

564.

TOTALLY HONEST ?
The IFOR Press and Information Operation in the Balkans
in the Eyes of the Press.

Simo Väätäinen
M.A. Thesis in Journalism
December 1997
Faculty of Humanities
Department of Communication
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

JYVÄSKYLÄN YLIOPISTO

Tiedekunta HUMANISTINEN	Laitos VIESTINTÄTIETEIDEN
Tekijä Simo Väätäinen	
Työn nimi TOTALLY HONEST ? The IFOR Press and Information Operation in the Balkans in the Eyes of the Press.	
Oppiaine Journalism	Työn laji M.A. Thesis
Aika December 1997	Sivumäärä 73
<p>Tiivistelmä - Abstract</p> <p>The first ever NATO-led land operation deployed in the Balkans in December 1995. The Operation Joint Endeavour was executed by the multi-national Implementation Force (IFOR), whose aim was to stabilise Bosnia-Herzegovina and create conditions for the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.</p> <p>The public information campaign of IFOR was reserved a crucial role in shaping the operational environment. Media was the channel through which the desired messages were sent out for the international and local audiences. The Operational Plan stressed the importance of the media and the need to depict the information to the media in total honesty.</p> <p>This report evaluates how the IFOR PI campaign did in the eyes of the press through a 43-point questionnaire which was sent to approximately a hundred journalists. They all have extensive expertise in covering the Balkan crisis and represent many of the most influential news organisations of the world.</p> <p>Overall, journalists evaluated that the IFOR PI campaign performed reasonably well: the information provided by IFOR was generally trustworthy and timely; the PI personnel treated journalists professionally and were helpful; journalists were not censored or prevented from getting information or doing their job; that is why there was no need for joint counter-strategies to defend the needs of the press; and, in comparison with other international organisations IFOR received reasonably good marks for its public information campaign.</p> <p>However, the press did not seem to recognise the IFOR PI campaign as outlined in the Operational Plan. Many journalists criticised IFOR of spinning, contorting and concealing information, and accused the PI personnel of lack of expertise in the Balkan conflict. The news agency journalists were most critical of IFOR PI operation. The broadcast journalists saw it in a more positive light. The opinions of the print and photo journalists were more diverse.</p>	
Asiasanat Media and war, journalists and war, IFOR and media, the Balkan conflict.	
Säilytyspaikka	Jyväskylän yliopisto/Tourulan kirjasto
Muita tietoja	

INTRODUCTION	1
1. BACK GROUND OF THE DEPLOYMENT	4
2. TASKS AND STRUCTURE OF IFOR	7
3. IFOR PUBLIC INFORMATION OPERATION	
3.1. Tasks and Policy.....	10
3.2. Structure.....	11
3.3. Media Environment.....	13
4. SURVEY	
4.1. Target Group.....	16
4.2. Questionnaire.....	18
4.3. Execution and Analysis.....	20
5. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY	
5.1. Quality of Information.....	24
5.2. Professionalism of the Personnel.....	25
5.3. Publicity Control.....	28
5.4. IFOR and other International Organisations.....	31
5.5. Attitudes towards IFOR.....	33
5.6. Need for Counter Strategies.....	35
5.7. Comments by the Journalists.....	36
6. CONCLUSIONS	39
SOURCES	43
ATTACHMENTS	
list of journalists who answered the questionnaire.....	45
list of the journalists whom the questionnaire was sent to.....	48
comments from the journalists.....	50
questionnaire.....	64
sample of the letter sent to the journalists with the questionnaire.....	69
data of the survey.....	70

INTRODUCTION

"Today journalists are generally more approving of what the Western military is doing in places like Somalia and Haiti than they would have been in the past with regard to conflicts in Vietnam and Panama. At the same time, there seems to have been a shift within the military towards a greater awareness of the need to manage the media more sympathetically than in the past." Journalists at War - Media and the military, Media coverage of post-Cold War conflicts. London International Research Exchange, WW.easynet.co.uk/LIRE/jawmil.htm

"To be successful, events must be depicted to the media in total honesty, must be significant enough to warrant their interest, must be relevant in the larger mission context, and must be co-ordinated to ensure they are not redundant and do not work at cross-purposes to the overall theatre campaign." IFOR Public Information - Campaign Strategy, Point 2

When IFOR started to deploy in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of 1995, many considered the UN missions in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be major failures, and indicators of UN incompetence in dealing with serious military crises. However, people who wanted to see deeper into the issue were quick to admit that the incompetence was not that of the UN, but of the international community - or more precisely, the United States and the few main European countries who could not make up their minds as to what to do with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed.

IFOR was portrayed as the able force that could halt the fighting and bring peace to Bosnia. Unlike the lightly or ill-equipped UN troops the NATO fighting machine had ample muscle. Their public images reflected this, too. The UN's battered figure was replaced by the might of IFOR. A military intervention was the very thing that many of the Balkan experts, journalists, and not least the Sarajevo government, had long been calling for. IFOR was on a mission that had a wide moral acceptance. However late, the international community, in the form of IFOR, had done something many had long demanded.

The Balkans persistently remained one of the main international news stories ever since the start of the conflict in 1991. Unlike the Gulf War, most of the media organisations who wanted to cover the IFOR mission had already been in the region since the beginning of the crisis and had gained considerable expertise on the conflict and the Balkans.

IFOR did not have the need nor the ability to keep the media under Gulf-like control. It adjusted to a situation where the media were all over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and had

expertise on the region and on the legacy of the crisis that some of the military could only hope for.¹

IFOR's public information (PI) goals were straight forward and simple: *enhancing public understanding of the IFOR mission; dissemination of accurate, timely and complete information to the public through the news media; informing fully and accurately all target audiences.* The public information campaign was based on honest and open depiction of the events to the media, which were allowed free access to IFOR activities. However, all this had clear operational purposes. IFOR's public information operation became "*a leading element of IFOR operations*" and was used "*to shape the operational environment, deter potential conflicts and resolve crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina.*"² The message that was spread out to everyone was clear: we are well-trained and well-equipped to respond any challenge.³

In Bosnia it was most logical approach. IFOR was there to create conditions for implementing the peace agreement, not to fight the war.

After having worked over four and a half years with the UN and IFOR press operations and the Finnish peace keeping troops in the former Yugoslavia, and having dealt closely with a great many journalists there, I became interested in how the press really saw the public information operations by the international community there.⁴

¹ ".the insights that many of these journalists developed after covering Bosnia for several years were invaluable to the IFOR commanders who chose to listen to them." Captain Mark Van Dyke, U.S. Navy, Chief, Public Information AFSOUTH/IFOR, presentation: Public Information in Peacekeeping - The IFOR Experience at the Seminar on Public Relations Aspects of Peacekeeping in NATO Headquarters Brussels, 11 April 1997. A broadcast journalist saw it from the other side and put it followingly "*I was summoned more than once to dine, drink and have my brains picked by incoming IFOR commanders (Gen. Nash, Gen. Rideau, Gen. Walker in particular) who wanted info on how it had been and how to handle particular situations.*"

² Captain Mark Van Dyke, U.S. Navy, presentation NATO Headquarters Brussels, 11 April 1997.

³ This was certainly the case with any military task but when it came to issues like arresting war criminals it was a different story. After all IFOR was a product of a political compromise - like the UN missions had been - and it had its bearing when it came to politically such sensitive issues like going after the indicted war criminals.

⁴ During the last three years of my assignment, I worked in the press accreditation office, where both the UN and IFOR and the media had a mutual interest: UN and IFOR press cards belonged to bona fide journalists only. In a way we were "on the same side". The UNPROFOR press cards, which entitled to access to the UNHCR relief flights into and out of Sarajevo, and also helped the holders to move around Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, were widely misused by non journalists (smugglers, war tourists, possible mercenaries or mujahedin, aid workers, and local persons who wanted to escape Sarajevo) starting summer 1992. The situation became unbearable both to the UN and the media and thus strict verification procedures for obtaining the press card were established late autumn 1993. The problem was slowly brought under control and as an acknowledgement of this the press accreditation office was the only part of the UN PI organisation that was transferred to the newly founded IFOR PI organisation. For more on the subject: "Lessons learned: Report on Press Registration, An overview of UN and IFOR press registration operations in former Yugoslavia 1992-1996."

I was over and over again surprised by how many of my military colleagues, regardless their nationality, had a very strong prejudice against journalists. Surprisingly, this was the case also with a great many journalists towards the military. This had probably more to do with the clash of institutional cultures between the media and the military and lack of knowledge of the "other side" than with real life personal experience⁵.

IFOR saw its PI campaign as a big success. The purpose of this thesis is to ask simply, how the media evaluated IFOR's press operation.

Based on the questionnaire sent to approximately a hundred journalists, this report seeks to find out: Was the information provided by IFOR as timely and accurate as the Operational Plan of IFOR anticipated? How did the media evaluate the professionalism of the IFOR PIO personnel/PIO organisation? Did the media spot any tendency by IFOR to control, guide or spin the media? How the IFOR PIO did in comparison to the press operations of other international organisations active in Bosnia-Herzegovina? What were the journalists' attitudes towards IFOR and its deployment? Did the media see any need for a joint counter strategy to defend their interests against IFOR?

The media community in Bosnia was very diverse. This report will also explore if there was any opinion shared among the media, and if there were any considerable differences between the news agency, print, broadcast or photo journalists on the issue. Moreover, the report will look into differences between local and international journalists on IFOR press operation.

All the journalists whom the questionnaire was sent to have extensive experience in covering the Balkan crisis. They represent many of the big and influential media organisations of the world and are hoped to provide an interesting angle to the issue.

⁵ Or even if these attitudes were based on real life experience, to me it seemed that lack of understanding of the ways the other side worked and thought resulted in misinterpretation and problems on the ground.

1. BACKGROUND OF THE DEPLOYMENT

Summer 1995 was the watershed time of the Yugoslav crisis.⁶ The international community was faced by developments that offered, as the phrase went, "the window of opportunity" for trying to force halt to the crisis. Slobodan Milosevic was crippled by the three years of stiff economic sanctions and his proxies started losing the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During the first days in May, the Croatian Army took the areas held by the so-called Krajina Serbs⁷ in Western Slavonia. Almost all the Serbs fled south over the Sava river to territory held by the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The situation started to escalate across the country. In Sarajevo, the BSA kept firing at the city from the 20 km Exclusion Zone⁸ and took some heavy weapons from the UN monitored heavy weapons collection points. On 24 May, Lt. General Rupert Smith, the Force Commander of the UN troops in Bosnia, ordered the parties to cease firing from the Exclusion Zone and to return the four heavy weapons to the collection points within 48 hours or to face NATO air strikes. The BSA ignored the ultimatum and kept firing at the other five safe areas. In the Tuzla town centre, an artillery shell killed over 70 people the next day.

During the following two days, 25-26 May 1995, NATO carried out air strikes against BSA ammunition dumps near Pale. The Bosnian Serbs responded by taking some UN Military Observers hostages and placing them near potential NATO targets. Within a few days the BSA held more than 360 UN peace keepers hostages. The air strikes ceased immediately and the humiliation of the international community by the BSA was complete.

⁶ The UNPROFOR News, renamed in May 1995 UN Peace Forces News, provides for a good chronology of main events in former Yugoslavia from November 1993 to December 1995, and has been a valuable source of information for this chapter.

⁷ Rebel Croatian Serbs who in 1991 captured one third of Croatia with the help of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). The stalemate between the Croatian Army and the rebel Serbs resulted in the deployment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to Croatia spring 1992.

⁸ A mortar shell that killed at least 58 civilians and wounded 142 others at the central market in Sarajevo 5 February 1994, triggered the establishment of the Exclusion Zone around the city. Sarajevo, together with Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Srebrenica, were declared UN safe areas by the Security Council resolutions 819 and 824 as early as in April-May 1993. The Security Council resolution 836 (4 June 1993) made it possible, under the authority of the Secretary General, to defend the safe areas through the use of air power. On 6 February 1994 the Secretary General requested the North Atlantic Council to "*authorise the Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Southern Command to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in and around Sarajevo ...*" The North Atlantic Council established the 20km Exclusion Zone around Sarajevo 9 February 1994. All the heavy weapons were to be withdrawn from the area or to be placed under the UN control at heavy weapons collection points. A ten day ultimatum, expiring 2400 GMT 20 February 1994, was given to the parties after which they would be subject to NATO air strikes if the ultimatum was not obeyed.

The counter reaction was not long due. In early June, the Western countries decided to send a heavily armed Rapid Reaction Force⁹ to Bosnia to protect the peace keepers. This was (yet again) not sufficient to control the situation; the BSA wanted to gain more.

Early in July heavy fighting erupted around the Srebrenica safe area. General Ratko Mladic was manoeuvring his army for a kill against the Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde safe areas, which were tying up too many of his few troops in Eastern Bosnia.¹⁰ By 11 July, the BSA had occupied Srebrenica and started preparing for the biggest atrocity of the Bosnian war. Up to 8000 men and boys were executed *en masse*.¹¹

Within a few days the BSA moved against Zepa and took control of the town by 25 July. At the same time the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO) assisted by the Croatian Army (HV) had been moving northwards in Herzegovina, alongside the Bosnian-Croatian-border, aiming to cut off Knin from the BSA held territory. They were preparing for an all-Croatian offensive against the Krajina Serbs.

The Croatian Army started the offensive against the so-called Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) 4 August 1995. The RSK defence collapsed within a couple of days and the Serb population of over 150,000 fled to Bosnia and Serbia. Banja Luka was packed with refugees and the last fraction of the remaining pre-war Croat and Muslim population began to be expelled *en masse* from the town.

On 28 August 1995, there was a mortar fired at the Markale market place in Sarajevo, killing more than 30 people and injuring another 80. This resulted in a massive NATO air strike operation against the BSA and an ultimatum which declared that the air strikes would not cease until the BSA withdrew all the heavy weapons from the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, desisted from any attacks on UN safe areas and accepted cessation of hostilities.

⁹ The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) acted under the Security Council Resolution 998 (16 June), and comprised of 12,500 mainly British, Dutch and French heavily-armed troops. It included a 4,500 strong multinational brigade, a 4,700 strong British air-mobile brigade and a 4,000 strong French brigade on stand by in France. The Force was to provide the commander of UNPROFOR with "...well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to UN personnel..." and it would not "...alter the fact that UNPROFOR cannot by itself end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina...", as the Secretary General put it in his letter to the Security Council 9 June 1995. Nothing was said about protecting the safe areas.

¹⁰ The BSA had estimated 65,000 troops but did not lack military hardware; artillery and tanks (Jane's Intelligence Review page 31, Vol. 7. Number 1).

¹¹ There is a very good web site on the Srebrenica massacre at www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/srebrenica.html. It includes investigative articles on the events around Srebrenica by David Rohde of the Christian Science Monitor, Roy Gutman of the Newsday and other international journalists.

The BSA did not comply with the ultimatum and the air strikes went on from 30 August until 20 September paralysing the BSA war machine.¹² The Croatian Army together with the HVO and the Bosnian Army saw their chances and moved very rapidly towards Banja Luka. Before 20 September, the HV had gained the high ground west and south-west of Banja Luka and was at the gates of the town preparing to overrun the last defences. However, the international pressure forced the Croats to halt the offensive.

The Bosnian Serb Army was basically defeated, partly because of the NATO air strikes and partly because of the rapid success by the opposing Croatian and Bosnian forces. Faced with the likelihood of a complete defeat together with the loss of the whole of Western Bosnia, including Republika Srpska's biggest city, Banja Luka, and Serbia's desperate need for lifting the sanctions, the Bosnian Serb leadership could not but agree to peace talks. Already at the end of August, they had given Milosevic the right to negotiate on their behalf with the international community.

After the successful Croatian offensive President Bill Clinton sent the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, together with a small five-man team to former Yugoslavia to find the solution to the crisis. The term "window of opportunity" surfaced; hectic diplomatic efforts followed and the Americans managed to get the parties to agree to travel to the peace talks in the USA. The 60-day cease-fire¹³ that was to give room for the peace talks came into effect 10 October 1995.

On 21 November 1995, after three weeks of intense negotiations in the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia initialled the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The formal signing ceremony of the agreement was held in Paris 14 December 1995.

¹² The air strikes were supported by the UN Rapid Reaction Force on Mt. Igman. The air operations were initiated after UN military commanders concluded that the mortar attack in Sarajevo came from Bosnian Serb positions. The operations were jointly decided by the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and the Force Commander, UN Peace Forces, under UN Security Council Resolution 836 and in accordance with the North Atlantic Council's decisions of 25 July and 1 August 1995, which were endorsed by the UN Secretary General. The objectives were: to reduce the threat to the Sarajevo Safe Area and to deter further attacks there or on any other Safe Area; the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the total Exclusion Zone around Sarajevo; complete freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel and non-governmental organisations, and unrestricted use of Sarajevo Airport. On 20 September 1995, CINCSOUTH and the UN Peace Force Commander concluded that the Bosnian Serbs had complied with the conditions and the air strikes were discontinued. However, they stressed that any attack on Sarajevo or any other Safe Area, or other non-compliance with the provisions of the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, freedom of movement or the functioning of the Airport would be subject to investigation and resumption of air strike operations.

