Demanding Dialogue:  
Political Struggle in the 21st Century Hong Kong

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SUMMARY

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The focus of this study is to examine the political discussion in nowadays Hong Kong. Research period is from year 1997 to 2004, concentrating on years 2003 and 2004. The massive democracy rally in July 2003 is seen as a culmination of this development started in the 1997 handover. Theoretical frame is the discussion around civil society, social movements, political development and democracy in Hong Kong. Main methodology is rhetoric and argumentation analysis, which is based primarily on the work of Stephen Toulmin and Pekka Korhonen’s adaptation of Toulmin’s apparatus. Also Manuel Castells has provided interesting views on social movements and their impact on society and politics. The research theme is very topical; democracy has been very much in public during recent years in Hong Kong.

This is a study of rhetoric, so here is analysed the argumentation rising from the Hong Kong society. The basic rhetorical apparatus includes three different factors, claim, data and warrant, which are used to build up an analysis of acts of Hong Kong societal groups like the pro-democracy movement or the administration. Main results of the study are constructed to seven rhetorical categories including both the views of the civil society and the government. Categories include as well people power and challenging authorities as Beijing principles and pressing on economical issues. Basically the study characterizes the discussion in Hong Kong public political sphere. I left for looking the political dialogue between the civil society and government in Hong Kong, what I found was in places unfair political struggle between strong authoritarian leaders and incoherent pro-democratic opposition that wells from the sometimes-questionable but politically important civil society of Hong Kong.

Keywords: Hong Kong, civil society, democracy, governance, rhetoric, political dialogue, social activism.
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1. INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 2003, more than half a million people took to the streets of Hong Kong to protest against the Article 23 legislation\(^\text{1}\) and demand democracy. There were also further demonstrations and gatherings organized by the pro-democracy camp on July 9 and July 13, attended by about 50,000 and 20,000 people. These events also attracted much international media attention. It was the largest demonstration on Chinese soil since Tiananmen Square incident 1989, and the largest protest ever directed against the Hong Kong government itself, although there have been many smaller demonstrations after the handover concerning different issues (So 2002). It is said that the historic July 1 mass protest was the most significant political event Hong Kong has experienced since the handover 1997. Mixed with the concern about civil liberties was anger about Hong Kong's record unemployment, plunging property prices and slow response in spring 2003 to the spread of Sars. As a whole the July protests were a culmination of public dissatisfaction that had been building up against the Tung Chee-hwa administration in the recent past. After demonstrations Tung delayed introducing new law for approval by the legislature and two most unpopular officials resigned but still it is clear that the political change in Hong Kong must happen gradually and with Beijing’s endorsement. On January 1 2004 there were another protest, about 100,000 people took the streets of Hong Kong. The central government was again surprised by size of protest, but still doubts support for democracy; also Tung Chee-hwa maintained silence on the democracy review (South China Morning Post 03.01.04). On July 1 2004 was also a big march. In public the July 1 march has, by now, become an icon, a symbol of Hong Kong solidarity, something the government under Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa has failed to articulate.

This MA thesis is a study about societal development that led to the massive protest rally, and especially about what happened after it, a study about political discussion between the government and people - more accurately the civil society in Hong Kong. The study is theoretically constructed on the

\[^\text{1}\] Article 23 of the Basic Law, which is Hong Kong’s constitution, states: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.” This article was written into the draft Basic Law after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The implementation of Article 23 of the Basic Law was finally unveiled for public consultation in September 2002. The proposals stirred fears of a crackdown on human rights groups and Falun Gong. The pro-democracy camp also perceived the proposals a threat to civil liberties. (South China Morning Post, 25.09.02)
civil society discussion and on the earlier studies made about Hong Kong. Empirical analysis is made mainly with rhetoric apparatus. Also Manuel Castells’ (1996, 1997) ideas is significant for example when building the identities of different actors in Hong Kong democracy issue, and for instance Stephen Toulmin’s (1958) theory of rhetoric is used to analyse the dialogue between the government and the civil society. Also earlier Hong Kong has been studied in the some light of Castells (e.g Kwok-leung 2000, Castells, Goh and Kwok 1990, Lui 1984, Kung 1984) with subjects like urban protests and urban movements. Studies mentioned above employ a similar theoretical framework to explore how an urban movement articulates the structural contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, and these studies provide us with information about the causes and course of urban protests in the early 1980s and in the 1990s in Hong Kong. Now democracy has been introduced to the political system, and the 1997 Handover have generated more conflicts between the government and grassroots.

Research period is from the year 1997 handover to the first half of year 2004, concentrating on the incident in July 2003 and what happened after that. Study background is the process that started in 1997, and the democracy rally in July 2003 is seen as a culmination of this development. Some people say that something went wrong, other ones just see different political development, but anyway, many questions are in the air. Answers to these questions are also varied, and I will handle them to some extend but intention of this research is to study political dialogue between the government and the civil society as it appears in public. The voices of political bodies, actors in economy, interest groups, media and citizens get all involved and constitute a large skein that I will unpack in purpose of making reasonable ideas. Who talks, how he talks and why - these are fundamental questions. 80 per cent of Hong Kong people have expressed their will for direct elections for the chief executive and the legislature (South China Morning Post 18.12.03). The Tung administration is facing a legitimacy crisis. A rational discussion of constitutional reform is missing, but it might be most important factor helping the central government understand that democratic development in Hong Kong is the only way to maintain stability.

In traditional Chinese society attitude towards civil society differs from Western viewpoint. Lack of democratic culture has meant that people have not seen the missing rights as a problem. Hong Kong is not a Western society but either not thoroughly Chinese. When speaking civil society in this study, it
refers to quite liberal, political concept of civil society, where public sphere\(^2\) is seen as a forum for
people to act and influence, and where a set of organizations and institutions, as well as a series of
structured and organized social actors, reproduce, albeit sometimes in a conflictive manner, the identity
that rationalizes the sources of structural domination (Castells 1997, 8).

The research theme is very topical; democracy has been very much in public during recent years in
Hong Kong. Reasons for choosing this subject are besides the topicality, my interests towards Asian
studies in general, and my advance level studies in the Finnish National University Network for East
and Southeast Asian Studies. This study is not a whole and concrete conception of political life in Hong
Kong. I have worked, and supplied all my materials in Finland and during a scholarship period in
Copenhagen at Nordic Institute for Asian Studies (NIAS). The concept of research is a theoretical
frame built on the civil society and democracy discussion and an empirical study with primarily article
material. The political dialogue that emerges in public is the main question in this research. Main
material source is the South China Morning Post publication that is the largest general circulation
English-language newspaper published daily in Hong Kong and the most important economic, political
and societal publication in the region. As an addition and support material I have also articles from Far
Eastern Economic Review that is an important Asia business magazine based on Hong Kong, and a
sister magazine of The Wall Street Journal. To gain more holistic picture, I also collected and analysed
Tung Chee-hwa’s speeches and press releases from years 2003 and 2004. Relevance from media
material comes from the media-dominance in the political space. Most arguments that are analysed in
this study are from above mentioned publications, and possible impacts of this publication form are to
be noted.

Albeit both used publications are more or less elitists and restricted to educated, English speaking
members of the upper and middle class, since the handover especially the South China Morning Post
has played a crucial role in stimulating and leading a critical public discourse on relevant subjects
(Holbig 2003). Like Manuel Castells (1996) says, outside the media sphere there is only political
marginality. To act on people’s minds and wills, conflicting political options use the media as their
fundamental vehicle of communication, influence and persuasion. Some materials are from different
websites, for example The Democratic Party of Hong Kong and

\(^2\) Public sphere is a concept from Jürgen Habermas (1962).
Hong Kong Voice of Democracy and their websites represent the pro-democracy camp that is an important side in this study. When analysing the government’s side, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa’s speeches and press releases during years 2003 and 2004 are in important position.
1.1 TERMINOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

Here are explained the most essential concepts in the study. By civil society it is meant the total of civil organisations or civil relations outside of the state or government. Its essential components are the various non-state or non-governmental civil organisations, including NGOs, citizens’ voluntary and advocacy social associations, residential community organisations, and interest groups and movements spontaneously organised by citizens. They are also referred to as ‘the third sector’ between the government and enterprises. Another way to define civil society is to see it as a political space, or arena, where voluntary associations seek to shape the rules that govern one or the other aspect of social life. Civil society associations bring together people who share concern about a particular policy area or problem. (Walzer 1998) Among the civil society there is another important factor, the political society.

As the civil society is defined as the pluralistic structure of economic, social and political organizations and uniting outside the state, the political society consists of political parties, their affiliated networks, organisations and campaigns that are intent on controlling the state. As democratic transitions evolve, political parties may either cooperate with or displace the voluntary organisations of civil society. The government, which is another side of searched dialogue, refers, depending on context, both to the Chinese Central Government and the local Hong Kong authorities lead by Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa. In each situation it is mentioned which one is concerned.

The use of the civil society concept differs, and Adam Seligman (1992, 201) divides the distinct uses of the civil society in the following way. The first is the more direct and concrete political use of civil society as a slogan of different movements and parties, as well as, of individual thinkers who may use it to critique certain government policies. The second use of the term is by social scientists as an analytic concept, a term to describe or probably explain certain forms of social phenomena, nowadays the term is used more and more to describe certain forms of social organization that once were associated with the ideas of citizenship and democracy that is next crucial term to be noted. The third use is as a philosophically normative concept, that is - putting it in somewhat grandiose terms - as an ethical idea, a vision of the social order, providing us with a vision of the good life. Linking between civil society and democracy is one the main threads of conversation in my study, and it is also a point that I shall return into the social movement that is a democracy camp in Hong Kong.
Even if democracy has become a universal idea, linking civil society and democracy is not a simple issue and civil society does not unambiguously aim to democracy. But still the general forms of democracy like the freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information that is a free press, free and fair elections, and institutions for making governmental policies depend on votes and other expressions seem to me to contain the essence what is meant by civil society, if not necessarily fully or concrete sense but as a phenomenon in the realm of values and beliefs. Nowadays the Western term "civil society" has become prominent in current Western and Chinese discussions regarding China's history and especially possible democratisation.

Adjusting the terms democracy and civil society to Hong Kong, or any Asian country, makes the process demanding explicitly because of the terms’ linkage to Western tradition, norms and heritage. Still the basic idea of civil society seems to be the existence of relatively autonomous organizations that are not dominated by state authorities, and who have possibilities to have effect in national or local policy. That does not subjoin the civil society directly to Western systems. Manuel Castells (1990) says that in a colonial society the first distinction to be found in civil society is not by class but by ethnic or national heritage. In postcolonial Hong Kong we must distinguish between the relationship of the state, and Western like bourgeoisie, and the state’s relationship with Chinese society. Today the division between the Westerns and Chinese is not so clear than in colonial times but still in the case of western likes, the relationship between the state and society is simpler than the relationship between the state and Chinese population. Moreover, referring Hudson (2003) it needs to be remembered that European theories of civil society are constructed from later points in time when civil societies had clearly emerged. In Asia, by contrast, civil societies are in the process of still being formed, and it is difficult to be entirely certain which features of Asian civil society will prove to be enduring.

The juxtaposition between pro-democratic civil society and authoritative government is to be cleared by demonstrating their views and starting basis. Pro-democratic civil society, whose most visible character is the active pro-democracy movement, consists the legal profession, the social workers, the journalists, the librarians, the bankers, the Jockey Club members, the Catholic Church and the Christian church workers, most people with the middle class status. This more or less grassroots section works aside to the pro-democratic political society, that is the Democratic Party and others
democratic political parties and actors, and also some pro-democratic businessmen. On the other side is the authoritative, hegemonic Chinese government with full support from the local administration, from pro-Chinese political parties, and usually also from the big business. Pro-Chinese approach means laying stress on good relations between Hong Kong and Mainland China, and China’s hegemonic role over the territory. Pro-Chinese is also somewhat anti-democratic and conservative view. Pro-democratic, however, is not directly anti-Chinese – pro-democracy activists usually point out that they are not against China, but against dissatisfactory government of Hong Kong, although even some harsh criticism against Beijing has been expressed. What pro-democracy camp wants is full democracy, including for example universal suffrage and better participation possibilities to the Hong Kong people, to the territory.

Communication in this study is analysed via its **rhetoric** and **argumentation**. Rhetorical tasks involve five basic moves: (1) the speaker tries to exert change by using **language** rather than non-symbolic forces (like guns or torture); (2) the speaker must come to be regarded as a **helper** rather than an exploiter; (3) the speaker must convince the listener that new **choices** need to be make; (4) the speaker must **narrow** the listener’s options for making these choices, even though (5) the speaker may become subtle by not **specifying** the details of the policies advocated (Hart 1997, 7). Rhetoric creations are practical creations, and because they are the creations of real people living in the real world, rhetoric is a controversial thing to study (Ibid.) Usually forensic rhetoric refers to situations where judgements of right or wrong have to be made (Korhonen 1992, 24). Here rhetoric is also a political struggle between the speaker and audience. The argumentation rising from the civil society and from the government, and the encounter of these two are in the focus of this study. The hypothesis, that the government wants stability and the democracy activists want a change, is more or less general and obvious, and I tried to go deeper in the political discussion. Basically I read my article material against the civil society discussion concentrating especially on the speech of political change that culminates to the democracy claims, and argumentation around it. It is also interesting if there are other goals in the democracy speech than foster actual democracy, for example identity politics or demarcation to the Mainland China. Democracy demands, people power, and dialogue between civil society and government are linked also to the general theory of **good governance**, and **narratives** build up by the different actors. Here narratives help to understand the reality, and are seen, as usual, as a means for constructing the world view by describing the actual situation, people and incidents.
Chaïm Perelman (1982, 6) says that an argument is never capable of procuring self-evidence, and there is no way of arguing against what is self-evident. For example statistical probability concerns only past or future facts or events, while the theses that are under discussion can deal also with non-temporal questions such as “Is democracy the best form of government?” which is very relevant question among the political actors in Hong Kong. The aim of argumentation is to elicit or increase the adherence of the members of an audience to theses that are presented for their consent. The absence of powerful political opposition both in the legislative councils and in society, and the lack of electoral pressure, have shielded the Hong Kong’s bureaucratic government from the greater public pressure witnessed in Western democracies. The bureaucratic government has had much room to perform its paternalistic role. There has been no bottom-up democratization, and China is opposing any top-down democratization, so it’s not surprise that Hong Kong’s political institutions have undergone little change, and the message of stability and prosperity has remained the same decade after decade. When the wishes of the public could be brushed aside, the developing political powerlessness could restrict interest in politics, foster political detachment, cripple political participation, and reduce critical mass support for any bottom-up attempt. Sing (2004) calls the basis of this dominance the great imperative for economic growth and stability in Hong Kong.

The method used to understanding rhetoric and reasoning of different actors, and building the themes of political dialogue in Hong Kong, is based on the work of Stephen Toulmin (1958) and Pekka Korhonen’s (1992) adaptation of Toulmin’s basic apparatus. The Toulmin system asks the critic to isolate in a given rhetorical message three key features that are Major Claims (C), Major Data (D) and Warrants (W). Major Claims are the broadest, most encompassing, statements made by the speaker, lie at a level of abstraction higher than other statements, represent, what the speaker hopes become the residual message in listeners minds and are frequently repeated in the message. Major Data lie at a level of abstraction immediately beneath that of the Major Claim. Major Data is the supporting structure of discourse, statements answering the listener’s question: What makes you say so? Warrants are the keys to the Toulminian approach. They make the “movement” from Major Data to Major Claim possible. Warrants are described as general, hypothetical statements, which can act as bridges and authorize the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us. (Toulmin 1958, Hart 1997) Analyse may be symbolised with the relation between the data and the claim, and the claim in support
of which they are produced by arrow, and indicate the authority for taking the step from one to the other by writing the warrant immediately below the arrow:

D → So C

Since W

For example:
Stability is the key to prosperity → So Hong Kong must be stabilized with any means

Civil society movements cause instability

In the study there are seven rhetorical categories raised from the argumentation between the civil society-political society combo, and the governments of Hong Kong and China. These categories are also the most important findings of the study. First three themes, *people power, fight for better life, and challenging authorities*, are from civil society, next three, *stability and prosperity, Beijing principles, and legislative tasks*, are from authoritative side, and last one, *mutual understanding*, is one in common. Most themes link to the normative theory of good governance that stipulates various criteria for instrument choice and evaluation, and to the structuring of different narratives that include as well democracy and authority, legality and legitimacy as prosperity and stability.
2. ABOUT HONG KONG

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, formerly the Territory of Hong Kong, HKSAR, consists Hong Kong Island and Stonecutters Island off the southeast coast of Mainland China; the Kowloon Peninsula, on the Mainland; and the New Territories, partially located on the Mainland. The New Territories made up 90% of the whole of Hong Kong. Once barren, rocky and sparsely populated, Hong Kong has been nowadays a leading world financial centre. Hong Kong had come under Chinese suzerainty between the years 221 B.C. and 214 B.C. Great Britain had occupied Hong Kong Island in 1839 at the beginning of the Opium War (1839-42), which had been prompted by trade disputes. China ceded the island to Britain in perpetuity under the 1842 Treaty of Nanking that ended the Opium War. China in the 1860 Treaty of Peking (Beijing) ceded to Britain the Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters Island, also in perpetuity. China in 1898 leased the New Territories to Britain for 99 years under the terms of the Peking (Beijing) Convention, which expired at midnight June 30, 1997. In 1941, during World War II, Japan captured Hong Kong and occupied it for four years. Upon Japan's surrender, Britain reclaimed the territory. The communist takeover in China in 1949 spurred decades of mass migrations from China to Hong Kong. The communist Mainland government had since insisted that the "unequal" treaties giving Britain sovereignty over Hong Kong were invalid.

In 1984, Britain and China signed the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, which set the terms of the handover of Hong Kong. In 1990, the Basic Law, a post-handover constitution for Hong Kong, was given final approval. The Basic Law included provisions that would allow Hong Kong to retain its capitalist economic system and much of its autonomy for 50 years, while at the same time giving China significant control over the colony's government. Now the former British Crown Colony of Hong Kong has been incorporated into China. Chinese government promised that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region would have its own economic and political system. It has its own executive (lead by Tung Chee-hwa), Legislative Council and political parties. The main parties are Citizens Party, conservative Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, liberal Democratic Party, Hong Kong Progressive Alliance (pro-integration) and Liberal Party (conservative, moderate pro-Chinese). Democratic reforms were instituted in the colony in 1994, and the first democratic legislative elections were held the following year. Chinese government instituted some rights limits almost
immediately after the handover, and many feared that democracy in Hong Kong could roll back further under Chinese rule.

