

**FRAGILE STATES PRODUCE AUTHORITARIAN
CITIZENS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE AND PERSONAL-LEVEL
AUTHORITARIANISM**

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<p>Tiivistelmä - Abstract</p> <p>Tässä maisterintutkielmassa selvitin tilastollisia analyysimenetelmiä hyödyntäen, millainen vaikutus ihmisten asuinmaalla ja sen hauraudella (epädemokraattisuudella) on heidän henkilökohtaiseen autoritääriiseen orientaatioonsa. Valitsin teoriaohjaavasti joukon European Values Study 2017 -tietoaaineistoon sisällytettyjä muuttujia, muodostin autoritääristä orientaatiota mittaavan skaalan ja testasin sen validiteettia. Validoinnin päätteeksi totesin sen enimmiltä osin toimivaksi. Skaala on käyttökelpoinen 31:ssä aineistoon sisällytetyistä yhteensä 34 maasta - sen sisäinen konsistenssi osoittautui riittämättömäksi ainoastaan Armeniassa, Montenegrossa ja Azerbaidzhanissa. Kyseessä on tiettävästi ensimmäinen kerta, kun autoritääristä orientaatiota on tutkittu yhtäältä systemaattisesti vertailevalla otteella, sekä toisaalta näin laajaa ja tilastollisesti edustavaa aineistoa hyödyntäen.</p> <p>Skaalaan sisällyttämieni muuttujien valinnassa ja viitekehysten yleisemmässä rakentamisessa hyödynsin erityisesti Bob Altemeyerin autoritääriusteoriaa. Koska Altemeyerin käsitteellistys olettaa poliittisen ilmapiirin ja erityisesti valtaapitävien olevan enimmäkseen "konservatiivisia", ei se ole sellaisenaan toimiva kaikissa eurooppalaisissa poliittisissa ilmapiireissä. Tästä syystä päädyin muuttamaan kyseistä käsitteellistystä siten, ettei se enää ota kantaa vakiintuneiden auktoriteettien konservatismiin asteeseen.</p> <p>Tulokset osoittavat, että asuinmaa selittää noin 35 prosenttia henkilökohtaisen autoritäärisen orientaation vaihtelusta. Tämä vaikutus supistuu huomattavasti, kun valtioiden hauraus vakioidaan. Hauraus on myös sikäli konsistentti autoritäärisen orientaation selittäjä, että sen selitysvoima säilyy senkin jälkeen, kun useiden yksilötason muuttujien vaikutus huomioidaan käyttäen moniluokitteluanalyysiä (MCA). Käytännössä tämä tarkoittaa sitä, että hauraammissa maissa asuu keskimäärin autoritäärisempiä ihmisiä. Kysymykseen siitä, aiheuttaako tällaisissa maissa asuminen kansalaisissaan autoritäärisyyttä, vai ylläpitävätkö autoritääriset ihmiset epädemokraattisia järjestelmiä, ei tämän tutkielman puitteissa ole mahdollista tyhjentävästi vastata. On kuitenkin varsin todennäköistä, että suhde toimii molempiin suuntiin.</p>	
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Abstract

In this master's thesis, I examined whether people's country of residence and its "fragility", or lack of democracy, affect their personal authoritarian orientation. To measure authoritarian orientation, I selected 30 variables included in the European Values Study 2017 dataset, created a scale, and tested its validity. At the end of the validation, I found the scale to be mostly functional. The scale is usable in 31 out of the total of 34 countries included in the data – its internal consistency proved insufficient only in Armenia, Montenegro, and Azerbaijan. As far as is known, this is the first time that authoritarian orientation has been studied with a systematic comparative approach while using such extensive and statistically representative data.

Bob Altemeyer's theory of authoritarianism comprises the core of the theoretical frame of reference in this thesis. Since Altemeyer's conceptualization assumes the political climate and especially those in power mostly as "conservative", it is not functional as such in all European political climates. For this reason, I remodeled the conceptualization so that it no longer takes a position on the degree of conservatism of the established authorities.

The results show that the country of residence explains about 35 percent of the variance of authoritarian orientation, and this effect shrinks considerably when the "fragility" of the states is fixed. The explanatory power of fragility stays consistent even after the effect of several individual-level variables is standardized using multiple classification analysis (MCA). This means that the people living more fragile countries are generally more authoritarian, and vice versa. The question of whether living in such countries causes authoritarianism in their citizens, or whether authoritarian people maintain undemocratic systems, cannot be exhaustively answered within the scope of this thesis. However, it is quite likely that the relationship works both ways.

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1. INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold War and the seemingly inevitable prevailing of Western liberal democracy the idea of governments drifting back into autocracy seemed very distant, almost an absurd one belonging strictly to the history. It was well into the 2010s when the true picture behind the pronounced optimism predominant at the time started to become clear: far-right parties begun to gain popularity across Europe, Ukraine was invaded by Russia, and Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. Indeed, democracy has been declining almost throughout the world. This is the case according to several sources: Freedom House (2021) reports, that democracy has been declining every year since 2006; The Economist Intelligence (2021) has reported the worst global score of democracy since the establishment of the EIU index in 2006, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) report (2021) suggests, among other worrisome details, that as of 2020 more countries are moving toward autocracy than democracy, and also that democratically elected governments including some of those found in long-established democracies are adopting authoritarian courses of action (Freedom House, 2021, p. 2; Economist Intelligence, 2021, p. 4; International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021, p. 1). In this era of declining democracy, proper attention should be paid at its “opposing force”, authoritarianism, which seems to have gained popularity in many parts of the world.

Authoritarianism can be observed on several levels, most obvious of which are the state level (e.g., examining whether a given state should be considered democratic, autocratic, or as something in between) and the level of elites and leaders (is the leader a democratically elected president, a dictator, or again, a person who might fall between these categories). Examining these levels is, though important, also inadequate, if one seeks a deeper understanding of the potential dangers of authoritarianism. If we concentrate solely on the sphere of elites, there is a possibility of disregarding the vast influence which the masses of people have on politics. As the masses consist of individuals with their unique psychological and social characteristics, it is extremely important to pay attention to the *personal level* of authoritarianism as well. It is often the general public, the *authoritarian followers*, who both help put despots into power and later maintain and reproduce the authoritarian political system. Similarly, it requires the opposition of masses to get rid of an authoritarian regime. As Arendt writes, neither Hitler nor Stalin could have stayed in power had they not possessed the trust and confidence of the masses of people (Arendt, 2013, p. 378). The movement of masses, or the lack thereof, is one of the most important forces which drive or resist societal change. Thus, if one seeks to further

such causes as democracy, inclusion, or equality, it is essential to understand the factors which influence the authoritarianism of the general public.

Personal authoritarianism has been rather widely researched, but up to the present, most of the empirical research on it has mainly concentrated on the psychological background of the phenomenon based either on the psychoanalytic, or the social learning theories, as well as on the socio-demographic characteristics of people scoring low or high on scales measuring authoritarianism. Thus, the effects of home environment, upbringing and education are relatively well-known. Children and adolescents get some of their values from their parents, teachers, friends, as well as other such people close to them, and often adopt them either through critical evaluation, "blind acceptance", or something between these extremes. Also, members of certain religious groups typically score higher on authoritarianism than others, and there is also evidence of a consistent positive association between age and authoritarianism (see Altemeyer, 1981, pp. 241-242). There is a rather obvious area in authoritarianism research, which has received little, if any attention: practically all the research in this field to date has been conducted in single-country settings. Even though the possibility of situation-specific authoritarianism is nowadays widely accepted, the possibility of people adopting differing views to governments with different values and ideologies - either in one country before and after a change of power, or in cross-country comparisons has not been researched, to my knowledge, by a single author. Consequently, there are plenty of possibilities for further research in this area. I have directed my attention toward the effect that the country of residence, as well as the properties of said country have on personal authoritarianism either directly, or indirectly through some third factors. To better understand the dynamics of authoritarianism in different countries, I have formulated the following research problem:

Is the personal authoritarianism of the people affected by the state of democracy and civil rights in their respective countries of residence?

I have further divided this problem into four questions to provide some structure to the research task:

- 1) Is it possible to construct a valid and reliable measure of personal authoritarianism from the variables in a dataset, which includes a reasonable variety of countries, is not outdated and which is of satisfactory quality (as in having high standards of data collection methods as well as being professionally collected and sufficiently statistically representative)
- 2) Are there differences in the dynamics of the authoritarianism scale in countries receiving relatively low, medium, and high means on the scale?

- 3) Does the country of residence homogenize their residents' levels of authoritarianism so that variance in individual states is smaller than in the whole data?
- 4) Does the country of residence have an effect of the authoritarianism levels of their respective inhabitants, and if so, is this effect mediated by the levels of democracy and civil rights of said states?

The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2 I shall cover a selection of theories of personal authoritarian orientation, formerly known as *authoritarian personality*. In addition to describing these theories, I shall discuss their strengths and weaknesses, as well as the extent to which they are still relevant today. Moving on to the more technical part of the thesis, in Chapter 3 I shall introduce the data – along with its advantages and limitations – that I have chosen for this master's thesis. The beginning of Chapter 4 stays on this more technical of a path, since that is where the research methods along with the measures and indices I use in this thesis are presented. This chapter also begins the empirical section of the thesis, as most of it considers the construction and validation of my authoritarianism scale. In Chapter 5 I shall conduct the analyses regarding the relationship between the country of residence and its level of democracy on the one hand, and personal authoritarianism on the other. The findings along with some other thoughts on the subject are concluded in Chapter 6.

2. THEORIES OF AUTHORITARIANISM

Although the idea of authoritarian personality as an explanation to the popularity of fascist movements dates back to the 1930s, it was not until the end of Second World War and the Holocaust, that attempts to empirically test the previously purely speculative assumptions resulted in T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford (later the “Berkeley Team”) releasing the almost 1000-page volume *The Authoritarian Personality* in 1950. The primary goal of this massive research project was to understand the “potentially fascist individual”, the most dangerous characteristic of whom being his “[susceptibility] to anti-democratic propaganda” (Adorno, Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1982, p. 1). The Berkeley Team further elaborated this by hypothesizing that “[i]f there should be a marked increase in antidemocratic propaganda, we should expect some people to accept and repeat it at once, others when it seemed that ‘everybody believed it,’ and still others not at all.” (ibid., p. 4). This clarification of framework has arguably been one of the most important individual properties of the original theory of authoritarian personality in keeping the subject topical to our days. This way it became possible to study authoritarianism as an independent phenomenon rather than as a subordinate definer of a unique historical era. It also provided the possibility to shift the emphasis from “already fascist” or otherwise authoritarian regimes to freer ones. This indeed seems a fruitful perspective, as it would be extremely difficult to tell “actual authoritarians” from ordinary people submitting out of fear in a totalitarian regime, whereas this is not so big of a problem in more democratic settings. The inclusion of democratic regimes into the scope of authoritarianism research has also made it sensible, or even imperative, to acknowledge the threat from within posed by authoritarians to democratic systems instead of solely theorizing in the domain of a static ideal type of a totalitarian system.

One of the most famous and influential part of the Berkeley Theory was the F (Fascism) scale, which was the first major attempt to measure authoritarianism in individuals. The scale was not originally constructed to measure fascism, however: The Berkeley Team first intended to develop “a scale that would measure prejudice without appearing to have this aim and without mentioning the name of any minority group”, and it was thus designed so that it would correlate as strongly as possible with the A-S (Anti-Semitism) and E (Ethnocentrism) scales which the team had developed first. The need for a more subtle way to measure prejudice was evident for at least two reasons: First, a scale like this could be used to measure antisemitism and ethnocentrism in groups which included members of ethnic minorities; and second – arguably the more important one considering the validity of measurements – people would often employ certain defenses when asked to give their opinions about race issues (Adorno et al., 1982, p. 151).

Soon after beginning the construction of the F scale, the Berkeley Team theorized that the scale should, in all probability, “yield a valid estimate of antidemocratic tendencies at the personality level” and based this notion on the assumption that antisemitism and ethnocentrism were “general tendencies - - in part at least, deep within the structure of the person” This somewhat arbitrarily formed line of thought also led to the Berkeley Team stating that with the F scale, they were indeed measuring “deeper, unconscious forces” rather than simply opinions or attitudes (Adorno et al., 1982, p. 152).

Based on previous research as well as their “clinical material” The Berkeley Team formulated nine “variables”, or rather hypothetical trends in persons, which should through some dynamic processes be noticeable both in ethnocentrism and “psychologically related opinions and attitudes” while seemingly explaining some of the consistency of answers in other scales, such as the E or A-S (Adorno et al., 1982, pp. 154–157). These are as follows:

- a. *Conventionalism*. Rigid adherence to conventional middle-class values.
- b. *Authoritarian submission*. A submissive, uncritical attitude toward authorities.
- c. *Authoritarian aggression*. Tendency to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.
- d. *Anti-intraception*. Opposition to the subjective, imaginative, and tender-minded.
- e. *Superstition and stereotypy*. Belief in mystical determinants of the individual’s fate, disposition to think in rigid categories.
- f. *Power and toughness*. Preoccupation with the dominance–submission, strong–weak, leader–follower dimension; identification with power, strength, toughness.
- g. *Destructiveness and cynicism*. Generalized hostility, vilification of the human.
- h. *Projectivity*. Disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outward of unconscious emotional impulses.
- i. *Sex*. An exaggerated concern with sexual ‘goings-on’ (Adorno et al., 1982, p. 157).

Understandably, the F scale ended up receiving considerable, arguably even disproportionate attention at the expense of the rest of the theory (see e.g., Feldman, 2003, pp. 41–42). The scale was only one part of it, however, and there is much more the theory can still offer even to present-day research. One important detail of the theory is – contrary to what one would assume – that there indeed were some attempts to understand some of the personal motives of people regarding their authoritarian

tendencies. The Berkeley Team writes, regarding the potential effect that certain conditions and properties of individuals such as their financial positions or religious convictions might have on their authoritarianism, that “[t]he general assumption made was that, granted the possibility of choice, an individual will be most receptive to that ideology which has most psychological meaning for him” (Adorno et al., p. 100). This argument should be understood through the team’s rejection of the hypothesis of rational choice regarding ideologies expressed earlier: “[Fascism] cannot possibly demonstrate that it will so improve the situation of most people that their real interests will be served. It must therefore make its major appeal, not to rational self-interest, but to emotional needs – often the most primitive and irrational wishes and fears” (ibid., p. 10).

The Berkeley Team attempted to provide empirical evidence for this, which was, regrettably enough, done by having biased people interview some test subjects, and afterwards interpreting the inferior data thus obtained with psychoanalytic concepts. This resulted in an odd combination of reasoning based on ego weakness and superego externalization, as well as repressed hostility towards the authoritarian father along with weird notions of pre-oedipal fixations and supposedly related homosexual tendencies (Adorno et al., pp. 232–234; 246; 267–281). I will not, however, discuss neither these individual statements, nor the broader psychoanalytic context of the Berkeley Theory at greater length, because they have been largely deemed unproven (see e.g., Duckitt, 2015, p. 256), and more importantly, because they have no value regarding the theoretical frame of this thesis.