¹³ Announced by the US President Bill Clinton 5 October 1995. Americans' sudden interest in getting involved with solving the crisis was widely considered as a way for President Clinton to score points for the coming presidential elections November 1996. A common joke went that the OSCE stood for "Organization to Secure Clinton's re-Election".

The United Nations Security Council lifted most of the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia a day after the peace agreement was initialled in Dayton. 15 December 1995, the Security Council passed resolution 1031 authorising the deployment of IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the withdrawal of UN troops from the country.

The operation Joint Endeavour started 16 December.¹⁴ The NATO-led multinational force was called the Implementation Force but became globally known as IFOR. The transfer of command from the UNPROFR to IFOR took place 20 December 1995.

2. TASKS AND STRUCTURE OF IFOR

The Dayton peace agreement included military and political accords, timetables and implementation arrangements, establishment of inter-entity boundaries, constitutional and election arrangements, chapters concerning human rights, refugees and displaced people, arbitration procedures, etc. The main emphasis of the agreement - although interpreted by the parties somewhat differently - was to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and unified state comprised of two entities, but at the same time with joint political and administrative institutions.¹⁵ Most importantly, the peace agreement stated that the refugees and displaced people were to be allowed to return to their homes.

IFOR was given a mandate that authorised the commander to use military force in implementing, and, if needed, enforcing the military aspects of the peace agreement.¹⁶ The IFOR commander had also the final authority to interpret the agreement on the military aspects of the peace settlement.¹⁷ The overall task of IFOR was to help to establish secure conditions for implementing the civilian part of the peace agreement.

The primary military objectives of IFOR were:

¹⁴ The so-called enabling force of 2,600 troops started deploying on 2 December, but the deployment of the main body of the force began only 16 December 1995, after the North Atlantic Council had approved the Operational Plan.

¹⁵ The entities are: the Muslim-Croat Federation, which was given 51 percent of the land mass, and the Republika Srpska, which has the remaining 49% of the land.

¹⁶ *"The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR Commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all that the Commander judges necessary, and proper, including the use of military force, to protect IFOR and to carry out the responsibilities..." "...IFOR shall have the unimpeded right to observe, monitor, and inspect any Forces, facility or activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the IFOR believes may have military capability. The refusal, interference, or denial by any Party of this right to observe, monitor, and inspect by the IFOR ... shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance..."* The General Framework Agreement, Annex 1A, Article VI, point 5 and 6.

¹⁷ The General Framework Agreement, Annex 1A, Article XII.

- to ensure compliance with the cease-fire;
- monitor the withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation back to their respective territories, and separate the forces;
- to ensure the collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks and the demobilisation of remaining forces;
- to create conditions for the withdrawal of UN forces that had not transferred to the NATO-led IFOR;
- to control the airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina; and,
- to establish the Joint Military Commission to be the forum where the parties of the conflict would deal with military aspects of the peace agreement.

IFOR also facilitated freedom of movement throughout the country by dismantling all illegal check points on the roads.¹⁸

The IFOR acted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and under the political direction and control of the alliance's North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC had the authority to issue further duties and responsibilities to IFOR in addition to the ones defined by the peace agreement.¹⁹

According to the established NATO chain of command in Europe, the overall military authority of the operation belonged to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General George Joulwan. The Headquarters of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AF South) in Naples was delegated the operational authority and the theatre command of the mission from December 1995 to November 1996. The commander of AF South (CINCSOUTH) was at the same time the theatre commander (COMIFOR) who had his headquarters in Sarajevo.²⁰

The COMIFOR had at his disposal, in addition to the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), Navy, Air, Special Operations, Naval Striking and Support, Support and Communication elements. The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), consisting of three multinational divisions was, responsible for the ground operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The country was divided into three operational sectors. In each of the sectors a multinational division (MND) had operational responsibility. The U.S.-led MND North covered the north-eastern third of the country and was headquartered in Tuzla. The


¹⁸ Although the parties were not allowed to set up check points, regular traffic control was not prohibited. This became a way of controlling movement of people into each entity. In principle everyone in BIH had the right to go anywhere one wanted to. However, very few Bosnians (Serbs, Croats and Muslims alike) dared to venture out of the area controlled by their own armed forces.

¹⁹ The General Framework Agreement, Annex 1A, Article VI, points 1 and 4.

²⁰ The first theatre commander (COMIFOR) was Admiral Leighton Smith who also was the Commander in Chief Southern Europe - CINCSOUTH). July 1996, Admiral Smith retired and Admiral Joseph Lopez was appointed as CINCSOUTH and COMIFOR.

U.K.-led MND South-West was responsible for the northern and north-western areas. It had its headquarters first in Gornji Vakuf and later in Banja Luka. The France-led MND South-East covered the southern and south-eastern areas from Mostar. (See the IFOR deployment map.)

Source: SFOR web site at www.nato.int/ifor/i-maps.htm. The map has been modified from the original.



Although led by NATO, 18 non-NATO countries participated in the operation.²¹ The non-NATO forces were incorporated into the operation on the same basis as forces from NATO member countries and were subject to the orders from the NATO/IFOR chain of command.²² The non-NATO troops took their orders from the commander of IFOR through the multinational divisional commanders.

²¹ As of September 1996, the non-NATO countries participating in the operation were Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine.

²² With the exception of the Russian brigade. In the theatre the Russian contingent was under the US-led Multinational Division (MND) North command but was subordinated to the Russian Col. General who acted as SACEUR's Russian deputy.

3. IFOR PUBLIC INFORMATION OPERATION

3.1. Tasks and Policy

A great emphasis was put on the role of the Public Information Operation (PIO) of the mission. The Operational Plan stressed the importance of public support for the mission and the media's role in mobilising it. The plan called for a proactive, well co-ordinated "PI" operation with full support from the military commanders.²³ PI officers were integrated with the inner circle of the commanders' decision-making teams. The PI operation was used on a strategic level to "*...shape opinions and attitudes, deter aggressive actions, and defuse crises...*"²⁴

The main task of the IFOR PIO campaign was to enhance public understanding of the mission. The Public Information Operation was not to spare any effort to disseminate accurate, complete and timely information to the public **through the news media**. Special attention was to be paid to ensure that all target audiences were fully and accurately informed about the operation's progress.²⁵

The main focus was on international media and public opinion. It seemed that the local media were not given such great importance. The local audiences were served mainly by the Peace News (Vjesnik Mira) publication, IFOR radio stations and IFOR-produced television pieces that were given to local TV stations for broadcast.²⁶

The PI operation stressed that it would support free and open reporting by the news media for all aspects of the IFOR mission. The press was to have free access to all IFOR military activities throughout the mission area, subject to operational security and the safety of the troops. IFOR did not impose any review of media products, i.e. censorship.

The policy took into account that a large number of media organisations were already in the region and in some cases might be able to report on specific incidents before the information made its way up the military chain of command and was available for the spokespersons.²⁷ The Operational Plan allowed the military commanders and public

²³ CINCSOUTH Operational Plan, Annex P, Public Information, Point 2a.

²⁴ A PI representative was placed in the joint operations centre 24 hours a day to make sure the PI operation had always the latest information. Flow of information went both ways, (see note 27). Captain Mark Van Dyke, presentation NATO Headquarters Brussels, 11 April 1997.

²⁵ CINCSOUTH Operational Plan, Annex P, Public Information, Point 3a-e.

²⁶ CINCSOUTH Operational Plan, Annex P, Public Information - Campaign Strategy, Point 2. More on the subject: Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina: How International Support Can Be More Effective, Chapter V F., and Chapter VI A. A Report by the International Crisis Group, www.intl-crisis-group.org

²⁷ "*Ironically...our PI representative (in the joint operations centre) was often able to provide first indication of an emerging crisis. The news wires and major television networks who we monitored were often ahead of our own intelligence and operational reports.* Captain Mark Van Dyke, presentation NATO Headquarters Brussels, 11 April 1997.

information officers in the field to confirm basic facts that were already obvious to the media. The authority to release information was in principle delegated to the lowest possible level.²⁸ However, news and media queries that had "...clear political overtones, address significant policy issues, or may otherwise be expected to focus major media attention on its release.." were to be left for NATO and SHAPE²⁹ to co-ordinate release or to comment on such issues.³⁰

All in all, the Operational Plan laid the foundation for building an open, honest and media-friendly environment. The plan in particular underlined the importance of totally honest depiction of the events to the media.³¹

3.2. Structure

The IFOR PI organisation was linked closely with both the NATO PI structures and with the military chain of command in theatre. This was to provide the PI operation with timely political guidance from upper echelons of the NATO chain of command and a steady flow of information from the mission area for distribution to the media.

The PI operation was led by the Chief Public Information Officer (CPIO), Captain Mark Van Dyke (US Navy). He reported directly to the COMIFOR and worked very closely with the commander on media issues.³²

The CPIO had in his charge a network of PI staff which was connected to the operational elements of the force. A PI representative was on 24-hour duty in the joint operations centre in Sarajaevo, to ensure that the PI operation was always up-to-date with the operations and that "...PIO actions were consistent with operations."³³

²⁸ *"The individual soldier, sailor, airman, marine...are usually our best and most credible spokespersons"* Captain Mark Van Dyke, presentation NATO Headquarters Brussels, 11 April 1997.

²⁹ Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

³⁰ CINCSOUTH Operational Plan , Annex P, Appendix 2, point 4a.

³¹ CINCSOUTH Operational Plan Annex P, Public Information - Campaign Strategy, Point 2. *"A co-ordinated PI campaign, based on the accomplishments of the mission, helps focus international understanding for the operation.... To be successful, events must be depicted to the media in total honesty, must be significant enough to warrant their interest, must be relevant in the larger mission context, and must be co-ordinated to ensure they are not redundant and do not work at cross-purpose to the overall theatre campaign."*


³² The commander of IFOR had his first and last meeting of the day with the CPIO. The CPIO also enjoyed an open-door policy with his commander for informal one-on-one meetings on media issues that required immediate attention.

³³ *"Ironically...our PI representative was often able to provide first indication of an emerging crisis. The news wires and major television networks who we monitored were often ahead of our own intelligence and operational reports."* Captain Mark Van Dyke, presentation NATO Headquarters Brussels, 11 April 1997.

The CPIO had under him two regional Coalition Public Information Centres (CPIC) in Sarajevo and in Zagreb: the AF South Public Information office and the ARRC Public Information office. The latter was in turn linked to the PI offices in the three divisional headquarters. (See the chart below.)

The national contingents were instructed to have dedicated press officers who were to be linked to the IFOR PIO structure through the Divisional Public Information Offices or the CPICs (see Chart 1.). The plan was to create unified and responsive PIO body, which was to be linked closely with the operations staff for a steady flow of information. This kind of a structure was needed for distributing unified IFOR/NATO messages regardless the nationality or the location of the press officer. The structure was designed to be able to react in a co-ordinated and proactive manner to any public information task.

Chart 1. IFOR PIO organisation chart



In practise, national agendas played a greater role than anticipated by the Operational Plan. Some of the contributing non-NATO nations did not value the public information function to the extent of the NATO doctrine. At the other extreme were the countries who brought in very strong PI units which functioned outside the IFOR PI chain, and

focused mainly on national agendas. Sometimes these agendas were contradictory to the official IFOR or NATO goals.³⁴

3.3. Media Environment

The media played a major role in the events leading to the war and disintegration of Yugoslavia. The political leaders in the republics bluntly used the media for their propagandist purposes and shaped the public opinion to the direction that best suited their interests. During the Yugoslav era, the media were used to support the existing political system and were controlled by the League of Communists in each republic.³⁵

The new power holders, particularly in Serbia and in Croatia, merely just stepped in for the old regime and even increased their influence over the media. The few independent media organisations were sidelined and were not able to reach as massive audiences as the state-controlled TV did. Media was the tool that generated nationalist euphoria, ethnic hatred and war psychosis. Such was the power of the media that many experts of the Yugoslav crisis are convinced that the war could not have been brought about without the help of the mass media.³⁶

³⁴ The U.S. contingent brought in the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) in Tuzla. This office was far better equipped than the divisional CPIC there. At the same time when the CPIC was desperately lacking staff, the JIB had so many personnel that it became a standard joke among journalists in Tuzla. Russians were generally described as unapproachable. Surprisingly the Nordpol brigade PIOs, including Finnish, Swedish, Danish, Norwegian and Polish officers, received criticism for not being interested in setting up media opportunities organised by IFOR.

The U.S.-sponsored "Train and Equip" program was designed to strengthen the Federation defence by arming and training the Croat HVO and the Bosnian Armija BiH. They had fought a bitter war against each other in 1993-94, but now they were to form a joint and credible defence against the BSA. It was a perfect sample of a contradiction between IFOR and national agendas.

³⁵ Mark Thompson, "Forging War; The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina." Page 7.

³⁶ "A campaign of intense propaganda was needed to mobilise the population, to make war thinkable in Yugoslavia, let alone inevitable." Mark Thompson, Forging War, page 5.

"Having travelled widely in Bosnia over fifteen years, and having stayed in Muslim, Croat and Serb villages, I cannot believe the claim that the country was forever seething with ethnic hatreds. But having watched Radio Television Belgrade in the period 1991-2, I can understand why simple Bosnian Serbs came to believe that they were under threat, from Ustasha hordes, fundamentalist jihads or whatever." Noel Malcom, "Bosnia, A Short History", page 252.

"The key to Milosevic's rule and an understanding of modern Serb nationalism is the Serbian media and their sustained campaign to generate national hysteria. Indeed, the Serbian media have played a very similar role in Milosevic's Serbia to that played by the Nazi media in Hitler's Germany, though on account of technological advances in the intervening half century, their influence has been more pervasive and more insidious." Christopher Bennet, "Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse; Causes, Courses and Consequences", page 248.

"It can be argued, indeed, that these regimes would never have been able to begin a war if they had not abused media unscrupulously, at times illegally. Campaigns of intense propaganda were used to mobilise

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the media disintegrated to three separate factions and were widely controlled by the ruling parties. In the areas held by the BSA and the HVO, the media were nothing but a tool of the political elite to govern the population and support nationalistic propaganda. However, few alternative media emerged in the Republika Srpska at the end of 1995, but the so-called Republic of Herceg-Bosna remained the wasteland of media freedom. In the government-controlled territories, and particularly in Sarajevo, the media had more space to manoeuvre but often only with the help of international donations, which in turn created an artificial media market.³⁷ Also, talent was lacking. Many of the best Bosnian journalists had left the country during the war or had been employed by the international media or other organisations.³⁸

Media played a crucial role in the events not only within the former Yugoslavia, but it also had an effect in shaping the policies of the international community. The war first in Slovenia, then in Croatia and finally in Bosnia was played in real time on the screens throughout the world. The images of JNA tanks in Ljubljana, refugees of Vukovar, the Omarska concentration camp, the Markala massacre, and events similar shook the world and each time required the international community to do *something*.³⁹ The media did not allow the war to be forgotten.⁴⁰ The horrors of war reached over and over again the TV screens and the headlines in the capitals of the mighty.

During these years many of the journalists and their organisations became experts in the Yugoslav conflict and formed the most important element of the very demanding audience for any one who represented the international community in the Balkans.

The war in the Balkans was one of the biggest stories in Europe since World War II. Between October 1993 and December 1996, the UN and IFOR issued over 20,000 press cards.⁴¹ Approximately one third of the cards were issued to local journalists employed by both the local and international media.

the population.... The most dramatic element of this propaganda was the incitement of popular fear and hatred against specific national groups." "Unfinished Peace, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans", page 152.

³⁷ "Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina: How International Support Can Be More Effective", page 4-6, 9-10. International Crisis Group Report 7 March 1997. WWW.intl-crisis-group.org


³⁸ For example in 1996, the Editor in Chief of ONASA, Mehmet Husic, complained to the author that it was far easier to get donations to buy equipment than for hiring qualified staff. Local media could not compete with the salaries paid by international agencies, loss of talent was inevitable.

³⁹ For more about the subject: Martin Bell, "In Harm's Way, Reflections of a War Zone Thug", pages 142 - 145.

⁴⁰ According to Paul Meller in his article, "The dead and the deadline", The Guardian, 25 March 1996, the discussion about the role of the media has two mainstreams. The other, represented by journalists, UN staff and most of Sarajevans, believes that the international intervention would not have come about without the efforts of the media. The other, represented by Sarajevo intellectuals, claims that the way the media depicted the war (incorrectly) as civil or religious war gave the politicians a good excuse not to act and thus prolonged the conflict.

⁴¹ This figure relates only to issued press cards, not to the number of journalists who covered the crisis. The normal duration of the validity of the press card was six months. Journalists who covered the crisis

Graph I. Number of issued UN and IFOR Press Cards monthly October 93 - November 96



The media community was thus very diverse. At one extreme it included media organisations and journalists who were devoted to most extreme type of propagandist presentation. At the other end were the most professional and dedicated journalists,⁴² some of whom risked their lives trying to unfold the nature of the events in Bosnia.⁴³ In between these two extremes one could find the whole scale of the media world: in size, importance and professionalism.

permanently could then be issued up to six press cards during these years. However, the number of issued press cards gives us a good indicator of the media interest.

