

Minna Rasku

On the Border of East and West

Greek Geopolitical Narratives



Minna Rasku

On the Border of East and West

Greek Geopolitical Narratives

Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston yhteiskuntatieteellisen tiedekunnan suostumuksella
julkisesti tarkastettavaksi yliopiston Agora-rakennuksessa (Ag Aud. 1)
elokuun 18. päivänä 2007 kello 12.

Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of
the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Jyväskylä,
in the Building Agora (Ag Aud. 1), on August 18, 2007 at 12 o'clock noon.



UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 2007

On the Border of East and West
Greek Geopolitical Narratives

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 307

Minna Rasku

On the Border of East and West

Greek Geopolitical Narratives



UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 2007

Editors

Jussi Kotkavirta

Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy / philosophy, University of Jyväskylä

Irene Ylönen, Marja-Leena Tynkkynen

Publishing Unit, University Library of Jyväskylä

URN:ISBN:9789513929039

ISBN 978-951-39-2903-9 (PDF)

ISBN 978-951-39-2886-5 (nid.)

ISSN 0075-4625

Copyright © 2007, by University of Jyväskylä

Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä 2007

ABSTRACT

Rasku, Minna

On the Border of East and West. Greek Geopolitical Narratives

Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2007, 169 p.

(Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research
ISSN 0075-4625; 307)

ISBN 978-951-39-2903-9 (PDF), 978-951-39-2886-5 (nid.)

Finnish summary

Diss.

The study examines the various placements of Greece in the geopolitical framework of Europe, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the grand dimensions of the West and the East. The aim is to analyse the geopolitical placing of Greece during 1981-2000. The purpose is to illustrate how varying discourses of Greekness have situated the country in differing positions between East and West; how it has been linked with the construction of Greek boundaries; and how these kinds of discursive processes are never-ending.

I have been reading Greek foreign policy discussion as narratives, which try to give answers to questions like 'who are we?', and 'who are the others?'; 'where do we belong?'; and 'where do we not belong?' The process of arguing national identity and delineating its borders is closely linked with geopolitical debates. The greatest change during the research period in the geopolitical place of Greece was the end of the Cold War. The geopolitical map of Greece changed rapidly as three socialist states on the other side of the Northern border vanished and new neighbours appeared, and thus new others, on the other side of the border. Although the geographic location of the border itself did not change, there has been a strong social and political need to recreate the existence of the border by using new narrativistic constructions, which then have been turned into new legal, administrative and social practices.

My argument here is that especially the Eastern border is one of the main elements of Greek geopolitical identity, comparable to such grand themes as the rhetoric of nationalism, language, and history, and naturally deeply imbued with them. The resulting eastern borderland identity is a way to explain Greece's special position in the world, and especially in Europe.

Keywords: geopolitics, narratives, borders, borderland, Greece, Aegean Sea, Balkans.

Author's address Minna Rasku
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy / political
science
P.O. BOX 35, FI-40014
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Supervisor Professor Pekka Korhonen
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy / political
science
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Reviewers Doctor Riikka Kuusisto
University of Helsinki, Finland

Docent Sami Moisio
University of Turku, Finland

Opponent Associate Professor Asteris Huliaras
Department of Geography
Harokopion University of Athens, Greece

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Pekka Korhonen who has guided and commented the manuscript, or its parts, several times from the very beginning of the process. I have benefited enormously of the fact that researches in different fields have commented the study. I would like to thank reviewers doctor Riikka Kuusisto and docent Sami Moisio for their valuable comments, and also Professor Kari Palonen, Margarita Gerouki and docent Teuvo Laitila. I am very grateful to Susanne Kalejaiye for checking the language and Olli-Pekka Moisio for editing the book. There are several people who have followed the process all these years. My final thanks got to my family and friends for their support and patience.

For their financial support, I would like to thank the project 'The East and the Idea of Europe', financed by the Academy of Finland, Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs of Greece, the Emil Aaltonen Foundation, Finnish Konkordia Fund, the Ellen and Artturi Nyysönen Foundation, Suomen Ateenan-insituutin ystävät ry, and Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy.

Jyväskylä, the 16th of July, 2007

Minna Rasku

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

1	INTRODUCTION	9
2	A GREEK SENSE OF PLACE	25
2.1	Place and Space	25
2.2	Place and Belonging	26
2.3	Place and Conflict	29
2.4	Place and Geopolitics	32
3	BEING IN EAST AND WEST	51
3.1	The Identity of 'We'	51
3.2	The Location of 'They'	57
3.3	Being in East and West.....	61
3.4	Narratives of Us	65
4	RE-PLACING MODERN GREECE	74
4.1	Away from Autocracy.....	74
4.2	Tenth Member of the European Union.....	78
5	PLACING GREECE ON THE BOUNDARY OF EUROPE	91
5.1	The Location of Greece	92
5.2	Maritime Boundary-Making	102
5.3	The Endless Question of Cyprus	121
5.4	Naming Macedonia	130
6	GEOPOLITICAL LOCATIONS OF MODERN GREECE.....	148

YHTEENVETO

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 INTRODUCTION

This study is an analysis of the various placements of Greece in the geopolitical framework of Europe, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the grand dimensions of the West and the East. Placing Greece on a geopolitical map is an interesting task for many reasons. It is situated in a geographic area where the discussion of borders and place is vital. Both the east-west dilemma and the Balkan-Europe dichotomy touch Greece deeply. The Mediterranean creates an interesting border to the south, because there Greece faces Africa. The Aegean Sea to the east separates Greece from Turkey, with which military conflict has been simmering throughout the past centuries, and from Anatolia, which traditionally has been referred to as a part of Asia, or even as Asia proper.

The analysis of the geopolitical location of Greece and how it has been changing is focused on Greece's first two decades in the European Union in 1981-2000. These changes of location have been movements of imagination because geo or *Gaia*, the earth, takes only very small steps within such a short span of 19 years. Although there have been a number of earthquakes and smaller movements of the earth in the Eastern Mediterranean area, the physical geographic position of Greece has remained the same. However, political 'earthquakes', strongly have influenced the perceived location of Greece. The most significant of these was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was soon followed by the dismantling of Yugoslavia. When the Cold War geopolitical order collapsed in the late 1980s, massive changes of political geography began to take place in Europe. The geopolitical locations of countries simultaneously began to change, and the effects were strongest in the vicinity of the Cold War political border.

Due to these enormous changes in the world geopolitical map and simultaneous theoretical developments in geopolitical analysis, interest in imagined geographies has moved to the core of studies of political geography. One of the red lines of this study is to focus on human sense of place as a geopolitical issue. The mutual relation of the earth and politics is a fascinating theme. The most practical level where these two are connected on a daily basis, involving ceaselessly changing rhetorical narrations, is the foreign policy of a

state. The sense of belonging to a certain place is a guidepost to answers for questions like 'where are we', 'who are we', 'are we members of the East or the West,' 'where would we like to be,' and so forth. Presenting these questions are the first steps in an attempt of placing contemporary Greece. Greece is a particularly interesting example, having border-countries that are continuously placing themselves. It lies at one of the traditional imaginary borders of East and West. Europe and Asia as continental metaphors are regularly activated in the Greek-Turkish relations, and made more intense because of the conflicting territorial disputes between the countries. Greece's southern sea border faces Africa, and therefore it is also on the border of North and South. The country is a member of the European Union as well as NATO, but there are still debates whether Greece is truly European or not. Although Greece has been a member of the EU since 1981, it has always been perceived as a geopolitical island, as it has always been surrounded by states that are not members of the EU. The sense of isolation was explained by the Communist neighbours in the North from whom a NATO member Greece had to be protected, and the fellow NATO country Turkey, in the East, which was a traditional enemy.¹ Greece is also the southernmost part of the Balkan area. That is why, from time to time, the question has been raised whether Greece is a Balkan state in Europe – or a European state in Balkans. Only Italy, behind the Ionian Sea, seems to be an uninteresting direction for the Greeks, as there is little dispute with the Italians.

The reason for focusing mainly on the period of 1981-2000 is the manifold influences resulting from membership in the European Union. During this time, Greece has solidified its democratic institutions and removed the military from intervening in the internal and external policies of the state. Greece has also become a member of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); not immediately in 1999 when it was first formed, but in 2001 Greece joined the Euro zone as the twelfth member². This was – for the time being – the final stage in a long process where Greece had to argue for its place among the democratic Western countries, in order to be really accepted as a member of the European Union. It can be said that Greece has moved from being 'part of the problem to part of the solution'³. During the first decade of the process of Europeanization Greece's western boundary was gradually porous, while Greece simultaneously needed to create a contrasting and clearly marked boundary towards the East, especially Turkey. During the 1990s, the post-Socialist turbulence⁴ in former Eastern Europe placed Greece into the position of a stable and advanced Western country in contrast to its neighbours in the Balkans. However, its relationship with Turkey continued to be difficult, especially over the Cyprus question and some territorial disputes in the Aegean,

¹ Kavakas 2001, 170 and *Ιωακείπιδης*, (publishing date unknown), 105.

² Botsiu 2002, 31.

³ Couloumbis e.g. 2003, 35 and 1999b, 415, and Kavakas 2001, 168.

⁴ The ending of the Cold War is often limited to the years of 1989 – 1991. The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, so did also the geopolitical template of Soviet East versus American West that had underwritten world politics for the previous forty years. Another important change for Greece, during the era, was the break-up of the former Yugoslavia along ethnic-regional lines in the 1989 – 1994.

but Greece also had to start to take into account Turkey's determined drive to become a member of the EU. Greek foreign policy towards Turkey has consequently moved from a purely territorial conception of national interests to a mixed territorial and functional conception. An example of the first policy line was the territorial conflict over Imia in 1996, involving high military tension, and of the second, the Helsinki meeting in 1999, when Greece began supporting Turkey's application for the membership in the EU. A constructive approach now requires a reinterpretation of the old Europe-Asia dichotomy, allowing for a dilution of the former sharp boundary-line over the Aegean.

A study of foreign policy, territories, boundaries and maps is inevitably also a research of rhetoric, whether verbal or visual. As Trevor J. Barnes and James S. Duncan point out, rhetorical devices, such as metaphors, irony, smiles and the like, are central to conveying meaning. 'They are the means by which we persuade our audience that we really did the things that we say we did'. They stress that 'in writing about worlds, we must pay attention to our rhetoric, as well as the rhetoric of others'. Of course we try to tell about worlds like they are, but we also end up telling what we are like.⁵ It is incredible how much we write ourselves within texts.

While doing my research I was able to live for two years (2003-2005) in Athens. This was made possible by my participation in the project 'The East and the Idea of Europe', financed by the Academy of Finland. During those years I deepened my skills in the Greek language, and collected the research material from different libraries and bookshops. I feel privileged to have lived those years in Athens with my family. Although the city was familiar to me because of numerous short visits there since the middle of the 1980s, it was a completely different story to move to Athens, to live there with my family, and make it a home for us. The presence of my daughter also made the normal school system, στο δημοτικό σχολείο, a part of our daily life, and of course intensified the importance of Greek language and culture. Also my daughter learned to speak fluent Greek during the two years, and to behave at school quite like a Greek child. While we lived in Athens, Greece around us was having victorious years. The glories came with the Olympic Games in 2004, the European Football Championship in 2004, and Greece's winning of the Eurovision Song Contest in 2005. These glories were as real as the endless strikes and demonstrations of taxi/metro/bus-drivers, garbage collectors, teachers, and various other groups before the parliament elections of 2004 – and after them, as it turned out that direct public action, causing differing levels of chaos for everybody, is an elementary part of the Greek political scene, and not necessarily connected with elections. All the narratives we learned and created, and the ordinary rituals that began to structure our lives in the Greek way, helped us to form a strong sense of belonging to Athens and to Greece. Now, when the particular period of our lives is in the past, and we have settled back to Jyväskylä in Finland, we still retain strong memories as well as nostalgia. The story of this dissertation is limited by our personal history, of two intensive

⁵ Barnes & Duncan 1992, 3.

years trying to learn everything about Greece and to try to start to think like a Greek. In this sense, this study clearly became written from the Greek point of view. The study may not be an objective analysis of the foreign policy of Greece as seen from the outside using various angles. Instead, this is a serious attempt by a foreigner to interpret and understand, in general and theoretical terms, the Greek way of placing themselves politically in the world.

The title of the dissertation, *On the Border of East and West – Greek Geopolitical Narratives*, implies how the topic of this study is not ‘hard facts’ but rather narrative stories, which people tell to convince others and themselves. I shall focus on narratives of places. Michel de Certeau, historian, ethnologist and member of the Freudian School in Paris, has defined how narratives are used for organizing places:

In modern Athens, the vehicles of mass transportation are called *metaphorai*. To go to work or come home, one takes a ‘metaphor’ - a buss or a train. Stories could also take this noble name: every day, they traverse and organize places; they select and link them together; they make sentences and itineraries out of them. They are spatial trajectories.⁶

The questions of place and belonging are linked with the question of identity. People belong *here* or *there* and they draw boundaries around their area, using linguistic means, such as naming, defining, setting categories and imbuing them with values for doing this. This complex activity I call here narrativization. Boundaries are stories which constitute social groups. When we think of national borders, we can easily conjure images of signposts with national colours, sentries with arms, fences and barbed wire, points for the inspection of travel documents and luggage, perhaps even mine fields. Even if all these physical signs of the border were taken away, as is currently being done within the European Union, the border would still be there, because it would be embedded in a multitude of practices used for ordering social and political reality. As Anke Strüver’s interesting study of daily interactions on the Dutch-German border show, ‘the barriers in people’s minds persist, and act as thresholds in people’s everyday practises’. She points that ‘these thresholds refer to imaginative borders that let everyday practises of borderlands ‘end’ at the border and demarcate the ‘bordered spheres’ of people’s lives’.⁷ Both young and old Dutch and Germans could in principle act as if the border did not exist, but in practice, they do not show any willingness to do so, and thus they maintain the existence of the border. The border and order are inherently linked, or as geographers Henk van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer put it, ‘b/order is an active verb’.⁸ Borders create order because they limit movement, holding people inside, but simultaneously they raise questions and tickle our curiosity about what lies on the other side. A border is a promise of an end and a hint of the beginning of something else. The power of boundaries exceeds their material form, because they are most of all normative ideas,

⁶ De Certeau 1988, 115.

⁷ Strüver 2005, 207-208.

⁸ van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer 2005, 3.

beliefs and imaginations that shape our understanding of the world and our place in it.

This study aims to explore how the boundaries of Greece have been made and narrated and how this process is still going on. I have been reading Greek narratives of placing the country. These stories try to give answers to questions like 'who are we?', and 'who are the others?'; 'where do we belong?', and 'where we do not belong?' The process of arguing national identity and delineating its borders is closely linked with geopolitical debates. During the period I am analyzing, the geopolitical map of Greece changed rapidly as three socialist states at the other side of the Northern border vanished. Simultaneously new states were created, which means, for example, that suddenly there appeared new neighbours, and new others, on the other side of the border. Although the physical Greek border with these new neighbours is in the very same place where it has been for a hundred years, there has been a strong social and political need to recreate its existence using new narrativistic constructions, which then can be turned into new legal, administrative and social practices. Borders are remade in political debates. Their purpose is not only to make *our* people understand where the border lies, but also to force the *others* to admit the existence and importance of the border.

After the collapse of Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, Greece's geopolitical importance, for example in the NATO, has changed. During the Cold War 'Greece was increasingly seen as a bulwark against communist expansion, and its administrative, military, economic and political institutions were shaped to serve that purpose'.⁹ After the period the whole geopolitical environment has changed and definitions of Greece's position and place were reconsidered. The so-called Eastern block is no longer named the enemy by the so-called West. Yet, a long maritime frontier with Italy, Libya, Egypt, Cyprus and Turkey remains the same, and Greece is still situated at the southern end of the Balkan Peninsula. There has been a nationally perceived need to try to raise this strategic value in debates about Greece's importance. When we read and hear about these speeches and testimonies about 'our country's place', we should really ask to whom this message is intended. Is it for building a sense of national belonging to the place, or is it for the consumption of people outside of Greece's borders.

The theoretical framework of the study is multidimensional. The two basic lines come from geopolitical theory and narrative analysis. With these I attempt to understand the Greek politics of geo. Geopolitics focuses attention to the political meaning of place, and it is a useful tool for analyzing foreign policy.¹⁰ The most interesting direction as seen from the location of Greece is the East. For several centuries, the traditional enemy has been Ottomans/Turkey and therefore the debate about the Eastern border is recreated endlessly. This study deals with one specific type of collective world-view: the image of threat, which can be used as a tool in the process of the spatial socialization of individuals to a

⁹ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 296.

¹⁰ Ó Tuathail 1999, 109.

particular nation-state. The character of geopolitical images of threat definitely is political. Those images are an active way to represent the world and to use territorial power in the process of the homogenization of a certain group of people, and thus in the process of building and reproducing a collective identity. The Eastern border of Greece is interesting because it is a maritime border, a line on the Aegean Sea. Greece has securitized¹¹ it and insists that the border is permanently situated in its present place by the force of a number of international agreements. However, Turkey claims that the issue is not settled yet and for example the delimitation of territorial waters is one of the open questions. During the 1981-2000 period, there was no progress on the issue and no new agreements were signed. The debates of the border between these two neighbours were occasionally very bitter and hot, and led these countries nearly to the brink of war in 1996.

The very same border is also part of the Eastern border of the European Union, which has given it a new status. For the Greeks is not only a border between us Greeks and them Turks, but also the border of a larger group where the Greeks belong, where they are accepted as a member, and Turkey is thus also a member of the other larger group. It is one of the mental borders of the East and the West, Europe and Asia. The meaning of Asia, nevertheless, has strongly been diluted in connection with this border, as Turkey has for decades tried to gain entry into European organizations. Yet, if not part of Asia, Turkey still has remained something more strongly 'other' than, e.g., any of the Balkan countries. Therefore, Greece, or rather its leaders of state and public opinion, sees itself as a gatekeeper of the EU. The border has continuously been problematic and the issue has been securitized not only during specific crises, but also during years that have been more peaceful.

My argument here is that the Eastern border is one of the main elements of Greek geopolitical identity. The borderland identity is a way to explain Greece's special position in respect to other countries. It gives advantages, because the myth of being the last fortress of Europe can be told to various foreign audiences, although it basically is identity building and order forming rhetoric for the Greek national audience. A sense of geographical, political and cultural marginalisation with respect to Europe is common in Greece, as in all borderland countries. It is especially common to 'most, if not all, nations that regard themselves as being at the edge of Europe'.¹² Borderland identity is often narrated in 'form of being the 'last bastion of Europe' against the Barbarian hordes of the East'.¹³ The national memories of these states are usually coupled with narrative elements of defeats of external conquerors. Hard battles were fought and sacrifices were made so that the rest of Europe could flourish. The idea of being *at the edge of Europe* is strong in Greece. If somebody dares to wonder whether this country really is part of Europe and would it not be better to place it somewhere else, the feeling of being insulted is extremely high among the Greeks. However, in daily debate, Greeks talk about *going* to Europe,

¹¹ Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998, 28.

¹² Schöpflin 2000, 91.

¹³ Schöpflin 1997, 29 and 2000, 91.

and about events taking place *in* Europe. Here Europe refers to the core states of the EU, such as France, Germany, or Belgium. Greece is verbally excluded from Europe in these expressions.

The stories of political place constantly change because states and borders are manmade creations and not eternal truths. Before World War II there were less than 70 states in the world. In the beginning of the 1960s there were more than 90 states and twenty years later about 160 states. In the beginning of the new millennium there are more than 190 states. Around every new state there is a border, and there are about 50 unresolved boundary disputes in 2007.¹⁴ After the Cold War, this process of the creation of new states was marked especially in Europe and its vicinity also creating more borderlines¹⁵ that are new. Also boundary studies have become more popular all over the world, but especially in Europe.¹⁶ The 1990's meant the '*spatial turn* in the human and social sciences'.¹⁷ Simultaneously geography was adopting a '*social-discursive*' turn,¹⁸ and borders became one of the focuses for new discussion and research. At the same time the phenomenon usually called globalization has caused a related debate about the proposed disappearance of the state and '*proclaimed the coming of a borderless world*'¹⁹, even in the face of increasing number of states and multiple levels of borders between and within them point to a completely opposite tendency.²⁰ It is as if the globalization discussion fuels localization ideas. The more the world is claimed to have opened in front of people, the more tightly they grab at their place and roots. Considering the globalization debate, this study will focus more on the staying force of old borders and emergence of new ones in the Greek context, rather than celebrate their disappearance, although there are changes in both directions.

The questions of place are always limited with borders, as a sign of the end of something as well as the beginning of something new. Borders are not simply lines on maps, but '*crucial elements in achieving an understanding of political life*'.²¹ Despite the repeated changes in the past, we tend to think of boundaries as eternal. Strong and steady borders are connected with the idea of peace; therefore changes cause insecurity in our minds. These changes remind us, however, that territories and political boundaries are '*social constructs and processes, not stable entities*'.²² These processes are full of stories and rhetoric, persuasion and conviction. Old myths are remembered, herstories are retold, and unrevenged defeats are fumed over. Any glorious past is taken as a model for future. As Professor of Geography Anssi Paasi formulates it: '*A historical perspective is therefore inevitable in any account on the*

¹⁴ Paasi 2005, 26.

¹⁵ Borderlines, borders, boundaries have all the same connotations in this study.

¹⁶ Paasi 2005, 20.

¹⁷ van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer 2005, 4.

¹⁸ van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer 2005, 4.

¹⁹ Soja 2005, 36-37.

²⁰ Paasi 2005, 26.

²¹ Paasi 2005, 18.

²² Paasi 2005, 19.

meanings of political boundaries'.²³ Narratives do not quote straight from the past but select the plot and old events from the present point of view. The past is, therefore, projected in a presentist manner.²⁴

Boundaries and their locations are often essential elements in representations and narratives regarding the past successes and defeats of states, on account of the fact that boundaries and territories have become political symbols over which nations go to war and for which citizens fight and die. As it is never possible to tell the 'whole history', and even if it was, the exercise hardly would be meaningful, and thus narratives are composed of well chosen events and arranged into plots.²⁵ When we write or tell about geography around us, it is not simply a reflective deed but a constitutive because 'new worlds are made out of old texts and old worlds are the basis of new texts'.²⁶ What is also important to understand, is the fact that new texts and stories repeat old plots or tropes, which settle certain rules for a story. History is not used only as a source of events to be quoted but also as a source of story forms to be employed in the present stories. It is easier for the audience to accept familiar stories. As Hayden White reminds us, 'Tropic is the shadow from which all realistic discourse tries to flee. This flight, however, is futile; for tropic is the process by which all discourse constitutes the objects which it pretends only to describe realistically and to analyze objectively'.²⁷ The idea of recurrent genres and themes is described well by Northrop Frye in his *Anatomy of Criticism*. The skill of a good writer is not to create something new, but to repeat something old in a new variation. We do not create out of nothing but out of already existing things. For Frye, the greatness of Milton's poem *Paradise Regained* is not of the rhetorical decorations that a poet added to his source, but 'the greatness of the theme itself, which [he] passes on to the reader from his source'²⁸. '[A] new poem, like a new baby, is born into an already existing order of words'.²⁹ Likewise, any story of geography or politics has to be situated into an existing field of narratives.

Also Patrick Thaddeus Jackson underlines the idea of repeated stories as a powerful tool to get a message to the audience: 'Especially in a democracy, the availability of public rhetorical commonplaces that can be utilized so as to render a given policy acceptable is an indispensable part of the process of public policy-making.'³⁰ The concept of commonplace can here be understood as a name or expression that all relevant members of the audience know well and can use systematically in their argumentation, but which would be, after all, quite hard to define exactly. For instance, 'Europe' and 'Asia', 'West' and 'East', or 'civilization' are commonplaces. The rhetorical commonplaces are not necessary shared and understood by all people in the same way because they

²³ Paasi 2005, 19.

²⁴ Paasi 2005, 20.

²⁵ White 1973, 7-11.

²⁶ Barnes & Duncan 1992, 3

²⁷ White 1978, 2.

²⁸ Frye 1990 96.

²⁹ Frye 1990, 97.

³⁰ Jackson 2006, ix.

have several dimensions. They are rather filled with mixed meanings, but Jackson does not see it as a problem in public discussion, because a definite meaning for a commonplace would end or limit its usability in debate and discussion.³¹ It is exactly the indefinite ambiguity of commonplaces that makes them fruitful elements in rhetoric. Using rhetorical commonplaces in speech or text can be understood also as a risk because they can be created in several ways and be connected in a number of actions. It is impossible to know beforehand whether an argument is seen as an important and good one, and how a commonplace would be stretched because members of an audience always translate messages to suit the concepts already existing in their minds. Intersubjectively, the acceptance of arguments involving commonplaces depends also on contingent social negotiations and interactive processes.³²

Frye divides structures of stories into four categories: the romantic, the tragic, the comic, and the ironic or satiric. He calls them generic plots or myths.³³ In foreign policy stories romantic or comic plots are most common because in both cases the result for the main actor (a state in most of the cases) is positive and the story usually moves towards a happy ending. Of these two plots, the romance is the most desirable plot because it 'is the nearest of all literary forms to the wish-fulfilment dream'.³⁴ The popularity of romance as a plot is easy to explain. It simplifies moral facts. Good and bad are not mixed as in ordinary life but clearly polarized. The audience is encouraged to take sides.³⁵ 'The complete form of romance is clearly the successful quest [... It can be divided in] three stages: the stage of the perilous journey, [...] the crucial struggle [and finally] the exaltation of the hero'.³⁶ It is interesting that although the hero might die in the crucial struggle, the point is the recognition of the hero, who has clearly proved to himself, and to the others, that he is a hero. In a milder way we can see the same focus in several foreign policy discourses, however disruptive economically or in terms of state relations, when public international recognition of one's point of view is seen important in an overriding manner. The victory would be that 'our cause' gains preferably sympathy, but at least understanding among the audience. In romance one of the central themes is 'maintaining integrity of the innocent world against the assault of experience [...] The integrated body which needs to be defended may be an individual, a social entity, or both'.³⁷ In the debates of the foreign policy of Greece, it is usually the state, but it can be also the nation or Greek culture.

Events of the past can also be defined as tragedies in foreign policy, normally in connection with spectacular and undeniable defeats leading to drastic changes in policy. The theme of tragedy is that of learning, and in foreign political narratives it serves as a justification for the termination of a certain political project. Catastrophe is the archetypal theme of tragedy. In the

³¹ Jackson 2006, 28.

³² Jackson 2006, 29, 50.

³³ Frye 1990, 162.

³⁴ Frye 1990, 186.

³⁵ Frye 1976, 50.

³⁶ Frye 1990, 187.

³⁷ Frye 1990, 201.

foreign policy of Greece certain events of the past are named catastrophes. For example losing the military campaign in Asia Minor in 1920-1922 is known as the catastrophe of Asia Minor, η Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή. As comedy is 'concerned with integrating the family [and similar social groups,] and adjusting them to the society as a whole; tragedy is much concerned with the breaking up [of social formations]'.³⁸ Η Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή meant, if not a breaking up the family, a definite collapse of the geopolitical project of militarily uniting all territories with ethnic Greek inhabitants within the Greek state. As a matter of fact, this led eventually into deeper ethnic integration of the Greek 'family', as ethnic Greeks escaped in large numbers as refugees from Turkey to Greece. The great narrative of settling these refugees symbolizes the successful story of Greek brotherhood. In practice the adaptation process in the mainland was far from easy because the 'newcomers' spoke different dialects, or in some cases even Turkish, and the locals did not necessarily welcome the 'outsiders'. Recent studies and memoirs tell how strongly refugees sometimes were discriminated, but yet they had no other option but to survive.³⁹ However, they lost their 'home', the place of their territorial roots, which has created in Greece a phenomenon of longing and nostalgia.⁴⁰ That part of Greek history is thus still narrated as a tragedy. However, the successful story of settling brothers to their ancestors' land remained, and partly influenced confusion in the beginning of 1990s when so called Soviet Greeks returned to their ancestor's land after the collapse of Soviet Union. Public expectations of Greeks reflected the previous story of 1920's, of brothers returning home, but the reality was different, as it was also then, and the attitudes towards newcomers rapidly became negative.⁴¹

The stories with certain plots and specific arrays of commonplaces are used by a rhetor to convince her audience. There exists an endless list of more specific rhetorical tools, which can be used to assure the audience about the rhetor's point of view. For example Chaïm Perelman's interest in the nature of argument and rhetoric has inspired the study of these since the 1950s all around the world. As one of the people who were influential in setting into motion the 'rhetorical turn' he refreshed research in the field. By connecting argumentation and rhetoric Perelman underlined the fact that it is in relation to the audience that all argumentation is developed.⁴² The basic idea was that argumentation is not an innocent deed which just happens, but an active teleological act, which can be opened and analysed. For Perelman 'every argument implies a preliminary selection of facts and values, their specific description in a given language, and an emphasis, which varies with the importance given [to specific elements]'.⁴³ The ancient rhetor concentrated on persuasion of his visible

³⁸ Fye 1990, 218.

³⁹ See e.g. Voutira 2003.

⁴⁰ See e.g. *Πολιτική Κορζίνα*, η ταινία του Τάσου Μπουλμέτη, 2003 or Μαρία Ιορδανίδου, *Λωξάντρα*, 1963. The nostalgic debate can be compared to the Finnish discourse of Karelia.

⁴¹ Voutira 2003, 145-159.

⁴² Perelman 1963, 138.

⁴³ Perelman 1982, 34.

audience. Perelman stresses that an audience is included in the situation even though the rhetorical message is just a written text, because all rhetoric is always persuasive communication.⁴⁴

Even though we are living in a global world where distances seem to have disappeared, there is a strong need to define belonging somewhere where one can feel at home. For example, small nationalistic groups quite often build their identity based on local culture. States have not come to their ends in the global world, and a common European culture, a popular term that is filled with different meanings, has not replaced local cultures. Therefore, places, distances, and territorial borders have not disappeared. There can be a need to define these terms repeatedly, but they still have not disappeared.

This dissertation aims to analyse the construction of the Greek place from the beginning of its membership in the European Union until the beginning of the new millennium. The purpose is to illustrate how varying discourses of Greekness have been placing the country between East and West and how new debates are recurrently being re-created. The aim is to analyse the material from different angles around the theme.

The research material consists of Greek foreign policy texts and academic comments on them. Speeches of Greek presidents and prime ministers form the nucleus of the material, but a more important part is publications by the Greek academic foreign policy community. Speeches of politicians are somehow obvious material in this kind of research in political science. The academic comments are, in a sense, a bit more rare research material. It can be argued that this kind of selective material highlights only the elite's point of views of the theme, but the decision can be justified. 'During a geopolitical transition the future and destination of a particular political unit is mainly determined by structural power deployed by the so-called political elite, rather than the deep masses',⁴⁵ and for this reason my study focuses on the geopolitical action of the Greek political elite. The political elite can be defined here as ministers, members of the parliament, security and foreign policy intellectuals, including diplomats, political activists and last but not least, relevant academics. It is their task to create the conceptual basis of the nation, and to manufacture changes in it when needed. As professor of Geography Anssi Paasi has written, 'academic scholars have been in a key position in the production of the border-centred outlook on the world and in shaping the practices and discourses through which the current system of territories is perpetually represented, reproduced and transformed':⁴⁶

Authors writing on the nation and state typically construct narratives that depict how the ideas of sovereignty and the system of states have emerged gradually in relation to the changing physical-material, economic and technological circumstances. The narratives also depict how the ideologies of nationalism and the ideas of nation as a manifestation of this ideology gradually emerged and spread to replace absolutist rule, and how the rise of the modern world system ('nation-') states finally transformed the network of more or less diffuse, permeable frontiers into a

⁴⁴ Perelman 1963, 138-139, 162.

⁴⁵ Moisio 2003, 8.

⁴⁶ Paasi 2005, 21.

grid of exclusive territorial boundaries. These elements are effectively represented and circulated in school atlases and other media, which concomitantly become instruments of popular politics.⁴⁷

Academic scholars analyse, define political situations, and try to clarify reasons for the present. Several kinds of explanations and narratives from the past are created and recreated. Definitions of the state, international relations and borders are an important part of the process. These analyses have a more objective status than stories in daily newspapers, or other media, which might be telling about the same events, but considered as popular information. Academic analyses can be utilized as an objective source of information for and by the media, although they are equally man made analyses, and thus opinions. The main difference is prestige. The analyses and comments of academic scholars have a respected status in public. Sometimes this kind of material is not understood as rhetorical messages, but as pure and innocent information. Another interesting dimension of the academic material, which makes one wonder is its assumed objective status compared to, e.g., journalistically produced material or politically coloured speeches, is the fact that academics may take part daily in politics and be linked with political parties as often as anybody else. They are not necessary neutral outsiders, who comment on deeds of politicians, but active participants, who actively influence events. For example, in the chapter 'Re-Placing Modern Greece' I have been leaning on material written by professor Yannis Valinakis, which criticises the Greek deeds in the EU at that time. The government was led by the socialist party PASOK. Later, after the parliament elections of 2004, Valinakis became a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government led by the conservative party Nea Demokratia.

The importance of academics was heightened because of the time of rapid changes in Greece's geopolitical and security environment. John Agnew writes that 'there is now increased attention paid to the ways in which academics and political leaders have understood and practised politics. He says that 'in times of flux, conventional wisdom is more open to scrutiny'.⁴⁸ Agnew points how the end of the Cold War made a number of narrative elements disappear. Examples would be the settlement and acceptance of political borders between states and ideological division of the world, which was partly a base for national identities, disappeared. Therefore, including academic comments in the research material along with speeches of politicians can be considered justified. Academic scholars produce definitions and authoritative opinions, and can have considerable influence via their texts.

One more dilemma while considering the research material was the question of propaganda. Traditionally the term has been understood as material which has a purpose to influence opinions. Is it therefore possible to understand academic research and materials as non-propaganda material if we follow the earlier assumption that a message from an academic is more

⁴⁷ Paasi 2005, 21.

⁴⁸ Agnew 1998, 2.

objective than the same message from a politician or a journalist? As long as the message is written for any audience and sent with a wish to be understood, the answer is no. Thus, I will in this dissertation deal with all material as political texts. Another fact noticed while writing the dissertation proves the same: the Ministry of Press and Mass Media of Greece, which is responsible for officially promoting of the country, regularly uses academic writers. Several articles have been published first in scientific books or magazines, and later again in official and propagandistic press material by the state. The venerable academic status of the writer does not seem to be tarnished by this practice.

The research material of the dissertation consists of texts written about the foreign policy of Greece, and its geopolitical position. During my stay in Athens 2003-2005 I was able to collect material from different libraries and bookshops. The most useful ones were the library of ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy), the library of the University of Athens, at the Aeolou -street and the library of the Panteion University. *The Southeast European Yearbooks* as well as *Επετηρίδες* and *Ανασκοπιές* of ELIAMEP, with texts written by academics and politicians, were useful collections. While discussing Greece in the context of the European Union texts of such writers as P.K. Ioakimidis, Michalis Tsinisizelis, Stelios Stavridis and Charalambos Tsardanidis were important. The foreign policy analyses of Theodore Couloumbis and Byron Theodoropoulos were very useful for that part of my research and, finally, Greece's geopolitical placing was illuminatingly discussed in the texts of Ioannis Mazis, Thanos Dokos and Georges Prevelakis - to name only some. Mostly I have maintained the traditional strict classification between research material and commentary literature, but there are a few texts, which argue interestingly about Greek foreign policy, but at the same time also rise to the metalevel and analyze well trends in the discussion of the topic. Especially John S. Koliopoulos' and Thanos Veremis' book *Greece, The Modern Sequel. From 1831 to the Present* (2002) has been used both as research material and commenting literature. In the literature list, research material and commentary literature have been separated, but each text appears there only once. If it has been classified as research material, it can be found only there.

Because I have written this study in English, I have placed the writers' names in the Latin alphabetical order in the bibliography, following the way I have written the names in the main text with Latin letters. Therefore, for instance, all books of Thanos Veremis are placed at the end of the list at letter 'V', although some of them are in Greek. In Greek his surname is of course written Βερέμης, and would be placed after 'alfa' in a Greek list of sources.

I have used also maps and other pictures as my research material, and I shall and analyze some of them in the text. However, the copyright owners of maps are sometimes very difficult to locate, publishers tend not to be very helpful, and using maps without permission is not considered as good academic manners. Therefore I have solved the problem by redrawing some of the maps -by hand rather than with computer, because I like old-fashioned handmade graphics more. This has no doubt resulted in visual simplifications, but maps serve essentially the same purpose as textual quotations, namely

making the text more readable and the argument clearer. The reader has to rely on me in the same way in both cases: have I quoted truthfully and have I drawn truthfully. To my best knowledge, I have done so.

There is one more interesting problem in the research material of the study. It is the question of who is Greek enough to be able to participate as a Greek in the Greek foreign policy debate? As it becomes obvious later in this work, Greekness itself is not an easy task to define. Quite often the political elite of Greece have at least one foot abroad. Diaspora is also an accepted dimension of Greekness. For example during the military regime a large part of the political elite⁴⁹ left the country. Some of them returned but some also stayed in their new home countries. However, from the Greek point of view, these people have not left their Greekness. Furthermore, their children are considered Greeks by the Greek army. This is true even if only one of the parents is Greek. One of the traditions of Greek governments is to support the Greek identity of Diaspora Greeks and their children by sending Greek teachers abroad and paying for their salaries. For example in Finland there are Greek schools in Helsinki, Tampere, and occasionally also in Jyväskylä. As the concept of 'Greek' is so wide, I do not hesitate to include a few Diaspora Greeks, who actively participate in the debate of Greek foreign policy, as full members of the group, irrespective of how long they have resided abroad. Otherwise, for example, the former minister in several governments and the present (2007) opposition leader George Papandreou, the son and grandson of former Greek prime ministers, could not have been considered as Greek during some periods of his life. He was born in the United States, his mother is an American, and he has been living and studying years abroad, including Sweden.

The research material of the study was either in Greek or in English, and in a few cases also in Finnish. The dissertation is written in the present *lingua mundi*, English. However, there are some quotations in the study that are in Greek. In those cases the quotations are either translated in footnotes in English, or analysed in text so that lack of understanding Greek does not hinder reading.

The structure of this book is relatively straightforward, and the story goes from general understanding of place towards specific issues of place in Greece. Chapter 2 continues this Introduction with a theoretical discussion of the concepts of place, identity and location. There are philosophical and poetic views of place which highlight the importance of a sense of belonging. Place is not considered here simply as a geographical location. It is a social construction and narratives both create places and tell us how we should understand them. The relationship between environment and human narrative is, in this sense, two dimensional. Lived experiences and repeated stories strongly influence our sense of place. Geopolitics opens a new dimension to look at the issue. For example, during the first half of the nineteenth century it became commonplace, in Europe, to consider Europe as the most civilized place on earth. The problem was, however, that Europe needed glorious roots, such as ancient Hellas or

⁴⁹ There is no detailed information of the exact amount of these more or less voluntary refugees.

Rome, to justify its noble present. To create continuity from the past to the present in Europe, even the newly independent modern Greek state also had to adopt the ancient past as the state's official historical narrative, instead of other competing historical narratives.

Chapter 3 introduces the theme of placing Greece into various geopolitical locations in the world. Although the physical location stays the same, its meaning varies greatly when it is interpreted from different angles and points of view. The question of belonging and place is closely related to the issue of identity. Narratives of *us* and *them* are widely used to define borders around our place. Greek narratives of identity are filled with past. However, the past of Greece, whether historical or mythical, is so wide that a storyteller can easily pick a suitable plot to explain the present with narratives.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to Greece's place in the European Union. Greece became the tenth member of EU in 1981 (that time still the European Community). The past was dramatic because of the military dictatorship of Greece (1967-1974) and bitter events in Cyprus 1974, which led to Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military wing. Therefore, the Greek leadership was searching for stability and a better future although the country's economic situation made it anything but an attractive candidate. Despite the obstacles, negotiations were short and successful. The first years as a member were complicated. Domestic pressure was against the EC and Greece was known as a trouble-maker in the Community by objecting to all common policy proposals. The wind changed in the middle of 1980's when it became clear that Greece was actually benefiting financially a great deal from its membership, and also its diplomatic status had become stronger than before. The new decade, 1990's started with possibilities and insecurity, because the Cold War was over and 'eternal' political systems had collapsed. Nationalism raised its head all over the Balkans and Greece was focused on turbulences of North during the first half of the decade. There were also several new problems with Turkey. However, the last years of the decade raised optimism in the foreign policy of Greece and these old enemies started to support each other. This sympathy was found partly because both countries were victims of earthquakes in 1999. Greece then started to support Turkey's membership in the EU.

Chapter 5 is devoted to issues of Greek foreign policy that have caused the most troubles during the last decades. It offers information on the present borders of Greece. How they have been created by time and also discusses the roots of the present problems. The question of divided Cyprus seems to be a never ending sorrow for Greece. Although Cyprus is another country, an old sense of ethnic and cultural brotherhood, and various specific events of the past, keep it among the main foreign policy issues. The third example concerns the battle over a name: Macedonia. A new state north of Greece decided to call itself Macedonia, after the collapse of Yugoslavia and this caused an enormous stream of national protests and objections in Greece in the beginning of the 1990s. Afterwards, the emotional national tumult has been called the biggest mistake of Greek foreign policy of the recent era; however, seen from inside that turbulence represented a cry for 'our history'.

It is impossible to analyse exhaustively these conflicts, because all of them individually are worth of several thorough studies. Due to the limited analysis, there has been a need to cut out several aspects that might be considered important. For example the question of Macedonia focuses on the name only and the debate about ethnic Macedonians is left completely aside.⁵⁰ My attempt has been to highlight the main theme of each conflict and reveal narratives and the debate around these themes.

Finally, chapter 6 ties the stories of Greece together with theoretical considerations of geopolitics and narratives. It also returns to the question of the place of Greece. It tries to answer the question whether Greece's geopolitical location on the border of East and West can be fruitfully understood through the various narratives used in the Greek foreign policy discussions, and whether the geopolitical place of Greece has changed during the main research period.

⁵⁰ See e.g. Karakasidou 1997, 2002 and Green 2005.

2 A SENSE OF PLACE

2.1 Place and Space

The concept of place refers not simply to a geographical location but to a two dimensional relationship between environment and human narrative.⁵¹ Landscapes are an important part of social integration because they include national ideas, memories, and emotions, which tie people together. Examples of landscapes like these are graveyards and memorials of battlefields as symbols of national pride and grieving. With these territorial elements, history is presented and recreated. Every generation sees these symbols from their own point of view and therefore participates in geopolitical processes, giving new meanings for them, which is part of larger selection that every generation makes of places and their commemoration.

The space that can be remembered becomes place.⁵² Donlyn Lyndon and Charles W. Moore define in their *Chambers for a Memory Palace* that: 'We need to think about where we are and what is unique and special about our surroundings so that we can better understand ourselves and how we relate to others'.⁵³ Accordingly, our human sense of place is also a political, even spiritual issue or can be seen as a theological or geographical one. Place seems to be a remarkable theme in various types of writing including literature, philosophy, cultural history and so forth. This again could be considered as what a number of commentators refer as a crisis in Western societies.⁵⁴ We talk about displacement, rootlessness and dislocation. It is interesting to reflect this with the debates about globalization. A simple analysis of these two issues gives the result is that people get lost in global and other similar big circles because, after all, human beings are local in their origin. It is as if the global relativity of space dissolved the human sense of place.

⁵¹ Sheldrake 2001, 1.

⁵² Sheldrake 2001, 1.

⁵³ Lyndon & Moore 1994, xii.

⁵⁴ Sheldrake 2001, 2.

Philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Gaston Bachelard have connected our existence with place. For them, space is empty and meaningless until human beings make it known and therefore a place. All thoughts and deeds are making an unknown known. For Heidegger: 'Spaces receive their being from locations and not from 'space'.⁵⁵ He insisted that 'place is the house of being'.⁵⁶ In addition, Gaston Bachelard continues with the theme by saying that 'without it, man would be a dispersed being'.⁵⁷ For Heidegger, 'to say that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations.'⁵⁸ A 'person' for Heidegger was *Dasein*, or 'being there'. Therefore, to be a person means 'to be there', to be in a particular place. Therefore, we can say that place is a soil for our identity. Nevertheless, as Dennis Crow stresses, these both are built 'through processes of representation, political action, and even through uneven economic development'.⁵⁹

This kind of strong value imbued connection between human and place is, sometimes, narrated through the concepts of patriotism, fatherland, or nationalism, but it also can be established in a more neutral way, which does not refer to exclusive possessing. Nostalgic feelings, childhood memories and historical narratives can create the sense of belonging. Bachelard stresses: 'For our house is our corner of the world. As has often been said, it is our first universe, a real cosmos in every sense of the word. If we look at it intimately, the humblest dwelling has beauty.'⁶⁰ 'Home' is not defined simply as a place of one's origin but it can reflect all inhabited places where people have lived and filled with their memories.

2.2 Place and Belonging

Human beings and places are fundamentally tied together. If we introduce ourselves, the most common way is to first tell our name and next the place where we come from. The place is taken as essential information about us. In this way, we place ourselves to a certain geographical and social matrix and share this information with others. Identity can be seen as something that makes people feel belongingness to a certain place that they have created for themselves by living and acting there and by talking about it. Identity connects people with each other. Anssi Paasi has argued about two forms of shared regional identity. 'Identity of region' is collective and built during a long time. 'Regional identity of the inhabitants' is more a result of an aggregate of individual lives.⁶¹ When it comes to place, there can be strong narrative

⁵⁵ Heidegger 1975, 154.

⁵⁶ Heidegger 1958, 26.

⁵⁷ Bachelard 1969, 6-7.

⁵⁸ Heidegger 1975, 157.

⁵⁹ Crow 1996, 2.

⁶⁰ Bachelard 1969, 4.

⁶¹ Paasi 1996, 35 - 36.

currents; they seem to gather together all those who have ever lived there. A place is reshaped by each and every person. Everyone makes his or her own story and adds it to the meaning of the place. This story has to accept and acknowledge the many other stories, or their interpretations that exist in this given location.⁶²

Most people have steady dwelling places, houses, or apartments, and therefore a defined location and an address are part of the human environment. In this way, Martin Heidegger's idea of dwelling becomes understandable. However, the sense of belonging does not end with the house. It is merely a physical metaphor for having a 'home'. The idea of having roots is tied with the immediate environment, neighbourhood, village, town, and the home country. 'Belonging involves both a connection to specific places and to our existence within networks of stable relationships'⁶³. The parish has traditionally been an example of setting boundaries of the world in Europe. For many people the parish formed both social and geographical reality.⁶⁴ It was very often the place from birth to death and even beyond, the local graveyard or churchyard represented a particular place for those who already had passed away.⁶⁵ This kind of small society was real compared with Benedict Anderson's concept of imagined communities. In a small society, everybody knew everybody and easily was able to meet others in a concrete way. An imagined community, such as the state, demands much more imagination if a sense of belonging is to be created.

Anssi Paasi introduces the concepts of *other* and *us* as spatial dimensions. *Other* is often situated somewhere else, *there*; while *us* are placed *here*. If others live here, as in the stories of people living in diasporas, we are in any case different from them.⁶⁶ Borderlines are drawn between *us* and the *other*. This is revealed with questions: 'Where is the divide between self (or us) and Other to be situated, where are the borderlines between human and 'something else'?'⁶⁷ Gearoid Ó Tuathail takes the Balkans as an example of the issue that placed *others* because it was 'located on the edge of Europe, territorially within Europe but not part of Modern European space or time' and it 'enabled them [the European powers] to see themselves as modern and advanced'.⁶⁸ The *other* is a counterpart for *us*, and for our identity. The other is a social and political construct that maintains the unity of organizations through an active process of exclusion, opposition, and hierarchization, facilitating the creation of clear self-identities. It used to be anybody who did not belong to the parish. Even the forest or hill next to one might be seen as strange and unfamiliar. The concept of identity has been traditionally strongly linked with place, and this in turn at least partly explains the controversy of travelling as activity.⁶⁹ One who is

⁶² Sheldrake 2001, 16.

⁶³ Sheldrake 2001, 10.

⁶⁴ Sheldrake 2001, 10.

⁶⁵ Sheldrake 2001, 11.

⁶⁶ Paasi 1996, 13.

⁶⁷ Paasi 1996, 9.

⁶⁸ Ó Tuathail 1999, 115.

⁶⁹ Sheldrake 2001, 16.

called 'well-travelled' can be seen as wise and educated but also as odd and immoral. The 'travellers', namely Roma, or *gens de voyage*, were often feared and despised in Western Europe.⁷⁰

While defining modern Greek identity, the *other* has been a useful concept for distinguishing the Greek from non-Greek. In the following quotation the level of otherness is presented by membership in the Greek nation. In the following quotation, Thanos Veremis and John Koliopoulos, who are both professors of Political and Greek and Balkan History, define how some people are more members than the others and some people are not members at all:

The perpetual fleeting outcasts of sedentary society were no more 'other' in newly independent Greece than in most lands of the time and subsequent times. Like the transhumant Sarakatsan and Vlach shepherds, Gypsies were considered enemies of organized human society and state security; unlike the Sarakatsans and the Vlachs, however who were never thought to be more than backward Greeks, Gypsies were never considered members of the Greek nation.⁷¹

Therefore, one explanation for this negative attitude towards Roma people, as well as to Jews, if we generalize harshly, has been connected to this lack of place and permanent settlement. It can be read also from the quotation in the words enemies of organized human society and state security. Organized society is stable and hierarchical and it is easier to control those who stay *in their place* instead of traveling around. It is also easier to be *secure* if you can foresee as much as possible and eliminate unpredictable factors. Travellers and traders were classical strangers, people who did not belong here, and had no organic connections with established social frameworks through ties of kinship or participation.