It soon became clear, that the F scale was not unidimensional; in other words, it was not measuring a single phenomenon. The Berkeley Research Team had reported a “fairly high internal consistency” between the items included in the scale. A more thorough investigation shows, however, that this statement is at the very least questionable. The only coefficient reported by the team was Cronbach’s alpha, which is affected by the length of the test (i.e., the number of items included; in this case, there were extremely many of them). The mean interitem correlation was reported to be .13, which is very humble. A more serious problem with the scale was that both these coefficients were affected by the fact that all the items included in the scale were written in “authoritarian direction” so that agreement always indicated authoritarianism and vice versa. It has been estimated that around 33 percent of the F scale’s variance was caused by this dreadful flaw in the scale. This so called “response set effect” has a devastating effect on the scale’s unidimensionality, but even more importantly, its whole validity (Altemeyer, 1981, pp. 16–17, 137, 316).

The F scale’s explanatory power still seemed tolerable, and some of its applications were successful to a certain extent. Some, though debatable, connections were found

between the F scale and other phenomena such as conformity, hostility toward certain targets, punitiveness/aggression against unconventional persons, and political conservatism. This is not a surprise, though, because the F scale was originally developed to measure ethnocentrism, which soon began to mean mostly Americans' prejudices towards Jews, black people, and other such minorities. The scale was in fact constructed from the beginning in such a manner that it would correlate with prejudice. The reason for this was that antisemitism and other prejudices were perceived as the core and "the spearhead" of fascism, even though they predated fascism, and have not been exactly unique to it. While considering the F scale's hard-wired connection to prejudice, the correlations between these phenomena were quite modest. As Altemeyer (1981, p. 33) puts it: "The major conclusion in *The Authoritarian Personality* - that authoritarianism is highly related to prejudice - is still unconfirmed, long after it has been assimilated into our culture". (Altemeyer, 1981, pp. 26-28, 53-56, 61-62, 67, 74, 77).

Overall, the psychometric properties (i.e., the validity) of the F scale are questionable at best. While the different traits seem to theoretically be parts of the same phenomenon (authoritarianism), no empirical evidence for this can be acquired whatsoever (see Altemeyer 1981, p. 77). In addition to this, there are, however, even more serious flaws related to the scale and its development. The quality of both the data and the methods for gathering and analyzing it which the Berkeley Research Team used in testing various assumptions and hypotheses about the origins of authoritarianism as was completely intolerable. The most alarming example of this provided by Altemeyer (1981, p. 36) is about the very original Berkeley study conducted in 1941.

The whole theory behind the F scale and the conceptualization of authoritarianism back then assumed that the degree of one's authoritarianism was determined by early childhood experiences. This assumption is not at all surprising, or senseless for that matter, as the Freudian psychodynamic theory was still the best one available in explaining these sorts of phenomena. The data used to test this assumption was completely flawed - and should have been considered as such even with the scientific standards of the 1940s. The data consisted of 20 men and 25 women who had high, and 20 men and 15 women who had low scores on the E scale, a scale designed to measure ethnocentrism, or in more precise terms, prejudice¹. The gravest flaws of the

¹ The E scale was operationalized as "prejudice among Americans against (a) Jews, (b) blacks, (c) other American minorities (including organized groups such as small political parties and religious sects, ethnic minorities and 'moral minorities') and (d) ('pseudo') patriotism". As one can imagine, the internal consistency of the scale was fairly high. The correlations between the E and F scales were quite substantial, highest of which, however, were achieved by using the scale only partially - i.e., including only the most highly intercorrelated five or ten of the original twenty items. These seemingly high

data are neither its inadequate size nor the fact that it is not balanced by gender nor that it only included people from the far ends of the E scale. What makes the data so utterly bad is the fact that a substantial number of men in this sample were *convicted prisoners in San Quentin Penitentiary*. If this is not enough, the proportions of them were different in the high and low E groups, being 40 and 20 percent respectively. One cannot but disbelievingly wonder how this sort of data could in any circumstances have been used to make generalizations about the general population. The data gathered from these subjects supposedly proved as fact some of the hypothesized psychodynamic origins of authoritarianism, such as that highly authoritarian people having overidealized their parents and been very submissive to them, as well as having been traumatically disciplined for misbehaving as children. The chain of reasoning summarized by Altemeyer seems sensible for the standards of the time: arbitrary and violent disciplining by the parents leads to the children repressing their hostility, and this in turn would reappear as prejudice against outgroups later in life. To add even more to the flawedness of the data, the interviewers were given access to the E scale scores of the interviewees. This resulted in the interviewers being biased and thus either consciously or unconsciously directing the interviews into desired directions. This most probably polarized the results even more, rendering them completely useless empirically. (Altemeyer, 1981, pp. 35-37; see also Adorno et al., 1982, pp. 256-266).

During the upcoming decades after the publication of The Berkeley Theory there were multiple other attempts to measure authoritarianism, which, almost without exception, failed as badly, or even worse, than the F scale had done. Based on Altemeyer's (1981) review, some of the most well-known attempts were H. J. Eysenck's R-T (Radical conservatism and tendermindedness-toughmindedness) scales, and Milton Rokeach's D (Dogmatism) scale. Eysenck was trying to form a two-factor theory of political behavior and came up with the R-T scales. Practically everything on his research was flawed: the items in neither of the scales measured the things they were supposed to: the R scale was originally meant to be a left-right political scale, but as that did not work out, Eysenck renamed it as the radical-conservative scale. The T scale, on the other hand, had practically nothing to do with either tendermindedness or toughmindedness; the items included in the scale measured only sexual attitudes and religious moral. As if the situation was not dreadful already, all the results Eysenck reported were highly exaggerated, and in some cases entirely forged. For example, he rotated his factor analysis in a completely arbitrary manner, and later calculated interitem correlations wrong so that the results would appear stronger. Unsurprisingly the data he was using was also flawed in many ways. Naturally, other scientists noticed these flaws immediately after the

correlations were then considered as explanations to why holocaust and other such horrible events took place. (Altemeyer, 1981, pp. 26 - 27).

publication² of the results. Furthermore, Eysenck's responses to critique were inadequate, and he never answered why he had calculated the means of interitem correlations wrong – a task where a gifted elementary school pupil could succeed without trouble (Altemeyer, 1981, pp. 80–89).

Partly as a critique of Eysenck's studies, Milton Rokeach developed the Dogmatism scale in the late 1950s. It was supposed to measure a form of “general authoritarianism” but succeeded in this task even worse than did the F-scale. Altemeyer argues that all the flaws of the F scale were present with the D scale as well – including the items being worded unidirectionally. Furthermore, the theoretical structure of the scale is very complex and seems to have avoided any empirical confirmation, and partially because of this complexity the D scale is even less unidimensional than the F scale. So, to put it bluntly, it was not at all clear what this scale measured, and even then, it did a rather bad job at it (Altemeyer, 1981, pp. 90–91).

There were also other attempts to conceptualize and measure authoritarianism, but seemingly all of them had serious flaws, and they have thus been largely mothballed. Bob Altemeyer seems to have been among the first researchers developing these scales that has paid enough attention to proper scientific principles. This is not to state that Altemeyer's theory would be free of problems – I will discuss these further in Chapter 2.1.2. The greatest difference between Altemeyer and many of the other scholars, however, is that Altemeyer acknowledges very explicitly the flaws of his data and does not attempt to make any generalizations to the general population; he is even reluctant to generalize about the “general population” of Canadian university students and their parents. The student samples are not representative in any way, as they consist of arbitrarily picked first-year psychology students, and even the parent samples would only be “reasonably representative of the mothers and fathers in our society [Manitoba, Canada] whose children attend large public universities”. It is clear, that Altemeyer's rather puritanic attitude toward generalizing and reporting results as they appear without exaggeration has paid off: unlike his predecessors' work, Altemeyer's seems to have kept up with time rather well (Altemeyer, 1981, pp. 217, 322).³

² One cannot but wonder, why such flawed research was published in the first place. Altemeyer (1981, p. 114) suggests that the publishers might have been hoping that “such papers might stimulate thinking about a problem, lead to more research, and hence contribute to progress”. Luckily these flaws were quickly noticed limiting the done.

³ I am by no means implying that Altemeyer's findings would, in a strictly empirical and content-concerning sense, still be relevant today. Naturally it is totally insignificant that there were, for example, observed correlations between the level of authoritarianism and some other phenomena in samples of Canadian students in the 1970s. This does not reduce the significance or power of Altemeyer's theory, though. Even though the empirical evidence in favor of Altemeyer's conceptualization of right-wing

2.1 Altemeyer's conception of Authoritarianism

Altemeyer's model of right-wing authoritarianism consists of three attitudinal clusters that are essentially the same as the three most powerfully covarying traits in the Berkeley model:

- 1) Authoritarian submission – a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives;
- 2) Authoritarian aggression – a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, which is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities; and
- 3) Conventionalism – a high degree of adherence to the social conventions which are perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authorities. (Altemeyer, 1981, pp. 147–148; 1988, p. 2).

Altemeyer did not pick these three traits (completely) arbitrarily, but through three years of studying the covariations of several hundred items first from previous scales supposedly measuring anything authoritarianism-related, and a bit later including items of his own invention. He then concluded that the items measuring submission, aggression, and conventionalism tended to covary, while items measuring other traits did not. It is no coincidence, that Altemeyer's way of reasoning is inductive: He had seen, that the previous researchers' attempts of approaching authoritarianism deductively had resulted in scales poor in internal consistency and psychometrical validity, and more importantly, theories lacking empirical justification (Altemeyer, 1981, p. 155, 170).

Unlike the Berkeley Research Team, which added and removed items to the F scale so that it would correlate as highly as possible with measures such as prejudice⁴, Altemeyer has replaced old items with new, less ambiguous ones only if a new item has covaried more strongly with the rest of the items on the scale. This replacing of items has been going on since 1973, and in the 2006 version, only two of the items that were in the first RWA scale from 1973 remain in their original wording (Altemeyer, 1981, p. 28, 1988, pp. 26–28, 2006, pp. 38–39).

I must point out, however, that Altemeyer's choice of items, on basis of which he first theorized authoritarianism to consist of the three traits listed above, was, at least to a

authoritarianism was mostly gathered 50 years ago, there are no implications that if repeated today, the findings would be entirely disproven.

⁴ This practice is without doubt ethically questionable, as the target here seems to have been to validate the theoretical statement that authoritarianism would be highly associated with prejudice, which is not exactly the case. There is some association, but it has never been very strong regardless of the scale used to measure authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981, p. 33).

certain extent, arbitrary. Altemeyer (1981, p. 18) lists the seven items⁵ with best discriminatory powers in accordance with Table 9 in chapter 7 of *The Authoritarian Personality* (Table 9 in chapter 5 in the 1982 edition; see Adorno et al., 1982, pp. 184–189). I have supplemented the list with the theoretical traits which each item is supposed, as well as their discriminatory powers (for the classification of items, see Adorno et al., 1982, p. 158–169; for the discriminatory powers, see *ibid.*, pp. 184–189):

- 1) Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse. (D.P. = 4.00; *aggression, sex*)
- 2) What the youth needs for most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country. (D.P. = 3.82; *aggression, power and toughness*)
- 3) There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents. (D.P. = 3.71; *aggression*)
- 4) Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question. (D.P. = 3.56; *submission, superstition and stereotypy*)
- 5) Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up, they ought to get over them and settle down. (D.P. = 3.38; *submission*)
- 6) Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn. (D.P. = 3.31; *conventionalism, submission*)
- 7) Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals, and ought to be severely punished. (D.P. = 3.31; *aggression, sex*) (Altemeyer, 1981, p. 18; Adorno et al., 1982, pp. 184–189).

What Altemeyer failed to bring up, however, is the fact that the discriminatory powers reported by The Berkeley Team did not dramatically drop after the seven most discriminating items he listed. The list looks rather different, if the items are presented in a bit less arbitrary way by choosing all items with discriminatory powers greater than the average (2.85) reported by The Berkeley Team (Adorno et al., 1982, p. 189):

- 8) Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around so much and mix together so freely, a person has to be especially careful to protect himself against infection and disease. (D.P. = 3.17; *projectivity*)
- 9) People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong. (D.P. = 3.17; *power and toughness*)

⁵ The fact that some of these items have, in one form or another, survived until the latest (2006) version of Altemeyer's RWA scale offers some evidence of these items' discriminatory power despite the problems of choosing these in the first place. Items 2 (discipline and determination), 4 (supernatural power), 5 (rebellious ideas), 6 (obedience), and 7 (homosexuality) still remain – in one form or another – in Altemeyer's most recent version of the RWA scale (see Altemeyer, 2006, pp. 11–12).

- 10) No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative. (D.P. = 3.16; *submission*)
- 11) Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things. (D.P. = 3.06; *superstition and stereotypy*)
- 12) Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private. (D.P. = 3.00; *anti-intracception, projectivity*)
- 13) If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off. (D.P. = 2.97; *conventionalism, aggression, anti-intracception*)
- 14) An insult to our honor should always be punished. (D.P. = 2.93; *aggression, power and toughness*)
- 15) Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people. (D.P. = 2.88; *aggression*) (Adorno et al., 1982, pp. 184–189).

This slightly less arbitrary way of choosing items with “the best discriminatory powers” suggests that there just might be more to authoritarianism than just submission, aggression, and conventionalism. In addition to most of the items measuring either conventionalism, aggression, or submission, there are items on this list theoretically tapping Anti-Intracception (items 12 and 13), Superstition and stereotypy (items 4 and 11), Power and toughness (items 2, 9 and 13), Projectivity (items 8 and 12) as well as Sex (items 1 and 7). This is not to state that The Berkeley theory would in any way empirically more valid than the more recent ones – quite the contrary. The most obvious element of uncertainty about these discriminatory powers is that they are calculated relative to the whole F scale. Keeping in mind the problems regarding its conceptual validity, the response set issue, and the poor quality of the data used by the Berkeley Team, it may be concluded that these items discriminate relatively well between high and low scorers on a scale of which there is no certainty on what it really measures. It is nevertheless reasonable to note that Altemeyer’s choice of conventionalism, submission, and aggression seems to have been arbitrary at least partly. Even though Altemeyer provided much better empirical evidence to support the three-trait model of authoritarianism than the Berkeley Team did on their theory, the division between the theorized dimensions of authoritarianism and related phenomena correlating with authoritarianism (such as religiousness, conservative sexual mores, stereotypical and categorical thinking etc.) remains somewhat arbitrary.

