibid.)

Roche and Girvin share the view that the government of the Irish Republic is not seeking unification in the most vigorous way, and indeed seems to share a more realistic view with the unionists. The SDLP's pursuit to unification on the other hand is leading to polarisation of the political situation in Northern Ireland. This is why the self deception policy of the Republic must be changed to calm the nationalist vigour in the north. A practical way to do this would be the abolition of the Constitutional claim for the territory of Northern Ireland with the removal of the Articles two and three of the Irish constitution, Roche argues. This would also remove the legitimacy of IRA to carry on its war for unification. (ibid; see also Aughey 1994a, 71-72)

7   THE CADOGAN GROUP

7.1   Scholars for detached analysis

An interesting exercise in academic politicking has been the Cadogan Group, a Belfast based group of scholars, founded in 1991, which has been publishing pamphlets commenting on the politics of Northern Ireland for over a decade, since the first one, *Northern Limits: The Boundaries of the Attainable in Northern Ireland Politics* (1992) (NL)[49]. The small nucleus of people who formed the Cadogan Group shared an unease about the British government policy of Northern Ireland as well as the notion that the current analysis of Northern Ireland was seriously flawed. The name Cadogan Group comes from the address in south Belfast to which the Group gathered for their discussions. The founding members included two economists Graham Gudgin and Patrick Roche, two political scientists Arthur Aughey and Paul Bew, journalist and also a former head of the European Commissions Northern Ireland Office Dennis Kennedy, former Under Secretary in the Northern Ireland Department of Education Arthur Greene and historian Paul Arthur.

Aughey and Roche have already been discussed as engaged academics. Paul Bew and Paul Arthur are historians whose influence has been felt since the revisionism of the 1970's. Perhaps taking the lead from these men, the rhetoric of the Cadogan Group stresses detachment and objectivity in many ways like textbook politicking, and its ethos is very much in building the arguments from the position of an expert. The Cadogan Groups defined itself in their first pamphlet as follows:

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[49]   The Cadogan Group pamphlets are: Northern Limits (1992), Blurred Vision (1994), Lost Accord (1995), Decommissioning (1996), Submission to the independent review of parades and marches (1996), Square Circles (1996), Rough Trade (1998), Taking Liberties (2002), Could Do Better (2002), Picking Up the Pieces (2003) and Beyond Belfast (2005).

The Cadogan Group consists of individuals from varying political backgrounds who have been meeting informally some time for political discussion. They were bought together by a common concern, that Government policy in Northern Ireland was tending to prolong instability in the province, that it was based on an incorrect analysis of the problem and its origins, and that there was a widespread and largely unchallenged nationalist or neo-nationalist consensus along similarly erroneous lines among observers and commentators in Britain, the Republic, North America and continental Europe. In challenging this nationalist analysis it is certainly not our intention to exculpate unionists from all blame for the present situation in Northern Ireland, or to seek to exonerate them from charges of misrule or intolerance.

Our primary concern has been to hold to realism and discard any analysis or agenda stemming primarily from either a nationalist or unionist philosophy. Thus widely accepted accounts of what happened in the past must be tested against available facts and statistics, and reviewed in the light of recent scholarship. Deeply imbedded political and cultural attitudes, prejudices, myths and fears cannot simply be dismissed, for they too are part of the real political problem, limiting the possibilities of change. By political realism we do not mean a simple acceptance of the status quo, nor do we intend to dismiss possibilities for change. Our purpose is to outline the changes we would like to see in political relationships in Ireland, North and South. But we believe that too often in the past suggestions for change have been based on subjective fancies, inflated expectations and ideological dreams. We are concerned to propose those limited though significant changes which we believe have a realistic possibility of general acceptance and which we believe to be workable….

…The purpose of the introductory historical section is to redress an unhealthy imbalance in interpretation which postulates a simple tale of unionist guilt and nationalist suffering, with the implications that (a) nationalism is "right" in a moral sense, and that (b) peace can come in Ireland only when unionists accept some form of Irish unity….

…The intention again has been to embrace political realism, not to justify any party position. As our contention is that much current policy, and most historical analysis, departs from such realism in a generally nationalist direction, particularly at the way in which a traditional and indeed dangerous nationalism has been advanced under the guise of progressive developments in Anglo-Irish relations or supposedly part of the process of European integration….

…This is not to argue for the status quo, or to support traditional unionism. As our conclusions show, we feel that the first need is for stability, that is for a settlement which is accepted as widely as possible by all participants in the present talks, and is accepted as a full and final arrangement. The encouragement of unrealistic aspirations, along with the resulting growth of corresponding fears, has been a major cause of instability, We therefore support an "agreed Ireland" if by that is meant an arrangement which is seen as an end in itself, and not by one party or another as a step towards a desired-or-feared-end. (Cadogan Group 1992, 1-2)

The Group does not identify itself as unionist or nationalist. Placing the Group on the political map of Northern Ireland therefore raises the question of how to define a Group or an individual who does not stand out as representing either of the two political traditions? Is there a room for a political agenda, stemming from neither nationalist nor unionist premises? In terms of party politics the Northern Ireland Alliance party or the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition have proved this very difficult, as the parties have been kept in the margins. The claimed non-unionist nature of the Alliance Party is generally questioned, as the party is labelled unionist despite its own protests (for more see footnote 8). It is often noted that the preconception in Northern Ireland politics is that

you need to choose sides, be a nationalist or a unionist, and if you do not choose, others will choose for you. In the same respect the Cadogan Group has been labelled as unionist. Whether there is any merit in this definition, we must look at the Group's own definition quoted above. Nevertheless the Cadogan Group was quickly labelled as unionist (e.g. Anderson & O'Dowd 1993; Coulter 1994; O'Dowd 1998; McCall 1998), and it is quite safe to make that assumption, since the foundations of their arguments clearly stem from the unionist discussions, especially those of the academic kind. The combatant role of the Group is well crystallized by Colin Coulter describing the Group as *nom de guerre* of unionist academics (Coulter 1994, 7).

The Cadogan Group makes a prime example of an act of intellectual intervention, although not in the Sartrean sense: As intellectual in the Sartrean sense was someone engaging outside their own area of expertise. Hence the Cadogan Group is very much a case of expert politicking. The Group's pamphlets are, like *Under Siege*, political action by different means, but nevertheless political action. The fact that the Group does not identify themselves as unionists or nationalists does not lessen this. Moreover, distancing the Group from the party politics of unionism gives them rhetorical *spielraum* to position themselves as representatives of scholarly knowledge, and thus as being more rational and righteous than the parry affiliates with their partisan ambitions.

The Group states that it has been formed to pose a critique of the nationalist or neo-nationalist discourse dominant in the British Isles and worldwide. In other words the Group is criticising the nationalist conception of the conflict and offering alternative interpretations and solutions. The Group states that it does not want to exculpate unionists from their responsibility, but to hold to "political realism" and to offer suggestions for change and to the questions troubling Northern Ireland. This would be done through "recent scholarship", which refers to the Group's competence in terms of a situation analysis. The Group argues, that in the past such policy suggestions have been "based on subjective fancies, inflated expectations and ideological dreams". In my mind, this can be interpreted as a critique particularly towards the political agents of nationalism. Nevertheless, this argument places the Cadogan Group as the antithesis of these attributes, as objective, realist and without a partisan ideology. The rhetoric is presented as rhetoric of a non-partisan Group of experts and scholars, but the Group cannot be described as politically detached as they clearly wish to engage politically. The Group represents itself as a torch bearer of scholarly knowledge, able to unlock the conflict and question the hegemony of the nationalist agenda. It is clear that the claimed dominance of the nationalist rhetoric and the dominance of the nationalist explanation of the situation are primarily under attack. Nationalist and unionist viewpoints are opened in the phrase: "The encouragement of unrealistic aspirations, along with the resulting growth of corresponding fears, has been a major cause of instability". Now, it is clear that "unrealistic aspirations" cannot mean anything other than the aspirations of the nationalists and the growth of fears refers to

the anxiety of the unionist community[50]. In other words this is a classic description and defence of a community under siege. The use of some key terms by the Group reveals their attached rhetoric, as foundationally signing to the unionist premises. "Inflated expectations" refer to the nationalist expectations of unification, as do "ideological dreams". It would be hard to imagine these to refer to the unionist standpoints, which have always stressed permanence and status quo. In this respect, the classification of the Cadogan Group as a unionist Group is not far fetched. Certainly, the Cadogan Group is not unionist in party political terms, but its agenda is clearly unionist, set to dismantle the claimed nationalist hegemony and displace it with another one, finding the union with Great Britain the only reasonable solution. The critique of the nationalists "inflated expectations" indicates that the Cadogan Group describes the Northern Ireland politics as a one type of a zero sum game, in which the gains of the other party are inevitable losses for the other. This is very much a typical way of portraying Northern Ireland and is familiar from the more traditional and hard line unionist or nationalist/republican circles. In this respect the ideas offered by the Group do not stem from a very radical re-evaluation or reinterpretation of the situation.

The use of reason, present for instance in the expression of "recent scholarship", is essential in the rhetoric of the Cadogan Group. It indicates the same anti-populist ethos that the unionist academics overall shared. The emphasis laid on secularism and rationality constructed a dichotomy between unionism representing logos and Irish nationalism representing dangerous pathos. Academic unionism was an attempt to depart from the sectarianism attached to the cultural unionism represented by people like Ian Paisley, and appeal to reason, with phrases such as "recent scholarship", which in the case of Cadogan Group replaced the concepts of liberalism and citizenship used by Aughey. A phrase like "This is not to argue for the status quo, or to support traditional unionism" (Cadogan Group 1992, 2), means just this. A departure from traditional unionism accustomed to cultural and sectarian bipolarity towards "new unionism" based on facts argued through science.

The rhetorical strategy of the Cadogan Group in its putting together the concepts of "political realism" and "recent scholarship" is hinting towards the figure of a scholar, or an intellectual, discussed by Zygmunt Baumann (1987), as Baumann argued that one role for the intellectual through time has been the role of a "social scientist". In a way familiar from Baumann the Cadogan Group argues that through the scholarly analysis of "facts and statistics" knowledge could be moulded into patterns of action as suggested by a "social scientist" represented by the Cadogan Group. In this interpretation, "facts and statistics"

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[50] "An Aspiration" is a commonly used unionist code word to critically describe the political goals of the Irish nationalists, for example "Only rights can be guaranteed, not aspirations" (a unionist *Way Forward* –pamphlet, 1984) as a reference that individual rights, not collective political aspirations can be guaranteed in a peace settlement. Also Robert McCartney used the concept often. Its use became even more politicized by the parity of esteem –debate, to which I come shortly (see 8.5 Parity of esteem and the language of the peace process).

stand above questioning, so the power given to the scholar to make fact based suggestions is absolute as the status of the scholar is also detached in terms of everything else but the facts themselves. The status of these suggestions is also stronger than mere suggestions, as they are derivatives from the "facts" and constitute the "political realism" they are to be taken seriously and preferably to be put to use as such. In a sense, this strategy even violates the autonomy of the politician in reference to a scholar, and at the same time the strong commitment to "political realism" stemming from "the facts" is also strongly limiting the autonomy of the Group itself.

As the Cadogan Group states that it does not want to exculpate unionists from their past sins, the Group is making an argument that is completely different from the claim that the nationalist understanding of the conflict is profoundly mistaken. In the first instance it is a question of critique of the past events, something almost every unionist in Northern Ireland would be willing to accept. But when the Group is attacking Irish nationalism as such, it is engaging in politicking with the things present. While undermining the whole of the nationalist point, the argument does not leave any other solutions than the unionist end-product.

The Group claims that the political realism it is advocating is not the same as to say that they want to preserve the status quo of Northern Ireland. At the same time they nevertheless fail to define what that status quo is that they do not wish to preserve. Is it the union, or is it the state of post AIA, which was something no unionist wanted to continue? In this sense the Group's effort to change the political situation through political realism must be understood as a rebuke of the nationalist argument and as an argument for the change of the constitutional and political status of Northern Ireland from the post AIA situation. This is a claim which every unionist and only a minority of the nationalist population would support. The argument: "past suggestions for change have been based on subjective fancies, inflated expectations and ideological dreams" is also a sentence worthwhile analyzing more deeply.

"Past suggestions for change" have always come from the British or Irish governments, from the nationalist parties or to some extent from some of the non-governmental organisations, or pressure groups, such as the civil rights movement. The unionist majority had not engaged itself in major rethinking. Or such efforts had been swept under the carpet, like in the case of *An End to Drift*-pamphlet (1987) by the combined unionist Task Force or the CEC. Therefore we have to understand the "past suggestions" as suggestions for reunification, which were supported by the inflated expectations of the nationalist population, driven by the ideological dreams of Irish nationalism. The antagonism of the Cadogan Group rhetoric is directly aimed against the nationalist agenda. This is stated more clearly in the paragraph above, where the Group states that it is seeking to redress the "unhealthy" assumptions of Irish nationalism.

What the Cadogan Group is proposing is an "agreed Ireland", an arrangement which is seen as an end in itself. When we put this into the context

of the post AIA politics it is easy to notice, that this is another step towards the unionist agenda. The unionist fear after the AIA had continuously been that any solution, devolution or other, which holds the support of the majority, could be seen from the nationalist point of view as a tool for reunification. It must be emphasised that this concern has not been completely empty, since the nationalist rhetoric after the Agreement had been quite triumphant with a clear and outspoken vision that the political process was moving towards unification. Altogether, what the Cadogan Group was after was a long term constitutional solution, a solution which would anchor Northern Ireland to the rest of the UK till the unforeseeable future, and not giving the nationalist argument the possibility of utilizing any future solution by using it as a stepping stone to unification. In this way the Cadogan Group is coming from the same strand of unionism as the integrationist thinking, which believed that securing the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the UK, would be the best guarantee to fight of any claims for unification in the future.

The analysis of the Cadogan Group is thoroughly constructed. Its aim is to challenge the claimed nationalist understanding of the conflict from the bottom up, starting from the understanding of the historical background of the partition and the root causes of the conflict. It is the view of the Group that the partition of Ireland was no more undemocratic or arbitrary as the partition of Yugoslavia in the 1990's. It was simply a resolution of the situation where people inhabiting the same island manifested different political aspirations, and wished to belong to different political systems. In this sense, the partition was logical and the only solution of different interests. It was not undemocratic nor did it permanently take away the legitimacy of Northern Ireland as a political entity separate from the Republic. Further, the Group disproves the view of the nationalist *New Ireland Forum*, which concluded that the root cause for grievances was in the partition (NIF 1984). Indeed, the Group states that this difference between the Protestant and Catholic nations has been reinforced and reinstated by the laws and practices of the Republic thus making a point *against* unification. This constitutional separation of the Protestant and Catholic nations and states has further been reinforced by the nationalist refusal to recognise Northern Ireland or to participate in its institutions. Further elaboration of the 'two nations' stance of the Cadogan Group can also be found in the Groups second pamphlet *Blurred Vision* (BV), published in spring 1994. In Blurred Vision the Group attacks the proposals for joint sovereignty and criticizes especially the Irish government for mixed messages in terms of the 'two nations' argument (Cadogan Group 1994, 23). (Cadogan Group 1992, 3)

The Group addresses the claim that, while the partition might not have been morally wrong the questions of civil rights, and the lack of them, would have permanently alienated the Catholic population from the polity of Northern Ireland. Thus it would seem clear that a constitutional settlement including Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom would not be viable. Therefore, the question of nationalist rights also needs to be addressed from the point of view of the unionist discourse in order to develop a logical

and defensible case for unionist Northern Ireland, in which the Catholics could be accommodated.

This is perhaps the point where the analysis or the argument of the Group is at its weakest. The Group states that the discrimination towards the Catholic population was addressed relatively shortly after the civil rights campaign raised these issues in the late 1960's and early 1970's and discrimination as a face value has not occurred since. Discrimination would also have been impossible since the direct rule has prevented the unionist administration from such, even if it would have wanted to carry them. Nevertheless, the Group does not address the matter of Catholic alienation from the Northern Ireland polity and a detailed analysis of this is lacking. (Cadogan Group 1992, 4)

The Group also points out other forums of claimed discrimination as it tries to show that the discrimination towards Catholics has not been as evident as argued. These forums include housing, gerrymandering and the disparity of Catholics to Protestants in the civil service of Northern Ireland. In the last case the Group points out that a far more important reason for the disparity has been the Catholic unwillingness to serve in the Northern Ireland administration, and the lack of grammar school educated Catholics. These "facts" are not made problematic in any way, which raises some obvious questions. The logic of the Group's argumentation is that Catholics were clearly disadvantaged, which nevertheless does not prove discrimination against them. (Cadogan Group 1992, 5-7)

Hence, according to Cadogan Group, the revision of political, economical and social history shows that the discrimination against the Catholic population has been overestimated in every sector of the society. This is one of the main reasons why the political process in Northern Ireland has not been able to accommodate the differences between the two blocks. In a sense, the intervention of the Group is based on the revision of the Northern Ireland political history, which the Group is claiming to be tainted by the hegemony of the nationalist history reading. The intervention is therefore profound: It questions the whole basis of the understanding of the conflict, and is trying to bring it back to a more favourable understanding from the unionist point of view. The Cadogan Group pamphlet is a continuum of the arguments presented in *Myth and Reality*, although the Group does not formulate their arguments to fit the academic genre as did the contributors of *Myth and Reality*, or engage in an academic re-evaluation of unionism as the authors in *Unionism in Modern Ireland*. The analysis of the Northern Ireland political history by the Cadogan Group is not only political history reading, as it allows the Group to build its argument on this revisionist reading of history. (Cadogan Group 1992, 5-7)

The Cadogan Group argument regarding the level of daily politics, i.e. against the Anglo-Irish Agreement is a familiar one. The Group argues that the Anglo-Irish Agreement is a manifestation of the dominance that the nationalist agenda has reached in the political debate of Northern Ireland, and that the Agreement simply shows betrayal by the British government who has signed to the demand of the nationalist agenda. In the constitutional setting provided by

the Agreement the unionist population of Northern Ireland can be forced to decapitate their political existence and to accept united Ireland. Aughey's conclusion in *Under Siege* was that in order to prevent this the nationalist hegemony must be challenged on all fronts, while the Cadogan Group does not spell this out, it is clear that this is their analysis also.

The view of the Group on nationalism of course produces conflicting opinions. The Group takes off from the position that Irish nationalism should be manifest only in its cultural, not political, sense. The political expression of Irish nationalism is something the Group sees almost as a treason and certainly not suitable for the political life of Northern Ireland. Is the Group accepting some level of unionist nationalism, while prohibiting the expression of Irish nationalism, at least when nationalism is termed to be a freedom of self expression of a certain definable group on the terms that group chooses? But can there even be such a thing as unionist nationalism? Almost certainly not, if the members of the Cadogan Group are asked. However, this disparity of accepting some elements in unionism that could be seen as analogous to the attributes seen as dangerous in Irish nationalism was something that commentators pointed out (e.g. Anderson and O'Dowd 1993).

The main political goal that the *Northern Limits* seems to have been the abolition or renegotiation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the replacement of it it with an agreement which would discard the "de-stabilising pipe-dream" of Irish unity. This would be done by securing a Bill of Rights and other safeguards for the nationalist minority. The idea of a Bill of Rights for the nationalists, rather than any Irish dimension in a constitutional settlement is also a familiar unionist theme, found in the UUP's *Way Forward* (1984) and other texts. Although the Group does not indicate whether it would include power sharing in its blueprint for future agreement, an answer to this might be found in the document:

> (iii) while taking account of minority concerns, be aware of the dangers of institutionalising the community divide in any mechanism of government, thereby helping perpetuate essentially sectarian politics. (Cadogan Group 1992)

Basically the Group is echoing the stance of the unionist discussion papers before the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which warned that power sharing would institutionalize the conflict. The Groups rhetoric is therefore surprisingly conservative in repeating the unionist argument. Only the role of an outside expert commentator differentiates the Group from the papers distributed by the unionist parties.

7.2   Academic unionists and the European integration

The European integration was another area of discussion, which was turned into a discussion of the Irish unification as the pro European arguments came

predominately from the constitutional nationalists (SDLP) while the unionists considered the EC a Trojan horse. As the unionists viewed European integration as a nationalist theme, they matched it with the arguments stemming from the decentralisation and regionalisation debate of the UK, which were with the devolutions of Scotland and Wales very central in the UK wide discussion. The Unionist party policy was that any decentralisation that would be applied solely in Northern Ireland was unacceptable (Walker 2004, 243; see also Aughey 2001b). In other words, the unionists were cautious of not slipping further from the UK, even as avant-garde of the devolution process. The Alliance party was an exception to this, as it was more pro Europe than the more straightforwardly unionist parties (Bew & Meehan 1994, 106). Overall, the biggest problem that the unionists had with the European integration was that if and when it meant lowering the national borders and increased co-operation with the Republic it was considered as another form of "creeping unification" (Bew & Meehan 1994, 95).

The Cadogan Group also used European integration as a context for making an argument to find an internal settlement in Northern Ireland, in contrast to a more drastic constitutional change. In this respect Irish nationalism is seen as outdated and obsolete in reference to British liberalism and the new evolving Europe, lowering the national frontiers. It is interesting to notice that the Group at the same time is criticizing the idea of detaching the nation from the nation state in the "Europe of nations". The implication of this thinking would be that the answer to Northern Ireland could be found in some sort of European governance over the area of Northern Ireland, in which both of the governments of Ireland and United Kingdom would be at least partially displaced. Another application of the same logic would be the more familiar joint authority of Northern Ireland. Interestingly, it seems that by refusing the possibility of "Europeanization" of the conflict, the Group is using two conflicting readings of the EC to make its case. On the one hand it is criticizing Irish nationalism as old fashioned for the new Europe, and on the other hand it is not adhering to the argument of the new Europe without nation state barriers. So, two forms of disguised conservatism are used in the Cadogan Group's argument building. The enthusiasm of the SDLP towards the European integration is interpreted as a nationalist scheme to further the cause of unification under the umbrella of European integration. The Group interprets the strategy of the SDLP as continually shifting the constitutional debate to a wider context, thus diluting the British dimension and weakening the unionist voice. Therefore, the Group is accusing nationalists of using the European dimension as a tool to anchor the notion of the Irish nation to the concept of the Irish state (McCall 1998, 398). Not surprisingly, the tone of the Group does not differ much from the euro scepticism of unionists (See Kennedy 1993b; 1994; Bew & Meehan 1994). (CG 1992, 11-25)

Among academic unionists the EC, and more broadly the European integration in relation to Northern Ireland, is most thoroughly discussed by a Cadogan Group member Dennis Kennedy, a former head of the European

Commission office in Northern Ireland. Kennedy's view is that European integration will lead in a direction, where the concept of the citizenship will be detached from nationality and will only indicate the place of residence, instead of nationality or cultural identity. In this context the cultural and political identities of the Catholic minority could also be satisfied in Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom (Kennedy 1993b; Kennedy 1994, 186-187). If anything, the European integration would mean lifting the education of the Irish nationalists from their archaic form of nationalism (ibid.). So, the evaporation of nation state borders would lessen the need of the Irish nationalist aspirations not of those of the unionists. To the pro-European/Irish nationalist *logos* argument that the funding that the EC was channelling to the Republic would also benefit the North as a part of the Republic, the response was to point out that the subsidiaries that the United Kingdom paid to Northern Ireland were four times the EC subsidiaries to the Republic between 1989-1993 (Kennedy 1994, 174).

The Cadogan Group also discussed the European aspect as well as the economical possibilities for unification. This is understandable, because its attachment to *logos* obviously invokes arguments that can be backed by numbers and graphs, good examples of the "facts and figures" and "recent scholarship" that the Group referred to in the preface of *Northern Limits*. The Group argues that even if Northern Ireland was handed to the Republic on a silver platter, it could not afford it, as the British taxpayer de facto kept the Northern Ireland economy running with massive subsidies that the Republic could not match. This claim was also supported by detailed accounts of the economic consequences of a unification of Ireland. The Group's rhetoric is in this respect very similar to the one used in "Expert politicking" discussed in previous chapter (For more on the unionist economic arguments see 8.6 Economic defence of the Union). (Cadogan Group 1992, 20).

7.3   From joint sovereignty to the will of the greater - and back

Unionism of the early 1990's was still deep in the disarray of the failed anti-Anglo-Irish Agreement campaign and in search for a new direction both in terms of ideological and political progress. The unionist political tactic in terms of negotiating with the British, Irish or the parties in Northern Ireland was very cautious, with an underlying current in believing that it is safer to stand still than to move. This led to a slow frustration of the British government, which determined that the existence of the Anglo-Irish Agreement seemed to hinder any chance of progress in Northern Ireland (Walker 2004, 241). With Peter Brooke replacing Tom King as the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 24th July 1989, a new positive atmosphere began to influence the political dynamics of Northern Ireland. The impetus for finding a political solution was obvious. No one was satisfied with the workings of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which

had jammed the progress inside Northern Ireland, although it had provided Great Britain an excellent defence against any international pressure. Nevertheless, new solutions seemed to be needed, and there were multiple options of what they could be[51]. (Cochrane 1997, 271-273)

The views of what the settlement needed, however, differed. Broadly speaking it can be said, that the unionist parties and the Conservative led British government were after an agreement which would return devolution to Northern Ireland. In terms of the interests of the British government, this also included as wide as possible inclusion of different political parties. The British government wanted to get a solution which would at least include the nationalist SDLP and preferably also the Republican Sinn Féin, especially if this could be done by getting rid of the IRA. The nationalists, North and South, as well as some elements of the British labour party nevertheless preferred an externally shared authority model, "joint authority", an idea originally suggested by the SDLP in the 1970's and which developed from the seed of Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) or the consultation right of the Irish government, outlined in the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Boyle & Hadden 1994, 160).

The Brooke talks commenced on March 1991 with the constitutional parties UUP, DUP, SDLP and the Alliance. The talks had a set of rules, which were to form the basis for any future political process searching a settlement in Northern Ireland through the 1990's, all the way to the Belfast Agreement of 1998. Any coming settlement would have to include three strands: Relations within Northern Ireland, with Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and between the two governments of United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Also, no agreement on any aspect would be reached before all the strands were negotiated, till the result satisfying all the participants as a whole. This principle opened up the possibility of not seeing the constitutional matters in isolation from the rest, and in terms of negotiating tactics it offered new possibilities of bargaining in one strand in order to get gains in another. (ibid.)

The Brooke Talks lasted until the July 1991 and while they did not produce anything concrete, they did manage to prove "valuable and produce genuine dialogue" in Peter Brooke's words. The joint unionist strategy in the Brooke Talks was to cement a way to continue as the "top dog" of devolved Northern Ireland. In order to gain this, the unionists pursued a legislative assembly with a committee structure without an executive. This was not power sharing in the sense the SDLP understood it, but was integrationist in tone, as the proposed legislative assembly without a shared executive would have tied Northern Ireland to the UK administration system. Obviously, the SDLP was not going to agree to this, especially since the AIA as a fall back option suited it

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[51] A good example of the early 1990's atmosphere, in which numerous solution proposals for Northern Ireland dilemma were "on the table", is an interesting collection of the proposals with a balanced analysis by Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden in Northern Ireland: The Choice (1994). The authors go through a number of examples of solution offering sharing power, communal separation or joint authority models.

far better than it did the unionists. Even though some unionists blamed the SDLP's tactic as one designed to cause collapse of the talks, with the unionist hard headed terms this was inevitable. Aughey argues that one of the reasons for the failure of the negotiations was that the two parties (unionists and nationalists) were negotiating about different things; when the nationalists were, at least publicly, searching for the reconciliation between the two "traditions", the negotiations for the unionists were about adjusting the relationships between the two states in Ireland, meaning that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland i.e. the existence of the state was not on the table (Aughey 1997c, 28). (Cochrane 1997, 278, 281)

The start of 1992 brought with it some changes in the negotiating table. In February 1992 Albert Reynolds replaced Charles Haughey as the Irish Taoiseach and in April, after the Westminster elections, which returned a Conservative majority enabling John Major to continue as the British Prime Minister, Sir Patrick Mayhew succeeded Peter Brooke as the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Mayhew started his own round of negotiations in 29th April 1992, which were to last until November. The Mayhew Talks failed, as had the Brooke Talks, in producing an agreement between the key players in Northern Ireland. The unionist politics in the Mayhew Talks differed, as the unionist parties split up with the UUP staying on the negotiation table and the DUP boycotting it. Also they both made some previously unseen positive gestures towards the Republic, with the UUP team even going to Dublin. Still, for some commentators this equals to movement without real change in the rigid unionist political strategy and ideology (Cochrane 1997, 289). On the other hand some argue that around 1992 the UUP woke up from its ideological slumber, and began the road towards a more flexible and innovative politics (Walker 2004, 244-245). The Brooke/Mayhew Talks were also seen in a pessimistic way by some of the unionist commentators who took them as a point from which nationalism and unionism were given equal validity in the eyes of the British (Roche 1994, 70).

The year 1993 brought with it turmoil in the political developments of Northern Ireland. The first surprising news of the year came when it was revealed that the SDLP leader John Hume had been engaging in discussions with Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin. From the unionist point of view this was dangerous, since it seemed to strengthen, or even create, the pan-nationalist front against the unionist parties, which were themselves starting to disintegrate from the forced anti-AIA pact. The emergence of the pan-nationalist front was, however, not an implication of the triumph of Irish nationalism, but was only a bit more than a forced marriage, resulting from Hume's overestimation of the pressure caused for the unionists by the AIA. Hume had anticipated that unionists would be forced to negotiate with the SDLP soon after the Anglo-Irish Agreement. This together with the fact that the Agreement had not resulted in the electoral meltdown of Sinn Féin, as had been expected by the two governments as well as by Hume, forced the SDLP to move into a pact with the republicans. Nevertheless, some sections of the unionist

population, namely its loyalist hard core, seemed to panic. One indication of this is the fact that the loyalist paramilitary group Red Hand Commando (a *nom de guerre* of the UVF) declared that it would attack bars and hotels holding Irish folk music nights, as this was considered to be a proof of the workings of the "pan-nationalist front" (Gillespie 2001, 261). The loyalist reaction evokes the question of how academic was the conceptualization of the unionist literati, in which the Irish cultural and political identities could be separated and only the first one cherished. (Patterson 2007, 313-314)

In historical terms the Hume-Adams pact was a recurring event in the history of Irish nationalism. The Irish nationalist movement had alternated its focus between the constitutional and the violent strand from mid 19th century to the present (English 2006). When Sinn Féin appeared to be joining with the constitutional nationalists this was just another phase of this process. In addition, the newly found consensus of political nationalism in Northern Ireland took the initiative away from the Dublin government putting it under pressure, as the unionists had not been the only ones who were somewhat sidetracked in the institutional realm that the Anglo-Irish Agreement created. As the nationalists were getting the focus back to Northern Ireland from Dublin, this obviously increased the pressure on the unionist side to have a likewise bigger role in the peace process.

