

Jouni Vauhkonen

A RHETORIC OF REDUCTION

Bertrand de Jouvenel's Pure Theory of
Politics as Persuasion

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Politics as Persuasion

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Editors

Tapani Korhonen

Department of Psychology, University of Jyväskylä

Pekka Olsbo, Marja-Leena Tynkkynen

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ABSTRACT

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politiikan puhdas teoria suostutteluna

Diss.

Bertrand de Jouvenel's pure theory of politics includes an important microscopic view of politics. In this study I am searching for reasons why de Jouvenel thought that we should find politics from every situation where "A tells B to do H". I call this attitude a "rhetoric of reduction", which is not so pure as de Jouvenel believed, but a product of a certain intellectual and political situation. I discuss the formation of pure politics in its context and I also try to find out what de Jouvenel may have been doing in saying what he said. The study shows how the pure politics was formed from the main idea of *Du Pouvoir* (1945): the dialectic of command, which combines several ideas of Weber, Hegel, and Marx. However, the pure politics was formed in a situation where political theorists discussed the end of ideology, depoliticisation, and the death of political theory and political philosophy. The pure theory of politics was meant to be a counter-move, a new beginning, against these end debates.

The methodological commitments of the study are drawn from the current conceptual history and rhetorical analysis: I utilise Quentin Skinner's Austinian views that the propositions of a political theorist are rhetorical moves in argumentation and "understanding any proposition requires us to identify the question to which the proposition may be regarded as an answer". I complement these views with Kari Palonen's distinctions of context, which include implicit part of text: intra-text, inter-text, co-text, and context. In addition, I de-contextualise de Jouvenel's texts with Aristotle's conception of *enthymeme*.

I conclude that the pure theory of politics is actually a rhetorical version of social contract theories. It aims at the consent of B and its derivatives. This kind of conception of politics seeks for mutual understanding just like Rousseau in *Du contract social* searched for the reason of the consent in the the social contract. Bertrand de Jouvenel is a contract theorist, who adds the rhetorical relation into the consent which in the actual contract theories seems to appear of nothingness and to form a general will. The pure theory of politics is politics which aims to subjugate every B.

Keywords: Bertrand de Jouvenel, political theory, politics, conceptual history, end of ideology, rhetoric, enthymeme, power, authority, post-war France.

Author's Address

Jouni Vauhkonen
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy/
Political Science
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Supervisor

Professor Kari Palonen
Academy of Finland Professor
Professor of Political Science
University of Jyväskylä

Reviewers

Doctor Leena Subra
Language Centre
University of Jyväskylä

Research Fellow Niilo Kauppi
Academy of Finland
University of Helsinki

Opponent

Professor Bruce Gronbeck
Department of Communication Studies
University of Iowa
USA

PREFACE

I begin to write this thesis here, in the Department of Western Manuscripts of *Bibliothèque nationale*, in rue de Richelieu, where I have spent several weeks during my two visits searching for the secrets of Bertrand de Jouvenel from his archives. This is perhaps not the best place to begin a thesis: the floor squeaks and the old manuscripts smell musty. However, here I can see that the most highly appreciated works of western political thought are not only books and texts, as of course they partly are, but also the footprints of real writers who have acted, thought, and lived. Their heritage lies here, in these boxes which we can see, touch, and smell. This beautiful building with its extremely important content presents something which Bertrand de Jouvenel would have called *aimable*, and he loved to quote these old forgotten authors and texts. From these windows I can see how pollution destroys the building and I can hear the problems of traffic in this city which is full of signs of past and almost every street corner has its place in the history of humankind. This place seduces to the past and its practices have been created during the time when people used the plume; now everybody uses their *ordinateurs* and I can read my e-mails here. The problems of the industrialised and postindustrialized world, which haunted Bertrand de Jouvenel through his life, they are present here, in this beautifully decorated room.

After the first lines, my work continued in several places. The largest part of it I wrote in two farms on the shore of Lake Iisvesi during the summer 2002. The summer was hot, but I spent most of it in the coolness of the outbuilding of Mannilanranta, Rautalampi, where my common-law wife Helena Mannila and her sister Marjatta have a strawberry farm. The rest of the hot summer I wrote this thesis in Suonenjoki, in the old house of my parents, Mirjam and Pertti Vauhkonen: in the same building where I was born in 1959. In turn, my family and my parents shared the presence of my non-presence; I admire their patience and first and foremost I have to thank them. In addition, several pages of the work were formed in trains between Jyväskylä and Helsinki, where I attend the meetings of a party, the executive council of the Finnish Green League.

I owe a lot to many men, women, and institutions that I could write these first lines in Paris and complete the work. I am happy that I have a possibility to thank them: The first of them is Mrs. Jeannie Malige, who has the rights of de Jouvenel's archives and who kindly gave her permission to study them in *Bibliothèque nationale*.

Without the financial support of VAKAVA, the national Graduate School for Political Science and International Relations, the completion of this work would not have been possible. VAKAVA financed the study during the years 2000-2001 and paid the expenses of the two visits to Paris. The work continued with the support of the University of Jyväskylä: at first I received a Rector's scholarship and finally the Faculty of Social Sciences and the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy/Political Science hired me for the autumn of 2002.

Several persons have helped me both intellectually and practically. During several years I have exchanged e-mails with Dennis Hale, Boston College. He was one of the rare persons who was interested in de Jouvenel's thinking at the time

when it was not fashionable to read de Jouvenel. Both his example and the articles and the translations of de Jouvenel's books, which he gave me during his visit to Jyväskylä during the fall 1999, encouraged me a lot.

My old friend from my life as a journalist, Jouko Marttila, sent me the copies of *The Pure Theory of Politics* when he studied at the University of Austin, Texas. A Canadian city-planner, Gae VanSiri, who actually was interested in my wife's graduate thesis, helped me to find John Braun's thesis concerning de Jouvenel's early ideas.

My colleagues have contributed to this work with their comments and their practical aid. The Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä and the several seminars, where I have presented papers, have formed an intellectually fruitful ground to study de Jouvenel. All the persons I will next mention, and many other men and women have aided me, in one way or another, during the preparation of this work: Pekka Korhonen, Sakari Hänninen, Jari Hoffrén, Suvi Soinen, Eeva Aarnio, Ainoriitta Pöllänen, Tapani Kaakkuriniemi, Marja Keränen, Kia Lindroos, Minna Turunen, Iisa Räsänen (†), Jukka Kanerva (†), Heli Paalumäki (Turku), Tuula Vaarakallio, Gerhard Göhler (Freie Universität), Jan Ifversen (Århus), Lauri Siisäinen, Matti Wiberg (Turku), Juha Sihvola, Eerik Lagerspetz, Heikki Ikäheimo, Simo Koivunen, Sari Roman, and Petri Koikkalainen (Rovaniemi). My hearty thanks to you.

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It has become a ritual for students of Kari Palonen to thank him very warmly. I also have the pleasure to be one of those who offer him my sincerest appreciation. In addition to the normal supervising, he loaned books and articles, gave practical advice of the second-hand bookmarkets in Paris, was always interested in the study, and encouraged when I hesitated. When I wrote something, the feedback came the next day. A student cannot expect so much!

Because of all this support and sometimes even in spite of it, I have surpassed myself in many ways during the preparation of this work. Therefore I will take all the political responsibility for mistakes, misunderstandings and misinterpretations, which a carefully prepared study, such as this, may also include.

I dedicate this book to my family: Helena, Annukka, and Anne-Mari Mannila. Their support and love have proved to be immeasurable and invaluable. I could not have done it without you!

Jyväskylä, November 2002

J.V.

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Abbreviations

AC = L'Art de la conjecture. 1964. Paris: Futuribles 1972.

JP = Journal du Pouvoir. A typescript in Carton 5.

NP = The Nature of Politics. 1986. Selected Essays of Bertrand de Jouvenel. New York: Schocken Books.

P = Du Pouvoir. 1945. Paris: Hachette 1972.

Po = On Power. 1948. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1993.

PT = The Pure Theory of Politics. 1963. Cambridge: CUP and Yale University Press.

PP = De la politique pure. 1963. Paris: Calmann-Lévy 1977.

S = De la souveraineté. 1955. Paris: Librairie de Médicis.

So = Sovereignty. 1957. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1998.

1 THE PURE THEORY OF POLITICS AND ITS CONTEXT

Man's spirit is like an organism: it grows; theories and doctrines are like machines, they wear out.

Bertrand de Jouvenel¹

To choose an outdated political theorist, such as Bertrand de Jouvenel, for the subject of a study brings along risks to a political upstart in the field of political theory. The risk lies in the fact that the meaning of 'outdated' transfers easily from the subject of the study to the author of the study. Because of these risks students of political theory readily choose their subject from the list of the canonised classics. They are right: the classics have managed to say something which almost always inspires. They are wrong: the list of classics lives like a Top 10 Chart in popular music but the changes are slower. Thus, the risks also include possibilities. Apt studies alter the list or widen its length. The well-studied classics wear out easily. New names can arise to the Top 10 of political science and suddenly the outdated political scientist can be at the centre of a renewed discipline.

I was fortunate. When I began to read de Jouvenel's books about ten years ago there were only a few in the whole world who were interested in de Jouvenel's political thought. Now his books are reprinted and he has been the focus of many seminars. This study is not, I hope, going to be a part of the embalming process of a new classic, but I would like to add another name to the list of interesting thinkers.

At first I focused my study of de Jouvenel's books on his conception of future. This was due to my master's thesis, in which I learned to think of political time. I soon realised that it was not, however, the most interesting part of de Jouvenel's thinking; his conception of politics was. Pure politics and its theory have some original characteristics that have propelled this long-lived project and have continued to keep it interesting. No-one has tried to think politics purely formally and, at the same time, to relate it with something which in other contexts is called rhetoric. These traits have shown me that it is important to study de

¹ In his letter to Ward E. Y. Elliott (1959). (Carton 58)

Jouvenel's pure theory of politics, because it aids in a better understanding of politics. Luckily, the study has raised me on the cross-swell of two intellectual breakers – the rise of de Jouvenel in the list of classics and the rhetorical turn in political science – both of which, I presume, will soon abate.

A scholar of a second rank classic has to do more basic research in archives than a student of a classic whose writings have been under more scrutiny. This laborious but very instructive work twice lead me to familiarise myself with de Jouvenel's papers in *Bibliothèque nationale*. During the two months, I managed to examine only a fraction of the files: I had to concentrate on something and I chose to read the published articles and collect biographical details. In short, I wanted to clarify the context of my subject: the formation of the pure theory of politics from the public side of his texts and to clarify what he did after the Second World War. The first part of this basic research is present and explicit everywhere in my study. The second is absorbed between the lines, because this is more a study of an intellectual history than a biography.

To understand a political theorist properly an interpreter has to set several preconditions. A close study of texts requires knowledge and understanding of their meaning and context². Above all one must remember that "political life itself sets the main problems for the political theorist" (Skinner 1978a, xi). With these general ideas in mind, I study Bertrand de Jouvenel's *The Pure Theory of Politics* (from now on also *The Pure Theory*) historico-rhetorically or rhetorico-historically. In accordance with Quentin Skinner's idea that "we need to understand why a certain proposition has been put forward if we wish to understand the proposition itself" I try to find a sense why a strange thought of "pure politics" has occurred in the world (Skinner 1988, 274). This sense is not found from the proposition itself but from the move in argument:

We need to see it not simply as a proposition, but also as a move in argument. So we need to grasp why it seemed worth making that precise move; to recapture the presuppositions and purposes that went into the making of it. (Skinner 1988, 274)

This means that I consider de Jouvenel's propositions as rhetorical moves in argumentation and "understanding any proposition requires us to identify the question to which the proposition may be regarded as an answer" (Skinner 1988, 274). In the spirit of Skinner's Austinian understanding of argumentation I also try to find out what de Jouvenel may have been doing in saying what he said (cf. Skinner 1988, 275). I try to follow faithfully the advice:

[W]e should start by elucidating the meaning, and hence the subject matter, of the utterances in which we are interested. We should then turn to the context of their occurrence in order to determine how exactly they connect with, or relate to, other utterances concerned with the same subject matter. My suggestion is that, if we succeed in identifying this context with sufficient accuracy, we can eventually hope to read off what the speaker or writer in whom we are interested was doing in saying what he or she said. (Skinner 1988, 275)

² "There is no implication that the relevant context need be an immediate one. As Pocock has especially emphasized, the questions and problems to which writers see themselves as responding may have been raised at a remote period, even in a wholly different culture." (Skinner 1988, 275)

But what is the context of a book? Here I follow Kari Palonen's interpretation that it is simply the implicit part of the text: *textum* has two dimensions – it is woven together with a more visible part of text and a less visible woof of context. (cf. Palonen 1999, 46) In accordance with Palonen, I want to distinguish some threads in the tissue of context: intra-text, inter-text, co-text, and context. (Palonen 1999, 45-47) I have written several chapters which especially try to shed light to these traits of the text. Although my thesis is aimed to be a study which takes its place after the "rhetorical turn", it nevertheless tries to find the "meaning of the context" historically and show how the argument transformed in a given context. Of course, these levels of the text are often interwoven and I hope that my narrative will reveal them consistently.

This study begins with an analysis which belongs to the category of intra-text. In the beginning of *The Pure Theory of Politics* (1963) we can find a dialogue titled *Wisdom and Activity: The Pseudo-Alcibiades* (from now on *The Pseudo-Alcibiades*). De Jouvenel described that it "does not really pertain to the body of the work but constitutes an extended and somewhat difficult introduction" (*PT*, xii). However, he did not much explain the meaning of the dialogue in the context of *The Pure Theory*. Thus, I interpret the 'function' of the dialogue i.e. the internal links and internal oppositions between the dialogue and the other parts of *The Pure Theory* (cf. Palonen 1999, 45). This chapter, 2. *The Pseudo-Alcibiades: A Reduction into a Character*, is also an independent interpretation of the dialogue, but at the same time it forms an introduction to the themes of this thesis.

Then I shall turn to the inter-textual sides of the book. Chapter 3 and 4 try to show outer links of *The Pure Theory* with de Jouvenel's own texts (inter-textuality in Palonen's sense), the problematics of the time or of long time debate which are thematised in the text (context in the limited sense), and the explicit quotations or implicit allusions known to insiders (co-text) (cf. Palonen 1999, 45-47). This means that at first I describe how de Jouvenel's prefigure of politics was expressed in *Du Pouvoir* (1945) and how it was transformed in de Jouvenel's texts. The problem of chapter 3 is now the internal references of *The Pure Theory* to de Jouvenel's earlier texts. I do not want only to find similarities in the formulations between the earlier articles or books and *The Pure Theory*, but I intend to reflect upon differences in the formulations of different texts (cf. Palonen 1999, 46). I limited my study to the texts which were published (or written) between 1942-1965, because in the 1930s de Jouvenel was oriented more practically to daily politics and after 1964 he concentrated on his futuribles project. I shall focus on the "mature" period of Jouvenel's thought also because the story of de Jouvenel's earlier thought was recorded in detail in John Braun's massive thesis *Une fidélité difficile: The Early Life and Ideas of Bertrand de Jouvenel, 1903-1945* (University of Waterloo, Canada). Here I wanted to study the problematics of the period during which he wrote and to emphasise the role of two discussions which were important in the formation of *The Pure Theory*: the international debate of "the end of ideology" and the French discussion of *dépolitisation*. In chapter 4, I shall show how these debates moulded his defence of politics. These debates formed a important part of the co-text of the book.

If the study has been this far "historico-rhetorical", I shall then turn, in chapter 5, to a "rhetorico-historical" examination of my subject. At the core of pure politics we find, in the disguise of the pure theory, the central conceptions of rhetoric: the pure theory of politics can be expressed in the way that we can find politics in every

situation where "A tells B to do H"³ (PT, 69). At this point I ask how de Jouvenel's texts work rhetorically and to trace where he adopted the idea of rhetoric. The purpose of these acts is to read off what he was doing in saying what he said. In addition, partly in accordance with Skinner's program, partly to turn in more rhetorical directions, I argue that the pure theory of politics is about a rhetoric of reduction, in other words, about a rhetorical strategy which has always lived in the shadow of amplification. My emphasis lies in the rhetorical study, even when I study the levels of co-text, context and inter-text. They are the constituents of the *inventio* of pure politics and its theory which are under my loupe.

In the last chapter my task is to draw conclusions from texts of a writer who found it very hard to write a conclusion to any of his books. I try to explain what de Jouvenel may have been doing in saying what he said and how he did it. This has not been the aim of earlier commentators.

1.1 De Jouvenel Studies

Bertrand de Jouvenel's political thought has not been the subject of many studies. A critical reader will notice that I quote only a few of these rare instances. Namely, most of their points have in my view minor importance or their points are a part of the self-evident constituent of the study. My aim is to establish a new view from the original sources, not to comment on the secondary sources, which have their own points. However, next I comment shortly de Jouvenel studies.

John Braun's enormous dissertation *Une fidélité difficile: The Early Life and Ideas of Bertrand de Jouvenel, 1903-1945* (1985) helped me a lot to see all the dimensions of de Jouvenel's political turns. However, I found no help when I studied de Jouvenel's rhetorical traits. Neither Zeev Sternhell's book *Ni droite, ni gauche. L'idéologie fasciste en France* (1983) nor Eric Delbecque's *mémoire* (graduate thesis) *Bertrand de Jouvenel 1934-1938: La fascination fasciste ou l'histoire d'une illusion* (1997) have a role in this study. Sternhell's interesting arguments of de Jouvenel's fascism in the 1930s are outside of the time limit and the questions of this study. These treatises or de Jouvenel's early writings offer no help to understand his political thought in the 1950s or the 1960s, or at least they would require a different view and method than I have here.

De Jouvenel's conceptions of power and authority have attracted perhaps more attention than his other views on political theory. Evelyne Pisier's *Autorité et liberté dans les écrits politiques de Bertrand de Jouvenel* (1967) was the first complete study on the subject. I learned a lot from Pisier's study: it helped to understand some aspects of power and freedom in de Jouvenel's works, but my study wandered away from Pisier's positions. I agree with some of Michael Dillon's interpretations in his article *Modernity and Authority in Bertrand de Jouvenel* (1975). For example, Dillon argued that Rousseau is for de Jouvenel the most important writer (Dillon 1975, 3-12). Again, I have set the point of my arguments in a different place than Dillon: He emphasised de Jouvenel's conception of freedom and its relation to the beginning of *Du contrat social*. I emphasise de Jouvenel's contractual characteristics in the core of pure politics.

³ The other formulations are "A suggests to B the action H" and "A demande à B d'accomplir l'action H" (PT, 69; PP, 107).

The most interesting of de Jouvenel studies is Hannah Arendt's critical analyse of *Du Pouvoir* in her *On Violence* (1969/1970). I subscribe to Arendt's critique, but I try to analyse how his conception was established. Her *What is Authority?* (1958) might have taken its inspiration of de Jouvenel's *Sovereignty* which was published in English 1957. She did not mention de Jouvenel's name, but Arendt's article was published in Carl J. Friedrich's (Ed.) *NOMOS I: Authority* (1958) where was published de Jouvenel's article *Athority: The Efficient Imperative* as well. At least Friedrich knew both of them⁴. (Friedrich 1959, 183; *PT*, 92 n. 2) However, I will not study de Jouvenel's conception of power or authority that much here. The main reason for that is that I studied them in my licenciate thesis and in an article⁵.

The articles of Roy Pierce, Carl Slevin, and Robert C. Grady were important when I began my study, but now I have drifted away from their views. Roy Pierce's *Bertrand de Jouvenel: Dux, Rex, and Common Good* is intended to be an introduction to de Jouvenel's political thought. For example, Pierce argued that there "is a clear trend in de Jouvenel's post-war writings from the historical and the philosophical to the behavioural and the operational" (Pierce 1966, 186). From my view, the argument is not entirely senseless, but I have specified considerably the changes in de Jouvenel's thinking. According to Carl Slevin, de Jouvenel had two important themes: The first was "concerned with the advantages and the second with the disadvantages of the high rate of technological and organizational change which has characterized Western societies over the past two centuries" (Slevin 1972, 51). I agree with Slevin, but this does not explain what de Jouvenel was doing when he wrote of pure politics. I also agree with Grady that de Jouvenel was in *The Pure Theory* "returning to his prewar concern with real-world problems, but it is a return based on a developed theoretical position and not ad hoc" (Grady 1980, 367). However, I situate the contract theory in the core of the pure politics unlike Grady. My modest aim is to show new ways to respond to the questions which Pierce, Grady and Slevin posed.

I have also quoted Gerd Habermann's *Die soziale Weisheit des Bertrand de Jouvenel* (1995). I agree with him that de Jouvenel belongs to the school of liberal "revisionists", but I cannot agree with his argument that de Jouvenel "ist in erster Linie Ordnungstheoretiker und -politiker" (Habermann 1995, 58-59). Rather, I prefer to connect him with the social contract theories and the *phronesis* tradition.

Very valuable have been some introductions of de Jouvenel's books like Daniel J. Mahoney's and David DesRosiers's introduction to the new edition of *Sovereignty* (1997) and Dennis Hale's and Marc Landy's introduction to the collection of de Jouvenel's articles *The Nature of Politics* (1986). Mahoney's and Desrosiers' article helped me to understand the Aristotelian characteristics in de Jouvenel's thinking. Hale and Landy paved my way to his Sophism.

⁴ As Dillon has noted, Friedrich, Arendt, and de Jouvenel relied upon Cicero's thoughts (Dillon 1975, 25)

⁵ See Vauhkonen 2000a: Puhdas politiikka likaisessa maailmassa. Retoriikka, valta ja aika Bertrand de Jouvenelin poliittisessa ajattelussa 1943-1965 [Pure Politics in a Dirty World. Rhetoric, Power, and Time in Bertrand de Jouvenel's Political Thought 1943-1965] and Vauhkonen 2000b: Herruus, auktoriteetti ja antiautoritaarinen auktoriteetti – Bertrand de Jouvenelin Poliitiikan puhtaan teorian valtakäsityksestä [*Herrschaft, Authority, and Anti-authoritative Authority – On Bertrand de Jouvenel's Conception of Power in The Pure Theory of Politics*]

In Finland Bertrand de Jouvenel is well-known only among some political theorists and futurologists. The most valuable de Jouvenel commentaries has been for me Kari Palonen's *Die Thematisierung der Politik als Phänomen. Eine Interpretation der Geschichte des Begriffs Politik im Frankreich des 20. Jahrhunderts* (1989) and his article *Argumentin politiikka* [Politics of Argument] (1997). Heli Paalumäki's graduate thesis⁶ helped me to place de Jouvenel among the French futurological thought, but she did not think of him as the political thinker from which his *futuribles* arose⁷. The same goes for Mika Mannermaa's *Evolutionaarinen tulevaisuudentutkimus* [Evolutionary Research of Future] (1991) and Johan Asplund's critical introduction *Teorier om framtiden* (1979).

Ward E. Y. Elliott's B.A. thesis *Bertrand de Jouvenel and the Organic Tradition* (1959) is worthy of mention here, because the subject of the study wrote an angry letter to the author of the study. Some quotations from the letter decorate this study.

The innumerable reviews of de Jouvenel's books are valuable for a reception study, which I do not here⁸. I learned much from them, but many of them have led me astray. Therefore I have betrayed all the commentators, utilised original sources, and followed my own way: The secondary sources which I utilise are mostly texts from the time when de Jouvenel prepared the pure theory of politics or other books which were important to him, as Rousseau's *Du contrat social*. The methodological or theoretical sources of this study come from the current debate of conceptual history and from the new rhetoric.

1.2 Reduction: *Enthymeme* and Example

In addition to the historico-rhetorical and the rhetorico-historical approach there will be another main thread in the study. Namely, I apply an age-old idea of political speech to de Jouvenel's pure theory of politics. In the course of the study this view is quite implicit, but in the concluding chapter it will be a tool which will help me, I hope, to say something general about the political speech. This de-contextualisation of the text will serve as a heuristical implement in an experiment which has the ambition to unearth the *point* of any political speech, or, the

⁶ *Kohti mahdollisia tulevaisuuksia. Bertrand de Jouvenelin ajattelu tulevaisuudentutkimuksen käännekohdan ilmentäjänä 1960-luvun Ranskassa* [Towards Possible Futures. Bertrand de Jouvenel's Thought as an Expression of the Turn of Future Studies in France during the 1960s] (1998). See also her article "Imagine a Good Day" – *Bertrand de Jouvenel's Idea of Possible Futures in the Context of Fictitious and Historical Narratives*. In *Ennen & nyt*, Vol. 1: The Papers of the Nordic Conference on the History of Ideas, Helsinki 2001.

⁷ Paalumäki has continued her de Jouvenel studies and opened www-pages: <http://users.utu.fi/helpaa/BJouvenel.html>

⁸ See for example Friedrich 1959, Meynaud 1963, Chevallier 1956 and 1951, Wood 1958, Bryson 1949, Peardon 1951, de Visme Williamson 1964, Catlin 1964, Macpherson 1967, Galli 1997, Kendal 1964, Robinson 1968, Lévy 1963, Suter 1959, Wedgewood 1949, Nguyen 1963, or Woolf 1958.

political in any speech.⁹ Namely, in accordance with Aristotle my starting point in reduction lies in the argument that when we ponder over contingent¹⁰ matters (i.e. things that can be one way or another) enthymeme and example are the means by which "all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes and nothing else" (Aristotle a, 1356b). It is not possible to study here whether syllogism and enthymeme are the same thing or not.¹¹ I take a position against traditional philosophical interpretations of Aristotle and I utilise Burnyeat's historical interpretation in which "an enthymeme is an argument (*sullogismos tis*) in a rhetorical speech"¹² (Burnyeat 1990, 21).

Rhetorical argumentation in a situation where one deliberates contingent matters differs from philosophical argumentation in Burnyeat's interpretation in two important ways.

First, the variable subject matter: rhetoric's function is to speak on issues where we deliberate because (a) we have no specialist expertise (*technē*) to guide us, and (b) we believe that the outcome is open and can be affected by our decision. Second, the simple audience: not only is the speaker no specialist on the question to be decided, but he is addressing an audience of people who cannot easily follow a long train of reasoning. This too is part of the function of rhetoric, to adjust a speech to the limitations of its

⁹ I'm deeply aware that these kind of universalisations can be dangerous to any political thought. However, they can also be powerful means in the changes of political thoughts. I hope that *enthymema* and example will serve extra-textually in same manner than conceptions of "text", context or co-text.

¹⁰ "But since few of the propositions of the rhetorical syllogism are necessary, for most of the things which we judge and examine can be other than they are, human actions, which are the subject of our deliberation and examination, being all of such a character and, generally speaking, none of them necessary; since, further, facts which only generally happen or are merely possible can only be demonstrated by other facts of the same kind, and necessary facts by necessary propositions (and that this is so is clear from the *Analytics*), it is evident that the materials from which enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the most part only generally true; and these materials being probabilities and signs, it follows that these two elements must correspond to these two kinds of propositions, each to each." (Aristotle a, 1357a)

¹¹ We have reasons for both interpretations: "The difference between example and enthymeme is evident from the *Topics*, where, in discussing syllogism and induction, it has previously been said that the proof from a number of particular cases that such is the rule, is called in Dialectic induction, in Rhetoric example; but when, certain things being posited, something different results by reason of them, alongside of them, from their being true, either universally or in most cases, such a conclusion in Dialectic is called a syllogism, in Rhetoric an enthymeme." (Aristotle a, 1356b)

¹² "[A]n enthymeme is an argument (*sullogismos tis*) in a rhetorical speech, and whereas the difference between a dialectical *sullogismos* and scientific *apodeixis* is defined by the character of their premises (...), the difference between dialectical and a rhetorical *sullogismos* is defined rather by the context in which they occur. Both take their premises from *endoxa*, propositions that enjoy good repute, in the one case with people who require reasoned discussion, in other with people who are accustomed to deliberation. Accordingly, if the standards of validity do need to be relaxed somewhat to accommodate rhetorical *sullogismoi* under the same definition as dialectical ones, then it is to the context that we should look to understand why and how." (Burnyeat 1990, 21)

audience. The consequence Aristotle draws for the enthymeme is correspondingly two-fold. First, the enthymeme must be argument (*sullogismos*) about things that, in the main, are capable of being otherwise than they are—few of them are invariable necessities. Second, it must restrict itself to a small number of premises—often fewer than the primary (=normal) *sullogismos*. (Burnyeat 1990, 21-22)

The correct interpretation of Aristotle is here, however, of minor importance. By means of these ideas, true or false in relation to Aristotle, I want to add to Skinner's Austinian historical program something which appears to form for me suitable extra- or de-contextual tools to find a better understanding of de Jouvenel's pure politics: how the doing the things with words actually happens in a political situation. Against Aristotle's argument that "[e]xamples are best suited to deliberative oratory and enthymemes to forensic", I consider enthymeme primary for any innovative political theory, for any intellectual project which tries to change the prevailing opinions (and which are thus in this sense political), or *for any other political speech or text* (cf. Aristotle a, 1418a). Enthymeme is more primary than example because we act politically through it. If we have no enthymeme, or in Skinner's language "a move in argument", we do not act politically i.e. we have no intentions to persuade others on the basis of our values or passions. This point of view does not mean that I underestimate the force of example. They are interdependent: without enthymeme examples are separate and disconnected, mere entertainment or epideictic rhetoric (which can have unintentional or unnoticed political aspects, dimensions or purposes too). Without examples enthymemes have no power, or at least less power to persuade. Only after enthymemes and examples can come the more subtle *ornatus* of rhetoric: the efficient figures and tropes.

In a free discussion enthymemes are set against each other. As Aristotle said, "[o]ne should not introduce a series of enthymemes continuously but mix them up; otherwise they destroy one another" (Aristotle a, 1418a). In the same way enthymemes may destroy one another in a debate, i.e. they are engaged in a life-and-death struggle. However, their "life and death" can also be like in Ovid's metamorphosis: a series of disconnected and sudden transformations into something else. And if a speaker does not mention enthymeme in a discussion this does not mean that it does not matter. It is only reduced to "the implicit", which is the strictest way of reduction.

After Aristotle, a difference was made between reduction¹³ and amplification. The Romans utilised verbs *minuere* and *augere* when they described these two ways of persuasive speaking (Skinner 1996, 135). To reduce and to amplify, these are rhetorical "strategies" of which I study reduction and its interplay with its "tactical" means and the means of amplification. How the enthymeme of the pure theory of politics is established and how it works, this is my main theme. To approach it I first analyse the most important example by which de Jouvenel supported his enthymeme: Alcibiades.

¹³ Kenneth Burke utilises the word "diminution" (*meiosis*) (Burke 1950, 69).

2 ***THE PSEUDO-ALCIBIADES:*** **A REDUCTION INTO A CHARACTER**

At the beginning of *The Pure Theory of Politics* Bertrand de Jouvenel has placed a "Platonic" dialogue titled *Wisdom and Activity: The Pseudo-Alcibiades*. The central ideas of de Jouvenel's pure politics are expressed in the dialogue, although in an indirect way. Now I will try to interpret the meaning of *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* and its position as an intra-text: the internal links and internal oppositions between the dialogue and the other parts of *The Pure Theory*. At the same time, this chapter is intended to be an opening to the themes of the study.

The dialogue imitates Plato's *Alcibiades I*, but it has a contradictory aim: Plato (or some of his students¹) had an intention to defend Socratic wisdom against Alcibiades' ambition² whereas de Jouvenel's dialogue is intended to be a politician's retort³ (cf. Plato a). The subject matter under the discussion is the military expedition which – as we know now afterwards – ruined Athens but the tension in relation to Plato forms the backbone of the dialogue. The two men discuss of the role of politician: Socrates wants the politicians to be wiser and more prudent; Alcibiades explains why politicians do what they do. In the following I shall introduce the themes and the subject matters which were important to the birth of the dialogue and the pure politics.

¹ Bertrand de Jouvenel did not seem to recognise that the authenticity of the dialogue *Alcibiades I* is not clear. For our purposes the question of authenticity is a matter of minor importance.

² Of course there are several ways to interpretate *Alcibiades* (cf. for example Digeser 1995, 204-207, Cazeaux 1998). Here I naturally favour de Jouvenel's interpretation.

³ The first version of the text was published in *The Yale Review* (December 1960 No 2). The title of the article was *The Pseudo-Alcibiades: A Dialogue on Political Action and Responsibility*. The version in *The Yale Review* was already almost ready. Bertrand de Jouvenel only completed the introduction of the dialogue and the last lines of the protagonists for the actual book. In the French version, *De la politique pure* (1963), there are only minor addenda.

2.1 Alcibiades, *un politicien*

The Pseudo-Alcibiades belongs to a small but significant genre of texts in the political theory: apologies of politicians. As Kari Palonen has recently argued, the apologies of politicians form an interesting genre of literature that is neglected by political theorists and intellectual historians (cf. Palonen 2002a, 2002b). Some of them, like Louis Barthou's *Le politique* (1923), F. C. Oliver's *Politics and Politicians* (1934), and J. D. B. Miller's *Politicians* (1958) legitimise the profession of politician among others. In contrast to that Max Weber's *Politik als Beruf* (1919a) and Jean-Paul Sartre's apology in the third volume of his Flaubert-study *L'idiot de la famille* (1972) apply a provocative rhetorical strategy in their attempt "to alter the allegedly 'ordinary meaning' of politics" and of the corresponding type of the politician (Palonen 2002a, 150). *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* belongs to this latter variant of the genre.

A new French noun, *le politicien* was introduced in the 1870s, besides the old expressions *le politique* and *l'homme politique*. Originally it referred to the American *politician*, but gave to the French usage a corresponding pejorative variant. Like Sartre, de Jouvenel does not distinguish *le politique* from *le politicien*⁴, but instead he intentionally adopts the pejorative term in *De la politique pure*, the French version of the book. (Palonen 2002a, 148; cf. *PP*, 26, 28, 36, 38, 49-50) De Jouvenel also utilises the words *l'hommes politiques* (*PP*, 11) and *l'homme état* (*PP*, 47). However, *l'hommes politiques* refers in the general sense to their way to use words politically, thus their being *politiciens*. In the second case the expression *l'homme état* refers to Plato's comparison between weavers and statesmen, not to de Jouvenel's own way of thinking.

The dialogue even underlines the "badness" of the politician because Alcibiades has one of the worst reputations in history. Why did de Jouvenel want to begin from the dark side of the demagogue? At the background of de Jouvenel's dialogue, I argue, we can find the turn of events in the course of his life and the history of France. Personal history does not, of course, explain everything. We can also see *The Pure Theory of Politics* as a response to certain assumptions in the international and French discussions to which I shall return in the chapter 4.

2.1.1 Alcibiades, a Career

A predecessor of the western ideal-type of a politician was the demagogue. Despite the unpleasant overtones of the word we should not, according to Max Weber, forget that "it was Pericles, not Cleon, who first bore this title" (Weber 1919b, 331; 1919a, 525). In the same breath, I have to emphasise that Pericles' adopted son Alcibiades has kept the demagogues' flag flying high and their bad name alive over centuries.

According to ancient Greek (and Roman) sources, Alcibiades was one of the celebrities of the time. Thucydides described him as the instigator of Athens' great fall from glory. In Plato's *Symposium* he is portrayed as the object of Socrates' true

⁴ I have found that in *De la souveraineté* (1955) de Jouvenel uses the words *grand politiques* and *politiques* (*S*, 33) along with *le succès personnel du politicien de profession* (*S*, 35).

love. In any case, he was an extraordinarily gifted and irresistibly attractive man, who brought about scandals and who created and led great political and military enterprises. He schemed complex plots and he succeeded, or was forced, to change sides from Athens to Sparta, and finally back to Athens again during the Peloponnesian war.⁵

Plato's dialogue pictures Alcibiades as a young man, while in *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* the protagonists discuss at the time when he "stands at the height of his influence in Athens and just before he moves the Assembly to decide the ill-fated expedition against Syracuse" (PT, 17). Socrates warns about the risks of the venture. Alcibiades explains why he cannot take the warnings into consideration.

2.1.2 Alcibiades/de Jouvenel

Parallels between the lives of de Jouvenel and Alcibiades are apparent in several respects. Bertrand de Jouvenel was born in the centre of the Third Republic. His father was a senator, an ambassador, and an editor-in-chief of *Matin*. Parallely Alcibiades was an adopted son of Pericles and a member of a rich and influential family. They both got the best education of their time. With the assistance of his mother, de Jouvenel got to know the French cultural elite (Bergson, France etc.) personally and he studied at the Sorbonne. Alcibiades was one of the young men who listened to the Sophists and Socrates. Like his father, de Jouvenel joined the Radical Party, but from 1936 to 1938 he was an important member of the semifascist *Parti Populaire Française*⁶. Before the war de Jouvenel joined the secret service of the French Army and during the occupation he had to flee from France to Switzerland because of his activities in the French Resistance. His career as an international journalist has led him to know personally all the important figures of the international politics from Hitler and Mussolini to Churchill and Lloyd George.

Thus, from the background of *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* we can easily find the same kind of top level and highly dangerous politics, an elitist high education, as well as dramatic personal experiences. We can also come to understand how easily de Jouvenel could himself identify with Alcibiades, or, at least his experiences helped him to understand the difficult situations of politicians better than if he had only had an academic career. Bertrand de Jouvenel expressed his experiences in the introduction of *The Pure Theory* in the following way:

⁵ Perhaps the most accurate description of the life and situations of Alcibiades is in Jacqueline de Romilly's *Alcibiade* (1995). Jacqueline de Romilly has revealed many of the problems of the original sources and her externally modest but highly erudite and practical small book helps us to understand them better on the basis of notes of Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Andocides, Plutarch, and some other sources.

⁶ "French Fascism" has aroused a huge debate and a flow of books (for example: Sternhell 1983, Plumyène and Laserra 1963, and Loubet del Bayle 1963). De Jouvenel was a central intellectual (with Drieu La Rochelle) at the heart of the *PPF* which, however, after his resignation adopted nasty features especially under occupation. John Braun has faithfully recorded de Jouvenel's every intellectual turn until 1945 in his *Une fidélité difficile: The Early Life and Ideas of Bertrand de Jouvenel, 1903-1945* (1985).

Born in a political *milieu*, having lived through an age rife with political occurrences, I saw my material forced upon men. (PT, xi)

His political *milieu* goes back to the 1920s and the enigma which he tried to understand was the disasters of the century which included two world wars. The impulsion of real life slung him into exile and provided time to think of the problems. This has been, by the way, a typical career of many political theorists. It is no wonder that he considered political life as a drama:

For its marshalling, I found my best guides in the geniuses who have immortally portrayed the drama of Politics: Thucydides and Shakespeare. (PT, xi-xii)

We cannot be sure that the reasons for his way to read political life as a drama was a question of just seeing it that way, or whether his dramatical life-experiences were the actual reason for that. However, we can find this kind of thought already from his notes of *Du Pouvoir* (1945):

En un mot, représentons-nous la vie sociale comme la représentation d'un drame. Chacun y tient un rôle défini, on sait où l'on va. Mais que des acteurs ne jouent plus leur rôle ou en jouent un autre, on entre dans l'indéterminé, dans le désordre. (JP, 14)

The sentence above, quoted from *The Pure Theory* legitimises his viewpoints of politics but also his mistakes in the 1930s and 1940s. During the war he continued to be a secret agent of the Vichy government and he had to meet Hitler's ambassador Otto Abetz quite regularly. This was one of the reasons he lost his reputation and got the bad name of collaborator although he later joined the Resistance and had to flee.

I have found from his archives a paper where he admires the book *Twenty-Fifth Hour* by a Romanian writer C. Virgil Gheorghiu.⁷ According to de Jouvenel, it is a complicated story of a Rumanian Jew who was deported to a concentration camp from which he ran away and fled to Hungary. There he joined SS-forces and helped the French to escape. Although he considered the book "melodramatic", he also appreciated it as great literature. In another paper from the early 1950s he was interested in Sartre's *La Nausée* and *Le Mur* and Camus' *La Peste*⁸, but he thought they were not great literature. (Carton 24, File *Intellectuals*)

These kind of thoughts do not only tell us about his lack of appreciation for some modern literature, but also about different kinds of existential experiences amongst the men who were at first the leaders or the central figures of France or Europe, yet soon to be doomed as traitors.

⁷ I have never succeeded to find either the book or the possible publication of the review. The beginning of the article includes religious rhetoric which refers to the beginning of the 1950s when de Jouvenel's Catholicism reached its peak.

⁸ De Jouvenel understood better Camus' *The Rebel*: "Camus' book will open to this public an unknown chapter of the moral history of the West: and the process whereby intellectuals become killers will be found clearly expounded." (de Jouvenel 1953 a, 1680)

2.1.3 Alcibiades, a Traitor

The occupation was a fresh memory in the minds of the Frenchmen at the time when *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* was written. In a sense, Alcibiades is an example of a traitor like those who became victims of *épuration*. The assassins also finally took Alcibiades' life while in exile. Alcibiades thus shared the destiny of many French politicians who drifted into collaboration with the Nazis and who, like Laval, became traitors without understanding it: "Je meurs pour avoir trop aimé mon pays", said Laval just before his execution (Kupferman 1980, 153). The responsibility of a politician was indeed a current issue dealt with in many courts after the Second World War.

The Pseudo-Alcibiades continues to analyse the problem of politician's responsibility, which was also the theme of Weber's *Politik als Beruf* and Merleau-Ponty's *Humanisme et terreur* (1947). Weber recognises that a politician cannot take all the responsibility of the side-effects of his action but "to say 'Nevertheless' in spite of everything" and continue (Weber 1919b, 369). In contrast to Weber Merleau-Ponty sees that a politician is responsible even for those side-effects which he cannot foresee (Merleau-Ponty, 66; see also Chapter 3.2.1.1.4).

Alcibiades' character is an example of a deceitful politician, who, after all, in close examination is revealed to be a political player in an impossible situation only trying to deal with it. Although Alcibiades was a gifted man, he could not determine *all* the aspects of the changing situation. He had the power, no doubt, to begin a venture against Syracuse. Yet he had no power to control all the consequences of the expedition, or all the tricks of his political adversaries. We can understand Alcibiades' actions in the context of the Peloponnesian war which had reached a deadlock due to the different qualities of armies: Sparta had an excellent infantry, but Athens was superior at sea because of its excellent fleet. Both armies avoided the battles where the adversary was at its best. In this situation Alcibiades tried to do something which would surprise everybody and break a stalemate of the war. His problems were that he underestimated the forces of Syracuse and that he could not foresee that a religious scandal would force him to flee.

Although we can think that Alcibiades is an anachronism and not from the real life of the 1930s or 1940s, it was once quite common to compare the Second World War with the Peloponnesian war. For example, Raymond Aron saw parallels with the distant wars: "Why is it that the German war of 1914-1945 will not have its Thucydides?", Aron wrote in 1960. William L. Shirer came forward during the same year and compared himself with the founding father of history. Shirer was a journalist and perhaps the best survived eyewitness to the Nazi regime. He wrote *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: a History of Nazi Germany* (1960) where he compared his role with the Thucydides, but he saw the search for the truth of the Second World War more difficult than it was to Thucydides. (Shirer 1960, xi) These examples show how common it was to describe the Second World War in the terms of the Peloponnesian war. In spite of the anachronism, in the context of *The Pure Theory* Alcibiades is an example of *instigator* who made an *initiative* to attack to Syracuse. He is an ahistorical model, an attempt to universalise political entrepreneurship.

A lesson of the dialogue lies here: a politician ought to have more ability for foresight, she/he should be more prudent. Socrates' character represents here the prudent (un)fortune-teller but "political activity is not highly sensitive to the teaching of wisdom" (PT, 16). Therefore, by the aid of the dialogue de Jouvenel seeks "an understanding what people actually do in Politics" and why they do it without so-called wisdom (PT, 17). The attitude is thus deeply political. De Jouvenel could not identify with futurologists although they adopted his "the art of conjecture" and the project of possible futures (*futuribles*). This political attitude has often remained unnoticed by those who consider de Jouvenel as a founding father of the futurology. Instead of "science of future" I would like to name the attitude of de Jouvenel here as "wisdom in hindsight beforehand".

And finally, Alcibiades is an example of a *dux*-type⁹ political leader, a minor Adolf Hitler who cheated anybody who happened to deal with him. De Jouvenel was one of those journalists who listened to Hitler's lies of peace, at the same time the dictator was preparing the acts of war (cf. de Jouvenel 1979, 250-258). Perhaps the contribution that *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* introduces is to typologise a specific character that *dux*-type of a political leader produces when s/he fails: a traitor. This leads us to think of the difficult situation of a politician "between past and future".

2.1.4 The Situation of Politician

The situation of a politician is manifold. S/he does not persuade only one person but many, and s/he has to take into consideration the persuasion and the intrigue of the other politicians. In *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* the situation is described to be following:

Alcibiades used trickery and cheating to achieve his goal – a high standing in Athens. However, he wants to be more than a notable among the other prominent Athenians. He wants to throw a military expedition against Syracuse and thus enlarge his sphere of power.

Both Alcibiades and Socrates use speech as their means but Alcibiades does not persuade in the same way as Socrates, who has an opportunity to have long and intimate discussions with his followers. In the dialogue Alcibiades uses Socrates' metaphor of a weaver¹⁰: "Have you not likened the statesman to the weaver who binds together the warp-threads of many individual lives and conducts, weaving them into a harmonious pattern?" (PT, 23) Socrates agrees, but Alcibiades extends the metaphor.

Alcibiades. But in Politics, Socrates, the warp-threads are individual men who are very far indeed from lending themselves passively. Each warp-thread is opiniated and elusive; therefore casting just one woof-thread to bind all these individuals in a common action takes a spell-binder. I am one such, Socrates, and know the difficulty of

⁹ De Jouvenel borrowed from G. Dumézil the duality of leadership: a *dux* is a conductor or a leader and a *rex* is "the man who regularises or rules" (*So*, 25; *P*, 156).