In a sense, the *other* can be said to be the one who is crossing the border. Borders have two basic functions. First, borders draw a line around different territories. Borders are signs of beginning and ending of an area. The other function is connected to identities. As Gearoid Ó Tuathail has written, 'the struggle over geography is also a conflict between competing images and imagining, a contest of power and resistance that involves not only the struggle to represent the materiality of physical geographic objects and boundaries but also the equally powerful and, in a different manner, equally material force of discursive borders between the idealized Self and a demonized Other, between 'us' and 'them'.⁷² Borders help to build mental lines between 'Them' and 'Us'.⁷³ The latter function makes borders stronger than the former. A state could not exist without borders though its people can live in Diaspora. A connection to

⁷⁰ Sheldrake 2001, 11.

⁷¹ Veremis and Koliopoulos 2003, 22. Thanos Veremis is a professor of Political History at the University of Athens and Konstantine Caramanlis Professor of Greek and Balkan History at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Tufts University. John Koliopoulos is a professor of Modern History, School of Philosophy from the Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki.

⁷² Ó Tuathail 1996, 14-15.

⁷³ Jukarainen 2000, 7.

homeland connects these people together. Borders are not steady and eternal. They are built, and crossed and replaced all the time.

However, there are several ways of seeing borders. Martin Heidegger defines borders with possibilities of something new: 'A space is something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely within a boundary, Greek *peras*.⁷⁴ A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognised, the boundary is that from which something begins to exist.⁷⁵ Also Anssi Paasi emphasises that 'borders always include the possibility for crossing over'.⁷⁶ Borders are there not just to separate groups and societies, but also to connect them. The concept of a border can therefore be more like that of a gate instead of a barricade. Inside the European Union the borders between member states have become lower and individual members need fewer and fewer documents to pass the gates. The symbolism of these borders has changed. However, the outer borders and gates have remained as before.

2.3 Place and Conflict

Places are political from the very beginning of their existence. They are open for new meanings immediately after their creation. Place is always a contested rather than a simple reality, human engagement with place is a political issue. We create places by giving them meanings. Therefore, we can say that politics creates places and places create politics. It is a circle of political development.⁷⁷ Place becomes political because of its original construction – it is formed and dominated by the stories of some of us and not by the stories of others.⁷⁸

Places also become political when we name them. A particular meaning is linked to human memories associated with the name of a certain piece of geography. There are no arbitrary names. All the names, however short, represent a code to reveal the wide range of associations, incidents, people and tales related to them.⁷⁹ An example of this is the long battle over the naming of Macedonia. From World War II, the Macedonian state bore the name Democratic Federate Macedonia; and, from 1946 onwards, the People's Republic of Macedonia. The Socialist Republic of Macedonia followed in 1963. After the break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia took, in 1991, as its new name, Republic of Macedonia. The state is commonly referred to as 'Macedonia', and this is where the trouble starts from the Greek point of view. The name Macedonia is also used to designate the wider geographical region of Macedonia, which included part of Greece, part of Bulgaria, and part of Albania, and in connection of Greece only, the

⁷⁴ *πέρας*: end, close, conclusion. Probably Heidegger meant here *πέρασμα*, which can be translated here as passage.

⁷⁵ Heidegger 1952, 208.

⁷⁶ Paasi, 1997, 30.

⁷⁷ Jukarainen, 2000, 39.

⁷⁸ Sheldrake 2001, 20.

⁷⁹ Sheldrake 2001, 16-17.

Greek region specifically called Macedonia. Due to the dispute between the governments of Republic of Macedonia and Greece over the name, the United Nations agreed to a provisional name – ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM) (Macedonian: Поранешна Југословенска Република Македонија (ПЈРМ) – when it became a member state in 1993. Most international organizations adopted the same convention, including the European Union, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the European Broadcasting Union, and the International Olympic Committee, among others. However, an increasing number of countries have abandoned the UN provisional references and have recognized the country as the ‘Republic of Macedonia’ instead.⁸⁰

Greeks have been opposing the name Macedonia ever since the independence of its neighbour and uses instead the name Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) or alternately Skopje, which is the name of the capital but used by Greeks as a name of the state. The reason for the debate is multidimensional. For example, part of the area of historic Macedonia lies inside the borders of Greece, as well as those of Bulgaria, and could be used in legitimizing a political program for uniting the ‘whole Macedonia’. Another problem, from the Greek point of view, is the heavy history of the name. The debate proves how ‘territories and their inherent symbolisms and institutions are social constructs and processes rather than stable entities [and hence,] a historical perspective is needed in any account of the meaning of political boundaries’.⁸¹ Ethnic and cultural Greek narratives from the ancient gods to Alexander the Great are connected with Macedonia. Therefore, the question is not only what kind of stories of this place is told, but also, who is telling these stories and who belongs within the narrative. It is very difficult to define the geographical area of Macedonia. Macedonia was never in ancient or medieval times or during the Ottoman era a specific area in the map. It was rather a well known name standing for various loosely defined places in the south Balkans, from the Black Sea to the Adriatic and from the Aegean Sea to the to the Balkan Mountains.⁸² After the Balkan Wars (1912, 1913) the term ‘North Macedonia’ was used by the Greeks to denote the part of Macedonia outside Greece’s northern border. After the World War II, the Greeks purposefully forgot the term ‘North Macedonia’, because Tito created plans about uniting all areas of Macedonia and the Greeks did not want to remind him of any connections between these areas. After 1991 Macedonia became a public issue of grand dimensions, and even the term Northern Greece was coined to denote it, for the purpose of undermining the Slav Macedonian notion of United Macedonia formulated by expansionary nationalistic elements in FYROM.

Geopolitical reasoning is a practical tool that politicians and other foreign policy decision-makers use whenever they try to make spatial sense of the world, ‘implicitly utilizing inherited forms of geographical knowledge to

⁸⁰ These include three of the five permanent UN Security Council members, the United States, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China.

⁸¹ Paasi 2005, 19.

⁸² Gounaris 2002, 71.

enframe particular questions and tacitly deploying cultural geographic discourses to explain certain dramas and events'.⁸³ In practise geopolitical reasoning is part of the normal everyday debate, which 'is taught as part of the socialization of individuals into certain 'national' identities and geographical/historical consciousnesses'.⁸⁴ In the case of Macedonia, geopolitical thinking became tightly intertwined with the name of the new state. Names cannot be found in the object to be named, they must be given. This means first inventing them and then succeeding in getting them accepted by others. Naming involves a clear decision making aspect, which renders to the act of naming a political dimension: names could always be different, and thus in the intersubjective context they are subject to potential conflicts. Naming is the contingent act *par excellence* and as such, it can be understood as a paradigm for politics, as Kari Palonen stresses.⁸⁵ In the case of Macedonia, all members of this debate have argued as if the name could concretely be derived from the object. Ancient ruins have been discovered and used to legitimize the place name. Unfortunately, these archaeological materials can be used as any rhetorical tools, for or against the cause, but they cannot give any straight answer. The ruins do not make decisions. The name Macedonia has been given for a purpose – but over centuries it has been given by many people to many different areas. History does not solve the problem. As Palonen emphasizes, what remains is accepting or denying. If the other states officially recognise the status of a new state, including the name that its decision making organs officially have given to it, its existence is also accepted. In Greece, the process is still going on in the case of the Republic of Macedonia.

In the Macedonian case, the debate is not only about the name itself, but also about the stories linked with the name Macedonia, and about the right to call them 'our stories'. Another type of conflict rises when a place contains several historical layers of stories. It does not matter whether they are fictional or 'real' because narrative and history, if we do not consider history as great narrative here, are closely related. Both share a common narrativistic structure and both employ a plot to suggest a pattern for an otherwise episodic event.⁸⁶ Another explanations of their close connection of history and these stories is that 'history has replaced mythology and fulfils the same function,' as Claude Lévi-Strauss has written. 'The aim of mythology, [and therefore also history,] is for him to ensure as closely as possibly that the future will remain faithful to the present and past.'⁸⁷ Any and every plot chooses a sequence of events and characters that suggest a direction of movement. The Greek past is full of juicy narratives. A rhetor can pick from the era of the Byzantine Empire a story highlighting the glorious history of modern Greece; another one can lift from the Ottoman era an explanation of the present, as in the following quotation of John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis:

⁸³ Ó Tuathail 1999, 113.

⁸⁴ Ó Tuathail 1999, 113-114.

⁸⁵ Palonen 1993b, 103

⁸⁶ White 1973, 6.

⁸⁷ Lévi-Strauss 1978, 42-43.

Repetition and lack of rigorous questioning from its proponents have led to the growth of the enduring myth of a pre-national Shangri-La in which the Greeks enjoyed, under Ottoman rule and Orthodox spiritual guidance, not only local self-government but also a communal solidarity and a frugal existence devoid of the vicissitudes of modernity.⁸⁸

The quotation is a version of an old story. The Ottoman rule is not called *Turkokratia*, and it is not described as an era of slavery, but as a pre-national Shangri-La. In this version the Greeks *enjoyed* their lives under Turkish power, and their culture flourished. The hierarchical order has been changed and the position of the Orthodox Church is raised, so that it can be presented side by side Ottoman rule. Being at the same level to something is a much better position than being under its pressure. This version is naturally told with a purpose. It is normally told as criticism towards Western foreign political and cultural orientation. Original Greek values such as 'honesty, compassion, hospitality and a strong sense of community'⁸⁹ were seen flourishing during the good old times, but, among the critics of the modern Greek nation state, the Westernisation process after independence has destroyed these values. The myth is selective and offers just one side of the story. For example, non-Muslim orthodox Christians 'were tolerated as long as they accepted the inferior status of *raya* (flock) and were prepared to obey the ruler who had imposed that inferior status on them'.⁹⁰ The people living within the borders of the Ottoman Empire were organized in various millets, according to their faith. The millets enjoyed a measure of autonomy and were represented by their religious leaders. The Orthodox Church was responsible for collecting taxes from the Orthodox millet for the Islamic state and for guaranteeing the millets' full obedience to the Sultan.⁹¹ The nostalgic narrative of the Ottoman era longs for the past. It is typical for a story like this that it expresses an eternal truth about the group, although all possible facts of the period were not taken into the plot.

2.4 Place and Geopolitics

There are various ways of looking at the connection between a place and human organizations. Geopolitics, which helps us to remember the political dimension of place, is a useful tool for analyzing foreign policy. Territories, states and geographical locations are linked together, because 'all states are territorial and all foreign policy strategizing and practice is, at least to some extent, conditioned by territoriality, shaped by a geographical location, and informed by a certain geographical understanding of the world'⁹², as Gearoid Ó Tuathail points. If we go to the roots of geography, the term itself reveals that it is not a 'fixed substratum of knowledge about the earth' but part of the man

⁸⁸ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 265.

⁸⁹ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 264.

⁹⁰ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 266.

⁹¹ See e.g. Fokas 2004, 71 and Tziampiris 2000, 40.

⁹² Ó Tuathail 1999, 109.

made knowledge, repeatedly created and influenced by history and politics.⁹³ Historically, to consult geography was not to view raw physical landscape or nature but to read a book. Though often forgotten today, geography is not *nature* and therefore not *natural*. Rather, geography, γεωγραφία, is inescapably active social and political *geo-graphing*, 'earth writing'. 'It is cultural and political writing of meanings about the world. Similarly, geopolitics is writing of the geographical meanings and politics of states'.⁹⁴ Dennis Crow writes that the maxim: 'All politics is local' takes a new meaning when one focuses in this double writing that is geography. One might say that 'cartography' contains a mimetic desire of the graphic performance in map making (graphy/ γράφω/ writing) and the performance of capturing the world within borders to make possible the fixing of it in maps (carte/ χάρτης/ map; choro/ χώρος/ place; topos/ τόπος/ e.g. land, space or place) in the first place.⁹⁵ Therefore showing a map of an area, not to mention of drawing one and capturing the world within borders, is a political deed.

As Professor of Geography J. B. Harley writes, the most familiar sense of power in cartography is that of power *external* to maps and mapping. This serves to link maps with the centres of political power. Power is exerted *on* cartography. Harley reminds, that behind most cartographers there is a patron; in innumerable instances the makers of cartographic texts were responding to external needs. Power is also exercised *with* cartography. Monarchs, ministers, state institutions, the Church and other similar powerful organizations have all initiated programmes of mapping for their own ends. 'In modern Western societies maps quickly became crucial to the maintenance of state power – to its boundaries, to its commerce, to its internal administration, to the control of population, and to its military strength'.⁹⁶ The map was, and still is, considered as a relatively 'accurate report of what is [out] there, [because] representation and the world are understood as one'.⁹⁷ However, maps are also inherently rhetorical and a species of the art of persuasion, in the same way that rhetoric is understood as persuasive communication.⁹⁸ 'Maps are a graphic language to be decoded'.⁹⁹ For example weather-maps are not telling only if the weather tomorrow is rainy or sunny, but also how the reader's essential world is defined. That is the reason why the visual rhetoric of maps is so effective. J.B. Harley has written also about silences in maps. He focuses on political silences, meaning things that are excluded from maps purposefully. 'Most obvious silences occur in speech and music, but they also occur in [...] [such] arts as painting and sculpture, and in the same way the concept of silence can be applied also to maps'.¹⁰⁰ What is 'absent from maps is as proper a field of study as what is placed in them'. Harley notes that silences should be considered as

⁹³ Ó Tuathail 1999, 109.

⁹⁴ Ó Tuathail 1999, 109.

⁹⁵ Crow 1996, 14.

⁹⁶ Harley 1992, 244.

⁹⁷ Agnew 1998, 15.

⁹⁸ Perelman 1982, 162.

⁹⁹ Harley 2001, 36-37.

¹⁰⁰ Harley 2001, 85.

positive statements and not as negative blank spaces. In the case of map the silence is merely the opposite of what is depicted.¹⁰¹

Geopolitics is not a neutral concept but a purposefully manmade creation of thought. It is active participation in creating and recreating political space. Therefore, it is possible to study geopolitics by studying texts, such as maps and other sources, which these participants of geopolitical debate have produced. Physical nature as mountains and seas are used in these debates as political geographing to create efficient arguments. Because of this, we hear analysis of varied areas and their geographical shape, or strategic meanings of frontiers. In addition, fortresses, insecure areas, chaotic spaces, and so forth are part of this reasoning. These terms help to control places by discourse.

The geopolitical worldview of a state is a written and spoken collection of meanings in our minds, created and recreated endlessly and not an objective image of the world. The worldview as well as any images linked with a specific place is a historical product, as Anssi Paasi stresses. Recreation is needed every time something shakes the old order. For Paasi a place is a result of the relationship of time and place and the structure of society and therefore a place is a collective concept.¹⁰² For example, a modern state has produced a place for itself in two discursive ways: with the ideas of national sovereignty for the outside and national law for the inside. Physical places are made 'real' in political debates and the purpose of this is to make them 'natural' for the audience. Reality also can be presented with maps, symbols, statues, speeches, and different kinds of festivals. Symbols like these are part of territorial iconography and daily social practise.¹⁰³

John Agnew has divided the history of geopolitics into three ages¹⁰⁴. Periodisation of geopolitical discourses, representations and practises simplifies the history of geopolitics a lot. However, Agnew's division can be fruitfully used in understanding the history of modern Greece as a small actor in a world ruled by great power politics. Agnew calls the first version of modern geopolitics *civilizational geopolitics*. This version was influential in the first half of the nineteenth century. Its main elements were a commitment to European uniqueness as a civilization: a belief that the roots of European distinctiveness were found in its past.¹⁰⁵ Ancient Greek geographers had divided the world into three continents: Europe, Asia and Libya (Africa). After geographical knowledge of the contiguity of the Eurasian landmass had grown, names did not change; the idea of the uniqueness of Europe continued to live strong, and it transformed Europe into a cultural continent. The idea was written with strong elements chosen from the past. European greatness was a heritage because of the civilizational and imperial achievements of the past. It is not a coincidence that the early nineteenth century saw an obsession among European elites with

¹⁰¹ Harley 2001, 86.

¹⁰² Paasi 1986, 120 - 121.

¹⁰³ Paasi 1997, 43.

¹⁰⁴ Agnew 1998, 85 - 113.

¹⁰⁵ Agnew 1998, 87.

the imperial exploits of ancient Greece and Rome.¹⁰⁶ Of course, a 'European' society, the idea of Europe as a socio-geographical entity, could arise only in reference to what it was not, and in relation to where it started. Thus, defining European borders and aliens outside of them were a natural part of the geopolitical narrative in this period also. But we should remember that there were different layers of history during this era, which had helped to develop the idea of a unique Europe and its connection with Greece. For example, the eighteenth century had an inclination to disparage African culture because of the rise of race as one of the basic concepts for structuring and analysing the human world. The creators of modern Greece benefited from this because it came to be viewed 'as the 'childhood' of the dynamic 'European race''.¹⁰⁷ Childhood was seen as an age of innocence, 'a period of emotion and feeling before rationality, and also without the sexuality and corruption of adulthood'.¹⁰⁸ Romanticism during the early nineteenth century stressed the importance of geographical and national characteristics. Therefore racism and progress were linked together and 'categorical differences between races, and dynamism was considered as the highest value'.¹⁰⁹

The peak of civilizational geopolitics took place, therefore, at the same time when the idea of the state of Greece was born. Till that time the area of present Greece had been part of the Ottoman Empire for more than 400 years, but the visible weakening of the Empire at the end of the eighteenth century made it possible for revolutionary Greeks to start contemplating the overthrow of Ottoman rule. On one hand, the idea of overthrowing the present rulers and of recreating the Byzantine Empire under Greek control seems to have been one element among the rebellious groups, but at the same time the idea of ethnic nationalism inspired by the French Revolution also gained currency among the Greeks. To the Greeks, the Muslim Turkish rulers represented the others and were the political, religious and military leaders against whom the ferocious fighting of the revolution (1821-1831) was directed. Tens of thousands Turks and Albanians were massacred in the beginning of the revolution. The Ottoman rulers then retaliated with even greater numbers of ethnic Greeks killed. The Ecumenical Patriarch, Grigorios, as a head of the Christian Orthodox millet was held responsible of the Greek rebellions by the Ottoman authorities and hanged.¹¹⁰ Although the European/non-European confrontation was not such a strong issue in the rebellion itself, it was one of the main elements in canvassing support for the Greek cause among *philhellenes*, such as the British romantic poet Lord Byron, in Western Europe.¹¹¹ It is said that Lord Byron's participation in the war and his death during the siege was 'a mere anticipation of the massive European military intervention that finally ensured the creation of the modern Greek state in 1830'.¹¹² The *philhellenes* influenced public opinion, which

¹⁰⁶ Agnew 1998, 88 and 23.

¹⁰⁷ Bernal 1987, 189.

¹⁰⁸ Bernal 1987, 208.

¹⁰⁹ Bernal 1987, 190.

¹¹⁰ Koliopoulos & Veremis 1988, 143-144.

¹¹¹ Petmezas 2004, 18.

¹¹² Tsoukalas 2002, 78.

then pressurized their governments, especially Great Britain and France, to help the Greeks. The European powers were paying their eternal debt to their own 'alleged cultural ancestors'.¹¹³

The Ottoman Empire was not recognized as a 'member' of the Concert of Europe until 1856, and even then it was admitted as a political, rather than civilizational, element of the concert of the Great Powers. 'The Otherness of Turks was a fundamental barrier to their participation in European centred civilizational geopolitics that drew hard lines around its European homeland and even had trouble including such 'marginal' Europeans as the Russians and Americans'.¹¹⁴ The Ottoman Empire itself was not regarded as a suitable home for the noble roots of the European civilization. Instead, the ancient glory of Greece, as well as Rome, was seen as the proper past for Europe. The link between the present and the past was constructed in repeated narratives. Imperial Europe at the height of its might, controlling most of the rest of the world needed ancient Hellas so as to create itself a grandiose classical past and, to be able to become what it wanted to be: the ancient, unique, noble, and superior centre of the world. This factor strongly influenced the successful establishment of the Greek state, and the tendency also can be seen in the fact that Great Britain, France and Russia offered the throne of Greece first to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, but he declined the offer and later became the first King of the Belgians. Hence the throne was offered to the Bavarian Prince, Otto Wittelsbach, who arrived in Greece 1833. Because he was a minor, the affairs of state were managed by Bavarian regency.¹¹⁵ The ruler definitely established the modern Greek state as European territory. These civilizational geopolitics also are the reason why it was compulsory for modern Greece to adopt ancient - but pagan - Greece as its official past, rather than the Orthodox Byzantine empire, which from the Greek point of view certainly would have been a much more logical and preferred choice with its living old traditions.¹¹⁶ Alternatives of the past were many. Ancient Greece could not be reduced only to Sparta and Athens, as superficial reading of Greek philosophy could lead far away Europeans to think. Even those within the Greek revolutionary movements were not in agreement over the location of ancient Hellas in time and space. It could have been the cluster of ancient city-states and settlements all over the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, or it could have meant just the Peloponnesus and adjacent islands. The empire of Alexander the Great reached in its height from Egypt to India. Also the meaning of the Byzantine Empire varied. 'Was it the Eastern Roman Empire which the Franks and the Ottomans destroyed, or was it the empire erected by the Turks on its ruins?'¹¹⁷ Borders of these different

¹¹³ Tsoukalas 2002, 79.

¹¹⁴ Agnew 1998, 92-93.

¹¹⁵ Koliopoulos & Veremis 1988, 49-50.

¹¹⁶ However the Orthodox Byzantine Empire was seen as a model when the nationalistic and romantic idea of Μεγάλη Ιδέα, the Great Idea of Greece became popular in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The term denoted Greece's post-independence irredentist aspirations. See e.g. Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002, 231 or Στάμκος 2002, 249.

¹¹⁷ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 7.

areas and their pasts were different – and the task of constructing Greek identity on this basis was quite demanding.

Present Greek historians mainly share the opinion that the pressure to accept the ancient pagan history as the official past of the state came from the outside. The Greek language spoken by most of the country's inhabitants and the physical remains of ancient Hellas helped to assimilate its modern inhabitants with the revered ancient heroes and sages. 'Europe's espousal of ancient Hellas as one of the high points of human civilisation and one of its three heritages, the other two being the Roman Empire and Christianity'¹¹⁸, has its roots in the Renaissance when Ancient Hellas was rediscovered. Later, Classicism revived interest in the land of the ancient Hellenes and Romanticism made the ethnic connection between ancient and modern inhabitants. Europe's mental link to Ancient Hellas needed a concrete contemporary proof, which was created purposefully in the form of modern Greece. In domestic politics, Greeks then submitted themselves to the idea of a European Hellas, constructing their national identity on ancient founding myths.

The second period in Agnew's list is named *naturalized geopolitics*. The era started from the late nineteenth century and lasted until the end of World War II. 'Rather than being a feature of civilisation, geopolitics now was largely determined by the natural character of states that could be understood 'scientifically', akin to the new understanding of biological processes that also marked the period'.¹¹⁹ The invention of political geography during this era was part of the trend. The state was seen as an organic entity and had, therefore, natural boundaries. This opened borders for new debate because historical boundaries were no longer regarded as the necessary, proper and natural ones. The state as a living organism had needs and demands and therefore the concept of *Lebensraum* became a justification for territorial expansion.

The term geopolitics was first coined in 1899 by Rudolf Kjellén, but the theoretical framework itself was born in the rival colonial empires of Germany and Britain. From 1870 onward, the Great Powers of Europe created programs of imperial expansionism and territorial acquisition. The scramble for Africa, for example, gave Europe 30 new colonies and protectorates. At that time intellectuals like Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) and Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) in Germany, Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922) in Sweden and Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) in Great Britain helped to codify a mode of reasoning about international affairs that would, in the context of World War II, come to be organised and categorised as constituting a 'geopolitical tradition'.¹²⁰

During this period, geopolitics became an academic science. It became understood as the study of the influence of geography on the practice of foreign policy by states. The expression 'influence' needs, however, to be qualified here. As Wolfgang Natter, a German specialist on the thought of Ratzel argues, Ratzel's writings display 'a very different project than that of a presumptive environmental determinist, the label with which Ratzel's efforts have largely

¹¹⁸ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 242-243.

¹¹⁹ Agnew 1998, 93.

¹²⁰ Ó Tuathail 1996, 22.

been rendered in most post Second World War disciplinary histories of geography in the English-speaking world.¹²¹ Ratzel and other representatives of classical geopolitics have been turned into satirical caricatures, and with that operation shelved off as unworthy of further reading. Their actual projects should rather be described in terms of an attempt to provide some sort of theoretical grounding for the territorial state in the context of nineteenth century dense space-time compression; compressed because of a sense of cramped and competitive overcrowding under conditions of contemporary globalization.¹²² The 'influence' of geography on politics was not understood as direct, in the sense that a sea coast would have forced policy makers to think in a certain way; the influence was imaginative; a specific geographic location offered both hindrances and possibilities, which policy makers then used as best as they could in policy formation. Part of the writings of classical geopoliticians dealt with language rather than with geography. For instance Rudolf Kjellén in his *Staten som livsform* (State as a Life Form), originally published in 1916, discusses common metaphors used about states, such as *Svea mamma* about Sweden, *la belle France* about France, *John Bull* about Britain, or *Uncle Sam* about the United States.¹²³ The point is not that a state was a life form in the same way as a pine or a wolf, but rather that people conceptualized it as if it was a living being, and consequently thought about policy as if the state was an actor in itself. Classical geopolitical theorizing thus was charting the ways of political thinking in connection with geography. However, when one reads the classical geopoliticians, their project was ambiguous in the methodological sense that both Ratzel and Kjellén quite happily jumped into their own metaphorical expressions, and in most parts of their texts argued as if the state really was a living organism, following the same spatial rules of conduct as other forms of biological life. They did not systematically maintain the methodological distinction between language and physical reality.

With the rise of the modern state, borders have become central characteristics of territorial political units. They became linear, narrow and clearly defined closures around states, closing in an area marking the limits of state jurisdiction.¹²⁴ As John Agnew emphasizes, 'the modern state differs from earlier political organizations because it claims sovereignty over all of its territory and over everything that exists within the territory, including the minds of its citizens. States create a strong conceptual division between the inside and the outside, and act as the geographic containers of the modern society'.¹²⁵ This also forces states to try to homogenize their populations as much as possible. The strong tendency towards homogenization is caused by the closed territorial principle under the conditions of potentially lethal international competition. Because of the apparent political and military efficiency of homogenous nation-states, the idea of an ethnically, culturally and

¹²¹ Natter 2005, 181.

¹²² Natter 2005, 177-182.

¹²³ Kjellén 1919, 46.

¹²⁴ Paasi 1996, 25-26.

¹²⁵ Agnew 1998, 51.

linguistically unified nation populating a specific state has been a major force in modern history. Recent examples of this idea have been seen in the Balkans after the collapse of Yugoslavia.

The classics of geopolitics all sought to promote an imperialistic agenda within the political culture of their own state and adopted the concept of 'national' culture, as ethnic nationalism became attached to the idea of the modern state in a particularly geometric form: a pure nation-state is populated by a pure ethnos. This development was strongly influenced by Friedrich Ratzel, who tended to think in terms of pure species of plants and animals in competition with each other, extending the idea then also to human ethnic groups. This agenda of the early geopolitical thinkers presupposed the superiority of their own national variant of European or Western civilization in intra-European competition, but on the world scale they tended to think in terms of the white race over other races, and of nationally organised capitalism over, for example, communism. Geopolitics as a discipline has its roots in Ratzel's theory that land is essential to the evolution of life forms and to the civilization of human groups. Attachment to land did not decrease with rising levels of civilization, because agriculture, the type of economic activity that Ratzel was most interested in, needed fertile soil. For Friedrich Ratzel the most successful people are those who expand into new regions and take them over. It is natural for a state to grow and seek new space for its growing population. Ratzel described the ever-increasing space as a need for *Lebensraum*. The struggle of the new space between different cultures was a natural process of change in human history.

If we think that the period from 1800 to 1900, mainly characterized by Romantic ideals, was also an era of natural scientific achievements, the two strains of thinking fit easily with the emerging social theories of the time. The chief metonymy used in theory construction was 'tree'. Trees can be found in Darwinian evolution, Indo-European linguistics and most nineteenth century histories use 'the ideal Romantic image', because trees are 'rooted in they own soils, are nourished by their particular climates, grow and progress, and never turn back'.¹²⁶ Similarly, European roots were seen to grow in Greek historical soil; this was employment of the tree metonymy in civilizational rhetoric. In geopolitical literature, a favourite metonymy of Germany was to describe it as a tree growing in a small hole in a rock; thus Germany faced the prospect of withering away because of lack of living space, unless it became strong enough to break the rock and succeed in spreading out to a wider growing space.¹²⁷ Ratzel used to discuss the general phenomenon of expansion by arguing that the expansion of a people (*Volk*) takes place in the same way as that of a forest (*Wald*).¹²⁸ The naturalistic tree metonymy had lots of uses in nineteenth century European imagination.

As Ratzel was a biologist before becoming a political geographer, he thought that the general phenomenon of the expansion of life forms is because

¹²⁶ Bernal 1987, 205.

¹²⁷ Kjellén 1911-13 II, 174-75.

¹²⁸ Ratzel 1899, 263.

all of them have spread in mixed populations over the surface of the globe in search of better living environments. The original movement is that of a species, whether a plant, animal, or a human ethno-cultural entity; a state is an organization that specific human groups have created for themselves to increase the effectiveness of their expansion and exploitation of land. This idea then brings us to the famous Ratzelian understanding of the concept of border:

Where the expansion of a life form comes to a stop, there lies its border. The borders consist of numerous points, wherever an organic movement has come to stand still. As much as there are areas of plant and animal species, forests and coral reefs: there also are boundaries existing of these plant and animal expansionary areas, including forest and reef boundaries. Thus, there also are territories and borders for races, nations, and all kinds of groups of people bound together by history and state formation.¹²⁹

Because all life heads for expansion, a state as a life form also tries to expand; and just as the expansion of a plant species is restricted by natural conditions and other plants, a state also will be confronted and restricted by its neighbours. State borders are only a derivative phenomenon; the principal movement is that of members of the ethno-national community. Borders should follow the movement of the individuals of the particular nation, but usually that is impossible, because neighbouring states do not allow it. Yet, members of the nation still exist outside of the borders, and for this reason a state has actually two borders:

All nomadic movements have their frontier zone, whose inner line is formed by the central mass of individuals, while the outer line is formed by those individuals that have proceeded farthest outwards. This kind of border thus cannot be presented with one line, but at least with two lines. The frontier zone is formed between them.¹³⁰

The outer border of the state is the potential border composed of individuals farthest away, and it could be realized if only the state just had enough power. Ratzel's favourite example was the Germans. The inner border of Germany would lie around the territory where only pure Germans lived, while the outer border of Germany enclosed the wide area where Germans lived, some in France, some in Russia and in many other states between these two, as well as in many places overseas. The actual existing state border of Germany would lie

¹²⁹ Ratzel 1899, 259. The original text: Wo die Verbreitung einer Lebensform Halt macht, liegt ihre Grenze. Die Grenzen besteht aus zahllosen Punkten, wo eine organische Bewegung zum Stillstand gekommen ist. So viel es Gebiete der Pflanzen- und Tierarten, Wälder und Korallengriffe gibt, so viel muß es Gränzen pflanzlicher und tierischer Verbreitungsgebiete geben, auch Wald- und Riffgrenzen. Und so gibt es Gebiete und Grenzen der Rassen und Völker und jener durch die Geschichte zusammengefügt Gruppen von Menschen, die Staaten bilden. Translation by Pekka Korhonen.

¹³⁰ Ratzel 1899, 261-262. The original text: Ja, jeder Nomadeneinfall hat seine Grenzzone, die innen durch die Linie der Massenbegrenzung, außen durch die Grenze der Ausläufer gebildet wird. Derartige Grenzen können also nie durch eine einzige Linie, sondern müssen mindestens durch ein paar Linien, die einen Grenzsaum einschließen, dargestellt werden. Translation by Pekka Korhonen.

somewhere between these two ethnic borders. Similarly, the goal of uniting all Hellenes within the expansionary Greek state was a central national goal of Greece during much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to the theory all nation states would have the temptation to push their state borders outside as far as ethnic kin lived somewhere outside of them. Consequently, a strong tendency towards territorial expansion would be an inherent characteristic of the modern nation-state.

After Ratzel's death in 1904, Rudolf Kjellén (1864 - 1922) from Sweden took a leading role in defining geographically inspired commentary in international politics. In 1899, he used the term 'geopolitics' for the first time in his article on the boundaries of Sweden.¹³¹ Kjellén also argued about nation, saying that it has to become aware of itself before it starts to dream of its own state.¹³² After its establishment, the state then takes leadership. The relations between the state and its citizens are like those between children and parents according to the Laws of Moses. Children are obedient and respectful while the state as the parents looks after their welfare.¹³³ For Kjellén the state was more essential than an individual person, because it is natural that individuals die, but losing even a piece of state territory is emotionally difficult to accept.¹³⁴ Kjellén thought that the future was reserved for large continental imperialist states whose territory was compact and contiguous. Small states only destiny was to be marginalized on the periphery, or disappear completely. They can survive for a while as buffer zones between large imperialistic states - or like Greece, Norway and Portugal by being at the edge. But Kjellén did not consider either position lasting.¹³⁵

Halford Mackinder (1861 - 1947) is best remembered for his maps of the world. The world of his global vision is divided into structurally defined territories. The most important area is in the middle and northern parts of the Eurasian continent, named the 'pivot area' or 'Heartland'; named thus because it was supposedly unconquerable.¹³⁶ It is surrounded with the 'Inner or Marginal Crescent', meaning the coastal areas of Eurasia, and that is in turn surrounded by 'Land of the Outer or Insular Crescent', composed of the American continents, southern parts of Africa and Australia.¹³⁷ International politics was seen as a theatre and this map set the stage for foreign political acts.¹³⁸ The pivot area could not be conquered by the maritime states of the two crescents, and therefore governing it would present the empire possessing the Heartland the possibility to govern the whole world. After the World War I. Mackinder was worried about the union between Germany and Russia because his argument ran that controlling Eastern Europe could lead into controlling the

¹³¹ Ó Tuathail 1996, 16, 22.

¹³² Kjellén 1919, 128.

¹³³ Kjellén 1919, 208-209.

¹³⁴ Kjellén 1919, 65.

¹³⁵ Kjellén 1919, 94.

¹³⁶ Mackinder 1943, 38-39.

¹³⁷ Ó Tuathail 1998, 30, 31 and 1996, 33.

¹³⁸ Ó Tuathail 1996, 33.

whole world¹³⁹, and this he turned into a slogan: 'Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World.'¹⁴⁰ For Karl Haushofer (1869 – 1964), who was 'sympathetic to many aims of the Nazi Party without ever being a member'¹⁴¹, geopolitics was an objective science based on the study of natural phenomena, economic capability and level of industrial development. He followed, partly, Mackinder's ideas about the importance of governing the heartland. Geopolitics studied the state as a territorial organism, exploiting as well as it could the resources that the space under its occupation offered. The Treaty of Versailles was seen as castrating Germany and Haushofer's goal was to teach the German youth to think in terms of wide space (*Großraum*).¹⁴² He saw geopolitics as an objective science based on the study of natural phenomena and the laws of nature.¹⁴³ Like Adolf Hitler, Haushofer believed that Germany should seek *Lebensraum* in the East rather than overseas in Africa and elsewhere.¹⁴⁴ This German *geopolitik* –tradition was the main reason why the geopolitics reputation as science after World War II was ruined.

Classical geopolitics is often defined as a problem-solving theory, which sees itself as an instrumental form of knowledge and rationality. The existing power structures are taken for granted, and it is used to provide conceptualizations and advice to foreign policy decision-makers. 'This is how the world is' is a common declarative narrative. Therefore, from this point of view, the advice is also imperative: 'this is how we must do'.¹⁴⁵ 'Is' and 'we' mark its commitment, on one hand, to a transparent and objectified world and, on the other hand, to a particular geographically bounded community and its cultural/political version of the truth of that world.¹⁴⁶ The purpose of classical geopolitics is to create strategic advantage for the future because the world is seen as anarchic and hostile.¹⁴⁷

It is against this background, the era of naturalized geopolitics, that the modern Greek state acquired its present borders, and the process fit well with the idea of a territorially expansionary state gathering its ethnic compatriots in foreign territory within the borders of the state. The process, begun early in the nineteenth century, sought to consolidate into a Greater Greece the Hellenistic and Orthodox communities scattered throughout the Balkans, the Aegean, and Asia Minor.¹⁴⁸ Greece's expansion to the north was narrated as justified because of the common history. It was an easy task to justify the expansion of the new state, its desire for 'natural' borders, with the ideas of previous geopoliticians.

¹³⁹ Ó Tuathail 1998, 30.

¹⁴⁰ Mackinder 1904, in Ó Tuathail et al. *The Geopolitics Reader* 1998, 150.

¹⁴¹ Ó Tuathail 1996, 46.

¹⁴² Ó Tuathail 1996, 47.

¹⁴³ Ó Tuathail 1996, 47.

¹⁴⁴ Ó Tuathail 1996, 48.

¹⁴⁵ Ó Tuathail, 1999, 107.

¹⁴⁶ Ó Tuathail, 1999, 108.

¹⁴⁷ Ó Tuathail, 1999, 107.

¹⁴⁸ McDonald 2001, 117.

Especially to regions immediately north of the Peloponnesus, namely Thessaly (1881), Epirus (1913) and Macedonia (1919), were all called areas to which Greece had a historical right. The new areas were gained with the support of Greece's protecting powers, France, Russia, in the beginning, and Great Britain. In 1864, Great Britain transferred the Ionian Islands to Greece. In 1881 the Turks were forced to cede Thessaly to compensate Greece for the emergence of the state of Bulgaria after the Congress of Berlin. Thus, 70% new land area was added to Greece, but the expansion was not only territorial. The population also grew from 2.8 million to 4.8 million after Epirus and Macedonia became part of Greece.

The idea of a homeland for Hellenistic and Orthodox communities fit well with Western European ideals of the time. All these areas were said to have shared the Hellenic past and therefore they were seen as natural parts of the modern Greek state. The fact that during the ancient era there were no states, as we know them now, but city-states, loosely connected together, which occasionally fought against each other, did not disturb the narrative. 'We were living in all these areas then and so it is meant to be also now' was the basic line of the national expansionary narrative of the period. Minor disturbing details caused no alarm. Legitimate expansion was seen as a *natural* right in this story. Other areas that were wished to be united with the modern Greek state were the Ionian islands, Greek areas of Asia Minor, Crete, and the Dodecanese islands. Part of Asia Minor was conquered by Greece during 1920-1922, but lost after Mustafa Kemal (Kemal Atatürk) reorganized the Turkish military and state. Because territorial conquest did not solve the issue, population movements were resorted to, and in the aftermath of this last Greek-Turkish war over a million ethnic Greeks were expelled from Turkey, in exchange for about 500 000 Turkish and Albanian Muslims from Greece. The Dodecanese Islands were ceded to Greece through the Paris Peace Treaty with Italy as late as 1947. It is said that the division of Cyprus is the final stage in the separation of the Greek and Turkish peoples from each other that began with the creation of the Greek state out of the former Ottoman Empire. All the other areas, or at least their Greek populations, were *rescued* home from the enemy, but Cyprus never came home. Nevertheless, all in all Greece can be considered as one of the most successful European expansionary states. Excepting the conquest of Asia Minor and the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire, an idea that ran against the ideological current of the period, Greeks were able to fulfil almost all of the original goals of geopolitical expansion based on the concepts of ethnicity and territory.

The other side of the project, and much easier to achieve in practice than territorial conquests, were conscious attempts at creating ethnic homogeneity inside of the state. In the case of Greece, the population has been claimed to be one of the most ethnically and religiously homogenous in the Balkans until recently. More than 95% of the population belonged traditionally to the Greek Orthodox Church and spoke Greek as their mother tongue. The sameness was created purposefully during the construction of the Greek state, partly by forced population movements, and partly by education of the population

within the state territory. For example, the Slavophone population of northern Greece was subjected in the twentieth century to various Hellenisation pressures by the Greek state.¹⁴⁹ Assimilation pressure and discrimination of Slavophones was strong especially during the Metaxas dictatorship in the late 1930s. However, after the 1990s a large influx of foreigners arrived into the country, mostly from Eastern Europe, and the new immigration has changed the homogenous balance of the population of Greece. From the late 1980s and early 1990s, the population of Greece underwent an enormous change in its social composition. Non-Greek speaking, non-Greek born and non-orthodox population rose from about 2.5% to roughly 10%.¹⁵⁰ The geopolitical project of naturalizing and homogenizing the population that began during the struggle for independence of Greece and was then formulated with the help of the concepts of ethnicity and territory, is another historical element, which is felt strongly also in present day Greece.

After World War II, 'geopolitical imagination became centred on competing conceptions of how best to organize international political economy'.¹⁵¹ Agnew has named the third period *ideological geopolitics*. The global space became divided between friends and enemies. The friendly block versus the threatening one, us against the others. 'The Cold War began as a series of US policies designed to rebuild Western Europe after World War II, but it became a system of power relations and ideological representations in which each side defined itself relative to the Other'.¹⁵² The beginning of the Cold War is often placed in March 1947, when US president Harry Truman gave a speech in the Congress and 'drew the line' against communism in Greece. After World War II, Greece fell into a civil war. The Communist side received strong support over the northern border from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, although ultimately the support came from the Soviet Union, as Socialist Greece fit well with its geopolitical goal of gaining access to the control of the Bosphorus. In 1947 Greece thus became the central theatre of the emerging Cold War. Truman used the metonymy of seeds of totalitarian regimes, which are nurtured by misery and want and which spread and grow when the hope of people for a better life has died. The main fear was that the Communism of Greece would spread to other countries, which similarly had serious troubles in reconstruction after World War II.

It is necessary only to glance at the map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbour, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ Kofos 1990, 107-114; Papahadjopoulos 1998, 14.

¹⁵⁰ Diamandouros 2001, 71.

¹⁵¹ Agnew 1998, 102.

¹⁵² Agnew 1998, 103.

¹⁵³ www.yale.edu/lawweb/Avalon/trudoc.htm Visited 10.4.2007. See also http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/ Visited 10.4.2007.

Truman asked the Congress to provide financial and material assistance for Greece. In practise it was realized as civilian and military personnel to assist in the task of reconstruction. The process influenced the result of the Greek Civil War in the late 1940s and Greece indeed avoided the *unspeakable tragedy of disappearing as an independent state*, as President Truman formulated it.¹⁵⁴ As Patrick Thaddeus Jackson notes, 'a communist triumph in Greece and Turkey would be an issue for the whole of something called 'the West', rather than a foreign incident against which the United States could somehow insulate itself, and the importance of these two countries in particular lay in their strategic location on the border where the two civilizations met'.¹⁵⁵ Therefore Truman justified also Turkey's inclusion because 'it was strategically important for the defence of 'the West''.¹⁵⁶ As seen from Greece: 'Of all Balkan states, Greece alone escaped the fate of being engulfed by communism. The victory of anti-communist forces in the civil war of 1946-49 secured the country into the Western camp, and made it, along with Turkey, the bulwark of NATO's defence in its southern flank'.¹⁵⁷ The idea of being rescued to the West remains strong. That Greece was able to *escape the fate* is a clear metaphor, which reveals that the country had the capability or luck to avoid something utterly negative.

During this period small states were not seen as destined to disappear from the face of the earth, but nor were they considered autonomous actors, but agents for one side or the other. Echoes of this era can nowadays be read every time when Greece's position is defined in the area: *Greece is located at the crossroads of three continents Europe, Asia, and Africa. It is an integral part of the Balkans where it is the only country that is a member of the WEU, NATO, the European Union, and so forth.* This is the normal locational litany that is presented in thousands of speeches and texts, with lots of variation, of course, but the essential meaning is the same. Greece is situated in a volatile area, but it has been taken in into a number of international organizations created for controlling and administering this volatility. Although the period supposedly is over since the end of the Cold War, the institutional arrangements that were set up to secure Greek special access to Western European and American support during the era of ideological geopolitics are still in place. In Greek foreign policy various issues can be justified by referring to any of these three geopolitical periods. 'Modern geopolitical imagination is a *system* of visualizing the world with deep historic roots in the European encounter as a whole'¹⁵⁸, and the Greek state has been a widely noted focus of each subsequent geopolitical period.

There is one more school of geopolitics, which needs to taken in account with this study. Critical geopolitics strives to expose power politics to scrutiny and public debate in the name of deepening democratic politics. As Ó Tuathail presents it, critical geopolitics understands the world as a product of the

¹⁵⁴ Truman Doctrine 1947. *ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ Jackson 2006, 152.

¹⁵⁶ Jackson 2006, 155.

¹⁵⁷ Veremis 2006, 177.

¹⁵⁸ Agnew 1998, 6.

histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space, and not as an innocent product of nature.¹⁵⁹ The same questions of political rhetoric also should be remembered in reading geography: Who defines areas in her speech or text, to whom it is presented and why it is done.¹⁶⁰ This criticism of geography not as a natural given but a power-knowledge relationship has roots in Michel Foucault's thoughts: 'There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations'¹⁶¹. Compared with the classical geopolitics of Ratzel, Kjellén and Mackinder, which basically claimed that *this is how the world is*, for critical geopolitics the verb 'is' is always a contested notion. Knowledge is seen as situational knowledge, which articulates from the perspective of certain cultures and subjects, while marginalizing that of others. Its 'we' is transnational community of citizens sceptical of the power concentrated in state and military bureaucracies, and committed to an open democratic debate about the meaning and politics of 'security'. Therefore, from this critical point of view: Geopolitics is not about power politics: it is power politics.¹⁶² Critical geopolitics explains places, spaces, borders, centres, and peripheries because of political purpose and discussion. Places and borders are not something given from the above, and they should not be taken for granted. We are purposefully producing places. Borders are human-made social constructions.¹⁶³ Through political debate, we create spaces, territories and borders, but the dynamics of the situation also work in the opposite direction, because these spaces, territories and borders also create new politics.

Sami Moisio points out that the central problem of geopolitics is a clear understanding of the concept of politics, because geopolitics cannot be studied beyond political theory but rather through it.¹⁶⁴ He criticizes, from a methodological point of view, the school of critical geopolitics because there the political tends to be seen as a one-way process, not as a conflictual aspect between two or more different competing political subjects trying to persuade the audience and putting their own geopolitical truth at the centre of political life. In critical geopolitics, the political seems to correspond with the concept of governance – inasmuch as critical geopoliticians tend to emphasize distances to the political nature of the representation they are studying. However, such an emphasis moves research focus from political struggle and places it close to the dominant linguistic structure, hegemonic discussion and the hegemonic governance the discourse empowers. The political alternatives of political opponents have not been studied and, therefore, contextual basis and contingency of the geopolitical arguments have been largely neglected in critical geopolitics.

¹⁵⁹ Ó Tuathail, 1996, 1.

¹⁶⁰ Moisio 1998, 29.

¹⁶¹ Foucault 1979, 27.

¹⁶² Ó Tuathail, 1999, 108.

¹⁶³ Ahponen & Jukarainen 2000, 6.

¹⁶⁴ Moisio 1998, 35.

In his critique, Moisió follows Kari Palonen's well known division of politics into polity, policy, politicking, and politicization. Polity refers to what we can call political order; it is the organizational unit within which a certain type of politics is being made, and harkens back to the classical Greek concept of *πολιτεία*. Policy is a common line or plan of action, pointing to a teleological goal for the whole polity. Policy can of course be disputed and usually is, unless extreme levels of unity have been achieved in or imposed on the polity, but nevertheless the frame of reference of policy is the whole unit. The central responsibility of the leadership of the polity is to formulate a viable policy, either by itself or after lengthy debates in some kind of political agora. Policy is a planned and justified road-map that the unit should follow in a certain domestic and foreign political situation. Politicking is a clear neologism, which refers to action, either for support or for overthrowing the established policy of the unit. Politicking easily evokes the image of individual action, but it can also be based on a group. The characteristic of politicking is that it takes place among issues that generally are recognized as political, while its counterpart, politicization, refers to a situation where issues that previously had been thought to lie outside of political considerations, and thus outside of disputes, are brought into the centre of politics. Politicking means taking part in an established game, often by a recognized and experienced player called politician, while politicization means a reinterpretation of the situation, and changing the game by bringing in new elements, which can mean the starting of a new game with different rules. Politicization is always an interpretative operation, which either transforms a phenomenon previously seen as non-political into a political one, or an interpretative operation that increases the political tension of a phenomenon.¹⁶⁵

This vocabulary can help in opening the politics of geo that a certain state conducts. The programmatic line of exponents of critical geopolitics tends to concentrate attention on great powers as the only polities worthy of studying, and it also tends to concentrate attention on issues of established policy. The concepts of politicking and politicization help to open domestic debates, disagreements and games for analysis, enabling a multidimensional reading of a political situation. It enables analyzing the geopolitical policy constructions of a small state in their own right, and not only as a derivative of great power politics. Nowadays, the latter often is an element in any foreign political situation, but small states nevertheless are political actors in their own right as well, and can form their own policies, and do politicking on them, from an exclusively domestic agenda. A country like Greece, situated in a complicated geopolitical environment, with various grand pasts to activate in political debates and policy formulations, cannot be understood only as an element of great power politics. The emphasis of critical geopolitics on debate and the political dimensions of language, corrected with Sami Moisió's stress on the importance of understanding policies as a result of politicking and politicization, is perfectly usable also in this study. Different rhetorical

¹⁶⁵ Palonen 1993c, 90 - 91. Palonen 1993a, 8-11.

placements of Greece and the narrativistic elements used in justifying them are the focus of this study.