⁴² Many journalists received awards for their coverage of the story. Roy Gutman of Newsday won the Pulitzer Prize 1993, for breaking the story on concentration camps and mass rape in northern Bosnia. David Rohde of the Christian Science Monitor won the Pulitzer Prize 1996, for his reporting of the massacre of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. On one of his trips to eastern Bosnia the Bosnian Serb authorities held him for ten days in prison October-November 1995. Ed Vulliamy of the Guardian won, among other prizes, the Granada's Foreign Correspondent of the Year Award 1992, for his coverage of the war in the former Yugoslavia.

⁴³ According to the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists, since the beginning of the crisis to September 1994, 44 journalists had been killed in the line of duty. In 1995, which saw some of the heaviest fighting of the crisis, three journalists were killed. "Journalists Survival Guide, former Yugoslavia", Committee to Protect Journalists, October 1994, New York, page 1. The record of the International Federation of Journalists as quoted by the UK National Union of Journalists magazine, The Journalist, February/March 1996, page 24.

4. SURVEY

4.1. Target Group

The media community in Bosnia was not a homogeneous group of journalists or media organisations. The diversity of journalists and their media organisations was well represented. This results in some difficulty for this study. How to find out what the media as whole thought about the IFOR PIO? One solution was to include in this study only those journalists who had considerable experience in the Balkans, and thus enough background to make valid judgements on the basis which to answer the poll. On the other hand, the media has been divided into sub categories in order to determine if, for example, print journalists evaluated IFOR differently than broadcast journalists did.

It was thought that a photojournalist or a cameraman saw the IFOR PI operation from a different angle than did a news agency journalist. The latter in turn had probably a different perspective or needs than did a broadcast journalist.

The media in this study were divided into four sub categories according to the type of media (news agency, print, broadcast, photo), and into two according to the nationality of the journalists (Bosnian or Croatian and international). The four sub categories and the news agencies included in them are listed below.

A) News agency journalists

Includes AFP, AP, Onasa, Reuters and WTN.⁴⁴

B) Print journalists

Includes both newspapers and magazines. New York Times, Washington Post, Milliyet, Time Magazine, Newsweek, Stern, News Magazine, Der Spiegel, Boston Globe and Oslobodenje.

C) Broadcast journalists

Includes ABC News, ARD, BBC, CBS News, CNN International, German Radio, ITN, NBC News, ORF, VOA, YLE and ZDF.

D) Photo journalists and cameramen

Includes AP, Magnum Photos, Saba Press, Visum and WTN.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ WTN is a TV news agency, but since it deals with daily news stories and covers the news in a way from the same angle as the other news agencies, it has been included in this category. To place WTN journalists together with broadcast journalists would not be justified since they are, due to nature of their work, committed to a long term coverage of the region unlike broadcast journalists who very often come to cover a special event and leave.

⁴⁵ Photographers and cameramen share similar types of difficulties and approaches when trying to catch pieces of reality. Often they are more exposed to the dangers of their profession than any other journalists. Due to similarities of their work they have been put together and separated from the rest of the journalists, even if they would work for news agencies or broadcasters.

To examine the possible difference between the local and international media organisations, the questionnaire was sent also to BH Press, Dani, Dnevni Avaz, Onasa, Oslobodenje, Ljiljan, RTV BIH and Slobodna Bosna,⁴⁶ all main Bosnian media organisations based in Sarajevo. Only Onasa, Oslobodenje and RTV BIH journalists returned the questionnaire. Thus this thesis looks more closely at differences of opinion between local⁴⁷ and international journalists only, not between international and local media organisations. One could assume that opinions of local journalists would differ on number of issues from those of their foreign colleagues due to their emotional closeness to the crisis, and to their expertise on the region and on the background of the crisis. Also, local journalists sometimes complained of being treated worse than their international colleagues by the international organisations.⁴⁸

The criteria for the selection of these particular media organisations and particular journalists was based on the importance of the media and the experience of the journalists in the region, and the contacts the author had with these organisations. This list is by no means exhaustive. Many important media and journalists were excluded, either because there were very difficult to reach or, simply, that the line had to be drawn somewhere.

Even though the main focus of media activity was in Sarajevo, some questionnaires were sent to journalists in Zagreb and Vienna, because they also covered Bosnia-Herzegovina, the northern parts of the country in particular.

Journalists who came to Bosnia only for a particular story or stayed in the region for a short period of time have been left out of this study. It was assumed - even though their point of view might provide valid information on IFOR's ability to deal with journalists - journalists who had stayed in the region or covered it for a longer period of time were better placed to judge the successes or the faults of the IFOR PI operation.

⁴⁶ BH Press is the official news agency owned by the government; Dani is an important political monthly magazine; Dnevni Avaz is the best-selling daily in Sarajevo; Onasa is the news agency linked closely with Oslobodenje; Oslobodenje is a Sarajevo-based daily; Ljiljan is a weekly magazine linked closely with nationalistic policies; RTV BIH is the state radio and TV; Slobodna Bosna is an influential bi-weekly magazine.

⁴⁷ Most of the local journalists who answered the poll work for international media organisations.

⁴⁸ They probably had a point. The role the media played in the build-up to the Balkan wars, and the continuation of state-controlled media propaganda in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, had tarnished much of the image of the local press. The other aspect was that dealing with the local media was not as glamorous as dealing with the most famous and influential media and journalists in the world. And certainly, journalists like Smiljko Sagolj and agencies like TWRA, SRNA and the Pale TV did not do any good for the image of local journalists.

4.2. Questionnaire⁴⁹

The questions of the survey are divided in six groups. The first focuses on the **quality of the information** provided by IFOR. It includes following questions.

1. Did you find the information provided by IFOR reliable?
2. Was the information provided by IFOR accurate enough?
3. How often did you need to cross check information released by IFOR?
4. Did IFOR provide information timely enough?

The second group of questions deals with **the professionalism of the organisation** in the eyes of the media.

5. To what extent the IFOR PIO personnel was adequately aware of the history of the crisis?
7. Did you feel that the IFOR personnel was adequately aware of their mission?
8. Did you feel that the IFOR personnel you dealt with knew what was going on?
9. Were you always treated professionally by the Public Information personnel?
10. Were you always treated professionally by IFOR soldiers?
11. Did you get adequate assistance from IFOR when you asked for it?
12. Did you get appropriate professional assistance form the regional IFOR press centres?
13. When a PIO person could not provide you with particular information but promised to check it and get back to you later on, how often this really happened?
18. Were you satisfied with the IFOR press briefings?
19. Were you satisfied with IFOR spokespersons?
20. Were you satisfied with the availability of the IFOR decision makers for comments?

The third group seeks to shed light on questions regarding **publicity control** by IFOR.

14. As an organisation, was IFOR open enough to the press?
21. Do you feel that you were ever misled by IFOR?
22. Do you feel that IFOR ever tried to cover up something?
23. Do you feel that you were ever censored by IFOR?
24. Were you ever prevented by IFOR performing your journalistic duties?
25. Did IFOR impose any unnecessary restrictions for performing your job?
26. Did IFOR ever try to prevent you getting information you wanted to?
27. Did IFOR ever pressure you to report on an event a certain way?
28. Did IFOR ever question your professionalism?
29. To your knowledge how frequent were the cases where a journalist filed a critical story on IFOR and afterwards felt that IFOR imposed restrictions/changed its attitude on the journalist?
30. In your opinion, to what extent IFOR was able to determine the media agenda?
31. Do you think that IFOR succeeded in focusing the media attention where it wanted to be focused?

The fourth group of questions compares the IFOR PIO to the **other international organisations**.

33. Could you please indicate the reliability of information provided by following organisations: UNHCR, OHR, OSCE, UNMBIH, ICRC, IFOR?⁵⁰

⁴⁹ The questionnaire is attached at the end of the thesis. Attachment IV, page 64.

⁵⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Office of the High Representative, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, International

34. If you evaluate the UN and the IFOR press operations, would you be able to give them ratings on how well they performed?
35. Did you find the information provided by the UN mission reliable?

The fifth group focuses on the **attitude of the journalists towards IFOR** at the time of the deployment.

32. Did you ever feel that there was animosity between the press and IFOR military?
36. Did you think that, at that time, the international community made a right decision when it deployed IFOR to Bosnia?
37. Did you at that time believe that IFOR would solve the crisis?
38. Did you agree with the IFOR deployment?
39. Are you hopeful for the future of unified Bosnia-Herzegovina?
40. Did you think that the use of force was the only way to solve the crisis late 1995?

The last group refers to the Gannett Foundation Media Center recommendations for the media on the need to secure the range and diversity of sources and collectively defend the needs of the press on the matters of access to information and censorship.⁵¹

6. Did you ever use video footage, photos or stories produced by IFOR PIO operation?
15. How big was the role of IFOR among your sources?
16. How big was the ratio of your internal IFOR sources compared to your IFOR PIO sources?
17. Do you think you should have had more internal IFOR sources?
41. Were you satisfied with the coverage your organisation gave to the story 12/1995-12/1996?
42. Would there have been a need for the media community to defend the interests of the press in a more organised way in the Balkan crisis 1991-1995?
43. What about during the IFOR deployment 12/1995 - 12/1996?

Because of the simplification this kind of multiple choice questionnaire is bound to cause, the journalists were asked and encouraged to comment either on the survey, particular questions or on the UN and IFOR PIO operation.⁵² Many of the journalists did comment and were very frank and forthcoming in their comments.⁵³

Committee of the Red Cross. UNMBIH had a mandate which focused on civilian issues, mainly on monitoring and training local police forces. Many of the UNPROFOR civilian personnel in Bosnia transferred to the UNMBIH.

⁵¹ "The Media... The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict." Gannett Foundation Media Centre. Pages 96-97. The Gannett Foundation Media Centre recommended (among others) that the media "*must learn to represent themselves collectively with one voice on matters of access to information and censorship in time of war without sacrificing the independence of individual media or their essential competitiveness.*" The Foundation recommended also that the range and diversity of sources should be given serious attention. For more about the subject also Luostarinen Heikki, "Mielen kersantit - Julkisuuden hallinta ja journalistiset vastastrategiat sotilaallisissa konflikteissa." Hanki ja Jää, Juva 1994. Pages 249-261.

⁵² A typical phrase used in the covering letter was "*Some of the journalists who have already returned the questionnaire and who felt that it did not adequately address the relevant points of the media have made very frank and extremely useful comments on issues concerning performance both of IFOR and UN PIO operation. I would very much appreciate your comments on them.*"

⁵³ All the comments are included in Attachment III, page 50.

Some questions were criticised as being misleading, vague or "loaded" by three journalists. One of them pointed out that the use of percentages was not a correct way of addressing complex questions.⁵⁴ Overall, the journalists did not seem to find it too hard to answer the questions.

To measure objectively issues like professionalism of an organisation or the quality of information provided by it is very difficult. It certainly would require a more sophisticated approach than just a simple questionnaire sent to a group of people. However, since this report is looking at those issues particularly from the media point of view the chosen approach should be obvious and well founded. Also, the journalists who responded to the poll were the customers and the targets of the organisation we are trying to research. Their opinions as such should provide for a valuable insight how they saw IFOR.

The other question is how well the given questions shed light on a particular issue. Most of the groups are fairly clear cut and obvious except for the second group which focuses on the professionalism of the organisation. It was at least the author's experience that journalists appreciated speedy, efficient and precise assistance, and deep knowledge of the complex crisis. Anyone who matched this criteria, was honest, frank and had some interpersonal skills gained a good reputation with the media. The second group of questions includes some of those elements which are indicators for the professionalism of the IFOR PI organisation and the personnel.

4.3. Execution and Analysis

The survey was done March-April 1997.

Each journalist or his/her office was contacted before the sending of the questionnaire either by e-mail or by fax. In most of the cases, ten to fifteen days after the questionnaire was sent, the journalist was contacted again and encouraged to do the poll.⁵⁵ A cover letter explained the purpose of the questionnaire and the confidentiality of the study.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ "I feel somewhat false answering a question about the chances of a united Bosnia's survival in terms of percentage points, or for that matter the question of NATO deployment. They seem rather too complex a question for an answer like 30%."

⁵⁵ The crises in Albania, Zaire and the Middle East were timed very badly for this study, as was the Pope's visit to Sarajevo. Most of the journalists that needed to be reached were in one of the regions for considerable periods of time, and naturally out of reach or too busy to answer the questionnaire.

⁵⁶ A sample of the cover letter is enclosed in Attachment V, page 69.

Confidentiality seemed to be an important factor. Some journalists made it clear that could not answer the poll if their names or media organisations would be identified with their answers. Both in the cover letter, and when making personal contact with the journalists it was stressed that all the answers would remain strictly confidential and would not be attributed to the person or his/her media organisation. It was also stressed that the survey was done out of academic interest only, and did not have any affiliation with either NATO, the UN or national authorities.

The questionnaire was sent to approximately 90 journalists; 55 of them returned the questionnaire.⁵⁷ The breakdown of the journalists who returned the questionnaire is below. The news agencies tended use more local staff than the other media organisations. That explains the relatively high proportion of local journalists in the news agency category of table 1.

Table 1. Breakdown of the journalists who answered the poll

	News ag.	Print	Broadcast	Photo/Cam	Total
International	6	13	13	5	37
Local	9	1	6	2	18
Total	15	14	19	7	55

The local journalists held less than 30 percent of UN and IFOR press cards, while in this study about one third of the answers came from local journalists.

⁵⁷ It is impossible to give an exact number of the journalists whom the questionnaire was sent to because some of them were sent to news agency bureaus in Zagreb and Sarjevo. The complete list of the bureaus and the journalists to whom the questionnaire was sent is in Attachment II, page 48; the list of those who returned the questionnaire is in Attachment I, page 45.

Percentage points, instead of a 1-to-8 scale, were chosen in order to break the regular symmetric scale and try to "fine tune" the options at the top and the bottom ends.

It can be argued that having a percentage point scale is a clumsy, or even too mathematical way of trying to find out what was thought about IFOR. However, it was not the purpose to seek mathematical precision in the answers but rather to spot tendencies in what the media thought about IFOR. This is particularly, if they were of a laudatory or of a critical nature.

Because of the relatively low number of journalists who answered the poll and the diversity of the media, mean and standard deviation and other more sophisticated statistical means were not used as the main indicators in analysing the results.

The standard deviations grew fairly high. That is why the results will be presented in a graphic form, which shows the tendency of the answers and opinions rather than exact statistical truth on each question.

It can be argued that this descriptive approach is well-founded at least for two reasons. First, 55 cases do not allow very detailed statistical and representative conclusions on how the journalists evaluated the IFOR press operation. It is questionable if such a small target group could with statistical precision represent the whole of the diverse media community in Bosnia. This is particularly true, because the target group was not selected randomly. The selection was based on their experience in the Balkans. It was hoped that this group of journalists could offer some tendencies on the issues at hand.

Second, it could also be asked if a statistical approach would be reasonable at all where we are trying to establish what the media thought about the IFOR PI operation. The numbers indeed provide the basis for the evaluation, but they need to have a strong descriptive element.

It was thought that if the diverse media community in the Balkans would be able to produce unified opinions on any given question it would constitute for a very strong and relevant statement from the side of the media on the given question.

It was also assumed that photographers and cameramen would form a fairly unified group of journalists who would answer the poll accordingly. This did not turn out to be the case. It seemed that they could agree only on very few things. That is why their numbers are not shown in the graphics as their own group as are the news agency, print and broadcast journalists. However, their numbers are included in the totals.


5. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

5.1. Quality of Information


Journalists considered information given by IFOR generally reliable and accurate. The majority of them estimated the quality of information acceptable or good. Broadcast journalists were clearly more satisfied with both the accuracy and reliability of the information than their news agency colleagues. International and local journalists had no differences on this issue.

On average IFOR did not get equally good marks on the timeliness of information. News agency journalists wanted IFOR to be quicker while broadcast journalists were quite pleased with the pace with which IFOR provided information. Opinions of print journalists were diverse, and, like local journalists, they did not share a common opinion on this question.

The displeasure shown by the news agency journalists is understandable due to the nature of their work. Being often the first to report on emerging news, they had high demands for instant and accurate information. Broadcast and print journalists with their feeds or deadlines to meet had normally more time to produce the story.




The question on the need to cross-check information released by IFOR seemed not to be specific enough and did not produce for a clear answer. It probably relied more on different journalistic cultures and individual styles of professionalism than on the reliability of information. It seems that some journalists considered cross checking a routine procedure that had to be done in any case, while the others tended to accept the information given by this international body as more or less accurate. International journalists seemed to be a bit more cautious and aware of the need to cross check information.



5.2 Professionalism of the Personnel


Journalists viewed IFOR personnel with some criticism. Most of them had been covering the region for a long period of time, and had gained considerable expertise on the Balkans. From their perspective IFOR personnel were not very well informed about the history of the crisis. They did receive better marks for their knowledge of the current situation - although still the marks were not too flattering - and of their mission.

Graph V. Awareness of IFOR PIOs of the history of the crisis, knowledge of current situation, and providing requested information that the PIO did not possess in the first place.