2.1.1 Characterizing people high and low in authoritarianism

One cannot figure out the broader personalities of the people scoring either low or high in the RWA scale by just looking at the items included in it. Based on his accumulated results, Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 2006) has provided descriptions of both typical “Highs” and “Lows”. It cannot be stressed enough, however, that these descriptions do not apply to individuals who have filled the survey form: Actually,

according to Altemeyer, even one's own responses and RWA scores (or scores on any other psychological test for that matter) are not accurate in diagnosing anything about an individual person. People always make errors when answering these scales, and the test-retest reliabilities lie somewhere around 90 percent, so people's scores are not perfectly stable. Scales such as RWA are accurate on the group level, however, as the "mean error" theoretically approaches zero, when the sample size increases (Altemeyer, 2006, p. 14). Furthermore, one does not have to be entirely coherent in their authoritarianism in order to be considered a "High" or a "Low". Human behavior is complicated, and there are always competing motives and preconceptions that shape people's responses and actions – let alone conscious reasoning and moral weighting of options. The descriptions below are thus only approximate, and every characterization will not hold true for every "High" or "Low" authoritarian.

Based on accumulated results until then, Altemeyer (1981) gives a description of "Highs":

The right-wing authoritarian believes authorities should be trusted to a relatively great extent, and that they are owed obedience and respect. He believes these are important virtues which children should be taught, and that if children stray from these principles it is the parents' duty to get them back in line. Authoritarians would ordinarily place very narrow limits on people's rights to criticize authorities. They tend to believe that officials know what is best, and that critics do not know what they are talking about. Criticism of authority is viewed as divisive and destructive, motivated by sinister goals and a desire to cause trouble.

The authoritarian does not ordinarily feel vulnerable to established authorities. On the contrary, he feels safer if authorities are strong. He supports government censorship in order to "control others," never imagining that the government would feel it necessary to censor what he reads, sees and hears. His reaction to electronic surveillance, unlawful search, and mail opening by officials is that only wrongdoers would object. To a considerable extent, he believes that established authorities have an inherent right to decide for themselves what they may do, including breaking the laws they make for the rest of us. (Altemeyer, 1981, p. 151)

"Lows", on the other hand, are described by Altemeyer (1988) in relation with "Highs" as follows:

Lows strike me as being fair-minded, evenheaded, tolerant, nonaggressive persons. Time and again they have indicated outrage at government injustices, regardless of the government's political stripes or the identity of its victims. They

do not maintain the double standards we find among Highs. Similarly, Lows have shown greater fairness in punishing criminals, being less swayed by who the criminal was than Highs are. They are more likely to make moral judgments on the basis of "individual principles of conscience" - - . They are not self-righteous; they do not feel superior to persons with opposing opinions. They are not mean-spirited.

I argue based on the content of these descriptions that the RWA scale ranges mostly from "liberal and open-minded" to "authoritarian" and "closed-minded". In the next sub-chapter, I shall present some other possibilities of what the RWA scale measures, though, as this matter is not particularly uncomplicated.

2.1.2 Limitations

The most obvious limitation, or rather a conceptual ambiguity in Altemeyer's conception of authoritarianism is the use of the term *right-wing* in an unusual way. Altemeyer recognizes this and elaborates the meaning: "Because the submission occurs to traditional authority, I call these followers rightwing authoritarians. I'm using the word 'right' in one of its earliest meanings, for in Old English 'riht' (pronounced 'writ') as an adjective meant lawful, proper, correct, doing what the authorities said" He further elaborates the unconventional use of the term "right-wing" stating that those North Americans most submitting to established authorities are mainly political conservatives, so they are "right-wingers" both in the psychological sense proposed by Altemeyer and in the more conventional political sense as well (Altemeyer, 2006, p. 9). This conceptualization of right-wing authoritarianism positions its logical counterpart, "left-wing authoritarianism", in a rather problematic way. Clearly this conception does not perform well, for example, countries ruled by Communists; there the people who most submit to the authorities, aggress against dissidents and are insisting on conventionality are political leftists, but still "psychologically" right-wing authoritarians. Altemeyer (1988) addresses this issue at some length. He states that "Behavioral scientists - - have usually meant something more involved, more dynamic, and psychologically more powerful by *authoritarian* than simple submission to *an* authority" and further argues that the most important question here is whether "the same kind of personality become a Communist *or* a Fascist - - but not a 'democrat'" (Altemeyer, 1988, p. 259). Altemeyer does admit that the level of "right-wing authoritarianism" of say, Communists, is relative to the political system they live in: American or Canadian Communists are not submissive to established authorities, favor free speech and other such freedoms; but in socialist countries they ought to be highly submissive, authoritarian, and thus only "figuratively" left-wingers (ibid., 260, 264). Consequently, Altemeyer emphasizes that the RWA Scale was created to measure fascist authoritarianism, which leads to that "authoritarian submission", for instance, means submission to

established authority instead of “preferred authority” (ibid., 262). This takes the theory into an extremely relativist place indeed.

Later, in his 1996 volume, Altemeyer attempts to measure “left-wing authoritarianism”, which he conceptualizes as “the covariation of three attitudinal clusters, which may be vaguely familiar”:

- 1) Authoritarian submission – a high degree of submission to authorities who are dedicated to overthrowing the established authorities in one’s society.
- 2) Authoritarian aggression – a general aggressiveness directed against the established authorities, or against persons who are perceived to support those authorities.
- 3) Conventionalism – a high degree of adherence to the norms of behavior perceived to be endorsed by the revolutionary authorities (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 219).

No later than at this point, it becomes clear that the division between “psychological right-wing” and “psychological left-wing” is completely arbitrary. It seems unreasonable to argue, that the type of authorities one is willing to submit to would somehow define their psychological properties, or that these properties might somehow drive “authoritarian-inclined” people to choose either an established or revolutionary set of authorities to submit to. It is also evident that the empirical measure proposed by Altemeyer measures “political”, instead of “psychological” left-wing authoritarianism, as many of the items included in the scale mention socialism or communism, as well as map the respondents’ preferences of leftist economic, and other policies (see Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 224–226). So, I maintain, that the division to right- and left-wing authoritarianism does not work, not at least in this particular form.

Altemeyer also claims, even in his most recent work, that right-wing authoritarianism is rather a personality trait, than a description of one’s political attitudes (Altemeyer, 2006, p. 9). Later research has posed criticism over this stance, and it seems that it might be more plausible to treat right-wing authoritarianism as something else than a personality trait. In a very strict sense, it has been argued, scales such as RWA measure only “attitude or value dimensions rather than personality” (Duckitt, 2015, p. 258). Also, the possibility of group- or system-specific authoritarianism discussed above would, in my view, contradict the standpoint that authoritarianism, in the “right-wing” or “reproduction of establishment” sense would indeed be a property of one’s personality. There is, however, room for compromise between these two “extreme” interpretations of the nature of authoritarianism. Duckitt (1989) views authoritarianism “in terms of normative beliefs - - and not as attitudes or values”

further elaborating that “[those] beliefs are given their most direct expression as prescriptive beliefs, that is, beliefs what people should do, how nonconformers should be treated, how one should react to leaders, and so forth” (Duckitt, 1989, p. 73). It could be argued that this approach might question the sensibility of measuring authoritarianism with the RWA scale, for instance, but according to Duckitt this is not the case: He argues, that these normative beliefs are also expressed in attitudes and values thus rendering possible the measurement of authoritarianism “purely as an attitudinal construct” (ibid.). This view is more crystallized in Duckitt’s later encyclopedia entry, where he argues that submission, aggression, and conventionalism all express “the motivational goal or value of group cohesion, articulated in attitudes favoring the subordination of individual autonomy and self-expression to group cohesion and authority” (Duckitt, 2015, p. 259). Thus, treating right-wing authoritarianism and the RWA scale as something else than a personality trait does not compromise the power of the theory, as the RWA scale manages to measure the phenomenon very well be it a personality trait or not. Furthermore, this approach makes it more sensible to speak of group-specific authoritarianism: it would be rather odd, if one’s personality were to depend on the group or political system, they are at a given time thinking about. Regardless of the scale doing its job rather well, its content is not without problems. Feldman (2003), for example, makes the rather obvious observation that the scale is politically biased, as many of the items have conservative content. This leads to unauthoritarian political conservatives receiving disproportionately high scores in the scale, as well as to an awkward conceptual obscurity regarding the distinction of authoritarianism from conservatism (Feldman, 2003, pp. 43–45).

The use of RWA scale outside North America also has its limitations. The scale could still be used, with some precautions, in other Western countries as well, but it might not perform as desired.⁶ The most illuminating example of the RWA Scale’s North America specificity is that submission to secular and religious authorities are so closely tied together in the scale. The same, in my understanding, holds true with conventionalism as well. I am not implying that conventional values in Europe, for instance, would not originate from religion – they most certainly do. Yet, I do argue, that Europeans do not express their conventional attitudes so much through religion as Americans, but rather understand conventionalism as an independent phenomenon. What this means in practice is that to my understanding most of those European (or at least Northern European) people, who swear by a very traditional conception of family and marriage do not justify this attitude primarily with the Bible’s teachings, but rather by tradition and morals at a more general level. This

⁶ J. Schneider, J. H. Duckitt, and J. J. Ray replicated some of Altemeyer’s research with the RWA scale in West Germany, South Africa, and Australia respectively in the years 1984 and 1985 receiving results similar to those of Altemeyer’s (see Altemeyer, 1988, pp. 13–14).

statement requires more evidence, though, and consequently should not be taken as a fact.

2.1.3 Possible solutions

Altemeyer (1996) recognizes, although belittles the problem of political bias of the RWA scale, as he proposes, that the scale might indeed actually measure conservatism in the way which laypeople understand it. He justifies this view by stating that “[a]lthough the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ carry enough common meaning that people can generally communicate with them, they also bring along enough confusion to make their use problematic”, and adds that the RWA scale should indeed be “our best current measure of the - - liberal-conservative dimension” in three ways: 1) “*Conceptually*, because we do have a fairly detailed definition of right-wing authoritarianism, which we do not have for liberalism and conservatism”; 2) “*Psychometrically*, because we have a measure of right-wing authoritarianism that has shown good internal consistency in every North American sample tested thus far (and in samples from other countries as well) - - “ and 3) “*Empirically*, because the measurements produced by the RWA scale correlate well, especially among politicians, with a wide range of attitudes, behaviors, and affiliations, that people commonly identify as liberal and conservative - - “ (Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 295–296). This might indeed be possible, as it is, in a society, largely the *existing structures* that conservatives are supposedly willing to “conserve”, that have partly authoritarian contents (e.g., prohibitions of same-sex marriage etc.); it is rare, at least in the western world, that new moral or religious restrictions would be imposed. Still, it seems a bit far-fetched to simply propose that the RWA scale measures conservatism, especially without providing extensive theoretical justifications for this stance.

Kreindler (2005) provides - partly unintentionally, it seems - some insightful ways to alleviate both the problems of arbitrary left-right division and the anti-conservative bias, as she questions whether authoritarianism really is “psychologically anything”, and instead argues that it is *politically reactionary* (Kreindler, 2005, p. 102). Even though this argument may seem trivial, it certainly has some advantages to it. Rendering authoritarianism as reactionary provides a solution for, or at least alleviates two of the problems discussed above: the counterintuitive idea of leftist authoritarians being psychologically right-wing, as well as the political bias of the RWA scale caused by the items containing conservative elements. If reactionism is defined “as a cluster concept that describes a complex political orientation, combining resentful affectivity with the forceful desire to return to the past” while acknowledging the agenda of reactionary parties often containing “the deployment of an idealized past and social order” (Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018, pp. 1272; 1284), the usefulness of placing authoritarianism in the realm of it becomes evident. Although left-wing reactionism is not a problem-free concept, it is much more so than an idea of “psychologically

right-wing leftwingers". Capelos and Katsanidou (2018) also write drawing on Robinson (2016), that "[a]lthough [leftist reactionaries] might not want to return to the past, they deploy memories and ideas from the past to articulate a particular kind of present and vision for the future" (Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018, p. 1273). This way, the idea of leftist reactionism can be used to further adjust the theory of authoritarianism.

As for the problem of the relationship between authoritarianism and conservatism, bringing reactionism into the picture is also most useful. Conservatism can be understood as being oriented toward supporting the *status quo* (Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018, p. 1273), as opposed to reactionism being directed towards a *status quo ante*, either real or idealized. This is not a fit-all solution to the problematic inclusion of conservatism as a de facto "trait" of authoritarianism, but in certain cases it might be very helpful. For example, if one has negative attitudes toward same-sex marriage, gender equality or immigration, they should not be taken as an authoritarian straight away: this should only be done if in this person's thinking there was also present a desire to return to a supposed past and say, criminalize homosexuality, make wives legally subservient to husbands, and put up an apartheid regime. To be fair, Altemeyer (2006) seems to have been trying to word the "conservative" items in his RWA scale in a reactionary, or at least provocative way in the spirit of measuring authoritarian aggression (see Altemeyer, 2006, pp. 11–12). Nevertheless, even when considering authoritarianism to be reactionary, we are left with the problem of coming up with suitable items to measure it. This would require drawing a line somewhere between conservatism and reactionism, as well as coming up with a way of determining with some level of certainty whether the respondents indeed desire to take away the freedoms of some people rather than just have a couple of negative attitudes along with an overall liberal orientation toward other people.⁷

In Kreindler's (2005) work, there is present also a further, perhaps a bit more surprising advantage of considering authoritarianism as a reactionary phenomenon. This approach seems to provide a means of tackling the problem of context-specific authoritarianism, which has been a shortcoming of several theories. According to Kreindler,

"Those who hold reactionary views in a particular context are most likely to engage in normative differentiation⁸ with respect to that context. For

⁷ The situation is further complicated by the way in which the term "conservative" is often used to label views or people that should rather be spoken of as reactionary. A will to "return to the ways of the good old times", for example, should not be taken as *conservative*, as it rejects the *status quo* while being oriented toward the *status quo ante*.

⁸ Defined by Kreindler (2005, p. 96) as "evaluating group members on the basis of their prototypicality regarding salient attributes".

convenience, we can call such differentiation ideological authoritarianism when it occurs in a societal context and contextual authoritarianism when it occurs in some other context. People who seek to preserve the social order and are hostile toward rebels can be described as ideologically authoritarian and will tend to score highly on the RWA scale whatever their economic opinions. On the other hand, people who do not submit to social authorities and conventions but do revere the leaders and rules of their own movement and attack its detractors can be described as contextually authoritarian. As Shils [1954] might have [sic] noted, neither contextual authoritarianism nor the tendency to decry the use of state power in one's own country but condone it in some other country could be identified by the RWA scale." (Kreindler, 2005, p. 102).

This does not help much if one has a task of measuring "general authoritarianism" or fascist potential, as a different scale would still be needed to measure it in the context of each individual group, or perhaps even each society. Still, Kreindler's idea of ideological authoritarianism can be, together with a couple of thoughts provided by Feldman (2003), used to challenge Altemeyer's rigid understanding of authoritarianism as submission to "established" rather than any "preferred authority". Feldman writes that "people who value social conformity should be strong supporters of the government, and, especially, the government's power to suppress nonconformity" and further elaborates this by noting, that "[s]uch people may not grant the government the right to take any action it wishes - - but they should be more likely than those who value autonomy to support the government when it wants to increase its control over social behavior and punish nonconformity" (Altemeyer, 1988, p. 262; Feldman, 2003, pp. 48-49).