One element of geopolitical placing is the debate about whether one is situated in the centre or in the periphery. By studying these spatial tropes, one can see how different cultures have positioned themselves visually in space in their attempts to create a politically acceptable worldview¹⁶⁶. In a political sense, being in the centre is focusing on the importance of position and action. Whatever is done in the periphery has less meaning. This leads to an idea that different kinds of actions are more allowed or possible in the centre than in the periphery, because attitudes towards a periphery are disinterested. It is as if distance neutralized what is important or dangerous. The discussion of centres and peripheries is filled with implicit circular norms. For example, what is good tends to be situated in the centre, and where the centre is, there good deeds are done. It is difficult to avoid such hierarchical spatial metaphors as *head*, *nucleus*, and *main* in political discourse. We cannot really say that some places are *natural* centres, because, in practise, places are valued and defined by actions and are therefore vulnerable to changes.¹⁶⁷

It is somehow taken for granted that what is in a centre, is much more important than what lies in a periphery. It seems to be part of the general conceptual basis of established political organizations. As Mircea Eliade's classic study shows, the conceptual division between cosmos and chaos is very old, and can be found among the earliest civilizations that have left written accounts of their understanding of geo.¹⁶⁸ People dwell in a certain world that they have first made to exist. What is our place is the nucleus of the world and important, and the further we go from the centre; the more the terrain is unknown and uncertain, belonging to *others*. From this point of view, communities like the European Union, where the centre seems to be somewhere near Brussels, is so disturbing for us, who are thrown to the edge of the EU's territory. If in EU maps we see ourselves at the periphery, it does not feel right. There you are, with EU neighbours on one side, and emptiness on the other. In such a situation, we can try to behave like the ones in the centre and emulate centre norms to the last in order to gain the centre's acceptance and respect, or we can try to build ourselves a distinct identity emphasizing our importance – which means that we transform our peripheral place into another centre. The interplay of these two policy lines forms the sense of belonging to a borderland, and the borderland identity. However, in a world full of multidimensional boundaries, it is possible to say that if there is a dominant culture, it is border culture, which means the mental skill of turning a peripheral position into a central position. Border culture can help us dismantle the mechanisms of inferiority and fear. Border culture can guide us to a common ground with various kinds of actors and improve our negotiating skills. Border culture is a process of negotiating towards utopia, but in this case utopia means peaceful coexistence and fruitful co-operation. It is not the same to be the last country of

¹⁶⁶ Turunen 1997, 44.

¹⁶⁷ Palonen, 1993c, 168.

¹⁶⁸ Eliade 1959, 22, 29-31.

the European Union than the one next to it. We are special, because we are the last ones.

Insights from classical geopolitics are therefore an element within this study, because place and space are integral dimensions of politics. Classical geopolitical forms of thought are used also nowadays, even though usually verbal framing of situations, rather than military force, is used in the political contests. The following example is written by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, Yannis Kranidiotis. The text was published in 1997, after the collapse of Yugoslavia.

In this sensitive region, we are well equipped to respond successfully to the new challenges. We are a homogeneous country, with stable democratic institutions and, despite temporary problems, the strongest economy in the area. Greece has a deep understanding of regional realities. At the same time, it is the only Balkan country, which is also a member of the European Union, NATO and the WEU. Greece has the potential to play – and actually does play – a major stabilizing role in the region. In this respect, Greece has considerably assisted all the countries in the area to conclude co-operation agreements with the European Union and integrate into the European family and institutions.¹⁶⁹

The quotation starts by defining the qualities of the place. It is a *sensitive region*, which implies that special qualities of knowledge and leadership are needed in its management. Greece itself is consequently qualified as a *successful, homogenous, and stable democracy* with the *strongest economy* in the region. Some problems are admitted, but stressed as *temporary*, which implies that essentially Greek economic problems do not need to be taken into consideration here. They would only mar the otherwise consistent picture. The unique capability of Greece to understand the area is underlined by explaining how it is physically situated in the Balkans, but simultaneously it is also ‘outside’ of the Balkans as a member of several clubs with a reputation for strength and capability. With these qualities, Greece is framed here as the leader and stabilizer of the region, capable of leading the others to the right direction. The right direction is the *European family*. This kind of hierarchical highlighting of the family, a well-known metaphor in political debate, has been analyzed by George Lakoff in his studies of the uses of moral arguments in politics.¹⁷⁰ The quotation exemplifies what Lakoff calls a strict father morality, in which a father figure, in this case Greece, possesses the highest morality and authority; Rudolf Kjellén’s geopolitical thinking proceeded along similar lines. Father has the duty to support and protect his family, so those who have risen to the top have a responsibility to exercise their legitimate authority for the benefit of all under their protection. This gives an option: the newly independent and thus childlike Balkan countries should return to their European family, as long lost members, after they have followed the advice. The framing of the situation is definitely hierarchical, elevating the position of Greece, while lowering that of the other Balkan countries, and it is only from this position that Greeks are willing to

¹⁶⁹ Yannis Kranidiotis, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, (Published in *Thesis*, Autumn 1997 ISSUE No3)

¹⁷⁰ E.g. Lakoff: 2002 and 2004.

lend a hand to the others. Thus, the argument is an attempt to trade some material and administrative resources for considerable political power both within the region and outside of it.

The history of classical geopolitics has normally been written in the way that the practical conduct of geopolitics appears as the privilege of the strongest powers. Notwithstanding, geopolitics can simply be understood as a hierarchical way of thinking, which allows attaching the most positive values to one's own state and placing it into the centre, while the other states are delegated to the periphery. Small states can use geopolitics as well as great powers; not only in relation with even weaker states, but also while politicking against stronger ones. Geopolitics analyzed as rhetorical politics makes this perfectly possible for small states, such as Greece. It thus enables the state representative to frame Greece not only as a leader of the new Balkan States, but also as a leader in relation with the EU, NATO and the WEU for the purpose of stabilizing the area, because Greece is framed here as the state with the best skills to administer all relevant activities in the Balkans.

3 BEING IN EAST AND WEST

3.1 The Identity of 'We'

We know that Greece was more or less forcefully adopted as the civilizational origin of Europe, and Greek mythology, through the repeated stories of ancient gods, legends and fables, is an essential element of European and Western narrativistic roots. In modern Greece the pagan past is frequently present more forcefully than anywhere else in Europe. The Greek identity truly has been constructed with these old stories from the dawn of history. Ancient mythology is daily generated and maintained, transmitted and received, applied, exhibited, remembered, scrutinised and experienced. When children study history in Greek public schools, starting from the third grade, an interesting point in those books is that after the chapters dealing with the Stone Age, the following chapter tells about Zeus, the king of ancient gods, and his children. This chapter is followed by stories of the Mycenaean culture. Mythology is not separated from secular history, but is delicately blended with it. Children are taught to understand where they come from and how their known world was created - and how these happenings are relevantly explained by stories thousands of years old. Civilization emerged in Greece under the care of ancient gods.

As Mirela-Luminita Murgescu writes, school textbooks on history are considered ideological highways, where information and values are shaped into memories and identities. Hereby these books are perceived more like living entities than simple objects. The books are concentrated memory, ready for all. Even nowadays, when auditive mass media seems to be hegemonic and overwhelms our memory with an array of information, the history textbook is considered a bastion of stability and conformity in an unstable and often chaotic informational universe.¹⁷¹

Old stories, which tell what has happened here before, are more than descriptions. They also imply ownership of places and are therefore culturally

¹⁷¹ Murgescu 2004, 339.

and socially creative. Narrative is important in the creation of a community because human stories define boundaries, and create bridges between individuals. The narrative structure of such communities enables people to shape the world that surrounds them. Moreover, it makes them, therefore, active participants. In the following text former minister of Northern Greece Nicolaos Martis explains what kind of people the Greeks used to be in the past, and what kind of criteria was needed to become a citizen in the ancient times.

The fact that in the space of ancient Greece there were many city-states made no difference. Their citizens were Greeks because they had the same language (Greek), the same gods (the twelve Olympians) and the same religion.¹⁷²

This story of the habits of ancient Greeks was used as a mythical instrument of self-definition. If our ancestors behaved in a respectable way, we too are respectable people. The past is shown here as a mirror of the present. It is important to see that those who accept the beliefs encoded in myth accept above all a particular world-view that it reflects as well as membership, and the rules that go with the membership. Convincing the rest of the world that even history proves our righteousness is not necessarily an easy thing to do, but most of such argumentation is nevertheless targeted for the group itself. Myth attributes special qualities to the group, extends its distinctiveness and creates boundaries.¹⁷³ At the same time, it gives meaning to the self-understanding of the community.

The previous quotation tells not about people in general but about Greek people who were living in this certain area. In this way, place can also be seen as memory.¹⁷⁴ Another story of identity is found in the situation when refugees arrive from across the borders and thus evoke a need to be assimilated by these people. The sense of belonging becomes more a political than an emotional tool. Citizenship has tended to be conferred on those who identify themselves as Greeks. Another solution is that they are identified by other Greeks as 'belonging' to Greek society and culture, as social researcher Elizabeth Mestheneos writes:

The emergence of modern Greece as a nation state, starting with the 1821 War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire, was a gradual and difficult process involving the incorporation of one and a quarter million Greek refugees from Asia Minor, Russia and Bulgaria, with its current national borders being established only in 1948. The perceived need to create a common national identity has underlined the continuous attempt to Hellenize all those within its borders and considerable ambivalence about those who remain as minority or atypical non-Greek elements within the national borders.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² Martis 1984, 47. Nicolaos K. Martis was born 1915. He studied law and was elected Member of Parliament seven times. He has served e.g. as a Minister of Industry and Minister of Northern Greece.

¹⁷³ Schöpflin 2000, 83

¹⁷⁴ Sheldrake 2001, 16.

¹⁷⁵ Mestheneos 2002, 179.

There are several factors that have been used to define who is Greek and who is not. Greek language and belonging to the Orthodox Church have been the most important ones. A third criterion, living in Greece, has also been an essential factor, but over time, as the places of borders have changed and Greeks have moved to and from Greece, there has been a need to change this limitation. In the first Constitution of the War of Independence the definition of the Greeks and the others was written as: 'Those indigenous inhabitants of the domain of Greece who believe in Christ are Greeks.'¹⁷⁶ In this case, Eastern Christianity was the principal qualification and criterion of Greek national identity. Language as a criterion was introduced later by the second revolutionary constitution: 'Those coming from abroad who have Greek as their mother tongue and believe in Christ'.¹⁷⁷ The following quotation is from Christina Koulouris' research on history and geography in Greek schools during 1834–1914. Definitions were needed because only part of Greece was 'free' at that time and Greeks were seen living on the other side of state borders.

Greeks are those who speak Turkish but profess the Christian religion of their ancestors. Greeks are also the Greek speaking Muslims of Asia Minor, who lost their ancestor religion but kept their ancestor tongue. As far as the inhabitants of Asia Minor, who are Muslims and speak Turkish, are concerned, only reliable historical evidence or anthropological studies can prove their Greek descent and their distinction from the non-Greek Muslims.¹⁷⁸

However, the religion and language definition soon was seen too limiting because there have always been *επερώγλωσσοι*, *heteroglossoi* (other-lingual) in Greece as well as *έτερο-θήσκοι/επερόδοξοι* *heterothreskoi* (other-religionists). Neither language nor religion, therefore, was reliable and decisive determinants of Greek identity. What was reliable and decisive was descent – where descent could be established with the assistance of historical evidence or anthropological study. History initially, archeology and folklore eventually, were mobilized to support the theory of modern Greek descent from the ancient Greeks. Drawing the line around the Greek identity has continued ever since.

The place of Greece can be defined simply within national borders of the state, or within the areas where Greeks have lived during the past, or are living now. 'The Greek Diaspora has always been one of the major components of Hellenism, because migration has been since antiquity, a way of life for Greeks'.¹⁷⁹ The amount of Greeks living in Diaspora is approximately 6 - 7 million scattered in 140 countries. To compare, there are about 10 million Greeks living in Greece. The Greek name for their country is Hellas. Georges Prevelakis, a professor of political geography, places the Hellenic world under three names: Greece, Cyprus and Diaspora.

¹⁷⁶ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 250.

¹⁷⁷ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 251.

¹⁷⁸ Koulouri 1988, 531, in Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 254-255.

¹⁷⁹ Dollis 2004, 155.

Το γεωπολιτικό πλαίσιο του Ελληνισμού ορίζεται τόσο από νέο διεθνές περιβάλλον, όσο και από τα επί μέρους γεωπολιτικά δεδομένα, τα οποία αφορούν στις σημερινές εκφάνσεις του Ελληνισμού: Ελλάδα, Κύπρος, Διασπορά.¹⁸⁰

Diaspora as a place is interesting because it includes an idea of being away from somewhere where these people belong. Dwelling somewhere for generations may change the sense of belonging, probably the children of immigrants already feel belonging to a new land and the “homeland” of their parents is a different place. Therefore, it can be said that the borders of the Hellenic world are not only spatial. People who live in Diaspora have taken the Hellenism with them from the homeland and it is flourishing “abroad”. Diaspora is also considered as a strength and reason for pride. Professor Panagiotis K. Ioakimidis defines the uniqueness of Greece in the EU with its massive Diaspora:

Η Ελλάδα είναι η μόνη χώρα-μέλος της Ένωσης με τόσο πολυάριθμη διασπορά, με έξι περίπου εκατομμύρια ομογενών σ’ όλες τις γωνιές της υφηλίου. Άλλες χώρες έχουν επίσης διασπορά (π.χ. Ιρλανδία, Ιταλία) αλλά ούτε σ’ αυτή την αριθμητική έκταση ούτε σε τόση γεωγραφική κάλυψη.¹⁸¹

Ioakimidis writes how Greece is the only member-state of the EU with such a large number of people in Diaspora in all the corners of the world. Others states also have their own Diasporas, especially Ireland and Italy, but Greece beats them with both numbers and geographical coverage. The quotation is interesting because it presents the phenomenon of migration as a victory for Greece. Greece has succeeded in sending people abroad, to every corner of the world, more than any other state in the EU. However, most of these people have left their home country with a wish to find jobs, education and a better life because Greece has been unable to offer them. However, if Greece as a state is considered, the borders of course are spatial, because they are drawn around the national territory, and its sovereignty is expected to be respected by others.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and during the post Cold War era in general, more and more immigrants have moved to Greece to stay. It is a new challenges for Greece, for decades a homogenous society, to define Greekness again. To whom can a Greek passport be given and, simply, who is Greek? Many of these immigrants were ethnically non-Greek, but a crucial dimension of the debate of Greekness that changed self-perceptions was the massive naturalization of expatriates, also called Soviet Greeks, or co-ethnic immigrants from the former Soviet Union. The majority of the Soviet Greeks, who arrived at their ‘historical homeland’ in the early 1990s, did not speak modern Greek, if they spoke Greek at all. Greeks in Greece had had expectations of rediscovering long-lost brothers in the form of these newcomers.¹⁸² The reality was not so positive and the adaptation process, on both sides, is still going on.

¹⁸⁰ Πρεβελάκης 1998, 279.

¹⁸¹ Ιωακείμης (publishing date unknown), 106.

¹⁸² Voutira 2003, 145-159.

The 'pro- and anti-Europe positions in Greece can be traced back to the ecclesiastical view mentioned earlier. The two main traditions in thinking can be split into two groups. One group emphasises Eastern Orthodoxy and differences with Western Christianity, and is quite ambivalent [...] [on EU membership. The] second group argues for a European orientation for Greece'.¹⁸³ An interesting non-state actor, when we discuss the Greek identity, is the Greek Orthodox Church. It influences the society and it promotes nationalistic sentiments. Also it has power to influence in the Greek political system. For instance, the open support for Yugoslav during the crisis in the beginning of the 1990s was supported by the Church, although it never became an official Greek policy. The tension reflects a general conflict between Europeanists and Traditionalists in Greece. The Europeanist 'favour total integration of Greece in the European Union, in all aspects of its society. The Traditionalist sees it as a threat to traditional Greek values and religion, and sees Greece as a part of the Eastern European group of Orthodox countries'.¹⁸⁴ However, Traditionalists' influence in the policy process is lower than their numbers. In the following quotation, George Papandreou, former Foreign Minister of the Hellenic Republic, describes the opinions of Greeks during the Yugoslav crisis.

For Greece the war [was] a real test of democracy. While an overwhelming majority of the Greek people were against the bombing, polls showed that they also agreed with the government's position of providing unwavering support to the alliance. This means that the same person who deplored the bombing also understood the need for Greece to respect its commitments as both an EU and NATO member. This reveals a sophisticated citizenry, able to comprehend the complexity of the situation. Greece stood out as a stable partner in the shaken and destabilized Balkans.¹⁸⁵

Papandreou's interpretation can be accepted as diplomatically true, but at the street level the situation looked different. The public opinion was strongly against the bombing and people were vigorously demonstrating against the NATO, the USA and all partners that were seen responsible for the situation. In any event, official support was given to the alliance. It can be assumed that the public pro-Serbia opinion, which was supported by the Church, was a typical, emotional Greek reaction that drove people to the streets. Later in this dissertation we shall see that this kind of action has also been described as *anti-European* behaviour, which has been harming the Greek political position in the EU. During the first years as a member of the EU, Greece was known as an opponent of almost any common decisions. At that time the socialist PASOK was in power, forming the Greek government, and it had won the elections against conservatives with a promise to withdraw the country from the EU. Although the promise was broken, the attitude towards the EU remained negative.

¹⁸³ Pace 2006, 128.

¹⁸⁴ Kavakas 2001, 172-173.

¹⁸⁵ Originally published in *Thesis*, Volume III, Spring 1999 ISSUE No1.

The present head of the Greek Orthodox Church, born in 1939 and elected to his position in 1998, His Beatitude the Archbishop of Athens and all of Greece Christodoulos¹⁸⁶, 'has on many occasions expressed political views with nationalist and irredentist intentions and has caused discomfort with the political leadership'.¹⁸⁷ For example, Archbishop Christodoulos steadfastly opposes possible Turkish membership in the EU. In his WebPages several speeches have been published. In the following quote the Archbishop stresses that if just any country, which wishes to join to the EU, will be accepted – and a common cultural background is considered as an irrelevant factor – Europe will be no less than murdered:

Εάν όμως η άποψη αυτή υπεριοχύσει, εάν δεχθούμε να γίνουν μέλη της Ένωσης όσες χώρες θέλουν, ή όσες κρίνει σκόπιμο η τρέχουσα γεωπολιτική συγκυρία, εάν δεχθούμε δηλαδή μιαν Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση να ξεπέσει σε μια ψευδειγγραφή οικονομική ζώνη, χωρίς καμιά πολιτική και πολιτιστική οντότητα. Αλλά στην περίπτωση αυτή, έχει δολοφονηθεί η Ευρώπη, και δεν θα μας μένει παρά να κηδεύσουμε το άταφο πτώμα της.¹⁸⁸

Archbishop Christodoulos does not mention Turkey or any other state by name. However, he presents Europe as a cultural formation, which should not be seen through current geopolitical circumstances or fake economic interests. Interests like money, if translated into the form of an economic zone, are not seen as reasonable motives to accept any state as a member of the EU. The EU is used as a synonym for Europe, with a long common history and culture. Europe, as a cultural entity, would perish with the influx of different cultures, which he does not define here, and 'we' in Europe would be left just to entomb its unburied body. The metonymies related to Europe's destiny are strong. Europe is a living thing, which can be murdered and whose body needs to be buried; otherwise those who remain to mourn the lost one have not done their duty and shown proper respect.

Attempts to create a kind of a Greek Orthodox fundamentalist movement is seen from 'involvement in politics, mass public support and a nationalist message'.¹⁸⁹ The first reason is the Church's involvement in Greek politics as shown through its constant comments on political developments and its use of influence as a pressure tool. The Archbishop's speech on Sunday liturgy is easily among the top news in the evening. He is also active in giving interviews to the press expressing the Church's political opinion. For example during the Yugoslav crisis the Church tried to convince the Greek people that 'the Catholic and Protestant West is fighting a war against the Orthodox people and their

¹⁸⁶ In polls on popular rating of leaders, Archbishop Christodoulos holds the first place enjoying more popular support than political leaders. The change of leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church in 1998 signified a change in the way that the traditional nationalistic ideals were transmitted to the public. Kavakas 2001, 172.

¹⁸⁷ Kavakas 2001, 172-173.

¹⁸⁸ Κεντρική σελίδα του Αρχιεπισκόπου.
http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/default.asp?id=80&what_main=1&what_sub=5&lang=gr&archbishop_heading=Ευρώπη (1.4.2007)

¹⁸⁹ Kavakas 2001, 172.

tradition in Yugoslavia'.¹⁹⁰ Archbishop Christodoulos is well educated, has a law degree in addition to his doctorate in theology, and in addition to Greek also speaks English, French, German and Italian. He also follows world politics closely and comments on various events in his home page.¹⁹¹ He is not in any sense an ignorant religious traditionalist, but a learned and well informed religious traditionalist, which heightens the strength of his messages.

The Church's has succeeded in getting their messages through, which is the second reason. Greeks from all age groups have been actively participating in liturgies since the 1990s. It has been explained not by the plain religious message, but the message of the Greek identity. Therefore, people can be said to go to Church to hear 'who they are'.¹⁹²

The third reason is connected to the previous one, which is 'the Church's involvement in promoting Greek nationalism. The nationalist messages that the Church transmits take an anti-European character'.¹⁹³ From the Church view, the EU is the reason for the vanishing of the traditional Greek Orthodox culture, which is seen to be closer to the orthodox Eastern Europe than to the Catholic-Protestant dominated EU. The Greek Church has always felt closer to its Slav neighbours in this respect and occasionally also to Islam. Islam has not been a threat since it has historically acted as a guarantor of the Greeks Church's existence, namely during the period when Islam fought against the Christian Latins.¹⁹⁴ However, the relationship with Islam is highly ambiguous. The populist statements of the Church leaders do not always display any closeness with Islam. For example the building of a mosque in Athens has been repeatedly delayed since 2000 when the parliament approved the government plan to build an Islamic centre and mosque, because of the Church's and public objection.

3.2 The Location of 'They'

We have a tendency to describe ourselves in the middle of the world; a world which is strange or hostile in varying degrees. The universal tradition for making distinctions is to discuss about *others* and *us*. Naming the *other* is simultaneously naming the place of chaos, and *we* are dwelling, naturally, in the known world. Edward Said reminds us that it is not necessary for the others, the barbarians, to know about this distinction, as long as we know the difference.¹⁹⁵ The concept of 'others' is very useful in distinguishing and defining group self-perception. 'By identifying the others, or those who represent them on each occasion, one can expect to reach a relatively stable definition of a human group. [...]The non-Greek Orthodox Christians, the Latin

¹⁹⁰ Kavakas 2001, 173.

¹⁹¹ <http://www.ecclesia.gr/english/EnArchbishop/EnArchbishop.html>; (20.3.2007)

¹⁹² Kavakas 2001, 173.

¹⁹³ See also Fokas 2000, 176.

¹⁹⁴ Clogg 1986, 208-230. Fokas 2000, 280.

¹⁹⁵ Said 1978, 54.

or Western Christians, and the Muslims have been the three principal 'others' for the Greeks and are a convenient point of departure for a discussion on the subject.¹⁹⁶ The principal others for Greeks are Turks since modern Greece was formed by carving territory out of the declining Ottoman Empire from the 1820s onwards. Turkey represented a source of chaos, threat and clear difference.¹⁹⁷ The Greeks created their own image of the Turks. They were fashioned to suit the ideological and political requirements of the Greeks. 'The Turks had been foreign invaders in the dominion of the legitimate ruler of the land'¹⁹⁸, the Medieval Byzantine Greek Empire.¹⁹⁹



The fall of Constantinople, the Byzantine imperial city and its transformation into the capital of the Islamic Ottoman Empire took place in 1453. Also renaming the city Istanbul²⁰⁰ is part of the fall of Constantinople and the Orthodox Roman Empire. This empire had been conquered by force; it had not surrendered its sovereignty by its own will, nor had it made any treaty with the conqueror. Therefore, 'the Greeks had never recognised the Sultan as their

¹⁹⁶ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 249. See also Harry J. Psomiades 2000: *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase*.

¹⁹⁷ See Moisio 2003, 11. The settlement reminds of the Finnish view towards Russia.

¹⁹⁸ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 260.

¹⁹⁹ East Roman Empire under Justinian I (527-565). Redrawn from *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of the Balkans* 2001, Map 6.

²⁰⁰ The origins of the name are said to be in Greek words εἰς τὴν πόλιν [*sti poli*], meaning *to town* or *in town*.

legitimate ruler, notwithstanding the Orthodox Church's subservience to him.'²⁰¹



Although Greeks and Turks have a long shared history, at present it contains few positive memories. Over the centuries they developed a slave-master relationship²⁰³ which may make peace-making more difficult than between 'equal enemies', such as Germany and France. 'Since the Ottoman era, the Greeks have asserted that the Turks were usurpers of their sovereignty and temporary squatters, and had never accepted that these latest arrivals from Asia were co-habitants or had even acquired rights to the lands they had conquered by force.'²⁰⁴ In neither the Byzantine nor the Ottoman era were the two nations treated as equal. To be able to understand the current situation, we have to take a look at the past. The ways in which history is interpreted and recorded will differ depending on the viewpoint of the writer. There is selectivity when it

²⁰¹ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 260

²⁰² Ottoman Empire with territories acquired between 1505 and 1566 and vassal client states. Redrawn from The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of the Balkans 2001, Map 21.

²⁰³ Theodoropoulos 1998, 45. Byron Teodoropoulos is an ambassador, (ret.) who has served in numerous places including Turkey, Canada, the EU and NATO. He was the General Secretary of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1976 - 1981) and was the Chairman of the Central Negotiating Committee for Greece's accession to the EEC. He has written on Greek Foreign Policy, Greek-Turkish relations, and the Cyprus issue.

²⁰⁴ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002

comes to deciding what facts to include, accounts of events may vary: there is always more than one way to describe how something happened. The question is to analyze the meaning of the past in the present, and how it is explained and understood in politics.²⁰⁵ Byron Theodoropoulos former Greek ambassador of Turkey and expert in Greek-Turkish relations explains how the Greeks perceive the Turks and vice versa:

The Greeks perceive the Turks as the Asiatic invaders who destroyed the Greek Byzantine Empire, enslaved the Greeks along with the other Balkan peoples for centuries, and demolished the cultural and social patterns of Hellenism. They have been repelled out of Greek lands only after a whole century of military and diplomatic struggle by the Greeks to regain their independence. The Greeks perceive themselves as the victims of an aggressive master, who reduced them to the status of "reya", i.e. the flock, the herd of third grade subjects, their children abducted at the will of the authorities to become Moslem soldier-slaves to the Sultans, their cultural heritage destroyed.

The Turks see the Greeks as the ungrateful subjects. The Ottomans generously granted them religious freedom and recognised their family law and customs, gave them the chance to expand their trade inside the Empire. Yet, the Greeks took up arms against their benevolent masters and, to make matters worse, their uprising marked the beginning of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, since the example of the Greeks was followed by the Serbs, the Bulgarians, and the Albanians. To add insult to injury, the Greeks attempted in the course of this century to set foot on the Anatolian mainland; their advance to the outskirts of Ankara threatened the very heartland of the Turkish nation. The Turks perceive themselves, therefore, as the indulgent masters of a multinational empire, where there was ample room for all, but in return received only hatred and disdain.²⁰⁶

In both stories 'our' version of the past is seen as the right one. *We* were good and the others bad. In the Greek version the past took place in the Byzantine Empire when life was good and *our* culture was able to flourish. And then the others made the golden era collapse. In the Turkish version the past, when everything was fine, takes place during the Ottoman Empire. *We* were generous and respectful for the others. And again the others made the golden era come to an end. In both stories good life turns to catastrophe and flourishing peaceful culture to war that destroys the good order. It is true that we cannot avoid the feeling that the past is to some extent our creation. What makes the attempt to come to terms with, even reconcile, differing perceptions about the past more complicated is that they are continuously fed by present events, tensions, confrontations, even threats of war. The Turks were what the Greeks hoped to leave behind, namely the East as a locational category. They were 'the barbaric East, which had destroyed the Greeks' 'own' idealised East. The West, in addition to everything else it has signified for the Greeks, became their refuge'.²⁰⁷

Another point of the Greek attitude towards the East has been a questioning of Turkey's Western orientation - although the Greeks' own debate of being European or Western *enough*, is also a sensitive issue in present Greece.

²⁰⁵ Nyssönen 1999, 11.

²⁰⁶ Theodoropoulos 1998, 45-46.

²⁰⁷ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 260.

Maybe this is an example of a wish that the present Turkey would be reminded of Greece's past, as said in the previous chapter. From the Greek point of view, 'the Turks have not been able to build a Western nation-state because they are incapable of doing so. Therefore, 'the Western institutions Kemal Atatürk imported into Turkey have not taken root, while those who undertook to make them work have never been more than an insignificant and vulnerable minority'.²⁰⁸ Also Turkey's possible membership in the EU is seen by Thanos Veremis and John Koliopoulos as an elite's dream and not a message from the masses.

This Turkey, scorned for its shaky and uncertain Western orientation and its backwardness, but feared all the same for the damage it is capable of inflicting on Greece, has become an essential and integral part of modern Greek identity. The Turk has not simply been one of the 'others'; while Slavs, Albanians and Latins have all been 'others', the Turks were indissolubly associated with all the dark aspects of the past which the Greeks have shared with them and from which they want to believe they have freed themselves.²⁰⁹

The other is also the one with whom there is competition. If Greece's geopolitical value for example in NATO has diminished recently, it is cause for concern, but if Turkey's geopolitical value has become stronger, it is a much more serious issue. In Greek texts their country is presented as the gatekeeper on the border of East and West. However, Turkey does the same. The competition goes on.

3.3 Being in East and West

Where does Greece belong, to the East or to the West, has been a long lasting question, presented time and again since the emergence of modern Greece. In general, Greece is wished to be seen in the West by most Greeks, but the West is not seen purely as a good place. The problem is that the West has not always been a reliable partner. Although there have been examples, such as the philhellenic connection between Greece and the West in the beginning of the modern Greece state, in the eyes of Greeks these old friends have also betrayed the country many times:

Western Europe's lapses into high-handed treatment of modern Greece have been met by cynicism on the Greek side regarding West European motives. To most Greeks the West has always appeared too willing to reach an understanding with dictatorial governments in Greece and to exploit friendly relations with them for reasons other than those offered for public consumption. Moreover, in its 150 years of independent statehood before joining the European Community in 1981, Greece had been blockaded several times by West European powers and twice partly or wholly occupied, in 1916 - 17 and again in 1941 - 44, by their armed forces.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 260 - 261.

²⁰⁹ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 261.

²¹⁰ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 271.

The dictatorship of generals was supported by the United States, and the occupations during the World Wars were not prevented by Western friends. The idea of the state of Greece alone in the hostile world with no friends and supporters is a very typical geopolitical myth. The idea is supported by selective stories from the past and the message reveals how *we* suffered because of others.

Both the Ottoman past as an Eastern past and Eastern Christianity, which so strongly influences Greek identity, call to mind the country's position on the boundary. These facts are partly keeping the debate fresh in Greece. The opposition between an abstract East and West is not a new issue, though. The ancient Greeks used the Orient to define the difference between civilization and barbarians, although their main dichotomy ran between the cultured South and the barbarous North. East was not always the pejorative component of this opposition. Byzantium was the centre of the civilized European world for several centuries after the fall of Rome. Only after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and especially with the strengthening of Western Europe, was the East internalized also by the Orthodox world as the less privileged of the opposition pair.

This debate of belonging to the East or to the West seems to be very common in borderlands and if, for example, foreign media comments on Greece as Eastern or Western; European or non-European, it is taken very seriously. In the present European debate, the occasional lapses of modern Greece into 'un-European' behaviour and practices have always drawn strong criticism from Western Europe. This is interesting because it reveals how a certain kind of behaviour is associated with the place called Europe, although defining *European behaviour* sounds quite impossible. The relationship between actions, conceptions and physical attributes are not meaningless while contemplating who belongs to Europe. What kind of behaviour is associated and anticipated becomes therefore a geopolitical question. The following quotation was published in *The Economist* in September 1994. It criticizes Greek behaviour as un-European. The terms used in this text are not East and West, but Europe and Balkans. However, the connotations of the terms are very similar.

Despite 13 years in the European Union and hand-outs now worth 6 billion a year, Greece still seems to belong more to the volatile Balkans than to Western Europe. First Greece exasperated its EU partners by its casual approach to European obligations, its slowness in implementing directives and its hostility to better EU relations with Turkey. At one stage, a frustrated Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, had said that "he would be happy to see Greece leave".

Michael Herzfeld has written of the marginal position of Greece, both within anthropology and as seen from the West generally. The place of the roots of Western civilization, Greece, is at the same time oriental because of its long association with the East and because it has been governed by the East during the Ottoman Empire. These dimensions are also felt by Greeks themselves. Greek Orthodoxy is Christian in its origins but at the same time oriental in its

ritual and its material trappings, from the western point of view²¹¹. Therefore, Orthodoxy and the East have the same connotation as an oriental mystery.

However, also the East has placed Greece into a marginal position. Greeks were called 'Romii' (Ρωμαίοι)²¹² meaning the Romans. This name was given because of their Western religion as Christians. As Koliopoulos and Veremis write it, the terms 'Hellas' and 'Hellenic' were associated with their pagan origin and were soon replaced by the official designation of the Christianized conquerors of the Hellenized East, the Romans. Thus, Greeks became Romans. Ottomans, who later conquered the Eastern Roman Empire, used the term 'Rum' to define the Orthodox millet.²¹³ The Latin 'Graeci' (as opposed to the indigenous 'Hellenes') was a designation adopted by the Romans, who first came in contact with people of that name in Epirus. The Latins chose to call the inhabitants of the entire Hellenic world by that name. The Latin Western Empire persisted in calling the subjects of the Eastern Empire 'Graeci'²¹⁴, especially after the schism of the churches in the eleventh century.

While reading texts of Greek foreign policy since the beginning of EU membership, one is reminded of the East-West dilemma quite often. Membership is seen as a guarantee of belonging to the West. The following example, in which professor of European policy in the University of Athens Panagiotis Iokamidis analyzed in 1994 how the membership in the EU has released Greece from this East-West dilemma, is a typical example of assuring rhetoric:

Naturally, the psychological sense of security is being reinforced by the apparent weakening of the identity crisis, which Community membership has brought about. It appears that Greece's integration into the European Community has answered once and for all the perennial question about Greece's position and role in the international arena (whether Greece belongs to the West or the East). With accession to the EC, Greece feels that it has found a place and a role in the international system worthy of its historical past and cultural tradition.²¹⁵

An interesting anecdote is the fact that the previous quotation was written in the very same year as the article in *The Economist*, quoted earlier in this chapter. One more dimension to the East-West dilemma is the old division between Westernisers and Easterners. The issue of the country's entry into the Community was entangled in the old difference between 'Westernisers' (modernisers) and 'Easterners' (traditionalists). This distinction is linked to the old question of whether Greece belongs to the 'East' or to the 'West'. The 'Westernisers' have been historically identified with 'the rational inquiry and the political liberalism of the continent - and sometimes a cosmopolitan view of the world'²¹⁶ - whereas the 'Easterners', represented by the Orthodox Church, have been identified with stability - including religion, tradition and social

²¹¹ Herzfeld 1987, 177.

²¹² Petmezas 2004, 14-15.

²¹³ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 1-2.

²¹⁴ See an interesting analysis of these names also in Green 2005, 80-88.

²¹⁵ Ioakimidis 1994a, 146.

²¹⁶ Tsinisizelis, 2002, 66.

hierarchy. The preceding reflections point to the belief that the Greek case in the EC is not or could not be a success story. This may be because the country joined the EEC on political, rather than economic reasons.²¹⁷

In Greek eyes in the 1970s, the new situation in the neighbourhood of the country necessitated additional structures of support in its international relations, all aimed at the same desirable state of affairs: a close European 'partnership' to effectively counter-weigh the sporadic, but recurring, military threats from Turkey. In international political terms, the Community was largely seen as an additional platform from which the newly (re)established, but still highly fragile, liberal parliamentary regime could consolidate its strength. It was also perceived to be the most appropriate context, which would facilitate the economic development of the country. In the following professor Michael Tsinisizelis describes the line between Eastern and Western groups:

The strategy of the then Government was based on a theory of induced modernisation, more precisely that the country as a whole would have had to adjust to this new and much more competitive [European] environment or else to perish. In short, the cleavages 'Right' vs. 'Left', 'East' vs. 'West' (and possibly 'Third World' vs. 'East' and 'West') and their by-products initially marked the development of the Greek-EEC relations.²¹⁸

These two groups of Westernisers and Easterners can be analyzed with the political categories of climbers and aristocrats, which are in opposition with each other, the former threatening the position of the aristocrat, and the latter trying to defend himself. The Westernisers tend to see Greece in some respects, especially economically, as less developed than Western Europe, which is a frame of thinking that forces the idea of climbing to the European level on the policy forming process. The Easterners tend to regard Greece on a higher spiritual and religious level than Western Europe, which then leads to fairly customary conservative thinking, opposing any changes that would lower the high position of Greece any further. The mode of life of a climber is modern, with its struggles to create a better future, and its sense of time as a linear, progressive entity, where the future is the most important dimension, and history is seen as something dark, from which one has to escape. An aristocrat's mode of life is satisfactory; he concerns himself with enjoying his life actively and creatively in the present, which appears to him as a cyclical unending eternity. The category of future, in the linear sense, is missing from it, but history, as the genealogical history of his ancestors, is an important dimension.²¹⁹ These categories appear illuminatingly also in the dialogue between the Westernisers and the Easterners in Greece.

The aristocracy, or Easterners in this debate, is not connected here to a noble family history but it is a political category, just like climbers. The aristocracy is a political caste connected to a stable and static situation. It is a certain group, which has been in a secure position for a long time and therefore

²¹⁷ Tsinisizelis, 2002, 65-66.

²¹⁸ Tsinisizelis, 2002, 66.

²¹⁹ Korhonen *Kosmopolis*, 1999, Vol. 29, No 2, pp. 7-22.

the position seems to be natural, as if it was a *right*. Change there is, but it is always cyclic, like days, seasons, man's life, and elections time to time but in practise, nothing is changing. What follows is a similar, cyclical unending eternity. The basic dimension of Aristocracy is not time, but space. The faith on the Aristocracy itself is strong and no other group seems to be capable to replace the caste in power. What was before is wished to endure.

The modern Greek state is blamed not only for introducing the nationalist virus into the Orthodox Ecumene, but also facilitating the introduction of Western mores, which have undermined traditional Greek values such as honesty, compassion and hospitality, and destroyed the sense of community created by the Orthodox form of worship.²²⁰

In the quotation of the Eastern and the old are seen valuable and what comes from the West, Western mores, are threatening this old way of life. Traditionalists were honest, compassionate and hospitable people; therefore, modernists must be the opposite. *Modern* is bringing *the nationalist virus* to the settled world where the sense of community was created by the Church. In contrast, the future is the most meaningful temporal dimension for the Climbers, because over there they see themselves placed in the position of Aristocracy. The present is a tool for a Climber to reach the goal in a future. This kind of future orientation is tied to Westerners' thinking. The life before is not seen as a positive one and the target is in a better and happier future where Greece is a completely a European and Western country.

3.4 Narratives of Us

There can be no sense of place without narrative, because storytelling, or merely interpretation, as an activity giving a meaningful and coherent linguistic shape to memories and experiences, always takes the form of a narrative. Myths and histories are part of any specific culture that works to define the identity of who 'we' or 'the people' are in a specific context.²²¹ Many cultures have a story how the world was created and thus unknown space became a known place. It can be a story from the Bible how God created the world²²² or it can be a poem of Finnish mythology in Kalevala, in which terra and heaven have their beginning in the egg.²²³ In the Greek myth, Chaos was alone everywhere until the

²²⁰ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 264.

²²¹ Dalby 1998, 296. See also Smith 1997, 49.

²²² In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Now the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the deep, and Spirit of God was hovering over the waters. And God said, "Let there be light," and there was light. God saw that the light was good, and He separated the light from the darkness. God called the light "day," and the darkness he called "night." And there was evening, and there was morning - the first day. Genesis 1:1-5. New International Version.

²²³ From one half the egg, the lower, Grows the nether vault of Terra: From the upper half remaining, Grows the upper vault of Heaven; From the white part come the moonbeams, From the yellow part the sunshine, From the motley part the starlight, From the dark part grows the cloudage; And the days speed onward swiftly, Quickly

Earth/Gaia arrived and laboured mountains, seas, nights and days, as in the following from the school book of history:

Στα πολύ παλιά χρόνια οι άνθρωποι εξηγοῦσαν τη δημιουργία του κόσμου με ένα μῦθο. Στην αρχή υπήρχε το χάος. Πυκνό σκοτάδι απλωνόταν παντού. Πέρασαν αμέτρητοι αιώνες, ώσπου να δημιουργηθεί η Γη. Η Γη γέννησε τα βουνά και τη θάλασσα. Τη νύχτα και τη μέρα.²²⁴

A cosmological myth is a way to give meaning to space. Most of the myths of the beginning of the world tell how the cosmos was created out of chaos. Chaos was in the beginning empty, indefinite space, but creation of the world changes it to spatial categories. Myths and narratives give an order to the known world. Cosmological myth guides us to understand the socio-spatial meaning of space, which is divided to sacred and the profane, the centre and the periphery, and also to upper (heaven), middle (sacred place) and lower region (hell).²²⁵ In this mythical geography, man symbolically transforms into a cosmos through a ritual repetition of the cosmogony. Mircea Eliade writes that we must create our world before we can live in it. *Our place* must be made first.²²⁶ This construction and founding of a sacred place, cosmos, makes orientation possible because it settles the limits and establishes the order of the world. We tend to categorize the world as centre and periphery. That is the reason why people have a tendency to see themselves in the middle of the world. As Eliade stresses, every sacred place is to be thought of as an *axis mundi*, the centre of the world, with boundaries separating it from surrounding secular or profane places.²²⁷ When we think about a local place or home, where we place roots, it has the same meaning. It is the *axis mundi*, whether sacred or not and somehow gives a fixed point to our identity. The symbolism of centre is needed in order to explain the world and thus construct it. The centre is an organised and structured place, which represents a cosmic order.

Stories are more than descriptions: they also argue about the ownership of places and are therefore culturally, and socially creative. Because human stories define boundaries, but similarly also create bridges, narrative is important in the creation of a community. The narrative structure of such communities enables people to shape the world that surrounds them, rather than be passively controlled by it.²²⁸ We follow this structure, more or less, every time when we create new places. We are willing to see ourselves in the middle of the holy land, in the centre. And if it is not possible, if for example a map throws us to a corner, we try to change our position. We explain to others how important we are, how we are just like the ones in the middle. We try to prove our importance by words and deeds.

do the years fly over, From the shining of the new sun, From the lighting of the full moon. Trans. John Martin Crawford. <http://www.sacred-texts.com/neu/kveng/index.htm>

²²⁴ Ιστορία Γ' Δημοτικού, σ. 102.

²²⁵ Eliade 1959, 22, 29-31. Simonsuuri 2002, 26.

²²⁶ Eliade 1959, 29-31. Simonsuuri 2002, 64.

²²⁷ Eliade 1969, 22, 29-31.

²²⁸ De Certeau 1988, 122-130.

Narratives of place are connected with history. History, which, usually, tells the winner's story, is selective and seeks to describe what reality is or is like, with the purpose of making human existence meaningful. In the organisation of space is inscribed not the actuality of the past actions, but their meanings. Historical narratives are not only a link to the past but also to our time and future. For example, in 1992 Vasso A. Papandreou reminded Greeks, in her speech, of the successful past and suggested similar success was also the goal of Greeks in the future. The goal would be reached by the deeds and actions of present:

Two thousand four hundred years ago Isocrates, in the Panegyric, said that the name the Greeks bore had become a symbol not of their lineage but of spiritual advancement, and he urged the Greeks to live in concord so that they could confront the dangers facing them from outside. His words are astonishingly topical today. Once, we were pioneers, now we struggle in the rearguard. Let us at least try to keep pace with today's pioneers. Let Greece's response to the challenge of Europe not to be drift away.²²⁹

Narratives like this create continuity from the past to the future. These old examples, such as reminding Greeks of Isocrates' speech, try to make present decisions and deeds more acceptable for the audience. Something has succeeded in the past, so it can be done again. The narrative from the past reminds the listeners of positive developments. Failings there also have been, but the storyteller chooses just the successful part of narrative. The goal is not in the past, though, but in the future where a past-like success can be called for. Isocrates mentions dangers from outside the country, which is a typical way to make distinction between them and us. We live in the centre, in the sacred place, where all is well and in order and even its inhabitants proceed in spiritual advancement. What is outside is periphery, and it contains possible danger. After realizing the seriousness of the dangers lurking outside, Greeks could live in concord among themselves. It also reminds the audience that Greeks were not at the moment living in concord.

When we talk about the European Union, in the national level, there are interesting two-dimensional levels of meaning in the term *us*. Benedict Anderson has created the concept of imagined communities, because we are never able to see or meet all members of a state. Every society, which is bigger than a village where it is possible to communicate with everyone, is imagined.²³⁰ European Union is an imagined community in this sense. We are not able to personally meet all of our fellow Union members however hard we try; we can know only a tiny fraction of the whole populace. Maybe the size of the European Union, as well as its diversity, is such that the sense of belonging is difficult to be sensed. As long as belonging to it has no concrete meaning, it can be said to be an imagined belonging. The bond between union's ordinary citizens, if we talk about a common identity, it is not very strong. Papandreou was a member of the E.C. commission at the time when the speech was held.

²²⁹ Papandreou 1992, 20-21. (Originally the speech was delivered at Panteion University on 21 October 1991).

²³⁰ Anderson 1991, 3-7.

She was talking in the context of the European Union, which is supposed to make national *us* to the same level with the other member-citizens, on the other side of the national borders. Yet there is a competition with the outsiders. 'At least try to keep pace with today's pioneers' - if we are not able to have spiritual advancement in front of the others. Narratives help to market something new with an old label. The quotation is just fifteen years old. The situation over a decade ago was markedly different from our present now in 2007. People were not talking about terrorism, but about the collapse of the Soviet Union. The era of the Iron Curtain was over. Former Yugoslavia was still the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. An optimistic period of continuing the peaceful construction of Greece and equally optimistic reconstruction of the former Eastern block countries seemed to be in the offing.

George Schöpflin has analysed various myths, which are used to create the sense of nation and to legitimate their place. Myths of redemption and suffering²³¹ stress that the nation, by reason of its particularly sad history, will undergo or has undergone a process of expiating its sins and will be redeemed, or, indeed may itself redeem the world. The frequency of this myth in Central or Eastern Europe can be explained with 'a sense of geographical, political and cultural marginalisation with respect to Europe [...] [and, of course] in conjunction with the legacy of Christianity'.²³² In their form of being the 'last bastion of Europe' against the Barbarian hordes of the East, they are linked to myths that the nation almost died so that the rest of Europe could live. Antemurade myths claim that 'a particular nation fought to save Europe, defending it while acting on behalf of the defensive forces beyond the walls'.²³³ These myths also have implications for the individual's role with respect to the community, leading to weakening individual responsibility, suggesting that history or malign forces have caused the suffering stating that it was 'the will of God'.²³⁴ Myth of being the chosen one, selection, and the myth of having a mission to civilize are common when identities of different groups are explained.²³⁵ The mission to civilize others is quite common not only in the borderlands of Europe but also wider in the Western world. These myths state that the nation or the group of people in question has been entrusted with a special mission, by God or by History, as in the following, where Nicolaos Martis reminds the audience:

Another event that had its beginning in Macedonia and which affected Europe and the whole world is that it was from Macedonia that the Apostle Paul began his missionary work in Europe. It is because of Alexander the Great and his Macedonian successors who spread abroad Hellenic culture that Greek was spoken in Paul's home and he himself was taught Greek science. Paul started his apostolic work in Europe from Macedonia through divine prompting. It was the voice of Europe

²³¹ Schöpflin 2000, 91.

