Raija-Leena Loisa

The Polysemous Contemporary Concept

The Rhetoric of the Cultural Industry

UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 2003

A Polysemous Contemporary Concept

The Rhetoric of the Cultural Industry

Raija-Leena Loisa

A Polysemous Contemporary Concept

The Rhetoric of the Cultural Industry

ABSTRACT

The aim of the study is to deliver understanding on the change of the concept of the cultural industry. It also aims at explicating the situation of the neutral and positive use of the concept in contemporary cultural policies. The conceptual change is studied via analysing major Western traditions on this issue. A rhetorical point of view on conceptual history employed by Quentin Skinner is used as a methodological approach in the study. As a result the study proposes eight possible meanings in employing the concept of cultural industry: critical, dialectical, emancipatory, cynical, descriptive, normative, legitimatory and instrumental. They are historical layers and all of them employed also in contemporary situation. Each of these meanings point at a specific rhetorical re-description of the situation of cultural and aesthetic production. These re-descriptions legitimate the tone of writing and the meanings given to the concept. The study also proposes a pyramid model pointing at the criteria of application and a circle model pointing at the range of reference of the concept of the cultural industry.

Keywords: cultural industry, conceptual history, cultural policy, media **culture**, cultural economics, popular culture

Author's address   Raija-Leena Loisa
                          Ruukuntekijäntie 4 B 17
                          01600 Vantaa

Supervisors   Academy Professor Kari Palonen
                          Department of Social Sciences and
                          Philosophy/Political Science
                          University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland

                          Professor Anita Kangas
                          Department of Social Sciences and
                          Philosophy/**Cultural** Policy
                          University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland

                          Senior Assistant Kia Lindroos**-Sabijan**
                          Department of Social Sciences and
                          Philosophy/Political Science
                          University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland

Reviewers   Professor (ma.) Matti Hyvärinen
                          Department of Social Sciences and
                          Philosophy/Political Science
                          University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland

                          Professor Pirkkoliisa Ahponen
                          Department of Social Policy
                          University of Joensuu, Joensuu, Finland

Opponent   Professor Hubertus Buchstein
                          Institut für Politikwissenschaft,
                          Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald, Germany

PREFACE

During the completion of an academic study one is sometimes in an unfavourable position of explaining to relatives, friends or randomly met people the work one is doing at that time. In my case I have usually answered the second question concerning the subject of my study with couple of words: 'the cultural industry'. The third question has been almost without exceptions: 'what is it?' This study is intended to be one possible answer to this question. It is not question posed only by laymen. During the 1990s the concept and the phenomenon of the cultural industry has come to be an extremely prominent one in cultural policies globally and in Finland. There has emerged a huge amount of professionals that are involved with this issue. They have also been in various occasions in a position to answer this question and 'define the concept'. Thus, the meaning has been more or less unclear even for various professionals in this field and much energy has been used for the endeavour of grasping it. There might be more acute and urgent problems for these people than to ponder about a concept and its 'definition'. If I manage to offer some help in this problem with this research, I am content with my endeavour.

I am not claiming that this research would solve the problem once and for all, because in this study the concepts are not regarded to be invariants and beyond time. The ethos of political science in Jyväskylä gives fruitful point of departure for the specific subject of this study: in taking under investigation such a delicate issue as the cultural industry there is no *single* meaning of the concept, not to speak about a *right* one.

Professor of political science Kari Palonen in the University of Jyväskylä has been influential for me as far as the perspective of doing academic research is concerned. Professor of cultural policy studies Anita Kangas in the University of Jyväskylä has encouraged me to take the delicate subject matter of the cultural industry under investigation. She has provided me with her first-hand knowledge and information on what takes place in the realm of cultural policy. I am grateful for their comments during the working process.

I want to thank the reviewers of the manuscript Matti Hyvärinen and Pirkkoliisa Ahponen. They have both encouraged me to think further.

The post-graduate seminars in political science and in cultural policy studies and the discussions with scholars in philosophy in Jyväskylä have offered me a forum to test my ideas. These occasions have prompted me to begin to think anew my own subject matter. In general, I have also learned something about the ideas of creativity and innovation.

Kia Lindroos-Sabijan has commented me as a supervisor during the completion of the study. Eeva Aarnio has offered interesting insights to teledemocracy which have been helpful for me during this work. Sakari Hänninen and Pekka Korhonen have provided me with valuable insights in seminars of political science.

CONTENTS

1   INTRODUCTION

An excellent indicator of the multiplicity of meanings contained within the concept of the cultural industry is seen in the fact that by simply uttering the word one can immediately create animosity or sympathy among one's audience, depending on the normative colouring with which the term is employed. I have encountered various kinds of reactions throughout my journey towards understanding this issue. In a sense, this work represents a still image of this point in my journey. The background and motivation for this research stems from the feeling of sheer astonishment that I experienced during my graduate studies in 1996. I had been introduced to the aesthetic thought of Theodor W. Adorno and others of the Frankfurt School in my studies in arts education in Jyväskylä, Finland. While working on my master's thesis I read an article by Ilkka Heiskanen, a professor of political science and an established expert on cultural policy issues. The article was published in 1985 and addressed the problems of the Finnish audiovisual sector. My spontaneous question was: 'How is this possible?' I began to consider the nature of writing about the cultural industry. The unproblematic nature of writing about the cultural industry refers to the fact that at first sight there seemed to be absolutely no reference to the critical concept of the cultural industry as employed by the Frankfurt School and Adorno. My initial surprise was that a similar concept was used but in an entirely different tone. It also seemed that the writers used the same concept to refer to entirely different phenomena. I afterwards learnt that in 1997 the Ministry of Education had set up a cultural industry committee. This was even more intriguing. I decided to solve the problem by embarking on my own investigation and finding out what kinds of changes had been taking place. Throughout the course of my journey I discovered that this is essentially about different traditions of thought. This study investigates these traditions.

The second surprise was the realization that the term 'cultural industry' seemed to be anachronistic. Why use the word 'industry' in a historical context that claims to be post-industrial? This prompted me to investigate the meaning of the word industry in different contexts. I came to the conclusion that my spontaneous questions provided sufficient justification for me to take the

conceptual historical point of view in my analysis of the discourses on this issue.

At a very general level the problem could be solved by highlighting the condition of our world, in which intrinsic values are substituted by instrumental values. Culture as a phenomenon of enlightenment and *Bildung* is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a medium or an instrument with which to gain monetary or prestige values. It seems as if the Finnish political and administrative system is giving out the same diagnostic warnings as the Frankfurt School of the 1930s, to be realized even more powerfully and entirely deliberately in our time: the realization of a one-dimensional and entirely docile people. The 1930s saw a departure from the Kantian tradition of disinterested pleasure towards the realm of the arts and of the human being as an end in itself in an instrumental world involving every sphere of life. The Finnish historian Jukka Relander expressed his astonishment in the following manner in October 2002: 'We have been experiencing a so-called perverse turn in relation to the Frankfurt School and older forms of critical thought. Theodor Adorno introduced his critical concept of the cultural industry in the 1950s. How low can we sink? In the 1990s our state set up a cultural industry committee (laughs)'. This is simply an ironical comment taken from the publication *Bileet Tornissa*, a record of a discussion among young Finnish intellectuals.

A more sophisticated analysis is offered by Finnish philosopher Jussi Kotkavirta in his article published in the year 2000. His writings were part of an anthology analysing the influences of antiquity in the modern world. Kotkavirta offers in his article an analysis of the modern artistic institution. According to Kotkavirta, in the late modern situation the borders of the once differentiated and autonomous institution have begun to crumble. This started as early as the beginning of 20th century. The erosion of the border between art and everyday life has been realized in our world with the advent of the assimilation of the arts and culture with the thoughts of the liberal market economy and consumerism. Kotkavirta's claim is that the fascist dictatorships in Europe represented a traumatic phase of disruption in relation to traditional conceptions of the arts and culture as civilization and enlightenment. On the other hand, these regimes fostered and enhanced the assimilation of European cultural and artistic life with the mass industrial society. The outcome of this is that the arts, while adapting to utilitarianism, have lost the critical powers that they once embodied. According to Kotkavirta: 'One symptom of this general change of climate could be the appropriation of the term 'cultural industry' into the normal vocabulary of Finnish cultural policy. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer used the term in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* highly critically, in order to characterize the new situation in which the arts and culture are subordinated to commercialism and other functions external to it – a situation in which culture becomes an industry. Finnish civil servants in cultural administration nowadays speak and write openly of their intent to steer the cultural industry or content creation at state and local administrative level. '*It is unlikely that this*

represents an issue of intervention into the logic of mass culture.' (Kotkavirta 2000, 68, 84-85)

Upon initial assessment, both of these reactions resemble my own. Kotkavirta gives a more sophisticated explanation of the change to which Relander only ironically refers. Still, one can find in Kotkavirta's text only a shadow of the contemporary situation. He also ends his account with a final statement which offers me a good basis and starting point for my own study. I consider this to be representative of the way of thinking familiar to philosophers, historians and some political scientists. The following delineation comes from another camp of media scientists which I count as a representative example of media and popular culture analysts. Douglas Kellner is known for his introductions to critical theory conceptions of media and culture. The following opinion is from his book *Media Culture. Cultural studies, identity and politics between the modern and the post-modern* (1995), translated into Finnish and published by Vastapaino 1998.

According to Kellner's idea of critical theory, and therefore the classical model of the culture industry, there are serious deficits in the original agenda. He offers as a solution an empirical analysis of media industries and its structures (as done in the discourses analysed in chapter 5). Another solution would be a more thorough analysis of audiences, reception and effects. Kellner aims for a combination of critical theory and the British form of cultural studies, which he later calls his own programme of multi-perspective analysis. The aim of this form of research is to shed light on the blind spots of one theory from the relatively enlightened position of another.

The problem with critical theory is, in Kellner's opinion, its abrupt dissociation of low culture and high culture. To overcome this impasse requires that our cultural and artistic life should be regarded as a continuum and a spectrum and use the same methods with all kinds of cultural works, whether they be opera or pop, modern literature or soap opera. Kellner believes that the most problematic way of thinking in critical theory is to dissociate monolithic mass culture from the ideal of 'authentic art'. This dissociation indicates that criticism, revolutionary potentiality or emancipation would take place only in avant-garde arts and all mass culture is mere ideology and deception. According to Kellner this dissociation should be deconstructed and reconsidered. Kellner believes that there are critical elements in cultural industries and ideological elements in art culture. At any rate, the reception of the audiences has the power to turn encoded messages upside down. (Kellner 1998, 39-40)

However, Kellner recognizes the power of critical theory. He states that it is precisely the critical method of understanding the transformation of culture and media into commodities and the realization of its reification and ideological character that provides the appropriate means to 'enlighten' the blind spots of populistic and uncritical media studies. Furthermore, through his statement that even an alternative way of accepting or opposing encoded messages can be an effective way of integrating people into the existing established social and

political system (ibid. 53), he suggests the possibility that the critical theory of the Frankfurt School might oppose contemporary cultural and media studies.

This refers to the possibility that it is futile to attempt to justify the contemporary use of the term 'cultural industry'. The following passage by a social policy scholar further strengthens this belief: 'Another stance through which the hidden opposition to pluralism in liberalism becomes clear is connected to the relations of liberalism, modernity and the market economy. It is difficult to prove any single movement or selection of theories that would name this critique of liberalism (it appears both in Marxian and conservative versions). Loosely expressed it is the question of cultural critique that regards liberalism, economics and culture as a totality that aims at a more efficient production, resiliency, movements of capital, cultural diversity and at the same time at a more total governance. Here pluralism loses all of its original and essential (radical) sense and becomes stunted as the subordination of the dynamics of lifestyles, tastes, artificial differences to the service of mass society. Difference transforms into diversity. Essentially, capitalism needs its marginality and counter-forces only to be able to integrate and nihilate them in a dynamic that is necessary to itself. Youth cultures, subcultures, alternative life styles, hips or neoconservatives seem to be either prefabricated and marketed by mass society or, as somewhat less cynically expressed, start out as truly 'authentic' groups and movements that afterwards are bought and integrated into the endless production process.' (Haatanen 2002, 250)

From this point of view it seems somewhat pointless to even begin this research if it is doomed to failure in its attempts to provide explanations and justifications for the change in discourse and concepts. Actually, one could state that nothing has taken place. The critical concept of the cultural industry can be implemented and its critique proves to be even more accurate than ever before. The idea of 'making a difference' is doomed by the above to be, in reality, mere ideology and a delusion of our time. However, in addition to 'truths' alone, I also consider each of the above accounts as legitimate perspectives on this issue. These accounts also reflect the personal conflicts I experienced when embarking on this study. I have felt stranded, situated between fronts in a 'no man's land' trying to settle in my own mind the various reactions I have experienced in different situations.

In the genre of research, which is rhetorical conceptual history in orientation, these reactions are valid as a source of evidence. They are evidence of the fact that there is no single dominating point of view on these issues, rather, a number of different viewpoints exist. In this kind of genre of research it is not the aim to prove the validity or adequacy of a certain point of view. My aim is rather to understand them in their own terms in order to offer them for the reader as a models of thought and a specific rhetorical points of view in this issue.

A specific contention I have is that Adorno's ideas were a critique and diagnosis of his own historical situation. They cannot be implemented and used *as such* in the contemporary world. I wish to direct this contention to each of the

writers of the above cited passages and take the courage to begin the research in order to find out what has changed in the world, in discourse and in concepts which might make it easier to understand the use of the term 'cultural industry' in the contemporary context.

The specific questions are:

- What has made the cultural industry currently such an acceptable concept?
- Is it a question of deliberately precipitating the catastrophe that Adorno was predicting or warning against?
- Does the critical theory of the Frankfurt School need revision beyond itself? Is the reception of Adorno's thought in the media and (popular) cultural studies adequate?
- What has taken place in discourses on the cultural industry and its view of the world? What has taken place in the conceptualisation of the term 'cultural industry' in its descriptive sense and the values it represents?

A very general assumption is that critical understanding of the cultural industry in its 'original' conceptualisation has transformed into an entirely unproblematic 'endowment' of the cultural industry. My aim is to test this assumption with an applied conceptual historical point of view of the various discourses on this issue during the 20th century. I also aim to avoid the pitfalls originating from both sides of this issue. On the one hand, I oppose the idea that the critical concept of the cultural industry is an original one in the sense that all conceptualisations coming later on or alongside critical theory are deviations from the 'truth'. I aim to avoid the thought of scientific Progress in the sense that later conceptualisations are fundamentally more accurate and adequate (read: understanding the 'true nature of the world') than earlier ones. Needless to say that from the point of view of Skinnerian conceptual history these various discourses are rhetorical interventions using linguistic *ornatus* in order to convince the audience to accept the point. The purpose of this research is more aimed towards presenting different perspectives of the world and the issue at hand as opposed to an analysis of whether the account given is true or false.

1.1 Neighbouring concepts

Why concentrate on the concept of the cultural industry while there is a wide selection of possible concepts that would be better suited to the so-called phase of post-industrialism, or that would avoid negative reactions and generate more sympathies? In short, I find the starting point of a study more fruitful if it involves contradictions and problems, even conflicts. In the following text I will give a preliminary outline of various related terms and concepts in order to

make my own position clear amid the apparent chaos. Discussion on popular culture is nowadays mostly received in a positive light following the generation struggles of recent history such as in Finland in the 1960s. Researchers adapted the British version of cultural studies as their catchword, implicating the radical, controversial character of the cultural practices of ordinary people in contrast to the elitist canons of high culture. The term 'popular' was first used in Britain by Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams (1958). They used the term in reference to the cultural life of the working class. The very etymology of 'popular' (lat. *populus*) justifies the claim that it has its origin in 'people'. Williams, and later on the members of the Birmingham School abandoned the term 'mass culture' for several reasons. They regarded it as a symptom of elitism. The term 'mass' is pejorative and is used to refer to something that is below more sophisticated and refined phenomena. It refers also to a multitude of homogenous appearances in which there are no contradictions and in which the possibilities of resistance are domesticated to the harmless everyday struggles of private life. They regarded the term 'popular' as entailing more to do with resistant groups and activities. They also usually deliberately abandoned the studies on modernistic art and concentrated rather on popular music, film and television. Kellner, however, regards their use of the term 'popular' as sometimes too simplistic, possibly leading to a 'cultural populism' (see also Frith & Savage 1993). The blind spot of these analysts is that they do not take into account that despite responding to popular tastes there are *industries* that mediate these trends and make use of them. (Kellner 1998, 44)

From another point of view, the idea of industry refers to a specific kind of systematic mode of production that has as its result a mass culture. The word 'industry' itself refers to the economic and technical operations in the field of cultural production. It is the primary reason for the homogenisation of cultural products and worldviews of people. This takes place in the number of choices offered on the market. Because of the 'law' of economic efficiency it is much more favourable to produce one item for millions of consumers than several items for a more limited number of consumers. The decreasing of political and social relevance of these items be they music, film or a television production is also characterized by the mode of production. The item must satisfy as many customers as possible and must in no way insult their opinions. This is thought to guarantee their selling power. The *cultural* industry refers to the situation in which the creative arts are in no better a position, but are influenced by activities external to the arts themselves as well as the 'lower' spheres of aesthetic and artistic fields. The *entertainment* industry would segregate the phenomenon into popular music or cinema, produced specifically in order to attract as much paying public as possible.

The concept of media culture fostered by Kellner indicates that our world is not one of direct communication but one of multi-filtered information concerning the issues and opinions of all fields of life. It describes our world as 'mediatized', where information and knowledge is delivered and received by agents who have no knowledge of each other. This is the industrial phase of

communication and broadcasting operations. To Kellner, the word 'media' refers to the use of industrial machinery in delivering messages, a medium in the sense of information channelling. It also refers to the practice of selection of news items and the method of relaying them, the practice of mediating information between the sources and the receivers. The word 'culture' in this context refers to the idea that it is not a unified 'mass', but a selection of contradictory worldviews of competing social and political groups. (Kellner 1998)

The range of reference of the term 'media culture' is much wider than the sole realms of the arts, whether they are popular or elitist forms. This concept is also similar to the term 'consciousness industry'. The two are actually quite closely related to each other. They both refer to the knowledge and opinions offered for the disposal of the consumer, the contents and material supplied to the outer cortex of our brains. While the media in Kellner's account classifies the phenomenon to be one of modern electronic, printed or digital equipment, Enzensberger, Negt and Kluge extend it beyond electronic and printed media into real life situations in schools, churches, working places, political party gatherings or parliaments. The word 'industry' in this case refers to the economic and technical mode of production, whereas the term 'public sphere' is employed to refer to face to face situations. The aim of the concept of the consciousness industry is to convert the face to face public sphere into publicity or industry with the intention of business owners creating a demand for 'cultural contents'. The public sphere is therefore purposely produced, and is no longer a selection of items merely emerging *ad hoc* in civilized discussions (*Produktionsöffentlichkeit*).

The most recent terms and concepts are 'creative industries' and 'content creation'. These are better suited than the above-mentioned terms to the 'post-industrial' condition. Their range of reference can be as wide as that of the consciousness industry, a kind of 'consciousness content industry and creation'. State administration programmes that are formed on the basis of cultural industries and content creation are, at least in Finland, cross-governmental programmes; which gives an indication of their breadth of scope. They implicate a new level of directness, narrowcasting and 'machine to machine' communication which, although do not resemble face to face communication, neither do they resemble the indirect communication of broadcasting.

1.2 The concept of culture

The term 'culture' is at the core of each of these concepts. At the same time it is one of the most difficult words to define exactly in Western languages. It has a long history from the origins of the Greek concept of *paideia* to the Latin word *colere*. The connotations of education and *cultura animi* were activities to develop spiritual qualities such as virtues, sciences or the arts, and even

producing crops. It remained, however, an activity concept alone as opposed to an objective practice. Only since 18th century Germany has *Kultur* been also understood as an achievement, a cultivated person or cultural product. However, at this time culture was not a value or virtue set over and above others, but rather a medium for humanity, *[deren] Zweck…auf Bildung der Humanität gerichtet sei* (Herder 1784, cit. in Fisch 1992) In the 19th century, along with the industrialization and development of technology, *Kultur* and *Zivilisation* were dissociated in German, culture representing the spiritual sphere of life in its entirety and civilization meaning the material side of development. The era of industrialization brought with it a feeling of disillusionment, and as a result culture was re-evaluated as the development of a more humane way of life, whereas civilization was used to exemplify the subordination of the inner life, a more outward and superficial refinement, or even purely technical development. This form of culture and civilization critique also became imprinted in the thought of the Frankfurt School. The end of the 19th century also saw the introduction of the ethnological sense of culture, in which the established culture and civilization was substituted by numerous cultures and civilizations. (Fisch 1992)

Fisch (1992, 771) highlights the use of the concept of culture in *Kulturpolitik* after World War II. Whereas the writers of cultural policy claim to employ a wide understanding of culture, they still make restrictions on arts and entertainment, education or mass media, i.e. the core areas of culture. The rationale for using culture rather than the arts in connection with policies has been the widening of the sphere of concern to include popular forms of expression. The word 'creativity' emphasizes this even further. For example, Unesco and the Council of Europe aim to employ an anthropological sense of culture in which culture is understood to mean the values and practices involved in all kinds of human behaviour. (Council of Europe 1998, 32; Unesco 1998, 16) The writers of the Council of Europe's report *In from the Margins* (1998) divide the concept of culture into two dimensions. First, they dissociate the aesthetic and scientific sense from the anthropological sense mentioned above. In the second dimension they dissociate the symbolic world (expression and interpretation of things) from the material world (commodities, production systems, technological infrastructure). Curiously, but for sensible reasons, despite the fact that the definition of culture is broad in their practical analysis, the writers concentrate on the 'core' sphere of the arts albeit from the broad perspective of cultural development. In practice this means that popular or technically reproduced expressions are not excluded.

This is not, however, the whole story of the concept of culture in cultural policy. Unesco's work is a prominent indicator of the breadth of the spectrum of issues in contemporary international cultural policy. This can be seen also in any international conference on cultural policy. The issues range from the environment, minorities, gender, youth and children to the media, economy and heritage. Still, there needs to be some kind of aesthetic or cultural (in the anthropological sense) interface for these issues. Culture is understood not only

objectively, but also in terms of development. The goal of development is 'physical, spiritual and social well-being'. (Unesco 1998, 16)

In the context of the discourses on cultural industries and its related concepts the term 'culture', generally speaking, refers to the anthropological sense of culture. It can be restricted to the creative arts, which are mediatized or commercialised, imprinted by desires and values external to itself. The German word *Kulturindustrie* indicates that the *geistig* sphere of life is instrumentalized and not taken as an end in itself (as a state of humanity). The concept of culture as used in the term 'cultural industry' can refer to practices and expressions that are more popular (in a favourable sense) than the expressions in the 'enclaves of high culture'. The word 'cultural' refers more to cultivation and refinement than to *Geist,* enlightenment or humanity as with the German word *Kultur.* The word 'cultural', as used in conjunction with the word 'industry' indicates industries that are more 'refined' than other 'ordinary' ones. Culture can even refer to consumer choices of any kind. The word 'culture' in this context can refer also to knowledge, information or education. In the consciousness industry version even religious culture (which is one of the classical senses of culture), political activity or jurisprudence are included. Finally, content creation or creative industries can constitute anything the human mind can invent in order to expand technology and gather monetary or cultural capital.

1.3 Previous research in this field

In my presentation of earlier research I take the principal criterion to be the interplay between the older form of critical theory and more contemporary ideas on popular cultures or cultural industries. Internationally Martin Jay (1973), David Held (1980) and Rolf Wiggershaus (1986) have been the most established historians on the Frankfurt School. In Germany, Michael Kausch (1988) wrote about the history of this critique in the Frankfurt School, basing his view on the biographies and texts of its members. Heinz Steinert (1992) studied, ironically, Adorno's aversion to jazz, mirroring it with the actual practice of jazz music creation and performance itself, emphasizing its somatic and communal elements. Andreas Huyssen (1986) clarified, for example, Adorno's essay on Wagner and declared it to be a prediction of the arrival of popular music. Miriam Hansen has in her articles during the 1980s and 1990s shed light on many misconceptions and missing elements in the reception of Adorno's critique on mass culture. She has also contributed to the reception of Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge from the point of view of micro politics of the 1990s. Richard Shusterman (1992/1997) propagates the point of view of pragmatist aesthetic philosophy, a 'melioristic point' in which he opposes Adorno, Horkheimer and other critics of mass culture for damning it too hastily as inadequate and not worthy of study. He does not claim that all media and popular culture were automatically valuable as such. Indeed, not all

phenomena of high culture qualify as such simply due to their status in elitist canons. The point is to analyse what is valuable in both of these and what is not. His idea is reminiscent of that of Douglas Kellner who came to this conclusion from a slightly different scientific angle (combining critical theory, cultural studies and post-structuralism) and who is much more sympathetic to the ideas of the Frankfurt School.

In Finland the thought of the Frankfurt School was received during the 1970s and 1980s in media studies and sociology (e.g. Veikko Pietilä). During the 1990s a number of researches have emerged using the critique of mass culture of the Frankfurt School as a theoretical background in their studies. Merja Hurri (1993) studied in her dissertation the journalism on culture in major Finnish newspapers during 1945-1980. She used the left and right versions of the critique of mass culture and found the echoes of these sentiments in Finnish newspapers. However, she did not extend her investigative work to discovering whether the ideas were truly held by the journalists. The similarities in ideas merely reflected the allusions of the researcher. This case is similar to the research of Sanna Talja (1998) on the contemporary Finnish discourses on music, Mervi Pantti (1998) on Finnish film critique during 1950-1970 and Tarja Rautiainen (2001) on the Finnish protest song and popular music discourses in the 1960s (Rautiainen explicates more carefully that the thought of the Frankfurt School was in reality rather unknown in Finland until the 1970s). Jari Muikku (2001) has a more specific starting point from which to test whether the thesis of standardization due to technological and economical modes of production holds in the Finnish recording industry. His conclusion was that Adorno's standardization thesis does not hold across the whole recording sector but does so in the specific case of Fazer, under the leadership of Toivo Kärki.

A wide range of dissertations and studies on cultural policy in Finland were written during the 1990s. A canonized description of the policies is given by Ilkka Heiskanen (1994) who differentiates them as a national prototype and the policy of the welfare state since the end of 1960s. During the 1990s various scholars have discussed the possible third line of marketisation and economisation of cultural policy (see Kangas 1999).

My intention in this study is to discuss a number of theoretical traditions usually not handled within the same context. Researchers studying cultural industries or popular cultures usually compare critical theory, cultural studies, post-structuralism, semiotics or pragmatism. The orientations and traditions presented in chapter 5 are not very often recognized in these kinds of contexts. Those writing about cultural industries from the point of view of economics or industrial analysis are not generally very familiar with the ideas of the Frankfurt School. In this study I have documented as many of the bridges between these traditions as has been possible to find in this selection of writings. The bridges are the comments on Adorno and critical theory, for example by Bernard Miège, Augustin Girard or Scott Lash. As far as the Finnish studies are concerned, I am in a somewhat favourable position to discover the 'true' role of critical theory, at least from viewpoint of my most important

source, the Cultural Industry Committee. As regards the earlier historical phases, I am in no better a position to comment. The role of critical theory or other theoretical movements in Finnish cultural and social sciences and journalism would require a primary study in itself.

The above-mentioned factors provide the basis for my selection of texts and writings. The texts of Enzensberger, Negt and Kluge represent a 'turn' of the 1970s which present a kind of overture for the emphasis on *difference* later on. In practice, this selection of theories and texts is partly an outcome of happy coincidences during my journey of study. Right from the start I had a basic overview of the 'bare necessities' which need to be included. I sometimes discovered sources via a recommendation from a supervisor, colleague or conference commentator. Many were found through book reviews in newspapers and journals. A single book or article often introduced me to several other useful sources. Sometimes an entire tradition and its sources were stumbled across simply by leafing through a book in a book shop, or even on a colleague's book shelf. My general criterion in selecting material has been the employment of the term 'cultural industry' and its most closely related terms. I am not offering an analysis of the discourses on popular culture, which would require a much wider selection of texts. Furthermore, my methodological starting point differs from a loosely understood discourse analysis. It is rather a rhetorical and conceptual analysis of the discourses on the issue of the cultural industry. Rather than simply classifying various types of speeches, I aim to understand the background to the writing of a given text and its mode of intervention in that situation. In terms of conceptual analysis, this involves an attempt to break down the structures of the language in order to find the elements with which to judge the meaning of the given concept. The aim is to offer a clear vision amid the prevailing 'disorder' on this issue, to discover what is at stake in this dispute and what is the precise meaning and use of the terms in question.

2   THE ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS ON THE CULTURAL INDUSTRY

While the primary criterion for selecting various texts in this research has been the employment of the term 'cultural industry', I am not concentrating purely on theoretical traditions but also taking into account policy documents. This may cause inconsistencies and incommensurableness between chapters. Theoretical texts are philosophical speculation and policy documents are pragmatist recommendations for policy making. I take the point of view of conceptual historical analysis which Quentin Skinner has been outlining since the 1970s as a 'method' of analysing these various genres of texts. From this point of view all kinds of writing and speech are linguistic act**ions** in our world. In order to mix the roles somewhat, a philosopher is involved in his/her contemporary issues - political, social or administrative, with his/her repertoire of concepts. A civil servant will have completed a certain period of university or other studies within a certain discipline and tradition of thought. It is therefore good practice, for instance, to try to discover the theoretical and disciplinal background of a writer of, e.g. a memorandum. Such information helps to understand his/her language and models of thinking. It is equally useful to try to study the social and political situation of a philosopher. This information helps us to understand what drives him/her to argue in a particular way, or what 'objectives' was s/he working towards in his/her texts. From a Skinnerian point of view, such texts are deliberate actions performed at a certain, significant moment of time. Thus, more than just speculating, a philosopher uses his/her concepts in a concrete discursive battlefield. An action is not merely something which takes place once a civil servant has recommended it in his/her memorandum, for example to forward a budget proposal and to fund it, or to increase the extent of education. From the Skinnerian point of view both of these actions are doing something *in writing.* However, it is reasonable to point out that writing philosophy or an administrative memorandum are entirely different genres of writing. One cannot expect a similar speculative depth of analysis in a memorandum as in a philosophical thesis, simply because a memorandum is not intended to be like that.

The background (*sic*) of Skinner is the lectures by J.L. Austin in the 1950s that have been published under the title *How to Do Things with Words*. With these ideas Austin started a movement called the speech act theory. Since the 1970s Skinner has been modifying this idea of the speech act to make it suitable for interpreting texts. Another line in his work is classical rhetoric, which is particularly evident in his book *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (1996b). Skinner also employs the idea of speech as an act into Hobbes' work, in the sense of Hobbes' writings as interventions in the models of thought in his time. The conceptual historical theme is present in the anthology *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (1989) in which he offers a descriptive-normative model for analysing conceptual changes and also a classical study on the concept of state. This indicates that Skinner's version of conceptual history emphasizes the rhetorical aspect in conceptual changes. Concepts are used as argumentative moves in attempts to convince the audience (Palonen 1999; Skinner 1999).

2.1 Linguistic action

According to Austin, to say something is not necessarily only an illustration or description of an action or situation, nor is it merely an argument that can be either true or untrue. In certain circumstances and within certain criteria to utter a sentence is, or is a part of the performing of an action, it is not merely the act of speaking. This is the core of the idea of the speech act. Austin calls these utterances performatives. Austin is very particular about his set **of** criteria for utterances and circumstances. The prerequisite is a speaker that has the opportunity and power to achieve a certain outcome via his/her utterance. A further criterion is that only a verb can accomplish this. A classical example is the English marriage formula in which an answer 'I do…' meets both criteria. Uttering these words is not only a description or statement but the performing of an action, in which at the moment of uttering the words a person makes an active promise of marriage. The prerequisite of the act is that the situation is right. The speaker must be in a situation in which uttering the words can accomplish the desired change of circumstances. In this sense, performatives are not true or untrue but, in Austin's terms, 'happy' or 'unhappy' (Austin 1962, 6-12).

Austin divides the speech acts (performatives) into three, locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary levels. The locutionary level implicates the denotative meaning of an act: the act **of** saying something. The illocutionary level implicates the character of the act: the act **in** saying something. This indicates how the locution is used. According to Austin, the locutionary act is always simultaneously an illocutionary act. The perlocutionary level tells one what the speaker manages to accomplish: an act **by** saying something. The locutionary act is the utterance of a sentence that possesses certain sense and reference. The illocutionary act is the utterance of a sentence that has some degree of power to

cause agreement between the parts, or at least create a suitable situation in which to attempt to make an agreement: such as ordering, warning or informing. The perlocuationary act is what the utterance manages to accomplish in the mind and acts of the target of the speech (Austin 1962, 94-120).

Austin classifies several special kinds of illocutionary performatives. (1962, 150-163) A more suitable verb for the purposes of this study than any of those mentioned by Austin is used here, namely the verb *to dissociate.* In this I combine Chaïm Perelman's (1971, 415-442) 'new rhetoric' with the speech act theory. It resembles the verbs 'class', 'estimate', 'assess', 'state', 'deny', 'oppose' and 'accept', as listed by Austin. The strategy of dissociation is, however, a specific act of dividing issues into what is, from the point of view of the speaker, true and false. A speaker or writer perceiving the world and words of others begins to question the way s/he is informed and enlightened and what s/he sees and hears taking place. Typically, s/he comes to the conclusion that something does not hold, and begins to assess the phenomena on the basis of whether they are real and essential or whether they are just illusionary appearances. This is a very basic method of classifying the world, i.e. into two opposites. The aim in analysing the dissociations of a speaker or writer is not to try to estimate if the dissociations are 'true' or 'false', but to understand that the dissociations are *used* in order to legitimate or justify one's point of view. In this sense dissociation is a linguistic, illocutionary act. It is act in speaking because the writer or speaker is estimating and classifying the issues of the world and s/he is intervening in the ongoing discourse on these matters. This takes place in all kinds of texts, whether philosophical, administrative or juridical. The view or change of theories a philosopher manages to accomplish is the perlocutionary act. The change in state or local budget, in education or such equivalent is a perlocutionary act of a civil servant. It is possible that one or several administrators can also accomplish a kind of 'rhetorical change' in policies in the sense that they can influence the adoption of a new vocabulary or way of thinking and arguing pro and con at the administrative level.

In the strategy of dissociation, the appearance/reality pairing forms the prototype for various kinds of dissociations with various concepts. The appearance is represented by term number I, and reality by term number II. Term II is normative and expresses the way things should be in the opinion of the writer/speaker. Term I expresses the issues that are not taken to be real and true, but illusory and false. (Perelman et. al. 1971, 415-417) The writer/speaker may also construct horizontal chains with several I and II terms. In an argument, the specific dissociation of a speaker can be challenged by stating that 'what you take as valid is in my opinion an invalid description'. Thus, the terms may be displaced and be turned upside down (ibid. 422-427).

The problem of the cultural industry revolves around several issues in which there are dissociations. These include the role of markets in the arts, the nature of popular culture or the power of media culture. They are not separate questions but consist of numerous interwoven links. For the sake of example, however, I have taken these in this context to be separate issues of dispute and

fields of dissociative strategy. Firstly, someone may state that leaving the arts to the playground of the free market economy subordinates them to external demands. A challenger of this view may state that the idea of 'autonomous art' is entirely obsolete idealism that has actually never existed in pure form, for that matter. Secondly, a person may claim that entertainment is socially escapist and aesthetically mediocre and in that sense 'below' the complex works of the arts. This can be challenged by saying that people who condemn entertainment have no actual understanding of the very thing that they are attempting to discredit. Thus, their estimation is based more on attitudes and prejudices than concrete knowledge or understanding. Thirdly, media critics have emphasised the character of mass media as transforming the discursive public sphere into a manipulative, deluding programme flow which regards the recipients as nothing more than consumers of prefabricated world views. Media 'enthusiasts' claim that the contingent character of the reception situation is such that the media producer cannot take for granted that their messages are accepted in the way that they are encoded. This is a rhetorical situation in which both parties challenge the views of the other, views that each party takes to be 'true' and 'real'.

Since the 1970s, Skinner has emphasized the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, which he presented in the *Philosophical Investigations*. In Skinner's view, when the meaning of a concept or an expression lies in its use, meaning in this sense is itself a complex of various possibilities used in linguistic action by the speaker. Skinner points this out in a following way: 'We shall now have to conduct a proper analysis of the notion of using words to mean things and meaning things by those words.' (Skinner 1997, 70)

For Skinner, the illocutionary act is the clue to the speech act: the power of the utterance at the moment of its expression. This is a kind of *Verfremdungseffekt* from speculating the possible truthfulness of a statement or from speculating what is taking place 'in reality' behind the 'sheer rhetoric'. Any kind of background, biographical or contextual information is only a medium for understanding what is taking place in the *actual text*, its meaning in the use of concepts. Skinner brings forth the concept of *intention* as a way of finding out what is taking place in writing a text.

2.1.1 Intention

According to Skinner, to understand the illocutionary act is to understand the intention of the author at the moment of uttering a sentence. He makes a distinction between motives and intentions. The *motive **for** speaking* is external to the act of speaking and does not necessarily solve the problem of the meaning of a sentence or an utterance (Skinner 1988a, 74). He gives an example of a policeman warning a skater about thin ice. The motive of the policeman for giving the warning is the state of feeling that he has at that moment and what he is aiming to accomplish. A motive may be a cause. However, he cannot control what he is *doing* at the moment of warning. Intention is not a cause but the meaning the act is given at the moment of its execution. Intention and

meaning can be a conventional explanation of what usually takes place in a given spoken situation. The skater, however, might mistake the goodwill of the policeman as malevolent intent. This possibility of interpreting a word or sentence in a manner other than intended indicates the multiplicity of meanings. The motive for writing refers to what prompted the writer in the first place to take up the issue and write in a certain way. This also helps to understand what is the relationship of a writer with his/her issue at hand. Knowledge of intention does not, however, require knowledge of motive. Realizing the intention solves the problem of the character of writing or speaking: whether it be written seriously or ironically; whether s/he is (seemingly) disinterested or committed. Skinner writes that realizing the illocutionary force is to realize what the author was doing **in** issuing an utterance (Skinner 1988a, 73-74).

The contingent character of the reception of an utterance indicates that the author may have several intentions from which it is possible to interpret what is crucial concerning the issue at hand. Identifying the possible intention helps to understand what might be the selection of objectives that the author is proceeding towards in his/her text. The interpreter estimates which of these is central to the author in the face of the issue at hand. The author is not simply *reacting* to the most prominent and demanding problems and questions of his/her time, but is him/herself *posing* questions for his/her contemporaries and generations after. The character of questioning emphasizes the idea of intervention in arguments at a certain time. Realizing the intention solves the problem of the character of that intervention: be it satire, parody, description, denial, critique, warning, attack, threat or defence, approval, or contribution (see Skinner 1997, 71-72; 1988a, 76).

Thus, language and utterances can have various levels and dimensions. Skinner emphasizes that what a person means by his/her utterance and what s/he means by uttering it must be analysed. (Skinner 1970, 120) This is the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary levels. An utterance has (1) a denotative *meaning* and *sense* but it is also (2) *used* for a certain purpose. The second case is, according to Skinner, what Austin indicated in writing about the illocutionary force of utterances. The denotative meaning is in many cases well-known or unproblematic whereas the point of the illocutionary act is that which is central to the case at hand for the interpreter (Skinner 1997, 71). In his book *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* Skinner refers to the same distinction. In this book Skinner places Hobbes' writings in his contemporary discussion and earlier traditions in an attempt to find out what was Hobbes' intervention and act in his own time (Skinner 1996b, 7).

2.1.2 Illocutionary re-description

Identifying both levels of the linguistic act, locutionary (denotative) meaning and illocutionary use (intention, intervention) helps to understand the meaning of a text in a specific situation. Skinner terms this 'illocutionary re-description'. (Skinner 1971, 1, 13; Skinner 1988b, 87) One example of illocutionary re-

description is *Kirja A & Ö*, a television programme on the subject of literature, presented by Finnish Public Broadcasting Television 27th January 2002. A group of Finnish professionals in the field of literature discussed the novel *Independence Day* by the young Estonian author Kaur Kender. The discussants contemplated the depressing depiction of the Estonian suburbs at the beginning of the 1990s. They also speculated about the possibility of Kender continuing the tradition of American beat literature. They wondered whether or not the description corresponded with the reality of that time in Estonia. One of the discussants described the novel as follows: it was full of black humour; it was a parody of clichés typically connected to Estonian 'reality'. I take this to be an illocutionary re-description of the novel by Kender. The discussants realized their own goals without exploring the biographies of the writer, and without any knowledge of his motives for writing.

Another example is David Lynch's film *Mulholland Drive*. My illocutionary re-description of the film is that it is an ironical ('extreme') description of the reverse side of the Hollywood dream world. It depicts Hollywood as a powerful industry with a reverse side of personal human tragedies. The film provides a good starting point for understanding the rhetoric of the various traditions presented in this study.

2.2 Naming and evaluating

Skinner interprets the situation of Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century in the sense that he was between the fronts of classical rhetoric and renaissance humanism. They were, according to Skinner, those problems and questions into which Hobbes intervenes with his argumentative stance. Hobbes abandoned the tradition of rhetoric in order to create his own *scientia civilis*. He tried to abandon rhetoric in favour of science. Skinner, however, ends up with the conclusion that Hobbes created his idea of *scientia civilis* by combining elements from rhetoric and science (Skinner 1996b, 7-12). In *Leviathan* Hobbes concluded by emphasizing that in moral and political questions deductive reasoning (which he earlier favoured in contrast to dialogical argument *im utramque partem*) is not convincing if not brought forth with *eloquence* (Skinner 1996b, 15).

In the Roman rhetorical tradition (especially Cicero), winning and disarming through speech was emphasized. There are two major means of convincing an audience: (1) challenging the conventional descriptions of activities and the status quo and (2) using figures and tropes of speech in enforcing an argument. A trope as a metaphor and *figurae* (mode of argument that is unusual and astonishing) were the 'swords' in Roman rhetoric which they called *ornatus* (Skinner 1996b, 50).

The purpose of *eloquence* is to awaken the feelings of an audience in order to bend it to your side. A contemporary example of the use of tropes is how the words of economics have spread into cultural and aesthetic discussion, e.g. the

word capital. One must wonder if this is a way of justifying the inclusion of the arts in the *lingua franca* of our time. Politicians also use metaphoric, clever expressions transferred from everyday situations into political matters to enforce their argument of e.g. the detrimental effects of transgressing the limits of budgets.

Skinner also regards naming and valuing as specific *rhetorical re-descriptions*. Renaming refers to a situation in which a conventional description of the world is rejected because the terms which are employed are not adequately defined. For example, an accused person admits that s/he has taken something but denies that it should be called – named – a theft. Renaming can work in situations in which the 'facts' cannot be denied but it is possible to manipulate the linguistic terms for these facts. A contemporary example might be the question 'what sort of activity can be labelled as terrorism?' or 'should armed violent action be defined as terrorism or freedom-fighting?' The purpose of renaming is to bring a given activity or state of affairs into a new moral light.

Revaluing refers to the situation in which an activity or state of affairs is valued negatively because the normative or moral character is actually better than the descriptive terms suppose. It is a question of manipulating the value connotations that a given term normally has associated with it. The term itself is not necessarily changed but the whole spectrum of values and connotations the term brings forth are manipulated. Revaluing means highlighting the virtuous aspects of a particular term and in that way compromising the opposing arguments. Devaluing means denying the conventional description of the virtues a certain term implies. The purpose in both of these is to present the issue in a different normative and moral light (Skinner 1996b, 139-145).

In classical rhetoric the manipulation of normative colouring was called *paradiastole. Paradiastole* can mean turning vices into virtues (e.g. by renaming a violent action as freedom-fighting rather than terrorism, or devaluing the evil of terrorism and revaluing it as rising up against an oppressive regime). The renaming direction is reversible. Usually gentleness is regarded positively, but by renaming it as a weakness of character, the virtue is turned into a vice.

In my estimation, illocutionary re-description is **describing the** intention of the writers that I have chosen to analyse. I investigate the character of their intervention and its use in the past or ongoing debate, and ascertain whether is, for example, it critique, defence or contribution. Rhetorical re-description is concerned with the directions and changes that the writers analysed are taking in the debates. The dissociative strategy of the writers can be counted as both a defence of one thing and a critique of another. Thus, a text is not solely a critique or a defence, even if one of these aspects may dominate. Analysing dissociations helps us to understand what the writing is a critique or defence of, thus the direction of a statement is the rhetorical re-description. The aim of analysing the above-mentioned tools is to estimate the character of the texts. The following tools are employed in analysing the concepts.

2.3   Description/evaluation

Already before his recourse to rhetorical re-description and paradiastol**e** Skinner expressed similar points from a more specific perspective. *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (eds. T. Ball, J. Farr and R. L. Hanson) contains histories of several political concepts. Skinner's article 'Language and Political Change' is a critique of Raymond Williams' *Keywords* (1976). The aim of the book is to show that language has social and political significance and is not just a 'superstructure' and epiphenomenon of basic unchanging truths. Rather, our political and social reality is constructed through language, which is itself historical throughout. The changes of our language have influence on how we understand our political and social world (Skinner 1989, 3).

According to Skinner, Williams begins promisingly by stating that through studying language (and its changes) we can attain knowledge and understanding of our social world. Skinner, however, asks what specific knowledge can we obtain and how vocabularies should be studied in order to acquire this knowledge (Skinner 1989, 6). He aims to differentiate word and concept. In the author's world view it is not crucial to concentrate on the words s/he uses, but what concepts s/he possesses. From possessing a concept, it does not necessarily follow that the speaker/author will employ a respective word. An equivalence between these does not necessarily exist. As an example, Skinner refers to Milton's *Paradise Lost*. In it Milton describes 'things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme', but he cannot yet use the word 'original'. According to Skinner, Williams seems to construct an equivalence between word and object. Skinner states that the history of the word 'original' is much shorter than the concept of original. Skinner contends that possession of a concept is signalled by the employment of a corresponding term, but not necessarily nor sufficiently (Skinner 1989, 7-8).

Skinner's most important critique of Williams is that he writes too carelessly about the changes of meaning. His own proposal for systematising the study of the changing of meaning is his distinction between descriptive and evaluative levels. At the descriptive level it is crucial to know the range of the criteria within which the word or expression is employed. On the other hand, it is crucial to have a clear sense of the nature of the circumstances in which the word can properly be used to represent particular actions or states of affairs, the range of reference. The concept of reference has often been taken to be an aspect or feature of the meaning of a word. But according to Skinner, it is more helpful to treat the understanding of the reference of a word as a consequence of understanding the criteria for applying it correctly. This is the denotative dimension of a word. The change of this dimension should not, in Skinner's opinion, be taken as a change of meaning.

As an example, Skinner mentions the word 'courage'. The range of criteria for this word could be: to apply the term in situations in which a person is free to act in a certain way; the person is in a dangerous situation; s/he must know

the nature of the act; s/he must act with caution; s/he has to be aware of the possible repercussions of the act. Let's suppose that s/he remains cheerful in the face of a sure and painful death. Is s/he courageous? According to Skinner, the person knows beforehand what is going to take place and as such, is not in immediate danger. In this situation, instead of courage we could speak of fortitude. If a person in a circus audience steps forward to act on behalf of a lion tamer, is s/he courageous? This is a heedless action, not to be called courageous, but reckless. (Skinner 1989, 9-10)

The evaluative level refers to what kind of range of attitudes the term can be used to express. Skinner connects this explicitly to Austin's speech acts, and thus to the linguistic act**ion**. At this point the object of analysis is to solve how the concept is used as an action. Skinner criticizes Williams for his being prone to regarding the change of ranges of attitudes as change of meaning. According to Skinner, the change of attitudes is not sufficient. Different persons may use the same word with the same criteria of application and range of reference but with different normative colouring and attitudes. Each of these three aspects may bring about dispute, not only linguistic dispute but also social. The dispute can be an expression of a dispute with different social groups that accuse each other of a 'wrong' social attitude. When there is dispute on all of these levels (not only attitudes) and one person wins and the other loses, it may be due to a change of meaning. It is also possible that a word can be polysemous, i.e. possessing several meanings, in each time period as opposed to a single standard meaning. Sometimes an older sense is dominantly applied and the newer one disappears. Sometimes the older sense becomes obsolete and is substituted by a new one. (Skinner 1989, 15) An indicator of a social character of linguistic dispute is e.g. that the system of public arts subsidy (what forms of expression benefit and what not) is partly determined and transformed by the linguistic actions in the field (what forms of expressions are valued high and what not).

Skinner also presents an alternative to the decreasing or disappearing of the speech act potential, i.e. the evaluative dimension. The word is employed throughout neutrally and descriptively, bearing no attitudes towards the issue. It is also possible that a much disputed term is dropped from the vocabulary (in order to pacify the rather dull arguments on semantics that some may feel do not lead anywhere). It is extremely difficult to avoid evaluative use of words. Even if you consciously attempt to do so they may creep into speech unintentionally. A writer can, however, contextually make clear the sense in which their words are used, either evaluatively or descriptively (See Skinner 1988c, 128).

Studying language and the meaning of terms and their changes is in Skinner's opinion not a fruitless endeavour from the political and social point of view. Understanding shifts in the use of vocabulary or introduction of new vocabularies enlightens us on social and political theories, beliefs, values and attitudes (Skinner 1989, 20). Any given word is prone to bearing an entire worldview within it. It is a powerful sword in social and political life.

As can be seen from the beginning of this account, the term 'cultural industry' is disputed and its use is loaded with strong and passionate normative colourings. It is my aim in the following study to analyse the character of the speech acts of the various writers by performing an illocutionary re-description. Following this, I go on to analyse the direction of the speech acts throughout the entire texts by finding out what is the rhetorical re-description of the author in question. In addition, I will analyse the descriptive dimension of the use of the given word/term, its application criteria and range of reference, and finally the speech act potential of the concept itself. The aim of the analysis is to investigate the meaning and use of the word/term both historically and in contemporary rhetoric, to study what the use of the word/term tells us about our social and political life, and find out whether a change in meaning of that word/term has taken place or what other circumstances are involved. I also take into account closely related terms and consider their significance within the rhetorical climate.

I have organized the contents of the work in chronological succession. Adorno's critical conception is presented as the starting point and invention of the concept. The studied texts date from the 1930s to the 1960s. Next, the German consciousness industry is presented as representing the climate of the 1970s. The Anglo-Saxon and other European discussions are presented in chapter 5 to point out the translation of the concept with a more neutral and descriptive meaning. The presentation of Finnish cultural policy is a case of European rhetoric received in a local setting. While presenting the theoretical and rhetorical traditions I only refer in passing to the 'methodological' issues. I offer at the end of each chapter the application of the Skinnerian rhetorical point of view to the conceptual analysis.

3 THEODOR W. ADORNO'S CRITIQUE OF THE CULTURE INDUSTRY RECONSIDERED

Adorno's critique of the culture industry cannot be fully understood if the different contexts within which it was born, namely, historical and theoretical and his own personal theoretical characteristics are not taken into consideration. The history of the Frankfurt School, the genesis of its critical theory and Adorno's role in it are all aspects of this contextual story.

A general term that could describe the climate of the birth of critical theory is one of disillusionment. One of the phenomena that caused this was the role of the working class in the historical circumstances at the beginning of the 20th century. On the one hand, the Second International showed the reduction of Marxism to sheer evolutionism. Perhaps a more dramatic cause for disillusionment was the fact that an organized working class could not prevent the outburst of World War I. The failed attempts of revolutions in the West led to the affirmation of the older social and political rule. Furthermore, the situation in the Soviet Union led to the dictatorship of the party avant-garde. (Greven 1994, 11, 23)

At the same time the situation of leftist politics in Germany was fraught with difficulties. Following the end of the First World War and the decline of the German imperial system, the republic was declared in Berlin in November 1918. The Social Democrats, Majority and Independent, took office. The Social Democrats as a regular part of the coalition government with the Communist Party grew in membership during the 1920s, but turned out to be increasingly ineffective. The party's dogmatism in applying theory, its adherence to the 'International-Bolshevik line', and its frequent changes of strategy led to its inability to organize the working class. The Social Democrats for their part completely lost their revolutionary ground. (Held 1980, 18-19)

The first members of the Frankfurt Institut für Sozialforschung, however, believed in the 1920s that socialism might still be possible for Western Europe. This was the optimism of the pre-emigration period in the history of the Frankfurt School. After emigration to the USA it was noticeable that their writings underwent a shift towards a more pessimistic outlook. It was partly the situation of Marxism in Europe and its orthodox versions and dependence

on the Stalinist Soviet Union which led the members of the Frankfurt School to avoid excessively crude Marxist formulations such as 'dialectical materialism'. This 'self-censorship' was also caused by discretion in their newly appointed situation at Columbia University in New York. As a result, the reliance on the revolutionary potentiality of the working class was lessened dramatically. (Jay 1996, 44)

The emergence of authoritarian movements in Europe is thought to have been readily accepted by large populations because of the widespread lack of national identity and the thesis of ego weakness which paved the way for them to seize power. As a diagnosis of their own time, the members of the Frankfurt School began to analyse the influence of technologies on people. Nazism was possibly the first movement in Europe to use it on a mass scale. Thus, technology and mass media were seen as the proper means for an authoritarian political propaganda. Its influence was seemingly guaranteed due to the supposition that Europeans could be easily led.

The situation in their exile in the USA was no better. The American style of cultural life and the rationalization of the working process were to lead to the standardization and categorization of the thinking process. Thus, Taylorism and bureaucratization, rationalized work and organized leisure provided fertile ground for authoritarian influences. While modern art had previously dawned and flourished in Europe, it was now forced to flee the continent because of the threat of Nazism. The situation in exile was, however, no better for all of the above-mentioned reasons. The USA did not resemble a 'free world' in this sense, but was organized and censored in more subtle ways than the Germany of the National Socialist regime. (Witkin 1998, 17; Huyssen 1983, 12) In Adorno's analysis of the culture industry the historical situations in Europe and the USA somehow intermingle to the extent that it can be difficult to separate them. He had already voiced his criticism of the cultural tendencies towards capitalist modernity in Europe, and it seems he also identified 'fascist' tendencies in American cultural life.

3.1 Theoretical context

The naming of the members of the Frankfurt Institut für Sozialforschung as the Frankfurt School took place in the 1960s. The members named themselves as representatives of critical theory already at the end of 1930s after Horkheimer's programmatic essay Traditional and Critical Theory (1937). The foundation of the Institut (1923) was an endeavour of Felix Weil a son of a wealthy entrepreneur. Felix Weil was not interested in continuing business but rather turned towards Marxism. His intention was to found a research institute which would be devoted to scientific socialism. Under the leadership of professorial Marxist, Carl Grünberg, the Institute established research on the history of socialism and the labour movement. The Institute and its overt Marxist research brought

troubles for some of the members and the whole endeavour was suspiced by state authorities. Following Grünberg's withdrawal from the leadership, Max Horkheimer took office with a much more conciliatory agenda. The new programme stated the crisis of Marxism and attempted to overcome it by fusing social philosophy and empirical social science. (Wiggershaus 1994) The aim was to organize materialistic social philosophy and interdisciplinary social research. (Greven 1994, 12)

German Idealism (Kant, Hegel) and subjectivist philosophies (Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard) had played a central role in the thought of the Frankfurt School members during their youth before turning to Marxist thought. Their disillusionment with the working class movement led the members to turn back to early Marx, although with differing interpretations. Generally, they denied the vulgar Marxist interpretations of base and super structure which was dependent on the base. For the members of the Institute the substance of Marx' writings was the realization of alienated and alienating social conditions. From early Marx they also observed that 'capitalism was not merely an economic or political crisis but a catastrophe for the human essence'. (Wiggershaus 1994, 5) It was alienation from true humanity.

Georg Lukács and Karl Korsch were writers whose ideas and deviations from orthodox, deterministic Marxism were partly formed on the background of the Frankfurt School members. Their emphasis throughout was the idea of human subjectivity against ideas on a 'determinist' historical development. (Held 1980, 20-21; Jay 1996, 42) Lukács's theory of reification that permeates all spheres of life was the idea that influenced their critique of culture. However, they were hostile to the idea of the proletariat as the subject-object of history and the standpoint of the proletariat as the criterion of truth. (Held 1980, 22-23) Max Weber's writings were the source of their ideas on rationalization and bureaucratization. Sigmund Freud's influence on their writings on society, family and subjectivity were crucial. (ibid.)

While critical theory was a critique of capitalism it was at the same time a critique of Marxism-Leninism and the type of rule in the Soviet Union. During the 1930s they disputed the nature of the relationship of the state and the economy; the question of monopoly capitalism versus state capitalism. They were in agreement with the phenomenon of 'primacy of politics' both with German Fascism and Soviet Socialism. Friedrich Pollock, for example, analysed the transformation of private capitalism into bureaucratic socialism and fascism which both represented state capitalism. Willem van Reijen and Jan Bransen describe the transformation of liberal capitalism into post-liberal. Liberalism was an episode in history which collapsed into methods of governance that excluded the freedom of markets. The free market system was transformed by state interventions for the purposes of balancing economic crises. The interventions ranged from the compensatory welfare state to the terrors of totalitarian regimes. (van Reijen & Bransen 1987, 439-440) Thus, in the primacy of politics the state took over the free movement of liberal capitalist dynamics,

which in turn led to a post-liberal state of capitalism. Pollock's thesis reflected this brand of state capitalism.

Adorno and Horkheimer fostered the description of this situation instead as monopoly capitalism, in which the organization of the state also plays an important part. The theory ranges between three assumptions. The view of the economy was one which entailed the disappearance of individual entrepreneurship and small and medium-scale capital along with market competition. The theory on politics was a conjecture of a liberal state transforming into authoritarian machinery and the inefficiency of political activity in these circumstances. Cultural life was seen as a means of sustaining this political situation with the help of a rationalized economic mode of production, which is not necessarily intentional but brought about by the general dynamic of the intertwinement of these spheres. The idea of monopoly building also in cultural life is prone to solidify the political consensus as it is. (see Mehtonen & Sironen 1991, 44)

During the 1940s, around the time of the completion of *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, the tone of analysis turned into a critique of instrumental reason, progress or positivism. This was a movement towards more philosophical questions, away from the more interdisciplinary empirical research of the 1930s in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung.*

Certain aspects of the theorisation of the Frankfurt School members make them incompatible with the contemporary 'post-modernists'. These aspects were also incompatible with the ideas of much contemporary thought of their time. Their emphasis was on truth and reason, however historical and mutable they may be. Perhaps the strongest and most original of their arguments was the dialectical mediation of social reality and philosophy. They denied the identity of subject and object, mind and matter and the primacy of the subject in philosophy. In addition, they denied the emphasis of the individual and society as polar opposites. Furthermore, they believed that the reification of either absolutism or relativism would lead to a false standpoint. According to Horkheimer there is historical truth, but none beyond time. Each period of time therefore has its own truth. Its criterion might be its possibility to foster social change. The dialectical mediation between reverse sides applies also as far as culture or art is concerned. Culture and art are never merely a reflection of the base structure, as orthodox Marxists might point out. Nor was it an entirely autonomous sphere. The relationships between society and culture were multidimensional. (Jay 1996, 47-63) More than artwork reflecting the social base or any class interests, these social contradictions are integrated into the very logic of artwork. An artist constructs with the typical language of his/her art form a contradiction, which is a type of analogy of the individual in the social condition. Only through this kind of 'disinterested' mediation can artwork avoid false representations of reality and exist as a sphere of truth in a world of crude equivalencies.

Paradoxically, despite their emphasis on truth, the search for primary truths was anathema. One can never find a resting place and say; here is where

truth lies. (Jay 1996, 67) Rather, one has to question all claims for truth and remain disinterested in the face of all movements in history.

Greven, however, describes the dead end of the historical situation, causing for the Frankfurt School members a 'Defizit an Politik'. They place more emphasis on philosophical problems rather than contributing to the actual problems of their time. This leads to the **incapacity** of action and politics (*Handlungs- und Politikunfähigkeit*). For some critics this is merely a cultural critique which is related to what it criticizes: mass culture. This interpretation might be a result of the tendency of the Frankfurt School members to reduce diverse political, economical and cultural phenomena to a single logic. In that sense, while they criticize the economic mode of production for reducing aesthetic creativity to a schema, they do the same to the description of the social and political world. According to Greven, in their historical analyses they have a misconception of the history of political theory and of consciousness and knowledge theory. Greven especially opposes their attempt to uncover a 'true essence of humanity' (Wiggershaus). According to Greven, the starting point must always be the historical situation beyond which there is no reality that is more 'real' than the present. The possibilities of the subject are bound to what exists and grows from this. There are no external boundaries that tie him/her, rather the boundaries are within. Due to the lack of outside boundaries there is always a contingent situation in the existing world and a possibility of intervention and action. However, Greven also contends that in the thought of critical theorists there has always been the possibility that 'people make their own history'. (Greven 1994, 14-15, 21-22)

The political action in the thought of critical theorists lies in the actual writing; in the analysis of their own time, even though this is abstract and philosophical. According to Wiggershaus, their intention was to 'break the spell' of the social condition. Their intention was a type of 'salvation through knowledge and discovery'. (Wiggershaus 1994, 6) The idea that they were writing solely cultural critique does not recommend their thought on materialistic interdisciplinary social philosophy and their respective theses. Another question which cannot be resolved trough 'revisions' of their thought, and in which Greven is right, is the possibility of a more real world behind the illusion. From the point of view of 'post-modern political theory' this search for truth, how ever mutable it might be, is a dead end of critical theory in its older form.

3.2 Theoretical background of Adorno's critical thought

Adorno as a prominent figure of the Frankfurt School was, and still is, a fiercely disputed thinker. He is known especially for his defence of **M**odern art and music, critique of philosophy, negative dialectics and critique of philosophy of history. As a co-writer of *Dialektik der Aufklärung* he has become a widely

known and disputed critic of mass culture. The Anglo-Saxon writers have put forward the most denunciating criticisms of his ideas, which are themselves often limited and even mislead.

Adorno's theory of the culture industry could be described as a constellation of several sources of influence. Firstly, an allegiance to **M**odernist movements in the arts, **E**xpressionist music and, in particular, literature. Secondly, a strain of cultural conservatism, which could be seen as incompatible with aesthetic **M**odernism. However, the conservative strain may be explained by his longing for the bourgeois era before the rise of concentrated and monopolistic capitalism during 19th century. This nostalgia can be noticed in some passages in his texts, such as in the *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie* (1962) where he describes the decay of the bourgeois practice of personal music making through new reproduction technologies such as radio and audio recordings. He cannot, however, be reduced to conservatism in any way. He does not share the conservative dissociations of the material and the intellectual and the emphasis on intellect. Rather, Adorno accepts the corporal strains in traditional popular cultures and folk culture. His critique of the culture industry from this perspective is that it has lost these corporal elements and turned out to be more on the side of reason and intellect, that is, rational and calculative cultural production. The third element in this group is Freud's **P**sychoanalysis. In particular, the idea of the Oedipus complex forms the background to the 'manipulation' or conformism thesis of the culture industry critique. The concept suggests that as a consequence of the failed internalization of the father authority, personal and individual autonomy remains insufficient and the individual becomes more inclined to internalize authorities outside the family, such as the influences of the culture industry. The fourth element is Marxism. The chief argument of his brand of Marxism in relation to the culture industry is the decline of competitive capitalism in the face of monopolistic tendencies. On the other hand, he sees the phenomena of reification and instrumentalization in the cultural sphere where utility values are substituted by exchange values. Crucial to comprehending Adorno's ideas is the understanding that these tendencies also take place in the traditional sphere of so-called high culture. The fifth element is his understanding of the American political, social and cultural system, as he experienced it during the 1940s.

Reading the Culture Industry chapter in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* can lead to the conclusion that Adorno was hostile to American mass culture and would regard it as the antithesis of German high culture. However, the culture industry for Adorno was not only an American phenomenon. The argument is much more general and universal; it is the organization of culture in advanced industrial societies. The critique in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* is also directed at the transition of Weimar **M**odernism to **F**ascist mass culture.[1] The main concern for Adorno is the defeat of the individual in liberal societies, which is threatened by monopoly capitalism or a Soviet model of centralisation.

---

[1]   Concerning the analysis of **F**ascist culture see Dröge & Müller 1995.

(Hohendahl 1992, 96) Adorno saw the problematical situation of culture already in his writings on Wagner (which he started in Europe) and the germs of mass culture in Wagner's *Gesamtkunstwerk*. It is crucial that the image he portrays of Wagner is ambivalent throughout, his options were open in both directions: Modernism and popular music. So, in Hohendahl's words: '...[he] was therefore critical of a position that would identify 'bad' mass culture exclusively with America and 'good' high culture with Europe'. (Hohendahl 1992, 77)

The reason for Adorno's obvious hostility towards American political, social and cultural life is that it was coloured by the after-effects of his departure from Europe and Fascist Germany. His experiences interconnect; on the one hand the American lifestyle reminded him of Nazi Germany and the years preceding it, but he also predicted that the German Modernist cultural life could not be rebuilt after the war; and moreover, it might instead come to more resemble American life. The reason why the German and American experiences intermingle is that the analysis of one is equally the analysis of the other. Hohendahl points out that: '...both the political system of the National Socialists and the organization of culture in North America were seen as aspects of the same historical dialectic of reason'. Adorno and Horkheimer were more interested in the general structure than contrasts between these countries. The only contrast that might have existed was a temporal one, in which America was regarded as a more advanced capitalist system than Germany (Hohendahl 1992, 89-90). The transformation of the arts and literature in America at that time was in Adorno's opinion more profound and more influenced by monopoly capitalism than in Western Europe. (ibid. 77)

Adorno's vision of America and his acquaintance with it might be described as unhappy. He first arrived in New York and joined the Radio Research Project in Princeton University and then moved to Los Angeles. First he saw a society dominated by new mass media, closely followed by the Hollywood 'dream factories', which created in him the strong impression that these formed the centre of the new cultural development. His experience of other significant parts of the USA, such as New England or the southern states was highly limited. (Hohendahl 1992, 85-86)

As far as the working class is concerned the Culture Industry chapter is also a description of the disintegration of the working class and its reconstitution as 'the masses'. As Adorno arrived in the USA at the end of the 1930s he had no memory of the economic depression of the beginning of the 1930s and the poverty of the working class. The poverty was not a problem for him, but the conformism of the working class and their docile nature was. (Hohendahl 1992, 81-84) It was precisely this anticipated massification which in his opinion was leading modern society toward authoritarian and ultimately to totalitarian structures. The consumers of the USA were no less able to be manipulated than the followers of Nazi ideology in Germany. (ibid. 95) Arguments such as for film and radio as new the media of democracy demonstrated utmost naivety to Adorno. The very term 'industry' implies that these new media forms were organised from above, and assumed a passive

audience below. They were entirely applicable as instruments for propaganda but not suitable for democracy. (Hohendahl 1992, 95-96)

However, the influences of the American years on Adorno were both positive and negative. As might be anticipated, after his return to Europe he was more watchful for the signs of an American-style culture in the 'old continent'. Because of his aesthetic **M**odernism he was not a defender of traditional high culture in its canonic form before his exile. This suspicion of an elitist attitude toward culture for its own sake was even strengthened in North America. The fetishization of high culture was for him ideology, as were the manipulative elements in industrially produced culture. Upon his return to Germany he must have brought with him some encouraging experiences in empirical social science. The product of his empirical 'teamwork' was the study *The Authoritarian Personality.* He also had more respect for democratic politics in its American form after his return, which led him to emphasize the significance of education in bringing forth a more democratic system also in Germany. (Jay 1985, 124, 126; see Adorno 1969c)

These five points (**M**odernism, conservatism, Marxism, **P**sychoanalysis and American culture) are the elements of Adorno's cultural industry critique, and especially the theoretical and historical contexts of its formation. The theory cannot be reduced to any of one these sources of influence, rather they all intermingle in his critique. Furthermore, Adorno's critique is a diagnosis of his own time and historical situation. It is for this reason that he grasped the phenomenon of the culture industry. It is not a universal, over-historical analysis. It cannot be implemented as such in later historical situations. The most serious problems in the critical reception of Adorno's theory are the anachronistic interpretations of his theories. One cannot evaluate Adorno's contribution by saying how adequately it describes the world we live in because it does not describe our world, but his own. The proper question might be what was his point of view in the face of the 1940s and the decades surrounding them. However, he did describe certain tendencies and germs of them which we now see in their full blossom. It might also be useful to uncover the mode of argumentation that Adorno used in his critique and try to implement that form of logic to our world.

In my analysis I shall construct an account of the logic of mass culture using Adorno's analyses from the 1930s to the 1960s. It is important to note that Adorno started to write on music and mass culture already in the 1930s before his emigration. The image of his critique may also become altered by analysing the texts written before his emigration. He also continued his line of analysis and theorisation after his return to Germany in the 1950s. Among the most influential books of the Frankfurt School, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* written during World War II in the USA, offers a clue to his critique. It also offers the mode of argumentation that I am searching for and opens up other texts written both before and after. In some sense, the dialectic of enlightenment is a 'grand narrative' within which the story of the logic of mass culture is the diagnosis of the way in which it takes place.

3.3 The dialectic of enlightenment as a mode of argumentation

For Adorno and Horkheimer, enlightenment was legitimate in its *Entzauberung der Welt*. It is an attempt to free the world from myth and magic, an idea inherited from Weber. However, their point that enlightenment itself turns into myth is not compatible with Weber's idea of the possibility of a unified value system entirely lost in the modern world. In Adorno's and Horkheimer's work, enlightenment produces dialectically exactly that which it tries to dispose of. Nature, both internal and external, is a material for ordering and classifying. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 13) The most powerful fear in the mythic world and the world of modern science is the fear of the unknown. That is why all that is unfamiliar is attempted to be captured, and the world is subject to classification and study in infinite detail. (ibid. 17-18) However, the unknown has the tendency to strike back. One never attains absolute certainty and clarity. Instead of attaining certainty, the outcome is rather a tradition of subordination of nature, both within and without. According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the curse of irresistible progression is irresistible regression. The reverse side of civilization is suppression. (ibid. 32-35) The tragedy of modernity is, of course, the element of striking back; the violent outbursts of the regressed.

This paradox of modernity could be compared to Walter Benjamin's theses on philosophy of history. According to Benjamin, '[e]s ist niemals ein Dokument der Kultur, ohne zugleich ein solches der Barbarei zu sein' (Benjamin 1974, 254). In a widely known fragment of these theses Benjamin describes the Angel of History, which he interpreted in the painting by Paul Klee *Angelus Novus*. The wind of progress pushes the angel toward the future, to which she has turned her back. All that the angel can see are the ruins piling up in front of her, while the wind continues to convey her forward toward the future. (Benjamin 1974, 255) The sublime horizon of the future is never reached; the future is back before we notice it. The only witness of the future is the ruin which has been brought about. The story of the Angel of History tells us the story of the dialectic of progress in temporal development.

The myth of Ulysses in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* turns our view to the analogy of disciplining of our inner nature. The twelfth song of Homer's epic 'Ulysses' tells the story of Ulysses' sailing ship passing by the Sirens. Ulysses is warned of the danger of the Sirens and passing them by is a test of his capability to avoid relapsing into temptation. Ulysses is bound to the mast and the more he is fascinated with the song of the Sirens the more tightly he lets himself be bound. As far as Ulysses is concerned it is a story of self-preservation, an ability to keep his inner instincts under control. Ulysses' role is that of commander and leader, and he commands the oarsmen to stop their ears with wax. They know of the danger of the song of the Sirens, but nothing of its beauty. So, deaf to the song the oarsmen continue rowing, isolated and unable to communicate. The rowers are the analogy of the role of the underclass, commanded and isolated from each other and burdened by their daily work.

(Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 39-41) Because of the burdens of daily life, they are unable to appreciate the beauty of the song. They are too tired to even try to understand it. Their world is the realm of labour, without the opportunity to understand their situation or take action in order to be able to change it. Ulysses, for his part, is representative of the bourgeois, being at liberty to contemplate the beauty of the song. It is, however, transcended as the realm of culture. The binding of Ulysses indicates the impossibility of turning contemplation into action. Culture is, in Marcusean terms, 'affirmative', having no relevance in every day struggles. This Homeric story tells in analogous form the paradox of modernity in the form of self-preservation causing human suffering. People are (even in modern times) over depressed, over burdened and tired or have too little time to develop judgement and understanding of the truth-potential of major art, Schönberg or Proust. Neither do they have enough energy to try to judge the complexity of modern socio-political life. Thus, they welcome the release from the demands of the work process provided by Hollywood films etc. (see Bowie 1997)

The outcome of modernity is a dynamic described in the mythical story above, namely the impoverishment of the imagination '...die Dauer der Herrschaft bedingt bei technischen Erleichterung des Daseins die Fixierung der Instinkte durch stärkere Unterdrückung. Die Phantasie verkümmert.' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 42) Paradoxically, technological progress in work and everyday life does not equate with progress of humanity, rather, it is a regression of it. In work, technology means division of labour, which in turn limits the sphere of individual responsibility to only a small area of production; in short, one is not required to develop one's capacities. In everyday life, technology means a reduction in the use of one's own imagination in coping with life's various everyday challenges. This brings about a loss of fantasy and imagination which is not due to a failing in progress as such, but due to the paradoxical situation that the very success of progress leads to its own demise. The tragedy lies in the fact that this technical progress never ceases, but penetrates into the very cells of individual existence both in the spheres of work and leisure. This has a marked influence on the control and command of our inner life and fantasy. As Horkheimer and Adorno point out, the last remnant of unrestrained fantasy may well only be found in childhood. (ibid. 40)

Horkheimer and Adorno mourn for the disappearance and suppression of sensual elements in modernity. This applies especially to intellectual work (and science), which attempts to create a separation between sensuality and sensual experience. The outcome is a forcing of consensus and unanimity (*Einstimmigkeit*): 'die Resignation des Denkens zur Herstellung von Einstimmigkeit, bedeutet Verarmung des Denkens so gut wie der Erfahrung; die Trennung beider Bereiche lässt beide als beschädigte zurück.' (ibid. 42) The intellect and experience as separate spheres lead to the impoverishment of both. This emphasis on experience and sensuality is a strain in Adorno's and Horkheimer's thought that separates it from conservative thinking which

emphasizes the intellectual and the spiritual in contrast to the material and sensual.

The notion of the massification, isolation and powerlessness of modern people and especially the working class is outlined in the following passage. It is also the link between the interpretation of Ulysses' myth and modern mass media:

> 'Die Regression der Massen heute ist die Unfähigkeit, mit eigenen Ohren Ungehörtes hören, Unergriffenes mit eigenen Händen tasten zu können, die neue Gestalt der Verblendung, die jede besiegte mythische ablöst. Durch die Vermittlung der totalen, alle Beziehungen und Regungen erfassenden Gesellschaft hindurch werden die Menschen zu eben dem wieder gemacht, wogegen sich das Entwicklungsgesetz der Gesellschaft, das Prinzip des Selbst gekehrt hatte: zu bloßen Gattungswesen, einander gleich durch Isolierung in der zwanghaft gelenkten Kollektivität. Die Ruderer, die nicht zueinander sprechen können, sind einer wie der andere im gleichen Takte eingespannt wie der moderne Arbeiter in der Fabrik, im Kino und im Kollektiv. Die konkreten Arbeitsbedingungen in der Gesellschaft erzwingen den Konformismus und nicht die bewussten Beeinflussungen, welche zusätzlich die unterdrückten Menschen dumm machten und von der Wahrheit abzögen. Die Ohnmacht der Arbeiter ist nicht bloß eine Finte der Herrschenden, sondern die logische Konsequenz der Industriegesellschaft, in die das antike Fatum unter der Anstrengung, ihm zu entgehen, sich schließlich gewandelt hat.' (ibid. 43)[i]

The people are freed from mythical, unknown powers and their existence as the primary species among other species. The tragedy of modernity is that the force of progress turns people back into existence as a species being. The growing leisure time and modern collectivity is not a solution to the problem of isolation by conveyor, either in the office or in the Soviet collective. Isolation and organization furthers all spheres of life, including leisure time, such as experienced at the cinema. But this is not a conscious, conspiratorial intention of the politically and economically powerful. It is more a kind of 'natural law' which follows industrialization and in which we all play our part. It is in our experience a deliberate act of forgetting of ourselves, our intentions and opinions in disheartening circumstances which is the fulfilment of the analogy of the Siren episode. Another key element in this story is the possibility that the suppressed may eventually violently burst out of their circumstances. This can take place through projection, in which a hatred of yourself and your deficits is projected onto somebody else.