¹⁰ This is an allusion to Plato's *The Statesman* where Socrates discuss with Stranger who compares statemanship with weaving (Plato b, 89- 97).

binding men to my woof-thread, a difficulty enhanced by there being rival spell-binders attempting to cast their spell upon the same threads. And have you noticed, Socrates, the craftsmen, who are willing to converse with you while doing their job if it is easy, turn unwilling if it is difficult?

Socrates. True.

Alcibiades. The political weaver, those warp-threads wriggle like serpents, cannot be patient with you. Nor can he feel modest about his achievement, nor can he believe that he must subordinate his talent to the fulfilment of your design. He is carried away by his doing and deaf to your telling. (*PT*, 24-25)

Political spell-binders cannot be patient as a philosopher or a craftsman. They have no time to discuss because their warp-threads (audience) are like serpents ready to wriggle away either because of their own opinions or because of the rivals who cast different spells. In a word, they act in a conflict situation. It is difficult to weave a historical well-knitted woof of serpent-men. Politicians must cast the "spell" of their words at their supporters. They are deaf of the Socrates-type of persuasion because their action ties them. But what does a politician actually do? Socrates concludes that "the craft of Politics consists in building up your standing, and developing an ability to move people, which itself makes use of the people's perception of what is good" (*PT*, 27). Thus de Jouvenel's concept of politics refers beyond any forms of government: all of them are dependent on the acceptance of some audience and thus they need legitimacy. Some of them can be very despotic. Their democratic characters are dependent on those who have equal opportunity to participate decision-making and on the number "equals" among the relevant audience.

2.1.5 Alcibiades and Democracy

Although *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* does not directly refer to representative parliamentary democracy, de Jouvenel was, after World War II, an ardent supporter of the parliamentary system. He studied the representative system in several essays of which *On the Evolution of the Forms of Government*¹¹ (1963) is the most important (*NP*, 102-156). The essay is a historical counterpart of *The Pure Theory* and thus might have been worthy of being a part of the book. On the basis of the historical experiences de Jouvenel asks whether the parliamentary democracy would be the *terminus ad quem*, the ultimate regime? After analysing the difference between the ancient and the modern democracies (Constant, Sismondi), the central characters of monarchy, tyranny, and totalitarianism, and the challenges of bureaucracy¹² (*Agentry*) to democracy, de Jouvenel proceeds to the problem of *notables*.

¹¹ *Of Forms of Government* (undated, Carton 27) and *Qu'est-ce que la démocratie?* (1960) are important preliminary texts of *On the Evolution of the Forms of Government*.

¹² According to de Jouvenel, the growth of bureaucracy is not a threat to freedom and democracy as such: "The belief that such growth of itself abridges individual freedom is absurd... Generally, a well administered state affords to the individual opportunities which he would not enjoy otherwise, and increases rather than diminishes his freedom of choice. Indeed the agentry can be used oppressively, but it is not oppressive by its very nature. It can validly be claimed that the administrative state is the service state." (*NP*, 143)

In any conceivable state of society there are men who stand out as possessing some social power or influence. Such in our day are, on the national scale, business leaders and trade union leaders, while there are others in localities. Nothing is more natural for a government than to seek for a national policy the active support of such notables. (NP, 145)

I interpret here that Alcibiades is precisely an example of notables, whose political enterprises may produce a disaster or some good. The notables may form a threat to democracy and freedom in two ways, by Caesarism and by the tyranny of a minor group of true believers of a violent ideology¹³. De Jouvenel, who himself was a notable *par excellence*,¹⁴ concludes that "we do not have any clear recipe of free institutions" (NP, 155). At the core of the question he saw that the participating circles¹⁵ ought not to be a "closed shop": "If, however, there is a 'closed shop' of participation and if the monolithic set has a rough character, then you have a tyrannical and brutal system." (NP, 150-151) The benefit of the representative system is that it keeps the "shop open" to all sort of political enterprises or reforms.

In a system of open participation the notables have a key position. From a role of participant they have established their own spheres of power. They can support or destroy the policies of governments: "the government must harden when it takes the offensive against established notables, obviously it can relax when it works with and through established notables" (NP, 146). From these ideas de Jouvenel determined the worst and the best political situation:

¹³ According to de Jouvenel the difference between them is that "in the *Pactum subjectionis* of Caesarism, the citizen gives up his public role but retains his private freedom, while under tyranny he must ceaselessly give proof of his civic spirit" (NP, 112). De Jouvenel continued to study Caesarism under the title of the *Principate*, which "is the generic noun I have proposed to designate all our contemporary regimes where the body politic is in fact vested in one man" (NP, 159). De Jouvenel's central arguments had been since *Du Pouvoir* that Monarchical rule was much milder than several one man rules before and after the collapse of *ancien régime*. Even the modern prime minister has often more power than a monarch had. In his article *The Principate* de Jouvenel argued that *demonarchization* had been a central character in European countries "sooner or later after 1680 when Louis XIV shone" (op. cit., 157). He defined the Principate in the following way: "Where the actual power of an individual is, in his own country, greater than that of the president of the United States, we shall call it a principate." (op. cit., 168)

The Principate was published in *Political Quarterly* vol. 36, no. 1 (January -March 1965). The French version, *Du Principat* was also published in *Revue française de science politique* Vol. XIV, Numero 6 1964 pp. 1053-1086. Originally the article was a paper delivered "au sixième congrès de l'Association internationale de science politique, qui s'est tenu à Genève du 21 au 25 septembre 1964" (de Jouvenel 1964, 1053, note).

¹⁴ Among other things he was a member of several economic commissions, for example *Commission des Comptes de la Nation* and *Commission du Plan*.

¹⁵ "By participant, I mean a person who currently and continually devotes a good deal of time to public affairs, a good deal of effort to promote certain policies. The lobbyist therefore is a participant as well as the militant for unilateral disarmament, the political journalist as well as the member of a constituency party, the highranking public servant as well as the elected representative." (NP, 150)

The worst political situation obtains when the existing set of notables have lost the respect and confidence of the people, and the government uses its power to uphold their positions and attributions. Then that government is bound to perish with the outworn notables to whom it has unwisely tied itself, and triumphant mutiny ushers in the arbitrary power of the boldest. The best political situation is that wherein trusted and diligent notables share the vision of progress which inspires the government, and lend their specific activities and prestiges to the furtherance of a well-inspired governmental policy. (NP, 146)

The latter situation is eminently favourable to representative government, because the notables "are its natural representatives" (NP, 146). Thus the representatives do not re-present their supporters as a realistic picture re-presents its object (cf. Ankersmit 1996). Instead of that the "function" of representation is to channel the political struggle of notables into a peaceful form of parliamentary practices.

It is also clear that notables are best able to play this useful role if the popular credit they enjoy is currently earned by them (NP, 147). This "earning" is better known in political science as the problem of legitimisation and it also includes rewards to supporters, distribution of interests and other means of preserving power (cf. Weber 1919b, 311) Now we come to the problem of Alcibiades being too eager:

While a liberal government will welcome vital notables and seek to work with them, it must combat their inherent tendency to generate a hard shell around the position they have established (NP, 147).

The dangers which constantly threaten a representative system are Caesarism and violent "believers" who, like the Nazis did, utilise the parliament as a step to total domination. De Jouvenel understood profoundly the vulnerability of any form of government: "Toutes les institutions politiques peuvent être utilisées à des fins impérialistes" (de Jouvenel 1959, 74). However, politics does not disappear if someone removes the representative system. We know from the history of totalitarian regimes that e.g. in Germany there was a constant rivalry between the national socialist organisations and their leaders, and the situation was similar in the Soviet Union. Under Caesarism or tyranny the place of politics has changed from the "open shop" into the "closed shop". How to keep the "shop open" and how to channel the political enterprises of Alcibiades-notables? This is, I argue, the problem de Jouvenel tried to attend to in *The Pure Theory* and the essays of forms of government. This is why he did not approach the problems of politics, power and freedom from the concrete level of historical facts – although he utilised them as examples. Instead, de Jouvenel tried to alienate and formalise the problems of politics from everyday struggle to a more impartial ground. And the point is that in doing so de Jouvenel defended politics in spite of the directions of policies inside of it. This formalistic attitude is very rare in the history of political theory.

2.2 *Locis* of Preferable

The Pseudo-Alcibiades illuminates that speech is characteristic to politics and the main tool of a politician. I study the history of this idea in chapter 3 but here I shall introduce another theme: how can a politician act politically by speech?

In the situation of Alcibiades the essential feature is that he, and other politicians, cannot dwell on any given subject. In a short time he has to make his point clear in an effective way. He wants to stand in front of a crowd, "send out not only words from one's lips, but heat from one's eyes and fingertips" (PT, 26).

This is the happiness of the politician, that the feelings he expresses become those of these many others out there, come back to him multiplied thousands of times by the great living echo, which thus reinforces them in himself. Brave echo, which not only returns my words, but turns them into deeds! (PT, 26)

"The happiness of the politician" is an incomprehensible conception to the Socratic school. Unlike a Socratic philosopher, a politician does not live with eternal truths, which give a philosopher a feeling of being right even when all the others disagree. A politician does not deal with truths but with actions. In this process the consent of others becomes an essential part in the strengthening and amplifying of the politician's *ethos*. Here we can find the "Austinian" mission of a politician – Austinian, but in a manner in which power is more visible than in "doing things with words". A politician does not, in Arendtian terms, labour or work, but Alcibiades makes others do things by the aid of his words. Then, "make doing" and "doing" are types of performance. For a politician of this type the most important thing is not the "perlocutive effect" of his words, i.e. the success in politics or the acquired support, because they can vanish in a few moments. Alcibiades is a politician who enjoys the "illocutive acts": his performance in front of the audience is the source of his happiness, which cannot be reduced to his success. This fragile relation between men in action is produced by words, and it "springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse" (Arendt 1958, 200). In this sense Alcibiades is an example of a politician who acts in the space of appearance and de Jouvenel's conception "the happiness of the politician" corresponds with the Arendtian distinction between work and action.

Alcibiades says that the politician finds his happiness from the echo of the crowd. In Weberian terms, Alcibiades is a vocational politician who lives *for politics*. He finds the meaning and purpose of his life from the dealing with public issues. As a rich aristocrat he is economically 'dispensable' and 'available' (*abkömmlich*) and has not had to live *from politics*, to make his daily living. (cf. Weber 1919b, 318) He enjoys standing in the middle of political struggle, a thing which the Socratic school despise and which most of men or women cannot and dare not to do. This happiness is something entirely different than the *eudaimonia*, the inner peace and calmness with a successful life among others, which the Socratic school tried to achieve. In politics, there is no guarantee of *eudaimonia*. It is no wonder that Socrates cannot understand this kind of happiness and he mocks Alcibiades because he thinks that his "true volume" is not in front of him: "Applause, it seems, swells you out, so presumably you shrink for lack of it". Alcibiades admits the "hunger of response", and his ability to acquire it, but he is also sensitive as regards situations, where he cannot get a grasp of his audience: "I can then shift to commonplaces they like to hear and await a more favourable occasion". (PT, 26) But how does a politician transfer the words to deeds? As if against Habermas' wordy discussions or ideal speech situation Alcibiades explains:

Now the politician who desires to obtain of great numbers, at short notice, a certain decision or action, must perforce appeal to their present view of the good, such as it is; precisely that view which it is your [Socrates'] purpose to change. The views of the good which are presently held are the politician's data which he uses to move people as he desires. That is the way the game is played, and you are not interested in the game. (PT, 25)

In other words, when a politician is going to move men, s/he must not, as her/his first step, only take into consideration the opinion of the audience: he or she also has an ability to refrain from some demands, the art of saying-not, and the ability to recognise things which are facts for the audience and use them in order to alter them by a policy/rhetoric. In short, they utilise the opinions of the audience as a starting point in altering the opinions of audience. An important thing is not to say immediately your ideals.

All this has been taken into consideration in treatises of rhetoric. Already Aristotle wrote that a political speaker must utilise *enthymeme* or example, which are more convincing than long dialectical reasoning. Aristotle emphasised that "the function of Rhetoric, then, is to deal with things about which we deliberate, but for which we have no systematic rules; and in the presence of such hearers as are unable to take a general view of many stages, or to follow a lengthy chain of argument" (Aristotle a, 1357a). If we apply Aristotle's ideas to *The Pseudo-Alcibiades*, the enthymemes and examples are formed from the present view of the good of the audience. In the words of Perelman's new rhetoric, a speaker must form arguments by beginning from the *loci* of the preferable (Perelman 1977b, 23, 29-30; 1977a, 43).

Alcibiades. The politician conjures up some image of the good to be achieved by the action he recommends, and the constituent parts of this image are made up of the ideas of the good which are current among the people. For instance I shall explain to Athenians that the Syracuse expedition will so raise our reputation and add to our forces as to amaze Hellas and intimidate Lacedaemon. (PT, 25-26)

Here the *loci* of the preferable signify "raise reputation" and the "add to our forces". According to Perelman, Alcibiades transfers "to the conclusion the *adherence* accorded to the premises" (Perelman 1977b, 21). And the conclusion is to attack Sicily.

Of course prudent Socrates is dubious about this kind of a dangerous gamble, which could invite (and which really invited) a disaster. Besides, he is skeptical of the result, even if the venture would be a success. It could increase envy, fear, and thus potential enmity among the neighbours of Athens. Socrates concludes: "The good you seek is twice doubtful: it is not sure that it will be attained, it is not sure that it is a good." (PT, 26) However, the wisdom of Socrates is futile, because he cannot persuade men in the Athenian assembly, or Alcibiades, their leader. Alcibiades has earlier ridiculed him. "How much easier it would be to persuade the people against spending all this money and venturing all these lives, and even this you cannot do!" That Alcibiades has decided to be good *is* good until there would come some other person who persuaded men to think another way: "I am sure that I see it as a good, and am confident of its attainment." (PT, 26)

Socrates sees "no Knowledge of the good to be sought nor any effort to extend such Knowledge to others" (PT, 26). Alcibiades acknowledges the difference between their pursuits:

Alcibiades. Knowing and getting others to Know is your pursuit, Socrates. Doing and getting others to Do is mine. (PT, 26)

To understand and to act are, from the point of view of a politician, two completely different categories:

Were I trying to get others to Know, I should have an uphill task which would interfere with my getting them to Do, and had I myself pursued this Knowledge you advocate, I would have divorced myself from the feelings of those I seek to move. (PT, 26-27)

However, Alcibiades has obtained some knowledge. He knows how to move others which is a different kind of knowledge than the expert's "just Knowing" without an ability to act, which is Socrates' domain. Even if an expert knows that a politician's policy leads to disaster, Socratic wisdom cannot prevent it from happening. Under de Jouvenel's intellectual attack there are, not just Plato, but also the strong Saint-Simonian tendencies of the French thought.¹⁶

For Socrates Alcibiades' concept of good is a philosophical problem and he cannot understand "political good": "you suddenly bring in the assumption that somehow there is a floating sense of what is for the best, in you and also in your fellows whom you address" (PT, 27). Alcibiades believes that he is doing the good for the city and his compatriots make the same judgement. And indeed, there is no "common good" outside politics. Already the subtitle of *De la souveraineté* (1955) underlines the same thing: *A la recherche du bien politique* alludes to the title of Proust's work. The past (as political good) is *perdu*. This and some other aspects in *The Pure Theory* connect de Jouvenel with the tradition of *phronesis* (see chapter 5).

De Jouvenel did not redescribe politicians to be better than their reputation. He only took them as they are. He did not want to defend politicians against excessive criticism. The point is that when we criticise politicians, we do not easily understand what is the "reason" of their unconventional actions if we measure them, for example, by the aid of moral standards which are not from the political realm. The dialogue asks: could we judge a politician on the criteria of politics, which might be different from moral criteria?

The provocative aspect of the dialogue is that de Jouvenel reads rhetoric and Sophism out of Plato's text. How de Jouvenel did it? I shall try to answer this question in chapter 5 where his own rhetorical means are under my loupe.

2.3 Discussion: The Ends as Means

By the means of *The Pseudo-Alcibiades*, Bertrand de Jouvenel has thus intended to stress the gap between Platonic political philosophy (wisdom) and the knowl-

¹⁶ De Jouvenel touches the topic of experts explicitly in his paper *Une science de la politique est-elle possible?* (1958).

edge of a political agent (activity). One aspect of this chasm is the way in which a political agent and a political philosopher understand means and ends. Philosophy deals with these problems under the title of 'practical syllogism' which can be described in the following way:

A wants to get (have) *e*.
 He thinks that unless he *p*'s, he will not get this.
 Therefore he *p*'s. (von Wright 1980, 73)

This idea of means and ends has nowadays become commonplace, which has hidden its rhetorical character. In politics, however, means and ends are ambiguous, and this is one of the themes in *The Pseudo-Alcibiades*. In the following I shall try to make explicit what kind of interpretations one can draw out of the means-ends discussion of the dialogue. In short, what are the implications of the means-ends category of *The Pseudo-Alcibiades*? This will illuminate, I hope, the relations of means and ends in politics more precisely than the use of practical syllogism.

2.3.1 The Double Meaning of Ends in Politics

What are ends in politics? According to Bertrand de Jouvenel's interpretation, *politics* means "the tussle which precedes the decision, and 'policy' the course adopted" (*So*, 18). It is also clear that,

in the tussle which precedes the decision of a large group, each little group has its policy, its line of conduct to bring about the decision it desires, and the small group's policy at this stage is not to be confused with the policy it seeks to promote. No less clearly this ultimate policy is not outside the sphere of politics, for politics go on, and the policy adopted is a factor in them. (*So*, 18)

Thus, in the context of de Jouvenel's political thought, we cannot speak of ends in politics. Only a policy can have an end, and politics signifies the struggle for *the* policy, out of many policies, or for the formation of a certain decision.

What kind of an end can a policy (expedition to Syracuse) have in *The Pseudo-Alcibiades*? Alcibiades mentions that his policy means *good* for Athens. The concrete content of good in this case is the reputation of Athens, and the addition to its forces. If we translate this into the language of practical syllogism, it might look like the following:

Alcibiades wants to get good for Athens.
 He thinks that unless they perform an expedition against Syracuse, he will not get it.
 Therefore he begins to plot and to argue for the manoeuvre.

A complex political situation does not easily adjust to the pattern of syllogism, however practical it would be. The last lines of *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* deal with the good end of the expedition, which was, indeed, unfortunate. That is a fact that we know, yet Alcibiades did not. Socrates gives his warnings, but Alcibiades asks him to give "some good vision of an ideal city to be achieved, a goal at which we politicians will aim" (*PT*, 28). Socrates finds an ideal city also as "a lever to move

men". Alcibiades agrees, but not without irony: an ideal is only a means to move men, there are others and the moving can surpass all the goals and ends which a politician has set beforehand.

That also. It lies in the nature of Politics that whatever is proposed as an end to be served, serves as a means to move men, and that the noblest dreams figure jointly with lower motives as the inputs available to us movers of men. No matter that my imperial conception of Athens' good seems to you paltry, still it will do as a good to be sought, it is no less true that this image serves to build up my following: a goal but also a means; and there is nothing which does not become a means in our hands. (*PT*, 28)

What kind of practical syllogisms can we formulate from these quotations? It is apparent that the syllogism above is only the first step on the road to the better understanding of the political situation in *The Pseudo-Alcibiades*. We can also formulate another syllogism, where means and ends have changed places:

Alcibiades wants to be the leader of Athens.
He thinks that unless he performs heroic deeds (expedition to Syracuse), he will not get the leadership.
Therefore he begins to plot and to argue for the manoeuvre.

In this case, an end, the "good for Athens" serves as a means of Alcibiades' personal ambition. Yet means and ends are intertwined in politics, and there is nothing which does not become a means in a politicians' hands, however good and pure the end or the means originally were. Socrates does not understand this kind of political thought because he thinks by the aid of the means-ends category. Alcibiades/de Jouvenel wanted to say that a characteristic of political thinking is that we can make no sharp difference between things and persons, because a politician can turn them to serve each other and power is an indispensable medium of all politics.

2.3.2 Means and Ends according to Rhetoric

The democratic feature of every rhetorical relation is, however, that no "Alcibiades" can dictate his means and ends (as much in tyranny or Caesarism). He or she has to rely on audience, which decides and does according to what seems good to it. A politician who wants to move people, at short notice, cannot change people's view of what is good. He must take it as it is: "The views of the good which are presently held are the politician's data which he uses to move people as he desires." (*PT*, 25)

The founding father of the new rhetoric, Chaïm Perelman, calls these kinds of rhetorical figures arguments based on the structure of reality.

As soon as elements of reality are associated with each other in a recognized liaison, it is possible to use this liaison as the basis for an argumentation which allows us to pass from what is accepted to what we wish to have accepted. (Perelman 1977b, 81)

As for means and ends in rhetorics, Perelman equates this pair with the appearance/reality pair, which is for him an ideal type of a philosophical pair.

The pair means/end can be easily made to correspond to the pair appearance/reality. In fact, when it concerns choosing a course of conduct [= a policy, politically speaking, note JV], it is easy to disqualify a desired goal by showing that the goal is only apparent, actually only a means of realizing a more distant end. It is the end which becomes the criterion of through which one can judge the adequate character of an act: its transformation into a means relativizes it in relation to sought-for end. This end, however, could be disqualified, in turn, as but a means toward a still more distant end. (Perelman 1977b, 133)

In the dialogue, the character of Socrates tries to show that Alcibiades' means and ends are not of reality: "The good you seek is twice doubtful: it is not sure that it will be attained, it is not sure that it is a good." (PT, 26) Socrates thinks that Alcibiades' goal is only apparent. His argumentation does work because he deals with contingent matters, not matters of reality or truth (Knowing), but with action that produces realities and truths (getting others to do something). He fails also because his argumentation does not convince the deciding audience: Alcibiades or the assembly of Athens. Socrates' craft of persuasion, arguing by a scientific authority, belongs primarily to the sphere of private discussions of certain, not contingent, things, which belongs, in rhetoric, to the realm of ends-constitutive deliberative speech to which I shall return in chapter 5.

2.4 Conclusions: a Reduction to Characters

The internal links between *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* and the other parts of *The Pure Theory* lie in the "immorality" of Alcibiades' character. De Jouvenel wanted to show that even an infamous character, such as Alcibiades, can have even good reasons for his defence. He reduced the idea that we can defend politics in spite of its directions or failures to Alcibiades. New ways to conceptualise politics require both provocative examples and some distance from daily politics. For example to defend Laval's actions during the Second World War could have been too close an example or Cicero all too generally accepted. Thanks to Thucydides, Plato etc., Alcibiades' bad reputation was enough to alienate his ideas from the naive goodwill and his model was remote enough to be thought without passions.

De Jouvenel constructed from Alcibiades an ideal-type politician. Alcibiades illustrated a politician who sets and pursues goals. He may fail, but he is always somewhere: planning an attack on Sicily, Russia, Kuwait or Iraq. However, there is another kind of reduction: Socrates, the idol of all philosophers. The lesson of the dialogue is, I argue, that a character as an example is a means of reduction. Let us call this kind of strategical rhetorical figure as *personification*. The rhetorical technique is the same as in Greek gods: the person of god represents some quality of wo/men.

At the background of de Jouvenel's choice of characters I have found his experiences and his motives are those that Quentin Skinner has called the problems of the innovating ideologist: "the sole motive for offering an ideological description of one's untoward social actions will normally be to legitimise them to others who may have doubts about their legality or morality" (Skinner 1974, 110).

In order to make his own political *and* theoretic choices intelligible de Jouvenel picked from history a doubtful character (which represents the vice of ambition) into which he tries to transfer some traits of close virtue (wisdom). Namely, we can find personifications of philosophy (Socrates) and action (Alcibiades). Also Socrates makes politics, but he has only a one person audience: he tries to persuade Alcibiades who analyses the inefficiency of Socrates' rhetoric. Socrates' way to make politics means that it is enough to convert the leading politician to support his opinion and his followers come along. Alcibiades' game of politics in front of the audience of many is more complex and presupposes a different kind of thinking than philosophy: simple philosophical pairs such as appearance/reality or means/end do not work because in politics there are no sharp lines between things and persons: a politician can turn them to serve each other. Therefore their *styles* of making politics are different: Alcibiades' performance in front of the audience is the source of his happiness, but he has to play with the "good" which "is twice doubtful": there are no guarantees that the end is good and that it will be achieved. Socrates enjoys a political game where he tries to convert the leading politicians. Alcibiades here represents the view of political science, action, and ambition. He tries not to convert Socrates to be a political scientist or to give up his role of a politician of one person audiences, but only to teach him that there are other ways of thinking than philosophy.

Now I shall take two steps away from contextual methodological ideas of the study. I shall approach the dialogue from the extra-textual viewpoint of Aristotle's rhetoric. Namely, I interpret that Alcibiades and Socrates can be seen as personifications of enthymeme and example as well: if we think about the faith of these characters and their manner to act we find two (tragic) ways of linguistic action: Alcibiades acts as an enthymeme, he strives after goals, whereas Socrates acts as an example, "do as I do, live like I live, and my death was an example of the force of my conviction of wisdom". But from the viewpoint of enthymeme and example the dialogue is not that simple. Also Socrates tries to persuade Alcibiades and thus to act politically, although he does not recognise his own political characteristics. Socrates' ability to persuade is weak because of his general pursuit to understand and know things. In other words, the enthymemes of action are strong and the examples of knowing weak in the dialogue.

From the perspective of enthymeme and example we can conclude that the enthymemes and examples of action (Alcibiades) conquer the enthymemes and examples of knowing (Socrates) if the question in the discussion is of contingent matters¹⁷. Alcibiades might seem to win in the present time, but also the example of Socrates can inspire men and women. Nevertheless, we do not speak of winners but rather of two tragical characters. A living enthymeme (Alcibiades) may become a traitor in an extreme situation, when he is defeated, but the Socratic lifestyle may also become deceitful. Socrates deceives Alcibiades, and also democracy, because he can not teach Alcibiades to be prudent in his actions. If a living enthymeme (Alcibiades) in an extreme situation meets the problem of *traitor*, a living example (Socrates) deals with the problems of *Gesinnungsethik* (ethic

¹⁷ The validity of this argument is of course limited inside the dialogue. I have not come across any empirical research from this point of view.

of principled conviction). It means that if you follow your conviction consistently, it leads to the ultimate destiny of the moralist in politics – a *martyr's* role in an extreme situation. From the political viewpoint the manifold dilemmas of Alcibiades are more interesting; he continues to act even in impossible or tough situations where he deals with the special ethic of politician: he had to act in the contradiction between *Gesinnungsethik* and *Verantwortungsethik* (the ethic of responsibility) and the evil side-effects of his or other politicians' actions. (cf. Weber 1919a, 548-560) Alcibiades' ability to act was so sophisticated that only assassins could take it away. On the other hand, Socrates' political craft becomes actual and reaches its peak when he meets death due to his conviction. The extreme situations that these two figures met were different in quality. However, these two figures succeeded in acquiring what the Athenians strived after most: immortal fame. The lesson of the dialogue is: if we miss the point of politics when we try to analyse it with the aid of criteria taken outside of politics, then, should we analyse politics with its own criteria? *The Pure Theory of Politics* tries to formulate the first conceptions of these criteria.

3 THE FORMATION OF AN IDEA

Now I shall turn to the inter-textual links of *The Pure Theory*. In this chapter I shall show some central links of the book with de Jouvenel's own texts (inter-textuality in Palonen's limited sense). I shall describe the story of de Jouvenel's way of thinking and its changes from about 1942 to 1965. The continuity and breaks in his own figures of thoughts form the first inter-text of the pure politics. Some interpreters have argued that the sum of de Jouvenel's "major works appears to be diversified, disjointed, and to lack thread tying it together" (Grady 1980, 365). The names of Alexis de Tocqueville and Benjamin Constant are often mentioned in this respect: "Er leistete mit diesem Buch [*Du Pouvoir*] für das 20. Jahrhundert, was Benjamin Constant und Tocqueville für das vorige Jahrhundert geleistet hatten – beiden Autoren schuldet er zweifellos zentrale Gedanken seines eigenen Werkes." (Habermann 1995, 59) In a sense these interpretations are not entirely wrong because most of his monographs are actually collections of articles which easily lead to thematical disunity. I am not going to deny these traits but I shall show here that there is also a continuity in his thinking – a continuity which includes transformations. I argue that the lack of unity came from his way to pose the questions and the transformations of continuity from his manners to answer them.

3.1 The Dialectic of Command

Bertrand de Jouvenel did not attend Kojève's famous lectures on Hegel but during the war he read *Rechtsphilosophie* which was translated into French in 1940. At the same time he was preparing his book *Richesse et Puissance* which was later titled as *Du Pouvoir* (1945) and became his most famous book. The long quotations of Hegel in his diary include several reservations of interpretation ("si je comprends bien") but he clearly took from Hegel an idea which became central in *Du Pouvoir*: that something can be "en soi et pour soi" (*JP*, 77).

Like almost all his books, *Du Pouvoir* was established around an article. *De la concurrence politique* became chapter VIII of the book. In his diary de Jouvenel

wrote that his friend Malraux read the article and the first six chapters of the book¹. Malraux showed de Jouvenel his debt to Marx (Boîte 1, Cahier 1, 4-5). Indeed the chapter *De la concurrence politique* begins with the phrase "L'histoire est lutte de pouvoirs" which transforms the idea of the *Communist Manifesto* that history is the history of class struggle (P, 229).

However, *Du Pouvoir* is not indebted to only one thinker or friend. Over 600 pages long, the meandering book refers to almost every important political philosopher in its notes. De Jouvenel's diaries reveal even more names and books to which he familiarised himself during the writing process. Here I shall mention only one whose name is not in the notes: Max Weber.

Weber is important here because de Jouvenel adopted one of Weber's ideas which changed the whole direction of *Du Pouvoir*. Namely, according to his diary, the concept of state was central to de Jouvenel when he began the book. It was *État* in his mind when he wrote the first chapters of the book. In this sense *Du Pouvoir* is a "natural history" of state power and violence which is attached to it.² He wanted to uncover the reasons which caused the totalitarian state and war:

Quelle cause constamment agissante a donné à la guerre toujours d'étendue [...]? (P, 24)

Nous ne pouvons plus, hélas! croire qu'en brisant Hitler et son régime, nous frappons le mal à sa source. (P, 37)

[M]on dessein se borne à rechercher les causes et le mode de croissance du Pouvoir dans la Société. (P, 39)

What has always caused war that all the time expands? Hitler and his regime is not the whole explanation. De Jouvenel wanted to study the causes and the mode of growth of Power in society.

Until November 1943 de Jouvenel utilised the word *État* in his notes. On the 29th of November he mentioned that he had read Max Weber's *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1922) and the name of Marcel Weinreich who was one of the first who interpreted Weber's writings in France (Boîte 1, Cahier 5³, 34-35). A couple of pages later there are phrases which he has lined over: "~~Les progrès de l'autorité politique ont été le progrès de la liberté pour les petits, les dominés, les exploités. ...~~". (Boîte 1, Cahier 5, 37) After that the word *Pouvoir* is, for the first time, mentioned in the phrase "C'est par son ambition que le Pouvoir est libérateur, plus que par sa

¹ The article was published in January 1942 in *Revue suisse contemporaine*.

² The first sentence of the book, the original introduction and the introduction from 1972 refer that it is war which determine the book: "Cet ouvrage est un livre de guerre à tous égards" (de Jouvenel 1945/1972, 5; P, 5, 21).

³ Here I found a mistake in the classification of *Bibliothèque nationale*: in de Jouvenel's classification this notebook has number 3. I presume that the person who has classified the notebooks has only seen the number wrong and mixed up numbers 3 and 5. De Jouvenel's handwriting is not easy to interpret.

bienveillance....”⁴ (Boîte 1, Cahier 5, 37-38). For that reason I argue that it was Max Weber under whose influence de Jouvenel formed the central ideas of power: in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* Weber speaks of *Herrschaft* and in brackets and in quotation marks he mentions “*Autorität*” (Weber 1922, 122). In *Du Pouvoir* Weber’s and Hegel’s ideas are mixed in the figure of pure power:

Je prendrai donc le Pouvoir à l’état pur, commandement existant *par et pour* soi, comme concept fondamental à partir duquel j’essaierai d’expliquer les caractères développés par le Pouvoir au cours de son existence historique, et qui lui ont donné un aspect tellement différent. (P, 171)

Power in its pure state means to command. From this “pure state” of Power de Jouvenel tried to explain the historical characters of Power. *Le commandement* is, according to de Jouvenel, the essence of *Pouvoir* and it has its own existence which is not included in its right goal or origin. However, every ruler commands in vain if there is no public who obeys. *L’obéissance civile* is the indispensable counterpart of the “essence” of *Pouvoir*.

Tout repose sur l’obéissance. Et connaître les causes de l’obéissance, c’est connaître la nature du Pouvoir. (P, 44)

If you know the reason of obedience, you know also the nature of Power. Thus, starting from the Marxian idea of struggle, Hegelian ideas of evolution and state and by the aid of Weberian *Herrschaft*⁵ de Jouvenel has constructed his conception of pure power. The real life questions to which he tried to answer were the Second World War and totalitarian rule. The more or less implicit questions were: What is the essence of power? How has the growth of Power and war accelerated each other?

In *Sovereignty* de Jouvenel wrote that *Du Pouvoir* “described the stages in the growth of the public authority in the historical states of the West. It also noted an attendant phenomenon which may be called the moral emancipation of the public authority.”⁶ (So, xxiv) If we follow his own interpretation, the questions were:

⁴ P is underlined. De Jouvenel explains that the letter P is capitalised because he wants to make difference between social powers and political power:

“C’est une erreur étonnamment répandue de ne remarquer dans la Société qu’un seul Pouvoir, l’autorité gouvernementale ou puissance publique. Alors qu’elle n’est que l’un des pouvoirs présents dans la Société, coexistant avec une foule d’autres qui sont à la fois ses *collaborateurs*, puisque avec lui ils concourent à procurer l’ordre social, et ses *rivaux*, puisque comme lui ils sont demandeurs d’obéissance et captateurs de forces.

Ces pouvoirs non étatiques, auxquels nous réservons le nom de *pouvoirs sociaux*, ne sont, pas plus que le Pouvoir, d’une nature angélique.” (P, 220)

“Nous écrirons constamment avec une majuscule le Pouvoir, entendant le pouvoir politique.” (P, 220, note 1)

⁵ I fully recognise that Weber understood that also *Herrschaft* is *Chance*: “*Herrschaft* soll heißen die Chance, für einen Befehl bestimmten Inhalts bei angebbaren Personen Gehorsam zu finden.” (Weber 1922, 28, 122; cf also Palonen 1998, 168-180, 193; see also chapter 5.1.3)

⁶ “Celui-ci décrivait la croissance successive de la puissance publique dans les États historiques de l’Occident. Il signalait aussi un phénomène concomitant qu’on peut appeler l’émancipation morale de la puissance publique.” (S, 8)

How *la puissance publique* has grown in the Western states? How that public authority has given up of its restraints? A reading from this point of view will lead at first to a story of increase and secondly a story of emancipation. However, the point of the book lies also in the "essence question" and in its answer: in the relation between to command and its indispensable counterpart, obedience.

Du Pouvoir was a success and it was soon translated into several languages. De Jouvenel's own estimation of the good reception of the book was that it was a result from the narrative of the book: in *Du Pouvoir* he tried to analyse historical evolution and it coincided with the evolutionary vision which Comte and Marx formulated at the end of 19th century (de Jouvenel 1980, 432; 1976, vii). However, the quotations above offer a different kind of a view of the book: besides the evolutionary story of power it includes a "logical" explanation of its growth: the "dialectic of command".

The explanation which de Jouvenel gave in *Du Pouvoir* did not satisfy him for a long time. He renewed his ideas in *De la souveraineté* and in *The Pure Theory of Politics*. However, the Weberian *Herrschaft* remained at the background of de Jouvenel's political thought when he transformed the idea.

3.2 Authority and Politics Replace *Pouvoir*

De Jouvenel revised his ideas for about nine years. *De la souveraineté* was published in 1955 and it was soon translated into English⁷ (1957). He wrote the book in a new situation: he did not live in exile, he continued his career as a journalist, he wrote much on economical issues, but his reputation in France was not good. However, *Du Pouvoir* brought him invitations to the most famous universities of the Anglo-Saxon world. In the introduction of *Sovereignty* de Jouvenel mentions Cambridge, Oxford, LSE, University of Chicago, College of St. John and especially the University of Manchester where "the almost complete exposition of a first version greatly assisted me in writing a completely different book" (*So*, xxvi). At the end of *Sovereignty* he enumerates the persons who criticised and helped him to write the entirely new last chapter to the English version: professors Michael Polanyi, J.J. Chevallier, Carl J. Friedrich, G.C. Homans and Mr. Chester Barnard, Mr. T.E. Utley, and J.F. Huntington, the translator of the book. (*So*, 357) In short, de Jouvenel took a lot of influences from contemporary Anglo-Saxon political thought, or at least he lived long periods in the English speaking world.

Some chapters of the book were published before *De la souveraineté*. The first, *L'Essence de la Politique* was printed already in 1952 in *Revue française de science politique* (de Jouvenel 1952) and the article in *Cambridge Journal* (7/1954) called *The Nature of Politics*⁸ is mostly the same text. Also an article titled *A Discussion of*

⁷ Translator J.F. Huntington notes: "This translation has had the benefit of revision by the author himself who has, here and there, varied or expanded the original. The latest chapter was not included in the French edition and has been written in English by the author for this edition." (*So*, xxvii)

⁸ This version of the text is a lecture delivered in LSE in 1953.

Freedom (*Cambridge Journal* 6/1953) is a version of the last chapter of the book, *De la liberté*.

It is no wonder that in *De la souveraineté* de Jouvenel's way to pose the questions changed entirely. One step in the transformation was his economical thoughts in *The Ethics of Redistributionism* (1951). The practices and theory of redistributionism led him from the contradiction of rich and poor into another conflict: "that between individuals on the one hand, and the State and minor corporate bodies on the other" (de Jouvenel 1951, 72). When de Jouvenel studied income redistribution, he seem to have asked: how does an individual give up his power in favour of the state?

[T]he redistribution is in effect far less a redistribution of free income from the richer to the poorer, as we imagined, than redistribution of power from the individual to the State. (de Jouvenel 1951, 73)

Here we can see the transformation of thought in its course. State, a macro perspective is still a central figure for de Jouvenel, but the role of individual, a micro level is becoming more important.

In *De la souveraineté* he no longer tried to search for an explanation to power through the relation of commanding and obedience but he returned to an observation of *Du Pouvoir* that it was men who in older days formed the public power for strictly defined purposes: "les hommes se sont fait autrefois de la puissance publique, on trouve qu'ils la concevaient asservie à une mission bien précise" (*S*, 8). However, *De la souveraineté* is not "like some clearly drawn map of a familiar country; rather, it is a work of exploration, undertaken now from one starting-point and now from another" (*So*, xxvi). From my view, the most interesting parts of the book are a couple of first chapters and the new last chapter of the English version. As de Jouvenel's metaphor implies also this study is thematically disunited. It deals with sovereignty and *bien politique* but it is also a study of authority and politics. *Du Pouvoir* represents political macro power in relation with state and micro power as commanding, but nine years later the idea has changed: each of us acts politically and exercises an authority (*une autorité*) (*S*, 7; *So*, xxiii).

The most visible transformation is that the word of power has changed from all embracing *Pouvoir*, which has its roots in the Latin verb *posse*, into authority, the etymology of which is derived from Latin *auctoritas* (Rabe 1972, 382-384). Power is now some kind of personal authority which is present in some degree in everybody and everywhere (*So*, xxiii).

Chacun de nous, alors même qu'il n'y pense point, a une activité politique, exerce une autorité, et doit prendre conscience de ce rôle, des obligations qu'il comporte, s'appliquer à le mieux jouer. La politique comme activité bien plus quotidienne, plus répandue et plus nécessaire qu'on ne pense, l'autorité comme présente à quelque degré en tout homme, le bien que l'on doit poursuivre comme résultat de cette activité et cette force partout manifestées, forment les thèmes inséparables de l'enquête ici entreprise. (*S*, 7)

Politics is here activity (action) and authority is a force which everybody has. Politics is a more ordinary, widespread and necessary phenomenon than is commonly thought (*So*, xxiii). The aim of politics is "good", but the subtitle of the book hints to Proust's lost time and the author understands that "good" is per-

haps also lost. Already in *Du Pouvoir*, de Jouvenel realised that political theory cannot be normative in the sense that one is searching for the common good (*le Bien Commun*). These theories which tell of sovereignty and the organic origin of power were interesting only from the point of view of how they helped *Pouvoir* to strengthen. (P, 55) As a relic of the common good his conception of politics has remains of *political good* which has its own limits.

When de Jouvenel began to write *De la souveraineté* his aim was "to search for the criteria applicable in our own day to the conduct of public authorities" (So xxiv). He tried to reflect the question "is it possible for us, who make no claim to stabilise either the present or the future, to find canons of conduct for the public authority of a dynamic society?" (So, xxv) This normative question proved to be wrong. De Jouvenel thought that it would be an error to believe that there could be the best of all possible social orderings – an error, which inevitably leads to tyranny:

C'est une erreur menant inmanquablement à la tyrannie de croire qu'il existe à un moment quelconque une ordonnance sociale la meilleure possible, tellement que la conduite des autorités publiques se trouverait dictée avec certitude par le devoir de causer ou de maintenir ladite ordonnance; mais d'autre part tout homme qui se trouve revêtu du moindre droit de commander à autrui (et c'est le cas du plus petit citoyen d'une république) doit nécessairement se faire quelque idée du bien qu'il cherchera à causer par l'exercice de ce commandement (S, 9).

But on the other hand, everybody who finds himself dressed in the smallest degree of authority over another – and de Jouvenel thought that this "is the case even the least important citizen of a republic" – must have some conception of good which he hopes to achieve by the exercise of power which is his (So xxv). In this sense the "political good" is present at the political microlevel. If we translate this into the language of rhetoric, the *loci* of the preferable is present in every persuasive speech: in the goals of the speech and in its justifications or reasons.

As conceptual historians have shown, power is an older phenomenon than state (cf. Skinner 1978b, 349-358; Rabe 1972, 382-401). De Jouvenel shared these views in saying that "[t]he phenomenon called 'authority' is at once more ancient and more fundamental than the phenomenon called 'state'; the natural ascendancy of some men over others is the principle of all human organisations and all human advances. The political phenomenon is something much wider and more general than what is commonly denoted by the word 'political'." (So, xxv-xxvi)

In *De la souveraineté* de Jouvenel no longer outlines world starting from a Minotaur but he has come to think social process "comme un incessant jaillissement d'initiatives entraînant" (S, 10). Some of these "authoritative initiatives" are the "especially remarkable" orders of state, maybe the most powerful, but only one among others: "[r]ather its part is that of grand accessory to the others" (So, xvi, 2-3, 13). Thus, the "key" of the book is, according to de Jouvenel, that he studied the benefits of social co-operation (S, 23).

L'enrichissement de cette coopération lui semble dû à l'incessant jaillissement d'initiatives dispersées, germes qui ne peuvent cependant fructifier que dans certaines conditions de stabilité. (S, 23)

In other words, the central questions of the book are: How do men yield mutual benefits by the means of co-operation? What maintains and enriches the co-operation? To the questions one cannot answer by the aid of normative books, like Plato's *Republic*, because "there is a tyranny in the womb of every Utopia"⁹ (*So*, 12). Even if one succeeds to define "political good", it would be only one of the elements and criteria of which one has to take into consideration in the political decision (*S*, 22). According to de Jouvenel, one can theorise "political good" beginning from the fact, that when "we give forth a political judgement we are, all unconsciously, setting to work a whole apparatus of definitions and postulates, we are using coefficients and parameters" (*So*, 11). De Jouvenel concludes that it would be a great thing "if each individual could be made more conscious of the apparatus of thought which goes into the making of his judgment" (*So*, 12; *S*, 21-22). Thus, he approached in the language of mathematics and natural sciences "the realm of rhetoric". The same question can be formulated in words of rhetoric as follows: how can every individual be more aware of the complex of thesis and arguments which everyone utilises?

What did de Jouvenel mean when he spoke of authority? In short, authority is for him an ability to give birth to other human beings' acts.

L'autorité, c'est-à-dire proprement la capacité de donner naissance à des actions d'autrui, est un fait social majeur qui se retrouve partout dans la société. (*S*, 13)

Authority is the capacity to have other men/women to do something and politics means that precise action by which the actions of others are produced. So de Jouvenel has separated both power and politics from the concept of state. Now he thinks that "every human grouping organised for any form of regular co-operation is a body politic (*un corps politique*), and that the aim of political science is the study of what holds these bodies together, how their cohesion comes about and how it is maintained and perfected" (*So*, 3 n. 1; *S*, 13).

3.2.1 Politics and Pure Politics

In the history of the concept of politics de Jouvenel has a role of "innovating ideologist". He coined his own conception of politics when he interpreted that in French one expresses with the definite article *la politique*, if one speak of struggle for the positions of power or formation of a decision. Instead of that, with an indefinite article *une politique* means a line of conduct. In English the contrast is stronger: *politics* and *policy*. (*S*, 27-28)

Thus *politics* means for de Jouvenel the symmetric duality around a decision. *Politics* expresses conflicts and arguments, or *contestations* which precede the decision, and *policy* means the line of conduct, which appears in it.

De sorte que le mot tend à une dualité symétrique autour d'une décision. *Politics* les contestations qui la précèdent et *policy*, la ligne de conduite qui en émerge. Il est clair d'ailleurs que, dans la contestation qui précède la décision d'un grand groupe, chaque

⁹ "[T]oute Utopie est grosse d'une tyrannie" (*S*, 22).

petit groupe participant à la contestation a sa *policy*, sa ligne de conduite pour faire triompher ses vues, ce qui n'est pas à confondre avec la *policy* qu'il veut faire adopter par le grand groupe. Il est clair aussi que cette *policy* finale n'est pas au delà des *politics*: car ces *politics* continuent, et la *policy* en est un facteur. (S, 28)

In conflicts, which precede a decision of a large group, every small group which participates has its own *policy*. This *policy* is not the same which they want the big group to adopt. It is also clear that, this final *policy* is not above *politics* because the *politics* continue and *the policy* is a factor in it.