²³² Schöpflin 1997, 29

²³³ Schöpflin 2000, 91.


²³⁴ Schöpflin 1997, 30.

²³⁵ Schöpflin 2000, 94.

towards Christianity²³⁶. The event will always remind all Christians of the Greekness of Macedonia. Paul not only visited Macedonia first, but also wrote his divinely inspired epistles in Greek. Ever since the 1st century A.D. his epistles to the Philippians, that is the Greek inhabitants of Philippi, and to the Thessalians, have been continuously read in the entire Christian world.²³⁷

In the secular and modern times, 'the religious motif of being the selected or chosen nation, has been transmuted into a secular form, like the particular virtue of civility, or capacity for modernity, or simply being more 'European' than anyone else'.²³⁸ Or, we could say, of being more 'Western'. The idea is quite hierarchical and sometimes even racist, because cultural superiority is seen in respect to other competitors. In case of Greece this superiority can be seen in instances of their bold reminders that the origins of the word *Europe* is actually Greek. Although there can be various etymological versions of the origins of Europe, the *Greek Europa* is the one, which is always told to new generations in Greece.

...τον χάιδεψε και σε λίγο,
παίρνοντας θάρρος,
ανέβηκε στη ράχη του. Ο
ταύρος ως τη στιγμή εκείνη
στεκόταν ήρεμος. Ξαφνικά
άρχισε να καλπάζει.
'Όρμισε στη θάλασσα κι
άρχισε να πετά πάνω από
τα κύματα που ο
Ποσειδώνας είχε ηρεμήσει
με την τριαινά του. Ο
Ταύρος δεν ήταν άλλος από
τον ίδιο το Δία που
μεταμορφώθηκε έτσι, για να
ξεγλάσει και να απαγάγει
την Ευρώπη.[...] Έτσι αυτός
ο ελληνικός μύθος έδωσε το
όνομα στην ήπειρο που βρίσκεται η χώρα μας.²³⁹



According to the myth, Europa was a daughter of the Phoenician king. Zeus saw her once and was filled with desire for her. He changed himself into a beautiful white bull and when Europa saw how gentle and mild the animal was, she climbed upon his back. The bull carried her over the sea to Crete where she bore him three sons. And later Europa gave her name to the continent of Europe.²⁴⁰

Another, semi-religious myth is the idea of a Promised Land. It has the same origins as being the Chosen nation. These both are well known narratives for example from the Bible, but modern versions with secular connotations are very common among the present cultures. For example, a place that was lost

²³⁶ 'And a vision appeared to Paul in the night; There stood a man of Macedonia, and prayed him, saying, Come over into Macedonia, and help us. And after he had seen the vision, immediately we endeavoured to go into Macedonia.' The Acts XVI, 9.

²³⁷ Martis 1984, 17.

²³⁸ Schöpflin 1997, 31.

²³⁹ Ιστορία Γ' Δημοτικού, σ. 136 - 138.

²⁴⁰ Ιστορία Γ' Δημοτικού, σ. 139.

during wars to enemies can have the function of a Promised Land because of nostalgia, which makes memories of the place better than it originally was. The two nineteenth century national land frontiers of Greece were as if temporarily closed gates leading to the unredeemed brethren and to the Greek 'promised land'. For most Greeks of the kingdom, Thessaly and Epirus until 1881, and Macedonia until 1913, were lands that were Greek by historic right, destined to join and enlarge the Greek state. The unredeemed provinces acquired strange dimensions and qualities in national imagination. Imperfect geographical knowledge and information about the inhabitants that was either rudimentary or downright false, gave rise to flights of fancy about them. If an area is said to be a Promised Land, it means that somebody mighty has promised the area to these people and they are just fulfilling their destiny. Each culture constructs its discourses in opposition to something else and this allows the culture to see itself as enduring, unique and the bearer of moral worth. The element of comparison, reflected against others, is always vital. Geopolitical rhetoric is used, borders drawn again and again, and history's lessons are re-invoked. It is an ongoing process, a continuous recreation of contemporary discourses, a work in progress without final form. But the ones who participate in this process tend to see the situation as stable.²⁴¹

Myths are also used to explicate the ownership of territory. Nations tell stories to themselves to justify their occupation and exploitation a certain territory.²⁴² Sometimes competing myths of another nation claim rightful possession of the same place. Who owns the correct myth? Whose story is oldest or strongest? These myths claim that there is a particular territory where a nation first discovered itself, assumed its perfect form, and expressed its finest self.²⁴³ This territory is the land where the polity's purity was cherished and where its virtues were preserved before any contact with outsiders. An example of this kind of myth is the role of the Orthodox Church as a latter-day *Noah's Ark*, as told by Koliopoulos and Veremis. The Church was able to save the Greek nation from being assimilated by its foreign rulers. Part of the myth is to think of all others as a threat for pure Greekness, Muslims as well as Latin temporal princes. This view sees that the Church welcomed the Greek Revolution and blessed the arms so that the country it had cherished could be liberated.²⁴⁴ The myth of Noah's Ark from the Old Testament tells how human beings had become so corrupt that God wanted to destroy them all. The only exception was Noah and his family because they had not forgotten their faith in the true God. Therefore this handful of people was advised to build an ark, which would rescue them while a flood, sent by God, would come and drown the rest of the people. This qualified group was thus saved to build a new and better world. If the Orthodox Church is compared to Noah's Ark, the story really makes a difference between the good and the bad people. The ones inside are chosen and have the right to inherit the land, because *the potency of all future*

²⁴¹ Schöpflin 2000, 89-90.

²⁴² Schöpflin 1997, 28-29 and 2000, 83, 90.

²⁴³ Schöpflin 1997, 28.

²⁴⁴ Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002, 142.

*life is contained in the ark.*²⁴⁵ Thus myths of territory can tie in with myths of a Golden Age²⁴⁶, which in modern Greece is often the legendary Homeric world. Schöpflin stresses that 'these myths are bound up with the sacralisation of territory, a particularly powerful imperative, whereby a community will defend its frontiers to the last and is incapable of seeing it as 'real estate', as a possible object for bargaining and trading'.²⁴⁷ This makes secession or cession one of the hardest political actions because territory is sacred space, space where the existence of the community is preserved from pollution, and thus its means of cultural reproduction are kept safe. In daily public consumerist debates, this sacred space is easily seen in the idea of domestic food. It is as common in Greece as in Finland to believe that the most clean and healthy food is produced in the home country, no matter what neutral tests measuring the presence of dangerous chemicals and other signs of pollution might say. Because the pollution is spiritual, empirical measurements do not count. The process of turning the EU into a similar kind of sacred territory is still going on.

According to Schöpflin, 'everything that symbolises that territory – flags, maps, anniversaries – serves in reinforcing the myth and excluding alternative rationalities, such as financial calculations'.²⁴⁸ This has extensive implications for political action and behaviour. It suggests that 'states, when faced with something that seems to be a territorial claim, even when it is not argued as such, will easily interpret it that way, with the result that political negotiations easily become impossible'.²⁴⁹ It is possible to recycle myths. The reordering of frontiers in Europe and else where create new myths and again give space and motives to use the old myths in a new way.

Myths connect and divide, because 'through myths, boundaries are established within the community and also in respect with other communities. Those who do not share the same myth are by definition excluded'.²⁵⁰ All groups seem to understand a boundary of this kind, which works like a password. Myth is therefore one of the key elements, which creates belongingness and closeness within communities. Myths are 'vital in the establishment of coherence, in the making of thought-worlds that appear clear and logical, in the maintenance of discourses and generally in making cosmos out of chaos'.²⁵¹ It is also possible to make chaos out of cosmos, if one does not behave prudently and with wisdom. Myths are there not only to be believed, but also to learn something from their usually tragic teachings, and to overcome the kind of destiny they point to. During the 1990s, increasing violence in the Balkans just north of Greece presented a situation where the complex uses of myths in political argumentation can clearly be seen, as in the following

²⁴⁵ Frye 1990, 198.

²⁴⁶ Schöpflin 1997, 28.

²⁴⁷ Schöpflin 2000, 91.

²⁴⁸ Schöpflin 2000, 91. Paasi 1997, 43.

²⁴⁹ Schöpflin 2000, 91.

²⁵⁰ Schöpflin 2000, 80

²⁵¹ Schöpflin 2000, 80.

quotation from professor of International Relations Theodoros Couloumbis in 1994:

The nations and the peoples of SouthEastern Europe in the post-Cold War period must resist the siren-song of a bygone era. They must avoid nationalist and irredentists claims at the expense of their neighbours, and must shy away from policies of sub-regional alliances, spheres of influence, revanchist campaigns, pre-emptive probes and disproportionate reprisals – all of which are remnants of a glorious but also self destructive past. We should not forget that it took two world wars, and scores of millions of dead, for conditions to ripen and permit traditional European rivals (such as the French and the Germans) to move forward with the remarkable experiment of European integration that has gradually given birth to the European Union. In the post-Cold War Balkans we have already suffered the tragedies of carnage and destruction in Bosnia and Kosovo. In addition to offering our hopes and prayers, we should try to support leaders who are cautious and prudent so that the Cassandra’s prophesy about the Balkans becoming once again the powder keg of Europe will not become self fulfilling.²⁵²

Here Couloumbis warns the people of South Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War period about nationalism. The text was written right after the restless decade in former Yugoslavia and in the Balkans in general and there was a serious need for stability in the area. There are two interesting myths mentioned in the text. First of all there are *siren-songs* that *should be resisted*. In the ancient myth Odysseus and his men pass by the land of the Sirens, the singing enchantresses who lure men to their doom. The crew heard nothing of their magical songs, for Odysseus filled their ears with beeswax; but he, bound tightly to the mast, could hear every intoxicating sound and struggled to go to them. The men were forbidden to release him, however much he begged. True to their orders, his men only tied him tighter until they were safely out of hearing. The emotionally simple ethno-nationalist agitation based on the creation of group unity by whipping up hatred in thought and massacres in deed against other ethnic, linguistic or religious groups, and which was considered a natural line of action during the nineteenth century expansionary geopolitics, is presented here as the siren song from the point of the wisdom of a later period of time. Emotional politics of hatred are at first psychologically rewarding, perhaps even euphoric as they create feelings of power and invincibility, but when the hurt ones start to strike back, beauty ends and suffering starts also for one’s own group. The myth is used here to express the limits of human behaviour. Myth is one of the ways in which groups and nations establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their own systems of morality and values. In this sense myth is a set of beliefs, usually put forth as a narrative, told by the community about itself. In here, *we* are the ones who were able to resist the siren songs a long time ago, in the mythical past of heroes, and *we* should be therefore able to do it again. The misery happened in the Balkans because the siren-songs were heard and the ones, *others*, who heard

²⁵² Couloumbis 1999a, 253. Theodore A. Couloumbis is professor of International Relations in the University of Athens and Director General of The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.

it, could not obviously resist the sirens' call and were, therefore, taken to their doom.

Another warning is tied with *Cassandra's prophecy*. Cassandra was a daughter of Priam, king of Troy, and Hecuba. She was famous for her gift of prophecy. According to one tradition she won her gift from Apollo, the god of prophecy, divination, music and arts. Apollo fell in love with Cassandra and promised to teach her the art of prophecy in return for her sexual favours. She agreed and Apollo fulfilled his promise, but she didn't. Angered, Apollo took revenge and left her with the power to foretell the future truly, but turned the blessing into a curse by condemning her to the fate of always being disbelieved. Thus Cassandra²⁵³ appears as a prophet of doom, forewarning of terrible events, but having her warnings unheeded. The message is therefore: this time people should hear the warnings and behave in a different way so as to be able to change their destiny. This of course is impossible within the world of the myth itself, but two optimistic elements, namely a later period of time allowing for the wisdom of hindsight, and the West as a front-runner on the road of peaceful stability, point the way out of the tragedy of the myth. Another quotation, by Dimitris Constans who is a professor and director of the Institute of the International Relations of the Panteion University, on same tragic theme made during the same time in the middle of the 1990s adds further clarification:

Greece should keep an EC perspective in its closer economic and political interactions with the new Balkans and stay clear, as much as possible, from entanglement in the labyrinths of the ethnic rivalries.²⁵⁴

The labyrinth was a vast underground maze so cleverly devised that anyone going in would be quite unable to find the way out again. It was a prison in which a Minotaur, a monster with the body of a man and the head, horns and tail of a bull, was housed in Crete. The writer sees ethnic rivalries as the labyrinth, a place where there seems to be no way out; once you are in, you only can go round the paths, until you are eaten by the monster. The Minotaur was finally killed by Theseus, who even found his way out, because he had been given a clue not to get lost inside of the labyrinth. Understandably in the preceding quotation, this possibility is not mentioned because the method would be useless in ethnic provocations. Therefore, staying outside and keeping a Western European perspective in mind could guarantee a better future for Greeks. The West appears as a meta-mythical element bringing in at least the hope of tragedy breaking wisdom from the outside of the Balkans, as a modern god, equally mythical in its dimensions. Greece, being situated simultaneously in two places, Europe and the Balkans, is able to choose whether to jump emotionally into the lethally intense adventures of the myth, or to stay outside and retain both wisdom and life.

²⁵³ Cassandra's scenarios of gloom and doom also in Couloumbis and Yannas 1993, 56.

²⁵⁴ Constans 1995, 93. Dimitris Constans is professor and director of the Institute of the International Relations of the Panteion University.

4 RE-PLACING MODERN GREECE

For border countries, such as Greece and Finland, membership in the European Union seems to be a more precise formulation of their identity than for countries that are placed 'in the middle'. The phenomenon can be interpreted with the concepts of center and periphery; the centre is more 'Western' and space becomes less West the further to the periphery it lies, especially if the direction is towards the East. The political and economic centre of Europe still lies in its old industrial heartland in the West, in Germany, France, the Benelux countries, and Britain, and thus in the European context the concepts of the centre and the West are overlapping. European Union membership is understood as a clear guarantee of belonging to West, which also implies the existence of a democratic and modern state. Greek negotiators preparing for Greek entry into the EC were looking for the status of all of this, and also for a guarantor for Greek internal stability, as well as for support in its external security worries. The purpose of this chapter is to present Greece's political situation before and during the membership. The 1970s, after the collapse of Junta, was the decade of Konstantinos Karamanlis as conservative prime minister, and he actively initiated and carried through the accession negotiations of Greece. The 1980s raised socialist Andreas Papandreu to the stage. Andreas Papandreu served as Prime Minister of Greece from October 1981 to July 1989, and again from October 1993 to January 1996. The only common thing between these two charismatic political leaders was that they clearly led Greek politics with their own personalities.

4.1 Away from Autocracy

In order to interpret Greece's first years as a member of the European Community, there is a need to analyze the way Greece entered the organization. Every member country has had its own reasons for applying, and the attitudes of the contemporary member states towards the accession of the applicant can differ. The case of Greece in the mid-1970s was interesting. The

dictatorship had just collapsed in 1974 and a new period began with the restoration of Greek democracy. Economically the country was so poor that it would shake the economic balance of the EC, and furthermore, there was a large trade deficit and high inflation in Greece. Originally the first Association Agreement with the EEC was signed in 1961, during the first premiership of the conservative and strongly pro-European Konstantinos Karamanlis, but the agreement was partly frozen for the years of the military dictatorship in Greece.²⁵⁵ It would seem that Greece was not a very attractive member country candidate for the EC. Nevertheless, negotiations for Greece's accession were completed within three years, from July 1976 to May 1979, while for Spain and Portugal negotiations lasted for seven years. Accession negotiations began with Portugal in October 1978 and with Spain in February 1979 and were concluded in June 1985. Greece joined the EC in 1981 and the two others in 1986.²⁵⁶

Greece became the tenth member of the European Economic Community and so far the only one, which has joined the Community alone as a single country.²⁵⁷ When the application was made, Greek conservative leadership was enthusiastic about making Greece a member of the European Community, but the Nine seemed uneasy and at times unwilling.²⁵⁸ While Britain and Denmark, and to a lesser extent Ireland, were considered to be at a similar level of industrial and economic development with the Six, Greece was largely an agricultural country with an income per capita half of the EC average²⁵⁹ and thus it would be a net beneficiary of the EC budget and funds. Accepting Greece in the Community would disturb the economic homogeneity that the nine member states presented as a group, and undermine the cohesion of the Community.

The only logical political reason, which has been used to explain the accession of Greece, as well as Portugal and Spain, was that the EC wanted to strengthen the newly democratic institutions in these countries and promote political stability, since all three of them had recently come out of dictatorial regimes.²⁶⁰ However, it has also been argued that strategic considerations were the main factor influencing the attitudes of the Community concerning the Greek accession. The Community wanted to keep Greece within the Western economic and political system in the context of the Cold War. The big states, West Germany and Britain in particular, were supported Greek accession because strategic reasons linked Greek membership in the EC to NATO security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The link of Greek accession with strategic considerations and NATO membership should be understood in the

²⁵⁵ Theodoropoulos 1999, 85; Tsinisizelis 2002, 64; Tsoukalis 2002, 37.

²⁵⁶ Ioakimidis 1994b, 114. See also <http://www.eu2005.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1113058531813>. 1.2.2007.

²⁵⁷ Botsiu 2002, 24.

²⁵⁸ Tsoukalis 1981, 134.

²⁵⁹ In 1977, Gross Domestic Product in Greece was 46,4 percent of the Community average. Greek agriculture employed 35 percent of the population in 1973. Tsoukalis 1981, 19

²⁶⁰ Tsoukalis 1981, 19.

contexts of the Cold War in which the European Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation acted as complementary institutions, contained within the broader Western alliance.²⁶¹ France, on the other hand, was supporting the Greek application because of its desire to shift the Community's centre of gravity to the south²⁶², counterbalancing the weight of the Northern states, after the 1973 enlargement.

The brief political history of Greece before the application was that the Greek junta officers were in power from 1967 to 1974. On 15 July 1974, the Greek junta organized a military coup with the Cypriot National Guard and overthrew President Makarios in Cyprus. This was followed by Turkish invasion of the northern part of the island on 20 July. Because of this, the military regime in Athens collapsed. On 24 July, a civil regime was restored in Greece and a new civil government was formed under Konstantinos Karamanlis.²⁶³ Karamanlis had been called back to Greece from his eleven-year exile in Paris. On 12 August, Turkey launched a second invasion in Cyprus and more than a third of the island fell under Turkish control. Four hours later Karamanlis announced Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military wing.²⁶⁴ The decision was not simply a protest of the British and NATO unwillingness to prevent or reverse the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. It was also a result of an increasing public sentiment against NATO and particularly the United States. After the crisis in Cyprus in 1974, a large part of the Greek electorate and the political elite held the United States responsible both for the imposition of the military regime and for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.²⁶⁵

The Greek government and Konstantinos Karamanlis were confronted with a double task: consolidating the new democratic institutions, and safeguarding Greek territorial integrity in the face of total paralysis of its armed forces. In November 1974, Karamanlis called for general elections, in which his newly formed conservative party, Νέα Δημοκρατία, (New Democracy), won 54.5 percent of the total vote. Within two weeks, he sent an *aide-memoire* to the Community expressing the wish for full Community membership.²⁶⁶ The Greek arguments for the membership were clear. The membership would provide Greece with an opportunity for rapid economic and social development. Karamanlis also believed that membership in the Community would contribute to the stabilisation of the Greek political situation. It would consolidate the fragile Greek democratic institutions, through close ties of co-operation with Community institutions, while enabling the country to take part in the political construction of Europe. At the same time, it would mark the end of a long period of political isolation after the seven years of dictatorship.²⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the most important argument of all was that Greek membership in the Community would enhance Greece's security, without changing its

²⁶¹ Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 225.

²⁶² Botsiu 2002, 24.

²⁶³ E.g. Clogg 1993, viii-xiv, and Diamandouros 1993, 1-25.

²⁶⁴ Siapkidou 2002, 21.

²⁶⁵ Ioakimidis 1993, 406.

²⁶⁶ See e.g. Ιωακείμης 1995, 436.

²⁶⁷ Kontogiorgis 1985, 34. Tsoukalis 1981, 108.

strategic orientation. After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, it seemed in Greece that the military threat came from Turkey rather than from the Soviet Union. Therefore Greece, although a NATO country, did not completely share the same threat perceptions from the Communist states as the alliance. It was felt that Greece could not be secured simply by relying on the Americans and NATO.²⁶⁸ Another security threat came from inside in the form of a possible and rumoured new military coup. Accession to the Community was considered as a security guarantee ensuring that the country would not again relapse to the military dictatorship of the previous seven years.²⁶⁹

However, much to the surprise of Greek leadership, the reception of Greece's bid for accession was politely negative. The economic situation of largely agricultural Greece would disturb the homogeneity in the Community. Because of Greece's economic backwardness and problems with Turkey, Greece had to undergo a pre-accession transitional stage before joining the EC as a full member. Therefore the Greek application was to be consigned to *Kalendas Grecas* (a Latin phrase meaning at an impossible date).²⁷⁰ Karamanlis reaction to the Commission's opinion was swift, angry, and effective: He threatened to pull Greece completely out of the NATO. He persuaded the Council of Ministers to ignore the Commission's views and start accession negotiations. It was the only time so far that the Council had ignored the Commission's opinion on such a vital issue.²⁷¹

During the negotiations, the Cold War setting cannot be ignored. For example, conditions for the West were aggravated in the Aegean because of the rising temperature in the Greek-Turkish relationship. There had been no progress on a settlement over Cyprus in 1975 and disputes over territorial rights came near to a military conflict that summer, when Turkey dispatched a ship to explore offshore oil at an area claimed by Greece as part of its continental shelf. The heated relations between the two neighbouring countries had two important implications for the West. First, it could offer the Soviet Union an opportunity to infiltrate in the Aegean on the pretext of safeguarding the freedom of navigation between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. More important though, was the fact that the tension between Greece and Turkey was weakening NATO's southern flank, causing dissatisfaction with the Alliance in both countries, and both of them were reconsidering their relations with NATO and the United States.

Considerations about increasing Soviet influence were not caused by Greek government actions, as Karamanlis was following a largely pro-Western policy. They were the result of increasingly anti-American and anti-NATO public opinion in Greece. In the aftermath of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, *Eotia* (Estia), the most anti-Communist daily in Athens commented, 'If the Soviet Union can guarantee [our territorial integrity], let us even go with

²⁶⁸ Siapkidou 2002, 33.

²⁶⁹ Theodoropoulos 1999, 87.

²⁷⁰ Ioakamidis 1994, 4.

²⁷¹ Ioakamidis 1994, 4.

Russia'.²⁷² The extent of this swing in public opinion had not only alarmed the Greek government, but also governments in Western Europe. This created a desire in Western Europe to keep Greece within the Western security community, through membership in the EC. From the Greek government's point of view a united Europe, independent of the two superpowers and with its own role in regional security, was seen as a safety net for the newly born democratic institutions, as well as the preferred alternative to the existing situation.²⁷³

Negotiations with the EC began in July 1976 and were concluded in May 1979 with the signing of the Accession Treaty. They lasted only thirty-four months, given the magnitude of the problems involved.²⁷⁴ Three forces pushed the negotiations forward. The first one was the active role and personal diplomacy of Prime Minister Karamanlis. The second was the results of the Greek elections in 1977. The anti-European Socialist Party was actually able to double its share of votes in elections between 1977 (25 per cent) and 1981 (48 per cent). This was an important factor given the desire of the Nine to keep Greece's orientation to the West. Finally, there was a demonstration of good will from the Greek government to return to NATO's military structure²⁷⁵ in the beginning of 1978.²⁷⁶ It seems that the main reason for membership was, after all, Greece's geographic location and the strategic value it had for the Western security alliance in the context of the Cold War. In the middle of October 1980, Greece was firmly reintegrated into NATO's military command after a six-year absence. In addition, three months later, Greece became the tenth member of the EC on 1 January 1981.²⁷⁷ These two entries were not officially linked, but in reality the negotiations had been connected during the whole three-year process.

4.2 Tenth Member of the European Union

Greece officially joined the EC in January 1981. Barely nine months afterwards, in October 1981, PASOK (Πανελληνιον Σοσιαλιστικόν Κίνημα, Panellinion Socialistikon Kinima, Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) came to power with a large electoral majority, 48% of the vote, with which it won 172 parliamentary

²⁷² Cited in *The Economist*, August 17, 1974, p.29.

²⁷³ Tsoukalis 1981, 107-108.

²⁷⁴ Ioakamidis 1994, 4.

²⁷⁵ Public opinion in Greece was not in favour of NATO re-entry. An opinion poll published in Athens on 10 April 1981, suggested that only 12 percent of the Greeks were in favour of Greece's reintegration to NATO. 58 percent opted for neutrality and 3 percent were in favour of Greek membership in the Warsaw Pact.

²⁷⁶ Clogg 1993, viii and Botsiu 2002, 24.

²⁷⁷ A poll in Greece taken in December on EC entry revealed that for every 100 Greeks asked, 38 thought it was "a good thing", 21 'a bad thing', 28 'neither bad nor good' and 13 'don't know'. The inflation rate was at 25 percent, unemployment was expected to increase, and the economy was stagnant. Eurobarometer No. 14, quoted in *Times*, December 17, 1980.

seats out of 300.²⁷⁸ It had pledged to carry out a programme of change (Αλλαγή, *Allagi*). The pro-EC party that was in power during the entry negotiations, Νέα Δημοκρατία, *Nea Dimokratia*, was voted to opposition. Among other things, *Allagi* included a commitment to hold a referendum on Greece remaining in the EC or not. For PASOK, European integration was a capitalist-driven process serving the interests of big business to the detriment of socialist objectives.²⁷⁹ Yet, upon assuming power, the PASOK government initiated – what can be called, with the benefit of hindsight – a process of gradual transformation from an anti-EC force to a deeply pro-integrationist one.

The first period 1981-1985 was by any standards a dramatic one. The PASOK government and Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou faced a difficult dilemma. The party had portrayed the EC as inherently antithetical to Greece's political and economic interests and still it had to live with the membership. Hence, contrary to pre-electoral rhetoric, promises and slogans²⁸⁰, for example to create a non-aligned Greece, Papandreou renewed the US bases agreement. He also chose to remain in the European Community and not to withdraw from NATO.²⁸¹ This meant a difficult balancing act for PASOK. In attempting this, the PASOK government used a number of policy techniques and various slogans to justify the changes in policy because internal pressure was strong.²⁸² The only practical step taken was, however, to file in March 1982 a memorandum to EC asking for 'special treatment' for Greece within the Community. This request was turned down by the EC, but the Commission presented PASOK increased financial assistance through the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs).²⁸³

During its early years in the EC the PASOK government frequently used the veto. It was clear that in practise there was no intention to carry through the Greek withdrawal. However, the PASOK government never made any formal statement that this was the case. The period from 1981 till spring 1985 was marked with uncertainty and ambivalence. It was a one foot in and one foot out situation.²⁸⁴ As Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stelios Stavridis write in their research about the Europeanization process of the Greek foreign policy, during the first years representatives of Greece kept on showing a clear preference for not aligning Greece with the remainder of its EC partners²⁸⁵. Greeks kept on questioning the nature of integration, in particular opposing efforts at advancing institutional and political integration, including the development of a European security identity. Failing to grasp the significance of political integration for Greece's interests and putting overwhelming emphasis on the economic aspects of integration, the government sided with Britain and

²⁷⁸ Ιωακεμιδης 1995, 437; Botsiu 2002, 25.

²⁷⁹ Ioakamidis 1994b, 6-7.

²⁸⁰ e.g. 'Η Ελλάδα ανήκει στους Έλληνες', meaning Greece belongs to Greeks.

²⁸¹ Couloumbis 1993, 115-116.

²⁸² Tsinisizelis 2002, 66.

²⁸³ Tsinisizelis 2002, 68. Ioakimidis 1994, 7.

²⁸⁴ Verney 1993, 138.

²⁸⁵ Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 226.

Denmark in attempts to block efforts for deepening institutional integration,²⁸⁶ such as the Gensher-Colombo initiative, Dooge Committee proposals, Spinelli initiative, the convening of the intergovernmental conference for drawing up the Single European Act, moving to majority voting etc. These projects and initiatives of transformation of the EC and its institutions were signs of a strong wish of some members for deeper integration and increasing political world role of the EC during the first half of the 1980s. At the same time, Greeks tried to prevent European political cooperation from reaching 'common positions' on numerous sensitive international issues. The best-known example was the Korean jumbo-jet incident in September 1983. After the Soviet Union shot down a civilian jet, which had violated its airspace, the Greek government stressed that the Community could not condemn the incident, but only regret it.²⁸⁷ Also Greeks prevented a common condemnation of the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, and of Syria and Libya for terrorist acts 1983 and 1984 respectively, etc. All this contributed to the creation of Greece's image as an unreliable partner. Greek behaviour in the EC did not seem to serve any vital Greek interest, but rather to conform to certain vague ideological predispositions.²⁸⁸

The period of vetoes and opposition ended around 1985-1986 for several reasons. First, because Greece was perceived to have an economic crisis, there was the adoption of the Intergrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) in 1985, through which Greece was to draw almost two billion ECUs in addition to the substantial financial transfers that it had already received from the EC budget – transfers that no government could easily ignore.²⁸⁹ Actually the PASOK government realised that only the European dimension had the will and capability of altering Greece's poor economical situation.²⁹⁰ Second, the socialist government realised that the membership had actually strengthened Greece's diplomacy. By being a member of the EC, the Greek government did indeed enjoy considerable bargaining advantage when dealing with its neighbours, most of all Turkey.²⁹¹ Third, the government began to realize that Greece risked total isolation within the EC if it insisted on continuing its obstructionist policy. In the worst scenario, an inner core of the EC members would proceed to a deeper lever of integration by themselves and leave the unwilling troublemaker to the marginal.²⁹² The members of the EC, led by France, frustrated by the failure to expand the role of the EC into the area of security, mainly due to Greek, Irish and Danish objections. They decided to revitalize the West European Union (WEU) as the forum for discussing security questions, a forum in which none of these countries participated.²⁹³

²⁸⁶ Ιωακειμίδης 1995, 437.

²⁸⁷ Verney 1993, 143. Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 227. Diamandouros 1993, 16.

²⁸⁸ Βαληνάκης 1991.

²⁸⁹ Verney 1993, 145. Ioakimidis 1994, 7-8.

²⁹⁰ Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 227.

²⁹¹ Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 227. Ioakimidis 1994, 8.

²⁹² Verney 1993, 146. Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 228-229.

²⁹³ Ioakimidis 1994, 8.

The new policy of the socialist government was seen in the conference on the Single European Act (SEA), in December 1985. Greece participated fully and later signed the act. The Single European Act provided a legal basis for a number of institutional modifications:²⁹⁴ formalisation of the EC, extension of Qualified Majority Voting; as well as things such as the introduction of the so-called cooperation programme. However, the core feature of the Commission remained unchanged. Greece had initially objected to convening such a conference.²⁹⁵ The final SEA text provided for the possibility of increased cooperation within the WEU and NATO frameworks. For Greece, and to PASOK, this was a big blow since it did not belong to the WEU. The Papandreou government started expressing support for efforts aimed at enhancing EC's ability to provide for its own defence.²⁹⁶ In the following Andreas Papandreou presents PASOK's views on foreign policy of Greece in Hellenic Parliament in 1991. At that time PASOK was in opposition and Papandreou had to defend his earlier decisions:

My own previous experience as Defence Minister in 1981, when I specifically asked NATO whether we were covered for any aggression coming from any country, the answer was "yes" together with refusal to put it down in writing. The gist of it was their refusal to assist an ally in case of aggression by another ally. [...] Our interest in applying to join the WEU was in order to be able to face Turkey as a non-ally.²⁹⁷

The quotation reveals how the security issues and feared threat of Turkey were a strong motivation in joining the WEU. This marked the opening of the second stage in PASOK's transformation process that resulted in the complete metamorphosis of the party into a genuine pro-integrationist force of a federal nature.²⁹⁸ PASOK's European policy and external orientation became radically different compared to the time in 1981, when the party came to power. The EC turned from an enemy to an almost reliable ally. Greek foreign policy had become 'Europeanised,' as Tsardanidis and Stavridis stress.²⁹⁹ Europeanization means here adaptation to European norms and practises. It is more than just integration,³⁰⁰ implying real change in political culture. Europeanization takes place if the political system of the member country is constantly obliged to take into account and apply EU methods, practices, norms and values that fit within the wider logic of European unification.³⁰¹ They maintain that, although the case of FYROM³⁰² in the 1990s was negative, because all Greek governments of those years prevented the EU from recognizing the new Balkan state, the process was still going on, somehow, because Greeks stayed within the common rules. Also vetoing the Customs Union with Turkey in 1994 was seen

²⁹⁴ Featherstone 1994, 156-157.

²⁹⁵ Verney 1993, 146.

²⁹⁶ Valinakis 1994, 58.

²⁹⁷ Andreas Papandreou in Hellenic Parliament December 20, 1991, presenting PASOK's views on Foreign Policy. 1992, 284-285.

²⁹⁸ Ioakimidis 1993.

²⁹⁹ Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 229.

³⁰⁰ Featherstone & Kazamias 2001, 4.

³⁰¹ Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 221.

³⁰² The Macedonia issue will be analysed later in this work.

as a positive act in Greece, because with it the Greek government managed to link the issue with Cyprus's membership of the EU in an attempt to find a solution for the long lasting Cyprus Problem.³⁰³ Also, during the 1980s, the public opinion had undergone a decisive shift in favour of integration. In the middle of the 1980s, the Eurobarometer surveys of the EC commission indicated the changes that had occurred. In 1984, 38 per cent of Greek voters believed EC membership to be 'a good thing', but by autumn 1987 the proportion had increased to 58 per cent. In autumn 1991 it had reached 73 per cent.³⁰⁴

Greece's European policy reveals that the country's policy is shaped by one paramount concern: the need to secure Greece's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. In other words, located in a turbulent geographic area, Greeks tend to perceive the European Union, and even more a future European federal system, as the institutional framework that would turn the 'Greek borders' into 'the Union's external borders' and consequently result in permanent protection.³⁰⁵ The issue is, however, common in countries that define themselves as borderlands. The significance of borders and a wish that also others in the European Union would pay attention to the significance of the border can be found also in countries such as Finland.³⁰⁶

One of the main reasons for which Greece joined the EC, namely to strengthen its external position as well as its regional and international role, seems to have been vindicated:

Overall its membership of the EU has solved a perennial problem, namely its position in the global system, between East and West. Owing to its geographical location in the Eastern Mediterranean at the interface of a variety of different cultural formations and political systems, Greece has oscillated between East and West. The recurring question 'where does Greece belong, to the East or the West?' had bedeviled Greek politics since almost the inception of the modern Greek state in the 1830's.³⁰⁷

Professor Panagiotis Ioakimidis' question of location in the quotation resembles the one Vilho Harle and Sami Mosio made in their book *Missä on Suomi?* (Where is Finland?). The Finnish debate about joining the European Union during the early 1990s moved between the mental lines of East and West in a similar way as in the Greek discussion. The borderland has worries about its place. Long history in a turbulent area has influenced the country both from the East and the West. The sense of belonging has varied during the past. However Europe is shown in the argument as an ideal direction where to belong, as Greece feels now that *the membership of the EU has solved a problem*. Greek political argumentation often uses strong and totalizing nationalistic tropes, depicting the state and its citizens as one living organism that has shared feelings, fears and common goals. It is traditional to present important messages using this rhetorical style. The discovered ideal location, in Europe, is

³⁰³ Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 229.

³⁰⁴ Tsinisizelis 2004, 131-132. See also Ioakimidis 1995, 127-128.

³⁰⁵ Ioakimidis 1994, 10.

³⁰⁶ Harle & Moision 2000.

³⁰⁷ Ioakimidis 2002, 11.

hoped to be permanent, because steadiness is regarded as positive for the development of culture and politics, and stability is positive also in psychological terms. There is no need to ask any longer, where does Greece belong.

The security issues were one of the main reasons why Greece wanted to be seen in the EC. Konstantinos Karamanlis was looking after – if not protection, then at least – some kind of strong support. In the history of modern Greece, there is a long list of protecting powers. Until 1947, the United Kingdom served as the official protector power (patron) for Greece. In 1947 and amidst the ravages of the Greek civil war, the USA officially took over the role of Greece's patron through the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine. This doctrine contributed decisively to the defeat of the insurgent communist forces and to ending the civil strife in Greece.³⁰⁸ The close and dependent relationship has partly influenced the love-hate attitude of Greeks towards the USA. The USA as well as the UK before did not prevent Greece from being involved in international and internal wars; they allowed the Junta to stay in power and they did not prevent the Crisis in Cyprus. Notwithstanding, Greeks give the impression that they view the EC in the role of a traditional protecting power, and its accession to the Community clearly was in this sense a change of the protector after serious disappointment with the United States. In framing the situation in these terms, Greek expectations from the EC in terms of political support are too high; the latter is neither capable, nor willing, to deliver.³⁰⁹ The feeling of insecurity and seeing the country as placed in the middle of a hostile world may seem exaggerated and paranoid to the other EU member states. Geopolitical thinking focusing on threats and enemies is easy to find in Greek behaviour in the EC. The end of the Cold War and the dramatic upheavals in the Balkans, including the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the tragic civil conflict that followed, have all heightened Greeks sense of insecurity. The enduring 'Turkish threat', perceived as very direct and acute by the Greek public, is constantly feeding this sense of insecurity. The purpose of turning Greek borders into the Union's external borders is part of the rhetoric, which reminds of this need of protection,³¹⁰ although Greek governments have realised that the EU is not willing nor capable to act as a military protector. For example, during the Imia crisis in 1996, there was no European defence of Greek interests.³¹¹

Two other reasons for Greece to join to the EC were consolidation of democracy and socio-economic modernization. Institutional membership in the EC has provided a 'safety net' for Greek political institutions. Even before accession, the prospect of joining the EC seemed to have acted as a deterrent to those, especially in the military, who might have had the desire and the means to challenge democratic politics.³¹² After all, the membership of Greece took

³⁰⁸ Ioakimidis 1994b, 14.

³⁰⁹ Ioakimidis 1994b, 13.

³¹⁰ Ioakimidis 1994b, 9, 13. Diamantouros 1993, 7.

³¹¹ Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 130.

³¹² Ioakimidis 1994b, 10.

place only seven years after the collapse of Junta. Signs of socio-economic progress since then were not very clear. Although Greece belonged to the countries that greatly benefited financially because of their membership, the country still remained among the poorest ones in the EC. In some cases the progress nevertheless has been obvious. The EC has provided a large market for the expansion of Greek exports. For example Greek exports to the EC, which in 1980 represented 48.2 per cent of total exports, rose to 64.2 per cent in 1992, while imports jumped from 40.9 per cent to 64.2 per cent over the same period. It shows Greece's growing dependency on the EC system and economy.³¹³

Anyway, these figures have not made the average Greek rich. Thus, Greece's per capita GNP, which in 1980 stood at 58 per cent of the EC average, dropped to 47 per cent in 1993.³¹⁴ The main macroeconomic indicators that constitute the 'convergence criteria' of the Maastricht Treaty of European Union for entering the third stage of economic and monetary union (EMU) were worse for Greece than for any other EC country. For example, public debt had actually risen to 154 per cent of GDP. This state of affairs raised doubts as to whether Greece would be in a position to take part in integration schemes in the monetary field.³¹⁵

The second decade of Greece's membership in the European Union, the 1990s, was filled with issues of foreign policy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the old system with Cold War was officially over. However, the old way of thinking and seeing threats remained. For Greeks even the disappearance of the Soviet Union was not such a remarkable event, because during the previous two decades it had not been considered as a serious security threat to Greece. In the north Greece ceased to have socialist states as its neighbours, but that hardly made the north a safer dimension. Compared to the collapse of Soviet Union, the much stronger security change for Greece was the collapse of Yugoslavia. The map of the Balkans changed radically. The new states were formed on the basis of ethnic groups, and nationalistic narratives were employed again in the region as tools to justify new borders. Greece was trapped into the nationalistic turbulences of Balkans via the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia. Greeks opposed Macedonian separation from former Yugoslavia for several reasons. It was seen, for instance, as a buffer zone between Greece and troubled areas. For example, during the Kosovo conflict, the area kept refugees and other problems far from the Greek border.³¹⁶ Another issue was debate about the name, symbols and borders that the most Greeks interpreted as a security threat after 1991. The theme will be analysed with details later in this work in the chapter of *Naming Macedonia*. Another main foreign policy issue during these

³¹³ European Commission 1993. Report on Progress in Economy and Monetary Convergence and Progress with the Implementation of Community Law Concerning the Internal Market.

³¹⁴ Ioakimidis 1994b, 11.

³¹⁵ Actually, Greece was the 12th country that joined to the European Monetary Union (EMU). Afterwards there was a scandal, however, because it was found out that suitable figures to prove Greece's capability for joining the EMU were falsified purposefully.

³¹⁶ Tziampiris 2002, 218. Couloumbis 1992, 81.

years was Turkey. The Eastern border was seen as problematic for several reasons. Although Greek official view is that it has no border disputes, that it is just Turkey, which causes problems, the situation still produces a lot of concern in Greece. For example, the questions about the ownership of an isled called Imia in Greek, and Kardak in Turkish, brought these neighbours to the brink of war in the beginning of 1996. The previous case, as well as several other problems of the Eastern border of Greece, will be analysed in chapters of *The Location of Greece* and *Maritime Boundary Making* later in this dissertation. Although Greece's borders did not change during these years, the world around was seen as full of threats and hostility just like before, as shown in the following quote, written by doctor of International Relations Fotios Moustakis:

During the Cold War, Eastern Mediterranean security issues were defined largely as a function of the Soviet threat in the overall East-West confrontation and competition. Greece and Turkey were important because they helped control Soviet access to, and influence in, the Aegean, the Balkans, and the Middle East. With the demise of the Cold War, however, the locus of risk has moved to the southern flank of NATO. The Bosnian and Kosovo experiences have shown how crises on the periphery of the NATO organisation can spill over and affect important alliance interests as well as how difficult it is for the US to remain aloof from a conflict in which the interests of its key allies are at stake.³¹⁷

The preceding quotation defines clearly the old strategic importance of Greece. The situation of Turkey has been similar. Greece and Turkey were vanguard allies of the United States to inhibit and complicate Soviet access to the Aegean Sea, the Balkans and the Middle East. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the importance of Greece and Turkey also collapsed. Experiences of Bosnia and Kosovo are examples of serious security issues in the area, but compared to the Cold War settlement, they do not offer any permanent reason for Greece's importance. In Greece the main foreign policy preoccupation of the government was security. Whenever there was a discussion on common foreign and security policy in Europe, the issue of Greek security problems with its neighbours took priority. Especially the possibility for Greek independent action in respect to Turkey had to be maintained at all costs because it took precedence in the Greek perception.³¹⁸

There is an interesting analysis of Greek geopolitical codes that have been used in debates about the Balkans.³¹⁹ Asteris Huliaras, who is Associate Professor in the Harokopion University of Athens, and Charalambos Tsardanidis, who is director of Institute of International Economic Relations, have divided the Balkan debates of the post-communist era in three different groups. In the first group, the area is seen as a menacing 'Muslim arc'. The second one gives the image of the Balkans as a Greek 'natural hinterland'. And the third stresses that the Balkans is an undisputed part of Europe. In 1991, after the collapse of communism, Greeks faced a mass migration of non-Greeks from the north for the first time in Greece's history. The 'Muslim arc' means an axis

³¹⁷ Moustakis 2003, 11.

³¹⁸ Kavakas 2001, 35.

³¹⁹ Huliaras & Tsardanidis 2006.

of Muslim populations from Albania to Turkey. The Muslim threat was a useful term in political speeches because Greece could be presented as the last bastion of the Christian West. As the theme of threat developed, so did the idea of the creation of an Orthodox alliance with Eastern Orthodox states including Serbia and Russia for defence against the 'Muslim arc'. However, the idea was wiped aside after a new and positive geopolitical code was accepted in the middle of 1990s.³²⁰

The new code made Greece the most powerful state in the region. The Balkans was described as a friendly 'natural hinterland' of Greece, which could be useful. This meant, for example, that about 3500 Greek companies did business across the Balkans.³²¹ Greece was presented as a mighty European state in the Balkans, not a poor Balkan state in Europe. The new and positive attitude, although it has a clear neocolonial tone, was also connected with Constantinos Simitis, who became the new Prime Minister when Andreas Papandreou resigned due to ill health in 1996. Simitis, of PASOK, was to change the foreign policy of Greece and present Greece abroad as a modern Western nation that brings stability and economic development to the troubled region.³²²

The last years of the 1990s turned the debate of the Balkans towards Europeanization in Greece. The Balkans was re-named 'South-Eastern Europe', although the *new* name was occasionally used already in the nineteenth century. The attempt of the Greek foreign ministry was to highlight that the Balkans should be considered an integral part of Europe.³²³ However the Europeanization debate of the Greek foreign policy towards the Balkans was part of the larger Europeanization debate of Greece. In this debate Greece is seen as a European state, which has the capability and ability to Europeanize the northern Balkan states, which 'look forward to a better future'.³²⁴ Therefore, as Huliaras and Tsardanidis conclude: 'if the Balkan countries become members of the European Union, then the eternal Greek identity question (whether the country is Balkan or European) will become less polarised, less antithetical'³²⁵ For instance, in the following George Papandreou, at that time Minister of Education of Greece, stresses Greece's difficult position in the Balkans during the first years of the 1990s:

The Balkans for Greece is not merely a dangerous region somewhere in the world. Greece is part of the Balkans. The break-up of Yugoslavia and resulting war is not simply a case-study of nationalism, racism, xenophobia or irredentism for Greek academics to scrutinize and Greek politicians to pontificate upon. Rather, it is a turmoil in our immediate neighbourhood that puts into jeopardy our national sovereignty and security. There is no other state of the once-known Western alliance more threatened by the combustible situation in the Balkans. As such, no other state of the traditional camp is more anxious in coming to a long-term resolution of peace, stability and prosperity in the Balkans, than Greece itself.³²⁶

³²⁰ Huliaras & Tsardanidis 2006, 469-472.

³²¹ Huliaras & Tsardanidis 2006, 472.

³²² Huliaras & Tsardanidis 2006, 473.

³²³ Huliaras & Tsardanidis 2006, 476.

³²⁴ Ioakimidis 2002, 288.

³²⁵ Huliaras & Tsardanidis 2006, 479.

³²⁶ Papandreou 1993, 16. See also Couloumbis 1992, 80-85.

Papandreou reminds the audience of Greece's geographical location. The common worry about the break-up of Yugoslavia and wars in the area meant for Greece something more than for distant EU and NATO members, because it did not happen somewhere out there but just on the other side of the Greek border. The disintegrating neighbour is a threat to Greece's national sovereignty and security. The rhetor also highlights Greece's uniqueness in this respect, by saying that no other state of the West is influenced by the Balkan situation so strongly. Papandreou does not use the term Muslim threat or arc, but the idea is inherent in the code, making the argument a strong claim that the northern neighbourhood means a threat to Greece's sovereignty and security. The last argument of Papandreou's text is part of the peace-maker rhetoric that Greece started to employ at this time in the foreign policy field. The hero of the story is left alone to face the threat. And no other state wishes to make peace in the area as much as Greece. Despite the case of Macedonia, in which Greeks were an active opposing party, Greece was presented by themselves as a peaceful model for the new countries of Balkans.³²⁷ In this rhetoric, Greece's location in the Balkans was always pointed out, but it was still differentiated from ordinary Balkan countries by explaining that Greece is a member of the EU, NATO, WEU and so on, as in the following quotation from professor Couloumbis:

Greece can and should play an active role in the Balkans of tomorrow. Our country is a member of the European Community and has linked its destiny with this most remarkable trans-national experiment. But it is also a Balkan and a Mediterranean state. In our view, therefore, Greece can afford to assume a more energetic role, something that has not been done adequately to date, in the formulation of a European-Community - wide policy vis-à-vis the Balkans. In this respect, Greece should operate through the expanding mechanism of the European Political Cooperation.³²⁸

The preceding quote holds ideas about the geopolitical placing of Greece between the Balkans and Europe. Traditionally, belonging to the Balkans has not been something that has been willingly underlined in Greece. Compared to the earlier quotation of Papandreou, Greece is not presented as a state facing a threat but as an active state, which can be an example for others. The idea was that the Balkans was located at a grey zone somewhere at the farthest edge of Europe, geographically within Europe but not belonging to Modern European space and time.³²⁹ This kind of thinking was commonplace and became even more self-evident after the break-up of Yugoslavia. The geographic fact, nevertheless, is that Greece lies at the southern end of the Balkan Peninsula. The possibility to have a leader's role in the area brings positive elements to the situation. From this point of view, reminding the audience that Greece is a Balkan country is a claim that Greece knows the area well and is an expert to understand how the situation should be sorted out. Yet, there is still a strong rhetorical need to keep in mind the elementary connection to the EU. Greece

³²⁷ E.g. Ioakimidis 1992, 179-186.

³²⁸ Couloumbis 1992, 82.