3.4 Adorno's speech acts

Dialektik der Aufklärung provides a clue to understanding Adorno's ideas on cultural industry. It is an argument intended as a culture and civilization critique. The argument in the book can be applied to various kinds of disciplines including studies on the arts and cultural production. The most obvious *intention* in the book is a critique of prevailing scientific 'ideologies' (Positivism) as well as the situation of advanced monopoly capitalism. At the beginning of this study I outlined the historical situation from which the work

originated and its theoretical context. The book also contributes to the line of arguments presented by Nietzsche (critique of religion and science), Freud (Psychoanalysis), Lukács (thesis of reification), Weber (thesis of rationalization) and Marx (critique of political economy). Their cultural critical argument in contribution to the above-mentioned theses was that the entire world had become totally administered. The cultural industry is one empirical example of this kind of totally administered world in which even leisure time is organized gavage. Their intervention into this discussion is the critique of progress; the technical, economical and scientific (Positivism) critiques. Their intention was to break the spell of the idea of continuous technological and economic progress. Their mode of argument was a description of paradoxical development: an attempt to show the blind-spots of belief in progress and in the application of that belief. This is also a *paradiastolic* rhetorical re-description exposing the bordering vices of professed virtues, i.e. their reverse sides. As a *paradiastole* it devalues the belief in progress, turning the positive idea into a negative. A special feature of Horkheimer's and Adorno's description is the notion of a kind of logic moving by itself, which only needs to be observed and noticed as taking place in each sphere of life in modernity. However, the intentional act of observing and clarifying it breaks the spell, i.e. the form of political activity which Horkheimer and Adorno assumed; it suggests the possibility of thinking otherwise.

The use of the term 'cultural industry' was fully deliberated by Horkheimer and Adorno. As a rhetorical re-description it was *renaming*. In 1962 in 'Résumé über Kulturindustrie' Adorno points out that in the 1940s they were using the term 'mass culture' in their written drafts, but this term might have given a false connotation:

> 'In unseren Entwürfen war von Massenkultur die Rede. Wir ersetzten den Ausdruck durch 'Kulturindustrie', um von vornherein die Deutung auszuschalten, die den Anwälten der Sachen genehm ist: dass es sich um etwas wie spontan aus den Massen selbst aufsteigende Kultur handele, um die gegenwärtige Gestalt von Volkskunst. Von einer solchen unterscheidet Kulturindustrie sich aufs äußerste. Sie fügt Altgewohntes zu einer neuen Qualität zusammen. In all ihren Sparten werden Produkte mehr oder minder planvoll hergestellt, die auf den Konsum durch Massen zugeschnitten sind und in weitem Maß diesen Konsum von sich aus bestimmen. Diese einzelnen Sparten gleichen der Struktur nach einander oder passen wenigstens ineinander. Sie ordnen sich fast lückenlos zum System.' (Adorno 1962/1977, 337)[ii]

This passage gives the suggestion that the selection and invention of the term was deliberately addressed to the defenders of the new media world and its so-called democracy at that time. It was, therefore, an example of renaming, which attempted to change the normative colouring of the phenomenon of mass culture, its harmfulness being emphasized through the use of the word 'industry'. It was addressed to early American mass communication research which Adorno became acquainted with during his involvement in Lazarsfeld's Radio Research Project. So-called 'administrative research' of this kind worked towards the legitimisation of media companies. (Adorno 1969b). Adorno describes his astonishment at hearing discussions all around him on studies of 'likes' and 'dislikes'.

This was a clash of different worlds. The American humanities had experienced a so-called behaviouristic turn, in which the object of study was the actual behaviour of people rather than speculation on democracy, the public sphere and citizenship, as for example Walter Lippmann and John Dewey earlier put forward. The behaviouristic study was by nature based on empirical observations and numerical data processed by statistical 'scientific' analysis. This same approach was also applied to media studies at that time, which was later to be named the Mass Communication Research tradition. The model of understanding the media system was a unilinear media-message-receiver paradigm (which had, however, already been modified in many ways during the 1940s). The most striking concern was the media influence. On the one hand, the researchers tried to solve the problem of whether the influence was too strong and harmful. The results of this media industry financed research usually carried relatively little influence. On the other hand, the researchers were asked how they could develop greater influence, for example via advertising and marketing, and thus the research institutes also tended to double-up as market researchers. They were economically and politically well connected. This observation prompted the classification of their work as 'administrative research'. The studies usually even excluded social and cultural issues, not to mention social theory. Their most influential background assumption was the behaviouristic orientation in communication studies. Cynically speaking, they simply counted on the 'facts' of the 'real world' taken together to prove or falsify assumptions. Their starting point consisted of empirical studies as a test of theories. The emigrants of the Frankfurt School took this as evidence for justifying the way things are. However, this type of research cannot prove anything more than what is already apparent. They themselves emphasized that the theory was only a starting point. It is not a question of simply applying empirical facts to theoretical patterns, but trying to use various sources of social theory in formulating a vision of the structures and essentials behind the appearances. (Pietilä 1998; Malmberg 1998) Their theoretical background was formed from the ideas of German Idealism, Marx, Freud, Lukàcs, Nietzsche or Weber, with help of which they diagnosed the 'appearances' of their time. For the Frankfurt School members this background was a *Verfremdungseffekt* from mere constative empirical observations and statements. However, the use of Nietzsche or Weber, for example, as an element in a 'holistic' view does not favour Nietzsche's or Weber's own ideas.

Especially problematic was the finding of 'mass communication research' that audiences are free, selective and interpretative. Renaming of the rhetorical re-description was also coupled with devaluation of the professed characteristics of the phenomenon. In his critique, Adorno tried to change the idea of a mass culture as being a 'democratic'[2] form of cultural production. The passage above gives the impression of cultural production being forced upon its

---

[2]   Throughout this study I use the word democracy in a loosely sociological sense. The parallel or analogy with political theory is the distinction between the minority and majority principle.

recipients from above. Even demand is manipulated and determined as being receptive to the products offered.

By solely reading *Dialektik der Aufklärung* and its chapter on the culture industry, one may be given the idea that the term was chosen to describe the American form of cultural production in its mass scale. But his writings both before and after his emigration revise this idea. Adorno had written articles on the 'product development' of high culture in the 'old continent' as far back as in the 1930s. So, the critique was not addressed only to American or popular culture. His writings are also addressed towards the fascist's tendency to selectively mobilize German high culture in order to prop up their political system while forcing German avant-gardists into emigration. The texts (especially articles on jazz) might also be seen as a reaction of the invasion of the American entertainment culture into Germany through its various domesticated forms of dance music. An important *motive for* his *writing* is the feeling of a disappearance of the position of intellectuals in late modern world (see Steinert 1992).

In the following chapters I shall reconstruct Adorno's idea on the logic of mass culture which analyses in detail the dynamic of the history of modernity as a paradoxical development. At the same time, I aim to determine the criteria for application, ranges of reference and ranges of attitude concerning the cultural industry in his account. It is worth noting that the idea of the cultural industry as a paradoxical development is not intended throughout as a serious-minded critique. Rather, there is a certain amount of irony in his sense of paradoxes and in his account of modernity and modern cultural production. One might also speculate if presenting things in terms of paradoxes can be interpreted as a move towards their rhetorical re-description as a *paradiastolic* revision of their normative colour. It is an attempt to show that good things always contain a germ of their negative reverse side *and* vice versa: the blind spots in the meaning of good or bad. Describing the world in the form of paradoxical developments turns the view into a devaluation of 'prevailing truths'. Within this study I am ultimately speculating whether Adorno's texts also contain a reverse dialectic direction, from a bad situation into something better. Thus, Adorno's thought also contains the possibility of finding greater opportunity in a number of circumstances in the 'totally administered' world that do not solely follow the logic of good intentions. This therefore inadvertently produces unintentional harmful repercussions, but every situation possesses an asset and the possibility of something 'better'.

3.5 The logic of mass culture

A point worth noting is that Adorno did not think that markets are detrimental to art and culture as such. One has to keep in mind that the Frankfurt School members wrote their analyses some time after Marx's critique of political

economy. The argument in this critique concerned the transformation of free exchange and markets towards the concentration of capital. Competition and exchange between individual sellers and buyers disappears and is substituted by the mass-scale production of a limited number of conglomerates. Adorno called this situation 'post-competitive capitalism' (Adorno 1941, 29, some orthodox Marxists called it 'imperialistic capitalism'). The core of Adorno's critique of the culture industry is the birth of monopoly, in which genuine and diverse cultural production stemming from the people themselves is substituted by a limited number of product types. These types are distinguishable from each other due to illusionary variations alone. It represents a belief in tested formulas and the endless iteration of their receipt.

In the *Dialektik der Aufklärung* Horkheimer and Adorno note that the birth of anonymous markets following absolutism and along with the rise of the bourgeoisie was the prerequisite for the autonomisation of art. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 166; see also Habermas 1990, 101; Wellershoff 1967, 1015) This is so because artists were no longer dependent on individual patrons, the court or the church. One cannot unambiguously proclaim Adorno to be a defender of public *patronage* cultural policy. Public support in monetary form does not guarantee the autonomy of art. This conclusion can be found in a passage in *Philosophie der neuen Musik.* In it, Adorno describes the fact that in the situation where mass culture dominates there is a lack of buying public for any kind of esoteric work, thus this work ceases to exist unless under the shelter of public support, in this case either in Europe or the USA. Public support is not a guarantee of free creativity, as is usually believed in European countries. Rather, in Adorno's opinion it is the situation of subordinating the artist to a situation of 'civil servant': 'Auch darin setzt der generelle Zug sich durch, den Künstler, dem die Basis des liberalen Unternehmertums unter den Füssen schwankt, in einen Angestellten zu verwandeln. So ergeht es nicht nur der Musik, sondern allen Bereichen des objektiven Geistes, zumal dem literarischen. Der wahre Grund ist die anwachsende ökonomische Konzentration und das Absterben der freien Konkurrenz'. (Adorno 1949/1976, 29) Adorno's opinion may be somewhat similar to the pejorative description of the receivers of public arts support as 'state artists'. This is brought about by mass culture and the concentration of capital in which, in Adorno's opinion, there are no 'small-scale' or 'esoteric' competitors and no audience for them. Curiously, Adorno's arguments cannot be taken as an authority to defend the public support system but rather as an authority to defend so-called small and medium-scale entrepreneurship. Essentially, the economic situation of Modern music (as with Modern art) resembles the situation prior to the market system, i.e. that of patronage by the court or the church. Modern music, by its essential character of autonomy, denies the democratic, large-scale circulation and popularity among the public. So, it is forced to apply to institutions, public organizations and commissions in order to somehow keep its production financed. The irony here is that the analogy with the situation prior to competitive markets denies the system of contemporary commission its ability

to enhance the autonomy of art. If there is an ideal situation for Adorno, it might be the emerging capitalism of the 17th and 18th century.

3.5.1 Industrialization and rationalization

Adorno described in his article 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik' (1932) the change in the function of music in the modern situation. The article contains observations of the commodification of musical life as a whole, not only popular music. A kind of nostalgia can also be noticed in his reference to bourgeois music making in private houses having disappeared and been substituted by records, popular concerts or radio. (Adorno 1932, 103) An important argument I wish to draw attention to in this article is the idea of rationalization, which applies both to the bourgeois classical music culture and the entertainment culture. Industrialization does not **only** mean the invention of the record but also a certain kind of organisation of production in musical institutions. Adorno's notion is that the emptiness and banality of light music coincides with the industrialization of production. (Adorno 1932, 374) If this industrialization does not refer to the invention of the record, then what is it exactly? The background for a new kind of industrial mode of production is the new condition of competition in which only the economically strongest survive. This forces production to a mass scale in order to reduce costs. Adorno discusses this in relation to music. The characteristics of the industrial mode of production are 1) organisation of production as a monopoly in order to raise the stakes for new entrepreneurs entering the market 2) pre-calculation of demand - making the song as easy as possible to understand and 'to sing along to' 3) the fading out of the contrast within songs, leaving only the most instantly exciting, new and easily recognizable content 4) reliance on the past musical traditions of Classicism and Romanticism. (Adorno 1932, 374) The dynamic described above is Adorno's most central theory concerning the repercussions caused by the economic mode of production in the post-liberal economic state on the contents of musical and other works. In his essay written in 1932 he describes the aspects of a phenomenon which ten years later or so he *names* as *Kulturindustrie*. His 1932 essay specifically highlights the situation in which the tradition of bourgeois art, even in Germany, is transformed and instrumentalized as *Betrieb.* What was once a sphere of independent thought now becomes just another commodity.

The idea is to describe the way in which popular music (*Vulgärmusik*) develops from the older forms of classical music and how the vulgarisation of this classical tradition leads to easily digested music without tensions, musical development and *Zusammenhang,* relations between unity and integral parts. The industrialization process also means organization of the whole of cultural life as it was in Adorno's day, with trusts becoming economic entities, gatekeepers, distributors, concert program officers, and producers of music hall programmes all in one. Such industrialized organization of musical events leads to calculated success. The main indicator for possible success is the prospect of easy acceptance of the music, so any challenging aspects must be eradicated

and along with this, the depth and contrast and all criteria for genuine musical work.

The following passage gives an idea of the outcomes of this kind of industrialization:

> 'Während noch ein Schlager wie 'Walencia', um den Markt zu bezwingen, die Banalität seiner Sekundschritte durch asymmetrische, 'aparte' Metrik von anderen Banalitäten unterscheiden musste, sind die durchrationalisierten, kapitalistisch-arbeitsteiligen Fabriken der Tonfilmschlager solcher Mühe enthoben. Ihre Produkte dürfen aussehen und klingen wie sie wollen, sie werden 'Erfolge'; die Hörer müssen sie nachsingen, nicht bloß weil die präziseste Maschinerie ohne Unterlass sie ihnen einhämmert, sondern vor allem, weil das Tonfilmmonopol verhindert, dass andere Musikware überhaupt an sie herangebracht wird, die sie wählen könnten.' (Adorno 1932, 375)

The outcome is, of course, a monopoly position of certain products while others are banished into near non-existence. Still, these products might be worth noting because they could also turn out to be successes, as Adorno indicates.

It may be difficult to distinguish what exactly is industrialization or rationalization, and where they differ because they are somewhat intermingled in the texts. However, my interpretation of Adorno's account defines industrialization as being the organisation of production in order to secure the successfulness of the products to the greatest possible extent. Classical repertoires (of music and other arts) possess certain elements which have the power to attract audiences. The managers of orchestras, museums and publishing companies count on these elements in order to secure their livelihoods. In entertainment production, such as with film scores as described above by Adorno, the attractions are 'churned out' on a mass scale.

Adorno's view is that light music is not *as such, necessarily* banal. It is *made* to be such with the help of the industrial mode of production: die Aushöhl*ung* und Banalisier*ung* der leichten Musik. This is a devaluation of the word 'industry'. It does not implicate democracy - universal access to cultural products and their diversity - but monopoly, catering solely for the tastes of the average consumer. It is not audience-orientated, rather, it orientates the audience; it does not react to demand but controls it. It is not something of novelty; rather, it draws on old formulas. It marks a devaluating rhetorical description of industry. If the belief in progress as described earlier is implemented in cultural production, this is industrialization. If cultural production (with the help of novel technological innovations) at the time of its birth at the end of the 19th century was defended by the terms 'democracy', 'popularity' or 'novelty', Adorno changes the moral light of this discourse by introducing his own terms of 'monopoly', 'manipulation of taste' and 'formulas'. It was not 'mass communication' which implicates the former virtues but 'industry' which implicates the latter vices. Thus, this is both renaming by using a more problematical word, and devaluation by giving characteristics to the phenomenon that denies its professed virtues. It is *paradiastole* from the positive into negative. At the same time it is the first criterion of the concept of the cultural industry. However, it does not refer to

the reproduction technology but the mode of production. Thus, it also implicates a range of reference which cannot be restricted solely to the recording industry, but extends also to the performance of live music.

Rationalization in the Taylorian sense helps us to understand the effective division of labour in art and entertainment 'factories' as is hinted at in the passage above. The division of labour is applied for the purpose of the efficient production of hit songs and films. Adorno tries to deconstruct the illusions of the originality and unmediated nature of popular music, especially jazz:

> 'Wie beim Jazz von 'unmittelbarer' Produktion keine Rede sein kann; wie die Arbeitsteilung in 'Erfinder', Korrektor, Harmonisator und Instrumentator hier womöglich noch weiter getrieben ist als bei der Operettenherstellung...' (Adorno 1932, 375)

Essential to all cultural production is the constant talent scouting in music publishing (usually a task for the 'artists and repertoire' agent). Once the potential stars and their scripts are found they must be put through the process of cultural production in order to come out as a potential hit. To somewhat 'modernise' Adorno's words, a hit tune needs a basic composition, lyrics and arrangement which work together as *harmonisation* and *instrumentation*. The Fordist way of doing this is to keep all the talents of the various tasks in-house. A case in point of rationalization in Finland might be considered to have been the recording of popular music by Fazer Music under the leadership of Toivo Kärki from the 1940s to the 1970s (see Muikku 2001). Another case might be the golden age of Finnish studio film production from the 1930s until the 1950s (see Pantti 1998). Rationalization is the second criterion of application of the concept of the culture industry. Its ranges of reference include the large companies that organise the in-house division of labour, or companies that commission partners. It does not necessarily refer to an *auteur* mode of production in which one person is responsible for the whole series of working processes or organising the production in single projects. The precondition is a form of production line continuity. The industry is a metaphor which does not refer concretely to a mechanized factory but to an organization of production which may also contain phases of human skill and handicraft.

3.5.2 Fetishization and regression

Adorno observed in musical life certain phenomena which led to a reification of some musical pieces and performers. In this, basically no difference is drawn between classical concert music and light music: 'Das Reich jenes Musiklebens, das von dem Kompositionsunternehmen Irving Berlin und Walter Donaldson - 'the world's best composer' - über Gershwin, Sibelius und Tschaikowskij bis zu the Unfinished friedvoll sich erstreckt, ist eines von Fetischen.' (Adorno 1938, 327)[iii] Reification and fetishization are, in Adorno's terms, *Waren-Hören*, in which musical pieces are commodities to be consumed. This is brought about by the industrial mode of production; by producing everything according to the average capacity of the consumer to understand and make assumptions.

Fetishization in general means hypostatization of certain appealing aspects of pieces or appealing works among the tradition.

The only music which is in Adorno's opinion not affected by fetishism and reification is perhaps the avant-garde, which he viewed as the progressive music of his own time. However, both 'official' canonical classical music and the phenomenon of light music are adapted to the receptivity of the listener; light music must not be too challenging and classical music must confirm the social status of the concert visitor. There are no longer any differences between the reactions and listening habits of classical and light music, both are fragmentary and have lost their grip on the entirety of the musical works. It is also crucial that these reactions do not originate from the spontaneity of the listeners, their musical taste or other 'natural' ways of listening, but are determined by different gatekeepers and intermediaries (publishing, recording and radio companies). There is no place for the so-called 'natural ear'; rather, listening is the product of a learning process in which the intermediaries and gatekeepers have their role to play.

The following is a description of fetishization as a selection of bestsellers:

> 'Stars sind keineswegs bloß die berühmten Personennamen. Die Werke beginnen ähnlich zu fungieren. Es erbaut sich ein Pantheon von best sellers. Die Programme schrumpfen ein, und der Schrumpfungsprozess scheidet nicht nur das mittlere Gut aus, das die musikwissenschaftlichen Branchevertreter den Hörern aufschwatzen möchten, sondern die akzeptierten Klassiker selber unterliegen einer Selektion, die mit der Qualität nichts zu tun hat: Beethovens Vierte Symphonie rechnet bereits zu den Seltenheiten. Diese Selektion reproduziert sich in fatalem Zirkel: das Bekannteste ist das Erfolgreichste; daher wird es immer wieder gespielt und noch bekannter gemacht.' (Adorno 1938, 327-328)[iv]

The performers are the stars and the works are the bestsellers, both undergo a similar process of monopolisation and fetishization. This is a selection process, in which genuine quality is not an issue. Selection itself leads to a vicious circle in which the most well-known is thought to be the most successful (and qualified) and is played more and more and consequently made all the more well-known. It is precisely this which leads fetishization into monopoly:

> 'Die masochistische Massenkultur ist die notwendige Erscheinung der Produktion selber. Nämlich der monopolistischen. Die affektive Besetzung des Tauschwerts ist keine mystische Transsubstantiation. Sie entspricht der Verhaltensweise des Gefangenen, der seine Zelle liebt, weil nichts anderes zu lieben ihm gelassen wird. Die Preisgabe der Individualität, die in die Regelhaftigkeit des Erfolgereiche sich einpasst; das Tun dessen, was jeder tut, folgt aus dem Grundfaktum, dass von der monopolisierten Produktion der Konsumgüter in weiten Grenzen jedem dasselbe angeboten wird. Die marktmäßige Notwendigkeit zur Verhüllung dieser Gleichheit aber führt zum manipulierten Geschmack und zum individuellen Schein der offiziellen Kultur, der notwendig proportional mit der Liquidierung des Individuums wächst.' (Adorno 1938, 332-333)[v]

It is important to note the idea of individuality in this passage. The selection of products is widely spread and marketed under the guise of opportunities for individual choice. We are made to believe that we have the possibility to make decisions between various kinds of products and genres, and this is where individuality lies. In Adorno's view this is merely *Schein*. Individuality (as with

diversity) is strongly emphasized at the moment of it's disappearance. In monopoly capitalism the receiver can be likened to a prisoner held captive within a cell; s/he cannot know what lies beyond the prison cell because **s/he is** not told anything of its existence. So, as s/he knows nothing of its existence, s/he cannot desire it. The logic that leads to this situation is the crowd effect of modern consumer culture, that is, to do exactly as others do. This crowd effect makes it easy to manipulate taste, to make people believe in the individual character of a product which in reality cannot exist because this would be in contradiction with the desire to assimilate with others; hence a manipulated taste. Marketed individuality is, paradoxically, the liquidation of the individual. This fetishization and related vicious circle forms the third criterion of the concept of cultural industry. It is again important to note its range, which cannot be reduced to popular culture only, but extends to all kinds of canonical representations of traditions of different art forms.

As a critique of Adorno's prisoner's cell analogy one might consider the obvious fact that the prisoner's plight may be deliberate. S/he does not want to leave the cell even if s/he realizes that the door is open - s/he does not wish to know of the diversity of cultural markets even if someone attempts to enlighten him/her of it. Staying in 'the cell' may be a conscious decision and a denial of 'the other' and is not always necessarily the outcome of disinformation. It is entirely possible, for example, that someone might just want to buy his/her records from the top 10 list of the nearest record shop simply because s/he wishes to avoid contact with any kind of controversial material.

In the passages above Adorno refers to classical music culture. In his essay 'Über Jazz' (1936) he refers thematically to the same phenomenon of the vicious circle as found in his 'Fetischcharakter' essay. However, the object of critique is light music, especially jazz, which was in his time domesticated into popular dance music:

> 'Das seine demokratische Attitude bloßer Schein sei, kommt an der Rezeption zutage. Nichts falscher als diese plebiszitär zu denken. Die Kapitalkraft der Verlage, die Verbreitung durch Rundfunk und vor allem der Tonfilm bilden eine Tendenz zur Monopolisierung aus, die die Freiheit der Wahl einschränkt und weithin eigentliche Konkurrenz kaum zulässt; der unwiderstehliche Propagandaapparat hämmert den Massen solange die Schlager ein, die er gut findet und die meist die schlechten sind, bis ihr müdes Gedächtnis wehrlos ihnen ausgeliefert ist: und die Müdigkeit des Gedächtnisses wiederum wirkt auf die Produktion zurück'. (Adorno 1936, 240)

In this passage we can also identify Adorno's critique of democracy. The idea of democracy, which regards a large circulation of relatively few cultural products as a guarantee of it, is in Adorno's opinion a false conception of democracy. It is merely the appearance of democracy, and could be described with the epithet of 'pseudo'. The idea does not address the distaste of music which is liked by vast numbers of people, or more precisely, direct opposition to this music due to it's not being sufficiently *plebiszitär*. If a musical piece circulates to the extent that it can be heard everywhere it eventually becomes sheer background music, *Begleitmusik* (or muzak in contemporary terms). It is hammered into the consciousness of the receivers and, paradoxically, people no longer notice it.

This mocks the idea of democracy as freedom of choice or rule of the people. In Adorno's words the professed democracy of jazz is more like a dictatorship of the few, thus the epithet *Schein*. In this sense Adorno writes: 'Je demokratischer der Jazz, umso schlechter wird es.' (Adorno 1936, 240) A more genuine idea of democracy might be the situation in which there were endless possibilities for people to choose from, and in which artists have real opportunities to present their works and performances.[3]

Adorno dissociates as follows:

appearance of democracy	true democracy
following the crowd	freedom of choice
oligarchy	rule of the people
system of best sellers	competition
as monopoly or oligopoly	
large circulation	low threshold to enter the market
'unity'	'diversity'

Monopoly in this context refers also to a concrete situation of the structures of the industry at that time, the recording industry, radio and film are tied together with various deals and agreements and possibly ownerships. The record is guaranteed distribution in radio channels and as film music which increases its popularity and possibly sales in recorded form. This is the vertical monopoly of controlling both production and distribution channels which will be explicated in chapter 5. This is also implicated in the statement in the Résumé article that *die einzelnen Sparten*, i.e. the various sectors of industries (for example film, radio, recording) together form a seamless system.

Economic issues seem to have political implications. However, Adorno's might be too crude an analogy between economics and politics. He does not take into consideration that chasing after best sellers may be a deliberate choice, and not merely the obsessive following of others - the door of the cell is not locked, yet the prisoner feels more comfortable in safe and familiar surroundings.

In Adorno's description, fetishization leads to a phenomenon in musical life which he refers to as regression of hearing. It can also be applied to other artistic forms. It is a fragmentary consumption in which the spectator disconnects the relations of the wholeness of the work, as referred to earlier in this thesis, and which in this case is given the term 'regression of hearing' and *beziehungsloser Konsum*. (Adorno 1938, 333)

The result of this is that listeners come to know only certain details such as

---

[3]   In the sense of Adorno's art philosophy, democracy might represent the way art presents the vision of the human condition in modern reality, not replicating it as through photography, but in a way that must be read using the formal language of certain forms of art. One example might be the interplay of music and drama in Alban Berg's opera *Wozzeck*, another might be Schönberg's atonal music.

certain unforgettable melodies in classical music, or spectators become familiar only with certain aspects of painting history. Certain details and parts of art history become known, but not the whole development of a particular work or tradition, or lesser known artists within this tradition. Another phenomenon of regression is the substitution of use value by exchange value:

> 'Setzt die Ware allemal sich aus Tauschwert und Gebrauchswert zusammen, so wird der reine Gebrauchswert, dessen Illusion der durchkapitalisierten Gesellschaft die Kulturgüter bewahren müssen, durch den reinen Tauschwert substitutiert, der gerade als Tauschwert die Funktion des Gebrauchswertes trügend übernimmt. In diesen Quid pro quo konstitutiert sich der spezifische Fetischcharakter der Musik: die Affekte, die auf den Tauschwert gehen, stiften den Schein des Unmittelbaren, und die Beziehungslosigkeit zum Objekt dementiert ihn zugleich. Die Beziehungs-losigkeit zum konsumierten Objekt gründet in der Abstraktheit des Tauschwerts.' (Adorno 1938, 331)[vi]

Use value means that the work has value in itself and, as such, this is its *raison d'être.* Exchange value means that the work is valuable because it affords monetary gain or social prestige. An irony in this passage is that exchange value masks itself as use value because people believe that they like certain pieces because of what they are as such. However, the term *Beziehungslosigkeit* is a clue to understanding the nature of exchange value in this context. The receiving process is simply a registering of details, not a relation to the object, which is fetishism in the manner Adorno describes it. Fetishism and regression of listening are reciprocal processes, like reverse sides of the same coin:

> 'Am Gegenpunkt zum Fetischismus der Musik vollzieht sich eine Regression des Hörens...Sie fluktuieren zwischen breitem Vergessen und jähem, sogleich wieder untertauchendem Wiedererkennen; sie hören atomistisch und dissoziieren das Gehörte, entwickeln aber eben an der Dissoziation gewissen Fähigkeiten, die in traditionell-ästhetischen Begriffen weniger zu fassen sind als in solchen von Fußball-spielen und Chauffieren.' (Adorno 1938, 339)[vii]

Regression is the character of the contemporary situation in listening, which is arrested at an infantile stage. People do not listen to entire entities but specific details, which is a fluctuation between forgetting and remembering. If one hears someone referring to, for example 'cool' or 'smooth' sequences in a musical piece, such as one might perhaps use to describe an excellent piece of music or a piece of ingenious defence in a football match, it might indicate the outcome of the process of regression in hearing. This applies to musical or artistic culture at large - it can be heard and read even in the realms of serious critique. The regression of hearing (and reception in general) as an outcome of fetishization can be counted as the fourth criterion of the concept of cultural industry.

3.5.3 Standardization and individuality

Adorno's sense of paradoxes reaches its peak in the essay 'Über Jazz'. Adorno analyses jazz as an example of mass culture that is thought to be a free musical form, full of individuality. In jazz music he sees exactly opposite traits. The individuality is stereotypical, improvisation is standardised, the use value is in reality exchange value, the syncopation is repetitious uniformity, the democracy is illusionary. (Buck-Morss 1977, 100) These contradictions have been outlined earlier in this study. Later in this dissertation I shall construct a vision in which all themes handled in this chapter can be seen as paradoxes.

The most profound contradiction of capitalism is seen in the following imperative:

> 'Vor allem aber das Gesetz, das eine des Marktes so gut ist wie eines der Mythen: er muss gleichzeitig stets dasselbe sein und stets das Neue vortäuschen. Es wird offenbar mit dem paradoxen und jede Produktivkraft lähmenden Anspruch an die Komponisten, immer nur *'genau wie...' und doch 'originell'*, durch Originalität wirksam zu komponieren. Wer beides zugleich vermöchte, würde das Ideal des 'commercial' realisieren; in der Unversöhnlichkeit beider Ansprüche aber, wie sie an alle Waren gestellt werden, mag einer der tiefliegenden Widersprüche des Kapitalismus selber sich anmelden als des Systems, das gleichzeitig die Produktivkräfte entwickeln und fesseln muss.' (Adorno 1936, 243-244, emphasis mine)

This requirement is for both progression and suppression of productive forces. The musical product must be recognizable, yet at the same time must resemble other works already on the market and still maintain originality. In the article 'On Popular Music' (1941) Adorno describes this same phenomenon as follows:

> 'In terms of consumer-demand, the standardization of popular music is only the expression of this dual desideratum imposed upon it by the musical frame of mind of the public, - that it be 'stimulatory' by deviating in some way from the established 'natural', and that it maintain the supremacy of the natural against such deviations.' (Adorno 1941, 24)

The piece must be simultaneously natural and stimulating; recognizable but interesting. In *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie* (1962) Adorno further describes this issue in such a way that, on the one hand, the piece must somehow arouse interest and differ from all other songs in order to be noticed at all. On the other hand, however, it must not go beyond the familiarity or character which people are accustomed to. The musical language must not distance itself from what the average listener regards to be natural. This is the residuality of the tonality of Romanticism spiced with accents borrowed from Impressionism and later movements. It is the interplay of striking novelties (*einprägsam*) and well-known banalities (*allbekannt-banal*). (Adorno 1962, 46) This is the interplay of standardization and individuality in modern culture, which is like fetishism and regression as reverse sides of the same coin. It is also the fifth criterion of application of the concept of cultural industry.

This is also a very useful and common distinction in philosophical discourse between familiarity and strangeness. Even if this distinction is efficiently used in the creation of popular music in order to secure success as far

as possible, it cannot be reduced to it alone. Its range of reference extends into various fields of human life, philosophy and the arts included. It also does not necessarily mean the hypostatisation of the strange even if that is sometimes regarded as the criterion of complexity and of art. Even in art there has to be something communicative in order to get the message through. Thus, this distinction might also be a tool for analysing literary texts as well as rock pieces. As such, the standard is a metaphor transferred from the technical sphere in which it refers to the functioning interplay of facilities and gadgets. In the cultural field this must mean the ability to convey ideas that others also understand in some way or other, and so in that sense enabling the author and receiver to communicate with each other.

The features of standardization are as follows. Firstly, the duration of a piece should be 32 bars. The second feature refers to the details, effects such as breaks, blue chords and dirty notes. It is crucial that these effects are not owned by any particular piece but are interchangeable: 'The beginning of the chorus is replaceable by the beginning of innumerable other choruses. The interrelationship among the elements or the relationship of the elements to the whole would be unaffected...Every detail is substitutable; it serves its function only as a cog in a machine.' One could think of the clichés of soap operas as well effects that are interchangeable between different series. The third feature includes the genres of popular music and films. Standards might also include the stylistic periods of classical music such as Neoclassicism or Serialism in the 20th century. The fourth phenomenon of standardization is the imitation of a hit piece of music: 'The musical standards of popular music were originally developed by a competitive process. As one particular song scored a great success, hundreds of others sprang up imitating the successful one. The most successful hits, types, and 'ratios' between elements were imitated, and the process culminated in the crystallization of standards.' (Adorno 1941, 23) However, artists that cannot be imitated may still exist and this is, in Adorno's opinion, 'the breath of free competition' (ibid.)

Adorno would deny the 'communicative' role of art and the interplay of standards and individuality. This is because in his philosophy of art he aims to estrange the everyday equivalencies of commodities and information, thus the conveying of clear messages. In his philosophy the truth of an artwork lies in the configuration of its aesthetic material. The individual elements of a piece of art are unique and not substitutable by or transferable to other elements conveying similar connotations. The production of a work for the sole purpose of conveying an obvious meaning is defied. However, Adorno does not exclude all meaning throughout, as this would be in contradiction to the possibility of truth-content. The work of art is rather a unique configuration of its elements. This uniqueness indicates that it is not to be identified with other works. Still, the configuration and the context indicate the possible meaning of a work in a certain given situation to a certain given receiver. This is the denial of the identification and classification of substitutable commodities and clear language of information. (see Bowie 1997; Adorno 1997)

The side of individuality which in Adorno's opinion is illusionary could be described as mechanical differentiation:

> 'Der Schematismus des Verfahrens zeigt sich daran, dass schließlich die mechanisch differenzierten Erzeugnisse als allemal das Gleiche sich erweisen.' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 131)[viii]

Mechanical differentiation might take the form of A and B Hollywood films, films by different studios, different price categories of magazines, or make of car. Individuality in films is expressed in the latest filming technique or through psychological effects or the personal appearances of the film stars, just as with 'personalized' features in different makes of motor car. The differentiation takes place according to different socio-economic status or different lifestyles. The point is that:

> 'Für alle ist etwas vorgesehen, damit keiner ausweichen kann, die Unterschiede werden eingeschliffen und propagiert...Jeder soll sich gleichsam spontan seinem vorweg durch Indizien bestimmten 'level' gemäß verhalten und nach der Kategorie des Massenprodukts greifen, die für seinen Typ fabriziert ist.' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 131)[ix]

The capitalist imperative is that you must manufacture a mass product (standardization) that is personally suited to an individual consumer (individuality). Adorno experienced this dynamic in his time, which is nowadays labelled as 'mass tailoring' or 'personification'. According to this logic you can differentiate yourself from the crowd and mass of consumers and at the same time identify with a specific social group. In various texts, such as his article 'On Popular Music' or in the *Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie*, Adorno refers to this individuality using the epithet 'pseudo'. The irony in this is the illusionary nature of freedom and choice:

> 'By pseudo-individualization we mean endowing cultural mass production with the halo of free choice or open market on the basis of standardization itself...Pseudo-individualization, for its part, keeps them (customers) in line by making them forget that what they listen to is already listened to for them, or 'pre-digested' (Adorno 1941, 25)

The individual features of a mass product exist in order to disguise from the consumer the fact that the choice is prefabricated and categorized beforehand, or at least to simply awaken his/her interest in the commodity at hand. The question 'What do people want?' is rhetorical because the person asking the question already knows what they want – and what they will be offered. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969) How could this be explained? Firstly, as Adorno himself indicates, the product itself is its own advertisement and furthermore it is the advertisement of a following product. According to a common triviality asking people, for example in market researches, what they would like to have next, they immediately try to remember what they have seen, heard or read lately and usually suggest one of these. However, in opposition to this theory is the idea that subcultures etc. may offer novelties for the 'followers of cool', who try to detect the 'weak signals' in current trends.

They try to find out what might be the next mega trend, i.e. what people might possibly want next. They then put forward their ideas for designing products and programmes to cater for these 'future customer expectations'. These options are then marketed according to ploys such as 'buy this if you want to identify with this group' and 'buy that if you want to identify with that group'. The point is that the choices are made beforehand for them. Their only task is to latch on to the most suitable consumer segments. This is the delusion of the appropriation of classical economics in the late modern economic condition and its idea of individuality which is, in Adorno's view, *Schein*. His idea is that the contents of musical (or other) works are also pre-fabricated, and that the consumers are offered the pre-digested contents of consciousness.

The driving force behind all of this, and especially behind the willingness towards consumption, is a fear of social exclusion. Horkheimer and Adorno cite Alexis de Tocqueville's book *De la Démocratie en Amérique:*

> 'Unterm privaten Kulturmonopol lässt in der Tat 'die Tyrannei den Körper frei und geht geradewegs auf die Seele los. Der Herrscher sagt dort nicht mehr: du sollst denken wie ich oder sterben. Er sagt: es steht dir frei, nicht zu denken wie ich, dein Leben, deine Güter, alles soll dir bleiben, aber von diesem Tage an bist du ein Fremdling unter uns.' (Tocqueville 1835/1840, 151 cit. in Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 141)[x]

This passage explains the logic of mass culture in a nutshell: to do as others do. Genuine individuality in Adorno's opinion might be seen as the strength to deny such social adaptation and rise against it. In the article 'Résumé über Kulturindustrie' (1962) Adorno gives his view that real individuality lies in the Kantian notion of **E**nlightenment. The dialectical process of **e**nlightenment has nullified this possibility both in modern society at large and in its powerful phenomenon of the culture industry:

> 'Der Gesamteffekt der Kulturindustrie ist der einer Anti-Aufklärung; in ihr wird, wie Horkheimer und ich es nannten, Aufklärung, nämlich die fortschreitende technische Naturbeherrschung, zum Massenbetrug, zum Mittel der Fesselung des Bewusstseins. Sie verhindert die Bildung autonomer, selbständiger, bewusst urteilender und sich entscheidender Individuen. Die aber wären die Voraussetzung einer demokratischen Gesellschaft, die nur in Mündigen sich erhalten und entfalten kann.' (Adorno 1977, 345)[xi]

True individuality in this sense is the Kantian notion of maturity, the ability to judge independently without the leading of others. This is also a precondition of 'true' democracy. For Adorno, democracy also means the ability to judge and deliberate on whatever issues are at hand. It could be said that it is much more difficult to find solutions and ideas with and from your own mind than choosing between ideas and items that already exist. Pseudoindividual consciousness and denial of social adaptation are the opposing ideas of individuality. In Adorno's opinion the Kantian idea of **E**nlightenment counts as real and the consumerist idea, which clearly stems from the appropriation of the economic liberalist tradition in the late modern monopolist situation, as illusionary.

Adorno's intention is to criticize the phenomena he saw evolving in his time. His rhetorical re-description was a devaluation of the phenomenon of mass communication and mass culture by renaming it as industry. He devalued it by denying the characteristics of democracy, choice, and individuality, which he thought were related to the phenomenon. He wanted to manipulate the moral colourings of the situation by claiming that the definitions of the terms 'democracy', 'choice' and 'individuality' by which this phenomenon was described, were not properly understood in the sense that the 'essential' nature of democracy, choice and individuality was not captured, but only their 'appearance'. This is of course only Adorno's claim, which can be further devalued by criticizing his notion of democracy. He executes his devaluation by using pejorative epithets such as pseudo or *Schein*. Furthermore, 'monopoly', 'fetish', and 'regression' are pejorative terms by which he intended to further devalue the phenomenon. Industrialization and rationalization should usually lead to a 'progression' of something. According to Adorno's paradoxical mode of argument, the most successful outcome of this progression, i.e. the completion of industrialization, itself leads to the worst outcome – the regression of production and consumption.

3.5.4 Entertainment as the after-image of work

In the article 'Freizeit' Adorno points out the paradoxical character of leisure or free time. He is himself astonished by the need for hobbies. His own experience is the intermingling of work and leisure, his university work is a source of much pleasure for him, and so he continues this in his free time. He does not rely on senseless, time-killing activities in order to refresh his ability to work during office hours. The idea of such free time pursuits is actually quite shocking to him. (Adorno 1969a, 58) For this reason he views the idea of effortless free time as ideological and paradoxical:

> 'Unterstellt man einmal den Gedanken von Marx, in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft sei die Arbeitskraft zur Ware geworden und deshalb Arbeit verdinglicht, so läuft der Ausdruck hobby auf das Paradoxon hinaus, dass jener Zustand, der sich als das Gegenteil von Verdinglichung, als Reservat unmittelbaren Lebens in einem gänzlich vermittelten Gesamtsystem versteht, seinerseits verdinglicht ward gleich der starren Grenze zwischen Arbeit und Freizeit. In dieser setzen sich die Formen des nach dem Profitsystem eingerichteten gesellschaftlichen Lebens fort.' (Adorno 1969a, 59)[xii]

Leisure time is not a place of refuge from capitalist logic, that logic follows you to your most remote places of freedom from work. Leisure time should be the opposite of reification of work into a commodity in Marxian terms. Adorno points out that the process of reification has entered into the realm of the unmediated life of free time. Furthermore, it is not actually a time of freedom but of organized freedom, which is a contradiction in terms. (Adorno 1969a, 60) In this sense it is in its very essence an after-image of profit and efficient working time.

The idea of leisure as the after-image of work is based also on the structural characteristics of products of the culture industry. The effects of the

products bring about something in the minds of the viewers, which the Frankfurt School members generally term as the destruction of experience. (Jay 1999) The problem of leisure time entertainment is two-fold: it is both insufficiently challenging and overly challenging at the same time. Firstly, it is not challenging enough because of the nature of the popular music and certain pieces of classical music as the repertoire of 'Easy Listening', as the famous American radio program at that time indicated. The norm is to listen casually with 'half an ear'. This is claimed to create a state of relaxation from the strenuous working process. (Adorno 1962, 44-45) Free time activities are designed to be as easy as possible so that they require no concentration or strenuous interpretation. In practice, due to their industrial mode of production there are no 'layers' for interpretation and thought. Adorno uses expressions such as 'standardisierte Reaktionen' or 'bedingte Reflexe'. This means implicitly that the listener or spectator does not advance in his/her thinking but remains in the same routine mode of reception that mirrors the dull routines in the factory or office. The recipients have learned their modes of perception and thus the works offer nothing that would break these reflexes of understanding. Thus, according to Adorno the ideology of passivity and easiness in the cultural industry leads to the progression of wholesale stupefaction. (ibid.)

One way in which entertainment can be overly challenging is that the temporal succession of things, for example in film, can be too rapid. The characteristics in film and social reality in metropoly that Benjamin described as the mutual beneficial effects, Adorno describes as the impoverishment of imagination and fantasy. For Benjamin, film provided a brand new channel for the perception of reality which had never before been possible. Adorno describes it as follows: 'Sie sind so angelegt, dass ihre adäquate Auffassung zwar Promptheit, Beobachtungsgabe, Versiertheit erheischt, dass sie aber die denkende Aktivität des Betrachters geradezu verbieten, wenn er nicht die vorbeihuschenden Fakten versäumen will. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 134-135)[xiii] The characteristics of film is that the spectator is not allowed to stop thinking and analysing but must follow the story in order not to lose track of the plot. In this sense it resembles the experience of a mechanical conveyer or the routine of office work. You cannot stop, but must follow the route of the production line.

This provokes the discourse between Horkheimer & Adorno:

> 'Amusement ist die Verlängerung der Arbeit unterm Spätkapitalismus. Es wird von dem gesucht, der dem mechanisierten Arbeitsprozess ausweichen will, um ihm von neuem gewachsen zu sein. Zugleich aber hat die Mechanisierung solche Macht über den Freizeitler und sein Glück, sie bestimmt so gründlich die Fabrikation der Amüsierwaren, dass er nichts anderes mehr erfahren kann als die Nachbilder des Arbeitsvorgangs selbst. Der vorgebliche Inhalt ist bloß verblasster Vordergrund; was sich einprägt, ist die automatisierte Abfolge genormter Verrichtungen. Dem Arbeitsvorgang in Fabrik und Büro ist auszuweichen nur in der Angleichung an ihn in der Muße. Daran krankt unheilbar alles Amusement. Das Vergnügen erstarrt zur Langeweile, weil es, um Vergnügen zu bleiben, nicht wieder Anstrengung kosten soll und daher streng in den ausgefahrenen Assoziationsgeleisen sich bewegt. Der Zuschauer soll keiner eigenen Gedanken bedürfen...' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 145)[xiv]

Both the non-challenging nature of the products and their temporal swiftness allows the associations of the spectators to remain unchanged, as they were before beginning to watch the film. Therefore, the very aspiration to switch off from the working routine in fact turns out to be nothing more than a replication of this same working process. It does not constitute regeneration after work, rather a return to the same root. The film format does not leave room for one's own, fresh insights. Instead, the thinking process once again covers the same ground one has covered in terms of learning and observation many times before. This is the reason why the products of the culture industry bring nothing new to our understanding of the world but are 'the affirmation of what already is' or 'the incontestable prophets of the existent'. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 156) Thus, one of the main arguments of Adorno's critique of the culture industry is that this phenomenon is the confirmation of the status quo of the existing society.

3.5.5 Adorno's defence of entertainment

As may be clear from the above, in Adorno's opinion the creative arts are included as part of the phenomena of the culture industry. In addition, not all entertainment is to be counted as a part of the culture industry. Despite existing thoughts on entertainment as duplicating existent reality, they defend certain phenomena of entertainment. They appreciate the old folk culture, farce, and clowning, as well as the absurd and senseless humour of Chaplin and the Marx Brothers. They also regarded the first cartoons as embodying features of free association and fantasy, thus opposing rigid rationalism:

> 'Stumpfsinnig ausgeklügelte Überraschung bricht in die Filmhandlung ein. Die Tendenz des Produkts, auf den puren Blödsinn böse zurückzugreifen, an dem die volkstümliche Kunst, Posse und Clownerie bis zu Chaplin und den Marx Brothers legitimen Anteil hatte, tritt am sinnfälligsten in den weniger gepflegten Genres hervor. Während die Greer Garson- und Bette Davis -Filme aus der Einheit des sozial psychologischen Falls noch so etwas wie den Anspruch auf einstimmige Handlung ableiten, hat sich jene Tendenz im Text des novelty song, im Kriminalfilm und in den Cartoons ganz durchgesetzt...Die Trickfilme waren einmal Exponenten der Phantasie gegen den Rationalismus. Sie ließen den durch ihre Technik elektrisierten Tieren und Dingen zugleich Gerechtigkeit widerfahren, indem sie den Verstümmelten ein zweites Leben liehen. Heute bestätigen sie bloß noch den Sieg der technologischen Vernunft über die Wahrheit.' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 146)[xv]

The above cited passage contains glimpses of past forms of the 'legitimate form of entertainment', which do not, however, necessarily exist any more. Adorno denies the following dissociative strategy and chain of dissociations: entertainment/art because it corresponds with the fantasy/rationality dissociation. Rather, entertainment/art corresponds with the rationality/fantasy dissociation. This is Adorno's intervention in the discourse on entertainment in which he differs from the cultural conservatism which values rationality and reason above sensuality and fantasy. In Adorno's opinion the demerit of entertainment in his time was not that it was not rational enough, but that it was too rational. (cf. Reiners 2002)

These sudden optimisms in regard to entertainment are placed between the lamentations of the notion of destruction of subjectivity and capacity to think and even the destruction of the idea of distraction itself because of the nature of the culture industry (for example, film) being 'too challenging' because of its pace. In trivial, common sense thought, entertainment is regarded as being distracted attention - *Zerstreuung, Ablenkung*, but in Adorno's thought it is more a compulsory or obsessive following of the plot. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 147)

Distraction itself is not lamented by Adorno, neither is humour, nor fun, but their actual disappearance amid exact, logical and even rationalised storytelling is. 'Freed amusement' might work in the way of avant-garde artwork to negate the world as it is. It might be an extreme case of art, the correction of its excessively overt intellectuality and reminiscence of work: 'In manchen Revuefilmen, vor allem aber in der Groteske und den Funnies blitzt für Augenblicke die Möglichkeit dieser Negation selber auf.' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 150-151)[xvi]

The features that are defended are senselessness, unorganized and free associations, and 'pure' and 'freed' amusement. In contemporary cultural life he might relate well with the revitalization of stand-up comedy. However, the process of tailoring for the sake of saleability removes these features, and thus the promise of entertainment as a distraction or negation of the prevailing existence are never fulfilled. There are a couple of paradoxes in this phenomenon: 'Die Fusion von Kultur und Unterhaltung heute vollzieht sich nicht nur als Depravation der Kultur, sondern ebensosehr als zwangsläufige Vergeistigung des Amusements' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 152). So, Adorno's thought not only includes the lamentation of the degradation of 'high culture' or 'bourgeois culture'. Maybe more detrimental is an opposite direction; our everyday culture and the omnipresent entertainment is too 'intellectual' in the sense that it is rationalized. It is rationalized in the sense that the psychological effects are well calculated and it must have no connotations that cause it to oppose itself. At the end of the essay Adorno and Horkheimer even draw parallels between Fascist propaganda and the American style of advertisement.

According to Adorno, while the culture industry should not be reducible to popular culture or entertainment without residue, it also does not necessarily oppose high culture. The area of 'depravation of culture' and 'intellectualization of amusement' is a kind of *in-between culture*, a saleable area between provocative avant-garde and absurd entertainment. The following passage provides some examples of this in-between culture:

> 'Verderbt ist die Kulturindustrie, aber nicht als Sündenbabel sondern als Kathedrale des gehobenen Vergnügens. Auf allen ihren Stufen, von Hemingway zu Emil Ludwig, von Mrs. Miniver zum Lone Ranger, von Toscanini zu Guy Lombardo haftet die Unwahrheit am Geist, der von Kunst und Wissenschaft fertig bezogen wird.' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 151)[xvii]

The untruth of the culture industry is not in its sensuality or corporality but in its intellectuality which it has borrowed ready-made from art and science. Furthermore, in the following passages Horkheimer and Adorno make very clear their denial of the typical cultural conservative critique of popular culture:

> 'Nicht also dass die Kulturindustrie mit Amusement aufwartet, macht den Betrug aus, sondern dass sie durch geschäftstüchtige Befangenheit in den ideologischen Clichés der sich selbst liquidierenden Kultur den Spaß verdirbt. Ethik und Geschmack schneiden das ungehemmte Amusement als 'naiv' ab - Naivität gilt für so schlimm wie Intellektualismus - und beschränken selbst noch die technische Potentialität...Die Spur des Besseren bewahrt Kulturindustrie in den Zügen, die sie dem Zirkus annähern, in der eigensinnig-sinnverlassenen Könnerschaft von Reitern, Akrobaten und Clowns, der 'Verteidigung und Rechtfertigung körperlicher Kunst gegenüber geistiger Kunst'. Aber der Schlupfwinkel der seelenlosen Artistik, die gegen den gesellschaftlichen Mechanismus das Menschliche vertritt, werden unerbittlich von einer planenden Vernunft aufgestübert, die alles nach Bedeutung und Wirkung sich auszuweisen zwingt. Sie lässt das Sinnlose drunten so radikal verschwinden wie oben den Sinn der Kunstwerke. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 151)[xviii]

In their critique Horkheimer and Adorno do not in general despise enjoyment as such. One could gather terms and oppositions in the above passages that prove this: *Spaß verderben* (ruining the fun), *ungehemmte Amusement* (unrestrained amusement), *technische Potentialität beschränken* (restriction of technical possibilities), *eigensinnig-sinnverlassenen Könnerschaft* (self-justifying and nonsensical skill), *seelenlosen Artistik* (mindless artistry), *das Sinnlose* (nonsensical). These features of unrestrained senselessness are the valuable features of entertainment, features that once existed, but have been eradicated during Horkheimer's and Adorno's time. The following features describe the situation of entertainment in their time: *Ethik und Geschmack* (ethics and taste), *gehobenes Vergnügen* (elevated pleasure)*, planende Vernunft* (schematic reason), *Bedeutung und Wirkung* (significance and effect). The actual sin of the culture industry is that it borrows features from 'high culture' and thus destroys the valuable elements of genuine 'folk culture'. The offence and deception here is that the promise of amusement is actually replaced by its ruin and denial. However, eventually the borrowed elements in the in-between area of the culture industry are destroyed, along with the 'progressive' elements of senselessness of the area below. Thus, Adorno constructs the following dissociative strategy: seriousness/fun or humour, concentration/distraction, spiritual/material, intellectual/sensual, reason/sense. Horkheimer and Adorno do not despise phenomena that are 'below' art culture. Rather, they despise the dynamic of cultural production that destroys the traits that are most characteristic of this area.

In the essay 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', Adorno writes about the idea that light music can possess both affirmative and subversive traits that can at the same time bring about change in the society they serve:

> 'Andererseits enthält gerade die 'leichte' Musik, von der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft geduldet, verachtet und benutzt gleich der Prostitution, mit der sie als 'leichtge-schürzt' nicht umsonst verglichen wird, Elemente, die wohl Triebbefriedigungen der heutigen Gesellschaft darstellen, deren offiziellen Ansprüchen aber widerstreiten

und damit in gewissem Sinne die Gesellschaft transzendieren, der sie dienen.' (Adorno 1932, 107)

Just as popular culture can contain subversive elements, art culture can contain affirmative elements. Adorno describes the situation as follows: 'Darum ist die Scheidung leichter und ernster Musik durch jene andere zu ersetzen, die die beiden Hälften der musikalischen Weltkugel gleichermassen im Zeichen der Entfremdung sieht: Hälften eines Ganzen, das freilich durch deren Addition niemals rekonstruierbar wäre'. (ibid.) Both musical spheres can be alienated. They are like the two halves of a totality which cannot be re-construed by adding them together. Adorno wrote to Benjamin in 1936: 'Les extrèmes me touchent, so gut wie Sie: aber nur wenn der Dialektik des Untersten die des Obersten äquivalent ist, nicht dieses einfach verfällt.' (Adorno-Benjamin 1994, 171) Adorno criticises Benjamin for describing the arts in a dialectical manner in his 'Artwork' essay, but overlooks the dialectics when it comes to new reproduction techniques. Adorno further writes: 'Beide tragen die Wundmale des Kapitalismus, beide enthalten Elemente der Veränderung (freilich nie und nimmer das Mittlere zwischen Schönberg und dem amerikanischen Film); beide sind die auseinandergerissenen Hälften der ganzen Freiheit, die doch aus ihnen nicht sich zusammenaddieren lässt...' (ibid.) The areas of lightness and seriousness both carry the scars of capitalism and resemble both halves of the truth drawn apart. However, you cannot construct the truth simply by adding them together as the culture industry is attempting to do in the manner described above as an in-between culture. Beyond the 'false reconciliation' of them in the culture industry the halves of the truth are mutual opposites. Adorno's claim is that the spheres of seriousness and lightness should not be added together, because in doing so one loses the shocking elements that prevail in each of the individual opposites. The sentence in parenthesis indicates that the transformative and truth element cannot be found in the in-between area of the culturel industry.

One could criticize of Adorno that even though he sees subversive and critical elements in light music and art he does not systematically analyse all examples of that culture from that point of view. Almost without exception he focuses exclusively on describing alienating traits, for example in jazz. He analyses truth contents (exposing social antagonisms in analogous form of the respective language of each art form) in Modern art. (see Jarvis 1998, 79) However, in the following I refer to Adorno's accounts in which he sees in addition to truth contents also alienating and problematical features, the 'scars of capitalism', in modern art. Good cases in point are Richard Wagner and Arnold Schönberg.

3.6 Dissonance versus Leitmotiv - ambivalent Richard Wagner

Adorno's analysis of Richard Wagner (and Arnold Schönberg) leads one to believe that the problems of cultural life do not invade the realm of art from somewhere outside of it. Rather, reification and commodification are phenomena that exist already within art. These are highly complicated problems in Adorno's thought and they emphasize the paradoxical nature of even art itself. It is clear that Adorno sees that both Wagner's and Schönberg's music are internally contradictory.

The problem in both analyses is one of subjectivity. The background to the Wagner analysis is the Psychoanalytic idea of ego weakness.[4] In the bourgeois family the paternal authority is an internalization of authority and thus a formation of a strong ego that can avoid influences external to the subject. This would mean the resolution of the Oedipus complex. However, this situation changed, and paternal authority was substituted by authorities outside of the family. The personality was more prone to external influences. The members of the Institut für Sozialforschung regarded the culture industry as a single strong source of influence among others. The culture industry substituted a healthy internalization of authority with external standards of behaviour, which led to adaptation and conformism. This was in connection with the interpretation of Fascism in which the father of the family was substituted by the *Führer* and the Fascist culture in which propaganda offered external guidance for the weak ego. (Huyssen 1983, 15)

According to Freud, the son identifies first with his mother and realises later that he is competing for the mother with his father. This leads to the feeling of threat of castration and psychological angst. The solution to this is to identify with the object of his hatred and competition. If the complex is settled not by internalizing the authority of the father, but rather through fearful identification with him, the outcome may be a fear of external authority. Adorno describes this as identification with the aggressor, through which he analyses the social reality. This idea was further developed in the empirical study *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950). In this study, hatred was regarded to also be projected onto to groups (such as Jews) that posed no immediate threat. (Witkin 1998, 73)

Another problem found in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* is the formation of this individual and autonomous subject. According to Andreas Huyssen, the idea of ego weakness might give the impression that the thought of the Frankfurt School members is based on nostalgia for a strong bourgeois ego and that the members of the Institut were trapped within patriarchal patterns of thought. For example, Jessica Benjamin criticized the idea of the culture industry as a substitute father as 'patriarchy without a father'. (Huyssen 1983, 16)

---

[4]   In the research project *Studies in Prejudice and Family* (1936) of the Institut für Sozialforschung this Psychoanalytical interpretation of the disappearance of paternal authority was dealt more thoroughly.

However, despite the interpretations of the decay of the ego there are traits in Adorno's thought in which strong ego and subjectivity is more of a problem than a solution. This can be noticed also in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* in the idea of the domination of the inner and outer nature. In these processes something of the spontaneous nature of man is lost. This is reminiscent of Nietzsche's interpretations of religion in the *Genealogie der Moral.* Thus, Adorno regards one of Wagner's most productive characteristics to be the situation in which the subject gives up its sovereignty and passively yields to archaic, instinctual elements. These are the elements that the subject loses in its emancipation. (Adorno 1937-38/1971, 60) Adorno writes that an unleashing of productive forces exists in moments of atrophy. Wagner discovers in his music the crisis of society in the era following the formation of the bourgeois subject. (Adorno 1937-38/1971, 59) Wagner brings out in his operas the decay and decentred nature of the modern individual.

However, a counter tendency to this, as well as a progressive one, is the freedom of dissonance. Wagner continues the cromatism of the Romantic period, which is a prerequisite of dissonance. Adorno writes that coincidences such as the Tristan accord have become dominating features. It is no more so that dissonance must be settled by consonance, but all energy lies in dissonance, which gains autonomy in the structure of the work. (Adorno 1937-38/1971, 62) Witkin (1998, 90) interprets this analogously with Adorno's social theory. Dissonance represents the individual and consonance society, hence the resettlement of contradiction. Already in Wagner's music the energy is on the side of the individual, dissonance. S/he protests the right of the social authority to govern and regulate. The freedom of dissonance might mean for Adorno that the modern subject may be in opposition in the face of alienated forces in modern society. Although dissonance is chaotic and decentred, there is a certain emancipatory element in it. It expresses the ability to resist.

The characteristics which reflect the culture industry in Wagner's operas include effects, *Leitmotiv*, phantasmagoria, and commodity. Wagner tried to calculate the effects his music may have on his audience. This is significant especially in his use of the leitmotiv technique, which Adorno identifies with advertisements and sound film. Adorno also compares the effects with Hector Berlioz's *idé fixe* and Charles Baudelaire's *spleen*. They are like obsessions that you cannot shake off. This further emphasizes the weakness of the psychic ego. (Adorno 1937-38/1971, 28-29) With film music, leitmotiv is identified with because it announces the events within the film as they occur, thus the spectator finds it easier to remain in touch with the story. (Adorno 1937-38/1971, 44)

In Wagner's music the traditional idea of subjectivity of developing themes also comes to an end. In music there is always a question of temporality and development. Wagner's gestures (*Gestus*) exclude this development. In his music it is rather a question of the repetition of expressive gestures that differentiate them from musical time and temporality. (Adorno 1937-38/1971, 34-35)

For Adorno, Wagner's music and Jugend style exemplified the prehistory **of** 20th century consumer culture, just as the Parisian passages did for Walter Benjamin. Adorno borrows from Benjamin the term 'phantasmagoria'. It originates from Marx' *Das Kapital*, from his descriptions of commodity fetishism. The critique of commodity fetishism is based on the observation that in the product the traces of its actual fabrication process are screened out. The product becomes an appearance alone, *Schein*, in which one can no longer recognize the social relations that exist in the production process, and which lie hidden behind its opaque reification. At the same time phantasmagoria refers to the dream-like magical nature that the products possess. In Adorno's (1937-38/1971, 86) words it is the 'Illusion als der absoluten Wirklichkeit des Unwirklichen'. This refers to the disappearance of the traces of work and the social reality of the working process. All that appears to us is the image of a commodity; we know nothing of the alienation by which it has come into existence. Just as with the commodities enticing consumers in Wagner's time, so also Wagner's operas turned to phantasmagoria and commodities that arrested the attention of opera-goers for hours on end. (Adorno 1937-38/1971, 86)

The issue becomes somewhat complicated by Adorno's idea that the precondition of progressive art is its appearance of pure *Schein*, and disappearance of the traces of its actual fabrication. Only through their reification do artworks speak about the human condition and do justice to it. The perfection of the artwork as pure *Schein* is at the same time its condition of truth. (Adorno 1937-38/1971, 81) Paradoxically, the artwork has to detach itself from the material world and its interests in order to express this world truthfully, remaining disinterested and without bias.

Adorno himself points out that Wagner cannot be interpreted by differentiating his 'progressive' and 'regressive' elements like goats and sheep (as is done above). Rather, both elements are intermingled. In the reification one has to recognize its double character. Wagner's music possesses the strength of subject (dissonance) and its weakness (leitmotiv, phantasmagoria) simultaneously. This refers to the idea that mass culture does not come from a position outside of art but that art itself turns dialectically and paradoxically against itself. (see Huyssen 1983, 37) This dialectical turn is all the more apparent in Adorno's analysis of Schönberg's music.

3.7 The dead end of modern music – Arnold Schönberg and his followers

The impression that art and the culture industry are opposing poles may originate from the passages in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* in which the writers compare the relations of universality and particularity or whole and detail in art and entertainment culture. Furthermore, the emphasis of the new in the arts and the unchanging (*Immergleichen*) in the culture industry may foster the idea

that they are situated at opposite poles. In *Philosophie der neuen Musik* (1949) Adorno describes non-representation in visual art and atonality of music as the resistance of creative artists in the face of new reproduction techniques, such as photography. The artists strove to estrange themselves from these techniques and avoid the invasion of the culture industry into their own spheres. (Adorno 1949/1976, 15) The composers of Schönberg's circle avoided the markets and saleability by making their music an issue of limited amount of initiated people. (ibid. 29)

Adorno writes about the impoverishment of the musical experience in the era of radio and record. (ibid. 30) He also describes how in his time all intellectual endeavours became reificated and commodified; artworks included. In this, one has to bear in mind that Schönberg's analysis anticipates the *Ästetische Theorie* in the sense that he understood that the fetish character of artwork is the prerequisite of its autonomy, its nature of existing for itself (as with *Schein* in the Wagner analysis). The issue of fetishism is not only one of gaining prestige as in the essays from the 1930s. However, at the same time, the idea of fetish character and being for itself represents ideology, projecting the image of a better world into a spiritual, intellectual realm beyond its realization in the material world. The autonomy of art is at the same time both a problem and solution. A solution in the sense that it guarantees the ability to express the human condition, yet a problem because it displaces the expression to a realm which does not necessarily provide a way back to the 'real' world. Thus, reification in the sense of commodification, existing for the sake of more than self, and popularisation of art, may break and deconstruct this ideology but at the same time it thoroughly transforms artworks into commodities. Consumability becomes the *raison d'être* of art, which in turn destroys its critical task. (ibid. 32) The possibility of critique thus disappears in both directions, a phenomenon which, in *Ästhetische Theorie,* Adorno refers to as de-aestheti**ciz**ation of art.

At this point I would like to refer back to the idea of light and serious music being the drawn apart halves of the same reality. Witkin (1998, 179) interprets this first to mean music which is completely commodified and surrendered to serving society (or the state, in the form of contributing to the growth of GNP). In addition, a second form of music also exists which is completely self-referential and difficult to understand, and in this form opposes subordination to economic growth. Both are as powerless. The first because it is subordinated to external requirements and the second because it no longer carries any influence. Paradoxically, detachment from empirical reality provides the possibility for truthful expression. However, at the same time it leads to total powerlessness and end of even critical tasks.

In a bizarre way this very meaninglessness forms the truth content of avant-garde art. By denying all things pleasing, these artists become estranged from the instrumental nature of modern culture and society. In their own meaninglessness they are able to 'function' *(sic)* as a critique of the world in which all must carry meaning and value to achieve a certain end. They cannot

be used to entice large audiences and gain vast sums of money. At the same time the meaninglessness of a work of art expresses the image of a meaningless world without straightforwardly 'photographing' it. It integrates in itself the image of the impoverishment of life. (Witkin 1998, 11, 16)

This function as a 'mirror' of the modern world is not unproblematic, though, just because of subjectivity. It too can lead to rational control of the elements that prevail in the production process of the modern world. The outcome may be art totally denaturised of all subjective impressions and intentionality. (Witkin 1998, 21)

At some point in the first decade of 20th century, Adorno began to symphatize with Schönberg's free atonality. He was sceptical towards the development of the twelve-tone technique into serial system in which all musical parameters are predetermined. This system did, in fact, resemble popular music in its decay of subjectivity and the dilemma between universal and particular.

Adorno compares modern music to the process of domination of nature in which *Philosophie der neuen Musik* was a logical continuation of the argument of *Dialektik der Aufklärung.* The purpose of the atonal technique was originally to free the subject from subordination to natural forces (in music the quasi-natural idea of tonality). However, this turns into the domination of the subject by turning against the autonomy and freedom of the subject, and thus nature becomes dominated. (Adorno 1949/1976, 67) Adorno describes the dialectic of the twelve-tone technique as enchaining music, thus freeing it from the coercion of tonality. The subject controls the music through a rational system in order to surrender to that rational system. As the composer's fantasy causes the material to bend to his constructive will the constructive material itself paralyses fantasy. The dominance of the subject transforms into subordination. The neck of the dominant 'king' tone is severed, but this leads to the tyranny of the row 'dictator'. Adorno writes: 'Die Gewalt, die die Massenmusik den Menschen antut, lebt fort am gesellschaftlichen Gegenpol, bei der Musik, die den Menschen sich entzieht' (Adorno 1949/1976, 69)[xix]. Adorno provocatively states that Beethoven could produce tonality from his personal subjective freedom. However, **D**odecaphony destroys this subjectivity completely. In the beginning such technical art had to destroy the *Schein* of beautiful art. However, this technicality becomes an end in itself. It elevates itself as the *Schein* of technical art. Art music thus becomes nothing more than a series of solutions to technical problems. Thus, Adorno states '[s]olcher Verlagerung des Schwerpunkts ist es zuzuschreiben, dass der Fetischcharakter der Massenmusik unvermittelt auch die avancierte und 'kritische' Produktion ergriffen hat.' (Adorno 1949/1976, 70)[xx]

The tewelve-tone technique also puts an end to a temporal development that traditionally prevails in music. Modern music organized on the basis of this system is characterised by shock elements and discontinuities. Subjective experience and its requirement for continuity and organization which can be understood are no longer tolerated: 'Die Momente des musikalischen Verlaufs

werden gleich psychologischen Regungen ungebunden aneinandergedreiht, als Schocks erst und dann als Kontrastgestalten. Nicht länger wird dem Kontinuum der subjektiven Erlebniszeit die Kraft zugetraut, musikalische Ereignisse zusammenzufassen und als ihre Einheit ihnen Sinn zu verleihen. Solche Diskontinuität aber tötet die musikalische Dynamik, der sie selber sich verdankt. Noch einmal bewältigt Musik die Zeit: aber nicht mehr, indem sie sie erfüllt einstehen lässt, sondern indem sie sie durch eine Sistierung aller musikalischen Momente durch die allgegenwärtige Konstruktion verneint. Nirgends erweist sich das geheime Einverständnis der leichten und der vorgeschrittenen Musik bündiger als hier.' (Adorno 1949/1976, 62)[xxi] In Schönberg's music, the shock elements (such as the gestures in Wagner's music) deny the temporal development that was characteristic in traditional art music. It also results in loss of contrast. Shock is akin to standardized detail.

Adorno felt that Schönberg was, however, able to compose 'progressively'. He was able to renew his ideas. It was rather his followers within the Serialism during the 1950s that were responsible for the detrimental effects of Schönberg's invention. However, one can read from Adorno's account that there is a dialectical and paradoxical element in Schönberg's original invention. It is, however, realized in the formation of a 'school' of serial composing. The paradoxical turn in Schönberg's invention is that as a part of the Expressionist movement it turns against subjective expression. The passages above contain several references to its rigid schemas and resemblance to popular music. Thus, there is certain logic in the most avant-garde innovations that can be turned into commodities. Their inner cores contain this kind of possibility in this movement.

3.8 Audiences and subjectivity

Just as subjectivity paradoxically fades away in modern music, so does it also in the perception of the products of the culture industry. This conclusion can be drawn from *Dialektik der Aufklärung*. As we already saw in the Wagner analysis, the subjectivity of the listener is lost through the enticing power of effects employed to arrest the attention. In the Culture Industry chapter this is continued as follows:

> 'Vergnügen heißt allemal: nicht daran denken müssen, das Leiden vergessen, noch wo es gezeigt wird. Ohnmacht liegt ihm zu Grunde. Es ist in der Tat Flucht, aber nicht, wie es behauptet, Flucht vor der schlechten Realität, sondern vor dem letzten Gedanken an Widerstand, den jene noch übriggelassen hat. Die Befreiung, die Amusement verspricht, ist die von Denken als von Negation. Die Unverschämtheit der rhetorischen Frage, 'Was wollen die Leute haben!' besteht darin, dass sie auf dieselben Leute als denkende Subjekte sich beruft, die der Subjektivität zu entwöhnen ihre spezifische Aufgabe darstellt.' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 153)[xxii]

This is also a continuation of the idea of leisure as being the after-image of work, in which Horkheimer and Adorno turn the familiar idea of entertainment

as a medium for relaxation upside down. Enjoyment of the products of the culture industry promises not freedom from harsh reality, but freedom from thinking about the possibility of changing it into something better. Again there is dissociation between individuality of consumer culture (the idea of a freely choosing consumer and the sovereignty of this idea, which stems from classical economic liberalist thought, and which seems to be anachronistic if the thesis of monopoly and post-liberal capitalism is taken seriously) and other traditional bourgeois ideas of individuality. The question 'Was wollen die Leute haben!' is rhetorical because the producers already know what they want, that is, the products which they believe among themselves that the consumers 'might' desire, and which they manufacture and advertise either aggressively or by means of subtle rhetoric. The subjectivity of the consumer culture involves freedom of choice within a limited range of ready-made options. This is an estrangement of true subjectivity in which the individual thinks for his/herself without the guidance of peers, political demagogues, or salesmen. The truth concerning individuality of consumer culture is, in Horkheimer's and Adorno's view, the following: 'Je fester die Positionen der Kulturindustrie werden, um so summarischer kann sie mit dem Bedürfnis der Konsumenten verfahren, es produzieren, steuern, disziplinieren, selbst das Amusement einziehen: dem kulturellen Fortschritt sind da keine Schranken gesetzt.' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969 152)[xxiii]

This is the predicament concerning the starting point of demand: is the starting point on the seller's side or the buyer's side? Which one is the originator of demand and consuming decisions? Economists seem to think that without true demand there cannot be any products. Consumer sociologists seem to think that demand is awakened through promotion and advertising. Horkheimer's and Adorno's view may be clarified in the passage above. The following clarifies it even further:

> 'Die Standards seien ursprünglich aus den Bedürfnissen der Konsumenten hervorge-gangen: daher würden sie so widerstandslos akzeptiert. In der Tat ist es der Zirkel von Manipulation und rückwirkendem Bedürfnis, in dem die Einheit des Systems immer dichter zusammenschießt.' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 129)[xxiv]

Demand might originate from the consumers; after all, we have enormous numbers of potential needs which can be addressed. This is why we are so consentient in our acceptance of the products directed at us. However, as soon as this process is set in motion it becomes a circle of manipulation and retroactive need. According to Horkheimer's and Adorno's thought, this can also lead to political inactivity. Consumption is the ideology of the culture industry, and it is ideological in the following sense; the possibility of a better world is projected to the 'super structure' of amusement and consumer commodities. The outcome is that we identify ourselves purely as consumers and objects, not citizens or political subjects. This is because one's every need is believed to be fulfilled by the consumption of commodities. The aim of this ideology is to pacify people from thinking about their problems and the social and political origins of these problems. Because the social system offers so

many pleasurable things to buy and consume it cannot, it is assumed, in essence be particularly all bad. Because possession of these items renders life reasonably bearable, there is no reason to rebel over minor issues. This is, of course, the description of the old form of critique of consumerist ideology. The consumer is the object of this ideological 'manipulation'. In another sense, the consumer is the object because his/her demand is externally guided. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 150)

However, the actual, individual manipulator can never be traced:

'Jedem beliebigen Tonfilm, jeder beliebigen Radiosendung lässt sich entnehmen, was keiner einzelnen, sondern allen zusammen in der Gesellschaft als Wirkung zuzuschreiben wäre. Unweigerlich reproduziert jede einzelne Manifestation der Kulturindustrie die Menschen als das, wozu die ganze sie gemacht hat. Darüber, dass der Prozess der einfachen Reproduktion des Geistes ja nicht in die erweiterte hineinführe, wachen alle seine Agenten, vom producer bis zu den Frauenvereinen.' (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 135)[xxv]

The process of manipulation is something the whole social system contributes to. It is a reproductive process in which the opinions and lifestyles of the people tend not to change; rather, the social system works to entrench the already existing state of mind. In this sense it acts as a confirmation of the status quo. The ultimate driving force behind all of this is revealed by Horkheimer's and Adorno's citation from Alexis de Tocqueville's book *De la Démocratie en Amérique*: it is the fear of social exclusion. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1969, 141) There is no 'elite' conspiracy behind this, rather it is a self-sustaining process in which we all take part - even as members of small groups within our social networks.

3.9 The 'revision' of the theory in the 1960s

The were no major turning points in Adorno's thought during his lifetime. This also applies to his conception of the culture industry. He was an elitist and a snob till the end. However, I have tried to present some characteristics in his texts that relativise the idea of his elitism. In the texts from the 1960s we find further support for this. Miriam Hansen states that one should avoid an 'on the verge of his death' line of discourse. Such a study might give the impression of a tragic figure who on his deathbed inadvertently begins to regret his previous statements and beliefs. (Hansen 1981-1982, 197) I have attempted to refer above to a kind of defence of entertainment in the 1930s and in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (although one should also avoid the 'already in his earlier writings' line of discourse). It could be argued that a dialectical thinker has 'abandoned' his objective when it comes to entertainment. I argue that this does not hold true. It is worth referring to the letter to Benjamin 18 March 1936, which was a comment on Benjamin's 'Kunstwerk' essay. Adorno accuses Benjamin for too little dialectic in the face of '*Gebrauchskunst*' or 'committed art'. It seems that Adorno understood Benjamin's point of reference to be mass art or political art

of the Soviet style.[5] Adorno's interpretation of Benjamin's point of reference and lack of dialectic is problematic. However, Adorno pointed out the possibility that new technology is not necessarily used 'progressively'. Sometimes it may simply involve the photographing of pre-arranged occasions. During his visit to the Babelsberg studios he noticed that the filmmakers seldom used aesthetic montage. (Adorno-Benjamin 1994, 173)

It is crucial to note Adorno's formulation of the dialectic of both the high and the low. (Adorno-Benjamin 1994, 171). Adorno understood art culture dialectically as is evident from the above account. Industrialization, commodification and fetishism also influence art culture. There are also dialectical moments in this culture that may cause it to resemble popular culture. Popular culture can contain elements that cause divergence of thought among people. This especially applies to early forms of popular culture. In the following line of reasoning I aim to show that also in Adorno's opinion new technologies (especially in film) can produce 'genuine' outcomes that cannot be regarded solely as mass culture.

Adorno's thought is generally not simply a question of 'good' and 'bad' culture and art, a level to which popular discourse usually reduces Adorno's critique. He does use these terms on several occasions as well as the now obsolete terms 'progressive' and 'regressive'. However, on a deeper and more profound level it is more a question of truth and falseness of cultural products. Thus, he condemns certain phenomena because they give a false idea of our reality and of ourselves and, conversely, he commends cultural phenomena that contain truth in the sense of a true understanding of our world and faithfulness towards reality (*Realitätsgerechtigkeit*), which means not pacifying but emphasizing existent antagonisms in society even though they may exist in the form of cipher. Thus, in Adorno's thought technical reproduction is not necessarily excluded from the realm of art. The criterion is that it is used aesthetically and in a way that gives a true vision of world.