IFOR PI personnel did receive very good marks for professional assistance of journalists, while the marks for the soldiers were slightly worse. Local journalists in particular felt that they were treated worse by the soldiers than their international colleagues were.

Graph VI. Satisfaction with the appropriateness of professional assistance from IFOR PIOs, IFOR soldiers and IFOR regional press centers.




There seemed to be no displeasure with the professional assistance received from IFOR in general, or from the regional IFOR press centres in particular. The PIOs got very good marks for their professional treatment of journalists. They also more often than not got back to journalists with information they had not possessed at the time of questioning.

The journalists were generally satisfied with the IFOR press briefings and the spokespersons. The graphs for the both questions were almost identical. There was, however, a clear opposition: news agency journalists who were very displeased with both the briefings and the spokespersons.

Broadcast journalists were clearly more happy with IFOR PIO than the news agency journalists. Opinions of print journalists varied a lot on these questions. However, they were very pleased - more than their news agency and broadcast colleagues - with how IFOR soldiers treated them. Local journalists felt that they were treated worse by the soldiers than their international comrades were.


The biggest difference between the broadcast and news agency journalists was with satisfaction with the spokespersons. As could be expected, the news agency people were much more critical than the rest of their colleagues.

Graph VII. News agency and broadcast journalists' satisfaction with the spokespersons



The media also showed some displeasure across the board with the availability of IFOR decision makers for comments.

Graph VIII. Satisfaction with the IFOR press briefings and spokespersons and with the availability of decision makers for comments.



5.3. Publicity Control

Journalists seemed to think that IFOR was adequately open to the press, although there was a small group which differed from the mainstream. Broadcast journalists saw IFOR in a more positive light in this regard than did the print journalists, who did not produce unified opinion. Needless to say, news agency journalists were the most critical. Local journalists were more satisfied with IFOR's openness than were their international colleagues.

Journalists on average were inclined to think that IFOR was able to determine the media agenda to some extent. Although they could not really agree whether IFOR was able to focus the media attention wherever it wished it to be focused on.

On the other hand journalists thought that there was some tendency to cover up things by IFOR, but most of the journalists felt that they had not been misled by IFOR.


For the most part journalists had not experienced any censorship⁵⁸ from IFOR, nor had there been any pressure to report on an event a certain way. Journalists did not feel that there was any significant restriction on their doing their job or on getting the information they required.

IFOR did not question their professionalism but some of the journalists indicated that they knew some cases of backlash for a critical story on IFOR. Unfortunately, only one case was identified in the comments of the journalists.⁵⁹


⁵⁸ Although the *censorship* term itself should be very clear it is probable that some of the journalists did not understand it as a preview of media products. In a comment a photographer says to have protested against acts of censorship when a IFOR soldier "*was trying to prevent me from doing my job.*"

⁵⁹ "*Gen. William Nash accused me of "jeopardising troop security" with that story, though he would never say that to my face. In fact, he never agreed to an interview again! His spokesman, whose name I can't remember was generally less helpful after that story. I don't really care if they question my professionalism, but certainly I questioned theirs.*" A broadcast journalist.


Graph IX. IFOR's openness to the press.



Graph X. Ability of IFOR to determine the media agenda, tendency to cover up things and tendency to mislead journalists.



Graph XI. Censorship by IFOR, prevention from performing journalistic duties and restrictions/backlash after a critical story on IFOR was filed.




5.4. IFOR and other International Organisations


IFOR PI operation did fairly well in comparison with the other international organisations in the region. UNHCR and ICRC were considered the most reliable organisations in Bosnia, while IFOR performed best in the middle group consisting of UNMBIH, OHR and IFOR.

OSCE was seen clearly as the most unreliable organisation.

Graph XII. Reliability of information given by IFOR, UNHCR and ICRC.




Graph XIII. Reliability of information given by IFOR, UNMBIH, OHR and OSCE.



IFOR was placed by the journalists in the same group with the UNMBIH both in the reliability of information and the performance of their public information operations. This is somewhat surprising because journalists basically agreed with the IFOR deployment and at least in the beginning saw it in a very positive light, while the UN was very widely criticised.

Another interesting factor is that when the journalists were asked to evaluate the reliability of information from a number of international agencies, IFOR received clearly better marks when compared with them than when standing alone (see Graph III: Quality of Information.) An obvious explanation is that when journalists also evaluated other international agencies, the answers show the relative quality of information. The question where IFOR stood alone gives us probably better reading on the actual reliability of the information from IFOR.




5.5. Attitudes Towards IFOR

The attitudes of the journalists towards IFOR were somewhat ambivalent. On the other hand they very strongly agreed with the deployment of the force, and thought that the international community made the right decision when deploying IFOR into the

Balkans. Journalists also believed very strongly that the use of force was the only way to solve the crisis. In fact, the three questions about the international community's decision to deploy IFOR, its deployment and the use of force, drew by far the strongest approving - and almost identical - statements from the journalists.

Graph XV. Cabability to solve the crisis, acceptability of use force to solve it, acceptability of the deployment of IFOR, and if the decision to deploy IFOR was a correct one by the international community.




On the other hand journalists were not that confident that IFOR would solve the crisis,⁶⁰ and thought that there were not much hope for the future of a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. Interestingly, they also to some extent felt animosity towards the IFOR military.

One could say that the journalists, while agreeing fully with the deployment of IFOR and the use of force, still viewed it with some suspicion. After all, it was a military organisation.

⁶⁰ Q37. "Did you at that time believe that IFOR would solve the crisis?" It has to be admitted that the question is not precise enough, or even fair. IFOR was not there to solve the crisis all alone, it was tasked to deal with military aspects of the peace agreement.

Graph XVI. Animosity between the press and IFOR military and hopes for unified Bosnia-Herzegovina.




5.6. Need for Counter-Strategies

Journalists seemed to be very satisfied with the coverage their media organisation gave to the story during the year IFOR was deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The IFOR PIO played a significant, but not overwhelming, role as a source for the journalists who claimed to have had almost as many internal IFOR sources as they had PI sources. However, they tended to wish for more internal sources. Print journalists seemed to use less IFOR sources than news agency or broadcast journalists. Use of IFOR produced media material, photos, video footage or stories was next to non-existent.

This, together with minimal restrictions by IFOR on the media, was probably the reason why the journalists did not seem to need any organised defence of press interests during the IFOR era. The story was slightly different during 1991-1995, but then again, the need did not seem to be that significant.⁶¹

⁶¹ Around 1993-94 there was, however, Foreign Journalists Association in Sarjevo, which was active in trying to get UNPROFOR to improve press accreditation practises and better control the UNHCR airlift. For more on the issue: "Lessons Learned: Report on Press Registration".

Graph XVII. Use of IFOR produced material, the size of the role of IFOR compared to other sources and need for an organised way to defend the interests of the press during IFOR deployment.



5.7. Comments by the Journalists

Thirty journalists made comments on the questions of the survey or on the relations between the journalists and the UN and IFOR PI operations. Some of the comments were very detailed and brought up specific cases. Also, credit was given where it was considered due, although most of the comments were of a critical nature.

Many of the comments ran parallel with the first group of questions that dealt with the quality of the information and publicity control by IFOR. The criticism was aimed at:

- the tendency to conceal, contort and spin information;
- delaying the release of information;
- downplaying some important events;
- lack of adequate background on the conflict or about the situation in Bosnia;
- interpreting the information the way that suited IFOR best;
- not providing the whole picture, relevant details often being obscured or left out;

- lying when confronted with damaging situations and stories;⁶²
- information sometimes being superficial and ignorant;
- attempts to spin or directly mislead the press.

There were also few positive comments on the quality of information. Two journalists concluded that the information provided by IFOR was "*generally accurate and reliable*" and that IFOR was "*quick with information and accurate most of times*".

Professionalism and quality of the personnel and the organisation were also discussed in number of comments. Journalists pointed out that the lack of continuity and institutional memory was a central factor that hindered the operation. The background of the crisis was so complex that one needed to have weeks, if not months, to master it. Frequent rotations resulted in loss of talent and institutional memory.⁶³

Nationality seemed to play a central role as well. Generally the British PIOs were considered the best, French and Americans the worst. In the end it came down to individual PIOs to make the difference, some were criticised, some credited.⁶⁴

The importance of good relations between the spokesmen and the media was best described by a print journalist in his comment: "*The credibility of individual spokesmen was crucial to the credibility of the mission in the eyes of the press. When there was a consensus that the spokesmen were being as frank as conditions allowed, relations and the exchange of information between the PIO and the press were much better. It was by no means inevitable for relations to be combative.*"

⁶² Here the Italians and one of the first IFOR spokesmen, LtCol Rayner, were singled out.

⁶³ "...most of them rotated too much, so that a lot of them didn't know enough about the region, problems, history, even about the roads and ways." A broadcast journalist. "...there was always a limited number of UN/IFOR personnel (PIO or other) who had continuity, width and depth of grasp as far as the situation on the ground was concerned.... Once they started feeling more comfortable about their performance within the given perimeters they were often rotated out... you learned that the OFFICE is not to be trusted unquestionably, while individuals working in them are or are not." A broadcast journalist

⁶⁴ "Nationality was a huge factor. On the whole, Europeans knew what was going on and what had happened. The North Americans didn't." A broadcast journalists.

The British were mentioned in a positive context by four journalists, and only by one in a negative light. "*A special word of praise should be made to the British PIO group in early 1996 in Gornji Vakuf. They were a model of excellence.*" A news agency journalist. "*Overall, British spokesmen and troops on the ground had the best understanding of what had happened in Bosnia. Some of the worst were American.*" A broadcast journalist.

"*A noteworthy example would be Major Simon Haselock, who understood events past and present*" A broadcast journalist. "*The PIO operation was greatly enhanced by the raising of the profile of Maj. Simon Haselock as a spokesman*" A news agency journalist.

The Americans were mentioned in a negative light by seven journalists; only two gave them good marks. Three journalists criticised the French troops and PIOs. The comments on the Americans went along the line "*US PI operation in Tuzla was an absurd disaster - incompetent and chaotic*", "...spokespeople at the beginning...were ill-informed with US personnel in particular being inclined to treat all non-US journalists with something approaching contempt.", "*British spokesman and troops on the ground had best understanding....Some of the worst were American.*"

Another journalist put it: *"Spokesmen who could quickly adapt their argument on the stage, in the heat of the argument, and were willing to admit the obvious failures, were seen in a more positive light, and IFOR benefited from the Press corps understanding of the difficult environment troops faced. When Spokesmen stonewalled, or failed to modify the message of the day in the face of new information provided by the press, they were seen as inflexible and occasionally even as comical."*

Differences between the military and the media worlds and their missions were also discussed. A photographer described it in a nutshell from the media point of view: *"The military establishment is rarely capable of dialogue with the media in a way that is constructive and acceptable to both parties - the press respect the antithesis of the military mind - but all said is not the plate of the military to help the press, good journalists should help themselves."*

Another journalist saw the issue followingly: *"I fully appreciated how IFOR had its own agenda and own interests to protect and defend but often these interests clashed ante the goals of extensive, honest, objective reporting"*.

The comments did not indicate conclusively whether the IFOR PI operation was considered better than its UN counterpart, but five journalists, however, criticised the UN press operation while only two were defending it.⁶⁵ IFOR was criticised for "spinning" the information and for refusing to arrest indicted war criminals. A print journalist saw a connection between the two. *"In March/April 1995 it became obvious that the Dayton accords will not be implemented by IFOR and OHR..... The open press policy changed - parallel to this process. It became an UNPROFOR press policy, which I could not appreciate at all."*

⁶⁵ The comments against the UN PIO were along the line: *"The IFOR PIO operation was a pleasant surprise after the United Nations disaster... There was no need for the PIOs to lie as much as the UN did because the IFOR PIO did not have to cover the impotence of their troops like UN had to."* A news agency journalist

"IFOR learnt most of the lessons of UNPROFOR's failures including media handling. IFOR had a clear decision/command chain & so a clear media line.... The media environment was more leaning for IFOR..... UNPROFOR PRs were defending a confused, contradictory and failing mission. It's not surprising they had such problems." A broadcast journalist.

"The greatest effort to lead the press corps astray was during General Sir Michael Rose era."

"My marks would be a bit better only for IFOR/SFOR mission while much worse for UNPROFOR. Specially during Gen. Rose's command when UNPROFOR failed in a blunt attempt to manipulate media." A news agency journalist.

"On the UN, the press department in terms of information to journalists was a disaster - the spokespeople tried their best not to be available to media outside of briefing times - unless they were to go live on CNN or something that would give them exposure. Under Akashi, we occasionally received veiled threats and pressure from one spokesman - Phil Arnold - simply because we were present to get comments from Akashi at 0700 every morning - and the press spokesman in question did not want to be there." A news agency journalist.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The IFOR PI operation was seen as a big success by the organisation itself. For the first time ever NATO had engaged itself in a land operation and the PI campaign had been reserved a crucial role in shaping the operational environment. The media was to be the channel through which the messages were to be sent out for the public consumption - internationally and locally.

The basis for the NATO peace enforcement operation was very strong. Military tasks were clearly defined in the peace agreement and the COMIFOR had some authority to manoeuvre within it. The operation had enough political support from the international community, ample military resources and, very importantly, public backing both internationally and, to a great extent, locally. The international community and the NATO were doing the "right thing" that had been demanded by the intellectuals and the media for years.

With such firm foundations it was possible to shape the media policy so that it allowed the press to have maximum access to IFOR activities and to the sources of information. The press was to have information depicted to them *in total honesty*, as the operational plan put it - a fairly unique situation in the media-military relations.

This paper was not trying to find out how the plan for the IFOR PI operation worked out. It merely looked to the issue from the side of the journalists. And, obviously, a slightly different picture emerged.

In the beginning, journalists looked very positively on IFOR, which replaced something that was considered too ineffective to solve the crisis. Basically the journalists fully agreed with the international community's decision to deploy IFOR and to use force. Even though the media and the military viewed each others with some "traditional" dislike, IFOR could not have had more favourable start.

Journalists were generally fairly pleased with the IFOR PI organisation and the personnel. They were relatively happy with the press briefings and individual spokespersons whose credibility was crucial to the mission. The ones who gained respect from the press for their expertise on the region and knowledge of what was happening, or honesty and frankness, put good face on the whole operation. The others did equal damage if they were caught lying or spinning information or if they were considered too confrontational.

Although IFOR was the heavy weight of the international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was not seen to control the media agenda. It played a significant but not overwhelming role as a source to the journalists. The journalists did not feel that they were restricted or prevented from doing their job. On the contrary they considered IFOR

fairly open to the media. Thus, there did not seem to be any significant need for journalistic counter-strategies in order to defend the needs of the press.

While information given by IFOR was considered generally reliable, UNHCR and ICRC were ranked as the most reliable of the main international organisations in the region. OSCE's image, expectedly, was the worst.

The mandates of ICRC and UNHCR restricted them to focus on humanitarian issues only. They were in a way sidelined from the political process and were fortunate enough not to get tarnished by it. Compared to the others, and to the OSCE in particular, they walked away shining clean and credible in the eyes of the press

Surprisingly however, the IFOR PI operation was not seen basically any better than its UN predecessor. Although some of the comments by the journalists were extremely critical of the UN, overall the UN and IFOR PI operations were seen fairly equally.

This was probably partly because the high hopes for IFOR were somewhat shattered. IFOR did not arrest the war criminals but evidently became involved in Balkan politics. As a news agency journalist put it IFOR "*... hid behind its mandate and did not go after the perpetrators of war crimes in the interest of political considerations.*"⁶⁶

The other factor was that UN personnel had much more continuity and they had gained a lot of expertise on the region. IFOR PIOs were normally assigned there only for a six month stint. It was far too short a period of time to familiarise oneself with the Balkans, gain contacts with media and be productive. There was lack of continuity and loss of valuable experience. All are very essential things when one has to deal with the press, particularly in such a complex environment as the Balkans. A print journalist said that "*... the soldiers couldn't really be expected to compete with our knowledge, but*

⁶⁶ It was proven by the media that the IFOR soldiers did not even know who the indicted war criminals were until some posters were being distributed after stories about IFOR's reluctance had started appearing in the media. IFOR's position was very clear. It would not go after the indicted war criminals but would apprehend them if they were identified in the course of normal duties. This drew a lot of criticism from the journalists as well as from the ICTY. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was pretty vague on the whole issue. Persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) were banned from taking part in the political process or holding any official function, but in the end it was basically up to the parties themselves to hand the indicted war criminals to the ICTY. It never happened. Article IX of the Peace Agreement read: "*The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Annexes to this Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.*" The Annex 1A, Article IX: Prisoner Exchange: 1. g. reads: "*Notwithstanding the above provisions, each Party shall comply with any order or request of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for the arrest, detention, surrender of or access to persons who would otherwise be released and transferred under this Article, but who are accused of violations within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Each Party must detain persons reasonably suspected of such violations for a period of time sufficient to permit appropriate consultation with Tribunal authorities.*"

because they knew so little, I didn't really respect what they had to say." It also seemed that UN civilian PIOs had been and were more willing to go off-the-record than their IFOR colleagues.