Hong Kong has been in a transition zone for a long time. Referring to Sing (2004), Hong Kong has been one of the rare anomalies in modernization theory because of being at the same time ‘higher-middle-income’ place and a non-democracy. Achieving one of the highest economic growth rates in the world in the past three decades, Hong Kong steadily increased its overall wealth without any chronic economic crisis before 1997. The chances of a higher income economy being a stable democracy are so high that the anomalous character of Hong Kong in respect of modernization theory has intensified from 1987 onwards (Sing 2004). Of high-income places in 1998, only Hong Kong, Singapore, Brunei, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Brunei were undemocratic. Kuwait, Qatar, The Arab Emirates and Brunei are wealthy oil-exporting states that derive their wealth mainly from the sale of oil, and since they have accrued income not through traditional domestic taxation and economic programs, and with Islam impact, such states have been under less pressure to become democratic. However given the absence of similar natural resources to oil or Islamic influences in Hong Kong, this explanation cannot apply to Hong Kong (Sing 2004, 10). Confucian culture stressing consensus and collective welfare might be regarded as the reason for Hong Kong’s anomalous condition, but because Hong Kong was a British colony for over 150 years, and British officials spread ideas of the rule of laws and procedure justice, the argument of a Confucian political culture cannot by itself explain the anomaly. Instead of one single factor, the combination of welfare, economic growth, Confucian heritage, non-sovereignty and non-independency from colonial times, and China as a strong partly external factor, can explain Hong Kong’s special situation.

Before Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997, local people had considerable fears and uncertainties concerning the Hong Kong SAR’s future. However, in 1996 and the first half of 1997, the international business community and the people of Hong Kong were bullish regarding the HKSAR’s economic prospects. By the beginning of 2001, the Hong Kong people were generally satisfied with Beijing’s limited interference in Hong Kong, and they had developed some trust in the Chinese leadership. They also noted that Hong Kong was more dependent on China than the other way round, and this dependence would only strengthen in the future. However, Hong Kong people had also become more
aware of the structural weaknesses of their economy, and they were pessimistic regarding the prospects of respectable economic growth. (Cheng 2004a, 1-17)

So despite the dawning trust between China and Hong Kong, the official statistics and the talk of economic recovery, many people have not felt benefits from those, and they tend to blame the government for the lack of strategy to ensure Hong Kong’s prosperity in the future. This situation also mingles with larger picture; the globalisation process and the information technology age have broadened the gap between the rich and poor. People worry about rising unemployment and many interest groups believe that the government has ignored them. Situation has been exacerbated also by falling confidence in the civil service, says Joseph Cheng (2004a, 16). In view of many civil service blunders since the handover, from the handling of the Sars or latterly of the chicken-fly crisis and the chaos at the opening the new airport, to the series of public housing construction scandals, many Hong Kong people have been asking where their civil service has gone wrong. The Article 23 was sort of last stitch.

The HKSAR government is now in the process of refining the political machinery established by the Basic Law. Quoting Cheng (2004a), “the anger and frustration of the Hong Kong people are shocking”. It is natural that people turn their anger and frustration at the government, and especially at the Chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa. The Chinese leaders, the Tung administration and the business community seem to believe that if the economy improves, then Hong Kong people’s anger and grievances will largely evaporate. Pro-Beijing united front leaders in Hong Kong often argue that democracy cannot solve the territory’s problems. But it appears that without democracy, the Tung administration and its successor will find it very difficult to solve their major problems.

Hong Kong could be seen as a megacity. Not measured by its size but its connections and global role. Manuel Castells says that megacities articulate the global economy, link up the informational networks, and concentrate the world power. Hong Kong is not just its seven million people: what is emerging is a mega city of 40 to 50 million people, connecting Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Macau and small towns in the Pearl River Delta. Megacities are the new urban form whose distinctive feature is being globally connected and locally disconnected, in the Hong Kong case I don’t fully underwrite the disconnected locality issue, but some aspects of that could be seen. One thing that I will handle also
later is that Hong Kong people don’t want to merge with Mainland Chinese, because they fear that Hong Kong is becoming a usual Chinese city without extraordinary prosperity and freedom.

The Southern China Metropolis, still in the making but a sure reality, is a new spatial form. It is not the traditional Megalopolis like on the northeastern coast of the United States. Unlike this classical case, the Hong Kong-Guangdong metropolitan region is not made up of the physical conurbation of successive urban or suburban units. There is considerable spatial discontinuity within the area, with rural settlements, agricultural land and undeveloped areas separating urban centres, and industrial factories being scattered all over the region. Within each city, within each area, processes of segregation and segmentation take place, in a pattern of endless variation. But such segmented diversity is dependent upon a functional unity marked by gigantic, technology-intensive infrastructures, which seem to know as their only limit the amount of fresh water that the region can retrieve from the East River area. The Southern China Metropolis, only vaguely perceived in most of the world at this time, is likely to become the most representative face of the twenty-first century. (Castells 1996, 404-410)

This is the political and social situation in which I have made my study. Hong Kong is a model of development in which the state has integrated economic growth and social stability through its planned interventions in the urbanization process, setting up public policies that structure collective consumption in a way that contributes both to human capital formation and to social integration, as the process of state-led economic development in the new conditions of the world economy (Castells 1990, 333).

2.1 GOVERNMENT DIFFICULTIES

Stability is the top priority of the Chinese leadership. Hong Kong administration has been willing to support Beijing without demanding much back. The reasons are their satisfaction with the situation and their reluctance to antagonize Mainland China. Many analysts in Hong Kong have criticized leading officials for bending over backwards to please Beijing and for failing to uphold Hong Kong’s tradition of civil liberties, writes Willy Wo-Lap Lam (2003). Doubts have also been cast directly on Tung Chee-hwa. However, the Tung government did try hard to strive for a liberal state for a first three years of its administration because its power was not threatened by the democratic forces, and because liberalism
was a valuable asset for developing Hong Kong into a global financial and high-tech city, says So (2002). It was the looming crisis of legitimacy that made the Tung government changed its policy of liberalism to ‘soft authoritarianism’, like So calls Tung’s tactic. The government credibility was tarnished by crisis of mismanagement and public scandals. Its promises of developmentalism, economic growth, and raising living standard were unfilled because of the downfall of the stock market and the real estate market, the high rate of unemployment, and the bankruptcies of small businesses during the Asian financial crisis. The Tung government’s over-extended reforms in the civil service, medical care, education, housing, and social welfare sectors led to all sorts of protests by civil servants, doctors, teachers, students, social workers, community residents, property owners, small business people, et cetera. In mid 2000, the Tung government therefore adopted some measures of authoritarianism in order to curb the rising tide of protests and to regain political control over the civil society (So 2002). However the sizes of the demonstrations kept rising.

In Joseph Cheng’s article (2004b) ‘The July 1 Protest Rally in Hong Kong: Causes and Implications’ is debated on government failures. The Tung administration and its supporters blame the economy for the grievances of the community. The implication is that when the economy improves, people’s dissatisfaction with the government will evaporate. No doubt the sharp deterioration in the territory’s economic performance since 1997 has caused much misery and dissatisfaction among Hong Kong people. The average annual rate of per capita GDP growth fell from 4.5% in the period 1983-1997 to 1.9% in 1997. Almost full employment was maintained from 1985 to mid-1997 as the unemployment rate ranged from 1.3% to peak of only 3.5%. Since Hong Kong returned to China the unemployment rate has climbed to record high of 8.7% in mid-2003. Nevertheless, the Hong Kong people simply could not imagine that the territory’s unemployment would be higher than in the US and Great Britain. Since the Asian financial crisis and the handover Hong Kong’s unique position as the gateway to China has been gradually eroded by the development of China’s coastal cities too; and today, Hong Kong people are acutely aware of the pressure of competition from the north border, especially from Shanghai. Hong Kong people actually worry that the HKSAR may become just like a major Chinese city, and that gap between Hong Kong and the major coastal cities has been rabidly narrowing. The globalisation process and the information age have broadened the gap between the rich and poor. The lower socio-economic strata have been suffering from a decline in real incomes and so on (Cheng 2003).
Last ten years before the handover the British administration had been almost totally absorbed in the Sino-British negotiations on the territory’s future and the associated diplomatic confrontations. As a result, it took no major initiatives in economic reforms and in social services in the transitional period before 1997. (Cheng 2004b, 5) This meant that when Tung administration took over, it really had its hands full in tackling in almost every major policy sector. It was not an easy situation. Tung himself had to spend tremendous efforts removing “the land-mines” left by the British administration. Finally, the political skills of Chris Patten, the last British governor, completely overshadowed the performance of Tung Chee-hwa. After seven years, now in 2003-2004, the Tung administration has not been able to show the community the clear and intense way forward. Hong Kong people acutely feel that they have been suffering from a decline in confidence.

Moreover, the Sars outbreak resulting in about three hundred deaths in Hong Kong generated more dissatisfaction and frustration with the Tung administration. Naturally it was accused of poor co-ordination in fighting the epidemic, and Sars also dealt a severe blow to the economy. The lack of cross-border exchange of information on infectious diseases and of an effective alert system was widely criticized. When the outbreak of what was then being called atypical pneumonia exploded in Guangdong - before Sars had been identified - Hong Kong was kept in the dark, and that is seen as a big mistake. (Cheng 2004b, and South China Morning Post e.g. 03.10.03) The Sars epidemic also exposed many weaknesses in the health-care system and raised more general needs for restructuring it.

Apparently the Chinese leadership had been aware of Tung’s incompetence and unpopularity. Still China’s official propaganda line has been that Hong Kong is doing very well since its return to the Motherland, says Cheng (2004b, 8). Replacing Tung would go against this propaganda line. There has also been an eagerness among Chinese leaders to show the world that the local Chinese could govern Hong Kong better than the British. China doesn’t want to shatter this claim. The new Chinese leaders, the president Hu Jintao and the prime minister Wen Jiabao, have been following the dictum of “stability takes precedence over everything else” in the handling of Hong Kong’s political crisis. They probably believed that they had no other option except to continue to support Tung. Replacing him would generate more instability, as Beijing was concerned with Hong Kong’s demonstration effect on China, and the rise of the pro-democracy camp in the territory. The Chinese leadership’s clear support
for Tung naturally means deterrence against open criticism of the Tung administration. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders chose to help Hong Kong solve its economic problems. Assistance has been including a sharp increase in the number of tourists allowed to visit Hong Kong, a Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) giving Hong Kong better access to the China market, and political pressure on Guangdong to improve co-operation with the territory. Hong Kong people, especially the pro-Beijing united front and the business community, appreciate economic support from the central government but besides they also feel embarrassed by the fact that the HKSAR people enjoying a per capita annual GDP of over US$24,000 have to seek assistance from the Mainland people with a per capita annual GDP of about US$1,000.

In Hong Kong it is also already a truism that often it is not a case of Beijing asking the SAR administration to do this or that. It is more likely that SAR officials are trying to score points for themselves, or simply to be politically correct, by anticipating what Beijing may like to see and hear, argues Lam (2003). This state of affairs easily plays into the hands of conservatives in both Beijing and Hong Kong who, for ideological or opportunistic reasons, are averse to a faster pace of democratisation, Lam continues. This can also be seen as a benefit for Tung, who was appointed to a second term in 2002, although he realised that he would have not have been able to stay on if ordinary people had been given a choice in the selection of their top leader.

It was in the context of these developments above that Tung introduced the Article 23 legislation. Admittedly most people in Hong Kong did not have the time and expertise to go trough the bill in detail. But they certainly became concerned and worried when the legal profession, the social workers, the journalists, the librarians, the bankers, the Catholic Church and the Christian churches et cetera came out to articulate their opposition. The language itself in the Article 23 was probably not so bad; it is just that what people feel is behind it or what could be behind it. Now the Article 23 is kept concealed and all attention has been aimed to economical development, but the shadow is still hanging over there.
2.2 MIDDLE CLASS FRUSTRATION

The Hong Kong middle class was largely unprepared for the sudden downturn of the economy in years 1997-1998. Indeed, Hong Kong society at large, ranging from government officials to ordinary people on the street, was slow to react to the financial crisis in Southeast Asia. The handover on July 1, 1997, did not bring about the crisis of confidence and socio-economic turmoil (Lui 2003). Rather, the smooth transition created an environment for even bigger speculative bubble in the stock and property markets, so the crisis was a shocking surprise. The post-1997 years in Hong Kong have largely shattered the middle-class dream and pushed the middle class towards a rediscovery of politics. They have blamed Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa's mishandling of the economy and paternalistic style of governance. Many middle-class families find they no longer have a secure future to look to. Young university graduates are now earning salaries and taking up jobs which, a few years ago, were deemed fit only for secondary-school graduates. (South China Morning Post 08.10.03) The middle class began to see that macro restructuring in the socio-economic environment was changing the stable, secure and well-paid careers they had log enjoyed. Mid-career redundancy and salary cuts were found threatening. But the real blow came when they suffered an enormous loss in their investments. (Lui 2003) The middle class was and is frustrated.

As society becomes more open, a middle class with more education and stronger economic base is emerged, claiming citizens’ rights and trying to assert itself in the policy-making process. Lui wrote in June 2003 that it is still too early to say that the middle class in Hong Kong is really ready for more organized political actions and it is premature to say that a kind of middle class politics is ready for action. Still in July 2003 the middle class organized a huge democracy rally and what is clear is that Hong Kong’s middle class is facing a very different political and socio-economic environment. Referring Lui, it has new grievances and discontent, and is becoming aware of the need of articulating and defending its interests. More critically, the middle class has begun to cast doubt on the legitimacy and credibility of their long uncritically accepted Hong Kong style market driven capitalism and governance pattern. The SAR government does not offer the same kind of institutional arrangements to keep the middle class away from politics and leave them happy. While the distrust of China is still common among the middle class, the agenda of post-1997 is changing, says Lui. Again, the political orientation of the middle class is a topic for discussion. Given the underdevelopment of political
organizations among the middle class, however, it remains an open question to see how the middle class will react to this changing socio-economic and political environment. So far the most striking anger has turned out to mass demonstrations, but yet it has to be turned into organized political action.

The public sector is beginning to experience uncertainty as the government talks of voluntary retirement; job cuts and reduced funding for schools, universities, hospitals and welfare agencies. Such pessimism and despair bred the middle-class protests that exploded in July, triggered by fears of losing political freedoms and civil liberties under the government's proposed national security legislation. The concern for freedom and better governance has now fuelled a clear middle-class demand for constitutional reform and democratisation. At the same time, there are more middle-class voices seeking political spokespersons of their own - some having deserted pro-democracy parties which they regard as insufficiently sensitive to middle-class needs and aspirations. In conclusion, July 1 has marked a turning point in middle-class attitudes towards public affairs. Instead of continuing to engage in despair and self-pity, some middle-class professionals have taken matters into their own hands, rather than waiting for the government to act. The demonstration reflected commonly held views among Hong Kong’s middle class.

2.3 SOCIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RISE

Social activism is on the rise, like the Article 23 concern and the Protection of the Harbour\(^3\) campaign spearheaded by other professionals showed. South China Morning Post, October 2003, reported a recent conference organised by three independent think tanks; during the conference more than 400 participants pondered the future of Hong Kong and urged government reforms. They were predominantly middle-class, professional people. Such newfound activism is going to gradually transform the political scene. Hong Kong has passed from an era in the 1990s, when political activism was mainly based on parties, grassroots pressure groups and at times civil disobedience, to a new era of civil-society intervention, based on middle-class voluntary action and professional networking. New middle-class activists are setting up their own platforms for political participation and policy

\(^3\) The Protection of the Harbour Ordinance provides that the Victoria Harbour is the special public asset and natural heritage of all Hong Kong people and the Government must protect and preserve the Harbour. Government's reclamation projects over the years have substantially diminished the size of the Harbour. What is left of the existing Harbour are demanded to be treasured. (http://www.friendsoftheharbour.org, 06.02.04)
intervention. This is a different brand of politics: it will pose a new challenge to the government and parties alike.

The social movement literature (e.g. Butenhoff 1999, Touraine 1981), as well as conventional wisdom, tells that social movements bring change. These movements press the state to address their demands and as a result expand and create new avenues for participation. A key reason for success or failure of social movement activity is the presence or absence of civil society. Especially Gramsci (1971) and Habermas (1962) call for the importance of civil society. Butenhoff (Ibid.) argues that social movements are collective actions that challenge authorities to address their demands. The goal of social movement theory is to explain why they emerge, in what ways they act and behave, and when they occur. Consequently, the field is interested in explaining why individuals are willing to risk their personal safety. Individuals put themselves in jeopardy by going out into the streets, protesting, putting their names on petitions, or undertaking any of a number of actions that challenge the authority of state. Another aim of social movement theory is to explain the forces that drive and sustain social movements, such as, what issues, who participate, and how social movements are organized and structured. Hong Kong provides an intriguing case to study in regard to social movement theory because it is a society in transition in which the people have been able to organize themselves and press the government to recognize their demands for reform.

The rise of the social activism has been a tension also in whole China at least for 20 years now. Changes in the economic and political environment in China have brought many reforms and China’s civil society began growing rapidly during the 1980s. Still many scholars think that since 1978⁴, China has conducted thorough economic restructuring, but its political system has basically remained unchanged. This is a one-sided view, says Yu Keping (2000). Yu thinks that if the political system in question refers to a multi-party system, with a separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers, and representative democracy advocated by Western countries, we could say that China’s current political system is the same as the original system without substantial changes. However, a 'political system' has many aspects. Referring Yu, in addition to the above-mentioned features, it includes the legal system, the rule of law, the administrative system, the system of leadership, the

⁴ In 1978 China lead by Deng Xiaoping ended the central planning system and started the market transition. Mao died in 1976, and era after is also called the Post-Mao China.
electoral system, the supervisory system, the relationship between the party and the government, the relationship between the central and local authorities, et cetera. According to these many-sided criteria, it should generally be agreed that since the 1980s, China’s political system has also undergone tremendous changes and many of these changes directly or indirectly promote the development of civil society.

