

Marko Kauppinen

Canon vs. Charisma

“Maoism” as an Ideological Construction







ABSTRACT

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In this dissertation an ideological construction called "Maoism" is studied. Maoism is defined as an ideology that includes two important spheres of interpretation: canon and charisma. Canon is the structured part of the ideology while charisma represents the mythical aspect. Ideological canons, as understood in this particular study, are the texts that reach a status of a canon. Moreover, during the time the texts remain canonized, they remain unchanged as well. However, changes or revisions can be forced upon canons as they can be revised to serve political needs and ambitions; canonized ideology can thus be used to justify political power.

Mao Zedong (1893–1976) was able to change the Marxist ideology into a different construction without losing its loyalty to the original, universal dogma. The revised ideology becomes then personified and named after the leader, yet staying pure in every way; in some cases, in fact, this process can even enhance the pureness of the ideology as the leader is considered to be superior in terms of ideological knowledge and competence. At the same time, the fountainhead of ideological wisdom is shifted from the original ideology to the leader himself as he is now seen as the main source of ideological innovation. Such a process of personification changes ideology into more than just a complex web of beliefs and theories guiding ideological actions.

Maoism thus qualifies as an ideological phenomenon that was based as much on mythical dimensions as it was on theoretical guidelines; in this sense, Maoism is an ideological construction combining myth with theory. These two spheres of interpretation are studied through *Mao Xuan*, a collection of Mao Zedong's political writings. Moreover, this collection is defined as an ideological "script" that defines the correct interpretation of Chinese Marxism and describes the "mystic moment," that is, the heroic narrative of Mao Zedong.

Keywords: Mao Zedong, Maoism, China, Marxism, ideological canon, ideological change, charisma

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1 SETTING THE STAGE

It has been widely debated whether or not Mao Zedong (1893–1976) was a “true Marxist” and what his motives as a Marxist ideologist were. Several scholars have argued that Mao(ism) lacked most of the characteristics of Marxist orthodoxy, serving as evidence that Mao’s thinking was voluntary and utopian in nature, an ideological act of heresy. For instance, Karl A. Wittfogel (1960a; 1960b) identified a significant conceptual weakness in Benjamin Schwartz’s interpretation of Maoism, as Schwartz claimed that the heretic originality of the (Chinese) communist power strategy was based essentially on peasant support, which Mao was said to have initiated in 1927. Rather than formulating a heretic conception, according to Wittfogel, Mao merely followed the changes Lenin made on Marxism in 1906 and later in 1917, when he devised the new peasant strategy in response to the new historical situation. Schwartz (1960), who in 1951 coined the term Maoism, responded by denying “the semantic weight” in Maoism as the most significant factor when discussing its originality towards the orthodox Marxist conception. Instead, the elements of the older doctrine (Marxism) inevitably “continue to shape the course of events” while new elements are being incorporated.

Similarly, Mao’s ideological and perhaps even intellectual relation with Marxism has been juxtaposed with his political style, which in turn can be vividly described as a combination of a modern version of a Machiavellian prince, a new-born Chinese emperor and a Stalinist dictator. In the context mentioned above, the question debated is whether or not Mao followed Marxist dogma, and to what extent his style and methods of leadership can be said to be communist in essence.

Such arguments inevitably lead to a complex realm of political and ideological interpretations. The critique mentioned of Mao’s conception of Marxism suggests that there is a *pure* Marxist orthodoxy that can be formulated through the works of Karl Marx. Moreover, the critical conception of Maoism – that is, the evaluation of the level of Mao’s *Marxism* – necessarily implies that the reader or student of Mao-texts is the author who holds the key in understanding the fundamental truths of Marxist ideology and is thus able to make the relevant judgment.

The main question of this study, however, arises from slightly different kind of problem. This study will concern Mao as an ideological actor, not as a Marxist actor; thus the main aim is in describing Maoism as an ideological phenomenon and construction. My argument is that ideologies such as Maoism act independently in a sense that they have their own references to the past, present and future. Thus, Maoism did not simply try to apply Marxism in China as such nor did it try to act purely according to basic Marxist premises; rather, it aimed at creating a momentum where ideological actions could be justified through the use of Marxism. Although Mao accepted most of the Marxist premises and can be considered to have been Marxist in this particular sense, he also utilized Marxist theories in a way that set them in motion, that is, the theories were not taken as dogma but as a source of ideological innovation and a basis for the Maoist interpretation.

However, Mao's usage of Marxism was not merely an effort to innovate a new ideological construction. In fact, several political - understood as a category of persuasive action - implications can be spotted in Maoism. According to George A. Kennedy (1998, 147), the Chinese tradition of narrating events serves two categories: "deliberative" oratory, which aims at persuading an individual or audience to undertake an action or act in a certain way; and speeches that are "announcements" by a ruler or other high official that lay out public policy or deal with some serious problem. In the case of Maoism, my thesis is that both of these categories are essential parts in Mao's way of representing his ideological views to fellow communists.

Another important aim of my study is to debate the concept of change through Maoism. In simple terms, Maoism is a revolutionary ideology, that is, it aims at revolutionizing the Chinese society; it thus pursues drastic social change. As already noted, Mao used Marxism to justify ideologically particular actions through "moving" the theories of Marxism into the Chinese context. In this sense, while specific reading of Marx would be the key to interpret Marxist orthodoxy correctly, the reading itself is subjective regarding the context through which the interpretation is conducted. If subjective and open to interpretation, orthodoxy is hardly the correct word to describe any ideological construction. One is never able to deduct the truths of Marxism simply and independently without being influenced by external interpretations. Consequently, the very interpretation of Marxism cannot be static and universal, something that corresponds correctly with the reality despite the changes in the environmental and social hierarchy.

Hence, in this particular case, ideological orthodoxy would actually be contra-ideological, as ideologies are never static by nature. There are always factors that necessarily influence our reading of ideologies, and these factors alter the claimed orthodoxy as well as the very interpretation of the relevant ideology itself. Thus, the proposition that there is only one possible interpretation, *the* orthodoxy, implies that the criteria which define this orthodoxy are themselves historical and as such subject to change.

However, ideologies can be “frozen” as easily as they can be set in motion. They can be claimed as static. One point of departure in my study is to discuss the paradox between ideological change on one hand and the “canonization” of Maoism on the other. How can an ideology that is based on change and thus movement be justified as a dogmatic? How can a revision of the original dogma be considered as a dogma itself? Can any indication of this be found in the Mao-texts that constitute the canon? My argument is that while Maoism indeed acted as a persuasive ideology, it also made “announcements” that necessarily dogmatized it. Of course, it must be noted here that I am not suggesting that canonized ideologies could not be interpreted differently, from the point of view of “deliberative oratory” for instance; this is already affirmed by the existence of Maoism. Rather, I am pointing out that the original dogma – Marxism in this sense – merely formed a sphere of interpretation after the canonization of Maoism, as Maoism formed a similar sphere after it was de-canonized after Mao’s death.

While I am focusing on ideological change, attention will be given to particular histories as well. By particular histories I mean ideological narratives that can exist without ideologies yet are commonly installed into them; in some cases, in fact, they are claimed to be built-in to ideological consciousness. Northrop Frye (1973, 282–283) argues that the scriptural plays of the Middle Ages presented to the audience a myth already familiar to and significant for that specific audience. Such plays were designed to remind the audience of their communal possession of this myth; the scriptural play was thus a form of a spectacular dramatic genre which Frye calls a “myth-play.” In the sphere of Maoism, such a myth-play is absolutely ever-present. It forms a particular history of the Chinese that is represented through the “deliberative oratory” of Maoism.

Although I am dealing with Maoism in this specific context, similar patterns of myth-plays can likewise be spotted in other ideologies, fascism being the most obvious example. I shall touch on this topic in my study as well. As such, this kind of definition of a myth-play also denies that man is an historical being in a sense where he is influenced by the development of history itself; history is not just a scene where man acts politically, but political man makes and re-makes history a reflection of his own image. In the case of Marxism, for instance, the myth-play behind the ideology is the exploitation of the proletariat and the future realization of communist utopia through revolution. Lacking practical experience of such an exercise, moreover, implies that the aim of ideological action is necessarily based on a myth-play that is supported by theories rather than vice versa, since no historical models or references for ideological action are yet available.

1.1 Sources

In a study that focuses on an ideology that is canonized, one needs to turn attention to the canon itself. Ideological canons, as understood in this particular study, are simply the texts that reach a status of a canon. Moreover, during the time the texts remain canonized, they remain unchanged as well. However, changes or revisions can be forced upon canons as they can be revised to serve political needs and ambitions; canonized ideology can thus be used to justify political power. In fact, one could claim that texts are always revised to a certain extent. As Michael Schoenhals (1986, 99-112) notices, the overall effect of the publication of the words (of the leaders) on the public is what counts the most. Thus, it is not important whether the published speeches correspond faithfully to what has been said in particular occasions. Accordingly, truth and falsehood do not matter significantly; what matters is whether the publication of a particular statement is likely to produce a “positive” political effect.

Given the definition for a canon, 毛泽东选集 (*Mao Zedong Xuanji*; *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*) can be claimed to possess all the qualities an ideological canon “needs.” 毛选 (*Mao Xuan*) – the abbreviated title for *Mao Zedong Xuanji* – is a collection of Mao Zedong’s major articles and thus a canonized collection of texts on a *de facto* basis. The articles in the book are arranged in a chronological order and annotated by the Committee for the Publication of the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, the official organ to supervise the layout of the texts. There exist five major volumes of *Mao Xuan*: the first volume came out in October 1951 and contains 17 articles from the 1920s and 1930s; the second volume was published in April 1952, covering 40 articles from the period of the war of Resistance against Japan, from July 1937 to 1941; the third volume includes 31 articles, covering the period between March 1941 and August 1945, and was published in April 1953; the fourth volume, published in September 1960, includes 70 articles; finally, the fifth volume, published posthumously in April 1977 also includes 70 articles covering the September 1949 and November 1957 period. Moreover, in 1991, the Central Committee decided to revise the volumes I through IV. (Li 1995, 269-270)

As my argument in this study is based on the paradoxical relationship between ideological change on one hand and ideological stillness on the other, I am using the version of *Mao Xuan* published in 1960 and re-printed in 1969, covering the volumes I-IV; the English version is entitled *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung I-IV* (SW I-IV), published in 1967 (I-III) and 1969 (IV). The reason for using these versions is that while containing the texts written before the founding of the People’s Republic of China (1949), these specific versions also represent the kind of ideological thinker Mao was during that period. This is especially fascinating as the canonized text is edited and to some extent even revised to constitute an image of desired ideological construction; the ideology that existed in 1960 was “imported” to the past and into the texts themselves. While Maoism was inevitably in a process of being made during the period

represented through the articles in *Mao Xuan*, it was also deemed universal at the very same time. In this specific sense, the purpose of reading the texts is not in pointing out changes or logical contradictions but in discussing how change itself is dealt with in the text and how certain important ideological themes correspond with each other, such as the contradiction between change and canonization. Likewise, I am not trying to reveal the foundations of Maoism but to read what Mao was represented as having written and said during this period that can be reflected upon my views on ideology as a concept. The quest – as well as the theoretical assumption of the reader – is thus in providing a conception of ideology that combines theoretical aspects with myth-play, and this conception is produced through reading of Mao-texts.

One of the most obvious problems when using *Mao Xuan* (or any other edited version of the original text) as the main material is the question of whether or not all of the texts were actually written or otherwise produced by Mao Zedong himself. For instance, some scholars contest the claim that both 矛盾论 (*Maodun lun; On Contradiction*) and 实践论 (*Shijian lun; On Practice*) – the most important theoretical texts under Mao's name and other essential parts of *Mao Xuan* – were written in 1937, thus challenging the ideological work of Mao during that period. Arthur Cohen (1968, 22–28) argues that these texts were actually written in the period 1950 to 1952; Stuart R. Schram (1967, 155–165; 1969, 84–88), on the other hand, has accepted the possibility that the two essays could have been written in 1937 while not denying that there might have been heavily revised versions of early 1950s available.

Facing these obvious challenges, no objective image or truthful history is being (re)constructed as the original sources are very much unavailable to this study, that is, it is impossible to export oneself to the relevant political context and read the texts in their original appearance. Instead, works under the name of Mao Zedong are considered to be an inseparable part of the ideological construction known as Maoism, regardless of the original author or source. In other words, the texts that are included in the 1960 version of *Mao Xuan* are considered to be inseparable parts of Maoism. In this sense, Maoism can be said to be a collective ideology that is merely represented through the face of Mao Zedong and named after him.

Moreover, this problem also includes the question of the role of official histories that the dominant regime has produced after being installed in power. The problem with such histories is that they are usually written under the influence of the author/institution whose story is being told. Hence, these kind of narratives are hardly objective. Rather, they promote a desired image by making choices of what is included in the story and what is omitted. Historical writing in this sense is also open to revision and manipulation. It is continuously creating new political contexts that interpret the old ones, depending on what is the dominant “grand narrative.” In this sense, prevailing ideology is imported into the text through utilizing particular histories; these histories, moreover, form a sphere of interpretation through which the ideology changes its appearance. In short, I am arguing that the myth-play is an

important vehicle for interpreting ideology which in turn determines ideological action.

1.2 Methodology and Structure

In this study, one of my thesis is that Maoism is an ideology that is represented in *Mao Xuan* as a static and unchanging piece of texts that are, in fact, dogmatic in their appearance. At the same time, however, *Mao Xuan* is considered to be historical evidence where Marxism is used to promote deliberative political motives and announcements that actually create a myth-play between the texts and the reader. This type of dealing with the text, of course, implies time while time implies change.

The methodology in this particular study has been greatly inspired by the works of Reinhart Koselleck, Kenneth Burke and Northrop Frye. Moreover, I found the Mao-interpretations of Nick Knight and Stuart S. Schram extremely useful and fascinating although I am closer to Nick Knight in terms of methodology. Reinhart Koselleck (2002, 120) argues that progress can be discovered only when people began to reflect on historical time itself; thus as a reflexive notion progress can only occur if people want it and plan for it. In the case of Maoism, the interpretation of the ideology as well as the canon itself are such reflexive notions too. They stay static as long as they are used to support the myth-play that is necessarily part of their essence. The myth of Mao and belief in his abilities to postulate a superior ideological construction would be such myth-plays.

Kenneth Burke (1962, 3) defines “scene” as a setting where action takes place. The principle of drama is that the nature of acts and agents should be consistent with the nature of the scene. This is what Burke calls “The Scene-Act Ratio.” What Burke implicitly suggests here is that every drama has its own specific nature and thus setting. According to my argument, this is just as every ideology has a specific setting in terms of its existence. In this sense, *Mao Xuan* can be interpreted as a script where dramatic scenes are put in an order that supports the story being told. Every article in *Mao Xuan* is an “act” that follows the nature of the scene, that is, the political background upon which they are reflected. In a larger scale, *Mao Xuan* is also a bigger setting, constituting the whole ideological story in a chronological order. Each step in this chronology forms an act that draws the “grand narrative.” This narrative, moreover, is represented as a romantic drama (see Frye 1973, 186), an adventure that combines the Marxist premises with a communist hero, Mao Zedong.

Chronology, in this sense, is especially important as it puts the canonized ideology in form of a story, the narrative of Mao Zedong. While the Mao-story can be located in history and it can be said to possess a unique sphere of experience, that is, no one other than Mao could have produced such results in the ideological front, it is still considered to be more of a myth than just a

“normal” piece of history. Reinhart Koselleck (2002, 120–121) uses the phrase “the temporalization of history” to describe processes where, for instance, it is possible to recognize that the truth of history changes with changing time and historical truth can become outdated; for Koselleck, thus, the central question is “what has changed” in the sense of historical times when the time has remained the same in a chronological order. In the specific case of Maoism, this is a conceivable point of departure when studying the process of de-canonization. However, in this study, the main focus will be in the 1960 version of *Mao Xuan* where the texts are taken as historical “truths” at one point in history.

Mao-scholar Nick Knight asserts a slightly different schema for reading ideological texts. While discussing the methodological problems of reading Mao, Knight implicitly proposes two relevant techniques of reading ideologies through which constructions like Maoism can be studied and investigated. First, the reading of Mao-texts is a theoretical exercise where mere empiricist reading of political texts is found insufficient; the texts do not in this sense constitute a neutral realm whose function is the communication of the intent of the author, according to Knight (1986, 11–13). Thus, it is impossible to arrive at sophisticated conclusions simply through a reading of the message on the surface of the text. Likewise, the true intent of the author cannot be disclosed as the text itself is not just a sterile piece of information but includes several factors unknown to us. Hence, reading of the relevant text is not only a mechanical activity whose purpose is solely the extrication of meaning from a text, but a process where the reader (and thus the interpreter) mobilizes a range of assumptions and poses certain questions with which to interrogate the text itself. The reader cannot focus solely on the political context within which the texts were written or produced as access to this specific political context can only be achieved through experiencing a similar environment to that which created the texts themselves. (Knight 1985, 123–129)

What Knight says here is that one cannot describe or indeed study Maoism through a reconstruction of the political context that created the Mao-texts. Likewise, it is impossible “to show how it really was,” that is, to know an historical or political context in any definitive sense, since the reconstructions of the past are significantly influenced by the assumptions and questions we mobilize to study the texts themselves. This suggestion, in my view, has very similar echoes in Koselleck’s “the temporalization of history,” with both addressing the issue that truths change when the times change.

The second point that Knight makes is the critique of the use of periodisations. Such a notion may actually seem a bit contradictory with the previous suggestion; however, in this particular case, Knight is not asserting “temporalization” in the sense that Koselleck uses the term but refers to the development of ideas of an individual that occurs during some specific timeline. For instance, in the case of Mao, using periodisations would mean separating “young,” “matured” and “aged” Mao, and using them in aid of an analysis; I suspect this “tactic” is familiar to any Marx-scholar. Knight (*ibid*, 128–129), on the other hand, argues that such temporal conceptualizations are necessarily

somewhat arbitrary. The use of periodisations, thus, would depend on an anticipation of change or discontinuity in the development in Mao's thought while evidence of this would have to be drawn from the Mao-texts; this kind of evidence, according to Knight, is only relevant because of the scholar's assumptions. In short, Mao is *expected* to change his views as time passes and this "evidence" would necessarily become the *Leitmotiv* of the whole study.

The critique of periodisations is by no means a denial of history or historicity. Rather, Knight (1985, 129) merely suggests that periods of history do not exist autonomously in history but they are created by historians and they are given significance by historians as well. The act of periodisations, hence, is a function of sensitivity on the part of the historian to discontinuities highlighted by the assumptions raised and questions posed. Consequently, these assumptions necessarily alter the interpretation and the very knowledge we derive from this type of study which in turn for Knight (*ibid*, 135) means that the understanding of the past and its relevance to the present can never be "uniform," that is, "happy unanimity."

There is one final methodological issue I see as important concerning this study. The forms of critique Knight asserts here suggests that there are risks in both neutral theoretical reading of Mao and in studying Maoism as periods that are created according to a significance given to them. Let's call these approaches philosophical and historical to pinpoint my argument. First, difficulties arise in determining what, in fact, is philosophical on one hand and historical on the other; likewise, the correspondence between these two interpretations as well differences between them is a question of significant relevance.

For instance, when studying political texts, one major conflict exists in dealing with the roles of philosophy and history, as changes occurring in ideologies are based on the contradiction between frozen time (philosophical) and temporal (historical) aspect approach. This is something I have already touched on when dealing with the problem of canonization. According to the philosophical approach, the inquiry into the subject must be persistent, systematic, and highly detailed; it must be, then, philosophic. The implications are not that changes could not be studied systematically or in detail. Rather, as our concepts, beliefs, actions, and practices go together and change together, understanding conceptual change (and thus ideological change) is in large part of understanding political change, and vice versa. And such understanding must of necessity be historical. (See Farr 1989, 24-25)

However, understanding the relationship between philosophy and history also require understanding the role of experience; this is my second point. Reinhart Koselleck (2002, 50-56) formulates "three kinds of acquisition of experiences" that are related to every history as they are necessarily concerned with experiences: the unique, unrepeatable experience, resulting from a surprise; collected experiences that are result of a process of accumulation, insofar as they confirm or correct one another; and finally, experience that transforms over the long term, gradually or in phases, beyond all spontaneous

effects and unexpected turns. Maoism has all of these realms of experience which in turn impose limits so that neither a strictly philosophical nor just a periodical approach can be used in studying of Maoism from the basis I have chosen: the unique experience of Mao Zedong himself; the collected and indeed collective experience of the Chinese communists developed and modified the kind of ideological construction Maoism is/was. Hence, the long term experience that is inevitably present in every history is argued to be present in the myths Maoism promoted through myth-play.

The structure of my study is in “acts” that outline my arguments and main thesis. In the second chapter (Act I), I will present relevant ideas on the concept of ideology as it is one of the key terms in my study. I am not only giving a theoretical definition for the concept but also discussing how the concept itself can be used as an aid to my reading of Mao-texts. At the same time, reflections on this discussion are re-reflected upon the idea of ideological change that constitutes an important vehicle for the later analysis. I am also concentrating more thoroughly on the canon/change-paradox, which I have already presented briefly in the introduction.

The third chapter (Act II) concentrates on the concept of myth and charisma. Both of the concepts are significant in terms of understanding the correspondence between ideology as a *theory* and ideology as a *myth*. While these “realms” have their own particular characteristics they are also closely linked to the context of Maoism. In fact, I am asserting an argument that they are inevitable parts of each other as ideology cannot be based on mere theoretical guidelines.

In the fourth chapter (Act III) I am presenting my idea on Maoism as a theoretical construction. This is done by discussing the Mao-canon from different viewpoints. At the same time, ideological canon is further defined and the second chapter is placed in a specific context of Maoism. I am also pointing out that Maoism as an ideology was based more on ideological action than it was on theoretical study of Marxism. As such, it defined revolutionary action as an experience.

The fifth chapter (Act IV) focuses on the mythic aspects of Maoism thus widening and completing the analysis of the Act III. I am not only focusing on the myth-plays Mao used in support of his ideological construction, but additionally, I am presenting the Mao-myth, the myth that changed Mao from romantic revolutionary into a divine actor that implicitly has “written” *Mao Xuan*. I am also re-defining revolution and revolutionary actions as a form of romantic adventure that supports the communist myth-play that Mao promotes.

2 ACT I: IDEOLOGICAL CANON VS. IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE

In this chapter, important remarks concerning the concept of ideology and ideological change are made. These remarks are necessary and indeed crucial in understanding the interpretation of Maoism made in the later “acts.”

Ideology is one of the most common concepts with which to describe political perceptions of prevailing reality. At the same time, however, it remains elusive and indeed a difficult one to define. Introduced by the French sociologist Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836) in the late 18th century, *idéologie* was first designed to serve as a tool or structural device to telescope the enclosed truths within societies. de Tracy thus defined ideology (deriving from the Greek word *eidos*, the visual image) as a science of ideas or study of perception, free from metaphysical speculation. Individual ideas, de Tracy noted, were formed altogether independently of the external influences of society. Ideology was a system *par excellence*, mirroring and reflecting everything according to nature, with an aim to demonstrate the relativity of perception. (Kennedy 1978)

It is, of course, difficult to determine the first author who dealt directly with ideological phenomena as such. For instance, Jorge Larrain (1979, 17–19) argues that Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) used ideas comparable with ideology in three different ways: when he related the bias of human knowledge to appetites and interests; when he linked religion to power and domination; and when he justified the use of force and fraud in order to get and maintain power. In the context of the concept of ideology, however, de Tracy was indeed the first to use the term itself although the phenomena of ideology in a Machiavellian sense became the dominant definition for the term. Thus, the concept soon gained a different connotation: as the original meaning of ideology referred to science of ideas, the new meaning was more of a synonym to describe a cluster of ideas forming a worldview (*Weltanschauung*) of a particular historical, social, economic, or other group. The concept in this specific sense became exactly the opposite of what de Tracy had designed it for. Ideology was increasingly associated with abstract metaphysics and utopian,

political liberalism, making the concept widespread in purely political usage. Accordingly, ideology lost its in-built objectivity and became defined through collective interests that can be said to be political *par excellence*.

Politically speaking, ideologies in their modern sense date back to the French Revolution of 1789–94, when political factions were called spiritual families, although the distinction between these groups at that time was not as drastic as during the next centuries to come. During that period, political factions determined the political scene, as the terms “left,” “right,” and “center” were introduced to label the sitting order of the spiritual families in the newly reassembled (1788) French Parliament. At the same time, the whole ideological spectrum was generalized in a way that needs little demonstration in the contemporary world. As the usage evolved further, the concept of ideology became widely used. It did not necessarily refer to the traditional left, right, or center. For instance, problems became apparent when defining “far left” and “far right” after World War I, at the eve of the rise of totalitarian ideologies (namely communism and fascism). Consequently, ideology was seen more and more as a method of ruling rather than a set of dogmas that would influence all spheres of humanity. Hence, the concept was heavily associated with power and domination. In a classic Machiavellian sense, ideology was now associated with the use of force and fraud in order to achieve and maintain power; ideology was a matter of political appetites and interests rather than an instrument to unveil the secrets of the natural order of things.

After the declaration of *lo stato totalitario* by Benito Mussolini in Italy in 1922, ideology fundamentally absorbed totalitarian connotations. Some scholars even went as far as to claim that all totalitarian ideologies are basically alike (see Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956), since the very method of control now proved to be similar. From this point of view, totalitarianism in itself would have to be described as an independent ideology, a form of political system, where *autos* himself wields all the power without responsibility to anyone else for what he does.

However, there are differences in the usage of such ideological constructions. Ideologies like Marxism and National Socialism are often described as secular religions, drawing a parallel between political and religious experience. Moreover, ideology based on totalitarian dictatorship is usually recognized as a system of beliefs, logically structured doctrine, covering all the most important aspects of human existence. Accordingly, such a definition implies that the relevant doctrine is completely accepted by the leaders of the ruling regime (Cassinelli, 1960, 69), as it does not qualify otherwise as totalitarian. This kind of interpretation regards ideology as a tight system of coherent ideas and of well structured content, a dogma. The other extreme considers ideology as a loose, more flexible system where practical matters are not bound to the dogma itself but are merely justified with it. For instance, Maoism can arguably have both spheres described above as it both reinterprets the Marxist premises and creates new ones; it thus uses Marxist premises loosely yet introduces a tight ideological interpretation of them in the

Chinese context. In order to specify this “problem,” it is necessary to define “pure” and “practical” spheres of ideology.

2.1 Main Definitions: Pure and Practical Ideology

Franz Schurmann (1968, 18–19) defines Chinese communism as an ideology that consists of a systematic set of ideas with action consequences serving the purpose of creating and using organization. According to Schurmann, ideas are formulated thoughts expressed in a particular language. Among the Chinese communists, thus, the ideas set forth in the party rules are formulated in the language of Marxism. For Schurmann, although each idea is different, ideas are nonetheless shaped by a uniform language, the language of that specific ideology.

What Schurmann suggests here is that ideology can be seen as both tight and loose at the very same time, since it determines and judges the action. In this specific sense, pure ideology is the structure of the ideological whole while practical ideology is what takes place within that structure. As pure ideology creates the need and basis for ideological action, action is necessarily correct as it is based on the pureness of thought. Such a conception of ideology characteristically focuses and projects itself toward a perfect final state of mankind, thus containing a chiliastic claim, based upon a radical rejection of the existing society and conquest of the world for a new one (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956, 9). The perfect state of mankind, in this context, is what ideological action is trying to achieve. Such an approach also implies that ideologies must have in-built utopias, and more importantly, that they actually are trying to respond according to these ideals.

Although ideologies do possess a certain idealistic element, the utopian approach can be juxtaposed with an approach that stresses ideologies as the situational transcendent ideas that never succeed *de facto* in the realization of their projected contents (Mannheim, 1976, 175); this, in principle, would mean that ideologies are inapplicable by their very nature. The specific theories behind ideologies are something that cannot be tested truthfully in practice. Consequently, ideologies are not based on logical or mathematical formulations, but on subjective and passionate reflections of the past, the present and the future. Likewise, ideologies do not provide majestic truths in themselves; they merely promote expectations.

According to the suggested basis, ideology is a construction of a utopian mind, distorted if not alienated from reality. In this sense, a state of mind can be said to be utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs (*ibid*, 173). Such a utopian mind cannot form an ideology that is based on general assumptions since it is the generality that gives the ideology its power and influence. However, generality does not necessarily mean universality. Ideologies that serve to create organizations require a conscious

conception of unity, as they cannot rely on an underlying “spiritual matrix” to give unity to their ideas (Schurmann, 1968, 18). In other words, such ideologies need to form a sense of unity through expressions that are not necessarily based on the theoretical (spiritual) constitution of the relevant ideology. This is an imperative, since individual members of any ideological class do not necessarily experience or domesticate all the elements of an outlook that could be called a *Weltanschauung* (Mannheim, 1976, 52). Rather, ideology has to include both theory and practice, which constitute a distinction between “pure” and “practical” ideology. While pure ideology is a set of ideas designed to give the individual a unified and conscious worldview, practical ideology is a set of ideas designed to give the individual rational instruments for action. At the same time, however, both sides of ideology operate together. Without pure ideology the ideas of practical ideology have no legitimization, and without practical ideology an organization cannot transform its *Weltanschauung* into consistent action. (Schurmann, 1968, 22–23)

In Schurmann’s analysis, pure and practical spheres of ideology have a close link with the Marxist opposition of practice and theory. Simplifying things further, it can be argued that this opposition is based on the kind of dualism people usually have in mind when discussing the basic differences between practical and theoretical: practical, lived social life as opposed to abstract ideas, or more specifically, action (practice) versus reflection or thinking (theory) (Kilminster, 1982, 160). However, theory and practice can be juxtaposed in a broader sense, as they are considered to be not separate but different walks of life. In Chinese Marxism, for instance, Schurmann (1968, 19) argues that there are two concepts that serve a special function at a general level: theory (理论, *lilun*) and thought (思想, *sixiang*). Of these, the concept of theory is seen as an inseparable part of pure ideology, whereas thought belongs to the realm of practical ideology. In this particular case, pure ideology refers to the whole, seen only from the outside, performing some task. Thought, on the other hand, could be defined as something that focuses on the formal ideas and describes their shapes. Thought is a tool to look at the parts of the ideological machine, an instrument of exegesis that aims at interpreting the formal ideas behind the pure ideology. In this sense, the implication of the Chinese communist conception of theory is that it cannot be changed, as it is universal in character. Regarding the other side of the same coin, however, Chinese communists regard theory or pure ideology as unchanging but yet not capable of leading to action by itself; thus theory without thought is meaningless, according to Schurmann (*ibid*, 33).

To be sure, there are several problems with these kinds of definition that operate at the extremes. First, it seems strange to claim that thought (as an ideological concept) is in a constant state of change since both theory and thought are also rhetorical references, not mere ideological definitions. An example of this can be found in the historical reception of Mao Zedong’s Thought: after taking Mao Zedong’s Thought as the guiding ideology in the Seventh National Party Congress in 1945, CCP made Maoism its pure ideology

and thus something that could indeed be interpreted as a theory rather than thought. Of course, it is necessary to point out that by 1945 Mao Zedong's Thought already had a clear theoretical (pure) constitution, at the same it was used as a rhetorical figure serving a practical purpose; Maoism thus had both a pure and a practical function.