When the foundations of this report were being constructed it was thought that the type of the media the journalists represented, and their nationality would play a major role in determining their answers to given questions. The results of this report would seem to support this assumption with regard to the type of media, not with regard to whether one was a local or international journalist.

Of all journalists the news agency journalists seemed to be most critical of IFOR. The broadcast journalists saw IFOR in a more positive light. Contrary to the other two groups the print journalists very often did not produce a common opinion on most of the questions. There seems to be no obvious explanation of this other than that the journalists in this group experienced IFOR not as members of a particular group, but rather very individually. This would match nicely with the stereotype of a war correspondent who goes his/her own way in search for the story.

As explained earlier the photographers and cameramen also could form a common opinion only in very few and obvious questions.⁶⁷ It has to be remembered, however, that only seven photographers/cameramen returned the questionnaire.

The graphs showed that - on average - the picture of the IFOR PI operation was relatively good. Attitudes towards IFOR were positive. There was animosity between the press and the military only to a fairly modest extent. IFOR was not seen as controlling the media. Information given was generally reliable and the PI personnel were considered professional and helpful.

Still, it is obvious that the press did not recognise the IFOR PI operation for being as open and honest as outlined in the Operational Plan. There was very strong, sometimes detailed and point-blank criticism expressed on IFOR. It was accused of spinning, delaying and contorting information. Some spokesmen were said to have been caught lying to the press. Lack of institutional memory, continuity and expertise on the region were criticised. Some nations participating in the operation were seen next to unapproachable while others were found to patronise the press.

The news agency journalists were without doubt among the most experienced press in the region. They stayed in the Balkans for long periods of time - some were permanently posted there - and dealt with IFOR almost daily. The fact, that this most experienced part of the press corps in the Balkans saw IFOR in a more negative light than the rest of the media, does not flatter the PI operation.

⁶⁷ Like in the question number six "Did you ever use video footage, photos or stories produced by IFOR PI operation?"

The press corps in Bosnia made up a very diverse but mainly professional and a demanding, hard-to-please audience - as most of the comments from the journalists show. They were quick to spot any tendency to spin, delay or manipulate information. Being familiar with the Balkans they found out very soon if someone lacked expertise and knowledge on the region.

Such a seasoned media community was a tough challenge for the IFOR PI operation, which all in all stood up reasonably well - with some grave criticism, though. A print journalist summed it up in his comment: *"IFOR's PIO operation served IFOR's interests very well, but made it difficult for journalists to find out "the truth" quite often."* A photographer saw it from his angle: *"... all said it is not the plate of the military to help the press, good journalists should help themselves."*

SOURCES

Unpublished NATO - UN documents:

CINCSOUTH Operational Plan, Annex P - Public Information

The joint UN-IFOR press accreditation database October 1993-November 1996

Lessons Learned: Report on Press Registration - An overview of UN and IFOR press accreditation/registration operations in former Yugoslavia 1992-1996 24 October 1996.

Service Paper: Operation Joint Endeavour - IFOR Public Information Operation - Lessons Learned

Published NATO documents

Public Information in Peacekeeping - The IFOR Experience at the Seminar on Public Relations Aspects of Peacekeeping in NATO Headquarters Brussels, 11 April 1997, Presentation by Captain Mark Van Dyke, U.S. Navy, Chief, Public Information AFSOUTH/IFOR. Published at www.nato.int/ifor/afsouth/s970411a.htm

The Dayton Peace Accord:

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-home.htm

Magazines and Newspapers

The Guardian, March 25 1996

Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol 7. Number

The Journalist, February/March 1996

UNPROFOR and UNPF News, issues January through December 1995

Internet sites (addresses as at the time of the visit February - April 1997)

www.haverford.edu/reig/sells/srebrenica.html

www.nato.int/ifor/afsouth/home.htm

www.nato.int/ifor/afsouth/s970411a.htm

www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa

www.nato.int/ifor/i-maps.htm

www.pulitzer.org

Bibliography:

Article XIX, Forging War - The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bath Press, 1994 Avon

Bell, Martin, In Harms Way - Reflections of A War Zone Thug, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1995 London

Bennet Christopher, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse - Causes, Course, Consequences, Hurst & Company, 1995 London

Committee to Protect Journalists, Journalists Survival Guide; The former Yugoslavia, CPJ 1994 New York.

Luostarinen Heikki, Mielen kersantit - Julkisuuden hallinta ja journalistiset vastastrategiat sotilaallisissa konflikteissa. Hanki ja Jää, Juva 1994

Malcolm, Noel, Bosnia - A Short History, Papermac, 1994 London

Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina: How International Support Can Be More Effective, International Crisis Group Report 7 March 1997. WWW.intl-crisis-group.org

The Media... The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict. Gannet Foundation Media Center, New York City 1991.

NATO Handbook, NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995 Brussels

Silber, Laura and Little Allan, The Death of Yugoslavia, Penguin Books, 1995 London

Unfinished Peace, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Aspen Institute Berlin and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996 Washington

ATTACHEMENT I**LIST OF CORRESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

The period of time they have been covering the Balkans given as announced by the journalists themselves

NEWS AGENCY JOURNALISTS

Aida Cerkez, Associated Press, not announced

Sabina Cosic, Reuters, not announced

Mark Heinrich, Reuters, since 1992

Faridoun Hemani, WTN, since 1991

Davor Huic, Reuters, not announced

Mehmet Husic, ONASA, since 1994

Metka Jelenc, Reuters, since 1993

Branka Kostovska, Associated Press, since 1993

Srecko Lucky Latal, Associated Press, since 1992

Liam McDowall, Associated Press, since 1990

Natasha Radanovic, WTN, since 1991

Suzana Sabljic, Reuters TV, since 1992

Allison Smale, Associated Press, since 1987

William Stebbins, WTN, since 1995

Christopher Stephen, AFP, since 1993

PRINT JOURNALISTS

Ray Bonner, The New York Times, not announced

Julian Borger, The Guardian, since 1994

Renate Flottau, Der Spiegel, since 1985

Gabriel Gruner, Stern Magazine, since 1991

Sandra Kukic, Oslobodenje, since 1995

Chris Hedges, The New York Times, since 1995

Elizabeth Neuffer, The Boston Globe, since 1994

John Pomfret, The Washington Post, since 1993

Erich Rathfelder, Die Tageszeitung, since 1987

Matthias Rub, Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, since 1994

Alexandra Stiglmayer, Time Magazine, since 1992

Stacy Sullivan, Newsweek Magazine, previously The Times, since 1995

Karl Wendl, News Magazine, since 1993

Ali Haydar Yurtsever, Milliyet, since 1991

BROADCAST JOURNALISTS

Sabina Arslanagic, RTV BIH/AP TV, since 1993

Davorka Blazevic, CBS News, since 1991

Ned Colt, EuroAccess News and Production, NBC News, since 1993

David Foley, VOA, CBC, NBC Radio, since 1991

Jadranko Katana, RTV BIH, since 1990

Maria Kobasic, ORF, since 1991

Mark Laity, BBC, since 1992

James S. Maceda, NBC News, since 1992

Stefan Pauli, ZDF, not announced

Gaby Rado, ITN, since 1992

Dominic Robertson, CNN, since 1991

Merdijana Sadovic-Maggie, ABC News, since 1992

Gordana Seler, ZDF, since 1990

Jackie Shymanski, CNN, since 1991

Vesa Toijonen, YLE, since 1991

Aernout Van Lynden, Sky News, since 1991

Johan Verheyden, BRTN, Knack Magazine, De Standaard, since 1992

Georg Von Ehren, freelancer for a number of German radio stations, since 1992

Nicholas Witchell, BBC, since 1995

PHOTOGRAPHERS/CAMERAMEN

Luc Delahaye, Magnum Photos, since 1991

Theodor Frundt, Pogrom and Visum, since 1991

Zoran Jankovic, WTN, since 1991

Gary Knight, Saba Press, since 1992

Rikard Larma, Associated Press, not announced

Paul Lowe, Magnum Photos, since 1992

Staton Winter, Associated Press, New York Times, Stern, Times, UNPROFOR, since 1991

ATTACHEMENT II**LIST OF THE JOURNALISTS AND THE ORGANIZATIONS TO WHOM THE QUESTIONNAIRE WAS SENT TO**

ABC NEWS	Rome bureau
AFP	Sarajevo bureau
AP	Vienna, Zagreb and Sarajevo bureau
ARD	Kornelia Galinec, Peter Dudzik, Friedhelm Brebeck
BBC	Mark Laity, Nicholas Witchell
BH PRESS	Goran Pirolic
BOSTON GLOBE	Elisabeth Neuffer
BRTN	Johan Verheyden
CBS NEWS	Davorka Blazevic, Sanja Fazlagic, Joe Halderman, Alan Pizzey, Bob Simon (via London bureau)
CNN INT.	Christian Amanpour, Dominick Robertson, Jackie Shymanski
DAILY TELEGRAPH	Scott Petersen
DANI	Senad Pecanin
DETROIT FREE PRESS	Neely Tucker
DNEVNI AVAZ	Sead Numanovic
EBU	Lance Newhart, Pierre Peyrot
EPA	Anja Niedringhaus
FINANCIAL TIMES	Laura Silber
FRANKF. ALLGM.	Matthias Rub
GERMAN RADIO	Georg Von Ehren
GUARDIAN	Julian Borger
ITN	Gaby Rado
LA TIMES	Tracey Wilkinson
LJILJAN	Sarajevo bureau
MAGNUM	Paul Lowe, Luc Delahaye
MILLIYET	Ali Haydar Yurtsever
NBC NEWS	Tom Aspell, Ned Colt, Jim Maceda, Michel Neubert
NEWS Magazine	Karl Wendl
NEWSWEEK	Stacy Sullivan
NEW YORK TIMES	Chris Hedges, Ray Bonner
ONASA	Mehmet Husic
ORF	Maria Kobasic, Friedrich Orter
OSLOBODENJE	Sandra Kukic, Amra Kebo
PHILADELPHIA INQ	Barbara Demick
REUTERS	Zagreb and Sarajevo bureau
RTV BIH	Sarajevo bureau
SABA PRESS	Gary Knight, Ron Haviv
SHOW TV	Vedat Yenerer
SKY NEWS	Aernout Van Lynden
SLOBODNA BOSNA	Senad Slatina

Der SPIEGEL	Renate Flottau
STERN	Gabriel Gruner
Die TAGESZEITUNG	Erich Rathfelder
TIME MAGAZINE	Massimo Calabresi, Ed Barnes, Chris Morris, Alexandra Stiglmayer
VISUM	Theodor Freundt
VOA	David Foley
WASHINGTON POST	John Pomfret
WTN	Zagreb bureau
YLE	Vesa Toijonen
ZDF	Gordana Seler, Stefan Pauli
	Odd Andersen
	Gilles Peress

ATTACHEMENT III
COMMENTS FROM THE JOURNALISTS

"I fully appreciated how IFOR had its own agenda and own interests to protect and defend but often these interests clashed ante the goals of extensive, honest, objective reporting. I often felt IFOR all the way up the chain of command was trying to seed the press a bill of souls. A photo-op rather than the facts, however when we did get access to soldiers on the ground I was always impressed with their openness and frankness. Not the case with the brass, however." A broadcast journalist.

"On the question if the press could get adequate assistance from IFOR when asked for it: It depended on the nation one had to deal with. For example, the Americans, British, Canadians, Scandinavians and some other nations were mostly very helpful. The French not always, and we sometimes had problems with some other (e.g. Asian) nations, that are probably not used to dealing openly with the press in their own countries.

I remember a pretty rude treatment by the French in Sarajevo. It was about a convoy, that we wanted to join out of Sarajevo, instead of going across Mt. Igman. We inquired about it at the gate of the French base. They would not even let us in, although we had IFOR press passes. All the guards at the gate would tell us (in a bad English) that there was a convoy next morning, and if we wanted to go along we should appear at 9:30. No additional info, nothing about security or procedures. It was like: take it or leave it. My comment at the end: You were absolutely great, and I'm afraid I abused you whenever I had a question. But, it was your "fault", because you mostly had the answers. And that has been the basic problem with the PIOs - most of them rotated too much, so that a lot of them didn't know enough about the region, problems, history, even about the roads and ways. A lot of times they would read a report on a region, instead answering my question directly, because those reports were their only source of information. And as we did less and less stories on IFOR, as there wasn't anything new, and I didn't need to be in touch with the PIOs all the time, there was no way for me to even get to know someone - I always had somebody new on the phone each time I called. That, again, is why I'd rather call you instead. But, the UNLO system worked - those people in the field, who had enough time to get to know their region and people, were very helpful, and really did a good job." A broadcast journalist.

"I spent most of my time in Tuzla with the American IFOR. What most struck me was that the soldier in the field was far more open and candid than the press people at the HQ. The U.S. JIB (Joint Information Bureau) at Tuzla was not very good. Friendly, yes. Helpful, not really." A print journalist.

"The IFOR PIO operation compared to that of UNPROFOR appeared greatly more inclined to conceal or to contort information out of recognition. Their spokespeople at the beginning of the IFOR mission were ill-informed with U.S. personnel in particular

being inclined to treat all non-U.S. journalists with something approaching contempt. Often, IFOR sat on information for days before making it public with the apparent aim of letting a story die-down. IFOR's desire to "spin" information rather than give the fact unpolluted was especially patronising. Sadly the Italians should be singled out for criticism for lying when confronted with damaging situations and stories. The PIO operation was greatly enhanced by the raising of the profile of Maj. Simon Haselock as a spokesman. A special word of praise should be made to the British PIO group in early 1996 in Gornji Vakuf. They were a model of excellence." A news agency journalist.

"IFOR learnt most of the lessons of UNPROFOR's failures including media handling. IFOR had a clear decision/command chain & so a clear media line. It was better funded & resourced. The media environment was more leaning for IFOR. IFOR had a clear mission which was easier to present and defend. UNPROFOR PRs were defending a confused, contradictory and failing mission. It's not surprising they had such problems. A broadcast journalist.

"The role of the individual Spokespersons was a crucial element in the success of the efforts made by the individual organisations. If we recall the first IFOR Spokesperson who arrived for the first IFOR Press conference, Major Tom Moyer, things got off to a very rocky start indeed, particularly in comparison to the very successful LtCol Chris Vernon, who was briefing for UNPROFOR during the transition. Then we had IFOR's LtCol Mark Rayner, who was disastrous, and had to be repeatedly rescued by Major Simon Haselock, until Rayner was sacked and Haselock was put in full time. I often felt IFOR needed to be harsher and quicker in its judgements on its new spokesmen in that very tense environment. Informal contacts with journalists eventually took place, but only after there were complaints. Essentially IFOR was providing a service to Journalists and yet failed to institute an elementary quality control process with the consumers, i.e. the press corps. Spokesmen who could quickly adapt their argument on the stage, in the heat of the argument, and were willing to admit the obvious failures, were seen in a more positive light, and IFOR benefited from the Press Corps understanding of the difficult environment troops faced. When Spokesmen stonewalled, or failed to modify the message of the day in the face of new information provided by the press, they were seen as inflexible and occasionally even as comical. IFOR also suffered from the remoteness of their Spokesmen to the decision making process. UNPROFOR Spokesmen shared a close relationship with their commanders, and understood the reasons why decisions were taken and could often win the debate. IFOR Spokesmen could only deliver information, and were rarely able to provide the background to decisions.

There is, of course, much more to say about the differences in availability between Admiral Smith and Adm Lopez, and the impact of those two different policies, as well, but hopefully some of my other colleagues will address this issue." A broadcast journalist.

"Because I worked for the XX my access to top IFOR commanders was probably greater than reporters working for other media organisation." A print journalist.

"The IFOR PIO operation was a pleasant surprise after the United Nations disaster. I think, that the military part of the Dayton Agreement is the only one functioning and that the good work of the PIO IFOR is linked to the IFOR mandate and the ability of using force. There was no need for the PIOs to lie as much as the UN did because the IFOR PIO did not have to cover the impotence of their troops like UN had to." A news agency journalist.

"... My marks would be a bit better only for IFOR/SFOR mission while much worse for UNPROFOR. Specially during Gen Rose's command when UNPROFOR failed in a blunt attempt to manipulate media. Main question, in my opinion, I do not see listed: "Do you think that the international community gave the right mandate to UNPROFOR/IFOR/SFOR?" In all three cases my answer would be 100% "NO". A news agency journalist.

"I've dealt with IFOR only for a short period of time; November 1995-February 1996, during and after the deployment. I worked with PIOs in Zagreb (which were pretty useless), Tuzla (which was also pretty bad) and Zupanja (pontoon operation, Capt. Evans was helpful and forthcoming). On the general, U.S. soldiers and officers were very open and willing to talk to the press (better than UN soldiers in Bosnia, including British) but the PIOs were very badly organised, slow and bureaucratic." A news agency journalist.