This interpretation in his mind de Jouvenel made an original turn in the political theory. He asked: "Are valuable results likely to be achieved by the method (...), which consists of the progressive break-down into its elements of a vast mass of phenomena all falling under the word 'politics'?" (So, 18) His answer was no, because "not a single science can be named which seeks to arrive at the simple by the way of the complex". Instead of that he preferred a narrow meaning of the word 'politics' (*politique*) and tried to build on it. (So, 18; S, 16)

De Jouvenel began to analyse politics from the view that the conduct of private individual is sometimes called *politique* even if he operates at a very modest scale.

On peut dire d'un particulier, agissant à une échelle très modeste, que sa conduite est politique. Quand le dit-on? Il faut que cette conduite soit bien propre à produire les effets recherchés par le sujet, bien adressée à son but, bien calculée. (S, 28)

The conduct of a private individual, operating on a very modest scale, is sometimes called "politic." When is it so called? Whenever his conduct has been apt to bring about the results desired by him, has been well conceived for its purpose, has been well calculated. (So, 18)

Here the French word *politique* and English *politic* have different connotations. In French there is only one word *politique*, to which are attached the meanings of *fin*, *adroit*, *prudent* which are less pejorative than for example the corresponding words in German, English, or Finnish (cf. Palonen 1989, 24). In the quotation *politique/politic* has the meanings of wise, skilful, and appropriate. The English version especially emphasises the meaning of appropriateness.

As a result of this positive dimensions of politics, one needs, according to de Jouvenel, more criteria, if one can say that an individual's conduct is *politique* or *politic* in the sense of these French and English words. For example, one could not say that Robinson Crusoe's activities on the desert island were prudent and wise or *political*. Robinson did not act according to wise political principles but economically (*selon une sage économie*). *Économie* means here the excellent use of the resources which one has. (S, 28)

Then, when can one speak of political conduct in private issues? De Jouvenel thought that whenever the other men's help is necessary in attaining aims.

Lorsque le résultat cherché, le but visé, supposent le concours d'autres hommes. Politique la conduite qui obtient ces concours, qui fait faire aux autres ce qui est nécessaire à la réalisation du dessein de l'acteur, politique l'action qui incline des volontés étrangères. (S, 28-29)

Actions which *fait faire* the action of others and which secure the help are political. In turn, to incline other persons "to his will" means political action. We are here near the idea of persuasion but de Jouvenel took his example of "politics of personal relationships" (*politique des particuliers*) from Balzac. According to de Jouvenel, many of Balzac's characters are descriptions of "the individual's political conduct in society" (*la politique de l'homme social*). (S, 29; So, 19) Here the original French text and the English version have different connotations: *la politique de l'homme social* refers to the *politics* of social man, where *social* is the qualifier of man, not an entity in the sense of *society*. Instead of that "the individual's political conduct in society" express that *society* is an entity where men/women act politically and *political* is an adjective, which qualifies the conduct of individual. The idea of the French version is nearer to de Jouvenel's later critique of the concept of society (cf. de Jouvenel 1958/1959 and 1961; PT, 43-66).

In most of Balzac's dramas there is a goal to be reached. Frequently it is some social position and the writer depicts the manoeuvres which tend to advance a man socially and blunders, manoeuvres and counter-manoevres which tend to pull him down. (So, 19; S, 29) De Jouvenel made an analogy between the situation in the world and the political situation, but again the versions of the book are different. In French "the situation in the world" ("*une situation dans le monde*") is analogous with the "political situation" (*une "situation politique"*) (S, 29).

'Une situation dans le monde' est l'analogie d'une 'situation politique': l'une et l'autre reposent sur un concours d'assentiments à l'importance du personnage en cause; l'une et l'autre sont obtenues par l'action militante en sa faveur de certains agents qu'il a su rallier: Balzac insiste beaucoup sur ces agents particuliers que sont les "grandes dames" qu'il aime mettre en scène. (S, 29)

In other words, in the French version man's situation in the world is political whereas in the English version "a man's 'social position'" is analogous to his "political position" (So, 19). The emphasis of political in the English version lies in the *social* and *position* whereas the French version stress the *world* and *situation*. We can conclude that the translation is slightly more "social" than the "political" French version. However, both of them rest on a sufficient number of people agreeing on the protagonist's importance. In both of the versions (and in in the English version in both of the positions) the actors (*agents*) have reached their position by the aid of the other actors, which the agent has been able to rally to himself, working actively in his favour. Balzac emphasises for example the importance of *grandes dames*. (S, 29; So, 19).

De Jouvenel continued Balzac's ideas by writing that *politique* (politics) occurs whenever a project requires the support of other wills – to the extent to which its author sets out to rally those wills (So, 19-20).

Obéissant aux suggestions du génie balzacien, nous dirons qu'il y a "politique" aussitôt qu'un projet implique la disposition favorable d'autres volontés, et *en tant que l'on s'applique à rallier ces volontés*. (S, 29)

According to de Jouvenel, it is important, that the word *campagne* includes pursuits to the different kind of goals whereas the conditions to achieve them are

very similar. His examples are a man aiming at a public office or admission to a club, or a social climber seeking an entrée into someone's *salon* of late 19th century, or an industrialist trying to put a new product on the market. Although all these have a different goal, they all require the disarming of hostility, rallying of popularity, winning of support, and conciliating of wills. (S, 29; So, 20)

To rally the wills in all of these is political by its form¹⁰. Always when we try to connect wills of men, it is political: for example if one tries to maintain the support of several different kind of groups in forming a cabinet, or if one tries to achieve the support of several financial groups, when one establishes an enterprise.¹¹ This led de Jouvenel to ask: has every human enterprise its own politics? He answered "certainly": just as each single one has its economy as well. An entrepreneur is a good economist (*bon économiste*) when he uses his instruments in a way that he can reach his goal; he is good politician if he can increase his means with the help won from others. (S, 30; So, 20)

Economics and politics appear here as two complementary aspects of human action. Economics is concerned with the use of resources on the spot, politics with adding to them. It is also clear that every human pursuit requires more than one man's forces. From this comes, according to de Jouvenel, that political aspect logically precedes economic aspect. In other words, the question of how much can man make with all combined resources is later in time than the question how man can combine the human resources. For example, if it is the question of "pure business", for instance founding a limited company, also here one must first put in motion the political operation or "campaign", to assemble the financial backing. (S, 30; So, 20-21) In other words, if one just wants to do business, one cannot avoid "politics" because one has to launch campaigns or convince bank managers, partners and customers that the action will bring profit. After that one can get loans and partners, which can make the profit possible.

Now we come to de Jouvenel's definition of criteria of political skill which he had in mind in 1952 when he wrote the book (and in 1956 when the book was translated):

Nous arrivons ainsi à une première conception, très étroite mais très précise, de l'art politique, comme une technique de l'addition des forces humaines par la réunion des volontés. (S, 30)

[I]t is a technique for increasing the human energies at our disposal by rallying other men's wills to our cause. (So, 21)

Political skill is something "which increases the sum of energy lent us by wills which are independent of our own" (So, 21). The definition is restricted because by it one can express a human phenomenon, which is present everywhere and any time and which is thus proper to study. (S, 30-31)

"The technique of increase" (*la technique additive*) is at its most primitive when the increase is needed for some *ad hoc* purpose. For example, if racists are incited

¹⁰ This form/content distinction is only in the French version the book.

¹¹ Raymond Aron criticised de Jouvenel that he does not separate political societies from other groupings (cf. Aron 1962, 10).

to lynch black men or if one brings neighbours together to fight a fire. Usually men think that these events are highly different but de Jouvenel argued that they are primitive political activity in the sense that the other men who are asked to do it are immediately ready to act. "The technique of increase" (or politics) is at its highest level when the increase aims to establish some permanent condition,"to which the group of men who bring it about must continue loyal". (S, 31; So, 21)

La technique de l'addition des forces est à degré plus élevé lorsqu'il s'agit de réaliser l'addition, non plus pour un acte une fois fait, mais pour créer un état de choses, nécessitant la permanence de l'assemblage humain qui le cause. (S, 31)

De Jouvenel thought that it is more difficult to persuade men to found things than to a short-term project. Men usually easily take the tasks which are in the line of their inclinations. But when one tries to create something long-standing, men think that it is dull although they otherwise would want it. (S, 31; So, 21-22)

More than anything else, it is the keeping together of a team of human beings which will present difficulties. The point is now that de Jouvenel thought of "a durable combination", "d'une 'composition' de volontés qui doit avoir le caractère d'un édifice". He pointed out that human wills are inconstant and anything built by them must for that reason show an innate tendency to come apart. And more the construction will grow, the more will grow the forces of disruption. Therefore the maintenance of the structure must proceed day in, day out, because conservation is, according to de Jouvenel, harder task than construction. These problems are properly political problems and the care required is political care. (S, 31-32; So, 22)

Les problèmes posés sont proprement des problèmes politiques, les soins qu'ils exigent des soins politiques. (S, 32)

De Jouvenel separated by names the different rallying actions: rallying wills for some "once for all" purpose he called "additive" and action directed to forming a durable combination he named "aggregative". These are, however, only stages of a single form of action which is everywhere present in all human formations: the activity of a boy organising a game is "additive", that of a man organising a continuing team is "aggregative". (S, 32; So, 22)

So far de Jouvenel has written of political action as instrumental in relation to some purpose or another. We have also seen that every project demands of its promoter some political action and sets in motion a technique for rallying assents, because the project includes the support of other men. (S, 32; So, 22)

Nous avons vu que tout projet, n'importe sa nature, et pourvu seulement qu'il exige le concours d'autres hommes, oblige à une action politique, met en jeu une technique de rassemblement des concours, dénommée technique politique. (S, 32)

After that de Jouvenel asked us to imagine a community (*le rassemblement*) which is no longer a means employed to achieve a given end but as an end in itself. The existence of the group is its highest purpose: "L'édifice humain est ici voulu pour lui-même, en soi." (S, 32; So, 22-23) Whenever action of a political nature has no other end in view than the formation of a group of men, it enters,

according to de Jouvenel, the category of "pure politics". The substance of action is then as much political as its form. This kind of action can never be merely additive, because de Jouvenel thought that it would be a self-contradiction to aim at a group as end itself and to want it only for a moment. Therefore the action of pure politics is inevitably aggregative. (S, 32-33; So, 22-23)

Quand l'action de forme politique est pure de tout autre dessein que la formation même de l'édifice humain, il y a *politique pure*. L'action est alors politique par sa matière comme par sa forme. Remarquons tout de suite qu'une telle action ne peut pas être simplement additive. Car il est contradictoire de vouloir un rassemblement pour lui-même et de ne le vouloir que pour un instant. Comme la vertu qu'on lui demande est l'existence, elle enveloppe nécessairement la durée. L'action de politique pure est nécessairement agrégative. (S, 32-33)

To sum up, the action of forming a group of men is always political in form but its end may or may not be political. When both the form and the end are political, then we have "pure politics". (S, 33; So, 23)

Résumons. L'action de grouper est politique par la forme: sa fin peut lui être hétérogène. Où il y a homogénéité de la fin de l'action avec sa forme, où l'action de grouper a pour but final l'existence du groupe, il y a politique pure. (S, 33)

Even if reality showed no concrete instance of "pure politics", the idea would still not be without value: it would be just like a chemical element which cannot be isolated. However, he found "pure politics" from real life: some men have been concerned only with basing, extending or consolidating aggregates (in French they are called *grands politiques*); also there were those for whom in times of troubles the all-important thing has been to keep the aggregate together (in French these are called *politiques*). (S, 33; So, 23) It seems that the word *politicien* was not settled in de Jouvenel's vocabulary in *De la souveraineté* because there he used the words *grand politiques* and *politiques* (S, 33) along with *le succès personnel du politicien de profession* (S, 35). In the French version of *The Pure Theory* the word *politicien* was dominant and although he did not translate the book¹², the *politicien* appeared already in the preliminary French texts (cf. de Jouvenel 1961a, 368)

From beginning of these criteria de Jouvenel defined activity of "pure politics" as an activity that builds, consolidates and keeps in being aggregates of men (So, 23).

Il semble donc légitime de définir l'activité politique pure comme *l'activité constructive, consolidatrice et conservatrice d'agrégats humains*. (S, 33)

This definition carries, de Jouvenel wrote, many advantages. Firstly, it shows what is political work (*une œuvre politique*) – it is a closely-knit aggregate. Secondly, it shows what is political labour (*un travail politique*) – it is the formation and unending rehabilitation of an aggregate of this kind. Also we can see that there is as well

¹² The translators of *De la politique pure* were Gabrielle Rolin, Guy Berger, Jean-Claude Casanova, Claude Fouquet, Pierer Hassner, François Hetman, and Maurice Roy. J. F. Huntington translated *Sovereignty*.

such a thing as negative political labour (*un travail politique négatif*) – it is the kind that makes for desegregation. We realise too what is a political force (*une force politique*) – it is the one which works politically (*c'est ce qui fait un travail politique*). And we realise that different political forces may have a negative effect as regards one another, with one tending to disassociate a whole which another tends to build or keep in being. (S, 33; So, 23-24)

Now we also understand that an effort directed to some merely additive end, however great its immediate effectiveness, may yet prove to be a negative political action, destroying aggregates in being and without ability (*pouvoir*) to construct an aggregate of its own (S, 33-34; So, 24). We also know, according to de Jouvenel, what is the political battle (*la lutte politique*) as it really is: creators of aggregates fighting for the allegiance of the wills that go to form them. We also realise what is sovereignty: it is the visible object of an inner conviction held by the members of an aggregate that their aggregation has an absolute value¹³. In this way the *Raison d'État* of every aggregate (and every organised body has its own *Raison d'État*) is seen to be what seems rationally needful to the preservation of the aggregate. (S, 34; So, 24)

After this de Jouvenel paid attention to two issues: the capacity to found aggregates and the conditions making for their stability. The capacity to found aggregates would be suited by the word "authority" ("*autorité*"), which also is, unfortunately, associated with intimidation. In this context it means the ability cause others to act: "capacité d'être auteur d'actions". (S, 34; So, 24) In Latin, *actor* is, properly speaking, a source, an instigator. The Latin word included the idea of that which causes increase. And truly the creator of an aggregate causes an increase, for the aggregate is something more than its parts, just as the men who make it up are themselves something else than what they were, materially and in most cases morally. (S, 34; So, 24)

This capacity to make initiatives is the *vis politica*, the causative force of every social formations or *universitas*. De Jouvenel emphasised that we must not think this *vis politica* only in relation to states: it is a work in every co-operative aggregate and in a note he used the example of the formation of a trade union, which was his favourite example of the formation of polity. (S, 34; 34 n. 1; So, 24-25; 25, n. 1)

The study of this *vis politica* must form, according to de Jouvenel, an essential part of a real political science. We may analyse it under three aspects, which are not often found together in the same operative agent: the capacity to bring into being a stream of wills, the capacity to channel the stream, and the capacity to regularise and institutionalise the resulting co-operation. The first capacity can itself be subdivided into the faculties of initiation and propagation. Now de Jouvenel utilises the distinction of political leadership, which he introduced already in *Du Pouvoir* (p. 156) and which was originally taken from Dumézil's studies: The man who leads into action a stream of wills, whether he found it or made it, is *dux*, the conductor or leader. The man who institutionalises co-operation is

¹³ In French: "c'est la réification d'une conviction intime chez les participants d'un agrégat, que cet agrégat a une valeur finale" (S, 34).

rex, the man who regularises or rules. It depends on the capacity proper to the *rex* whether the additive achievement of the *dux* becomes a lasting aggregation. (S, 34-35; So, 25)

L'étude de cette *vis politica* doit être un des chapitres essentiels d'un véritable science politique. On peut analyser cette force en trois aspects qui ne sont pas fréquemment réunis chez le même agent: la faculté de déterminer un courant de volontés, la faculté de la canaliser en actions, la faculté de régulariser, d'institutionnaliser cette coopération. La première faculté peut elle-même se décomposer en facultés d'invention et de propagation. Celui qui entraîne à l'action en courant de volontés, qu'il l'ait suscité ou trouvé, est *dux*, un conducteur, un leader. Celui qui institutionnalise la coopération est *rex*, celui qui rectifie, qui régit. Pressentie par Rousseau (...), la dualité Dux-Rex a été merveilleusement mise en lumière par Dumézil, dans des recherches fondamentales pour la science politique (...). Nous dirons qu'il dépend de la faculté mise sous le signe du *rex* que l'œuvre additive du *dux* devienne une agrégation permanente. (S, 34-35)

This duality of political leadership was, I argue, the idea on the base of which de Jouvenel later developed the model of the different kind of basic political actors.

At this point de Jouvenel wanted to throw in some remarks on the parasitic talents needed by a professional politician for a personal success: a flair for recognising whatever currents of will are astir in society and the additive talent, which enables him to dispose men favourably to his person (his one aim), so that he acquires a sort of primacy among them. He has no *auctoritas*, because these professionals do nothing, not even evil. (S, 35; So, 25-26) These remarks are in contradiction with the apology of the politician which he some years later presented in *The Pseudo-Alcibiades*. We can read of them echoes of his disappointments from the 1930s when young de Jouvenel wanted more effective political arrangements than the Third Republic.

However, no aggregate can hold together if the ties which bind it are downward only: it needs also lateral ties. The intimacy established between the members of the group must also satisfy material, sentimental and moral needs, as well as symbols common to all. (S, 35-37; So, 26-27) The central character in all of these is the co-operation by the aid of which men can achieve more than a solitary individual.

For these reasons, de Jouvenel thought, it would be useful to restrict the study and the subject of political science to the way in which aggregates are formed and the conditions necessary to their stability. One of the obstructions which has until then hindered the development of political science was its limitation to the aggregates called States, which are too long-lived for any summary comprehension of them to be possible. De Jouvenel took his example from biology which was one of the main subjects he studied at Sorbonne: just as genetics has greatly gained by the study of heredity as it operates over many generations of short-lived insects, so political science will gain greatly from an ability to work on aggregates that mature quickly; of these social life presents instances all around us. (S, 39; So, 30)

In this way de Jouvenel defined the substance of his most important conception in *De la souveraineté*: these remarks are a beginning for the study of political genes, or "the essence of politics" which is "more widespread and more necessary than is commonly thought" and "each of us, even if he gives no thought to it,

has a political activity". But politics had also the aspect of power, or here the aspect of "authority" which is "present in some degree in every man". (*S*, 7; *So*, xxiii) Let us now study de Jouvenel's renewed conception of micropower.

3.2.2 *Auctor* and authority

The chapter which analyses the conception of authority begins with the definition of man. De Jouvenel was against an individualistic theory of man and his target was Rousseau's ideas that men were born free and that they lived "dans leur primitive indépendance" in the state of nature (Rousseau 1762, 29, 35): "Man is made by co-operation ... Every man is born helpless and wild. He wins control of himself through education given by the group – by, first and foremost, the narrow group called family." Because the individual is born of the group, it is important to understand how the group is formed. (*S*, 41; *So*, 31) At first de Jouvenel dropped two ideas of formation: For the cynics the birth of a society is due to the violence by a band of conquerors. De Jouvenel showed the problem of this theory by asking: how the conquering band came to be formed? Equally wrong is, he thought, the theory of spontaneous formation of a group. Namely, he thought that aggregates are formed by the action of *auctor*: "[l]'association ... se constitue ... comme le fruit d'une action de l'homme sur l'homme". (*S*, 41-44; *So*, 31-34) De Jouvenel did not mention where he adopted the term *auctor* from, but the long quotations of Hobbes hint that he shaped the idea in a critical relation to the sixteenth chapter of *Leviathan* where Hobbes speaks of actor, author and authority (Hobbes 1651, 132-133).

By the "authority" de Jouvenel meant the faculty of gaining another man's assent: "J'appelle Autorité la faculté d'entraîner le consentement d'autrui". In the formation of voluntary association he saw the work of a force which is authority. This definition led de Jouvenel to make distinction between authority and authoritarian: "authoritarian government" is one which has to recourse to violence lacks of enough authority or its authority is inadequate for its purposes. It must therefore use intimidation. (*S*, 45; *So*, 35)

Instead of "this corruption of the word" de Jouvenel wanted to pose the richness of the meanings which has the traditional word *auctor*. (*S*, 45; *So*, 36)

L'*auctor* est, communément, le compositeur d'un ouvrage, le père ou l'ancêtre, le fondateur d'une famille, d'une cité, le Créateur de l'univers. Ce sens est le plus matériel: on y peut voir la concrétisation de sens plus subtils. L'*auctor* est celui dont le conseil est suivi, auquel il faut remonter pour trouver la vraie source d'actions faites par autrui: c'est l'instigateur, le promoteur. Il a inspiré, insufflé, à autrui l'intention qui l'habitait, et qui est devenue celle d'autrui, principe d'actions libres faites par autrui. L'idée de père, de créateur est ainsi éclairée, amplifiée: c'est le père d'actions libres qui ont en lui leur origine mais en d'autres leur siège. (*S*, 45-46)

The general meanings of *auctor* are creator of a work, father or ancestor, founder of a family or a city, the Creator of the universe. The more subtle meanings have become incorporated in it: The *auctor* is the man whose advice is followed, to whom the actions of others must be traced back; he is the instigator, the promoter. He inspires others with the breath of his own purpose, which becomes that of those others as well – the very principle of actions which they freely do. The no-

tions of father and creator are in this way amplified: he is the father of actions freely undertaken whose origin is in him though their location is in others. (*So*, 36)

Now a question arises: how can a man be the source of actions freely undertaken by others? De Jouvenel explained that, at first, the *auctor* can give them the example, and this is another meaning of the word *auctor* too. But *auctor* is also the guarantor, the man who vouches for the good end of the enterprise. The root of the word denotes, according to de Jouvenel, the idea of augmentation: the guarantor increases the confidence of whoever embarks on action at his instigation, and the action undertaken, thanks to this increased confidence, will prove in the end a means of advancement for the man who does it.¹⁴ (*So*, 36) In this instance de Jouvenel did not mention that *auctor*'s deeds are done only by speech, i.e. rhetorically.

Everywhere and at all levels social life offers us the daily spectacle of authority fulfilling its primary function: "de l'entraînement de l'homme par l'homme". Man is, under Providence, apt to receive the instigations of others: without this gift we should be ineducable and unadaptable. The counterpart of this receptivity is, according to de Jouvenel, an activity, *la capacité instigatrice*, the authority. No one is entirely without this capacity to instigate, but it takes very different forms, and we have it in very different degrees. (*S*, 46; *So*, 36-37)

This ability to instigate works continuously and mobilises human energies. To it we owe all our progress; it may fairly be called providential. It can, like every other gift, be used badly. (*S*, 47; *So*, 37)

From this view de Jouvenel concluded that disposing seems to be a superior activity than proposing. He continued with the proverb "Man proposes, God disposes" which is in human relations a worn classification, because at every moment men dispose their actions and everything which is depended on them. And if men only dispose all the time, there would be no such thing as society. It does not exist because of the capacity to dispose but because man has ability to have an influence by his suggestion on other men's dispositions; it is by the acceptance of proposals that contracts are clinched, disputes settled and alliances formed between individuals. The faculty of proposing is part of every man's natural equipment, but in this respect we are very unequal when it comes to taking an initiative. We are more unequal still in the faculty of getting our proposals accepted. (*S*, 47; *So*, 37)

From these points of departures de Jouvenel again defined authority:

J'appelle 'Autorité' (et si l'on veut autorité propre ou naturelle) le don de faire accepter les propositions que l'on formule. Cette autorité se manifeste fortement dans une société d'enfants où tel entraîne ses compagnons dans les jeux qu'il suggère, ou fait admettre

¹⁴ "Or, comment peut-on être source d'actions faites librement par d'autres? D'abord en leur donnant l'exemple, et c'est encore un sens du mot; aussi en se portant garant que l'action est la bonne, qu'elle portera des fruits heureux pour celui qui l'assume. L'*auctor* est le garant, celui qui promet la bonne fin de l'entreprise.; il semble que ce sens soit le plus primitif. La racine du mot dénote l'idée d'augmentation: le garant augmente la confiance de celui qui entreprend à son instigation ou moyennant sa caution, et l'action entreprise grâce à cette augmentation de confiance sera finalement un moyen d'augmentation pour celui qui la fait. Est-il possible de mieux exprimer et la condition et le résultat de la coopération humaine?" (*S*, 46)

son règlement d'une querelle intervenue. Cette autorité est essentielle à la marche de toute Société, étant nécessaire qu'il y ait des actions collectives et qu'on arrête les conflits. Il est très vrai que si les hommes étaient sourds à toute autorité, il n'y aurait entre eux ni coopération, ni sécurité, bref aucune Société. (S, 47)

"Authority" is the ability of a man to get his own proposals accepted. If men were deaf to all authority, they would have among them neither co-operation nor security – in short, no society. (So, 37)

After that, when de Jouvenel studied the origins of sovereignty, he made the distinction between *pouvoir* and authority. He mentioned the *pouvoir* only few times and it meant now the faculty "to make themselves obeyed" (*la faculté de se faire obéir*). Instead of that, authority is the faculty of inducing assent (*la faculté de d'entraîner l'assentiment*) and it is exercised only over those who voluntarily accept it. If the rulers have authority over only a part of their subjects, they may receive from that part a strength sufficient to subject the others to their power (*pouvoir*). (S, 48-49; So, 39) One can have authority only by the voluntary assent of others, but *pouvoir* means something of which a group has acquired over a bigger group by their co-operation.

From this view, it is a mistake to oppose authority to liberty:

L'autorité est la faculté d'entraîner l'assentiment. C'est un acte libre que de suivre une autorité. La limite de l'autorité se marque où cesse l'assentiment volontaire. Dans tout État, il y a une marge d'obéissance qui n'est obtenue que par l'emploi ou la menace d'emploi de la force: cette marge entame la liberté et manifeste le défaut d'autorité. Elle est très faible chez les peuples libres où l'autorité aussi est très grande. (S, 49)

To follow an authority is, according to de Jouvenel, a voluntary act and authority ends where voluntary assent ends. There is in every state a margin of obedience which is won only by the use of force or the threat of force: it is this margin which breaches liberty and demonstrates the failure of authority. Among free peoples it is a very small margin, because there authority is very great. (So, 39)

Next de Jouvenel returned to the infancy of human aggregates and in this way to the theme of leadership. By the Aristotelian distinction he separated their final cause from the efficient cause: personal ascendancy (*l'ascendant personnel*) is their efficient cause and the final cause of the establishing authority is the guaranty of co-operation (*la cause finale de l'autorité constituée est d'assurer l'Être-Ensemble, de garantir la coopération*). The binding force vary from one form of necessary co-operation to another and he made the difference between the "action-groups" (for example a group in a boat race) and the groups where the men act together but have no commands in their actions (for example a group of fishermen who need not shared commands but whose quarrels must be solved anyhow. (S, 50; So, 40-41)

These mental pictures represented for de Jouvenel two types of authority: "l'une entraînant, l'autre pacificatrice, l'une intermittante, l'autre habituelle". Again he borrowed Dumézil's *dux-rex* distinction: a *dux* leads collective action with the precise end in view; the *rex* lays down rules of conduct, enforces contracts, arbitrates disputes. A *dux*, leader is needed for example in military enterprises or same kind of end-focused efforts and in primitive societies it is a rare phenomenon. Instead of that, the authority called *rex* is universally necessary because living together leads to quarrels which call for remedies. (S, 50-51; So, 41)

De Jouvenel noted that an authority of the type *rex* must of its nature be one of the least exigent forms of rule imaginable. Pursuing no defined end, it has thus no need to mobilise energies of the citizens for one purpose or another. Its mere presence, the confidence which it inspires and the guarantee which it furnishes set the co-operation in motion. It is not the question to command in *rex's* orders but his subjects are convinced that it is greatly to their advantage to share in the benefits brought by the *rex*. He is over them for precisely the same reasons that cause us to place a lightning conductor on our roofs. But this capacity of bringer of good things makes a prisoner of him. Many instances can be given in which *rex* finds himself almost kept in confinement. (*S*, 56; *So*, 46)

In this way authority is for de Jouvenel the creator of the social tie, and its position is consolidated by the benefits which spring from the social tie (*So*, 47).

L'autorité nous est apparue créatrice du nœud social; consolidée par les bienfaits qui résultent du nœud social; peu exigeant, sans droits définis, tenue de justifier par l'événement la réputation de *fas* qui la soutient. Tel est, à ses premiers pas, ce qui deviendra le pouvoir politique. (*S*, 57)

It makes few demands and has no defined rights, but it is under the necessity of justifying by the event the reputation for divine prescription which upholds it. This is, according to de Jouvenel, in its first levels the thing which would become political power. (*So*, 47)

In this way de Jouvenel has tried to rearrange the questions of politics and power from those points of departure which he thought to be the most fundamental. We should read the book as a critique against normative political theory and as an effort to open the space of political theory to new directions: to that human field of action which political theorists had left to sociologists, but from which arise also the problems of political scientists. These conclusions are made explicit at the end of *Sovereignty* which does not exist in the French version:

Political Science needs a more ambitious programme and a more affirmative attitude than is now thought proper. ...

It is fashionable to regard political theory as a thing completed, and to deal with it from an historical angle only, relating by what successive achievements of the mind it was built up.

It is then left to sociology to study men's behaviour in so far as they are left indeterminate by legal commands. (*So*, 358)

[T]hese phenomena are more important than those usually nominated 'political' and are in fact basic to so-called 'political phenomena'. (*So*, 359)

De Jouvenel was taught that the chief problem of political science of the time lied in the relationship between the state and the individual. He thought that the figure upon which political science should focus its attention is the initiator, and that "the chief problem of the science is to study the conditions of dynamic balance between the driving forces and the adjusting factors". (*So*, 361)

Even a more microscopical program of political science was included at the end of the book:

The elementary political process is the action of mind upon mind through speech. Communication by speech completely depends upon the existence in the memories of both parties of a common stock of words to which they attach much the same meanings. In like manner, the influence of man upon man, which is the elementary political process, completely depends upon there being, in the consciences of both parties, a common stock of beliefs and a similar structure of feelings. It would be foolish to ignore that men are disposed to action by their subjective interests, but just as foolish to forget that these interests themselves are conceived within a framework of beliefs and feelings. Even as people belong to the same culture by the use of the same language, so they belong to the same society by the understanding of the same moral language. As this common moral language extends, so does society; as it breaks up, so does society. (*So*, 368)

"The action of mind upon mind through speech" could have led de Jouvenel to think political action from the view and with the vocabulary of rhetoric. Here we can find all the traits of classical rhetoric: a speaker, an audience and shared meanings of speech through persuasion. This is what Kenneth Burke called "identification" where persuasion is needed when everything is not entirely the same and not entirely different (Burke 1950, 25) or here we can find Terence Ball's "contingently contested concepts" ("these interests" which are themselves "conceived within a framework of beliefs and feelings") and "the perpetual *possibility* of disagreement" (Ball 2002, 23-24). However, in *The Pure Theory* de Jouvenel developed the idea to more formal directions with a vocabulary of pattern-like language.

In *Sovereignty* de Jouvenel also thought of some characteristics of language:

The security of communication with our fellows rests upon a clear common understanding of the terms in use, but the enrichment of communication calls for the coining of new terms which, through the backwardness of many minds, give rise to misunderstandings. Let us hope that the tensions in our society are of similar nature. And let us in any case cherish the simple terms which are capable of moving the hearts of all men. (*So*, 368)

In other words, the communication rests upon a common understanding of terms, but it is not enough: the enrichment of it calls for the new terms, which will lead to misunderstandings. This "perpetual motion machine" of language continues always to move or the language will be impoverished. De Jouvenel deeply understood the figurative character of language when he wrote of metaphor in the beginning of *De la souveraineté*:

Les traités de rhétorique nous représentent la métaphore comme un ornement ajouté à la pensée pour en rendre l'expression plus agréable et plus frappante. Quel erreur sur la nature du processus intellectuel! L'homme pense par images, et le style sans métaphores n'est point le style naturel avant ornementation, mais au contraire un style systématiquement dépouillé des images qui ont soutenu la démarche de l'esprit. (*S*, 53)

Treatises of rhetoric picture metaphor as an ornament added to a thought. This view of rhetoric, which restricted its range to elocution, provides us with reasons why de Jouvenel did not continue his study in terms of rhetoric: his connections with the treatises of rhetoric were indirect. He lived in the time of a "rhetorical desert" as Compagnon (1999, 1245) calls it. At the end of the nineteenth century

the reformations purged step by step *rhétorique*, which flourished over centuries in France (see Fumaroli 1980), from education and replaced it with the new disciplines, like the explication of texts in the secondary schools and the history of literature at the universities. The reform in 1902, the year before de Jouvenel was born, cut the head of rhetoric in the secondary schools and the lycées of the republic. The name *rhétorique* disappeared from the lists of classes of the secondary schools. Of course, rhetoric did not disappear entirely and there was always some who read or translated books of rhetoric, but it was not until Roland Barthes' article *L'ancienne rhétorique, aide-mémoire* (1970) which opened the gates for revival of rhetoric in France. But if we think of the rhetorical resources which de Jouvenel could have had, the French rhetoric before his birth, "ce sont pour la plupart des rhétoriques complètes, et non pas restreintes au style ou à l'élocution". However, according to Compagnon there was an exception, Pierre Fontanier's *Manuel classique pour l'étude des tropes* (1821; 1830), which concentrated on presenting different tropes. (Compagnon 1999, 1225-1247). It seems quite probable that "les traités de rhétorique" are only one book, Fontanier's *Manuel*, which has been recently republished under the title *Les figures du discours* (1977)¹⁵.

De Jouvenel could have known the works of Chaïm Perelman, which his friend Michael Polanyi knew (Polanyi 1963, 13) or the books of Kenneth Burke, but for one reason or another he has no connection with the new rhetoric. Even this quotation refers to the figurative character of all language which has been quite common since Nietzsche, who himself recognised the importance of Sophists and rhetoric directly: his lectures on rhetoric are recently published (Nietzsche 1989). For de Jouvenel the images of mind are not the ornaments of language, but the metaphors are necessary to the progress of the mind. He also reminded that the natural scientists think through images as well and that the primitive form of philosophy was poetry:

– a poetry rich in truths which cannot as yet be formulated in other way, and myths should rightly be regarded as the primitive form of political philosophy among societies of men (*So*, 44; *S*, 54).

These ideas have become commonplace after the linguistic turn of social sciences, where "myths are the varying but pervasive subtexts of all political communication" (Nelson 1998, 159). However, in *De la souveraineté* politics appears in the conflicts between initiators or in the conflicts between initiators and the authorities which try to solve the problems caused by the initiators. Freedom in this respect means "the freedom to create a gathering, to generate a group, and thereby introduce in society a new power, a source of movement and change" (*So*, 363). Therefore the problems of modern sovereigns become difficult between change and stability:

¹⁵ There Fontanier explained that "Les tropes par ressemblance consistent à présenter une idée sous le signe d'une autre idée plus frappante ou plus connue, qui, d'ailleurs ne tient à la première par aucun autre lien que celui d'une certaine conformité ou analogie. Ils se réduisent, pour le genre, à un seul, à la *Métaphore*, dont le nom si connu, et plus connu peut-être que la chose même, a perdu, comme l'observe Laharpe, tout sa gravité scolastique." (Fontanier 1821/1830, 99)

[T]he social universe must be at the same time fluid, responsive to new initiatives, and a solid ground to which the individual may trust. The unexpected must be allowed to happen and legitimate assumptions must not be belied. An adequate degree of stability must be achieved in the face of change. (So, 363)

De Jouvenel was on the side of change and against "those who are in general distrustful of initiatives making for change" and "those who are very much in favour of such initiatives but want to see them centralised in and monopolised by the public authority". He wanted to belong among those "who like initiative and want to see it very widespread. This last may serve as a definition of Liberalism." (So, 364)

This liberalism based on the idea that however "advanced" a government which monopolises initiative deems itself to be, "in the end it will be found that it has assumed the character of a dead-hand" (So, 364). Government must foster the conditions under which initiative will flourish, although they generate problems:

[A]s these initiatives generate change, disturbance and conflict, it seems logical that the greater their dynamism and variety, the greater the problems of adjustment which the sovereign meet. Nor can these problems be solved by the mere application of general laws, for these assume unchanging issues and the issues are forever changing. Therefore, there must be in government a perpetual capacity for novel situations and an inventiveness to deal with unforeseen complications. (So, 365)

In this way de Jouvenel enlightened a view that F. R. Ankersmit has now brought up. Namely, Ankersmit has emphasised that "*stronger* state should not identified with the *meddlesome* state" (Ankersmit 1996, xv). It is the *rex* character of the government which ought to be strong, the capacity to solve problems of initiatives. The extent of the governmental activities and the enterprise trait of it, *dux*, should be limited.

The progressive character of society is here conceived as arising from non-governmental initiatives, but the necessary stability requires that a government should be that much the more active in resolving problems as the citizens are active in creating them. It follows that an ever-increasing activity of government in the performance of its essential function must be expected. This intensification is not to be confused with the extension of the governmental label to functions which is needed not be performed by government; the latter are an unnecessary burdening of the governmental machine, injurious to the performance of its proper duty. (So, 365)

In other words, de Jouvenel did not demand government to intervene in every issue but he insisted on strength in the sense that government must have enough ability to find solutions when initiatives cause problems. He argued against an idea of Rousseau, that "the more free are citizens, the less free can the government be" (So, 366; cf. Rousseau 1762, 134). The problem is posed in a wrong way, because it implies that "the government of free men is not free, because it must be obedient to the political wishes expressed by the citizens" (So, 366-367).

But I say that government is not free even to practice such obedience, because, by reason of its very purpose, it must solve the problems posed by the social actions of free men, and this essential task may be incompatible with deference to the demands of citizens for a given action by itself. (So, 367)

Now the free government can not represent the opinions and interests of men in the "mimetic" sense or and as a copy of people, but in Ankersmit's "aesthetic" sense where "brokenness" and "gap" characterises its relation with subjects: it is something else that it represents (Ankersmit 1996, 18). When Ankersmit's aesthetic politics is an apology of representative democracy, de Jouvenel made no conclusions as to the form of government. He emphasised that "the performance of the function of sovereignty depends upon the public spirit" (So, 367).

In this way de Jouvenel had formed yet not completed the figures and conceptions (politics, authority) which he accomplished in *The Pure Theory of Politics*.

3.3 The Pure Theory of Politics

Again de Jouvenel continued to develop his ideas during nine years. Already in 1956 he decided to write a book of pure politics and by the aid of his British and American friends it became possible to realise it. (PP, 9) As early as in *Du Pouvoir* he had the idea of pure power and in *De la souveraineté* he had lanced the concept "pure politics". At the level of headings he expressed the pure politics first time at the beginning of 1957 in a journal called *Revue internationale d'histoire politique et constitutionnelle*¹⁶ 1957 (Nguyen 1963, 317). The questions of political good or sovereignty have now changed to a practical pedagogical problem: How to establish political science in France? These years were the time of "second transformation" in political science of France when *la science politique* was separated from *les sciences politiques* of which no science was political science. The new *la science politique* came close to the American political science. De Jouvenel was involved in this process and his books and articles were important in the formation of new science and especially for its theory. (Favre 1985, 37-39; Berndtson 1981, 112; de Jouvenel 1958, 51-62). Perhaps the title of an article *Une science de la politique est-elle possible?* (1958) expresses the problem of the time best. In the article he tried to explain that German *Staatwissenschaft* can not be a solution to the problem and the idea of "pure politics" could be a better direction.

[J]e crois voir dans cette identification de la science politique avec la science de l'État, la cause même qui a empêché le tracé d'une avenue d'entrée qui puisse être commune aux politologues et qui puisse faciliter aux étudiants l'accès aux connaissances particulières. (de Jouvenel 1958, 54)

In *Invitation à la théorie politique pure* (1957), which was the first of the many articles concerning of pure politics and political, he combines his conception of

¹⁶ Later the journal returned to its original name *Politique*.

micro politics with the critique of political theory.¹⁷ The study of pure politics ought to enlighten the basic elements of political phenomena, but it ought to produce means of basic studies as well.

La théorie politique pure, telle que nous l’imaginons, doit mettre en lumière les éléments fondamentaux des phénomènes politiques. Elle doit donc être “élémentaire”; mais je crois qu’elle doit aussi faire l’objet d’un enseignement élémentaire. (de Jouvenel 1957a, 91)

De Jouvenel’s purpose was a new discipline: to establish or to find unambiguous linguistic roots or “radicals” for political science: “Sans radicaux, point de langage” (de Jouvenel 1957a, 89). The reason for this purpose is de Jouvenel’s observation that political science was born in the shadow of other disciplines, especially law (de Jouvenel 1957a, 87). In the four-leaf clover of political science (political theory and history of political thought; political institutions; parties, groups and public opinion; international relations) de Jouvenel saw possibilities to the success of Frenchmen in the field of political theory. *L’esprit français* produces clear ideas and elegant constructions. That is why mathematics is the discipline in which Frenchmen have succeeded and this is the reason why political theory is proper to Frenchmen. (de Jouvenel 1957a, 86, 91)

[C]’est un caractère spécifique de l’esprit français que le goût des idées claires et distinctes portant aux constructions élégantes. Il est bien connu que la science dans laquelle les Français tiennent aujourd’hui la plus large place, est la mathématique. Par analogie, il est vraisemblable que, compartiments de la science politique, celui où nous pouvons mieux nous distinguer est la théorie politique. (de Jouvenel 1957a, 91)

In this sense the questions of *The Pure Theory* were almost ready made already in 1957. This is no wonder because de Jouvenel finished the first version of *The Pure Theory* at the end of 1957. (*PT*, xiii). We can summarise de Jouvenel’s questions of the year 1957 in the following way: What are the basic elements of political phenomena? How to find for the political theory the radicals from which one can develop it to the level of for example economics? Namely, in economics de Jouvenel saw remarkable theoretical development which was reached in returning to study of microcosmos – to the study which *political scientist* treats like unscientific:

Ainsi la science économique s’est développée essentiellement par la réflexion sur les radicaux – que beaucoup de *political scientists* tiennent pour non scientifique – et non par l’investigation minutieuse – que les mêmes tiennent pour seule scientifique. Il faut d’ailleurs remarquer que les progrès accomplis l’ont été par un passage de la réflexion

¹⁷ Cf. for example De la politique pure (*Le contrat social* 2/1959), Théorie Politique Pure (*Revue française de science politique* 11/1961) and Ce qu’est la politique pure (*Annales de philosophie politique* 6/1965). At the same time de Jouvenel started the art of conjecture project which he tries to connect with political science: see for example L’art de la conjecture politique (*Table ronde* 1962), Political Science and Prevision (*The American Political Science Review* 1/1965) and On the Nature of Political Science (*The American Political Science Review* 4/1961). The original idea of *futuribles* project was born in discussions with Waldemar Nielsen who was representative of Ford Foundation (Carton 58, *Entretien avec Monsieur de Jouvenel*).

initiale sur le plan macrocosmique à une réflexion sur le plan microcosmique (Walras, Jevons), le retour au plan macrocosmique venant longtemps après. (de Jouvenel 1957a, 90)

In *De la politique pure* (1959) this microscopical view led de Jouvenel to think that political action is something on its own. Every attempt to regulate political action is a result of political action which can be withdrawn by political action.

[T]oute réglementation politique de l'activité politique ne saurait être qu'un produit de l'activité politique, révoquant par l'activité politique. C'est donc cette activité qu'il s'agit de saisir, et pour cela il convient de l'aborder en ses manifestations les plus simples: c'est ce que l'on entend par la Politique pure. (de Jouvenel 1959, 278)

To understand thoroughly this type of action on its own also political science ought to return to the micro level, back to basics or to "shared trunk" as he wrote in 1961 (de Jouvenel 1961a, 365). De Jouvenel asked how there can be peaceful epochs and times of crisis in the history and how "à partir de cette 'normalité', expliquer les crises?" In his opinion we can explain the crisis on in the way that extraordinary actions of crisis are only extraordinary development of ordinary actions which are produced during normal times (de Jouvenel 1961a, 371).

[I]l me paraît préférable de supposer que les actions extraordinaires des époques critiques ne sont rien autre que des développements extraordinaires d'actions ordinaires qui se produisent couramment dans les époques normales. Autrement dit, les grandes éruptions tirent leur source d'un bouillonnement sous-jacent en temps ordinaire, ou encore il s'agit de versions macroscopiques de processus observables au microscope en tout temps. (de Jouvenel 1961a, 371)

In other words, the sources of big eruptions can be found from the underground states of turmoils of the normal times. This kind of consideration expresses, how de Jouvenel's experiences revised his conception of politics. At the background we can again find the motive of *Du Pouvoir*: how on earth all that happened? In this article he even referred to his experiences and to the history of the century which did not have any explanation in the political science:

Quel sera l'événement? Quel l'effet de telle décision? Par quelle stratégie obtenir tel résultat? Ce sont là, émergeant d'un fouillis mineur, les préoccupations de l'homme engagé dans la politique: elles sont événementielles et opérationnelles; or ces préoccupations ne figurent pas dans la science politique. Le contraste m'a frappé lorsqu'après avoir longtemps vu "faire de la politique", j'ai pris connaissance systématique de ce qui s'enseigne à ce sujet. (de Jouvenel 1961a, 368)

L'histoire du dernier demi-siècle assurément ne doit pas nous porter à regarder les crises politiques comme si rares et improbables que nos études en puissent faire fi. (de Jouvenel 1961a, 379)

Indeed, we can define that de Jouvenel's problems were as Quentin Skinner has said of the "political life itself". He seems to have thought: "I am surprised of the extraordinary events of the century. Can there be any scientific explanation? I cannot find any from the political theory. My experience tells me that the theories are too general or pose wrong questions. Perhaps, it is better to study these phenomena microscopically."