Similarly, if Maoism is interpreted in a sense were the doctrine of Marxism is defined as that tradition which treats the works of Marx as a bible and imagines that it can clinch substantive arguments with the words "Marx has said it" as Roy Edgley (1982, 21) metaphorically suggests, we are clearly making a strong reference to Mao's writings. An emphasis will then be on the written material rather than anything else. But since we know that Mao achieved his status as an ideological author mostly by lecturing (propagating), pre-1949 Maoism cannot be claimed to be purely textual. It was still an ideology in making, and it was only after 1949 that the texts themselves were re-organized and re-produced. However, the problem of actual versions of the speeches and the later textual versions of them as pointed out in chapter 1 is also noteworthy. Moreover, some scholars tend to argue that theory can be understood both as guiding practice and something that constitutes the world. Having said this, an implication that pure and practical ideologies are basically the same thing is necessarily introduced. This implies that Maoism was not only an explanatory theory but the correct application of it as well.

Since problems occur in finding solid ground for one easy definition, suggestions can be made towards defining ideology through its purposes. As argued earlier, ideology can be defined as a systematic set of ideas with certain action consequences. Ideology thus serves a special function as a doctrinal whole that provides rational instruments to action. Hence, ideology has to possess power in relation to its advocates. Likewise, such ideological power needs to be propagated. In short, ideology provides both the means of *control* as well as *power* through which ideological aims can be achieved and practiced.

2.1.1 Ideology as a Means to Control

Although "control" is almost as a elusive concept as is ideology, it is inevitably a relevant part of the ideological structure on a *de facto* basis. Likewise, if ideology is to fulfill its full potential, it has to include the means for interrelating philosophic, programmatic, and propagandistic elements in a more or less coherent manner. This, in principle, forms the structural element of ideology that actually provides the tools to justify the existence of the relevant ideology. Thus, structure refers to the organization of any ideological constitution, defining what the component parts or elements of that ideology are and how they relate to each other (Hagopian, 1985, 4).

In a more specific sense, ideology needs concepts through which it can explain the constitution and justification of its existence. The formulated thoughts need to be expressed in a particular language, as already suggested by Franz Schurmann. In simple terms, this means the formation of a political language that is domesticated by the subjects to ideological propaganda. To a

great extent this kind of language, or jargon in some cases, belongs to the realm of practical ideology as it is trying to explain the theoretical basis of an ideology through verbal expressions. Practical ideology can thus be seen not only as a system of communication that reveals itself in verbal expressions but also as a communication system that requires common categories of thought as well as a common language (Schurmann 1968, 58). In brief, pure ideology needs to manifest itself with words through which it becomes a program and the words themselves need to be made as persuasive as possible. The program, or ideological manifesto, constitutes the theoretical basis of the relevant ideology by setting up the ideals and by simply and generally describing the theoretical means to achieve them.

While the ideological program manifests the philosophic and programmatic elements, the propagandistic elements are usually absent from it. In fact, ideological manifestos rarely give rational instruments to action. Rather, they represent idealistic aims sharable among their advocates thus providing “big concepts” such as freedom, democracy, nation, etc. This also suggests that these concepts need to be more or less in-built in the political tradition of the relevant ideological group; otherwise the language itself remains ineffectual. In a more specific sense, the concepts need to be appropriate towards the supported myth-play of the ideological whole. For instance, Chinese communists did not have a manifesto comparable with their European counterparts although they do have a constitution, the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, which is revised when necessary, usually during the National Congress. For the first six years of the existence of the Chinese communist party (中国共产党, *zhongguo gongchandang*) (1921-27), the movement was under the control and direction of the Third International (the Comintern), implying that no manifesto was even needed: the policies and strategies were imported from abroad as the Marxist ideology was still unfamiliar even to most of the Chinese communists; although a few scholars were interested in the works of Marx, it was alien to the majority of the members. This fact, in some cases, is passed over by arguing that the Chinese “socialists” were in fact Marxists even before they familiarized themselves with the texts of Marx and thus became “true” Marxists (see Chan 2003, 32).

Likewise, because the Comintern’s doctrine insisted on revolutions based on industrial workers rather than peasants, the communist movement in China also concentrated its propaganda efforts among urban industrial workers (Wang 1999, 16). Marxist ideology was not modified in any fundamental sense when imported to China, and this was one of the reasons that eventually led to the triumph of Maoism. In many ways, this also emphasizes the distinction between ideals and the practical definition of ideology: while ideals draw a picture of a perfect society, practical ideology aims at realization of it. Sometimes ideals cannot be achieved through dogmatic practices implemented from above but through acquiring a new way of thinking, a new version of practical ideology, while the ideals themselves remain the same.

Ideals, however, can also be forced upon the audience, party members or a whole nation. In Chinese communism especially, a great role has been given in achieving a certain state of mind, leading to the “liberation” of thought and thus to a new consciousness. When taken to extremes, the processes to achieve correct thinking included methods (or techniques), such as “thought reform” (思想改造, *sixiang gaizao*) that became notorious during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (无产阶级文化大革命, *wuchan jieji wenhua da geming*) (1966–1976). Thought reform had certain specific features: total control of the environment, both of the people physically and of the information available to them; a grim psychological experience, undergone with guidance through successive phases and intensified by the manipulation of one’s sense of guilt and shame (Fairbank, 1993, 241). Thought reform forced the subject to believe that his ideas were corrupted and needed altering. Hence, indoctrination of a new ideology in the sense of thought reform consists of two elements, confession and re-education. On the one hand, confession aimed at the exposure and renunciation of past and present evil by re-constituting the subjects *Weltanschauung*. On the other hand, re-education operated as a tool in remaking the person in the communist image, that is, it implemented correct language and behavior (Lifton 1967, 17) which in turn acted as a way of controlling the subjects themselves.

The concept of consciousness is also relevant to our concerns here as it is closely linked with the concept of thought. Consciousness is indeed a *Marxist* concept since it was Marx and Engels who used it to describe the general modes of thought that constituted the ideological basis of human existence; for Marx, however, consciousness did not determine the being of man but on the contrary, social being determined the consciousness. Likewise, ideology was defined as a reference to specific elements of thought, while forms of consciousness were an element that described general modes of thought (Sumner 1983, 14). Maoism, for instance, would be such a specific element of thought as it is an application of a general conception of thought. But the concept of consciousness can be confusing if applied in such a simple manner. As Marxism is not parallel with religion, it is hardly consciousness either. Hence, attempts to draw a picture of reality from (general) ideas only lead to false consciousness; and false consciousness, of course, is also false knowledge. The process of gaining ideological knowledge thus leads from a general to a specific mindset, aiming to reveal the objective interest behind the ideas and to a realization of what kind of functions the ideology serves (Bell 1967, 397), that is, what are the main aims of the ideology itself. It is through action that knowledge is confirmed to be either true or false. Consequently, knowledge determines the action but is also open to revision.

In this sense, knowledge and action are closely linked. At the same time, however, there is a clear gap between them. As practical ideology is merely a category of action or an application of pure ideology, correct action cannot occur without the possession of correct thought. Correct behavior, a category of correct action, is manifested through speaking and acting. In the Maoist context,

for instance, each individual member of the organization is trying to do what Mao did, thus emerging with a manner of thinking similar to that of Mao (Schurmann 1968, 45). Through domesticated ideological language and behavior it is possible to act correctly. Through correct action, knowledge can be applied correctly and correct thought achieved. Of course, correct in this context is subjective as it refers to the thinking of an individual. Adoption of Maoism would then follow the pattern as shown here: “theory” + “practice” equals “thought”; at a more practical level “truths of Marxism-Leninism” + “the practice of revolution and construction in China” equals “the thought of Mao Zedong” (ibid, 30). According to the formula, ideology is created individually through certain command of knowledge that is transformed into action. After experiences in applying that knowledge, “thought” will emerge to describe the sum of the ideological whole.

2.1.2 Ideology as a Means to Power

If we look at most of totalitarian (and non-totalitarian as well) regimes, consistent ideological action has started with a revolution of some sort, either violent or another dramatic act, since without possessing power it is impossible to enforce ideology upon anyone. Similarly, in totalitarian rhetoric revolution is often considered to be holy, because it includes the sacred connotation of destroying the *ancien régime* and introducing the new political system.

The myth behind the revolution is thus driven as much by a desired future as it is by an assumed past. As the idea of revolution implies, one of the key elements in revolutionizing society is succeeding in removing the *ancien régime*. In simple terms, in order to achieve the status of revolution, one must succeed in gaining power. Likewise, rebellion is an unsuccessful revolution from this point of view. It is, however, unclear what attributes can be used to describe revolution. Barbara Salert (1976, 6-7), for instance, argues that attributes like success, violence, and participation are occasionally too controversial since confusion sometimes arises over whether a successful revolution is the one that succeeds in gaining power or the one that succeeds in transforming society. Salert’s argument is clearly based on juxtaposing social revolution with ideological revolution. This is an awkward exercise since social “revolutions” are more commonly described as “reforms.” In this study, moreover, all of the attributes mentioned are considered as inseparable parts of the concept of revolution; likewise, from this perspective, revolutionary action is something where the participants aim at success through the use of violence. Their sole purpose, thus, is the destruction of an old regime and construction of a new social and economic order, with a state power effectively capable of protecting this newly installed system (see Dunn 1989, 348). From this point of view, revolution needs to last in order to possess legitimacy; otherwise it is overthrown by a counterrevolution or has to be considered to be as a mere rebellion.

While revolution is a vehicle to achieve political power, propaganda can be seen as a vehicle to send desired messages to the audience. The concept of

propaganda itself, first introduced by the Roman Catholic Church to oppose Reformation (*Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*, "Congregation for propagating the faith") in 1622, refers to action with an interest of spreading the doctrine, or "breed," if given its original meaning in Latin (*propagatio, propagare*). In the modern sense, however, scholars make a distinction between propaganda and agitation, since the latter is a form of propaganda only in the broadest definition. For instance, according to Harold Lasswell (1995, 13), propaganda is a matter of indoctrination while agitation is only a matter of incitement. Victoria O'Donnell and Garth J. Jowett (1989, 53), on the other hand, define the difference as follows: propaganda that is used to maintain the legitimacy (*integrative propaganda*) and propaganda designed to stimulate the masses to act (*agitative propaganda*). Similarly, agitation can be defined as something that seeks rebellion and war, in other words, temporary chaos. Moreover, it can also serve as a tool of short-term integration as governments or regimes employ agitative propaganda after having been installed in power, as they want to pursue a revolutionary course of action. (Ellul 1973, 71-75) Concerning this study, a combination of both integrative propaganda and agitative propaganda is clearly the definition that serves the needs the best; the pre-revolutionary context can suitably be analyzed through the category of action that was based on maintaining order. While revolutionary action seeks war, it also has to maintain order so that the revolution itself can be achieved.

In the case of Chinese Marxism, the propagandistic elements of ideology can be seen as twofold. First, Marxist ideology aimed at propagating an outlook powerful enough to revolutionize China. This led to practical interpretations concerning the pure ideology; it is commonly argued that Chinese revolutionary intelligentsia had very little interest in the works of Karl Marx until they proved to be useful in legitimating revolutionary actions. Marx was considered to be too theoretical and not radical enough, as the Chinese revolutionaries were mainly interested in methods and ideologies that promised quicker solutions than those offered by the Marxist doctrine (Meisner 1967, 53). Second, the Russian revolution was treated as an example in removing the *ancien régime* rather than a victory of Marxism as a superior ideological construction. Chinese Marxists were not particularly interested in the general principles of Marx's materialistic explanation of history, and more importantly, the economic laws of history were neglected for obvious reasons: accepted in use, such an interpretation would have implicitly suggested that no socialist revolution was possible in China since the country was still in a pre-industrial stage. Partly because of this, the Chinese Marxists were not so interested in the utopian elements of ideology as they were in the romanticized past, "the glory of the Hans," as Stuart S. Schram (1963, 161) puts it.

In a more specific sense, ideology has to implement a kind of strategy in order to achieve power. Ideology usually comprises (a) one or several explanatory theories that represent the pure ideology; (b) a set of ideals as represented above; (c) a series of related slogans, that is, persuasive ideological language that is used by those being influenced and controlled by the ideology

itself; (d) and finally, a store of admired symbols that give a sense of unity (see Schweitzer 1962, 46). Based on this strategy and the means to power it provides, ideological leaders can claim a right to the exercise of power because they see in power an instrument for realizing their ideology.

Another important aspect of ideological power is a process of dogmatization where ideology serves a dual function in achieving and maintaining power. On the one hand, the ideology exists prior to and is independent of the leaders who are morally bound to its tenets. For instance, Marxism is such an independent ideology because it was the theory that provided the universal truths. The ideological tenets of Marxism were thus independent of the will of the leaders and their actions were oriented by the goals implicit in the ideology. On the other hand, within communist movements usually there exists a practice that the party is prior to the ideology, and that new ideological tenets are the products of the will of the leaders. In this sense, enunciation of a new ideological tenet thus becomes a manipulative instrument by which the top leaders get their own ideas accepted by the followers.

Ideological power also signifies power to change the ideology itself. Although ideology is said to be consistent over time or upon the ideological motives of the leaders themselves, it is inevitably changed every time it is "used." When ideology is interpreted and used, the authority to interpret the original ideology is shifted from the ideology to the leaders. Consequently, ideological power is exercised through two different schemas: ideological doctrine and ideological mentality; in the first case the ideology is contrasted with "truth," here meaning science and valid knowledge in general while the second case is not concerned with the truth-value but with the functional value of the relevant ideology (See Sartori 1969, 398). In this specific sense, truth-value equals doctrine, or the pure element of ideology, while functional value refers to the practical element and the action consequences. In both cases, nonetheless, the leaders manipulate the ideology either through defining the doctrine or through determining the correct action where the ideology supposedly instructs.

2.2 Ideological Change and the Problem of Revision

As already noted, ideologies are never static by nature, although they usually have pure elements attached to them. Since change is taken as an instrument motivating political and ideological actions, there have to be a variety of patterns through which change occurs. In other words, different types of ideologies stress change in different ways.

Hence, a suggestion can be made that every ideology has a specific rhythm concerning history, that is, ideologies interpret the concept of time differently. Karl Mannheim separates four basic ideological positions: anarchism, conservatism, radicalism, and liberalism. While these ideologies are simplified

and stereotyped to certain extent, they do reflect the idea of ideological change in a specific way. According to Mannheim (1976, 59–63), time orientations among the four ideologies differ regarding their aspirations for change. As one would guess, conservatives “...are inclined to imagine historical evolution as a progressive elaboration of the institutional structure that *currently* prevails, which structure they regard as a utopia,” that is, conservatives maintain that *prevailing* reality is the best man can hope for, at least for the time being. In contrast to conservatism, liberals “...imagine a time in the *future* when this structure will have been improved, but they project this utopian condition into the *remote* future,” suggesting that utopian projection will actualize itself eventually through moderate actions. A more predestined view is that of radicalism, which includes that “...the utopian condition is *imminent*, which inspires their concern with the provision of the revolutionary means to bring this utopia to pass *now*,” implying indeed radical measures in removing the obstacles in the way of fulfilling that vision. Finally, anarchism tends to “...idealize a *remote past* of natural-human innocence from which men have fallen into the corrupt ‘social’ state in which they currently find themselves.” (ibid.). Accordingly, anarchism treats history as non-temporal, that is, they insist that utopia can be achieved through human action *at any time*.

Of course, these four “isms” can operate together, as do pure and practical spheres of ideology. In fact, some ideologies possess all of these time-orientations. Ideologies that are changing over time and stress thinking as the key or emphasize that the conceptions of prevailing reality change along with the reality itself are necessarily orientated differently concerning time in different situations. Maoism is an obvious example. Maoism was radical as it tried to achieve the state of communism during the Great Leap Forward (大跃进, *da yuejin*) (1958–1960). It was very much anarchist when initiating the Cultural revolution. The liberal elements of Maoism can be spotted in earlier stages of Chinese Marxism as Mao did not yet possess political power. The conservative implication of Maoism, although somewhat controversial, is the nature of any ideological movement as its legitimacy to rule rests on the current state of affairs, that is, maintaining the political power.

There are, however, certain limitations and problems with change and particularly with ideological change. While change is the basic element of human existence, ideologies or political power can prove to be hostile towards such an element. The logic behind this is simple: the political power enables a way to control the masses and the changes within the society, especially because drastic change tends to create an atmosphere of revolution. Similarly, it is argued that where things have not changed at all, there is the least likelihood of revolution (Hoffer 1963, 4–5), although this would necessarily mean cultural and political isolation (like China before colonization). Hence, change is a potential risk of losing the power as new ideas challenge the current ones. Similarly, where the ideological foundation of a movement is often considered to be “holy,” something that already contains the ultimate truth; change challenges this as the foundation may not correspond with the changed reality.

Despite the above-mentioned “risks,” ideological change can occur without challenging the fundamental premises of the ideology itself. This can be done through deliberative change which re-defines the used particular language, that is, the formulated ideas behind the concepts are changed to meet the new definition. Additionally, concepts can change spontaneously during some unspecified timeframe, thus changing the very meaning of the concepts.

2.2.1 Conceptual Change: a Matter of Desirability

Ideological change, in most cases, takes place according to the will or interests of those in power. However, it can also take place through re-definition of the ideological concepts, that is, through re-definition of the particular language which is not necessarily done by the rulers themselves. Thus, while the language as such remains the same, the formulated ideas that define the concepts change or they are given a new meaning. This type of conceptual change can be expressed through the logic of desirability. As motivation for change emerges, new rhetorical figures emerge to replace the old concepts as they are no longer considered appealing enough.

The basic idea here is that while ideological change can be forced, conceptual change takes place over a period of time according to certain patterns. Such patterns, for instance, include sudden power shifts, where the new ruler or more precisely the history of the ruler is “temporalized” as Reinhart Koselleck (see 2002, 120–121) suggests. A good example of this is the rise of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, which in turn changed the meaning of the particular ideological language as the Maoist “formulated ideas” were deemed obsolete and new meanings/definitions suddenly replaced them. For instance, while Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 759; SWIII, 22) regarded the slogan 实事求是 (*shi shi qiu shi*, “Seek truth from facts”) as an illustration of the basic principle of dialectical materialism, the post-Mao meaning had a very pragmatic connotation of proceeding from (economic) reality (see Li 1995, 412–413). Similarly, also “ideological erosion,” that is, slow changes in the minds of the leaders can alter the meaning of the ideological language used. Finally, revival of an “old” concept in a new context can constitute a new meaning as was the case with the rise of “Deng Xiaoping theory” (邓小平理论, *Deng Xiaoping lilun*) during the years of 1992–1997 (see Baum 1994, 363–364; Lam 1995, 37–41; Wu 1996; Kauppinen 2003, 301–310; 2005, 203–216). Along with the acknowledgement of the mentioned patterns, an additional three requirements need to be met if any concepts are to be understood and correctly applied. First, it is necessary to know the nature and range of criteria of the standard usage of the concept. Second, a concept’s range of reference must be known to us. And third, the range of attitudes the term generally expresses must be clear (Skinner 1989, 9–10). As the requirements are met, it is possible to use that kind of evaluative language in a way that both legitimates and describes the activities and attitudes of specific social groups (*ibid*, 21).

Thus, the targets of change are the social and intellectual attitudes on the part of those using the language. When such changes emerge, ideological change emerges out of necessity since the very ideas that determine the ideological language is changed in the minds of those using it. Consequently, the users of the language bring new ideas into it by creating an image of the rhetorical figures in their imagination. Likewise, if we accept the aim of emphasizing the need to reconstruct the conscious intentions of the thinker within the relevant social context as the main method in interpreting ideologies or indeed political theories, political texts, or written history more precisely, ideologies must then be regarded as a written reflection of deliberate and purposive speech-acts from the past (Freeden 1996, 100-101). Accordingly, written reference must be available, as the purpose of the text itself is interpreted through the written word. In a more specific sense, each textual reference is a reflection of its writer in a particular historical situation thus revealing, at least implicitly, the writers conceptions of the subject under investigation.

To be sure, these reflections are necessarily interpreted through a certain matrix. This approach, usually named as *Begriffsgeschichte* (conceptual history), aims at monitoring "the struggle over the correct concepts" (Koselleck 1985, 77-78), or more precisely, studying the political language that "...restrains the continual historical impulse for renewal by offering stabilizing patterns, and it does that through constraining our conceptualizations of history logically and culturally." (Freeden 1996, 99) Rather than just emphasizing single concepts with no structural reference, ideologies have to be stressed as well. Thus, single concepts form a greater whole out of necessity. If these conceptualizations take place logically and culturally in terms of political language, then political language is also the language of the ideology that influences the thinkers of our time.

But problems, of course, are obvious as well. If ideological thinking or indeed ideology as a whole is taken as the "chemistry of ideas" that consists of different ideas and concepts with somewhat seemingly arbitrary relations with each other, three necessary ingredients have to be introduced: an invariant myth, a compound of philosophical doctrines which alternate cyclically in the history of ideology, and finally, an historically determined decision as to a chosen class of the time (Feuer 1975, 1-16). These ingredients constitute the cornerstones of basically any ideology and alteration on any one of them influences the other two. This implies that no radical changes can occur in any of them, as it would lead to a de-ideologization *in toto*. The very foundation of ideology would be questioned if the structures of ideological construction were altered. Thus, if new ideas appear alien to the original ideology, either the new ideas must be brought into consonance with the old ones or the whole ideology must be redefined.

Conceptual histories are the vehicles for the sort of historical understanding which the study of conceptual and political change demands (Farr 1989, 67). In order to meet the requirements of genuine history, three

methodological commitments have to be made: first, the genesis of the concept must be told, that is, the pre-history of the concept needs to be understood; second, concept's reference to other concepts has to be traced in order to understand the political life of the concept; and finally, conceptual histories must *explain* the emergence and transformation of concepts as outcomes of actors using them for political purposes. Accordingly, the practical considerations of these three reasons have to be explained as well: the sources revealing the genesis of the particular concept, the "Great Political Theories," the "Great Texts," for instance; the chosen form and length of the conceptual history, that is, "the constellation of which the concept is a part, or about the problems and contradictions which exercise those who invent or change their concepts" (ibid, 39); the realization that conceptual histories are never finished, i.e. there also exists a future history to be told. (ibid, 38–39)

2.2.2 Innovation, Reform and Manipulation

So far, ideology has been taken as a systematic set of ideas with certain action consequences. Likewise, ideological language forms a network that relates relevant concepts as a web of persuasive words. Moreover, as already argued, ideologies change according to certain patterns. Absent in most definitions of ideology, however, is the role of morphology of ideological concepts, that is, how the meaningful words behind the relevant ideology can and should change.

As ideologies will frequently include the deliberate formation of new conceptual patterns, it must also be acknowledged that ideology, unlike myth, is an agent of change. Being an agent of change, ideologies remain open to revision. Hence, ideologies are "open" in this sense and offer the option of internal choice among the conceptual de-contestations. In this particular sense, they recognize the role of innovators, reformers, or manipulators (see Freedman 1996, 125).

In many ways, reform or indeed revision is seen as a form of revolutionary action. Revolutions occur in science, for instance, after a new innovation is invented. However, reform and revolution are not from the same tree. Reform is something that merely "upgrades" existing objects and in some cases ideas. But revolution drastically changes the "paradigms" behind our whole way of thinking. The distinction between revolution and reform can thus be explained through the concepts of "experience" and "expectation." It is clear that even though both concepts imply movement and thus space (revolving the political system on one hand, and reforming it on the other), they differ in time; revolution defines itself through seizing the moment, whereas reform through upholding the moment.

In this sense, experience can be defined as present past whose events have been incorporated and can be remembered. Expectation on the other hand, is future made present as it directs itself to the not-yet, to the unexperienced, to that which is to be revealed. To further explain the concepts, Reinhart Koselleck's (see 1985, 272–273) categories *Erfahrungsraum* ("space of experience") and *Erwartungshorizon* ("horizon of expectation") can be introduced. They both

refer to that unique sphere that is generated in the human mind: experience to the spatiality of the past and expectation to the line behind which a new space of experience will open, but which cannot yet be seen.

Hence, revolution falls into the category of expectation and reform into the category of experience. Even though revolution has space of experience of its own, it is still plausible to argue that revolutionary movement defines itself more through the future and the present than through the past. Of course, *ancien régime*, the enemy, does not exist without experience, since revolution always has to summon up some sort of vision of the past. Likewise, in some cases it is very difficult if not impossible to make a difference between reform and revolution as revolutions can be driven by an idea of re-living the past rather than creating something entirely new and unique.

Nevertheless the differences and problems in defining the concepts themselves, revolution can be argued to seize the moment; it does not have to theorize actual policies to be applied after the successful revolution. In some cases in fact, the philosophic and the programmatic elements have never been applied to reality, and are thus beyond experience. This, in essence, was also the case with Mao Zedong's revolutionary writings although he did concentrate on practical matters as well. In this sense, revolution is a romantic vision of a possible yet uncertain future, a romantic adventure. According to Northrop Frye (1973, 186–187), for instance, the essential element of plot in romance is adventure, which means that romance is naturally a sequential and processional form; likewise, the complete form of the romance is the successful quest. Thus, revolution and revolutionary action are also contingent, even erratic as the mistress (power) is yet to be conquered. Reform, on the other hand, has to give rational instructions. Reform in this sense does not have an enemy, since in this case the *ancien régime* would be the very revolution that generated the society within which reforms supposedly would take place; reform would then be the enemy of its origins.

Romances are also known for their moments of despair. In various studies it has been suggested that ideological change follows a dialectical circle: belief (thesis) – disbelief (antithesis) – reconstruction of belief (synthesis) (Hong & Sun 1999, 33; Brugger & Kelly 1990, 6). Ideological change, hence, goes through a series of contradictory phases as it is trying to respond to the demands of prevailing reality. This, of course, not only implies that ideology is somewhat rational (that is, it sincerely aims at bettering the life of its supporters), but more importantly, it is never ready as a theory; it always contains contradictions that need to be solved.

Much like ideological change, conceptual change can be defined as one imaginative consequence of political actors criticizing and attempting to resolve the contradictions they discover or generate in the complex web of their beliefs, actions, and practices as they try to understand and change the world around them (Farr 1989, 25). The basic definition of ideology being a “systematic set of ideas with action consequences serving the purpose of creating and using organization” (Schurmann 1968, 18), conceptual change is thus all about

ideological change as well. Ideological as well as conceptual change, from this point of view at least, provide tools for individuals or groups who change their concepts in order to solve problems and remove contradictions in theory and practice (Farr 1989, 26).

Ideology is an agent of change, as argued already earlier. Moreover, in the realm of ideology, there always has to be room for innovation, reform, and manipulation. Groups or individuals executing such an act can thus be called “innovating ideologists” (see Skinner 1974, 293); they are the political actors who change the prevailing beliefs, actions, and practices in order to cope with the problems facing the political reality. While ideological change implies change in thinking or thought, conceptual change here refers to the language of politics that needs to be adjusted. Such a change has to take place somewhere between familiar and extreme categories of political forms (Apter 1965, 2), that is, new meanings of familiar concepts arise from ideological contradictions.

Hence, conceptual change is a source of innovation. As the leaders recognize being placed at a disadvantage, they seek to generate the motivation for change. This is fundamentally a question of legitimacy as ideology finds itself in a need of *raison d'être* and has to be updated; if not with new concepts, then at least with new ideas behind the familiar concepts. In this sense, if practice is not to be altered to conform to theory, then theory must be made to justify practice (Hsiung 1988, 121). Theory has to be divorced from practice, but at the same time they still remain closely linked. If contradictions occur in theory, they reflect themselves in practice, and vice versa.

As political concepts are so closely linked with their past connotations, arguments have been made to support the critical conception when dealing with ideological change. Revisions occur because the old concepts are loaded with unwanted meanings and are thus in a need of change. For instance, the critical basis for studying the concept of ideology would mean acknowledging it as purely pejorative. From this perspective critical conception preserves the negative connotation conveyed by the term throughout most of its history binding the analysis of ideology to the question of critique. (Thompson 1984, 4) Such an approach necessarily treats ideology as a matter of discourse among men, as pejorative connotation rises from ethical discourse.

Ideologies are thus investigated through a reflection of language, as ideological language and ideology are somewhat juxtaposed. Moreover, propaganda (as an instrument/method utilizing ideological language) and ideology are submitted as concepts with closely linked connotations. The rationale for an integrative approach for the two concepts thus “justifies” itself through the similarities of critics they have encountered through the history, since both terms were born as innocent descriptions of social activities but gradually attained a negative connotation, and each has retained that pejorative meaning. (Burnett 1989, 128–129) To be sure, the critical conception is an easy solution: it gives only one possible interpretation and sticks with it. However, the possibility of change is denied (or omitted at least) at the same time. For instance, the dichotomy of revolution and reform outlines the problem of

defining changes within ideologies as discussed earlier. Ideological change is not seen as an inevitable process but as a deliberated choice, a matter of revision that actually “corrupts” the original ideology.

Hence, reforms are difficult to categorize since they lay somewhere between merely updating the original ideology on one hand, and debunking it on the other. From this point of view, leaders or persons with an access to ideological debate dwell upon the changes in ideology that are in fact corruptions, proving the insincerity of the leaders (Friedrich & Brzezinski 1956, 89). No meaningful changes or genuine adaptations are thus possible without necessary corruption of the original ideology. Because of this, the ideology itself needs to be left un-revised. Rather, the concepts defining the ideology are altered, or, new adequate concepts are introduced when the past ideas no longer correspond with the reality correctly.

2.2.3 The “Science” of Ideology

Ideology and science are usually considered as mutually exclusive, since ideology is seen as something that distorts the reality instead of providing accurate knowledge of it. In this specific context, ideology is seen as something subjective, having negative content.

In a broader sense, ideology and science can be contrasted at least two different ways. First, ideology can be seen as the opposite or even antithesis of science and as a collection of mere cognitive errors. The relationship between science and ideology thus appears as the opposition between truth and error while science is considered as the way to overcome ideology. Second, ideology can be interpreted as different from science but not as its antithesis. Science cannot defeat ideology by providing truthful knowledge, as ideology is rooted in social contradictions. Hence, ideology is not simply a cognitive error that can be overcome by a more adequate cognition, that is, science. (Larrain 1979, 173) In this sense, ideological language operates as a symbolic and metaphoric level, as it does not have to describe reality accurately: ideology does not exhaust the truth by providing interpretations likely to challenge scientific approach.

From this latter point of view, ideological language is much like religious language. In fact, they are both difficult to use in the sense of logical argumentation. This is why the language of religion often bases itself on metaphors. Images from the natural world pervade human consciousness, even before they enter into statements of metaphoric combination and after they have ceased to belong to the coding of a mythic pantheon (Cook 1980, 248). An example of this could be the symbols representing the moon or the sun, both used in basically every known culture. As such, the symbols reflect or represent certain specific ideas, and are thus metaphorical in nature.