"1. Access to IFOR decision makers without going through PIO was unnecessarily restricted, ... to an absurd degree in American military. 2. Lack of availability of PIO spokesmen on weekends, evenings was disturbing. 3. Deliberate me??? In some cases was a problem, especially IFOR behaviour towards sighted war crimes indictees. 4. U.S. PIO operation in Tuzla was an absurd disaster - incompetent and chaotic. 5. IFOR unnecessarily restricted journalists' use of Sava River bridge. 6. IFOR briefings should be held earlier in the day. 7. IFOR briefings should run as long as press wants them to, not cut off arbitrarily by a spokesman." A news agency journalist.

"It is somewhat hard to answer a question that requires a value judgement through a choice of percentages. I feel somewhat false answering a question about the chances of a united Bosnia's survival in terms of percentage points, or for that matter the question of NATO deployment. They seem rather too complex a question for an answer like: 30%. Let me make clear that all my comments are based solely on my work in Tuzla with US IFOR troops. I had limited experience with any others, perhaps only some with the French, and they were worse with than the Americans. In no way I considered the civilian side of IFOR, which is perhaps what the UN P&I became. When I think of

IFOR, I think of the Yanks in Tuzla, and perhaps the Russians, but they were very unapproachable." A news agency journalist.

"Well, Well.... what to say?? If it wasn't for CERTAIN individuals who happened to be working at those organisation(s), it would have been incredibly hard to get ANY information - either due to info not being available to PIOs, or not "available" for press, or "no Comment" statements, no msgs and phone calls answered, answered too late or etc etc....it is very frustrating to hear: "I don't have any info or no comment on this issue" after you have heard a certain detail from several sources, maybe sometimes even read it on the wires and saw it on TV already - or... leaving msgs and getting phone calls back after literally three-four days later???!!"

Also, I wish UN/IFOR/SFOR or whatever you want to call it - came to the region in full force a LOT LOT LOT earlier and with a lot clearer mandate as I am sure lives and lives would have been saved, number one, and , number two, maybe only maybe hostilities would not have flared to the level where they did." A news agency journalist.

"Some questions can be a little misleading, for example:

I do think IFOR deployment was necessary when it was made - but I do believe it should have happened in 1992 or earlier and not in 1995-6.

I agree with its work but it could have been more aggressive in 1992 and even after it was deployed.

IFOR mandate is not what I agree with - the organisation hid behind its mandate and did not go after the perpetrators of war crimes in the interests of political considerations.

When we say IFOR soldiers/PIO's were aware of the mandate - yes they were, but that doesn't mean they were any more sympathetic to the need for an enlarged mandate.

We covered hundreds of stories in the period mentioned, but pls. keep in mind these were either in parts or portions, and without commentary so please treat news agency stories as slightly differently.

On the UN, the press department in terms of information to journalists was a disaster - the spokespeople tried their best not to be available to media outside of briefing times - unless they were to go live on CNN or something that would give them exposure.

Under Akashi, we occasionally received veiled threats and pressure from one spokesman - Phil Arnold - simply because we were present to get comments from Akashi at 0700 every morning - and the press spokesman in question did not want to be there.

UNBIH - especially the IPTF matters - were a little better in Sarajevo after IFOR deployment - and so UN as such receives higher marks - but overall, their information department was awful.

The same problem applies to IFOR as did to U-N - the spokesmen tried very hard to peddle their bosses view and downplayed some important events. Thus in your questioning, there is some room for vagueness. Yes IFOR and UN did not deceive us, and they did come back to answer questions - but they did downplay important events,

and only after persistent efforts from the media, did they come back to us with information - and they did not lie about it (always). There were some answers I personally could qualify as lies - but cannot prove them so I did not say so." A news agency journalist.

"Some of these questions are, erm, loaded. Clearly if you wanted to stop the war in 1995 this was the way to do it. If you want to stop it for good - ie. when the SFOR vice is unwound - then you have a problem. I think the willingness to help of your IFOR press officers was outstanding. I think the helpfulness of units was patchy, and I think the information chain of getting information to the press offices was slow and badly organised. I also think that you press officers should be given a crash course in understanding media. They are trained to withstand shouting and yelling from a bunch of soldiers playing as journalists but that is beside the point. I make a distinction between stopping the war, which IFOR did, and solving the crisis, ie. ensuring no war when IFOR leaves." A news agency journalist.

"1. Basically, IFOR and UNPROFOR was imposing restrictions because of security in area and transported us to the area and I was very grateful for the help I got. Also my thanks go to IFOR and UNPROFOR in Zagreb and especially to Mr Simo Vaatainen and his crew who was at all times available to help.

2. The mandate of UNPROFOR was wrong and the timing of sending IFOR was too late." A print journalist.

"As a weekly I didn't need the IFOR sources that much during my work. The people of PIO were always extremely helpful and reliable." A print journalist.

"For a photographer political statements at press briefings are not that important. Co-operation and clear information concerning risks count more. ...IFOR press briefings are more or less surface information. The fabulous image of a successful IFOR operation has to hold on, questions with a critical context from journalists sometimes are handled in a way that journalists resign to ask further questions. IFOR press accreditation were supposed to be accepted by all religious groups in Bosnia, but even IFOR stated during the first month of its mission that journalists have to apply for a accreditation by the authorities in Pale (100 DM per day). With US and German PIOs assistance and information was different from UK, French, Danish, Swedish or other PIO. The former participants of UNPF were more co-operative and supportive in my duties. They just were better informed about the history of this conflict." A photo journalist.

"I have often observed that throughout the six years of UN/IFOR press relationship the international press always tended to rely heavily on the "independent sources" such as EEC monitors, UN, IFOR PIO or personnel in general, even down to the established NGO's. The less the experience or knowledge of a journalist coming to former Yugoslavia (exp & knowledfe of his particular story), the more he/she is inclined to rely

(often unquestionably) on the information provide by the PIO. It is always a ??? of departure which he/she clings on to until such a moment where he/she realises that IFOR, IPTF; UNHCR, and above all, UNPROFOR are heterogeneous organisations which, to various degrees, reflect the composite of different national interests, h habits, inclinations and levels of professionalism. The journalists dutifully read PIO press clippings and other material which were sometimes, I observed, written in a somewhat ignorant and superficial manner, at least when instead of supplying the facts of the mission performance on the ground, the information consisted of IFOR, IPTF, UNHCR or UNPROFOR official interpretation of the given facts. For example; the first press material issued by IFOR PIO that I had in my hands, November 95, contained a two pages summary of the recent history of former Yugoslavia which contained several unbelievably arbitrary assertions. This kind of information served to the press under the pretence of facilitating the interpretation of the facts followed in the rest of the material could have reflected either on inatentiveness to facts (which raises the question of reliability or accuracy of the rest of the material that does concern the IFOR mission) or, worse, an attempt to influence or mislead (which raises the same question again). On the other hand, whenever the information, be it in a written or oral form, provided by IFOR or UNPROFOR PIOs kept to the facts about their mission, I found it generally accurate and, more often than not, reliable.

The more experienced journalists realised the necessity of cross-checking the information they received through official channels, for several reasons; Firstly, the inpredictability and the speed with which the situation changed, a large number of interested parties involved, and different (in)accessibility or different areas, made it necessary to constantly double-check and update the information.

Secondly, there was always a limited number of UN/IFOR personnel (PIO or other) who had continuity, width and depth of grasp as far as the situation on the ground was concerned (I observed that limited duration of their missions resulted in a situation where freshly arrived personnel took several months to master the basics of how UN or IFOR mandate actually functions on the ground, or needed to rid themselves of some preconceptions about the place and the mission). Once they started feeling more comfortable about their performance within the given perimeters they were often rotated out. The other side of this argument is, of course, that some personnel were left in one spot for indefinite time and never had a chance to enlarge their picture (if you wish, I am referring to an extreme example where a certain spokesman was left in one sector for such a long time that after a while he established himself among the press as the spokesman for one of the parties involved in the conflict, as opposed to the UNPROFOR).

I guess what I am trying to say is that if you stayed around long enough you learned whose information is to be trusted. Dealing with UNPROFOR and to a lesser extent with IFOR PIOs, you learned that the OFFICE is not to be trusted unquestionably, while individuals working in them are or are not. Taking the information for granted just because it comes from an "independent source" such as IFOR PIO is a bad judgement and could often get one into trouble. I concluded a long time ago that the differences of ability, flexibility and knowledge among the media relations personnel are impermissibly great. There was an American major in charge of media relations in

Split who was so inadequate that he was very quickly dismissed as a totally unreliable contact. His information was inaccurate and outdated and moreover, when corrected by the members of the press, he often failed to follow through with the correct information long after he was proven wrong. He either did not know how to double check the information he was receiving from his office or simply did not bother to. In either case, he was totally inadequate for the job he was doing and had it not been for his more focused and informed British counterpart could have caused some serious damage because he happened to be in a place where he was often a first contact a lot of incoming members of the press had, before they ventured a long and not totally danger-free trip across Bosnia to Tuzla in November and December 95. He may very well be an extreme example but the fact that he was left to perform the job he was obviously not up to, seemed to be another, though small-scale, illustration of the failure on the part of IFOR to recognise and close the gaps existing between its numerous offices and nationals, and thus amends for one of the greatest weaknesses the UN mission in former Yugoslavia was suffering from.

Your question number 31 is a very interesting one, but I will try to be brief. It has often been a matter of regret to me that we, as a major TV network, kept to well trodden paths and seldom ventured away from superficial and narrow focused reporting from former Yugoslavia. I do not think I would be very much mistaken in saying that over 75% of our stories were Sarajevo and Tuzla orientated. It has often been my experience that once we did go to less exposed areas, we found different angles to illustrate the crisis and the nuances that are so frequently overlooked and which should have complemented black & white, and somewhat superficial picture we were often serving the American audience. It is in those places that we have often found IFOR, IPTF, or ECMM personnel who were just eager to say what was going on, and who were so rarely heard. They often proved to be valuable sources in discovering parts of the mosaic without which the big picture leaves a lot to be desired. It is beyond me to establish whether the international press or the UN mission and later IFOR are more to be blamed for that situation but it was evident that either the international presence and relief (in form of humanitarian or military aid) followed where the press chose to focus, or the press, taking the easy path, followed where international organisations established themselves. Whatever the sins of the press in this matter, one cannot avoid the conclusion the UNPROFOR and IFOR often directed the attention of the media, if for no other reason, than simply because a lot of areas or incidents were not taken into account until they appeared in official reports. Then, owing to the increasing animosity and restrictions imposed on the media by the local parties, UNPROFOR and IFOR did remain an only, relatively reliable source of information. Whether they were always aware of the responsibility and how well they used or misused it, requires somebody with a lot more internal knowledge of the UN and IFOR mission than I possess." A broadcast journalist.

"Most of my comments are concerning the work of UN/IFOR in Serbia and Bosnia during the war. I had only two or three times contact with the office in Zagreb in Croatia. My critics are focused on the relations between IFOR & UN and journalists, not on the IFOR mission as such. In my opinion TV stations have been privileged

compared to newspapers. I could get during all the time the much better information by talks with all 3 warring parties. By the way, there was a different behaviour depending on the nationality of the IFOR representatives. I had very bad experience with the French and English staff, partly with the U.S. staff. The Italians, Dutchmen, unreadable, showed more readiness to help." A print journalist.

"The military establishment is rarely capable of dialogue with the media in a way that is constructive and acceptable to both parties - the press respect the antithesis of the military mind - but all said is not the plate of the military to help the press, good journalists should help themselves." A photo journalist.

"A few things come to mind in thinking about the IFOR press operation. I never trusted the press operation. Part of it was their slickness. They came into the Holiday Inn and set up that elaborate press room with a sound system and television monitors. At times, they would try to show us high-resolution graphics and charts and it all came across as so disingenuous. Who were they trying to fool? They refused to answer simple questions, often putting ridiculous spin on issues, then they would try to indoctrinate us with say, demining graphics. I found it so patronising.

The people they had minding the telephones both in Sarajevo and Tuzla could rarely answer questions, to the point, that I am convinced that was NATO's strategy. They were always polite so one could not get angry with them, but I can't remember a time that one of them was able to answer a question. Even the good spokesmen, such as Simon Haselock, lacked adequate background on the conflict in Bosnia. It was a real problem for IFOR because most journalists had been around for a long time and knew the story so well—the soldiers couldn't really be expected to compete with our knowledge, but because they knew so little, I didn't really respect what they had to say.

The first spokesman IFOR had, Lt.-Col. Mark Rayner was not only condescending, but he lied to me on two occasions that I know about. Ever since then, I was suspect of everything IFOR said. This mistrust was also the result of IFOR being slow in compiling information. Often times, something would happen, and it would take IFOR two or three days to tell us about it. When we would ask why it took so long, they would say they wanted to make sure they had gotten the information correct. It was a ridiculous excuse, and often the information they initially put out proved to be incorrect anyway. A few examples come to mind:

- 1.) *Sometime in the spring of 1996, seven Bosnian Muslims claiming to be survivors of the Srebrenica massacre turned themselves in to an American IFOR base near Zvornik. The Americans, suspicious of their short haircuts and seemingly clean appearance, turned them into the Serb police where they were subsequently beaten and forced to sign murder confessions. IFOR claimed that the UN police force turned the men over to the Serbs, and subsequently that IFOR was present when the men signed the confessions and that no force was used. Both were outright lies that IFOR later claimed were mistakes. After talking to ICRC and confirming that all seven men were on the list of missing persons in the wake of the Srebrenica massacre, then finding several of the families of the men and confirming it myself,*

IFOR still refused to admit that these men came from Srebrenica. There were some suspicious circumstances behind the appearance of these men nearly a year after the massacre, but IFOR would not even admit that they came from Srebrenica.

- 2.) *In January 1996, a shoulder-launched missile was launched from a Grbavica high-rise onto a Sarajevo tram, killing one woman. IFOR's response on the ground was pretty impressive. They located the spot from where the missile was launched, surrounded the building and searched for the culprit. The UN would never have done such a thing. This should have been a public relations coup. Instead it was a disaster. Even though IFOR troops found the actual room in the building in Serb-controlled Grbavica, spokesman Mark Rayner still refused to say the Serbs had launched the missile. I remember asking if he thought it was possible for Bosnian Muslim to sneak across the Grbavica bridge (which at that time was manned by government troops, Serb troops, and IFOR troops) with a should-launcher, climb up into a heavily-militarised building and launch a missile on his own people and Rayner said it was not out of the realm of possibility.*

If you want more specifics, I'd be happy to give them to you. I've quite enjoyed this little rant about the IFOR press operation" A print journalist.

"Questions 1 thru 4. On the whole, IFOR did a good job with the media. It was quick with information and accurate most of the time. The only problem to arise was one rampant in the Balkans... information always came with a spin. IFOR would interpret events to suit it, just like every other organisation or the warring sides. Journalists couldn't just report... they had to consult various sources, and then analyse what was being said.

Question 5. Most IFOR personnel had an excellent knowledge of what had happened in Bosnia... and consequently had a healthy respect for the press. A noteworthy example would be Major Simon Haselock, who understood events past and present.

A point that must be made though, the amount of knowledge varied by nationality. Overall, British spokesman and troops on the ground had the best understanding of what had happened in Bosnia. Some of the worst were American.

Question 7. This one varied wildly. Nationality was a huge factor. On the whole, Europeans knew what was going on and what had happened. The North Americans didn't. It also varied due to the specifics of a mission. Most troops knew why they were there, but some of IFOR's press conference claims fell flat. Here's an example... I did a story in mid-summer 1996, after listening to IFOR claim for months it would arrest war criminals if encountering them during their normal course of duties. To prove them wrong, I enlarged two photographs..one of Radovan Karadzic, one of Gen. Ratko Mladic, the two most wanted men in Bosnia. I went from IFOR platoon to platoon, from French to Italian to American, asking the same question... "Do you know who he is?"

Most of the troops had no idea. In fact, only Americans I encountered about one mile down the road from Gen. Mladic's hideaway knew. But their answers were even more

astounding. When I asked what they'd do if Mladic drove thru their checkpoint, they said nothing. They had no order, no instructions to stop him. The commander of that particular unit said it on camera and caught a lot of hell for what apparently was an admission of policy, not lack of knowledge.

Question 11. Would have been better if this was a question about the UN...am fondly remembering hijacking Yasushi Akashi's plane.

Question 14. IFOR could have been more open with the press and fought in vain many a time to present its spin to a very seasoned press crew. Their mission has so far been highly successful... if turned bad, I think we'd seen more of what happened during the UN days...journalists using inside sources who were more than willing to talk about what was really going on.

A curious twist to IFOR openness... at the start of the mission, it was hampered by the same liability that troubled the UN, that is no institutional memory. I was summoned more than once to dine, drink and have my brains picked by incoming IFOR commanders (Gen. Nash, Gen. Rideau, Gen. Walker in particular) who wanted info on how it had been and how to handle particular situations.

Questions 21, 22. An example of a cover up was the war crimes story I mentioned earlier on. In response to the story, IFOR played up troop ignorance. They said the troops had either forgotten the official "we'll catch them if we encounter them" policy, or had not been properly briefed by their commanding officers. The story caused enough of an uproar that all IFOR troops must now carry the official UN war crimes list complete with photos of the wanted, and a card instructing them what to do. But that was after the story.