3.3.1 The Questions of *The Pure Theory*

The version of *The Pure Theory* in the year 1957 was not yet ready enough. De Jouvenel continued to develop his ideas by lecturing at Cambridge and Yale¹⁸, and finally at Berkeley, during the fall term of 1960. Parts of the book were published beforehand in the journals *The Yale Review*, *The American Political Science Review* and *The Review of Politics*.¹⁹ (PT, xiii) However, he dealt with pure politics in several other articles during 1957-1965. Here I will focus on these articles along the versions of the book when they clarify or add something to *The Pure Theory*.

The titles of the French and the English versions of the book illuminate the two dimensions of de Jouvenel's pursuit: *The Pure Theory of Politics* and *De la politique pure*. On the one hand, he tried to develop a *theory* of the *pure* politics and, on the other hand, he tried to say something of the *pure politics*. He began to elaborate the pure politics by outlining a political science, its basic concepts and its substance.

In 1961 de Jouvenel compared political science with other sciences. Other sciences utilised theory to observe reality from which theory again get new characteristics²⁰: “[L]a possession de la théorie guide les recherches pratiques, dont les résultats en retour apportent des amendements à la théorie.” (de Jouvenel 1961a, 364) Nothing similar appeared in political science: it did not study “les préoccupations événementielles et opérationnelles”. The historical reason for that is, according to de Jouvenel, that those who act politically and those who study it are not the same men:

Historiquement l'homme traitant de politique a été autre que l'homme faisant de la politique et son propos a été bien moins de comprendre la conduite du politicien que de la changer. (de Jouvenel 1961a, 368)

It follows that the pursuit of political scientists has been, not to understand politics, but to change it. This is, of course, an allusion to Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. Political science lacks basic concepts also because the newcomers from philosophy²¹, theology, law²² and later sociology and economics have occupied it. They utilised the concepts of their science; there were no basic concepts. In addition, political words were “widely circulating currency” which “politicians are

¹⁸ “In essence this treatise is an expanded version of Storrs Lectures [at Yale, note JV]. The expansion, however, has been considerable.” (PT, xiii)

¹⁹ De Jouvenel wrote of *Journal of Politics* but the name of the publication must be *Review of Politics*. He referred to the articles: Ego in Otherdom. *Yale Review* 48 (June 1959), 505-514; The Pseudo-Alcibiades: A Dialogue on Political Action and Political Responsibility. *Yale Review* 50. (December 1960), 161-171; Political Configuration and Political Dynamics. *Review of Politics* 23 (October 1961), 435-436; On the Nature of Political Science. *American Political Science Review* 55 (December 1961), 773-779 and The Manners of Politics. *Yale Review* 51 (March 1962), 414-424. (see NP, 238-239)

²⁰ “Faire de la théorie, dans les autres disciplines, c'est construire dans l'esprit un modèle qui schématise la genèse des phénomènes, de sorte qu'il y ait correspondance entre l'enchaînement logique des concepts et la succession chronologique des apparences observées: cette correspondance se vérifie si tel changement apporté à la fois dans une pièce du modèle et la pièce correspondante de la réalité, entraîne logiquement dans le modèle et chronologiquement dans la réalité la même modification du résultat. Un modèle ainsi

not interested in using them properly but in using them for effect” (*PT*, x). This could have been an excellent starting point for the rhetorical studies of politics, but de Jouvenel thought that this ”deficiency” should be remedied with a good theory: “une bonne théorie (...) n’a pour objet que de faciliter le travail de recherche et la formulation des constations” (Jouvenel 1961a, 365).

Whatever the reasons, political science stands alone in its lack of agreed ‘elements’. There are no basic concepts, simple enough to allow of only one meaning, therefore conveying exactly the same signification to all and confidently handled by everyone; there are no simple relations, acknowledged by all to form the smallest components of complex systems, and commonly used in the building of models devised to simulate the intricacies of real situations. (*PT*, x)

To find simple basic concepts and to form the simple relations from which one can understand more complex models of real situations, this seems to be the function of *The Pure Theory*. At first this kind of method seems to be old-fashioned. The study of natural languages and the new rhetoric, or linguistic and rhetorical turn have changed de Jouvenel’s dream of unambiguous words irretrievably to the lost past²³. The merit of pure politics can be found from other characteristics of the book.

De Jouvenel also knew well, that “every political situation is complex and original” (*PT*, ix). Thus he wanted not to build an all embracing normative theory, but a model which simulates reality:

This activity of the mind is habitually called ‘theorizing’ in sciences other than political. Models thus obtained perform a representative function: they have no normative value. (*PT*, xi)

conçu est prédicteur, et invalidé par sa prédiction erronée. Son mandat est de représenter la réalité, sa vertu est d’y être docile.” (de Jouvenel 1961a, 364)

²¹ De Jouvenel connected philosophy with the magisterial mind: “La recommandation de tel ou tel régime est en philosophie politique subsidiaire à la formation de “l’esprit de magistrature”, qui fait regarder tout office que l’on se trouvera occuper comme devant être rempli selon l’inspiration de certains principes et selon certaines règles.” (de Jouvenel 1961a, 369) In politics always somebody crosses Rubicon (ibidem, 368) and the accused can become judge (ibidem, 369).

²² In the article *Thoughts on a Theory of Political Enterprise* (1958) de Jouvenel studied the difference between juridical and political: “The law and the judiciary bodies are great instruments of social peace, and therefore are rightly honored. This inclines peace-loving thinkers to picture the political system as an enlarged version of the judicial system, operating in much the same manner. Unfortunately, such a point of view is unrealistic.” (*NP*, 56) “In short, while the judge stands immovable above the individual parties, the political adjudicator finds himself within the field of contending forces, and even subject to them.” (*NP*, 56) “The investigation of political forces has been hampered by various reasons. One is the juristic bent of political science in many nations.” (*NP*, 56-57)

²³ Cf. for example Arnold: “Ambiguity is never entirely avoidable in arguments because the language which must be used is inevitably equivocal in some degree and because the terms that are available are often open to more than a single interpretation.” (Arnold 1982, x)

To theorise in a way which can make reality more intelligible was de Jouvenel's task. The opposite of his model to theorise were the models "in the quite different sense of 'ideals'", for example Rousseau's model of a democratic assembly wherein all those who will be subject to a decision participate in taking it. Each one of them in so doing is moved only by concern of the good of the whole, and trusts solely to his own judgement, uninfluenced by the opinions of others. (*PT*, xi)

The adjective "pure" in the title is used by analogy with the contrast between "pure" and "organic" chemistry. Just as "organic" bodies are far more complex than those to which the student is first introduced in the beginners course, so are the situations and relations of actual politics far more complex than those de Jouvenel's examined in *The Pure Theory*. (*PT*, x) He tried to find the basic characteristics of politics from the most banal situations:

[C]'est dans les situations les plus banales que je cherche les caractères fondamentaux de la politique: où commence l'action politique là doit aussi commencer l'étude. (*PP*, 12)

Political science begins where political action begins. Because his purpose is to come down to the greatest possible degree of simplicity, "political phenomena appear essentially as relations between individuals" (*PT*, x). This kind of approach is not equivalent to Clausewitz's famous definition of war²⁴ where politics would be "continuating the war by other means" and the only thing which makes the difference between war and politics are the means (Clausewitz 1832, 8). Neither it is equivalent for example to Carl Schmitt's political in the relations between friend and enemy²⁵ (Schmitt 1932, 26). It finds politics from the relations between every individual. In this sense de Jouvenel's conception of politics is connected with relations although he wanted to elaborate a conception of action. Though de Jouvenel argued that "political phenomena appear essentially relations between individuals", he actually changed the view from the "political phenomena" to the "phenomenon of politics" (*PT*, x). In other words, he did not count some phenomena into the class of politics (which are political phenomena), but constituted politics from the certain aspects of phenomena (phenomenon of politics). He separated "political" from state, society, parties etc. and situated it in the relations between individuals. The book does not deal with moral problems either (*PT*, 71 n. 1).

In other words, de Jouvenel tried to begin with observations and to establish a non-normative "theorizing" of politics. The question is how the phenomenon of politics appears in the relations between men. He did not mention any great political thinker but emphasised the importance of his experiences (*PT*, xi-xii). This is the usual case with theorists of politics when they declare a new conception of politics: no one comments others or refers to common usage of the word (cf. Palonen 2002b, 25-26). If we want to believe this and to find the roots of de Jouvenel's

²⁴ According to Clausewitz "der Krieg *nichts ist als die fortgesetzte Staatspolitik mit anderen Mitteln*" (Clausewitz 1832, 8).

²⁵ "Die spezifisch politische Unterscheidung, auf welche sich die politischen Handlungen und Motive zurückführen lassen, ist die Unterscheidung von *Freund* und *Feind*." (Schmitt 1932, 26)

political thought, we must search them from his political experiences²⁶ and from his view that Thucydides and Shakespeare are more important to his political thought than the classics of political theory.

But his own experience was not a reference large enough for his conception of politics. De Jouvenel concluded that if politics is understood restrictively as the conduct of men in offices of authority, then all those who have held office have found out something about political behaviour. He held the view that we should regard as 'political' every systematic effort, performed at any place in the social field, to move other men in pursuit of some design cherished by the mover. This extended the material of political conduct: "we all have the required material: any one of us has acted with others, been moved by others and sought to move others". (PT, 30) The main thing is now the adjective *political*, not the substantive *politics*, which is the central difference between the German and the French vocabulary of politics where the word *politique* rarely appears alone (Palonen 1989, 23).

One of de Jouvenel's central arguments in *The Pure Theory* is that

The smallest identifiable component of any political event, large or small, is the moving of man by man. That is elementary political action. (PT, 10)

This approach resembles the eidetical reduction in phenomenology, where a phenomenon is purified of everything additional and the *eidōs* of the phenomenon is found (cf. Husserl 1995, 61-66). In the same way the pure theory of politics tries to avoid all normativity. The smallest identifiable element of every small or large political event is that moving of man by man. However, there is a difference of connotations between the French and the English version of the book: *The Pure Theory* speaks "technically" of "moving men"²⁷, whereas *De la politique pure* is more connected with action: it speaks of how men have others to do something: "l'homme faisant agir l'homme" (PP, 29). In the article *Théorie Politique pure* (1961) he used also the formulation "rapport de faire-faire d'un homme à un autre" (de Jouvenel 1961a, 376).

Now we can interpret the title of *The Pure Theory of Politics*: the "pure" refers de Jouvenel's way to approach his subject and politics refers to the relation of "having somebody to do something", and finally the "theory" means to "theorise" from beginning of the observation or it means de Jouvenel's non-normative and descriptive way to study.

²⁶ He repeated this "rhetoric of experience" in such a way that we can read between the lines that this man interviewed Hitler, saw Doriot's *Parti populaire français* and experienced his part of the horrors of the Second World War: "The man who was born into mild Politics cannot imagine it ferocious: and historical instances are to him fantastic tales. But he who has once seen men unmanned by victory and unmanned by defeat, who has watched how blood flushes the face of the one and drains from the face of the other, who has heard the blustering laugh and the pitiful cry, that man feels that the mildness of Politics is not so well assured, that its maintenance needs to be contrived: that this indeed is the first and foremost of political arts." (PT, 186)

²⁷ 'Man moves man' is not only de Jouvenel's view. He noticed that his friend Edward Shils emphasised it as early as 1939. (PT, x, note 1)

3.3.2 Configuration and Dynamics

One of the starting points of *The Pure Theory* is that political science had studied politics "geographically". It was born and it was developed as a kind of "cartography of heights"²⁸. In short, political science studies only "configuration" which means "where different things stand in relation to one another". However, our mind also strives towards statements of consequence which means "how successive events arise from another" (*PT*, 3). De Jouvenel wanted to study dynamics of political process although he recognised the importance of configuration:

The importance of configurations is great but adequately recognized, and they are dealt with more than adequately by other authors. Therefore it has seemed to me that a different approach to Politics might be tried. (*PT*, 4)

Mon souci est autre: c'est de penser la dynamique. (de Jouvenel 1961a, 364)

He thought the study of dynamics more difficult than the study of configurations, because "we grasp more easily disposition in space than process in time" (*PT*, 3).

Theoretical writers have always been interested in advocating ideal maps, derived from some principle. Practical politicians have ever needed accurate and detailed knowledge of the actual map, as a guide to efficient action. (*PT*, 4)

The statesman, even mere 'boss', resorts daily to some empirical understanding of operational relationships: can we not elaborate such understanding? (*PT*, 13)

In other words, if we begin from the practices of politicians we could achieve a better understanding of politics. De Jouvenel also utilised the terms "dynamics" and "statics" to designate his idea:

The technology of Politics is essentially concerned with dynamics while its science cleaves to statics. (*PT*, 8)

The terms of natural sciences have been common in the French human sciences. We can now trace, I argue, the original source of de Jouvenel's conceptions "configuration" and "dynamics". It is quite clear that he took the idea from Theodor W. Adorno's article *La statique et dynamique, catégories sociologiques* which was published in *Diogenes* (33/1961), in the same issue where was de Jouvenel's article *Le mieux-vivre dans la société riche* was published, too. Adorno mainly studied the discussions of the Amsterdam meeting of sociologists in 1955 when they have returned to the relations between social statics and dynamics: he reminded that statics and dynamics were conceptions of Auguste Comte. (Adorno 1961, 36) Adorno's comments of Comte are the most probable source of inspiration when de Jouvenel before *The Pure Theory* wrote of dynamics in the articles *Théorie Politique Pure* in *Revue française de science politique* (11/1961) and *Political Configuration and Political Dynamics* in *Review of Politics* (October 1961).

²⁸ "[L]a science politique soit née et se soit développée comme une cartographie des hauteurs." (de Jouvenel 1965, 22)

In Comte's duality of social physics the statics had the most important role whereas the study of dynamics had minor importance:

[L]'étude statique de l'organisme social doit coïncider, au fond, avec la théorie positive de l'ordre, qui ne peut, en effet, consister essentiellement qu'en une juste harmonie permanente entre les diverses conditions d'existence des sociétés humaines: on voit, de même, encore plus sensiblement, que l'étude dynamique de la vie collective de l'humanité constitue nécessairement la théorie positive du progrès social, qui, en écartant tout vaine pensée de perfectibilité absolue et illimitée, doit naturellement se réduire à simple notion de ce développement fondamental.²⁹

Comte's positive study left the dynamics "a priori au rang d'accidents" whereas de Jouvenel especially wanted to "understand the sparking off of contributory actions" (Adorno 1961, 37; *PT*, 8). In this sense we can not claim that the pure politics and its theory are a normative social technology or an attempt to find universal laws of human conduct. Under the loupe of the human sciences every subject is unique and free: "dans les sciences humaines, nos individus sont des hommes: que chaque personne soit unique et agent libre ce n'est certes pas moi qui le méconnaîtrai" (de Jouvenel 1961a, 367).

In this sense we can understand that the pure theory of politics was an attempt to reconsider politics, not again by the aid of spatial conceptions, but from the view of temporal dynamics. In other words, de Jouvenel tried to move away from politics of space into the politics of time:

Our times are marked by a precipitous course of events and an attendant instability of configurations. Political maps and constitutions are highly perishable commodities. (*PT*, 10)

Along with the configurations de Jouvenel wanted to pay attention to the conception of event. He was not, however, alone to think event: as we later will come to notice, Raymond Aron wrote of event too and these considerations were a result of current debates (cf. chapter 4.3.).

3.3.3 *Eventus and Eventum*

When political maps and constitutions are highly perishable commodities, it is the concept of event³⁰ (*event, la genèse de l'événement*) through which de Jouvenel

²⁹ Auguste Comte: *Cours de philosophie positive*. t. IV, 5e éd. Société positiviste d'enseignement supérieur, Paris, 1893, p. 254. Here quoted according to Adorno 1961, 36.

³⁰ In the new introduction of *De la politique pure* (1976) de Jouvenel asked, why *The Pure Theory* was not a similar success as *Du Pouvoir*. He concluded that the narratives of the books offer an explanation: *Du Pouvoir* tried to analyse historical evolution and it coincided with the dominant evolutionist view which was formulated during the 19th century Comte and Marx. Instead of that *The Pure Theory* tried to analyse the genesis of event, which is according to evolutionist view only an accident during the logical course. De Jouvenel thought that event is the real cause of development and it is worth of proper study. *The Pure Theory* tried to encourage political scientists to this study. (de Jouvenel 1976, vii)

intended to say something new (*PT*, 10; *PP*, vii). The event is a result of instigation: “la mise en mouvement d’autrui” (de Jouvenel 1961a, 373). In other words, de Jouvenel studied event from the view of the instigations which preceded the event, from the view of its genesis. He discerned two connotations and perspectives by the aid of two latin terms *eventus* and *eventum*:

[T]he masculine *eventus*, with its connotation of outcome, can be taken to designate the event which I propose to bring about, of which I am somehow the author, while the neutral *eventum* can be taken to denote the event which is utterly out of my hands. (*PT*, 6)

In other words, de Jouvenel tried to think how the events happen. And he answered that they happen because men try to have others do something. A view of the events (masculine *eventus*) is that I am an active actor because I cause the event by other men’s action. The other view to the events (neuter *eventum*) is that I cannot influence on them. These terms get political traits if we apply to them the vocabulary of politics: *Eventus* describes those characteristics of action which we often use with the word *policy* while *eventum* gets easily the meanings of *politics*. As his example de Jouvenel utilised two current political event in the beginning of 1960s. The election of John F. Kennedy to the President of the United States was for the Foreign Office of France an *eventum*; for the campaign team it was an *eventus* (*PT*, 6; *NP*, 72-75). In this way de Jouvenel has discerned the views of agent and observer concerning on events.

The word ‘designing’ has, in common English usage, an unfavourable connotation, when applied to a person. Used neutrally, the term denotes the occupational trait of the politician. (*PT*, 8)

He seeks to bring about a certain *eventus* requiring actions from other persons, and therefore he seeks to elicit the adequate contributory actions, and for this purpose makes moves likely to elicit actions: all of this constitutes the *design* of the politician, which, on being carried out, constitutes a *political operation*. (*PT*, 8)

In order to carry through an *eventus* (*move*) a politician must cause deeds of other persons. Along this pursuit he performs some actions (acts politically), which elicits action of others. All this constitutes the *design* of the politician, which on the level of action constitutes a *political operation*. In this way de Jouvenel has discerned several characteristics of the original *eventus*, which form a political line or a large policy:

1. the *policy* is an action wanted (*eventus*)
2. *acting politically* (“to elicit contributory actions”) means to cause actions of other men in a way in which the policy is realised
3. together these form a *design* or a policy in the sense of a political programme
4. when the design (or a policy) is performed it forms a *political operation* which can be also called a policy

De Jouvenel called with the term “instigator” the man who seeks to elicit a given deed from another. He also separated two types of instigator: in so far s/he strives to obtain an *eventus*, s/he is called an ‘operator’; in so far as s/he builds a following habitually responsive to the same voice, or a voice proceeding from the same place, s/he is an ‘entrepreneur’. (*PT*, 10) In his article *Théorie politique pure de*

Jouvenel took examples from daily politics to depict these types of instigators: a representative who wants make a law tries to form a political operation. The founder of a party creates a political enterprise.

L'agent que je veux placer sous le microscope est "l'entrepreneur politique", avec son importante variété: "l'opérateur politique". J'appelle "opérateur politique" l'homme obsédé par une certaine fin qu'il se propose et qui, en vue de cette fin, s'applique systématiquement à mettre en mouvement quantité de personnes dont le concours simultané ou successif est nécessaire au résultat qu'il recherche. L'ensemble de ses démarches et de leurs effets constitue "l'opération politique". J'appelle "entrepreneur politique" l'homme qui se propose de constituer de façon durable un rassemblement d'énergies susceptibles d'être employées successivement sous une même conduite. Pour citer des exemples simples: le député qui veut faire passer telle loi tente une opération politique, le fondateur d'un parti crée une entreprise politique. (de Jouvenel 1961a, 371-372)

In his article *Thoughts on a Theory of Political Enterprise* (1958) de Jouvenel explained that a "political entrepreneurship" is "the activity which tends to the banding and bunching of men in order to create a force capable of exerting pressure upon a social field, large of small". An example of the political enterprise is "the constitution of a de facto power aimed at the capture and exploitation of a seat or stronghold of de jure authority". However, "these seats are artifacts, while the propensity to enlist the energies of other men is natural" and this is the reason why the political enterprise is more ancient than established authority. (NP, 60-61) De Jouvenel regarded "the history of labour unions as offering perhaps most promising material for the analysis of political enterprise". A political enterprise may easily find itself induced to press upon or invade the political establishment in order to suit the laws and the uses of lawful authority to its purpose. (NP, 61)

Thus, in de Jouvenel's thought the political enterprise is formed by the initiative of instigator. However, this does not mean "that things happen 'because' of an instigator, but they occur 'through' a relation instigation-response, that this is the simplest and basic link in complex chains". *Eventum* has no identifiable author and it arises out of the meeting of many chains wherein the phenomena de Jouvenel was concerned with figure of basic constituents. His purpose was to "seek out in the complexity of Politics those elements which are simple and present *semper et ubique*". (PT, 10)

De Jouvenel clarified the distinction *eventus/eventum* by the aid of German jurist Jhering's terms of action. Jhering discriminated between human action and animal action in terms of *ut* and *quia*. (PT, 6-7; NP, 73)

Quia actions are those I perform under the pressure of outside causes, without choice or deliberation. *Ut* actions on the other hand are those I perform in view of certain result I wish to bring about. (PT, 7)

These terms refer that the "future is present to the mind of acting man" (PT, 6). They involve a certain vision of a future state of affairs I propose to obtain, and of a 'path' to that state. (PT, 7) In other words, de Jouvenel bound his conception of action to the concept of future. *Quia*-actions are those without possibilities to find choices or deliberate. In *ut*-actions there are some aspects of freedom and chance, but it is not free in the Aristotelian sense of *praxis*. In philosophy, this distinction

has usually expressed in the difference between the causal (*quia*) and intentional (*ut*) approaches (see for example von Wright 1980, 27).

According to de Jouvenel, we are aware that we have the ability to bring about certain situations by our choice served by our efforts. The very notion of 'cause' is a product of such experiences. From our earliest childhood, we have found that we can change something and from this microcosmic experience of a relation between my effort and this change arises the general idea of 'cause and effect'. (*PT*, 7)

The concepts of causality and future in his mind de Jouvenel started to depict his conception of politics in *The Pure Theory*. In order to understand better his conception of politics we must study more closely his conception of future which was under construction at the same time he established the former. In short, he thematised the temporal aspect of politics from the direction of future.

3.3.4 *Futuribles*

Perhaps the most lasting of de Jouvenel's manifold enterprises has been the project called *futuribles*, which still continues. In the beginning of the project the agent of the Ford Foundation, Waldemar Nielsen was a central figure.

At a 1958 symposium on the Greek island of Rhodes, de Jouvenel spoke on the trend toward authoritarian governments among the world's new nations in Africa and Asia as well as elsewhere. His remarks caught the attention of a young man who represented the Ford Foundation, Waldemar Nielsen. Unknown to de Jouvenel, Nielsen campaigned the Foundation and eventually won financial support for de Jouvenel. With Ford money, de Jouvenel launched a project known as *Futuribles*, in 1960. This international venture was governed by a Board made up of seven scholars. In addition, there was one person officially listed as a collaborator – Daniel Bell, then a professor of sociology at Columbia University. (Carton 58, paper "Bertrand de Jouvenel The Inventor of *Futuribles*", p. 20)

The futurologists have often interpreted that the most famous fruit of the project, de Jouvenel's book *L'art de la conjecture* (1964) is a work of futurology. De Jouvenel opposed vehemently this kind of view: there can be no "science of future" because a science speaks of certain things. We can only make good and reasonable or less reasonable conjectures of future. (*AC*, 31-32) Here I interpret that the *futuribles* and the ideas connected with it are a part of de Jouvenel's conception of politics, a temporalised view which elaborated and extended it.

The word *futuribles* is a neologism, which was a combination the Latin word *futura* and the French word *possible* (*AC*, 34):

Le futurible est un *futurum* qui apparaît à l'esprit comme un descendant possible de l'état présent. (*AC*, 34)

A *futurible* appears to the mind as a possible descendant of the present situation. In this sense the study of future is an art of conjecture, *l'art de la conjecture* and we study of future in order to bring possible results closer to the wanted result:

Heureux si le désirable nous paraît aussi probable! Il en est souvent autrement, et c'est ainsi que l'esprit recommande les inflexions de cours tendant à rapprocher le probable du désirable. Et c'est bien pourquoi l'on étudie l'avenir. (AC, 35)

In this sense *l'art de la conjecture* is a supplementary art of those who act politically:

Indeed when we discuss Politics, not in the character of political scientists but as mere men, we are apt to speculate some future event. (PT, 6)
 Surmising is essential to the conduct of human affairs; a mistaken surmise can be disastrous. (PT, 5)

In the middle of the 1960s de Jouvenel even emphasised that political scientists ought to be experts in surmising: "Il appartient à la fonction du politiste d'être expert en prévoyance." (de Jouvenel 1965a, 3)

The views of *l'art de la conjecture* are, however, distant to his ideas of politics. It would be easy to argue against the desirability of development of conjecture and to see it as a form of governmentality³¹ which always meets its limits in the real life battle of politics: at the meeting point of several *eventus* (or policies) forms an *eventum* (politics) which is always, a way or another unexpected and beyond all conjectures and control. De Jouvenel understood this well. In *The Pure Theory* his aim is to understand the political processes and in this way to direct them:

Tragedy occurs when process, naturally diffuse throughout the body politic, acquire concentration, an intensity, a polarization which affords them an explosive power. Nothing then is more important to the guardians of a body politic than to understand the nature of these process, so that they may be guided to irrigate and precluded from flooding. (PT, 13)

However, *The Pure Theory* approaches its subject from the view of unreliable individuals. And this view offers no salvation of the better conjectures:

There is a fluidity in our disposition which makes it impossible to predict the response of a given man however much we know about him. In dramatic circumstances, I sought to guess respective reactions to competing instigations in the case of men I knew very well and found myself with a poor score of good guesses. (PT, 78-79)

In spite of this unreliability we can find something reliable from the relations between individuals. De Jouvenel elaborated it into a form of pattern.

3.3.5 A Tells B to Do H

The title of the chapter *Instigation* (in French *L'instigation*) underlines and stresses the primacy of initiative which de Jouvenel wanted to indicate in *The Pure Theory*.

³¹ In the introduction of the edition of the year 1976 of *De la politique pure* de Jouvenel express his desire to control: "J'ai cru qu'il fallait remonter aux phénomènes politiques élémentaires, saisis à l'état brut, pour comprendre les moyens et conditions de les policer." (de Jouvenel 1976b, 8)

The central character of politics is not in doing (I do something) but in the having others to do something, in French the *faire-faire* relation: "L'instigateur fait faire à un autre ce qui est nécessaire à la réussite du projet" (de Jouvenel 1961a, 373).

One of the central arguments of this study is that by the idea of pure politics de Jouvenel turned, subconsciously or unintentionally, political science into the direction of rhetoric. It is now a question of formal analysis of the situations where "a communication tries to influence one or more persons, to orient their thinking, to excite or calm their emotions, to guide their actions". In words of Chaïm Perelman, this kind of action "belongs to the realm of rhetoric"³². (Perelman 1977b, 162)

However, de Jouvenel did not analyse the importance of figures or linguistic deeds for politics. He tried to formalise some traits of political situations without the central concepts of social science: De Jouvenel emphasised that "no mention has been made of the State, of sovereignty, of the constitution or function of public authority, of political obligation" (*PT*, 81-82). His point of departure is in the observation which he already made in *De la souveraineté* that there is no such thing as "the completely solitary man" (*l'homme à l'état isolé*) (*So*,1; *S*, 11). Because he rejected both the ideas of abstract individual and the concepts of collectivities, he had to establish some idea of the environment of man in the modern world before he could introduce the "pure politics":

As I plan to discuss Politics at the 'micro' level of action of individual upon individuals, I deemed it necessary to stress at the outset that these individuals do not operate in a void, but are situated in an environment. (*PT*, 62)

A central character of these ideas is that de Jouvenel was against the collective concept of society (*société*):

L'idée juridique de *Societas-Populus*, qui joue un rôle immense et non épuisé dans l'histoire politique, n'a été, pour la science sociale, qu'une charge et un obstacle. (de Jouvenel 1961, 49)

[L]'individu sans rapports n'est même pas concevable. Mais ces rapports nombreux et divers, est-il légitime d'en faire la somme, de les totaliser et de les regarder comme les rapports avec *un* autre être, *la* Société? (de Jouvenel 1961, 54)

De Jouvenel tried to replace the concept of society with his own neologism *Ego in Otherdom*, or, in French *Ego en Aultrui*³³. This means that

³² Perelman quoted de Jouvenel's *De la souveraineté* in his article *Autorité, idéologie et violence* (1969), but I have found no de Jouvenel's references to Perelman (Perelman 1990, 396). His friend Michael Polanyi seems to have known well Perelman's *Traité de l'argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique* (1958) and Stephen Toulmin's *The Philosophy of Science* (1953). Polanyi also shared a lot of their views: "[Wittenberg and] Perelman both enquire, as I have done, into the role of decision and personal judgement in science and acknowledge their comprehensive powers. They would seem to share my view, that our dependence on these powers is the fundamental problem of epistemology." (Polanyi 1963, 13) "Toulmin has shown systematically that the framework of scientific theories contains general suppositions which cannot be put directly to an experimental test of truth or falsity. Such general premisses overlap more specific statements which embody them." (Polanyi 1963, 12)

³³ When he searched for a proper word, he also used the term *Ontité* (de Jouvenel 1958, 58).

Each man begins operating within a field already settled, wherein he finds prior occupants, and an established complex of relations and manners. Such priority of Otherdom relatively to the individual should be remembered as the basic datum of political science. (PT, 57)

Everybody has experiences of the Otherdom. We experience it every time when we are newcomers for example at school: "What a boy discovers when he finds himself standing in the school grounds after his father has departed is that he is a 'newcomer in Otherdom'" (de Jouvenel 1958/1958, 507).

The word is so chosen as to convey the feeling, immanent in the knower's approach, that what he moves in is the realm of others, wherein he is subject to demands of the others. Which others? All the others, and this is the important point. (PT, 55)

Each man begins operating within a field already settled, wherein he finds prior occupants, and an established complex of relations and manners. Such priority of Otherdom relatively to the individual should be remembered as the basic datum of political science. (PT, 57)

In *The Pure Theory* de Jouvenel used the expression "structured environment", but in the article *Ego in Otherdom* the term was "universe into which he is thrown as a highly organized field" (de Jouvenel 1958/59, 508). All in all, the situation of the modern man is that he is always *Ego in Otherdom* whether he goes to school, "enters a profession, takes up a situation, is admitted into a club or a circle, or goes into politics" (de Jouvenel 1958/59, 508). In this world of others we all act politically.

If the chapter *Instigation* is the core of *The Pure Theory*, its central points are expressed in few paragraphs. The whole book searches for and finds arguments for this "radical" of politics and excludes counterarguments:

I propose to consider the simple case of two men, one of whom prompts the other to perform a certain action. Throughout this discussion, *A* will stand for the speaker, *B* for the man spoken to, and *H* for the action suggested. First, *A* suggests to *B* the action *H*, and we call this an instigation; secondly, *B* performs *H* and we call it a compliance, or he does not and we call it a non-compliance. An instigation followed by compliance is called efficient, and inefficient if not so followed. That is all I want to deal with at present; but I hope to deal with it exhaustively, thereby laying the foundation for the analysis of complex situations. (PT, 69)

Considérons deux hommes dont l'un incite l'autre à une certaine action. Appelons *H* l'action qui est présentée au second comme devant être accomplie par lui; nommons *A* celui qui la propose, l'*instigateur*, et nommons *B* celui à qui elle est demandée, l'*appelé*. L'énoncé '*A* demande à *B* d'accomplir l'action *H*' n'est certainement pas dénué de sens, mais il est vide de contenu concret. Il convient à un nombre illimité de cas particuliers très divers. L'énoncé ne désignera une situation particulière qu'une fois les lettres remplacées dans l'expression par des désignations précises. (PP, 107)

A close examination reveals that the versions put emphasis on the different things. *The Pure Theory* stresses the importance of instigation as a relation and an action. The French version underlines the importance of the roles of the actors *A* and *B*, because de Jouvenel gave them the names of *instigateur* and *appelé*³⁴. In any case,

³⁴ In *De la politique pure* (1959) de Jouvenel used the terms *l'appelant* and *l'appelé* (de Jouvenel 1959, 275).

we can discern two actors in de Jouvenel's microworld: A, who incites, and B, who makes the decision. They form a relation, which is established through the deeds of both of agents. In this sense it is not an abstract relation. In addition, the central character of the relation is the deed H. We can define that H is the thesis "do H", but it also requires more persuasion i.e. arguments for its support.

De Jouvenel's pattern of politics is simple: "A suggests to B the action H" or "A tells B to do H" (PT, 69). However, he simplified the pattern even more in the articles *De la politique pure* (1959) and *Ce qu'est la politique pure*³⁵ (1965). In the figure of letters ABH? the question mark refers B's freedom: we can never be completely sure if B accomplishes H or not before B begins to act. (de Jouvenel 1965, 28) The question mark implies the contingency of the persuasion situation; every attempt to appeal is uncertain and B can refuse to support A. As Chaïm Perelman wrote: "Dans une argumentation rhétorique tout peut toujours être remis en question; on peut toujours retirer son adhésion." (Perelman 1989, 87)

We can find this kind of situations from everywhere. The "class" of the situations contains much more than we normally understand of politics, but according to de Jouvenel it is the basic swarming from which the movements arise:

La "classe" des situations de ce type est immense. Elle comprend incomparablement plus que les politiques n'admettraient comme politique: mais c'est ici le grouillement fondamental sur la base de laquelle s'érigent les mouvements perceptibles. (de Jouvenel 1965, 28-29)

From this class we can discern a smaller part, where A's relation with B has special possibilities to get others to listen. De Jouvenel described this kind of relation with an exclamation mark which is in connection with A: A!BH? In these articles, de Jouvenel argued that this kind of situation is called normally politics. The question mark implies, that A's appeal remains uncertain (de Jouvenel 1965, 29)

By two exclamation marks de Jouvenel expressed, that A is a political leader: A!!BH? Three exclamation marks means that A has the rights of sovereign in relation to B: A!!!BH? In all cases the question mark indicates that it is always B who decide the fate of A's initiative. (de Jouvenel 1959, 276; 1965, 29)

Il est impossible d'user du concept d'instigation sans qu'il renforce notre conscience de la liberté humaine comme fait irréductible. Et ceci d'abord parce que l'appel de A à B n'a de raison d'être que B est regardé par A comme libre de faire H ou non. (PP, 108)

I interpret that in this sense even the crude offer of a mafioso which one "cannot refuse" implies the freedom of B, because the initiative was made and B did not accomplish it automatically. The consequences of the refusal can be unbearable, but they do not remove the possibility to refuse.

These kinds of specifications of ABH relation "should be regarded as circumstantial additions to the formal relation" (PT, 69). The formulation embraces political relationships but also relationships thought of as non-political, and phenomena which are opposite in relation to each other, such as sedition and civil

³⁵ There are only minor differences between the articles *De la politique pure* (1959) and *Ce qu'est la politique pure* (1965).

obedience. De Jouvenel thought it is an advantage of the study "that situations which are fancied to be of different natures should fit into the same procedure of presentation". We try to understand here "some elementary human relations wherever they occur and in whatever context". (PT, 70)

3.4 Continuity and Transformations

The aim of this chapter was to make an overview to the formation of de Jouvenel's conception of politics. I tried to show what was the reason for the "disunity" of his political thought and that there was a continuity in his thinking as well – a continuity which included transformations.

I began from *Du Pouvoir* where he posed the question: what caused the increase of power which appeared in the Second World War? During the 1950s the question transformed to a form: what causes political change? In this way he moved from the conception of power to the conception of politics. The transfers in his questions meant also changes in de Jouvenel's ways to pose the problems. If his task in *Du Pouvoir* was to explain the reasons of the misery of the world, in *The Pure Theory* his task was only to found a discipline. These transformations in the posing of questions form, I argue, the main reason to the interpretations that there is disunity in de Jouvenel's works.

However, we can find continuity in de Jouvenel's way to answer the questions: when "the power in its pure state" transformed to a more subtle "pure politics", the idea of purification remained, although the conception of power transformed from *Pouvoir pure* to the authority. At the level of storylines this means a transfer from historical developments to the analysis of event. All in all, we can trace the central characteristics of the idea of ABH relation back to *Du Pouvoir*, in which the "logical" cause of Power was the relation between commanding and obeying, which actually was an interpretation of Weber's *Herrschaft*. This hierarchy of power was softened in the course of time to the politics of persuasion. Finally, in *The Pure Theory* we can find politics even from every banal situation where a person tries to move another. However, this conception of politics formed not only because of the inner laws of de Jouvenel's own thoughts. It was also a reply to contemporary discussions.

4 TWO DEBATES

Now I shall turn to the debates which I think were important to the formation of de Jouvenel's conception of politics and to its pure theory. This chapter presents two debates which were current when de Jouvenel wrote the articles which later formed *The Pure Theory*. The problems of the time or of the long time debates which are thematised in the text belong more to the context of the book in the other sense of inter-text than authors's own texts. The explicit quotations or implicit allusions known to insiders are the co-text. (cf. Palonen 1999, 45-47). Both debates are quite implicit in *The Pure Theory* and in this sense they indeed belong to its co-text, or, from the view of the author, it was their contra-text.

The importance of these debates comes not from de Jouvenel's open and large attacks against them but from the open space they cleared for the defence of politics. However, the point of *The Pure Theory* was targeted against them and without them there would not have been so much reason to defend politics and to formulate its pure theory. I argue that they created an antipolitical or unpolitical spirit which made a playground for de Jouvenel's ideas which grew out from the certain experiences of political action.

When I illuminate some central figures of political theory debates to which the pure theory of politics was a reply, I perfectly understand that my choices are not the whole co-text because de Jouvenel managed to take influences from so many directions and periods of history. However, I defend my choices by arguing that these debates posed the questions to which the pure politics was or at least tried to be an answer. These debates were the "political life itself" which set the main problems for de Jouvenel (Skinner 1978a, xi). In this sense the debates of the *dépolitisation* and the "end of ideology" are the hidden context or the co-text of the book. They made it possible for de Jouvenel to defend politics and stand out from his intellectual company.

4.1 The End of Ideology and the Anticommunist Intellectuals

The Pure Theory of Politics begins with a reference to a debate which was current since the middle of the 1950s until the end of the 1960s. The first lines of the book describe the complexity and unigueness of every political situation.

The hasty mind, however, seizes upon some single feature because of which it assigns the given situation to a certain class of situations, previously formed, and in regard to which the mind has passed judgement once for all. The situation envisaged involves centralization; I am in general for (against) centralization: therefore my stand is as follows....'

It seems inevitable that such work-saving procedure should be commonly resorted to: which implies a permanent demand for ideologies – taxonomic devices constituting wide classes and inspiring general judgements, allowing us in short to take a stand on problems we have not analysed. (PT, ix)

In this way *The Pure Theory* is a comment to the "end of ideology" debate – a counter-argument against the whole discussion. In a note of the manuscript, which does not exist in the published version, the relation is even clearer :

So I cannot subscribe to the view of my friends Raymond Aron, Edward Shils and Daniel Bell regarding "The End of Ideology." (Carton 4)

What is this all about? What were the main arguments of these men? How was de Jouvenel related to the debate? How did *The Pure Theory* become a counter-argument of the end of ideology?

The end of ideology debate linked with several other discussions: the role of the intellectual in France, to the return to Hegel, and perhaps the closest relation it has with the debate on totalitarianism, inspired by Hannah Arendt's *The Origin of Totalitarianism* (1948-1951) and some other books. After the death of fascism and Nazism there was not a lot of reason to argue against other ideologies, and the discussion focused on the problem of communism. During the 1950s also the theme of "third world" or "developing countries" rose giving intellectual distance and some new dimensions to the quarrel between capitalism and communism.

In the center of the most important non-Marxist discussions was the *Congress for Cultural Freedom* (CCF) (1950-1975), which was a by-product of the Korean War and financed by CIA through American foundations.¹ In addition to the CCF de Jouvenel participated in the several CIA sponsored institutions² and at

¹ The details of the work of the CIA are in the archives but the grand lines are well known. Pierre Grémion has written the history of the CCF in France: *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme. Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris* (1995).

² CIA financed several institutions and journals which were de Jouvenel's forums. Most of these institutions and men and women who participated in them were not puppets of the CIA and they made interesting science and theory. De Jouvenel got money from the Ford Foundation for his project *Futuribles* and wrote to the journal of CCF called *Preuves*, financed by CIA (Winock 1997, 607). There he published two important ecological articles in 1965: *Civiliser notre civilisation* and *Introduction au problème de l'Arcadie*. He was also a member of the Mount Pelerin Society. In his letter to Ward E. Y. Elliott de Jouvenel shed light on his relation to the group: "I do not think it has been quite clear to you that I do regard the public authorities as responsible for maintaining a climate of full employment and favourable growth, while I see no benefit in the assumption by the State of specific economic activities. I am at one with the Mt Pelerin group on the second score but at odds with them on the first. I was drawn into association with the group in 1946 by our common distrust of the over-extended State, faith in which involves quite excessive belief in the virtues and indeed practical possibilities of centralisation (the over-extended State ceases to possess the assumed coherence of decisions), I have been moving away from the group because of its fighting doctrinarism. I find it impossible to wed myself to any doctrine." (Carton 58)

the turn of the 1960s his project *Futuribles* got money from the Ford Foundation which was also the biggest financial supporter of the CCF (Grémion 1995, 409). In the beginning of the 1950s the participants in the CCF were at first stigmatised as the "intellectuals of the cold war", but after the Hungarian uprising, which for a large group of French intellectuals was the moment when they broke with communism, their participation in the activities of the CCF met with less hostility (Grémion 1995, 320, 227-275).

All in all, the debate was large and continued especially after the publication of *The Pure Theory*. For my study the beginning of the discussion and its participants are important. The participants the men who were close friends and who met in the committee of the *Congress for Cultural Freedom* in Paris in the beginning of 50s: Raymond Aron, Edward Shils, Daniel Bell, Michael Polanyi, C. A. R. Crosland, and Bertrand de Jouvenel (Grémion 1995, 319-320). In this chapter I focus on the men de Jouvenel mentioned: Aron, Bell, and Shils. They will illustrate a certain international intellectual co-text where de Jouvenel matured his ideas.

4.1.1 Before the "End of Ideology"

Although the "end of ideology" has several ancestors, we can more concretely define its beginning *avant la lettre* to the meeting of the Conference of the Cultural Freedom in Milan in September 1955 and to the publication of Aron's *L'opium des intellectuels* (1955). The meeting in Milan produced a lot of the factual material for the discussion whereas Aron's book forcefully propagated the concept of *la fin de l'âge idéologique?*

However, it was Sweden's leading journalist and former political science professor Herbert Tingsten who first expressed the idea of "end of ideology", without mentioning the term, in his article *Stability and Vitality in Swedish Democracy* in *Political Quarterly*³. As early as in the beginning 1955, Herbert Tingsten noted a direct relationship between economic development and ideological conflicts in Swedish democracy. Having considered the major areas of traditional cleavage in Swedish politics, he concluded:

The great controversies have [...] been liquidated in all instances. As a result the symbolic words and the stereotypes have changed and disappeared. All parties emphasize their patriotism, their feeling for democracy, their progressiveness and their striving for social reform. Liberalism in the old sense is dead, both among the Conservatives and in the Liberal Party; Social Democrat thinking has lost nearly all its traits of doctrinaire Marxism, and the label of socialism on a specific proposal or a specific reform has hardly any other meaning than the fact that the proposal or reform in question is regarded as attractive. The actual words 'socialism' or 'liberalism' are tending to become mere honorifics, useful in connection with elections and political festivities. (Tingsten 1955, 145)

³ Tingsten had also wrote on the theme without using the term in the late 1940s and early 1950s in the Swedish leading newspaper *Dagens Nyheter*, where he had been editor since 1946. The substance of the article was given as a lecture at the London School of Economics and Political Science on 26th October 1954.

Tingsten wrote that an "ideological and actual economic-social levelling has taken place", which "entails the growth of the fund of common purpose and the shrinkage of the margin for conflicts, particularly fundamental conflicts" (Tingsten 1955, 146). Noting the emergence of "a community of values" between widely divergent parties and groups, he stated that the importance of "general ideas" had been reduced to a point where "one can speak of a movement from politics to administration, from principles to technique". (Tingsten 1955, 147)

But it was the congress in Milan, entitled *L'Avenir de la liberté*, which collected the anticommunist intellectuals and their themes together. De Jouvenel's friend Michael Polanyi gave the name to the congress and Raymond Aron played an ever increasing role in the organisation of the CCF (Grémion 1995, 161). At the same time Aron prepared *L'Opium des intellectuels*, "which was to provide an important stimulus to the "end of ideology" debate, especially in the United States" (Colquhoun 1986, 488). The congress in Milan gathered together 140 intellectuals of which 100 were from Europe and 22 from America (Grémion 1995, 157). The program of the congress expressed that the main problem was the challenge of communism to the free world. Among the several themes⁴ and papers of the congress one can find the word "ideology" but the end of it was in no paper which was delivered (Grémion 1995, 317).

Bertrand de Jouvenel's contribution to the congress was concerned with *Some Fundamental Similarities between the Soviet and Capitalist Economic System* (published in 1956). He criticised the belief that there was an essential difference between the Soviet economy and capitalism. He noted, according to Grémion, that "[t]ous les maux du capitalisme du temps de Marx, qu'il avait dénoncés, se retrouvent aujourd'hui en URSS" (Grémion 1995, 191).