First, the government has paid increasing attention to the legal system and the rule of law, and citizens’ freedom of association has begun to become of substantial significance. The existence of civil society must first be legalised. According to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, citizens have freedom of association. This is a fundamental legal basis for civil society. But freedom of association was a mere scrap of paper prior to reform. If ordinary citizens applied for association without authorisation, it was impossible for them to secure the approval of the government. Worse still, they might suffer from political risks because of this. Therefore, no one applied to the government for voluntary association. As a result, all social associations were highly integrated with the Party and government departments, and there were no other civil organisations. Since reform policies were implemented, the Chinese government has begun emphasising the legal system and the rule of law, regarding them as the basic state policy and taking effective measures to ensure the administration of the country according to law. Citizens’ right of freedom of association has been fulfilled to some extent. If citizens apply to establish non-political social associations, they will not suffer from political pressure and their applications may be approved, Yu (2000) continues.

Second, the government has delegated many powers to lower levels. In a political sense, we can say that the process of political and economic reform in the last 20 years is a process of shift from high integration of the state and society to gradual disintegration. In this process, the government mainly delegated powers to society. First, the functions of government were separated from those of enterprises. The government delegated business management, and decision-making powers (including over personnel matters) to enterprises and most economic powers to society. Second, the central government delegated many powers to local governments. Since reform measures were implemented, local governments at all levels have had more powers with regard to cadre management, administration, social management, political and economic policy-making, taxation, finance and
banking. Lastly, the government gradually lifted control over the management of citizens, and the room for their free activities increased unprecedentedly.

Third, the government began changing its functions. China’s society prior to the 1980s was like a patriarchal family. Government at all levels played the parental role, and citizens the part of children. The parent was responsible for the future development of children and for their livelihood. As a consequence, government at all levels had too many departments and overstaffing was a problem. Since the 1980s, China's top leaders have tried to conduct political restructuring which aims at streamlining government departments and changing their functions. A few attempts at this have been made and efforts in this regard continue to date. (Yu 2000, 5-6) These reforms have generated useful experience and lessons, but we can confirm one point: the functions of the government have undergone great changes. Their economic and social functions have been weakened, and their administrative functions have been strengthened. The government no longer performs its management functions in most areas of production, business operation, civil affairs, culture, art and academic research, and it entrusts relevant civil organisations, for example, non-governmental professional associations, trade organisations and voluntary organisations, with these functions. So there is a room for the social activism and possibility to move on towards a real civil society. The Party and civil society associations can influence each other to improve governance. The biggest reform needed today is the building of a realistic national social security system in a country that is faced with privatisation, the ageing of the population and urbanization, which separates the elderly from their children.
3. ON CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society has a long history in the traditions of Western political thought. There are many definitions on civil society and there are considerable disagreements at the margins about what the concept includes and excludes. Castells (1997) sees civil society as a set of organizations and institutions, as well as a series of structured and organized social actors, which reproduce, albeit sometimes in a conflictive manner, the identity that rationalizes the sources of structural domination. The different roles, strategies, and interests of civil society and political society, as shown in comparative studies in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia, have engendered their clashes and decreased their mobilization for democratization (e.g. Sing 2004, Collier 1999). Nonetheless there is no a priori ground in denying the cooperation between civil society and political society in promoting democracy. Collaboration has especially arisen when the ruling authoritarian regimes have monopolized the political space and dwarfed the power of parties in political society. Civil societies in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Chile (Sing 2004) for instances, cooperated with parties and took up the dominant role, demanding democratic reform. In short, it is important to evaluate the actual relationship between civil society and political society in Hong Kong, by addressing two following points: the positions and strategies of the major social groups of civil society and political parties in political society with respect to democratization, and the degree of cooperation or conflict between civil society and political society in promoting democracy (Ibid.). The strength of mobilization of pro-democracy forces partly rests on the public attitudes towards democratic and authoritarian institutions.

3.1 PUBLIC SPHERE AND DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE

The concept of civil society has gained much currency in the literature of democratisation. Civil society, public sphere and democracy are hard to separate from each other. Historically the public sphere has played a central role in citizens’ struggle vis-à-vis the state. Habermas (1962) identifies the early bourgeois public sphere as part of the realm of civil society, which put the state in touch with society through the vehicle of public opinion. He idealizes the bourgeois public sphere as being capable of solving political disputes through rational-critical discourse. Building on, yet modifying, Habermas’s conception, Ku (2004) argues that ‘openness’ forms an integral part of the modern public sphere, which invokes an imagined public in democratic struggle against state secrecy. In Habermasian sense the
public sphere is rather class-bounded term, and the liberal civil society is not the same thing as the Habermas’s bourgeois civil society, but still public sphere is a significant word in the background of the civil society. Public sphere can be seen as mostly economical area and activity or as a special political sphere, where public discussion, political acts and public opinion play an important role. Habermas’s public sphere and bourgeois civil society are historical phenomenon that emerged as a consequence of a long process in the 17th and 18th centuries Western Europe and I won’t part it from its historical frames. But I use the word public sphere as a part of the civil society. Public sphere emerges when society is ready for it, which means there are markets, and functioning institutions forming the society.

In Hong Kong society media has played an important role and especially political parties rely heavily in the media for publicity, says Cheng (2004a, 9). Thereby public sphere constituted by private citizens who deliberate on issues of public concern can be seen as an intense part of the civil society in Hong Kong, or at least there is a potential for public sphere to become obvious. Policies such as opposition to Beijing and fighting for democracy are now diminishing appeal to most Hong Kong people. People expect advice from political parties on such issues as housing, education, funding, and medical insurance. When government proposals are severely criticized, people want to know what the alternatives are. Political actors also blame the media for taking no interest in serious policy research. Cheng says that political parties are only limitedly developed in Hong Kong and that reflects the political apathy of Hong Kong people. The pro-democracy camp might be active but its performance is often poor and this together with the lack of interest in general public is a serious obstacle to democratic development. Referring Butenhoff (1999, 5), throughout the history, it is argued that Hong Kong’s stability was due to Britain laissez-faire practises and its ability to absorb social problems. Yet, other explanations for Hong Kong’s stability portray the Hong Kong people as politically apathetic and point to the retention of cultural ties to China - a culture based on harmony. But like Lui and Chiu (1999) argue, in contrast to the claim that Hong Kong has been politically stable thanks to the colonial social and political order, it is also true that social movements have constituted and constitute an important part of Hong Kong’s social and political life.

It is also crucial to notice that apathy, as a simple idiom is not adequate explanation to stability. Apathy has been commonly treated as a natural trait in the Chinese national character, and seldom is
considered to be a psychological and behavioural manifestation contingent upon structural conditions. Furthermore, it is rare for the users of the term to dimensionize the concept, or to recognize that it is possible for the affective, evaluative, cognitive and behavioural dimensions of political apathy to vary independently without changing in the same direction to form a consistent syndrome (Lau 1993). There can be seen the need of a closer look at the interactions among the changing political opportunity structure, state-society relations, and the public discourse on politics. Lui and Chiu state that social movements in Hong Kong are both constitutes and constitutive of the political environment. On the other hand, they are socially constructed. The emergence of various kinds of social movements since the mid-1960s and the later proliferation of pressure group politics and party politics were outcomes of rising demands for social rights and political participation. The changing of state-society relations shaped the form taken by most social movements, primarily in terms of protest actions and the role of political opposition outside the political system. On the other hand, they have been constitutive of Hong Kong politics in that they have restructured public political discourse and open political opportunity. So after all, social movements are no marginals in the constitution of political life in Hong Kong.

The function of the public sphere crystallizes in the idea of public opinion (Habermas, 1962, 112). Public opinion means the rational opinion, which emerges from the civil society and is the element that gives substance and effect to popular sovereignty (Zolo 1992, 145). Freedom of public opinion may then be considered as the substantive and effective foundation of democracy. In an ideal system of democracy, public opinion is often assigned the role of a watchdog. It seems that the public sphere as a frame for public opinion exists in Hong Kong but it has not became widely aware. When the Communist party came to power in China, public opinion was subjected to the Party’s propaganda line. Looking at the role of public opinion and of the press during colonial times, we find a different picture. Traditionally, public opinion in Hong Kong could be said to serve to legitimise British colonial rule in the face of pressure from China, says Heike Holbig (2003, 195-6). During the years before the handover, Hong Kong press clearly continued to play a watchdog role, barking loudly both the Chinese and British negotiating teams. At the same time, the press began to act as a mirror, reflecting public opinion, Holbig (Ibid.) continues. Since the handover, local and foreign observers have monitored Hong Kong media closely. The development of press freedom has been measured against legal provisions and economic pressure as well as the personal and institutional intimidation of journalists
and editors, with optimistic and pessimistic accounts balancing each other. The question, if the media have been able to consolidate or even advance their role as a mirror of public opinion or whether, under the impact of the Communist Party’s monopoly on information and public articulation, they have gradually been ‘blinded’, is still open.

Still Hong Kong press can be seen to have gone some way towards emancipating itself during the years since the handover. The shift of the media’s focus from high political discourse to more down to earth matters, from agitating against China to pondering the internal affairs of the SAR, which has been seen as a dangerous sign of a depoliticization, could equally be welcomed as a healthy sign that Hong Kong society is getting to know itself, argues Holbig (2003). The July 2003 protests brought much publicity to the democracy activists but there is a concern that Hong Kong people’s passion may not last long. Also the victories of Democracy Party in many elections have increased the potency of democracy camp but it may still not be enough to actually go towards democracy. The pro-democracy camp understands that it cannot mobilize hundreds of thousands of people to march on the streets all the time: and it therefore hopes to use the elections to send a message to the Tung administration, to Beijing and to the world that Hong Kong people have not forgotten the demand for democratisation. Still the chances for the Chinese leadership to meet the civil society in the frames of the public sphere are low. The general belief is that Beijing will first study the lessons of the legislative elections in September 2004. Pessimists say that Hong Kong people will then be advised to wait for another five years.

Positive thinkers (e.g. Zhang 2003) see that China, with its tradition and culture, can perhaps develop a new model of civil society in which the state, the non-governmental sector, and the commercial sector can collaborate, and supplement each other’s role. A win-win situation can be achieved if the state and society seek to build a synergetic approach in dealing with one another. Actually in Hong Kong over the last two decades has been already developed a vibrant civil society. Sometimes it is even said that civil liberties and civil society are precisely what distinguish Hong Kong from China. China promised Hong Kong 50 years of its own system of civil liberties and now after seven years of peaceful exercise of those liberties, the publication of Article 23 has aroused fears of losing those freedoms.

5 See e.g. South China Morning Post 24.11.03. The Democratic Party secured 95 out of the 120 seats their candidates contested in the District Council Elections in 23.11.03.
In conclusion the next and final element that is to be integrated to the theory of civil society, political society, and public sphere is the political culture, particularly the public attitudes and reactions towards democracy and/or authoritarianism. The political orientation of the people can affect democratic transitions. Public pressure arising from the need for the political change is important to inducing obstinate authoritarian regimes to initiate transitions and to adhere to them (Sing 2004). In opposition, when the public cast doubt on the legitimacy of authoritarianism, or harbour a belief in the value of democratic institutions, authoritarian rule by consent or hegemony becomes much harder. The Tiananmen incident is a sadly famous example about hard actions of hegemonic regime. Hence, among different political attitudes or cultures, I will in particular focus on the political dialogue on the authoritarian vs. democratic juxtaposition, and the strength or weakness of both pro-democracy groups and anti-democratic front.

3.2 IS IT ONLY ELITE ACTIONS?

Hong Kong state is bureaucratic polity dominated by an administrative class. There is a feeling of confusion at all levels. Traditionally in Chinese society the political elite does not rely on general public’s awareness or activity. It is the administrative class, with strong social and ideological cohesion and shared professional interests and cultural values that had hold power in Hong Kong (Castells 1990, 127). They have exercised this power while keeping in mind the interests of the business elite. With regard to the representation of the common people’s interests, the culture of the administrative class can be labelled as paternalistic, that is serving the people (without their participation as citizens) in the terms the officers understands to be the best, without entering too much in contact with the local society (Ibid, 128). It is also generally expected that the Chinese leadership will make the decision on Hong Kong’s democratisation process. Ming Sing (2004) calls this approach an elite-centred transition perspective. Champions in the elite-centred transition approach contend that structural factors including socio-economic development do not determine whether democratic transition will occur. Before and during democratic transitions, complex interaction between different groups and individuals with different and changing preferences creates an indeterminacy, which no simple and fixed structural variables can explain. I will come back this bargaining vision in the empirical part of thesis; at this point it is important that among the multiple actors involved, presumption is that the governing elites’ opinions count most.
The elite have been very important factor in the Hong Kong society also during the British colonialism. Behind the communal claims of prosperity and stability was a strong inclination for the colonial system of elite privilege and executive domination to remain as a bulwark against the rising public, says Ku (2001). The whole political system under colonial rule was very elitist and paternalist, and in such small area like Hong Kong those elements can have particular deep forms. The distance between the colonial government and the people was increased by the very character of the colonial government, which was a 'pure, secluded, and faceless bureaucracy', argues Lau and Kuan (1988, 21). Also important society actors like the Jockey Club have been more or less elite groups. The top-down viewpoint has dominated Chinese thought, liberal as well as Marxist, and in Hong Kong during as well colonial as Chinese time, up to today, being based on the tradition-rooted distinction between ordinary citizens and "true intellectuals". As Yu (2000, 20) says, China’s civil society is a typical government-led one and has an obvious official-civil duality. This duality and other Chinese cultural characteristics (Lau and Kuan, 1988) can be seen also in Hong Kong, even though unlike traditional and even contemporary China, Hong Kong is an industrialized, modernized and predominantly urban society exposed to Western acculturation and immersed in cosmopolitanism.

In modern Chinese thought, as well as in the west, civil society has been typically seen as a saintly, utopian gemeinschaft free of selfishness, pervaded with sincerity, lacking all constraints limiting properly free individual desires, free of exploitation, without any conflicts or feelings of alienation coming between people, and also free of all ideological confusion - a great oneness. (Metzger1998) Metzger’s argument about prudence is twofold. On one hand, this top-down approach is advisable given current Chinese conditions, at least on the Mainland. On the other hand, with its utopianism, the modern Chinese intellectual mainstream has been disastrously imprudent. For many Chinese intellectuals, prudence has been a morally suspicious concept amounting to nothing more than an apology for the corrupt vested interests of elites. Government servants in Western societies are bound to be not only responsive to requests from taxpayers but also active in the enforcement of laws and regulations. In Chinese societies, their character is generally quite different. Chinese civil servants are dictating elite whose duty was, and still is, to carry out the wishes of a controlling minority, enlightened or not. Their responsiveness to individuals depends of the individual’s social status. Complaining may also lead to a loss of face and goes against the pragmatic nature of most Chinese people.
Some special features rise forth from the Hong Kong elite. Lau and Kuan (1988) write about the increased role of wealth in the elite status in Hong Kong, though the traditional elite characteristics like education, governmental service and proficiency in English are still also valid. From the Lau and Kuan’s description we can note several salient features of especially the Chinese elites in Hong Kong. Most of them came from the humble origins, which is a mark of the openness of Hong Kong society. The elite class is an open and non-exclusive group. There is no closed upper caste to severely restrict mobility opportunities in society. Elite status is not based on cultural accomplishments, moral excellence or political achievements, but most importantly, on economic success; this is quite big contrary to Mainland China. The values embodied in the Hong Kong elites differ from their counterparts in China. Their moral status is weak, and they have no sense of cultural or moral mission. The dominance of this amoral elite results to rampant of materialism and utilitarianism. The spread of Christianity by the missionary schools that many of the elites have attended might have tempered the rampant materialism among the populace, but their modest influence has proved to be too weak to make a noticeable dent in the Chinese psyche, particularly when it runs against the spirit of a booming economy, claim Lau and Kuan. So the nature of the Hong Kong economy further enhances the economic clout of the local bourgeoisie. Now the business elite has dominated the political system over 150 years in remarkably successive way. The heroic image of the economically successful mitigates potential sentiments of class antagonism but on the other hand, reliance on foreign markets and dependence on foreign direct investment induce a sense of economic inefficacy among the people, who have no means to control their economic future. Economy as the greatest elite in Hong Kong leaves a little space to more variegated thoughts from the civil society, democracy claims as a one pattern.