The unionist sense of isolation was not helped, when the Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew slipped in the German Die Zeit interview that the United Kingdom would give Northern Ireland to the Republic with pleasure (mit einem handküß), if the majority of the people of Northern Ireland so wished, and before that happening the UK would pay the annual three billion pound subventions to Northern Ireland "without complaining", which was of course just the thing the unionists interpreted Mayhew to be doing by his statement. Mayhew's slip-ups, which were to continue, resulted in the unionist parties loss of trust in the Secretary of State. Before the end of the year it was also revealed that the British had had some form of communication and perhaps even policy discussions directly with the IRA. This infuriated the unionists and resulted in swift attempts of denial on the British side. In fact, this particular backchannel had been working since October 1990 and in some form the communication between the British and the IRA had been going on since the start of the troubles. (Neumann 2004, 164). (Cochrane 1997, 297 ; 311)

The perceived unionist isolation or the fear of it, as in the sense of a asymmetrical withdrawal of interest by the nationalist parties, the Irish Republic and the British parties, was a constant theme of unionist politics in the 1990's, and indeed always. The unionist reading of the situation, with their multi levelled suspicion is well put by Paul Dixon, one of the writers contributing to textbook politics (Barton & Roche 1994), in the Political Studies Journal in 1995.

> …unionists are considerably more isolated than the nationalists. It is the array of national and international forces which are ranged behind the nationalists (the so-called 'pan-nationalist front') which gives some way to explaining the oft-cited siege mentality of unionists. Given the 'unreliable' record of successive British

> Governments on Northern Ireland, it is hardly surprising that unionists are insecure about their constitutional position in the UK and have regarded the 'Peace Process' with such suspicion. (Dixon 1995, 505)

The relations between the unionist parties were worsening, partly because the upcoming district elections, partly because the DUP was being more aggressive in denouncing Mayhew's reliability. The dynamics of this division were in effect bringing the UUP and the Tories closer to each other, especially as the changed balance of power (a hung Parliament) in Westminster elections 1992 increased the importance of the Unionist MP's. (Cochrane 1997, 299, 304)

The Joint Declaration on Peace (JDP) (also known as the Downing Street Declaration) presented by the British and Irish governments on 15th December 1993 did not indicate a failure in finding an internal solution in Northern Ireland, as had the AIA. It was designed as a blueprint for any such solution in the future, and in essence it delineated the guidelines, which the two governments were giving to the ongoing political process. The Declaration was a triumph of diplomatic rhetoric designed to open up a way for historic compromise, failed to be found in the talks (Neumann 2004, 177). Or, as Arthur Aughey, argues "a masterpiece of considered ambiguity" (Aughey 1995e, 13). The most important message of the Declaration, which Neumann terms as a tactical masterstroke by the British, and which Cox labels as completely buying into the Republican analysis (Neumann 2004, 177; Cox 1996), is to be found in the paragraphs four and five:

> The Prime Minister, on behalf of the British Government, reaffirms that they will uphold the democratic wish of the greater number of the people of Northern Ireland on the issue of whether they prefer to support the Union or a sovereign united Ireland. On this basis, he reiterates, on the behalf of the British Government, that they have no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland. Their primary interest is to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the people who inhabit the island, and they will work together with the Irish Government to achieve such an agreement, which will embrace the totality of relationships. The role of the British Government will be to encourage, facilitate and enable the achievement of such agreement over a period through a process of dialogue and co-operation based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions in Ireland. They accept that such agreement may, as of right, take the form of agreed structures for the island as a whole, including a united Ireland achieved by peaceful means on the following basis. The British Government agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish. They reaffirm as a binding obligation that they will, for their part, introduce the necessary legislation to give effect to this, or equally to any measure of agreement on future relationships in Ireland which the people living in Ireland may themselves freely so determine without external impediment…(British and Irish governments 1993)

Nothing new in essence, but the fact that the consent was reaffirmed by the British government was to return to the unionists some of the confidence they had lost, and to dilute the fear that Britain had moved from a position of a neutral arbiter to the persuader of unity. If we compare the text to the Hume/Adams statement the difference is striking. Gone is the talk about an Ireland wide

settlement advocated by Hume and Adams (Hume & Adams, 1993) and back in is the idea of an internal settlement. There was no mention of the unionist majority or even a majority as such, but the Declaration spoke of the democratic wish of the greater number of the people in Northern Ireland, a statement, which was word for word in tandem with the language of the unionist leader James Molyneaux, and in essence meant the acceptance of the consent principle. This was spelled out in the explanatory "personal message" by the Northern Ireland Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew that was published after the Declaration. In his message Mayhew states that "In short the consent of a majority of people in Northern Ireland is required before any constitutional change could come about" (Mayhew 1993). Unionists seemed to be winning the struggle in relation to the rule of the majority *within* Northern Ireland in the event of constitutional rethinking, and indeed the wording of the constitutional section of the Declaration was so unionist friendly that it led the nationalists to question whether a deal was brokered between the unionists and the Tory government (see for example the republican TUAS document (TUAS 1994))

Much has been said about the second line of the fourth paragraph and the fact that it lacks a comma between the words selfish and strategic. The interpretation being that it does not remove Great Britain from having an interest in Northern Ireland. This proves how important the written word and its interpretations are when it comes to profound questions. The haziness of the wording led the UUP leader James Molyneaux to comment in the *Ulster Unionist* paper:

> The post-election [British] Government will be forced to establish a clear understanding of the Union and then underpin it with constitutional arrangement which demonstrate that the citizens of Ulster are, like their colleagues in England, Scotland and Wales citizens of the United Kingdom with identical rights and obligations. (Molyneaux, 1994)

In terms of the Republic's position in the JDP it is interesting that it seems to depart from the traditional school of Irish nationalist thought by accepting Northern Ireland as some sort of separate part from the rest of the island of Ireland, as the traditional reading of Irish nationalism has emphasized the wholeness of the island. We have to remember that in 1993 the Republic's Constitution Articles Two and Three stating that the territory of the Irish Republic consists of the whole of Ireland were still valid. Dublin seemed to be acknowledging that Northern Ireland and its people were not, at least totally, part of the Irish nation, and had a right for self-determination apart from the will of the greater number of the people of Ireland as a whole. Obviously the stand of the Irish government also strives to guarantee the right of the nationalist people in the North to seek constitutional change, the manifestation of the political aspect of Irishness, which was something the unionists often used as a pretext against the full political rights of Irish nationalism, or at least seemed highly suspicious of it. (Cochrane 1997, 315-316)

Even if the JDP resembles the Hume/Adams statements and carries with it a lot of "green" rhetoric, the contents of the document are far from green and

in many ways are opposite to the original propositions of Hume/Adams or even the Irish government. The notion of the right for self-determination for the Irish people on the island of Ireland is totally absent and replaced by a solid affirmation of the consent principle, with a consent given *before* any legislation towards unification. The JDP can therefore be considered as a minor triumph for the British diplomacy, which succeeded in uniting the constitutional nationalists North and South as well as the biggest unionist party behind its policy of non-violence and inclusive settlement in Northern Ireland. Whether this was surrendering to the Republican analysis, and that the objective of inclusive document could have reached with a less "green" rhetoric is debatable and indeed widely debated among scholars. (Neumann 2004, 151; 166)

Whether the JDP was a triumph for the British or not, it nevertheless divided the unionist parties as the UUP at first cautiously supported the declaration, while the DUP was adamant in its opposition from the start. Molyneaux was perhaps more right when he indicated the JDP gave the British the necessary room to avoid being trapped by Sinn Féin, and that the UUP did not support or endorse the Declaration as such, but understood that it worked for the benefit of the greater number of people in Northern Ireland. This did not prevent Paisley from labelling Molyneaux as Judas Iscariot and Molyneaux returning the compliment by accusing Paisley for aiding the IRA with his scaremongering. The united unionist front of the anti-AIA campaign was definitely shattering. (Cochrane 1997, 321-323)

The unionist parties did not need to be without outside advice, as Arthur Aughey, among others, served them a situation analysis with suggestions of what to do, and perhaps also left a role to play for the advisors with a hint towards the intellectual:

> Unionists must organise to prevent that [the undoing of their constitutional position] happening. And they have a very good case if only they can put it convincingly. They must try to turn what is positive in the Downing Street Declaration against any further dangerous drift away from the Union. This is not an easy task and will require not only political skill but also intellectual clarity. Unionists may think they are "being sold out" and that the IRA "is winning". Yet there is still much to fight for and much to keep them in the game. (Aughey 1995e, 14)

However, an element of detachment is also present in Aughey's text, as he speaks of the unionists as "them" not as "us". This indicates the autonomous position of the scholar handing out advice. It can also serve to give the impression of being a scholar, cool, controlled, detached and level-headed.

7.4 "Blurred Vision"

The Joint Declaration on Peace activated the Cadogan Group to publish their second pamphlet *Blurred Vision* (BV) in April 1994. The Group had had success with its first publication *Northern Limits*, as the demand for the pamphlet had

forced three re-prints. The response was nevertheless not all positive, as the Group was quickly labelled unionist, or even in line with the hard-line unionism (Andersson & O'Dowd 1993). Therefore the Group starts *Blurred Vision* blandly denouncing its independence from either the unionist or nationalist parties. However, compared to *Northern Limits, Blurred Vision* makes the link between the liberal strand of the UUP and other like-minded unionist organisations, such as the Ulster Young Unionist council, and the Cadogan Group more visible. The position of the Group in *Blurred Vision* is not far from the careful endorsement of the Downing Street Declaration by the UUP. (Cadogan Group 1994, 1)

What is interesting is that the Group nevertheless makes an effort to claim impartiality. They do not actively define themselves either as political or as apolitical, only that the members "belong to different political parties or to none", and that they have not any beforehand commitment to any solution. In effect this says that the Group does not have a particular political objective or a point it wishes to further. In effect, the Group is clearly seeking recognition of being an outside observer. Someone, who can be trusted to provide correct information and to stand above politics. In addition to being a rhetorical move to increase trust by claiming to be speaking for the logos and not for the pathos, the denouncing of party political ties is in keeping with the suspicion the unionist community has felt towards politics (Todd 1987). However, it is obvious that although the Group is not party politically committed it is clearly politically committed.

Blurred Vision is essentially a political speech act against any form of joint authority in Northern Ireland. As can be seen in the text of the Downing Street Declaration and other documents and discussion papers provided, joint authority over Northern Ireland was something that was considered, especially as a fall back position if a proper inclusive settlement inside Northern Ireland was not reached. Especially the SDLP and the Irish government, with some elements of the British Labour Party, supported joint authority. The Cadogan Group paper discards Joint Authority explicitly (Cadogan Group, 1994 24).

The argument of the traditional Irish nationalism had been that Ireland should have a right for self determination as a whole. The Downing Street Declaration nevertheless also anchored the Irish government to the principle of consent, a principle that the Northern Ireland constitutional status should not be altered without the consent of the majority *in Northern Ireland*. The key argument that the Cadogan Group is making against the joint authority is that it would violate that consent, since the support for such a settlement inside the unionist constituency was very low. As Farrington has shown (Farrington 2001, 58), this is the profound argument that the UUP also based its strategy on in the 1990's. The Group shares the thinking of the main unionist party, and like the UUP it also sees sense in the Downing Street Declaration because of its endorsement to unionist consent. The logic of the JDP was seen to help the unionist strategy of cementing the consent principle.

The Group also repeats the fear unionists felt towards Irish nationalism, especially highlighting its territorial claim: "The nationalist aspiration is at base territorial" (Cadogan Group, 3). The Group points out that Irish nationalism had always searched for the unification of the island of Ireland as a territory, not just that the aspirations and desires of the people on that island should be equally treated. In *Blurred Vision* the object of the Group critique is constantly Irish nationalism, the policies of the Republic of Ireland, or the parties in Northern Ireland representing Irish nationalism. As such, it is very clearly a unionist document and also very much in tune with the rest of the academic unionist documents of that time in its emphasis on the anti-territorial and secular ideology of unionism, a fact which is hardly surprising. (Cadogan Group 1994)

As the paper is a critique of a certain policy proposal, a joint government of Northern Ireland, it goes to some length to prove that this proposal is not viable. The language of the document is very much persuasion by facts. Apart from the brief analysis of Irish nationalism and the malign intentions of some representatives of it, the paper proves its point by showing that joint authority would be unworkable. But an important subtext in the document is the principle of consent. The unionist goal, as I have pointed out, had been to anchor any proposal for Northern Ireland to the principle of consent, which would in effect give the unionist population a veto on any constitutional change in Northern Ireland. The main political battle was therefore between the unionist consent principle and the nationalist goal of seeing Ireland as a single entity, entitled to *political* self-representation as a whole. The unionists, and this very much includes the Cadogan Group, did not have any problems with the manifestation of the cultural aspect of Irishness as long as it did not mean that the political Irishness, which, for unionists meant hostility towards the Northern Ireland state. To prevent this, the discussion had to be steered away from issues concerning territory, which in essence would mean the possibility of a joint authority and towards a discussion on how the apolitical Irishness could be accommodated in the existing Northern Ireland state. The Bill of Rights for the nationalists in Northern Ireland outlined in the first paper of the Cadogan Group was also such a device. But as we have just seen, the statement of the Irish Republic in the JDP underlined the fact that the political aspect of Irishness must be manifest in Northern Ireland also (Joint Declaration on Peace, section 2, 1993).

The fear behind the unionist thinking concerning joint authority was that the political aspiration of Irish nationalism would not stop at joint authority, but would only secure an interim solution, which might be honouring the consent principle, but that would nevertheless be used by the nationalists as a stepping stone towards unification. For unionists that would mean compromising on their Britishness, but would mean an advancement towards their goal for nationalists. In order for the joint authority to be a permanent solution, it would have to have the capacity to survive the possibility of a nationalist majority in Northern Ireland. It was the opinion of the Group that

this was unlikely, as the Group implicated that a nationalist majority in Northern Ireland would eventually lead to unification (Cadogan Group 1994, 11). The only thing that would sell joint authority to the unionist community was if the nationalists would accept that the ultimate goal of a united Ireland would have to be dropped (Cadogan Group 1994, 12). But the Group's view on nationalism did not consider this possible:

> This assertive strand of nationalism [vaguely defined, but consisting of the nationalist elements in the Irish Government, SDLP and Sinn Féin, therefore equalling to the political field of nationalism] is designed specifically to overcome the constitutional reality of Northern Ireland's place within the UK and the absence of majority consent for changing that status: It has little interest in co-operative institutions, especially of devolved character within the UK, which would be durable. Durability and stability of devolved institutions (the very language of unionism) would mean the frustration of movement towards the goal of Irish unity. (Cadogan Group 1994, 13)

This quote crystallizes the point the Group, and indeed the whole field of academic unionists, were making. Irish nationalism at present was not to be trusted, since it did not compromise its ultimate goal. That is why the unionists must find means to secure the permanence of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. The Cadogan Group indicates that this cannot be done through politics in the context of joint authority, but can be done by preventing the notion of Irishness having primarily political connotations by stressing its cultural aspect. The goal would then be something like a cultural autonomy for the Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland, which, the Group seems to think, would in time alleviate the unionist fears of political autonomy. The Catholic cultural autonomy is not defined, which in my mind betrays the fact that by offering it the Group is more interested in replacing a political autonomy with a cultural one, another clear step in a unionist agenda. The only political idea viable and acceptable of forming the foundation of the Northern Ireland state and for the Group was unionism. In this sense, and this is the only conclusion one can make in *Blurred Vision*, Cadogan Group did represent a very hard-line unionist view. Still, the Group does take a stance supporting some elements of power sharing in devolved Northern Ireland. This is nevertheless done by pointing out the defects of power-sharing in contrast to normal party democracy and should therefore best be applied only until non-sectarian party politics would emerge. This is an echo from the CEC- campaign and shows the continuum and permanence of the academic influence from the late 1980's to mid 1990's.

8   MANIFESTO POLITICKING AND CONTESTING THE LANGUAGE OF THE PEACE PROCESS

> For I am convinced, now that the shooting war is over (for good I hope), the real war
> has just begun. And it will be an intellectual war. How might Unionists respond to
> the new battle lines?
> -Arthur Aughey, 1995

This chapter will discuss the form of unionist academic, or intellectual, politicking, which is most clearly political, even in the narrowest understanding of the word. Indeed, even close to party political. Obviously this comment does not take away the political in the texts dealt with earlier. The main textual genre I am discussing in this chapter is a manifesto. Manifesto is most often understood as a public declaration of principles and intentions, such as election manifestoes in the UK, for instance. As such, the unionist manifestoes that are dealt with below may be a bit elusive, since they do not constitute principles or intentions, which would be without contradictions. Partly this is due to their collegial nature as compilations of different texts by different authors. One obvious reason for nevertheless calling them manifestoes is that the authors themselves name them such (Idea of the Union 1995, 4). It is also a proper term to separate them from the more academic text type of textbook politicking and from the pamphlets published by the think-tank Cadogan Group, for instance, although, pamphlet would be as accurate in naming these texts as a text type than manifesto. However, I have applied this separation to highlight the difference between the more partisan manifestoes and pamphlets which I understand here to be more independent and detached in terms of party politics. The manifestoes at hand are of course the clearest examples of partisan academic unionist politicking, as they are financed by the Union friendly organisations or the affiliates of the Ulster Unionist Party. They are articulated as *unionist* manifestoes, and as such their relation to the notion of detachment is obviously weaker than textbook politics in particular, and therefore different kinds of rhetorical strategies are applied in them. The manifestoes, however, are separate from purely party political manifestoes as the writers are academics and intellectuals, not party members. This of course provokes questions of why

these types of manifestoes were considered worthwhile. One answer might be that the unionist parties felt they were really in a type of political deadlock, where new ideas were needed, or at least this was so strongly felt by the scholars and intellectuals who wanted to make themselves heard.

This chapter will also introduce some discussions in which the academic and the daily political debate were closely connected. One of these is the discussion revolving around the "parity of esteem" concept, which was central in the peace process since the mid 1990's. To understand the challenges facing unionism of that time, contributing to the more analytical parts of this chapter requires another plunge to the politics of that era.

8.1   The Framework Documents: Striking the face of unionism

The ongoing political process, stressing the widest inclusion possible, reached a new level on 31st August 1994 when the IRA issued a statement declaring a ceasefire. The reactions of the unionist parties were again twofold. The underlying idea in the unionist parties was that in order to get the IRA to declare a ceasefire, substantial concessions would have to be granted secretly by the British government for the republicans. This empowered fears that "a pannationalist front" would win the place in the negotiation table for Sinn Féin, in addition to some secret promises given to the republican movement. In turn this provoked Ian Paisley to denounce the cease fire and accuse John Major of lying. On the other hand it gave Major the possibility of utilizing the schism between the unionist parties. He did this by announcing Paisley as being out of order and promoting UUP, which kept more restraint, although without hiding its suspicion towards the British government and the Republican movement. (Cochrane 1997, 328-330)

For the UUP leader James Molyneaux courting the British proved to be fatal. Molyneaux argued strongly for a "long view" on politics, which meant that the UUP should trust the Major government, and work to influence within the Conservative party and behind the scenes in corridors and committees. In this sense Molyneaux was an antithesis of the figure of a politician which Paisley represented. Therefore the *Framework Documents* published by the British and Irish governments on 22nd February 1995 came as a shock to unionists, as its tone was in stark contradiction to the unionist principles and it was made in secret from the eyes of Molyneaux. The document was, nevertheless, leaked to the press and the unionists already knew that something very unpleasant was on its way. (Cochrane 1997, 332-334)

The Framework Documents was designed to work as a device for the all-party (including Sinn Féin) negotiations, and was built on the previous Joint Declaration on Peace, but whereas the JDP could be seen as an example of "green" rhetoric with an "orange" substance, the Framework Documents seemed to be a farewell for Northern Ireland as a member of the United

Kingdom. The whole document seemed to have an orientation towards all-Ireland context, although it did include proposals for devolution in Northern Ireland. But it also included a North-South executive dimension and only a weak East-West dimension. In essence, the Framework Documents completely lacked the element of Northern Ireland as a part of the British political system, which had been Molyneaux's lead idea in his cautious strategy, and which was still visible in the wording of the JDP. Molyneaux's demand, quoted above (p. 146), for clearing out the constitutional position with arrangements underpinning Northern Ireland to the Union seemed to be answered with the opposite. The British newspapers also showed surprise at the stark wording of the document. Here is an example from the Independent on the 25th February, under the title "The week John Major went nationalist" by the paper's Northern Ireland correspondent David McKittrick.

> This was the week, a historic one for Anglo-Irish relations, when John Major pulled the plug on the leaders of Unionism, some of whom fondly regarded his as an ally, and aligned himself with modern Irish nationalist history. (McKittrick, 1995)

The Framework Documents was unanimously condemned by both of the unionist parties, while this did not help the leader of the UUP, whose countdown for exit had started. Molyneaux defeate was the Westminster by-elections in North Down, where the UUP candidate was beaten by an independent candidate Robert McCartney, who build up his campaign on the failure of Molyneaux to prevent the Framework Documents, in spite of the latter's much taunted "personal relationship" with John Major. A factor in the loss of the UUP candidate Alan McFarland was also the decision of the DUP to support McCartney, and not to put up a candidate themselves. A comment has to be made that Paisley's support for McCartney, who politically is the antithesis of the DUP leader, shows the dynamics of the Northern Ireland politics. Quite like in football, the most hated adversary is the second team of your home town and so Paisley supported McCartney in order to hurt the UUP. (Walker 2004, 247)

When we look at the wording of the Framework Documents, the unionist fury over it is understandable. The North-South institutions outlined in the Documents were to be set up by an Act of Parliament, not by the devolved Assembly of Northern Ireland, and while these institutions were accountable to the devolved Northern Ireland government, their responsibilities would to be transferred to the standing Inter-Governmental Conference, if the internal arrangements in Northern Ireland were to break down. So, the Inter Governmental Conference, hated by the unionists since its introduction in the AIA (1985), was to function as a fall back position for problems expected in the implementation of the devolution. It must be remembered that devolution on a power sharing basis had never properly worked in Northern Ireland, and hence the fall back position for the likely collapse was very important. The unionists read this as a possibility, and even as an incentive, for the nationalists to make the Assembly unworkable and to sideline the unionists (Neumann 2004, 152).

Looking at the overall picture from the perspective of the Framework Documents it does not seem impossible to argue that while the unionists, namely the UUP, showed surprising flexibility, the flexibility which was rewarded in the Framework Documents was the much more modest nationalist or republican flexibility (Bew, Gibbon, Patterson 2002, 214). Aughey states: "If there is a single political formula informing the Framework Documents it is the formula of Irish unity by consent" (Aughey 1997c, 30). On the constitutional matters the document stated for instance that:

> It is for the people of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish (British and Irish governments 1995: Framework Documents 1995, Section 2)

For unionists the reading was obviously that Northern Ireland was not a de facto part of the United Kingdom and the UK government certainly was not eager to keep them in that Union.

The Framework Documents was widely interpreted amongst the unionist academics to represent a "profound crisis for unionism" (Coulter 1996, 187), but also an opportunity to reconstruct the ideological defence for unionism by constructing the idea of the Union into a "modern, inclusive and progressive" (ibid). So, the unionist intellectuals were constantly calling for change, rethinking, secularism and a more inclusive unionism. This was not seen to be delivered by the present politics of unionism and its leadership, which, from the perspective of unionist academics, or intellectuals, had only produced rigid and unimaginative politics. The swing that had returned the unionist politics from its more innovative integrationist strand to a more traditional one was starting to raise nostalgic feelings, with a clearly articulated pessimism towards the unionist leadership:

> There appears little prospect that a body of unionists will emerge capable of proffering a defence for the Union as lucid or thoughtful as that tendered by electoral integrationists a decade ago in the aftermath of the Hillsborough Accord [The Anglo-Irish Agreement]. A rather more plausible scenario is that unionists will retreat characteristically into that sullen, charmless introspection which has deprived the unionist cause of influence and condemned Northern Ireland to the iniquitous status of mere ante-chamber of the Union. (Coulter 1996, 187)

Coulter's pessimism is striking when taking into account that David Trimble had emerged as the new leader of the UUP the previous year. Frustrated by the laconic leadership of Molyneaux, Trimble was generally welcomed by the unionist literati as a positive step ahead. Still, Trimble was not about to turn unionism back towards integrationism and even less likely towards any plans of full electoral integrationism. Therefore Trimble's unionism in a sense kept to the minimalist track originated by Molyneaux.

8.2 Manifestoes

The year 1995 saw a sudden increase in the unionist intellectual writings. Most noteworthy of these are the two manifestoes *The Idea of the Union* and *Selling Unionism Home and Away*. The first mentioned was published "through the generous financial aid of [unmentioned] pro-Union organizations in British Columbia [Canada] and Northern Ireland" and the latter was a publication of the Ulster Young Unionist Council, which was active in publishing works emphasising the secular and more "in depth" analysis of unionism, sometimes categorized as "new unionism". The Canadian connection behind *The Idea of the Union* is perhaps explained by the fact that the editor of the manifesto Professor John Wilson Foster was a Professor of English at the University of Columbia, Vancouver. This shows again, as in textbook politics, that the academics intervening were not limited to those academics with chairs in Northern Ireland, Ireland or UK. *The Idea of the Union* is an act of formulating and positioning an ideological backbone for unionism. The theme is approached from the perspective of nationality and citizenship (Aughey) in the context of the British Isles (Dennis Kennedy) and particularly Scotland (Graham Walker), from historicity (Richard English), constitutionalism (Aughey) or personal experience and identity (John Wilson Foster). The publication also includes reprints of critical evaluations made by unionist academics on the New Ireland Forum, Anglo-Irish Agreement, The Downing Street Declaration, the Framework Documents as well as the economic consequences of unification and corrections on "historical injustices". As such the manifesto is a complete package of the academic unionist vision of the union, describing unionism in a positive way, and on the other hand, portraying Irish nationalism as archaic and deplorable. While the manifesto has more general articles on these matters it also directly discusses the current political processes through critical evaluations of the documents listed above. In that sense it carries on the legacy of the dual defence of the *Under Siege*. However, *Selling Unionism* is a more hands on guide for a unionist politician or a unionist citizen on how to communicate the gospel of unionism in a coherent and effective way.

The context of these two publications is, however, different from the likes of Under Siege, Myth and Reality or Perspectives and Policies. They share the constitutionally nervous political context of post Anglo-Irish Agreement, but the political process working its way had produced new texts and contexts against which these manifestoes must be viewed. The text of these manifestoes is in dialogue predominantly with the Joint Declaration of Peace (aka the Downing Street Declaration) in 15th December 1993 and the Frameworks Document in 22nd February 1995. These documents define the textual basis, questions and concepts, which were to be used in the political struggles that the manifestoes were playing a role. With these documents a new set of contestable concepts also emerged, among these was the "parity of esteem" and indeed the "peace process" itself. However, the key principles of internal settlement and

consent were not forgotten, although their defence needed the new vigour that the manifestoes offered.

8.3 "The Idea of the Union"

The introduction of the *Idea of the Union* distances itself from the standard academic writing, with which the bulk of the previous unionist publications had still identified themselves. So the use of expert position or the stress on logos over pathos was rhetorically not used as strongly.
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> The idea of the Union is intended not as an academic book, but as a timely contribution to the debate now being conducted on the future of Northern Ireland. It is offered as a ready compendium of arguments against political positions, documents and agendas hostile to the maintenance of the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and as the basis of a pro-union manifesto. (The Idea of the Union 1995, 4)

This time stressing being "outside of the unionist/nationalist division", which, for instance, the Cadogan Group used, was gone, although some of the contributors to the *Idea if the Union* were Cadogan Group members. The documents that the introduction referred to are defined later:

> *"A genuine settlement would decide the long-term and permanent status of Northern Ireland."* The Framework document (sic) (1995) – like its predecessors, the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) and the Downing Street Declaration (1993) – declines the opportunity of doing this and chooses to envisage the status of Northern Ireland as a road, not as a place or destination, and would like permission to erect signs to make that road legally one-way. (IO, 4)

The writers juxtapose a metaphor of movement (road) with the metaphor of permanence (place) in order to make their point that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland should be cemented rather than changed. The rhetoric is pure conservativism in which change is associated with negative factors, such as uncertainty. Similar to the case of the unwillingness of the unionist politicians to take up power in the birth of the Stormont regime, the contributors to the manifesto state that they are not interested in political power, with which they only refer to politics in terms of party politics, thus deliberately neglecting to see the political in their own text. Therefore the manifesto is presented as non-political with the combativeness of the manifesto being a combativeness of reason and realism, "too long deserted", indicating, the anti-populist position the writers are seeking. Again, it is interesting to see how easily the academic unionists attach negative aspects to politics or power. This is in clear contradiction to the fact that these publications are used to educate the unionist politician to do politics.

The introduction, positioning the intervention in hand, repeats the argument that unionism is by nature inclusive and can, as a political idea, accommodate all citizens as far as this does not contradict the existence of the

constitutional link with Great Britain. The introduction also repeats the claim that the cause for the Northern Ireland troubles was not in the partition, as the partition was the result, not the cause of "troubled history". This interpretation is among the clearest distinctions between unionism, new and old, and nationalism. Emphasising the cultural similarities, north and south is described as "manufacturing consent", a scheme by nationalists and the British Government to lure unionists into accepting a united Ireland. In sum, the aim of the unionist writers is to prove the idea of the union superior to the idea of nationalism and republicanism. Again, by making the argument seemingly in the sphere of the logos and placing their political opponents in the sphere of the pathos. The perceived hostility on the part of the British is a clear indication of the turmoil produced by the Framework Documents. (IO, 5-6)

Arthur Aughey's contribution to the *Idea of the Union* is to repeat the points he made already earlier: Unionism is not understood properly and sadly this misunderstanding is shared not only by the audiences in the UK, Ireland and internationally but also by the local unionist politician, who fails to appeal to the rational core idea of unionism and instead succumbs to populism and mobilisation as political *tools*, failing to utilize what Aughey sees as the essence of politics, all transcending idea of inclusive unionism and its superiority in relation to nationalism. Aughey also repeats the unionist narrative of history, where the power over Catholics was forced upon the unionist politicians. (Aughey 1995a, 8-19)

The idea of the Union includes a set of topics and contradictions constructing the argument the writers wish to put forward. The texts of the manifesto are obviously not coherent as they are a product of several authors, some of whom also seem to disagree upon the points they are making. However, what unites these texts is the fact that they are all in some way connected to the texts of the *Joint Declaration on Peace* and the *Framework Documents*, with which they are in dialog. The concepts that are used are taken from these documents and their usage therefore implicates a certain effort to control or contest these concepts; to define them in the most suitable way for the unionist politics. The unionist rhetoric in these manifestoes is based on building a dichotomy between unionism and nationalism, in which unionism is portrayed as civil and inclusive and nationalism as out dated and exclusive.