Altemeyer's anti-relativist stance about the importance of submission to any established authority as the foundation of authoritarianism probably worked just fine in the temporal and spatial context in which it was originally developed and used: that is, North America (as well as, with certain limitations, other western countries) in the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, the governments probably wanted to "increase their control over social behavior and punish nonconformity" more than they do today. In other words, I find it plausible, that back then the governments in both North America and Western Europe provided some sort of response, at least a spiritual one, to the reactionaries wanting to punish nonconformity. As time has passed, the political atmosphere in the western world seems to have generally shifted into a more liberal, permissive, and egalitarian way, thus rendering these governments unsuitable targets for authoritarian submission. Of course, it is common knowledge that this development has either stopped or reversed in certain countries, such as Hungary and Turkey, where the governments indeed seem to be providing response to and inciting reactionary views of the state of society. The fact that no government is either totally

reactionary or totally liberal somewhat complicates this. For example, the Finnish government, whose general outlook in social issues is liberal and permissive, does have a somewhat negative stance toward certain deviants, such as drug users: the government certainly wants to punish nonconformity in this respect. This is also something that reactionary people, or authoritarians, should by all reason be happy about, even though they might not accept the actions of their liberal government in most cases. To conclude, Altemeyer's conception of authoritarianism as submission to established authorities should work perfectly fine in countries where the governments are at least somewhat reactionary, but it would be problematic in countries with relatively more liberal atmospheres. This is also further complicated by that most governments fall between these two categories.

2.2 A suggested conceptualization

As it has become clear that the artificial division of authoritarianism to "psychologically" left- and right-wing types is not very well aligned with reality, it seems justified to propose some modifications to Altemeyer's otherwise empirically sound conceptualization. Considering Kreindler's (2005) and Feldman's (2003) arguments, as well as the problem with submission to different "types" of governments or other authorities⁹ pose to this, I propose the following, slightly modified conceptualization of authoritarian orientation:

- 1) Authoritarian submission – a high degree of submission to any set(s) of authorities, established or not, which endorse reactionary, or in some cases conservative policies, with the aim of forcing people into socially agreeable dispositions;
- 2) Authoritarian aggression – a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, quarters, or instances, who promote a tolerant outlook toward people from diverse backgrounds; and
- 3) Conventionalism – a high degree of adherence to the social conventions which either exist now, existed in the past, or are supposed to have existed in an idealized past, and which are further perceived to be endorsed by the object of submission.

⁹ It is different to submit to the governments in Finland and Sweden, which mainly promote liberal values and do not generally try to force people into socially agreeable dispositions on the one hand, and the Hungarian and Polish governments, which to a certain extent do, on the other. In countries such as Finland and Sweden, the "authoritarian" option would be to either generally oppose the established authorities, or perhaps submit to anti-democratic authorities, such as Anu Turtiainen's "Power belongs to the people" group, whereas in countries with more conservative governments, it would be rather "authoritarian" to support them, and "anti-authoritarian" to find some anti-government groups to submit to (provided that they are not anti-democratic as well).

This model, although arguably a bit vaguer than Altemeyer's, has the advantage of ignoring whether the authorities in question are established or not. I argue that it is not authoritarian to submit to established authorities, if they are remarkably anti-authoritarian; instead, while evaluating the relative authoritarianism of people one should acknowledge the authoritarianism of the object of their submission.

I have also proposed a modification to the role of the objects of authoritarian aggression. This conceptualization no longer assumes that these groups would somehow be "perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities", or by any authorities for that matter. Instead, I argue that the objects of aggression can be either any people or groups that the aggressor maintains are living in an indecent way (e.g., sexual or gender minorities, people from different ethnic backgrounds, drug addicts, etc.), or any such quarters that promote a tolerant and inclusive outlook towards some of all of these groups.

In addition to these modifications, I have proposed a clarification to the "Conventionalism" cluster. It is rather obvious, that Altemeyer's argument about authoritarian people adhering to "the social conventions which are perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authorities" has not kept up with time very well, as the conventions which most of modern authorities endorse are arguably much more liberal than those endorsed by the authorities of the past. Generally, the authorities in modern liberal democracies promote inclusive and tolerant outlooks toward minorities. Thus, I argue, it is sensible to include a reactionary element in this cluster.

3. DATA

The data which I have chosen for this thesis is The European Values Study 2017 integrated dataset. According to the European Values Study Website, “The European Values Study is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on basic human values. It provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values, and opinions of citizens all over Europe. It is a unique research project on how Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, politics, and society.” (EVS, 2022a). The research project has been “financially supported by universities and research institutes, national science foundations, charitable trusts and foundations, companies and church organizations in the EVS member countries” (EVS, 2020b, p. 7).

In order to make the data as commensurable and statistically representative as possible, the EVS Methodology Group has set some standards regarding, among other things, sampling procedures and translation of questionnaires. According to the EVS Methodological Guidelines Document (EVS, 2020b), it has been expected that each participating country employs a probabilistic sampling strategy: single stage sampling has been preferred, but carefully conducted multistage sampling has also been deemed acceptable. Furthermore, the effective sample sizes have been set 1200 for countries with a population higher than two million, and 1000 for those with less than that (EVS, 2020b, pp. 8–9).

The EVS integrated dataset consists of 56491 responses from 34 European and Asian countries. The response rates for the interviewer-administered surveys in each country ranged from 21.2% (Sweden) to 85.9% (Ukraine), and those of the self-administered surveys from 10.2% (Latvia) to 80.9% (Netherlands). The complete listing of the response rates for each EVS country is provided in the EVS 2017 Method Report (EVS, 2022b, pp. 53–54). 44,7% of the respondents are males, while 55,3% are females. A total of 26 respondents have not reported their gender. The number of responses from each country ranges from 1003 (Montenegro) to 3362 (Denmark). It is obvious, even after considering these numbers alone, that although having satisfactory sample sizes the data is not totally statistically representative. Females are over-represented, which is rather typical for survey-type datasets. The gender distribution is most unbalanced among Eastern European respondents: countries with less than 40 percent of male respondents include Albania, Czechia, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, and Slovakia. The only countries in which there are more male than female respondents are Italy and Germany – and in both these countries, males outnumber females by mere 0,4 percentage points. In addition to the male gender, other generally well-known predictors of high nonresponse rates in surveys are, among others, young age, low education level, and being single. When nonresponse rates are not random

(i.e., independent of say, sociodemographic characteristics), they can lead to biased estimations (see e.g., Reyes, 2020, pp. S98–S99).

Assessing every possible predictor of nonresponse from every single country included in the dataset manually would be, although technically possible, very time-consuming, and would require a disproportionate amount of space. Luckily enough, the research teams in individual participating countries have, under the supervision of the EVS Methodology group, done this already by including several weighting variables in the dataset. These include calibration (gweight), design (dweight), and population size weights (pweight). The EVS Methodology group advises that one should use either gweight or dweight in single-country analyses as well as in country comparisons without combined statistics, and either of these together with pweight (i.e., the product of pweight and gweight or dweight) in country comparisons with combined statistics (EVS, 2020c, pp. 4–8). As dweight is only available for a limited number of countries, I shall use either gweight, or the product of gweight and pweight, in my analyses wherever applicable. I will also report the weights used in each individual analysis. What the use of these weighting variables means in practice is that the weight, or influence, of each individual respondent is either reduced or increased based on their age, gender, educational level, and region in the case of gweight, and further scaled in accordance with each country's population in order to avoid small countries being over-represented, in the case of pweight.

As one of my goals regarding this thesis is to understand the way in which the individual states' performance in different areas of democracy and civil rights is connected to the authoritarianism of said states' residents, I have supplemented the dataset with a few indices, most notably the Fragile States Index published by The Fund for Peace (2021). I will cover these at greater length in Chapter 4.2.

3.1. Limitations of the EVS data

As the dataset consists of observations from 34 different countries, and as in all these there have been many people involved with the data collection, there might be both human errors and perhaps even some intentional distortions in the dataset. I do generally assume, however, that the data itself is mostly unflawed, as there most probably have not been any chances for individual data collectors to gain any personal benefits from misrepresenting the data. A more serious problem might be the comparability of data between different countries, especially the democratic and autocratic ones. Even though there are no implications of, for example, violations of the respondents' anonymity in any country, it is not a given that the respondents have been trusting of the data collectors' promises about this. There is a major possibility that many people have not answered truthfully about certain things, such as their

political views or perhaps even personal background information in countries in which the authorities are generally intolerant of dissidence. This might indeed partially compromise the trustworthiness of the analyses regarding certain countries, but as the data is mostly from countries in which there is no extreme intolerance of dissidence present, the situation is by no means hopeless. What this results in, though, is that any numbers and coefficients calculated with the whole dataset as well as those from individual autocracies such as Belarus or Azerbaijan should not be taken as “absolutely true” or representative, but as indicators of “direction” of say, an observed association between two variables. If a positive correlation were to be observed between, for example, age and religiousness of the respondents, there are no implications that this would not be the case. The uncertainty does not lie in the “positiveness”, or direction of the association, but in its strength: in reality, the value of the coefficient might be somewhat greater or less, than what is indicated by the dataset.

There are also other factors which might affect the comparability of the data in different countries, such as the possible effect of translating the questions to different countries, as well as differences in self-selection biases among the respondents in different countries (although the latter can be, to some extent, alleviated by the use of weights). As these are such possibilities which are generally very well known among statisticians and other people who participate in data collection and survey design, I content myself with assuming that in the big picture, this does not pose too great of a problem. Thus, it should indeed be (mostly) safe to use this dataset in researching authoritarianism.

4. METHODS, MEASURES, AND INDICES

In order to gain understanding about the movements of masses as well as about any possible regularities present in these movements, we need to assess the demographics and attitudes of these large bodies of people. To achieve this, the use of quantitative data and research methods is required: Even though qualitative interviews and text analyses would undoubtedly provide us with a better view of all possible ways of thinking, reacting or acting relative to certain events (let alone said events themselves), the use of these methods would not make it possible to state anything about the universality of these findings, not to mention comparing these regularities in different countries. In the best possible scenario, one would, of course, use both qualitative and quantitative data. Unfortunately, there are – to my knowledge – no pre-collected and published interview data which would allow researching authoritarianism, and due to the extremely limited nature of resources available for this sort of thesis, it has not been possible to collect any material of acceptable quality and extent. Consequently, I shall exclusively use quantitative data in this thesis.

Notwithstanding the reflection above, the choice of methods is, of course, mostly defined by the type of data (which is, in turn, defined by the research questions). As the nature of the data I am using is quantitative (statistical), the research methods applied to it must be quantitative as well. Quantitative research, and consequently the research methods as well, generally fall into three categories: descriptive, correlational (“connection-observing”), and explanatory. The first category consists of methods which are used to describe the data, such as presenting frequencies and percentages, as well as simple graphical illustrations of the value distributions of individual variables. The second category includes methods such as the correlation analysis, and the one-way analysis of variances (ANOVA). The purpose of these methods is to provide a means to observe the direction and strength of associations between individual variables: In correlation analysis the goal is to observe a linear association between two continuous variables, whereas the one-way analysis of variances is used to observe the effect which a categorical variable supposedly has on a continuous one.

Simply reporting associations observed between variables is usually inadequate when one seeks to understand their subject of research, however, and thus it is most often sensible to take the research to the explanatory level. The most important characteristic of explanatory level analysis is the inclusion of theoretical assumptions about the reasons why certain associations exist between variables, the direction of the causality regarding said associations, as well as whether the associations are real to begin with, or if one has just observed “quasi associations” (see Jokivuori & Hietala, 2015, esp. pp. 14–15). Most research methods residing in this category are multivariate ones, examples of which include but are not limited to linear and logistic regression analyses, two-way analysis of variance, as well as the Multiple Classification Analysis

(MCA) which is the primary multivariate method I shall use in this thesis. The MCA combines elements from ANOVA and regression analysis, and it is used to simultaneously observe the effects that several independent variables have on a dependent variable. Like most multivariate methods, the MCA has also been embedded with the practice of elaboration: while calculating the effects of a given independent variable, all the other variables in the model are controlled for. What makes the MCA special, however, is the fact that it reports both the uncontrolled and controlled effects of each independent variable, which makes it possible to observe the differences which occur in these effects when controlling the other variables (On MCA, see Jokivuori & Hietala, 2015, pp. 109–112).

In addition to the MCA, I shall employ another multivariate method, or rather a way of using a variety of methods a bit more creatively than usual: the contextual analysis. As Jokivuori and Hietala (2015) write, the idea of contextual analysis is to acknowledge the effect of community-level variables, when analyzing individual-level phenomena (Jokivuori & Hietala, 2015, p. 136–138). I shall use this method explicitly in Chapter 5, but the broader approach of observing the effects of community-level variables is present in the whole empirical section of this thesis, as *the country of residence* can be seen as this sort of a variable.

Every analysis reported in this thesis, unless otherwise specified, has been run with the statistics software IBM SPSS 28, for which I have purchased a license via the University of Jyväskylä Digital Services. I have also provided a brief technical index in Appendix I, which can be consulted for interpretations of various statistical concepts present in this thesis.

4.1 Constructing a scale measuring Authoritarian Orientation

As authoritarianism has not been measured in the EVS dataset in any direct way such as the RWA scale, it was necessary to construct a scale indirectly. I have done this in various steps, the technicalities of which along with all the variables included in the scale are reported in greater detail in Appendix II.

The alpha reliability of these recoded 30 items is .783, which is not extremely high, but still completely acceptable. The mean interitem correlation is .112 – rather low, but still there.¹⁰ These results as well as the adequate theoretical foundation support the

¹⁰ The reader might recall from Chapter 2, that the Berkeley Research Team reported a mean interitem correlation of .13 for the F scale. Even though the coefficient is greater, the “true” mean interitem correlation of the F scale items is still most probably lower than this one. This is due to the fact that the F scale was not balanced against response sets, but the scale of my construction is, although not perfectly so. In my scale, 17 of the items are worded so that agreeing implies more authoritarianism, while 13 are the other way around. This undoubtedly lowers the mean interitem correlation of the scale.

construction of a sum variable consisting of all these items, which tap mostly conventionalism (15/30), authoritarian submission (10/30), and expressions of openly antidemocratic attitudes (8/30). Only two of the items seem to measure authoritarian aggression, which is undeniably a shortcoming regarding the conceptual validity of the scale. It should be noted, though, that aggression has slightly less representation than submission and conventionalism in Altemeyer's RWA items as well. Furthermore, it might be argued, that whereas conventionalism and submission can be rather reliably measured by surveying attitudes, aggression is more dependent of specific circumstances, and thus a bit more problematic to map.