Moreover, the symbols represent the very ideas behind the relevant religion, its foundation. Thus, transitional and schematized mythology can be taken as a datum; while new interests and techniques are constructed out of an erratic but vivid new world myth, the preoccupations of contemporary society are reflected against the background of traditional narrative situations (Kirk

1970, 251). As the sun and the moon are undeniably existent, science has no tools to challenge the role given to them by religions. Likewise, there is no room for rationalization of things or logic in the field of religious language. All definitions are more or less symbolic and highly ritualistic. Hence, the basic instrument defining things inside and outside societies are beliefs. Because of this, the definitions are necessarily ideological as well. To be sure, ideology or religion are far from science in terms of measurement. In fact, their content always remains immeasurable. While scientific knowledge is presented as a terminology that gives an accurate and critically tested description of reality, non-scientific knowledge is presented as antithetical to such science (Burke 1962, 565).

Accordingly, there is a difference between scientific and dramatistic. As scientific language is language that determines and explains scientific aims and exploits, dramatistic language explains itself in terms of symbolic action that is exercised through the necessarily *suasive* nature of even the most unemotional scientific nomenclatures. (Burke 1966, 45) Hence, scientific and dramatistic approaches are not mutually exclusive but different perceptions of the same thing through different color filters. The relation of scientific and dramatistic knowledge or perception is thus a dichotomy explaining the twofold theory of truth. As every ideology, in the first place, finds that its myth tends to contravene scientific evidence, a language that actually combines these two receptions is needed. This means that science, as a tool for providing facts to support the ideological thinking, is subordinated under the majestic myth behind the ideology. Hence, the prevailing ideology has to support mythic thinking in order to find the necessary legitimization for its action. Science cannot, nor will it, challenge the myth, since the myth is the fundamental part of ideological thinking.

From the above chain of arguments, a special reference to language as action can be found as well. While the difference between the scientific and the dramatistic approach to the nature of language is the difference between explanatory and normative, they both exercise the given roles through actions. The scientific approach treats the language as definition, whereas the dramatistic approach, while being symbolic in nature, treats language as an act, as symbolic action. Definitions are symbolic in themselves, developing through action.

Hence, the scientific approach builds the edifice of language with primary stress upon a proposition (it is, it is not), and the dramatistic approach puts the primary stress upon hortatory expressions (thou shalt, thou shalt not) (Burke 1989, 114–115; 1966, 44). Accordingly, the power of words can be emphasized as a vehicle of the most primitive ideas and emotions of mankind. In this sense, canonized normative (religious, ideological) language is the exploitation of scientific terms to ideological ends, while logic (explanatory) is a science of systematic symbolization with no passions (see Richards 1945).

3 ACT II: IDEOLOGICAL MYTHS AND CHARISMATIC ACTORS

While ideology was defined earlier through pure and practical dimensions, I shall now focus on broadening that definition. As already argued, ideology requires “an invariant myth” fused with “a compound of philosophical doctrines,” represented by “a chosen class” in order to have an applicable theory. Having achieved these conditions, power and control can be pursued through the usage of the ideology.

However, mere powerful ideology is unable to create sufficient conditions for revolutionary action as power requires leadership and in most cases charisma. Charisma or charismatic leadership is most commonly acknowledged as something that manifests itself through loose ideological action, agitation, and religious - highly symbolic and mythical - language. In this sense, charisma is not necessarily seen as a part of pure ideology or science. Rather, the charisma(tic leader) exploits pure ideology by using it in a way that meets the needs of the “common believer.” Hence, charisma uses ideological language by defining it through powerful images and desirable conceptual patterns. While a person able to innovate such ideological revisions can be charismatic, facts and the truth behind these innovations are beyond charisma; ideology or science *an sich* does not qualify as charismatic entity. Likewise, the facts as well as the truth are considered to be the tools to create and strengthen charisma not the source of charisma themselves.

Theory, strategy, and other institutionalized constructions provide backup for charismatic deeds. For instance, a charismatic leader can arise within the communist party, but it is unlikely that he can uphold his charisma by rejecting the jargon or grand theories accepted by the relevant group. In other words, too drastic a revision of pure ideology is likely to cause erosion of charismatic power. Even the most beloved leader has to rely upon the universal codes of the communists although he is able to force changes in ideology. This was notably the case with Mao Zedong although he introduced significant changes to the Chinese interpretation of Marxism starting from the 1930s.

However, the leader can use the ideology in another way as did Mao; by re-defining the concepts accepted by the other communists and through using those in a context that demonstrates and reflects the leader's own political passions. Mao was thus able to change the ideology into a different construction without losing its loyalty to the original, universal dogma. The revised ideology becomes then personified and named after the leader, yet staying pure in every way; in some cases, in fact, this process can even enhance the pureness of the ideology as the leader is considered to be superior in terms of ideological knowledge and competence. At the same time, the fountainhead of ideological wisdom is shifted from the original ideology to the leader himself as he is now seen as the main source of ideological innovation

Such a process of personification changes ideology into more than just a complex web of beliefs and theories guiding ideological actions. The person who is considered to be the one possessing charisma and ideological power is identified with the ideology itself. The leader becomes an inseparable part of the ideology while the ideology is now seen as an extension of the leader's personality and abilities. Moreover, the leader is now associated with mythic qualities. For instance, Mao-image became a mass consumption product especially during the Cultural Revolution and the image of the leader was given special meanings (see Schrift 2001). However, although charisma is a very powerful ability in controlling the gathered following, it is still *just* an ability. Abilities, as subjective and indeed temporal, have a tendency of disappearing or being "worn out." Thus, the merged charisma and ideology combine into a mythic ideological construction, providing a solid and lasting basis for political power.

3.1 Charisma and Myth - Basic Definitions

While ideology in the mentioned context can be described and defined as mythical and indeed charismatic, the concept of charisma itself, in rather simple terms, can be used in at least three senses:

- 1) In the classic Weberian sense, charisma is the supernatural endowment of the leader. In this particular case the concept of charisma is understood as a divine gift which is demonstrated to the followers by miracles, signs or proofs. While this kind of charisma is based on situation-oriented and contingent belief in the magical powers of the leader, it is also something that can be lost. If the followers lose their faith in the leader, the leader loses the divine gift accordingly.
- 2) Charisma can also be something that is used to refer to a sacred or awe-filled property or groups, roles or objects. Hence, the concept of charisma is referred to as the routinization of action into ritual, and

its institutionalization in offices (*Amstcharisma*), kinship group (*gentilcharisma*) and blood lines (*erbscharisma*).

- 3) The popular and indeed secular sense of using the concept is to refer to the personal qualities of a leader. The leader is thus a “charismatic personality” who attracts a following on a basis of his personal attributes; moreover, these attributes are opposed to a divine gift, as they are considered to be more static. (Weber 1968; Spencer 1973, 341)

These three formulations represent types of pure personal charisma that emerge in three different situations: military, magical and religious. Political charisma is more or less submitted in these types, as political power arises from (at least) one of them. From this point of view, the generator or author of (political) order possess certain charismatic qualities thus being able to create a momentum for maintaining political power. This implies that a person needs a sense of order to act politically and ideologically.

Monitored from this particular context, gaining political power is a matter of organizing chaos. As the chaotic crowd of the people becomes a mass movement and share more or less systematic beliefs, they reach popular unity through a national mystique. Such conception of politics provides an objectification of the general will; it transforms political action into a drama shared by the people themselves. (Mosse 1975, 2) After such objectification, ideological aims and goals are identified as the will of the people themselves. In this sense, the charismatic leader – secular in most cases – is seen as a master of events (or leader who brings order through mastery), who is set to pattern the future by creating order from chaos. The political leader armed with the gift of charisma thus acts as a combination of sage, general, the prince and the revolutionary leader.

While political charisma can be gained in various ways, the above mentioned combination can be defined as follows: *The sage* has the power to create order from chaos by conceptualizing the world. He resolves the existential chaos of reality; he structures the cosmos and provides guides for action as well as a promise for the future. The masses, the potential followers, are incapable of achieving order by themselves and are awed by the demonstrated capacity of a great mind to make sense of an incomprehensible world. (Spencer 1973, 345) Then again, the charisma of *the general* quite simply and logically, is based on success in battle. The gift of charisma is evidenced by his performance and is thus vulnerable as it easily vanishes in defeat. Moreover, the general cannot be charismatic without sufficient conditions, that is, war. However, *the prince* being the supreme political authority, holds a position with a slightly different type of charisma. The prince is responsible for the ongoing welfare of the people, the state and other people under the influence of his charisma. If drought, famine, depression, earthquakes, disease or civil disorder occur, the blame is fixed upon the prince; the failure in governance is thus a potential risk of losing charisma. (ibid, 346) Logically, war is actually something that can consume such a charisma. Finally, the charisma of *the revolutionary*

leader rests on gaining power or proving an adequate promise of successful revolution. The revolutionary leader orders the future, generates charisma by convincing his followers that his vision of the future will be true. Accordingly, his charisma is based upon the force of his will and the persuasive power of his arguments; speeches and writings constantly generate a sustaining revolutionary reality. (ibid, 346–347)

In all of the cases mentioned above, charisma is something that needs an audience, followers, who believe in the extraordinary abilities of the leader. Although the concept of charisma is far from the concept of propaganda, they have certain similarities as ideological myths are most commonly spread through propagandistic means. While charisma is not necessarily gained through pure agitation or subjective persuasion (that is, it applies to “reason” through sentimental means), it is quite commonly exercised within political groups (or indeed political culture) whose members agree more or less on the relevant ideological issues. Accordingly, propaganda will only persuade people who are actively engaged in the culture and who can focus on the society as a whole (Evans 1992, 6).

However, this kind of propaganda would be available to a certain elite only, eliminating the lower classes as an audience. Moreover, propaganda in written form would be out of reach as well, since illiterate people are unable to understand the texts. This stresses the importance of stories and oral resources of information, as the peasants in the countryside were indeed unable to absorb any kind of ideological “information” in written form. Propaganda in this sense could be defined as education rather than induction of forced ideas. Significantly, this was quite widely recognized as one of the main functions of propaganda until the 1920s. While seen as a way to “organize the chaos” (bearing thus similar function than the role of charismatic leader), basic knowledge of propaganda was understood as something that normal schools should provide for the training of the educator to make him realize that his is a twofold job: education as a teacher and education as a propagandist (Bernays 1928, 122).

From this point of view, the job of the teachers was to ensure that correct ideas were promoted in order to make good citizens. Accordingly, propaganda was defined as the educational efforts or information used by an organized group that is made available to a selected audience. The specific purpose of propaganda was to make the audience take a particular course of action or conform to a certain attitude desired by the organized group (Evans 1992, 1). Hence, propaganda was something that would be taught rather than forced. Consequently, histories and the narratives they included were presented from a point of view indeed propagandistic, as it was a handy way of spreading the desired doctrine through commonly known fables.

In the specific context of this study, charisma is identified with the concept of rule. Rule, in a broad sense, is institutionalized political power. Hence, in order to become a leader, charismatic leader’s stabilized power has to be institutionalized and structured. Structure in this sense means that there is a

stable and ordered relation of parts; before power can be structured, it must be stable. The stabilization of power thus precedes that erecting of a structure, which produces institutionalization. (Friedrich 1961, 9-10) Stabilization of power occurs not only through charisma of the leader but through the representation of his power. Here the distinction between charisma through representation and charisma through mastery becomes important. In sense, representation brings satisfying order as the leader structures the universe of values for his followers; whereas mastery satisfies deep-felt needs and brings order that is unique and considered everlasting.

Hence, three styles of charismatic representation can be formulated: the innovator, the articulator, and the symbolizer. *The innovator* possesses revolutionary charisma that deals with an extreme form of representation in which the leader brings forth new values in the basic and classic form. The innovator imposes his values upon the followers, regardless of whether they bear an actual and intrinsic relation to the followers' needs. However, the leader does not force irrelevant ideas on the political culture and in some cases the leader in part earns his charisma because of the responsiveness of his followers to his ideas. Hence, the basic function of the innovator is to create values and beliefs that answer the very needs of the diffuse tensions of his agitated following. (Spencer 1973, 347) *The articulator*, however, says what the followers want to hear or what they are not capable of saying themselves. Charismatic articulators seize upon diffuse, and intense, but unarticulated sentiments, and by giving them voice acquire charismatic following. Moreover, the articulator does not create values or beliefs like the innovator, but rather exploits them. (Ibid, 348) Hence, the articulator can be seen as more temporary leader in nature, as he does not necessary create durable ideas. In some cases, agitation is the weaponry of such charisma, since the followers' sentiments are often based on enthusiasm, not awe. The last style is *the symbolizer*. A charismatic symbolizer bears the most passive relationship to the values and beliefs he represents. As the term already suggests, the symbolizer merely stands for those values, being the perfect example of the group type. (Ibid) The symbolizer is thus not innovating or acting as a demagogue, but signifies values by representing the ideals to the masses through carefully selected procedures. Such charisma is also very much visual in nature; parades, paintings and even buildings bearing a certain name symbolize values held dear by the represented group.

3.1.1 Temporality of Ideological Charisma

As already mentioned, charisma as such is born and lives along with the leader who possesses certain charismatic qualities. Likewise, it dies and vanishes with him. Thus, charisma is very much temporal by its nature as it cannot be given from one actor to another. Rather, it has to change into a new kind of charisma or find its force from rituals and institutions.

However, there is a one exception where charisma - as a mythical construction - can actually be claimed by a successor: a role that is identified

and named with charismatic conceptions. It has always been a custom of the powerful to name themselves after victories, political or military. In ancient Rome, for instance, whoever had the *imperium* bore the title of *imperator*. Less weighty men yet with influence were said to possess *gravitas*, influence. Accordingly, they were acknowledged as *gravis auctoritas*, a person with a great influence and importance. (Wagenvoort 1947, 104–105) These men of great power could also become deified human beings, subjects of heavy *mana*, that is, strong spirit. Likewise, deified persons had to perform special duties or achieve great victories in order to achieve such a status. At the same time, they served a special function as the charisma of the leader was decided among the contesters; the one proving to be the most powerful would then absorb the charisma of all of the earlier leaders into his personality.

In some cases, such leaders are considered to be god-like beings. Ernst Cassirer uses the phrase “momentary gods” to describe the deities that serve a special function, a phrase that reflects well the temporal aspect of these heroes. “Whenever a special god is first conceived,” Cassirer (1946, 20) writes, “it is invested with a special name, which is derived from the particular activity that has given rise to the deity. As long as this name is understood, and taken in its original sense, the limits of its meaning are the limits of the god’s powers; through his name the god is permanently held to that narrow field for which he was originally created.”

Thus, for every deity there is a sacred place, a spatial reference. The spatial reference signals the power of an actor. Outside the reference, the actor is among his equals. Such a reference can be physical construction (temple, church, etc.) or abstract space (religion, ideology). A deity is both the source and limitation of his influences. For instance, a charismatic leader provides innovative actions, speeches and examples, but is still subject to the same ideological code as his followers. This also strengthens the belief of the followers as the leader appears to be an approachable example of the ideology in the sense of knowledge and actions.

Every specific ideological role has a specific mask as well. The mask is revered as an apparition of the mythical being that it represents; man is wearing the mask, and man is also mystifying it. The one wearing it, furthermore, is identified with the god during the time of the ritual of which the mask is a part. (Campbell 1986, 33) This implies the temporality of the actor. The actors might change (or even die) but the mask itself remains the same, thus giving the impression that the actor lives, in fact, forever. This, in simple terms, is also the basic function of religious and political leaders (priests, kings, etc.). In this sense, there is an endless chain of momentary gods in history. Those leaving the stage become invisible, and new heroes, more or less human in character, enter, through whom the destiny is realized. (Campbell 1966, 315) The momentary gods are thus the founding fathers that influence the action (or the rituals) of the new heroes who try to live up to the example set forth by their ancestors. This also sets up a pattern of history through which narrative of an ideological group is represented.

In the shift of power the role (and trust) of the masses becomes crucial. This demands intellectual resources and ideological innovation. As the moment of a single leader has expired, a new leader not only takes over the role of his predecessors but also puts his ideas to the test. The intellectual goes to the masses in search of weightiness and leadership role. At the same time, a new ideas or new conceptions are represented. Through this process, new leader seeks to justify his actions, and make his words become flesh. Accordingly, these men of words need the sanction of ideals and the incantation of words in order to act forcefully (Hoffer 1963, 47). Similarly, a leader of a totalitarian regime possesses a vision; he might even be described as a god among the common people. His mission is to start the revolution of thought. Hence, individuals are completed only through imitation of heroic examples. During his life (without ideology) the individual is necessarily only a fraction and distortion of the total image of man. The totality – the fullness of man – is not in separation, but in the body of the society as a whole. The individual can be thus only an organ in a society and through a society. (Campbell 1966, 383)

In this specific context, a charismatic leader is associated with ideological myth. Likewise, mythmaking stresses the importance of integrating the individual with the ethos the myth represents. A community instructed by myths provides its members with a library of scripts upon which the individual may judge the internal drama of his multiple identities (Bruner 1969, 281). The myth serves not only as instruction manual but also as a criterion for self-criticism. Self-criticism is thus a form of self-surrender, an act of atonement, which can be defined as the source of a mass movement's unity and vigor (Hoffer 1951, 42–43). Self-criticism necessarily emphasizes the feeling of guilt as well, defining "us" all as fellow sinners.

However, as already argued, ideological charisma like ideology itself is subject to change. To control the transformation of charisma with all its attendant dangers is to ritualize it and, by doing so, to institutionalize both the role of the leader and the political habits required of the public (See Apter 1968). Of course, such a conception implicitly suggests that the revolutionary movement not only has to possess a combining myth leading to action but a highly ritualistic liturgy it has to follow as well. Such a liturgy, "great texts," serves as a tool that both binds and gives instruments to rationalize prevailing chaos through language. Similarly, history – as a structured representation of the charisma – is organized in a special way using certain conceptual constructions.

3.1.2 Language of Ideological Charisma

While charisma can be represented through various ways – visual, psychological, etc. – it also needs a special language expressing the fundamental essence of charismatic qualities. This kind of language not only describes the ideology in a persistent manner, but attracts the followers by representing the ideology through persuasive concepts and ideas.

In most cases, persuasive language is associated with the tradition of rhetoric. In ancient Athens, *rhêtor*, a public speaker or politician, needed rhetorical skills to persuade, giving the concept of rhetoric somewhat pejorative connotation. Likewise, the Roman classicists Cicero and Quintilian stressed persuasion, although Quintilian's *bene dicendi scientia* ("science of speaking well") somewhat differs from Cicero's *dicere ad persuadendum accommodata* ("speech designed to persuade"). In this specific context, language was seen as a vehicle for understandable communication while rhetoric was an art aiming to further develop the skills in speaking and arguing. (see Kennedy 1994, 128–158; 177–185)

Hence, given the original meaning, rhetoric aims at persuasion, and persuasion is done by language. Moreover, rhetoric takes place through ceremonies, body language, or staged displays of sounds or images as well; rhetoric is thus judged as much by the consequences or the effect it causes as it is by the techniques used. Accordingly, rhetoric can be defined as an instrument that aims at achieving certain objectives rather than artistic aspect of using that instrument.

Like rhetoric, ideological language necessarily acts as an instrument with certain objectives. Although the objectives in this particular case can be somewhat vague in essence, they need to be described in adequate terms. Ideologies with a strong tradition towards founding fathers have to develop a rhetorical apparatus that has a certain very specific and highly ritualistic reference to the original texts. To a great extent, the old texts are ideologically mystified and canonized in the same way that the history behind the myth, as they are made timeless and immune to ideological erosion. Because of this, any revision to them has to be very sensitive and certainly not too drastic since "upsetting" the ancestors would be interpreted as ideological heresy.

Moreover, political (or ideological) language has to adapt to formally constituted and extremely conventional social order within which it operates. This method might be defined as "playing the old works historically," where diverse ideological orientations to both past and present are possible, and every historical analysis is grounded, at least implicitly, in a purposeful and usually self-conscious political stance (Bristol 1985, 9). New ideas have to be represented through old ideas and old concepts, as they otherwise challenge the very basis of the relevant ideology and its legitimacy.

While ideological language operates with the purpose of attracting a following, it also has to be able to represent and define the pure dimension of the ideology it represents. However, this can be a problematic exercise as ideological language is more dramatistic than scientific. Despite this, the *terminology* of ideology can be scientific. In fact, ideological language uses scientific terms to justify dramatistic aims. In other words, ideology tends to mystify the words it uses or give special meaning to them. When some part of a doctrine is relatively simple, or if there are weak spots in it, there is a tendency among the advocates of the relevant ideology to complicate and obscure it;

simple words become pregnant with meanings and made to look like symbols in a secret message (Hoffer 1951, 80).

In a similar way, a charismatic leader can give special meanings to words that otherwise appear to be just normal or even meaningless. After being taken into special use, the word absorbs the mythical powers of its user and the ideology he represents. The original bond between the linguistic and the mythico-religious consciousness is primarily expressed in the fact that all verbal structures appear as *also* mythical entities, endowed with certain mythical powers; the Word (referring to the ideological canon), becomes a sort of primary force, in which all being and doing originate (Cassirer 1946, 44–45).

Hence, ideological language is a kind of word magic, representing a theory of the Word being first in origin and supreme in power accordingly. Such word magic is, of course, common and familiar to most communist regimes. In China, for instance, the communist rhetoric drew its legitimacy from similar realm to the emperors of the pre-Republican era. Hence, there is a twin rhetorical base of legitimacy in communist China: the national myth and ideological orthodoxy. While the national myth provides a sense of the historical place of the governing structures, contributing to the self-identity of the Chinese nation, ideological orthodoxy provides stability and unity in the face of change and factional battles. (Kluver 1996, 15) As already argued, charisma and myth fuse with ideological language in order to establish persuasive argumentation. From this perspective, studying the interrelation between language and ideology is to turn away from the analysis of well-formed sentences or systems of signs and focusing instead on the ways in which expressions serve as a means of action and interaction. Such an approach could be defined as semiological where the reference to the systematic analysis of meanings consists of two types of variables: communicative and linguistic. In addition, two actors operate within the network of communication: the masses and the elite. Commonly, the elite manipulate the used symbols, whereas the masses interpret those symbols and respond. There is thus interaction between these two through political symbols. (Dittmer 1977, 69)

However, mere symbols cannot themselves guide ideological actions as they necessarily need to be associated with ideological thinking or *ethos*. This suggests that ideological language needs to be taken as something that determines thought by acting as the grid through which reality is perceived and understood. The structures of thought act as the ideology of the group according to this method; ideology is mystified and promoted as a myth by arguing that it exists everywhere and is yet invisible. (Hodge & Louie 1998, 47) In this sense, the myth actually operates as a part of ideological thinking. Likewise, ideological language in this context is neither dramatic nor scientific; rather, it is omnipotent and all-explaining. This approach also stresses the difference between science and metaphysics; as science refers to the systematic account of reality, but metaphysics operates as *a priori* assumptions concerning this account. An accepted pattern of using words often occurs prior to certain thinking and forms of behavior; a platitudinous recognition of the

hypnotic power of philosophical and learned terminology on the one hand or of catchwords, slogans, and rallying cries on the other are the stimulating elements of ideological actions (Whorf 1956, 134). As ideology is the subsuming category which includes sciences and metaphysics, language is an instrument of control and communication, aimed at both manipulating and informing the hearers, who preferably are manipulated while they suppose they are being informed (Hodge & Kress 1993, 6).

3.2 History and Myth – Further Themes

When charismatic actors and mythic elements are set on stage, history becomes much more than just a chain of events. It is a narration of principles and models, left behind by the deified heroes. Such elements are arguably present in Chinese historical writing as well as in many Western counterparts.

In fact, already the earliest Chinese historical texts were produced to assist the memory in performance of sacrificial rites due from the emperors or kings of the first dynasties to their ancestors. Accordingly, Chinese historiography functioned as a tool to collect the facts and subject them to a process of discreet filtering which may only suppress those of greater moment to speak for themselves without interference (Gardner 1961, 69). Historiography in China thus served a similar function to the one portrayed in Niccolò Machiavelli's *Il Principe*, first published in 1532. Of course, historiography did not just perform as a chronicle for ritual behavior or mere summary of events. It also provided useful information about methods of ruling, that is, it was considered as a mirror through which ethical standards and moral transgressions pertinent to the present day could be viewed (Unger 1993). In the context of Maoism, this principle materialized later in the well-known phrase "using the past to serve the future," an epitome of history in service of propaganda and ideology. Thus, history was far from being objective as it could be used in promoting certain ideological motives and aims. This, in turn, influences both the interpretation of history as well as the writing of it.

As far as the official history of the Chinese Communists is concerned – at least until the 1980s – the Party historiography can be regarded as stereotyped, monotonous, and indeed propagandistic. To be sure, this view was justified to some extent, since the school courses on "party history" (党史, *dangshi*) were filled with propagandistic elements as they were used to indoctrinate the Marxist *Weltanschauung* to the people. Of course, such indoctrination was only logical, as it was a good way to attract followers willing to fight for the cause of Communism. During 1940s, when the courses of "revolution history" (革命史, *gemingshi*) were replaced by the party history, the Communist movement started to pay greater attention to producing "official" historiography. (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 1993, 151–153) This represented a major shift from

revolutionary ethos to a history of socialist construction, establishing a more adequate way of legitimating the existence of the Party after the revolution.

While the history of Communist revolution was mainly concentrating on idolizing heroic men while criticizing the *ancien régime*, party history aimed at legitimating the post-revolutionary action, summarizing successful campaigns and providing useful knowledge of past events. Historical writings thus increasingly became scholastic manuals rather than objective, un-political *tractatus*. Such a manual also needs adequate language. As argued earlier, ideological language is something that needs to be domesticated before it can be used correctly. Historical language (or language used in writing history), however, operates with slightly different codes. Whereas ideological concepts necessarily possess certain qualities relevant to that ideology, historical concepts are idealistically free of such connotations; at least they ought to be.

Understanding such historical pattern requires understanding of its evolution. David Bidney (1958, 11) argues that man's interpretation of the world is evolved through three stages: a mythic stage, an epic stage, and a historical stage. The mythic stage changes into the epic when man bases his conduct on some notion of the "model of man" or the cult of hero. The historic stage emerges when man ceases to look to the exemplary past and sets up rational objectives and means for their attainment. In the mentioned sense, the epic stage of history appears as an arena for potential emergence of charismatic leadership. While the charismatic leader does not necessarily establish a hero-cult, he usually sets up at least some kind of model for his followers. Accordingly, the history becomes attached to the leader's personal abilities and exploits, providing a mirror for the coming generations.

However, the historic stage in this particular case seems to exist without past tendencies as it lacks an ideological space of experience. In other words, as actions are now defined through expectations rather than experiences, the models or examples from the past are omitted to some extent. Thus, the revolutionary leader cannot have a specific model in the past as revolutions should be unique, everlasting. In a similar way, the context of revolutionary action becomes a process of model-making and myth-creating, as the ones creating such models or myths are the executors of the successful revolution itself.

Of course, since the revolutionary regime's great strength and the meaningfulness of its ideology depends upon the leadership principle, there is a question whether or not the regime survives the death of the leader. (Cassinelli 1976, 239) In order to survive, the charisma of the leader has to be institutionalized as described earlier. Similarly, the language used in historical writing has to represent the stage of symbolism (see Urban 1951, chapter IX), as too accurate a representation of historical facts would be subject to intense reading for several generations to come; but elusive language escapes the possibility of being "rationalized." Thus, the ultimate function of such language is not to copy (imitate) reality, nor to give analogies to describe it, but to symbolize it in various ways.

Because of this logic, the language of ideology can also be called as the science of accurate symbolism. In contrast to scientific language, the language of ideology and religion (which is used by propagandists in many cases) is more of a case of symbolism serving as a metaphysical principle rather than thoughts becoming flesh trying to name things occurring in reality. Ideological language can thus be defined as the science of the systematization of symbols with a purpose of using them in a way that strengthens the relevant ideological agenda. In other words, the language of ideology and religion, as well as the symbols they use to aid thinking, act as "...a continuous source of wonder and illusion" (Richards 1945, 87); they are thus symbols that explain everything yet leave room for future interpretations.

However, the function of such symbols is not only to give answers to the subjects of the relevant ideology. Rather, purely ideological language and its power of words serve as an instrument to control the objects as the words and concepts themselves are attributed as occult powers or highly ritualistic ideological meanings. Likewise, argumentation is seen as a weak inference in this particular context, non-compelling in its conclusions, which must be brought to life in countering the monopoly of demonstrative or apodictic inference represented by logic. (Meyer 1994, 67) As such, logic cannot describe feelings or passions that necessarily influence ideological thinking.

Mythical symbolism leads thus to an objectification of feelings, as already argued. Myth objectifies and organizes human hopes and fears, and transforms them into persistent and durable works: ideological references (Bidney 1958, 8). Consequently, myth is represented literally, using symbolic conceptualizations. While textual reference is needed in creating ideological myth, the world of myth itself is dramatic, a world of conflicting powers. This suggests that the charismatic entity able to be transformed into a myth is a product of a struggle, giving charisma extra value and a sense of sacrifice. This implies that human personality is not fixed and unchanging, "...but conceives every *phase* of a man's life as a new personality, a new self" (Cassirer 1946, 51).

3.2.1 Charismatic/Dramatic Representations

As already argued, ideology is associated with power while charisma is associated with abilities of leadership and in broader sense with rule. Moreover, ideology as well as its mythic dimension operates through certain conceptual patterns, forming a language promoting and describing the ideology itself. Likewise, charismatic leaders exist in histories that form chains of "momentary gods." In this sense, furthermore, each temporal period in the history of the relevant ideology is named after the one possessing the charisma; the ideology behind the charisma is identified with that name, thus closely binding the ideology to the history itself.

However, as the charisma is temporal by its very nature, each period has different types of charisma that emerge from different sources. Certain events initiate the process where charisma is found and later institutionalized. In this context, history has events that are necessarily non-equal; events in history

promoting the rise of charismatic deeds are hence the most important ones. In many ways, such processes can be contrasted with the traditional idea of history (in the West) that was systematized by Herodotus and Thucydides in particular. They initiated the tradition of historiography as the history of events, and more precisely, political events and wars. In doing so, historiography depended upon the contingency of human action, trying to reveal a certain meaning underlying the course of events (see Cobet 1986, 1-18).

The narrative events described in pages of history thus convey at the same time the idea of a directed and purposeful process. Early Western historians did not simply relate what happened, but imparted significance to the chain of events by the very processes of selection and emphasis in their narrative texts. (ibid, 1) With such intentions, historiography could very well be described as a method of compensating the native myths by constructing a historicized ideology (See Cornell 1986, 68), either by legitimizing or condemning the choices of the character in the narrative being told.