8.4   Inclusive unionism versus exclusive Irish nationalism: The debate on culture

The key argument cutting through most of the rhetoric of unionist intellectuals is that unionism has been misunderstood and misrepresented by the unionist politics, in essence, that the defence of the union is left to the wrong people (O'Dowd 1998, 76). Aughey argues that the failure of the unionist politics has led to the situation, where there are two conflicting interpretations of the nature

of the Union: the unionist and nationalist. The tragedy for the unionists is that the policy of the British government has been to balance these two, instead of discarding the nationalist reading of the Union. This has in fact been "the greatest factor of instability in Northern Ireland today" (Aughey 1995b, 46). The unionist argument has been that the Union with the United Kingdom is, and must be kept as, a permanent solution. Nevertheless, Aughey complains that the nationalists have been allowed to re-interpret the Union as an open entity which can be changed through time, this and the unwillingness of the British Government to discourage the nationalist re-interpretation, Aughey claims, is disastrous. This failure has led the British policy from the Anglo-Irish Agreement onwards. The re-definition of the Union has been a genius coup of the nationalist politicians (namely John Hume) who have dropped their traditional stance of rejecting the Union and replacing it with a strategic re-definition, or re-negotiation of the Union which depicts the union as a temporary arrangement, a midway for Irish unification. (Aughey 1995b)

The heterogeneity, as well as the argument structure of the unionist intellectuals is shown in the use of the concept of culture. Culture is a concept with a very wide usage in Northern Ireland. Unfortunately most of the examples where culture has been debated in relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the definition of the concept has been very elusive. But, as the definition is to be found in the actual use of the concept, we do not need to trouble ourselves with defining culture. One good example, in which the role of culture in Northern Ireland politics is debated, is the article *The Politics of Culture in Northern Ireland* by Simon Thompson (Thompson, 2003), concluding that culture seldom escapes being political in Northern Ireland. Culture as a concept also has an important place in the rhetoric of academic unionists, since by defining the Irish national culture as a certain kind of culture (negative) the academic writers wish to highlight more positive aspects in their own culture.

As we have seen, Aughey considers unionism as a political idea, separate from culture, transcending the limitations of creating one's own identity through culture. Unionism is a broad platform making it possible to be a unionist on the one hand and have an Irish cultural identity on the other. The editor of the manifesto *Idea of the Union* Professor John Wilson Foster, nevertheless, seems to have another idea of the relationship of culture and unionism: "I am a unionist because unionism is my culture". For Foster the culture of unionism is a dialect version of the larger British culture, such as is the "middle Catholic[52]" culture of Northern Ireland. Therefore he separates the culture of unionism into two different spheres, the high culture of unionism which attaches itself to the British culture, and the low unionist culture which is based on the dichotomy between the Protestant culture and a Catholic culture. The latter culture manifests itself in the marches and 12th July bonfires, and has given a bad face to unionism worldwide. By separating the Ulster British

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[52] "Middle catholic" like middle England, middle Ulster etc. refers to middle classes or to the masses of a particular geographical area or to a population joined together by a particular cultural attribute such as religion.

culture from a more territorial Protestant culture Foster is clearly following the footsteps of Todd (Todd 1987) who similarly separated the two *political* cultures of unionism. But in contrast to Todd, Foster does not make an ultimatum for either of the unionist cultures to reform themselves in order to avoid extinction. Instead, he compares the unionist Protestant culture to the culture of the Roman Catholics/Irish nationalists. He does not, however, clearly separate the Catholic nationalist culture from a possible civil nationalist culture as he does with unionism, but speaks of one monolithic Catholic culture, which is then compared to unionism as a part of the "richer culture of pluralist, secular British Isles with its correspondingly larger polity". As a complete negation of this, the Irish nationalist culture is therefore the poor, homogenous, ecclesiastic culture of the Republic of Ireland. And further proof of this is offered *"But my later study of Irish literature in the crucial decades between the 1880's and 1922 convinced me of the superiority of the unionism over republicanism."* With this dichotomy it is clear that Foster argues that cultural identity of Irishness does not justify its political representation, or constitutional guarantees. The hostility and exclusiveness of the Irish culture is further proved by the claim that it has driven the unionist culture south of the border into extinction. Foster of course neglects the *Protestant* subcultures that do exist in the southern part of Ireland, even if southern *unionism* might be absent. (Foster 1995a, 59-64)

Arthur Greene's[53] contribution continues with the dangers of Irish culture in *Idea of the Union*. Greene labels Irish scholars and the Irish government as the protagonists of an Irish cultural separatism. Greene attaches Irish cultural separatism to cultural nationalism and nation building. Interestingly, in this point he refers to Julien Benda and his *Treason of the Intellectuals* as a useful analogy of the Irish intellectuals who have committed a similar betrayal by allowing themselves to be used by the forces of separatism and nationalist passions. Greene takes a strong science positivist view against invented cultures, particularism and separatism, by emphasising the natural unity of the British Isles. Interestingly Green bases a geographical defence for the natural unity of the British Isles from the works of a Dutch geographer Marcus Heslinga. It must be mentioned that Greene is not alone in his interpretation, as a less politically committed scholar John Whyte also agrees that Heslinga may have unintentionally made the best case for the Union (Whyte 1990, 46).

The point Greene makes through Heslinga is based on history and geography: The plantation of Ulster did not have significant meaning in the habitation of Ireland, so there were no English "colonisation", as the emigration process to Ireland was an ongoing process without the malign or political intentions of the English. Greene's argument is therefore an argument against the very foundation of Irish nationalism. Instead of ethnicity Irish nationalism is based on culture, especially on the whaling Irish language, and is as such, Greene argues, completely artificial. Simply put, the Republic of Ireland is an

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[53]   Former Under Secretary in the Northern Ireland Department of Education and a founding member of the Cadogan Group.

artificial entity, breaking the true unity of the British Isles, founded on geographical facts, Greene states. Through Heslinga Greene uses the strategy of depoliticization as an attempt to portray the Irish question on geographical terms, thus arguing for the apolitical naturalness of the British Isles as a one entity.

Further on in the same manifesto Edgar Heslett makes a point that the division in the form of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic is so real, that it should be recognized (Heslett 1995, 127). Greene's view of the artificiality of the division of the British Isles is shared by Barbara A Finney, who questions the independence of the Republic by highlighting its continuing dependence of its neighbour, the United Kingdom.

> For all its much flaunted "independence", the Irish Republic has never been truly independent. It relies on the United Kingdom for so much. It sheltered behind Britain's skies in the last war, it needs Britain to mop up its migrants – providing them with homes, jobs and welfare. It depends on the United Kingdom for much of its export trade, for specialist health care and many other services. It turns to the United Kingdom for much of its sporting interest, even for members of its national soccer team – including even its manager! It also relies heavily on British television programmes and other entertainment. This is very much a one way process. The United Kingdom turns to the Irish Republic for very little – it certainly need never turn to it for support in world or European matters! (Finney 1995, 54)

The paradox is that while the Irish Republic does not seem to differ so much from the rest of the British Isles, at least for Finney, at the same time she portrays a massive amount of fear towards the prospect of Northern Ireland joining that Republic, because this would mean a worse deal for Northern Ireland in terms of democracy, minority rights and many areas in politics and society. Finney accuses the Republic of treating its own minorities, mainly the Protestant minority, worse than the unionist Stormont administration ever could, and also comparing the Irish parliament to the Italian one on the grounds that they both share a certain "sleaze" factor. In short everything Irish is bad, or at least strange and frightening, and everything British is good. (Finney 1995)

Greene's argument and accusation, is that the Irish intellect has fallen pray to the phenomenon that Benda warned of as early as the 1920's, that of intellectuals involving themselves to the wordly passions. In this case "wordly passions" meaning the construction of the Irish nationalist ethos. As I have shown, the political nature of the Irish intelligentsia is recognized, and even commended, also by non-unionist scholars (O'Dowd 1991). Greene argues, that the Catholic church, with its strong influence in the formation for the Irish nationalism, left a legacy of anti-intellectualism, which contributed to the fact that Irish intellectuals, mainly historians, have taken a role where their task is to justify Irish separatism, separatism, which Greene sees completely irrational in the wider context of the British Isles. For Greene the betrayal of the Irish historians has been the project of writing an Irish history from the point of a colony, in which the original population of Ireland has been portrayed as suffering under the English tyrants, who have used the planted unionist

population as their tools. In his argument Greene very much forgets the fact that the Irish had their own *Historikerstreit*, just few years before. In Irish history revision the old-school nationalist history in which Greene is pointing to was largely repealed, with the central revisionist work of Roy Fosters *Modern Ireland 1600-1972* (Foster, 1988). Nevertheless, the accusation Greene makes is not completely empty. (See English 1996 for a good overview of the debate), and as a part of a polemical manifesto, with the purpose of defending the Union and unionism, it does not have to be academically defensible. (Greene 1995)

Instead of finding a justification and rationality for unionism, as is Aughey's strategy, Greene is pointing out the lack of them in Irish nationalism, which stands outdated with its ethnic, linguistic and cultural separateness. The only attributes left to Irishness are the Catholic faith and the Irish language, and for Greene these are just the two factors, which have given the unionists the reason to opt out from a polity shared with Irish nationalism. Therefore Greene acknowledges the reactionary nature of unionism from which Aughey seems to shirk. For Greene, the point simply is that Irish nationalism with its narrow concept of the cultural identity is something Protestant people of the North do not want. (ibid)

The political manifestation of Irish nationalism, especially in the form of republicanism, is straightforwardly judged by the writers of the unionist manifestoes. Republicanism is portrayed as an ideology designed for the dismemberment of the Northern Ireland state, and as such, it must not be accepted as a legitimate political aspiration (Kennedy 1995, 34). Therefore, only apolitical Irishness should be allowed in any future plans for the political solution for Northern Ireland. Irishness would be limited to the cultural aspect of Irishness, excluding the possibility of its political expression. Irish nationalism is therefore portrayed through the concepts of ethnicity and religion, while unionism is argued through reason (English 1995, 135). Because of this, these two traditions are not symmetrical and should not be presented as such, as Richard English, a political scientist from Queen's University argues in the *Idea of the Union*. The conclusion being that the legitimacy for the political aspect of Irishness cannot be given in the territory of Northern Ireland, but it must be given for the political unionism.

Although one of the unionist academics' lines of argument concentrated on the debate of culture and whether Irish culture can be understood as apolitical or political, that is, whether it can be cherished by a political unionist or not, there was also another line of discussion, which was highly critical towards the Irish cultural nationalism. This discussion not only penetrated Northern Ireland, but went on in the Republic of Ireland as well. As we have already seen, in the building process of the Republic and especially in the mental separation of it from the United Kingdom, the emphasis of genuine and distinctive Irish culture was pivotal. The nation building was done through blending of culture and politics, in a sense that the explicitly Irish aspects of the society, such as Catholicism, were highlighted in order to create a homogenous

and separate national ethos. The fusion led to the close, and constitutional[54], relationship between the Church and the State as well as the emphasis on the education in the Irish language and subsequent politicization of culture by embracing its Irish aspects.

This trend has its critics. One of the most notable of them has been Conor Cruise O'Brien, who has constantly criticized the tendency of the Republic of Ireland to cherish cultural nationalism. O'Brien is also an interesting and striking figure in the sense that he has made a career as a public servant in the Irish foreign ministry as well as in the Irish *Dail,* and who also is known of his unionist sympathies. These sympathies climaxed in 1996 when he joined Robert McCartney's United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP). Nevertheless O'Brien was later cast away from the UKUP after suggesting that unionists should also contemplate the possible benefits of the unification. O'Brien has concentrated his criticism towards the Irish physical force tradition and nationalist stance of the politics of Irish Republic, and he has been known as the strong adversary of the Fianna Fáil pro-nationalist politician Charles Haughey[55]. O'Brien himself is an example of the anti-nationalist cosmopolitan intellectual, who created a diplomatic and scientific career taking him from the US to South Africa[56]. As a remarried divorcé and a person who advocated for political relations between the Irish Republic and Cuba, O'Brien was the epitome of a leftist threat to the traditional Catholic values (Patterson 2007, 163). Politically O'Brien can be termed as a revisionist, since he has worked to question the long era of Eamon de Valera and been a constant critic of the claimed theocratic nature of the de Valerian Irish state. In terms of the Northern Ireland peace process and the nationalist and republican politics in Northern Ireland O'Brien has upheld the unionist position on numerous occasions.

O'Brien argues that culture in the Republic of Ireland has a history of reflecting negative aspects of cultural nationalism. This was illustrated in O'Brien's provocative essay on the politics of W.B. Yeats, *Passion and Cunning* in 1965 (O'Brien, 1988). In his essays O'Brien draws parallels between the national poet of Ireland and fascism, showing how the poet showed admiration to Mussolini and at least flirted with the Irish blue shirts, which were the equivalent of the German brown shirts (SA). O'Brien argues that this tendency of Irish nationalism to harness culture and cultural persons for its parochial and separatist cause has continued since the 19th century, and is a regrettable feature in the Irish cultural life. There is nothing new as such in the claim that Yeats flirted with the Nazis, however, O'Brien argues that Yeats' 'detachment' from politics came only after it became obvious that Ireland could not be won over

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[54]   Article 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland recognized the "special" position of the Roman Catholic Church in the state.

[55]   Taoiseach 1979-1981, 1982, 1987-1992

[56]   In the University of Cape Town, South Africa, O'Brien was engaged in an interesting incident termed as the "O'Brien" affair, where he got mixed in a debate on free speech and academic freedom. The debate with the Marxist students was so heated that O'Brien was titled the 'warrior scholar'. For a detailed description see Higgins 1990.

by the local fascists. Therefore there was nothing amusingly blue eyed and harmless in the stance Yeats took. On the contrary, it was a warning sign of the direction the Irish intellectuals could be moving to. (O'Brien 1988, 40-41)

The argument that the Irish nationalists were using culture as a tool for politics was repeated by more straightforwardly unionist commentators. Ulster Young Unionist Council (UYUC) for example published a booklet by Arthur Aughey titled *Irish Kulturkampf* (Aughey 1995d), in which Aughey draws parallels between the Third Reich cultural propaganda front and the actions of the Irish cultural nationalists. Aughey uses the term *Kulturkampf* solely in its Third Reich connotation, and not in the original that referred to Bismarck's struggle with the Roman Catholic Church to increase the secular state power and decrease the power of the Church in the united Germany in the 1870´s. Aughey argues that not only hard headed Republicans, but also the constitutional Irish nationalists (SDLP), despite the acclaimed respect for the "two traditions" and "parity of esteem" concepts had been using Irish culture and its claimed superiority as a political weapon. The nationalists were using culture politically, by transforming the Irish cultural identity into a political identity, stated Aughey. This went together with the nationalist strategy of portraying unionism as culturally hollow, Aughey argues. (Aughey 1995d, 7)

Kulturkampf is also a term used by O'Brien in his essay *'The Irish Mind'* (1988 [1985]). O'Brien argues that Irish cultural intellectuals, who have succumbed to cultural nationalism, do not acknowledge themselves as a part of the wider English speaking intellectual tradition, which, according to O'Brien, they undeniably are. Instead, they spend lots of time and intellectual creativity in denying their English (in terms of language) roots and idolizing everything Irish, however fabricated it may be. Clearly O'Brien's position, in terms of being an intellectual, is different, even close to Benda's. O'Brien sees (Irish) intellectuals not as primarily Irish or as someone who could have a political mission. The 'Irish mind', as the synonym for present Irish intellectuals, is for O'Brien something, which is, in its attempt to manifest political Irishness failing, and therefore failing also the possibility of creating something truly original and Irish. (O'Brien 1988, 192-198)

Even if the unionist could argue having a cultural identity it was still the thesis of the nationalists, argued Aughey that the unionist cultural identity was in terminal decay and it is only a matter of time when the superiority of Irishness was understood by the unionists (Aughey 1995d). The target of these Irish "cultural imperialists" is to question the non-Irish cultural fondness of the Northern Irish bourgeois, artists and intellectuals (Aughey 1995d, 9). The Irish cultural nationalism only celebrates the distinctively Irish aspects of culture on the island of Ireland. This distinction from the English colonial imports can be made through language (Gaelic) or their historical roots (Gaelic sports, Gaelic folk music etc.) Only distinctively Irish is *real* (Aughey 1995d, 13), and everything that differs, is to be considered foreign and hostile. Irish cultural nationalists also claim that dissidents to this thinking (such as O'Brien) are an excellent example of *Trahison des Clercs*. We are already familiar with

contradictory argument, which most of the unionist intellectuals make: Culture must be kept apolitical. Unionists and Protestants can cherish the elements of the Irish culture, also its distinctive aspects such as language or Gaelic sports. This does not transform a unionist enjoying these aspects of Irishness into an Irish nationalist. Apolitical cultural identities will not have to work as badges of separatism, Aughey argues. Unionism is a political identity, such as Irish nationalism, but Irishness and Protestantism can also serve as cultural and apolitical identities. With this argument Aughey contradicts Todd (Todd 1987) who more straightforwardly implicated that the (necessary) acceptance of the Irish aspect of the unionist cultural identity would inevitably lead to the corrosion of the unionist political identity. (Aughey 1995d)

Aughey is deconstructing the concepts of culture, nationalism and political identity and putting them back together to build a conceptual map more fitting to his political objective. Separating political and cultural identities from each other and depoliticizing culture is essential in his thinking. Aughey is constructing a polity where only the "icing" on its citizens can be termed political, while the core identity is remaining heterogeneous and apolitical. In this polity it would be enough for its citizens to agree on the constitutional premises. Translated to the real politics of Northern Ireland this would mean deciding on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as a part of the UK. Besides that, everyone would be free to carry out their personal interests the way they would want to. This thinking puts together aspects of classical liberalism with a very narrow understanding of the concept of the political. Aughey's theory rests upon the individual, without putting too much thought on the practical functions the polity in which its citizens would share nothing but an abstract notion of its constitution.

Aughey later elaborated his idea of the multi layered identity of the unionist people through the use of concepts the 'constitutional people' and the 'sovereign people', which indicated the two aspects of the collective unionist psyche. This dualism, claims Aughey, also explained the problem of 'conditional loyalty' most famously put forward by Miller (1978). Aughey argues that the unionist people are defined on one level by the status and durability of Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom, and with the institutions that are a part of that link. This unionist identity does not require homogeneity of cultural identities (as does the Irish nationalism), but is manifested and expressed through the institutions and practises of the liberal British state. The most obvious practical political example manifesting the idea of the 'constitutional people' has been the Campaign for Equal Citizenship. The idea of the constitutional people also responds to the dilemma of unionist conditional loyalty. Briefly; the United Kingdom is a *Union* state, not a *unitary* state, and therefore the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, to which the Thatcher government appealed after the Anglo-Irish government, for instance, does not fully apply (see also Aughey 2001a, 309-310). (Aughey 1997c, 20-22)

Whenever the idea of the constitutional people has seemed to be under threat, another aspect of the unionist identity, the 'sovereign people' has

emerged, the 'sovereign people' meaning people in the metaphysical sense as people with the right to self-determination, apart from any constitutional arrangements, or current political institutions. Whereas the constitutional people are loaded with conservativism, the sovereign people are more volatile, willing to rebel if they feel their self-determination is threatened, and are inclined to populist radicalism. Aughey maintains that both of these aspects are present in unionism, complementing each other. As the level of the constitutional people is secular, liberal, and rigid only in terms of the constitution and institutions; the sovereign people are more inclined towards the identity provided by the Protestant faith. Nevertheless, this division does not reflect a division in the party political field in unionism, but is simply a deconstruction of the unionist political thought, and goes its way in explaining the unionist politics. The context in which Aughey wrote his conceptualization was the context provided by the Framework Documents (1995), which, Aughey argues, cannot be acceptable to unionists, as the Framework Documents violates the unionist people in a way unacceptable to both of the aspects of the 'unionist people'. The key point being that the Documents violate the consent principle by putting the idea of unity before the idea of consent[57]. (Aughey 1997c, 22-33)

8.5   Parity of esteem and the language of the peace process

A new concept, the *parity of esteem,* appeared in the Northern Irelands political rhetoric in the early 1990's. Parity of esteem was first mentioned in the Opsahl report, which documented the human suffering of the troubles and was meant as an act of reconciliation, taking example from South Africa, where similar reports lead to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in 1995 (Pollak 1993). Subsequently the idea of the parity of esteem was picked up by the British officials, mainly the Northern Ireland Secretary of State Patrick Mayhew, who introduced the concept in its political form in his two Coleraine speeches in December 1992 and April 1993 (English 1995, 135). Parity of esteem basically meant, that in any future political solution for Northern Ireland the two main traditions, unionism and nationalism, should be granted an equal recognition, a parity of esteem. Simon Thompson, a one of the most straightforward academic protagonists of the idea (eg. Thompson 2002, 2003) has defined it as follows:

> [Parity of esteem is a] common sense idea that the distinctive cultures and traditions of the two national communities should enjoy equal and public acknowledgement in any workable political settlement in this region…parity of esteem is interpreted as part of a political project of cultural engineering designed to create and sustain two

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[57]   For a more detailed analysis of the Framework documents and the unionist responses to it see 8.1 The Framework Documents: Striking the face of unionism.

moderate political blocks, both of which accept the legitimacy of the political system within which they were formed. (Thompson 2003, 54-55)

This definition among others provokes more questions than answers and also its inevitable potential for politicking. In the political process seeking an agreement in Northern Ireland the new concept soon found its way in official documents, as can be observed in the paragraph 10 of the *Frameworks Documents* in 1995.

> Any new political arrangements must be based on full respect for, and protection and expression of, the rights and identities of both traditions in Ireland and even-handedly afford both communities in Northern Ireland parity of esteem and treatment, including equality of opportunity and advantage. (British and Irish governments 1995)

The idea of parity of esteem has its roots in a debate starting in the early 1990's with Charles Taylor's[58] essay "*The Politics of Recognition*" (1992, expanded edition 1994). The empirical background for the debate was the turmoil surrounding the European map as new states were born after the downfall of the Soviet empire and the reunification of Germany. Furthermore, de-colonization and the questions relating to the status of indigenous people and aboriginals worldwide were on the roots of the "recognition debate". Taylor's essay was accompanied by further formulations on recognition, such as Fraser (1995), Habermas (1994), Honneth (1995) and Tully (1995). For our purposes, however, it is sufficient consider the original essay by Taylor and one of its critiques, offered by Michael Walzer. Taylor's central thesis is that due recognition is a vital human need, since:

> Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the *mis*recognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false distorted, and reduced mode of being. (Taylor 1994, 25)

In terms of society Taylor goes through the evolution of the concept of the liberalism and finds in its core a commitment to, what he calls proceduralism. Taylor argues that it has been the ideal to think a liberal society as such, that the state does not concern itself with the things that one might consider his or her ends in life. The liberal state remains in its diverse form with procedural commitment to treat people with equal respect, not depending on their personal goals or aspirations in life, and by not taking a stand on these commitments, which Taylor calls substantive. In essence, a liberal state cannot take the stand to protect one culture at the expense of others. Taylor, however, argues that a society with strong collective goals can also be liberal if it performs its collective goals in a way that they do not violate the diverse nature of that society. Taylor

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[58]   Charles Taylor is a Roman Catholic social reformer from Quebec and a subsequent professor of politics in Oxford.

uses the Canadian French minority in Quebec as an example of a society, which has a strong collective goal of protecting its distinctive culture from the English speaking majority, without casting away its liberal core .(Taylor 1994, 56-61).

Michael Walzer uses terms Liberalism 1 and Liberalism 2 to describe the two concepts of liberalism he finds in Taylor's essay. Walzer clarifies the terms by arguing that in Liberalism 1 the state does not have any cultural or religious projects, as in Liberalism 2 the existence of these projects is the key aspect in the nature of the state, with the addition that people with different commitments, or no commitments at all, also have their rights protected, so it is basically possible to have a state committed to liberalism 2 with the people themselves opting to choose liberalism 1 inside the larger commitment of the state. Walzer argues that virtually all nation states are representatives of liberalism 2, as generally speaking they do produce citizens of certain kind, Finns, Norwegians etc. Immigrant societies, the U.S. is the best example, are on the other hand states representing liberalism 1. Indeed it is their official policy. Therefore, in the case of the immigrant societies at least, Walzer opts for liberalism 1 over liberalism 2, as it would be virtually impossible for the state to fulfil the commitment to protect the survival of all its diverse cultures. This debate on the role of the state, and especially the rights for political aspirations in contrast to cultural aspirations were in the focus of the parity of esteem debate in Northern Ireland. (Walzer 1994, 99-100).

For Richard English, and many other academic unionists, parity of esteem meant that recognition is to be given "to a tradition whose instinct and drive is to support and maintain the state, and on the other hand, to a tradition aiming at some form of dismemberment of the state" (English 1995, 136). For English, this represents an intellectual blunder, where cultural traditions and political aspirations are combined, without giving much thought to the matter. Or, more direly, because the strategy has been to combine these two in order to speed up the British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. This is in line with the British policy since the Anglo-Irish agreement, which English paraphrases in two statements: "We'll stay as long as the majority wish it" and on the other hand "we'll go as soon as it is possible" (English 1995, 135).

English argues, that as culture and politics cannot be separated in Northern Ireland and cultural parity always carries political implications, the parity of esteem given to two separate cultural entities also gives de facto parity to two separate political beliefs and aspirations, these being unionism and Irish nationalism, in particular the more radical northern dialect of the latter. Aughey shares the same concern of parity of esteem between United Kingdom citizens sliding "into parity of political expression of the "two traditions" (Aughey 1995e, 12), meaning that the necessary parity already existed through the British citizenship and the parity discussion was in danger of expanding it dangerously to political aspirations. For English it is clear that in the early 1990's context two intermingled things were happening: "first, of, equal respect was given for two sets of cultural traditions, and, second for two sets of political aspirations" (English 1994, 98-99). He stated:

> And there does seem to be an intellectual (and, therefore, a practical) confusion involved here. For the state to accord equal legitimacy on the one hand to a tradition whose instinct and drive is to support and maintain the state and, on the other, to a tradition aiming at some form of dismemberment of the state seems to me fundamentally incoherent. (English 1994, 99)

In short, the aspiration to break the Union with the United Kingdom was to have the same legitimacy and respect as the wish to maintain it. This ambiguity was, for English, not only incoherent but also had the potential to be "fatally destructive and destabilising", because in Northern Ireland every political proposal always carried with it the possibility of launching a set of events making things worse (English 1994, 100). The comment on potential destabilisation can perhaps also be read as an act to limit discussion, as rhetoric underling the responsibility of those making proposals is by nature limiting options on the table.

In practice, what parity of esteem meant for English was that it imperilled unionists, by upholding and strengthening the idea the northern nationalists English argued having of the future actions of the British government. English argued that it was safe for the nationalists to assume, in the light of events, that there was an understanding, or even support, in the ranks of the British officials for the withdrawal of the British and for the subsequent Irish unity. At the level of potential political polarisation in Northern Ireland this kind of celebration of the division line was not only intellectually vague and, but politically very dangerous, English argues. In 1997 we find Aughey pointing out in retrospect, that the concept of the parity of esteem had in practice most often been used for denial, e.g. preventing one or the other "tradition" of fulfilling their wishes (Aughey 1997b, 10-11). Typical examples of this were the Orange Order parades set to go through the Catholic neighbourhoods. (English 1994, 100-101)

Another critic of the parity of esteem has been Robert McCartney who, like Aughey (Aughey 1995e, 12), tends to equate parity of esteem to equality of individual rights. In this reading parity of esteem is nothing that would not exist already, since the role of the state, for McCartney, is to secure the equal rights and opportunities of the individuals carrying on their lives as their wish, extending also to apprehend cultural autonomy. This reading of the concept is a rhetorical attempt to steer its usage towards the benefit of the (academic) unionists, who had argued for the superiority of the British state in contrast to the Irish one precisely because of its more liberal stand in individual rights. In Walzer's terms the British state is an example of Liberalism 1 and the Irish Republic of Liberalism 2. In the case of McCartney, we have an example of combatant rhetoric aimed to influence to the use of the concept, thus changing the contents that are being loaded to that concept. McCartney is arguing, that the nationalist reading of the parity of esteem concept is nothing more than an attempt to destabilise the constitutional integrity of the Northern Ireland state, and as such an effort to advance the nationalist cause.

> [G]radually I came to realise that what they [nationalists] mean by 'parity of esteem is not parity of esteem for the individual but parity of esteem for the constitutional identity of the state. I don't know of any democracy which says that the minority

shall be allowed the same rights as the majority in determining the constitutional and political identity of the state itself, [for] that seems to me to be a concept that has got nothing to do with civil rights, protection of individual rights or protection against majoritarianism ... (McCartney 1997, quoted in Hennessey and Wilson, 1997)

The critique made by English is echoed in the *Idea of the Union* by a Cadogan Group member Dennis Kennedy (Kennedy 1995, 34-36), who argues that an ideology, like Northern Irish nationalism, designed for dismembering of the state, should not be granted equal recognition with the one upholding the state. Only non-political Irishness should have recognition, and should be at the core of any Irish dimension of a future settlement. Both writers show the tendency of the unionists to manifest unease and nervousness towards the ongoing political process, which was seen by the unionists as going the wrong way. For example, for Kennedy the Downing Street declaration of 1993 was an indication of the acceptance of the nationalist analysis of the Northern Ireland situation, while discarding the unionist one (Kennedy 1995, 33). The consequence for accepting the nationalist premises is no less than also accepting the nationalist solution, unification. The problem which was facing unionism was clearly put by Kennedy: Any downplaying of the status of Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom was always a step in the direction of defeat for unionism. So unionism could hardly gain anything, whereas any movement in the political process was always a victory for the cause of nationalism and unification. For Barbara Finney, another contributor to the *Idea of the Union*, parity of esteem is not something, which could be granted to Irish nationalism. For her parity must be earned, which has not happened in the case of nationalism. Contrary, the nationalists have proved their unworthiness for parity (Finney 1995, 57).

The unionists were afraid that the language of the peace process had the potential to cement a continuum towards a nationalist solution, unification. Therefore the unionists were concentrating on blocking any "political process" or later "peace process", which would imply an open ended movement. For unionists process was a synonym for change, and a change could be pointing towards the acceptance of political Irishness and unification. From the unionist point of view the constitutional status of Northern Ireland was turning into a "*political process designed to ensure movement towards a framework which is substantially Irish and only residually British*" (Aughey 1995b, 48). The fears of the unionists were not all groundless, or just premises for certain type of rhetoric, as the British officials were clearly indicating a certain tendency to get rid of the problem of Northern Ireland[59]. The language of the union had changed from the language of permanence (Thatcher (1981): "Northern Ireland is as British as Finchley") to the language of transition, which was evident in both the Downing Street Declaration, which spoke of the united Ireland "as of right" that could be the outcome "over a period" and in the Framework Documents (Aughey 1995b, 50). Aughey argues that this was the result of a conscious Irish nationalist

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[59]   For example Northern Ireland Secretary of State Patrick Mayhew stated in a German Die Zeit interview that Britain would release Northern Ireland with pleasure (mit einem Handküß) (Aughey 1995b, 49).

strategy to challenge the unionists' steady interpretation of the concept of the Union and replace it with a rivalling concept of dynamic and therefore changeable idea of the Union (Aughey 1995e, 10-11). The constitutional challenge that this represented for unionists was particularly a challenge dealt in the area of a political language, says Aughey (Aughey 1995e, 6).