The Authoritarianism sum variable ranges from 0 to 51 with the mean of 26.56 and standard deviation of 8.47. The median score is 27, along with Q1 equaling 21, and Q3 equaling 33. The observations are distributed roughly normally but the scale is slightly skewed to the left, which can be seen in Figure 1. The scale's normality is also verifiable numerally, the coefficients for skewness and kurtosis being $-.364$ and $-.369$ respectively. As both these values are within the range of $-.50$ and $.50$, the scale is indeed considered normally distributed. This is important regarding later analyses performed with the scale, as normality of the dependent variable is required for many statistical methods to work correctly.




Figure 1: The distribution of Authoritarianism (weighted by product of gweight and pweight)

There is substantial variation in both the mean levels and standard deviations of authoritarianism in different countries, as is shown in Table 1. Sweden has the lowest

mean authoritarianism of 18.56 followed by Denmark with 18.59, whereas Georgia and Romania score the highest with means of 35.15 and 32.80 respectively. The general tendency seems to be that Eastern European people score somewhat higher than their Western and Northern neighbors. The standard deviations are also slightly lower in East than in the West, reaching as low as 4.44 in Azerbaijan and 4.49 in Armenia, which means that there is less variation between respondents' answers in these countries. It is also noteworthy that all the standard deviations save that of Spain are lower than the standard deviation calculated with the whole dataset (8.47). To conclude, these parameters suggest that the country of residence (or perhaps the cultural environment for that matter) affects the levels of authoritarianism of its residents, and more importantly, also has a tendency of slightly shrinking the variation thereof.

Table 1: Authoritarianism in different countries

Country	Mean	N	SD	Country	Mean	N	SD
Albania	30.60	1454	5.01	Iceland	18.77	1633	6.82
Armenia	33.49	1501	4.49	Italy	25.22	2282	7.67
Austria	20.63	1651	8.13	Lithuania	27.20	1453	5.61
Azerbaijan	30.97	1817	4.44	Netherlands	21.97	2409	7.61
Belarus	32.14	1548	6.14	North Macedonia	30.59	1118	7.33
Bosnia and Herzegovina	31.12	1735	6.34	Montenegro	32.51	1004	4.95
Bulgaria	31.09	1566	5.38	Norway	19.45	1123	6.62
Croatia	29.25	1493	8.14	Poland	29.65	1352	7.36
Czechia	27.01	1829	6.44	Portugal	28.38	1217	6.96
Denmark	18.59	3369	6.41	Romania	32.80	1616	5.75
Estonia	27.04	1304	6.55	Russia	32.08	1838	5.64
Finland	22.29	1220	7.63	Serbia	31.44	1520	6.65
France	24.44	1880	8.34	Slovakia	28.22	1436	6.27
Georgia	35.15	2212	5.41	Slovenia	24.31	1080	7.26
Germany	20.49	2178	7.61	Spain	22.28	1210	8.57
Great Britain	24.48	1794	7.97	Sweden	18.56	1198	6.66
Hungary	27.90	1519	7.16	Switzerland	20.59	3174	7.83

Note: Results weighted by gweight.

4.2 Evaluating the validity of the scale

Even though the normality of the scale as well as its means differing from country to country can be considered as indicators of validity, they are by no means sufficient proof of it. Therefore, I have gathered some findings about the correlates and dynamics of personal authoritarianism reported by Altemeyer (1981, 1988), which can be used to test whether my authoritarianism scale behaves similarly to that of his.¹¹

¹¹ All of the analyses reported in this subchapter have been, unless otherwise specified, weighted by the product of gweight and pweight.

1) *People who support conservative parties score higher on Personal Authoritarianism than liberals, and the relationship is stronger among people more interested in politics (Altemeyer, 1981, p. 222)*

Although the respondents have been asked about their party preferences, these parties have not been classified liberal or conservative. The data does, however, include a variable in which the parties have been placed onto a left-right scale: according to the EVS 2017 Variable Report, “country-specific categories have been recoded according to the placement of national political parties on a left-right scale as delivered by country” (EVS, 2020d, p. 20). The correlations between authoritarianism and the left-right alignment of the respondents’ preferred political parties are presented in Table 2. All the correlations are positive, and statistically significant at the .001 level. This means that respondents preferring right-wing parties tend to be more authoritarian, and vice versa. The association between authoritarianism and the left-right alignment of preferred political parties is stronger among those respondents more interested in politics. Hence, the scale performs as expected with respect to both the party choice and the effect that interest in politics has to this relationship.

Table 2: Correlations between Authoritarianism and the left-right alignment of preferred political party in the classes of interest in politics

	INTEREST IN POLITICS				
	Total	Not at all interested	Not very interested	Somewhat interested	Very interested
Correlation between Authoritarianism and the left-right alignment of preferred political party (r/sig)	.230***	.154***	.171***	.236***	.330***
N	37898 ¹²	5928	11346	14539	5959

Notes: Pearson correlations. Results weighted by product of gweight and pweight. Sig *** p < .001.

¹² More than 30 percent of the respondents has not answered on the question about their preferred political parties. It is no surprise that in every country there are people who cannot decide between parties or are not interested in politics altogether. This would not be a problem if the percentage of people not answering the question were roughly equal in every country. There is, however, considerable regularity in these percentages. The percentages of respondents with missing data are greater in countries which either are at present considered autocratic, such as Belarus and Azerbaijan (70,3 and 55,1 percent respectively), or have recent autocratic history, such as most ex-socialist countries as well as Spain and Portugal (40,4 and 47,7 percent missing respectively). In these countries, a substantial number of people are probably either afraid, or otherwise feel uncomfortable to express their party preferences even to researchers. In addition to the humanely unfortunate nature of this situation, this also might have some consequences regarding the validity of this individual analysis. Still, as the overall number of valid observations is rather high, there is little reason to expect that the results would be significantly altered were there more people willing to express their party preferences.

2) *The internal consistency of the items included in the scale grows relatively to interest of politics (derived from Altemeyer reporting extremely high Alpha Reliabilities among legislators: Altemeyer, 1988, p. 243; Altemeyer, 2006, note 4, p. 216)*

As I mentioned earlier, the alpha reliability of the items included in my Authoritarianism scale is .783 when calculated with the whole dataset. When the reliability analysis is run individually in each of the groups of “political interestedness”, the scale indeed performs as anticipated in this regard as well: the Cronbach’s alphas for groups of respondents reporting being not at all, not very, somewhat, and very interested in politics are .693, .750, .790 and .826 respectively. Altemeyer (1988) interpreted the extremely high alphas among legislators so that authoritarianism tends to form an ideology among politicians, who are arguably more interested and knowledgeable in political matters than the general public (Altemeyer, 1988, p. 243). This should, by all reason, hold true for “ordinary” people as well: the more interested and aware people are about politics, the more consistent they should be in their authoritarianism. It seems, that this is indeed the case.

3) *Authoritarian people are more prejudiced towards minorities (Altemeyer, 1981, p. 238–239)*

There are several items included in the dataset, which map whether the respondents would mind having people of certain minority groups as neighbors. Using five of these items¹³, I have constructed a measure of prejudice, which is positively correlated with authoritarianism ($r = .339, p < .001$). Once again, the scale behaves as expected.

4) *Authoritarian people both accept the teachings of their childhood religions to a greater extent than others, and are more religious in general (Altemeyer, 1981, pp. 239–240)*

There is no direct measure of “the level of religiousness” of people in the dataset, but this area of life has been surveyed by a few items. First, the respondents have been asked whether they consider themselves “a religious person”, “not a religious person”, or “a convinced atheist”. The mean levels of authoritarianism are the greatest among religious people (28.94), lowest among atheists (20.40), while the “non-religious people” fall in between (23.36). I confirmed this finding with an Analysis of Variances (ANOVA) with multiple comparisons (Tukey HSD), which suggests that all these means differ from each other at the .001 level ($df = 2, F = 4412.81, p < .001$).

¹³ These being: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you identify any that you would not like to have as neighbours?” 1) people of a different race, 2) immigrants/foreign workers, 3) homosexuals, 4) Christians (optional in countries with Christian majority), 5) Muslim (optional in countries with Muslim majority).

The respondents were also asked about how often they attend religious services apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings/baptisms. The general direction is as expected: among the people attending religious services more often, authoritarianism levels are higher. There is one slight exception in this, as the people who report attending *less often than once a year* have a slightly higher mean authoritarianism (26.60), than those who report attending *once a year* (25.70). Nevertheless, those who report attending *never [or] practically never* have the lowest mean (24.05). An ANOVA with multiple comparisons (Tukey HSD) once again suggests that all these differences are statistically significant at the .001 level, save for the difference between the people who report attending *once a month* and *only on specific holy days*, which is statistically significant at the .01 level ($df = 6, F = 782.14, p < .001$).

The notion about authoritarians accepting the teachings of their childhood religions more than antiauthoritarians is a bit trickier to test with this dataset, as there is no such variable included. The respondents who have reported not belonging to any religious denominations have been asked, however, whether they have belonged to one in the past. Even though a positive answer in this question does not necessarily mean that the respondent would have abandoned the teachings of their childhood religion in particular, it still seems reasonable to assume that most of these people have resigned from that, rather than from some other religion that they might have joined later in life. The results indicate that people who have left a religious denomination are indeed less authoritarian than average: their mean score is 20.64, whereas the mean of those who have never belonged to any is 26.26.¹⁴ I conducted an ANOVA to confirm the statistical significance of this difference ($df = 1, F = 2013.68, p < .001$). Although these religion-related results are a bit less convincing than the previous ones, it still seems that the scale is behaving mostly similarly to that of Altemeyer's.

5) *A higher level of formal education is associated with lower authoritarianism, as well as a higher internal consistency of the items, i.e., a higher alpha reliability (Altemeyer, 1981, pp. 242–243)*

The respondents' level of education has been reported in a variety of forms, the most commensurable of which seems to be the three-level version: each respondent has been given a value of either low, medium, or high. The people with a "low" education level have mean authoritarianism of 29.32, those with "medium" have 26.11, and people with "high" education level have a mean of 23.35. The respective alpha reliabilities in these groups are .714, .765, and .810. These findings are in line with Altemeyer's, and the scale continues to perform as expected.

¹⁴ As we recall from Figure 1 in Chapter 4.1., the (weighted) mean of authoritarianism in the dataset is 26.56, extremely close to this value.

6) *Authoritarian people should support electronic surveillance and mail-opening by officials more than others* (Altemeyer, 1981, p. 151; 2006, p. 18)

There are three variables in the dataset measuring government surveillance measures: The respondents have been asked whether they approve of their own government keeping people under video surveillance in public areas, monitoring their emails and other information they exchange over the internet, or collecting information about them without their knowledge. The alpha reliability of these three items is .726. After recoding each of these items so that a greater value indicates greater acceptance, I constructed a mean aggregated sum variable titled "Acceptance of government surveillance measures". The correlation between this variable and authoritarianism is, although positive and statistically significant at the .001 level, rather modest ($r = .117$, $p < .001$). When this analysis is run separately for groups of countries with relatively low, medium, or high mean levels of personal authoritarianism (each group consisting of roughly 1/3 of the participating countries), it becomes evident that the scale seems to perform best in countries with relatively low mean authoritarianism levels: The correlation between authoritarianism and acceptance of government surveillance measures in this group is .257, whereas in countries with relatively high mean levels of authoritarianism it is .118. The scale seems to perform the worst in the countries which fall between these categories: in this group, the correlation is basically nonexistent, .073. All these correlations are nevertheless statistically significant at the .001 level.

Suspecting that the population size weight might interfere with the results, I ran the analyses a second time with only weighting the data by gweight. This time, the scale performed more consistently: the correlations between authoritarianism and acceptance of government surveillance measures were .235 for the "low", .115 for the "medium", and .140 for the "high" group. Curiously enough, the correlation between the two scales calculated with the whole data dropped to .108. All the correlations were, once again, significant at the .001 level.

Even though the directions of all correlations reported above are positive and statistically significant, I am hesitant to draw conclusions about the scale's performance on this regard. It seems, that the scale performs as expected in countries with relatively low means of authoritarianism, which is consoling: these are supposedly the countries, into the conditions of which most scales measuring personal authoritarianism have been designed. So, one might conclude that my scale indeed works as it is supposed to. Yet, I cannot help but mention that making such an incautious claim might contain some risks: I find it probable, that the countries falling in between the extremes are more in danger to eventually turn authoritarian, than the countries which have lower means. If the scale indeed performs worse in these

countries, it might not be a strong enough instrument to recognize “potential fascists” from the general population. Naturally, this sort of scale cannot be expected to perform equally well in a large selection of countries with different cultures and histories, so the deviation is not entirely unexpected. While this setback does not render the scale unusable, it is still clear that some caution must be taken while interpreting the results, especially those concerning single countries.

4.3.1 Further considerations of the scale’s internal consistency

To examine how the scale performs in countries with different mean levels in the scale, I decided to run the reliability analysis separately to countries which have relatively low, medium, or high mean levels in the scale. The consistency seems to go down, as the mean of authoritarianism rises: the Cronbach’s alphas for countries with low, medium, and high means are .755, .709 and .541 respectively. This finding clearly requires some further inspection, and it seems reasonable to examine the internal consistencies of the scale in each country separately.

The internal consistencies (Cronbach’s alphas) of the authoritarianism scale items in different countries are presented in Table 3. The deviation in these reliabilities between implies that the scale does not perform equally well in every country. As the minimum level of “acceptable” alphas is most often considered either .600, or sometimes .500 (see Jokivuori & Hietala, 2015, p. 78), it is clear that at least in Armenia, Montenegro, and Azerbaijan the scale does not work well. Furthermore, there are a total of 11 countries in which the alphas are less than .600 – all of these being located in either Eastern Europe or Asia.

I also constructed a separate dataset consisting only of the countries’ means, standard deviations and Cronbach’s alphas of authoritarianism, and ran a correlation analysis with this dataset. Turns out, that both the mean level and standard deviation of authoritarianism are strongly correlated with the alpha coefficient: the correlations are -.668 and .918 respectively, both significant at the .001 level.¹⁵ Unfortunate as it is, this finding provides empirical evidence to the theoretical problem of North America, or in this case, Western Countries specificity of Authoritarianism scales which I mentioned in Chapter 2.1.2. Even though there undoubtedly exists some form of personal authoritarianism outside the Western cultural sphere, it is most likely not organized in this “Altemeyerian” way. As the internal consistency of the scale is either adequate or almost so in most countries, and more importantly so in the whole

¹⁵ The relationship between the standard deviation of the scale and the scale’s items’ internal consistency is rather intuitive. As most of the respondents in countries with low internal consistency are stacked around the (relatively high) means of said countries, the scale most definitely does not discriminate well between people of low and high authoritarianism there. (For instance, the means of authoritarianism in Armenia, Montenegro, and Azerbaijan are greater than 30, while the standard deviations are less than 5; see Table 1).

dataset, I conclude that despite this setback, the scale can be used – with some caution – in further analyses.