It is also almost needless to say that elite support to the government is essential to the survival of any political regime. The Chinese elite in Hong Kong comprises entrepreneurs, industrialists, social notables and other prominent individuals. They are successful individuals, but generally speaking are not recognized leaders of social or political groups, says Lau (1993). In passive sense, elite support does contribute to political stability in Hong Kong. Elite support, on the other hand, is no solid guarantee of political stability. The lack of powerful linkages between the elite and the masses means that whenever troubles break out, the elite cannot be relied upon masses, and this observation is particularly pertinent in cases of anomic riots or movement led by anti-government leaders (Lau 1993).
Elite approach links to the hegemonic narrative of political stability and economic success that has dominated Hong Kong, and is now being challenged by the civil society movement. Now when at least the lower-level elite members have also joined to the anti-government fronts, the stability of Hong Kong is really threatened. The elite-government collaboration is no longer, if ever, enough assertive mean to warrant the non-involvement of the general public. I cannot explain Hong Kong’s politics by looking only at the elite, so it is imperative that I also pay attention on the political orientations and behaviour of the common people, the civil society, and their relationships within the society.
4. CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG

The origins of Hong Kong civil society can be found in the more economic than political factors. The Chinese society and especially the business culture had been based on networks of trust and cooperation for centuries and nowadays family firms and cross-sectoral business networks are still the main basis for their national economy. The key component for the whole Chinese society is the family, not the individual, so the emerging Chinese civil society is also based on families and networks. And above individual and above family is the state. In China state has always pre-empted the civil society and the civil society is usually not seen as a counterforce for state. In Chinese history, civil society was contained within the political state. The Confucian social order and the dominance of the state over civil society in traditional China meant that it was the prerogative of the state to mould society in such a manner that a favourable social environment could be created (Lau and Kuan 1988). Both the moralizing function of the state and the lack of institutional autonomy of civil society legitimised the social interventionism of the state, which felt free to create social organizations as well as change or suppress existing ones (Ibid.). The emergence of a relatively independent civil society is therefore a product of modern China. Quoting Castells (1996. 187), the story is more complex in the case of Hong Kong. The basis of the industrial structure of Hong Kong was made from small and medium businesses that originated mainly from family savings, starting with 21 industrialist’ families who emigrated from Shanghai after the communist revolution. But the British colonial government aimed at making Hong Kong into a showcase for the successful implementation of the British colonialism, and British civil servants built a network of governmental institutions to diffuse information about markets, technology, management, and other critical matters. Without these functions the original networks would never have been able to tap into the global markets. This linkage between supportive government and family-based business networks relies behind the success of Hong Kong and also behind the elite position of the state-capital alliance in the society. The new forms of civil society like the democracy activists have to struggle against this powerful alliance and this kind juxtaposition is new and sometimes shocking figure of civil society interaction in Hong Kong.
Centre for Civil Society and Governance in Hong Kong claims that over the past two decades, Hong Kong has developed an increasingly important and vibrant civil society. In the year 2000 policy address, the Chief Executive acknowledged this importance and observed that the ‘third sector’, which is defined as organizations, which are neither profit-oriented businesses or government agencies, can often find solutions to social problems that appear intractable to both the market and Government. In the following year, the government announced the establishment of a $300 million Community Investment and Inclusion Fund, designed to encourage the building up of social capital, community participation and the development of the third sector. These initiatives have been welcomed by peak organizations, such as the Hong Kong Council of Social Service, the Legislative Council and many voluntary organizations. These structural initiatives suggest that there may be difficulties in the relationships of civil organizations with the market and with government; that their full potential is yet to fully realise and that there may be duplication of function and contradiction of purpose. Anna Wu, the Chairperson of the Equal Opportunities Commission, was once asked why there were so many NGOs in Hong Kong. She replied that, perhaps among other factors, it had to do with a permissive rather than prescriptive legal system, with the mobilization of social forces that was ‘undirected, widely participatory and bottom up’ and with government policies in which a large space is carved out for the community. These features of the Hong Kong system have made for large numbers of civil organizations - some highly visible, others not - who can, under some circumstances play highly positive roles in the achievement of social policy objectives but who may also wish to see their own values more fully represented in policy and who can act as a serious obstacle when policies come into conflict with their own aims.

Hong Kong is a part of China, but is Hong Kong civil society the same thing as Chinese civil society? Referring Yu (2000), China's civil society is a government-led and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are in transition. China's CSOs are not institutionalised and the development of the current civil organisations is rather uneven, and there are significant disparities in social, political and economic influence and status between different civil organisations. Also the problems that civil society in China confronts include different issues. Most of the civil

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6 The University of Hong Kong established the Centre for Civil Society and Governance in December 2002 with the aim of enhancing knowledge of the nature, constituents, and roles of civil society and, in particular, the contribution that civil society can make towards good governance. http://www.hku.hk/ppaweb/form/CCSG-Description.pdf, 12.3.04.
organisations are too dependent on the Party and government organs of political power. They have a strong official nature and the functions, which many civil organisations claim to perform, fall far short of their actual roles, which are often restricted by local Party and government organs. Some civil organisations also impose mandatory obligations on their members. Unlike other official organisations, civil organisations have a distinctive feature, that is, their members join organisations and participate in their activities on a voluntary basis. China's civil organisations have a long way to go in this respect. The various professional associations, chambers of commerce, academic organisations, charity organisations and professional organisations have many mandatory obligations, which their members must perform. In a more or less narrower sense, same things are seen also in Hong Kong’s civil society.

Wong Yiu-chung (2001) has studied Hong Kong society, 'One country, two systems'-model in practise. His six-point study is a part of my own theory framework. Wong splits Hong Kong society in to two camps. First there is pro-one country camp, which comprises the leftist politicians, members of China official establishment and some pro-China businessmen, and secondly there is pro-two systems faction, which consists of mostly democrats, academics and journalists. Castells (1997) starts with building the models and origins of identity forming. He says that legitimising identity generates a civil society. This legitimising means introducing identity by the dominant institutions of society and in Hong Kong case that means local government with Beijing impact. However Castells sees this classical civil society somewhat capable of challenging the state power, because of the continuity between civil society’s institutions and the power apparatuses of the state, and because of both are organized around similar identity of citizenship, democracy and the politicisation of social change. But what if democracy and citizenship are not evident, like in the case of Hong Kong? Castells has also two other identities, the resistance identity and the project identity. The resistance identity leads to the formation of communities, and even if Castells sees this probably the most important type in our society I don’t fully accept it into the identity building of Hong Kong people. Religious fundamentalism, territorial communities, nationalist self-affirmation or the sense of alienation (Castells 1997, 9) are not important issues here. The third case, project identity is a project of a different life, here on the basis of an oppressed identity of people in Hong Kong. This project identity is also expanding toward the transformation of society as for claiming the full democracy. So when Hong Kong is a prosperous modern society but not fully developed in the sense of democracy or civil society, the identity of it can
be described both with the legitimising and project identity but essentially as an uncompleted identity. Here starts construction of so called civil society in Hong Kong and especially it’s most visible form, a social movement called pro-democracy group.

Amongst identities, networks are important factors in Castells theory. What networks do is to constitute the new social morphology of societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture. Given that Hong Kong society is not to compare direct with Western societies, but still the networking logic of the information age is penetrating it, I have developed a suitable mode for Hong Kong. It is about struggling network coalitions of traditional Chinese network society and modern Castellsian network society. And contemporary social and political movements are actors in a central conflict between networks and collective identities. Social movements are all symptoms of our societies and all impact social structures, with variable intensities and outcomes. I have used Castells adaptation of Alain Touraine’s classic typology that defines a social movement by three principles: the movement’s identity, the movement’s adversary, and movement’s vision or social model, which Castells calls societal goal. Identity refers to the self-definition of the movement of what it is, adversary refers to the movement’s principal enemy and societal goals refers to the movement’s vision of the kind of social order, or social organization, it would wish to attain. In short, to Castells social movements are purposive collective actions whose outcome, in victory as in defeat, transforms the values and institutions of society. Social movements are not good or bad, progressive or regressive; they are all symptoms of who we are.
Here presented the definition of Hong Kong democracy movement with the Castells’ model of social movements as collective actions:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Adversary</th>
<th>Goal</th>
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<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>general HK people,</td>
<td>Old system,</td>
<td>Fully democratic</td>
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<tr>
<td>pro-democracy</td>
<td>networking,</td>
<td>personified often</td>
<td>system to HKSAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>activists</td>
<td>middle-class</td>
<td>to Tung Chee-wa</td>
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Activist’s identity culminates to the being of ordinary Hong Kong people. They are middle class, they are usual working people who are now networking and mobilizing to express their thoughts. Activists are opposed to the authoritative adversary on behalf a higher societal goal, which, if trusting Castells (1997, 106), leads to integration between their specific identity and the well being of society at large.

The democracy activists are the main societal group in my study. Then who are actually democracy activists? They are academics, students, church servants, social workers, and journalists, active and concerned people mainly with the middle class status. They are definitely part of the pro-two systems faction. They are not necessarily anti-China, antagonizing the Mainland is rather sensitive business and not everyone is ready to do that, but for example the young Turks of the Democratic Party are some of those Beijing critics. It is either not the whole middle class that is calling for democracy, actually, excluding the mass rallies, rather small number of people have been fighting for democracy.

Who exactly organized the July 1 rally? It is actually an alliance of pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong, and that alliance is more than just the Democratic Party. In fact the Democratic Party is not very popular among the people in Hong Kong, in general the pro-China Party have been more popular. A lot of people think that the Democratic Party have failed to identify and fix the problems relating to livelihood issues (Hung, 2003). Still the Democratic Party seems to share lots of opinions with the general public. They say that if the Tung administration believes that the security bill will be better accepted when the economy improves, then the messages of the July 1 protest may not have been fully understood. If this is not just political talk, the claims about democrats’ untenability seem not so truthfully predictive.
Apart from the Democratic Party and its supporters it is important to focus on different other groups who command a lot of respect in Hong Kong. One important group is barristers in Hong Kong. Hong Kong still has two legal professions: solicitors and barristers. Hong Kong people generally believe - with a certain degree of bias - that barristers know more about law and are more willing to stand up to the government. Because they have been so well respected, Hong Kong people just trust them. Hong Kong people think this way: if these barristers oppose this national security law, like they did, there must be something wrong with this draft. Other groups are radio and television talk show hosts. They play a significant role. These hosts include professors and other independent pro-democracy people. (Hung 2003) One talk show host actually holds a column in South China Morning Post. On the other hand, some famous groups like Falun Gong are not very important factors in the pro-democracy movement. Pei (2003) underlines that Falun Gong had nothing to do with the demonstrations in Hong Kong. If they had had something to do with rally, that would have really complicated the situation because the more Falun Gong get involved on anything, the hard-liner Beijing will become.

People behind the rally were from groups that are used to see very apolitical. They are university people, guesthouse attendants, librarians, young people, and accountants and so on - they all went to the rally. So it is really a broad segment of society, and mostly middle class elements in Hong Kong. Hong Kong middle class is activated because of cumulative effects from three important issues. Hung (2003) says that one activist explained to her why he protested. He put it this way: I have less money now (not “no money”), then the government put my health at risk during the Sars outbreak, and now they want to take away my freedoms. So the financial crisis, Sars epidemic and releasing Article 23 have been the main driving forces to the pro-democracy activists. One of the positive outcomes of the Sars outbreak was that Hong Kong citizens felt more empowered as they saw that they could positively affect their city. As tourism and business dropped to record lows, and Hong Kong people were forced to slow down, citizens had a chance to find out what was important in life other than materialistic concerns. Many Hong Kong people believed that the government was slow to react to the crisis and felt that they themselves had to create initiatives to compensate for the lack of leadership. A huge surge of civic energy emerged to examine social responsibilities such as promoting better hygiene and caring for the environment.
Much has been written about the ‘unholy alliance’ between the big business and Beijing to ensure ‘stability and prosperity’ for fifty years. The state-capital alliance has been seen as the major opposing force for democracy. Using Castells’ terms one network is dominating another less dynamic and powerful network. Economic prosperity and political stability are the basis of the hegemonic rhetoric still in postcolonial Hong Kong. The political system under British colonial rule was one of elitism and paternalism within an administrative discourse of public interest (Ku 2001, 127). The new government is not much different. After the handover 1997, the SAR government continued to displace the democratic agenda by drawing on the rhetoric of success - in terms of a rosy picture of strengths and opportunities ahead (Ibid. 131). The sectors that Tung has succeeded to unite or co-opt include the business community, the traditional left wing or pro-China establishment, and ordinary citizens resigned to the fact that they have to acknowledge Beijing’s suzerainty in return for jobs and economic security. But when jobs and economic security are on unstable ground, people are less likely to trust the government. The question about economic security links to the question about social rights and freedom. Like Chack-kie Wong said in South China Morning Post 03.11.03, the July 1 rally might show that Hong Kong people are now even more concerned about their civil and social rights compared with the times before.

Also the church assigns a rather big role within a pluralist society of Hong Kong. Different congregations have had a rather big role in providing welfare in area; above all the Western missionary work has been significant. Congregation work or charity organizations like the Jockey Clubs are not in important position in this study and I don’t intervene to their heritage or norms, but in the focus you find active, more political groups, especially particular amendment forces like democracy movement. Still is important to notice that nowadays more and more church actives are also democracy activists. I use the word civil society in its quite political sense but in the wide fundament of the term lays a variegated mass. The Christian community in Hong Kong has mainly been preoccupied with social services and preaching the gospel, acting as the government’s partner rather than its critic (Sing 2004). Also the financial dependence of the mainline Protestant churches and the Catholic Church has further undermined their readiness to confront the government (Ibid.).
Since 1915 The Hong Kong Jockey Club has contributed substantial funds towards charitable and worthy causes that have benefited Hong Kong. "Racing for Charity" is the Club's historic commitment to Hong Kong and the cornerstone of their unique business model. Working with the government and non-profit agencies, the Jockey Club aims to bring a better quality of life to the people of Hong Kong and immediate relief to those most in need. In addition to this ongoing work, the Club also proactively identifies and generates projects that anticipate future community and social needs. The Jockey Club has been a player in a social network of the political elite and the economic bourgeoisie, although the economic bourgeoisie like Jockey Club has been under the clear supremacy of the real political elite. There are many opinions about the Jockey Club, but like Castells (1990, 129) says that it is one of the greatest myths about Hong Kong is the widely held belief that especially colonial Hong Kong was run from the capitalists circles of the Jockey Club.

Hong Kong has more or less lacked militant labour union, and student bodies, which were the important impelling forces from civil society for bottom-up democratisation for example in South Korea during the 1980s. Also church activists and academics are generally seen as having no political ambitions. It is significant that now new acting groups such as Power for Democracy, Hong Kong Democratic Development Network and Civil Human Rights Front are often dominated by church activists and academics (Cheng 2004b, 13). At this stage, these groups attempt to bring together various types of organizations in support of democracy and human rights, especially while there is a decline in appeal of the pro-democracy political parties.

4.1 DIVIDED OPINIONS

Less than half of Hong Kong people believe they are enjoying basic rights such as freedom of speech and the right to live in a clean environment, a several Chinese University study have found (South China Morning Post e.g. 15.11.03). Ninety per cent of respondents said they should be guaranteed a wide range of rights in a developed city like Hong Kong. Observers said the findings showed many people felt their basic rights were not properly protected and reflected a general lack of faith in the government while 94.5 per cent of people believed a person should be equal before the law; only one-third believed this right was protected in Hong Kong. Nearly 90 per cent said a citizen should be

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7 The Hong Kong Jockey Club, http://www.hongkongjockeyclub.com, 27.01.04
8 Reported in South China Morning Post, 03.11.03
guaranteed freedom of speech, but only 40 per cent felt this right was protected. Researchers (e.g. Wong 2002) have also studied the attitudes of the Hong Kong voters towards China and Hong Kong. About the identity and the ethnical and cultural sense surveys show that both localistic sentiments towards Hong Kong and nationalistic sentiments towards China were simultaneously prevalent among Hong Kong voters. A varying large majority in Hong Kong agrees that the success of Hong Kong today is totally due to the Hong Kong’s people cleverness and diligence, that Hong Kong is the most felicitous Chinese society, and that Hong Kong people are able to govern Hong Kong well. At the same time, a similar varying large majority (55.5 - 82.2 %) thinks that Chinese people are hard-working, that they are proud of Chinese history and culture, and that the 21st century will be the Chinese century.

What really divide the Hong Kong voters are political issues, particularly the issue of Hong Kong-Mainland relations, writes Wong (2002, 172). Less than a half of the Wong’s study respondents agreed that the Hong Kong SAR government is trustworthy and that Hong Kong’s democratic conditions are satisfactory. The attitudes towards the politics of China were even more negative. Only 16-25 % believed that the Chinese central government is trustworthy, and that China’s democratic and freedom conditions are satisfactory. This should be largely due to the still authoritarian nature of Chinese regime. In this regime, not only the political system undemocratic, its conditions for freedom are also criticized both locally and internationally. This contradicts the ideology of Hong Kong voters, who accord more value to individual freedom and rights than to national interests.

When it came to social rights, although 91.6 per cent believed they had the right to live in a clean environment, only 20.3 per cent said they enjoyed this in Hong Kong. The findings also showed that 81.8 per cent thought they should have the right to ask the government to use public money properly, but only a quarter said they enjoyed such a right in reality. Social work professor Wong Chack-kie said the government should be aware that many people believed their basic rights were not being fulfilled. "The government has, at times, taken actions that have given the public the impression that civil and social rights are not properly protected," Wong said. He also showed that the Article 23 legislation was an example of how Hong Kong people felt the government was trying to suppress their right of expression. "All these have undermined the image of the government and its leadership," and "Government officials should explain clearly to the public how it was justified to reach those decisions," said Wong.
Hong Kong people have a strong sense of belonging to the territory - but are distrustful of political institutions, a university study released on November 25 2003 showed (South China Morning Post, 15.11.03). Confidence in political bodies, particularly the Chief Executive and his cabinet, is very low. Reasons for impaired social cohesion can be searched from the economic issues, such as unemployment, negative equity and the gap between rich and poor. From the mass demonstration on July 1, pro-government politicians have suffered a backlash; a somewhat political crisis has been reality in the administration. Regaining the trust of the people after the mass rally is a big challenge to the Hong Kong government.

So in Hong Kong civil society is now challenging and putting pressures over the SAR government. What I am aiming to clear up is what kind of discussion this situation creates and how different parties respond to pressures. Hong Kong pro-democracy movement is still weak, the government has been refusing a dialogue, and people are not too interested in democracy, but for example July 1 rally could be seen both ending and beginning of a certain development. Ending it is because it was kind of polarisation point of democracy demands. Beginning it is since it brought lot of publicity to pro-democracy activists and drove democracy discussion onwards. Improving economy is not enough to sustain stability in society is a quite clear message from the people of Hong Kong. Anthony Cheung Bing-leung in the South China Morning Post, 8 October 2003, said that Hong Kong has passed from an era in the 1990s, when political activism was mainly based on parties, grassroots pressure groups and at times civil disobedience, to a new era of civil-society intervention, based on middle-class voluntary action and professional networking. New middle-class activists are setting up their own platforms for political participation and policy intervention. This is a different brand of politics: it will pose a new challenge to the government and parties alike.
4.2. POLITICAL ACTORS

Alvin So has identified six important political actors for Hong Kong’s democratisation. First the British and Hong Kong Governments, secondly the Chinese Government and the Pro-Beijing forces, thirdly big businessmen, fourthly corporate professionals, fifthly service professionals, and sixthly grassroots. Those actors have played different roles and formed different alliances with varied strengths at different times as the democracy project unfolded. In this study it is concentrated on two larger alliances, the Hong Kong and Chinese Governments, and versatile civil society groups culminating to the pro-democracy camp. Market forces are left aside, but the impact of business is always somewhat present in Hong Kong. Alvin So also classified and conceptualised the democratic development of Hong Kong into different phases. In short, he has explained the conversion of the state of Hong Kong from a non-democracy before the 1980s to a restricted democracy in the late 1980s, then to a contested democracy in the early 1990s, the back to a restricted democracy in the late 1990s. Also Lau and Kuan have conducted a number of vigorous research studies over the years. They have laid the overall emphasis on the Chinese Government opposition and the political and economic dependence of Hong Kong on China as the crucial structural constrain, but So has pointed out also the great importance to social domestic forces in explaining Hong Kong’s democratic development, sums up Sing. Sing also demonstrates that Hong Kong’s democracy has consistently been a product of implicit or explicit bargaining of different state and societal actors. (So 1999, Kuan and Lau e.g. 1995, Sing 2004) What is almost universally agreed in the pro-democracy camp is that 66-years old Tung must go before there can be any progress (Far Eastern Economic Review 24.07.3). The problem for Beijing is that allowing Tung to resign and appointing a more popular replacement is unlikely to satisfy the growing desire for democracy.