The British ambiguity towards the permanence of the constitutional link was, according to Aughey, also seen in the ranks of the Irish nationalists, who had started to manifest a "we are the masters now" –mentality (Aughey 1995b, 51). Consent principle of the Downing Street declaration was seen as a vehicle of deception designed by the pan-nationalist front and the British government to dupe the unionists into the agenda for unification (McCartney 1995, 67). The unionist fears manifesting themselves in the need of documents like *Idea of the Union* were clear. That is why the unionist rhetoric started to concentrate more and more on permanence, constitutionality, "finding a stable settlement" (Kennedy 1995, 36). This settlement would give unionists permanent recognition for the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and limit the expressions of Irishness to its cultural aspect, cutting off republicanism as a manifestation of the political aspect of Irish nationalism (Kennedy, 1995, 34). The assessment of the situation from the unionist perspective was that the pan-nationalist front had succeeded in driving a wedge between the unionists and the British in terms of actual politics as well as in terms of public sympathy (Roche 1995).

Dennis Kennedy raises an interesting question, when he asks, is a person supporting the democratic will of the majority necessarily a unionist, although the result of his opinion is the continuation of the Union? Kennedy argues that unionism, as an ideological commitment to the Union, holds such specific definitions that it does not encourage liberal Protestants or Roman Catholics in becoming unionists and accepting that label. Kennedy points out that as a political movement unionism has become known as sectarian by espousing Protestantism and rejecting Catholicism. Kennedy does not seem to shirk away from the possibility of a Catholic unionist, while some fellow unionists, such as McCartney, would perhaps think otherwise. In any case what Kennedy is arguing can be understood as a similar critique to the unionist party politics as Aughey had expressed. Unionism in party political terms had moved away from its non-sectarian and liberal nature. (Kennedy 1995)

The concept of parity of esteem can also be criticized without necessarily taking aboard the unionist credentials. This type of critique is offered by Alan Finlayson (1997, 1998, 2001) who has paid attention to the fact than the more politically unionist critics of the concept. Finlayson argues convincingly, that the use of the concept as a steering mechanism for political institutions has had the downside of institutionalising the conflict and cementing its bipolar nature[60]. Finlayson has gone as far as calling for the replacement of the parity of

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[60] For a more unionist oriented critique pointing to the same conclusion see Aughey 1999

esteem concept with the "parity of contempt", as he sees neither of the two "traditions" in Northern Ireland worth the heavy support the concept of the parity of esteem and its usage has given (Finlayson 1998, 121). For Finlayson the task of politics in Northern Ireland is not to accommodate these two traditions but to show their equal illegitimacy (ibid.). Interesting debate around the concept of parity of esteem and its possibilities has become much broader than it is necessary to consider them here. For example, Shane O'Neill has evoked an interesting debate on the footsteps of the parity of esteem –debate by applying Habermasian discourse ethics to Northern Ireland (See O'Neill 1994; 2000; 2002; Newey 2002; Little 2003 and as a summary Finlayson 2006).

8.6   Economic defence of the Union

The economic problems that would come with the Irish unification, was a frequently repeated claim of the professional economists inclined towards unionism. The most notable of them were Patrick J Roche and Esmond Birnie, both professional university economists and, in the case of Roche, also a member of the unionist think tank the *Cadogan Group*. Obviously the 1990's academics did not invent the argument. For example, in 1956 UUP Stormont cabinet minister Brian Maginness reassured the nervous unionists who calculated that in demographic terms the "disloyalists" would supersede the loyalists somewhere around the year 2000 by arguing that the British welfare state and the economic gap would eventually win a major part of the Catholic people for the cause of unionism[61] (Patterson & Kauffmann 2007, 44-45). Also the Marxist BICO strongly argued for the impossibility of the unification because of the economy (BICO 1972b).

This type of rhetoric, appeals strongly to *logos,* and shows, that even if the majority of the people of Northern Ireland decided to accept the unification, the Republic could not afford it. The most coherent and substantive illustration of this argument in the 1990's can be found in the provocatively titled, *An Economic Lesson for Irish Nationalists* and *Republicans* (1994) by Roche and Birnie. The booklet was published by the Ulster Unionist Party, and in that sense shows a rare occasion of harmonious marriage of unionist scholars and unionist politicians. In matters more related to party politics the unionist parties always kept their distance from the unionist intellectuals, which can be seen in the less enthusiastic welcome of *Under Siege,* or in the ostracism of McCartney. However, making the unionist case by appealing directly to the "hard facts" of economics was welcomed by the party. The authors point out that while it is impossible for the Irish Republic to pick up the bill of unification, the economic benefits of further north-south co-operation are also slim and the concurrent

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[61]   Maginness' statement was radical, as at that time the idea of Roman Catholic unionists was in many circles unthinkable. Maginness therefore represented the liberal and secular unionism of the 1950's.

calculations by the republican Sinn Féin are mistaken. Other scholarly interventions arguing essentially the same; that from a material perspective, Irish unification is a disaster, were for example *The Economics of the Union* (1995) by Graham Gudgin, *Economic Unification* (1995) by Esmond Birnie both in the *Idea of the Union* manifesto and several of the unionist Cadogan Group pamphlets, most specifically *The Northern Limits* (1992). Arguments through economics may be the purest form of expert politicking, but I will discuss it only briefly as a more profound analysis would require going deeply to the facts and figures which constitute this line of argument. (Roche & Barton 1995)

It might be that economic expertise that the unionist literati had, could be more easily utilized by the Ulster Unionist Party, as economics was something that could be thought of being "above politics". Suggestions overlapping with the political, such as the choosing of a more politically attached strategy in science by Aughey, or the more direct interventions by McCartney were received more cautiously. This often is the case as rhetoric based on economic necessity often works as a god-term in capitalist societies, and is capable of overriding any other argument (Burke 1969, 355-356). Argument through economics is a very typical act of depoliticization[62], and as such a logical and powerful move, when considering the sometimes anti-political ethos of the Northern Ireland electorate, to which for example Todd has referred to (1987). But of course as Carl Schmitt has said economic is very much political and economics can be used in obtaining political power positions (Schmitt 1963, 76)[63].

8.7   What is to be done?

It is evident that the academic strand of unionism was not satisfied with the way things were handled in the party politics of unionism. The academic unionists of the *Idea of the Union* were not supporting unionism in its sectarian and exclusivist (towards the Catholics) form. Nevertheless, no major ideological rethinking was suggested, only ways of conducting politics better. One

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[62]   Schmitt lists typical depoliticalizations of the liberal nineteenth century that should be done away with. One of these antithesis for the political is economic (Schmitt 1963, 21). Schmitt also rephrases the Walter Rathenaus argument that the destiny today is not politics but economics to "economics has become political and thereby the destiny" (Schmitt 1976, 78). In original: …daß heute nicht die Politik, sondern die Wirtschaft das Schicksal sei. Richtigen ware zu sagen, daß nach wie vor die Politik das Schicksal bleibt und nur das eingetreten ist daß die Wirtschaft ein Politikum und dadurch zum "Schicksal" wurde (Schmitt 1963, 76-77).

[63]   Daß die Wirtschaftlichen Gegensätze politisch geworden sind und der Begriff der "wirtschaftlichen Machtstellung" entstehen konnte, zeigt nur daß von der Wirtschaft wie von jedem Sachgebiet aus der Punkt des Politischen erreicht warden kann. (Schmitt 1963, 76) Translation: "Economic antagonisms can become political, and the fact that an economic power position could arise proves that the point of the political may be reached from the economic as well as from any other domain" (Schmitt 1976, 78).

exception is Graham Walker, a Scottish born political scientist (QUB), who gives the rethinking of unionism some building blocks in his contribution to the *Idea of the Union*. Walker makes the case that United Kingdom of the day does not serve the nature of the multi-cultural state, which the UK has become, and therefore the idea of the Union must be radically re-thought. A solution to this would be a more federal UK, which would be more prepared to accommodate the centrifugal tendencies, which might rise from the fact that the British monoculture had been replaced by a multicultural nation. A federal UK would also be better in accommodating its Irish dimension the same was as it does with the Scottish or Welsh. This would obviously not lead to the unification of Ireland or the British Isles as a whole, but would only give Irishness its proper cultural place in the multicultural state of the United Kingdom. One practical application of the multicultural would be the well known recipe of the *Campaign for Equal Citizenship*: the organisation of the British parties in Northern Ireland as well as in the other parts of the UK. By this Walker is repeating the old argument of the CEC, that the sectarian tensions of Northern Ireland would be eliminated by replacing the present parties with the British ones. An act cementing the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and in that way helping to reach a "permanent settlement" and avoiding the "process" of eroding the British link. Nevertheless, since the passing of the CEC and the expulsion of McCartney from the UUP, support for the electoral integration was purely academic, in every sense of the word. (Walker 1995)

When put into to perspective, one can notice that Walker's "rethinking" is very close to the Aughey's suggestion that unionists should take part in the UK wide debates the benefits of the British citizenship over the concepts of English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish nationalities (Aughey 1994b), and indeed in the UUP's negotiation strategy in the Mayhew Talks to raise the regionalisation aspect of the UK to counter the Irish nationalists "Europe card".

For the academic contributors of the *Idea of the Union* it was clear that in order to escape from the pan-nationalist conspiracy or the malign intentions of the British and Irish governments, unionism had to change on the level of unionist politics, as the consensus among the academics seemed to implicate that the foundations of unionism were solid. The blame for failure is directed at the unionist politicians, who have failed to emphasize the positive elements of unionism and have instead succumbed to the Protestant triumphalism by sacrificing reason. The brainpower available for the change in unionism must come from somewhere else, since "one proverbial criterion of intelligence having plenty of daylight between oneself and the unionist party" (Foster 1995b, 71) So, the writers of the *Idea of the Union* -manifesto did support the same ultimate goal as the party political unionism, but they were not pleased with the way these goals were expressed. But for any goals to be reached it seemed that unionism needed a rescue from the party-politics:

> It is not necessary for intellectuals to join unionist parties, though it would be good if some were to do so: if they translate the political debate into cultural terms and challenge opponents on values and ideas, they will rescue the union from party-political unionism – which stoutly defended the Union, but at the price of a spacious,

positive, generous concept of the historic link. Besides, an intellectualised and cultivated unionism would be protected from charges of sectarianism and triumphalism.

> *The central task of the pro-Union intellectual is to appreciate the Union not simply as history but as a culture, a value system, an idea (with its own force-field)…*For the intellectual, the Union is open-ended: it is not a closed system meant to exclude anyone. (Foster 1995b, 71 *Foster's emphasis*)

Foster also advises how this engaged academic, a new intellectual, should carry on his duty of defending the union:

> The pro-Union intellectual is not only affirmative but also critical. One of his or her tasks is to read the political and constitutional ramifications, the ideological implications, of government's social and cultural policies. These are often implemented indirectly by key players in the unfolding fate of the connection with Great Britain: *civil servants, arts and culture administrators, media personnel, and teachers and lecturers in the humanities*. These are frequently the transformers (and often unwitting transformers) of government policies into rules, images and ideas. (Foster 1995b, 71)

Foster seems to share a rather Mannheimian or Gramscian notion of the intellectual as a derivative of his or her class. Foster sees intellectuals as the avant-garde of the unionist minded people, who then carry out their tasks, or duties, as unionist intellectuals for the cause of the Union. Foster also believes that a dialogue outside the trenches of nationalism and unionism could be had between the nationalist and the unionist intellectuals. Therefore, the unionist intellectuals could eventually succeed in that which their politicians have failed; to convince the nationalists that their desires and aspirations could be accommodated in a rearticulated union (Foster 1995b, 73).

Foster and most of the contributors to the *Idea of the Union* give some practical suggestions on how the idea of the union, unionism and the unionist politics should be rethought and changed. Unionism should resign itself from its hostile cultural triumphalism, which is manifest in the form of Orange Order or the Protestant marches and turn to its core, which is seen in the constitutional link to the United Kingdom (Walker 1995, Aughey 1995a; 1995b, English1995). Unionism should change as a part of the bigger change facing Great Britain and the British identity (Walker 1995). In both, in the change of unionism and in the selling of unionism, the unionist academics seem to agree that they have a task to perform. Not necessarily as active politicians, which the writers appear to limit to party politics, but as active, engaging, participants on every level of the discourse.

What the intellectuals are offering is in stark contrast with the direction the political process was heading in the mid 1990's. Electoral, or any kind of, integration with the rest of the United Kingdom was more and more off the table, after a brief period in the late 1980's when the disintegration of the unionist campaign against the Anglo-Irish Agreement had brought the integration option to the public frame. The only political fossil from the CEC was, in practice, the United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP) headed by Robert McCartney, nevertheless the unionist intellectuals can hardly be directly linked

to his party. More than anything, the intellectuals shared with the leadership of the UKUP the disappointment felt towards the way politics was being made by the main unionist parties, especially the UUP. It seems that while the unionist academics emphasised the need for a new, modern and secular political thinking they themselves were, at least in terms of practical political suggestions, lagging behind in the discussion climate of the late 1980's.

The *Idea of the Union,* of the two key manifestoes we have been focussing on, concentrated mainly on the message delivered. What was to be the message that was going to win sympathies for the unionist cause? It was not going to happen by repeating old rhetoric of no surrender, but the unionist needed to emphasize the positive, inclusive and secular image of unionism. For this image scholars portraying unionism as a religious ideology or as an old fashioned and doomed political idea did not fit. That is why the intervention made could not be limited only to the party-political sphere, and was done also through academic debate. Whereas *Idea of the Union* was an act of spelling out the message, *Selling Unionism* was a guide book on how to deliver that message, which was believed to be capable of winning the support unionism needed.

8.8 "Selling Unionism"

Selling Unionism can also be interpreted as a speech act in the internal unionist power struggle. The dominant trend of unionist politics had been the "long view" on politics personified in the party leader James Molyneaux. Molyneaux had emphasised a very cautious and almost invisible politics, which was based on personal relationships between Molyneaux and people like John Major or the Queen Mother, and in doing politics behind the scenes in cabinets and conference rooms. The biggest blow to this way of politics, as has been shown, was the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Hennessey 1996, 180), which shifted the unionist camp from minimalist integration towards electoral integration. However, the Molyneaux line returned victoriously in Westminster in the Maastricht treaty vote in 1993 (Hennessey 1996, 185), as the unionist MP's gave their support for the critical vote in the House of Commons, and presumably were paid back in the blueprint of the Downing Street Declaration, which committed the Republic to the consent principle, paramount to the unionist politics. Nevertheless, the *Framework Documents* finally showed that the restraint and invisible way of making politics was proving ineffective. *Selling Unionism* can therefore be interpreted as a critique to the old UUP and a manifestation of the new more articulate UUP with David Trimble as its front man.

James Molyneuax announced his resignation in August 1995, a few months after the publication of *Selling Unionism*. This tells us that the context of the document is highly significant in understanding its content. The booklet must be read, not only as a speech act in favour for a more proactive and

articulate unionism, but also as a direct intervention in directing the competition that the largest unionist party would face, after the long reign of "Wee Jimmy"(Molyneaux). The summer of 1995 would bring a breath of old sectarian tension when "parity of esteem" was put to a real test in Drumcree[64], but in the spring 1995 the secular strand of unionism was reaching its heyday. The booklet is also in line with the unionists' "growing awareness of their profound shortcomings in the area of propaganda" (Parkinson 2001, 274), which also saw the setting up of the Unionist Information Office in London in 1996. The belief that unionists cannot present their case, although they might have a good one, was so widely taken as a fact that the *Independent on Sunday* published an article in 1995 titled *Selling the unionists* that labelled especially loyalists as the image maker's nightmare and subsequently asked six PR agents how they would improve this image (ibid.) .

In contrast to the *Idea of the Union, Selling Unionism* (SU) is straightforwardly a publication of the Ulster Unionist Party, published by its more moderate and liberal section, the Ulster Young Unionist Council (UYUC). UYUC was among the most important organisations involved in the phenomena of engaging academics, since it published numerous works by Aughey or other unionist minded academics. In that sense, the academics were attached to the party-politics of unionism, while they themselves often denied it. The situation analysis of the five men contributing to the *Selling Unionism* is that unionism is in a very crucial state and that immediate action must be taken. The writers are: Arthur Aughey, who writes on how to sell unionism better in the home front, Northern Ireland; David Burnside a politician of the UUP, who spells out how unionism is to succeed in mainland UK; Jeffrey Donaldson, another UUP politician, who talks of the perspectives of unionism in America; Eoghan Harris, a southern media expert and one of David Trimble's advisors, who considers how unionists should make their case in the Republic; and Gavin Adams, young UUP politician and a post-graduate student who shows how to sell unionism to Europe. (SU 1995, 5)

Selling Unionism is opened by Aughey, who argues, in line with the mainstream unionist politics of the mid 1990's, that the peace process of Northern Ireland had been conceptually hijacked by the pan-nationalist front. He had succeeded in creating a quasi logical discourse, where the peace process was seen as a historical law with the Irish unification as the only logical conclusion. Aughey states that any action of the British government or the unionists in questioning the contents given to the peace process by the nationalists is labelled as "unhelpful". Aughey argues that the peace process of finding a political solution for Northern Ireland and the nationalist oriented political process of seeking Irish unification have been blurred into a one single entity, used by the nationalist parties. He continues that even the neutral political commentators are failing to see the difference anymore. He sees that this tactic has already succeeded in turning Britain from the ally of unionists to

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[64] See second paragraph of 9.1 David Trimble and the peace talks

a neutral mediator in the process. The next step for the nationalist campaign is going to be, argues Aughey, that Britain is no longer even neutral, but becomes the persuader of the unionists. (Aughey 1995c, 9).

According to Aughey the Irish nationalists share a sense of cultural superiority which makes them triumphant. The nationalists, namely Sinn Féin and some elements of the SDLP, believe that whereas the nationalists are culture-bearing people capable of creating an invigorating culture, the unionists are culture-dependant people, without the capability of creating one. The political implication of this is that the nationalists do not think unionists are capable of politically adapting to new circumstances (the changing political climate in Northern Ireland) and expect unionist to collapse from within, to die from its shallowness. For Aughey, unionism is at least as much under siege as it was in 1989. (Aughey 1995c, 10-11)

The choices Aughey offers unionism are stark. The first is a choice of "gently managing decline", in other words accepting the fact that they have lost, and finding some comfort in history and cultural traditions. In this choice unionism would in essence give up its core as a political thought and succumb into a heritage organisation." The other option is what Aughey calls the "Tancredi option", from the novel "*The Leopard*" by Guiseppe de Lampedusa[65]. The strategy of this option is crystallized by Aughey into a quote from the novel: "Unless we take hand now, they'll foist a republic on us. If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change". Aughey creatively and powerfully puts both his understanding of unionism and his opinion on what should be done in one quote. The quote reflects both the conservative nature of unionism, from which Aughey believes unionism should obtain the ideological foundation for its defence; and the notion that the unionist politics are in a need of change, if unionists want to keep a future victory a possibility. The emphasis of the "Tancredi option" is spelled out clearly:

> If the Tancredi option is the favoured choice, then Unionism is set for interesting times. For I am convinced, now that the shooting war is over (for good I hope), the *real* war has just begun. And it will be an intellectual war. How might Unionists respond to the new battle lines? (Aughey 1995c, 12)

Aughey is referring to the capability of the unionist parties, as they are, to respond well enough or to survive in the new intellectual war. This can even be interpreted as a call to arms for the unionist intellectuals, resembling Gramsci's idea of the organic intellectuals being the avant-garde of their "class". Aughey sees in the heart of Ulster unionism two propositions: the first one sees the British presence on the island of Ireland as a necessary way to protect the survival of the Protestant people; the second proposition is the thought that the British authority in Northern Ireland is necessary for the accommodation of the "cultural and religious diversity and the promotion of economic well-being".

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[65] Aughey elaborates the "Leopard –lessons" some years later in his article "Learning from the 'The Leopard'" (Aughey 2001c).

The former line of thought is basically a mode of communal defence manifesting itself in the politics of the Democratic Unionist Party. This latter line of argument, which Aughey calls liberal/progressive is found in the ranks of the UUP. Aughey argues that the defence based on communal defence requires defeat, fear and humiliation in order to gain success and is therefore not the way to proceed politically. The only way is to market unionism in a way that it can be truly considered as an option for the "greater number" of people in Northern Ireland. For this, the liberal and progressive way of the UUP is the only choice. From the perspective of emphasising the British link as a way to secure diversity and economic prosperity, even some proportion of the Catholic population could be won to the unionist cause. From the perspective of the religious minded cultural defence this would be impossible. Aughey is trusting in the utilitarian calculation of the Catholic people, based on material and civic advantages offered by the union, in comparison to the Irish Republic. The politics to go with this defence are not the politics emphasising division, religion and communal defence, but politics which dwell on detaching the idea of the state from the idea of religious community. (Aughey 1995c, 12-13)

Aughey, perhaps satirically, continues by describing himself as being "not a politician and poor at practical suggestions" and that due to this he "can only observe that what Unionism lacks today is what one might call a "concept""(Aughey 1995c, 13). Clearly, what he is arguing is political no matter how narrow a definition given to the word. Even on the level of party politics Aughey makes a statement for one party (UUP) against another (DUP). Even on the level of actual suggestions he is not as poor as he claims. Indeed, giving suggestions might be considered a norm in a type of normative theorizing in which Aughey is engaged. Advising the UUP headquarters to argue on the merits of the British passport, instead of on the merits of the religious/cultural autonomy of the Protestant people, is a clear political intervention suggesting the direction the politics of unionism should be steered towards. But Aughey's demarcation goes also to the heart of the Weberian division between a politician and a scholar. Aughey leaves the autonomy to select a proper action to the politician, as he limits himself to suggestions, based on the deficiencies and problems he sees from his position as a scholar. Whether these suggestions are practical or not is up to the politician, but in terms of making the suggestions he does prove his autonomous role to do them in reference to the commitment of the politician to a particular party policy.

By the lacking "concept" of unionism Aughey means that unionism has been too narrow-mindedly concentrated on the day-to-day communal defence of the Protestant community to be able to recognise its founding political idea. Contrary to *Under Siege*, Aughey does not spell out this concept of unionism, which he in *Under Siege* called the "character of unionism", but just refers to it as feeling of being a part of something wider and larger than Irish nationalism. The core of the political defence for unionism must in any case be rethought from the premises of secular and liberal political thought. The task of this

rethinking Aughey is giving to the Young Unionists[66], while encouraging them to be fast, otherwise "The Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland *will* be in the dustbin of history". (Aughey 1995c, 13-14)

Gavin Adams, more or less, repeats Aughey's 1989 argument, of unionism being in line with the modern political beliefs and concepts such as citizenship, while Irish nationalism is still fixated on the political thought of the 18th and 19th centuries (Adams 1995, 52). The main point of his article though, is to encourage the UUP to organise on the European level also in order to deliver the unionist message to that sphere. Adams sees possibilities in the new European citizenship, which would broaden the British citizenship, of a prime importance to unionists.

David Burnside discusses the importance of showing a positive unionism in Great Britain. He has an interesting personal history mixing politics and business. Burnside worked in the 1970's as a public relations officer of the UUP, having previously been a member of the Vanguard Unionist Party until its disintegration in the 1970's. Another notable vanguard member included David Trimble. In the 1980's Burnside worked as a head of public relations for British Airways and returned officially to politics in 2000, being actively involved already after his departure from the BA in 1993. Burnside attempted to bring business life public relations models into the badly marketed UUP. In the booklet Burnside argues that unionism must be able to produce a message, which is more "customer friendly" (Burnside 1995, 18).

Burnside's analysis show the reasons why UUP has not done so well in the public relations battles against the nationalists, or rival unionist parties. First, the UUP did not have the benefit of working with the financial support of the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland, Europe, or in the USA. But the resources aside, the unionists have also done a worse job in terms of techniques. The UUP is also suffering from the fact that its leader (James Molyneaux) does not have the same television appeal as Ian Paisley from the DUP. Burnside shares Aughey's view that by dominating the media Paisley is giving all unionism a bad name, and a public image the general audience in Britain has difficulties identifying with[67]. Nevertheless, the future horizons for moderate unionism are not so bleak, argues Burnside. The union has support in the UK and in the British media, although the more aggressive message coming form the DUP headquarters often seems to cover the message of the UUP. Obviously, *Selling Unionism* does not take a positive standpoint for electoral integration because it is a publication of the UUP. Whereas Aughey kept his sympathies for integration to himself, Burnside addresses the matter and does not judge the decision of the Conservative party to have an organisation in Northern Ireland,

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[66] Young Unionists is the "youth wing" of the UUP, also known as the Ulster Young Unionist Council, the publisher of the Selling *Unionism* –pamphlet.

[67] An additional footnote on Burnside's own personal political career is perhaps in place. After the 1998 Belfast Agreement Burnside became a critic of the treaty, as well as a critic of the UUP's new leader David Trimble. Burnside later joined the DUP, as did Jeffery Donaldson, another critic of Trimble and a contributor to the *Selling Unionism*.

since Burnside sees this as a possibility to promote the unionist cause in the ranks of the Conservatives. (Burnside 1995, 14-16)

As practical advice Burnside suggests that the unionists should win back the concept of peace by using it as much as possible in their policy documents. "Reasonable and moderate policies" should then be more actively presented on television, radio or newspapers, aiming especially at organisations and people who already share a tendency towards unionist sympathies. The problem with launching a proper "corporate style" advertising campaign for unionism is the lack of financial resources. But this aside, with a more positive campaign new people can be won to the cause of unionism. For Burnside, as a member of the liberal and secular strand of unionism, unionism should be detached from religion, which would open up the possibility of Catholics joining the unionist ranks. As practical party-political advice Burnside disclaims the possibility of a pan-unionist front with the DUP, as was done in the campaign against the Anglo-Irish Agreement. As a future tactic this would be a mistake, Burnside argues. (Burnside 1995)

In his article Jeffrey Donaldson notes that the U.S. has always been a stronghold for the Irish nationalists, and the importance of the pressure coming from the U.S. can be seen for example in the TUAS document circulated by the republican leadership during the summer of 1994 (TUAS) [68]. Donaldson represents the disappointment felt by the unionists that the U.S. has intervened in what Donaldson describes as the "internal matter for the United Kingdom". Nevertheless, the unionists have realised that in order to counter the nationalist message in the U.S. they have to be more active in delivering the unionist side of the story. Donaldson's article shows how this has proceeded. The unionists have made contacts with numerous American people who have unionist sympathies, either through an Ulster-Scot heritage or by other means. Out of these sympathizers the UUP has organised a band of "representatives" who are given information on Northern Ireland, and who have agreed to act as local ambassadors for the unionist cause, by contributing letters to newspapers etc. In addition, the unionist delegates have already in the process of establishing relationships to the editorial boards of the main U.S. newspapers. (Donaldson 1995)

Donaldson argues that although the nationalists have had through the "Kennedy-clan" or other Irish nationalist sympathizers, mostly in the ranks of the Democratic Party, a certain lead in contrast to unionists, the unionists have their share of the Washington establishment. Donaldson notes that the U.S. Republicans have risen to the majority in both houses of the Congress, which gives unionists new possibilities, since many of the new Republican

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[68]   Consensus of the abbreviation TUAS has not been reached, but one interpretation is that it stands for Tactical Use of Armed Struggle. However, the document was related to the internal debate of the Republican movement on the IRA ceasefire and gave directions on how the republican supporters should behave politically. The document stressed the need to create a positive consensus, from the point of view of the Republican movement, over the Northern Ireland situation in Europe and in the USA.

representatives come from the Southern States of the U.S., who, according to Donaldson, have a similar ethos and political beliefs as Ulster Unionism (Donaldson 1995, 22). Donaldson gives a rather optimistic picture of the unionist campaign in the U.S. He also believes that since 60 percent of the Americans who have Irish roots are of the Ulster-Scots extraction the potentiality of the unionist message to go through in America is obvious. In deference to other contributors of *Selling Unionism*, Donaldson seems however more willing to emphasize the difference between unionism and nationalism on the cultural level, and does not underline constitutional matters, or the differences on political ethos between unionism and nationalism. (Donaldson 1995)

Perhaps the most interesting article of *Selling Unionism* comes from Irish journalist and a politician Eoghan Harris, who is an interesting figure in Irish politics. Harris has a university degree in history from the University College, Cork, and he has subsequently served as an ideologist for the Marxist Worker's Party, as an advisor to the Irish Taoiseach John Bruton (in office 1994-1997) and as an advisor and a speech writer to David Trimble[69]. Harris can be described as a former Republican, who nowadays, and at the time of *Selling Unionism* had turned into a fierce critic of the perceived republican agenda. In terms of his anti-Republican agenda, Harris is, as a unionist sympathizer, close to another southerner, Conor Cruise O'Brien, who was introduced earlier.

Harris argues that unionists are losing the rhetorical battle against the nationalists essentially because unionists lack a proper political theory, a theory which Harris calls a theory of change. Through his journalist experience, Harris has found that Catholics are better in telling a good story, as the unionists lack the skill of putting their message in a narrative form. The Catholic culture therefore produces people who are naturally better at performing, particularly in television or radio. Where a unionist is always trying to make a case, the nationalists do not. They tell a good story. Because of this, the unionists have lost the upper hand. There is no pan-nationalist conspiracy, just the fact that the nationalists are rhetorically superior. (Harris 1995, 27-29)

The unionists nevertheless have more profound problems. One of the biggest ones is their failure to see politics as a product and not as a process. Therefore the unionist politics need "an adequate theory of change" (Harris 1995, 29). By this Harris means that the unionist have not realised the "political kudos to be derived from changing your mind in public". The unionists should resign from repeating the mantra of "No surrender" or just stating their case over and over again without change. Harris states that people prefer the politicians who admit to being wrong and changing their minds. So Harris argues, unionists should give up their way of thinking politics in a serial way, for example striving for the permanent settlement of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. By doing this, the unionists succumb to the idea that politics

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[69]   Harris is behind the famous phrase "Northern Ireland has been a cold house for Catholics", which Trimble used in his Nobel Peace Price acceptance speech.

is just about the means of getting to a preferred option. In this, the unionists fail to grasp the dialectical nature of politics which is familiar to the nationalists. The nationalist notion of politics, which Harris sees as superior, does not have solid goals, but sees politics as a process of moving in a desired direction. By using the system of thinking dialectically the Republicans have been able to define the meaning of the peace process as a process towards unification. It is essential therefore for the unionists to win the peace process back, but it will not happen with the current unionist notion of politics: (Harrris 1995, 29-31).