What I also reported, and what really raised hackles, was that France and Britain had agreed on a commitment not capture war criminals. It became policy. The US did not go that far, but followed that lead for obvious political reasons... raids on headquarters would mean casualties, even accidental encounters with the likes of Karadzic and Mladic could have been deadly. That policy (an actual written agreement between France and Britain) stands today. Yet, journalists are still being told "encounter and catch".

Question 24. There were a few incidents involving obstruction by IFOR, particularly in situations that made them look less than active. An example... attempts by groups of Muslims to cross over to Serb territory and return to homes lost during the war. IFOR held back the press at a number of locations... the Danish in particular.

Question 26. Again, the war crimes story with the photographs. The US troops I was interviewing immediately radioed in my questions, waited for a response, and then took off on orders. They would no longer answer my questions.

Question 28. That war crimes story again! Gen. William Nash accused me of "jeopardising troop security" with that story, though he would never say that to my

face. In fact, he never agreed to an interview again! His spokesman, who's name I can't remember was generally less helpful after that story. I don't really care if they question my professionalism, but certainly I questioned theirs.

Question 29. In fact, negative questions or stories no doubt irritated IFOR powers, but also garnered their respect. Refusing to comment was sure to be mentioned in a press report, and that could garner a lot of heat from bosses in Naples and Brussels. We were usually given preferential treatment because of our reach and potential impact. That went for IFOR and just about any of the other involved parties in Bosnia. A free lance radio reporter would not get the same kind of access we did. Not fair for them, but great for us.

Question 30. The media agenda became all too apparent at IFOR press conference after press conference. The media bombarded IFOR and all other organisations with the same questions day after day. I stopped attending the daily news conference fairly early on because they became utterly redundant. The press had their spin, as did IFOR. On note on the "press agenda". As far as I'm concerned, all involved in the Bosnian conflict had an agenda.

Question 32. This question is difficult to answer, because I do not share all the opinions of my colleagues out there on this one. I'd probably be shot for expressing this one publicly.

Yes, there was animosity, but a great deal of it was overblown. As I said earlier, I listened to far too many press conferences where the media complained away for what wasn't being done by IFOR forces in Bosnia. I think a serious point was missed by many of my colleagues. Yes, IFOR could have done more, perhaps taken a heavy handed approach when there was a violation by one of the parties. But there was a valid reason why this wasn't done.

Few of the press understood the concept that unless the formerly warring sides take it upon themselves to really make peace and cooperate, a lasting peace in Bosnia will never happen. The parties must accept some responsibility for making the peace process work. Yes, one side is more guilty than the other and could use a prod or two. But all sides have to understand that there will not always be a "big stick" (NATO) in the neighbourhood to solve their disputes.

The press rationale and agenda evolved because of the Bosnian Muslims obvious victimisation by the Bosnian Serbs. But journalists must remember and be very cognisant of how the Bosnian Muslim government used that perception to its own end.

I know that's a drastic thing to say, but I firmly believe it's true. It was President Alija Izetbegovic's intent to involve the international community from the start, because it was obvious that Bosnian Muslims would not win the war. I don't know if enough journalists remembered that. I feel rather uneasy about how much of a "cheering section" the international press corps became. Especially after events in Krajina. I remember full well, bemoaning its loss with Croats in 1991, then cheering them on in the summer 1995 during its recapture. But there's quite a different story emerging now, isn't there? Tales of ethnic cleansing and little tolerance for minorities.

Question 34. Many would say I rated the UN operation too highly, but I've kept in mind the fact that shooting the messenger doesn't always work out as intended. The UN press personnel had perhaps one of the toughest jobs in Bosnia. Many had starkly different personal opinions as to what they had to say on the record.

Question 35. The most important thing to remember when dealing with the UN during the worst times in Bosnia, is just what spin they were presenting. I think the greatest effort to lead the press corps astray was during General Sir Michael Rose era. Attempts to control our reporting by either limiting information or making events sounds not quite so bad, backfired against Rose. The UN organisation began to leak like a sieve, from off the record chats to confidential documents.

On comment in defence (dare I say that) of some of the UN personnel that had to deal with us over the years. Most were military men, who'd been taught in academies around the world that the press was the enemy. If it had been strictly military situation that UN commanders and their lot had to deal with, they might have done better. But being forced to work around some essentially impossible political realities gave them a task most had no skills for or capabilities.

Question 38. I obviously agree with the IFOR deployment but feel it came years too late. The UN should have been sent packing much earlier.

Question 39. Again, it's all too easy to blame one side for the ongoing division of Bosnia. But I think a careful look at all three former warring factions record since the war ended must be taken. Not one has gone out of the way to make the Dayton Peace Accord work. Not one.

Mostar provides a good Croat/Muslim example. Fingers are always pointed at the Croats, and yes they are often to blame for any violence. But Muslim militants keep the Croats out the East side of the river as well⁶⁸. I spent some time there, and from city authorities down, none wanted the Croats back but kept up the official front of let's all be united. The Sarajevo suburb transfer is another example.

The Bosnian Serbs need little explanation. It's been their intent from the start to cleanse and separate and sadly they've succeeded.

I think the reality on the ground in Krajina provides the closest version of the truth. One time victims reclaim lost lands... and almost immediately remove minorities as if that assures victory. It definitely assures the end of a multiethnic society.

Question 40. That's a difficult question to answer, in part the success of the mission has yet to be proved. Yes, the guns have fallen silent but is that because there's a bigger gun in the neighbourhood or because the parties want peace? That answer has yet to be proven, probably when NATO troops depart... if they do.

⁶⁸ The town of Mostar has been divided to Western and Eastern part by the Neretva river since the war between the Croats and Muslims began 1993. Croats control the Western part and Muslims the Easter part of the town.

A get-tough stance in terms of troops has been tried before in other countries. Lebanon, Vietnam, where the intervention was a disaster. In other examples like Haiti or the Gulf, where things went according to plan. What were the factors that determined the outcome of these interventions? International commitment to the cause has some role. But the largest and most critical element was the actions and intent of the parties being "subdued".

Question 42. I'm 50-50 on this one, due to many of the reasons listed above. I think the media has to be very careful about choosing sides in war. Sometimes the best proclaimed intentions are proven false. Frankly put, I have serious doubts about any of the former warring sides commitment to democracy, peace and a multiethnic society. I hope I'm proven wrong." A broadcast journalist.

"Some questions, such as 3 or 37 on which I commented in brackets are a bit misleading. So is 14, too. There I would say that IFO R protected its interests as an organisation extremely well, but that means automatically that it wasn't "open enough" to the press. I had also problems rating certain things because you did not make a difference between official and off-the-record information, e.g. in questions 33. Generally, I would say that UN officials have been much more open off-the-record than IFOR officials have been. I'd also like to add that IFOR did not try to hide that it was withholding certain information or conveying only the official line (e.g. with regards to war criminals), so it was clear that we journalists were dealing with an organisation that was pursuing its own interests, and that we had to do a lot of additional work. Even unofficial sources were less open than UN, UNHCR, OHR, etc. Sources and much more careful. So, on the whole, IFOR's PIO operation served IFOR's interests very well, but made it difficult for journalists to find out "the truth" quite often." A print journalist.

"Lack of knowledge about the situation on the ground in Bosnia was the most disturbing aspect if IFOR presence and relationship with the media." A broadcast journalist.

"36-40 reflect my opinions as a private person. As a journalist I refuse to comment. Sorry." A broadcast journalist.

"During both the UN and IFOR deployments attempts to spin or directly mislead the press more often than not ended up backfiring. The credibility of individual spokesmen was crucial to the credibility of the mission in the eyes of the press. When there was a consensus that the spokesmen were being as frank as conditions allowed, relations and the exchange of information between the PIO and the press were much better. It was by no means inevitable for relations to be combative." A print journalist.

"Openness depended largely on the local commanders rank and willingness to deal with the press. If it was in his interest, and the commander being of some intelligence, then he or she would be open and helpful. Otherwise IFOR was not open enough.

Depends on the situation. If there was an incident like Mahala, IFOR would try to block coverage. Once the press went around them, they would allow access, to control the coverage. Persistence always paid off. Many soldiers felt that we were out to make them look bad. I had a few problems with IFOR personnel, but these instances were because the IFOR soldier at hand was trying to prevent me from doing my job. I strongly protested acts of censorship, especially if they were unwarranted, such as no ranking officer was around to tell the grunts "let the press do its job". They all (international organisations in Bosnia) released information that they felt was reliable as far as their sources, and they felt was reliable as far as they were concerned. I think that the Bosses at the other end could have done a lot more for their correspondents, and the coverage delivered, putting more pressure on the governments at large to respond to the events taking place. Also putting into perspective events, and on which side they were taking place. The Serbs screwed themselves in terms of media coverage, and yet they won many a public relations war in other countries and on home turf with foreign commanders of UN Forces. A lot went uncovered, and I think that media orgs could have done more to obtain credible coverage. This goes for other conflicts as well." A photographer

"At the beginning the door was opened for a real peace process. But when it became public that IFOR did not want to arrest war criminals, the impact of IFOR lost its strength. In March/April 1995 it became obvious that the Dayton accords will not be implemented by IFOR and OHR. Now it is a big manoeuvre. The open press policy changed - parallel to this process. It became an UNPROFOR press policy, which I could not appreciate at all." A print journalist.

"Government info service, IFOR/UN were to give accurate info. But not the full picture - not everything is told. Details are obscured or often left out. The role of info services is two fold - I trust the information - I don't trust that I am getting the full picture. IFOR was sucker, more polished and concealed more than UN - as there were not interested parties involved in disseminating data + more sensitivity to what was released. Early days the "chain" between generals and PIOs was short + generals were less" A print journalist.

"IFOR was too closed and worried about what it was doing in Bosnia. Its intel was busy plus it didn't reach out to the press who could've helped it understand much. While the press collectively had biases, it generally understood how did plus didn't work. IFOR's failure to top that resource was a source of its troubles today. An example is IFOR's foolish behaviour around Sarajevo during the withdrawal in Jan-March 96." A print journalist.

"I've never been a fan of multiple choice. Reality is so much more complex. The Zagreb office was always fast in handing out our press passes, but the soldiers usually rule and there was little information of real use. The press briefings in Sarajevo were almost as bad as those of the Americans in Vietnam. PS Don't take it personally - we wish you all the best." A broadcast journalist.

ATTACHEMENT IV
THE QUESTIONNAIRE

PLEASE NOTE THAT YOUR ANSWERS WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO YOUR PERSON OR TO YOUR ORGANIZATION.

Name: _____

Agency: _____

How long you have been covering former Yugoslavia? _____

How many stories (approx.) did you file 12/1995-12/1996 on former Yugoslavia? _____

Please choose the option that best describes your opinion on a given question by marking a "X" in the box below the question. **If you feel that a question is not relevant or that you cannot answer it please leave it blank.**

The options can also be given a number of quality attributes. Below there are two samples of the attributes to facilitate your decision making.

NO	never	NO	no, nil, not at all, non existent
1-10%	extremely rarely	1-10%	extremely bad
10-25%	very rarely	10-25%	very bad
25-40%	rarely	25-40%	bad
40-60%	often	40-60%	acceptable
60-75%	quite often	60-75%	good
75-90%	very often	75-90%	very good
90-100%	always	90-100%	excellent

SURVEY:



1. Did you find the information provided by IFOR reliable?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

2. Was the information provided by IFOR accurate enough?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

3. How often did you need to cross check information released by IFOR?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

NO	1-10%	10-25%	25-40%	40-60%	60-75%	75-90%	90-100%
----	-------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	---------

4. Did IFOR provide information timely enough?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

5. To what extent the IFOR PIO personnel was adequately aware of the history of the crisis?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

6. Did you ever use video footage, photos or stories produced by IFOR PIO operation?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

7. Did you feel that the IFOR personnel was adequately aware of their mission?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

8. Did you feel that the IFOR personnel you dealt with knew what was going on?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

9. Were you always treated professionally by the Public Information personnel?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

10. Were you always treated professionally by IFOR soldiers?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

11. Did you get adequate assistance from IFOR when you asked for it?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

12. Did you get appropriate professional assistance form the regional IFOR press centers?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

13. When a PIO person could not provide you with particular information but promised to check it and get back to you later on, how often this really happened?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

14. As an organization, was IFOR open enough to the press?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

15. How big was the role of IFOR among your sources?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

16. How big was the ratio of your internal IFOR sources compared to you IFOR PIO sources?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

17. Do you think you should have had more internal IFOR sources?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

18. Were you satisfied with the IFOR press briefings?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

NO	1-10%	10-25%	25-40%	40-60%	60-75%	75-90%	90-100%
----	-------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	---------

19. Were you satisfied with IFOR spokespersons?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

20. Were you satisfied with the availability of the IFOR decision makers for comments?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

21. Do you feel that you were ever misled by IFOR?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

22. Do you feel that IFOR ever tried to cover up something?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

23. Do you feel that you were ever censored by IFOR?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

24. Were you ever prevented by IFOR performing your journalistic duties?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

25. Did IFOR impose any unnecessary restrictions for performing your job?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

26. Did IFOR ever try to prevent you getting information you wanted to?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

27. Did IFOR ever pressure you to report on an event a certain way?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

28. Did IFOR ever question your professionalism?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

29. To your knowledge how frequent were the cases where a journalist filed a critical story on IFOR and afterwards felt that IFOR imposed restrictions/changed its attitude on the journalist?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

30. In your opinion, to what extent IFOR was able to determine the media agenda?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

31. Do you think that IFOR succeeded in focusing the media attention where it wanted to be focused?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

32. Did you ever feel that there was animosity between the press and IFOR military?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

33. Could you please indicate the reliability of information provided by following organizations?

	0-10%	10-25%	25-40%	40-60%	60-75%	75-90%	90-100%
UNHCR							
OHR							

OSCE							
UNMBiH							
ICRC							
IFOR							

34. If you evaluate the UN and the IFOR press operations, would you be able to give them ratings on how well they performed?

UN							
IFOR							

35. Did you find the information provided by the UN mission in Bosnia reliable?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

36. Did you think that, at that time, the international community made a right decision when it deployed IFOR to Bosnia?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

37. Did you at that time believe that IFOR would solve the crisis?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

38. Did you agree with the IFOR deployment?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

39. Are you hopeful for the future of unified Bosnia-Herzegovina?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

40. Did you think that the use of force was the only way to solve the crisis late 1995?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

41. Were you satisfied with the coverage your organization gave to the story 12/1995-12/1996?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

42. Would there have been a need for the media community to defend the interests of the press in a more organized way in the Balkan crisis 1991-1995?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

43. What about during the IFOR deployment 12/1995 - 12/1996?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions!

Please include here your mailing address if you want to receive the summary of the results of this survey:

I would be most grateful for your comments on any of the questions above, on this survey, or on relevant points that would shed light on your opinion on IFOR PIO operation.

ATTACHEMENT V
A SAMPLE OF THE COVERING LETTER THAT WAS SENT TO
JOURNALISTS TOGETHER WITH THE QUESTIONNAIRE

14 March 1997, Jyväskylä
 5 PAGES

Dear Gabriel,

I tried to get hold of you yesterday and left a message to your answering machine. As I explained I am doing my MA thesis on what the media thought about the IFOR PIO operation. I would like to ask you to fill in the attached questionnaire and fax it back to me at the number below.

I would be very grateful for your honest and frank answers. I would also very much appreciate your more detailed comments on the IFOR PIO operation or on the survey. Some of the journalists who have already returned the questionnaire and who felt that it did not adequately address the concerns of the media have made very frank and extremely useful comments on issues concerning the performance both of IFOR and UN PIO operation.

Please note that this thesis is done purely out of academic interest and has no financial or any other kind of control from NATO/UN or national authorities. **All the answers will remain confidential and none of the answers or opinions of the journalists, neither their media organizations will be identified in the thesis.** In your case the answers will be presented (without your name or the STERN's name) collectively together with A) print journalists, B) European print journalists. Your name will be mentioned in the attachements where all the ones who answered the poll will be listed.

If you want to receive a summary of my thesis I will be more than happy to forward it to you hopefully later this spring.