³²⁹ Ó Tuathail 1999, 115. Todorova 1997 115, 128.

belongs to both of these locations and that makes it valuable as a peace-maker. The following quotation was written a decade later by professor Thanos Veremis, who is a professor of Greek and Balkan history. The writer claims how Greek endeavours were successful at least at one level:

Greek business ventures have played a leading role in foreign direct investment in the Balkans. Geographic proximity and knowledge of the region and its idiosyncrasies have made Greek companies an important influence in the transition of Balkan economies. Throughout the past thirteen years a total of 7 billion euros was invested in the region.³³⁰

The preceding text is an excellent example of ‘hinterland’ debate of the Balkans in Greece. Greek business ventures invest in the area and help the local economics. The text is practical geographical reasoning of the spatial world.³³¹ The rhetor uses everyday information to assure the audience that Greeks have taken *a leading role* in the Balkans. *Business ventures, companies, investment, and 7 billion* are all metonymies for economic power, which then acts as a metonymy for power in general. The argument for a regional leading role is proved with references to money and its practical synonyms and as Kenneth Burke has commented, money is a god-term of our time. In other words money is accepted as a complete explanation of something, as well as the justification.³³² During the 1970s the phenomenon described in the quotation easily might have been interpreted negatively as economic imperialism, but especially since the 1990s Burke’s observation has started to apply also on the international scene. Foreign investors appear as beneficiaries, while the political implications of the relationship also have somehow been cleaned of negative connotations. Another example of the same theme is from the president of the Hellenic Republic, Constantinos Stephanopoulos:

Greece has also its particular role to play in the region, of which it is a part. Greece is helped in this by the relative advantages it enjoys. Greece has a far better economy than any other Balkan country; it is the only nation in the area to be a member of the European union; and, even more important, it is the only country whose history and institutions can serve as an example to those countries that have only recently regained their freedom and are not marching full of hope towards a better world.³³³

President Stephanopoulos does not offer a humble view of his country. *Far better economy* makes the country rich compared to other Balkan states. The strong one shows an example and leads the poor ones who *have only recently regained their freedom* towards a better world. In this case it is not only money used as a rhetorical symbol of better life but also *history and institutions* of Greece that can serve as an example for the Balkan countries. This comparison is not offered only to the Balkan states but also to the rest of Europe and the West. The text is based on a speech held in a conference on security in ‘Southeastern Europe and the U.S. – Greek relationship’.

³³⁰ Veremis 2006, 184.

³³¹ Ó Tuathail 1999, 113-114.

³³² Burke 1969, 355.

³³³ Stephanopoulos 1997, 3.

Despite continuing tension with Turkey, Greece was able to strengthen its role also in that direction. This has been specifically praised as European behaviour.³³⁴ Although simultaneously in 1999, most of Greeks opposed NATO's intervention during the KOSOVO crisis and the Greek opinion was a minority of one within the 15 EU member states.³³⁵ The last years of the research period made a difference in the old game between Greece and Turkey. More positive relations between the two countries had been silently under development for a while but the earthquakes in August 1999 in Izmit, Turkey and in September in Athens, made it visible for the public. Expression of sympathy between Greeks and Turks³³⁶ were proclaimed and the political weather changed. In Helsinki, at the end of the year 1999, Greeks began to publicly support for the first time Turkey's attempts to become a member of the EU. In the following, the new optimism has become flesh in many levels. It is an interview of Greek foreign minister George Papandreou. A Greek journalist was interviewing him together with a Turkish journalist, which was news in itself.

[Colakoglu] Will the final solution of the Cyprus problem and of the Turkish-Greek dispute involve the unison of the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots under the same roof?

[Papandreou] Yes, I think so. That is the way Europe solves problems. In Europe, we are not creating new borders or dividing lines; on the contrary, we are trying to create a feeling of belonging. It is a new kind of belonging; you maintain your language, your culture and so on. You reach your decisions for your country and region, and yet you conduct close cooperation with those around you. This is valid both for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots and for Europe in general. Cyprus can be united under one roof within the general roof of the EU. [...] Cyprus is on the way to finishing its negotiations in one year. It can become a full EU member in two to three years. Think, after it is an EU member, the Turkish Cypriots can be parliamentarians in the European parliament, they can speak in Turkish there. The Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sectors will become parts of the EU administration. They can be represented at the EU ministerial council and at the EU summits. They will be protected by the judiciary too. The Amsterdam Treaty, which has such sensitive provisions for the protection of human rights and minority rights, will be valid for the Turkish Cypriot sector. [...] Furthermore, the Turkish language will be spoken in the EU first by the Turkish Cypriots. This will make Turkey's full membership easier. The Turkish language will become accepted in the EU. [...] I do not want a successful divorce in Cyprus but a happy marriage. This will also be the most important factor in establishing a good friendship between the Turks and the Greeks. Both sides will benefit from that.³³⁷

There are several interesting issues in the quotation. First of all George Papandreou is representing not only Greece but also the European Union as a full-fledged representative that has totally internalized European mores and forms of conduct. Another detail is that the European Union is called *Europe*. Therefore, Greece is situated on the position of answering on the behalf of the whole continent! As a member of the Union, Greece represents something

³³⁴ Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 223.

³³⁵ Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005, 232. Veremis 2006, 180.

³³⁶ Çarkoğlu & Kirişçi 2005, 8.

³³⁷ by Nuri Colakoglu and Alkis Kourkoulas, (Broadcast on NTV, 21 January 2000) in the CD-ROM *Greece's Role in the New Europe* (ELIAMEP) 2000.

valuable, something that Turkey also admires. The hierarchical position of Greece being higher than that of Turkey is very clear, although the interview is full of good will and positive hopes. Greece's problems are, finally, European Union's problems, and Greece, through Papandreou's mouth, can explain how they should be solved.

The Union, as Papandreou describes it, is a dream or a fairy-tale: no new borders and dividing lines are drawn because the purpose is to create a strong sense of belonging together. Every prospective member country seems to be worried about its identity, language and culture. Therefore, Papandreou's assuring words of member countries' ability of maintaining their own language in the future is a good point. There is no need to worry because the borderless Europe, where the mutual sense of belonging together is strong, every nation can still maintain its own identity. The language question is also a tool with which Papandreou tries to sell the idea of united Cyprus as a member of the EU. Turkish-Cypriots would speak Turkish in the Union and make it a familiar and *accepted* language for the other members. The term chosen may be cruel, but there is a connection to the fact that every member country's language is becoming an official language in the EU. The idea goes that an already known language would make the Turkish membership in the Union easier.

The matrimonial metaphors *marriage* and *divorce* at the end of the quotation are interesting. Metaphors are inherently persuasive, because they explain the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar,³³⁸ in this case totally unpredictable future developments in terms of family behaviour. The point is not that the metaphors are surprising; they are good rhetorical elements exactly because they are not surprising. The stream of rhetoric, like any other stream, seeks the easiest channel: the rhetor who uses the expected association will communicate more rapidly.³³⁹ Greece and the European Union want the divided Cyprus to be united. During the interview, the so-called Annan Plan was under negotiation for solving the question of Cyprus. The main idea was that united Cyprus would become a member of the EU in 2004. Many politicians in Greece were openly supporting the Annan Plan and were trying to induce the Greek Cypriots towards voting in favour of the Plan. However, the Greek Cypriots finally voted against the proposed solution and only the southern part of Cyprus became a member of the Union.

³³⁸ Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 5.

³³⁹ Frye 1990, 103.

5 PLACING GREECE ON THE BOUNDARY OF EUROPE

This chapter attempts to systematically present the most crucial Greek foreign policy issues during the main research period. They are all interesting both from the geopolitical point of view and also as examples how different narratives, myths, metaphors and stereotypes are used to explain the present with the past. The chapter starts by locating the present borders of Greece and continues to the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Eastern border of Greece in the Aegean. These different issues obviously have roots in the past and the problem has remained unresolved. Over the decades, Turkish governments have systematically presented the issue as a political one, while Greek governments have continued to argue it systematically as a question of sovereignty, i.e. a legal question. The next theme has also a long history. The question of a divided Cyprus did not start in 1974 when Turkey's troops occupied the northern part of the island. Debate over the destiny of the island had been going on between the two neighbour countries, Cyprus itself and various 'protecting' powers for years before 1974, and the issue is still unresolved. The dividing line still runs through the middle of the capital Lefkosia/Lefkosa³⁴⁰. The latest, thus far unresolved problem of Greek foreign policy is the name of the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia. After the break-up of Yugoslavia the debate over the name and several other contested issues rose in Greece. The Greek view is that the new state is more or less stealing Greece's history, and possibly threatening Greek territorial integrity. Since the beginning of 1990's, the main mission has been to convince the rest of the world to see the FYROM issue in the same light as the Greeks do.

³⁴⁰ A story-version of the name tells that the Frankish crusades find *Lefkosia* too difficult to pronounce and renamed the city as Nicosia during the 10th century.

5.1 The Location of Greece

In addition to intra-state relationship and narratives, geography provides the environment, or the physical context, of particular inter-state relationships, while history provides for interpretative narratives of the context. In the following, President Constantinos Stephanopoulos places Greece in place and time:

My country is situated at the meeting point of Europe and Asia. Given this geographic position, it was inevitable that Greece would, from ancient times, be the site of innumerable conflicts and become a crossroads of various cultural traditions. Greek civilization emerged to a position of dominance in the ancient world, and bequeathed to the West moral values, philosophical thought, and the political principles of democracy. All these outstanding achievements are the lasting foundations of our Western civilization.³⁴¹

The president presents *his country* with pride, because it is situated in an interesting area and because it has outstanding achievements in past, which also influence the present. The rhetoric is positive and praising as we can expect from the speech of the president in an international conference. He depicts Greece as the meeting point, as if there was only one, of two old continents, Europe and Asia. He thus argues Greek historical centrality in respect to the present political and economic European Union centre. The foundations of Western civilization are based on outstanding Greek cultural achievements. The complicated geographical place, moral values and historical foundations of the West are neatly connected. The quotation is interesting from the point of view of the theory of argumentation. It can be said that at least in this case the narrative beats numbers, which often are assumed to be more forceful rhetorical elements than words. The president does not actually explain *where* his country is. He rather *situates* it, but the strength of the argument is that he does this by defining what his country *means*. He could have placed Greece geographically within latitudes and longitudes, which would have been mathematically accurate, but as political argumentation quite meaningless.

Geography shapes the perception and operation of military threats and vulnerabilities in two ways: through distance and terrain. Distance works on the traditional principle that military threats are more difficult to mount and easier to defend when invaders are travelling over longer distances than over shorter ones. Terrain works similarly in that it tends to amplify or reduce vulnerability to military threat. Flat terrain presents fewer obstacles than mountains. Sea and open water have been seen as logistical obstacles to invasions by neighbours.³⁴² However, the political meaning of a national border can also be seen as relative because if relations between the two states are good, proximity is not a problem, or if military techniques are advanced, distance does not offer much protection.³⁴³ Greece's relations with Turkey will always be

³⁴¹ Stephanopoulos 1997, 2.

³⁴² Buzan et. al 1998, 59.

³⁴³ Palonen 1993c, 156, 167.

influenced, for instance, by the Aegean Sea, since the sea lies between the two countries. In the next quotation Dr. Fotios Moustakis, whose main research interests are in the areas of security in south-Eastern Europe, NATO enlargement and Greek-Turkish relations, explains why the sea is so meaningful for Greeks.

Since ancient times the Eastern Mediterranean has been the scene of conflicting interests. Cretan, Phoenician, Carthaginian, Hellenic and Roman fleets mastered the sea successively and secured their power and prosperity. It has been either a familiar route of trade and culture, or a fault line between hostile state and civilisation. Seldom have nations won a war in the Eastern Mediterranean without of the sea and many nations have lost wars when its use was denied to them. It should be remembered that Athens, a sea power, was in the end defeated by Sparta, a land power, when the later finally mastered the sea and learned to use its advantage. So, the Turkish claims over the Greek islands and islets are coincided, in Greece, with the building of a strong Turkish navy.³⁴⁴

The present is explained by the past. Military threats are made meaningful largely in terms of the impact of historically interpreted experience on the present perception. The existence of historical enmity and repeated military conflict tend to amplify present perceptions of threat.³⁴⁵ The impact is made stronger with the strong names of history, the people who *mastered* the sea and gained *power and prosperity*.

The following text describes and exemplifies how the borders of Greece and the importance of the state is highlighted and explained with geography. It was written during the Cold War in 1988, less than 20 years ago, and it reveals how quickly 'eternal' truths change. In the late 1940s, it was easier for a conception of Europe to settle in people's minds because the Cold War defined Europe as the beleaguered West threatened by the Soviet controlled East³⁴⁶ as seen in the following text written by professor Van Coufoudakis, an expert of policy of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

A close examination of Greece's strategic location shows that it is indeed the essential link in NATO's SouthEastern flank. First, Greece provides continuity to the alliance's Southern region, not only for purposes of communications, but also for protecting Italy from the East, and Turkey from the West. Turkey would be totally isolated from the other NATO members if Greece were to be lost to the West.³⁴⁷

The writer positions Greece as the geo-strategic *link* between two of the world's important areas. Being next to the important ones brings benefit for the one who speaks. Being a link or a bridge opens the possibility for co-operation and many kinds of traffic between the two areas. Moreover, it would all happen via the link, which means the possibility to be in control, and power. Greece is also seen as a reliable *protector*. Interestingly Greece would protect Italy from the *East*, and Turkey from the *West*! So, it does not only say that these two dimensions are a threat to each other, whatever that means, but also that Greece

³⁴⁴ Moustakis 2003, 13 - 26.

³⁴⁵ Loo 2003, 157.

³⁴⁶ Cowland etc. 1995, 289-290.

³⁴⁷ Coufoudakis, 1988, 20.

is on a border between these two, and somehow does not clearly belong to either of them. As the quotation continues, the impression of the borderland-role becomes stronger, because the possibility that Greece would be lost to the *West*, is seen as a threat. The role of a protector is a positive and respected one because it contains the continued good for others, and this is seen possible because Greece belongs neither to the West, nor to the East.

Nevertheless, there are problems with such classical approaches to geopolitics. Classical geopolitics represents the geopolitical form of the state only in spatial terms and it understands the state as a natural given. The reason for that is the connection to the visually seen geo. The politics of geo is seen as truth of the earth. We tend to trust our sense of sight, even if we see geo only as a drawn map, which is only than visual rhetoric. Mountains, seas, and rivers can be all seen, and therefore, because we trust our eyes, the science of geography is taken as a clean and innocent science.³⁴⁸ Another reason for the faith in naturally given states comes, as noted earlier, from the fact that states are artificial creations and therefore purposefully argued as natural. The state, in other words, can be understood as the result of debate and, in this sense, not permanent. We also can understand boundaries, sovereignty, and territoriality as the result of a naturalising discussion.³⁴⁹ Therefore, geopolitics can be seen as an outcome of two processes: visualising and narrating. 'Visualising' and 'seeing' are connected to 'narrating' and myth making. From this perspective, geopolitics can be understood as the spatial practices, both material and representational, of statecraft itself; hence the critical study of geopolitics focuses on the particular cultural mythologies of the state. 'Geopolitics', as a method of representing global space, involves visualising the world as a single picture. It adopts a particular vision of the geopolitical space.³⁵⁰

'Visualising', 'seeing' and 'representing' are important because they can influence image formation in the policy-making process. Formatted images are made to present *our* point of view of the environment both inside and outside the state.³⁵¹ This visualising is made by political debate. An open space is turned into a known place when our minds become filled with different meanings, which make the area important for us. The discussion is full of myths, memories from the past, and practical reasoning why a particular place, such as an island, border, or mountain, is so important. In this way, the image of the place is created picture-like in our imagination. This image formation of the place is also made via maps and other pictorial representations, and therefore visualising is made practical. The map was, and still is, considered as a relatively accurate report of what is there. Representation and the world is one.³⁵² The area is visually drawn so that the audience, to whom the discussion is offered, can become eye witnesses as the story is told. Maps, as highly stylized and abstract pictures, never tell the whole truth of a described area, but

³⁴⁸ Loo 2003, 158.

³⁴⁹ Loo 2003, 158-159.

³⁵⁰ Loo 2003, 160.

³⁵¹ Loo 2003, 160.

³⁵² Agnew 1998, 15.

this actually only increases their usefulness. Influencing the human sense of sight is effective, because we have a tendency to believe what we see. Of all human senses, sight is usually felt to be the most trusted one. Another reason is tied with identity issues. By visualising an area, which is called homeland, identity becomes visual. Pointing to a certain part of a map and saying, 'this is where I come from', the piece of paper is transformed into a visual narrative of 'me'. Weather maps provide this kind of geopolitical narrative regularly to their audiences. The following map is from a daily Greek newspaper, *Ελευθεροτυπία* (Eleftherotipia). While telling us what the weather is like in Greece, it simultaneously describes how the Greek territory is framed for the daily reader. The daily recurrence makes the visual rhetoric of weather maps so effective.



Source: www.enet.gr (2.3.07)

One of the interesting things in this map is that Cyprus is included within the territory, although it is another state. It could be explained by the fact that the newspaper is also sold in Cyprus, which shares the same Greek language, although the dialects may differ, but this is not the only reason why Cyprus is often placed within Greek maps. There are maps where the island of Corfu and the island of Rhodes are cut in half on their south-Eastern and north-Western corners respectively because of the frames of maps, but notwithstanding all of Cyprus is placed inside those frames. This kind of map could be called *a geocultural map of Greece*. The placement of Cyprus on the map can be explained by common history and the Hellenic tradition, but the custom also sends a message of a territorial connection. Cyprus is called a cousin or little brother of the Greek family. On the other hand, the question of divided Cyprus is still very painful for Greeks and this kind of visual representation keeps reminding the audience. Turkey is not seen in the map, because it is placed under the smaller map of Europe. The cumbersome neighbour simply vanishes. The European dimension is given more importance than daily information on Turkey. Therefore, what is seen is an essentially harmonious view of Greece surrounded

by Europe and Cyprus, with the sun emerging shining from behind the clouds, and political conflict formations nowhere to be seen. This is a daily geopolitical utopia offered to newspaper readers – the interpretation of course depending on the weather, but sunshine is the norm in the Eastern Mediterranean. The displacement of Turkey from the map brings to mind J.B. Harley's important comment on silences in maps. Harley reminds us that silences should be considered as positive statements and not as negative blank spaces.³⁵³ In this case the silence regarding Turkey simply acts like a fairy-tale where the fairies have removed the trouble maker from the scene and brought the Hellenic family happily together.

It is important to remember that these images change over time. The core of critical geopolitics is the belief that these 'geopolitical representations' of politics deserve serious attention, for it is such 'scripting' of the world that helps to constitute and legitimize foreign policies.³⁵⁴ However, these policies also change over time, and then new scripts have to be written. Non-Greek political playwrights also use different story lines. The following quotation is a delicious example of the debate that is trying to define the placement of Greece in a new context. A British writer explains how Greece used to be part of *us*, in this case *the West*, and how it has become, after the end of the Cold War useless to *us*, and therefore *we* can let it be only a member of *them*.

In South-Eastern Europe, the two states of the region, Yugoslavia and Greece, that had been allied one way or another with the West during the Cold War, found their international position doubly undermined. First, because the end of the Cold War reduced their geo-strategic significance for the West at the time of increased economic competition[...] The redrawing of the European political map after the Cold War and the construction of a Balkanist discourse on the supposedly backward, tribal and un-European nature of the region, threatened to peripheralize the SouthEast. As was poignantly remarked in the British press, Greece, "from being one of us since the [Cold] War, has become one of them [the Balkans]. With the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern and central Europe, Greece's usefulness [to the West]...has disappeared."³⁵⁵

Starting from the past, the writer reminds the reader how Greece was *allied with the West*. Allied, as a word, means somebody who is on the same side with us, against the others. However, it does not indicate that the writer meant that Greece had ever been *part* of the West, but just an ally. How about the *tribal and un-European nature of the region*? Nature of course does not refer to climate and fauna here. The argument is written with the thought that Europeans reside in states, which do *not* have a *tribal nature*. The discussion on Balkanism, which arose after the Cold War, started to define people of the Balkan area among the *others*. Others do not fulfil the demands that are needed for being members of *us Europeans*. As Maria Todorova analyzes the characteristics of the Balkanism debate, there has been no need for special proof of the Balkans as the *others* of Europe. In her research, she shows how the Balkans have been represented as

³⁵³ Harley 2001, 86.

³⁵⁴ Loo 2003, 159 - 160.

³⁵⁵ See Adam Nicholson, 'A Fall from Cultural Grace', the Spectator (London), November 12, 1993.

having inhabitants who do not care to conform to the standards of behaviour devised as normative by the civilized world. Stereotypes are strong and explicit justifications are especially drawn from the Balkan wars.³⁵⁶ At the end of the decade, in 1999, Greece had gone even further to 'becomes one of them' from the London point of view. While NATO forces were bombing Yugoslavia, there was an immense wave of sympathy in Greece towards the Serbs. At the same time, the Russian press was also supporting the Serbs. Meanwhile, the rest of the so-called West had quite a different opinion of pros and cons of the situation.³⁵⁷ These two supporters share the same orthodox religion as Serbs, and additionally Russians and Serbs both are Slavic nations.

A response to the previous quotation could be the following text, which simply explains where Greece is. It reminds the audience of the unique place of Greece and the special experience of the country as a member of the EU, the WEU and NATO. These membership reminders are equal to claiming belongingness in certain kinds of family groups. Therefore, it is not only the country, which is pointed to as an important one, but also its location. This citation is written by professor Thanos Dokos, specialized in strategic studies and defence.

Greece is located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia, and Africa). It is an integral part of the Balkans (where it is the only country that is a member of the European Union, the WEU and NATO) and is also in close proximity to the Black Sea and the oil-rich regions of the Middle East and Caucasus. The Aegean Sea is an important shipping route, with the Mediterranean, and a major transit route for the transportation of energy products (after the construction and operation of pipelines from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus). Furthermore, Greece's position in the Eastern Mediterranean enhances its strategic importance. The Mediterranean region constitutes a crucial area of contact (a 'faultline') between what is described by many analysts as the emerging great division of the world: the North and the South.³⁵⁸


The text does not mention the existence of Turkey, whose strategic position is almost the same. For being the gatekeeper at the crossroad, the Greek duty cannot be shared. In this quotation, compared with the of president Stephanopoulos in the beginning, Greece is placed in a quite different way. In this case, the border of Greece lies next to South, because Africa is included to the list. Africa is closer and Greece is part of Balkans. Instead of historical importance, the narrative of place is filled with economic (read: money) importance: *shipping route, transportation of energy, pipelines* and so forth. Once again Greece is the only country in the region with membership in several international and important unions. The message of this text is twofold. First, it reminds the Greek auditoria that, although *we* are living in a crucial area on the border of something different, *we* are similar to other countries belonging in these Western unions. *Our* duty is therefore very important. The second message is for outsiders. It stresses membership in the powerful organizations and within them the importance of Greece, because without Greek cooperation

³⁵⁶ Todorova 1997, *Imagining the Balkans*.

³⁵⁷ Kaakkuriniemi 2007, 23.

³⁵⁸ Dokos 2003, 43.

the activities of these organizations in the region would be much more difficult. Geographic location is thus a power resource, but it has to be spoken into existence and maintained rhetorically there.



The map tells another interesting story of Greece's geopolitical position. It also represents one of the ways in which Greece has been placed in recent literature.³⁵⁹ It is framed so that although it is a map of the Aegean Sea Region, Turkey takes most of the space in this picture. Although Greece is always stressing its place in the European Union and the West, this map reveals another reality for the country. As if it was the last fortress of the EU, Greece is, actually, the only member of the EU in this 1998 picture. Cyprus joined the Union later. Here Greece appears to be situated in the middle of an unruly world. In the north there are the post-socialist Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria; a restless area especially after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. The border symbolizes a gate that leaks legal and illegal immigrants, drugs, criminals, and most of all, ethnic nationalism, which had caused wars on the other side of the border. The south-Eastern corner also shows how the Middle East is linked to the Greek story. Syria, Lebanon and Israel are all appear in the vicinity. The traditional enemy, Turkey, is in the middle and Turkey's size is visually enlarged by the line delineating the Western border. The choice of placing something on the map is as valid as leaving something out. It points out the proximity of Greece to the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East. As a narrative, it is the total opposite to the previous sunny and 'European' weather map.

It is interesting to compare the map and the quotation, because Turkey was left out of the text but not from the picture. In a text, the purpose is to stress

³⁵⁹ The original is' in Aldo Chircop, André Gerolymatos and John.O.Iatrides (eds.) *The Aegean Sea After the Cold War. Security and Law of the Sea Issues*, International Political Economy Series, Hampshire and London: MacMillan Press Ltd., xiv. The copyright owner of the original is Innovative Learning Media Ltd., 1998.

the importance of Greece and its' strength in the area. Turkey is tied together with an area called 'East', and therefore it is part of the other. In the map, Turkey is included because it frames the Aegean Sea and is part of the world threatening Greece. The border of the Turkish coastline is the most important information in this map, and that is why some problematic kilometres of it are selected and specially defined. The message of this map is not that Greece is a connecting area, as in the previous text, but as a country that knows where its' borders are. The message of the text is opening and welcoming compared to the map. There are two details, which reveal that the map is not of Greek origin. Though the text is by Greek authors, the original map was published in Canada in a book with detailed information about the Aegean Sea after the Cold War. First, the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is named as Macedonia, which is a name very seldom used in Greece. Another, slightly milder detail is Istanbul, which on Greek maps usually carries the name Constantinople.

The Eastern border with Turkey has been problematic and the issue has constantly been securitized not only during periods of crisis but also during years that are more peaceful. It is not only a border between *them*, and *us* but also a border of a larger group, as the present Eastern border of the European Union, where *we* belong, where *we* are accepted as a member. It is one of the mental boundaries of the East and the West, Europe and Asia. This sense of being situated along a grand civilizational and historical boundary is one of the principal elements of Greek geopolitical identity. The borderland identity is a way to explain the special position of the country in respect to other countries – and to Greek citizens as well.

An element of geopolitical placing is the debate about whether one is in the centre or in the periphery. By studying these spatial tropes, one can see how different cultures have positioned themselves visually in space in their attempts to create a politically acceptable worldview.³⁶⁰ In a political sense, being in the centre is focusing on the importance of position and action. Whatever is done in the periphery has less meaning. This leads to the idea that some actions are more allowed or possible in the centre than in the periphery because attitudes towards a periphery tend to be more disciplinary. To be in the periphery means being in a position of a lower rank and the situation also involves being in a lower power position; by definition it is that in the case of the softer forms of power, and quite often also in the case of material power resources. Attitudes from the centre towards the periphery are disciplinary but disinterested; resulting in non-systematic policies, because the level of observation is not constant. The centre is always visible from the periphery, but the periphery only occasionally enters the public consciousness of the centre. During those periods when the periphery is noticed by the centre, the disciplinary aspect of the centre-periphery formation tends to become visible in, e.g., disparaging remarks, direct commands, or strict application of some existing common norms. The debate of centres and peripheries is filled with implicit circular

³⁶⁰ Turunen 1997, 44.

norms. For example, what is good is situated in the centre. Moreover, the centre is where good deeds are done, and implicitly the periphery is where bad or worthless things occur. It is difficult to avoid such hierarchical spatial metaphors as *head*, *nucleus*, and *main* in political discussion. We cannot really say that some places are *natural* centres, because, in practise, places are valued and defined by actions and are therefore vulnerable to changes.³⁶¹

A well know writer who also places Greece beyond the European boundary is Samuel Huntington. Huntington asks where the Eastern boundary of Europe is, and who should be thought of as European. He responds that 'the most compelling and pervasive answer to these questions is provided by the great historical line that has existed for centuries separating Western Christian peoples from Muslim and Orthodox peoples'[...]. [He also stresses that] 'Europe ends where Western Christianity ends, and Islam and Orthodoxy begin'.

During the Cold War, the United States was at the center of a large, diverse, multicivilizational grouping of countries who shared the goal of preventing further expansion by the Soviet Union. This grouping, variously known as the "Free World", the "West", or the "Allies", included many but not all Western societies, Turkey, Greece, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Israel (...). It was opposed by a grouping of countries only slightly less heterogeneous, which included all the Orthodox countries except Greece, several countries that were historically Western, Vietnam, Cuba, and a lesser degree India, and at times one or more African countries.³⁶²

Huntington's discourse of the borders of the East and West is an example of how the past is selectively used to justify the present, and, of course, to influence the future. Myths and histories are part of any specific culture that works to define the identity of who 'we' or 'the people' are in a specific context. Sometimes societies are positioned as entities possessing insecure characteristics, such as civilization, which is an extremely complex concept.³⁶³ Huntington is not using the term *tribe*, when he draws the line around his West. He is seeking the difference from religions. Categorising people with their faith, or their assumed faith, brings a very old discussion to the debate of borders. Earlier the Crusaders drew lines with the same criteria. It is not only Christians against pagans, but also Christians against different kinds of Christians. Orthodox Christianity is defined as different from that of the West, an *anomaly* as Huntington says, in the Western organization, with which he means NATO:

Greece is not part of Western civilization, but it was the home of Classical civilization, which was an important source of Western civilization. In their opposition to the Turks, Greeks historically have considered themselves spear-carriers of Christianity. Unlike Serbs, Romanians, or Bulgarians, their history has been intimately entwined with that of West. Yet Greece is also an anomaly, the Orthodox outsider in a Western organization.³⁶⁴

³⁶¹ Palonen, 1993c, 168.

³⁶² Huntington 1996, 157.

³⁶³ Dalby 1998, 296.

³⁶⁴ Huntington 1996, 162.

Huntington does not give the role of a hero to Greece, and the narrative definitely is not a romance from the Greek point of view. For Greeks Huntington's argument is a tragedy. Huntington admits Greece's importance as source of Western civilization. It has had its moments in the past. But the point of Huntington's argument is that Greece is *an anomaly, an outsider*, which cannot therefore be a real part of *us*, namely the West. As Frye writes: 'The tragic hero has normally had an extraordinary, often nearly divine, destiny almost within his grasp, and the glory of that original vision never quite fades out of tragedy'³⁶⁵. This part of Huntington's book raised loud objections in Greece, no matter how the final battle of civilizations was described later there. Understandably, Huntington's thesis prompted firm rebuttals from Greek academics. A sense of geographical, political, and cultural marginalisation with respect to Europe is common in Greece, as in all borderland countries. In the following, John Mazis, who is a professor of political science and specialized on Balkan and Mediterranean issues, replies to Huntington that Greece does not *belong* to Europe, *Greece is Europe*:

Διαφωνώ εν μέρει με τον Χάντιγκτον στο γεγονός ότι τοποθετεί την Ελλάδα στον Ανατολικό κόσμο. Και εδώ υπάρχει μια μεγάλη πλεκτάνη εις βάρος του Ελληνισμού. Η Ελλάδα δεν ανήκει στην Ευρώπη, είναι Ευρώπη, γιατί το ελληνικό πνεύμα είναι οικουμενικό. Ο ευρωπαϊκός πολιτισμός δημιουργήθηκε από τον Αριστοτέλη, το ρωμαϊκό πνεύμα και μετέπειτα το ιουδαϊκό πνεύμα, όπως περνάει μέσα από τον Χριστιανισμό. [...] Ο Χάντιγκτον [...] εντάσσει την ανατολική ορθοδοξία στον ισλαμικό ουσιαστικά χώρο.³⁶⁶

When Huntington uses the difference between the Western and Eastern Christian churches, he makes the past into a tool to justify his thesis. He selects the era of Byzantium from the history of Europe when this distinction between the East and West Christianity was relevant. Some other examples from the past, e.g., the classical period, the Roman Empire, Hellenistic, and Ottoman periods are all left aside because they would not support the border he is drawing. One of the versions of the East-West dichotomy played itself out in the opposition between Greek Orthodoxy and Catholicism. It is Catholicism and not Western Christianity in general that is part of the dichotomy, because it was the political and ideological rivalry between Rome and Constantinople that created a rift between the two creeds and attached to Orthodoxy the status of a schismatic and heretical deviation (and vice versa). The reformation made unsuccessful attempts to reach an understanding with the Orthodox Church in a common fight against papal supremacy. The notion of a general Western Christianity as opposed to a putative Eastern Orthodox entity is not a theological construct but a relatively late cultural and recent political category.

³⁶⁵ Frye 1990, 210.

³⁶⁶ Μάζις 2001, 36-37: Disagreement with Huntington arises from the fact that he places Greece in the Eastern World. And here there is a great deceit against Hellenism. Greece does not belong to Europe; it is Europe, because the Greek spirit is universal. European culture was developed from Aristotle, the Romans Spirit and later from the Jewish spirit that runs through Christianity. [...] Huntington [...] places eastern orthodoxy essentially within the Islamic world.³⁶⁶

Moreover, as in Huntington, it appropriates religious images to legitimize and obfuscate the real nature of geopolitical rivalries and boundaries.³⁶⁷

The argument of this chapter has been that such a relation can still be seen, but methodologically the idea is that geopolitical principles are used in the thinking, geopolitical arguments, and rhetorical metaphors when framing political situations, for either domestic or international environments, by state representatives, including politicians, bureaucrats, academics, ordinary citizens; in other words: anybody in a concrete context adopting the role of a state representative. Nowadays border making and battles of power within a stabilized state system are mostly verbal struggles. These debates are not fought exclusively by the superpowers that used to draw the global maps during periods like the Cold War. Time after time, countries such as Greece also place their country in these debates. The purpose is not to make the country physically bigger but politically more influential and prestigious. Strong countries mean countries that have lots of political power and are capable of influencing others. Other countries are recognized not merely as countries but as entities with capabilities and importance.

Greece is placed in the West, Europe, and NATO. Although Greece is in the Balkans, it is always reminded that it is different from the rest of the Balkan countries. Geographical position is used in these texts as a strength and a reason why Greece is a uniquely important country. It forms part of the present Eastern border of the European Union, and one of the mental borders for the East and the West. It is no wonder that borderland research and borderland identity debates are quite common in Greece. Greece has adopted a gatekeeper's role both in the European Union as well as in NATO and other Western societies; it definitely is a member of Western organizations. Therefore, it can be seen that Greeks are proud of this gatekeeper role but at the same time worried that others may not see it that way.

5.2 Maritime Boundary-Making

The purpose of this section of this chapter is to reflect on the position of Greece in the geopolitical framework of military tension in the Aegean Sea. First we will take a look at Greece's maritime boundaries in general. Two directions are relatively easy, namely the south and the West. The Mediterranean creates an interesting border to the south, because there Greece borders Africa, but there is no special conflict with any African country, and Africa features very little in Greek foreign political rhetoric.

The same can be said of the West, where Italy lies on the other side of the Adriatic, and, until recently, that direction has been unproblematic. The main worry has been the Aegean. As seen from Greece, Italy behind the Ionian Sea seems to be the only calm, peaceful, and uninteresting direction, from whence no great surprises threaten. The only serious conflict with Italy within living

³⁶⁷ Todorova 1997, 18.

memory was during World War II. This era is remembered yearly on 28 October and known as the *Ochi* (Όχι) -day³⁶⁸, which works as a kind of second 'independence day' for Greece. Ochi-day, which commemorates Greek dictator Ioannis Metaxas' rejection of an ultimatum, put to him by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini on October 28, 1940. The ultimatum demanded that Greece government either permits Axis forces to enter Greek territory and occupy unspecified 'strategic locations' or else face war. Metaxas is said to have at once responded with the single word: Όχι - 'no'³⁶⁹. In response to Metaxas's refusal, Italian troops stationed in Albania, which at the time was an Italian protectorate, attacked the Greek border. Metaxas's reply marked the beginning of Greece's participation in World War II.

During the last decade, Ochi-day, itself, has increasingly become a source of national division. On the day, cities and towns organise parades of students and schools as well as military parades. Traditionally, the honour of bearing the Greek flag in the parade is reserved for the student that has the best marks in the school. During the last years, the best marks have been given, several times, for a student of foreign origin. For example, in 2000, Albanian-born ace student Odysseas Cenai topped his class in the Nea Mechaniona high school in Thessalonica. However, the parents' association refused to let him be flag-bearer because he was not a Greek national. The night before the parade, the 15-year-old chose to put an end to the dispute, by saying he would renounce his right to carry the flag. During the parade, there were incidents of violence when two other young students protested the decision by raising a banner, which carried a sentence of the ancient Greek scholar Isocrates saying 'Greeks are all those who have Greek education.'³⁷⁰ Since then the theme has become a part of public debate every year before Ochi-day. The media participates strongly in this often populist debate by interviewing many participants, from the best 'foreign' origin students and their classmates as well as parents, teachers, local authorities, and so on. National sentiments are expressed and testimonies of Greekness given. Moreover, although politicians make annual statements on multi-cultural tolerance, in practice the plot seems to repeat itself in specific localities the same way it did in October 2000. Ochi-day has become politicized in a highly nationalistic sense. Ochi-day can be seen as an example of a specific name that had in practice become a commonplace, and whose meaning shifted drastically in the new circumstance. The concept of rhetorical commonplace implies that its meaning is not necessary shared and understood by all people in the same way because they are not univocal but mixed bits of meanings.³⁷¹ We could also say that they are fields of variable meanings, or as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson formulated it, linguistic expressions can be understood as containers.³⁷² A mixture of meanings appear inside of them at a certain

³⁶⁸ Όχι=no.

³⁶⁹ There are doubts of the real use of the word 'Όχι' the actual reply can as well have been the French 'Alors, c'est la guerre' ('Then it is war').

³⁷⁰ Diamandouros 2001, 72.

³⁷¹ Jackson 2006, 26-29.

³⁷² Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 19.

moment, while the content changes as time passes; some elements drop out, while others are strengthened, and completely new elements also can appear. This is what happened to Ochi-day. It used to be a day for remembering World War II, but then the celebrations became focused on the visual image of marching students carrying Greek flags, and finally the central meaning of Ochi-day shifted to a debate about Greekness in relation to immigrants.

Geographically Italy and the Ionian Sea connect Greece with the West. The concept 'the West' is not a simple one, but can be defined as the USA, NATO, and the European Union – all of them together as a bundle of mixed images. The Greek way of seeing the map does not always recognise this continuation to West because there is no land-neighbour belonging to the EU. The connection is explained as a mental one, and the country is seen as surrounded by hostile enemies, or at least *others*. Greece presents, therefore, a good example of traditional geopolitical thinking, also in the way that national territory is a constant ingredient of Greek foreign policy. In the classical geopolitical sense, geography is an objective of policy, a prize in a conflict between states, and this geopolitical aspect is continuously activated in relations between Greece and Turkey. All states have, normally, a clear sense of their national borders and territory. 'Territory is regarded as fundamental to statehood, such that few states are ever willing to relinquish even a part of their claimed territory'.³⁷³ If there is an argument about territory, it turns into an open place for politics. Only one actor is needed to make an argument about a territory, and therefore to make it political – but it takes two actors to make it apolitical!³⁷⁴ If there are no conflicts, disagreements, or even the lightest dilemma about a territory, only then can the area be called peaceful and apolitical. For example, in spite of the recent politicization of Ochi-day, the Western border with Italy itself causes no clash of interests for either state and is therefore apolitical. On the other hand, the Aegean Sea on the Eastern side of Greece is highly complicated. There is no agreement with Turkey for example how the territorial waters should be defined in this special case. Disagreement makes the border political.

The Aegean Sea to the East separates Greece from Turkey, with which military conflict has been simmering throughout the past centuries. The placement of Turkey, on the boundaries of Europe, the Middle East, and Eurasia is, indeed, another extremely interesting topic for study, especially now while the debate of Turkey's possible membership in the European Union is active, but the task will not be attempted here.³⁷⁵

The Aegean Sea is the national landscape of Greece and it is filled with mythical nostalgia as well as hard politics in the minds of Greek people. There are few tourist brochures of the country without an image of blue sky over the sea and picturesque islands of the Aegean Sea. Simultaneously, its importance on every level is also brought to mind for the Greek people themselves. The

³⁷³ Loo 2003, 157.

³⁷⁴ Palonen, 1993c, 164.

³⁷⁵ See e.g. Lesser, Ian O. & Fuller, Graham E. 1993: Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China and Lesser, Ian O. 2000: NATO looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean.

Aegean is a source of many myths beginning from its very name: When Androgeus, the son of king Minos of Crete, attended the first Panathenaea in Athens, he attracted the ire of King Aegeus by winning all the prizes. Aegeus had Androgeus killed and king Minos waged war on Athens to avenge the death of his son. Peace was won only with the promise that Athens would send seven young men and seven young women every year to Minos to be slain by the ungodly bull-monster known as the Minotaur; the tradition continued until Theseus successfully killed the Minotaur. Theseus and his father had devised a signal by which Aegeus would be able to tell, by the colour of the ship's sails, whether Theseus had defeated the Minotaur and was returning safely to Athens. Theseus should hoist a white sail on his return from Crete if he survived the terrors of the Labyrinth. Theseus survived but forgot to hoist the sail. Aegeus saw the ship in the distance and incorrectly interpreted the signal. He thought that Theseus was dead and threw himself into the sea and drowned. This myth is told to explain how the Aegean Sea got its name.

The importance of the Aegean Sea for Greece is displayed in the following quotation of historian B. G. Spiridonakis, which was presented in 1977, when the *detente* phase of the Cold War was coming to an end. Although it is a bit older material than the others in the dissertation, it gives an idea about the debate right after the collapse of the military regime of Greece and conflict with Turkey, which led to the divided Cyprus. The fear of being 'pushed off from the Aegean' describes the restless time. The argument is based on an attempt to explain how *natural* the connection between the mainland and the archipelago is:

Though connected to both the Greek and the Anatolian mainland, the Aegean archipelago may be considered as a natural prolongation of Greece, which the hinterland Turkey is lacking. When the islands are under the control of the same power, which dominates Asia Minor, then Greece herself cannot hope to exist as an independent national unit, and is bound to be invaded from both land (Thrace) and sea.[...] Greece, if pushed off from the Aegean, cannot but suffocate and totally disappear from the map.³⁷⁶

The justification with *nature*, in the beginning of the citation, is interesting. The claim that the archipelago may be considered as a natural prolongation of Greece, which the hinterland Turkey is lacking, is of course counterfactual. The archipelago is as much a prolongation of Turkey as it is that of Greece, but in political argumentation rationality is not always the point, but rather the making of claims themselves. Yet, there are better claims and worse claims, and with the hindsight of 30 years, this no longer looks like a good one. The argumentative context has changed. If we believe that all borders are man made creations, this kind of explanation of how some area belongs to another on the left side of it, but not to something else on its right side seems quite fragile. The text uses nature as an explanation in its attempt to induce belief in the naturalness of the border. The idea that if Greece were pushed off from the Aegean the country would *suffocate* and *disappear* is quite dramatic. A state is

³⁷⁶ Spiridonakis 1977, 29.

made to appear as a plant or some other soil bound living creature, which would die if taken away from its growing place. Another owner, in this case Turkey, which is unnamed, but therefore more strongly implicated as a formless menace, would be an *unnatural* choice. Therefore, the Aegean Sea is needed so that Greece can survive. Another example offers as strict Greek view to the issue although the following writer, a former lawyer and veteran of the WWII, Kyriakos A. Kyriakos does not need natural argumentation to justify his cause.

Εμείς οι Έλληνες, από το δημοτικό σχολείο ακόμα μάθαμε ότι το Αιγαίο Πέλαγος είναι θάλασσα Ελληνική. Δεν είναι "συνεταιρική" με κανέναν άλλο γείτονα και ανήκει μόνο στους Έλληνες. Τα παζάρια και τα αλισβερίσια με απροσημάτιστα δηλωμένο επιθετικό γείτονα δεν ακούγονται καλά στα αυτιά των Ελλήνων πατριωτών.³⁷⁷

Kyriakos describes how the Greeks learn already at school that the Aegean Archipelagos is the Greek Sea. It is not 'shared' with any neighbor and belongs only to the Greeks. He stresses that bargaining and dealing with unorganized declarations, by the aggressive neighbor, do not sound good in the ears of patriotic Greeks. This kind of rhetoric is typical among the average Greeks, if I may be excused for using the expression, and would be received with applause among a typical Greek audience. The message is simplified: The Aegean Sea is Greek and even children should know this. Those who agree are patriots, and – although it is not written in the text – those who disagree are not patriots and therefore traitors of the common nation.

A quite different version of Greek argumentation about the Aegean, which nevertheless explains the importance of the area for Greece, describes the Aegean Sea as a maritime and aerial road from Europe and the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles all the way to the Turkish harbours in Anatolia. This was made 25 years later, in 2002 by professor Ioannis Mazis, who is specialized in geopolitics and geography:

Τι σημαίνει, όμως, η αντίληψη αυτή για την περίπτωση του Αιγαίου; Το Αιγαίο είναι μία θαλάσσια και εναέρια οδός από τη Μεσόγειο και την Ευρώπη προς τα Δαρδανέλια, αλλά και για τα τουρκικά λιμάνια της Ανατολής. Πρέπει ακόμη να τονίσουμε ότι το Αιγαίο δεν επηρεάζει γεωπολιτικά μόνον την Ελλάδα και την Τουρκία, Αποτελεί πρακτικώς - και όχι νομικώς - διεθνή θαλάσσια και εναέρια δίοδο που εξυπηρετεί πρώην Σοβιετικές Δημοκρατίες, όπως η Ουκρανία και η Ρωσία, αλλά και συνδέει από απόψεως μεταφορών την εμπορική κίνηση μεταξύ Ευρώπης και Ασίας.³⁷⁸

Mazis stresses that the Aegean Sea influences not only to the geopolitics of Greece and Turkey. It is also, in practice, an international sea and aerial passage that serves countries of the former Soviet Union, and connects commercial transportation between Europe and Asia. This argumentation connecting financial reasoning with geopolitics adds value to the message. Money, business and finance is considered cool reasoning and they create the

³⁷⁷ Κυριακός 1999,153.

³⁷⁸ Μάζις, 2002, 200.

appearance of more objective argumentation than the previous citation which explained the importance of the Aegean Sea for Greece with *naturalistic* argumentation. The reason is at least partly the common respect for mathematics and numbers, which are understood as facts themselves, although business reasoning can be seen, also, as a dirty game, in which some get money and the others lose it. Another reason clearly is that this argument evokes the image of strong external powers, diminishing the possibility of either Greece or Turkey to rock the status quo. Once again, stability seems to be imposed from the outside to the region, which, left to itself, might resort to violent conflict.

Another change, which highlights how geopolitical reasoning has been changing within twenty years, if we compare the two previous quotations, is that the first one explains why the Aegean Sea is important for *Greeks*, and the latter, why it is important for so *many*. The first one matches perfectly with argumentation of the era of geopolitical history, which John Agnew has named naturalized geopolitics,³⁷⁹ which still could be used plausibly during the era ideological geopolitics.³⁸⁰ A natural prolongation of Greece is part of the reasoning in which the state is seen as a living organic entity and which could also, therefore, suffocate, if not understood and treated properly. The latter example displays proper argumentation after of the era ideological geopolitics, in which the area is seen from a more global view. The Cold War is over and the Aegean Sea is open for transportation of the former Soviet Union states, as well as any states, because the area is presented as a route which connects Europe and Asia. The same area is not needed for the sole possession of a single state, and the organic and naturalistic metaphors have changed into images of cooperation and mutual economic advantage. The American War against Terrorism has not been allowed to mar the imagery; the emphasis is on European foreign political argumentation, rather than that of the American led total West.

Notwithstanding, not to make the situation appear too easy, even in 2002 fairly one-sided argumentation could be heard. Let us remind ourselves of two famous geopolitical slogans: Halford Mackinder claimed that 'Who controls Eastern Europe rules the Heartland; and who rules the Heartland rules the World Island; and who rules the World Island rules the world'.³⁸¹ Nicholas John Spykman continued the idea as 'Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world'.³⁸² The theme has been replayed several times in various places. As a rhetorical argument it is quite handy, as it seems to lead the listener from the premise to the conclusion through a geometrically neat argument, where expansion of control leads logically to more expansion. However, behind this logical calculation there is another rhetorical element: the slogans are pure verbal descriptions of physical movement. The image of menacing expansion is visually heightened by moving

³⁷⁹ Agnew 1998, 93.

³⁸⁰ Agnew 1998, 103.

³⁸¹ Mackinder, 'The Round World', *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1943. Quoted from Spykman 1944, 43.

³⁸² Spykman 1969, 43.

the mental eye through successive geopolitical theatres with expanding territorial extent. The effect is stronger in Mackinder's slogan, which of course is the original; Spykman only used the same rhetorical structure in a less propagandistic manner. In the case of Greece and the Aegean Sea, with echoes the Greek occupation of tracts of Asia Minor in 1920-22, the same argumentative structure of territorial controlling and ruling is still used:

Those who control the Asia Minor region also control the Asia Minor coasts of the Eastern Aegean, and in effect the oil fields of the NE Aegean and half of this commercial route of hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea and the Gulf.³⁸³

The quotation nicely recycles old material. The Asia Minor region has become a strategically significant area, comparable with Mackinder's Eastern Europe. The most significant part of the Aegean Sea is, hence, the Eastern Aegean areas. The importance is seen because of the oil fields of the North-Eastern Aegean and commercial route of hydrocarbons from further East. They are economic factors, which tend to mitigate the military aspect of the argument: again, Turkey as a state is not mentioned, which turns it into a formless and undefined menace. Thus, the Aegean continues to be a highly emotional geopolitical issue, and not all Greek discussants definitely value common international usage of the area.

The most difficult border which Greece must delineate exactly is the Eastern border, most of which is a tightly winding line on the Aegean Sea. There are plenty of Greek islands situated close to the Turkish coast, so close that swimming from one country to the other is easily possible, although coastguards of both countries would see it as a bad idea. The border is mostly invisible for the hundreds of thousands of tourists visiting the area every year, but in Greek and Turkish politics the border is extremely conspicuous, full of complicated meanings, creating endless political tensions between the two neighbours.

The border was formed during the last century. Thrace has been part of modern Greece since 1919. In the northeast, the border is placed mostly in the middle of river Evros, which flows from Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea. On the other side of the river there is Ευρωπαϊκή Τουρκία, European Turkey, which lies between the river and the Sea of Marmara. At least this old name on maps gives an impression that this part of Turkey is European, while the rest may be something else. Symmetrically, parts of Greece, namely some islands on the Aegean Sea, could theoretically be called the Asian part of Greece. The Aegean does not contain any tradition where the boundary between Asia and Europe would lie, so presumably it should lie in the middle of the sea. Notwithstanding, there has never been any area called as Ασιατική Ελλάδα, Asian Greece. No map exists where you could find any of the Greek islands with an Asian name, or even with a hint of East in its name. The idea is out of question, although, in the case of some Greek Islands, some hundred meters further there begins a land mass that Greeks have called Asia Minor, Μικρά Ασία.

³⁸³ Μάζις, 2002, 436.

From the Sea of Marmara onwards, the Turkish coastal area is called Anatoly, which is a Greek word meaning East. Greeks have also named this area as Asia Minor, but Anatoly is nowadays a more neutral word, which is satisfactory for both countries.³⁸⁴ In the beginning of the 1920s, partly because of the territorial upheaval following the end of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire³⁸⁵, there was a short two-year period, when Greece was able to conquer southern Thrace, Imvros and Tenedos islands, and part of Anatolia. It was called η Μεγάλη Ιδέα, the Great Idea³⁸⁶. The collapse came when the Turkish army, lead by Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk, reconquered most of these areas. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923)³⁸⁷ signified the death of the Greek Great Idea; of the remaining unredeemed territories, Cyprus was officially ceded to Britain and the Dodecanese to Italy.³⁸⁸ This treaty established the status quo between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean. Turkish sovereignty was determined to extend to a maritime belt three miles from the Turkish coast, and to include Imros and Tenedos. Η Μεγάλη Ιδέα had become a catastrophe of Asia Minor, η Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή.

In the north-eastern Aegean, in the sea area from Evros down to the Greek islands of Samos and Ikaria and the opposite Turkish coast, the median line is mutually recognized. South from the islands, the maritime boundary between the Dodecanese and the opposite Turkish coast follows the same principle. Agreements of this area were signed between Turkey and Italy in 1932 and Greece succeeded Italy in these agreements as the territorial possessor when the final change of the Eastern border took place in 1947. The Dodecanese islands were ceded to Greece through the Paris Peace Treaty.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁴ Μήλλας 2002, 35 - 37.

³⁸⁵ The period of Greek history, while Greece was occupied by the Turks, is also known as Turkokratia. It is usually situated between two series of dramatic events, those of 1453 symbolizing the end of the Byzantine world and those of 1821, an important milestone in the Modern Greek revival. However, it is well known that the military conquest and occupation of the Greek lands started well before the fall of Constantinople and went on until the middle of the 17th century with the fall of Crete. Spiridonakis 1977, 11-12.

³⁸⁶ Η Μεγάλη Ιδέα, the Great Idea was a phenomenon of the time in the Balkans, comparable to Greater Serbia, Greater Bulgaria, and Greater Albania. The idea of Greater Greece cherished the dream of a Byzantium state, which would gather all ethnic Greeks, who had been under the Ottomans, within the same state.

³⁸⁷ Treaty of Lausanne (1923) was signed by Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Japan.

³⁸⁸ Koliopoulos & Veremis 1988, 286.

³⁸⁹ Redrawn from Πρεβελάκης 1997, 105.



The next picture of the Aegean Sea and its surrounding coasts is a satellite photo. It does not show any national borders or reveal at all how complicated the border between Greece and Turkey has been for several decades. Actually, it proves that state borders are not, by any means, *natural*, meaning part of the nature. They do not exist until we create them. The Aegean Sea is called an 'archipelagos' for a good reason because it is dominated by over 3,000 islands, islets and rocks. The Aegean insular formations are not isolated but instead form series of chains along the sea. With the exception of two islands at the entrance of the Dardanelles, namely Imvros and Tenedos, and 62 rocks along the Anatolian coast, all the other islands (i.e. 3042) belong to Greece.³⁹⁰

³⁹⁰ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Aegeansea.jpg>. Source: NASA.



Despite the number of signed contracts and treaties during the past, the Eastern border of Greece is all but settled. The sea and the border are at the core of Greek foreign policy. If we listen to the popular debate and simplify these problems, Turkey is concerned that Greece might be trying to tighten its grip on the territory and extend its layers of juridical and administrative control to such a degree that it would turn the Aegean effectively into a 'Greek lake'.³⁹¹ Conversely, Greeks are concerned that Turkey might try to occupy half of the Aegean. The Aegean Sea dispute covers several interrelated and controversial issues between Greece and Turkey:

- A) The delimitation of territorial waters.
- B) The delimitation of national airspace.
- C) The delimitation of Flight Information Regions (FIR), and their significance for the control of military flight activity.
- D) The delimitation of exclusive economic zones and the use of the continental shelf.
- E) The introduction by Turkey of the concept of "Grey Zones", in describing its policy to dispute the status of an undetermined number of islands and islets, with the small grazing islets of Imia/Kardak being the best-known example.

We shall deal with each of these issues below.

³⁹¹ See e.g. Gerolymatos 2000, 48.

A) The delimitation of territorial waters

Common international laws and agreements define territorial waters. Article 3 of The Law of the Sea Convention, signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica, in 1982, defines the concept of territorial waters. The present usual practice is to draw a line to 12 nautical miles from the coast. However, if two countries are so close to each other that the 12 nautical miles rule cannot be used, the tradition has been to agree upon a median line.

Existing territorial sea boundaries in the Aegean Sea are based on the principle of equidistance either conventionally or customarily. In the northeastern Aegean, namely in the Sea area from Evros down to the Greek islands of Samos and Ikaria and the opposite Turkish coast, the median line is mutually recognized as the territorial sea boundary.³⁹²

It all sounds very simple but, given that the distance between Greece and Turkey is sometimes as little as one nautical mile, the problems which have lasted for decades; and different points of views of Greece and Turkey have made the Aegean one of the most difficult territorial disputes, especially where the 12 nautical mile rule cannot be implemented. Several international laws cover the Aegean Sea. For example, the law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) was ratified by the European Union (1994) and Greece (1995) but not by Turkey; therefore, the treaty does not bind Turkey. The Greek government announced after signing the treaty that it retains rights to extend its territorial waters from the present 6 miles³⁹³ to 12 nautical miles, but this has not been implemented.³⁹⁴ The Turkish government has declared that any Greek attempt of extension would be a cause of war.³⁹⁵ The present 6 miles grants 48.8% of the Aegean Sea to Greece, 7.4% to Turkey and the remaining 48.8 becomes High Seas. A 12-mile territorial sea would alter the Greek share to 71.5% and Turkish share to 8.8%. In this case Turkish ships would reach High Seas only by passing through Greek territorial waters.³⁹⁶

B) The delimitation of national airspace

The national airspace of a state and its territorial seas are normally coterminous. National airspace gives the sovereign state a large degree of control over foreign air traffic. National airspace allows normally civil aviation passage under international treaties, but foreign military aircraft do not have the same rights. Greece adopted a 10 mile national airspace in 1931.³⁹⁷ It does not coincide with the boundary of the 6 mile territorial waters. Since 1974, Turkey has refused to recognise the outer 4 miles of airspace that extend beyond Greek territorial waters.³⁹⁸ However, Greece argues that all its neighbours, including

³⁹² Strati 2000, 93.

³⁹³ The 6 nautical miles follows the Compulsory Law of 1 September 1936.

³⁹⁴ Platias 2000, 66. Strati 2000 90.

³⁹⁵ Platias 2000, 82. Strati 2000, 92.

³⁹⁶ Papahadjopoulos 1998, 35-36.

³⁹⁷ Platias 2000, 83.

³⁹⁸ Platias 2000, 82.

Turkey, have acknowledged its 10 mile claim and that the issue was raised after the 1974 crisis in Cyprus.³⁹⁹

The different views about airspace have been one of the most long-standing sources of military irritation between the two countries, as they have given rise to regular incidents between fighter jets. Turkish air force jets routinely and demonstratively fly within the outer 4 mile zone of contested airspace, while Greek air force jets routinely intercept them and try to force them to leave. During these activities a number of accidents and shot-down jets have occurred.⁴⁰⁰

C) The delimitation of Flight Information Regions (FIR)

The question of Flight Information Regions (FIR) does not affect the two states' sovereignty rights but it is a very interesting problem in the case the Aegean Sea. According to an agreement adopted in 1952 by the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the air space over the Aegean Sea is part of the FIR of Athens.⁴⁰¹ The agreement relates to the responsibility for regulating civil aviation. A FIR may stretch beyond the national airspace of a country, over areas of high seas, or in some cases even over the airspace of another country. It does not give the responsible state the right to prohibit flights by foreign aircraft; however, foreign aircraft are obliged to submit flight plans to the authorities administering the FIR. This has been perceived by both Greece and Turkey as giving the state administering the FIR a certain tactical advantage with respect to military movement in that zone. Two separate disputes have arisen: the issue of a unilaterally proposed revision of the FIR demarcation and the question of what rights and obligations arise from the FIR with respect to military as opposed to civil flights.

Shortly after the Cyprus crisis, 1974-1980, Turkey unilaterally attempted to change this arrangement. Turkey extended the Istanbul FIR westward following the north-south median line claimed by Turkey for the Aegean continental shelf, including the national airspace of the Greek islands in that area. In practice, the FIR demarcation is no longer a disputed issue of civil flights but of military flights.⁴⁰²

The current (as of 2007) disputes remain over the need to submit military flight plans to the Athens FIR. According to common international practice, military aircraft normally submit flight plans to FIR authorities when moving in international airspace, just like civil aircraft. Turkey, concerned that Greece might misuse its civil authority to gain a tactical military advantage, refuses to do so and claims that the practice for military aircraft is optional. Greece argues that it is obligatory, because of civil aviation safety. In popular perception in Greece, the issue of allegedly illegal Turkish military flights in the international

³⁹⁹ Theodoropoulos 2003, 311-322.

⁴⁰⁰ Platias 1999, 191.

⁴⁰¹ Papahadjopoulos 1998, 37.

⁴⁰² See e.g. Syrigos & Arvanitopoulos: <http://www.idis.gr/english/index.htm> , Papahadjopoulos 1998, 36-37.

part of Athens FIR is often confused with that of the Turkish intrusions in the disputed outer 4-mile (7.4 km) belt of airspace claimed by Greece.

D) The delimitation of exclusive economic zones and the use of the continental shelf

The continental shelf, according to the LOSC, comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the coasts of the state.⁴⁰³ Islands also have a maritime zone; which means that the islands have territorial sea, a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.⁴⁰⁴ The issue with the continental shelf between Greece and Turkey has roots in oil. The issue is not well known outside the area, which probably is explained by the fact that the amount of oil under the Aegean quite likely would not make its owner a multimillionaire. However, tension between the two countries, over the continental shelf was high during the mid 1970s in the aftermath of the Oil Crisis, when the panic of prices and energy security ran highest. In both 1974 and 1976, the two countries came very close to war when the Turkish oceanographic vessels proceeded to search for mineral resources in disputed areas just outside Greek territorial waters.⁴⁰⁵ A similar crisis followed also in 1987. Tension between Greece and Turkey rose when Turkish Sismik I began seismic tests in the Aegean, near the Greek islands of Lesbos, Lemnos and Samothrace, in the beginning of April 1987. Greece ordered its military forces to full alert and threatened to prevent the vessel from conducting petroleum explorations.⁴⁰⁶ It was believed that the Aegean Sea might hold rich oil reserves. However, finally the amount of oil was shown not be enough to start an oil crisis over its ownership.⁴⁰⁷ The problem, from the Greek point of view, was that the map, issued by the Turkish Government, tried to delimit the seabed between Greece and Turkey to a median line from the Greek and the Turkish mainland. Greece measures the median line from the islands, and this means that Greece would gain the economic rights to almost the whole of the Aegean.⁴⁰⁸ This map ignored the existence of the Greek islands and their right to a continental shelf. In this case, Greece has the Law of the Sea on its side, but because Turkey has not joined the convention, Greece has no legal instrument to enforce its claim.

F) From Imia vs. Kardak to Grey zones

In the end of year 1995 the running aground of a Turkish vessel on a small rocky islet in the Eastern Aegean Sea caused a dangerous incident in the history Greek-Turkish relations.⁴⁰⁹ The islets are called Imia (Ιμια) in Greek and Kardak in Turkish. When a Turkish vessel ran into a reef near the islet of Imia/Kardak and refused to be tugged by Greek boats insisting that this was Turkish

⁴⁰³ Strati 2000, 94. Papahadjopoulos 1998, 34.

⁴⁰⁴ Strati 2000, 95.

⁴⁰⁵ Papahadjopoulos 1998, 34.

⁴⁰⁶ Platias 2000, 79.

⁴⁰⁷ Theodoropoulos 1997, 125.

⁴⁰⁸ Papahadjopoulos 1998, 34.

⁴⁰⁹ E.g. Gerolymatos 2000, 48. Papahadjopoulos 1998, 37. Λιούσης, 1997.

territory, the Mayor of nearby Kalymnos decided to plant a Greek flag on the islet. The flag was removed by Turkish journalists in January 1996, and a Turkish flag was hoisted on the islet. Greek soldiers replaced the Greek flag and the incident was deemed as innocuous by the Greek Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos until Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller herself laid an official claim on Imia. This was the beginning of an escalation that added one more negative item in the already burdened agenda of Greek-Turkish relations.⁴¹⁰ The uninhabited islets lie 3.8 nautical miles from Turkish mainland coast and 5.5 nautical miles from the Greek island Kalymnos. The total area is about 10 acres. Warships of the two countries encircled the islets. The crisis of two NATO countries de-escalated only after the United States intervened in 31 January 1996.⁴¹¹ The crisis represented for Greece the first post World War II occasion in which Turkey laid claim to a concrete piece of Greek territory. Some maps of the area assigned these islets to Greece, others to Turkey. The case of the Imia/Kardak rocks is complicated by the fact that one has to trace the history of sovereignty of these rocks from Turkey first to Italy and only later to Greece.⁴¹² Turkey claims that the transfer in 1923, under the Treaty of Lausanne, from Turkey to Italy was never ratified, highlights the traditional presence of Turkish fishing boats in the area, and maintains that Greece was attempting in 1996 to claim that the group of rocks could be inhabited in order to advance its territorial shelf claims. Greece argues that because the islets are 3.8 nautical miles off the Turkish coast, article 12 of the Lausanne Treaty, 1923, which established the border in the region, and which granted Turkey sovereignty over islands within 3 nautical miles only, negates any Turkish claim to them.⁴¹³

The following Greek map places the islets to the Greek side although the border itself is not drawn on the map as a line. The border is drawn by naming. The map does not offer any alternative name for Imia, just the Greek one, with big fonts in bright red, obviously added to the map later for argumentative purposes, which underlines the point that there is only one owner for the islets. The audience for the message of the map is not only in Greece because the most important texts are written in English and not in Greek (e.g. *Imia*). However, the smaller islands like Kalolimnos just above the bigger island Kalymnos is written in Greek and names of some islets in Turkish possession are written in Turkish. Notwithstanding, please note that one of the Turkish islands, *Büyükiremit*, next to the name *Imia*, is presented also with an old Greek name *Ποντικοῦσσα*. Rhetorically the naming allows for Turkish possession, but reminds the viewer that the rock has a Greek past.⁴¹⁴


⁴¹⁰ Veremis 1997, 5.

⁴¹¹ Papahadjopoulos 1998, 37.

⁴¹² Raftopoulos 2000, 136, 138.

⁴¹³ Papahadjopoulos 1998, 37.

⁴¹⁴ Information for this map has been collected from several similar maps in books and the internet.



However, for the first time in the troubled history of Greek-Turkish relations a direct military link was established between Cyprus and the Aegean.⁴¹⁵ During the Imia crisis the Ankara government increased its forces in northern Cyprus, and in the worst Greek scenario a military confrontation in the Aegean was feared to cause a second invasion of Cyprus.⁴¹⁶ During the crisis of Imia/Kardak and in the months following it, both governments were busy creating legal arguments why each one considered the islets their own. Greece was quoting the Treaty of Lausanne, after WWI in 1923, which gives the legal status of most of the territories in the area to Greece. Turkey stressed that the Treaty mentions only islands and not islets. After the crisis, Turkey raised a dispute about other “grey zones”, meaning other islands and islets across the Aegean Sea, which had unclear possession.⁴¹⁷ The number and names of these islands and islets have varied but for example Kalolimnos, Pserimos, Agathonisi, Fournoi and Gavdos have been mentioned. These islands are mainly situated next to the Turkish border, but there is an interesting exception with Gavdos.⁴¹⁸

The following map shows the island of Gavdos, which is situated south of Crete. Again, the message of this Greek map is not only for Greeks but also for the English speaking international audience. It reveals the distance between

⁴¹⁵ Gerolymatos 2000, 56.

⁴¹⁶ Gerolymatos 2000, 56.

⁴¹⁷ Papahadjopoulos 1998, 38.

⁴¹⁸ Papahadjopoulos 1998, 39.

Turkey and Gavdos. There are several Greek islands between them. Therefore, the Greek message must be to show the audience how absurd the idea of connecting this island to Turkey would be in practice.



419

The issue of grey zones has added yet another source for occasional military irritation, in addition to the 10 mile (18.5 km) airspace and the FIR. According to some reports, the Turkish air force has adopted a policy of ignoring Greek claims to *all* air-space and territorial waters around such formations that it counts as grey zones. This has occasioned Greek accusations that Turkish fighter planes are violating not only the outer zones of maritime airspace, but even the airspace directly over Greek islands. This frontier dispute dilemma gives one more paradox to the question of violating airspace. In the following, the spokesman of Greek government, Evangelos Antonaros, stresses the Greek point of view on the issue in an interview, after a European Union summit in December, 2004.

The Greek government, state and political parties do not recognize 'grey zones', alternate government spokesman Evangelos Antonaros stressed on Wednesday, in response to questions regarding bilateral ties with Turkey. 'Greece's sovereign rights in the Aegean and anywhere else they exist are not subject to negotiations,' Antonaros said in response to questions claiming Turkish attempts to create a 'grey zones' issue in the Aegean.⁴²⁰

Antonaros is emphasizing that the government, the state and political parties are all standing behind the opinion that there are no grey zones on the Eastern border of Greece. Stressing the unified opinion that the spokesman offers on the behalf of all these groups is important because these organs of state do not agree about every theme, but rather quarrel constantly. Therefore, exhibition of

⁴¹⁹ Information for this map has been collected from several similar maps in books and the internet.

⁴²⁰ <http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=731&article=14534>, source: ANA, (20.1.2005).

a unified national front is an important sign for the audience that even a debate over the case is out of question. Written news by the Athens News Agency invariably places the term gray zone within quotation marks, which can be translated as *so-called* in this case. Therefore, the message can be simplified that Greece does not even recognize the existence of a dispute, which is totally a *so-called* problem created by the other country. Another way of impressing that the problem between the two countries is not real is to call it *attempts* and a *created issue*. Antonaros places the issue under the title of *Greece's sovereign rights*, which brings an aura of legal holiness to the debate. Sovereignty is used as a finalistic answer, no more excuses are needed, and the issue is not negotiable! Although sovereignty as a Burkean god-term has suffered during the last decades and its political strength is no longer what it used to be, especially during the nineteenth century, it still carries a fair amount of force, especially in connection of a conflict.

The following quotation offers a surprising solution for the disputed frontiers. Proposing that the area be given to the third party, Mazis states:

The NATO administration of the Aegean space in this case is the best geopolitical counterbalance and geostrategic countermeasure for the naval metropolitan powers. The "grey zones" in the Aegean Sea projected by Turkey and seemingly "tolerated" by Washington belong neither to Greece nor Turkey: most probably, they will belong to NATO. This point must be studied by Greek foreign policy makers, for it endangers the country's territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, the appropriate diplomatic manipulations of Athens may ensure NATO support for Greece, protecting the interests of the Western collective security systems in the SE Mediterranean.⁴²¹

Here, Ioannis Mazis⁴²² gives a hint of Greek frustration in the dilemma. There is an accusation towards NATO and the USA of *tolerating* Turkish demands. He proposes that grey zones could be given, as well, to NATO's control if *Washington* tolerates the situation - as if it was the lesser of two bad choices. In addition, he too stresses that the situation threatens Greece's sovereignty. The text includes a message for the Greeks, *Athens*, that suitable diplomacy would ensure NATO's *support* for Greek opinion. Greece as the misunderstood hero, whose sufferings are tolerated by others, needs to *manipulate* the bigger players so as to secure proper support for its own cause. The geopolitical myth of a country being surrounded by enemies and misunderstanding is written between the lines, although the idea of handing the disputed areas and their problems over to the third party is clearly sarcastic. *The country's territorial sovereignty* does not allow any dilution. Turkey has traditionally preferred to regard the whole set of disputes as a *political* issue, requiring political negotiation, while Greece has insisted on treating them as strictly *separate* and purely *legal* issues, requiring only the application of existing principles of international law. Turkish advances towards direct negotiation, with a view to establishing what it would regard as an equitable compromise, have been

⁴²¹ Μάζις, 2002, 428. Mazis 1997, 36-37.

⁴²² Professor Ioannis Mazis is specialized on the issues of geography/geopolitics. He has written several books about the geopolitics of Greece as well as Islam.

vehemently rejected by Greece. Greece refuses to accept any process that would put it under pressure to engage in give-and-take over what it perceives as inalienable and nonnegotiable sovereign rights.

If we think about the state of Greece, the territory of the country is seen threatened by Turkey every time the theme of the Aegean Sea, especially the islets, is discussed. The theme is intensely securitized, which means that it is elevated above normal political deliberation⁴²³. The issue is lifted to an emergency mode, out of the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere. Conversation is over before it has even started. This is the reason why Greece, consistently and steadfastly, refuses to *negotiate* with Turkey.

By 'securitising' the issue Greece refuses to accept that there is a Greek-Turkish dispute, with the exception of the seabed. Greece declares that there is not a real dispute but only Turkish claims over Greek sovereignty. Since negotiations mean compromise, Greek governments are not willing or able to negotiate because if they do, they are negotiating Greek sovereignty. Finally, it creates a lack of public debate. The perception of a threat from Turkey, the validity of the Greek position and the strategy to be followed are unquestionable. It is like questioning the integrity of the Greek State.⁴²⁴

'Negotiate' as a term is not an innocent one, because it connotes hierarchical assumptions of power. One side of the dispute is, at least, a little bit stronger and the other side has to accept negotiation. As Fierke notes, where negotiation is essentially an adversarial mode of communication constructed around a sharp 'we - they' relationship and in which each side tries to maximize its pre-given interests, dialogue is often a more suitable problem-solving approach of communication, in which all participants are understood to be equal partners, and in which interests are more likely to emerge in common during the process of communication.⁴²⁵ In the following the term dialogue is used instead of negotiation, but within certain, well defined limits.

We believe that the best way to settle differences is through dialogue. Yet it must be understood that a dialogue between Greece and Turkey, cannot, under any circumstances, compromise matters of territorial integrity and sovereignty. No country would negotiate on such matters, unless it was defeated in war. Further, any such dialogue must be based on existing international conventions and the rules of international law.⁴²⁶

In the preceding text, the condition for Greeks to be ready for dialogue, are well limited. First of all, no issues such as sovereignty or territorial integrity, which would demand compromises, could be on the table. The term negotiate is used only to clarify the previous message and it is linked with a situation of a threat of war, which as a situation is far beyond the equal face-to-face level of the term dialogue, if we follow Fierke's ideas. The second limitation for the dialogue conditions is at the end of the text. The possible dialogue between the two neighbours should be based on international conventions and laws. In the case

⁴²³ Buzan et.al. 1998, 28.

⁴²⁴ Kavakas 2001, 175 - 176.

⁴²⁵ Fierke 1999, 27.

⁴²⁶ Varvitsiotis 1997, 122-123.

of the Aegean Sea, there are no international laws that both countries have signed. Also Byron Theodoropoulos stresses the difference between the Aegean and all the other similar border disputes by saying that 'the Aegean dispute' is not a dispute of the common variety involving claims and counterclaims. 'In the case of the Aegean there is only one claimant party, namely Turkey. Greece claims nothing'.⁴²⁷

If we see that political security is about threats to the legitimacy or recognition either of political units or of the essential patterns (structures, processes, or institutions) among them, Turkish threat can be seen as a political one because of its influence on the external recognition of the state and its external legitimacy.⁴²⁸ A sovereign state and its borders should be recognized. From this point of view, even accepting the idea of a legitimate Greek-Turkish dispute would mean admitting that country's borders are not clear and, therefore, not recognized. That is the reason why Greek governments dismiss the issues as a political theme and public debate over them has not really existed. However, the old tradition might be changing. For example, Byron Theodoropoulos has already asked the Greek audience several tight questions so as to look ahead and learn lessons from the past:

I would for example ask my fellow Greeks: Does the Greek air defence really need an air-space of 10-nautical miles? What are the benefits Greece expects to derive from eventually extending her territorial waters to 12 nautical miles along the totality of her Aegean coastline? Does the Aegean continental shelf have any economic significance? Or is Greece only anxious to prevent the enclavement of her islands of the Eastern Aegean in a Turkish continental shelf in order to preclude further Turkish claims on the islands themselves?⁴²⁹

Theodoropoulos dares to make questions that change the whole theme. He actually proposes that some of these issues that Greece and Turkey have disputed for decades, would not actually make any difference. He points to such issues as territorial waters and national airspace. They are mainly popular foreign political poses, but not beneficial to Greek interests.

The Aegean disputes have long roots in the past. History and different events are used to explain the original moment or reason for it. Retired ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos, who has become a Greek expert of Greek-Turkish relations during last decades, has written extensively on Greek Foreign Policy, Greek-Turkish relations, and the Cyprus issue. For him the beginning of the Aegean dispute had only one reason, and the reason was Cyprus:

The effort to change the status quo in the Aegean started as a tactical decision by Turkey. It seems that when the Cyprus question arose in the early 1950s, Ankara considered it more expedient not only to localize the differences between Greece and Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus, but also to widen the area of confrontation to include the totality of Greek-Turkish relations, in the belief that exercising direct pressure on Greece would weaken Greece's position in the Cyprus problem.⁴³⁰

⁴²⁷ Theodoropoulos 1997, 123.

⁴²⁸ Buzan et.al.1998, 144.

⁴²⁹ Theodoropoulos 2003, 313.

⁴³⁰ Theodoropoulos 2003, 311-322.

The explanation, which presents Cyprus as the main reason for the Aegean disputes is interesting. All the present Aegean Sea conflicts between Greece and Turkey have surely arisen later than the *early 1950s*, and the issue of grey zones was raised as late as 1996 after the Imia/Kardak crisis. Hence, Cyprus, and pressure to weaken Greece's position in the Cyprus problem, can be used as the original reason for the first disputed issues of the Aegean Sea. However, the question of Cyprus has remained unresolved for decades and therefore it is difficult to believe that it was the reason for, e.g., complicated issue of airspace. However, Byron Theodoropoulos is not alone with the idea of Cyprus rooting all the disputes. Cyprus is the single most hurtful issue in Greek-Turkish relations. The same conclusion of the origins of the Aegean dispute can be found also in the following quotation by Constantine Stephanou, a professor at Panteion University:

Although both Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, they have different perceptions of their security interests. In Greece, there have been varied assessments of the security threats posed by Turkey. However, the general perception has been that since 1974 Turkey wanted to change the Aegean status quo in a manner, which would annex Greece's Eastern Aegean islands into a Turkish zone of functional responsibility (continental shelf, Flight Information Region, sea and rescue responsibilities, NATO command responsibilities etc.). These goals, coupled with Turkish demands for the demilitarization of the islands facing Turkey - which have been militarized after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus - were deemed by Greece as evidence of a policy aimed at undermining Greek sovereignty over the aforementioned islands.⁴³¹

The debate about *the Aegean status* as the one above, although from the Greek point of view the one who wants to change it is just Turkey, is an example of geopolitical representation. It is a classical debate of boundaries and their locations, and narratives regarding the past are remembered and re-remembered to justify the story as long as they fit to the plot. Although the Aegean Sea dispute is relatively peaceful and under control, compared to many boundary problems around the world, it is still creating tension in the region, and is far from over.

5.3 The Endless Question of Cyprus

*Cyprus is the only long-standing problem in Europe to remain unresolved. All over Europe dividing lines and walls have been swept aside and foreign troops withdrawn. But in Cyprus the division [...] continues.*⁴³²

Look at a map of Greece, and you will find Cyprus on it even though there is not always room to include the whole of Rhodes and Corfu. Although Cyprus is an independent state its importance to Greece is symbolised by this. The

⁴³¹ Stephanou 2004, 113 - 114.

⁴³² Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Antonis Samaras, in New York, September 27, 1991. The speech was held in 46th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

purpose of this section is to discuss the role that Cyprus plays in Greek security and the country's political debate.

Cyprus may be mentioned often in political science and public debates in Greece, but an explanation of its importance is rarely the main theme. It is referred to as though it was common knowledge, its inclusion requiring no justification. It seems to be accepted that Cyprus is important in itself. Depending on your point of view, it can be cited either as a cause or as a result. In the following quotation Cyprus, although another state, is considered crucial to Greece's national interests. The calculation is simple: when something happens in Cyprus, then Athens...

Greece's national interests extend beyond its borders to include the security of another state, namely Cyprus. As a result, when Cyprus is threatened by Turkish military action, decision makers in Athens must prepare to come to the island's defence by threatening retaliation against Turkey.⁴³³

Until 1960, Cyprus had long been administered by outsiders. Cyprus became a British crown colony in 1925 after being part of the Ottoman Empire since 1571. However, Cyprus had been under the British administration already since 1878, after the Congress of Berlin. During World War II, and again during the Suez Crisis in 1956, Cyprus served as an airbase and a refuelling station for Britain. It was in the 1950s, the great era of decolonization, when the Greek Cypriots decided the time had come to reach for self-determination. The struggle led to a form of controlled independence which gave the Turkish community in the island a right to share power with the Greeks while Turkey, Greece and Britain acted as guarantor powers. Cyprus became a republic in 1960 with Archbishop Makarios III as President and Dr. Fazil Kutchuk as Vice-President. Cyprus also became a member of the Commonwealth in 1961, while Britain retained sovereignty over two military bases.

Thereafter the power-sharing system broke down. There were clashes between the Greek and Turkish communities and in 1964 a UN peace-keeping force was sent to the island. Following a coup organized by the Greek junta in Athens in July 1974, the presidency of Archbishop Makarios was overthrown. He would later return to power. Turkey then invaded the island, seized some 40 percent of its territory and set up a Turkish Cypriot Administration which would lead to the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1983, recognized only by Turkey. Talks have been held on and off ever since to try to resolve the situation but so far without success.

⁴³³ Platias 2000, 74. Athanasios G. Platias is Associate Professor of International and Strategic Studies at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences in Athens.



Cyprus is one of the most critical problems faced in Greek-Turkish relations, and the two neighbours have come to the brink of war over this (or Aegean interests) on several occasions in the past four decades. During the 1990's there were a number of crises, including the declaration of the Joint defence doctrine between Greece and Cyprus, the October 1994 declaration of *casus belli* by Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller over the possible extension of Greek territorial waters and the Imia/Kardak dispute which brought the two countries close to the war. The issue of Joint defence doctrine between Greece and Cyprus culminated at the end of the year 1998⁴³⁴ to the S-300PMU-1 missile system. The missile system was bought from Russia and was supposed to be placed on Cyprus. However, Turkey strongly opposed the idea and finally the president of Cyprus announced that the missile system would be placed outside the country, possibly on the island of Crete of Greece. The crisis of Imia/Kardak islets between Greece and Turkey also had a connection with Cyprus, because simultaneously when the two neighbours were nearly at the

⁴³⁴ 29.12. 1998 After meeting with Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and other top Greek officials, and with the Cypriot National Council, Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides announces that the S-300PMU-1 missile system will not be deployed on Cyprus. Clerides says that after presenting the views of the Greek government on the issue to the Cypriot National Council, 'the positions of the parties were clear, as it was also clear that there was no unanimity. As a result of this, as President of the Cyprus Republic, being fully aware of the responsibilities I am shouldering and being fully conscious of the critical times our national issue is passing through, I reached the decision not to deploy the missiles in Cyprus and I agreed to negotiate with the Russian Government for their possible deployment in Crete.' Clerides acknowledges that Greece's support for deploying the missiles on Crete instead of on Cyprus weighed heavily in his decision, and he states that the 'only and exclusive guideline in taking this decision was the best interest of the Cypriot people and the broader interests of Hellenism.' Clerides also says that he stands by his 1997 decision to purchase the S-300PMU-1 missile system from Russia, and that in not deploying the system in Cyprus he is not 'giving in to pressure, threats and blackmail.' <http://cns.miis.edu/research/cyprus/chrlate.htm> (4.3.07)

brink of war further in the Aegean, the tension also rose in Cyprus causing Turkey to increase its forces in northern Cyprus.⁴³⁵ Cyprus has become part of the cosmological and mythical landscape of modern Greece. It is a battlefield where the enemy was faced. This myth gives meaning to the land because it makes the known world spatially ordered and understandable. At all times and in all human communities things that we do to establish order, to 'make cosmos out of chaos', to quote Mircea Eliade⁴³⁶, is encoded in symbolic form and acted out through ritual. The fundamental need is for coherence; identities create, express, but also necessitate coherence; even the elements of multiple identities have to be coherent. The survival of this coherence cannot be left to chance. Deep identity processes are made sacred in order to ensure that the basis of a community is secure.

One of the basic elements of this cosmos-making is to describe ourselves as being in the middle of a hostile world. When Greeks were asked in 2003 to name Greece's closest international allies, 43.9% answered 'no country' or 'do not know'.⁴³⁷ This suggests that Greeks see their country as a potential victim, surrounded by enemies. Some Greeks compare it to Israel, a country without friends in the centre of a violent region.⁴³⁸ To establish a sense of identity, we distinguish between *others* and *us*. Naming the *other* is like naming the place of chaos, and *we*, naturally, are dwelling in the orderly, known world. In a recent study of the Greek public's perceptions of the world outside the country's territorial borders it transpired that close to 90% of respondents referred to Turkey as the unique potential source of hostility. The United States got 34% and Albania 29% of the votes. On the other hand, the answer does not seem so dramatic when considered alongside the response to another question. When Greeks were asked to identify 'the country's three most important problems', foreign policy was mentioned by a mere 3.6% of respondents. However, 72% of respondents referred to 'unemployment' as the most important problem.

The following quotation is a typical example of the ongoing debate about Cyprus' strategic importance. In this case, it is claimed that Cyprus brings added value to Greece. If Cyprus was under the influence of Greece, Greece would become more important in the eyes of its EU and NATO partners.

Cyprus has a dual strategic importance for Greece. The island is situated near the politically important and sensitive region of the Middle East as well as close to the Suez Canal. This strategic importance of Cyprus implies that the country that exercises influence over the island possesses a significant geo-strategic value that

⁴³⁵ Gerolymatos 2000, 56.

⁴³⁶ Eliade, 1959, 22, 29-31.

⁴³⁷ 'The View from Greece: Perceptions of Turks and Greek-Turkish Rapprochement by the Turkish Mass Public'. The study was conducted by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy - ELIAMEP (Athens) 2003. The questionnaire was designed in co-operation with the Centre for European Studies at Bogazici University (Istanbul) and was aimed at achieving the greatest possible comparability between Greek and Turkish public opinion. The study is based on nation-wide samples of 2,000 people.

⁴³⁸ Let us not forget the close relations between Israel and the U.S.! The state of Israel is a good example of how a symbol can be interpreted differently depending on the storyteller who develops the plot to match his purpose.

would allow it to increase its prestige and bargaining power within the international community. In this context, Athens sees Greek influence over Cyprus as adding to Greece's geostrategic importance. This, in turn, is expected to make Greece even more important in the eyes of its EU and NATO partners, which consider Cyprus as being situated at a traditional cultural crossroads and therefore as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East.[...] But Cyprus has another strategic value for Greece. The island not only is situated close to the Turkish mainland, but also in Turkey's so-called 'soft belly'. This would create a significant degree of insecurity to Turkey especially if medium- and/or long-range weapons systems were to be installed on the island and a strong Greek navy was to be deployed in the area. This seems to provide Greece with a bargaining card in dealing with Turkey in the sense that Ankara may refrain from undertaking certain actions in the Aegean fearing Greek retaliation from its south. These point to the strategic interconnection existing between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus⁴³⁹.

Yiannis A. Stivachtis stresses, in this quotation, how the geo-strategic value of the island is value for Greece. The purpose seems to be to create insecurity for Turkey, and security for Greece. The text looks optimistically towards the future because all benefits would accrue to Greece if the plan, a strengthened influence on Cyprus, were to be realised. Cyprus itself has no role as an active participant. It is seen as an interesting and important place which can be useful for Greece. It is easy to understand that through political debate, we create areas and borders, but it also works vice versa - these areas also create new politics. The winner benefits because influence on the island would mean a threat to the other party and give it a more important position in the eyes of allies. In this way, Cyprus is treated as a place which has no power itself, and which can be spoken for. Cyprus is often mentioned as a little brother or a little cousin in the Greek media and in public debates. The attitude tends to be, therefore, hierarchical and patronising.

But this geo-strategic reasoning is just one dimension of the story. Another element in the debate concerns brotherhood and family, which are essential to the spirit of Hellenism. It is an arena where history, narrative and remembering, as well as common culture and myths, can be used as explanations. Narratives of a place are connected to history. History, which usually tells the winner's story, is selective. Although Greece no longer officially espouses the policy of Ένωσης (enosis) or union, it still considers Cyprus to be part of the Hellenic world. Greece is seen as the guardian of the interests of Hellenism in Cyprus too. Cyprus has never been part of modern Greece, but culturally and historically it has a Hellenic identity and similar roots. The past is used to explain the present. If there are glorious names or glorious events in history, we might add value to our current situation by mentioning them. The Greek Foreign Ministry writes:

The name of Cyprus has always been associated with Greek mythology [...] and history. The Greek Achaeans established themselves on Cyprus around 1400 B.C. The island was an integral part of the Homeric world and, indeed, the word 'Cyprus' was used by Homer himself. Ever since, Cyprus has gone through the same major historical phases as the rest of Greece, came under foreign conquerors [...]

⁴³⁹ Stivachtis 2002, 40. Yiannis A. Stivachtis is a professor of international relations at Schiller International University - The American College of Switzerland, and visiting professor at the International University, Vienna.

Throughout history, however, the island's character remained essentially Greek, since neither the disadvantage of its geographical position [...] nor the incessant raids and occupations, the introduction of foreign languages, religions and civilisations it underwent for centuries on end, were able to alter the religion, the culture, the language and the Greek consciousness of the great majority of its people.⁴⁴⁰

Critical geopolitics argues that places, spaces, borders, centres and peripheries are a result of political intention and debate.⁴⁴¹ This is one way of looking at Cyprus. Myths of *territory* are fairly common. These claim that there is a particular territory where a nation first discovered itself, assumed its perfect form or expressed its finest self. Often, this is a land where its purity is safeguarded and where its virtues are preserved before any contact with outsiders. Thus myths of territory can tie in with myths of a Golden Age, which is how the legendary Homeric world was used by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the preceding quotation. Byzantine traditions or the Orthodox heritage might also be mentioned for the same reason because they can also draw on myth and the symbolic meaning of territory. These myths are used to justify the current political boundaries of the state. One modern myth is that Greece is surrounded by enemies, or if some nation is not an enemy, then it at least belongs to the category of aliens. But there is one exception, namely Cyprus. By the Greeks it is seen as part of *us*. Cyprus⁴⁴², with its Greek 'cousins' or 'brothers' as they often called, is seen as the only member of the family who could help, or at least understand *our* feelings. And as said before, it is regarded as a little brother who can and should be guided and looked after. The Cypriots share the same language, although with their own dialect; the same orthodox religion and a similar cultural and historical background.

The family connotations are meaningful because the family, and looking after its welfare, is at the core of Greek thinking. Greeks consider Cypriots as members of a family. "Even if we have disagreements, they [Cypriots] belong to a family, and you know how we are with the family", is a view expressed about the connection between these two countries. This theme became obvious in several debates during my stay in Athens during 2003-2005. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots can feel frustrated with this family attitude and wish, for example, that there was no need to celebrate Greek national days, especially

⁴⁴⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, 1998:1. The Cyprus Issue. www.mfa.gr/foreign/cyprus visited 1.9.2005. Also in http://old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/cyprus/background.html visited 12.4.2007.

Also names and how their roots are explained are part of the politics. There are historians who maintain that the name of Cyprus comes from the Phoenician language. In Phoenician "kubru" means "coast". The reason why this name was used by the Phoenicians is that Cyprus is located on the "opposite coast" to Anatolia. Another explanation of the name says, however, that the name of Cyprus originated from "zabar". This is based on the sound, because this name is read as "Cypr" in the Akat language.

⁴⁴¹ Ó Tuathail, 1999, 108. Ahponen & Jukarainen 2000, 6.

⁴⁴² It is obvious that in this simplistic view, Cyprus is seen as a country full of cousins, Greeks, and all the questions of minorities and borders are not taken into account. The view is limited and this *Cyprus* exists only in the myths.

October 28, in Cyprus. A family like this is a non-standard example of an Andersonian imagined community, which usually is reserved for nation-states, but here the relationship between these two sovereign states seems to be especially close, at least in national imagination.

Another reason for the inclusion of Cyprus into nearly every speech about Greek foreign policy is a feeling of guilt. The memory of human beings is selective, and the most common version of the past, for example in Greek newspapers, which tell about daily news of Cyprus, reminds the audience that the roots of division of Cyprus are in the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish troops 1974. 'Ever since 1974, when the Turks grabbed the north of Cyprus...' ⁴⁴³ However there could be also other versions of the past or merely other moments from where to start the story of the past. There was, for example, the policy of *enosis*, which cherished the dream of uniting Cyprus with the mainland, as a direct continuation of the national ethno-territorial project of expansion began in the early nineteenth century. It is only in connection with the *enosis* policy that the Greeks realised that there was a sizable Turkish minority on Cyprus, which could not be dealt with by using nineteenth century ways. It was hard for Greeks to accept why a land inhabited for thousands of years by the Greeks and occupied by the Turks only four centuries ago, would not be allowed to join its brethren in a free Greece. The Greek military occasionally interfered in Cyprus' domestic and foreign policy, or at least had constant influence there. Finally, there was the Greek Colonels' coup against the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. As Dimitris Constans ⁴⁴⁴ writes:

The Greek coup d'état of April 21, 1967, was a major setback to the process of adjusting foreign policy to the rapidly changing regional environment. An abortive coup staged by the Greek dictatorship against the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in 1974 offered Turkey a much-sought-after pretext to invade the island and impose, by means of force, a 'solution' tailored to its needs. ⁴⁴⁵

Turkey is accused of just seeking an excuse to interfere. But there is another issue here too. Greece as such is not identified here with the Colonels and their policies. The argument establishes a distance, forms a boundary and creates a new other in the political debate. It was a different Greece, or more correctly, an illegal and illegitimate Greek leadership a long time ago that gave Turkey its opportunity. In Greek argumentation, after the establishment of democracy, the Junta is never part of *us*, but always *them*. Notwithstanding, the effect of this history has been to give Greece a bad conscience, a feeling of being partly to blame for the current situation. Thus they cannot just stop caring about the problems of their neighbouring country and let it go alone. That seems to be one reason why Cyprus is still also *our* problem, seen from the Greek side. Although this guilt is rarely visible in the written statements relating to

⁴⁴³ Mark Dragoumis, 30 April 2004, Athens News.

⁴⁴⁴ Dimitris Constans is a professor and Director of the Institute of International Relations, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, as well as the President of the Hellenic Society of International Law and International Relations.

⁴⁴⁵ Constans 1995, 73.

Greece's foreign policy, it frequently surfaces in conversations with ordinary Greeks. Remembering and re-examining the past has started at many levels in Greece. What is 'forgotten' may represent more threatening ideas lodged in popular 'memory' which have been carefully and consciously, not casually and unconsciously, omitted from the official narrative.

In its simplest form, a commemoration is a way of marking out space in the public sphere. It is a way of saying: 'Pay attention, this is a bit of our past that deserves our respect.' It demands respect because celebrations of this kind embody moral value, generally what those who organise the celebrations think desirable. But different communities may view a particular historical event from completely opposite viewpoints – one side's victory is the other side's defeat.⁴⁴⁶ It is interesting to realise how much the grand lines of the common history of Greece and Turkey differ, because each party sees a different past and present. A happy and positive historical incident on one side is presented as an unhappy and negative one on the other side. Victory, peace and the establishment of an empire for one; means loss of empire, invasion and slavery for the other; achieving national liberation for one is collapse of order and retreat for the other. There is no common historical narrative but two opposing ones, and these are handed down from generation to generation, used for interpreting contemporary political events from opposite standpoints, in a context where double standards are used for evaluating each other and third parties. As Hercules Millas stresses:

The Greeks are enthusiastic about the self-determination of the Kurds in Turkey, but not of the Turks in Cyprus, or elsewhere. The Turks do want Bosnia's integrity and the minority status for the Serbs there, but they do not like a similar practise in Cyprus; loss of property has a different meaning in Bosnia and in Cyprus. It is normal both for the Greeks and the Turks to send their armies to help compatriots in foreign countries (Izmir in 1919, Cyprus 1974), but at the same time such a practise is conceived as an invasion when roles are reserved (Cyprus 1974, Izmir 1919).

In Cyprus first some legal/political preconditions should be met before the dialogue. The same view is valid for the Greeks but with the converse reasoning.

In the Cyprus issue for example, "rights' and "claims' on the island can be defended referring to various basic "principles': 1) historic; 2) legal due to international law; 3) legal due to bilateral treaties; 4) principle of self-determination; 5) minority rights; 6) strategic sensitivities; 7) distance from "mother land'; 8) "lebensraum'; 9) self-defence; 10) being the winner of the war, etc. In a discussion of the Cyprus (or other) issue parties can choose any combination of the above "principles' and use them to their ends.⁴⁴⁷

The problem of Cyprus remains a central issue on the agenda of both countries. It is said that the division of Cyprus is the final obstacle separating the Greek and Turkish peoples that began with the creation of the Greek state out of the former Ottoman Empire. The process, begun early in the nineteenth century,

⁴⁴⁶ Schöpflin 2000, 74.

⁴⁴⁷ Millas 2002, 98-102. Millas himself has been living within these two stories. He was born in Turkey as a member of the Greek community of Istanbul. He was studying in Turkey and also served in the Turkish army. Currently he is living and teaching in Greece.

sought to consolidate into a Greater Greece the Hellenistic and Orthodox communities scattered throughout the Balkans, the Aegean, and Asia Minor.⁴⁴⁸

The reason why Cyprus is so important for Greece has its roots in the past. The story did not begin in the 1960s or 1970s, but centuries earlier. It depends on the storyteller as to which starting point he takes, and how the past is used to explain the present. The Greek story of Cyprus can either be a shared Hellenistic experience with brothers or it can be seen as part of a strategic plan which derives from an almost colonialist attitude to the island. It is also part of another debate between Greece and Turkey. The main themes can be divided, roughly, into two parts: psychological reasoning and strategic importance for Greece. Both of them are influenced by the fact that Cyprus lies at the core of Greek security considerations, and plays an essential role in the formulation and implementation of Greek political and military strategies. Psychological reasons include the sense of brotherhood and family (little cousins) as well as a feeling of guilt and responsibility for what happened in the past. The country's strategic importance to Greece is part of the geopolitical calculations that, more clearly than anything else, explain why Cyprus cannot be forgotten. The notion of Hellenism – in terms of both brotherhood and territory – can be used to strengthen the two arguments.

The debate has gone on for decades. Changes in Cyprus have usually exacerbated the poor relations between Greece and Turkey, and have highlighted the risks of provoking new confrontations. Cyprus was seen as a battlefield for these two countries. Just recently there have been new opportunities for fresh thinking. Attitudes have started to change. First of all, there have been more and more attempts to rewrite the past. And there has been a concrete new start with the European Union. Greece's European policy for Cyprus has been two-fold. On the one hand, Greece has attempted to hinder some aspects of EU – Turkish relations, and on the other, has promoted the accession of the republic of Cyprus to the Union. For Greece, the accession of Cyprus to the Union serves three different, although interrelated, purposes. Firstly, it provides a way to strengthen Greece's position in the Eastern Mediterranean; secondly, it serves as a means through which Greece can attempt to achieve a favourable solution to the ethnic Cyprus question; and, thirdly, it provides a political means to deter potential or actual Turkish threats vis-a-vis Greece as well as Cyprus.⁴⁴⁹ There was hope that Cyprus would be united before it joined the European Union. UN secretary general Kofi Annan's plan was created to solve the Cyprus problem. The purpose was to unify Cyprus as a loose federation of two constituent states, named United Republic of Cyprus. It had for example a clause to remove Turkish armed forces (approximately 30 000 soldiers) from the island. Greek Cypriots, despite considerable international pressure, were against the plan for reasons including the compensation bonds for homes lost in the 1974 invasion would have been exchangeable as currency, instead of a blank permission of 'returning to their

⁴⁴⁸ McDonald 2001, 117.

⁴⁴⁹ Stivachtis 2002, 53.

old homes'. The result of the referendum in the Greek Cypriot side in spring 2004 prevented the solving of the Cyprus question. The Greek-Cypriot rejection was clear (by 76 percent) of the Annan Plan in the April 24 referendum on the reunification of Cyprus. By contrast, the Turkish-Cypriots endorsed the plan by 65 percent. Great hopes placed on the Annan Plan also in Greece were not fulfilled:

From a geopolitical perspective, a united Cyprus as a member of the EU would not only be an asset to the union but would also substantially contribute to stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. The EU can play a substantive role not only in promoting such an outcome, but also in fostering better relations between Greece and Turkey and in bringing about positive developments in Turkey itself.⁴⁵⁰

The Cyprus problem is one of the Cold War legacies that has remained unresolved. It seems that in the present political debate in Greece, Cyprus is considered to be more of an EU problem with the hope that this may help to bring about a solution. The EU is seen as a guarantor of security not only in Cyprus, but also in Greece and Turkey. The Greeks are still talking about their little cousin or brother, but the present tone is a little bit different. It is time for the young brother to grow up and survive on his own and the European Union is seen as a safe playground in which he can develop. After all, Cyprus is a foreign country. This is the way it is increasingly depicted in Greek debates and media; in other words the historical programme of uniting all Hellenes within one state seems to be coming to an end, and simultaneously a rhetorical and mental boundary is being created between Greece and Cyprus. From the Greek point of view, in Cyprus there reside both *our* people (Greeks) and *their* people (Turks), but physically Cyprus is not *ours* (Greece's), nor *theirs* (Turkey's). In this way, Cyprus is being put at a greater mental distance. Simultaneously, in Cyprus both the Turkish and the Greek people, in ordinary conversations, emphasize that they are Cypriots, rather than Turks or Greeks. Boundary construction and deconstruction takes place on all sides of the conflict, but this naturally happens very slowly.

5.4 Naming Macedonia

On 8 September 1991, votes for independence won the referendum in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, after which it peacefully declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It became a parliamentary democracy, and dropped the element 'Socialist' from its name, becoming simply the Republic of Macedonia (Република Македонија). The new state is a small landlocked Balkan polity, populated by two million people, of whom over half are Macedonians, who speak a South Slavic language closely related to Bulgarian; one fourth Albanians, and the rest various other ethnicities, the biggest being Turks and Serbians. Reactions in Greece to the

⁴⁵⁰ Theophanous 2001, 295.

appearance of a new independent neighbour at the other side of the northern border were surprisingly strong, and not totally positive or welcoming:

It would not be an overstatement to say that Greece's foreign policy during the first half of the last decade [1990's] was dominated by a single issue: Macedonia.⁴⁵¹

During the main research period, 1981 – 2000, there were three main foreign policy topics that were of the utmost concern in Greece. The issues of Cyprus and the Aegean Sea dispute are both connected with the Eastern neighbour country Turkey. The third concern is known as the question of Macedonia. It is also thematically a story about borders and a threat to sovereignty, but in this case also the politics of naming and ancient history were on the public stage much more than in connection with the Aegean and Cyprus cases. Ancient gods and kings, past empires and apostles from the dawn of Christianity were invited to justify the Greek cause.

As a result of the collapse of former Yugoslavia, Greece became involved in a dispute over the official name of the newly independent northern neighbour. The battle over the name of Macedonia can be seen as Greece's participation in the nationalistic turbulences that shook the Balkans in 1990s. It should be noted, however, that Greece's reaction over the issue was partly a response to nationalistic manifestations in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia in 1989–1991, even prior to the independence of the state in September 1991. Nationalistic demonstrators there had carried slogans for the '*reunification of Macedonia*' or declaring, '*Solun⁴⁵² is ours*'.⁴⁵³ Greece was now confronted with the same kind of ethno-nationalistic political program that it itself had adopted at the establishment of the independent Greek state in 1832, namely unification of all ethnic members within one nation-state, including the Ratzelian geopolitical idea of territorial expansion to the farthest reaches of the land-based existence of the population, similar to which claims were added to all territories that at some point in history could be conceived as having been populated by the ethnic group. Another historical analogy was that if small Greece had been able to effectively participate in the dismantling of the great Ottoman empire, the ethnically divided poor Macedonia with its population of two million and without any allies might have, in purely theoretical terms, have militarily attempted to launch a war of conquest not only against Greece, which in terms of population is five times bigger than it, much richer, and a NATO and EU member, but also against Bulgaria and Albania. In practice this military scenario has not been an issue at all.⁴⁵⁴ The dispute concerns basically an amount of emotional nationalistic agitation by some elements in Macedonian domestic politics, part of which were written in the first constitution; the full symbolical use of the historical implications of the grand name Macedonia by the government of the new state; and Greek reactions to all that. The situation

⁴⁵¹ Michas 2002, 42.

⁴⁵² Thessalonica's name in Bulgarian and Macedonian languages.

⁴⁵³ Kofos 1999, 368.

⁴⁵⁴ Nikolaïdis 1997, 79.

became heavily securitized in Greek domestic politics and instead of being handled with cool and wizened 'European' detachment, rather it was the siren songs of emotional confrontation in the Balkans that were listened to, and Greek reactions were based on worst-case scenarios.

Greeks refused to officially recognize the new state with its name the Republic of Macedonia. They claimed that the appropriation of the name Macedonia by its neighbour represented stealing Greek history and culture and recognition would therefore constitute an acceptance of stealing Greek cultural heritage. Another worry focused on the territorial claim⁴⁵⁵ that Greece saw implied in using the name Macedonia, which is also the name of Greece's Northern Province next to the border.⁴⁵⁶ The idea of united Macedonia was not new, because reunification of all Macedonian territories of Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia was also Tito's dream in the 1940s. A separate Macedonian identity was greatly assisted by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia after 1946. Yugoslavia's Macedonia province became one of the six republics of Tito's state. Promoting the creation of a Macedonian national identity was seen as a counterweight to Serbian power within the Yugoslav Federation and it was also expected to undermine the Bulgarian influence on the population.⁴⁵⁷ The material dealing with aspects of the Macedonian issue is enormous, but the treatment is in this study limited to a few elements of visual and verbal rhetoric connected with questions of geography, names, or myths, which have not yet been systematically studied in literature, and which well suit the theoretical and methodological aims of this dissertation. This section focuses on the name of the state, and on symbols that have been created to make this new state stronger. The case is interesting from the Greek point of view because Greece clearly has become *the other* for this new state, just like Turkey has served in that function for Greece. The material analyzed in the following, both textual and visual, is mainly from the beginning of the 1990s, when the main battles of the rhetorical war over the Greek-Macedonian border was fought.

By the interim agreement, the country's temporary appellation has officially been the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) since 13 September 1995. Excepting Greece, the rest of the world has been calling the state just Macedonia in unofficial contexts, and has also normally accepted the official name the Republic of Macedonia, except in cases where Greece has been able to influence the situation, such as in official European Union or United Nations documents. The problem, or the Macedonian question as it is often called in Greece, also includes the three other elements: constitution, state symbols, and use of history. The Greek stand has been that other conditions 'could be discussed', but the name is 'not negotiable'.


As Yugoslav unity began to crumble in the 1980s, Macedonian nationalism acquired dynamics of its own and increasingly began to challenge Greek perceptions of Macedonian history and culture. Declaring its independence in

⁴⁵⁵ E.g. Couloumbis, Veremis & Dokos 1994, v.

⁴⁵⁶ Θεωδορόπουλος, Λαγάκος, Παπούλιας και Τζούνης 1995, 33 - 48.

⁴⁵⁷ Michas 2002, 42.

September 1991 with the name the Republic of Macedonia, the new state adopted a constitution in which there were references to the annexation of the Macedonian provinces of Greece and Bulgaria. It printed maps of Greater Macedonia and adopted the image shown in the following picture, of a harbour with a White Tower, which happens to be the symbol of the Greek Macedonian city of Thessalonica, on its commemorative currency.



458 A souvenir bank note

In the picture is a souvenir banknote issued in Skopje on 15 January 1992, not a real banknote, but notwithstanding this kind of image naturally raised anger in Greece. Territorial issues are emotional. The problem of the first Macedonian constitution was similar, as it included the following sentences; in Article 3, 'the only changes that can take place in the territory of Republic of Macedonia are changes of annexation of new territories,' and in Article 49, 'the republic takes care of the status and rights of the members of the Macedonian people of neighbour countries.'⁴⁵⁹ Due to of Greek pressure, both of these items were removed from the constitution in September 1995 thus settling that dispute. Thereafter it has basically been the name of Macedonia that has kept open the political dimension as a subject of potential conflict.

If we think about a name, it is the most important symbol of any identity. Naming a subject, in this case a state, is a constitutive political act, because it establishes the basic national symbol. Naming is the contingent act *par excellence* and as such it can be understood as a paradigm for politics, as Kari Palonen stresses.⁴⁶⁰ Every name, even a single word, is a code that once understood, unlocks a world of associations of events, people and their stories.⁴⁶¹ Both Greeks and Macedonians have in their conflict reverted to essentialistic rhetoric

458 The Citizens' Movement 1993, 5. <http://www.kinisipoliton.gr/idenglish.html>

459 See e.g. Kofos 1994..

460 Palonen 1993c, 103

461 Sheldrake 2001, 17.

and acted as if the name somehow could be justified with references to empirical objects. Archaeology as a science became heavily politicized in this confrontation. However, archaeological findings, insights and theories can provide only rhetorical raw material for arguments; they cannot solve anything as long as the political situation is open. In the case of the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia the fighting still goes on. The following quotation displays how Greece formulated its attack during the early stages of the rhetorical conflict. This is a passage from a letter sent by Papaconstantinou Michael, Minister of Foreign affairs of Greece, to the United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 25 January 1993:

The name of a state is a symbol. Thus, the fact that the authorities in Skopje have adopted the denomination 'Republic of Macedonia' for their state is of paramount significance. It is important to note that they have explicitly adopted the name of a wider geographical extending over four neighbouring countries, with only 38.5% to be found in the territory of FYROM. This fact by itself clearly undermines the sovereignty of neighbouring states to their respective Macedonian regions. To be precise, 51.5% of the Macedonian geographical region is in Greece, with a population of over 2.5 million people, while the remaining 10% in other neighbouring states. Moreover, the territory of FYROM, with an exception of a narrow strip in the south, had never been part of the historic Macedonia. Nevertheless, FYROM insist on monopolizing the Macedonian name in the denomination of the state, and thus pretends to be the sole title deed holder of a much wider geographical region. There is no doubt that the exclusive use of the Macedonia name in the republic's official denomination would be a stimulus for expansionist visions both over the land and the heritage of Macedonia through the centuries.⁴⁶²

Foreign policy decision-makers tend to use practical and pragmatic geopolitical reasoning, rather than any sophisticated theories developed by members of the academia, utilizing culturally accepted forms of knowledge to explain foreign political dramas and events. This reasoning is based on ordinary everyday discussion. It is taught at schools as part of the socialization of individuals into national identity and geo-historical consciousnesses.⁴⁶³ In the quotation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs uses simple statistical information of geographical extent while reasoning the question of the name. Numbers and statistical information are powerful rhetorical tools because the audience tends to believe that numbers are clean and simple facts. It is based on general respect for mathematics. Compared to words, numbers are not seen as emotionally loaded metaphors, which are used to influence opinions, but merely as pure information without any hidden means.

It is not possible to define convincingly the geographical area of Macedonia. Macedonia was not a specific area on the map in ancient or medieval times, or during the Ottoman era. Even the exact territory of the ancient Macedonian Kingdom is not known, and it changed over time. In history, Macedonia was a well known name standing for various loosely defined places in the south Balkans, from the Black Sea to the Adriatic and from

⁴⁶² Papaconstantinou Michael, Minister of Foreign affairs of Greece, sent this letter, Memorandum of Greece, to the U.N. Secretary-General 25.1.1993.

⁴⁶³ Ó Tuathail 1999, 113-114.

the Aegean Sea to the to the Balkan Mountains.⁴⁶⁴ Macedonia is thus a geographical area in which each interested Balkan nation, depending on the occasion, could convincingly claim an important 'grip of brethren.'⁴⁶⁵

However, nowadays there exist several maps that are used in arguments for the definition of Macedonia's location. These maps, as well as other pictures are used to visualise its historical existence. Geographic space can be rhetorically colonized and claims of possession presented by drawing it. A strong



message of preferred order is written on every map. To publish a map of a 'united Macedonia' is an intentional political deed. However, the message, which is sent with the map, is multidimensional and the one who sends it cannot be sure how the various audiences interpret it. As much as the rhetor's background influences the message, so too will the receiver's background influence how it is understood. For an audience with similar opinions as those of the rhetor, the map can be seen as simple information. This is the area that the debate is about. If the audience is certain chauvinistic elements in FYROM, the map can indicate that this is our rightful territory that legitimately should belong to us. Our brothers are still living everywhere in this area, but under the occupation of other states. The map may represent a form of expansionary policy and in this sense be oriented to the future. It may also remind the audience of the past, because during history glorious or otherwise remarkable events relevant to the polity under construction have taken place in areas the maps presents. Regarding the present, such a map easily is a tool for emotional politicking or politicization, as it can raise anger, because the geopolitical present does not correspond with the past, or with the depicted future.⁴⁶⁶

464 Gounaris 2002, 71.

465 Gounaris 2002, 71.

466 The Citizens' Movement 1993, 8.

On the contrary, if the audience is Greek, the message read from the map is completely different, and these expansionist Macedonian maps have been published in the Greek media. They are well known in Greece. The first reaction seems to be a sense of threat. In the map an outsider has grabbed a part of our country and violently drawn borders that leave most of Greece outside. The map presents an image that indicates that the borders of Greece indeed could be changed in a hostile way. The map visually destroys the nationalistically constructed vision of state and cultural history taught at schools, disturbs policies towards the future involving the total territory of the present state, and is of course eminently usable material for domestic politicking and for the politicization of Greek popular attitudes towards Macedonia. Reinhart Koselleck has commented on expectations in a way that is useful here. He says that at once person-specific and interpersonal, expectation takes place in the here and now; it is the future made present; it directs itself to the not-yet, to the non-experienced, to that which is to be revealed. Hope and fear, wishes and desires, cares and rational analysis and curiosity: all enter into expectation and constitute it.⁴⁶⁷ For this reason, the future is the most insecure temporal direction, easily activated for inflaming thinking and emotions in tense political situations.

Visualisations like this are an effective part of political discussion. The area is drawn so that the audience, to whom the debate is offered, can be eye-witnessing the story told. Although maps never tell the whole truth of a described area, it is by no means a drawback; their rhetorical power is derived exactly from this narrowing of perspective to a few elements, such as a state border drawn with a strong coloured line. The politicized area is made concretely visible on a map. Influencing the human sense of sight is efficient, because it is one of our principal senses, and we tend to believe, and be impressed by what we see with our own eyes. Actually, if the main Greek concern about the Macedonia question happens to be revisionist claims about the territory, the map makes their fears become concrete. It disturbs the established structure of reality and creates a sense of disorder. Kalypso Nikolaïdis takes another angle for the threat of FYROM. She argues that Greeks knew that the security threat from a weak fragmented neighbour in the beginning of its nation-building process was not going to be valid within the next twenty years. The bigger problem and the threat the new country presented was with its ethnic identity theme and symbolic politics in the region⁴⁶⁸. These were issues because the idea of Greece does not traditionally have space for ethnic minorities or minority issues. Macedonian identity and shared values, which might cross borders, might threaten the basic idea of a homogenous Greece.

Movement is another dimension that is questioned by the map. It actually presents two temporal realities. The audience can see that the present Greek, Bulgarian and Albanian borders are still visible, but they have been overdrawn

⁴⁶⁷ Koselleck, 1985, 272.

⁴⁶⁸ Nikolaïdis 1997, 79.

with the much stronger line of the borders of Greater Macedonia. Borders interfere with free movement. The first European maps tended to be descriptions and aids of movement. The first medieval maps included only the rectilinear marking out of the itineraries. Distances were calculated in hours or in days, meaning the time it would take to get to the next place. These old maps told a memorandum by prescribing actions and describing the road. We can read them like a history book.⁴⁶⁹ Just like the medieval maps, which helped people to move from one place to another by revealing a road, the present maps tell the same story with different elements. The border around a state assures the audience that it is possible for the insiders to move freely within the area, with easy usage of language and national currency, knowledge of customs, and protected by the power of the state. A violently drawn border is a visible marker of the possible fragility of unhampered movement. It closes some people in and some people out. As Michel de Certeau stresses about maps: 'The description oscillates between the terms of an alternative: either seeing (the knowledge of an order of places) or going (spatializing actions)'.⁴⁷⁰ Either/or, both aspects of the map can be understood as concrete threats for a Greek audience.

Interpretations and narratives of history are another integral part of the debate. In the fourth century B.C., Macedonia was raised to prominence under King Philip II and his son Alexander the Great, and the whole Greek territory became the springboard of Hellenic culture to the Near East. After being successively overrun by the empires of Rome, Byzantium, and medieval Bulgaria and Serbia; Macedonia passed to the Ottoman Empire where it remained for almost five centuries. Through these conquests, the area was turned into a melting pot of ethnic groups and religions. In the nineteenth century, during the Balkan uprising against the Ottoman rule, newly founded states in South-Eastern Europe divided the Macedonian lands among themselves. Greece based their claims of legal ownership of the land on the legacy of Alexander the Great's ancient Macedonian kingdom, whose heir modern Greece considered itself to be, while Bulgarians and Serbs based their historical rights on the existence of Bulgarian and Serbian medieval empires, which also had encompassed Macedonia.⁴⁷¹ In the following, the story of the Alexander the Great is used in ministerial rhetoric as a narrative that legitimates the assumption of moral and cultural superiority towards all competitors and rivals and requires them to recognise the unique moral worth of Greece.⁴⁷² It is interesting how certain parts of the story are stressed so as to point to what is an essential element of this story. The following quotation was written in 1984, several years before Yugoslavia was to collapse. It is an example of a worry that Greeks already felt towards the Socialistic Republic of Macedonia, Yugoslavia's sixth province, and its nationalistic policy created by Tito. During the 1980s, this discussion was limited to academic circles in Greece, but when the issue rose as

⁴⁶⁹ de Certeau 1988, 120.

⁴⁷⁰ de Certeau 1988, 119.

⁴⁷¹ Πρεβελάκης 1998, 235 - 236. Kofos 1990, 107 - 114.

⁴⁷² Schöpflin 2000, 94.

a serious national problem in 1991, these texts were used to justify the Greek cause.

Alexander the Great changed the course of human history, not by his conquests since his campaign lasted a mere 13 years, but by other actions. At the beginning himself, and afterwards his Macedonian successors, established the Greek tongue as the *lingua franca* (Koine) of the empire and spread the elements of Greek culture. In this cosmopolitan empire of Alexander the Great, all citizens irrespective of origin, tribe, language, nationality or religion strove to acquire the Greek language and learning and to assimilate the Hellenic spirit of education so as to be considered really civilized.⁴⁷³

For the Greeks the course of human history was changed because the Greek language was spread so widely that it became the *lingua franca* and all these people became 'really civilized'. These elements from history are worth remembering and they are the most precious lessons from this part of the past for the Greeks. The pride derived from this past is not hidden in the quotation. To understand space as a text is to conceive of the spatial order as something more than merely the physical manifestation, or product, of activities conducted in space. What is inscribed in the organization of space is not the actuality of past actions, but their meaning.⁴⁷⁴

The following text is ten years younger than the previous one. It is part of Greece's mission to explain to the rest of the world that their cause was justified. The foreign Minister of Greece Andonis Samaras also stresses the connection between Alexander the Great and present Greeks as the only right nation to inherit that part of history.

Skopje has absolutely no right, either historic or ethnic, to use the name Macedonia. No historical right because the Slavs, who make majority of the Republic's present population, first appeared in the history of the region in the sixth century A.D., that is some 1000 years after the period, when Alexander the Great established Macedonia as a significant part of the Greek world. And no ethnic right, because the present population of this republic is made up of Slavs, Albanians, Gypsies and other ethnic groups, all of them respected, of course, but none with any connection to Macedonians.⁴⁷⁵

Different layers of history, whether events in the area or people who have lived there are categorised. The 'correct' categorization is emphasized by saying that the other ethnic groups all are '*respected, of course*', it makes the reader wonder. The expression clearly has a double meaning. Our collective memory is easy to root metaphorically in a place. Memory embedded in a place involves more than anyone's personal story. Everyone who has ever lived there belongs to the common, or collective, memory and narratives. Everybody shapes the place but also faces the many layers of the story that already exist in the place.⁴⁷⁶ Such location-based narratives can be strong and have considerable effect on people.

⁴⁷³ Martis 1984, 16. Nicolaos K. Martis was born 1915. He studied law and was elected Member of Parliament seven times. He has served e.g. as a Minister of Industry and Minister of Northern Greece.

⁴⁷⁴ Moore 1986, 81.

⁴⁷⁵ Samaras 1993, 152.

⁴⁷⁶ Sheldrake 2001, 5.

If people are heavily bombarded with glorious historical arguments, they are not eager to 'compromise in shame'.⁴⁷⁷ Narratives of ancestors and places filled with memories are key elements of human solidarity. 'We bond together by sharing stories and we are trapped by the immediacy of the present'.⁴⁷⁸ These narratives of places are needed because they make sense of the otherwise unrelated events of life and help us to find a sense of dignity. If the narrative of glorious forefathers is accepted in people's minds, it becomes a duty for them. They, as well as their deeds, are compared with the ancestors, at least in their own minds.⁴⁷⁹ In this sense, the stubbornness of both sides in the Macedonian question is understandable.

Names and stories are more than descriptions: they also display ownership of places and present concrete claims about the genuine existence of a community with deep historical roots. The narrative structure of such communities enables people to shape the world that surrounds them, rather than be passively controlled by it.⁴⁸⁰ Consider another way of using ancient history in present Greek politics:

The fact that in the space of ancient Greece there were many city states made no difference. [...] They fought between them, but they regularly united against a common danger. Then, particular conceptions and political passions were put aside and a panhellenic conscience prevailed all over Greece. It is what characterizes today's Greeks as well, and constitute one of the most significant proofs of the continuation of the Greek people. The modern Greeks have the same virtues and vices as those of their ancestors. As far the particular names of the tribes, they are still in use today to denote the inhabitants of a specific geographical area of Greece.⁴⁸¹

The story of the habits of ancient Greeks was used as a mythical instrument of self-definition. If our ancestors were behaving in a certain way, so are we. The past is shown here as a mirror of present. It is important to see that those who accept the beliefs encoded in myth accept above all a particular world-view that it reflects as well as membership and the rules that go with the membership. Convincing the rest of the world that even history proves our righteousness is not necessarily an easy thing to do. Myth attributes special qualities to the group, extends its distinctiveness and creates boundaries. At the same time it gives meaning to the self-perception of the community.⁴⁸² The Macedonian question proved to be an instance where the Greek political system was able to achieve unity, just like in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus confrontations. A unique consensus emerged, linking the traditional bastions of Greek nationalism – such as the army, the Church, and the strongly anticommunist party of the right (which continued to hold KKE, Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας, Kommunistiko Komma Elladas, accused for its wartime and Civil War Macedonian policy), – with the adherents of the socialist and 'patriotic' PASOK and followers of the

⁴⁷⁷ Gounaris 2002, 64-65.

⁴⁷⁸ Sheldrake 2001, 19.

⁴⁷⁹ Gounaris 2002, 64.

⁴⁸⁰ de Certeau 1988, 122-130.

⁴⁸¹ Martis 1984, 47.

⁴⁸² Schöpflin 2000, 83

leftist party Synaspismos.⁴⁸³ All these groups united in front of the Macedonian question in the beginning of 1990s. There were many Greeks who claimed that only the Greek part was justifiably called Macedonia. *‘Η Μακεδονία είναι ελληνική’* (Macedonia is Greek), ran the famous slogan in the huge rallies in 1992 against the recognition of the FYROM as the ‘Republic of Macedonia’.⁴⁸⁴ These rallies brought one million people to the streets of Thessalonica in February 1992.⁴⁸⁵ It was difficult for Greeks to understand that the outside world was not as ready as the Greeks to link the stories of the ancient Macedonian kingdom and its Greekness to contemporary Greece and its problems with its small neighbour.

The Greek point of view was very inflexible during the first years of the 1990s. Greece refused to recognize either the Macedonian nation or Macedonia as a state because everything denoted by the name Macedonia – the history, the territory, and the people – was regarded as an exclusively Greek possession. In the following, president Constantinos Stephanopoulos explains and justifies the present with the past:

The insistence of FYROM upon calling itself ‘Republic of Macedonia’ is unacceptable to both the government and the people of Greece. This is so because it falsifies Greek history by implicitly denying the Greek character of ancient Macedonia and of the Macedonians who have always formed an integral part of the Greek nation, long before the time of King Philip and Alexander the Great. Furthermore, it allows the nationalist Slav elements of FYROM to further their expansionist aims at the expense of Greece, as will be easily and immediately understood by anyone with knowledge of the history of the region from the beginning of the twentieth century up to the present day.⁴⁸⁶

The quotation was published in 1997 and it does not sound any more flexible as the ones in the beginning of 1990s. The president speaks on behalf of the government and the people. Therefore the message is signed by all Greece. History, people and territory are all included in his speech and the denial is strict: the name cannot be accepted because it might influence expansion at the expense of Greek borders. Those who disagree with the president, the government and the people of Greece are said to be ignorant of history. However, although this was practically the sole Greek opinion in public during the 1990s, criticism and deeper analysis has started to appear during this decade. For example, journalist Takis Michas explains the situation in the following way:

This refusal was based on the fundamental template that defines the nationalistic ideology of the modern Greece, namely the postulate of an unbroken historical continuity between ancient and modern Greece. This belief [...] combined with the belief that the ancient Macedonians were Greeks to produce the view that only Greeks could identify themselves as Macedonians.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸³ Kofos 1999, 365 – 366.

⁴⁸⁴ Gounaris 2002, 71-72.

⁴⁸⁵ Kofos 1999, 366.

⁴⁸⁶ Stephanopoulos 1997, 5.

⁴⁸⁷ Michas 2002, 43-44.

The political construct of the unbroken historical continuity between ancient Greece and modern Greece harkens back to the period in the beginning of the nineteenth century and its civilizational geopolitics⁴⁸⁸ in Europe. As we already have seen, the intellectual elite of the time explained Europe's greatness and unique superiority compared to other continents with its noble past, meaning the ancient Greek and Roman roots, and this perspective were adopted by the new Greek state. It was convenient for Europe that also the new modern Greek state accepted ancient Greece as its past. Hellenic roots were taken as an element of educational curriculum; Greek language became an important factor, and also the Orthodox Church, which had cherished Greekness in the Ottoman Empire, was revered for its role during the Ottoman period and thus made to accept the new national identity.⁴⁸⁹

The beginning of the twentieth century was already part of a period known as naturalized geopolitics.⁴⁹⁰ The state was seen as an organic entity and had, hence, expandable boundaries. The natural character of states was based on a scientific attempt to understand the behaviour of states, which was inspired by the new understanding of biological processes of the period. From the Greek point of view it was in a sense natural to place the state's borders in their natural and right places. The southern part of Macedonia with its Greek population and heavy history was brought home. The nationalist narratives which were created during the beginning of the new state, to justify its' existence, had defined Macedonia to be Greek. The testimonies that Macedonia must be Greek start with no less than the ancient Gods. The mythology of Greece is based on the Gods of Mount Olympus. The problem is that the territory of the Republic of Macedonia also includes Mount Olympus. If the Gods, beginning from Zeus, lived on the other side of the border, does it mean the Greeks were worshipping foreign Gods?

The role of Macedonia in Greek civilization starts in mythology. The abode of twelve gods was located on Olympus, and on the second in importance mountain of Macedonia, the Pieria, King Pieros introduced the worship of the Muses and gave them the names of his daughters. According to mythology, the Muses left Pieria as birds and established themselves on Mount Helicon. That is why they were renamed Heliconians from Pierians. The conviction of the ancient Macedonians and of the other Greeks that the domicile of the twelve gods was the Macedonian Mount Olympus, and that the nine Muses who were the daughters of King Pieros lived also in the Macedonian Mount Pieria, constitutes a proof that the first Greek tribes lived in Macedonia. There they worshipped their gods and from there they moved towards the south in search of vital space. Therefore Macedonia must have formed a most important part of Greece. Otherwise it would seem inconceivable that the Greeks believed their gods inhabited a non-Greek land.⁴⁹¹

This mythology of ancient Gods is an essential part of Greece's cultural heritage. The stories of Gods are closely related to a cosmological myth, which is a way to give meaning to space and which explains and makes the known

⁴⁸⁸ Agnew 1998, 87.

⁴⁸⁹ Koliopoulos & Veremis 1988, 141 - 151.

⁴⁹⁰ Agnew 1998, 93.

⁴⁹¹ Martis 1984, 20.

world spatially ordered and understandable. The basic idea is telling how the cosmos was created out of chaos. Chaos was in the beginning empty, indefinite space, but creation of the world meant establishing spatial categories. In this way myths and narratives give order to the known world. Cosmological myth guides us to understand the socio-spatial meaning of space, which is divided to sacred and the profane, the centre and the periphery, and also to upper (heaven), middle (sacred place) and lower region (hell).⁴⁹² Interpreted with these concepts, in the quotation the location of heaven is placed on Mount Olympus, the sacred place is Greece, because that is where worshipping and narrativizing takes place, and the lower region is where non-Greek elements hold sway. The last question is made just to show how ridiculous the structure of the world would be in any other order. This is an expansionist territorial claim from the Greek side.

Centrally, myth is about existence, about the order of the cosmos or perceptions. It is not about historically validated truths (in so far as these exist at all), about the ways in which communities regard certain propositions as normal and natural and others as perverse and alien. Myth creates an intellectual and cognitive monopoly in that it seeks to establish the sole way of making the world and defining the world-views. For a community to exist as a community, this monopoly is vital and the individual members of that community must broadly accept the myth. Myth is not identical with falsehood or deception. Members of a community may be aware that the myth they accept is not strictly accurate, or it is accurate but not in terms of history. It is the content of the myth that is important, not its accuracy as a historical account.⁴⁹³

After the name, one of the strongest symbols of the state is the flag. The new Macedonian parliament passed a resolution in August 1992, which the government endorsed, as the flag of the republic. The authorities in Skopje affixed on their new flag the emblem of the ancient Macedonian dynasty, found in a tomb supposed to be that of King Philip II: a 16 point golden sun. The emblem was found earlier in the royal tombs in Vergina's archaeological sites, in Greece, dating back to the fourth century BC. It came to be known as the Vergina Star or the Vergina Sun. The use of it as a symbol of the new state was among the most crucial problems that Greece faced in the beginning of 1990's.

⁴⁹² Eliade 1959, 22, 29-31.

⁴⁹³ Schöpflin 2000, 83 and Eliade 1954.



Vergina flag⁴⁹⁴

Throughout 1993 many European states recognised the new state under the name the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Greece's battle over the non-inclusion of the term Macedonia in the process of recognition seemed lost.⁴⁹⁵ A spontaneous popular boycott of products originating from countries whose foreign policy was judged unfriendly to Greek position described the Greek frustration about the situation. However, after April 29, 1993 when the US had recognized FYROM⁴⁹⁶, the Greek government decided to shut down Greece's northern border by imposing a unilateral trade embargo on the basis of national security. The action was justified using the Macedonian name, the flag and constitution that implied territorial claims on Greece's northern province of Macedonia. The embargo damaged Greece's international image because it was seen as breaking EU rules by violating the Treaty of Rome, which prohibit a member state from unilaterally closing the EU's external borders. Nevertheless, the European Court of Justice stated later that the safeguard clause in treaty allows the action in case of serious tension including a threat of war.⁴⁹⁷

Everything that symbolises the enemy – flags, maps, and anniversaries – serves in reinforcing the national myth and excluding alternative rationalities, like financial calculations. This has extensive implications for political actions and behaviour. It suggests that states, when faced with something that seems to be a territorial claim, even when it is not argued in territorial terms, will easily interpret and reinterpret it that way, with the result that political negotiations easily become impossible. The major reordering of state frontiers in Europe in history is associated with major political and military upheavals. These re-orderings of frontiers on the other hand, create new myths and

⁴⁹⁴ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Macedonia_1991-95.svg

⁴⁹⁵ Papahajopoulos 1998, 15-16.

⁴⁹⁶ In the beginning of November 2004, the United States officially recognised the 'Republic of Macedonia'.

⁴⁹⁷ Papahajopoulos 1998, 16.

provide narrative space and motives to use the old myths in a new way. Here is a Greek comment on the situation from the year 1993:

On the issue of territorial claims, the old ghosts of the 1940s have re-emerged. The leading political party of the republic, VMRO, conducted its election campaign of the slogans for the 'unification' of all Macedonian regions, i.e. the annexation of Greek, Bulgarian and Albanian territory.[...] In the course of 1992, numerous calendars, maps, tourist mementos, car stickers and other paraphernalia have appeared everywhere in the republic and foreign countries where emigrants from Skopje live.⁴⁹⁸

The situation lasted for about a year. Finally, in 1995 the Vergina Sun was removed from the flag and Greece agreed to lift the embargo, while the so-called Intermediate Agreement with FYROM was signed.⁴⁹⁹ The symbol of the new flag is still a sun but this modern design has only eight rays. The official translations describe the symbol as stylized eight-ray sun, which spreads over the length of the flag.



The Present Flag⁵⁰⁰

The questions of narratives that seem to belong to certain places reveal the political nature of a place, because the way place is constructed means that it is occupied by some people's stories, but not by those of others. Macedonian stories may be the same in the both sides of the border, and the audiences are reminded of similar ancient myths, but still there is contest: Who belongs to the story? For instance, who belongs to the story of Alexander the Great? Central places and central events belong to socially strong groups and express power, and peripheries remain for weaker groups in society.⁵⁰¹ In the case of

⁴⁹⁸ The Citizen's Movement 1993, 6-7.

⁴⁹⁹ Nikolaïdis 1997, 85.

⁵⁰⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Macedonia.svg

⁵⁰¹ Sheldrake 2001, 21.

Macedonia, which has several borders,⁵⁰² the reminder of contesting narratives is interesting. Macedonia is a shared space and a shared identity, which has never been, from the Greek point of view, historically, a specific national entity.⁵⁰³ But I am convinced that if you ask about the national entity of Macedonia in the streets of Skopje, it does exist. The stories of Macedonian identity and historical narratives have been in use since 1940. Therefore it is a typical geopolitical example of an area which is constructed and debated and, in this way, becomes real.

Just like the Balkan area in a large sense, Macedonia is a border region between Muslims and Christians, Turks and Serbs, Slavic speakers and Greek speakers; historically a border of empires and nation-states, the Entente and the Central Powers, communism and Western democracies, modernity and tradition, stability and instability.⁵⁰⁴ It can be said that narratives of different historical legacies of South-Eastern Europe still influence the relations of states, or at least that these narratives are activated in different political debates for plenty of purposes. The peculiar time of institutional and political collapses after the Cold War created special space for remembering a multitude of different kinds of pasts. In a sense, the Cold War had frozen history.⁵⁰⁵ The global bipolar confrontation had forced two different grand narratives on the two blocks, with corresponding historical explanations of how the various participating nations had arrived from antiquity to the point where they were at present. Nationalistic ideas had been buried or at least weakened since World War II in both blocks, because economic, political and military integration was such an overriding necessity for both. Suddenly from the late 1980s onwards the opportunity for remembering the past in new and different ways, and this phenomenon was more marked in the former Eastern block, because there the collapse of the old grand narrative was nearly total.

Greek hopes of an honourable solution to the question of Macedonia turned pessimistic during the 1990s. Already at the end of the decade the events in the beginning of 1990s were reinterpreted as mainly harmful for Greece. The massive domestic political campaigning, which then strongly influenced the way the issue had been dealt with in foreign policy, was seen as a colossal mistake:

Greece failed to persuade its allies and international opinion about the correctness of its position on the "Macedonian" question. Athens was unable to explain that more than history and historical heritage were at stake, and that its main concern was, in long-term, the possible re-emergence of revisionist claims, as indicated by FYROM's name, flag and certain provisions of its constitution. Domestic political consideration prevented the acceptance by Greek political leaders of a compromise solution.⁵⁰⁶

And:

⁵⁰² Gounaris 2002, 87

⁵⁰³ Nikolaïdis 1997, 79.

⁵⁰⁴ Gounaris 2002, 87.

⁵⁰⁵ Τζιανιρόης 2003, 15.

⁵⁰⁶ Dokos 1999, 250 - 251.

It has become fairly clear by now that Greece committed a colossal political mistake in putting so much emphasis on the denomination of the newly founded state of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) after the break-up of the federal state of Yugoslavia in 1991.⁵⁰⁷

Large segments of populations in foreign countries never heard about the dispute at all, and if they heard, they did not care. According to the principle of sovereignty, citizens of an independent state can call their state whatever they please. Those who became more deeply acquainted with the issue easily noticed that the territory had been called Macedonia already for a couple of generations, while it was part of Yugoslavia, and thus the name could be considered legitimate and the issue settled. Only in very official and diplomatic circumstances was the appellation FYROM used, but as time went by, the name the Republic of Macedonia became increasingly used also in academic debates and the media, practically everywhere except in Greece. Although Greece decided to establish diplomatic relations with Macedonia, the question of the name has not been settled thus far. Every now and then the problem is reactivated in Greek or Macedonian publicity and the debate awakes again. For example, in spring 2005 there was a debate between Athens and Skopje about a Macedonian map shown in some internet sites. The map pointed out that part of the area of Macedonia was still under the occupation of Greece. It is impossible to control all material that is published privately in the internet, but in this case the diplomatic problem was that a link to these private pages was presented in the Macedonian government official website. The Foreign Ministry of FYROM removed the link from its website in June 2005.

Following strong objection from Athens yesterday, the Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) removed a link on one its websites which took users to a map of the country showing sections of the country alleged to be under Greek occupation [...].⁵⁰⁸

The map in the internet showed Macedonian territories extending to the Aegean and all the texts and names of places were written in their Slavic form. All places were displayed with their Slavic names no matter in which part of Macedonia they existed, whether in the present republic, or in the hypothetical Greater Macedonia. Thessalonica of course was turned to Solun. However, these names were all written with the Latin alphabet and not with Cyrillic as normal with Macedonian; therefore it can be assumed that the audience was supposed to be Western foreigners. Even though the link was removed from the government pages, it was still possible long afterwards to find the map with a normal search engine. However, the text stopped mentioning occupation, presenting just statistical facts: The Republic of Macedonia covers about 25,713 sq km and slightly more than half of the region lies in northern Greece, 34,411 sq km. A small portion of the region belongs to Bulgaria, 6,798 sq km & 802 sq km belongs to Albania.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁷ Ioakimidis 1999, 173. See also e.g. Veremis 1995, 93.

⁵⁰⁸ Kathimerini. 30.6.2005

⁵⁰⁹ <http://www.makedonija.cjb.net/> (2.3.07)



Karta Makedonija⁵¹⁰

Another example of the continuation of the Macedonian issue on the Greek side is when in December 2006 Foreign minister Dora Bakoyannis accused the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) of trying to *distort history*, following reports that the tiny country's main airport would be renamed after the ancient Greek warrior-king. Bakoyannis said that the reported decision of FYROM government to rename Skopje's Petrovec airport 'Alexander the Great Airport' could damage FYROM's bid to join the European Union and NATO. For Greece the question of Macedonia has a bitter taste, and at least for the time being the small northern neighbour seems to present a perennial point of conflict similar with Turkey in the case of the Aegean and Cyprus. Military tension, however, is much smaller.

⁵¹⁰ <http://www.makedonija.cjb.net/> (2.3.07)

6 GEOPOLITICAL LOCATIONS OF MODERN GREECE

The purpose of the study was to analyse Greek foreign political narratives in order to see how the present Greeks are placing themselves while using historically strongly imbued conceptions of national identity. After analysing different foreign policy issues, it is obvious that there is no simple answer to this. The debate over the theme whether Greece belongs to Europe, or not, is very interesting because it is repeated during the whole research period. Belonging to the West and Europe is justified with various reasons. Events of history as well as economical or military links are all used in these narratives. The first impression is the conclusion usually made by Greek academics and politicians who have been considering the issue: Greece definitely belongs to Europe. Let us believe, for a moment, what the experts say. The message essentially is that for Greek foreign policy being part of Europe is important, and being part of the European Union is important as well. The latter makes the previous concrete, in the economic, political and to a lesser extent military sense.

Notwithstanding, because the issue reoccurs time after time it makes one wonder whether these rhetors are not sure that the audience already knows and remembers the fact. Just because Greek academics and politicians need to reassure their audience, in Greece and abroad, of the place of Greece, they reveal that the issue is not settled yet. It is a sensitive theme, and it bothers them. There is a constant need to keep on explaining where Greece is. I claim that the reason is the existence of the general East-West border, which makes Greece a borderland. The sense of living next to the border, which separates entities that categorically differ so much, is very strong in Greece. Repeated stories, plots and commonplaces explain people's everlasting need to tell and hear the same story again and again. For example, variations of the narrative of being the last gatekeeper of the West seem to be popular. It brings added value to the place and its people, and it is a valuable duty that should be recognised and praised by those who remain protected by the existence and actions of Greece.

The greatest recent change in the geopolitical place of Greece was the end of the Cold War. The old order had created certain rules and the new situation with its open possibilities caused many fears. In the period after the Cold War at first the Greek sense of insecurity increased in respect to Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. The insecurity was caused especially by events that occurred in the neighborhood of Greece. The collapse of the Soviet Union happened, after all, quite far away, but the break-up of Yugoslavia brought the changes concretely to the other side of the Greek northern border. It was problematic also because Greece saw the situation in a different way compared to other members of the EU. It was feared that nationalistic movements in Balkans could spread to Greece. The question of naming Macedonia was partly a result of the collapse of the old system, although the issue had roots already in Tito's Yugoslavia and the arguments of both sides had been heard several times before, but on the Greek side mainly in academic publications. However, it became a massive public and nationalistic phenomenon after 1991, when the new state was born on the ruins of the socialistic republic. Actually it is the only "new" Greek foreign policy issue that has remained unresolved. The other serious ones are the question of Cyprus, which nowadays seems to be more or less transferred to the EU sphere to be solved there, and the Aegean dispute with Turkey.

Just like every country and nation, the Greeks are continuously explaining and defining where is Greece. Sometimes the question is answered by explaining who we are and who the others are. The Hellenic past is seen strongly as an explanation for the present borders, for example. On the other side of the border lies the East and the Balkans, as specific categories in themselves. Greece wants to be placed on the better side of that border. The perspective here emanates clearly from the West, and Greek discussants simply wish to place themselves in the West. Greece forms the southern end of the Balkan Peninsula. The Balkans have been categorised in the geopolitical discourse with several negative connotations and the wars after the break-up of Yugoslavia strengthened its unofficial otherness to the West. Greece's position in the Balkans has varied because while being there it simultaneously has belonged to the West. Foreign commentators have sometimes claimed that Greece displays typical Balkan behaviour. The Greek answer both in domestic and foreign policy has been to highlight Greece's position as a unique Balkan expert and a role model. Greece is said to be now a European state in the Balkans, which can also help and advise others. During the last years of the 1990s, together with the discussion of the possible integration of Balkan countries into the EU, the name of the Balkans was placed under a process of rhetorical redefinition. It was argued as an integral part of Europe, or that it should at least be re-Europeanized after the years under Communism. During the same years, the Europeanization of Greece was also on the agenda in contexts implying a Balkan image for Greece. Filling an old name with new positive connotations is a typical phenomenon in geopolitical debates. If I simplify here, at the end of this discursive process, if it continues on these lines, Greece lies in the Balkans as part of the *European* Balkans. The imagery is

definitely positive, and hopefully points to the possibility of solving Greek foreign political problems in the northern direction with the help of the European Union.

On the other side of the Greek Eastern border lies the East, which normally means Turkey. Turkey strongly dominates the Greek idea of the East. Turkey, and before that the Ottoman Empire, has been the traditional enemy of Greece for several hundreds of years, especially in nationalistic Greek history writing. During the past decades the symbol of the difficulties in Greek-Turkish relations has been the frozen stalemate over the border issues. The official Greek view is that Greece has no border disputes. Yet, as Turkey defines the situation in a geometrically opposite way in terms of several different border disputes with Greece, it naturally causes in practice a geopolitical dispute about the delineation of the eastern border of Greece. So far the situation has remained unresolved. At the end of the 1990s Greece changed its official policy and started to support its neighbour's attempt to become also a member of the European Union. The support is not necessary widely understood among ordinary Greeks, but official policy now defines the EU membership of Turkey as a benefit for Greece. Even the candidacy is believed to stabilise and improve the situation in Turkey. Another hope is connected with Greece's foreign policy issues with Turkey. The debate over the Eastern Aegean border would become part of the European Union's problems and the pressure to solve the Cyprus question would also be included in the EU's issues. The European Union thus increasingly appears as a cure-all medicine for Greek foreign political problems.

However, the possible membership of Turkey in the EU would certainly cause changes in the present Greek geopolitical narrative. The eastern border has been made so strong in the Greek foreign policy debate that the whole narrative should be changed if Turkey was part of the EU. A new foreign evil usable as the ultimate other would perhaps be needed in some situations. Simultaneously the borderland rhetoric, which now is used to make the place of Greece unique, valuable and important, would be in jeopardy, or at least some of its strongest elements would become questionable. Turkish membership would change the location of Greece towards the geographic centre of the EU. On the other hand, members of the EU also have disagreements, and the new situation certainly would not diminish intra-EU disagreements. We can speculate that if Turkey moved definitely to the West, and the process included a drastic reorganization of the national constitutive myths in both countries, the Greek sense of being exactly on the East-West border certainly would diminish, but at the same time, in an intra-EU setting, the east as a dimension might be strengthened. Anyway the border itself would not cease to exist, because it is multidimensional, part of a historically constructed perceived reality that includes wider geopolitical and geocultural aspects, but the geopolitical narratives would have to be reconstructed.

The modern Greek state seems to have been 'rescued' to the West three times during its history. First it was rescued from the Ottoman East to form the physical geopolitical location for the civilizational roots of the noble world-conquering Europe. The first half of the nineteenth century was a time of

civilizational geopolitics in Europe. European greatness was narrated into the form of a heritage, constructed upon the civilizational and imperial achievements of the past, especially those of Greece and Rome. Greek antiquity was narrated as the place where Europe was born in an autogenetic way. Therefore, the new Greek state was helped by the great powers, backed by European public opinion, to become an independent state, but simultaneously Greece was forced to adopt the pagan antiquity as its own historical point of identification. I do not say that the independence of Greece would not have happened anyway, sooner or later, without European support, because national independence was a common political ideology in the area at that time, but in that case the whole story would probably have been quite different, and the antiquity might not be emphasized so much in present Greek foreign political narratives. It is interesting to speculate whether the modern Greek state would have been different if it had adopted, for instance, the Byzantine Empire as its historical model. Had there been a debate about the name of Macedonia? Or where would have the 'natural' borders of the state been? Anyway, it can be said that the ancient Hellas as the original history of the modern Greek state in its specific autogenetic form is, at least partly, imported history.