> The same cognitive flaws that allow Unionists to see politics as a product rather than a *process*, prevent them doing well on the mass media. (Harris 1995, 29)

> Unionists will *never* beat Sinn Fein's superior system of thinking dialectically – by which they borrowed from the Workers Party – by passive sulking but only by stealing the peace process. (Harris 1995, 31)

Harris' critique of the lack of the process nature in the unionist politics brings Hannah Arendt to mind. Through Arendt, Harris might be seen suggesting a type of politics for unionists which would accept the unpredictability nature of a process, which would allow the retention of a sense of strength in the unionist politics. As for Arendt the unexpectedness and unretractability is central to a process keeping its strength, while in contradictory terms in the production process, in which the end product is known and pursued, the strength of the action process itself is entirely absorbed and exhausted by the product (Arendt, 1958 232-233). Applied to unionist politics this would mean that the unionists politicians should dare to face the unexpectedness of their actions, as this would lead to a more powerful and successful politics, whereas at the moment unionist politicians are too committed in the end product (keeping the union) which takes the strength from their politics. Harris does not himself hint of Arendt's influence, but she might linger behind his thoughts.

Here we can also detect a disagreement among the academic advisors of unionism. Aughey also had made the point that the dynamic conception that the nationalists had given to the peace *process* had put the permanence seeking unionist politics in a tight spot (Aughey 1995e). But contrary to Harris, Aughey did not suggest that unionists should change their fundamental beliefs, or give up the idea of the Union as the ultimate test for the success of politics, quite the contrary.

The unionist rhetoric is, in Harris's eyes, about making a case in court, while the nationalists have realized – through their Catholic culture – that in order to be victorious you should apply not the ways of the court, but that of the theatre. First of all the unionist must remake their story from the perspective of admitting something they do not wish to. In essence, to make political gains one must start by giving something. In Harris's words this unionist "story" must be as follows:

> The unionist story is about how a heroic people were planted in another country, and with great courage and hard work, made it their own, and how despite the most cruel campaign to make them either go away, or become less *human*, they stayed

> human, and stayed put, by showing the other people with whom they share the island, how they might live in harmony (Harris, 1995, 37-38)

The presentation of this story – which is the only story acceptable – should be through the ways of the theatre, not the court, and by using the structure from Aristotle's *Poetics.* Harris then gives a conclusive lecture of unionist politics on rhetoric and how to act in the hostile interviews conducted by the media of the Republic of Ireland. (Harris 1995)

With Harris we can again notice the heterogeneity of the unionist intellectuals. Whereas *The Idea of the Union* was very much a manifesto for seeking a permanent solution, with its conservative rhetoric, Harris is preaching the opposite, that unionists should give up the permanence of the answer looked for, at least on a rhetorical level. Instead they should develop their political rhetoric in the same direction as the nationalists: in the direction of change. Whereas majority of the unionist intellectual writers are signatories to the claim that the rhetoric of change has been more effective, others, unlike Harris, seem reluctant to make compromises in order to change the unionist message of seeking permanence.

9 ACADEMIC UNIONISM AND THE BELFAST AGREEMENT

9.1 David Trimble and the peace talks

This chapter will outline the climax of the era of the academic interventions, which found more profound and theoretically constructed ways in rethinking unionism. Unionist party politics also changed in terms of electing a new party leader by replacing James Molyneaux to whom the unionist lack of innovation and a drift to a political deadlock had been personified, with David Trimble. The process for finding a political solution had accelerated due to the paramilitary ceasefires, but sudden stops and difficulties were still a head, and one of the most important political events in the politics of unionism was the stand off of Drumcree taking place in the summer of 1995.

The widely known uncertainty and ambiguity around post-ceasefire political institutions were partly the reasons behind the Drumcree standoff when the issue of re-routing the Orange parades from Catholic neighbourhoods led to a standoff between the parading Orangemen and the local residents. The standoff was also a practical test for the new catchphrase of the peace process "the parity of esteem". The Catholics wished that parity would mean that parading as a show of superiority would not be allowed. The standoff was lifted, when the parade was finally allowed to enter the Catholic area, with Ian Paisley and David Trimble "dancing" their way into Catholic Carvaghy Road in front of the Orange parade. Trimble's behaviour, which can easily be labelled as triumphant, did make him a hate figure in the Catholic and nationalist eyes. (Godson 2004, 129-146)

The image of David Trimble was twofold, very much like the image of academic or intellectual unionism. Although Trimble was a former academic, a law lecturer from Queen's University Belfast, in the past he had been a member of the 1970's unionist Vanguard party, which, if anything manifested unionist extremism, with the use of direct action and physical force as a continuum of politics. Therefore, when Trimble won the UUP leadership contest and was

elected as a chairman on 8th September 1995 he was considered a hardliner. Trimble's aim was not so much of moderating the UUP, but modernising it by bringing in new and proactive politics and more professional and dynamic ways of making politics. His stance was very much like Aughey and others had advocated. Among the changes that contrast to the minimalist notion of politics of Molyneaux era, there was a more active take on American politics. Almost following the advice of Jeffrey Donaldson outlined in *Selling Unionism* Trimble established a North American bureau for the UUP, as well as an information office in London. This indicated that the party was taking public relations more seriously, and did not trust others to deliver their message anymore. The ways of making politics were new, and politics were given some merit, which was a new step in terms of unionist politics, but this did not mean that Trimble would have moderated the thinking of the UUP. (Cochrane 1997, 337-343)

Perhaps Trimble aimed to be more moderate and active inside his own party than he finally succeeded in being. He tried to end the bondage between the Orange Order and the UUP, which would have been a major step towards secularisation of the UUP[70]. One of the key arguments of the unionist intellectuals had been that the party needed to severe links with the Protestant strand of unionism, or cultural unionism, and cherish its secular political philosophy. This had been Aughey's point in essence. Trimble had a real go on this as, ironically taken into consideration his background, it was his first task as a party leader, but did not succeed in securing consensus inside the party for modernising the connection. Trimble's attempt to modernising the image of unionism and limiting the role of the Protestant faith and Protestant organisations such as the Orange Order would have, in addition, opened up the possibility of selling unionism to Roman Catholics as well. In the party conference where Trimble made his proposal it was objected, among others, on the grounds that losing 160 000 Orange Order votes for the possibility of winning 50 000 Catholic votes was simply bad mathematics. (Walker 2004, 253)

It is easy to agree with Farrington (Farrington 2001) that secularism can be seen as a growth idea in the unionism of the 1990's. This can be seen, besides the modernising attempts of Trimble and other liberal UUP members, from the fact that numerous small unionist parties, with a profoundly secular political idea were born in the mid 1990's. These include the United Kingdom Unionist Party, led by Robert McCartney, and two loyalist groupings the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP). In addition the DUP, which of the two main unionist parties has by far the broadest religious support, suffered most in the early 1990's elections (Patterson 2007, 313). All this boosted the shift of the unionist politics towards secular and civic emphasis and away from ethnic and religious dichotomies. However, it is harder to agree with Farrington that this would have been an indication of a genuine change in the ideology of unionism. The political climate that unionism faced post Anglo-

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[70]   For a thorough history of the relationship between unionism and Orangeism see Patterson & Kaufmann 2007.

Irish Agreement and, especially against its failed campaign to overthrow the Agreement, was such that change was necessary to keep unionism alive. Whether this change was a profound one, or just a tactical one in the sense that the secular and anti-sectarian aspect of unionism was feted while the Protestant unionism was put into a corner, is debatable. Still, Trimble was a step in a new direction in terms of the UUP leadership. For some he was even filling the "gap for the role of intellectual in Irish politics" (Bew, Gibbon, Patterson 2002, 226). (Walker 2004, 253)

In terms of the political process towards a settlement in Northern Ireland, Trimble also had a success unseen in the Molyneaux period. One of the central questions in the peace negotiations was the role of Sinn Féin. Should it be allowed to enter the negotiations, before the decommissioning of the IRA weapons? The position of the unionists and the British government had been that the republicans should buy their ticket to the negotiation table by giving up arms, but the international Mitchell Commission recommended that this principle should be replaced with a dual process of decommissioning, proceeding in tandem with the political talks. The British government was to accept this, but it also accepted Trimble's suggestion that elections take place before negotiations. Trimble manifested a more flexible form of unionist politics, insisting that the turtle defence assumed by the unionists in the event of any perceived nationalist threat could only result in the unionists having to observe the political process. Trimble was trying to avoid the previous sidelining of unionism, even if it meant a relaxation on some of the unionist principles. (Bew, Gibbon, Patterson 2002, 229-230) For the proposition of allowing Sinn Féin to enter the peace negations before the decommissioning, the unionist intellectuals were to take a more hard line approach. The Cadogan Group published its pamphlet *Decommissioning* in January 1996 in which it condemned the idea of decommissioning taking place only after the republican were let into the round table (The Cadogan Group 1996a, Conclusion). The Group, which consisted largely of people sympathetic to Trimble's more secular approach, took a considerably harder line on the republicans than Trimble himself. The rhetoric of the Cadogan Group is indeed quite fundamental, but the fundamentality is not based on cultural unionism, which was the driving force of Paisleyism and the DUP. On the contrary, the fundamentals of the Cadogan Group, as far as they are used as building blocks for rhetoric, lay on secular matters, namely on the inviolability of the democratic wish of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland, in short on the unionist cornerstone, the consent principle.

9.2   Rethinking unionism through Habermas

One of the most influential academic unionist publications, at least when measured by its publicity is Norman Porter's *Rethinking Unionism* (1996). In his

book Porter ties together the discussions inside unionism from the late 1980's CEC campaign to the liberal unionist arguments of the Northern Ireland peace process. This is nothing new as such, but Porter is not only tying things together but also has a new angle to offer in the search for unionist identity. For this "civic unionism", as Porter calls his creation, he dwells heavily from the republican [71] political tradition, thus separating himself from the Aughey/McCartney line of argument, which built on British liberalism. In the following I will use the concept "liberal unionism" to describe the Aughey/McCartney line of argument. This is because Porter himself collects the somewhat heterogeneous arguments of academic unionists under this label and very much uses it as a point of origin for his own suggestion, which he calls "civic unionism". I use the term "liberal unionism" while being fully aware of my earlier arguments questioning the liberal nature of academic unionism.

Porter himself is an interesting and a somewhat separate figure from the rest of the writers discussed. Porter's father, also named Norman Porter, was a fierce evangelical Protestant and an ally of Ian Paisley in the 1950's and 1960's. The Porter family lived in Belfast before they immigrated to Australia in 1970. The younger Norman Porter inherited his father's political stand and according to his own words was "an explicit Protestant bigot" by the time they immigrated. The younger Norman Porter, however, changed his attitudes towards the Northern Ireland politics in Australia. He did his undergraduate studies in Adelaide and post graduate studies at Oxford with Charles Taylor as his thesis supervisor. This fact comes through very forcefully in Porter's civic unionism, as it owes a lot to Taylor's publications especially in terms of the "recognition" debate discussed in the chapter on parity of esteem. Porter returned to Northern Ireland in 1994, after the paramilitary ceasefires, with great expectations towards the modernisation of unionism. Porter also joined the UUP and became active especially in its Labour Group. However, soon Porter was disappointed with the opportunities that the unionists constantly missed in the changed context of the ceasefires. His book is therefore a product of the frustration he personally had with mainstream unionism. Nevertheless, at the time of *Rethinking Unionism*, Porter remained as the member of the UUP. Due to his personal history, Porter's outsider/insider view of unionism is a very interesting one. (Porter 1996, 1-5)

As Habermas along with Taylor is the theorist Porter most widely applies, Porter links heavily with the recognition discourse. Porter shares the concern that unionist politics since the Anglo-Irish Agreement have been in a constant continuum of failures, positioning himself in the same strand of academic unionists considered earlier. Despite his UUP membership, Porter sees himself as an outsider to the daily political struggles. Porter argues that he is especially disappointed with the fact that unionism is still held hostage by organisations like the Orange Order, and that liberal unionism has done little to put some

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[71]   *Republican* obviously does not mean *Irish republican*, but refers to the broader republican thinking, Macchiavelli etc.

intellectual spirit in unionist politics. Porter is especially strong in accusing the liberal unionists of making a great mistake while labelling the peace process as a republican conspiracy, in this case Porter especially blames the Cadogan Group. For Porter all the unionist political practices show not only the failure of the intellectual "new unionism" or liberal unionism, but also, in general, that mainstream unionism does not have anything to offer. The unionist political activity has been based on secrecy and narrow proceduralism, with Molyneaux as the prime example of the latter. The problem is that unionist politics have never been questioned, since they are seemingly producing the required result of keeping the Union safe. Now, when this end-product no longer seems secure[72], the whole premises of the unionist politics must be rethought. The purpose of Porter's book is then essentially how to make unionist politics intelligent starting from the premises. (Porter 1996, i-9)

The structure of *Rethinking Unionism* is a structure on which Porter relies heavily for the previous criticism laid on unionism and its different strands. Porter categorises unionism into cultural unionism and liberal unionism, falling close to the categorisation made by Jennifer Todd (Todd, 1987), in which cultural unionism is termed as Ulster Loyalism and liberal unionism as Ulster Britishness. The major part of Porter's book is then analysis of these two cultures, or traditions, following well known paths, passing McCartney and Aughey as the leading figures in liberal unionism and Ian Paisley and the Orange Order as the flag bearers of the cultural unionism, nothing new so far.

However, the criticism Porter gives to liberal unionism is quite interesting as it is structured to unveil the rhetorical nature of the liberal unionist agenda. Porter argues that Aughey fails to convince that his theory on the triumph of the British citizenship as the combining factor between the Protestant and Catholic identities could be more than a rhetorical construction for political purposes. As we have seen, this might well be true, but still Porter's act as a whistleblower for the whole strand of unionist academic arguments as an intervention to an intervention is very interesting. (Porter 1996)

Porter argues that the procedural citizenship that Aughey offers as a solution to the problem of keeping the Union, while at the same time adequately answering the call of the nationalist political self representation is failing. Therefore, Porter does not believe that political identity could be constructed purely separate from the cultural identities in Northern Ireland, because a functional polity requires its members to interact more deeply than merely on the level of thin layer of political identity provided by citizenship (Porter 1996, 160-161, 167). Porter argues that the procedural citizenship offered by the McCartney/Aughey line of reasoning, provides too narrow a realm for political engagement, as the citizens would easily opt out from politics, which would not offer any kid of virtue for civic action. The alternative proposal Porter offers, is the notion of civic unionism, which he terms as an answer to the

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[72] Here Porter refers obviously to the "crisis" of unionist politics post the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

problems neither cultural unionism or liberal unionism can solve. Porter argues that civic unionism, unlike any other unionist proposal, is also capable of embracing the nationalist population of Northern Ireland and welcoming them to share the same polity with the unionists, and also inject civic virtues to the polity of Northern Ireland making it more viable. Here Porter is using Habermas to attack Aughey's notion of citizenship as a basis for Northern Ireland polity. Through Habermas (Habermas 1992, 3) Porter argues, in line with Aughey, that "A nation of citizens" does not constitute its identity on the common ethnic or cultural properties, but on the *praxis* of active exercising of civil rights. But the departure happens, when Porter, through Habermas, contends that for Northern Ireland polity to achieve this, it would require the recognition of all the substantive identities of the people of Northern Ireland. Porter quotes Habermas in saying that in this "nation of citizens" everyone would receive "equal protection and respect in his/her integrity as a unique individual, as a member of an ethnic or cultural group and as a citizen" (ibid; Porter 1996, 158). By this Porter denounces the citizenship based/procedural academic unionism.

In terms of the long line of unionist argumentation the most "shocking inversion" of civic unionism is, that it abandons the iconic principle of traditional, cultural or liberal, unionisms, which all take as their premise that the Union must be kept at all costs. In contrast, Porter seems to be willing to make constitutional adjustments that would transform unionism into something essentially different. As opposed to the dichotomy of traditional unionism and liberal unionism Porter is suggesting some kind of a "third concept of unionism". But, evidently the shocking inversion seems to be lacking its shock effect as what Porter proposes is unclear. (Porter 1996, passim)

Porter's idea of the civic unionism is built heavily on his criticism on liberal unionism. According to Porter, liberal unionism is essentially a form of conceptual defence of unionism provided by the academic unionists. Nevertheless, it has been conducted by concepts, which are failing to do their work. More precisely, Porter claims that the argument, in which the Irish nationalism is depicted to manifest (Isaiah Berlin's notion of) the positive freedom, while unionism is essentiality portrayed as a harbinger of negative liberty, found in British liberalism, and the following conclusion that because of this unionism would be essentially superior in comparison to nationalism as a political idea is wrong. Further, the way that Aughey describes unionism as a political idea capable of accommodating the cultural Irishness also, therefore making unionism open to everyone in Northern Ireland, is for Porter simply not possible, as unionism, as it is understood by Aughey, cannot be detached from its anti-Irish nationalist and anti-Catholic ethos. What is needed is something new, but this new can also be something called unionism, since, after all Porter remains a unionist. (Porter 1996, 186)

Porter does not discard all the criticism by the academic unionists. Porter agrees that the concept of parity of esteem is something which is difficult to apply in the context of Northern Ireland, at least with keeping a sense of

fairness towards the nationalist or unionist people. The problem Porter shares with the rest of the unionist writers in terms of parity of esteem is that it requires too much. For example Aughey points out the challenges of giving equal esteem to political traditions that cherish and seek to abolish a state. Porter asks how could the nationalist community be forced to give esteem to the triumphant marches of the Orange Order and therefore support a culture of deep anti-Catholicism? Porter suggests that parity of esteem be replaced by the concept of "due recognition", which would better describe the essence of the new Northern Ireland. (Porter 1996, 184-190)

The new Northern Ireland polity would be attached with the "Northern Irish way of life", an idea that would embrace both of the political traditions, without leaving anything outside in the name of pluralism and Habermasian discursive ethics. It is not necessary to go in depth to Habermas' discourse ethics, but a couple of lines are necessary. Habermasian discourse ethics aspires to a discourse in which mutual recognition and rationality would lead to the best possible conclusion that would be accepted by all taking part in the discourse[73]. Hence the discussants would come to realise when the best possible argument is uttered, whatever their position might have been before. The discussants would also be required to behave ethically with respect to the other discussants. Others would not be considered as adversaries, for example. Also unequal power relations would be excluded in the ideal speech situation. The emphasis of the discourse ethics is very much on the rational, with some expenses on the political. In applying discourse ethics to the Northern Ireland, Porter attaches to the notion that a rational solution that would overcome the limitations and objections of unionism and nationalism could be found. This is a completely different idea if compared to Aughey's argument that the liberal character of unionism already holds the keys to finding a permanent solution. It is a bit odd that Porter combines the communitarianism of Taylor with the universalism of Habermas for building blocks of new unionism or new Northern Ireland. After all, Habermas is inclined to overcome divisions and factions to find a common position approved by all whereas Taylor is rather cementing divisions.

In addition to Habermas[74] and Taylor, Porter is inclined towards classical republican thinking to provide the dynamics for the Northern Irish polity he is mapping out[75]. This is seen especially in the ideas of stressing the need for

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[73] Of discourse ethics see e.g. Habermas 1993

[74] Explicitly Porter Refers to *Justification and Application* (Habermas 1993) and to *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Habermas 1987) and to an article "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe" (Habermas 1992).

[75] Namely Porter refers to Machiavelli, which he reads through Skinner (Skinner, 1978), as a cornerstone of Porter's notion of civic republicanism: "Drawing on earlier Roman thinkers such as Livy and Cicero, what emerged was an articulation of a civic republicanism that viewed the deliberations and commitments of the whole body politic as integral to the realization of a free society; that is, a political theory that considered citizen self-rule as the necessary condition of political liberty. Free states, Machiavelli tells us, are those 'which are far from all external servitude, and are thus

esteemed civic virtues of the citizens for a prosperous polity. Porter also turns to Hannah Arendt through whom Porter argues that a proper political community is attainable only through citizens' words and deeds (Porter 1996, 163)[76]. One more obvious background for Porter is of course the "recognition debate" of the early-mid 1990's[77]. The key concepts for Porter's new Northern Ireland polity would then be the notion of reason, free dialogue in a strong civil society and justice. By including these ideas in the political thought of unionism, we would get the third form of unionism, the civic unionism. (Porter 1996, 188).

Metaphorically Porter shares literary critic Edna Longley's (Longley 1994) idea that Northern Ireland should be seen as a "cultural corridor" between the rest of Ireland and Britain. But if we compare this idea of a corridor allowing influences to pass through from both sides, we can see the difference between more traditional academic unionists, such as Aughey, who demands that the corridor should be closed on one end, as far as the transit includes matters of the political. In essence, for Aughey, the Britishness of Northern Ireland can never be in transit, although the same does not apply to matters in the cultural sphere. In contrast, Porter would be more willing to let the political pass through. In relation to this, Porter speaks of "difference through openness" which would substitute "refusal with appropriation". But what Porter clarifies, is that although both ends of the corridor must be kept open, in terms of quantity and quality, however, this does not mean that what comes in from these ends is to be treated equally. (Porter 1996, 174-176)

> One crucial consideration is that British factors carry most weight. Three interlocking points explain why. First, the legitimacy of Northern Ireland's status as an integral part of the United Kingdom is recognised in international law. Second, according to basic democratic standards, the views of majority of citizens in a polity must count when its constitutional future is at stake, and they cannot be legitimately overridden. And, third, given that a conspicuous majority in Northern Ireland expressively wish

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able to govern themselves according to their own will'." (Porter 1996, 107). Machiavelli, however, seems quite incompatible with both Habermas and Taylor because Machiavelli precisely breaks with the tradition of political thinking that advocated the banning of civil disorder and wanted to avoid the birth of factions. For Machiavelli a homogenous body politic with no political quarrels was not the ideal. (Geuna 2006, 61-62). The Skinner quote by Porter is also incompatible with Taylor as Skinner precisely challenges the continuity of Aristotelianism, republicanism and communitarianism that Taylor through Pocock's thesis advocated. For Pocock/Taylor the republican tradition is very much a version of Aristotelianism and as such an alternative to the liberal tradition. Skinner does not see the freedom theorized by republicans as positive freedom, but as a specific form of a negative one. This gives theoretical autonomy to republicanism in relation to the Aristotelian tradition and reconfigures republicanism as a third way between liberal individualism and Aristotelian communitarianism.. Porter, on the other hand, despite quoting Skinner, follows Taylor's stricter dualism of Aristotelian republicanism (=communitarianism) and (individual) liberalism. (Geuna 2006, 66-68)

[76]   Behind this is Arendt's separation of "action" from "work" and "labor" and that the action in the words and deeds of the people will create a human togetherness. See also *Introduction* in this work.

[77]   Especially works of Charles Taylor. For the recognition debate see the chapter on the parity of esteem.

to remain part of the United Kingdom that wish must be respected. Similar points cannot be marshalled to warrant either prioritising or granting equal weight to Irish factors. (Porter 1996, 176)

When it comes to the core of Porter's politic, he does not differ too much from the rest of the academic unionists who had for decades stressed that the essence of the conflict in Northern Ireland is its constitutional status.

However, as mentioned, some room for political Irishness must be left. This is done by converting the masterful inactivity as *modus operandi* of unionist politicians (Porter 1996, 21), hailed by Aughey. Porter believes heavily in institutions in the process of turning Northern Ireland into a blossoming pluralist civil society. These institutions would be open to everyone and work as safeguards for inclusive pluralist debate and deliberation. However, while Porter wants to withdraw from the "masterful inactivity" of politics in Northern Ireland, Porter, as a unionist, does not wish Northern Ireland to become an independent state either, as this would not bring anything into the equation, but would instead deprive Northern Ireland from having connecting surface with the British and the Republic of Ireland polities. (Porter 1996, 177-181)

In the Northern Ireland set up according to the ideals of civic unionism the state would banish its Protestant nature and its role as the defender of the Protestant faith and exclusively Protestant culture in Northern Ireland. Porter is suggesting that Northern Ireland would go through a same type of reformation, which happened in the Italian city states of the renaissance in which citizen self rule was to become the necessary precondition for a free society. In this historical development, Protestantism would not be the guarantor of civil liberties but an obstacle towards them. Porter even draws similarities between Northern Ireland and the context of the post-Reformation political thinkers (see also Skinner 1978, 352). This classical republicanism, as understood by Porter almost completely comes from Machiavelli, (Porter 1996, 107-108), would then be put in use in the renewed polity of Northern Ireland. The new polity of Northern Ireland would be British in its core, but civic unionism also would allow Irishness in all of its aspects to be manifest, as Northern Ireland would be a genuinely plural society. Porter does not avoid the idea of political Irishness existing in the polity of new Northern Ireland. The practical tools for creating this change would be the introduction of a thick notion of citizenship[78] (in contrast to Aughey's "thin") and a "maximalist notion of politics" (Porter 1996, 184). For Porter the impetus of turning Northern Ireland society towards republicanism is not dependent solely of the political will, as the process was already on its way. Porter also sees new ventures in the sphere of the civil

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[78] Thick citizenship is a communitarian term for stronger and communal citizen participation to the matters of the polity in contrast to the thin citizenship in which the role of the state is stronger. See Walzer 1994 and Taylor 1990.

society representing this turn[79] (Porter 1996, 203). Whether civic unionism in practice could create something like "Catholic unionism" is obscure. However, this is the reading of Porter's civic unionism by some scholars (e.g. Graham & Shirlow 1998, 251). (Porter 1996, 183)

In the new civil society of Northern Ireland, ideas of civic republicanism, deliberative action, and creative politics would carry most weight, while the role of the state would be in protecting, and not intervening, in the free exchange of ideas in the civil society. The direction of the political process should be turned, so that ideas would float from the civil society towards the state, and the state would be the object of a change, not vice versa. In this respect, the state would represent more than narrow proceduralism or bureaucratic rule, and it would mirror the true image of the diverse society. For Porter, the central agent in politics is the citizen, not parties, states, or political traditions. In contrast to other unionist literati, Porter is turning to pluralism and deliberation in his search for new unionism, for him they represent the only chance to gain real freedom in Northern Ireland polity. However, as pluralism's foundation is one that undermines the state as the sovereign and the highest authority, its utility in political reality of Northern Ireland, in which strong loyalty towards different states is the essential line of division between individuals, seems for me unrealistic. The model Porter is advocating does therefore sustain the idea of legitimizing a role for political Irishness, however, the problem is that Porter does little to concretise his model further. Nevertheless, in the time before the Belfast Agreement, Porter's intervention was highly significant in introducing ideas for the ongoing political process and therefore having an impact of the post-Belfast Agreement Northern Irish society and politics. (Porter 1996, 204-213)

After the heavy criticism given to the Aughey/McCartney line of argument, it is perhaps a bit surprising that Aughey in his review article of Porter's book in the *Irish Political Studies* journal does not respond with a detailed deconstruction of Porter's thesis. Essentially Aughey sees Porter's biggest failures as the application of empty rhetoric in his conceptual selections ("openness through difference", "true recognition" and "a way of life worth having" are mentioned in the review) and in the fact that Porter puts too much faith in political philosophy while forgetting the practicalities of Northern Ireland politics.

> Descending from the rarefied atmosphere of philosophy it may be no accident that Porter appears to recommend a style of politics in which unionists are no longer unionists and nationalists are no longer nationalists. The philosopher's high wire act of 'openness through diversity' becomes the *philosophe's*[80] illusion of a rational

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79 These include setting up the Opsahl commission to document the human suffering during "the Troubles". Another example could be the independent think tank Democratic Dialogue.

80 *Philosophe's* is not a typing error. Aughey is referring to a particular school of philosophy in the 18th century, the *philosophes* who strongly believed in rationality and that the role of philosophy is to change the world, not only discuss it. Famous

common good. One can still applaud Porter's endeavour even though he falls from the wire. (Aughey 1997a, 129)

Interestingly Aughey pairs *Rethinking Unionism* in his review with *Unionism in Modern Ireland*[81], obviously feeling more comfortable with the concept of unionism he shares with the authors of the latter: "Indeed, the English and Walker book provides a necessary corrective to some of the interpretive lacunae of the Porter book. In particular, it has an understanding of the history and character of the United Kingdom which is missing in Porter". (Aughey 1997a, 130)

9.3   ...and refusing to rethink through Schmitt

As Norman Porter turned to Habermas in search for a new political culture for unionism in his highly positivist work, Arthur Aughey takes a different turn as his article "A State of Exception: The Concept of the Political in Northern Ireland" (1997) which offers a very different reading of the peace process, peace negotiations and of what to do with unionism. It is fitting that whereas Porter believes in pluralism which downplays the sovereignty of the political entity, Aughey sees Northern Ireland through Carl Schmitt for whom the strong sovereign was essential in politics. Indeed Schmitt can be taken as a straightforward critique of the type of pluralism that Porter is building on (Schmitt 1963, 41-45). Although Aughey does not refer to Porter in his article it is my opinion that it is not farfetched to suggest that Aughey wants to offer a different and, for him, a more realistic view of politics in Northern Ireland. It might seem surprising that Aughey, as someone who has built the essence of the unionist argument on the grounds that unionism represents the ideals and virtues of the British liberalism, and who does not dispute those virtues, should pick and use a theorist who is known as a fierce critic of liberalism. Schmitt's militant Catholicism does not surface in any point that Aughey is putting Schmitt in use. This goes to show the eclectic character of academic unionists as well proves the point made by comedian Julius Henry "Groucho" Marx that "Politics doesn't make strange bedfellows – marriage does." In politics divisions can in the end be overcome quite painlessly and in politics to a great extent everything that is not explicitly shut out can be put to use.