Theories of the modernization paradigm and the transition approach have also recognized the potent impact of international forces of democratisation. Among the sixty-one democracies listed by Freedom House during the 80s, with the exception of six, all the rest could trace the origins of democracy to decolonisation, or to the allied victories on the Second World War, or to Gorbachev’s approval of democratisation in Eastern Europe at the dawn of the Cold War (Whitehead 1991). Given that Hong Kong had been a colony of Britain for over 150 years, and that it was scheduled in 1984 to be returned to China 1997, the question how the international factors of the British and Chinese Governments have
impinged upon the democratization of Hong Kong obviously warrant attention (Sing 2004). Many democratic transitions arise from transaction or bargaining among different political forces. An important insight derived from the transition approach is that leading authoritarian elites are compelled to make concessions, and unleash democratization during their interaction or bargaining with various forces, when the benefits attached to political relaxation outweigh those attached to suppression, writes Sing (2004). For instance, authoritarian regimes including Brazil, Spain, and Taiwan, started the transition by negotiations between oppositional forces and authoritarian elites. Now in Hong Kong they are trying to start the negotiations. Pro-democracy forces can promote democratization by increasing costs of continuing authoritarian rule by discrediting its legitimacy and changing the calculus of authoritarian leaders. Sing says that treating democratic transitions as a process of bargaining, three elements are found to be crucial to the conceptual edifice in an integrated approach: interests, cleavages, and political opportunities. In the light of my studies, hitherto in Hong Kong cleavages have been in the leading role, but interests are gradually reaching completion and becoming clearer. Political opportunities are the most complex element.

Have social movements actually made a difference in Hong Kong society in the past? Is there a real civil society and if so, has it grown because of social movement activity? Butenhoff (1999, 113) argues that the independent labour movement, the non-traditional Christian movement and the democracy movement have increased the urgency for political reforms and support for autonomous Hong Kong. She also concludes that many of the social movement organizations that emerged in the 1980s have become political parties in order to take part in direct elections. It may be asserted that this is a sign of social movement success. Accordingly, civil society has grown and more people have a platform to express their concerns and ideas. Activists stress that they will continue to be involved in constructing a society that protects democracy and human rights.

4.3 ON DEMOCRACY AND ACTIVISM

The absence of democracy has been very important fact in the Hong Kong polity. There were no elections of any kind until the 1980’s and the first wholly elected Legislative Council was achieved only in 1995. The lack of democracy means different things like an absence of direct political pressure to the government. Issues, like civil service, which in other societies would be seen as political, are
depoliticised. This is partly the product of the nature of Chinese culture and partly the product of the absence of the political institutions that are needed for the expression of political ideas and the extension of political pressures. (Wilding 1996, 7) According to Xu Chongde, a Basic Law drafter in China, China definitely has to have a democracy, which would safeguard Hong Kong's prosperity and stability, but not a kind of democracy that betrays the national interest. Xu also accentuates defining what real democracy is and what fake democracy is. Xu's comments at the conference in Hong Kong are interpreted as an attempt to abbreviate hopes that Beijing will allow direct election by the earliest dates set out in the Basic Law. (Far Eastern Economic Review 25.03.04) But it's worth noting that the concept of law in China is at variance with norms in much of the rest Asia, and especially Hong Kong. Communist regimes make and remake laws to perpetuate their rule, laws are meant to be instruments of state. Laws cannot protect people from state intrusion. So Chinese advises on democracy must be taken with scepticism.

In Carnegie Endowment report "Political crisis in Hong Kong: Implications for China and United States” is discussed about democracy and the prospects of having full democracy in Hong Kong. Most Hong Kong people demand that when the next chief executive is elected in 2007, universal suffrage should be used. They also demand that all legislators in Hong Kong should be directly elected in 2008 and urged Tung Chee-wa to step down. Hong Kong is a free region but it has never been a democracy. What free is supposed to mean is that the government doesn't impede economic growth and wealth creation. Activists believe that there are people in Hong Kong, prompted by lessons of the past, who understand the critical necessity for democratic systems to remain in place in Hong Kong and to continue to gather strength in the future in order to prevent the Beijing government from having unchecked influence over the governance of Hong Kong. Popular democracy, and pressure from the grassroots level, will be crucial in keeping alive the hope that Hong Kong would move on from a colonial system under the British to true autonomy after 1997. Founded on the premise that accurate information is absolutely critical to monitoring the way of life and the rights of the Hong Kong people after the transition to Chinese rule, the activists seek to create a space which chronicles the activities of the grass-roots democracy movement of Hong Kong, and the political climate in which it operates through the period of transition and beyond. Given that, at the time of the founding of this organization, indications are that freedom of the press, whether by self-censorship or by direct government intervention, is under imminent threat, such an endeavour seems the only way to continue the free
discussion of the performance of Hong Kong’s government in safeguarding the fundamental rights of society.

The pro-democracy movement was in difficult state in the year before the massive protest rally. There was considerable frustration with the lack of progress as no one expected any breakthrough before 2007. Even the political parties in the pro-democracy camp did not believe that democratisation was an issue with much political appeal. The Democratic Party (the party with most seats in the legislature) and its allies could make very little impact on the government’s policy-making process. In fact, there had been little meaningful consultation between the pro-democracy groups and the government. As the Tung administration enjoyed the backing of a safe majority in the legislature, it did not have to lobby for the approval of the pro-democracy groups, which were treated as the opposition. (Cheng 2004b, 10-11) Before Hong Kong’s return to China, there was substantial moral and public opinion pressure to maintain unity within the pro-democracy camp. Such pressure evaporated after July 1997. Cheng calls young Turks those non-mainstream factions in the Democratic Party who felt frustrated and attempted to challenge the leadership first in 1998. Young Turks were not interested in a better in relationship with the HKSAR government or improving relations with the Chinese authorities and they publicly called the resignation of Tung Chee-hwa.

The above differences remain controversial among pro-democracy groups today. There are other types of problems as well. To attract the media’s attention, the pro-democracy parties usually have to dramatize their gestures and statements. A harsh criticism against Beijing leads to making headlines in the newspapers but seldom to a balanced statement. The success with the media also makes it very difficult for pro-democracy leaders to establish a dialogue of mutual trust with senior Civil servants, says Cheng. The groups have also offered convenient excuses to the Chinese officials for rejecting any contacts with them. Such political posing often has a negative impact also on the intelligentsia’s support.

The pro-democracy political parties have relationships with the grassroots community organizations, which emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s, and which have been supporting pro-democracy groups. Political parties certainly can help to raise issues of importance to grassroots community organizations in the legislature. But their high profile and eagerness for publicity often result in failures to
compromise and in delays in achieving settlements. (Cheng, 2004b, 12-13) Many grassroots organizations therefore worry that they may be taken for a ride, and they often prefer to act without the involvement of political parties. After all, the grassroots community organizations are issue-oriented; they want concrete solutions to their problems. After the splits in the pro-democracy political camp, there exerted a pressure on grassroots community to take sides. The pro-Beijing political groups eagerly court them too. So the dissatisfaction with the Tung administration produced a massive protest rally on July 1, 2003. It was a major boost for the morale of Hong Kong pro-democracy movement and to the civil society in general. The opposition to the Article 23 legislation was linked to the demand for democracy. Now the demand for democracy has been strengthened and it can no longer be avoided by the Tung administration.

Also the pro-democracy movement’s problems remain; its biggest challenge is to maintain the movement’s momentum and the people’s interest in the cause (Cheng 2004b, 13). The business community in Hong Kong keeps conservative and has reservations regarding democratisation. Businessmen are also unhappy with the Tung administration because most of them have lost more than a half of their fortunes since Tung assumed the power. But the business community does not trust either the pro-democracy camp, and believe that their privileges and interests will be threatened if full democracy is to be implemented in the territory. Further, tycoons consider that their interests have been well respected by the Chinese leaders, and they therefore prefer lobbying Beijing than engaging the democratic process. (Cheng 2004b, 15) The Lack of collaboration between the business class and the democracy forces is one very important barrier for democracy. Also cooperation between the civil society and political society should improve.

One point is that some pro-democracy activists, especially the organizers of the demonstrators may be not mature enough. They might put too many things on the agenda to actually gain their goals. Hung (2003) adduces that for example in one demonstration, activists invited some speakers who urged the Beijing government to re-evaluate the Tiananmen Square crackdown. This unnecessarily complicated the issue. Most Hong Kong people do not want any kind of revolution. If they are not ready for a revolution, they must think about how to have negotiation with Beijing government. Putting some extremely sensitive issues like Tiananmen, Falun Gong, or Taiwan in the agenda does not help. Still today, within Chinese territory, Hong Kong is the only place that can commemorate the June 4th 1989
massacre openly and in a large scale, and even if this is not to be linked to the democracy demands, the openness should be maintained. Pro-democracy camp and Hong Kong people in general have a realistic assessment of the prospects of democracy in the territory in the foreseeable future. This notwithstanding that the Chinese authorities and the business community oppose full democracy. The next big challenge is the legislature elections in September 2004.

Unfortunately, democracy movement suffered a major setback on February and April 2004 after Beijing effectively slapped down any hopes of full democracy within the next three years and practically banned the possibilities for universal suffrage in 2007 and 2008. After three days of meetings with a Hong Kong taskforce charged with seeking the Chinese leadership's views on universal suffrage in the city by 2007, the central government declared democracy would have to wait. The government said it would have the final say on political change, adverting to the official Xinhua news agency. "The high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong meant self-governing under the authorisation of the central government," the Xinhua report quoted the Mainland government. "The political system of Hong Kong should meet with the legal status of Hong Kong as a regional administrative zone directly under the central government," it went on. So Beijing hammered home the message that decisions on Hong Kong's democratic future are a sovereign right of the central government and not a matter for Hong Kong alone. It leaves no room for doubt. It might even be said that Beijing thinks that Hong Kong people have not seriously considered its fears, and that there has not been sufficient discussion on matters of principle.

The Democrats’ answers were quite clear too; while some of the principles set out in that statement amount to a reiteration of what is written in the Basic Law, others are rattling assertions about which Hong Kong people should speak up. Democrats say that the ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage. Nowhere in the Basic Law does it say that the formation of the legislature after 2007 must consolidate the executive-led government. And there is no reason why universal suffrage would contravene any principle, which Beijing thinks important, as it is written in the Basic Law that this is the ultimate aim for the election of the chief executive and the

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9 The Xinhua News Agency is the state and worldwide news agency in China. Xinhuanet.com consists of the Beijing head network, 32 local channels throughout China and 10 subsidiary websites of the Xinhua News Agency. http://www.xinhuanet.com

10 See for example South China Morning Post, February 18, 2004 or The Democratic Party website http://www.dphk.org/e_site/index_e.htm.
entire legislature. Other principles stated by Beijing are almost a reiteration of what is written in the Basic Law, which nobody in Hong Kong ever questions. One is the one country, two systems principle, and that Hong Kong is an inseparable part of China. Political advisers to Beijing and leftists alike have been hitting out at democrats, accusing us of trying to make the city independent by calling for an early introduction of universal suffrage. Equating democratic aspirations to the quest for independence is far-fetched. By fighting for universal suffrage, people are merely seeking a political solution to correct the systemic flaws dogging Hong Kong. Two countries, two systems, or the quest for independence, has never appeared on the people's political agenda. It is difficult to see how the democratic aspirations for universal suffrage can be incompatible with one country, two systems. If that worries Beijing, then Hong Kong people should clearly tell them: “we will never seek independence”.

Democrats hope such assertions by Beijing are meant to mark the beginning of dialogue with the people of Hong Kong, and not to dash hopes for political reform. And if these statements of principles are intended to make Hong Kong people understand Beijing’s worries, then democrats should help allay the fears. The ball is in the democracy court. People need to voice their democratic aspirations and tell Beijing that they will never seek independence. If a viable solution is to be worked out, constructive dialogue based on mutual trust and understanding is essential.

Finally, I will like to execute Szeto Wah’s opinion on democracy movement and its possibilities: “Whatever way you have chosen to save China, be it social movements, education, or even economic infiltration, your conviction of going up to the mountain as revolutionaries or diving into the sea of capitalism should be as vigorous. Everyone should try his or her best, but please do not demand others to follow suit, which might be out of another's ability. Every position is as important. Every act will accumulate to a quantitative change. When enough people are working on it, the quality of the change will emerge. That is how I wish to see the Chinese democracy movement to evolve.” In the past, Hong Kong people were concerned with, and active in supporting the democracy movement in China. After the reunion, Hong Kong is part of China; therefore the Chinese democracy movement has to include Hong Kong as an integral part. Hong Kong citizens’ past activities were not directly connected to the political struggles locally. Democracy activists are now moving towards such a direction and expanding such a dimension. Democracy development is, of course, a long-term process, and current

means might not be the best, but democrats seem to believe that for China to advance towards democracy is a social reality no one can restrain. In conclusion, in Hong Kong society, there is a lack of meeting of different political minds, and growing voices of the civil society actors need to unite their parties before they are able to make serious moves towards democracy, but no one can deny that already now the democracy activists are making progress. Nowadays human rights and democracy activists are also important pioneers for building a sustaining society tolerant to different opinions and individuals.

4.4 STABILITY AND PROSPERITY - THE PRO-ONE COUNTRY FRONT

Leaders in non-democratic political systems always have great difficulty in understanding the dynamics of democratic politics, and they make all kinds of miscalculations based on that because democratic politics has a very unique set of dynamics, says Minxin Pei (2003). Regarding Taiwan and the attractiveness of one country, two systems, it is often argued that without changing China’s own political system, there are really very low probabilities of making the people in Taiwan believe that their political future lies with China. To appeal to Taiwan, China must make its own political system much more attractive. Hong Kong basically has no options like Taiwan, but there are claims for change in the air, which is evident.

Hong Kong is more tolerant of social conflict than China (Lau and Kuan 1988), but social harmony is still highly cherished. First of all, the central government, that is the government of China, has a need to stabilize Hong Kong. Secondly Beijing leaders need to worry about the spill over effects in China if they make too many concessions within a short time. They worry that that citizens on the Mainland will follow Hong Kong people to demand what they want by staging large-scale demonstrations. Thirdly central government must also support Tung. Beijing leaders worry that Mr. Tung’s stepping down may be perceived as a failure of one country, two systems, a formula under which Hong Kong was handed back to China. Such a failure would give Taiwan a strong reason to reject any plan to reunify with the Mainland. The reunification with Taiwan is the most important and sensitive issue of Chinese external affairs. Finally even it President Hu and his allies want to sack Tung, he cannot risk doing so because former President Jiang Zemin, who still has an upper hand over Hu, handpicked Tung. It is too risky for Hu to have conflict with Jiang when Hu’s leadership in the party remains unstable. (Hung 2003)
The “one country, two systems” principle is supposed to serve a demarcation line between the one country and two systems. It is a political arrangement by which the power of the central government and regional governments is properly separated. (Wong, 2001, 23) In practice one country always takes precedence over the two systems. The Basic Law regulates or restricts Hong Kong but not Beijing. Hong Kong is allowed to run its internal affairs but the definition of internal affair remains at the mercy of Beijing. There lacks a constitutional mechanism to limit or demarcate the power of the central government (Ibid. 24). There is no guarantee that the principle that was devised to solve the issue of sovereignty of Hong Kong, the principle “one country, two systems” would remain during the twenty-first century. The one country, two systems model has a fatal flaw in it. It really does not address democracy in Hong Kong. Quoting Minxin Pei (2003) “one country, two systems is based on one country, two different economies, but, for all we know, the two economies have integrated to a great extent, and if they implement closer economic relationship agreements, then it’s going to be one economy.” What is left is the political system of Hong Kong. And as far as the Chief Executive is appointed by Beijing and not elected by the people in Hong Kong, he will be accountable only to Beijing; he will not be accountable to the people in Hong Kong, which means that he is not really sensitive to the needs of the Hong Kong people.

Still the opposition from the Chinese government is not a sufficient explanation for the non-democracy of Hong Kong. Ming Sing (2004) shows that the suggestion of the opposition from the Chinese Government as the only significant constraint on Hong Kong’s democratisation raises more questions than it answers. First the Chinese Government is not a purely negative factor. From 1986 onwards, a large pro-democracy movement emerged in Hong Kong. Sing says that the Chinese Government’s potential threats to the enshrined values of Hong Kong were a major factor contributing to this development. The Chinese Government’s presence and threats unintentionally triggered the clamor for democracy in Hong Kong. Secondly the Chinese Government, an external factor, is not the only constraint on democratisation, the opposition of the domestic bourgeoisie and the frail support from the public have to be taken into consideration. Finally using the opposition from China to account for Hong Kong’s failure to democratise raises other historical and contemporary questions. Why did Britain not democratise Hong Kong long before the 1980s? Why did strategic elites of Hong Kong such as the middle class and the capitalist classes not push for democracy before the 1980s, so as to entrench the
control of the Hong Kong people over the city-state to lessen potential Chinese influence from 1997 onwards?