Another point which relativises Adorno's elitism is the question of reception of cultural products. Far from being something brought about on his 'deathbed', this idea was already present in his work during the 1940s. In the last paragraphs of the Culture Industry chapter of *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, Horkheimer and Adorno write about the advertising nature of the culture

---

[5]   One could speculate as to what the true point of reference of Benjamin's essay was. What kind of film and photography he was referring to? He names film producers such as Dziga Vertov and photographers such as Eugene Atget. He was referring to artists that used techniques in order to find opportunities for aesthetic expression. Benjamin's point of reference was the art film and photography of his time, but not 'mass culture' using technique. In some senses Adorno's critique was inadequate, but he does very clearly see that these new technologies are not solely progressive. It could also be claimed that Benjamin could see that the use of new technologies (especially in the film culture) can lead to a new kind of aura and cult which is constructed around the star actors and actresses. He also regards that the film industry may bias the possibilities of film to investigate modern reality. According to Benjamin, the commercial film industry may strengthen and uphold the illusions of reality. (Benjamin 1974, 154-157) In that sense Benjamin understood the situation dialectically.

industry and its identification with propaganda. In the final paragraph the writers refer to the absolute standardization of people, from their human instincts to their personal outlook. This they regard as the triumph of advertisement in the culture industry. Man strives to mimic the model served up by the culture industry; s/he is compelled to identify him/herself with the images portrayed in television series, magazines and films. But this scenario becomes changed in the final words '[d]as ist der Triumph der Reklame in der Kulturindustrie, die zwangshafte Mimesis der Konsumenten an die *zugleich durchschauten* Kulturwaren.'[xxvi] Even if the identity is forced, people willingly succumb to it, totally conscious of the fact that it is mere illusion. In reality they see through the entertainment and products; they realize that they are being wilfully misled. Jarvis (1998, 74) states that it is a question of seeing through individual hidden agendas, such as in the sceptical reception of soap operas. However, this does not destroy pessimism towards a system which individuals are powerless to steer. This is also an ironical statement, as it represents the idea that the culture industry successfully achieves its aim of eradicating individual thought when people buy and consume these products, *even if* they see through them.

The essay 'Das Schema der Massenkultur' was a draft of the Culture Industry chapter in *Dialektik der Aufklärung*. In this essay Adorno regards the addressees of cultural production to include both objects and subjects:

> 'In der Anpassung an die technischen Produktivkräfte, die das System als Fortschritt ihnen aufzwingt, werden die Menschen Objekte, die ohne Einspruch sich manipulieren lassen, und fallen damit hinter die Potentialität der technischen Produktivkräfte zurück. Da sie aber, als Subjekte, doch stets noch selber die Grenze der Verdinglichung sind, so muss die Massenkultur in schlechter Unendlichkeit immer aufs Neue wieder sie erfassen: die hoffnungslose Mühe ihrer Wiederholung ist die einzige Spur der Hoffnung, dass die Wiederholung vergeblich, das die Menschen doch nicht zu erfassen seien.' (Adorno 1981, 331)[xxvii]

In this passage one can detect a paradoxical nature of progress. Both in working life and leisure time people are adjusted to the technical forces of production and this is marketed to them as progress. However, because people are merely manipulated objects of this process they cannot resist it and cannot realize the actual potentiality of these forces of production both in leisure and work. I also interpret this to mean that they also cannot become cultural producers themselves, even if the productive forces might allow this. They are also unaware of the 'progressive' aesthetic potentiality in these productive forces. In the above passage Adorno gives a reason for this which is, once again, the 'rationality of adaptation'. People are not stupid, and the process is not one of '*Verdummung*'. This is not the reason for the triumph of mass culture. The reason for its irresistible progression is the willingness to follow others and to think that adaptation to the image of mass culture provides a passport to a social life. Nevertheless, Adorno states ironically that the only hope is that the omnipresent repetition of mass culture might eventually reveal its own futility. A kind of barrier exists around the subjectivities of people which restless

bombardment does not break. In this sense therefore, in modern reality people remain as subjects.

The dialectic of simultaneously being both an object and a subject, conforming and resisting, and taking pleasure from and seeing through the illusion also comes out in the texts from the 1960s. In 'Résumé über Kulturindustrie' Adorno cites the phrase 'Die Welt wolle betrogen sein' and states that it is more true in his time than ever. He writes: 'sie wollen bereits einen Betrug, den sie selbst durchschauen; sperren krampfhaft die Augen zu und bejahen in einer Art Selbstverachtung, was ihnen widerfährt, und wovon sie wissen, warum es fabriziert wird.' (Adorno 1962/1977, 342)[xxviii] The receivers simultaneously express resistance and approval, realization and absence of memory. This deconstructs the idea that people are totally blind and guidable by external forces. The only hope that this might in fact be the case is the existence of a deep subconscious suspicion towards all that is offered: 'Nur ihr tief unbewusstes Misstrauen, das letzte Residuum des Unterschieds von Kunst und empirischer Wirklichkeit in ihrem Geist, erklärt, dass sie nicht längst allesamt die Welt durchaus so sehen und akzeptieren, wie sie ihnen von der Kulturindustrie hergerichtet ist.' (Adorno 1962/1977, 344)[xxix]

In 1969 in his 'Freizeit' essay, Adorno conceptualizes these ideas as '*gedoppeltes Bewusstsein*', i.e. split consciousness. The conclusion comes from an empirical study conducted in the Institut für Sozialforschung. The study was based on the wedding of Princess Beatrix and German diplomat Claus von Amsberg which was well publicized in the German mass media and weeklies at that time. The objective was to study and assess the reaction of the German public. The hypothesis was that the public would consider the issue as it is presented at face value. Furthermore, they expected the media publicity to strengthen the phenomenon of personalization in which individual people and private relationships were also overestimated by the public instead of the understanding of social determinants. Adorno points out that their expectations were too simplistic. The actual result gave them the impulse to believe this situation to be a phenomenon of split consciousness. The news items became viewed by the public as entertainment, proving that all news, even politically relevant news, can be turned into a consumer item by way of its mode of production and transmission. However, they also included control questions in their questionnaires concerning the political significance the interviewees might ascribe to the historical occasion. The researchers observed the following:

> 'Dabei zeigte sich, dass viele - die Repräsentanz mag auf sich beruhen - plötzlich sich ganz realistisch verhielten und die politische und gesellschaftliche Wichtigkeit desselben Ereignisses, das sie in seiner wohlpublizierten Einmaligkeit atemlos am Fernsehschirm bestaunt hatten, kritisch einschätzen. Was also die Kulturindustrie den Menschen in ihrer Freizeit vorsetzt, das wird, wenn meine Folgerung nicht zu voreilig ist, zwar konsumiert und akzeptiert, aber mit einer Art von Vorbehalt, ähnlich wie auch Naive Theaterereignisse oder Filme nicht einfach als wirklich hinnehmen. Mehr noch vielleicht: es wird nicht ganz daran geglaubt.' (Adorno 1969a, 66)[xxx]

Adorno also states that this result may prove that a Kantian possibility for a mature state of mind still exists: 'Das würde zusammenstimmen mit der gesellschaftlichen Prognose, dass eine Gesellschaft, deren tragende Widersprüche ungemindert fortbestehen, auch im Bewusstsein nicht total integriert werden kann...ich meine aber, dass darin eine Chance von Mündigkeit sichtbar wird, die schließlich einmal zu ihrem Teil helfen könnte, das Freizeit in Freiheit umspringt.' (Adorno 1969a, 67)[xxxi]

I would like here to interpret Adorno's thought in the face of the media and its recipients as a system consisting of four separate phases. Firstly, the audiences resemble a 'black hole'. They accept anything that is invented to rouse their attention. Secondly, they possess a deeply ingrained subconscious distrust of all that they are offered. Thirdly, if questioned, the recipients are able to form conscious responses and critical evaluation of this phenomenon. At the fourth level, even the critical attitude is abandoned, but it is done so consciously. The stream of products and programmes are accepted as such without constant analysis. However, this is an attitude of conscious silence (as highlighted in the 'Résumé' essay). The result is not that receivers somehow lose their subjective autonomy and boundaries, rather, as Adorno states in his 'Schema' essay, the endless repetitions only serve to prove that the process of reaching and manipulating audiences is performed in vain. The tragic question here is, of course, why people so willingly accept the situation and the system in its entirety even if they are fully aware of its ill, and even harmful, nature. Thus, this does not change the overall vision of Adorno's pessimism. It does, however, clarify his idea that the consciousness and inner life of people cannot in the end, despite all attempts, be captured. They are even conscious of any such attempts. They are free to accept or deny the reality of the situation. However, due to outward repression in the late modern labour and market situation they are more likely to choose to remain within the confines of their cell, rather than leave it, and seek detachment from the realities of everyday life.

The result of the study on the wedding of Beatrix was a positive indication that the situation from the point of view of the recipient is not entirely hopeless. Similarly, in the 1960s Adorno identified within German filmmaking some positive aspects concerning the production aspect of this situation which he went on to analyse in his essay 'Filmtransparente' (1966). In this text he conducts an imaginary discussion with Benjamin and understands film production to be divided into commercial motion pictures and art cinema. This situation is illustrated by the description of the dispute between '*Papas Kino*' (Daddy's cinema) and '*Bubis Kino*' (Kiddie's cinema).

The background of the article is the situation in which Adorno, after his return to Germany in the 1950s, became acquainted with lawyer-director Alexander Kluge and subsequently discovered German independent filmmaking. He refers to this genre via the term *Oberhausener* (after the Rhine town where the movement had its origins). The producers and directors of this movement opposed the West German film industry. The year 1966 saw an upsurge in the number of film premiers by independent directors (Volker

Schlöndorff's *Der junge Törless*, Edgar Reitz's *Mahlzeiten*, Vlado Kristl's *Der Brief* and Alexander Kluge's *Abschied von Gestern*). This boost was made possible due to provision of funding from a new public institution, Kuratorium Junger Deutscher Film, which was founded in 1965. However, the system ran into difficulties during 1967 as a result of the Film Subsidies Bill, which favoured more established filmmakers. In 1966 the commercial lobbyists actively promoted their interests in the wording of the bill. The publication of the 'Filmtransparente' essay in that year in *Die Zeit* was an intervention on behalf of the independent filmmakers. (Hansen 1981-1982, 193) Adorno's essay may be seen also as a reflex of pan-European discourse on film at that time. It emerged also in Finland during the 1950s and continued until the 1970s. The discourse was characterised by the dissociation of entertainment films and art cinema. (see Pantti 1998)

Adorno's critique towards film is based on his observation that the technology of film production is reduced to reproduction technology. He referred to this in his letter to Benjamin, using the German word *Technik*. Instead, aesthetic or immanent technologies such as the sound structure of the work were treated as less important. What could these aesthetic technologies be? Adorno is well known for his opposition to Benjamin on the issue of montage. Montage can be understood as the cutting of film or as aesthetic montage, which is an artistic effect. Adorno's critique is rooted in his understanding of montage as constituting nothing more than the assembling of oppositional fragments of reality. He was more in favour of the idea of construction, in which the elements of reality are deconstructed into pieces and then constructed anew to create a reality of its own. In the 'Filmtransparente' essay he sees montage as ambivalent. On the one hand, the artist should have a clear intention. The dilemma of filmmakers is that they must find a middle road between sheer arts-and-crafts and a mere documentary mode of film production. Adorno regards montage as one solution to this predicament. It does not interfere with things as they are, but arranges them in a constellation akin to that of writing. However, this is not a wholly reliable procedure. Adorno demands intentionality, which montage is liable to fall short of. In his view, intentionality is not achieved automatically. He understands, however, that there is a paradox here, that even denial of significance and interpretation has, in a sense, a kind of meaning and significance in itself: 'Das Subjekt, das sich verschweigt, redet durchs Schweigen nicht weniger, eher mehr, als wo es redet' (Adorno 1966/1977, 358)[xxxii]. It could be said that he defends montage when it resembles *ecriture* rather than script, and the constellations formed through ecriture.

Adorno employs terms such as *Unbeherrschtes, Zufälliges* or *Zufall ungesteuerter Empirie* to refer to subjective expression in film as a kind of mimesis (see Adorno 1997) in opposition to organization. Thomas Levin translated the latter as 'unguided chance'. I interpret it as allowing the possibility for something unexpected to be created. Adorno combines these elements to form *Bubis Kino. Papas Kino* seemed to him to be more controlled

and sophisticated, in the way that cosmetics disguise and fade away facial wrinkles. Conversely, the work of the younger filmmakers possessed liberating aspects which directly stemmed from the fact that they contained uncontrolled and accidental elements: 'Während in der autonomen Kunst nichts taugt, was hinter deren einmal erreichtem technischen Standard herhinkt, haben gegenüber der Kulturindustrie, deren Standard das nicht Vorgekaute, nicht schon Erfasste ausschließt, so wie die kosmetische Branche die Runzeln der Gesichter beseitigt, Gebilde ein Befreiendes, die ihre Technik nicht gänzlich beherrschen und darum ein Unbeherrschtes, Zufälliges tröstlich durchlassen. In ihnen werden die Mängel des Teints eines schönen Mädchens zum Korrektiv des fleckenlosen der approbierten Stars.' (Adorno 1966/1977, 353)[xxxiii]

The most important aesthetic factor in film is, in Adorno's opinion, the return to 'subjective experience': 'Die Ästhetik des Films wird eher auf eine subjektive Erfahrungsform rekurrieren müssen, der er, gleichgultig gegen seine technologische Entstehung, ähnelt und die das Kunsthafte an ihm ausmacht.' And what exactly is this experience which comes forth in his account?

> 'Wer etwa, nach einem Jahr in der Stadt, für längere Wochen im Hochgebirge sich aufhält und dort aller Arbeit gegenüber Askese übt, dem mag unvermutet widerfahren, dass im Schlaf oder Halbschlaf bunte Bilder der Landschaft wohltätig an ihm vorüber oder durch ihn hindurch ziehen. Sie gehen aber nicht kontinuerlich ineinander über, sondern sind in ihrem Verlauf gegeneinander abgesetzt wie in der Laterna magica der Kindheit. Diesem Innehalten in der Bewegung verdanken die Bilder des inneren Monologs ihrer Ähnlichkeit mit der Schrift: nicht anders ist auch diese ein unterm Auge sich Bewegendes und zugleich in ihren einzelnen Zeichen Stillgestelltes. Solcher Zug der Bilder dürfte zum Film sich verhalten wie die Augenwelt zur Malerei oder die akustische zur Musik. Kunst wäre der Film als objektivierende Wiederherstellung dieser Weise von Erfahrung.' (Adorno 1966/1977, 355)[xxxiv]

Film technology may even be a medium *par excellence* for the representation of this type of experience of internal irrational succession of images. It is also a medium for unchained associations, which Adorno longed for in the 1940s when he described the disappearance of older forms of entertainment. In this sense, Adorno finds in the 1960s that possibilities for genuine *Erfahrung* do exist within modern reality and even for its representation in aesthetic montage in film. He partly owed this idea to Kluge (see 1981-1982, 209) who referred to the inner stream of images and associations as a more than 'thousand year-old film'. It is crucial that these inner images are spontaneous and opposed to realism. These spontaneous, free associations represent for Kluge the *Erfahrung* that is according to Adorno and Benjamin lost in the modern culture. They are beacons of inspiration in the late capitalist era.

3.10 The dialectic of entertainment

Some ideas that can be found in Adorno's texts are very seldom noticed by critics. In the following I will cite a couple of these critics. Their 'new' ideas are something that Adorno was already aware of.

In 1965 so-called Beatles mania was at its height. Adorno could not ignore this, and he even reacted to it in a radio discussion with Peter von Haselberg. They were discussing the topic of progress and consciousness. Adorno claimed: 'Ich möchte sagen, dass es sich bei dem Begriff des fortgeschrittenen Bewusstseins gar nicht nur um ein rein temporales handelt, also um das, was up to date ist. Ich meine, sonst käme ein künstleriches Bewusstsein heraus, für das dann die Beatles, weil sie gerade heute Mode sind, moderner wären als die fortgeschrittene, neue Kunst.' (Kemper 1991, 890) von Haselberg provoked him to continue and back up his claim by referring to an idea of the Beatles as being a kind of 'entartete Kunst'. Adorno denies the idiosyncrasy of this but states that the point is that the 'von oben' directed culture is regressed (*Zurückgebliebenes*). This is because they count on the expression of old traditions, which according to Adorno's philosophical assumptions did not speak truthfully in his time. (Kemper 1991, 890-891) This shows that in some respects his convictions concerning musical and artistic progress did not change over time. In this claim he iterates the notion present in his texts on music from the 1930s onward that popular music mostly uses formulas from earlier traditions of classical music.

'These people' perhaps simply offered entertainment, fun and shameless enjoyment of life. This is hedonism, enjoyment in the sense of here and now. For Adorno, this is of course affirmation of the status quo and does not entail any possibility of antiauthoritarian impulse. To be entertained is simply to adjust to the status quo.

Kemper fosters the trivial claim that rock music is oppositional, even if in an 'unconscious' way. To Adorno's critique of 'unconscious life' he replies with the critique against intellectuals having 'leblosen Bewusstsein'. (Kemper 1991, 896) Rock music does not, however, hide its affirmative or blinding character: 'Gegen diesen allgegenwärtigen Verblendungszusammenhang einer vermeintlich wahren Erfahrung in einer falschen Welt rebelliert die aufbrechende Rockmusik, indem sie ihren Scheincharakter, ihre Vorläufigkeit als ideologisches Blendwerk offensiv propagiert. Rockmusik wird zu einer Kunstform, indem sie sich phantasievoll weigert, eine zu sein. Sie bleibt ein klingendes Paradox.' (Kemper 1991, 897)

Adorno himself interprets the behaviour of the audience in coping with this situation in his essay 'Résumé über Kulturindustrie': 'Der Satz, die Welt wolle betrogen sein, ist wahrer geworden, als wohl je damit gemeint war. Nicht nur fallen die Menschen, wie man so sagt, auf Schwindel herein, wenn er ihnen sei's noch so flüchtige Gratifikationen gewährt; sie wollen bereits einen Betrug, den sie selbst durchschauen; sperren krampfhaft die Augen zu und bejahen in einer Art Selbstverachtung, was ihnen widerfährt, und wovon sie wissen, warum es fabriziert wird.' (Adorno 1962/1977, 342) The shameful attitude does not necessarily concern the rock audience. But the musicians do not care about their own character as 'ideological blinding agents' because they can count on the situation that 'the listeners/spectators are already aware of this fact'. They see through the deception.

This can be further clarified by Keppler's and Seel's analysis of a piece by Bobby McFerrin at the end of the 1980s: *Don't worry, be happy.* According to Keppler and Seel, the ambiguity of this piece is in the fact that the masses enjoyed its illusionary promise (and, of course, the captivating melody). On the other hand, the intellectuals themselves enjoyed the concealed pleasure of revealing the illusion, stating that it was *only* an illusion and the knowledge of somehow being more aware than the masses of the manipulative efforts of the songwriter. But this is in itself an illusionary description. According to Keppler and Seel:

> 'Erstens, weil auch die Intellektuellen keineswegs nur das Dementi genießen, sondern beides: die Erfüllung und das Dementi, oder genauer: die Erfüllung durch das Dementi. Zweitens, weil auch den vielen die Eigenart dieses Songs nicht entgangen sein kann: Denn jeder weiß, dass die Maxime, 'Don't worry, be happy', nicht hält, was sie verspricht; allen, denen das Stück gefällt, gefällt es, obwohl sie das wissen. Nun ist der Umstand, dass der Hörer weiß, dass das Rezept nicht stimmt, aber trotzdem sein Vergnügen daran hat, eine für den Schlager (und vieles andere in der Massenkultur) durchaus übliche Situation… Dass McFerrins Lied in einem positiven Sinn nicht hält, was es verspricht, dass es unterhält und ablenkt, indem es nichts Falsches verspricht, macht seine Faszination für alle seine geneigten Hörer aus, ganz gleich, wie viele Schuljahre oder Semester sie hinter sich haben mögen. Sie erleben einen heiteren Augenblick der Freiheit vom Verlangen nach falscher Tröstung.' (Keppler & Seel 1991, 881)

This is one example of the turning of the 'dialectic of enlightenment' into the 'dialectic of entertainment': it turns against itself upon reception, even if it still maintains its character as a source of enjoyment.

One can further ask whether rock and popular music can be reduced completely and solely down to their character as a commodity, as Adorno seems to indicate. While asking this, Kemper cites Adorno's 'Gesellschaftliche Lage' essay from 1932, in which he segregates light music which is compatible with valorization of capital, and serious music which denies this. Kemper continues:

> 'Das Paradox, das jedes Kunstwerk im Kapitalismus durchdringt, trägt Rockmusik offen aus: Sie verlangt die Abschaffung jener Zustände, denen sie sich selbst verdankt, ohne aber zugleich auch die eigene Abschaffung zu propagieren.' (Kemper 1991, 899)

Even if rock music is an industry worth billions it is not purely business, but contains value in terms of experience, spontaneity and impulses that are not easily domesticated. The value of experience is one key factor of this issue. Another is the following: 'darauf [Impulswirkungen] hat Helmut Salzinger schon Anfang der siebziger Jahre mit seiner ironisierenden Marx-Paraphrase 'Der Rock ist ein Gebrauchswert' hingedeutet: Rockmusik als klingender und in der Kasse klingelnder Witz über die versteinerten Verkehrsformen der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Als Methode, 'dem System mit seinen eigenen Mitteln eins auszuwischen; den Erwachsenen das Geld aus der Tasche zu ziehen, während man sich hinter ihrem Rücken über sie mockierte'. (Kemper 1991, 900) The situation in which valorization of capital and service of cultural business continues hand-in-hand with its total disregard and contempt is, according to

Kemper, an 'ironic reflexivity' of rock music. Keppler and Seel claim that this takes place in mass culture as a general occurrence. They term it 'Spannung zwischen Vereinnahmung und Distanzierung', 'Pendelschlag zwischen Verengung und Durchbrechung' and finally 'Dialektik der Unterhaltung.'

Adorno had precisely this possibility in mind in his 1932 Gesellschaftlichen Lage essay. Immediately after segregating serious music which denies the markets and light music which does not, he states: 'Andererseits enthält gerade die 'leichte' Musik, von der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft geduldet, verachtet und benutzt gleich der Prostitution, mit der sie als 'leichtgeschürzt' nicht umsonst verglichen wird, *Elemente, die wohl Triebbefriedigungen der heutigen Gesellschaft darstellen, deren offiziellen Ansprüchen aber widerstreiten und damit in gewissem Sinne die Gesellschaft transzendieren, der sie dienen.*' (Adorno 1932, 107) In this sentence Adorno expresses at an abstract level the idea of 'ironic reflexivity' or 'oscillation between narrowing and breaking through', or the dialectic of opposing while serving something.

Despite the Beatles critique, Adorno has a good sense of understanding of sensuality, impulses, and pleasure. In his Filmtransparente essay he opposes the French *Libertinage* of conservative and religious West European countries. It becomes clear that he looks favourably upon the practice of open hugging among youths in the city centres, a behaviour which they may have picked up from films. Adorno claims: 'Will sie die Massen ergreifen, so gerät selbst die Ideologie der Kulturindustrie in sich so antagonistisch wie die Gesellschaft, auf die sie es abgesehen hat. Sie enthält das Gegengift ihrer eigene Lüge.' (Adorno 1966/1977, 356) The behaviour of these youths might equally be interpreted as an expression of further pseudo-individuality. This passage indicates that, in favourable circumstances, even domesticated storytelling may contain liberating and rebellious elements, thus acting as an antidote to the cultural industry.

Within the idea of the dialectic of entertainment one can identify three individual aspects. Firstly, simple sensuality and pleasure, which can function as critique in repressive societies. Secondly, the interplay between producers and consumers which are both aware of the lie which they are party to. Thirdly, the indirect 'mockery' of the same economic system they are serving and using. This shows that Adorno regarded the phenomenon of the culture industry as dialectically as he regarded the phenomenon of serious art. Later on, I will apply this dialectical idea also to 'serious' media reportage, claiming that mystification can also turn against itself.

After this delineation of dialectical character of popular culture one might find reason to defend, in accordance with Keppler and Seel, the co-existence and interference of various cultural activities and spheres. This has, of course, been a triviality for a long time. However, in relation to Adorno's conception of cultural democracy, I would like to cite theirs: 'Es soll das einen öffentlichen Raum haben, was den wenigen, ebenso wie das, was den vielen gefällt. Abwesenheit von Zensur, ob im Namen einer Minderheit oder auch einer Mehrheit, ist das mindeste, was ästhetische und politische Kultur unter demokratischen Verhältnissen gemeinsam haben.' (Keppler & Seel 1991, 877)

The absence of these censorships is not so threatening for Adorno enthusiasts and mass culture dystopians when the possibilities described above are taken into account. Still, one could ask why is it that cultural works, be they esoteric or popular, always have to gain their *raison d'être* through opposition and critique of something, be it direct or dialectical. Why not simply be satisfied with enjoying the present? The endeavour of finding the hidden truth does not change. The dissociation of illusion/truth prevails. What Adorno manages to do *by saying* is not a subversion of 'prevailing truths', *Umwertung aller Werte* but to some degree a steering of attitudes. Even if Adorno's ideas can be interpreted by reconsidering his elitism and pessimism, these features cannot in the end be extracted from his thought. For some, the problem may be one of negativity and criticism, which seem to be the sole evaluation criteria for all that is of value in this world.

3.11 Conclusion

The *motive for writing* for Adorno was a feeling of loss of place in the late modern world. As intellectuals of the European mould he and his co-workers were no longer respected and their work and philosophical endeavours seemed to be wasted in the 'brave new world' of empirical experimental studies and technocratic planning. There was a strong feeling of being an outsider in a technocratic world. Positivism, which in Europe once also contained critical elements, became transformed into administrative research following their emigration. A cynical interpretation of their motive is, of course, that they were solely concerned with *their own* position. However, it was more a genuine concern for the phenomenon in general which drove them to investigate why the 'critical powers' seemed to disappear in the late modern world.

The reason why the beginning of *Dialektik der Aufklärung* provides a clue to understanding Adorno's critique of the culture industry is that it introduces the idea of progress turning against itself. The culture industry is the specific sphere of their civilization critique. It is a specific sphere of self-preservation through adjusting to others and to what is 'up to date', and of producers adjusting their products to maximise their convenience value to their customers, thus leading to the impoverishment of both reason and sensuality. The culture industry is not an entity which leads rationality and logical thinking astray, but conversely, is one which leads sensuality and materiality into rational calculation. The critique is not a question of 'denying everything that is fun' concerning entertainment and ease of living. Adorno's (and Horkheimer's) account contains such a large amount of Nietzschean influence in terms of critique of religion and science that it is absurd to claim that Adorno and Horkheimer would deny material life, enjoyment, experience and happiness. Their argument is that it is, in fact, the culture industry that denies these elements. Understood in the light of *Dialektik der Aufklärung* this is a

disciplining and controlling phenomenon as opposed to something that brings liberation to instinctual life. Every field of life, the creative arts and *geistige* included, are subordinated to events external to it. I argue that the pointing out of this notion is the chief *intention* of Adorno's writing, his *act of* and *act in saying* the word *Kulturindustrie*. His (and Horkheimer's) intention was to break the spell of late modernity, and this is my illocutionary re-description of their endeavour (in Benjamin's terms awakening from the 'dream').

The intention of breaking the spell of modernity and the ideal of Progress takes place by showing the reverse sides of this phenomenon. He tried to show how economical, technological and scientific progress - and success - may bring about human suffering. In the aesthetic sphere industrialization, rationalization and technological innovations which are intended to create progress turn the sphere towards a regressive course. The paradoxical and dialectical reverse sides are his strategy of dissociation. Efficient economic mode of production, including organization of cultural institutions, rationalization (division of labour) and technical innovations, were thought to bring about democracy, individuality, relaxation, a new perception of reality, and free choice among an ever widening selection of commodities. In this dissociation he names the professed virtues of large circulation (democracy), personal outlook (individuality), distraction (relaxation with entertainment) and film as a test of reality (perception): shopping choices with the epithet *Schein*. The following list of dissociations can be attained: monopoly/democracy, standardization/ individuality, adjusting/enjoying or relaxation, conditioned association reflexes/perception, predetermined demand/sovereign choices. With the epithet *Schein* and these renamings, Adorno sees these virtuous characteristics, which the new technologies and industrialization in the common sense is thought to bring about, to be 'illusionary', 'appearance' and 'semblance'. To him, truth would be breaking the monopoly or oligopoly situation in favour of true competition as in the wake of capitalism. Individuality and free choice should rather be akin to the Kantian idea of maturity, in which thinking originates from one's own mind. 'True' relaxation comes rather paradoxically with concentration on important issues as opposed to the heedless wasting of time. Concentration and slow temporal succession are more likely to bring fourth new kinds of associations. His use of the term 'culture industry' and his texts in general show that the term implicates these illusionary characteristics. The term implicates the illusion and ideology of his time if taken in an unproblematic, neutral or a commending manner.

Here he maker use of a paradiastolic form of rhetorical re-description in which he tries to turn valuations and normative colourings upside down. On the one hand, it is an intervention into cultural conservatism, which emphasizes rationality and the regression of rationality in crude culture. In Adorno's opinion the situation is rather an opposite one to this: the rationality of the culture industry is itself a detrimental aspect. Adorno *renames* this phenomenon as 'industry', which changes its moral light. As mentioned above, this is not a regression of rationality but a triumph of it. On the other hand, it is an

intervention into economic liberalism and its vision of the free choice of consumers (which was illusionary in the new post-competitive economy). The term 'industry' lends this discussion a connotation of discipline and control of choice, not its freedom. Adorno dissociates the liberal idea of individuality in the free choice of consumers and the German Idealism thought of as bourgeois individuality situated in *Mündigkeit,* the ability to think without the leading of others. In the face of conservatism Adorno turns its vices, materiality, fantasy, and corporality into virtues. In turn, he turns their virtues of rationality, spirituality and logic into vices, which are also the vices of the culture industry. Addressing the tradition of mass communication research, Adorno indicates that it does not merely consist of neutral social communication via new forms of media. It is precisely the new situation of the interplay of the economy and technological innovations which transform social communication into industry, where opinions are predetermined and offered from above.

The culture industry seems to be a domination of inner nature. It is not sphere of freedom of choice or a sphere of relaxation after work. On the contrary, choices are predetermined and leisure more resembles work than freedom of thought. To conclude, I shall illustrate this using a number of paradoxes in Adorno's critique.

The following elements are praised as being present in the new entertainment culture in Adorno's time: democracy, individuality, popularity and pleasure. They all turn against themselves in Adorno's account. Adorno uses certain vocabulary that changes the normative colourings of the following praised phenomena: industrialization, rationalization, fetishization, monopolization, regression and standardization. When he describes the phenomenon of the culture industry using these words he attempts to change the normative colouring of the entire phenomenon.

These concepts are used to devalue the existent forms of cultural production. The renaming of cultural production at that time took place as follows. Folk culture and mass communication turned from the concept of mass culture in Adorno's drafts into the culture industry. The word 'mass' implicated schema and uniformity (everybody is offered the same), the word 'industry' implicated the deliberate economic form of organization implemented to bring forth the mass characteristics of cultural works. We are told that it is not a question of offering a selection of items and freedom of choice, but something that is organized from above and which we are willing to accept because our memory and senses are tired of accepting existing offers.

The paradox of democracy lies in the fact that if it is understood in terms of a wide distribution of entertainment, the idea of democracy turns against itself. The background to this is the idea that it offers possibilities to only a small number of entrepreneurs to enter the market. It somehow mocks the idea of democracy as plurality, diversity and 'the rule of people'. It is in Adorno's opinion the system ruled by the economically strong. The idea of the opportunity to choose is praised as individuality. But in reality the opportunities and possibilities to choose come not from the individual but

again from the economically strong. It represents '*Liquidierung des Individuums*' because it embodies manipulated taste and only the appearance of individuality. The process is all the more bizarre in practice because the producers sometimes seemingly offer thought-provoking material and yet at the same time their only task is to alienate the consumers from their real subjectivity.

Free time as organized freedom turned into a commodity and entertainment is, paradoxically, a prolongation of work. It is not a question of the idea that intellectual workers must pursue 'non-intellectual' hobbies in order to relax from the process of thinking. Nor does it follow that manual and industrial workers must pursue intellectual hobbies in order to avoid replicating their working activity in their leisure time. For example, Adorno describes that he does not need senseless pastime and pseudo-relaxing activities, but that he can listen to music in a 'strenuous' manner, and the labour involved is rewarding to a degree far and above that which he would otherwise experience. It is a question of organization; one gives in to social pressure which demands that everybody must have at least one hobby, or preferably several in order to keep up to date with trends. The idea here is that this is actually a mockery of free time, which should be something spontaneous.

However, we can also find paradoxes in Adorno's defence of entertainment. In fact, sense can be found in the most senseless and absurd. Sentimental and rational entertainment breaks its promise of relaxation. The senseless and absurd do not promise anything of the kind, but challenge one to think beyond actual reality. This is done by making sudden, irrational associations, thus causing one to deviate from one's routine thinking in work and leisure.

The art culture is not saved from paradoxes either. In Wagner's music there is both subjective freedom (dissonance as liberation of instinctual elements) and the decay of subject (ego weakness in being led by leitmotiv and phantasmagoria). In Schönberg's music and in his invention there is a germ of loss of subjectivity. The **system of** twelve-tone **technique** was once a liberation from the quasi-natural domination of tonality, but it turned into mere mathematics and into the domination of the same subjective fantasy.

In the reception of the culture industry, split consciousness represents paradox par excellence: the strong willingness and enjoyment involved in watching, for example, a television series in a state of aversion. This split consciousness may provide an explanation for the experience of bad conscience through enjoyment, or a sense of being above the *Schund*: the existence of a bad conscience or arrogance in the state of enjoyment. It seems as if the only possibility for critique is through irony and an ostentatious attitude of seeing through the illusion. Another possibility for reception comes through simply ignoring the fact that 'they' are trying to manipulate one's opinions, thus the willingness to consume remains largely unaffected. These paradoxes are rhetorical re-descriptions directed towards all common sense thinking on these issues.

One minor phrase of Adorno that 'the ideology of the culture industry contains the antidote to its own lie' might change this understanding completely. This phrase means that rationalized or organized fun may in certain circumstances lead to a liberated lifestyle which does not obey the rules in order to keep up with the status quo. Another, very early observation is paradoxical in character, stating that light music can oppose official requirements and, in a certain sense, reach beyond the society that it serves. This is a dialectic of simultaneously opposing while serving something. It may be an inverse of the recuperation process of the avant-garde of which Adorno was aware, that of serving while opposing. Together, the antidote hypothesis and the split consciousness hypothesis lead us to the conclusion that serialized and rationalized cultural production do not necessarily pose a threat to liberty and individuality. The essential difficulty of explaining the dynamic of the cultural industry and its inherent problems seems to be withered away by sleight of hand. Still, after all reconsiderations of Adorno's thought the problem of opposition remains: after all, the possibility of opposition and critique, whether direct or dialectic, is the elitist legitimation and *raison d'être* of all artistic endeavours be they popular or esoteric. These paradoxes can be judged as rhetorical re-description which attempt to alter existing valuations. Despite the impossibility of avoiding certain dead ends of the Frankfurt School of thought, there is the possibility that the consciousness of people cannot ultimately be captured at all. Despite the dismal reality of the outside world, the individual is always free to interpret the situation otherwise and find freedom from inside and within. This issue forms the background of my interpretation of the dialectic of entertainment or the dialectic of mystification and the idea of vices containing possibilities for virtues.

Finally, I am obliged to provide a definition of the culture industry by way of the Skinnerian descriptive-normative model. The criteria of application for the concept of the culture industry include the following: 1) Industrialization. This does not refer solely to the reproduction technique, but also the economic mode of organization. This mode can be implemented in the forms of production that are based on these reproduction techniques such as the recording industry, productions of live music or art museums. 2) Rationalization. This denotes the effective division of labour within an organization. 3) Fetishization. This is the vicious circle of top-selling products; it also means the domination of exchange value in the form of prestige or money or simply as a mask of use value. 4) Monopolisation. This is the organization of large capital-intensive enterprises which raises the threshold for entering the market; it may also denote a selection of top-selling products as in the phenomenon of fetishization due to competition and the necessity to reduce costs, which in turn leads to the vicious circle that excludes diversity. 5) Regression. This is related to monopolisation in terms of the fetishization of beautiful or striking details, which in turn leads to fragmentary and atomistic reception of cultural works. 6) Standardization - pseudoindividuality. This is the dynamic of familiarity and strangeness in various spheres of individual life,

but in the culture industry it refers to substitutable individual details which are not solely applicable to any single work. It is also the disconnection of the dynamic complexity of these features and the paradoxical phenomenon of individuality becoming standardized. In cultural production this leads to the domination of the average - a culture of in-betweens.

The technical reproduction criterion is not a necessary requirement in the definition of the range of reference of the culture industry. A unique piece of artwork may also be a phenomenon within the culture industry. However, the initial criteria mentioned above constitute an essential check list. If each of these criteria is fulfilled, a unique work of art may also be counted as a part of the culture industry. In this way some degree of artistic creativity and carrying of meaning content may exist, but this is used for commercial reasons, rationalized and industrialized, therefore making it a phenomenon of the culture industry. Plurality of expression, diversity of opportunities to choose and aesthetic complexity are issues that are, in Adorno's opinion, diametrically opposite to the culture industry as he describes it.

The range of reference may preliminarily be formed as the in-between area of provocative avant-garde and absurd humour. The culture industry may include activities such as creative art: visual, composing, writing; performing art: music, theatre; publishing: books, magazines, newspapers; recording; film; electronic media; and commodity production. Even if the preliminary criterion is popularity (not necessarily reproducibility) and the area in which to apply the 'in-between area', one must take into account the possibility that even the most esoteric criteria may turn into commodities. Thus, popularity among large audiences is not alone essential, but also the status in the cultural canon.

The normative stance may be very clear. He uses the word to condemn the phenomenon. However, there is some degree of irony in his account and especially in his sense of paradox. His action lies in his writing and he wields this word with the intention of breaking the spell of prevailing thought praising late modern 'progressive' phenomena. The nature of his action is to cause one to notice the dynamic of one's time; and in this realization the optimism and positive elements of modernity can be found, if only one has the patience to hear what he is saying. His intention has been interpreted in several ways throughout the decades and, indeed, this study is also only one of many possible interpretations. Usually his *act by saying* the term 'culture industry' has been a nervous reaction. He is interpreted as intervening in the personal life of individuals and the act is seen as one of denying them their happiness and pleasure, or attempting to dictate 'von oben' what they should listen to and look at. The presence of a certain arrogant and snobby tone cannot be denied. But his concern was rather to demonstrate the possibility that they are being dictated 'von oben' and also in terms of their personal desires as a result of the vicious circle of monopoly capitalism. The Anglo-Saxon cultural studies have usually misunderstood Adorno as regarding people as essentially stupid, and that he regards it to be their own fault and inability to interpret the world, and as such they therefore must require intellectual guidance. In fact, the

stupidity is the fault of the diluted encodings of cultural works themselves as dictated by economic efficiency. The late modern social condition is also rather at fault in this respect. Adorno's intention is to show at a chiefly hypothetical level how the mode of production influences the contents of products. The delineation at the end of this chapter shows that people are intelligent enough to notice this dynamic. His mode of presenting things as paradoxes gives the idea that there are always dialectically neighbouring vices in all virtues, and vice versa.

NOTES

i.   The regression of the masses today is their inability to hear the unheard-of with their own ears, to touch the unapprehended with their own hands - the new form of delusion which deposes every conquered mythic form. Through the mediation of the total society which embraces all relations and emotions, men are once again made to be that against which the evolutionary law of society, the principle of self, had turned: mere species beings, exactly like one another through isolation in the forcibly united collectivity. The oarsmen, who cannot speak to one another, are each of them yoked in the same rhythm as the modern worker in the factory, movie theater, and collective. The actual working conditions in society compel conformism - not the conscious influences which also made the suppressed men dumb and separated them from truth. The impotence of the worker is not merely a stratagem of the rulers, but the logical consequence of the industrial society into which the ancient Fate - in the very course of the effort to escape it - has finally changed. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 36-37)

ii.   In our drafts we spoke of 'mass culture'. We replaced that expression with 'culture industry' in order to exclude from the outset the interpretation agreeable to its advocates: that it is a matter of something like a culture that arises spontaneously from the masses themselves, the contemporary form of popular art. From the latter the culture industry must be distinguished in the extreme. The culture industry fuses the old and familiar into a new quality. In all its branches, products which are tailored for consumption by masses, and which to a great extent determine the nature of that consumption, are manufactured more or less according to plan. The individual branches are similar in structure or at least fit into each other, ordering themselves into a system almost without a gap. (Adorno 1991c, 85)

iii. The world of that musical life, the composition business which extends peacefully from Irving Berlin and Walter Donaldson - 'the world's best composer' - by way of Gershwin, Sibelius and Tchaikovsky to Schubert's B Minor Symphony, labeled *The Unfinished*, is one of fetishes. (Adorno 1991a, 31)

iv.   Famous people are not the only stars. Works begin to take on the same role. A pantheon of bestsellers builds up. The programmes shrink, and the shrinking process not only removes the moderately good, but the accepted classics themselves undergo a selection that has nothing to do with quality. In America, Beethoven's Fourth Symphony is among the rarities. This selection reproduces itself in a fatal circle: the most familiar is the most successful and is therefore played again and again and made still more familiar. (Adorno 1991a, 31-32)

v.   The masochistic mass culture is the necessary manifestation of almighty production itself. When the feelings seize on exchange value it is no mystical transsubstantiation. It corresponds to the behaviour of the prisoner who loves his cell because he has been left nothing else to love. The sacrifice of individuality, which accommodates itself to the regularity of the successful, the doing of what everybody does, follows from the basic fact that in broad areas the same thing is offered to everybody by the standardized production of consumption goods. But the commercial necessity of connecting this identity leads to the manipulation of taste and the official culture's pretence of individualism which necessarily increases in proportion to the liquidation of the individual. (Adorno 1991a, 35)

vi.   If the commodity in general combines exchange value and use value, then the pure use value, whose illusion the cultural goods must preserve in a completely capitalist society, must be replaced by pure exchange value, which precisely in its capacity as exchange value deceptively takes over the function of use value. The specific fetish character of music lies in this *quid pro quo*. The feelings which go to the exchange value create the appearance of immediacy at the same time as the absence of a relation to the object belies it. It has its basis in the abstract character of exchange value. (Adorno 1991a, 34)

vii. The counterpart to the fetishism of music is a regression of listening...They fluctuate between comprehensive forgetting and sudden dives into recognition. They listen

atomistically and dissociate what they hear, but precisely in this dissociation they develop certain capacities which accord less with the concepts of traditional aesthetics than with those of football and motoring. (Adorno 1991a, 40-41)

viii. How formalized the procedure is can be seen when the mechanically differentiated products prove to be all alike in the end. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 123)

ix. Something is provided for all so that none may escape; the distinctions are emphasized and extended...Everybody must behave (as if spontaneously) in accordance with his previously determined and indexed level, and choose the category of mass product turned out for his type. (Horkheimer & Adorno1972, 123)

x. Under the private culture monopoly it is a fact that 'tyranny leaves the body free and directs its attack at the soul. The ruler no longer says: You must think as I do or die. He says: You are free not to think as I do; your life, your property, everything shall remain yours, but from this day on you are a stranger among us'. (Horkheimer & Adorno1972, 133)

xi. The total effect of the culture industry is one of anti-enlightenment, in which, as Horkheimer and I have noted, enlightenment, that is the progressive technical domination of nature, becomes mass deception and is turned into a means for fettering consciousness. It impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves. (Adorno 1991c, 92)

xii. If we suppose with Marx that in bourgeois society labour power has become a commodity in which labour is consequently reified, then the expression 'hobby' amounts to a paradox: that human condition which sees itself as the opposite of reification, the oasis of unmediated life within a completely mediated total system, has itself been reified just like the rigid distinction between labour and free time. The latter is a continuation of the forms of profit-oriented social life. (Adorno 1991d, 164)

xiii. They are so designed that quickness, powers of observation, and experience are undeniably needed to apprehend them at all; yet sustained thought is out of the question if the spectator is not to miss the relentless rush of facts. Even though the effort required for his response is semi-automatic, no scope is left for the imagination. (Horkheimer & Adorno1972, 126-127)

xiv. Amusement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work. It is sought after as an escape from the mechanized work process, and to recruit strength in order to be able to cope with it again. But at the same time mechanization has such power over a man's leisure and happiness, and so profoundly determines the manufacture of amusement goods, that his experiences are inevitably after-images of the work process itself. The ostensible content is merely a faded foreground; what sinks in is the automatic succession of standardized operations. What happens at work, in the factory, or in the office can only be escaped from by approximation to it in one's leisure time. All amusement suffers from this incurable malady. Pleasure hardens into boredom because, if it is to remain pleasure, it must not demand any effort and therefore moves rigorously in the worn grooves of association. No independent thinking must be expected from the audience: the product prescribes every reaction: not by its natural structure (which collapses under reflection), but by signals. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 137)

xv. Banal though elaborate surprise interrupts the storyline. The tendency mischievously to fall back on pure nonsense, which was a legitimate part of popular art, farce and clowning, right up to Chaplin and the Marx Brothers, is most obvious in the unpretentious kinds. This tendency has completely asserted itself in the text of the novelty song, in the thriller movie, and in cartoons...Cartoons (trickfilme) were once exponents of fantasy as opposed to rationalism. They ensured that justice was done to the creatures and objects they electrified, by giving the maimed specimens a second life. All they do today is to confirm the victory of technological reason over truth. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 137-138)

xvi. In some revue films, and especially in the grotesque and the funnies, the possibility of this negation does glimmer for a few moments. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 142)

xvii. The culture industry is corrupt; not because it is a sinful Babylon but because it is a cathedral dedicated to elevated pleasure. On all levels, from Hemingway to Emil Ludwig, from Mrs. Miniver to the Lone Ranger, from Toscanini to Guy Lombardo,

there is untruth in the intellectual content taken ready-made from art and science. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 143)

xviii. The deception is not that the culture industry supplies amusement but that it ruins the fun by allowing business considerations to involve it in the ideological clichés of a culture in the process of self-liquidation. Ethics and taste cut short unrestrained amusement as 'naive' - naivety is thought to be as bad as intellectualism - and even restrict technical possibilities...The culture industry does retain a trace of something better in those features which bring it close to the circus, in the self-justifying and nonsensical skill of riders, acrobats and clowns, in the 'defense and justification of physical as against intellectual art' (Frank Wedekind) But the refuges of a mindless artistry which represents what is human as opposed to the social mechanism are being relentlessly hunted down by a schematic reason which compels everything to prove its significance and effect. The consequence is that the nonsensical at the bottom disappears as utterly as the sense in works of art at the top. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 142-143)

xix. The force to which man is subjected by mass-music continues to live on as a socially opposite pole in that music which totally withdraws from man. (Adorno 1973, 68)

xx. Such a displacement of gravitational center is responsible for the fact that the fetish-character of mass music has suddenly affected even advanced and 'critical' production. (Adorno 1973, 70)

xxi. The moments in the course of events of music are placed disjointedly alongside one another, similarly to psychological impulses - first of all as shocks and secondly as contrasting figures. The continuum of subjective time-experience is no longer entrusted with the power of collecting musical events, functioning as a unity, and thereby imparting meaning to them. The resulting discontinuity destroys musical dynamics, to which it owes its very being. Once again music subdues time, but no longer by substituting music in its perfection for time, but by means of an omnipresent construction. Nowhere does the secret agreement between incidental and progressive music prove itself more conclusively than here. (Adorno 1973, 60)

xxii. Pleasure always means not to think about anything, to forget suffering even where it is shown. Basically it is helplessness. It is flight; not, as is asserted, flight from a wretched reality, but from the last remaining thought of resistance. The liberation which amusement promises is freedom from thought and from negation. The effrontery of the rhetorical question, 'What do people want?' lies in the fact that it is addressed - as if to reflective individuals - to those very people who are deliberately to be deprived of this individuality. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 144)

xxiii. The stronger the positions of the culture industry become, the more summarily it can deal with consumers' needs, producing them, controlling them, disciplining them, and even withdrawing amusement: no limits are set to cultural progress of this kind. (Horkheimer & Adorno1972, 144)

xxiv. Furthermore, it is claimed that standards were based in the first place on consumers' needs, and for that reason were accepted with so little resistance. The result is the circle of manipulation and retroactive need in which the unity of the system grows ever stronger. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 121)

xxv. From every sound film and every broadcast program the social effect can be inferred which is exclusive to none but is shared by all alike. The culture industry as a whole has molded men as a type unfailingly reproduced in every product. All the agents of this process, from the producer to the women's clubs, take good care that the simple reproduction of this mental state is not nuanced or extended in any way. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 127)

xxvi. The triumph of advertising in the culture industry is that consumers feel compelled to buy and use its products even though they see through them. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1972, 167)

xxvii. Through this adjustment to the technical forces of production, an adjustment which the system imposes upon them in the name of progress, men become objects that can be manipulated without further objection and thus fall far behind the potential which lies in the technical forces of production. But since as subjects, men themselves still represent the ultimate limit of reification, mass culture must try and take hold of

them again and again: the bad infinity involved in this hopeless effort of repetition is the only trace of hope that this repetition might be in vain, that men cannot wholly be grasped after all. (Adorno 1991b, 80)

xxviii. People are not only, as the saying goes, falling for the swindle; if it guarantees them even the most fleeting gratification they desire a deception which is nonetheless transparent to them. They force their eyes shut and voice approval, in a kind of self-loathing, for what is meted out to them, knowing fully the purpose for which it is manufactured. (Adorno 1991c, 89)

xxix. Only their deep unconscious mistrust, the last residue of the difference between art and empirical reality in the spiritual make-up of the masses explains why they have not, to a person, long since perceived and accepted the world as it is constructed for them by the culture industry. (Adorno 1991c, 91)

xxx. Here it turned out that many of the people interviewed - we shall ignore the exact proportion - suddenly showed themselves to be thoroughly realistic, and proceeded to evaluate critically the political and social importance of the same event, the well publicized once-in-a-lifetime nature of which they had drooled over breathlessly in front of their television sets. What the culture industry presents people with in their free time, if my conclusions are not too hasty, is indeed consumed and accepted, but with a kind of reservation, in the same way that even the most naive theatre of filmgoers do not simply take what they behold there for real. Perhaps one can go even further and say that it is no quite believed in. (Adorno 1991d, 170)

xxxi. That would concur with the social prediction that a society, whose inherent contradictions persist undiminished, cannot be totally integrated even in consciousness...but I think that we can here glimpse a chance of maturity (*Mündigkeit*), which might just eventually help to turn free time into freedom proper. (Adorno 1991d, 170)

xxxii. The individual subject who remains silent speaks not less but more through silence than when speaking aloud. (Adorno 1981-2, 203)

xxxiii. While in autonomous art anything lagging behind the already established technical standard does not rate, vis-à-vis the culture industry - whose standard excludes everything but the predigested and the already integrated, just as the cosmetic trade eliminates facial wrinkles - works which have not completely mastered their technique, conveying as a result something consolingly uncontrolled and accidental, have a liberating quality. In them the flaws of a pretty girl's complexion become the corrective to the immaculate face of the professional star. (Adorno 1981-2, 199)

xxxiv. A person who, after a year in the city, spends a few weeks in the mountains abstaining from all work, may unexpectedly experience colorful images of landscapes consolingly coming over him or her in dreams or daydreams. These images do not merge into one another in a continuous flow, but are rather set off against each other in the course of their appearance, much like the magic lantern slides of our childhood. It is in the discontinuity of their movement that the images of the interior monologue resemble the phenomenon of writing: the latter similarly moving before our eyes while fixed in its discrete signs. Such movement of interior images may be to film what the visible world is to painting or the acoustic world to music. As the objectifying recreation of this type of experience, film may become art. (Adorno 1981-2, 201)

4   THE CONSCIOUSNESS INDUSTRY

In the previous chapter I came to the conclusion that Adorno's thesis on the cultural industry is dialectical in both directions: from enlightenment to myth and vice versa. I wanted to oppose the standard understanding of Adorno's theses: that of the media culture as total manipulation and deception of the 'masses'. This is an idea that can be found also in the writings of Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge. According to their thought, the idea of the dialectic of the media is, however, more outspoken and programmatic whereas in Adorno's writings the idea was mainly situated only in subordinate clauses. On the other hand, Negt and Kluge also continue the themes and arguments given by Adorno to whom their book *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung* was dedicated. For the purposes of this study I have examined the thought of these writers as far as their ideas on the consciousness industry, the neighbouring concept of the cultural industry is concerned. My assessment does not necessarily address the numerous other issues that they employ in their other works.

The broadest common denominator of Enzensberger, Negt and Kluge is that they continue the tradition of critical theory in their own ways. Negt was an assistant of Jürgen Habermas and concentrated on issues of education, whereas Kluge was an adherent of Adorno. Kluge and Enzensberger both concentrated on aesthetic issues; Enzensberger on literature, Kluge on film, and both on the media. Another common characteristic is their use of the term 'consciousness industry'. The term is a continuation of Adorno's term 'culture industry' but with a new emphasis. On the other hand, Negt and Kluge use the term *Öffentlichkeit,* which they inherited from Habermas's book *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit.* Their new ideas are an important contribution to this discussion. Both writers are leftist intellectuals but distance themselves from more dogmatic versions of leftist thinking, which is particularly evident when it comes to the so-called manipulation thesis.

I have organized this chapter in terms of (pseudo)musical ideas. I regard Enzensberger as the originator of the ideas which came to blossom in the 1970s and have some parallels to Negt and Kluge's ideas. Negt and Kluge came with their own themes and conceptualised Enzensberger's vague ideas as *Erfahrung* and *Gegenöffentlichkeit.* With these terms they captured the general climate of

the 1970s. The third section of this chapter could also be named using the term 'resignation'. The 1980s can be considered as a kind of 'morning after' period following the celebrations of counter cultures and potentialities of media in the 1970s (this was a 'hangover' for the leftist intellectuals, of course, not for the others). The chapter ends with a coda, in which German *Kultur- und Medienwissenschaftler* proclaim the end of emancipation in Baudrillardian terms. Despite the general 'morning after' atmosphere, this chapter gives a description of a transition phase between the early 20th century and its closing stages. The birth of cultural radicalism, counter cultures and the practice of oppositional media transformed the Western cultural and political climate after which the old form of critical theory and its critique of capitalism had to be considered anew.

4.1   Overture by Enzensberger

Hans Magnus Enzensberger was born in 1929. He was a prominent figure in the German post-war intellectual scene. He was multi-talented; a poet, essayist, journalist, media critic and media entrepreneur all in one. The climate of the 1950s was imprinted by the catchword 'nonconformism'. It comprised a controversial, slightly aggressive, rebellious lifestyle involving absurd literature, existentialism, pieces of critical theory, abstract art and modern jazz. This lifestyle was more distracted and less unified and directed as compared to the 1960s. After the war years the outlook became more one of curiosity towards the world and towards the knowledge it offered. One community which offered a playground for this curiosity was *Gruppe 47*, organized by German post-war generation literates, Enzensberger among them. (Lau 1997, 26)

In 1955 Alfred Andersch recruited young Enzensberger as his assistant radio editor. This was his start as a cynical and oppositional poet in the public service media world. This might also have caused some controversy among his contemporaries, as an opposer of the restoration period gave the appearance of serving the aggressor. In reality, in Enzensberger's person the old myth of the poet as an 'outsider' was deconstructed. He did not compromise, but held his cynical tone even in his office duties. He did not resent the media world because of being left 'out in the cold,' on the contrary, he did so because he knew its internal workings well. He was clever enough to make his life within the system; he knew how it functioned. This was an asset for him in analysing its effects on the consciousness of others. (Lau 1997, 40-41)

In general, Enzensberger's interests were focussed on mundane matters, as opposed to issues usually paid interest by poets and literates. Even in the mundane media world he was interested in the structures of this phenomenon. Even more than just a critic and analyst, he actively used the media. In his radio essays and writings he 'virtuously used the media as a critique of itself'. In this

sense he was himself a leading example and a teacher for the audience among which he later tried to generate awareness of the potentialities of modern media. It was due to his personal charisma and intelligence that he could successfully play with the media world. For example, the cynically critical essay on *Spiegel* was immediately referred to and reflected upon in the very same journal. (Lau 1997, 70-74) Besides *Spiegel* he analysed *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (1962), *Taschenbuch-Produktion* (1958), *Wochenschau* (1957), consumer culture and tourism (1960, 1958) (published in *Einzelheiten I: Bewusstseins-Industrie* 1971, Suhrkamp). In these essays one can notice the sense of paradox which Enzensberger regarded as prevailing in his own time.

In 1962 in his essay Bewusstseins-Industrie, Enzensberger renamed the phenomenon previously understood as the cultural industry. He distances himself from this canon:

> 'Ebensowenig deckt der Name Kulturindustrie, mit dem man sich bislang beholfen hat, die Sache. Er ist einer Augentäuschung ihrer Kritiker zuzuschreiben, die sich's haben gefallen lassen, dass die Gesellschaft sie kurzerhand dem sogenannten Kulturleben zurechnet, daher sie den fatalen Namen Kulturkritiker tragen; nicht selten auch noch vergnügt und stolz darauf, dass ihnen derart ihre Harmlosigkeit bescheinigt, ihr Geschäft zur Sparte gemacht wird.' (Enzensberger 1962/1971, 8)

In Enzensberger's vision the term 'culture' connotes the aesthetic sphere of life. Using the term *cultural* industry segregates the topic of discourse into this aesthetic and artistic sphere. At the same time it makes the discussion less harmful and, to some degree, depoliticizes it. After all, surely nobody is concerned about the commercialization of culture; this is merely a marginal issue in relation to the big money outside. I believe Enzensberger, in a provocative manner (which does not necessarily favour Adorno's culture industry thesis, which strongly advocates a theory of 'consciousness steering'), wishes to point out the real danger of late modernity in which the steering of consciousness has grown to become the key industry. This is evidently also a reaction to the studies that are handled in chapter 5, which take the cultural industry to be disinterested and descriptively containing certain sectors of industries that can be considered as fabrications on the basis of aesthetic ideas. So, what exactly is this consciousness industry? Enzensberger refers to the fact that most representatives of cultural industry analysis use technical novelties and reproducibility as criteria for the branches of radio, television, film, and the recording industry. Enzensberger would also like to include journalism (even if it is based on outdated technology), fashion, design, tourism and even religious education. In terms of their influence on the mind, these are as significant as electronic mass media or film. (Enzensberger 1962/1971, 9) The intention of renaming was to make the concept seem even more harmful and to widen the extent of its range.

For a reader who might oppose the idea of 'steering' consciousness, Enzensberger offers an answer. He cites Marx' phrase in *Die deutsche Ideologie*: 'Das Bewusstsein ist von vornherein schon ein gesellschaftliches Produkt und bleibt es, so lange überhaupt Menschen existieren'. He believes that it is

delusion to think that 'in his own consciousness, if not anywhere else, a person can be the master of the house'. The point is that directing one's thought and mind is nothing new. The practice takes place in social interaction and, in Marx' terms, in the division of labour. But in Enzensberger's words, 'erst wenn sie industrielle Masse annimmt, wird die gesellschaftliche Induktion und Vermittlung von Bewusstsein zum Problem' (Enzensberger 1962/1971, 8). Against Adorno's idea of formulation of false consciousness by the culture industry, Enzensberger claims that consciousness can never be produced externally: 'Immerhin weist der Name [Kulturindustrie], wenn auch undeutlich, auf den Ursprung jenes 'gesellschaftlichen Produktes', des Bewusstseins hin. Er liegt ausserhalb aller Industrie. Daran möchte das ohnmächtige Wort Kultur erinnern: dass Bewusstsein, und wäre es auch nur falsches, industriell zwar reproduziert und induziert, jedoch nicht produziert werden kann. Wie aber dann? Im Dialog des einzelnen mit den andern.' (Enzensberger 1962/1971, 8) Thus, Enzensberger opposes the idea of entire autonomy of thought as well as the idea that it can be 'steered' from without. Any actions from without can only serve to awaken or reproduce already prevailing desires and anticipations.

The term *consciousness* industry also refers to the fact that the product of this 'branch' is an immaterial one (opinions, evaluations, prejudices), as opposed to concrete goods (even if these immaterial products can be commodities). People are offered contents of consciousness for example in the form of opinions, evaluations or prejudices. (Enzensberger 1962/1971, 13) Another Marxian notion which also connects with immateriality is the idea of secondary exploitation (*Ausbeutung*):

> 'Verständigen wir uns zunächst über den Begriff der immateriellen Ausbeutung. Während der Periode der Primärakkumulation steht in allen Ländern die materielle Ausbeutung des Proletariats im Vordergrund; dies gilt, wie am Beispiel des stalinistischen Russlands und Rotchinas ersichtlich, auch für kommunistische Gesellschaften. Kaum aber geht diese Periode ihrem Ende zu, so wird offenbar, dass Ausbeutung nicht nur eine ökonomische, sondern auch eine Bewusstseinstatsache ist. Wer Herr und wer Knecht ist, das entscheidet sich nicht nur daran, wer über Kapital, Fabriken und Waffen, sonder auch, je länger je deutlicher, daran, wer über das Bewusstsein der anderen verfügen kann.' (Enzensberger 1962/1971, 14)

For Enzensberger, there is no difference between the economic backgrounds of these industries. If we think about television, the ultimate intention is the same in both public service and commercial organisations. The idea of exploitation is based on the vision that not only is work force and surplus value exploited from them, but also their own evaluations of the world. It is no longer a question of owning capital, factories and artillery. These are no longer necessary criteria for achieving power. More crucial is obtaining the ability to lead the minds of others. The social task of these industries is to ensure that the existing system of rulers and the ruled prevails. In this he seems to be in accord with the most leftist intellectuals (*die gesellschaftliche Aufgabe der Medien: die existierenden Herrschaftsverhältnisse zu verewigen*). It seems as if the situation is frozen into a nightmare. Enzensberger's rhetorical re-description is one of

renaming the phenomenon as the consciousness industry, and thus devaluing it, if possible, to a much more harmful degree than even Adorno could do. He denies the sectoral term 'culture' and substitutes it with the more sensational word 'consciousness'. In addition, he does not only understand *Industrie* descriptively as a sector of business or economic *Betrieb*, but as an 'operational' term of influencing and steering.

4.1.1 Awakening from the nightmare

The situation for Enzensberger is not as hopeless as may appear. According to his logic the consciousness industry entails potentialities: on the one hand it may turn against itself with the same kind of dialectical turn as referred to in the previous chapter, or on the other hand, it can be used in an unusual way (for example Enzensberger's own use of publicity). The first possibility is evident in the following passage:

> 'Ausbeuten lassen sich nur Kräfte, die vorhanden sind; um sie, im Dienste der Herrschaft, zu domestizieren, müssen sie erst erweckt werden. Dass es nicht möglich ist, sich dem Zugriff der Bewusstseins-Industrie zu entziehen, ist oft bemerkt und stets als Beweis für ihre bedrohliche Natur gedeutet worden; *dass sie aber die Teilnahme aller einzelnen am Ganzen erwirkt, kann sehr wohl auf jene zurückschlagen, in deren Dienst das geschieht.* Ihre eigene Bewegung kann sie nicht sistieren, und *es kommen darin notwendige Momente zum Vorschein, die ihrem gegenwärtigen Auftrag, der Stabilisierung der jeweils gegebenen Herrschaftsverhältnisse, zuwiderlaufen.* Es hängt mit dieser Bewegung zusammen*, dass die Bewusstseins-Industrie nie total kontrollierbar ist.*' (Enzensberger 1962/1971, 15)

The second possibility is anticipated at the end of the essay: 'Es handelt sich nicht darum, die Bewusstseins-Industrie ohnmächtigt zu verwerfen, sondern darum, sich auf ihr gefährliches Spiel einzulassen' (Enzensberger 1962/1971, 17)**.** This essay was written at the beginning of the 1960s. During this decade of radicalization, Enzensberger too, was carried away into more programmatic proclamations of emancipatory media use.

Towards the end of the 1960s *Gruppe 47* also saw its delegitimation by the new generation. This community of literates was seen to form an institution. It was no longer a question of an autonomous community, but a group supplying raw material for the publishing industry and the critique institution. The meetings were more like a market place followed by publishers, editors and critics. With its professionalisation and commercialisation it had lost its controversial character, as Rudolf Walter Leonhardt analysed in *Die Zeit* already in 1959. (Lau 1997, 124; see also Wellershoff 1967) Enzensberger was not perturbed by these comments. He still regarded *Gruppe 47* as a 'public sphere'. For him, it was a place of mutual reflection not only on literature but on political matters as well. It was an arena for testing the democratic public sphere. Enzensberger defended *Gruppe 47* in similar terms to Habermas who analysed the situation of Britain and France in 18th century. (Lau 1997, 147)

However, the radical generation in the mid 1960s regarded *Gruppe 47* as a part of the system against which they wanted to rebel. They demanded more engaging literature and more direct action in place of aesthetics. They

proclaimed the commodity character of previous controversial literature. Enzensberger is commonly regarded as the clown of this radicalization. In some sense this might indeed be true. But still, he recognised the political character of poetry 'sich jedem politischen Auftrag zu verweigern und für alle zu sprechen noch dort, wo es von keinem spricht, von einem Baum, von einem Stein, von dem, was nicht ist'. (Lau 1997, 176) Even more clear is his Adornoian tone in the following passage from his essay on Poesie und Politik: 'Ich glaube, dass die politische Poesie ihr Ziel verfehlt, wenn sie es direkt ansteuert. Die Politik muss gleichsam durch die Ritzen zwischen den Worten eindringen, hinter dem Rücken des Autors, von selbst'. (cited in Lau 1997, 56) During the 1960s this vision runs out of 'relevance' for Enzensberger, too. In 1967 he notes 'die politische Unerheblichkeit jener Schreib- und Malübungen'. (Lau 1997, 234) Still, in opposition to the radicals, Enzensberger notices the commodity character even of the most oppositional literature. He describes the recuperation process as follows (described by Lau): 'Auch die extremsten ästhetischen Ausbruchsversuche, so Enzensberger, stoßen auf keinen Widerstand mehr; sie werden alsbald zur Ware gemacht und einem nach Abwechslung gierenden Publikum zum Konsum angeboten - zuerst in der Kunst, dann in 'Werbung, Design und Styling'. Die Rhetorik der 'Revolte' und des 'Umbruchs', von den Manifesten der künstlerischen Avantgarde bis zum Überdruss strapaziert, klingt heute hohl. Das 'Aufbrechen hergebrachter Wahrnehmungsweisen' ist längst eine Strategie der Kulturindustrie. Auch und gerade die Avantgarde, die Adorno noch in einem heroischen Widerstandskampf gegen solche Vereinnahmung gesehen hatte, verfällt dem Betrieb, der seine Fähigkeit zu schlucken und anzuverwandeln auf eine begünstigende Weise zu steigern verstanden hat. Es kommt also gerade nicht darauf an, für die Kunst eine 'gesellschaftliche Funktion' anzugeben, wie Boehlich verlangt.' (Lau 1997, 271-272) Despite this, Enzensberger recognizes the potentialities of electronic media for oppositional use.

This is his idea in his essay Baukasten zu einer Theorie der Medien (Constituents for the theory of media). It was published in 1970 in his own journal *Kursbuch*. It reflects the enchantment in the face of new technical possibilities which were prevalent at the end of the 1960s. Of course, the idea of an antidote or the dialectical turn of the media against itself is present in this essay. He even gives the example of the media presentation of the Vietnam War as the mobilisation of opposition and the later end of the war. (Enzensberger 1970, 174) However, his more programmatic thesis of the essay came as follows:

> 'Eine marxistische Theorie der Medien gibt es bisher nicht. Daher fehlt es an einer brauchbaren Strategie für diesen Bereich. Unsicherheit, Schwanken zwischen Angst und Verfallenheit kennzeichnen das Verhältnis der sozialistischen Linken zu den neuen Produktivkräften der Bewusstseins-Industrie. Die Ambivalenz dieser Haltung spiegelt bloß die Ambivalenz der Medien selbst wider, ohne ihrer Herr zu werden. Aufzuheben wäre sie nur durch die Entfesselung der *emanzipatorischen Möglichkeiten*, die in der neuen Produktivkraft stecken: Möglichkeiten, die der Kapitalismus ebenso sabotieren muss wie der sowjetische Revisionismus, weil sie die Herrschaft beider Systeme gefährden würden.' (Enzensberger 1970, 160)

In a way, this resembles Negt and Kluge's ideas of *Gegenöffentlichkeit*. Enzensberger's critique opposes the vulgar Marxism of his time, especially the idea that capitalism stays alive by exploiting false needs. In Enzensberger's opinion they are completely legitimate needs, there being no such thing as 'false needs'. The successfulness of advertising proves this. In fact, without the true nature of these needs the endeavours of advertising would be totally absurd and carried out in vain. Enzensberger makes the following point: '*Eine sozialistische Bewegung hat diese Bedürfnisse nicht zu denunzieren, sondern ernst zu nehmen, zu erforschen und politisch produktiv zu machen.*' (Enzensberger 1970, 171) The ideas of oppositional media use and experience have certain parallels with the work of Negt and Kluge.

In both of these passages we can find evidence of the media being used in a more unusual way. Enzensberger's contribution to the discourse is that he sees electronic media dialectically in the sense that there are potentialities for its use repressively and emancipatorily. With this view he differs from the leftist *'Berührungsangst'.* The second passage gives us an idea as to what this emancipation means. It must be based on the actual needs and desires of people, and on their experiences in everyday life. In line with his previous views in the essay Bewusstseins-Industrie he holds the view that advertisement and entertainment do not produce false needs. On the contrary, their seduction is based on 'real' needs already existing within their targets, otherwise their efforts would be in vain. A critical question for the left was, according to Enzensberger, how to take these needs and desires into consideration in order to lead to a more politically active, thoughtful and participatory life. In these questions Enzensberger captures the climate of the beginning **of** the 1970s and begins a rhetoric of experience and oppositional activity. In this chapter we find a new dissociation of repressive and emancipatory media use, which was a possibility within the historical situation of that time. Theorists that were conscious of this brought it as a contribution to and critique of older critical theory. Enzensberger's intention was to highlight this possibility and to encourage the new left to act accordingly.

4.2 The themes of Negt and Kluge

Negt's and Kluge's book *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung* was published in 1972. According to Miriam Hansen it was a contribution that directed the attention of the reading public away from the painful history and the division between problematical literary culture and problematical national identity. They offered a conceptual framework with which to view the present situation and new movements. From the contemporary perspective the 1970s are not necessarily associated with a particular 'spirit' as are the 1960s. Rather, it was a decade of transition. 'The institution Adorno' died in 1969, and the student movement disintegrated. The Federal Republic's first social democratic chancellor Willy

Brandt was elected in the same year. The ending of the seventies was marked by a kind of 'German Autumn' in 1977, the kidnapping of industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the death of leading terrorists of the first generation and the election of CDU chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1982. The radicalization of the student movement had ended up in denial of parliamentary and party politics. In the early 1970s this movement proliferated into a variety of strategies: anti-imperialist campaigns, Marxist-Leninist party building and *Betriebsarbeit* (organizing of factory workers by joining their ranks), the regrouping of the antinuclear movement, the emerging women's movement and the struggle over the abortion law, the squatter movement and opposition to real estate speculation, the turn towards oral history and histories of everyday life, the discovery of the political in the personal, rural communes, food cooperatives and consciousness-raising groups. These movements were confined to Germany, but were part of something emerging all over the Western world. (Hansen 1993, 185)

The galvanising effect of Negt's and Kluge's book was that the world was no longer seen as 'frozen into a nightmare', but fissures and instability were identified as providing opportunities for oppositional publicity. Negt and Kluge directed a radical critique towards the dominant public sphere for excluding the interests of the larger proportion of society. In Hansen's words: 'by grounding their notion of a counterpublic (*Gegenöffentlichkeit*) in a more comprehensive 'context of living', they offered a conceptual framework through which a number of diverse movements could identify and generalize their concerns.' (Hansen 1993, 186) Hansen tends to interpret Negt and Kluge from the perspective of early the 1990s, when several kinds of micro politics rose onto the overt intellectual agenda. *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung* seems to offer a solution to the representation problems of these oppositional movements. Negt and Kluge themselves only refer to the student movement in cynical and critical tones. Besides this, they offer commentary on historical proletarian movements such as English Chartism, Italian Maximilianism and certain movements in the October revolution. It might be worth disputing whether the term 'proletarian' was already at that time considered anachronistic or simply a gesture of capturing *Zeitgeist*.

4.2.1 Öffentlichkeit

The German word *Öffentlichkeit* can be translated as public sphere (for example *Gruppe 47*, party organisations, citizen activism and organizations; and on a more general level, public social interaction and organization). The word 'arena' or the Greek word 'agora' might clarify this meaning. On the other hand, it might simply mean a public space or places where people randomly move without organizing meetings etc. The third dimension is one of publicity, which denotes the mass media and PR work in firms and institutions. All of these dimensions are present in Negt's and Kluge's account in *Öffentlichkeit*.

Negt and Kluge inherit the word from Habermas' work *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*. On the one hand they assume his idea, but they also revise it. In

line with Habermas, they regard the public as a historical category, linked to the formation of bourgeois society under liberal capitalism (Hansen 1993, 197). Habermas presents an ideal of the public sphere that was never fully realized in history and even less so later on. Negt and Kluge oppose Habermas' way of constructing an ideal against its historical realization. In the logic of Negt and Kluge, the contradictions in the bourgeois public sphere do not erupt in disintegration and decline. Rather, they inhere in it and offer fissures from which to enter. Also in Kant's philosophy and political practice the public is understood and founded on an abstract principle of generality. Thus, representation of a general will is a powerful mechanism of exclusion of the particular life contexts of numerous people groups. (Hansen 1993, 198) In Hansen's analysis, Negt's and Kluge's account of the public sphere allows one to conceive it as 'an unstable mixture of different types of publicity, corresponding to different stages of economic, technical and political organization; a site of discursive contestation for and among multiple, diverse, and unequal constituencies; a potentially unpredictable process due to overlaps and conjunctures between different types of publicity and diverse publics; and a category containing a more comprehensive dimension for translating among diverse publics that is grounded in material structures, rather than abstract ideals, of universality' (Hansen 1993, 199). Thus the public sphere is for them not singular but plural, with instability, dilation, fissures and overlapping, thus causing contradictions. Whereas for Habermas public life is predicated on formal conditions of communication (free association, equal participation, deliberation, polite argument), for Negt and Kluge it represents constituency, concrete needs, interests, conflicts, protest and power. (Hansen 1993, 201)

The most striking intention of *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung* is to present the dialectic of the bourgeois and proletarian public sphere, which is a similar dissociation to Enzensberger's repressive and emancipatory media use. It is characteristic of the bourgeois public sphere that in its contemporary form it is only a residual and decadent form of its original ideal as described by Habermas. Negt and Kluge describe it as *Blockierungszusammenhang,* obscuring the social horizon of 'true' experiences despite the fact that it in fact professes to reveal and present them. In contrast, the proletarian variant of the public sphere reflects the interests and experiences of the majority of subordinated people as they really are. The public sphere for Negt and Kluge not only represents media publicity, but a much wider range of socialization e.g. in work and family. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 10-11)

This is the general idea of contradiction between the bourgeois public sphere and the proletarian experience. Thus, the catchwords for the entire organization of the thesis are bourgeois, proletarian, public sphere, experience and their dialectic. A further term that requires clarification and is situated between the bourgeois and proletarian public spheres is the public sphere of production (*Produktionsöffentlichkeiten*). In the following I separate these themes into separate elements in an attempt to construct Negt's and Kluge's contribution to the discussion on consciousness.

4.2.2 The bourgeois public sphere

It is evident that for Negt and Kluge bourgeois and bourgeoisie are philosophical and historical words in which the revolutionary struggle against feudalism and absolutism at the beginning of modernity is encapsulated. They therefore admit that the term 'public sphere' was originally used in a revolutionary manner by the bourgeoisie. The phenomenon entailed revolutionary potentialities. However, with it they also deliver certain criticism towards Kant's theorization and the actual bourgeois practice itself.

As previously mentioned, they criticize Kant for his universalism. According to Negt and Kluge, the deficit of the bourgeois public sphere is initiated already in Kant's ideas. This is because they accuse Kant of excluding certain sections of society from taking part in public life: 'So schneidet Kant alle diejenigen Bevölkerungsschichten von Politik und Öffentlichkeit ab, die an bürgerlichen Politik nicht teilhaben, weil sie diese Teilnahme nicht leisten können.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 31)

Kant's and Habermas's (or Horkheimer's, for that matter) conceptions on liberal economy and private ownership as a basis for a functioning public sphere seem rather odd in the following context:

> 'Die bürgerlichen Privateigentümer - Rohstoff der kantischen Konstruktion - waren an der Bildung öffentlicher Erfahrung nicht interessiert. Ihr Marktwissen ist privat. Im Verhältnis zum Staat und zur Öffentlichkeit interessieren sie in erster Linie die Möglichkeiten der Rückwirkung dieser Öffentlichkeit auf ihre privaten Interessen.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 32)

Kant tried to construct an idea of a universal ideal of the public sphere, whereas the practices of the rising bourgeoisie in reality were directed against these ideals. They did not try to construct a public sphere, but attempted to foster their private interests through it. According to Negt and Kluge, Kant did not fully comprehend the actual practice of the bourgeois. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 33)

The *Bourgeois-Realität* was the situation in which the bourgeoisie tried to use the public sphere on behalf of its own interests. Their private information and interests are not bent towards favouring public life; rather, public life is bent towards favouring their interests. The situation tends to be organized in such a way that the particular private interests of free entrepreneurs become universal with the help of the public sphere. All who do not fall into this position are excluded from public representation, as the first passage in this section indicates.