Aughey argues, following Norman Jacobson (Jacobson 1986), and also reframing Skinner perhaps[82], that the political context in which each political

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philosophes include Denis Diderot, Montesquieu, Voltaire and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

[81]   For a deeper discussion on *Unionism in Modern* Ireland see 6.4 Shining the shield of unionism

[82]   "I take it that *political* life itself sets the main problems for the political theorist, causing a certain range of issues to appear problematic, and a corresponding range of questions to become the leading subjects of debate" (Skinner 1978, xi)

commentator is living influences the way in which that commentator views different political theorists. In Jacobson's example when one lives in a fearful state, one turns to Hobbes. Aughey asks which political theorist could give us advice on the matter of how to view the politics in Northern Ireland. For Aughey the answer is not Habermas but Schmitt, towards whom he turns to understand why the political peace process has returned political failures, and why the idea of the parity of esteem has been used mainly to prevent and block the political adversary, thus turning the whole idea upside down. (Aughey 1997b, 2)

Although Aughey does not make the comparison to Habermas, it is easily read from his interpretation of Schmitt, as Aughey stresses the point that for Schmitt the division line between the friend and the enemy constituting the political is definitive. Through this dichotomy Aughey lays out his criticism of the peace process. For Aughey the conceptualization of friend and enemy, and more precisely the way in which Aughey reads it, is the key to understand the political reality of the mid 1990's Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, Aughey does not make the necessary differentiations between *inimicus* and *hostis* as private and public enemy. When speaking of the division constituting the political Schmitt is speaking of the public enemy, *hostis*. "Feind ist *hostis*, nicht *inimicus*" (Schmitt 1963, 29). Therefore: "Privatmann hat keine Politischen Feinde" (Schmitt 1963, 52), but a political community cannot exist without determining the distinction of friend and enemy. The public enemy, *hostis*, exists when a fighting community of people (*kämpfende Gesammtheit von Menschen*) confronts a similar community (Schmitt 1963, 28-29). A community which ceases to make this distinction ceases to exist politically. If the community permits the distinction upon the friend and the enemy to be taken by another, it is no longer a community of free people, but is absorbed into another political system. As Aughey does not make the distinction between *inimicus* and *hostis* or the enemy or the advesary, I surmise that Aughey uses liberalising Schmitt reading of Chantal Mouffe, although he does not refer to it.

Aughey argues that, the relations between the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland are those of a friend and the enemy. All political action and every political utterance therefore are from these premises. Northern Ireland, for Aughey, is a place in a state of exception, in which mere openness and discussion simply are not enough, like they would be in a settled polity. In essence, Aughey claims that in the political situation of Northern Ireland the two competing factions are in such a ferocious conflict, that a sovereign ruling over the whole of the polity just is not achievable. Aughey also dwells on the criticism Schmitt set forth upon in *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (Schmitt 1985 [1923], 49) as Aughey argues that perhaps openness and discussion alone are not sufficient to overcome the beasts of naked power in Northern Ireland (Aughey 1997b, 5 see also Aughey 1998, 123-124), or indeed openness and discussion are impossible in the sense that according to Schmitt the ideals of parliamentary debate required. Through this Aughey draws a line

between the Northern Ireland parties negotiating the forthcoming Belfast Agreement and the Weimar Republic.

The use of Schmitt is interesting, as in the case of applying the thesis of *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* Aughey joins a longer trend of unionist argument. The context of *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* was the Weimar republic and Schmitt constructed his criticism mainly on the argument that the parliament had lost its nature as a place of free, open debate and deliberation, and had become a place where different factions were making politics in a way which was the antithesis of the ideals of parliamentarism. The ratio of the parliament had been in the process of confrontation of differences and opinions, from which the "real political" had resulted (Schmitt 1985, 34-35). Schmitt, however, pointed out that the realities of parliamentarism had drifted far away from ideal of the parliament being the forum of reason found in public discussion. Schmitt particularly criticizes the fact that political decisions have escaped from the parliament to a smaller and smaller committees, which do not share the same attributes of openness with checks and balances as the parliament as an institution of political decision making did. Real power had been transferred from parliament to the party coalitions, committees and capitalist interests, thus betraying the principles that parliamentarism had originally stood for. (Schmitt 1985, 49-50) As a parenthesis, Schmitt's interpretation of parliamentarism as a truth seeking debate is clearly unhistorical and fails to acknowledge the rhetorical dimension with *pro et contra* of the parliament. The same critique could be extended to Habermas also.

The unionist critique of, or more accurately through, parliamentarism has been interesting, although it does not really have much in common with Schmitt. They both share the idea that in the ideal parliament openness, free speech and deliberation are essential. However, again, the unionist defence of parliamentarism seems to be, more than anything, an instrument to combat against the ever looming power sharing[83]. The central point of the unionist critique has been that in a forced power sharing coalition a true deliberation could not take place, as normal parliamentarism would be prevented through the absence of any formal opposition, for instance. However, Aughey broadens, through Schmitt, the "factory of grievances[84]" metaphor from the Stormont parliament into the body politics of Northern Ireland as he sees in it the same kind of failure that faced the parliament in the Weimar Republic.

Aughey argues that the political peace process can be read in at least three different positive ways. The first reading, or interpretation, is that the ongoing talks should or could be about persuading people to accept the most rational and logical outcome, somewhat analogously with the functions of an ideal

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[83]   As an example of this look the The DUP's pamphlet *Ulster. The Future Assured* (1984) which virtual*y* builds the whole case against power sharing on the notion that power sharing would violate normal parliamentarism.

[84]   "Factory of grievances" is an often used metaphor of the Stormont parliament, as it being the *originator* of problems, instead of working as a place to resolve them. In Patrick Buckland's book (1979), titled likewise, it referred especially to the era of 1921-1939.

parliament. This reading, Aughey argues, is naïve and completely misses the nature of the world of politics. The second reading argues that the talks can be understood as talks to prevent something more sinister from happening. In this reading talking is an end in itself. The third reading believes that the parties negotiating have acknowledged the impossibility of winning and are in a process of negotiating with alliance building, conceding in some aspects to gain it in others. However, Aughey still offers a fourth, and a more pessimistic, although for him the most realistic, reading, which assumes that the talks are "about winning and losing, about victory and surrender, about mastery and humiliation". In this reading the essence of Northern Ireland politics follows the friend /enemy dichotomy, as the unionists and nationalists are depicted as real enemies, which can with their inability to discuss, only manoeuvre. This includes the acceptance of the fact that the other side cannot be persuaded to join oneself, referring to Schmitt's idea that by joining one's adversary one extinguishes one's political existence, meaning that a complete end for disagreement between nationalists and unionists would abolish at least one of them. This is quite similar to the way in which Aughey argued in his review of Porter's *Rethinking Unionism* in that Porter was unrealistically calling for a style of politics where unionists and nationalists would no longer be unionists or nationalists (Aughey 1997a, 129). For Aughey even the fourth reading, is not quite accurate enough to describe what is going on, but is however, the only one that seems to have something to do with the political reality. (Aughey 1997b, 8)

The picture that Aughey paints of the Northern Ireland politics is very pessimistic. For him there is a struggle which will determine who will be the master and who will be the slave. The examples of this reading come from Drumcree (which worked as an incentive for Aughey's article), where the Orange Order marchers were left to defend their, argued, right to march through a Catholic neighbourhood at a time when the British government turned its back on them. Aughey argues this showed a sign of weakness. For Aughey the Orange march is an indication of the Scmittian struggle for survival that is going on in Northern Ireland. Only the weak will perish, or join their former enemy. In this scheme, according to Aughey, the Orangemen's actions showed that they are not weak; that they are not willing to give up their rights and join Catholic Ireland. Because of this, they seem to be the true defenders of unionism and its ideals. It would seem that for Aughey only the Orangemen have realised the essence of Schmitt: "Es ware tölpelhaft zu glauben, ein wehrloses Volk habe nur noch Freunde, und ein krapulose Berechnung, der Feind könnte vielleicht durch Widerstandlosigkeit gerührt warden" (Schmitt 1963, 53)[85]. This is a sign of a major change for Aughey who had previously insisted on the demolishing consequences of the culturally oriented unionist defence. Aughey's pessimism comes from the belief that there cannot be a

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[85] "It would be ludicrous to believe that a defenceless people has nothing but friends, and it would be deranged calculation to suppose that the enemy could perhaps be touched by the absence of a resistance" (Schmitt 1976, 53)

natural political unity in Ireland, as neither the nationalists or unionists are willing to surrender their central demands, and therefore the prospects for a negotiated long term solution are limited (Aughey 1997b, 19). The division line between the friend and the enemy in Northern Ireland is so stark that a unitary polity would require the total surrender of either of the communities. In another publication in the same year, Aughey (Aughey 1997c) describes the profoundness of the political division more straightforwardly, also making clear the hopelessness of a solution, which would not take into consideration this division. (Aughey 1997b, 9)

> Unionist mentality – 'not an inch', 'what we have hold', 'no surrender'. In the nature of things in Irish politics this is not an irrational position to hold. It is *only* one part and not the whole of political immobilism. The Unionist 'no first step because it is a step towards a united Ireland' corresponds to the Nationalist 'no first step unless it is a step towards a united Ireland'. Both are mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing dogmas. (Aughey 1997b, 18)

> For Ulster Unionists today, whatever may have been the case in the past, there is no *natural* political unity in Ireland. There are held to be two states or two nations or two peoples on the island of Ireland. (ibid, 19)

Aughey goes to the application of the social contract theory when he points out that the basic conundrum in Northern Ireland is that there seems to be no desire for political contract between the unionists and nationalists. There is little value for talks, if the parties talking do not wish to accomplish such a contract, or it is impossible for them to do so, based on the fact that some principles just might prove to be those that cannot be compromised on. In this argument Aughey follows Miller, whom he criticized in *Under Siege.* Miller concluded that the difficulty for unionists to reach an agreement with the nationalists is in their incapability to see nationalists as members of their social contract band (Miller 1978). Aughey argues that the negotiations might indeed have the tendency to worsen the Northern Ireland conflict, as they would, and seemed, with their dynamics to sharpen the division of Northern Ireland into nationalists and unionists. (Aughey 1997b, 9-10)

In his conclusion Aughey presents an interesting point, in terms of the conceptual battle of the peace process as manifested in the parity of esteem debate. Aughey follows Rorty (Rorty 1990, 9) in describing Northern Ireland as being in a transitional situation where the old vocabulary for politics has become a nuisance, but a new vocabulary is yet only half-formed.

> Much of the vocabulary of traditional nationalism and traditional unionism has become a nuisance. The political challenge is to transform the vaguely *promising* new vocabulary of, for instance the Downing Street Declaration into a viable political grammar. (Aughey 1997b, 11)

And Aughey again turns to Schmitt:

> For Schmitt 'all political concepts, images, and terms have a polemical *meaning*…A word or expression can simultaneously be reflex, signal, password, and weapon in hostile confrontation' (1976, p. 31). The 'peace process' is a good example. Put very

> simply, in terms appropriate to the Northern Ireland case, it is the fear which unionists have of being redefined and redescribed in terms conductive to nationalism; and it is the fear which nationalists have of being confined in terms conductive to unionism. Those fears remain unresolved. (Aughey 1997b, 11)

This is of course repeats the argument academic unionists had been making through the 1990's and indeed earlier: the language of the "peace process" with its concepts such as the "parity of esteem", are cemented to the friend/enemy dichotomy of Northern Ireland and are not in any sense impartial or analytical, claims Aughey. In this sense Aughey is eloquently using Schmitt trying to unmask the vocabulary of Northern Ireland politics to re-politicize it. In relation to the intellectual war, which followed the shooting war, depolitization was even more evident than when Aughey first made this diagnosis. (Aughey 1995c, 12). This war was to be fought with concepts rather than with explosives, and in this war, it seems, Aughey wanted the intellectuals to be able to supply propositions that could be fairly weighed by the politicians.

The biggest similarity, therefore, with Aughey and Porter is that they both agree to the importance of concepts and ideas building the agenda of the Northern Ireland peace process, and also that they both see the possibility of politicking through the contestation of these concepts. However, their concept of the political is in stark contrast. While Porter is almost non-political with his trust that the solution will be found by pure reason through Habermasian discourse ethics, Aughey is attached to a completely different notion of politics. Where Porter's ideal of Northern Ireland would almost mean the absence of politics, Aughey does not see it possible that the political would evaporate without perhaps the annihilation of either the unionists or nationalists. On the other hand, one can also interpret Porter's attempt to unsettle the unionist/nationalist division as an act of repoliticization through depoliticization, thus making able to see the situation beyond ready set antagonisms.

An interesting critique of Aughey is offered by Alan Finlayson, who argues that although Aughey touches an interesting point by offering some theoretical explanation models from the field of political theory, and especially Carl Schmitt he fails to follow Schmitt's logic to the end. Finlayson, up to a point, recognizes that what Aughey is doing is an act of politics, not only a piece of scholarly work: "This might just be the voice of Cadogan seeking to have it both ways" (Finlayson 1998, 117). However, Finlayson does not discuss Aughey's article as a speech act designed to have an impact in the ongoing peace negotiations, although the political context explains Aughey's own introductory words by describing a scholar of political theory being influenced by the politics of the context in which he is living in. Finlayson argues that Aughey oversimplifies things, when he dichotomizes the Northern Ireland politics in the unionist/nationalist division. For Finlayson the answer is different. The Northern Ireland polity does not require construction, but deconstruction. Both Irish nationalism and unionism must be deconstructed and stripped of their irrational and harmful aspects. Unfortunately, with the triumph of doctrines like the parity of esteem, this does not seem likely to

happen. Therefore, instead of cementing and institutionalizing everything that is wrong in Northern Ireland politics through parity of esteem between unionism and nationalism, they should face parity of contempt and deconstruction, which would offer a much better chance of creating something novel. Finlayson demands that:

> "We need actively to seek out and uncover that which is, or has been, excluded by the concentration on the sectarian monolith and show that its domination is not inevitable but the result of political processes that establish it as hegemonic and as the horizon of intelligible political activity" (Finlayson 1998, 121-122).

In his reply to Finlayson, Aughey asks who is "we", and why can it not make itself heard. Aughey remains sceptical towards deconstruction as presented by Finlayson and of a radical pluralism that Porter advocates. Unionism and nationalism, for Aughey, seem to be part of the political reality that cannot be completely transcended (Aughey 1998, 125). (Finlayson 1998, 120-122)

9.4   Academic unionist commentary on the peace talks

The Cadogan Group was pessimistic regarding what was expected from the negotiation process. In its 1996 pamphlet *Square Circles* (SC) the Group seeks an explanation for the "inevitable failure of the talks". In addition they question, whether the round table approach for the negotiations is appropriate for the situation in Northern Ireland, and also suggest what should happen after the inevitable collapse of the negotiations. Again, the Group is positioning themselves as outside observers, detached scholars, not politicians. They are not part of the negotiation process, or even in the politics of Northern Ireland, but can still contribute objective and impartial judgement on the course of politics and the motives of different political agents. This said, SC is the most partisan of the Cadogan Group's pamphlets. If we compare its rhetoric to their first publication *Northern Limits* in 1992 there is a big difference in tone. While, *Northern Limits* tried to appear as an even handed analysis, at least in the sense that it gave some culpability to the unionists as well, *Square Circles* is built on the criticism of nationalist arguments and it makes a point of showing that the British government has too easily given in to the extortion of the republican paramilitaries. (Cadogan Group 1996b)

The Cadogan Group argues that the failure in the up-coming talks is inevitable because the bi-lateral intergovernmental approach applied to Northern Ireland, had been unable to solve the problem of antagonism between the two dominant political traditions in Northern Ireland. Instead, the logic of the problem framing has emphasized the dichotomy between unionism and nationalism as two contradictory political beliefs. This has reduced the possibility of a dialogue between those two beliefs in Northern Ireland. The politics of the round table have become the politics of reciprocal blaming, which

for an outside observer, give the message that what is going on is childish behaviour of opposing factions. What is completely missing from the equation is any reference to the fundamental questions lying at the core of the conflict. These fundament questions are those that the Cadogan Group wishes to bring back to the negotiations table. The two governments have been failing in a search for a settlement that would not result in loss for either of the two conflicting traditions. This is not possible, as the fundamental question underlining the Northern Ireland problem is a question of whether the area is a part of the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland. For this question there cannot be an answer that would make both sides winners. On the fundamental level the pamphlet is very close to being an application of Aughey's Schmitt article (Aughey 1997b) to the politics of the peace process. (Cadogan Group 1996b, 6-7)

The Group use the concept of the parity of esteem as an example of the faulty logic of the peace process. If this concept were expanded to apprehend the two conflicting political traditions concerning the constitutional nature of the state, this would mean that the claim to overturn the Northern Ireland state would be given equal merit to the claim to preserve it. This is contested by the Group, which argues that it is not meaningful to talk of the nationalist community in Northern Ireland having a right for self-determination. Only *people* could have that right and since 1920 there had been a single unit qualified to that right: the people of Northern Ireland. This is nevertheless not accepted by the nationalists, who have as their strategy to continuously push beyond the established boundaries of Northern Ireland and are confronted by unionists pushing these boundaries back. The practical test for the different interpretations had been the Drumcree parade in which rights on different levels had clashed. The conclusion for this kind of open ended parity of esteem could only be the dismantling of the Northern Ireland state (Cadogan Group 1996b, 28). (Cadogan Group 1996b, 22-24)

The Group also argues that blurring the fundamentals of the Northern Ireland question explains why analogies, which do not stand closer scrutiny, are been drawn between Northern Ireland and South Africa or Palestine. In these conflicts there existed a solution that neither part in the negotiations process accepted. In South Africa it was inevitable that the white minority government should give up their power in favour of the massive majority. In Palestine it was accepted by Israel that some form of autonomous home land should be given to the Palestine people. In Northern Ireland the nationalist claim for unification does not share the approval of the majority of the population, nor does it have any kind of universally valid moral backing. Furthermore, it is not the same thing as the call for the full civil rights for the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. No single solution is available in Northern Ireland, only two contradictory solutions remain from which one must be chosen. (Cadogan Group 1996b, 14-16)

It is the view of the Cadogan Group that the British government has also failed to grasp the essence of the Northern Ireland situation, while it has lapsed

from its traditional line of strengthening the constitutional strand of Irish nationalism, to sidelining the more militant republican tradition. However, the current UK government policy in which Sinn Féin is been feted in hope for the closure to political violence in Northern Ireland, has changed the dynamics of the peace process from a previous search for accommodating traditional nationalism and unionism to the negotiation between militant republicanism and the British state to the terms of the cease fire. The republican movement has therefore succeeded in taking the search for settlement hostage. (Cadogan Group 1996b, 17-18)

For Cadogan Group, the way that the British government had announced having no selfish strategic interest in Northern Ireland was not only offensive, but also undermined the boundaries of the United Kingdom. The constitutional status of Northern Ireland had been put on the negotiation table by the British government, a set back from the Brooke-Mayhew Talks, which succeeded in asserting the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and managed to gain the endorsement of the Republic to the Union in the Downing Street Declaration and in the Frameworks Documents. The Group fears, that this sloppy strategy of the British government could lead to the eventual mismanagement of the consent principle. (Cadogan Group 1996b, 33-34)

To sum up, the inter-governmental negotiation strategy has lead to the situation where the different and mutually exclusive political beliefs of nationalism and unionism have been strengthened and reinforced. Instead of seeking a solution, which would provide the Irish identity forms of non-political self-expression within the constitutional limits of Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom, the process of widening the scope of parity of esteem to provide encouragement for the equal representation for the political self-determination of Irishness has widened the gap between unionism and nationalism. This has been done by fomenting the passions of Irish nationalism. (Cadogan Group 1996b, 35-38)

From these premises, any negotiations would only succeed in limiting the scope to bargaining constitutional change against promises of cessation of political violence. To alter the premises, an urgent return to the key principles is needed. For the Cadogan Group these are returning to the consent principle and arguing that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland should be cemented to remain within the UK. The Irish identity could be fully expressed within the scope of Ireland as an island on geographic, not political terms. (Cadogan Group 1996b, 41-42)

The conflict in Northern Ireland is essentially created by two different discursive structures that make the political problem (Finlayson 1997, 74). Therefore, for every political dilemma in Northern Ireland there exist two different premises, explanations and solutions. It is the contestation between these discourses that form the essence of politics. The strategy of the Cadogan Group is to use their expert position in legitimising their discourse as the more believable discourse and thus they hope to be given the advantage to name the key questions with the answers and propositions to it. It is the one who can set

the questions can dictate the answers. In this light the works of the Cadogan Group are speech acts designed to manifest the unionist discourse on the expense of the nationalist discourse.

In the background of Square Circles is the unionist stand, largely adopted by the unionist middle classes and the upper echelons of the professionals that both the Molyneaux line of minimalist integration, and the more ambitious electoral integration with the United Kingdom, would be preferred solutions as opposed to the devolution and power sharing. This is why the Cadogan Group is clinging in the refusal of political Irishness and is insisting that Irishness can be tolerated only in its non-political form as a notion of an Irishness of a place. The integrationist policy stemming from the Equal Citizenship Campaign remains visible in the policy documents of the Cadogan Group. But this time it makes the manifestation of the unionist intellectuals look rather conservative, since the political process had already turned inevitably towards devolution.

The dangers of the political aspects of Irishess, particularly those of Irish nationalism, were the big theme for the rhetoric of the unionist intellectuals approaching the Belfast Agreement. One interesting example of this rhetoric is still worth looking at, since it is a speech act in combining concepts taken from the field of political science attached to the political questions of the peace process. The text in hand is Arthur Aughey's article *Fukuyama and the Irish Question* (Aughey 1998) which puts together ideas taken from Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) and elaborates his use of the *thymos* concept to Northern Ireland and the perils of Irish nationalism. Aughey's text is directly related to the ongoing peace talks, as he uses Fukuyama to suggest the kind of resolution that should be found in the talks. Fukuyama himself is a known as a harbinger of the 1990's neoconservatism in the U.S. and has been the "official" commentator affiliated with the Republican Party in the U.S. Fukuyama received his Ph.D. from Harvard where he studied under the supervision of Samuel Huntington.

Thymos, is a concept originating from Plato and meaning spiritedness, a desire for recognition. Aughey argues that in the centre of the Northern Ireland conflict are the two aspects of *thymos*: *isothymia*, which is a desire of one's equality; and *megalothymia*, which is a desire for recognition of one's superiority. Aughey does not explicate the way in which the unionists or nationalists manifest their *megalothymotic* nature. Since the unionists do not constitute a nation, Aughey questions whether the *megalothymia* of nationalism is the desire for recognition of the superiority of the Irish race, and if the *megalothymia* of unionism is the desire for the superiority of the unionist character. This is never stated but at least this implication that can be read in the text. In every case, the purpose of the peace negotiations is to transfer both manifestations of *megalothymia* into common recognition of *isothymia*, in the language of the peace process, through the concept of *parity of esteem.* This is the task of the negotiation teams and the two governments, whose position Aughey sees as "privileged", since they are not wholly implicated in the passions of

Northern Ireland, and are in the position to resist the destructive claim of simple unionism and simple nationalism (in their *megalothymotic* forms).

According to Aughey, the talks themselves are about reckoning the impossibility of winning. Since this is, again, not explicated we are not able to say what is the "impossible" winning situation for each of the parties involved. We can make the assumption that for Irish nationalism the impossible winning situation would be a united Ireland. But what is the impossible winning situation for unionism, full integration? By not stating the premises of his logic, Aughey constructs a quasi-logical argument, in which discarding the nationalist claim is made to appear fair, or inevitable, while the unionist claim is not losing any substantial, or constitutional grounds. The act of the union still remains. (Aughey 1998; Fukuyama 1992)

The end product from these premises, the metamorphosis of two *megalothymias* into two jointly accepted *isothymias* is found when both of the parties accept a distinction to be made between symbol and substance, and agreement is reached on these grounds in such a way that both parties are ready to accept a certain amount of distasteful symbolism in order to secure the substantial gains they need. In practice: unionists would be willing to accept the symbolism of cross-border co-operation, if they are able to secure the substance of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom; while Nationalists would have to agree to the symbolism of Northern Ireland in order to secure the substance of parity of esteem for their own tradition. For Aughey, this would mean an 'end of history' in that it would end the pattern of mutual denial in Northern Ireland and would be, quoting Fukuyama, "a supremely rational act". This would also open the non-political element of Northern Ireland politics, which has led both sides involved to search something, which they have simultaneously believed the other side to be incapable of giving.

There is nevertheless nothing non-political in Aughey's article. What Aughey does is to separate the wish for a political recognition from the wish for cultural recognition and then he grants unionists the political recognition they are asking for, while the Irish nationalists and republicans are given their cultural recognition even though the political aspect of recognition is denied. In short the solution Aughey presents does not constitute a situation where the *megalothymotic* elements of both unionism and nationalism would be satisfied, but instead a situation where the unionist wish for the constitutional status quo would gain recognition at the expense of the nationalist wish for a political recognition being forced to become merely recognition of cultural. In Aughey's rhetoric, the logic seems to make sense. By giving something, both of the parties stand to win considerable gains. But the political aspect of the text lies in the definition of the core substances of unionist or nationalist politics. By defining these substances on different grounds, Aughey is able to sustain the quasi-logic of the argument, while at the same time replacing the nationalist aspiration for political recognition with the more acknowledgeable cultural recognition.

9.5 The Belfast Agreement

The change from John Major to Tony Blair as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was not a setback for the unionists, although they had historically been more inclined towards the Tories. Blair started with a policy of radical constitutional reform, with devolution proposals for Scotland and Wales. This was a step away from the politics of John Major, as Blair was moving towards a union of different regions, in essence, from a Tory 'unitary state' towards a Labour 'union state' (Walker 2004, 256). The new emphasis on diversity suited the UUP, and David Trimble announced in the House of Commons that "the government's commitment to decentralisation and openness creates opportunities for us". The unionist parties were therefore drifting further away from their integrationist stance, since everything seemed to point towards political settlement, which would include devolution on a power-sharing basis. Trimble was more successful than the prior UUP chairmen in influencing the direction that the UK Prime Minister was directing the peace process. It was largely Trimble's accomplishment that the idea of east-west institutions in the form of the British Isles council was to be introduced to the negotiation table. This was an idea Trimble had supported since his Vanguard times in the 1970's and in the context of the 1990's it worked to give an institutional aspect to the unionist standpoint that the British Isles constituted a single political and economical entity. It also tapped into the post-nationalist, federalist climate of the latter part of the 1990's. (Walker 2004, 255-256)

As the Blair government announced that a renewed ceasefire would allow Sinn Féin to re-enter the negotiation process, the framework of the future settlement was beginning to take shape. It seemed obvious that the consent principle, cherished by the unionists and criticized especially by the republicans as a unionist veto, would hold in the new agreement because the British government and the unionist parties were not willing to compromise on it. The unionists would gain a return of devolution, which would end the interference of the Irish government through the institutional framework of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The cost of these gains would be the Irish dimension in a North-South ministerial council, and the admittance of the republicans in any power sharing administration. (Bew, Gibbon, Patterson 2002, 231-232; Patterson 2007, 334)

It is important to notice, that a break in the republican ceasefire did not necessarily indicate that Sinn Féin or the IRA would be drifting further away from the peace process. In fact, it might be argued that the huge bombs in London or Manchester were put in place in order to build a green façade to disguise the serious republican rethinking that went on behind the scenes. It was becoming clear that the republican movement would have to accept the partitionist nature of the coming agreement, as Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Féin, was only able to pursue a renegotiated union rather than no union at all. The principle of the unionist consent, or unionist veto, had penetrated through

every document published by the British and Irish governments since the start of the 1990's and the tide was not about to turn. Because of this, the unionist side of the peace process did not have to feel alert, although the U.S. Senator George Mitchell showed a considerable lenience towards the IRA. At least some of the unionist negotiators, such as David Trimble, understood this, while others, such as Jeffrey Donaldson, remained adamant on the issue of prior decommissioning before setting up the power sharing institutions. Still, in order to re-enter the negotiations Sinn Féin had to agree to the "Mitchell principles", which stated that the republican movement would have to give up any non-peaceful means of striving for its goals. As the republican movement agreed to this, in the form of a new ceasefire and the more hard line unionist parties the DUP and the UKUP were taken out of the process by their leaders Ian Paisley and Robert McCartney, the road was open for an agreement (Mitchell 1999, 110).

The Belfast Agreement reached during the Easter of 1998 was not a bad deal for unionism if we judge it by the blueprint. The Agreement had a similar structure to the prior declarations, which had formed a path towards the final closing of the deal between the unionist and nationalist parties. Strand One of the Belfast Agreement dealt with the matters inside Northern Ireland, indicating the shape of the power sharing institutions. Neither the nationalists, who wished for a stronger cabinet type executive or the unionists, who wished for a more administrational committee type of devolution got exactly what they wanted. The power sharing executive was to be allocated on D´Hondt basis with a "First Minister" coming from the biggest community and his Deputy First Minister from the its counterpart. This forced democracy or applied consociationalism was later to evoke some criticism from the field of social science scholars.

Strand Two was given special attention by the UUP negotiation team during the final days of the negotiation process, and subsequently the Irish aspect of the Belfast Agreement was relatively small, like the unionists had hoped. The North-South ministerial council was not made as a free-standing body, as had been the hope of the republicans. On the contrary, only marginal matters which were of residual political importance were put under joint administration. These included tourism, animal and plant help. SDLP's Seamus Mallon described the Belfast Agreement as "Sunningdale for slow learners". One could truly reply that this was the case also in terms of its North-South aspect not being far from "necessary nonsense" as the unionist Premier Brian Faulkner had described the corresponding parts of the Sunningdale deal in 1974. While the unionists took a symbolic defeat when they agreed to joint institutions, yet in retrospect this was a small price to pay for the recognition of the Northern Ireland state, which the Republic was now forced to give, and also to take out the paragraphs two and three of its constitution. Overall, it can be argued, that the Belfast Agreement delivered much for the UUP, who could call it a triumph after the constitutional position of Northern Ireland was recognised by both the Republic and the nationalist and republican parties of Northern

Ireland (Tonge 2006, 70). Even the moderate nationalists (SDLP) had no reason to be disappointed, since the three stranded approach of the Agreement mirrored the SDLP position in the talks.

The ambivalence of the unionist popular stand on the Belfast Agreement was obvious already before the referendum on the Agreement, which was going to take place simultaneously in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. The southern Irish vote was predictable, as the constituency in the Republic had distanced itself from the passions of the constitutional matters concerning its northern neighbour. Other than in the most hard core republican circles, it was no longer believed that the existence of a separate Northern Ireland was preventing the fulfilment of the sovereignty of the Irish nation[86]. Irish nationalism, also with its northern strand, had matured, as there could be no doubt that the Belfast Agreement was indeed partitionist, even much more so than the original Northern Ireland act dating to 1920. The issue, however, was going to be how the unionist constituency would receive the Agreement, since it did include elements of north-south co-operation, as well as permitting institutionalized and political representation to Irish nationalism and republicanism, forces that traditionally sought to end the existence of the Northern Ireland state.