Table 3: Countries organized by the internal consistency of authoritarianism

Country	Cronbach's alpha	Country	Cronbach's alpha
Armenia	.289	Hungary	.711
Montenegro	.326	Norway	.715
Azerbaijan	.345	Sweden	.715
Bulgaria	.507	Slovenia	.728
Romania	.517	Italy	.730
Albania	.545	Poland	.752
Georgia	.554	Iceland	.755
Lithuania	.559	Netherlands	.755
Russia	.566	North Macedonia	.755
Slovakia	.583	Great Britain	.758
Bosnia and Herzegovina	.583	Finland	.766
Czechia	.624	Germany	.774
Serbia	.630	France	.777
Belarus	.681	Switzerland	.777
Denmark	.681	Spain	.778
Portugal	.684	Croatia	.779
Estonia	.695	Austria	.788

Note: Results weighted by gweight.

4.3 Supplementing indices

As I mentioned earlier, I have supplemented the EVS 2017 dataset with some indices, with the help of which I hope to be able to illuminate the relationship that I have hypothesized to exist between the state of democracy and civil rights in different countries on the one hand, and personal authoritarianism of said countries' inhabitants, on the other. There are multiple different indices measuring the performance in democracy and civil rights, the content of which seems suitable for my purposes. As randomly picking one index and conducting all the analyses with that might not lead to the most desirable of outcomes, I have picked six indices from four different institutions: The *Political Rights* and *Civil Liberty Rights* indices published by the Freedom House, the *Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism* and *Voice and Accountability* indices by World Bank, the *Fragile States Index* by The Fund for Peace, as well as the *Democracy Index* by Economist Intelligence. I have used the 2017 versions of all these indices, so that the information would be from the same year as most of the dataset itself. Next, I shall present how each of these indices is connected to my authoritarianism scale.

I have manually imputed the values of each index into the dataset by recoding the "country" variable five different times accordingly. This means, that for any given

index, all the respondents from a single country have received the same value: For example, every respondent living in Germany has received the value 56 in the Civil Liberty Rights index, and 39 in the Political Rights one. This limits the use of these indices to cross-country comparisons only. The complete listing of the values in each index by country is reported in Appendix III.

The correlations between authoritarianism and the six indices are presented in Table 4. Every index is rather strongly correlated with authoritarianism, which indicates that the levels of democracy and civil rights in any given country indeed affect the personal authoritarianism of said country's inhabitants. Yet, these correlations are by no means sufficient evidence for this interpretation, as the relationships might have been, either partially or completely, caused by some third factors – a possibility which I shall examine further in Chapter 5.

It is also evident in Table 4 that the indices are extremely strongly correlated with each other. This is not too surprising, as it is common that countries scoring well in some indices also tend to do so in others – and vice versa (see e.g., Metsälä, Nyyssönen, & Pitkänen, 2021). Furthermore, these indices are not completely independent of each other: For example, the World Bank *Voice and Accountability* index contains information from the Freedom House *Political Rights* and *Civil Liberty Rights* indices (see *Worldwide Governance Indicators*, 2020b). It is nevertheless reasonable to conclude that each of these indices essentially measure the same thing, which is the countries' overall performance in several walks of political and social life, most notably democracy.

Table 4: Correlations between authoritarianism and several indices¹⁶

	Authoritarianism	Fragile States Index	Political Rights	Civil Liberty Rights	Political Stability	Voice and Accountability	Democracy Index
Authoritarianism	1						
Fragile States Index	.482***	1					
Political Rights	-.417***	-.945***	1				
Civil Liberty Rights	-.429***	-.948***	.995***	1			
Political Stability	-.413***	-.914***	.889***	.912***	1		
Voice and Acc.	-.459***	-.972***	.983***	.985***	.900***	1	
Democracy Index	-.472***	-.965***	.964***	.978***	.896***	.993***	1

Notes: N = 55431. Pearson correlations. Results weighted by product of gweight and pweight. Sig *** p < .001.

¹⁶ I double checked these correlations by running the analysis also by weighting the data only with gweight, as well as not weighting the data at all. The correlations were practically equal to those reported here, although the correlation between Fragile States Index and Authoritarianism was greater in both settings (r = .546, p < .001 when weighted by gweight, and r = .542, p < .001 when unweighted).

As many statistical methods do not allow multicollinearity among independent variables (i.e., they must be independent from each other), I must decide on only using one of these indices. The Fragile States Index seems to be the best option, as its association with authoritarianism is the highest. This is most probably explained by the fact that this index seems to tap more areas of countries' political, social, and economic performance than the other ones. In addition to its seeming empirical strength, the use of Fragile States Index in measuring democracy can also be conceptually justified: For example, Freedon (2017) argues, that the concept of democracy includes "both logically and in actual use" the concepts of liberty, equality, community, participation, and accountability (Freedon, 2017, p. 122). These are, as reported by the "Indicators" section of the Fragile States Index homepage, indeed some of the properties in political atmospheres that the Fragile States Index measures (see The Fund for Peace, 2018).

5. AUTHORITARIANISM, COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE, AND DEMOCRACY

As I wrote in Chapter 4.1., there seems to be evidence that the country of residence tends to homogenize the levels of authoritarianism of its inhabitants. It is not possible, however, to find out anything about the strength of this homogenizing effect by simply observing means and standard deviations of the variable in each country – instead, running a form of contextual analysis is required. In this case, this is most reasonably done by examining the so-called intraclass correlation (ICC), which indicates whether a group membership (i.e., the country of residence) homogenizes the members' (i.e., residents') attitudes regarding any given phenomenon (Jokivuori & Hietala, 2015, pp. 138–140).¹⁷

First, we should check whether the differences in the means of authoritarianism between countries reported in Chapter 4.1. are statistically significant – i.e., whether it is sensible to conduct further contextual analyses in the first place. This can be tested by running an ANOVA, which indicates that this indeed is the case ($df = 33$, $F = 957.920$, $p < .001$). As one might guess, the assumption about the homogeneity of variances is not met; Levene's test indicates unequal variances ($F = 91.69$, $p < .001$). This might add to the uncertainty of the results to some extent, although not severely so, as the sample sizes are large. Multiple comparisons would not make much sense here, as there are 34 “groups” to compare with each other. I did, however, calculate the Eta and Eta Squared coefficients, which are .598 and .358 respectively. These indicate that there is a noticeable intraclass correlation present – the greater these values are, the greater the proportion that the class membership explains the variance of the dependent variable, that being personal authoritarianism in this case (see Jokivuori & Hietala, 2015, p. 139). These findings suggest that it is indeed reasonable to analyze the relationship further.

In technical terms, the intraclass correlation means the intergroup variance – total variance ratio, i.e., how great the intergroup variance is in relation to the total variance. According to Jokivuori and Hietala (2015, p. 140), the intraclass correlation can be calculated through the formula $ICC = \frac{Var(x)}{Var(x) + Var(Error)}$, in which $Var(x)$ = estimate of intergroup variance, and $Var(Error)$ = estimate of intragroup variance. These parameters can be acquired through running a “variance components” analysis, and thus we end up with the equation $ICC = \frac{25.046}{25.046 + 46.497} \approx 0.35 = 35\%$. This means, that the differences between countries explain approximately 35 percent of the variance of personal authoritarianism, while the remaining 65 percent is explained by other factors, such as psychological properties and upbringing. There are probably many

¹⁷ Every analysis in this chapter has been weighted by gweight.

reasons for this homogenizing effect, as each country has its own, relatively unique historical, cultural, and social contexts. Attempting to numerically measure these aspects would most likely result in a failure. Still, the unique histories combined with the social atmospheres along with other such factors as well as a dose of chance has resulted the countries to perform differently in various sectors which – though being contractually, or even partly arbitrarily defined – can be measured with some success. One such metric is the Fragile States Index, the choosing of which as the indicator of democracy I discussed earlier in Chapter 4.4.

In order to examine the relationship between state fragility and personal authoritarianism I have divided the states into three categories in accordance with their relative fragility. As 34 is not divisible by three, the middle class contains 12 countries, while the low and high classes each contain 11. When the variance components analysis described above is run again separately to each of these three groups, the ICCs for countries with low, medium, and high fragility are 0.14, 0.13, and 0.06 respectively. So, the state fragility does indeed partly explain the effect which the country of residence has on the mean levels of personal authoritarianism.

To test whether the effect of state fragility to personal authoritarianism is stable and not caused by some third factors, I ran a Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) on the data. The results are presented in Table 5. I included some well-known correlates of personal authoritarianism (age, religiosity, education level) in the model, and as the dataset lacks a proper measure of reactionary resentment, also information about the respondents' self-reported state of health and happiness as measures of general enjoyableness of life. Examination of the Eta coefficients reveals that all the independent variables save that for sex, are associated with authoritarianism in the unadjusted situation, and the deviations are directed as one might suspect: High means in authoritarianism are associated with high age, low education level, religiosity, poor health, low happiness, as well as living in a fragile state. Controlling for the effects of other variables in the model changes the picture, however: By observing the Beta coefficients one can observe that the effects of age, state of health, and happiness fall substantially, while the effect of sex grows slightly although remaining very low. The effect of state fragility, however, manages to stay substantial, and both religiosity and education level also maintain much of their explanatory power. The coefficient of determination (R^2) reveals that the model explains approximately 41.5 percent of the variance of authoritarianism, most of which is attributed to the three variables with the highest Betas (about the interpretation of the MCA analysis results, see Jokivuori & Hietala, 2015, pp. 116–117). It may thus be concluded that state fragility is indeed an important factor when explaining the differences in the levels of personal authoritarianism between residents of different countries.

Table 5: Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) of several variables' effects on authoritarianism

Authoritarianism			Predicted mean		Deviation		Factor summary	
			Unadjusted	Adjusted for factors	Unadjusted	Adjusted for factors	Eta	Beta adjusted for factors
Fragile States Index	Not fragile	19338	20.79	21.51	-5.49	-4.77	.541	.465
	Semi-fragile	17878	26.98	26.99	.70	.71		
	Fragile	16103	32.09	31.22	5.82	4.94		
Happiness of respondent	Very happy	14268	25.64	26.84	-.64	.56	.104	.041
	Quite happy	31926	26.08	26.10	-.20	-.18		
	Not very happy	6230	28.34	26.03	2.06	-.25		
	Not at all happy	896	29.33	25.45	3.05	-.83		
State of health	Very good	11793	24.11	25.28	-2.17	-1.00	.209	.083
	Good	22050	25.50	25.50	-.78	-.19		
	Fair	14543	28.15	26.97	1.87	.69		
	Poor	4065	29.36	27.36	3.08	1.08		
	Very poor	869	29.99	27.92	3.71	1.64		
Religiosity	A religious person	33840	28.61	27.69	2.33	1.41	.372	.233
	Not a religious person	15166	22.91	24.44	-3.37	-1.84		
	A convinced atheist	4314	19.82	21.68	-6.46	-4.60		
Educational level	Lower	15842	28.96	28.24	2.68	1.96	.286	.200
	Medium	23730	26.70	26.49	.42	.21		
	Higher	13748	22.47	23.66	-3.81	-2.62		
Sex	Male	25727	26.29	26.69	.01	.41	.001	.047
	Female	27593	26.27	25.98	-.01	-.39		
Age	15–29 years	10383	25.18	25.71	-1.10	-.57	.115	.044
	30–49 years	18333	25.49	26.09	-.79	-.19		
	50+ years	24603	27.33	26.66	1.05	.38		

Model Goodness of Fit: $R = .644$, $R^2 = .415$. Notes: Results weighted by gweight. All Betas are significant at the .001 level.

Even though the MCA model presented above is used to “explain” the variance of personal authoritarianism, it should not be taken as a stance about the direction of causality between personal authoritarianism and state fragility. What the model

suggests is that people in more fragile states simply tend to be more authoritarian on average than people living in less fragile states. This does not mean that state fragility would “cause” the inhabitants to be more authoritarian. Instead, the relationship most probably works both ways: On the one hand, state fragility should affect the relative authoritarianism of said states’ inhabitants through factors such as providing feelings of (un)safety and distributing propaganda, while on the other hand, the authoritarianism, or lack thereof of the people should maintain, in some cases possibly even enhance the relative fragility on the one side, or the level of democracy on the other. This should be the case at least in those states in which the means of authoritarianism are low, and which are democratic: The inhabitants of such a state maintain the democratic political system as most of them do not hold authoritarian values, while the state, being democratic and having a free political atmosphere, maintains the inhabitants’ relative antiauthoritarianism. It would occur to me, however, that in the case of more authoritarian regimes the state of democracy should primarily affect the authoritarianism of the people, instead of the other way around. Even if the residents of an authoritarian state were to mostly support their regime, this support should be, to a great extent, caused by propaganda and the fact that one might not be able to choose freely not to support said regime. Regardless of the partial involuntariness of the support, this still results in a somewhat infinite loop: First, the propaganda shared by the state slowly moves the people’s values into a more authoritarian direction; second, these people – voluntarily or not – support the regime, and some of them demand authoritarian politics, thus (third,) maintaining the regime, and so on. As long as the regime stays in place, there is not much of a chance to break this circle. The balance might well be somewhat less stable than that in more democratic regimes, though: If a repressive regime falls, the chances are that the people would lose some of their authoritarianism. This has not, however, always, or even most of the time been the case, as different authoritarian regimes have on many occasions followed one another. Changing the political culture and the general atmosphere requires much more than just changing the regime, which might have been in place partly because of these in the first place.

6. DISCUSSION

I have now successfully provided some answers for the research questions I set in Chapter 1. It seems, according to the results, that personal authoritarian orientation among people is indeed affected by their countries of residence as well as these countries' respective levels of fragility, or "lack of democracy and civil rights". I have been successful in constructing a scale mostly valid in measuring personal authoritarian orientation; unfortunately, though, it does not perform equally well in all countries and cultural climates. It is evident, that the scale should not be used in Armenia, Montenegro, nor Azerbaijan, as its internal consistency is extremely low in those countries. The scale also tends to perform worse in countries with the highest means on the it, which is at least partially caused by the fact that there exists a negative association between the scale's mean level and its internal consistency (i.e., the countries with the highest means on the scale tend to have low internal consistencies on it). On the other hand, the scale seems to perform well enough in countries located in the Western and Central Europe, so it is a valid instrument in these areas. The scale is - regrettably enough - not free from the anti-conservative bias which has also been present with virtually all its predecessors. Also, the scale fails to discriminate between conservatives and reactionaries; it is thus too "sensitive" in labeling people authoritarian. As it is uncertain, whether reactionism is an essential component of authoritarianism in the first place, or whether conservative people can be generally regarded as authoritarian (and as these two concepts are often used to describe the same thing), the scale should perform mostly well.