By simple standards, an actor with power and a place to use that power is needed in order to represent such narratives. The political authority requires a cultural frame in which to define the relevant narrative and advance its claims (Geertz 1977, 168). What is suggested here is that a political actor with an intent to control needs a culturally relevant myth, and above this, a systematic construction of ideas to support that myth. There is always a need for *persuasion* among the leaders through different elements of ideology. As such, history can indeed be defined as a narrative, a story promoting the ruling regime, seeking legitimacy by introducing historicized ideologies. While history in this particular sense is inevitably defined as something that is written by the privileged, it also serves a special function by providing a powerful historical image through which it is represented to the audience. The ideological narratives are thus shown in a certain, specific context: the context of power. Often, such contexts have been acknowledged as something called "spectacular." In fact, already by definition a spectacle is something exhibited to view, a show of exceptional magnitude. Spectacle thus refers not only to the Latin *spectaculum*, a specialized definition to describe the shows of the circus and arena, but to the external, visible component of all rituals and public acts (Feldherr 1998, 13).

Studied from a psychological point of view, spectacles serve as a kind of mythic imagination, submitting reason to the religious experience, hence reinforcing the ideology influencing the audience behind the stage. The inspiring force of historical or ideological myths cannot thus be denied. As the myth becomes fused with the totalistic sacred science, the resulting logic can be so compelling and coercive that it simply replaces the realities of individual experience. The myth becomes something that exercises total power over the subjects, being a "doctrine over person." (Lifton 1967, 490) Following such a process, historical experiences are severely altered, or even rewritten, since they have to be made consistent with the doctrinal logic.

To be sure, spectacles need to be monitored, as they are visual by definition. Saying that something is visual basically means that there has to be certain space where this visual representation can be seen. For instance, in the case of Roman spectacles, the arena was the circus, a place where spectators “fell from God” (See Tertullianus 1977, 255), that is, they worshipped mortal flesh instead of spiritual beauty. While the circus was a place serving a special entertaining function in Rome, it also reflected power relations within the society.

Hence, the space seen in circuses can be defined as a product, since the space produced in this context also serves as a tool of thought and of action. In addition, besides being a means of production it is also a means of control and of domination, of *power* (Lefebvre 1994, 26). In this sense, the divisions of time are determined through rituals, as the rituals guarantee the continuity of the life of the community in its entirety (Eliade 1954, 51). Again, the role of specific language becomes important. Language not only performs certain duties in spectacles, but moreover, it defines the role of the actor on the stage. In spectacles, performers present themselves as representatives of a larger group or a larger reality, whereas in theatre, for instance, the performers represent themselves in roles distinct from their lives outside the performance (Beeman 1993, 379). Both are well planned and serve certain symbolic role. In spectacles, however, the *social* role is brought on the stage, whereas drama aims at separating it from the fictional.

Moreover, the actors are potential creators of new society that represent the interests of the masses. In this sense, the actors in a spectacle represent themselves to the audience as a continuation of the general will. Likewise, also the audience itself is not a group of individuals but representatives of the masses (MacKerras 1979, 5), identifying themselves with the charismatic actor on stage. Hence, the spectacles are designed to meet the exact needs of the relevant audience. The audience sees itself in the performers, magnifying the effect on the stage. A spectacle is thus all about reinforcing already accepted views rather than compromising something through the performance. Accordingly, there is no room for debate or any other form of challenge within the context of spectacles. If dramas would be reflected upon the stage, it would qualify as a privileged site for the celebration and critique of the needs and concerns of the *polis* (Bristol 1985, 3); drama cannot thus be fitted in the same category as spectacle. Dramas have no clear ending, whereas spectacles have only one possible script. This suggests that spectacles can only take place after charisma and ideological power have been secured or institutionalized to an extent.

There is also a difference in place and context between spectacles and normal political dramas. Whereas dramas can take place almost in any place, there is a special venue for a spectacle. The performance of a spectacle has to be located and contextualized. The place where a spectacle is represented not only consists of the architecture or scenery that contains or displays the performance; it also has to contain the range of associations of that location or material for the

spectator, including historic activities that have occurred in the same place. The context of the spectacle is thus in part a function of the nature and frequency of the occasion and the psychological effect of these upon the participants. (Beacham 1999, 24–25) From this point of view, a spectacle can be defined as three-dimensional and sequential, taking place over a period of time, with its place, circumstance, and unfolding shaping the expectations and experiences of the audience. Because of this, the spectacle is conditioned by the manipulation of language and imaginary to inform, exhort, move, or amaze the audience by whom the performance is given (Ibid, 25). This relationship between the audience and the actors is thus what gives the spectacle its unique significance.

Spectacles are also ways to domesticate the aesthetic in order to secure the position of the leaders. Spectacles are seen as a cunning manipulation of the aesthetic for the sake of political legitimacy. Political leaders rely on the public spectacles so as to master in a self-contradictory fashion – that is, the leaders “contradict” themselves with the challenge of upholding the vitality and stability of the ideology – the arrival of new concepts of secularized power (see Koepnick 1999, 53), so that the new (ideological) vocabulary can be installed in convenient place and time. This means that certain specific representations of power are performed in a certain specific way in order to secure the continuation of political and ideological legitimacy.

For instance, the rituals of the Roman nobility (*nobilis*) gives some sense of the omnipresence of the spectacle as a way of articulating the structure of civic bonds in the Roman state (Feldherr 1998, 13); while the *nobilis* arrived at the center of power, they were visible to the common people and hence acknowledged as *gravis auctoritas*. In this sense, spectacles served as an idiom of social experimentation, in which utopian fantasies are performed and collective desires for a better life are expressed (Bristol 1985, 52). In this sense, the audience strengthens their belief in the system while the actors of such spectacle re-claim their right for power.

Moreover, such aesthetization of power also provides an enemy against which the society can define itself. It sharpens and refines the image of the outsider, giving unwanted features to the enemies while promoting the ideal type (see Mosse 1999, 45–53). Likewise, the visual aspects of political and ideological power provide more intense and influential way of strengthening legitimacy. It is exactly the visual aspect of worship that creates power, as it makes the worshipped more appealing. Where man sees another worshiped, he supposes him powerful and is more likely to obey him, which makes his power even greater (Hobbes 1958, 282). Powerful leaders thus always exercise power through visual actions since such exercise makes them even more powerful. The subject of such power actively reduces the sovereign presence to the object of his gaze – to a spectacle – in order to define his own presence against it. In this sense, the actor’s visible presence is an effect of the power the subject already possesses. (Pye 1984, 104)

3.2.2 History as a Deliberate Narrative

In the context of power – and in the realm of ideological power especially – histories and the narratives that combine into a consistent historical line can be severely altered or revised, as already implied. Moreover, the events themselves that create certain narratives are hardly equal; certain unwanted events are simply “forgotten” while otherwise trivial ones are promoted. In the mentioned sense, such narratives are judged to be subjective and indeed ideological. At the same time, history (as a chain of narratives) becomes subjective and ideological as well, since it is the ideological and political motives that actually “decide” which events are narrated.

However, before entering deeper into the realm of narrative, it is necessary to take a closer look at the concept itself. The Latin word *narratio* first surfaced on the stage as a technical term denoting the part of an oration immediately following the statement or argument. The Latin word translated from the Greek *diegesis*, digest or the summary of the facts or events, narration differed from *muthos* (Aristotle’s plot or fable) and *logos* (statement). During Cicero’s era, *narratio* was extended to describe pleasant, artful, or inventive storytelling. (Swearingen 1990, 173–197) After converging into English *narration*, the word still referred to the technical rhetorical term, not to topical telling, an integration of rhetorical and historical narrative.

While histories are necessarily influenced by the dominant ideologies, it can be difficult to make a difference between factual and manufactured narratives. This is a question of the artistic elements of realistic historiography, and moreover, how well historical representation correspond with realistic representation. Hence, artistic elements necessarily influence the narration, making history far from being purely realistic. To be sure, this approach also challenges the usual tactic of setting the historical over the mythical. Thus, history is far from being genuinely empirical, as much as myth is never entirely conceptual; in fact, they often merge into a one single conception of history. From this perspective, historical works are verbal structures in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past structures and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them. (See White 1973, 2–3)

In this sense, every ideology is attended by specific idea of history, that is, every ideology has a historical thinking of its own. Accordingly, every idea of history is attended by specifically determinable ideological implications. In a more specific sense, every history has layers that include contributions of past writers; since every writer and narrator is a subjective agent and makes his own interpretations in each period of time, thus history becomes an ideologically laminated construction. Likewise, the “original” narratives escape further into the past as new layers are interpreted. Such layers are also responsible for ideological interpretations of the past as well the aspirations for the future. Historical and ideological thinking thus operate together, and determine the desirability and optimum pace of change, suggesting temporal location of the utopian ideals of basic ideological positions (See *ibid*, 22–29). Ideologies claim

the authority of science and realism, but never succeed in their aims to realize the utopia (Mannheim 1976, 175); they only claim to have the solution to the final, majestic question of human existence.

Having said this, temporal utopias (or ideological interpretations of history) have to be seen as mere models for ideologies, not as ideals or as the myth of eternal return that determines the present world of social praxis. Ideologically influenced historical texts are thus utopian interpretations of some specific time/space context. If ideological and historical thinking operate together and thus manipulate our understanding of the history itself, historical thinking becomes a narrative in the sense of past experience, while ideological thinking is a tool in interpreting that narrative. Human beings, then, participate in history both as actors and as narrators. History means both the facts of the matter and narrative of those facts, both “what happened” and “what is said to have happened” (see Trouillot 1995). History can be seen as something that has to be re-enacted in the subject’s own mind, that is, history is a re-enactment of a person’s past experiences, and because of this, historian has to rely on the relics or documents left behind by the historical (and thus ideological) actors (see Collingwood 1948, 282). Using these kinds of documents implies hierarchy and hierarchy implies inequality of things. Hence, the meaningful narration that determines the historical “facts” has been delivered within the privileged space of *temenos*, “a piece of land set apart,” a history of the victorious.

In this sense, also histories and the whole tradition of historiography is no more than ideological *temenos*. It is only the chosen actors that will be remembered through narrations, since they are the ones who deliver the meaningful stories. Hence, such stories provide a format into which experienced events can be cast in the attempt to make them comprehensible, memorable, and shareable (Olson 1990, 100–101). And in doing so, narratives, in fact, have to be seen not only as devices for storing information for re-use, but as forms of thought, as devices for interpreting experience and informing action. Such stories, moreover, leave no room for speculations. As already suggested; revolutionary action is a romantic adventure where a hero challenges an enemy. Romance is thus also a myth, where the attributes of divinity will cling to the hero and the enemy will take on demonic mythical qualities; however, despite being a myth, the act itself takes place in *our* world (see Frye 1973, 187) and can thus be considered as an ideological myth-play that has a clear political connotation. The logic behind such a myth is very simple: the good invariably overcomes the evil. In a traditional sense, narrative logic suggests that one thing leads to one and the only one other, the second to a third and so on to the finale. The logic of narratives thus requires that one alternative has to be chosen at the expense of the others, and depending on the prevailing ideology, this alternative is either “good” or “bad”; in this sense, the narrative possesses various future times from which one is chosen due to plausibility (or desirability) (see Chatman 1978, 56–57). Several bifurcations of time exist simultaneously in history, and one is emphasized over the others because it serves the ideological needs.

Narratives, especially the dominant ones, have to be remembered, otherwise they are mere events; as events are historical facts that have no deeper meaning, narratives, especially the grand ones, have a known myth-play built inside into them. To a great extent, such remembrance is achieved through visualization of the narrative. This was especially relevant in Rome, where the link between performing public actions and recording them included not only literary history but visual representations of *res gestae*, a representation of the glorification of the emperor. Hence, as means of preserving the memory of events – a *monumentum* – written history could be classed together with the paintings, statues, and dedications that created a visible record of a military victory or other great deed (Feldherr 1998, 21–22). Similarly, funerals were aimed at providing a great display of family status and a re-enactment of the values of society. Romans believed that by emphasizing family tradition and continuity the loss would have been put in proportion and the status of the family re-asserted. (Beacham 1999, 19) The greatness of the deceased was emphasized as statues were erected. Moreover, if worthy, the name of the deceased was included in the Hall of Fame; hence, the acknowledged person was not only canonized but also placed in a pantheon beside his ancestors.

As such, grand narratives require a form of monumentalism, combining nationalism and aesthetics. As the original idea of aesthetics tended to praise simplicity and classical style, the so-called new politics mixed the classical with the monumental. Erecting the monument was thus an integral part of the growth of nationalism in the age of mass movements, when masses of the population were drawn into the agitation for national unity (Mosse 1975, 31). National monuments formed one of the most essential aspects of the self-representation of the nation, penetrating and perhaps even transforming people's consciousness. Moreover, they served as a cement of the society, as they represented the new order, the politics of spectacle, and the aesthetic dimension of politics in which all could join. Through aesthetic representations, the new movements could organize the masses, turning a chaotic crowd into a mass movement (Ibid, 211); hence they used visualization of ideology as a form of propaganda, signaling power.

4 ACT III: THE MAO-CANON

In Moscow in 1957, Mao delivered a speech where he suggested that there are Marxists of different degrees: those who are 100, 90, 80, 70, 60, 50 percent Marxist. Some might be only 10 or 20 percent Marxist, according to Mao. Then in 1959, Mao went as far as to throw doubt on the possibility that he could be regarded as a “100 percent Marxist” by saying that he had not mastered all the domains of Marxist learning. (Knight 1986, 7)

Having said this, Mao actually admits that being a Marxist does not require 100 percent following of the teachings of Karl Marx. Marxism is not a dogma nor is it totally abiding. On the contrary, Marxism is an ideology that is constantly developing and changing, although the basic premises and elements remain the same. The sharing of these premises maintains ideological identity among those who are called Marxists. This, furthermore, suggests that such pragmatic reading of Marxism actually disintegrates rather than enriches or deepens the Marxist ideology (See Schwartz 1979, 202).

From this particular perspective, Maoism seems a somewhat peculiar ideological construction; as the basic theoretical reference behind Mao’s thought is undeniably Marxism, it would mean that the language used as well as the actions promoted are Marxist in this context as well. Also the premises that ensure the Marxist identity – such as the Hegelian-Marxist faith in a redemptive historic process – would have to be acknowledged as universal in a tight sense and thus considered to be inevitable part of Maoism. Consequently, Mao would have to be considered as an unswerving Marxist and a monolithic Leninist who by combining these two isms created an ideology we recognize as Maoism.

If such an exercise of applying and developing an ideology while staying loyal to the original identity is possible, then Maoism is open to similar process as well. It is through the universality that the particularities are developed, that is, Marxist premises are constantly found truthful through applying them in historical situations. At the same time, the particularities develop the “father ideology” by providing useful and successfully tested applications. Logically, of course, no “son” can claim the throne while these circumstances prevail; no ideological usurpation can be conducted unless the father is emulated, and the son is judged to be the new ruler.

In the specific context of Maoism, the kind of emulation mentioned never actually took place. Yet Mao claimed his place as a source of ideological wisdom that reached a status of a canon; by the 1950s Maoism was considered absolutely immutable and a universally valid truth (Schram 1969, 9). Here it must be stressed that Mao did not construct the Maoist ideology to be majestic in the sense of theoretical substance as will be shown in this chapter. Rather, he aimed at the correct application of the Marxist canon. While canon in ideological sense can be defined as something that possesses power and influence over its advocates, it also acts as a guideline for ideological action and language. Thus, it can be argued that Mao actually affirmed the status and the premises of Marxism by using them as a way to discuss the problems within China; Mao thus used Marxism to make relevant ideological “announcements.” Accordingly, canonization is a process where certain ideas and arguments form a coherent, attractive ideological construction; canon can in this sense only exist if it is used to justify certain ideological and political actions.

Hence, canon provides legitimacy to justify ideological actions. Although theories as such are incapable of justifying political or ideological actions as they necessarily need someone to articulate the theoretical formulas into persuasive words, canon does provide certainty and stability concerning social reality. For instance, the Bible provides its believers with a basis for faith in the existence of God, yet the believers do not necessarily need to concur with every detail described in the book itself. Similarly, Marxism provides the basic premises while giving the possibility to interpret the implications of the canon further through applying it according to specific ideological needs.

However, in a strictly Marxist context, the overall evaluation of one’s *Marxishness* is subjective and cannot be regarded simply as skill at quoting Marx in politically adequate way. Nevertheless, the ideological identity can be maintained by claiming that the specific reading of particular historical situations are Marxist; thus, being a Marxist does not necessarily refer to mastering all the domains of Marxist learning but to a claim that the actions are deduced from the basic premises of Marxism. For instance, Mao is said to have converted into Marxism around early 1920s after reading the Chinese version of the *Die kommunistische Manifest* as well as texts of a few other Marxist authors, including Kautsky and Kirkup (Snow 1973, 165). Thus, it seems quite impossible for anyone to master a huge variety of theories and texts that have been produced under the name of Marxism before being “allowed” to be a Marxist in this sense. Accordingly, correctness or orthodoxy of different interpretations is indeed impossible to detect, since different versions of Marxism arguably have different points which they emphasize. Following this logic, the one making the assessment of ideological pureness is also the one defining the pure ideology itself; in this particular case, Mao for instance is referring to his own perspective of Marxism, thus criticizing other interpretations – at least implicitly – as well. It is through Mao’s own life and experiences that the Maoist version of Marxism is *lived* and *experienced*.

Hence, it is an imperative to study Mao's conception of Marxism as a product of personal experience that is merged with the ideological "paradigms" that Mao sees as fundamentally Marxist; such paradigms are, for instance, the theory of contradiction and the concept of war. Consequently, it is more plausible to argue that developing or re-interpreting existing Marxism is the key in defining whether or not someone is truly ideological in this particular sense. However, rather than just executing practical applications, providing new ideas acts as the main criteria for the creation of new version of Marxism. In other words, while the application of the basic premises remains the valid condition for *Marxist* ideological orientation towards specific historical situations, the formulation of particular new ideas *from* the basic premises qualifies as the criteria for the formation of a developed version of Marxism itself. In this specific context, Maoism can actually be regarded as an extension of Marxism and more importantly, Mao can be imported as a theoretical figure in the category of Marxist thinkers.

Similarly, while Mao did not regard himself as a complete Marxist, understanding Maoism still requires domestication of Mao's theoretical constructions and their relation to the original texts; thus re-definition and re-interpretation of the originals becomes a species of ethical discourse, where new ideas act as an implicit critique towards the old theories. Hence being a Marxist is a process of constant debate with the prevailing current through the basic premises.

However, being a Marxist does not necessarily require systematic mastering of Marx and Hegel, although the basic premises remain as the source of ideological action. In this sense, some of Mao's conceptions can be traced back to Marx while most of them are merely used to justify revolutionary action. Thus, too much emphasis on ideological orthodoxy can be misleading, since the dogmatic aspects of Maoism were not Marxist in a traditional sense; the jargon used by Mao Zedong resembled Marxism but the very essence of the theories behind the ideology were of different origin. For instance, Marx's analysis in *Das Kapital* from 1867 focuses primarily on the structural contradictions, rather than on class antagonisms, that characterize capitalist society; the contradictory movement (*gegensätzliche Bewegung*) has its origin in the twofold character of labor, rather than in the struggle between labor and capital, or rather between the owning and the working classes. These contradictions, moreover, operate (as Marx describes using a phrase borrowed from Hegel) "behind the backs" of the both capitalists and workers, that is, as a result of their activities, and yet irreducible to their conscious awareness either as individuals or as classes. Hence, the fact that Mao was not a traditional Marxist – as seen from a Western perspective – can be partly explained through Mao's philosophical background. While a traditional Marxist would in this particular case have to be a student of Hegel and perhaps even Kant (like Lenin), it is impossible to fit Mao into this category. This also starts to make sense with Mao's "need" to create a purely Chinese version of Marxism which resulted in several differences between the original theory and the Maoist interpretation of it.

Stuart Schram (1969, 169) claims that Mao was mediocre as a strictly Marxist philosopher; as a systematic thinker dealing with problems on a high level of abstraction in terms of Marxist categories Mao never excelled. This seems logical if Mao is studied through Marx. Likewise, academic standards of the theoretical texts that Mao produced are hopelessly average. Despite the argumentative weaknesses, however, certain references to the original texts and the “Great Political Theories” are made in the texts as Mao used Marx, Lenin and even Hegel to justify his argumentation. In this sense, Mao was not discussing the theoretical aspects of Marxism nor was he producing an academically bullet-proof study. On the contrary, Mao merely used Marxism to debate the needs of the current Chinese politics with the aim of exposing the problems that Mao saw relevant. In this sense, Maoism was a *way* of using and transforming the concepts of Marxism for certain specific political purposes. It was an instrument to add weight to otherwise weak reasoning in terms of political influence. Thus, the emergence of Maoism signaled the need to change the ideological agenda from theoretical Marxism into a flexible and more pragmatic interpretation.

Hence, Marxist premises were altered to meet Mao’s understanding of them. At the same time, Mao adopted the parts of Marxism that could be conveniently used in the Chinese political context. Since the condition for emerging canon is in re-interpreting and re-defining the original ideas and concepts, we shall now discuss the main concepts that determine Maoist ideological canon and thus the very concept of ideology: contradiction and war.

4.1 The Concept of Contradiction

While Mao uses Marxism as a point of departure in his theoretical works, some concepts, like 矛盾 (*maodun*, “contradiction”), are used in a way alien from traditional Marxist point of view. In Mao’s interpretation of Marxism contradiction is the key term as well as the very kernel of his entire philosophy, which is in turn the foundation of his entire system of thought and his political and revolutionary activities (Soo 1981, 46). Hence, the very foundation for studying social conditions is drastically different in Maoism than it is in Marxism; Mao focuses primarily on the development of ideas rather than materialistic conditions in the society thus omitting the fundamental idea of *gegenätzliche Bewegung* Marx described in *Das Kapital*.

Although *On Contradiction* (Mao Xuan, 274; SWI, 311) starts with a quotation from Lenin – “Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects” – and the whole study focuses heavily on “Leninist” interpretation of Marxism, the idea of the essay seems to be in giving new ideas on the subject rather than just re-stating what Lenin said. In fact, one might argue that the whole text is written to prove that Mao actually not only understood the basics of Marxism fully, but moreover, that he

was able to develop and re-define the ideology to meet the standards of the Chinese communist movement. Likewise, it seems that Mao merely used Lenin's practical definition of dialectics as the basic premise for studying the concept of contradiction rather than accepted Leninism as a point of departure as such.

Mao thus starts the analysis of contradiction from the Russian interpretation of Marxism and develops it to fit the problems of the Chinese society. While the basic tenet of Maoism is "the principle of contradiction" (矛盾律, *maodun lü*), the Maoist theory of contradiction itself was something of a hybrid between the Western and Chinese philosophical traditions. Hence, the principle of contradiction was as much influenced by Mao's understanding of the Soviet interpretation of Marxism as it was by the wide knowledge of the Chinese classics, literature, and history that Mao himself said influenced his philosophical understanding (see Snow 1973, 140-141). Consequently, Mao's understanding of contradictions was actually formed and developed dialectically itself, that is, it was not based on systematic exploitation of specific philosophic tradition; with different emphases during different phases of its development, the very basis of the principle of contradiction cannot be interpreted or explained by a quantitative calculation of what percentage of each element - Marxist or Chinese - is contained in Maoism. (Soo 1981, 132)

While the question of intellectual influence over Mao's understanding of the concept of contradictions seems problematic, it has to be noted that Mao provides no systematic treatment of contradiction as a term nor does he ever give it a clear-cut philosophical definition (*ibid*, 52). However, it is possible to give a basic definition for the concept Mao used at least on one occasion in this specific sense: the characters 矛 and 盾 refer to "spear" and "shield," the former used for attack and the latter for defense. Deriving from a traditional Chinese story¹, the concept of *maodun* bares thus the meaning of "mutually opposed" and "logically incompatible." Nonetheless, although both concepts are mutually incompatible, one cannot exist without the existence of the other. Similar echoes can be seen in Mao's handling of what is contradictory:

“古代战争，用矛用盾；矛是进攻的，为了消灭敌人；盾是防御的，为了保存自己。”
(*gudai zhanzheng, yong mao yong dun; mao shi jingongde, weile xiaomie diren; dun shi fangyude, weile baocun ziji*; "In ancient warfare, the spear and the shield were used, the spear to attack and destroy the enemy, and the shield to defend and preserve oneself." (*Mao Xuan*, 448; SWII, 156)

As the previous quotation explicitly reveals, Mao does not share the Marxist usage of the concept of contradiction where the emphasis is on materialism rather than abstract ideas. It is also noteworthy that Mao sees war as an

¹ The Chinese story (by Han Feizi) goes like this: a man boasts that he can make spears which penetrate anything, while at the same time he can supply shields which nothing can pierce. In the story, the man later confronts the question of "what happens when your shield and your spear meet." As the man is unable to answer, his claim is found to be "logically incompatible." (Soo 1981, 52)

inseparable part of his interpretation of Marxism which further suggests that Maoism was based on very pragmatic and flexible usage of the Marxist premises. Likewise, Mao seems to have inverted the ontological assumptions of Marxism by delineating a distinction between thought and matter; in this sense, the material preconditions for the emergence of a particular form of consciousness need not necessarily exist, for consciousness was not dependent on a particular material environment (Knight 1990, 10).

Although the whole idea of contradiction changed during Mao's life, the very foundation of its origins in a somewhat systematic form can be spotted in *On Contradiction*. Regardless of the original appearance and possible revisions forced upon the text, this study deals with the essay as the most important document to explain the complexities of this particular phenomenon in Maoism. While *On Contradiction* was originally written in 1937 and later published in 1952, the translated Russian material Mao had been using as an aid to produce the text had already been deemed as obsolete in the Soviet Union by the late 1930s; yet the text was circulated as such suggesting that Mao knew it was out of harmony with the Soviet ideological line (Schram 1969, 89). This implies aspirations towards canonization of Maoist interpretation at the expense of the Soviet interpretation. Likewise, the 1952 version of *On Contradiction* includes slight changes in usage of certain terms if contrasted with the original 1937 version that has been analyzed by Nick Knight (see 1980, 641–668): for instance, on some occasions Mao uses 冤家 (*yuanjia*, “enemy” or “opponent”; the connotation of the word includes interaction with the counterpart) to indicate contradictions in the original version; in the official version, however, the term has been throughout replaced by 矛盾. Nonetheless, the original text affirms that Mao did not borrow his theory of contradiction from Stalin's 1950s texts but produced it, at least supposedly, independently without much Soviet influence. As the ideology called Maoism is represented and systematized in *Mao Xuan*, which in turn includes the version from 1952, it will be used as the main source of analysis and its version of *On Contradiction* is considered official. Moreover, as already maintained, the text itself acts as a vehicle of ideological canonization, as it re-interprets and re-defines Marxist ideological canon.

4.1.1 Basic Ideas Behind Mao's Theory of Contradiction

Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 275–279; SWI, 311–314) starts his study on contradictions by differentiating two “world outlooks” (宇宙观, *yu zhouguan*) that are necessary when observing the law of development: the metaphysical conception (形而上学的见解, *xinger shangxuede jianjie*) and the dialectical conception (辩证法见解, *bianzhengfa jianjie*). This distinction is again justified with a quotation from Lenin's commentary on Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*, although the passage itself deals with the conception of development or evolution rather than directly affirms Mao's position regarding metaphysics and dialectics.

Notwithstanding the peculiarities in the mentioned reference, Mao maintains that the metaphysical world outlook actually holds that all things in the universe and all their characteristics have been the same ever since they came into being. Hence, metaphysics itself produces only quantitative changes because it sees things as isolated, static and one-sided. According to this dualism, Mao seems to juxtapose Lenin's concept of "repetition" - that is, simple increases and decreases that occur quantitatively - with metaphysical development, which is something external rather than internal; thus, the cause of increase or decrease (of quantity) is not inside things but outside them, meaning that the motive force of such development is external as well. Mao actually proposes that the metaphysical world outlook holds all things in the universe and their characteristics as static and never-changing. This, in principle, suggests that the development of the metaphysical world outlook only reflects quantity and space, that is, only external relations change while internal, immaterial and even abstract ideas stay stagnant. Thus the idea of metaphysics represents, at least implicitly, the traditional Chinese conception of history where things do not develop themselves but merely follow each other cyclically (see Schwartz 1985, 354). Moreover, Maoism concurs with the Marxist conception of contradiction on this matter; while Marxism rejects logical contradictions in thinking, it also condemns the narrowness of metaphysical thought with its scheme that only put things in an "either-or" -category (Schaff 1960, 242).

In a more intense analysis, Mao's conception of external and internal causes of development is actually quite logical and non-surprising. While Marx dealt mostly with materialistic - and hence metaphysical - conceptions and laws of development, Mao focused on the evolution of ideas; when internal (or dialectical) conditions for development are realized and correctly domesticated, external conditions become irrelevant or they become secondary causes of change. In other words, external factors such as geography, climate, social or industrial conditions do not reflect the potential for development in the society as the development of things is in their internal and necessary self-movement, not in their *mere* appearance. This, moreover, raises a question of to what extent Mao actually was familiar with Karl Marx's writings. Rather than being a Marxist in this specific sense, Mao seems to criticize the traditional Chinese conception of development where change is a continuous, integral, cyclical movement, which always returns to its starting point. Since cyclical movement always returns to the starting point, it does not imply the idea of exalting the new at the expense of the old, or the future at the expense of the past. This kind of conception quite clearly was very much incompatible with Mao's own conception of change that promoted the idea of revolution and thus a shift from "old" to "new." For instance, concerning the changes within society, Mao argues:

“社会的变化，主要地是由于社会内部矛盾的发展，即生产力和生产关系的矛盾，阶级之间的矛盾，新旧之间的矛盾，由于这些矛盾的发展，推动了社会的前进，推动了新旧社会的代谢。” (*shehuide bianhua, zhuyao di shi youyu shehui neibu maodunde fazhan, ji shengchan wei he shengchan guanxide maodun, jieji zhi jiande maodun, xin jiu zhi jiande*

maodun, youyu zhexie maodunde fazhan, tuidongle shehui de qianjin, tuidongle xin jiu shehui de daixie; "Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in society, that is, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between classes and the contradiction between the old and the new." (Mao Xuan, 277; SW I, 314)

It must be noted that this passage, in principle, is in no way contradictory with the traditional interpretation of Marxism. On the contrary, the general mechanism of development of the social formation in classical Marxism is indeed the contradiction between the forces and relations of production; the development is thus considered as "transhistorical constant" which makes historical progress possible (Healy 1997, 122–123). However, what Mao actually seems to argue here is that the quantitative conditions are not necessarily relevant in society's development as social development is due chiefly not to external but to internal causes. Of course, the internal contradictions in this specific context are a bit difficult to determine. If the relations of production are indeed an internal contradiction, it should not include purely materialistic dilemmas such as quantity of production. Rather, internal contradictions should focus on the question of quality and explanation of such differences in appearances of things.

Likewise, the whole concept of development is categorized as two different schemas in Mao's analysis. For instance, while geographic and climate-related changes take place over tens of thousands of years according to Mao, social changes manifest themselves in thousands, hundreds and tens of years. Although this perspective is somewhat evolutionary, Mao does not strictly promote the idea of social evolutionism but deals implicitly with this conception as external, that is, social changes are something that can be influenced by correct ideological action if the internal contradictions of things are correctly studied. In this sense, Mao's reading of Marxist dialectics does not posit a simple dialectic which moves through a series of negations of its essence nor does it confirm any ideal essence existing prior to and/or outside of society (Levy 1997, 157). Rather, Mao's study of contradictions starts by analyzing already existing social problems that reveal themselves through correct reading of the Marxist premises.

Hence, Mao sees understanding of the internal causes of contradiction as a vehicle to resolve the problem of social development and political, economic and cultural issues concerning history and society. Having taken this as the starting point, internal causes become the ones that are capable of determining the external causes as well. Thus, while external causes of contradiction only reflect themselves through mechanical motion and changes in quantity, the internal causes of contradiction actually explain why and how the same kind of motion can produce things that differ qualitatively. At the same time, external conditions in societies are explained and the external causes become operative through the internal causes. For instance, in the transition from socialism to communism, when classes presumably face the brink of final extinction, there will still be certain difficulties with groups who are content with the existing order and are thus unwilling to change it (Healy 1997, 137); such groups are still

subject to external causes of contradiction as they do not reflect the idea of internal causes of contradiction adequately. They “hang on” to the materialistic needs.

Although internal causes of contradiction are the ones that truly liberate “things” in terms of political struggle, quantitative change leads to qualitative change. In other words, even after all class conflict has been eliminated, contradictions will continue to arise between the productive forces and the relations of production. In this sense, the universe is in ceaseless and perpetual flux, where the development of the productive forces inevitably creates new contradictions which in turn will engender contradictions between the members of the society. These contradictions – as a process of the development of thought – will be resolved by an endless series of qualitative changes, so that there will be an infinite number of revolutions, even after communism is fully established. (Schram 1969, 100) Once more, this idea is not alien to the traditional Marxist understanding of contradictions; the source of all movement and thus change is the struggle of internal opposites proper for every thing and every phenomenon. More than that, in this specific sense, any thing and any phenomenon is contradictory as containing internal opposites (Schaff 1960, 250), that is, internal causes of contradiction in Mao’s terms.

This method of dealing with contradictions also suggests further implications on the concept of society and the level of its development. Not only does it suggest that when the old society ends and the new society begins, the process of the development of contradiction does not disappear; furthermore, as the new society contains new contradictions which should be resolved in their turn, so too does the process of development of social contradiction continue as long as the society exists (Soo 1981, 56). While the mechanical motion and external causes of contradiction are the same in different types of societies (capitalist, socialist, etc.), the internal causes are the ones determining how advanced the society actually is. In other words, materialistic quantity does not produce a significant advantage over a dialectical world outlook although it remains unclear why the metaphysical world has produced seemingly more “quantity”. Mao typically exemplifies this through military terms:

“两军相争，一胜一败，所以胜败，皆决于内因。胜者或因其强，或因其指挥无误，败者或因其弱，或因其指挥失宜，外因通过内因而引起作用。” (*liang jun xiang zheng, yisheng yibai, suoyi sheng bai, jie jue yu neiyin. shengzhe huo yin qi qiang, huo yin qi zhi hui wu wu, bai zhe huo yin qi ruo, huo yin qi zhi hui shi yi, waiyin tongguo neiyin er yinqi zuoyong*; “In battle, one army is victorious and the other is defeated; both the victory and the defeat are determined by internal causes. The one is victorious either because it is strong or because of its competent generalship, the other is vanquished either because it is weak or because of its incompetent generalship; it is through internal causes that external causes become operative.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 278; SW I, 314)

It is noteworthy that Mao is not making a quantitative reference when using the concepts of “strong” and “weak.” Rather, he implicitly deals with the qualities of the leader in battle and thus suggests that understanding the internal causes in war also makes the quantitative causes operative. Accordingly, a competent

leader with a relatively small military force can defeat a much bigger unit by showing strength and competence in the heat of the battle. The competence of the leader is in understanding the internal causes influencing the battle instead of just counting on the external ones. In this specific usage, Mao's reference can also be seen in terms of a problem and a difficulty; a problem or a difficulty presents a situation or event where different sides or groups are not in harmony, and thus interact for and against, with and among, one another (Soo 1981, 54). This, furthermore, qualifies as a methodology of "announcements." Just as in battle, in the field of politics, a political party has to depend on the correctness of its political line; otherwise it fails in leading the revolution to victory, according to Mao.

While Mao's conception of external and internal causes of contradiction is specified as "dialectical" rather than "metaphysical" since the whole construction deals with change that occur internally, there is an inseparable link between materialistic and non-materialistic world, that is, immaterial qualities are necessarily reflected through material things. For instance, although a military leader trusts his skills in strategy and sometimes even mere intuition, his excellence is manifest in his army and in its capability to win battles. Hence, the result of the internal causes of contradiction can be – indirectly if not directly – measured quantitatively; the overall casualties on both sides would thus determine the victory. Accordingly, social changes occur by applying the understanding of the internal causes of contradiction in reality that in turn alter the materialistic conditions. In this sense, especially in contrast to Stalin, for instance, Mao did not promote a kind of fetishism of technology that would ensure the victory: Mao emphasized struggle rather than rationality, and mass action rather than technical advancement (Schram 1969, 119).

In this specific context of social and political development, internal causes are also the motives altering the reality to such an extent that revolution can be executed. As already argued, revolution and revolutionary action arises from the need to resist the *ancien régime*. Moreover, as revolution is defined through "expectation" rather than "experience," it is also a negation to the present and the past; being something "expected," revolution is also drastically dialectical as it focuses on changing the society internally rather than externally. As such, it combines experience and expectation, since no expectations can exist without experiences (see Koselleck 1985, 269–270), just as no opposites can "solve" their contradictory nature. Thus, revolution actually reacts to the external causes that are existent in the society rather than re-defines the conditions for the change. Accordingly, Mao points out:

“唯物辩证法是否排除外部的原因呢？并不排除。唯物辩证法认为外因是变化的条件，内因是变化的根据，外因通过内因而起作用。”(*weiwu bianzhengfa shi fou paichu waibude yuanyin ne? bingbu paichu. weiwu bianzhengfa renwei waiyin shi bianhuade tiaojian, neiyin shi bianhuade genju, waiyin tongguo neiyin er qi zuoyong*; “Does materialist dialectics exclude external causes? Not at all. It holds that external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and that external causes become operative through internal causes”). (Mao Xuan, 277; SW I, 314)

Hence, Mao suggests that external causes remain stagnant unless made “operative” through understanding of the internal causes just like a good leader makes his army operative in the way mentioned above. If external causes are taken as an axiom, the defeat is inevitable. However, this generates problems if contrasted with Mao’s handling of thought – as a developing sum of internal and external contradictions, that is, ideological construction of experienced premises of Marxism – as he insists that no ontological distinction can be made between matter and thought. Mao thus seems to maintain that thought is a particular form of matter which is constantly in motion (see Knight 1990, 26); thought is movement that absorbs experiences and consumes expectations. In this sense, understanding internal contradictions significantly and inevitably develops thought while mere quantitative dealing with reality fails in producing movement that develops thought. Likewise, thought itself is a contradictory process where the principle of the unity and the conflict of opposites is the central thesis as it aims at clarifying the source of movement and development, as well as their mechanism (Schaff 1960, 243–244). For Mao, such conflicts of opposites constitute the central thesis above all else.

Similar echoes can be found in the development of societies on a larger scale. Social changes can be forced with revolutionary action in just a few years or even months. This implies that every stage of history is a potential arena for political revolution. However, Mao does not maintain this perspective when discussing the development of a dialectical world outlook; in fact, he deals with dialectics as a developing system that is continually becoming more perfect theoretically. Hence, ancient dialectics were “spontaneous” (自发的, *zifade*) – which is opposed to “rational” (合理的, *helide*) – in character according to Mao, as the social and historical conditions prevailing could not provide full understanding of the world. Rather than acting as a systematic system, ancient dialectics were supplanted by metaphysical aspects.

This, in the context of the contra-evolutionary perspective that Mao implicitly maintains, is a challenging intellectual construction if studied through the overall conception of contradiction. According to Mao, the relation of the internal and external causes of contradiction determines the changes occurring within societies. However, the external causes – the sociological infrastructure and quantitatively measured things – were subject to qualitative sublimation. Hence, although structural and external elements do not change as a result of internal contradictions, they change their *basis* of existence as they are dialectically studied. For instance, a product becomes more complete in *essence* although the *appearance* of the product remains the same. Accordingly, dialectical materialism and everything it was applied to becomes an organic entity with superior qualities. Indeed, (economic) development is in this sense a spiral process in which successive increments in material and human resources combine and reinforce one another to produce a continual forward movement (Schram 1974, 31). The idea of a thing itself is thus what changes.

In all, Mao’s conception of contradiction proposes that the dialectical world outlook is a method of observing and analyzing contradictions, and

resolving them as far as they can be solved. As a result of such a process, the overall understanding of external causes of contradiction is mastered and correctly handled. Simultaneously the understanding of social development is made more complete. However, although contradictions prevail universally, they also have certain particular characters that need to be mastered; this is what Mao calls the “universality” and “particularity” of contradiction.

4.1.2 Universality and Particularity of Contradiction

While internal and external causes of contradiction constitute the basic level of Mao’s conception of dialectics, “universality” and “particularity” are the very essence of the theory of contradiction itself. Mao deals with both universality and particularity of contradiction as things that are closely linked; both concepts thus constitute the very kernel of Mao’s theory of dialectic as well as further explain how contradictions themselves influence revolutionary and ideological activities.

However, although closely linked – just like theory and practice – there are some obvious differences in the concepts. Universality in this context is something that is considered to be objective while particularity in its various forms is what proves that the universal laws of contradiction are truthful. Hence, the concept of universality suggests law-like paradigm and constitutes the basis of the simple as well complex forms of motion; universality in this sense is rooted in a reality where all things are dynamically interrelated and interacting (Soo 1981, 54). Universality also forms the basis for a more specific analysis of contradictions. In other words, universality form a structure through which particularity can be observed, verified and studied. Mao defines two ways of dealing with the universality:

“矛盾的普遍性或绝对性这个问题有两方面的意义。其一是说，矛盾存在于一切事物的发展过程中；其二是说，每一事物的发展过程中存在着自始至终的矛盾运动。” (*mao dun de pu bian xing huo jue dui xing zhe ge wen ti you liang fang mian de yi yi. qi yi shi shuo, mao dun cun zai yu yi qie shi wu de fa zhan guo cheng zhong; qi er shi shuo, mei yi shi wu de fa zhang guo cheng zhong cun zai zhe zi shi zhi zhong de mao dun yun dong*; “The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement in opposites exists from beginning to end.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 280; SW I, 316)

Hence, Mao maintains that this type of contradiction, as universal and absolute, determines the processes that take place within all forms of existence – from scientific to social. Again, Mao makes a reference to Lenin’s notions of Hegel to justify his twofold theory; in contrast to Lenin, however, there is no indication of the same kind of concreteness in Mao’s conception of the structure where contradictions occur. Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether Mao actually includes economic relations in his conception. Marxism emphasizes that the productive forces of society are unable to function within the existing (current) relations of production. This in turn causes incompatibility between the productive forces and the relations of productions so that the social mechanism

is unable to function properly, hence the internal causes of contradiction in this sense would suggest a state of incompatibility of the parts of the social mechanism itself (See Schaff 1960, 246). For Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 277; SWI, 314), one can suspect, such material incompatibility does not exist because the development of the society is due to the internal causes of contradiction – including the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of productions – that are developed materially only if contrasted with Mao’s conception of thought as a category of matter in movement. In Mao’s reasoning universal contradictions are continuously manifested, because thought itself is a reflection of objective reality, or more precisely, nature and society which both are full of contradictions (Soo 1981, 56). Hence, as already maintained, thought is considered to be a category of matter.

It is also important to note that Mao sees no universality in purely material things although thought as such is a reflection of material things that are in contradictory movement. In any account, however, reflections of the kind mentioned *cannot* be described except by abstractions. For instance, Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 281; SWI, 317) deals with three examples when indicating the essence of universality: war, development of thought, and the struggle between ideas. In the case of war, offence and defense, advance and retreat, victory and defeat are mutually contradictory phenomena, according to Mao. These concepts constitute the totality of war, impelling the development of war and determining the outcome of military actions. Actual development in the course of war takes place through necessary steps that are contradictory by nature. Thus, the concepts mentioned form a constitution for war, while particular actions are reflected through them. In other words, universality develops and determines the process through which particular contradictions are applied. It is also noteworthy that the concept of “defeat” and “victory” are in this sense universal contradictions as they constitute the totality of war; in other words, victory in battle is not a victory as such but only a *single step* towards development that resolves the universal contradiction of war.

Likewise, in the sphere of development of thought, every difference in concepts should be regarded as reflecting objective contradiction. This means that differences should be dealt with the terms of universality, that is, resolving them should actually be executed through the usage of universal concepts that are consistent with the universality of contradiction. Following such an exercise, the objective contradictions are reflected in subjective thought. The movement (or actual development) thus is constituted in opposites of concepts, impelling the development of thought, solving the problems that arise in man’s thinking.

Finally, the struggle between ideas is a similar process of resolving contradictions. In this context, however, the reflections of ideas are ideological. The existence of contradictions is universal as they necessarily arise in all processes. Consequently, new processes create new forms of contradictions. To the question of what is the emergence of a new process, Mao gives the following answer:

“这是旧的统一和组成此统一的对立成份让位于性新的统一和组成此统一的对立成份，于是新过程就代替旧过程而发生。旧过程完结了，新过程发生了。新过程又包含着新矛盾，开始它自己的矛盾发展史。” (*zhe shi jiu de tong yi he zu cheng ci tong yi de dui li chengfen rang wei yu xin de tong yi he zu cheng ci tong yi de dui li chengfen, yu shi xin guo cheng jiu dai ti jiu guo cheng er fa sheng. jiu guo cheng wan jie le, xin guo cheng fa sheng le. xin guo cheng you bao han zhao xin mao dun, kai shi ta zi ji de mao dun fa zhan shi*; “The old unity with its constituent opposites yields to a new unity with its constituent opposites, whereupon a new process emerges to replace the old. The old process ends and the new one begin. The new process contains new contradictions and begins its own history of the development of contradictions”.) (*Mao Xuan*, 282; SW I, 318)

As the previous quotation suggests, contradictions are always universal in the sense that they exist in all processes of the development of things regardless of the current stage of development. The cause of the new contradictions is unclear, however; if the old process is completed, thus forming a “synthesis” (or *Aufhebung*) in a Hegelian sense, it should actually be a part of a larger process and thus incomplete. From this perspective, it seems that Mao deals with a series of contingent, independent processes rather than promotes the idea of continuous and chain-like development. Nonetheless, every contradiction can be identified through the particularity. Particularity, as a reflection of objective reality, is concrete and definite. The particularity refers to the concrete and unique characteristics of a contradiction, the essence or nature of a contradiction; this means that each contradiction is qualitatively different from others (Soo 1981, 58–61), and because of this, they can also be prioritized according to their particular nature. This is an interesting notion, of course, since in traditional Marxism movement, especially mechanical movement, is an objective contradiction (Schaff 1960, 246); it works “behind the backs” independently. In Maoism, however, being prioritized, contradictions of lesser importance inevitably are put to a halt until the primary contradiction is solved. For instance, Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 295–301; SWI, 331–337) argues that one of the contradictions – out of necessity – must be “the principal contradiction” (主要的矛盾, *zhuyao de maodun*) while the rest occupy a secondary and subordinate position. What Mao suggests here is that the primary contradiction, such as the imperialist aggression launched by Japan, can temporarily unite in a national war against imperialism, although the contradictions between the Chinese continue to exist. Furthermore, the primary contradiction influences the existence and development of the non-principal (secondary, etc.) contradictions (See Soo 1981, 60–61).

Obviously, Mao’s conception has significant space/time implications. Likewise, it suggests remarkable flexibility and pragmatism in terms of ideological actions. If the primary contradiction is taken as a synonym for a political problem or a military campaign, we are referring to a practical solution of such a problem. This in turn suggests that while the primary contradiction can be regarded as canonized and indeed dogmatic – or as a canonized ideological dogma – the practical applications derived from that specific dogma are flexible. In fact, in the political context of the Japanese occupation in China, one could actually suspect tactical retreat from a dogmatic or otherwise too

drastic conception of contradictions on behalf of Mao. This kind of pragmatism can partially be explained by the fact that Mao's interpretation – unlike most of Lenin's or indeed all of Stalin's formulations – had no position as a ruling ideology of a ruling regime at that time. Hence, Mao's "method" of handling processes of contradiction separately is quite understandable and logical. While the universality of contradictions is the basic law concerning motion and development in all things, the particularity of contradictions is necessarily situation and time oriented. Thus, it is spatial and temporal by its very essence, which is affirmed implicitly in *On Contradiction* (See *Mao Xuan*, 274–312; SWI, 311–347) on several occasions; Mao quite often uses historical particularities as an aid to demonstrate contradictions that occur in the Chinese society. Particularity exists in each form of motion of matter and every form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction, its own space/time context. Accordingly, through particularity, one thing can be distinguished from another and because of this they are necessarily concrete in terms of qualitative essence.

Regardless of being spatial and temporal, particularity of contradictions is not born with the process as such: contradictions already *are* present in the very beginning of the new process as the old contradictions create the new one. Because particularities are already present basically means that they are already existent even before they are properly identified. However, it is through the process of identification that the particular contradictions are placed in an ideological context. For instance, while the basic premises of Marxism – such as the idea of class struggle – are universal throughout the whole world, they contain specific particular essence in different political contexts. Mao thus does not deal with Marxism as an ideology *an sich* but as an instrument to reveal ideological problems; in Mao's (*Mao Xuan*, 284; SWI, 320) reasoning, every form of society and every form of ideology has its own particular contradiction and particular essence. Hence, it is through particular contradictions, specifically characteristics of China, that will determine the particular nature of Marxism in China as well. In short, China has its own form of class struggle that is dependent on the specific space/time context. In this sense, understanding particularity is in making distinctions about the character of contradictions rather than discussing whether or not they are present or absent. Thus, the process of development – as well as the process of gaining knowledge of things – starts from the understanding of correct methodology and processes of cognition; the cognitive process advances from the particular to the general and from the general to the particular.

In this sense, Mao proposes that dialectical understanding of things is actually cyclical rather than something that follows directly "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" -formula. Each cycle, if the method is applied correctly, advances human knowledge a step higher. This suggests that the external (materialistic) causes remain more or less the same along the process, while internal causes change according to the altered particular conditions. Only after understanding the internal causes of contradiction can the materialistic modification begin. For

instance, while thought and ideological thinking as such remain as reflections of objective reality and thus materialistic, they can be reflected back upon their original “source” so that they actually alter the *idea* and the very *essence* of that thing. Mao’s notion here, it must be said, is yet again completely in consonance with the traditional Marxian conception of dialectical materialism, in which theoretical thinking acts as a basic element of the social transformation; things are to be studied and theorized in their particular contexts, not in general apart from their historical significance (See Lichtheim 1971, 242). Hence, Mao’s conception of “particular-general-particular” not only suggests that universality is affirmed through the study of particularity, but moreover, that the achieved knowledge of universality has to be applied to concrete things, particularly to context-specific things that emerge as a result of the process.

Although Mao maintains that universal contradictions are naturally and necessary present in every thing in the world, the particularity in each occasion is the key in understanding that universality. This dictates that things that differ qualitatively need to be resolved by methods that are cognitively observed from the particular to the universal. Mao exemplifies such processes with the following passage:

“不同质的矛盾，只有用不同质的方法才能解决。例如，无产阶级和资产阶级的矛盾，用社会主义革命的方法去解决；人民大众和封建制度的矛盾，用民主革命的方法去解决；殖民地和帝国主义的矛盾，用民族革命战争的方法去解决；在社会主义社会中工人阶级和农民阶级的矛盾，用农业集体化和农业机械化的方法去解决；共产党内的矛盾，用批评和自我批评的方法去解决；社会和自然的矛盾，用发展生产力的方法去解决。” (*butong zhide maodun, zhi you yong butong zhide fangfa caineng jiejie. liru, wuchan jieji he zichan jieji de maodun, yong shehui zhuyi gemingde fangfa qu jiejie; renmin dazhong he fengjianzhidude maodun, yong minzhu gemingde fangfa qu jiejie; zhimindi he diguozhuyide maodun, yong minzu geming zhanzhengde fangfa qu jiejie; zai shehui zhuyi shehui zhong gongren jieji he nongmin jieji de maodun, yong nongyejitihua he nongyejixiehuade fangfa qu jiejie; gongchandang neide maodun, yong piping he ziwo pipingde fangfa qu jiejie; shehui he zirande maodun, yong fazhan shengchanlide fangfa qu jiejie;* “Qualitatively different contradictions can only be resolved by qualitatively different methods. For instance, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is resolved by the method of socialist revolution; the contradiction between the great masses of the people and the feudal system is resolved by the method of democratic revolution; the contradiction between the colonies and imperialism is resolved by the method of national revolutionary war; the contradiction between the working class and the peasant class in socialist society is resolved by the method of collectivization and mechanization in agriculture; contradiction within the Communist Party is resolved by the method of criticism and self-criticism; the contradiction between society and nature is resolved by the method of developing the productive forces.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 286; SW I, 321–322)

According to the quotation, Mao seems to maintain that the principle of using different methods to resolve different contradictions is the key in understanding Marxism correctly. Moreover, as each solving of particular contradictions create a new process and new contradictions, contradictions continue to exist universally. Thus, although certain contradictions can be solved and completed, the outcome of the process inevitably creates conditions for a new kind of – particular and previously unknown – contradictions.

Again, Mao’s handling of the process of development depends on dualism: there are major and minor contradictions that are determined or influenced by

fundamental contradictions. While minor contradictions can be partially or temporally resolved, major contradictions usually remain “virulent.” For instance, fundamental contradictions (class-related, for instance) are either completed – in a sense that they develop into a new kind of contradiction – during the process or they are cumulative, that is, they remain existent and get intensified. However, the intensification is *not* due to “necessary self-movement” that was fathered by Hegel and eagerly adopted by Lenin (See Cohen 1968, 16); on the contrary, Mao treats intensification – at least implicitly – as an ideological phenomena, that is, it is actually caused by ideological action. The fundamental contradiction in the process of development and the essence of the process determined by the fundamental contradiction will not disappear until the whole process is completed (See *Mao Xuan*, 289; SWI, 325), that is, unless correct actions develop them. This, moreover, suggests that some contradictions “move” from lower stage to higher as the process intensifies. Accordingly, some fundamental contradictions can only be solved through a series of processes, involving several stages of development.

Although contradictions can actually intensify in the process and follow the different stages of development, they possess different particularities, that is, at each stage intensified contradictions have different qualities. Moreover, different stages of development demand different strategies and – in a more specific sense – different, developed versions of the relevant ideology. Thus, the development of ideology is also a process of consecutive contradictions. Moreover, this kind of dealing with intensified contradictions actually suggests that ideological action somewhat accelerates along the process, the final stage being a state of open conflict, that is, revolution.

Significantly, Mao implicitly also suggests that Marxism develops according to particularities during the process of socialist development. For instance, Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 293–294; SWI, 329–330) argues that Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution; as Lenin and Stalin have correctly explained contradictions that occur during this stage and formulated the theory as well as tactics of the proletarian revolution to solve this specific contradiction, they have also elevated Marxism to a new stage. Likewise, Mao’s conception of “sinified” Marxism would similarly represent a new stage. In other words, the whole process of dialectical development is based on cumulative knowledge that can be achieved through applying practice that in turn is based on the universality.

4.1.3 Knowledge and Practice

While dialectical understanding in a Maoist context is a cognitive process advancing from the particular to the general and from the general to the particular thus advancing ideological knowledge, there are also certain specific elements that need to be mastered in order to fully understand the true essence of Marxism: methodology and the relation between knowledge and practice. To these questions Mao gives answers in *On Practice*.

The version of the text itself used here as the basis for the analysis is the official 1950 version that has been edited for *Mao Xuan*. Just like *On Contradiction*, also the official version differs from the 1937 version as it likewise differs from the first published version from mid-1940s. For instance, in his analysis of the employment of rational knowledge to change the world, Mao argues that action is, in fact, guided by thought which in turn implies that without thought there can be no action; this passage, however, has been totally erased from the official version (See Knight 1980, 653).

Somewhat unlike the concept of dialectics, Mao's conception of gaining theoretical knowledge is a very close relative of the basic tenet of almost any Chinese philosophy. Chinese philosophy, if generalized, treats history and historical method as an indispensable part for obtaining reliable knowledge or truth "...since man is a historical being and is influenced by the development of history." (Wakemann Jr. 1973, 238-239) Practical learning, thus, is not aimed at an absolute understanding of the reality but at an understanding where reality is acknowledged as a process. Rather than scientific, such knowledge is intuitive and a process itself as well, that is, intuitive thinking aim at absorbing whatever is good, regardless of its source. As such, understanding of the truth remains always relative, and because of this, the truth is constantly being enriched through the dynamic process of practical learning. (Soo 1981, 77) In ideological context, it is the action itself that eventually modifies and makes improves the current, the prevailing reality. Practice in this sense is applying Marxist methods correctly according to the relevant particularities, not acting upon predestined ideological guidelines.

As in *On Contradiction*, *On Practice* also seems to act as a form of critique and as a source of handling of knowledge and practice correctly. In this sense, it is a text that guides education since search for knowledge is the prime objective of education (see Hu 1962, 86). Likewise, it puts much emphasis on Marx and Lenin, thus qualifying as a study of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism. More than just re-stating general Marxist theories, however, *On Practice* stresses ideological flexibility by promoting the well-known phrase "Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action" (马克思主义不是教条而是行动的指南, *makesizhuyi bu shi jiaotiaoer shi xingdongde zhinan*) (*Mao Xuan*, 259; SWI, 295). Accordingly, Mao maintains flexibility in choosing proper methods that are dictated by each concrete situation and circumstance; in other words, particularities greatly affect the chosen ideological action. Such dealing with ideological flexibility, however, is not something that has been an integral part of Mao's thinking in all situations. In fact, in 1942 for instance, Mao emphasized the need to create theories - in accordance with China's realities and necessities - instead of merely developing the prevailing Marxist principles a step further (Schram 1969, 174). Once more, this "request" has been completely erased from the later official version which understandably has also been left out from *Mao Xuan*.

Hence, Mao actually suggests that the ultimate function of ideological action is not in studying the theory of Marxism as a universal truth but as a source of ideological innovation. Rather than handling any "ism" as a dogmatic

piece of theoretical construction, Mao implies that it is possible to derive laws which do not have universal status, and which are applicable only to particular instances within a general category. At the same time, Mao is to a certain extent neglecting deductive methodology by omitting the “rationality” of using majestic theories that can be put to any social or historical context. For instance, while the Hegelian philosophy of history and thus the idea of development is based on the conviction that the totality of the world is an ordered whole which the intellect can comprehend and master, Marxian principles, on the other hand, point out that men could free themselves only by overturning the established order (Lichtheim 1964, 35). Similarly, Mao maintains that knowledge cannot be achieved through understanding the order of things but through contradicting them; knowledge moves upward, ascends in contradictory stages. Knowledge is thus not a passive reflection of reality, but a process in which the knowing subject takes an active part, ascending by abstraction from sensations to higher products of knowledge (see Cohen 1968, 9-10). While the basis of knowledge can be universal, that is, it can be represented logically and deduced as universal, the knowledge itself should not be applied to reality *as* universal. In other words, while universal theories – Marxist premises for instance – can form the basis for acquiring knowledge, the acquired knowledge cannot be universally applied to every situation as such. Rather, knowledge comes from the realm of particularity, the realm of induction.

Mao thus promoted inductive knowledge that in turn should be reflected upon the universal principles of Marxism. In this sense, being a Marxist was also a process of acquiring knowledge through applying and even challenging prevailing knowledge. Consequently, there was an ever-present dualism between universal and particular. For instance, the dualism between theoretical and practical can be resolved by acquiring knowledge through social practice. According to Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 259-260; SW I, 295), knowledge depends on activity in material production; this, moreover, suggests a link between knowledge and metaphysics although material production in a Maoist context is not a pure category of manufacturing. Through the understanding of material production it is possible to understand the properties and laws of nature and the relations between man himself and nature. Mao describes the process in the following terms:

马克思主义者认为，只有人们的社会实践，才是人们对于外界认识的真理性的标准。实际的情形这样的，只有在社会实践过程中(物质生产过程中，阶级斗争过程中，科学实验过程中)，人们达到了思想中所预想的结果时，人们的认识才被证实了。人们要想得到工作的胜利即得到预想的结果，一定要使自己的思想合于客观外界的规律性，如果不合，就会在实践中失败。(makesizhuyi zhe renwei, zhi you renmende shehui shijian, cai shi renmen dui yu waijie renshide zhenli xingde biao zhun. shijide qingxing shi zheyangde, zhi you zai shehui shijian guo cheng zhong (wuzhi shengchan guo cheng zhong, jieji douzheng guo cheng zhong, kexue shiyan guo cheng, zhong), renmen dadaole sixiang zhong suo yu xiangde jieguo shi, renmende renshi cai bei zheng shile. renmen yao xiang dedao gongzuode shengli ji dedao yu xiangde jieguo, yiding yao shi zijide sixiang he yu keguan waijiede gui lü xing, ruguo bu he, jiu hui zai shijian zhong shibai; “Marxists hold that man’s social practice alone is the criterion of the truth of his knowledge of the external world. What actually happens is that man’s knowledge is verified only when he achieves the anticipated results in the process of social practice (material

production, class struggle or scientific experiment). If a man wants to succeed in his work, that is, to achieve the anticipated results, he must bring his ideas into correspondence with the laws of the objective external world; if they do not correspond, he will fail in his practice.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 261; SW I, 296–297)

The correspondence between “ideas” and “the laws of the objective external world” is crucially important here. While Mao defines the external as something that can be influenced through the internal, that is, internal factors (ideas in this specific sense) make external factors operative, the external world has certain general characteristics that need to be correctly understood. This correspondence is thus similar with the “particular-general-particular” – formula introduced in *On Contradiction*; ideas must be reflected upon general conceptions through which they can be brought back to the particular level of observation.

As human knowledge develops with social practice, it can take several forms: class struggle, political life, scientific and artistic pursuits, according to Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 260; SW I, 296). However, any activity within these categories cannot elevate the actors to a higher level of understanding of things unless correct methodology – the science of Marxism – is followed and correctly applied. Hence, as comprehensive historical understanding of the development of society has been included in Marxist theories, they are also the key in observing the particularity of objects. Likewise, the laws of the objective external world have been exposed through Marxist “reading” of human development, thus re-defining the concepts that construct society as a whole. The process of development in this context is also completion of ideas and concepts; as such, it is also a process of development of knowledge. Similarly, of course, the Marxist conception of the development of history coincides with Mao’s theoretical construction to great extent. While Hegel’s idea of history was constituted by the progressive evolution of the spirit towards freedom, for Marx the meaning in history is bound up with man’s mastery over nature, including his own nature (see Lichtheim 1964, 39). In the Maoist context, such “progression” is dialectical understanding or mastery over nature and metaphysics.