Earlier the Cadogan Group had argued that the peace process had been hijacked by the hegemony of the nationalist discourse, and the concepts of the peace process were those of the nationalist choosing. The Group had put forward its thesis of creating stability through recognition of the existing borders of Northern Ireland and developing a society based on pluralism and multi-culturalism. Nevertheless, the pluralism that the Group advocated was pluralism which was strongly apolitical. Only pluralism of different cultures was encouraged, but pluralism of multiple political choices was ruled out. The Irish identity was not to have a political aspect, which would be a granted right for political and constitutional aspiration. This was also the point of departure of the Group in relation to the Belfast Agreement. During the 1990's, the Cadogan Group had evolved from a group that might at first have had a role as a fresh discussant in something its critics called as the bastion of conservativism. Things were turning out opposite from the desire of the academic unionists claiming that the intervention of the middle class unionists would invest unionism with a liberal inflection, as e.g. Coulter claimed (Coulter 1997, 135). True, the position of the Cadogan Group was not very open-minded, if we compare its philosophical ethos to writers such as Norman Porter. The arguments of the Cadogan Group were still based on reading unionism and Northern Ireland through the thinking that Aughey had offered already in

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[86]   Obviously those sharing this determination did exist, which was shown in the split of the IRA in November 1997 after Gerry Adams' supporters tried to gain control in the matter of weapons *decommissioning* related to the Belfast Agreement process. Out of the split emerged the hard core Real IRA with the 32 County Sovereignty Committee with its political wing. This new organisation was not left empty, since it had some influential, at least in moral sense, supporters, such as Bernadette Sands-McKevitt, the sister of late Bobby Sands. (Patterson 2007, 337)

1989. This ambivalence can be seen in the response the Cadogan Group gave to the Belfast Agreement, as the Group's pamphlet *Rough Trade*, published just prior to the 1998 referendum took two different positions on the Agreement: for and against. The easy, and correct, way to interpret this is that the unionist constituency, which the Group had started to mirror, did not find one voice to answer the question if the Belfast Agreement was something that unionism should accept. Nevertheless, the position of the Group's argumentation was as always; based on intellect, not emotion. But this time the intellect could have two equally justified positions.

From the point of view that the unionist electorate should vote for the Agreement the Cadogan Group raised the point that the Agreement seemed to cement the principle of consent on possible future change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. The Cadogan members who supported the deal believed that the all-Ireland institutions and the North-South co-operation were largely symbolic, for good and bad, but altogether no more than "necessary nonsense" to appease the nationalist counterpart in the negotiations. This point was probably most heavily supported by Professor of politics Paul Bew, who also worked as an informal advisor to David Trimble. Bew argued that "The unionists have won, they just don't know it" (Bew, 1998). It was phrased in straightforward language that the alternative for unionism, which Ian Paisley or Robert McCartney were offering, was impossible. Unionists had wanted a more stripped down Assembly, in which the aspect of the political was reduced to a minimum. The unionist wish had been a more administrative type of assembly. Nevertheless, the pro-Agreement part of the unionist camp did not want to make a too big of an issue out of that. Furthermore, the unionists did not seem to share too much confidence in the prospect of seeing Tony Blair as a vigorous protector of the Union, but with the consent principle explicitly spelled out in the Agreement, there were fewer fears about the ambivalence of the British government (Cadogan Group 1998, 10-15).

However, from the anti-Agreement point of view, the matters that were readily passed by the yes camp, were raised to the status of deal-breakers. The most profound difficulty was with the concept of *parity of esteem*. If the concept was given the wide interpretation it seemed to have in the Agreement, it meant that Irish nationalism as a political aspiration would have an institutionalized role in the polity it had always sworn to destroy. This was unacceptable for unionists who considered the violation of the Northern Ireland state unacceptable, even on this level of principle. Therefore the conclusion of the anti-Agreement strata of the Cadogan's was that the Agreement, by accepting the claim of Irish nationalism to have a right for political self impression, was locking Northern Ireland as a polity into fantasies and mythologies of that nationalism (Cadogan Group 1998, 21).

The problem for unionists who were sceptical towards the Agreement was profoundly this: were there enough guarantees, that if the unionist constituency signs the Agreement and even agrees to the fact that Irish nationalism has a role to play in the politics in Northern Ireland, will the nationalists agree on their

part to honour the status of Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom, or will they merely take the Agreement as a new position from which to carry on the aspiration for united Ireland? In addition, heavy criticism was laid out towards the structure of the Assembly and the executive, as it was thought unlikely that these forced structures would produce a stable government. (Cadogan Group 1998)

The Cadogan Group pamphlet *Rough Trade* is challenging. On one hand it implies a belief that the Agreement could deliver stability and that the acceptance of the principle of consent, which was nevertheless explicitly delivered by the Agreement, was enough to secure the Union. On the other hand it evokes disbelief: that the structures of the Agreement are plausible; that the nationalists are not going to settle on the confirmed constitutional status of Northern Ireland; and that the unionists are once again left alone. The strongest incentive for accepting the Agreement seems to be the lack of any other and better choices. The duality of the Cadogan Group therefore mirrors the unionist constituency. It is even more interesting to reflect on the unclear stance of the Cadogan Group when taking into account the massive pro-Agreement campaign that was going on around Northern Ireland, with singer and song-writer Bono (Paul David Hewson) from the Irish rock music group U2 joining David Trimble and John Hume on stage in Belfast to appeal for peace and for the Agreement. In this context the final political intervention of the Cadogan Group was crippled before the signing of the Belfast Agreement. (Cadogan Group 1998)

The referendum in Northern Ireland upon the agreement in the spring of 1998 recorded a 71 percent 'yes' vote, with a majority in constituencies, unionist and nationalist[87]. Nevertheless, the ambivalence of the unionist electorate, clearly reflected in the dualistic pamphlet of the Cadogan Group, was visible in the Assembly elections a month later. The UUP score of 21.3 per cent of the first preference vote was its worst result ever in an STV election. This meant that the DUP was right on the tail of the UUP with 18 per cent of the vote. And perhaps more strikingly the division of the unionist parties resulted in the nationalist SDLP raising as the biggest party with 22 per cent of the vote, with Sinn Féin at 17.7. The unionist division in the Assembly became fully clear as the new Assembly members registered themselves as unionist, nationalist, or other (for the purposes of the required cross community support, as spelled out in the Belfast agreement). Trimble had a slim majority of 30 pro Agreement unionists with 28 anti Agreement unionists, which implied a rocky path for the new Assembly. (Wilford 2001, 60-61)

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[87]   Simultaneous referendum in the Republic of Ireland with a 56,3 turnout produced a 94,4 percent majority for the Agreement and the subsequent abolition of the articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 *constitution*. The combined yes vote on the island was approximately 83 per cent. (Wilford 2001, 70)

9.6　The Structure of the Agreement

9.6.1 Constitutional matters

It is very difficult, or impossible, to trace the impact of academic unionism on the negotiation process that culminated in the 1998 Belfast Agreement. To do this requires careful consideration of the textual evidence in the Belfast Agreement that could indicate the effect of the academic unionism project, with its self attached labels of liberalism, secularism and progressivism, on the Agreement. As we have seen, these attributes are at least to a certain extent rhetorical, since it can be argued that academic unionism did in fact illustrate great conservativism and its political thought was often far from new or novel. Nevertheless, I will conclude by a reading of the 1998 Belfast Agreement with the purpose of reflecting the objectives of academic unionism with the actual product of the negotiation process. In the negotiations leading to the Agreement Robert McCartney of the UKUP boycotted the negotiations, while a politician sometimes attached to the academic, or "new unionist" movement David Trimble (O'Dowd 1998, 70) was the leader of the largest unionist party the UUP. So, while not active on the party political field, can the objectives of the academic unionists be found fulfilled in the text of the Belfast Agreement? Imperative in this sense is Section Two of the Agreement which defines the constitutional status of Northern Ireland.

> 1. The participants endorse the commitment made by the British and Irish Governments that, in a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the Anglo-Irish Agreement, they will:
>
> (i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland;
>
> (ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland;
>
> (iii) acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and, accordingly, that Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people;
>
> (iv) affirm that if, in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish;
> (v) affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there

shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities;

(vi) recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland.
2. The participants also note that the two Governments have accordingly undertaken in the context of this comprehensive political agreement, to propose and support changes in, respectively, the Constitution of Ireland and in British legislation relating to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. (The Belfast Agreement 1998)

The constitutional section of the Agreement clearly states the territory of Northern Ireland as the natural polity of the people in Northern Ireland and the citizens of that polity as the agents in it. It is the right of the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves, also politically, as British, Irish or both, which in some way blurs the definition of Northern Ireland polity as primary. Most importantly for unionists, academic or not, the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland polity as it stands now is granted in the section iii. Therefore the claimed nationalist argument of the illegitimate and failed political entity of Northern Ireland is not supported in the text of the Agreement. The legitimate wish of the majority of the Northern Ireland polity, stated in the Agreement, is to remain in the United Kingdom. Therefore, although the agreed substantial differences upon the status of the Northern Ireland state, the political aspiration of unionism is given what it wanted. This is the substantial gain unionism needed to secure, in order to prevail. But the wish of the unionists that the aspiration of the political aspect of Irishness, in the form of Irish nationalism, should not be granted its wish for legitimate manifestation is not fulfilled, the Belfast Agreement supports the full aspiration of the political identities of unionism and nationalism. The problem following from this for unionists is that they have to accept the existence of a nationalist anti-Northern Ireland state ethos existing in the polity of Northern Ireland. The problems that are not addressed came from the legitimate manifestation of political ethos seeking the abolition of the same state in which it is functioning.

In constitutional terms the Agreement was a good result for the academic unionist, as it gave unionism the substantial recognition it needed, by cementing the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. Another issue is, whether the parity of esteem for the nationalist and unionist political aspirations, given by the Agreement, is only one of those symbolic concessions unionism was willing to make. If asked from an academic unionist, probably not. A completely different question is whether the form of consociationalism agreed upon in the Agreement is functional? From the perspective of politics as understood by the academic unionists, it is not. The problem is related to the political sovereignty needed for the formation of the polity. In the political philosophy of academic unionism, the sovereignty forming that the polity

requires is the approval of its citizens who have to be attached to it as willing actors inside that polity. The aspiration of the political Irishness invalidates the sovereignty of the polity and creates a situation where politics in its consociationalist form as in any other form, becomes impossible. In fact, the application of consociationalism in Northern Ireland is questionable if viewed from the perspective of consociationalism literature (e.g. Reynolds, 1999). However, politicians, like David Trimble, seemed to believe that a joint polity, in which different aspirations of unionism and nationalism could be sustained together, was possible:

> We can now get down to the historic and honourable task of this generation to raise up a new Northern Ireland in which pluralist unionism and constitutional nationalism can speak to each other with the civility that is the foundation of freedom. (Trimble 1998)

The interlocking characters of the power sharing elements present in the Belfast Agreement were those that had been on the negotiation table since the start of the direct rule and the first attempt to bring back devolution. The Strand One of the Agreement laid out the structure of the power sharing government in Northern Ireland. For the purposes here it is not necessary to go too deeply in to the structure of the agreement or indeed to the functions of the power sharing. But some observations are in place in reflection to the stance and arguments of the academic unionists.

Full legislative and executive authority of devolved matters was to be handed over to the New Northern Ireland Assembly, which was to be elected from the existing Westminster election constituencies. The members of the Assembly were then to designate themselves either, unionist, nationalist, or other. Based on that designation the decisions of the Assembly were to be made on cross community basis i.e. that they would need to have the support of at least 50 per cent of each block. The executive committee was to be formed to reflect the two communities, i.e. the ministerial posts were to be allocated by following the D´Hondt formula, which meant that no actual opposition in the normal sense would be left as all the major parties would have a representation in the executive. The executive was to be led jointly by a First Minister from the largest community (unionist) and a Deputy from the other community (nationalist). So, as far as the demand for normal parliamentarism, or majoritarianism that the academic unionists, essentially Robert McCartney, requested was denied. Robin Wilson states:

> If the nature of the direct rule in Northern Ireland was to leave everyone in opposition, the nature of the Belfast Agreement was to put everyone (all significant parties, at least) into government – a remarkable transition. (Wilson 2001, 73)

The odd choice of applying the D'Hondt method in allocating ministerial posts (which is not used in any other country or government[88]) was a result of the UUP negotiation tactic in the Belfast Agreement negotiations to seek for an administrative devolution in which there would not be a single executive, but several committees, whose heads would be selected by the D'Hondt formula. When this was contrasted and combined with the SDLP's demand for power sharing with a "normal" ministerial executive cabinet the result was finally something like "the camel that emerged from the committee designing a horse" (Wilson 2001, 76). In essence, what the people in Northern Ireland got was a four party involuntary coalition, out of which one party (DUP) was against the whole administration, and did all it could to safeguard it from developing any real cooperation. In addition, against this type of Grand Coalition the voters really did not have any kind of power to oust a politician they did not agree with. In many aspects the political structures coming out of the Belfast Agreement betrayed politics for the sake of administration. An easy answer to this would be that politics was too dangerous to be left running loose, but is it really so? It seems, that the administrative model that the Agreement produced carried with it the seed for stagnating peace process.

When considering the discussion papers of the two unionist parties published in 1984 the difference between the solution they had been seeking and the outcome that was spelled out in the Belfast Agreement is striking. The UUP had seen it virtually impossible to share power with nationalists, who sought the abolition of the Northern Ireland state, while the DUP view was that a government working on a power sharing basis without any normal opposition would simply be undemocratic. Obviously, much had changed in 14 years, but still the amount of constitutional bargaining that the unionists who supported the Agreement were willing to make was surprising. And even the intellectual strata of the unionist community were divided upon the Agreement, as we can see in the *Rough Trade* pamphlet of the Cadogan Group. It is hard to argue against the fact that, if the Belfast Agreement cemented anything it was the division between unionist and nationalist parties by making it institutional. The Belfast Agreement replaces the constitutional arrangements defined in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, as stated in the first paragraph of the Chapter two (constitutional issues) of the Belfast Agreement. This gives us the perspective to reflect upon the intellectual project evoked to develop a new and a more efficient defence for unionism in the period between these two agreements. Still, not much of the intellectual project seems to be visible in the text of the Agreement, and yet it almost seems that the pitfalls that some of the authors of the intellectual genre were warning of are present. Obviously, what

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[88]   In Switzerland the formula for allocating seats for all the parties in the Federal Council comes nearest with its "magic formula (zauberformel) , but has two important differences: The Swiss decentralisation of power creates more opportunities for checks and *balances* as the more "traditional" type of devolved administration in Northern Ireland. Secondly the whole parliament in Switzerland gets to vote upon the selected councillors, so they are not simply party appointees, like in Northern Ireland. (Wilson 2001, 76)

the unionists weight heavily is the approval of the consent principle defined in the chapter mentioned above and the wording of the annex, which states that:

> (1) It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section in accordance with Schedule 1. (Belfast Agreement 1998, chapter 2, annex A)

This together with the consent principle in effect cemented what the nationalists had been terming the "unionist veto", and in terms of constitutional issues the nationalist part of the Agreement seemed to be a larger problem. Indeed, as Bernadette Sands McKevitt (a sister of a Republican hunger striker Bobby Sands) put it, her brother did not die for cooperation on tourism. The republican agenda for ending partition seemed to have reversed itself to become the acceptance of partition. In this respect the unionists had been successful. McKevitt was directly referring to Strand Two of the Belfast Agreement, which dealt with the relations between the North and South of Ireland. In the Anglo-Irish Agreement these relations were under joint British-Irish governance and therefore a constant cause of concern and suspicion for unionists. However, in the Belfast Agreement the cooperation between the two states in Ireland was dealt through the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive on their part and because the unionists had a majority in both of them there seemed to be little to worry about. In addition the Agreement limited the areas of cooperation to a twelve different areas, tourism being one of them and the one that McKevitt used for her comment. (Belfast Agreement, Strand Two)

9.6.2 Parity of esteem, again

Parity of esteem was one of the most interesting and important concepts in the debate involving intellectual intervention. It was the broadly shared view of the unionist intellectuals that the concept held within in the potential of giving the upper hand to the presumed nationalist front with its hegemonic discourse. Therefore the meaning of the concept was highly debated, and indeed formed a miniature model of the whole phenomena of the intellectual politicking as we have seen in the chapter 0.

Considering that the concept itself surfaces in the text of the Belfast Agreement, it is possible to ask what signs, if any, of the debate's influence are evident in the way the concept was used in the text? First use of the parity of esteem concept can be found in the Strand Two dealing with the constitutional issues already quoted above. Let us just go briefly back to it.

> (v) affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and aspirations of both communities; (Belfast Agreement 1998)

In the text of the Agreement the concept of parity of esteem has been given a wide meaning. It is not used to refer only to cultural equality, which was stressed in the academic unionist critique of the concept. It is also perhaps striking that the term recognition is not to be found in the text, although that was the very basis of the whole parity of esteem debate, if we broaden the discussion to include the universal background stemming from the original essay by Charles Taylor (Taylor 1994). Parity of esteem is explicitly given to the aspirations of both communities. There cannot be any other conclusions that this means that equal recognition is granted to unionism and republicanism, which was the nightmare scenario of many unionist commentators simply because equal merit would be given to a tradition committed to upholding the state of Northern Ireland, and to one committed in destroying it. Of course for practical reasons giving parity of esteem to all strands of unionism and nationalism was necessary. As Sinn Féin was given entry to the negotiations table and an entry to the governance of Northern Ireland it is obvious that the republican ideology could not be excluded. Nevertheless, based on the amount of ink the academic commentators used during the 1990's to detach parity of esteem thinking from the political and reattach it solely to the cultural their defeat was overwhelming. In addition anchoring the aspiration of both communities to the concept of parity of esteem obviously opened a whole new language game revolving around the definition of aspiration. Caution about the definition of parity of esteem may also indicate of the amount and importance that the discussion had created. Nevertheless, the implications that the concept had in the text of the Belfast Agreement had only limited direct political impact, since the power sharing structures and the constitutional status quo that the Agreement conserved were defined in detail elsewhere.

Parity of esteem was visible also elsewhere in the Agreement: in Strand One defining the institutions to be set up after the devolution; in Strand Three, where the co-operation between UK and the Republic of Ireland were defined; and in the concluding section of the Agreement. In all these instances the use of the concept was identical and it was used to refer to permeability of equality between the two communities. Strictly speaking the wide interpretation given to parity of esteem was a defeat not only to the academic unionists, but also to the unionists as such, because since 1984 the phrase "Only rights can be guaranteed, not aspirations" was to be found in the UUP policy document (The Way Forward 1984, 5). The line in its original use was to refer to an idea that even if the civil rights of the nationalist people as individuals were to be granted and guaranteed their aspiration, as far as it was hostile to the Northern Ireland state, was not to be given this recognition or legitimacy. At least for hard core unionists, inclined to give weight to matters dealing with definitions of certain concepts, the permanence of the parity of esteem idea was capable of evoking instability and fear. However, the debate of parity of esteem has not risen to the level of the mid 1990's and when the St. Andrews' Agreement (13.10.2006) partly re-negotiating the Belfast Agreement, parity of esteem was not mentioned once.

9.7   Academic unionism after the Belfast Agreement

The Belfast Agreement created a new context for politics in Northern Ireland. Since it became obvious for all agents engaged in Northern Ireland politics that the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was not delivering what the participants, the British and Irish governments, had hoped for, an inevitable process for a new agreement had begun. In this sense the Anglo-Irish Agreement had proven unworkable, although the unionist campaign to collapse it was not the only reason for its downfall. More broadly, the fact that the AIA did not deliver better security for the British, and the fact that the Republic was also not fully satisfied with the Agreement sealed its faith. Although the nationalist parties of Northern Ireland had not been party to the AIA it had suited their strategy as the joint authority that the AIA hinted at, could have be seen as a stepping stone to unity. This hope had also proven vain. Broadly speaking as the era of 1985-1998 had been dominated by the debates constructing a wider narrative of the peace process, with documents such as the Downing Street Declaration and the Framework Documents working as mile posts of that process, it is clear that for an Agreement with multi party acceptance and a new constitutional framework a wholly new context for the debate had been created.

This had a direct impact on the quantity of the academic interventions as well. For example the vigilant Cadogan Group had published seven pamphlets in 1992-1998, with a best year being 1996 with three publications. After the Belfast Agreement the Group published a pamphlet again in 2002, after the devolution provided by the Belfast Agreement had drifted into a deadlock. That same goes with other academic interventions. Their number was significantly reduced. In my mind this has a couple of reasons. It can be debated if the unionist parties were in a state of disarray between the AIA and the Belfast Agreement. It is probably an overstatement to argue that they were in full crisis, but at least when politics in the grander scale seemed to be out of their control, this provided opportunities for political agents coming outside the party politics of unionism. Also secularism as a major trend of the unionist politics of the 1990's provided an opportunity for the academics to step in. As the Belfast Agreement brought devolution with power sharing back to Northern Ireland, politics was again more than anything party politics. Also, due to the functions of the political system of Northern Ireland, with its division into two blocks, the daily political discussion was heavily dominated by the parties, which found themselves in a situation in which they were to compete mercilessly against each other to gain power in each block, unionist or nationalist. As the Belfast Agreement institutionalized this division, with dividing the Stormont parliament into three blocks; unionists, nationalists and other, instead of following a "normal" parliamentarism, it was more and more difficult to surface outside this dichotomy.

The Northern Ireland political debate also became more and more focused on the workings of the devolution or the decommissioning, and wider political

debate abated. Hence, there was no longer the same need for the philosophical discussion of the natures of Ulster Unionism or Irish nationalism, as both of them had been given a formal right for existence in the Belfast Agreement. The scope of the debate also narrowed simply because some of the key issues of the 1990's seemed resolved. This included the consent principle, which had always been essential to unionism and which can be found as a concurrent theme of the rhetoric of the academic unionists. The Belfast Agreement had formalised the consent principle and also guaranteed the endorsement of the Irish Republic and the nationalist parties towards it (Cadogan Group 2006). In some sense, reframing Arthur Aughey, the intellectual battle that had started in the late 1980's had ended in the cease fire of the Belfast Agreement. By this I do not at all mean that the academic unionists would have been silent. Especially the academic debates on unionism and nationalism have been and are vigorously ongoing as can be observed in literature or at first had at the conferences of the Irish Political Studies Association (IPSA)[89]; nevertheless, the broader political aspect that these debates had before the Belfast Agreement changed. However, the potential has always remained as we can see in the simple example of the publication frequency of the Cadogan Group above. If the party politics stall, due to some institutional crisis, the debate can easily be broached again. An example occurred prior to the St. Andrews' Agreement (2006), when this debate resurfaced. The Cadogan Group published an assessment of the St. Andrews' Agreement in which it, among other arguments, vindicated a point that Northern Ireland should turn towards a normal parliamentarism, instead of the forced coalitions dictated by the Belfast Agreement (Cadogan Group 2006). Key figures of the debate have obviously gone nowhere, but have continued publishing "interventions" to the Northern Ireland politics. In 2005 Arthur Aughey published *The Politics of Northern Ireland: Beyond the Belfast Agreement*. He also took part in a wider debate with *Nationalism: Devolution and the Challenge to the United Kingdom State* (2001a) in which he searches for the character of the United Kingdom polity and the meaning of Britishness. And most recently he released the *Politics of Englishness* (2007).

The problem of getting the unionist middle classes interested in politics, that the academic interventions as suggestions for a more secular and open-minded politics represented, has gone nowhere. After the Belfast Agreement it has been difficult to persuade pro-union electors to vote, or the Protestant middle classes to participate in unionist politics (Godson 2004, 359). From this perspective Liam O'Dowd's claim that the 1990's secular trend represented the last doomed effort of unionism to construct a defendable idea seems at least in some aspects legitimate (O'Dowd 1996). On the other hand, the last decade has not brought any convincing new arguments to alter the present constitutional status, and the unionist majority does not seem willing to relinquish the Union. On the contrary, the last few years have been victorious to the Democratic

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[89] The author witnessed a vigorous debate on the *alleged* evolution of *the* Irish nationalism in one of the panels of the IPSA conference in Belfast 2005.

Unionist Party, which indicates that the communal defence lines are as strong as ever.

10 CONCLUSIONS

It is time to answer the question why we should study the politicking of scholars especially those in Northern Ireland. The starting point of this study and largely the answer to that question lies in the perceived nature peculiar to the Northern Ireland society, especially in the position of the Northern Ireland scholars, which stands in the middle of a conflict that seems to leave little room for a non committed position because the division between unionism and nationalism is so permeable. As I mentioned in the start of this study, my personal observation of the interconnection of scholars and politics in Northern Ireland was the spark igniting this work. It was my belief that by using Northern Ireland as the empirical background the relationship between science and politics, and the role of the scholars as politicians would come to light in an interesting way, while also giving me the opportunity to say something of the conflict in Northern Ireland from a new perspective. It has been my intention to deconstruct the study of the Northern Ireland conflict from a particular perspective, by pointing out the unionist politics and agendas in relation to the Northern Ireland academic study.

Obviously this study is not the final word on the subject. Some other scholar may draw different conclusions, even with using the same material. This just goes to prove the subjectivity of scholarly activity. This work of course is not immune to this subjectivity either, as it is in many ways committed by my choices. Many of these choices can be questioned. Of course there are contexts that I have not thoroughly considered, while I have perhaps given too much weight to others. For instance, the writings of Professor Arthur Aughey form a key part of this thesis, not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of the depth of the analysis. A different angle might have given different conclusions. More generally, my approach to political science obviously has its limitations as well. By concentrating on the textual analysis I have more or less bypassed dwelling on such concepts as culture, identity tradition and so on. However, I believe that my selection of material and methods have some benefits as well. The academic interventions are by nature textual, for instance written suggestions of how to do things better in terms of unionist politics. Because of

this, textual analysis offers the best way to go into depth in these interventions and also show their relation to other texts, whether these texts are products by the unionist or nationalist parties or governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Stepping out of the selected methodology, or including some contexts that I have considered not so important might have blurred the findings of this study.

The idea that social sciences could be pure and objective, in a sense of being perspective free and a completely detached activity is surely far outdated and the purpose of this study has not been to prove anything like that. Still, the arguments of the "science believers" that the aim of non-natural sciences would also be to find the "truth" are not that rare. Furthermore, in the struggles that take place between scholars, theories and arguments of rhetorical strategy building and on getting the facts straight can be often found. Sometimes they occur in a way that completely prevents the practice of a proper debate. It is not the same to argue that the requirement of the classic textbook meaning of objectivism does not belong to the social sciences, and to say that some level of objectivity would not be beneficial.

The objectivistic perspective to humanist and social sciences argues for the importance of recognizing the influences that the scholar's personal history and other subjective premises might have upon a study. The value of an academic study can increase when its implications and "hidden agendas" are put on the table. This is, to certain extent, the normative way in which each study is built, when the scholar's disposition states the method of selection of primary and secondary sources, the way in which the study will be conducted, and what the research questions are. These together constitute the particular perspective that the scholar is taking. However, these do not necessarily include all the scholar's commitments, because a study may also include a daily political aspect, and the scholar may be in some particular way committed to a certain political stand which may even be guiding the process of the selection of research questions, methods, sources and so on. These commitments are seldom stated, although they may contribute to the same level of commitment as do the other aspects in the selection of the perspective. The importance of acknowledging these aspects is one of the generalizations that can be drawn from this study, but it must not be taken as a suggested norm for scholars to disclose everything. In the particular case of scholars that I have discussed in this thesis the commitment has been to a certain normative doctrine, unionism, which has constituted the premise from which studies fitting the stencil of this doctrine have been derived. Beyond this particular case, it can be concluded that every study has its normative element, whether it is declared or even consciously recognized by the author.

The presence of the strong unionism/nationalism dichotomy in Northern Ireland makes it perhaps easier to detect the political in the scholarly discourse; however, the political obviously has the potential to be present in other surrounding as well. The political is easiest to notice when the scholar politicking is committed to a particular daily political doctrine. If a scholar is

strongly pro or against the membership of Finland in NATO the resulting study may reflect this personal stance even to the conclusions drawn to support those particular views. This is the same logic as in the case of a scholar committed to Northern Irish unionist viewpoints. But of course the scholar does not have to go as far as to make a study to persuade the audience. The role and ethos of a scholar can be applied to gain more credibility for the argument. Everyday one comes across comments made by scholars as scholars, commenting on something they do not possess direct scholarly information. This does not prevent them having a strong opinion of the matter as scholars. This is perfectly acceptable, and no guilt should be put upon that scholar. However, what is often lacking is the criticism needed from the audience when they come across such utterances. This work therefore also contributes to seeing the potential of a scholar to act politically more clearly, as well as to the requirement for the general public to acknowledge this and receive the utterances of the scholar with proper criticism. What has become clear in the process of this study is how it particularly represents a study of scholars acting politically in Northern Ireland, while not presenting Northern Ireland as an exception from the rest of the world and its scholars.

My intention has been to demonstrate that a study of Northern Ireland cannot escape its political aspect. However, the quality of any study has nothing to do with its political aspect, intentional or not. But I argue that every study has its political aspect, whether or not someone points it out. The political aspect of course differs. A study can be written as political, it can be received politically or it can be politicized and used politically. Acknowledging this, I believe, will also give more analytical perspective to the particular Northern Ireland conflict. It seems bold to assume that textual commentary and suggestions regarding what the followers of a particular political idea should do, could be any less political than a political speech delivered in front of the Belfast City Hall or in the Stormont Parliament. Of course the textual genres are different, and I do not suggest that a scholar of Northern Ireland should state their political affiliations at the start of a study that the scholar is writing, although I am not saying that this is something they should not do either. If we accept the notion that a particular study benefits from pointing out the commitments of the scholar, not limited only to the commitments in terms of the conduct of the study, we must accept that the personal commitments of the scholar, for instance party affiliations, may be beneficial to point out as well. Would this not be a part of the fair play of academic debate? But in my opinon this is not something that should be demanded. In any case, when a particular study has a strong daily or party political aspect, this usually becomes obvious without any disclaimer stating that the scholar is strongly committed to some political stand. If a certain study is also intended to work as a political speech and not only as a piece of academic writing, the author would perhaps lose a great deal of rhetorical power by stating their objective. It is very understandable that the claim of non-commitment can be considered more effective in terms of persuasion. One is of course free to select any rhetorical

strategy one wishes to use to get one's message delivered, but the educated reader should also be alert of the presence of such a strategy.

There is a difference between the relations of science and politics and a scholar and a politician. Science has its autonomy in respect to daily politics as scholars are free to make suggestions without the need to mind the many commitments and attachments that the politician has. But the politician also always has the autonomy to choose to listen to these suggestions or not. However, the actions of a scholar and a politician are analogous. Both operate in a universe in which there is a struggle between theories, ideas and concepts, and which have certain regulative instruments setting the boundaries of that struggle, for instance the norms of democracy or the parliamentary procedure in politics and the requirement of fair play in the scholarly debates. But even if science is autonomous in respect to politics, a scholar has the potential to be every bit as political as any other politician when addressing the matters that are daily- or party political. The ethos of a scholar does not make a person immune to being a politician.

While this analysis has covered the time span of roughly 1971-1998 of Northern Ireland politics, there has been a closer focus on the era between the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and the Belfast Agreement of 1998, but the concentration has been on the years 1989-1997. This is because the phenomenon that I have been looking at has been most alive during these years. The answer to a question, why is it so, is important, as the answer will give essential information of the particular phenomena under consideration. After having clarified the universal potential of a scholar to be political, it must be said that there is also something particularly interesting in the rapid and wide-spread politicization of the Northern Ireland literati in the early 1990's that seek explanation and present the Northern Irish scholars as a particularly interesting study.