It is not too surprising that the scale performs worse in countries which are farther away from the European cultural sphere. For example, according to Chien (2016), measures of authoritarianism, or any other such phenomena, for that matter, developed in the individualist Western cultural sphere do not perform well in more collectivist countries, such as China. If one wants to measure authoritarianism in such countries, some more "culture-inclusive" models, which better "understand Chinese people's interactions with authorities" are required (Chien, 2016, pp. 6-7). This stance is, of course, does not directly explain why my authoritarianism scale is unusable in Armenia, Montenegro, and Azerbaijan, but I do find it likely that there are some comparable cultural reasons explaining the low internal consistencies. It might thus be so, that it is not sensible to strive towards developing a universal authoritarianism scale. At the very least, separate scales are needed for some roughly determined cultural spheres. I do not see these results as a failure, however, as there now exists some empirical evidence to the previously mostly theoretical assumption that these scales measuring authoritarianism are western world specific.

The models proposed by Chien do have some obvious advantages over the, do I dare to say, "rigid" ones developed in the west: He writes, that "The self in the Mandala

Model¹⁸ is able to monitor and to give reasons for his or her own actions. In addition, the self is able to memorize, store and organize various forms of knowledge and make them a well-integrated system of knowledge. However, it is unnecessary for the self to reflect on each of his or her own actions. In everyday life, one intends to, or even has to take some actions when identifying with a particular social role.” and later concludes, that “The Mandala Model assumes a self with agency and intentionality”. In this model, the *self* is also contrasted with *person* as “an agent-in-society who takes a certain standpoint in the social order and plans a series of actions to achieve a particular goal” as well as *individuals* as “members of the human species who are no different from other creatures in the universe” (Chien, 2016, pp. 12–13).

Of course, the more “rigid” models such as Altemeyer’s conceptualization do not deny the individuals their ability to organize knowledge and to reason their actions, either. As the purpose of these statistical models is, however, to provide simplified ways of understanding the structure of people’s values and attitudes (and sometimes behavior), as well as information about the strength and certainty of the associations observed, the more complicated mental functions that people have must be generally disregarded as “noise” when compared to the “signal” of the regularity in their behavior and values, that can be statistically observed. It is always possible, to a limited extent, to alleviate this by qualitatively interviewing people and asking them to provide some justifications and reasoning for their opinions or behavior, and then constructing new, slightly more precise theoretical conceptualizations and empirical measures. Even then, there is always some “noise” left in people’s answers, as none of us reason exactly identically to any other person, or strictly according to some predetermined sets of instructions or rules. Hence, we are stuck with imperfect models and measures of authoritarianism. It is still worth keeping in mind that as an individual, even the most unauthoritarian person *might* always reason about their values and behavior in such a weird way, that they would end up being somewhere next to the new Hitler (or more precisely, among a new Hitler’s followers), and at the same time the most authoritarian person might be the nicest fellow one was to ever meet. In the big picture, however, such occurrences are rare, and if an authoritarianism scale is valid, it is most probably that the people scoring the highest are most likely in the “Hitler” neighborhood, and those scoring the lowest are somewhere feeling compassionate and being nice and accepting towards their fellow human being.

Overall, a word of caution should be issued regarding the reasons behind the observed differences in levels of authoritarianism between residents in different

¹⁸ A “universal model of self [proposed] for the development of indigenous psychologies” proposed by Hwang (2011), in which the self “refers to an individual who has been socialized with the ability of reflexivity”. The model draws on Giddens’s structuration theory as well as and Bourdieu’s constructivist structuralism (Hwang, 2011, pp. 329–330.)

countries. Neel, Tzeng, and Baysal (1983) argue, that measure instruments, as well as “differences across language and culture groups” affect people’s scores on F, D and A scales¹⁹ (Neel, Tzeng & Baysal, 1983, pp. 393; 395–397). Even though I cannot exclude the possibility of this effect tinkering with my scale as well, I do find it probable that it is well within tolerable limits. I base my judgement on this issue on the fact that, as we remember from Chapter 2, the F and D scales were subject to extreme response set bias, which in all probability should accentuate the effects of translation and wording. Furthermore, the EVS Methodology group has made considerable efforts to ensure the quality of translation and comparableness of wording of EVS items across languages, which was hardly the case for the translations made of the F and D scales in the 1970s and earlier (see EVS, 2022b, pp. 30–31).

As the careful reader might recall, my analysis also revealed that the country of residence indeed homogenizes the residents’ authoritarianism levels in addition to simply influencing those levels (i.e., the variance of authoritarianism is generally smaller in individual countries compared to the whole dataset). What this means in practice, is that living in a given country (or in a sphere of a given culture, for that matter) both influences the levels of authoritarianism, but also tends to pull the answers somewhat closer towards the mean level of said country. Indeed, it is intuitively understandable that living and socializing in a sphere of a given culture should lead to the assumption of most, or at least some of the values central in said culture’s view of life.

There is also evidence, that a substantial amount of the variation of personal authoritarianism is explained by fragility of the countries of residence. State fragility, which contains information about e.g., the state of democracy and civil society as well as economic success, remained the strongest explanatory variable behind personal authoritarianism even after controlling for the effects of multiple other variables. Unfortunately, I am not in the position to take strong stances about the direction of causality in this relationship. Most probably it works in both ways: Living in a democratic country should generally enhance “anti-authoritarianism” in its inhabitants, while people being “anti-authoritarian” also helps to maintain the democratic system. Similarly, authoritarian regimes most probably use propaganda to evoke “authoritarian responses” in their residents, and these people, supposedly being more authoritarian, also support their regime to some degree, and some of them even most probably demand authoritarian policies. This hypothesis is partly supported by the evidence offered by Neundorf, Gerschewski, and Olar (2020), who

¹⁹ The A scale is a modified version of the Berkeley F scale.

have studied the effects that living in an inclusionary²⁰ autocracies have on the populations' attitudes toward democracy after regime change. Their results show that the residents of formerly inclusionary authoritarian regimes are more critical toward their newly established democratic regimes, than are those who have originally been socialized in a democracy, or in an exclusionary²¹ autocracy. Neundorf et al. provide a theoretical explanation to this relationship by arguing that inclusionary autocratic regimes tend to succeed at creating reasonable political support of citizens by wider distribution of resources (Neundorf et al., 2020, pp. 1915–1917).

This master's thesis has been one of the first, if not *the* first attempt to research authoritarianism with a dataset this comprehensive: Most researchers, including Altemeyer, have been stuck with sampling mostly students and arbitrarily picked townfolk due to extremely inadequate funding. In developing the theory of personal authoritarianism and measures this does not pose a problem: One cannot but admire the depth, precision, and proficiency of Altemeyer's work while considering the level of funding he has had available. In the theoretical sense, my scale is not the strongest candidate in measuring authoritarianism, as it does not tap authoritarian aggression. Also, as the scale has been constructed of variables in a pre-collected dataset, it does not completely correspond to the theoretical conceptualizations of authoritarianism. It is nevertheless probable enough, that if one were to survey the items included in my scale together with an "actual" authoritarianism scale, there would be a substantial correlation between these two. So, even though my scale will not capture authoritarianism with the precision of say, the RWA scale, it should still do the job just fine. In future research, though, it might prove fruitful to construct a scale which would better correspond with the "left-right agnostic conceptualization" which I formulated in Chapter 2.2, as well as have said scale consist of items worded in the reactionist way. This would most likely mean reverting back to sampling students, as considerable funding would be needed to come up with a dataset which would be both statistically representative and have an excellent correspondence with theory.

Naturally, many questions about personal authoritarianism remain unanswered. One can immediately think of at least two branches - or perhaps dimensions - of personal authoritarianism, which could not be addressed due to the limitations of the dataset as well as the scope of this thesis. First, there is the role of inclusion and exclusion of people, as well as the emotions evoked by these. For example, in Arendt's theory of

²⁰ Defined by Neundorf et al. (2020, p. 1893) as "regime[s] that rel[y] on a broad public support base [and which] incorporate various social, economic, and ethnic groups into their power structure by ensuring a wider redistribution of political and socioeconomic benefits to the population"

²¹ Defined by Neundorf et al. (2020, p. 1893) as "regime[s] with - - narrow societal bas[e]s that exclude from power most social, religious, and ethnic groups - - [and which] rely more on redistributing particularistic goods to the members of the ruling elite, while actively restricting the access to power and economic redistribution to other groups from within society".

totalitarianism, some of the most recurring elements of why people might hold totalitarian values are their (either perceived or real) experiences of being unfit for society as well as the emotions of resentment and frustration caused by this (See Arendt, 2013, pp. 105; 164; 333–334).²² The role these emotions might play in defining people’s authoritarian orientations should indeed be empirically studied, as this might provide some important knowledge on how authoritarianism could be reduced by policy measures. Second, I find it probable that there are multiple different “rationalizations” for authoritarianism, or rather “experience horizons” in which it can occur. Inspired by Arendt’s thoughts about “the mob” as “the residue of all classes” on the one hand and her description of Arthur de Gobineau’s and Joseph Conrad’s “adventures” on the other (ibid., pp. 164–165; 218–219; 237–238; see also Arendt, 1994, pp. 106–107), I have come up with three examples of experience horizons the circumstances of which should embrace people’s authoritarian responses:

- 1) The horizon of the underprivileged with internalized resent: possibly shared by people who have been raised up to see the surrounding society as being generally untrustworthy and have been socialized to think that this society is treating them unfairly;
- 2) The horizon of the disappointed: possibly shared by people who despite having been socialized with a generally neutral or positive view of the society, have changed their perceptions and become frustrated through some disappointing experiences and/or life events;
- 3) The horizon of the fearful middle class: possibly shared by people who, despite doing (relatively) fine, are in constant either real or irrational fear of losing their statuses due to factors such as disturbances of the status quo.

Furthermore, I theorize that a more or less unhealthy form of nostalgia might play a part in the adaptation of authoritarian attitudes. If one were to attain a view that returning to a form of *status quo ante* might somehow restore or enhance the well-being of their own reference group on the expense of others, this might lead to said person developing an authoritarian mindset irrespective of whether they would fall under any of these categories.²³ After these theorizations it should be emphasized that both

²² Arendt (2013, pp. 471–472) states that totalitarianism is the opposite of authoritarianism, because as contrasted with authoritarian regimes, there are no real hierarchies present in totalitarian ones. She (ibid.) further argues, that whereas authoritarian regimes strive toward restricting civil liberties, they never try to completely obliterate them. Even though Arendt’s reasoning about the issue does have its advantages I refuse to fully accept this claim. To me, the difference between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes appears not as that totalitarianism would be the opposite of authoritarianism, but that totalitarianism is an extreme case of authoritarianism. Regardless of whether one seeks to harshly restrict or obliterate liberties, the aim is essentially the same: to not give people so many liberties.

²³ If this orientation toward a form of *status quo ante* would pronouncedly include the support of restoring certain hierarchies and unequal power structures, we would be observing *social dominance*

these categories as well as the notion of nostalgia are entirely hypothetical, and lacking any empirical evidence. Still, they do offer some perspectives which could possibly be addressed further in future research.

To conclude, I hold that one plausible explanation for the observed relationship between state fragility and personal authoritarianism is that there should, by all means, be more feelings of resentment, frustration, and despair present among populations living in autocracies, than those living in democracies. Of course, despite the association which exists in the big picture, a regime does not necessarily need to be authoritarian to evoke these emotions: For instance, a severe shock to the economy might drive masses of people into desperation even in (relatively) democratic climates, as was the case with the Weimar Republic in the 1920s. This sort of event could be extremely dangerous, as authoritarian movements are adept in taking advantage of them in mobilizing the masses (cf. Arendt, 2013, pp. 333–334). This, in turn, would quite probably result in the large body of people starting to support authoritarian policies out of their desperation. Consequently, a vicious circle might appear: First, people living in relatively democratic circumstances begin demanding authoritarian policies after they lose their livelihoods as a consequence of an economic or other disaster; next, an authoritarian movement might be able to seize power, and become established; finally, the people might get used to this, and the interaction between the people and the establishment might reproduce the latter (given that the people's basic needs are met better than during the preceding system). These cycles can be broken, of course, but changing the established political culture of any country is not an easy, nor a fast task to any regime. It might nevertheless be sensible for any establishment to try and promote inclusive and humane politics so that as many people as possible could feel themselves to be appreciated, useful, and secure. This would most likely result in the whole society functioning at its best, when the people composing it could live as free of resentment and frustration as possible.

Who, apart from an *authoritarian*, would possibly be against this?

orientation (SDO) which, according to Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin (2006, p. 281), “captures the extent of individuals’ desires for group-based dominance and inequality”, rather than submissive type authoritarianism. If the feeling of nostalgia would mostly consist of an undefined longing for “the good old days” with no orientation towards restoring or enhancing social hierarchies, then we would most likely be witnessing submissive-type authoritarianism. Unfortunately, drawing the line between these two possible forms of nostalgia would be extremely hard in practice: most people supporting the restoration of certain hierarchies would in all probability refuse to admit this.

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APPENDIX I: TECHNICALITIES OF STATISTICAL MATTERS

For a master's thesis written in Jyväskylä-based political science, this one includes much more statistical jargon than the average one. That is why I have considered it appropriate to formulate this technical appendix to help those readers less familiar with statistical matters. The terms are presented in alphabetical order, so that it would be easy to find individual entries at will.

Alpha reliability: See Cronbach's alpha.

Beta (in MCA): A standardized coefficient which can be used to compare the relative explanatory power of each independent variable included in the model (see Jokivuori & Hietala, 2015, p. 112). The beta coefficient reports the "true" effect of each independent variable on the dependent one; in other words, the share of the effect which is not explained by the other variables in the model.

Continuous variable: A variable, which can theoretically receive any values between 0, where it has no value, and a certain end point, given that there is one. Weight is a classic example of such a variable: at 0 kg, there is no weight, and this variable has no upper limit. The exactness of the values is limited only by the instrument used, and due to the possibility of adding decimals, the variable can receive infinite different values even between 0 and 1 kilograms, for example. In a strict, technical sense, Likert-scaled variables are not considered continuous; however, as it can be reasonably assumed that people might in theory fall anywhere between two points in the Likert scale (for example between somewhat agree and totally agree), they are often used similarly to "truly" continuous variables.

Correlation: A linear relationship observable between two continuous variables. The correlation coefficient r is standardized and can receive values between 0 (no association) and 1 (perfect association).

Cronbach's alpha: A coefficient, which indicates the internal consistency of a set of items, i.e., if said items measure the same phenomenon. This is a standardized coefficient, which can receive values between 0 (no consistency) and 1 (perfect consistency: all variables measure exactly the same thing). Bigger is better, but values which are equal or extremely close to 1 are to be avoided, as such a measure probably fails to capture the whole phenomenon in all its nuances. Also known as "alpha reliability".

Eta (in MCA): A coefficient analogous to the correlation coefficient, which reports the effects that the independent variables have on the dependent one in the unstandardized situation, in which the effects of the other variables in the model have not taken into account and standardized. Eta squared indicates how much each independent variable included in the model alone explains of the variance of the dependent variable (see Jokivuori & Hietala, 2015, p. 112).

Internal consistency: See “Cronbach’s alpha”.

Likert scale: A scale, which is commonly used to measure attitudes, values, and other such things. Most commonly ranges from -3 to +3 (totally disagree, disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, agree, totally agree) or -4 to +4.

N: In this thesis, most often the number of observations in a given group. In other occurrences, also the size of the population.

n: The size of a sample.

Categorical variable: Non-continuous variables, also known as discrete or qualitative, which do not have obvious numerical values, for example gender, country of residence, and any “yes/no” questions.

P-value ($p < .001$ etc.): See “Statistical significance”.

Population: The mass of people etc. which has been sampled, e.g., 15-80 years old German people.

R squared (in MCA): The coefficient of determination of the model. Indicates how much of the dependent variable’s variance the whole MCA model explains.

r: Correlation coefficient; see “Correlation”.

Recoding: Changing the values of a variable in order to simplify both the analyses and the interpretation of the results. Most often this is about changing the direction of the scale so that values which were previously coded low are recoded into high, and vice versa. This is especially useful to variables which are originally in the negative form.

Sample: The respondents or other “units of observation” taken from a population. The sampling should be done by using an acceptable sampling technique, such as simple random sampling, so that bias could be minimized.

Standard deviation (SD): Indicates how much the data disperses from the mean with relation to a single variable. Low standard deviation means that most of the observations are located close to the mean, while a high one indicates the opposite.

Statistical significance: A construct which is used to evaluate the confidence of a difference, association, effect etc. observed between two or more variables, which is reported with p values. The traditional classes, or levels of statistical significance are $p < .05$, $p < .01$, and $p < .001$. For example, if a difference in means of say, height, between women and men in a given dataset is significant at the .05 level, this means, that if one were to collect 100 datasets of the same size from the same population, in

95 of those the relationship would be observable, and the direction would be same (e.g., men would be taller than women in 95 of these 100 datasets). If this observed difference were to be significant at the .001 level instead of the .05 one, this would mean, that if one were to collect 1000 datasets of the same size from the same population, in 999 of these the relationship would be observable, and the direction would be the same (e.g., in 999 of these datasets men would be taller than women). Statistical significance does not indicate anything about the significance of the finding at hand content-wise: finding no difference is as significant a finding as finding a difference.

APPENDIX II: CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE

I constructed the authoritarianism scale in various steps: First, I went through the European Values Study Master Questionnaire (2018) and picked variables that are either seemingly related to Authoritarianism as understood by Altemeyer or expressing openly antidemocratic attitudes. Second, I tabulated the EVS and 2006 RWA items, color-coded them with respect to content, and marked their correspondences. Finally, I proceeded to recode all these variables into new ones with SPSS so that the scales go from low to high authoritarianism. For dichotomous variables this means that the “authoritarian” answer was recoded to “2”, the “unauthoritarian” answer to “0”, and “neutral” answers (“don’t know” and “no answer”) to “1”. Likert items were decoded so that the “somewhat” as well as the “totally” authoritarian answers (for example “somewhat agree” and “totally agree”) both recoded to “2”²⁴, unauthoritarian answers to “0”, and “neutral” answers again to “1”. Continuous items with scales ranging from 0 to 10 were divided into three categories, with “don’t know” and “no answer” included in the neutral category of “1”. In addition to these three general categories of variables, there are two items with more unique properties. First, there are two variables in the dataset containing information about the preferred primary and secondary aims of the respondents. I recoded these so that if the primary aim of the respondent was to “maintain order in the nation”, they would receive the value “2”, while having this as the secondary aim would result as a “1”. All other answers were coded to “0”. As inconsistent answers (respondent choosing all the options available or having the same aim as primary and secondary) would obviously result in flawed recoding, I have controlled this by using a flag variable included in the dataset. The few respondents with inconsistent answers receive a “0” of both these variables. Second, the respondents were asked whether they find a possible change in the near future toward greater respect for authority in “our way of life” a good thing, a bad thing, or if they would not mind it. In this case, I recoded “good” into 2, “bad” into 0, “don’t mind”, as well as “no answer” and “don’t know” into 1.

The EVS items chosen into the scale are presented on the left of the table below, Bob Altemeyer’s (2006) right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale items, the latter of which are presented on the right. The EVS dataset contains a number of items measuring openly antidemocratic attitudes, which I decided to include into the scale regardless of the fact that such items are not included in Altemeyer’s scale. I have also qualitatively coded the items with regard to their content, so that **turquoise represents conventionalism**, **green authoritarian submission**, **red authoritarian aggression**, and

²⁴ This approach helps to keep the scale more robust, even though it might seem unintuitive: Altemeyer (1981, pp. 242-243) notes, that low education level is associated with pronounced use of the extreme response categories. This might be an expression of either their values truly being more extreme towards one way or another, a tendency of simply preferring more extreme wordings, or a combination of these two. As there is no certainty, it is safer to only pay attention to the direction of the wording (agreement/disagreement) rather than its extremity. This approach helps to shrink the otherwise possibly exaggerated correlations between the respondents’ education levels and authoritarian orientations partially caused by the preference of extreme answer categories.

brownish green openly antidemocratic attitudes. The EVS as well as the 2006 RWA scale totals are included in the bottom of the appendix.

EVS item and recoding information	Justifications
<p>v71. Marriage is an outdated institution: yes = more authoritarian; recode (1 = 0) (2 = 2) (-1, -2 = 1) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 16: God's laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.</p>
<p>v75. A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family agree = m. a.; recode (1, 2 = 2) (3, 4 = 0) (-1, -2 = 1) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 18: A "woman's place" should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.</p> <p>RWA item 7 in 1982: The sooner we get rid of the traditional family structure, where the father is the head of the family and the children are taught to obey authority automatically, the better. The old-fashioned way has a lot wrong with it.</p>
<p>v82. Homosexual couples are as good parents as other couples disagree = m. a.; recode (1, 2 = 0) (3, 4 = 2) (-1, -2 = 1) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 4: Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.</p>
<p>Encourage children to learn at home: v85. Good manners mentioned = m. a.; recode (1 = 2) (2 = 0) (-1, -2 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 12: The "old-fashioned ways" and the "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live.</p>
<p>Encourage children to learn at home: v86. Independence no mention = m. a.; recode (1 = 0) (2 = 2) (-1, -2 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 9: Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.</p>
<p>Encourage children to learn at home: v87. Hard work mentioned = m. a.; recode (1 = 2) (2 = 0) (-1, -2 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 12: The "old-fashioned ways" and the "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live.</p>
<p>Encourage children to learn at home: v89. Imagination no mention = m. a.; recode (1 = 0) (2 = 2) (-1, -2 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 9: Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.</p>

EVS item and recoding information	Justifications
<p>Encourage children to learn at home: v90. Tolerance and respect for other people</p> <p>no mention = m. a.; recode (1 = 0) (2 = 2) (-1, -2 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 20: 20. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way.</p>
<p>Encourage children to learn at home: v93. Religious faith</p> <p>mentioned = m. a.; recode (1 = 2) (2 = 0) (-1, -2 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 12: The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live.</p>
<p>Encourage children to learn at home: v95. Obedience</p> <p>mentioned = m. a.; recode (1 = 2) (2 = 0) (-1, -2 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 12: The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live.</p> <p>Past presence: RWA item 12 in 1982: Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn</p>
<p>v100. Would never attend lawful demonstrations</p> <p>agree = m. a.; recode (1 = 0) (2, -1, -2 = 1) (3 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 15: Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way” things are supposed to be done.”</p>
<p>v101. Would never join unofficial strikes</p> <p>recode (1 = 0) (2, -1, -2 = 1) (3 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p> <p>agree = m. a.;</p>	<p>RWA item 15: Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way” things are supposed to be done.”</p>
<p>v110, v111. Primary (v110) / secondary (v111) aim of respondent: Maintaining order in the nation</p> <p>(Two variables which are mutually exclusive, when controlling for f110 inconsistency)</p> <p>primary aim = most authoritarian</p> <p>v110: recode (1 = 2) (2 thru 4 = 0) (-1, -2 = 0) (else = sysmis) if f110 = 0</p> <p>v111: recode (1 = 1) (2 thru 4 = 0) (-1, -2 = 0) (else = sysmis) if f110 = 0</p> <p>v110_v111_uni = sum(v110,v111)</p>	<p>RWA item 17: There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.</p>

EVS item and recoding information	Justifications
<p>v112. Willing to fight for country in a war (yes/no)</p> <p>agree = m. a.; recode (1 = 2) (2 = 0) (-1, -2 = 1) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 12: The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live.</p>
<p>v114. Greater respect for authority (Possible change in our way of life in the near future: good, bad, don’t mind)</p> <p>good = m. a.; recode (1 = 2) (3, -1, -2 = 1) (2 = 0) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 5: It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s minds</p>
<p>v134. Essential characteristic of democracy: Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws</p> <p>agree = m. a.; recode (0 thru 3 = 0) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p> <p>v134_11c recoded similarly, and summed with v134</p>	<p>Openly antidemocratic attitude</p>
<p>v137. Essential part of democracy: The army takes over when government is incompetent</p> <p>agree = m. a.; recode (0 thru 3 = 0) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p> <p>v137_11c recoded similarly, and summed with v137</p>	<p>Openly antidemocratic attitude</p>
<p>v138. Essential characteristic of democracy: Civil rights protect people from state oppression</p> <p>disagree = m. a.; recode (0 thru 3 = 2) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 0) (else = sysmis)</p> <p>v137_11c recoded similarly, and summed with v137</p>	<p>RWA item 7: The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.</p>
<p>v140. Essential characteristic of democracy: People obey their rulers</p> <p>agree = m. a.; recode (0 thru 3 = 0) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p> <p>v140_11c recoded similarly, and summed with v140</p>	<p>RWA item 19: Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything.</p>

EVS item and recoding information	Justifications
<p>v141. Essential characteristic of democracy: Women have the same rights as men</p> <p>disagree = m. a.; recode (0 thru 3 = 2) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 0) (else = sysmis)</p> <p>v141_11c recoded similarly, and summed with v141</p>	<p>RWA item 18: A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.</p>
<p>v142. Important to live in a country that is governed democratically</p> <p>disagree = m. a.; recode (1 thru 3 = 2) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 0) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>Openly antidemocratic attitude</p>
<p>v145. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections</p> <p>agree = m. a.; recode (1, 2 = 2) (3, 4 = 0) (-1, -2 = 1) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 14: What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path.</p>
<p>v147. Having the army rule the country (very good - very bad for country)</p> <p>agree = m. a.; recode (1, 2 = 2) (3, 4 = 0) (-1, -2 = 1) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 14: 14. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path.</p>
<p>v148. Having a democratic political system</p> <p>disagree = m. a.; recode (1, 2 = 0) (3, 4 = 2) (-1, -2 = 1) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>Openly antidemocratic attitude</p>
<p>v151. Taking soft drugs: can never be justified - can always been justified</p> <p>never = m. a.; recode (1 thru 3 = 2) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 0) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>Past presence: RWA item 21 in 1982: The courts are right in being easy on drug users. Punishment would not do any good in cases like these (Altemeyer, 1988, p. 22).</p>
<p>v153. Homosexuality: can never be justified - can always been justified</p> <p>never = m. a.; recode (1 thru 3 = 2) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 0) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 4: Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.</p>
<p>v154. Abortion: can never be justified - can always been justified</p> <p>never = m. a.; recode (1 thru 3 = 2) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 0) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 16: God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.</p>
<p>v155. Divorce: can never be justified - can always been justified</p> <p>never = m. a.; recode (1 thru 3 = 2) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 0) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>RWA item 16: God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.</p>

EVS item and recoding information	Justifications
<p>v158. Having causal sex: can never be justified - can always been justified</p> <p>never = m. a.; recode (1 thru 3 = 2) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 0) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>Past presence: RWA item 8 in 1982: There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse (Altemeyer, 1988, p. 22).</p>
<p>v163. Death penalty: can never be justified - can always been justified</p> <p>always = m. a.; recode (1 thru 3 = 0) (4 thru 7, -1, -2 = 1) (8 thru 10 = 2) (else = sysmis)</p>	<p>Past presence: RWA item 56 in circa 1974: Capital punishment should be completely abolished (Altemeyer, 1981, p.172).</p>
<p>EVS totals:</p>	<p>RWA item totals (2006 only)</p>
<p>Submission: 10/30</p>	<p>Submission: 13/20</p>
<p>Aggression: 2/30</p>	<p>Aggression: 9/20</p>
<p>Conventionalism: 15/30</p>	<p>Conventionalism: 20/20</p>
<p>Openly antidemocratic attitudes: 8/30</p>	

APPENDIX III: VALUES EACH COUNTRY HAS RECEIVED IN A SELECTION OF INDICES (RANKINGS FROM 2017)

Country	Code in Data	Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Fragile States Index	Voice and Accounta bility	Political Stability	Democracy index
Albania	8	28	40	60,5	0,2	0,38	5.98
Armenia	51	16	29	71,0	-0,56	-0,62	4.11
Austria	40	37	58	27,7	1,39	1,05	8.42
Azerbaijan	31	4	10	76,3	-1,56	-0,75	2.65
Belarus	112	5	15	72,4	-1,36	-0,05	3.13
Bosnia and Herzegovina	70	21	34	73,0	-0,21	-0,35	4.87
Bulgaria	100	33	47	53,7	0,43	0,33	7.03
Croatia	191	37	50	50,6	0,48	0,69	6.63
Czech Republic	203	38	56	40,1	0,88	1	7.62
Denmark	208	40	57	21,5	1,52	0,87	9.22
Estonia	233	38	56	44,7	1,21	0,65	7.79
Finland	246	40	60	18,7	1,56	1,08	9.03
France	250	38	52	33,5	1,15	0,28	7.80
Georgia	268	27	37	76,5	0,26	-0,37	5.93
Germany	276	39	56	28,1	1,43	0,59	8.61
Hungary	348	29	47	52,0	0,54	0,81	6.64
Iceland	352	38	59	22,5	1,38	1,35	9.58
Italy	380	36	53	45,2	0,99	0,31	7.98
Lithuania	440	38	53	41,7	0,99	0,78	7.41
Montenegro	499	26	43	55,7	0,12	-0,06	5.69
Netherlands	528	40	59	27,4	1,5	0,92	8.89
North	807	21	36	66,1	-0,14	-0,25	5.57
Norway	578	40	60	20,5	1,69	1,17	9.87
Poland	616	37	52	40,8	0,78	0,52	6.67
Portugal	620	39	58	29,0	1,2	1,12	7.84
Romania	642	35	49	50,9	0,6	0,06	6.44
Russia	643	5	15	79,2	-1,09	-0,64	3.17
Serbia	688	29	47	70,0	0,12	0,09	6.41
Slovakia	703	36	53	44,3	0,91	0,91	7.16
Slovenia	705	39	53	32,4	1,01	0,87	7.50
Spain	724	38	56	37,9	1,02	0,28	8.08
Sweden	752	40	60	22,1	1,57	0,98	9.39
Switzerland	756	39	57	21,1	1,56	1,26	9.03
United Kingdom	826	40	55	33,2	1,36	0,39	8.53