I'll try to get hold of you later today. Best regards

Simo Väätäinen
 email: simvaat@kanto.jyu.fi
fax: +358-14-601 511
 tel+358-40-584 9061
 Laajavuorentie 5A9
 40740 Jyväskylä
 FINLAND

Gabriel Gruner
 STERN Magazine
 49 40 3703 3597 (t)/ 5729 (f)

ATTACHMENT VI. Answers by the international and local journalists for each question, number of cases, the mean shown in percentages and as converted to the 1-to-8 scale, and standard deviation shown on 1-to-8 scale

	NO all/int/loc	1-10% all/int/loc	10-25% all/int/loc	25-40% all/int/loc	40-60% all/int/loc	60-75% all/int/loc	75-90% all/int/loc	90-100% all/int/loc	CASES	MEAN	MEAN	St. dev.
Q1	0-0-0	0-0-0	6-4-2	4-4-0	20-13-7	13-6-7	10-8-2	2-2-0	55	48%	5.4	1.3
Q2	1-1-0	1-1-0	6-4-2	7-7-0	16-9-7	16-8-8	7-6-1	0-0-0	54	42%	5.1	1.4
Q3	0-0-0	4-2-2	4-1-3	8-6-2	8-5-3	9-6-3	12-11-1	4-1-3	50	46%	5.3	1.8
Q4	3-3-0	7-5-2	8-4-4	8-7-1	10-8-2	11-8-3	5-0-5	0-0-0	52	30%	4.3	1.8
Q5	0-0-0	11-8-3	7-5-2	12-6-6	10-7-3	11-7-4	2-2-0	0-0-0	53	28%	4.2	1.5
Q6	35-27-8	9-4-5	7-3-4	2-1-1	0-0-0	0-0-0	0-0-0	0-0-0	53	0%	1.5	0.9
Q7	0-0-0	3-2-1	2-1-1	12-7-5	16-12-4	11-7-4	6-6-0	3-1-2	53	42%	5.1	1.4
Q8	2-2-0	4-3-1	4-3-1	17-11-6	13-7-6	9-6-3	6-5-1	0-0-0	55	34%	4.6	1.5
Q9	1-1-0	0-0-0	2-1-1	0-0-0	6-5-1	13-9-4	14-7-7	18-13-5	54	69%	6.6	1.5
Q10	1-1-0	1-1-0	1-1-0	2-2-0	9-6-3	19-9-10	14-13-1	7-4-3	54	62%	6.1	1.4
Q11	2-2-0	0-0-0	1-1-0	7-4-3	15-11-4	14-8-6	10-8-2	5-3-2	54	52%	5.6	1.5
Q12	2-1-1-	1-1-0	2-2-0	7-3-4	14-11-3	12-7-5	10-9-1	4-1-3	52	48%	5.4	1.6
Q13	0-0-0	4-3-1	5-3-2	7-7-0	7-5-2	10-7-3	15-6-9	3-3-0	51	48%	5.4	1.7
Q14	2-2-0	1-1-0	9-8-1	6-2-4	21-15-6	12-7-5	4-2-2	0-0-0	55	36%	4.7	1.4
Q15	1-1-0	4-4-0	8-5-3	9-7-2	17-12-5	8-2-6	6-5-1	0-0-0	53	34%	4.6	1.5
Q16	0-0-0	7-6-1	4-2-2	5-4-1	16-9-7	8-5-3	5-4-1	1-1-0	46	36%	4.7	1.6
Q17	5-4-1	2-2-0	2-2-0	2-1-1	6-3-3	9-5-4	11-7-4	12-9-3	49	54%	5.7	2.3
Q18	4-3-1	5-4-1	9-5-4	3-1-2	15-10-5	13-9-4	5-4-1	0-0-0	54	33%	4.5	1.8
Q19	2-2-0	3-2-1	9-6-3	4-2-2	11-7-4	16-11-5	8-5-3	2-2-0	55	40%	5.0	1.7
Q20	6-4-2	5-3-2	8-6-2	14-9-5	10-5-5	5-5-0	4-2-2	1-1-0	53	25%	4.0	1.8
Q21	7-7-0	8-4-4	9-5-4	10-7-3	7-1-6	5-4-1	5-5-0	3-3-0	54	25%	4.0	2.1
Q22	3-3-0	5-3-2	7-4-3	6-3-3	9-6-3	10-9-1	9-4-5	5-5-0	54	39%	4.9	2.0

	NO all/int/loc	1-10% all/int/loc	10-25% all/int/loc	25-40% all/int/loc	40-60% all/int/loc	60-75% all/int/loc	75-90% all/int/loc	90-100% all/int/loc	CASES	MEAN	MEAN	St. dev.
Q23	32-27-5	10-5-5	5-3-2	2-0-2	3-1-2	2-0-2	0-0-0	1-1-0	55	0%	2.0	1.6
Q24	16-11-5	7-6-1	13-7-6	7-6-1	5-3-2	1-0-1	1-1-0	2-2-0	52	9%	2.9	1.8
Q25	10-7-3	15-8-7	5-2-3	8-7-1	7-4-3	4-4-0	1-1-0	2-2-0	52	15%	3.3	1.9
Q26	16-12-4	10-4-6	9-5-4	5-4-1	5-4-1	1-1-0	3-3-0	3-3-0	52	12%	3.1	2.1
Q27	36-25-11	6-5-1	3-1-2	3-3-0	0-0-0	4-1-3	1-1-0	1-1-0	54	0%	2.0	1.8
Q28	41-28-13	2-1-1	6-5-1	4-2-2	0-0-0	0-0-0	0-0-0	1-1-0	54	0%	1.6	1.3
Q29	19-17-2	18-9-9	4-3-1	3-2-1	3-0-3	2-1-1	0-0-0	0-0-0	49	2%	2.2	1.4
Q30	4-4-0	5-4-1	8-5-3	10-4-6	10-7-3	8-6-2	3-3-0	0-0-0	48	27%	4.1	1.7
Q31	3-3-0	4-2-2	12-8-4	8-5-3	11-8-3	6-2-4	9-7-2	0-0-0	53	31%	4.4	1.8
Q32	4-3-1	12-6-6	9-6-3	15-11-4	4-2-2	4-4-0	5-3-2	0-0-0	53	21%	3.7	1.7
Q33												
lcr	0	1	2	1	5	10	23	8	50	66%	6.4	
hcr	0	1	3	0	1	10	30	8	53	69%	6.6	
ifor	0	1	5	3	9	20	13	1	52	54%	5.7	
ohr	0	1	2	2	8	13	10	0	36	54%	5.7	
unbh	0	1	4	2	10	20	3	0	40	46%	5.3	
osce	0	4	6	11	11	10	3	0	45	34%	4.6	
Q34												
ifor	0	0	4	7	10	17	13	1	52	52%	5.6	
unbh	0	3	7	7	7	18	9	1	52	44%	5.2	
Q35	1-1-0	2-1-1	2-2-0	8-5-3	11-7-4	18-9-9	9-8-1	1-1-0	52	46%	5.3	1.5
Q36	2-2-0	0-0-0	1-1-0	0-0-0	3-1-2	4-2-2	12-10-2	32-20-12	54	77%	7.1	1.6
Q37	12-10-2	6-4-2	3-2-1	4-4-0	11-6-5	8-7-1	5-1-4	4-1-3	53	27%	4.1	2.3
Q38	1-1-0	0-0-0	1-1-0	0-0-0	2-2-0	5-3-2	12-9-3	32-19-13	53	78%	7.2	1.3
Q39	15-13-2	8-4-4	6-5-1	5-3-2	5-3-2	1-1-0	3-2-1	11-6-5	54	24%	3.9	2.7
Q40	5-2-3	1-0-1	3-3-0	0-0-0	1-1-0	2-1-1	10-9-1	30-18-12	52	69%	6.6	2.3
Q41	0-0-0	0-0-0	1-1-0	3-2-1	4-4-0	12-10-2	21-11-10	10-6-4	51	68%	6.5	1.2
Q42	5-4-1	5-3-2	2-1-1	4-3-1	5-3-2	6-5-1	11-6-5	10-8-2	48	46%	5.3	2.4
Q43	9-6-3	5-4-1	7-3-4	4-3-1	3-3-0	6-5-1	9-5-4	4-3-1	47	30%	4.3	2.4

ATTACHMENT VII. Answers by the news agency (n), print (pr), broadcast (b) and photo (ph) journalists for each question, number of cases, the mean shown in percentages and as converted to the 1-to-8 scale, and standard deviation shown on 1-to-8 scale

NO	n/pr/b/ph	1-10%	10-25%	25-40%	40-60%	60-75%	75-90%	90-100%	CASES	MEAN	MEAN	St. dev.
Q1	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	1-3-0-2	3-0-1-0	6-6-5-3	3-2-6-2	2-2-6-0	0-1-1-0	55	48%	5.4	1.3
Q2	0-0-1-0	0-0-0-1	2-3-0-1	2-2-0-3	6-5-4-1	4-1-10-1	1-2-4-0	0-0-0-0	54	42%	5.1	1.4
Q3	0-0-0-0	1-2-0-1	1-0-3-0	0-3-5-0	3-2-2-1	3-3-2-1	3-3-4-2	2-0-1-1	50	46%	5.3	1.8
Q4	0-1-0-2	5-2-0-0	4-1-1-2	1-3-3-1	2-2-6-0	1-3-6-1	1-1-2-1	0-0-0-0	52	30%	4.3	1.8
Q5	0-0-0-0	5-4-1-1	3-2-0-2	4-1-5-2	1-2-6-1	2-4-4-1	0-1-1-0	0-0-0-0	53	28%	4.2	1.5
Q6	8-12-10-5	5-0-3-1	0-0-6-1	1-1-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	53	0%	1.5	0.9
Q7	0-0-0-0	1-1-1-0	1-0-0-1	3-4-3-2	5-3-6-2	3-2-5-1	1-3-2-0	0-0-2-1	53	42%	5.1	1.4
Q8	1-0-0-1	1-2-1-0	2-1-0-1	5-5-5-2	4-1-6-2	2-3-3-1	0-2-4-0	0-0-0-0	55	34%	4.6	1.5
Q9	0-1-0-0	0-0-0-0	2-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	1-2-1-2	7-2-2-2	3-2-7-2	2-6-9-1	54	69%	6.6	1.5
Q10	0-0-0-1	0-1-0-0	0-1-0-0	1-0-0-1	3-1-4-1	7-1-9-2	1-7-4-2	2-3-2-0	54	62%	6.1	1.4
Q11	0-1-0-1	0-0-0-0	1-0-0-0	5-1-1-0	3-4-5-3	4-2-7-1	0-3-5-2	1-3-1-0	54	52%	5.6	1.5
Q12	1-1-0-0	1-0-0-0	0-1-0-1	3-1-2-1	5-4-3-2	1-2-7-2	1-3-6-0	1-2-1-0	52	48%	5.4	1.6
Q13	0-0-0-0	1-2-1-0	3-2-0-0	0-3-2-2	3-1-2-1	3-1-5-1	5-2-6-2	0-2-1-0	51	48%	5.4	1.7
Q14	0-1-1-0	0-0-0-1	3-4-1-1	2-3-1-0	9-3-6-3	0-3-7-2	1-0-3-0	0-0-0-0	55	36%	4.7	1.4
Q15	0-0-0-1	1-2-1-0	2-2-2-2	1-4-3-1	3-4-8-2	6-1-1-0	1-1-4-0	0-0-0-0	53	34%	4.6	1.5
Q16	0-0-0-0	0-3-1-3	1-2-1-0	1-1-3-0	6-1-6-3	3-3-2-0	0-2-3-0	0-0-1-0	46	36%	4.7	1.6
Q17	0-2-2-1	0-0-2-0	0-1-0-1	0-0-2-0	2-3-1-0	6-1-2-0	3-3-4-1	2-4-3-3	49	54%	5.7	2.3
Q18	3-1-0-0	1-2-0-2	4-1-3-1	1-1-1-0	2-4-7-2	2-4-6-1	2-1-2-0	0-0-0-0	54	33%	4.5	1.8
Q19	0-1-0-1	1-1-0-1	5-1-2-1	2-1-1-0	2-3-4-2	3-5-6-2	2-2-4-0	0-0-2-0	55	40%	5.0	1.7
Q20	4-1-0-1	3-1-1-0	3-3-1-1	2-3-7-2	3-4-3-0	0-0-5-0	0-1-2-1	0-1-0-0	53	25%	4.0	1.8
Q21	2-3-1-1	3-1-4-0	1-1-5-2	1-3-4-2	6-1-0-0	0-2-3-0	0-3-1-1	2-0-1-0	54	25%	4.0	2.1
Q22	1-2-0-0	0-1-4-0	0-0-4-3	3-2-1-0	4-2-2-1	0-3-5-2	3-3-2-1	3-1-1-0	54	39%	4.9	2.0

	NO	1-10%	10-25%	25-40%	40-60%	60-75%	75-90%	90-100%	CASES	MEAN	MEAN	St. dev.
Q23	6-10-14-2 n/pr/b/ph	3-3-4-0 n/pr/b/ph	0-1-0-4 n/pr/b/ph	1-0-1-0 n/pr/b/ph	2-0-0-1 n/pr/b/ph	2-0-0-0 n/pr/b/ph	0-0-0-0 n/pr/b/ph	1-0-0-0 n/pr/b/ph	55	0%	2.0	1.6
Q24	3-8-4-1	1-1-5-0	5-4-2-2	3-0-2-2	0-0-3-2	1-0-0-0	0-0-1-0	1-0-1-0	52	9%	2.9	1.8
Q25	1-5-4-0	4-5-5-1	2-0-2-1	2-1-3-2	2-0-3-2	1-2-0-1	0-0-1-0	2-0-0-0	52	15%	3.3	1.9
Q26	4-8-3-1	3-3-4-0	1-1-5-2	1-0-3-1	2-0-2-1	1-0-0-0	0-0-1-2	2-0-1-0	52	12%	3.1	2.1
Q27	6-14-13-3	3-0-1-2	2-0-1-0	0-0-2-1	0-0-0-0	2-0-1-1	0-0-1-0	1-0-0-0	54	0%	2.0	1.8
Q28	9-11-16-5	1-0-0-1	2-1-2-1	1-2-1-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	1-0-0-0	54	0%	1.6	1.3
Q29	4-7-5-3	6-5-7-0	0-0-1-3	2-0-1-0	1-0-1-1	2-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	49	2%	2.2	1.4
Q30	2-1-0-1	0-3-2-0	2-2-3-1	3-1-6-0	3-3-2-2	3-1-3-1	1-2-0-0	0-0-0-0	48	27%	4.1	1.7
Q31	1-1-0-1	2-1-0-1	3-3-6-0	3-3-2-0	3-2-5-1	3-0-2-1	0-3-3-3	0-0-0-0	53	31%	4.4	1.8
Q32	0-2-1-1	5-1-3-3	3-2-4-0	4-3-7-1	2-0-2-0	0-3-1-0	1-2-1-1	0-0-0-0	53	21%	3.7	1.7
Q34												
icrc	0-0-0-0	0-1-0-0	0-0-0-2	0-0-1-0	0-1-2-2	4-1-3-2	7-5-11-0	3-3-2-0	50	66%	6.4	
hcr	0-0-0-0	0-1-0-0	1-1-0-1	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-1	2-1-5-2	8-8-14-0	4-3-0-1	53	69%	6.6	
ifor	0-0-0-0	0-1-0-0	2-0-1-2	1-1-1-0	3-3-2-1	5-4-9-2	4-4-5-0	0-0-1-0	52	54%	5.7	
ohr	0-0-0-0	0-1-0-0	1-0-0-1	1-1-0-0	4-1-2-1	4-3-4-2	1-5-4-0	0-0-0-0	36	54%	5.7	
unbh	0-0-0-0	0-1-0-0	0-1-2-1	0-1-1-0	4-1-3-2	6-5-8-1	1-2-0-0	0-0-0-0	40	46%	5.3	
osce	0-0-0-0	1-1-1-1	2-2-1-1	4-4-4-0	3-3-2-1	3-1-6-1	0-1-2-0	0-0-0-0	45	34%	4.6	
Q34												
ifor	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	1-1-2-1	4-0-0-1	2-4-3-2	5-3-6-3	2-3-7-0	0-0-1-0	52	52%	5.6	
unbh	0-0-0-0	0-1-0-0	4-1-2-2	1-2-3-1	1-0-5-2	4-3-8-2	5-3-1-0	0-1-0-0	52	44%	5.2	
Q35	0-1-0-0	1-1-0-0	0-1-0-1	2-1-3-2	3-2-5-1	6-3-7-2	2-3-4-0	0-1-0-0	52	46%	5.3	1.5
Q36	0-0-1-1	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-1	0-0-0-0	2-1-0-0	1-0-1-2	3-2-6-1	9-10-11-2	54	77%	7.1	1.6
Q37	3-0-5-4	2-2-1-1	2-0-1-0	0-2-2-0	4-4-2-1	1-3-4-0	2-1-2-0	1-1-1-1	53	27%	4.1	2.3
Q38	0-0-1-0	0-0-0-0	0-1-0-0	0-0-0-0	1-0-1-0	1-1-1-2	2-2-6-2	11-8-10-3	53	78%	7.2	1.3
Q39	4-5-5-1	1-0-5-2	2-2-2-0	1-1-1-2	1-2-2-0	1-0-0-0	1-2-0-0	3-2-4-2	54	24%	3.9	2.7
Q40	3-1-1-0	0-0-0-1	1-2-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-1	1-0-0-1	3-2-5-0	6-9-11-4	52	69%	6.6	2.3
Q41	0-0-0-0	0-0-0-0	0-0-1-0	0-1-2-0	0-1-2-1	4-3-5-0	7-3-7-4	4-4-1-1	51	68%	6.5	1.2
Q42	1-1-3-0	1-1-3-0	2-0-0-0	1-0-2-1	1-2-1-1	2-2-2-0	3-2-4-2	3-3-2-2	48	46%	5.3	2.4
Q43	2-2-5-0	2-1-2-0	3-2-1-1	2-1-1-0	0-0-2-1	1-2-2-1	3-1-3-2	1-2-0-1	47	30%	4.3	2.4