A characteristic of this time has been that the politics of Northern Ireland have spiralled out of the control of the unionist politicians. The era of unionist dominated Northern Ireland with its ethos of "masterful inactivity" lasted 1921-1971. But even after that time, the situation was constitutionally speaking relatively under control as the direct rule of the London government was not necessarily a bad option for the unionists. However, the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the forced sidestepping by the unionists changed the situation. For Northern Ireland their constitutional integrity has been the foundation of all unionist politics. After the Anglo-Irish Agreement that constitutional integrity seemed seriously threatened, at least its future was no longer in the hands of the unionists. This caused a partially forced grand coalition of the unionist parties to form a joint anti-Agreement campaign against the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The campaign was to be fought with weapons well known as the historical *modus operandi* of the unionist politics: mass mobilisation with the help of the Protestant heritage organisations such as the Orange Order. In other words, the anti-Agreement campaign made the communal division more visible by stressing the difference of ethnicity and religion.

As the British government stood adamant this time, the anti-Agreement campaign's failure became obvious quite soon. However, the problem was that the unionist parties did not have much to offer if their strategy should fail. Mass mobilisation on the grounds of cultural defence was something which had been victorious since the partition of Ireland and in the collapse of the Sunningdale deal in the 1970's. This put the unionist politics in a serious deadlock, liberating voices that had been unheard before, due to the rigid political system in Northern Ireland. The frustration with the traditional unionist parties was also visible in the way in which the party field splintered in the late 1980's as the Campaign for Equal Citizenship (CEC) rose to challenge the very existence of the party system of Northern Ireland. The CEC was uncompromisingly unionist, but unionist in a new and innovative way, which drew support especially from the ranks of the educated and of those who were hoping for a more secular unionism.

The McCartney/Aughey axle, which has often been discussed here, perfectly describes the way politics and science became intermingled. Robert McCartney as the leader of the CEC was an important catalyst contributing to the widespread engagement of the unionist academics in the 1990's, and Arthur Aughey's *Under Siege* was the essential work in recognising the political aspect of scholarly activity and putting it to use, thus taking one step further and applying the strategy of seeing a study as a one type of political speech and stepping out of the rhetorical strategy of depoliticization present earlier. Obviously this was not Aughey's invention, but nevertheless, *Under Siege* was an important incentive for the whole 1990's secular unionist discussion and in the phenomena of scholars participating in debates in Northern Ireland 1985-1998. What followed the distribution of *Under Siege* was that academics, scholars and intellectuals began politicking on a wide repertoire of different textual genres, yet all shared the ethos of an academic, a scholar or an intellectual, and intended to take advantage of that ethos in their argument building. However, while the scholarly interventions were secular in nature and proposed to express a more modern and novel unionism, they did not blur the division between nationalism and unionism any more than had the traditional apologies of unionism. The prime objective remained the same: to keep the union by use of the strategy of pointing out everything which was wrong in Irish nationalism and everything that was good in Ulster unionism. This case proves that intellectuals are not automatically reformers. They can be strong conservatives as well.

One difference from more traditional unionist campaigns was that the rhetorical strategies of the academics applied secular ideas and concepts that were more familiar to the unionist educated middle classes, and, as it was hoped, also more familiar to the audiences outside Northern Ireland. Still, the academic interventions cannot be separated from the party politics of unionism. The prerequisite for the widespread academic intervention was the stalling of the unionist party politics in the first place. It is even arguable that the academic unionists never really abandoned the Ulster Unionist Party. There was

widespread support for the CEC among the educated, but as the CEC collapsed the link between the UUP and the academics was sometimes quite evident as in the publications of the Ulster Young Unionist Council that featured many combatant pieces of writing by numerous academics. These interventions might have been non-partisan, but they were not non-committed, in a sense of being "above politics".

Under Siege was more open than the previous scholarly interventions sharing its committed nature. For instance, an important part of the Northern Ireland studies in the 1970's was committed to Marxism in terms of methodology and ontology, but in many additional cases, it was also committed to either Irish nationalism or Northern Irish unionism. Nevertheless, these commitments were seldom out in the open, more often they were covert. Because it breaks with this traditional stance, *Under Siege* is the most important example of a study from a particular politically committed perspective in the 1980's and 1990's, and it connects to the objectivistic view of science, in which the author openly declares his commitments more thoroughly. The rhetorical strategy of *Under Siege* was more open to criticism, but it was also more able to make a political point.

Some of the academic interventions discussed in this thesis are very elusive by nature. This means that the political in them is not always manifest in the most obvious way. To get to the political I have relied partly on the idea that every text is not locked only to first hand interpretation, but it can be re-interpreted as a move in numerous contexts and debates. Therefore I have looked beyond the declared motive of the text. For example, I have interpreted a textbook not simply as a textbook but also as a one type of political speech act, with political intentions hand in hand with the other ones. But with many of the texts this type of re-interpretation has not been necessary because the presence of the political is obvious. One reading strategy was to look at the themes and subjects under discussion, as the decision of what to include and omit is the first political step the original author of the text took.

While sometimes elusive, these interventions are also heterogeneous in nature. This is partly because of different views of what is meant by a scholar, politician, and the political and what is considered to be their reciprocal relationships. The different views of these relations constitute the Meta level of the texts analysed, which partly explains the choices made between different rhetorical strategies applied in the texts of the unionist scholars. Whether the scholar is seen as completely non-committed in respect to politics depends of the meanings that are given to the concepts of a scholar, a politician and the political. These themes and questions are universal, and in this respect the conclusions can be generalised as themes present in any debate on the relations of scholars, science, politicians and politics.

One extreme of my empirical evidence is the rhetorical strategy of drawing an imaginary spectrum between science and politics and highlighting the difference between these two. This strategy shares the textbook meaning of objectivity by portraying science as politically non-committed and separate

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from the world of politics in which everything is seen as a struggle between partisan interests. This strategy portrays scholarly debates as being "above politics". This type of rhetorical strategy is most evident in textbook politics, which has the tendency to build spatial metaphors to separate politics and science. This is done by drawing a clear distinction between arguments in the sphere of politics, which are considered "mere rhetoric" or annulled as "myth," and arguements in the sphere of science which are considered objective "reality". This is of course not the case with all the texts that are discussed under textbook politics. For example, Professor Richard English shows in his writing that he is fully aware of the political nature of the academic interventions (e.g. English 1996). It is futile to second guess the level of consciousness or the intentions of the writers, but it would seem that in most cases the political nature of the text is very well acknowledged, but was left unstated simply due to the selection of a certain rhetorical strategy that emphasising non-commitment and objectivity in its very strict form. The *political* strategy of depoliticizing has a particular appeal in unionism, which has often portrayed everything political as suspicious, even sinful. As a move in the depoliticizing strategy the term *political* is then often reduced to a very narrow meaning of *party political*. This interpretation of the political then gives virtually everyone without the unionist party membership the opportunity to claim "objectivity and detachment" (Barton & Roche 1994, 1).

The claim of detachment might be acceptable if we understand detachment as referring to staying party politically non-committed, as is the case with the reference above to Barton and Roche. But this does not exclude the ability to commit to a particular political stand. Detachment is very much a political position as it allows the academic to examine the situation from a distance and then to commit on grander scale; particular detachment does not exclude the possibility of a commitment on a larger scale. This is very much the position that Max Weber has. The outspoken motif of the unionist writers to regain the balance in the written history, which they claim is biased, does not make their position any more "objective" according to Weber's analysis in his "mittlere Linie" critique[90].

The detachment of the scholar comes from the autonomy to make suggestions without the restraints of daily politics. Reversed, this gives the politician the autonomy to listen to the suggestions made by the scholar or not. The claim of "objectivity", used to denote complete detachment from party politics is harder to escape. A good example of this kind of rhetorical use of objectivity, when it is portrayed as total non-commitment can be found in the introduction of one of the textbooks discussed:

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[90]   Aber mit wissenschaflicher "Objektivität" hat das das Allermindeste zu tun. Die "mittlere Linie" is um kein Haarbreit mehr wissenschafliche Wahrheit als die extremsten Parteiideale von rechts oder links. (Weber 1904, 154)

> In the interests of objectivity and detachment, contributions have been sought from established academics and specialists, and not those actively involved in party politics. (Barton & Roche 1994, 1)

As I have argued, there is no such thing as detached objectivity, at least when it comes to social sciences or *Geisteswissenschaft*. In the particular case of Northern Ireland, this has been clearly illustrated because the speech acts of the scholars cannot escape the political. The division line between nationalism and unionism is so permeable than virtually all discussions are politicized through this dichotomy at some point, be it the European integration, or the debate whether there are intellectuals in Ireland/Northern Ireland or not. Every utterance for or against something is easily turned into an utterance for or against unionism or nationalism. Because of this, the rhetorical strategy of detached and objective science versus partisan politics is in risk of a failure, at least in its original effort to appear detached.

One way for a scholar to portray their personal ethos is to portray it as a "social scientist". In this thesis I have argued that particularly the Cadogan Group has used this position. The scholar as a "social scientist" keeps the ideal of the "facts" which are considered to be something the scholar is able to find, analyse and mould into patterns of action in the society. This way the scholar remains politically non-committed while merely interpreting the facts. However, the scholar as a "social scientist" avoidably loses some autonomy, not in terms of the selection of perspectives, but in terms of the bigger ontological problem of seeing the facts as essential absolutes that the scholar just transforms into suggestions for action. These suggestions are, however, much less "open" than the suggestions stemming from the interpretations rather than "facts". When the suggestions of a "social scientist" are understood as derivatives from "facts", the scholar is more easily committed to these suggestions, although they might not be politically committed. In this reading, also the autonomy of a politician is questionable, since the suggestions of the "social scientist" advocating "political realism" are not easily dismissible as they represent suggestions stemming from the "pure reality". Of course most politicians do acknowledge that the suggestions made by the scholars are not to be taken literally. The rhetorical strategy of understanding the concepts of a scholar, a politician and the political this way works by limiting the options and emphasising the trustworthy and non-committed nature of the scholar.

From the scholar as a "social scientist" it is easy to look at the rhetorical strategy of depoliticization. The Cadogan Group is perhaps the clearest example of an political agent whose reason for existence is build on the ideal of being a group of "social scientists" interpreting the "recent research" and "statistics". In the opening of its first pamphlet the Group spells out its chosen strategy. The Cadogan Group clings tightly to its self definition as a non-committed advisor. This is already an oxymoron. If one works as an advisor one is already politically committed at some level, even if the advice is not followed. As I have argued, there is nothing politically non-committed in the texts of the Cadogan Group. The rhetoric of the Group is built on the attempt to limit the political *spielraum* by the

rhetorical use of phrases such as "recent research". This type of term denotes the social science studies are something that must be taken as premises for any political course of action. As such it is a political move that rhetorically depolitizes the work of scholars. At the same time the Group implicitly argues that there is some "objective" knowledge that is free of particular political perspectives and aspects. The Group then nominates itself as the interpreter of this objective reality, which it transforms into policy proposals.

Another move in depoliticization is the often used economic argumentation. Portraying economics as above politics, with arguments such "the economic necessity demands" are perhaps the most widely used strategies of depoliticization, as well as rhetorical arguments which, when utilized successfully, are superior in persuasion, at least in the context of western capitalist societies (Burke 1969, 355-366). I have not given this line of arguments too much space, since the argument itself is quite simple: In material terms the people of Northern Ireland are better off with the UK and that the Republic of Ireland simply cannot afford the unification. This argument does not change, regardless of the facts and figures behind it. Also, as it has not been my intention to construct this thesis upon the idea of revealing either the possible deceptions of the unionist scholar, or to justify their claims, it would not have been worthwhile to start breaking down the numbers into truth or false.

A scholar can acknowledge being political without being committed to the party political. A scholar may not be committed to a particular policy, but can still be committed to a larger scheme or to a normative doctrine. This type of rhetorical strategy is the one I have discussed most in my analysis and also the one that might be the most common type of committing politically. This strategy incorporates the numerous interventions by Arthur Aughey as well as the manifesto politicking of unionist scholars and intellectuals. These texts are more self aware of their nature than those that come across as representatives of objective science above political passions or those that use the strategy of a "social scientist". As speech acts, or as political speeches for or against something, they are more open by acknowledging their own political nature. This means that they are also open for counter arguments, but it also means that they can often be taken more seriously as they are not filled with unconvincing rhetoric claiming impartiality.

A necessary incentive for the academic interventions was the political context of Northern Ireland in the late 1980's till the mid 1990's. The changes in respect to the constitutional certainty were so significant, that even without the crisis of the party political, the political game field expanded rapidly. The looming joint authority of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, or the threat to the constitutional status quo, presented in the peace talks, held with them such a wide arsenal of different questions and debates that they virtually called for the engagement of the scholars. The *parity of esteem* debate, to consider just one example, held numerous contexts ranging from the models taken from the autonomy of Quebec to the break up of Yugoslavia and the whole "recognition debate" that went with it. Parity of esteem, nevertheless, was not simply an

academic matter in Northern Ireland as it went straight to the core fear of the unionists by stating that the Irish nationalism would be granted equal political rights to aspire for the abolition of the Northern Ireland state. In the case of parity of esteem, the most convincing critique came from the unionist minded scholars, who were already equipped with the potential to enter such a debate. The expanding game field was utilized by the scholars who wished to portray unionism in a more positive way, or who wished to continue the struggle for the survival of the Union with a new set of arguments.

Obviously the connecting theme of the academic or intellectual interventions was the defence of unionism. To look at the history of this phenomenon we have to go to the 1970's and to the early days of the Troubles. The 1970's debates concentrated largely on the history of unionism, its motifs and to its internal logic. But the 1970's discussion was largely academic in the sense that it did not have much connecting surface with the daily political reality of unionism. One very important exception was the British Irish Communist Organisation (BICO), in whose publications the theme of combining unionist rhetoric, based on secular, "academic" arguments, with an articulated *will to power* was absolutely clear. In the 1980's Robert McCartney did the same through a unionist defence based on the merits of British liberalism and the British passport, questioning the traditional unionist politics, which in McCartney's view had failed, and were at risk of delivering united Ireland on a silver platter. McCartney also succeeded in drawing the attention of the secular unionists, who were alienated from the traditional unionism. This had happened because the unionist politics had in the hour of need turned to mass mobilisation and ethnical juxtapositions rather than to creative thinking. In many senses Aughey's *Under Siege* was the elaboration of the McCartney themes, and of Aughey's publications was the most obviously party political, as Aughey strongly advocated McCartney as the saviour of unionism. As time went on, McCartney was forced to notice that the unionist party machine could not be turned over so easily and his political position diminished, while Aughey's later interventions were more party-politically detached though they retained the normative commitment to unionist doctrine

To present unionism as a modern, secular, reasonable, logical, and inclusive political idea has bee the central theme of scholars committed to unionism. In this sense it can be considered as a direct continuum of the CEC and as elaborations of the themes Aughey presented in *Under Siege*. Of course presenting unionism as secular, modern, reasonable, logical and inclusive has meant implicitly and explicitly the presentation of Irish nationalism as outdated, theocratic, illogical, and exclusive. As we are talking about academic interventions, the pro unionism evidence has most often been presented in scholarly debates; less in party political texts such as pamphlets and manifestoes, and more in texts that blend the genres of academic and political texts, such as textbooks. This also links with the idea presented in reference to the textbook politics, arguing that it is not only significant to look at the text at hand but also at the selection of the topics, and further also to see the bigger

contexts in which these texts were produced. It is not a coincidence that the talk of unionism's bad publicity came simultaneously with a kind of revision of unionism studies.

Secularism was the flag bearing theme of 1990's unionism, this is beyond doubt and accompanies the wide spectrum of unionism, not only academic unionism. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the rhetorical nature of that theme. However, I will not start arguing for or against the existence of a true secularization project in the 1990's unionism. I do, however, argue that the impetus that the academic interventions gave to the unionist politics as a whole was central in the fact that such secularization was possible. At least at some level the suggestions given by academic unionists for breaking the political deadlock were absorbed into the unionist politics. Hints of this are seen in the Belfast Agreement and in the talks leading to it. David Trimble epitomized the changed mental atmosphere of unionism as a pro politics politician in contrast to his predecessor Jim Molyneaux, who believed not only in minimalist integrationism but also had a very minimalist idea of politics, with shying away from politics towards "managerial" handling through personal relationships. It is also important to note in passing that though David Trimble tried to sever the link between the UUP and the Orange Order, it proved impossible. Trimble was a different type of politician who had accustomed himself to the idea that the traditional unionist politics had reached a deadlock around the Anglo-Irish Agreement and it was very possible that the Unionist Party would never gain its historical strength. The scholarly interventions expressing the need for a new unionist political thinking and sketching a secular defence for unionism and the modernisation of the UUP leadership were not isolated processes taking place in separate vacuums.

So what were the themes of the academic interventions? The discussions of the 1970's were largely about deconstructing the colonial discourse that had dominated the Irish question. The unionist revisionists started to challenge the conception that the British presence in Ireland and later in Northern Ireland would have been colonial and put in place to serve the British interests. They also questioned the claim that unionism would have been an elaborate false consciousness set upon the Protestant population of Ireland to make them serve as the executors of the British interests. The central theme of the Marxist influenced debates of the 1970's was to give unionism reason, logic, value and purpose. In the1980's Robert McCartney and the Campaign for Equal Citizenship epitomized the "unionist resistance" in which the juxtaposition of unionism and Irish nationalism was portrayed as the juxtaposition of inclusive liberalism and exclusive nationalism. Academic unionism was loaded with content eclectically taken from the theory of classic liberalism, especially emphasising its ideals of individual liberties in contrast to the dangers of an authoritarian state. Nationalism was portrayed as an out dated idea that was, particularly in the Irish case, dangerous and led to the perils of individual liberty. But, interestingly, however secular the unionist defence of the scholars and intellectuals tried to be, the *bête noir* of the Roman Catholic Church in the

Irish Republic and the importance of Catholicism in the state ethos of the Republic was constantly highlighted. The role that the Roman Catholic Church had played historically in the construction of Irish nationalism was constantly discussed and extrapolated to the ethos and politics of the Irish Republic and the Irish nationalism. This was rhetorically effective, as through it the unmodern nature of Irishness could be transferred to the audience.

We are left with the question of whether the academic interventions were something really so innovative and significant? There is no clear cut answer to that question. Can it even be argued that academic interventions presented a new and innovative way of doing politics? As I have argued, the political aspect in science is elemental, it cannot be taken away and therefore putting it there is not possible either. Therefore, academic interventions were nothing new. However, I maintain that there was the spill over from daily politics to the academics and vice versa and that it was, and is, significant. Therefore looking at the Northern Ireland conflict from that perspective has been worthwhile. Academic interventions are by nature a phenomenon that require new areas to politicize, but at the same time they attempt to politically depoliticize something else. Academic interventions have the tendency to question and challenge as we have seen in the examples of the nationalist understanding of the Irish conflict, or the essence of unionism. This way history writing and interpretation in the field of social sciences were questioned and politicized as they were seen analogous to the daily political arguments challenging unionism. All this could be done analogously by claiming that science was above politics and that the arguments that were raised in scholarly debates were politically detached. Politicization and depoliticization were present at the same time, even in the same argument. At the other end of the spectrum were the interventions that openly acknowledged their own political nature.

The academic interventions discussed were not moderate, although they were secular. The academics did not, with some exceptions, engage in a very thorough rethinking of unionism in a sense that they would have challenged its core ideas. On the contrary, the central thesis was that unionism withheld everything that made it a modern and defendable idea, but the unionist politicians had neglected this and retorted to an unintelligent populist politics, risking the existence of the Union. The constitutional certainty is what unionism has always been after, and the academic interventions were no exception to this, although they portrayed the difference between the constitutional options through different ideas and concepts, as dichotomies were created between liberalism and nationalism and not race or ethnicity. The result, nevertheless, remained the same. This proves the point that the academic interventions were not above the unionist/nationalist division, as they were clearly suggestions and politicizations coming from the unionist camp to suggest new means to break the political deadlock, or to otherwise further the cause of unionism. Sometimes they were non-committed in relation to party politics, perhaps, but certainly they were committed in relation to the unionism/nationalism division.

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tämä tutkimus tarkastelee tutkijan ja tutkimuksen poliittisuutta sekä tutkimuksella politikointia Pohjois-Irlannin unionistien keskinäisissä debateissa. Tutkimukseni lähdeaineistona ovat unionismiin sitoutuneiden pohjoisirlantilaisten tutkijoiden tekstit, joita analysoidessani tarkastelen tutkijaa poliitikkona, tutkimuksen poliittisuutta sekä kysymystä siitä, miten tutkimusta ja politiikan teoriaa voidaan käyttää päivänpoliittisessa argumentaatiossa.

Pohjois-Irlannin unionismi ja irlantilainen nationalismi politisoivat helposti lähes kaikki Pohjois-Irlannissa käytävät keskustelut. Siitä huolimatta usein oletetaan, että Pohjois-Irlannin politiikantutkimus on, tai että sen tulisi olla, näistä konflikteista riippumatonta. Tämä johtuu osaltaan tieteellisen objektivismin oppikirjamääritelmän kritiikittömästä hyväksymisestä, eli käsityksestä, jonka mukaan tutkijan ja tutkimuksen täytyisi pysytellä poliittisten ristiriitojen yläpuolella eikä tutkija saisi tehdä tutkimustaan poliittisesti sitoutuneena. Tutkimuksessani kuitenkin totean, että tutkijan poliittinen sitoutuminen voidaan nähdä samanlaisena tutkimuksellisena perspektiivivalintana kuin tutkimuksen metodin tai materiaalin valinta.

Jakautuminen unionistiseen ja nationalistiseen diskurssiin näkyy myös pohjoisirlantilaisessa tutkimuksessa, jossa jatkuvasti käydään kamppailua unionismin ja nationalismin keskinäisestä paremmuudesta. Vaikka tämä kamppailu voidaan nähdä ensisijaisesti tieteen sisällä tapahtuvana debattina, on kiistelyllä kuitenkin myös päivänpoliittinen ulottuvuutensa. Tutkimuksessani tulkitsen tieteellisen argumentaation genreen kuuluvia lausumia myös päivänpoliittisina puheina ja analysoin Pohjois-Irlanti-tutkimusta poliittisen puheen kaltaisena interventiona, joka sisältää poliittisia suosituksia ja toimenpide-ehdotuksia erilaisissa konteksteissa.

Vaikka tämän tutkimuksen empiirinen aineisto muodostuu akateemisista interventioista unionistien käymiin keskusteluihin, tutkimukseni käsittelee myös laajemmin tieteen ja politiikan suhdetta toisiinsa sekä tutkijan potentiaalia toimia poliitikon kaltaisesti. Tutkijalta ja poliitikolta vaaditaan usein samankaltaisia ominaisuuksia, ja tiede ja politiikka voidaankin toiminnalliselta logiikaltaan nähdä pitkälti toistensa kaltaisina. Esimerkiksi politiikan parlamentaariseen traditioon historiallisesti liittyvä reilun pelin ajatus muodostaa käyttökelpoisen metaforan myös sille, millaista tieteellisen debatin tulisi olla.

Politiikan teoriaa käytetään päivänpoliittisissa debateissa esimerkiksi korostettaessa unionismin maallista ja modernia luonnetta ja verrattaessa unionismia irlantilaisen nationalismin vanhanaikaisuuteen ja ulossulkevuuteen. Tässä tapauksessa kyse on retorisesta konstruktiosta, jossa politiikan teoria, esimerkiksi klassinen liberalismi, tarjoaa aineistoa päivänpoliittisesti sitoutuneen argumentaation rakentamiseen. Tätä retorista strategiaa eivät käytä ainoastaan poliittisesti sitoutuneet tutkijat, vaan myös teoriaa taitavat puoluepoliitikot. Tässä mielessä tutkimukseni on puheenvuoro myös keskusteluun

niin sanotusta "uudesta unionismista", jolla tarkoitetaan unionismin 1990-luvun sekularisoitumistendenssiä sekä keskiluokkaisten ja koulutettujen unionistien pyrkimystä irrottautua unionismin leimallisesta protestanttisuudesta.

Akateemissävytteisen retoriikan ja maallistuneen argumentaation lisääntyminen on usein tulkittu merkiksi uudenlaisen unionismin synnystä. Tutkimukseni kuitenkin osoittaa, että unionismin sekularisoituminen oli ennen kaikkea retorista. Esimerkiksi akateemisen ja maallistuneen unionismin kanta Pohjois-Irlannin konfliktin peruskysymykseen, Pohjois-Irlannin perustus-lailliseen asemaan, säilyi muuttumattomana, vaikka unionistinen argumen-taatio rakennettiin uskonnollisen vastakkainasettelun sijasta kahden poliittisen filosofian väliseksi vastakkainasetteluksi.

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A CHRONOLOGY OF KEY POLITICAL EVENTS 1967-1998

1960 - 1969

- **1967, February 1:** Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association formed.
- **1968, October 5:** Clashes between NICRA and Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Derry, during civil rights marches putatively considered by many as the beginning of the "Troubles".
- **1968, October 9:** People's Democracy formed after demonstration in Belfast by students. Derry Citizens' Action Committee is formed from five existing protest groups in Derry, led by Ivan Cooper and John Hume.
- **1969, March 30 / April 20 & 25**: Loyalist bombers targeted local amenities, including water and electricity. Northern Ireland receives Army reinforcements for the first time since the Second World War.
- **1969, April 17:** Bernadette Devlin wins a by-election and becomes the youngest woman ever elected to Westminster.
- **1969, April 28**: Terence O'Neill resigns as Prime Minister of Northern Ireland.
- **1969, August 12-14:** Serious rioting erupted in Bogside, Londonderry/Derry. After two days of continuous rioting, British troops were deployed in Belfast and Derry.
- **1969**, **August 14-17:** In response to events in Derry, rioting breaks out in Belfast and elsewhere. Seven people are killed and hundreds of homes are destroyed. The British Army is again sent in to restore order.
- **1969, December 18:** A split formed in Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army, creating what was to become the Workers Party and Sinn Féin, and the Official IRA and Provisional IRA.

1970 - 1979

- **1970, August:** Leading Nationalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) was formed.
- **1971, August 9:** Internment was introduced in Northern Ireland.
- **1972**, **January 30**: Bloody Sunday - Thirteen men were shot and killed by armed British forces following peaceful protests in Derry.
- **1972, March 24**: Stormont Government was dissolved. Direct rule from Westminster was introduced.
- **1972, July 21:** Bloody Friday - nine people were killed and one hundred thirty seriously injured when the IRA set twenty-two bombs that exploded in Belfast in the space of seventy-five minutes.
- **1973, December 3:** The Sunningdale Agreement was signed
- **1974, May 15-24:** Ulster Workers Council strike.
- **1979, March 30:** Conservative shadow spokesman on Northern Ireland, Airey Neave was killed by a bomb planted in his car by the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA

1980 - 1989

- **1980**, **October 27:** Republican prisoners in the Maze began a hunger strike in protest against the end of special category status.
- **1980, December 18:** Hunger strike called off.
- **1981, March 1:** Prisoners in the Maze began a second hunger strike.
- **1981, April 9:** Hunger striker Bobby Sands won a by-election to be elected as a Member of Parliament at Westminster.
- **1981, May 5:** After 66 days on hunger strike, 26 year old Bobby Sands MP died in the Maze 5.5.1981. Nine further hunger strikers died in the following 3 months.
- **1981, October 31:** Second hunger strike ended.
- **1983, May 30:** New Ireland Forum set up.
- **1984, October 12:** The IRA carried out a bomb attack on the Grand Hotel, Brighton, which was being used as a base for the Conservative Party Conference. Five people, including MP Sir Anthony Berry, were killed. Margaret and Denis Thatcher narrowly escaped injury.
- **1985, November 15:** Margaret Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
- **1985, December:** All fifteen Unionist MPs at Westminster resigned in protest against the Anglo-Irish agreement.
- **1987, November 8:** Eleven people were killed by an IRA bomb during a Remembrance Day service in Enniskillen, County Fermanagh.

1990 – 1999

- **1990**, **March:** Charles Haughey became the first serving Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) to visit Northern Ireland since 1965.
- **1990, November 22:** Margaret Thatcher resigned as British Prime Minister.
- **1990, December:** The IRA held its first Christmas ceasefire for 15 years.
- **1993, June:** President of the Republic of Ireland, Mary Robinson, visited community groups in Belfast. Robinson publicly shook hands with Gerry Adams, provoking criticism.
- **1993, September:** The IRA declared a ceasefire to coincide with a visit to Northern Ireland by prominent Irish Americans.
- **1993, October 23:** Ten people were killed by an IRA bomb at a fish shop on Shankill Road, Belfast.
  - As a retaliation, the UFF shot and killed eight people at the Rising Sun bar, Greysteel, County Londonderry 30th October.
- **1994, August 31:** The IRA issued a statement which announced a complete cessation of military activities. The loyalist paramilitary groups reciprocated six weeks later. The ceasefire was broken less than two years later.

- **1994, December:** Former US Senator, George Mitchell, was appointed by US President Bill Clinton as special economic advisor on Ireland. In effect, Mitchell was the 'peace envoy' promised by Clinton in 1992.
- **1995, January:** A delegation from Sinn Féin met with officials from the Northern Ireland Office.
- **1995, February 22:** The British and Irish governments released the Joint Framework document.
- **1995, September 8:** David Trimble was elected as the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, following the resignation of James Molyneaux.
- **1995, November 30:** Bill Clinton became the first serving US President to visit Northern Ireland.
- **1996, June 4:** Talks at Stormont began without Sinn Féin.
- **1997, May 1:** Labour won the UK general election. Tony Blair was elected Prime Minister. Dr. Marjorie 'Mo' Mowlam was appointed as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
- **1997, June 6:** Sinn Féin won its first ever seats in the Dáil (Irish Parliament)
- **1997, July 19:** The IRA renewed its ceasefire.
- **1997, August:** There was a debate on BBC's Newsnight between Sinn Féin and the UUP. This was the first television debate between the two parties.
- **1997, September:** Sinn Féin endorsed the Mitchell Principles and entered political talks.
- **1998, March:** George Mitchell set a deadline of 9th April for the parties to reach an agreement.
- **1998, April 10:** Mitchell's deadline passed, but the talks continued. At 5:35 p.m., on Good Friday, 10th April, George Mitchell made the announcement: 'I am happy to announce that the governments, and political parties of Northern Ireland have reached an agreement.' The agreement is officially known as the Belfast Agreement**.**
- **1998, May 22:** The people of Ireland, North and South, voted in favour of the Belfast Agreement in two referendums held on the same day.
- **1998, June 25:** Northern Ireland Assembly elections were held. David Trimble was elected First Minister. Seamus Mallon was elected deputy.
- **1998, December 10:** David Trimble of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and John Hume from the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to bring peace to Northern Ireland.