This is an expression of a certain line of interpretation of Kant during the 1970s (see also Saage 1973, cit. in Langer 1986). Claudia Langer claims that Kant's construction of public sphere cannot be interpreted only as an expression and legitimation of bourgeois privat interests. Furthermore, for example Arendt does not consider Kant as a theorist of a rising bourgoisie. On the contrary, she interprets Kant as providing the possibility to communicate and to take part in public life on behalf of all. Arendt also interprets Kant's idea of disinterestedness as a state of mind in which a person does not assume

anyone's part (and interest) in a dispute, but judges the situation independently, equally taking into consideration all points of view. (Arendt 1985)

The above discourse dealt with the question of the classical, historical, and bourgeois public sphere. It did not work along the lines of ideals according to Negt and Kluge. All the more so in the 20th century, in which the remnants of that classical tradition are, according to Negt and Kluge, decadent forms of the classical model.[1] In contemporary forms the bourgeois public sphere suffers from a radical deficit:

> 'Da die bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit nicht genügend in substantiellen Lebensinteressen fundiert ist, bleibt sie darauf angewiesen, sich mit dem realitätshaltigeren kapitalistischen Produktionsinteresse zu verbinden. Der proletarische Lebenszusammenhang bleibt für diese bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit ein 'Ding an sich', in sie hineinwirkend, aber unbegriffen.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 12)

The solution to the problem is not one of looking back towards the classical bourgeois public sphere or to refer to its ideal construction which, in Negt's and Kluge's opinion, never existed. The contemporary residual of this classical form is an even more harmful, decadent, *Zerfallsform* of the classical bourgeois public sphere. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 19-20) It does not take into account (to an even lesser extent than before) the context of the actual lives of people.

What exactly are these decadent forms? As already mentioned, Negt and Kluge do not employ a concept of the public sphere in the singular form, as a unified block. The public sphere consists of several particular public spheres which in their bourgeois form are unidirected, however:

> 'Geht man dagegen von ihrer wirklichen Substanz aus, so ist sie überhaupt nichts Einheitliches, sondern die Kumulation nur abstrakt aufeinander bezogener Einzelöffentlichkeiten. Das Fernsehen, die Presse, die Verbands- und Parteienöffentlichkeit, der Bundestag, die Bundeswehr, die öffentliche Schule, die öffentlichen Lehrstühle an den Universitäten, die Justiz, die Kirchen, die Konzerne us**w**. verbinden sich nur scheinbar zu einem Begriff der Öffentlichkeit im allgemeinen. In Wirklichkeit läuft diese allgemeine übergreifende Öffentlichkeit als Idee parallel zu ihnen und wird von den in den einzelnen Öffentlichkeiten erfassten Interessen, vor allem von den organisierten Produktionsinteressen, ausgenutzt.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 15)

One can see that the range of reference of the public sphere includes both media publicity and the public sphere in the sense of social and political interaction and integration. Like Enzensberger, they include education and religion, the parliament and even the army and the institution of justice. The very criterion for the public sphere is for them, as for Enzensberger in the consciousness industry, the immateriality of opinions, evaluations and prejudices.

Negt and Kluge regard public service television as a concrete example of the contemporary bourgeois public sphere. It is a translation of the classical idea

---

[1] In that sense they follow Habermas's analysis of the decay of the public sphere. However, as is mentioned, they differ from Habermas's view with two notions: the classical bourgeois public sphere did not work along its ideals and there are potentialities in the 20th century for the situation to take another route.

into a modern technique. In all other respects, the bourgeois public sphere tends to be more 'handicraft' oriented than electronically based. However, public service radio and television are not by their nature the realisation of early bourgeois ideals because the entire situation of contemporary mediation of knowledge differs from that of the time of the rising bourgeoisie. The situation in the modern mass media is one in which large amounts of information are delivered via reports and senders to large numbers of receivers who do not know each other. During the classical phase of *Öffentlichkeit* the situation was much more personal. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 175) Television and radio are 'monologue forms,' not communicative ones. Furthermore, Negt and Kluge criticize these media forms for harbouring a kind of selection mechanism. It is not question of which institutions have the most direct influence on the media apparatus and their delivery of information. Rather, in their 'objectivity' and 'equality' they accumulate information into an abstract form in which the actual 'lived impulses', the actual, concrete contexts of living are not constituted. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 204)

It is important to note the idea of public service media and Negt's and Kluge's devaluation of it, which is a critique of the standard understanding of public service media as equally representing all spheres of society, and its seriousness as a guarantee of its quality.

In the following, one may find that this type of constitution takes place in what Negt and Kluge call the public sphere of production. The relevance of the term 'public sphere' to the discussion on the consciousness industry is also indicated in the following. The 20th century is imprinted by a new kind of public sphere which integrates the classical remnants of it and overlaps with them. Whereas the bourgeois public sphere is a form of the past and of history, the consciousness industry and *Produktionsöffentlichkeiten* are forms of the present.

4.2.3 The public sphere of production

The intertwinement of classical bourgeois (turned into a modern technique) and the public sphere of production functions on the basis of similar mechanisms: abstractness and universality. The outcome is the following:

> 'Es wiederholt sich im Kombinationszusammenhang von klassischer Öffentlichkeit und neuer Produktionsöffentlichkeit die Abweisung des proletarischen Lebenszusammenhangs, so wie er ist. Lebenszusammenhang wird insoweit rezipiert, als er sich in domestizierter Form in die Realisierung des Verwertunginteresses einfügt.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 41)

Just as the classical public sphere was imprinted by the bourgeoisie fostering their own interests through the public sphere, so the new public sphere of production follows the same course. It was, and is, not a question of ideas stemming from *ad hoc* gatherings. Rather, in the public sphere of production ideas are created and prefabricated through and by media institutions. For this reason it is called *Produktionsöffentlichkeit*. The aim of this prefabrication and

production is to anticipate the possible demand of receivers and to ensure the economic success of their 'cultural contents'. However, in Enzensberger's, Negt's and Kluge's terms they are in no way false, but real and legitimate. They are only used and domesticated to please the taste of as many people as possible. In this sense they are not 'contexts of living as they are'.

A critical constituent of this context of living is the ability to fantasize. This is also a constituent of experience. In the everyday life of work and routine, thought is predominantly attached to the present and the future. Experience as *Erfahrung* indicates the free association and fantasizing between all three time spans, the past, present and future. The Benjaminian idea of thinking in the past and through this finding new possibilities for the future clarifies the idea of fantasy in the thought of Negt and Kluge. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 69-70)

Fantasy and associations are the precise raw materials for the consciousness industry. They are not taken as they are; on the contrary, their form is domesticated to an extent that enables them to serve the valorization of capital. It is the working of human fantasy that provides the raw material for successful living and expansion of the consciousness industry. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 69, 71, 107) The domesticated form indicates that they are universalized, produced, and mediated, as opposed to being immediate descriptions of contexts of life as they are; which in this sense equates as *industry*.

In a similar manner to Adorno, Negt and Kluge view leisure time not as an escape from harsh reality but a situation in which the logic of capital follows everywhere, even into the remotest spheres of leisure. This is because the valorization of capital continues to extend into all spheres. According to Negt and Kluge, the reason why experiences are not taken as they are is because the buying public will not stand and face reality as it is, but view it in its embellished form.[2] The actual danger in this is not one of becoming captivated by stories or admiring beautiful people and landscapes; rather, the danger is that of the transformation of public into private. It is a reverse logic of the bourgeois public sphere in which (in Negt's and Kluge's opinion) private interests are channelled into public and universal necessities. As an example, Negt and Kluge mention the example of police detective television series (especially American ones) which offer violence in measured doses, thus obscuring the phenomenon of violence as a social reality. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 43, 215) Problems are no longer social and political, but pertain to private life politics or 'life management'.

On the other hand, in the contemporary situation a proliferation of various sub-cultural experiences and lifestyles offer material for media products that have the potential to attract a 'young, urban, active and buying' audience. Even if they remain as minority or marginal genres directed at specific audiences, the experiences represented may lose their public character.

---

[2]   A curious example might be the situation of the reception of Aki Kaurismäki's films. They are mostly descriptions of working people but in a romanticized form. Even then, the so-called 'larger audience' does not follow his films. It seems as if depictions of the conditions of the working people attract well positioned audiences while the 'ordinary people' hanker after the dream world of Hollywood.

The diversification of lifestyles and habits does not necessarily lead to a 'new cultural politics of difference'. The experiences do not necessarily reach beyond sub-cultural networks. (see Hansen 1993, 183) In Negt's and Kluge's thought the privatization and loss of public political character threatens to allow the use of experiences as 'raw material' in media production.

The merit of the private media industries in comparison to the public service industry is the fact that they integrate aspects of people's lives in their productions, even if these contexts of lives are presented and rendered as unproblematic. The situation concerning public service radio and television is even worse. The kind of 'official line' in reportage or generalization of views constitutes the deficits of the public service operation whereas private television and radio can, according to Negt and Kluge, construct a communicative relationship in the sense of 'parasocial interaction' (Horton & Wohl, cited in Lunn 1995). This is the idea of projecting one's own life situations onto the stories of television and radio drama series. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 176) The generality and official line of public service media prompts Negt and Kluge to devalue it in the face of private media in the following manner:

> 'Der Preis für diese Rücksichtnahme ist, dass das Fernsehen in dieser generalisierten Form der Kommunikation mit den Zuschauern deren Bedürfnisse und Interessen nicht im emanzipatorischen Sinn entfalten kann. Das bedeutet, dass das Fernsehen gegenüber der vordringenden privatwirtschaftlichen Bewusstseinsindustrie Schwächen hat.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 177)

It is precisely this weakness of the public service in relation to private-owned media industries which means that it does not necessarily 'speak' to people and attract them. The educational intentions of public service programming are in vain because they do not reach the people. This is the root cause of their inability to make people resistant to the attraction of the consciousness industry. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 177)

Spectators are captivated by what the consciousness industry has to offer. This does not take place in an emancipatory sense. People are not offered possibilities to distance themselves from their situation and possibilities to rise up and organise their lives otherwise. In the sense of the Adornoian ideology critique, situations are depicted and represented but no solution or way out of repressing circumstances is offered. The act of receiving is to assimilate ideas and to adjust to the status quo. It is important to note here that neither Negt and Kluge nor Enzensberger are theorists of 'total manipulation' and 'deception' because in their view people are simply not misled.

The manipulation process is, of course, attempted over and over again. The whole idea of the term *Bewusstseins-Industrie* for Negt and Kluge as well as for Enzensberger is one of 'secondary exploitation', an immaterial alienation from fulfilment of 'real' desires. People are species beings, both in work and leisure quite in an Adornoian sense. 'Das, was an Gattungspotential der Meschen, durch den Arbeitsprozess bestimmt, entsteht, soll auf einer weiteren Ebene nochmals Gegenstand der kapitalistischen Verwertung sein.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 246) The deficit of the public service and the irresistible attraction of

private media are the threats and hindrances involved in creating an opposing and, in Negt's and Kluge's mind at that time, a 'proletarian' variant of media practice: 'Deshalb ist der Medienverbund eine äusserste Gefährdung jeder Selbstorganisierung menschlicher Erfahrung in den Formen autonomer, proletarischer Öffentlichkeit. Der Rohstoff, aus dem proletarische Öffentlichkeit sich bilden kann, ist genau der Gegenstand, den der Medienverbund verarbeitet.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 246)

Working time and leisure time seem to be split apart from one another. Characteristics that do not find their use in working time are called for by media products in the sphere of leisure, that is, feelings and sensations. Work requires concentration and leisure allows distraction. Work calls for all possible intellectual abilities to come alongside a range of specialized tasks. The point of leisure is to pacify these intellectual endeavours. This concentration on specialised tasks and the out-of-office pacification of mind hinders one's view of the 'system' as a whole. This ensures that the 'system' can continue as it is unchecked and without disturbance. People are equally as alienated from work (from seeing the wholeness of the process and products) as they are from their own consciousness (from what they truly need and desire). The problem is that in leisure people are made to 'forget' what they would need to improve their condition in the working process. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 284, 306) This is reminiscent of Adorno's description of the splitting of work and leisure. Leisure activities, hobbies and media use are praised as a distraction because they do not require intellectual endeavour. In reality, however, rationalized (in Negt's and Kluge's terms 'domesticated') entertainment does not deliver what it promises. It keeps people in the same state of mind as in work, i.e. in an alienated state. For Adorno this denies truly sensual experiences, and for Negt and Kluge, it blocks people from understanding how to fulfil their real and legitimate interests and needs. For all of them, entertainment in its appropriate form does not necessarily exclude intellectuality and reflection of people's contexts of living. It should not, however, exclude sensuality, either. The objective could be that both work and leisure are intertwined so that they both lead to a more comprehensive understanding of our world.

The following is an explanation of the phenomena of *Verblendungs-zusammenhang* (Adorno) and *Blockierungszusammenhang* (Negt and Kluge). Essentially, they are the same phenomenon. In the former definition people are simply too blinded by the glittering media world to see their actual situation of alienation from the world and their own 'true' essence. In the latter, people are blocked by the universalized and domesticated media world from recognising the opportunity of fulfilling their interests and needs. It resembles a membrane surrounding our inner life which hinders its expression. The needs on which the media system is based are of course real, but the point of Enzensberger and Negt & Kluge is that they are not *realized* or understood properly, but merely pacified through illusion.

This may sound somewhat like a grand-scale 'manipulation' and 'conspiracy' theory. Negt and Kluge, however, do not view the situation

entirely in this light. They count on the future possibility of a 'proletarian public sphere' in which the splitting as described above does not take place. Rather, it would be one of 'remembering' the past and the present and mobilizing ones endeavours towards shaping a better future. Negt's and Kluge's ideas are an intervention into the discourse on manipulation. The problem is not one of blocking information coming 'from above' (even if they lament the officialdom and generality of information leverage). This would be manipulation, steering and secrecy. The problem is one of representation and mobilization through this. It is an issue of what does *not* come 'from below', i.e. from the contexts of living. Negt's and Kluge's intention is to criticize the media system while at the same time encouraging us to recognise and to take hold of new possibilities. Like Enzensberger, they emphasize the immaterial, mental aspect of the public sphere and the media system; they are based on feelings, sensations, experiences, opinions and prejudices. Negt and Kluge construct a similar dissociation to Enzensberger: repressive private and public service media versus the emancipatory proletarian media. However, as stated earlier, joint situations and dilatation exist within the media system which make it possible to penetrate. The contradictions within this system may also turn against themselves, thus there is reverse dialectics.

In the following one can identify the split between the handicraft and face to face communication approach, and the electronic and digital technologies approach to producing the public sphere:

> 'Die klassische Öffentlichkeit der Zeitungen, Kanzleien, Parlamente, Clubs, Parteien, Vereine beruht auf einer quasihandwerklichen Produktionsweise. Die industrialisierte Öffentlichkeit eines Computers, der Massenmedien, des Medienverbundes, der kombinierten Öffentlichkeits- und Rechtsabteilungen von Konzernen und Verbünden, zuletzt: die durch die Produktion veränderte Realität als Öffentlichkeit bilden demgegenüber eine übermächtige und höher organisierte Produktionsstufe.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 36-37)

This is a highly generalised division of the modern public sphere of production. According to Negt and Kluge, however, 'sprechen hier und im folgenden immer nur von Öffentlichkeit als einer Kumulation von Erscheinungen, die ganz verschiedene Wesenseigenschaften und Ursprünge haben. Eine einheitliche Substanz hat Öffentlichkeit überhaupt nicht.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 35) The idea of variety of phenomena is indicated in the following:

> 'Zum Begriff der industrialisierten Produktionsöffentlichkeiten... I. Ihren Kern hat die Produktionsöffentlichkeit in der sinnlichen Präsenz von Öffentlichkeit, die vom objektiven Produktionsprozess - der Gesellschaft, so wie sie ist - ausgeht. Hierzu gehört die Organisationsstruktur der gesamten Produktion ebenso wie 'die Industrie als das aufgeschlagene Buch der menschlichen Psychologie' (Marx), also in den Menschen Verinnerlichtes und Aussenwelt: die Rühmlichkeit der Bank- und Versicherungspaläste, Stadzentren und Industriezonen ebenso wie die Arbeits-, Lern- und Lebensprozesse in und neben den Betrieben... 2. Die Bewusstseinsindustrie sowie der Konsum- und Werbezusammenhang, d. h. die auf die Sphäre der sekundären Ausbeutung angesetzte Produktion und Distribution, überlagern und verbinden sich mit der primären Produktionsöffentlichkeit. 3. Die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Konzerne und die der gesellschaftlichen Institutionen (Verbände, Parteien, Staat) bilden eine Abstraktionsform der einzelnen Produktions-

öffentlichkeiten und gehen in die Produktionsöffentlichkeit als zusätzliche Überlagerung ein.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 35-36)

The public sphere of production thus includes public spaces as well as socialization in work, family and the education system. This seems to constitute the primary exploitation, while the consciousness industry represents the secondary exploitation of media productions and consumer culture. PR activities among firms and public institutions is also included. The range of phenomena reflects the aim of the whole public sphere of production: to guarantee that the economical and political system goes on and works without disturbance. This is, however, a 'mission impossible':

'Auch innerhalb der Produktionsöffentlichkeiten setzen sich regelmäßig diejenigen durch, die die direktere Verbindung zum Profitinteresse besitzen, oder diejenigen, die mehr Lebenszusammenhang in sich zu vereinigen vermögen. Die Nahtstellen zwischen den verschiedenen Produktionsöffentlichkeiten, z. B. zwischen privater Bewusstseinsindustrie und öffentlich-rechtlichem Fernsehen, zwischen Massen-medien und Presse einerseits und der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Konzerne anderer-seits, zwischen gewerkschaftlicher Öffentlichkeit und der Öffentlichkeit der Unter-nehmerverbünde usw., ist durch Brüche und einen spezifischen Reichtum an Widersprüchen gekennzeichnet.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 39)

The direction of opinions and information within the different branches of publicity and the public sphere is not uniform but contradictory. For example, the mass media can portray the situations of corporations in quite a different light than is the case. This also provides an opportunity for alternative publicity - *Gegenöffentlichkeit*, to intervene in the joint situations, and to capitalize on the contradictory character of the public sphere. Before delineating Negt's and Kluge's idea of the proletarian public sphere, I will present their idea on experience, on which this form of public sphere should be based, and not in a domesticating sense as in the consciousness industry.

4.2.4 Negt's and Kluge's conception of experience

The German word *Erfahrung* is not adequately translated using the word 'experience', which is linked to the words ''expert'' and ''experiment'', and which gives a certain sense of stability. In contrast, the root of the word *Erfahrung* is in the word *fahren* (to ride, to travel). It conveys the sense of mobility, of journeying, wandering, and in general a temporal meaning of duration and finally of return. The word *Erlebnis* with its sense of occurrence or event might correspond more to the word 'experience'. A dispute over which of these terms to use went on between Walter Benjamin, Siegfried Kracauer and Adorno. On the one hand, Negt and Kluge, along with their contemporaries in the 1970s, adopt the word *Erfahrung* from this tradition. It became a catchword during that time along with the word 'consciousness'. For them, it refers to the 'capacities of having and reflecting upon experience, of seeing connections and relations, of juggling reality and fantasy, of remembering the past and imagining a different future. On the other hand, for them *Erfahrung* is disintegrated and transformed with the onslaught of industrialization,

urbanization, and a modern culture of consumption. It loses the capacities it once had entailed in transforming into *Erlebnis*. (Benjamin 1974; Hansen 1993, 188)

The point in Negt's and Kluge's book is the idea of constructing the public sphere on the basis of *Erfahrung*. For them, the word has all the Benjaminian connotations, but their special emphasis is on the material and particular basis of the life of the working class, their experience and interests especially in the socialization of family and situations within the place of work. Thus their construction grows from beneath, from the particularity of situations. Hansen lists 'post-modern' catchwords to describe this operation: 'openness', 'inclusiveness', 'multiplicity', 'heterogeneity', 'unpredictability', 'conflict', 'contradiction', and 'difference'. In this sense, Negt's and Kluge's concept of experience differs from that of Adorno who emphasizes right up to the end of his life the role of negativity of modern art in enhancing critical subjectivity. (Hansen 1993, 189) Despite the fact that Adorno also emphasized sensual elements of experience, he leant more towards intellectual estimation as a true sphere of experience.

Negt's and Kluge's idea of experience is undoubtedly a continuation of the dissociation of false and true that one can find in the Frankfurt School of thought. The idea is to find a 'real' or 'authentic' experience. Their merit might, however, be in the fact that they do not search for it from above or from certain ideals, but from the factual contexts of living of the majority of the population.

> 'Unser politisches Interesse an diesem Buch ist es, einen Rahmen für eine Diskussion zu setzen, die die analytischen Begriffe der politischen Ökonomie nach unten, zu den wirklichen Erfahrungen der Menschen hin, öffnet.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 16)

Moreover, they legitimate their endeavour using Marx' formulation: 'radikal sein bedeute, die Dinge an der Wurzel fassen'. They regard their endeavour as beginning from the contexts of living, representing this, and the doom of the bourgeois reflex of attempting to find solutions from ideals and authorities existing above life. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 87) They lean on Marx also in the following idea of reverse organisation of publicity: 'dass es nicht ausreiche, dass der Gedanke zur Wirklichkeit drängt, sondern dass die Wirklichkeit auch zum Gedanken drängen müsse' or 'dass die Befreiung der Arbeiter nur das Werk der Arbeiter selber sein könne'. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 59)

It is not question of giving people education on issues that they 'should' know or should 'need'. It is rather question of taking into consideration what people 'want'. This might even be understood as an intervention by 'knowledge gap' researchers, whose chief interest is in the relationship between reading and spectating, complaining about the correlations between spectating and ignorance. (Maase 1990) In Negt's and Kluge's vision, this ignorance is the direct outcome of the stream of 'abstract' news articles and documentaries. Further interest might be aroused if the life situations of people were taken as they really are, and reported from the point of view of those involved. They continue with the idea of workers organizing the public sphere on the basis of their 'first hand' knowledge of their own situations.

But what are these experiences? Above, I indicated that they include associations and fantasy. These are included, along with certain other characteristics, among experiences:

> 'Die Wirklichkeit der Arbeiterklasse umfasst ganz heterogene Elemente: eine Reihe von Verhaltenstendenzen, Intentionen, phantastischen Verkehrungen der Realität, Wünschen, Hoffnungen, die sich als isolierte, vereinzelte…' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 61)

People's experiences include both attitudes on the given order and hopes for the future, as well as the development of their mind in the present. The dialectical problem is that in the consciousness industry privacy and free time are made to be isolated spheres. On the other hand, the isolated phenomena are gathered and generalized in a certain agenda of issues and professional catchwords while life itself slips out of their hands (one could think of contemporary phenomena such as family violence, youth violence, drug addiction, mental depression). Negt's and Kluge's point is that publicity allows certain frames of reference and points of view into public discussion while entirely excluding other existing issues. (see Negt & Kluge 1972, 209)

Miriam Hansen interprets the fragmentation thesis in the sense that while televisual dramaturgies of global synthesis and transparency are being perfected, the actual 'context of living' of large populations appears disjointed, fragmented, and irrelevant. Mass unemployment, brutalization of social relations, pollution, collapse of urban infrastructures, health care, and education systems are indeed represented as problems; they are not ignored in any way. They are, nevertheless, presented in such a way that leads one to believe that they are separate and unrelated phenomena and thus, especially in USA (Hansen's point of view), not delegitimating master narratives of national identity and international leadership. (Hansen 1993, 184) In European countries, the representation of problems as isolated phenomena can pacify people into thinking that these problems are not related to adopted policies, and also give the subtle indication that they are actually caused by some natural law of private personalities, unfavourable genotype or simply the inability to manage ones own life.

Another problem of solidification of experiences is caused by the consumer culture:

> 'Die Ware als sinnlich-übersinnliches Ding wird zum Mittel, Gebrauchsgegenstände in Phantasieprodukte zu transformieren, die nicht nur Gegenstand des Konsums sind, sondern eine Weltanschauung suggerieren. Gegenstand der massenhaften Realisierung dieser Ware ist das Bewusstsein…*Die Triebphantasien der Menschen, Hoffnungen, Wünsche, Bedürfnisse, sind nicht mehr freigesetzt, können sich nicht mehr nach zufälligen Interessen entfalten, sondern werden mit Gebrauchswerten, mit Waren konkret besetzt.*' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 287)

One can see that Negt and Kluge follow the Marxian idea of commodity aesthetism, in which commodities contain cultural and social meaning and significance. Thus, already Marx could see that 'physical consumption' of actual visible and concrete objects has transformed into 'imaginary consumption' of ideas, images, lifestyles and world views. As such, they do not produce false

consciousness. On the contrary, they are based on the real and legitimate consciousness of people. The problem is that they are materialized in certain commodity items with which people are made to believe (via advertising) that they can gain happiness, while not making any 'true' changes, for example to their discontented working and family situations.

The solution to this situation of discontent is not sought through face to face contact beyond electronic or written communications, the media or consumerism. The representations of 'real' experiences are searched for in vain from the public sphere of institutions and organizations:

> 'Produkte, die dieser Organisationsstufe von Erfahrung entsprechen, gibt es heute weder im Fernsehen noch außerhalb des Fernsehens, zum Beispiel in der Arbeit politischer Gruppen. Für diese Fragestellung sind die Gegensätze Kultur - Industrie, politisch engagierter Kommentar - Unterhaltung unergiebig. (Negt & Kluge 1972, 222)

The answer is not to favour 'authentic' or avant-garde art and to foster the civilized cultural argument. Nor is the answer to be found in politically conscious discussions on television or elsewhere. The 'authentic' or 'real' experience is not to be found there. Neither can it be found in sitcoms or soap operas nor in the so-called 'docusoap'. These avenues may, however, sometimes possess a degree of truth, especially if they are of a controversial nature.

4.2.5 The proletarian public sphere

Possibly the only solution available to the working people is to organize publicity and a public sphere of their own: 'Seit es die Arbeiterbewegung gibt, kam es darauf an, die proletarischen Interessen in eigenen Formen der Öffentlichkeit politisch auszudrücken.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 13) For excluded groups of populations (for Negt and Kluge, the working class) it is necessary to cease to allow the product and programme stream to pacify one into illusionary dreaming. It is a question of finding and realizing the true needs within, which are distorted and pacified in the consumer culture, and begin organizing on the basis of them:

> 'Eine Entfaltung des Bedürfnisses ist aber nicht in solchen in der Regel nur kurze Zeit dauernden Kampfsituationen möglich, sondern nur in Form von Lernprozessen, in denen sich der regressive Wunsch nach Vereinfachung der Verhältnisse von dem zugrunde liegenden emanzipatorischen Bedürfnis, die Wirklichkeit zu verstehen und in ihr kollektiv, durch organisierte Erfahrung vorbereitet, die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse zu verbessern, trennen lässt.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 79)

The aim is to break the system of blocked contexts of living among excluded groups or the working class. Negt and Kluge, however, warn against certain forms of constructing publicity, namely through the esoteric artistic avant-garde (ibid. 78) or solely by intellectuals (ibid. 80). These do not help if one wishes to get to the bare roots, to the actual contexts of living that must be made understood by large populations. On the other hand, they warn against

the group mentality (ibid. 115) of the working class itself; the tendency to construct a society within a society.

The solution is to use the media at hand, and as wide as possible a circulation of it, to work against its harmful tendencies. This is the idea of counter publicity.

> 'Eine Gegenöffentlichkeit, die sich auf Ideen und Diskurse mit aufklärerischem Inhalt stützt, vermag keine wirksamen Waffen gegen den Zusammenhang von Schein, Öffentlichkeit und öffentlicher Gewalt zu entwickeln…Gegen Produktion der Scheinöffentlichkeit helfen nur Gegenprodukte einer proletarischen Öffentlichkeit: Idee gegen Idee, Produkt gegen Produkt, Produktionszusammenhang gegen Produktionszusammenhang.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 143)

They do not only call for serious, enlightening or intellectual programmes. Rather, they call for alternatives of all kinds of genres of programme making. This also includes entertainment, if accomplished in a controversial manner.

A good example of this might be the *Tageszeitung*, a newspaper circulated in Berlin (it's not clear to what extent the founding of this newspaper was influenced by these theoreticians). Nowadays it has gained in respect and is referred to regularly among other media. (Hansen 1993, 192) Another example might be Kluge's own television and film production. Kluge as a film director was defending the public subsidy of film and film education and was a prominent figure of the German auteur film scene. Despite this, he thought and insisted that 'the market, with its professed goal of catering to as many people as possible, still provided a better model for engaging the viewer's imagination than the bureaucratically protected enclaves of high culture.' (cited in Hansen 1993, 193, 194) This is in line with Negt's and Kluge's warnings against esoteric programmes and products that do not speak to large audiences. Another explanation for this is the tone in *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung* with which they describe public service television. Kluge himself produced a weekly show for commercial channels in the 1980s. In his show *Zehn vor Elf* he presented conversations with writers, actors, and directors, and essays on certain topics such as archaeology of advertising, nuclear fall-out, cinema, the circus or re-renditions of famous opera-plots. This is for Kluge the strategy of counter-production: 'programmes that at once learn from and compete with the enemy on the most advanced technical and economic level'. (Hansen 1993, 195, 196)

Perhaps the most prominent film in which Kluge was co-director was *Deutschland im Herbst*, which tells the story of the occurrences of 1977. It was a co-production of several directors, which itself emphasizes a new kind of collective *Autorenkino* conception. On the other hand, it told a different version of the story to that portrayed by the German public service television. In this sense it formed a counter product. It was accused of not taking into consideration the point of view of the working class. The directors replied that they could only honestly tell the story from their own point of view, which was one of 'bourgeois intellectuals'. The film used a kind of *Verfremdung* technique of montage of drama and documentary material. This montage technique was intended to be a parody of televisual presentation which in itself is a hastily compiled collage of fiction and 'facts'. With the cuts, ruptures, silences, breaks,

and empty spaces between shots they tried to alienate the spectator from emphatic immersion into the story line. Instead, they tried to engender a resistance that was intended to provoke the spectator into autonomous co-authorship. With this they aimed at the construction of an oppositional story - a counter history of what had taken place in 1977. (Hansen 1983)

4.2.6 A theory of manipulation?

All of the above might somewhat resemble a genuine thesis of manipulation of the masses. However, despite the fact that Enzensberger, Negt and Kluge were prominent figures of left intellectuals they did not share the more dogmatic wing of the left which comes into the so-called 'manipulation of media'. I would like to contrast their ideas with those of a couple of writers in *Das Argument* at the beginning of 1960s. The articles of Wolfram Burisch and Uta Gerhardt tell a story of the manipulation process. There is no single subject or manipulator, the system is anonymous, and everybody takes part in it. It is the logic of the 'capitalist system' of private ownership of media, which leads into mystification. 'Der privatwirtschaftliche Charakter der Massenmedien öffnet sie den finanzkräftigen Interessenten an einer Massenbeeinflussung. Die Freiheit der Meinung entwertet, weil die Mittel, mit denen Meinung gemacht wird, käuflich sind.' (Gerhardt 1963, 7)

However, one can also read of the opposition of *Herr* and *Knecht*, the elite and the masses. The elite, the politically and economically powerful, possess a covert deal with media owners and leading journalists. They seem to work together to 'enlighten' the masses that are mere objects of the process. 'Die Institutionen der Meinungsmache sind den Handlangern eines Führerregimes als *Manipulationsinstrumente* bereitet'. (Burisch 1963, 11) In reality, in the background of public 'enlightenment' much more is taken than is told. Ordinary people do not know the backgrounds and logics of the issues, or of their dependence on chosen policies. The masses are made to believe that they are kept informed via the media while in reality the information is only the surface of what actually takes place. 'Was jenseits des oberflächlichen Scheins an *Manipulation* durch anonyme Mächte geschieht, bleibt jedoch verborgen.' (Burisch 1963, 11) The outcome is the mystification of the given world. 'Als *manipulierte* schlägt Aufklärung um in ihr Gegenteil, in totale Mystifikation geschichtlich-gesellschaftlicher Antagonismen... Kommunikation ward umge-schmolzen zur ideologischen *Manipulation*, Aufklärung der Massen zur Verführung derselben.' (Burisch 1963, 13) They live an ideology in the sense that the facts are told as 'truths' while other aspects which might also be involved are not revealed. In Burisch's opinion the economic 'truth' is a myth that everybody works towards in order to favour each other, and which is thought to be the best means of accomplishing something good in this world.

There is a certain sense of reciprocity of 'manipulation' in this story, the idea that the 'world wants the deception'. The media reality resembles a kind of play in which the audience plays the part of the anonymous process. Gerhardt realizes this to a greater degree than Burisch. What remains unstated is that the

audience is also a final limit and end zone in the sense that it can produce unexpected counter moves to the media delivery. The situation is uncontrollable. For example, the media coverage of the Vietnam War may represent a situation in which realistic descriptions of the war that were intended to back military action in reality sparked huge opposition in the Western world. This might be called in Adorno's terms the antidote to the cultural industry, or a reverse direction of dialectic of enlightenment; or simply a 'dialectic of mystification,' in which mystification turns against itself. The above description also differs from Negt's and Kluge's account in the sense that Negt and Kluge intended to turn the interchange around; stories of what takes place in the ordinary life of the majority of people in place of enlightenment concerning what takes place in state politics and the economy.

Even if Negt's and Kluge's account might be seen implicitly as an account of manipulation and deception, they do not use these words. When they do use them they distance themselves from such constructions. (see Negt & Kluge 1972, 219-220) They write explicitly: 'Hierbei folgen wir nicht der Tendenz, den Medienkonzernen nur die Verbreitung von Unheil zu unterstellen. Es geht insbesondere nicht um die *Manipulationstheorie*. Der Mensch ist gewiss kein Pawlowscher Hund, der nur auf die Reize einer Bewusstseinsindustrie hin Reaktionen produziert; vielmehr vermag er Widerstand zu leisten. An diesen Widerständen aber lernt gerade der Medienkonzern ebenfalls. Das Problem liegt darin, dass in den Mischprogrammen und der Verarbeitung seiner wirklichen Bedürfnisse der Mensch zuletzt immer schwerer unterscheiden kann, was seine Bedürfnisse und Interessen sind.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 256) This indicates the conception of a kind of interplay between the spectators and the producers in which also illusion and reality are displaced. It is difficult to find the starting point anymore.

Enzensberger is somewhat more ironical:

'Die Neue Linke der sechziger Jahre hat die Entwicklung der Medien auf einen einzigen Begriff gebracht: den der Manipulation. Er war ursprünglich von großem heuristischen Nutzen und hat eine lange Reihe von analytischen Einzelunter-suchungen ermöglicht, droht jedoch zu einem bloßen Schlagwort herunterzu-kommen, das mehr verbirgt als es aufklären kann, und das deshalb seinerseits einer Analyse bedarf... Der liberale Köhlerglaube, als gäbe es in politischen und gesellschaftlichen Fragen eine reine, unmanipulierte Wahrheit, scheint sich bei der sozialistischen Linken einer merkwürdigen Geltung zu erfreuen: er ist die unausgesprochene Grundvoraussetzung der These von der Manipulation... Die Enteignung Springers ist ein wünschenswertes Ziel, doch wäre es gut zu wissen, wem die Medien übereignet werden sollen. Der Partei? Das ist, nach allen Erfahrungen, die mit dieser Lösung gemacht worden sind, keine brauchbare Alternative. Es ist vielleicht kein Zufall, dass die Linke eine Analyse der Manipulationszusammenhänge in sozialistisch regierten Ländern bisher nicht geleistet hat.' (Enzensberger 1970, 163-164)

The background for the complaints of the left is possibly the sense of losing their position as intellectuals, thus the feeling of their own powerlessness in the face of a mediatised world. This is also one explanation for Adorno's negative vision of the cultural industry. Kluge's and Enzensberger's own experiments in the media world tell a story of a 'transitory intellectual' (Hachmeister 1993) that

can play the part in a given media landscape without fear of the popular mass culture (while still not compromising their aesthetic ambition).

4.3 Variations

According to the interpretation of Jörg Lau, in the 1980s Enzensberger became ashamed of his earlier optimism. Enzensberger transformed himself into a nihilistic media critic in his famous essays 'Der Triumph der *Bild*-Zeitung oder Die Katastrophe der Pressefreiheit' (1983) and 'Die vollkommene Leere. Das Nullmedium Oder Warum alle Klagen über das Fernsehen gegenstandslos sind' (1988). Negt and Kluge omitted the whole category of 'proletarian' in their 1981 published *Geschichte und Eigensinn*. In this context they publicly stated that they do not even know what the proletarian public sphere is.

Enzensberger's sense of paradox blossoms in his essay *Bild*:

> 'Die Zeitung ist nicht faschistisch, weil sie nicht angetreten ist, um die Massen zu mobilisieren, sondern im Gegenteil, ihnen jede Regung abzugewöhnen. Sie ist deshalb als politisches Kampfblatt im herkömmlichen Sinn untauglich. Mit ihr verglichen, wirken Zeitungen wie der *Völkische Beobachter*, der *Bayern-Kurier* und die *Deutsche National-Zeitung* wie Fossilien. Was sie von *Bild* unterscheidet, ist die Tatsache, dass sie eine (wenn auch niederträchtige) Botschaft zu verkünden haben, dass es ihnen um einen (wenn auch widerwärtigen) politischen Inhalt geht. Die Botschaft von *Bild* lautet dagegen, dass es keine denkbare Botschaft mehr gibt; sein einziger Inhalt ist die Liquidierung aller Inhalte... So, nämlich in Gestalt einer höhnischen Fratze, hat *Bild* die längst preisgegebene Utopie der klassenlosen Gesellschaft eingelöst, als ein Blatt, das nicht jedem etwas bietet, sondern allen nichts. (Enzensberger 1983/1997, 139)'

The denomination of yellow paper fascists is again a complaint directed from the side of the left, which is in Enzensberger's thought a misinterpretation. The following extract contains the idea of the nihilistic interplay between producers and consumers, the idea that the world wants to be deceived and is well aware of the deception:

> 'Dennoch ist die Ohnmacht der Kritik eine massive Tatsache, und ihr Grund liegt auf der Hand. Jede Aufklärung über die *Bild*-Zeitung ist vergeblich, weil es nichts über sie zu sagen gibt, was nicht alle schon wüssten. Das gilt nicht nur für diejenigen, die die Zeitung machen. Es gilt vor allem für ihre Leser, deren Zynismus hinter dem der Macher nicht zurücksteht. Ihre selbstverschuldete Unmündigkeit erwartet keinen Befreier. Sie ist sich ihrer durchaus selbst bewusst. An diesem Schuldbewusstsein scheitert alle Aufklärung, weil es bereits aufgeklärt ist.' (Enzensberger 1983/1997, 141)

The door of the cell is open in this sense, too. The recipients are completely aware of the fact that a yellow paper offers nothing to the reader and to read it would merely prove their state of infancy. Enlightenment on this situation from the part of a media critic is mere tautology. It can be laughed at because the readers already know that it is rubbish, and they read it for that very reason.

Bild wird gelesen nicht obwohl, sondern weil das Blatt von nichts handelt, jeden Inhalt liquidiert, weder Vergangenheit noch Zukunft kennt, alle historischen, moralischen, politischen Kategorien zertrümmert; nicht obwohl, sondern weil es droht, quatscht, ängstigt, schweinigelt, hetzt, leeres Stroh drischt, geifert, tröstet, manipuliert, verklärt, lügt, blödelt, vernichtet. Gerade dieser unveränderliche, alltägliche Terror verschafft dem Leser den paradoxen Genuss, den er mit jedem Süchtigen teilt, und der sich von der bewusst erlebten Erniedrigung, die mit ihm verbunden ist, gar nicht trennen lässt. Die Tatsache, dass *Bild* prinzipiell nicht datierbar ist, dass es sich selbst permanent wiederholt, führt nicht zur Langweile, sondern zur Beruhigung. Bei seinem jahrzehntelangen Frühstück mit *Bild* wiegt sich der Leser in der Gewissheit, dass alles so weitergeht, dass *nichts etwas macht*, oder was auf dasselbe hinausläuft, dass das Nichts nichts macht.' (Enzensberger 1983/1997, 141)

Despite the fact that the German version of the yellow paper contains no meaning or content, Enzensberger still in 1983 believes that people are somehow mentally moved by what is offered. In 1988 he goes even further to state that the mind of the spectator is entirely empty:

'In der Nullstellung liegt also nicht die Schwäche, sondern die Stärke des Fensehens. Sie macht seinen Gebrauchswert aus. *Man schaltet das Gerät ein, um abzuschalten...* Der Idealfall ist also unerreichbar. Man kann sich der vollkommene Leere, wie dem absoluten Nullpunkt, nur asymptotisch nähern. Diese Schwierigkeit ist jedem Mystiker vertraut: Die Meditation führt nicht ins Nirwana, die Versenkung gelingt allenfalls punktuell, aber nicht endgültig, der kleine Tod ist nicht der große. Immer moduliert ein minimales Signal, das Rauschen der Realität, die 'Erfahrung der reinen Gegenstandslosigkeit' (Kasimir Malevitsch). (Enzensberger 1988, 244)

According to Carsten Klingemann, the idea of *Nullmedium* tells us about the changing direction of manipulation: 'Die Manipulationsrichtung hat sich nämlich genau umgekehrt: Die Zuschauer sind die wahren Manipulateure, die ihre Wünsche gegen die Intention der Medienproduzenten durchsetzen. Wer sich ihnen nicht fügt, wird per Tastendruck mit Liebesentzug bestraft.' (Klingemann 1993, 755) Rudolf Maresch even lends this passage of Enzensberger a utopian meaning: 'Seine Hoffnung gründet sich letztlich nur noch auf eine Mythologie: den Glauben an die Fähigkeit *des Menschen* auch noch im Sinnlosen nach Sinn zu suchen und so der vollkommenen Leere der Fernsehbilder zu entgehen.' (Maresch 1992, 51)

I would like to study this passage from a slightly different point of view. It is true that the power of the spectator or consumer, for that matter, lies in his/her choices. Even if they are not collective and organized they may in some situations form into a unidirectional 'critical mass' of similar choices (see Herbert Blumer 1999). Even if not forming a critical mass the spectator/consumer is always free not to choose what is offered. Ultimately it always boils down to the question of individual freedom to choose or to ignore. I believe the idea of ignoring is critical in this passage. Enzensberger's phrase 'man schaltet das Gerät ein, um abzuschalten' is a critique to both positive and negative versions of conceptions of audience activity. Ironically this situation is the strength of television; it is the borderline of efforts of 'manipulation'. The fact that nothing takes place while watching television forms a securing wall against all *Bewusstseinsbeeinflussung*. Neil Postman delivered a similar statement in the 1980s by writing that television is at its best when it does not claim to be

serious, but entirely irrelevant. (Postman 1985) At the same time, Enzensberger's idea is a radical critique towards the notions of a critically appropriating audience as fostered in British cultural studies. This phrase ridicules the Hallian encoding/decoding model or media ethnographic interpretations of socioeconomically and geographically differing reception styles. However, the end of the passage indicates that ultimately people cannot avoid making some sense of what they receive even if it may be vague. This tells nothing of an aspiration for utopia. Rather, it reveals a hopelessness. The audience even fails to avoid making sense of what they receive. Television cannot reach its early model, that of Malevitsch's *Black Square*. Audiences can struggle against the requirements of critical appropriation and withhold from analysing. However, the route cannot be travelled to its end. Nevertheless, the idea of *Nullmedium* is in a genuine sense absence of all strategies; the strategy of how to avoid influences of opinion leading, or the strategy of how to negotiate with given messages or oppose them. The only act of receiving is to remain unchanged.

Jörg Lau describes that during the writing of these essays Enzensberger was turning from ideas of emancipation towards a kind of 'rehabilitation of normality'. For him, normality was no longer the effect of manipulation, education, censorship or ideological bombardment. Rather, it was 'die Grenze aller Bewusstseinsindustrie, aller Medien, aller Propaganda'. The cynical reader of *Bild* possesses a kind of strategy *(sic)* of obstinacy, *Eigensinn.* (Lau 1997, 330-331) People are not to be led astray; they are already enlightened of their own situation and their possibility to play the meaninglessness game. Curiously, Negt and Kluge stated already in *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung*: 'Der Medienverbund und die Auswirkung der Bewusstseinsindustrie würden überschätzt. Die Marktausweitung der Bewusstseinsindustrie stoße auf eine feste Schranke: die Blockierung der Massen im Arbeitsprozess und in ihren überlieferten, verdinglichten Gewohnheiten. Es gibt, so wird gesagt, gar nicht genügend Freizeit, auch nicht genügend Wahrnehmungs- und Lebensenergie, die auf den Medienverbund antworten könnten.' (Negt & Kluge 1972, 246-247) This, of course, hinders them from making a critical analysis of the media and their own situation. However, it is also the boundary of the negative media influence on their lives. According to research, despite the growing amount of supply the time spent consuming media does not increase relative to supply. (Hickethier 1992) People are still busily occupied with their daily routines and day to day life, which provides them with a secure wall against inappropriate 'heavy usage'. I think this might be the first indication of Negt and Kluge's turning towards the concept of *Eigensinn*: dispersed activities also in face to face relations that can no longer delineate with the concept of counter publicity (in a proletarian sense). (see Hansen 1993, 206, 207)

The ideas above may still only be variations on a general theme of dissociation of 'appearance/essence'. They do not necessarily solve the problem of dichotomizing illusion and reality. The idea of escaping the repressive situation in favour of something more truthful still remains. It is still a search

for 'true needs'. There are some reactions in German journals to the media theory of the 1960s and 1970s. They are imprinted by the appropriation of French theory, especially Jean Baudrillard's thought. This at least attempts to overcome the 'essence/appearance' problem. Enzensberger's and Negt's & Kluge's later ideas seem to revise the emancipatory possibility. However, they still believe in a possibility of some kind of 'authenticity' of existence, be it normality or obstinacy. The writers in the 1990s deconstruct the entire repressive/emancipatory dissociation. They claim that the possibility of emancipation and authenticity is lost.

4.4 Coda

According to Hickethier, the background of Baudrillard's simulation thesis is set in post 1968 disillusionment, in which the view was that as it was impossible to change the world so the interpretation of the world had to be changed. The thesis was imprinted by a powerlessness in the face of the mediatized world. Reality and illusion seem to change places, with reality becoming more and more mediatized. One can no longer dissociate which is which. In the theses of *Verblendungszusammenhang* (Adorno) and *Blockierungszusammenhang* (Negt & Kluge) there still seems to be reality behind the Platonian 'hole of the cave'. The thesis of simulation indicates the disappearance of 'truth' and 'reality'. (Hickethier 1992, 59)

Rudolf Maresch believes that both the threats of media culture (manipulation, isolation) and hopes of it (media competence, critical counter publicity, emancipatory media practice and critique of relations of production) are obsolete ideas. (Maresch 1992, 49, 51) They do not take into consideration the new situation of the fading away of reality.

Against these threats and hopes is the collapse of essential dichotomies. The Benjaminian idea of the fading away of the criteria for deciding between the original and the reproduction in photography is widened in Baudrillard's thought to encompass the entire world.

> 'Entwicklung der Medien immanenten Angleichung wesenslogischer Differenz (Realität-Fiktion; Wahrheit-Fälschung; Sein-Schein) und der gleichzeitig damit verbundenen Referenzlosigkeit der Zeichen, kann das angeblich Manipulierende, Verführende und Betrügende nicht mehr an einer objektiven, oder sonstwie idealen, kritischen und negativen Instanz gemessen und beurteilt werden.' (Maresch 1992, 49)

There is no longer a point of reference or starting point against which a message can be evaluated or judged. Thus the claim that the phenomena of our world are irrelevant or only semblance, along with all epithets of pseudo or quasi, is not very relevant any more. One can always ask where/what is true in our culture. This thought can be understood from the turn towards sign theories. The traditional communication model of sender - message - receiver has become obsolete. The message is substituted by a code which consists of a sign

that relates only to other signs and does not refer to an 'original' meaning. Thus the meaning of a sign is always uncontrollable. A sign can be randomly related to other signs, which makes the message contingent.

Maresch attempts to construct new sentences leaning on Baudrillard's theories. The most significant is the idea of the disappearance of an enlightened, free and self-conscious subject with which to attack the emancipatory media theories. Instead of a self-conscious subject, he sees the human being as just another 'data processing machine', a node in the information flow, a 'fractal subject'. (Maresch 1992, 51, 53)

Rather than working on knowledge and internalizing it, these 'fractal subjects' toy with the surface of the mediatized world. Maresch criticizes media critics such as Negt and Kluge for not taking into account the complex situation between the senders and receivers. Enzensberger is much more aware of it in his essays during 1980s.

> 'Die Medienkritiker übersehen einfach, dass eine heimliche Komplizenschaft zwischen Produzenten und Konsumenten besteht. Genauso wie es das Geheimnis des Erfolges der Bild-Zeitung wohl ist, dass sowohl Macher als auch Leser um ihre Lügengeschichten wissen, genauso praktizieren die Fernsehkonsumenten eine heilige Allianz mit den TV-Produzenten. (vgl. Enzensberger 1988)... Alle Versuche kritischer Kritiker, das Publikum von den betrügerischen Machenschaften des Fernsehmediums zu überzeugen, gehen daher fehl. Es genießt Fremdbestimmung, Denkentwöhnung und Narkotisierung des Wahrnehmusapparates, wie Platons Hühle zeigt.' (Maresch 1992, 51)

It is pointless to attempt to warn people of the threats of media messages, they already know of the threat; as Enzensberger wrote, they are already enlightened.

Instead of judging, people can play several kinds of games with the media. Carsten Klingemann refers to the studies of 'reality construction' by the media. The situation seems to be an 'interactive', reciprocal game of constructing reality. The spectators can contingently construct a different kind of reality from what is intended by the senders. (see Klingemann 1993, 757) Hickethier describes a kind of cat-and-mouse game in which media producers try to grab the interest of the spectator who becomes gradually accustomed to the tricks and loses his/her interest. This cycle continues ceaselessly. Another possibility is a kind of projection game in which the spectator mirrors his/her life with that of television characters, but never assumes this 'parasocial interaction' to be literal. (Hickethier 1992, 63) This toying with the surfaces is a kind of strategy employed to cope with the mediatized world. Maresch, however, accuses Enzensberger of omitting a strategy in his *Nullmedium* thesis. He wants to take these games a step further.

The idea is to cause noise and disturbance in the information flows. He calls for a so-called militant 'activism' though he does not yet, in 1992, use the word. His formula is as follows:

> '[F]ür die *Ausweitung und weitere Eskalation der Programme, Datenträger und Informationsträger* eintreten, bis sich jeglicher Sinn verflüchtigt hat und das ganze System, destabilisiert an seiner eigenen Metastase, implodiert... die Apparate und ihre Energieströme benützen, sich in ihre Verknüpfungs-, und Verschaltungssysteme

einklicken und auf diese Weise das grenzenlose Spiel der Kontingenzen und Indeterminationen, die die Informationsträger schaffen, wenn sie Informationen transportieren, weiter beschleunigen. Soll heissen: Redundanzen nicht vermeiden, sondern die Informationssysteme mit ihnen aufheizen.

Eigene Schalt- und Regelkreise aufbauen, eigene Codes erfinden und mit den bestehenden verknüpfen, um dadurch das offenkundige mediale Spiel von Simulation, Verführung und Manipulation weiter anheizen und listig überbieten zu können... Dann kann es nur noch darum gehen, wie es die Militärstrategen im Golfkrieg auf beiden Seiten bestens verstanden haben, besser und effektvoller als alle anderen zu lügen, zu betrügen und zu täuschen und auch nicht davor zurückzuschrecken, gezielte Desinformationen in die Welt zu setzen oder Gerüchte zu streuen... zielen sie nicht mehr auf Aufhebung und Überwindung einer falschen Welt, sondern suchen nach Erhalt von Bewegungsfreiheit und Aufbau von Widerstandslinien in mediatisierten Welten, in denen Un-Sinn mit noch größerem Un-Sinn, Verführungen mit besseren Verführungen und Simulationen mit Gegen-Simulationen beantwortet werden müssen.' (Maresch 1992, 54-55)

Ironically, the logic of the act no longer works 'against the grain' but 'along the grain', coping with the mediatized world by using its own means and strategies. As Maresch states, the aim is not to find a better world beneath the false layers of *Blockierungszusammenhang*. The only aim is to secure a piece of personal territory to live in. The irony is that even if the direction of action is no longer directed against anything, they still rely on the possibility of the media world being its own antidote. The acceleration is directed to turn against itself. Thus, working along the grain, for example using the strategies of activism, is believed to produce certain outcomes that do actually function against the grain. This is still an attempt to escape from the 'Platonic cave'.

4.5   Conclusion

Enzensberger's, Negt's and Kluge's *motive for writing* was the feeling of being a so-called 'transitory intellectual' who no longer regarded himself as an alien relic or an outsider in the new media world, but somebody who is 'literate' in it and knew the rules of how to act critically within it. Enzensberger's and Negt's and Kluge's act in writing these essays and books was to break the spell of this new world as it was in Adorno's writing. Enzensberger did this through his sense of paradox in his writings (e.g. his essays on tourism and *Bild-Zeitung*). Negt and Kluge also challenged many trivial assumptions on, for example, the character of public service media. Their intention was to provide a more programmatic warning and encouragement at the same time. Their dissociation was the repressive and emancipatory media use. They wanted to cause people to realise how to cope with the mediatized world. However, the strategy of coping changed during the 1980s from what it was in 1960s and 1970s. First, they especially wanted to make people see the emancipatory possibilities of the media world. Later on, they hypostatized the normality and obstinacy.

My illocutionary re-description of these texts is that they (in particular Enzensberger's) are ironical and cynical, compromising standard left-wing thought at that time. However, they were criticizing the institution of the

media. Their description of the media world is ambivalent, containing both its problems and possible future opportunities. Their use of the term consciousness industry is intended to highlight this ambivalence.

Their writings were an intervention to critical theory and vulgar Marxism. They inherited from Adorno and other Frankfurt School members the critique of mass culture. From Habermas, Negt and Kluge they assumed the idea of the public sphere. However, they all saw mass culture as more fragmented and containing a greater variety of phenomena than Adorno ever did. In contrast to Habermas, Negt and Kluge they deny the ideal character of the classical bourgeois public sphere. They share the Habermasian idea of the structural transformation of the public sphere from that of the early bourgeoisie, which consisted of personal communication, into mass communication in which the participants do not know each other. They did not share Habermas' dystopia at that time that discursive version of public sphere has transformed into consumption of mass media leverage and that this would be the only possibility of public sphere in their contemporary time. Their concept of an oppositional public sphere is their most important contribution to the discourse. They turn against Marxism with their notions of 'manipulation' and 'false needs'. This is also a rhetorical shift in contrast to the assumptions of the first generation of the Frankfurt School. Whereas Adorno seems to think that the sellers of commodities addressing to people with their repertoire of wares is only a delusive retroactive circulation of demand and supply. Enzensberger, Negt and Kluge state in a more programmatic way that the needs are in no way false but legitime. They, however, still insist that the legitime needs are in a way layers of an authentic essence of human mind that can be emancipated in controversial media activities. The rhetorical shift in the 1990s influenced by French theory challenge the whole notion of authenticity. After that the whole endeavour of speculating whether needs and desires are real or false is futile, because according to the simulation thesis one cannot decide which is which. So, after that it is at least intellectually easier to accept the toying with the surfaces of media and commodity world.

Enzensberger's, Negt's and Kluge's writings capture the climate of the decades in which they were written, including the catchwords and sentiments of their time such as 'public', 'experience', and 'consciousness'. At the same time they intervened critically into some trivial assumptions of the time. Negt and Kluge were not iterating the trivial claims for public service media. For them, the public service organization was just as harmful (or even more so) than the commercial media. Nevertheless, they still did not search for a solution from face to face contacts outside the electronic world as there was no authentic culture left outside of the damned media world either. They also did not foster the assumption of the existence of a clique which hides the truth of their 'real' decisions. Rather, their point of view is that this possible 'clique' merely blocks information coming from below, thus blocking people from becoming acquainted with each other and knowing each others' (or their own) situations.

Enzensberger's, Negt's and Kluge's rhetorical re-description is, on the one hand, the revaluation of the possibilities of emancipatory media use, which Adorno mentions only in subordinate clauses. These texts are much more programmatic. On the other hand, they rename the culture industry as the consciousness industry. Their intention in this is to draw attention to the broadness of the phenomenon. It is not only a question of aesthetic matters or an industry as a sector or *Betrieb*. It is described using the word 'consciousness' and another concept of industry as 'reproducing' (of the existent) and influencing as being more dangerous and at the same time – if used otherwise – more promising. Their aim was to further increase the harmful character of this industry by renaming it as consciousness, although its possibilities increased respectively. The reason for using the concept of consciousness is also to emphasize the immaterial nature of the phenomenon, which concerns opinions and mental states in general. I think this idea is also present in Adorno's theory of the culture industry, but as with Enzensberger's opinion, it is incorrectly named.

Their writings mark the transition phase from the early to late 20th century. Their historical situation brought the possibility of counter cultures, which were their hope amid the situation of repressive social systems. It was a time of 'conscious' political activity and radicalism. Their concept of an oppositional public sphere, the representatives of which would join the 'proletariat,' is a revaluation of the social and media system, and in this sense their writings offer a possibility for rhetorical re-description both at this moment and later on. The culture industry is not a 'totalitarian' mass culture but offers possibilities to think and act in alternative ways. Enzensberger, Negt and Kluge reacted in the 1980s to the recuperation of activism and radicalism by using vocabulary such as 'normality' and 'obstinacy'. Their cynical move implicates a kind of leap from the dialectical circle of identity and difference and the instrumentalization of difference.

The integration of the terms 'public sphere' and 'consciousness' widen the criteria and range of the issue. In Enzensberger's thought, the range of the consciousness industry is extended into new spheres. The criteria of application include opinions, attitudes, evaluations, and prejudices. The range of reference is, besides the media, world religion, education, parliament and party politics. For Negt and Kluge the criteria include desires, hopes, needs, attitudes, and intentions. In general, the criteria of application for all of them are immateriality and interaction; and as a social phenomenon; socialization (family, work, education), the interplay of public/private, artisanal techniques, and reproducibility; and in the attempt to influence the human mind: opinions, hopes, and needs. The range of reference is the media in its written, electronic and digital form; film; advertising; PR work; social or political organizations; religion; education; urban spaces; and commodity production. They hardly write at all on creative art, neither visual nor musical, in this context (even if Enzensberger is aware of the commodity character of literature). They take into

account the organization of the media world into public service and private owned which is seldom present in Adorno's thought.

In their ambivalent valuation they both condemn the repressive character of these institutions. However, the original negative moral colour is somewhat brightened by glimpses of the future. Nevertheless, during the 1980s they end up in disillusionment and adopt a new emphasis of obstinacy towards the world. Still, it is an attempt towards a more genuine experience than the media world can offer: obstinacy and normality are the securing walls against reproduction and steering of consciousness and the attempt to instrumentalize marginality in favour of economic growth. It seems as if obstinacy is a German answer to the situation of simulation. In a situation in which the idea of emancipation has become obsolete the solution is to resign completely. In particular, Enzensberger's sense of irony and paradox continues the mode of argumentation of the previous chapter. In this chapter one can also find the reverse direction of the dialectic of enlightenment, that of mystification turning against itself.

5 CULTURAL INDUSTRIES OUTSIDE GERMANY

The 1970s was the decade of the birth of another tradition of discourse on the phenomenon of cultural industries. France was the location for the formulation of a more descriptive way of analysing this phenomenon. The publication *Les industries culturelles* (1979, Chantal Laxroix, Marc Petit and Francois Rouet) was an introduction to the line of enquiry that was pursued in France in the 1970s. It had certain influences on Unesco's work and on the French Ministry of Culture and its research department, which translated the concept into a usage that has gained in influence since then. In France, Bernard Miège and his colleagues (e.g. Patrice Flichy) of the Grenoble School conducted research into the technical and economical structures of the media and cultural production. The most important emphasis in these was on the audiovisual sector. The Council of Europe also published papers concerning the phenomenon. Studies in music and the recording industry also dealt with structural problems in these industries since the 1970s (e.g. Steve Chapple and Reebee Garofalo; Dave Harker; Richard Peterson and David Berger; Krister Malm and Roger Wallis; Keith Negus; Robert Burnett and Simon Frith). Nicholas Garnham wrote on the issue in Britain, where new city policies also dealt with the issue as an instrument in urban regeneration.

There is not necessarily a change of discourse nor indeed any suggestion that the rhetorical move would preclude other possibilities. It is rather a question of different traditions living side by side and gaining or losing prominence. In France, the concept was taken from a different point of view, one which fostered a more empirical and neutral mode of study. The phenomenon was so prevalent and was expected to become even more so, that it was considered highly preferable to analyse it thoroughly before condemning it out of hand. This is the intention of the studies on the 'structures of cultural industries'. The mid 1970s was also a time of an emergence of popular culture discourses in both Europe and America. The discourse was influenced by semiotics, cultural studies, pragmatism or post-structuralism. Cultural studies devalued the elitism of critical theory and revalued the 'popular' nature of the commercial cultures of our time. The unilinear concept of emancipation was more emphatically rejected than in previous approaches.

Among governments, the phenomenon of popular cultures and cultural industries were seen more as a general asset than a threat. It was time to both exploit them and to empirically analyse their structures. By the end of the 1980s there had emerged a whole branch of cultural economic research, which attempted to legitimise cultural activities in economic terms by emphasizing the externalities of these activities. The cultural economic strain is one facet in this discourse. It is traceable to the writings of William Baumol in the 1960s. In the 1970s the Association of Cultural Economics was established. In the 1980s, its influence became more widely felt in various investigations into the impact of, for example, festivals on the local economy. At the end of 1980s there emerged a novel rhetorical device of describing the change in economic organization as a post-Fordist one (Scott Lash and John Urry; David Harvey, Mike Featherstone).

The newest translation of terms is the discourse on creative industries, which originated in Britain in the government of 'New Labour' under the leadership of Tony Blair. The concept has become globally recognised, especially among English speaking world. The leading idea is to use the term 'cultural industries' as a rhetorical tool in political discourse in order to raise the status of cultural production. The message to the political leaders is that artistic and cultural creativity in its various sectors is something that is increasing in *economic* importance. After the demise of the old heavy industries, we could say that future economic prosperity lies in our minds and the only real capital we have is stored in our imaginations. Governments have tried to pacify the artistic establishment that this economic emphasis does not exclude the idea of the intrinsic value of art. Further, it does not necessarily mean the ruin of the education and non-profit-making sector in favour of a few highly profitable 'content creation' firms. In the British version the concept of creativity widens the range of activities included. Creativity usually connotes to aesthetic creativity and to the arts. However, in the novel emphases on creativity in public policies in various countries it connotes also to various technological, social or procedural (in labour processes) innovations or ingenious business ideas.

This rhetoric of cultural industries differs from those of popular culture. Its main concern is to analyse both the intermediating systems between the artwork (or media) and the audience, and the business carried out between the starting point and the 'end user'. Another dimension is that of cultural policy: how governments relate and should relate to one another on the 'business' of culture.

Adorno's sociology of culture was one of interpreting the mediation of society in the cultural artefacts themselves. The other German theorists make speculative distinctions in the media scene and in the critical content analyses of cultural artefacts. One might say that they are engaged in the attempt to make the invisible clearly seen. In particular, Enzensberger's analyses on media phenomena and tourism are intended to raise public perception of certain elements of the system used in mediating cultural artefacts to their audience. The intention of these German theorists was a political one: either to break the

spell of the popular or to point at the emancipatory (leftist) possibilities of the media. In the present chapter the emphasis is more on the concrete economic and policy aspects of cultural industries.

Identity politics, which is the heritage of the 1970s and to which Negt and Kluge explicitly refer in passing, and to which their account of oppositional behaviour is a background, also appears in this chapter. They are either integrated into the accounts on urban policies or the phenomenon of consumption. Whereas Enzensberger's and Negt's and Kluge's critique was a kind of institution critique of media systems - an analysis of the mediation of messages to receivers the present chapter is devoted solely to a kind of intermediating business phenomenon. The intermediation refers to the economic and policy systems and processes taking place between sender and receiver.

5.1 Cultural industries as assets in policy making

Justin Lewis (1990) declaims very powerfully against the notion that public policies (cultural policy included) can be some kind of value-free, pragmatic allocation of resources. On the contrary, this allocation involves precisely the sort of normative claims and valuations employed in, for example, justifying expenditure for various sectors of public subsidy. (Lewis 1990, 1) The ideal situation would be to provide 'something for everybody'. But because this is impossible, decision-makers have to prioritise what to subsidize and what not. The basic message of Lewis's book is the following dilemma:

> 'While this book argues that the cultural system provided by the free market alone is inadequate and limited, it acknowledges that the defence put up by the arts establishment against the free marketeers is smug and insubstantial. Why should working-class people as tax-payers, subsidize entertainment for the educated middle classes?' (ibid.)

Lewis wants to deconstruct the boundaries between 'high' and 'low'. In Lewis' opinion public support so far (in his time) has been limited to certain elitist forms that do not correspond to the tastes of the wider population. In addition, the range of this production is not necessarily diverse but has somehow solidified at a certain repertoire. At the same time he avoids becoming entangled in free market ideology itself, but instead attempts to draw up a list of values as questions which can be addressed to the free market system, for example: does it really enhance values such as diversity, innovation and so on, as is sometimes claimed. It is clear that Lewis does not accept the value systems applied by those who allocate public support. He tries to argue that there are some forms of popular culture that are also worth supporting. Then there arises the question of what should be included if we want to support and fund culture per se, rather than the arts. What does the widening definition of culture concretely contribute to the process of cultural policy decision-making? Lewis's

minimum criterion for subsidy is a notion of creativity - a criterion of cultural artefacts in general. He points out: 'The function of that object is as a self-conscious, personal, or collective expression of something. This distinguishes bingo from ballet. It also incorporates fashion and film as artistic practices.' (Lewis 1990, 5) Lewis explicitly argues in relation to his criterion that in musical procedure itself there is nothing that differentiates a pop band's composition from that of a classical musician. In the strictest sense they are both 'self-consciously creative and expressive cultural practice'. However, there are some value systems that differentiate them from each other in which he introduces Bourdieu's term 'cultural capital'. (Lewis 1990, 8)

He uses Bourdieu's term to implicitly point out that usually arts are regarded as being multi-layered and complex and popular cultures as being schematic and pre-digested. The cultural capital is supposed to be higher among the receivers of complex works. This is of course the heritage of the sociology of the arts and the tradition of aesthetics which since the 19th century has reacted to the rise of novel techniques and popular tastes by segregating the culture of good taste and 'purity' from the culture of bad taste and 'impurity'. This has been taken to be the legitimisation of subsidies for 'high culture' and 'good taste' even up until the 1990's.

According to Nicholas Garnham, to take the concept of cultural industries as key in analysing cultural activity and public cultural policy is precisely to take a stand against a whole tradition of idealist cultural analysis, e.g. the tradition mentioned above. According to Garnham this tradition (inadequately) 'defines culture as a realm separate from, and often actively opposed to, the realm of material production and economic activity.' (Garnham 1990, 154) Garnham claims that cultural policies have in fact evolved from within this tradition. It includes not only the British tradition (presented by Raymond Williams in *Culture and Society*) but also that of German Idealism. Public intervention in this area of *Geist* or intellectuality is justified because this 'culture possesses inherent values, of life enhancement or whatever, which are fundamentally opposed to and in danger of damage by commercial forces' and because 'the market cannot satisfy this need' (ibid.). This leads in Garnham's interpretation to an absurd situation in which:

> 'A further crucial component of this ideology is the special and central status attributed to the 'creative artist' whose aspiration and values, seen as stemming from some unfathomable and unquestionable source of genius, inspiration or talent, are the source of cultural value. The result of placing artists at the centre of the cultural universe has not been to shower them with gold, for artistic poverty is itself an ideologically potent element in this view of culture, but to define the policy problem as one of finding audiences for their work, rather than vice-versa. When audiences cannot be found, at least at a price and in a quantity which will support the creative activity, the market is blamed and the gap is filled by subsidy.' (Garnham 1990, 154-155)

The point of reference is the philosophical tradition that starts from Kant and his invention of disinterestedness and which continues in early Romanticism with the emphasis on genius and, later in the 19th century Aestheticism with the idea of the bohemian, poor and suffering artist. In Garnham's mind, when this

is applied to the context of the modern welfare state it creates an absurd and unbearable situation. This is, of course, also his famous reaction to the Greater London Council's cultural industries policy, which he regards as an absurd continuation of the traditional legitimisation of public support. It could also be seen as a more market-oriented (still a Keynesian) person's reaction to cultural policy as a whole, and to public support as it was practiced. These are, at least in Lewis's opinion, not natural and universal but entirely arbitrary (Lewis 1990, 20). Both of these writings are interventions in cultural policy rhetoric aiming to change the value system. It is intended as an objection to implementing the tradition of thought of 'autonomous art' into cultural policy decision-making. Lewis wants to question the following assertion: 'The types of music preferred by highly educated people with legitimate taste are given high aesthetic value and will tend to be publicly subsidized, while the 'popular' aesthetic is given less value and left to the commercial sector' (Lewis 1990, 16) This exactly leads in Garnham's opinion to the alienation problem of the decision-makers: 'For, while this tradition of autonomous art has been to reject the market, most people's cultural needs and aspirations are being, for better or worse, supplied by the market as goods and services. If one turns one's back on an analysis of that dominant cultural process, one cannot understand either the culture of our time or the challenges and opportunities which that dominant culture offers to public policy-makers'. (Garnham 1990, 155)

In these passages Lewis and Garnham argue that public policy making is alienated from the real world of what people do and like to do. The above excerpt from Garnham provides a form of context and motive for the whole discourse; in other words to try to understand the culture of our time. But that does not mean that it has to be taken as pre-given and to celebrate it without question. Rather, as Garnham states, we have to consider both its *challenges* and *opportunities*. It has to be emphasized that none of the writers mentioned in this chapter take this phenomenon of commercial cultural production as unquestionable and unproblematic. These arguments are on the one hand a 'celebration' and on the other hand a 'critique' of free market ideology. They do not think that the free market system will automatically cater for the 'real' needs of 'people', unlike the subsidized system of 'high culture'. Leaving markets to their own devices harms the values of diversity and innovation. On the other hand, the cultural industries sectors offer opportunities for public policy. A strategic intervention in its structures can diversify the scene and as a by-product partly solve the alienation problem and also bring money to the public purse. The challenge is exactly the problem of diversity - how to sustain it in the context of the pressures of market forces.

5.1.1 Urban regeneration

Lewis differentiates the Western system of cultural production into two areas: subsidized art forms and commercial cultural production. He would disagree with Garnham on the efficiency of the markets in promoting a certain set of values. The most important values Lewis points out are diversity and

innovation. The markets do not necessarily enhance diversity for the following reason:

> ''The market alone', write Mulgan and Worpole, 'for all its dynamism and concern to meet unmet wants, is incapable of sustaining diversity except on its own terms.' Taste will be at worst dictated by, at best be geared to the economics of production. This, in the age of home based entertainment, is bound to work against artistic diversity, for two basic economic reasons. Firstly, the economies of scale in the production process apply to culture as much as anything else. It is generally more profitable to produce a small range of products for a lot of people than a diverse range for a number of small groups of people. Secondly, those groups with limits on their disposable income, such as the unemployed, or with restrictions on ways of spending it, the disabled for example, will be more or less ignored by the process of cultural production. They are not, unlike other segmented markets, able to sustain the economics of production.
> The free-market culture is much more likely to diversify at the 'upper' ends of the market. Middle-class people are likely to have enough disposable income to support cultural products with a more limited appeal.' (Lewis 1990, 26)

The neither do markets necessarily enhance innovation in cultural production:

> 'The free market suppresses artistic innovation, because it is easier and cheaper to do without it. Innovation is an expensive business - it involves that area of activity known in industry as 'research and development'. This means allocating resources to activities that may spend most of the time producing little of value, in the hope that it will result in something new or something better.
> Innovation also involves taking enormous commercial risks. A business will usually invest in a formula that is tried and tested - whether it is a pop group, a play, or a film - because it will be able to predict with reasonable safety that it will be successful. Investment in something new and different is like plunging into the unknown.' (Lewis 1990, 26-27)

In Lewis' opinion these are the areas where cultural policy should turn its attention and intervene if it wants to turn the machine from subsidizing only limited 'excellence' into investing in forms that reach a larger population. Lewis emphasizes the notion of democracy in the form of 'art for all' or demystifying art to the wider population (Lewis 1990, 33). Another formulation of his notion of democracy is cultural democracy: a 'society in which people are free to come together to produce, distribute and receive the cultures they choose' (Shelton Trust, 1986 *Culture and Democracy Manifesto*, 1986 cited in Lewis 1990, 111; see also Henry 1993). The passages above point at the latter notion. Lewis regards diversity and innovation as a kind of 'grass root' phenomenon in which potentially whoever can contribute to a particular cultural industry with an innovative idea, which therefore diversifies the scene. This was the precise challenge that faced the Greater London Council's Cultural Industries Unit in the mid 1980s.

In the late 1970s the British became aware of the potential of cultural activities in urban regeneration. Cultural Quarters were established for example in Sheffield, Nottingham and Liverpool while the London area constituted the most powerful concentration of creative potentiality and activity. The Greater London Council began in 1981 to formulate a certain Industrial Strategy in which cultural industries played an important role. It was above all an

industrial policy. Simon Frith explains the reasons why culture became a target for local state investment as follows:

> 'There were two immediate reasons for the GLC's interest in cultural industries: first, the general South East shift from the manufacturing to the service sector in terms of capital investment, profit and employment; second, technological change, and particularly the development of new communications technologies. It was as apparent to public sector as to private sector economists that 'the economic sectors of leisure, tourism, broadcasting, telecommunications and retailing are amongst the fastest growing in the modern economy' and that they included some of the 'most effective jobs'. (Frith 1991, 137)

London has a special status among British cities in relation to culture. It is the most important tourism and leisure centre in Britain as well as the most prominent site for media production (broadcasting, publishing, the music industry, advertising and press). However, the cultural industry's (urban) policies were taken outside London and they continued after the demise of the GLC (Frith 1991, 138).

According to Frith, industrial cultural policy was focused on electronic goods and the media. Tourist cultural policy was focused on entertainment and heritage. Both of these were based on popular cultural production. Cosmetic cultural policy for its part focused clearly on high culture. It could be considered a kind of urban face-lift, designed to attract not just tourists but also investors and white collar employees. It was believed that new global services industries, electronics companies or computer businesses were locating themselves by reference to cultural rather than natural resources. (Frith 1991, 140-141) If the rationale is that the support system must have a new orientation and means, it has to be asked what activities exactly were supported and in what way. What was the nature of this new intervention? Frith described the actual commercial (but not necessarily profitable) branches and sectors that benefited. Franco Bianchini outlines the new political commitment to the policy of granting subsidies.

In general, the subsidies policy of the GLC was oriented towards contemporary, technology-based, popular culture in contrast to traditional support for elite culture. This included radio, television, record- and video-making. More specifically the orientation was towards small businesses: the small record labels, fringe theatre groups, small literary presses and magazines, independent film and video-makers. (Frith 1991, 143, 145) The idea that everything outside the highly subsidized canonical art forms is economically viable, commercial and even profitable proves to be somewhat dubious. Partly because of this idea 'they have tended to ignore the diverse and rich currents of popular culture which uses the new forms - the record, sound system or pirate radio station rather than the concert hall; the poster, record sleeve or cartoon rather than the painting; the dance floor rather than the ballet'. (Frith 1991, 147) Frith wants to remind us that popular culture is not always mass culture. Rather, they are on the edge of the commercial world. They represent the new voices that the industrial system might repress. (Frith 1991, 148)

The most recent form of intervention is one that adopts an investment approach as straight investment during critical phases of production or as loan finance. (ibid. 143) It differs from traditional subsidies for primary producers. The cultural industry policy is concerned with investment in the intermediate zone between artist and audience: e.g. production processes (excluding the actual inventing of a creative idea) and distribution. (Frith 1991, 143-144) Also investments can be directed to infrastructure, as in recording studios for local people to make demos and records. However, the GLC did not ignore the traditional subsidy system for certain forms of production, for example live music, theatre, poetry and dance in the South Bank complex or various festivals (Frith 1991, 147-148).