The second rescue operation was with the Truman doctrine in 1947. In that case, there was a fear that Greece would become a member of the Eastern block and adopt a socialist political system. The bloody civil war was fought mainly between communist and anti-communist forces. The communists received strong support over the northern border from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania. Without the support from the United States, the Iron Curtain could have been far to the West from Greece. The Cold War placed Greece closely within Western geopolitical interests. The West as a concept - and a commonplace - started to denote the United States and its close allies after World War II. All leading European states were in ruins and the United States was the only strong and powerful state in the world and, therefore, capable of creating universal ideals for all. Greece, together with Turkey - this linkage itself being a clear sign that the geopolitical framework had changed drastically - was supported so as to keep them both in the Western sphere. It is said that Truman justified his worry about losing Greece by pointing to a map to explain Greece's geopolitical importance. A communist Greece would threaten the security of Dardanelles and Turkey and disorder could spread also to the entire Middle East. Therefore Truman was underlining Greece's geopolitical importance in the area, on the border of Turkey and further Middle East. Truman placed Greece on the border, but simultaneously also made it a gatekeeper, or a border guard, rather than a neutralized buffer zone. At the same time he also tied the destinies of Greece and Turkey together, which has caused echoes till the present. Seen from the distance of the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the two neighbours might seem to fit together with perfect geopolitical logic for the protection of the rest of the West from communism. Both of them were pawns in the great worldwide game. Seen from the local situation, the alliance of the neighbours seemed a rusty affair from the beginning, but at least their role in superpower calculations forced them

together, and possibly dampened their chances of belligerence towards each other. Compared to the previous rescue operation, this one did not lean on the narrated historical and cultural values of the area, except derivatively as part of the American construction of its policy towards Europe with the help of the commonplace West. Military and political calculations nevertheless seem to have been the overriding considerations, as the lumping together of Greece and Turkey clearly implies. Greece had become a strategic partner of the West.

The third crucial moment of the West to rescue Greece was the membership in the European Community in 1981. After the military junta had collapsed in Greece there was a strong antipathy against NATO and the US among the Greeks. Greece had withdrawn from NATO's military wing as a result of NATO's incapability or unwillingness to prevent Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Also the US support given to the junta raised opposition against the superpower and kept it alive long afterwards. It was assumed by the government that membership in the European Community would stabilize the Greek political situation, provide Greece with an opportunity for rapid economic and social development; and enhance Greece's security.

A little over 30 years had given time to Western European states to recover from the previous war. The Cold War had become the basic normative fact of interstate relations, but the United States and the Soviet Union were not the only strong actors in the world. In the domestic and international political situation of Greece in the latter half of the 1970s, the European Community was seen as an alternative to the United States - although not in the sense of a replacement. The situation can perhaps be described as a reorganization of the content of the concept of the West from the Greek point of view; the share of the United States was lowered, and the amount of Western Europe was increased. Even though the EC was not a military union, the Greek leadership could still assume improved security within the Community. Solving immediate Greek economic problems and launching a program of economic development would stabilize the country. European political pressure would keep the soldiers out of politics. Because the Cold War as such had in a sense become irrelevant from the Greek point of view, the main military threat being a fellow NATO member, Greece did not need a protector with superpower capabilities. The European Community was not a military organization, but it contained relatively strong military powers, including Britain that still had a military base in Cyprus, quite capable of matching Turkey's military force. It was not thinkable that these members of the Community would simply lay back and watch if Greece, as a fellow Community member, was attacked by Turkey. Therefore, compared with the time of the proclamation of the Truman doctrine in 1947, the West clearly had become divided in two separate and partly independent halves. Greece still wanted to belong to the West, but this time the closer West was more attractive.

If we look at the reasons for Greece to join to the European Community from the point of view of the fears and ghosts that were haunting the state leadership, the results of the membership seem quite good from the present point of view. Economic and social development started with the support of the EC; Greece did not fall under military dictatorship anymore; and the

emotionally exuberant Greek version of democracy is a stable political system. Greece has learned to use its membership to support its foreign policy. It can well be said that the country was once again successfully 'rescued' to the West.

However, we could also interpret the situation so that all these rescue operations actually highlight the fact that Greece's real location is on the border. The border has been occasionally moving during the past two centuries with global and regional geopolitical changes, and Greece has simply been maintained at the Western side of the line. It is as if the border of East and West was sometimes so thin that Greece could easily fall to the other side in the geopolitical turbulences of the world. Greeks are borderlanders in an area where the East and the West overlap. The discussions for example whether Greece is Europeanized enough are part of a very typical borderland debate. Probably people in Luxemburg do not wonder whether their behaviour is European or Balkan/Eastern behaviour, but in Finland quite similar analyses could be written.

Among the texts of academics and politicians related to these issues, there seems to be a common understanding that belonging to the West is on the whole a desirable and positive thing. The West means several things in these texts. It is alternately and at the same time Europe, Western Europe, the European Union, WEU, NATO, USA, and Christianity. The Greek Church contains a specific Eastern dimension, but also the Church, if needed, stresses that Greece is Europe, especially if the *other* comes from East. The traditional other of Greece has been Turkey, but another, a bit more controversial enemy is in the opposite direction. The West, despite the fact that it is the place where most Greeks want to belong, is also one of the others. It is not only the Church as an organization, which cherishes the Eastern idealism of original Greekness; the view is spreading further also in the Greek society. The fact was clearly recognized during the 1990s in connection with national debates triggered by Samuel Huntington's civilizational geopolitics. The European Union as a 'Christian team' is constantly analysed in Greek discussions, because Greece with its Eastern Christianity does not always fit with the Protestant/Catholic Union. It seems to be difficult to be steadfastly Western when simultaneously being situated geographically, culturally and historically so much in the East.

Although there still have been several problems with the European Union and Greece has kept on repeating the question of Cyprus and its problems with Turkey, and later with Macedonia, the change has been clear. To, once again, quote professor Coulombis, "from being part of the problem, Greece became part of the solution'. The new role as a peacemaker both in the case of the new Balkan states and with the possible EU membership of Turkey is obviously much easier for other EU member countries. But it must be added that Greece has definitely not lost its own identity within the European Union. A new layer of Western imagery has been added to the image of Greekness, but no actual melting of the Greek identity has taken place.

The analysis of Greek geopolitical narratives does not support the theoretical globalization debate about vanishing borders. On the contrary, the Greek geopolitical debate about borders and sovereign territory is an attempt to

maintain them. The borders may be higher or lower, thicker or thinner, in the sense of not being insurmountable obstacles to economic and political exchanges, but they nevertheless are drawn strong and clear. Another theoretical debate about globalisation as a threat to national identities seems also to be an overstatement, at least in the case of Greece, but probably also more generally. National identity is kept alive, old myths are repeatedly employed, and heroes' deeds are kept alive, one of the implications being that the present Greeks should achieve the same.

Another dimension in these narratives and hero-stories is that Greece as an actor is never in a supporting role but always the one in the leading or guiding role. This role can be understood as a metaphor of the geopolitical centre-periphery debate, in which everybody wants to be in a centre. Although Greece is placed in EU maps in the south-eastern corner, Greece as seen from the inside of the country is not really situated in that far-away corner. The centring process can be seen for example in the discourse of the country's unique role in the Balkans and its capability and willingness to be a model for other Balkan countries in their processes to 'become' European ones. To turn ourselves to a centre by drawing the attention of others to us in a favourable light is a sure way to make us more important. Although the leaders of small states will not normally get their messages through in the international media as easily as the leaders of greater powers, their messages are loud enough in their home countries, and can be found when analysing foreign policy texts and narratives. This creates a proud foreign political tradition that occasionally forces also bigger players to recognize Greece as the centre of its own area. Particularities change; how the place of the country is defined, how the identity is defined, who are the enemies and in which ways they are dangerous, are stories altered with the passage of time. The following formulation perhaps summarizes the central tenets of present Greek discussion: *Greece is located at the crossroads of three continents Europe, Asia, and Africa. It is an integral part of the Balkans, where it is the only country that is a member of the WEU, NATO, the European Union, and so forth.* If Greece may be situated in the periphery of the EU, the foreign policy debates widen the perspective so that its geopolitical place becomes satisfactory and even pleasing for the Greeks.

YHTEENVETO

Tämä tutkimus 'On the Border of East and West. Greek Geopolitical Narratives' käsittelee kreikkalaisen ulkopoliitiikan muutosta vuosina 1981 - 2000. Tavoitteenani on selvittää kuinka kreikkalaiset hahmottavat oman maansa sijainnin geopoliittisella kartalla idän ja lännen rajalla ja kuinka tuo mielikuva muuttuu tutkimusajan kuluessa. Työssäni rakennan myös geopoliittista teoriaa paikasta ja tilasta Euroopan unionin kaakkoiskulmalla, Kreikan ja Turkin rajalla. Jäsenyys Euroopan unionissa (Kreikka hyväksyttiin unionin, tuolloin vielä EEC, 10. jäseneksi 1981) on ollut perifeerisissä rajamaissa hyvin merkityksellinen identiteetin samoin kuin geopoliittisen määrittelyn muokkaaja. Kuuluuhan rajamaa silloin *virallisesti* länteen, joskin rajanveto idän ja lännen välillä jatkuu kreikkalaisessa ulkopoliittisessä keskustelussa. Tutkimusaineistoni koostuu kreikkalaisista ulkopoliittisista teksteistä ja akateemisista kommentaareista ajanjakson aikana. Maan poliittisen johdon puheet ovat osa tutkimustani, mutta painotus on kuitenkin selkeästi Kreikan ulkopoliitiikkaan keskittyvissä akateemisissa kirjoituksissa.

Luen Kreikan ulkopoliitiikan lähihistoriaa geopoliittisesta näkökulmasta. Vaikka kriittinen geopolitiikka, joka tieteen haarana on keskittynyt muun muassa karttojen ja ulkopoliittisten tekstien kätkemien merkitysten purkamiseen sopiikin työhöni, esimerkiksi Simon Dalbyn ja Gearoid O'Tuathailin tapaan, yllättävästi myös klassisen geopolitiikan avulla voidaan Kreikan ulkopoliittista retoriikkaa hyvin tulkita. Vihollis- ja uhkakuvat piirtyvät selkeästi, ja rajalinjoilla on keskeinen sija Kreikan ulkopoliitiikassa. Uskon tämän painotuksen johtuvan nimenomaan Kreikan sijainnista *rajalla*. Geopolitiikan klassikoista esimerkiksi Friedrich Ratzelin, Karl Haushoferin ja Halford Mackinderin mustavalkoisempi maailmanjako tuntuu olevan usein lähempänä kreikkalaista ulkopoliittista keskustelua kuin suvaitsevaisempi nykypainotus. Oman huomionsa työssäni saavat myös narratiivit, joilla Kreikan kuulumista tietylle alueelle tai tiettyyn asemaan selitetään, oikeutetaan tai perustellaan. Ei ole mitenkään poikkeuksellista, että esikuviksi arjen ulkopoliitiikkaan haetaan Olympoksen jumalia tai nationalistisia uhkakuvia selvennetään Odyссеuksen seikkailujen avulla. George Schöpflingin sekä Claude Levi-Straussin teoriat myyteistä ja narratiiveista tukevat käsitystäni myyttisen historian valikoivasta käytöstä nykyajan tilanteiden tulkinnassa.

Jaan analyysini vuosilta 1981 - 2000 kolmeen ajanjaksoon. Ensimmäistä kautta vuodesta 1981 vuoteen 1985 värittää periaatteellinen vastustus kaikkia EU:n yhteisiä päätöksiä kohtaan. Näinä vuosina Kreikan hallitusta johti PASOK (Pan-helleeninen sosialistipuolue), joka oli noussut valtaan lupauksellaan vetää maa pois sekä unionista että Natosta. Toiseen jaksoon vuodesta 1986 vuoteen 1996 sisältyy useita ulkopoliittisia murroksia kuten Neuvostoliiton sekä Jugoslavian valtioiden romahtamiset. Kreikka kääntyi vähitellen myötämieliseksi EU:ta kohtaan, koska esimerkiksi maan saama taloudellinen hyöty jäsenyydestä oli merkittävää ja maan geopoliittisen statuksen koettiin parantu-

neen. Kolmas ajanjakso vuodesta 1996 eteenpäin sisältää Kyproksen EU-jäsenyyden valmistelun, jota Kreikka tuki voimakkaasti. Lisäksi Kreikan suhtautuminen Turkkiä kohtaan lieveni ja maa alkoi tukea naapurin jäsenyyspyrkimyksiä Euroopan unioniin. Tiukan vastustamisen kääntymistä myötämieliseksi selitetään esimerkiksi ajatuksella saattaa ongelmallinen rajanaapuri Kreikan naapurista koko EU:n yhteiseksi ongelmaksi. Mahdollinen Turkin jäsenyys unionissa muuttaisikin mielenkiintoisesti aiemmin niin tiukkaa rajanvetoa ja kahtiajakoa Kreikan itärajalla.

Kreikan sijainti idän ja lännen rajalla sekä yhdellä lukuisista Euroopan ja Aasian rajoista tulee siis jatkuvasti näkyviin nykypäivän kreikkalaisessa ulkopoliitikassa. Kreikan itäraja on myös Euroopan unionin itäraja ja sikäli olennaisimpia tekijöitä geopoliittisen sijainnin määrittelyssä. Rajan kautta määritellään myös maan strateginen merkittävyys, jolloin Kreikka korostaa merkitystään Euroopan portinvartijana. Toisaalta maan itäinen konnotaatio syntyy Kreikan vaikutusvaltaisen kirkon ja sen historian kautta. Idän kirkko on historiassa ollut läntisen eli katolisen kirkon vastapoolina. Keskiajalta moderniin aikaan saakka uhka on tullut myös lännestä. Ortodoksinen yhteys onkin sitonut maata itäiseen ja slaavilaiseen suuntaan, samoin kuin ottomaanien kautta islamilaiseen maailmaan. Ottomaanien alaisuudessa ortodoksisella kirkolla oli erityisasema kreikkalaisuuden säilyttäjänä. Kirkon lisäksi myös itäisen Välimeren kulttuuriperintö sitoo maata itään ja Välimeren eteläpuolisiin maihin. Kreikan nationalistiset, antiamerikkalaiset ja antieurooppalaiset pyrkimykset tukevat maan suuntautumista itään erityisesti uskonnon, bysanttilaisen perinnön ja balkanilaisuuden kautta. Siinä mielessä maa on poikkeus protestanttisten ja katolisten EU-jäsenmaiden keskuudessa.

Kreikan kansallisten etujen nostaminen etusijalle yhteisessä päätöksenteossa eristi maan oppositioon EU:ssa tutkimusajanjakson alkuvuosina, mikä on toisaalta hyvin ristiriitaista Kreikan unionin jäsenyydeltä odotettujen hyötyjen vuoksi. Yhtenä päätavoitteena kun oli nimenomaan Kreikan turvallisuuden parantaminen EU:n avulla. Kreikka on usein nähty hankalana jäsenmaana varsinkin suhteessa EU:n ulkopoliitikkaan. Maa on vaatinut erityiskohtelua ja vetäytynyt yhteisistä päätöslauselmista näin vesittäen yhteisiä suunnitelmia. Tämä selittyy osittain muista jäsenmaista eroavalla ideologisella painolastilla, joka Kreikalla oli mukanaan jäseneksi liittyessään. Kreikan imago EU:ssa onkin pitkälti olla yhtenä *eteläisistä* ja *pienistä* jäsenmaista. Kreikkalaisen identiteetin on sanottu heilahtelevan balkanilaisen ja eurooppalaisen identiteetin välillä. Kysymys balkanilaisesta valtiosta Euroopassa tai eurooppalaisesta valtiosta Balkanilla on tuttu myös kreikkalaisissa itsearviointeissa.

Toisaalta Kreikassa on myös vahva sotilasdiktatuurin jälkeinen antiautoritääriäinen mieliala ja Eurooppa-myönteinen suuntaus, joka liittyy Kreikan Euroopan unioniin. Länsipainotus muistuttaa myös Kreikasta demokratian alkukotina luoden näin yhden historiallisen selityksen Kreikan kuulumisesta länteen. Sekä itään että länteen suhtaudutaan yhtäläillä huolestuneen epäluuloisesti. Itäistä uhkaa edustaa pitkäaikainen vihollinen Turkki ja länsi taas edustaa epäluotettavia ja vieraita arvoja perinteiselle kreikkalaisuudelle. Tämä

kahtiajakoisuus aiheuttaa pitkälti Kreikan ristiriitaisen käyttäytymisen EU:n yhteisissä päätöksentekotilanteissa, mistä maa on saanut kärsiä myös itse.

Tutkimusajanjaksooni liittyy useita merkittäviä muutoksia kreikkalaisessa politiikassa. Tänä aikana maassa vakautettiin demokraattisia instituutioita sotilasjuntan (1967 - 1974) jäljiltä ja samalla armeijan rooli pieneni niin ulko- kuin sisäpoliittisissa päätöksenteoissa. Kreikasta tuli nopean neuvottelukierroksen jälkeen EU:n jäsen ja myöhemmin yhteisen rahaliiton EMU:n jäsen. Geopoliittisesti katsoen läntistä rajaa madallettiin ja yhteyksiä vahvistettiin, kun vastaavasti itäraja merkitsi jatkuvaa kontrastia ja ongelmia rajanaapuri Turkin kanssa. Maat ajautuivat muun muassa sodan partaalle 1996 Aigeian meren epäselvien rajalinjojen äärellä. Toinen maiden välejä hiertävä ikuisuusongelma on jaetun Kyproksen kysymys.

1990-luvulla sosialistisen järjestelmän romahduksen jälkimyllerrykset entisessä Itä-Euroopassa hipoivat Kreikan rajoja. Balkanin niemimaalla käydyt sodat ja nationalistiset kuohunnat herättivät levottomuutta Kreikassa, mutta maa onnistui pitämään olonsa vakaina huolimatta esimerkiksi näihin päiviin jatkuneesta ristiriidasta pohjoisen rajanaapurin Makedonian kanssa. Kreikka ei ole edelleenkään hyväksynyt Makedonia -nimeä, koska katsoo nimivalinnan sisältävän laajentumispyrkimyksiä oman samannimisen maakuntansa alueille, samoin kuin myös Bulgarian puolella olevan historiallisen Makedonian alueille. Kansanliikkeeksi 1990-luvun alussa kasvanut vastustus asettui kuitenkin vuosien myötä ja esimerkiksi ulkomaankauppaa käydään maiden välillä nyt runsaasti. Entisen Jugoslavian hajotessa Kreikka profiloitui ainoaksi Serbiaa tukevaksi EU-maaksi. Tilanne kuvastaa hyvin kreikkalaisten vahvaa uskoa oikeuteen omaan ulkopolitiikkaan huolimatta EU:n yhteisistä linjauksista.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Research Material

- Antonaros, Evangelos (2004)
<http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=731&article=14534>, source: ANA, visited 20.1.2005.
- Botsiu, Konstantina (2002) 'Introduction' in *Greece in the European Union: The New Role and the New Agenda*, Athens: Ministry of Press and Mass Media, 17-36.
- Çarkoğlu, Ali & Kirişçi, Kemal (2004) 'The View from Turkey: Perceptions of Greeks and Greek-Turkish Rapprochement by the Turkish Public', Special Issue on Greek-Turkish Relations, *Turkish Studies*, Frank Cass, vol. 5, No. 1, pp.117-154, Spring 2004.
- Çarkoğlu, Ali and Barry Rubin (2005) *Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Détente*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Chircop, Aldo (2000) 'Maritime Boundary - Making in the Mediterranean: A Necessary Premise for Regional Marine Co-operation?' in Aldo Chircop, André Gerolymatos and John.O.Iatrides (eds.) *The Aegean Sea After the Cold War. Security and Law of the Sea Issues*, International Political Economy Series, Hampshire and London: MacMillan, 103-117.
- Clogg, Richard (1993) 'Introduction: The PASOK Phenomenon, in Richard Clogg (ed) *Greece 1981-89, the Populist Decade*, London: St Martin's Press, viii-xiii.
- Constans Dimitris (1995) 'Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy: Domestic and External Parameters' in Dimitri Constans & Theofanis G. Stavrou (eds) *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century*, Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 71-98.
- Coufoudakis, Van (1988) 'The Essential Link - Greece in NATO' in Theodore Couloumbis & Thanos Veremis (eds) *Yearbook 1988*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Defence Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 19 - 25.
- Couloumbis, Theodore (1992) 'The European Challenge in the Balkans' in Theodore A. Couloumbis & Thanos M. Veremis (eds) *The SouthEastern European Yearbook 1991*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 75-88.
- Couloumbis Theodore A. (1993) 'PASOK's Foreign Policies, 1981-89: Continuity or Change?' in Richard Glogg (ed.) *Greece, 1981-89: The Populist Decade*. London: St. Martin's Press,113-130.
- Couloumbis, Theodore & Yannas, Prodromos (1993) 'Greek Security in a Post-Cold War Setting' in Theodore A. Couloumbis & Thanos M. Veremis (eds) *The SouthEast European Yearbook 1992*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 51-58.
- Couloumbis Theodore, Veremis, Thanos M. and Dokos, Thanos (1994) 'Preface' in Theodoros A. Couloumbis, Thanos Veremis and Thanos Dokos. *The*

- SouthEast European Yearbook 1993*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), v-vi.
- Couloumbis, Theodore A. (1999a) 'Greece in a Post-Cold War Environment' in Theodoros A. Couloumbis, Thanos Veremis and Dimitrios C. Triantaphyllou, *The Southest European Yearbook 1998 – 99*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 247 – 260.
- Couloumbis, Theodore A. (1999b) 'Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy Since 1974' in Van Coufoudakis, Harry P. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds) *Greece and The New Balkans, Challenges and Opportunities*, New York: Pella, 407-422.
- Couloumbis, Theodore A (2003) 'Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities' in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds) *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, London and New York: Frank Cass and Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 31-41.
- Diamandouros, Nikiforos, P. (1993) 'Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91: An Interpretation' in Richard Clogg (ed) *Greece 1981-89, the Populist Decade*, 1-25.
- Diamandouros Nikiforos (2001) 'Greek Identity in the Context of Globalisation' in Tsoukalis Loukas (ed.) *Globalisation & Regionalism, A Double Challenge for Greece* Athens: ELIAMEP.
- Dokos, Thanos P. (1999) 'Greek Defence Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era' in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades & André Gerolymatos *Greece and The New Balkans, Challenges and Opportunities*, New York: PELLA, 239-264.
- Dokos, Thanos P. (2003) 'Greece in Changing Strategic Setting' in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis & Fotini Bellou (eds.) *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, London and New York: Hellenic Foundation for European and Defence Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and Frank Cass, 42 – 68
- Dollis Demetri (2004) 'Greeks abroad' in Anthony J. Bacaloumis (ed.) *About Greece*. Athens: Ministry of Press and Mass Media, 155-159.
- Featherstone, Kevin (1994) 'Political parties' in Panos Kazakos and P.C. Ioakimidis (eds) *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated* London: Pinter Publishers, 154-165.
- Featherstone, K. and Kazamias, G. (2001) 'Introduction: Southern Europe and the Process of "Europeanisation"', in K., Featherstone and G., Kazamias (eds) *Europeanisation and the Southern Periphery*, London: Frank Cass, 1-22.
- Fokas, Efterpe (2000) 'Greek Orthodoxy and European Identity' in Achilleas Mitsos & Elias Mossialos (eds) *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 275-300.
- Fokas, Efterpe Spiro (2004) *The Role of Religion in National-EU Relations: The Case of Greece and Turkey*, London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, doctoral dissertation.
- Gerolymatos, André (2000) 'The Military Balance of Power Between Greece and Turkey: Tactical and Strategic Objectives', in Aldo Chircop, André Gerolymatos and John O. Iatrides (eds) *The Aegean Sea After the Cold War. Security and Law of the Sea Issues*, International Political Economy Series, London: MacMillan Press, 47-60.

- Gounaris, Basil C. (2002) 'Macedonian Questions', *SouthEastern European and Black Sea Studies*, 2: 3, 63 – 94.
- Green, Sarah F. (2005) *Notes from the Balkans. Locating Marginality and Ambiguity on the Greek-Albanian Border*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Herzfeld, Michael (1987) *Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huliaras, Asteris and Tsardanidis Charalambos (2006) '(Mis)understanding the Balkans: Greek Geopolitical Codes of the Post-communist Era', *Geopolitics*, 11:3, 465-483.
- Huntington, P. Samuel (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remarking of World Order*, Berkshire: Simon & Schuster.
- Ιωακειμίδης, Π. (1992) 'Προϋποθέσεις για την αποτελεσματική συμμετοχή της Ελλάδας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα στη δεκαετία του 1990', σε Γιάννης Βαληνάκης (επ) *Επετηρίδα Αμυντικής Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής 92, Η Ελλάδα και ο Κόσμος 1990-91*, Αθήνα Ελληνικό Ίδρυμα Αμυντικής και Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής (ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ), 117-125.
- Ioakimidis, Panagiotis C. (1992) 'Greece, the EC and the Eastern European Countries: An Overview', in Theodore A. Couloumbis & Thanos M. Veremis (eds) *The SouthEast European Yearbook 1991*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 179-187.
- Ioakimidis P. (1993) 'Greece in the EEC: Policies, experiences and prospects', in Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomakakis (eds) *Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order*, New York: Pella, 122-137.
- Ioakimidis, P.C. (1994a) 'The EC and the Greek political system: an overview', in Panos Kazakos and P.C. Ioakimidis (eds) *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*. London: Pinter, 139-153.
- Ioakimidis, P. C. (1994b) *Greece in the European Union, Problems and Prospects*. Reading: University of Reading, Discussion Papers in European and International Social Science, No: 52.
- Ioakimidis, P.C. (1995) 'The Case of Greece in the European Union', in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Thanos Veremis & Thanos Dokos (eds) *The SouthEast European Yearbook 1995*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 105-134.
- Ιωακειμίδης, Π.Κ. (1995) *Ευρωπαϊκή πολιτική ένωση. Θεωρία – διαπραγμάτευση θεσμοί και πολιτικές. Η συνθήκη του Maastricht και η Ελλάδα. β' έκδοση. Θεμέλιο, Βιβλιοθήκη Ευρωπαϊκών Θεμάτων*
- Ιωακειμίδης, Παναγιώτης Κ. (publishing date unknown) *Το Μέλλον της Ευρώπης, Η Προοπτική της Ευρωπαϊκής Ομοσπονδίας και η Ελλάδα*, Αθήνα: Ι. Σιδερής
- Ιστορία Γ' Δημοτικού (2005) Στα πολύ παλιά χρόνια, Έκδοση ΙΘ' 2005. Αθήνα: Οργανισμός Εκδόσεως Διδακτικών Βιβλίων.
- Karakasidou, Anastasia (1997) *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia*, Chicago and London :University of Chicago Press.

- Karakasidou, Anastasia (2002) 'Cultural Illegitimacy in Greece: The Slavo-Macedonian 'Non-Minority'', in Richard Clogg (ed.) *Minorities in Greece, Aspects of a Plural Society*, London: Hurst & Company.
- Kavakas, Dimitrios (2001) *Greece and Spain in European Foreign Policy. The influence of southern member states in common foreign and security policy*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Κεντρική σελίδα του Αρχιεπισκόπου.
http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/default.asp?id=80&what_main=1&what_sub=5&lang=gr&archbishop_heading=Ευρώπη visited 1.4.2007
- Κυριακός, Κυριάκος Α. (1999) *Η Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική*, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Εντός.
- Kofos, Evangelos (1990) 'National Heritage and National Identity in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Macedonia', in Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (eds) *Nationalism & Nationality*, Athens: SAGE - ELIAMEP, 103-141
- Kofos, Evangelos (1999) 'Greece's Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy Over FYROM's Independence and Recognition', in Van Coufoudakis, Harry P. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds) *Greece and The New Balkans. Challenges and Opportunities*, New York: Pella, 361 - 394.
- Koliopoulos, John S. and Veremis, Thanos M. (2002) *Greece, The Modern Sequel. From 1831 to the Present*, London: Hurst & Company.
- Lesser, Ian O. and Fuller, Graham E. (1993) *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, Santa Monika: RAND.
- Lesser, Ian O. (2000) *NATO looks South. New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean*, Santa Monica: RAND.
- Martis, Nikolaos K. (1984) *The Falsification of Macedonian History*, Athens: Ikaros.
- Mazis, Ioannis Th. (1997) *The Principles of Geopolitics and the Case of the Greek Space in South-Eastern Mediterranean*. Athens: Panteion University, Institute of International Relations, Occasional research paper No12.
- Μάζης, Ιωάννης (2001) 'Γεωπολιτική του ευρύτερου χώρου', σε Κωνσταντίνος Κούρος (επ) *Γεωπολιτική και Ελλάδα*, Σειρά: Αναζητώντας, Αθήνα: Εσοπρον, 9 - 44.
- Μάζης, Ιωάννης (2002) 'Γεωπολιτική. Η Θεωρία και η Πράξη'. Αθήνα: Ελληνικό Ίδρυμα Ευρωπαϊκής Πολιτικής (ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ) και Εκδόσεις Παπαζηση.
- McDonald, Robert (2001) 'Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Conflict', in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds) *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalisation*, The IFPA-Kokkalis Series on SouthEast European Policy, Herndon (Virginie): Brassey's, 116 - 150.
- Mestheneos, Elisabeth (2002) 'Foreigners', in Richard Glogg (ed.) *Minorities in Greece, Aspects of a Plural Society*, London: Hurst & Company, 179-194.
- Michas Takis (2002) *Unholy Alliance, Greece and Milošević's Serbia*, Texas: Texas A&M University Press.
- Millas, Hercules (2002) *Do's Don'ts. For Better Greek Turkish Relations*, Athens: Papazissus Publishers.

- Μήλλας, Ηρακλής (2002) *'Τι Πρέπει - Τι Δεν Πρέπει'*, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, 1998:1. The Cyprus Issue. www.mfa.gr/foreign/cyprus Visited 1.9.2005.
- Moustakis, Fotios (2003) *'The Greek - Turkish Relationship and NATO'*, London: Frank Cass.
- Murgescu, Mirela-Luminita (2004) 'Memory in Romanian History: Textbooks in the 1990s',
in M. Todorova (ed.) *Balkan Identities. Nation and Memory*. London: Hurst & Company, 339-354.
- Nikolaïdis, Kalypso (1997) 'Greeks and the Macedonian Question: Lessons for the Better Future', in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. & Dimitris Kleridis (eds) *Security in SouthEastern Europe and the U.S.-Greek Relationship*, Virginia: Brassey's, 73-87.
- Nicholson, Adam (1993) *A Fall from Cultural Grace*, the Spectator (London), November 12.
- Papaconstantinou Michael (1993) Memorandum of Greece Concerning the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (letter dated 25 January from Minister of Foreign affairs of Greece to the U.N. Secretary-General), in Theodore A. Couloumbis & Thanos M. Veremis (eds) *The SouthEast European Yearbook 1992*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 307-311.
- Papahadjopoulos, Daphne (1998) *Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Implications for the European Union*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, Paper No. 72.
- Papandreou, Andreas (1992) 'PASOK views on Foreign Policy', in Theodore A. Couloumbis & Thanos M. Veremis (eds) *The SouthEast European Yearbook 1991*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP, 283-285.
- Papandreou, George (1994) 'Greece, the United States and their Mutual Common Interests in the Balkans', in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Thanos M. Veremis and Thanos Dokos (eds) *The SouthEast European Yearbook 1993*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP, 13-21.
- Papandreou, Vasso A. (1992) *The Role of Greece as a New Europe Takes Shape*. Occasional Research Paper - Special Issue, Athens: Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences and Institute of International Relations.
- Petmezas, S. (2004) 'History of Modern Greece' in Anthony J. Bacaloumis (ed.) *About Greece*. Athens: Ministry of Press and Mass Media, 14-43.
- Platias, Athanassios G. (2000) 'Greek Deterrence Strategy' in Aldo Chircop, André Gerolymatos and John. O. Iatrides (eds) *The Aegean Sea After the Cold War. Security and Law of the Sea Issues*, International Political Economy Series, London: MacMillan, 61-86.
- Πρεβελάκης, Γιώργος (1998) *Γεωπολιτική της Ελλάδας*. Αθήνα: LIBRO.
- Psomiades, Harry J. (2000) *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase. A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy*, New York: PELLA.

- Raftopoulos, Evangelos (2000) 'The Crisis Over the Imia Rocks and the Aegean Sea Regime: International Law as a Language of Common Interest', in Aldo Chircop, André Gerolymatos and John. O. Iatrides (eds) *The Aegean Sea After the Cold War. Security and Law of the Sea Issues*, International Political Economy Series, London: MacMillan, 134-151.
- Samaras Antonis (1991) 'Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece in 46th session of the United Nations General Assembly, in New York, September 27, 1991', in Theodore A. Couloumbis & Thanos M. Veremis (eds) *The SouthEast European Yearbook 1991*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP, 173-281.
- Samaras, Andonis (1992) 'Address of Foreign Minister Andonis Samaras in Lisbon 17 Feb. 1992', σε Αριστοτέλης Κ. Τζιαμπίρης, *Διεθνείς Σχέσεις και Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα* (2003), Αθήνα: Ελληνικό Ίδρυμα Ευρωπαϊκής και Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής (ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ), 145-159.
- Siapkidou, Elli (2002) *Why did the European Community accept Greece as a member in 1981?* Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Spiridonakis, B. G. (1977) *Essays on the Historical Geography of the Greek World in the Balkans During the Turkokratia*, Thessaloniki: Institute of the Balkan Studies.
- Στάμκος, Γιώργος (2002) 'Γεωπολιτική του αρχιπελάγους. Ο Ελληνισμός στην εποχή της παγκοσμιοποίησης'. Θεσσαλονίκη: Αρχέτυπο
- Stephanopoulos Constantinos (1997) 'Strengthening Stability in a Troubled Area: Greece's Role in the Balkans', in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. & Dimitris Kleridis (eds) *Security in SouthEastern Europe and the U.S.-Greek Relationship*, Virginia: Brassey's, 1-10.
- Stephanou, Constantine A. (2004) 'The Foreign Policy of Greece', in Anthony J. Bacaloumis (ed.) *About Greece*, Athens: Ministry of Press and Mass Media, Secretariat of Information, 108 – 117.
- Stivachtis, Yannis A. (2002) 'Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean region. Security consideration, the Cyprus imperative and the EU option', in Thomas Diez (ed.) *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict. Modern conflict, postmodern union*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 34 – 53.
- Strati Anastasia (2000) 'Greece and the Law of the Sea: Greek Perspective', in Chirop, Aldo, Gerolymatos André and Iatrides, John O. (eds) *The Aegean Sea After the Cold War. Security and Law of the Sea Issues*, Hampshire and London: Macmillan, 90 – 102.
- Syrigos & Arvanitopoulos: <http://www.idis.gr/english/index.htm>, visited 1.2.2007.
- The Citizens' Movement (1993) *Borders, Symbols, Stability. Issues Relating to the Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Athens: The Citizens' Movement.
- Θεωδορόπουλος Βύρων, Λαγάκος Ευστάθιος, Παπούλιας Γεώργιος και Τζούνης Ιωάννης (1995) *Σκέψεις και Προβληματισμοί για την εξωτερική μας πολιτική*, Αθήνα: Ι. Σιδερής.

- Theodoropoulos, Byron (1997) 'The So-Called Aegean Dispute: What are the Stakes? What is the Cost?', in Robert L. Pfalzgraff, Jr. & Dimitris Kleridis (eds) *Security in SouthEastern Europe and the U.S.-Greek Relationship*, Virginia: Brassey's, 123-129.
- Theodoropoulos, Byron (1998) 'Perception and reality. How Greeks and Turks see each other', in Thanos M. Veremis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds) *The SouthEast European Yearbook 1997-98*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 45-52.
- Theodoropoulos, Byron (1999) 'Negotiating for Accession', in Theodore A. Coulombis, Thanos M. Veremis and Dimitrios C. Triantaphyllou (eds) *The SouthEast European Yearbook 1998-99*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, 85-96.
- Theodoropoulos, Byron (2003) 'Greek-Turkish Relations: A New Era?', in Theodore A. Coulombis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds) *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), London and New York: Frank Cass, 311 - 318.
- Theophanous Andreas (2001) 'The Cyprus Problem: A Challenge for the European Union', in Christodoulos K. Yiallourides & Panayotis J. Tsakonas (eds) *Greece and Turkey after the end of the Cold War*, Caratzas, 295-323.
- Tozun, Bachel (2001) 'Turkey's Cyprus Challenge. Preserving the Gains of 1974', in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.) *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalisation*, The IFPA-Kokkalis Series on SouthEast European Policy. Brassey's, 208 - 222.
- Truman, Harry (1947) Truman Doctrine. President Harry S. Truman's Address before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12. www.yale.edu/lawweb/Avalon/trudoc.htm visited 10.4.2007
- Truman, Harry (1947) *Address of the President of the United States: Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, March 12, 1947.* http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/ visited 10.4.2007.
- Tsardanidis, Charalambos and Stavridis, Stelios (2005) 'The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal', in *European Integration 27: 2*, 217-239.
- Tsinisizelis, Michael J. (2002) 'Greece in the European Union. A Political/Institutional Balance Sheet', in Secretariat General of Information (ed.) *Greece in the European Union: The New Role & the New Agenda*, Athens: Ministry of Press and Mass Media, 64-74.
- Tsoukalas, Constantinos (2002) 'The meaning of "Europe" as a Historical Inversion of the European Meaning of "Greece"', in P. C. Ioakimidis (ed.) *Greece in the European Union: The New Role and the New Agenda*. Athens: Ministry of Press and Mass Media, 75-89.
- Tsoukalis, Lukas (1981) *The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement*, London: Allen & Unwin.
- Tsoukalis, Lukas (2002) 'Greece in the European Union: Political and Economic Aspects' in Secretariat General of Information (ed.) *Greece in the European*

- Union: The New Role & the New Agenda*, Athens: Ministry of Press and Mass Media, 37-45.
- Tziampiris, Aristotle (2000) *Greece, European Political Cooperation, and the Macedonia Question*. Ashgate.
- Τζιαμπίρης, Αριστοτέλης Κ. (2003) *Διεθνείς Σχέσεις & Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα*, Αθήνα: ΕΛΙΑΜΕΠ.
- Βαληνάκης Γ. (1987) *Εξωτερική Πολιτική και Εθνική Άμυνα 1974 - 1987: Η Ελλάδα στο Σύστημα Ανατολής Δύσης*, Θεσσαλονίκη: Παρατηρητής.
- Valinakis, Yannis G. (1988) 'The Strategic Importance of Greece', in Theodore Coulombis & Thanos Veremis (eds) *Yearbook 1998*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 59-70.
- Valinakis, Yannis (1994) *Greece's Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, Ebenhausen/Isartal: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP-S394.
- Varvatsiotis, Ioannis M. (1997) 'The Turkish Threat', in Robert L. Pfalzgraff, Jr. & Dimitris Kleridis (eds) *Security in SouthEastern Europe and the U.S.-Greek Relationship*, Virginia: Brassey's, Inc, 117-123.
- Veremis, Thanos (1995) *Greece's Balkan Entanglement*, Athens: ELIAMEP.
- Βερέμης, Θάνος (1997) *Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική, Διλήμματα μιας Νέας Εποχής*, Αθήνα: Ι. Σιδέρης
- Veremis, Thanos A. (1997) 'SouthEastern Europe After Dayton: An extended Version', in Thanos M. Veremis & Nicolas Protonotarios (eds) *SouthEast Europe Factbook. Survey 1996 - 97*, Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 1-6.
- Veremis, Thanos & Koliopoulos, John (2003) 'The Evolving Content of the Greek Nation', in Theodore A. Coulombis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds) *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy, (ELIAMEP), London: Frank Cass. 13-28.
- Veremis, Thanos (2006) 'After the storm: Greece's role in reconstruction', in Brad K. Blitz (ed.) *War and Change in the Balkans. Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 177-187.
- Verney Susannah (1993) 'From the "Special Relationship" to Europeanism: PASOK and the European Community 1981-89', in Richard Glogg (ed.) *Greece, 1981-89: The Populist Decade*. London: St. Martin's Press, 131-153.
- Voutira Eftihia (2003) 'When Greeks Meet Other Greeks, Settlement Policy Issues in The Contemporary Greek Context', in Renée Hirschon (ed.) *Crossing the Aegean, An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey*, Oxford & New York: Berghahn Books, 145-159.

Commenting Literature

- Agnew, John (1998) *Geopolitics. Re-visioning world politics*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Ahponen, Pirkkoliisa & Jukarainen, Pirjo (2000) 'Introduction', in Pirkkoliisa Ahponen & Pirjo Jukarainen (eds) *Tearing Down the Curtain, Opening the Gates: Northern Boundaries in Change*, Jyväskylä: SoPhi, 5-8.

- Anderson, Benedict (1991) *Imagined Communities. Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.
- Bachelard, Gaston (1969) *The Poetics of Space*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Barnes, Trevor J. and Duncan, James S. (1992) 'Introduction' in Trevor J. Barnes and James S. Duncan (eds) *Writing Worlds. Discourse, Text & Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Bernal, Martin (1987) *Black Athena, The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, Volume 1: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785-1985*, New Brunswick and New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Burke, Kenneth (1969) *A Grammar of Motives*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Buzan, Barry, Weaver, Ole & de Wilde, Jaap (1998) *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- de Certeau, Michael (1988) *The Practise of Everyday Life*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Cowland, D. A. & O'Neill, B. C. & Reid, A. L (1995) *The European Mosaic. Contemporary Politics, Economics & Culture*, London and New York: Longman.
- Crow, Dennis (1996) *Geography and Identity. Living and Exploring Geopolitics of Identity*, Washington: Maisonneuve Press.
- Dalby, Simon (1998) 'Geopolitics and Global Security. Culture, Identity, and the "Pogo Syndrome"', in Gearóid O'Tuathail & Simon Dalby (eds), *Rethinking Geopolitics*, London and New York: Routledge, 295 - 313.
- Eliade, Mircea (1954) *The Myth of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and History*, London: Penguin.
- Eliade, Mircea (1959) *The Sacred & the Profane. The Nature of Religion. The Significance of Religious Myth, Symbolism, and Ritual Life and Culture*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Word.
- Eliade, Mircea (1969) *Images and Symbols. Studies in Religious Symbolism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fierke, K.M (1999) 'Dialogues of Manoeuvre and Entanglement. NATO, Russia, and the CEECs', *Millennium* 28: 1, 27 - 52.
- Foucault, Michel (1979) *Discipline and Punish*, New York: Vintage.
- Frye, Northrop (1976) *The secular Scripture. A Study of the Structure of Romance*, Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
- Frye, Northrop (1990) *Anatomy of Criticism. Four Essays [1957]*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University of Press.
- Harle, Vilho ja Moisiio, Sami (2000) *Missä on Suomi? Kansallisen identiteettipolitiikan historia ja geopolitiikka*, Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Harley, J.B. (1992) 'Deconstructing the map', in Trevor J. Barnes and James S. Duncan (eds) *Writing Worlds. Discourse, Text & Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape*, London and New York: Routledge, 231-247.
- Harley, J.B. (2001) *The New Nature of Maps. Essays in the History of Cartography*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Heidegger, Martin (1952) *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Heidegger, Martin (1958) *The Question of Being*, New York: Twayne.
- Heidegger, Martin (1975) *Poetry, Language, Thought*, New York: Harper & Row.
- Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus (2006) *Civilizing the Enemy. German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Jukarainen, Pirjo (2000) *Rauhan ja raudan rajalla, Rauhan ja konfliktintutkimuskeskus, Tutkimuksia 90/2000*, Helsinki: Like.
- Kaakkuriniemi, Tapani (2007) 'Russia Within and Beyond Its Borders', in Katalin Miklóssy and Pekka Korhonen (eds) *The East and the Idea of Europe*, forthcoming.
- Kjellén, Rudolf (1911-13, fyra delar) [1905] *Stormakterna. Konturer kring samtidens storpolitik*, Stockholm: Hugo Gebers förlag.
- Kjellén, Rudolf (1919) *Valtio elinmuotona. Poliittikan käsikirja*, Hämeenlinna: Arvi A. Karisto.
- Korhonen, Pekka (1999) 'Nousukkaan ja aristokraatin ajat', *Kosmopolis*, 29: 2, 7-22.
- Koselleck, Reinhart (1985) *Futures Past: on the semantic of historical time*, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
- Lakoff, George (2002) *Moral Politics. How Liberals and Conservatives Think*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark (2003) [1980] *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, George (2004) *Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate*, White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing.
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1978) *Myth and Meaning*, London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Loo, Bernard (2003) 'Geography and Strategic Stability', in *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 26: 1, 156-174.
- Lyndon, Donlyn & Moore, Charles W. (1994) *Chambers for a Memory Palace*, Cambridge: MIT press.
- Mackinder, Halford J. (1998) [1904] 'The Geographical Pivot of History', in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge (eds) *The Geopolitical Reader*, London and New York: Routledge, 27-31.
- Moisio, Sami (1998) *Kriittinen geopolitiikka ja alueelliset uskomusjärjestelmät: uhkakuvatutkimuksen teoriaa empiirisin esimerkein*, Turku: Turun yliopiston maantieteen laitoksen julkaisuja. N:o 158.
- Moisio, Sami (2003) *Geopoliittinen kamppailu Suomen EU-jäsenyydestä*, Turku: Turun yliopiston julkaisuja. Sarja C, Dissertation.
- Moore, Henrietta (1981) *Space, Text and Gender: An Anthropological Study of the Marakwet of Kenya*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Natter, Wolfgang (2005) 'Friedrich Ratzel's Spatial Turn. Identity of Disciplinary Space and its Borders Between the Anthro- and Political Geography of Germany and the United States', in Henk van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer (eds) *B/ordering Space*, Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 171-186.
- Nyyssönen, Heino (1999) *The Presence of the Past in Politics, '1956' after 1956 in Hungary*, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä: SoPhi. Dissertation.

- Ó Tuathail, Gearoid (1996) *Critical Geopolitics. The Politics of Writing Global Space*, London: Routledge.
- Ó Tuathail, Gearoid (1998) 'Thinking critically about Geopolitics', in Gearoid, Ó Tuathail & Simon, Dalby (eds) *The Geopolitics Reader*, London: Routledge, 1-12.
- Ó Tuathail, Gearoid (1999) 'Understanding Critical Geopolitics. Geopolitics and Risk Society', in Colin S. Gary and Geoffrey Loan (eds) *Geopolitics – Geography and Strategy*, London and Portland: Frank Cass, 105 – 124.
- Paasi, Anssi (1986) 'The institutionalization of regions. A theoretical framework for understanding the emergence of regions and the constitution of regional identity', *Fennia* 164:1, 105 – 146.
- Paasi, Anssi (1996) *Territories, boundaries and consciousness. The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border*, Chichester-New York-Brisbane-Toronto-Singapore: John Wiley & Sons.
- Paasi, Anssi (1997) 'Geographical Perspectives on Finnish National identity', *GeoJournal* 43: 1, 41 – 50.
- Paasi, Anssi (2005) 'The Changing Discourses on Political Boundaries. Mapping the Backgrounds, Contexts and Contents', in Henk van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer (eds) *B/ordering Space*, Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 17-31
- Pace, Michelle (2006) *The Politics of Regional Identity. Meddling with the Mediterranean*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Palonen, Kari (1993a) 'Introduction: From Policy and Polity to Politicking and Politicization', in Kari Palonen and Tuija Parvikko (eds) *Reading the Political. Exploring the Margins of Politics*, Tampere: The Finnish Political Science Association, 6-16.
- Palonen, Kari (1993b) 'Reading streets names politically' in Kari Palonen & Tuija Parvikko (eds) *Reading the Political. Exploring the Margins of Politics*, Tampere: The Finnish Political Science Association, 103-121.
- Palonen, Kari (1993c) '*Politikointi – politisointi – politiikka. Tulkinta poliittikan ajatusmuodon pelikielikaikatiiloista*', Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, valtiopoliin laitos, Opetusmoniste n:o 1.
- Perelman, Chaïm (1963) *The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Perelman, Chaïm (1982) *The Realm of Rhetoric*, Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Ratzel, Friedrich (1899) [1882] *Anthropogeographie. Erster Teil, Grundzüge der Anwendung der Erdkunde auf die Geschichte*, Stuttgart: Verlag von J. Engelhorn.
- Said, Edward (1978) *Orientalism*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Sheldrake, Philip (2001) *Spaces for the Sacred*, Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Schöpflin, George (1997) 'The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths' in Geoffrey Hoskins and George Schöpflin (eds) *Myths & Nationhood*, New York: Routledge, 19-35.

- Schöpflin, George (2000) *Nations, Identity, Power; The New Politics of Europe*, London: Hurst & Company.
- Simonsuuri, Kirsti (2002) *Ihmiset ja jumalat, myytit ja mytologiat*, Hämeenlinna: Tammi.
- Soja, Edward W. (2005) 'Borders Unbound. Globalization, Regionalism, and the Postmetropolitan Transformation' in Henk van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer (eds) *B/ordering Space*, Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 33-46.
- Spykman, Nicholas John (1944) *The Geography of the Peace*, publishing place unknown: Archon Books.
- Strüver, Anke (2005) 'Bor(der)ing Stories. Spaces of Absence along the Dutch-German Border', in Henk van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer (eds) *B/ordering Space*, Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 207-221
- Todorova, Maria (1997) *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Turunen, Ari (1997) *The politics of displaying geo. The spatial order of ecumenical world maps*, Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, licenciate thesis.
- van Houtum, Henk, Olivier Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer (2005) 'Prologue. B/ordering Space', in Henk van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer (eds) *B/ordering Space*, Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 1-13.
- White, Hayden (1973) *Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- White, Hayden (1978) *Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.