Du point de vue de marxiste, les États-Unis sont un *welfare system*, l'URSS un système d'accumulation du capital. Les États-Unis ont atteint la deuxième phase de Marx, alors que l'URSS est toujours dans la première. On peut se demander si l'on ne pourrait pas dire de l'URSS ce que Marx disait de l'Angleterre de son temps: la concentration dans

⁴ The congress divided to five themes under which were subthemes:
I. Les problèmes d'un monde libre: a) Différence entre idéologie et pratiques économiques dans le monde occidental b) Correspondance et contraste entre les régimes économiques de l'Occident et celui du monde communiste c) Le progrès économique dans les pays sous-développés et la rivalité des méthodes occidentales et communistes
II. Phénomènes qui menacent la société libre: a) L'instabilité inhérente à une société libre. L'abus systématique des institutions libres à seule fin de les détruire. Les causes de la paralysie du fonctionnement de la démocratie. b) L'influence d'une société de masse. L'influence des mass media. c) L'apparition et le développement croissant des formes totalitaires et autoritaires de gouvernement au XXe siècle. d) Le double rôle du nationalisme favorise et compromet les sociétés libres. L'influence du colonialisme et des conflits raciaux.
III. L'invincible liberté: Comment la liberté demeure vivante sous l'oppression: aspect de la résistance individuelle et collective
IV. Phénomènes qui consolident les sociétés libres: Les traditions dans la société libre qu'elles maintiennent mais qu'elles risquent de stériliser. Dialogue entre la coutume et la raison. Les fondements de l'autorité face aux droits du citoyen dans une société libre. Dialectique de l'assentiment et du dissentiment.
V. La lutte pour la liberté (Grémion 1995, 178-179)

les centres industriels d'un prolétariat sans l'espoir d'une amélioration de ses conditions de vie est peut-être le signe avant-coureur d'une crise de régime. (Grémion 1995, 193)

In his article *On the Character of the Soviet Economy* (1957) de Jouvenel continued to analyse the Soviet Union from Marx's view. From the basis of detailed statistical knowledge of Soviet situation and Marx's analysis of capitalism de Jouvenel concluded that there was no communism in the Soviet Union⁵.

The avowed purpose of the Soviet government is to bring Russian industrial power, in the shortest possible time, to parity with that of the United States. There is nothing specifically "communist" in this purpose. Indeed it stands in stark contradiction to the Marx-Engels picture of a communist economy which would not be concerned with building-up of capacities but with their full employment for the consumer satisfaction of the workers. (de Jouvenel 1957b, 327)

De Jouvenel emphasised that the class struggle was regarded by Marx as a struggle over "value added", the workers wishing to obtain the whole of it and to apply it to consumption, the capitalists wanting to retain as much of it as possible, and to apply it to investment. The workers were bound to win this fight, but not as long as it was socially useful that accumulation proceed. And therefore it was also a historical necessity that capitalists should retain their power to make profits as long as accumulation had to proceed. This led de Jouvenel to say that the Soviet "communism" was actually a "Super-Capitalism", "a synthetic version of early industrial capitalism". (de Jouvenel 1957b, 329)

From these analyses of Soviet economy in terms of Marx we can easily understand that it was impossible for de Jouvenel either to join the communists, as his brother did, or to be a fellow traveller. His position – was it a parody of the convergence theory according to which socialism and capitalism became to resemble each other, or was it serious thinking in which he utilised the opponent's conceptions – came close to some views of the extreme left, which did not see any fundamental difference between Soviet communism and capitalism. But it was impossible for him to join his friends in the debate of the end of ideology as well: his conception of ideology differed fundamentally. Before the presentation of it we must take a closer look at another debate which preceded and prepared the "end of ideology" and which has also a place in de Jouvenel's ideas of ideology. Namely, the "end of ideology" grew from the question of the position of the intellectual in France.

⁵ De Jouvenel published several articles of the Soviet Economy and their message and contents was the same: there was no communism in the Soviet Union. Here I quote from the article "On the Character of the Soviet Economy". *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Vol. XIII November 1957. No. 9. pp. 327-330

Identidad y esencia de las economías capitalista y soviética. El porvenir de la libertad. Suplemento de la revista "Cuadernos". No 16. Enero-Febrero 1956. pp. 17-22.

The Crisis of the Communist Mind. *Orbis*. Vol I, April 1957, Number 1. pp. 77-98.

4.1.1.1 The Treachery of Clergymen and Return to Hegel

In France there had been a large debate on the responsibility of the intellectual since Dreyfus' case which actually created the concept of intellectual. Julien Benda's important *La Trahison des clercs* (1927) is one of the texts that transformed the discussion to the language of religion. Benda's argument was that the intellectuals (the secular clergymen, the freelance scribblers who make their living by writing, or in French simply *le clerc* or *le clerc moderne*) had betrayed their mission – which was to serve timeless values such as truth and justice. The betrayal is made in favour of political passions⁶, in favour of worship of several earthly religions (for example in favour of *la religion de la politique expérimentale*), and all in all, in favour of nation and class (Benda 1927, 263; 237). He condemned this kind of "integral realism" and saw that the logical end of it would be "organised slaughter of nations and classes". Instead of political passions Benda set a higher goal, the mission of the intellectual: the superiority of a Man – a desire of all species to become the master of things: "c'est l'homme, ce n'est pas la nation ou la classe, que Nietzsche, Sorel, Bergson exaltent dans son génie à se rendre maître de la terre" (Benda 1927, 336; Winock 1997, 239; cf. Colquhoun 1986, 476)

We can find echoes of Benda's book in the articles of Raymond Aron which were published during the war. But Aron had discussed ideology already in the 30s when he wrote a review on Henri de Man's *Au delà du Marxisme* (*Beyond Marxism*)⁷ and read Marx (Colquhoun 1986, 161-170).

In *La Sociologie allemande contemporaine* (1935) Aron "unleashed a biting attack on Mannheim's 'historical relativism'" (op.cit., 105). Here, as it was later in the end of ideology debate, it was Marxism which seemed for him to raise three sets of questions: Was ideology a general phenomenon and, if so, how could the Marxist escape from the vicious circle in which he found himself and justify his standpoint and judgments? Was ideology universal, in the sense that all intellectual systems, ideas and categories were inseparable from their social situation? Finally, did ideology imply a negative value-judgement, in that the explanation of ideas in terms of their social situation was also a condemnation of them? More generally, was the genesis of a set of ideas relevant to their truth or moral value? (op.cit., 105-106)

Mannheim's attempt to answer these questions was that "neither proletarian nor bourgeois ideologies were either true or false, but both were 'perspectives'" (op.cit., 106). Mannheim's relativism did not satisfy Aron in the 1930s but in this way the concept of ideology rooted into his writings. In the article *L'Idéologie* (1937) Aron defined ideology:

⁶ "[L]es passions politiques atteignent aujourd'hui à un point de perfection que l'histoire n'avait pas connu. L'âge actuel est proprement l'âge du politique." (Benda 1927, 183)

⁷ Henri de Man was important figure and his ideas of planning were important for the whole generation of the anti-communist intellectuals before the war. Aron and de Jouvenel knew de Man personally (Colquhoun 1986, 182, n. 6; de Jouvenel 1979, 184, 222, 394-395, 460-461).

Any idea can be called ideology, either because of its origins (psychological or sociological) or because of its consequences. In so far as the critique of ideologies confines itself to such judgements of fact, it is, in principle, objective. But objectivity disappears, or at least is compromised, as soon as, with the use of such terms as *logical* or *illogical* and *real* as opposed to illusory, one reintroduces an implicit appreciation of the content of the idea into psychological or social analysis.⁸

Aron continued the study in *La France libre* during the war. Namely, in the articles *L'Avenir des religions séculiers I-II* he introduced the expression "secular religion" which came to be one predecessor of the end of ideology debate. He concluded that communism was an atheistic secular religion and, in complete contrast to Christianity, taught that man fulfilled his destiny uniquely in the temporal sphere, here on earth (Colquhoun 1986, 476). Aron, who always was a *homo politicus* compared to Benda who was mostly⁹ a man of *vita contemplativa*, adopted Benda's question and asked in the year 1944: where were the traitors now? The answer, where he elaborated the idea of involved intellectual, is not here important whereas his parallels between Christianity and Marxism are. (cf. Colquhoun 1986, 475-476) They also paved the way to the "end of ideology" debate.

Finally Raymond Aron referred to Benda's book at the end of *L'opium des intellectuels* (1955) just before he begun to analyse possibilities of *la fin de l'âge idéologique*, the expression, which became the most important root of the "end of ideology" (Aron 1955, 309-312). There he also utilised the conception of "secular religion" and asked, "has the ideology in fact become the equivalent of a religion?" (Aron 1955, 293; Aron 1957, 285) He answered that once again, it was difficult to give a positive answer, because communism did not see itself as a religion. Aron widely studied the differences between religion and Marxism and concluded that communism was a political attempt to find a substitute for religion in an ideology erected into a state orthodoxy (Aron 1955, 294; Aron 1957, 285-286).

The roots of the end of ideology debate have in fact also been traced back to writers such as Engels, Weber, and Mannheim (Colquhoun 1986, 488; LaPalombara 1966, 5-6). More interesting than dig up older and older roots of the discussion is to search for the point of the debate and its newness, how "the end of ideology" was new in the 1950s. In this spirit I would like to add to the list Alexandre Kojève's famous lectures concerning Hegel (1933-1939), from which those who later discussed the end of history took influences. According to Colquhoun, Aron himself attended these lectures (Colquhoun 1986, 163).

Kojève interpreted Hegel's dialectic of Master and Slave in a way that it is also an ideological battle. From his underdog position a Slave must develop an abstract idea, an ideal of his Freedom in order to transform his situation (Kojève 1947, 43-70).

⁸ The article was originally published in *Recherches philosophiques* 6. Here I quote according to Colquhoun 1986, 169-170.

⁹ Benda's inclination towards eternal issues did not last always. For instance, after the Second World War he got close to communists, whereas during the 1920s he was quite near the *Action française*. (Winock 1997, 238-246, 520, 565)

[B]efore *realizing* Freedom, the Slave imagines a series of ideologies, by which he seeks to justify himself, to justify his slavery, to reconcile the *ideal* of Freedom with the *fact* of Slavery. (Kojève 1947, 53)

In Hegel's dialectic the battle did not lead to the series of new battles but to reconciliation in the absolute. If you follow Hegel's path faithfully, it easily leads to the ideas of ending. Raymond Aron was not, however, that faithful. As a secular clergyman he preached salvation – anticommunism – and he took his ideological weapons from his enemy.

4.1.2 Raymond Aron's Attack

Raymond Aron's fervent attack *L'Opium des intellectuels* is mainly a part of the showdown of French intellectuals. Again, he utilised Benda's views of the position of intellectuals and asked: "Encore une foi, ou sont les traîtres?" (Aron 1955, 311) More than the French communists he pointed at their fellow travellers.

J'avais eu l'occasion, au cours de ces dernières années, d'écrire plusieurs articles qui visaient moins les communistes que les "communisants", ceux qui n'adhèrent pas au parti mais dont les sympathies vont à l'univers soviétique. (Aron 1955, 9)

The name of the "traitors" are well-known: the journals *Temps modernes* and *Esprit*, and his old friends Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Aron 1955, 125). Aron especially did not mince his words in the critique of Merleau-Ponty's *Humanisme et terreur*. Aron's target is to hit against the Hegelianism of Marxism which Merleau-Ponty had espoused as a result of Kojève's lectures (Colquhoun 1986, 163).

The central point in these debates was the conception of history and its end. According to Kojève "History stops at the moment when the difference, the opposition, between Master and Slave disappears" (Kojève 1947, 43). This idea was at the background of the discussion and it had a connection to a Merleau-Ponty's argument which especially irritated Raymond Aron:

Considéré de près, le marxisme n'est pas une hypothèse quelconque, remplaçable demain par une autre: c'est le simple énoncé des conditions sans lesquelles il n'y aura pas d'humanité au sens d'une relation réciproque entre les hommes ni de rationalité dans l'histoire. En un sens, ce n'est pas une philosophie de l'histoire, c'est la philosophie de l'histoire, et y renoncer, c'est faire une croix sur la raison historique. Après quoi, il n'y aura plus que rêverie ou aventure. (Merleau-Ponty 1947, 266)

This chapter was, according to Aron, "quite startling in its dogmatism" and highly revealing. It expressed the conviction of so many intellectuals throughout the world: "that Marxism must be identified with *the* philosophy of history, must be definitely true". (Aron 1957, 116) Aron interpreted that Merleau-Ponty tried to make a totality of history. Against this Hegelian history where "la fin sublime excuse les moyens horribles" Aron placed the plurality of meanings of history: "Chaque moment de l'histoire a *des* sens, l'histoire entière peut-elle n'en avoir qu'un?" (Aron 1955, 167, 170) According to him, if there were only one meaning of

history, there would be a three-fold plurality to overcome: "celle des civilisations, celle des régimes, celle des activités (art, science, religion)" (Aron 1955, 170). This would come true only in a situation of the universal state. Aron did not take a firm stand, if this is sometimes possible or not, but he claimed that it would not be a solution those who "se refusent à confondre l'existence dans la Cité et le salut de l'âme". (Aron 1955, 170-171)

According to Aron, every action has a place in a complex of actions. One cannot ascribe to the conduct or the thoughts of others a meaning arbitrarily deduced from one's own interpretation of events. (Aron 1955, 169)

Le dernier mot n'est jamais dit et l'on doit pas juger les adversaires comme si notre cause se confondait avec la vérité ultime.

La connaissance vraie du passé nous rappelle au devoir de tolérance, la fausse philosophie de l'histoire répand le fanatisme. (Aron 1955, 169-170)

The conception of history was in the core of the strife. Aron argued that Merleau-Ponty tried to totalise history when he wrote that

Une philosophie de l'histoire suppose en effet que l'histoire humaine n'est pas une simple somme de faits juxtaposés – décisions et aventures individuelles, idées, intérêts, institutions – mais qu'elle est dans l'instant et dans la succession une totalité, en mouvement vers l'état privilégié qui donne le sens de l'ensemble. (Merleau-Ponty 1947, 266)

History is, according to Aron, certainly not a 'simple sum of juxtaposed facts'. Is it an 'instantaneous totality'? Aron's answer was that the elements of society are interdependent: they influence one another reciprocally; but they do not constitute a totality. (Aron 1957, 142-143) Later, the quarrel over the conception of history led Aron and de Jouvenel to approach the historical processes from the view of events (see chapter 4.1.5).

4.1.2.1 Merleau-Ponty: Humanism and Terror

Today Aron's critique seems unfair: after the occupation, collaboration and *épuration* it was a dirty rhetorical move to transfer the meaning of treachery from collaborators via Benda to his old friends. It was a dirty answer to Merleau-Ponty's – which was perhaps a dirty trick as well – way to equate the purges of collaborators and Stalin's trials. In spite of the Hegelian tendencies Merleau-Ponty's *Humanisme et terreur* was a response to Arthur Koestler's famous novel *Darkness at noon* and above all it is a study of responsibility. Merleau-Ponty referred directly to *Politik als Beruf* where Max Weber studied among other things the responsibility of the politician. Weber showed that the politician, who sometimes has to utilise the decisive means of politics, power and violence, is in an impossible situation between *Gesinnungsethik* and *Verantwortungsethik* (cf. Weber 1919b, 358-360; Weber 1919a, 551)

No ethics in the world can get round the fact that the achievement of 'good' ends is in many cases tied to the necessity of employing morally suspect or at least morally dan-

gerous means, and that one must reckon with the possibility or even likelihood of evil side-effects. Nor can any ethic in the world determine when and to what extent the ethically good end 'sanctifies' the ethically dangerous means and side-effects. (Weber 1919b, 360)

Weber pointed out that in the real world we see repeatedly the proponent of the 'ethics of conviction' suddenly turning into a chiliastic prophet and that men who espouse an ethic of conviction cannot bear the ethical irrationality of the world (Weber 1919b, 361). Neither is it possible to unite ethic of conviction with the ethic of responsibility. Those who get involved with politics, which is to say with the means of power and violence, must notice that it does not hold true of their actions that only good can come of good and only evil from evil, but "rather opposite is often the case". Weber concluded that anyone "who fails to see this is indeed a child in political matters". (Weber 1919b, 362) In this sense no one can wholly determine all the consequences and side-effects of his or her actions. Weber's point was that the two ethics were not absolutely opposite but complementary. No one can act without inner conviction but in their action politicians must feel responsibility. In the course of events politicians must maintain their ability to continue:

Only someone who is certain that he will not be broken when the world, seen from his point of view, is too stupid or too base for what he wants to offer it, and who is certain that he will be able to say 'Nevertheless' in spite of everything – only someone like this has a 'vocation' for politics. (Weber 1919b, 369)

In *Humanisme et terreur* Merleau-Ponty only continued Weber's ideas and applied them to the Moscow trials and to the collaborators. It was the comparison with them which perhaps caused the anger of Aron. The ethical study itself was not only an apology of the process:

On parle là-dessus d'une "apologie des processus de Moscou". Si, pourtant, nous disons qu'il n'y a pas d'innocents en politique, cela s'applique encore mieux aux juges qu'aux condamnés. (Merleau-Ponty 1947, 62)

In politics there are no innocents and according to Merleau-Ponty it is thus better to apply his study to the judges than to those condemned to death. Those who have read Merleau-Ponty's book, like Aron, among the works of "revolutionary idealism", had not recognised the value of this sentence. They have emphasised Merleau-Ponty's conclusions, which were not very successful, while ignoring his discussion of political responsibility.

We must, however, recognise that Merleau-Ponty studied the violence which was connected with the politics of communists and aimed to create humane relations between men. He studied it on their own terms, not on the terms of others:

Elle ne consiste pas à rechercher si le communisme respecte les règles de la pensée libérale, il est trop évident qu'il ne le fait pas, mais si la violence qu'il exerce est révolutionnaire et capable de créer entre les hommes des rapports humaines. (Merleau-Ponty 1947, 44)

Merleau-Ponty's hard contribution to the politician's ethics of responsibility is that those who draw the wrong conclusion in a certain historical situation are also responsible for those side-effects which they could not see beforehand.

Nous montrons qu'une action peut produire autre chose que ce qu'elle visait, et que pourtant l'homme politique en assume les conséquences. (Merleau-Ponty 1947, 66)

In this sense, those who adopted a violent policy – French collaborators, the accused of Stalin's trials, and their judges as well – were responsible and the only criteria was history: a revolutionary who utilises violence or a collaborator can not know beforehand if his or her action is justified or entirely futile bloodshed, but they are responsible for it and even for those side-effects which one cannot see in advance.

In this discussion appeared also the opposite of the conception of pure politics. Merleau-Ponty wrote that political action is always impure:

L'action politique est de soi impure parce qu'elle est action de l'un sur l'autre et parce qu'elle est action à plusieurs. (Merleau-Ponty 1948, 62)

The impurity is due to plurality of political agents: *le politique* is not the same in the eyes of others as in the eyes of the actor; the others judge him or her from a different view because they are not him. When a person adopts a political role – a role which can bring glory, he also accepts that it can also bring infamy. (Merleau-Ponty 1948, 62)

Aucun politique ne peut se flatter d'être innocent. Gouverner, comme on dit, c'est prévoir, et le politique ne peut s'excuser sur l'imprévu. Or, il y a de l'imprévisible. Voilà la tragédie. (Merleau-Ponty 1948, 62)

In this sense Merleau-Ponty intended that his study of the "problème communiste" may apply to every politician – to the victims of *épuration* and Stalin's trials or to their judges – to everyone who gets involved with the extreme means of politics – violence. In this business nobody is innocent because no one can see the future for which he or she is responsible. From this view, a perspective of tragedy is opened to politics.

This kind of impurity or purity of politics is not the same thing as de Jouvenel's purity of politics. Merleau-Ponty's idea is that one cannot make politics without "getting one's hands dirty" just as in Sartre's play *Les mains sales* which has perhaps taken its inspiration from *Humanisme et terreur*. De Jouvenel's pure politics means the formal traits of politics, which makes easily intelligible some nasty traits of politics, like treason or other reasons of dirty hands, because it does not take a stand on the content of politics. *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* illuminates the same impurity and responsibility of politician as *Humanisme et terreur*.

These were the main characteristics of polemics from which arose Aron's last chapter of *L'Opium des intellectuels* which has the title *La fin de l'âge idéologique?* – a title which spread the end of ideology to other countries, especially to the USA where also Edward Shils had already utilised the "end of ideology" (1955) and where Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology* (1960) and S. M. Lipset's *Political Man* (1959) spread the idea during the 1960s. *The Opium of Intellectuals* (translation into Eng-

lish 1957) also attracted attention in Britain and the work has also been translated into German, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Japanese, Portuguese and Russian.¹⁰ For ten years Aron had to defend his thesis against his critics. He published the articles in a small book *Trois essais sur l'âge industriel* (1962-1964). (Aron 1983, 577-586)

4.1.2.2 Aron's *la fin de l'âge idéologique*

As for the content of the chapter *Fin de l'âge idéologique?* it is a loose conclusion of the more important and analytical chapters of the book. It studies in a very general level the possible passing of Marxism. Aron wrote that he studied the subject under a paradoxical situation, when McCharthy ruled in Washington, Beauvoir's *Les Mandarins* won the Concourt prize and the intellectuals made the pilgrimage to Moscow and Peking. (Aron 1955, 315)

From the last chapter of Aron's book one can find very few mentions of ideology or its end. It offers only one short definition of ideology and a list of contemporary ideologies:

Une idéologie suppose une mise en forme, apparemment systématique, de faits d'interprétations, de désirs, de prévisions. (Aron 1955, 317)

Libérale, socialiste, conservatrice, marxiste, nos idéologies sont l'héritage d'un siècle où l'Europe n'ignorait pas la pluralité des civilisations, mais ne doutait pas de l'universalité de son message. (Aron 1955, 324)

The text is some kind of skeptical hope: it dreamed of a new situation of the world from the view of Europe. For example, Aron asked if the rejection of fanaticism encourages a reasonable faith, or merely skepticism:

La critique du fanatisme enseigne-t-elle la foi raisonnable ou le scepticisme? (Aron 1955, 333)

In his answer he saw possibilities that the secular religions dissolve into politico-economic opinions as soon as one abandons the dogma. Yet the man who no longer expects miraculous changes either from a revolution or an economic plan is not obliged to resign himself to the unjustifiable. However, Aron saw also is other way to dissolution of ideology: He presumed that the intellectual will lose interest in politics as soon he discovers its limitations. He accepted this promise joyfully, because indifference does not harm us.

Acceptons avec joie cette promesse incertaine. Nous ne sommes pas menacés par l'indifférence. (Aron 1955, 334)

This was exactly Tingsten's problem, "to widen the freedom of individual", and perhaps Aron underestimated the force of indifference (Tingsten 1955, 151). In Sweden, democracy had already lost its vitality: "the problems, difficulties and

¹⁰ Aron's book "created a furore", of the reception of *L'opium des intellectuels* see Colquhoun 1986, 479-488.

dangers threatening the stable, levelling, universally accepted democracy have received little attention" (Tingsten 1955, 140).

Aron's thoughts in the last chapter of *L'opium des intellectuels* were a kind of postscript to the essays which were mainly published earlier and the question in the title was a loose attempt to transfer the Hegelian idea of history to communism. However, it was the title of the last chapter and the anticommunism of the other parts of the book which began to bear fruit. These ideas interested Edward Shils, who had earlier taken up the theme in his *Encounter* report (November 1955) of the Milan Conference. Shils made *The Opium of Intellectuals* the starting-point for his argument in favour of a "civil politics" as opposed to an "ideological politics"¹¹. (Colquhoun 1986, 488; Grémion 1995, 318)

4.1.3 Edward Shils and Civil Politics

Edward Shils took part in the discussion as early as 1955 in the article of *Encounter* (5, November). He interpreted the results of the Milan Congress under the title *The End of Ideology?*. Shils concluded that after five days of discussion and debate, there emerged among the Western representatives a clear consensus along the following lines: (1) total or extremist ideologies appeared to be in a state of decline: passionate adherence to universal ideological formulations were no longer relevant; (2) this decline was due largely to the increasing economic affluence in Western countries; and (3) this decline was crystallised in the fact that "over the past thirty years the extremes of 'right' and 'left' had disclosed identities which were more impressive than their differences" (Shils 1955, 53)¹².

Shils' main contribution to the debate was his article *Ideology and Civility* (1958). At first, Shils enumerated the ideologies: Italian Fascism, German National Socialism, Russian Bolshevism, French and Italian Communism, the Action Française, the British Union of Fascists, and their fledging American kinsman, "McCarthyism". Then he presented the "articles of faith of ideological politics" of which was the first and above all "the assumption that politics should be conducted from the standpoint of a coherent, comprehensive set of beliefs which must override every other consideration". (Shils 1958, 25-26)

These beliefs attribute supreme significance to one group or class – the nation, the ethnic folk, the proletariat – and the leader and the party as the true representative of these residences of all virtue, and they correspondingly view as the seat and source of all evil a foreign power, an ethnic group like the Jews, or the bourgeois class. The centrality of this belief has required that it radiate into every sphere of life – that it replace religion, that it provide aesthetic criteria, that it rule over scientific research and philosophic thought, that it regulate sexual and family life. (Shils 1958, 26)

¹¹ Shils and Aron had met in London during the war. Bell got to know Shils at the University of Chicago where he had begun his career between 1946 and 1948. (Grémion 1995, 318)

¹² Here I quote Shils according to M. Rejai, W.L. Mason, D. C. Beller: *Political Ideology: Empirical Relevance of the Hypothesis of Decline*. *Ethics*, Volume 78, Issue 4 (Jul., 1968), 303-312.

Shils listed also other sins of ideological politics: Ideological politics have required a distrust of politicians and of the system of parties through which they work (Shils 1958, 26-27). Ideological politics have taken up a platform outside "the system" (Shils 1958, 27). Ideological politics are alienative politics. They are the politics of those who shun the central institutional system of the prevailing society. (Shils 1958, 27) Ideological politics are the politics of "friend-foe", "we-they", "who-whom". Those who are not on the side of the ideological politician are, according to the ideologist, against him. (Shils 1958, 28)

Finally Shils studied the traditions which had been the breeding ground for ideological politics: religious enthusiasm, manichaeism, scientism, romanticism, bohemianism, populism, and millenarism. These were not "the only traditions of the modern intellectual, but most of the others have the same tendency". (Shils 1958, 27-48)

Shils thought that the end of ideology is not coming soon and his strategy to the situation was to develop an alternative to ideologies:

What we may legitimately hope for in the coming decades is a condition of quiescence of ideological politics and of the ideological disposition from which it brings. This quiescence can be sustained only in an effective alternative is available. Civil politics are this alternative. (Shils 1958, 49)

Shils' "civil politics" are based on "civility, which is the virtue of the citizen, of the man who shares responsibility in his own self-government, either as a governor or as one of the governed":

Civility is compatible with other attachment to class, to religion, to profession, but it regulates them out of respect for the common good.

Civil politics do not stir the passions; they do not reveal man at the more easily apprehensible extremes of heroism and saintliness. They involve the prudent exercise of authority, which tries to foresee the consequences of human powers and the uncertainties of foresight. The civil politician must be aware of the vague line between the exercise of authority and the manipulation of human beings as objects outside his moral realm. (Shils 1958,49)

Unlike ideological politics, which believed that the more strictly one adhered to a virtue and the more completely one fulfilled it, the better would be one's action, the civil politics require an understanding of the complexity of virtue, that "no virtue stands alone, that every virtuous act costs something in terms of other virtuous acts, that virtues are intertwined with evils, and that no theoretical system of a hierarchy or virtues is ever realizable in practice" (Shils 1958, 52).

Shils spoke in favour of traditions of intellectual life (Tacitus, Cicero, Clarendon, or More), but he understood well the enormous troubles and dangers of his civil politics. Among these ponderings he mentioned "pure politics" which is in connection with ideological politics:

A complete disavowal of every line of affinity between civility and ideology will not only be false in fact but would turn civility into an ideology. Civility would come an ideology of pure politics concerned with no substantive values except the acquisition and retention of power and the maintenance of public order and with absolutely no

other interest. Civility would take upon itself the onus of the very same moral separatism for which it criticizes ideological politics, if it denied its affinity with the substantive values which the ideological outlook holds and distorts. (Shils 1958, 59)

We can or should not "completely extirpate the ideological heritage", or traditions which were later an important theme of Shils (Shils 1958, 58). Later Shils' also revealed how the society of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* at the University of Chicago was an important impetus to his civil politics: "They all impressed me with their remarkable sense of civic responsibility and their goodwill toward mankind." (Shils 1972, ix-x)

Shils' view seems to have been that "normal" conservatism, liberalism or social democracy are not ideological thinking. This was also Tingsten's point and it formed the central problem of end-debate, when the interlocutors denied the ideological character of the common beliefs of the time. Shils' critique of pure politics reveals that his civism wanted to be a right thinking, against wrong ideologies. It is clear that de Jouvenel did not accept this kind of vulgar "ideologisation" of the opponents' beliefs and "civilising" of Shils' own ideas. However, de Jouvenel took something from Shils.

Namely, the themes of civilising and civilisation were de Jouvenel's concern as well, but he enlarged them into two directions. The first was his famous ecological aim to "civilise our civilisation": technical progress, he wrote, offers so many possibilities for bad and good things that we must be wise and use them properly if we want to increase the possibilities of a better everyday life¹³ (*le Mieux-Vivre*) (de Jouvenel 1965b, 23). But these problems of "better life in an affluent society" has been his theme already in the beginning of the 1960s. He lectured of "efficiency and amenity" in Kings College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, in 1960 and published the article *Le Mieux-vivre dans la société riche* in *Diogenes* (33/1961). He also contributed to the special issue of *Arguments* (22/1961) where the theme was *bien-être*. His essay was titled *Civilisation de la production et culture de l'aménité*. All these articles studied the harms and inhumanities of the contemporary technological age and the possibilities to make life more pleasant.

The second direction of civility was, some years later than Shils, in 1961 when de Jouvenel published the essay *On the Nature of Political Science* which came to be a part of *The Pure Theory* and which defined a function of political science: "its function is to civilize power, to impress the brute, improve its manners, and harness it to salutary tasks". Political science is like the bishop which tames the barbarians who had conquered a peaceful civilisation, and teach them and "the ruler's turbulent child" what they must and must not do. (*PT*, 35).

However, de Jouvenel thought that in its contemporary state political science offered no recipes. The technology of politics had been mightily developed outside political science during the last half century, and developed by the very men to whom the prudent scientist would like to deny it. Those who are least sensitive to the aesthetic and ethical appeal of traditional theory have broken away

¹³ "Vu les possibilités données par le progrès technique, en user sagement pour rendre aimable l'existence quotidienne de l'homme du commun, voilà tout le problème qui m'occupe." (de Jouvenel 1965b, 23)

from its restraints and guidance; while those with finer feelings are victims of processes which they cannot grasp. (*PT*, 38) We can not ameliorate the situation, if we do not come back "to inquiry into elementary political behaviour" (*PT*, 40).

In this way de Jouvenel turned even the normative idea of civilising into a non-normative study of politics: we can not civilise politics without knowing its unpleasant characters and it requires their inquiry without normative aims. We all have ideologies and Shils is wrong when he thinks that only our opponents have them.

In this way also the debate opened into new directions but the question mark in the titles (like *Fin de l'âge idéologique?*) or in the doubts of Shils remained until Daniel Bell published his collection of essays under the title *The End of Ideology* (1960).

4.1.4 Daniel Bell and the Exhaustion of Utopia

It was Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology* (1960) which made the debate well-known to the large academic public. The book is a collection of essays concerning several subjects and "composed over a ten-year period" (Bell 1960, 15). Bell studied the problem of ideology in his essay *Exhaustion of Utopia* at the end of the book. He did not want to begin with the popular usage of the word where ideology denotes belief-system, or rather *myth*:

[I]n popular usage the word *ideology* remains as a vague term where it seems to denote a world-view or belief-system or creeds held by a social group about the social arrangements in society, which is morally justified as being right. People then talk of the "ideology of the small businessman," or of liberalism, or fascism, as an "ideology." Or some writer will talk of "the dream-world of ideology (in which) Americans see their country as a place where every child is born to 'equality of opportunity,' where every man is essentially as good as every other man if not better." In this sense, ideology connotes a "myth" rather than just a set of values. (Bell 1960, 399)

By declaring that he followed Mannheim he made a distinction between "the *particular* conception of ideology," and "the *total* conception of ideology". In the first sense, ideology means the transformation of interests into ideology: "individuals who profess certain values do have interests as well, and we can better understand the meaning of these values or beliefs, or the reasons why they come forth where they have, by linking them up with they have" (Bell 1960, 399). In stead of that the *total* ideology is "an all-inclusive system of comprehensive reality, it is a set of beliefs, infused with passion, and seeks to transform the whole of a way of life". This commitment to ideology is not necessarily the reflection of interests in the shape of ideas. Here also Bell adopted Aron's idea that, in this sense, ideology is "a secular religion". (Bell 1960, 399-400) He also wrote that ideology is "the conversion of ideas into social levers" and compares ideology to religion. The main difference between them was that religion helped men to cope with the problem of death. (Bell 1960, 400)

Religion symbolized, drained away, dispersed emotional energy from the world onto the litany, the liturgy, the sacraments, the edifices, the arts. Ideology fuses these energies and channels them into politics. (Bell 1960, 400)

Bell's point was that in those days the ideologies were exhausted, which meant that "for the radical intelligentsia, the old ideologies have lost their 'truth' and their power to persuade" (Bell 1960, 402). In practice this means only that communism or any form of vulgar Marxism was not an idea which he can believe. At the same time Bell broke with classical liberalism – a relic of which was Friedrich Hayek's fervent attacks against the welfare state:

Few serious minds believe any longer that one can set down "blueprints" and through "social engineering" bring about a new utopia of social harmony. At the same time older "counter-beliefs" have lost their intellectual force as well. Few "classic" liberals insist that the State should play no role in the economy, and few serious conservatives, at least in England and on the Continent, believe that the Welfare State is "the road to serfdom." In the Western world, therefore, there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and political pluralism. In that sense, too, the ideological age has ended. (Bell 1960, 402-403)

Today we can ask if Bell here outlined the main characteristics of the counter ideology of anticommunist intellectuals: the desirability of decentralised power, a system of mixed economy, and political pluralism. Do they not evoke passions if they are in danger? These views were beyond Daniel Bell's study. According to him, the ideologies of the nineteenth century were universalistic, humanistic, and fashioned by intellectuals. The mass ideologies of Asia and Africa are parochial, instrumental, and created by political leaders. The driving forces of the old ideologies were social equality and, in the largest sense, freedom. The impulses of the new ideologies are economic development and national power. (Bell 1960, 403) He also thought that "even for some of the liberals of the West, 'economic development' has become a new ideology that washes away the memory of old disillusionments (Bell 1960, 403).

Bell's ideas show how the problem of "underdeveloped" countries gradually mixed into the debate and brought new dimensions to the dichotomy between communism and capitalism. Some years later this came to be an important factor in Raymond Aron's essays of the industrial society, when the "end of ideology" was already a "truth":

It is true to say that ideologies are dead in the advanced societies of the West, if we take an ideology to be a total interpretation of world history, but the statement does not apply to countries in process of development. They are in the grip of a controversy as passionate as it is confused. (Aron 1962-1964, 43)

Daniel Bell wanted and tried to save the concept of utopia and to begin anew the discussion of it, but this discussion had to be "aware of the trap of ideology". The point was that "ideologists are 'terrible simplifiers'" because ideology makes it unnecessary for people to "confront individual issues on their individual merits": "One simply turns to the ideological vending machine, and out comes the prepared formulae. And when these beliefs are suffused by apocalyptic fervor, ideas become weapons, and with dreadful results." (Bell 1960, 405)

According to Bell, there was, more than ever, some need of utopia, in the sense that men need "some vision of their potential, some manner of fusing pas-

sion with intelligence". He wanted utopia which was not based on a faith but which was an empirical one: "a utopia has to specify *where* one wants to go, *how* to get there, the costs of the enterprise, and some realization of, and justification for the determination of *who* is to pay". (Bell 1960, 405)

4.1.5 An Epilogue: Raymond Aron and Event

The object of Aron's and de Jouvenel's criticism was not only the Hegelian view of world history. Already in *L'Opium des intellectuels* Raymond Aron questioned forcefully Oswald Spengler's organistic view of history and Arnold Toynbee's history of civilisations, which were also "secularised theologies" (Aron 1955, 156-159; Aron 1957, 146-149). Against these determinisms Aron began to develop *déterminisme aléatoire* which was meant to emphasise the importance of contingent things of historical events:

Un événement, en tant qu'il résulte de l'action d'un homme, exprime celui-ci en même temps que la conjoncture. (Aron 1955, 174)

[An event, in so far as it results from the action of man, expresses man at the same time as the historical contingency. (Aron 1957, 162).]

Chaque fois que l'on situe un acte par rapport à une situation, on doit réserver la marge d'indétermination. (Aron 1955, 174)

[Every time one places an act in relation to a situation, one must make allowances for a margin of uncertainty. (Aron 1957, 163)]

In the beginning of the 1960s Aron (and as we have seen, also de Jouvenel) found *event* as the counter-concept against deterministic historical narratives. Thucydides was the model of the non-deterministic historical narratives and Aron and de Jouvenel had found Thucydides. In his essay *Thucydides and the Historical Narrative* Aron declared that the "history of events cannot be reduced to that of societies, classes, and economics" but there is always some contingent aspects of human action. The event is now for Aron "an act performed by one man or several men at a definite place and time". The event "can never be reduced to circumstances unless we eliminate in thought those who have acted and decree that anyone in their place would have acted the same way". (Aron 1961, 33)

Aron utilised de Jouvenel's conception of "pure politics" from *De la souveraineté*¹⁴ when he wrote that

As we apply the word "political" to an action that tends to unite, maintain, and carry on the social order, political conduct immediately seems to us *an event* since decisions that affect existence, prosperity, or the decline of collectivities are made by individuals and often cannot be thought of as the same if one supposes them made by others. (Aron 1961, 35)

According to Aron, events "*as they have happened* cannot be integrated with or reduced to circumstances" (Aron 1961, 35).

¹⁴ "The characteristic activity of "pure politics" may, therefore, be defined as an activity that builds, consolidates and keeps in being aggregates of men." (*So*, 23)

The definition of "event" that we have given immediately conveys the tie between "event" and "accident". Since an event is an action of one man or several, an action we instinctively regard as free or, if you like, *chosen*, we look upon it as not inevitable with regard to the situation. "Not inevitable" means that the actor could, without being essentially different, have made another decision (Nicias could have given order to retreat to the expeditionary force some weeks earlier) or that another person could have made the same decision earlier or later or a different decision at the same moment. Max Weber saw clearly that there are no accidents in the absolute sense of the word: there is accident in relation to this or that given situation. (Aron 1961, 35)

Unlike de Jouvenel, Aron did not consider event characteristic to politics, but "any work at the moment of its birth" is event, "the conjunction of *one* mind a point in space and time" (Aron 1961, 33). Both of them formed the ideas of event as a central argument against deterministic views of history, or the Annales school and especially against Fernand Braudel's *la longue durée*. Bertrand de Jouvenel made the move in argument by forming answers to the questions: What are the essential traits in the genesis of event? How does an event happen?

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Now I have presented the main characteristics of Aron's, Shils', and Bell's contributions of the "end of ideology". Although de Jouvenel shared the anticommunist attitude of his friends, he could not, however, join with them in the "end of ideology" debate. Why did he step aside? I argue, that the reason was his conception of ideology which differed from the conceptions of his friends. Next I shall briefly present de Jouvenel's view of ideology.

4.1.6 De Jouvenel: Ideologies are Global Maps

De Jouvenel wrote of ideology before the end-debate in *Confluence* (September 1953). The problem of the article titled *The Factors of Diffusion* was the positive attitude of Western intellectuals to Marxism and how it diffused. The article echoed Aron's idea that Marxism had "taken the character of a 'religion'" (de Jouvenel 1953, 80) Also Raymond Aron wrote about the diffusion of ideologies in two articles which had the term in the title¹⁵. The titles reveal the relation of articles: de Jouvenel tried to continue and clarify Aron's ideas.

¹⁵ I found three of Aron's manuscripts in Carton 24 of the de Jouvenel archives. The manuscripts did not include the date of their publication: *Les relations entre la diffusion des ideologies et le point IV*, *The Diffusion of Ideologies*, and *Le role des ideologies dans les changements politiques*.

Without mentioning the word "ideology"¹⁶ the *Factors of Diffusion* began with a description of man's mind which is like a picture gallery¹⁷:

[I]t is full of images, representations, and ideas of the things and agents encountered in our universe. The lifetime of a genius would not suffice for the autonomous formation of the store of images possessed by the least of us. We owe our wealth of ideas to intercommunication. Education and conversation testify to our faculty of receiving representations of things from others. The diffusion of such sketches is a continual and essential phenomenon of social life.

Among these pictures, some can be likened to global maps which purport to give a general view either of the universe or of a universe of things, thus serving as a framework into which particular pictures are to be fitted. These small-scale drawings of large wholes exercise a major influence on our actions. Man seeks to act rationally: this means nothing else but choosing a course on the basis of what is 'known,' i.e., going by the map in one's possession (thus many actions of A, who goes by his map, may be adjudged irrational by B, who has another map). (de Jouvenel 1953c, 70)

It is here a question of ideologies and especially of what causes the spread of beliefs which "seem to me false and nefarious". Namely, for the "Western intelligentsia" the triumphant march of the communist creed had been a shock: "If, then, ideas are not propagated by the sole virtue of their resemblance to the nature of things, what causes their success?" (de Jouvenel 1953c, 70)

He analysed carefully the spread of communism in France and concluded that conditions of perfect competition between ideas never occur. On the contrary, there were reasons to believe that the reception of an ideology is enormously facilitated by its resemblance to patterns previously held in the mind. (de Jouvenel 1953c 79) In the spirit of Aron's secular religions he compared Marxist thought with the promises of religions: the Promised Land is the end of private property. The article ended with thoughts how Saint-Simon and Comte failed to develop a religious character to their ideas.

Saint-Simon and after him Auguste Comte both perceived that an all-embracing system of thought could not conquer and to come to rule society if it did not take the character of a 'religion.' They conceived this more clearly than Marx and Engels, but they failed to work into their would-be 'religions' the basic pattern of ontological explanation which the human mind demands. They were handicapped simultaneously

¹⁶ He mentions the word "ideology" at the end of the article (see for example page 79).

¹⁷ A version of this picture gallery was also in de Jouvenel's essay *The Treatment of Capitalism by Continental Intellectuals* which was published in F. A. Hayek's (Ed.) *Capitalism and the Historians* (Chicago 1954): "Man possesses mental images, representations of the universe on progressive scales, of the things and agents therein, of himself and his relation to them. These images can be roughly likened to ancient maps adorned with small figures. Rational action, in a sense, means to go by the maps available to the ego, however inaccurate. The breadth, richness, and precision of these representations or maps are due entirely to intercommunication. Education consists in conveying a stock of such images and fostering the natural faculty of producing them. In any group, chosen at random, it can be observed that members are unequally active in communicating such representations; in all organized societies known to us a fraction of the members is specialized in dealing with representations." (de Jouvenel 1954a, 93)

by the fact that they openly offered 'religions' in an age which pretended to want none, and by the fact that their models did not satisfy the metaphysical urge. Marx and Engels, on the contrary, presented a 'religious' substance without a religious dress. Some fifteen centuries ago Pope Gelasius stated that the Demon can hold of the human mind only by diverting to his purpose man's natural appetite for God. (de Jouvenel 1953c, 80-81)

The Factors of Diffusion makes intelligible why de Jouvenel did not join with his friends to the end of ideology debate. Already in 1953 he had a conception of ideology which prevented him from following Aron, Shils, or Bell. Although he shared anticommunism¹⁸ with them, he had no illusions of the end of political struggle if Marxism happened to disappear of the world. Ideologies – "taxonomic devices constituting wide classes and inspiring general judgements, allowing us in short to take a stand on problems we have not analysed" (PT, ix) remain even if one of them is abolished. Thus, de Jouvenel succeeded to avoid the ideological traits of the "end" debate, because his view of ideologies began from the level of individual consciousness.

4.1.7 On the Rhetorical Characteristics of "End of Ideology"

LaPalombara has expressed aptly the rhetorical character of the end of ideology debate.

In the case of Aron, his passionate and intemperate attacks on the ideas of certain French intellectuals are so extreme as to represent not so much social science analysis as they do a fascinating example of the rhetorical aspect of ideological exchange.

It seems equally apparent that what these writers mean by ideology is not any given set of values, beliefs, preferences, expectations and prescriptions regarding society but that *particular* set that we may variously associate with Orthodox Marxism, "Scientific Socialism," Bolshevism, Maoism, or in any case with strongly held and dogmatically articulated ideas regarding class conflict and revolution. Thus, "the exhaustion of political ideas in the West," refers to that particular case involving the disillusionment experienced by Marxist intellectuals when it became apparent that many Marx's predictions were simply not borne out, and when the outrages of Stalinist regime were publicly revealed. (LaPalombara 1966, 8)

I argue that the "end of the ideological age" stuck fast to Aron's political thought through his critique of Hegelian "end of history": "Chaque moment de l'histoire a *des sens*, l'histoire entière peut-elle n'en avoir qu'un?" (Aron 1955, 170) It was Aron's cleverness that in this way he tried to transfer the Hegelian-Marxist discussion of the "end of history" into the question of the end of Marxism itself.