Bianchini reported on the activities of the GLC project in opening the South Bank area for open-air entertainment from 1981-1986, and in keeping the foyer of the Royal Festival Hall open outside performance hours, where visitors could experience live music and exhibitions. The South Bank policies were subsequently adopted in other parts of the city. (Bianchini 1987) According to Bianchini, in many respects traditional cultural policy was non-politicised, not least because of the arm's length principle, which organizes cultural administration such that it remains relatively independent of direct parliamentary and political influence. However, the GLC made identity politics a special objective in their support system. The central question was the representation of the various tastes of Londoners not only in cultural performances but also the representation of minorities in terms of race, gender, and sexual orientation, and disabled, elderly and youth groups. (Bianchini 1987) The GLC wanted to substitute the traditional non-politicised cultural policy with a new kind of 'cultural (identity) politics'. This would appear to be a British version of the 'proletarian' public sphere or *Gegenöffentlichkeit.*

It might sound odd that leftist politics took arguments that might traditionally be expected of a Conservative free-marketeer. However, the rationale behind this cultural industry argument is the support of minority cultural phenomena, which is traditionally ignored in cultural policy-making.

The sphere of cultural production could be described as covering three main areas: 1) the subsidized arts sector, 2) profitable cultural industries and 3) 'grass root' popular culture. However, cultural industries do not necessarily include all popular cultures. One can identify a similar pattern of thought in Adorno's claims and in the cultural industry debate above. According to his thinking, subsidies should favour the 'low', 'below' and 'in-between' areas. Large-scale cultural industries are a phenomenon of concentrated entertainment conglomerates that can suppress the creativity of large populations. In the new policies it is a question of intervening in grass root productions in order to make them viable both economically and socially. For example in the GLC's objectives the social impact was as valuable as the economic one. Lewis for his part emphasizes along with economic intervention and investment also cultural investment. In his view, an important consideration in decision-making should be to evaluate the cultural and the

aesthetic significance of a project. Quite apart from economic viability, the question is also an aesthetic one (Lewis 1990, 138-139). These good intentions have also had their reverse side of the coin. Urban policies have brought about the so-called 'gentrification problem' in which house prices have risen, increasing the general cost of living in their wake. This of course has been detrimental to the lives of ordinary city dwellers and the original ideal of fostering social and cultural life can be said to have backfired somewhat.

5.1.2 The reconsideration of cultural industries in the work of Unesco

The origins of Unesco's reconsiderations can be traced to the beginning of the 1970s. At that time the issue of cultural industries arose at several regional conferences. The first publication was the selection of articles in *Cultural Industries - A Challenge for the Future of Culture* in the year 1982. It is based on the papers presented at the meeting in Montreal in June 1980. The subject of the meeting was 'The Place and Role of Cultural Industries in the Cultural Development of Societies'. The Assistant Director General for Culture Makaminan Makagiansar pointed out the changing nature of the world in his opening address as: 'the result of the mass production of messages and symbols, giving rise to what has been termed the new industrial revolution in culture'. This statement reminds us that the context of this rhetoric - the rise of technology-based cultural production - can no longer be ignored but rather, ought to be analysed and even taken advantage of.

The importance of this area and the traditional inability or ignorance of cultural policymakers to bring it into consideration is summarised in Augustin Girard's words:

> 'Curiously, although Adorno and Horkheimer observed the phenomenon and used the term 'culture industry' as far back as 1947, and attention was drawn to cultural industries again in 1972, those responsible for cultural policies have persistently turned a blind eye to the growing importance of the products of these industries in people's leisure time. And yet they have affected children and adults alike, including the older generation; they are an intrusive, obvious phenomena of which everyone has some experience. The figures are impressive: several hours a day, in other words most of people's available leisure time, are spent in the company of cultural machines. George Bernard Shaw was right when he said that evidence is the most difficult thing in the world to see.' (Girard 1982, 25)

Girard laments the fact that despite the birth of the analysis of this phenomenon as early on as the 1940s and the awareness of its importance to people at large, those responsible for cultural policies have failed to draw conclusions from any studies conducted. In the similar vein as Lewis and Frith, Girard points out that: 'the conclusion that inevitably springs from this observation is that far more is being done to democratise and decentralize culture with the industrial products available on the market than with the 'products' subsidized by the public authorities.' (Girard 1982, 25) On the one hand, the writers applaud cultural industries for being democratic and decentralized in the sense of having a large circulation and because of the fact that they are products that

everybody knows, while on the other hand, this precise fact simultaneously constitutes a threat.

The writers use expressions such as 'mass media', 'standardization', 'international mass culture' and 'imported products' to point out that the phenomenon of cultural industries is not simply a harmless one. The contradiction is that on the one hand the mediatisation and universalisation of the world help people around the globe to understand each other, while on the other hand it is a threat to safeguarding the cultural identity of individual peoples and their maintaining control over their own development. However, it is Unesco's role to point toward this global development in reports and declarations and to make suggestions to local policymakers. In this context their suggestion is to challenge national and local policies in order to enhance 'the small-scale production to counterbalance the effects of the cultural standardization brought about by the mass media'. (Unesco 1982, 11-12) They also ask if 'international agreements could help to counterbalance the spread of standardized international mass culture' (ibid. 17). Examples of the possibility of this were the 'cultural exception' clauses in GATT negotiations in the 1990s and the critique against the inclusion of cultural production into the MAI agreement later on. However, the delicate balance is becoming more difficult to maintain. According to Unesco's writers 'protectionistic' national cultural policies should not harm the genuine international exchange of ideas and insights. Despite that, the evaluative dissociation is that domestic 'endogenous' production is the site of creativity while international production is the site of standardization and schemas.

According to Girard (1982, 31) there might be certain criteria for deciding the extent to which internationalism is harmful or not. Small language areas such as the Scandinavian countries may require protectionist approaches either as a result of a financial deficiency in supporting domestic production. Sometimes the problem is that the contents are in conflict with local cultural behaviour. Despite the fact that the Unesco's writers regard the Frankfurt School's condemnation of the culture industry as too hasty, they themselves still present elements of this critique such as the supposed detrimental impact of 'monopolistic' or 'oligopolistic' international production on various 'grass root' phenomena. The background of the Unesco's writer's arguments might be the USA-Europe controversy in film and television production - even if it is not overtly stated that the point of reference for the denunciation is the USA. Europe and the developing countries place themselves in opposition to the mass-scale entertainment business in the USA. European countries can never compete with the budgets of Hollywood. Hollywood and others may also offer morally problematical products that can differ from the values of their recipient countries. They also thrive and make profit because the language they employ is the global *lingua franca.*

The phenomenon of cultural industries is thought to be beneficial for both audiences and artists for the following reasons. As has been stated already, the worldwide media provides the opportunity to see and understand cultural,

political and social systems from geographically far-flung origins. On the other hand, rather than threatening the status of the arts, the media world provides artists and intellectuals with a vast expansion of the potential for reaching their public as well as keeping their own economies 'sustainable'. (Unesco 1982, 22).

Girard points out the benefits for the artists even more strongly:

> 'The fifth reason for endeavouring to understand and control the expansion of cultural industries is that, contrary to widespread belief, those industries will make it possible to approach the problem of the status of the artist and creative work in contemporary society on a far more constructive basis. Since the system of cultural production must inevitably keep pace with the fast-moving developments in communication, and the media and the cultural industries create a considerable demand for cultural products in a context of keener competition, the artist - whether creator or performer - will be assigned a role which paradoxically he never acquired in the system of high bourgeois culture.' (Girard 1982, 28-29)

The process of cultural industries feed both artistic creation and consumption, which influence each other and increase both economic and cultural wealth. Thus, it is not necessarily enough merely to condemn the phenomenon but to bend it to benefit us all in various ways.

Mattelart and Piemme draw attention to the translation of Adorno's and Horkheimer's term *Kulturindustrie* as being in the singular form, 'the culture industry'. This raises some issues. Is it a question of a kind of uniformity, seeing a complex phenomenon as something that can be reduced to a single logic? The answer that these writers do not take into consideration might be that Adorno and Horkheimer were conscious of the complexity of the phenomenon, its different sectors and its various approaches. However, for provocative reasons they wanted to see common features in all these elements. This is indicated in the sentence in the essay 'Résumé': 'Dies einzelnen Sparten gleichen der Struktur nach einander oder passen wenigstens ineinander. Sie ordnen sich fast lückenlos zum System'. (Adorno 1962/1977, 377) Their conclusion was to demonstrate the dynamics characterizing all these sectors which make them work so conveniently together, forming both horizontal and vertical oligopolies. However, Mattelart and Piemme claim that Adorno and Horkheimer did not necessarily refer to cultural industr*ies* (in which there are complex and diverse structures depending on the sector in question) but to mass culture (Mattelart & Piemme 1982, 52). It could be concluded that the writers above included in the term 'mass culture' the implication of inappropriate elements of standardization etc. For Adorno, mass culture was a result of the culture industry; the industrial mode of production was for him imprinted by a single logic and had as its end standardized and universalised cultural creation and reception. According to contemporary writers there are structures in cultural industry that are mass-scaled, standardized etc. But it contains other, more small-scale forms, too. Mass culture for them is something unresidually standardized and schematised. Cultural industries contain both: there are modes of production and logic that have an end that *includes* sub-cultural phenomena intended only for a small circle of enthusiasts. It is the structures and typologies of these industries that I want to turn to next.

5.2 The structures of cultural industries

Bernard Miège criticizes Adorno's and Horkheimer's account of the culture industry on three counts. Miège tends to think that Adorno's thought is limited to an idea of artistic creation as established in the previous two centuries. This inhibits him from seeing the transformations that technological innovations had brought about in the arts. According to Miège, Benjamin much more accurately perceived the aesthetic and artistic possibilities of these technologies, such as in photography and film. Miège claims that Benjamin's account of the potential of technology in the arts makes it invalid to condemn them because they are interwoven with the markets. Thus, Adorno criticized new technologies because of their intertwinement with economic considerations, which does not convince Miège:

> 'Admittedly, technologies and markets are tightly interwoven. Cinema, art photography, radio and television creation, video art, etc., all appeared and developed in a commercial form, but this is not a sufficient reason for drawing a line between art and technology, and refusing the new conditions of cultural production, such as the collective work involved in cinema or television production. If technologies unquestionably accompany the development of cultural commodities, they also open up new directions in art. The refusal of commoditisation mustn't bring in its wake a distrust for technology and artistic innovation.' (Miège 1989, 10)

In chapter 3 the reader may find certain revisions in Adorno's work. He changed his attitude especially towards (the publicly subsidized art) film in the 1960s. Furthermore, he did not see either classical art culture or modern art as unproblematic. He also did not see that classical or modern art would not be influenced by technology (keeping of course in mind his conception of technology as a sound **structure of the organization of** aesthetic material) or economics. In addition, he was modernist in his thought and did not foster the appropriation of Romantic or any previous language of art in the context of the 20th century. Benjamin for his part was not particularly concerned with the commercial applications of technological innovation. He was more given to a consideration of the avant-garde movements in film and photography. It is, however, crucial in this passage to note the triangle of art, reproduction technology and commerce. In Miège's opinion there is no reason to condemn technology in aesthetic processes just because technology is very often tightly intertwined with commercial procedures. On the contrary, the alliance of art and technology may lead to novelties and innovations. The triangle of technology, art and economy may equally lead to aesthetic innovations and the transformation of the arts as in the Benjaminian alliance of technology and art.

The second reason for his critique is the reference to 'the culture industry' as singular. It

> 'misleads one into thinking that we are faced with a unified field, where the various elements function within a single process. The phenomena - it is thought - are the same in literature, music, painting or in the radio. The same model is said to be at work, quickly levelling out the different modes of creativity and imposing common standards. There is no need to take the analysis very far to discover that this

postulate is false; more than forty years after the publication of *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, we are still faced with a heterogeneous process made of elements that, quite obviously, do not belong to the same field or, at least differ greatly. The differences between the international production of television series or video clips on the one hand, and contemporary literary creation or painting on the other, prevail over their similarities from the point of view of the artists' working conditions as much as from the way the products are valorised or appropriated by the classes that are to consume them. The cultural industries are complex, and an analysis must bring out the reasons for this diversity.' (ibid.)

As I wrote in the previous section, it is a question of different points of view. On the one hand, we really can see common features in all the various sectors of cultural industry (as, by the way, Scott Lash and John Urry (1994) do in their analysis which will be presented later on). On the other hand, we can emphasize the differences and diverse logics in various sectors. It is not evident that Adorno and Horkheimer would not have seen these differences. They only emphasized the common features. It was their rhetorical device to enter the discussion and derail the optimism they encountered underpinning the subject. It was also their starting point, at a rather hypothetical level, to analyse the connection between mode of production and content. They were not interested in studying the structures of these various branches as such but rather the influence of efficient economic modes of production in banalising the contents of cultural works. For provocative reasons they emphasized the common denominators of these various sectors. Claims of the complexity of these industries are a common way of compromising older critical theory e.g. in studies of recording industries. There is a built-in assumption that the complexity and multiplicity of types of capital valorisation and business logics somehow proves that there is also diversity in the contents. As a hypothetical statement this does not hold with the more exact analysis of the contents of these *various* industries. The resorting to an emphasis of variety in these industries is, of course, a rhetorical device in compromising the critical concept of the culture industry. Miège also refers to the variation in reception. This is in congruence with various audience studies in which reception models are explicated to relate to class or identity profiles.

The writers presented in this chapter all share the previous notion that cultural industries are complex. It is my task in this chapter to present their analyses concerning this complexity and diversity. In relation to previous sections these writers take it for granted that there *is* diversity in the markets despite the globalisation, universalisation and standardization of culture. These writers analyse the structures of cultural industries and do not present policy recommendations as do the writers cited in the previous passages in this chapter.

It is partly due to the audience reaction that the whole enterprise of the cultural sector is marked by uncertainty. Miège's point is that Adorno and Horkheimer did not take this into consideration:

'Lastly, the authors of the *Dialektik der Aufklärung* paradoxically took a greater interest in markets and in commodities than in the industry. More precisely, they reduced it to its technical components and to serialisation. They hardly perceived

that this industrialisation of art should be analysed as a process of capital valorisation adapting to new fields with specific conditions. If capital is trying to use cultural production as a source of profit - historically first in the U.S, later in Europe, but in any case more intensively today - this process does meet with resistances and limitations. These limitations - and everything points in this direction - are structurally-based and linked as much to the specificities of creativity as to those of the reception and consumption of art. The fact that Adorno and Horkheimer did not take into account this fundamental aspect of the industrialized production of culture prevented them from thinking in terms of its unequal, or even uncertain, development in some sectors.' (ibid. 11)

Essentially, the error here was a certain conviction of Adorno and Horkheimer that if a piece of music is standardized, individualized and marketed, its success must be guaranteed. And that these procedures are made to guarantee success. This is in Miège's opinion a misunderstanding. Cultural commodity is always marked by the uncertainty of its economic success. However, it is Miège's and others' misunderstanding that Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt School would not have realized this. Their point of view was to emphasise the attempt to manage this uncertainty precisely by banalising the contents to the extent that it would attract as large an audience as possible and to offend or disturb as few as possible. Another way to manage this uncertainty was of course the 'gatekeeping process' of monopoly building. Industrialisation is also in Miège's conception an attempt to take into consideration the uncertainty of the cultural enterprise. It leads to special arrangements in the process in order to manage this uncertainty. The difference in opinions on industry lies in the idea that, for Adorno, securing the success of a production must be undertaken 'from above' (in which even individual features cannot be taken as 'real') whereas for Miège it seems to be undertaken 'from below', by catering to the various taste cultures. This dissociation can be deconstructed by acknowledging that the driving force of mass culture is the individual in Adorno's opinion and, in particular, the individual's personal fear of exclusion or need to identify with something. In the Résumé essay he indicates the possibility that the number of unsuccessful investments is relatively high. This possibility of uncertainty is, however, much more programmatically presented in the accounts presented in this chapter. The notion stems from Anglo-Saxon market economics in which an economic investment is always, in every sector of industry, regarded as risk. It can bring monetary gains or losses and the entrepreneur is responsible for taking and bearing this risk.

The account above outlines in general terms the objection to critical theory by discussants of cultural industries. Their points are firstly the potential of technologies to produce aesthetic novelties even if intertwined with economic considerations. Secondly, the diverse character of various kinds of industries is emphasized in contrast to Adorno's insistence of its illusoriness. Thirdly, the uncertainty of economic investment is emphasized along with the ways of managing it.

5.2.1 Typologies of various sectors

Augustin Girard shares with Miège the opinion that cultural industries as a phenomenon should not be thought as spheres of activities marked by a single logic or entity:

> 'Cultural industries must on no account, then, be considered as a single entity but must be broken down by sectors. The breakdown must be done in two ways, making the distinction on the one hand between the various stages in the production and marketing process and on the other, as these various stages are not the same in each of the media, between the media themselves, each of which is governed by a production and marketing rationale of its own.' (Girard 1982, 33)

We can anticipate in this passage that it is no longer a question of analysing products or consumption - the opposite ends of the cultural endeavour. Rather, it is a question of what takes place in between. There is much more at stake in cultural production processes than simply the creation of a single work for anonymous consumers. This intermediating system is mostly ignored but worth researching. Deconstructing the 'single entity' begins in analysing the differentiated steps from artist to audience. This indicates the concept of a 'value chain', a vertical difference between enterprises. The writers presented in this chapter are trying to deconstruct the singularity of the culture industry by also horizontally differentiating various media types from each other.

Miège constructs his own model of differing *processes* in various media types. The criteria for distinctions are based on the possibility of reproducibility and the nature of the contribution of artists and technicians. The relative shares of these give an implication of the conditions of the capital valorisation of the sector. The construction of a prototype by an artist is the most expensive phase whereas selling the reproduction of the prototype provides the return on the investment. Miège outlines three competitive logics: the logic of publishing (such as books, records, prints); the logic of flow (broadcasting media); and the logic of the written press (printed media). The logic of publishing is reproducing the prototype and selling the copies directly to consumers. The logic of flow requires the constant creation of audience. In commercial broadcasting this takes place by attracting viewers for the advertisers who are the financiers of the broadcasting firms. In public service broadcasting the broadcaster must somehow legitimate the institutional fund or licence fee payments gathered from the receivers. The logic of the written press combines these logics. (Miège 1989, 12)

The logic of the valorisation of capital is different in the following differing types. In the publishing industry one has to create a repertoire of products in order to attract as large a population as possible. In the flow of audiovisual media the task is to construct a programming policy in order to create loyalty to the channel in question. In the written press one has to combine these strategies mentioned above within the publishers of newspapers and magazines. The crucial asset of the press is the fact that a newspaper and magazine obsoletes rapidly and one is forced to buy a new one regularly. The situation is the same in audiovisual broadcasting in terms of what constitutes

news and documentary. Entertainment programming must use tricks to entice viewers and maintain loyalty to the channel. The media critics imply that the whole mode of production of television, its technical medium and its financial base, forces news, reportage and documentary to assimilate the values of entertainment. The requirement of real time, speed and competition in entertainment programming and commercial channels decreases the relevance and depth of analysis of news reportage not to mention its ability to increase the civilized understanding of the world among the public. (Bourdieu 1999; Ramonet 1999)

Miège also differentiates various types of *products*. This typology is in Miège's opinion essential in order to distinguish between industrialized capitalist production and small-scale commercial production. The first type includes reproducible products not directly integrating the work of artists (such as sound and visual reproduction equipment). The second type includes products that are reproducible and require the participation of cultural workers. They are the 'heart' of cultural commodities, and the sectors I will later term the 'classical' ones of cultural industries (i.e. published products, film and television programmes). They are also the battlefield of governmental and commercial strategies with no clear answers on which one would better enhance them. The third type includes semi-reproducible products such as prints, art handicrafts or limited-edition books. In this type some amount of reproducibility is required but it may be limited due to technical considerations (as in the case of lithography) or cultural reasons (to increase the use and prestige value and along with it the future economic value) (Miège 1989, 42-43). Here the criterion for the differentiation of various types is reproducibility, which increases as creative input decreases. The crossing point is reflected in the second type of products which can be classified as the core of both cultural commodities and industries. The processes of publishing, flow and the press are included in the second type.

Girard outlines a similar 'logic' for differentiating the sectors. He terms the production of books, art reproductions and records as *publishing industries*. In these cases a small-scale creative activity is subsequently reproduced in a large number of copies by means of industrial processes. In *programming industries* the actual act of creating something implies from the outset a substantial industrial input (cinema, television). Photograph is an object produced with technological apparatus to begin with and has a possibility to be reproduced infinitely. (Girard 1982, 32). The logic is three-phased, starting from the creative act which is then multiplied in reproduction and finally ending in the sector in which technology is the first and dominant factor. In Miège's approach this classification includes only publishing and flow logic which Girard terms as 'programme industries'. These are disinterested structural analyses of logics in valorising capital in cultural industries and not a policy view favouring one logic against the other.

In Lash's and Urry's account we meet a different point of view in which the definition is potentially much broader. The change in the point of view must

be explained using the overall theme of their book *Economies of Signs and Space.* It concerns the change in industrial structures which are characterized by the thesis of post-Fordism which implies a situation of post-industrialism. Their book is a part of a series of accounts on post-industrialism published at the turn of 1980s and 1990s (others would include, for example, David Harvey, Mike Featherstone). Their book deals with the globalisation of economies in general and cultural economies in particular as representative of changed structures. Thus, they want to point out that the global flow of information reaches the aesthetic sphere, too.

> 'We concentrate in this chapter on the flows of other sorts of symbols, other forms of communication through aesthetic symbols, images, sounds and narratives. Production in the culture industries is design-intensive. We suggest a second, aesthetic dimension to information and communication structures, of the flow not of cognitive symbols or information but of aesthetic symbols. These structures also contain spaces for the acquisition of symbol-processing capacities, incorporating not just information-processing, but also the processing (or better the interpreting) of aesthetic symbols.' (Lash & Urry 1994, 112)

This is the most general definition of cultural industries so far: aesthetic symbols, in image, sound and narrative. It includes the full range of cultural production from the advertisement poster to Picasso, from the Michael Jackson pop song to orgel music composed by e. g. Olivier Messiaen, from Harlequin romances to Joyce and Proust. The most crucial criterion when deciding what culture industries constitute is the following: 'The concluding section examines the implication of the circulation of the objects of the culture industry as *branded*, circulating *intellectual property.*' (Lash & Urry 1994, 113, emphases mine) In analysing industrial processes the writers have to differentiate cultural products from other categories of product. The criteria are symbolic meaning, implying brand (symbolic value for the customer) along with some degree of intellectual content and property. However, at a more practical level the writers concentrate in their analysis of cultural industries in the most classical sectors. In this they are in line with the previous writers. They analyse book publishing, cinema, the recording industry and television. Their contribution is that the production systems of these sectors are imprinted by so-called 'flexible specialization'. They seek to trace the vertical disintegration of this production. (Lash & Urry 1994, 112) This also provides structural analysis from a fresher perspective than that of Miège and Girard.

As an economist, Richard Caves introduces a new term, '*creative* industry'. In his account, the range of reference differs from those previously put forward, in that he does not necessarily require the element of reproducibility:

> [in analyses of economists] 'One [factor] has been largely missed, however, - the 'creative' industries supplying goods and services that we broadly associate with cultural, artistic, or simply entertainment value. They include book and magazine publishing, the visual arts (painting, sculpture), the performing arts (theatre, opera, concerts, dance), sound recordings, cinema and TV films, even fashion and toys and games. So far, economists exploring this area have mainly focused on public subsidy for the elite performing arts.' (Caves 2000, 1)

Creative and performing arts as well as book publishing, the recording industry, film and TV are included in the definition of creative industries. Caves' point is to show that there are certain intermediating procedures between artist and audience in each of these sectors of creative art:

> 'Artists of all types engage in creative processes and tasks that come to completion only with the collaboration of 'humdrum' (or 'ordinary') partners, and perhaps of other artists as well. The painter needs an art dealer, the novelist the publisher. The cinema film requires a number of actors, a director, screenwriter, cinematographer, production designer, make-up specialist, and many others who see themselves in some measure as artists (along with teamsters and accountants, who likely do not). These collaborations rest on deals and contracts - perhaps of the 'handshake' variety, perhaps elaborately drawn.' (Caves 2000, 1)

Caves' book addresses these contracts as they exist either in ongoing organizations or one-off deals. In the above passage there is an implicit reference to the fact that creative processes take place in classical cultural industry sectors, too, and not only in creative arts. Conversely, creative artists must also have contracts and deals and 'routine' activities around their creative work. The concept of creativity implies both these aspects and is an explanation for Caves' renaming of these industries.

5.2.2 Criteria for defining

In the passages above we find certain minimum criteria for defining cultural industries. Lash and Urry point out that cultural industries are about *aesthetic symbols* in contrast to solely cognitive symbols. They also require the birth of *intellectual property*. It is the basis for immaterial rights - intellectual, immaterial ideas that can be materialized on one platform or another. Intellectual property is a prerequisite of a cultural commodity (we can of course question whether intellectual property is more of a cognitive or aesthetic symbol). Intellectual property seems to be the most profound criterion and aesthetic symbolism is a kind of 'controlling question'.

When speaking about *cultural* industry we face the perhaps impossible task of defining the word 'culture'. While in the previous chapter there was a broader definition of culture with the renaming of the phenomenon as consciousness, in this chapter it is mostly limited to aesthetic activities. However, David Throsby gives a very concise and informative account on this issue in his book *Economics and Culture* (2001, 3-4). It suffices to draw very closely defined limits. With culture I refer in this context to aesthetic activities (including popular cultures) and the issue known as 'the aesthetisation of everyday life' (this comes about due to the loading of commodities with aesthetic meanings and the use of them to construct personal identities in everyday life). Throsby presents some criteria to be used in specifying cultural activities, which greatly resemble those of Lash and Urry:

> 'The second definition of 'culture' has a more functional orientation, denoting certain activities that are undertaken by people, and the products of those activities, which have to do with the intellectual, moral and artistic aspects of human life. 'Culture' in this sense relates to activities drawing upon the enlightenment and education of the

mind rather than the acquisition of purely technical or vocational skills. In such usage, the word is more likely to occur as an adjective than as a noun, as in 'cultural goods', 'cultural institutions', 'cultural industries' or the 'cultural sector of the economy'. To give this second definition more precision, let us propose that the connotation contained in this usage of the word 'culture' can be deemed to derive from certain more or less objectively definable characteristics of the activities concerned. Three such characteristics are suggested. They are:
* that the activities concerned involve some form of *creativity* in their production
* that they are concerned with the generation and communication of *symbolic meaning*, and
* that their output embodies, at least potentially, some form of *intellectual property*. (Throsby 2001, 4; emphases mine)

Of course, one can begin to problematise the concepts of creativity, symbolic meaning and intellectual property. However, a standard way of understanding them together can at least ensure their relation to artistic and aesthetic activities. According to these criteria, creative and performing arts cannot be excluded from the area of cultural or creative industries. There is room for this in Lash's and Urry's conception, even though they limit their concrete analysis to the classical sectors of cultural industries.

Caves and Throsby undertake to widen the definition, though in a different manner. Caves' approach is to examine the drawing up of contracts both in creative and performing arts. Throsby's method is to employ an industrial economic analysis to creative and especially performing arts. More classical and more limiting criteria we find in Unesco's reports and Garnham's writings:

'Generally speaking, a cultural industry is held to exist when cultural goods and services are *produced, reproduced, stored or distributed on industrial and commercial lines*, that is to say *on a large scale* and in accordance *with a strategy based on economic considerations* rather than any concern for cultural development.
There are various types of cultural industry, for example, those in which *a created work*, still in most cases the work of a craftsman, *is reproduced on a large scale with the use of machines and by industrial processes*. Cases in point are gramophone records, books and art reproductions.' (Unesco 1982, 21; emphases mine)

The most important criteria that differ greatly from the previous ones are reproducibility, scale and economic considerations. There is a notion that the creation of a single idea is the basis of reproduction, but this can be counted as cultural industry only after the creation phase when the work enters the reproduction and intermediating system. Garnham sets similar boundaries:

An analysis of culture structured around the concept of the cultural industries, on the other hand, directs our attention precisely at the dominant *private market sector*. It sees culture, defined as the *production and circulation of symbolic meaning*, as a *material process of production and exchange*, part of, and in significant ways determined by, the wider economic processes of society with which it shares many common features.
Thus, as a descriptive term, 'cultural industries' refers to those institutions in our society which employ the characteristic modes of production and organization of *industrial corporations to produce and disseminate symbols in the form of cultural goods and services*, generally, although not exclusively, as commodities. (Garnham 1990, 155-156) These (cultural goods as commodities) include newspapers, periodical and book publishing, record companies, music publishers, commercial sports organizations, etc. In all these cultural processes, we characteristically find at some point the use of *capital-intensive, technological means of mass production and distribution*, highly

developed *divisions of labour* and hierarchical modes of managerial organization, with the goal, if not of *profit maximization*, at least of *efficiency*. I refer to this as a descriptive use of the term 'cultural industries' because it describes characteristics common to the cultural process in all industrial societies, whether capitalist or socialist. (Garnham 1990, 156-157; emphases mine)

The criterion might be as broad as in Lash's and Urry's, Caves's or Throsby's accounts: symbolic meaning. However, there are 'controlling questions' including the private sector, the free market, industrial corporations, capital-intensiveness, material process, mass production, division of labour, profit maximization or efficiency. These specifications might also appear in Lash's and Urry's account because they end up referring to similar sectors to those identified by Garnham.

Garnham and others use the concept descriptively in pointing at the sectors of the field, their similarities or differences and their structures of concentration or diversification. This descriptive use takes them as granted despite protestations at their existence. A normative use of the concept in this context points at the speculation as to what kind of measure is needed in order to ameliorate the situation, for example from the point of view of diversification. It is also evident in this section that cultural industries cannot live without viable creative ideas and deeds. This is the core of all cultural commodification.

5.2.3 The creative core

Within cultural industries, creativity and serialization (or reproduction) are reverse sides of the same coin: the one cannot be without the other. Miège emphasises the importance of the creative idea: 'The imprint of the artist must remain visible to the user: the product, even if it is reproduced in thousands of copies, must retain traces of the work of the artist who conceived it.' (Miège 1989, 25-26) He continues: 'In our society, in fact, cultural products must continue to be marked by the stamp of the unique, of genius, in order to be standardized: the star system and the industrial organization of Hollywood are indissolubly linked.' (Miège 1989, 29)

Even accepting that cultural industries cannot exist without creative ideas, Lash and Urry emphasize the reverse side: that neither can exist without some kind of packaging of these ideas in order to possess intellectual property: '[f]irms can only exploit or make money from cultural object, when they have juridically converted into intellectual property. Only when firms are able to exclude other entrepreneurs and consumers from rights to the use of cultural object can the culture industry survive.' (Lash & Urry 1994, 134) They also emphasize that even if in culture industries also creative processes are sometimes outsourced (in contrast to other industries that outsource usually support functions and manufacture) they are the *core* of the culture industries. It is worth asking what then remains if creative work is disintegrated.

Lash and Urry emphasize the conversion of objects and ideas into exchangeable and juridically legitimate property of the originator. They also

remind us, in the context of the post-Fordist thesis within contemporary industries, that the core of these procedures is still creativity, ideas and symbolic meaning.

The obverse of this is the position taken by Miège when he postulates that even in unique products and performances there are certain economic, even capitalist, tendencies. He does not, for example, regard live musical comedy as a cultural industry because it does not fill the reproducibility criterion. But it does meet the criterion of the capitalist mode of production. (Miège 1989, 40) Even if we employ reproducibility as the criterion of the cultural industry, unique artworks nevertheless contain economic repercussions: even cultural labour is productive, adding monetary value to the creator and intermediaries. This productivity has the potential to be enormous.

> 'In contemporary societies, it is no longer possible to consider artistic and cultural production as if it depended essentially on patronage or small commercial production. Just as it is no longer possible to adapt the ideas of Adorno and the Frankfurt School and claim that authentic art is totally foreign to the industrialization of culture, no matter how fruitful their ideas may be in other respects.' (Miège 1989, 41)

However, in Adorno's thought, creative and authentic art is in no way unreachable by economic forces. Adorno regarded artworks as commodities even if they are at the same time autonomous 'creatures'. His notion of the commodification of art is highly complex and cannot be reduced to mere economic factors. On the other hand, one may read in chapter 3 that authentic art even in the very early phases of capitalism is touched and contaminated by industrial processes. Furthermore, modern art is in no safer position in this regard. There is the possibility of recuperation in which even the most radical avant-garde work turns into an institution or a bestseller. A cynical interpretation of the interplay of co-working and creativity is, of course, the situation which Adorno described as the interplay of standard and pseudo-individuality. In the *Filmtransparente* essay he indicates that true artistic and aesthetic self-expression may be possible through a kind of 'auteur mode' of production.

5.2.4 Nothing is as certain as the uncertain

Even if there is a strong imprint of creativity and originality it does not guarantee great success:

> 'The *uncertainty* (or the instability) of the use values created or taken over by cultural commodities is a specific feature of the cultural industries.' (Miège 1989, 43)

The reason for uncertainty is not one of a deficiency in marketing techniques. In some cases, neither refined nor aggressive marketing can bring the money home. In Miège's opinion it is not because of the arbitrary nature of artistic taste, which would become a version of the 'rational consumer' theory in artistic study. Taste alone does not necessarily generate revenue. The problem is the difficulty in mastering the conditions of the valorisation of the (cultural)

products. It is not just the nature of the product in question but its nature in the context of other commodities. In the following passages it is referred to in the context of being surrounded by and in competition with other consumer items. They are much more predictable because the majority are considered necessities whereas cultural products are regarded as 'unnecessary' or 'luxury' items. Thus, branding, which works with other commodities does not help in the cultural sector.

> 'Even if the *cultural product* is a marketable item from the point of view of its promotion and distribution and the methods used to sell it, it *is not like other goods, and the laws of capital accumulation do not operate in the same way as elsewhere when culture is at issue.* This has been amply demonstrated by historical analyses of the record and film markets.' (Girard 1982, 37; emphases mine)

One possible approach to manage this uncertainty is to feed the production process in ever smaller cycles hoping that there may be hits among flops. In this case, the cutting short of 'pulp' literature, popular summertime hits or film distribution periods can produce enormous waste. In this regard, the resources available to a firm, including its advertising budget are of no help. Neither is branding, because the nature of cultural products differs from that of other consumer items (*Bond* and *Star Wars* films perhaps excluded):

> 'Such a regularity of flops does not exist in other economic sectors; the use of 'brand names', [as employed by] automobile or detergent manufacturers, is unsatisfactory in this area.' (Miège 1989, 43-44)

Another possibility is to study carefully beforehand the receptivity of audiences and to test a motion picture, for example, with a sample audience before a firm invests its money in an overly risky enterprise. However, Caves claims that this does not necessarily help, either:

> 'There is great uncertainty about how consumers will value a newly produced creative product, short of actually producing the good and placing it before them. It might meet acclaim and bring in revenue far exceeding its cost of production, or it might find few customers who place any positive value on it. If the creative product is costly to produce (a movie, rather than a painting), producers will try however they can to learn whether buyers' valuations will be high or low, before all of the product's costs have been incurred. *Research and pre-testing are largely ineffective, however, because a creative product's success can seldom be explained even ex post by the satisfaction of some pre-existing need.* The problem worsens when the costs are sunk, as they usually are, and cannot be retrieved once a disaster is evident. This property implies that the risk associated with any given creative product is high, and that ways of allocating or sharing it will be important for the organization of production. This is what one Hollywood observer called the *nobody knows* property[3].' (Caves 2000, 3; emphasis mine)

Even if one can find out what tastes a certain group of individuals have, whether by testing or researching, with this knowledge one still cannot predict or subsequently explain the actual success or failure. With a list of the sample

---

[3]   Caves named this property in honour of William Goldman's observation concerning the motion picture industry: 'Nobody Knows Anything'. (William Goldman: *Adventures in the Screen Trade: A Personal View of Hollywood and Screenwriting* 1984, 39; cited in Caves 2000, 371)

group's 'preferences' available, even a movie tailored to fit these requirements is still on very thin ice before the actual situation at the box office becomes known. Caves continues his argument in the following note: '…producers and executives know a great deal about what has succeeded commercially in the past and constantly seek to extrapolate that knowledge to new projects. But their ability to predict at an early stage the commercial success of a new film project is almost nonexistent.' (Caves 2000, 371). He also gives a curious example of the inability of research to recognise opportunities for successes: 'When the CBS network was approached with the idea of a puppet show with various animal characters, the network responded that its research division had established that there was no demand for a program hosted by a frog. Kermit thus sprang directly into independent syndication.' (David F. Prindle 1993: *Risky Business: The Political Economy of Hollywood,* p. 34; cited in Caves 2000, 371)

In contrast, there may be big budget films intended as blockbusters that flop disastrously. Caves calls them 'Ten-Ton Turkeys'[4] (Caves 2000, 136-143). For several reasons producers try to complete the work. Among them is a quality that Caves calls *art for art's sake.* It is the usual situation that producers care about their enterprise and believe in it whatever the 'predictions' say. Not the least of these reasons is the fact that it is rational to complete it precisely because of the uncertainty: 'Hesitate, and a moderate loss is assured. Carry on, and face chances of either a heroic victory or a catastrophic loss' (Caves 2000, 138). Whether in deciding to give up or continue - in both cases the filmmaker is held responsible, but they may equally prove to be a hero: 'To write off is to concede misjudgement in letting the project get that far, whereas if the project goes to completion and fails, the filmmaker is at fault. Besides, it might still succeed: *nobody knows.* (Caves 2000, 142)

Thus, in some cases the evidence of a potential failure is clearly visible, but it may still be more rational to continue the production. Sometimes seemingly marginal and unsuccessful ideas prove to be great successes. It is also rational to take into account controversies and marginalities because, once again, 'you never know'. This is, in conclusion, perhaps the only way to manage the uncertainty: to create a repertoire consisting both of anticipated marginality and best-selling works:

> 'The uncertain character of cultural use-values which stems from the extreme difficulty encountered by the producer in mastering the conditions of valorisation for each of the manufactured products...In other words, *a record producer cannot rigorously predict* whether a certain song is going to become the hit of the season, but having *spread his risk by offering a list,* he knows that he has a much better chance for success.' (Miège 1989, 26; emphases mine)

Even if one researches the market in an attempt to uncover certain consumer 'segments' and to offer different products to different audience groups, the consumer's choices still cannot be predicted. Despite the impossibility of the prediction, it is nevertheless rational to cater for possible different audience

---

[4]   Examples might be Tom Wolfe's *The Bonfire of the Vanities* or Michael Cimino's *Heaven's Gate.* (Caves 2000, 138)

groups and to offer a list or repertoire rather than isolated products. The losses are thus financed by the successes.

> 'The third key characteristic of the cultural commodity lies in the nature of its use-values. These have proved difficult if not impossible to pin down in any precise terms, and demand for them appears to be similarly volatile. As I have already remarked, culture is above all the sphere for the expression of difference. Indeed, some analysts would claim that cultural goods are pure positional goods, their use-value being as markers of social and individual difference. While this aspect of culture merits much deeper and more extended analysis, it is only necessary here to draw one key conclusion, namely that *demand for any single cultural product is impossible to predict.* Thus the cultural industries, if they are to establish a stable market, are forced to create a relationship with an audience or public to whom they *offer not a single cultural good, but a cultural repertoire across which the risks can be spread.* (Garnham 1990, 161; emphases mine)

Repertoire-building is a long-established method of managing publishing industries, which could be implemented in other sectors and even to state subsidy policies. From the classical economics point of view absolutely all investments contain risk. The shortcoming of this economic approach, as with the above analyses, is that economically 'high-risk' creativity is not recognised for its potential to deconstruct the attempts to control and plan our world and all that takes place within it. Rather, the risk must be managed in order to minimize it as much as possible.

Another shortcoming is that the risk is limited to purely monetary loss or gain. It ignores the potential human risks which the 'development' of economic freedom *may (or may not)* bring about. Aesthetic, political or social risks are not taken into account. The warning of the Frankfurt School **was** that economic, technological or scientific (or a combination of these) success may bring about as their reverse side human suffering. This is description that illuminates the blind spot of fashionable neoclassical economics even today. In the rhetoric of risk and the so-called 10 % rule in which, for example, one record out of 10 finances the rest there is a built-in assumption that the 10 % is standard and the rest is somehow radical or more creative. However, this statement as such does not tell us anything of the contents and style of these records. In addition, where the repertoire policies may contain controversies the statement as such does not bear witness to it.

5.2.5 Teamwork and intermediaries

Another approach to managing the uncertainty might be to offer tasks within certain phases of the production process to specialized professionals, notwithstanding that this can make it difficult for the artist to control the process. There may be weak links and possible causes for loss in this process. This having been said, cultural production, other than the process of a single creative artist, is necessarily teamwork involving a crew of professionals. Miège believes that the members of the crew are also essential in the creation, in that they intervene and their fingerprints are visible in the final product. Miège refers to them as 'coordinating agents'. They may be technical coordinators

such as sound engineers, record pressers, film cutting professionals or printers. The economic coordinators include, for example, marketing personnel, producers, accountants. Between the author and industries there are also several artistic coordinators including film directors, artists and repertoire professionals, layout artists, producers of lists, artistic directors, and music arrangers. In Miège's opinion they are not simply intermediaries but they 'intervene in the very conception of the product'. However, it should be noted that the distinction between different professionals is also arbitrary because they form a kind of collective labour in constructing a list of works or a single work. They all leave their imprint in the final work. Creativity also exists in the phases of processing the creative idea. The originator and artist is not the sole owner of the image of the outcome. (Miège 1989, 28-29).

The idea of teamwork (which Caves calls 'motley crew property') has to be differentiated from the idea of intermediaries. The working team or the crew takes responsibility for the processing of a single project. Intermediaries can include specialized institutions, firms or freelance professionals who together cater for several projects and different productions, for example undertaking the marketing, promotion, distribution, contract-forming, agenting and accounting. In general, they are the links between the production team and the audience. Caves' point is that these procedures take place in every sector of the creative industries. Even if the painter works alone in his atelier s/he may need a gallerist, or the services of an accountant or a lawyer. This phenomenon of 'vertical disintegration' (a 'post-Fordist' way of organizing production processes visible in cultural industries) has increased the markets for small intermediating or team-working firms.

5.2.6 Vertical disintegration

In Caves' work vertical disintegration denotes the market situation as it exists especially in the film industry. The term spans film production and its intermediaries: distributors and exhibitors. Vertical integration in this context concerns one firm owning the whole value chain from production to exhibition. It owns different procedures vertically. In contrast, horizontal integration would be a monopoly or oligopoly situation in which one firm owns, for example, a chain of theatres. Caves attributes the origin of the disintegration process to the *Paramount* decision in the 1940s in which an antitrust case against seven major studios in 1948 ended the studios' ownership of theatres and changed the terms under which distributors could market films to exhibitors. The studios' ownership of theatres had brought about an effective barrier to the entry of new studios or independent producers into the making of quality films. On the one hand this was due to 'block booking' in which an exhibitor was offered a year's package of a studio's films on an all-or-nothing basis. On the other hand, the major studios implemented a kind of price discrimination in which the larger and better-located 'first-run' theatres got the well-promoted film first and after a period of time the neighbouring theatres received it at lower prices. This made the competition situation for 'second-run' theatres and

independent film producers extremely difficult. The *Paramount* decision lowered the entry barriers into the industry and undermined the basis for oligopolistic behaviour among the major theatre-owning studios. (Caves 2000, 93)

This decision thus opened the market for new entrants, - especially independent producers and filmmakers. However, according to Caves, the fact that the industry would open up to competing independent filmmakers was no particular threat, because the studios' entrenched distribution systems survived unchanged. (ibid.) A counter-force to this is that competing distributors could emerge, too: 'While the old studios continued to distribute many films, small competitors did emerge capable of distributing 'small' films in limited geographic markets. The major studios also remained important agents for financing film production, but they were not the only vehicle for films with smaller budgets.' (Caves 2000, 96)

Vertical disintegration causes something called flexible specialization - a phenomenon of organizing production processes in a novel way in which: 'What replaced film production within the dismantled studios was a transformed system sometimes called 'flexible specialization', with most inputs required to produce a film coming together only in a one-shot deal. These inputs are selected by an entrepreneurial coordinator (usually the producer) for their suitability to the project's needs and their availability at the right time.' (Caves 2000, 95). In this situation, the producer seems to be the sole person 'in-house' who employs and retains the crew using his/her contacts in the market. In addition, the crew seeks out different opportunities in different projects. Finally, not only creative workers such as actors are hired in a one-shot deal but this way of organizing opens the market to a variety of service firms. These service firms are made up of rental studios, properties firms, editing, lighting, recording/sound, film processing, market research and artists' representatives (agencies) (ibid. 96-97).

Lash and Urry describe this phenomenon of outsourcing as the post-Fordist organization of industry.

> 'The vertically integrated firm began to appear in the inter-war period in British publishing, initially with functional differentiation of production departments from commissioning editors...The shift to post-Fordism via vertical disintegration is no less complex and variable a matter than the development of Fordism. In some cases, such as cinema, the flexible specialization thesis is valid. Here Storper and Christopherson (1987) have argued that the decline of mass consumption of cinema in the USA, with the introduction of television from the late 1940s, created a situation in which transaction costs were minimized through disintegration of cinematic production. That is, given that a smaller batch of films was going to be made, it became less expensive to reduce overheads and hire labour and facilities out of house rather than integrate them into hierarchies.' (Lash & Urry 1994, 114)

In cultural industries the decline of mass movie consumption has led to flexibility via disintegration of first, creative, 'above-the-line' or 'upstream' labour (stars, directors, writers and producers) and then also technical 'downstream' labour. This has brought with it a transaction-rich nexus of markets of small firms. (ibid.)

Lash and Urry and their research team have studied these post-Fordist organization patterns in various cultural industries: publishing, television and the recording industry. It also soon becomes clear that outsourcing takes place under a slightly different logic in different industries. In publishing the outsourcing takes place merely in the downstream activities: retailing, design and copy-editing. (ibid. 116). In the television industry's 'flow model' the actual programming takes place in-house, but programmes are created by several independent production firms. In this it actually starts to resemble the 'publishing model' in commissioning production companies. As a fine example they take the British Channel **Four** which outsourced all of its programming to various production companies. They regard the ethos of programming being imaginative and politically conscious which takes into account the 'minor narratives' of **our** time. (Lash & Urry 1994, 119)

The recording industry as such is also a kind of publishing process. In this industry outsourcing includes almost all creative work. Artists and 'crew workers' earn their incomes as royalties from different firms. Before the 1960s, major British record companies carried out most functions in-house. Musicians, producers and A&R men were hired as wageworkers. The songwriter worked in close association with the company. The mid 1960s brought about the phenomenon of the 'group' in which pop bands began to write, produce and record their own music. This was a process of creating a specific character of a single band, which was not necessarily dependent on a particular recording company. This led to the situation in which writers or producers worked for a band rather than a firm and to the situation in which both creative workers and various other professionals earn their incomes as royalties. (Lash & Urry 1994, 119-120).

From a philosophical point of view, even if these ideas form a disinterested analysis of industrial structures and do not intend to favour one interpretation against the other as the discussants of cultural policies do; there is sympathy towards 'true competition' and against the 'oligopolistic situation'. On the other hand, the intention of the writers is to deconstruct the myth of genius contained in the older art discourse. They try to show that there is much more taking place in the arts and culture sectors than just the work by a creative artist on the wall, on the record shelf of the private consumer, in a museum or gallery, or in the music library. The actual record or painting is only the visible tip of the iceberg. There is much more that is not necessarily visible to the ordinary consumer of culture but which strongly influences the options s/he has to 'consume'.

The actual existence of the dialectic between major and small is entirely a historical phenomenon. It is a phenomenon influenced by legislature, organizational 'trends', political and cultural climates in various historical phases and so on, all of which influence consumer behaviour. The technical possibilities are quite significant: the costs of equipment for filming, recording, editing etc. and their availability are highly important elements in favour of small-scale entrepreneurship in cultural industries. The 'small-scale' players are

surely a threat to the 'majors' when they enter the market and alter market share and the overall competition situation. The rhetoric of their symbiotic or antagonistic existence belongs at the core of the structures of the cultural industry.

5.2.7 Majors versus independents

Steve Chapple and Reebee Garofalo (1977) and Dave Harker (1980) continued in their studies of recording industries the critique of capitalist organization, lamenting the situation that the machinery of major recording industries was inhibiting the creativity of individual artists. Richard Peterson and David Berger (1974) studied the structures of these industries and identified a cyclical model of concentration and diversification of capital and output. Krister Malm and Roger Wallis have continued the critical reception of Adorno's concept by stating that it does not reveal much about the actual structures of the industries. The structural problem is the existence of large-scale capital intensive organizations and smaller-scale commercial operators. It has been a long dispute among analysts of the character of the interplay between these and medium-scale operators situated in-between. Robert Burnett (1990) claimed that Peterson's and Berger's cyclical model lost its validity in the 1980s. After that the situation has been one of a two- or three-level system with operators existing on various scales at the same time. In the description of the character of this phenomenon the symbiosis thesis seems to be the 'winning' one. (See Muikku 2001) However, there is evidence in support of both models, which introduces ambiguity into analysis of the phenomenon. The evidence is a rhetorical device for convincing the audience to accept the described side of the phenomenon.

The following passage by Miège reminds us of the impossibility of predicting success. The tremendous marketing campaigns that major corporations can afford do not guarantee a bestseller. A seemingly marginal and unsaleable product can prove to be a success at least among certain audience groups, and potentially also among wider audiences. However, the asset of a major player such as a leading publishing house is that they can cope with a degree of failure. (Miège 1989, 29) At the same time small-scale operators can temporarily attain successes even without aggressive marketing. The problem for the major player is that its budgets for single productions are usually large and any failures damage them proportionally, whereas in small-scale organizations the losses are also more minor.

In the following it is important to note the idea that cultural industries (as well as other industries) are economic sectors in which there can be both large-scale and small-scale operators. The quantity of facilities and capital does not matter. Even a micro company run by just a couple of people counts as an industry if they are producing exchangeable commodities.

> 'It does not take much research to discover that every type of capital from small family capital to large scale multinational capital is present in the culture industries. But one can also see that between one branch and another there are notable

differences, in particular a very different rate of penetration of monopoly capital.' (Miège 1989, 30)

It is helpful to think of this cultural commodity production as a 'source of livelihood', sector or branch of economy be it major or small. The term 'industry' also refers to this and not only to a factory-like process (even if there must be cost-efficient processes also in handicrafts).

The reason for the existence of these smaller producers is the consuming 'habits' of certain small audience groups. However, it may be that these works intended for special audiences are only viable in a large market area (or language area). Another explanation is that there really is a talent pool in small businesses. They are not tied to large production volumes and long-term contracts. They can turn quickly from one line to another in anticipation of what seems to be 'in' at that moment. (Miège 1989, 44-45) They are in a position to produce the innovative ideas that can be proved to be successful or not. They are the pool of creativity in producing models for further expropriation.

One can see in Adorno's essay **'On Popular Music´'** that he had had the idea of imitating a successful piece of music as early as the 1940s. Garnham, Breton and Lewis link the origin of the imitated works to innovations by small-scale producers. Garnham highlights the contradiction that on the one hand, there is a very strong drive towards expanding market share of audience in the cultural sector. But the cultural 'use-value' is the novelty or difference of the product. For that reason there is a constant need to create new works. If successful, they can function as *prototypes* for subsequent productions. (Garnham 1990, 160). It is not novelty for novelty's sake but it can work as a predictor. If a work proves to be successful it can function as a template, recipe or prototype for following products. If a song proves to be a hit, a myriad of other songwriters use it as a template for their songs. This applies to films, programmes, books, music (consider the boom in fantasy literature with Tolkien as the originator, or the hip hop trend in Western countries (and beyond) with the black artists in the slums of American cities as originators) or plays, too. This is exactly the power of a cultural work to function as its own advertisement, just as Adorno indicated.

> 'Anyone who has reflected on the structure of standard television and radio programmes, films, and even that of some books, plays and musical compositions cannot but be impressed by the extent to which they seem to be produced according to a blueprint or recipe. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the production pattern of *many cultural products is done according to prototypes*. The idea is not that all output follows a given standard prototype, but the more interesting notion that if a product - a film, record, book, etc. - is successful, it then serves as a model, a prototype, for the production of a stream of other products - of other films, records, books, etc. The success of a product serves as a signal that it can be used as a prototype for the fabrication of others.' (Breton 1982, 47)

Lewis' example is British rock music during the 1970s and 1980s. He also introduces the idea that 'independents' represent a form of research and development sector. They do the ground-work, gather a certain audience, hence testing popularity. Their ground-work is equivalent to cost-free marketing for

the majors that pick the ripe fruit. This is because investment in something new and different involves plunging into the unknown. It is much safer to invest in a formula that is tried and tested – be it a pop group, a play or a film. A group or a work that is 'pre-tested' in some way or other can predict to a certain extent its success, at least much more accurately than an entirely unknown production.

Lewis describes the situation of British music industry in the end of the 1970s which went through one of its most artistically creative periods. This was due to the emergence of punk and new wave as small groups. These groups were working with independent record labels or promoters that were using cheap available technology and taking commercial risks to support new musical styles. Sometimes they behaved in a decidedly non-commercial manner which however did not decrease their possibilities to break through even in commercial terms. Small labels took the role of 'creating' the market for major record companies. (Lewis 1990, 27)

For major corporations, the poaching of an artist from a small label is a strategy in controlling potential competition. An artist signed to a small label gaining popularity and success threatens their market share, thereby requiring that he/she/it be bought out. In this sense, cultural and music industries greatly resemble other 'humdrum' industries and their strategies. The purchasing of a new, talented artist into the firm is not necessarily a benevolent or 'altruistic' act nor is it a cultural act to diversify the markets.

Still, small producers could be said to provide talent and innovation pools for the major players. After an appropriate time period and rising popularity the major player will cater to the ongoing successful performance. The majors do 'cultural work' as a by-product of their 'egoistic' management strategies. Miège claims that the most celebrated innovations and successes are often the work of small or medium-size independent producers. But because of the uncertainty of the success of an innovation, majors leave them for the small-scale producers and only take part in the distribution deals. By doing so, they use small-scale producers as buffers in unfavourable market situations. The small-scale producers take responsibility for research and development and majors gain the ripe fruit of the product's success and even do a tremendous amount to foster the success of the venture by making use of their well-organized networks and resources in distribution. (Miège 1989, 91).

The reason for calling these small-scale producers 'independents' is that they are often established on the initiative of artists themselves and characterize a certain genre in music or filmmaking. They also provide greater stability for artists in creating their works and provide them with expertise in their specific interests when making a certain kind of music or film. The contract deals are usually also simpler and more resilient in contrast to the leonine clauses employed by big companies. (Miège 1989, 91).

Garnham highlights the more unfavourable issues of small-scale producers. He calls them 'satellites' working around the centres of power-clusters of majors. The flip side of contractual and operational stability is a

higher level of insecurity, low levels of profitability, and weak trade-union involvement. He refers to the role of small-scale producers as the buffers of majors in the market situation when large-scale cultural industries shift much of the cost and risk of cultural research and development off their own shoulders. With this satellite-style of buffer system they also minimise certain risks such as labour unrest or pension payments (a major financial responsibility). This issue prompts him to call the small-scale producers an 'exploited sector'. More than independents they are in Garnham's opinion 'dependents' of the majors, as implicit in the term 'satellites'. (Garnham 1990, 163)

The theme of this section is a selection of perspectives. The interplay of minor and major players can be described as either a productive symbiosis or the symbiosis thesis can be seen as a delusion and the true situation being one of fierce antagonism. The research referred to in this section seems to be value-free analysis but at a deeper level it reveals the attitudes and normative colourings of a single research project. Even quantitative statistical analyses reveal certain assumptions and beliefs that are not necessarily facts, such as the amount of new artists entering the market indicating innovation in a certain historical period. Simon Frith can be counted as a contributor in this discourse. His contribution is the deconstruction of the 'truths' and 'facts' implicit in the research into the music industry and the discourse presented in this chapter.

Frith devalues the rhetoric of major versus small-scale producers for the following reasons. He sees in it a kind of morality and normative dissociation that may be not valid in 'real life'. He refers to the view prevalent also in the GLC that 'as new talents and ideas emerge they are always in danger of (being) bought up and exploited by the major companies, with the result that the profits of success are rarely reinvested in the base of cultural production'. According to Frith:

> 'The problem of this argument is that the small/creative/marginal versus big/exploitative/central model is not a very helpful way of understanding how the cultural industries work. In the record industry, for example, the majors and independents have a symbiotic rather than oppositional relationship, with the small labels acting as the research and development departments of the majors which, in turn, take on the task of marketing any promising 'discoveries' (and many 'independent' companies are, in fact, part owned or bank-rolled by the majors). And one could point to the similar dependence of the theatrical 'fringe' on mainstream impresarios, of independent TV producers on the major broadcasting companies, of 'alternative' comedians on mass media exposure. To put this another way, even 'small' businesses are 'market-led', even 'creative' independents are dependent for their livelihoods on the sale of their products, on their competitive edge in a market place where the rules of exchange are defined by the 'big' operators. This doesn't preclude their producing 'oppositional' work, but it does suggest that such radicalism is not, in itself, a matter of marginality - independent publishing companies mostly produce mainstream culture (their independence a reflection of market specialization rather than resistance); 'radical' art and ideas are just as likely to emerge from the cultural bureaucracies.' (Frith 1991, 146)

In the discourses on the music industries, the symbiosis or interplay thesis seems to be 'a winning argument'. Minors and majors are dependent *on each other*, as opposed to one dictating over the other. (see Muikku 2001) Throughout this chapter a reader can find a dissociative strategy of big/exploitative/central

versus small/creative/marginal, which Frith seeks to deconstruct above. Small is revalued in contrast to big scale. The small scale is the reservoir of innovation, which big-scale operations domesticate into the mainstream. The small scale is the source of diversity whereas big-scale operations universalise the scene. Small-scale productions are options for making a difference to others whereas big-scale operations are opportunities for identifying with a majority of audiences. Curiously, this indicates a kind of dissociation of 'high' and 'low' entering the popular music industries. A Finnish researcher calls this 'pop modernism' with which he postulates that within the popular music scene there are genres usually regarded as more complex and innovative than others (e.g. a trivial dissociation of conservative pop and radical rock) (Kari Kallioniemi cited in Rautiainen 2001). These genres of course enter the recording industry and formulate an enterprise orientation and ethics.

Frith operates above with these dissociations and his latter sentences indicate his devaluation of this rhetoric. He denies the belief that small-scale operators are usually not market-oriented but a kind of fringe phenomenon that live only by the mystery of their genius. From this perspective it seems like the discourse of autonomous art has been adapted to the fringe phenomena of popular cultures. Frith also denies the belief that market orientation would somehow decrease the possibility of oppositional behaviour. Radicalism in style and messaging does not *necessarily* coincide with marginality in market share. Equally, leading positions in the industry (in the sense of volume) do not *necessarily* preclude the possibility of rejecting innovation or controversiality. Frith thus broadens the idea of risk as including aesthetic and political issues. He also makes visible the built-in assumptions of minor/major and creativity/standard dissociation which do not necessarily hold in actual analysis of contents and styles.

5.2.8 Tendencies of concentration

Despite vertical disintegration and the devaluations of normative ideas and dissociations, some writers offer a perspective of concentration. This is thought to take place especially in the distribution phase of production. One empirical support for this claim is the stated tendency towards multi-media conglomeration. There are many outcomes of these tendencies. At a very general level the writers of the Unesco reports describe the tendency as a threat to being in control of the means of production and distribution, the trend towards the concentration and internationalisation of the most prominent firms and the subordination of creative artists to market forces by them being dictated to by consumer demand. (Unesco 1982, 21)

Stated in a very general way, the outcomes of the concentration of production and distribution are harmful to both consumers and artists. Garnham points out that the sore point is particularly to be found in distribution: '*It is cultural distribution, not cultural production that is the key locus of power and profit.* It is access to distribution which is the key to cultural plurality.' (Garnham 1990, 161-162; emphasis in original). The harmfulness lies in the fact

that the distribution phase determines which products are accessible to the audience. So there is diversity in production but the uniformity becomes apparent as a result of the system of control of the distribution channels. Thus distribution is, in Garnham's opinion, the location of highest levels of capital intensity, ownership concentration and multi-nationalization. (Garnham 1990, 162). Furthermore, this is largely a phase that is hidden from consumers and over which they certainly have little control.

Even if there are post-Fordist outsourcings of functions and a myriad of small service firms on the opposing pole, there is an even stronger tendency toward neo-Fordism in distribution. The decentralization of production can co-exist with centralization of distribution. Transactions of small firms are usually not with one another, but with the giant, centralized distributors. TV and cinema are most prone to this neo-Fordist domination by distributors because of the very high entry costs they involve (Lash & Urry 1994, 125-126).

This is a direct result of different logics in different industries. It is much easier to set up a publishing company with a couple of enthusiasts in a certain literary or musical genre. It is also much easier and cheaper to produce a list or repertoire of books than a list of films. However, it may be more difficult to get marginal and minority reader or listener interest books and records into retail outlets than potential bestsellers. The occurrence of this among small-scale producers is, however, much more likely in the field of publishing than in TV or film (even though there may be opportunities for independent audiovisual producers to extend their range of productions to also supply the advertising industry in order to give them more viability). Usually, as Lash and Urry point out, film and TV producers have to possess a large amount of monetary capital in order to enter the market. The situation may be slightly different for book and music publishers.

The reason for the power of distributors is the following:

> 'Distributor power is due to their capacities as financiers, which is exacerbated by the temporality of big-budget filmmaking. The majors set up the intake of revenues for a film so that they recoup all of their advance (and more) before the producer touches a penny. For say a 25 million dollar film, the studio will often split profits 50-50 with the production company. The major will typically put up 70-75 per cent of the advance, say 19 million dollars of 25 million dollars, most of which is spent during the (20-week) shooting. The producer must get the other 25 per cent from elsewhere. Majors only provide this sort of finance when they are also the distributors of a film. The distribution company first pays itself about 30 per cent of these rental revenues for distributing the film. The studio/distributor pay themselves back the principal of their advance to the producer plus interest on this loan as well as the studio's printing, advertising and marketing costs. After this point the film is into de facto profits, a percentage of which the studio/distributor pays itself as the 'end money guarantor'. Now, and only now, can the producer receive 50 percent of remaining profits. But before s/he can touch a cent of these s/he must pay back the principal and interest on the loan taken to finance the other 25 per cent of the advance. (Lash & Urry 1994, 127, the figures representing the level of 1994, rll)

This is a description of a kind of 'food chain' in which the actual producer of an original idea may be in an unfavourable position. This is not usually understood, whereas producers continue to be blamed for commercialisation

and penny-pinching. This is also the reason for the situation which Garnham described as the *dependence* of the 'independents'. Having said this, are the distributors themselves to be blamed? It could be argued that it is only as a result of their work that any production at all reaches the film market.

Besides the power of the distributors, multi-mediatisation is another factor that hinders the entrance of small producers. Multi-mediatisation and conglomeration can be regarded as appropriate defence-responses to the uncertainty of the entertainment business. Garnham calls this the 'extension of the principle of repertoire'. His examples are Pearson-Longman and Robert Maxwell in the UK who implement a cross-media principle, exploiting the same product e.g. film, book or music across several media. In Garnham's opinion this is increases the barriers to entry into the market. (Garnham 1990, 163)

One could of course regard the situation as an unhappy one if we encounter a limited range of products across the various media. There is nothing disturbing if they are *limited in number*, but if this were to become the whole story of cultural production we as consumers would naturally have fewer and fewer options. It is exactly this future scenario that prompts critics to challenge this tendency.

Caves describes a new tendency of vertical integration in the 1990s in which, once again, media content creation and distribution ends up in the hands of just a few major operators. Major American corporations have merged film studios, TV networks, theatres, print publishing and even consumer electronics. Until the 1980s any such attempts to merge were obstructed by the previous *Paramount* decision and the opposition of the Federal Communications Commission. The story of these mergers begins in the 1980s. The cinema film studios restored some of the integration into exhibition that had existed before the *Paramount* decisions. In 1986 MCA (Universal) acquired a 50 percent interest in Cineplex-Odeon, then the second largest theatre in North America. In 1987 Columbia acquired full control of Tri-Star that included Loew's theatre circuit. Other media-content firms later integrated with television channels. Time acquired Warner Bros. and the studio became linked to Time's cable networks. Time increased its acquisitions with Turner Broadcasting adding thus several more networks. Twentieth Century-Fox acquired TV stations and established the Fox broadcasting network. Disney acquired the TV stations and broadcast network of ABC. Consumer-electronic manufacturer Sony continued the merging mania by purchasing Columbia. Sony was seeking to avoid former exclusion from access to entertainment software. (Caves 2000, 326-327)

Naomi Klein, for her part, complains of the dominance of chains in various retail sectors. This is also taking place, however, in the cultural sector, as in the publishing industries, which jointly own retail literature superstores. This tendency is squeezing the small bookshops, which would offer a more versatile selection of literature, into bankruptcy. The disappearance of small bookshops has, in Klein's opinion, implications for the freedom of expression (even if one accepts that besides superstores there are *specialized* stores that can compete with superstores in catering for so-called niche-markets). The book

superstore is, however, much better placed to offer books from a wide variety of publishers whereas in, for example, Sony or Nike stores the selection of items is much more restricted. (Klein 2001, 153).

Even if this is the case, branded retail shops, and shop chains of certain producers are commonplace. This, alongside multi-mediatisation, helps to control the uncertainty of success. A striking example of this is Virgin's megastores and their synergies within the brand in which the consumer's choice is ready-made. By running both record label and retailing, Virgin Megastore outlets are created in order to secure the delivery and promotion of Virgin artists. Klein claims that this is done in order to avoid instability in respect to audience reception. Their intention is to control all of the variables behind any possible success and manipulate the reception of a blockbuster or best-seller phenomenon, even before anything has actually taken place. According to Klein it would be delusive and ridiculous to speak about the sovereignty of the shopper in this situation of synergies and brand extensions. Cross media productions work to intensify this deficiency. (Klein 2001, 153-154).

Furthermore, this is unlikely to be an outcome of a kind of 'natural law' but rather of an intentional policy after the demise of the *Paramount* decisions. Prior to this demise, these systems would have been condemned as 'illegal cartels' or 'monopolies'. Nowadays, synergies and fusions (simply *renamings* of the same thing) are legitimated by appeals to the serious competition faced in global markets. It is, nevertheless, presented as a reaction to a kind of 'natural law' of global economics, whereas Klein claims that it is question of a change of perspectives and policies during the Reagan period. In contrast, in 1974 the government of the USA accused the television industry of constructing a cartel or vertical monopoly (vertical integration) and it tried to hinder CBS, ABC and NBC from producing entertainment programmes and films for their own channels. The rationale behind this accusation was the attempt to defend other, competing production houses in their attempts to enter the market.

> During this government anti-trust campaign, CBS was forced to sell off its programming arm – which, ironically, is now the synergy-obsessed Viacom. Another irony is that the interest that pushed most aggressively for the Federal Trade Commission investigation was Westinghouse Broadcasting, the same company that merged with CBS in distribution. Full circle arrived in September 1999 when Viacom and CBS announced their merger, worth an estimated 80 billion dollars. The companies, reunited after all these years apart, converged into an entity far more powerful than before the divorce took place… For the culture industries, the final piece of the new-world jigsaw fell into place in 1993 when Federal Judge Manuel Real lifted the anti-trust restrictions that had been imposed on the three major television networks in the seventies. The decision opened the door for the majors to once again produce their own prime-time entertainment shows and movies and neatly paved the way for the Disney-ABC merger. (Klein 2000, 162,163).

Caves notes that the activity of merging reduced significantly during the 1990s. Moreover, in reality, synergies were not necessarily obtained - they were more or less illusory. They required the cumbersome initial coordination of creative and bureaucratic activities. According to Caves: 'Observers of the media

conglomerates' post-merger behaviour generally detect no significant synergies. Disney and ABC have engaged in only a limited amount of cross-promotion of each other's wares, and these resources could have been used for other promotional purposes.' (Caves 2000, 327-328).

In summary, the most obvious and harmful outcomes of these tendencies are threats to both artists and audiences. They are prone to raise the threshold for new artists entering the market. If the process of merger is tolerated to its logical conclusion, the outcome may well be the reduction of the range of options for consumers, and thence their freedom of choice. Paradoxically, free markets that once were enablers of the freedom of speech turn into its suppressors. Most curious of all is that this process takes place with the collusion of us as 'willing consumers'. We as consumers appear to legitimate the entire process. The standardization of production and personality that Adorno predicted seems to be at hand. Horkheimer and Adorno described the culture industry in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* in the period before the *Paramount* decisions and other measures to enforce competition were in place. In his own lifetime he was aware of the tendency toward vertical monopoly and that the sectors resembled and assimilated each other. The situation altered somewhat in the 1960s as both the diversification of actual contents and relations of ownership took place. This historical phase brought with it a degree of diversity to cultural life that is not yet extinct. The globalisation of culture since the 1980s and the phenomena of mega fusions and synergies make Adorno's views relevant now, albeit with some reservations. Still, it is never possible to extinguish product diversity in the markets. This is because, as related in this chapter, it is rational to cater for marginal audiences, because 'you never know', they may turn out to be successes. Conversely, the most calculated work can turn out to be a failure. Further, it is 'politically rational' to keep in mind the principle of the absence of censorship in the name of both the majority and the minority.

5.2.9 Commodities as cultural objects

Klein (2001) describes the phenomenon of product development as 'snooping the cool', e.g. pilfering from controversial marginal cultures. Every nook and cranny in our culture is searched in order to find the most subversive trends that might be used in branding one's consumer items, be they clothes, food, electronics or cars. The consumer norm seems to be the young (15-25 or 25-35 years), urban, active, searching for change and reasonably affluent. Klein notes that even the most underground counter-cultures are harnessed in advertising and branding campaigns in order to secure the sale to the 'global teenager'. Miège described the same phenomenon in the following way:

> 'Thus in capitalist societies we are witnessing the promotion of culture by commerce and the promotion of commerce by culture.' (Miège 1989, 36)

In the sections above it was a question of the 'commercialisation of culture' in its various forms. In this section it is question of 'aesthetisation or culturalisation of commerce'. Commodities (and services) are loaded with symbolic meanings and with them one may construct one's identity.

Lash and Urry state that cultural industries have been paving the way for the aesthetisation of commerce and commodities and not the other way around. The reason for this is that cultural production is design-oriented using symbolic meanings in their objects. According to them, in the culture industries R&D is the main activity, while production is secondary. (Lash & Urry 1994, 122).

Lash and Urry's intention is to point out that the creation and design of 'prototypes', the 'creative core' is actually more important than the element usually called reproduction. In actual fact, they seek to alter the terms: what is commonly called reproduction (e.g. printing a novel in 'book format') is in reality production; and what is called production is in fact design, product development or R&D. (Lash & Urry 1994, 122-123)

After that they seek to change the notion of the direction of influences. It is not so that culture is transformed into commodities but that commodities are transformed into cultural objects:

> 'Even in the heyday of Fordism, the culture industries were irretrievably more innovation intensive, more design intensive than other industries. The culture industries, in other words, were post-Fordist *avant la lettre*. We are arguing, *pace* many Marxist, against any notion that culture production is becoming more like commodity production in manufacturing industry. Our claim is that ordinary manufacturing industry is becoming more and more like the production of culture. It is not that commodity manufacture provides the template, and culture follows, but that the culture industries themselves have provided the template...We mean that production has become not just more knowledge infused, but more generally cultural; that it has become, not just a question of a new primacy of information-processing, but of more generic symbol-processing capacities. In the culture industries the input is aesthetic rather than cognitive in quality. Closest to the culture industries in being highly R&D intensive is the manufacture of software...' (Lash & Urry 1994, 123)

It is perhaps a point of contention as to what degree in various Marxist accounts the reification process actually means exactly this kind of prominence of 'sign-value' (ibid.), symbolic meaning and aesthetic encoding in cultural and other commodities. Marx himself in his chapter on commodity-fetishism in the *Das Kapital* describes exactly this kind of religio-mystical aura being attached to various commodities. These ideas we find in Klein's descriptions of contemporary consumer culture as well as in Lash's and Urry's account above.

It is not stated straightforwardly in the cited passages of this section that commodities form part of cultural industry, and its range of reference (for Klein, for example, cultural industries mean the publishing, recording, film and TV industries). Rather, it is stated that cultural production offers a model for producing other commodities. However, I would like to interpret this discussion so that the criterion for describing an endeavour as a 'cultural industry' may be taken as the processing of aesthetic symbols. Thus, any given design-intensive commodity production is engaged in loading these symbols

into its products. In this analysis, commodities themselves may be considered at the 'extreme' end of cultural industry.

The very latest development in communications and production techniques is taken to deconstruct the older threat-visions of concentration. In the following section I will give a presentation of a kind of 'rhetorical turn' from these threat-visions into the critical reception of the discourses on *cultural* industries.

5.3   The rhetoric of creative industries

The term 'creative industry' is the newest term in the discussions on industrial cultural production. It can be traced back to the beginning of the British 'New Labour' under the leadership of Tony Blair. Previous urban regeneration policies were merged with a fresh emphasis on the economic impact of cultural activities. Australian cultural politicians have also been emphasizing and using the term 'creative industry' but with a slightly different range of reference, to which I will turn shortly. Before analysing British creative industry policy I will begin with Stuart Cunningham's and Terry Flew's considerations on the issue.

Stuart Cunningham briefly maps out the history of the term and the implementation of the cultural industry. At the same time he (and Terry Flew also) tries to uncover the actual novelty of the term *creative* industry both in relation to the history of the cultural industry and the contemporary policies of creative industries.

A kind of triple turning upside down of the words 'culture' and 'industry' occurred. Cunningham refers to the negative version of critical theory in the 1930s and 1940s, when especially in Adorno's account, culture was seen as *industry*. Then, during the 1970s and 1980s a kind of reversal of the argument took place. Large industrial companies in film, TV, radio, recording, and publishing were rhetorically referred to as *cultural*. There was a specific objective behind this rhetoric. It was to 're-badge' large, usually commercial industries such as TV and film as 'cultural'. This was a legitimation for the state's cultural policy regime, continued regulation and subvention while direct industry development arguments became harder to maintain. (Cunningham 2002, 110).

To this period also belongs British urban regeneration policy, which sought new opportunities for cultural industries in this regeneration process. This kind of rhetoric was previously in dispute between Labour and the Thatcher government, with the former emphasizing the cultural and the latter the industry elements.

During the late 1980s a third turning point was reached when arts and culture were seen as fresh economic potential. Cunningham describes this as the scholarly 'settling-down' period. This argument as a kind of apology of aesthetic issues in terms of economy was originated e. g. by John

Myerschough's *Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain* (1988) and by David Throsby and Glen Withers in Australia. (Cunningham 2002, 111)

Terry Flew describes this as the *ad hoc* element in defining the cultural industries for policy purposes. Usually, these arguments are delivered to legitimate the traditional elements of the subsidized arts that selectively use the economic discourses surrounding cultural industries (e.g. arguments associated with market failure, such as the nature of cultural product being public good, merit or producing externalities) to accommodate more traditional arguments for arts subsidy. These arguments are used to justify the continued use of public revenue for the benefit of particular interests. The aim was to defend arts institutions in the face of financial cuts threatened by the Conservative government in the 1980s. (Flew 2002, 185)

For Flew, the ad hoc nature of the definition creates the condition in which cultural or creative industries are 'defined as those activities that were under the policy purview of those areas of government that were already defined as responsible for the administration of culture' (ibid.) We can see that in both of these cases, industries regarded as cultural and culture seen as economic opportunity require the legitimation of the continuation of prevailing, existing policy. Cunningham and Flew in particular decry the Australian documents *Creative Nation* 1994 and *Knowledge Nation* 2001 for basing their arguments on the arts and not considering the importance of 'the new economy' and digital culture as the 'real' and modern basis of creative industries. (Flew 2002, 185; Cunningham 2002, 109)

Further 'criteria' for creative industries might be 1. the small-scale, even micro-size, of the organization, 2. global/local networking, 3. overt commerciality while maintaining an artistic ethos, 4. audience-orientation in the design. Using new information technologies one can meet these criteria:

> 'This turn to the creative industries results in part from the scope of ICTs to allow for greater flexibility in production, such as small batch production rather than long productions runs.' (Flew 2002, 181)

Cunningham regards the phenomena called cultural industries indicating the arts and the established commercial or large-scale public sector media. This is in his opinion a concatenation that does not hold. He emphasizes rather the emergence of small business models of networked and usually commercial but with the commitment rather to aesthetic creativity than commercial practice – meaning growth of capital or market shares. It is crucial that new creative applications in technology widen the opportunities for creatives while threatening the settled business models of the big commercial firms. These possibilities decrease the dominance of mass models of centralised production (media) and real time public consumption (the arts). The magic words are interactivity, convergence, customisation, collaboration, networks and a global/local/regional orientation rather than a 'national' one. (Cunningham 2002, 111)

The creative industry in this conceptualisation seems to be a sector existing between the traditional creative arts in their 'analogous' form and the

large organizations of the classical cultural industries. It is a sector in progress using all the opening and emerging possibilities of digital technology of content creation from computer based Internet and CD format to new mobile internet platforms.