Studies that are sceptical of the “one country, two systems” arrangement have generally overlooked the fact that the Hong Kong government has been blessed by certain factors, argues So (2002). The first blessing is the positive China factor. During the 1997 transition era, the PRC had a stable leadership, a cordial relationship with the U.S., and a strong growth economy. A stable PRC regime enabled its leaders to speak with one voice and to actualise the HKSAR’s promised high degree of autonomy. Friendly ties with the U.S. and attention from the global media induced the Beijing leaders to be more cautious toward any attempt to overt interference in Hong Kong. The second blessing is the inverted Taiwan factor. The Taipei regime’s “state to state” concept and the election of Progressive Democratic Party’s Chen Shui-bian as president worsened cross-strait relations. As Hong Kong has been the prime showcase on the PRC’s drive for reunification with Taiwan, it might seem that the more intense the hostility between Beijing and Taipei, the greater efforts would be exerted by Beijing to ensure the effective functioning of the HKSAR system. Finally Hong Kong had already built up a basically sound economic foundation with very substantial fiscal and foreign exchanges reserves before the 1997 handover. Such resources have greatly increased the state capacity of the HKSAR. (So 2002) Authoritarian governments have so far maintained political stability in Hong Kong and the other Tigers, and stability has been seen as essential to their economical success. Still the development of civil organisations requires both an economic base and a political environment. It is hard to imagine the existence and development of civil organisations without a tolerant political environment. Hong Kong also needs to relate to civil society in a way that assures stability and fulfils the overarching goal of economic prosperity.
5. RHETORICS OF STABILITY AND CHANGE

In following chapters it will be discussed seven general themes, 1) people power, 2) fighting for better life in the name of democracy, 3) challenging authorities, 4) stability and prosperity, 5) Beijing principles, 6) constitutional tasks, and 7) mutual understanding. Themes are constructed from the specific discussion taken place in Hong Kong society after the handover 1997, concentrating on years 2003 and 2004. First three themes rise from the civil society, next three rest on the government sentiment, the last one is about obstacles and attempts to build up consensus. Citations are gathered from articles in both South China Morning Post and Far Eastern Economic Review, from different websites of democracy activists, and from the speeches and press releases of Tung Chee-hwa. All citations are from years 2003 or 2004. Voices from different societal actors are put to the rhetorical frame constructed by Stephen Toulmin (1958). Following Pekka Korhonen (1992), in this study I have used the basic structure of Toulmin’s rhetoric model: analysing arguments with the concepts of data, claim and warrant.

First theme is people power. Mass demonstrations on July 1 both 2003 and 2004, and several smaller power expressions display the empowerment of people who have been invisible in the political system. People power is the slogan of pro-democracy activists, and it aims to equal dialogue, and to participatory democracy, which is the subject of second theme. Fighting for better life means that Hong Kong people are ready to act to improve their livelihood and to have a word to say in processes concerning their own lives. Fight for better life links to the fight for democracy, which is the hottest topic in Hong Kong politics today. Third theme, challenging authorities, conducts to the struggle between people and government. Hong Kong people are ready to challenge the decisions of public authorities, they demand accountability and do not want to kowtow Beijing. Stability and prosperity, the fourth theme, is about the victorious narrative of economical success and political stability in Hong Kong. At the time of political instability, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa is vigorously pressing on economical recovery, and trying to absorb politics to economical discourse. Fifth chapter deals Beijing principles, and inflexibilities in the current political system. One country, two systems – principle tends to undervalue the two systems part by patriotic rhetoric. Sixth theme is constitutional tasks that include discussion around the Article 23 setback, and more general constitutional reform and its pace. In seventh and final chapter, we seek mutual understanding in the rhetoric of stability and change. All
themes associate with each other, and together form, not complete, but perceiving picture about the political discussion in 21st century Hong Kong.

5.1 PEOPLE POWER

The first rhetorical theme is people power. People power as a warrant is connected to the rhetoric of good governance. The Article 23 controversy has sparked public discussion on the more general topics of good governance and the need for a faster pace of democratic development Good governance is a process of social management designed to maximise the public good.

Good governance is the return of state power to society, and it indicates a high level of cooperation between the government and citizens Power expressions and demands for dialogue are crucial if Hong Kong people want to gain any political power

Since dialogue, and political power of people have been missing in the territory

“Return power to the people”
“Respect the people’s voices”

Above listed arguments are slogans of the social movement activists. Slogans link to principle that good governance is actually the return of state power to society, and a process of good governance is that of returning state power to the people or balancing the gap between state power and social power. State power and social power are antithetical, and usually the former subsists by draining the latter. What state power is differs on the state type. In general it is political power. At global level it is the

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12 Slogans released for example on the Civil Human Rights Front’s web page: http://www.civilhrfront.org/index_e.htm, 5.8.04.
dominant form of state as an internationalised Western-global conglomerate of state power, within which US hegemony is mediated not only by its core alliances with Western Europe and Japan, but also by the role of the ‘global layer’ of state institutions in legitimating Western power (Shaw 2001). But state power outside the West remains largely semi-authoritarian and quasi-imperial, and so beset by conflicts over democracy and national rights. The most acute political conflicts of the global era are as a result of these contradictions in the relations of non-Western state power to society (Ibid.). Good governance indicates a high level of cooperation between the state and society or between the government and citizens. As far as the whole society is concerned, there would not be good governance without the government and especially without citizens. As far as small social groups are concerned, there can be no government, but there must be public management. Good governance relies on citizens’ voluntary cooperation and their conscientious acceptance of authority. There is only good government at most without citizens’ active participation and cooperation. Therefore, the basis for good governance is the citizen or civil society, rather than the government or state. There would not be good governance in its true sense without a sound, developed civil society. Therefore, one of the reasons for the emergence and development of the theory and practice of good governance in China since the 1990s is the growth of civil society, which is bound to bring about changes in the structure and status of governance. (Yu 2000) This is especially outstanding in China following the implementation of reform measures and the opening up of markets.

Whether to adopt ‘return power to the people’ as a slogan has become a point of contention between the pro-Beijing and pro-democracy camps. The former equated this to a pro-independence agenda while the latter defended it as a legitimate demand for universal suffrage. Does a slogan matter that much? As a discourse of the ordinary citizens, ‘power to the people’ simply conveys the message that the people do not trust the powers-that-be and want to take back into their own hands decisions affecting their well-being and destiny. In the absence of leadership by the government in the area of constitutional reform, the third sector has taken it upon itself to take the lead, providing information, stimulating discussion and collecting public opinion. Such a development underlines the political maturity of the Hong Kong community and its desire, and readiness, for greater democracy. People forgive and forget the government’s mistakes from time to time, but when things accumulate over time, people begin to lose faith, and that’s what has happened in Hong Kong. The public’s trust in the government is very
low, like many opinion polls have found out (South China Morning Post e.g. 15.10.03). More than 60 per cent of respondents have said no political parties could represent the people of Hong Kong.

“Everybody is saying that since the government is so weak, it can do nothing; hence the lack of trust. Government should listen to public views and launch constitutional reform”, said Joseph Cheng (South China Morning Post, 15.10.03). Citizens demand full democracy, more and more people are filing lawsuits to seek social change; via demonstrations the government was forced to listen the public opinion, pressure is growing, and people are willing to use their power if their position is threatened. Censors blocked news of the July 2003 demonstration and subsequent protests from the official Mainland press (Far Eastern Economic Review 24.07.03). However, reports on the internet news sites, the Hong Kong-based Phoenix satellite television service and local Hong Kong television, which is widely received in neighbouring Guangdong province, ensured that what has happened since July 1 is widely known on the Mainland. In addition, the thousands of visitors shuttling daily between Hong Kong and the Mainland mean that it is virtually impossible to quarantine political events on either side of the border. Network society is reality and offers new kind of means to people power to gain attention and spread the message of democratisation. Like Castells (1997, 106) says, the powerful impact of the movement has come, to a large extent, from their media presence and from their effective use of information technology.

Recent events in Hong Kong have demonstrated that civic participation remains the most effective and practical way for citizens to take part in local politics. The July protests were the boldest manifestation of civic power in fostering change that Hong Kong had in recent in recent memory. Some people say Hong Kong people only have three minutes of passion for everything. It has been disproved by this overwhelming turnout figure.

“We should all be proud of those who walked out with dignity,” argued Margaret Ng in South China Morning Post 02.07.04. The year 2003 was a year of empowerment, Ng continued. The situation in Hong Kong nowadays is that the community known for its apathy to politics has seemingly becoming highly politized. Mass demonstrations are said to be an expression of people’s power. But they were the result of more subtle changes already in process; argue
Loh and Galbraith (2003). For example earlier in 2003, during the Sars outbreak, Hong Kong people had a taste of what a difference they could make through community initiatives to help fellow citizens and to change government thinking on many issues relating to prevention and control measures. Hong Kong people are beginning to realise that they have a responsibility to participate in the affairs of their city through discussing public issues, improving their awareness of public affairs and making an effort to influence public policy. Awareness now leads to the rhetorical act that aims to convincing the listener, so, the governments of Hong Kong and China, that new choices need to be made. People power is the actual political power of people. In theoretical frame networking people power does more than organizes activity and shares information. Networking powers are the actual producers, and distributors, of cultural codes (Castells 1997). In practise, this power provides, like Loh and Galbraith (2003) seem to believe, the possibility that this new sense of empowerment and civic consciousness will lead to an effective push for electoral reform and leadership responsive to the will and needs of people, albeit Tung continues to delay opening up any discussion over how the community can move towards democracy, which is the guiding theme in the next chapter.
5.2 FIGHT FOR BETTER LIFE

Democracy represents freedom, justice, and the rule of law. Hong Kong people should fight for democracy since people are concerned about their liberties and livelihood.

“Improve people’s livelihood”
“What we’re after, is a government that is made accountable to its people”

Arguments above are slogans from mass demonstrations, which in addition to people power, express the determination to defend the core values of Hong Kong that are necessary for maintaining a healthy society, such as respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression, and press freedom. Demonstrations also form a dialogue between the people and Beijing as well as the Hong Kong government. So far authorities have not provided other adequate channels to communicate. The essence of good governance is management of public life through cooperation between the government and citizens, a new relationship between political state and civil society and an optimal relationship between the two. The key elements of good governance include 1) legitimacy; 2) transparency; 3) accountability; 4) the rule of law; 5) responsiveness; 6) effectiveness; 7) uprightness; 8) civic engagement/participation; 9) social justice and 10) stability. (Yu 2000, 3) In a certain way it is relevant to link good governance to democracy because key elements of both of them are quite similar. Of course democratic government is not necessarily a good government but like the democratic triumph in the 20th century and collapse of other forms of governance shows, democracy might the best governance hitherto. Robert A. Dahl (1998, 147) says that essential conditions for democracy are democratic beliefs and culture, control of military and police by elected officials, and no strong foreign control hostile to democracy. Also a modern market economy and society, and weak sub cultural pluralism are mentioned as favourable but not essential conditions for democracy. Peter Ferdinand (1999) also points out that the minimal institutional form of democracy - elections, a national parliament, some degree of government
accountability, and pluralist press - is not enough to ensure democratic stability. In any case, there is a
difference in the ways in which these institutions operate and govern in different countries.

People in Hong Kong are worried about their livelihood, both economically and politically. Different
societal groups emerge and develop different identities and narratives. Pro-democracy camp is the most
visible group, but diversified field of civil society includes many other groups like The Protection of
the Harbour Ordinance\textsuperscript{13}, which provides that the Victoria Harbour is the special public asset and
natural heritage of all Hong Kong people and the Government must protect and preserve the Harbour.
Government's reclamation projects over the years have substantially diminished the size of the
Harbour. What is left of the existing Harbour are demanded to be treasured. Another examples are The
Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) that comprises more than 40 non-governmental groups (NGO) in
Hong Kong, Christians for Hong Kong Society, Hong Kong Journalists Association, Students Unions,
and many pro-democracy factions, which all aim to the better life of Hong Kong people. In general,
democracy is seen to be the solution for problems. In a way fighting for good life is fighting for
democracy.

“Fight for democracy” and
“We want democracy”

are also slogans of demonstrators, and clearly implied policy recommendations. Fighting and wanting
have a little difference in nuance, but both arguments’ message is clear; the mass rallies marked an
important step towards political maturity and demands for political reform, the democratization of
Hong Kong.

“Even if I can’t enjoy democracy, I want our next generation to be able to live in a
democratic society. I am here to fight for their rights too.”

The argument above was one of the reasons protesters said to South China Morning Post on 1.7.2004.
Within the middle class, a significant albeit small number of people have been fighting for democracy
on various fronts such as collective action, the legislature and, most importantly, the sphere of public
debate. Because of the propensity of civil society to reject compromise, interest-based actions, and

\textsuperscript{13} (http://www.friendsoftheharbour.org, 06.02.04)
participation in routinized institutions than political society, civil groups campaigning for democracy are also more likely to demand a greater and faster pace of democratization (Sing 2004). What is important in their struggles through the public sphere is that they have established a new set of normative codes in a democratic discourse of the public, which helps push for democratic reform. In discursive terms, democrats claim for openness, public accountability, equality and inclusion in response to secrecy, administrative interest, privilege and exclusion.

But there were also other important reasons behind the protest. Many participants expressed dissatisfaction with how the government had handled the SARS outbreak that overwhelmed Hong Kong between March and May 2003. Many others felt they had to march to express their concerns because their views were not adequately represented by anyone, including Hong Kong’s political parties. For these people, the protest march was a “self-help” event in the absence of other means to show their general dissatisfaction. Indeed, almost 90 percent of marchers were unhappy with the government’s performance overall, and more than 80 percent thought the Chief Executive should resign. To put the community’s view simple: if the government is not going to lead Hong Kong into a better life and democracy, it should at least try not to be an obstacle. So far the rising discourse of democracy have opened up a new discursive space for political struggle that leads to the next theme, challenging authorities.
5.3 CHALLENGING AUTHORITIES

Social movements shape society → Project identity of activists should expand towards the transformation of Hong Kong society despite the reluctance of authorities

Since acting civil society is capable of challenging state power

Hong Kong pro-democracy activists have a mission. In one of their websites they say,

“The bloody ending to the Tiananmen Square student movement on June 4th, 1989, changed the way the Hong Kong people viewed the transition to Chinese rule. As they looked on in shock and pain at the actions of the Chinese government, which seemed to be concerned more with protecting their own power than protecting their people, the residents found reason for fear. They lost faith in China's promises to respect their way of life, their freedoms, and the rule of law.”

People in Hong Kong have questioned the legitimacy of colonial British rule. Now they question Chinese leaders’ legitimacy to rule from Beijing. In the light of Gramsci (1971), the rift between popular masses and ruling ideologies cannot be cured by the simple exercise of force, or preventing new the new ideologies from imposing themselves. If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer leading but only dominant, exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached to their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously (Ibid.). Economical problems, government blunders, and fears of loosing freedoms, have diminished people’s faith in Hong Kong success and prosperity, and now they are challenging leaders in the name of democracy and people power. Hong Kong people have gained confidence in their own ability to rule, illustrated by the overwhelming support for the pre-handover elections, says Butenhoff (1999, 115). Also the number of watchdogs and political parties has been growing. Of course activists will also confront more constrains and greater obstacles, and Beijing regime may attempt to slow the pace of democracy, but all activities point to the important contributions social movements have made in developing, and now maintaining civil society, and pushing the limits in

14 The Hong Kong Voice of Democracy, http://www.democracy.org.hk, 05.01.04
order to construct a civil society in which self-rule will be enjoyed by all, Butenhoff (1999) goes on in a optimistic tone. Also first the chicken flu and then Sars helped undermine the dominant narrative of administrative success, and hence the government’s public credibility. In theoretical terms the moral authority of the paternalistic government was weakened through a process of narrative challenging at a time of crisis or critical episode.

“We dare to say no to the ruler. The ruler cannot take away our rights, we want our rights back.”
“We want reconciliation with Beijing, but in Beijing eyes reconciliation means we have to kowtow the Communist Party.”
“The government performance is not satisfactory and the people near the president in China are disturbing democracy in Hong Kong.”

Just as a person’s or an organization’s credibility with the public is established through narrative construction and heroic characterization, it could be lost through narrative deconstruction and de-heroization in times of conflict and crisis (Ku 2001). In Hong Kong, the colonial discourse was specifically a paternalistic-administrative one that was incorporated into a hegemonic narrative of economic and governing success. The narrative consisted of several building blocks including a prospering economy, a stable political order as well as an effective and efficient administration. Within civil society, the SAR government is now suffering slashing attacks by the democrats on the issues of civil liberty, rule of law and democracy. In times of uncertainty and challenge in Hong Kong, people power via fighting for better life and challenging authorities have become discursive strategy whereby to undermine the credibility of a traditional narrative of stability and prosperity that has helped sustain a particular political or social order. In Castells’ (1996, 1997) terms project identity of Hong Kong social movement is a project of a different life that is also expanding towards the transformation of society when for example demanding full democracy. Castells (1997) talks about the crisis of institutions of the state and of the civil society. While the crisis of state in the globalisation age might be true in Hong Kong, the crisis of civil society along the state is more complex issue, because of the unfinished structure of the civil society in Hong Kong or in Asia. The traditional Habermasian civil society might not even emerge in times, when state is already in conflict with the global networking power. It may be that in places like Hong Kong, the forming civil society emerges finally already ready made for the global era. It means that these projects of people emerge from communal resistance rather than from the reconstruction of old institutions, which, in Hong Kong case, does not even exist.
With the legacy of Article 23 still lingering, a politically astute government, and one which respects the rights of its people, should consult with an open mind, analyse the views objectively, and truthfully reflect the people’s views to Beijing. Above all, it should uphold what Hong Kong people want; namely democracy and a high degree of autonomy. And to issue a timetable for the constitutional review, it is imperative to embark on a formal public consultation, listing concrete proposals in a consultation document. Challenging authorities means challenging the hegemonic discourse or narrative, which, as a matter of fact, has continually to assert and maintain its dominance by incorporating, displacing or dissolving the challenging discourses within its own articulation (Gramsci 1971). The dominant discourse of the authoritative administration of Hong Kong is to be analysed next.