In rhetoric this kind of move in argumentation is called *paradiastole* trope: It is always possible to redescribe "virtues and vices" in one of two contrasting ways. One may excuse or justify disgraceful actions by covering them with the names of neighbouring virtues, or, one may seek to discountenance virtuous actions by

¹⁸ "The trouble with Marxism is not that it constitutes a system, but that it is false. Moreover and far worse, the brutal arm of the temporal power is at its service." (de Jouvenel 1953c, 77)

arguing that they are really instances of some neighbouring vice. (Skinner 1991, 13) Aron questioned the French revolutionary thinking by the Hegelian figure of "end of history" and applied it to Marxist terms. He likened the "virtue" of Hegelian reconciliation with Marxist class struggle. Thus, he inserted the idea of ending from the concept of history into the meaning of ideology which was Marxism in disguise.

Thus, the point of the discussion was not the end of ideology in general, but in the challenge of Marxism to the other ways of thought. However, the speech of an end was not analytical enough to satisfy de Jouvenel's desire for knowledge of politics and make it intelligible, or, in short: to think politically.

But there was another discussion which was, I suggest, important to pure politics as well – the debate of *dépolitisation* – and which was even more implicit in *The Pure Theory* than the end of ideology. Again, *The Pure Theory* was a counterargument against this debate.

4.2 *Dépolitisation*

De Jouvenel mentioned the word *dépolitisation* only twice, firstly in his article *Une science de la politique est-elle possible?* which was a speech delivered in *Académie des sciences morales et politiques* in February 1958. As the title hints, it was de Jouvenel's contribution to a debate on the possibility of establishing political science in France. Before establishing a new science he had to think about the concept of politics: when, he asked, is a problem said to be political? (de Jouvenel 1958, 51) In the spirit of deliberative rhetoric he concluded that in a political situation there are possibilities to choose:

Pour que le problème devînt politique, il fallait que l'on eût le sentiment que la situation présentait une fourche, n'importe le nombre de ses branches. Si les choses peuvent aller de telle manière ou de telle autre, il y a occasion de mobiliser les volontés et d'affronter ces coalitions. Et c'est proprement cette mobilisation et cet affrontement des volontés qui constituent "la politique". (de Jouvenel 1958, 52)

Politics requires mobilisation of wills and conflict of coalitions in a situation where there are several different possibilities. De Jouvenel argued that our days are the time of *politisation*:

Notre temps a été signalé par la "politisation" de quantité de situations qui ne donnaient pas lieu antérieurement à des conflits politiques, à cause que l'esprit n'imaginait pas l'altérabilité desdites situations (ou du cours des chose en découlant), sous l'influence de la volonté humaine. Tout ce que l'on estime dépendre de la volonté humaine est "cause matérielle" de politique. (de Jouvenel 1958, 52)

Our time is the time of *politisation* because we can think that most things depend on human will. However, our time is also the time of experts and engineers. And in this context de Jouvenel mentioned the word *dépolitisation*: to resort to experts means an attempt of *dépolitisation*:

Le recours aux experts pour dicter une décision ou un ensemble de décisions est un effort de dépolitisation. Il s'agit de substituer dans les esprits à des images différentes du possible, auxquelles s'attachent différentes volontés, l'image unique d'un nécessaire énoncé par les experts. (de Jouvenel 1958, 52)

The several images of possible future are replaced by the expert's necessary and only possible image of the future. The idea of administration by experts comes from Plato. De Jouvenel carried this image to the extreme:

Supposons que les experts doués d'une pleine science, qui leur est reconnue par tous, portent des jugements nécessaires. En ce cas il n'y a plus de conflit de volontés est il n'y a même plus matière à volonté étant inutile de vouloir le nécessaire. Il n'y a plus de politique mais aussi cette hypothèse postule que les phénomènes humains ne comportent qu'un seul degré de liberté, à savoir leur mouvement linéaire dans le temps, leur déplacement dans la rainure de l'Histoire. C'est-à-dire que le rêve du gouvernement parfait implique la négation du pouvoir de détermination de l'homme, et si cela est nié, le gouvernement parfait est lui-même inutile. C'est d'ailleurs là ce qui explique l'ambiguïté présente chez les utopistes qui semblent passer d'un moment à l'autre de la notion de gouvernement très sage et tout puissant à la notion de dépérissement du Gouvernement. Les deux représentations ont leur racine dans un même concept. (de Jouvenel 1958, 52-53)

In its logical end, the administration by experts means the end of politics, but also that the liberty of the human being is restricted to adaptation into the linear movement of history. In this sense the dream of the perfect government means the end of the government of man, and when it is denied, the best government is also unnecessary. This is the way how the utopian thinkers combine the conception of omnipotent government and the disappearance of government: the two phenomena have their root in the same concept.

The second time when *dépolitisation* occurred in de Jouvenel's texts was in *The Pure Theory*. The chapter *Manners of Politics* was published first in *Yale Review* (March 1962), but the original version did not include the discussion of *dépolitisation* (cf. *NP*, 191-201). For *The Pure Theory* he had written a new beginning which studied what kind of cruel game politics is or can be. The starting point was that "[p]olitics is conflict" and far the largest part of governmental activity is removed from the field of conflict: that part is performed by professional agents. (*PT*, 189) Then de Jouvenel presented the criteria of "de-politization":

The necessary and sufficient condition for 'de-politization' of a government activity is that the agents entrusted with it should know for certain what is to be done. This knowledge is afforded by standing rules, and therefore what has been done can be assessed judicially[.] (*PT*, 189)

De Jouvenel's intention was not to analyse the "growth of professional Government", but "to stress that Politics refers to 'unsolvable problems': that is, situations where no effective computational procedure (or *algorithm*) is available by means of which a solution can be found, which *dissolves* the problem, carrying irresistible conviction" (*PT*, 189).

The quotations enlighten de Jouvenel's attitude against the whole discussion of *dépolitisation* which was current in the 1950s. He approached it from the

view of expertise and he recognised it as a form of utopian thinking. This kind of view was rare even during the 1950s when the political thinking was thematised in France. However, it actualised especially from the view of negations of politics.

The argument of *dépolitisation* is of course linked with the conception of politics. Before there can be demands or complaints of *dépolitisation*, one must present narratives of politics. In France, there were two stories of politics: the narratives of the dramatisation and banalisation of politics.

4.2.1 Narrative of Drama

Politics was born as an action concept at the turn of the 19th century. At that time the name of the discipline of politics had gradually begun to transfer into the meanings of action (Palonen 1985, 20-31). In France the vocabulary of politics began to enlarge at the end of the 19th century. The most remarkable characteristics of the vocabulary are the negations of the neologisms. (Palonen 1989, 43)

Neben der **impolitique** Robespierres findet man jetzt auch **apolitisme** (Blum 1892), **extra-politique** (Maurras, *Dictionnaire*, 1931, 94) un **antipolitisme** (Mounier 1938, 38-39), auch von **les partis non politiques** is die Rede (de la Grasserie 1899, 260-261), während der katholische Philosoph Maritain die Termini **supra-politique** (z.B. 1935, 280) und **politicisme** bzw. **politiciste** (1936, 530) verwendet. (Palonen 1989, 43)

The terms *politisation* and *dépolitisation* were placed in the French vocabulary just before the Second World War, but the theme of politicisation (*Politisierung*) did not hardly ever actualise contrary to Germany (Palonen 1989, 45). After the war the terms *politisation* and *dépolitisation* were already current. The "end of ideology" was a common topic elsewhere at the end of the 1950s, whereas the debate on *dépolitisation* was a topical issue in France. (Palonen 1989, 89)

We can understand the French theme of *dépolitisation* firstly from the view of narrative which tells us of experience of the dramatisation of politics. As a context there were the interlocutors' experiences of the resistance and the euphoria of the liberation. The experience of action was dramatised compared to the time before the war. A week after the liberation of Paris, Albert Camus wrote:

Les routines dont était tissée la vie politique avant 1940 ont cédé; les hommes de la Résistance ont été des hommes jetés solitairement dans l'alternative de la honte ou de l'action.

C'est ainsi qu'une tradition proprement humaine tend à se substituer à la tradition exclusivement politique, dans l'ordre même de la politique. Non que l'action politique de la Résistance ait été anarchique. Mais la solidarité complice des politiciens s'est vu submerger par la camaraderie d'une lutte où chacun jetait tout son bagage humain.

C'est bien un nouvel ordre qui se trouve fondé. Un ordre dans lequel le visage de l'homme apparaît sous une lumière drue. La politique n'est plus dissociée des individus. Elle est l'adresse directe de l'homme à des autres hommes. Elle est un accent. (Camus 1944, 1523-1524)

Although the *Résistance* was not in principle a political struggle, it was the art of war under occupation which had *de caractère politique* (Camus 1944, 1253).

Réunir une troupe d'attaque, coordonner à travers tout le pays les activités, d'éléments sociaux originellement disparates, est une acte politique. (Camus 1944, 1523)

This lead to a conclusion "que la lutte politique n'est ni une carrière, ni un loisir, ni un accident de la vie". Instead of "nothing but politics" politics became an accent (*un accent*) in life. (Camus 1944, 1523-1524)

Although the reality of the Fourth Republic soon normalised politics, the experience of politicisation was enough to question the established forms of politics. When later it was said that the critique of the *dépolitisation* was typical for the non-communist left, one can understand it through the experiences of the resistance and the first years of the postwar experiences of *politisation*. (Palonen 1989, 90) We can count de Jouvenel into this class of the noncommunist left, although he could not come back from exile immediately after the war. However, from Switzerland and through his visits to the United Kingdom and the USA he could see perhaps better than any Frenchman how the time of new possibilities opened everywhere.

4.2.2 The Banality of Politics

There is also a less dramatical narrative of politicisation. In the beginning of congress of IPSA in 1961 the prime minister Michel Debré stated:

Depuis cinquante ans, la politique a pris dans la vie des individus et dans la vie des foules une importance nouvelle – je serais même tenté de dire une constante présence. (Debré 1961, 802)

The disputability of things and questions were experienced so commonly that the claim of *dépolitisation* became a strong argument.

Both these stories of politics are present in de Jouvenel's conception of politics. However, he did not argue against the *dépolitisation* or lament it. His interpretation of the banality of politics meant simply that he began to think larger political phenomena from the micro level, from the most simple cases he could imagine. From his view, the pursuit of *dépolitisation* by experts meant the same as the Marxist argument of the withering of the state. And in terms of drama he wanted to dramatise the banality of politics which otherwise had lost its speciality: "I found my best guides in the geniuses who have immortally portrayed the drama of Politics" (*PT*, xii).

In France very rare person demanded politicisation. One of those was in 1947 a Greek emigrant and Trotskyite Cornelius Castoriadis, when he wrote of industrial action:

Tout dépendra .. de la capacité de l'avant-garde de politiser les luttes. Cette politisation ... s'exprime très concrètement par la création d'organes politiques autonomes des masses. (Castoriadis 1947, 84; here according to Palonen 1989, 91)

Demanding of *dépolitisation* seems to have been especially the way of Gaullists to make politics. According to Jean Touchard it was particularly de Gaulle, who firstly demanded that the trade unions should cleanse themselves of politics (*se*

lave de la politique) (1948) and later that they must *dépolitiser*. During the elections of 1951 the Gaullist candidates utilised the term and the theme. (Touchard 1962, 28) After de Gaulle's demands the conventional critique of politics became again proper and even more: *dépolitisation* became a subject of political struggle in newspapers and a conceptual problem, which finally the political scientists began to study.

4.2.3 Some Aspects of the French Unpolitical

If we study Georges Vedel's (Ed.) *La dépolitisation, mythe ou réalité?* (1962), we easily conclude that de Jouvenel would have had a whole arsenal of the terms of the unpolitical. This collection of articles is a result of meetings of *Association Française de Science politique* which was inspired by the press debate of *dépolitisation*. The French political scientist asked: is there a general tendency to *dépolitisation* in the modern democracies? (Vedel 1960, 5) They noted that un- or depolitical has several dimensions: *dépolitisation* (depolitisation), *dépolitiser* (depoliticise), *apolitisme* (apolitism), *apolitique* (apolitical) and *antipolitisme* (antipoliticism) (Touchard 1962, 27-29).

Different political movements utilised these term for several political purposes and in the argumentation they got several meanings. As I mentioned, one central way to speak of *dépolitisation* in the 1950s was the Gaullists' demands of *dépolitisation*. It was not a question of *dépolitisation* as such but the activity: they tried to depoliticise some politicised things (for example the labour unions). In this speech the verb *dépolitiser* gained a more prominent place than in the texts of the leftists (*la petite gauche*) who were not committed to socialists or communists. This independent left lamented of *dépolitisation* and the meaning they gave it referred not to action but was a discovered fact. (Touchard 1962, 28-29, 31) At the background of this speech we can find the dramatical experiences of politics during and after the war whereas the new phenomena during the 1950s seemed from these views unpolitical because they estimated "political" and ideologies from the view of classical isms: the success of the Poujadists in the elections of 1956, the defeat of the Fourth Republic to de Gaulle, the decrease of militants which was a result of television and radio becoming more common, and the decreasing of intense demands (Touchard 1962, 29-30; cf. also note 8, 30).

According to Touchard the Frenchmen seldom spoke of *dépolitisation*: the point was that the workers deproletarised or became petit bourgeois, the party politics failed, the citizenship was in crisis (*la crise du civisme*), or the end of ideology (Touchard 1962, 30-31). One who utilised the term was Raymond Aron in his essay *De la droite* which began the book *Espoir et peur du siècle* (1957).

Notons que Raymond Aron emploie le terme de "dépolitisation" (en italiques) dans son essai "De la droite" qui ouvre *Espoir et peur du siècle* (dont l'achève d'imprimer porte la date du 22 mars 1957). Après s'être demandé si la tendance à l'égalité est génératrice de paix durable, il écrit: "...L'optimisme à court terme des observateurs se fonde sur deux faits principaux: la *dépolitisation* des masses, que favorisent radio et télévision, en même temps que l'absence de revendications violentes, l'accélération de la mobilité verticale que devrait provoquer la réforme du système scolaire" (pp. 42-43). (Touchard 1962, 30, note 8)

Thus, Aron utilised the term *dépolitisation* to describe some phenomena, which have become themes of discussion during the 1950s. The French unpolitical had some other dimensions as well.

4.2.3.1 Tactical Apolitism, Organised Depolitisation, and Doctrinal Antipoliticism

Maurice Merle has separated three dimensions of the French unpolitical: the tactical apolitism (*l'apolitisme tactique*), organised depolitisation (*la dépolitisation organisée*), and doctrinal antipoliticism (*l'antipolitisme doctrinal*) which has three variations.

The tactical apolitism begin, for example, with the attitude: "Votez pour moi parce que je ne fais pas la politique" (Merle 1962, 44). According to Merle especially the groups which have not reached the national level of politics utilise this kind of tactical apolitism. However, he found the same kind of rhetoric from the established parties and politicians. His example is Antoine Pinay, a provincial industrialist who was thrown into politics involuntarily and who "never tried to be primeminister": "La politique n'est pas mon fait: laissez-moi donc à l'administration de ma ville"¹⁹. From this view politics appears to be an indispensable evil, which has to adjust to methods of administration and trade. (Merle 1962, 44-45) Against these views, for example, Gaston Bouthol: wrote "Affirmer de ne pas faire de politique, c'est encore faire de politique" (Bouthol 1962, 39). In France, one who publicly declares to make politics is inevitably from left. Thus, the tactical apolitism is according to Merle a privilege of the French right – a privilege which reveals real unpolitical audiences. However, Merle wrote that also the groups and persons who usually declare to be partial, sometimes utilise apolitism. (Merle 1962, 46)

The organised depolitisation means, according to Merle, a view of rulers, which tolerates and encourages only current ways of ruling.

La politique ici condamnée est la *libre* participation des citoyens à la vie publique. Mais on peut dire qu'il y a dépolitisation systématique dans la mesure où la passivité et l'apathie de l'opinion sont officiellement considérées comme préférables à l'expression spontanée des opinions et à l'intervention incontrôlée des citoyens dans la marche des affaires publiques. (Merle 1962, 50)

From this view politics (*la politique*) divides and degrades; obedience towards the power unites and enriches. Politics and the parties, which are connected with it, can defend only private interests; national discipline secures common interest and is the only possibility to rule well and it also leads the big public and private issues. (Merle 1962, 50) Merle found an example from Marshal Pétain, in which he tried to reduce the "real" meaning of politics from "cette lutte stérile de partis ou de factions" into both the science and art conception at the same time, when it becomes a policy where people are governed according to their interests which are supposed to be the most general and the highest:

¹⁹ The quotations comes from a leaflet *Antoine Pinay, cet honnête homme* (Bourg 1953, Editions touristiques et littéraires).

Je viens aujourd'hui vous parler "politique". Peut-être certains d'entre vous vont-ils s'écrier: enfin! tandis que d'autres diront: déjà! Ils se méprendront les uns et les autres. La politique ou de factions, ce fiévreux déchaînement d'ambitions personnelles ou de passions idéologiques, cette excitation permanente à la division et à la haine où un historien voyait la plus dangereuse épidémie qui puisse s'abattre sur un peuple. La politique, la vraie politique, est à la fois une science et un art. Son objet est de rendre peuples prospères, les civilisations florissantes, les parties durables; elle est l'art de gouverner les hommes conformément à leur intérêt le plus général et le plus élevé. (*Revue de Deux Mondes*, 15 septembre 1940; here according to Merle 1962, 50)

The quotation expressed for Merle the most doctrinal form of Bonapartism and its distinction between the high national questions which require competence and vocation and the discussions and sterile divisions of parties (Merle 1962, 51)

The Fifth Republic tried to regularise officially the *dépolitisation*. In his first speech to the National Assembly in 1959 the Prime Minister Michel Debré wanted to *dépolitiser* the problem of Algeria. In the name of nationalism Debré tried to depoliticise the essential national issues: "La "dépolitisation" de l'essentiel national est un impératif majeur." (Merle 1962, 51). In other words Debré tried to remove *l'essentiel national* out of the inter-party controversy. Paul Delouvrier made the same kind of a proposition when he spoke before the cantonal elections: "Il ne faut pas politiser ces élections; il s'agit d'élire des conseillers généraux, c'est-à-dire des gestionnaires de ce département dont les tâches à régler sont énormes." (Merle 1962, 51) In fact this kind of organised depoliticisation means only that the nationalist right tried to consolidate the Fifth Republic and to sweep under the carpet the disputes which were shaking its position. In this sense the systematic depoliticisation is only a certain government policy in disguise. (Merle 1962, 52)

What Merle named the doctrinal antipolitism (*l'antipolitisme doctrinal*) is something that goes further than the *dépolitisation*, unpolitical or apolitical. If to *dépolitiser* means politicking with the issues and the questions which are tried to neutralise, so the antipolitism means an intense politicking in order to abolish politics and the political. From France Merle found three different branches of the doctrinal antipolitism. The first is Charles Maurras' national monarchism, a traditional form of antipolitism. The two others were anarchosyndicalism and technocratism.

The relation between politics and Maurrasian traditionalism is ambivalent: one central slogan of monarchists was *Politique d'abord*.

Nous sommes généralement d'accord entre royalistes et même entre nationalistes sur un premier point: nous admettons tous que la question politique domine tout. Politique d'abord est une devise courante. (*Gazette de France*, 28 juillet 1904; here according to Merle 1962, 52-53)

La question politique has here only meaning that monarchists and nationalists try to advance their own program and thus it refers to the *policy* aspect of politics. Elsewhere Maurras stigmatised democratic or republican politics:

Arrêtons nous sur le sens étrange, mystérieux et nouveau de ce terme de politique... Politique en soi signifie quelque chose comme national et civique. C'est l'intérêt général et supérieur de la ville, de la cité, de la patrie; or l'usage constant de nos contemporains, distingués ou non, est de le traîner dans la boue. Il n'est plus guère compris qu'en

mauvaise part: politique mène à politiquer et à politicien. (Discours prononcé à Lyon; cité dans Ch. Maurras: *Dictionnaire politique et critique*, 1933, tome IV, article "politique"; here according to Merle 1962, 53)

In Maurras' monarchy there would not be a class of politicians, the subjects would not make politics but they only are born, they work, and die. (Merle 1962, 53). Maurras' antiparlamentarism tried to utilise the prejudices against politicians, but it was not the only strong movement against politics in France.

The revolutionary syndicalism had a strong impact in the beginning of the century and it had caused antiparlimentary attitude to the French political speech afterwards. In the centre of it was Proudhon's prejudices against the state. (Merle 1962, 56)

The technocratic abolishment of politics had a long tradition in France from since the time of Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte. When Saint-Simon wanted to substitute "l'administration des choses au gouvernement des hommes", he especially wanted to change the indefinite political science into a exact science like physics of human issues. (Merle 1962, 56-57) As it is well known, the Comtean positivism has the same goal and they often complement each other. As a science and action politics appears to be for them a dubious and indefinite thing:

A travers la conception technocratique, la politique et surtout la politique démocratique, apparaît comme le domaine incertain du hasard, de l'improvisation, de la discussion stérile, du compromis douteux. Une conception rationnelle de l'organisation sociale doit logiquement tendre à éliminer l'activité spécifiquement politique au profit de la domination des techniciens. (Merle 1962, 58)

From this view, a rational conception of social organisation has to logically eliminate the political action: the experts rule will replace it.

In all cases the doctrine against politics forbids the legitimacy of democratic play and includes an argument: political action with its electional, party and parliamentary rites is an action of secondary class, which does not touch the essential of social mechanism. However, these three ideologies form a central part of the French political thought. They all abandon politics because of different arguments, but the conclusion is the same: "la politique n'est condamnée qu'en tant qu'elle repose sur l'idéologie et sur les techniques du gouvernement des citoyens par les citoyens". The paradox of the French political life has been a long time the struggle of cliques, which are ardent to destroy it. (Merle 1962, 59).

4.3 Conclusions: the Spirit of Unpolitical vs. Pure Politics

It was a kind of a spirit of unpolitical which has several dimensions where de Jouvenel wrote *The Pure Theory of Politics* (1963) and the essays which preceded it. The central character of the *dépolitisation* debate was an asymmetry: those who criticised *politisation* did not defend *dépolitisation*, neither did those who criticised *dépolitisation* demand *politisation*, which was very uncommon demand in the French discussion. The end of ideology debate seemed to end politics as well.

These debates were "the real life problems" which were a challenge to de Jouvenel. On the one hand he could not join the end of ideology debate, because his conception of ideology was more personal than the one of his colleagues Aron, Shils, or Bell. However, this discussion, especially Aron's view against the Hegelian conception of history helped de Jouvenel to pay attention to the genesis of event. On the other hand he had developed, in *Du Pouvoir*, a figure of thought which opened possibilities to develop the idea of politics from the micro level. His experiences supported the idea that in the beginning of every political event there is always a person who tries to move the other person. In *De la souveraineté* he found the English vocabulary of politics of which he made an interpretation. There he also transformed the idea of command and obey to a more equal idea of persuasion.

These rhetorical devices helped him to resist the lure of both the aspects of the French unpolitical of which the discussion of *dépolitisation* was current and the international trend to cut the head of politics by ending the ideology.

In the introduction of this study I wrote that in a free discussion enthymemes are set against each other. If we apply the idea now to de Jouvenel's situation we notice that against several French enthymemes of unpolitical he set his pure politics. In the argumentation his rhetorical move was not to continue or defend this or that aspect of *dépolitisation* or to demand *politisation*. He simply tried to show, from the micro level, that we cannot avoid politics. The cure for the end of ideology was the same: not to continue or lament the discussion, but to develop a counter-enthymeme, the pure politics and its theory.

This counter-enthymeme happened to be the age old idea of rhetoric, the idea which was dead and buried at the end of the 19th century. The "spirit" was not only unpolitical, it was also antirhetorical. How did de Jouvenel come to adopt the idea of rhetoric? In what way and by what means could he defend it? This will be the theme of next chapter.

5 THE PURE THEORY OF RHETORIC: SOME REDUCTIONS

Political scientists have paid surprisingly little attention to detailed analysis of the arguments made by many of their behavioral and postbehavioral classics.

John S. Nelson, *Tropes of Politics*

Until now I have studied how de Jouvenel's figure of thought was constructed from beginning his own ways to think and from the basis of the discussions of the time. After this historico-rhetorical study of the pure politics I turn now to the rhetorico-historical part.

This means that I begin with the general level but I show in detail the relation between the pure politics and rhetoric. I also study what kind of political worldview de Jouvenel constructed on the basis of his figure. Then I turn to de Jouvenel's own means of rhetoric, and finally I study his connections with the rhetorical traditions. In other words, in the first part of the chapter I ask what kind of rhetoric the pure politics is and how it works politically? What kind of worldview is in *The Pure Theory*? The second part of the chapter poses the question what are de Jouvenel's rhetorical means, his figures and tropes? The third, a more "historical" part, asks what kind of connections he had with the rhetorical tradition.

5.1 The Realm of Rhetoric and Pure Politics

Bertrand de Jouvenel's the pure theory of politics includes the idea of politics as persuasion. Actually, it revives rhetoric in a peculiar way. *The Pure Theory* is not meant to be a science of certainty, but it tries to say something of the politics which deals with contingent things. As Hale and Landy noticed "this kind of 'knowledge' is the stuff of sophists" (Hale & Landy 1986, xxxiii). It is based on the argument, or in other words, on the enthymeme, that we can find politics anywhere where "A tells B to do H" (*PT*, 69).

This formal distinction corresponds to a general separation in rhetoric between a speaker, a speech and a spoken-to, "with the speaker so shaping his speech

as to 'commune with' the spoken-to" (Burke 1950, 271). All this happens in a situation where argumentation "does not aim solely at gaining a purely intellectual adherence" but it "very often aims at inciting action, or at least at creating a disposition to act" (Perelman 1977b, 12; 1977a, 25-26). In other words, de Jouvenel approaches the central ideas of rhetoric by utilising the vocabulary of politics.

From this view we can realise that all rhetoric include a political dimension: somebody tries to persuade others by some argument. When this is the central character of political argumentation, thus, in turn, we can consider the argumentation theory as a type of political analysis of speech or texts. We can recognise rhetoric as politics of speaker and audience in a relation which is formed by the act of appeal. Although all the characteristics of politics cannot be included into its rhetorical traits, all rhetoric has its political dimension. (cf. Palonen 1991, 12)

Next I shall study what de Jouvenel said of the protagonists of persuasion and compare it with what is said in the new rhetoric of them and their acts.

5.1.1 A, the Speaker

De Jouvenel had several names and levels of A. The most common case is two human beings where one tries to make the other do something. But the ABH-relation extends into inner deliberation of A and B as well. De Jouvenel did not mention this when he wrote of A or B, but later when he analysed political groups, the committee and its decision-making.

Even when the decision belongs to many, the debate must in fact be limited to a few.¹ On the other hand, when decision belongs to one, he will apt to seek the views of a few advisers; and even if he does not, the several courses he contemplates in solitude can be regarded as several opinions. (*PT*, 146)

In this way, A and B are not actually consistent persons when they make deliberate decisions but "a small group" which has a discussion: a deliberation of an individual splits into several discussions of As and Bs. De Jouvenel did not study more the dimensions of this individual's inward politics and how it could lead to the rhetorical understanding of multiple personalities etc. However, the mobile² of at least two interlocutors corresponds to Perelman's new rhetoric where the inner deliberation is more intelligible if we compare it with the discussions with others:

¹ In his article *The Chairmans Problem* de Jouvenel concluded that a meeting of under 12 persons is the best situation for the freedom of speech, because everybody has an opportunity and time to express his or her opinion. (*American Political Science Review*, vol. LV, no. 2 (June 1961); see *NP*, 44). The theme of the article were the bottlenecks which in practice limit the freedom of speech. He criticised the abstract conceptions which assume that everyone has to have access to any discussion. If we interpret the freedom of speech in this way, the scarcity of time and space has not been taken into consideration and anyone who tries to be a participant in public discussions feels to be cheated when he or she meet the "gatekeepers" of the media or any public realm.

² Perhaps it is now the era when I must stress that I mean the mobile in the artistic sense of the word.

Even in the realm of inward deliberation, certain conditions are required for argumentation: in particular, a person must conceive of himself as divided into at least two interlocutors, two parties engaging in deliberation. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 14)

It also very often happens that discussion with someone else is simply a means we use to see things more clearly ourselves. Agreement with oneself is merely a particular case of agreement with others. Accordingly, from our point of view, it is by analyzing argumentation addressed to others that we can best understand self-deliberation and not vice versa. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 41)

Thus, A, before he begins to persuade B, has had the same kind of inner persuasion situation which B faces when A tells B to do H. A political actor, who have met a contingent situation, must think questions like "what to do", "what kind of policy to adopt", "what kind of consequences and reactions there will be if I take this or that stance or if I make this or that decision", "what are the consequences for my general pursuits if I do this or that", "someone has made a suggestion, should I accept or refuse and what consequences there will be" etc.

In this sense inner political battle does not differ from the politics defined in *De la souveraineté*. It is only a special case of politics which expresses arguments and *contestations* which precede the decision, where a *policy* means the line of conduct, which appears in it. In conflicts, which precede a decision of a large group, or a decision of an individual, every small group (or the views of an individual in a deliberation) which participate has their own *policy*. This *policy* is not the same policy which they want that the big group (or an individual) will adopt. It is also clear that this final *policy* is not above *politics* because the *politics* continue and *the policy* is a factor in it. (cf. S, 28; So, 18) Thus, a carefully deliberate instigation is *the policy* adopted after an inner meeting of the "Ministers of inner cabinet" or of the "executive committee" of inner society; the arguments which support *the policy* are its constitutive policies.

In de Jouvenel's works we can find several types of instigators. The modest form of it is A, but the more authoritative forms were expressed by exclamation marks: A!BH? meant that there is a normal political situation, A!!BH? implied that A is a political leader and in A!!!BH? A has the rights of sovereign in relation to B (de Jouvenel 1959, 276; 1965, 29). *Dux* i.e. the leader, Napoleon at the bridge of Arcola, Alcibiades, *auctor*, Romulus, political entrepreneur, *l'appelant*, the boss of the Teamsters Union, or the leader of brigands, they all are different types and levels of A, instigators.

5.1.1.1 Team of Action

The agents in the pattern ABH? do not act in a void. They do not constitute a society but groups, which has two basic forms: the pursuit to some goal or the coexistence of men. How are these groups formed? The question haunted de Jouvenel especially in *De la Souveraineté*, where we can find the sources of its inspiration. As several commentators have noticed (Slevin, Mahoney & Desrosiers) de Jouvenel studied the question especially in *De la Souveraineté* in the spirit of social contract theories. He took a lot of influences of these theories, but of course, in several respects his stand was critical.

De Jouvenel's point of departure was that there is no such a thing as "the completely solitary man" – an isolated man is a product of intellectual abstraction (So, 1). An individual is a product of several groups: the domestic unit, the milieu of existence, the team of action, and "to consider groups as secondary phenomena resulting from a synthesis of individuals is a wrong approach, they should be regarded as primary phenomena of human existence" (So, 67).

He described how the painters of the century in which the natural independence of man was a postulate of philosophers depicted births, marriages and death-beds "all occasions when a man is surrounded by his own group; he is [...] in his true natural state" (So, 67). Thus, against the contract theories he adopted the Aristotelian attitude that the group is a "natural" phenomenon: "Without the group man is an impossibility"³ (So, 1-3, 67). However, we can find some remnants of social contract theories as well, because especially these theories tried to trace the formation of groups. Indeed, a remarkable part of *De la souveraineté* tries to figure out the process of formation of groups, and Rousseau and Hobbes are under critical study.

All this led to a position that de Jouvenel's central point of view remained to the formation of group and how to keep a body politic in good condition. It was never subversive and he never asked: how to dissolve harmful groupings or a body politic? Whenever he touched these problems of "action of a negative kind", it happened from the view of formation of a group: the different political forces "may have a negative effect as regards one another, with one tending to disassociate a whole which another tends to build or keep in being" (cf. S, 33; So, 24). He never thought that sometimes it is enough to dissolve a group without forming a new one.

In *De la souveraineté* de Jouvenel rejected two ways to explain the formation of groupings: The first was the model of voluntary association, which means that "men come together under the pressure of a purpose which each has and which is the same in each" (So, 32). The problem of this model is that "there is in fact no such thing as spontaneous convergence of wishes which have arisen simultaneously in the breasts of all" (So, 34). The second was the model of domination imposed from without. For the cynics the birth of a society is due to the violence done to a population by a band of conquerors, who subject them to a social discipline which is to the conquerors advantage. (So, 34) The problem of this explanation lies in the question:

[H]ow the conquering band came to be formed? Those who today conquer and bring together others must in some way have been brought together themselves. In what way? Are they perhaps those whom their chiefs have conquered? If so, how did these latter come to win so improbable a victory? Even if, what is certainly untrue, the assemblage of men could gain in extent only by violence, the start of the process cannot in any case have owed anything to violence. (So, 35)

De Jouvenel rejected these theories, because they "overlook the role of the founder – the *auctor* – in the formation of the group" (So, 34). The essential character in the

³ "Le fait naturel, aux deux sens de primitif et de nécessaire, c'est le group. Sans le group, point d'homme." (S, 79)

formation is the consent, or, the obedience of others, again a essential concept in the contract theories. Neither Hobbes nor Rousseau thought a lot of the importance of the words in the consent, or how was it made by speech before anyone can "sign" a contract, or how its existence was legitimised by words (cf. Rousseau 1762, 38-40; Hobbes 1651, Chapter XIV).

We can find more traces of contract theories when de Jouvenel discerned the *natural* obedience from the *civil* obedience:

The natural disposition of a man to draw inspiration from another for his own actions is one thing; the conviction that it is his duty to act in accordance with the proclaimed will of that other is something else.

No feeling of obligation enters into *natural* obedience: I act as Primus wants me to act because he has infused his will into mine, and for just as long as this endures. Whereas in the case of *civil* obedience I act as Primus wants me to act because I acknowledge the duty of submitting my action to his will and act as though his will were also mine. Natural authority has for me the pull of a lover; its is an attraction bound up with my liking for Primus. Constituted authority has for me the pull of a rope to which I have first been tied; it draws me on even though Primus has no sort of personal attraction for me. What tie members of a political society to the public authority are invisible ropes. Or, to put the contrast in more popular language, a man is, as regards a natural society, a subscriber, and, as regards a constituted society, a debtor. (*So*, 103-104)

In other words, at the background of de Jouvenel's way to see the natural grouping there is a model of contract theories: the one who gives a consent to *auctor's* instigation is a kind of subscriber (of a social contract). Also de Jouvenel took from Rousseau the idea that politics is "is a technique for increasing the human energies at our disposal by rallying other men's wills to our cause" (*So*, 21). Namely, in the beginning of *Du contrat social* Rousseau spoke of the point where men could not better their existence without uniting their forces⁴ in an aggregate and "[c]ette somme des forces ne peut naître que du concours de plusieurs" (Rousseau 1762, 38).

In *The Pure Theory of Politics* de Jouvenel studied only two types of political groups, but family is still the group which fosters us: "we are all 'home-made'" and we easily transform our disappointments in the world to the demands of "the ideal of the nation-wide or world-wide family". The urge to the family collectivism is expressed in the slogans "one for all and all for one, from each according to his capacity, to each according to his needs": these are the natural ways of the home. (*PT*, 52)

But family is actually the only natural group in *The Pure Theory*. It is an other kind of group which can (mis)use the family-made affections: "Working upon men's affections is characteristic of Politics. Followers are won, not hired." (*PT*, 53) This corresponds with Max Weber's idea in the *Parliament and Government in Germany* that politics is struggle: "the political leader recruits his following and wins over the mass by 'demagogy' (Weber 1918, 228). At the most elementary level they are won, in de Jouvenel's thought, by the work of *auctor*, A, or other types of instigator. This instigator forms the first type of group, a following, or, the *team* which can have several kinds of purposes, but in principle it is a group

⁴ Because men cannot engender new forces they must unite (Rousseau 1762, 38).

which pursuit some end(s). Its opposite, which has its origin in the B type of action, is committee, which tries to solve problems. On a general level this corresponds to Michael Oakeshott's later distinction between *universitas* and *societas* where the first is seen as "an association of intelligent agents who recognize themselves to be engaged upon the joint enterprise of seeking the satisfaction of some common substantive want" and the second "was understood to be the product of a pact or an agreement, not to act in concert but to acknowledge the authority of certain conditions in acting" (Oakeshott 1975, 199-206).

In *The Pure Theory* de Jouvenel's way to study the groups is more formal than before and he says hardly anything of teams: he concentrated on the formal study of the committee, which is an intellectual continuation of the B's ways to act. But it is clear that what is said of the action group in *De la souveraineté*, that is also valid in *The Pure Theory*: The team of action, being a group which propels and draws, is the perfect opposite of a domestic group. It is now a case, not of living together but acting together, not of consuming but of getting and winning. The domestic group can be pictured as a round cell at the centre of which is the mother rather than the father. The team of action, being a group in movement, tends to be streamlined and should be pictured as a spindle-shaped cell; it is the leader or the promoter who activates this group. (So, 75) In *De la souveraineté* he rejected in clear words the ideas that apply the models of family groupings and team as ideals:

It is as futile and dangerous to aim at making of society one large family, as sentimental socialism seeks to do, as to aim at making of it one large team, as positivist socialism seeks to do. (So, 77)

De la souveraineté depicted the team of action from several angles, but in *The Pure Theory* the *team* is only a small group of men which "share an intention, the implementation of which requires at least a once-for-all decision of some public authority" (PT, 176). The importance of the team in *De la souveraineté* was the result of its being "the social formation by means of which human existence has been and still is being transformed" (So, 74). The team is formed around "the intending politician" (PT, 174). But how is this team put together? In *De la souveraineté* de Jouvenel described how from the sense of isolation, without a coherent circle around her/him, a modern human being, is apt to steer towards political congregation, "an organic whole of relationships along with the symbols which are its cement" (S, 74).

The central feature in this symbolic relation is that people can set different kinds of ends to pursue and they have the freedom to choose between them. The ends, or future, has in de Jouvenel's political thought the same pictorial traits as ideology:

A man conceives an end: the end presents itself to his mind in the form of a picture – in, it might be said, an image in relief. Upon the images of an experienced reality, given and present, is superimposed the image of a future reality, given but still to be made. The word "project" denotes a projection of the mind on the plane of the visible universe, the imprint of will. (So, 74)

The team of action is most readily understood, because it has been assembled for an explicit end which explains the *raison d'être* of the group (So, 75). In Max Weber's language, it is *Zweckrational*, not guided by principles: but this does not lead

to the (famous misinterpretation of) "iron cage" of ends. On the contrary it leads to the "principles" of opportunism: the members of the group can decide whatever end they want.

Because the team has a final cause known to all and it is addressed to a precise objective, success and failure are ascertainable facts; the degree of success can be related to the volume or intensity of the factors used and it can be said that these have been more or less effectively employed (*So*, 76). De Jouvenel mentioned that Hobbes tried to "seek to make the action group the model of the political society", but this was an error because the laws of effective action "do not necessarily preside over the organisation of social structures of a complex kind" (*So*, 76-77).

The team of action is the source of political change in de Jouvenel's political thought, but at the same time it is the greatest troublemaker. *The Pure Theory* developed especially these negative traits of team. At first sight he seems to follow Hobbes in the sense that he was for order and against political disorder. However, *The Pure Theory* gives no receipts – it posed the formal problem: how the established authorities (i.e. committees) can deal with problems caused by teams which has adopted more and more a war-like attitude.

No century has been more concerned than ours to do away with war: it has proved signally unsuccessful. All too little attention has been given to the phenomenon that internal politics have become more warlike. (*PT*, 181)

The Hobbesian solution, to call for very great authority, does not work, because the team possessed by an *idée fixe* exactly desire the acts of violence: they goad the authorities into hurting innocent bystanders and they try gain the moral benefits of martyrdom. In the terrorist strategy the team is in its most extreme form and it means the Hobbesian 'war of all against all' which "requires the complete abolition of moral sense", i.e. "that what is waged is a form of war". (*PT*, 179-180) Actually, it means the situation where B's compliance is entirely denied:

If I could never induce any other man to lend a hand to my purpose, indeed if I could never induce him to stay his hand when he might injure me, then the proximity of my fellows would afford me no services and offer only dangers. (*PT*, 71)

In principle, de Jouvenel saw that in this kind of war-like situation is a question of manners. He utilised the metaphor of game and described how in politics can be players, like Hitler, who raises the stakes so high that "the old players cannot refuse" and "if they leave the table, the intruder wins by default" (*PT*, 190).

De Jouvenel did not demonstrate the reasons why the *ethos* of politics is sometimes corrupted into a warlike showdown. He just tried formally to depict the possibilities of team to have an effect to a nonchalant or even reluctant committee. The terrorist strategy is of course only the most extreme case and there is a vast range of possibilities to make the committee to do things: The first possibility is to "plead in favour of that decision with the holders (or holder) of the competent authority". The next obvious is to win over people who have easy and habitual access to the decision-maker or makers. But the situation becomes difficult if the decision-makers cannot be persuaded directly or "swung over by the mild

nagging of their immediate circle". The team then turns to an outside pressure upon the committee, which is "a current procedure in a regime of liberty: indeed its being held legitimate defines political liberty". (PT, 176)

This third procedure means, that through propaganda, the team recruits partisans of its intention who join with it in demanding the decision (PT, 176). If the committee is reluctant to make the decision wanted even if the positive pressure is remarkable, the team has a possibility to generate "nuisance policies". De Jouvenel used the word "nuisance" here only relative to committee: "it is not implied that the actions so denominated are in themselves 'wrong', but that they are meant to badger the committee". There exist a lot of means of nuisance, for example going on a hunger-strike or throwing a bomb are both demonstrations of intense feeling, meant to break the will of the committee. (PT, 178) Also the milder forms of action (such as picketing, demonstration, marches), peacefully conducted, bring home to the rulers that here is discontent: and it must generate in them some doubt whether they have done all they should. (PT, 179) All these, up to the terrorist strategy form the formal procedure of nuisance politics against the committee, which has its roots in the political conduct of B.

5.1.2 B, "the King-Maker"

The entrepreneur types of agents cannot act without the audience which decide the fate of instigations. If I could never induce any other human being to lend a hand to my purpose, there would be only dangers in the world (PT, 71). But what actually is B who decides? Mostly it is a person, an individual, who listens the speech of A. However, like in the case of A, the ABH-relation belongs also to inner deliberation of an individual and "the several courses he contemplates in solitude can be regarded as several opinions" (PT, 146). A is a course, a small policy in the inner deliberation of B, but B is our general ability to deliberate suggestions or actions and our propensity to comply.

In the new rhetoric, Chaïm Perelman made a similar difference between two agents in a situation of rhetorical action, between a speaker (*orateur*) and a listener (*auditeur*):

L'argumentation [...], qui sollicite, une adhésion, est avant tout une action: action d'un individu, que l'on peut appeler, de manière très générale, l'orateur, sur un individu, que l'on peut appeler, de manière très générale aussi, l'auditeur, et cela en vue de déclencher un autre action. (Perelman 1989, 439)

Thus, the B and its derivatives in the pure politics can be translated to the problems of audience in the new rhetoric. At first sight de Jouvenel's view emphasises the personal discussions as the most important characteristic of politics. However, ABH-relation describes every situation where someone transmits meanings in order to move someone be it an inner deliberation in solitude or the most persuasive political speech on television. The only limiting factor is that we can reduce it to A's attempt to make some B to do something. A tries to form an audience, "the gathering of those whom the speaker wants to influence by his or her arguments" (Perelman 1977b, 14). This means for example that every person who is present in the persuasion situation are

not inevitably members of the audience. On the other hand we cannot always specify the audience: Who belong to the audience of a leading politician, who speaks in the parliament of the foreign policy issues? The MPs who are present, the large public of voters, or perhaps the leaders of other countries? Who are the audience of an old book? It is better not to describe these kinds of audiences as "universal" as Perelman wrote, but to say that these are non-specified audiences, just like novels are "letters to unknown". In these cases we can find pure politics only if we can find B's active attitude towards or against A's attempts to persuade. In this sense all the B-type audiences are varieties of Perelman's "particular audiences" (Perelman 1977b, 14).

De Jouvenel did not study B's situation thoroughly. However, he saw that the power comes from those who decide the fate of instigation. The man who speaks to others and carries them to the action is the man who makes history. But there is one who decides whether this hero shall indeed make history: "*Response, there is the king-maker*" (PT, 83).

Some A suggestions obtain some B compliance; everybody knows this from experience. As the opposite of this kind of experience de Jouvenel outlined an idea of universe "where no B would comply with any A suggestion". The result would be what I wrote in the previous chapter of the Hobbesian "war of all against all". No Government could come to existence, because "its very existence depends upon habitual compliance to its biddings". (PT, 71)

According to de Jouvenel, the propensity to comply is the most excellent and essential social virtue, not a weakness, but the condition and fount of every progress. He did not want to make a hero out of the instigator: "In fact the propensity to comply is a thing good in itself, while the instigation may be bad as well as good". (PT, 71)

Often there is not a situation where the B deliberate between "yes" and "no" to a given H-suggestion, but B has to choose between a number of suggestions (PT, 87). We cannot deliberate every suggestion for a long time. In the role of B we must have general patterns which guide our decision. This lead de Jouvenel to study the theme of authority. Namely, authority and prejudice results from B's consent. A can establish positions of authority, when some Bs comply to her/his suggestions. In this sense ABH? relation includes power i.e. possibilities and the question mark implies the uncertain character of every response. These signals are yet those which "are competing but not conflicting" (PT, 111). But there are also suggestions which conflict and de Jouvenel gave the name "the Law of Conservative Exclusion" to different levels of conflict:

Any set of people in some way dependent upon another must have some provision, explicit or implicit, for the elimination of signals which would conflict at the level of the set. Signals which do not conflict at the level of the set may freely compete, but signals which are incompatible at the level of the set cannot be allowed to compete. (PT, 112)

The Law of Conservative Exclusion is not a law in the sense that it operates at all times inevitably. But whenever and wherever competing instigations would conflict, from different signals to perform, one is selected and the others are eliminated. There is room for only one signal and moreover compliance to this one signal must be enforced. The name for this single, monopolistic, obedience-exacting signal in *The Pure Theory* is command.