5.3.1 British creative industry policies

The British case constitutes a selection of different areas. The Creative Industries Taskforce include in their policy area the following activities (in alphabetical order): advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and computer services, television and radio. Thus they include the 'analogue' creative arts (arts, crafts, antiques, architecture), established commercial 'classical' cultural business sectors (TV, radio, film) and digital 'new economy' sectors (software) (the division by Cunningham 2002, 108). One can see that they also include the design and fashion sectors which indicates that under certain criteria, commodity items such as kitchen utensils, electronics or clothes (just to mention a few) are included as products of the creative industries. The actual definition in the Mapping Documents is that creative industries are 'those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property' (CITF 2001). Creativity and intellectual property seem to be the old criteria. However, the wealth and employment elements are new emphases (equally present in earlier cultural policy objectives).

I interpret the aim of British cultural policy as being one of raising the awareness of these activities as industries among various groups of people. For political decision-makers and financiers they are presented as a 'serious' area of future economic growth (Smith 1998, 2). For artists and young talented people they are presented as a possible career and source of employment. The role of creative industries policy seems to be coordination between various areas of interests: education, financing, promotion and information on intellectual property issues. Besides education at all its levels the government's role in financing issues has to be noted. In the 2001 Mapping Document the CITF refers to this issue in the following way: 'ensuring that creative businesses have access to appropriate financial support, and that the financial sector is aware of the opportunities and benefits of investing in the creative industries'. Thus, it is not the aim of government to allocate money directly in new and promising cultural enterprises but to raise awareness of their economic viability among venture financiers. At the same time it is also important to educate cultural entrepreneurs in matters concerning their economic organization. One solution to the problem in Britain is a specific fund, The Creative Advantage Fund in the West Midlands which provides venture capital to creative businesses. The orientation of this fund is to analyse both the cultural and economic aspects of an applicant. Thus it is organized specifically to cater to the needs of cultural entrepreneurs. (see Morgan 2002).

The objective of mapping these areas is to offer information on their economic possibilities and existing character in terms of percentages and pounds. The mapping was carried out by the University of London's Department of Arts Policy and Management. The issues mapped so far are: revenue (total and industry specific), this total being 112.5 billion pounds; employment, being 1,3 million persons; exports, totalled at 10.3 billion pounds; the share of GDP, calculated at 5 %; and the output growth, reaching 16 % in 1997-1998 compared to growth in the economy as a whole of 6 %.

While the Secretary of State Chris Smith (responsible for cultural policy) emphasizes these 'serious' economic values, in his speeches (published in 1998 as the book *Creative Britain*) he also draws attention to three other areas: access, excellence and education. He does this in the following way:

> 'The key themes are *access, excellence, education* and *economic value.* Access, in ensuring that the greatest number of people have the opportunity to experience work of quality. Excellence, in ensuring that governmental support is used to underpin the best, and the most innovative, and the things that would not otherwise find a voice. Education, in ensuring that creativity is not extinguished by the formal education system and beyond. And economic value, in ensuring that the full economic and employment impact of the whole range of creative industries is acknowledged and assisted by government.' (Smith 1998, 2)

Besides the economic value, Smith also emphasizes the intrinsic value of art:

> 'It is also vital, however, to remember that culture and creativity have immense intellectual, spiritual and social value as well as economic importance.' (Smith 1998, 15)

> 'I have tried to set out tonight some of the vision I have of how public policy on the arts can develop in the years ahead. The arts for everyone; part of everyday life; economically vital for the nation; and part and parcel of our education system. These are bold objectives. But let us never forget that the primary joy of art is the value it has, of and for itself.' (Smith 1998, 46)

One could claim this to be nothing more than the mere 'rhetoric' of speeches, while at the same time the base of the education system continues to be corroded by new policies. On the other hand, one must take these statements seriously insofar as we have to look what 'these people' have to say and avoid condemning new objectives and terminologies too hastily. It seems that the traditional arts subsidy policy stays as it is. The 'new' is not constructed to substitute the 'old'. The new objectives are simply visions to enable the 'hype' that is created over and above the basic cultural work that is traditionally subsidized. In a speech to the Royal Shakespeare Company conference in 1997 Smith answers his opponents:

> 'Reading some of the press comment in recent days, however, you would have thought that the Government had forgotten all of this [the spiritual nature of art]. Judging by our critics, we are a platoon of philistines prepared to boogie to Oasis and applaud *The Full Monty,* but totally uninterested in the work of the RSC or the fate of the British Museum. Well, I have news for those who might have thought this. We are not uninterested; we never have been uninterested; and we have no intention of being uninterested.' (Smith 1998, 49)

Actually, the policy objectives group around three key words: aesthetics, democracy and economy. Smith chooses to emphasize excellence and creativity, the core of all industries in this area, but this diversity is not enough if it is not circulated to, as far as possible, all. This is the democracy aspect. Democracy, for that matter, may lead to economic viability and wealth creation, both cultural and monetary, for all. These are fine and beautiful words, which Smith puts as follows:

> 'And it is a tenet that does not just recognize the intrinsic importance of culture of itself. It also recognizes the importance of ensuring that the widest possible number of people can have access to that cultural excellence. If I had to encapsulate the central theme of our new Government's approach to the arts, it would be this: our aim is to make things of quality available to the many, not just the few. And I say 'things of quality' advisably, because we must not fall into the trap of assuming that widening the audience for an artistic event or institution necessarily involves diluting the quality or excellence of the experience...Access and excellence are at the heart of what we want to achieve. But there is a further objective which sits alongside these: achieving a full recognition for the enormously important role that the arts and cultural activity in general play in our economic life.' (Smith 1998, 49-50)

No area, whether aesthetics, democracy or economy, should be overemphasized, but they are all facets of cultural production that must be further encouraged by policies. One could speculate in general whether the word 'creativity' has several connotations. On the one hand it of course means aesthetic creativity. However, it also refers to the creation of (monetary) wealth through aesthetic activities. In line with Cunningham and Flew it means literally producing wealth in monetary terms, and not just in the imagination as one could read in Cunningham's critique towards the application of neo-classical economics to the arts.

British politicians and some economists do not stubbornly believe in the free market but take into consideration the traditional subsidized arts sector, too. To date, this has been the line of Unesco, the Council of Europe and the European nation states themselves. However, there are requirements emerging from the WTO, World Bank and EU to dismantle the public subsidy of culture entirely in the name of avoiding distortions on the free market. If the economist presented in the following section is a neo-classicist, he at least fosters to some extent the traditional non-profit orientation of cultural institutions - which may come as surprise for some contemporary cultural policy 'free-marketeers'.

5.4 The approach of economics to cultural industries

There is a huge amount of literature in cultural economics concerning the cultural industries. However, I shall concentrate on the writings of one contributor, the Australian economist David Throsby. He has been writing on cultural economics since the 1970s. As an economist his insights can be classed as highly realistic and diplomatic. From his texts one could draw the conclusion that he sees the phenomena *in utramque partem,* using the phrase of classical

rhetoric. He acknowledges the economic component of art but also its intrinsic and social value. While he includes in his analyses the cultural components of the economy, he is also well known for the distinction he draws between economic impulses as individual and cultural impulses as collective. (Throsby 2001, 13-14).

In this context I shall present his conception of the cultural industry. In recent discussions as the idea of the cultural industry has been spreading in Western cultural policymaking, the economists sometimes find themselves in the firing line, accused by artists and academics alike. Throsby responds to their accusations thus:

> 'Many creative artists resent the thought that their activities form part of an industry. Such a proposition, they believe, emphasizes the commercial aspects of artistic production and subjugates the pure creative impulse to the demands of the market place. For those artists represented in chapter 6 as being motivated solely by the desire to create cultural value in their creative work without thought of economic gain, such a view is understandable. The heavy-footed economist brandishing words such as 'market structure', 'concentration ratios', 'labour demand' and 'value-added', must indeed seem insensitive to the finer purposes of art.
>
> Yet the fact that individuals and firms produce goods or services for sale or exchange, or even simply for their own pleasure, creates a grouping of activity around particular products, types of producers, locations, etc. which can be encircled in conceptual terms and labelled an industry. As we noted briefly in chapter 1 when introducing the term 'cultural industry', such a delineation need not imply any ideological or pejorative judgement, nor does it necessarily impose any economic or other type of motive on the industry participants. The paraphernalia of industry analysis comprise simply a convenient box of tools for representing and analysing the way in which the processes of production, consumption and exchange occur for given commodities.' (Throsby 2001, 110-111)

Nevertheless, Throsby concedes that in contemporary usages the word 'industry' alongside the word 'culture' implies the economic potential of cultural production. It can generate 'output', 'employment' and 'revenue' as was seen in the previous section in relation to the term 'creative industries'. For some, including some artists, the idea is welcomed. According to Throsby 'the argument here is that if culture in general and the arts in particular are to be seen as important, especially in policy terms in a world where economists are kings, they need to establish their economic credentials; what better way to do this than by cultivating the image of art as industry, bigger (in the Australian case, at least) than beer and footwear.' (ibid.). Undoubtedly, for some artists this becomes a means to enhance their status in society. They are no longer regarded as a burden to the public purse but as individuals who engage in productive work in monetary terms, as do workers in other industries. This idea is, of course, that of legitimating to which I referred in the previous section and towards which Cunningham in particular, was cynical.

Thus, for Throsby and for cultural economists the creative arts are primarily the core of the cultural industry. This is not because of the fact (as in previous accounts) that mass-scale reproduced and disseminated objects are based on an original creative idea. Rather, the idea, as might be clear in the passage above, is that the same toolbox of analysis can be applied to, for example, the activity of a sculptor or (more appropriately perhaps) to that of a

symphony orchestra. As it is a question of economics, one can guess already that the issue must be one of supply and demand, sellers and buyers. As far as demand is concerned, one could analyse the specific characteristics of the demand for cultural products, such as: the importance of taste (which is usually ignored in orthodox economics), the cumulative nature of demand, price and income elasticity. (Throsby 2001, 115-116).

On the supply side the specific characteristic of cultural production is its organization mostly on a non-profit basis. It is important to note in cultural economics this division between profit-making and non-profit organizations:

> 'But a distinction can be made in analysing the arts between the profit-making and the non-profit sectors of the industry. Although clear-cut lines cannot be drawn, it can be broadly stated that profit-oriented supply in the arts embraces popular entertainments and cultural forms where demand is strong and widespread and where financial motives dominate over artistic values in the organisation of production...The non-profit sector, on the other hand, embraces the more esoteric art forms such as classical music, jazz, 'serious' drama, poetry, opera, classical and modern dance, the fine arts, contemporary visual art and so on. Production activities within these product groupings tend to be more concerned with artistic values than with financial gain, as indeed the designation 'non-profit' indicates. Suppliers may be unincorporated individual artists (considered in more detail below), firms incorporated as not-for-profit enterprises under appropriate corporations law or publicly owned and operated firms organised on a non-profit basis. (Throsby 2001, 116-117; see also Throsby & Withers 1979, 10, 14-15).

From the ideas of this economist at least, we cannot draw the conclusion that creative and performing arts should produce monetary gains. However, Throsby and Withers foster the idea of a certain amount of audience maximization for cultural institutions in order to remain viable. But this should not take place at the expense of quality output and cultural work (to do what is important in the sense of increasing our knowledge of heritage). (Throsby & Withers 1979, 15).

As Throsby and Withers in the 1970s analysed the performing arts institutions, they used the 'industrial organization theory' in order to investigate the situation of these institutions. This may be one example of the paraphernalia of industry analyses applied to the arts:

> 'We will now consider the industry characteristics within which this supply and demand interact. A convenient framework for our discussion is provided by the conventional analytical apparatus of industrial organization theory. In this approach, the features of an industry are usually grouped under three main headings: structure, conduct and performance. (Throsby & Withers 1979, 40)

The term 'structure' refers to the economically significant features of a market. The situation of the structure of classical sectors of cultural industries were delineated in previous sections. They are the features that affect and reflect the behaviour of firms. The firms structure the market and they may be blocked of an entrance into it. In the structure analysis proposed by Throsby and Withers one can identify facets and terms familiar from previous presentations: product differentiation, barriers to entry, the degree of seller concentration. One could also investigate the diversity of production or the potential to enter the markets and its costs and the problem of concentration in the performing arts

institutions. The 'conduct' describes the actual behaviour of the firms supplying that market. Meantime, 'conduct' might be understood as the 'intentions' of a producer, to use Skinnerian terms as an analogy. The 'performance' is concerned when analysing how well an industry achieves its desired objectives and contributes to the economic objectives of society as a whole. Performance resembles Skinner's formulation 'act by doing'. The conduct refers to the actual behaviour and agency in the market, while performance is something this agent manages to accomplish.

Throsby also offers certain criteria for defining the cultural industries, as presented at the beginning of this chapter. They include creativity, symbolic meaning and intellectual property. Creativity as such can take place wherever. The symbolic meaning specifies the creativity as aesthetic. Intellectual property specifies these as an object, service or some kind of package of ideas which can be legitimately possessed by the creator(s) (i.e. a commodity which is exchangeable). (Throsby 2001, 112).

Throsby also offers certain frames of reference in order to visualize the range of reference:

> 'Accepting the general definition of cultural commodities noted above allows us to propose a model of the cultural industries centred around the locus of origin of creative ideas, and radiating outwards as those ideas become combined with more and more other inputs to produce a wider and wider range of products. Thus at the core of this industry model lie the creative arts as traditionally defined: music, dance, theatre, literature, the visual arts, the crafts, and including newer forms of practice such as video art, performance art, computer and multimedia art and so on. Each of these art forms on its own can be regarded as an industry, and is frequently referred to as such, although such a usage generally embraces more than just the original producers. So, for example, the 'music industry' refers to an enormous range of participants, including composers, performers, publishers, record companies, distributors, promoters, retailers, collecting societies and so on; even so the core of the industry can still be seen to be the original creative musician...The next group in the widening pattern of concentric circles defining the cultural industries comprises those industries whose output qualifies as a cultural commodity in the terms outlined above but where other non-cultural goods and services are also produced, such that the proportion of what might be termed 'primary cultural goods and services' is relatively lower than in the core arts case. Although precise boundaries are difficult to draw, this group can be thought of as including book and magazine publishing, television and radio, newspapers and film. In all of these cases both cultural and non-cultural goods and services are produced side by side...Finally, in some interpretations the boundaries of the cultural industries are extended further to catch industries which operate essentially outside the cultural sphere but some of whose product could be argued to have some degree of cultural content. These industries include advertising...tourism...and architectural services.' (Throsby 2001, 112-113).

This model outlined by Throsby is extremely useful in organizing the range of reference according to a clear logic. By visualizing a circular model it is much more helpful when understanding the range of reference than any 'linear' list of the various spheres of activities that it might include. I have modified and presented the model as follows:

FIGURE 1   The circle model. The model presents the range of reference of the concept of **the** cultural industry

The problem with this model is, in my opinion, the idea that creativity lies at the core of arts and that it withers and fades when entering the outer orbits. It might also be useful to think of a 'circle' (creativity and product development activities) in each orbit. Film cutting or sound editing may contain creativity as well as scriptwriting and composing. Or, as we saw previously, commodity design and product development may be as creative as painting a canvas.

5.5   Conclusion

At a very general level, the *motive for writing* of these various contributors is an attempt to raise awareness and increase understanding of the culture and world we live in. They set out to promote a comprehension of and disinterested analysis of the operations and structures of this world. Their intention is to more or less fiercely oppose both elitist cultural theory and the cultural policies they usually underpin. In their conception these are not based on absolutes, nor on universal ideas but rather on the opinions, values and beliefs of a limited number of educated and initiated people who tend to originate from the upper classes of their societies. These writers also intend to point at the deficiencies of critical conceptions of the cultural industry. Other European and Anglo-Saxon writers prefer to point at the empowering rather than emancipatory, radical or controversial role of 'marginal' cultural industries and the media world. Their point of view was also (as with Negt and Kluge) to take a descriptive approach

to what the individuals involved in these industries actually engage in. Where they differ from Negt, Kluge and Enzensberger is in their belief in the truly 'popular' character of small-scale commercial agents in which the activity is indigenous, not something steered from without. Their investigations begin with, for example, the activity of certain youths in their neighbourhood, who operate on the edge or fringe of the 'big' commercial world, into which these marginalities are only later integrated. Over and above any possible political controversies or radicalism these 'youngsters' may represent is their creation of alternative lifestyles that offer potential feelings of empowerment for the fans that follow them. This is my illocutionary re-description of their writing. They turn against the tradition of autonomous arts discourse by revaluing the popular, and devaluing prior notions where art was placed in the authentic sphere of genius, and popular production was condemned to the sphere of the banal and the standard. This is their rhetorical re-description as directed against cultural elitism. The evidence of marginality and its existence being empirically provable is a rhetorical re-description that re-evaluates the concept of the cultural industry, which can now include this marginality and creativity. This is taken to be the denial of its detrimental character.

Another object of revaluation is the character of uncertainty and commercial risk in cultural businesses. This is in a way taken as the negation of determinism, which disturbs the writers of the Frankfurt School. However, it does not follow from this that there is any sense of anarchy in the sectors. Uncertainty and risk are not values that would preclude all endeavours of planning and operations to secure success. On the contrary, the value here is that cultural producers should in some way or other manage the uncertainty. This having been said, this can in itself lead in two opposing directions: enhancing 'diversity' (repertoire building) or encouraging 'uniformity' (monopoly/oligopoly building).

As Cunningham noted, the discussants referred to in this chapter wanted to see the products containing popular elements and industries around them as *cultural*. It is not a question of *Geist* or *Bildung* becoming commodity, but the phenomenon of industries containing a variety of fine aesthetic and cultivated elements. This is their rhetorical re-description as renaming the phenomenon of these industries with the adjective 'cultural' rather than employing the noun 'culture'. On the other hand the adjectival form refers to practicing arts and aesthetic creation. As well as elements of industrial organization, the newer term 'creative industries' explicitly claims the inclusion of creativity.

The word 'industries', in contrast to the word 'industry', signified to the discussants outside Germany an economic sector marked by complexity. This is the rhetorical re-description with which they seek to rename the phenomenon using the plural form. They want to deny the assumptions of critical theory in regarding this as the phenomenon solely of monopolistic organization both vertically and horizontally. These discussants coming from France and English-speaking world claim that all kinds of capital valorisations and accumulations are present in the cultural and creative industries. They range from a family

firm employing a couple of people to multinational and multi-medial entertainment conglomerates. Creative industries also contain a variety of business models and logics, such as publishing or flow logics. There are also intermediary and teamwork operators, which indicates the presence of a value chain. In these discussions the businesses built around the exploitation of creative ideas are more in focus than the interplay of an artist and audience or an artist and society as in the philosophical concept of mediation. Cultural industries for them are not coterminous with mass culture, even though some mass cultural phenomena exist in them. The term 'cultural industries' refers to much more diverse phenomena than the word 'mass culture'. As we saw in Adorno's conception, industrial processes can produce mass culture as an outcome. However, the writers in this chapter emphasize that it can also produce innovations and diversity directed at limited size of audience.

These ideas give to the concept of cultural industry a descriptive meaning. The writers take the existence and structures of different classical sectors of the cultural industries as granted, despite the lamentations of their being there at all. The idea of adopting a descriptive meaning is to analyse the structures in a disinterested way, if possible. This applies to the accounts dealt with in the middle part of the chapter (Miège, Lash & Urry, Garnham, Caves). These accounts are imprinted by a normative tone when speculating on the possibilities of enhancing progress in the various sectors. Progress for them actually implies preventing centralization and monopolization from taking place and ensuring diversity in the markets. Their intention is to show how to 'correct market failure' to some degree.

Among the economists, Throsby also gives the concept descriptive meaning, but from a different point of view, analysing the whole realm or aesthetic sphere from the perspective of industrial economics. His analysis is not restricted to the classical sectors of the cultural industries. He divides the realm into for-profit and non-profit organizations that both, however, can be analysed from the point of view of economics. This provides the opportunity to include the partly public-supported art institutions. The choice of 'descriptive' analysis stems from the tone of wishing to avoid crude valuations. Throsby's application of industrial economics in the analysis of the creative and performing arts also provides an opportunity to legitimate the concept of the cultural industry. To include the arts as the receiver of public support must at the moment be legitimated or justified in economic terms by the externalities they bring forth. Thus, they are as much industries as the other 'everyday' ones that are 'productive' in their own ways. Throsby's ideas differ also from the analysts of the classical sectors of cultural industries in the sense that the word 'industry' does not connote for him manufacture or serial fabrication, rather simply an activity in a specific area. This is his view of the meaning of the word 'industry'. If not the manipulation of it, it emphasises the one possible sense of the word as a sphere of activity. This is his rhetorical re-description, set against that of his critics who do not necessarily realize this possibility. His idea of economics as an efficient way of organizing non-profit activity as well as for-

profit activity is also a re-description of the issue in the battlefield of cultural critics and free-marketeers.

Caves, with his concept of creative industries, comes very near both to Throsby and the analysts of the classical sectors. He includes the creative arts, albeit from a different point of view than Throsby, emphasizing the contract and intermediating aspect of the creative arts. He also analyses the classical sectors in parallel ways to Miège, Lash & Urry or Garnham.

The Australian discussants of creative industries (Cunningham, Flew) turn their critical gaze on the attempts to legitimate cultural industries, claiming that they are merely tricks to demonstrate the economic credentials of the creative and performing arts, primarily in order to keep their public subsidy. These discussants propagating the concept of creative industries emphasize again the industry element while creativity refers to the potential of any kind of aesthetic (or marketing or technological) innovation to create *(sic)* visible, provable amounts of money. This is indicated in the accounts of British creative industries policies as well as in the accounts of the Australian writers such as Cunningham and Flew. The Australians emphasize more the phenomenon of digital creation whereas the British cultural politicians include whatever aesthetic creation may arise, digital applications included. The British politicians still favour the legitimatory meaning of the creative industries. Along with it they also favour an instrumental meaning of it in an attempt to emphasize its value to both national economy and prestige. In contrast, the Australians devalue the national character of creative industries claiming them to be more 'global' in character. Having said this, they remain as instruments for various agents to secure visible monetary gains.

The accounts described in the first part of the chapter seem to be value-laden recommendations on cultural policies aiming to cater for marginal cultural industries and not to leave them to the free market only, nor to cater solely for the traditional subsidized arts sectors. The role of Unesco is to make recommendations to national policymakers. This imprints their normative tone in the writing. They welcome the new world of global culture but they also state that it is wise to sustain national diversities. They are more likely to regard the diversity and multiplicity of opinions in creative work as the goal of cultural policies. The accounts described in the middle part of the chapter seem to be value-free and descriptive analyses of the structures of these industries (as was stated above) without policy recommendations. Despite this, there are built-in assumptions that creativity lies in the small-scale organization and the more unsuccessful part of the repertoire (in sales terms) or in the work of new artists entering the markets. Standardization lies in the large-scale operations, in the 10 % of the repertoire or in the imitations of the once creative and new prototype. We can find this dissociation in these accounts and the transfer of the myth of genius to the small and innovative.

The threat of concentration is a residue of critical theory in European cultural industry rhetoric. This chapter points at the contradiction and possibilities of both concentration and diversification. One can find in the

stories of these writers empirical evidence for both possibilities. In this sense, the possibilities offer different perspectives to our world of cultural production. It is as if Adorno's nightmares were coming true in the synergy mania of global multimedia conglomerations in which the choices of consumers are entirely predetermined and no possibilities of deviance are 'allowed'. From another perspective, this is not the whole story and the operations of fusions and synergy-seeking can also turn against themselves.

The German word *Kulturindustrie* and the English term 'cultural industries' embody different concepts of culture. The German word *Kultur* refers to the *Bildung*, *Geist* and *Innerlichkeit* that are ends in themselves. It also indicates the result of a process of cultivation which is turned into an instrument of economic operations. The English word 'culture' refers rather to cultivation as a process of embellishing and refining big business as cultural. This suggests the legitimatory meaning of culture in the classical sectors. Printed and electronic media, film and recording industries should also be counted as worthy of public intervention in the form of subsidy and regulation. The word 'cultural' (as in 'cultural industry'), in connection to institutions or creative arts, refers to the practicing of aesthetic and educational creativity. The adjectival form refers in general to the process of cultivation and practice rather than to the results or objects or to cultivated minds.

We can find in Throsby's model a clear image of the range of reference of the cultural industries: from creative arts to commodities. In conclusion I would like to present the criteria for application lying behind this model, beginning with the arts.

The basic criterion for the concept of cultural production in general and for the activities taking place within this field in particular, is some form of *creativity*. Creativity as such can constitute almost anything, but the following specifications draw up some boundaries. According to Lewis, 'the function of that (cultural) object is as a self-conscious, personal or collective expression of something'. Specifications for creativity are self-consciousness and expression. Lash and Urry concentrate in their chapter on cultural industries as 'flows of other sorts of symbols, other forms of communication through aesthetic symbols, images, sounds and narratives'. Specifications for creativity for them are *aesthetic symbols*. Lash and Urry continue: 'the concluding section examines the implication of the circulation of the objects of the culture industries as branded, circulating *intellectual property*.' Intellectual property is a specification that implies that creative deeds have to be turned into commodities or packages of some kind in order to become exchangeable and to be legitimately owned by somebody. These three criteria: creativity, symbolic meaning and intellectual property, are also those which Throsby uses to define cultural commodities. They are also the basis for any kind of cultural industry sector.

In my search for explications for various areas in the model I will begin with the arts. Caves and Throsby share the idea that creative arts are part of the range of reference of the cultural industries. According to Caves, this is due to the situation in which creative artists need 'humdrum' activities and

intermediaries as well as the original authors, while at the same time their 'finger prints' are required in the classical sectors. Various deals and contracts also exist in the creative arts, bringing about the intervention of industrial organizations in the work of an artist. It could be that the myth of genius working under inspiration in solitude has never applied, except during brief periods in an artist's working process. Throsby's reason for including creative arts into the range of reference of cultural industries is the fact that one can apply the tools of economic analysis (for example industrial organization theory) to creative and performing arts as well as other sectors. In both of these lines of enquiry there is no normative claim of one thing being better than another. The analyses can only prove that there are different logics for dealing with and organizing the various sectors.

For classical cultural industry sectors, like publishing, recording, film or media, the Unesco writers give the following criteria. It is a question of cultural industry when cultural goods are produced, reproduced, stored or distributed on industrial and commercial lines, on a large scale with a strategy based on economic considerations, reproduced with the use of machines and by industrial processes. Garnham gives similar criteria. Cultural industries are a private market sector, involving the production and circulation of symbolic meaning and material processes of production and exchange. They are capital-intensive, use technological means of mass production and distribution, divisions of labour, and their objective is, if not profit maximization, at least efficiency. At a general level, the most important criterion seems to be *reproducibility*. This makes it different from the 'core' area of unique objects and performances. Reproducibility implies technical means and the specifications are large-scale or mass production, economic considerations or capital-intensivity or for-profit activity and efficient division of labour.

The problem for all cultural goods, despite the procedures mentioned above, is that their sale is always uncertain. This is also a kind of criterion for cultural goods: that they are 'luxury' goods, not necessities for most people. It is not possible to predict their success in any way. Vertical disintegration, being a part of the history of organization of cultural industries was at the same time a hindrance in securing success. There may be many ways of managing the dangers of this uncertainty. For example, a new kind of both vertical and horizontal integration has been taking place from the 1980s onwards. The centralization of production and distribution, multimediatization, multinational conglomeration and mergers are means to manage uncertain success. At the same time they are criteria that coincide with those of Garnham and the writers in the Unesco report.

However, as has been emphasized many times, in cultural industries there is also the question of independent and small-scale producers. They function as talent and innovation pools for major actors. Depending on the point of view they can also be termed 'dependents': sectors that work as a buffer for majors. In my opinion, the majors can never be the whole story of cultural production. Even in some kind of totalitarian scenario the opposing voices and minorities

cannot be completely stifled. It is precisely due to the fact that 'you never know' that it is rational to produce seemingly controversial products and pass them to the distribution systems. Thus, one method for managing uncertainty is to produce a mixed repertoire of marginals, best-sellers and something 'in-between'. *Being small-scale* and constructing *repertoire* are at the same time further criteria for cultural industries.

The creative industries discourse can contain elements of the circle model for describing the range of reference of cultural industries (as we saw in Caves' analysis and British and Australian contemporary cultural policy). For a more limited, contained discussion we can refer to the software orbit in the circle. Software is a very broad term in this context containing the range of phenomena in digital cultural production. Their criteria are interactivity, convergence, customisation, collaboration and networks. They are simultaneously global and local, while also being less national. The small-scale characteristic in this case can range to even a micro-sized production organization. A further criterion (one that Cunningham and Flew do not take into consideration) is that digital processes may help to decrease the intervention of intermediaries. Almost the whole value chain can be controlled by a single person. This is one option for avoiding the costly major distribution system. This shrinking of the value chain (analogous to the food chain) also makes it possible for a single artist to increase his/her income. Digital networks as such become efficient distribution systems. In general, new information technology assists in constructing small-scale, global/local, networked, audience-oriented, collective and commercial production companies while being at the same time artistic in ethos. Information technologies seem to decrease the power of the discourse on concentration. Consequently, the threshold into publishing, for example, seems to be much lower than in 'analogous' distribution systems, at least at the moment (if one does not take into account the so-called digital divide aspects or the possible future structures of the Internet or the requirements to invest in efficient computers).

In my opening statements, I claimed that the criterion for a cultural product is that it is some sort of commodity. Thus, it seems odd that there are commodities in the outermost orbit of the model. By commodities in the outer orbits I refer to the ordinary, everyday 'necessities', such as food, clothes, detergents or cars. In support of this aspect of my model, it is worth pointing out that Lash and Urry wanted to challenge the usual idea that cultural production has become commodified. Rather, according to them, it is other way around: commodity production has culturalized. Miège also refers to another issue concerning which a huge amount of literature has been written, i.e. the fact that we are witnessing the promotion of commerce by culture. It is the situation in which all kinds of everyday commodities are loaded with symbolic meanings, in other words, branded. Even the most controversial cultures are used and harnessed in this branding. Thus, it also becomes possible to apply the very profound and original criterion of art and cultural work to everyday commodities. In other words, they contain: *aesthetic symbols* or *symbolic meaning*.

As far as the dimension of the speech acts of these words is concerned one might think that the terms 'cultural industries' and 'creative industries' are used to commend the phenomenon quite unproblematically. This is not true. As I have been emphasizing, the discussants referred to in this chapter also see the inherent problems very clearly. Their attitude is not ambivalent, either, but an attitude in which the phenomenon is truly seen as complex. The cultural policies constructed around these industries may also seem to be commending the phenomenon of the cultural industry, seeing it as an asset in a more democratic cultural policy. However, also in this discourse, the concentration of large-scale companies are seen as a threat to which cultural policy should answer by investing in more 'genuine' and 'innovative' cultural industries. It could be that British politicians engaging with the creative industries at the beginning of the 21st century also unquestioningly regard large-scale production as being an asset to British national prestige and economy. It can be said that in the accounts covered in this chapter there are similar appearance/essence dissociations as in Adorno's accounts. For example, one thing can be seen as more appropriate and finer than another thing. This does not hold for cultural economists that seem to deconstruct all normative claims in their analyses. They appear as merely disinterested analysts of various structures and conducts in cultural production. They appear to maintain neutrality on the issue. The case is similar to the descriptive use of cultural industries when pointing at their various classical sectors. However, there is a hidden valuation in the economists' accounts, too. The economists want to contribute to the revaluation of the arts in the face of contemporary politics in which economic values are dominant. They want with their analyses, intentionally or not, to raise the status of the arts in contemporary politics and legitimate their public subsidy. This is done by re-badging arts as *industries*, while those writing on classical cultural industry sectors revaluate them by re-badging them as *cultural*. Basically, the intention in this is similar, legitimating them as a sphere deserving of public intervention in subsidies and regulation.The writers in this tradition also use the words normatively, thus speculating as to what measures would be appropriate to enhance, for example, the goal of diversification in these 'cultural' sectors.

The general approach in these writings is that of the pragmatist: to harness the potential of these industries, but not necessarily for emancipatory leftist political purposes. Rather, these writers emphasise the potential for constructing individual lifestyles while supporting urban infrastructures and national economies. Lifestyle and identity work through aesthetic symbols are not regarded problematical ideas anymore because in these accounts they are counted as 'real'. The ethos seems to be the following: if one finds something pleasureable (or 'cool') it is completely 'legitimate' to use it either instrumentally or to immerse in the world view it may offer for example as a genre of music or film. In this sense, this chapter is a watershed between those that precede it and those that follow. It is an introduction to the following description of the Finnish cultural policy environment.

6 THE FINNISH CASE OF CULTURAL INDUSTRY RHETORIC AND POLICY

The aim of this chapter is to give a local or national example of discourses and policies described in the previous chapter. The 1970s (period of counter cultures, oppositional public sphere etc.), as delineated in chapter 4 forms the background for subsequent discourses (activism turned into life styles, as outlined in chapter 5). The possibility of an oppositional youth culture gives a vision that the logic of the mass culture has become disrupted. This is an important explication for the possibility of a new kind of rhetoric of cultural industries and revaluation of the phenomenon in international and local settings in Finland. Finnish political culture also experienced a time of cultural radicalism during the 1960s and 1970s. Cultural critique played an important role in this movement. In this chapter I will give a very general overview of the discourses at that time and the nature of the critique. I will also highlight the significant changes which occurred at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. The discourses from the 1950s until the 1970s, the changes in them, and the changes in the actual field of production provide a background for the cultural policy of the 1990s. A stronger reception of European cultural policy ideas took place in the 1980s and to a still greater degree in the 1990s. The concept of the cultural industry was adopted into the most prominent vocabulary concerning cultural policy. However, the background of this vocabulary and its legitimation is not only a phenomenon of reception but a deliberate turn against the older domestic discourse.

6.1 Conflicts in the cultural field

The changes in cultural and political life in Finland have been often described as an aesthetic conflict (1950), a generation conflict (1960) and a political conflict (1970). (Tuominen 1991, Hurri 1993, Pantti 1998) In the 1950s the energies of the modernist movements burst out in a variety of art forms (literature, music, visual arts). The 1950s were a time of discourse on modernism, and opinions

both pro and con were strongly represented. The younger generation of artists felt a sense of disillusionment following the loss of the war and they used the modernist language of art to estrange themselves from the nationalist immediate past. The conflict was centred on the language of art and the ways of doing art that would best suit the time and social situation. In this sense it was an aesthetic conflict.

In the 1960s the stringent modernism of the 1950s was questioned by a new generation of so-called 'cultural radicals'. The 1960s was a time of economic, technological and social structural change in Finland. The dramatic increase in urbanization was a major influence. A new style of youth culture had already emerged in the 1950s, but the 1960s was a time of much stronger influence throughout the country. Artistic developments followed the pattern of other Western countries. While the 1920s saw the birth of the avant-garde movement, by the 1960s it was in full blossom. The 1960s was a time of devaluation of old values and life styles.

In 1966 the left-wing parties obtained a slight majority for only the second time in the history of independent Finland and formed a popular front government. During the election victory Ylioppilasteatteri (the Student Theatre) performed a political musical *Lapualaisooppera* written by Arvo Salo (who later became the Social Democrat Minister of Education), composed by Kaj Chycenius and directed by Kalle Holmberg. The play was a kind of rewriting of history, **of** the nature of the nationalistic Lapuan liike movement. The election win and this play, the revitalising of the cabaret tradition, the nomination of Eino S. Repo (in 1965) as director of Yleisradio (the Finnish Public Broadcasting Company) and the founding of several critical magazines were the most prominent events which sparked the further radicalization of the young student generation.

At the end of the 1960s the communist party fractioned and the more radical and dogmatic fraction rallied around their leader Taisto Sinisalo, as after whom the group was named the *taistolaiset*. The transition towards a more stringent soviet orientation and a more dogmatic Marxism-Leninism has been explained as resulting from the disillusionment of the radical left concerning the policy of the popular front government. 1970 saw a right-wing election victory which led to the so-called 'proletarian turn' in leftist cultural life. (Pantti 1998, 24; Raittinen 2002, 22-23; Immonen 1999)

The time of the immediate past – especially concerning the arts and culture and reception of international ideas – is worth its own study. The critique of commerciality and economic mode of production involved the whole cultural field and representants of all forms of arts. I am going to give an overview on the discourse and critique from the point of view of music and film using couple of studies as sources. Music and film are legitimated in this context of cultural industry because they are the most international forms of expression. Hopes and threats are invested mostly to them also in Finland.

6.1.1 Conflicts in music and film

In popular music, existing export restrictions were deconstructed in 1955 which strengthened the invasion of rock 'n' roll music. Besides this trend, Finnish tango dominated the rural dance culture. Students, in the meantime, assumed rather more arrogant musical styles. For them, rhythm & blues was a rebellion against petty bourgeois values. To some degree a division between high and low art took place in popular music in the 1960s. Luoto and Lindfors describe this as division between 'art rock' and 'commercial rock'. The most overt values of 'art rock' were a complexity of pieces and instrumental technical skills. In general, the 'rock ideology' in Finland was also imprinted by claims and beliefs in its 'anti-commerciality' and 'radicalism'. (Luoto & Lindfors 1999, 62-63)

Another sphere in between Finnish classical music and commercial music was the so-called protest song of the 1960s and the song movement of the *taistolaiset* movement which followed. The background for the protest song was the invasion of international popular music into the Finnish domestic market, the Anglo-American student movement and the folk music movement. The aim was to criticize 'commercial' music and to foster a more 'genuine' musical expression. In Finland, the protest song was a reaction to the situation of expansion of international popular music, and an attempt to create a new style of popular music and chanson. The relation to popular culture was complex and problematical. On the one hand, popular musical expression was a medium of critique against the values of high culture. On the other hand, it was a phenomenon of high culture in its critique of commerciality and claims for social and political commentary in song lyrics. (Rautiainen 2001, 16-20)

The European discourses on film found their expression also in Finland. A common element in these discourses was the creation of dissociation between old (entertainment film) and new (art cinema). The motivation in creating this dissociation was to legitimate the ideological, aesthetical and economical claims of new art cinema. In the film discourse and actual filmmaking of this period one can detect aesthetic conflict, generation conflict and political conflict. (Pantti 1998, 10, 42-43)

The dissociations of art and cultural value against industry and economic usefulness were constructed. Thus, divisions of 'high' versus 'low' 'culture' and 'industry' were strongly delineated in the 1950s in film discourse. A concrete distinction was drawn between non-commercial European films versus the dominance of Hollywood. (Pantti 1998, 33, 40)

The old production system was collapsing at that time partly because of the introduction of television. As a result of this collapse, new production companies emerged to take the place of the old system. (Pantti 1998, 7)

The new discourse paved the way towards the replacement of the industrial production model with a new cultural production model. The old studio system had industrially produced several films each year via a small number of companies. By the beginning of the 1960s the situation had switched, with a number of companies producing relatively few films. This is a brief description of the structural transformation of film production as it occurred in

Finland. The discourse on film and the structural transformation of production model indicates that the 'new wave' phenomenon took place also in Finland. (Pantti 1998, 85, 162)

Pantti refers to this period of 1950-1970 as the period of structural change of Finnish film. The chief aim in the discourse and policies at that time was to create a new film *culture* on the ruins of the old film *industry.* As mentioned earlier, the motivation was to secure and legitimise the *raison d´être* of the Finnish new wave and its organization of public support when there was no possibility for business or economical success. The most important outcomes were the founding of the Finnish Film Foundation (1969) and the Film Commission of the Arts Council in the Ministry of Education. (Pantti 1998, 27)

6.1.2 Critique of mass culture

The decades from the 1950s until 1970s were also imprinted by discourse on mass culture, mostly a critique of it. The climate of the 1950s was crystallized in the discussion aroused by the publication *Toiset pidot Tornissa* (Repo 1954). This was the second meeting of young intelligentsia practising a diagnostic of their time. What, broadly speaking, came to life in this discussion was the substitution of intrinsic values by instrumental values, and humanism by technology. This has nothing to do with the Frankfurt School, which was still almost unknown in Finland, but much more with the older and anti-political Germanic cultural critique.

Pekka Gronow as a sociologist promoted a more rationalist and pragmatist line of music policy. His argument in the 1960s was that public money should be directed in relation to the true demand of various musical cultures. The reality for him was that popular music was in demand and practiced more than the movements of classical music, and a value-free and egalitarian music policy would respond aptly to this situation. However, despite his realism he still favoured the idea that cultural policy measures would help the popular music composers and performers to gain 'quality'. This was the legitimation of public money, not to foster just any kind of music without regard to its quality. (Rautiainen 2001, 144)

In other cultural policy documents the line of criticism against entertainment was continued. The Art Committee in 1965 suggested that entertainment should be screened in some way or other. In addition to this, it was held that people should be 'immunized' through art education to defend themselves from the attraction of detrimental entertainment. (Art Committee 1965)

The main problem with popular music for all discussants, was its internationality and industrial nature. The critique of commerciality existed alongside the defence of popular musical expression. The most important background for the critique of commercially produced mass culture was the idea that foreign, mostly Anglo-American, popular culture was a threat to domestic cultural production. (Rautiainen 2001, 129-130)

In the film discourse, the old domestic film industry was regarded to make films that were aesthetically inadequate. There was therefore no sense in trying to research them. Moreover, they were also socially inadequate. This was because the elements of conflict within them only existed at the level of the plot. In this reduction they reflected the mode of production. As a result of the mode of production they did not reflect 'true' social contradictions. Consequently, they were doomed to be classified as escapist entertainment and nothing more. It was impossible to even begin political and social discourse through them. (Pantti 1998, 16, 18)

Pantti describes the dissociations in the film discourse in the following way:

old film industry	new film culture
bad taste	good taste
schema	innovation
unrealistic	realistic

She also compares the Finnish film discourse and critique with the attitudes of the Frankfurt School and Adorno on the cultural industry. The parallel is that both think that the industrial mode of production unifies and standardizes both production and consumption and does not investigate the contradictions of the capitalist system. (Pantti 1998, 44, 48)

It seems as if the music discourse and the film discourse were incompatible, because in music there was a certain degree of questioning of the past elitist classical music tradition and defence of popular music. In the film discourse the past seemed to be too popular and the new critique wanted to create a new esoteric form of filmmaking. The common denominator in these discourses was that they were directed critically at the industrial mode of production both in music and in film. What was demanded was more socially and politically conscious and responsible works of film and music. This reflects the intellectual climate at that time.

Alongside the critique emerged new ideas on cultural policy. The 1970s was a time of construction concerning the cultural policy of the welfare state. This is usually described as the 'new cultural policy' or a 'second line of Finnish cultural policy' after the first line of endowment of the arts ('cultural policy of national prototype'). (Heiskanen 1994; Kangas 1999) The basic idea in this was to guarantee the possibility for ordinary people throughout the country to participate in cultural life, both in receiving and in creating art. Besides the democratization of culture in the sense of the demystification of art, the need was recognised to foster the practice of cultural democracy in the sense that 'what people themselves wish to do is important.' The most important document in this respect was the memorandum of the Cultural Activity Committee (1974), led and written by Arvo Salo. Gronow also took part in the work of this committee and his ideas are clearly seen in the text. It was the writers' claim that public support should not be distributed on the basis of

arbitrary aesthetical valuations but on the basis of what people do in reality. However, again, it was not legitimate to support simply 'anything', but the 'high quality' commercial entertainment culture.

Gronow favoured the conception of cultural industry as fostered in international cultural policy as, for example, by Unesco. He did not use the term critically, but pragmatically. He propagates the idea that because the phenomenon of industrialization and mediatisation of society, knowledge and culture is a reality we must take it seriously. This must not, however, take place by condemning and hopelessly grieving over the situation, but by intervention in the development of it in one way or other. The rationale is that because the cultural industries are quantitatively the strongest producers and deliverers of cultural works and services it should be taken as the most important concern in cultural policy. Gronow used the term descriptively by highlighting the actuality and existence of certain sectors of it without dwelling upon lamentations, for example concerning the commodification of culture. On the other hand, he also used it normatively by drawing attention to the measures involved in bending it to favour both the artists and the audience. (Gronow 1976, 181, 102) Gronow's text was a handbook for artists and cultural workers and was not intentioned to be a study of the field. However, it is a document of a slightly different conception in relation to the dogmatic left. It is important to note that this requirement was expressed already in the mid 1970s and it is not a 'perverse' invention of the 'free marketeers' of the 1990s. Ilkka Heiskanen has also taken part as a discussant in this period. He has also employed a descriptive and intentionally neutral perspective collaborating with the French scholars.

Besides the idea of specific cultural policy, the rhetoric of the cultural industry was also addressed, and not necessarily in the critical sense of the Frankfurt School. The connection with critical theory is in the lamenting over concentration, standardization and schematization which Gronow also regards to be the most striking problems. (ibid. 109) The intention of cultural policy has been to prevent the nightmares of Adorno from becoming realized.

6.1.3 The 'explosion' of the 1980s

The turn of the 1970s and 1980s is described as the diversification of tastes and styles in various cultural fields, especially in popular music, visual arts and cultural journalism. Usually it is described as the turn from overt political commitment to subjectivism in the arts (the visual arts and theatre in particular, see Vieru 1999, Niemi 1999). The overt high cultural requirements of political commitment in popular music also disappeared from the agenda. The 1980s was a turn towards sole consumption and enjoyment of popular music and film. Despite this, political commitment and participation became modified from a total explanation of the world through Marxism-Leninism into various counter-cultures and citizen movements such as the peace movement (with certain connections to a leftist past) and the green movement. (Immonen 1999, 21) This was also reflected in the *Taide* magazine in the 1980s. Leena-Maija Rossi

pointed out in 1999 that after the overt politicization, the 1980s brought about in art discourse a politics of its own kind which was not necessarily recognized as political at that time.

Luoto and Lindfors state that the trends in popular music diversified into several subcultures at the end of 1970s. However, despite this, in the mid 1980s mainstream rock became the most successful trend in the commercial sense. This was a phenomenon of a certain urban 'thirty something' way of life, a turn from *Weltschmerz* into hedonism. Alongside hedonism of course also existed a certain original blend of radical rock and punk culture that became the most powerfully exported popular music at that time. (Luoto & Lindfors 1999, 67)

Vieru (1999, 80) describes the diversification of styles in the visual arts. At the same time the art discourse increased tremendously, with several artists also writing theoretical commentaries. Rossi (1999) described that post-structuralism seemed to acquire a firm position during the late 1980s in art discourse, especially in the *Taide* magazine. At that time the political nature of producing art and of writing about it was more strongly realized and the liberation from the conception of politics of the 1960s and the 1970s was clearly to be seen.

The 1980s also brought a change in media practice and discourse. The monopoly of the Finnish Public Broadcasting Company (Yle) was broken; the sole commercial broadcasting firm, MTV, received a licence to provide news services; and private local radio stations received licenses to broadcast their own channels in 1985. The 1980s brought with it discourses on 'information society', 'interactivity' and 'diversity'. (Heiskanen 1985, 236) In particular, the word 'diversity' takes the place of the word 'equality'. It is more a question of cultural and lifestyle differences and segmented consumer cultures than of political world views.

6.2   Reception of European cultural industry policies

Heiskanen's analysis is part of a project which the Ministry of Education started in 1984. The headline of the project was 'The arts and new technology'. Its aim was to figure out how new technology changes the situation and status of art and traditional cultural industries and how this change should be recognized in the arts and cultural policy in Finland. (Mitchell 1985, 5)

The basic aim of the project was to translate the European model of cultural industry policies into the Finnish setting. The new situation of 'arts and new technology' required bridging the gap between economic and industrial policy and traditional arts and cultural policy. These had previously existed under the broad titles of technology and communications policies. However, the European model provided a new definition: cultural industry policies. According to Mitchell (1985, 26) this cultural industry policy in general involves the subsidy and regulation of commercial cultural production and distribution.

The European tone of correcting market failure - subsidizing cultural forms that free markets do not - is evident also in this. It is worth repeating Mitchell's citation of French Minister of Culture Jack Lang, which pinpoints the 'essential' aim of European cultural industry policies at that time:

> 'As far as the industrial character of this sector (cultural industry sector) is concerned it does not remind us of other sectors, because it produces usually immaterial products. It involves high and hardly calculable risks. If the markets were allowed to play freely it would mean that the leading role would be left to a few big enterprises that are able to do research and development without public support and thus succinct the creative work of the whole sector. The government has taken initiative to foster traditional accepted mechanisms so that they can be used in order to regulate the market as well as encourage innovations by securing against the risks of losses.' (Cit. in Mitchell 1985, 27)

Thus, it is aimed at developing innovative and not very market-oriented cultural industries. According to Mitchell it was not aimed at developing them to be highly profitable nor controlling their contents but to enhance their survival both as an economic sector and a cultural activity. This is strongly reminiscent of the line of argument of the writers of, for example Unesco, as well as of Justin Lewis or of any of those presented in the British Greater London Council experiment on urban policies. In 1989 the Viestintäkulttuuritoimikunta (the working group of media culture) began working on the basis of the project suggested by the government in 1987 to promote the Finnish audiovisual sector. Numerous recommendations were put forward for measures to be taken, such as export programmes, increasing education in the industry and pre-recession logical measures including increased budget funding for subsidizing audiovisual production. (Viestintäkulttuuritoimikunta 1989)

A later document, a memorandum of the Kulttuuripolitiikan linjat (the lines of cultural policy, 'Kupoli') committee from the year 1992 belongs to the same historical phase and line of rhetoric. However, a great number of changes in the cultural industry scene occurred during the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Most important of these was the disintegration of the Finnish Public Broadcasting Company's monopoly in the media sector. Cable television also became established alongside Finnish public service broadcasting. In the year 1992 commercial broadcaster MTV3 began its own channel, thus changing the television broadcasting system. This bears witness to the Finnish case of media deregulation. However, in the development of the book publishing and recording industry no radical changes took place. The film industry also remained much as it was, being subsidized chiefly by the Finnish Film Foundation.

The range of reference of the cultural industries seems to be represented by the central orbits of the circle model that I presented in chapter 5; that is, the classical sectors of cultural industries. The Kupoli committee considers these to include the publishing industry, television and radio, film, video and the recording industry (in this order) (Kupoli 1992, 186-199). Heiskanen takes the segmentation a bit further than this. In his analysis (1985) he concentrates on the

audiovisual cultural industry and its content creation industry: film and television. He excludes *information products* of mass communication: newspapers, radio and television news and factual programmes and articles (which in other contexts count among cultural industries). He refers exclusively to the *traditional cultural industry sectors*: the publishing industry or the recording industry. (Heiskanen 1985, 196-197)

6.2.1 Opinion making in view of the critical past

The attitudes radiating from the Kupoli memorandum reflect the general change in cultural sciences from the leftist doom of mass culture into a new kind of understanding and analysis of reception processes. The writers generally consider the idea of mass communication as ruining the consciousness of people through superficial entertainment to be cultural pessimism. (Kupoli 1992, 180) The point of reference is the older domestic discourse and the international theories surrounding this issue. Despite the fact that cultural producers are more and more linked to the business world, as the writers claim, cultural production is not to be left simply to be the playground of the free markets. This is in its pure form the opinion recepted from European discourses on cultural industries as described in the previous chapter. The special catchwords of both Kupoli writers and Heiskanen include 'user sovereignty,' 'self-determination' or 'autonomy'.

For Kupoli writers, the lack of these values is due to the tough play of markets in the cultural sector:

> 'The hard forces of markets seem to substitute the monopoly of the public sector but cannot guarantee the self-determination of the users. In the new oligarchy there is difficulty hearing the voice of the users'. (Kupoli 1992, 181)

For Heiskanen, the solution does not lie in the activity of the public sector, either. According to him, the characteristic feature of the public sector is its tutelage of the media contents or controlling of what is deemed appropriate for the people. He is in accord with the Kupoli writers in his view that the 'free marketeers' do not *necessarily* offer a solution either. The chief interest of the economic actors is, of course, to make use of the new emerging possibilities to valorise capital and as a 'by-product' to act benevolently in favour of the national economy as a whole. Both of these factors, the activity of the public sector and the economic sector, may harm 'user sovereignty'; one through tutelage and the other through the doctrine of the median consumer which does not take into account differentiated consumer groups. (Heiskanen 1985, 195-197)

The solution for the Kupoli writers seems to be to enhance the infrastructure and situation of small commercial producers for the following reason:

> 'Small units produce usually more innovative outputs in relation to the investments put in them than the medium and large-scale units. Small units usually give rise to new ideas and more unconventional solutions.' (Kupoli 1992, 183)

The course of things dictates that these innovations produced in small and flexible units in turn feed the distribution sector and large-scale units. In a way, they produce the pool of material from which to glean products which are most appropriate and ripe for a large-scale audience. This is the rationale familiar from the previous chapter, such as from Lewis' account; for example, a relatively unheard of garage band which attracts a small following and is eventually picked up by a big label which is scouting for something 'cool' and which might therefore bring them big audience success. It is also reminiscent of the rationale of the small/innovative versus big/conventional. Nonetheless, Kupoli writers seem to count on the efficiency of subsidizing specialized and quality products. They firmly oppose the idea that a growing number of products indicates growth in innovation and plurality (the rationale held by the so-called 'free market ideology'). Thus, innovation and plurality must be enhanced through public measures. (Kupoli 1992, 183-184)

Heiskanen seemed to differ in this thought as early as in 1985. Even if he defends small-scale units and their opportunities to produce for 'differentiated audience segments', he does not defend public subsidy for so-called 'quality products' (on which the operations of the Finnish Film Foundation were based). He expresses his concern towards the intellectual radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s and the divisions of conservative versus radical that it brought with it, and which still held a firm position in 1985. (Heiskanen 1985, 199, 205) A curious detail in his account is his description of a kind of 'audience trap':

> 'While the audiences have segmented, contents are created for the strongest and most conspicuous audiences. These include those still suffering from the structural transformation of our society, the older generation and the generation born after the war. New urbanised generations and those which grew up with middle class values and lifestyles are forgotten or are dominated by the artificially fostered nostalgia for the immediate past.' (Heiskanen 1985, 208-209)

The curious aspect in this passage is that, with respect to when this article was written, the Finnish people are currently witnessing the domestic broadcasting system from the point of view of 'twenty years later on,' and for this reason they could turn this argument upside down. The strongest and most conspicuous audiences are the generations born after the 1960s and 1970s. They represent the 'norm audience'. This is largely due to the influence of the two channels of commercial broadcasting, and the fact that this audience is the most prone to consume the products advertised on television and private radio channels. The Finnish Public Broadcasting Company (Yle), for its part, is compelled to continue its commercial aspects in order to retain at least some share of audience in order to legitimate the television licence payments that it demands from the receivers. The older public (the post WWII generation) are accustomed to complaining about the situation and feel that they are completely forgotten or only occasionally offered something worthwhile. Back in 1985 this scenario was predicted as being a possible future outcome, and it has indeed proven to be the case. Heiskanen forecasted that after such 'structural transformation' the generations born after 1960 will not steer towards nostalgic television production.

Kupoli and the publication by Mitchell are important reflections of opinion making in our immediate past. They strongly oppose the cultural pessimism and elitism of previous decades and want to render available for the Finnish use a European kind of cultural policy discourse that is based on contemporary cultural studies and on special cultural industry discourses in Europe. Kupoli writers still carry with them the worries of the 'big versus small.' One can trace these even in Heiskanen's account. However, he calls for healthy, economically viable, or even strongly profitable productions, especially for the audiovisual sector.

6.2.2 Cultural industry policies in the 1980s

Heiskanen's chief objective for new cultural industry policies is to enhance the economically healthy and profitable audiovisual production sector (in addition to other cultural industry sectors). He expresses his resentment as follows:

> 'In some domestic sectors of audiovisual production the 'lively core' of private entrepreneurship has totally disappeared, the will and ability to produce successful, for-profit works attracting large audiences has disappeared.' (Heiskanen 1985, 218)

This sentiment applied primarily to film, which was still imprinted by the Finnish 'new wave' ideology, but was also directed at television programmes. According to Heiskanen, the reason for this is the small-scale size of the domestic market. It was also partly due to the objectives of the producers, their elitism and highbrow ideals. The model he refers to in order to open up this situation is that of Channel Four of the BBC. Heiskanen calls for markets for commercial independent television and film producers in order that a new television channel might open. His main objective is content creation based on a healthy economic foundation. (Ibid. 220)

The Kupoli writers continue where the writers of the 1985 publication left off, with the vision that cultural industry policy is a kind of bridge between art and cultural policy and financial and industrial policy: it is an amalgamation of both. The very basis of this policy is education and training both in producing and understanding messages, with freedom of expression at its core. In the context of new technologies, the very objective of cultural industry policy should be the construction of infrastructure, and to enable artists to increase their use of these new channels and equipment.

Whereas the Kupoli writers speak in very broad and general terms, Heiskanen is more specific in his analysis. He claims that the most important subsidies should be channelled towards the 'raw material' of production, the provision of scholarships for artists in their creative work. It is of course wise to not become sidetracked by the terminology here. From the point of view of the cultural industry, artists' scholarships are directed at the 'creative core' to use Throsby's formula. It is the subsidy of creative work, but not of its economy. In the context of cultural industry policy it is a question of the support of this economy. In Heiskanen's opinion the only true economic support was the

production support provided by the Finnish Film Foundation. This was maintained in order to 'keep the film industry alive'.

Besides traditional state budget money, television licence payments and lottery money there are at least a couple of other sources of funding available to help keep the industry going. Certain income transfer methods exist within the industry, for example, film exhibitors pay a so-called 'foundation payment' with which to subsidise new film production. These payments are also tax deductible for the exhibitors. As consumers, when buying blank CDs or video cassettes we pay a copyright fee which is included within the price of the purchased item. All presenters of recorded music performed in public must also pay a copyright fee. There are several organizations in Finland that coordinate these copyright money transfers: Teosto, Gramex, Videoteosto, Kopiosto. (Heiskanen 1985, 231-232)

All of the writers within the union are in agreement concerning the fact that the Finnish cultural industry policy has been uncoordinated and fragmented. Is it ever, in practice, possible to coordinate it thoroughly? In my opinion this certainly poses quite a challenge, if only due to the sheer number of different industries with different business models and logics of capital valorization. A separate system for each industry may therefore be required, although together film and television are the most critical in this respect due to their capital-intensive nature. Musicians and writers can earn from copyright incomes and royalties, and the publishing industry can benefit from its own 'wise' policies.

For example, Heiskanen's message was oriented in both directions. The investors should take content creation industry seriously. It *can* be economically profitable and return investment. Equally, the content creators should take the economic realities seriously in order to bring the hostilities between themselves and investors to an end. In many respects Heiskanen was 'progressive' in his writings from the point of view of contemporary cultural policy.

6.3 Formation of contemporary cultural industry discourse and policy

There are several background factors involved in the contemporary discourse and policy of the cultural industry. The ideas presented above are important, namely the European and international models, and especially the work of Unesco which was brought to Finland through the activities of several persons, in particular Ilkka Heiskanen and Ritva Mitchell. Along with this is the change of the cultural and political climate in the 1980s, the change in conception of the arts and politics and the diversification of the actual cultural production scene. The economic importance of art and culture and their externalities formed a special line of discourse that found resonance in Finland following the economic recession. The very broad background for the cultural policy of the

1990s stems from the dominance of economic and technological thought globally and nationally at that time. Cultural politicians - and artists - were obliged to adapt to the language, vocabulary and models of thinking of the free market economy and continuous technological progress. This is due to a much broader change of public management strategies since the end of the 1980s which involves the whole public administration and **which** is implemented broadly in European countries. Marketisation, privatisation, management techniques and tactic are welcomed and employed under the doctrine of New Public Management. This doctrine is believed to bring fourth efficiency and accountability. With help of these it is much easier to control the costs and benefits of public organizations, arts institutions included. (Kangas 2003; Eräsaari 2002; Heiskanen 2001)

Cultural sector for its part has to contribute the structural transformation of the welfare state. Expressed in broad terms, for the cultural sector this means the change from financing by public subsidy to a model market-driven mode of cultural production. In the report *In from the Margins* by the Council of Europe, the linking of cultural policy to the markets is described as taking place in two ways. On the one hand, cultural policy attempts to 'correct the market failure.' This is the motivation for cultural industry policies. It is widely accepted by European governments that sectors of cultural industries cannot necessarily cater for their own needs. It is necessary to protect national film production, rock and popular music industries or language minority literature in order to compete with competition from Hollywood and other international industries. This is precisely the same rationale described earlier in this thesis. The subsidy of traditional art institutions is also a form of correction of market failure. However, in the European cultural policies of the 1990s the second means of connection to markets in cultural policy is based on the 'fact' that public money for arts institutions is decreasing and they are forced to increase their own funding through, for example, private sponsorship deals. Another necessary requirement is to adopt a business approach in their organization and management. (Council of Europe 1998, 63)

The market-driven cultural production can be understood as the rise of cost-efficiency and profit-seeking in cultural administration thinking and in its requirements for arts institutions. It is a line of thought in which the public sector is also productive in some senses, for example, in terms of production of health care or cultural services. It is required to produce as much as possible with the minimum possible resources. Thus, to reduce and amortise the resources needed demand must be maximized for each single given item, such as a theatrical piece. In the cultural sector cost-efficiency and profit-seeking leads to the question of the audience: 'What do people want'?' The question of the marketeers has entered public subsidy decisions. In practice, the Ministry of Education provides goals of audience size to the arts institutions and they have to meet the requirements in some way or other. What might this mean? The following passage from the document of the Helsinki University of Art and Design (1997, 4) gives an implication: 'In relation to this (the requirements of

renewal of public cultural subsidy) there are claims to renew the criteria for public funding so that the quality and need of services are measured in the markets.' Public subsidy in Finland is still about 0,2 % of GNP. Many theatres, orchestras, museums and the National Opera are still working under the shelter of law. Their subsidy is not necessarily removed but they have to legitimate their grants and subsidies through better performance, especially in terms of increased audience attraction. There is a criticism (for example, Uusitalo 2001) that this leads to the situation in which art institutions forget their role as undertaking 'cultural work' by continuing to present traditions and cultural heritage in a versatile way. They are forced to perform tricks to gather as large an audience as possible. The writers of the *In from the Margins* report also speculate whether this leads to 'intellectual laziness' and 'the denial of the possibility to fail,' (in economic terms) which, paradoxically, is considered to be the way to 'progress' in the arts. (Council of Europe 1998, 61, 64, 68)

A factor that is linked to the turn in public management doctrine is general and global development of the information society. Discourses on the information society were frequent as early as in the 1980s, and occurred even after the 1960s. The 1990s saw the emergence of a new global boom in this field. It was adopted into the Finnish political agenda and the slogan in the mid 1990s quickly became, as in the report of Ministry of Finance, '*Suomi tietoyhteiskunnaksi'* ('Finland towards the information society'). The agenda has spread to all sectors and levels of public administration, the Ministry of Education included. Why is this so? I think the most general answer to this question is found in the following sentence from the report; 'In the economy of global competition there is no alternative to the constant growth of productivity' (Valtionvarainministeriö 1996, 4). It seems very clear that the information society strategy at that time was based solely on economic values. There was a general twofold theory on the uses and effects of information technology: 1) it is a medium of rationalisation of work and administration 2) it is a medium for a new kind of business activity. Thus: 'information technology and communication networks are media for renewal of both private and public sectors' (Valtionvarainministeriö 1996, 6). The significance of this to the public sector is, in effect, simply the introduction of a new form of electronic clientage, and services that might in the long run reduce the size of public sector employment. The outcome of the strategy at that time was the establishment of the Information Society Programme and the Council of Information Society.

The change in academic cultural sciences for its part has paved the way for revisions in cultural policy programmes. Already in the 1980s the change of the media landscape (deregulation and disintegration of the state monopoly) and the change in the intellectual climate were present, which can be traced in the Kupoli memorandum. However, the change and turn in cultural research of various kinds after the 1960s gained stronger influence on cultural policy in the 1990s. Semiotics, post-structuralism, cultural studies, and pragmatism are intellectual schools that 'deconstructed' old norms, valuations and *fashion*s in the academic field.

Kellner refers to the intellectual climate since the 1960s as a time of theory wars or theory fever. Post-structuralism abandoned structuralism, semiotics, psychoanalysis, Marxism or any kind of totalising discourses. Nevertheless, in a way it did still lean on these earlier theories. Various kinds of syntheses emerged in the spheres of Feminist studies or minority studies. According to Kellner, the reason for the warlike situation was the eagerness of the researchers to find a clue to our culture after the disillusionment of the totalising explanations of, for example, Marxism. Every new idea was considered to be another piece in the puzzle. Besides post-structuralism, the cultural studies and various syntheses were often used to abandon the ideas of the Frankfurt School. Kellner, for his part, propagates a multi-perspective analysis, which advocates taking the 'fruits' of various schools in order to give a more valid vision of, for example, popular cultural phenomena. He indicates that without the 'paranoia' of the Frankfurt School we end up in 'cultural populism', 'audience fetishism' or 'romanticized affects'. (Kellner 1998, 29-56) Despite the fact that international movements have sometimes appeared in Finland following a period of delay, it is evident that at least since the end of the 1980s Finland has not been a place of sanctuary from theory disputes and unrest.

6.3.1 The work of the Cultural Industry Committee

These factors partly prompted the Ministry of Education to set up a special Cultural Industry Committee in March 1997. Its task was to study the situation of the Finnish cultural industry, to revise attitudes on it, to revise the actual concept of it, and to suggest objectives and policies to develop it. The work of the committee is on the one hand rhetorical, in the sense that it tries to change opinions and convince the audience to accept a new way of thinking. On the other hand it is pragmatic in the sense that it suggests concrete projects and analyses policies. The set-up was cross-governmental, involving representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Labour, and the Ministry of Transport and Communication. Besides these, other representatives of industry and technology policies (Sitra and Tekes) were involved. The chairperson, Hannele Koivunen, was from the Ministry of Education. This emphasizes the role of cultural industry policy to situate itself in a bridge-building position between economic, technology and traditional cultural policies. There was also representation by universities, academies, the Finnish Public Broadcasting Company (Yle), and publishing and production companies.

The immediate intention in setting up this committee was described by Koivunen and Tanja Kotro in *Arsis*, the information periodical of arts administration. It was the change of the operational context of the cultural sector brought about by the ICT, Information and Communication Technologies. The aim of the committee was simply to introduce the information society strategy to the cultural sector. Later on in this analysis one can see that the change also occurred in economic terms. But what does the ICT

actually change? A very broad description of the importance of information society development for the cultural sector is as follows: 'Information networks offer channels to deliver creative contents globally with a low threshold of publishing' (Koivunen & Kotro 1997, 19). This is a tremendous vision that is at the very core of the 'cultural' information society. Digital information and communication is a global medium and channel through which almost everyone has an opportunity to be heard. Geography, time, distance, language, ethnicity, hierarchies and inequalities of the art institution and media system seem to be swept away.

These are the general motivations of the work of the committee. The points of view arising from the development of the cultural industry in the 21st century are those of new technology and entrepreneurship in culture. The motivation for the work of the committee is outlined as follows:

> 'The central purpose of these action proposals is to create the preconditions needed for making Finland an important country in the field of content creation as well as of information technology by means of increasing the investments in culture and strengthening its importance.' (Cultural Industry Committee 1999, 4)

The idea 'for making Finland an important country in the field of content creation' was hailed as a serious objective of the new state government in the spring of 1999. It was taken on board and the idea became a kind of slogan iterated on various occasions after the programme of Lipponen's II government, for example in preliminary report (1999) by Jouni Mykkänen, Managing Director in Finnish Film Foundation on the situation of Finnish content creation industries. Generally, it can be understood as the 'second phase of information society development': the development of software and their application in various products and services that 'fill' the technological apparatus or platform with 'content'. This is regarded as the challenge for Finland, which is known as a high-tech country with regards to technological hardware. The appointment of the Cultural Industry Committee was already previously initiated (after the introduction of information society strategies) in the work of the Finnish Information Society programme and the Council of Information Society. This was intended to continue in the work of the Content Creation Initiative *SiSu*, which in 2000 began under the new name *Sisältötuotantohanke*.

The goal of the Cultural Industry Committee was the following:

> 'The cultural objective of developing the operational preconditions for content and cultural industry is to provide the Finnish market with as much Finnish culture as possible and to seek growth in the international market'. (Cultural Industry Committee 1999, 6)

The role of cultural policy is to enhance the infrastructure of entrepreneurship both in its analog and digital forms. There is also a clear intention to enhance Finnish *cultural* production as well as to seek a growing international status for it. Other work requirements included not only increasing the size and volume of companies but searching for further audiences for small-scale production internationally. An amazing issue is the description of Finland as a kind of 'personalized creature' in the face of the claims of our world being an interplay

of globality and locality in which nationality is no more an important issue (for example, the creative industries rhetoric). This is, of course, the continuation of the old issue of national survival in the face of an international invasion of commercial culture, and national prestige in the arts sector. The new variation on this theme is the rhetoric of the competitive edge of Finland in international markets - cultural markets included.

In the preliminary article Koivunen and Kotro present two forms of democracy in cultural production that information technologies offer. First; 'New technology can be applied to the traditional forms of art and culture, and to its distribution.' Furthermore, they increase the interactivity between the artist and the receiver. This is the idea of 'democratisation of culture' (see Henry 1993). It is to deliver art to a wider range of audience groups and to organize art education in order to demystify art. Second; 'Technology prompts new forms of art and new kinds of expression' (Koivunen & Kotro 1997, 19). This is a form of 'cultural democracy', the opportunity for people to indulge in freedom of expression and take part in formulating and influencing the landscape of cultural production. In the context of information technology the fact is that the laic and popular discourse is often ignored. Information and communication technology is often understood only as a channel. However, as the first point indicates, it is by nature more a medium than a channel. Furthermore, it is also a medium in the sense of an 'instrument', like a pencil and paper, brush and canvas or flute and piano. One cannot also forget the role of information technology as a medium of 'help' in the working process of an artist. Thus, in general, the new information and communication technologies involve the whole cultural production sector in one way or other, if not in expression then at least in communication networking and managing.

Koivunen (1999, 293, 295) emphasizes both forms of democracy: 1) large distribution and acquisition of the arts and 2) personal creativity for all. The latter can also be combined with the idea of diversity. Democracy as wide distribution is regarded to be 'real', unlike Adorno seemed to think. In order to avoid the accusation of censorship in the name of the majority, however, Koivunen also includes the idea of diversity, which is also a form of democracy and one which is needed to balance the scene. In this we avoid the deficit of Adorno's thought of devaluing large audiences and their significance. Furthermore, we also avoid the deficit of opinions that emphasize only large audiences and volume of production (for example, the Content Creation Initiative, which was later introduced in Finland). It is like finding a safe, 'truly' democratic way between the alternatives of censorship in the name of the majority or minority (see Keppler and Seel in chapter 3).

This is the hope invested in the ICT. There are also sentiments of threat. This sentiment is familiar to that of centralisation as mentioned in chapter 5. In Koivunen's writings it is not only centralisation of distribution as in the previous accounts, but one of actual production in multimedia corporations: 'The threatening vision might be the centralisation of the media so that there is no more a place for versatile content creation and small and medium size

entrepreneurs. It may also mean inequality in the delivery and distribution of information' (Koivunen & Kotro 1997, 19). These are rather obvious consequences. But Koivunen implicates in 1999 (Koivunen 1999, 294) that it is the ICT itself which offers a counter tendency to this course by encouraging the small and marginal producers to find markets globally. Heiskanen (2002, 147-148) also states that the traditional vision of a European threat is formulated from 'fashion' through new technology. One could speculate, for example, concerning the music industry that the digital 'revolution' structurally transforms the whole sector. The intermediaries disappear while a single author alone performs all procedures from creation to distribution. This prevents conglomerates from controlling production and distribution, as there are always possibilities to divert from the mainstream and even to find audiences via the Internet.

Uusitalo and Jyrämä (2002, 91, 99) ask in their article 'Do new technologies change the value chains of enterprises?' The music industry is taken as one of their examples. Their findings were that small units take advantage of the Internet by commercialising and distributing their artists globally. However, big units can take advantage as well by segmenting their supply more efficiently and operating in niche markets, an option which was not economically viable for them before. Thus, they intervene in the markets of the minority players. At the level of business organization, the ICT functions in a twofold way, fostering both specialization and concentration. In other words, the small players using the ICT do not in any way threaten the position of the big players in the markets. This does not, nevertheless, wipe away the threat of concentration at organizational level. At the level of cultural output the winner in this situation seems to be the 'marginal' or 'niche' artist.

6.3.1.1 The relation to critical theory

The echoes of critical theory are interwoven with the vision of the threat of concentration. This vision forms the outline of critical theory also in the work of the Finnish Cultural Industry Committee. Thus, the aim of public intervention in cultural industries has been to prevent the nightmare form being realized. However, there are many ideas in which it differs and even consciously tries to distance itself from the tradition of the German form of critical theory. The cultural policy writers in the previous chapter and the Finnish opinion-makers take for granted the descriptions of diversification and marginal cultures or subcultures in, for example, the studies on the structures of cultural industries. There is also empirical evidence to support this description. The end of 1970s and the 1980s were times of entry of counter cultures into cultural industries, and it is this development that public policies attempt to foster. The empirical facts of transformation are used as the rhetorical legitimation for the policies of cultural industries at state level. In this context, from a Skinnerian point of view it is not necessarily 'obligatory' to prove the claim but to understand that the idea is used as a rhetorical device to legitimate one's policies.

In broad terms it is a rhetorical description in the sense that the world is understood as changing from an industrial into a post-industrial forum. The idea of cultural industry nowadays sounds somewhat anachronistic because in contemporary societies it is no longer a question of an industrial production model but of a post-industrial one. On the other hand, the term is fitting because the post-industrial production model is basically a question of culture; factors such as, for example, symbolic meanings in trade marks make it a cultural phenomenon.

I have used the text by Tanja Kotro (project secretary of the committee during 1997-1999) published in the Web site of Cultural Industry Committee, in which she discusses the role of Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno in relation to contemporary economic models, to construe the relation of the committee to the critical theory. It is not a study or thesis on the subject but only a preliminary paper concerning the concept of cultural industry. However, as a preliminary paper it is a document of the ethos and world view the committee was seeking to create among the readers of its proposals. Writing this text she was influenced by the theories of post-industrialism, especially the book by Lash and Urry cited in the chapter 5. A following list of dissociations can be construed on the basis of the text.

old	new
industrial	post-industrial
Fordist	post-Fordist
hierarchy	network
in-house	outsourcing
large-scale	small- and medium-scale
uniformity	specialization, diversity
commodity/ware	symbolic meaning
mass	individual
counter culture	lifestyle
political activist	active consumer
'keeping up with	'making a difference to
the Joneses'	the Joneses'
the logic of mass culture	social logic
The Frankfurt School	Cultural Studies
	Scott Lash
	Pierre Bourdieu

This is also a clarification of the previous chapter and a description of the way the writers referred to differ from the point of view of critical theory.

In Finnish cultural industry policy texts the above dissociations work as the legitimation of policies. These oppositions are also clearly to be found in Kotro's and others' writings on this issue. This can be understood in terms of positioning oneself in relation to 'old' theories and the 'old' world claiming that we live in a 'new kind of world' in which we need a 'new kind of theory' to illustrate and analyse this situation. The 'old' and 'new' are of course entirely relative concepts. An opponent of the view described here might claim that we live rather in a 'new' world of *Erlebnisgesellschaft* in which all deviations and differences are integrated to feed the commercial system and that this procedure does not in character deviate in any way from the logic of mass

culture. Sometimes an 'old' text make us think about issues in much more deeper level than a 'new' one. An 'old' one sometimes brings fourth disillusionment in the face of the 'new'.

However, for Kotro (and others), emphasizing the small-scale, individuality, activity etc. works to revaluate the phenomenon of the cultural industry and devaluate the old connotations attached into it. With these dissociations the writers attempt to structure the changes in valuations and construct a more positive attitude towards the phenomenon they are promoting. It is also a project of redefinition and conceptualization of cultural industries anew in relation to critical theory and the political climate of the 1960s and the 1970s. The 'old' critical theory is identified as the analysis of the old model of industrial production. The aim here is to state that the historical context, and with it the production model, has changed to the extent that the critical theory apparatus no longer applies as an analytical tool in the contemporary situation. This is a rhetorical re-description in the sense of revaluating the phenomenon of the cultural industries by highlighting global changes and the need to change the description of the cultural industry into a more positive one. The same original term as used by Adorno is still employed, thus they do not rename it.