5.4 STABILITY AND PROSPERITY

Economic revival is important to Hong Kong government should be pressing on economical issues

Since stability and prosperity are traditional keys to the success of Hong Kong

In a society, the hegemonic discourse that serves to reproduce certain power relationships usually builds upon specific narratives of glory, success or development, which may incorporate or displace the democratic codes (Ku 2001). In Hong Kong, narrative of glory has been the extraordinary strong state-capital alliance headed to the political stability and economical success. Concern for political and social stability, and to strengthen and confirm the legitimacy of the government’s authority has always been a central thread in Hong Kong politics. The government was very conscious in the early post war years that most of the population had no particular loyalty to Hong Kong, or to the colonial government. And a few miles away was China, the subject seemingly of almost continuous revolution – communist in 1949, cultural in the 1960’s and economic in the 1980’s. There was much to concentrate government’s attention on the achievement of political stability as the central task. Political stability was central to
the success of the kind of economy, which Hong Kong is and was. Hong Kong had to persuade international companies and international capital that it had the stability to ensure the safety of their investment and their staff. Equally, of course, a successful economy was a key factor in ensuring political stability and legitimacy. The feel-good factor generated by economic growth induces, and increases, satisfaction with government so no Tung Chee-hwa is pressing on economic development to marshal people’s interests away from societal stir. Statements from Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa’s speeches 2003-2004:

“The most pressing issue we face is to revive the economy as soon as possible.”
“We need to make sure that our economic recovery is sustained so that people’s livelihood can be improved.”
“Stability is the cornerstone of our success in the past.”
“Division is damaging Hong Kong.”

The strength of rhetoric of stability and prosperity is also found in Tung’s Policy Addresses for year 2003 and 2004. In Addresses words related to economy (economical development, recovery, difficulties, cooperation…) mentioned over 170 times, when in comparison, words democracy, civil society or activism were not mentioned at all. Hong Kong people and mass demonstrations were observed twice, while stability, relationship and cooperation with the Mainland recorded almost hundred times. So main claims that are repeated by Chinese authorities are revitalising the economy, and maintaining stability and unity. It seems that behind the hegemonic communal claims of prosperity and stability has been a strong inclination from the colonial system of elite privilege and executive domination to remain as a bulwark against an increasingly assertive public. The demonstration by 500,000 people of July 1 2003, and the two rallies thereafter, further convinced leaders in Beijing of the imperatives of putting the economy and stability above everything else (South China Morning Post, 08.09.03). What stability and prosperity actually is in this narrative, is a simple chain of thoughts: Stability = no mass riots = administrative effectiveness, and Prosperity = traditionally modern capitalist city, but today more like the Manuel Castells’ (1996) networking metropolitan city.

Hong Kong is more tolerant of social conflict than China (Lau and Kuan 1988), but social harmony is still highly cherished. There is a symbiotic relationship between economic growth and political stability. In the past government’s concern with political stability was matched by that of the people. Lau (1993) writes of ‘this pervasive fear of conflict among the Hong Kong Chinese’. Most of them had
come to Hong Kong in search of stability and order. In the late 1970’s, Lau’s research found that 87 per cent of a sample of the Hong Kong population said that social stability was more important to them than economic prosperity. 57 per cent saw the primary role of government as being to maintain social stability. Only 10 per cent put the establishment of a democratic and egalitarian society at the top of their list of government responsibilities. (Wilding 1996) Government’s concern with political and social stability has changed over the years but it remains a powerful influence on its attitude to the development of social policies. Still stability is more than just economic prosperity. Like Castells (1990, 149) says, the stability in Hong Kong has not been purely the result of the resigning of its population nor the outcome of the government’s quelling of social protest. It appears to derive from the combined effects of social reform, improving living conditions, and political liberalization, opening up channels of citizen participation. Hong Kong state is very interventionist, but its modes of intervention pertain more to the sphere of collective consumption and public infrastructure than to the realm of production or capital circulation. For example housing in Hong Kong has been one of the main targets and instruments in state intervention in the economy and society. It has actually been a striking paradox in the urban policy in the world - with Singapore a head of, Hong Kong as the market economy that has been holding the highest rates of economic growth, has the second largest public housing program in the capitalist world. But nowadays, since the Article 23 debate, leaders have tried hard to use economics to absorb politics.

In the context of colonial authoritarianism and capitalism, the power structure in Hong Kong had been characterized by a lack of internal democracy, and also by this strong state-capital alliance. During the political transition in 1984-1997, despite the demands by the pro-democracy activists, the colonial government and the socio-economic elite formed a strategic power alliance with the Chinese government to obstruct democratic development. In their hegemonic articulation, democracy is undermined by the construction of a narrative of a miraculous economic success without political instability. This narrative did have a material basis in a fast-developing economy and a relatively stable political order in the last three decades or so. Now when economic success in no longer miraculous and instabilities have occurred, the governmental hegemony is not so obvious although still very strong. Strength of this hegemony lies on the Beijing principles that are discussed next.
5.5 BEIJING PRINCIPLES

Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of China. Hong Kong cannot change its system on its own. Since Hong Kong leaders always follow the ruling principles formed in Beijing.

In an undemocratic or partially democratic society, hegemonic articulation by the dominant groups submerges or undermines democracy not so much by direct opposition as by narrative displacement. Narrative is a powerful symbolic medium through which events are selected and interpreted as meaningful and through which identities are constituted and reconstructed (Hart 1997, Ku 2001). Narrative displacement means that certain value codes are made out of place, irrelevant or peripheral in a narrative construction centred on a different set of codes (Ibid.). Democracy development is included in the Basic Law, but Beijing principles more or less impede actual development. In day-to-day politics, the Central Government has also expressed serious concerns about the constitutional review relating to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Concern has raised through different channels a number of issues of principles. In general such principles have their roots in Deng Xiaoping's remarks in 1984. Five issues handled in Tung’s media session February 20 2004 are following:

"One Country, Two Systems": specifically, the Central Government has pointed out that "One Country" is the premise on which "Two Systems" is implemented. "One Country" refers specifically to the People's Republic of China.”

Narrative hegemony of One Country always overtakes Two Systems. In principle’s most reduced sense, it means that Beijing leaders do not need to change their opinions - no matter how many protest.

"Hong Kong people running Hong Kong": patriots must form the main body that runs Hong Kong. There are specific criteria for a patriot. A patriot respects one's own nation, sincerely supports "One Country, Two Systems" and does not do anything that would harm our country or Hong Kong.”
So patriots must form the main group of people ruling Hong Kong. The question is, what does patriotic mean, exactly? One Beijing official is said to have questioned whether those who opposed the Article 23 legislation were patriotic under the one country principle. The pro-Beijing camp joined the chorus by accusing Democratic Party members of being unpatriotic. If those who do not support the national security legislation are unpatriotic, by the same token, those who took part in the historic July 1 march and those who clamour for direct elections of the chief executive would fare no better. If unpatriotic were synonymous with dissident, it would spell the end of the one country, two systems principle, and that of a high degree of autonomy. This is a matter of grave concern, and the taskforce would be duty-bound to seek clarity from Beijing, but so far the rhetoric of patriotic is not fully clarified.

"A high degree of autonomy: Hong Kong's autonomy is exercised under authorisation by the Central Government."

Reiteration is discovered to be good rhetorical instrument, and this is pretty much like the first principle with different words. Hong Kong is autonomous, yes, but sovereignty of Central Government is never contradicted.

"Executive-led: this is an important principle under the design of the Basic Law. Constitutional development in Hong Kong must not deviate from this principle."

This is associated to Tung’s own position, and is of course important both to him and to Beijing leaders who picked him up. Anyway, no one is contradicting this principle; more essential question seems to be the identity of Chief Executive and the means to choosing him. Chief Executive handpicked in Beijing is very good assurance to Chinese leaders that Hong Kong is to be somewhat ‘patriotic’ and ‘loyal’. Where Tung has failed is in the politics played out in the space of media and public. In system where leaders do not have to convince the general public, or fight for the approval of citizens, or campaign for the success in elections, the characters of leader does not have to be anything special or great. Nowadays, when leadership is personalized, and image making is power making (Castells 1996, 507), the leaders like Tung Chee-hwa face new kind of, and serious, challenges dealing with the ordinary people and their will.

"Balanced participation: our political structure must have due regard to the interests of all sectors of society. Also, constitutional development must accord with the principles of gradual and orderly progress and fully reflecting the actual situation in Hong Kong.”
Some of the principles on which Beijing seeks reassurance are those, which are never questioned, while others are bones of contention with no definite answers, such as in light of the actual situation, and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. They need not be discussed infinitely, nor should they get in the way of the constitutional review. The reform issue has rocketed on the list of Hong Kong people's priorities, and it warrants immediate public discourse. But the way in which the government conducts public consultation has been contentious.

It is clear that principles spelt out by the Central Government are very important. All democracy demands, demonstrations, and instabilities spell danger to Beijing. Hong Kong's successful defiance of the authorities is unlikely to inspire similar protests on the Mainland in the short term, but it sets a dangerous precedent for the Chinese Communist Party, which shows no sign of being willing to relax its grip of power, states in Far Eastern Economic Review 24.07.03. If more and more mass protests in Hong Kong win more concessions, it would almost certainly attract popular attention on the Mainland where social pressures are building over unemployment, corruption, and the growing income gap between rural and urban areas. This is a key reason why censors blocked the news of the July 1 mass rally from the Mainland press. In Beijing the campaign for democracy has been labelled confrontational and steering Hong Kong away from the nation. The Tung administration has stuck to the old-style administrative absorption of politics. Despite pledges to reform the advisory system, those appointed remain mostly from the narrow pro-government and pro-Beijing circle. Both governments have failed to respond positively to the community's single most united demand - that of opening up the system of government and giving some power to people.

President Hu Jintao told Tung Chee-hwa that constitutional development beyond 2007 should be in line with the Basic Law, and that the political system must develop in the line with the Basic Law and practical conditions in Hong Kong (South China Morning Post 18.12.03). Hu’s remarks aptly described the political aspirations of the people of Hong Kong. Firstly the practical situation in Hong Kong warrants a more democratic political system. The last seven years of Tung’s governance have shown that the lack of democracy breeds instability. People in Hong Kong have turned their frustrations with the government into claims for democratic reforms. Secondly the demand for direct elections for the chief executive in 2007, and for the entire legislature in 2008, is in line with the Basic Law, because the Basic Law says that the goal of political reform is universal suffrage. But still after the mass
demonstrations and after the pro-democrats won the District Council elections, the Mainland’s Basic Law drafters and legal experts quickly responded with a warning. Chinese authorities made clear that constitutional reforms are not entirely issues of Hong Kong, and that if people are trying to decide the matter on their own, it would be tantamount to seeking independence.

Independence has very bad connotations in the "one country, two systems"-model, even if aspirations for democratic development is far different from the quest for independence. To repeat, Hong Kong people are not seeking any revolution. Public is upholding the principle of “one country, two systems”, not “two countries, two systems”, but not either “one country, one system”. People in Hong Kong know that constitutional reform has never been the exclusive preserve of Hong Kong SAR. The Basic Law stipulates that amendments to the method for selecting the chief executive - for terms after 2007 - must have the endorsement of two-thirds of all Legislative Council members and the consent of the chief executive. Further, they need the approval of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Hong Kong people do not seek to deny Beijing a say in the process. Actually the important issue here is not at all the interpretation of the Basic Law. Important thing is that there exists a deep gap between the Hong Kong people who aspire for democracy, and the Beijing leaders who have deep-rooted fears about Hong Kong using democracy to oppose the Mainland China. Polarisation of views precedes more instability, and instability highlights polarisation; a certain vicious circle is reality. The sharp divide between the government and people can only be bridged through understanding and dialogue.

Any timetables for political reforms have not been set in Beijing and Chinese President Hu Jintao have been very sensitive on commenting on the democracy issues. Also main pro-Beijing party, the DAB’s poor performance and defeats at the local polls have been issues that are toned down (South China Morning Post 03.12.03). Tung Chee-hwa has had meetings with Beijing leaders both after the mass rally and after the District Council elections. Worries at the highest political level in Hong Kong and in entire China are clearly seen. Discussions about the “political and social situation” are placed at the top level and words that come to publicity are short and more or less general. So, rather than addressing the issues by changing the system or replacing leaders, the central government have decided to stonewall the constitutional review process by asking the National People's Congress to rule out electing the chief executive and all legislators by universal suffrage by 2007 and 2008 (South China Morning Post
02.07.04). More than anything else, this has become a rallying call for all those bent on achieving this
goal. Some so-called patriotic personalities have said that:

“Rather than marching down the streets, those who do not like it here can choose to vote with their feet by leaving Hong Kong (Ibid.).”

During Hong Kong's transition to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, there were fears that a large number of people and businesses would vote with their feet by leaving a city whose future under 'one country, two systems' was uncertain. As things turned out, those concerns over a pre-handover mass exodus were unfounded. Patriots’ remarks were rather more combative than those from central government officials, who have been noticeably careful in choosing their words so that their comments could not be used to provoke more people to take part in rallies. But however, prudence or even silence might be as well as provocative. Both because of the constraints in the legislation, and in the leaders’ principles, the people of Hong Kong, who are clearly ready for democracy on all counts, still cannot choose their leaders through the ballot boxes, but have to come to the streets to express their opinion. Constitutional reform, the next subject, is more the issue of future, but its origins are now in the process of refining.
5.6 CONSTITUTIONAL TASKS

Article 23 was a notable setback in The discussion about constitutional The Legislative work of Hong Kong review is becoming more and more administration necessary

Since despite the growing pressures from civil society, government is unwilling to open up any politics

“I would like to reiterate that it is our duty as Chinese citizens, it is also a duty under the constitution, to legislate national security law in accordance with our Basic Law. It is also a very important part of our relationship with the Central Authorities. I would like, though, to give you the assurance, my reassurance, stated many times already, that this legislation will not affect the freedoms and the rights of Hong Kong people, those rights and freedoms we have traditionally enjoyed.”.

said Tung Chee-hwa in his transcript on Basic Law Article 23, July 3 2003. Tung tried to inform his audience correctly, and convince them about the harmlessness of Article 23, but it was too late. Also secrecy and vagueness before and during the release of Article 23 have lessened the trust among Hong Kong people. Hong Kong government have been also regarding political activity with ‘abhorrence and consternation’. They have a clear sense of what is good and right for Hong Kong and China. Political activity is seen to threaten the hegemony of the bureaucratic regime. Administrators want to be free to do what think best because it is the best. Circling deductions, but effective in the authoritarian regimes.

A political tactic focusing on the legislation work is named by Lam (2003). It is the strategy of raising bogeymen to persuade, if not bully, the Hong Kong populace into supporting an otherwise unpopular policy and legislation, or one that clearly undermines the SAR’s autonomy. A case in point is the practise of asking the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress to interpret the Hong Kong Basic Law. Ordinarily, the policy of deferring to the NPC would be seen as undermining the autonomy of Hong Kong and the authority of its own Court of Final Appeal (CFA). Basically this can be seen as a fear-mongering, for example Falun Gong and also some CFA’s interpretations of the Basic Law has been named as a huge threat to the community and government has marshalled number of statistics and projections showing the need of the NPC to overrule the CFA.
“territory’s residents already enjoy real and unprecedented democracy.”
“territory’s political system should be changed only gradually and according to the limits laid out in Beijing.”

Above is the opinion of Beijing leaders and their vassals in Hong Kong. Michael Davis in South China Morning Post 09.09.03 argues that the constitutional message floating in the air in Hong Kong appears to be that a government in an economically developed community with liberal and democratic commitments should also be liberal and democratic. A halfway house of authoritarianism and liberal democracy tends to produce political arrogance and political half-measures, Davis (2003) continues. In the Article 23 debate, the political arrogance came first. The tight deadline and aggressive way to push the bill forward became the symbols of current political culture. The political arrogance was followed by political half-measures. Despite the clearly valid criticism from for example the Bar Association and the Article 23 Concern Group, government concessions were always the minimum necessary to deflect the most telling points of critics. This attitude was also on display when government withdraw the bill but still made no firm indication of moderation in the next draft (Davis 2003).

Another tactic ‘the cry wolf’ was first used to good advantage by former Financial Secretary Donald Tsang to win acceptance for his annual budgets. The mode for operation was like this: a couple of months before the releasing his budget, Tsang or his aides would float trial balloons about a large number of tax increases or new taxes. On budget day, however, only a small number of new levies were announced. The public, of course, would end up paying more than before, but thanks to ‘it’s not so bad after all’ psychology; residents heaved a collective sigh of relief. This tactic was also used to good effect in the SAR’s crusade against the Falun Gong. Immediately after Tung had condemned the group as ‘an evil cult’, officials claimed that the administration was considering an anti-cult law. Later, however, officials began saying that the administration had no intention of enacting such legislation ‘at this stage’. Some members of the community began to say ‘Tung is not that bad after all!’ (Lam 2003)

Now there is Article 23 of the Basic Law, which since 1997 has hung over Hong Kong like a sword of Damocles. One theory is that this intentionally engineered suspense leads to a cynical form of intimidation against pro-democracy elements and the media. One good question is also what if the wolf really shows up. By refusing to say definitely what is going on, Tung has kept Hong Kong residents on tenterhooks. While this may be sharp psychological warfare, the unpopular Tung can hardly expect to
make himself more lovable among citizens. Rhetorically Tung has not specified the details of the policies advocated, but his attempts to be subtle have become being unreliable or even twisted.

Much of the next step that Beijing will take in Hong Kong depends on the decisions of the Coordinating Leading Group on Hong Kong Affairs (CLGHKA), which was set up after the July 1 demonstrations last year. And it is the head of the CLGHKA, Vice-President Zeng Qinghong, who masterminded the series of tough tactics leading up to the NPC pronouncement last April that ruled out general elections in the SAR. Zeng, a close adviser to ex-president Jiang Zemin and a master tactician, has in the summer 2004 or so also come up with a "smile offensive" to persuade Hong Kong citizens to accept Beijing’s no-democracy ruling, claims Lam (2004). This united-front strategy includes wooing so-called moderate democrats who think that the fight for democracy should be accomplished with minimal damage to mainland-Hong Kong relations.

In the end it could be seen as a battle between the rule of man and the rule of law. With rhetorical terms, during Article 23 debate Hong Kong leaders failed to convince people that new choices should made, and leaders were seen as an exploiters rather than helpers. On the other hand, so far activists have not convinced leaders with the virtue of democracy. Half done rhetoric in the democracy camp have unburdened people’s worries and thoughts, but their narrow-minded accusations, and again leaders’ control over the premises of a discussion have blocked the origin of consensus. Constructing mutual understanding from fragmented field of political communication is the theme in next chapter.
5.7 MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

The visions of general public and government do not meet Discussion realizes in harsh criticism and again in silence

Mutual understanding occurs in rhetoric, but so far stays at the idealistic level

“Let us work together to build a prosperous, stable, free, democratic, harmonious, and united Hong Kong.”
“What we need in our community is peace, stability, and mutual understanding.”
“We understand.”

Above statements from Tung Chee-hwa’s speeches are beautiful words of cooperation and understanding. To the people who took part in the rallies Tung said repeatedly that he understands, and the government understands. Also in his Policy Address for year 2004 he said:

“Government departments will strengthen their understanding of public views and attitudes through contacts in various sectors. My colleagues and I will keep in touch with people through different channels and means to achieve a clearer understanding of their aspirations.”

Also the pro-democracy activists and other civil society actors show signs of willing to meet minds:

“We hope that Beijing views the demonstrations as an expression of the public’s desire for democracy, not as a protest against the Central Government.”
“Asking for democracy is not to seek independence.”

By narrowing the Beijing leaders options for judging activists, they are cleaning up their negative and threatening image in the eyes of Chinese authorities, and convincing leadership that democracy does not danger the Chinese rule over Hong Kong. Repeatedly activists have also pointed out that Hong Kong people are Chinese and proud about that. Similar and positive identities with common ethnical and cultural senses of Hong Kong people and Chinese found in studies (e.g. Wong 2002) are good
basis for constructing mutual understanding, but in practice, beautiful speeches on common 'magnificent history' seem not to be enough for maintaining common thoughts about future relations. Today Hong Kong-Mainland relationship is even the most critical issue in Hong Kong politics. The open question is, what Beijing leaders really intend? Do the leaders mean to crack down on Hong Kong's democratic aspirations, or will they support an orderly transition to a more representative system of government? Reading the mixed messages is sometimes very confusing.

The problem of trust influences heavily on the both sides of discussion board. Democrats have been hoping for starting the dialogue and giving state leaders more comprehensive picture of Hong Kong’s situation, and also the administration has given some promises on preparedness to dialogue, but so far little has happened. Opinions about the reasons for missing dialogue vary a lot. At the democrats’ side they say that Tung Chee-hwa has been listening only to the one side, and it is true that for example the DAB has been very trustful what comes to their position as a leading party and China’s favourite. On the other side, in pro-China camp, democrats’ present combative mentality is often seen as a major barrier for starting the dialogue. Pro-democracy groups have not been invited to the meetings between Hong Kong’s political parties and national leaders despite the promises of Vice-President Zeng Qinghong (South China Morning Post, e.g. 12.09.03), and pro-democracy front feels that it has been marginalized in the seven years since handover.

In 2003 rally demonstrators wore black to show their anger and protest, in 2004 they wore white to proclaim liberty and democracy. In 2004 the popular mood seemed less desperate or fatalistic. Last year's outburst was triggered by a strong collective resistance to losing Hong Kong's hard-earned freedom, while a major call this year is to fight for more democracy. There is now certainly a sustainable collective voice for better governance in Hong Kong, which underlines the demand for political reform. It symbolises the search for a pro-active Hong Kong identity within the new national context. Both Tung and Mainland officials have said they are listening. But rhetoric aside, it is too early to say if they are sincere about reorienting their policies in favour of the majority wishes of the people. The possibility remains that they may become more nervous about the rising tide of people power and resort to a more hawkish line. The change-over from negative and disruptive criticism or stunning silence to positive and constructing argumentation is now in the process, but fragmentation in the civil society and doubts in the administration remain. Interests of both sides are not meeting.
Referring Sing (2004), the interests of the Chinese Government are to maintain Hong Kong’s pragmatic value for China, to achieve national unity by regaining Hong Kong and using it to lure Taiwan into unity, and to prelude Hong Kong from a rapid democratization, which would undermine the Chinese Government’s control over everything and its hegemony in China. What the pro-democracy forces can then do is to enhance their bargaining power by threatening government’s interests. The more the civil society and political society could marshal support from the grassroots, the middle class, business persons and the British Government for democratization, and the more they can assure China of the harmless nature of Hong Kong’s democracy regarding the hegemony of the leaders in Mainland China, the greater would be their bargaining power. Using Toulminian terms, the major claim Hong Kong should be democratised, because it is what people want and what their well being needs (major data), is to be warranted with the theses of the advantageous but politically harmless nature of democratization process. The anti-democratic groups have also been keen to mobilise domestic forces and the general public against democratization. Similarly, the domestic pro-democracy forces have been eager to press the government by mass demonstrations to democratise Hong Kong. The bargaining perspective reminds us that a seemingly much weaker force can successfully obtain concessions from a stronger one, as long as the former can pose an effective threat to the interests of the latter. In the past decade, political systems have been shaken all over the world, and political leaders have been destroyed (Castells 1997, 333). In Hong Kong issue is not about destroying, but fitting new political expressions into traditional political categories.

Figure 1 is an illustration of bargaining principles of democratization, based on Sing’s (2004, 25) similar model, and on my own augmentations.
To repeat, Chinese Government’s widely known interests are preserving Hong Kong prosperity so that it could contribute to China’s development, and using Hong Kong’s handover to persuade Taiwan to accept reunification. The local democratic opposition have managed to obtain democratic concession by threatening these interests with successful large-scale pro-democratic mobilizations. This is an affair of communities and resistance movements. Adapting Castells (1996), resistance and projects contradict the hegemonic logic of the society dominated by certain network of state and capital by engaging defensive and offensive struggles. Latest mobilization was this demonstration on July 1 2004. The pro-democracy camp’s biggest challenge is to persuade China that despite these threats to China’s interests,
democracy of Hong Kong is not a threat to the hegemony of the Chinese Communist Party. Additionally, democrats also try to monitor not just the authoritarian state but also political society in the democratization campaign. This is what the bargaining is about. In colonial times Hong Kong always considered itself “a borrowed place, a borrowed time”, oscillating between the variations of Chinese politics and the world trends of the decolonisation process (Castells 1990, 331). No more the place and time are borrowed, but challenges remain. The state needs to establish the relationship to its civil society on more solid ground than those provided by the traditional colonial structures or traditional Chinese structures.

In conclusion the outcome of Hong Kong’s political development can be interpreted as a result of bargaining among different forces and other related factors. Firstly the dialogue between governing elites and pro-democratic opposition groups among external opportunities and constraints has shaped the democratization in Hong Kong. Secondly while China has been the most important obstacle on Hong Kong’s democratization, another factor that tends to be overlooked is the limited mobilization power of the pro-democracy opposition in both civil and political society. The tension between pro-democratic civil society and political society has cut down the influence of pro-democratic opposition. Thirdly in the past and somewhat also nowadays the general decline in media reports of activities organized by pro-democratic alliances has drastically increased the difficulty of mobilizing support for pro-democracy movements (Sing 2003). Also since the 1990s, a growing number of local media conglomerates have been taken over by pro-China magnates (Ibid.). However, mainly because of the immensity of July 1 2003 demonstrations, during the recent year, pro-democracy movement have been constantly in the public. Hundred of articles in the South China Morning Post and Far Eastern Economic Review are just the surface. Reports on the Internet news sites, the Hong Kong-based satellite television service and local Hong Kong television have ensured that what has happened since July 1 is widely known also on the Mainland. No more it is possible to quarantine political events on Hong Kong or China. Fourthly the worst scenario of China’s blunt repression of the people of Hong Kong after the mass demonstrations and the rise of the pro-democracy party has not materialized. There are several factors that tell their story of the accommodating behaviour of China. PLA (The People’s Liberation Army) were never involved during the rallies, although there were some fears of PLA in July 1 2003. Police in Hong Kong behaved very nice. Only about a thousand policemen were there to control the situation. There were half a million protesters. No arrests. The relationship between the
police and Hong Kong people was actually good. Both sides understood that protesters were not against the policemen, but against the Tung administration. Also in general Hong Kong is a low-violence society and the streets of the territory are some of the safest in the world.
6. CONCLUSION

This study has analysed the political discussion in Hong Kong after the year 1997 handover. Actual research materials were from years 2003 and 2004, so emphasis has been on very recent development. Basis of the analysis was civil society discussion and political development in contemporary Hong Kong, and as a result we found the rhetorical themes interpreted in chapter five. This has only been a partial vision of political dialogue in Hong Kong: democracy movement as the currently most visible part of civil society, and both government in Hong Kong and China held the main roles, when for example the market sector or other sides of civil society like church work or civil service faded to the background. My article materials were from two publications, South China Morning Post and Far Eastern Economic Review, and their views have also put own limits to the course of the study. Tung Chee-hwa’s speeches and press releases were the main source for the identity and image of the governments, and of course they represent acutely him, not the entire Chinese authority.

At the first parts of the study it was discussed about the origins and forms of civil society, about Hong Kong, and combining these two, about civil society in Hong Kong. That followed the story of democratic development, and introduction to the different actors and their position. The field of political actors and development expressed and analysed may not be complete. It is constructed on the former studies made on Hong Kong, and on the article and speech material I collected, and different sources have put emphasis on different factors. What I attempted to do, was to build a balanced picture of political actors and their rhetoric in Hong Kong, but what at times came across when reading the articles and different websites was the good-bad arrangement, where the governments of Hong Kong and China were seen as the big bad evil, and the pro-democracy camp as a protagonist for everything good, liberal and desirable. Both the South China Morning Post and Far Eastern Economic Review seem to have a somewhat pro-democratic approach to the events in Hong Kong, and especially in columns and insights many openly known pro-democracy journalists and academics repeatedly pointed out the importance and advantage of democracy. As a researcher I tried to stay beside the normative attitude and prejudices, but reading and analysing hundreds of pages of democratic pathos some impulses towards democracy may have occurred in the text. Also the discussion if democracy is the best form of governance was in a minor role here.
The research theme is still very topical. News concerning democracy development in Hong Kong are frequent. This has been a little nuisance, because I had some difficulties to decide when to stop collecting articles when suitable news published day after day, and actually is published furthermore. Analysing process that is running, or even just begun, has its own problems, and the biggest problem is that there are several questions without answers. No one can tell if and when Hong Kong will democratise and with what consequences. The future of China is big, although widely debated, question mark that influences all over the world. So I had some difficulties on concentrating the actual plain dialogue and rhetoric occurring in the Hong Kong society right now. But topicality is also an advantage. Wide general interest on the issue provided sufficiently materials, and growing emphasis in the Hong Kong society itself has been vivid and very interesting subject to study.

With these qualifications on the methodology of this study, some conclusions can be made. The rhetorical categories raised from the discussion were the main results of this study. People power, fight for better life, challenging authorities, prosperity and stability, Beijing principles, legislative tasks, and mutual understanding speak all their own words about the political situation in Hong Kong. In the basis it is about the hegemony of Chinese authority underlining the cultural politics involved in power relationships, which means that these dominant groups actively seek popular consent to its leadership for example by drawing on the dominant, familiar and popular themes, and symbols prevailing in society, and about opposing groups challenging the domination by presenting different value themes or symbols or re-interpreting the dominant ones. A hegemonic discourse is never without its challenges and oppositions. The hegemonic narrative of stability and prosperity or the state-capital-alliance in Hong Kong has been studied a lot, and there is not much new information in findings of this study concerning it, and in the end I would like to emphasis more the other themes like challenging authorities or even more the fight for better life. Politics of domination and resistance in Hong Kong are now in the some kind of turning point, or at least in the evaluation point. Ku’s (2001) arguments about the concrete moments of struggle, conflict and crisis that contribute to the ‘cracking up’ of the hegemonic narrative in the postcolonial setting are coming more and more true.

Fight for better life links to the democracy, but it is also more. It is more general issue of well-being and happiness, and, using Castells’ (1997) terms, grass rooted networks of communal resistance. With the people power thesis it mingles with the possibility of governance failure. Governance can make up
for some defects of the state and the market in the process of regulation, control and coordination, but governance is not omnipotent (Yu 2000). It has many inner limitations. Good governance relies on citizens’ voluntary cooperation, active participation, and their conscientious acceptance of authority. Fight for better life there connects to the facilitating the government, not only criticizing and antagonizing it. While the most striking feature of people power, especially in crisis situations, might be the opposition to the government, people power is also cooperation with authorities, and mutual understanding towards a better life. Still it is unrealistic to think that the marchers’ call for universal suffrage in 2007 and 2008 will be effective. But the demonstrations have been powerful expressions of feeling.

The question about stability is very interesting. As noted earlier Hong Kong people rate stability very high, but now it looks likely that a massive anti-government rally calling for the election of the chief executive and all legislators by universal suffrage will become a regular fixture on July 1. The 500,000-strong turnout on July 1 2003 rally was evidence of a political system that failed to properly incorporate the views of the community in the policy-making process, and of inept leadership, but social instabilities are also positive features. Indeed, Hong Kong officials usually try to put a positive spin on Hong Kong's notoriety as a city of protests by saying it shows that the freedoms of speech, procession and demonstration are alive and well (Lau 2004). Hong Kong people have few channels of communication open to them. But they have used one in demonstrations: a desire to get their message across was evident among the marchers. Despite the fears of governments, rallies do not directly threat the political stability in Hong Kong. Admittedly, even in places with a fully democratic and functioning political system, many still find it necessary to air their grievances by taking to the street.

Social movements are not good or bad; they are avenues of our transformation, since transformation may equally lead to a whole range of heavens, hells, or heavenly hells (Castells 1997). This is not an incidental remark, since processes of social change in our world often take form of fanaticism and violence that we don’t usually associate with positive social change. Social movement in Hong Kong is not fundamental or violent, but in any case, it is a social movement, and therefore, it is a symptom of its society. In theory, it is social movement with identity constructed in a context marked by power relationships. They are expanding towards the transformation of the Hong Kong society, the democratization of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
The prospects for political development in Hong Kong hinge on several factors: including the government’s initiative to undertake constitutional reforms, the China factor, the distribution of political power among the major political parties, and the political inclinations of the general citizens. Referring to the actual situation in Hong Kong, democratisation has surged on Hong Kong people’s list of priorities; the massive protests during years 2003 and 2004 and the turnout in the District Council elections in November 2003 can prove that, but like Kuan and Lau (1995) argue, the reality is that the public’s conception of democracy is full of intricate ambiguities. In terms of motivation, the dominant factor is to improve material well being. Also the Tung administration and its supporters keep blaming the economy for the grievances of the community, and their implication is still that when the economy improves, people’s dissatisfaction with the government will evaporate. Democracy development is dealt in general with silence, and political speech about understanding people’s demands remains political speech. On the other hand, Hong Kong society is still wealthy; the HKSAR people are enjoying a per capita annual GDP of over US$24,000, which is circa the same as in United Kingdom (The World Bank, 9.9.04). On the whole, the people of Hong Kong still enjoy relatively high degree of freedom. There is a vibrant press and a strong and independent judiciary (Chan 2003).

On the other hand, there are worrying signs, which may suggest a gradual erosion of human rights. Members of the judiciary have subject to personal attack on racial grounds, self-censorship is noticeable, the government has shown a weak commitment to the rule of law, the prosecution policy is inconsistent, and the approach in democratic reform is lukewarm and so on (ibid). These are all signs of concern. It is true that a democratic political system bears no definite relationship to stability and prosperity. There is no evidence to show that democracy promotes prosperity, and also no adequate proof that democracy cannot co-exist with stability and prosperity. Those who oppose democracy and direct elections in Hong Kong frequently argue that, despite the absence of democracy, the local community still enjoys wide freedom and the rule of law. However, in the absence of democracy, like in Hong Kong, freedom and the rule of law are the gifts of the rulers, which can also be withdrawn when it pleases them, argues Cheng (1986).

Hong Kong is now in the situation that Gramsci (1971) calls the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot born; in this situation might appear a variety of morbid symptoms. It is a situation caused by the
‘crisis of authority’ of the old generations in power, which has been witnessed nowadays in Hong Kong, and the ‘problem of the younger generation’, which occurs in the immaturity of the democracy movement. If the political leadership in Chinese and Hong Kong governments remain conservative and do not introduce democratic initiatives in Hong Kong, political development will stagnate in the SAR. Still the political inclination of the general public perhaps appears to be most positive factor. According to various surveys and studies conducted over the last two decades, it has been observed that that people in Hong Kong have begun to accept the generally defined concepts of democracy, accountability, direct elections, responsible government, responsive administration, liberty, and political freedom (Lam 2002). In 1995 Kuan and Lau wrote that the democratic aspirations of the people of Hong Kong could be characterized as a partial vision of democracy that is largely congruent with the partial character of the reform measures so far implemented by the authorities. This vision was premised on the conventional wisdom that public policies should in the end serve the interests of the people but that the governmental structure and processes need not depend on their expressed preferences, and that he politician should be judged in terms of their ability to defend people’s interests but that whether they are popularly elected or not of primary concern. Nowadays it seems that more accountability among administration and universal suffrage are more and more important, while the partial vision and especially partial commitment go a long way toward explaining why the democratic development and political dialogue have been more or less immature.

This study has attempted to characterize the discussion in Hong Kong public political sphere. I left for looking the political dialogue between the civil society and government in Hong Kong. I found in places unfair political struggle between strong authoritarian leaders and incoherent pro-democratic opposition that wells from the sometimes questionable civil society of Hong Kong. I also noticed that, among the civil society, the political society is an essential actor when dealing the mobilization power and influence of pro-democracy opposition. Finally, despite the conflicts between the civil society and government, in harsh conditions, and when the civil and political society cooperates, the attempts at democratization are realized in actually concrete form. In the current situation in Hong Kong it might seem that the pro-democratic forces in both political and public sphere don’t have very great incentives to cooperate with the administration in order to achieve democratic break-troughs, and universal suffrage in 2007 is more or less unattainable, still we must, of course, look to the future. Here I am referring to signs of improving communications among the key actors, and voice the hope that a more
constructive dialogue will enlarge common ground for the benefit of the whole Hong Kong community. When democracy movement has been the main mobilizing force among people, it should be noticed that even if democratization does not occur in the near future, the risen dialogue and people power remain, and keep challenging the authorities and bringing new voices to the politics, which is important in the territory with or without democracy. Perhaps Hong Kong people’s new sense of empowerment and civic consciousness will lead to an effective push for electoral reform that will ensure that the next chief executive does not suffer from Tung Chee-hwa’s crippling lack of public mandate. Then Hong Kong may finally, for the first time in its history, enjoy a leadership that is truly responsive to the will and needs of the people.
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