Hence, in Mao’s reasoning, the process of practice is an inquiry that starts from the external and advances into the internal, the more specific stage of understanding. However, at first only the phenomenal side is seen, that is, the separate aspects and the external relations of things; in this sense, moreover, there exists a clear distinction between appearance and essence, which in turn is once again a very Marxist notion indeed (See Cohen 1968, 13). In other words, at first one is unable to see the relations and correspondence between the things monitored, at the same time the aspect of particularity is lacking. At this stage, one cannot form deeper concepts or draw logical conclusions either as his understanding is superficial. However, social practice – class struggle for instance – develops man’s thinking further. Mao describes the change in thinking as a process of cognition:

社会实践的继续，使人们在实践中引起感觉和印象的东西反复了多次，于是在人们的脑子里生起了一个认识过程中的突变（即飞跃），产生了概念。概念这和东西已经不是事物的现象，不是事物的各个片面，不是它们的外部联系，而是抓着事物的本质，事物的全体，事物的内部联系了。概念同感觉，不但是数量上的差别，而且是性质上的差别。(shehui shijian de jixu, shi renmen zai shijian zhong yinqi ganjue he yin xiang de dongxi fanfu le duoci, yu shi renmende naozi li sheng qi le yige renshi guo cheng zhong de yibian [ji feiyue], chan sheng le gainian. gainian zhe he dongxi yijing bu shi shiwude xianxiang, bu shi shiwude gege pianmian, bu shi tamende waibu lianxi, er shi zhua zhao le shiwude benzhi, shiwude quanti, shiwude neibu lianxi le. gainian tong ganjue, bu dan shi shuliang shang de chabie, erqie shi le xingzhi shang de chabie; "As social practice continues, things that give rise to man's sense perceptions and impressions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change (leap) takes place in the brain in the process of cognition, and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things; they grasp the essence, the totality and the internal relations of things. Between concepts and sense perceptions there is not only quantitative but also qualitative difference.") (Mao Xuan, 262; SW I, 298)

It is important to note that Mao is not making a reference to concepts as linguistic constructions but rather as knowledge of the internal aspects of a thing. Hence, the phenomena of a concept (external relations, the appearance) give the shape and name to things while the essence of a concept (internal relations) gives specific characteristics to it that can be utilized through correct ideological actions. This means that general concepts – such as nation, society and politics – have specific and particular characteristics in different conceptual realms. Likewise, Marxist conceptions are to be applied through particularities as they are inevitably different in every cultural and political context. While Mao has a strong tendency to relate everything to the class struggle (see Schram 1969, 169), also the concept of class struggle is used in a way that qualifies as particular; it is thus not a universal concept in essence but only in appearance. This means that class struggle can be used in different types of analysis concerning society to provide different types of knowledge. Graham Young (1986, 42–47), for instance, sees four types of such actors that can be subject to the class struggle: “remnant” forces, that is, individual members of the overthrown classes that inevitably remain after the revolution; the incompleteness of socialist reforms; the continuing influence of overthrown classes and their ideologies; and finally, the immediate implications the class struggle has over the communist party itself. Having a wide range of references, the class struggle is merely an idea or a vehicle of gaining ideologically valid knowledge.

Such a viewpoint implies that internal relations of things give a new meaning to the reflection of the concept as a whole. It does not suggest, however, that the concept is changed in a sense of *conceptual change* although several similarities can be spotted in the process. While conceptual change is a form of critique and an attempt to resolve the contradictions discovered in the web of beliefs, actions and practices, this is exactly what Mao maintains when implicitly arguing that understanding of the internal causes of contradiction is a vehicle to resolve political, economic and cultural issues concerning the society. As conditions change, also the very reading of ideologies changes to correspond with the new situation. However, in contrast to discussing beliefs or pure

actions and practices, Mao stresses the emergence of “thought” as something that reveals true knowledge. According to Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 262–263; SWI, 298), the real task of knowing is to arrive at thought and at the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their laws and of the internal relations between processes through perceptions. At the same time, logical knowledge of things is achieved. In this sense, logical knowledge differs from perceptual knowledge as logical refers to mastering the essence of a concept while perceptual knowledge only sees the phenomena in simple form. Likewise, perceptual knowledge is incapable of grasping the development of the surrounding world in its totality, in the internal relations of all its aspects.

Hence, concepts consist of two parts in the Maoist context: an internal, developing part that is realized through correct thought and an external, structural part that determines the phenomena. This notion is once again justified with Lenin’s interpretation of Hegel. This time the passage is quoted from Lenin’s “Conspectus of Hegel’s *The Science of Logic*” (see *Collected Works vol. XXXVIII*, 161) where he states: “The abstraction of *matter*, of a *law* of nature, the abstraction of *value*, etc., in short, *all* scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and *completely*.” Again, it is unclear why Mao chose this quotation which, in the very essence, criticizes Kant through specific, commentary-like reading of Hegel’s *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Although Lenin’s ideas are focused on slightly different matters, Mao explicitly maintains that Marxism holds that each new stage of development has its own characteristics in the process of cognition. Moreover, Mao sees that knowledge manifests itself as perceptual at the lower level and logical at the higher level. Both stages, however, are in an integrated process of cognition.

In the mentioned sense, concepts are something that are rationalized through perception and correct thought. Perception solves the problem of phenomena by describing it and giving it a form while logic uses theoretical knowledge in analyzing and solving the problem of the very essence of the concept. However, the solving of both of these problems is inseparable from practice. On the contrary, knowing a thing is to come into contact with it by living (practicing) it in its environment, according to Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 263–264; SWI, 299). Thus, the perceptual and the rational are qualitatively different, but are not divorced from each other. Rather, they are unified on the basis of practice. Ideological concepts gain their meaning thus through experiencing them in relevant political contexts.

Mao’s own conception on this matter is in justifying “particularity” of Marxism, that is, in justifying his own version of it. Thus, Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 263–265; SWI, 299–300) maintains that Marx could not know the specific elements of imperialist society as he lived during *laissez-faire* capitalism; because of this lived reality he was unable to develop the ideology any further. Likewise, Lenin developed Marxism by practicing its concepts in an imperialist environment, developing the ideology a step further. Quite logically, Chinese particular conditions have created a momentum for a Chinese version of Marxism, developed by practicing Marxism in that specific environment. Thus, it was the

era of imperialism – which Mao acknowledges as the last stage of capitalism – that was able to create sufficient conditions for Marxism to develop in China. At the same time, at least implicitly, Mao omits the economic determinism that had obvious weaknesses when applied in the underdeveloped infrastructure of the Chinese society. Moreover, in this specific sense, Mao utilized a myth-play that emphasized China's experiences of imperialism over the economic backwardness of the nation; the economic problems were, in fact, a result of imperialism.

Mao also stresses similar kind of spatiality and temporality in his theory of gaining knowledge. Thus, Mao commits an act of rewriting (*umschreiben*) the history, which in turn is a synthesis between the recording (*aufschreiben*) and the continuing (*fortschreiben*); rewriting corrects both the recording and the continuing in order to retrospectively arrive at a new history (see Koselleck 2002, 56). In a Maoist context, only through the understanding of particularity and time/space awareness can “pure” and “objective” knowledge be acquired. Mao describes the process as follows:

由此看来，认识的过程，第一步，是开始接触外界事情，属于感觉的阶段。第二步，是综合感觉的材料加以整理和改造，属于概念，判断和推理的阶段。只有感觉的材料十分丰富和合于实际，才能根据这样的材料造出正确的概念和伦理来。(you ci kanlai, renshide guo cheng, di yi bu, shi kai shi jiechu waijie shiqing, shuyu ganjuede jieduan. di er bu, shi zonghe ganjuede cailiao jiaji zhengli he gaizao, shuyu gainian, panduan he tuilide jieduan. zhi you ganjuede cailiao shi fen fengfu... he he yu shiji..., caineng genju zhe yangde cailiao zao chu zhengquede gainian he lunli lai; “Thus it can be seen that the first step in the process of cognition is contact with the objects of the external world; this belongs to the stage of perception. The second step is to synthesize the data of perception by arranging and reconstructing them; this belongs to the stage of conception, judgment and inference. It is only when the data of perception are very rich... and correspond to reality... that they can be the basis for forming correct concepts and theories.”) (Mao Xuan, 267; SW I, 302)

As this quotation already suggests, rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge. At the same time, however, perceptual knowledge remains to be developed into rational knowledge, that is, subjective perception is deducted as logical conclusion. Hence, dialectical movement of knowledge holds true for both minor and major processes of cognition, from the perceptual to the rational. This basically means that perception has to be “sublimated” into a rational conception, capable of being imported back to the source of perception through action. Following such an exercise, the overall knowledge is tested by practicing the foundation that emerges as a true knowledge. Such an exercise, however, leads to certain problems. For instance, if perceptual knowledge and thus particular knowledge can be used as a vehicle to reach rational knowledge through deduction, such a process should be repeatable; however, Mao seems to stress experience and experiences are unique. Likewise, if theories are considered to be a sum of such rational knowledge, it would suggest that theories are hardly more than just guidelines; in this case Marxism itself would only be a representation of a certain time/space, while it still is able to provide certain useful and even truthful premises to guide action.

Along with the inevitable link between rational and perceptual knowledge, testing and applying the laws of the objective world becomes crucial in determining the knowledge in itself. This means that the importance of theory is only emphasized because it can guide action; thus, without certain consequences of action, theory is useless, as already suggested by Franz Schurmann (1968, 24–37). According to Mao's conception of the relation between theory and practice, knowledge begins with practice, that is, theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and it must return to practice as well. In this sense, the "truthfulness" of Marxism, for instance, is in proving specific actions justified and necessary, not in formulating a grand theory of its own. In the mentioned context, the active function of knowledge manifests itself in the process where rational knowledge is transformed into revolutionary practice. The knowledge of objective laws of the world must hence be redirected to the practice of changing the world; through such a process, the theory is being tested and developed. Only by redirecting rational knowledge to social practice – the practice of production, of revolutionary class struggle, revolutionary national struggle, etc. – can knowledge be made more complete in its very essence.

While Mao maintains that theory and objective laws must be tested through practice, ideological practice in itself has to have a special essence, the essence of revolution. Mao thus suggests that Marxism as an ideology is proved to be true because it has been verified in the subsequent practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle. Likewise, dialectical materialism is universally true because it is impossible to escape from its domain in practice, according to Mao. This logic leads Mao to proclaim:

人类认识历史告诉我们，许多理论的真理是不完全的，经过实践的检验而纠正了它们的不完全性。许多理论是错误的，经过实践的检验而纠正其错误。) (*renlei renshide lishi gaosu women, xuduo lilunde zhenlixing shi bu wanquande, jingguo shijiande jianyan er jiuzhengle tamende bu wanquan xing. xuduo lilun shi cuowude, jingguo shijiande jianyan er jiuzheng qi cuowu*; "The history of human knowledge tells us that the truth of many theories is incomplete and that this incompleteness is remedied through the test of practice. Many theories are erroneous and it is through the test of practice that their errors are corrected.") (*Mao Xuan*, 269; SW I, 305)

Hence, theory is tested through reflection of the objective process in the brain and the exercise of subjective activity. By doing this, the knowledge is able to advance from the perceptual to the rational, and ideas, theories, plans and programs are necessarily created and advanced as well by applying these in practice. However, Mao never follows Marx in the quest for freedom. Marx acknowledged that the world was to be progressive not by an appeal to "eternal" principles, but by the progressive unfolding of its own essence, which is freedom (see Lichtheim 1964, 37), Mao merely aims at progression that manifests itself in revolutionary action. For Mao, thus, the process of reaching knowledge was not a process of realization of freedom but a process where guidelines for ideological action were constantly produced and re-produced.

As practice is considered something that proves the theory true or false, the concept of knowledge applied in this sense is a close relative with the

concept of change in a broader sense. In a strictly Marxist context, the point of departure is, of course, change towards the realization of communism, a state of freedom. This change takes place according to certain periods, each characterizing development of the society. This, in principle, suggests that change will eventually stop, as there is nothing more to achieve; the world is complete and thus perfect. Mao's conception, however, stresses the idea of universal and permanent change, insisting that change has a certain nature as well as direction. The nature of change, to put it simply, is either progressive or regressive; thus, the opposite of change is not a standstill or rest but reversed change. Similarly, the direction of change is not linear but cyclical, that is, change never exalts the new at the expense of the old, or the future at the expense of the past. Rather, history (or universe in broader sense) does not proceed forward as such, although there is definitely movement that both acquires knowledge and develops the society. In this sense, history is only a setting where the drama can take place; the hero (agent: Mao) with the help of a friend (co-agent: Marxism) outwits the villain (counter-agent: imperialism) by using a file (agency: knowledge described above) that enables him to break his bonds (act: revolutionary war) in order to escape (purpose: revolution) from the room where he has been confined (scene: pre-revolutionized China) (see Burke 1962, xxii).

The implication of history as a never-ending story of such dramas also defines the possibilities of human action. As already emphasized, knowledge is something that is in an everlasting state of development, that is, it can never reach a state of perfection; thought changes constantly and evolves continually. Thought thus changes as theory is applied into reality and theory leads to a certain kind of action. The action, if successful, changes reality, or, if unsuccessful, forces a revision of the theory (Schurmann 1968, 34). Moreover, in doing so, it is also necessary to realize that if thought does not correspond to the relevant laws, failure in practice is imminent. This, however, can serve as a possibility to turn the failure into success if lessons are derived from it and ideas altered to correspond to the observations made.

4.1.4 War as Politics

Although war as a concept is quite controversial in the Maoist context, it significantly represents the method of how Mao Zedong actually applied ideological action and how he defined it through the concept of war itself. In this sense, the theory of war is actually the key to understand the Maoist application of Marxist ideology.

To a great extent, Mao's methodology concerning the study of war was a synthetic or "whole-part-whole" approach, thus resembling the study of dialectics and contradictions. This is not surprising as Mao systematically used military situations as examples in his argumentation; war was universal by character yet it included particularities just as knowledge includes both universal and particular aspects. In a more specific context, Mao tended to view everything in its totality, not in terms of isolated aspects (Soo 1981, 34) although

the totality was also reflected upon the particularity in order to achieve correct knowledge. As in the discussion of universality and the particularity of contradiction, this meant that every situation in war was studied through totality (in case of war: victory vs. defeat) but still as something that was composed of particular and smaller situations (individual battles with consequences on the whole).

While this kind of synthetic dimension is apparent in most of Mao's writings, Mao did not stress the whole over the parts or harmony over the opposition. For example, even though war consisted of the totality combining war and peace, it was necessary to oppose "unjust war" (非正义的战争, *feizhengyide zhanzheng*) with "just war" (正义的战争, *zhengyide zhanzheng*) (Mao Xuan, 443; SWII, 150). War thus had also qualitative attributes. Likewise, the enemy was seen as equally important to a political movement as were the followers who executed orders; in other words, if the enemy is eliminated, the very essence of politics is likewise eliminated as well which would introduce a state of "perpetual peace" (永久和平, *yongjiu heping*). However, this notion is clearly in disharmony with the theory of contradiction in which Mao emphasizes the fact that contradictions between the people will continue to exist even after the revolution.

Hence, the totality of war was a far more complex concept for Mao than just the interaction between war and peace. The logic would then be as follows: unjust war is opposed with just war, resulting in victory (of the just) and thus peace, since unjust war has no legitimacy. Victory being combined inseparably with the political aims of the war and the war being inseparable from the politics, the object of both politics and war is the preservation of oneself and the destruction of the enemy. However, the destruction of the enemy, out of necessity, only reveals a new enemy thus resulting in a new warlike situation where action would be transformed to "revolutionary" once more since universal contradictions prevail.

Despite the logic described above, Mao used terms that were "final" in many ways, perpetual being one of them. For instance, in order to achieve victory, especially if the enemy seems have the advantage, it was necessary to apply the "war of annihilation" (歼灭战, *jianmie zhan*). Thus the basic element of war and politics was the "contest of attrition" (拚消耗, *pan xiaohao*), through which enemy is consumed rather than directly destroyed (Mao Xuan, 468-471; 220-221; SWII, 174-178; SWI, 248-249). In this specific context, war was a contest of endurance, a test in applying correct methods; the one with the knowledge of universality and particularity of situations, combined with correct theoretical reasoning, would eventually triumph. Mao explains the process as follows:

“基于战争的特殊性，就有战争的一套特殊组织，一套特殊方法，一套特殊过程。这组织，就是军队及其附随的一切东西。这方法，就是指导战争的战略战术。这过程，就是敌对的军队互相用有利于己不利于敌的战略战术从事攻击或防御的一种特殊的社会活动形态。因此，战争的经验是特殊的。” (*jiyu zhanzhengde teshuxing, jiu you*

zhanzhengde yitao teshu zuzhi, yitao teshu fangfa, yitao teshu guocheng. zhe zuzhi, jiu shi jundui jiqi fu suide yiqie dongxi. zhe fangfa, jiu shi zhi dao zhanzhengde zhanlüe zhanshu. zhe guocheng, jiu shi diduide jundui huxiang yong you li yu jib u li yu dide zhanlüe zhanshu congshi gongji huo fangyude yizhong teshude shehui huodong xingtai. yinci, zhanzhengde jingyan shi teshude; “From the particular characteristics of war there arise a particular set of organizations, a particular set of methods and a particular kind of process. The organizations are the armed forces and everything that goes with them. The methods are the strategy and tactics directing war. The process is the particular form of social activity in which the opposing armed forces attack each other or defend themselves against one another, employing strategy and tactics favorable to themselves and unfavorable to the enemy. Hence war experience is a particular kind of experience.”) (Mao Xuan, 447–448; SW II, 153–154)

Hence, the particularity of things is essential in understanding the characteristics of war, and ultimately, to achieve victory. Particularities in this context arise exactly from the experiences of war, that is, every situation or battle requires certain specific strategic actions. Likewise, war is something that needs to be studied just like the theoretical foundations of Marxist ideology; in order to apply strategies on practical level, the war must be “theorized” in a broader sense. Accordingly, the Maoist conception of war actually regards war as a same kind of entity as society, something that develops into new levels after successful application of particular motives of the dominant ideological group.

In the process of development, war becomes ideological or even ideology “in itself,” a cause for particular actions. Particular organizations refer to the very foundation of the ideological machine and to the structural element of the ideology. Particular organizations are structures capable of implementing the relevant ideology, or wage war in this specific case. As war is based on strategy and tactics meant to ensure victory in battle, war is also based on a program; it thus follows a certain philosophical basis that defines the needs and motives behind political action, which in this case is war. Politics would “take command” (政治挂帅, *zhengzhi guashuai*) as “prominence” was to be given to politics (突出政治, *tuchu zhengzhi*) (see Li 1995, 454; 576). As the basis of war is defined, the applied strategy, the program of war, is unleashed into action.

As already maintained, to understand war (or ideologies likewise) is to study it and experience it; it is thus a union of universality and particularity. The basis for studying war, according to Mao (Mao Xuan, 154; SWI, 179), is the understanding that the laws of war are developmental. By saying this, Mao suggests that war signifies progress and development, which imply flexibility and change. At the very same time, progress signifies a process of thought; as strategy is applied into action, it evolves through a series of tests. Results, either successful or unsuccessful, determine how the strategy is further developed. Hence, the logic of war is similar to the interaction between theory and thought. While the laws of war are considered to be universal and thus unchanging, they are also pure in the ideological sense. Strategy on the other hand, responds according to these laws and is very much practical.

Like in the theory of contradictions, applying methods relating to war also has its own special functions. Similarly, strategy and tactics are defined through universality and particularity. Mao argues that:

“研究带全局性的战争指导规律，是战略学的任务。研究带局部性的战争指导规律，是战役学的和战术学的任务。” (*yanjiu dai quanju xingde zhanzheng zhidao guilü, shi zhanlüe xuede renwu. yanjiu dai juibuxingde zhanzheng zhidao guilü, shi zhanyi xuede he zhanshu xuede renwu*; “The task of the science of strategy is to study those laws [laws of war] for directing a war that govern a war situation as a whole. The task of the science of campaigns and the science of tactics is to study those laws for directing a war that govern a partial situation.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 159; SW I, 183)

An ideologist needs to understand the whole (pure) theoretical construction as well as the partial practical construction of the ideology he tries to develop and apply, and the commander also needs to understand the whole as well as the parts relevant to the whole of war; an understanding of the whole thus facilitates the handling of the part because the part is subordinate to the whole. In this context, the whole and the parts form an inseparable link between each other, as do the universality and the particularity of contradictions. Without grasping both sides, the concept of war is deduced into mere action without ideological motives or a political agenda.

Hence, without the knowledge of the universal laws of war there can be no successful campaigns. Likewise, without the knowledge of the particularity of situations, the knowledge of the universal laws is obsolete. In this specific sense, gaining knowledge in military situations is exactly the same kind of process as is gaining knowledge of ideology. In fact, just like the general development of the social formation in classical Marxism is held to be the contradiction between the forces and relations of production (see Healy 1997, 122), the general development of war in Maoist context is also the contradiction between the forces (revolutionary actors) and the prevailing settings (scene) against which the actors are testing response. However, in this kind of battle the script alone is not enough to ensure the victory. Mao argues quite clearly that the process of knowing a situation is not just a matter of making a plan or forming a strategy and acting according to it; one also has to innovate and improvise. Knowing – gaining knowledge and applying it – is a much more complex process. Thus, while applying strategy it is necessary to examine how the plan actually works and what kind of new particularities it causes. If the outcome is not what expected (defeat in battle), that is, the plan does not correspond with reality, it becomes necessary to make new decisions and change the original plan, according to Mao’s conception. Thus, just like the very reading of ideologies, strategy is something that changes to correspond with the new situation.

Consequently, Mao implicitly criticizes “academic” war and traditional military officers; they do not have experience with all the conditions related to war but only learnt knowledge. In short, they have not developed their tactical knowledge through the process of learning and knowing; they fight only “on paper,” as Mao puts it. This is hardly surprising, of course, if reflected upon Mao’s own background concerning academic competence in military strategy.

At the same time, Mao's conception of military competence is exactly the same as is his conception of applying Marxist-Leninist ideology. Hence, just like learning an ideology can only take place through applying it in action, warfare can be learned only through fighting a war. This is one of the most important notions of the Maoist conception of politics. A communist can do great things and develop Marxism regardless of her/his background. Even a man without a formal education can be an ideologist or a general, as long as he follows the correct way of learning.

In the Maoist conception war is thus not only a tool of politics and ideological action; it is a process of learning and a form of education. While the search for knowledge can be defined as the prime objective of education, education that emphasized incorrect thinking and action is actually worse than no education as all. In a more specific context, Maoism actually seeks to create a monolithic pattern of ideological conformity where practice and applied knowledge tends to determine both the nature of knowledge and the very meaning of education itself (see Hu 1962, 86). In many ways, such a pattern is also the basis of Chinese Communism in general. For instance, if these categories are monitored through the schema formulated by Franz Schurmann (1968, 30), they do resemble the logic behind the ideological structure known as Mao Zedong's Thought. Similarly, "the laws of war" + "the laws of revolutionary war" are the basis for "the laws of China's revolutionary war." Also, the formula can be defined as "laws of war" + "applied strategy" = "result." Of course, there are certain differences in attributes defining the outcome but the logic itself remains the same: certain universal truths combined with understanding and applying them in action results in developing the ideological structure.

5 ACT V: THE MAO-MYTH

While Maoism is a somewhat elusive and even controversial ideological construction in the theoretical sense, its mythical dimensions are much easier to spot and define. In fact, it can be argued that Maoism as an ideology, especially during the notorious political campaigns, was heavily concentrated on such “faith” and a kind of ideological “fever” that had very little to do with actual policies based on theoretical formulations. Maoism thus qualifies as an ideological phenomenon that was based as much on mythical dimensions as it was on theoretical guidelines; in this sense, Maoism is an ideological construction combining myth with theory.

Likewise, as already argued in the previous chapter, Maoist conception of Marxism stressed experience over theoretical knowledge, that is, the main emphasis was on living through the revolution as the key in becoming a good communist. At the same time, Maoism provided an extension of Marxism; as the interpretation of the Chinese version of Marxism was mostly constructed by Mao, he also became the source of ideological innovation among the Chinese communists. Hence, Mao was considered to be the only one who could further develop Marxism in China. In fact, starting from 1943 when the term 毛泽东思想 (*Mao Zedong sixiang*, “Mao Zedong Thought”) was coined by Wang Jiaxiang, Maoism was elevated as “China’s Marxism and Leninism, China’s Bolshevism, and China’s communism.” (see Li 1995, 265–267)

However, Mao’s status as a leader was much more than just that of innovator’s; Mao did act also as a symbolizer, a force that represented the masses by giving them a perfect example of how a communist should live and what he should do. Mao thus represented the perfect example of the group type while giving further examples as he lived. While being able to “innovate” his own ideological construction that actually displaced the “original,” dogmatic version of Marxism, Mao also articulated his ideological views through speeches, lectures and writings. At the same time, as the ideal of communism was now represented through the image of Mao Zedong, Mao’s life became fused with the concept of the ideology itself. In this specific context, Mao was

identified with the Chinese version of Marxism, which then emerged as Maoism. Likewise, Mao's role as the hero of a romance to whom all the values of the Chinese communism were bound started to exceed normal limits of drama. In fact, as a symbolizer, Mao now represented – especially in *Mao Xuan* – a new kind of hero that existed in a myth; while in the romance proper the hero is human, in the myth proper he is divine (see Frye 1973, 188).

The motives promoting ideological actions can be seen as acts that actually aim at fulfilling certain narratives, that is, the consequences of such action are considered to be predestined and historically justified regardless of the means to achieve them. Hence, policies used in achieving wanted steps are almost irrelevant since it is the outcome that determines whether or not the myth is being fulfilled in an adequate way. For instance, if the myth behind a specific stage of communism “promises” a certain result, it is more important to achieve that result than debate over the means of action. Likewise, of necessity the ideological actions to achieve the results themselves are flexible out.

Ideological action is also something that tries to re-live and re-create myths relevant to the ideology. There are narratives connected with each ideology or ideological “ism” through which members identify the narratives as a part of a larger ideological whole. The ideological myth in its totality consists of numerous specific narratives, small stories that show how the ideology works in practice. For instance, books such as Li Jian's 中南海咏叹调 (*Zhongnanhai yongtandiao*, “Aria of Zhongnanhai”) from 1992 promote stories where Mao is represented as a man of the people, ever-concerned with the welfare of the nation, and especially the poor. In an alternative history, where the communists would not have won the national war, Mao's deeds would only be a footnote of an unnamed ideology, not stories of a “god-inspired” leader.

In a strictly Chinese context, there are several different ways of determining the concept of narrative in a sense that deals with heroic deeds. The ones contributing the most in terms of this study can be placed into four categories proceeding along the narrative continuum from history to fiction: chronicle historiography, official historiography, unofficial historiography, and supernatural hero-cycles (Plaks 1977, 319–352). Of these categories, the first refers to truthful narration, if such a thing can be considered possible as the concept of truth is often subjective in the realm of politics; but at least theoretically it refers to a style of narration free of political purposes. Official historiography, on the other hand, has implicitly a motive behind it, that is, it emphasizes certain events over the others; in other words, “official” omits the “unofficial.” The difference between these two, then, is that the first simply sets of events in chronological order while the second actually puts the events in a specific context. Hence, chronicle historiography provides a chain of events and official historiography adds a sense of “destiny” into it as is done in *Aria of Zhongnanhai*.

Unofficial historiography has a relative and optional relationship with chronicle historiography. It provides a negation (or a challenge) to official historiography, which in light of the facts tries to either judge or confirm the

given interpretation of history. Unofficial historiography thus tells us “facts” that the official historiography omits. In a more specific sense, unofficial histories are the histories of dissidents; such histories include books like Gordon C. Chang’s *The Coming Collapse of China* (2002) and Li Zhisui’s *The Private Life of Chairman Mao* (1994). At the same time, they include the prospect of becoming official in the future.

Finally, supernatural hero-cycles, or the emergence of “momentary gods,” challenge the logic behind the facts by presenting the course of history as an achievement of exceptional men. While doing this, they also – quite necessarily – provide such facts that cannot be challenged through logical reasoning. Heroes act as myths; the words and actions that are left behind the heroes are considered the source of powers that they represent. Hence, mythologized ideological characters are beyond re-evaluation although the words themselves can be interpreted differently depending on the context.

All of the categories mentioned above can be found in the narrative(s) of Mao Zedong starting from his birth and ending with his death. During the life of Mao, in many ways, the official historiography does not provide details that would be somehow extraordinary: we know who he was, where he was born, where he studied, and so on. But the facts concerning his political life, however, are much more complex. In order to fully grasp anything that could be called the narrative of Mao Zedong or indeed Maoism, all of the categories mentioned before need to be studied in an attempt to even start imagining Mao as an historical figure. I intentionally omit the facts that form the chronicle historiography (the milestones of Mao’s life, if you will) since they provide no extra value to the task at hand. Rather, I shall concentrate on the official historiography and supernatural hero-cycle, with lesser emphasis on the unofficial historiography at this point. In doing so, I hope to better characterize the image of Mao, as well as to apply the relevant theories more efficiently.

5.1 Mao’s Charisma Institutionalized

As always, it is very difficult to determine when and where myths begin and emerge; their birth is often as obscure as is their essence. However, certain conditions can be formulated that determine when and how ideological charisma – and thereupon ideological myth – is institutionalized.

First, the role of ideological language used provides the most obvious and perhaps the easiest way of reading ideological and political charisma. Charisma in this sense does not merely refer to a gathered following nor to decisions that are justified “in the name of” the one possessing the charisma. Likewise, ideological language does not necessarily follow hierarchy and direct political power. Rather, it is articulated through propagandistic means, that is, the person delivering the meaningful and powerful rhetoric is the one considered charismatic in this context.

However, there are some limitations to this kind of handling of charisma and ideological language. While the rhetoric provided by the charismatic person is not always the words of the one possessing the power, it is thus a similar kind of ethical discourse – or critique of the current – as are the revisions of reforms forced upon the theoretical foundation of the ideology itself. For instance, when Mao (see *Mao Xuan*, 753–761; SWIII, 17–25) proclaimed in May 1941 that “we” communists should “reform our study” (改造我们的学习, *gaizao womende xuexi*), he was by no means the supreme figure in terms of political power although his charismatic power was already gaining strength. Stuart R. Schram (1967, 386), for instance, locates the emergence of a veritable Mao-cult in 1942 and its climax at the Seventh Party Congress in April in 1945. In other words, charisma is not a “suit of clothes” that can be worn along with political power, although political power can emerge from political charisma.

The rise of meaningful rhetoric, as reflected upon Maoism and the person of Mao Zedong, started at around the late 1930s and reached its climax in 1941–1942 as will be argued. This period displays Mao with the ideal type of innovative charisma, when new values and ideas are forced upon the followers; by pointing out “mistakes” in studying and dealing of Marxist ideology, Mao creates beliefs that still have inevitable reference to the prevailing political culture. Hence, the process of implementing new methods of studying and interpreting the relevant ideology has a specific purpose of making the audience – Chinese communists in this case – take a particular course of action by utilizing the means of “educational” propaganda.

Second, charisma of this kind aims at stabilizing and institutionalizing political and ideological power through building a power-base. The power-base paradigm, in its simplest form, is built through rising in rank; either political or military (see Shambaugh 1995, 52). However, there is also an *ideological* dimension in the power-base paradigm that can be formulated. The ranks themselves are incapable of producing significant ideological innovations or revisions; moreover, the charismatic person needs to possess a vision of the future, an agenda. In a more specific sense, this means possessing the charisma of an innovator, and in some cases, the need to act as a revolutionary leader who is able to articulate his ideas into a consistent ideological guideline with a promise of successful revolution.

In the traditional sense of the power-base paradigm, Mao Zedong’s personal power-base started to reach critical mass during and after the so-called Zunyi conference. Zunyi is a city in Guizhou province, and acted as the venue for an enlarged Politburo conference in January 1935, three months after the epic Long March was under way. The Zunyi conference is also officially regarded as the rise of Mao’s personal charisma and prelude to his supreme power within the communist party. In fact, from the Seventh Congress in 1945 until Mao’s death in 1976, two merits were ascribed to the Zunyi conference: it changed the party leadership in favor of Mao Zedong, making him the leader of the whole Communist Party, and it changed the political and military line by

establishing “the correct line” to replace former “erroneous line” (see Yang 1986, 235–271; Kampen 1989, 705–727).

At the beginning of the Long March in October 1934 Mao was considered as having a strong position among the communists, however without having much power. Thus, Mao could not be blamed for the military losses as he had been excluded from the military leadership in the preceding months. Accordingly, Mao was in position to criticize current tactics used, as well as to provide an alternative strategy, shown successful in the earlier campaigns. This gave Mao a considerable advantage over his opponents – Zhou Enlai, Qin Bangxian and Otto Braun – who had spent most of their lives in Europe and Shanghai instead of fighting a guerilla war in the mountains. Moreover, the three-man-leadership now appeared to be not qualified to lead the Red Army, which had been reduced to about 30,000 men from more than 86,000 within a few months after launching the Long March. (see Jocelyn & McEven 2006; Yang 1986, 235–271)

As the military tactics applied before the Zunyi conference had resulted in severe losses for the Red Army, a series of heated discussions took place within the top-rank Party and Army leaders: Tongdao meeting on 11 December 1934, Liping -meeting on 18 December, and finally Houchang meeting on 1 January 1935 being the most important ones (Kampen 1989, 708). During these meetings Mao Zedong managed to receive the support of several Politburo members for his views on military strategy, while the old three-man-leadership faction became increasingly opposed. This also reduced the influence of the Comintern within the party in favor of Mao, while the role of the Russian revolution became increasingly neglected. The revolution had been treated as a model for achieving political power, but now it became reduced only to a symbol of the superiority of communism without containing any specific instructions of how to execute the revolution in practice in China. The change initiated the sinification of military tactics as well as the interpretations of Marxism. A momentum for the creation of a Chinese model of communist revolution became possible, making way for Mao’s version of Marxism.

Of course, Mao did not just become the leader of the party straight away, although the Zunyi Conference mood did favor him in many ways. In fact, Mao only became a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and an assistant to Zhou Enlai. However, for the first time, Mao was among the top five leaders of the entire Party with access to influence all important decisions. Moreover, he started to develop a reputation as the only man who had represented a correct Party line in the past and who had the basic potential to lead the Communist revolution to the victory. (Yang 1986, 257–258) In essence, this meant that Mao was now able to further build his power-based charisma as well as influence the language used within the top-rank communists.

5.1.1 Re-writing the Script: 1941–1942

While Maoism was forming slowly as the most relevant ideological interpretation among the Chinese communists starting from mid-1930s, it was

not until the so-called rectification campaign (1941–1942) that it actually triumphed as the official dogma. At the same time, Mao's personal charisma was mystified and the veritable Mao cult began.

The rectification campaign – which in essence aimed at enforcing Maoist influences among the Chinese communists rather than actually changing the Marxist ideology itself – marked the decisive stage of both the rise of the rhetorical reference of Mao Zedong Thought (毛泽东思想, *Mao Zedong sixiang*) and the phenomenon of “Mao Zedongism” (毛泽东主义, *Mao Zedong zhuyi*), that is, Maoism; the former concept surfaced in July 1943 while the latter was used already in early 1942, although it thereupon disappeared almost immediately until the Cultural Revolution (see Schram 1972, 279). Significantly, however, Mao's name started to be associated with the concept of Marxism and the communist movement itself. While Mao was now associated with the Marxist ideology, his abilities also experienced dramatic increase; they rested on gnostic belief according which the hero supposedly possesses the direct knowledge of ultimate human nature (see Ellwood 1999, 14).

There are three essential textual parts in the campaign that include Mao Zedong's basic work on the rectification movement: 改造我们的学习 (*gaizao womende xuexi*, “Reform Our Study”) from May 1941, and 整顿党的作风 (*zhengdun dangde zuofeng*, “Rectify the Party's Style of Work) and 反对党八股 (*fandui dang bagu*, “Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing”) from February 1942. All of these serve a special function in the campaign: reforming the interpretation of Marxism into a Maoist conception of it, resisting and rectifying “subjectivism” and “secretarianism,” and finally opposing “stereotyped writing” that had a bad influence within the party. In all, these one report and two articles idealistically aimed for a party-wide movement of Marxist-Leninist education to rectify the style of work in accordance with the ideological principles of Marxism.

Again, Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 753–761; SWIII, 17–26) starts *Reform Our Study* by combining Marxist with ideological action and the sphere of experience. Likewise, Mao sees the lack of understanding the current (and thus particular) conditions as the first big problem when trying to take another step in integrating the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. This, in principle, also suggests that the understanding of both universal (general) and particular (situation-specific) aspects of Marxist ideology has been neglected in such a way that the very study of ideological action needs to be reformed. On a more systematic level, Mao suggests that the party should make a detailed investigation and study of developments in the economic, financial, political, military, cultural and party activities of the enemies, friends and finally Chinese communists themselves in order to draw concrete conclusions of the situation as a whole. This is crucially important as it re-denies the whole settings of the act being “played”; thus, instead of seeking to analyze the realm of scene in terms that have no relation to the terms Mao

uses, Mao proceeds to derive the nature of his terms for the discussion of the scene from the nature of his terms for the agent (see Burke 1962, 128). Through reforming the scene and thereupon the setting, also the very role of the agent – Chinese communism in this sense – is changed according to the script Mao defines.

Second, Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 753–761; SWIII, 17–26) argues that the study of history – the very basis of understanding the particular elements of Marxism in China – has not been done in an organized way. In Mao’s analysis, Marxist scholars (in China) tend to start from non-Chinese premises, that is, they do not pay attention to both current and past conditions in China. This is interesting, of course, since the overall social development (in purely Marxist theory) should be the same in any country. Reversing this, Mao maintains that certain Chinese elements are directly applicable to Marxism in general. Such a premise calls for an analytical study of China’s economic history, political history, military history and cultural history. Again, this forces significant implications upon Marxism. In this context, Marxism would remain an incomplete ideological system if the universal and especially particular were not conjoined in a manner that Mao suggests; likewise, Marxism in the Chinese context consists of Marxism’s universal laws applied in a certain manner to disclose the regularities which characterized Chinese society and the Chinese revolution (Knight 1983, 27). At the same time, the myth-play changed from the realization of a foreign theory into a realization of Chinese elements in Marxism.

Third, Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 753–761; SWIII, 17–26) once more stresses the importance of understanding the needs of revolutionary practice when studying the universal truths of Marxism. As already argued, Mao maintains that in order to succeed in revolution one must correctly combine theory with practice, that is, understand both universal and particular aspects of applied Marxism. Likewise, the solution would include education on the study of the practical problems of the Chinese revolution and using the basic principles of Marxism as the guide, not as a dogma. Mao thus not only suggests in *Reform Our Study* that his own ideas on universality and particularity should be embraced, but moreover, he actually emphasizes the “totalitarization” of Marxism in China; the ideology itself should not be only a field of intellectual or academic study but should actually include all areas of society. In a more precise context, this is the question of knowledge. In *Rectify the Party’s Style of Work* Mao once more discusses the concept of knowledge in the following words:

“什么是认识？自从有阶级的社会存在以来，世界上的知识有两门，一门叫做生产斗争知识，一门叫做阶级斗争知识。自然科学，社会科学，就是这两门知识的结晶，哲学则是关于自然知识和社会知识的概括和总结。” (*shenme shi zhishi? zicong you jieji de shehui cunzai yilai, shijie shangde zhishi you liangmen, yimen jiaozuo shengchan douzheng zhishi, yimen jiaozuo jieji douzheng zhishi. ziran kexue, shehui kexue, jiu shi zhe liangmen zhishide jiejing, zhexue ze shi guanyu ziran zhishi he shehui zhishide gaikuo he zongjie;* “What is knowledge? Ever since class society came into being the world has had only two kinds of knowledge, knowledge of the struggle for production and knowledge of the class struggle. Natural science and social science are the crystallizations of these

two kinds of knowledge, and philosophy is the generalization and summation of the knowledge of nature and the knowledge of society.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 775; SW III, 39)

Hence, Mao suggests that knowledge is closely linked with the concept of experience and practice; production requires knowledge of technology and manufacturing while class struggle requires understanding of the social reality and ideological awareness. Likewise, as knowledge is completed through practice and thus action, knowledge without correct application remains incomplete.

Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 753–761; SWIII, 17–26) continues his definition of relatively complete knowledge by separating it into two stages: a perceptual stage and a rational knowledge. Perceptions are the basic element of knowledge that is systematized into rational knowledge, structured conception of how and why things are, and how they work. In Mao’s analysis, perceptual knowledge can – at least implicitly – precede rational knowledge or rational knowledge can act as ground for further, personalized systematization of knowledge. As acquired knowledge (that is, so-called book-learning knowledge, knowledge without experience) can be truthful and correct in the first place, it is still only relatively complete until truth is acquired through personal experience of the struggle for production and of the class struggle. By doing this, knowledge becomes complete as it is verified by the relevant actor. In simple terms, true intellectuals take part in practical work and become practical workers by testing and verifying their theoretical knowledge by studying practical problems.

In many ways, Mao’s suggestion is exactly the same he makes in *On Practice*; understanding that the very concept of knowledge and thus the whole process of gaining knowledge is cognitive, advancing from the particular to the general and from the general to the particular. However, in this specific case of applying book-learning into the verified experience of theories, the process seems to advance from the general to the particular *par excellence*. This is not contradictory with the concept of knowledge defined in *On Practice*, as the general knowledge is something that has been summarized into consistent theoretical formulations by others, that is, preceding scholars or Marxist ideologists in this specific case. In many ways, this is only logical if contrasted with Mao’s conception of history. As Francis Y.K. Soo (1981, 37) argues for instance, Mao maintained the idea that the present has grown out of the past and should thus be considered as a crucially important if not decisive factor; the past was a source of knowledge in itself.

Moreover, by defining knowledge as argued, Mao also defines theory as something that needs certain phases in order to qualify as consistent and indeed systematic: it must be drawn from a correct understanding of reality and it must also be applicable to the same reality over and over again by different actors. Mao discusses the concept as follows:

“真正的理论在世界上只有一种，就是从客观实际抽出来又在客观实际中得到了证明的理论，没有任何别的东西可以称得起我们所讲的理论。” (*zhenzhengde lilun zai shijie shang zhi you yizhong, jiu shi cong keguan shiji chou chulai you zai keguan shiji zhong dedaole zheng mingde lilun, mei you renhe biede dongxi keyi chen deqi women suo jiangde*

lilun; “There is only one kind of true theory in this world, theory that is drawn from objective reality and then verified by objective reality; nothing else is worthy of the name of theory in our sense.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 775; SW III, 40)

Hence, according to Mao, theory – and theoretical formulations – are in essence drawn from particular situations and tested in particular situations as well. Having said this, Mao suggests that theory is useless if not connected with practice, an idea which in turn is borrowed from Stalin; nevertheless, following the logic, Marxism is defined as both scientific and revolutionary, that is, it has been born out of revolutionary experience and objective reality, and its truths have been successfully tested in revolutionary action. Likewise, mere knowledge of practical work without a correct understanding of rational and comprehensive knowledge is useless. Without theoretical knowledge it is impossible to do revolutionary work well.

In a more specific context, Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 769–786; SWIII, 35–52) once more makes a distinction between subjectivist tendencies: “dogmatism” (教条主义, *jiaotiao zhuyi*) emphasizes one-sided theory over practice while “empiricism” (经验主义, *jingyan zhuyi*) stresses practice over theoretical knowledge. If theory is not connected correctly with practice, correct revolutionary action is not possible; and without correct revolutionary action no revolution is possible in China. Thus, Mao combines the whole concept of Marxism-Leninism with the concept of Chinese revolution. While studying Marxism-Leninism can be seen here as the way for raising the theoretical knowledge of the Communist party to a sufficient level, the practical knowledge can also be raised through understanding objective reality to the level where correct revolutionary action is made possible. Accordingly, studying Marxism-Leninism is not to be done for the sake of the Marxist ideology itself but solely because it is the correct science which leads the revolutionary cause of the Chinese proletariat to victory.

Finally, the rise of Maoism as well as the whole rectification campaign marked the beginning of simplified and indeed propagandistic usage of language, that is, Marxism was now being “popularized” through more attractive and down-to-earth conceptions. Likewise, Marxist texts were criticized by Mao for being “stereotyped” and too hard to grasp by the common people. In essence, this marked “proletarianization” of the Communist language. Since the ultimate aim of Marxism was now defined as achieving the revolution in China rather than studying the depths and mysteries of the ideology itself, also the ideological language was made practical and more persuasive.

Mao emphasized the need to modify Marxism to an ideology that could be easily embraced by any Chinese. In order to achieve such an aim, the language used needed to be modified to meet the capabilities of the audience. In a more specific sense, this is a question of using correct propaganda. In *Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing*, Mao argues:

“共产党员如果真想做宣传，就是看对家，就要想一想自己的文章，演说，谈话，写字是给什么人看，给什么人听的，否则就等于下决心不要人看，不要人听。” (*gongchan dangyuan ruguo zhen xiang zuo xuanchuan, jiu shi kan dui jia, jiu yao xiang yixiang zijide*)

wenzhang, yanshuo, tanhua, xiezi shi gei shenme ren kan, gei shenme ren tingde, fouze jiu dengyu xia juexin bu yao ren kan, bu yao ren ting; "Communists who really want to do propaganda must consider their audience and bear in mind those who will read their articles and slogans or listen to their speeches and their talk; otherwise they are in effect resolving not to be read or listened to by anyone." (*Mao Xuan*, 793; SW III, 59)

The previous quotation explicitly reveals Mao's idea of both ideological language as well as propaganda. Ideological language should be simple and persuasive so that it could be easily absorbed by the audience through the means of oral and written propaganda. In this particular case, Mao (*Mao Xuan*, 777-778; SWIII, 42) referred to propaganda as a kill of "shooting an arrow at the target." Marxism being the arrow, the Chinese revolution was the target. Likewise, when writing an article or making a speech, one should always consider the audience, that is, the audience itself was a subject for studying and analyzing. In other words, the aim of an arrow was as much on the hearts and minds of the Chinese people, to whom communist ideals could be introduced through the use of popular myth-plays like romanticizing the glorious past of China.

Hence, Mao was actually suggesting and promoting non-theoretical language when discussing Marxist ideology which in turn was strikingly contradictory to traditional Marxism. As Kenneth Burke (1962, 210) argues, Marxism begins by grounding agents (communists) in a scene (history, society) while on the rhetorical level its scientific and anti-scholastic vocabulary is needed for purposes of political dynamism. Mao, on the other hand, repeatedly used metaphors and symbolic language, a form of religious and symbolic argumentation. In essence, this means that the theoretical foundation of the relevant ideology is considered "truthful" without debating its contents and the only function of ideological action is to promote the ideology through persuasive expressions, and finally realize the majestic myth behind the ideology itself. By using metaphoric conceptions in "explaining" and propagating ideologies, Marxism remains abstract and mystified but yet canonized and unerring.

5.1.2 "Sinification" as a Form of Ideological Myth

While ideological myths are often associated with persons representing the ideology (political/charismatic leaders for instance) rather than ideologies themselves, they can also be associated with more abstract concepts relevant to the represented ideological whole. Although ideologies or theories themselves are not easy to define as charismatic, certain images can be installed with them to make the ideological construction act as a myth.

In most cases, certain histories and narrative patterns are emphasized through ideologies, thus giving a personified element to the specific ideological constructions. National Socialism is such a construction; it combines loose theoretical agenda with national mystique by arguing the inequality between the races. As already suggested, it combines "an invariant myth" (*Reich*) with "a compound of philosophical doctrines" (racial theories), and is represented by "a

chosen class" (Aryans). With a strong reference to "blood and soil" and thus to a specific people and nation, it is defined as a "national" and "universal" ideology among the Aryan race. At the same time, the concept of national is somewhat broadened to mean more than just a specific area.

Likewise, Marxism finds its primary source of legitimacy from similar logic although the communist ideal man is not spatially but temporally bound; exploitation of the proletariat prevails until the communist utopia is realized. Hence, communist ideals are considered universal yet developing as they are somewhat built-in the consciousness of the working class.

In contrast to the traditional Marxist conception which was at least in theory promoted "internationalism" and "universalism" rather than "nationalism," the Maoist version of Marxist ideology is fused with a national mystique thus undermining the universality that Marxism actually maintains. For instance, Stuart R. Schram (1973, 7) argues that by postulating that Marxism should be sinified, in order to play its proper role in China and to achieve a successful revolution, Mao, in fact, suggested that Marxism must be transmuted to such an extent that it loses its foreign essence; Marxism thus merely acts as a storehouse of techniques. In the case of Maoism, lack of universalism in this sense means promoting nationalism and patriotism. Like the theory of contradiction in Mao's ideological constructions, the dualism between international and national is also a question between universality and particularity; patriotism is always particular while internationalism, the very essence of Marxist movement, remains universal. This implies, quite logically, that universal and "internationalized" aims and motives are incapable of achieving sufficient conditions for revolution in China by themselves. They need to be "particularized." However, this does not mean that the particular (national) excludes the universal (international). In Mao's words:

“国际主义者的共产党员，是否可以同时又是一个爱国主义者呢？我们认为不但是可以的，而且是应该的。爱国主义的具体内容，看在什么样的历史条件之下来决定。”
(guoji zhuyizhede gongchan dangyuan, shi fou keyi tongshi you shi yige aiguo zhuyizhe ne? women renwei bu dan shi keiyide, erqie shi ying gaide. aiguo zhuyide juti neirong, kan zai shenme yangde lishi tiaojian zhi xia lai jue ding; "Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time, be a patriot? We hold that he not only can be but must be. The specific content of patriotism is determined by historical conditions.")
(Mao Xuan, 486; SW II, 196)

Mao refers to a situation oriented dealing with things rather than idealistic or general conception of historical conditions. This is a crucially important notion as it suggests that every ideological construction has a reference to the very situation where it is applied. Every situation is a specific scene where the agent must act according to the specific script, the particular reading of it; as already suggested, "it is a principle of drama that the nature of acts and agents should be consistent with the nature of the scene" (Burke 1962, 3) which in turn suggests that the scene (China) dictates the agents (Chinese communists) and the acts (revolutionary action). Leninism, for instance, would be in this sense inapplicable to rest of the countries as it has its specific, country oriented characteristics. Likewise, Marxism as such can only provide general guidelines

to ideological action, and the analysis of particular conditions has to follow the specific characteristics of the relevant political time/space orientation. Consequently, there is no pure or indeed abstract Marxist theory in the sphere of Leninism that can rise above the concrete experiences of the Russian revolution; in this context, Leninism is no more than the union of Marxist theory combined with Russian practice, that is, “Russianized” Marxism (see Wylie 1979, 455).

In a more specific sense, Maoism makes a difference between general and relative conceptions of ideology. Marxism is thus considered to have certain general characters that are universally truthful, for all times and all countries. This is the universal aspect of the ideological construction, its pure essence. At the same time, however, Marxism (and other ideologies likewise) exist conditionally and temporally, thus being relative. This is the sphere of application and ideological action, the particular and relative aspect of ideological whole. In Mao’s criteria, therefore, it is valid to accept a universal theory such as Marxism as representing a scientific reflection of objective reality since Marxism has been constructed with regard to the norms of inductive procedure, building from the particular to the universal (Knight 1983, 22). Consequently, Leninism can only be an example of particularized and relative Marxism, not a dogma that can be applied to China; thus the only way to implement Marxism to China is to sinify it.

Hence, Marxism is a developing system according to Mao’s conception of it. It was constructed by Marx and Engels, and further developed by Lenin and Stalin. Likewise, it can still be further studied and developed to meet the needs of the Chinese Communists. Mao argues that:

“不应当把他们的理论当作教条看待，而应当看作行动的指南。不应当只是学习马克思列宁主义的词句，而应当把它当成革命的科学来学习。不但应当了解马克思，恩格斯，列宁，斯大林他们研究广泛的真实生活和革命经验所得出的关于一般规律的结论，而且应当学习他们观察问题和解决问题的立场和方法。。。对于中国共产党说来，就是要学会把马克思列宁主义的理论应用于中国的具体的环境。” (*bu ying dang ba tamende lilun dang zuo jiaotiao kandai, er ying dang kan zuo xing dongde zhinan. bu ying dang zhi shi xuexi makesilieningzhuyide cijiu, er ying dang ba ta dang cheng gemingde kexue lai xuexi. bu dan ying dang le jie makesi, engesi, liening, sidalin tamen yanjiu guangfande zhenshi shenghuo he geming jingyan suode chude guanyu yiban guilüde jielun, er qie ying dang xuexi tamen guan cha wenti he jie jue wentide lichang he fangfa... duiyu zhongguogongchandang shuo lai, jie shi yao xuehui ba makesilieningzhuyide lilun ying yong yu zhongguode jutide huanjing*; “We should regard it (Marxism) not as a dogma, but as a guide to action. Studying it is not merely a matter of learning terms and phrases but of learning Marxism-Leninism as the science of revolution. It is not just a matter of understanding the general laws derived by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin from their extensive study of real life and revolutionary experience, but of studying their standpoint and method in examining and solving problems... For the Chinese Communist Party, it is a matter of learning to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism to the specific circumstances of China.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 499-500; SW II, 209)

As the following quotation implies, Mao calls for the creation of a Chinese tradition of Marxism. Marxism, despite its truthfulness, cannot and should not be applied to China as such but should be considered as a model and theoretical basis for the Chinese version of Marxism. The concreteness and

practical level of ideological action on the other hand must be “found” in the specific characteristics of China’s history and development, in the deeper roots of Chinese nation and culture. It is, moreover, also important to note that Mao is not promoting his own interpretation explicitly over the others. In fact, it is “we” who should take action. In this sense, the text is thus a dialogue which speaks with the voice of the internal actors (“we communists”) not the author himself; Mao modifies his own voice as a decorum which in turn represents the internal characters (see Frye1973, 268–269).

Moreover, sinification of Marxism is also a matter of translating Marxist jargon into understandable and simplified concepts. This is not surprising if monitored from Mao’s own perspective of Marxist learning; it is reliably reported that Mao’s close comrades tried in vain to interest him in Marx’s writings other than *Die Kommunistische Manifest* (see Schram 1999). Hence, one can suspect that Mao himself was still unable to grasp most of the essence of Marxist ideology and was looking for a way to take part in the process of creating Chinese Marxism by defining the relevant concepts through more familiar Chinese counterparts that he mastered. Sinification was thus a process of transforming somewhat academic Marxism into a peasant-friendly ideology.

However, although the Chinese version of Marxism (or the forerunner of Maoism in this particular case) was indeed very much simplified in terms of theoretical implications, it was not a version that was just a spin-off of the Russian version of Marxism. Likewise, Maoism was not based on a claim that it is a pure science; rather, the terminology of Maoism is not a neutral “preparation for action” but “inducement to action” (see Burke 1962, 624). In this sense, Marxism was a further developed and “bettered” by using it as a basis for the creation of the Chinese version. Hence, in Mao’s conception, Marxism could be developed by applying it through Chinese experiences in revolutionary action which proved the basic premises truthful while creating a new ideological construction. This, moreover, suggests that adaptation and development of Marxism in China’s particular environment actually represents a new theoretical synthesis and a higher formulation than Marxism itself. At the same time, however, the new synthesis also verified the superiority of Marxism by proving that it can be applied successfully in China. When tested successfully in practice and thus acting as the basis for particular and practical adaptation, the universal and general character of Marxist theories was confirmed as well.

Sinification of Marxism has generated at least two clear lines of interpretation. Nick Knight (1983, 18) defines them as follows: the first interpretation suggests that the sinification of Marxism was solely a result of Mao’s sinocentrism and emphasized the Chinese tradition and realities at the expense of Marxism’s universal truths. The second interpretation on the other hand, suggests that the sinification process of Marxism was a kind of ploy utilized by Mao to promote his own position in the power struggle within the party. Of course, both interpretations have their weaknesses. While Mao omitted dogmatic or traditional Marxist theories to a certain extent (for instance,

by neglecting the “Hegelian” development of history), he considered the theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin universally applicable (if applied through particular reading of them) as already argued earlier. Hence, it is not reasonable to say that the universal truths were something that would be neither expendable nor disposable. Likewise, although Mao used the sinification of Marxism as an ideological tool to enhance his own status as a leader in the party, the process of sinification also had a more noble reason, that is, Mao was quite certainly concerned about the future prospects of the revolution, and thus wanted to revise and re-define the orthodox (European and Soviet) reading and interpretation of Marxism.

However, although considering Marxism as a universal ideology in the sense mentioned, Mao also stressed the importance of installing a kind of Chinese “spirit” into it. Mao writes:

“样八股必须废止，空洞抽象的调头必须少唱，教条主义必须休息，而代之以新鲜活泼的，为中国老百姓所喜闻乐见的中国作风和中国气派。” (*yang bagu, bixu feizhi, kongdong chouxiangde diaotou bixu shao chang, jiaotiao zhuyi bixu xiuxi, er dai zhi yi xinxian huopode, wei zhongguo laobaixing suo xiwen-lejiande zhongguo zuofeng he zhongguo qipai*; “Foreign stereotypes must be abolished, there must be less singing of empty, abstract tunes, and dogmatism must be laid to rest; they must be replaced by the fresh, lively Chinese style and spirit which the common people of China love.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 500; SW II, 210)

It is noteworthy that Mao actually refers here to foreign style of writing rather than theoretical constructions or foreign influence in general. In a more specific context, neither “Chinese style and spirit” – nor sinification itself – mean abandoning the idea of internationalism and universalism altogether.

In this sense, it is possible and indeed imperative to formulate a third interpretation or function for Mao’s sinification of Marxist theories: genuine belief in the Marxist methodology while applying them in the specific context of China. The Marxist laws were consequently imported to and interpreted through the Chinese society. In a more specific context, sinified Marxism is something that involves “the use of language accessible to the average Chinese, enlivened with popular proverbs and colorful turns of phrase, with an occasional quotation to give it added weight” (Schram 1963, 260). Thus, familiar language acts as a vehicle to both indoctrinate and to rationalize the ideology.

Hence, by defining ideology in the manner just mentioned, sinified Marxism operates with the codes of mythological language. This kind of language exploits, re-interprets and translates scientific terminology into “dramatistic,” that is, words are put in a familiar context by mystifying and giving a special meaning to them suitable to the relevant ideology. Moreover, historically specific situations are used to justify the represented ideology, while the represented ideology, in fact, finds justification from the political culture and history of the relevant nation. For instance, as Kenneth Burke (1962, 714) restates Marx’s idea, “earlier history is nothing more than an abstraction formed from the later history, from the active influence which earlier history exercises on later history.” In this sense, the political drama involving the agents (Chinese communists) is based on a myth that actually arises from the historical

“consciousness” which in turn is based on the ideological interpretations of the past. Thus, the Chinese revolution is not only a process to realize the Marxist premises but a process through which the premises themselves are used as a vehicle to interpret the past in order to justify the myth-play that Maoism promotes, that is, the re-vitalization of the Chinese people.

5.1.3 Mao's Self-image as a Charismatic Leader

As one builds both theoretical and charismatic power in an ideological as well as in a political sense, one also starts to build a relationship to the very foundation of power. In the case of Mao Zedong, as John Bryan Starr (1977, 435) implicitly suggests, this is a question of to which extent Mao regarded himself a Marxist, a Leninist or indeed a Marxist-Leninist.

In simple terms, one can start studying the mentioned relationship through references: how and where Mao actually referred to the texts of Marx or Lenin. As already argued in chapter 4, Mao had thrown doubts on whether anyone can be regarded as “100 percent” Marxist in the sense of mastering Marxist learning. Likewise it was argued that, Mao dismissed direct learning from the books, thus signifying that mere reference to the original texts was not a good way to show one's devotion or relationship towards the ideology represented. What, then, would establish an adequate method of examining Mao's image as a Marxist? This can be done by replacing simple theoretical relationship (and thereupon textual references) to the original texts by studying what kind of role Mao saw himself play in the course of communist revolution in China. This, in essence, reveals the *ideological* as well as *political* assumptions behind Mao's conception of Marxist ideology.

It is quite clear that in the late 1930s and early 1940s Mao was more interested in enforcing the legitimacy of his revolutionary practice within the party than the theoretical conclusions to which it had led him (*ibid.*, 436) Hence, the purpose – the course of revolution – influenced Mao's ideas and interpretations of Marxism's ideology significantly; Mao was not directly interested in studying the ideology itself but rather in finding ways that would inevitably lead to political power. Although this kind of legitimacy still finds its primary source from Marx and Lenin, it did not try to show the consonance between Mao's own ideas and those of Marxism but to imply that the revolutionary practice in China was different than it was elsewhere.

This conception of the character of revolutions can be easily spotted in Mao's writings, such as 中国革命和中国共产党 (*zhongguo geming he zhongguo gongchangdang*, “Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party”) from December 1939. In this specific and lengthy piece of text, Mao actually omits the possibility of a proletarian-socialist revolution and emphasizes a bourgeois-democratic – or new-democratic in Mao's terms – revolution instead. According to Mao:

“这种新民主主义的革命也和社会主义的革命不相同，它只推翻帝国主义和汉奸反动派在中国的统治，而不破坏任何尚能参加反帝反封建的资本主义成分。” (*zhezhong xin*

minzhu zhuyide geming ye he shehui zhuyide geming bu xiangtong, ta zhi tui fan diguozhuyi he hanjian fandongpai zai zhongguode tongzhi, er bu pohanai renhe shang neng canjia fandi fanfengjiande zibenzhuyi chengfen; "The new-democratic revolution also differs from a socialist revolution in that it overthrows the rule of the imperialists, traitors and reactionaries in China but does not destroy any section of capitalism which is capable of contributing to the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle." (Mao Xuan, 611; SW II, 327)

This notion is undeniably hardcore Marxist in essence if monitored strictly from the works of Marx. By arguing that capitalism was necessary in order to achieve a form of socialist struggle as well as maintaining that no socialist revolution was in sight in China, Mao actually and quite explicitly positioned his own ideological agenda in a climate drastically different than that of Russian Marxists for instance. Likewise, in this very sentence, Mao in clear words denies the possibility of such historical development that would instantly leap from a feudal society to a socialist one. Consequently, Mao implicitly argues that China has to first achieve a state of new democracy and a kind of capitalism in order to develop into a socialist country in later stages of history.

However, this does not mean that socialist revolution would be somehow obsolete and inapplicable in China. On the contrary, the success of the new-democratic revolution merely sweeps away obstacles that have also blocked the possibility of the rise of modern capitalism. In this context, a certain degree of capitalist development is seen as an inevitable result of the victory of the democratic revolution in economically backward – that is, non-capitalist – China. Without capitalism, there is no proletariat; without proletariat, there can be no socialist revolution. Without conditions for capitalist exploitation, no Marxist persuasion can be made from the Marxist premises. As Kenneth Burke (1962, 719–720) argues, such (Marxist) persuasion is something where one gets the immediacy of participation in a local act, while seeing in and through this act an over-all design; at the same time, a distinction is drawn between the “spontaneous” response to a situation and the kind of new act that arises from under a deliberately Marxist interpretation of that situation. In the case of Mao, the local act (China) is still reflected through the over-all design (the Marxist premises), which eventually will lead to a socialist revolution in China under the Maoist interpretation of that specific situation. It is thus the role of a leader to ensure that the conditions emerge adequately.

With the rise of capitalism the socialist factors will also emerge: the relative importance and leadership of the proletariat and the communist party, the state sector of the economy owned by the democratic republic and the co-operative sector of the economy owned by the working people. While democratic revolution gives rise to two politico-economic systems, it also alters social and political conditions to such extent that socialist revolution becomes possible. Thus, in a democratic society, a contest between the capitalist and socialist systems prevails, a contest that will decide the faith of the new-born proletariat and the socialist movement itself. Democratic – or non-feudal – society will give birth to conditions for exploitation that is the very essence of socialist revolution. In a more specific context, both ideological constructions

now face the challenge of increasing their power through gaining prestige and support; this, in essence, requires charismatic leadership and special kind of dealing with the masses through the means of persuasive propaganda.

In January 1940, just after the discussion of the character of revolution, Mao wrote yet another lengthy essay named *新民主主义论* (*xin minzhu zhuyi lun*, "On New Democracy"). In the essay, Mao gives some idea about how prestige and therefore political power can be achieved in China. Significantly, at the same time, Mao also implicitly points out qualities that a charismatic leader needs. Mao writes:

“在中国，事情非常明白，谁能领导人民推翻帝国主义和封建势力，谁就能取得人民的信仰，因为人民的死敌是帝国主义和封建势力，而特别是帝国主义的缘故。在今日，谁能领导人民驱逐日本帝国主义，并实施民主政治，谁就是人民的救星。” (*zai zhongguo, shiqing feichang mingbai, shui neng lingdao renmin tui fan diguozhuyi he fengjian shili, shui jiu neng qude renminde xinyang, yinwei renminde sidi shi diguozhuyi he fengjian shili, er tebie shi diguozhuyide yuangu. zai jinri, shui neng lingdao renmin quzhu riben diguozhuyi, bing shishi minzhu zhengzhi, shui jiu shi renminde jiu xing;* "In China, it is perfectly clear that whoever can lead the people in overthrowing imperialism and the forces of feudalism can win the people's confidence, because these two, and especially imperialism, are the mortal enemies of the people. Today, whoever can lead the people in driving out Japanese imperialism and introducing democratic government will be the saviours of the people.") (*Mao Xuan*, 635; SW II, 349–350)

Here Mao makes two important arguments: first, he not only summons a rise of a revolutionary leader but also a leader of the peasants, the heart of the Chinese people; second, imperialism, foreign influence is once more condemned as the direct enemy of the Chinese. Implicitly, Mao calls for re-nationalization of Chinese culture and history as it is its degeneration that has led to the need of a "saviour," a hero that would restore the greatness of China. In this sense, Mao is acting according to the very romantic ideas of the past; the romance is marked by its extraordinarily persistent nostalgia and its search for some kind of imaginative golden age in time or space (see Frye1973, 186).

However, re-nationalization of the kind mentioned does not mean that foreign influences or foreigners *an sich* would now emerge as enemies of the Chinese people, culture and history. Rather, Mao's conception suggests that ideology has to be nationalized through specific reading and interpreting the relevant political situation, the over-all design should be reflected upon the local act, which in turn as a particular condition, further develops the over-all design as well, thus creating an ideological "act" peculiarly Chinese. For Mao (see *Mao Xuan*, 984; SWIII, 255), the local act is thus the establishment of China's own national, scientific and mass culture and education. Such re-nationalization also means very similar things as the process of sinification discussed in the previous section. While sinification was more of a process of re-shaping Marxist ideology and its language into a something that could be described with a phrase like "Chinese style and spirit," re-nationalization of culture and history was concentrating on describing the ideology through convenient and inspiring narratives.

Hence, historical narratives serve as a guide to achieve a momentum for revolution. By re-evaluating historical legacy through Marxist methodology, history becomes something that interacts between the past, present and future. In other words, combining Marxist theory with Chinese history is a process where traditional Chinese history will eventually lead to the creation of modern Chinese history, that is, as history is being re-interpreted through Marxist content, it reveals how Marxism itself can be developed into a higher level; the very content of Marxism will be richer than before its application in China while applying this new content will inevitably enrich Marxism even further. In this sense, an ideologically interpreted past – history interpreted through Marxist methodology – is something that serves the future rather than objective study of historical facts themselves.

Mao defines the problem as follows:

“学习我们的历史遗产，用马克思主义的方法给以批判的总结，使我们学习的另一任务。” (*xuexi womende lishi yichan, yong makesizhuyide fangfa geiyi pipande zongjie, shi women xuexide lingyi renwu*; “Another of our tasks is to study our historical heritage and use the Marxist method to sum it up critically.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 499; *SWII*, 209)

Mao’s conception of reading and interpreting history through ideology and vice versa also dictates how a leader must interact with the ideology itself. In essence, interpreting history (as well as the relevant political culture) suggests that the leader should be able to understand both international and national circumstances and peculiarities; a good communist leader is thus a nationally aware internationalist. It is not sufficient for a Chinese Marxist to merely evaluate the historical heritage but also to assimilate it into their world-view as this is the only way to provide them with a new methodology to help guide the revolution (Wylie 1979, 474). Assimilating China’s historical legacy into the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution is not only a process of adopting a new particular form in which the general content of ideology can reside but a new form of totality that assimilates particular and general content into one nation and cultural specific ideological whole.

Considering the role that Mao gives to the historical heritage and thus the interpretation of the past, the glorification and mystification of the heroes from the past is likewise imminent. Besides glorifying the whole nation as a heroic actor, Mao also placed himself as a central figure in the process of re-interpreting the history. It was Mao who had realized the means to make China great again through the application of Marxism. At the same time, as Howard L. Boorman (1966, 82) observes, the interpreter of history comes to occupy a dominant position in the history of a people, a country or an institution, and his/hers personal views on history and the historical process assume significance; moreover, the recorded views of such event-making individuals are of intrinsic value because these individuals have personal knowledge of the events described – because they are actors before they are authors. In this specific sense, Mao was “making” history as he both re-interpreted the history as well as placed – temporalized and spatialized – himself in the pages of that history.

5.1.4 War as a Romantic Act

While Mao Zedong's conception of contradiction reflects his understanding of Marxist ideology and development that occur within societies in a broader sense, the Leninist elements of Mao's thinking – that is, means of gaining political power through revolutionary action – are reflected through the concepts of “war” and “revolution.” As already argued, war is an act to achieve a specific purpose, that is, revolution. In this sense, both concepts are closely linked with ideology as well, since Marxism is the co-agent of Maoism.

Ideology needs a program or a manifesto in order to secure sufficient conditions to motivate political action. In other words, it needs a script. For instance, with the success of the revolution in Russia, Marxism became an orthodox doctrine, aiming not at revolutionary rejection of an old political structure, but at the acceptance of a new political structure (Burke 1962, 210). Hence, with the successful revolution the settings and “the Scene-Act Ratio” changed; accordingly, the script that was written to support revolutionary action could no longer form the guideline for action. Rather, the experiences of the revolution were institutionalized as a collective script that in turn now emphasized the myth that led to the realization of the revolution itself. Revolution, moreover, became a romance where the attributes of divinity “will cling to the hero” (see Frye 1973, 187); or, as Shu Guang Zhang (1995, 29) observes, Mao's confidence in a human being's subjective capability to determine the result of war is an evidence of romanticizing military affairs.

In the case of Maoism, the Mao-agent is represented in *Mao Xuan* not only as a hero but as a constructor of an ideology; moreover, Mao is a “target” for ideological identification. While the programmatic elements of ideology define certain rules, aims, and theoretical foundation that constitute the very foundation of movement on an organizational level, (ideological) battles require understanding of universal and particular knowledge of military tactics and strategy. Without the act there can be no defeating the counter-agent and no purpose that needs to be fulfilled. Thus, the programmatic element is the basis of any ideology; as ideology is a systematic set of ideas with action consequences serving the purpose of creating and using organization, a philosophic (theoretical, pure) element defines the ideas while a programmatic (practical) element defines the action consequences. In this specific context, the programmatic element of ideology not only determines the methods of political action, but moreover, it determines the aims and goals of the ideology as well. It sets up a frame for battles by defining the circumstances confronted in ideological battles and introduces the necessary means to overcome them.

As already maintained, the concept of contradiction is the key in understanding Mao Zedong's approach to ideological action and theory of knowledge. The concept of contradiction re-defines the very constitution of the ideological whole, especially on a theoretical level. On a more practical level, however, the concept of war and the concept of revolution are the ones through which theoretical knowledge is realized; they are also the channels through which the romantic adventure is experienced. Both concepts act as a

manifestation of rational knowledge that arises from understanding and applying the correct ideological agenda. Consequently, action, tactics and strategy are the methodology to solve the problems that arise with war and revolution. Hence, war and revolution are ideological solutions to certain political situations. As political situations can only be solved through action, ideological actions necessarily are violent. This is hardly surprising if placed in the context of the socio-historical situation under which the communist movement in China struggled until the end of the 1940s: the revolution could not be achieved. In many ways, both concepts (war, revolution) correspond with the historical perspective that emphasizes a kind of “past-present-future” approach; based on the theories developed by Marx, the role of historical analysis was seen as a philosophical method that reveals the dialectical structure of both the historical development and its relationship with class struggle and social revolution within societies (Soo 1981, 109). At the same time, however, the Chinese version of Marxism was in a state of development itself and while the experiences in war and revolution influenced its essence; the role of the actors were yet to be decided and the script still to be written.

There was an inevitable link between the creation of Maoism and the experiences of war. War was necessary to achieve momentum for the revolution, and the revolutionary war became the keys to eliminating all other wars and to gaining political power. The role of ideology was thus also in bettering the morale of its advocates. As revolutionary action was closely linked with ideological action, that is, the ultimate role of ideology was to motivate revolution; peace in this context would mean that ideologies had become “obsolete” along the process. The dilemma of revolutionary action is thus in its success; if successful, revolutions would no longer be needed which in turn would mean that ideological action became unnecessary as well. However, since ideological action is the source of correct knowledge and knowledge is never perfect or complete, revolution can never be entirely successful. A successful revolution, in this particular case of Maoism, removes the conditions to further explore the truths of Marxist learning that inevitably remains as the role of the ideology.

Although Mao put a great deal of emphasis on experiencing the war as the source of strategic innovations, he also constructed certain formulas and guidelines of war on paper. Thus, he did not rely solely on practical learning of waging war but also laid emphasis on written and academic warfare. In essence, Mao’s formulations display a dualism similar to his theory of contradiction, that is, he implicitly defines war through universality and particularity hence studying it as a form of ideological action. This is important for two reasons: first, although Mao (see *Mao Xuan*, 449–451; *SWI*, 155–157) quite explicitly promoted “heroic sacrifice” (勇敢牺牲, *yonggan xisheng*) thus omitting too much emphasis on mere strategic abilities to an extent, he also needed to qualify as a competent military leader through mastery of military tactics. Second, while war in itself is a series of battles with somewhat contingent elements attached to it, it also has universal, law-like elements; it can be “controlled.” In Mao’s (see

Mao Xuan, 154–158; SWI, 179–182) analysis there are three types of wars that all follow three kinds of laws: *the (basic) laws of war, the laws of revolutionary war, and the laws of China's revolutionary war.*

Of these, “the laws of war” (*zhanzhengde guilü, 战争的规律*) refer quite simply to a problem which anyone directing a war must study and solve. War in this case is considered to be the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions among classes, nations, states, or political groups. In this sense, war is necessarily ideological, since the “need” for war arises from political motives. Accordingly, war in this specific context is universal and general, and the concepts used (defeat vs. victory; friend vs. enemy, etc.) are defined through simple and contradictory concepts. “The laws of revolutionary war” (*革命战争的规律, geming zhanzhengde guilü*) refers to a problem which anyone directing a revolutionary war must study and solve. In this particular case it also refers to either a revolutionary class war or a revolutionary national war of which the latter is especially relevant to the Maoist context before 1949; both have their specific circumstances and nature, in addition to the basic laws of war described above. In the sense of understanding war, ideological motives and elements are used to describe the essence of a conflict more accurately (fascism vs. communism, etc.). “The laws of China's revolutionary war” (*中国革命战争的规律, zhongguo geming zhanzhengde guilü*) refer thus to a problem which anyone directing China's revolutionary war must study and solve. This is the most specific stage of a war, whether civil or national war, waged in China. Accordingly, the characteristics of Chinese society are imported into this kind of conflict; this type of war is also the one with the most particular characteristics.

Although all kinds of war have their own particular characteristics, situation specific wars are the most ideological ones. War, in the sense mentioned, thus forms a spatially and temporally definable concept that can only be understood through experiencing this phenomenon. According to Nick Knight (1983, 20), for instance, Mao rejected the notion that there can only be laws of war in general; thus laws arising from events in one geographical area may not be relevant in another area, or in the same location at a different time. Mao also gives four principal characteristics that determine China's revolutionary war and thus the whole outcome of the communist revolution:

“经过了一次大革命的政治经济不平衡的半殖民的大国，强大的敌人，弱小的红军，土地革命 - 这是中国革命战争四个主要的特点。” (*jingguo le yici da gemingde zhengzhi jingji bu pinghengde banzhimindide daguo, qiangdade diren, ruoxiaode hongjun, tudi geming - zhe shi zhongguo gemingzhangzhen sige zhuyaoode tedian*; “Thus the four principal characteristics of China's revolutionary war are: a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through a great revolution; a big and powerful enemy; a small and weak Red Army; and the agrarian revolution.”) (*Mao Xuan, 175; SW I, 199*)

These characteristics imply significant policies promoted by Maoism. In Mao's analysis, the first and the fourth of these principles suggest that the Red Army and the communist movement itself can grow and defeat its enemy while the

remaining two principles mean that victory – although imminent and thus achievable – is unlikely to follow rapidly. Hence, revolution in this specific context is defined through a liberalist conception of time in a sense that Mannheim (see 1976) defines it; revolution is thus an outcome of ideological action that will eventually “consume” the prevailing current.

While Mao’s conception of time and revolution can indeed be claimed to be liberalist, one can also spot radical elements that were necessary in order to achieve popular support for the movement itself. As already maintained earlier, liberal ideologies tend to revolutionize the current through reforming the present, that is, they see the change as imminent yet something that will take time to achieve. Radical ideologies on the other hand aim at immediate change thus provoking controlled chaos. Likewise, liberalism articulates through integrative propaganda while radicalism through agitative propaganda. Benjamin I. Schwartz (1979, 189) argues that “the Maoist strategy” involves the imposition of a political party organized in accordance with Leninist principles while promoting “a strong mass bases,” that is, strong peasant mass base. This base was also a condition for the revolution. In this sense, Mao indeed had a romantic vision of revolutionary action that was based on the accumulation of the political will of the peasants.

It is also possible to formulate certain strategic implications of war that Mao saw necessary for ideological action and thus politics. First, it is obvious that Mao was not only interested in war as a form of ideological struggle but as a way to implement his own ideas within the party. Although Mao was in this particular case promoting his own status as a military and indeed political leader, he quite controversially masked it as a task of stressing “unity and progress” (团结, 进步; *tuanjie, jinbu*), which in turn emphasized the romantic adventure that can be shared by those participating in revolutionary action. In July 1940 Mao proclaimed:

“为此目的，在政权问题上，我们主张统一战线政权，既不赞成别的党派的一党专政，也不主张共产党的一党专政，而主张各党，各派，各界，各军的联合专政，这既是统一战线政权。” (*weici mude, zai zhengquan wenti shang, women zhuzhang tongyi zhanxian zhengquan, ji bu zancheng biede dangpaide yidang zhuanzheng, ye bu zhuzhang gongchandangde yidang zhuanzheng, er zhuzhang gedang, gepai, gejie, gejunde lianhe zhuanzheng, zhe ji shi tongyi zhanxian zhengquan*; “Thus, as far as political power is concerned, we stand for united front organs of political power; we do not favor one-party dictatorship either by the Communist Party or by any other party, but we stand for the joint dictatorship of all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life and all armed forces, that is, for united front political power.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 718; SW II, 438)

Despite the calls to stress democratic or “three thirds system” (三三制, *san san zhi*) – a system that ensured that communists would take only one-third of the places in all government or people’s representative bodies during the anti-Japanese war – Mao was not keen to let anti-communist elements influence politics. In fact, he emphasized the need to oppose both “right” and “left” opportunism, thus implying that there was no need for ideological debate,

unless initiated by Mao himself. However, anti-communist in this specific case does not mean anti-Marxist but policies that were not approved by the communists.

In a more intense analysis, Mao seems to identify the sinified version of Marxism-Leninism as a national ideology that can and should be embraced by all Chinese; in this sense, Maoism appears to be constructing a nationalized ideology as well. All Chinese should thus unite and progress under the banner of Marxism that is modified and designed to meet the needs of the whole nation. As Maoism was now defined as something essentially Chinese and war was a form of applying this ideological construction, politics was also seen implicitly as a subordinate to ideological action. It is thus not surprising to note that Mao defined war as “the continuation of politics” (政治的继续, *zhengzhide jixu*), a phrase Mao indirectly borrowed from Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz’s *Vom Kriege* (1832). Hence, in Mao’s conception, war is politics and war itself is a form of political action; war always has a political character and victory in itself is inseparable from the political aim of the war.

As the aim of war is closely if not entirely linked with the political and ideological aims of the group waging war, the overall task of gaining power is a matter of mobilizing the masses to act according to the relevant ideology. Maoism was thus a peculiar cocktail between romantic faith in the masses and contempt of the individual conscience (see Lichtheim 1964, 360). This, in essence, was also a “violation” of Marxist belief in the development of history according to which the proletarian revolution would occur almost spontaneously (see Cohen 1968, 30). This, moreover, suggests that the masses have to be “informed” about the political aim of the war, that is, they have to be motivated to identify the victory with their own needs and aspirations. Consequently, war has to be acknowledged as a kind of myth-play experience that is driven by the desired future and the assumed past, an inevitable adventure towards the realization of the mutual dream of a successful quest. By characterizing the battle as a matter of ideological action as well, the outcome of the war is not only identified with the destroying the *ancien regime* but with creating a new regime.

Finally, war in the Maoist context is a method of ideological action that aims at preserving oneself while destroying the enemy. Although this aim is somewhat obvious, preservation does not mean waging war carefully or avoiding losses in battle. On the contrary, Mao emphasized the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war. To the question of whether the concept preservation actually contradicts the concept of heroic sacrifice Mao answers strictly:

“不相矛盾，是相反相成的。战争是流血的政治，是要付代价的，有时是极大的代价。部分的暂时的牺牲（不保存），为了全体的永久的保存。” (*bu xiang maodun, shi xiang fan xiang chengde. zhanzheng shi liuxuede zhengzhi, shi yao fu daijiade, you shi shi jidade daijia. bufende zanshide xisheng (bu baocun), wei le quantide yongjiude baocun*; “No, it does not; sacrifice and self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. War is politics with bloodshed and exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high price. Partial and temporary sacrifice (non-preservation) is incurred for the sake of general and permanent preservation.”) (*Mao Xuan*, 450; SW II, 156)

Hence, losses are necessary to win battles, that is, to consume the enemy. Accordingly, attack is a means of destroying the enemy with the function of self-preservation; as attacking is the only way to totally annihilate the enemy, it is also a way of preserving oneself from the enemy. Likewise, defense in this context is always accompanied by attack and is thus not pure and simple defence. While attack and defense are closely linked in Mao's conception of war, the strategic implication of war itself is the ideological object of war; the object of war is in the underlying principle of war, that is, to gain political power. Consequently, war is simply a form of revolutionary action.

6 CLOSING THE CURTAINS

I started my project by making a reference to a discussion from the 1960s that has been lying dormant until recently. One of the activists that have been keeping the question of Mao's Marxism virulent is notably Nick Knight. In *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought* Knight (1997, 84-116) calls for the "retention of the concept of orthodoxy" in order to "evaluate the origins and development of Chinese Marxism." There are always dominant themes that constitute the "orthodoxy" or "canon," as in the context of this particular study. According to Knight (ibid, 90), acknowledgment of the dominant themes and the dominance of a particular theoretical current in Marxism allows a point of reference, which in turn permits evaluation and comparison of the otherwise unmanageably large mass of concepts within the vast corpus of the Marxist texts. In the case of my conception of Maoism, such a point of reference is the 1960 version of *Mao Xuan* that constitutes "a particular theoretical current" in Chinese Marxism.

Thus, it is not important to examine whether or not the version of *Mao Xuan* used is in consonance with the concurrent Marxism in the West and in the Soviet Union. Rather, it should be regarded as an interpretation of Marxism that has inevitable references to the particular scene, that is, China. Moreover, as the text is taken as a dogmatic and canonized piece of interpretation of Marxism, it is at the same time a vehicle for dramatic political changes in a society; it is through the use of dogmas that ideological actions reach such a level of justification that the actions themselves become "divine" as well.

Such ideological actions are moreover romanticized and mystified; they necessarily give individuals a motive and a model to action which in turn both enhances and strengthens the belief in the dogma itself. Since the birth of the dogma is considered "holy," it is unchallenged until it is found sufficient to justify the existence of the dominant political group. Even after a revision, however, the dogma stays relevant as the basis for the group. While the interpretation can change, the story, the myth-play remains untouched. For instance, although Maoism is no longer *the* ideology in China, the myth-play

Mao promoted through the use of Marx is still relevant as it is imported as the interpretation of the official history.

As charisma is something that has to be “earned” or possessed and ideological myths are born along with charismatic leaders, myths are not “made” in the sense of manufacturing. However, myths can be strengthened and enhanced in a special way, that is, they can gain new channels through which they appear. In this context, myths are made available to the public by means that lack the collective space of experience; they thus become stories that are being told for special purposes, and as such they actually escape reality and normal patterns of history. Or, as Kenneth Burke (1962, 307) argues, “experience itself becomes mystical when some accidental happens to be “representative” of the individual, as when a sequence of circumstances follows exactly the pattern desired by him.” This is what Burke calls “the mystic moment” which represents a stage in “act” where things inevitably take a “higher meaning.” These meanings, then, give the act a special purpose, and the narrative itself becomes evidence of the emergence of a “momentary god.”

In most cases, such narratives that are used to promote ideological themes tend to lose objectivity and become – more or less – fantastic. In the case of Maoism, the interaction of national mystique and “invincible” ideological theory caused a peculiar construction that combined political and religious elements. Thus, the Maoist ideology was eventually powered not only by nationalism and a kind of populism but by a spirit of revolutionary voluntarism, which held that the ideas and will of men are more important than the development and relationship of the material forces of production (Boorman 1966, 99). Likewise, the very image of Mao Zedong reflected the ideals that were possible to construct upon his life and deeds. This is not surprising, of course, since an individual’s significance upon history is likewise reflected through other people, a country or an institution; the more dominant the figure, the more systematic (and deliberate) the interpretation of his historical status. In this sense, challenging the grand narrative is also challenging the truth.

The patterns through which ideological narratives are being told easily qualify as heroic and being such the stories tend to be cumulative in terms of their essence. Although hero-cycle stories have always been somewhat essential parts of Chinese culture for instance, few anticipated the ideological fever and the magnitude of Mao-worship that erupted with the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. As Mao was erected above all the other leaders of the Party, his image as an omnipotent leader was also propagated. While Chinese communism merged with the personality of Mao Zedong in totality, his thought also gained new attributes. In fact, Mao Zedong Thought became an invincible ideological construction, providing answers to every possible problem. Starting from 1966, several Chinese newspapers released stories of the wonders that resulted by following of Mao Zedong Thought: on the 15 December 1967, Peking Review reported that a patient had re-gained his vision by watching the image of the great Chairman, and by following his brilliant Thought; on the 15 November 1968, Peking Review reported that a Mao

Zedong Thought propaganda team of medical workers, relying on the invincible Thought of Mao, had enabled many a deaf-mute to speak; on the 28 November 1969, New China News Agency reported that a medical assistant who was an activist in the living study and application of Mao Zedong Thought and a Communist Party member, restored a patient's vision by using the teaching's of Mao in his work; on the 30 January 1969, New China News Agency reported that a doctor assisted by workers and PLA Mao Zedong's Thought propaganda team had resurrected a man from the dead by reading out quotations from Chairman Mao's little red book (see Urban 1971). And these stories are just the top of an iceberg. Consequently, every wonder or bizarre event in China was soon considered as a crystallization of Maoism in action.

The mystification of Mao's personality was thus a process of debunking the institutionalized charisma and returning to the traditional hero cult. Mao's charisma was no longer based on an institutional power-base. On the contrary, the party's legitimacy was now based on Mao's personal charisma. Likewise, Maoism included in itself a variety of charismatic aspects and functions. As already argued, charisma can be gained through four different "vocations": the sage, the general, the prince, and the revolutionary leader. Mao Zedong acted as all of them, although his charisma rested on different basis during different periods of time. For instance, the period of pre-revolution was characterized by the charisma of the sage, the general and the revolutionary leader; Mao was considered to be capable of bringing order (revolution) with his abilities regarding military strategy and pure personal greatness. Mao was thus seen as a person who would succeed in gaining the power, and more importantly, in upholding it through mastery of events, how erratic or contingent they might be. Likewise, Mao not only was the source of innovation – the creator of the correct ideological worldview – but also the symbol and the very articulator of that order.

With Mao's promotion to divine, however, his type of charisma changed into a primitive and indeed omnipotent one. Mao was above charismatic evaluation, and his thought was unerring and universal. From this bias, the leader is responsible only for the good things that take place in the society, while considered not responsible for any misfortune. Rather, the responsibility of erratic decisions and failures in bringing fortune to the people is directly interpreted as a failure in following the invincible and all-knowing thought of the leader. Thus, the leader does not have to provide actual good deeds as he is seen as the very source of all morality and wisdom.

YHTEENVETO

Kaanon vs. karisma. "Maoismi" ideologisena konstruktiona

Tämä tutkimus keskittyy länsimaissa Maoismina tunnetun ideologisen konstruktio- määrittelemiseen ja sen edelleen kehittämiseen. Yleinen lähtökohta Maoismin tutkimuksessa on ollut debatti siitä, missä määrin Mao Zedong seurasi perinteisiä marxilaisia oppeja ja missä määrin hän taas sisällytti kiinalaisia elementtejä omaan ideologiseen tulkintaansa.

Tässä tutkimuksessa tätä tulkintaa on kuitenkin pyritty merkittävästi laajentamaan. Ensinnäkään tutkimus ei lähde tarkastelemaan Maoa pelkkänä marxilaisena ideologina eikä näin ollen myöskään Maoismia ortodoksisena marxilaisena ideologiana, vaan pääpaino on itse Maoismin ja ideologian käsitteiden laajentamisessa. Maoismi jaetaan kahteen osioon, kaanoniin ja myyttiin, joista jälkimmäinen heijastelee nimenomaisesti Maon persoonaa ja siitä kumpuavaa karismaa. Tästä myös työn nimi, joka kuvaa sitä näennäistä ristiriitaa, joka usein mielletään olemassaolevaksi kaanonin ja karisman välille.

Tutkimuksen perusargumentti on kaanonin ja myyttien yhteistyö Maoismin kaltaisissa ideologisissa konstruktioissa. Työn lähtökohta on siis antaa määritelmä sellaiselle ideologialle, joka on paitsi vahvasti dogmaattinen, niin myös ilmentää jonkun henkilön persoonaa, kuten Maoismi tekee. Maoismia tulkitaan tällaisena ideologina *Mao Xuanin* – Maon koottujen teoksien – kautta. *Mao Xuan* sisältää Maon tärkeimmät ideologiset tekstit, ja siitä on myös referoitu muun muassa *Pieni punainen kirja*. Tekstien järjestys on kronologinen, joka antaa paitsi mahdollisuuden tarkkailla Maon ajattelun kehittymistä, niin myös tutkia millaisen ideologisen narratiivin kyseinen teksti tuottaa. Näin ollen välittömän mielenkiinnon kohteena on se narratiivi, joka kuvaa Maoa ideologisena aktorina.

Mao Xuania luetaan eräänlaisena teoreettisena tarinana eli "skriptinä", joka paitsi avaa Maoismin teoreettista tulkintaa, niin myös kertoo millaisissa olosuhteissa ja ennen kaikkea minkä tyyppisin käsittein Maoismi selittää oman olemassaolonsa. Vaikka Maoismi määritelläänkin ideologiseksi kaanoniksi, sitä ei määritellä muuttumattomaksi tai immuuniksi muutoksille. Tutkimus lähteekin liikkeelle siitä ajatuksesta, että ideologinen muutos on välttämätöntä, koska historian tulkinnat muuttuvat väistämättä. Ideologiseen muutokseen kiinnitetään siten erityistä huomiota puuttamalla erityisesti reformien ja revisioiden problematiikkaan. Tässä ilmenee myös työn idea kaanonin ja myyttien suhteesta; siinä missä kaanon saattaa pysyä muuttumattomana tekstimuodossa, niin sen edustamien myyttien tulkinta ja sisältö muokkaavat myös kaanonin tulkinnallista sisältöä.

Tutkimuksen metodologia nojaa vahvasti Northrop Fryen, Kenneth Burken ja Reinhart Koselleckin tapaan tulkita narratiiveja, historiallisia tarinoita yleisemminkin sekä muutosta. Johtuen metodologian eräänlaisesta näytelmäluonteisuudesta, myös itse tutkimus on kirjoitettu "akteihin" eli spesifeihin

temaattisiin näytöksiin. Tutkimus kiinnittää alkupuolella aivan erityisesti huomiota valitun teoreettisen viitekehyksen selittämiseen; loppuosa keskittyy em. viitekehyksen soveltamiseen suhteessa Maoismiin ja *Mao Xuaniin*.

Tutkimuksen pääasiallisena johtomotiivina voidaan nähdä paitsi Maoismin käsitteen uudenlaisen määrittelyn, niin myös uudenlaisen tavan nähdä Maoismin tapaiset ideologiset konstruktiot ja tulkita niitä.

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