The ideas on consumption might require a few words of clarification. For example, Justin O'Connor (who gave a speech in 1999 in connection with Finnish cultural industry policies) emphasizes that the mass consumption habits of the 1950s/60s changed into the niche markets of 1970s/80s. This is to say that the consumption habits changed first and the production culture changed afterwards from Fordism to post-Fordism in order to be able to react to the changes in consumption more elastically. This indicates the Bourdieuan 'social logic' of producers reacting towards the different consumer groups. (Bourdieu 1984) The old logic is one of mass culture in which large masses of consumers are 'made to want' something produced without consulting them first, and which sustains and grows with the social compulsion to keep up with the neighbours due to the fear of social exclusion (keeping up with the Joneses). O'Connor even claims that amidst the background of the contemporary social logic are the counter cultures of the 1960s, which as a system is the opposite of the logic of mass culture. It is based on the ideals of personal expression, of breaking the rules, of the explicit rejection of the established social and artistic order. This has led to consumer behaviour in which 'material (commodity/ware) consumption has become increasingly cultural, central to the construction of meaning and identity'. This is what Bourdieu calls 'reflexive consumption'. According to O'Connor there is no need to reach for the *Dialektik der Aufklärung* on your bookshelf when you hear the term 'cultural industry'. (O'Connor 1999, 4)

Jari Muikku describes this in the context of the recording industry as a system of reciprocity and mutual activity between the entrepreneur and the audience. The worker in the industry tries to sense the 'pulse' of the buying public and tries to predict future tastes. As the cycle continues, the disc jockeys

or fanzine journalists and recording companies act as 'authorities on taste' for the public. The logic behind this is that producing records in business is a kind of lifestyle in which work and leisure are intertwined. The producer or other workers visit concerts, clubs and parties in order to sense what is 'going on' and what is 'in'. Usually, especially with small labels, the production policies reflect the very musical taste of the entrepreneur. His/her public is also an audience specialized within this genre. This audience listens and follows the genre even 'structurally' which Adorno did not realize took place in popular music during his time. This is a process which has prompted the large corporations to divert from standard production. (Muikku 2001, 28, 32, 54, 55)

Liisa Uusitalo (1998, 216) describes how the analysis of consumer behaviour was earlier described as being determined by various class, reference group, cultural and social backgrounds. In the 'post-modern' descriptions it is rather described as the activity of *deconstructing* existing social structures and *reconstructing* new ones. Thus, consumption has role in social structuring. However, Uusitalo is rather cynical towards the utopian descriptions of the 'sovereign shopper' in cultural theories that stem from the ideas of the classical political economy. Neither can one accept the determinist view of critical theory. Thus, she claims implicitly that German critical theory has certain validity in contemporary world. It would be logical to try to find the middle ground between determinism and sovereignty in explaining the production-consumption relationship. (Uusitalo 1998, 227)

In general, the Cultural Industry Committee considers Benjamin to be more appropriate also in the contemporary situation because he sees audiences in a different light to Adorno. On the other hand, he sees democratic potentialities in the reproduction processes that Adorno regards to be only illusionary. In the Kunstwerk essay the point of reproduction is on the one hand exactly this democratic delivery: that the work of art meets the receiver, even in his/her own home. This is indicated in the following passage: 'In Benjamin's theory there is hope and he counted more on the audience than Adorno did. There are to be interpreted new ideas of democracy in Benjamin's writing. According to him it is crucial in appreciating film, such as in sport where each spectator is an expert of sorts. Benjamin describes the relationship of the masses in the face of art as being transformed from reactionary to progressive. In the progressive attitude the pleasure of seeing and experiencing combines with professional judgement. Furthermore, the technological innovations in the various art forms extend to the optical and acoustic register of receiving which increases the possibility of understanding what is seen and heard.' (Kotro 1999, 1)

It is not very clearly stated why the reactionary stance is transformed into a progressive one. Technological innovations are not an additional factor but the very issue of this progressiveness. It is the ability through film and photography to study the optical world in its minute details which make the receiving process more progressive in the face of ordinary life. The succession of a film narrative also has a mutually enhancing effect with the experience of

modern city life. Benjamin's account must be read also in connection with his idea of the transformation of the concept of art. The 'aura' of unique artwork in a museum is a kind of mystification of that work and the source of the religious character or cult of the older artistic tradition. The technological innovations in Benjamin's time transformed the conception of art into a more mundane and secular, and because of that, more progressive process. Another important point, which in my opinion is not so clearly referred to, is the idea that with the help of technology it is possible to create actual works of art, and not only mass culture. Benjamin himself is no more 'responsible' for the contemporary fact that photography par excellence is prone to lean towards the mystified new sphere of visual art. Benjamin's ideas of reproducibility are also able to be transferred to involve the whole mediatized reality as was indicated in chapter 4.

6.3.1.2 The concept

The section 'The relation to critical theory' gave implications of the background facts in relation to which 'the concept of cultural industry must be considered anew'. This section deals with the new consideration in conceptual terms. Thus, one must start by analysing the word *industry*. In the final report of the Cultural Industry Committee it is explicated in the following way; "The concept of the cultural industry is problematic, the word *industry* refers to a specific sphere of activity, and does not necessarily correspond to the connotations of the Finnish word for industry." (Cultural Industry Committee 1999, 13) So, it is not question of factories and manufacture as the Finnish word *teollisuus* usually indicates. According to O'Connor (1999, 3) it 'can now be applied to any set of activities whose product is more or less similar'. This definition is clearly present in the background of for, example, Throsby's analysis. Thus, there can be as much a 'care industry' as a 'paper industry'. O'Connor refers to the situation in which the word 'industry' has never lost its old connection to the word 'industriousness', meaning diligence, and that it has never been restricted only to manufacturing diligence. The German word *Industrie* also has this meaning in the context of the word *Fleiß*. Apparently, the origin of the Finnish word for industry is also in a word with same connotations as diligence or *Fleiss*. The direct Finnish translation of diligence is *ahkeruus*, but this has connotations with the word *tehdä* (to make), which is the etymological root of the word *teollisuus* (industry). From the verb *tehdä* we get the Arendtian implication of fabrication, *Herstellen,* which differs from action, *Handeln.* The common issue in arts and industrial labour is fabrication. This may explain the possibility of using them together and differentiating them from politics as a realm of action (with the exception of policy making). (see Arendt 1958)

The economic (and fabrication) connotations cannot and are not even intended to fade away when referring to the word *toimiala* (set of activities) with the word 'industry'. That is self evident, because they want to speak 'the major language or our time'. At the same time they want to cause the artist and cultural producers to believe in their message. Thus, they write 'the concept is useful, however, because it combines two separate spheres traditionally miles

apart: artistic creativity and economic production'. (ibid. 13) The word which convinces both the humanist and the artist is, of course, *culture,* and it is still used in connection to industry. Later on this word disappears or is substituted with the word *creative* (in Finnish *luova*), which does not necessarily have any connection to culture or the arts. It can refer to anything, for example a creative idea of an office worker to introduce a new, more reasonable process of work. The Cultural Industry Committee writes about content creation (*sisältötuotanto*) and creative industry (*luova tuotanto*) occasionally and as a kind of synonym of the cultural industry. Thus it must be a question of *aesthetic* content creation, which strongly uses new technology but can also be a 'traditional analogous' production in small and medium-size enterprises. It is not solely restricted to *digital content creation* as in the later work of the Content Creation Initiative.

In the actual redefinition in the final report one can find all of the aspects presented in chapter 5 along with the circle model by Throsby. In the broadest definition the criterion is symbolic meaning. Thus, the cultural industry can represent anything that has some kind of cultural and symbolic dimension to it, for example consumer commodities of various kinds. This is nothing new, as Koivunen states. Counting on symbolic meanings is present, for example, even in the ancient act of gift-giving. This definition is interesting in an analytical sense, but not in terms of policy. It does not offer a definition on the basis of which to formulate policy initiatives (if not giving resources on research and development or marketing initiatives of various companies).

A more restricted definition is that regarding 'cultural industry covering fields of traditional and modern art and culture from its creation through to its distribution'. This is the definition also used in Throsby's analysis. With the criteria given by him and with the redefinition of the word 'industry', one can also count creative arts as industry. They are just *toimialoja*, 'sets of activities' among others, with structural and operational characteristics of their own. This second dimension also brings forth the idea of the value chain, the route of the artwork from creation to reception. The production and distribution system is a very important part of the cultural industry. It can be regarded as spanning publishing activities, programming activities (such as music performances), galleries, museums, libraries, art trade and broadcasting. This definition provides opportunities to produce policy action proposals and statistics. This second alternative indicates, however, the importance of the activities, or industries*, related* to the creative arts, i.e. the distribution phase of the arts.

The third, classical definition is based on the criterion of reproducibility: the electronic or mechanical production that enhances commercial success and mass audience. It refers to the middle area of the circle model: publishing, cinema, television, radio, printing and digital media. This has also been the definition in earlier discourses and policies in Finland from the 1970s to the early 1990s. It must be noted in passing that Heiskanen (2002, 151-164) still favours this definition using economic activity and reproducibility as the criteria of application. This can be seen from his analysis in which he counts the publishing

industry, audiovisual industry, music industry and new media as cultural industry sectors.[5]

The narrowest definition is that of cultural entrepreneurship. This again is a definition with a low value of policy application other than in terms of lowering the threshold for starting up an enterprise and the provision of consultation and starting finance with the help of public institutions. It more resembles a point of view on cultural production. It can be combined with the discourse on the effects on employment of the arts and culture and other externalities. On the other hand, this is a point of view used to emphasize the idea that works of art are 'also' commodities that have a clear monetary value. This is the reverse side of the fact that some commodities are loaded with symbolic and cultural meaning. It is not necessarily a question of a requirement for artists to adopt the same kinds of dynamic goals of growing in scale and volume that some rather 'humdrum' companies exemplify. Rather, it is the question of 'surviving' that is characteristic for traditional 'handicraft' entrepreneurs. An appropriate slogan for this might be 'a healthy economic basis' (as implicated in Heiskanen's opinions). In the work of the Cultural Industry Committee goals of growth and internationalisation clearly exist, but there is still a very strong emphasis on small and medium-scale activity. They take pains to explain this as the main change of context and activity that legitimates the contemporary discourse and policy on the cultural industry and take it as a fact which fades away its old negative connotations. Later on in the reports by the Content Creation Initiative this small-scale and project form is seen as the precise embodiment of the problem of the whole sector.

6.3.1.3 The value chain concept

The value chain is a model used in economic theory and generally in industry to describe the route taken by a product from its conception through to the consumer. It is therefore highly logical to speak of culture as an industry using this model. But why should this idea be transferred from economics and industrial sectors to cultural production? What *surplus* value does it have?

---

[5] However, if the sector is named as copyright industries it can include creative arts as its basis and all kinds of software design as well. Heiskanen offers a strategy to describe the economic importance and contribution of the whole sector. It is one of looking the circle model from a reverse starting point, starting from outer orbits like 'peeling the onion'. The turnover of copyright industries was in 1997 roughly 46 billion FIM (7,7 billion euros). When the software, data banks and advertising agencies (turnover 19 billion FIM, 3,1 billion euros) are reduced we get the turnover of mass communication and cultural industries, 26 billion FIM, 4,3 billion euros. In that sector newspapers and magazines have the share of 9,2 billion FIM, 10 billion euros. Electronic mass communication has the share of 3,8 billion FIM, 6 million euros. The share of artistic work and actual (classical sectors of) cultural industry is 13 billion FIM, 2,1 billion euros): book publishing and retail 3,8 billion FIM, film and video 1,6 billion FIM, music industry (recording and retail, concerts) 3 billion FIM, creative and performing arts (visual arts, theatre, opera) 1,2 billion FIM, architecture, design, photography 2,1 billion FIM, public libraries 1,6 billion FIM. (Heiskanen 2002, 144)

This model is an age-old idea even in the cultural sector. True, it has functioned for ages but it has really only begun to be analytically visible at the present time. The European and Anglo-Saxon writers do not use the actual term but it is evident that the idea of cultural production forming a type of continuum from creation to distribution is present in their writings (vertical/horizontal dis/integration). The surplus value of the idea of the value chain is in its analytical power to explicate the bottlenecks of production and public policy. It is also a useful tool when analysing a specific sector and its various phases of activity. It is also evident that technological innovations alter the chain and can even lead to its entire destruction. For example, the music industry does not necessarily employ different firms to cater for each of the various phases, but the whole chain can be managed by a single person.

The value chain consists of the following continuum of phases of activity:

creative idea - product development - packaging - marketing - distribution - end user

In relation to chapter 5, the bottlenecks in this continuum are distribution and concentration. Thus, intervention with cultural policy instruments in these phases might diversify the chain as a whole. According to the Cultural Industry Committee the bottleneck in the Finnish context is the phase of product development: '...development provides the tools for packaging the creation for various distribution channels, for example the theatre, television or information network'. (Cultural Industry Committee 1999, 19) The various participants in each of the activities in the cultural sectors, for example, in literature the publishing editor or agent; in visual arts the gallery owners or producer or agent; in music the contact person in the recording company, or any other supervisors can act as developers that in principle either directly or indirectly have an influence on the final work of art itself. The intention of the Cultural Industry Committee is for various kinds of interpreters 'between the fronts': managers, producers and agents. The development process somewhat resembles a preparatory phase before packaging. Its task is to evaluate to which channel the work in question is best suited in order for it to be a saleable immaterial or material product.

Finnish practice in the 'industry' has faced the problem of prejudice from both fronts. The term 'product development' is itself regarded to be commercially branded with nothing to do with 'real' art. Thus, according to the committee: 'There is a need for a readjustment of attitudes on both sides: the artist often feels reluctance towards entrepreneurship, and entrepreneurs and financiers have stereotypical notions of artists.' (Cultural Industry Committee 1999, 19) The 'product developers', i.e. managers, producers and agents act as translators and 'buffers' between the artists and (private) financiers. They should be knowledgeable on the structures and models of production in the various industries. They should also be specialized in export or contract law. These are growing fields of expertise and intermediary activity that are currently desperately lacking in the cultural sector.

Packaging means the organization of a product based on a certain idea which is appropriate for a particular chosen channel. The agents of packaging include book, magazine and music publishers, television or radio broadcasters, festival organizers, and film production and distribution companies. According to the committee, in Finland the majority of know-how concerning packaging is currently located in the publishing industry and media companies.

Marketing can also sometimes be a bottleneck, as indicated in the previous chapter. Without product marketing the consumer cannot appreciate the diversity of the scene of production. Thus, in order to keep the 'grass root' activity alive it is advisable to invest in marketing procedures of small-scale firms and, for example, to subsidize these endeavours, and organize training. Again, it is pointless to damn this as an aggressive, dirty commercial operation but to see its cultural value as enhancing the diversity of cultural expression and its survival. Finally, the participants involved in distribution or exhibition include, for example, theatres, orchestras, museums, libraries and public service media that are publicly subsidized. Commercial participants include film theatres, private radio and television channels, and book and record shops.

The committee states that a special characteristic of Finnish public financing is its concentration on creative ideas when granting scholarships to artists. Another characteristic is the support of exhibition/distribution with public subvention for theatres, orchestras, museums and libraries. This helps them to keep ticket prices reasonable and makes it possible for a broad spectrum of citizens to participate in performances and exhibitions.

Another possibility to understand the value chain is to understand it as a 'surplus value chain' in sole monetary terms. This is basically the concept of it as understood in other industries. The basic creative idea has no monetary value as such, unless we think of it as a basis for immaterial rights, for example, a copyright that can be sold and purchased. Copyrights are a legal basis for someone to transform an idea into a product that can further be sold and purchased. References to 'raw materials' might cause extreme consternation for many because the term has established connotations with raw materials, such as wood and milk, of standard commodities. This is, however, a misguided comparison. Rather, one must compare artistic 'raw material' to the production of computer programmes or software, design and other 'intellectual' or 'immaterial' concepts, 'intellectual realization or vision' (*älyllinen oivallus*) as Heiskanen puts it. The 'raw material' is the intellectual property that can be trademarked or copyrighted. The value chain means that it is refined or worked on at various stages along the chain of production. The idea is that additional economic activity can be created from a single idea, thus feeding the national economy and the economic and industrial structure of a given country.

The reverse side of this concept is that the value chain behaves rather like a 'food chain' in which the originators of the idea may receive less and less remuneration than the developers and other intermediaries in proportion to the length of the chain. The greater the number of players, the smaller the reward that finally reaches the sole originator of the product (as, for example, with a

film scriptwriter). An acute problem experienced in telecommunications and content creation is that of operators pricing their products too high and attempting to capture too great a share of income from the applications of content creators. The outcome is that consumers do not use the services and the creators are squeezed dry of resources and all possibilities to do business.

However, if the value chain is considered as a surplus chain, it might be argued that it is preferable to work on a given product domestically as far as possible rather than sell the idea abroad, in order that the idea enhances economy of the home country. This is, of course, the traditional formula used in the industrial sector in Western developed countries, and which could be applied also to the cultural sector. In contemporary global economies this idea is somewhat obsolete. We can no longer necessarily make strong divisions between domestic and international markets. Thus, it can be argued that by enhancing the creation of surplus, be it orientated internationally or domestically, it will in any case ultimately also benefit the domestic economy.

6.3.1.4 Humanistic points of view in the work of the Cultural Industry Committee

A rather 'pessimistic' interpretation of the above-mentioned concept might be that the intention of the committee in developing the idea of the value chain and the concept of the cultural industry was purely to expose the economic potential of culture and the arts. The following passage gives another point of view:

> 'The purpose of the entire value circle is to please the final consumer, a customer or an audience. What the customer wants from cultural industry and content production is material for his or her own personal development and happiness, be it instruments for work or leisure, joy and relaxation or social respect.' (Cultural Industry Committee 1999, 20)

The committee wanted to transform the value chain into a value circle in order to emphasize the feedback of the consumer. On the other hand, one can see that they also emphasize more than solely economic factors, such as personal development, which is a humanistic point of view *par excellence.*

> 'The added value refers to the value (e.g. entertainment, learning) that the customer obtains after having purchased a product of cultural industry.' (Cultural Industry Committee 1999, 20)

Thus, added value or surplus value is not only monetary in character but also entails personal, intellectual and social well being. Besides the 'well-being' of the national economy there is a social emphasis of health of the community. It seems as if humanistic values are contrasted in these passages with sole instrumental, technical and economical values. However, it has to be challenged whether these 'humanistic' values are intrinsic to cultural policy. These values represent another method of legitimation of subsidy for the arts and culture, because they are *instruments* in obtaining personal and intellectual development. In this sense, *Kultur* as *Geist*, *Bildung* or morality is not an end in

itself to which there are other instruments to obtain it. Rather, culture itself is an instrument for various kinds of virtues and goods, be they material or intellectual.

In general, the idea of the value circle indicates that the 'real' needs of the consumers should be considered. It can be related to the idea of user sovereignty, offering a diverse set of opportunities to choose from. It might be considered that it deconstructs the deterministic vision fostered by Adorno, that the products are just tricks by marketeers to hook consumers. The idea of 'social logic' is also contained within this. Furthermore, it might deconstruct the contemporary problematical technology orientation in which the engineers are the drivers of development and the 'end user' or 'final consumer' is not consulted. However, a couple of ideas should be noted here. Firstly, in connection with the idea of risk presented in chapter 5, even if we knew for sure what the user or consumer might want, the actual success of the 'luxury' product is always unsure. Production in accordance with the list of needs does not guarantee the final situation in terms of cash flow. Secondly, a person studying theory and history of art and aesthetics might see the 'audience orientation' to be in diametrical opposition with the ideal of autonomous art. According to that ideal, the task of an artist is not to meet the requirements of his/her audience but to listen to himself/herself and comment on the contemporary situation uncompromisingly, anticipate the future, and be in the 'front line' whilst, despite this, remaining understandable and communicative. As was stated in chapter 3, the audience orientation does not necessarily bring novelties to the markets. A creative artist working in his/her atelier does think about a possible audience, about what kind of people s/he is directing his/her message to. S/he is excited about the possibility that there may be even just a single person who might be touched by their message. A creative artist, however, does not linger around his/her audiences at exhibitions asking "What do you think? Do you like it?' (even if s/he may ask these questions in the privacy of his/her atelier). S/he cannot, however, avoid noticing which line of work is selling best or providing him/her with further scholarship funding from the visual arts commission or from foundations. But a 'true' artist denies that this kind of recognition would influence **his/her** work.

The other point of view might mitigate the reason for the above criticism. This is the fact that the committee emphasizes the very basis of any value chain or symbolic exchange as being the creative individual. It should be noted that they have no intention to substitute the existing system of subsidies at the beginning and end of the value chain with any forms of business support. They claim that the traditional, existing arts policies should remain in place, but *further* support for business activities in the cultural sector is needed.

> 'For this reason the basis of a successful cultural industry is to support the existence of preconditions necessary for creativity by the traditional means of art support, i.e. public funding, but even the contribution of the private sector is needed, in particular in the development of cultural industry enterprises.' (Cultural Industry Committee 1999, 17)

There is also a very strong emphasis on education of the arts and culture at all levels of the education system. This, together with media education and entrepreneurship training form, according to the committee, the basis for the development of cultural industries.

The third point of view is in the form of a warning against counting on short-term monetary output. Rather, the committee emphasizes that work should be based on long-term orientation and hopes.

> 'On the other hand, the encounter of commercial principles and cultural contents of art may not be exactly unproblematic. There is a risk that we evaluate and measure the production of art and culture merely instrumentally, with the short-term criteria of economy. The value of the intellectual capital of art and culture becomes, however, most often visible only in the long run, and the justification for it cannot be derived from economic objectives or improvement of competitiveness alone.' (Cultural Industry Committee 1999, 18)

This is again a mitigation of the criticism on the audience orientation. It is a peculiarity of the cultural sector and the arts that, paradoxically, the works that comment on our own time usually do not attract large segments of the audience in our own time. The value of an artist is often only discovered retrospectively. Cultural capital grows with the passing of time, as does the economic capital valorised through it. Thus, the immediate size of audience is not very indicative of the cultural value of the work and its possibilities in terms of future economic value. (see e. g. Bourdieu 1993) In the final sentence it is claimed that the *raison d'être* for the arts and culture cannot be based only in its instrumental value to raise the 'competitiveness' of our country in economic terms in the globalized world. This can even be read as a defence of the intrinsic value of art and culture even if they *also* have economic repercussions.

In the following I will give a list of the humanistic points of view I have identified in the committee report:

> * education in the arts and culture is the basis for the development of cultural industries
> * public support of art is a starting point and is not substitutable
>   -> the existence of heritage and fostering reservoirs of new aesthetic ideas
> * cultural industry policy should concentrate on the activities of small and medium-size enterprises
> * other benefits exist beyond purely economic advantage: personal, intellectual and social
> * long-term objectives in place of short-term monetary profits

In general, the arts and culture should not be subordinated with short-term and solely monetary objectives of profit.

The new opening in terms of the cultural industry policy is the vision of the middle phase of the value chain. In the following I will present the possibilities that already exist, drawing on the final report and Heiskanen's analysis.

6.3.1.5 Cultural industry policies in Finland in the 1990s

The system of investment in the middle phase of the value chain can be differentiated in the following way: direct public money to enhance business activity (Finnish Film Foundation and European Union structural funds), public support of research and development in private firms (Ministry of Trade and Industries, Tekes, Sitra, Finnvera Oyj[6]), support through copyright fees based on legislation (AVEK, ESEK, LUSES, VISEK[7]), private support (sponsorship, arts purchasing, repertoire planning in publishing companies).

The role of the Finnish Film Foundation is to fund a certain percentage of a film budget, providing direct funding to businesses and thus 'helping the industry survive'. The role of Sitra, Tekes or Finnvera Oyj is to invest in and grant loans to several kinds of enterprises, cultural included. Their instruments of funding include capital financing, loans, guarantees and export guarantees. Other sources include the European Union Media and eContent programmes. The nature of this support is to invest chiefly in research and development as opposed to the operations of firms. The copyright organisations deliver the levies gathered from blank tapes and CDs or from the public presentation of music or visual arts. Part of the income is delivered directly to the artists as royalties and part is delivered to the promotion centres to support economic and cultural activity in the sectors (for example, AVEK for film festivals, export, international co-productions).

Heiskanen (2002, 167) also approves of direct public support for artists in the form of scholarships and believes that support for art institutions is the basis for the development of cultural industries, even if he does not count arts as industries directly. Such public money is thus only 'indirect' funding if considered from the point of view of cultural industry policy. The indirect significance of arts policies for the actual industrial sectors are the following: to sustain the level of educated labour, to foster the demand for creative content, and to apply new technologies. The scholarships might count as promoting 'innovation' when granted to young artists and those just entering the field with new insights. Heiskanen claims that 20 % of the funds granted by the Arts Council system can be counted as financing 'research and development', especially the grants awarded by New Media Council.

The Cultural Industry Committee regards the task of private support as most problematic and challenging. Sponsorship, the oldest form of private support, has been growing in volume during the 1990s. On the other hand, book and record publishers have a traditional role in repertoire management, i.e. publishing marginal and small audience literature with the help of capital

---

[6]   Tekes is the Foundation for Development of Technology. Sitra is the Fund of Finland's Independence Annual. Finnvera Oyj is a publicly owned company financing small and medium size business activity especially with regional emphasis.

[7]   AVEK is The Promotion Centre for Audiovisual Culture which works under the copyright organization Kopiosto ry. ESEK is The Finnish Performing Music Promotion Centre working under the copyright organisation Gramex ry. LUSES is the Promotion Centre for Creative Music working under the copyright organisation Teosto ry. There is also VISEK, Promotion Centre for the Visual Arts.

gathered from best-sellers. This can be counted as 'cultural work'. But the committee calls for private investments in cultural entrepreneurship:

> 'It is essential for the centralisation of the cultural industry and content creation that privately managed, specialized capital investment activity in the field is started. This entails making the financiers acquainted with the possibilities inherent in the field and its growth forecasts; on the other hand, the enterprises must learn about capital financing and other financing instruments, because different financing solutions are needed in different phases of enterprise activity. In constructing capital investment enterprises the public administration can also accelerate the development by participating as a minority partner to the establishment of the enterprises.'(Cultural Industry Committee 1999, 40)

What makes this almost impossible are the traditional mutual prejudices which state a lack of a common language, and that the financier knows nothing about the cultural sector while to the artist, business is seen as dirty. (ibid. 41) According to the committee, attitudes are changing rapidly among the younger generation of both artists and financiers: 'for the artist a good financial foundation is a natural means of realising personal creativity, and the financier has discovered the possibilities inherent in cultural industries (e.g. in blockbuster films)' (ibid.)

The challenge for the Content Creation Initiative project which has followed the Cultural Industry Committee remains the issue of private financing. The obstacle to meeting this challenge is the same problem encountered in the scenario presented above, that of financiers and investors versus artists and actors in the field of digital media. It is the difference between attitudes or 'philosophical and ideological' backgrounds and language.

6.3.2 The Content Creation Initiative

The background of the Content Creation Initiative is in the work of the Cultural Industry Committee which proposed the project on digital content creation. This suggestion was taken up by the programme of Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen's government in April 1999. The content creation working group works along the guidelines of the objectives given in the government programme. It is a cross-governmental project in cooperation with the information society, with the Ministry of Education included in the programme with regards to cultural and educational digital content creation.

From the point of view of chapter 5, it can be connected to the 'rhetorical turn' from the cultural industries to the creative industries. According to O'Connor (1999, 2) cultural industries still seemed to be 'artist centred' and creative industries based on technological reproduction and aimed at the mass market. This is in agreement with the visions of the Australian writers (Cunningham and Flew) cited in chapter 5. It could be said that the Finnish Content Creation Initiative is a case of the contemporary international creative industries rhetoric and policies. The 'rhetorical turn' from arts centred to technology centred also took place in Finnish discourse and policy. While the Cultural Industry Committee still emphasized the economic importance of

'creative arts', for the Content Creation Initiative this is only a form of interface; the creative arts are included for the sole purpose of possible involvement in digital and technological applications. Of course, anything can be creative or content-based (*sisältö*), this is not an exclusive domain of the arts and culture. Nevertheless, the project within the Ministry of Education concentrates its efforts on aesthetic and educational creation and content, though only on a digital platform. (see the interim report 1, 2001)

However, there are other problems which reflect the *still* existing difference between business and aesthetic activity in digital production. The interim reports 2-6 were obtained from economic consultants, LTT-Tutkimus Oy and the Turku School of Economics. They are based on interviews among the managing directors of content creation firms and among the possible investors. These interviews strongly determine the points of view of the reports. As a reaction to these reports and also to the Cultural Industry Committee, the new media organization mcult organized a research project among the artists, designers and workers in the digital content creation field. The report of the outcomes of the interviews is presented in interim report no. 7 *Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä* (eds. Minna Tarkka & Tapio Mäkelä 2002). It may be needless to say that report no. 7 is a strong critique of the point of view of sole business economics. Tarkka also criticizes the use of the value chain model to interpret the field. According to her, it emphasizes for the most part the distribution phase and an idea of technology as being a platform onto which to 'pour' the 'content'. For the purposes of this study I have constructed a 'montage' of these differing points of view based on three themes.

6.3.2.1 Growth – Creativity

The consultants contend that 'creative expertise' is the 'substance' of a content creation company. With this expertise the entrepreneurs can create 'clear, unique characteristics' which form the 'competitive edge' of the company. (LTT-Tutkimus Oy, 5) Without an 'idea' any attempts to control the value chain are futile. (Ibid. 16) Thus, creativity (in whatever form) is the basis for all activities. Following on from this, the other crucial element to be coupled with creativity is business expertise. It is clear that for all of the writers cited in this chapter this is the fatal and critical issue on cultural or content creation industries: the balance between cultural creativity and business expertise. One cannot exist without the other, at least if one wishes to survive. However, the union of opinion ends here.

In the opinion of the consultants sole expertise is not enough, it must be subordinated to the growth policy of the company. Growth policy alternatives include networking, joint ventures or partnerships. The very simple objective of growth is *to raise the scale.* There are at least three ways of doing this: internally or organically; vertically (see vertical integration in chapter 5), by purchasing companies positioned within other phases of the value chain; or horizontally (see horizontal integration in chapter 5), by concentrating all business endeavours within a single phase of the value chain. (LTT-Tutkimus Oy, 6) This

may be regarded as precisely the threat vision of the Cultural Industry Committee, in case there is 'no alternative' to this growth policy.

The reason for growth is the problematic nature of small-scale business. The small size of a company presents the following problems. Firstly, specialization of roles so that, for instance, the managing director and the digital artist have clearly defined and separate roles, cannot take place. Secondly, there are usually insufficient resources for research and development and internationalisation. Thirdly, the bargaining position in negotiations with customers and financiers is weak. (LTT-Tutkimus Oy, 11)

What does the possible private investor expect? In short: reproducibility of a product or process, mass production, internationalisation, continuity of business and the absence of one-off projects. The interest of potential investors is aroused if technological applications are used for the purposes of fulfilling expectations and increasing growth. (Ibid. 11, 23) Isn't this precisely the vision that risks turning the development from 'the new' 'social logic' into 'the old' 'logic of mass culture' if one thinks from the point of view of the binary system that I presented at the beginning of this chapter (see The relation to the critical theory)? A common critique of business economists is that the sector in Finland is extremely small-scale and fragmented. Growth of scale in general is due to the growing number of enterprises, rather than to the growing volume and size of single businesses. (Toivonen 2002, 13) This fact is generally presented as a problem within the sector as opposed to its strength, for example, in specializing in marginal audiences. The principle of growth is coupled with the principle of creating added value on the money invested. This is, however, the classical problem of the chicken and the egg. It may suffice to conclude that they do in fact benefit each other: the added value and valorization of capital enables growth in scale, and growth in scale in turn enables further investment and thus further added value.

From the point of view of the content creators (interviewed in the report of Tarkka and Mäkelä) the creativity, the very basis of this sector, lies in small units: 'When the size of the company increases, creativity decreases', as an informant stated to Kaukomies (2002, 40). This can be seen as the very basic 'truth' or 'doctrine' from the point of view of the new media artist. Furthermore, growth in scale and division of roles may lead to a polarised situation and disrupt cohesion within the workers in the firm. (Nousiainen 2002, 57). As if in answer to the challenge of business consultants, Nousiainen (2002, 61) lists the benefits of small-scale business. 'The strength of the interviewees (entrepreneurs of small-scale firms) is in their agility, inventiveness, fastness, and reactivity. It is easy for small-scale firms to react to the changes in the industry and to constantly modify their production models.' Further benefits include innovativeness and the ability to take (cultural) risks.

Mäkelä (2002b, 108) cites Cathy Brickwood who emphasizes that even if it is important to increase the size of big centres (she refers here to new media centres as opposed to multimedia business conglomerates, even if these do also benefit from business activity in the field) and the network infrastructure 'it is

important to foster small, radical and elastic organizations - that is the prerequisite of creativity and innovation in the contemporary media scene.' Tarkka (2002b, 93) also cites an interviewee: 'A very great, principally mistaken estimation is that content creation will somehow resemble that of Disney, in which meaning content is industrially produced for the many'. Is, therefore, their vision for another Nokia in content creation? Not necessarily, even if they count on the international orientation and visibility of Finnish authors.

6.3.2.2 Surplus – Survival

The following principle is a very simple truth with regards business economics: 'purchase at one price, sell at twice the price'. This is the point of view of investment; that output should grow more rapidly than input. (Toivonen 2002, 7) This is also the source of creating monetary surplus or added value, which should form the basis of business activities.

The consultants see problems in the distribution of public money: 'The public subsidy models of content creation are aimed at being encouraging, but they are not encouraging in the actual running of business. There should be requirements for public support that would encourage entrepreneurs to use money more effectively and productively... In other words, economic success should not hinder gaining public support' (LTT-Tutkimus Oy, 7). On the other hand, they draw a clear division of roles between public and private money; public money should be used for investment during the initial phase and start-up of a business and in research and development, whereas private money should be invested in growth, export initiatives, and development of new ideas and processes. In general, private money is '*demanding money*', *it demands profits.* (ibid. 8, 15) One could even understand this as the 'ethics of the share holder' versus the 'ethics of the stake holder', which is more visible in the following critique.

Tarkka (2002a, 26) cites Tetta Jounela (Ministry of Trade and Industry) who claimed that the industry nowadays lacks *'patient money'* both from the public and private sectors. Investors somehow live in the illusion that content creation will be the next 'profit boom' and are investing with the hope of getting back their investments quickly and enormously multiplied. On the other hand, after the recent depression and collapse in the IT sector investors have lost interest and anything reminiscent of 'content creation' tends to evoke suspicion. Investors do not necessarily believe in the idea of long-term investment, as Jounela's comment suggests.

Another question is whether the new media artists and entrepreneurs themselves are demanding profits, monetary added value and success. Or, is profit orientation the 'only alternative' open to developing the industry? Mäkelä (2002a, 101) cites the interview research carried out among new media entrepreneurs at the London School of Economics. According to its results, the non-profit organization was in actual fact regarded as providing the most appropriate means of progress for the industry. The ideas outlined above may

provide an indication as to why this might be the case. Further reasons are outlined below.

The writers of the interim report no. 7 (eds. Tarkka & Mäkelä) foster the idea of new media centres and incubators in place of large-scale profit-oriented multimedia or cross-media companies. They regard these centres and incubators as 'contexts for innovation'. Another factor present among the new media artists is a kind of 'gift-giving economy' which exists alongside the business models and value chains. Gift-giving is an 'open source' system in which technical solutions to problems are shared in the community. In addition to open source, the setting up of copyrights during the initial phase in order to shelter the final product and favour the originator of the solution is needed. What the writers call for are 'economically solid and sustainable models' rather than profits that the business model and value chain ideologies indicate. (Mäkelä & Tarkka 2002, 188)

In essence, growth and profit is not the motive for the work of content creators and new media artists themselves. Tarkka (2002a, 24) describes their motivation in the following way:

> 'The objects of this study, the companies specialized in content creation and new media design, consisted mostly of small and new enterprises. They might be described as 'sub-cultural entrepreneurs', - instead of motives for growth and profit the business is orientated by passion about the work, gratification and enjoyment obtained through the activity. On the other hand, these companies could be compared to traditional small-scale enterprises in which growth is substituted by the motive for a reasonable livelihood, satisfied customers and excellence of work.'

Instead of economic risks, they are more prone to take 'creative risks'. This is their exact motivation, to maximise use of their own expertise. The interviewees describe the common problem that arises when the financier cannot appreciate that, for the artist, this is more important than money. Thus, it seems that the artists and investors undergoing discussions do not share common interests. The chief interest of the financier is to create a profit on the money invested. Without this s/he cannot continue to operate. The professional interest of the artist is to develop his/her expertise and abilities as far as possible, which can sometimes conflict with short-term profit maximization. Without the possibility of professional development an artist may feel a lack of integrity and a feeling of selling him/herself to the lowest bidder.

New media artists seem to identify themselves with the traditions of handicrafts and applied arts; they regard themselves as 'digital handicraft workers'. This indicates that they value highly effective production processes and a functional final product. This is their objective and source of professional pride. (Nousiainen 2002, 51) This does not, however, reflect inefficiency or waste in terms of time and resources, but a special set of professional values that usually do not coincide with those of financiers. The problem of the artist/financier relationship is fundamentally one of differing interests.

For some new media artists and designers the primary motive for working is not monetary, but social success; to 'leave one's mark in the world' (ibid. 50). However, they have also come to realize economic realities, not in order to get

rich, but to simply 'fill the gaps'. In other words, there has to be enough money in reserve in order to enable the artist to continue their work and pay the bills. (ibid. 52)

Professional pride and a passion to develop expertise as far as possible can be counted as the chief sources of motivation for non-profit organizations which favour progress in the industry. This is the rationale of writers who claim that profit orientation does not necessarily enhance creativity and innovation. Rather, commercial goals and profit-oriented objectives bring about conventional solutions and standardization in the cultural field. For example, Eskelinen (2002, 139) notes that creative diversity (read: dispersion and fragmentation) is still the most valuable aspect and source of strength in the field.

6.3.2.3 Consumer – Citizen

What is the starting point of a successful enterprise? Again, this question can be answered with a simple truth of business economics: to meet the actual demand of the customers. Without a customer base there is no business. Thus, we get a kind of 'nominalistic' definition of culture: 'Culture is at its best when it attains large audiences that enjoy the culture offered.' (LTT-Tutkimus Oy, 24) The background of this statement is of course an intention to intervene in the discourse on what is 'good' and what is 'bad' from a sheer business economics point of view. They do not want to try to define the goodness or badness of culture but to take a rational point of view towards demand and supply. From the point of view of economics 'the truth' lies where demand and supply are in balance. Thus, to the question 'what is culture or cultural?' one can answer 'it is what is named to be such'. Or, taking this line somewhat further, 'a piece becomes a work of art only when someone is willing to pay money for it' (Dietmar Pieper, cited in Aho 1997, 17).

This is exactly what the new media artists and designers oppose. Their main message concerning this issue is that 'in the background there has to be something that one wants **to** do with people, some way of treating them as more than just money purse or means of payment' (Nousiainen 2002, 54). One can even notice a very traditional way of thinking according to the ideal of autonomous art: 'More important than defining the user segments is the observation of yourself, going into yourself, recognizing that I, as an individual, am a human being and through this realizing *what should be talked about, what should be told.*' (Pelo 2002, 78**;** emphasis **mine**) It is characteristic of this activity that it is orientated socially and culturally, there may not necessarily be a seller and a buyer in the classical sense, but the 'customer' takes part in the interactive production process: 'the applications take users more as citizens than consumers' (Brickwood 2002, 175). In general, 'taking as a citizen' means that the user is made to realize something of this world and made to participate in this world, rather than just using his/her money to satisfy the interests of the financiers and national/global economy.

Despite the cultural orientation the new media enterprises claim to be aware of the user segments and the market. Despite the issues mentioned above, they do not work in a vacuum ignorant of the realities of the market. They do not necessarily segregate sectors of business and arts and culture. (Tarkka 2002a, 25) However, they do study the market through realistic research. Furthermore, despite careful research there seems to be a realization of the risk of cultural endeavours. Tarkka (2002a, 22) claims that success is born only in the social use of an application and sometimes coincidences prove to be successful, such as with the example of the standard GSM short message service. This feature was not intended to be an economically successful text messaging service to begin with, but it proved later to be highly successful once it was adapted to social use. Success does not emerge due to the rational calculations of producers or rational choices of consumers, there is always an unpredictable element involved in the social uses of applications. Besides good research, the creators need intuition or tacit knowledge which is a form of 'human capital' that increases in step with time and experience.

The objective of content creation and digital applications should not be one of gathering enormous sums of money by 'entertaining the masses'. There should be provision for applications across a range of spheres of life from education to social and health care and applications of teledemocracy, which is in fact the primary objective of the cross-governmental Content Creation Initiative and Council of Information Society. The digital format provides the opportunity for people to take part in the process as opposed to purely consuming, or more specifically, to do both of these. The message is that besides making money, the product should offer people something to think about and the possibility to 'leave his/her mark in the world'.

6.3.2.4 Just a rhetorical problem?

The writers from both fronts are basically in agreement concerning the objectives: 'to improve Finland's position as a country of content creation', which seems odd from the point of view of international global/local rhetoric in digital creation, in which nationality is no longer of importance. They also agree on the role of business economics, especially concerning the balance of art and business. Why, therefore, do they not see eye to eye with each other despite this?

According to the business consultants, the problem is that investors possibly do not understand the products of the content creation enterprise, the business model (the source of cash flow and position in the value chain) or the location of the market. (LTT-Tutkimus Oy, 8) Is this because the new media entrepreneurs lack the right language to convey this information in such a way that they would understand? The solution in general for the consultants is for there to be more training in business economics (this was also the solution for the Cultural Industry Committee) so that the content creators and their managers can learn the language used by the investors. However, it is also contended that the parties need to know *each other* better. (Ibid.) It is not

excluded that investors could also learn something from the content creators. Nonetheless, this encounter is a necessary prerequisite for private funding which is a necessity for *growth, success* and *market share.*

The persons interviewed in report no. 7 were frustrated by the situation and regarded the problem as being a rhetorical one. One has to adapt different strategies of convincing and entirely a different vocabulary with different kinds of agents and financing and support systems. (Mäkelä & Tarkka 2002, 192) According to the interviewees, the solution to the problem of lack of common understanding is mutual interpretation and translation (Tarkka 2002a, 33). Their suggested course of action to achieve this goal is to organize 'language schools', where participants can meet and discuss. Unsurprisingly, the interviewees also demand that the investors and financiers take a cultural orientation for the sake of role reversal. (Nousiainen 2002, 55, 61)

This is surely a rhetorical problem. Both participants have their own 'truth' and present it using the particular vocabulary and *ornatus* suited to it. As there is a question of 'truths' there are different points of view and perspectives involved. Translation would be easy if the participants were of one mind on the manner and strategy with which to obtain the basic objectives. The differences of opinions presented in this section highlight that this is an issue of differing interests stemming from different roles, professions and disciplines. These include differences in background, intellectual discipline, and philosophical assumptions, which in turn result in differences in language. One camp represents liberal economics, the other cultural and social sciences (in connection with new technologies). This also indicates that the worlds of art and economics may *still* be miles apart on certain issues, namely, growth, added value and market share.

If the participants were to come to a compromise and settle these issues they would certainly collaborate more easily. A new media artist or entrepreneur can translate his/her sublime ideas into the language of the private investor. The financiers, for their part, may gain added interest and provide funding. Once this is accomplished the entrepreneur is free do as s/he likes. The critical point comes later, i.e. whether the idea has succeeded in creating a stable cash flow. This is because the interest of the financier is to gain his/her investment back multiplied.

This seems to be a conflict between the 'logic of mass culture' and 'social logic' in contemporary cultural policies. Again, I offer the solution of avoiding censorship either in the name of the majority or minority. For the sake of economic well-being and along with it social well-being, at least *some* units are needed that are willing to seek profit and growth through audience maximization. In addition to this, at least *some* units are also needed that can perform 'research and development' with long-term objectives and with high professional esteem.

A word is a 'mighty sword' also in this encounter, bearing opinions and world views. More important than attempting to prove which is right and which is wrong, is the understanding that the words and ideas on both fronts

are rhetorical devices used to legitimate ones endeavours. It is the task of the reader of a report to decide which to accept. Uttering a particular word in this 'battle of words' can be motivated by various interests.

The problem in the delineation above was the extent of thinking in economic terms. In 2002 the traditional so-called 'feast' at the Torni restaurant once again took place. Young intellectuals representing various spheres of life gathered at Torni to discuss the most striking issues of our time. Their 'diagnosis' and critique continues the reaction of the digital content creators as delineated above from a more general framework.

A contemporary form of ideology critique is directed at the major language of our time: economics. The historians and philosophers lament the situation in which economic thinking spreads to all spheres of life. This is basically the problem realized already in discussions in 1954; that of instrumental values substituting intrinsic humanistic values. This leads to specific repercussions: quantity substitutes quality especially in arts and culture and education; the amount of audience attraction becomes more important than the cultural or social significance of for example, a theatre piece; schools and universities begin to resemble education factories, producing from their 'biomass' a suitable working force raw material for global enterprises; efficiency becomes a value as such not to be questioned under any circumstances; and politicians state their chosen measures as necessities in response to a kind of undisputable natural law of economics. The historians' and philosophers' critique of the media crystallizes in the following statement 'to make something true it need only be iterated enough times'. Ideology lies in the situation in which someone responding to these requirements or presenting them does not really realize that these issues could also be thought otherwise. To believe that economics is a value-free and non-political 'true' description of the processes in our world is an ideology, a delusion of our time.

The curious thing is that the economists involved in this discussion proved this delineation to be partly a misunderstanding of the intentions of the economists themselves. Firstly, they do not *want* to favour efficiency at the cost of civilization or *Bildung*. As one historian pointed out, economic efficiency is not an ultimate value for which all other values are merely instrumental in obtaining. However, efficiency in economics *is* an instrument through which other virtues can be gained. Secondly, the calculation of GNP is not intended to include measurement of happiness and human development. It is solely intended as an indicator of the level of production of a given country in a given year (this indicator is commonly used almost as the sole indicator of 'development' for the purposes of policy making and the media, a practice which seems to take place against the 'true' will of the economists themselves). Thirdly, the economists seem to want to wash their hands of the accusation of being representatives of a 'single truth'. Unity of opinion does exist among economists concerning certain economic dynamics and the measures required to enhance them. However, they are in hot dispute over the application of the majority of measures involved in attaining required results. The contemporary

situation in the global economy and its hegemonic discourses is regarded as transitory. In 50 years the situation may look entirely different. The problem is to some extent passed on to the politicians, who understand economics only superficially and believe in certain 'truths' which not all economists believe in. Another problem arises when politicians do not inform the people that their particular line of policy is a deliberate choice from a range of various possibilities, but instead present it as the sole course of action open to them that corresponds to the true problematic situation in the world. (Valkama 2002)

6.3.2.5 What is the content creation industry in actuality?

Heiskanen also offers a strategy of 'onion peeling' for determination of the economic significance of the new media sector. The analysis can be used to introduce a sense of reality to the issue disputed above. The turnover of the new media sector was 700 million FIM (117 million euros) in 1998 and in 2000 one billion FIM (150 million euros). The majority of turnover consisted of system and network services: Internet, extranet and intranet applications, information storing applications, information security applications, and mobile applications. The share of this activity is estimated to be 1/5 of the entire industry. If the Internet services of operators and e-commerce are reduced from the turnover, the share of actual content creation stands at approximately 2/3. Half of this figure comprises advertisement and marketing (designing Internet services, homepages, and multimedia 'brochures' for individual firms). The remainder includes software sales and maintenance of information services. The share of actual *cultural* content creation as referred to above is 8 % of total turnover. This sector includes games, educational CD-ROMs, entertainment CD-ROMs, 3D animation and multimedia art. Thus, its share of turnover in 2000 was in the region of 80 million FIM (13 million euros). This share reaches 15 million euros if digital book, digital interactive education applications and portals are included. (Heiskanen 2002, 162)

What, then, exactly are the products of multimedia art? They can include both Web applications and CD-ROMs. Perhaps an example of a successful encounter between a financier and artists may be that of Meetfactory, owned by Merja Puustinen and Andy Best. They received investment from a venture capitalist to run a 'work of art' called *Conversation with Angels* on a Web site. The composition took the form of a game with an environmental dimension to it and was aimed at teenagers throughout the world.

Another example may be a work which was recognised in the Prix Möbius competition, named *Need*, by Tuomo Tammenpää. This is an example of another kind of economic strategy. Tammenpää works in multimedia and web design firm Mindworks Oy as an art director, producing applications on order for firms. The income from this firm enables the continuation of his involvement in artistic projects such as *Need* (www.needweb.org) during his free time. The work *Need* is in the form of a parody of contemporary multimedia marketing.

A third example is the Habbo Hotel Net chat environment. The business model is based on virtual furniture sales via mobile phone. It is a virtual community that attracts a chiefly teenage clientele. It is considered to be a working concept both of business and cultural dimensions, visual pleasure and communication.

A fourth example that might correspond with the visions of the financiers interviewed in the Content Creation Initiative studies is Remedy Entertainment's Max Payne. This is a PC game that has gathered both economic capital and cultural esteem internationally.

6.4 Conclusion

The *motive for writing* for all of the discussants cited in this chapter is to adjust to global changes; first from a traditional society into industrial society, and then from an industrial society into a post-industrial information society. Even if this is a commonplace description it illustrates the threats and hopes invested in the different phases. The main component in this change is technology, along with economics and cultural production. It produced outcomes that alarmed the critics of mass culture. Their motivation was to attempt to shelter themselves, to foster their interests as 'free artists' and to warn people of the harmful consequences that these phenomena can bring about. In Finland the motives have been largely national. In history this has been a question of how to shelter our endogenous creativity in the face of the intervention of international entertainment. Nowadays it is more to do with making the 'personalized entity' of Finland a prominent country in this issue, a question of how to enhance the competitive edge of Finland in the cultural markets. The motives of the various agents involved in the new field of digital content creation are professional ones, with investors and new media artists pursuing different kinds of interests.

Their *intention in writing* was to demonstrate in their arguments and with certain terminology the mediocre and harmful character of these phenomena. The rhetoric from the 1950s up until the 1970s was imprinted by the problematical nature of the industrial mode of production. Despite popular revaluation the industries were not revalued among the intellectuals. In the 1970s, Heiskanen, Gronow and other cultural policy discussants formed the exception to this rule. They brought the international cultural policy emphases into Finnish settings.

From the 1980s onwards the motive was to intervene into the cultural industries with policy making in order to foster a national identity and diversity in the sector and to prevent the perceived threats from becoming realized. There was no longer a feeling of threat and horror in the face of the phenomenon, but a determination to meet the challenge; it was realised that if used wisely it can benefit the field and bring about positive outcomes. This motivation for writing remained in force until the end of 1990s. In general, this

is the discourse of 'big/conventional' versus 'small/innovative'. The *intention in writing* was to show the global change from industrial into post-industrial, and by showing this to legitimate the importance of investments in cultural industries. The change of the 'logic of mass culture' into 'social logic' was regarded to be empirically evident and the role of cultural policy was to take on the challenge of emphasizing this change. This is the rhetorical re-description of the situation, in which the descriptions of the realities are manipulated behind a given concept in order to be able to claim that the old connotations of the term are *passé.* The world has changed since Adorno formulated his critique. Thus, his critical concept does not provide an adequate current description of our world.

Some discussants in Finland give a descriptive meaning of the concept when pointing at the existence and structures or operations of various classical sectors of cultural industries (Heiskanen, Mitchell, Gronow, Kupoli writers). They also give a normative meaning when highlighting the possibilities of enhancing positive development for the minor players in the sectors. The suggestion is one of correcting the market failure with strategic intervention through public subsidy. Since the end of the 1980s the Finnish cultural sector as a whole has experienced a trend of legitimating public subsidy in economic terms. The Cultural Industry Committee takes this idea and claims (rhetorically) that the word 'industry' strengthens this legitimatory possibility even further. It can also represent an instrument for maintaining the national competitive edge. One can speculate whether the instrumental and legitimatory meanings are similar or the same in essence. One can also legitimate public support with speculation on the future increase of the national competitive edge. Or one can argue (and statistically prove) that the arts and cultural works are instruments that contribute to the national economy. The reason for differentiating them is because the legitimatory meaning determines the status of the arts and culture as receivers of public support. The instrumental meaning refers rather to any kind of benefit that the arts and cultural works can bring to individuals, states or the global system. Of course, one can legitimise public support with any number of benefits. The list of potential instrumental benefits can also be practically endless.

The Cultural Industry Committee carefully tries to avoid too crude an economic stance by emphasising the aesthetic and social credentials of the cultural industry besides economic ones. The cultural industry should not be legitimised only in terms of short-term economic gain, but should also be understood as an instrument for long-term individual, social, aesthetic and economic development. The economic benefits are emphasized in the Content Creation Initiative for a range of reasons.

In cultural industry rhetoric from the mid 1990s it is important to note the intention to convince various audiences of the benefits of an economic emphasis. Political decision-makers are told that the arts and culture have economic dimensions and have the potential to function as an 'economic catalyst'. Private investors are told that the arts and culture can even provide

multiple returns on their investments. The artists, in turn, are told that they should take the economic realities seriously, both at state budget level and at the level of their own businesses. The writers of both committees also try to prove that this does not affect the existing arts subsidy system. Cultural industry policy is aimed at working alongside the existing system as an additional policy, as opposed to substituting the existing one. On the other hand, as a 'rhetorical' intervention in cultural policy, it is implicated that creative artists should increasingly take entrepreneurship as a model for economical survival and not to count only on public grants. New technologies are regarded as a new tool for the production of art, a new distribution platform for art or a new medium for assistance in working processes or communication.

The intention of highlighting existing policy alternatives is to chart the situation, to show what already exists and what is further required. The urgent and unsolved problem seems to be that of the face-off between private financiers and artists. We can see that in the studies published by the Content Creation Initiative there is a certain change in motivation and intention. The *motive for* using the language of business economics seems to be the need to cater for the interests of the financiers, to find solutions and to suggest models with which to 'bring home their money'. This is, of course, a vulgar interpretation. A more compromising interpretation might be the following: to identify the difficulties experienced by financiers and company managers upon meeting with the new media artists and designers. Their *intention in* writing is to identify from their point of view the solution and strategy for fostering content creation in Finland and achieving international prominence. In their views there are some ideas that would turn the tide from post-industrialism back to old models of industrialism, even if realized with the platform and tools of the most progressive information society. The *motive for* writing of the content creators was to defend their professional integrity, esteem, self-steering, independence, authorial sovereignty, and meaningfulness of work. These can be seen as the vocabulary of autonomous art adapted to 21st century 'digital handicraft'. Their *intention in* writing is simply to show that they do not take the values of private financiers as their own. Despite that, they try to show that on the whole they are not hostile to business economics. The only problem seems to be the extent to which it has to be applied. They want to turn the tide from threatening mass industrial potentiality back to post-industrial diversity. In the Content Creation Initiative a rhetorical re-description takes place by renaming the phenomenon as 'content creation'. This is reminiscent of the European and Anglo-Saxon creative industries discourse. The word 'culture' is omitted and 'creative' is added in order to widen the sphere, especially with regard to digital creation. The concept of creation has double meaning. Firstly, it is the idea of human intellect packaged, in this context, into software. Secondly, it is the creation of monetary value through these ideas. The implication in international discourse on creative industries and Finnish discourse on content creation is one of producing visible and provable surplus value to the national economy and not only with speculative and *rhetorical* tricks, as is the situation

with the cultural industry discourses. At the same time, the 'old' industrial mode of production is called for in the 'new' post-industrial organization and gadgetry.

The writers criticizing mass culture did not employ the term 'cultural industry'. Nevertheless, they were referring to a similar phenomenon and a similar range of attitudes to those held by Adorno when he named culture as 'industry'. Its range of reference is the entertainment culture at large, and the most conspicuous criterion of application is mediocrity. The discussants clearly realized that the harmful influence on imagination and mediocrity in the aesthetic form was due to the industrial mode of production. An attempt was later made to alter this climate. The writers from the 1980s onward tried to convince their audiences that the critique of mass culture in its academic and literary form is ungrounded. This paved the way for a new conception of the cultural industry received from the European discourses described in chapter 5. Its basic criteria are technical reproducibility and a commercial basis of organization. Thus, the range of reference is the publishing industry, film industry, recording industry, and media industry. These are the classical sectors of the cultural industry. The emphasis of policy is, just as in its European models, the enhancement of the small and marginal sectors of these industries.

The contribution of the Cultural Industry Committee in the conception of the cultural industries is remarkable. In their four-phased definition we can see each of the sectors named in the circle model in chapter 5. The very basic criterion is *symbolic meaning*. Thus, the reference ranges from creative arts to commodities, city attractions, urban planning and tourism. As a criterion, symbolic meaning is adequate for analytical goals but, according to the committee, not for policies. Thus, the second, more restricting criterion is that the cultural industry embodies certain aesthetic sets of activities and especially the intermediary activities *related to the arts*. This criterion is reminiscent of the value chain and its distribution phase. Thus, the reference ranges from libraries to museums to the arts market. Technical apparatus is not necessarily needed. They also highlight the criterion of *reproducibility* and the classical sectors as its range of reference. This, however, is not the only alternative. The criterion usually following reproducibility is *entrepreneurship*. However, this is not, according to the definition of the committee, restricted to classical cultural industries but to the arts in general. To the arts, this is a question of taking a certain viewpoint, of realizing their innate economic potential. The actual word 'entrepreneurship' emphasizes the small-scale character of the activity and its roots in handicrafts and applied arts.

The entire situation changes with the emphasis of the Content Creation Initiative. Even if in the area of activity of the Ministry of Education it is restricted to educational, cultural and aesthetic content creation, the 'analogous' forms of cultural entrepreneurship are withered away. A very basic criterion is *digitalisation.* Thus, the range of reference is the so-called new media entrepreneurship in its various forms.

One could ask what is the actual 'perlocutionary act' of the Cultural Industry Committee and the Content Creation Initiative? What have they managed to accomplish? Have they favoured artists in any sense? Despite unearthing ironies among artists, journalists and scholars in humanities, their work is not necessarily actually realized in terms of budget funding. The whole endeavour therefore appears to be, cynically expressed, 'sheer rhetoric'. The only 'visible' money comes rather from EU projects such as the eContent program. In fact, they change the traditional cultural policy measures, i.e. to establish a committee that formulates a budget proposal and recommends that a certain amount of money be put towards it (for the Cultural Industry Committee, proposal of the cultural heritage digitalisation project was a continuation of this). Rather, in the contemporary situation one should strive for opportunities for education (business management consultancy) and expertise centres linked to cultural industry sectors that are set up with the intention of incubating and helping (business) innovations in this area. The old, familiar and existent measures (such as copyright fees) are to all intents and purposes 're-described' from the point of view of the new sudden increase in use of the term. The Ministry of Education is no longer a sole operator in cultural policy. The Ministry of Trade and Industries is as important, for example, in providing start-up finance and in supporting for example, the new export initiative Music Export Finland.

A general critique towards the Finnish contemporary cultural industry discourse can be directed from the point of view of Throsby's analyses. They regard the economy almost without exception as a source of at least some degree of monetary profit. The word 'economy' also has another connotation: organization of an activity in an economical (or rational) way that does not necessarily relate to money in any sense. The word 'technology' has the connotation of an instrument or distribution platform. It can also have other connotations, particularly in connection with the word 'technique' in the sense of ability, skill, proficiency or method. The interviews conducted among the new media artists possess an imprint of these connotations. A further critique is the contemporary one-dimensional realization of the character of artistic and aesthetic endeavour at administration level. In the critique institution the problem of the character of the arts as political commentary is also addressed on occasion. However, the artist **in the** administrat**ive language** is no longer even analogous with a politician or a lobbyist. The most prominent one is an analogy to entrepreneur. An artist as a politician might also be considered as a dimension in aesthetic 'labour' that is, however, completely omitted in the committee work in Finland.

As far as the two separate logics and their possible adequacy as true or false descriptions are concerned, empirical evidence for both can be found in the contemporary situation. In fact, the idea of a two-level system of majors and minors is enough. The commonplace accounts of fusions and synergy among media and entertainment conglomerates prove that the logic of mass culture is alive and well. From the 1980s onward it has been evident that the world

popular music scene is led by an American-based globally operating entertainment business. It is, however, important to note that this is not a complete picture of the situation. Both logics and their various blends are at hand to work as a rhetorical device and a point of reference for the critic of capitalism, cultural populist or disinterested analyst of industrial structures.

7 CONCLUSION

The dialectical possibilities in critical theory, the later ideas of an oppositional public sphere, positional lifestyles and the description of industries including various scales of capital and differentiated ethos of repertoire building and programming policies are the connecting points in the world view, following which it is better for purposes of convenience to speak about the 'cultural industry'. Adorno's account was an intervention into these problems in his own time. Economic, cultural and political activity have each undergone changes during the years following the completion of *Dialektik der Aufklärung*. The account in this study is my description of the changes that might be needed in order to understand the 'perverse turn'. Since the end of 1960s counter cultures and political radicalism have brought forth something which has rendered the logic of mass culture as no longer the sole channel through which to describe our world. Social logic, sub-cultures and lifestyles (or 'mind styles') are the opportunities which cultural industry politicians have been attempting to reach out towards. At the level of policy measures it is the very logic of mass culture which is attempted to be avoided by fostering (aesthetically) significant entrepreneurship that cannot properly operate in the 'tough markets'. This is, however, the story of an immediate past. At present, certain tough requirements exist that threaten to water down the noble intentions of earlier cultural industry policies. Having said this, however, it is entirely possible that this may not be the case at all; the situation being a true 'unknown' in which a definite outcome is impossible to predict with certainty.

Each historical phase and theoretical tradition during the 20th century has added a new layer to the original concept of the cultural industry as introduced through critical theory. The phases have brought with them a new meaning in the sense of the 'object' of their contributions. The uses (ranges of attitudes) have also changed and varied during the course of the century. The range of reference and criteria do not vary greatly between Adorno, cultural economics or the Finnish cultural industry committee. All of them include the creative arts. The range of reference varies with those that do not apply it to the arts, but exclusively to the classical sectors, and also with those that do not consider ordinary commodities to be included within this realm. The most striking

development is in uses; the social attitude which is carried with the term and the attitude which is created among the audience via a unique meaning. Uttering the word is certainly a speech act because it is uttered with the particular intention of creating critical, analytical, neutral, commending or ironical understanding of it. The perlocutionary act is the ambience your use of it manages to create. The term 'cultural industry' is not merely a term, but a specialised expression loaded with strong passions for and against something, or somewhere between these two. For example, a person using the term in a completely commending fashion will be judged as naive by his/her audience in employing a critical sense of it. Conversely, a person loading it with critical meaning is doomed to be labelled as an old fashioned relic of a past era, or even as paranoid by an audience more enthusiastically specialized in the problems of popular culture. A person may be labelled as intellectually corrupted, opportunistic or simply idle and intellectually lacking if using the term in a commending and unproblematic manner. Equally, another person may be described as stubbornly holding on to ideas that prevent the creation of any virtues and well-being for our world if employing the term in a condemning fashion. The criterion of virtue sometimes simply represents the positive influence on economic dynamism. In analysing these one should always take into account the theoretical starting point of the speaker or writer. It is not just an ambience or an opinion but a more profound *Weltanschauung* and a way of positing oneself in this world. Sometimes the points of view are simply incommensurable due to differing starting points. The aim of this study is not to make these seem as if they are commensurable. It is simply to highlight the differences in the meanings and usages of this concept. Curiously, I can testify to the effect of the various speech acts through my own experiences in seminars, conferences and other occasions during the completion of this study.

The 'Meaning' column in the table 1 describes with single words the crystallizations of the meanings of the concept of the cultural industry in the various rhetorical itineraries delineated in this study; they are the 'objects' of the writings. These meanings are like historical layers in the 20th century traditions of writing on the cultural industry, which are equally valid and employed today. There is still much dispute on both the reference (figure 1, circle model) and criteria (figure 2, pyramid model) as well as on the social attitudes (table 1). Thus a radical turn or change in the concept has not taken place in the sense of older connotations becoming entirely omitted. In the table below I have also included the rhetorical 'moves' of various traditions of discussion. The table represents a brief summary of these issues and the writers responsible for them. A more specified delineation of the various writer's contributions and differences to others can be found in their relevant chapters and concluding sections.

TABLE 1 Presentation of the meanings of the cultural industry and the rhetorical moves

Meaning	Motive	Intention	Rhetorical re-description	
			naming	valuation
critical Adorno Enzensberger Negt Kluge	a changing status of intellectuals, disappearing of critical powers in the modern world	breaking the spell of modernity	industry illusionary character of democracy, freedom, sensuality, popularity, relaxation	dialectic of economic mode of production: virtuous intentions turning into vices
dialectical Adorno Enzensberger	a mode of philosophy denying the truth over time	breaking the spell of positive arguments		recuperation of radical activity; split consciousness, dialectic of entertain- ment as vicious anonym tendencies turning against themselves in virtuous reception
emancipatory Enzensberger Negt Kluge	the activity of transitory intellectuals	encouraging oppositional media use working within it	consciousness steering or blocking mind	emergence and existence of counter cultures as evidence and resource of possible transformation
cynical Enzensberger	resignation, disillusionment in the 1980s	revealing the absurdity of radical or commercial endeavours	*Nullmedium*	indifference, negligence, 'strategy of normality' of audiences
descriptive Unesco, Grenoble School, Lash & Urry, Caves, Heiskanen Gronow, (Throsby)	an attempt to analyse the structures of the classical sectors	neutral and disinterested analysis of various sectors	cultural: an aesthetic sector in industrial system industries: complexity mode of capital scale (small/middle/large) various logics (publishing, flow) value chain (intermediaries, vertical/horizontal dis/integration)	small and medium scale, uncertainty: devaluing deterministic decriptions
normative same	an attempt to understand how to enhance positive development	suggesting measures to 'correct the market failure'		built-in assumptions of the site of creativity and innovation
legitimatory Throsby, urban policy-makers, cultural/creative industries policy-makers,	convincing public public subdizer or private investor justifying expenditure	showing economic or other credentials of the arts and cultural/creative industries	creative: extending range of reference content creation: terminology of a post-industrial information society	aesthetic significance of industries economic significance of the arts and culture
instrumental same	an attempt to enhance corporate, local, regional, national, international or personal development	arguing for direct income and prestige value or other values and benefits		demand for balancing various benefits, contradictions between agents in the field

These meanings can be used against each other, for example by compromising the critical meaning with the emancipatory one and vice versa. The critical meaning can also be compromised by the descriptive sense and vice versa. It is as if they highlight the reverse sides of this phenomenon by illuminating the discrepancies of one account with the help of the other. The various meanings can be used commendably by accepting the point they represent or condemningly by criticizing the meaning it offers with another meaning in this list or from outside of these rhetorical itineraries.

Differentiating emancipatory, legitimatory and instrumental meanings and connecting certain discussants with them may be delusive because the meanings can be very near to each other. Furthermore, the writers and discussants may have proposed other kind of ideas elsewhere which might displace their being in this division. Urban policy-making projects are certainly pointing at the emancipatory role of their endeavours for certain groups of people. Discussants related to Unesco employ emancipatory meaning for national and local cultural diversity. Negt's, Kluge's and Enzensberger's accounts of the oppositional use of media can be understood also as instruments for the benefit of left intellectuals and working class. It is possible to continue the speculation. With strict lists of approaches, discussants and their connections to labels of meanings is inten**ded** to be representation of their *specific* 'object' of contribution, of what is most crucial in them with the help of the sources used in this study.

The discussants and approaches under the labels of meanings can also be covered in order to fade away the specific theoretical traditions and to obtain a more general model which can work as help in multi-perspective analysis of aesthetic or media phenomena. The table in this form is intended to give a brief summary of the traditions, the meanings they employ and their rhetorical moves.

One could also add for example a *parodic* meaning to the table. There are symptoms of this in newspaper or magazine articles, television talk shows or in any kind of randomly observed texts and discussions. It seems that especially artists, journalists and scholars in humanities and social sciences are active in this issue. One can hear an echo of a kind of 'postmodern' ethic of unbelieving. Their intention is to show the hollowness of the rhetoric of administration when making policy programme out of pop. They express it by using especially the term content creation metaphorically in contexts that renders it sound absurd. This is possibly the most 'efficient' method of contemporary critique because it captures the ethos of not taking anything very seriously. At the same time it shows that the economic and technological belief is not accepted as readily as it is offered to us.

The discussants presented in the table represent the perspectives and rhetorical devices used in handling the given issue in various situations. If one so wishes, they can offer the opportunity to look at the issue from various angles. This is not aimed at giving a thorough description or a holistic view, rather, it is a selection of traditions (that may be more numerous than presented

in this study) and a construction of an 'ideal type' of concept of the cultural industry. (see Weber 1949) The table is my rhetorical 'move' in the discussion on this issue. I intentionally attempt to avoid value judgements on the adequacy or substantiality of any of these meanings and uses of the concept of the cultural industry, although I cannot avoid value judgements 'creeping in' unintentionally. My interest is to deliver understanding of their point of departure and their claims and I leave it to the reader to take his/her own side in the debate. My intention is not to state who is right or wrong, but to offer these traditions as tools for, for example, interpreting a single media phenomenon from various angles. I have, of course, been clearly influenced in my approach by Douglas Kellner and his idea of multidimensional media studies. This idea seems to be currently spreading throughout the field of media studies.

The Skinnerian model of rhetorical conceptual history provides the opportunity to examine and present short-term transformations in concepts. One can observe certain changes and shifts even over the course of a single century, and it does not require millennia in order to be able to observe them (the German type of *Begriffsgeschichte*). Skinner himself warns against over hasty interpretations of change of concept, claiming that the existence of a dispute on the meaning and attitude conveyed by a concept does not necessarily mean that a change has taken place. This is exactly the situation in the case of my study. This rhetorical point of view provides the opportunity for a lateral conceptual history (see Palonen 2002). One can analyse the variations of meaning and uses at a certain point in time, which in this case is the present time.

With the following pyramid model I intend to offer a vision of the idea of the cultural industry and a list of criteria for application as a summary.

FIGURE 2   The pyramid model. The model is a presentation of criteria for application of the concept of **the** cultural industry

The pyramid model is a kind of synthesis of the criteria of application that can be found in the texts handled in this study. The range of reference is to be found in chapter 5 in the circle model. The circle model, however, excludes some spheres that should be included according to Enzensberger's, Negt's and Kluge's conception of the consciousness industry. Nonetheless, the most prominent sector of this industry in their opinion, electronic media, is included. At the same time the pyramid model is a critique towards the vision of circle model in which creativity lies at the core and economic operations begin to dominate in the outer orbits. The concepts at the bottom act as titles of an index of meanings that they indicate. Thus, the elements in the index are the criteria from which to select.

Art stands for aesthetic component or dimension: symbolic meaning, aesthetic symbolism, creative core, and intellectual idea or *Geist*. Economics stands for an efficient profit-oriented or non-profit mode of production, markets as a sphere of supply and demand, investment, economies of scale and scope, concentration/diversification, and commodity form. Technology stands for reproduction technique, distribution technique (broadcasting or telecommunication as channels), digital technology, skill (technical mastery in using a material or an instrument) or organization of an aesthetic material. Politics stands for democracy in a broadly sociological sense, individuality and freedom in thinking and action, emancipation, empowerment, subordination, national prestige or competitive edge, and policies for intervention in the markets using various specific instruments.

This model could be thought of as revealing the self-excluding reverse sides of the phenomenon. If the cultural industry is defined through an economically efficient mode of production, the product thus made cannot contain any aesthetic or political relevance as was thought in the Finnish film discourse earlier. A 'true' artwork contains no economic component, and it is logically quite possible that the sphere of art lies entirely outside the market system. This is because a person classifying himself/herself as an artist will create his/her works (financing his/her living in some way or other) even if nobody is going to buy them. According to this idea the system of supply and demand does not apply here. A 'true' artwork may also be a work of 'handicraft' and a 'unique' creation, and in that sense there is no technological component of reproduction or distribution (except skill in using a material or an instrument). A 'true' artwork (in the sense of e.g. **A**estheti**cism** or **A**bstract **E**xpressionism) does not contain political or social commentary. In the sense of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory, the denial of any commentary is, paradoxically, in itself a highly powerful one. Politics and arts, and technology and arts are completely possible combinations as well as a triangle of arts, technology and politics in the sense of, for example, art photography or cinema. Usually, however, this triangle excludes economics in the sense of a profit-oriented, efficient mode of production.

The point of my description of these dimensions as reverse sides is not to exclude but rather include these all as elements. With this model and the index

of dimensions that each word indicates one can determine the character of a certain product or performance. If not a test of an issue included within the realm of the cultural industry, it is a model for studying the dimensions of a product or performance. With the strategy of inclusion I intend to point out that they are dimensions that exist right from the beginning. It is naive to claim that in aesthetic activities there would not be political or economical dimensions. Even if the author intentionally tries to avoid them, s/he cannot control the reception or any other repercussions that his/her endeavour may bring forth. This is evident even in Adorno's account of Schönberg.

Let us take couple of examples out of the circle model: painting and design of clothes. A painting is without doubt an aesthetic symbol, containing symbolic meaning and creative and intellectual ideas. The artist possesses certain specific skills in working with material, and can possibly even use reproduction techniques such as graphic design. The painter has something to say. If not a raw political commentary, the work might be an intervention into a certain social situation or into the art world and contain his/her personal world view, be it in an abstract form or not. The work may also contribute to national prestige. Economically speaking the artist may have the backing of a private sponsor (which is the grey area between policy and economy). The artist may even manage to make a living through the sale of his/her works. Alternatively s/he may be forced to earn his/her living by doing routine work and finance his/her aesthetic endeavours in this way. His/her work may catalyse the arts markets. The basis of financing may influence what s/he wants or what s/he is able to accomplish with his/her art. Even an artist needs some form of economic basis and income in order at least to survive.

Taking an example of a commodity such as cloth; let's assume that the product is designed by someone who is loading symbolic meaning into the item in order to attract certain kinds of customers. The production process either requires technical facilities or is produced throughout as a handicraft item requiring mastery in certain skills. The process is doubtless in need of some economic operations: organization of a business, division of labour, marketing, financing and logistics. Politics in this case refers to the ethos of the organization which produces the items. This has consequences for the social relations among the workers and a more general world view of the organization (whether it prompts boycotting acts, whether the firm carries social responsibility or environmental responsibility etc.). The goods can also be delivered simply as 'positional goods' which is in itself a form of politics.

The table represents the vision that no particular individual meaning or rhetorical move is, as such, more valid than any other. Each of them can be backed up by empirical evidence. The pyramid model is intended as a reminder to guard against limited visions of aesthetic or economic matters.

Nevertheless, the story of critical theory is also useful in trying to understand the character of the time of the beginning 21st century. The critical concept of the cultural industry captures a characteristic of our time which extends much further than just aesthetic issues. It is - as the discussants of the

Bileet Tornissa publication point out – the substitution of qualities with quantities and values with instruments. Everything must be legitimised with any numerical, accountable figures and external benefits it might possess, besides this it is valuable only as such, in itself. In general, this is the turn in state administration strategies in which the doctrine of New Public Management is widely employed (see chapter 6).

In the sectors of the arts and media culture this is, of course, the requirement to secure quantities of spectators for television and radio programmes, or numbers of visitors to a museum, concert or theatre performance. This kind of legitimation and reduction naturally stems from financial difficulties; one is forced to make lists of priorities because available financial resources do not stretch far enough to cover everything. What is striking in this thinking is that the idea of risk or uncertainty seems to be missing. Controversialities, difficulties and esoteric expression in programming and exhibition policies are commercial risks in terms of statistical probabilities. It is much safer to have a conventional output. However, conventionality is also a risk in aesthetic, political and economic terms. The difficulty of a piece as such does not automatically reflect its intellectuality or political or aesthetic significance. At worst, it may do nothing more than to bring about counter reactions and a strengthening of stereotypical attitudes towards the arts. Even a 'trick' of audience attraction may contain valuable repercussions in the minds of the spectators. However, chasing after audience segments, their preferences and trying to please them presents the *risk* of a dead end. A very brave, and possibly overly idealistic, comment was recently offered by a Finnish composer: 'Supply creates demand'.

The above description is basically concerned with cultural production in Finland as subsidized by the state. Other subsidized sectors naturally include education and health care. A similar model of organizing activities has also spread in these sectors. Crudely expressed, in universities this especially means the pursuit of target numbers of examination successes, particularly master's, licentiate and doctor's theses, which are the most valuable achievements for any department. Cynically stated, the author of this paper may herself be a product of the 'doctor industry', with the word 'industry' used in the pejorative sense to denote the production process of theses. However, along with the increasing number of doctoral students and opportunities in departments, the critical mass of commentary, information, knowledge, ideas and innovations among colleagues and supervisors is also on the increase. As the requirement to increase is dependent on output, the requirement for efficient supervision is also on the rise. The ultimate outcome of this issue is another aspect which is exceedingly difficult to predict.

In health care, once again crudely expressed, an efficient nurse, doctor, social worker or therapy worker is one that manages to handle as many 'cases' as possible during the day. This is a highly rudimentary and simplified statement, yet the logic is clearly visible in each of the various sectors of health care. Each sector applies this logic in a slightly different way depending on the

nature of the function performed. The term 'care industry' is sometimes even used in a genuine critical and pejorative capacity, and not in the neutral sense that O'Connor intended it, as mentioned in chapter 6.

It is evident that various professionals in these sectors and people in general are completely aware of these tendencies. Sometimes their frustrations burst out, for example in letters to the editor, interviews of experts in the media or in magazine columns. It is also a common grumble in everyday coffee break discussions. The world is not accepted as readily as it is offered to us. As economic efficiency as a model of thinking continues to spread to the most 'remote' corners of the public sector a whole 'complaint industry' is spreading at a respective pace. Various professionals claim that these are the sectors that should be excluded from the laws of cost-efficiency, or at least that efficiency should not be counted in the cost of humanity and civilized conduct. The discussions can be concluded with the question: who can put an end to the vicious circle? The tragedy of modernity lies in this. One can somehow understand the dynamics of the world, at the same time one is powerless to change anything beyond one's *own* life. Of course, the principle of risk and uncertainty tells us that there are no positive univocal collective political answers to these questions, or that even they have uncontrollable outcomes.