From the actual speech act situations we know, that not only the speaker but also the audience can often be authoritative. We try to tell B to do something but this B has a clear superior situation in regard to us. B has a upper decision-making position or B has established practices to deal with A's suggestion. Now I continue de Jouvenel's pattern to new directions and change the place of the exclamation mark(s); it is now a question of situation where the exclamation mark is after B: AB!H? And why not A and B could be agents, which both have a lot of power shares like A!!B!!H?

De Jouvenel did not develop the idea, but from his political thought we can find some "logical derivatives" of B, or, in other words, different kinds of authoritative audiences. The most well-known of these is the type of leadership who decides and settles: *rex* (*S*, 34-35). Also we can understand the political *rentier* as a type of authoritative audience: a political *rentier* is a "dog-in-office", like a Member of Parliament and its opponent is a self-made authority of *parvenu* (*PT*, 105). St. Louis under the oak of Vincennes is one of de Jouvenel's visions by which he wanted to depict this type of authority in *De la souveraineté* (*So*, 48-49). But even "when the decision belongs to many, the debate must in fact be limited to a few" (*PT*, 146). The name of the "few" in *The Pure Theory* was "committee".

5.1.2.1 Committee

In *De la souveraineté* the level of group was divided into three categories: the domestic group, the action group and the milieu of existence. In *The Pure Theory* there were also three forms of groups but the third form was changed: the formal conception of *committee* is something entirely different than the milieu of existence. In short, the committee is the opposite of team and it tries to solve the problems caused by the political entrepreneurs (or *dux*) and the teams. (*PT*, 146-165; 176-186) We can think that all the *rex* types of leaders and committees are authoritative audiences to which we can formally give an expression of exclamation mark(s) after B (for example AB!!!H?).

When de Jouvenel wrote of committee he meant the decision-making set which "comprises more than one person but not a large number" (*PT*, 146). The committee means that "several men are engaged in choosing a decision to be issued authoritatively" (*PT*, 146). This "group of men" deliberate the decision not like a jury of court, but like a war council⁵. Indeed, de Jouvenel continued the study of committee with several distinctions which Aristotle made between forensic and deliberative rhetoric, but he now connected them with the decision, not with the speech (cf. Aristotle a, 1358b). In short, the judicial decision looks back to past, the political decision, on the contrary, looks forward to the outcome of the decision now being formed; practically everything that is said in the course of a trial is couched in the past tense, whereas in the case of political debate the future tense is sure to be used. Also many political decisions – and those the most important – cannot be made according to a procedure as careful as that which is

⁵ De Jouvenel studied the difference between juridical and political in his article *Thoughts on a Theory of Political Enterprise* (1958) (*NP*, 55-68). See chapter 3.2. note 22.

required in the administration of justice. The time is limited in the political decision, but a court has a lot of time to search for the truth. A political decision will also produce effects, new facts. These decisions can be reviewed afterwards, but whether this review approves or condemns the decision taken, it can never undo its effects. (*PT*, 151)

In essence a judicial decision is a finding that some person or persons did at some past moment unduly affect the then existing state of the world, while a political decision is an endeavour to affect the future state of the world. Such an endeavour implies surmising how the decision will work out, and therefore taking into account facts yet to come, contingencies. (*PT*, 152)

De Jouvenel warned us that resorting to judicial decision-making, when the occasion calls for political decision, is a grave political mistake (*PT*, 155). Even the decision-makers have entirely different relations to their audience in the judicial and in the political decision: The judge is deemed to be impartial and independent, but the political decision-maker is never independent. His or her being subject to outside pressure is not abnormal but natural. The judge decides an issue which affects only one or few. The political magistrate decides issues which affect great numbers; as he or she must decide them with a view to their outcome they cannot always be presented as a mere application of principles. His or her authority rests upon opinion and is apt to vanish if opinion turns against him. He or she cannot be indifferent to the reactions evoked because these are a part of the decision's outcome, and may indeed determine the outcome. (*PT*, 161-162).

According to de Jouvenel, it is a rank absurdity to believe that any governing body can ever afford indifference to the dispositions of subjects and agents, because it must depend upon them for the actualisation of the commands it utters: and this remains true whatever the form of government. But it is no less unrealistic to assume that the governing body, acknowledging the power of opinion, can live in harmony with it, letting itself be guided by its demands. This could be done of course if the people were consistently of one mind, or even if there were a continuing majority for a coherent set of decisions. But in fact demands for a certain decision are usually minority demands, and different minorities may on different occasions be strong enough to 'swing' decisions inconsistent with each other. (*PT*, 163)

Now we are coming to a characteristic, which in de Jouvenel's opinion was central to the political problem – its unsolvability. To solve a problem means that it will never be a problem any more. In politics the constituents of the problem are the incompatible and conflicting demands. As in a bankruptcy, there is no possibility of meeting all the claims in full. Some must be denied altogether or all must be reduced. (*PT*, 207)

What characterizes a political problem is that no answer will fit the terms of the problem as stated. A political problem therefore is not solved, it may settled, which is a different thing altogether. (*PT*, 207)

According to de Jouvenel, there are some possibilities to settle political problems. First, the parties who formulate the demands creating the problem may pare down their demands and therefore incompatible demands will then become compat-

ible. In this way, the political problem will have changed into a problem admitting a solution. (PT, 207) We can also try to solve political problems by the application of a principle or the dictate of an authority. In practice, de Jouvenel thought, the two may be joined together: that is, when the dictate of an authority is based upon a principle. (PT, 208) However, these are not political ways to settle political problems.

Namely, the unsolvability of political problems means that the *compromise* is the characteristic way to settle them. Certainly the compromise will not be received in the same spirit as a solution, because there "will be many on both sides who will go on thinking that their terms could have been satisfied more completely if only they had held out more". Even the best settlement by compromise therefore will not cause that feeling of enjoyment which comes with the offering of the solution to a problem. The compromise settlement leaves the issue in being. It may be reopened at any time. (PT, 208)

De Jouvenel's one-sided emphasis on the compromise leaves out a important procedure and misses the point of parliamentary democracy: that the number of votes can be a principle according to which we can settle political problems. Both the compromise and the principle of majority leaves the case open to attacks of minorities. From de Jouvenel's point the principle of majority belongs to the principles of authority. However, for example Max Weber thought that compromise is "the dominating form in which conflicts of *economic* interest are settled, particularly those between employers and workers" (Weber 1917, 102). Here we have a clue for the explanation why de Jouvenel emphasised the compromise: his political thinking owes a lot to the histories of the trade unions. However, in the parliamentary level of the compromise "there is *always* the *ultima ratio* of the *voting slip* in the background" (Weber 1917, 102). De Jouvenel's micropolitical approach seem to shed no light to the importance and novelty of the electoral arithmetic in the parliamentary procedures. Neither he thought that there could be provisional arrangements, which can be dissolved or validate if they happen to work.

Nevertheless, in his view politics means the formal play of human incompatibilities. The intention of A or a team, which is directed to the future, clash with the *attention* of B or committee (PT, 169-186). The event, the time of politics appears in a clash of different attitudes of time in which for example the concept of progress seem to be senseless. All this comes visible, or rather audible when A tells B to do H.

5.1.3 "Tells to Do H", or Deliberative Rhetoric

In the pure theory of politics there are two political agents who act on the basis of their difference: the *incompatibilities* of their starting points defines their actions. When A (speaker) tells B (listener) to do H, they act politically differently simply because the one speaks and the other listens. They can of course change their roles, but in this way we can quite concretely make the difference between two political actions: persuasion and decision. In any case, the relation between A and B can be seen in accordance with Kenneth Burke's view that identification is compensatory with division and strife (Burke 1950, 22, 25)

In pure identification there would not be strife. Likewise, there would be no strife in absolute separateness, since opponents can join battle only through a mediatory ground that makes their communication possible, thus providing the first condition necessary for their interchange of blows. But put identification and division ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just where one ends and the other begins, and you have the characteristic invitation to rhetoric. (Burke 1950, 25)

In the same manner the ability to understand and respond to instigations in de Jouvenel's ABH-pattern gives confirmation to the traits of communication, division, and conflict between human beings, and thus bases rhetoric and politics.

The 'normal' case of political persuasion is of course the deliberative rhetoric, which deals with the things which can be in one way or another. In a sense de Jouvenel's *futuribles* tries to formalise some traits of deliberative judgement. However, A's telling to B to do H touches every type of speech or text which tempt men or women to do something. Even the most objective scientific presentations or the apparently unpolitical spheres of entertainment lure men to pay attention. Or, if we take a case in a court of law, we can discern a lot of political characteristics in de Jouvenel's sense: the prosecutor tries to assert that the defendant is guilty and he or she persuades the jury or the judge to sentence a punishment, the counsel for the defence tries to persuade in the opposite direction or to mitigate the punishment and the judge tries to persuade both to act in a way that she/he can make the sentence from the basis of the most probable knowledge. In short, from de Jouvenel's view all "A tells B to do H" have deliberative aspects and we can study them as political.

These rhetorical characteristics of *The Pure Theory* make it difficult to connect it with the three large approaches of political theory: the normative-ontological, the analytical-empirical, or the dialectic-critical traditions. All of these objective theories are based on the confusion that being and acting can be identified. Instead of that, a non-objective theory of political does not touch the being, but deals with the preconditions of acting: "Bedingungen für Handeln gibt es dort, wo nicht das Sein *des Menschen* zur Debatte steht, sondern die Handlungen *der Menschen* in der Welt." (Vollrath 1977, 9-10) As Ernst Vollrath has successfully shown, there is the fourth tradition, which has its starting point in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, the tradition of practical reason, the *phronesis*, or in the Roman context *prudencia* (Vollrath 1977, 36-). Although the pure theory of politics has a lot of appearances which characterise Platonic tradition, I argue that from the basis of *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* and the central thesis of the pure politics, we can include it to the tradition of *phronesis*. This comes apparent when we compare it with the main characteristics of the other theoretical traditions. In order to avoid the expansion to infinite of this study I shortly lean on what Ernst Vollrath has said of the issue in *Die Rekonstruktion der politischen Urteilskraft* (1977).

The central differences between the tradition of *phronesis* and the theory oriented tradition lie in the point how they understand the conceptions of theory and action and their reciprocal relation. At first, we can illuminate the attitude of the *phronesis* tradition in the words of Edmund Burke: "The rules and definitions of prudence can rarely be exact; never universal"⁶. However, it was Aristotle who

⁶ In *The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*, London 1803-1827, VIII, p. 87. Here quoted according to Vollrath 1977, 28.

first formulated the difference between exact theoretical sciences and practical knowledge of *phronesis*. The basis for the practical knowledge lies in Aristotle's thesis "daß alles Handeln ein einzelnes Handeln ist, also die bleibende Particularität des Handelns" (Vollrath 1977, 36; Aristotle b, 1110b6). This particularity binds action with contingency and frees its knowledge from the strictness of theoretical sciences: a carpenter planes a plank entirely away, if he or she tries to imitate mathematical lines. (Vollrath 1977, 36-37) This practico-political approach does not also have the compelling character of Plato's *nous*, but Aristotelian wisdom has topico-rhetorico-dialectical traits. In the Plato's tradition *the* Reason overcomes all the attempts to establish a political community based on the debates. (Vollrath 1977, 37-38) A consequence of the theoretical approach is, in theory, that it leads to the vanishing of the plurality of acting men. In practice, there will always be men and women who think and act differently. (cf. Vollrath 1977, 42)

At first sight de Jouvenel's attempt to establish the pure theory of politics means the opposite of *phronesis*:

Die Applikation der puren Theorie auf den politischen Bereich ohne die Führung der klugen Urteilskraft trägt der Partikularität, der Pluralität, der Situativität, der Akzidentalität dieses Bereiches nicht Rechnung. (Vollrath 1977, 49)

However, as we have seen, the aim of de Jouvenel's "the pure theory" is exactly to study, from the view of political agent, the formation of event in a way which Vollrath includes in the the tradition of *phronesis*, in its particularity, plurality, situativity, and occasionality.

The clearest difference between the pure theory of politics and the traditional political theory is their attitude towards moral-ethical receipts. As we will see (see chapter 5.2.1.) the pure theory of politics gives no moral advice; it is formal, not normative. The opposite to the traditional political theory is apparent: "Traditionnellerweise wird philosophisch die Theorie der Praxis als Ethik und Moral abgehandelt." (Vollrath 1997, 44) The non-normative formality distinguishes it *both* from tradition of theory *and* the tradition of *phronesis*: to think politics formally as actors, acts and relations is something unique in the field of political thought. However, the pure politics took the formality from the side of theoretical tradition and combined it with the central trait of practical reason, with the deliberative rhetoric. This makes intelligible why the means and ends are so intertwined in *The Pseudo-Alcibiades*: the deliberative rhetoric does not discern the means from ends because it is ends-constitutive.

The means-ends dichotomy belongs to the realm of philosophical pairs (Perelman) or to the theoretical world of making (Arendt-Vollrath), not to the world of action, where they are problematical. In the words of Edmund Burke:

The *means* to any end being first in order, are *immediate* in their good or their evil; – they are always, in a manner, *certainities*. The *end* is doubly problematical; first whether is to be attained; then, whether, supposing it attained, we obtain the true object we sought for.⁷

⁷ In *The Correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*, London 1844, III, p. 118. Here quoted according to Vollrath 1977, 27.

In action the means and ends belongs together: "im Handeln die Mittel stets vor den Zwecken wirklich sind, weil die Zwecke nur durch die Mittel verwirklicht werden können" (Vollrath 1977, 27). The expedition to Syracuse is "a goal but also a means" (*PT*, 28; see chapter 2). And everything can be a means in Alcibiades' hands. There is nothing that would fall outside of the political sphere by its character, but everything can become political (a means to "our" hands). Even Socrates' benevolent method of dialogue can serve the meanest political purposes.

But Alcibiades' political persuasion also *constitutes* the goal, in the public realm of *polis*. In this sense it is "an end in itself", as Dana Villa has pointed out:

Deliberative speech, political debate, when engaged in by public-spirited citizens, is "an end in itself", because here the quarrel over "means", about the appropriate action to "good" to be attained is articulated concretely only in the medium of debate about possible courses of action. Where all are agreed on the end, debate can take place, but it ceases to be political. Political debate is end-constitutive: its goal does not apart from the process, dominating it at every point, but is rather formed in the course of the "performance" itself. Through such deliberation, individuals rise above merely strategic considerations and engage questions that have a direct bearing on the *kind* of political community they see themselves as part of. Genuine political deliberation does not move at the level of "in order to", but rather at the level of "for the sake of": it ultimately is concerned with the meaning of our life in common. (Villa 1996, 32)

As I mentioned, the tradition of *phronesis* has its roots in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle depicts practical/political deliberation as an activity valuable for its own sake. Practical wisdom (*phronesis*), the primary intellectual virtue of deliberation concerned with action, is not merely concerned with the selection of means, as is *techne* or art. Rather, in deliberation, the man of practical wisdom, the *phronimos*, is more concerned with finding what is *good* for himself and his fellow citizens. This sets his deliberation off from more limited, instrumental sort that is concerned with particular questions of policy. The latter type of deliberation, when done well, brings "success in the attainment of some particular end" (Aristotle b 1142b 30, 163). The former sort is "good deliberation in the unqualified sense": it does not concern itself with "what is good and advantageous in a partial sense, for example, what contributes to health or strength"; rather, it seeks "what sort of thing contributes to the good life in general" (Ibid. 1140a 25, 152). The "correctness" of unqualified deliberation is measured not so much in terms of its success as in its ability to attain "what is good" (Ibid. 1142b 20, 163). It does not have an end "other than itself," as does *poiesis*, for "good action is itself an end" (Ibid. 1140b 5, 153). To deliberate well, as the man of practical wisdom does, is to *do* well. (Villa 1996, 32-33)

The tremendous irony of *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* lies in the fact that we know that the end of Syracuse expedition was not what Alcibiades wanted. He had to flee to Sparta and the Athenian troops were destroyed in Sicily. The ends constituted through deliberative speech are not the ones which actually will be realised. Here we meet what Sartre has said of counter-finality or Max Weber in *Politik als Beruf* that "the eventual outcome of political action frequently, indeed regularly, stands in a quite inadequate, even paradoxical relation to its original, intended meaning and purpose (*Sinn*)" (Weber 1919b, 355).

The formal study of politics is de Jouvenel's response to the challenge of the impossible in politics. He wanted "to pick out certain elementary and pervading

traits of Politics, yet "nothing was further from my mind than to paint on a large canvas a complete picture of Politics" (*PT*, 213). He tried to reduce politics to its some simple elements like actors, actions and relations, which helps to avoid the problems of teleological or normative theories. In spite of that he is, as Mahoney and Desrosiers have noted "imbued with the spirit of Aristotelian political science" (1997, xv), especially his formal analysis of the genesis of event shed light to *praxis*, to the deliberative speech situation.⁸

The persuasion situation is from Kenneth Burke's view a case of identification and compensatory with division and strife (Burke 1950, 22, 25). If we add to this view Chaïm Perelman's point that persuasion is aimed to action by mutual understanding we have de Jouvenel's pure politics. Perelman even wrote that in argumentation there are no contradictions only incompatibilities:

Dans l'argumentation, il n'existe pas de contradictions. Il n'y a que des incompatibilités, l'obligation de choisir entre deux êtres, deux règles, deux solutions, deux actions. Ces incompatibilités résultent d'une décision, elles sont *posées*, encore que pour celui à qui elles sont présentées elles puissent prendre un aspect objectif. (Perelman 1989, 456-457)

This view is in accordance with de Jouvenel's idea that unsolvability characterises political problems. We cannot make solutions to political problems; they remain always in one way or another one-sided, because there is no possibility of meeting all the claims in full: some must be denied altogether or all must be reduced.

In the same manner the relation between A and B is also an insoluble conflict, because one needs persuasion. In a close examination politics ends if B decides to do H. Doing H is not politics, only the decision (and A's persuasion). In this sense and at this micro level both the pure theory of politics and Perelman's new rhetoric come close to the social contract theories, because they all focus their attention to the consent. Actually a more political enterprise would study the means and reasons which keeps the politics going on: the characteristics of incompatibilities, B's refusal, the compromise, the margins which do not accept the compromise etc.

Namely, if the situation is settled in unanimity, there actually was not a political problem. This is why persuasion happens with identification, which is not "pure identification" because also "there would be no strife" in absolute separateness, since opponents can join battle only through a mediatory ground that makes their communication possible (Burke 1950, 25). Thus, in words of Hilikka Summa "rhetorical identifications are the purest *political*" (Summa 1996, 59).

The point of departure to the conflict lies in the fact that A and B are politicking in different ways. And as we have seen, we can clarify this micro level politics by the aid of rhetorical terms. The action seems to be very different if we choose the view of A or B. A makes politics by the aid of her/his instigation: the instigator tries to get it accepted by means of argumentation. Now it is the question of rea-

⁸ In *The Pure Theory* there are no references to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* or *Politics*. Actually *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* confuses knowledge and wisdom: in the tradition of *phronesis*, the practical wisdom is just what Alcibiades knows, whereas the true knowledge is the realm of certain science. In *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* the conceptions are just the other way round.

sons – “the who and the what factors” – as de Jouvenel put it (*PT*, 75). B makes politics when she/he deliberates the suggestions and especially when B refuses the suggestion, because it compels A to continue the persuasion. Also mere indifference or passivity is enough to make A to continue. If A uses authority, B has power as well. De Jouvenel did not give a name for this “superiority” of B, but in an analyse of Shakespeare’s *King John* it is A’s *might* which disappears when Bs do not listen to the suggestions:

They will not hear you, and there goes your might. For the might of man is not as the Lord’s might, an indefeasible and permanent attribute: it is an ability to move others, and those others, by refusing to be moved, deny and destroy this might. The king’s power seems a thing solid and heavy like a block of ice, but it is capable to running off like water and crystallizing elsewhere. (*PT*, 83)

It is the question mark after B, which can make the solid king’s power capable to running off like water (cf. 4.2.2.). This is the dimension of power, which Max Weber called *Chance*:

Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf die Chance beruht. (Weber 1922, 28)

According to Weber the social relation consists only of those opportunities and possibilities which are at hand and which we think when we aim at action. *Chance* can be volatile or long lasting as “state” (Weber 1922, 13-14). *Macht* means those *Chances*, deliberate occasions and possibilities, by which the own will can be championed inside of a social relation also when there are resistance (Weber 1922, 28). *Macht* is especially in connection with the struggle or resistance. If it is broken down, the other has anymore no power-shares, because they are in connection with the struggle. In other words, if my own will is realised, the struggle ends. Politics and the power which is in connection with it, they are transformed into something else.

De Jouvenel did not study the possibility to turn the situation – how B can become A – because it is self-evident for him that we all act in both roles all the time. From the view of struggle the interchangeability of the roles means the politicisation of the situation onwards or the condensation of the struggle. When B becomes A it extends the repertoire of their action and also condensates the argumentation between them. (cf. Palonen 1997, 82)

It is noteworthy that A and B has different kind of power-shares: A instigates, B decides. If de Jouvenel had followed his idea of insolubility of the political problems consistently, then the answer to the political incompatibilities of A and B would have been, not B’s consent, but the compromise, a new division of power-shares.

The two ways to act politically correspond with two political attitudes: attention and intention.

Attention is a ‘presence of mind’ whereby we take cognizance of a situation, conceive it as a problem and try to solve it. Intention might be called a ‘futuraity of mind’ whereby we picture a future situation and seek to actualize it. (*PT*, 169)

Men are eminently capable of attention and intention, but these capacities are very unequally developed. Anyone who has raised children or looked at himself knows the difficulty of steadying attention or intention: "attention shifts or vanishes, intention flags". (*PT*, 169) In this sense "intention" does not mean phenomenological intention, i.e. to give sense to something (cf. Husserl 1995, 74). Rather, attention is this observing things as something. Here the intention means the intention of analytical philosophy: "[e]verything that a man does *in order* to make real the object of an intention of his, he does intentionally" (von Wright 1980, 16).

De Jouvenel considered attention and intention exceptionally from the ethical angle. He perhaps never realised the nasty characteristics of modern surveillance or psychological consequences of attention of a massacre when he wrote that "[a]ttention can never do harm" and that it is "inherently good". "Bad attention" meant for him only "weak attention", but it never had a negative value. (*PT*, 170) Attention was good, whereas "intention affects and involves others, clashes with other intentions: intention is the great breeder of conflict". In addition, incompatibility of intentions fosters a Manichean view of society. De Jouvenel gave an example: the man who intends to build a dam cannot be regarded as anything enemy by the villagers whose homes are to be submerged, and their intention to preserve the village can only be regarded as an obstacle by the engineer. (*PT*, 171)

From these attitudes is constructed the two types of political actors: Intenders and Attenders. The Intenders know what they want, but the practise of attentive statesmanship is more difficult: they have to have many eyes and to satisfy conflicting demands (*PT*, 172-175). They has also the names of *dux* and *rex* and at the level of groups team and committee. At the most elementary level they are called A and B. How these figures work rhetorically, this will be my next riddle to solve.

5.2 Politics of Letters

As the title of this treatise implies I try to show here that the pure politics utilises more a type of reduction than the other rhetorical strategy, amplification. The strategies reduction and amplification do not exclude each other but are always complementary and interconnected. Here I set my starting point to the Roman theorists who, according to Quentin Skinner, wrote that "there are two complementary ways in which an orator can hope to stretch the truth in such a way as to arouse the deepest and most powerful feelings of an audience ". In order to strengthen an argument the speaker must "first of all present his own case so as to minimise or gloss over any weaknesses in it, thus making it appear as plausible and attractive as possible. The verb generally used in this context is *minuere* – to lessen, to diminish, to extenuate." (Skinner 1996, 135)

I argue that de Jouvenel's main and the most obvious rhetorical strategy was to lessen, to purify politics from other things. In addition, he did not only reduce politics to the simple things, he also tried to diminish counter-arguments and not so much to utilise the orators other and even more important task: "to magnify everything that can plausibly be said in favour of his own cause against

that of his adversaries. The verb used by the Roman rhetoricians in this contrasting context is *augere* – to increase, to strengthen, to intensify or to enhance.” (Skinner 1996, 135)

In short, I show what kind of rhetoric is the pure theory of politics. Of course the ”reduction” is a one-sided view to de Jouvenel’s thoughts and it is not easy to discern the means of reduction from the means of amplification. Namely, as Peacham in *The Garden of Eloquence* wrote the term ”amplification is not merely the name of a figure, but is rather the general term for the entire process of ’increasing and diminishing’ the force of an argument” (Skinner 1996, 137). Here I try show that there is also another general view to argumentation, that of reduction, which is not a figure, but also a general term to the entire process to establish and use arguments. Because my aim is to say something new of the pure politics, this view serves as a heuristic and anachronistic signpost which, I hope, indicates something of my sources and helps us to understand better the pure politics and rhetoric.

5.2.1 Why de Jouvenel Wrote in English

The most visible rhetorical choice was that de Jouvenel wrote *The Pure Theory* in English. The success of *Power* and *Sovereignty* in the Anglo-Saxon world had created a promise of an audience. Some chapters of the book were published in *Yale Review*, *American Political Science Review* and *Review of Politics*, *Diogenes*, *Encounter*, or *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Some other English journals published his other articles. His connections with the English speaking scientific world were large and he wanted to make a contribution to the ”end of ideology” debate and to a discussion of the ”decline of the political theory” – a debate which I wanted to pass over until now.

On the Nature of Political Science (1961) was de Jouvenel’s link to the debate. This article, which came to be a chapter of *The Pure Theory* was published in the *American Political Science Review*. He seemed not to have known the roots of the debate, like Alfred Cobban’s *The Decline of the Political Theory* (1953) or Peter Laslett’s introduction to *Philosophy, Politics and Society* (1956), or at least he did not refer to them. This ”decline debate” aroused a counter movement where *The Pure Theory* was a contribution, almost at the same time was published perhaps the most well-known article, Dante Germino’s *The Revival of Political Theory* (August 1963). De Jouvenel seemed to have known the central texts of the debate. He was interested in ”descent from moral pulpit” which was, for example, expressed in Robert A. Dahl’s report of the fifth IPSA congress *The Behavioural Approach in Political Science* (1961). The descent had aroused Leo Strauss’ ardent attack *What is Political Philosophy?* (1957). Another of de Jouvenel’s links to the debate was Irving Kristol’s article *The Profanation of Politics* which was published in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays presented to Michael Polanyi* (1961). (PT, 34, see also notes 3 and 4; Cobban 1953; Germino 1963)⁹ Both Kristol and Strauss were somewhat neo-Platonic think-

⁹ I also owe a lot of these thoughts to Petri Koikkalainen’s papers which he has delivered in several History of Political and Social Concepts Group Annual Conferences and other seminars.

ers. For example, Strauss maintained that political philosophy was begun by Socrates, developed fully by Plato and Aristotle, and continued until the present when it fell into "a state of decay and perhaps of putrefaction, if it has not vanished altogether" (Strauss 1957, 17; Gunnell 1979, 37; Kristol 1961, 153)

The concern with political theory reached France in the beginning of the 1960s. *Revue française de science politique* published a special issue of the theme in June 1961. De Jouvenel's article *Théorie politique pure* was among the essays of Eric Weil, Richard Wollheim, Henri Lefevre, Anthony Downs and Stanley Hoffman¹⁰. Raymond Aron wrote the preface to the issue and continued the debate in the same publication the next year in his article *A propos de la théorie politique* (1962). However, perhaps the most famous contribution to the decline debate in the issue was Isaiah Berlin's article *La théorie politique existe-t-elle?* which was published there for the first time. De Jouvenel shared a lot Berlin's ideas: in order to be a theory, there ought to be the clear concepts and some interchange between empirical facts and the formation of theory, or the critique of Saint-Simon and Comte were, no doubt, a significant part of his theoretical tools. Perhaps the only thing in Berlin's article which could have attracted de Jouvenel's critical attention is Berlin's argument that "L'idée d'une théorie (ou d'un modèle) de l'action – par opposition au comportement – qui soit "Wertfrei" [sic] est inintelligible" (Berlin 1961, 324).

Namely, in *The Pure Theory* de Jouvenel seems also to adopt Dahl's attitude that political theory is indeed dead and there are no reasons to offer moral receipts with the aid of political theory. He did not adopt Dahl's behavioural approach, but he developed the attitude which I have several time repeated and which is also over and over again repeated in de Jouvenel's works: "Thus we always come back to inquiry into elementary political behaviour." (*PT*, 40) He thought that there is no political theory in the sense of other sciences, but let us develop it. His proposition was "the pure theory" which wanted to describe, not to prescribe political reality (*PT*, xi). In this way we can classify the pure theory of politics into the category of "the theories of the middle range" which were an appeal to remain on a level of analysis which goes beyond fact finding, but also avoids grandiose speculations which at no point are linked to observation of reality.

Although the debate thus was conducted also in French, its problems and most of its participants referred to the Anglophone debate. This is the most obvious reason for the most visible rhetorical choice, to write the book for the English speaking audience.

¹⁰ Raymond Aron: *La théorie politique*; Eric Weil: *Philosophie politique, théorie politique*; Richard Wollheim: *Philosophie analytique et pensée politique*; Henri Lefebvre: *Marxisme et politique. Le marxisme a-t-il une théorie politique?*; Anthony Downs: *Théorie économique et théorie politique*; Stanley Hoffman: *Théorie et relations internationales*.

5.2.2 How Do Letters Work Rhetorically?

The second prominent feature of de Jouvenel's rhetorical strategies is that he reduced his message to letters: ABH?, A!BH? and other formulations of the pattern are a specific means of rhetoric which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca called quasi-logical arguments (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 193). It is an attempt "to transform an argument into a rigorous demonstration" in which "a person would have to define all the terms used, eliminate all ambiguity, and remove from the argument the possibility of multiple interpretations" (Perelman 1977b, 53).

To form an argument in this way was common in the scientific argumentation before the "rhetorical turn" and it has several advantages when one tries to establish scientific authority. Namely, it imitates the objectivity of mathematics, physics, and formal logic, in short, the forms of formal reasoning. If we take the example of mathematics, the appreciation of it arises from the fact that we can apply it in every field of human understanding quasi-objectively, because it reduces everything into a certain aspect of things, into their number. This kind of objectivity vanishes immediately at least in fields other than pure mathematics when we study the criteria of classification which must be based on arguments. They are not something universal or objective, or "instances of correct or incorrect demonstrations, but of stronger or weaker argument that the speaker can reinforce if necessary with arguments of other kinds" (Perelman 1977b, 53)

The pattern ABH? tries to express this kind of objectivity. De Jouvenel declared that it was the most simple element of politics. The characters and the marks express what is said of definition in the new rhetoric:

In the process of defining a term, the claim to identify the defining expression (the *definiens*) with the term to be defined (the *definiendum*) constitutes an argumentative, quasi-logical usage of identity. (Perelman 1977b, 60)

From Perelman's view, the pattern ABH? is a "complex definition" which combines the elements of the "normative definition" (it tries to prescribe the usage of the term "politics") and the "condensed definition" (which shows the essential elements of the normal usage of the term) (cf. Perelman 1977b, 61). Through the definition de Jouvenel tries to transfer the value of "elementary traits of politics" to his pattern.

The letters ABH, the question mark and the exclamation marks in the different versions of the pattern are a reduction which tries to transform the expressive ability of symbols into the letters of the pattern. Because the first letters in the alphabet are A and B, they fit to the purposes to neutralise political problems. After hundreds of years of education, their position in western culture is so conventional that anyone who tries to argue that they are partial excludes him/herself outside of the scientific discussion. Of course, A and B are not objective or outside of political disputes, but in the context of the 1960s and late 1950s they formed a credible basis for non-normative argumentation of politics.

A and B symbolise two persons. With the force of the neutrality of letters they express that there could be anybody: the letters are chosen to symbolise men and women because they embody a simple difference in their situation but no distinctive or individualised differences. The symbols give neutral presence to human beings. (cf. Perelman 1977b, 102)

The question mark symbolises B's possibility to refuse action H. By the force of question it expresses the surprise of answers: we never know completely what will be the answer when we ask; if we knew, we would not ask. It transfers the meanings of contingency and uncertainty of political matters into an objective-like pattern. It is the symbol of Weberian *Chance* in the pattern and it refers to B's freedom. In argumentation, everything can be questioned at any time:

Dans une argumentation rhétorique tout peut toujours être remis en question; on peut toujours retirer son adhésion. (Perelman 1989, 87)

The role of the exclamation marks is opposite: to symbolise A's relative "superiority", or authority, as de Jovenel wanted to express it. It transfers into a symbolic liaison the experiences which we have of commands.

The symbolic function of H is to make a difference from the first letters A and B. Because it symbolises the action "to do", the performance of A's suggestion, it must not be for example C, which would continue the symbolic relation of men. Thus, de Jovenel has taken a letter, whatever letter, which does not easily symbolise men.

A notable thing is that "telling" has no special symbol here, but the whole pattern symbolises that activity. Perhaps de Jovenel could have used t or T (for example AtBH?) but it would have reduced the symbolic force of the pattern: a reduction works only if it does not have too many details.

The main problem of reduction is that when it reduces a problem into only one of its aspects, it "can lead to the disregard of other possibly essential aspects" (Perelman 1977b, 79-80). A symbol can easily lose its symbolic liaison:

But since the symbolic connection is neither conventional nor based on a universally known and acknowledged structure of reality, the meaning of symbolism may be understood solely by the initiated and remain quite incomprehensible to everyone else: a symbol will lose the character of symbol where this initiation is lacking. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 335)

Therefore it is rare that the "quasi-logical arguments can themselves carry conviction. They must be supplemented by arguments based on the structure of reality." (Perelman 1977b, 79-80) Also de Jovenel had to argue that his pattern came of reality.

5.2.3 Essence of Politics and Its Manifestations

De Jovenel's task was to set the basic concepts for political science, the conceptions simple enough from which it would be possible to proceed to interpret complex reality. But he had "to seek out in the complexity of Politics those elements which are simple and present *semper et ubique*" (PT, 10). Although he wanted not to "offer a grand simplification of Politics considered globally" and "the picture I shall try to offer of the elements should not be 'blown-up' to serve as a picture of the whole", the pursuit to the basics of politics lead to arguments based on the structure of reality (PT, 11).

In Perelman's new rhetoric there are two kinds of arguments based on the structure of reality: the first is based on the "liaisons of succession, such as cause to effect" and the second is the "liaisons of coexistence, such as the relation between the person and his acts" which is the prototype of all double hierarchies of argument, such as means and ends, or essence and its manifestation. (Perelman 1977b, 81, 90-92).

De Jouvenel's "foundationalist" task was to search for the power in its pure state, *l'essence de la politique*, the nature of politics, elementary political behaviour, or the pure politics. All these figures are based on the liaisons of coexistence, the double hierarchy of argument, where "one is shown to be expression of the other" (Perelman 1977b, 90). To point out that different things have same nature, is a way to reclassify them: a simple request and incitation to lynching belongs to the same category of pure politics; they have only differences of degree. This is the way how the pure politics and its theory reclassify different persuasive actions into the category of politics.

De Jouvenel utilised a lot of classics of political thought. The names and quotations of Plato, Cicero, Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, Weber and a vast number of second rank classics populate the pages of his works. Yet, to be credible during the time which was characteristic "the decline of political theory", an effort to build a theory required some expressions to break with the tradition and arguments from authorities outside the rejected field. It would have been theoretical suicide to resort only to those classics which represented the decline. Thucydides and Shakespeare are the exceptional arguments from authority, "where the prestige of a person or a group is used to gain acceptance of a thesis" (Perelman 1977b, 94). Because there were no commonly accepted authorities, de Jouvenel took his authorities outside the field of political theory. The new criteria of politics required the rejection of already established authorities.

De Jouvenel also utilised another kind of act-person liaison of coexistence. He drew from his personal experiences, which are a type of arguments based on the structure of reality: "Born in a political *milieu*, having lived through an age rife with political occurrences, I saw my material forced upon me" (*PT*, xi). This is a way to establish his own authority – "you must trust me because I have seen it". Now an attack against the pure politics would have been an attack *ad personam* to de Jouvenel. This belongs to the oratorical ethos in which the speaker's words create an image of him (cf. Perelman 1977b, 98). This search for the new criterion from personal experiences served the rejection of the old authorities, but it has a historical reference in the habits of the Third Republic as well: Although the Third Republic purified itself of rhetorical tradition in education, its manners were based on the eloquence. A French historian, Nicolas Roussellier has given the name *une société de l'éloquence* to the way of governing in which the parliament was the place where the real decisions were made and where speeches in the parliament were not a ritual, but changed the world. In the Third Republic, the governments were weak, unstable and changed continuously by the caprices of changing parliamentary coalitions.

La IIIe République a été une "société de l'éloquence" à tous les étages de l'activité politique. La succession en pyramide des "assemblées communales" (les conseils municipaux) et des "assemblées départementales" (les conseils généraux émancipés et

parlementarisés dès la loi du 10 août 1871) constituaient une armature officielle, assurant le rayonnement de la culture de l'éloquence: elles étaient les viviers, elles étaient les passages obligés et les lieux de formation de l'élite parlementaire; elles étaient aussi, en miniature, la "commune assemblée" ou le "département assemblé"; des lieux de discussion, voire d'élaboration et de partage des décisions entre les représentants des collectivités locales et les responsables de l'administration territoriale de l'État. (Roussellier 2000, 264)

This was the political culture where Bertrand de Jouvenel grew and in which he was running for the Radicals in the 1928 elections as the youngest candidate in France. In the third *circonscription* of Le Havre de Jouvenel had no possibilities to become elected, but there he found himself bedevilled by an array of dirty tactics¹¹. (Braun 1985, 122-123) Bertrand de Jouvenel was born in the centre of this political culture where his father Henry, uncle Robert, and mother Sarah Claire Boas lived and acted. In this sense, it is no wonder that he set a rhetorical relation in the core of pure politics and he saw his material forced upon him.

The arguments based on the structure of reality can form a liaison in several ways. De Jouvenel's experiences, Shakespeare, and Thucydides belong to the argumentation by example: they "presuppose the existence of certain regularities of which the examples provide a concretization" (Perelman 1977b, 106).

Now we can come back to the place of *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* in *The Pure Theory*. To be sure, *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* is the most forceful but also the most difficult example of the pure politics, but it has a peculiar characteristic: it has been written to "stress the contrast between political philosophy and political activity" (PT, 17).

It does not really pertain to the body of the work but constitutes an extended and somewhat difficult introduction. While in the body of the treatise I have, or hope I have, traced the path, step by step, part I [*The Pseudo-Alcibiades*] discusses my reasons for tracing this path. (PT, xii)

This politician's retort is intended to be an example against those who are against the "descent of moral pulpit" in political science. By the aid of a Platonic dialogue de Jouvenel tried to illustrate and underline the central current differences between the modes of political thought and the modes of political action. Because there was a huge gap between them, the new ways to conceptualise politics required a lot of intellectual distance and new examples, a provocative deviation from the old paths, in which a defence of a Machiavellian politician could be a useful means. *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* concretised and justified the rejection of past, which is the most fundamental form of reduction, a reduction into a zero. Still, it

¹¹ There were crowds maliciously chanting "Chéri, Chéri", which hinted to Colette's novel and the love affair with Bertrand and the novelist. There were also posters that asked "Pourquoi de Jouvenel a-t-il découpé 'des Ursins'?" (Braun 1985, 122-123) Bertrand's whole name was Edouard Bertrand de Jouvenel des Ursins and in the family mythology the end indicated descent from the great Roman Orsini family. According to Braun, "genealogists have not surprisingly been able to establish a link between the Orsins and this ambitious bourgeois family [de Jouvenels] from Champagne" (Braun 1985, 13-14). The malicious hint of the posters seem to have been right.

was an example drawn from the tradition of political thought and in this sense intelligible for those who had not taken de Jouvenel's step from the old path. However, de Jouvenel wanted not to take the step in the name of "the end of ideology", or the decline of political theory, but he reduced the current science into the zero in order to establish it again.

When he descend to the level zero, no political science before me, he also took the stance of rhetoric. How did the age old tradition, which died at the end of the 19th century in France, suddenly appear in the disguise of pure politics? We can trace the sources of inspiration from the names of authorities, which de Jouvenel have left to us: Shakespeare, Thucydides, Cicero...

5.3 "My Best Guides"

De Jouvenel's attitude towards rhetoric and persuasion had always not been as sympathetic as in *The Pure Theory*. For example, in his essay *The Treatment of Capitalism by Continental Intellectuals* (1954) he criticised the intellectual who tries to apply everywhere their own "authority of a kind, called persuasion" which seem "to him the only good form of authority". In the spirit of Weber's *Politik als Beruf* he wrote that in real societies "persuasion alone is inadequate to bring about the orderly co-operation of many agents" (de Jouvenel 1954a, 117; cf. Weber 1919b, 313).

It is necessary that some power less fluctuating than that gained from persuasion should lie in the hands of social leaders; the intellectual, however, dislikes these cruder forms of authority and those who wield them. [...] The intellectual's effort to whittle down the use of alternatives to persuasion is obviously a factor of progress, while it may also, carried too far, lead society into the alternatives of anarchy and tyranny. (de Jouvenel 1954a, 118)

Here we can find both de Jouvenel's urge to order and his suspicion against persuasion which turned only some years later, in the new end of *Sovereignty* (1957), to an observation that the "elementary political process is the action of mind upon mind through speech" (So, 368). Next I study the possible rhetorical resources which might have been sources which have helped de Jouvenel's "rhetorical turn".

The history of rhetoric in France reveals that it has been a long time a important part of the French culture and I subscribe to Roland Barthes' argument that "le monde est incroyablement plein d'ancienne rhétorique" (Barthes 1985, 85). But as I mentioned in chapter 3.1.3. de Jouvenel lived in the time of "rhetorical desert" (Compagnon 1999, 1245). At the end of the nineteenth century the reformations purged step by step rhetoric from the education and replaced it with the new disciplines, like the explication of texts in the secondary schools and the history of literature at the universities (Compagnon 1999, 1235) Rhetoric withered away and it was removed from the teaching of lycées of state. History of classical literature, Greek, Latin and French replaced it. At the level of universities it never disappeared entirely and there have always been those who were interested in rhetoric. (Fumaroli 1994, 1-16; Compagnon 1999, 1215-1250)

De Jouvenel's view to rhetoric in *De la souveraineté* was that the studies of rhetoric represent metaphor as something ornamental to the thinking¹². Metaphor means for de Jouvenel more than just an ornament. In the spirit of Nietzsche and others he understood that all language is figurative. These kinds of thoughts suggest that he did not know the studies of the new rhetoric, but his view of rhetoric comes from the certain 19th century rhetoric, very likely from Pierre Fontanier's *Manuel classique pour l'étude des tropes* (1821; 1830).

Thus, de Jouvenel's direct connections with the classics of rhetoric seem to have been narrow. Neither have I found any reference to the new rhetoric¹³ which was taking shape at the same time when de Jouvenel prepared his ideas of the pure politics. The closest relation to the new rhetoric I have found is in his friends texts. Michael Polanyi wrote in the introduction of *Science, Faith and Society* (1963¹⁴) that he shared some views of Perelman's *Traité de l'argumentation. La nouvelle rhétorique* (1958) and Stephen Toulmin's *The Philosophy of Science* (1953)¹⁵ (Polanyi 1963, 12-13). Raymond Aron utilised the term "chain of identifications" in *L'Opium des intellectuels*, which imply that Aron might have known Kenneth Burke's or Perelman's writings but he did not mention their names (Aron 1955, 138; 1957, 128). From the base of de Jouvenel's own thought we noticed that he formed the idea of politics from Max Weber's *Herrschaft*. All this refers to a fact that he did not utilise directly any rhetorical tradition, new or old and it is a little bit complex to associate de Jouvenel with the rhetorical tradition.

However, something changed his views from the disbelief of persuasion and confirmed it so much that he set it in the core of his political theory. To search for the indirect influences of the rhetorical tradition, this is the task of the next chapters. This study is of course immense, because the rhetorical tradition is present everywhere. Here I argue that we can follow de Jouvenel's own statement of Thucydides and Shakespeare and bind him to the tradition through them (*PT*, xi-xii). To his own words we must add two important names, which have carried the tradition through centuries but in different ways: Plato and Cicero.

¹² "Les traités de rhétorique nous représentent la métaphore comme un ornement ajouté à la pensée pour en rendre l'expression plus agréable et plus frappante. Quel erreur sur la nature du processus intellectuel! L'homme pense par images, et le style sans métaphores n'est point le style naturel avant ornementation, mais au contraire un style systématiquement dépouillé des images qui ont soutenu la démarche de l'esprit." (*S*, 53)

¹³ Perelman quoted de Jouvenel's *De la souveraineté* in his article *Autorité, idéologie et violence* (1969), but I have found no de Jouvenel's references to Perelman (Perelman 1990, 396).

¹⁴ Originally the book was published in 1946.

¹⁵ "[Wittenberg and] Perelman both enquire, as I have done, into the role of decision and personal judgement in science and acknowledge their comprehensive powers. They would seem to share my view, that our dependence on these powers is the fundamental problem of epistemology." (Polanyi 1963, 13) "Toulmin has shown systematically that the framework of scientific theories contains general suppositions which cannot be put directly to an experimental test of truth or falsity. Such general premises overlap more specific statements which embody them." (Polanyi 1963, 12)

5.3.1 Thucydides

Thucydides seems to have been in fashion at the turn of the 1960s. Raymond Aron, in a note in his article *Thucydides and the Historical Narrative* (1961), tells us a reason for this vogue: "Readers familiar with the interpreters of Thucydides will perceive at once how much the following pages owe to Madame de Romilly" (Aron 1961, 21). Aron never mentioned what works of Jacqueline de Romilly he meant, but her edition and translation (in collaboration with L. Bodin and R. Weil) were published 1953-1972. Her early works of Thucydides must have been familiar to Aron and the common subject hints that they might have been de Jouvenel's source as well¹⁶.

In her later work *Les grandes sophistes dans l'Athens de Périclès* (1988) de Romilly has shown how both "Thucydides and Euripides are deeply affected by their [sophists'] teaching, as, later, is Isocrates" (de Romilly 1992, xii). If we connect the rhetoric with the sophists, then we are immediately on the field of rhetoric when we speak of Thucydides. However, Thucydides' relation with rhetoric is complicated. Namely, if we believe in accordance with Edward Schiappa, that rhetoric was a concept coined by Plato "to portray and define his rival Isocrates," it is impossible to connect Thucydides with rhetoric (cf. Schiappa 1999, 15).

Prior to the coining of *rhetorike*, *logos* was the key term thematized in the texts and fragments generally assigned to the fifth-century history of rhetorical theory. The texts and fragments concerning *logos* suggest important differences between the way the art of discourse was conceptualized before and after the coining of *rhetorike*. My argument is that the coining of *rhetorike* was a watershed event in the history of conceptualized Rhetoric in ancient Greece. Specifically, prior to the coining of *rhetorike*, the verbal arts were understood as less differentiated and more holistic in scope than they were in the fourth century; the teaching and training associated with *logos* do not draw a sharp line between the goals of seeking success and seeking truth as in the case once Rhetoric and Philosophy were defined as distinct disciplines. (Schiappa 1999, 23)

We must thus understand that there was no distinction between rhetoric and philosophy in Thucydides' days. But, if we want to knit rhetoric together with the sophists, as it is usually done, the situation is different. Namely, according to Jacqueline Romilly, Thucydides is supposed to have been a disciple of the three sophists, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Antiphon (Romilly 1992, viii). De Romilly points out in a very convincing way that Thucydides adopted many of the sophists' "bad habits". She states that Prodicus, the sophist who is associated with the distinction of nuances of vocabulary, is a person to whose style "Thucydides, himself such a dense and profound writer, clearly owes much" (Romilly 1992, 75).

Thucydides adopted a lot of Gorgias, too.

Of all the inventions of the Sophists, this bizarre, laboured style of Gorgias' seems one of the most artificial and fanciful. Perhaps that is why none of his followers imitated the master's excesses.

¹⁶ See for example Romilly's *Thucydide et l'impérialisme Athénien – La pensée de l'historien et la genèse de l'œuvre* (1947; 1961) and *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide* (1956).

It has to be said, however, that he did have his imitators, but they were considerably more measured. First and foremost them was Thucydides. (Romilly 1992, 64)

Jacqueline de Romilly makes even such a conclusion that "Gorgias should thus be recognized as the inventor of an extremely refined prose style." (Romilly 1992, 65)

And what about Protagoras' Double Argument? It must be far away from Thucydides' meticulous prose. According to de Romilly it is not.

Thucydides uses specific contrasts and comparasions to illustrate and clarify particular concepts: to distinguish between fear and terror, for instance, but also between all the different forms of courage and boldness, between revolt and defection, hegemony and empire, and so on. The assurance of such thinking stems from the attention that Prodicus and Protagoras paid the correct use of vocabulary. (Romilly 1992, 75)

Protagoras is said to be the inventor of "opposed speeches." According to Romilly the technique was not invented by the sophists. However, by developing the technique of double arguments, Protagoras converted it into a method of an argument having its own right, for which the rest of his teaching paved the way. (Romilly 1992, 76) These debates, as is well known and which are often known as antilogies, are also a constant feature of the writing of Thucydides (Romilly 1992, 76).

All in all we can say that if we take seriously de Jouvenel's references that Thucydides was his model, we are immediately dealing with, not only the tradition of *phronesis*, but the ways of thinking what Plato called rhetoric and Sophism as well. I do not, however, exaggerate Thucydides' sophistical traits because "humans can get quite good at doing various things long before developing abstract theories and specialized vocabularies about what it is that we are doing" (Schiappa 1999, 108-109). But de Jouvenel's Thucydides is not the Thucydides of "international politics" and *Realpolitik*. Rather, he is the Thucydides of "l'incessant jaillissement d'initiatives dispersées" (S, 23). *History of the Peloponnesian War* is from de Jouvenel's view a book of initiatives and projects which rise and fall. These projects are formed by the aid of "A tells B to do H", by the persuasion and this brought de Jouvenel's ideas close to sophism.

5.3.2 Shakespeare

Several studies have pointed out the importance of the classical rhetoric to the literature of the Elizabethan time. In his *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*, Quentin Skinner goes through a long list of the books which were being studied in the grammar schools in the Elizabethan time (Skinner 1996, 19-40). Madelaine Doran begins her study of the Elizabethan drama with a chapter dealing with rhetoric, because *eloquence* was the central trait which characterised the literature of the Renaissance (Doran 1954, 23).

To understand the Elizabethan drama aright we need to see it against the background of rhetoric that is one of the distinctive features of the age. To the Renaissance rhetoric was a discipline, a tool, the expression of an ideal. It formed the central core of human-

istic education, it seemed to teach the means of moving men to virtuous ends, it embodied an ideal of the dignity of man. For speech, as the manifestation of reason, was taken as the measure of man's difference from the beasts. (Doran 1954, 26)

English renaissance drama is rhetorical from first to last. If a curve is drawn from early Elizabethan period to the late Jacobean or Caroline period, conscious rhetoric will appear as a dominant characteristic of style at both ends [...] If we are not so highly conscious of rhetoric at the height of the period, that is only because it has become thoroughly adapted to the matter it is used to express. Exuberance rather than economy remains characteristic of the plays of Jonson, Chapman, Marston, Webster, and Shakespeare. (Doran 1954, 51)

Thus, Shakespeare is not an exception to the rule and according to Miriam Joseph, who has studied Shakespeare's rhetoric, many of the grand passages of Shakespeare convert the texts that were studied in grammar schools (Joseph 1995, 243).

Shakespeare knew the complete doctrine and method of composition regularly taught in the grammar schools of his days from a combination of Latin textbooks. He employed in his work the techniques prescribed in Cicero's *Topica*, the *Ad Herennium*, Susenbrotus' *Epitome troporum ac schematum*, Erasmus' *Copia* and *Modus conscribendi*, Aphthonius' *Progymnasmata*, Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, and a work on logic, perhaps Melanchthon's. (Joseph 1995, 243)

Joseph is sure that Shakespeare's interest in rhetoric continued also in his adulthood (Joseph 1995, 243). Thus, we are dealing with rhetoric also when we speak of Shakespeare as one of de Jouvenel's best guides.

We must not exaggerate either the importance of Thucydides's sophism or Shakespeare's rhetoric. De Jouvenel did not invent the pure politics by the aid of his masters but, as we have seen in the chapter 3, it was formed when the power in its pure state transformed gradually to a relation of persuasion. Thucydides and Shakespeare are only rhetorical means, perhaps unconventional arguments by authority in the political theory but authorities as well, by which he legitimized his pattern of ABH. Thucydides' sophisticated writing of history and Shakespeare's dramas, which has taken influences of the classical rhetoric, justified the idea that the smallest identifiable relation of politics is "A tells B to do H". De Jouvenel needed this kind of unconventional authorities in the field of political theory to defend his new enthymeme of the pure politics against the decline of political theory.

5.3.3 Cicero

Cicero is present everywhere in de Jouvenel's works, even more than his views are deeply rooted in Western culture. Thus, Cicero might have been a source of de Jouvenel's "rhetoric". The detailed study of quotations does not speak for this kind of argument. There are no quotations of Cicero's rhetorical studies, but he referred often to his "political studies" *De re publica*, *De legibus* and his speech *Pro Domo* (JP, 65-66; Po, 222, 321, 323 note 23, 360; PT, 125-128, 192 note 1).

The most "rhetorical" Cicero's study de Jouvenel seems to have read is *De officiis*, which formed an important source for his article *Théorie Politique Pure* (1961).

Before de Jouvenel took the example of Cicero he outlined some central characters of *The Pure Theory*: the recent political theory was too much normative and he defined his own position, tried to think of the dynamics of politics and the microprocess of action: "Je dois aussitôt préciser qu'il ne s'agit point de philosophie de l'histoire, mais du microprocessus d'action à court terme." (de Jouvenel 1961a, 364)

Here de Jouvenel thought the possibilities to form the common concepts of political theory and he made the distinction of event between *eventus* and *eventum* as well. His view was a man who makes politics and thinks of what will happen.

Quel sera l'événement? Quel l'effet de telle décision? Par quelle stratégie obtenir tel résultat? Ce sont là, émergeant d'un fouillis mineur, les préoccupations de l'homme engagé dans la politique: elles sont événementielles et opérationnelles or ces préoccupations ne figurent pas dans la science politique. Le contraste m'a frappé lorsqu'après avoir longtemps vu "faire de la politique", j'ai pris connaissance systématiquement de ce qui s'enseigne à ce sujet. (de Jouvenel 1961a, 368)

One historical reason for this misery of political science has been, according to de Jouvenel that those who study politics have to be a different person than those who make it. As a result, they want more to change it than understand it:

Historiquement l'homme traitant de politique a été autre que l'homme faisant de la politique et son propos a été bien moins de comprendre la conduite du politicien que de la changer. (de Jouvenel 1961a, 368)

Then he turned to study the relations with politics and administration and justice. We cannot reduce politics to administration or the action of courts, because in politics the defendant or the prosecutor may become a judge during the "process"¹⁷ (de Jouvenel 1961a, 369). This is the context where de Jouvenel alienated his study from the post war French situation, which could have been too contentious an example and took out Cicero. Politics is an area where the guardians of institutions are exposed to the aims of criminals and Cicero incarnated for de Jouvenel *l'esprit de magistratur*:

La politique est un domaine où le gardien des institutions est exposé aux poursuites des délinquants. Par ses écrits et ses actes, Cicéron s'offre à nous comme incarnant "l'esprit de magistrature". S'il réussit à mettre Catilina en posture de malfaiteur puni, il est banni par le gangster Clodius: revenu en place, il est déconcerté par le franchissement du Rubicon, il l'est encore par le meurtre de César. Finalement il tombe sous les coups

¹⁷ "Malheureusement la politique se ramène point à l'administration. S'agissant de tout ordre humain, il faut compter avec les volontés qui s'affirment et les intérêts qui s'affrontent. Le plus simple moyen de maintenir cet ordre est de lui donner des gardiens placés en posture de grande supériorité vis-à-vis des perturbateurs. Ainsi en va-t-il dans le cas d'ordre juridique; ses gardiens ont mandat de punir l'acte aberrant et de trancher le conflit d'intérêts, et ils en ont effectivement le pouvoir. Lorsque nous suivons un procès au civil, nous n'imaginons pas que l'une des parties puisse soudain occuper le tribunal et rendre la sentence qui l'avantage: lorsque nous suivons un procès au criminel, nous n'imaginons pas que l'inculpé puisse se substituer au procureur et au juge, requérir contre eux et les condamner: or ces phénomènes se voient en politique." (de Jouvenel 1961a, 369)

des assassins d'Antoine: la tête et la main droite de l'orateur sont clouées à la tribune du Forum. Dans ce destin, quelle allégorie! La Justice poursuivie par le Crime! (de Jouvenel 1961a, 369-370)

Cicero was for de Jouvenel a model of Justice, which the Crime was harassed. Cicero's writings belonged to political science and his life to history. Between them de Jouvenel found incompatible parts although he thought that Cicero was good in historical thinking. However, he thought that we should read *De officiis* from the view that Cicero was surprised when Caesar crossed Rubicon. Although de Jouvenel was a thinker who appreciated "law and order" in a reasonable measure, he understood well that in politics we must think that there are always some who will do forbidden things and we must consider these issues as well:

Les préceptes généraux contenus dans les écrits de Cicéron appartiennent à la science politique, les événements singuliers de sa vie appartiennent à l'histoire. Ce partage n'est pas sans inconvénients: l'esprit formé par le *De Officiis* sera pris au dépourvu par le passage du Rubicon. Sans doute il est bon de penser aussi comme histoire. La politique est essentiellement le domaine où ce qui est pensé par certains comme "ne se faisant pas" risque d'être fait. (de Jouvenel 1961a, 370)

The most important influence of Cicero for de Jouvenel seems to have been his life. *The Pure Theory of Politics* ends with a forceful image: "the head and hands of the great guardian [of civility and public order] Cicero, nailed to the rostrum" (PT, 212). Cicero seems to have been for him a sublime model of right things, but, at the same time, a warning of the weakness of mere speech. In this sense we can consider de Jouvenel's pure politics as an example of the rhetorical dimension of politics, which, in the words of Raymond Aron, "always carries with it an element of dialogue between the two poles of constraint and persuasion, of violence and discussion between equals" (Aron 1961, 23).

5.3.4 Plato

Alf we finally take Plato himself, we must remember that *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* is addressed against Plato's (or at least some of his student's) *Alcibiades I* but it refers directly to *Gorgias* as well: Socrates says that "[y]ou may remember my discussion with Gorgias" where Gorgias boasted about his art, i.e. what Plato called rhetoric (PT, 22). It is no accident that Plato took them as the opponents of Socrates in his dialogues. According to Jacqueline de Romilly "Socrates himself appears to have had many links with the sophists" and "in the *Meno*, Plato reports him as declaring himself to have studied under one, namely Prodicus" (Romilly 1992, ix).

No doubt, we must consider Plato's works as a response to the challenge of sophists. Over and over again he took up the sophists' names and ideas and argued against them. And when de Jouvenel argued against Platonic ideas and in favour of Gorgias' art, it means resorting again to the arguments of sophists: *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* is intended to be a politician's retort to *Alcibiades I* but actually it argues against Plato's views in *Gorgias* – Plato's most forceful attack against the oratory. Although de Jouvenel had clearly no intention to go so far, *The Pseudo-*

Alcibiades took – indirectly, involuntarily, yet inevitably – the position and the point of views of sophists¹⁸ for which Plato gave the name *rhetorike*.

Thus, in spite of the modern outlook of the "pure theory" de Jouvenel is dealing with the age-old problems of the rhetoric through his opponent Plato and through both of his "best guides": Shakespeare and Thucydides. The distinction between Ambition and Wisdom is a part of the quarrel between Rhetoric and Philosophy, where seeking success and seeking truth were defined as distinct disciplines by Plato (cf. Schiappa 1999, 23).

¹⁸ Hale and Landy have also noticed this although they do not elaborate the idea: "this kind of 'knowledge' is the stuff of sophists" (Hale & Landy 1986, xxxiii).

6 A REDUCTION TO RHETORICAL CONTRACT

I find it very hard to write the conclusion to any of my books. My instinct is to say: 'this is as far as I have taken it...'

Bertrand de Jouvenel¹

Until now I have studied the formation of an idea from several angles, which have lead this work into different textual universes. The open and deliberate "disunity" of the study may bother an academic reader who has a strict theoretical training. A historian may be embarrassed by the attempts to analyse de Jouvenel's rhetorical means. It is time to knit together the threads of the text and its context into some conclusions. I draw the conclusions from the main threads of the study, which were intertwined: from the strategy according to which I contextualised the subject: from the rhetorico-historical and historico-rhetorical view, and from the "purely" de-contextual strategy, i.e. from what I wrote of *enthymeme* and example. I combine them to an argument that the pure theory of politics is a rhetorical "theory" of politics, which reduces politics into rhetoric, or, if you want, to rhetorical relation and which has its own rhetorical strategy: to utilise a rhetorical reduction against some other reductions. In other words, now we can go back to my original questions: What did de Jouvenel actually do when he began to write of pure politics and its theory? What kind of move in argument was it? How did he make it? Is there any use to my argument that the question is now about reduction and enthymemes?

To conclude means a one-sided interpretation, a reduction, and I have tried to open a view to de Jouvenel's works from a narrow perspective, from the view of rhetoric: how a figure of thought was established, how it transformed and how it works. My view does, of course, not make intelligible everything of de Jouvenel's political thought, but what I try now to conclude helps us, I argue, to understand some characteristics of his political thought: its political aspects in the field of political theory.

If I have succeeded in identifying the context of *The Pure Theory* with sufficient accuracy, then, according to Quentin Skinner, I can eventually hope to read off what de Jouvenel was doing in saying what he said. (Skinner 1988, 275). Namely,

¹ In his letter to Ward E. Y. Elliott (1959). (Carton 58)

I approached the subject of the study in the spirit of Skinner's idea that "we should study not the meaning of the words, but their use" (Skinner 1969, 55). To put it simply, the meanings of the pure theory of politics are its uses as a counter-enthymeme to certain discussions.

I have traced the formation of de Jouvenel's pure theory of politics from several directions: The first was the history of the formation of his works which forms chapter 3 of this study. The second is the two debates which were current when he matured his ideas: the debates on the end of ideology and *dépolitisation*. The third debate which was revealed in the course of the study was the discussion on the decline of political theory. These was the "political life itself" which posed the problems for de Jouvenel. Although he developed the idea of pure politics from his own figure of thought, the pure *theory* of politics became a counter-enthymeme which argued against the two end-debate.

What kind of reductions can we find from the textual universe I have dug up? De Jouvenel's opponents have established a lot of them: ideologies (especially Marxism) and the declines of ideologies and political theory, several forms of *dépolitisation*. All these debates have their own questions and enthymemes. I describe them in short.

The end of ideology debate asked: is the ideological age ending? As we have seen, the question has the allusions to the debate of the ending of history. The enthymeme was: Yes, the ideology is ending with communism, because the increase of welfare transforms the ideological struggle into the terms of economical allocation. So the intellectuals have no reason to commit ideologically with the religion-like belief systems (fascism, nazism, or communism etc.). This was something new which the 1950s brought along to the ideology debate and indeed, there were some good reasons to begin to think in this way, because there had been some changes in the "real life": nazism and fascism had fallen and the "industrial society" had brought along some new phenomena which fed the beliefs that they can change something at the level of ideologies as well.

The pure theory of politics became a counter-enthymeme against the end of ideology, because it answered the question of the end debate: No, the ideologies are not dying because we need always some generalisations – right or wrong – in order to orientate in the world. We cannot deliberate every issue we meet in detail. The consequence is that we will need taxonomic devices which help us to cope with our problems. This implies a permanent demand for ideologies. The ideologies can change, but there will always be some belief system; if communism dies, there will be some others to replace it. We all have our own ideological commitments. Let us study from the microscopical view how they are formed in the political battle. Formal study is better than normative, because it helps us to detach of teleological prejudices. This leads to new questions: What are the basic elements of politics, present *semper et ubique*? How can we form from these elements the basic concepts of political theory, the concepts which help us to approach the political reality in order to revise our theory or concepts again?

In this way de Jouvenel cleared the whole end debate and avoided its main problem: Tingsten, Shils, Bell, or Aron did not understand that their own self-evidencies could be ideological. In his *Mémoires* (1983) Aron finally admitted the

limits of his conception of ideology, although he hid it within a defence² (Aron 1983, 577-579).

De Jouvenel's political move in relation to the ideology debate was in *The Pure Theory* that he defended, not some certain forms of ideologies, but a certain conception of ideology. It seemed useful to utilise the word "ideology", because it expressed something meaningful, i.e. that we resort to "taxonomic devices" when we deliberate our problems. However, the most profound change or move in the argument was not in the answers to the end debate: the pure theory of politics moved the entire set of questions. In short, the questions of ending transformed into the questions of the genesis of event. The question was not anymore: Is the ideological age ending? The questions were: What is an event? How does it happen?

If we examine the discussion of *dépolitisation* and its relation to the pure theory of politics, the situation is slightly different. French political scientists transformed the public debate of *dépolitisation* into the question which was in the title of Georges Vedel's (Ed.) book *La dépolitisation, mythe our réalité?* In a more subtle form it was expressed in the introduction of the book which was the title of meetings of *l'Association française de science politique*: "Existe-t-il une tendance à la dépolitisation dans les démocraties modernes?" (Vedel 1962, 5) To take these kind of questions under study meant a kind of recognition of an enthymeme: Yes, there is a tendency of *dépolitisation* and we can study it from several respects, both theoretically and empirically. Instead of lamentations or demands of *dépolitisation* de Jouvenel based his argumentation on the unavoidability of politics, that the mark of his time was, and even now is, *politisation* of many situations which were not before in political conflict (de Jouvenel 1958, 52). When the empirists made statistics of the decline of ideology and the tendencies of *dépolitisation*, when theorists defined the conceptions of both phenomena, de Jouvenel had already changed the place of questions and answers. He turned the situation and took politics from the microperspective as his starting point. Again, the questions changed: What are the basic elements of politics? How can we define politics microscopically from a narrow meaning of the word?

The view was radical enough to arouse, for example, Raymond Aron's resistance in his article which continued the debate on political theory. In *Revue française de science politique* Aron lamented that de Jouvenel's view did not distinguish the specifically political groupings of the other groups:

On voit mal comment B. de Jouvenel passerait de la politique, activité constitutive d'agrégats, à la définition des agrégats spécifiquement politiques, tout au moins par la voie de l'analyse microscopique qu'il a choisie. (Aron 1962, 10)

Aron resorted to the authority of Max Weber in order to show the importance of *des agrégats spécifiquement politiques*, i.e. states or other groups which utilise legitimate violence (Aron 1962, 10-11). Without mentioning de Jouvenel's name he re-

² "Avec le sens que je donnai au terme idéologie, mon analyse me paraît, aujourd'hui encore, plutôt vraie que fausse. Mais la définition limitative de l'idéologie prête justement à la critique. Le nationalisme ou même le libéralisme ne s'organisent pas en un système total du monde, même pas du monde historique, mais ils ne diffèrent pas radicalement du socialisme ou du marxisme-léninisme, bien que les deux derniers prétendent à la scientificité et, pour ainsi dire, à la totalité." (Aron 1983, 578)

turned, in his conclusion, to the microscopical policy-perspective³. Aron thought that the problem in de Jouvenel's view was that it underestimated the specifically political groupings and lead to analysis of the *political aspect* of every group (Aron 1962, 25). However, the analysis of political aspects is, I argue, the most interesting and original trait of de Jouvenel's thought, which separates him from the average French intellectual or from most of political theorists of the time. Although, for example, Raymond Aron recognised the importance of persuasion in politics, he wanted to connect it with the conception of state. De Jouvenel's radical shift was to think politics from every persuasive situation, which lead him to see *political* as a persuasive aspect of every speech. This is his contribution to political theory and political thought: to analyse politics from a narrow perspective, to descend from moral pulpit and to analyse actors, relations, and deeds. This lead him to find the political aspect of every thing, especially the political aspect of human action.

The same cure was applied to the death-sickness of political theory or political philosophy. If this debate asked, like Berlin, if political theory still existed, its enthymeme was established around the decline of political theory. De Jouvenel's counter-enthymeme was: Well, if political theory is dead, why not find another type of theory which has the clear basic concepts and which theorise from empirical observations. He did not add to the list of political things some new phenomena, but shifted the view. The political aspect became central.

De Jouvenel moved the enthymeme of the whole end debates, both the end of ideology and the political theory. The "move in argument" was realised by the change of questions. However, at the background was de Jouvenel's own way to think microscopically, his own "rhetorical resources" which he supported by the aid of constituents from the end, de- and decline debates. The narrative of these debates focused on the ending of something, on the Apocalypse. The pure theory of politics tried to begin something new; its narrative was the story of the Creation. In a way, we have here two ways of reductions: the end debates tried to reduce their substance into zero, but the pure theory of politics reduced its substance into the "basic elements". It was intended to be, in a quite literal sense, the alphabet of political theory. In this respect, the symbolic use of A,B, and H is illustrative. When the letters as symbols give neutral presence to human beings, they reduce the substance of their relation and leave the performance of *faire faire* between them.

Now we can return to meaning of *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* in relation to the other parts of *The Pure Theory*, especially its relation to the most formal expressions of the pure politics, like ABH?. It was also a move against the end-reduc-

³ "Tout activité humaine comporte une politique (*policy*), tout agrégat humain un aspect politique, c'est-à-dire un ordre de commandement, avec un régime et des acteurs, mais, à travers l'histoire, certains agrégats ont passé pour "politiques en tant que tels", les cités, les empires, les nations et leur volonté consciente appelée État. La théorie peut s'attacher à l'aspect politique de tous les agrégats humains ou aux unités "par excellence politiques". Le choix entre ces deux objets est libre, mais les agrégats par excellence politiques ont une importance effectivement supérieure parce qu'ils se réservent le monopole de la violence légitime et que, en une large mesure, ils déterminent l'aspect politique des autres agrégats." (Aron 1962, 24-25)

tions, when de Jouvenel set the most forceful example of pure politics, Alcibiades. To present politics formally may be useful when we try analyse political aspects of some situation but it is a dull way to speak of politics. It requires flesh and blood, emotions with distance or rhetorical *pathos* to be interesting. It is better to speak of Alcibiades than all the time of abstract A or B. This is the problem of any *enthymeme*: to speak shortly and, at the same time, effectively, it requires vivid examples. The subject under discussion is contingent, i.e. we cannot apply any rules or convictions because the issue is new to the audience. Only a specialist can address an audience with a long train of reasoning, but he or she do not speak of contingent things.

All this requires the contradictory qualities of the politician, because we act in the role of politician when we discuss contingent things even if our actual role happens to be in a field which tries to exclude politics, such as scientist, theorist, philosopher, priest, or bureaucrat. Max Weber described these qualities in *Politik als Beruf*: Anyone wishing to practise politics of any kind, and especially anyone who wishes to make a profession of politics, has to be conscious of the ethical paradoxes and of his/her responsibility for what may become of him/herself under pressure from them (Weber 1919b, 365) At the same time, a politician must fit together contradictory qualities which are pre-eminently decisive for her/him: passion (*Leidenschaft*), a sense of responsibility (*Verantwortungsgefühl*), and judgement (*Augenmaß*). (Weber 1919a, 545; Weber 1919b, 352)

This does not exclude the possibility to be an expert for example in the field of political theory, but to act politically, *faire faire* in the politics of political theory, requires qualities which are the opposite of expert, because a politician has to make decisions from an uncertain basis. I draw a conclusion: when we deal with contingent matter, the audience is simple and the speaker incompetent even if there would be a world famous professor speaking in a meeting of Nobel prize winners. Namely, when the things which we deliberate can be in one way or another, we cannot decide according to expertise, but according to our ability to judge.

After this long study we can now answer the question: what kind of politics is the pure theory of politics? Above all, the pure theory of politics is a fervent attempt to think politically, to think politics, or if you want, political, in its own terms. Perhaps the closest parallel with *The Pure Theory* was Bernard Crick's *In Defence of Politics* (1962), where Crick defended politics against ideology, democracy, nationalism, technology, and its friends: the non-political conservative, a-political liberal, and the anti-political socialist. I argue that de Jouvenel agreed with most of Crick's critique. However, he could have disagreed with Crick's idea that politics "are the public actions of free men" (Crick 1962, 18). The micropolitical view of *The Pure Theory* shed light also on the political aspects of personal relations. This was difficult to understand from Crick's view, which took a lot of its inspiration from Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* (1958) – another close parallel to *The Pure Theory*, which de Jouvenel very much later appreciated (de Jouvenel 1976a, 166-167). Very likely Crick classified de Jouvenel's book into the category of conservative 'empiricism' which "praise 'concrete actions' and 'actual situations' rather than abstract ideas; but they do so themselves in a purely abstract manner" (Crick 1962, 195).

Of course, the pure theory of politics does not thematise every aspects of politics, but its formal characteristics helps us to leave aside the moral disapproval

which so easily infiltrates into the normative approaches of political science and theory. Simplified figures of actors and relations helps us understand better the "bad" and "good" politics and formulate political thought beyond them. *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* hints that we could specify other criteria for political action than ordinary laments of low moral standards of politics and how politicians fail in their tasks. Could we develop formal criteria to judge politics? Of course these criteria will not be outside of the political battle, but this would lead a direction in which we could develop the pure theory of politics. For example, one positive political characteristic in Alcibiades was his ability to continue action in impossible situations. Or, if we take *rex*-type political actors, we could judge their ability to transfer the contradictory and incompatible political problems into compromises or into the questions of majority rule. These kinds of formal criteria could lead us to more practical judgements of daily politics than from moral perspective or the partial perspectives of, for instance, different parties or ideologically committed demagogues, as journalists today often are.

If we understand that reduction means one-sided interpretation we can relate the pure theory of politics also to the perspectivism of the rhetorical tradition. This means that the pursuit of a presentation (theorising, deliberative speech etc.) is not impartial, comprehensive or balanced. The pure theory of politics is as one-sided a view to politics as this study is a one-sided view to the pure theory. This kind of Weberian *einseitige Steigerung*, or in de Jouvenel's case rather *einseitige Einschränkung*, i.e. rhetoric of reduction sharpens the point of views (cf. Weber 1904, 191). A reduction helps to speak effectively. To analyse *in utramque partem* means that different one-sided views are set against each other, as I have here set the pure theory of politics against some other reductions. De Jouvenel's pure politics is an interpretation of politics, where the "remainder" after the reduction is the contradiction between two different types of actors and between them, an unavoidable rhetorical struggle. In this sense, for example, the interesting point of de Jouvenel's thought was not that he was embedded in French political thought or in the international debates, but how he struggled against its certain modes and how he managed to surpass the expectations.

To formulate a pure theory of politics is a reduction which includes an enthymeme that we can find politics always when "A tells B to do H". This simple argument aims at the consent of B: this kind of conception of politics seek for mutual understanding just like Rousseau in *Du contract social* search for the reason of the consent in the the social contract (cf. Rousseau 1762, Chapter VI, 38-40). A motive to understand politics seems to have been to elaborate better understanding against the "state of nature" situations like the World Wars. In this sense de Jouvenel appreciated more order than disorder and he is a contract theorist, but a theorist who added rhetoric to the consent which in the actual social contract theories seems to appear of nothingness and to form a general will⁴. The

⁴ De Jouvenel edited *Du contract social* and wrote a long introduction to the book, where "sa théorie de la Volonté générale est à vrai dire une théorie de l'union sacrée" (de Jouvenel 1947, 123). In addition to this *Essai sur la politique de Rousseau* (1947) de Jouvenel wrote several essays on Rousseau: see for example *Rousseau: the Pessimistic Evolutionist* (1961-62; in French 1965), *Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (1962), and *Théorie des formes de gouvernement chez Rousseau* (1965).

pure theory of politics is politics which aims to subjugate every B. Let the B be free and say "No" or give counter-arguments, to change his/her role into A. So politics goes on.

6.1 The Limits of Pure Politics?

The question of the politics of the pure politics leads us also to the borders of the pure theory. At first, to be sure the pure theory of politics is politics, at least according to its own criteria, because it has an imperialist pursuit, a policy: to conquer the field of political theory by the means of the new basic concepts. In this way Bertrand tried to persuade Alcibiadeses of the time to be more prudent and to lead them to study politics more profoundly than before.

The limits of this kind of reduction becomes apparent when we approach it from the perspective of rhetoric. As we have seen "the pure theory" is a rhetorical construction, which was formed at the certain situation and from the certain intellectual combination. In other words, the constituents of its *inventio* were drawn from the certain historical situation. Its purity is limited to certain arguments which can always be contested. Its arguments were developed as answers to the certain problems of political theory: to the dead-sickness of ideology and political theory itself. The constituents of its formulation were drawn from the reception of Weber, Hegel, and Marx.

Next I try to make explicit some traits which today appear anachronic. In other words, in which respects de Jouvenel's theory of politics still was impure, that is, tacitly committed to certain contemporary assumptions or conventions that are no longer so evident. Of course, *The Pure Theory* and its preliminary articles were texts in a situation which was divided to the contradiction between the communists and the West. Already this brought impurity to the pure theory because it appeared from the view of opponents as a type of bourgeois political thought. It was anti-communist thought because it saw the world "comme un incessant jaillissement d'initiatives entraînantes" (S, 10). Politics continues even if a policy or an utopia is carried out. The private enterprises and ventures are the essential character of the world were the pure theory of politics reigns. However, in this world the communist pursuits (or other utopian enterprises) can be some of the competing policies. If an ideology overcomes its competitors, the pure theory allows us to search for and to find politics even from the most totalitarian regimes or from the other forms of government which claim that there are no politics.

Secondly, the pure theory of politics excluded ecological issues, which might be a anachronic characteristic for a political theory today. Although it emphasised prudence of all political actors, it does not take a stand and leave the directions of every A-politician's initiatives and the decisions of every B-type of politician up to them. But if we study de Jouvenel's articles like *The Stewardship of Earth* (1968) or all the articles of *Arcadie, essais sur le mieux vivre* (1968) and *La civilisation de puissance* (1976), we find an exceptional French thinker who had a deep concern for the environment. In France, until recently ecological consciousness has been rare. Without any doubt Jean Jacob, a historian of political ecology, counts de

Jouvenel among the founding fathers of the French ecological thinking (Jacob 1999, 212-217). In the pure theory of politics de Jouvenel wanted, however, to exclude the substantial issues of politics: the pure theory studied politics as actors, deeds and relations, which can destroy and exploit nature and environment or try to save them. It left the choice to the actors.

Thirdly, today the pure theory of politics appears at first sight militantly anti-feminist: "man moves man" and innumerable other formulations, where the political subject is man, make it difficult to analyse and at the same time be a politically correct writer. In addition, the active *dux*-types of politicians have characteristics which are easy to connect with the masculine virtues, whereas B or *rex*-types of politicians have feminine traits: B reacts to A's proposals. They are a happy couple when B gives her consent. I admit that now I ridicule a bit, but any careful feminist reader would find many sex/gender problems in de Jouvenel's pure theory. No political theory is pure enough to avoid these political problems today.

Some of de Jouvenel's examples hint that he was not entirely unaware of women's movement issues. In *Du Pouvoir* he seriously studied the possibility that "the first great revolution in human affairs was the overthrow of the matriarchate"⁵ (*Po*, 78 note 19; *P*, 127 note 19). In *De la souveraineté* the English translation speaks of man's situation in the world whereas the original French version says just that "Une situation dans le monde' est l'analogie d'une 'situation politique'". The French version did not take a stand for or against the man or woman and emphasised the political role of *grandes dames* in Balzac's novels. (*S*, 29; *So* 19) Finally, when de Jouvenel in *The Pure Theory* argued against Rousseau's *la volonté générale*, he utilised an example where a woman was the most important political actor. Rousseau described the situation where the "general will" rules and his stand was that unanimity is formed spontaneously and there was "the perfect identification between choosers and subjects" (*PT*, 133):

The first man to propose them [new laws, note JV] merely says what all have already felt, and there is no question of factions or intrigue or eloquence in order to secure the passage into law of what everyone has already decided to do provided he is sure that all others will do it as well. (Rousseau, *Social Contract*, Book IV, ch. I; here quoted according to *PT*, 135; cf. Rousseau 1762, 133)

De Jouvenel thought that this kind of spontaneous formation of a decision is an illusion. He took an example of a "primitive" society and quoted Wilbur Chaseling's book *Yulengor: Nomads of Arnhem Land* (London 1957) where the persistent persuasion of an old woman named Damilipi lead to violent incidents among the men who were sitting peacefully in groups by the fire.

For an hour or more Damilipi, the oldest of Yakangaiya's wives, partially blind, stark naked and switching flies with a bunch of twigs, strode up and down haranguing and insulting her men, accusing them of cowardice and laziness in not raiding their hereditary enemies and continuing a feud which was dying out by mutual consent. Damilipi's campaign was continued for two days, and as other women joined her the horde was

⁵ He quoted professor Bachofen's study *Das Mutterrecht: eine Untersuchung über die Gynöikokratie der alten Welt nach ihrer religiösen und rechtlichen Natur*, Stuttgart 1861.

roused to the point of organizing a killing party. Weeks later the men attacked, and in the reprisal two of Damilipi's sons and a daughter-in-law were killed. (Chaseling 1957, 63-64; here quoted according to *PT*, 135)

De Jouvenel argued that we have not here "in fact a proposal laid before a more or less formal committee, but an instigation, which, by a process of cumulative stimulation, finally moves the body politic as a whole". Here again de Jouvenel added a rhetorical relation into the social contract. Here again he feared that politics sinks to the "state of nature". The common action is not taken in a response to a command issued by an established Authority, but because of the strong inner coherence of the body politic, a coherence such that its members cannot conceive of not moving together, and have no will to resist a mood which gains momentum within the group. This inner consensus is formed by persuasion, which is the first critical move against Rousseau. The second move is that we "have here a form of consensus such as Rousseau desires, but which does not necessarily run to the wisest decisions as he seems to assume". (*PT*, 135)

To be sure I have no aim to prove by these examples that de Jouvenel actually was a feminist. Without parody it would be a life-long task. These examples prove only that although the feminist issue was not current, de Jouvenel had no intention to predestine women to this or that role in politics. This study has taken seriously the problems of the context and surely the feminist issue was not the main concern of the men who worried of the end of ideology, *dépolitisation*, the decline of political theory etc. De Jouvenel simply could not think that such a "natural" distinction between man and woman could be politicised, because the feminist issue was not current.

The pure theory of politics is, however, so unconventional a move in the field of political science, that in the feminist respect its reception would deserve closer attention. On the one hand, for the present reader the grammatical masculinity of man/homme has become more obvious than for a reader of the time when *The Pure Theory* was published. However, in the common language of de Jouvenel's time the generic masculine "man" or "homme" did not suppose that the political actors are always men, but the majority of examples show that man is a rule, woman is an exception in the role of political actor. In other words, de Jouvenel's enthymeme of the political actor is more neutral than the grammatical conventions of the time, but his examples were one-sided. On the other hand, the pattern of pure politics, which has no sex/gender attributes, only A and B, and the micropolitical approach could have made it possible to raise the questions of the subject of politics: the detaching of "man" by the neutral pattern is a move which opens the playground for the other grammatical political subjects. Thus, although de Jouvenel clearly belonged to the "male politics" of the time, in his own way he began to de-construct the rule. As we know it has finally led to the politicisation of pronouns. The microscopical approach of politics might have been a source for the "personal is political" slogan. *The Pure Theory* was published just before the women's movement arose in the USA. De Jouvenel's reception in the movement might be worth a study. All this is not aimed to be a critique of de Jouvenel, but I try to show the conventions or "ideologies" which reigned and which were difficult to avoid.

De Jouvenel played with unambiguous abstractions in the field of political theory. Reduction to the smallest identifiable elements of politics was his deliber-

ate rhetorical means to alter deadlocks of the end of ideology and the existence problems of political theory. Of course, the pure theory is a legitimate way for a reduction: by the aid of it, we can put into brackets many presuppositions and prejudices of politics and shed light to some characteristics of politics. For instance, if de Jouvenel underestimated the other means to reveal the particular characteristics of politics, his narrow view exposed the importance of the rhetorical relation. However, we must understand that de Jouvenel's pure theory is a way of reduction, which has its roots in a historical situation and, at the same time, its historical limits. By means of de Jouvenel's pure theory we can thematise some traits of politics, but not all: every perspective to politics has their own limits, which can be questioned from other perspectives.

Bertrand de Jouvenel's pure theory of politics demonstrated that it is possible to play with abstractions in the field of political theory and to say something significant. Today we can ask, if it is better, also in that field, to play with the special characteristics of politics – such as ambiguities, differences, discontinuities, or contradictions – than reductions. We can now understand the point of *The Pseudo-Alcibiades* in the new light: when the preconditions of persuasion depend always on the audience, this encourages instigators to different types of rhetorical/persuasive strategies. In this sense, *the* pure theory cannot be the same *semper et ubique* but only a pure theory which takes into consideration the different audiences and the different political agents which change in different historical situations, as change the strategies of persuasion. In this sense the pure theory of politics is thoroughly rhetorical and historical, i.e. the meaning of "pure" had no necessity to refer to spatio-temporal universality. Rather, the "pure" means that in politics the ABH-relation prevails and the action is political only if it takes into consideration the specific traits of a given situation. After the finding the relation of any situation, every theorising will lose its purity in the sense of "universality" because of the particularities and contingencies of the situation.

In *The Pure Theory* de Jouvenel did not search for any substantial foundation for his figure of pure theory, but his hidden motive to understand politics was its more prudent practices and the fear of state of nature. Even if we think that these tendencies are the "foundationalist" characteristics of his theory, they leave a lot of room to different interpretations and ways to utilise pure theory. Bertrand de Jouvenel stated that "I find it impossible to wed myself to any doctrine", because he saw "that every doctrine that ever was appeared as a rationalisation of reactions to a given situation, and served its purpose of rallying people to cope with this situation".

This does not mean that a doctrine is bad because it is old, it may again become suitable in given circumstances. Every doctrine elaborated by the human mind is however far too constricted, especially after it has gone through the shrinking process of didactic restatement, to be suitable to all situations.⁶

For these reasons I argue that de Jouvenel understood well these last historical limits of his "pure" theory. Also in the conclusion of *The Pure Theory* he wrote that

⁶ In his letter to Ward E. Y. Elliott (1959). (Carton 58)

"[n]othing was further from my mind than to paint on a large canvas a complete picture of Politics". Rather, he wanted "to take a microscope to discern on this large canvas certain traits and articulations also to be found in pictures representing Politics at different times or places". (*PT*, 213) In this sense the pure theory of politics include two contradictory tendencies: to reduce and to theorise. The reduction means the way by which he established his point, the enthymeme of pure politics. The theorising means amplification, establishing the net of arguments around the enthymeme. The tension between them remains unsolved and ambiguous, as the relation between A and B.

TIIVISTELMÄ

PELKISTYKSEN RETORIikka

Bertrand de Jouvenelin politiikan puhdas teoria suostutteluna

Ennen Bertrand de Jouvenelia (1903-1987) kukaan ei ole ajatellut politiikkaa puhtaasti formaalisti ja samaan aikaan sijoittanut politiikan keskiöön retorista suhdetta. Tutkin käsillä olevassa väitöskirjassa, kuinka puhtaasti politiikan ja sen teorian ajatuskuviot muodostuivat ja millaisia yhteyksiä niillä on retoriikkaan. Nimeän ”pelkistyksen retoriikaksi” (a rhetoric of reduction) sen tavan, jolla de Jouvenel tuottaa ja käyttää ideaansa.

Tutkimukseni aineisto koostuu pääasiassa de Jouvenelin julkaistuista teksteistä sekä *Bibliothèque nationale*ssä säilytettävän arkiston lähteistä. Metodologialtaan tutkimus nojaa käsittehistorian viimeaikaisiin näkemyksiin kontekstin merkityksestä poliittisille ajattelijoille. Lähtökohtana on Quentin Skinnerin ajatus, että poliittinen elämä itse asettaa poliittiselle teoreetikolle pääongelmat. Tämä yleinen ajatus mielessäni lähestyn de Jouvenelin teosta *The Pure Theory of Politics* (1963) historiallisretorisesti ja retorishistoriallisesti. Työni pyrkii Skinnerin ideoiden mukaisesti ymmärtämään, miksi ajatus politiikan puhtaasta teoriasta esitettiin: millainen siirto se oli argumentoinnissa?

Teoksensa *The Pure Theory of Politics* alkuun de Jouvenel sijoitti vuoropuhelun, joka matkii Platonin nimissä kulkevaa dialogia *Alkibiades I*, mutta joka on tarkoitettu poliitikon puolustuspuheeksi. Tulkitseen, että dialogi tukee kaikkein voimallisimpana esimerkkinä koko teoksen enthymemaa, jonka mukaan voimme löytää politiikkaa kaikkialta, missä ”A koettaa saada B:n tekemään H:n”. Dialogi pyrkii pelkistämään henkilöhahmoihin puhtaasti politiikan keskeiset ideat. Samalla se kysyy, pitäisikö ja voisiko politiikkaa arvioida joillakin muilla kriteereillä, mitä tähän asti on tehty.

Työni kolmas ja neljäs kappale tutkivat politiikan puhtaasti teorian intertekstuaalisia piirteitä. Niissä eksplikoin *The Pure Theory*n viittauksia kirjoitusajankohdan keskusteluihin sekä debatteihin, jotka olivat kestäneet jo pidempään. Kolmas kappale kuvaa puhtaasti politiikan muotoutumisen historiaa vuosilta 1942-1965. Kappaleessa neljä nostan esiin kaksi keskustelua, jotka muokkasivat *The Pure Theory*a: kansainvälinen keskustelu ideologian loppumisesta ja ranskalainen keskustelu depolitisaatiosta.

Viidennessä kappaleessa tutkimukseni painotus kääntyy historiallisretorisestä retorishistorialliseksi. Kysyn, kuinka de Jouvenelin tekstit toimivat retorisesti ja mistä hän mahdollisesti omaksui retoriikan idean. Väitän, että kyse oli retorisesta pelkistyksestä, reduktiosta, joka on aina elänyt toisen retorisen strategian, amplifikaation, rinnalla. Tässä vaiheessa kytken *The Pure Theory*n politiikan teorian loppua koskevaan keskusteluun.

Viimeinen kappale vastaa kysymykseen, mitä de Jouvenel oikeastaan teki, kun hän puhui politiikan puhtaasti teoriasta. Tulkitseen de Jouvenelin teorian vasta-vaiteeksi läpikäymilleni ideologian, politiikan ja politiikan teorian loppua koskeville keskusteluille. Ne pelkistävät kohteensa nollaan, kun taas politiikan puhdas teoria on kirjaimellisesti politiikan alkamista merkitsevä kertomus, sen A, B ja H.

De Jouvenelin radikaali veto politiikan teorian kentällä oli lähteä ajattelemaan politiikkaa jokaisesta suostuttelutilanteesta käsin, mikä johtaa tarkastelmaan poliittisen *aspektia* jokaisessa puheessa. Hän ajatteli politiikkaa toimijoina, suhteina ja tekoina, mikä puolestaan herättää kysymyksen myös jokaisen asian poliittista aspektista.

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