In this sense, economics is not necessarily a *lingua franca* of our time. It may be a general framework for organizing various activities that everyone should somehow learn and understand to begin with. But it is not necessarily accepted, internalized or indoctrinated as such; rather it creates controversies, at least within the minds of professionals. Even at the cultural administration level in Finland an evident shift has occurred away from understanding the art world only in terms of the economy. Economics is more understood as a specific separate entity alongside other aspects of personal development, and culture and the arts are seen as a medium for *cultura animi.*

I have tried to reveal a certain naivety in the idea of identity construction as the only 'activity' of our time. If identity is construed solely by the commodity world there is always something delusive if it is claimed to be a source of 'true' individuality. It is the role of critical theory to reveal this in our time. At the same time there is always an element of unpredictability and inventiveness in consumption. A psychologist might refer to this as divergent thinking. Technological inventions are not solely to be understood as the creative productions of an engineer, but also as the divergent end uses and different users of these applications. This may be another case of a happy integration of the creative mind with the 'capitalist system'. From the political point of view the divergence in thinking and agency goes beyond integration; the human mind cannot be captured by a 'system'.

The fact that the concept of the cultural industry creates various kinds of reactions when uttering it and that the meanings listed above are still used proves that we do not live in a mass culture and that economics is not the *lingua franca* or our time. The contemporary possibility of emancipatory media use, through digital information networks or some other form, proves that there is

no solidified system of a 'free' market economy as a kind of melting pot of all manner of controversies and marginalities. Inventive human minds always break away and run ahead of the attempts of instrumentalization. In order to take the change of perspective to the thesis of instrumentalization one could point out the following: the very moment the 'snoopers of cool' find the scent, 'cool' is already somewhere else.

YHTEENVETO

Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää kulttuuriteollisuuden käsitteen sovelluskriteerit, sovellusalue sekä merkitykset, joita siihen länsimaisessa kulttuurianalyysissä on liitetty 1900-luvulla. Tavoitteena on myös selittää aikaisemman kriittisen analyysin käännettä puolustavaan analyysiin. Tutkimus osoittaa ne historialliset käänteet, joiden jälkeen kulttuuriteollisuuden käsitettä voidaan käyttää neutraalisti ja myönteisesti kulttuuripoliittisena kattokäsitteenä. Lähtökohtana ei ole vain määritellä käsite vaan välittää näkemys erilaisista teoreettisista perinteistä, joissa asiasta on kirjoitettu. Käytettyjen lähteiden valikoima on rajattu siten, että valinnan kriteerinä käytetään teollisuus-sanan esiintymistä teksteissä. Kulttuuriteollisuuskeskustelun alkaminen ajoitetaan yleisesti ja myös tässä tutkimuksessa Frankfurtin koulun ensimmäisen polven analyyseihin 1930-luvulta lähtien aina 1960-luvulle, jossa se sai alkuperäisen kriittisen merkityksensä. Saksalaisen vasemmistoälymystön edustajina Hans-Magnus Enzensberger, Oskar Negt ja Alexander Kluge jatkavat keskustelua nimeämällä ilmiön tajuntateollisuudeksi. He sisällyttävät siihen sekä uhkaavia mahdollisuuksia mutta myös emansipatorisia mahdollisuuksia median käytön tavasta riippuen. Saksalaisessa keskustelussa esiintyy myös dialektisia ja kyynisiä sävyjä, joiden kautta välittyy kuva absurdista ja toiminnan lopputulosten suhteen epävarmasta maailmasta. Myös saksankielisen maailman ulkopuolella on keskusteltu ja kirjoitettu asiasta, mutta useimmiten kokonaan toisenlaisella normatiivisella värityksellä. Nämä kirjoittajat Ranskassa, Britanniassa, Australiassa ja USA:ssa ovat enemmän tai vähemmän kytkeytyneitä kansallisiin ja kansainvälisiin kulttuuripolitiikan kysymyksiin. Nämä kirjoittajat analysoivat kulttuuriteollisuuden eri lohkojen rakenteita kuvailevasti ja osoittavat normatiivisesti toimenpidesuosituksiin ja markkinoiden tavoiteltavaan tilaan. Kulttuurin taloustieteen tapa osoittaa taiteen ja kulttuurin ulkoiset hyödyt on käytössä myös kulttuuriteollisuuskeskustelussa. Teollisuus-sana tässä yhteydessä sisältää retorista tehoa, jolla pyritään ilmaisemaan se, että kulttuurilla on valtiontaloudellisia ja työllisyysvaikutuksia. Kulttuuripolitiikassa on otettu käyttöön tämän tutkimusperinteen (ns. *impact studies*) tarjoama mahdollisuus legitimoida taiteen ja kulttuurin julkinen rahoitus. Kulttuuriteollisuuden käsitteen sisältämä legitimoiva mahdollisuus on lähellä myös mahdollisuutta, jonka voi nimetä instrumentaaliseksi. Näillä on tietty sävyero, jolloin instrumentaalinen merkitys viittaa niihin kaikkiin mahdollisuuksiin ja hyötyihin, joita taiteella ja kulttuurilla voi olla yksilölle, kansalle tai kansainväliselle järjestelmälle. Painopiste siirtyy kauemmas julkisen tai yksityisen rahan legitimointitarpeesta yleisemmin taiteen ja kulttuurin välineluonteeseen. 1960-luvun poliittiset liikkeet ja vastakulttuurit, taiteen ja kulttuurin ympärillä pyöritettävän liiketalouden rakenteiden fragmentaarisuus ja skaalaerot, elämäntapaerot ja niihin kytkeytyvä tuotanto ja kulutus ovat niitä selittäjiä, jotka murentavat pohjaa Frankfurtin koulun kriittiseltä näkemykseltä ja teesiltä, jonka mukaan kulttuuriteollisuuden toimintatapa tuottaa lähes poikkeuksetta massakulttuuria ja näennäistä yksilöllisyyttä. Kuitenkin nykykulttuurissa on myös tendenssejä, joiden perusteella

Frankfurtin koulun varoitukset ovat edelleen aiheellisia, joista vähin ei ole juuri taiteen ja kulttuurin välineluonteen ylikorostaminen. Tutkimuksessa esitetään, että kriittinen, dialektinen, emansipatorinen, kyyninen, deskriptiivinen, normatiivinen, legitimatorinen ja instrumentaalinen ovat nimiä niille keskeisimmille merkityksille, joita 1900-luvulla on annettu kulttuuriteollisuuden käsitteelle. Ne ovat merkitysten historiallisia kerrostumia, mutta samalla edelleen voimassa ja käytössä olevia. Nimet kytketään kunkin ajan mukanaan tuomiin retorisen uudelleenkuvauksen mahdollisuuksiin. Uudelleenkuvaus on ilmiön arvottamisella ja nimeämisellä vetoamista (esim. yllä mainitut poliittiset liikkeet, kulttuuriteollisuuden alojen rakenteet, sosiaalinen logiikka) Ne selittävät sitä, miksi käsitettä on jossain määrin helpompi käyttää neutraalisti tai myönteisesti nyt kuin aikaisemmin. Samalla ne ovat välineitä nykykeskustelussa, jossa voidaan arvioida vastapuolen argumenttien pätevyyttä. Ne ovat ikään kuin eri näkökulmia samaan asiaan. Tulokset toimivat esimerkkinä ja sovelluksena lateraalista käsitehistoriasta. Keskustelun perinteiden esittäminen ja tutkimuksen tulokset voivat toimia välineenä moniperspektiiviseen mediailmiöiden ja kulttuurin tuotannon analyysiin. Tutkimus tarjoaa myös pyramidimallin havainnollistamaan käsitteen sovelluskriteereitä sekä kehämallin havainnollistamaan käsitteen sovellusalaa.

LITERATURE

GS: Gesammelte Schriften

Adorno, Th. W. 1932. Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik. Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 1, I 103-124; II 356-378.

Adorno, Th. W. 1936. Über Jazz. Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 5, 235-259.

Adorno, Th. W. 1938. Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens. Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 7, 321-355.

Adorno, Th. W. 1941. On Popular Music. Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 9, 17-48.

Adorno, Th. W. 1962. Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Adorno, Th. W. 1969a. Freizeit. In Th. W. Adorno. Stichworte. Kritische Modelle 2. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 57-67.

Adorno, Th. W. 1969b. Wissenschaftliche Erfahrungen in Amerika. In Th. W. Adorno. Stichworte. Kritische Modelle 2. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 113-147.

Adorno, Th. W. 1969c. Erziehung nach Auschwitz. In Th. W. Adorno. Stichworte. Kritische Modelle 2. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 85-101.

Adorno, Th. W. 1937/38/1971. Versuch über Wagner. Die musikalischen Monographien. GS 13. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Adorno, Th. W. 1949/1976. Philosophie der neuen Musik. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Adorno, Th. W. 1973. Philosophy of Modern Music. London: Sheed & Ward.

Adorno, Th. W. 1966/1977. Filmtransparente. In Th. W. Adorno. Ohne Leitbild. GS 10.1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 353-361.

Adorno, Th. W. 1962/1977. Résumé über Kulturindustrie. In Th. W. Adorno. Ohne Leitbild. GS 10.1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 337-345.

Adorno, Th. W. 1981-2. Transparencies on Film. New German Critique 24-25, 199-205.

Adorno, Th. W. 1981. Das Schema der Massenkultur. Kulturindustrie (Fortsetzung). In T. W. Adorno. GS 3. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 299-335.

Adorno, Th. W. 1991. The Culture Industry. Selected essays on mass culture in J. M. Bernstein (Ed.) London: Routledge.

Adorno, Th. W. 1991a. On the fetish character in music and the regression of listening. In J. M. Bernstein (Ed.) The Culture Industry. Selected essays on mass culture. London: Routledge, 26-52.

Adorno, Th. W. 1991b. The schema of mass culture. In J. M. Bernstein (Ed.) The Culture Industry. Selected essays on mass culture. London: Routledge, 53-84.

Adorno, Th. W. 1991c. Culture industry reconsidered. In J. M. Bernstein (Ed.) The Culture Industry. Selected essays on mass culture. London: Routledge, 85-92.

Adorno, Th. W. 1991d. Free time. In J. M. Bernstein (Ed.) The Culture Industry. Selected essays on mass culture. London: Routledge, 162-170.

Adorno - Benjamin 1994. Briefwechsel 1928 - 1940. Hrsg. Henri Lonitz. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Adorno, Th. W. 1997. Aesthetic Theory. Minnesota: University of Minnesota. Orig. Ästetische Theorie 1969. Transl. Robert Hullot-Kentor.

Aho, K. 1997. Taide ja todellisuus. Helsinki: WSOY.

Arendt, H. 1958. Kultur und Politik. Merkur 12 (12), 1122-1145.

Arendt, H. 1985. Das Urteilen. Texte zu Kants politischer Philosophie. München: Piper.

Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ball, T. & Farr, J. & Hanson, R. L. 1989 (eds.). Editor's Introduction. In Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: CUP, 1-5.

Benjamin, W. 1974. Illuminationen. Ausgewählte Schriften 1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Bianchini, Franco 1987. GLC R.I.P. Cultural Policies in London 1981-1986. New Formations 1.

Blumer, H. 1999. Joukko, massa ja julkiso. Tiedotustutkimus 3, 14-26. Orig. version 'Collective Behavior' in A. M. Lee Jr. (Ed.) 1946. New Outline of the Principles of Sociology. From the version 'The Crowd, the Mass, and the Public' in W. Schramm (Ed.) 1961. The Process and Effects of Mass Communication transl. Veikko Pietilä.

Bourdieu, P. 1984. Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1993. The Field of Cultural Production. London: Polity.

Bourdieu, P. 1999. Televisiosta. Helsinki: Otava. Orig. 1996. Sur la television. Transl. Tiina Arppe.

Bowie, A. 1997. From Romanticism to Critical Theory. The philosophy of German literary theory. London: Routledge.

Breton, A. 1982. Introduction to an economics of culture: a liberal approach. In Unesco: Cultural Industries. A challenge for the future of culture. Paris: Unesco, 40-50.

Brickwood, C. 2002. Kansakunnan verkostoituminen Euroopan Unionissa. In: M. Tarkka & T. Mäkelä (Eds.) Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä. Mcult. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 7, 167-183.

Buck-Morss, S. 1977. The Origin of Negative Dialectics. Sussex: The Harvester Press.

Burisch, W. 1963. Zum Begriff von Massenkommunikation. Das Argument 5 (25), 8-16.

Caves, R. 2000. Creative Industries. Contracts Between Art and Commerce. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Council of Europe 1998. Syrjästä esiin. Puheenvuoroja kulttuurista ja kehityksestä Euroopassa. (In from the Margins). Helsinki: Taiteen keskustoimikunta.

Creative Industries Taskforce 2001. Mapping Document. Http://www.culture.gov.uk/creative/mapping.html.

Cultural Industry Committee (1999): Final report. Http://www.minedu.fi/kupo/ky/kulttuuri-teollisuus/cultural.html.

Cunningham, S. 2002. From Cultural to Creative Industries: Theory, Industry, and Policy Implications. Proceedings. The Second International Conference on Cultural Policy Research, Wellington, New Zealand, 108-116.

Department of Culture, Media and Sport 1998. Mapping Document. Http://www.culture.gov.uk/creative/creative_industries.html.

Dröge F. & Müller, M. 1995. Die Macht der Schönheit. Avantgarde und Faschismus oder die Geburt der Massenkultur. Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt.

Enzensberger, H. M. 1962/1971. Bewusstseins-Industrie. In H. M. Enzensberger 1971. Einzelheiten I. Bewusstseins-Industrie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 7-17.

Enzensberger, H. M. 1970. Baukasten zu einer Theorie der Medien. Kursbuch 20, 159-186.

Enzensberger, H. M. 1971. Einzelheiten I. Bewusstseins-Industrie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Enzensberger, H. M. 1983/1997. Der Triumph der *Bild*-Zeitung oder Die Katastrophe der Pressefreiheit. In P. Glotz (Ed.) Baukasten zu einer Theorie der Medien. Kritische Diskurse zur Pressefreiheit. München: Fischer, 133-144.

Enzensberger, H. M 1988. Die vollkommene Leere. Das Nullmedium Oder Warum alle Klagen über das Fernsehen gegenstandslos sind. Der Spiegel 20, 234-244.

Eräsaari, L. 2002. Julkinen tila ja valtion yhtiöittäminen. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

Eskelinen, E. 2002. Broadband ja digi-tv - haasteet tuotantorakenteille. In M. Tarkka & T. Mäkelä (Eds.) Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä. Mcult. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 7, 127-140.

Fisch, J. 1992. Zivilisation Kultur. In Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 7. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 679-774.

Flew, T. 2002. Beyond *ad hocery*: Defining Creative Industries. Proceedings, The Second International Conference on Cultural Policy Research, Wellington, New Zealand, 181-191.

Frith, S. 1991. Knowing One's Place: The Culture of Cultural Industries. Cultural Studies From Birmingham 1. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 134-155.

Frith S. & Savage J. 1993. Pearls and Swine: The intellectuals and the Mass Media. New Left Review 198, 107-116.

Garnham, N. 1990. Capitalism and Communication. Global Culture and the Economics of Information. London: Sage.

Gerhardt, U. 1963. Masse und Massenkommunikation. Das Argument. 5 (25), 2-7.

Girard, A. 1982. Cultural Industries: a handicap or a new opportunity for cultural development. In Unesco. Cultural Industries. A challenge for the future of culture. Paris: Unesco, 24-39.

Greven, M. Th. 1994. Kritische Theorie und historische Politik. Theoriengeschichtliche Beiträge zur gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Gronow, P. 1976. Kulttuuripolitiikan käsikirja. Helsinki: Otava.

Haatanen, K. 2002. Oikeiston ahdasmielisyys, vasemmiston ylimielisyys. Tiede & Edistys 3, 241-255.

Habermas, J. 1962/1990. Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Hachmeister, L. 1993. Der Gesamtschuldner. Das Fernsehen als Antipode intellektueller Orthodoxie. Merkur 47 (5), 841-853.

Hall, S. 1980. Encoding/decoding. In S. Hall & D. Hobson & A. Lowe & P. Willis (Eds.) Culture, Media, Language. Birmingham: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies.

Hallitusohjelma Paavo Lipposen hallitukselle 15.4.1999

Hansen, M. 1981-2. Introduction to Adorno, 'Transparencies on Film' (1966). New German Critique 24-25, 186-198.

Hansen, M. 1983. Alexander Kluge, Cinema and the Public Sphere: The Construction Site of Counter-History. Discourse 6, 53-73.

Hansen, M. 1993. Unstable Mixtures, Dilated Spheres: Negt and Kluge's *The Public Sphere and Experience*, Twenty Years Later. Public Culture. Society for Transnational Cultural Studies, 179-212.

Heiskanen, I. 1985. Uusi viestintäteknologia ja rakenteellinen kuri suomalaisessa joukkoviestinnässä ja kulttuuriteollisuudessa. In R. Mitchell (Ed.) Uusi teknologia, taiteet, taidepolitiikka. Helsinki: Valtion taidehallinnon julkaisuja 28, 193-247.

Heiskanen, I. 1994. Kulttuuripolitiikan pitkät linjat. Hyvinvointikatsaus 2, 6-9.

Heiskanen, I. 2001. Muuttuivatko laitokset, miksi ja miten? Taide- ja kulttuurilaitosten institutionaalinen muutos 1990-luvulla. TaiLa-projektin julkaisuja. Acta Politica. University of Helsinki. Department of Political Science. Publication no 20.

Heiskanen, I. 2002. Kulttuuriteollisuus. In I. Heiskanen & A. Kangas & R. Mitchell. Taiteen ja kulttuurin kentät. Perusrakenteet, hallinta, lainsäädäntö ja uudet haasteet. Jyväskylä: Tietosanoma, 141-192.

Henry, I. 1993. The Politics of Leisure Policy. London: Macmillan Press.

Held, D. 1980. Introduction to Critical Theory. Horkheimer to Habermas. London: Polity.

Hickethier, K. 1992. Hermetik der Medien oder die Freiheit des Zuschauers. Ästhetik und Kommunikation. 21 (79), 58-64.

Hohendahl, P. U. 1992. Adorno's American Years. New German Critique 56, 76-108.

Horkheimer, M. & Adorno, Th. W. 1947/1969. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente. Frankfurt: Fischer.

Horkheimer, M. & Adorno, Th. W. 1972. Dialectic of Enlighetenment. New York: Herder & Herder. Transl. John Cumming.

Hurri, M. 1993. Kulttuuriosasto. Symboliset taistelut, sukupolvikonflikti ja sananvapaus viiden pääkaupunkilehden kulttuuritoimituksissa 1945-1980. Tampere: Acta Universitatis Tamperensis ser. A vol. 389.

Huyssen, A. 1983. Adorno in Reverse: From Hollywood to Richard Wagner. New German Critique 29, 8-38.

Immonen, K. (1999): Kulttuurin kentän muuttuminen. In A-M. Latikka (Ed.) Puoli vuosisataa. MMM juhlakirja. Helsinki: Otava, 16-23.

Jarvis, S. 1998. Adorno. A Critical Introduction. London; Routledge.

Jay, M. 1984. Adorno. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Jay, M. 1985. Permanent Exiles. Essays on the Intellectual Migration From Germany to America. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jay, M. 1973/1996. The Dialectical Imagination. A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jay, M. 1999. Onko kokemus edelleen kriisissä? Ajatuksia Frankfurtin koulun kaihosta. In O-P. Moisio (Ed.) Kritiikin lupaus. Näkökulmia Frankfurtin

koulun kriittiseen teoriaan. Jyväskylä: SoPhi, 177-196, transl. Olli-Pekka Moisio.

Kangas, A. 1999. Kulttuuripolitiikan uudet vaatteet. In A. Kangas & J. Virkki (Eds.) Kulttuuripolitiikan uudet vaatteet. Jyväskylä: SoPhi, 156-178.

Kangas, A. 2003. Cultural Policy in Finland. In P. Duelund (Ed.) The Nordic Cultural Model. Copenhagen: Nordic Cultural Institute, 79-112.

Kant, Immanuel 1790/1995. Kritik der Urteilskraft. Köln: Könemann.

Kaukomies, M. 2002. Cross-mediatuotannon käytäntöjä. In M. Tarkka & T. Mäkelä (Eds.) Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä. Mcult. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 7, 35-46.

Kausch, M. 1998. Kulturindustrie und Populärkultur. Frankfurt: Fischer.

Kellner, D. 1998. Mediakulttuuri. Tampere: Vastapaino. Orig. 1995. Media Culture. Cultural studies, identity and politics between the modern and the post-modern. Transl. group of translators supervised by Riitta Oittinen.

Kemper, P. 1991. 'Der Rock ist ein Gebrauchswert'. Warum Adorno die Beatles verschmähte. Merkur 45 (9/10), 890-902.

Kender, K. 1998. Itsenäisyyspäivä. Helsinki: WSOY. Orig. 1998. Iseseisvupäev. Transl. Hannu Oittinen.

Keppler, A. & Seel, M. 1991. Zwischen Vereinnahmung und Distanzierung. Vier Fallstudien zur Massenkultur. Merkur 45 (9/10), 877-889.

Klein, N. 2000. No Logo. London: Flamingo.

Klein, N. 2001. No Logo. Tähtäimessä brandinvaltiaat. Helsinki: WSOY.

Klingemann, C. 1993. Massen-Wirklichkeiten und Massen-Konstruktionen im NS-Staat und in der Mediengesellschaft. Das Argument 35 (5), 749-759.

Kluge, A 1981-2. On Film and the Public Sphere. New German Critique 24-25, 206-220.

Koivunen, H. & Kotro, T. 1997. Kulttuurisektorin toimintaympäristö muuttuu. Arsis 3, 19.

Koivunen, H. 1999. Instituutioista innovaatioihin. In H. Koivunen & T. Kotro (Eds.) Kulttuuriteollisuus. Helsinki: Sitra, 283-297.

Kotkavirta, J. 2000. Moderni, antimoderni ja myöhäismoderni klassismi. In M. Härmänmaa & T. Vihavainen (Eds.) Kivettyneet ihanteet? Klassismin nousu maailmansotien välisessä Euroopassa. Jyväskylä: Atena, 62-88.

Kotro, T. 1999. Kulttuuriteollisuuden käsitteestä. Http://www.minedu.fi/kupo/ky/kulttuuriteollisuus/käsite.html.

Kulttuuripolitiikan linjat -komitean mietintö, Kupoli 1992. Komiteanmietintö 1992: 36, Helsinki: Valtion painatuskeskus.

Kulttuuritoimintakomitean mietintö 1974. Komiteanmietintö 1974: 2, Helsinki: Valtion painatuskeskus.

Lacroix, C. & Petit, M. & Rouet, F. 1979. Les industries culturelles. Documentation francaise, 'Notes et études documentaires'.

Langer, C. 1986. Reform nach Prinzipien. Untersuchungen zur politischen Theorie Immanuel Kants. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Lau, J. 1997. Hans Magnus Enzensberger. Ein öffentliches Leben. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Lash, S. & Urry, J. 1994. Economies of Signs and Space. London: Sage.

240

Lewis, J. 1990. Art, Culture & Enterprise. The Politics of Art and the Cultural Industries. London: Routledge.

LTT-Tutkimus Oy 2001. Sisältötuotannon arvoketjun rahoitus. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 2.
Http://www.minedu.fi/opm/hankkeet/sisu/ julkaisut.html.

Lull, J. 1995. Media, Communication, Culture. A Global Approach. London: Polity.

Luoto, S. & Lindfors, J. 1999. Rockia Euroopan reunalla. In A-M. Latikka (Ed.) Puoli vuosisataa. MMM juhlakirja. Helsinki: Otava, 60-68.

Maase, K. 1990. Kultureller Selbstausschluss - ein ewige Kreislauf? Zur Debatte über Lesen und neue Medien. Das Argument 30 (1), 29-37.

Malmberg, T. 1998. Yhteiskunta, mediat ja tiede. Lyhyt 1900-luvun joukkoviestintä- ja mediatutkimuksen historia. In U. Kivikuru & R. Kunelius (Eds.) Viestinnän jäljillä. Näkökulmia uuden ajan ilmiöön. Helsinki: WSOY, 417-429.

Maresch, R. 1992. Mediatisierte Welt(en). Über das Unmöglich-Werden sozialer Emanzipationsprozesse. Ästhetik und Kommunikation 21 (79), 48-56.

Marx, K. 1867/1995. Capital. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Transl. David McLellan.

Mattelart, A & Piemme, J-M. 1982. Cultural Industries: the origin of an idea. In Unesco. Cultural Industries. A Challenge for the Future of Culture. Paris: Unesco, 51-61.

Mehtonen, L. & Sironen, E. 1991. Frankfurtin koulu. In E. Sevänen & L. Saariluoma & R. Turunen (Eds.) Taide modernissa maailmassa. Taiteensosiologiset teoriat Georg Lukácsista Fredric Jamesoniin. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 66-85.

Miège, B. 1989. The Capitalization of Cultural Production. New York: International General.

Mitchell, R. 1985. Johdanto: Tietoyhteiskunta, audiovisuaalinen yhteiskunta ja taiteiden postmoderni tilanne. In R. Mitchell (Ed.) Uusi teknologia, taiteet, taidepolitiikka. Helsinki: Valtion taidehallinnon julkaisuja 28, 11-28.

Morgan, K. 2002. Building the Creative Region: Supporting the Growth of Creative Industries Enterprises. Proceedings, The Second International Conference on Cultural Policy Research, Wellington, New Zealand, 353-360.

Muikku, J. 2001. Musiikkia kaikkiruokaisille. Suomalaisen populaarimusiikin äänitetuotanto 1945-1990. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

Myerscough, J. 1988. The Economic Imprortance of The Arts in Britain. London: Policy Studies Institute.

Mykkänen, J. 1999. Suomi merkittäväksi sisältöteolliseksi maaksi.
Http://www.culminatum.fi/ajankohtaista/19990924mykkanen.html.

Mäkelä, T. 2002a. Johdanto: mediakulttuurin innovaatioympäristö. In M. Tarkka & T. Mäkelä (Eds.) Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä. Mcult. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 7, 101-104.

Mäkelä, T. 2002b. Mediakulttuurin kansainvälinen toimiala. In M. Tarkka & T. Mäkelä (Eds.) Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä. Mcult. Sisältötuotanto-työyhmän väliraportti 7, 105-126.

Mäkelä, T. & Tarkka M. 2002. Yhteenveto ja suositukset. In M. Tarkka & T. Mäkelä (Eds.) Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä. Mcult. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 7, 187-198.

Negt, O. & Kluge, A. 1972. Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Negt, O. & Kluge, A. 1981. Geschichte und Eigensinn. Frankfurt: Zweitausendeins.

Niemi, I. 1999. Teatteri realismin ja rituaalin vuorovaikutuksessa. In A-M. Latikka (Ed.) Puoli vuosisataa. MMM juhlakirja. Helsinki: Otava, 40-45.

Nietzsche, Friedrich 1887/1994. On the Genealogy of Morality. Cambridge: CUP. Transl. Carol Diethe.

Nousiainen, J. 2002. Uusmedia ja mediataide B silminnäkijälausuntoja altistumisalueelta. In M. Tarkka & T. Mäkelä: Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä. Mcult. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 7, 47-62.

O'Connor, J. 1999. Cultural Industries and Cultural Policy in Europe. Http://www.culminatum.fi/ajankohtaista/19990924oconnor.html.

Palonen, K. 1999. Rhetorical and Temporal Perspectives on Conceptual Change. Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought vol. 3, 41-59.

Palonen, K. 2002. Begriffsgeschichte und/als Politikwissenschaft. Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 44, 221-234.

Pantti, M. 1998. Kaikki muuttuu... Elokuvakulttuurin jälleenrakentaminen Suomessa 1950-luvulta 1970-luvulle. Helsinki: Suomen Elokuvatutkimuksen Seura.

Pelo, R. 2002. Käsikirjoituksia koulutuksesta työelämään. In M. Tarkka & T. Mäkelä (Eds.) Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä. Mcult. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 7, 75-88.

Perelman, C. & Olbrechts-Tyteca L. 1971. The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on Argumentation. London: University of Notre Dame.

Peterson, R. A. & Berger D. G. 1975. Cycles in Symbol Production: The Case of Popular Music. American Sociological Review 40 (April), 158-173.

Pietilä, V. 1998. Hajanaisesta moninaiseksi. Joukkoviestintätutkimuksen kehityksestä (etupäässä) angloamerikkalaisessa kulttuuripiirissä. In U. Kivikuru & R. Kunelius (Eds.) Viestinnän jäljillä. Näkökulmia uuden ajan ilmiöön. Helsinki: WSOY, 397-416.

Postman, N. 1985. Huvitamme itsemme hengiltä. Helsinki: WSOY. Orig. 1985. Amusing Ourselves to Death – Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business. Transl. Ilkka Rekiaro.

Raittinen, V. 2002. Taiteilijan on sitouduttava! Kulttuurivihkot (30) 4-5, 22-24.

Ramonet, I. 1999. Median tyrannia. Helsinki: WSOY. Orig. 1999. La Tyrannie de la Communication. Transl. Jouni Kuurne.

Rautiainen, T. 2001. Pop, protesti, laulu. Tampere: Tampere University Press.

Reiners, I. 2002. Adornon kulttuuriteollisuuskritiikin taustaa. Lecture. University of Jyväskylä.

Repo, E. S. (Ed.) 1954. Toiset pidot Tornissa. Jyväskylä: Gummerus.

Rossi, L-M. 1999. Taide vallassa. Politiikkakäsityksen muutoksia 1980-luvun suomalaisessa taidekeskustelussa. Helsinki: Taide.

Shusterman, R. 1997. Taide, elämä ja estetiikka. Pragmatistinen filosofia ja estetiikka. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Orig. 1992. Pragmatist Aesthetics. Transl. Vesa Mujunen.

Sisältötuotanto-työryhmä 2001. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 1. Http://www.minedu.fi/opm/hankkeet/sisu/julkaisu.html.

Skinner, Q. 1970. Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts. The Philosophical Quarterly 20, 118-138.

Skinner, Q. 1971. On Performing and Explaining Linguistic Actions. The Philosophical Quarterly 21, 1-21.

Skinner, Q. 1975. Hermeneutics and the Role of History. New Literary History 8, 209- 232.

Skinner, Q. 1978. Action and Context. Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 52, 57-69.

Skinner, Q. 1988a. Motives, intentions and the interpretation of texts. In J. Tully (Ed.) Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics. London: Polity, 68-78. First published in 1972 in New Literary History 3, 393-408.

Skinner, Q. 1988b. 'Social meaning' and the explanation of social action. In J. Tully (Ed.) Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics. London: Polity, 79-96. First published in 1972 in P. Laslett & W. C. Runciman & Q. Skinner (Eds.) Philosophy, Politics and Society. Series IV, 136-157.

Skinner, Q. 1988c. Language and social change. In J. Tully (Ed.) Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics. London: Polity, 119-132. First published in 1979 as The Idea of Cultural Lexicon. In Essays in Criticism 29, 205-224. Repr. in revised form in 1980 as The State of the Language. In L. Michaels & C. Ricks (Eds.). The State of the Language.

Skinner, Q. 1989. Language and Political Change. In T. Ball et al. Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: CUP, 6-23.

Skinner, Q. 1996a. From Hume's Intentions to Deconstruction and Back. Journal of Political Philosophy 4, 142-154.

Skinner, Q. 1996b. Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge: CUP.

Skinner, Q. 1997. An Interview with Quentin Skinner. Cogito 11 (2), 69-76.

Skinner, Q. 1999. Rhetoric and Conceptual Change. Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought 3, 60-73.

Smith, C. 1998. Creative Britain. London: Faber & Faber.

Steinert, H. 1992. Entdeckung der Kulturindustrie, oder: warum Professor Adorno Jazz-Musik nicht ausstehen konnte. Wien: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik.

Taideteollinen korkeakoulu (University of Art & Design) 1997. Taideteollinen korkeakoulu kulttuurialan muutostekijänä. Kulttuuriteollisuuden ennakointi-hanke. Helsinki: TaiK.

Talja, S. 1998. Musiikki, kulttuuri, kirjasto. Tampere: University of Tampere.

Tarkka, M. & Mäkelä, T. 2002. Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä. Mcult. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 7. Http://www.minedu.fi/opm/hankkeet/sisu/julkaisut.html.

Tarkka, M. 2002a. Mediakulttuurin kotimainen toimiala. In M. Tarkka & T. Mäkelä(Eds.) Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä. Mcult. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 7, 19-33.

Tarkka, M. 2002b. Teknologiakehityksen kulttuurinen käänne - tutkimus- ja kehitystyön uudet suunnat. In M. Tarkka & T. Mäkelä (Eds.) Uusi mediakulttuuri innovaatioympäristönä. Mcult. Sisältötuotanto-työryhmän väliraportti 7, 89-97.

Throsby, D. & Withers, G. 1979. The Economics of Performing Arts. London: Edward Arnold.

Throsby, D. 2001. Economics and Culture. Cambridge: CUP.

Toivonen, T. E. 2001. Ars cara. Audiovisuaalisen alan tukeminen, investointinäkökulma. Turun Kauppakorkeakoulu, Yritystoiminnan tutkimus- ja koulutuskeskus, Mediaryhmä.
Http://www.minedu.fi/opm/hankkeet/sisu/julkaisut.html.

Tully, J. 1988. The pen is a mighty sword: Quentin Skinner's analysis of politics. In J. Tully (Ed.) Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics. London: Polity, 7-25.

Tuominen, M. 1991. 'Me kaikki ollaan sotilaitten lapsia'. Helsinki: Otava.

Unesco 1982. Cultural Industries. A challenge for the future of culture. Paris: Unesco.

Unesco 1998. Moninaisuus luovuutemme lähteenä. Kulttuurin ja kehityksen maailmankomission raportti. (Our Creative Diversity). Helsinki: Otava.

Uusitalo, L. 1998. Consumption in Postmodernity. Social Structuration and the Construction of the Self. In M. Bianchi (Ed.) The Active Consumer. London: Routledge, 215-235.

Uusitalo, L. 2001. Kulttuurin ja talouden vuorovaikutus. Lecture. University of Jyväskylä.

Uusitalo, L. & Jyrämä, A. 2002. Muuttavatko uudet teknologiat yritysten arvoketjuja? In L. Uusitalo (Ed.) Kuluttaja virtuaalimarkkinoilla. Helsinki: Edita, 85-102.

Valkama, H. 2002 (Ed.) Bileet Tornissa. Helsinki: WSOY.

Valtion taidekomitean mietintö 1965. Komiteanmietintö 1965: A 8. Valtion painatuskeskus.

Valtionvarainministeriö 1996. Suomi tietoyhteiskunnaksi. Kehityksen päälinjat ja toimenpiteet 1995. 1. part. Helsinki: Valtionvarainministeriö.

Van Reijen, W. & Bransen, J. 1987. Nachtwort des Herausgebers. Max Horkheimer GS 5. Frankfurt: Fischer, 453-457.

Wellershoff, D. 1967. Literatur, Markt, Kulturindustrie. Merkur 21 (11), 1013-1026.

Vieru, E. 1999. Modernismista nykytaiteeseen. In A-M. Latikka (Ed.) Puoli vuosisataa. MMM juhlakirja. Helsinki: Otava, 76-81.

Viestintäkulttuuritoimikunnan mietintö I 1989. Komiteanmitetintö 1989: 15. Valtion painatuskeskus.

Weber, M.1949. 'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy. In M. Weber. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 49-112.

Wiggershaus, R. 1994. The Frankfurt School. London: Polity. Orig. 1986. Die Frankfurter Schule. Transl. Michael Robertson.

Witkin, R. W. 1998. Adorno on Music. London: Routledge.

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH

1   Kyöstiö, O. K., Oppilaiden terveydentilan riippuvuus koulutyypistä. – Health status of pupils according to type of school. 78 p. Summary 6 p. 1962.

2   Heinonen, Veikko, Differentiation of primary mental abilities. 136 p. 1963.

3   Elonen, Anna S., Takala, Martti & Ruoppila Isto, A study of intellectual functions in children by means of the KTK performance scales. 181 p. 1963.

4   Juurmaa, Jyrki, On the ability structure of the deaf. 114 p. 1963.

5   Heinonen, Veikko, Lyhennetty faktori-analyysi. – A short method for factor analysis. 76 p. Summary 5 p. 1963.

6   Pitkänen, Pentti, Fyysisen kunnon rakenne ja kehittyminen. – The structure and development of physical fitness. 163 p. Summary 10 p. 1964.

7   Nurmi, Veli, Maamme seminaarien varsinaisen opettajakoulutuksen synty ja kehittyminen viime vuosisadalla I. – Die Entehung und Entwicklung der praktischen Lehrer-bildung unserer Lehrerseminare im vorigen Jahrhundert I. 270 p. Zusammenfassung 15 p. 1964.

8   Nurmi, Veli, Maamme seminaarien varsinaisen opettajakoulutuksen synty ja kehittyminen viime vuosisadalla II. – Die Entstehung und Entwicklung der praktischen Lehrer-bildung unserer Lehrerseminare im vorigen Jahrhundert II. 123 p. Zusammenfassung 10 p. 1964.

9   Nummenmaa, Tapio, The language of the face. 66 p. 1964.

10   Isosaari, Jussi, Bruno Boxström ja Sortavalan seminaarin kasvatusaineiden opetus 1882-1917. – Bruno Boxström und der Unterricht in den pädagogischen Fächern am Seminar von Sortavala 1882-1917. 167 p. Zusammen-fassung II p. 1964.

11   Nummenmaa, Tapio & Takala, Martti, Parental behavior and sources of information in different social groups. 53 p. 1965.

12   Weckroth, Johan, Studies in brain pathology and human performance I. – On the relationship between severity of brain injury and the level and structure of intellectual performance. 105 p. 1965.

13   Pitkänen, Pentti, Ärsyke- ja reaktioanalyyttis-ten faktorointitulosten vastaavuudesta. – On the congruence and coincidence between stimulus analytical and response analytical factor results. 223 p. Summary 14 p. 1967.

14   Tenkku, Jussi, Are single moral rules absolute in Kant's ethics? 31 p. 1967.

15   Ruoppila, Isto, Nuorten ja varttuneiden opiskeli-joiden väliset asenne-erot eräissä ylioppilas-pohjaisissa oppilaitoksissa. – Attitude differences between young and advanced university and college students. 182 p. Summary 14 p. 1967.

16   Karvonen, Juhani, The structure, arousal and change of the attitudes of teacher education students. 118 p. 1967.

17   Elonen, Anna S., Performance scale patterns in various diagnostic groups. 53 p. 1968.

18   Tuomola, Uuno, Kansakouluntarkastajaan kohdistuvista rooliodotuksista. – On role-expectations applied to school inspectors. 173 p. Summary 8 p. 1968.

19   Pitkänen, Lea, A descriptive model of aggression and nonaggression with applications to childrens behaviour. 208 p. 1969.

20   Koskiaho, Briitta, Level of living and industrialisation. 102 p. 1970.

21   Kuusinen, Jorma, The meaning of another person's personality. 28 p. 1970.

22   Viljanen, Erkki, Pohjakoulutustaso ja kansa-koulunopettajan kehitysympäristöjen muo-dostuminen. – The level of basic education in relation to the formation of the development milieus of primary school teachers. 280 s. Summary 13 p. 1970.

23   Hagfors, Carl, The galvanic skin response and its application to the group registration of psychophysiological processes. 128 p. 1970.

24   Karvonen, Juhani, The enrichment of vocabulary and the basic skills of verbal communication. 47 p. 1971.

25   Seppo, Simo, Abiturienttien asenteet uskonnon-opetukseen. – The attitudes of students toward religious education in secondary school. 137 p. Summary 5 p. 1971.

26   Renko Manu, Opettajan tehokkuus oppilaiden koulusaavutusten ja persoonallisuuden kehittämisessä. – Teacher's effectiveness in improving pupils' school achievements and developing their personality. 144 p. Summary 4 p. 1971.

27   Vaherva, Tapio, Koulutustulokset peruskoulun ala-asteella yhteisömuuttujien selittäminä. – Educational outcomes at the lower level of the comprehensive school in the light of ecological variables. 158 p. Summary 3 p. 1974.

28   Olkinuora, Erkki, Norm socialization. The formation of personal norms. 186 p. Tiivistelmä 4 p. 1974.

29   Liikanen, Pirkko, Increasing creativity through art education among pre-school children. 44 p. Tiivistelmä 4 p. 1975.

30   Elonen, Anna S., & Guyer, Melvin, Comparison of qualitative characteristics of human figure drawings of Finnish children in various diagnostic categories. 46 p. Tiivistelmä 3 p. 1975.

31   Kääriäinen, Risto, Physical, intellectual, and personal characteristics of Down's syndrome. 114 p. Tiivistelmä 4 p. 1975.

32   Määttä, Paula, Images of a young drug user. 112 p. Tiivistelmä 11 p. 1976.

33   Alanen, Pentti, Tieto ja demokratia. – Episte-mology and democracy. 140 p. Summary 4 p. 1976.

34   Nupponen, Riitta, Vahvistajaroolit aikuisten ja lapsen vuorovaikutuksessa. – The experi-mental roles of reinforcing agent in adult-child interaction. 209 p. Summary 11 p. 1977.

35 Teikari, Veikko, Vigilanssi-ilmiön mittaamisesta ja selitysmahdollisuuksista. – On measuring and explanation of vigilance. 163 p. Summary 2 p. 1977.

36 Volanen, Risto, On conditions of decision making. A study of the conceptual foundations of administration. – Päätöksenteon edellytyksistä. Tutkimus hallinnon käsitteellisistä perusteista. 171 p. Tiivistelmä 7 p. 1977.

37 Lyytinen, Paula, The acquisition of Finnish morphology in early childhood. – Suomen kielen morfologisten säännönmukaisuuksien omaksuminen varhaislapsuudessa. 143 p. Tiivistelmä 6 p. 1978.

38 Hakamäki, Simo, Maaseudulle muutto muuttoliikkeen osana. – Migration on rural areas as one element of migration as a whole. 175 p. Summary 5 p. 1978.

39 Moberg, Sakari, Leimautuminen erityispedagogiikassa. Nimikkeisiin apukoululainen ja tarkkailuluokkalainen liittyvät käsitykset ja niiden vaikutus hypoteettista oppilasta koskeviin havaintoihin. – Labelling in special education. 177 p. Summary 10 p. 1979.

40 Ahvenainen, Ossi, Lukemis- ja kirjoittamishäiriöinen erityisopetuksessa. – The child with reading and writing disabilities in special education. 246 p. Summary 14 p. 1980.

41 Hurme, Helena, Life changes during childhood. – Lasten elämänmuutokset. 229 p. Tiivistelmä 3 p. 1981.

42 Tutkimus yhteiskuntapolitiikan viitoittajana. Professori Leo Paukkuselle omistettu juhlakirja. 175 p. 1981.

43 Hirsjärvi, Sirkka, Aspects of consciousness in child rearing. – Tietoisuuden ongelma kotikasvatuksessa. 259 p. 1981.

44 Lasonen, Kari, Siirtolaisoppilas Ruotsin kouluyhteisössä. Sosiometrinen tutkimus. – A sosio-metric study of immigrant pupils in the Swedish comprehensive school. 269 p. Summary 7 p. 1981.

45 Ajatuksen ja toiminnan tiet. Matti Juntusen muistokirja. 274 p. 1982.

46 Mäkinen, Raimo, Teachers' work, wellbeing, and health. – Opettajan työ, hyvinvointi ja terveys. 232 p. Tiivistelmä 2 p. 1982.

47 Kankainen, Mikko, Suomalaisen peruskoulun eriyttämisratkaisun yhteiskunnallisen taustan ja siirtymävaiheen toteutuksen arviointi. 257 p. Summary 11 p. 1982.

48 Walls, Georg, Health care and social welfare in, cooperation. 99 p. Tiivistelmä 9 p. 1982.

49 Koivukari, Mirjami, Rote learning comprehension and participation by the learnes in Zairian classrooms. – Mekaaninen oppiminen, ymmärtäminen ja oppilaiden osallistuminen opetukseen zairelaisissa koululuokissa. 286 p. Tiivistelmä 11p. 1982.

50 Koponen, Ritva, An item analysis of tests in mathematics applying logistic test models. – Matematiikan kokeiden osioanalyysi logistisia testimalleja käyttäen. 187 p. Tiivistelmä 2 p. 1983.

51 Pekonen, Kyösti, Byrokratia politiikan näkökulmasta. Politiikan ja byrokratian keskinäinen yhteys valtio- ja yhteiskuntaprosessin kehityksen valossa. – Bureaucracy from the viewpoint of politics. 253 p. 1983.

52 Lyytinen, Heikki, Psychophysiology of anticipation and arousal. – Antisipaation ja viriämisen psykofysiologia. 190 p. Tiivistelmä 4 p. 1984.

53 Korkiakangas, Mikko, Lastenneuvolan terveydenhoitajan arvioinnit viisivuotiaiden lasten psyykkisestä kehityksestä. – The psychological assessment of five-year-old children by public health centres. 227 p. Summary 14 p. 1984.

54 Human action and personality. Essays in honour of Martti Takala. 272 p. 1984.

55 Matilainen, Jouko, Maanpuolustus ja eduskunta. Eduskuntaryhmien kannanotot ja koheesio maanpuolustuskysymyksissä Paasikiven-Kekkosen kaudella 1945-1978. – Defence and Parliament. 264 p. Summary 7 p. 1984.

56 Puolue, valtio ja edustuksellinen demokratia. Pekka Nyholmille omistettu juhlakirja. – Party, state and representational democracy. 145 p. Summary 2 p. 1986.

57 Siisiäinen, Martti, Intressit, yhdistyslaitos ja poliittisen järjestelmän vakaisuus. – Interests, voluntary assiociations and the stability of the political system. 367 p. Summary 6 p. 1986.

58 Mattlar, Carl-Erik, Finnish Rorschach responses in cross-cultural context: A normative study. 166 p. Tiivistelmä 2 p. 1986.

59 Äystö, Seija, Neuropsychological aspects of simultaneous and successive cognitive processes. – Rinnakkaisen ja peräkkäisen informaation prosessoinnin neuropsykologiasta. 205 p. Tiivistelmä 10 p. 1987.

60 Lindh, Raimo, Suggestiiviset mielikuvamallit käyttäytymisen muokkaajina tarkkailuluokkalaisilla. – Suggestive covert modeling as a method with disturbed pupils. 194 p. Summary 8 p. 1987.

61 Korhonen, Tapani, Behavioral and neural short-lateney and long-latency conditioned responses in the cat. – Välittömät ja viivästetyt hermostol-liset ja käyttäytymisvasteet klassisen ehdollista-misen aikana kissalla. 198 p. Tiivistelmä 4 p. 1987.

62 Pahkinen, Tuula, Psykoterapian vaikutus minäkäsitykseen. Psykoterapian käynnistämän muutosprosessin vaikutus korkeakouluopiskelijoiden minäkäsitykseen. – Change in self-concept as a result of psychotherapy. 172 p. Summary 6 p. 1987.

63 Kangas, Anita, Keski-Suomen kulttuuritoimintakokeilu tutkimuksena ja politiikkana. – The action research on cultural- activities in the Province of Central Finland. 301 p. Summary 8 p. 1988.

64 Hurme, Helena, Child, mother and grandmother. Interegenerational interaction in Finnish families. 187 p. 1988.

65 Rasku-Puttonen, Helena, Communication

between parents and children in experimental situations. – Vanhempien ja lasten kommunikointi strukturoiduissa tilanteissa. 71 p. Tiivistelmä 5 p. 1988.

66 TOSKALA, ANTERO, Kahvikuppineurootikkojen ja paniikkiagorafoobikkojen minäkuvat minäsysteemin rakenteina ja kognitiivisen oppimisterapian perustana. – The self-images of coffee cup neurotics and panic agoraphobics as structures of a selfsystem and a basis for learning therapy. 261 p. Summary 6 p. 1988.

67 HAKKARAINEN, LIISA, Kuurojen yläasteen oppilaiden kirjoitetun kielen hallinta. - Mastery of written language by deaf pupils at the upper level of Comprehensive school. 281 p. Summary 11 p. 1988.

68 NÄTTI, JOUKO, Työmarkkinoiden lohkoutuminen. Segmentaatioteoriat, Suomen työmarkkinat ja yritysten työvoimastrategiat. - Segmentation theories, Finnish labour markets and the use of labour in retail trade. 189 p. Summary 10 p. 1989.

69 AALTOLA, JUHANI, Merkitys opettamisen ja oppimisen näkökulmasta Wittgensteinin myöhäisfilo-sofian ja pragmatismin valossa. - Meaning from the point of view of teaching and learning in the light of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and pragmatism. 249 p. Summary 6 p. 1989.

70 KINNUNEN, ULLA, Teacher stress over a school year. - Opettajan työstressi lukuvuoden aikana. 61 p. Tiivistelmä 3 p. 1989.

71 BREUER, HELMUT & RUOHO, KARI (Hrsg.), Pädagogisch-psychologische Prophylaxe bei 4-8 jährigen Kindern. - Pedagogis-psykologinen ennaltaehkäisy neljästä kahdeksaan vuoden iässä. 185 S. Tiivistelmä 1 S. 1989.

72 LUMMELAHTI, LEENA, Kuusivuotiaiden sopeutuminen päiväkotiin. Yksilöllistetty mallioppimis-ohjelma päiväkotiin heikosti sopeutuvien kuusivuotiaiden ohjauksessa sekä vanhempien kasvatuskäytännön yhtey-det lapsen sopeutumiseen ja minäkäsitykseen. - The adjustment of six-year-old children to day-care-centres. 224 p. Summary 9 p. 1990.

73 SALOVIITA, TIMO, Adaptive behaviour of institutionalized mentally retarded persons. - Laitoksessa asuvien kehitysvammaisten adaptiivinen käyttäytyminen. 167 p. Tiivistelmä 4 p. 1990.

74 PALONEN, KARI et SUBRA, LEENA (Eds.), Jean-Paul Sartre - un philosophe du politique. - Jean-Paul Sartre - poliittisuuden filosofi. 107 p. Tiivistelmä 2 p. 1990.

75 SINIVUO, JUHANI, Kuormitus ja voimavarat upseerin uralla. - Work load and resources in the career of officers. 373 p. Summary 4 p. 1990.

76 PÖLKKI, PIRJO, Self-concept and social skills of school beginners. Summary and discussion. - Koulutulokkaiden minäkäsitys ja sosiaaliset taidot. 100 p. Tiivistelmä 6 p. 1990.

77 HUTTUNEN, JOUKO, Isän merkitys pojan sosiaaliselle sukupuolelle. - Father's impact on son's gender role identity. 246 p. Summary 9 p.1990.

78 AHONEN, TIMO, Lasten motoriset koordinaatiohäiriöt. Kehitysneuropsykologinen seurantatutkimus. - Developmental coordination disorders in children. A developmental neuropsychological follow-up study. 188 p. Summary 9 p. 1990.

79 MURTO, KARI, Towards the well functioning community. The development of Anton Makarenko and Maxwell Jones' communities. - Kohti toimivaa yhteisöä. Anton Makarenkon ja Maxwell Jonesin yhteisöjen kehitys. 270 p. Tiivistelmä 5 p. Резюме 5 с. 1991.

80 SEIKKULA, JAAKKO, Perheen ja sairaalan rajasysteemi potilaan sosiaalisessa verkostossa. - The family-hospital boundary system in the social network. 285 p. Summary 6 p. 1991.

81 ALANEN, ILKKA, Miten teoretisoida maa-talouden pientuotantoa. - On the conceptualization of petty production in agriculture. 360 p. Summary 9 p. 1991.

82 NIEMELÄ, EINO, Harjaantumisoppilas peruskoulun liikuntakasvatuksessa. - The trainable mentally retarded pupil in comprehensive school physical education. 210 p. Summary 7 p. 1991.

83 KARILA, IRMA, Lapsivuodeajan psyykkisten vaikeuksien ennakointi. Kognitiivinen malli. - Prediction of mental distress during puerperium. A cognitive model. 248 p. Summary 8 p. 1991.

84 HAAPASALO, JAANA, Psychopathy as a descriptive construct of personality among offenders. - Psykopatia rikoksentekijöiden persoonallisuutta kuvaavana konstruktiona. 73 p. Tiivistelmä 3 p. 1992.

85 ARNKIL, ERIK, Sosiaalityön rajasysteemit ja kehitysvyöhyke. - The systems of boundary and the developmental zone of social work. 65 p. Summary 4 p. 1992.

86 NIKKI, MAIJA-LIISA, Suomalaisen koulutusjärjestelmän kielikoulutus ja sen relevanssi. Osa II. - Foreign language education in the Finnish educational system and its relevance. Part 2. 204 p. Summary 5 p. 1992.

87 NIKKI, MAIJA-LIISA, The implementation of the Finnish national plan for foreign language teaching. - Valtakunnallisen kielenopetuksen yleissuunnitelman toimeenpano. 52 p. Yhteenveto 2 p. 1992.

88 VASKILAMPI, TUULA, Vaihtoehtoinen terveydenhuolto hyvinvointivaltion terveysmarkkinoilla. - Alternative medicine on the health market of welfare state. 120 p. Summary 8 p. 1992.

89 LAAKSO, KIRSTI, Kouluvaikeuksien ennustaminen. Käyttäytymishäiriöt ja kielelliset vaikeudet peruskoulun alku- ja päättövaiheessa. - Prediction of difficulties in school. 145 p. Summary 4 p. 1992.

90 SUUTARINEN, SAKARI, Herbartilainen pedagoginen uudistus Suomen kansakoulussa vuosisa-

dan alussa (1900-1935). - Die Herbart'sche pädagogische Reform in den finnischen Volksschulen zu Beginn dieses Jahrhunderts (1900-1935). 273 p. Zusammenfassung 5 S. 1992.

91 AITTOLA, TAPIO, Uuden opiskelijatyypin synty. Opiskelijoiden elämänvaiheet ja tieteenala-spesifien habitusten muovautuminen 1980-luvun yliopistossa. - Origins of the new student type. 162 p. Summary 4 p. 1992

92 KORHONEN, PEKKA, The origin of the idea of the Pacific free trade area. - Tyynenmeren vapaa-kauppa-alueen idean muotoutuminen. - Taiheiyoo jiyuu booeki chi-iki koosoo no seisei. 220 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. Yooyaku 2 p. 1992.

93 KERÄNEN, JYRKI, Avohoitoon ja sairaalahoitoon valikoituminen perhekeskeisessä psykiatrises-sa hoitojärjestelmässä. - The choice between outpatient and inpatient treatment in a family centred psychiatric treatment system. 194 p. Summary 6 p. 1992.

94 WAHLSTRÖM, JARL, Merkitysten muodostuminen ja muuttuminen perheterapeuttisessa keskus-telussa. Diskurssianalyyttinen tutkimus. - Semantic change in family therapy. 195 p. Summary 5 p. 1992.

95 RAHEEM, KOLAWOLE, Problems of social security and development in a developing country. A study of the indigenous systems and the colonial influence on the conventional schemes in Nigeria. - Sosiaaliturvan ja kehi-tyksen ongelmia kehitysmaassa. 272 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 1993.

96 LAINE, TIMO, Aistisuus, kehollisuus ja dialo-gisuus. Ludwig Feuerbachin filosofian lähtö-kohtia ja niiden kehitysnäkymiä 1900-luvun antropologisesti suuntautuneessa fenomeno-logiassa. - Sensuousnes, bodiliness and dialogue. Basic principles in Ludwig Feuer-bach's philosophy and their development in the anthropologically oriented phenom-enology of the 1900's. 151 p. Zusammen-fassung 5 S. 1993.

97 PENTTONEN, MARKKU, Classically conditioned lateralized head movements and bilaterally recorded cingulate cortex responses in cats. - Klassisesti ehdollistetut sivuttaiset päänliik-keet ja molemminpuoliset aivojen pihtipoimun vasteet kissalla. 74 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 1993.

98 KORO, JUKKA, Aikuinen oman oppimisensa ohjaajana. Itseohjautuvuus, sen kehittyminen ja yhteys opetustuloksiin kasvatustieteen avoimen korkeakouluopetuksen monimuoto-kokeilussa. - Adults as managers of their own learning. Self-directiveness, its development and connection with the gognitive learning results of an experiment on distance education for the teaching of educational science. 238 p. Summary 7 p. 1993.

99 LAIHIALA-KANKAINEN, SIRKKA, Formaalinen ja funktionaalinen traditio kieltenopetuksessa. Kieltenopetuksen oppihistoriallinen tausta antiikista valistukseen. - Formal and functional traditions in language teaching. The theory -historical background of language

teaching from the classical period to the age of reason. 288 p. Summary 6 p. 1993.

100 MÄKINEN, TERTTU, Yksilön varhaiskehitys koulunkäynnin perustana. - Early development as a foundation for school achievement. 273 p. Summary 16 p. 1993.

101 KOTKAVIRTA, JUSSI, Practical philosophy and modernity. A study on the formation of Hegel's thought. - Käytännöllinen filosofia ja modernisuus. Tutkielma Hegelin ajattelun muotoutumisesta. 238 p. Zusammenfassung 3 S. Yhteenveto 3 p. 1993.

102 EISENHARDT, PETER L., PALONEN, KARI, SUBRA, LEENA, ZIMMERMANN RAINER E.(Eds.), Modern concepts of existentialism. Essays on Sartrean problems in philosophy, political theory and aesthetics. 168 p. Tiivistelmä 2 p. 1993.

103 KERÄNEN, MARJA, Modern political science and gender. A debate between the deaf and the mute. - Moderni valtio-oppi ja nainen. Mykkien ja kuurojen välinen keskustelu. 252 p. Tiivistelmä 4 p. 1993.

104 MATIKAINEN, TUULA, Työtaitojenkehittyminen erityisammattikouluvaiheen aikana. - Development of working skills in special vocational school. 205 p. Summary 4 p. 1994.

105 PIHLAJARINNE, MARJA-LEENA, Nuoren sairastumi-nen skitsofreeniseen häiriöön. Perheterapeut-tinen tarkastelutapa. - The onset of schizophrenic disorder at young age. Family therapeutic study. 174 p. Summary 5 p. 1994.

106 KUUSINEN, KIRSTI-LIISA, Psyykkinen itsesäätely itsehoidon perustana. Itsehoito I-tyypin diabetesta sairastavilla aikuisilla. - Self-care based on self-regulation. Self-care in adult type I diabetics. 260 p. Summary 17 p. 1994.

107 MENGISTU, LEGESSE GEBRESELLASSIE, Psychological classification of students with and without handicaps. A tests of Holland's theory in Ethiopia. 209 p. 1994.

108 LESKINEN, MARKKU (ED.), Family in focus. New perspectives on early childhood special education. 158 p. 1994.

109 LESKINEN, MARKKU, Parents' causal attributions and adjustment to their child's disability. - Vanhempien syytulkinnat ja sopeutuminen lapsensa vammaisuuteen. 104 p. Tiivistelmä 1 p. 1994.

110 MATTHIES, AILA-LEENA, Epävirallisen sektorin ja hyvinvointivaltion suhteiden modernisoitu-minen. - The informal sector and the welfare state. Contemporary relationships. 63 p. Summary 12 p. 1994.

111 AITTOLA, HELENA, Tutkimustyön ohjaus ja ohjaussuhteet tieteellisessä jatkokoulutuk-sessa. - Mentoring in postgraduate education. 285 p. Summary 5 p. 1995.

112 LINDÉN, MIRJA, Muuttuva syövän kuva ja kokeminen. Potilaiden ja ammattilaisten tul-kintoja. - The changing image and experience of cancer. Accounts given by patients and professionals. 234 p. Summary 5 p. 1995.

113 VÄLIMAA, JUSSI, Higher education cultural approach. - Korkeakoulututkimuksen

kulttuurinäkökulma. 94 p. Yhteenveto 5 p. 1995.

114 KAIPIO, KALEVI, Yhteisöllisyys kasvatuksessa. yhteisökasvatuksen teoreettinen analyysi ja käytäntöön soveltaminen. - The community as an educator. Theoretical analysis and practice of community education. 250 p. Summary 3 p. 1995.

115 HÄNNIKÄINEN, MARITTA, Nukesta vauvaksi ja lapsesta lääkäriksi. Roolileikkiin siirtymisen tarkastelua piagetilaisesta ja kulttuurihistoriallisen toiminnan teorian näkökulmasta. 73 p. Summary 6 p. 1995.

116 IKONEN, OIVA. Adaptiivinen opetus. Oppimistutkimus harjaantumiskoulun opetussuunnitelma- ja seurantajärjestelmän kehittämisen tukena. - The adaptive teaching. 90 p. Summary 5 p. 1995.

117 SUUTAMA, TIMO, Coping with life events in old age. - Elämän muutos- ja ongelmatilanteiden käsittely iäkkäillä ihmisillä. 110 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 1995.

118 DERSEH, TIBEBU BOGALE, Meanings Attached to Disability, Attitudes towards Disabled People, and Attitudes towards Integration. 150 p. 1995.

119 SAHLBERG, PASI, Kuka auttaisi opettajaa. Postmoderni näkökulma opetuksen muu-tokseen yhden kehittämisprojektin valossa. - Who would help a teacher. A post-modern perspective on change in teaching in light of a school improvement project. 255 p. Summary 4 p. 1996.

120 UHINKI, AILO, Distress of unemployed job-seekers described by the Zulliger Test using the Comprehensive System. - Työttömien työntekijöiden ahdinko kuvattuna Comprehensive Systemin mukaisesti käytetyillä Zulligerin testillä. 61 p. Yhteenveto 3p. 1996.

121 ANTIKAINEN, RISTO, Clinical course, outcome and follow-up of inpatients with borderline level disorders. - Rajatilapotilaiden osastohoidon tuloksellisuus kolmen vuoden seurantatutkimuksessa Kys:n psykiatrian klinikassa. 102 p. Yhteenveto 4 p. 1996.

122 RUUSUVIRTA, TIMO, Brain responses to pitch changes in an acoustic environment in cats and rabbits. - Aivovasteet kuuloärsykemuu-toksiin kissoilla ja kaneilla. 45 p. Yhteenveto 2 p. 1996.

123 VISTI, ANNALIISA, Työyhteisön ja työn tuottavuuden kehitys organisaation transformaa-tiossa. - Development of the work communi-ty and changes in the productivity of work during an organizational transformation process. 201 p. Summary 12 p. 1996.

124 SALLINEN, MIKAEL, Event-ralated brain potentials to changes in the acustic environ-ment buring sleep and sleepiness. - Aivojen herätevasteet muutoksiin kuuloärsykesar-jassa unen ja uneliaisuuden aikana. 104 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 1997.

125 LAMMINMÄKI, TUIJA, Efficasy of a multi-faceted treatment for children with learning

difficulties. - Oppimisvaikeuksien neuro-kognitiivisen ryhmäkuntoutuksen tuloksellisuus ja siihen vaikuttavia tekijöitä. 56 p. Yhteenveto 2 p. 1997.

126 LUTTINEN, JAANA, Fragmentoituva kulttuuripolitiikka. Paikallisen kulttuuripolitiikan tulkintakehykset Ylä-Savossa. - Fragmenting-cultural policy. The interpretative frames of local cultural politics in Ylä-Savo. 178 p. Summary 9 p. 1997.

127 MARTTUNEN, MIIKA, Studying argumentation in higher education by electronic mail. - Argumentointia yliopisto-opinnoissa sähkö-postilla. 60 p. (164 p.) Yhteenveto 3 p. 1997.

128 JAAKKOLA, HANNA, Kielitieto kielitaitoon pyrittä-essä. Vieraiden kielten opettajien käsityksiä kieliopin oppimisesta ja opetta-misesta. - Language knowledge and language ability. Teachers´ conceptions of the role of grammar in foreign language learning and teaching. 227 p. Summary 7 p. 1997.

129 SUBRA, LEENA, A portrait of the political agent in Jean-Paul Sartre. Views on playing, acting, temporality and subjectivity. - Poliittisen toimijan muotokuva Jean-Paul Sartrella. Näkymiä pelaamiseen, toimintaan, ajallisuuteen ja subjektiivisuuteen. 248 p. Yhteenveto 2 p. 1997.

130 HAARAKANGAS, KAUKO, Hoitokokouksen äänet. Dialoginen analyysi perhekeskeisen psykiatrisen hoitoprosessin hoitokokous-keskusteluista työryhmän toiminnan näkökulmasta. - The voices in treatment meeting. A dialogical analysis of the treatment meeting conversations in family-centred psychiatric treatment process in regard to the team activity. 136 p. Summary 8 p. 1997.

131 MATINHEIKKI-KOKKO, KAIJA, Challenges of working in a cross-cultural environment. Principles and practice of refugee settlement in Finland. - Kulttuurienvälisen työn haasteet. Periaatteet ja käytäntö maahanmuuttajien hyvinvoinnin turvaamiseksi Suomessa. 130 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 1997.

132 KIVINIEMI, KARI, Opettajuuden oppimisesta harjoittelun harhautuksiin. Aikuisopiskelijoiden kokemuksia opetusharjoittelusta ja sen ohjauksesta luokanopettajakoulutuksessa. - From the learning of teacherhood to the fabrications of practice. Adult students´ experiences of teaching practice and its supervision in class teacher education. 267 p. Summary 8 p. 1997.

133 KANTOLA, JOUKO, Cygnaeuksen jäljillä käsityön-opetuksesta teknologiseen kasvatukseen. - In the footsteps of Cygnaeus. From handicraft teaching to technological education. 211 p. Summary 7 p. 1997.

134 KAARTINEN, JUKKA, Nocturnal body movements and sleep quality. - Yölliset kehon liikkeet ja unen laatu. 85 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 1997.

135 MUSTONEN, ANU, Media violence and its audience. - Mediaväkivalta ja sen yleisö. 44 p.

life. - Koherenssin rakenne, pysyvyys ja terveyttä edistävä merkitys työelämässä. 60 p. (150 p.) Yhteenveto 5 p. 2000.

159 MÄNTY, TARJA, Ammatillisista erityisoppilaitoksista elämään. - Life after vocational special education. 235 p. Summary 3 p. 2000.

160 SARJA, ANNELI, Dialogioppiminen pienryhmässä. Opettajaksi opiskelevien harjoitteluprosessi terveydenhuollon opettajankoulutuksessa. - Dialogic learning in a small group. The process of student teachers´ teaching practice during health care education. 165 p. Summary 7 p. 2000.

161 JÄRVINEN, ANITTA, Taitajat iänikuiset. - Kotkan ammattilukiosta valmiuksia elämään, työelämään ja jatko-opintoihin. - Age-old craftmasters -Kotka vocational senior secondary school - giving skills for life, work and further studies. 224 p. Summary 2 p. 2000.

162 KONTIO, MARJA-LIISA, Laitoksessa asuvan kehitysvammaisen vanhuksen haastava käyttäytyminen ja hoitajan käyttämiä vaikutuskeinoja. - Challenging behaviour of institutionalized mentally retarded elderly people and measures taken by nurses to control it. 175 p. Summary 3 p. 2000.

163 KILPELÄINEN, ARJA, Naiset paikkaansa etsimässä. Aikuiskoulutus naisen elämänkulun rakentajana. - Adult education as determinant of woman's life-course. 155 p. Summary 6 p. 2000.

164 RIITESUO, ANNIKKI, A preterm child grows. Focus on speech and language during the first two years. - Keskonen kasvaa: puheen ja kielen kehitys kahtena ensimmäisenä elinvuotena. 119 p. Tiivistelmä 2 p. 2000.

165 TAURIAINEN, LEENA, Kohti yhteistä laatua. - Henkilökunnan, vanhempien ja lasten laatukäsitykset päiväkodin integroidussa erityisryhmässä. - Towards common quality: staff's, parents' and children's conseptions of quality in an integration group at a daycare center. 256 p. Summary 6 p. 2000.

166 RAUDASKOSKI, LEENA, Ammattikorkeakoulun toimintaperustaa etsimässä. Toimilupahakemusten sisällönanalyyttinen tarkastelu. - In search for the founding principles of the Finnishpolytechnic institutes. A content analysis of the licence applications. 193 p. Summary 4 p. 2000.

167 TAKKINEN, SANNA, Meaning in life and its relation to functioning in old age. - Elämän tarkoituksellisuus ja sen yhteydet toimintakykyyn vanhuudessa. 51 p. (130 p.) Yhteenveto 2 p. 2000.

168 LAUNONEN, LEEVI, Eettinen kasvatusajattelu suomalaisen koulun pedagogisissa teksteissä 1860-luvulta 1990-luvulle. - Ethical thinking in Finnish school's pedagogical texts from the 1860s to the 1990s. 366 p. Summary 3 p. 2000.

169 KUORELAHTI, MATTI, Sopeutumattomien luokkamuotoisen erityisopetuksen tuloksellisuus. - The educational outcomes of special classes for emotionally/ behaviorally disordered children and youth. 176 p. Summary 2p. 2000.

170 KURUNMÄKI, JUSSI, Representation, nation and time. The political rhetoric of the 1866 parliamentary reform in Sweden. - Edustus, kansakunta ja aika. Poliittinen retoriikka Ruotsin vuoden 1866 valtiopäiväreformissa. 253 p. Tiivistelmä 4 p. 2000.

171 RASINEN, AKI, Developing technology education. In search of curriculum elements for Finnish general education schools. 158 p. Yhteenveto 2 p. 2000.

172 SUNDHOLM, LARS, Itseohjautuvuus organisaatiomuutoksessa. - Self-determination in organisational change. 180 p. Summary 15 p. 2000.

173 AHONNISKA-ASSA, JAANA, Analyzing change in repeated neuropsychological assessment. 68 p. (124 p.) Yhteenveto 2 p. 2000.

174 HOFFRÉN, JARI, Demokraattinen eetos – rajoista mahdollisuuksiin. - The democratic ethos. From limits to possibilities? 217 p. Summary 2 p. 2000.

175 HEIKKINEN, HANNU L. T., Toimintatutkimus, tarinat ja opettajaksi tulemisen taito. Narratiivisen identiteettityön kehittäminen opettajankoulutuksessa toimintatutkimuksen avulla. - Action research, narratives and the art of becoming a teacher. Developing narrative identity work in teacher education through action research. 237 p. Summary 4 p. 2001.

176 VUORENMAA, MARITTA, Ikkunoita arvioin- nin tuolle puolen. Uusia avauksia suomalaiseen koulutusta koskevaan evaluaatiokeskusteluun. - Views across assessment: New openings into the evaluation discussion on Finnish education. 266 p. Summary 4 p. 2001.

177 LITMANEN, TAPIO, The struggle over risk. The spatial, temporal, and cultural dimensions of protest against nuclear technology. - Kamppailu riskistä. Ydinteknologian vastaisen protestin tilalliset, ajalliset ja kulttuuriset ulottuvuudet. 72 p. (153 p.) Yhteenveto 9 p. 2001.

178 AUNOLA, KAISA, Children's and adolescents' achievement strategies, school adjustment, and family environment. - Lasten ja nuorten suoritusstrategiat koulu- ja perheympäristöissä. 51 p. (153 p.) Yhteenveto 2 p. 2001.

179 OKSANEN, ELINA , Arvioinnin kehittäminen erityisopetuksessa. Diagnosoinnista oppimisen ohjaukseen laadullisena tapaustutkimuksena. - Developing assessment practices in special education. From a static approach to dynamic approach applying qualitative case. 182 p. Summary 5 p. 2001.

180 VIITTALA, KAISU, "Kyllä se tommosellaki lapsella on kovempi urakka". Sikiöaikana alkoholil-

le altistuneiden huostaanotettujen lasten elämäntilanne, riskiprosessit ja suojaavat prosessit. - "It's harder for that kind of child to get along". The life situation of the children exposed to alcohol in utero and taken care of by society, their risk and protective processes. 316 p. Summary 4 p. 2001.

181 HANSSON, LEENI, Networks matter. The role of informal social networks in the period of socio-economic reforms of the 1990s in Estonia. - Verkostoilla on merkitystä: infor-maalisten sosiaalisten verkostojen asema   Virossa 1990-luvun sosio-ekonomisten muutosten aikana. 194 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 2001.

182 BÖÖK, MARJA LEENA, Vanhemmuus ja vanhem-muuden diskurssit työttömyystilanteessa . - Parenthood and parenting discourses in a situation of unemployment. 157 p. Summary 5 p. 2001.

183 KOKKO, KATJA, Antecedents and consequences of long-term unemployment. - Pitkäaikaistyöttömyyden ennakoijia ja seu-rauksia. 53 p. (115 p.) Tiivistelmä 3 p. 2001.

184 KOKKONEN, MARJA, Emotion regulation and physical health in adulthood: A longitudinal, personality-oriented approach. - Aikuisiän tunteiden säätely ja fyysinen terveys: pitkittäistutkimuksellinen ja persoonallisuuskeskeinen lähestymis-tapa. 52 p. (137 p.) Tiivistelmä 3 p. 2001.

185 MÄNNIKKÖ, KAISA, Adult attachment styles: A Person-oriented approach. - Aikuisten kiintymystyylit. 142 p. Yhteenveto 5 p. 2001.

186 KATVALA, SATU, Missä äiti on? Äitejä ja äitiyden uskomuksia sukupolvien saatossa. - Where's mother? Mothers and maternal beliefs over generations. 126 p. Summary 3 p. 2001.

187 KIISKINEN, ANNA-LIISA, Ympäristöhallinto vastuullisen elämäntavan edistäjänä. - Environmental administration as promoter of responsible living. 229 p. Summary 8 p. 2001.

188 SIMOLA, AHTI, Työterveyshuolto-organi-saation toiminta, sen henkilöstön henkinen hyvinvointi ja toiminnan tuloksellisuus. - Functioning of an occupational health service organization and its relationship to the mental well-being of its personnel, client satisfaction, and economic profitability. 192 p. Summary 12 p. 2001.

189 VESTERINEN, PIRKKO, Projektiopiskelu- ja oppimi-nen ammattikorkeakoulussa. - Project -based studying and learning in the polytechnic. 257 p. Summary 5 p. 2001.

190 KEMPPAINEN, JAANA, Kotikasvatus kolmessa sukupolvessa. - Childrearing in three generations. 183 p. Summary 3 p. 2001.

191 HOHENTHAL-ANTIN LEONIE, Luvan ottaminen – Ikäihmiset teatterin tekijöinä. - Taking permission– Elderly people as theatre makers. 183 p. Summary 5 p. 2001.

192 KAKKORI, LEENA, Heideggerin aukeama. Tutkimuksia totuudesta ja taiteesta Martin Heideggerin avaamassa horisontissa. - Heidegger's clearing. Studies on truth and art in the horizon opened by Martin Heideg-ger. 156 p. Summary 2 p. 2001.

193 NÄRHI, VESA, The use of clinical neuro-psychological data in learning disability research. - Asiakastyön yhteydessä kerätyn neuropsykologisen aineiston käyttö oppimisvaikeustutkimuksessa. 103 p. Yhteenveto 2 p. 2002.

194 SUOMI, ASTA, Ammattia etsimässä. Aikuisopiskelijat kertovat sosiaaliohjaaja-koulutuksesta ja narratiivisen pätevyyden kehittymisestä. - Searching for professional identity. Adult students' narratives on the education of a social welfare supervisor and the development of narrative competence. 183 p. Summary 2 p. 2002.

195 PERKKILÄ, PÄIVI, Opettajien matematiikka-uskomukset ja matematiikan oppikirjan merkitys alkuopetuksessa. 212 p. - Teacher's mathematics beliefs and meaning of mathematics textbooks in the first and the second grade in primary school. Summary 2 p. 2002.

196 VESTERINEN, MARJA-LIISA, Ammatillinen har-joittelu osana asiantuntijuuden kehittymistä ammattikorkeakoulussa. - Promoting professional expertise by developing practical learning at the polytechnic. 261 p. Summary 5 p. 2002.

197 POHJANEN, JORMA, Mitä kello on? Kello moder-nissa yhteiskunnassa ja sen sosiologisessa teoriassa. - What's the time. Clock on modern society and in it's sociological theory. 226 p. Summary 3 p. 2002.

198 RANTALA, ANJA, Perhekeskeisyys – puhetta vai todellisuutta? Työntekijöiden käsitykset yhteistyöstä erityistä tukea tarvitsevan lapsen perheen kanssa. - Family-centeredness rhetoric or reality? Summary 3 p. 2002.

199 VALANNE, EIJA, "Meidän lapsi on arvokas" Henkilökohtainen opetuksen järjestämistä koskeva suunnitelma (HOJKS) kunnallisessa erityiskoulussa. - "Our child is precious" - The individual educational plan in the context of the special school. 219 p. Yhteenveto 2 p. 2002.

200 HOLOPAINEN, LEENA, Development in reading and reading related skills; a follow-up study from pre-school to the fourth grade. 57 p. (138 p.) Yhteenveto 3 p. 2002.

201 HEIKKINEN, HANNU, Draaman maailmat oppimisalueina. Draamakasvatuksen vakava leikillisyys. - Drama worlds as learning areas - the serious playfulness os drama education. 164 p. Summary 5 p. 2002.

202 HYTÖNEN, TUIJA, Exploring the practice of human resource development as a field of professional expertise. - Henkilöstön kehittämistyön asiantuntijuuden rakentumi-nen. 137 p. (300 p.) Yhteenveto 10 p. 2002.

203 RIPATTI, MIKKO, Arvid Järnefeldt kasvatus-ajattelijana. 246 p. Summary 4 p. 2002.

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH