

Mika Huovinen

Did the East Belong to the SS?

The Realism of the SS Demographic
Reorganisation Policy in the Light of
the Germanisation Operation of SS- und
Polizeiführer Odilo Globocnik



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Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston humanistisen tiedekunnan suostumuksella
julkisesti tarkastettavaksi yliopiston Historica-rakennuksen salissa H320
lokakuun 14. päivänä 2011 kello 12.

Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of
the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Jyväskylä,
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UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 2011

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JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN HUMANITIES 161

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URN:ISBN:978-951-39-4425-4

ISBN 978-951-39-4425-4 (PDF)

ISSN 1459-4331

ISBN 978-951-39-4420-9 (nid.)

ISSN 1459-4323

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Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä 2011

ABSTRACT

Huovinen, Mika

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Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2009, 268 p.

(Jyväskylä Studies in Humanities

ISSN 1459-4323; 161)

ISBN 978-951-39-4420-9 (nid.)

ISBN 978-951-39-4425-4 (PDF)

Yhteenveto: Kuuluiko Itä SS-järjestölle? SS-järjestön uudelleenjärjestelypolitiikan realismisuus SS- ja poliisijohtaja Odilo Globocnikin germaanistamisoperaation valossa

Diss.

The research goal of this study is to ascertain whether the SS would have been able to carry out large-scale National Socialist demographic reorganisation projects after the Second World War if Germany had won the war. The objective of the National Socialists was to Germanise large areas of eastern Europe by removing the local non-German inhabitants and replacing them with so-called Germanic populations. The fate of those non-German people was to be slavery or extermination. The SS was the most influential of the National Socialist organisations that were interested in demographic reorganisation. The SS included organs suitable for both planning and implementing the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policies in practice, but its operations were hampered by several difficulties. Despite these, the SS wished to carry out demographic reorganisation projects even in almost totally non-German areas while the war was still under way. As an example of this, I use the Germanisation project of SS- und Polizeiführer Odilo Globocnik, which was carried out in Distrikt Lublin in Poland in 1942 and 1943. Globocnik's operation was strongly supported by Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who was personally interested in it and visited Lublin several times. Globocnik's Germanisation operation was carried out in two phases. The first part of the operation was effected during the last months of 1942 and the second part in the summer of 1943. The enormous problems encountered by Globocnik's Germanisation project indicate that the SS might not have been able to carry out large demographic reorganisation projects after the war.

Keywords: National Socialism, Germanisation, Odilo Globocnik

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PREFACE

I have been interested in German occupation and demographic reorganisation policies since the early 1990s, and this study is the culmination of a series of seminars and a thesis which I have been writing since 1995. The research process has been long but also rewarding. During the years of research, I have had the opportunity to familiarize myself with German and Polish archives and research institutes and also to visit some geographical locations like the towns of Lublin and Zamosc, which are important in this study. Primary sources and the scientific literature of foreign institutes and archives have been indispensable in this research, and I would like to thank the persons who have helped me in the Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in München, the Deutsches Historisches Institut in Warschau and the Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie.

This study would not have been finished without the financial support of the Emil Aaltonen Foundation and the Ellen and Artturi Nyyssönen Foundation, and I would like to thank both of these foundations for supporting my research. I would also like to thank the Department of History and Ethnology of the University of Jyväskylä for supporting the research project. Over the years several members of the staff of the department have given me valuable support, and I would particularly like to thank Petri Karonen, Jari Ojala, Tuulikki Tuomainen and Pasi Ihalainen. The most significant person for this study has been Professor Seppo Zetterberg. He has counselled me throughout the research process, and our cooperation has been most gratifying for me. I would also thank Gerard McAlester for carrying out a thorough check of the English language of the work.

My wife Sari and my daughter Milla have supported me during the years when I have had to conduct the research for this study in addition to carrying out my main occupation. We have together made some interesting trips exploring Central and Eastern Europe, and they have always afforded me the opportunity to concentrate on my research when I have needed to. For this, my special thanks to both of them. My parents have also supported my study, particularly by providing a peaceful environment for the writing process. There are also some other persons who have been interested in my study, and I would like to thank Kari Kokko, Mikko Seppänen and Vesa Vainikainen in particular.

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research goal and methodology

SS- und Polizeiführer (SSPF, SS and Police Chief) Odilo Globocnik carried out a series of deportation and settlement operations during the years 1941–1943 in the *Generalgouvernement* (General Governorate), an administrative area of German-occupied Poland. Globocnik's objective was to deport and to exterminate the non-German inhabitants in an area around the town of Zamosc (Zamość) in the Lublin region and to settle in their place a population defined as German and thereby Germanise the area.

The replacement of the population of the target area was the most important factor in Globocnik's operation. It was not a question of cultural standardisation or suppression aiming at transforming the culture of the region through changes in language or religion. Globocnik's operation was a much more radical attempt to change the character of the target area.

The terms "*Eindeutschung*" or "*Verdeutschung*" (Germanification) do not represent the real character of the operation that was carried out in the area of Zamosc. It is possible to use "Germanification" to indicate an operation the objective of which is just to change the language and culture of the original population of the area. The nature of Globocnik's operation, on the other hand, is better expressed by the term "*Germanisierung*" (Germanisation), and that word is used here to indicate that it was a question of something more: the replacement of the original inhabitants of the area with a population that the SS had defined as Germanic.¹

¹ Heinrich Himmler put it thus: "*Unsere Aufgabe ist es, den Osten nicht im alten Sinne zu germanisieren, das heißt den dort wohnenden Menschen deutsche Sprache und deutsche Gesetze beizubringen, sondern dafür zu sorgen, daß im Osten nur Menschen wirklich deutschen, germanischen Blutes wohnen.*" Leitspruch Heinrich Himmlers für die Germanisierung des Ostens", 1942, Juni / Juli, Berlin. Anlage Nr. 21. *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan.*

According to Leniger (Leniger 2006, p. 65) the project has been described as follows: "*Der Kern der späteren Germanisierungspolitik des RKF bestand in der Vertreibung von*

The primary objective of the SS was not to settle in the area of Zamosc inhabitants from the heartlands of Germany² but Germans living outside Germany³ whom the SS had classified as suitable pioneers of the east. The plans of the SS also envisaged placing in the area of Zamosc people of neighbouring areas who could not be regarded as Germans but who had German ancestors.⁴ Thus the population of the area would consist of so-called *Reichsdeutsche* (German citizens), *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans) and *Deutschstämmige* (persons of German descent).

The idea of Germanising the area by settling Germans or people of German descent there was understandable in light of the fact that at least 20 million persons classified as Germans lived outside Germany before the Second World War, of whom about 10 million lived as minorities in Europe. The majority of these Germans lived in Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union and the Balkan states.⁵ The resettlement of the Germans living in eastern and southeastern Europe would have enabled – at least in theory – the creation of large areas populated by Germans.

The operation executed in the area of Zamosc has been regarded as the first step in the Germanisation of eastern Europe. The measures taken there have been further connected to the broader future plans of the SS, and it has been estimated that the fate of the non-German population of the whole of eastern Europe would have been enslavement or genocide if the SS had succeeded in carrying out its plans.⁶

Teilen der autochthonen Bevölkerung und in der Verteilung des auf diese Weise 'freigemachten' Besitzes an volksdeutsche Umsiedler, autochthone Volksdeutsche und Zuwanderer aus dem Altreich."

² In the National Socialist terminology the area of the Third Reich in 1937 was called the "Altreich".

³ In the National Socialist terminology, the ethnic Germans were called *Volksdeutsche*. In this study, "*Volksdeutsche*" refers to Germans who lived outside the Third Reich and who considered themselves Germans but were not German citizens.

⁴ In the National Socialist terminology the term "*Deutschstämmige*" was used of persons whose ancestors were German but who had for the most part adopted the language and culture of their area of domicile.

⁵ Lumans 1993, p. 22.

⁶ Scholars are convinced of the intention of the SS to carry out the Germanisation programme and the deportation and extermination operations related to it, but there are differing views about the Zamosc operation as a part of the National Socialist demographic rearrangement policy.

Bruno Wasser (Wasser 1993B, p. 8) called the Zamosc operation an experiment:

Das erreichte Ausmaß der Umvolkung und ihr exemplarischen Charakter durch Bestimmung der Zamojszczyzna als 1. Großsiedlungsgebiet im Generalgouvernement durch den Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums, Heinrich Himmler, lassen dieses Gebiet als modellhaftes, raumpolitischen Exerzierfeld der SS erscheinen (Sonderlaboratorium der SS).

Wasser's opinion is based on Madajczyk's view, which is apparent not only in the name of the work *Zamojszczyzna – Sonderlaboratorium SS* but is also mentioned in the Introduction (Madajczyk 1977, p. 16):

Die Bezeichnung „Sonderlaboratorium SS“ wird in keinem Dokumente gebraucht, aber wir begehen jedoch keinen Missbrauch, wenn wir diese Bezeichnung einführen, denn sie resultiert aus der Rolle, die dem Gebiet von Zamość zugewiesen wurde – ein Versuchsobjekt für die nazistischen Kolonisationsmethoden in völlig nichtdeutschen Gebieten, denen die Nazismus die Rolle eines deutschen Lebensraumes zugewiesen hatte.

The SS really wanted to carry out the Germanisation programme in eastern Europe by deporting and exterminating the original populations and by settling German or North European populations designated as Germanic in their place.⁷ However, the project carried out in the Zamosc area raises a question about whether the SS would have been able to carry out the more extensive Germanisation projects in eastern Europe envisaged in the National Socialist plans for the future. The question of the ability of the SS to carry out a larger Germanisation project is a result of the problems related to the Germanisation carried out in the area of Zamosc. It has been claimed that the problems were so severe that the whole project had to be abandoned.⁸ In spite of this, researchers have come to the conclusion that the SS would have initiated Germanisation projects in much wider areas if the National Socialists had only had the opportunity to do so.

Even if the reasons for the failure are clear in themselves, it is possible to examine the Zamosc operation and estimate whether the SS would have been capable of carrying out larger Germanisation operations. The doubt is supported by the fact that Robert Koehl, for example, has made a highly critical

Heinemann has a different view: she does not regard the Zamosc operation as an experiment, as can be seen in her work *Rasse, Siedlung deutsches Blut* (pp. 404 and 415):

Am Beispiel Zamość läßt sich im kleinsten Maßstab studieren, wie eine ethnische Neuordnung nach dem gewonnenem Krieg ausgesehen hätte: ... Die »Zamość« -Aktion war also gerade kein »Sonderfall«, wie der polnische Historiker Madajczyk meint. Vielmehr bestanden durchaus ähnliche Ansätze »germanischer Siedlung in fremdvölkischen Gebiet«, so im Siedlungsgebiet »Hegewald« in der Ukraine und ansatzweise auf der Krim. Gleichzeitig hatten die verantwortlichen Spezialisten bereits Erfahrungen mit der Durchführung von Aus- und Ansiedlung gemacht, vor allem im Warthegau, aber auch in Südosteuropa, so daß sie hier bereits Gelerntes anwenden konnten. Somit erscheint es zutreffend, die Zamość-Aktion nicht als »Sonderlaboratorium«, sondern als wichtige Etappe auf dem Weg zur allmählichen Realisierung der Europa-Besiedlungspläne der SS zu verstehen.

Aber die Zamość-Operation mit ihren zwei Phasen der »Pazifizierung« und »Extermination« wies den Weg zukünftiger Politik gegenüber der einheimischen Bevölkerung im Osten.

The main point is that the Zamosc operation was connected to the future plans of the SS, and that it a fruitful subject for research. Götz Aly's and Susanne Heim's view in *Vordenker der Vernichtung* (p. 438) describes the situation well:

Doch zeigt »Zamość« in aller Prägnanz, was sich die Planer des »Menscheinsatzes« und der neuen Raumordnung vorstellten, wessen sie Fähig waren. Sie wollten mit ihren Siedlungsprojekten im Osten Initialzündungen geben für die nazistische Form der Modernisierung Europas, für die soziale Umsichtung einerseits und Idee Ermordung von Abermillionen »unbrauchbaren« und »überzähligen« Menschen einerseits.

⁷ The devotion of the SS to the project has been exhaustively described by Peter Longerich in his biography of Himmler. In this work (pp. 658– 663 and 766–768), he shows how impatiently Himmler waited in order to be able to carry out his future plans, and he describes the extent that the genocide might have reached after the Holocaust. It is also possible to elucidate the matter with the help of Himmler's own statements: *Heinrich Himmler: Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945 und andere Ansprachen*. Rede vor Gauleitern und anderen Parteifunktionären am 29.2.1940. s. 123 – 124; Rede vor den Oberabschnittsführern und Hauptamtchefs im Haus der Flieger in Berlin am 9.6.1942. s. 157 – 159, 183; Rede vor dem Offizierskorps einer Grenadierdivision auf dem Truppenübungsplatz Bitsch am 26.7.1944. s. 236.

⁸ On the failure of the Germanisation project of the SS in Zamosc, see Aly & Heim 2004, p. 438; Heinemann 2003, p. 415; Wasser 1993A, p. 290.

assessment of the SS organisation.⁹ Leniger, too, claims that extermination was much more likely than a comprehensive operation involving more constructive elements.¹⁰

The question of the ability of the SS to carry out the more extensive future racial plans of the National Socialists in the east is significant because the SS was undoubtedly the most important organ that implemented the most radical features of the National Socialist ideology during the war. It was also strongly oriented towards the future and strove to become the most important implementer of the demographic rearrangement policy.¹¹ When these factors are combined with the exceptional position of the SS in the National Socialist state,¹² it is natural to conclude that the SS would have carried out wide-ranging demographic operations in eastern Europe if Germany had won the Second World War.

It is possible to examine the ability or inability of the SS to carry out more extensive Germanisation projects with the help of following questions:

Did the SS organisation possess a clear and uniform view of the tasks awaiting it in the future and a plan that would make it possible to start carrying them out systematically?

Did the SS possess such an organisation and position in the National Socialist state as would enable it to carry out more extensive Germanisation operations in almost purely non-German areas?

Would other factors, for example those connected to individual members of the SS or to conditions in the target areas, have made the realisation of the plans possible?

The basic goal of this research has resulted from studying the National Socialist ideology and administrative system and the organisation and operations of the

⁹ Koehl 1983, pp. 186–193, esp. p 193: “Neither Himmler nor even Heydrich was ever capable of drawing up a blueprint or master-plan of the imperialist settlements or of vesting central authority in one SS Main Office, least of all in this ad hoc creation of 1939.”; Koehl 1957, pp. 230–231:

For the German people, with their particular history, Nazi ideology “made sense”. Constructed out of the odds and ends of German idealism, historicism, racism and the attic furniture of pre-1914 Europe, this ideology was a potent myth. But it was only a myth. Efforts to convert a myth into a technology, to develop techniques of social control from half-truths were bound to founder, sooner or later. Myths can combine logically contradictory elements very well, and even gain strength thereby – but they do not cease to be myths. In order to build reality of the myth even the National Socialists were forced to seek the concrete empirical manifestations of the “higher truth”.

¹⁰ Leniger 2006, p. 228.

¹¹ The part played by the SS as an implementer of the most radical National Socialist plans for the future is reflected by its role in the Holocaust. The matter has been described for example by Peter Longerich in his study *Politik der Vernichtung*. Also the motto “Der Osten gehört Schutzstaffel!” (The east belongs to the SS) launched by the SS reflects the organisation’s interest in carrying out the plans for the future. This was already stated by Helmut Heiber in the 1950s in an article in *Vierteljahrshäfte für Zeitgeschichte*. Heiber 1958, p. 284. The dedication of the SS to the project has also been succinctly described by Rolf-Dieter Müller in his work *Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik*. Müller 1991, pp. 83–114.

¹² The SS has been described as a special non-governmental institution, and also as an independent National Socialist organ responsible directly to Hitler. Buchheim 1958, p. 243.

SS within a broader general frame of reference. The wider background factors must also be examined because the Germanisation operation in Zamosc was carried out in an area under a National Socialist administrative system by a group of representatives of the SS who had adopted the National Socialist ideology.

It is possible to divide the discussion of the general frame of reference into three main areas: the National Socialist ideology, the SS and the Generalgouvernement. The object of studying National Socialist ideology is to elucidate the ideological background of the operation, while the purpose of studying the SS is to elucidate the factors that made it into the organ that was to implement the future National Socialist demographic reorganisation programme. The examination of the Generalgouvernement, for its part, concentrates on how the National Socialists saw the area, how they governed it and how one of its regions became the target of the demographic policy of the SS.

Once the goal of the research has been formulated, it is necessary to assess whether it is possible to examine the feasibility of the plans of the SS on the basis of a single operation. Here the following factors are relevant: There are no other projects for which there existed corresponding preconditions even though the SS carried out a large number of different Germanisation operations during the Second World War in several different areas.

The most important factors supporting the use of the Zamosc operation as an example are the circumstances prevailing in the area and the methods used in the operation. The fact that the population of the target area was almost completely non-German is the most significant of the factors related to the circumstances. The fact that the objective of the SS was to eliminate the Polish population is the most important of the factors related to the methods.

There were comparable circumstances in the Ukraine, but the objectives, and the methods used to attain them, of the SS differed from those related to the Zamosc operation: the objective in the Ukraine was not to create a German area with a population imported from abroad but to resettle the local *Volksdeutsche*. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Ukrainian population did not have to face the threat of extermination like the Polish population in the area of Zamosc.¹³

In view of these factors, it is possible to use the Zamosc operation as the subject of this study. However, the use of the Zamosc operation as an example requires that its special nature be taken into account: the project was carried out by an exceptionally active and unscrupulous *SS- und Polizeiführer* who was in direct contact with the *Reichsführer-SS* (State Leader of the SS, Himmler) and who strove to implement the National Socialist ideology without caring about the situation of the target area or the means he employed.¹⁴

¹³ For a more extensive treatment of the operation carried out in the Ukraine, see Heinemann 2003, pp. 451–464. An article called “A New Ordering of Space and Race: Nazi Colonial Dreams in Zhytomyr, Ukraine, 1941–1944” written by Wendy Lower published in the *German Studies Review* 2002 deals also with that operation.

¹⁴ The special position of Distrikt Lublin resulting from the activities of its *SS- und Polizeiführer* has been dealt with in earlier studies, for example Pohl 1993, pp. 42–45.

The methodology of the study is based on an examination which proceeds from motivation to action and from the general to the particular. Thus the National Socialist ideology, the SS, the Generalgouvernement and the general progress of the National Socialist project for the future are dealt with first. Only after these background matters have been dealt with is attention turned to the Zamosc operation and its assessment from the perspective determined by the goal of the research. The study also includes an analysis of the sources and a presentation of previous research, as is natural after the statement of the goal and methodology of the research.

The starting point for the study is in itself favourable because previous research indicates that an examination of the Zamosc operation is possible. On the other hand, the large amount of the research material available has made it necessary to restrict the background literature of the study to research that is recent and essential from the point of view of the subject. The abundance of the earlier research has also meant that in order to obtain new information research it has been necessary to formulate questions that approach the subject of the research from a new perspective.

Taken as a whole, there are a number of challenges involved the execution of the research, which in itself seems straightforward. These include deciding on the depth and scope of the treatment of the subject. The most important questions related to this concern the treatment of relations between the SS and the administration of the Generalgouvernement: the conflicts between them produced a considerable amount of material, and they affected the Zamosc operation, although an examination of this material does not yield much information about the operation itself. Because of this, the focus in the use of primary sources has to be as far as possible on documents that deal with the operation itself rather than with its consequences.

Even if the Zamosc operation has been studied previously and the events related to it are known quite well, some factors related to the subject have received less attention. The most significant of these is an assessment of the situation of the different population groups of the area. Such an assessment should above all address the question of whether all the inhabitant groups were victims. The situation of the Jews and the Poles is clear; they were expelled from their homes, their family relations were severed, they were used as forced labour and they were murdered. But nor was the position of the Ukrainians and the *Volksdeutsche* in any way enviable under National Socialist rule because both groups had to leave their homes, spent long periods of time in various camps and ended up settled in perilous areas. The position of the *Deutschstämmige* was not good either: they had to choose between being Germans or Poles, and whichever they chose; the consequences were beyond their control.

Questions related to terminology and the standpoint of the researcher are also relevant. The terminology which the National Socialists used was often intentionally misleading. Euphemisms were used above all to refer to measures directed against the local population. For example, the National Socialists tried

to camouflage killing with expressions like “*Sonderbehandlung*” (special treatment) or “*Evakuierung*” (evacuation). Also the term “*Umsiedlung*” (resettlement), a derivative of the word “*Siedlung*”, took on different significances depending on the situation. With reference to Germans, it did in fact mean resettlement, but when it was applied to the Jews, it was used to describe measures that most probably ended in death. Correspondingly, the word “*Ansiedlung*” (settlement) does not in itself express the fact that, according to the National Socialist ideology, the placing of one population group in an area required the removal of some other population group.

The use of euphemisms indicates that the National Socialists realised that their actions were basically wrong and involved crimes against humanity. The character of the operation examined here thus places its own demands on the research and, for example, a judgemental approach might be expected. However, it is more important to attempt to adopt a neutral stance because the indefensible nature of the aims of the National Socialist policies is obvious, and the implementers of these policies have already been condemned for their deeds in numerous war crime trials. The main aim of this work is to answer the research questions in the spirit of following sentence: *Wie es eigentlich gewesen ist?*

An explication of the strategy used in this study regarding the use of place names is also pertinent. Because the work is based on German-language sources, the German names in use at that time are used for Polish localities in the target area unless English names exist. The Polish names are given in parentheses.¹⁵ Also the policy for referring to the separate administrative districts established by the National Socialists needs to be explicated: again the German names in use at that time are used.

In addition to place names, it is necessary to specify the strategy for referring to the different organs of the National Socialist regime. The policy adopted here has been to use the original German name and/or abbreviation with an English translation appended in parentheses on its first appearance. The abbreviations used in the work have been included in a separate appendix.¹⁶

The National Socialist terminology also contained various titles and ranks. The ranks used by the SS were in effect military ranks and referred to the leadership of SS units of different sizes.¹⁷ In this text, ranks are given in their full German forms (albeit without the SS prefix) rather than as abbreviations or translated into their English equivalents. Other titles used in the National Socialist system also appear in the text; they too are given in their German forms and accompanied by English translations where appropriate.

¹⁵ The National Socialists renamed some Polish localities replacing earlier Polish names with German ones. For example, Lodz was renamed Litzmannstadt and Gdingen was called Gotenhafen. In this study, the German or English names are used.

¹⁶ The abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1.

¹⁷ SS ranks are listed in Appendix 2.

1.2 Previous researchs and sources

The operations of the SS in the area of Zamosc have aroused the interest of earlier researchers, and they have been dealt with in several studies. Bruno Wasser even made a study dealing solely with the Zamosc operation. Other Western studies only use the operation as an example or do not focus exclusively on it. Examples of such studies are Isabel Heinemann's *Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut* and Götz Aly's and Susanne Heim's *Vordenker der Vernichtung*.

The Zamosc operation has been the object of much interest in Poland, where it was studied quite early on. The most important of the Polish works for this research is Czeslaw Madajczyk's compilation of sources, the introduction to which provides an extensive treatment the subject. Madajczyk also deals with the subject in *Der Generalplan Ost* and *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*, which were published in Germany. He has further touched on the subject in a work about the history of occupied Poland.

Some biographical studies also deal with the Zamosc operation. Odilo Globocnik has inspired as many as three biographies. They are quite recent, but their quality varies. However, the writers have succeeded in acquiring a lot of primary sources and in interviewing contemporaries of Globocnik. There is also a number of works about Heinrich Himmler. The most significant of them is an exceptionally comprehensive and thorough biography written by Peter Longerich. Nor should Padfield's biography of Himmler be underrated. A biography of Hans Frank was published in 2006, and there is also information available about other persons who were connected with the Zamosc operation. They include *Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer Ost* (Higher SS and Police Chief East) Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger, *Chef des Reichssicherheitshauptamts* (Chief of the Reich Security Head Office) Reinhard Heydrich and Konrad Meyer who created the plans of the National Socialists for the future.

Other works of earlier research that are important from the point of view of this study deal with the SS, the Generalgouvernement and the National Socialist ideology together with its associated policies. There is plenty of research related to the SS. The first exhaustive studies appeared in the 1950s and the 1960s, since when the research has mostly focussed on individual parts of the organisation. The most significant of these for the present study are works by Hans Buchheim, Isabel Heinemann, Hermann Kaienburg, Robert Koehl, Markus Leniger, Jan-Erich Schulte and Michael Wildt. The ideology of the SS has also attracted the attention of researchers such as Josef Ackermann's and Bernd Wegner.

Martin Broszat and Gerhard Eisenblätter published works on the Generalgouvernement in the 1960s. There have also been numerous studies in Poland, but with a few exceptions they have not been translated into major world languages. Czeslaw Madajczyk's study has been translated into German, albeit in an abridged form. There are also works dealing with Distrikt Lublin.

They concentrate above all on the genocide of the Jews, and Bogdan Musiał's study, in particular, contains plenty of information about both the Generalgouvernement and Distrikt Lublin. Historians have produced works dealing with National Socialist ideology and foreign and war policy. The most important earlier works for the present research are studies by Eberhard Jäckel, Andreas Hillgruber, Hans Umbreit and Rolf-Dieter Müller.

Previous research also includes a number of published primary sources. They can be employed to study in particular the background factors that directly influenced the Zamosc operation, and some of the primary sources have proved to be extremely useful for this study. Himmler's office calendar is an exceptionally high-quality primary source, which makes it possible to create a background chronology for the settlement and expulsion operations. Furthermore, the thorough research work that has been carried out in connection with it helps the researcher to utilise and contextualise the information contained in the diary.

Other published primary sources that have been used in this work are Frank's office diary and works dealing with the National Socialists' plans for the future - *Der Generalplan Ost* and *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan* - as well as *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS*, which concerns the settlement and deportation operations. Frank's diary is a considerably abridged version of his original office diary of over 10,000 pages, which gives us an insight into Frank's views and the focuses of his activities. *Der Generalplan Ost* is an extremely comprehensive compilation of sources for the SS plans, but here too it has been necessary to be selective with regard to the citation of sources. In the work *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*, sources play a less prominent role than the actual research. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS* is as comprehensive as one can expect of a source compilation published in the mid-1970s. However, the book is targeted above all at Polish readers, and thus Polish-language sources have not been translated, in addition to which the work is vitiated by the fact that the source material has been reduced to samples.

Although the National Socialist demographic reorganization policy has been comprehensively presented various published primary sources, by no means all the source material has been published; the vast majority of it exists in archives in Germany and Poland. There are sources related to the Zamosc operation stored in various archives. The main archival sources used in this study are those conserved in the Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde and the Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie because these archives contain the most important materials concerning the Zamosc operation.

In the Berlin archive, it is possible to access documents produced by both the SS and the administration of the Generalgouvernement. The most extensive of the sources concerning the SS is the series *NS 19 Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS*. It contains a considerable amount of correspondence connected with the activities of Himmler as well as supplementary material sent to him.

Other significant archival sources concerning the SS in Berlin are the series *R 49 Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums*, *R 69 Einwandererzentralstelle Litzmannstadt* and *R 75 Umwandererzentralstelle Posen*. Both the R 49 and the R 75 series contain only a limited number of documents, but they are indispensable and indeed highly important for the present study. The R 69 series is very extensive, and it offers very detailed information about the operations of the *Einwandererzentralstelle (EWZ)* in Distrikt Lublin.

The Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde also contains personal documents related to the *Zamosc* operation. The most significant of these for this study are the *SS Führerpersonalakten*. The contents of the personal documents vary considerably, but there is, for example, a considerable amount of information available about *Odilo Globocnik's* activities.

In the Lublin branch of the Polish State Archives, *Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie*, there are materials concerning the local SS organisation. The archive holds various series of materials, of which *Umwandererzentralstelle Posen - Zweigstelle Zamosc* is the most significant for this study. Its documents have been vital for the execution of the research because they have made it possible to describe how the Germanisation project of the SS proceeded and the kind of operations that were connected to it.

Even though there are numerous documents available, none of them covers the whole operation without gaps, and the information has to be gathered by using several sources side by side. Especially sources concerning the SS organisation in Lublin are fragmented, nor is there any exact direct information available about *Globocnik's* activities. However, by using several sources together it is possible to create a clear picture of the *Zamosc* operation.

2 THE IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND AND THE SS ORGANISATION

Heinrich Himmler, the *Reichsführer-SS*, was the most influential person behind the development and operation of the SS organisation. His influence was based on the fact that he succeeded in adapting the SS organisation to changing ideological tasks and in raising it to a position in which it could carry out National Socialist ideology. Because this ideology also included a policy of expansion, it was natural that Himmler should make the SS available for carrying out those tasks that were related to this policy at a favourable moment in history.¹⁸

The relation between Himmler and the SS organisation was symbiotic,¹⁹ and Himmler used the organisation to achieve his own ideological objectives. This was possible because the attachment of power to the individual and the investing of some persons with great freedom of action were typical phenomena in the National Socialist administrative system.²⁰ It was, therefore, mainly Himmler's interpretation of National Socialist ideology that the SS carried out.

The commitment of the SS to implementing Himmler's views was based on the fact that he kept the members of the organisation tightly under his control – a control that even extended to their private lives – and imposed strict discipline on his organisation. The commitment was facilitated by the elitist character of the SS and by various factors which increased its solidarity, such as a common set of values and the idea of creating the organisation's own cult to replace Christianity.²¹

Even though the SS may have operated very independently indeed, it was a part of the *Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP, the National Socialist German Workers' Party) and represented an entity that was much

¹⁸ Longerich 2008, p. 11.

¹⁹ Longerich 2008, pp. 11–13.

²⁰ Longerich 2008, p. 765.

²¹ Longerich 2008, p. 764.

wider than itself. Because of this, it is necessary to examine the background and start with National Socialist expansionist ideology.

2.1 The main features of National Socialist expansionist thinking

National Socialist foreign policy expressed the National Socialists' idea of territorial expansion.²² Its central objective was to secure the survival possibilities of the people of Germany by acquiring a large enough living space.²³ The concept "living space" meant a geographical area which would ensure the survival possibilities of the nation in terms of food supply and security. The idea also involved the formation of a wider geographical entity by creating a strong continental bloc of states around Germany.²⁴

The expansion programme was based on ideas which Hitler had developed after the First World War. According to these, in order to conquer sufficient living space Germany should first establish and arm itself, after which it should secure its rear by allying itself with Britain and Italy, then defeat France and finally attack the Soviet Union. These objectives were soon exceeded and supplemented with the idea of gaining world power.²⁵ In spite of this, the idea of creating a continental bloc can be considered the National Socialists' primary foreign-policy objective, for which there existed fairly clear plans, and with regard to which even further-reaching plans were to be formulated.

The state provided the means for Hitler to carry out his expansion programme. The task of domestic policy was to make sure that the people would be able to carry out the foreign policy. It would not be possible to achieve these objectives without obtaining power over the state of Germany, which Hitler did with the help of the NSDAP. However, he did not bind himself to the party's programme or its ideology totally, regarding them as only a means of getting a sufficient number of persons to commit themselves to the party in order for him to be able to carry out his own ideas.²⁶

The National Socialist programme for the future, which emphasised territorial expansion, was above all Hitler's creation, but the attempt to carry it out would not be possible without a sufficient mass of supporters who had adopted the National Socialist ideology and who wanted to implement it in practice. Therefore, it is worth acquainting ourselves with the thinking of Hitler's supporters before we undertake a closer study of the expansion programme. The National Socialist ideology formed an entity which embraced not only views concerning socialism and revolution but also ideas about nature

²² Jäckel 1969, p. 53.

²³ Rich 1973, p. 6.

²⁴ Kletzin 2000, pp. 16, 24 117–125.

²⁵ Jäckel 1969, pp. 31–49, 122.

²⁶ Jäckel 1969, pp. 93–95, 125.

and biology. Furthermore, it included the acceptance of military organisation, violence and war.²⁷

The formation of the main elements of National Socialist ideology was influenced by a radical transformation of the conservative value system, in other words the so-called “conservative revolution”. This can be described as a process of renouncing rational thought. This new way of thinking included several other “anti-trends”, like the rejection of liberalism and democracy and anti-Semitism.²⁸

The changes in the value system further led to a change in the contents of some long familiar ideological concepts. Terms like “nationalism”, “authoritarianism” and “militarism”, which were significant from the point of view of National Socialist ideology, took on new meanings. Nationalism came to embody an aggressive future-oriented imperialism. It also included the idea of a stable and consensual community formed by the people, characterised by the concept “*Volksgemeinschaft*”. Commitment to the person of a charismatic leader together with a willingness for submission and sacrifice came to occupy a central position in the concept of authoritarianism. Militarism, for its part, came to include the idea of preparing peacetime society for a state of war.²⁹

The plans of Hitler and the National Socialists’ world of ideas created the foundation for a manifold policy of conquest, but first it is worth taking a look at how the idea of living space and of the right to conquer it came into being. The concept of living space was based on geopolitical ideas developed by Friedrich Ratzell, who also connected it to theories of race. Ratzell’s ideas were further developed by the Swede Rudolf Kjellen and by Sir Halford MacKinder in Britain. Eventually Karl Haushofer, who lived in Munich,³⁰ produced a synthesis of his predecessors’ ideas which was generally in accord with the National Socialists’ ideas of expansion.³¹

According to Haushofer, the natural direction for Germany to expand was to the east, but he considered that it was a perilous venture to attempt to conquer living space by means of a military campaign.³² The National Socialists agreed about the direction of expansion, and they were especially interested in the territories of Russia and the countries bordering on it.³³ Unlike Haushofer, however, they did not consider the conquering of living space here to be

²⁷ According to Hermann Kaienburg, the main elements of the National Socialist ideology were: *das völkische Element, das Element des nationalen Sozialismus, das nationalrevolutionäre Element, das aktivisch-vitale Element, das Element des biologischen Naturalismus*. Furthermore, the ideology also included: *die Zustimmung zu militärischer Ordnungsvorstellungen, Gewalt und Krieg*. Kaienburg 2003, pp. 59–60.

²⁸ Wegner 1982, pp. 25–38. Cf. Kaienburg 2003, pp. 58–59.

²⁹ Wegner 1982, pp. 26–38.

³⁰ Haushofer’s place of residence was significant because the headquarters of the National Socialist Party was in Munich. For a broader treatment of the significance of the ideological atmosphere of the city for National Socialism, see Auerbach 1977.

³¹ Kamenetsky 1961, pp. 28–33.

³² Kamenetsky 1961, pp. 30–33.

³³ Hitler presented the idea in *Mein Kampf*, and it can be found for example in Heiber’s article on *Generalplan Ost*. Heiber 1958, p. 281.

impossible because they believed that Russia had been debilitated by the Bolsheviks' elimination of the intelligentsia, the leaders of the country.³⁴

The central direction of the National Socialists' expansion policies was also influenced by other factors than the assumption that the territories in the east would be easy to conquer: Germans had lived in eastern Europe for ages because migration to the east had already begun in the Middle Ages and had continued in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. The settlers had thrived in their new environment and spread out from the Baltic countries all the way to the Volga and the Caucasus,³⁵ and, most importantly, it was also believed that they had decisively influenced the formation of states in eastern Europe.³⁶ The economic significance of the eastern territories was considered the most important factor; for example, Hitler regarded them as a guarantee of the independence of Germany.³⁷ Furthermore, it was believed that the possession of territories in the east would stabilise German society.³⁸ The stability and the independence were especially desirable after the First World War because of the social disorder and the economic that beset the country. According to the racial theories of the times, success in the east would be most probable³⁹ because the Slavs were considered inferior to the Germans.⁴⁰ These ideas were further confirmed by the notion that the master race was entitled to conquer living space and to subordinate the original inhabitants.⁴¹

The historical, economic and social points are fairly clear and easily understandable underlying factors of National Socialist expansion policies, but the factors related to racial ideology were the result of a considerably more complex development. It was founded on the division of humans into races on the basis of visible and assumed characteristics⁴² and the notion that these races were not equal.

This racial ideology also embodied the view that the dominant group was of Aryan descent, and that they were located on the highest level in the racial hierarchy. The idea was further developed in such a way that it considered possible to trace a line from the Aryans through the ancient Germanic peoples and on to the Germans, and it even came to reassert the right of the Germans to rule other peoples. The idea that the Germans were justified in re-conquering their ancient ancestors' homelands was thus evolved.⁴³ The emphasis on the Aryans was closely connected to the so-called *Völkische Weltanschauung*, an

³⁴ Jäckel 1969, pp. 45–46; Rich 1973, p. 7.

³⁵ Koehl 1957, pp. 3–4.

³⁶ Rich 1973, p. 7.

³⁷ Umbreit 1988, p. 215.

³⁸ Rich 1973, pp. 7–8.

³⁹ Kamenetsky 1961, pp. 28–29.

⁴⁰ Goldhagen 1997, p. 411.

⁴¹ Burleigh & Wippermann 1991, p. 39.

⁴² According to Hans F. K. Günther's race definitions, which the National Socialists also used, there were six major races in Europe. Günther called them *nordisch*, *fälisch*, *westisch*, *dinarisch*, *östisch (alpine)*, *ostbaltisch*. Wasser 1993B, p. 53.

⁴³ Burleigh & Wippermann 1991, pp. 25–32. Cf. Reinicke 2003, p. 29.

outlook which was based mainly on race ideology and included a belief in the superiority of the Aryans.⁴⁴

Even though the National Socialists did not profess to being absolute supporters of this idea themselves, they exploited the possibilities offered by it.⁴⁵ The ideas of the *Völkische Weltanschauung* offered the National Socialists a basis for manipulating and using people because it was one of the goals of this ideology to lead the people to national awareness. The objectives also embraced the idea of the rebirth of the German nation, which was to be carried out by purifying the race. A programme of eugenics was to produce tall, long-skulled and blue-eyed Germans. The final objective was a purebred German-Aryan individual, whose task would be to create a Greater Germanic State containing all the Germanic peoples.⁴⁶

It was naturally easy for the National Socialists to accept the ideas about the eugenic improvement of the people and territorial expansion embodied in *Völkische Weltanschauung* thinking. A Greater German State was also one of Hitler's objectives, but the relationship between National Socialist ideology and *Völkische Weltanschauung* thinking is indicated by the fact that Hitler did not include the establishment of a Greater Germanic State among his immediate objectives. Until the arrangement of the great powers was finally settled, Hitler considered that it was enough to hold the conquered territories on a temporary basis and to exploit the occupied areas as effectively as possible because the actual rearrangement of Europe was a task that could be postponed until after the war. In questions concerning the rearrangement of Europe, Hitler was probably influenced by the fact that he was not totally sure how the conquered areas would be used after the war except for those territories that had previously belonged to Germany or those in the east which constituted living space.⁴⁷

The significance and the meaning of living space in the whole National Socialist expansion programme is indicated by the fact that the most consistent element in National Socialist expansionist thinking was the Eastern Campaign. Hitler began to steer Germany towards war immediately after his rise to power, and the officers of the *Reichswehr* (armed forces) were already told in February 1933 that the objectives were to re-establish Germany's lost position as a political force and to conquer and populate the German living space in the east.⁴⁸

The significance of the Eastern Campaign was emphasised by the fact that the National Socialists considered the Soviet Union to be the most dangerous enemy of Germany because they regarded it as being led by a Jewish-Bolshevist clique that was extremely dangerous for the whole of Western Europe.⁴⁹ They

⁴⁴ Puschner 2002, p. 28–31.

⁴⁵ Puschner 2002, pp. 25–26, 36. Cf. Kroll 1998, pp. 55 72–73. The race doctrine typical of *Völkisch* thinking has even been identified as the core of National Socialist ideology. Lund 1995, p. 23.

⁴⁶ Puschner 2002, pp. 27–29, 31, 35. Cf. Lund 1995, p. 23.

⁴⁷ Umbreit 1988, pp. 95–96.

⁴⁸ Hermand 1988, p. 315; Thies 1980, p. 106; Weissbecker 1994, p. 9.

⁴⁹ Hillgruber 1972, pp. 136–139, 142.

believed that the consequences would be disastrous if they did not succeed in suppressing Jewish Bolshevism. Correspondingly, they also believed that if they did succeed in this, the question of supremacy in Europe would be finally settled and Germany would even be in a position to contend for world domination.⁵⁰

The major territorial targets in the east comprised the Baltic countries, the Ukraine and the Crimea, but the final goal was to gain possession of areas up to a line running from Archangel to Astrakhan or the Urals.⁵¹ The plan to conquer these areas also made the parts of Poland that had not belonged to Germany earlier one of the targets for conquest.⁵² Hitler's original objectives further included the restoration of the areas lost by Germany in the First World War. Furthermore, the area of the present Czech Republic was also among the expansion targets because Bohemia and Moravia were regarded as naturally belonging to a Greater German State.⁵³

After the first territorial objectives were achieved, the next objective would be to populate the living space with a people classified as German, in other words the Germanisation of the area at the expense of the original inhabitants. Hitler had thought that this would be possible by directing the flow of Germans eastwards instead of to the west and south.⁵⁴ The populating of the living space with Germans was connected with the idea of a Greater German State because other Germanic peoples than the inhabitants of the Germany were to be sent to the east.⁵⁵ Thus it was natural to include the countries populated by Germanic peoples in the expansion programme.⁵⁶ Eventually the objective was to establish a state which would reach to from the North Cape to the Alps and from the Atlantic to the Black Sea.⁵⁷

The National Socialists' aims of supremacy were also directed at Finland, the Slovak Republic and the Balkan states. Those countries were to be attached to a German-led bloc through different relations of interdependence. Nor would other states on the continent of Europe remain unaffected: Switzerland, Spain and Portugal were to lose their independence, while France was to be suppressed into impotence, and Italy was to be directed to focus its attention on the south.⁵⁸

⁵⁰ Hillgruber 1972, pp. 137, 140, 143; Thies 1980, pp. 150, 155.

⁵¹ Umbreit 1988, pp. 78–79, 134; Hillgruber 1972, p. 141.

⁵² In his work *Der Deutsche Drang nach Osten*, Wolfgang Wippermann indicates that the ideological totality of areas for annexation in the east included the territory of Poland. Wippermann 1981, pp. 111–112. On the other hand, one might naturally ask how the National Socialists would have obtained territories in Russia without conquering Poland first. Thus it is no wonder that Hass states that Poland was regarded as a part of German living space. Hass 1994, p. 218. Umbreit's claim that the National Socialists wanted to populate Polish areas with Germans also becomes understandable in this light. Umbreit 1988, p. 269.

⁵³ Umbreit 1988, pp. 122, 124.

⁵⁴ Ackermann 1970, pp. 201–202.

⁵⁵ Looock 1970, p. 270.

⁵⁶ Röhr 1996, pp. 312–315.

⁵⁷ Gruchmann 1962, p. 120; Umbreit 1988, p. 122.

⁵⁸ Gruchmann 1962, pp. 72–80, 94, 96–97, 103, 109, 111.

Of the major European powers, only Britain was not among the countries to be conquered or subjected. This can be explained by the fact that Britain was regarded as having a place as an ally of Germany in the initial stages of the rearrangement of Europe: if Britain accepted Germany's eastern expansion and suppression of France, Germany would forget its aspirations for colonies, world trade and a navy.⁵⁹

Although idea of the domination of the continent of Europe by a Greater German State was a characteristic particularly of the National Socialists, similar ideas were held by other groups in Germany, and some scholars have claimed that previously separate expansionist ideologies coalesced in National Socialist Germany.⁶⁰ One of the background ideas was a vision of a *Grosswirtschaftsraum* (Greater European Economic Area). It was developed in the 1930s by the leading circles in German economic planning. The idea was to replace a liberalist economic model with a broad economic area, which would guarantee the self-sufficiency of Germany.⁶¹

The development of the *Grosswirtschaftsraum* was not totally restricted to Europe because the idea was to add the colonies of Africa to the area of the continent of Europe. Hitler, too, was interested in this idea. However, the colonies were only to have a supplementary effect on the self-sufficiency of the economic zone. The idea of a *Grosswirtschaftsraum* did not serve Hitler's views very well because he did not believe that sufficient self-sufficiency and security could be achieved by commercial policy alone.⁶²

National Socialist expansionist thinking can be summarized as follows: Germany should first launch a strike against an impotent Western Europe, then conquer and secure living space in the east to gain access to its sources of raw materials and finally establish its position as the only continental superpower, if necessary, by suppressing any competing non-European superpowers. After that Germany should swallow up all the Germanic states of Europe to create a Greater Germanic State and initiate a Germanisation project in the eastern territories.

The main trend of the expansionist thinking emphasised expansion to the east. These territories were to serve Germany primarily as a supplier of food and raw materials in a possible siege situation during future operations aiming at world domination. The view that the territories that were the targets of eastern expansion constituted living space for the German people was also clearly expressed, but there were no very concrete plans concerning it.

It is understandable that the Greater Germanic State and the Germanisation project were given less attention because the populating of wide expanses of territory with a Germanic population would be a project that would take several generations to complete. The National Socialist war policy, on the

⁵⁹ Gruchmann 1962, pp. 72–73.

⁶⁰ Rössler & Schleiermacher 1993, p. 7; Kahrs 1992, pp. 9–26.

⁶¹ Umbreit 1988, p. 210. Germany had already tried to build an economic and political empire in central and eastern Europe during the First World War. For a more comprehensive treatment of the subject, see Koehl 1957, p. 5.

⁶² Umbreit 1988, pp. 79, 134, 210, 212–213.

other hand, was to be implemented in a much shorter time span. In practice, this was shown by the fact that the final rearrangement of Europe was postponed until after the war and by the fact that the areas regarded as German living space were to be placed under the control of more or less temporary administrations.⁶³

The idea of utilising the conquered areas to supply the needs of warfare and postponing the final objectives until later in the future seemed to be a justifiable solution because it would ensure that the limited resources would be enough for the large projects to be carried out and that the wide areas conquered would most probably remain relatively peaceful and productive at the most crucial times.

The postponement did not mean that the gathering of background information, for example, was renounced. In Germany there already operated a whole group of institutions that gathered information about and studied the areas targeted by the expansion policies, and new ones were established. Among these institutions were the *Reichsstelle für Raumordnung* (the Reich Centre for Territorial Research) and the related *Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft für Raumordnung* (the Reich Work Community for Territorial Research). Other institutions included the *Auslandwissenschaftliche Fakultät* (the Faculty for Foreign Studies) in the University of Berlin and the *Deutsche Auslandwissenschaftliche Institut* (the German Institute for Foreign Studies).⁶⁴ The study of foreign countries also was practised in the *Deutsche Auslands-Institut* (the German Institute for Foreign Studies) in Stuttgart, the *Deutsche Akademie* (the German Academy) in Munich and the *Deutsche Stiftung* (the German Foundation) in Berlin.⁶⁵ In addition to such state institutions there were several research institutes dedicated to the study of eastern Europe⁶⁶ and a whole group of different research communities,⁶⁷ whose work focussed both on areas inhabited by Germans and on former German colonies.⁶⁸

Even though many questions concerning the expansionist thinking remained unclear, many National Socialists devoted themselves to the project and tried to carry out tasks related to it to the best of their ability. However, this did not take place in perfect harmony and mutual understanding because the National Socialists who were interested in the matter had more or less divergent ideas of their own about it.⁶⁹ The problematical situation was further

⁶³ Hans Umbreit indicates the lack of unity in the occupation administration in the series *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*. The subsection which deals with the matter is entitled "Die mangelhafte Einheit der Verwaltung". Umbreit 1988, pp. 102-121.

⁶⁴ Kletzin 2000, pp. 34-40, 44-53.

⁶⁵ Rössler 1990, p. 114.

⁶⁶ For a broader treatment of the subject, see Burkert 2000.

⁶⁷ For a broader treatment of the subject, see Fahlbush 1999.

⁶⁸ Rössler 1990, s. 114 - 115.

⁶⁹ In *Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik*, Rolf-Dieter Müller describes differences in views related to the settlement use of the eastern territories. Müller 1991.

affected by the fact that conquering large tracts of land inevitably led to the desire to control them and to competition for this control.⁷⁰

While the National Socialists may have had different views on the details of expansion and living space policies, the task of the armed forces was clearly only to conquer the living space.⁷¹ After that, the areas concerned were to be placed under civil administration. Although, from the point of view of the SS, all the areas under civil administration were of interest, and Himmler wanted to exert an influence in all sectors of the future Greater Germanic State, he tried to extend his power above all to those areas that were defined as living space.⁷²

From the point of view of the SS, the most interesting areas were those that were annexed to Germany: the *Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren* (the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia), the *Generalgouvernement* in Poland, the *Reichskommissariat Ostland* (the Reich Commissariat Ostland) covering the Baltic region and Belarus and the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine* (the Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine). Himmler tried to justify his interference by appealing to the unsuitability of the civil administration to rule the living space, and the weaker structure of civilian organisations compared with the military administration made the intrusion of the SS possible. Himmler's operational scope was further strengthened by the fact that he enjoyed Hitler's support in conflict situations.⁷³

The fuzziness of National Socialist expansionist ideas and the setting-up of separate regional administrative organizations created the basis for the SS to gain a firm grip on the National Socialist project for the future. Since only the main features of the expansionist policy were outlined, an enthusiastic National Socialist with organisational skills could start to fill in the details required to implement the project and to develop the organisation for it.

The situation was favourable from Himmler's point of view because the other leading National Socialists did not take responsibility for the National Socialist ideology or producing a policy to implement it as he did but only tried to use it to secure and strengthen their own positions.⁷⁴ The situation became even more tempting for the SS because of a proposal to exclude the traditional organs of the government from ideological projects and the fact that the administration of territories annexed in the expansion was not run centrally by an organ at the national level. Thus, an opportunity opened up for the SS to implement its own interpretation of the National Socialist racial expansion programme.

⁷⁰ Umbreit 1988, p. 121.

⁷¹ This is also indicated by the fact that Hitler regarded the military occupation administration as just a necessary evil and did not consider that his generals were suitable persons to handle the administration of the occupation. Umbreit 1988, p. 103.

⁷² Umbreit 1988, p. 115.

⁷³ Umbreit 1988, pp. 100, 116–117.

⁷⁴ Fest 1974, pp. 13–15.

2.2 The SS ideology as a manifestation of National Socialist thinking

It was Heinrich Himmler who formulated the ideology of the SS. It was to replace existing values, and it was intended to offer the members of the organisation a new worldview and to guide and motivate their actions.⁷⁵ Himmler's work was facilitated by the rather homogeneous personal background of the members of the SS, in which either participation in the First World War or experience of it in youth was an important element. Other significant factors were approval of the social system preceding that war and difficulty in adapting to the new situation created by it.⁷⁶

Heinrich Himmler was born in 1900 into a middle-class Bavarian family. His father, Gebhard Himmler, worked as a teacher and headmaster, and through his occupation as a tutor he had connections with the local royal family of Wittelsbach. Heinrich's mother, Anna, was a housewife according to the custom of the time.⁷⁷ The Himmlers' family life has been described as well regulated and typical of their social class.⁷⁸

In Himmler's childhood and youth, some features which later became essential elements of SS ideology stand out. One of them was the value given to history and the past,⁷⁹ because in Himmler's home an active interest was taken in history.⁸⁰ History also was an essential part of Himmler's education as were classical languages and literature. The second significant factor was the interest he showed in a career as an officer. And, in fact, he succeeded in enlisting as an officer cadet at the beginning of 1918.⁸¹

Himmler took a shortened course of officer training and was awaiting service at the front when the First World War ended. This dashed his hopes of a military career because he was discharged soon after the armistice without being promoted to officer rank.⁸² The war completely changed the direction of the young Himmler's life because he had been given a taste of a seemingly inaccessible military career but then had it taken away from him. Politics provided an alternative option because it offered an opportunity to do something about the deplorable situation in society. Thus it is no wonder that Himmler became interested in politics during the confused period of time following the armistice.⁸³

⁷⁵ Banach 1998, p. 89.

⁷⁶ Kaienburg 2003, pp. 57–58.

⁷⁷ Padfield 1990, pp. 21–23, 26, 58.

⁷⁸ Witte & Co 1999 p. 21.

⁷⁹ For more extensive discussion of this, see Reinicke 2003.

⁸⁰ Padfield 1990, pp. 22–23, 26.

⁸¹ Longerich 2008, pp. 20, 28–31.

⁸² Padfield 1990, pp. 29–31; Smith 1979, pp. 75–76, 85–86.

⁸³ Longerich 2008, p. 32; Padfield 1990, p. 31; Witte & Co 1999 p. 21; Smith 1979, pp. 87–88.

Himmler was drawn into politics in the beginning of 1919. At that time a revolutionary Soviet republic was briefly established in Bavaria.⁸⁴ Even though the armed forces suppressed the Soviet republic, counterrevolutionary Bavarians did not remain inactive and formed voluntary troops to support the regular army. Himmler also joined a troop called *Freikorps Oberland*. His objective was evidently not only to participate in the suppression of the Soviet republic but also to join the armed forces again.⁸⁵ However, Himmler's service in the *Freikorps* was short because he went back to his studies and finished the upper secondary school.⁸⁶

The question of the direction of his life and a career then became current. Himmler had to give up the idea of a military career because the *Freikorps* unit in which he had enlisted was disbanded. However, from the point of view of his ideological development, his service in the *Freikorps* was very significant because in it he became familiar with nationalism, racial doctrines and anti-Semitism and also with a view that emphasised the connection between man and the land.⁸⁷

Since the way to a military career was barred, Himmler decided to start university studies in the field of agriculture.⁸⁸ The choice of subject, which at first sight seems to be rather peculiar, can be explained by the fact that it was a typical alternative to an officer's career in the conditions of those times.⁸⁹ When he began his studies, Himmler was not a fanatic who supported extreme ideas but rather a romantic who had accepted the prevailing racial doctrines and dreamt about a return to the past.⁹⁰ However, he started developing into a radical revolutionary, for he continued his activities in the *Freikorps*. The significance of this is emphasised by the fact that the *Freikorps* is considered to have been the intellectual and physical precursor of National Socialism.⁹¹

Himmler's worldview developed relatively rapidly in a more radical direction, and after his first year at university it already embodied the major elements of his later thinking. These elements included anti-communism, a belief in a worldwide conspiracy of the Jews, a view of the unity of the Germanic peoples, ideas about the significance of "racial purity", "back to the land" notions and a German migration into eastern Europe.⁹²

Himmler's thinking does not seem to have significantly broadened later, although for example his ideas on the back to the land movement were clarified.⁹³ The idea of a return to the land is explained by the fact that it belonged to a noetic world of adolescents who supported the ideology of the *Völkische Weltanschauung*. An example of such eager colonists is offered by a

⁸⁴ Padfield 1990, 35–36.

⁸⁵ Padfield 1990, p. 36; Witte & Co 1999 p. 21.

⁸⁶ Padfield 1990, p. 31; Witte & Co 1999 p. 21; Smith 1979, pp. 89–90.

⁸⁷ Padfield 1990, pp. 35–38; Smith 1979, pp. 94–96.

⁸⁸ Padfield 1990, pp. 36–39; Smith 1979, p. 107.

⁸⁹ Longerich 2008, p. 34.

⁹⁰ Padfield 1990, pp. 38–39.

⁹¹ Padfield 1990, pp. 41–42, 45–46. Cf. Smith 1979, pp. 108, 127.

⁹² Padfield 1990, p. 47.

⁹³ Witte & Co 1999 p. 22.

group called *Bund Artam*, to which Himmler also belonged. Its objective was to promote migration to the country, and it has been described as a bastion of anti-Slavic, anti-urban and anti-Semitic sentiments.⁹⁴

Even though the young Himmler actively participated in politics, he was not yet a fulltime politician. He graduated in summer 1922 and began to work in a company that produced fertilisers near Munich in September 1922.⁹⁵ The summer of 1922 was a significant turning point in Himmler's life because he would have liked to continue his studies in the field of political science but the rampant hyperinflation prevented his parents from financing his studies.⁹⁶

The transition to working life did not mean giving up politics, and Himmler's political activity focussed on a paramilitary organisation called *Reichsflagge*. When it broke up, Himmler followed Captain Ernst Röhm into another group called *Reichskriegsflagge*. Participation in the operations of these organisations brought him into closer contact with the National Socialists, and he joined the NSDAP in August 1923.⁹⁷ Himmler's enrolment in the NSDAP is an indication that that he had become an active supporter of its racial doctrines, radical nationalism and expansionist policies. The following stage was to become actively involved in National Socialist politics, a manifestation of which was in his participation in Hitler's failed putsch in the forces of the *Reichskriegsflagge* in November 1923.⁹⁸

The attempted coup was followed by a spell of unemployment for a few months which was filled with political activities. The final sign of Himmler's new course was his taking up a job as Gregor Strasser's secretary in summer 1924.⁹⁹ It opened up an opportunity for rapid advancement in the NSDAP.¹⁰⁰ Himmler moved back to Munich along with Strasser in autumn 1926, when the latter took up his new position as *Gauleiter* of Lower Bavaria.¹⁰¹ In Munich there would be opportunities for Himmler to get a post in the central administration of the NSDAP. He did not need to wait long because already in autumn 1927 he was appointed Deputy Leader of the SS and in January 1929 *Reichsführer-SS* (RFSS, State Leader of the SS).¹⁰²

Himmler's worldview was essentially complete when he was appointed *Reichsführer-SS*. In his new position, Himmler had a possibility to disseminate his ideas to a wider audience, and in summer 1931 he lectured the leaders of the SS about the objectives and the purposes of the SS and its relation to other parts of the NSDAP. According to Himmler, the SS was a cadre that owed allegiance above all to Hitler and which would be a trailblazer in the future final struggle against communism.¹⁰³

⁹⁴ Longerich 2008, pp. 109–110.

⁹⁵ Padfield 1990, p. 57.

⁹⁶ Longerich 2008, pp. 71–73.

⁹⁷ Padfield 1990, p. 58; Witte & Co 1999 p. 23.

⁹⁸ Padfield 1990, pp. 65–67.

⁹⁹ Padfield 1990, pp. 67, 72, 76–77, 80; Witte & Co 1999 p. 23; Smith 1979, pp. 203–205.

¹⁰⁰ Padfield 1990, p. 81.

¹⁰¹ Padfield 1990, pp. 83–84.

¹⁰² Padfield 1990, pp. 86, 92; Witte & Co 1999, pp. 23–24; Smith 1979, p. 225.

¹⁰³ Longerich 2008, pp. 132–134.

Himmler's views on the future task of the SS fell on fertile soil because the outlook of the members of the SS emphasised conservative ideals like order and honour, the fulfilling of obligations and the acceptance of subordination to authority.¹⁰⁴ Such ideals also constituted the foundation of its spirit of loyalty, which was manifested in the admission and acceptance of the absolute power of Hitler. It has been considered that the loyalty the SS offered to Hitler was similar to that usually offered by an army to a ruler.¹⁰⁵

The SS can, in fact, be compared to an army: even though the loyalty of the members of the SS and their commitment to the National Socialist ideology were in principle voluntary, it is possible to regard the members of the SS as political soldiers who knew what they were fighting for and who operated in politics as if in a war. An ideal SS man carried out his orders without question. Hence no task was considered to be impossible for the SS.¹⁰⁶

The properties of the SS made it an effective tool for implementing the National Socialist ideology. This was understood within the organisation, and the idea of the organisation's own excellence was consciously nourished. The SS began to create an image of itself as an elite within the National Socialist movement. This notion was quite easy to justify because, even before the National Socialists' rise to power, the SS organisation was already regarded as constituting the core of the movement and its members as being the party's most active fighters.¹⁰⁷ The image was further enhanced by the fact that the organisation was understood as a kind of party police force.¹⁰⁸ This trend was promoted by Himmler, who distanced the SS from the spontaneous radicalism and violence represented, for example, by the *Sturmabteilung* (SA, Assault Division, often called Stormtroopers).¹⁰⁹

The separation of the SS from other branches of the party did not pass unnoticed, and the idea of its superiority was not liked in other party organisations. However, this did not constitute a drawback because Hitler allowed the SS to have its own contacts with business and to develop its own ideological line to counterbalance its ostracism by the rest of the party.¹¹⁰ This loosened the links between the SS organisation and the family of National Socialist organisations even further and made it more independent and more distinct.

The differentiation was also served by the idea of developing of the SS into a biological elite. According to this plan, the SS was to be developed into a group with a uniform genotype. The result was to be a "blood community".¹¹¹

¹⁰⁴ Kaienburg 2003, p. 58.

¹⁰⁵ Koehl 1983, p. 91.

¹⁰⁶ Buchheim 1999A, pp. 219, 221-222, 233, 241.

¹⁰⁷ Koehl 1983, p. 48.

¹⁰⁸ Bracher 1980, p. 382.

¹⁰⁹ Koehl 1983, p. 72.

¹¹⁰ Koehl 1983, p. 51.

¹¹¹ Koehl 1983, p. 48.

Himmler put the matter in concrete terms by describing the SS as both a military and a racial organisation.¹¹²

The conception of the SS as an elite group was not restricted to the idea of developing it into a biological elite; it also involved the notion that the SS was an order of knighthood.¹¹³ Behind this probably lay the fact that royalty had been admired in Himmler's home.¹¹⁴ Himmler used the Jesuits and the *Deutsche Orden* (German Order of Knighthood) as models.¹¹⁵ The use of the Jesuits as an example was based on the idea that they had committed themselves totally to the values of their order,¹¹⁶ while the *Deutsche Orden* served as an example because of its settlement of territories in the east.¹¹⁷

The idea of the SS as an order of knighthood favoured the development of the organisation because it served both to differentiate the organisation from others and to enhance its internal solidarity. The notion can be linked to the organisation's use of different interpretations of history to promote its own interests and with the development of special SS traditions.¹¹⁸ The idea of an order of knighthood was also practical in the daily run of National Socialist politics because it helped to distinguish the members of the organisation and to bind them more closely together. This was important because notoriously the National Socialist system was beset by constant power struggles.¹¹⁹

The notion of the SS as an order of knighthood also made it possible to develop the values that united its members.¹²⁰ It was important to commit the members of the SS to the values of the organisation because the practical implementation of National Socialism involved tasks that were in conflict with the dominant values prevailing in German society. Because of this, the SS rejected and began to oppose Christianity.¹²¹ Behind this lay the idea of replacing Christian values with the "virtues" of the ancient Germans, which would make it possible to fight against enemies who were classified as "sub-human".¹²²

The idea behind the resistance to Christianity was that membership of the church would prevent the absolute commitment of the SS members to

¹¹² Himmler stated the matter thus: "*Die SS ist ein soldatischer, nationalsozialistischer Orden nordisch bestimmter Männer und eine geschworene Gemeinschaft ihrer Sippen.*" Longerich 2008, p. 365.

¹¹³ The idea of the SS organisation as an order of knighthood has been discussed by Josef Ackermann in his work *Heinrich Himmler als Ideologe* and by Bernd Wegner in *Hitlers Politische Soldaten: Die Waffen-SS 1933-1945*. Wegner 1982.

¹¹⁴ Kaienburg 2003, pp. 47-48.

¹¹⁵ Wegner 1982, pp. 39-41.

¹¹⁶ Ziegler 1989, p. 7.

¹¹⁷ Wegner 1982, pp. 40-41.

¹¹⁸ The application of history to the needs of the SS organisation has been discussed by Wolfgang Reinicke in *Instrumentalisierung von Geschichte durch Heinrich Himmler und die SS*. Reinicke 2003.

¹¹⁹ Himmler fully realised this and tried to keep the SS men apart from the other National Socialist institutions and to preserve the integrity of his organisation. Wegner 1982, p. 55.

¹²⁰ Wegner 1982, p. 41.

¹²¹ Wegner 1982, p. 51. National Socialism in itself was already anti-Christian, but the SS wanted to be in the vanguard in this matter too. Ackermann 1970, pp. 88-90.

¹²² Longerich 2008, p. 275.

furthering the ends of National Socialism. This would create an impossible situation because utter loyalty was an essential part of the SS ideology.¹²³ The motto "*SS Mann, deine Ehre Heisst Treue*" (SS man, your honour means fidelity) launched by Hitler in 1931 emphasised the significance of loyalty. This was manifested in practice by the commitment of the SS men to serving Hitler without questioning the methods they used or the objectives of their actions.¹²⁴

The rejection of Christianity started a religious project within the SS because it was considered that its members needed the spiritual support that a religion could offer. A doctrine to replace Christianity was developed from a cult of ancestor worship.¹²⁵ However, the background of the SS religion was wider than the religion of the ancient Germans, including as it did also interpretations of history, astrology and the doctrine of reincarnation.¹²⁶

The SS ideology also involved the utilisation of historical examples to bind the members to the organisation by creating an awareness of history in them. In practice, this was manifested in views in which some periods of the past were purposely romanticised and in attempts to connect the past seamlessly to the present and the future. The Prehistoric Age was the most important of the periods employed, and interest was focussed on the ancient Germanic society because it was possible to take from this numerous elements that were useful both for the development of the organisation's ideology and for its practical activities.¹²⁷

In addition to the Prehistoric Age, the Middle Ages were also utilised in creating the ideology of the SS. A suitable example of a strong leader was found in the character of King Heinrich I, and an example of territorial expansion was found in the operations of the Deutsche Orden. Later periods, on the other hand, were seen mainly from the point of view of the unification of Germany, which led to an emphasis on the importance of Prussia.¹²⁸

A view according to which the individual was a part of the historical continuum served as the basis for connecting the past, the present and the future into an integral whole. Thus the individual was obliged to play his or her part in ensuring the continuation of life.¹²⁹ It was a natural step from this idea to the notion that the Germans were the descendants of an ancient Germanic people. Because the Germanic people was considered incomparable in its qualities with respect to other groups of people, it was natural that the modern Germans should also be regarded as incomparable with respect to other peoples. The idea of superiority was further connected to the policy of

¹²³ Ackermann 1970, p. 95; Wegner 1982, p. 51.

¹²⁴ Wegner 1982, pp. 42–44.

¹²⁵ Ackermann 1970, pp. 40–42, 64, 75, 77, 82–84.

¹²⁶ Longerich describes the matter thus: "*Durch Mischung von Geschichte, Geschichtmythos, Sterndeutung und Sternbeobachtung Welterklärungs und Wiederverkörperungstheorie entstand hier tatsächlich ein Religionsersatz, möglicherweise vermischt mit Vorstellungen über eine germanische Urreligion.*" Longerich 2008, p. 295.

¹²⁷ The following elements were involved: *bäuerliche Dorfkultur, heroisches Kriegerertum, unchristlichen Naturglauben, Humanitätsfeindlichkeit und Todessehnsucht, Gefolgschaftsprinzip und Rassenreinheit.* Wegner 1982, p. 60.

¹²⁸ Wegner 1982, pp. 61–65. Cf. Reinicke 2003, pp. 46–52.

¹²⁹ Wegner 1982, pp. 57–59. Cf. Ackermann 1970, pp. 64–65.

territorial expansion because the area inhabited by the Germans was thought to be too small and the superiority of the Germans would entitle them to conquer new areas. It was possible in turn to connect to these beliefs the idea that the "back to the land" movement was good for the genotype.¹³⁰

Behind the thinking connected to the land and to territorial expansion was the ideology of *Blut und Boden* (blood and soil), which in turn was influenced by the ideology of the *Völkische Weltanschauung*.¹³¹ The contents of the *Blut und Boden* ideology can be defined as follows: The concept "blood" signified the human genotype which had taken shape over the ages as man fought against nature, i.e. the soil. In this way a connection was formed between blood and the land, resulting in a common unity of blood and soil.¹³² From these ideas followed the notion that a human being who lived on his farm produced healthy descendants, and this idea could then be used to justify the importance of the living in the countryside.¹³³

The thinking that emphasised farming was intensified by presenting urban living as the opposite of healthy rural life. The danger of urbanisation lay in the loss of the connection with the soil. Urbanisation was dangerous because it would destroy both the genotype and the culture based on it. The consequence would be the decline of "the Nordic race".¹³⁴

The person who developed the *Blut und Boden* ideology was Richard Walther Darré. He was the first leader of the *Rasse und Siedlungsamt* (RuSA, the Race and Settlement Office) of the SS. Later he was *Reichsminister für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft* (Minister for Food and Agriculture) and *Reichsbauernführer* (Reich Farmers' Leader).¹³⁵ It was mainly Darré's ideas that provided the basis for the expansionist ideology of the SS, and, with Alfred Rosenberg, he was a one of the major sources on whom Himmler founded his ideas.¹³⁶ Darré's thinking served Himmler well, because he, too, was a representative of the *Völkische Weltanschauung* ideology and interested in re-establishing a more permanent connection between the Germans and the soil they lived on.¹³⁷

However, although it was based on it, Himmler's thinking differed from Darré's. The major difference lay in the fact that Darré did not develop the idea of expanding the Germans' living space in his theories to the same extent as other National Socialists¹³⁸ because he regarded it as matter for the future.¹³⁹ Himmler, on the other hand, was very interested in extending the living space. The basic ideas behind this were the threatened position of Germany and

¹³⁰ Wegner 1982, pp. 46, 49-50.

¹³¹ Lund 1995, pp. 11-12.

¹³² Bensch 1995, pp. 56, 59.

¹³³ Kroll 1998, pp. 167-168.

¹³⁴ Bensch 1995, pp. 46-49.

¹³⁵ Bensch 1995, pp. 25-26.

¹³⁶ Kroll 1998, p. 212. Cf. Longerich 2008, p. 138.

¹³⁷ Ackermann 1970, 195-198; Puschner 2002, p. 26.

¹³⁸ Bensch 1995, pp. 62, 65.

¹³⁹ Kroll 1998, pp. 193-194.

Europe and the fight for survival, but in the background there was also a genuine interest in getting more land for rural settlement.¹⁴⁰

According to the National Socialists' general line, Himmler considered the east to be the most natural direction for expansion. Expansion towards the east was a significant part of SS ideology, as is exemplified in an utterance of Himmler in which he emphasised the importance of populating the east and disparaged expansion into the west.¹⁴¹ The value accorded to the east was further reflected in an internal definition of the tasks of the SS in which the populating of the east was given pride of place.¹⁴²

The importance of the east was further emphasised by the fact that in the opinion of Himmler the crucial fight for survival would be waged between Europe and Asia. In Asia – according to Himmler – there had regularly sprung up peoples that had attacked Europe: the Huns, the Hungarians, the Mongols, the Turks and so on. Nor was the argument limited to historical examples: the Soviet Union was also presented as a threat to Europe.¹⁴³

Himmler estimated that it was possible to repel the Asian danger by conquering a wide enough area of eastern Europe and by populating it with a sufficient number of Germans. Eventually – after hundreds of years – there should be 400–500 million inhabitants who could be classified as Germans. The inhabitants of the east would be farmers called *Wehrbauer* who had been given the task of defending the state, and the carefully organised and well governed villages populated by them would form the defensive wall of the European world against the east.¹⁴⁴

Himmler's views on the settlement policy were strict because in his opinion the settled areas would be German only when every inhabitant of them was a German. Thus the success of the project would require the expulsion of the non-German inhabitants and making those of Germanic origin conscious of their difference from them. This was important because, in Himmler's view, a mixing of the population in the provinces of the east would endanger the whole country.¹⁴⁵

These ideas, which started from farmers and proceeded to the Germanisation of the east, led to the Greater Germanic project. It was not merely a question of conquering and populating the areas of eastern Europe with Germans because ultimately it consisted of collecting together the members of the Germanic genotype from all around the world and the establishment of a Greater Germanic State.¹⁴⁶

According to Himmler's interpretation, the Greater Germanic State meant a one which would not merely be an extended Germany but a formation

¹⁴⁰ Ackermann 1970, pp. 198–200.

¹⁴¹ Himmler stated his view thus: "*Der Osten ist das Wichtigste für uns. Der Westen stirbt leicht. Im Osten müssen wir kämpfen und siedeln.*" Wegner 1982, p. 50.

¹⁴² Ackermann 1970, p. 102.

¹⁴³ Primarily: Kroll 1998, pp. 212, 213, 215; secondarily: Hass 1994, p. 217.

¹⁴⁴ Ackermann 1970, pp. 198, 205, 223, 224.

¹⁴⁵ Ackermann 1970, pp. 205–206.

¹⁴⁶ Ackermann 1970, p. 181.

consisting of people of a similar genotype.¹⁴⁷ The state that Himmler strove for was in its most moderate version to cover all the territories that had belonged to the German Holy Roman Empire.¹⁴⁸ A subsequent version would also include northern France, Norway and Denmark.¹⁴⁹ In the widest alternative, the state would cover all those areas which at some stage in history had been populated by a Germanic people.¹⁵⁰

The idea of a Greater Germanic State did not change the basic idea that the actual focus of interest had to remain on the east and the settlement of eastern territories had to be the major objective of the whole project.¹⁵¹ The inclusion of other Germanic peoples in the project was important because it would extend the population base of the project from 90 million to 120 million.¹⁵² For Himmler's settlement plans, a group of 90–120 million Germanic people would not be enough, and therefore it would also be necessary to squeeze every drop of German blood out of other peoples.¹⁵³

Himmler really believed that it would be worthwhile to start looking for a Germanic genotype among other peoples.¹⁵⁴ The plan to recruit people of Germanic stock would become a large and far-reaching operation because in addition to the small next-door neighbours of Germany, France too would be scoured for Germanic blood. Nor did the Germanic inhabitants of the eastern territories escape Himmler's interest. According to the instructions given to the SS officers, they should be either won over to the side of Germany or eliminated. Himmler's great interest in the Germanic people is perhaps best shown by the fact that in his view individual persons of Germanic stock who had moved to the Americas and Africa should be returned to Europe.¹⁵⁵

The SS ideology also addressed the fate of the original population of the eastern areas. Subjugation was the basic policy as this would prevent social and economic equality between the Germanic people and the Slavs.¹⁵⁶ Himmler justified the subjugation of the Slavs by the superiority of the Germanic people.¹⁵⁷ In Himmler's opinion, the Slavs were sub-humans who were incapable of ruling themselves,¹⁵⁸ and they were described in disparaging and derogatory terms.¹⁵⁹ Himmler required that the national identity and culture of the Slavs should be destroyed and that they should be split into small groups

¹⁴⁷ Kroll 1998, p. 220.

¹⁴⁸ Umbreit 1988, p. 123.

¹⁴⁹ Kroll 1998, pp. 218–219.

¹⁵⁰ Ackermann 1970, pp. 172–173.

¹⁵¹ The problem of finding a sufficient number of Germanic inhabitants for the conquered areas of the east troubled Himmler throughout the war, and he was afraid that the areas would not be populated just because of a lack of settlers. Ackermann 1970, p. 225.

¹⁵² Kroll 1998, pp. 218–219.

¹⁵³ Ackermann 1970, p. 225.

¹⁵⁴ Kroll 1998, p. 226.

¹⁵⁵ Ackermann 1970, pp. 209, 225–226.

¹⁵⁶ Ackermann 1970, pp. 218–219.

¹⁵⁷ Kroll 1998, p. 222.

¹⁵⁸ Ackermann 1970, p. 206.

¹⁵⁹ Hass 1994, p. 205.

and enslaved. After this the Slavs were to be made into an alien work force in Germany's employ for a period of generations.¹⁶⁰

The SS ideology could be described as the product of a single leading National Socialist who combined a mixture of mutually reinforcing radical ideas which were typical of their time. The most significant difference between the thinking of Himmler and that of mainstream National Socialist ideology lay in the little attention he paid to economic objectives. The reason for this was that Himmler's thinking was based on an ideology that emphasised the significance of rural life.

Even though the SS ideology differed to some extent from the mainstream of National Socialist thinking, the features which were emphasised in it secured and promoted to the position of the organisation in the National Socialist dictatorship. It can also be seen that, even though the ideas about migration to the countryside seemed old fashioned and even if the SS ideology was influenced by the so-called "conservative revolution", the SS organisation also incorporated numerous modern features.¹⁶¹

With regard to the objective of this research, the ideological views on race of the SS and the expansionist ideas later formed the background for the operations which the SS imposed on large population groups, be it the genocide of the Jews or the settlement of *Volksdeutsche* in the new territories and the deportation of the non-German populations of those areas. Furthermore, it is worth noting that there were other aspects of the SS ideology effectively that supported the development of the organisation into the organ that implemented the expansion ideology.

2.3 The birth of the SS organisation and its development into a security organisation

The SS was originally only a modest bodyguard unit, whose survival was far from secure because the Sturmabteilung (SA) was responsible for the protection of the NSDAP. However, Hitler was not satisfied with the services of the SA and wanted to have his own bodyguard. This was a consequence of the attitude of Ernst Röhm, the Director of the SA, who was not ready to place his organisation totally at the disposal of the party executive.¹⁶²

Hitler developed his idea of a bodyguard in 1922 and 1923, and for his own personal protection he established a unit of 12 men called *Stabswache*. Its operation was extended in spring 1923 with the establishment of a new unit of about a hundred SA men. The new unit was called *Stosstrupp*.¹⁶³ These units

¹⁶⁰ Ackermann 1970, pp. 210, 217, 219–220.

¹⁶¹ For example, Allen 2002, pp. 19, 21–29.

¹⁶² Kaienburg 2003, pp. 41–43.

¹⁶³ Koehl 1983, pp. 11–13.

were not long-lived because after the unsuccessful putsch of 1923 there was no need for a personal bodyguard or for a personal task force. However, when Hitler was released from prison, he founded a new bodyguard to himself. It consisted mainly of the men who had been enlisted in the former Stosstrupp. The name of the new unit was *Stabswache*, and its commander was Julius Schreck.¹⁶⁴

With certain reservations, it is possible to regard the *Stabswache* as the forerunner of the later SS, although Hitler established several different *Stabswache* units in 1925, and the designation *Schutzstaffel* was also introduced in the same year. The word "*Schutzstaffel*" (protection unit) could be shortened, if necessary, into the handy abbreviation SS. From the very outset, the new units took on an elitist character because Schreck directed them to induct only party activists and to bind them tightly to the party machinery.¹⁶⁵ Each *Schutzstaffel* unit was to consist of the approximately ten most reliable members of the local branch of the party.¹⁶⁶ The careful screening of men produced good results, and from the outset of their existence the units formed a party cadre that served the interests of the party and were not isolated groups in the usual tradition of paramilitary units.¹⁶⁷

Even though the SS units had their own tasks and they had an elitist character, they could not be kept apart from the SA, and they became part of it. When the Director of the SA, Ernst Röhm left the organisation temporarily,¹⁶⁸ Franz Pfeffer von Salomon was appointed commander of the force, and he also took the SS units under his control.¹⁶⁹ In spite of this, the SS units retained a part of their special character, and tasks related both to security and intelligence and to internal discipline in the party were left to them.¹⁷⁰

In March 1927, Julius Schreck was succeeded by Erhard Heiden. At same time, Heinrich Himmler rose to second place in the SS hierarchy. He had already some experience in the SS at that time because he had formed SS units when operating in Lower Bavaria on the staff of the *Gauleiter*. The influence of Himmler immediately began to make itself apparent in the SS units: the members began to be required to display exemplary conduct, and the tasks of the SS units were expanded to include external intelligence work directed against political opponents, freemasons and Jews.¹⁷¹

Erhard Heiden's term as a commander of the SS was short, and Himmler was appointed to be its leader in January 1929. This appointment initiated the rapid development of the SS organisation into a more independent and more important organ for the implementation of National Socialism. However, the

¹⁶⁴ Buchheim 1999B, p. 30.

¹⁶⁵ Buchheim 1999B, pp. 30–31.

¹⁶⁶ Koehl 1983, pp. 21–22.

¹⁶⁷ Buchheim 1999B, pp. 30–31.

¹⁶⁸ Buchheim 1999B, p. 30.

¹⁶⁹ Kaienburg 2003, p. 44.

¹⁷⁰ Buchheim 1999B, pp. 31–32.

¹⁷¹ Kaienburg 2003, pp. 44–45.

initial situation was rather modest because at that time the SS was still scattered and under the influence of local party organs.¹⁷²

Himmler started to promote the cause of the SS resolutely. He tried to form a unity out of the network of units and to detach it from the SA into an independent branch of the NSDAP. The first attempt to separate the SS units from the SA took place in December 1930, but it did not succeed. The project was influenced by Ernst Röhm's return to his former post. Himmler probably guessed that Röhm would try to tighten his grip on the SS units. This premonition proved right because Röhm did in fact demonstrate his desire to take the SS organisation under his control.¹⁷³

Röhm did not succeed in his intentions because Hitler needed the SS units to control the SA before his rise to power. From summer 1931 on, the new task of the SS was to control the SA to ensure that it would not endanger the long-term objectives of the NSDAP because of its revolutionary nature. The use of the SS for controlling the SA was a natural choice because the SS leaders were required not to interfere in the internal politics of the party, and there was concrete evidence of its suitability for the task.¹⁷⁴

The duties allotted to the SA were not restricted merely to the prevention of rioting; they also involved intelligence work.¹⁷⁵ Reinhard Heydrich was given the task of building an intelligence organisation for the SS in 1931,¹⁷⁶ and in early 1932 the SS intelligence unit *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD, the Security Service) was established.¹⁷⁷ The *Rassenamt* (Race Office) was established at the same time. Its first field of activity was the selection of individuals on a racial basis. In summer 1932 it was renamed the *Rasse und Siedlungsamt* (RuSA, the Race and Settlement Office). An office called the *SS Amt* (SS Office) was also formed at this time. It constituted the central administrative unit in the SS organisation.¹⁷⁸ With the establishment of these offices the SS organisation obtained its central administrative machinery.

Reinhard Heydrich was an exceptionally important person from the point of view of the later population policy, based as it was on the organisation's racial ideology, because it was the sections of the SS organisation led by him that specifically implemented the most radical National Socialist policies in the occupied areas. It is also worth noting that Heydrich's personal history resembled that of Himmler in that he too had experienced a failed military career.¹⁷⁹ Thus the backgrounds of the most important leaders of the National Socialist racial population policy were fairly similar, a fact which should also be taken into account later in connection with Odilo Globocnik.

¹⁷² Kaienburg 2003, p. 45.

¹⁷³ Koehl 1983, pp. 33, 38–40, 42.

¹⁷⁴ Koehl 1983, pp. 34, 30, 34, 47, 59.

¹⁷⁵ Koehl 1983, pp. 30, 41–42.

¹⁷⁶ Buchheim 1999B, p. 32.

¹⁷⁷ Koehl 1983, p. 51.

¹⁷⁸ Kaienburg 2003, pp. 66, 69, 88.

¹⁷⁹ Sydnor 2003, pp. 208–211.

The development of the organisation of the SS was not restricted to enlisting new personnel and establishing offices; it also involved reorganisation at the local level. This was carried out in connection with the reorganisation of the SA.¹⁸⁰ New units called *Sturm* about 25–30 men in strength were established. Himmler tried further to combine the new units into bigger detachments called *Standarten*,¹⁸¹ with two or three *Standarten* in the area of every *Gau*.¹⁸²

The number of members of the SS increased rapidly at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s. Before the rise of Himmler to the position of *Reichsführer-SS*, the organisation had had about 1000 members, but by December 1931 there were approximately 10,000 members. However, this was only the beginning because by the summer of 1932 the strength of the SS units already amounted to more than 40,000 men. This did not present a problem from the organisational point of view because numerous *Standarten* staff units had been established in the 1931 organisational reform.¹⁸³

Even though the organisation might have been ready for the rapid growth in the strength of the units, the increase in numbers also required other measures, such as the induction of suitable leaders. Himmler recruited new SS leaders at the turn of the 1920s and the 1930s. The availability of suitable candidates was increased by the economic depression, and it has been claimed that it was possible to enlist able persons for the SS more easily than before owing to the rise in unemployment.¹⁸⁴

During the time between its establishment and Hitler's rise to power, the SS grew from a scattered group of individual units into a fairly large and centrally led organisation. The successful development of the SS up to 1933 was a result above all of the appointment of Heinrich Himmler as *Reichsführer-SS*. He was an active and devoted National Socialist who did not settle for maintaining the SS organisation unchanged but started to extend and to develop it in order to carry out his own interpretation of National Socialism.

Even before 1933, the SS had developed an ability for solving conflicts within the party, for it had given evidence of its reliability and its operational efficiency. The SS did not yet succeed in getting rid of the SA even though the new *Reichsführer-SS* resolutely tried to do so. However, it became possible to pursue this goal again with new contrivances after the National Socialists' rise to power, and the SS was able to take advantage of the fact that the ambitions of the SA organisation had become excessive.

The SA organisation was the most revolutionary element of the National Socialist movement, and it tried to create parallel functions with the government after Hitler's rise to power. This would before long have led to a collapse in the position and significance of the SS. The SS realised the situation and made an attempt to enhance its profile, for example by strengthening its

¹⁸⁰ Koehl 1983, pp. 43–44.

¹⁸¹ The terms "*Staffel*", "*Sturm*" and "*Standarte*" can be translated into English as "section", "platoon" and "regiment" respectively. A *Sturmbann* is a "battalion".

¹⁸² Kaienburg 2003, pp. 65–66.

¹⁸³ Koehl 1983, pp. 30–31, 52–53.

¹⁸⁴ Koehl 1983, pp. 36–37, 43.

image as an elite. It was helped in this by the fact that the SA continued to grow in size and accepted just about anybody as a member.¹⁸⁵

The relations between the organisations began to deteriorate, and it is considered that from the beginning of summer 1933 the SS was engaged in a struggle with the SA. It has been estimated that it would not really have been possible for the SS to emerge from the struggle as the winner if Röhm's desire to challenge both Hitler and the Reichswehr had not made the situation advantageous to the SS. The success of the SS was influenced by the fact that its leaders were clever enough to keep a low profile after Hitler's rise to power and await the development of events, which was just the opposite of what happened in the SA.¹⁸⁶ This then led to Hitler seeing less reason to fear Himmler than Röhm.

Hitler saw Röhm as a dangerous competitor and the SA as too radical an actor for his own purposes. Nor should the significance of the Reichswehr be forgotten because it feared that the SA was trying to usurp the responsibilities of the army. In the end, the SA fell foul of Hitler's suspicions, which opened an opportunity for the SS to bolster its position, and in June 1934 representatives of the SS showed to the officers of the Reichswehr faked documents which demonstrated the threat posed by the SA. This probably induced the Reichswehr to look favourably on the idea of its opponent being suppressed because it gave a free hand to Himmler and Heydrich, and it even armed the SS units when they started their campaign against the SA.¹⁸⁷

After the connivance of the Reichswehr was obtained, the focus of the operation against the SA shifted to the NSDAP, but it was different units of the SS that were responsible for the murders of SA members. The plans were drawn in the SD, but the SS bodyguard in Berlin and the guards of the concentration camp of Dachau near Munich were responsible for the assassinations.¹⁸⁸

The suppression of the SA led to almost immediate results because the SS obtained the independence from it on 20/7/1934. This allowed the SS to extend its activities in military activities, which had been the preserve of the SA.¹⁸⁹ The SS was able proceed relatively fast in this because it had already begun to establish regular military detachments.¹⁹⁰ The first regular units established by the SS served originally as a reserve police force. This was not to be their final destiny, but two types of armed troops took shape before the Second World War. They were called *SS-Verfügungstruppen* (Special Purpose Troops) and *SS-Totenkopfverbände* (Death's Head Units). The Verfügungstruppen were regular army units of the SS, and they were organised into three regiments of three

¹⁸⁵ Koehl 1983, pp. 62–63, 77, 79.

¹⁸⁶ Koehl 1983, pp. 74, 76, 79, 87, 91.

¹⁸⁷ Koehl 1983, pp. 75–76, 87, 99.

¹⁸⁸ Koehl 1983, pp. 80, 100.

¹⁸⁹ Koehl 1983, pp. 75, 101.

¹⁹⁰ Buchheim 1999B, p. 32.

battalions each. The Totenkopfverbände for their part constituted the units that guarded the concentration camps.¹⁹¹

The elimination of the SA leadership also brought the concentration camps permanently under the control of the SS. Because neither the SA nor the SS had succeeded in bringing the police under their control immediately after Hitler's rise to power, they had organised their own detachments to persecute political opponents. Command posts had been turned into prisons, but when they failed to serve their purpose, the SA and the SS started to establish concentration camps. After the SA fell, Theodor Eicke was appointed *Inspekteur der Konzentrationslager* (Inspector of Concentration Camps) and commander of their SS guards.¹⁹²

In practice, the SS organisation was divided at the end of 1934 into three branches: the original regional SS units, now called the *Allgemeine SS*, the special departments (Verfügungstruppen and Totenkopfverbände) and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD).¹⁹³ The functional division was not reflected in the organisation because when the offices which directed the functions of the SS were designated head offices (*Hauptämter*), of the most visible branches only the SD got its own head office, which was called the *Sicherheitshauptamt* (SDHA, the Security Head Office). The other head offices – the *Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt* (RuSHA, the Head Office of Race and Settlement Affairs) and the *SS-Hauptamt* (SSHA, the SS Head Office) were formed from the corresponding existing offices.¹⁹⁴

The SS-Hauptamt controlled all the branches of the SS organisation except for those dealing with race, settlement and security matters.¹⁹⁵ Thus it was responsible for the different armed SS units, the concentration camps and the Allgemeine SS. The SS-Hauptamt continued its growth, and in 1939 its financial management branches became the *Hauptamt Verwaltung und Wirtschaft* (the Head Office of Administrative and Economic Affairs) and the *Hauptamt Haushalt und Bauten* (the Head Office for Budget and Construction).¹⁹⁶

The operation of the Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt covered four fields including ideological education, racial screening, communication with agriculture and the welfare of the families of SS men. The RuSHA soon extended its sphere of operation, and in 1936 its remit already included the development of the settlement programme.¹⁹⁷

The SD was organised as a central national agency in early 1933. Its objective was to take over the functions of the Security Police and begin the surveillance of every German. The SD did not succeed in this to the desired extent.¹⁹⁸ Even so, the SS managed to take the Security Police under its control.

¹⁹¹ Koehl 1983, pp. 64–65, 80, 135, 140.

¹⁹² Koehl 1983, pp. 69, 107, 130, 135.

¹⁹³ Koehl 1983, p. 107. Cf. Buchheim 1999B, pp. 59–60.

¹⁹⁴ Koehl 1983, p. 109.

¹⁹⁵ Kaienburg 2003, pp. 66, 88.

¹⁹⁶ Buchheim 1999B, p. 208.

¹⁹⁷ Koehl 1983, pp. 116–117.

¹⁹⁸ Buchheim 1999B, p. 60.

The enterprise began in Bavaria in spring 1933, when Himmler and Heydrich took command of the Security Police in Bavaria and Munich.¹⁹⁹ However, this was only the beginning, and Himmler succeeded in getting control of the Security Police in almost the whole of Germany except Prussia.²⁰⁰

In Prussia, Kurt Daluege stood in Himmler's way on police matters,²⁰¹ but Himmler and Heydrich obtained control of the Security Police of Prussia in April 1934. Thus Himmler took control of the organisation that had been regarded as the most important branch of the Security Police in Germany.²⁰² The take-over of the Security Police of Prussia made it possible to develop the Security Police into a national organisation. This took place in 1935 and 1936, when out of the regional security police organisations an organisation was formed called the *Geheime Staatspolizei* (*Gestapo*, the Secret State Police) which operated over the whole country.²⁰³ Heydrich was responsible for the Gestapo, but he did not combine the Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst, and the SD remained a party organ.²⁰⁴

Himmler was not satisfied with the mere control of the Security Police, and the take-over process continued and was directed at the whole police organisation. He obtained control of all the branches of the police force when, in addition to his earlier office, he was made *Reichsführer-SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei* (State Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police Force) on 17/6/1936.²⁰⁵ Thereafter the police organisation under Himmler comprised the *Ordnungspolizei* (Orpo, the Order Police), which was under the command of Kurt Daluege, and the *Sicherheitspolizei* (Sipo, the Security Police) under Reinhard Heydrich's command. The Sicherheitspolizei consisted of the Gestapo and the *Kriminalpolizei* (Kripo, the Criminal Police).²⁰⁶ The Ordnungspolizei consisted of three branches: the *Schutzpolizei*, the *Gendarmerie* and the *Gemeindepolizei*. The Schutzpolizei operated in the towns, the Gendarmerie in the countryside and the Gemeindepolizei in minor population centres.²⁰⁷

The possession of all the police increased the size of the organisational structure of the SS because the Sicherheitspolizei and the Ordnungspolizei got their own head offices called the *Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei* (HA Sipo, the Head Office for the Security Police) and the *Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei* (HA Orpo, the

¹⁹⁹ Buchheim 1999B, pp. 37–38; Koehl 1983, pp. 70–71.

²⁰⁰ Buchheim 1999B, pp. 39–42; Koehl 1983, p. 88.

²⁰¹ Kurt Daluege was one of the old warriors of the National Socialist movement. His rise began when a Berlin SA leader called Walter Stennes caused problems for Hitler at the end of the 20s. The matter was solved by making Daluege the head of the Berlin SA. This was only the beginning of his success because Himmler also appointed him head of the local SS, and Daluege started to carry out intelligence activities which benefited Himmler and Hitler. Göring also appreciated Daluege's value and appointed him *Staatskommissar zur besonderen Verwendung* (State Commissioner for Special Purposes) after Hitler's rise to power. Koehl 1983, pp. 31, 38–40, 45, 69–70, 88, 121.

²⁰² Buchheim 1999B, pp. 42–43.

²⁰³ Buchheim 1999B, pp. 43–47. Cf. Kaienburg 2003, pp. 95–96. Cf. Koehl 1983, p. 125.

²⁰⁴ Koehl 1983, p. 95.

²⁰⁵ Buchheim 1999B, pp. 49, 52, 56; Koehl 1983, pp. 112, 122.

²⁰⁶ Buchheim 1999B, p. 56. Cf. Koehl 1983, p. 122.

²⁰⁷ Kaienburg 2003, p. 96.

Head Office for the Order Police).²⁰⁸ Other changes in the organisation also took place in the same year. Perhaps the most significant development was the establishment of the *Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS* (the Personal Staff of the Reichsführer-SS). Karl Wolff, who had served as Himmler's adjutant since 1934, was made head of the *Persönlicher Stab*. The concentration camps also obtained a more autonomous status when Theodor Eicke became completely independent of both the local SS organs and the state authorities. Furthermore, a centralised administration, which consisted of the General Staff and the Inspector, was created for the *SS-Verfügungstruppen*.²⁰⁹

The general development of the SS was exceptionally favourable during the first years of the National Socialist administration. Its success was based on the fact that just after the party's rise to power it established its reputation as an utterly reliable supporter of Hitler's power. The independence achieved by the SS serves as an indication of the value that was attached to its reliability, which in turn made it possible for the organisation to grow even more rapidly and to take over new areas of activity. The most significant step in its development from the point of view of the later operations connected with population policy was Himmler's appointment as chief of all the police forces. This was a sensible step with regard to the subsequent settlement and expulsion operations as the demographic surveying and handling of the groups who were to be the objects of these operations was a natural function of a police organisation, especially one that had adopted elements of the National Socialist ideology.

2.4 The moulding of the SS into a tool for implementing the policies of the New Order

After the SS obtained control of the police and its central administration was organised, it instigated measures to bring actors at the regional level under tight control. The first change was to make the regional SS commanders responsible not only to Himmler and the SSHA but also to all the other SS head offices.²¹⁰ The next step was to create a national regional organisation with the help of *Höhere SS und Polizeiführer* (HSSPF, Higher SS and Police Chiefs). The idea behind this was that HSSPFs should direct all parts of the SS organisation at the regional level and that the traditional branches of the organisation and the police should be combined into a single unit detached from the civil authorities.²¹¹

The Ordnungspolizei had started to develop the HSSPF scheme in 1937 in connection with preparations for mobilisation. Mobilisation was the responsibility of the *Wehrmacht* (armed forces), and by linking up with the

²⁰⁸ Wilhelm 1997, p. 76.

²⁰⁹ Koehl 1983, pp. 107, 109, 113, 132–133, 138, 141.

²¹⁰ Koehl 1983, p. 112.

²¹¹ Birn 1986, pp. 9, 83.

Wehrmach, the SS would be able to confine itself to military organisation at the regional level and not to become involved in the regional divisions of the NSDAP or the state administration. The SS thus likened itself to the Wehrmacht and tried to remain aloof from the civil administration. However, this was no simple matter because initially the HSSPFs were responsible to the state administration and to the NSDAP. However, these dependencies ended before the outbreak of war.²¹²

The creation of the HSSPF system was also influenced by the development of the SS organisation. Some of the head offices were able to grow freely during the first years of the National Socialist administration. This has been regarded as constituting an obstacle to the unity of the SS, and Himmler is thought to have created the HSSPF system in order to unify the organisation's operations regionally for this reason. This argument is supported by the fact that the chiefs of the SS head offices are known to have been at least partly against the HSSPF system, and it is believed that Himmler did not even wish to clarify the relationship between the head offices and the HSSPFs.²¹³

The HSSPF system may have increased the efficiency of the SS, but it did not solve all the questions related to relations between the SS and the state. The following step was to clarify of the position of those parts of the SS that did not belong to the apparatus of the state. This took place in summer 1938, when Hitler defined the mutual relations between the Wehrmacht, the police and the armed units of the SS. The SS organisation was to be a part of the NSDAP, and there should be no need to arm the SS except for the cadet schools, the Verfügungstruppen, the Totenkopfverbände and the police reinforcement units.²¹⁴

The existence of these armed SS units was justified by their special internal tasks and their attachment to the army in wartime. However, it was stated that their character differed from that of other armed units, and that, for example, the Verfügungstruppen belonged neither to the army nor to the police but were a branch of the party intended for the personal use of Hitler. Nor did the Totenkopfverbände groups belong to the police or the army but were likewise a party organ.²¹⁵

In addition to the Verfügungstruppen and the Totenkopfverbände, a third armed force was formed, which was at the disposal of the SS and which neither belonged to the party machinery nor was meant for Hitler's personal use. This force consisted of police units which had been established to strengthen the Ordnungspolizei after the First World War because of the internal unrest in Germany.²¹⁶

The take-over of the units of the Ordnungspolizei was an important step because the majority of them had been merged with the Wehrmacht after

²¹² Koehl 1983, pp. 129–130, 160.

²¹³ Birn 1986, pp. 79, 100.

²¹⁴ Koehl 1983, pp. 145–146.

²¹⁵ Koehl 1983, pp. 145–146.

²¹⁶ Corilla 2006, p. 50.

Hitler's rise to power,²¹⁷ and the lack of larger armed police units was felt during the annexation of Austria. This led to the development of armed reserve police units and to the formation of separate police battalions after the Second World War broke out. However, they were not the only closed police units because smaller motorised gendarme units were established from 1936 and 1937 on.²¹⁸

The SS had already achieved a fairly good position after the middle of the 1930s with regard to its operations connected with racial and population policy, but it did not have yet contacts with all those people who would be needed to carry out its future plans. Therefore Himmler started to create contacts particularly with the *Volksdeutsche* of eastern Europe. The project proceeded favourably when Werner Lorenz, a long-term member of the SS, took over control of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* (Vomi, the Office for the Welfare of Ethnic Germans) from the *Auswärtiges Amt* (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in January 1937.²¹⁹

The gradual take-over of the Vomi made it possible for Heydrich to begin his work among the *Volksdeutsche*. The SD succeeded in extending its operations to the *Volksdeutsche* of the Baltic States, Poland and Rumania before the Second World War. Likewise, the *Ergänzungsamt* (Manpower Supply Office) of the SS-Hauptamt extended its activities among the *Volksdeutsche* of eastern Europe. This force was established in 1938 to reinforce the *Verfügungstruppen*. Its formation was prompted by the refusal of the Wehrmacht to cooperate in increasing the number of the military units of the SS, which made it necessary to begin recruiting personnel abroad.²²⁰

However, the development of the SS organisation was not one of unadulterated success between 1933 and the war: it experienced problems and even setbacks. There was, for example, the question of whether the SS any longer consisted of political soldiers at all. The reason for this was the heterogeneous composition of the organisation; it included administrators, professional soldiers, policemen and men of the Allgemeine SS. It was not easy to associate the men of the Allgemeine SS with the image of the political soldier in the late 1930s, which led to a further decrease in the significance of the Allgemeine SS.²²¹ This development is understandable because the objective of the SS was to take over the organs of state control and extend its activities not only into the precincts of the state administration but also into the geographical areas of its future operations.

The RuSHA got also into trouble towards the end of the 1930s because Richard Walther Darré and Himmler fell out. Darré left the RuSHA in summer

²¹⁷ Dierl 2001, pp. 163. Cf. Wilhelm 1997, p. 85.

²¹⁸ Wilhelm 1997, pp. 85–86, 88–90.

²¹⁹ Koehl 1983, pp. 146–147. For a broader discussion of the early history of Vomi and Lorenz, see Lumans 1993, pp. 31–49. One is hardly surprised to learn that Lorenz had served in the First World War as a young officer and had had leave the army after the war. He had failed in his agricultural projects, but when he joined both the NSDAP and the SS at the end of 1930, his career took a new direction.

²²⁰ Koehl 1983, pp. 147, 149, 150–151, 141.

²²¹ Koehl 1983, pp. 113, 128–129.

1938, and Günther Pancke was appointed in his place. He was one of the old warriors of the NSDAP and also a *Freikorps* veteran. However, the work carried out by the RuSHA was not wasted, and the individual organs established by it were transferred to the control of other SS head offices.²²²

Even though the development of the SS was uneven with regard to the future racial and demographic ideological policy, the organisation was able to initiate its first projects before the Second World War. They were carried out during the annexation of Austria, when detachments of the *Sicherheitspolizei* and the *Ordnungspolizei* were sent into action together with the occupation forces of the *Wehrmacht*.²²³ The *Sicherheitspolizei* arrested both Jews and opponents of the new administration.²²⁴ The RuSHA extended also its operation into Austria and evacuated the inhabitants from a number of areas to be used for military training, thus creating the *modus operandi* of future deportation and settlement operations.²²⁵

For the SS, the annexation of Austria was an important stage on the way to future events because its activities extended at that time into areas that served the National Socialist "New Order" (*Neuordnung*) policies. In this way, the SS began to develop into something other than just a National Socialist security organ. At the same time, operational models were created which were to become established practices. These included the sending of special detachments into the target areas of the expansion policy and the implementation of measures focusing on the populations of these areas. They were initially on a small scale, but even so they represented a significant beginning in a new field of activity.

The operations of the SS outside Germany continued in the autumn of 1938, when the Sudetenland was annexed to Germany. The model of the operations was nearly the same as that used in Austria. Detachments of the *Sicherheitspolizei* were dispatched to the area along with the occupying forces of the *Wehrmacht*. Their task was to prevent activities against the new order and to take the buildings and functions of the Czech Security Police under their control.²²⁶ After that, the RuSHA extended its activities into the area. It had prepared its deportation and settlement operations in the Sudetenland even before the occupation by gathering information and by creating connections. At first, the objective was to establish a *Bodenamt* (Land Office), which was to operate under the supervision of the SS, with the task of settling German farmers in the area.²²⁷

The basic conditions for the operations in the Sudetenland were in principle good because the area was fairly small both in terms of its area (about 30,000 square kilometres) and its population (about 3 million persons). Furthermore, more than two thirds of the inhabitants had a German

²²² Koehl 1983, pp. 116–117, 119.

²²³ Krausnick 1981, p. 19.

²²⁴ Umbreit 1988, p. 13.

²²⁵ Heinemann 2003, pp. 121–122.

²²⁶ Krausnick 1981, pp. 22–23.

²²⁷ Heinemann 2003, p. 122.

background. The Wehrmacht did not pose an obstacle either, because it was ready to give up its control of the area quickly, and a civil administration had taken the responsibility for the area by the end of October 1938.²²⁸

The entrance of the SS into the Sudetenland seems to have gone without problems, but the task of unifying the region and incorporating it into the Third Reich was given to Konrad Henlein, who had been the head of the local National Socialists. A mark of his new position was his appointment to the position of *Reichskommissar* (State Commissioner). The *Reichsministerium für das Innere* (RMI, the Ministry of the Interior) established a new organ to provide him with support in the unification process.²²⁹ However, the SS had succeeded in carrying out preparatory work in the area, one example of which are the surveys it made of the inhabitants' racial properties. These indicated that there was reason to start large-scale deportations in the area because three quarters of the population were estimated to be unsuitable in terms of their genotype for the needs of the SS.²³⁰

After the annexation of the Sudetenland, the SS extended its activities to other Czech areas. These ended up under the control of Germany in March 1939, when the western areas of Czechoslovakia were occupied and placed under German control as the *Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren* (the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia), or *Protektorat* for short. This was the first step in carrying out the National Socialists' living space policy, and it was influenced for example by considerations regarding the improvement of Germany's self-sufficiency in food supplies and increasing the capacity of the armaments industry.²³¹ However, the clearest evidence of the launching of the living space programme are the plans of the SS, in which the Germanisation of the whole area was envisaged.²³²

The SS extended its operations into Czechoslovakia by sending *Einsatzgruppen* (Task Forces) of the *Sicherheitspolizei*. This time the *Einsatzgruppen* were larger than before, and they were further divided into subdivisions (*Einsatzkommandos*).²³³ The SS was able to operate fairly freely after the occupation in the area of the *Protektorat* because the former *Reichsaussenminister* (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Constantin von Neurath, who was known to be a conservative, was made responsible for the administration of the area. He was chosen mainly to placate the foreign powers, and consequently his possibilities for influencing matters were limited from the outset.²³⁴ The influence of the SS was further increased by the fact that Himmler succeeded in insinuating the more energetic Karl Hermann Frank as a von

²²⁸ Umbreit 1988, pp. 14, 18, 20.

²²⁹ Umbreit 1988, p. 15.

²³⁰ Heinemann 2003, pp. 176–177.

²³¹ Umbreit 1988, p. 21.

²³² The idea of the Germanisation of Bohemia and Moravia obviously already existed at a very early stage. The plan was confirmed in summer 1942, when Himmler stated that the idea was to Germanise the area within 20 years. Heinemann 2003, pp. 127–128, 168.

²³³ Krausnick 1981, p. 25.

²³⁴ Umbreit 1988, pp. 23–25.

Neurath's deputy.²³⁵ Frank's usefulness to the SS is indicated by the fact that Himmler appointed him HSSPF of the Protektorat in April 1939.²³⁶

When the SS had succeeded in acquiring a strong enough position in the administration of the Protektorat, it became possible to begin the actual work of Germanisation. This was based on the approach that had already been adopted in the Sudetenland, that is, getting control of the land. The SS succeeded in this by taking over the Land Office of Czechoslovakia in Prague. At first, the seizure of the land focussed on properties owned particularly by Jews, followed by the estates of the Catholic Church. Later the SS also expropriated state-owned land.²³⁷

The objective of the seizure of the land was to make it possible to offer arable land to Germans; in other words, it was a preparatory stage in the process of Germanisation. The Germanisation programme proper would subsequently be implemented by populating the area with German people and by expelling the Czechs.²³⁸ The confiscations were focussed on areas in which there already lived a certain number of German inhabitants. Thus, the major targets were Iglau (Jihlava) and Brünn (Brno) and the SS founded two companies to implement the settlement activities.²³⁹

The resettlement of German inhabitants on Czech lands was the first operation planned by the SS with the objective of moving a *Volksdeutsche* population into a non-German area. The plan was to place the Germans of the South Tyrol (Südtirol, Alto Adige) in Italy in northern Moravia. Behind this lay an agreement between Germany and Italy, as a result of which Himmler was authorised to arrange the emigration of the German minority from the South Tyrol.²⁴⁰

Himmler had established an office for the transfer operation to function in conjunction with the Persönlicher Stab. It was called the *Leitstelle für Ein- und Rückwanderung* (the Control Centre for Immigration and Repatriation) and Ulrich Greifelt was appointed to head it.²⁴¹ According to Leniger, the plans for the South Tyrolean Germans were very important with regard to the future because the Germanisation process was evolved in connection with them. The process consisted in the expulsion of the original inhabitants of the target area and their replacement with a population whose status was defined as higher in the National Socialist racial ideology.²⁴²

Another option for obtaining inhabitants for the settlement project was to convert Czechs into Germans. This idea was connected to a project called "*Rassische Bestandaufnahme der Tschechen*" (the racial absorption of the Czechs). Its objective was to divide the population into different groups. One group was

²³⁵ For more on Karl Hermann Frank, see *Biographisches Lexikon Zum Dritten Reich*, p. 128.

²³⁶ Umbreit 1988, p. 26.

²³⁷ Heinemann 2003, pp. 131–140.

²³⁸ Czechs with a Germanic genotype were to be sent as labour to the so-called *Altreich*. Heinemann 2003, p. 140.

²³⁹ Heinemann 2003, pp. 140–141.

²⁴⁰ Longerich 2008, pp. 429, 432–436.

²⁴¹ Buchheim 1999B, p. 187.

²⁴² Leniger 2006, p. 45.

to be Germanised, another consisted of those who were designated for forced labour, and the rest were to be expelled or killed. The project was designed to be carried out with the help of school doctors, and plans were made to supply them with the necessary forms for this procedure. The preliminary plans envisaged that about 55% of the Czechs would be expelled. A network of RuSHA outposts was established for the division of the population into groups. It consisted of the *RuSHA-Aussenstelle* in Prague and *RuSHA-Dienststellen* in Budweis (Budejovice), Iglau and Brünn. Later the network grew considerably wider.²⁴³

The actions of the SS did not pass unnoticed by its competitors. The most important of these was the former director of the RuSHA, Richard Walter Darré, and von Neurath was also particularly dissatisfied with the activities of Curt von Gottberg, the Director of the Bodenamt in Prague. The position of the SS does not seem to have been very strong because von Gottberg was removed in December 1939. After that, the SS organisation did not recover its hold of the conduct of affairs until Reinhard Heydrich's appointment as *Reichsprotektor* in the autumn of 1941.²⁴⁴

The activity of the SS in the Protektorat has been characterised as prefiguring the later deportation and settlement operations, the main features of which it already embodied. These features included the segregation of the population into groups, compulsory population transfers and differences of opinion with the civil authorities. This view is further reinforced by the fact that the persons who were involved in the planning in the Protektorat are known to have used the same methods in those areas of Poland that had been annexed to Germany. It is also worth noting that the system developed for the transfer of the South Tyrolean Germans was also later used in the Polish areas.²⁴⁵

The development of the SS organisation during the years preceding the Second World War was mainly purposeful but also to some extent conflictual: the SS organisation established more and more units to carry out its racial ideological operations, and an executive structure to co-ordinate the operations of the organisation regionally and centrally was created. The organisation's operations were extended to the geographical areas in which it intended to carry out its racial and demographic ideological policy. On the other hand, problems began to appear inside the organisation, especially in connection with the RuSHA.

The SS began implementing its racial and demographic policy quite early, but it did not completely succeed in creating an organisation that was suited to implementing this policy. Even though the organisation already included an office dedicated to racial and settlement issues (the RuSHA), to which it would have been natural to delegate such responsibilities, this did not happen, and a new temporary dedicated organ was created to handle the population transfers. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the SD and the Sicherheitspolizei came to

²⁴³ Heinemann 2003, pp. 151–157.

²⁴⁴ Heinemann 2003, pp. 146–148, 150–151.

²⁴⁵ Heinemann 2003, pp. 130–131, 146, 185–186.

occupy an important position in the execution of the racial expansion and population policies.

The basic arrangement of functions within the SS before the outbreak of the Second World War strongly stamped later events in the field of race and population policy. Thus there were originally already three actors which had differing tasks and spheres of responsibility but no common dedicated umbrella organisation that could have directed operations centrally. The result was a situation in which the different branches of the SS operated in a more or less disconnected fashion, carrying out different tasks in different areas even though they were united under one leader and bound by the SS ideology that he had developed.

3 THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE TRANSLATION OF PLANS INTO ACTION

The SS extended its operations in earnest to the field of the racial population policy after the outbreak of the Second World War, and initially the emphasis was on the annexed Polish territories. The starting point was clear because Hitler had already stated before the military operations began that the objective was not to conquer the territory but to annihilate the opponent. Hitler also announced that the final objective was to empty Poland of Poles and to populate the area with Germans.²⁴⁶

The final outcome of the Polish campaign made it possible to initiate the racial reorganisation measures involved in the National Socialist expansionist policy on a large scale, and the SS was authorised to implement them in conjunction with the campaign. The campaign also led to the establishment of an administrative area called the *Generalgouvernement*, which is the target area of this study. Initially, however, the *Generalgouvernement* was reserved as a place for the undesirable population and there were no immediate plans for its Germanisation.

To begin with, the demographic reorganisation policy of the SS did not proceed in a straightforward fashion, and it was beset by many difficulties. The major problems were connected with the transfer of the undesirable non-German population of the annexed Polish territories to the *Generalgouvernement*: Hans Frank, the official responsible for the administration of the area, did not wish to take in the expelled Poles, and this made for strained relations between the administration of the *Generalgouvernement* and the SS.

Even though the *Generalgouvernement* was not to be Germanised immediately, the SS extended its activities into the area and obtained a significant position in the administration. The administrative district of Lublin (*Distrikt Lublin*) was the major object of the SS operations, and Brigadeführer

²⁴⁶ Umbreit 1988, pp. 28–29. Cf. Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 28–29.

Odilo Globocnik was appointed the *SS- und Polizeiführer* (SSPF, SS and Police Chief) of the area. From the outset, he tried to carry out various projects to implement SS ideology on his own initiative, which were ultimately manifested in an attempt to Germanise the area. This led to constant conflicts with the administration of the Generalgouvernement.

3.1 The extension of SS operations to Poland and the Eastern Plan

Germany attacked Poland on 1/9/1939 after agreeing with the Soviet Union on their spheres of interest in eastern Europe. The troops of the Wehrmacht rapidly advanced deep into Poland, and Warsaw surrendered on 28/9/1939. The troops of the Soviet Union broke into eastern Poland according to a pact made with Germany on 17/9/1939, and Germany and the Soviet Union agreed on the division of Poland on 28/9/1939. The earlier division of spheres of interests was altered at the same time to the effect that Germany got control of areas located east of the river Vistula, such as the future Distrikt Lublin, and the Soviet Union got Lithuania.²⁴⁷

The SS attached some *Einsatzgruppen* (task forces) to the troops of the Wehrmacht. The Sicherheitsdienst had already started to prepare the establishment of these units in May 1939, and five *Einsatzgruppen* were established for the campaign. They were manned mainly with members of the SS and the police with detachment commanders who were mostly from the SD. Later one further task force was established to operate in Upper Silesia.²⁴⁸

The total strength of the *Einsatzgruppen* was about 2700 men, and their duty, according to an agreement between the SS and the Wehrmacht, was to combat all anti-Reich and anti-German groups operating behind the German lines. The operations of the *Einsatzgruppen* were from the outset contrary to international agreements as in their implementation of the National Socialist policy of expansion into the east they assassinated the Polish leaders in order to destroy the state of Poland.²⁴⁹ The *Einsatzgruppen* also included representatives of the Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt (RuSHA, the Race and Settlement Head Office), the task of which was to take control of land property.²⁵⁰

In addition to their other actions, these task forces began to establish Jewish councils to register Jews and to organise the deportation of the Jewish population further to the east.²⁵¹ The operations of the *Einsatzgruppen* also became more radical in the course of the campaign. In this they were influenced by Himmler, who incited them to commit acts of violence and by an incident in Bromberg (Bydgoszcz), where the Polish Home Guard had killed rebelling local

²⁴⁷ Broszat 1961, pp. 14–15.

²⁴⁸ Wildt 2003, pp. 421, 423–424, 434.

²⁴⁹ Umbreit 1988, p. 31.

²⁵⁰ Madajczyk 1987, p. 19; Heinemann 2003, p. 201.

²⁵¹ Wildt 2003, pp. 429–431.

Germans, an act which was avenged by the invading German troops on the initiative of one *Einsatzgruppe*.²⁵² This was no minor incident because the number of Poles killed amounted to over 10,000.²⁵³

In addition to the *Einsatzgruppen*, other groups of the SS also participated in the Polish campaign. They included the battalions of the Ordnungspolizei, which the Wehrmacht requested to provide support for its occupation forces. There were altogether 21 police battalions and two other units of the Ordnungspolizei stationed in Poland at the end of September 1939. The police battalions terrorised the area behind the front lines and carried out arbitrary executions. In addition to these troops, just under 1300 gendarmes and SS cavalry units were sent to the Polish territories to reinforce the police during the campaign.²⁵⁴

Additionally, two SS infantry regiments, an artillery regiment and reconnaissance, pioneer and bodyguard units participated the Polish campaign, mainly behind the lines. Three *SS-Totenkopfstandarten* were also dispatched to Poland. Their task was to operate as security forces in the occupied areas. Other SS units that operated in Poland included the *Heimwehr Danzig* (the Danzig Home Defence Force), the core of which was formed by one battalion of the Berlin *SS Totenkopfstandarte* and the *Wachsturmbann Eimann* (Eimann Guard Battalion). Furthermore, so-called "*reinforced SS-Totenkopfstandarten*" were also stationed in Poland during the campaign. They consisted mainly of members of the Allgemeine SS.²⁵⁵

The incident in Bromberg opened up an opportunity for Himmler, with the support of Hitler, to extend his authority, and it was not long before the future of Poland was mapped out by the SS in greater detail. On 7/9/1939, Heydrich stated that a purely German administration would be established in Poland and that the Polish leaders should be rendered innocuous, by which he meant killed.²⁵⁶

Plans for the fate of Poland were developed rapidly during the campaign, and Hitler presented his views concerning the future of the conquered Polish areas to the commanders of the Wehrmacht on 20/9/1939. He stated that the Poles and the Jews should be expelled from western Poland. Heydrich presented similar plans on 21/9/1939, mentioning deportations and a plan to make the areas that had not to be annexed to Germany into a separate administrative region.²⁵⁷ The overall plan drawn up for the organisation of the areas conquered by Germany at the end of September was as follows: a broad zone designated for Germanisation would be established beside the western border of the area, while east of it would be an area reserved for the Poles, and another reserved for the Jews was to be located between the rivers Vistula and Bug.²⁵⁸

²⁵² Wildt 2003, pp. 432-435, 438-447.

²⁵³ Madajczyk 1987, p. 15.

²⁵⁴ Mallmann 2004, pp. 71-74.

²⁵⁵ Cüppers 2004, pp. 91-94.

²⁵⁶ Wildt 2003, pp. 447-449.

²⁵⁷ Wildt 2003, pp. 457-458, 461-462.

²⁵⁸ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 53-54.

The leaders of the SS had a very clear idea about what Hitler wanted in Poland after the military operations ended. In practice, the demographic reorganisation policy and the authorisation to carry it out already existed and merely awaited the end of military operations. However, these factors alone were not enough to enable the initiation of large-scale measures because that would have required the termination of the Wehrmacht's occupation administration. The Wehrmacht was actually quite willing to give up control of the occupied areas quickly because the National Socialist population policy was of such a nature that it had nothing to do with the Wehrmacht,²⁵⁹ although the army had in fact participated in the expulsion and murder of Jews during the campaign.²⁶⁰

Hitler had known that it was not possible to use the military administration to carry out the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policy. Consequently it had originally been envisaged that the military administration would remain in power for only a short period of time. However, the withdrawal of the Wehrmacht from administrative responsibility did not mean that the SS obtained control of the occupied areas because there was also a civilian administrative organ attached to the military administration,²⁶¹ and the leading positions in the civilian administrative organ were occupied by so-called "old warriors", in other words long-serving National Socialists.²⁶²

The process of transferring the Polish territories to the civilian administration began at the end of September 1939, and the independent civilian authorities took the territories under their control on 26/10/1939.²⁶³ When the civil administration was established, some areas were annexed to Germany and some were made into a separate administrative unit, as Heydrich had anticipated. Behind this lay Hitler's objective of expelling the Poles and the Jews to an administrative area separate from the territories annexed to Germany and replacing them with *Volksdeutsche* from eastern Poland and the Baltic States, areas which lay within the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union.²⁶⁴

Hitler's goal was to create a straight and militarily advantageous eastern border and to annex economically valuable Polish territories to Germany. Thus a much larger area than the civil servants of the Reichsministerium für das Inneren had planned was annexed to Germany.²⁶⁵ The annexed territories included the most developed areas of Poland, and about 80% of the country's industry was located in them. The most developed areas were Upper Silesia (with the mining and metal industries) and the area around Lodz (the textile industry). The area around Posen (Poznan) was also a valuable addition to the

²⁵⁹ Broszat 1961, pp. 28–29.

²⁶⁰ Wildt 2003, pp. 463–468.

²⁶¹ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 2–3, 63.

²⁶² Broszat 1961, pp. 26–27; Madajczyk 1987, pp. 23–24.

²⁶³ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 6–12.

²⁶⁴ Broszat 1961, pp. 18–19.

²⁶⁵ Broszat 1961, pp. 33–34.

Reich because its agriculture produced more than the needs of its own region.²⁶⁶ With regard to the Germanisation project, the Lodz area was the most significant because it became a centre of SS activities related to the associated demographic reorganisation policy.²⁶⁷

The areas annexed to Germany were administratively divided into four parts. The first administrative unity consisted of Danzig (Gdansk) and Western Prussia (Pomerellen), and it was later known as the *Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreussen*. The area around Posen (Poznan) formed the second unit, and it was designated the *Reichsgau Wartheland*. The area around Kattowitz (Katowice) was incorporated into Silesia and the areas of Zichenau (Ciechanow) and Suwalken (Suwalki) were made part of East Prussia.²⁶⁸ Albert Forster and Arthur Greiser were appointed as leaders of the new Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreussen and the Reichsgau Wartheland respectively.²⁶⁹

A separate administrative unit known as the *Generalgouvernement* (General Governorate) was formed from those Polish territories that the leading National Socialists did not want to annex to Germany. The official name of the Generalgouvernement was originally "*Generalgouvernement für die besetzten polnischen Gebiete*" (the General Governorate for the occupied Polish Areas). Later on the name was shortened to the simple form: "*Generalgouvernement*".²⁷⁰ The geographical area of the Generalgouvernement was 95,743 square kilometres, and it contained about 11 million inhabitants. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Galicia (Galizien), too, was annexed to the Generalgouvernement, the area of which thereby increased to 145,180 square kilometres and the number of inhabitants to just under 18 million.²⁷¹ The Generalgouvernement was to be a reservation for the subjected stateless and half-free population, which the Third Reich could use to supply its need for labour.²⁷²

The position of the areas annexed to Germany was not uniform: Economically, they were defined as being part of the Third Reich, and a customs border (*Zollgrenz*) was set up between them and the areas not annexed to Germany. The definition of a police border (*Polizeigrenz*) was more complicated. Danzig and Upper Silesia were regarded as Germanic areas so they belonged inside the police border. The other annexed areas were located outside the police border.²⁷³ Thus all areas outside the police border but inside the customs border were to be Germanised and were consequently of interest to the SS.²⁷⁴

²⁶⁶ Musial 2004A, p. 18.

²⁶⁷ Leniger 2006, pp. 94–96.

²⁶⁸ Broszat 1961, pp. 35–36.

²⁶⁹ Rich 1974, pp. 70–71.

²⁷⁰ Umbreit 1988, pp. 39–40, 43.

²⁷¹ Musial 1999, p. 21.

²⁷² Broszat 1961, pp. 21–25.

²⁷³ Broszat 1961, p. 37; Rich 1974, p. 72.

²⁷⁴ The administrative arrangements for the Polish territories conquered by Germany are presented in Appendix 3.

On 7/10/1939, the SS obtained from Hitler wide-ranging authorization to implement measures related to the demographic reorganisation. Himmler tried to shape the authorisation in a way that would enable him to use the title *Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums* (RKF, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germanhood).²⁷⁵ The title of commissioner may be considered partly justified because his authority, albeit restricted both in time and substance, was regarded as exceeding that of the individual ministry. The remit of the RKF was indeed of that kind because the authorisation included the possibility to carry out evacuations so that *Volksdeutsche* could be settled in the new areas of the Third Reich and isolated from the population classified as noxious.²⁷⁶

It was of major significance that Himmler was appointed RKF in his capacity as *Reichsführer-SS*. Obviously, this was influenced by the idea that the activity of the RKF was concerned with political measures, which belonged to the province of the NSDAP.²⁷⁷ Himmler was supposed to operate within the remit of the RKF with the help of the existing authorities. For example, the *Reichsminister für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft* (Minister of Food and Agriculture), would be responsible for the settlement of farmers. Thus it was not intended to create a large new organization. However, the tasks of the RKF were in practice of such a nature that new organs had to be established to carry out the operations involved. The first of these organs was a general staff formed from the *Leitstelle für Ein- und Rückwanderung*, which was responsible for the resettlement of the South Tyrolean Germans. In the new situation, it was renamed the *Dienststelle des Reichskommissars für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums* (Office of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germanhood).²⁷⁸

Greifelt was known as an economic expert, and he was originally the contact person for the *Vierjahresplan* (Four-Year Plan) in the *Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS* (Personal Staff of the Reichsführer-SS), where it was his responsibility among other things to ensure the supply of labour. In connection with this, a plan was developed to repatriate Germans living abroad to the Reich, and this task was assigned to Himmler.²⁷⁹ In this way, a person whose field was economics rapidly became the co-ordinator of the National Socialist population policy.

The *Dienststelle des RKF* was attached to the *Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS*, and it comprised six main departments. The tasks of the departments, which reflected the contents of the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policy, included management and planning, the relocation of people in new settlement areas, their transportation, the raising and administration of funds and the requisition and re-distribution of land.²⁸⁰ It is

²⁷⁵ Longerich 2008, pp. 449–451.

²⁷⁶ Buchheim 1999B, pp. 183–186.

²⁷⁷ Buchheim 1958, pp. 242–243, 279.

²⁷⁸ Buchheim 1999B, pp. 185–187.

²⁷⁹ Buchheim 1958, pp. 275–276.

²⁸⁰ Buchheim 1958, pp. 245–246.

also worth noting that the Dienststelle des RKF was not officially a part of the SS organisation and that its links to the SS were created mainly through its personnel. The same also applied to the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, which was originally essential for the whole activity of the RKF. However, the position of both organs was subsequently developed to an increasing extent as a part of the SS organisation.²⁸¹

The Dienststelle des RKF initially had limited influence within the SS organisation, and it has been described as being an organ that belonged principally to the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS and which was responsible for dealing with Himmler's activities as RKF. Nor did Greifelt become an independent actor of much significance, remaining merely a representative of Himmler. The weak position of the Dienststelle des RKF is also reflected in the fact that for example the *Zentralbodenamt* (the Central Land Office) was originally only loosely connected with its higher administrative structure. This was a result of the fact that the offices which functioned under the *Zentralbodenamt* were established by the *Siedlungsamt* (Settlement Office) of the RuSHA. However, these land offices became more tightly involved in the operations of the RKF in early 1940.²⁸²

At the regional level, the Representatives of the RKF (*Beauftragten des RKF*) appointed by Himmler were responsible for carrying out the tasks of the RKF. Himmler usually appointed high-ranking SS or police officers as Representatives of the RKF but the practice varied. The Representatives of the RKF established *Ansiedlungsstäbe* (Regional Settlement Staffs) to carry out their tasks, and under these *Kreisansiedlungsstäbe* (Local Settlement Staffs) were established. The Representatives of the RKF could also use the authorities of the civilian administration in the areas where they worked. However, the authority of the RKF was not a matter of course because the leaders of the civil administration did not necessarily recognise it.²⁸³

The problems connected with Himmler's authority as RKF appeared clearly in the annexed Polish territories. Albert Forster, the Gauleiter of Danzig-Westpreussen, tried to Germanise his district as quickly as possible and to operate as independently as possible. The Gauleiter of the Wartheland, Arthur Greiser, on the other hand, worked in cooperation with Himmler from the outset, which was ensured by Greiser's membership in the SS.²⁸⁴ Greiser's commitment to the SS is indicated by the fact that one of the co-ordinators of the demographic reorganisation of the SS worked part-time in Greiser's administration.²⁸⁵ Forster's and Greiser's different approaches were reflected in the operations of the RKF in that Himmler appointed Greiser as the Representative of the RKF in Wartheland but in the area of Danzig-Westpreussen, the local HSSPF acted as the Representative of the RKF.²⁸⁶

²⁸¹ Lumans 1993, pp. 52–53, 134–137, 148–150.

²⁸² Buchheim 1958, pp. 246, 257.

²⁸³ Buchheim 1999B, p. 189

²⁸⁴ Broszat 1961, pp. 46–47, 54–55, 87–90, 126–130.

²⁸⁵ Esch 2003, p. 192.

²⁸⁶ Broszat 1961, p. 59 reference 2, p. 62.

The operations of the RKF also required special organs at the national level. *Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand GmbH* (DUT, the German Resettlement Trust) and *Deutsche Ansiedlungsgesellschaft* (DAG, the German Settlement Society) were of such a nature. The task of these companies was to take care of the property matters of *Volksdeutsche* who were to be repatriated to the Third Reich.²⁸⁷ The third national-level organ was the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*. Its tasks included the transfer of the *Volksdeutsche* of eastern Europe to their new abodes and the arrangement of temporary accommodation for them.²⁸⁸

Of the SS head offices, the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA, the Reich Security Head Office) and the *Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt* were connected with the activities of the RKF. The RSHA was a new head office, which was established on 27/9/1939 during the Polish campaign. It was led by Reinhard Heydrich, and it consisted of the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD, the Security Service) and the *Sicherheitspolizei* (Sipo, the Security Police), which included the *Geheime Staatspolizei* (the Gestapo, the State Secret Police) and the *Kriminalpolizei* (Kripo, the Crime Police).²⁸⁹

The RSHA was responsible for the measures imposed on the non-German population, the evaluation of the political reliability and the citizenship of the *Volksdeutsche* returnees. The RuSHA, for its part, was responsible for the racial screening of the target population.²⁹⁰ The most significant actor in the field of the demographic policies was the RSHA. An organ to co-ordinate the evacuations was established in the RSHA in order to enable the central direction of the operation. It belonged to *Amt III* (Office III) led by Otto Ohlendorf. Hans Ehlich was appointed head of the new organ, and Adolf Eichmann from *Amt IV* (Office IV, the Gestapo) of the RSHA was made responsible for the planning of the evacuations.²⁹¹

The division of the racial activities between the different offices of the RSHA was based on the fact that *Amt IV* was a police organisation, which belonged to the state, and could influence the activities of other state authorities. Correspondingly, *Amt III*, which was affiliated to the *Sicherheitsdienst*, produced various plans connected with racial policy and used the other branches of its own organisation to carry them out. The division of tasks was promoted by the fact that the SD represented expertise in racial policy, which made it a suitable organ for planning. It should also be noted that for example Eichmann was transferred from the SD to the Gestapo only after the Polish campaign began.²⁹²

The scope of the activities of the SS was also increased by the fact that the SS units had abandoned the legal system of the Wehrmacht in the area of hostilities, which enabled it to operate much more freely than before in carrying

²⁸⁷ Buchheim 1999B, pp. 191-192.

²⁸⁸ Lumans 1993, pp. 131-134, 137-148.

²⁸⁹ On the establishment and structure of the RSHA, see Wildt 2003, p. 283-415.

²⁹⁰ Buchheim 1999B, pp. 195-197.

²⁹¹ Aly 2002, pp. 103-107.

²⁹² Wildt 2003, pp. 490, 493.

out the National Socialist policy in practice.²⁹³ Even though the legal system of the SS was established during the Polish campaign, it is not considered to have been merely a product of the events of the campaign; it had been planned ever since the middle of 1938. The objective of Himmler was to create for the SS a legal system of its own that would emphasise the values of the organisation and enable it to handle legal matters internally.²⁹⁴

The implementation of the racial population policy also required the drawing-up of long-term plans. This was one of the tasks of the Dienststelle des RKF. Konrad Meyer was head of the RKF organ that was responsible for the planning, and he can be regarded as the main planner of the SS.²⁹⁵ Meyer was born in Salzderhelden in Lower Saxony in 1901. He studied at the University of Göttingen, and after his studies, he made his way to Berlin and into the service of the SS.²⁹⁶

Meyer belonged to the same generation as Himmler: he, too, he had grown up during the First World War and, like so many of his generation, after the war he had adopted radical nationalist, anti-democratic and anti-Semitic ideas. His background was reflected in the basic premises behind his planning, which differed from earlier German plans for the east²⁹⁷ and the finished plans themselves were in accordance with the National Socialist racial ideology.²⁹⁸

Meyer has been described as a technocrat and a rational scientist,²⁹⁹ and it was typical of his new plans that although they were targeted at different areas, they formed an integrated entity with a vision of the future that was totally unbridled. The difference from the earlier plans was not restricted to their presuppositions; the objectives also differed. The aim was no longer to establish individual small farms but to create modern, completely German areas in terms of both population and appearance.³⁰⁰ In practice, for the National Socialists "modern" meant a society dominated by agriculture, in the achievement of which the existing culture of the area would be destroyed.³⁰¹

It was easy for Meyer to extend the planning to areas outside Germany because the National Socialists had established a whole group of organs whose tasks included the compilation of information about the target areas.³⁰² Organs for regional and livelihood planning had also been founded, and Meyer had established fixed contacts with them and had become one of the directors of an organ called *Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft für Raumforschung* (the Reich Work Community for Territorial Research).³⁰³ Furthermore, as Director of the *Institut für Agrarwesen und Agrarpolitik* (the Institute for Agrarian Affairs and Agrarian

²⁹³ Wildt 2003, pp. 475–476. Cf. Eisenblätter 1969, p. 43.

²⁹⁴ Vieregge 2002, pp. 13–17.

²⁹⁵ Aly & Heim 2004, pp. 156–158.

²⁹⁶ Short biography of Meyer: Gutberger 1996, pp. 511–512.

²⁹⁷ For a more extensive treatment of the differences between the plans, see Stoehr 2002.

²⁹⁸ Madajczyk 1993, p. 16.

²⁹⁹ Rössler & Schleiermacher 1993, pp. 7–8.

³⁰⁰ Stoehr 2002, pp. 78–85, 89.

³⁰¹ Rössler & Schleiermacher 1993, pp. 9–10.

³⁰² Kletzin 2000, pp. 34–40, 44–53; Rössler & Schleiermacher 1993, pp. 8–9.

³⁰³ Rössler & Schleiermacher 1993, p. 8.

Policy) in Berlin,³⁰⁴ he was able to tap the resources of this organ as well.³⁰⁵ It should also be noted that various doctrines concerning regional and areal organisation on which the planning could be based had been developed in National Socialist Germany.³⁰⁶

From Meyer's point of view, it was significant that Himmler's prerogative in the field of the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policy was so strong that the SS was able to prevent competitors from the civil administration from influencing the planning.³⁰⁷ Meyer left the Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft für Raumordnung and recruited staff from it for the Dienststelle des RKF.³⁰⁸

Even though Konrad Meyer was the head planner of the SS organisation, the planning activities of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt initially held the advantage over those of the other SS head offices. This was a result of the fact that the *Einsatzgruppen* had remained in the Polish territories after the military campaign in order to implement the deportations of the undesirable population.³⁰⁹ It is thought that *Amt III B* of the RSHA subsequently became the centre for planning the demographic policy of the SS, co-ordinating all the SS head offices in this field of activity.³¹⁰ It should also be noted that the RSHA may have exploited the scientific communities just as the RKF planners did.³¹¹

The RSHA did not hold the upper hand in the planning activities of the SS for long because its capability was limited mainly to deportation and extermination activities.³¹² Thus there was also a demand for the comprehensive planning activity of the Dienststelle des RKF, and this office did in fact produce a series of plans. These presented various solutions for organising the eastern areas. The first of the plans was drawn up by Konrad Meyer, and it was completed in early 1940.³¹³ The division of labour and the relations between the RSHA and the Dienststelle des RKF is shown by the fact that the long-term plan of the RSHA, which was completed in the winter of 1940, served as background material for Meyer's plan.³¹⁴ The objective of the long-term plan was the total Germanisation of the annexed Polish territories.³¹⁵

³⁰⁴ Roth 1993, p. 69.

³⁰⁵ Rössler 1990, p. 165 reference 2.

³⁰⁶ For example, Aly & Heim 2004, pp. 161-162; Wasser 1993B, pp. 29-31.

³⁰⁷ Rössler & Schleiermacher 1993, p. 9.

³⁰⁸ Rössler 1990, pp. 164-165, 167.

³⁰⁹ Roth 1993, pp. 32-34.

³¹⁰ Roth 1993, p. 31. Cf. Wildt 2003, pp. 381, 414.

³¹¹ Office VII of the RSHA was responsible for the scientific research work related to the target areas. In addition, the *Wannsee Institut*, which operated under Office VI, also gathered information about the target areas. Wildt 2003, pp. 364-377, 407-410. Furthermore, the *Auslandwissenschaftliche Fakultät Universität Berlin* and the *Deutsche Auslandwissenschaftliche Institut* were linked to the RSHA. Kletzin 2000, pp. 49-51.

³¹² Madajczyk 1993, p. 16. The views on the background of the plans of SD have provoked discussion. Roth 1993, pp. 27-28, 31.

³¹³ Views about the date when the plan was completed vary: Roth estimates that it was completed in January 1940. Roth 1993, p. 58 reference 217. In *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*, it is estimated that it was completed in April or May 1940. *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*, p. 3.

³¹⁴ Roth 1993, pp. 58-59.

³¹⁵ Wildt 2003, p. 491.

The first plan of the RKF planners was called *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete* (Planning Principles for the Development of the Eastern Territories),³¹⁶ and it focussed only on those areas that were annexed to Germany in the autumn of 1939. The objective was to increase the proportion of the German population in the target areas to a level of 50% within a few years, after which the Germanisation process was supposed to continue almost under its own impetus.³¹⁷ In order to achieve this goal, it was planned that 3.4 million Poles should be deported from the area and 3.4 million Germans transferred there in addition to the 1.1 million Germans who already lived there. The question of the 560,000 Jews who lived in the area was also addressed. They were to be expelled as soon as possible. Thus the demographic calculations were based on a population of 9 million persons instead of 9.5 million.³¹⁸

The basis for the calculations was that the population density of the area should be about 100 inhabitants per square kilometre. The number was considered to be high in comparison with the figures of the neighbouring provinces of Ostpreussen and Pommern, as well as with the agriculture-dominated area of the so-called *Altreich*. In spite of this, the goal was not rejected, and it was proposed that a mixed agricultural and industrial economy and social structure be developed in the area. In it about 35% of the population would work in agriculture and industry. The idea for this kind of economy and a social structure was based on model areas in Germany such as the area around Hannover and certain areas in Bavaria that were classified as "healthy".³¹⁹

Even though the economic and social structure of the area was designed to be single entity embracing both industry and agriculture, the settlement of German farmers in the area was regarded as a precondition of the successful implementation of Germanisation there. According to this view, the proportion of the German population was to rise to 70% in the countryside, which meant that 1.46 million German agrarian settlers needed to be found for the area.³²⁰

In fact, the finding of German farmers was estimated to be the major difficulty in the Germanisation process, so it was planned to focus the limited resources on carefully selected targets. The German population was to be settled as soon as possible in three different target areas. The first was the region on the west side of the border between the annexed territories and the Generalgouvernement. The second target was the surroundings of larger towns. The third target was the area of Suwalken. A fourth objective was to form a line of German settlement across the whole annexed area and along the former Polish Corridor.³²¹

³¹⁶ *Planungsgrundlagen für the den Aufbau der Ostgebiete* document is published in the *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan* work as Document number 1 under the following heading: *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, ausgearbeitet von der Planungshauptabteilung des Reichsführers SS. 1940, April-Mai, Berlin.

³¹⁷ *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, p. 3.

³¹⁸ *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, p. 3.

³¹⁹ *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, p. 4.

³²⁰ *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, p. 4-6.

³²¹ *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, p. 5-6.

The focus of the direction and the targets of the German settlement had been chosen so that the operation would lead to the isolation of the Polish-populated areas. Furthermore, it was intended to unify the areas already populated by Germans. It was estimated that in addition to the 285,000 Germans who already lived in these areas, about 1.8 million Germans were needed for the Germanisation of the primary targets. Of them about 820,000 persons should work in agriculture in addition to the 180,000 Germans already living in the countryside, so that the proportion of the German population in the countryside would reach 70%.³²²

It was planned that in the first stages of the project, the settlers would be taken from areas of the so-called *Altreich* that were designated as over-populated. It was assumed that the acquisition of settlers would be relatively uncomplicated because there were estimated to be 100,000 families available in the Baden and Württemberg regions alone. Furthermore, it was estimated that the *Reichsnährstand* organisation³²³ would be able to supply 15,000–20,000 young farmers.³²⁴

According to the plans, the German settlement of the countryside would be carefully organised into villages, which would be communities that reflected the broader general plan for the settlement of the countryside and the members of which would be more or less bound to the soil. The bulk of the inhabitants were to be farmers who cultivated holdings of a sufficient size to be productive. Some of the inhabitants would be agricultural workers, but the aim was to provide them with their own farms at a later stage of the project. The leaders of the villages were to be carefully selected large estate-owners, called *Wehrbauer*, who met the ideological and vocational requirements and who employed labourers on their estates.³²⁵

About 1000 hectares of farmland would be needed for an average village, and the average number of farms in each would be 40. Two of these would be *Wehrbauer* estates, 26 would be normal family farms and 12 would be farms tilled on a part-time basis by workers or craftsmen. The number of inhabitants would be at least 300–400 persons, which would be enough to enable the establishment of schools with a few classes. The villages were not designed to be particularly self-sufficient enclaves as they were intended to function in close co-operation with the small towns of their surrounding areas. This connection was to be promoted by dispelling the social polarity between the urban and rural populations.³²⁶

It was estimated that the German settlement would require a considerable amount of new construction work in both the countryside and the towns because all the farms involved in the first settlement stage were to be equipped

³²² *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, p. 5–6.

³²³ The *Reichsnährstand* was founded in September 1939 to co-ordinate the agriculture of the Third Reich. Its head was the *Reichsbauernführer*. *Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus*, p. 750.

³²⁴ *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, p. 12.

³²⁵ *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, p. 8–10.

³²⁶ *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, p. 7–8, 11.

with new buildings, and the building stock of the towns was also to be thoroughly modernised. Because of this, special attention was paid to brick manufacture, which was to be tripled or quadrupled in both the annexed areas and the Generalgouvernement.³²⁷

The construction projects were not limited merely to the building stock, but attention was also paid to the traffic network, which was regarded as extremely important for the annexation process. Therefore, a comprehensive network of motorways was to be built. Posen would be the most important hub, and from there motorways would lead to Berlin, Breslau, Lodz and via Bromberg to Danzig. In addition to the motorways, attention also was paid to the building of ordinary roads, and it was estimated that the area that was to be settled during the first stage would alone require 4000 kilometres of new roads. In addition to fixed connection like road networks, the links between the new areas and the Reich were to be tightened with the help of cultural bonds. These could be created with the help of "godparenting", for example, which involved a town or region in Germany adopting one in the occupied territories and providing it with economic and other support.³²⁸

The *Planungsgrundlagen* plan indicates that in 1940 the SS already had a relatively complete scheme for the Germanisation of the Polish territories. The method to be used in the Germanisation project and the carefully considered subsections dealing with its various components occupied a central position in the plan. The starting point for the whole process was the transfer of people from the heartlands of the Third Reich to the east so that the settlement project would also serve the needs of the so-called *Altreich*. In the annexed areas, the new German settlement would mean the formation of a totally new society created at the expense of the former structures and inhabitants.

Apart from the idea of creating a new society, the most significant aspect of the early plans was the fact that their implementation would promote later stages of the Germanisation process. It is also worth noting that in the plans the areas were dealt as a single entity despite their administrative division. This reflects the attitude of the SS to the different administrative solutions and anticipates what was to come.

The *Planungsgrundlagen* plan also created the basis for future plans regarding questions related to the inhabitants because each group of inhabitants would willy-nilly be subjected to the proposed measures. The Jews would be in the worst position because they were not to be tolerated in the area at all. The fate of the Poles would not essentially differ from that of the Jews because their status would be continuously weakened, and eventually there would be no permanent Polish inhabitants in the area. The position of the German settlers was not so rosy either because in practice they would be bound to the soil.

The early RKF plans concentrated on outlining the main features of the project. This was understandable because the plans were drawn up quickly. However, the *Planungsgrundlagen* plan gives a whole batch of indications about

³²⁷ *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, p. 11, 13.

³²⁸ *Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete*, pp. 13–14.

what was to come because it focussed on matters which were also to be significant in the later plans. Such matters were the future social structure of the areas, the acquisition of inhabitants and the specification of target areas.

The plans of the SS organisation were an expression of Himmler's ideas. He had presented these in written form to Hitler in spring 1940, and he had received Hitler's support for them.³²⁹ Himmler's objective was to split up the population groups of the conquered area and to get rid first of the Jews and before long of all the other non-German inhabitants. He also tried to prevent the education of the non-German population so that it could be turned into an abject work force and to isolate the Germanic genotype in the area.³³⁰

Himmler was not alone in the ideas expressed in his writings because the treatment of the population of the conquered Polish areas had already been outlined in November 1939 by the *Rassenpolitisches Amt der Reichsleitung der NSDAP* (the Department for Racial Policy of the National Socialist Party).³³¹ The document was called *Die Frage der Behandlung der Bevölkerung der ehemaligen polnischen Gebiete nach rassenpolitischen Gesichtspunkten* (The question of the treatment of the population of the former Polish territories from the point of view of racial policy), and it provided the guidelines for Himmler's actions.³³²

Hitler ordered that Himmler's written exposition of his ideas should be brought to the knowledge of those persons who were responsible for the administration of the conquered Polish territories, and Himmler himself disseminated it within his own organisation.³³³ However, Himmler's ideas were probably already been quite widely known by his subordinates because the representatives of the SS had been implementing National Socialist demographic reorganization policies since the beginning of the Polish campaign.

3.2 The first Germanisation project of the SS

The SS began the Germanisation of the annexed Polish territories in 1939, utilising the technique that had been developed in the Protectorate. For land acquisition and settlement planning the operation relied on the services of the *Landämter* (Land Offices). These had been established in Posen, Danzig, Kattowitz and Zichenau and operated under the *Zentralbodenamt* in Berlin.³³⁴ Land acquisition was made possible by an agreement between Himmler and Göring.³³⁵ The RSHA was responsible for questions related to the population, but the practical operations were the responsibility of local staffs connected to

³²⁹ Der Reichsführer SS. 28/5/1940. "Himmler zur Behandlung von Fremdvölkern."

³³⁰ Einige Gedanken über die Behandlung der Fremdvölkischen im Osten. Not dated. "Himmler zur Behandlung von Fremdvölkern."

³³¹ Broszat 1961, p. 23; Madajczyk 1987, pp. 392–393; Wasser 1993B, pp. 21–22.

³³² Madajczyk 1987, pp. 392–393.

³³³ Der Reichsführer SS. 28/5/1940. "Himmler zur Behandlung von Fremdvölkern."

³³⁴ Heinemann 2003, pp. 188–189, 212–214.

³³⁵ Buchheim 1958, pp. 270–271.

the RuSHA,³³⁶ whose representatives also decided the fate of individual persons.³³⁷

The plan of the SS was to arrange operations so that in the annexed territories the *Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer* (HSSPF) and the *Inspekteur der Sicherheitspolizei* (IdS, Inspectors of the Security Police) would be responsible for the deportations. They established *Evakuierungsstäbe* (evacuation staffs), and the staff established in Posen developed into an organ called *Umwandererzentralstelle* (UWZ, the Central Office for Migration), which was responsible for the deportations and which later also operated in Lodz.³³⁸ The *Umwandererzentralstelle* of Posen was led by Ralf Heinz Höppner³³⁹ and the *Umwandererzentralstelle* of Lodz by Hermann Krumej.³⁴⁰ The UWZ organisation operated under command of the RSHA,³⁴¹ and in addition to Posen and Lodz, the UWZ also had offices in Kattowitz and in Danzig.³⁴² The local offices of the UWZ had sub-offices in the areas in which the National Socialist New Order policies were to be implemented.³⁴³

The tasks of the UWZ included the expulsion of the Jews and the Poles. The expulsion of the Jews was called "*Evakuierung*" (evacuation) while that of the Poles was designated "*Umsiedlung*" (resettlement). The resettlement involved expelling Poles from their homes and subjecting them to various kinds of examinations. The purpose of the examinations was to determine which population group the expelled persons belonged to, and they also investigated the political views, racial characteristics, health and ability to work of the target population. The idea was to send those members of the population who were estimated to be most suitable to Germany as a workforce and from that group to pick out those persons who would be Germanised. Those who refused to engage in the labour service and those who did not reach the middle level in the examination were to be deported to the *Generalgouvernement*.³⁴⁴

According to the UWZ, the objective was to expel above all those Poles who owned farms, and to leave Polish servants for the use of the German population that was to be settled in place of the deported population. Old, sick and disabled persons who had been left alone were to be moved elsewhere in the target area. Those who were to be expelled would be given one hour to prepare for the deportation. The police, who were responsible for the deportation, were to make sure that the expelled persons took along enough food for a fortnight, warm clothing, a blanket or other covering, cutlery and

³³⁶ Heinemann 2003, pp. 217–218, 224.

³³⁷ Heinemann 2004, pp. 77–78.

³³⁸ Banach 1996, pp. 223–224.

³³⁹ Wildt 2003, p. 489 reference 7; Alberti 2004, p. 117.

³⁴⁰ Roth 1993, p. 39.

³⁴¹ The subordination of the UWZ to the RSHA can be seen in headlinings of documents of the UWZ. For example, *Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, Umwandererzentralstelle Posen, Dienststelle Litzmannstadt: Abschlußbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R75 / 3b*

³⁴² Heinemann 2003, p. 197.

³⁴³ 8. Die Umwanderer-Zentrale. BArch R 75 / 1.

³⁴⁴ 8. Die Umwanderer-Zentrale. BArch R 75 / 1.

personal documents. During the expulsion, the police were also instructed to pay special attention to ensure that the expelled persons did not damage or destroy buildings so that the Germanic population to be settled in the area would be able to continue farming without delay. It was also to be made clear to the expelled that it was not possible to change the situation.³⁴⁵

The instructions of the UWZ were apparently not intended to be followed to the letter because it has emerged in studies of the deportations that the units of the Ordnungspolizei that carried out the deportations systematically killed persons who were unable to move or to work.³⁴⁶ Also, the claim that whole families were deported for labour service is unconvincing because the National Socialists were certainly not interested in establishing Polish communities in the heartlands of the Third Reich. It is much more probable that those who were unable to move were killed, while those who were capable of working were screened off and children and old persons deported to the Generalgouvernement.³⁴⁷

The *Einwandererzentralstelle* (EWZ, the Central Office for Immigration) was responsible for the *Volksdeutsche* who were to be settled in place of the expelled Poles. The EWZ was established in October 1939 in Gdingen (Gotenhafen, Gdynia) and Martin Sandberger was appointed as its chief.³⁴⁸ He has been described as a typical young RSHA expert who care nothing about the targets of the organisation's operations.³⁴⁹ The EWZ moved several times during its operational lifetime, being located in Posen and Berlin before moving to Lodz in 1941. Later on, it had branches in Gdingen, Stettin, Schneidemühl, Paris and Cracow. Martin Sandberger was followed as head of the EWZ by Lambert von Malsen-Ponickau.³⁵⁰ The EWZ operated under the RSHA just like the UWZ did.³⁵¹

The *Einwandererzentralstelle* came to occupy an important position in the whole Germanisation project because its operations focussed on the *Volksdeutsche*, from whom it was easiest to obtain settlers most easily at short notice. The availability of *Volksdeutsche* was a result the policy of repatriating them from their habitations in eastern Europe that began in 1939. The first step along this road was an agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, on the basis of which about 130,000 *Volksdeutsche* from eastern Poland had been transferred to Germany by February 1940. At the same time, about 120,000 Germans from the Baltic countries were repatriated to Germany on the basis of agreements made with the Baltic States. The influx of the *Volksdeutsche* did not

³⁴⁵ Krumej: Merkblatt für Polizeibeamten zur Durchführung der Evakuierungen von polnischen Hofbesitzern. 9/5/1940. BArch R 75 / 3.

³⁴⁶ Browning 1999, pp. 48–50.

³⁴⁷ Aly 2002, pp. 112–113.

³⁴⁸ Wildt 2003, p. 489.

³⁴⁹ Leniger 2006, pp. 148–149.

³⁵⁰ Buchheim 1958, pp. 265–266.

³⁵¹ Headlinings of documents of the EWZ indicate subordination of the EWZ to the RSHA. For example, Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, Einwandererzentralstelle, Der Leiter: Anordnung Nr. 212. 27/9/1943. BArch R 69 / 922.

end here, and before the end of 1940 about 30,000 *Volksdeutsche* arrived from the Generalgouvernement, about 80,000 from Romania and about 140,000 from those areas of Romania that had been annexed to the Soviet Union. Thus at the end of 1940 there were already about 500,000 *Volksdeutsche* who had arrived for resettlement.³⁵²

The task of the Einwandererzentralstelle was to screen the *Volksdeutsche* and to assess their suitability as inhabitants of the National Socialist state. The examination was called *Durchschleusung* (filtering), and its most central component was a racial examination performed by representatives of the RuSHA.³⁵³ An attempt was made to disguise this as a medical examination. The SS racial examiners emphasised the significance of the assessment and compared it to a doctor's certificate. However, in addition to the subjects' racial characteristics, the examinations of the EWZ also evaluated their political and social attributes.³⁵⁴

The EWZ dealt with people in units consisting of families, which were classified on the basis of the racial examination into Groups RuS I to RuS IV and RuS IVf. The designation "*O-Fall*" was used for persons belonging to Groups I–III, indicating that they were suitable material for settlement as pioneer in the east. Those belonging to Group IV, on the other hand, were classified as "*A-Fall*", which meant settlement in the so-called *Altreich*. Persons in Group IVf were categorised as aliens, and for them the designation *S-Fall* was used. Their fate was either to be returned to the country they had been taken from or to be deported to the Generalgouvernement.³⁵⁵ The objective of the operation of the EWZ has been described as the selection of persons who would be racially faultless, medically healthy, politically reliable and economically useful inhabitants of the National Socialist state. However, this goal proved to be far from simple to attain because the operation was slow, and there were also tensions within the EWZ about the relative significance of racial-ideological and medical considerations.³⁵⁶

The racial activities of the SS were not restricted to the registration and screening of the arriving *Volksdeutsche* or to the examination of the expelled non-German population; the SS also wanted to register and examine the *Volksdeutsche* living in the annexed Polish territories. For these a register called *Deutsche Volksliste* (DVL, the Register of German People) was compiled. The aim behind this was to make the population of the area as pure as possible in terms of its racial characteristics. To reach this objective, it was necessary to examine the Germans who were already living in the area. The registration and examination of people was facilitated by the fact that it was not intended to

³⁵² Heinemann 2003, pp. 190, 233–234, 242–243. There are some researchs focusing the repatriation of the *Volksdeutsche*. For example, Jachomowski 1984 and Hehn 1984.

³⁵³ Heinemann 2003, pp. 232–233.

³⁵⁴ Heinemann 2006, pp. 173–174, 176.

³⁵⁵ Heinemann 2003, pp. 235–236. Cf. Leniger 2006, pp. 150–151.

³⁵⁶ Leniger 2006, pp. 161, 224.

grant German citizenship to the *Volksdeutsche* of the area without registration and a racial examination.³⁵⁷

The system of solving the questions connected to citizenship was modelled on a method used in the Wartheland.³⁵⁸ The people were classified in the DVL register into four main groups. The qualities required of members of Groups 1 and 2 were such that they could clearly be categorised as Germans. Groups 3 and 4 were problematical because the National Socialists could not decide whether their members were Germans or Poles. The final result was that members of groups 3 and 4 were to be settled in the so-called *Altreich*. To be included in the DVL register, a person had to reach level RuS III in the racial examination.³⁵⁹

From the point of view of the National Socialist New Order demographic policy, the expulsion of the non-German population was at least as important as the settlement of the population that had been classified as German – in fact the deportations were the most crucial element in the whole process. In the SS organisation, the deportations were given different names indicating the nature of the operations such as *Nahplan* (short-term plan), *Zwischenplan* (mid-term plan) and *Fernplan* (long-term plan). The majority of expulsions took place in the Wartheland area, and the city of Lodz became the centre of the demographic reorganisation.³⁶⁰ The driving force behind this was Arthur Greiser, the *Gauleiter* of the Wartheland, who believed that the region would become the model area for the whole of postwar Germany.³⁶¹

The first short-term plan was carried out in December 1939, and about 88,000 persons were deported from the Wartheland into the Generalgouvernement. The mid-term plan was carried out in February-March 1940, and about 40,000 persons were deported from the Wartheland into the Generalgouvernement. A second short-term plan was implemented between March 1940 and January and at that time about 133,000 persons were deported from the Wartheland into the Generalgouvernement. During the implementation of a third short-term-plan in January-March 1942 about 19,000 persons were deported from the Wartheland.³⁶²

Expulsions were also carried out in the other annexed Polish territories. From the Danzig-Westpreussen area about 41,000 persons were deported into the Generalgouvernement between May 1940 and March 1941. From the Zichenau area slightly fewer than 22,000 persons were deported into the Generalgouvernement before the Eastern Campaign, and from eastern Upper Silesia about 17,500 persons were deported.³⁶³

³⁵⁷ Heinemann 2003, pp. 233, 245, 260.

³⁵⁸ Broszat 1961, pp. 121–126.

³⁵⁹ Heinemann 2003, pp. 260, 265.

³⁶⁰ Röhr 1996, pp. 266–268.

³⁶¹ Alberti 2004, p. 113.

³⁶² Röhr 1996, p. 268.

³⁶³ Röhr 1996, p. 268.

Altogether about 400,000 persons were deported into the Generalgouvernement before the Eastern Campaign.³⁶⁴ The deportations were integrated seamlessly with the transfer of the *Volksdeutsche* from eastern Europe.³⁶⁵ The transfer of the *Volksdeutsche* and the expulsion of the Poles before the beginning of the Eastern Campaign posed a challenging set of problems. Even at the first stage of the operation it became apparent that the authorities of the Generalgouvernement were experiencing difficulties in receiving and accommodating the deportees, and a little later a labour shortage in Germany and a lack of rolling stock presented further obstacles to the deportations. In February 1940, Göring forbade the deportations into the Generalgouvernement. The SS did not give up its deportation objectives, however, and brought up the matter again and again, and Frank, the official responsible for the Generalgouvernement, failed to get any support from Hitler.³⁶⁶

The deportations had to be discontinued in March 1941 because of the approaching of the Eastern Campaign. After this it was possible to continue them only inside the annexed areas. This is in fact what happened, and by February 1942 more than 110,000 persons had been expelled from their homes in the Warthegau.³⁶⁷ In spite of this, the settlement of the *Volksdeutsche* in the annexed territories did not succeed as expected, and by March 1942, out of over 500,000 returnees only 287,000 persons had been settled in the annexed territories. There were still 131,000 persons living in camps, and 93,000 had been settled in the *Altreich*.³⁶⁸

The accommodation of the *Volksdeutsche* in camps was partly due to the fact that there were not enough farms available in the annexed Polish territories for them.³⁶⁹ The average time spent in the camps was nine months, but some remained in them right up to the end of the war.³⁷⁰ The conditions in the camps were so bad that there was a high mortality rate among children and old persons.³⁷¹ The camp life also caused dissatisfaction and conflicts among the *Volksdeutsche* of eastern Europe, who had left their homes voluntarily, and that was not the kind of outcome they had expected. On the other hand, the SS used the time spent in the camps by the *Volksdeutsche* in attempting to unify them into a solid National Socialist settler group.³⁷²

The execution of the deportations also caused increasing passive resistance among the Polish population. This was manifested in attempts to avoid deportation by escaping out of the target areas for the duration of the operations. The escape activity was clearly effective because in summer 1940 the SS succeeded in expelling only about 40% of the planned number of

³⁶⁴ Musial 2004A, p. 17.

³⁶⁵ Röhr 1996, p. 267.

³⁶⁶ Wildt 2003, pp. 491–496, 532–536.

³⁶⁷ Röhr 1996, pp. 267–269.

³⁶⁸ Heinemann 2003, pp. 243, 247, 249–250.

³⁶⁹ Heinemann 2006, p. 177.

³⁷⁰ Schulze 2006, pp. 193–194.

³⁷¹ Heinemann 2006, pp. 178–179.

³⁷² Leniger 2006, pp. 111–112, 137.

people.³⁷³ There is also some original source material available about the failure of the expulsions. From this, it emerges that the Poles could not be found in their homes in the early hours of the morning, when the expulsions were carried out, and that they sometimes spent the night outdoors for weeks on end. Because the expulsions were carried out in only one area at a time, the Poles also had time to move or to sell their property. The most crucial mistake was the numbering of the targets, which gave the Poles advance detailed information about them and thus enabled them to avoid expulsion.³⁷⁴

In addition to the problems in the expulsion and resettlement of the Poles, the SS also experienced difficulties in expelling the Jews from Germany, Austria, the Protectorate and the annexed Polish territories. Adolf Eichmann had been appointed to prepare the expulsion of the Jews in October 1939. He made an expedition to occupied Poland and chose the area of Nisko as the target reception area for the deported Jews. Just under 3000 Jews were expelled from Vienna and Ostrau (Ostrava) in October 1939. However, the project ended almost as soon as it began, and the enclosure of the Jews into ghettos remained the most important anti-Semitic measure at this time.³⁷⁵

In addition to its anti-Semitic operations, the SS also proceeded with its extermination of the Polish intelligentsia, using the *Selbstschutz* (self-defence) units of local *Volksdeutsche* to help it. The *Selbstschutz* units had in fact been ordered to be disbanded, but their members were transferred either to the SS or to other organs of the NSDAP.³⁷⁶ In practice the *Selbstschutz* units continued to operate well into 1940 except in the Danzig-Westpreussen area.³⁷⁷ The murdering of the Polish intelligentsia was not to be the only systematic extermination programme conducted in the areas conquered by Germany: chronically ill and psychiatric patients were also executed in order to facilitate the accommodation and maintenance of the arriving *Volksdeutsche*.³⁷⁸

The operations of the SS in the field of demographic reorganisation did not succeed as planned, but they gave rise to organs and practices which made it possible to start carrying out deportation operations on a fairly broad scale. The RSHA developed into the major demographic reorganisation organ of the SS. The scope of its activities was based above all on the fact that the police organisation which enabled it to implement the evacuations was co-ordinated by the SS. The RuSHA, too, played an important role when the reorganisation policies were put into effect because its staff constituted a significant part of the local SS organs in the annexed Polish territories.

However, the operations of the SS met with considerable resistance at all levels –local, regional and national. At the local level, the problems stemmed from the fact that the population designated for expulsion started to engage in

³⁷³ Broszat 1961, p. 97.

³⁷⁴ Kreisleitung Lentschütz Osorkau / NSDAP-Barth / UWZ Litzmarunstadt. Not dated. BArch R 75 / 3.

³⁷⁵ Wildt 2003, pp. 468–473, 496–498.

³⁷⁶ Wildt 2003, pp. 476–480, 483–484.

³⁷⁷ Jansen & Weckbecker 1992, pp. 193–196.

³⁷⁸ Aly 2002, pp. 114–126.

passive resistance and as a consequence the deportations did not proceed in the expected way. At the regional level, the problems stemmed from the National Socialist administrative system, which emphasised the power of individual persons. As a consequence, the operations of the SS concentrated on the Wartheland area and not on all the annexed Polish territories. At the level of the central administration problems were caused by the fact that the demographic reorganisation programme of the SS prevented the economic utilisation of the conquered areas.

From the point of view of later Germanisation operations, the most significant factors in the events of 1939 and 1940 were the rapid organisation of the SS to implement the National Socialist reorganisation policies and the practical experience obtained in the racial demographic operation. The organisation in itself proved to be functional, but the operations were beset by numerous difficulties. Above all, these were manifested in the fact that it was not possible to resettle the *Volksdeutsche* of eastern Europe rapidly in the annexed Polish areas, and they ended up living in the camps of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* for varying periods of time. There were also hostile reactions among the Polish population, but they did not develop into systematic resistance and rebellion.

3.3 The Generalgouvernement – a problematic area

Hans Frank was appointed to head the civil administration of those Polish territories that were not annexed to Germany. His administrative unit was called the *Generalgouvernement*, and his title was *Generalgouverneur*. In his early career, Frank had served as Hitler's lawyer, participated in the setting up of the National Socialist administrative system and was appointed Minister without Portfolio in the mid-1930s. Frank's moderately fast career advancement was based on the fact that he was one of the so-called "old warriors" and had participated for example in the failed 1923 putsch.³⁷⁹

Frank's advancement to the position of *Generalgouverneur* was enabled by his earlier appointment as head of the civilian administrative unit in the military administration of the occupied Polish territories. An experienced National Socialist, Frank did not hurry in taking up his duties in the military administration but waited for the situation to become more advantageous for his own power ambitions. Thus Frank's term of office in Poland did not begin until the end of October 1939 with the establishment of the *Generalgouvernement*.³⁸⁰

Frank was to be totally independent and the sole and sovereign ruler in the *Generalgouvernement*.³⁸¹ The administrative organisation of the

³⁷⁹ For a more extensive account of Frank, see Schenk 2006 and Klessmann 1971.

³⁸⁰ Umbreit 1988, pp. 35–36, 38–39.

³⁸¹ Madajczyk 1987, p. 62.

Generalgouvernement consisted of the organs of administration at central, district, county and local government levels. The central administration consisted of the *Amt des Generalgouverneurs* (Office of the Generalgouverneur), which was re-named in summer 1940 the *Regierung des Generalgouvernements* (the Government of Generalgouvernement). The central administration was headed by Frank's long-standing colleague, *Staatssekretär* (Secretary of State) Josef Bühler. The *Regierung des Generalgouvernements* consisted of 12 *Hauptabteilungen* (main departments) and the *Staatssekretariat* (Office of the Secretary of State). The main departments were divided into subdivisions, which in turn were further subdivided into smaller units.³⁸²

Local administration originally functioned in four administrative districts: the Administrative Districts of Warsaw (*Distrikt Warschau*), Cracow (*Distrikt Krakau*), Radom (*Distrikt Radom*) and Lublin (*Distrikt Lublin*).³⁸³ They were headed by the *Gouverneure* (Governors), and they each had an *Amt des Distrikts* (District Offices), which carried out the administrative tasks. The branches of the District Office covered all those fields in which the central administration of the Generalgouvernement operated, although the *Gouverneur* had the power to make decisions on the strategy of the operations carried out in his administrative *Distrikt*.³⁸⁴

The *Distrikte* were further divided into *Kreise* (Counties). These were larger than their earlier Polish equivalents, and at the beginning of 1940 there were altogether 47 *Kreise* in the Generalgouvernement. Because the *Kreise* were fairly large entities, some of them were divided into sectors called *Kommissariat* (Commissariats), of which altogether 35 existed in the Generalgouvernement in mid-1940.³⁸⁵

The administration of the *Kreis* was the last and lowest level of the German administration, and administration at the grass-roots level remained the responsibility of representatives of the local Polish population. The position of the Polish local administration was subordinate to that of the Germans. This was problematic for those persons who were involved in local government because they had to strike a balance between the demands of the Germans and the advantages of the Poles, a situation that also led to corruption and resistance to them.³⁸⁶

The *Regierung des Generalgouvernements* was situated in Cracow. The objectives set by the National Socialists for the Polish campaign influenced the choice of capital, and the former capital (Warsaw) of the destroyed country was not regarded as a suitable capital of the new administrative unit.³⁸⁷ The factors that affected the choice of capital reflected the attitudes of the National Socialists towards the Generalgouvernement. In Hitler's opinion, it could serve the interests of the Third Reich in the short run as an area where troops could

³⁸² Musial 1999, pp. 23–24, 32–33.

³⁸³ Umbreit 1988, p. 43.

³⁸⁴ Musial 1999, pp. 24, 34, 40.

³⁸⁵ Musial 1999, pp. 44, 63–64.

³⁸⁶ Musial 1999, pp. 64–66.

³⁸⁷ Umbreit 1988, pp. 28–29, 35, 43.

be concentrated for future hostilities against the Soviet Union. The Generalgouvernement would also be a source of cheap labour, and all the other resources it offered should be used for the benefit of Germany as effectively as possible. The position reserved for the Generalgouvernement was considered to be that of a subjected colony.³⁸⁸

The suppression of the Generalgouvernement into the position of a colony meant that the National Socialists sought create a situation in the area that would make it totally impossible for the local population to form a leading social stratum. Consequently the population group comprising the leading Poles had to be exterminated.³⁸⁹ And the SS indeed attempted to do this, for example in the so-called *Ausserordentliche Befriedungsaktion, AB Aktion* in the summer of 1940. In it the Germans executed about 3500 politicians and resistance activists as well as about 3000 criminals.³⁹⁰ The National Socialists' objectives also included the destruction of the economy of the area. When the idea of exploiting the area as a reservation for the undesirable elements of the population of the annexed territories was also one made of these objectives, the Generalgouvernement was to be made into a place inhabited by all those groups that the National Socialists wanted to get rid of without caring how it affected the conditions of the area.³⁹¹

Whether or not the Generalgouvernement was considered to be an area that was to be populated with Germans in the more distant future became a central question in the plans for of the area. According to Hitler and Frank, the Generalgouvernement was to be Germanised, but the Germanisation would take place in the more remote future, and it was not specified in greater detail. According to opinions of some in the SS, on the other hand, the Generalgouvernement was to be Germanised as soon as possible.³⁹² However, it is should be borne in mind that the Germanisation of the Generalgouvernement in the way proposed by the National Socialists would not have been possible without a new deportation area for the undesirable population.

The uncertainty concerning the future of the Generalgouvernement had an effect on its judicial position. The basis of this was the view that Poland had been destroyed as a state. Therefore it was thought that questions related to the administration of the Generalgouvernement were internal affairs of the Third Reich, but because the Generalgouvernement had not been annexed to Germany, the definition of its status proved to be difficult. However, the matter had to be solved, so the Generalgouvernement began to be regarded as a dependency of the Greater German State which could be annexed to the Reich as one or more individual *Reichsgau* areas.³⁹³

The National Socialist plans decisively affected the administrative system of the Generalgouvernement. The original objective was to create only the kind

³⁸⁸ Majer 1981, pp. 459, 461–463.

³⁸⁹ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 67–68.

³⁹⁰ Madajczyk 1987, p. 187.

³⁹¹ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 67, 69, 74, 111–112.

³⁹² Majer 1981, pp. 463–465, 482.

³⁹³ Majer 1981, pp. 466–476.

of administration that would permit the area to be utilised as efficiently as possible.³⁹⁴ Hitler did not want to develop an administrative organisation consisting of Germans for the Generalgouvernement, but before long the most essential organs of administrative organisation were manned mainly by German officials.³⁹⁵ The reason for this lay in National Socialist ideology: because the goal was to destroy Poland as a state, it was not suitable for Poles to be in leading positions. Thus an administrative organisation run by Germans was the only possible solution for governing the area.³⁹⁶

The administrative model of the Generalgouvernement has been regarded as exceptionally clear in comparison with the rest of the National Socialist administration. This was partly due to the fact that it was created without the burden of an earlier model. Another partial reason for the clarity of its structure was that it was based on a concept called "*Einheit der Verwaltung*" (unity of the administration), according to which autonomous governmental authority in special areas was to be renounced and the administration was to be consolidated within a uniform system. Another basic idea of this administrative model was the partial integration of parallel state and party activities as part of the same entity.³⁹⁷

The centralisation of the administration was an excellent idea with regard to effectiveness and target-orientation, but in real life it would have placed exceptional demands on the leaders of the administration.³⁹⁸ The significance of the leaders was emphasised because the administrative model was supposed to be based precisely on the realisation of the "*Führerprinzip*" (leader principle) in practice. It would have meant that the leaders would be responsible for all branches of the administration at all levels, which in turn would have emphasised the significance of the lowest level of German administration, i.e. that of the *Kreis*.³⁹⁹

The establishment of the new administrative system was not easy, and the lack of suitable staff became one of the factors that in practice made it impossible to realise the new administrative model with its emphasis on uniformity. The failure had become obvious by the autumn of 1940. The major problem of the administrative system was that the majority of the German civil servants were employed in the service of the central administration.⁴⁰⁰

One can assume that the reason for the concentration of administrative staff in the central and district administrations was the fact that these constituted the kernel of the whole administration; it made sense to concentrate personnel resources in planning and preparatory work and to deploy only individual civil servants to work at the local level. This was probably also affected by the fact that the methods used in planning and preparatory work at

³⁹⁴ Majer 1981, p. 477; Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 79–80.

³⁹⁵ Majer 1981, p. 485.

³⁹⁶ Musial 1999, p. 23.

³⁹⁷ Majer 1981, pp. 487–490.

³⁹⁸ Majer 1981, p. 491.

³⁹⁹ Musial 1999, p. 69. Cf. Schenk 2006, pp. 163–164.

⁴⁰⁰ Majer 1981, pp. 495, 497.

that time required more labour than the administrative work carried out at the local level. On the other hand, it is known that the remoteness of the locations of regional government in the Generalgouvernement reduced the interest of civil servants in jobs at the *Kreis* level.⁴⁰¹

The recruitment of administrative staff was made problematic right from the outset by the growing need for civil servants caused by the expansionist and war policies of the Third Reich. At first Frank tried to succeed in the competition for them by attempting to enlist so-called "National Socialist fighters", and he certainly got a motley crew to enter his service,⁴⁰² although he rapidly changed his ideas about the hoped-for administrative staff.⁴⁰³

Despite the problems in enlisting administrative staff, it has been estimated that the leaders of the administration of the Generalgouvernement were up to their tasks. The final product can be considered fairly reasonable because the administrative work of the Generalgouvernement was not appreciated at the national level, and there was a tendency to send the weakest material to the area.⁴⁰⁴ Frank was not alone with this problem, because staff who were regarded as dispensable in the heartlands of the Reich also tended to be sent to the annexed Polish territories.⁴⁰⁵

Even though the establishment of a system that emphasised administrative unity has been regarded as a failure, there was a functional German administrative organisation in the Generalgouvernement. It has been suggested that it was a typical feature of the administration that the personal qualities and political views of the administrative staff became apparent above all at the local government level. The significance of the administration of the *Kreis* was further emphasised by the fact that the *Kreishauptmann* (Head of the County) was the sovereign governor of his *Kreis*. His position was supported by Frank's administrative model, and in practice he could decide on the life or death of the inhabitants of his area. The *Kreishauptmänner* have in fact been described as petty kings, and as a result of their governing methods, the designation "*Kreiskönigtum*" (county kingdom) has been used to describe the *Kreise*.⁴⁰⁶

All in all, the administrative organisation of the Generalgouvernement seems clear. The chain of command looks simple, and the focus of the placement of staff can also be justified. Thus the claim that the organisation with its emphasis on administrative unity failed does not seem totally warranted. However, there are reasons for this adverse judgement, the main one being that the administrative organisation of the Generalgouvernement failed to control the SS units operating in the territory. Consequently, it has been suggested that the civil authorities of the Generalgouvernement did not in reality have absolute control over their areas and had to accommodate themselves to the arbitrary actions of the SS.

⁴⁰¹ Musial 1999, pp. 84–85.

⁴⁰² Musial 1999, pp. 79–80, 85–86.

⁴⁰³ Broszat 1961, pp. 71–72.

⁴⁰⁴ Musial 1999, pp. 80–83.

⁴⁰⁵ Broszat 1961, p. 52.

⁴⁰⁶ Musial 1999, pp. 47–62, 73.

The observation about the position of the SS in the Generalgouvernement is interesting. First of all, it reminds us that competition for power was an essential element in the National Socialist administration. Secondly, it raises the question of why the administration of the Generalgouvernement could not accept the independent activity of the SS. Was it just a question of defending its own position, or was there a fundamental difference in views about how the area should be governed?

In answer to these questions, first it can be noted that Hans Frank, who had been appointed the sovereign governor of the territory, certainly used every possible means to hold on his position; after all, he had long experience of working as a leading National Socialist. Secondly, it can be concluded that the setting up of a new administrative system of absolute rule in the area undoubtedly created an atmosphere in which the intrusion of an outside organisation to obstruct the administration was not regarded favourably, whatever kind of instructions were originally given to the administration.

The position of the SS in the Generalgouvernement was strong partly because it had already extended its activities into Poland in conjunction with the military campaign. The dispatching of various SS units with the attacking troops was, however, only the beginning because, when the conquered Polish areas were transferred to the civilian administration, the SS established its position by setting up a permanent police organisation in the area and by incorporating members of the *Einsatzgruppen* into its forces.⁴⁰⁷

Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger, who had been appointed *Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer* (HSSPF) at the highest level of the military administration' was then made HSSPF of the Generalgouvernement with the title HSSPF Ost.⁴⁰⁸ As the highest leader of the SS and the police in the Generalgouvernement, he was formally directly subordinate to the *Generalgouverneur*, but in practice he took his instructions from Himmler. Krüger's position was further strengthened by his appointment as the Representative of the RKF in the Generalgouvernement.⁴⁰⁹

Krüger was not a very good choice as the HSSPF in the Generalgouvernement. He was an officer who had not succeeded in his military career, although the First World War would have made rapid advancement in a military career possible. Krüger had not been recruited for the Reichswehr, and he had had to make a living in the *Freikorps* in the early 1920s. Later on, he tried without success to launch a career in business. Krüger only joined the National Socialist party in the late 1920s, and he became a member of the SS in December 1930. After that he held an important position in the SA, but at the same time he also kept up his connections with the SS. In the end, the SS was the only organisation in which he had a possibility to pursue a military or paramilitary career. Himmler evidently appointed Krüger HSSPF because he had held a high-ranking position in the SA, because he was interested in

⁴⁰⁷ Wildt 2003, pp. 480–481.

⁴⁰⁸ About Krüger more widely: Thompson 2003, pp. 320–331.

⁴⁰⁹ Musial 1999, pp. 27–28.

obtaining an important post and because Himmler had good grounds to trust his loyalty.⁴¹⁰

Krüger's appointment may have been a compromise, but the situation was facilitated by the fact that a strong SS organisation operated under him. It embodied a branch-specific organisation led by the *Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD* (BdS, Commander-in Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service) and the *Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei* (BdO, Command-in-Chief of the Order Police). In the every *Distrikt* of the Generalgouvernement there also functioned a regional SS organisation under the *SS- und Polizeiführer* (SSPF). These officials were especially significant because in reality they were not responsible to the *Gouverneur* of the *Distrikt*, only to the HSSPF.⁴¹¹

The operational capability of the SSPF was based on the fact that he was able to operate in a fairly independent way and on the organisation that he had at his disposal. The armed police forces in particular came to occupy a significant position. A police regiment of the *Ordnungspolizei* under a *Kommandeur der Ordnungspolizei* (KdO, Commander of the Order Police) was stationed in every *Distrikt* of the Generalgouvernement. Each regiment comprised three police battalions of about 500 men, which in turn were subdivided into three companies.⁴¹²

In addition to the armed police formations at the disposal of the SSPF, there were gendarmerie units and a network of German police stations covering the whole of the Generalgouvernement.⁴¹³ As well as the German police forces in the Generalgouvernement there were also local non-German police forces, which were controlled by the German police.⁴¹⁴ It was planned to establish additional police forces, but the project proved to be unviable because of the low quality of the available personnel. The SSPFs could also employ the organs of the *Sicherheitspolizei* and the *Sicherheitsdienst* and a *Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD* (KdS, Commander of the Security Police and Security Service) was appointed in every *Distrikt*. The operations of the SD focussed for the most part on intelligence, while the Gestapo, for its part, was responsible for practical actions and obtained its information above all by means of torture.⁴¹⁵

The strength of the police forces in the Generalgouvernement was not very high, and for example in 1940 the strength of the *Ordnungspolizei* was 9132 men in armed units and 1361 men in the police stations. The strength of the *Sicherheitspolizei* was about 2250 men.⁴¹⁶ In November 1942 there were 34,000

⁴¹⁰ Thompson 2003, pp. 320–324.

⁴¹¹ Eisenblätter 1969, p. 132.

⁴¹² Browning 1999, pp. 16–17, 55.

⁴¹³ Browning 1999 pp. 17, 61.

⁴¹⁴ In addition to the Polish police, the German police had the Ukrainian police, the Belarusian police and the auxiliary Jewish Order Police. Madajczyk 1987, p. 202.

⁴¹⁵ Borodziej 1999, pp. 41–42, 45–46, 60–65, 71–72. The local organisation of the Sipo and the SD in the Generalgouvernement, see *Dienststellen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD im sogenannten Generalgouvernement nach dem Stand von 1943*. Ramme 1970.

⁴¹⁶ Mallmann 2004, pp. 75–76.

policemen in the Generalgouvernement. The German police amounted to about 14,000 men, and the number of the non-German police was thus about 20,000.⁴¹⁷

There were other armed units at the disposal of the SS. The SS cavalry units stayed on in Poland after the military operations were over, and their strengths were increased from November 1939 on. By March 1941 it had become possible to form two whole regiments from them. Reinforced SS-Totenkopfstandarten units were also were stationed in Poland. In the spring of 1940, the total strength of these units was about 31,000 men, of whom around 10,000 were stationed in the annexed Polish territories or in the Generalgouvernement.⁴¹⁸ In addition to these forces, the SSPFs could recruit and train members of the non-German population to form units for their own use.⁴¹⁹

The strength of the police seems rather small with regard to the area of the territory but the total strength of the armed German forces there was certainly not small because the combined strength of the police and the other SS units never fell under 50,000 men and was usually about 70,000–80,000. Correspondingly, the Wehrmacht had usually about 500,000 men in the area.⁴²⁰ Thus the Germans had plenty of armed troops even with regard to the population of the whole area.

The SS organisation seems to have been quite strong at the levels of central and regional administration, but the significance of the HSSPF and the SSPFs in ordinary police operations was not so great because the chain of command of the Ordnungspolizei, the Sicherheitspolizei and the Sicherheitsdienst went from the central agencies of Berlin via a branch-specific route to the police chiefs.⁴²¹ Thus, for example, the operations of the Sicherheitspolizei were directed by an office called *RSHA IV D2*. The independence of the police forces is also shown by the fact that two separate organs of the Sicherheitspolizei which were directly subordinate to the RSHA were established in the Generalgouvernement.⁴²²

The direct chain of command of the police forces has been explained by the fact that Himmler regarded the HSSPF above all as his own representative to Frank.⁴²³ This indicates the attitude of the SS to the Generalgouvernement, for when the procedure is extended to the SSPFs at the regional level, it forms a model in which the HSSPF and SSPFs created a buffer that protected the SS organisation from the civil authorities. The buffer also enabled the Ordnungspolizei, the Sicherheitspolizei and the Sicherheitsdienst to implement operations which were ordered not by the authorities Generalgouvernement but by other authorities.

This peculiar organisational structure may have protected the interests of the SS, but it was not operationally efficient, and it is known that for example

⁴¹⁷ Borodziej 1999, p. 34.

⁴¹⁸ Cüppers 2004, pp. 93–94.

⁴¹⁹ Browning 1999, pp. 17, 61.

⁴²⁰ Madajczyk 1987, p. 239.

⁴²¹ Eisenblätter 1969, p. 153.

⁴²² Borodziej 1999, pp. 44–48.

⁴²³ Eisenblätter 1969, p. 152.

the organisation of the Security Police suffered from internal problems. Furthermore, problems were caused by the attempt to transfer dispensable civil servants from the heartlands of the Third Reich to the Generalgouvernement. Even though a rapid career advancement was possible there, the Generalgouvernement was not a popular posting among the police either, and their work was hampered by alcohol abuse and corruption.⁴²⁴

At the first stage of the administration, the mutual relations of the civil administration and the SS seem to have been quite good. Frank and the representatives of the SS may have disagreed on questions concerning the control of the police or the deportations, but initially Frank did not oppose Hitler's programme of extermination, which the operations of the SS put into effect. However, by December 1939 he had already turned against the terror practised by the SS and strove to change the policy in early 1940.⁴²⁵

Previous research has categorised the problems between the SS and the administration of the Generalgouvernement causally into three groups. The problems of the first group resulted from the population deportations into the Generalgouvernement. Those in the second group were caused by the arbitrary executions carried out by the SS. The third group of problems arose as a consequence of the disagreements about the organisation of the police.⁴²⁶

The questions related to the police are the most significant from the point of view of the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policy because control of the police forces was the key to the carrying out the reorganisation. The importance of questions related to the evacuations in particular should not be underrated because they created a precedent in which the SS organisation tried to implement the National Socialist demographic programme despite the resistance of the administration of the Generalgouvernement.

The differences in views connected to the control of the police began from the level of the central administration. The HSSPF was supposed to be under Frank and to consult him in deciding about important matters. The representatives of the civil administration also wanted SSPFs at the regional level to be responsible to the *Gouverneure*, but Himmler considered that the SSPFs should be responsible only to the HSSPF.⁴²⁷ The subordination of the SSPFs to the *Gouverneure* would break the unity of the SS organisation and prevent its highhanded operations. The subordination of the HSSPF to the *Generalgouverneur*, on the other hand, was regarded as so self-evident that it was not even worth questioning.

The problems were also caused by differences of opinion about the location of the police forces. HSSPF Krüger considered that the centralised stationing of police units in garrisons was the best solution because in this way they could be rapidly deployed. The administration of the Generalgouvernement, on the other hand, wished to decentralise the police

⁴²⁴ Borodziej 1999, pp. 49–50, 52–57.

⁴²⁵ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 100–101, 131, 167–172; Broszat 1961, pp. 74, 180–182.

⁴²⁶ Musial 1999, pp. 28–29; Eisenblätter 1969, p. 135.

⁴²⁷ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 133–134.

forces and to bring them within the sphere of control of the local representatives of the civil administration. The SS opposed the idea, and HSSPF Krüger stated that the garrisoned units of the Ordnungspolizei were militarily trained and unsuitable for ordinary police operations.⁴²⁸

Because the SS was able to retain the police under its command, from the spring of 1940 on the administration of the Generalgouvernement had to establish *Sonderdienst* (Special Service) units to operate at the *Distrikt* level. Their tasks included the guarding of bridges and office blocks, price control as well as other tasks ordered by the administrative authorities. The reaction of the SS to the *Sonderdienst* forces was not totally negative, and it even trained them. The strength of the *Sonderdienst* at first amounted to about 2500 men, but later its strength was usually about 2200 men.⁴²⁹

Frank did not succeed in solving the problems relating to the police early on in his administration, and these unsolved questions later re-emerged again and again. Even later, Frank did not succeed in quashing the SS. One reason for this was the fact that he distanced himself from the plans for the Generalgouvernement that had been presented by Hitler in autumn 1939 and strove to develop the administration of the area, but the SS held firmly to the original plans.⁴³⁰

At first Frank succeeded relatively well in standing up to the SS: for example, he was able to stop the deportations to the Generalgouvernement on two occasions. However, his success did not continue for long because he failed to gain control of the police, which belonged to the SS. In spite of this, the period between the beginning of 1940 and the end of 1941 is considered to be the heyday of Frank's career as *Generalgouverneur*.⁴³¹ The fact that up to the Eastern Campaign the Generalgouvernement was always regarded as a superfluous land that had little significance in the politics of the Reich was the reason for his success.⁴³²

Although Frank can be regarded as having been fairly successful in the first years of his administration, his opponents also became more powerful during that time. A new problem for Frank was Himmler's cooperation with Hans Lammers and Martin Bormann. Lammers was the *Chef der Reichskanzlei* (the Chief of the Reich Chancellery) and Bormann was the *Chef der Parteikanzlei* (the Chief of the Party Chancellery).⁴³³ Lammers's position as *Chef der Reichskanzlei* was significant because the complaints sent there by Frank ended up being passed on to Bormann and Himmler for comment, with the result that they ultimately worked against Frank.⁴³⁴ Behind the procedure lay the idea of using Lammers to investigate contentious issues.⁴³⁵ For his part, Bormann's aim

⁴²⁸ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 137, 139.

⁴²⁹ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 140–141, 149.

⁴³⁰ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 143–145, 151–152.

⁴³¹ Eisenblätter 1969, p. 200.

⁴³² Musial 1999, pp. 29–30.

⁴³³ For a more extensive study of Bormann, see Longerich 1992.

⁴³⁴ Broszat 1961, p. 81.

⁴³⁵ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 90–94.

was to obtain control of the NSDAP organs under Frank, and to this end he allied himself with Himmler. Bormann, himself a supporter of extreme racist policies, was also obviously inspired by the fact that the *Parteikanzlei* was naturally interested in matters regarding demographic and racial policy.⁴³⁶

Taken as a whole, the task of administering the Generalgouvernement was just about impossible from the very outset. The planned use of the territory as an area where the undesirable population could be deported would have prevented its efficient administration and the effective utilisation of its resources for the needs of the economy. That is why Frank changed the objectives of his administration in early 1940. However, the SS did not give up its original objective to use the area as a deportation area, and it also jealously guarded its own independence.

The result was a conflict in which Frank initially succeeded well in principle but lost the support of Hitler and made an enemy out of the SS. From Frank's point of view, the intransigence of the SS and Himmler's possibility to ally himself with Lammers and Bormann were the most problematic issues. Frank's problems were caused above all by his position as the leader of a separate administrative region within the National Socialist administrative system; he had been set a task that required independence, but the preconditions for performing the task were lacking. Furthermore, his opponent was able to act in a sphere at the national level that was significantly wider than the individual administrative unit.

The reason for the conflicts between Frank and the SS was basically ideological. Frank was forced to change from an ideologist into a practical leader in order to avoid chaos in his administrative unit. The SS, for its part, had no reason to care about the situation in the Generalgouvernement because its objective was to carry out the National Socialist demographic reorganisation programme in the annexed Polish territories and to use the Generalgouvernement as a deportation area for the undesirable population.

The intransigence of the SS was caused by its firm commitment to implementing National Socialist ideology and by its ability, based on its ideological principles, to see things from a broader perspective than the administrators of an individual area. Differences between the views of Frank and the SS arose not only at the national and central administrative levels but also at the *Distrikt* level, which became apparent above all in *Distrikt Lublin*, where the active and enterprising SSPF, Odilo Globocnik, operated.

3.4 *Distrikt Lublin* - the eastern outpost of the SS

Distrikt Lublin consisted of areas that had belonged to the Polish Voivodeship of Lublin. In size it was about 26,600 square kilometres, and its population in 1940 numbered about 2,400,000. The principal livelihood of the area was

⁴³⁶ Longerich 1992, pp. 179, 225-226, 231.

agriculture, and the region has been described as a relatively backward one because of the small size of the farms and the large landless population. There was almost no industry at all, and the proportion of the urban inhabitants of the population was about 17 per cent.⁴³⁷

A publication produced by the administration of the Generalgouvernement in 1940 drew attention above all to the historical connections of the district with Germany. The town of Lublin was described as a border settlement established by the Germans in the thirteenth century, and it was stated that about 25,000 *Volksdeutsche* lived in the area in the so-called "German triangle" of Lublin, Cholm (Chełm) and Lubartow (Lubartów). Some Germans had already moved to the area in the late eighteenth century, but the main wave of migration there had begun only in the 1860s. At its highest, the number of the German population of the area had been about 50,000 persons but it had fallen after the First World War to about half of that number.⁴³⁸

The other significant matter to which the German administration drew attention was the Jews. The economy of the area was described as being dominated by them, and their existence was seen as a problem. The third object of attention was the Ukrainian population of the area. It numbered about 300,000 persons, and the objective of the German administration was to improve the position of the Ukrainians without, however, allowing them to govern themselves.⁴³⁹

The National Socialists also drew attention to the previous Polish administration and emphasised its weaknesses. The administration was described as bureaucratic, and rates of disease and crime were claimed to be high. According to the Germans, the main problem in the area of crime was the bandit groups, which the previous administration was not been able to control. The Germans also thought that the number of problems had been further increased by the fact that the area had initially been occupied by Soviet forces, which had withdrawn when the German and Soviet interest zones were changed. After the withdrawal, there had been an administrative vacuum, which Polish gangs of robbers had filled before the arrival of the Wehrmacht.⁴⁴⁰ According to Madajczyk, the area of Lublin had first been occupied by the Germans, but they had soon withdrawn further to the west. Soviet troops had occupied only the most eastern part of the future Distrikt Lublin, so there had remained area between the occupying forces that had remained uncontrolled.⁴⁴¹

The description of Distrikt Lublin by the administration of the Generalgouvernement offers a clear indication of the National Socialists' view of the area and the focus of their attention. The most central issues were questions related to the population and crime. With regard to demographic matters, it should be noted that there were four important population groups: the Poles, the Jews, the Ukrainians and the Germans. From the point of view of

⁴³⁷ Musial 1999, pp. 21–22.

⁴³⁸ *Das Deutsche Generalgouvernement Polen*, pp. 139–140.

⁴³⁹ *Das Deutsche Generalgouvernement Polen*, pp. 141–144.

⁴⁴⁰ *Das Deutsche Generalgouvernement Polen*, pp. 148–153.

⁴⁴¹ Madajczyk 1987, pp. 8–9.

the new administration, the most acceptable group, in addition to the *Volksdeutsche*, was the Ukrainian population because it was thought that it would be possible to co-operate with them. Unlike the *Volksdeutsche* and the Ukrainians, the Poles and the Jews were either rejected or regarded as undesirable. The views about high crime rates and gangs of bandits are also worth noting, and they will also come up later.

According to the views of the German administration, Distrikt Lublin in itself presented a challenge, and the situation was not improved by the rather slow implementation of the civil administration. For example, the *Chef der Zivilverwaltung* (CdZ, the chief of the civilian section of the Wehrmacht occupation administration) did not take up his post in the area until the middle of October 1939, and the organ reached the local level only towards the end of October, advancing eastwards as the Red Army withdrew from the area.⁴⁴²

The transfer of the Lublin area from the administration of the Wehrmacht to an organ responsible to the administration of the Generalgouvernement began with the appointment of the *Gouverneur*. The first *Gouverneur* of Distrikt Lublin was Friedrich Schmidt. He had previously worked in the NSDAP as *Leiter des Hauptschulungsamtes der NSDAP* (Chief of the Head Office for Education). Schmidt was also a member of the SS with the rank of *Brigadeführer*. His party affiliations and SS background hardly suited him to be a *Gouverneur* in the Generalgouvernement, and Schmidt remained in his post only to the end of January 1940. The reasons for this were that his attention was occupied by party work, and that he ended up in conflict with Frank because of differences of opinion concerning the position of the SS.⁴⁴³

Ernst Zörner was chosen to be Schmidt's successor. He had already served in the service of Frank in Cracow. Zörner had also acquired administrative experience in the heartlands of the Third Reich and he was one of the early members of the NSDAP. Zörner seems to have been a natural choice for the post of *Gouverneur*, but the appointment was also influenced by the fact that Frank was trying to restrict the power of the SS in Distrikt Lublin. There was indeed good reason to do so because the SSPF Odilo Globocnik, whom Schmidt had employed as his deputy, had tried to get himself appointed as the latter's successor on his own initiative.⁴⁴⁴

Zörner resolutely began to restrict the influence of the SS, and as one of his first moves he appointed the head of the *Gouverneur's* Office as his deputy to replace Globocnik. Zörner's actions did not bode well for relations between the civil administration and the SS, and they resulted in a long-lasting conflict. The disagreements became further acerbated when Zörner supported a proposal made by Frank in early 1940 for a change of course in the policies that were being implemented. This led to whole bunch of further problems, which

⁴⁴² Musial 1999, pp. 15–18.

⁴⁴³ Musial 1999, pp. 35–36.

⁴⁴⁴ Musial 1999, pp. 35–36.

became more serious when the SS intensified its activity in the Generalgouvernement in 1942.⁴⁴⁵

Although the Gouverneur may have had problematical relations with the representatives of the SS, he could not forget the administration of the area. He was assisted in this by the *Amt des Distrikts* (the District Office). In Distrikt Lublin, the structure of the *Amt des Distrikts* had already been shaped in December 1939, but it started to function slowly except in a few fields of operation that the Germans considered the most important. The real administrative work in fact only began in 1940, and of the actual process of establishing the *Amt des Distrikts* did not come to an end until June 1940.⁴⁴⁶

The *Chef des Amtes des Distrikts* (Head of the District Office) was responsible for the operations of the office, and he was also the deputy of the *Gouverneur*. At first, the post changed hands repeatedly because it was difficult to find a suitable incumbent. Zörner changed the *Chef des Amtes des Distrikts* almost immediately after his appointment, but Dr. Fritz Schmiede, the new holder of the post quitted the job already in summer 1940. The following *Chef des Amtes des Distrikts*, Dr. Hans Damrau was not only a Doctor of Law but also a member of the SS, and his connections with the SSPF led to his being suspended in November 1940. The fourth *Chef des Amtes des Distrikts* Dr. Ludwig Losacker, too, was a member of the SS, but he continued in the post up to July 1941. Dr. Wilhelm Engler was the following official who was appointed to the post. He succeeded in remaining in office right up to the spring of 1943, when the pressure of the SS on him became too strong. The last *Chef des Amtes des Distrikts* was Ernst Schlüter.⁴⁴⁷

The *Amt des Distrikts* Lublin was responsible for 11 *Kreise*.⁴⁴⁸ There were 200,000–300,000 inhabitants in an average *Kreis* in the countryside and the city of Lublin had about 150,000 inhabitants. The administrative organ of the *Kreise* was supposed to be the office of the *Kreishauptmann*, but it is known that one *Kreis* of Distrikt Lublin was administered by a group of fewer than ten persons.⁴⁴⁹

The turnover in the office of the *Kreishauptmann* in Distrikt Lublin seems to have been as high as that of the *Chef des Amtes des Distrikts* because each *Kreis* had at least three or four *Kreishauptmänner*, although there were a few exceptions. The *Kreishauptmänner* were mainly middle-aged men, and they usually had a university education. In addition to their similar education, they were also united by the National Socialist ideology. Of the 28 persons who functioned as *Kreishauptmänner*, 22 definitely belonged to the NSDAP, and 14 of them had joined to it before 1933.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁵ Musial 1999, pp. 37–39.

⁴⁴⁶ Musial 1999, pp. 40–42.

⁴⁴⁷ Musial 1999, pp. 42–43.

⁴⁴⁸ The *Kreise* of Distrikt Lublin were Lublin, Lublin-Land, Radzyn, Pulawy, Biala Bodlaska, Janow, Lubelski, Krasnystaw, Cholm, Zamosc, Bilgoraj and Hrubieszow. Musial 1999, p. 44.

⁴⁴⁹ Musial 1999, pp. 44–46.

⁴⁵⁰ Musial 1999, pp. 93–95.

Even though the leaders at different levels of Distrikt Lublin seem to have been quite well educated and firm supporters of the National Socialist ideology, they also were losers in the National Socialist power game because they had not succeeded in the competition for power in the heartlands of the Third Reich. This assessment also applies to Zörner, who had been forced to give up the post of *Oberbürgermeister* (Lord Mayor) of Dresden.⁴⁵¹

Altogether there were about 400 Germans on average working in administrative posts in Distrikt Lublin. The number is very small compared to the number of inhabitants of the *Distrikt*, but it does not tell the whole story with regard to the level of the German administration. It should be remembered that the SS and the Wehrmacht were relatively strongly represented in the area, and there was also a Sonderdienst unit there. The superiority of the Germans was also partly ensured by the fact that in practice the civil administration held total sway over the local population.⁴⁵² When we add the lack of support, we can understand why the Poles did not rise up in resistance, compelling the Germans either to change their policies or even to withdraw from the area.

The overall picture of the civil authorities of Distrikt Lublin is quite complex: the area was administered with very small resources with practically no restricting regulations. On the other hand, the turnover of the personnel who have governed the area was fairly high, and their professional competence at least partly questionable. Furthermore, the constant conflicts with the SS affected the whole administration. The was most clearly manifested in the difficulty in finding a suitable *Chef des Amtes des Distrikts* because many of the candidates were members of the SS and obviously more faithful to their background organisation than to their new employer. So the overall situation was not very favourable to the administration, whose objective was the utilisation of the area.

The difficulties of the civil authorities were especially a result of the fact that Odilo Globocnik was appointed *SS- und Polizeiführer* of Distrikt Lublin. He is known to have been a leader who threw himself enthusiastically into the task of carrying out the visions of Himmler,⁴⁵³ but he had a habit of acting on his own initiative.⁴⁵⁴ Globocnik was obviously expressly appointed SSPF in Lublin,⁴⁵⁵ and Distrikt Lublin was evidently designed to be an area which right from the outset was to be different from the other administrative districts of the Generalgouvernement.⁴⁵⁶

It is known that Hitler had already outlined a plan for the concentration of the Jews into the area between the rivers Vistula and Bug at the end of September 1939, and Heydrich had also planned locate the Jews behind Warsaw in the area around Lublin.⁴⁵⁷ Furthermore, it noteworthy that Lublin

⁴⁵¹ Musial 1999, pp. 95–96.

⁴⁵² Musial 1999, pp. 48–56, 59, 87.

⁴⁵³ Longerich 2008, pp. 357, 361–364. Cf. Poprzeczny 2004, pp. 85–86.

⁴⁵⁴ Pucher 1997, p. 15; Allen 2002, p. 133–134.

⁴⁵⁵ Pohl 2004, p. 90. Cf. Madajczyk 1987, p. 68.

⁴⁵⁶ Poprzeczny 2004, pp. 83–86.

⁴⁵⁷ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 54–55.

was also ideologically an important locality for the National Socialists because it could be considered the spiritual home of eastern Judaism and the source of the "Jewish evil" because of the school for rabbis located in the city.⁴⁵⁸

Globocnik was born in Trieste in 1904, and his ancestors included men of free professions and civil servants. His father, Franz Globocnik, was an army officer, and the Globocnik family regarded themselves as Germans. The Globocniks moved from Trieste to Klagenfurt after the outbreak of the First World War, and Odilo was enrolled in a military school in Sankt Pölten in 1915. However, the end of the war brought his studies to an end and frustrated his plans for a career as an officer. The young Globocnik did not remain inactive, however, but continued his studies in the field of mechanical engineering and qualified as technician in 1923.⁴⁵⁹

Globocnik may have participated in the operations of the Austrian *Freikorps* on the border with Yugoslavia during his time as a student, and he was also involved in other extreme nationalist activities. However, he could not participate in politics full-time, because he had to earn his living after his father died in 1919. The young Globocnik found himself a job in the construction industry, and he worked in various managerial positions up to the middle of the 1930s.⁴⁶⁰

The National Socialist ideology also spread into Austria, and, according to his own account, Globocnik took part in the National Socialist movement from 1922 on. There is only limited information available about the early stages of his political activities, but during the early and mid-1930s he was sentenced to imprisonment several times for crimes related to his political activity. This did not escape the notice of the SS, into which Globocnik was recruited in September 1934. It was obviously an intentional recruitment, because Globocnik started to pass on information to the SS and to visit Munich regularly. He also established a SS unit called *Sonderdienst der Gauleitung* in Carinthia.⁴⁶¹

Globocnik's party career advanced rapidly in the mid-1930s because the National Socialists of Carinthia obtained a strong position among the fractious National Socialists of Austria at that time. The significant position that Globocnik reached is indicated for example by the fact that he was one of the persons whom Hitler summoned in summer 1936 to Obersalzberg to give them instructions about matters related to the management of the party. In spite of Hitler's intervention, the power struggle among the National Socialists of Austria continued up to 1938, when the Carinthians succeeded in occupying the most important positions in the Austrian National Socialist party. At that time, Globocnik was appointed *Organisationsleiter* (Chief of Organisation) of the Austrian NSDAP.⁴⁶²

After the annexation of Austria (the so-called *Anschluss*), there should have been no obstacles to Globocnik's advancement because he had played a

⁴⁵⁸ Pohl 2004, pp. 87–88.

⁴⁵⁹ Pucher 1997, pp. 16–19, 22.

⁴⁶⁰ Pucher 1997, pp. 19–24.

⁴⁶¹ Pucher 1997, pp. 24–30.

⁴⁶² Pucher 1997, pp. 31–41.

significant role in toppling the government of Austria. In spite of this, he was not successful in the competition for positions among the leading Austrian National Socialists. The situation was obviously serious for Globocnik, and he tightened his connections with the SS.⁴⁶³ This was a very sensible step with regard to his future career because his real career problems were only beginning.

Soon after the *Anschluss*, Globocnik sank into even deeper problems. After some confusion, he was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna with the support of the SS, but he failed in this post and had to give it up. After this his only real alternative was to take up full-time employment with the SS. However, this was easier said than done, and Himmler kept Globocnik well aware of his weak position. Globocnik had to begin his new career in the SS-Verfügungstruppen, and he participated in the Polish campaign as an infantry corporal (SS-Unterscharführer).⁴⁶⁴

Globocnik's wandering in the wilderness did eventually come to an end when Himmler appointed him SSPF of Distrikt Lublin on 9/11/1939 with the rank of Brigadeführer.⁴⁶⁵ The SS started to carry out the placement of the Jews of the Third Reich in Distrikt Lublin at the same time, and the transfers got under way quickly. However, the project folded already in the winter of 1939 and 1940.⁴⁶⁶ The reasons for this were the unsuitable circumstances for the location of the Jewish population in the area, the lack of transportation, the preparations for the Eastern Campaign and Globocnik's disagreements with the civil authorities.⁴⁶⁷

Although the large-scale placement of the Jewish population in Distrikt Lublin did not succeed, in the autumn of 1939 Globocnik began to set up forced labour camps for the Jews.⁴⁶⁸ He was partly following Heydrich's wishes, because the latter's objective was to establish forced labour camps for several hundred thousand Jews who had been taken prisoners of war. Their main task would be to fortify the border against the Soviet Union.⁴⁶⁹ Globocnik started to carry out the fortification project; his plan was to use forced labour to dig a large anti-tank trench in order to prevent a possible attack by the Soviet Union.⁴⁷⁰ In connection with this, Globocnik tried to get the right to use the local Jewish population as forced labour, which he succeeded in obtaining with the assistance of the first *Gouverneur*.⁴⁷¹

The plans to establish a deportation area for Jews (*Reichsghetto*) and to build a defensive line were clearly connected to the broader plans of the SS. So also was Globocnik's third project, which involved the transfer of the *Volksdeutsche* of Distrikt Lublin to the annexed Polish territories. The removal of

⁴⁶³ Pucher 1997, pp. 41–43.

⁴⁶⁴ Pucher 1997, pp. 44–69.

⁴⁶⁵ Pucher 1997, pp. 69, 74–75.

⁴⁶⁶ Pucher 1997, pp. 71–74. Cf. Longerich 1998, pp. 256–258.

⁴⁶⁷ Poprzeczny 2004, p. 151. Cf. Longerich 1998, pp. 259–260.

⁴⁶⁸ Pohl 2004, pp. 104–105.

⁴⁶⁹ Kielbon 2004, p. 119.

⁴⁷⁰ Pucher 1997, pp. 83–84. Cf. Schulte 2001, p. 247; Poprzeczny 2004, p. 155.

⁴⁷¹ Poprzeczny 2004, p. 157.

the ideologically acceptable population also accorded with the plan to make the Generalgouvernement the target area for the location of the undesirable population.

The transferral of the *Volksdeutsche* of Distrikt Lublin to the Warthegau began in March 1940. The Director of the Einwandererzentralstelle (EWZ) contacted both Heydrich and Department III ES of the RSHA, stating that Himmler hoped for the *Volksdeutsche* of the Generalgouvernement to be resettled in 1940, after the repatriation of the Volynian *Volksdeutsche*. The objective was to carry out the operation so that the accommodation of *Volksdeutsche* in transit camps could be prevented by screening the settlers in the departure area.⁴⁷²

The EWZ started to plan the evacuation in earnest in May 1940. At that time it was noted that there were about 31,200 *Volksdeutsche* living in the area around Cholm in Distrikt Lublin, and it was decided that their repatriation would be carried out after the harvest had been gathered. This was to be done by expelling the Poles from the Wartheland and settling the *Volksdeutsche* on the farms vacated by the departing Poles. It was planned that the SSPF of Distrikt Lublin with the assistance of the Vomi would be responsible for organising the transfer of the *Volksdeutsche*. The EWZ would be responsible for assembling and screening the population in the departure area, the Ordnungspolizei for the transportation and the HSSPF in the Warthegau for settling the *Volksdeutsche* in their new area of habitation.⁴⁷³

The transfer of the *Volksdeutsche* of Distrikt Lublin was authorised when Himmler in his capacity as RKF gave the order for it on 9/5/1940.⁴⁷⁴ After that, the EWZ and the Vomi agreed on the arrangements related to the operation and gave the necessary instructions.⁴⁷⁵ The transfer was completed by the end of 1940, and 24,459 persons were resettled.⁴⁷⁶ Thus Distrikt Lublin became even more clearly an area inhabited by a non-German population.

A particular feature of the operation was the original idea of carrying out the project as a kind of a population exchange (*Tauschumsiedlung*) in which the German and Polish populations would change places.⁴⁷⁷ Subsequently the plan was changed so that the Ukrainians who had moved to the Third Reich together with the *Volksdeutsche* of eastern Europe were settled in Distrikt Lublin instead of the Polish population. The objective was to strengthen the position of the

⁴⁷² Leiter der EWZ–Heydrich, RSHA III ES. 14/3/1940. BArch R 69 / 922.

⁴⁷³ Leiter der EWZ: Vermerk. 8/5/1940. BArch R 69 / 922.

⁴⁷⁴ RKF: Anordnung 18 / II. 9/5/1940. BArch R 69 / 925.

⁴⁷⁵ Besprechungsniederschrift. 21.5.1940. BArch R 69 / 922;
Hoffmeyer / Umsiedlung / Vomi: Dienstanweisung für die Umsiedlung der Volksdeutschen aus dem Generalgouvernement. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 922;
Aktenvermerk: Zusammenarbeit mit der VOMI. 5.6.1940. BArch R 69 / 922;
Doppler: Aktenvermerk: Umsiedlung Distrikt Lublin. 20.8.1940 BArch R 59 / 293;
Der Transport. Not dated. BArch R 59 / 293;
Doppler: Dienstanweisung: Umsiedlung Distrikt Lublin. 24.8.1940. BArch R 59 / 293.

⁴⁷⁶ Bericht über die Tätigkeit des Einsatzstabes Litzmannstadt der Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle bei der Umsiedlung Distrikt Lublin (General Gouvernement) Herbst 1940. 16/1/1940. BArch R 59 / 229.

⁴⁷⁷ RKF: Anordnung 18 / II. 9.5.1940. BArch R 69 / 925.

Ukrainian population, whom the National Socialists regarded as cooperative, at the cost of the Polish population and to reduce the area populated by Poles.⁴⁷⁸

The population transfers carried out in Distrikt Lublin created the foundation for future deportation and settlement operations because a fixed link was created between the Einwandererzentralstelle and Globocnik, and the National Socialists' aim to play the Polish and the Ukrainian populations against each other became obvious. Both of these factors were manifested later on in the Germanisation operation, and even though they were not crucial for its implementation, they are worth bearing in mind as underlying factors.

The activities carried out by Globocnik on his own initiative led to constant problems with the administration of the Generalgouvernement. The problems in the relations between the SS and the civil administration are not in themselves particularly surprising,⁴⁷⁹ but what was exceptional was the fact it was possible for the name of an individual SSPF to continually crop up in various more or less negative connections at the level of the central administration without that person being replaced. Globocnik's position as the SSPF of Distrikt Lublin must have been exceptionally strong from the outset.

Globocnik apparently met Frank for the first time in January 1940.⁴⁸⁰ The change of *Gouverneur*, which had taken place few days earlier, was probably discussed in the meeting.⁴⁸¹ The object of the change was to restrict the influence of the SS, but in spite of that the organisation continued to operate relatively freely, and for example Frank took up the matter of the unlawful executions carried out by the SS when he visited Lublin in March 1940.⁴⁸²

Frank met Globocnik again in May 1940,⁴⁸³ at the time of the extermination of the Polish intelligentsia (*Ausserordentliche Befriedungsaktion, AB Aktion*).⁴⁸⁴ The SS was responsible for carrying out this operation. Frank stated his acceptance

⁴⁷⁸ Dolezalek / Planungsabteilung / EWZ: Übernahme der deutschen Höfe im Cholmer-Land durch ukrainische Bauern. 6/8/1940. BArch R 69 / 145; Gradmann / EWZ: Aktenvermerk. Besiedlung der Chelmer und Lubliner Gebiet frei werdenden Höfe deutscher Bauern durch ukrainische Umsiedler. 22/8/1940. BArch R 69 / 145; Greifelt-Globocnik. 21/8/1940: Ansiedlung von Ukrainern im Generalgouvernement. BArch R 69 / 145. Leiter der EWZ: Anordnung Nr. 46. Ansiedlung von Ukrainern im Distrikt Lublin. 14/9/1940. BArch R 69 / 145.

⁴⁷⁹ For example, in Distrikt Radom Gouverneur and SSPF were in good terms. Seidel 2006, p. 64.

⁴⁸⁰ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Unterredung mit SS Brif Globocnik. 25/1/1940, p. 100.

⁴⁸¹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Empfang von Gr Schmidt (Lublin) und Besprechung seiner weiteren Tätigkeit im GG; StadtHptm Zörner in Abwesenheit Schmidts mit Wahrnehmung der Geschäfte beauftragt. 27/1/1940, p. 102.

⁴⁸² *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Dienstversammlung der Kreis- und Stadthauptmänner des Distrikts Lublin. 4/3/1940, pp. 147–148.

⁴⁸³ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Empfang von SS-Brif Globocnik. 6/5/1940, p. 193; *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung mit SS-Ogruf Krüger und SS-Brif Globocnik. 7/5/1940, p. 194.

⁴⁸⁴ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Anlage zum Diensttagebuch: Beratung über außerordentliche Maßnahmen zur Sicherstellung von Ruhe und Ordnung im Generalgouvernement. 16/5/1940, pp. 202–203.

of the necessity of the SS,⁴⁸⁵ but the views he expressed also clearly demonstrated how problematic the relationship between the administration of the Generalgouvernement and the SS was. The problems are shown by the fact that, in the same connection, the wrongdoings of Globocnik came up⁴⁸⁶ and it is known that Frank tried to get rid of the SSPF in summer 1940.⁴⁸⁷

It seems that Globocnik was not able to carry out the mass murder of the Polish intelligentsia hoped for by Frank without crossing the local civil authorities. Globocnik's highhandedness was next discussed in June 1940, when the operations of the *Selbstschutz* unit, whose members were recruited from *Volksdeutsche* of Distrikt Lublin, also came up.⁴⁸⁸ According to Globocnik, the *Selbstschutz* was a necessary resource for handling the tasks of the police.⁴⁸⁹ The question was raised again in July, when Frank ordered HSSPF Krüger to disband the *Selbstschutz* unit and to settle questions about personal relations in Lublin.⁴⁹⁰

The situation in Lublin evidently calmed down for a while.⁴⁹¹ When Frank visited the area on 25–28/7/1940 he did not investigate questions related to the SSPF's actions or even meet Globocnik, at least according to his diary,⁴⁹² and the *Selbstschutz* unit was disbanded in August 1940.⁴⁹³ The temporary calm did not, however, mean the termination of problems because Frank stated in September 1940 in a meeting with his *Gouverneure* that questions related to the police posed a challenge to the administration. On the same occasion the possibility changing the *Gouverneur* in Lublin was also discussed, without, however, any conclusion being reached.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁸⁵ Frank stated: "Ich kann diese Polenpolitik nur mit Ihnen machen. Entschuldigen Sie dieses ganz offene Wort. Wenn ich hier im Lande nicht die alte nationalsozialistische Kämpfergarde der Polizei und SS hätte, mit wem wollten wir dann diese Politik machen?" *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Polizeisitzung. 30/5/1940, pp. 210–211.

⁴⁸⁶ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Polizeisitzung. 30/5/1940, p. 215.

⁴⁸⁷ Eisenblätter 1969, p. 143–144.

⁴⁸⁸ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung über Fragen des polizeilichen Einsatzes im Generalgouvernement. 27/6/1940, p. 246.

⁴⁸⁹ Jansen & Weckbecker 1992, p. 195.

⁴⁹⁰ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung mit SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger. 10/7/1940, p. 248.

⁴⁹¹ When the *Selbstschutz* unit was disbanded, a training centre for the Sonderdienst unit was established in Lublin s. It continued to operate under Globocnik's authority until spring 1941. *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung mit SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger. 10/7/1940, p. 248; Besprechung des Herrn Generalgouverneurs mit Staatssekretär Dr. Bühler, Unterstaatssekretär Kundt und SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger. 13/12/1940, p. 311 reference 170.

⁴⁹² *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 25/7/1940 – 28/7/1940, pp. 258–259.

⁴⁹³ Jansen & Weckbecker 1992, p. 195 reference 98.

⁴⁹⁴ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Arbeitssitzung: Besprechung mit den Gouverneuren. 11/9/1940, pp. 276, 279.

The organisation of the police continued in October 1940. Himmler visited the Generalgouvernement at that time,⁴⁹⁵ and the position of the police in the administration was dealt with more broadly and more thoroughly.⁴⁹⁶ It did not mean the end of the difficulties caused by Globocnik, because the following problem concerned the use of Jewish forced labour. This was considered a good solution for carrying out various kinds of civil engineering projects during the spring of 1940,⁴⁹⁷ but by the autumn the situation had changed, and there were complaints about Globocnik's highhanded actions in this area as well. The problem was caused by his proposal to use Jewish forced labour to dig an anti-tank trench along the eastern border, which would lead to the conscription of Jewish labour and hence to a disturbance in the economy of the area.⁴⁹⁸

Frank met Globocnik again in December 1940. They discussed questions like the use of the Jews for forced labour and matters related to the Sonderdienst training unit, which had been formed from the Selbstschutz unit. Globocnik considered the concentrated employment of the whole Jewish population of Distrikt Lublin on individual projects necessary in order to have a sufficiency of forced labour. Frank, for his part, hoped that the Sonderdienst training unit would continue to function and clearly expressed his confidence in Globocnik.⁴⁹⁹ The subjects and contents of the discussion were significant: Globocnik's project for the concentration of the Jews was a prelude to what was to come, and only a little later it was used as an example in planning the ghettos.⁵⁰⁰ Frank's expression of confidence in turn clearly reveals the inability of the civil authorities to deal with a strong SSPF at the regional level.

The drama surrounding Globocnik's position soon resumed when Frank visited Lublin in January 1941. On that occasion, Globocnik served as his host because he was the *Distriktstandortführer* (District Leader) of the NSDAP in Distrikt Lublin.⁵⁰¹ Taken as a whole, the situation in Distrikt Lublin was far from satisfactory for Frank and the civil administration, and he tried to take control of the situation when he went to Berlin in March 1941. He met not only Hitler but also Himmler and Krüger. Frank believed that with Himmler and Krüger he had reached a solution that satisfied all parties with regard to police matters.⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁵ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 26/10/1940 – 27/10/1940, p. 292.

⁴⁹⁶ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung über Polizeifragen. 17/10/1940, pp. 288–290.

⁴⁹⁷ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Arbeitssitzung betr. Wasserwirtschaftsfragen. 24/4/1940, p. 190, p. 190 reference 77.

⁴⁹⁸ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Erste Vollsitzung des Wirtschaftsrats des GG. 31/10/1940, p. 300, p. 300 reference 155.

⁴⁹⁹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung 13/12/1940, p. 311.

⁵⁰⁰ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung von Fragen der Einsiedlung von Polen und Juden in das Generalgouvernement. 15/1/1941, p. 328.

⁵⁰¹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 22/1/1941–23/1/1941, pp. 330–331.

⁵⁰² *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 17/3/1941–18/3/1941, pp. 332–333.

Even though Frank imagined that the issues concerning the police had been settled, the negotiations continued on 30/4/1941. On that occasion, Frank emphasised his own position as the superior of the HSSPF and of the whole police organisation. Krüger, for his part, wished for the role of the police as a part of the administration to be clarified.⁵⁰³ Police matters were again dealt with in May 1941. Then questions about Globocnik came up again because he would not agree to take assignments given to him by the *Gouverneur*, and Frank refused accept this highhandedness. However, he was powerless in this matter.⁵⁰⁴

Frank's inability to control the obstinate Globocnik is explained by the support the latter received and his strong local position. In fact, in later statements, contemporaries have described Lublin as a city ruled by the SS.⁵⁰⁵ The position of the SS really became exceptionally strong in Distrikt Lublin because the organisation had gained a grip on the administration as soon as it was established. The authorities of the Generalgouvernement, on the other hand, could not control Globocnik after this, and in practice his activities began to burgeon freely.

Globocnik's projects seem absurd, but they expressed the National Socialist ideology of the SS, and his plans regarding the *Reichsghetto* or the construction of the anti-tank trench with Jewish slave labour reflect it in its purest form. The projects were in no way surprising because Globocnik had proved to be an unscrupulous implementer of National Socialist ideology even before the *Anschluss*, and as the Gauleiter of Vienna he had striven to implement the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policy purposefully and without regard for the conditions there.

The recent history of Distrikt Lublin, which differed from that of the rest of the Generalgouvernement, the views about the character of the area presented by the National Socialists, and the proposed uses of it together with an SSPF specifically appointed with a view to effecting them, constitute a significant part of the background to the later Germanisation operation. The fact that the area itself differed from other areas of the Generalgouvernement and that its SSPF was unorthodox created the background for the later wide-ranging activities of the SS in various purely ideological projects.

⁵⁰³ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Polizeibesprechung 30/4/1941*, pp. 364–369.

⁵⁰⁴ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Polizeibesprechung. 20/5/1941*, pp. 375–378.

⁵⁰⁵ Poprzeczny 2004, p. 200.

4 THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN REMOVES THE OBSTACLES TO THE REORGANISATION OF EUROPE

The Eastern Campaign against the Soviet Union permitted the SS to start implementing the National Socialist ideological demographic policy in full. The results of the earlier efforts, hindered as they were by various kinds of difficulties, had not lived up to expectations. Now the situation had changed, and nothing seemed to be preventing the execution of the projects. There arose a rush of enthusiasm for the east in the SS, and both the organisation and plans were developed to correspond to the changed situation.

Behind the enthusiasm lay the fact that the Wehrmacht had obtained considerable success in the first stage of the campaign, and the defeat of the Soviet Union seemed only a question of the time. The situation was also affected by the fact that the territorial expansion at that time affected areas that were particularly interesting from the National Socialists' point of view and the occupation of which would guarantee a possibility for the Third Reich to develop into a significant world power.⁵⁰⁶

The changed situation was also apparent in the Generalgouvernement because its status changed from being a land without significance into an area that was to be Germanised. As the prospects for the future altered, a significant turn also took place in the relations between the SS and the administration of the Generalgouvernement, and the SS obtained a considerably stronger hold over its opponent in 1941 and 1942. This meant that the SS was able, at least in principle, to start carrying out policies in accordance with its own interests more freely.

The situation created by the Eastern Campaign also affected the status of Distrikt Lublin in a significant way, because it now provided a springboard for the SS to launch its operations in the east. This was evident above all in the numerous tasks which were assigned to SSPF Globocnik, one of which was the Germanisation of the area. From the SS point of view, Germanisation was

⁵⁰⁶ About the matter more widely: Hillgruber 1965, pp. 564–578.

certainly not the most important or most urgent task, but it did constitute a significant part of the programme that was to be carried out in Distrikt Lublin.

4.1 Changes in the status of the Generalgouvernement and the tightening hold of the SS

After the outbreak of the Eastern Campaign the Generalgouvernement appeared in a totally new light for the National Socialists: First, it was an important area for communications with the eastern front. Second, it had lost its status as a dispensable land where undesirable or useless groups were to be deported from areas that were estimated to be more important.⁵⁰⁷ The SS, in particular, was interested in the Germanisation of the Generalgouvernement, and in the plans of both the RSHA and the RKF organisation it was designated as an area that was to be Germanised. The alteration in the position of the area was also realised by the administration of the Generalgouvernement, but the civil servants did not take a clear stand on the time when the Germanisation should be carried out.

The idea of Germanising the area was influenced by National Socialist interpretations of the history of the geographical territory of the Generalgouvernement. According to the views published by the administration of the Generalgouvernement in 1940, the area around the river Vistula had originally been inhabited by Germanic tribes, and the Slavs had arrived in the area only later. Since the Middle Ages, the area had been again an object of German interest, and it was considered to have developed above all thanks to German settlers. However, according to the National Socialists, the Germans who had moved to the area had become Polonised so a permanent German minority with its own culture had not formed in the area. The following wave of German settlers had arrived in the area in the nineteenth century, and for example the development of the industrial town of Lodz was credited to the Germans. On the basis of such ideas about the history of the area, it was possible for the National Socialists to present the view that the Generalgouvernement was a part of the historical living space of the German people.⁵⁰⁸

Against the background formed by these views concerning the area of the Generalgouvernement, it is no surprise that the idea of Germanisation arose at a quite early stage. In early 1940, Frank was not yet able to foresee what the final fate of the Generalgouvernement would be, but even then it was clear to him that the Generalgouvernement was no longer a mere prize of war but a part of the so-called living space of the Germans.⁵⁰⁹ However, the idea of making the

⁵⁰⁷ Musial 1999, p. 30–31.

⁵⁰⁸ *Das Deutsche Generalgouvernement Polen*, pp. 17–35.

⁵⁰⁹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Abteilungsleitersitzung 19/1/1940*, pp. 90–91.

Generalgouvernement a part of German living space was vitiated by the fact that Hitler did not want to have the Poles Germanised, and Frank considered the idea of killing almost 20 million Poles impossible.⁵¹⁰ The final outcome was that Frank suggested that for the time being the Generalgouvernement should be the native country of the Poles, in which absolute peace should prevail.⁵¹¹

Nevertheless, Frank had dreamt of the Germanisation of the Generalgouvernement, but he considered it possible only after all the areas that had been annexed to Germany were Germanised.⁵¹² The idea of Germanisation evidently fascinated Frank. This is evident for example in his speech to the *Volksdeutsche* because in his opinion the Poles basically no longer belonged in the Generalgouvernement.⁵¹³ Frank's aversion to the undesirable non-German population deepened fast, and he announced only a few days after his speech to the *Volksdeutsche* that he was not interested in the Jews at all and in the Poles only as a source of labour.⁵¹⁴ Naturally, Frank presented the matter to the Poles in an altogether different light.⁵¹⁵

The notion of the Generalgouvernement as a part of German living space grew in strength. In July 1940 its official name, "*Generalgouvernement für die besetzten polnischen Gebiete*" (General Governorate of the Occupied Polish Territories), was shortened to "*Generalgouvernement*". In the same connection, the idea was put forward that the Generalgouvernement would become a part "of the actual area of the German Reich".⁵¹⁶ As the notions of a Germanic Generalgouvernement strengthened, the murderous plans for the Jewish population also began to develop. Frank expressed his views in Lublin in 25/7/1940, saying that before long the Generalgouvernement would become an area without Jews.⁵¹⁷ Frank's views also reflect the broader National Socialist racial demographic policy, because the expulsion or extermination of the Jews held pride of place in the programme of the SS, as the plans drafted in the winter of 1939–1940 had already made clear.

⁵¹⁰ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Sitzung des Reichsverteidigungsausschusses 2/3/1940, p. 128.

⁵¹¹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Abteilungsleitersitzung 8/3/1940, pp. 150–151.

⁵¹² *Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Abteilungsleitersitzung 12/4/1940, p. 164.

⁵¹³ Frank stated: "Heute müssen Polen, froh sein, wenn wir sie überhaupt noch in diesem Gebiet dulden." *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Rede Franks vor Volksdeutschen auf dem Burghof. 19/4/1940, p. 172.

⁵¹⁴ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Arbeitssitzung anlässlich der Anwesenheit des Staatssekretärs Backe. 23/4/1940, p. 186.

⁵¹⁵ He put the matter as follows: "Wir wollen hier nicht irgendwie einen Ausrottungskrieg gegen Volkstum führen. Der Schutz des Reiches über das polnische Volk in dieser deutschen Interessenzone bedeutet für Sie die Möglichkeit, sich getreu den Überlieferungen Ihres Volkes zu entwickeln." *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Ansprache Franks in Radom. 25/5/1940, p. 207.

⁵¹⁶ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung mit Staatssekretär Dr. Bühler. 10/7/1940, p. 247.

⁵¹⁷ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 25/7/1940, p. 258.

Frank's vision of the Generalgouvernement without the Jews was based on an idea developed during the invasion of France to expel the Jews to the island of Madagascar.⁵¹⁸ For Frank, the plan to expel the Jews was ideologically more important than the Germanisation project, which met with an increasing number of problems as it was planned to deport more Poles to the Generalgouvernement from the annexed Polish areas. Thus Frank could only resign himself the fact that the Germanisation of the Generalgouvernement was a matter for the future.⁵¹⁹

The view of Germanisation as a project to be postponed till later gained strength towards the end of 1940 as Frank noted that Hitler had quashed the idea of Germanising the Generalgouvernement and directed that it be regarded as a labour reservation.⁵²⁰ Moreover, it was no time before the administration of the Generalgouvernement again had to handle questions related to receiving the Poles expelled from further west.⁵²¹ At the end of 1940, Frank was compelled to state that any such notions as annexing the Generalgouvernement into the actual *Reich* in the form of a number of regions (*Gaue*) were ridiculous because the area was becoming even more Polish than before as a result of the deportations.⁵²²

Although the commencement of the Germanisation project was not yet visible, the authorities of the Generalgouvernement planned measures in 1940 which could facilitate a future Germanisation operation. One of the plans applied to the redistribution of the land so that small farms of 2–10 hectares would be combined into medium-sized and large farms for the use of future German settlers.⁵²³ The plans were connected to an areal disposition plan (*Raumordnungsplan*) which had been projected in June 1940.⁵²⁴

The idea of Germanising the Generalgouvernement might have seemed rather remote at the turn of 1940 and 1941,⁵²⁵ but Frank announced that he wanted at least to get rid of the Jews.⁵²⁶ However, the situation changed rapidly, because by the end of March 1941 Frank was able to inform his subordinates

⁵¹⁸ Browning 2005, pp. 81–89.

⁵¹⁹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 31/7/1940, p. 263.

⁵²⁰ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Abteilungsleitersitzung, 6/11/1940, p. 305.

⁵²¹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung des Herrn Generalgouverneurs mit Staatssekretär Dr. Bühler, Unterstaatssekretär Kundt und SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger. 13/12/1940, p. 310.

⁵²² *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Abteilungsleitersitzung 19/12/1940, p. 314.

⁵²³ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung mit Landesbauernführer Körner. 1/8/1940, p. 265.

⁵²⁴ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung über Frage der Aufstellung eines Generalraumordnungsplanes. (ORR Schepers). 24/6/1940, p. 244.

⁵²⁵ The representatives of the SS presented an exact plan for the evacuations to Frank on 15/1/1941. *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung von Fragen der Einsiedlung von Polen und Juden in das Generalgouvernement. 15/1/1941, pp. 326–329.

⁵²⁶ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 22/1/1941, p. 330.

that Hitler had decided that the Generalgouvernement was to be Germanised within 15–20 years. Nonetheless, Frank emphasised that the Germanisation programme should not be commenced headlong,⁵²⁷ and he wanted to postpone it in practice until the end of the Eastern Campaign.

At the same time as Frank learnt for certain about the Germanisation of the Generalgouvernement he also became assured of the fact that there would be no future for the Jewish population in the area.⁵²⁸ Eventually Frank connected the two matters together and was able to state in almost the same breath that not a single Jew would remain in the Generalgouvernement and that 4–5 million Germans would be settled there.⁵²⁹ The first concrete ideas about settling Germans in the Generalgouvernement were linked to the above-mentioned the redistribution of the land. On 3/5/1941 Frank discussed the establishment of state farms for Germans and the settlement of 30,000 German families during the following 20 years.⁵³⁰ The matter was debated only a few weeks later by the Generalgouvernement administration in discussing the reorganisation of landed property.⁵³¹

In the autumn of 1941, Frank was already totally convinced that the Generalgouvernement would be a German area.⁵³² Consequently, the majority of the population of the Generalgouvernement had to become foreigners in their own homes. The conviction that the Germanisation programme would begin can be seen in the fact that Frank started to reinforce the position of the *Volksdeutsche*, and there were no longer any plans to resettle them outside the Generalgouvernement since he regarded them as the first group of the future Germanic population.⁵³³ The idea of the Generalgouvernement as an area reserved for Germanisation became firmly established during the autumn of 1941, and in October Frank outlined the extent of the future German settlement.⁵³⁴

⁵²⁷ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 25/3/1941, pp. 335–336.

⁵²⁸ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Regierungssitzung, 25/3/1941, pp. 336–337.

⁵²⁹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 26/3/1941, pp. 338–339.

⁵³⁰ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung mit Landesbauernführer Körner, SS-Sturmbannführer Kuchenbäcker, Diplomlandwirt Jahn. 3/5/1941, p. 371.

⁵³¹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Regierungssitzung, 20/5/1941, p. 381 and reference 50.

⁵³² Frank stated: "Wir müssen kristallklar diese innere Einstellung uns und allen Deutschen dieser Zeit einhämmern: Fremdling in diesem Lande ist nicht der Deutsche, sondern der Nichtdeutsche." *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Ansprache Franks. Eröffnung der Ausstellung "Germanenerbe im Weichselraum" im grossen Hörsaal des Instituts für Deutsche Ostarbeit. 12/9/1941, p. 404.

⁵³³ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Konstituierende Sitzung des Arbeitsbereichs GG der NSDAP zur Gründung des Arbeitsgemeinschafts zur Behebung volksdeutschen Notstandes. 23/10/1941, pp. 442, 444.

⁵³⁴ Frank stated:
...jedes Argument, dass das Generalgouvernement etwa eine Art polnischer Reststaat oder etwas Ähnliches wäre, wegfällt. In dem Augenblick, in dem der Führer genehmigt hat, dass wir sagen: Deutsches Reich – Generalgouvernement, sind wir nunmehr ein deutscher,

At the same time as the Generalgouvernement developed into an area reserved for Germanisation, the concrete plans for expelling the Jewish population also took shape. In order that the expulsions should succeed, an area to which the Jews would be deported was needed. The notion of annexing the Pripet swamps to the Generalgouvernement was developed because it would be possible to locate large civil engineering projects there.⁵³⁵ Because only Galicia had been annexed to the Generalgouvernement,⁵³⁶ Frank hastened to ascertain whether it would be possible to expel the Jews to the areas ruled by *Ministerium für den besetzten Ostgebiete* (*Ostministerium*, the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories). The answer was negative.⁵³⁷ Therefore, the idea of the expelling of the Jews was transformed into a decision to exterminate them, and in December 1941 Frank unequivocally announced that the Jews were to disappear, and that he had received an order to initiate the extermination operation.⁵³⁸

When the decision on the genocide of the Jews had been confirmed, ideas about the progress of the Germanisation project had also become clearer. Frank described to his listeners his vision of the motorways to be built across the Generalgouvernement with German villages along them. Furthermore, he stated that large military bases would be established in strategic areas and surrounded by broad areas populated by Germans. Frank estimated that it would be easy to expel the undesirable groups of the population to the east out of the way of the Germans, and thus the Germanisation process would not create insuperable difficulties. Eventually, the area would be called "*Vandalengau*" instead of Generalgouvernement.⁵³⁹

Even though Frank was a staunch supporter of Germanisation, and his objective was to expel the Polish and the Ukrainian populations from the Generalgouvernement, he did not want to proceed headlong in dealing with the matter but thought that it was more reasonable to conceal the final objectives

ein deutsch bestimmter Bereich. Je mehr wir im Osten an Land erobern, desto größer ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass wir die Juden und die asozialen Polen loswerden, dass wir im Laufe der Zeit im Gesamtsiedlungsprogramm des Ostens uns darauf einrichten dürfen, dass dieses Weichselland bis weit an den Pruth hin deutsches Siedlungsland wird.

Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Konstituierende Sitzung des Arbeitsbereichs GG der NSDAP zur Gründung des Arbeitsgemeinschafts zur Behebung volksdeutschen Notstandes. 23/10/1941, p. 444.

⁵³⁵ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Besprechung des Herrn Generalgouverneurs mit Staatssekretär Dr. Bühler, SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger, Gouverneur Dr. Lasch und Oberregierungsrat Dr. Schepers. 18/7/1941, p. 387.*

⁵³⁶ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945, p. 387* reference 83; Madajczyk 1987, p. 530. The territorial arrangements related to the Eastern Campaign are presented in Appendix 4.

⁵³⁷ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Besprechung zwischen dem Generalgouverneur, Reichsminister Rosenberg und dem Bevollmächtigten des Generalgouverneurs. 14/10/1941, p. 413.*

⁵³⁸ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Regierungssitzung 16/12/1941, p. 457.*

⁵³⁹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Regierungssitzung 16/12/1941, pp. 458–459.*

during wartime and to try and use the non-German population to aid the war effort and thus keep the area peaceful.⁵⁴⁰

Frank's outlines for the Germanising of the Generalgouvernement required concrete plans. The central administration of the Generalgouvernement included an organ called *Abteilung Raumordnung* (the Areal Planning Department), which developed into the *Hauptamt für Raumordnung* (the Head Office for Areal Planning). It had organs at the regional level in the *Distrikte*, but it also had direct contacts with both Himmler and the head planner of the SS.⁵⁴¹ The *Abteilung Bevölkerungswesen und Fürsorge* (the Department for Population and Supply) also worked in close cooperation with the RKF Stabshauptamt.⁵⁴²

The administration of the Generalgouvernement actively produced various studies dealing with the situation of the area, but they focused mainly on the population density or the economy. The land was the most significant object of interest but plans for the towns were also outlined. The most important plan produced by the administration of the Generalgouvernement was entitled *Bodenordnung im Generalgouvernement* (The Disposition of Land in the Generalgouvernement). It was completed on 3/5/1941, and its implementation would have removed from the area 1,200,000 persons working in agriculture over a period of 20 years and affected more than half of the arable land.⁵⁴³

The fact that the administration of the Generalgouvernement did not produce comprehensive plans for the future of the area as the SS did was a minor problem compared with the fact that Frank began to encounter really serious difficulties with the SS during the period following the Eastern Campaign. First, cases of corruption emerged in the Generalgouvernement. The most serious of them was the case of Gouverneur Karl Lasch, but Frank's luxurious life style did not pass unnoticed in the investigations either.⁵⁴⁴

The situation became difficult for Frank because Himmler joined forces with Bormann and Lammers, and the trio conducted "a comradely interrogation" with Frank in March 1942. The weakness of the Frank's position is indicated by the fact that Gouverneur Lasch was executed, and the Generalgouvernement had to change other governors, too. The SS tried to have the *Gouverneure* of Distrikt Lublin and Distrikt Galizien changed and to get Globocnik appointed as the Gouverneur of Distrikt Lublin. Both of the districts were important for the Germanisation project. The endeavour did not succeed in all respects, but the SS was able to get suitable persons appointed as governors of Distrikt Galizien and Distrikt Krakau.⁵⁴⁵

The endeavour to suppress Frank involved more than the execution of one governor and the changing of two others: it also included the strengthening of

⁵⁴⁰ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Regierungssitzung 11/3/1942*, pp. 469–470.

⁵⁴¹ Esch 1992, pp. 88–89, 94–95. Cf. Wasser 1993B, pp. 80–82.

⁵⁴² Aly & Heim 2004, pp. 215–220.

⁵⁴³ Madajczyk 1987, pp. 244, 399 reference 21, 400–401, 435; Wasser 1993B, pp. 31, 44–45.

⁵⁴⁴ Schenk 2006, pp. 258–265.

⁵⁴⁵ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 243–247.

the position of the HSSPF Ost. This was done by appointing HSSPF Krüger *Staatssekretär für das Sicherheitswesen* (Secretary of State for Security). An essential part of the campaign was an attempt to strengthen Krüger's position as the Representative of the RKF in the Generalgouvernement, but it did not succeed.⁵⁴⁶ However, it is worth noting that Frank had to admit in the spring of 1942 that Krüger was Himmler's representative in RKF matters in the Generalgouvernement.⁵⁴⁷

The improvement in the position of the HSSPF was a significant step in the strengthening of the position of the SS. Frank had only himself to blame for this, at least partly, because it had been his idea to enlist paramilitary units for the use of the administration of the Generalgouvernement. Initially, the problem had been the strengthening of the position of the Sonderdienst, which the SS disapproved of. The problem had become even more serious as Frank had been trying to enlist all German men over 17 years of age to form *Wehrschützenbereitschaften* (home guard units) since the autumn of 1941. The *Wehrschützenbereitschaften* were to be part of the organisation of the NSDAP, and a representative of the SA was appointed as their leader. The reaction of the SS to the projects was hostile, and the appointment of Krüger as *Staatssekretär* was also aimed at subordinating the forces of Frank's administration to the command of the SS.⁵⁴⁸

The events of the winter season of 1941-1942 presaged the collapse of Frank's position in the summer of 1942. He had started to criticise the growth in the influence of the SS machinery of violence and the decrease in the significance of the judicial system since the late autumn of 1941. In summer 1942, he made speeches in Berlin, Vienna, Munich and Heidelberg in which he publicly criticised the abolition of the constitutional state in National Socialist Germany and its replacement by a police state.⁵⁴⁹

Hitler would not tolerate Frank's speeches and forbade him to speak in public. Furthermore, Frank was removed from several posts related to the judiciary, and he was left with only his positions as a Minister without Portfolio and Generalgouverneur. The collapse of Frank's position led to Lammers, Bormann and Himmler starting to develop a plan to divide the Generalgouvernement into *Reichsgaue*.⁵⁵⁰ If it had succeeded, the project would have removed Frank from power altogether and most probably strengthened the position of the SS in the Generalgouvernement.

However, the SS did not succeed in displacing Frank or getting Globocnik appointed as Gouverneur of Distrikt Lublin in spite of its attempts. As the SS intensified its efforts, disputes between its representatives and the administration of the Generalgouvernement became a matter of course, and the situation was

⁵⁴⁶ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 247-253.

⁵⁴⁷ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945*. Besprechung mit SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger. 21/4/1942, p. 491.

⁵⁴⁸ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 240-243, 254-256.

⁵⁴⁹ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 259-260; Schenk 2006, pp. 268-270.

⁵⁵⁰ Eisenblätter 1969, pp. 260-261, 267-268.

further aggravated by *Das Schwarze Korps*, which strongly attacked Frank, and jurists in general, after his speeches in 1942.⁵⁵¹

The weakening of the Frank's position was also seen in his own activities because he began to spend more and more time elsewhere than in the Generalgouvernement. Frank had obviously been a lone figure earlier, and his plight was further aggravated by the fact that, as a result of his own political actions, he had not been able to become the real leader of his administrative area. Thus the governing of the Generalgouvernement became a burden, which he more and more often delegated to his deputies.⁵⁵²

Examined as a whole, the administration of the Generalgouvernement can be regarded as having sunk into a very difficult situation by the summer of 1942. The civil authorities aimed at the Germanisation of the area and wanted to get rid of the Jewish population, but they were not able to carry out these projects unaided because the SS controlled the necessary resources. Thus the keys to the future of the Generalgouvernement seem to have been almost totally in the hands of the SS, and the road seemed open for the implementation of the first measures. However, it should be remembered that Frank was in favour of Germanisation just as much as Himmler, as Madajczyk had earlier claimed.⁵⁵³

4.2 The adaptation of the SS organisation to the new situation

During the period between the Polish Campaign and the Eastern Campaign, the targets of the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policy had expanded towards the west and south. The west was the more important direction because there were areas there that had been targets of the National Socialist expansion policy from the very outset. The situation of the south was different: originally, Hitler had even not been interested in the territories of Yugoslavia because they were supposed to be in Italy's sphere of interest. The situation had changed during the war, however, and in spring 1941 Hitler deemed it necessary to secure his southern flank with operations in Yugoslavia and Greece. At the same time, it was estimated that it would be possible to split up Yugoslavia and distribute its territories between its neighbouring states and to annex Austria-Hungary's earlier possessions there into a Greater Germany.⁵⁵⁴

The entry of the SS into the areas in the west was no simple matter because the Wehrmacht had originally planned for the military occupation administration to be responsible for governing them. Hitler had accepted the idea, and the SS was not able to extend its operations into the area using the *Einsatzgruppen* as it had done in Czechoslovakia and Poland. However, the situation fairly soon began to turn in favour of the SS because the plan for a purely military occupation administration fell through almost immediately:

⁵⁵¹ *Das Schwarze Korps* described jurists as "sewer animals". Schenk 2006, p. 270.

⁵⁵² Schenk 2006, pp. 166-171.

⁵⁵³ Madajczyk 1987, p. 100.

⁵⁵⁴ Umbreit 1988, pp. 71-72, 122.

Luxembourg was placed under the governance of Gauleiter Gustav Simon of Koblenz-Trier. The situation in Belgium was solved by annexing earlier possessions of Germany like Eupen, Malmedy and Moresnet into the administrative district of Aachen, while the rest of the country was left under the military administration. Alsace (Elsass) and Lorraine (Lothringen) ended up under a civil administration and, like Luxembourg, were to be annexed as parts of Germany.⁵⁵⁵

In Lorraine Germanisation began almost immediately after the establishment of the German administration, and by October 1940 about 20,000–25,000 undesirable persons had been expelled from the area. The measures were soon expanded, and in November 1940 the deportation of about 60,000 persons was carried out in the area. The operation was considerable in scale, but it was not an SS project because Gauleiter Josef Bürckel wanted to act independently in actively implementing the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policy in his own administrative district.⁵⁵⁶

Bürckel's independent initiative was made possible by the fact that he was the Representative of the RKF in the area and thought that he was answerable for his actions only to Hitler. It was a problem for the SS that Bürckel's ideas about Germanisation differed steeply from the racist views that predominated in the SS organisation. The situation did not remain unfavourable for the SS for very long, however, because Bürckel appointed the HSSPF of Lorraine, Theodor Berkelmann, in September 1941 as *Bevollmächtigter für die Besiedlung Lothringens* (Plenipotentiary for the Settlement of Lorraine). This move was obviously influenced by the fact that Bürckel had not succeeded in acquiring Germanic settlers for the area, and this provided an opportunity for Himmler to intervene in the matter.⁵⁵⁷

In Alsace, too, the Germanisation operation was first carried out under the auspices of the civil authorities. The most significant difference compared with Lorraine was the number of deportations, which was distinctly higher in Alsace: by the end of 1940 Gauleiter Robert Wagner had succeeded in either expelling from, or keeping outside, the area more than 100,000 undesirables. Initially, the activities of the SS seem to have been just as fraught with difficulties as they were in Lorraine. For example, it was not until 1941 that the SS was able to establish a Bodenamt in the area, although it had succeeded in carrying out racial studies of the population since 1940. This might have been a result of the fact that Wagner accepted the racial ideology of the SS.⁵⁵⁸

In the south, the target areas of the Germanisation policy were Southern Carinthia (Südkärnten), Upper Krain (Oberkrain) and Lower Styria (Untersteiermark). They were placed under civil administrations in April 1941. Gauleiter Siegfried Uiberreither was appointed as the head of the civil

⁵⁵⁵ Umbreit 1988, pp. 55–57, 59, 64–67, 137–139.

⁵⁵⁶ Heinemann 2003, pp. 306–307, 310. For broader treatment of the subject, see Schaeffer 1997.

⁵⁵⁷ Heinemann 2003, pp. 308–313.

⁵⁵⁸ Heinemann 2003, pp. 318–320. For broader treatment of this subject, see Kettenacker 1973.

administration of Southern Carinthia and Upper Krain, Gauleiter Franz Kutschera in turn was put in charge of Lower Styria, although he was soon replaced by Friedrich Rainer in November 1941.⁵⁵⁹

According to plans presented in the SS organisation, 260,000 Slovenes were to be expelled from the annexed southern areas. The civil authorities seem to have accepted the plans of the SS and also to have expressed their own ideas for the Germanisation of the area. The plans strongly resemble those that were carried out in the annexed Polish territories with regard to both the deportations and the settlement: the intelligentsia was to be expelled, and the deported were to be transported to neighbouring areas which were of no interest to the National Socialists. Furthermore, plans were made to create a new southern border zone populated with German farmers. The acquisition of inhabitants seems to have been on a surer basis than elsewhere because it was planned to get the settlers mainly from neighbouring areas. Some of them would be obtained from the more southern zone controlled by Italy, some from the South Tyrol (Südtirol, Alto Adige) and only a few from the more distant Bukovina (Bukowina, Buchenland).⁵⁶⁰

The plans for the south seem very straightforward. This is understandable in view of the time when the areas were annexed: the period of trial and error was over. The thinking of the SS, too, had had time to develop to a fairly advanced and flexible level. This could be seen in the activities carried out in the south: because the acquisition of settlers had proved to be extremely difficult, the deportations were given up and the original inhabitants of the area started to be converted into Germans.⁵⁶¹

The SS began to become active in the west and south in 1941, when the early success of the Eastern Campaign made it possible to envisage a process of reorganising the whole of Europe under Germany. The general intensification of the organisation's activity was also evident in developments in the former Czechoslovakian areas. In the Protektorat this was made possible by the rise of Reinhard Heydrich to become the leader of the administration in the autumn of 1941. Heydrich tried to implement a policy the objective of which was to annex the area into a Greater Germany. In practice, this meant that the area should be populated by Germans. Heydrich's idea was to use the Bodenamt of Prague as the principle tool in the Germanisation process. His plan also included a survey of the population, using both the RuSHA and the RSHA, the main responsibility lying with the latter. The survey of the population was planned to be extended to the whole population of the area, and those who were designated as unsuitable for Germanisation were to be expelled to Siberia or to the Arctic coast of western Russia.⁵⁶²

The activities of the SS also intensified in the Sudetenland, where an RKF office was established in September 1941. The activity first focused on a survey

⁵⁵⁹ Umbreit 1988, p. 139.

⁵⁶⁰ Umbreit 1988, pp. 158–159.

⁵⁶¹ Umbreit 1988, pp. 159–160.

⁵⁶² Heinemann 2003, pp. 150–151, 157–161.

of the population of the area, but because of the fuel shortage it was carried out in only a few areas. The total number of persons examined remained at a few thousand, and it was not until 1943 that a permanent office of the RuSHA was established in the area. It was also planned to settle *Volksdeutsche* in the area, and the RKF office established two organs there during 1941. The operation remained relatively modest because by the turn of 1942 and 1943 only slightly over 3000 *Volksdeutsche* had been settled in the area.⁵⁶³

The shift of the SS to a new level of activity was also reflected in its organisational structure, and the Dienststelle des RKF and the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* became SS head offices.⁵⁶⁴ The Dienststelle des RKF was given the title *Stabshauptamt* (Staff Head Office), and thus *Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums - Stabshauptamt* became its official name. The structure of the RKF Stabshauptamt comprised three groups of offices. Their respective tasks were roughly divided as follows: questions regarding the administration and settlers; accounts and planning; building and land acquisition.⁵⁶⁵

Even though the racial activities were in their heyday, the operations of the SS also rapidly expanded in two other areas during the early years of the Second World War: economic affairs (including the establishment of concentration, extermination and labour camps) and the creation of armed forces suitable for use in warfare.

The number of concentration camps increased after the outbreak of the Second World War, and by 1942 five new camps had been established. The growth in the number of concentration camps did not lead to a corresponding administrative development at the head office level: the guard units were formed into an SS division in the winter of 1939–40, and Theodor Eicke, the Inspekteur der Konzentrationslager, was put in command of it.⁵⁶⁶ Thus the camps lost Eicke, the person who had for so long developed them, and they came under pressure from the SS head offices in their struggle for authority. In the new situation, the camps were seen either as institutions to produce economic benefits or as a tool for eliminating the undesirable population groups.⁵⁶⁷

Oswald Pohl, *SS-Verwaltungschef* (Chief of Administration of SS), who was responsible for the *Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftshauptamt* (VWHA, the Head Office for Administrative and Economic Affairs), had developed a plan for the economic exploitation of the concentration camps. Some companies, like *Deutsche Erd- und Steinwerke* and *Deutsche Ausrüstungswerke*, had been established in the camps earlier on. However, their operations had remained on a fairly small scale because the objective was merely to satisfy the material requirements of the armed troops of the SS, the police or the settlers. However, after the outbreak of war, it became possible to initiate much broader operations with the opportunity to use large groups of prisoners as forced

⁵⁶³ Heinemann 2003, pp. 178–182.

⁵⁶⁴ Koehl 1983, pp. 187, 192.

⁵⁶⁵ Buchheim 1958, p. 247.

⁵⁶⁶ Orth 1999, pp. 63–64, 68.

⁵⁶⁷ Koehl 1983, p. 169.

labour. The new prospects inspired the representatives of Pohl to attempt to get the concentration camps under their control.⁵⁶⁸

Himmler, too, obviously regarded the use of concentration camps for economically productive activities as reasonable because he did not want to let them come under the control of the RSHA, which was responsible for the extermination operations. A clear indication of this was the fact that in early 1942 Himmler placed the concentration camps under the authority of the newly founded *Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt* (WVHA, the Head Office of Economic Administration).⁵⁶⁹ Himmler's objective was also to use the concentration camps to carry out of his future projects. The clearest example of this is Auschwitz, the establishment of which was a result of the plan to Germanise the area of Kattowitz. Another concentration camp that was linked to plans for the future was the Majdanek camp in Lublin.⁵⁷⁰

The growth of the military element of the SS organisation also continued in a more emphatic fashion after the outbreak of war. The most visible example was the fusing of SS detachments into increasingly large units. In practice, this meant the formation of SS divisions. When establishing the first divisions, the existing forces, in other words *Verfügungstruppe* and *Totenkopfverbände* units, were used, and during the winter of 1939-1940 the police units were also combined into divisions. With the formation of the divisions, the name of the military units of the SS was changed to *Waffen-SS*.⁵⁷¹

The growth in the number of *Waffen-SS* troops also led to the establishment of a new head office to administer them. The new head office, called *SS-Führungshauptamt* (SSFHA, the SS Leadership Head Office) was established in August 1941. The continuing growth of the SS organisation led also to the establishment of other new SS head offices. These were the *SS-Personalhauptamt* (SSPHA, the Personnel Head Office) and the *Hauptamt SS-Gericht*, which was responsible for legal matters. The background organisation behind the new SS head offices was the *SS-Hauptamt* (SSHA), which developed into the organ that was responsible for the supply of men for the *Waffen-SS*.⁵⁷²

The SS organisation thus expanded considerably, and in the spring of 1942, when the developmental phase of the Eastern Campaign had ended, it included the following head offices or other organs at that level:

Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS
Hauptamt SS-Gericht
SS-Personalhauptamt

SS-Führungshauptamt
SS-Hauptamt

Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt

⁵⁶⁸ Koehl 1983, pp. 166, 169-170.

⁵⁶⁹ Koehl 1983, pp 171, 176-177.

⁵⁷⁰ Orth 1999, pp. 77-78, 100-101. About the role of Auschwitz more widely: Steinbacher 2000.

⁵⁷¹ Koehl 1983, pp. 135, 195.

⁵⁷² Buchheim 1999B, pp. 210-211.

Reichssicherheitshauptamt
Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei

RKF Stabshauptamt
Hauptamt Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt⁵⁷³

In this list, the SS head offices have been grouped into branches. The first branch consists of organs that were responsible for the central administration of the whole organisation. The second group contains those head offices that were central from the point of view of the Waffen-SS troops. The third branch comprises only one head office, which was responsible for the concentration camps and the economic administration of the whole organisation. The head offices responsible for internal security and intelligence form the fourth group. The fifth group is composed of those head offices that were engaged in the implementation of the Germanisation programme.⁵⁷⁴

This grouping of head offices shows that, even when it was at its most active, the implementation of the racial ideological policy accounted for only a fraction of the activities of the SS. In any case, the organisation process was important because it directly affected the ability of the organisation to carry out its race ideology in practice.

However, an equally important factor was that the SS obtained a sufficient mandate to operate in the conquered areas of the Soviet Union. Himmler's ability to carry out the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policy in the Soviet areas was based on Hitler's view that the authority of the RKF was also valid there.⁵⁷⁵ The SS therefore extended its activities into the Soviet areas using the accustomed formula; *Einsatzgruppen*, police battalions and other

⁵⁷³ Obersturmbannführer Brandt of the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS sent a letter about the correct names of the SS Head Offices to their directors on 27/8/1942. The list was as follows:

- 1) *SS-Hauptamt*
- 2) *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*
- 3) *Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt*
- 4) *Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei*
- 5) *SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt*
- 6) *Persönlicher Stab*
- 7) *SS-Personalhauptamt*
- 8) *Hauptamt SS-Gericht*
- 9) *SS-Führungshauptamt*
- 10) *Dienststelle SS-Obergruppenführer Heißmeyer*
- 11) *Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums – Stabshauptamt*
- 12) *Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums – Hauptamt Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.*

Brandt's letter is an indication of the uncertainly related to the organisation of the SS and the confusion arising from rapid growth and ad hoc solutions. BArch NS 19 / 3905. Cf. Kaienburg 2003, pp. 377–378.

⁵⁷⁴ It is worth noting that in Brandt's list the *Dienststelle SS-Obergruppenführer Heißmeyer* is also placed on the level of *Hauptamt*. The organ in question was responsible for the operation of institutions called *Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten (Napola)*. *Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus*, pp. 655–657, 785; Kaienburg 2003, p. 378.

⁵⁷⁵ For example Schulte 2001, p. 286.

departments were sent in with the attacking troops of the Wehrmacht, and HSSPFs and SSPFs were attached to the military and civil administrations.⁵⁷⁶

The SS also tried to take control of planning. At the national level, the highest authority was given to Konrad Meyer, who was known to be the head planner in the SS. His authority was extended in summer 1942, and thanks to it the SS succeeded in extending its power to the *Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft* (the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture) and to the *Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete* (the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories).⁵⁷⁷

Hitler supported Himmler's activities by also appointing him as the *Beauftragter der Partei für Volkstumsfragen* (the Party Representative for Nationality Questions) in February 1941 and a *Hauptamt* (head office) was established in the NSDAP in March 1942 for the branch in question.⁵⁷⁸ Himmler's objective was to man the *Hauptamt* with personnel from the SS main offices dealing with population and nationality questions and retain the decision-making power of the representatives of the SS.⁵⁷⁹

When the *Hauptamt für Volkstumsfragen* (the Head Office for Nationality Questions) was established, Himmler also defined the spheres of authority of the SS main offices operating in the field in question: the Vomi, the RSHA, the RuSHA and the RKF Stabshauptamt. The RKF Stabshauptamt and the RSHA were to be the focal organs. It was the task of the former to co-ordinate all settlement and planning activities, while the RSHA was in a focal position in questions related to non-German groups, although its duties also included dealing with the *Volksdeutsche*. Thus the Vomi and the RuSHA were left in positions of secondary importance.⁵⁸⁰

After the commencement of the Eastern Campaign, the SS had the opportunity to start planning and partly also carrying out the National Socialist racial and demographic reorganisation policy on a much wider scale than before. The organisation intensified its activity comprehensively between spring 1941 and summer 1942. In that period, it was able to extend its power in practice to all the areas targeted for reorganisation, and it also succeeded in obtaining the responsibility for planning both in the heartlands of the Third Reich and in the most important occupied areas.

The stage of intensified activity was succeeded by the rapid development of plans for the future. The RSHA and the RKF Stabshauptamt were the most active organs in the field of planning, but there was also room for energetic

⁵⁷⁶ Förster 1983, pp. 414–417, 421–426.

⁵⁷⁷ Meyer's title was *Planungsbeauftragter für die Siedlung und Landesneuordnung beim Reichsleiter für Agrarpolitik, beim Reichsminister für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft und beim Reichsbauernführer und Leiter des Siedlungsausschusses für die besetzten Ostgebiete*. Buchheim 1999B, p. 199.

⁵⁷⁸ Kaienburg 2003, p. 400.

⁵⁷⁹ Anordnung des RFSS über den Aufbau der Volkstumsarbeit der NSDAP und eine Abgrenzung der Zuständigkeiten der Hauptämter der SS. 28/11/1941. BArch R 69 / 687.

⁵⁸⁰ Anordnung des RFSS über den Aufbau der Volkstumsarbeit der NSDAP und eine Abgrenzung der Zuständigkeiten der Hauptämter der SS. 28/11/1941. BArch R 69 / 687.

individual actors. The most significant of these was Odilo Globocnik, the SSPF im Distrikt Lublin. The increased activity of the SS was first seen in the genocide of the Jews, but there were also attempts to implement deportations and resettlement operations in the new target areas.

The birth process of the Holocaust and its connection to the National Socialist ideology have been thoroughly analysed by numerous researchers,⁵⁸¹ but questions related to the implementation of the National Socialist racial ideology are still worth studying. It is possible to examine the expansion stage of the operation of the SS both at the level of the central administration and at the level of individual administrative areas such as Distrikt Lublin in the Generalgouvernement.

4.3 The SS revises its plans for the future

The drawing up of new plans for the east commenced almost immediately after the onset of the Eastern Campaign. The RSHA and the RKF Stabshauptamt were responsible for the planning, but the Hauptamt Haushalt und Bauten (the Head Office for Budget and Construction) was also involved in it with a plan drafted by Oberführer Hans Kammler. The plan, called *Friedensbauprogramm* (Peace Building Program), was completed in December 1941. It focused on all the areas of the Greater German State, but Himmler considered the estimated building costs too expensive.⁵⁸²

The *Friedensbauprogramm* planned a network of SS and police bases (*SS- und Polizeistützpunkte*) in the eastern territories. The scheme was called *Programm Heinrich*.⁵⁸³ The number and location of the bases was determined by the Ordnungspolizei, but the *SS-Bauwesen* (the SS Construction Organisation) was responsible for building them. The bases were divided into three classes according to their importance and size, but exact information about their locations is unobtainable, although Schulte has estimated the locations.⁵⁸⁴

In order that the bases might be established, the Pohl's organisation extended its activities into the eastern territories and attached its representatives to the local SS organisations. An organ called *Wirtschaftsinspektion der Waffen-SS* (Economic Inspectorate of the Waffen-SS) was established in the area of every HSSPF, and organs called *Bauinspektion der Waffen-SS* (Building Inspectorate of the Waffen-SS) were founded for the construction industry. Because the establishment of the bases also required the securing of maintenance, Pohl attached his own administrative staff to the

⁵⁸¹ The matter has been dealt with most comprehensively by Götz Aly in his work *Endlösung* (Aly 2002) and by Cristoph Browning in *The Origins of the Final Solution* (Browning 2005).

⁵⁸² Roth 1993, pp. 73–74.

⁵⁸³ Roth 1993, pp. 73–74.

⁵⁸⁴ Schulte 2001, pp. 296–298, 299, Geplante SS- und Polizeistützpunkte in Osteuropa 1941/42.

organisation of the HSSPFs and began to take control of the economic measures and the land that the existence of the bases required.⁵⁸⁵

Behind the plan to build the bases lay the idea that control of them and of the countryside surrounding them would be the starting point for the Germanisation of the east. It is possible to examine the project more closely in the case of the Ukraine, and according to Schulte about 80,000 members of the SS should have been stationed in bases. Schulte also claims that the number of SS troops was far too small to control the target areas, and the whole programme was unrealistic.⁵⁸⁶

The RSHA, too, became more active in the autumn of 1941. The clearest indication of this is Reinhard Heydrich's speech in Prague, in which he dealt with questions about the objectives of the future population policy and the target areas for Germanisation.⁵⁸⁷ The plan of the RSHA for the demographic reorganisation of Europe was completed in January 1942. It is estimated that it contained plans for the deportation of non-German populations and the extermination of the Jewish population. The plan of the RSHA also included a scheme to establish a reservation area for the undesirables in Northern Russia. The size of the undesirable groups amounted to over 40 million persons. The number included all the 11 million Jews of Europe and 31 million Slavs.⁵⁸⁸

The deportations would affect at least half of the populations of the target areas, and for example 80–85% of the Poles were to be expelled. In addition to the deportations, there were also to be other demographic measures, which would produce 14 million persons who could be classified as Germans. It was planned to use them to Germanise the annexed Polish territories, the Generalgouvernement, the area of Bialystok, the Baltic States, Belarus and a part of the Ukraine. The percentage of the population designated for Germanisation varied according to the area. About 15–20% of Poles were to be Germanised, 25% of the Belarussians and 35% of the West Ukrainians.⁵⁸⁹

The RSHA updated its plan in April-May 1942. In the revised version, Ingermanland, the area along the bend of the river Dnieper (*Dneprbogen*), the Crimea and a mainland area north of it, which the National Socialists called *Tauria*, were added to the areas that were to be Germanised. Later on, the Protektorat, too, was added to the target areas. This revised plan of the RSHA was called the *Gesamtplan* (Comprehensive Plan), and it raised status of the RSHA and placed Hans Ehlich in very significant position as the co-ordinator of the SS's plans for the east, because Himmler accepted the *Gesamtplan* as the basis for further planning.⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁵ Schulte 2001, pp. 278–279, 282, 284–296.

⁵⁸⁶ Schulte 2001, pp. 295, 303–304.

⁵⁸⁷ Rede Reinhard Heydrichs über die Grundsätze der nationalsozialistischen „Neuordnung“ Europas (Auszug). 1941, 2. Oktober, Prag. Dokument Nr. 5. *Vom Generalplan Ost Zum Generalsiedlungsplan*.

⁵⁸⁸ Roth 1993, pp. 40–41.

⁵⁸⁹ Roth 1993, p. 41.

⁵⁹⁰ Roth 1993, pp. 41–42, 44, 61.

Even though the representatives of the RSHA seem to have been successful in designing the demographic plans, there also was a demand for the plans of the RKF organisation. It is known that Himmler ordered Konrad Meyer to produce new plans on 24/6/1941. The result was a plan called *Generalplan Ost* (General Plan East), which was completed on 15/7/1941.⁵⁹¹ It envisaged a fairly broad protection zone reaching from the Generalgouvernement to the area of Bialystok and on to the southern area of the Baltic States. The target area of the plan included the towns of Lublin and Zamosc, which are important from the point of view of this research, and also the town of Lemberg (Lvov), which was the capital of Galicia.⁵⁹² The planning work continued, and the following wide-ranging and thorough plan for the east was completed in late spring 1942. It too was called *Generalplan Ost*.⁵⁹³

In addition to Meyer, several planners of the RKF Stabshauptamt participated in the drafting of the plan, and a group of experts from outside institutions were also involved in it, among them the Reichstelle für Raumordnung and the Universities of Berlin, Giessen and Leipzig. The economic estimates were produced by Felix Boesler from the University of Jena.⁵⁹⁴ The plan was, as its name suggests, a comprehensive and thorough presentation of the organisation of the eastern territories, and it was divided into three parts. These covered the preconditions for future settlement activity (*Forderungen an eine künftige Siedlungsordnung*); a review of the expenses involved in developing the annexed areas and the means whereby they might be covered (*Überblick über die Kosten des Aufbaues der eingegliederten Ostgebiete und ihre Aufbringung*); and the designation of the settlement targets in the occupied eastern territories and the basic factors involved in developing them (*Abgrenzung der Siedlungsräume in den besetzten Ostgebieten und Grundzüge des Aufbaues*).⁵⁹⁵

The *Generalplan Ost* of 1942 involved both the annexed Polish territories and the occupied areas of the Soviet Union. In addition to these territories, the Generalgouvernement also was dealt with in the plan because it was located between the other two areas.⁵⁹⁶ The geographical extent of the plan also indicates the progress in RKF planning over the period 1939–1942. The first plans involved only the annexed Polish territories; then they were expanded to include the Generalgouvernement; and finally they covered all the eastern territories under the control of the Third Reich.

⁵⁹¹ Müller 1991, p. 96.

⁵⁹² Roth 1993, pp. 59–60, 65 Abb. 7.

⁵⁹³ The full title of the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942 was: *Generalplan Ost. Rechtliche, wirtschaftliche und räumliche Grundlagen des Ostaufbaues, vorgelegt von SS-Oberführer Professor Dr. Konrad Meyer, Berlin-Dahlem, Juni 1942*. The plan has been published in *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan* as document number 23 under the heading: *Denkschrift "Generalplan Ost. Rechtliche, wirtschaftliche und räumliche Grundlagen des Ostaufbaus"*. 1942, 2. Juni, Berlin.

⁵⁹⁴ Roth 1993, pp. 67–68. The *Generalplan Ost* has also been published in the first volume of *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium* as document number 25 and in the *Polish Western Affairs* magazine in 1962.

⁵⁹⁵ *Generalplan Ost*, pp. 91–92.

⁵⁹⁶ The target areas of the *Generalplan Ost* are presented in Appendix 5.

In the situation of summer 1942, the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942 offered the SS a comprehensive plan for settling matters related to the eastern question. The solutions presented in it were based on careful calculations and estimates of the resources, in addition to which they took into consideration the power-political interests of the SS, which were manifested in the intention to place the new targets of Germanisation under the authority of the Reichsführer-SS and in speculations about how the SS could gain absolute control of the Germanisation process that had already begun in the annexed Polish territories.⁵⁹⁷

The plan was presented as defensive in character because the objective was to settle a German population only in target areas that were considered for security reasons to be extremely important to the Third Reich.⁵⁹⁸ The areas of Ingermanland together with the Crimea and the mainland area behind it were defined as such areas. In addition to these, the area of Memel-Narew also was to be Germanised. The reason for this was its geographical position: it was at the geopolitical intersection of the directions of settlement in Ingermanland and the Crimea, and in any case it was a natural target of the settlement activity.⁵⁹⁹ The new target areas for German settlement were named *Siedlungsmarken* (Settlement regions) or *Marken des Reiches* (Regions of the Reich). They were to be severed from their earlier administrative connections and transferred to the total control of the SS. Furthermore, it was planned that the administrative staff of these areas should operate under the legal system of the SS.⁶⁰⁰

The *Siedlungsmarken* were to be connected to Germany by means of a network of bases. This would comprise altogether 36 bases with German settlements (*Siedlungsstützpunkte*). Fourteen of them would be placed in the Generalgouvernement, 14 would be in the Reichskommissariat Ostland and eight would be in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The towns of Lublin and Zamosc were included in the list of *Siedlungsstützpunkte*. The *Siedlungsstützpunkte* in the area of the Reichskommissariat Ostland were divided into an outer and inner line because the area of the Baltic States was considered to be exceptionally important. The *Siedlungsstützpunkte* were to be located along railway lines and motorways at a distance of about 100 kilometres from each other, and the geographical area of one *Siedlungsstützpunkt* was to be about 2000 square kilometres.⁶⁰¹ The *Siedlungsstützpunkte* were not to be placed directly under the authority of the Reichsführer-SS, and they would continue to be governed by their present administrations.⁶⁰²

The regional arrangements outlined in the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942 and the *Planungsgrundlagen* of 1940 supplemented each other into a single entity that created the model for controlling both the annexed Polish territories and the conquered Soviet territories between the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea. The

⁵⁹⁷ *Generalplan Ost*, pp. 92, 98–99.

⁵⁹⁸ The defensive function was directed against Russia and Asia. *Generalplan Ost*, p. 98.

⁵⁹⁹ *Generalplan Ost*, pp. 98–99, 123.

⁶⁰⁰ *Generalplan Ost*, pp. 99, 101.

⁶⁰¹ *Generalplan Ost*, p. 123, Tabelle: Siedlungsbedarf und Aufbaukosten in den Siedlungsgebieten und Stützpunkten im Ostraum (Ohne Polizei und Wehrmacht.)

⁶⁰² *Generalplan Ost*, p. 92.

entity formed by the two plans can be regarded as constituting a carefully planned minimum solution.

The *Generalplan Ost* of 1942 emphasised the need for carefully regulated and limited measures. It was manifested not only in the exact delimitation of the settlement targets but also in the careful planning of the numbers of the inhabitants and the proportions of Germans in the populations. For example, the total population of the annexed Polish territories was now to have 7.2 million persons because there were to be 80 inhabitants to the square kilometre instead of 100, as in earlier plans. It was estimated that the Germanisation of the countryside would require 1.8 million persons, and 2.2 million would be needed for the German urban population.⁶⁰³

The population target of the annexed Polish territories had fallen from 9 million persons to 7.2 million persons, but the size of its German population had risen to at least 5 million persons. Thus, the proportion of Germans out of the total population would rise to 70%. This target would be reached by designating about 2.5 million Poles living in the area as Germans, by importing about 1.5 million Germans from other areas and using the approximately one million Germans who already lived in the area.⁶⁰⁴

The proportion of the German population was planned to be considerably lower in the *Siedlungsmarken* and the *Stützpunkte* than it was to be in the annexed Polish territories. In the *Siedlungsmarken*, the share of the German population would rise to a level of 50%, but in the *Stützpunkte* it would remain at 25%–30%. It was estimated that in order to reach these figures 3,345,805 persons classified as Germans would be required. It was planned to get them mainly from the so-called *Altreich* and from among the *Volksdeutsche* of eastern Europe. Furthermore, it was thought that more inhabitants could be obtained from remigrants and among the Germanic people of western Europe and by Germanising the inhabitants of the eastern territories.⁶⁰⁵

Altogether, the objective of the *Generalplan Ost* was to settle 4,845,000 more or less German persons in the *Siedlungsmarken*, the *Siedlungsstützpunkte* and the annexed Polish territories. This was to happen within 25 years. During the first five-year period, the focus would be on Germanising the countryside to the envisaged level in the *Siedlungsmarken* and the annexed Polish territories. After this, the focus would shift to the towns; the Germanising of the annexed Polish territories was to be completed in ten years and that of the *Siedlungsmarken* in fifteen years. In the *Siedlungsstützpunkte*, the settlement activity would continue for 25 years, although in the last five-year period only a small number of rural inhabitants would be settled.⁶⁰⁶

The new inhabitants of the eastern territories were to be bound to their new domiciles by means of a land-control system. The objective was that the state should control all the real estate that was necessary for the settlement

⁶⁰³ *Generalplan Ost*, pp. 122, 129.

⁶⁰⁴ *Generalplan Ost*, pp. 122–123, 128.

⁶⁰⁵ *Generalplan Ost*, pp. 126–128.

⁶⁰⁶ *Generalplan Ost*, pp. 122, 126.

activity, and that the Reichsführer-SS should represent the state in this matter.⁶⁰⁷ These ideas were a clear extension of proposals that had been presented in 1940, but this time there had been enough time to elaborate them further than before, and in considerable detail.

The settlement of the German population in the countryside was to be carried out so that the German settlers would be furnished with ready farms, which would be given to them in fief. Against their fief the settlers would have to take out a settlement debt (*Siedlungsschuld*), the term of repayment for which would be 33 years. The fief would become the property of the settler either after 20 years of taking it or when half of the settlement debt had been paid. The settlement of towns was planned on approximately the same basis as the settlement of the countryside because the objective was to get permanent inhabitants for the area. It was planned to achieve this for example by favouring owner-occupation and by regulatory economic measures.⁶⁰⁸

It was estimated that the settlement activity would be relatively expensive because it would require a considerable amount of building. The targets of the construction project formed a comprehensive programme which included large-scale civil engineering, the development of traffic and energy networks, the construction works required by industry and the building required in the individual German settlements.⁶⁰⁹ Unlike in 1940, there had been time to make comprehensive plans for the construction activity; the settling of one German would cost 6256 *Reichsmark* (RM). The Germanisation of the annexed Polish territories was estimated to cost about 45.7 billion RM and the Germanisation of the *Siedlungsmarken* and *Siedlungsstützpunkte* 20.9 billion RM.⁶¹⁰

The costs were considered high, and different ways of reducing them were suggested. It was taken as a matter of course that the expenses accruing to the Reich should be lowered by employing initiative in the settlement areas and by using forced labour. On the other hand, it was expected that the *Altreich* would participate in the project by introducing an *Oststeuer*, or *Ostaufbausteuer*, (East (construction) tax), which would be levied on every inhabitant of the country. In addition to these means, every *Gau* would have to “godparent” an area in the east.⁶¹¹

The *Generalplan Ost* of 1942 was a natural extension of the earlier plans of the SS. The only significant difference was the fact that the destiny of the non-German populations of the target areas was not expressed as explicitly as in the 1940 plan. However, there are several references of the fate of the non-Germans, and both deportations and selections are mentioned.⁶¹² The final result and the

⁶⁰⁷ *Generalplan Ost*, p. 93.

⁶⁰⁸ *Generalplan Ost*, pp. 94–95, 97–98.

⁶⁰⁹ *Generalplan Ost*, Tabelle: Gliederung der Aufbaukosten für die eingegliederten Ostgebiete.

⁶¹⁰ *Generalplan Ost*, pp. 121, 129. It is possible to compare the costs of the *Generalplan Ost* for example with costs of rearmament policy of the Third Reich. According to Aly, costs of the rearmament policy were in 1933–1939 about 45 billion RM. Aly 2005, pp. 52–53.

⁶¹¹ *Generalplan Ost*, pp. 101, 103, 110, 114, 118.

⁶¹² The matter was indicated thus:

methods used would probably not have been any better than in the earlier model.⁶¹³

Even though the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942 offered a large number of carefully planned solutions, it did not present a real defensive system. The area between the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea could not have been controlled with three *Siedlungsmarken* and a network of *Siedlungsstützpunkte*. It is possible that the RKF planners were familiar with the plan of the WVHA to establish its own bases and ignored its target areas. The base program of the WVHA has been studied, and it is known that bases were to be comprehensively established in all towns that were important for the control of the eastern territories. The bases had been divided into three main categories, and for example first-class bases were to be established in the major centres of the German civil administration.⁶¹⁴

It is possible to compare the military bases mentioned in the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942 with the plan of the WVHA and to use the area of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine as an example: the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942 planned the establishment of eight bases but the plans of WVHA proposed five first-class bases, 12 second-class and just under 30 third-class bases. Except for one, the base program of the WVHA covered all the bases proposed by the RKF planners.⁶¹⁵

In comparing the base program of the WVHA and that of the RKF Stabshauptamt, it is noteworthy that the RKF planners emphasised the needs of the German settlers,⁶¹⁶ while the plans of the WVHA focused on the facilities of the SS and the police.⁶¹⁷ A closer examination clearly shows that the plans of the WVHA and of the RKF Stabshauptamt were quite dissimilar. It is possible to regard the WVHA plan as a project for the near future because its objective was to take care of the rapid placement of the representatives of the SS in areas that had been transferred to a civil administration. The plans of the RKF

Da auf die Mitarbeit der in den Gebieten jetzt bodenständigen Bevölkerung nicht verzichtet werden kann, muss die zu schaffende Völkerordnung im Ostraum auf eine Befriedung der dortigen Einwohner abzielen. Diese Befriedung wird dadurch erreicht, dass die nötige Bereitstellung von Siedlungsland für die Ansetzung deutscher Menschen nicht wie bisher durch Evakuierungen, sonder durch Umsetzung der bisherigen Bewohner auf anderes Kolchose- und Sowchoseland mit gleichzeitiger Verleihung von Bodenbesitzrecht erfolgt. Diese Umsetzung muss gebunden sein an eine sinnvolle Auslese nach dem Leistungsprinzip und mit einem sozialen Aufstieg der positiven Kräfte des Fremden Volkstums Hand in Hand gehen.

Generalplan Ost, pp. 128–129.

⁶¹³ The *Generalplan Ost* and the evacuations related to it have inspired researchers to speculate about what the fate of the original populations of the target areas of the plan would have been. The researchers have concluded that the implementation of the plans would have led to large-scale genocide. For a broader treatment of this subject, see Aly & Heim 2004 and Eichholz 1993.

⁶¹⁴ Schulte 2001, pp. 299–300.

⁶¹⁵ The simplest way of comparing the plans is to use the following maps: Roth 1993, Abb. 8, p. 66 and Schulte 2001: Geplante SS- und Polizeistützpunkte in Osteuropa 1941/42.

⁶¹⁶ *Generalplan Ost*, Siedlungsbedarf und Aufbaukosten in den Stützpunkten in den Siedlungsgebieten und im Ostraum (Ohne Polizei und Wehrmacht).

⁶¹⁷ Schulte 2001, pp. 300–308.

Stabshauptamt aimed at a more distant future. Taken together, it is possible to construct out of the plans of the WVHA and the RKF Stabshauptamt a combined project that would have begun with the establishment of SS and police bases and continued with the founding of German settlements.

Himmler was not satisfied with the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942 as such and required that it be developed into a total settlement plan (*Gesamtsiedlungsplan*) that would cover not only the eastern territories but also Bohemia and Moravia, Alsace and Lorraine, and Upper Krain and Southern Styria. Furthermore, Himmler wanted the settlement activity to be expanded considerably in the east as well because he wished to Germanise Estonia, Latvia and the Generalgouvernement totally within 20 years.⁶¹⁸

Himmler's demands were most probably inspired by the RSHA plans for the east, which were broader and more radical than Meyer's. It has been estimated that the RKF Stabshauptamt had been instructed to develop its plans along lines that had been defined in the RSHA.⁶¹⁹ Himmler's demands reflected the differences between the views of the experts of the RKF Stabshauptamt, who were responsible for overall planning, and those of the leading National Socialist, who was responsible for general ideological policy. On the other hand, both parties were also certainly influenced by current situation: the summer campaign of the Wehrmacht in the southern sector of the eastern front was about to be launched, and there were fairly general hopes of a swift victory.

The RKF planners started to revise their plans in accordance with Himmler's wishes and result was a considerable amount of material from which it would be possible to compile a *Gesamtsiedlungsplan*.⁶²⁰ The Director of the RKF Stabshauptamt sent the new material to Himmler on 23/12/1942. It was compiled by Konrad Meyer, and it was entitled *Zusammenstellung von Grundzahlen und Karten als Unterlage für einen Generalsiedlungsplan* (A Collection of Basic Figures and Maps as the Basis of a General Settlement Plan).⁶²¹ The new plan was known internally within the RKF Stabshauptamt as the *Generalsiedlungsplan* (General Settlement Plan). The target areas of the *Generalsiedlungsplan* were divided into three sections. They were the *Siedlungsgebiete im Volksraum* (the Settlement Areas in the Ethnic Space), the *Ostsiedlungsraum* (the Eastern Settlement Space) and the *Baltischer Raum* (the

⁶¹⁸ Schreiben des Reichsführers SS an Ulrich Greifelt mit Bemerkungen zum „Generalplan Ost. Rechtliche, Wirtschaftliche und räumliche Grundlagen des Ostaufbaus“, mit der Aufforderung, einen *Gesamtsiedlungsplan* vorzubereiten. 1942, 12. Juni, Führerhauptquartier. Dokument Nr. 27. *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*.

⁶¹⁹ Roth 1993, pp. 41–42.

⁶²⁰ Some material collected for the *Gesamtsiedlungsplan* has been published in *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan* as document number 71 under the heading: *Material zum Generalsiedlungsplan - Flächen und Bevölkerungsberechnungen, Unterlagen für einen Generalsiedlungsplan - Grundzahlen und Karten*. 1942, Dezember, Berlin. Not all the material has been preserved so the source is not complete, but the plan can still be examined as a whole because the missing documents are not so significant.

⁶²¹ Begleitschreiben von Ulrich Greifelt an den Reichsführer SS zur *Zusammenstellung von Material und Unterlagen für einen Generalsiedlungsplan*. 1942, 23. Dezember, Berlin. Dokument Nr. 70. *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*.

Baltic Space). The *Siedlungsgebiete im Volksraum* consisted of the following areas: Luxemburg, Lorraine, Alsace, Upper Krain, Lower Styria, Bohemia and Moravia and the annexed Polish territories apart from for the areas of Lodz and Zichenau, which had been defined as a part of the *Ostsiedlungsraum* along with the areas of Lublin, Cracow, Lvov, Warsaw and Bialystok.⁶²²

The plans for the eastern territories were totally revised. First of all, the old administrative structures were dropped and a regional organisation that would serve a future division into *Gaue* was proposed. It would affect the annexed Polish territories, the Generalgouvernement and the area of Bialystok,⁶²³ which was under the authority of Erich Koch, the Gauleiter of Eastern Prussia and the Reichskommissar of the Ukraine.⁶²⁴ The Baltic Space, on the other hand, was not part of the eastern territories, and they were to be Germanised as an independent entity.⁶²⁵

Compared to the schemes that were proposed for the eastern territories, there was nothing special in the plans for the southern and western areas: in practice, they had already been annexed into Germany, and they had more or less German populations, or they may even have belonged to Germany earlier. According to National Socialist thinking, it was self-evident that they should made a part of the Third Reich. The same ideas also applied to the areas of Bohemia and Moravia, which would form a separate Slavic enclave in the middle of areas populated by Germans.

The expansion of the target areas led to demographic proposals involving far greater numbers of people than before. The general goal was to obtain altogether 28 million inhabitants who were classified as Germans for the settlement targets within 30 years. About 13 million of them were to be located in the *Volksraum*, 10 million in the *Ostsiedlungsraum* and 5 million in the *Baltischer Raum*.⁶²⁶ The Germanisation would require the transfer of 15.5 million German persons to the areas in question. However, the plan only provided for the acquisition of 12 million German settlers, because the Germans required for the *Baltischer Raum* were not included in that figure.⁶²⁷

Plans were made to acquire settlers within 30 years from the following sources:

The "Altreich"	10,910,000	persons
"Germanic countries"	1,100,000	persons
<u>Remigrants</u>	<u>200,000</u>	<u>persons</u>

⁶²² *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Tabelle I: Raum und Bestand; Anmerkung zu Karte 2.

⁶²³ *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Anmerkung zu Karte 2, p. 252.

⁶²⁴ Umbreit 1988, p. 86 map: Ablösung der Militär durch die Zivilverwaltung in ihrer zeitlichen Abfolge.

⁶²⁵ For the Baltic States the plan seems to have been based at least partly on earlier schemes; for example, the list of towns planned for Germanisation was partly the same as in the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942. *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Anmerkungen zur Tabelle I; *Generalplan Ost*, Tabelle: Siedlungsbedarf und Aufbaukosten in den Siedlungsgebieten und Stützpunkten im Ostraum (Ohne Polizei und Wehrmacht)

⁶²⁶ *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Anmerkungen zu Karte 2; Tabelle II: Erstrebte Bevölkerungszahl und Siedlerbedarf.

⁶²⁷ *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Tabelle V: Die Menschenbilanz.

Total 12,210,000 persons ⁶²⁸

The plans for the acquisition of inhabitants from outside the target areas were rather similar to the estimates presented in the earlier plans. However, considerably more attention was paid than before to the population to be obtained from the so-called *Altreich*. For example, its evacuation and placement areas were specified much more carefully than before.⁶²⁹ This indicates that the "godparenting" activity projected in earlier plans were also part of this plan.

The total cost of the construction required for carrying out the *Generalsiedlungsplan* was estimated to be 150 billion RM, without taking into account the measures affecting the *Baltischer Raum*. It was planned to invest 52 billion RM in the *Volksraum* and 98 billion in the *Ostsiedlungsraum*.⁶³⁰ The cost of one German inhabitant would be about 6520 RM, which is fairly similar to the figure presented in the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942. It was planned that the construction would be carefully regulated and an order of priority was specified, in which supplies and traffic communications together with civil engineering were given pride of place.⁶³¹

The expansion of the target areas and the rise in costs caused by it were not the only significant changes in the plans because the designs for Germanisation were considerably more radical than in the earlier plans. The area defined as the *Volksraum* was to be Germanised totally within 20 years. The *Ostsiedlungsraum* was to be Germanised totally within 30 years except for the areas of Warsaw and Bialystok, and even there the proportion of the German population was to reach a level of at least 80–95%.⁶³² There are no available figures for the *Baltischer Raum*, but it is more or less evident that total Germanisation was the target in that area too.⁶³³

The Germanisation project would have involved extremely large deportations because the number of the original inhabitants of the target areas totalled 43 million persons,⁶³⁴ and fewer than 13 million of them had been designated as German or suitable for Germanisation. Therefore at least 30 million persons would have to be expelled from the target areas. The proportions of those who were to be expelled can be estimated from the share of those whom it was planned to Germanise. Of the French, the Slovenes, the Czechs and the Estonians about 50% would be Germanised. For the Latvians, the share was 30%, for the Lithuanians 15% and for the Poles 5%.⁶³⁵ The new

⁶²⁸ *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Tabelle IV: Zahl der Vorhandenen Siedler (Siedlerreserve).

⁶²⁹ *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Tabelle VI: Die landmannschaftliche Gliederung der ländlichen Siedlerbilanz.

⁶³⁰ *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Faust- und Vergleichszahlen zu den Tabellen des *Generalsiedlungsplans*.

⁶³¹ *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Anmerkungen zur Tabelle VIII B.

⁶³² *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Anmerkungen zur Tabelle VII.

⁶³³ The area of the Baltic States was omitted from the population calculations.

Generalsiedlungsplan, Tabelle V: Die Menschenbilanz.

⁶³⁴ *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Tabelle V: Die Menschenbilanz.

⁶³⁵ *Generalsiedlungsplan*, Anmerkungen zur Tabelle II.

figures of the RKF Stabshauptamt thus correspond roughly with those earlier proposed by the RSHA.

The *Generalsiedlungsplan* was manifold plan. Above all, it was the experts' answer to the ideologists' insatiable needs, which led to the significant extension of the target areas. On the other hand, in spite of its scope it was a kind of minimal plan: the target areas were not to grow unreasonably large, and for example the Germanisation of the Crimea was not dealt with at all, nor was the idea of a uniform German-settled area reaching to the Urals. The third significant point about the plan was the fact that the target areas were to be Germanised almost totally within 20–30 years. This deviated considerably from the earlier plans, in which the proportion of Germans was usually planned to be about a half of the total population.

The solutions proposed in the *Generalsiedlungsplan* were clearly influenced by the ideas that had been proposed in the plans for the east of the RSHA, and the *Generalsiedlungsplan* can be considered the response of the RKF Stabshauptamt to the challenge presented by the RSHA. It seems that the planners of the RKF Stabshauptamt were no longer especially interested in the feasibility of the plans but had simply started to produce plans that would be agreeable to the Reichsführer-SS.

It has been estimated in an earlier study that Office III of the RSHA had come to be the major co-ordinator of all the eastern plans of the SS by April and May 1942, and that it continued to hold sway until the late summer of 1943.⁶³⁶ The position of the RSHA can be seen for example in the division of tasks drawn up by the RKF Stabshauptamt in summer 1942 concerning the further development of the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942. The tasks of the SD included in practice all questions related to the non-German groups, including deportations.⁶³⁷

It is possible to consider the *Generalsiedlungsplan* as the culmination of the planning activity of the SS. However, it is worth noting that the planners' proposals did not reach the level of detail that was typical particularly of the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942. This can be explained by the fact that individual plans concerning the different areas had already been drawn up.⁶³⁸ On the other hand, the *Generalsiedlungsplan* did not propose any exceptional solutions, such as the establishment of military bases or special settlement districts. And, unlike the previous plans, it did not emphasise security questions or the importance of the settlement of the countryside.

The development of these plans reflects the fact that the SS expanded its aims for the future. In the beginning, the idea was to Germanise individual areas. Then the goals broadened, and the focus was on the eastern territories until finally there was a comprehensive plan involving all ideologically important areas controlled by National Socialist Germany. The division of

⁶³⁶ Roth 1993, p. 42.

⁶³⁷ Aufstellung zur Aufgabenverteilung bei der Weiterbearbeitung des Generalplans Ost. 1942, 28. Juli, Berlin. Dokument Nr. 37. *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*.

⁶³⁸ There are general references to these plans in the *Generalsiedlungsplan*.

responsibility was a typical characteristic of the planning, and the tasks were divided between the RKF Stabshauptamt and the RSHA: the RSHA was responsible for the main lines of the population policy, and the planners of the RKF Stabshauptamt strove to outline the overall goal. The role of the other SS main offices was mainly auxiliary because the plans of the WVHA and Ordnungspolizei aimed to control the area, not at its Germanisation.

From the point of view of the Generalgouvernement, the plans of the SS for the east developed in a fairly straightforward way after the onset of the Eastern Campaign. The basic objective was the Germanisation of the area, but in the plans of the RKF Stabshauptamt, for example, this goal was to be reached only after several intermediate stages. First the plan was to Germanise the eastern border of the Generalgouvernement, next came a scheme for a network of military bases and only at the third stage was the Germanisation of the whole Generalgouvernement clearly envisaged. While the plans of the SS clearly show that the National Socialists' final objective was the Germanising of the Generalgouvernement, and proposals regarding the chronological duration of the Germanisation process were also presented, there were no clear detailed plans for implementing it. This opened up an opportunity for an unscrupulous agent with plenty of initiative like Odilo Globocnik to act independently.

4.4 The organisation of the SS for the Germanisation project in Distrikt Lublin

The Germanising project of the SS in Distrikt Lublin began with the Eastern Campaign. It was above all a project of SS und Polizeiführer Odilo Globocnik, but the Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler also had a strong influence on it. It began with Himmler's and Globocnik's meeting in Lublin on 20/7/1941.⁶³⁹ In a memorandum concerning the meeting it appears that the objective was to establish a large settlement area for Germanic people around the town of Zamosc and to recruit the Germanic inhabitants of the area from the Generalgouvernement.⁶⁴⁰

According to the information of the administration of the Generalgouvernement, the town of Zamosc was founded in 1580, and in 1940 it had 24,300 inhabitants including 7000 Jews.⁶⁴¹ In 1942 the Kreis Zamosc had about 255,000 inhabitants. The majority of the population were Polish, but the total population also included about 40,000 Ukrainians and about 16,000 Jews. Although the proportion of the German population was very low compared with the other peoples, the National Socialist administration was above all

⁶³⁹ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 20/7/1941, p. 186.

⁶⁴⁰ Reichsführer-SS: Vermerk 21/7/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik; available in print: Dokument 3. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*. The surroundings of Zamosc are described in Appendix 6.

⁶⁴¹ *Das Deutsche Generalgouvernement Polen*, p. 175.

interested in the Germans, and their significance in the history of the town was emphasised.⁶⁴²

Several factors explain why the plans just focused on the surroundings of the town of Zamosc: some people of German descent already lived in the area,⁶⁴³ the soil of the area was fertile, the town of Zamosc was known for its renaissance architecture and it was situated along the routes to east.⁶⁴⁴ The Germanising project also indicates that the SS was clearly of the opinion that the Germanising process should already be initiated in the eastern areas other than the already annexed Polish territories while the hostilities were still continuing. The administration of the Generalgouvernement was less unanimous in its views about how and when the Germanisation was to start, but for the SS these questions were much clearer, and it also had at its disposal the resources required to carry out the process, at least in principle.

The idea Germanising the area of Zamosc did not emerge unexpectedly in summer 1941 because in early 1941 Globocnik had already sent Himmler a memorandum dealing with the subject. At that time, the idea was, according to Globocnik's description of the project, "*Rückgewinnung polonisierten, ehem. deutsch-pfälzischer Siedlungen im Kreise Zamosc*" (the return of the Polonised German-Palatinate population living in Kreis Zamosc). Himmler became interested in the project, and it is known that he wanted to discuss it during his visit to Lublin in summer 1941.⁶⁴⁵

The properties of the area of Zamosc made it an interesting target for Germanisation, and Globocnik's project had already proceeded fairly far in summer 1941, various preliminary operations having been implemented ever since autumn 1940. The preparation was divided into two main lines between autumn 1940 and summer 1941: the establishment of local SS and police bases and the setting up of a planning organisation for the deportation and settlement activities. A third, and at this stage minor, operational focus was the surveying of the local population to find persons of German descent. It is known that Himmler and Globocnik had already agreed about this in October 1940.⁶⁴⁶

There is information available from September 1940 about the project for the establishment of SS and police bases,⁶⁴⁷ and according to Globocnik's personal documents, Himmler had already authorised him to establish such bases in November 1940. Globocnik had started the operation, and he had also been able to obtain from Sturmbannführer Georg Claus of the local civil administration control of six estates which had been designated to provide sites for SS and police bases on 1.3.1941. They were generally about 450–600 hectares

⁶⁴² *Das Generalgouvernement*, p. 323.

⁶⁴³ The population of German descent had moved to the area from Palatinate, Lorraine and Alsace towards end of the 18th century. It was not a question of a large number of people because apparently only 151 families containing 732 persons had come to the area. Wasser 1993B, pp. 67, 115.

⁶⁴⁴ Madajczyk 1987, p. 12. Cf. Wasser 1993B, pp. 67–68.

⁶⁴⁵ Brandt: Aktennotiz für SS-Hauptsturmführer Peiper. 24/6/1941. BA SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁴⁶ Pohl 2004, p. 91.

⁶⁴⁷ Brandt - Greifelt 10/9/1940. BArch NS 19 / 183.

in size, but because two of them were larger, their estimated total area amounted to about 9000 hectares.⁶⁴⁸

The setting-up of the SS planning organisation in Lublin began in autumn 1940, when Himmler is known to have given Globocnik permission for the establishment of an *SS-Mannschaftshaus* (SS Crew Home). Out of this there later developed an organ called *Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte* (the Research Institute for Eastern Accommodation), whose task was to draw up the plans that were important for the deportation and settlement project. It was natural that such an organ should have developed out of the *SS-Mannschaftshaus* because the *SS-Mannschaftshäuser* had been established back in the 1930s to collect the student members of the SS under a common umbrella organisation.⁶⁴⁹

Globocnik obtained for the *SS-Mannschaftshaus* project the services of a young SS officer called Untersturmführer Gustav Hanelt.⁶⁵⁰ He had already directed - according to his own claim - an *SS-Mannschaftshaus* in Jena and established one in Königsberg.⁶⁵¹ Hanelt's background was rather unusual because he had tried to study anthropology and history, among other things. Later on, he had succeeded in gaining admission to read law at the University of Berlin,⁶⁵² and he may possibly have graduated later.⁶⁵³ Hanelt was clearly a good choice for Globocnik because he acted energetically in the project for establishing SS and police bases, became the Director of the *SS-Mannschaftshaus Lublin* and also carried out other special duties assigned to him by Globocnik.⁶⁵⁴

The Germanisation project seems to have proceeded slowly during the winter of 1940-1941. This is understandable because the main attention of the authorities was fixed on the coming Eastern Campaign. At that time, a proposal for transferring Globocnik away from Lublin also came up. According to Himmler's office calendar, the idea was to appoint him as SSPF in Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg).⁶⁵⁵ The transferral of Globocnik is also mentioned in Krüger's letter to Himmler in April 1941. Krüger reacted to the matter with reservation and hoped that Globocnik could remain in Lublin.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁴⁸ Bericht: Aufbau der SS- und Polizeistützpunkten. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik. It is possible to date the document with the help of its covering letter to May 1941, and Himmler checked it as read on 18/7/1941. Globocnik: SS- und Polizeistützpunkte. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁴⁹ Heinemann 2003, pp. 92-93, 381-382.

⁶⁵⁰ Globocnik: Anlage / Beförderungsvorschlag. 20/12/1941. BArch SSFPA Gustav Hanelt.

⁶⁵¹ Gustav Hanelt: Lebenslauf. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Gustav Hanelt.

⁶⁵² Gustav Hanelt: Lebenslauf. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Gustav Hanelt.

⁶⁵³ Beförderungsvorschlag. 6/1/1941. BArch SSFPA Gustav Hanelt; Globocnik: Personal-Bericht. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Gustav Hanelt.

⁶⁵⁴ Globocnik: Anlage / Beförderungsvorschlag. 20/12/1941. BArch SSFPA Gustav Hanelt.

⁶⁵⁵ *Dienstkalendar Heinrich Himmlers*. 10/3/1941, p. 129 reference 32.

⁶⁵⁶ Krüger stated the matter thus: "Ein Wechsel der Person als SS- und Polizeiführer in Lublin ist m.E. nur möglich, wenn der Nachfolger einmal ideenmäßig die Größe dieser uns gestellten Aufgaben erfährt, zum anderen aber auch die ausgesprochene Härte besitzt, um mit Erfolg die von SS-Brigadeführer Globocnik mit größten Verständnis eingeleiteten Aufgaben weiterzuführen." Krüger - Himmler 2/4/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

Krüger's view was also influenced by the fact that Globocnik served as the Distriktstandortführer of the NSDAP in Distrikt Lublin, which was advantageous for the SS. Krüger also thought that there was no other SS- und Polizeiführer already operating in the Generalgouvernement who could replace Globocnik.⁶⁵⁷ Himmler promised to return to the matter later,⁶⁵⁸ but Globocnik was not transferred from the post of SSPF im Distrikt Lublin.

It was natural that the Germanisation project should be taken up again after the successful beginning of the Eastern Campaign, and this indeed happened on 20/7/1941. The leading National Socialists were certain of victory and had already solved those questions that in their opinion were related to the control of the conquered Soviet territories.⁶⁵⁹ Because of this, it was possible for the leaders of the SS to give their attention again to an individual SSPF and his projects. The main focus was not in any case on the deportation and settlement activity, which remained for a long time in the shade of Globocnik's new task, which he received on 17/7/1941, to establish SS and police bases in the newly conquered eastern territories.⁶⁶⁰

The moderate significance of the Zamosc Germanisation project is indicated by the fact that Oswald Pohl and probably also Hans Kammler were present at Himmler's and Globocnik's meeting on 20/7/1941.⁶⁶¹ The participation of Pohl and his representative in the meeting suggests that the purpose of the meeting was above all to deal with Globocnik's task of establishing SS and police bases in the east.⁶⁶² This supposition is supported by two memoranda belonging to Globocnik's personal documents. From them a clear picture of the nature of the meeting emerges because the first memorandum concerns Globocnik's assignment and the other Pohl's duties.⁶⁶³ Compared with the other projects, the Germanisation of Zamosc received but little attention, and it was briefly dealt with in the memorandum concerning Globocnik's assignments.⁶⁶⁴

The minor attention received by the Germanising project is explained by the fact that the major interest was focused on the town of Lublin. It was to be developed into an important centre for the activities of the SS, and a special SS district of 60,000 inhabitants was to be built there.⁶⁶⁵ Lublin and Zamosc were also treated differently in other plans. For example in the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942, the size of the planned German population of Lublin was 29,000 persons

⁶⁵⁷ Krüger - Himmler. 2/4/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁵⁸ Himmler - Krüger. 19/4/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁵⁹ For example. Schulte 2001 pp. 260-262.

⁶⁶⁰ Himmler - Globocnik. 17/7/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁶¹ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 20/7/1941, p. 186.

⁶⁶² *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 17/7/1941, p. 185; Himmler - Globocnik. 17/7/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁶³ Reichsführer-SS: Vermerk. 21/7/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁶⁴ The memorandum referred to the matter thus: "11. Die Aktion 'Fahndung nach deutschem Blut' wird für das gesamte Generalgouvernement erweitert und ein Großsiedlungsgebiet in den deutschen Kolonien bei Zamosc geschaffen..." Reichsführer-SS: Vermerk. 1/7/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁶⁵ Kaienburg 2003, p. 531.

and that of Zamosc was only 6300.⁶⁶⁶ Here, it should also be noted that the size of the towns was different.

Lublin was to be a major eastern SS base, and consequently various support institutions were to be established there. The most significant of them was to be a concentration camp of 25,000–50,000 prisoners, who were to serve the SS in the construction industry. Other institutions to be established included various production units for the manufacture of consumer goods. Furthermore, some farms were to be placed under the control of the SS to provide for its maintenance.⁶⁶⁷ Although Himmler's main attention was focused on the town of Lublin, the base project and the economic measures, the attention received by the town of Zamosc and the area surrounding it should not be underrated. Particularly the town itself was to be developed, and an apartment was to be furnished for the use of the Reichsführer-SS and his guests there.⁶⁶⁸

The SS did not delay in initiating Himmler's plans, but the project was so large that it would not have been possible to carry out it rapidly or with the powers of an individual SS- und Polizeiführer. Therefore, the SS main offices for different fields extended their activities to Lublin. The most important of these was the Hauptamt Haushalt und Bauten, which established an organ called *Zentrale Bauinspektion der Waffen-SS und Polizei für den Ostraum und das Generalgouvernement in Lublin* (the Central Construction Inspectorate of the Waffen-SS and the Police for the Eastern Territories and the Generalgouvernement).⁶⁶⁹ It was one of five organs dealing with construction that were established in the Generalgouvernement.⁶⁷⁰

The Zentrale Bauinspektion of Lublin was later called the *Zentralbauleitung der Waffen SS und Polizei Lublin* (the Central Construction Administration of the Waffen-SS and the Police in Lublin), and it also had offices in Zamosc and Cholm (Chełm).⁶⁷¹ With a strength of only 22 persons in August 1941, the Zentralbauleitung was not a very large institution despite its grandiloquent name. The organisation was first headed by Unterscharführer Hautz. He is designated in the documents as both "building contractor" and "architect".⁶⁷² By February 1942, however, the organisation seems to have grown, and its activities already affected about ten targets in the Lublin area.⁶⁷³

The SS-Bauwesen also established a concentration camp in Lublin in accordance with the plans. It was first designated as a prisoner-of-war camp (*Kriegsgefangenenlager*).⁶⁷⁴ The title of concentration camp (*Konzentrationslager*)

⁶⁶⁶ *Generalplan Ost*, Siedlungsbedarf und Aufbaukosten in den Siedlungsgebieten und Stützpunkten im Ostraum (Ohne Polizei und Wehrmacht).

⁶⁶⁷ Kaienburg 2003, p. 530–532.

⁶⁶⁸ Reichsführer-SS: Vermerk. 21/7/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁶⁹ Schulte 2001, p. 273.

⁶⁷⁰ Übersichtsplan der Bauinspektionen und Zentralbauleitungen der Waffen SS und Polizei. 4/11/1941. Amt II Bauten / Hauptamt Haushalt und Bauten. APL 516 / 0 / 2.

⁶⁷¹ Bauinspektion der Waffen SS und Polizei Generalgouvernement. APL 516 / 0 / 2.

⁶⁷² Liste der Angehörige der Zentralbauleitung. 9/8/1941. APL 516 / 0 / 4.

⁶⁷³ Aktenplan der Zentralbauleitung der Waffen-SS u. Polizei Lublin. 12/2/1942. APL 516 / 0 / 6.

⁶⁷⁴ Kaienburg 2003, pp 533–536.

was introduced only in spring 1942. The project was initially described as the establishment of a prisoner-of-war camp because that name made it easier to deal with in discussions with the civil authorities.⁶⁷⁵ The camp in question was also known by the name Majdanek,⁶⁷⁶ and it was in fact a multi-purpose camp. It served as a transit camp, a prison for deported Poles and a hospital for Soviet prisoners-of-war, but it was also an extermination camp, a forced labour camp and a labour reservation.⁶⁷⁷

The concentration camp was not the only institution that represented the economic operations of the SS in Lublin; there was a whole group of other SS production plants operating in the area. The largest of them was the *Bekleidungswerke der Waffen-SS, Aussenstelle Lublin*, established in summer 1941 to provide clothing supplies.⁶⁷⁸

In addition to the Pohl's organisation, the Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt also extended its activities in Distrikt Lublin. This activation was prompted by the observations of the Director of the RuSHA, Otto Hofmann,⁶⁷⁹ made in the course of his tour of the Generalgouvernement in the autumn of 1941. He decided that the RuSHA should establish offices in the east in connection with the functions of the HSSPF. Hofmann also thought that representatives of the RuSHA would be of use in Lublin because of the SS and police base project.⁶⁸⁰

The RuSHA posted Obersturmbannführer Heinrich Thole as its representative in Lublin in autumn 1941. At first he was appointed only to Distrikt Lublin, but in early 1942 his territory was enlarged to cover the whole of the Generalgouvernement, and the post was transferred from Lublin to Cracow. Thole was replaced in Lublin by Sturmbannführer Diehl. The tasks of the representatives of the RuSHA were connected with the Germanisation project because they involved a study of the demographic conditions of the area and the preparation of future measures in cooperation with Globocnik's staff.⁶⁸¹

The intensification in the activities of the SS were also reflected in Globocnik's organisation, which was divided into five main sections in August 1941.⁶⁸² The first comprised the basic functions of the SSPF. It was headed by Chief-of-Staff Obersturmbannführer Josef, "Sepp", Nemeč. The second section, headed by Sturmbannführer Hans Maubach was responsible for the establishment of the SS and police bases. The tasks of the third and fourth sections, under Hauptgefolgschaftsführer Lothar von Seltmann and

⁶⁷⁵ Kranz 1998, pp. 238, 366–367.

⁶⁷⁶ The name "Majdanek" was adopted only after the Second World War. Madajczyk 1987, p. 328.

⁶⁷⁷ Kranz 2004, pp. 237–238, 241–245.

⁶⁷⁸ Kaienburg 2003, pp. 540–548.

⁶⁷⁹ Otto Hofmann had replaced Günther Pancke in summer 1940 as Director of RuSHA. Heinemann 2003, p. 684.

⁶⁸⁰ Hofmann - Verwaltungsamt im Hause. 4/10/1941. BArch NS 2 / 116.

⁶⁸¹ Heinemann 2003, pp. 386–390.

⁶⁸² Michael Esch has published a number of documents of Globocnik's planning organisation in his article "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin" in 1996. Esch does not indicate in which archive the documents are located. Jan-Erich Schulte has ascertained that the documents are in the AGK archive in Warsaw. Schulte 2001, p. 265 reference 101.

Obersturmführer Gustav Hanelt respectively, comprised the Germanisation process. The functions of the fifth section consisted of tasks connected with Globocnik's position as the Distriktstandortführer der NSDAP, and the Chief-of-Staff Nemeč was also responsible for that field of activity.⁶⁸³

The division of duties between the third and fourth sections was as follows: The tasks of the third section included the realisation of the Germanisation process in practice. The fourth section for its part was responsible for planning and scientific work with the help of the SS-Mannschaftshaus Lublin, and its duties included the drafting of plans related both to the SS and police base project and to the extermination of the Jews.⁶⁸⁴

The division of the functions connected with the Germanisation process between two sections is indicative of a situation in which there was as yet no single dedicated organ or person responsible for the project. The fact that those persons who were responsible for the Germanisation project in 1942 and 1943 are not mentioned by name in 1941 also points to that kind of situation. The second significant feature is the combination of the extermination of the Jews and the Germanisation process under the same planning organisation. The National Socialists obviously considered them to be measures that were naturally interconnected.

The shaping of the organisation reflects the fact that Globocnik had become an agent of the RKF in Distrikt Lublin. His authorisation to act as a Representative of the RKF was probably verbal because in the minutes of summer 1941 and in other documents up to the end of 1942 there is no mention of Globocnik being appointed a representative of the RKF. This deviated from the usual practice because the appointment of RKF representatives in 1939, for example, was confirmed in writing.⁶⁸⁵ Nor does Globocnik's authorisation does not appear in a list of RKF representatives dated 2/7/1941,⁶⁸⁶ although a Representative of the RKF in Lublin is mentioned in an RKF document which can be dated at the earliest to 1941.⁶⁸⁷

One can deduce Globocnik's RKF authorisation from the headings of the documents produced by his organisation in 1943,⁶⁸⁸ although they indicate

⁶⁸³ Aktennotiz Hanelts über eine Stabsbesprechung am 6. August 1941 über die erweiterten Aufgaben der Dienststelle und des Forschungsinstituts. Dokument 1. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁶⁸⁴ Aktennotiz Hanelts über eine Stabsbesprechung am 6. August 1941 über die erweiterten Aufgaben der Dienststelle und des Forschungsinstituts. Dokument 1. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁶⁸⁵ Anordnung Nr. 13/I 19/12/1939. RKF-Stabshauptamt: Zusammenstellung der bis 31. Anordnungen, Anordnungen, Dienstanordnungen of Dezember 1942 erschienenen Allgemeine, Rundschreiben. 18/6/1943. BArch R 49 / 3.

⁶⁸⁶ Dienstanordnung Nr. 60. 2/7/1941. BArch R 49 / 8.

⁶⁸⁷ Beauftragter des Reichskommissars f.d.F.dt.V. Not dated. BArch R 49 / 9. The document can be dated at the earliest to 1941 because the EWZ offices in Lodz, Berlin and Paris are mentioned in it. Leniger 2006, p. 230.

⁶⁸⁸ Such documents include Globocnik's orders to the local RKF organ from January to May 1943. They are Anweisung No. 2, Anweisung No. 3, Anweisung No. 5, Dienstanweisung No. 6, Dienstanweisung No. 7 and Dienstanweisung No. 8. Globocnik used title Der SS- und Polizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des Reichskommissars für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums in these documents.

above all the state of affairs in Distrikt Lublin rather than the official nature of his authority. The question of Globocnik's RKF authority is important because without it he could not have proceeded with the Germanisation project within the SS organisation. On the other hand, a recorded authorisation would have received publicity,⁶⁸⁹ and the authorities of the Generalgouvernement would have obtained a clear confirmation of the fact that Distrikt Lublin was one of the areas to be Germanised and that the local representatives of the SS were not acting only on their own initiative.

A formal and visible RKF authorisation would have confused the structure of the SS organisation in the Generalgouvernement because HSSPF Krüger had been appointed as a Representative of the RKF as early as 1939. Globocnik's appointment would have abolished Krüger's formally superior position and placed an individual SSPF in a visibly special position. This would be possibly have been detrimental both to the internal unity of the organisation and to its image.

It is therefore possible to explain the lack of a clearly recorded authorisation by the fact that the SS did not want to publicise its Lublin projects. Thus the authorisation most probably remained a matter between Globocnik and Himmler, and only Globocnik's duties were recorded for the internal use of the SS. This is not surprising when one takes into consideration the tense relations between the SS and the administration of the Generalgouvernement.

Globocnik considered his RKF authority sufficient and began preparing the actual commencement of the Germanisation project in autumn 1941. There is information about the progress of the project because a representative of the Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt named Hauptsturmführer Helmut Müller sent a report about it to the Director of the RuSHA.⁶⁹⁰ The latter was apparently interested in Globocnik's projects and went to Lublin and probably visited the local SS and police bases.⁶⁹¹

Müller's report describes the modes of operation of the SS: an officer of field rank had been appointed as the representative of the RuSHA in Distrikt Lublin but an officer who operated at considerably lower level in the organisation was in direct contact with the Director of the RuSHA. However, Müller was something of a Jack of all trades because his duty in 1941 was to carry out land surveying under the SSPF,⁶⁹² although later he also represented the RuSHA in Distrikt Lublin in other capacities.⁶⁹³

BArch R 49 / 3533. These documents are also *available* in print: Dokument 115, Dokument 116 ja Dokument 117. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*. Dokument 269 ja Dokument 270. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

⁶⁸⁹ The recipients of the directives of the RKF Stabshauptamt included Frank.

⁶⁹⁰ Müller - Hofmann. 15/10/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik; available in print: Dokument 4. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁶⁹¹ Schreiben des Chef des Rasse und Siedlungshauptamtes an der Major der Wehrmacht Grosse-Leege über die Pläne der Schaffung einer quer den Distrikt Lublin bis nach Siebenbürgen reichenden Brücke des Deutschums. 21/6/1941. Dokument 2. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁶⁹² Der Chef des Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamtes SS: Personalmitteilung Nr. 4. 22/10/1941. BArch SS Listen A0006.

⁶⁹³ Hofmann - Lörner. 6/12/1941. BArch NS 2 / 116.

Müller had plenty of information about the plans of the local SS organisation, and according to him Globocnik's objective was to populate a part of Distrikt Lublin with people of German descent who were already living in the area and to reinforce the settlement with *Volksdeutsche* from Distrikt Radom. The German settlement was to be concentrated in the surroundings of the town of Zamosc. In this way Distrikt Lublin was to become a gateway that would connect the German areas to the Baltic countries and Transylvania.⁶⁹⁴

Müller also stated that Globocnik had started to establish a planning institute for the needs of the Germanisation project called *Planungs- und Forschungsstelle GG*. The project was headed by Obersturmführer Gustav Hanelt, whose task was also to get experts from the *SS-Mannschaftshäuser* from the main area of the Third Reich to Lublin. The idea was that the experts could be able to utilise the planning work in their postgraduate studies.⁶⁹⁵

Müller did not consider Globocnik's planning organ adequate for the task of carrying out the deportation and settlement activities in practice, and he considered that it was necessary for the RKF Stabshauptamt and the RuSHA to establish their own organs. However, this was problematic because Standartenführer Hammer, who represented the RKF Stabshauptamt in the Generalgouvernement,⁶⁹⁶ had visited the area and had outlined a plan for the establishment of an organ of the RKF Stabshauptamt in Lublin. Hammer's proposal did not please Globocnik, who was not prepared to allow the RKF Stabshauptamt to take over his personal project.⁶⁹⁷

Globocnik's attitude to Hammer's proposal reflects a situation in which he had clear authorisation for the RKF operation and in which he was also in the process of developing an organisation that would be responsible for planning it. This also indicates the position of the SSPF in Distrikt Lublin in relation to the organisation of the HSSPF of the Generalgouvernement: the SS organisation seems in practice to have operated totally independently in Lublin without any real need for cooperation with the HSSPF organisation.

Müller's report also shows the relations between the local SS organisation and the administration of the Generalgouvernement. According to Müller, Globocnik regarded the Generalgouvernement only as an interim solution, and

⁶⁹⁴ Müller - Hofmann. 15/10/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁹⁵ Müller - Hofmann. 15/10/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁹⁶ Documents dated summer 1942 indicate that Hammer operated under the HSSPF Ost. Hammer's SS rank and his correspondence with Globocnik refers to the fact that he was responsible for the RKF operation in the Staff of HSSPF Ost. Hammer - Globocnik 1/6/1942. BArch R 69 / 923. There is also information available about the position of Hammer in a report of the EWZ: Leiter der EWZ: Vierteljahrsbericht der EWZ für die Zeit vom 1.7. bis 30.9.1942 über die Durchschleusung der bisher erfassten Umsiedler durch die EWZ. BArch R 69 / 19. A similar conclusion can be drawn from documents which Hammer drafted together with the Administration of the Generalgouvernement. Der Leiter der Hauptabteilung Innere Verwaltung in der Regierung des Generalgouvernements Siebert & Der Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer im Generalgouvernement als Beauftragter des RKFDV im Auftrage SS-Standartenführer Hammer Hammer. 24/4/1942: Richtlinien zur Verordnung über die Einführung eines Ausweises für Deutschstämmige im Generalgouvernement vom 29.10.1941. BArch R 69 / 925.

⁶⁹⁷ Müller - Hofmann. 15/10/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

his objective was gradually to empty the whole territory of Poles and Jews. In Müller's view, the basic problem with the whole Germanisation project was that it could not be carried out without the co-operation of the civil authorities.⁶⁹⁸

The administrative authorities of the Generalgouvernement were aware of Globocnik's plans in good time, and documents from March 1941 indicate their attitude to the project. From them it appears that Gouverneur Zörner had wanted to keep the civil authorities out of the activities of the SS from the outset.⁶⁹⁹ On the other hand, the definition of Globocnik's duties dated 21/7/1941 included the strict concealment of the Germanisation operation,⁷⁰⁰ so the feeling was mutual.

The factors related to the birth of Globocnik's Germanisation project indicate a situation in which an individual SS officer in a strong enough position succeeded in attaching his own, quite unnecessary, project to Himmler's wider plans. One can clearly show that Globocnik was given numerous more important duties and that the Germanisation project was in reality a by-product of other ventures.

Globocnik's ability to impress Himmler with the need for the Germanisation project was phenomenal. It was obviously based on a reciprocal enthusiasm and mutual understanding.⁷⁰¹ With regard to the project as a whole, however, it was not the best possible arrangement because in this way Globocnik bypassed the SS head offices that were responsible for the Germanisation programme as well as the RKF organ in the Generalgouvernement. Nor were the problematic relations with the officials of the Generalgouvernement likely to support Globocnik's venture but rather cast a shadow over it right from the outset.

⁶⁹⁸ Müller - Hofmann. 15/10/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁶⁹⁹ Schreiben des Leiters der Abteilung für Bevölkerungswesen und Fürsorge in der Abteilung Innere Angelegenheiten des Amtes des Gouverneurs des Distrikts Lublin, R. Türk, an die reishauptmannschaft in Zamość über die Stellungnahme der deutschen Verwaltung gegenüber der auf die ReGermanisierung der polonisierten Dörfer im Gebiet von Zamość hinielenden Aktion der SS. 13/3/1941. Dokument 1. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁷⁰⁰ Reichsführer-SS: Vermerk. 21/7/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁷⁰¹ Poprzeczny 2004, pp. 162, 279-279.

5 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMANISATION PROJECT

The development of the Germanisation project of SS- und Polizeiführer Odilo Globocnik took nearly two years and the most significant actor in it, in addition to Globocnik himself, was Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler. Their mutual communication intensified after Germany attacked the Soviet Union, and for some time it was exceptionally active. Himmler visited Lublin several times, and Globocnik kept him up to date on the progress of the project.

The preparation of the Germanisation project did not proceed without snags, and especially the RKF Stabshauptamt was suspicious, which caused numerous problems during the preparatory stage. The administration of the Generalgouvernement was not enthusiastic about the project either, but that did not really bother Globocnik. The most important moving force behind the development of the operation was Globocnik's own initiative, and he succeeded in getting the most important relevant organs of the SS involved in his project.

The development of the project was divided into several stages, and during it all the factors that were to be important for its realisation were addressed. They included the screening of the local population to find persons German descent, the genocide of the Jewish population of the area, the drafting of plans concerning the target area, the inclusion of the different organs of the SS organisation in the project and the issuing of an RKF ordinance, which was necessary for carrying out the project.

The long preparation phase is an indication of the capability and willingness of the SS and its individual representatives to organise themselves in order to implement a project the object of which was to Germanise an area that was rather remote and separate from the heartlands of the Third Reich. Thus an in-depth analysis of the preparatory phase is justified. It is also necessary because some problems which later affected the whole project very significantly already emerged during the preparations.

5.1 Preliminary measures

Even though the preparation of the project was complicated and involved numerous irregularities, a smallish experimental deportation and settlement project was initiated in Kreis Zamosc on 6/11/1941.⁷⁰² It is known that some thousand Poles were deported⁷⁰³ to make way for the settlement of about one hundred *Volksdeutsche* families in Distrikt Radom.⁷⁰⁴ The Distrikt in question was a natural area in which to start the resettlement of the *Volksdeutsche*. About 35,000 ethnic Germans lived there,⁷⁰⁵ and some of them had had to give up their homes because of the establishment of Waffen-SS and Wehrmacht training areas.⁷⁰⁶

The target settlement area in the autumn of 1941 comprised the following villages: Huszczka Duza (Huszczka Duża), Huszczka Mala, Dulnik, Zawada, Wysokie, Bortatycze and Bialobrzegi (Białobrzegi).⁷⁰⁷ The target area was divided into two parts: the Zawada-Wysokie-Bortatycze-Bialobrzegi section was located west and north-west of the town of Zamosc, while the part comprising Huszczka Duza and Huszczka Mala was located on the northern side of the town.⁷⁰⁸ It is known that the operation was completed by 9/11/1941⁷⁰⁹ and the person responsible for the planning of it was by his own admission Hauptsturmführer Helmut Müller, the representative of the RuSHA in the area.⁷¹⁰

Müller had described the preparation of the project to Otto Hofmann, the Director of the RuSHA and had envisaged that the Poles who were to be deported would have to be examined in order both to ascertain those who represented the German genotype and to obtain a labour force for service in the Third Reich.⁷¹¹ Müller's ideas later strongly marked the whole Germanisation project, but it is worth noting that a similar procedure had also been used in the Wartheland.

Because carrying out even a small deportation and settlement project was quite a daring endeavour, Globocnik had contacted Himmler before embarking

⁷⁰² *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 17/11/1941, p. 265 reference 57.

⁷⁰³ According to an earlier study, the number of deported Poles was 2098. *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 17/11/1941, p. 265 reference 57.

⁷⁰⁴ Heinemann 2003, pp. 384–385.

⁷⁰⁵ Hopf: Radom, der deutsche Distrikt im GG. 10/5/1942. BArch R 69 / 127.

⁷⁰⁶ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Polizeibesprechung. 25/1/1943, pp. 609–610. According to Madajczyk, 160 villages were emptied in Distrikt Radom to make way for the establishment of military training areas. Madajczyk 1987, p. 412.

⁷⁰⁷ Schreiben des Kreishauptmannes in Zamosc, Weißenmaier, an den Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin, E. Zörner, betreffend die ersten Umsiedlungen im Gebiet von Zamosc und das Schicksal der umgesiedelten polnischen Bevölkerung. 20/11/1941. Dokument 8. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁷⁰⁸ It is possible to find the location of the villages from basic maps.

⁷⁰⁹ Schreiben des Kreishauptmannes in Zamosc, Weißenmaier, an den Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin, E. Zörner, betreffend die ersten Umsiedlungen im Gebiet von Zamosc und das Schicksal der umgesiedelten polnischen Bevölkerung. 20/11/1941. Dokument 8. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁷¹⁰ Müller - Hofmann. 15/10/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁷¹¹ Müller - Hofmann. 15/10/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

on it. He justified the project above all as an attempt to improve the situation of the local population of German descent before the winter season of 1941-1942. Globocnik warned Himmler of the possible unrest that would be caused by the deportation of the Poles and asked for a meeting on the matter.⁷¹² Most probably, the issue was dealt almost immediately because Himmler met Globocnik on both 13/10/1941⁷¹³ and 25/10/1941, and the Germanisation project was probably discussed in the latter meeting.⁷¹⁴

The operation did not go without questions being asked afterwards because in the opinion of the authorities of the Generalgouvernement the situation in the area had come to a head. The difference between the views of the civil authorities and of Globocnik was visible during Frank's visit to Lublin in October 1941.⁷¹⁵ The matter also was also noted in the central administration of the SS because Himmler discussed it with Heydrich, the Director of the RSHA,⁷¹⁶ and with Josef Bühler of the Generalgouvernement. The latter probably demanded Globocnik's dismissal,⁷¹⁷ which in itself was nothing exceptional or even new. The worry of the administration of the Generalgouvernement was justified because the authorities responsible for agriculture stated that the population of Distrikt Lublin was in a state of confusion, although it was not the fate of the Polish population that was the main concern of the civil servants but the threat to that year's crop.⁷¹⁸

It is worth noting that the civil authorities of the Generalgouvernement pointed not only to the danger to the economic utilisation of the area also to the inflexible implementation of the operation and to its side effects. These included the fact that some of the original inhabitants were fleeing or preparing to flee from the area,⁷¹⁹ and it had not been possible to settle them elsewhere.⁷²⁰ The representatives of the SS, too, noticed the increase in unrest caused by the first deportation and settlement measures. The dissent was apparent in the suspicious attitude of the Poles towards the operations of the SS, and it was manifested in practice as a readiness to flee before they were deported.⁷²¹

The reaction of the Polish population should not have come as a surprise because there had been similar reactions the previous year in the Wartheland. Indeed, it seems that the representatives of the SS were not up to dealing with

⁷¹² Globocnik - Himmler. 10 / 1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁷¹³ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 13/10/1941, p. 233.

⁷¹⁴ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 25/10/1941, p. 246.

⁷¹⁵ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945*. Regierungssitzung in Lublin. 17/10/1941, pp. 425-428.

⁷¹⁶ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 17/11/1941, p. 265 reference 57.

⁷¹⁷ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 2/1/1942, p. 306 referencce 7.

⁷¹⁸ Heinemann 2003, p. 385.

⁷¹⁹ Schreiben des Kreishauptmannes in Zamosc, Weißenmaier, an den Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin, E. Zörner, betreffend die ersten Umsiedlungen im Gebiet von Zamosc und das Schicksal der umgesiedelten polnischen Bevölkerung. 20/11/1941. Dokument 8. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁷²⁰ Schreiben des Kreishauptmannes in Zamosc, Weißenmaier, an den Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin, E. Zörner, betreffend die Ansiedlung der Ausgewiesenen in anderen Kreisen. 17/1/1942. Dokument 19. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁷²¹ Schreiben des. Bez. Leutnants der Gendarmerie Schule über die Vorfälle in Stary Zamosc. 17/1/1942. Dokument 18. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

the situation. Furthermore, it should be noted that the first deportation and settlement operation carried out in the area of Zamosc already revealed phenomena that later came to characterise the whole project. However, in spite of Gouverneur Ernst Zörner's recalcitrant attitude, some of the civil authorities were ready to cooperate with the SS.⁷²²

From the outset, the most significant the supporter of the Germanisation project among the civil authorities of the area was the *Kreishauptmann* of Zamosc, Helmuth Weihenmaier.⁷²³ It is possible to explain the different attitudes of the *Gouverneur* and the *Kreishauptmann* in terms of their personal relations with the SS organisation, which may have been considerably less problematic at the level of the *Kreis* than at that of the *Distrikt*. On the other hand, it is also possible that an independent *Kreishauptmann* like Weihenmaier was genuinely interested in Germanisation and was not able to foresee its negative consequences.

Some further observations can be made about the operation of autumn 1941. First of all, Hauptsturmführer Müller participated not only in the preparation of the project but most probably also in carrying it out. However, his name no longer appears in later documents concerning the operation, and it seems that Globocnik's own men replaced him. This may have been a consequence of his critical views, which can be seen in his letters to Hofmann.⁷²⁴ The experiment also revealed some major difficulties, which were also manifested a year later in connection with the broader Germanisation operation carried out then: the administrative authorities disapproved of the project as such, and the Poles refused to be expelled. It would have been possible for the representatives of the local SS organisation to draw the proper conclusions on the matter and to choose a new approach, but they stubbornly continued along their chosen path.

In addition to the experimental deportation and settlement operation, Globocnik tried to intensify measures to obtain inhabitants for his project. These measures were based on a previous catalogue of people of German descent in *Distrikt Lublin*. The project was known by the name *Fahndung nach deutschem Blut* (the quest for German blood), and Himmler had ordered it to be extended to the whole *Generalgouvernement* in July 1941.⁷²⁵ Globocnik, who had already found 8000 persons of German descent in the surroundings of Zamosc, required that the EWZ should examine them.⁷²⁶

Globocnik was in fact late with this demand because the EWZ had already moved its office from *Distrikt Lublin* to *Distrikt Radom* in November 1940 and had started screening people of German descent living west of the river

⁷²² Schreiben des Kreishauptmannes in Zamosc, Weihenmaier, an den Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin, E. Zörner, betreffend die ersten Umsiedlungen im Gebiet von Zamosc und das Schicksal der umgesiedelten polnischen Bevölkerung, 20/11/1941. Dokument 8. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁷²³ On Weihenmaier more widely, see Musial 1999, p. 397.

⁷²⁴ Müller - Hofmann. 15/10/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁷²⁵ Reichsführer-SS: Vermerk. 21/7/1941. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁷²⁶ Globocnik - Sandberger. 20/12/1941. BArch R 69 / 136.

Vistula.⁷²⁷ However, the question of the population of German descent in the Generalgouvernement came to the fore in the autumn of 1941,⁷²⁸ and the EWZ began the follow-up registration of *Volksdeutsche* in the western parts of the Generalgouvernement. Moreover, it became obvious in the autumn of 1941 that there was a need to examine the population of German descent in Galicia. The target population was divided at that time into *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans) and *Deutschstämmige* (persons of German descent).⁷²⁹ This kind of division was to be applied in the operations in Distrikt Lublin, too.

In connection with its handling of the situation in Galicia, the EWZ also became aware of the interest of the SS in the population of German descent in Distrikt Lublin as well as the contacts between Himmler and the local SS organisation and the plans for the Germanisation of the area.⁷³⁰ The situation became advantageous to Globocnik in spring 1942, when the EWZ started to prepare measures for dealing with the population of German descent in the Generalgouvernement.⁷³¹ The EWZ also explored and considered the situation in Zamosc, initially without the expectation of any special results,⁷³² and at that time it could not promise Globocnik much,⁷³³ although the EWZ did send its representative to Cracow to investigate questions related to the population of German descent.⁷³⁴

The EWZ apparently took the matter seriously, and it also sent a representative to Zamosc on an inspection tour among the population of German descent. This made numerous matters regarding the situation in Distrikt Lublin clear to the administration of the EWZ. Various measures supporting the Germanic population in accordance with National Socialist ideology had been initiated in the area, in addition to which the centralised placement of the population of German descent and the renovation of villages had been planned. With regard to the future, however, the most significant measure was the deportation of the Polish population from a village, some of whose inhabitants were persons of German descent. The representative of the EWZ may also have related as his most important piece of information that Himmler had met the inhabitants of German descent in July 1941, after which

⁷²⁷ EWZ - Franke. 15/11/1940. BACh R 69 / 136.

⁷²⁸ Nachregistrierung im Generalgouvernement. 17/11/1941. R 69 / 686.

⁷²⁹ Volkspolitisches Referat des SS- und Polizeiführers und Referat „Deutsche Volkszugehörige“ in der Inneren Verwaltung, u. -Abt. Bevölkerungswesen und Fürsorge Beauftragter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle - Angehörigen des Kommandos der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle zur Erfassung der deutschen Volkszugehörigen: Dienstanweisung für die Erfassung der deutschen Volkszugehörigen und Personen deutscher Abstammung im Distrikt Galizien. 1/9/1941. BACh R 69 / 131.

⁷³⁰ Backofen - von Malsen: Erfassung Galitsien (zugleich Dienstreisebericht von SS-Hauptsturmführer Fauss und SS-Untersturmführer Backofen über die Dienstreise vom 14. - 17.10.1941). 17/10/1941. BACh R 69 / 716.

⁷³¹ Leiter der EWZ - Stern / RSHA III B4. 15/2/1942. BACh R 69 / 392.

⁷³² Stabsführung-Planung / EWZ: Aktenvermerk an den Leiter der EWZ: Deutschstämmiger aus dem Zamoszer Land. 17/2/1942. BACh R 69 / 132.

⁷³³ von Malsen - Globocnik. 23/2/1942. BACh R 69 / 392.

⁷³⁴ Backofen - Malsen. 19/3/1942: Dienstreise SS-Untersturmführer Backofen nach Krakau 16. - 17.3.1942. BACh R 69 / 410.

the decision on “winning back” (*Rückgewinnung*) the population of German descent was made.⁷³⁵

The personal interest of Himmler was such a clear sign of the significance of the area of Zamosc that the EWZ could no longer delay, and it had to initiate measures to examine the people of German descent in the area of Zamosc. The major issue in the Generalgouvernement became the screening and registration of persons of German descent (*Deutschstämmige*) because the question of the *Volksdeutsche* had already been settled,⁷³⁶ although it was to cause problems later.⁷³⁷

According to internal documents of the EWZ, the decision on the screening of the population of German descent of Distrikt Lublin was made before the end of April 1942. By that time, the EWZ had also decided to catalogue the population of German descent in Distrikt Galizien and to open an office in Cracow.⁷³⁸ The Director of the EWZ explained the overall situation on 13/5/1942, stating that in the area of Zamosc there lived about 8000 persons of German descent, who were to be catalogued and examined. A considerably larger group of people of German descent lived in Distrikt Galizien, and they, too, were to be catalogued and examined. To carry out the task, it was planned to establish two organs, which were to operate under the new office in Cracow.⁷³⁹

After questions of principle had been settled, the leader of the EWZ ordered the *Volksdeutsche* and the *Deutschstämmige* in the Generalgouvernement to be catalogued.⁷⁴⁰ The EWZ explained the basic principles of its operation in interim reports. From them it appears that the objective was to catalogue and to examine the population of German descent in the area of the Generalgouvernement, but it did not plan to initiate any evacuations. The target group was divided into *Deutschstämmige* and *Volksdeutsche*. There were still some *Volksdeutsche* in the area because some of them had not been accepted by the SS for evacuation during the earlier operation. The operation was to be carried out in Distrikt Galizien and Kreis Zamosc of Distrikt Lublin, and it had Heydrich's approval. According to the Director of the EWZ, there was also an

⁷³⁵ Gradmann: Das Deutschtum im Gebiet von Zamosc. 19/3/1942. BArch R 69 / 132; available in print: Dokument 22. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁷³⁶ Siebert & Hammer. 24/4/1942: Richtlinien zur Verordnung über die Einführung eines Ausweises für Deutschstämmige im Generalgouvernement vom 29. Oktober 1941. BArch R 69 / 925.

⁷³⁷ According to a document which the EWZ sent to Kommission XV, the naturalising of the *Volksdeutsche* belonged to the sphere of authority of the administration of the Generalgouvernement. Nebenstelle Krakau / EWZ - Kommission XV / EWZ. 25/8/1942. BArch R 69 / 923. It is known that the matter was also discussed between July and September with the RKF representatives of the Generalgouvernement. Leiter der EWZ: Vierteljahrsbericht der EWZ für die Zeit vom 1.7. bis 30.9.1942 über die Durchschleusung der bisher erfassten Umsiedler durch die EWZ. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 19.

⁷³⁸ Gradmann: Aktenvermerk. 28/4/1942. BArch R 69 / 26.

⁷³⁹ Vermerk des Untersturmführers W. Gradmann über die Ergebnisse der Konferenz betreffend die Aufgaben der Einwandererzentralstelle im Generalgouvernement. 13/5/1942. Dokument 24. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁷⁴⁰ Leiter der EWZ: Anordnung Nr. 185. 20/5/1942. BArch R 69 / 401.

agreement with the administration of the Generalgouvernement and with HSSPF Krüger concerning the operation,⁷⁴¹ and there are references to this in other documents too.⁷⁴²

The plans of action of the EWZ give further information concerning the views of the SS on the inhabitants of the Generalgouvernement. The EWZ started off by dividing the inhabitants into four groups: *Volksdeutsche*, *Deutschstämmige*, *Fremdstämmige* (persons of foreign descent) and *Fremdblutige* (persons of foreign blood). A *Volksdeutscher* was a person who could be considered a German by descent and who considered him- or herself to be a German. A *Deutschstämmiger* had at least one German grandparent. The EWZ defined Poles, Ukrainians and Belarussians as *Fremdstämmige*, while Jews, Gypsies and Tartars were classified as *Fremdblutige*.⁷⁴³

The extension of its operations into the not-so-German population of the Generalgouvernement was a leap into the unknown for the EWZ, which among other things concomitantly tightened up its regulations concerning the *Volksdeutsche*.⁷⁴⁴ However, it was the *Deutschstämmige* who constituted the real problem. The EWZ was worried about what kind of attitude it should adopt towards them, and it began to question the sense of the whole operation.⁷⁴⁵ It had, however, already given instructions for identifying the *Deutschstämmige*, so the soul-searching was without any greater significance.⁷⁴⁶

The EWZ sent Kommission XV under Sturmbannführer Franz Herold to Distrikt Lublin.⁷⁴⁷ Herold was born in 1892 and was a member of a generation that was older than the ordinary SS officers in Distrikt Lublin. He had previously served in the SD, and he had been recruited into the EWZ on 8/9/1939.⁷⁴⁸ Herold had participated in several EWZ operations, and he had been posted to the Generalgouvernement in 1940.⁷⁴⁹

Kommission XV began to operate in Zamosc on 29/5/1942, and by the end of June it had examined 1449 persons. Only 609 of them were classified as *Deutschstämmige* and only 24 as *Volksdeutsche*.⁷⁵⁰ The initial results of the cataloguing were not very encouraging with regard to the problem of finding

⁷⁴¹ Leiter der EWZ: Vierteljahrsbericht der EWZ für die Zeit vom 1.4.1942 - 30.6.1942. Not dated. BAArch R 69 / 18.

⁷⁴² Siebert & Hammer. 24/4/1942: Richtlinien zur Verordnung über die Einführung eines Ausweises für Deutschstämmige im Generalgouvernement vom 29.10.1941. BAArch R 69 / 925.

⁷⁴³ Richtlinien der Staatsangehörigkeitsstelle für die Erfassung von Volksdeutschen und Deutschstämmigen im Generalgouvernement. Not dated. BAArch R 69 / 127.

⁷⁴⁴ Leiter der EWZ: Anordnung Nr. 187. 20/5/1942. BAArch R 69 / 401.

⁷⁴⁵ Förster - Leiter der EWZ: Das Problem der Deutschstämmigen. 18/6/1942. BAArch R 69 / 410.

⁷⁴⁶ The instructions stated: "...Bei der leistungsmässiger, erbbiologischer und sicherheitspolizeilischer Überprüfung keine Bedenken vorliegen und die Familie als wünschenswerter Zuwachs im deutschen Volkstum angesehen werden kann." Leiter der EWZ: Anordnung Nr. 186. 20/5/1942. BAArch R 69 / 401.

⁷⁴⁷ Gradmann / Stabsführung-Planung / EWZ: Aktenvermerk. 28/4/1942. BAArch R 69 / 26; Personalliste der Kommission XV. Not dated. BAArch R 69 / 923.

⁷⁴⁸ Personal data form. BAArch SSFPA Franz Herold.

⁷⁴⁹ Personalstelle / EWZ: Bescheidung. 13/3/41. BAArch SSFPA Franz Herold.

⁷⁵⁰ Vierteljahrsbericht der Einwandererzentralstelle für die Zeit vom 1. April bis 30. Juni 1942. Not dated. BAArch R 69 / 18.

settlers, and the situation did not improve during the following months. Between July and September 1942, 6842 persons were examined, and it was possible to classify only 2048 of them as *Deutschstämmige* and 140 as *Volksdeutsche*.⁷⁵¹ Kommission XV reported that it had screened the whole of Kreis Zamosc by the end of September 1942.⁷⁵² In addition to the local population of German descent, the *Kommission* also examined the Russian Germans in the Vomi camp in the area of Cholm in Distrikt Lublin in summer 1942.⁷⁵³ The operation was repeated in the autumn of 1942,⁷⁵⁴ but this was only a marginal measure as the focus of the whole operation was on cataloguing the local population of German descent.⁷⁵⁵

Although the number of the Russian Germans was insignificant in itself – only 455 persons were examined in summer 1942,⁷⁵⁶ and only 161 persons in autumn 1942.⁷⁵⁷ – the result was significant with regard to later activities and to the project as a whole. For example, the result of the screening in summer 1942 were described as excellent; the number of those selected for naturalisation was

⁷⁵¹ Vierteljahrbericht für die Zeit vom 1. Juli bis 30. September über die Durchschleusung der bisher erfassten Umsiedler durch die Einwandererzentralstelle. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 19.

⁷⁵² By the end of June 1942, the EWZ had operated in the following villages: Ploskie, Zdanow, Rospulcie Mokre, Niedliska, Zawada, Jaroslawice, Ruszow, Zamosc-Majdan, Bortatycze, Bialobrzegi, Zlojec, Zarusdzie, Podstary-Zamosc Doly, Nowa-Wies, Ruskie-Piaski. Surveys had also been carried out in the towns of Zamosc and Hrubieszow. By the end of September, the operation had been further extended to the following villages: Nowa-Osada, Nielisz, Wysokie, Mokre, Labunie Horodle, Plaszow, Skierbieszow, Kotlice, Stary-Zamosc, Komarow, Tyszowce and Laszczow. Leiter der EWZ: Vierteljahrsbericht der EWZ für die Zeit vom 1.4.1942 - 30.6.1942. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 18; Leiter der EWZ: Vierteljahrsbericht der EWZ für die Zeit vom 1.7. bis 30.9.1942 über die Durchschleusung der bisher erfassten Umsiedler durch die EWZ. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 19.

⁷⁵³ Hammer - Globocnik. 1/6/1942. BArch R 69 / 923; An den Leiter der EWZ SS-Obersturmbannführer Malsen: Durchschleusung Cholm - Vorbericht. 28/6/1942. BArch R 69 / 410; Bericht über die Durchschleusung der im Lager Cholm (Distrikt Lublin) untergebrachten Russlanddeutschen durch die Einwandererzentralstelle des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 130; Stabsführung. Planung / EWZ: Bericht über die Erfassung der Volksdeutschen aus der Union der Sozialistischen Soviet-Republiken in Cholm, Distrikt Lublin. 4/7/1942. BArch R 69 / 378.

⁷⁵⁴ Kommission XV / EWZ: Erfahrungsbericht über die Erfassung der Russlanddeutschen im SS Flüchtlingslager Cholm am 29.9.1942. 1/10/1942. BArch R 69 / 520; Abschlussbericht über die Durchschleusung der bisher erfassten Russlanddeutschen aus den Gebieten - Leningrad - Wolga - Sonstige - durch die Einwandererzentralstelle. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 518.

⁷⁵⁵ EWZ Kommission XV - EWZ Nebenstelle Krakau. 2/7/1942. BArch R 69 / 520.

⁷⁵⁶ Bericht über die Durchschleusung der im Lager Cholm (Distrikt Lublin) untergebrachten Russlanddeutschen durch die Einwandererzentralstelle des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 130; Vierteljahresbericht der Einwandererzentralstelle für die Zeit vom 1. April bis 30. Juni 1942. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 18.

⁷⁵⁷ Abschlussbericht über die Durchschleusung der bisher erfassten Russlanddeutschen aus der Gebieten- Leningrad" - Wolga" - Sonstige -" durch die Einwandererzentralstelle. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 518.

388 persons, and 215 adults were classified as suitable settlers of the eastern territories.⁷⁵⁸

Before the beginning of the Germanisation operation, the SS had examined 8291 persons in Kreis Zamosc but classified only 2821 of them as *Deutschstämmige* or *Volksdeutsche*. Globocnik's endeavour to Germanise the area of Zamosc therefore could not be realised using only local people of German descent. This was just the opposite of what had been planned in the meeting between Himmler and Globocnik in summer 1941. The situation was further worsened by the fact that the estimations made by the EWZ of the quality of the local population of German descent were rather unfavourable.⁷⁵⁹

Because there were not enough people of German descent available in Kreis Zamosc, the Germanisation project required the supply of people of German descent from elsewhere. Thus, Globocnik had to turn to the RKF Stabshauptamt for help because this was the organ that was in charge of dealing with people of German descent. As a result, Globocnik forfeited the possibility of being able to conduct his project almost totally independently. However, it is worth noting that, in the view of the EWZ, people of German descent were not supposed to be resettled. This well illustrates the internal differences of opinion within the SS and the distinctive nature of Globocnik's project.

5.2 The early phases of the preparation

The preparations for Globocnik's Germanisation project did not progress rapidly, the major reason being the problem of finding suitable inhabitants. However, Globocnik's other duties also slowed down the commencement of the project. The task of establishing SS and police bases, which had been given to Globocnik in summer 1941, did not proceed favourably, and, having failed to establish a single base, he was relieved of the task at the end of March 1942.⁷⁶⁰

According to Allen, Himmler's decision to take Globocnik off this assignment by suggesting that the former preferred a modern bureaucratic mode of operating to the more personal approach of Globocnik, who was largely untrained and unsuited to conduct large-scale operations.⁷⁶¹ Another factor that obviously influenced the decision was a plan to use Globocnik's resources for the extermination of the Jews and only after that in the Zamosc Germanisation operation.

⁷⁵⁸ Vierteljahresbericht der Einwandererzentralstelle für die Zeit vom 1. April bis 30. Juni 1942. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 18.

⁷⁵⁹ Vierteljahresbericht für die Zeit vom 1. Juli bis 30. September 1942 über die Durchschleusung bisher erfassten Umsiedler durch die Einwandererzentralstelle. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 19.

⁷⁶⁰ Himmler - Globocnik. 27/3/1942. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik. Cf. Schulte 2001, pp. 276–278, 308.

⁷⁶¹ Allen 2002, pp. 134, 138–139.

There are references to Globocnik's change of duties in documents dating from March 1942, when Himmler and Frank met to discuss the future Germanisation of the Generalgouvernement.⁷⁶² According to the reports drawn up by the authorities of the Generalgouvernement, Himmler presented to Frank his ideas for construction projects to be realised in the towns of Lublin and Zamosc in 1942 and for the resettlement of persons of German descent in Kreis Zamosc. The objective was to carry out the settlement operations in such a way that they would not cause unrest among the non-German population of the area.⁷⁶³

The Germanisation of Kreis Zamosc and the extermination of the Jews belonged together in the ideology of the SS. For example, Globocnik thought that the expulsion of the Jews and the Poles was a precondition of the Germanisation project.⁷⁶⁴ It is also worth noting that the expulsion of the Jews from the areas to be Germanised was likewise an essential part of the plans of the RSHA and the RKF Stabshauptamt. Globocnik was thus not alone in his views, but he probably regarded the murdering of the Jews as something that was self-evident: they could not be resettled in other areas of Distrikt Lublin because it was planned to Germanise the whole district, and because of similar plans for the other eastern areas there were no places for the Jews there either.⁷⁶⁵ Furthermore, it should be remembered that the National Socialists regarded the mass murder of the Jews as a means of increasing their scope for action at the regional level.⁷⁶⁶

The idea of the murdering of the Jews of the Generalgouvernement was born during the summer and autumn of 1941, and it had the approval and support of the civil authorities of the Generalgouvernement. When the decision about the extermination had been made, the civil authorities and the representatives of the SS started preparations for its implementation. Globocnik was responsible for the establishment of extermination camps, and the civil authorities were responsible for rounding up the Jews to be murdered. Globocnik established three extermination centres in the Generalgouvernement: Belzec and Sobibor in Distrikt Lublin and Treblinka in Distrikt Warschau.⁷⁶⁷

The extermination camp of Belzec was completed at the beginning of March 1942, and the genocide of the Jews of Distrikt Lublin began in the middle of March 1942 even though the preparations of the civil authorities were still

⁷⁶² *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 13/3/1942, p. 473.

⁷⁶³ Notiz A. Zwei Notizen über Gespräche zwischen dem Reichsführer SS und Generalgouverneur Dr. Hans Frank über die Aussiedlung von Polen am 13. – 14. März 1942. 1942, 27. März, Krakau. Dokument Nr. 12. *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan; Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 13/3/1942, p. 379, reference 41. Cf. Zwei Protokolle von in den Tagen vom 13. – 14. März 1942 geführten Gesprächen des Reichsführers-SS mit dem Generalgouverneur des GG u. a. über das Thema der Aussiedlung der Polen. 27. – 30.3.1942. Dokument 23. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁷⁶⁴ Musial 2004B, pp. 60–61, 63, 72, 84–85.

⁷⁶⁵ Musial 1999, pp. 201–208.

⁷⁶⁶ Musial 2004B, pp. 60–61, 63, 72, 84–85.

⁷⁶⁷ Musial 1999, pp. 215–218.

unfinished.⁷⁶⁸ The influence behind the commencement of the genocide was Himmler, who visited the area just before the genocide began in Lublin.⁷⁶⁹ Initially, Globocnik concentrated on the establishment of a ghetto in the city of Lublin because he had to arrange room for the German, Czech and Slovakian Jews who were to be deported there. After that, the deportations were focussed on individual *Kreise* of Distrikt Lublin. In them, the civil authorities rounded up the Jews on their own initiative, and Globocnik's agents transported them to the extermination camps.⁷⁷⁰

After the first wave of extermination of the Jews of Distrikt Lublin, the genocide continued, focussing on other districts of the Generalgouvernement as the operations of the SS became ever more independent. Behind this was Himmler, who had succeeded in pressurising Generalgouverneur Frank into making the Sicherheitspolizei responsible for affairs related to the Jews in the Generalgouvernement at the beginning of June 1942. After this, matters proceeded more rapidly, and in July 1942 an order was issued for the extermination of all the Jews of the Generalgouvernement by the end of the year.⁷⁷¹

The second stage of the genocide of the Jews in Distrikt Lublin took place between August and November 1942. The Jews were transported from the northern parts of the district to Treblinka. The Jews of the southern *Kreise* were transported to the extermination centres of Sobibor and Belzec. Some of the Jews were also taken to the concentration camp of Majdanek in Lublin, and in addition to those who perished in the extermination camps, at least 11,000–12,000 Jews were shot in the area of Distrikt Lublin.⁷⁷²

According to contemporary German documents, 260,705 Jews had lived in Distrikt Lublin before the genocide. Of these, only about 20,000 persons were still alive at the end of 1942. By 9/11/1942, the extermination of the Jews of was almost total.⁷⁷³ The Jews under German supervision had been collected either into labour camps under the Sicherheitspolizei or into the six remaining ghettos. Most of these Jews were murdered by the end of the 1943.⁷⁷⁴

In examining the holocaust of Distrikt Lublin, it should be noted that between 1939 and 1943 almost 640,000 Jews were transferred to Distrikt Lublin. About 473,240 of them arrived in 1942 and about 102,210 in 1943. The majority of these consisted of Jews from the Generalgouvernement, and only 121,450 of the arriving Jews were foreigners. Most of the deportees were murdered soon after their arrival.⁷⁷⁵ Even though the Germanisation project and the extermination of the Jewish population seem to have been entwined from the outset, it should be noted that the genocide of the Jews was only the first step in

⁷⁶⁸ Musial 1999, pp 222–223.

⁷⁶⁹ Pohl 2004, pp. 100–101.

⁷⁷⁰ Musial 1999, pp. 223–224, 242–244, 262–266.

⁷⁷¹ Musial 1999, pp. 276–278, 284–285.

⁷⁷² Musial 1999, pp. 286–287, 290–292.

⁷⁷³ Pohl 2004, pp. 103–104.

⁷⁷⁴ Musial 1999, pp. 287, 307.

⁷⁷⁵ Kielbon 2004, pp. 139–140.

the extermination activities planned by the SS, and that, alone, it would not have made it possible to Germanise any of the areas envisaged by the organisation.⁷⁷⁶

In the documents of the SS-Mannschaftshaus Lublin there is information about the connection between the Holocaust and the Germanisation project. They show that the rounding-up of the Jews had been concluded by March 1942 and that the transportation to the extermination camps had begun.⁷⁷⁷ The attitude of the representatives of the SS in Lublin to the Holocaust offers an indication of how strongly they believed in what they were doing. The murdering of a large group of people was only a part of a wider process, because when the questions related to the Jews were solved, the staff of the SS-Mannschaftshaus started to examine questions like the position of the SS- und Polizeiführer in relation to the administration of the Generalgouvernement. Furthermore, it was planned to examine questions related to the control of an area extending as far as Siberia.⁷⁷⁸

The matters under consideration were extremely broad in view of the size with the institution because the core personal of the SS-Mannschaftshaus consisted of only six young scientists. In spite of this, the plan was to develop it into a research centre for eastern affairs and to give it a completely new name. Particular attention was paid to the name question, and of the 17 alternatives considered, none of them was the *Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte* (*Fostu*, the Research Institute for Eastern Accommodation), which was later adopted.⁷⁷⁹

The main task and the mode of operation of the new scientific institution were defined as being to serve mainly the SS and to operate under its tight control.⁷⁸⁰ It was planned that the activities of the institution would focus on thirteen fields, which comprised in practice everything that the SS would have to take into consideration in dealing with the east.⁷⁸¹ To get the institution up

⁷⁷⁶ This is apparent in the *Planungsgrundlagen* plan of 1940. Furthermore, it can also be clearly perceived in the *Generalsiedlungsplan* plan. Isabel Heinemann also has come to a similar conclusion (Heinemann 2003, p. 360).

⁷⁷⁷ This fact is expressed by the following sentence: "*Diese Arbeit fand den Abschluss mit der Evakuierung der Juden seit dem 15.III. nach Osten.*" Arbeitsbereich des SS-Mannschaftshauses vom März 1942. Dokument 2. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁷⁷⁸ Arbeitsbereich des SS-Mannschaftshauses vom März 1942. Dokument 2. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁷⁷⁹ Arbeitsbereich des SS-Mannschaftshauses vom März 1942. Dokument 2. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁷⁸⁰ The function of the institute was defined as follows:

Aufgabe diese Instituts muss sein: Fragen und Probleme, die von anderen Stellen he angefragt werden bzw. Durch den Reichsführer-SS zur Bearbeitung gestellt sind, zu behandeln und zu Untersuchen und vom Standpunkt der SS dazu Stellung zu nehmen. ...Das Institut soll ohne Rücksicht auf die augenblicklichen vorläufigen Maßnahmen jede zur Bearbeitung gestellten Fragen auf ihre endgültige Lösung hin untersuchen. Es ist daher grundsätzlich Aufgabe des Instituts alle Fragen der Forschung, die Lebensgrundlagen für deutschen Menschen im Ostraum zu behandeln. Bei Durchführung dieser gestellten Aufgaben ist es daher notwendig, alle Sparten des Instituts zwecks einheitlichen ausgerichteter Behandlung mit SS-mäßig gebundenen Kräften zu besetzen, formations- und ideenmäßig...

Arbeitsbereich des SS-Mannschaftshauses vom März 1942. Dokument 2. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁷⁸¹ The branches were:

and running was considered to be a challenge in itself, and difficulties were expected because of overlapping tasks with such organs as the Ostministerium, the Reichsstelle für Raumordnung, the administration of the Generalgouvernement and the RKF Stabshauptamt.⁷⁸²

The difficulties awaiting the Forschungsstelle reflect the situation that had been created as result of Globocnik's activities with his independent and obstinate prosecution of the Germanisation project. In view of Globocnik's character, the Germanisation project was a natural continuation of the policy he had practised earlier in Vienna and in Lublin in 1939–1940. But this time Himmler supported Globocnik and took even Konrad Meyer with him to visit Lublin in March 1942.⁷⁸³

The issues of the Germanisation project became permanently subject of discussion at the level of the central administration of the SS in July 1942. The RKF Stabshauptamt contacted Himmler in order to have the Generalgouvernement defined as an area of settlement (*Ansiedlungsgebiet*). The objective was to settle about 10,000 *Volksdeutsche* from Bessarabia and Bukovina there because there were no areas where they could be settled in the annexed Polish territories. In addition to these groups, the *Volksdeutsche* of Bosnia were also to be settled in the Generalgouvernement. The plan was to settle people of German descent around the SS and police bases in Distrikt Lublin in order to create a fairly integrated area of German settlement.⁷⁸⁴

In the opinion of the representatives of the RKF Stabshauptamt, the settling of the *Volksdeutsche* in the Generalgouvernement was not an ideal solution, but it was considered a better alternative than keeping them in camps.⁷⁸⁵ The proposal of the RKF Stabshauptamt represents the attitude of the leaders of the RKF organisation towards Globocnik's Germanisation project. It should also be noted that, according to his own memorandum, Ulrich Greifelt

1 Bevölkerungspolitik und Rassenfragen

2 Hygiene - Seuchenfragen

3 Volkskunde

4 Rechtsfragen (*Fremdvolkrecht, Herrschaftsformen, Minderheitenrecht*)

5 Raumordnung und Raumforschung

6 Landschaftsgestaltung

7 Bauwesen

8 Landwirtschaft

9 Vermessungswesen

10 Volkswirtschaftliche und kaufmännische Sparte

11 Historiker und Kunsthistoriker

12 Bildstelle, Archiv, Bücherei, Registratur

13 Presse und Propaganda.

Arbeitsbereich des SS-Mannschaftshauses vom März 1942. Dokument 2. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁷⁸² Arbeitsbereich des SS-Mannschaftshauses vom März 1942. Dokument 2. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁷⁸³ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 14/3/1942, pp. 379–380.

⁷⁸⁴ Creutz - Himmler. 3/7/1942. BArch NS 19 / 2379; available in print: Dokument 26. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁷⁸⁵ Creutz - Himmler. 3/7/1942. BArch NS 19 / 2379.

had not discussed matters connected to the Germanising of the Generalgouvernement at all when he met Himmler at the end of May 1942.⁷⁸⁶

Himmler approved the project and ordered the RKF Stabshauptamt to prepare an ordinance to settle the acceptable *Volksdeutsche* in Zamosc in Distrikt Lublin and to confer with Globocnik about the matter. In his order, Himmler also drew attention to the fact that the operation would promote the Germanisation of Distrikt Lublin and free some *Volksdeutsche* from the miseries of camp life.⁷⁸⁷

The action of the RKF Stabshauptamt reflects the problems of the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policy. The RKF Stabshauptamt offered only 10,000 persons to be settled in Distrikt Lublin, even though it had several tens of thousands of persons available in the course of 1942. For example, in January 1942 the evacuations had already affected 507,262 *Volksdeutsche*, and 125,881 of them awaited re-settlement,⁷⁸⁸ and in October there were still 77,256 persons waiting in the camps.⁷⁸⁹

Small numbers of inhabitants would also have been available otherwise because the SS had extended the rounding-up of the *Volksdeutsche* to increasingly distant areas as the Eastern Campaign progressed, and in January 1942 the RKF Stabshauptamt had given instructions about the repatriation of Germans from Serbia and Bulgaria, for example. However, it was a question of very small numbers of people compared to the earlier groups of *Volksdeutsche*. The number of *Volksdeutsche* in Serbia was 2000 persons, and there were just over 3000 Bulgarian Germans in three different groups.⁷⁹⁰

Even if there were plenty of people available to settle, the RKF Stabshauptamt did not give precedence to the Germanisation of Distrikt Lublin over other projects. Obviously, the idea was to proceed in order and first Germanise the Polish territories already annexed to the Third Reich. At least the idea of settling people there for whom there was no room elsewhere in the Generalgouvernement population suggests this.

Globocnik did not care about the opinion of the RKF Stabshauptamt and had been pushing for the Germanisation of the Zamosc area actively since June 1942. He had had reports drafted dealing with the demographic conditions of Distrikt Lublin and the SS and police bases there. Himmler, Globocnik and Krüger discussed Globocnik's reports on 8–9/7/1942, and the documents

⁷⁸⁶ Greifelt - Himmler. 2/6/1942. Anlage: Vermerk zu einem Vortrag beim Reichsführer-SS am 28.5.1942. BArch NS 19 / 2743.

⁷⁸⁷ Himmler - Greifelt. 14/7/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3410.

⁷⁸⁸ Chef des Stabshauptamtes - Reichsführer-SS. 17/2/1942. Appendix: Bericht über den Stand der Umsiedlung 15/1/1942 vom Inspekteur für Statistik. Tabelle 1a: Stand der Um- und Ansiedlung. BArch NS 19 / 2095.

⁷⁸⁹ Vorbemerkung, Tabelle 1a Die Ostumsiedlung: Übersicht. RKF Stabshauptamt: Bericht über den Stand der Um- und Ansiedlung am 1.10.1942. BArch R 49 / 84.

⁷⁹⁰ RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 62/I 6/1/1942. BArch R 49 / 2; RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 63/I 22/1/1942. BArch R 49 / 2; RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 64/I 22/1/1942. BArch R 49 / 2.

ended up in the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS, from which they were passed on for the use of the RSHA and the RKF Stabshauptamt.⁷⁹¹

Himmler supported the Germanisation project and travelled to Lublin in July 1942 to meet Globocnik. He issued an order to the effect that that Lublin was to be settled with Germans and that the population of German descent of the Generalgouvernement was to be concentrated in Distrikt Lublin. The overall aim was to settle in Lublin and the surroundings of Zamosc about 50,000–60,000 *Volksdeutsche* families.⁷⁹² The number of people envisaged by Himmler could have amounted to 200,000 persons, so had the plan been realised it would have emptied the Vomi camps and led to serious changes in the target area.

Himmler was obviously enthusiastic about the Germanisation project in summer 1942. He acquainted himself more widely with Distrikt Lublin and visited the target areas that it was planned to populate with Germans in Kreis Zamosc.⁷⁹³ During his visit, he also had time to attend to the results of the research on people of German descent and the definition of their position.⁷⁹⁴ His idea was to use them as settlers of the area. Globocnik, Krüger and Himmler are also said to have stated that the authority invested in the SS was quite enough to deal with the possibly problematic question of the naturalisation of people of German descent, should it arise. Globocnik's attitude to the matter is indicated by the fact that he is said to have regarded the administration of the Generalgouvernement as a foreign government which really had nothing to do with the matter.⁷⁹⁵

The boost that the Germanisation project received in summer 1942 attracted attention in the Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt. The Director of that organ, Otto Hofmann, felt that he had been excluded from the arrangements for the project on the basis of a memorandum he had received. The problem lay in the fact that Himmler had authorised the Director of the SS-Hauptamt, Gottlob Berger, and Globocnik to organise the settlement of wounded SS men in Distrikt Lublin. Hofmann also stated that the representative of the RuSHA in the Generalgouvernement was Obersturmbannführer Karl Kuchenbäcker, whom he considered to be an important expert on race and settlement

⁷⁹¹ Globocnik: 3/6/1942 / Himmler: 8/7/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Globocnik: 3/6/1942 / Himmler: 9/7/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Meine - Greifelt. 15/7/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Brandt - Greifelt. 7 / 1942. BArch NS 19 / 183.

⁷⁹² *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 18/7/1942, p. 495 reference 80.

⁷⁹³ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 19/7/1942, p. 496.

⁷⁹⁴ Herold - Stabsführung / EWZ. 20/7/1942: Besuch des Reichsführers-SS. BArch R 69 / 392.

⁷⁹⁵ Leiter der EWZ - Ehlich / RSHA III B: Vermerk: Entwurf Reichsführer-Befehls von 20.7.1942 über die Schleusung von Volksdeutschen und Deutschstämmigen im Generalgouvernement. 6/8/1942. BArch R 69 / 392.

questions,⁷⁹⁶ and who enjoyed the absolute confidence of the administration of the RuSHA.⁷⁹⁷

In fact, Kuchenbäcker served as a representative both of the administration of the Generalgouvernement and of the RuSHA. He had replaced Heinrich Thole in the spring of 1942 as the representative of the RuSHA, and he had drawn up a memorandum entitled *Bodenordnung im Generalgouvernement* in the beginning of 1941. In addition to his other activities, Kuchenbäcker also worked for the RKF branch of the HSSPF Ost,⁷⁹⁸ In serving several masters like this he was a typical National Socialist planner.

A representative of the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS placated Hofmann by telling him that Himmler and Globocnik had discussed the matter in Lublin on 21/8/1942 and the role of the RuSHA in the settlement operation had been settled.⁷⁹⁹ Nevertheless, Hofmann had good reason for concern because although the RuSHA had been responsible for the settlement staffs (*Ansiedlungsstäbe*) in the operations in the Warthegau, Himmler had told him in February 1942 that he no longer considered it appropriate that the settlement staffs should be subordinate to the RuSHA. By way of compensation, Himmler had promised that the RuSHA would be entrusted with the settlement operations during the Germanisation of Ingermanland and the Crimea.⁸⁰⁰

Hofmann's interest in Distrikt Lublin is understandable because he had paid a visit to the area, and the RuSHA had operated there for some time. Furthermore, it should be noted that Globocnik's project for local SS and police bases had been transferred at the latest in spring 1942 to the control of the RuSHA. According to its own statement, the SS-Mannschaftshaus had at that time ended its activity in that area and passed the responsibility for it on to the RuSHA.⁸⁰¹

The RuSHA had linked up with Globocnik's project, earlier and according to Heinemann, representatives of the RuSHA were already operating in Globocnik's local SS and police bases in late autumn 1941.⁸⁰² The RuSHA had also established a branch office under its direct command in Lublin in spring 1942.⁸⁰³ Its task was to train members of the SS as farmers to be settled by the

⁷⁹⁶ Hofmann - Brandt. 4/8/1942. BArch NS 2 / 59; Hofmann - Himmler. 4/8/1942. BArch NS 2 / 59.

⁷⁹⁷ Hofmann - Kuchenbäcker. 14/4/1942. BA RuS-Akten Karl Kuchenbäcker; Hofmann: Beauftragung SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr. Kuchenbäcker. 3/5/1942. BArch RuS-Akten Karl Kuchenbäcker.

⁷⁹⁸ Heinemann 2003, pp. 390–391.

⁷⁹⁹ Brandt - Hofmann. 23/8/1942. BArch NS 2 / 59.

⁸⁰⁰ Chef des RuSHA-SS - Siedlungsamt. 12/2/1942: Vortrag beim RFSS am 9. und 10.2.1942. BArch NS 2 / 90.

⁸⁰¹ Arbeitsbereich des SS-Mannschaftshauses vom März 1942. Dokument 2. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁸⁰² Heinemann 2003, p. 391.

⁸⁰³ Der Chef des Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamtes SS: Dienststelle und Aufgaben der RuSHA-SS im Gebiet des HSSPF Ost. 18/4/1942. BArch NS 2 / 22.

RKF Stabshauptamt. The farms on which they were to be settled⁸⁰⁴ were contiguous with SS and police bases or those that were called *Ostlager*.⁸⁰⁵

Hofmann's interference reflects the special position that Globocnik's organisation had reached: the SS- und Polizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin had a direct contact with the Reichsführer-SS. Thanks to this special connection, Globocnik was able to bypass the usual formalities and even disregard an individual SS head office. Soon the authorities of the Generalgouvernement were also being ignored. The Germanisation project had already been discussed with the administration of the Generalgouvernement in spring 1942, and the plans had been quite comprehensively presented, but the first actual notice concerning the project reported that Himmler had accepted the proposal of the RKF Stabshauptamt about settling people of German descent in the Generalgouvernement.⁸⁰⁶

More exact information about the plans was given during the first part of August 1942, when HSSPF Krüger told the administration of the Generalgouvernement about the project. At that time, it appeared that the plan of the SS was to settle about 10,000 families of German descent in Distrikt Lublin around the towns of Lublin and Zamosc. The civil authorities were of the opinion that the matter required closer study and that a detailed statement concerning it should be drafted. However, the general assumption was that the operation was possible, albeit on condition that it should not cause unrest in the target areas.⁸⁰⁷

Krüger tried to assure the Generalgouvernement that the measures would be carried out in cooperation with the civil authorities. However, the favourable picture obtained of the cooperation in August 1942 did not mean that there were no tensions in the air. They are apparent in the comments of Gouverneur Zörner.⁸⁰⁸ Behind Zörner's sharp views there probably lay a dispute between him and the representatives of the SS concerning the plans of the latter to take possession of the farms. Naturally, the dispute intensified, and Himmler proposed that Gouverneur Zörner be dismissed for incompetence and passed

⁸⁰⁴ Der Chef der Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamtes SS: Das Arbeitsgebiet des RuSHA. 20/4/1942. BArch NS 2 / 58.

⁸⁰⁵ The first Ostlager was apparently established only in February 1943. It was located in Distrikt Lublin. RuSHA-SS: Tagesbefehl Nr. 45/43. Besondere Anweisungen: Ostlager der SS "Erlenhof." 24/2/1943. BArch NS 2 / 12.

⁸⁰⁶ Fernschreiben des SS-Obersturmbannführers R. Brandt an die Regierung des Generalgouvernements in Krakau, das über das Einverständnis des Reichsführers-SS mit dem Vorschlag der Ansiedlung deutscher Volksgruppen im GG berichtet. 8/7/1942. Dokument 27. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁸⁰⁷ *Das Dienstagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945.* Sitzung zur Besprechung von Sonderproblemen des Distrikts Lublin im Königssaal. 4/8/1942, pp. 536-541; available in print: Dokument 28. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁸⁰⁸ This was indicated by the following sentence: "Gouverneur Zörner äußert seine Zufriedenheit, daß die Umsiedlungsfrage endlich einmal amtlich von Krakau aus begonnen werde, und verspricht seine volle Unterstützung." *Das Dienstagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945.* Sitzung zur Besprechung von Sonderproblemen des Distrikts Lublin im Königssaal. 4/8/1942, p. 541.

unfavourable reports of Zörner, which Globocnik had sent to him, on to Lammers and Bormann.⁸⁰⁹

The views of the administration of the Generalgouvernement did not affect the activities of the SS in practice, and Globocnik was able to start practical arrangements for the Germanisation project in early August 1942. He planned, for example, to establish 22 schools to the area of the operation.⁸¹⁰ Globocnik was advised to utilise the property of the murdered Jews in establishing the schools and to contact Greifelt and Pohl on this matter.⁸¹¹ The idea of utilising the property of the Jews in the Germanisation operation also came up more widely, and the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS contacted the RKF Stabshauptamt about the matter.⁸¹² Later on Globocnik solved questions connected to the provision of furniture for the schools by establishing a labour camp in Krasnik which used a Jewish work force.⁸¹³

The conflict between Globocnik and Zörner did not affect the assessments made at the time by outsiders, and Globocnik, for example, is mentioned in very favourable terms in a report made by the Wehrmacht.⁸¹⁴ In late summer 1942, Globocnik clearly enjoyed Himmler's unreserved support, and Himmler visited Lublin again on 21/8/1942. On this occasion, he and Globocnik visited Zamosc and explained their plans to Kreishauptmann Weißenmaier.⁸¹⁵ Himmler was also interested in the possibility of extending the Germanisation operation to Distrikt Galizien.⁸¹⁶ The idea was not entirely new because it had

⁸⁰⁹ It is possible to find documents related to the matter in folders 1755 and 2612 of series NS 19 of Bundesarchiv. The most important communications are: Himmler - Frank. 18/8/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Brandt - Globocnik. 22/8/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Globocnik - Himmler. 26/8/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Globocnik - Brandt. 31/8/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Brandt - Globocnik. 2/9/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Brandt - Globocnik. 8/9/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Brandt - Globocnik. 15/9/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Globocnik - Brandt. 13/9/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Brandt - Globocnik. 23/9/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Himmler - Lammers. 29/9/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Brandt - Globocnik. 15/10/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Brandt - Bormann. 22/10/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Lammers - Himmler. 7/11/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1755; Himmler - Lammers. 15/11/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1755.

⁸¹⁰ Globocnik - Himmler 11/8/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2655.

⁸¹¹ Brandt - Globocnik 12/8/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2655.

⁸¹² Brandt - Greifelt 14/8/1942. BArch NS 19 / 2655.

⁸¹³ Bericht über das Arbeitslager Krasnik. 22/9/1943. APL 510 / 1 / 2.

⁸¹⁴ The report stated: *"Auf meine Frage, warum sein Verhältnis mit dem Gouverneur Dr. Zörner ein gespanntes sei, gab er etwa folgende Erklärung ab: Zörner ist ein Verwaltungsmann aber kein Führer... Globocnik macht durchaus den Eindruck eines energischen Führers und man gewinnt den Eindruck, dass er seinen Betrieb gut und straff in Ordnung hält."* Kommandeur des OKW / Stabes z.b.V. Sonderbeauftragter des Führers: Bericht Nr. 12. 3/9/1942. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

There is also available a document drafted by Globocnik which reveals his adverse attitude to Zörner and attempts to improve relations between the SS and the administration of the Generalgouvernement. Telegramm des SS- und Polizeiführers im Distrikt Lublin, O. Globocnik, an den Reichsführer-SS mit der Mitteilung über den von General v. Unruh gemachten Vorschlag, den Versuch zu unternehmen, eine abermalige Besprechung mit dem Gouverneur E. Zörner zwecks Bereinigung der Atmosphäre der Zusammenarbeit herbeizuführen. 8/9/1942. Dokument 30. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁸¹⁵ *Dienstkalendar Heinrich Himmlers.* 21/8/1942, p. 523.

⁸¹⁶ *Dienstkalendar Heinrich Himmlers.* 17/8/1942, p. 521 reference 72.

been discussed during Himmler's earlier visit in July, when he had visited the SS-Mannschaftshaus in Lublin.⁸¹⁷

Even though the Germanisation of Distrikt Galizien was also mooted, Globocnik was the only SS- und Polizeiführer in the Generalgouvernement who in fact carried out a more extensive Germanisation operation.⁸¹⁸ Distrikt Galizien had probably become the second most interesting target area for the SS thanks to its SS- und Polizeiführer, Friedrich Katzmann. He and Globocnik were the only SS- und Polizeiführer who were not changed before the implementation of the most radical features of the National Socialist ideology in the Generalgouvernement began in 1942.⁸¹⁹

Globocnik tried to maintain close personal contact with Himmler in late summer and autumn 1942 through the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS.⁸²⁰ It is probable that Globocnik's approaches did not have much effect on Himmler, but they produced a series of correspondence between Globocnik and the personnel of the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS.⁸²¹ The close communication led to familiarity, which was to the advantage of Globocnik in promoting his project. Even though Himmler was obviously enthusiastic about the project, and it had been thoroughly dealt with during his visits, and despite the fact that the administration of the Generalgouvernement was aware of it and, with some preconditions, had given its consent to it, the project got under way fairly slowly within the SS organisation.

Globocnik intervened and started to try and speed up the handling of the project at the end of August 1942 with the help of Sturmbannführer Rudolf Brandt of the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS. Globocnik hoped that Brandt would remind Himmler about the need for an official directive for the execution of the project, giving Globocnik the authority to effect the confiscations that were important for the settlement operation.⁸²²

Brandt started to take care of Globocnik's confiscation authorisation and contacted the RKF Stabshauptamt, asking it to draw up a directive designating Kreis Zamosc as a target area of settlement.⁸²³ Brandt informed Globocnik about the progress of matters and in his letter reported that the RKF Stabshauptamt was preparing the settlement directive and that it was due to arrive to be signed by the Reichsführer-SS in the next few days. Brandt had also discussed the

⁸¹⁷ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 20/7/1942, p. 497 reference 86.

⁸¹⁸ Madajczyk 1987, p. 428.

There are some documents available about the interest in Distrikt Galizien, e.g. Dokument 224 and Dokument 250. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁸¹⁹ Pohl 1993, pp. 109–110. Cf. Pohl 2004, p. 106.

⁸²⁰ Globocnik - Grothmann. 26/8/1942. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik; Globocnik - Baumert. 5/10/1942. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁸²¹ Grothmann - Globocnik. 30/9/1942. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik; Brandt - Globocnik. 28/8/1942. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik; Grothmann - Globocnik. 10 / 1942.

BArch NS 19 / 3165.

⁸²² Globocnik - Brandt. 31/8/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 29. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁸²³ Brandt - RKF-Stabshauptamt. 8/9/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 31. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

possibility of carrying out confiscations in connection with the Germanisation project, but Himmler had considered that Globocnik's existing rights were sufficient.⁸²⁴

In spite of Brandt's prompting, the RKF Stabshauptamt took its time, and Brandt inquired about the finalising of the settlement directive on 22/9/1942.⁸²⁵ The RKF Stabshauptamt answered Brandt on 25/9/1942 and promised to send a draft proposal the following day.⁸²⁶ The matter was urgent because on the same the day Himmler presented the Germanisation project to Hitler in connection with matters related to the genocide of the Jews and other plans for the future.⁸²⁷

After the meeting of Hitler and Himmler, the preparations began to proceed at a faster pace. Himmler met Globocnik on 4/10/1942 in Cracow,⁸²⁸ and they began to demand the delivery of admissible *Volksdeutsche* by the RKF Stabshauptamt.⁸²⁹ On 4/10/1942 Himmler wrote to the Director of the RKF Stabshauptamt and stated that it was possible to begin the settlement activity, but the inhabitants required for it were lacking. Himmler began lose patience with the RKF Stabshauptamt and criticized its actions. He ordered the settlement of Germans from Slovenia and Lorraine in Distrikt Lublin.⁸³⁰ Globocnik, too, was very active, and he would have wanted to travel to Zagreb (Agram) on 9/10/1942 to arrange the evacuation of the *Volksdeutsche*.⁸³¹ Himmler did not agree and ordered Globocnik to let the *Volksdeutsche* Mittelstelle take care of the matter.⁸³²

Globocnik certainly had no reason to leave Lublin because the RKF Stabshauptamt had become active over questions related to the acquisition of inhabitants. On 10/10/1942 Oberführer Rudolf Creutz notified Himmler that there were 1000 German families from Bessarabia, 90 German families from Serbia and 600 German families from the Leningrad area available for settlement in Lublin on 15/10/1942.⁸³³ Creutz also said that the availability of Germans from the Baltic States and Slovenia was being feverishly prepared and that a representative of the RKF Stabshauptamt had been sent to Lorraine to arrange for the transfer of the Germans there. In addition to these groups, Creutz had offered Globocnik 600 German families from Romania, and Globocnik was ready to take this group too.⁸³⁴

⁸²⁴ Brandt - Globocnik. 9/9/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 32. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁸²⁵ Brandt - Creutz. 22/9/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 33. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁸²⁶ Creutz - Brandt 25/9/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 34. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁸²⁷ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers.* 22/9/1942, p. 566 - 567.

⁸²⁸ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers.* 4/10/1942, p. 579.

⁸²⁹ *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers.* 4/10/1942, p. 579 reference 27.

⁸³⁰ Himmler - Greifelt 4/10/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 35. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁸³¹ Globocnik - Grothmann 7/10/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3165.

⁸³² Grothmann - Globocnik. 8/10/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3165.

⁸³³ Creutz - Himmler 10/10/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3165.

⁸³⁴ Creutz - Himmler 10/10/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3165.

Himmler agreed to the settling of the Germans from Romania in Distrikt Lublin and ordered them to be transported there immediately.⁸³⁵ There was also a plan to settle Germanic persons from Norway in Distrikt Lublin.⁸³⁶ In addition, the *Volksdeutsche* from Russia, 455 of whom were in a camp in the area of Cholm,⁸³⁷ could be used as settlers; the EWZ had examined them in summer 1942 and believed that they could be used to settle Kreis Zamosc.⁸³⁸

Generally speaking, the preparations for Globocnik's settlement project met with problems almost as soon as the RKF Stabshauptamt became involved in it. Globocnik's own organisation certainly anticipated the problems, but it could hardly have imagined the kind of difficulties the project would meet even before it got going.

5.3 The preparation proceeds, and the plans take shape

The RKF Stabshauptamt succeeded in promising Globocnik more than 2000 families of *Volksdeutsche*, but the drafting of the directive required by the operation was a problematic task. Creutz of the RKF Stabshauptamt informed Brandt of the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS that HSSPF Krüger's interference was delaying the preparation of the directive. Krüger had met Greifelt, the Director of the RKF Stabshauptamt, and they had agreed that Globocnik and Kuchenbäcker would also see the draft directive before it was sent to the Reichsführer-SS for acceptance.⁸³⁹

Krüger's intervened in the matter in his capacity as the Representative of the RKF in the Generalgouvernement. Another influential factor was the fact that Krüger also officially represented both the SS and the administration of the Generalgouvernement, and on 4/9/1942 Frank had stipulated that the Germanisation project must be prepared in cooperation between the SS and the Generalgouvernement in such a way that Frank could approve the plan before it was put into effect.⁸⁴⁰

Taken as a whole, the preparations did not seem to be proceeding very favourably, and the situation is revealed in a letter which Globocnik sent to Krüger on 21/10/1942. In it he stated that according to the RKF Stabshauptamt altogether 27,300 persons in 8,840 families were immediately available for

⁸³⁵ Grothmann - Creutz 18/10/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3165.

⁸³⁶ Der SS-Führer im Rasse- und Siedlungswesen und Beauftragter des Reichskommissars für die Festigung Deutschen Volkstums / Der Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer beim Reichskommissar für die besetzten norwegischen Gebiete - Reichsführer SS. 28/10/1942. BArch NS 19 / 123; *available* in print: Dokument 41. Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.

⁸³⁷ RKF-Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 74/I 28/9/1942. BArch R 49 / 5.

⁸³⁸ An der Leiter der EWZ. 28/6/1942: Durchschleusung Cholm - Vorbericht. BArch R 69 / 410.

⁸³⁹ Creutz - Brandt. 7/10/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3607; *available* in print: Dokument 38. Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.

⁸⁴⁰ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945*. 4/8/1942, p. 541.

settlement, and for later stages of the operation 71,000 persons would be available. However, Globocnik's plan was to settle initially only 5,000 families around the local SS and police bases.⁸⁴¹

Globocnik also revealed in his letter to Krüger that not all of the settlers promised by the RKF Stabshauptamt were in fact available. According to him, only 3596 families were available, and of these only 1782 families were farmers. Globocnik had acquired 765 families independently, so the RKF Stabshauptamt had been able to deliver only 1017 families of farmers for his use.⁸⁴² The people whom Globocnik had found independently were obviously the *Volksdeutsche* and *Deutschstämmige* from Kreis Zamosc because, according to the reports of the EWZ, it had found altogether 785 families of German descent in the area.⁸⁴³

The acquisition of settlers was not Globocnik's only worry because according to him it was not only the RKF Stabshauptamt that had failed to give due attention to the project, but the same was true of the other SS head offices, and he thus did not have at his disposal all the assistance he needed. Nor had the question about the placement of the Poles who were to be expelled been solved, in addition to which the training of those settlers who were to be placed in positions of responsibility had not been realised as expected, either. As an overall solution, Globocnik suggested that the Germanisation project should be executed in two phases, and in the first phase only 2500 families should be settled. Alternatively, the whole project should be postponed until 1943.⁸⁴⁴

Krüger sent Globocnik's letter on to Himmler and requested a decision on the commencement of the Germanisation operation. Krüger also said that he and Globocnik had contacted Greifelt, the Director of the RKF Stabshauptamt, who had also supported the idea of asking Himmler for a decision.⁸⁴⁵ Globocnik's and Krüger's reactions indicate that the whole operation seemed likely to fail even before it began. On the other hand, some of the preparatory measures had succeeded because Globocnik stated in his letter to Krüger that they had been completed by 15.9.1942 and that the RKF Stabshauptamt had accepted the plan for settling the persons of German descent.⁸⁴⁶

The plan accepted by the RKF Stabshauptamt had clearly been drafted in the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte. The documents of this institute contain a mention of a disposition plan for the area of Zamosc. This plan was almost ready in October 1942. The institute next intended to produce a detailed plan for the deportation and settlement project (*Umsiedlungsplan*) and a plan of the final areal disposition of Kreis Zamosc. It also intended to obtain more basic

⁸⁴¹ Globocnik - Krüger. 21/10/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 39. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁸⁴² Globocnik - Krüger. 21/10/1941. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

⁸⁴³ Leiter der EWZ: Vierteljahrsbericht der Einwandererzentralstelle für die Zeit vom 1. April bis 30. Juni 1942. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 18; Leiter der EWZ: Vierteljahrsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. Juli bis 30. September 1942 über die Durchschleusung der bisher erfassten Umsiedler durch die Einwandererzentralstelle. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 19.

⁸⁴⁴ Globocnik - Krüger. 21/10/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

⁸⁴⁵ Krüger - Himmler. 30/10/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 42. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁸⁴⁶ Globocnik - Krüger. 21/10/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

information for the Germanisation project so that in the future it would be possible to extend it to Kreis Krasnystaw and Kreis Hrubieszow. In addition, the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte proposed to draw up various plans concerning the whole of Distrikt Lublin and the Generalgouvernement.⁸⁴⁷

Even though the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte produced plans, its work was restricted by the scantiness of resources. In spring 1942 there was a plan for the comprehensive organisation of the institution but at the end of the year most of the researchers' posts were still unoccupied, and the same persons were responsible for several different functions. Hauptsturmführer Gustav Hanelt was still Director of the institute and Sturmmann Franz Stanglica⁸⁴⁸ was responsible for the planning activity and the library and map collection. Untersturmführer Jürgen Lassmann was responsible for the planning and architecture related to the construction activity, which involved the most extensive activity and employed the largest number of personnel.⁸⁴⁹

The plan mentioned by Globocnik and accepted by the RKF Stabshauptamt was most probably Stanglica's disposition plan for the area of Zamosc drawn up in the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte. Stanglica presented his view, coloured by his National Socialist outlook, that a German would not feel comfortable living in a Polish town or in a Polish countryside. Therefore, the permanent settlement of Germans in the east would require changing of the disposition of the area. This assessment was influenced by an

⁸⁴⁷ Aktennotiz Stanglicas für Globocnik vom 6. Oktober 1942 über Konflikte mit der Verwaltung des Distrikts Lublin. Dokument 3. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁸⁴⁸ According to correspondence of the EWZ, Stanglica had a university degree, and he came from Vienna. His first SS rank was Sturmmann, and his post in 1942 was Volkspolitische Referat Lublin. Gradmann: Das Deutschtum im Gebiet von Zamosc. 19/3/1942. BArch R 69 / 132.

⁸⁴⁹ At the end of 1942, the Forschungsstelle included a total of 15 sections. These and the number of posts in them are shown in the following table:

I <i>Planung, Forschung, Statistik</i>	11
II <i>Architekturabteilung</i>	46
III <i>Recht</i>	2
IV <i>Russlanddeutschtum, Sammlung von volkskundlichen Material</i>	2
V <i>Germaneneinsatz</i>	1
VI <i>Geschichte und Ostforschung</i>	0
VII <i>Landwirtschaft</i>	0
VIII <i>Forstwirtschaft</i>	0
IX <i>Medizin</i>	0
X <i>Rassen- und Volksforschung</i>	0
XI <i>Kunst</i>	0
XII <i>Literatur</i>	0
XIII <i>Slawistische Philologie</i>	0
XIV <i>Naturwissenschaften</i>	0
<i>Verwaltung</i>	11

There were 73 posts altogether, but the number of the personnel was only 55 because the same persons were responsible for several posts. It is also worth noting that some of the personnel were employed only on a part-time basis. Organisations- und Arbeitsplan der Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte Lublin. APL 510 / 3 / 1. Jan-Erich Schulte has shown that the document describes the situation at the turn of 1942–1943 and has published it in Schulte 2001, p. 268, Schaubild 14. The document is also available in print as Dokument 406 in *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

idea according to which the German and the Polish cultural landscapes differed sharply from each other in that German settlements were characterised by order and Polish ones by disorder.⁸⁵⁰

According to Stanglica the changes in the areal disposition required a thorough knowledge of the target area, and questions relating to the population, agriculture, economy, traffic, landscape and the allocation of settlements should all be taken into consideration. The result of the re-arrangement would be an area that would make it possible to continue with its German settlement. Stanglica's objective was to gather as wide-ranging information about the area of Zamosc as possible and to utilise it in the planning. Stanglica paid special attention to maps and considered 1:25,000 and 1:100,000-scale maps to be the most important tools in the planning because they could be used for drawing up plans at the levels of the county (*Kreis*), the main village (*Hauptdorf*) and the village (*Dorf*).⁸⁵¹

Stanglica's general goal was to create an area which would imitate the conditions in the heartlands of Germany and which would have traffic communications with Germany. Stanglica envisaged that the average population of the area would be 60 persons to the square kilometre and the population of the countryside 30 persons per square kilometre. The size of the individual village was to be about 1000 hectares and to include 49 farms. One of them would be a large farm of 125 hectares, accompanied by ten farms of 50 hectares each, eight farms of 30 hectares and five farms of 20 hectares. In addition to these, there would also be five small farms of two hectares reserved, for example, for craftsmen and machinists. The plan also included an idea to reserve an area of 40 hectares in every village for the dwellings of farm labourers.⁸⁵² Stanglica justified the large number of the farms of 50 hectares, claiming that the objective was to mechanise agriculture as thoroughly as possible after the war. Behind this idea lay the view that as little as possible non-German labour should be used.⁸⁵³

Stanglica's plans strongly resembled the views presented in the *Planungsgrundlagen* scheme of 1940, and their implementation would have utterly changed the conditions of the Zamosc area. According to Stanglica, more than 60% of the farms of the area were less than 10 hectares in size, and about 30% of them were less than 3 hectares in size. It was also characteristic of the area that the properties were fragmented into several smaller units.⁸⁵⁴ Stanglica was not satisfied with the borders of the area of Kreis Zamosc either,

⁸⁵⁰ Denkschrift Stanglicas zur Raumplanung in der Zamojszyzna. Dokument 4. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin." The document is not dated, but it is possible to estimate that it was drafted between the end of 1942 and the end of 1943.

⁸⁵¹ Denkschrift Stanglicas zur Raumplanung in der Zamojszyzna. Dokument 4. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁸⁵² Denkschrift Stanglicas zur Raumplanung in der Zamojszyzna. Dokument 4. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁸⁵³ Denkschrift Stanglicas zur Raumplanung in der Zamojszyzna. Dokument 4. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁸⁵⁴ Denkschrift Stanglicas zur Raumplanung in der Zamojszyzna. Dokument 4. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

and he proposed changing them in order that the county should get more natural borders. Furthermore, he planned the thorough rearrangement of the areas of the main villages because he wanted to make them into clearly defined, closed units.⁸⁵⁵

With the help of Stanglica's plan and a document entitled *Amtliches Gemeinde- und Dorfverzeichnis für das Generalgouvernement*, drafted in the spring of 1943 by the administration of the Generalgouvernement, it is possible to estimate what would have followed the implementation the plans of the SS. In doing so, however, it must be taken into consideration that the demographic facts presented by the administration of the Generalgouvernement describe the situation in spring 1943, when the SS had already carried out its deportation and settlement operations.

According to *Amtliches Gemeinde- und Dorfverzeichnis für das Generalgouvernement*, the area of Kreis Zamosc was 2703 square kilometres, and it possessed 219,854 inhabitants. Thus the average population density was 81.3 persons per square kilometre. There were three towns and 29 communes in Kreis Zamosc, and the total number of villages was 333.⁸⁵⁶ If the information of the administration of the Generalgouvernement is arithmetically compared with Stanglica's plans without the proposed border changes, the following results are obtained: according to Stanglica's premises, there would be room in the area for at most 162,180 persons. If the whole surface area is regarded as agricultural land, there would be room for 81,000 persons. However, the size of the rural population of Kreis Zamosc in spring 1943 was altogether 189,713 persons.

Continuing with the calculations and noting that the size of a village was estimated to be 1,000 hectares, we calculate that about 270 villages should have been created in the area. Because only 20 farms of two hectares each had been planned for the non-German work force in each village in the countryside, only 21,600 non-German residents would have remained if the number of inhabitants of each non-German farm is estimated to be four persons. In order that the average population of the countryside should not have exceeded 30 persons per square kilometre, about 60,000 inhabitants of German descent would have had to be settled in the countryside and about 170,000 non-German persons to be expelled.

When Stanglica's premises are compared with the demographic data of the towns, we can note that the urban population should have been about 80,000 persons, but in fact it was only 31,141 persons. It is probable that the envisaged figure remained only a statistic, because the conditions of wartime made it impossible to carry out the building of towns in Kreis Zamosc on the large scale that had been planned. It is probable that the planners of the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte contented themselves mainly with

⁸⁵⁵ Denkschrift Stanglicas zur Raumplanung in der Zamojszyzna. Dokument 4. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁸⁵⁶ *Amtliches Gemeinde- und Dorfverzeichnis für das Generalgouvernement*, Allgemeine Übersichten: Übersicht 2: Fläche, Einwohner, Bevölkerungsdichte, Zahl der Gemeinden und Dörfer der kleineren Verwaltungsbezirke.

planning the Germanisation of the town of Zamosc, the fate of whose non-German population would have been practically total deportation.

According to the plans of the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte, as many as 200,000 persons of the total population of about 220,000 persons of Kreis Zamosc were to be expelled. Thus the plan conformed to the plans of the RKF Stabshauptamt in late 1942. In practice, the execution of Stanglica's plan would have meant that the genocide of the Jewish population of Kreis Zamosc would have been followed by the genocide of the Polish population.

The conformity of the plans of the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte with those of the RKF Stabshauptamt plans is not a coincidence because there is information in documents that indicate that Globocnik's staff had connections with RKF planners like Konrad Meyer and Udo Schauroth, both of whom are known to have visited Lublin.⁸⁵⁷ Furthermore, it should also be noted that the representatives of the RSHA had links with the Lublin planners,⁸⁵⁸ and that the latter had instructions drafted by the RKF Stabshauptamt concerning the reorganisation of the areas to be Germanised.⁸⁵⁹ It is only natural that these instructions should be found among the materials of the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte because they had been intended for the use of all the organs that were to implement the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policy.⁸⁶⁰

By the end of 1942, in addition to the standard operational procedures, which deal with the issues of the countryside and support for the settled Germans, the RKF Stabshauptamt had also drawn up standard operational instructions concerning the development of towns.⁸⁶¹ The standard operational procedures of the RKF Stabshauptamt were drafted in order to that the eastern areas might be developed in a uniform manner. The plans concerning the countryside were published early with the objective of creating general guidelines with help of which it would be possible first to obtain some experience and then to utilise it in operations that would take place after the

⁸⁵⁷ Aktennotiz Stanglicas für Globocnik vom 6. Oktober 1942 über Konflikte mit der Verwaltung des Distrikts Lublin. Dokument 3. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin"; *Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers*. 14/3/1942, pp. 379–380.

⁸⁵⁸ Esch 1996, pp. 64–65.

⁸⁵⁹ Among the documents of the Forschungsstelle there are numbers of the magazine *Neues Bauerntum* of January 1941 and February 1942 which contain the following general regulations of the RKF: Nr.7 / II Grundsätze und Richtlinien für den ländlichen Aufbau in den neuen Ostgebieten and Nr. 11 / II Festigung der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Umsiedlerdörfer in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten während der Kriegszeit. The documents include also the regulation of the RKF-Stabshauptamt for carrying out regulation 11 / II. APL 510 / 3 / 8.

⁸⁶⁰ Wasser 1993B, p. 39.

⁸⁶¹ Grundsätze und Richtlinien für den ländlichen Aufbau in den neuen Ostgebieten (Nr. 7/II 26/11/1940) Sofortige Festigung der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Umsiedlerdörfer in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten während Kriegszeit (Nr. 11/II 30/1/1942) Richtlinien für die Planung und Gestaltung der Städte in den eingegliederten deutschen Ostgebieten (Nr. 13/II 30.1.1942). RKF Stabshauptamt: Zusammenstellung der bis 31. Dezember 1942 erschienenen Allgemeinen Anordnungen, Anordnungen, Dienststanordnungen, Rundschreiben. 18/6/1943. BACh R 49 / 3.

war.⁸⁶² The chosen strategy was sensible with regard to the whole operation, and it reflected the National Socialist ideology's emphasis on the significance of the countryside.

In the instructions of the RKF Stabshauptamt concerning the countryside, the farm size was defined as 25–40 hectares, the objective being to establish farms that could support a family with several children. The villages were to form single units with a head village located at the centre and within walking distance of the smaller villages. The centres of the villages were to be constructed so as to provide the necessary services and to inspire a sense of community in the inhabitants. In addition to these objectives, the supply of energy with hydroelectric power plants was also addressed.⁸⁶³

The RKF Stabshauptamt wanted to dictate the Germanisation down to the smallest details. An example of this was *Allgemeine Anordnung 11/C* (General Order 11/C), which dealt with the improvement of cultural and economic conditions. It was published on 30/1/1942 and it concentrated above all on questions related to the improvement of the building stock.⁸⁶⁴ *Allgemeine Anordnung 11/C* was further clarified in February 1943 with a separate instruction concerning its implementation because it had not been carried out in the desired way.⁸⁶⁵ Another general order, *Allgemeine Anordnung 20/VI/42*, issued in December 1942 was connected to the development of the settlement, and it concentrated on questions related to landscaping.⁸⁶⁶ The order was exceptionally wide-ranging and comprehensive, but the matter was regarded as important because questions related to the landscape were considered to be crucial to the permanence of the German settlement.⁸⁶⁷ The instructions were supplemented with photographs portraying manmade landscapes in Mecklenburg and Schleswig-Holstein and with a drawing of a village plan in the area of Zichenau.⁸⁶⁸

If one examines the plans of the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte and the instructions given to it by the RKF Stabshauptamt and compares them with the plans of the RSHA and the RKF Stabshauptamt, it is evident that the work

⁸⁶² Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 7/II. Grundsätze und Richtlinien für den ländlichen Aufbau in den neuen Ostgebieten. 26/11/1940. BArch R 49 / 158.

⁸⁶³ Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 7/II. Grundsätze und Richtlinien für den ländlichen Aufbau in den neuen Ostgebieten. 26/11/1940. BArch R 49 / 158.

⁸⁶⁴ Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 11/II über die sofortige Festigung der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Umsiedlerdörfer in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten während der Kriegszeit. 30/1/1942. BArch R 49 / 4.

⁸⁶⁵ RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung 11 II of Hinweise zur Durchführung der Allgemeine/vom 30. Januar 1942 über die sofortige Festigung der kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse der Umsiedlerdörfer in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten während der Kriegszeit. 28/2/1943. BArch R 49 / 196.

⁸⁶⁶ Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 20/VI/42 über die Gestaltung der Landschaft in den eingegliederten Gebieten. 21/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 4.

⁸⁶⁷ The order was as follows: "Sollen daher die neuen Lebensräume den Siedlern Heimat werden, so ist die planvolle und naturnahe Gestaltung der Landschaft eine entscheidende Voraussetzung. Sie ist eine der Grundlagen für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums." Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 20/VI/42 über die Gestaltung der Landschaft in den eingegliederten Gebieten. 21/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 4.

⁸⁶⁸ Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 20/VI/42 über die Gestaltung der Landschaft in den eingegliederten Gebieten. 21/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 4.

of the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte was in accordance with the broader National Socialist policies. The most important fact, however, is that the representatives of the SS operating in Distrikt Lublin were ready to include the systematic genocide of the Polish population in the execution of their plans.

Aly, Heim and Eisenblätter claim the Poles to be expelled were to be divided into groups according to their ability to work and their political reliability. The screening was to be followed by the deportation of children and old persons to remote areas, the expulsion of those able to work into forced labour and the killing of the undesirable elements of the adult population.⁸⁶⁹ According an instruction drawn up by Office IVB4 of the RSHA the Poles who were classified for deportation were to be divided into four groups (I - IV).⁸⁷⁰ It was estimated that 5% of the population would be placed in Groups I and II, 74% in Group III, while Group IV would account for 21%.⁸⁷¹

The members of Groups I and II were to be sent to Lodz for Germanisation. Members of Group III would consist of those Poles who had been assigned to forced labour, and persons belonging to Group IV were to be either exterminated or expelled from the area.⁸⁷² The systematic extermination was to be directed at persons of working age in Group IV, who were to be transported to Birkenau as a work force.⁸⁷³ In practice, this meant almost certain death because Birkenau was that part of Auschwitz that specialised in the systematic, large-scale extermination of human beings.⁸⁷⁴

Members of Group III who were able to work were to be sent to Berlin as forced labour, except for those who were designated to provide the labour required in the area of Zamosc or who were classified as good or excellent farmers. The latter group was to be placed on farms designated *Z-Höfe*.⁸⁷⁵ Those farms would be located in villages called *Z-Dörfer* (*Z* stood for *zusammengelegte* = consolidated).⁸⁷⁶ The Polish population of those villages would serve as farm labourers for the German population.⁸⁷⁷

⁸⁶⁹ See for example Aly & Heim 1991, pp. 433–435; Eisenblätter 1969, p. 220.

⁸⁷⁰ Anweisungen des SS-Obersturmbannführers H. Krumej betreffend die Klassifikation der polnischen Aussiedler im Lager in Zamość. 21/11/1942. Dokument 57. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*; Müller - Himmler. 31/10/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 43. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*. The group designations were the racial ones used by the RuSHA: *RuS I rassisch gut, RuS II rassisch gut, RuS III nicht rückdeutschungsfähig, RuS IV rassisch unerwünscht*. For example, see Heinemann 2003, p. 257.

⁸⁷¹ Wasser 1993B, pp. 141–142.

⁸⁷² Müller - Himmler. 31/10/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

⁸⁷³ Anweisungen des SS-Obersturmbannführers H. Krumej betreffend die Klassifikation der polnischen Aussiedler im Lager in Zamość. 21/11/1942. Dokument 57. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁸⁷⁴ Hilberg 1999, pp. 943–948.

⁸⁷⁵ Anweisungen des SS-Obersturmbannführers H. Krumej betreffend die Klassifikation der polnischen Aussiedler im Lager in Zamość. 21/11/1942. Dokument 57. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁸⁷⁶ Wasser 1993B, p. 176.

⁸⁷⁷ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 69 / 923; available in print: Dokument 60. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

Persons not of working age in Groups III and IV were to be placed in so-called *Rentendörfer* (pension villages),⁸⁷⁸ which it was planned to establish in Distrikt Radom. The objective was to place about 2000 expelled Poles there with about 200 persons located in each *Kreis*.⁸⁷⁹ However, this number of persons proved to be too small, and later documents mention that the objective was fact to place there about 5000–6000 persons comprising 2000 families.⁸⁸⁰ Distrikt Radom was not to be the only area that was to receive the expelled Poles: Distrikt Warschau was also designated to take in some of the expelled population.⁸⁸¹

The plans relating to the Germanisation project were further linked to the genocide of the Jews because the persons to be placed in the *Rentendörfer* would replace Jews,⁸⁸² and because the SS organisation planned to substitute Poles from Zamosc for the Jews working in the armaments industry.⁸⁸³ The plan to exterminate the Jews of Berlin and replace of them with Polish labour as well as the systematic murder of the Poles in Auschwitz is revealed in the correspondence of the SS. This also yields information about the numbers of people who were to be expelled from the area of Zamosc. The objective was to send two trainloads of 1000 persons to Berlin every week. Correspondingly, it was planned to send three trainloads of 1000 Poles to Auschwitz every week.⁸⁸⁴

The plans of Globocnik's organs show how a regional SS organisation embraced the genocidal plans of the RSHA and was willing to carry them out. Globocnik's Germanisation project also meets the demands expected of a model operation in so far as it involved applying the policy of the head office in practice. Thus, it is possible to use Globocnik's operation as an example of how the SS would have tried to carry out its future plans in the east, and what the consequences would have been.

⁸⁷⁸ Müller - Himmler. 31/10/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

⁸⁷⁹ Püschel: Vermerk: Besprechung am 23.11.1942 mit dem SS- und Polizeiführer, SS-Standartenführer Dr. Böttcher, Radom und dem Vertreter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle für den Distrikt Radom, SS-Obersturmbannführer Dopler. 24/11/1942. BArch R 75 / 14.

⁸⁸⁰ Püschel: Aktenvermerk. 5/12/1942. BArch R 75 / 14

⁸⁸¹ Fernschreiben des SS-Obersturmbannführers H. Krumej an den SS-Hauptsturmführer H. W. A. Püschel betreffend die Bestimmung von Orten als Rentendörfer. 2/12/1942. Dokument 67. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*. Wasser 1993B, p. 137.

⁸⁸² Aly & Heim 2004, pp. 433–437; Wasser 1993B, p. 121.

⁸⁸⁴ Telegramm des SS-Hauptsturmführers H. Günther an den SS-Obersturmbannführer H. Krumej über die Zurverfügungstellung von Transportzügen für ausgesiedelte Polen aus Zamość nach Berlin und Auschwitz. 26/10/1942. Dokument 40; Schreiben des SS-Hauptsturmführers H. Günther an den SS-Obersturmbannführer H. Krumej betreffend die Aussiedlung der Polen aus dem Gebiet von Zamość. 6/11/1942. Dokument 46. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

5.4 The preparation ends

Globocnik and the SS organisation of Distrikt Lublin had prepared to begin the Germanisation of the town of Zamosc and its surroundings during the late autumn of 1942. However, the commencement of the operation required a clear written authorisation from Himmler, but the matter was buried in the RKF Stabshauptamt. The authorisation was extremely important because, while the administration of the Generalgouvernement supported the notion of Germanisation, it basically resisted the idea of putting it into effect in wartime. Thus Globocnik needed a clear indication of the support of the Reichsführer-SS, but he had to wait for it almost up to the commencement of the Germanisation operation because it was not until 12/11/1942 that Himmler finally issued the directive.⁸⁸⁵

The RKF Stabshauptamt was responsible for the delay in issuing the important authorisation. The preparation of the directive took time and it was only at beginning of November 1942 that it was sent to be signed by the Reichsführer-SS. The reason for the procrastination was most probably the fact that the RKF Stabshauptamt was not very confident about the ability of the SS to carry out all the tasks related to the Germanisation operation in the Generalgouvernement. This is clearly evident in the covering letter attached the settlement directive.⁸⁸⁶

⁸⁸⁵ The regulation is known by the name “Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 17C des Reichsführers-SS, Chef der Deutschen Polizei und Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums über die Bestimmung eines ersten Siedlungsbereiches im Generalgouvernement”. The date of the document is 12/11/1942, and it states that it was drawn up in the RKF-Stabshauptamt in Berlin-Halensee. It is possible to find the document in series R 49, R 69 and NS 19 in the Bundesarchiv. It is also printed in volume 1 of *Zamojszczyzna – Sonderlaboratorium SS* as document number 52.

⁸⁸⁶ Greifelt's letter read as follows:
Reichsführer!

Die hiesige Dienststelle hat befehlsgemäss in Zusammenarbeit mit SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger, dem Reichssicherheitshauptamt und dem Leiter der Einwandererzentralstelle den beiliegenden Entwurf für eine Allgemeine Anordnung ausgearbeitet.

Die praktische Bedeutung dieser Anordnung wird vor allem darin bestehen, dass die Bestimmung unter Ziffer 2 c zusammen mit der Bestimmung unter Ziffer 4 d die Möglichkeit gibt, Volksdeutsche aus dem Generalgouvernement „Umsiedler“ durch die Einwandererzentralstelle nach den Weisungen von SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger einzubürgern. Generalgouverneur Frank hatte bekanntlich gegen die von Reichsführer-SS getroffene Entscheidung, dass die Volksdeutschen im Generalgouvernement ganz allgemein durch die Einwandererzentralstelle und nicht durch die innere Verwaltung des Generalgouvernements eingebürgert werden sollte, beim Innenminister Einspruch erheben. Alle beteiligten Dienststellen, insbesondere auch die Referenten des Innenministeriums, stehen auf dem Standpunkt, dass der Einspruch des Generalgouverneurs Frank gegen die Zuständigkeit der Einwandererzentralstelle in allgemeinen Einbürgerungssachen nicht verhindern kann, dass Volksdeutsche aus dem Generalgouvernement als Umsiedler so wie alle anderen Umsiedler durch die Einwandererzentralstelle eingebürgert werden.

Um Einsprüche des Generalgouverneurs gegen die vorliegende Anordnung möglichst zu erschweren, erschien es ferner angebracht, die Anordnung von vorherin auch die Führerweisung vom 18.8.1942 über verantwortliche Führung der Bandenbekämpfung durch den Reichsführer-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei zu stützen, und dadurch den

In spite of the hesitation of the RKF Stabshauptamt, the directive for the Germanisation project was issued, and Kreis Zamosc (*Bereich Nr. II/10/I GG*) was designated to be the first area to be settled with Germans in the Generalgouvernement. The RKF Stabshauptamt did not consider the authorisation of Himmler as RKF to be sufficient and sought to have it reinforced with an order based on his position as responsible for counterterrorist activities.⁸⁸⁷

The uncertainty is also reflected in the parts of the order relating to the inhabitants. The new inhabitants of the area were to be the Germans of Bosnia and those Germans who were threatened in their places of residence in the occupied territories, as well as the *Volksdeutsche* and the *Deutschstämmige* of Kreis Zamosc and other areas of the Generalgouvernement who were in distress in their domiciles or who had to be resettled for security reasons. Additionally, the authorisation reserved the possibility of using other separately defined groups of people on a case-by-case basis.⁸⁸⁸ The plans to settle the area above all with endangered Germans visibly reflect the basic strategy of the eastern plans of the RKF Stabshauptamt to locate people of German descent in concentrated areas in order to improve security, but the idea was not to settle a specially defined and uniform group of *Volksdeutsche* in Kreis Zamosc.

The views related to the acquisition of inhabitants are also indicative of the confusion in the National Socialist demographic reorganisation policy. In the camps of the Vomi, there were tens of thousands of people whom it would have been possible to settle in the town of Zamosc and its surroundings, but attention was rather focused on the Germans of Bosnia, whose transferral was only at a preparatory stage, and the RKF Stabshauptamt did not issue

Siedlungsmaßnahmen im Bezirk Lublin von vornherein ein betont sicherheitspolizeiliches Gepräge zu geben.

Es wird gehorsamst gebeten, den beteiligten Entwurf unterschriftlich zu vollziehen und zur Versendung an die hiesige Dienststelle zurückzuleiten.

Der Chef des Stabshauptamtes

Greifelt

SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei

Greifelt - Himmler 11 / 42. Entry stamp 6/11/1942. BAArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 45. Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.

⁸⁸⁷ The order was as follows: "*Auf Grund des Erlasses des Führers und Reichskanzlers vom 7.10.1939 und der Führerweisung über die verantwortliche Führung der Bandenbekämpfung durch den Reichsführer SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei vom 18.8.1942 ordne ich an.*" Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 17C. 12/11/1942. BAArch R 49 / 2.

⁸⁸⁸ The authorisation stated:

Der Bereich II Der Bereich/10/I GG soll die neue gesicherte Heimat werden für

a) Umsiedler aus Bosnien

b) gefährdete volksdeutsche Umsiedler aus den besetzten Ostgebieten c) Volksdeutsche und Deutschstämmige aus dem übrigen Generalgouvernement, die zur Behebung ihrer jetzigen Notlage oder aus sicherheitspolizeilichen Gründen in den Bereich II/10/I GG oder innerhalb dieses Bereiches umgesiedelt werden müssen

c) sonstige Umsiedlergruppen, die ich für den Ansatz im Bereich II Ansatz im Bereich/10/I GG im einzelnen bestimme.

Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 17C. 12/11/1942. BAArch R 49 / 2.

instructions for it until December 1942.⁸⁸⁹ These instructions designated Distrikt Lublin as the target area for their settlement.⁸⁹⁰ At the same time, other instructions were issued designating Distrikt Lublin as the settlement area for a few other small groups.⁸⁹¹

The Germanisation operation was to be completed by summer 1943, and the objective was to populate the town of Zamosc and the surrounding area of Kreis Zamosc with Germans. As the representative of the Reichsführer-SS and the Staatssekretär für Sicherheitswesen, HSSPF Krüger was to be responsible for carrying out the operation. However, he was not left solely responsible for its implementation because the Einwandererzentralstelle (EWZ) and the Deutsche Umsiedlungs- und Treuhand GmbH (DUT) were ordered to share the responsibility for carrying out the operation, and Krüger was authorised to use any other necessary organs too. Furthermore, Himmler assigned *Reichsgesundheitsführer* (Reich Health Leader) to help Krüger, and he was asked to take care of questions related to the public health service for the population of German descent who were to be settled.⁸⁹²

The handling of organisational matters was perfunctory, their most peculiar feature being the special emphasis that was placed on the activities of the EWZ. The second interesting feature is the emphasis on the importance of Krüger, even though the major influence behind the project was Globocnik. Possibly the reason for Krüger's authority was his position as *Staatssekretär* in the administration of the Generalgouvernement because the expulsion of the Polish population was an essential part to the operation. Since this had already caused problems at the *Distrikt* level in the autumn of 1941, it was perhaps thought that the transfer of the responsibility for this to the level of the central administration might ease the situation.⁸⁹³

In addition to plans related to the demographic reorganization, attention was paid to planning the use of land, and plans were ordered to be drawn up on the basis of the earlier RKF directives. Unspecified representatives of Himmler in the Generalgouvernement were to be responsible for them, and the

⁸⁸⁹ Anordnung 82/I (Umsiedlerbegriff Bosnien. 8/12/1942). Anordnung 85/I (Bestimmung des Ansatzgebietes für die Bosniendeutschen. 9/12/1942). RKF Stabshauptamt: Zusammenstellung der bis 31. Anordnungen, Anordnungen, Dienstanordnungen von Dezember 1942 erschienenen Allgemeine, Rundschreiben. 18/6/1943. BArch R 49 / 3.

⁸⁹⁰ RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 82/I: Umsiedlerbegriff Bosnien. 8/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 5; RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung 85/I: Bestimmung des Ansatzgebietes für die Bosniendeutschen. 9/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 5.

⁸⁹¹ RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 84/I. Bestimmung des Ansatzgebietes für die Baltennachumsiedler. 9/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 5; available in print: Dokument 74. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*; RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 83/I. Bestimmung des Ansatzgebietes für Umsiedler. 9/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 5. It is worth noting that the idea of settling a small number of Germans from Belarus and Bulgaria in Distrikt Lublin gave rise to quite a large amount of correspondence. Some documents related to the matter are available in print: Dokument 240. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*. Dokument 280, Dokument 310, Dokument 328, Dokument 373, Dokument 381, Dokument 402, Dokument 405. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

⁸⁹² Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 17C. 12/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 2.

⁸⁹³ Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 17C. 12/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 2.

finished plans were to be handed over to the RKF for Himmler's acceptance.⁸⁹⁴ It is probable that the plans would have been drawn up by the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte because it was the organ of the SS that was most specialised in this field of activity.

Examined as a whole, the Germanisation project was constructed on a flimsy basis because the preparation was not discussed exhaustively with the authorities of the Generalgouvernement in spite of the Himmler's order. This is indicated in the last part of the settlement regulations, in which it is apparent that the preparation of questions related to the acquisition and management of land had not been handled properly.⁸⁹⁵ The SS intended to take care of the acquisition of land independently, and the establishment of a *Bodenamt* to work under Krüger was ordered in December 1942. Its task was to obtain land for the use of the RKF Stabshauptamt.⁸⁹⁶ The definition of SS policy had been expected because on 10/11/1942 HSSPF Krüger had already in his own name issued an order concerning the expropriation of farms.⁸⁹⁷

The questions related to land acquisition anticipated problems that arose later, but these were anyway to be expected because the regulations were not distributed to the authorities of the Generalgouvernement at all. The line chosen by the SS is reflected in the fact that the regulations were only sent to following organs and persons:

Reichsministerium für das Inneren
 Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft
 Hauptamt für Volkstumsfragen der NSDAP
 Reichsgesundheitsführer
 HSSPF Ost
 Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS
 The Director of the RSHA
 The Director of the RuSHA
 Vomi
 The Berlin office of the EWZ.⁸⁹⁸

It should be noted that the regulation was not sent to the Umwandererzentralstelle, (UWZ), which was the organ responsible for demographic expulsions. However, the information about the operation did

⁸⁹⁴ Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 17C. 12/11/1942. BA R 49 / 2.

⁸⁹⁵ The order was as follows: "*Wegen der Finanzierung der Siedlungs- und Neuordnungsaufgaben, der Regelung der Eigentumsverhältnisse am Grund und Boden und der Durchführung der festgestellten Pläne werde ich im Benehmen mit der Regierung des Generalgouvernements und den sonst zuständigen Stellen noch Anordnungen treffen.*" Reichsführer-SS, RKF: Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 17C. 12/11/1942. BA R 49 / 2.

⁸⁹⁶ RKF Stabshauptamt: Dienstanordnung Nr. 144. 23/12/1942. BA R 49 / 9. Also: RKF Stabshauptamt: Zusammenstellung der bis 31. Anordnungen, Anordnungen, Dienstanordnungen of Dezember 1942 erschienenen Allgemeine, Rundschreiben. 18/6/1943. BA R 49 / 3.

⁸⁹⁷ Anordnung Nr. 3 des SS-Obergruppenführers F. W. Krüger, die die Grundsätze der Beschlagnahme der Grossgutsbetriebe, die in SS- und Polizeistützpunkte umgestaltet werden, festlegt. 10/11/1942. Dokument 49. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁸⁹⁸ Anlage zur Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 17C vom 12. Nov. 1942. Verteilerschlüssel. BA R 49 / 2.

reach the UWZ because it is known that an order to establish an office of the UWZ in Zamosc was issued on 21/10/1942.⁸⁹⁹ Questions connected with the Umwandererzentralstelle are significant because the organ in question was in a very central position with regard to the whole Germanisation operation.

The distribution of the directive was otherwise exceptional because usually general directives from the RKF Stabshauptamt were also communicated to Generalgouverneur Frank and more than 40 other significant actors.⁹⁰⁰ The situation in question obviously arose from the fact that the order had been classified as secret.⁹⁰¹ This apparently meant that it had to be concealed from all persons and organs outside the RKF organisation, because other directives of the RKF Stabshauptamt were hardly intended for distribution to an audience wider than the National Socialist administration either.

It was probably thought in the SS organisation that Krüger's position as Staatssekretär für Sicherheitswesen was enough to ensure that the information would be passed on to the administration of the Generalgouvernement, or then the idea was to begin the Germanisation operation without heeding the civil authorities since they had already been informed about the project during the spring and summer of 1942. Both alternatives are possible, and the situation did not improve because the relations between Frank and Krüger became more strained towards the end of 1942,⁹⁰² and in December 1942 Himmler had to send Reichsgesundheitsführer Leonardo Conti to Cracow to sort out Krüger's problems.⁹⁰³ Furthermore, the relations between Krüger and Globocnik became inflamed⁹⁰⁴ as the preparation of the Germanisation project ended and its realisation began.

The situation was unusual in other respects as well, and the directive was not passed on to Globocnik or his organisation at all. However, he received information about the issuing of the directive on 16/11/1942 because he had asked the representatives of the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS to inform him when it happened.⁹⁰⁵ Globocnik's independent initiative is by no means surprising, but it can be considered an indication of his understanding of the situation and of his desire to be able to execute the project as quickly as possible after it obtained sufficiently strong support from Himmler.

An examination of the settlement directive and its preparation and distribution allows us to form a picture of a situation in which an *SS und*

⁸⁹⁹ Wasser 1993B, p. 112.

⁹⁰⁰ Anordnungen des Reichskommissars für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums of Verteiler für die Allgemeine. BArch R 49 / 4.

⁹⁰¹ RKF Stabshauptamt: Zusammenstellung der bis 31. Dezember 1942 erschienenen Allgemeine Anordnungen, Anordnungen, Dienstanordnungen, Rundschreiben. 18/6/1943. BArch R 49 / 3.

⁹⁰² Krüger described the matter in his messages to Himmler: Krüger: Bericht. Personalangelegenheit SS-Oberführer Dr. Schöngarth. 25/11/1942. BArch NS 19 / 2028; Krüger - Himmler. 25/11/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2653; Krüger - Himmler. 15/12/1942. BArch NS 19 / 806.

⁹⁰³ Himmler - Krüger. 24/12/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2653.

⁹⁰⁴ Globocnik - Wolff. Telegram. 24/11/1942. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

⁹⁰⁵ Meine - Globocnik 16/11/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3607; *available* in print: Dokument 55. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

Polizeiführer who had direct contact with the *Reichsführer-SS* was able in the face of severe obstacles to push through a project that no-one else considered important, and the implementation of which could not be justified. The final result was a situation in which the preparation of the project was concealed especially from the administration of the Generalgouvernement even though the matter had been discussed at the levels of central, regional and local administration.

That the concealment was intentional is indicated by the fact that the directive for this Germanisation project was, apart from the regulation concerning the property of the Jews of the Generalgouvernement, the only classified general directive made by the RKF Stabshauptamt between 1939 and 1942.⁹⁰⁶ This observation is supported by the fact that the officials of the Generalgouvernement had to make inquiries about the activities of the SS. An example of that is a report of the Kreishauptmann of Zamosc, which he sent to Gouverneur Zörner and to Staatssekretär Bühler at the beginning of November 1942.⁹⁰⁷ According to the report, it had not yet been possible to obtain enough information about the Germanisation project of the SS to form a clear picture about it, but there were already three SS organs in the area that were connected with the operation. These organs were the RKF Stabshauptamt, the Einwandererzentralstelle and the Umwandererzentralstelle, and their respective leaders were Obersturmführer Adolf Bareuther, Sturmbannführer Franz Herold and Obersturmbannführer Hermann Krumej.⁹⁰⁸

The Kreishauptmann had succeeded in getting information about the operation from Bareuther and Krumej. At that time, it had appeared that the first deportation and settlement action was to take place in the area of the village of Skierbieszow and that the operation was to begin at the earliest on 15/11/1942. The objective of the SS was to Germanise first the countryside and after that continue the operation in the town of Zamosc, from which the almost the whole Polish population was to be expelled. The Kreishauptmann was also familiar with the plans of the SS about the segregation of the Polish population into separate groups, and he knew that the objective was to send part of it as forced labour to the area of Berlin and Brandenburg, to place children and old persons in separate villages and to transport a section of the population to Auschwitz.⁹⁰⁹

Even though the SS had attempted to conceal the operation, its members had passed on very detailed information about it and even had hoped for the cooperation of the Kreishauptmann in designating those Poles who were to be left in the area.⁹¹⁰ Thus the overall view we get of the actions of the

⁹⁰⁶ RKF Stabshauptamt: Zusammenstellung der bis 31. Anordnungen, Anordnungen, Dienstordnungen of Dezember 1942 erschienenen Allgemeine, Rundschreiben. 18/6/1943. BArch R 49 / 3.

⁹⁰⁷ Weißenmaier - Zörner, Bühler. 3/11/1942. BArch R 102 II / 11; *available* in print: Dokument 44. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁹⁰⁸ Weißenmaier - Zörner, Bühler. 3/11/1942. BArch R 102 II / 11.

⁹⁰⁹ Weißenmaier - Zörner, Bühler. 3/11/1942. BArch R 102 II / 11.

⁹¹⁰ Weißenmaier - Zörner, Bühler. 3/11/1942. BArch R 102 II / 11.

representatives of the SS is contradictory. However, it is possible to conjecture that Bareuther and Krumej had assumed that they were talking to persons who staunchly supported the National Socialist racial ideology. It also is probable that Krumej and Bareuther knew that the Kreishauptmann had met Himmler and assumed that he looked favourably on the project. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the Kreishauptmann was not known to have opposed the project in earlier connections.

The most central feature of the report of the Kreishauptmann is the up-to-date, clear and truthful picture it gives of the coming Germanisation operation. The level of the information it contains is understandable because earlier in September 1942 the Kreishauptmann had obviously been ordered to observe the SS operation.⁹¹¹ In addition to that, the authorities of Distrikt Lublin had also had some preliminary information about the plan of the SS concerning its re-organising of the area.⁹¹²

The only significant part of the organisation that the Kreishauptmann did not mention was the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, which is mentioned in the documents of the local SS organisation later on.⁹¹³ The Vomi reacted to the Germanisation project late and only on 9/11/1942 did it issue an order concerning the matter. This concerned the organisational structure, which was to consist of three organs: The *Einsatzführung Zamosc*, which was to be responsible for the administration would naturally be located in Zamosc. The other organs were an *Ansiedlungslager* (Settlement Camp) and an *Auffanglager* (Reception Camp) located in Cholm. The leader of the operation was Untersturmführer Otte, who was stationed in Zamosc.⁹¹⁴

The *Einsatzführung Zamosc* was not the only organ of the Vomi in the area because Hauptsturmführer Klemens is known to have been the head of the Umsiedlung branch of the Vomi on the staff of the SSPF Lublin.⁹¹⁵ His task was to organise the support of the Vomi for the settled population of German descent.⁹¹⁶ The picture we get of the local organisation of the Vomi is further clarified by the fact that the *Einsatzführung Zamosc* was established by the *Umsiedlung* department of *Einsatzstab Litzmannstadt* of the Vomi, located in Lodz, to handle the expulsion and settlement activities in Zamosc.⁹¹⁷ However, the Vomi was also permanently represented in the Generalgouvernement with

⁹¹¹ Weißenmaier - Zörner, Bühler. 3/11/1942. BArch R 102 II / 11.

⁹¹² Aktennotiz Stanglicas für Globocnik vom 6. Oktober 1942 über Konflikte mit der Verwaltung des Distrikts Lublin. Dokument 3. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁹¹³ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 69 / 923; available in print: Dokument 60. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

⁹¹⁴ Perthen / Einsatzstab Litzmannstadt / Umsiedlung / Vomi / RKF: Befehl Nr. 199. 9/11/1942. BArch R 59 / 226.

⁹¹⁵ Klemens / Abteilung Umsiedlung / Vomi / Der SS- und Polizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin: Dienstanweisung: Anschaffungen zu Lasten der Dienststelle. 17/11/1942. APL 510 / 2 / 1.

⁹¹⁶ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 69 / 923.

⁹¹⁷ Perthen / Einsatzstab Litzmannstadt / Umsiedlung / Vomi / RKF: Befehl Nr. 199. 9/11/1942. BArch R 59 / 226.

branches at both the *Kreis* and *Distrikt* levels. The organisation established for the Germanisation project was also mentioned by name (*Beauftragte im Ansiedlungsgebiet*, Representatives in the Area of Settlement) in a document describing the permanent organisation. Its strength was 20 persons, while the strength of the other organs in Distrikt Lublin was 11 persons, in addition to which there were altogether seven officials in the various *Kreise*.⁹¹⁸

The RKF Stabshauptamt also reacted late to the actual beginning of the Germanisation operation. However, it did not consider it necessary to send its representatives to Lublin, and it merely issued some orders touching on the operation. For example, *Allgemeine Anordnung 18/C*, which ordered the real estate of the Jews of the Generalgouvernement to be utilised above all for the settlement of the German population, was clearly connected with the Germanisation project.⁹¹⁹ This order also included other directions. One of them applied to the Bodenamt which was to be established in Cracow. Its tasks were connected with the acquisition of land for the Germanisation project and the implementation of *Allgemeine Anordnung 18/C*.⁹²⁰

In addition to regulations concerning property, towards the end of 1942 the RKF Stabshauptamt issued orders concerning construction activities.⁹²¹ The objective was to keep building under control, centrally administered and carefully planned. The idea was that the RKF Stabshauptamt would establish for each individual building project an organ called *RK-Bauleitung* (RK Construction Management Office), which would operate according to a plan approved by the RKF Stabshauptamt.⁹²² Special attention was paid to ensuring that the local RKF representatives would not be able to interfere suddenly in the building projects.⁹²³

⁹¹⁸ Weibgen: Etatvoranschlag. 23/11/1942. APL 510 / 2 / 1.

⁹¹⁹ The order was as follows: "Das gesamte unbewegliche Vermögen der Juden im Generalgouvernement ist MIT sofortiger Wirkung zur Verwertung für Zwecke der Festigung deutschen Volkstums (insbesonder zum Ansatz von Umsiedlern und andern bevorrechtigten Bewerber) zur Verfügung zu stellen." Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 18/C des Reichsführer-SS und Chef der Polizei of Deutsche, Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums über die Behandlung jüdischen Vermögens im Generalgouvernement. 15/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 4.

⁹²⁰ The order was as follows: "Dem Bodenamt liegt die Bearbeitung mit der Durchführung der Allgemeinen Anordnung Nr. 18/C zusammenhängenden Fragen Ob. Darüber hinaus ist das Bodenamt zuständig für die Erfassung sonstigen Grundbesitzes, der im Gebiet des Generalgouvernements für Zwecke der Festigung deutschen Volkstums benötigt wird." RKF Stabshauptamt: Dienstanordnung Nr. 144. 23/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 9.

⁹²¹ Anordnung 76/VII (Baumaßnahmen, die vom Rk.f.d.F.dt.V. Stabshauptamt als Bauherr durchgeführt werden. 5/11/1942). Anordnung 77/VII (Aufstellung von RK-Bauleitungen. 6/11/1942). Anordnung 78/VII (Mittlbereitstellung für Baumassnahmen des Rk.f.d.F.dt.V. als Bauherr. 2/12/1942.) Anordnung 81/VII (Bauunterhalt. 2/11/1942). RKF Stabshauptamt: Zusammenstellung der bis 31. Anordnungen, Anordnungen, Dienstanordnungen von Dezember 1942 erschienenen Allgemeine, Rundschreiben. 18/6/1943. BArch R 49 / 3.

⁹²² RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 76/VII. Baumassnahmen, die vom Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums Stabshauptamt als Bauherr durchgeführt werden. 5/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 5.

⁹²³ The matter was stated as follows:
Zur Durchführung wird vom Stabshauptamt eine RK-Bauleitung aufgestellt und aus Bauleitungsmitteln besoldet. Sie ist verantwortlich für die sach- und fachgemäße

The regulations concerning building activities also show that the objective was to bring the earlier projects to completion and to place all RKF construction activities under the authority of Sturmbannführer Hubert Karl.⁹²⁴ This was influenced by the growth of the power of the WVHA. An office called *Amt Bauten* (Construction Office), which as the name suggests was dedicated to building activities, was established on 15/6/1942 in the RKF Stabshauptamt. On the suggestion of Hans Kammler, Himmler had appointed Sturmbannführer Karl from the WVHA as its head. When the *Amt Bauten* was established, the organs of the *Amt Planung* (Planning Office) responsible for construction were closed down.⁹²⁵

In organising the construction activities, the organs of the RK-Bauleitung also came under consideration. The chiefs were to be appointed by Office C VII of the RKF Stabshauptamt in mutual agreement with the RKF representatives. The objective was that the heads of the RK-Bauleitung organs should operate under the command of the RKF representatives' chiefs of staff or of *Baureferenten* (building consultants). The *Zentralbauleitungen* and *Bauinspektionen der Waffen-SS und Polizei* and also the *SS-Wirtschaftler* (SS Economists) stationed in the occupied territories were to be responsible for the supervision of the RK-Bauleitung organs.⁹²⁶

While the regulations relating to construction activities cannot be connected directly with Globocnik's Germanisation project, representatives of the WVHA started to curb the independent initiative of the RKF representatives before Globocnik really got going and initiated very large building projects. It is probable that the WVHA had not forgotten some of Globocnik's earlier projects.

The termination of the preparatory phase of the Globocnik's Germanisation project can be described as chaotic because the directive required by the operation was delayed, and when it was finally issued, the RKF Stabshauptamt clearly continued to entertain suspicions about the project. It is not possible to perceive any similar misgivings among the organs of the RSHA, and not only the EWZ but also the UWZ extended their operations into Distrikt Lublin without hesitation, even though the expansion of activities there entailed reductions elsewhere. Even Heydrich's death did not seem to affect the eagerness of the institutions of the RSHA. Obviously, this was a result of the fact that Himmler had temporarily taken charge of the RSHA after Heydrich's death.⁹²⁷

Durchführung des Bauvorhabens nach den genehmigten Vorentwürfen. Wünsche oder Befehle der Beauftragten können nur soweit berücksichtigt werden, als dadurch das Bauvorhaben keine wesentliche Änderung erfährt, keinerlei Mehrkosten oder ordnungsgemäße Durchführung und Abwicklung des Bauvorhabens nicht gefährdet ist...

RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 76/VII. Baumaßnahmen, die vom Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums Stabshauptamt als Bauherr durchgeführt werden. 5/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 5.

⁹²⁴ RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 76/VII. Baumaßnahmen, die vom Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums Stabshauptamt als Bauherr durchgeführt werden. 5/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 5.

⁹²⁵ RKF Stabshauptamt: Organisation des Bauwesens. 15/6/1942. BArch R 49 / 11.

⁹²⁶ RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 77/VII. Aufstellung von RK-Bauleitungen. 6/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 5.

⁹²⁷ Wildt 2003, p 679–684.

Taken as a whole, the SS, with the exception of the RKF Stabshauptamt, organised itself quite well for the Germanisation project, because Globocnik succeeded in getting organs representing all the necessary institutions in Distrikt Lublin. The separate representation sent by the RKF Stabshauptamt to the area was not even necessary as such, because Globocnik was able to use his own planning organisation, and he also managed to establish a local nominal RKF office independently. The only thing that Globocnik did seem to lack was a population of German descent.

6 THE FIRST STAGE OF THE GERMANISATION OPERATION

The SS started the operation for the Germanisation of the area of Zamosc at the end of November 1942. The operation was divided into two stages, of which the first was carried out in the winter of 1942 and 1943. The first measures already gave some indication that the implementation of the SS plans would weaken the security situation because the Polish population of the area began to engage in resistance activities. The increasing unrest drew the attention of the administration of the Generalgouvernement, and the Germanisation operation also led to an internal conflict within the National Socialist administration.

Our examination of the first part of the Germanisation project is divided into four parts; the first deals with the order for the operation, the second with the operation itself, and the third and fourth with its consequences and immediate aftermath. It is possible to create an exact picture of the operation with the help of the documents of the SS organs in Lublin and Zamosc. An in-depth examination of the problems related to the operation allows us a more thorough examination of how the SS organisation operated, in accordance with the objective of this study.

The most important new information is connected to details of the execution of the Germanisation operation, such as its geographical progress and the problems it encountered in practice. When the examination of the implementation phase is connected to information about the preparatory phase of the operation, it is possible to form a clearer overall view than has hitherto been the case. This, in turn, makes it possible to estimate the ability of the SS to carry out wider-ranging ideological demographic reorganization projects in corresponding circumstances, which is the object of this study.

6.1 The order for the implementation of the operation

Globocnik's order to carry out the first phase of the Germanisation operation in Kreis Zamosc was dated 22/11/1942. It defined a chain of command and gave broad instructions for carrying out the required measures in practice.⁹²⁸ Globocnik had attached to his order a classified covering letter, in which he informed the recipients of the background factors and objectives of the operation.⁹²⁹ Since Globocnik's letter gives information directly about his ideas regarding the operation, it deserves a closer examination.

Globocnik emphasised that it was an exceptional assignment because its outcome would be a new home for *Volksdeutsche* arriving from all over Europe. It would make possible the formation of a permanent German settlement, which in turn would ensure that all the conquered areas remained under the control of the Third Reich. Globocnik expected that the recipients would carry out his order precisely and would understand the situation of the population to be settled the area, and he promised to help in the execution of the project to the best of his ability.⁹³⁰

⁹²⁸ It is possible to find this order signed by Globocnik in folder number 3533 of series R 49 and in folder 923 of R 69 in the Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde. The title of the document is: "Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc".

⁹²⁹ Globocnik: An unser Mitarbeiter! Not dated. BArch R 49 / 3533; available in print: Dokument 59. Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.

⁹³⁰ The covering letter was as follows:
An alle Mitarbeiter!

In der Anlage übergebe ich Ihnen den Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung. Die Ansiedlung erfolgt auf unmittelbaren Befehl des Reichsführers-SS. Dieser Befehl ist für uns eine Verpflichtung, die über den Rahmen einer normalen Befehlsdurchführung hinausgeht, denn der Reichsführer-SS erwartet von uns nicht die formale Erledigung seines Willens, sondern er erwartet von uns, daß wir den aus allen Teilen Europas zusammengewanderten Volksdeutschen hier einen neue Heimat und ein gesundes Leben ausbauen, um die Voraussetzung einer Entwicklung künftiger Generationen zu schaffen. Die Sicherung aller eroberten Gebieten für die Zukunft hängt allein von der Verwurzelung deutscher Menschen in diesem Boden ab. Wer hier einen Fehler macht oder diese Aufgabe zu leichtfertig anfaßt, schädigt das deutsche Volk in seinem künftigen Bestand und ist ein solches Vergehen schwerster Verrat an unserer Pflicht.

Ich erwarte daher von allen Beteiligten restlosen Einsatz, bedingungslose Durchführung der Aufgabe und Verstehen der Menschen. Nur mit viel Geduld und Verstehen der Nöte, vor allem mit richtiger Lenkung und Führung dieser Menschen, die außerhalb des deutschen Volkes gelebt und unter fremdem Volkstum gelitten haben, kann die Aufgabe erfüllt werden. Hier ist nicht maßgebend, welche Sprache einer spricht, hier ist nicht maßgebend, ob er über alle Kenntnisse verfügt, die heute dem Deutschen Selbstverständlichkeit geworden sind, hier ist nur maßgebend, daß deutsches Blut gerettet ist und diese Blut zur Sicherung und Festigung unseres gesamten Volkstums für die Zukunft eingesetzt werden soll.

Ich erwarte daher die restlose Durchführung meines Befehls und bin jederzeit da, wo es zu helfen gibt. In dieser Disziplin und diesem Vertrauen zueinander wollen wir dem Befehl des Reichsführers-SS nachkommen.

Globocnik

SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant d. Polizei

Globocnik: An alle Mitarbeiter! Not dated. BArch R 49 / 3533.

Globocnik seems to have been thoroughly convinced about his project, and his order was detailed and carefully designed. It was sent to all the leaders of the organs needed in the operation and to a large group of other individuals in positions of authority.⁹³¹ The most important persons in Globocnik's own organisation were Hauptsturmführer Reinhold von Mohrenschildt and Obersturmführer Adolf Bareuther.

Globocnik intended to lead the operations in person although he had appointed Bareuther to be responsible for them with the title of *Einsatzführer* (Leader of the Operation).⁹³² Later Bareuther's title was *Leiter der Dienststelle des Beauftragten des Reichskommissars f.d.F.d.V. Aussenstelle Zamosch* (Leader of the Zamosc Office of Representative of the RKF).⁹³³ Von Mohrenschildt, for his part, was Globocnik's personal deputy in the Germanisation operation. His post was in Lublin,⁹³⁴ and he was responsible for the operations of both the RKF Stabshauptamt and the RuSHA.⁹³⁵ Bareuther and von Mohrenschildt had not been very long in the area and were new members of Globocnik's staff because a year earlier the officers in charge of the project in question had been Lothar von Seltmann and Helmut Müller.

According to documents of the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte, von Mohrenschildt had not actively participated in the planning of the operation before October 1942.⁹³⁶ von Mohrenschildt was one of Globocnik's Austrian staff, but there is no very reliable information available about his activities during the war.⁹³⁷ According to personal documents, von Mohrenschildt was born on 8/11/1915 in Leifling in Carinthia and had served in the SD since August 1938.⁹³⁸ He had been Globocnik's subordinate in Lublin as early as 1939–1940, after which he had spent some time in the Netherlands.⁹³⁹ He was registered in the SS organisation of the Generalgouvernement on 7/5/1942,⁹⁴⁰ but he had already returned to Lublin in October 1941.⁹⁴¹

From the point of view of the operation, Bareuther was in a more significant position than von Mohrenschildt, so his background should be studied a little more closely. Bareuther joined the NSDAP and the SS on 1/11/1938. He was born in 1902 and came from the Sudetenland. Bareuther had

⁹³¹ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. Verteiler. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹³² Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹³³ "Fragebogen zur Erstellung der SS-Stammkarte." 1.4.1943. BArch SSFPA Adolf Bareuther.

⁹³⁴ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹³⁵ Globocnik: Für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. Verteiler. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹³⁶ Aktennotiz Stanglicas für Globocnik vom 6. Oktober 1942 über Konflikte mit der Verwaltung des Distrikts Lublin. Dokument 3. "Die »Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte« in Lublin."

⁹³⁷ On von Mohrenschildt and his activities, see Poprzeczny 2004, pp. 120–129.

⁹³⁸ Personal data form. BArch SSFPA Reinhold von Mohrenschildt.

⁹³⁹ Krüger - Personalhauptamt. 17/2/1942. BArch SSFPA Reinhold von Mohrenschildt.

⁹⁴⁰ Personal data form. BArch SSFPA Reinhold von Mohrenschildt.

⁹⁴¹ Krüger - Personalhauptamt. 17/2/1942. BArch SSFPA Reinhold von Mohrenschildt.

studied chemistry and served in the Czechoslovakian army for a year and a half, after which he had served in the reserves and was promoted to lieutenant.⁹⁴²

Bareuther had served in the Waffen-SS since September 1939. He had been promoted during that time as a reserve officer. Bareuther had expressed his desire to be transferred to the RuSHA to work on colonization tasks in the eastern territories, and his superior estimated that he was suitable for the task.⁹⁴³ Bareuther was posted to Lublin on 1/1/1942, and he was promoted to Obersturmführer on 30/1/1942.⁹⁴⁴ His activities in the field of Germanisation began on 1/5/1942, when he was sent to Zamosc as a representative of the Lublin RKF delegate.⁹⁴⁵

Other significant representatives of the SS organs who received Globocnik's order were Obersturmbannführer Hermann Krumej of the Umwandererzentralstelle and the representatives of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. The representation of the Vomi was divided between the offices of Lodz and Lublin. The recipients of the order were Hauptsturmführer Clemens in Lublin and Obersturmbannführer Perthen and Untersturmführer Werner in Lodz.⁹⁴⁶ Also Sturmbannführer Franz Herold, the Director of the local office of the Einwandererzentralstelle received the order, but for some reason he was classified as a representative of the Vomi.⁹⁴⁷

Obersturmbannführer Krumej seems to have been the most important of the above mentioned officers. He was born in the Sudetenland in 1905, and he had joined the SS only in November 1938. Originally by trade Krumej had kept a chemist's shop. His choice of career was dictated by the poor economic situation after the First World War. In the middle of the 1920s, Krumej had served in the Czechoslovakian army for over a year as a section leader in the field artillery. After the joining the SS, Krumej had rapidly been given command of an SS regiment. After the outbreak of the Second World War, he was posted to the Wartheland to organise the expulsions of the Jews and the Poles, and he was made the Director of the office of the Umwandererzentralstelle in Lodz.⁹⁴⁸

Hauptsturmführer Richard Thomalla was also among the recipients of Globocnik's order.⁹⁴⁹ He had been posted to Lublin in August 1940.⁹⁵⁰ Thomalla

⁹⁴² Personal-Bericht. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Adolf Bareuther.

⁹⁴³ Personal-Bericht. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Adolf Bareuther.

⁹⁴⁴ Personal-Nachweis für Führer der Waffen SS: Dienstlaufbahn. BArch SSFPA Adolf Bareuther.

⁹⁴⁵ Beförderungen in der Waffen-SS. Der SS-Führer im R.u.S.-Wesen / Reichskommissar f.d.F.d.V. Dienststelle Lublin. 19/3/1943. BArch SSFPA Adolf Bareuther.

⁹⁴⁶ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. Verteiler. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁴⁷ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. Verteiler. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁴⁸ Krumej: Mein Lebenslauf. 22/4/1942. BArch SSFPA Hermann Krumej; Heydrich - Himmler. 20/4/1942. BArch SSFPA Hermann Krumej.

⁹⁴⁹ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. Verteiler. BArch R 49 / 3533.

was originally a mason by trade,⁹⁵¹ and he had worked under Globocnik on various assignments connected with construction. He had also been involved in Globocnik's ill-fated SS and police base project.⁹⁵² Thomalla had served in the RK-Bauleitung Zamosc,⁹⁵³ and, most significantly for the deportation and settlement operations, his duties had included providing buildings for the *Volksdeutsche*.⁹⁵⁴

In addition to Globocnik's closest colleagues in his own organisation and the officers in charge of the local organs representing the various main offices of the SS, the order was also circulated to the organs of the local SS and police organisation. Consequently, it was sent to the Kommandeur der Ordnungspolizei and the Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD as well as to Hauptsturmführer Gustav Hanelt of the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte. Other persons who belonged to the local SS organisation and received the order were Hauptsturmführer Biegelmeier, Hauptmann der Ordnungspolizei Eder and Oberleutnant der Gendarmerie Wagner.⁹⁵⁵ Biegelmeier represented the SD, and his duties concerned the Ukrainian population living in the area of the Germanisation operation, Eder was responsible for the security of the area and Wagner for the transfer of the *Volksdeutsche* from the camp in Mokre to the target area.⁹⁵⁶

Other persons mentioned in the order are Hauptsturmführer Dr. Kurt Sichel, Sturmbannführer Georg Wipern, Hauptsturmführer Ulbrich and Untersturmführer Wiebe.⁹⁵⁷ Ulbrich's task was to take care of the establishment of German schools in the area, Wiebe worked in the *SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc* (SS Work Office Zamosc), and his tasks included the recruitment of the administrative staff needed in the villages.⁹⁵⁸ Wipern is known to have been Globocnik's assistant in charge of economic matters related to the Holocaust,⁹⁵⁹ and he also dealt with economic matters concerning the *Volksdeutsche*. Sichel was responsible for matters related to the public health service. A doctor and a chemist's shop were to be located in every main village and a German hospital

⁹⁵⁰ Der Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer Ost - SS- und Selbstschutzzführer im Generalgouvernement, SS- und Polizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin, SS-Personalhauptamt. 22/8/1940. BArch SSFPA Richard Thomalla.

⁹⁵¹ Personal data form. BArch SSFPA Richard Thomalla.

⁹⁵² Globocnik - HSSPF Ost. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Richard Thomalla.

⁹⁵³ Bauleitung Zamosc / Der Beauftragte des RKF - SS-Personalhauptamt. 20/3/1944. BArch SSFPA Richard Thomalla.

⁹⁵⁴ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁵⁵ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. Verteiler. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁵⁶ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁵⁷ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. Verteiler. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁵⁸ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁵⁹ Schulte 2001, p. 275 reference 140.

and chemist's shop were to be established in the town of Zamosc, in addition to which a German sick fund was to be established to cover the whole area.⁹⁶⁰

Some of other persons mentioned in the order were Hauptsturmführer Georg Michalsen, SA-Obersturmbannführer Schölller and Obersturmführer Bohlmann. Michalsen's area of responsibility included the handicrafts and industries practised in the towns, and Schölller was responsible for public information and propaganda. Bohlmann's task was to provide from the Lublin office of the SD the staff needed in the resettlement of the Ukrainian population.⁹⁶¹ In addition to the representatives of the SS, Globocnik also relied on the local organisation of the NSDAP. This group included Stabsamtleiter Pfeiffer and the *Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt* (NSV, the National Socialist People's Welfare Organisation), the *Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft* (NSF, the National Socialist Women's League), the *Hitler-Jugend* (HJ, the Hitler Youth) and the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* (BDM, the League of German Girls) associations.⁹⁶² This cooperation was possible because Globocnik himself was the leader of the NSDAP in Distrikt Lublin.

In addition to the representatives of the SS and the NSDAP, the *Siedlerwirtschaftsgemeinschaft* (SWG, the Settlers' Economic Community) also was mentioned in the distribution list of the order.⁹⁶³ The SWG was an organ established by Globocnik to take care of the material welfare of the *Volksdeutsche*.⁹⁶⁴ Globocnik's partner in this field of activity was Sturmbannführer Dr. Georg Claus. He was also the official responsible for agriculture and nutrition in the civil administration of Distrikt Lublin.⁹⁶⁵ Claus was the same person who had handed over farms for Globocnik's use in spring 1941.

The only persons and organs mentioned in the order that did not represent the SS organisation or other organisations under the authority of Globocnik were Kreisbauernführer Kettler (the last-mentioned last recipient in the distribution list)⁹⁶⁶ as well as the Kreishauptmann, the Kreislandwirt and Regierungsrat Mayer, who were mentioned in the order itself.⁹⁶⁷ It was expected that the Kreishauptmann would assist the village leaders in the appointment of bailiffs (*Vögte*). The duty of the Kreislandwirt was to take charge of the livestock of the population to be expelled, and Mayer's duty was to make the representatives of the *Landinspektion* available for the use of the

⁹⁶⁰ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁶¹ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁶² Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. Verteiler. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁶³ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. Verteiler. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁶⁴ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁶⁵ Globocnik: Siedlerwirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Not dated. BArch NS 19 / 2234.

⁹⁶⁶ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. Verteiler. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁶⁷ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

SS.⁹⁶⁸ The Landinspektion was an organ of the civil administration at *Kreis* level, whose functions included land surveying.⁹⁶⁹

The idea was to carry out the Germanisation operation and the deportation and settlement activities connected to it quickly. The *Volksdeutsche* who were intended to be the inhabitants of the area were to arrive from Lodz in five shipments between 24/11/1942 and 14/12/1942. The unit responsible for the transportation was the Lodz branch of the Vomi, which was also responsible for the transportation of the *Volksdeutsche* settlers accommodated temporarily in camps in Mokre and Cholm. The official responsible for directing the *Volksdeutsche* settlers to their new abodes was Untersturmführer Werner.⁹⁷⁰

The *Volksdeutsche* were to be settled in six main communes (*Hauptdorfbereich*). These areas were located radially around the town of Zamosc: Skierbieszow (Skierbieszów) was located to the northeast, Zlojec (Złojec) to the northwest, Szczebrzezyn to the west, Miaczyn (Miączyn) to the east and Komarow (Komarów) from the southeast to the south of the town.⁹⁷¹ The main commune of Szczebrzezyn located in Kreis Bilgoraj and the main commune of Miaczyn in Kreis Hrubieszow.⁹⁷²

A total of 1815 *Volksdeutsche* families were to be settled in the villages of the target area of the Germanisation operation.⁹⁷³ In practice, just under than 10,000 persons were to be placed in the target settlements. In examining the target areas we find that the size of the populations to be settled in the main villages is not mentioned except in the case of Zlojec.⁹⁷⁴ In later documents, the main villages are described as "German villages", but the numbers of *Volksdeutsche* placed in them remain unknown.⁹⁷⁵

The umbrella organisation responsible for the settling of the *Volksdeutsche* was the SS-Arbeitsstab. It should have specified the deportation days, but in accordance with earlier plans, the Umwandererzentralstelle was responsible for the deportations. The extension of the operations of the UWZ into the Generalgouvernement involved reductions and reorganisation in the Wartheland.⁹⁷⁶ However, the UWZ did not have to execute the deportations unaided because the Ordnungspolizei was ordered to place 500 men at its

⁹⁶⁸ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁶⁹ Wasser 1993B, pp. 175–176, 208–209.

⁹⁷⁰ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁷¹ The locations can be examined using Appendix 6.

⁹⁷² Tann: Die Deutschen Dörfer im Kreise Zamosc. Not dated. APL 510 / 3 / 8; available in print: Dokument 358. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I; Amtliches Gemeinde- und Dorferzeichnis.*

⁹⁷³ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁷⁴ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁷⁵ Tann: Die Deutsche Dörfer im Kreise Zamosc. Not dated. APL 510 / 3 / 8.

⁹⁷⁶ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht: Monat Oktober. 5/11/1942; Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht für den Monats Januar. Not dated. BArch R 75 / 4.

disposal.⁹⁷⁷ In practice, that meant the *Polizei-Abteilung z.b.V. Zamosc* (Zamosc Special Police Battalion),⁹⁷⁸ which had been formed from the troops of Polizeiregiment 25, which was stationed in Distrikt Lublin.⁹⁷⁹

The deportation and settlement actions were to be implemented in three villages a day. The deportation task forces of the UWZ were to expel the Poles early in the morning with the future village leader participating in the operation. The expulsions were not to affect all the Poles of the target areas, and those designated separately as expert and auxiliary labour were to be left in the area. The SS-Arbeitsstab was responsible for definition of the expert labour, and the Landinspektion was to be responsible for the designation of the required farm labourers.⁹⁸⁰

According to the instructions of the UWZ, the Polish population to be expelled was supposed to be treated as labour to be sent to the heartlands of the Third Reich.⁹⁸¹ In reality, the expelled were to be divided into four groups according an instruction drafted by Office IV B4 of the RSHA.⁹⁸² The Polish population left in the area was to be located in so-called Z villages, from which the required numbers of people belonging to the groups I, II and IV were to be deported.⁹⁸³

From the instructions of the UWZ, it appears that the expulsion of the Poles from a village should have taken about one hour. All the Polish inhabitants of the villages were to be rounded up by the German police at a predetermined assembly point, where the persons to be left in the area would be separated from those due for expulsion, after which the latter were to be transported by the most direct road to a transit camp (*Durchgangslager*) in Zamosc.⁹⁸⁴ The expelled were to take sufficient food, clothing and equipment with them to survive for eight days. They were also to be allowed to take with them 30 kilos of property including cash, valuables and securities.⁹⁸⁵

The transit camp in which the expelled Polish population was to be placed to await its fate came to occupy a significant position in the operation of the UWZ. It is known that there were several camps run by the UWZ. One of them was located in an old fortress called the Rotunda in the town of Zamosc.

⁹⁷⁷ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁷⁸ This appears in the deportation instructions of the Zamosc office of the UWZ. For example, / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 19. 15/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 16.

⁹⁷⁹ Wasser 1993B, p. 92.

⁹⁸⁰ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁸¹ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Merkblatt für die Aussiedlung von polnischen Hofbesitzern. 21/11/1942. BArch R 75 / 14.

⁹⁸² Anweisungen des SS-Obersturmbannführers H. Krumei betreffend die Klassifikation der polnischen Aussiedler im Lager in Zamość. 21/11/1942. Dokument 57. *Zamojszczyzna – Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

⁹⁸³ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁸⁴ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Merkblatt für die Aussiedlung von polnischen Hofbesitzern. 21/11/1942. BArch R 75 / 14.

⁹⁸⁵ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Merkblatt für die Aussiedlung von polnischen Hofbesitzern. 21/11/1942. BArch R 75 / 14.

In addition, the UWZ also had the former prisoner-of-war camp of the Wehrmacht in Zamosc and four other camps at its disposal.⁹⁸⁶

It was to be made clear to the expelled Poles that the deportation was final, and no promises of compensation were to be made. Furthermore, the UWZ drew special attention to the fact that the expelled were to leave their homes in an inhabitable condition. Therefore, the expelling forces were instructed to do their best to ensure that the buildings were not set fire to or otherwise destroyed and to suppress any resistance with firearms.⁹⁸⁷ The instructions were exactly the same as those given earlier in the Wartheland.

Globocnik's order also dealt with the Ukrainian population because, according to the SS, 15 villages of the target area contained Ukrainian inhabitants.⁹⁸⁸ The exact number of the Ukrainians is not known because in some villages the calculations were based on the family and in others on the individual person. The resettlement was to affect 385 families and 541 persons,⁹⁸⁹ so it was a question of few thousand persons. The measures affecting the Ukrainians were the responsibility of the SD, but the UWZ also had to participate in the project because the settlement of the Ukrainian population elsewhere required the expulsion of the Polish population. The treatment of the Ukrainians was to be different from that of the Poles. This is indicated by the fact that the measures were to be carried out in cooperation with the Ukrainians.⁹⁹⁰ It was also stated in the instructions of the UWZ that persons classified as Ukrainians were not to be treated like the Poles.⁹⁹¹

The different treatment of the two population groups was inspired by the interest of the SS in playing off the non-German population groups against each other, which it was believed would facilitate the execution of the Germanisation plans. It was important that the Ukrainians should be well treated because it was planned to settle them in a buffer zone protecting the new German

⁹⁸⁶ Wasser 1993B, pp. 130–131.

⁹⁸⁷ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Merkblatt für die Aussiedlung von polnischen Hofbesitzern. 21/11/1942. BArch R 75 / 14.

⁹⁸⁸ According to the SS, there were Ukrainians in the following villages:

Skierbieszow	6 families	Zlojec	74 families
Ilowiec	3 families	Zarudzie	29 families
Laziska	44 families	Wolka-Zlojeca	29 families
Suchodebie	5 families	Cieszyn	110 families
Sitaniec and Kol. Dembowiec	10 persons	Kol. Sitaniec	27 families
Horyszow Ruski	170 persons	Zukow	241 families
Lipina-Nowa	3 families	Hajowniki	45 families
Koniuchy	130 persons		

Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁸⁹ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁹⁰ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁹¹ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Merkblatt für die Aussiedlung von polnischen Hofbesitzern. 21/11/1942. BArch R 75 / 14.

settlement.⁹⁹² The Ukrainian population was to be placed initially in reception camps, which were to be established in Kreis Hrubieszow. The official responsible for the camps was Hauptsturmführer Krüger.⁹⁹³

The treatment of the Ukrainian population was also in line with the policy of the administration of the Generalgouvernement, whose objective likewise was to exploit the willingness to co-operate of the Ukrainians against the Poles. The Ukrainians were represented by the *Ukrainische Hauptausschuss* (UHA, the Ukrainian Main Committee) in official connections. Its Director was Professor Volodimir Kubiyovich, who had earlier been an academic in Cracow. According to Madajczyk, he was the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists and he even made friends with Otto Wächter, the Gouverneur of Distrikt Galizien.⁹⁹⁴ The traditionally favourable disposition of the Ukrainians towards the Germans was not altruistic at all because the Ukrainians were striving for an independent Ukrainian state.⁹⁹⁵

The measures affecting the Polish and Ukrainian populations were described in a rather cursory manner in Globocnik's order. On the other hand, very clear instructions were given about the transfer of the *Volksdeutsche* to the settlement targets and the establishment of a supportive organisation. The placement and transfer of the *Volksdeutsche* were to take place in such a way that they would arrive at the target villages no later than noon. The village leaders were to be ready in the villages to meet them. The auxiliary labour force sent by organs of the NSDAP was to be responsible for the villages during the time between the expulsion of the Poles and the arrival of the *Volksdeutsche*. Representatives of the Landinspektion would then be responsible for the placement of the *Volksdeutsche* on the individual farms.⁹⁹⁶

The village leaders were to be responsible for organising the necessary help for the new inhabitants of the villages. They also were ordered to appoint artisans, leaders of the *Landwacht* unit (territorial defence) and *Dorfhelferinnen* (female village helpers) to work under them.⁹⁹⁷ Furthermore, an organisation covering various aspects of living was to be established in each main commune to assist the settlers. Its leader's title was *Führungsbauer*. He was to have under him a small number of staff dealing with construction, safety, medical services and economic affairs.⁹⁹⁸

The most significant institutions to be established in the main communes were to the gendarmerie stations, surgeries and the retail shops of the SWG. The shops were to be established in following villages: Skierbieszow, Stary-

⁹⁹² Wasser 1993B, p. 143–146.

⁹⁹³ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁹⁴ Madajczyk 1987, pp. 121, 527, 530–531.

⁹⁹⁵ Wasser 1993B, pp. 99–100.

⁹⁹⁶ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁹⁷ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

⁹⁹⁸ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

Zamosc (Stary-Zamość), Sitno, Niewirkow (Niewirków), Komarow, Labunie, Zlojec, Sitaniec and Zdanowek. In addition, schools and day care centres were to be established in the area.⁹⁹⁹ It was also planned to undertake active building work in the villages. Hauptsturmführer Thomalla was ordered to set up an office in Zamosc, to establish building teams in every main commune and to transfer a building team from Bortatycze to Sitaniec. The objective was to recruit 20 building foremen and 150 skilled workers and distribute them over the area. Thomalla would also be able to use some of the expelled Polish population as a work force for his projects.¹⁰⁰⁰

The order for carrying out the Germanisation operation was exhaustive, and it is possible to estimate that Globocnik had at his disposal a fairly large organisation for supporting the settled *Volksdeutsche*. However, a few individual matters are worth noting at this stage: 1) The progress of the operation was not defined, and the leaders of the main villages and villages were not named in the order. These matters were to be specified later. 2) Only 500 men of the Ordnungspolizei were reserved for the implementation of the operation.¹⁰⁰¹ 3) Globocnik sent the order to his superior HSSPF Krüger, the Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei and the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD as information.¹⁰⁰² Thus the official recipients did not include a single significant representative of the administration of the Generalgouvernement. The information policy corresponded almost completely with the strategy chosen by the RKF Stabshauptamt earlier.

The mention of Kreishauptmann and of an individual Regierungsrat in the order indicates that the SS had contacts with the local administrative authorities and that some of these were willing co-operators with the SS. The most significant of these persons was Kreishauptmann Weißenmaier. The lack of officials of the Generalgouvernement from the distribution list indicates not only the inflamed relations between Globocnik's organisation and the administration of the Generalgouvernement but also the strength of the SS at every level of the National Socialist administrative system. The major factors that made for this strength were the collapse of Frank's position and the concomitant emphasis on the position of the SS which took place during the spring and summer of 1942.

⁹⁹⁹ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

¹⁰⁰¹ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

¹⁰⁰² Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. Verteiler. BArch R 49 / 3533.

6.2 The deportation and settlement operations in late 1942

The Germanisation operation of the SS focused on six main communes in November and December 1942 in accordance with Globocnik's order. It is possible to trace almost every deportation and settlement operation affecting individual villages with the help of the deportation orders of the Umwandererzentralstelle¹⁰⁰³ and the settlement orders of the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc.¹⁰⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰³ There are next numbered deportation orders in the Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie in the series Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD – Umwandererzentralstelle Posen. Dienststelle Litzmannstadt. Zweigstelle Zamosc (APL 513 / 0):

Document	Drafting / implementation date	Signum
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 4	29/11/1942 / 30/11/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 33
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 7	3/12/1942 / 4/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 51
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 8	4/12/1942 / 5/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 54
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 9	5/12/1942 / 6/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 55
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 10	6/12/1942 / 7/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 35
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 11	8/12/1942 / 9/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 47
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 12	9/12/1942 / 10/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 45
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 13	10/12/1942 / 11/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 43
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 14	10/12/1942 / 12/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 46
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 15	11/12/1942 / 13/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 18
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 16	12/12/1942 / 14/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 41, 17
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 17	13/12/1942 / 15/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 34
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 18	14/12/1942 / 16/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 53
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 19	15/12/1942 / 17/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 15, 16
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 20	17/12/1942 / 18/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 31
Einsatzbefehl Nr. 21	17/12/1942 / 19/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 37
Einsatzbefehl 23	17/12/1942 / 21/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 40

Einsatzbefehl Nr. 16 is available in print in Volume 1 of *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS* as document number 76. Two unnumbered deportation orders for the year 1942 are also mentioned in the directory of the series 513 / 0. They are in folders 513 / 0 / 36 and 513 / 0 / 42. The targets of those orders were the villages of Hajowniki and Lipina Nova.

¹⁰⁰⁴ These are located in the Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie in numbered deportation order folders of the series Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD – Umwandererzentralstelle Posen. Dienststelle Litzmannstadt. Zweigstelle Zamosc (APL 513 / 0) contains the following settlement orders:

Document	Drafting / implementation date	Signum
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 14	2/12/1942 / 4/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 51
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 15	3/12/1942 / 5/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 54
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 16	4/12/1942 / 6/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 55
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 17	6/12/1942 / 7/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 35
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 18	8/12/1942 / 9/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 47
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 19	9/12/1942 / 9/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 45
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 20	9/12/1942 / 11/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 43
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 21	9/12/1942 / 12/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 46
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 22	9/12/1942 / 13/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 18
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 23	12/12/1942 / 14/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 41, 17
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 24	12/12/1942 / 15/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 34

By comparing the above-mentioned orders, information obtained from earlier research¹⁰⁰⁵ and a list of what were later designated “German villages” in the area of the Germanisation operation,¹⁰⁰⁶ it can be observed that there is no detailed information available about a few of targets of the operation specified in Globocnik’s order. These are the villages of Czeszyn, Zlojec, Zarudzie, Czolki (Czołki), Kolonie Czolki (Kolonie Czołki) and Sitno. However, since all the villages listed above are mentioned in the list of German villages, it is justified to assume that the deportation and settlement operation also affected them and that they were dealt with in orders that are missing. Thus the picture of the progress of the Germanisation project formed with the help of individual orders is most probably correct.

Obersturmführer Bareuther of the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc was responsible for the progress of the operation. In his orders, he specified the number of Poles to be expelled, the number of *Volksdeutsche* to be settled and the leaders of the main villages and the villages. The SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc also specified the time of departure of the *Volksdeutsche* from the camp in Mokre, their route to the target settlements, and time of departure of the expelled Polish population. Furthermore, Bareuther gave instructions about specific matters that varied according to the target area as necessary. Such matters were for example the *Deutschstämmige* or the Ukrainian population living in the area and the villages reserved for the Polish population.¹⁰⁰⁷

The Umwandererzentralstelle concentrated on the expulsions in its orders, which it drew up only after obtaining instructions from the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc specifying the target area of the operation. The orders of the UWZ specified the following details:

- the leader of the operation
- the leader responsible for the police operations
- the command post or posts
- the start time for the operation
- the target area of the operation and the number of the persons to be expelled
- the principles of the operation and special factors to be taken into consideration.¹⁰⁰⁸

The Polizei-Abteilung z.b.V. Zamosc drew up its orders on the basis of the directions of the UWZ. These orders specified the strength of the police forces assigned to the operation, the deployment of individual subsections in the

Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 25	12/12/1942 / 16/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 53
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 26	12/12/1942 / 17/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 15, 16
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 27	16/12/1942 / 18/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 31
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 28	16/12/1942 / 19/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 37
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 30	16/12/1942 / 21/12/1942	APL 513 / 0 / 40

One of the orders - Nr. 23 - is available in print as Dokument 77 in volume 1 of *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS*.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Wasser 1993B, p. 139 reference 34.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Tann: Die Deutschen Dörfer im Kreise Zamosc. Not dated. APL 510 / 3 / 8.

¹⁰⁰⁷ For example, SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 18. 8/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 47.

¹⁰⁰⁸ For example, Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 4. 29/11/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 33.

target area and the tasks of the subsections.¹⁰⁰⁹ Other documents concerning the Germanisation operation dealt with the Polish population to be left in the area as a labour force,¹⁰¹⁰ the Ukrainian population that was to be evacuated from the area,¹⁰¹¹ the *Deutschstämmige* living in the area,¹⁰¹² the vehicles required for the transportation of the Polish population to be deported ¹⁰¹³ and cases of illness occurring in the target area.¹⁰¹⁴

The Germanisation of Kreis Zamosc began in the main commune of Skierbieszow to the north of the town of Zamosc on 27/11/1942, by 29/11/1942 and the operation had been executed in the following villages: Skierbieszow, Sady, Lipina Nova, Hajowniki, Zawoda, Laziska, Suchodebie, Iłowiec (Iłowiec). The village of Zawoda was not mentioned in Globocnik's order, but obviously the targets were changed as the operation proceeded because in a report of the UWZ no mention is made of action in the village of Czeszyn, which can be found in the 1943 list of German villages.¹⁰¹⁵

After the actions in the main commune of Skierbieszow, the operation focused on the villages of the future Sector A of the main commune of Zamosc. The target villages were Udrycze, Kolonie Udrycze, Wyslowice (Wisłowiec) and Kolonie Debowice (Dębowiec). The date for the operation was specified as 30/11/1942,¹⁰¹⁶ and the result was to be an area populated with *Volksdeutsche* reaching from the town of Zamosc to the main village of Skierbieszow.

The orders relating to the progress of the Germanisation operation are not available for the period 1/12/1942–3/12/1942. Because it is possible to examine the progress of the operation day by day in the period 4/12/1942–19/12/1942, it can be estimated that during the time between 1/12/1942 and 3/12/1942 the operation targeted the villages of Zlojec and Zarudzie in the main commune of Zlojec. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the deportation and settlement activity was carried out to the northwest of the town of Zamosc in the main commune of Zlojec on 4/12/1942. It was directed at the following villages: Chomeciska-Male (Chomęciska-Male), Stary Zamosc, Pod Stary Zamosc and Wolka Zlojeca (Wólka Złojeca). The objective was to expel 2087 persons from the area ¹⁰¹⁷ and to settle about 250 *Volksdeutsche* there.¹⁰¹⁸

¹⁰⁰⁹ For example, Polizei-Abteilung z.b.V. Zamosc: Abteilungsbefehl Nr. 22. 16/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰¹⁰ For example, Zurückgestellte aus Siedliska Kreis Zamosc. Not dated. APL 513 / 0 / 54; Landarbeiterfamilien für das Dorf Siedliska Gemeinde Wysokie Kreis Zamosc. Not dated. APL 513 / 0 / 54.

¹⁰¹¹ For example, Liste der Ukrainer. Not dated. APL 513 / 0 / 54.

¹⁰¹² For example, Deutschstämmige aus dem Dorf Siedliska Kreis Zamosc. Not dated. APL 513 / 0 / 54.

¹⁰¹³ For example, Für den Treckführer! 4/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 54.

¹⁰¹⁴ For example, Krankheitsfälle im Dorf Sitaniec Kreis Zamosc. Not dated. APL 513 / 0 / 55.

¹⁰¹⁵ Wasser 1993B, p. 139 reference 34. The village of Czeszyn was certainly one of the targets of the 1942 operations because the German inhabitants of the village in question were attacked by partisans in the winter of 1942 and 1943.

¹⁰¹⁶ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 4. 29.11.1942. APL 513 / 0 / 33.

¹⁰¹⁷ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 7. 3.12.1942. APL 513 / 0 / 51

After the main commune of Złojec, the operation would continue in the main commune of Szczebrzeszyn. This was located to the west of the town of Zamosc. The Germanisation operation was to focus on the villages of Wialacza (Wiałacza), Zawada and Siedliska on 5/12/1942. Those villages were located quite near the town of Zamosc. Altogether 3069 persons were to be expelled from the target area,¹⁰¹⁹ and about 400 *Volksdeutsche* were to be settled in it.¹⁰²⁰

On 6/12/1942, the measures were to focus on the villages of Kolonie Sitaniec, Sitaniec Blonie and Sitaniec Wolica in the main commune of Sitaniec. The area was in the immediate vicinity of the town of Zamosc. The villages in question were located on the north-western side of Zamosc, and from them, a German settlement was to be formed extending round from the northern side of the town of Zamosc to its western flank. The objective of the UWZ was to expel altogether 2305 persons from the area,¹⁰²¹ and the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc planned to place about 300 *Volksdeutsche* in it.¹⁰²²

The deportations were to be carried out in the following villages on 7/12/1942: Kolonie Staw Noakowski (Staw Noakowski-Kolonia), Nawoz (Nawóz), Staw-Ujadowski (Staw-Ujazdowski), Nielicz (Nielisz) and Grobia. The intention was to expel altogether 2989 persons.¹⁰²³ The villages in question were located at the extreme edge of the main commune of Złojec northwest of the town of Zamosc. The plan of the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc was to settle about 200 *Volksdeutsche* in the villages of Kolonie Staw Noakowski and Nawoz. The villages of Nielicz and Staw Ujadowsk were designated as villages for the Poles.¹⁰²⁴

The operation would be continued in Sectors B and C of the main commune of Zamosc on 9/12/1942. The area of action lay in the immediate surroundings of the town of Zamosc. The targets of the operation were the villages of Majdan, Mokre and Szopinek. The size of the population to be expelled was to be 1548 persons.¹⁰²⁵ According to the plans of the SS-Arbeitsstab, the village of Szopinek would be a reservation for the Polish population,¹⁰²⁶ and thus the expulsions there would affect only a part of the population if the plan was to follow Globocnik's order.

¹⁰¹⁸ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 14. 2.12.1942.
APL 513 / 0 / 51.

¹⁰¹⁹ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 8. 4.12.1942.
APL 513 / 0 / 54.

¹⁰²⁰ SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 15. 3.12.1942.
APL 513 / 0 / 54.

¹⁰²¹ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 9. 5/12/1942.
APL 513 / 0 / 55.

¹⁰²² SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 16. 4/12/1942.
APL 513 / 0 / 55.

¹⁰²³ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 10. 6/12/1942.
APL 513 / 0 / 35.

¹⁰²⁴ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 17. 5/12/1942.
APL 513 / 0 / 35.

¹⁰²⁵ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 11. 8/12/1942.
APL 513 / 0 / 47.

¹⁰²⁶ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 18. 8/12/1942.
APL 513 / 0 / 47.

On 10/12/1942, the Germanisation operation was to focus on the villages of Labunie, Ruszow (Ruszków) and Kolonie Ruszow. These villages were located in the main commune of Komarow, which lay in the immediate vicinity of the town of Zamosc on its southern and southeastern sides. The objective was to expel altogether 2997 persons¹⁰²⁷ and to settle about 200 *Volksdeutsche* in their place.¹⁰²⁸ The operation would proceed on 11/12/1942 to the villages of Zdanow, Zdanowek, Lipsko and Kolonie Lipsko. They were located in Sector B of the main commune of Zamosc southwest of the town of Zamosc, and here the intention was to expel altogether 2300 persons.¹⁰²⁹ In place of the expelled it was planned to settle about 290 *Volksdeutsche*.¹⁰³⁰

As a result of the expulsions and settlement actions carried out between 9/12/1942 and 11/12/1942, a fairly uniform zone of German settlements was to be created south of the town of Zamosc. would be further reinforced on 12/12/1942 when the operations of the SS reached the villages of Labunki and Wierzbie. The objective was to expel altogether 2066 persons.¹⁰³¹ Plans were made to settle *Volksdeutsche* in the villages, but their number is not mentioned in the order of the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc.¹⁰³² In Globocnik's instructions it was planned to place altogether 79 *Volksdeutsche* families there.¹⁰³³

The operation was to continue in the immediate vicinity of the town of Zamosc on 13/12/1942. was to be directed at the village of Ploskie (Płoskie), where 1322 persons were to be expelled.¹⁰³⁴ In place of the expelled population, it was planned to settle about 200 *Volksdeutsche*, and it was mentioned that there were a large number of *Deutschstämmige* living in the area.¹⁰³⁵ The operation directed at the village of Ploskie was to fill the western flank of the immediate surroundings of Zamosc with German settlers.

After the actions in the immediate surroundings of the town of Zamosc, the Germanisation operation was to be directed at the eastern parts of Kreis Zamosc in the main commune of Komarow. The targets on 14/12/1942 were the villages of Krzywy Stock (Krzywostok), Komarow Wies (Komarów Wieś), Komarow Gorne-Dolne and Wolica-Brzozowa, from which altogether 2850

¹⁰²⁷ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 12. 9/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 45.

¹⁰²⁸ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 19. 9/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 45.

¹⁰²⁹ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 13. 10/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 43.

¹⁰³⁰ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 20. 9/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 43.

¹⁰³¹ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 14. 10/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 46.

¹⁰³² SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 21. 9/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 46.

¹⁰³³ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BA R 49 / 3533.

¹⁰³⁴ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 15. 11/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 18.

¹⁰³⁵ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 22. 9/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 18.

persons were to be expelled.¹⁰³⁶ The plan of the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc was to settle about 400 *Volksdeutsche* in the area.¹⁰³⁷ After the operation affecting the main commune of Komarow, the operation was to continue in Sector B of the main commune of Miaczyn located to the east of the town of Zamosc. On 15/12/1942, the operation targeted the villages of Dub, Kolonie Dub and Kolonie Rudka. The size of the population to be expelled was estimated to be 1500 persons,¹⁰³⁸ and the size of the *Volksdeutsche* population to be placed in all three villages was to be about 250 persons.¹⁰³⁹

The populating of the above-mentioned villages with *Volksdeutsche* would have connected the main commune of Komarow to the main commune of Miaczyn. The reinforcement of the main commune of Komarow would continue on 16/12/1942 when the targets were the villages of Kolonie Wolica Sniatycka, Wolica Sniatycka Antoniowka and Ruszczyzna. They were located in a tight group immediately on the north side of the main village of Komarow. The number of persons to be expelled was 1250,¹⁰⁴⁰ and altogether 300 *Volksdeutsche* were to replace them in these villages.¹⁰⁴¹

The deportation and settlement activity was to continue in the main commune of Komarow on 17/12/1942 in the villages of Huta Komarowska, Janowka (Janówka) and Zubowiec (Zubowice), where the objective was to expel altogether 2400 persons.¹⁰⁴² According to Globocnik's order, Huta Komarowska and Janowka were among the targets to be populated with *Volksdeutsche*, and the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc planned to settle about 200 *Volksdeutsche* in them.¹⁰⁴³ The village of Zubowiec was a new settlement target, and the idea was to locate in it those *Volksdeutsche* who could not be settled in the villages of Dub and Rudka.¹⁰⁴⁴ The targets were located to the southwest and east of the main village of Komarow and the placement of a German population in them would reinforce the Komarow main commune.

The focus of the Germanisation operation soon shifted back to Sector B of the main commune of Miaczyn, where Kolonie Bozydar, Czesniki (Cześniki) and Kolonie Niewirkow (Niewirków-Kolonia) were specified as the targets of the operation on 18/12/1942. Altogether 1600 persons were to be expelled from

¹⁰³⁶ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 16. 12/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 41.

¹⁰³⁷ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 23. 12/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 41.

¹⁰³⁸ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 17. 13/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 34.

¹⁰³⁹ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 24. 12/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 34.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 18. 14/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 53.

¹⁰⁴¹ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 25. 12/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 53.

¹⁰⁴² Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 19. 15/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁴³ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 26. 12/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁴⁴ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ergänzung zum Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 26. 15/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

the villages¹⁰⁴⁵ and in their place about 250 *Volksdeutsche* were to be settled in the area.¹⁰⁴⁶

The Germanisation operation was to continue in Sector A of main commune of Miaczyn on 19/12/1942. The targets were the following villages: Jaroslawiec (Jarosławiec), Wolka Horyszowka (Wólka Horyszowska), Kolonie Horyszow and Horyszow Polski (Horyszów Polski). They were located on the east side of the town of Zamosc. The number of persons to be expelled was 2600,¹⁰⁴⁷ and plans were made to place 400 *Volksdeutsche* in the area. At least some of the expelled population were to be placed in the villages of Staw Ujadowski and Nielicz, which had previously been designated as a reservation area for the Polish population.¹⁰⁴⁸

Detailed orders related to the implementation of the Germanisation operation on 20/12/1942 are not available. Based on the orders concerning the previous and following days, it is possible to estimate that the operations of that day implemented the missing settlement order number 29 of the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc and operation order number 22 of the Umwandererzentralstelle Litzmannstadt Zweigstelle Zamosc. It is probable that these orders specified the villages of Sitno, Czolki and Kolonie Czolki as targets of the Germanisation operation because they were the only villages of Sector B of the main commune of Miaczyn which are not mentioned in the existing deportation and settlement orders.

The last orders concerning the Germanisation operation to be carried out in Kreis Zamosc in 1942 are probably *Einsatzbefehl Nr. 23* of the Umwandererzentralstelle Litzmannstadt Zweigstelle Zamosc and *Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 30* of the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc. These orders concerned the operation on 21/12/1942. The expulsions were to take place in the villages of Niewirkow, and Kotlice, which were located in Sector B of the main commune of Miaczyn. The objective was to expel altogether 2300 Poles¹⁰⁴⁹ and to settle about 300 *Volksdeutsche* in their place.¹⁰⁵⁰

Using the orders and other documents of the SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc, the Umwandererzentralstelle Litzmannstadt Zweigstelle Zamosc and the Polizei-Abteilung z.b.V. Zamosc, it is possible to examine the Germanisation operation of the SS more closely and to ascertain what was supposed to happen on any single day.

Thursday 17/12/1942 can be selected as an example, because the orders of all the above-mentioned organs are available for it. The SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc

¹⁰⁴⁵ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 20. 17/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 31.

¹⁰⁴⁶ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 27. 16/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 31.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 21. 17/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 37.

¹⁰⁴⁸ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 28. 16/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 37.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 23. 17/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 40.

¹⁰⁵⁰ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 30. 16/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 40.

issued its order for that day on 12/12/1942.¹⁰⁵¹ The Umwandererzentralstelle Litzmannstadt Zweigstelle Zamosc issued its more precise order on 15/12/1942,¹⁰⁵² and the order of the Polizei-Abteilung z.b.V. Zamosc was issued on 16/12/1942.¹⁰⁵³ The preparation was complicated because the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc originally ordered that the action was to take place in the villages of Huta Komarowska and Janowka but supplemented its order on 15/12/1942 and added the village of Zubowiec to the target area. The addition was made because some *Volksdeutsche* from the villages of Rudka and Dub were to be resettled.¹⁰⁵⁴

According to the orders of the SS-Arbeitsstab, the number of persons to be expelled was 2000. Five hundred of them were Ukrainians living in the village of Zubowiec.¹⁰⁵⁵ The instructions concerning the Ukrainians are not available, but in other locations, the handling of the Ukrainian population was carefully planned, and they were to be given four hours to prepare for evacuation.¹⁰⁵⁶ Obviously, this is what happened because the UWZ did not include the Ukrainians in its order, nor were they included in the total number of those who were to be deported.¹⁰⁵⁷

The UWZ ordered that the deportation was to begin in the morning of 17/12/1942 at exactly five o'clock. The management of the operation was to be in the hands of Obersturmbannführer Krumej, and the officer responsible for the operation of the Ordnungspolizei was Hauptmann Meurin. The objective was to expel 100 persons from Huta Komarowska, 1000 from Janowka and 400 from Zubowiec.¹⁰⁵⁸ The expulsion action was to begin with the police surrounding the villages, after which some of the police would advance into the villages and round up the people in the village centres. A total of 6 police officers and 160 policemen were reserved for the operation. Eighty policemen were assigned to Janowka, 60 of whom were to surround the village, and 20 of them were to perform the actual expulsion. The corresponding numbers for Huta Komarowska and Zubowiec were 20 and 60 policemen respectively.¹⁰⁵⁹

The Poles to be expelled were to be collected first in the centres of the villages, after which they were to be transported to Zamosc in a closed detachment under police supervision. The expelled persons would not be allowed to take furniture or a large quantity of flour or cereals with them, and

¹⁰⁵¹ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 26. 12/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁵² Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 19. 15/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁵³ Pol.Abt.z.b.V. Zamosc: Abteilungsbefehl Nr. 22. 16/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁵⁴ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ergänzung zum Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 26. 15/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁵⁵ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ergänzung zum Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 26. 15/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁵⁶ For example, Liste der Ukrainer. Not dated. APL 513 / 0 / 34.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 19. 15/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 19. 15/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Pol.Abt.z.b.V. Zamosc: Abteilungsbefehl Nr. 22. 16/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

the slaughtering of poultry or other small animals was to be prevented.¹⁰⁶⁰ The chattels of the expelled were to be transported by wagons, 200 of which had been reserved for the purpose.¹⁰⁶¹

The expulsion of the Poles was to be completed by 10 a.m., and the *Volksdeutsche* were due to arrive almost immediately after that. It was ordered that about 200 *Volksdeutsche* should be settled in Huta Komarowska and Janowka. They were scheduled to leave the camp in Mokre at six o'clock on the same morning.¹⁰⁶² The number of persons who were to be settled in Zubowiec is not known, but 40 farms were reserved for them.¹⁰⁶³

On the whole, the preparations for the operation targeted at Huta Komarowska, Janowka and Zubowiec seem rather flimsy based on the information that can be gleaned from the orders. It seems that the SS really thought that 20 policemen would be able to drive 1000 Poles out of their homes into the village centres. According to Heinemann and Wasser, the operation did not achieve its objectives especially with regard to the deportations because there were originally more than 34,000 inhabitants in the target area, and the vast majority of them were to be deported. The SS was able to deport about only 10,000 persons, so about two thirds of the Polish inhabitants succeeded in avoiding deportation.¹⁰⁶⁴

A UWZ report describes the composition of the Poles expelled from the target area. Altogether 9771 persons had been subjected to a racial examination. On the basis of it, 314 persons had been placed in Group II, 5147 persons in Group III and 1594 persons in Group IV. Of those in Group III, 2716 persons were left in the area as a labour force, while the fates of the remaining 7,055 at the end of 1942 were as follows:

1310 persons were sent to Berlin to replace Jewish labour there
2207 persons were sent to Rentendorf villages
644 persons were sent to Auschwitz
285 persons were assigned for re-Germanisation
2609 persons were still in the UWZ camp in Zamosc.¹⁰⁶⁵

The fate of the deported Polish population was in accordance with the expectations of the SS, but number of persons sent to Auschwitz was relatively

¹⁰⁶⁰ Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 19. 15/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁶¹ Für den Treckführer! 16/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁶² SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 26. 12/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁶³ SS-Arbeitsstab für den Kreis Zamosc: Ergänzung zum Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 26. 15/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 15.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Heinemann 2003, pp. 408–409; Wasser 1993B, p. 141. Cf. Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b; *partially available* in print: Dokument 404. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹⁰⁶⁵ Bericht des SS-Obersturmbannführers H. Krumej über die Tätigkeit der Zweigstelle Zamość der Umwandererzentralstelle von Beginn der Aussiedlungsaktion bis zum 31. Dezember 1942. 31/12/1942. Dokument 98. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

small. An evaluation of the result is complicated by the fact that there is no information available about the final placement of the persons in the UWZ camp. All in all, the information available about the fate of the Polish population indicates that the SS tried to carry out its plans systematically, and that the objective of the operation was to sort out persons of German descent and eliminate the Polish population of the area. However, it should be noted that the representatives of the SS were not able to carry out the operation in the desired way, and it is known that only two transportations from Zamosc arrived in Auschwitz in December 1942.¹⁰⁶⁶

It was not only the deportations that failed, because the placement of persons who were classified as unable to work in the so-called *Rentendorf* villages did not take place without problems either. The objective had been to place members of the Polish population who were unable to work in the villages of the murdered Jews in Distrikt Warschau and Distrikt Radom. The placement had first taken place in Kreis Garwolin in Distrikt Warschau,¹⁰⁶⁷ and after that it had continued in Kreis Siedlce,¹⁰⁶⁸ eventually the transfers would apply to fewer than 4500 persons in all.¹⁰⁶⁹

The operation had caused a strong negative reaction not only among the Polish population of the target area but also in Warsaw,¹⁰⁷⁰ and the civil authorities of Distrikt Radom expressed their reluctance to take in any more deportees in February 1943.¹⁰⁷¹ However, the placement of the expelled population was not in the end a very significant problem for the SS because the placement of old persons and children in Distrikt Lublin was not an excluded solution. It should also be noted that the deported population tried to return from the *Rentendorf* villages to their home areas in spite of prohibitions.¹⁰⁷²

The transfer of the Ukrainian population succeeded better than the actions targeting the Polish population. According to Globocnik's statement, the SD

¹⁰⁶⁶ Madajczyk 1987, p. 424.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Bericht des SS-Obersturmbannführers H. Krumei über die Tätigkeit der Zweigstelle Zamość der Umwandererzentralstelle von Beginn der Aussiedlungsaktion bis zum 31. Dezember 1942. 31/12/1942. Dokument 98. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹⁰⁶⁸ Schreiben des SS-Obersturmbannführers H. Krumei an die Generaldirektion der Ostbahn über die Transportzüge für die ausgesiedelten Polen aus Zamość nach dem Distrikt Warschau. 22/1/1943. Dokument 158. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*; Schreiben des SS- und Polizeiführers im Distrikt Warschau, F. von Sammern-Frankeneck, betreffend die aus dem Distrikt in den Kreis Siedlce ausgesiedelten polnischen Familien. 25/2/1943. Dokument 204. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹⁰⁶⁹ Bericht des Warschauer Amtes des Sicherheitsdienstes über die Folgen der Umsiedlungsaktion in Zamosc im Distrikt Warschau. Not dated. *Dokument 175. Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹⁰⁷⁰ Bericht des Warschauer Amtes des Sicherheitsdienstes über die Folgen der Umsiedlungsaktion in Zamosc im Distrikt Warschau. Not dated. *Dokument 175. Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹⁰⁷¹ Vermerk über Gespräche mit dem SS- und Polizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin, Böttcher, und mit dem Leiter des Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamtes, Reinke, über die Angelegenheiten der Schaffung von Rentendörfern und über die geplante Aussiedlung von Polen aus dem Kreise Opatów. 12/2/1943. Dokument 184. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹⁰⁷² Wasser 1993B, p. 140.

succeeded in evacuating 1777 Ukrainian families comprising 6778 persons from their homes. The Ukrainians were temporarily placed in a camp in Kreis Hrubieszow to await resettlement.¹⁰⁷³ The success of the first stage of the resettlement of the Ukrainian population is not surprising. It had originally been the aim of the SS to treat the Ukrainians better than the Poles, and to carry out the resettlement in cooperation with the target population. It is also worth noting that the resettlement process of the Ukrainians was never completely finished: a part of the operation was put off till the future, which meant that the situation in the target area of the Germanisation operation remained agitated.

The facts related to the Germanisation operation indicate that the objective of the local SS was to implement the racial extermination policy envisaged by the RSHA, but it was not possible to carry it out in the area in question with the resources available. The information available about the operation also indicates that even though the daily operations seemed quite carefully designed as such, the execution of them did not succeed. It is also noteworthy that the representatives of the SS had to change their plans in the middle of the operation, and, for example, in the course of it they were able to appoint only a few village leaders.¹⁰⁷⁴

The representatives of the SS became aware of the problems during the operation and, for example, the exact numbers of the persons to be deported no longer appear in the orders for the final stage of the operation. The second interesting observation is that Obersturmbannführer Krumey, the representative of the UWZ, disappears from the orders of the UWZ in the

¹⁰⁷³ Fernschreiben des SS- und Polizeiführers im Distrikt Lublin, O. Globocnik, an das Reichssicherheitshauptamt über die Umsiedlung der Ukrainer aus dem Kreise Zamość in den Kreis Hrubieszów. Dokument 92. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹⁰⁷⁴ The individual village leaders are mentioned in the following settlement orders:

Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 14	APL 513 / 0 / 51
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 15	APL 513 / 0 / 54
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 16	APL 513 / 0 / 55
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 17	APL 513 / 0 / 35
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 20	APL 513 / 0 / 43
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 23	APL 513 / 0 / 41

The individual village leaders are not specified in the following settlement orders:

Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 18	APL 513 / 0 / 47
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 19	APL 513 / 0 / 45
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 21	APL 513 / 0 / 46
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 22	APL 513 / 0 / 18
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 24	APL 513 / 0 / 34
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 25	APL 513 / 0 / 53
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 26	APL 513 / 0 / 16
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 27	APL 513 / 0 / 31
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 28	APL 513 / 0 / 37
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 30	APL 513 / 0 / 40

course of the operation.¹⁰⁷⁵ The reason for the absence of his name might be illness, other duties or even Christmas leave.

Even though the operation did not go as expected, the representatives of the SS did not abandon the project but carried out the settlement of the German population in place of the original population as planned. This decision of the SS created the source of future problems: the people who were settled in the area did not come to an empty space because the majority of the previous inhabitants were still in the area and just waiting for an opportunity to return to their former homes.

6.3 An interim assessment of the first stage of the operation

The failure of the deportations did not mean that the SS did not succeed in settling a population of German descent in the target area, but the way the operation was carried out created a situation in which the Polish population had time to move from the target villages to neighbouring areas. This was possible above all because the objective was to establish an area in which there would be a one-to-one ratio of German and Polish villages.¹⁰⁷⁶

According to the documents of the SS, the number of Polish villages equalled the number of villages populated with *Volksdeutsche* in every main commune in the target area of the operations of November-December 1942 except for the main commune of Zamosc.¹⁰⁷⁷ Thus in Kreis Zamosc there were plenty of Polish villages where the population to be deported from other places could seek protection during the operations of the SS. Family ties often made it easier fall back on help in neighbouring villages. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Polish population may well also have sought refuge in neighbouring *Kreise* or hidden in the forests.

It is possible to examine the internal views of the SS about the deportation and settlement activities in the reports of the UWZ. They show that the operation differed significantly from that which had been implemented in the Wartheland. According to the UWZ, the operation there had been so well planned and prepared that the Poles who were to be expelled had been individually selected in advance. In Kreis Zamosc, on the other hand, those who were to be deported had not been individualised in advance, and the inhabitants of the villages had been expelled *en masse*. The performance of the police battalion that had carried out the deportations was considered good even though it had been regarded as necessary to reinforce it with 500 German

¹⁰⁷⁵ Obersturmbannführer Krumej did not sign deportation order number 20 dated 17/12/1942; it was signed by Hauptsturmführer Hütte. Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 20. 17/12/1942. APL 513 / 0 / 31.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Globocnik: Einsatzbefehl für die Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc. 22/11/1942. BArch R 49 / 3533.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Tann: Die Deutschen Dörfer im Kreise Zamosc. Not dated; Aufstellung der deutschen und polnischen Dörfer im Siedlungsgebiet. Not dated. APL 510 / 3 / 8.

policemen. For its own part, the UWZ stated that it had operated to the limits of its powers, and that the operation had been possible only because no large operations had been carried out in the Wartheland at the same time.¹⁰⁷⁸

Even though the UWZ stated that the performance of the individual police battalion as such had been good, its actions gave rise to a number of complaints about highhanded behaviour. The complaints came from railway workers, the importance of whose work placed them in a position in which they were able to complain about the activities of the SS. The major problem had been the fact that the deportation actions were applied to persons who should not have been subjected to any such measures.¹⁰⁷⁹

Individual cases show that Polish railway workers and their families were not spared deportation but experienced the cruelties of the operation like all the other Poles. Thus, according to their own accounts, they were robbed, assaulted and imprisoned. Railway workers were rapidly released from the UWZ camp, but their close relatives were not freed, and they did not get back their identity cards which showed that they worked on the railways. The most conspicuous detail emerging from their stories is the fact that the SS men and the Ukrainian auxiliaries of the SS who carried out the deportations often demanded alcohol from their victims.¹⁰⁸⁰

Eyewitness accounts confirm the Black's claim that the SS also used non-German forces in the Germanisation operation. They were men whom Globocnik's organisation had trained in Trawniki. The so-called Trawniki men had been conscripted from Soviet prisoners-of-war after summer 1941, and they were used mainly for murdering the Jewish population of the Generalgouvernement, but it seems that there were enough of them for some of Globocnik's other undertakings, too.¹⁰⁸¹

The representatives of the SS certainly did not admit their mistakes, and claimed that the stories of the hapless Poles were mere fabrications.¹⁰⁸² It is understandable that the SS produced such an account for outsiders, but the UWZ report also drew attention to shortcomings in the operation, and it

¹⁰⁷⁸ Bericht des SS-Obersturmbannführers H. Krumej über die Tätigkeit der Zweigstelle Zamosc der Umwandererzentralstelle von Beginn der Aussiedlungsaktion bis zum 31. Dezember 1942. 31/12/1942. Dokument 98. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹⁰⁷⁹ Direktor / Bezirksdirektion Radom / Ostbahn - Krumej / Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt. 2/1/1943. APL 513 / 0 / 1; available in print: Dokument 108. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹⁰⁸⁰ Aussage des Eisenbahnarbeiters J. Pierscionek aus dem Dorfe Boryszów Polski, gemacht vor deutschen Dienststellen, betreffend seine und seiner Familie Aussiedlung und Unterbringung im Lager in Zamosc. 12/1/1943. Dokument 131; Aussage des Eisenbahnarbeiters H. Bojarzuk. 12/1/1943. Dokument 132; Aussage des Eisenbahnarbeiters J. Skawarek aus dem Dorfe Jaroslawiec, gemacht vor deutschen Dienststellen, betreffend die Plünderung seiner Wohnung während der Aussiedlung des Dorfes. 12/1/1943. Dokument 133; Aussage des Eisenbahnarbeiters A. Marcola aus dem Dorfe Bozydar, gemacht vor deutschen Dienststellen, betreffend die Aussiedlung aus seinem Haus und die Unterbringung im Lager in Zamosc. 12/1/1943. Dokument 134. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹⁰⁸¹ Black 2008, pp. 288–293.

¹⁰⁸² Meurin - Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt. 25/1/1943. APL 513 / 0 / 1; available in print: Dokument 162. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

proposed improvements. The major problem had been the massive flight of the Poles. It was estimated that it was caused by the scantiness of the police forces and by the uncertainty of the Poles about their future. This had been reinforced by Polish propaganda, which had claimed that the fate of the Poles would be that of the Jews. The propaganda hit the mark exactly, because in its report the UWZ outlined a plan for the extermination of the Poles on an even larger scale than before.¹⁰⁸³

Other organs also described different shortcomings and problems that they had met with during the Germanisation operation. For example, officials of the concentration camp in Auschwitz expressed the wish that only persons who were able to work should be sent there because they had to reserve the camp's extermination capability for the Jews.¹⁰⁸⁴ This plea and the earlier suggestion of the UWZ are incompatible, but the former indicated that the possibility for the genocide of the Poles existed in practice.

The Polish population realised what kind of plans the SS harboured because the Germanisation operation resembled the genocide of the Jews that the SS had carried out in Distrikt Lublin and which was continuing in other parts of the Generalgouvernement. Because the Poles knew about the fate of the Jews, it was natural that they do everything they could try to avoid being caught up in the operations of the SS. The SS failed to anticipate the understandable reaction of the Polish population, and its operation against the Poles can be considered to have failed.

The reason for the failure was the fact that the representatives of the SS thought that they would be able to carry out the Germanisation operation phase by phase, proceeding day by day from village to village in a restricted area targeting the Polish population with measures the ultimate objective of which was genocide. The model for the basic execution of the operation was provided

¹⁰⁸³ The proposal of the UWZ read as follows:

Um die Aussonderung des unerwünschten Blutes und der Asozialen restlos zu erreichen, wäre zu erwägen, ob nicht auch die Kinder mit den Eltern in das Arbeitslager nach Auschwitz überführt werden sollten. In absehbarer Zeit treten die jetzt in die Rentendörfer verbrachten Kinder der Wertungsgruppe III biologisch wieder in Erscheinung und tauchen später erneut in unliebsamer Weise auf.

Bericht des SS-Obersturmbannführers H. Krumeier über die Tätigkeit der Zweigstelle Zamosc der Umwandererzentralstelle von Beginn der Aussiedlungsaktion bis zum 31. Dezember 1942. 31/12/1942. Dokument 98. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹⁰⁸⁴ The petition of the representatives of Auschwitz read as follows:

Arbeitseinsatzfähigkeit bezüglich Erklärte SS-Hauptsturmführer Haumeier, dass nur arbeitsfähige Polen angeliefert werden sollen, um somit möglichst jede unnütze Belastung des Lagers sowie des Zubringerverkehrs zu vermeiden. Beschränkte, Idioten, Krüppel und kranke Menschen müssen in kürzester Zeit durch Liquidation zur Entlastung des Lagers aus demselben entfernt werden.

Diese Maßnahme findet aber insofern eine Erschwerung, da nach Anweisung des RSHA entgegen der bei den Juden angewendeten Maßnahme, Polen eines natürlichen Todes sterben müssen. Es wird dieserhalb von der Lagerführung gewünscht, von der Zuweisung Nichteinsatzfähiger Abstand zu nehmen.

Bericht des SS-Untersturmführers H. Kinny über den Transport der polnischen ausgesiedelten Personen aus dem Gebiet von Zamość nach dem Lager Auschwitz. 16/12/1942. Dokument 80. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

by the measure implemented in the Wartheland, but when the SS replaced the proposed deportation of the Polish population to some other area with genocide, the character of the operation changed decisively, and the result was resistance, which increased almost to the point of becoming an uprising.

Even though the reason for the failure can be clearly indicated, we should ask whether the representatives of the SS really believed that tens of thousands of persons living in a fairly large area would patiently look on as people of neighbouring areas and villages were driven out of their homes and transported off to almost certain death. The question is worth asking because the Poles had been fleeing from the target areas as early as 1940, and the UWZ knew it.

It does not even seem to have occurred to the representatives of the SS that the Poles would react other than passively to the deportations. If the SS men had understood that the real difficulty in the operation did not lie in getting organised and obtaining *Volksdeutsche* settlers, they would not have attempted to carry out the operation with 500 policemen at a rate of several villages a day. The reason for the wrong judgement of the SS was its disparaging attitude towards the Poles and the straightforward progress of the first stage of the genocide of the Jews in the Generalgouvernement.

During the first stage of the Germanisation operation, several thousand *Volksdeutsche* were settled in Kreis Zamosc. According to the information of the RKF Stabshauptamt, altogether 4983 persons, of whom about 80% came from Bessarabia had been sent to Distrikt Lublin by 14/12/1942.¹⁰⁸⁵ The *Volksdeutsche* of the camp in Cholm are obviously missing from this information because, according to the documents of the *Volksdeutsche* Mittelstelle, altogether 5515 persons comprising 1143 families were sent to Zamosc in November and December 1942.¹⁰⁸⁶ The report of the RKF Stabshauptamt dated on 1/4/1943 confirms the numbers of the *Volksdeutsche* Mittelstelle because, the number of settled persons is 5,534 and it contains 541 *Volksdeutsche* from the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁸⁷ According to the UWZ, about 7,000 persons (1700 families) of

¹⁰⁸⁵ The RKF Stabshauptamt gave the following information about the settlers:

	Herdhaltungen	Personen
aus Bessarabien (Be 3)	513	2460
aus Bessarabien (Ki)	287	1426
Russlanddeutsche	109	499
aus Bosnien	81	341
aus Bulgarien	34	186
rum. Verwandten- nachumsiedler	12	71
Total	1036	4983

¹⁰⁸⁶ Auskunft des Stabshauptamtes März 1943: Generalgouvernement. BArch R 49 / 2. Perthen: Arbeitsbericht des Reichskommissars für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums Hauptamt *Volksdeutsche* Mittelstelle Einsatzstab Litzmannstadt für das Jahr 1942. 23/1/1943. BArch R 59 / 229; *partially available* in print: Dokument 159. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹⁰⁸⁷ Tabelle 1b Ostumsiedlung; Ansiedlung - a) Personen. RKF Stabshauptamt: Bericht über den Stand der Um- und Ansiedlung am 1.4.1943. BArch R 49 / 85.

German descent were settled in Kreis Zamosc. The information of the UWZ shows that 5508 *Volksdeutsche* in 1074 families were transported to the area. This means that the number of *Deutschstämmige* was 2257 persons (631 families).¹⁰⁸⁸ Globocnik had different figures, and according to him, the number of settled persons was about 8500 comprising about 1900 families.¹⁰⁸⁹

When the above-mentioned figures are compared with the 14 settlement orders of the SS-Arbeitsstab, in which the numbers of the *Volksdeutsche* are mentioned,¹⁰⁹⁰ one notes that the SS-Arbeitsstab ordered the placement of 3940 persons over a period of 14 days. The objective was thus to settle on average 281 persons every day. Because the number of the persons varied daily between 200 and 400, it is possible to estimate that, during the nine days for which there is no information about the number of settlers, about 1800–3600 persons could have been settled. When the number of the settlers is calculated on the basis of how many individuals the Vomi delivered, one can suspect that the size of the population was really under 2000. Thus the total number of settled *Volksdeutsche* was less than 6000 persons.

Once the numbers of the *Volksdeutsche* have been more or less ascertained, it remains for the *Deutschstämmige* to be dealt with. The most important question concerns whether the *Deutschstämmige* were included in the figures for the inhabitants of the villages populated with Germans. It is probable that they were included in Globocnik's figure of 8500 persons. That number corresponds quite well with the figure arrived at if the 3000 *Deutschstämmige* enrolled in the area by the EWZ before the Germanisation operation are added to the number of *Volksdeutsche* given by the Vomi.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Lagebericht für das Generalgouvernement und den Warthegau / Juli 1943. Not dated. BArch R 75 / 4.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Globocnik - Grothmann. 3/3/1943. Anlage 10: Zahlen über angesetzte Deutsche und Umsiedler. BArch NS 19 / 2234. Available in print: Dokument 214. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

¹⁰⁹⁰ It is possible to obtain information about the number of *Volksdeutsche* settlers from the following settlement orders of the SS-Arbeitsstab:

Document	Number of settlers	Signum
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 14	250	APL 513 / 0 / 51
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 15	400	APL 513 / 0 / 54
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 16	300	APL 513 / 0 / 55
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 17	200	APL 513 / 0 / 35
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 19	200	APL 513 / 0 / 45
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 20	290	APL 513 / 0 / 43
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 22	200	APL 513 / 0 / 18
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 23	400	APL 513 / 0 / 41
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 24	250	APL 513 / 0 / 34
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 25	300	APL 513 / 0 / 53
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 26	200	APL 513 / 0 / 16
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 27	250	APL 513 / 0 / 31
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 28	400	APL 513 / 0 / 37
Ansiedlungsbefehl Nr. 30	300	APL 513 / 0 / 40
Total	3,940	

It was natural that Globocnik should include the *Deutschstämmige* in the figures for the Germanic population of the area because in this way the situation could be made to look better than it really was. One should also note the fact that it was originally intended that the Germanisation operation should be based particularly on persons obtained from the target area, but there is no information available that indicates persons who had been classified as *Deutschstämmige* had been resettled inside Kreis Zamosc.

It is possible to make assumptions about questions relating with the *Deutschstämmige* with the help of the documents produced for the Germanisation operation. The folders concerning individual measures contain documents in which there are mentions of the *Deutschstämmige* in individual villages, and from these it is possible to calculate that they consisted of altogether 155 families and 4 persons.¹⁰⁹¹ The document series is not perfect, but because more than 150 families are mentioned, it is reasonable to estimate that a few thousand of people classified as *Deutschstämmige* remained in the villages of the target area.

The Germanisation operation produced a situation in which fewer than 10,000 persons of German descent, of whom 2/3 were *Volksdeutsche*, lived in the area of Kreis Zamosc. About 10,000 Poles and 7000 Ukrainians had been expelled out of their way. In addition to the Germanised villages, at least as many Polish villages existed in the target area, and over 20,000 Poles had escaped to other villages in the area or to neighbouring *Kreise*. These demographic facts did not make for a good basis for pacifying the area.

It is possible to analyse the demographic composition of the area with the help of a document entitled *Amtliches Gemeinde- und Dorferverzeichnis*, which was published by the administration of the Generalgouvernement. According to the geographical definitions used by the administration of the Generalgouvernement, on 1/3/1943 the Germanisation operation had reached

¹⁰⁹¹ There are mentions of the *Deutschstämmige* in the following documents:
Deutschstämmige aus dem Dorf Pod-Stary Kreis Zamosc. Not dated.
 APL 513 / 0 / 51.
Deutschstämmige aus dem Dorf Siedliska Kreis Zamosc. Not dated.
 APL 513 / 0 / 54.
Deutschstämmige aus dem Dorf Sitaniec-Blonie Kreis Zamosc. Not dated.
 APL 513 / 0 / 55.
Deutschstämmige aus dem Dorf Sitaniec-Wolica Kreis Zamosc. Not dated.
 APL 513 / 0 / 55.
Deutschstämmige aus dem Dorf Sitaniec-Kolonie Kreis Zamosc. Not dated.
 APL 513 / 0 / 55.
Deutschstämmige aus dem Dorf Sitaniec-Lapiguz Kreis Zamosc. Not dated.
 APL 513 / 0 / 55.
Deutschstämmige aus dem Dorfe Majdan Kreis Skierbieszow. Not dated.
 APL 513 / 0 / 47.
 Zurückgestellte aus dem Dorfe Kolonie Bozydar Kreis Zamosc. Not dated.
 APL 513 / 0 / 31.
 Zurückgestellte aus dem Dorfe Horyszow Kolonie Kreis Zamosc. Not dated.
 APL 513 / 0 / 37.

the following communes which contained the following numbers of inhabitants:¹⁰⁹²

Komarow	8099	Kotlice	7053
Labunie	6236	Mokre	9633
Nielisz	9044	Nowa Osada	6992
Skierbieszow	5823	Stary Zamosc	9825 ¹⁰⁹³
Wysokie	3983		

According to the information of the administration of the Generalgouvernement, in March 1943 there were altogether 66,688 persons living in the target area of the Germanisation operation. The figure might be not exact because of the unrest caused by the Germanisation operation but it can be used to as an approximate estimate of the population. When this figure is compared with that of the *Volksdeutsche* settled in the area, it can be seen that the operation had not created an area that could be classified as Germanic.

Because approximate figures for the target area are available and information is also available about the size of the population that it been planned to expel, it is possible to estimate what the situation would have been like if the Germanisation operation had achieved its objective: even in that case, a majority German population would not have been created in the area because the deportations would have affected only about a half of the population of the area, and only about 10,000 people of German descent would have been settled there.

6.4 Winding up the operation and the weakening security situation

The first stage of the Germanisation operation ended in late 1942, but numerous measures still remained to be carried out. They included the resettlement of the evacuated Ukrainian population, attempts to suppress the unrest and measures for securing the permanence of the German settlement.

In the view of the local SS organisation, the major task was to support the settled *Volksdeutsche*. The representatives of the SS started to strengthen their local organisation. It began with a new definition of the duties of the *Kreisdienststelle Zamosc des Reichskommissars f.d.F.d.V* (Zamosc County Office of the RKF), in addition to which the local RK-Bauleitung and the Siedlerwirtschaftsgemeinschaft received new instructions for carrying out their duties.¹⁰⁹⁴ Instructions concerning the SS and police bases,¹⁰⁹⁵ the cultural life of

¹⁰⁹² The term "*Gemeinde*" used by the administration of the Generalgouvernement is here translated as "commune".

¹⁰⁹³ *Amtliches Gemeinde- und Dorfverzeichnis für das Generalgouvernement.*

¹⁰⁹⁴ Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Anweisung No. 2 an die Kreisdienststelle Zamosc des Reichskommissars f.d.F.d.V. 6/1/1943. BArch R 49 /

the *Volksdeutsche*¹⁰⁹⁶ and continuing the enrolment of persons representing the German genotype¹⁰⁹⁷ were issued later in the spring of 1943.

The instructions of the Kreisdienststelle Zamosc des Reichskommissars f.d.F.d.V also dealt with the continuation of the Germanisation operation, but the main attention was focused on securing the living conditions of the settled *Volksdeutsche*.¹⁰⁹⁸ In the field of construction, Globocnik ordered that the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte should be responsible for planning and gave a large number of detailed instructions to the RK-Bauleitung about the organization of construction activities. These instructions emphasised the need to curtail expenses, the reuse of old materials and contained some of Himmler's more or less naive views about construction.¹⁰⁹⁹

The instructions concerning the economy included the idea that the main communes should be self-sufficient units, but in practice the result of their implementation would be a regional economy totally directed by the SWG.¹¹⁰⁰ Similar ideas aiming at uniformity can be perceived in the instructions concerning cultural life. They were characterised by a firm determination to create a homogeneous culture reflecting the National Socialist ideology. The implementation of the task was assigned to the Vomi, which would have the village leaders and the Hitler-Jugend, the Fraueneinsatz, the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte and the SS-Landwacht institutions to assist it.¹¹⁰¹

It was extremely important for the SS to stabilise the security situation. A report of a motorized gendarme battalion in February 1943 describes the level

3533; available in print: Dokument 115. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*. Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Anweisung No. 3 an die Kreisdienststelle Zamosc des Reichskommissars f.d.F.d.V. 6/1/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533; available in print: Dokument 116. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*. Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Anweisung No. 5 an die Kreisdienststelle Zamosc des Reichskommissars f.d.F.d.V. 6/1/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533; available in print: Dokument 117. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Dienstanweisung No 6. 1/5/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533; available in print: Dokument 266. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin. Der Beauftragte des RKF: Dienstanweisung 7. 12/5/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533; available in print: Dokument 270. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin. Der Beauftragte des RKF. Dienstanweisung No 8. Lublin 11/5/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533; available in print: Dokument 269. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Anweisung No. 2 an die Kreisdienststelle Zamosc des Reichskommissars f.d.F.d.V. 6/1/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Globocnik wrote: "Grundsatz ist, dass höchstens 10 % Neumaterial für die Neuherstellung der Gebäude verwendet darf und der Baukostenbeitrag pro Hofstelle nicht mehr als RM 1.000 beträgt, sofern der Hof 20 ha gross ist. 'Warm und trocken' ist die Richtlinie des Reichsführers-SS." Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Anweisung No. 3 an die Kreisdienststelle Zamosc des Reichskommissars f.d.F.d.V. 6/1/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533.

¹¹⁰⁰ Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Anweisung No. 5 an die Kreisdienststelle Zamosc des Reichskommissars f.d.F.d.V. 6/1/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533.

¹¹⁰¹ Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF. Dienstanweisung 7. 12/5/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533.

of unrest. It reveals that the Germanisation operation had caused such severe unrest in the area of Kreis Zamosc and in the eastern parts of Kreis Bilgoraj that it could be described as an uprising. About 700–800 armed Poles participated in the resistance with the support of the original population. The gendarmes estimated that it was an operation of an organised military resistance movement led by the Polish intelligentsia, and that the organisation covered the whole of Distrikt Lublin.¹¹⁰²

It was proposed to solve the situation by changing the leaders of the Polish police and improving the economic situation of Polish policemen. In the opinion of the gendarmes, however, this did not mean that it would be possible to use the Polish police to suppress the resistance movement. This they considered to be a task for Germans, but it required additional resources, an at least partial rejuvenation of the available personnel, the implementation of decent traffic supervision and thorough search operations in the forests. Nor was the development of the German inhabitants' own self-defence organs to be forgotten.¹¹⁰³

The weakening of the security situation presented a threat to the whole Germanisation operation, and it is noteworthy that Himmler had already drawn attention to it in the middle of November 1942 before the operation even began.¹¹⁰⁴ He had also contacted the chief of the Gestapo about the matter.¹¹⁰⁵ Himmler took up the matter again at the outset of the operation. By that time, he had lost patience and asked Krüger in exceptionally outspoken terms about his intentions for suppressing Polish resistance.¹¹⁰⁶

Himmler's interest in pacifying the area had been obviously increased by the unrest that had occurred in Distrikt Lublin throughout 1942. The administration of the Generalgouvernement was well-informed about the unrest and had dealt with it several times in different sessions even before the beginning of the Germanisation operation.¹¹⁰⁷ The SS would therefore have

¹¹⁰² Bericht des Kommandeurs des I motorisierten Gendarmerie-Bataillons für den Kommandeur der Gendarmerie des Distrikts Lublin über den Aufstand im Kreise Zamosc. 4/3/1943. Dokument 222. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹⁰³ Bericht des Kommandeurs des I motorisierten Gendarmerie-Bataillons für den Kommandeur der Gendarmerie des Distrikts Lublin über den Aufstand im Kreise Zamosc. 4/3/1943. Dokument 222. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹⁰⁴ Himmler - Krüger. Telegram. 15/11/1942; Himmler - Krüger. Telegram. 17/11/1942; Himmler - Krüger. Telegram. 21/11/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1433.

¹¹⁰⁵ Himmler - Müller, Krüger. Telegram. 22/11/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1433.

¹¹⁰⁶ Himmler's message read as follows:
Lieber Krüger!

Was gedenkt Ihr endgültig zu tun, um die dauernden Bandenüberfälle zu stoppen.

Heil Hitler!

Dein H. Himmler

Himmler - Krüger. Telegram 22/11/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1433.

¹¹⁰⁷ *Das Dienstagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945: Fünfte Arbeitsbesprechung der Hauptabteilungspräsidenten.* 11/5/1942, p. 494; Sitzung im Distriktgebäude (Lublin). 31/5/1942, p. 500; Hauptabteilungsleitersitzung. 1/6/1942, p. 501; Polizeisitzung. 18/6/1942, pp. 507–509; Regierungssitzung. 13/7/1942, p. 521; Hauptabteilungsleitersitzung. 21/9/1942, p. 565.

needed to address the situation as quickly as possible so that the cause of restlessness could not be attributed to the Germanisation operation.

A real deterioration in the situation in Kreis Zamosc began in December 1942,¹¹⁰⁸ and the unrest increased in the beginning of January 1943. The *Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS* (Command Staff of the Reichsführer-SS) was informed about several partisan attacks that had taken place in or near Kreis Zamosc on 8/1/1943.¹¹⁰⁹ The events required a quick response, but Himmler did not expect Krüger to deal with the security situation alone but also required the Gestapo to participate in the measures.

Himmler contacted the Chief of the Gestapo again and ordered him to prepare to a sufficiently extensive operation to intern the poor section of the population, which he considered to be most prone to partisan activity, in concentration camps.¹¹¹⁰ The pacification of the Generalgouvernement seemed to be an important issue for Himmler because he had authorised the Chief of the *Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS* to organise the trains required for the transports.¹¹¹¹ Furthermore, he drew special attention to the fact that the imprisoned persons should be sent to the concentration camps of Lublin and Auschwitz or to camps in the heartlands of the Third Reich.¹¹¹²

The attacks by the Polish resistance were also directed against the population of German descent in Kreis Zamosc. The documents of the SS show that partisans had attacked the village of Cieszyn (Czeszyn), robbing and killing just under 50 *Volksdeutsche*, some of whom were unarmed men belonging to the local territorial defence unit. Globocnik had naturally initiated retaliatory measures. He had directed them against whole villages and even requested the support of the *Luftwaffe* for his operation.¹¹¹³ Himmler had also intervened in the matter and instructed his subordinates to take strong enough countermeasures to ensure that there would be no more attacks.¹¹¹⁴ However, the attack on the village of Cieszyn did not remain the only act of violence

¹¹⁰⁸ Amend / HSSPF Ost - Knoblauch / Kommandostab RFSS. 23/12/1942. Telegram. BACh NS 19 / 1433.

¹¹⁰⁹ HSSPF Ost - Kommandostab RFSS. 8/1/1943. Six telegrammes. BACh NS 19 / 1433. Some of the telegrammes are available on print: Dokument 121, Dokument 124, Dokument 123 and Dokument 124. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

¹¹¹⁰ Himmler - Müller. 11/1/1943. Telegramm. BACh NS 19 / 2648.

¹¹¹¹ Wolff was to order the trains with the help of Staatssekretär Ganzenmüller in the Reichsverkehrministerium. Himmler had probably envisaged a really large-scale operation because otherwise the Reichsverkehrministerium would not have been involved in the matter. The idea was possibly to kill even hundreds of thousands of people because only a little earlier Himmler had ordered trains for the transportation of the Jews from Ganzenmüller. The role of Ganzenmüller and the railways in the extermination of the Jews appears in Ganzenmüller's letter to Wolff on 28/7/1942. Ganzenmüller - Wolff. 28/7/1942. BACh NS 19 / 2655.

¹¹¹² Himmler - Müller. 11/1/1943. Telegramm. BACh NS 19 / 2648.

¹¹¹³ Krüger - Himmler. 28/1/1943. Telegramm. BACh NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 164. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

¹¹¹⁴ Telegramm des Reichsführers-SS an den SS-Obergruppenführer F. W. Krüger, der die Sühnemassnahmen für die Ereignisse im Dorf Cieszyn befiehlt. 1/2/1943. Dokument 174. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

targeting the population of German descent, and we also have available a personal account of a resistance attack.¹¹¹⁵

The subjection of the population of German descent to attacks by the resistance was a natural and understandable consequence of the Germanisation operation because the majority of the population to be deported had remained in the area. Even though the Polish population was subjected to systematic persecution and murder, the situation of the population of German descent should not be forgotten. The *Volksdeutsche* had left their homes more or less voluntarily, the representatives of the SS had examined and selected them and almost all of them had ended up living for months on end in miserable conditions in the camps of the Vomi.

In November and December 1942, a few thousand *Volksdeutsche* were transferred into a hostile environment in Kreis Zamosc. The basic conditions for starting life in their new area of domicile were further weakened by the fact that the local SS organisation reacted extremely coldly to the settlers: a large number of families had been classified as politically unsuitable, and their placement to the target area was considered questionable.¹¹¹⁶ Globocnik's attitude to the settlers explains the sharp line: he resisted any rights or advantages being granted to them.¹¹¹⁷ Globocnik's real attitude thus deviated totally from the requirements he had specified in the covering letter of his order in November 1942.

The overall situation of the *Volksdeutsche* was weak, and the depth of the problems was increased by the fact that the SS did not take the task of guaranteeing their security very seriously. Self-defence units, which had been trained already in the Vomi camps were recruited from among the German population, but at least some of them were not armed, as the example of Cieszyn indicates.¹¹¹⁸ The dismissive attitude of the SS to security questions is reflected by the fact it was already aware that there had been unrest in Distrikt Lublin even before the Germanisation operation began.

HSSPF Krüger had already reported about actions against the resistance in May 1942,¹¹¹⁹ and in June 1942 Gottlob Berger, the Director of the SS-Hauptamt had lamented the weak security situation in Distrikt Lublin.¹¹²⁰ The security situation was indeed clearly poor even before the Germanisation operation and, for example, Kommission XV of the EWZ had had to use a police guard for its

¹¹¹⁵ Greifelt - Krüger. 28.7.1943. Appendix: Müller - Koch. 9.6.1943. BArch R 52 II / 281.

¹¹¹⁶ Krüger - Himmler 9/11/1942. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 48. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹¹⁷ Globocnik - Grothmann. 3/3/1943; Anlage 9: Germanen-Umsiedlung. BArch NS 19 / 2234. Available in print: Dokument 214. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹¹⁸ Perthen: Arbeitsbericht des Reichskommissars für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle Einsatzstab Litzmannstadt für das Jahr 1942. 23.1.1943. BArch R 59 / 229.

¹¹¹⁹ Krüger - Himmler. 22/5/1942. Telegramm. BArch NS 19 / 1671.

¹¹²⁰ Berger - Himmler. Entwurf. 17/6/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1671.

own protection in summer 1942.¹¹²¹ Himmler had taken up the issue of the security deficit at a general level and ordered that the available forces should be reinforced in August 1942.¹¹²² Globocnik had started countermeasures, which were described as efficient,¹¹²³ and it is known that at least three anti-partisan operations were carried out before the massive operation of summer 1943.¹¹²⁴

The security situation worsened further during the early months of 1943 when the SS continued deportation and resettlement actions in Kreis Hrubieszow in January 1943. The idea was to resettle the Ukrainian population in an operation called *Ukraineraktion*. The objective of the measures in question was to use the Ukrainian population to form a buffer zone in order to protect the *Volksdeutsche*. In line with the established modes of operation of the SS, this required the expulsion of the Polish population.¹¹²⁵ Thus Kreis Zamosc and its neighbourhood remained restless throughout the whole spring of 1943.

According to the documents of the Umwandererzentralstelle, altogether 1756 Ukrainian families comprising 7072 persons were resettled in Kreis Hrubieszow, and they were given almost 140,000 hectares of land instead of the 11,000 hectares they had possessed in their earlier domiciles.¹¹²⁶ The settlement of the Ukrainians required 75 deportation actions affecting the Poles. The operation began on 13/1/1943,¹¹²⁷ and the settlement of the Ukrainians was completed at the turn of February and March 1943,¹¹²⁸ although the report of the operation in April 1943 mentioned a few minor measures that were still planned.¹¹²⁹

During the operation, the Poles were expelled from 63 villages in the northwestern part of Kreis Hrubieszow. It was planned that the deportations would affect 14,738 persons, but the SS succeeded in rounding up only 5578

1121 Stabsführung. Planung. / EWZ: Bericht über die Erfassung der Volksdeutschen aus der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjet-Republik in Cholm, Distrikt Lublin. 4/7/1942. BArch R 69 / 378.

1122 Himmler: Befehl über die Verstärkung der Kampfkräfte der SS und Polizei im Generalgouvernement und in den besetzten Ostgebieten. 17.8.1942. BArch NS 19 / 1671.

1123 Stabes z.b.V. Sonderbeauftragter des Führers / Kommandeur des OKW: Bericht Nr. 12. 3/9/1942. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

1124 Wasser 1993B, pp. 95–96.

1125 Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b; Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 40 Ukr. 9/2/1943. APL 513 / 0 / 27; Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 41 Ukr. 18/2/1943. APL 513 / 0 / 20; Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt UWZ: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 42 Ukr. 18/2/1943. APL 513 / 0 / 24; Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 44 Ukr. 21/2/1943. APL 513 / 0 / 21.

1126 Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Lagebericht Mai 1943. Not dated. BArch R 75 / 4.

1127 Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

1128 Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht für Februar 1943. 4/3/1943. BArch R 75 / 4.

1129 Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht für den Monat April 1943. 29/4/1943. BArch R 75 / 4.

persons, 1109 of whom had to be left to provide a work force in the area. Thus the SS had possession of 4469 persons,¹¹³⁰ and at least the some of them ended up in Auschwitz.¹¹³¹ The reason for the failure was considered to be the inadequate number of policemen available to carry out the evictions and the quality of the forces.¹¹³² Because the SS used the same methods as in the settlement of the *Volksdeutsche* in November and December 1942¹¹³³ and, for example, shot fleeing Poles,¹¹³⁴ the problems should not have come as a surprise.

According to the SS, it was the failure of the deportation operation that had led to the unrest because the Poles had fled to the neighbouring Kreis Cholm, from where they launched attacks on their former home villages at night. The UWZ carried out 21 actions with the help of the Gestapo and the SD and arrested 1064 Poles, but these actions had not led to the complete pacification of the area.¹¹³⁵ The representatives of the UWZ did not consider that it was the activities of the SS as such that had caused the unrest but rather the propaganda disseminated among the Poles that claimed that the same fate awaited them as had befallen the Jews. Even though the deportation and settlement activity was considered to have caused some unrest, the UWZ did not admit that it had caused an intensification of partisan activity because this was considered to have happened throughout the Generalgouvernement.¹¹³⁶

The UWZ tried hard to show that the unrest was already abating in spring 1943, and it reported that the Poles who had fled in autumn 1942 were returning to their former abodes. However, a statement in the same document according to which the partisans had attacked the Ukrainians belied the claim of pacification.¹¹³⁷ The documents show that fate of the Ukrainians proved to be a miserable one. The situation was especially complicated because the

¹¹³⁰ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b; Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht für den Monat März. 4/4/1943. BArch R 75 / 4; Bericht des SS-Obersturmbannführers Hahn über die Umsiedlung der Ukrainer aus dem Kreise Zamosc nach dem Kreise Hrubieszów sowie über die Evakuierung der Polen. 3 / 1943. Dokument 227. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹³¹ Poprzeczny 2004, p. 250.

¹¹³² Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht für den Monat März. 4/4/1943. BArch R 75 / 4; Bericht des SS-Obersturmbannführers Hahn über die Umsiedlung der Ukrainer aus dem Kreise Zamość nach dem Kreise Hrubieszów sowie über die Evakuierung der Polen. 3/1943. Dokument 227. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹³³ For example, Zweigstelle Zamosc / UWZ Litzmannstadt: Einsatzbefehl Nr. 40 Ukr. 9/2/1943. APL 513 / 0 / 27.

¹¹³⁴ Einsatzbefehl Nr. 51 des Leiters der Umwandererzentralstelle in Łódź, H. Krumej, betreffend die zusätzliche Aussiedlung von Polen aus den Dörfern Jamki und Mojslawice im Kreise Hrubieszów. 20/4/1943. Dokument 260. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹¹³⁵ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹¹³⁶ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht für Februar 1943. 4/3/1943. BArch R 75 / 4.

¹¹³⁷ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht für den Monat April. 29/4/1943. BArch R 75 / 4.

Ukrainian police was not available in the settlement area, and this was guarded by the Polish police, who did not protect the Ukrainians from the attacks of the Poles. Furthermore, the anti-partisan operations of the Germans were often also directed against the Ukrainian population, and hundreds of innocent people were arbitrarily murdered.¹¹³⁸

According to the UWZ, an experiment of settling Polish farmers in so-called Z villages among the German settlement in Kreis Zamosc was carried out in spring 1943. The idea had already put forward during the planning of the Germanisation operation but had apparently been renounced, since the UWZ claimed that it was modelled on a practice that had been employed in the Wartheland. The project was small-scale because it comprised the placement of less than a hundred people in one village, but the feedback received was considered very positive, and it was intended to extend the project to the whole Generalgouvernement.¹¹³⁹ However, it should be noted that Globocnik had very different views about the Z villages because according to him there were 40 so-called Z villages in the area of Zamosc with 1413 farms and 6509 inhabitants.¹¹⁴⁰

Even though the representatives of the SS tried to explain the state of affairs in the best possible light, the reports concerning both the whole of Distrikt Lublin and the individual *Kreise* tell of the unrest caused by the Germanisation operation and the different problems this caused to the administration.¹¹⁴¹ It is indeed justified to assume that the Germanisation operation at least caused some kind of chaos in the area, which the SS organisation was not able to pacify with the forces at its disposal.

According to Wasser, the strength of the Polish resistance movement was already about 4000–8000 members at the end of 1942, and the number certainly did not decrease as the operations of the SS continued in the area.¹¹⁴² It would have been possible to correct the situation if the representatives of the SS had not insisted on continuing its project by settling the Ukrainians in the homes of the Poles and again threatened the survival of the latter in spring 1943.

¹¹³⁸ Fragment einer Denkschrift des Vorsitzenden des Ukrainischen Hilfskomitees, W. Kubijowicz, an den Generalgouverneur des Generalgouvernements. 25/2/1943. Dokument 203. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

¹¹³⁹ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BAArch R 75 / 3b.

¹¹⁴⁰ Globocnik - Grothmann. 3/3/1943. Anlage 10: Zahlen über angesetzte Deutsche und Umsiedler. BAArch NS 19 / 2234; available in print: Dokument 214. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

¹¹⁴¹ Bericht des Kreishauptmannes in Biłgoraj für Februar 1943 für den Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin. Dokument 218; Lagebericht des Kreishauptmannes in Hrubieszów für Februar 1943 für den Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin. Dokument 219; Lagebericht des Kreishauptmannes in Krasnystaw für Februar 1943 für den Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin. Dokument 220. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*; Fragment eines Referates des Oberregierungsrates Dr. Hasse, gehalten auf einer Arbeitstagung im Sitz der Lubliner Distriktsbehörden mit Beteiligung der Abteilungsleiter und der Vertreter der Kreishauptmannschaften. 28/5/1943. Dokument 276. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹¹⁴² Wasser 1993B, pp. 147–148.

The problems of the SS were further increased by the fact that the placement of the Poles in the so-called *Rentendorf* villages had not succeeded in the desired way either, and it had attracted widespread attention in the target areas outside Distrikt Lublin. The information about the matter had first spread in the form of rumours, and particularly the high mortality caused by the bad treatment of the children in the transportations attracted further attention and led to criticism of the operation especially as the genocide of the Jews was still fresh in people's memory.¹¹⁴³

The belief of the SS organisation in its cause began to turn into stubbornness, which is most clearly reflected in the desire of the officials of the UWZ to expand the operation and their schemes for wider-ranging operations involving the whole Generalgouvernement. The representatives of the Lublin SS organisation inevitably met with the problems as a result of their blind intransigence. The consequence was a broad conflict between the representatives of the SS and the administration of the Generalgouvernement, which finally led to the whole project being broken off and to several changes in personnel.

¹¹⁴³ Bericht des Warschauer Amtes des Sicherheitsdienstes über die Folgen der Umsiedlungsaktion in Zamość im Distrikt Warschau. Dokument 175 Madajczyk 1977A; Schreiben des SS- und Polizeiführers im Distrikt Warschau, F. von Sammern-Frankeneegg, betreffend die aus dem Distrikt Lublin in den Kreis Siedlce ausgesiedelten polnischen Familien. 25/2/1943. Dokument 204. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

7 THE SECOND STAGE OF THE GERMANISATION OPERATION

The second stage of the Germanisation project was carried out in summer 1943. It was directed at the southern parts of Kreis Zamosc in conjunction with an extensive anti-partisan operation whose objective was to suppress the activities of the Polish resistance movement, which had been formed in the winter of 1942–1943. The Germanisation operation was not the main project of the SS any more, but nor was it a mere by-product of the other operation.

The implementation of the second stage of the Germanisation operation was not simple because the representatives of the SS had ended up in conflicts with the administration of the Generalgouvernement, and in order to carry out the next phase of the operation it was necessary to put the relations on at least some sort of footing. The conflict between the different organs of the National Socialist administration is not in itself an extremely important matter for the subject of this study, but it gives information about the operation itself and offers indications about the kind of problems that the SS might have faced in larger projects.

The representatives of the SS did not renounce their dreams of more extensive Germanisation projects in spite of the adversities. This is shown in the preparations for the second stage of the Germanisation operation. However, the enthusiasm did not extend to Reichsführer-SS Himmler any more, so it was not realistic for them to envisage any the expansion of the project. One can assume that that some kind of confusion prevailed in the SS over the demographic reorganisation policy in 1943. However, it should be noted that the confusion did not apply to all sectors of the operation because, for example the genocide of the Jews actually intensified at that time.¹¹⁴⁴

¹¹⁴⁴ For a broader treatment of the subject, see I.ongerich 1998.

7.1 The conflict between the SS and the civil authorities

The SS and the civil authorities found themselves in open conflict as consequence of the deportation and settlement activities, but the latter were forced to admit that the gradual beginning of Germanisation in the Generalgouvernement had Hitler's approval. The real problem was the fact that it seemed as if the SS operations in Kreis Zamosc would never end at all.¹¹⁴⁵ It should be noted that the administration of the Generalgouvernement had received information about the project of the SS at a very early stage: Himmler had already presented to his ideas to Frank in March 1942,¹¹⁴⁶ and Globocnik had told about his intention to enrol the population of German origin in Kreis Zamosc only a few days later.¹¹⁴⁷ The real state of affairs should have become clear to Frank at the latest by the beginning of August 1942, when he visited Lublin. At that time, an article about Himmler's construction project had already appeared in the press, and Krüger presented the project for settling the *Volksdeutsche* in the area in considerable detail, in addition to which the timing of the operation had also been clearly revealed.¹¹⁴⁸

Relations between the SS and the administration of Generalgouvernement had already become strained before the beginning of the Germanisation operation, and Frank had decided to take steps against Globocnik on 24/11/1942.¹¹⁴⁹ The friction had been caused mainly by Globocnik's highhanded confiscation of land for the SS and by Himmler's order concerning the appropriation of the property of the murdered Jews by the SS.¹¹⁵⁰

The situations became even more strained as problems concerning the Germanisation operation arose.¹¹⁵¹ HSSPF Krüger told Frank at the beginning of February 1943 that he had suggested to Himmler that the operation be

¹¹⁴⁵ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Gouverneurs-Besprechung. 22/2/1943, p. 620; available in print: Dokument 200. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

¹¹⁴⁶ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Empfang des RFSS Himmler. 13/3/1942, p. 473.

¹¹⁴⁷ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Arbeitstagung der Distriktsstandortführer und der Amtswalter der Arbeitsbereich Generalgouvernement der NSDAP. 18/3/1942, p. 481.

¹¹⁴⁸ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Sitzung zur Besprechung von Sonderproblem des Distrikts Lublin im Königssaal. 4/8/1942, pp. 536–541.

¹¹⁴⁹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 24/11/1942, p. 579.

¹¹⁵⁰ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung. 24/11/1942, p. 575; Haushaltbesprechung. 26.1.1943, pp. 613, 615.

¹¹⁵¹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Gouvernementssitzung. 7/12/1942, p. 582–583; Gouverneursbesprechung im Schloss Belvedere. 24/1/1943; Polizeibesprechung 25/1/1943, pp. 598, 603–604, 609–610. The reaction of an individual representative of the civil administration is illustrated by Dr. Hagen's letter to Hitler in which he criticises the extermination plans of the SS. The matter accumulated a considerable amount of correspondence, which is also available in print: Dokument 73, Dokument 178, Dokument 190, Dokument 245, and Dokument 247. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*. Dokument 257. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

interrupted,¹¹⁵² but problems still arose at the meetings of the administration of the Generalgouvernement and eventually Frank unequivocally forbade the continuation of the Germanisation project and the handling of affairs without their being first discussed by his administration.¹¹⁵³

The actual conflict began when Gouverneur Zörner reported about the actions of the SS in Distrikt Lublin in detail. He stated that the SS had settled about 9000 *Volksdeutsche* from Bessarabia and other areas of southeast Europe in the countryside in the northern part of Kreis Zamosc and that about 40,000 hectares of land had been given to them. According to Zörner, those Poles who were able to work had been deported, mainly to Auschwitz. A smaller number of the expelled Poles had been sent as labour to Germany or had been left in the area as a labour for the *Volksdeutsche*.¹¹⁵⁴

Zörner drew attention above all to the consequences of the Germanisation operation. He presented the unrest of the non-German population and the problems that made the economic utilisation of the area more difficult. In his opinion, the unrest was caused by a fear for livelihood, family and life. The situation of the countryside population in particular had weakened because previously the farmers had enjoyed a fairly secure status. The situation had changed decisively as consequence of the actions of the SS, and it further deteriorated because the people were afraid that they would be exterminated like the Jews or end up in a concentration camp.¹¹⁵⁵

Zörner reported that the fear had given rise to a refugee movement. It was unorganised, but its consequences were significant because the fleeing people had succeeded in taking not only their personal property but also their cattle with them. Some of the refugees had joined the partisans, which had then led to the formation in the area of a militarily organised movement that was capable of efficiently combating the police units of the SS. The worst thing about the activity of the resistance was that it was not restricted to Kreis Zamosc but had spread to *Kreise* Krasnik, Pulawy and Bilgoraj.¹¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, the partisans had targeted the *Volksdeutsche*. The attacks had been carried out at nighttimes, and women and children had participated in them.¹¹⁵⁷

The Germanisation operation had also had a negative effect on the Ukrainians, who lived in a state of uncertainty. Zörner was concerned because he suspected that the operations of the SS would obstruct the plan to set the Ukrainian and the Polish populations against each other. He was also troubled by the chaotic state of the agriculture: a considerable number of villages were

¹¹⁵² *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 3/2/1943, p. 618.

¹¹⁵³ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Gouverneurs-Besprechung. 22/2/1943, pp. 620–623.

¹¹⁵⁴ Zörner - Bühler. 24/2/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 201. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

¹¹⁵⁵ Zörner - Bühler. 24/2/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

¹¹⁵⁶ The *Kreishauptmänner* of these *Kreise* reported to Zörner about the problems caused by the operation of the SS. The reports are available in print in volume I of *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS* as documents 218, 219 and 220.

¹¹⁵⁷ Zörner - Bühler. 24/2/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

almost empty, which not only endangered the crop for the coming year but also reduced the food deliveries from the area. The decrease in agricultural production was further aggravated by the fact that the *Volksdeutsche* were not able to continue farming on the same scale as the expelled Poles. Furthermore, the food consumption of the *Volksdeutsche* was greater than that of the Polish population. Zörner considered the consequences of the Germanisation operation in Distrikt Lublin to be so serious that he demanded that it be permanently abandoned.¹¹⁵⁸

The representatives of the SS immediately closed ranks when the administration of the Generalgouvernement demanded reports of the Germanisation operation.¹¹⁵⁹ HSSPF Krüger tried to get the upper hand by informing Himmler about the development of the situation and sending him the documents that he had received. Krüger also arranged a meeting for all the parties concerned, and even Konrad Meyer attended it. Staatssekretär Josef Bühler represented the administration of the Generalgouvernement, but it is not known that Zörner was present at the meeting.¹¹⁶⁰ His absence meant that the representatives of the SS could openly oppose him and discredit his claims.

The most eager defender of the operation was naturally Odilo Globocnik. Even before the operation, he had started producing documents attacking the civil authorities for Himmler. They were not necessarily connected to the Germanisation project in any way; rather his objective was simply to undermine Frank's and Zörner's position.¹¹⁶¹ Perhaps the most significant of these documents was a report in December 1942 on the operations of the NSDAP in the Generalgouvernement.¹¹⁶²

Globocnik naturally also drafted a detailed rejoinder to Zörner's report. He tried to show that Zörner's views and information were groundless and systematically attacked every point that Zörner had made. For example, Globocnik stated that only 40 criminals had been sent to Auschwitz. He also

¹¹⁵⁸ Zörner - Bühler. 24/2/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

¹¹⁵⁹ Frank required Globocnik to send him a report of his actions. Globocnik sent Frank's letter on to Krüger. Depesche des SS-Obergruppenführers F. W. Krüger an den Reichsführer-SS betreffend das Ersuchen des Generalgouverneurs Frank an O. Globocnik, ihm einen Bericht über die bisherigen Umsiedlungsmassnahmen im Distrikt Lublin zu übersenden. 28/2/1943. Dokument 206. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹⁶⁰ Krüger - Himmler. 28/2/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 207. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.* Himmler - Krüger. 28/2/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 208. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.* Krüger - Himmler. 3/3/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 212. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.* Krüger - Himmler. 17/3/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 238. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹⁶¹ In August and October 1942 Globocnik sent a large amount of material attacking Zörner to Himmler: Globocnik - Himmler. 26/8/1942, Globocnik - Brandt. 31/8/1942, Lerch - Brandt. 12/10/1942. BArch NS 19 / 1755.

¹¹⁶² Krüger - Himmler. 2/1/1943. Appendix: Globocnik: Die Partei im Generalgouvernement. 10/12/1942. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

tried to disprove the view that the Poles had a reason to flee and engage in resistance activities.¹¹⁶³

In order to emphasise his views, Globocnik dismissed the stories about unrest as exaggerated gossip and rumours. While he hastened to admit that there was resistance in the area, he also stated that it had existed there previously. Globocnik did not accept Zörner's opinion about the crisis in agriculture and considered that the problems were mainly caused by the incompetence of the civil authorities. All in all, Globocnik considered Zörner's report to be groundless and ended his letter by dismissing it in crushing terms.¹¹⁶⁴

Kruger's intervention in the handling of the consequences of the Germanisation operation was clearly an efficient way of controlling the situation because he dealt with the matter as the Staatssekretär für Sicherheitswesen of the administration of the Generalgouvernement. Thus the matter was taken out of the hands of Zörner, who could thus be sidelined. Krüger was also in an exceptionally favourable position to criticize Zörner because he had already sent Himmler various critical reports on the administration of the Generalgouvernement.¹¹⁶⁵

Krüger finished the job by sending to Himmler a comprehensive report on the situation in the Generalgouvernement in early April 1943. In it, he defended the actions of the SS and strongly attacked both Frank and his administration.¹¹⁶⁶ Himmler sent the report on, and it was no time before the issues addressed in it appeared in correspondence between Himmler and Lammers.¹¹⁶⁷ In this way the leaders of the SS in the Generalgouvernement took the matter out of Frank's reach to a level controlled by Himmler.

The Kruger's intervention did not silence Zörner, and he reported on the actions of the SS again on April 1943. According to Zörner, the SS had resettled about 7000 Ukrainians from Kreis Zamosc in the northern part of Kreis Hrubieszow and deported about 10,000 Poles from the settlement area. Zörner

¹¹⁶³ Globocnik: Stellungnahme. Not dated. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 239. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹⁶⁴ Globocnik ended his letter thus:

Anschließend darf ich feststellen:

1) Alle Anwürfe wiederholen sich und sind durch nichts erwiesen.

2) Die Quellen dieser Anwürfe sind hier nicht bekannt. Eine Umfrage bei den zuständigen Stellen, z.B. bei den Kreishauptleuten, bei der Sicherheitspolizei usw., hat ergeben, dass diese auch nicht von dort stammen.

3) Wäre ich dankbar gewesen, wenn ich rechtzeitig von solchen Fragen verständigt worden wäre, auch dann, wenn es sich nur um ein Gerücht handelte, um eventuelle Unzukömmlichkeiten abstellen zu können.

4) Hat der Gouverneur der Verwaltung ein Verbot zur Mitarbeit gegeben, sodass eine Zusammenarbeit durch ihn behindert wurde und wird.

Es kann daher festgestellt werden, dass eine rein unsachliche Haltung gegen die Ansiedlung gegeben ist.

Globocnik: Stellungnahme. Not dated. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

¹¹⁶⁵ Krüger - Himmler. 14/1/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2648; Krüger - Himmler. 19/1/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹¹⁶⁶ Krüger - Himmler 9/4/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2664.

¹¹⁶⁷ Lammers - Himmler. 17/4/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2664. Himmler - Lammers. 8/5/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2664.

also stated that a German population had been placed in the town of Lublin, which had led to a conflict between the civil authorities and the representatives of the RKF Stabshauptamt.¹¹⁶⁸

The Germanisation activity also aroused doubts within the SS, but the information available mainly concerns statements made after the war. For example, Johannes Müller, the Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei of Distrikt Lublin, said that Globocnik's methods had been so radical that the local representatives of the RSHA had complained about them. After that, according to Müller, the Chief of the Gestapo, Gruppenführer Heinrich Müller, and Standartenführer Hans Ehlich had made an inspection visit to Lublin.¹¹⁶⁹

It should be noted that, according to Müller, the creators of the racist population policy of the RSHA visited Lublin and thus had an opportunity to become acquainted with the consequences of the implementation of their plans in reality. There is no information available about the effects that the visit had on Globocnik's operation, but the visit certainly did not advance Müller's career in the RSHA.¹¹⁷⁰ However, he was not alone in his views because his predecessor, Walter Huppenkothen, had also made a statement expressing the doubts felt in the Sicherheitspolizei and in the SD.¹¹⁷¹

Globocnik and his operation were certainly assessed in the spring of 1943. The Director of the SS-Personalhauptamt, Maximilian von Herff, drafted the most important assessment after visiting the Generalgouvernement on an inspection tour.¹¹⁷² von Herff's itinerary was comprehensive, and he inspected the different organs of the SS in Distrikt Lublin and even visited Zamosc.¹¹⁷³ von Herff also met the local SS officers and concluded that Globocnik had tried to do too much himself and should have had an experienced chief of staff who, unlike the young SS officers in Lublin, would have been able to temper the impulsiveness of his superior.¹¹⁷⁴ In addition to organisational matters, von

¹¹⁶⁸ Fragment des Lageberichts des Gouverneurs des Distrikts Lublin über die Aus- und Umsiedlungen im Gebiet von Zamosc (für März 1943). 15/4/1943. Dokument 258. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹¹⁶⁹ Aussage von J. Müller, in den Jahren 1941-1943 Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und SD im Distrikt Lublin, in der Angelegenheit der Expansionsabsichten des SS- und Polizeiführers im Distrikt Lublin, O. Globocnik. 17/12/1947. Dokument 153. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹⁷⁰ Aussage von J. Müller, in den Jahren 1941 - 1943 Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und SD im Distrikt Lublin, in der Angelegenheit der Expansionsabsichten des SS- und Polizeiführers im Distrikt Lublin, O. Globocnik. 17/12/1947. Dokument 153. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹⁷¹ Aussage von Walter Huppenkothen den in Jahren 1940 - 1941 Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD im Distrikt Lublin, über das Thema der Arbeiten an dem Plan, SS- und Polizeistützpunkte anzulegen. 24/11/1947. Dokument 15. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹¹⁷² On von Herff's position see Buchheim 1999A, p. 260.

¹¹⁷³ Reiseplan für die Besichtigungsreise von Gruppenführer von Herff. 7/5/1943. BArch NS 19 / 1794.

¹¹⁷⁴ Beurteilungsnotiz anlässlich der Dienstreise des SS-Gruf. von Herff durch das Generalgouvernement im Mai 1943. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik. Cf: Beurteilungsnotiz anlässlich der Dienstreise des SS-Gruf. von Herff durch das Generalgouvernement im Mai 1943. BArch SSFPA Ernst Lerch.

Herff also drew attention to the significance of Globocnik's personal input, which he regarded as considerable.¹¹⁷⁵

von Herff did not bring out the significance of Globocnik's personal input in vain, because in the spring of 1943 Globocnik evidently suffered some kind of breakdown, which impaired his ability to work. There is no information about the matter in wartime documents but it emerged in the postwar trial.¹¹⁷⁶ Globocnik's debilitation was temporary because the operation continued in summer 1943, but there was no longer any return to the euphoria of 1942.

In addition to high-ranking SS officers, the civil authorities also made inspection tours and tried to ascertain whether the SS intended to continue its Germanisation project. One of these civil officials was Friedrich Gollert, who was responsible for regional planning in the Generalgouvernement. He drafted a report of his inspection tour of Kreis Zamosc. The report describes the situation in Zamosc in the spring of 1943, but it also gives a clear indication of the enthusiasm of the SS for proceeding with the Germanisation project.¹¹⁷⁷

It appears from Gollert's report that the representatives of the SS planned to change place names. The town of Zamosc was to be renamed Pflugstadt. Correspondingly, the village of Zawada was to be called Wirsing, and the new name of the village of Skierbieszow was to be Heidenstein. The report also indicates a connection between the Germanisation operation and the genocide of the Jews because, according to it, the SS intended to demolish the empty homes of the Jews and use the rubble for new buildings. This probably did happen because, according to Gollert, the village of Skierbieszow, for example, was just like a German village.¹¹⁷⁸ Gollert also revealed that there were numerous active SS branches operating in the area of Zamosc. Gollert also saw the effects of the disastrous resistance attacks on the villages populated by

¹¹⁷⁵ von Herff's statement reads as follows:
Vollnatur mit all ihren grossen Licht- und Schattenseiten. Wenig auf das Äusserliche gebend, fanatisch von der Aufgabe besessen, sich bis ins Letzte für die einsetzend ohne Rücksicht auf Gesundheit oder äusserlichen Dank. Einer der besten und stärksten Pioniere im G.G. Verantwortungsbewusst, selbstbewußt, mutig, Tatsachenmensch. Sein Draufgängertum läßt ihn oft die gegebenen Grenzen sprengen und die ihm innerhalb des Ordens gezogenen Grenzen vergessen, jedoch nicht aus persönlichem Ehrgeist, sondern vielmehr aus Besessenheit um der Sachen willen. Der Erfolg spricht unbedingt für ihn.

Beurteilungsnotiz anlässlich der Dienstreise des SS-Gruf. von Herff durch das Generalgouvernement im Mai 1943. No date. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

¹¹⁷⁶ Poprzeczny 2004, pp. 112–113, 266; Rieger 2007, p. 135.

¹¹⁷⁷ Bericht des Leiters der Warschauer Dienststelle für Raumplanung, F. Gollert, über die Besichtigung der besiedelten Terrains im Kreise Zamosc durch den kommissarischen Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin L Fischer, darunter auch des grossen Konzentrationslagers hinter Lublin (Majdanek). 10/5/1943. Dokument 268. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹¹⁷⁸ Bericht des Leiters der Warschauer Dienststelle für Raumplanung, F. Gollert, über die Besichtigung der besiedelten Terrains im Kreise Zamosc durch den kommissarischen Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin L Fischer, darunter auch des grossen Konzentrationslagers hinter Lublin (Majdanek). 10/5/1943. Dokument 268. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

inhabitants of German origin. In spite of all this, the report intimates the possibility of new cooperation between the civil authorities and the SS.¹¹⁷⁹

The improvement in the situation was influenced by a change of governor on 10/4/1943. Ludwig Fischer, the Gouverneur of Distrikt Warschau, was appointed temporarily as the Gouverneur of Distrikt Lublin.¹¹⁸⁰ The idea of the administration of the Generalgouvernement was to appoint a *Gouverneur* who would be able to control Globocnik.¹¹⁸¹ The representatives of the SS got the first hints of the change in February 1943, and HSSPF Krüger reported to Himmler about Frank's intention to transfer Zörner away from Lublin.¹¹⁸² The project proceeded during the spring of 1943, and it was dealt with as part of a wider administrative reform.¹¹⁸³ Globocnik intervened in the matter and informed the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS about his views of the candidates for governor¹¹⁸⁴ and his ideas concerning the project.¹¹⁸⁵

Frank had attempted to cooperate with Himmler on the subject of the administrative reform, but Himmler contacted Lammers and Bormann about it.¹¹⁸⁶ The lumping together of the change of governor with the administrative reform and the emergence of the Himmler-Bormann-Lammers team as a background force is not surprising, even though there is no clear proof available that Frank was pushed into a particular solution. The most important point is the fact that the SS worked against Frank at all the levels of the administration, and that Frank was forced to change the leader of Distrikt Lublin even though the problems had been caused by the SS.

Gouverneur Fischer reported about the situation in the area of Zamosc in mid-May 1943. According to the new governor, the Germanisation operation had made relations between Globocnik's organs and the civil authorities so bad that they had ended up working against each other. However, Fischer stated that he had already succeeded in improving the relations quite successfully. An inspection tour carried out together with Globocnik had helped. Fischer also said that he had seen some affirmative results of the Germanisation operation on the tour.¹¹⁸⁷

¹¹⁷⁹ Bericht des Leiters der Warschauer Dienststelle für Raumplanung, F. Gollert, über die Besichtigung der besiedelten Terrains im Kreise Zamosc durch den kommissarischen Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin L Fischer, darunter auch des grossen Konzentrationslagers hinter Lublin (Majdanek). 10/5/1943. Dokument 268. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹¹⁸⁰ Musial 1999, p. 39.

¹¹⁸¹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945*. Besprechung über Bedenken der Gouverneure gegen Neuenteilung der Distrikte. 16/3/1943, pp. 633- 634.

¹¹⁸² Krüger - Himmler. 3/2/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹¹⁸³ Krüger - Himmler. 13/3/1943. Telegram; Himmler - Brandt. 13/3/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹¹⁸⁴ Globocnik - Brandt. 19/3/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹¹⁸⁵ Globocnik: Vereinfachung der Verwaltung im Generalgouvernement. 15.3.1943. BArch NS 19 / 2234.

¹¹⁸⁶ Frank - Himmler. 16/3/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2648. Himmler - Krüger. 29/3/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹¹⁸⁷ Bericht des kommissarischen Gouverneurs des Distrikts Lublin, L Fischer, vorgelegt dem Staatssekretär der Regierung des Generalgouvernements, J. Bühler, betreffend die Übernahme der kommissarischen Führung der Dienstgeschäfte des Gouverneurs

Fischer further stated that he had mentioned to Globocnik that the mistakes that had been made could not be repeated if the Germanisation operation was to continue while the war was still going on. Globocnik had promised to address the problems, in addition to which he and Fischer had agreed that the SS should inform the civil authorities about future operations. Fischer was indeed quite hopeful because he estimated that the security situation was improving and assumed that the Germanisation operations would not be continued in the near future.¹¹⁸⁸

Even though the relations between the civil authorities and the SS improved in Distrikt Lublin in spring 1943 because of the change of *Gouverneur*, the SS was not able to continue the Germanisation project without an interruption. Krüger again told Frank that he had suggested to Himmler that the Germanisation operation be suspended.¹¹⁸⁹ In fact, Himmler halted all deportations in the Generalgouvernement on 17/5/1943.¹¹⁹⁰ Himmler had to do something because the situation began to be intolerable for the SS. Frank had tried to contact Himmler in early May 1943, but in vain.¹¹⁹¹ Frank had a real reason for contacting Himmler because the weak security situation was a repeated subject of debates in various sessions of the administration of the Generalgouvernement.¹¹⁹²

Apparently, Himmler intended to resolve the matter by halting the Germanisation project at least temporarily. His decision was also influenced by the opinion of the authorities responsible for agriculture, who had drawn attention to the consequences of the Germanisation operation and required that it be ended.¹¹⁹³ Himmler's solution came too late to influence Frank, who had already approached Hitler with a letter in an attempt to have the situation resolved. Frank was particularly worried about the weakening security situation and the threat to the economic utilisation of the Generalgouvernement. Furthermore, he was also concerned by questions related to the exercise of power because the representatives of the RKF

des Distrikts Lublin sowie über die Besichtigung des Gebietes von Zamosc. 14/5/1943. Dokument 272. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹¹⁸⁸ Bericht des kommissarischen Gouverneurs des Distrikts Lublin, L. Fischer, vorgelegt dem Staatssekretär der Regierung des Generalgouvernements, J. Bühler, betreffend die Übernahme der kommissarischen Führung der Dienstgeschäfte des Gouverneurs des Distrikts Lublin sowie über die Besichtigung des Gebietes von Zamosc. 14/5/1943. Dokument 272. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹¹⁸⁹ *Das Dienstagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945*. Arbeitssitzung 15/4/1943. p. 643.

¹¹⁹⁰ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen. Lagebericht Mai 1943. Not dated. BArch R 75 / 4; partially available in print: Dokument 277. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹¹⁹¹ Frank - Himmler 11/5/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2648; available in print: Dokument 274. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹¹⁹² *Das Dienstagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945*. Hauptabteilungspräsidenten-Sitzung. 20/4/1943, pp. 650, 652; Ernährungssitzung. 4/5/1943. p. 657.

¹¹⁹³ Creutz - Reichsführer-SS Persönlicher Stab. 27/4/1943. Appendix: Riecke - Göring. 13/1/1943; Körner - Himmler. 7/4/1943. BArch NS 19 / 982.

Stabshauptamt had acted in a highhanded manner, and Globocnik, for example, had not presented any report to the civil authorities about his actions.¹¹⁹⁴

According to Frank, the main reason for the weakening in the security situation was the way in which the SS had carried out the deportation of the Poles. Those to be expelled had been driven out of their homes almost without an opportunity for getting dressed or equipping themselves. After this, they had been transferred to a camp in which they had been divided into groups according to their ability to work. Family ties had been severed as consequence of the segregation, and the family members who had ended up in different groups had no information about one another's fates.¹¹⁹⁵

Frank estimated that the deportations had caused panic and that about a half of the Polish population had fled from the target areas. Some of them had joined the partisans operating in the area,¹¹⁹⁶ which had become more restless than before. The unrest had only increased as consequence of the retaliatory measures of the Ordnungspolizei, who had responded to the resistance attacks with mass executions, in which innocent people had been shot. According to Frank, this was likely to turn the population against its German rulers because both the resistance movement led by the Polish intelligentsia and Soviet propaganda were able to exploit the cruelties of the Germans.¹¹⁹⁷

With regard to the economic utilisation of the area, Frank noted that the unrest was likely to reduce the amount of food obtained from the area and also that, unlike the Poles, the *Volksdeutsche* had to be guaranteed a full supply of food. Therefore, the settlement of the *Volksdeutsche* in the area would surely lead to a reduction in the food shipments from it. Frank predicted that the continuation of the Germanisation operation would lead to the collapse of food production and famine in the Generalgouvernement.¹¹⁹⁸ Frank's views were substantiated and stated in an unimpassioned way, nor did he seem to be exaggerating in his estimation of the consequences of the Germanisation operation. However, it is noteworthy that his National Socialist point of view still shines through: his attitude to both the Poles and the *Volksdeutsche* was without feeling.

It was some time before Frank's letter had any effect, and Himmler agreed to meet him only after he had asked once again for a meeting in June 1943.¹¹⁹⁹ Lammers had had time to acquaint Himmler with Frank's letter before the meeting,¹²⁰⁰ so Himmler was in a good position for arranging the situation to his own advantage. In their meeting, Himmler and Frank dealt with the continuation of the Germanisation operation and agreed that it could be continued as long as it did not cause unrest or weaken the possibility of

¹¹⁹⁴ Frank - Hitler. 25.5.1943. BArch R 52 II / 250.

¹¹⁹⁵ Frank - Hitler. 25.5.1943. BArch R 52 II / 250.

¹¹⁹⁶ In the National Socialists' jargon the partisans were branded as gangs of robbers (*Banditengruppen* or *Banden*) and their members as robbers (*Banditen*).

¹¹⁹⁷ Frank - Hitler. 25/5/1943. BArch R 52 II / 250.

¹¹⁹⁸ Frank - Hitler. 25/5/1943. BArch R 52 II / 250.

¹¹⁹⁹ Frank - Himmler. 19/6/1943. Telegram, Himmler - Frank. 21/6/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹²⁰⁰ Lammers - Himmler. 4/6/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2705.

utilising area economically. According to Himmler, the objective was first to settle the eastern border of the Generalgouvernement with a German population, which made Distrikt Lublin and Distrikt Galizien the targets of the operation. The immediate objectives were the populating of Kreis Zamosc and the town of Lublin with Germans by the beginning of 1944.¹²⁰¹

The time between the two Germanisation operations almost proved fatal for the whole project because the SS came face to face with the consequences of its own activities, and the administrative authorities of the Generalgouvernement succeeded in stopping the progress of the project for a while. However, it should be noted that the SS regained control of the situation relatively fast thanks to Himmler's strong position.

7.2 The preparation of the new operation

It seems that Globocnik paid little heed to the conflict with the administration of the Generalgouvernement, and in January 1943 he reported on the results of the Germanisation operation and plans for continuing it to HSSPF Krüger, who passed the reports on to Himmler.¹²⁰² Globocnik's new plans included the continuation of the Germanisation operation in the southern parts of Kreis Zamosc, and he had ordered the SS-Arbeitsstab to make preparations for the operation. The plan was to be presented to Globocnik on 25/1/1943, and the intention was to carry out the operation on the basis of the order issued on 18/11/1942 for the previous operation and to utilise the same organisation.¹²⁰³ This time Globocnik also wanted to Germanise the town of Zamosc, and he ordered that Obersturmbannführer Hermann Krumej of the UWZ should be responsible for it.¹²⁰⁴

The RKF Stabshauptamt had also reacted to Globocnik's project, and in December 1942 it had specified Distrikt Lublin as the settlement target for about 400 families who could not be settled in the Wartheland. These settlers came

¹²⁰¹ Himmler - Frank 3/7/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2648; available in print: Dokument 295. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹²⁰² Krüger - Himmler. 14.1.1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 142. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹²⁰³ The order read as follows:

Der Arbeitsstab Zamosch führt die Vorbereitung für die Ansiedlung des südlichen Teiles des Kreises Zamosc. Es stehen ihm für seinen Arbeitsstab die gleichen eingearbeiteten Hilfskräfte zur Verfügung und hat die Ansiedlung gemäss meinem Einsatzbefehl vom 18.11.1942 vollzogen zu werden. Vorlage des Siedlungsplanes Zamosc Süd 5.II.1942, Planungsunterlagen sind bei der Post zu entnehmen. ... Ein entsprechender Arbeitsplan ist mir bis 25.1.1943 vorzulegen,...

Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Anweisung No. 2. 6/1/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533; available in print: Dokument 115. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹²⁰⁴ The order read as follows "Aufgrund dieser Unterlagen hat er nicht nur die Aussiedlung selbst vorzunehmen, sondern auch deren Termin zu bestimmen." Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Anweisung No. 2. 6/1/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533.

from various areas of eastern and south-eastern Europe.¹²⁰⁵ In addition to these groups, *Volksdeutsche* from the Baltic States¹²⁰⁶ and Bosnia were designated to be settled in Distrikt Lublin in December 1942.¹²⁰⁷

According to information of the RKF Stabshauptamt, 40,304 *Volksdeutsche* were evacuated from the east during 1942. The number of those from Bosnia was altogether 18,302 persons while those the Baltic States amounted to 11,410 persons, in addition to whom 5314 so-called "Russian Germans" arrived from Ingermanland.¹²⁰⁸ In practice the objective of the RKF Stabshauptamt was to direct almost all the *Volksdeutsche* who had arrived from the east in 1942 to Distrikt Lublin.

Previously, Globocnik's project had certainly not previously been among the most important projects of the RKF Stabshauptamt because the numbers of *Volksdeutsche* settled in 1942 were as follows:

<u>Target</u>	<u>Number of people</u>
Wartheland	21,576
Danzig-Westpreussen	20,194
Upper Silesia	16,467
East Prussia	586
Southern Carinthia and Lower Styria	525 + approx. 1200
Bohemia and Moravia	690
Lorraine	948
Lithuania	17,637
Distrikt Lublin	approx. 5500

In addition to these, 10,569 *Volksdeutsche* were resettled in the area of Zhitomir in the Ukraine.¹²⁰⁹

In the camps there were altogether 63,320 *Volksdeutsche* at the disposal of the RKF Stabshauptamt at the end of 1942. Furthermore, the RKF Stabshauptamt knew that 73,789 registered *Volksdeutsche* were living on the western side of the river Vistula.¹²¹⁰ So it would have been possible earlier to amass more *Volksdeutsche* for Globocnik's operation, but for some reason or other the RKF Stabshauptamt did not warm to the project until Himmler furiously intervened. On 3/12/1942, Himmler wrote to Ulrich Greifelt, the Director of the RKF Stabshauptamt, and accused him of delaying the Germanisation operation.¹²¹¹ Himmler's letter started a process that led to Greifelt taking a long sick leave and the permanent impairment of his ability to

¹²⁰⁵ RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 83/I 9/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 2.

¹²⁰⁶ RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 84/I 9/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 2; available in print: Dokument 74. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹²⁰⁷ RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 85/I 9/12/1942. BArch R 49 / 2.

¹²⁰⁸ RKF Stabshauptamt: Bericht über die Um und Ansiedlung im Jahre 1942. 30/4/1943. BArch R 49/14.

¹²⁰⁹ RKF Stabshauptamt: Bericht über die Um und Ansiedlung im Jahre 1942. 30/4/1943. BArch R 49/14.

¹²¹⁰ RKF Stabshauptamt: Bericht über die Um- und Ansiedlung im Jahre 1942. 30/4/1943. BArch R 49/14.

¹²¹¹ Himmler - Greifelt 3/12/1942. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 70. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

work.¹²¹² However, the officials of the RKF Stabshauptamt were not the only objects of Himmler's anger in the winter season 1942– 1943, because he also dismissed Otto Hofmann, the Director of the Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt.¹²¹³ Himmler's dissatisfaction was also directed at Werner Lorenz, the Director of the Vomi.¹²¹⁴

Himmler's measures tell about the lack of unity in the SS organisation over questions connected with the Germanisation project. It is also noteworthy that the RKF Stabshauptamt still did not react to Himmler's projects with unreserved enthusiasm, and it remained doubtful about the settlement of the *Volksdeutsche* in Distrikt Lublin.¹²¹⁵ Nor did Lorenz swallow Himmler's criticism unequivocally, and he commented on the problems caused by Globocnik's projects in December 1942.¹²¹⁶

Even though the situation at the beginning of 1943 did not favour the continuation of the Germanisation project, Himmler issued orders for the settlement of individual groups of *Volksdeutsche* in Distrikt Lublin and Distrikt Galizien.¹²¹⁷ Himmler's decision seems to have won the day for Globocnik, because the RKF Stabshauptamt acted on Himmler's orders: it designated some suitable groups of people as settlers of Distrikt Lublin,¹²¹⁸ and later clarified its views concerning other groups of settlers who were to be sent to the Generalgouvernement.¹²¹⁹

The Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS also intervened in the acquisition of inhabitants, and in its correspondence it dealt with Germans from Bulgaria,¹²²⁰ Belarus¹²²¹ and the Ukraine.¹²²² Questions connected to the acquisition of

¹²¹² Koehl 1957, pp. 156– 159.

¹²¹³ Heinemann 2001, pp. 429– 430.

¹²¹⁴ Himmler's letter read as follows:

Ich darf die Erwartung aussprechen, daß Sie sich sofort mit SS-Gruppenführer Greifelt in Verbindung setzen, sodaß ich noch in diesem Jahr keine Weihnachtsmärchenzahlen sondern tatsächlich genaue Unterlagen bekomme, wer noch in den Lagern ist, wieviele endgültig in das Altreich vermittelt wurden, wobei für mich sehr interessant ist zu erfahren, wieviele Bauernfamilien durch die Pflichtvergessenheit machen Dienststelle der SS für die Ansiedlung verloren gegangen und verstädtert sind, und außerdem noch die Feststellung, wieviele tatsächlich jetzt in den Lagern für die Ansiedlung im Osten noch zur Verfügung stehen.

Himmler – Lorenz. 4/12/1942. BArch NS 19 / 2390.

¹²¹⁵ RKF Stabshauptamt: Tätigkeitsbericht (Stand Ende 1942). Not dated. BArch R 49 / 26.

¹²¹⁶ Lorenz - Himmler. 24/12/1942. BArch NS 19 / 2390.

¹²¹⁷ Reichsführer-SS: Anordnung. 24/2/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3869.

¹²¹⁸ Reichsführer-SS, RKF: "Bestimmung des Ansiedlungsgebietes für Umsiedler deren Ansatzentscheid nachträglich von Altreich' auf Osten" geändert ist. 25/1/1943. BArch R 49 / 2; RKF-Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 2/43/1 20/3/1943. BArch R 49 / 2.

¹²¹⁹ RKF Stabshauptamt: Anordnung Nr. 3/43. 27/3/1943. Richtlinien für die Genehmigung der ständigen Niederlassung oder der vorübergehenden Aufenthalts von Umsiedlern im Generalgouvernement (einschl. Galizien), deren Ansiedlung nicht durch Lenkungsordnungen vorgesehen ist. BArch R 49 / 5; available in print: Dokument 243. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹²²⁰ Brandt - Stabshauptamt. 19/2/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

¹²²¹ Kube - Himmler. 13/2/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 185. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*
Brandt - Kube. 3 / 1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 251. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹²²² Reichsführer-SS: Anordnung. 24.2.1943. BArch NS 19 / 3869.

inhabitants constituted a real problem in spring 1943 because, according to the estimate of the RKF Stabshauptamt, the Slovenian Germans, for example, were not even willing to be settled in Distrikt Lublin and did their best in the examinations of the EWZ to avoid being settled in the east.¹²²³

In early 1943, Himmler was not particularly interested in questions related to the Germanisation project. It was not until 20/2/1943 that he turned his attention back to it, requesting the SS officers responsible for the Germanisation project to suspend their operations for the duration of the war except for those measures that had already been planned for Distrikt Lublin.¹²²⁴ His lack of interest may possibly be explained by impact of the battle of Stalingrad, which compelled the leading National Socialists to revise their views about the importance of matters more broadly.

Himmler's visit to Lublin on 15/2/1943 explains his order. He concentrated above all on the weakening security situation at that time,¹²²⁵ but the instructions he gave on 20/2/1943 indicate that the continuation of the Germanisation operation was also discussed. Globocnik continued with his preparations after the visit and clarified his intentions to Himmler in a letter on 3/3/1943, in which he presented quite detailed plans for proceeding with the operation. Globocnik also sent a comprehensive report of his actions to the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS. It included, in addition to the plans, a report of the economic profits obtained from the genocide of the Jews, proposals for promotions and decorations, a sample settlement contract letter¹²²⁶ and information about the *Volksdeutsche* who had been settled and the *Deutschstämmige* who had been screened.¹²²⁷

According to Globocnik, 5800 persons of German origin were to be settled in the southern parts of Kreis Zamosc. In addition, a total of 5000 persons of German origin would be settled in the northern part of the Kreis Zamosc and 6509 Poles expelled. The Germanisation operation was also to extend to the town of Zamosc, where it was planned to settle 10,000 persons of German origin. Globocnik envisaged that after the termination of the deportation and settlement activities altogether 29,900 persons of German origin, of whom 600

¹²²³ Creutz: Bericht über das Verfahren zur Wiedereindeutschung von rassistisch wertvollen Personen. 25/3/1943. BArch NS 19 / 1780.

¹²²⁴ Himmler - Krüger, Greifelt, Globocnik, Cassel 20/2/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 197. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹²²⁵ Himmler - Chef der Ordnungspolizei, Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 15/2/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹²²⁶ Krüger had already sent examples of settlement contract letters to Himmler in January 1943. The text of the letter read as follows:

SIEDLERBRIEF Im Namen des Führers u. Reichskanzlers ADOLF HITLER verleihe ich als Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums dem deutschen Ostsiedler _____ BESITZRECHT an HAUS, HOF und BODEN im Dorfe _____ Kreis _____ Des Besitz ist unveräußerlich und geht Bewahrung ungeteilt an Kind und Kindeskind über. Haltet das Erbe in Treue und formt im Osten d. Zukunft Geschlecht! Reichsführer SS.

Krüger - Himmler. 3/1/1943. Appendix: Siedlerbrief. BArch NS 19 / 967.

¹²²⁷ Globocnik - Grothmann. 3/3/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2234; partially available in print: Dokument 214. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

would be so-called *Reichsdeutsche* (German citizens), would be living in Kreis Zamosc.¹²²⁸

The town of Zamosc and the surrounding area were not Globocnik's only targets; his objective was also to carry out the Germanisation of other areas of Distrikt Lublin. Altogether 19,000 persons of German origin were to be settled in Kreis Krasnystaw, while the town of Lublin was to receive 10,000 persons of German origin in addition to the 3800 Germans already living there. Globocnik's general objective was to get 75,700 persons of German origin into Distrikt Lublin. He estimated, very optimistically, that there were already 36,700 Germans in the area, but he still needed 39,000 new German inhabitants.¹²²⁹

Globocnik also proposed a revision of the operational methods, which had been criticised. He intended to spread a rumour about of the Germanisation operation finishing, to prepare the future operation in secret and to keep it secret until the last moment, to carry out the measures between the spring sowing and the harvesting, to advertise operations concerning the Poles as improvements in security and to promise the Poles unrealistic compensations.¹²³⁰ Globocnik's plans indicate that he had not given up his ambitions, and that he still cared nothing about the drawbacks that his activities would cause for the administration of the Generalgouvernement.

Globocnik also specified his views on the Germanisation activity more closely. He proposed that the *Siedlerwirtschaftsgemeinschaft* (SWG, the Settlers' Economic Community) should guarantee the maintenance of the Poles who would stay on in the so-called Z villages, that only those classified as a danger to security should be deported and that the *Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand GmbH* (DUT, the German Settlement Trust) should issue a certificate for their lost property to those Poles who would be sent as labour to Germany. Furthermore, Globocnik stated that the section of the Polish population placed in Group III would mainly remain in the area and that only those in Group IV would be deported as forced labour.¹²³¹

Himmler preferred not to take a stand for a while on Globocnik's plans,¹²³² but HSSPF Krüger supported the idea of continuing the project, and according to his reports the Vomi had 20,042 persons in its camps in Litzmannstadt who were available to be settled in Distrikt Lublin. Krüger stated that the earliest date for beginning the deportation and settlement operations would be

¹²²⁸ Globocnik - Grothmann. 3/3/1943. Appendix 10: Zahlen über angesetzte Deutsche und Umsiedler. BArch NS 19 / 2234; available in print: Dokument 214. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

¹²²⁹ Globocnik - Grothmann. 3/3/1943. Appendix 10: Zahlen über angesetzte Deutsche und Umsiedler. BArch NS 19 / 2234.

¹²³⁰ Globocnik - Grothmann. 3/3/1943: Appendix 11: Maßnahmen für die weitere Umsiedlung. BArch NS 19 / 2234; available in print: Dokument 214. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I* ; Globocnik: Maßnahmen zur Beruhigung der Fremdvölkischen bei der Umsiedlung. Not dated. BArch NS 19 / 2234; available in print: Dokument 215. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I*.

¹²³¹ Globocnik: Maßnahmen zur Beruhigung der Fremdvölkischen bei der Umsiedlung. Not dated. BArch NS 19 / 2234.

¹²³² Brandt - Globocnik. 14/4/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3773.

15/6/1943.¹²³³ Himmler answered Krüger and requested him to implement the settlement of the 20,042 persons of the Vomi camps.¹²³⁴

Himmler instructed Krüger to carry out the measures in the same way as before, except for the division of the Polish population into four groups. Furthermore, Himmler's letter indicated that the Poles designated for deportation were to remain in the area and that their living conditions should not be weakened.¹²³⁵ Himmler had presented a similar proposal to Otto Wächter, the Gouverneur of Distrikt Galizien. Apparently, he wanted to avoid arousing any fear among the Polish population that those in Group IV would encounter the same fate as the Jews.¹²³⁶

Even though Himmler distanced himself from the Germanisation project, the SS and the authorities of the Generalgouvernement found themselves in conflict over questions related to it, and although the operation also aroused doubts within the SS, the central administration of the SS did not reject the project after the Himmler's intervention. Greifelt, the Director of the RKF Stabshauptamt, made a presentation about the coming operations to Himmler in May 1943. The objective was to continue the Germanisation project in Distrikt Lublin and to extend it to Distrikt Galizien. However, the problems that had arisen had not passed unnoticed, and it was planned that the treatment of the Polish population should be improved. This, however, would not happen without others suffering: it was stated that the continuation of the whole project would require the extermination of the remaining 300,000–400,000 Jews in the Generalgouvernement.¹²³⁷

It is also possible to follow the planning of the second stage of the Germanisation project with the help of the documents of the Umwandererzentralstelle. The monthly report for February 1943 describes the preparatory measures carried out in the town of Zamosc. It also states that the Reichsführer-SS had issued an order to continue the Germanisation project in the southern parts of Kreis Zamosc, but at the time there was no information yet about the exact date when the operation was to begin.¹²³⁸

According to the UWZ, the preparation had met with various kinds of obstacles since the outset, and the monthly report of March 1943 describes the significant difficulties encountered by the preparations for the deportations to be carried out in the town of Zamosc. The situation was confused, and it was

¹²³³ Krüger - Himmler 17/3/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

¹²³⁴ Himmler - Krüger RKF Stabshauptamt, Vomi, Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, RuSHA, Globocnik. 28/3/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 249. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

¹²³⁵ Himmler - Krüger RKF Stabshauptamt, Vomi, Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, RuSHA, Globocnik. 28/3/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607.

¹²³⁶ Himmler - Krüger. 3/3/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 213. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹²³⁷ Greifelt - Brandt. 19/5/1943. Appendix: Vermerk zu einem Vortrag beim Reichsführer-SS am 12. Mai 1943. BArch NS 19 / 2743. Also available in folder BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹²³⁸ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht für Februar 1943. 4/3/1943. BArch R 75 / 4; partially available in print: Dokument 221. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.*

not improved by the fact that the UWZ was still waiting for new orders from the Reichsführer-SS regarding the measures planned for the town of Zamosc.¹²³⁹ In spite of this, the officials of the UWZ considered that they had almost completed the preparations concerning the town of Zamosc by the end of April 1943, although there was still no certainty about the starting date.¹²⁴⁰

In spite of the postponements, the planning of the Germanisation operation was continued in the UWZ, and in the first part of May 1943, fairly detailed proposals for carrying out the new measures were presented. They included a proposal to use the Poles' own organisation to help in expelling them, and a plan for reforming the treatment of the expelled population so that landless persons should be deported out of the area as labour while the others should be resettled in other *Kreise* in place of the undesirable sections of the local populations. If there were no possibilities for resettlement, it was proposed that those members of the population who were able to work should be used as a labour in local industry, which it was planned to expand. Those who were unable to work were to be located in so-called *Rentendorf* villages in Distrikt Warschau and Distrikt Radom.¹²⁴¹

Globocnik had also continued with the preparation of the Germanisation operation, and on 1/5/1943 he issued an instruction concerning the SS and police bases. The objective was to place the SS and police bases at the disposal of the regional SS organisation so that Obersturmführer Adolf Bareuther would be responsible for handling the whole organisation at the *Kreis* level (SS-*Kreisoberleitung*). For questions related to agriculture, an organ called SS-*Oberleitung* led by Obersturmbannführer Hermann Dunkel would be responsible for the operation at the *Distrikt* level.¹²⁴²

Dunkel was a farmer by trade. He was one of the older and more experienced men in the SS organisation: born in 1892, he had served in submarines during the First World War.¹²⁴³ During the Second World War, he had first served in the Navy and later on in the Waffen-SS, but he had been discharged from service on 20.5.1941.¹²⁴⁴ He was soon posted to Distrikt Lublin

¹²³⁹ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht für den Monat März. 4/4/1943. BArch R 75 / 4; *partially available* in print: Dokument 253. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹²⁴⁰ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht für den Monat April 1934. 29/4/1943. BArch R 75 / 4; *partially available* in print: Dokument 264. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹²⁴¹ Vorschläge des Leiters der Umwandererzentralstelle in Łódź, H. Krumej, über die Modifikation der Aus- bzw. Aussiedlungsaktion. 8/5/1943. Dokument 267. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹²⁴² Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Dienstanweisung Nr. 6. 1/5/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533; *available* in print: Dokument 266. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹²⁴³ Personalfragebogen. BArch SSFPA Hermann Dunkel.

¹²⁴⁴ Der Chef des Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamtes SS: Ernennungsvorschlag. 7/12/1942. BArch SSFPA Hermann Dunkel.

as a leader of the SS and police base in Jablon,¹²⁴⁵ after which he was promoted and made responsible for the SS and police bases of the whole *Distrikt*.¹²⁴⁶

Dunkel's appointments were based on his professional skill in the field of agriculture, and he had already been noticed in summer 1941 not only as an expert and a competent official in the field of agriculture but also as a reliable choice for tasks that required initiative.¹²⁴⁷ Dunkel proved to be worthy of the confidence shown in him, and he was recommended for a decoration in spring 1943.¹²⁴⁸ He succeeded well in duties in Lublin, but it is interesting that he had originally come to the east because the *Waffen-SS* wanted to get rid of him.¹²⁴⁹

Globocnik envisaged that every base would be responsible for 1–4 large farms, which were to be managed by *Volksdeutsche*. The following bases were to be established:

Skierbieszow	Waldhof
Ruskie-Piaski	Bortatyce
Zawada	Topornica
Adamow (Adamów)	Krasnobrod (Krasnobród)
Tarnawatka	Dzieraznia
Horyszow Polski	Laziska ¹²⁵⁰

The SS and police base project provides indirect information about the Germanisation operation of summer 1943. The most significant fact was that the SS-Arbeitsstab Zamosc still existed with Obersturmführer Bareuther at its head. Thus, the organisation responsible for the second Germanisation operation was same as in late autumn 1942. Later documents reinforce this interpretation because in them Globocnik states that Bareuther had led the Germanisation operation.¹²⁵¹

Sturmbannführer Ernst Lerch was Bareuther's superior in summer 1943. He is mentioned as being responsible for the operations of the RKF in documents dating to spring 1943.¹²⁵² Lerch was a young SS officer born in 1914, and like Globocnik he came from Carinthia. In civilian life, Lerch had been a waiter, and he had joined the SS in March 1934, serving in the SD since November 1936.¹²⁵³ Lerch had been Globocnik's adjutant in Lublin since July

¹²⁴⁵ Hofmann - Dunkel. 9/7/1941. BArch SSFPA Hermann Dunkel.

¹²⁴⁶ Der Chef des Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamtes SS: Ernennungsvorschlag. 7/12/1942. BArch SSFPA Hermann Dunkel.

¹²⁴⁷ Müller - Hofmann. 23/6/1941. BArch SSFPA Hermann Dunkel BA SSFPA.

¹²⁴⁸ Der Führer im RuS-Wesen. Der Beauftragte des RKF im Generalgouvernement. 1/3/1943. BArch SSFPA Hermann Dunkel.

¹²⁴⁹ Ergänzungstelle Nordwest / Ergänzungsamt der Waffen-SS - Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, Ergänzungsamt der Waffen SS. 29/4/1941. BArch SSFPA Hermann Dunkel.

¹²⁵⁰ Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Dienstanweisung Nr. 6. 1/5/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533.

¹²⁵¹ Globocnik wrote: "B. hat den gesamten Siedlungseinsatz im Kreis Zamosc (GG.) geleitet..." Personal-Bericht. Not dated. Adolf Bareuther SSFPA Adolf Bareuther; Globocnik: Aktennotiz an SS-Obergruppenführer Hildebrandt. 4/9/1943. BArch SSFPA Adolf Bareuther.

¹²⁵² Globocnik: Dienstanweisung. Lublin 8/2/1943. BArch R 69 / 923.

¹²⁵³ Personal data form. BArch SSFPA Ernst Lerch.

1940.¹²⁵⁴ Later on, he was not only made responsible for the RKF operation but also appointed temporary Chief-of-Staff.¹²⁵⁵

It seems that by spring 1943 Globocnik had at least partially reorganised his staff because there are no mentions of the earlier Chief-of-Staff Josef Nemeč. Another person who disappeared was Reinhold von Mohrenschildt, but unlike Nemeč he re-appears later. The SS-Personalhauptamt did not approve of Globocnik's staffing policy and considered Lerch, for example, to be too closely involved with Globocnik.¹²⁵⁶

Globocnik also wanted to continue measures related to the *Deutschstämmige*, and on 11/5/1943 he issued an instruction concerning the matter. Because the EWZ was already operating in Distrikt Lublin surveying the population to find representatives of the German genotype, Globocnik wanted only to ensure the availability of those registered by the EWZ as *Deutschstämmige*. According to Globocnik, the objective was to rescue the weakening genotype and to re-attach it to the stronger genotype.¹²⁵⁷

Globocnik considered that it was the absolute duty of the *Deutschstämmige* to join the German population without the possibility of refusal.¹²⁵⁸ This view was an unequivocal expression of Himmler's idea that the German genotype in the east should be reintegrated with the Germans or be exterminated. It seems that Globocnik and Himmler shared the objectives of the eastern policy but, unlike Himmler, Globocnik was ready to carry out the policy in practice without regard for the situation.

The preparation for the second stage of the Germanisation project shows the blind commitment of Globocnik and the representatives of the UWZ to carrying out the plans of the SS for the east irrespective of the changing conditions. Correspondingly, Himmler's reactions reflect an ability to adapt the operation to the situation and to give up projects which were unproductive or harmful to Germany's own interests.

7.3 The events of summer 1943

The SS started to prepare an anti-resistance operation in Kreis Zamosc and its surroundings in spring 1943, and Himmler began to muster the additional

¹²⁵⁴ Lerch: Politischer Lebenslauf. Lublin 2/2/1942. BArch SSFPA Ernst Lerch; SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei Globocnik: Personal=Bericht. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Ernst Lerch.

¹²⁵⁵ Beurteilungsnotiz anlässlich der Dienstreise des SS-Gruf. von Herff durch das Generalgouvernement im Mai 1943. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Ernst Lerch.

¹²⁵⁶ Beurteilungsnotiz anlässlich der Dienstreise des SS-Gruf. von Herff durch das Generalgouvernement im Mai 1943. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Ernst Lerch.

¹²⁵⁷ Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Dienstanweisung Nr. 8. 11/5/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533.

¹²⁵⁸ Globocnik stated the matter as follows: "Nach erfolgter Überprüfung über die Wertigkeit durch die EWZ, ist der Betreffende verpflichtet in die deutsche Volksgemeinschaft einzutreten. Eine Weigerung gibt es nicht." Der SSPF im Distrikt Lublin, Der Beauftragte des RKF: Dienstanweisung Nr. 8. 11/5/1943. BArch R 49 / 3533.

troops needed for the operation in May 1943. At that time, there were about 13,600 German policemen and about 15,000 non-German policemen stationed in the Generalgouvernement. Himmler's intention was to send around 6000 men as reinforcements, and in addition to these there were 17,000 men available if required.¹²⁵⁹

The extermination of the remaining Jewish population was also an integral part of Himmler's plans. He mentioned the scheme while outlining the basic principles of the anti-partisan operation to Frank at the end of May 1943. Himmler justified continuing the genocide of the Jews by claiming that it was a precondition for pacifying the Generalgouvernement.¹²⁶⁰ Himmler had to discuss questions connected to the anti-resistance operation with Frank because the latter had contacted him in May 1943 when preparing a meeting dealing with security matters.¹²⁶¹

Frank was eager to acquaint himself with the security situation, and he also wanted to visit Lublin, although HSSPF Krüger tried to prevent this by appealing to the poor security situation.¹²⁶² Krüger was not able to turn Frank's head, and the latter travelled to Lublin on 28/5/1943. Frank met both the new Gouverneur of Distrikt Lublin, Ludwig Fischer, and Globocnik. The security situation in Distrikt Lublin proved to be extremely bad because the German administration was considered to have been destroyed in three *Kreise*. According to Globocnik, it was a manifestation of the strengthening of the resistance movement that had taken place in all the occupied areas. More exact accounts of the situation showed that a partisan movement with a strength of about 5000–6000 members was active in Distrikt Lublin. Its activities had intensified after the turn of 1942 and 1943, and it was estimated that the local police forces were unable to control it.¹²⁶³

The security matters of Distrikt Lublin continued to be discussed after the Frank's visit, and the administration of the Generalgouvernement assumed that the SS would not continue the Germanisation operation until the security situation improved.¹²⁶⁴ The SS took the task of suppressing the partisan movement seriously. Himmler placed a brigade of the SS and two regiments of the Wehrmacht at the disposal of Obergruppenführer Erich von Bach¹²⁶⁵ in

¹²⁵⁹ Reichsführer-SS: Aktennotiz über Bandenbekämpfung. 10/5/1943. BAArch NS 19 / 1706.

¹²⁶⁰ Reichsführer-SS: Aktennotiz über Bandenbekämpfung. 10/5/1943; Himmler - Frank. 26/5/1943. Telegram. BAArch NS 19 / 1706.

¹²⁶¹ Frank - Himmler. 26/5/1943. Telegram. BAArch NS 19 / 1706.

¹²⁶² *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 25/5/1943, p. 660.

¹²⁶³ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. 28/5/1943–29/5/1943, pp. 666–678.

¹²⁶⁴ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Arbeitssitzung 31/5/1943, pp. 682–683.

¹²⁶⁵ von Bach is better known as von dem Bach-Zelewski.

Distrikt Lublin¹²⁶⁶ and declared the Generalgouvernement an anti-partisan operation area (*Bandenkampfgebiet*).¹²⁶⁷

Even though the plans of the SS included a broad anti-resistance campaign, Globocnik still had to explain his plans in June 1943. His idea was to organise about a month-long anti-partisan operation, which was to purge the area of Kreis Zamosc totally of partisans and enable its repopulation.¹²⁶⁸ Globocnik sent a memorandum about the operation to Himmler on 1/7/1943. According to him, the plan was to expel the non-German population from the southern part of Kreis Zamosc and to settle a population of German origin there.¹²⁶⁹ In addition to that, the forest area of Bilgoraj was to permanently emptied of inhabitants and the area north of it and some areas south of it were to be populated with Ukrainians. The Polish population was also to be expelled from the towns of Zamosc and Tomaszow (Tomaszów Lubelski), which were to be populated with Germans.¹²⁷⁰

According to the UWZ, the anti-partisan operation began on 27/6/1943 in Kreise Zamosc, Krasnik and Bilgoraj. The objective was to round up all men aged 15–45 years in separately chosen areas.¹²⁷¹ Along with the anti-partisan operation, the SS was also able to initiate the second phase of the Germanisation operation because Himmler had met Frank on 23/6/1943, and they had come to a mutual understanding on the matter. Frank even believed that there that there would be no problems at all in the future.¹²⁷² Frank had good reason to feel satisfied because he and Himmler had agreed that Globocnik, who according to

¹²⁶⁶ Himmler - Bach. 16/6/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 1433.

¹²⁶⁷ Brand - Krüger. 21/6/1943. Telegram; Himmler - Frank, Bach, Krüger. 21/6/1943. BArch R 19 / 321; Madajczyk 1987, p. 118.

¹²⁶⁸ Globocnik - Brandt. 19/6/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹²⁶⁹ This time the resettled population of German descent also included the Deutschstämmigen of Kreis Hrubieszow. Globocnik: Vermerk. 1/7/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2234; available in print: Dokument 290. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹²⁷⁰ Globocnik's objectives were expressed as follows:

1. *Die Bevölkerung dieses Gebietes, die seit Jahrzehnten nur vom Raub und Banditentum lebt, ist entfernt.*

2. *Dem Reich werden etwa 30 000 Arbeitskräfte zugeführt.*

3. *Die das deutsche Ansiedlungsgebiet umgebenden Gebiete sind dann von Ukrainern besetzt, die gewissermassen ein Vorfeld bilden und dem Deutschtum friedlicher gegenüberstehen.*

4. *Ausserdem wird durch diese Ansiedlung der Spannungszustand der Polen auf die Ukrainer übertragen und sie zu Abwehrkräften gemacht.*

5. *Tritt eine neue Agrar-Struktur ein, da Proletarierbesitz verschwindet und eine durchschnittliche Hofgröße von 6 ha eintritt, was zu Intensivierung und Ertragsteigerung beiträgt.*

6. *Das deutsche Ansiedlungsgebiet wird für den weiteren Ansatz von Deutschen frei und zwar unter Voraussetzung einer Sicherungsmaßnahme. Dadurch aber wird das deutsche Siedlungsgebiet vergrößert, was zur wesentlichen Sicherung des Gebietes beiträgt. Ein polnisches Druck kann dann nur mehr vom Norden aus erfolgen und ist es dann von einer Seite aus leichter, die Sicherheit für das Siedlungsgebiet zu gewährleisten.*

Globocnik: Vermerk. 1/7/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2234.

¹²⁷¹ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹²⁷² Himmler (Brandt) - Lammers. 28.6.1943; Frank - Lammers. 24.6.1943. BArch NS 19 / 2705.

Frank had become “totally impossible”, should be transferred.¹²⁷³ However, the mutual understanding in practice meant that the operation would be continued in accordance with the objectives of the SS. This appears in a letter from Himmler to Frank on 3/7/1943, in which he explained his plans in considerable detail.¹²⁷⁴

Himmler’s objective was to protect the eastern border of the Generalgouvernement with German settlement. To this end, villages populated with Germans were to be established in Distrikt Lublin and Distrikt Galizien. The plans also included populating the towns of Zamosc and Lublin with German inhabitants. The new inhabitants were to come from Alsace, Lorraine, Slovenia, Upper Krain and Lower Styria. Himmler’s intention was to resettle the non-German population in the areas emptied by the anti-partisan operation and to utilise building material from the Warsaw ghetto for the necessary construction work. A further objective was to play the Polish and the Ukrainian populations off against each other.¹²⁷⁵

In his letter, Himmler stated out that only small-scale Germanisation operations were to be carried out while the war was still going on and that that they should not be allowed to endanger security or to jeopardise the economic utilisation of target areas.¹²⁷⁶ Himmler’s statement were hypocritical, but he was not the only one who had to defend the Germanisation project because the RKF Stabshauptamt also had to try to convince the experts on agriculture at the national level by making the same assurances.¹²⁷⁷ In the summer of 1943, the implementation of a Germanisation operation could no longer be taken for granted as it had been in 1942.

The SS organisation was able to engage in Germanisation activities again in summer 1943, but in spite of Himmler’s promises hardly anything seems to have changed from the earlier operation. It is possible to study the operation with the help of documents of the UWZ. They show that the Germanisation operation and the anti-partisan operation were part of the same endeavour because they were both inspired by the desire to populate the area with inhabitants of German origin and to destroy the resistance movement, which itself was a consequence of the earlier Germanisation operation and now threatened the new German settlements.¹²⁷⁸

The operation of the UWZ in summer 1943 consisted above all in the maintenance of assembly camps, the screening of the imprisoned people imprisoned in them and their transferral elsewhere. The UWZ operated four

¹²⁷³ Frank put the matter thus: “...die Abberufung des völlig unmöglich gewordenen SS- und Polizeiführer Globocnik vom Distrikt Lublin...” *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*. Besprechung (Feldkommandostelle des RFSS Himmler) 23/6/1943, pp. 697–698.

¹²⁷⁴ Himmler - Frank. 3/7/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹²⁷⁵ Himmler - Frank. 3/7/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹²⁷⁶ Himmler - Frank. 3/7/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹²⁷⁷ Greifelt - Himmler. 8/7/1943; Brandt - Körner. 16/7/1943. BArch NS 19 / 982.

¹²⁷⁸ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

prison camps in Zamosc, Zwierzyniec, Budzyn and Lublin.¹²⁷⁹ According to the UWZ, altogether 36,389 persons were arrested in the anti-partisan operation of summer 1943. Their fates were as follows:

26,007	were sent as forced labour to Germany
3207	were selected to work in the Generalgouvernement
6,000	were designated as unable to work
514	died
373	fled
264	were selected for Germanisation
24	were classified as Gypsies ¹²⁸⁰

The UWZ explained the high proportion of labour by the fact that that the population had been expelled from the area in units of whole extended families, which had made it possible to place the children in charge of relatives and to designate a larger proportion of the population for labour.¹²⁸¹

The placement of persons who were unable to work was a difficult problem. The reason for this was the fact that it was no longer possible to place them in the so-called *Rentendorf* villages. The UWZ planned to solve the problem by putting those who were unfit for work in separate prison camps, in which they would perish before long. In addition, it was proposed to ship those unable to work somewhere off in the direction of Cholm, but this was renounced for political reasons.¹²⁸² Obviously the vague concept of sending people somewhere in the direction of Cholm was a fiction that actually meant killing them because chronically ill and disabled persons had been killed before the Eastern Campaign, and the phrase "Died Cholm II" was used in their death certificates.¹²⁸³ It is justified to suspect that the representatives of the SS planned to murder persons who were unable to work, but the project had to be given up for fear of unrest.

It appears from the documents that the UWZ handed over a large number of families to the employment authorities and that a considerable number of children and old persons died in the camps of the UWZ.¹²⁸⁴ It is probable that the UWZ also continued its racial screening. The objective was to find persons who represented the Germanic genotype among the Polish prisoners in the

¹²⁷⁹ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹²⁸⁰ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹²⁸¹ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹²⁸² Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹²⁸³ Pohl 2004, pp. 89–90.

¹²⁸⁴ Umsiedlungstransporte. Not dated; Übersiedlungstransport nach Zembyce am 7.8.1943; Übersiedlungstransport nach Brzeziny am 10.8.1943; Übersiedlungstransport nach Konopica am 10.8.1943; Übersiedlungstransport nach Wojciechow am 11.8.1943. APL 513 / 0 / 67.

camps, but the classification into race groups may also have continued because the UWZ sent 2600 persons belonging to Group IV to Lublin concentration camp, where they were segregated according to their fitness for work.¹²⁸⁵ This most probably meant that those unable to work were exterminated.

The expelled Poles were in a real danger of being systematically murdered by the SS, and their fear that they would be treated like the Jews was totally justified. However, in summer 1943 there seems to have been a certain change in the policy of the UWZ because, according to a statement it made, during that summer it collected above all those members of the population who were suitable for labour and returned the others to their home areas.¹²⁸⁶

It should be noted that the policy change in no way excluded the possibility that the non-German members of the population of the target area might be killed by the SS or lose their lives as a result of other circumstances. Furthermore, it should be realised that in summer 1943 the SS carried out about 260 anti-partisan operations in which some 7000 persons lost their lives and 34 villages were destroyed.¹²⁸⁷ Thus it was not only in the camps of the SS that the original population of the area faced the threat of death. Moreover, there were other unpleasant features connected to the operation. One of them, noted by Madajczyk and Wasser, was that about 4500 children from the area of Zamosc were sent to Germany, and their fate has never been ascertained.¹²⁸⁸ Another group of victims were the few gypsies mentioned in the UWZ report. It is very possible that the SS killed them.¹²⁸⁹

The Germanisation project was integrated with the anti-partisan operation, and the local office of the RKF Stabshauptamt carried out a parallel operation in which some of the villages were totally emptied and repopulated with inhabitants of German origin.¹²⁹⁰ According to the UWZ, altogether 5144 persons of German origin were settled in Kreis Zamosc in summer 1943. Of them 3379 were *Volksdeutsche* and 1765 *Deutschstämmige*.¹²⁹¹ The report of the RKF Stabshauptamt dated on 1/10/1943 confirms number of the settled *Volksdeutsche*. According to the report, the total number of settled *Volksdeutsche* was 8368. When we compare that number with numbers of a RKF

¹²⁸⁵ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Lagebericht für das Generalgouvernement und den Warthegau / Juli 1943. Not dated. BArch R 75 / 4.

¹²⁸⁶ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹²⁸⁷ Wasser 1993B, p. 151.

¹²⁸⁸ Madajczyk 1987, pp. 423–424. Cf. Wasser 1993B, p. 221.

¹²⁸⁹ Madajczyk 1987, pp. 538–539.

¹²⁹⁰ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen. Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹²⁹¹ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Lagebericht für das Generalgouvernement und den Warthegau / Juli 1943. Not dated. BArch R 75 / 4; Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

Stabshauptamt report dated on 1/6/1943, we can estimate that about 2500 *Volksdeutsche* were settled during the summer of 1943.¹²⁹²

The measures were targeted at five main communes. It is possible to define the target area of the Germanisation operation with the help of the information from earlier operations and the list of German villages. The operation of summer 1943 was carried out in the following main communes:

Krasnobrod (Krasnobród)
Rachanie
Tarnawatka
Tomaszow-Lubelski
Werszczyca (Wierszczyca).¹²⁹³

According to a document of the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte, there were altogether 51 villages classified as German in the target area.¹²⁹⁴

There is no such exact information available about the Germanisation operation of summer 1943 as there is about the operation of 1942, but it is possible to estimate that they were quite similar: the objective of both was to empty the villages of non-German inhabitants and to populate them with inhabitants of German descent. The targets of the new operation also seemed to have been carefully delimited. For example, on 9/7/1943 the objective was to settle Germans on about 100 farms.¹²⁹⁵ On the following day, the goal was to settle Germans on 120 farms¹²⁹⁶ and on 12/7/1943 to populate about 110 farms with Germans.¹²⁹⁷

The combined anti-partisan and Germanisation operation ended in August 1943, and the UWZ closed all its camps except for the one in Zamosc, which was not closed until January 1944.¹²⁹⁸ One reason for the termination of the operation was the fact that the SS could not ignore the views of the administration of the Generalgouvernement as heedlessly as before. The civil authorities tightened their grip, as can be observed from Frank's exceptionally strong reactions when he expressed his disappointment to the representatives of the SS. Frank was obviously aware of what had happened in Distrikt Lublin because HSSPF Krüger had informed him about the progress of the anti-

¹²⁹² Tabelle 3 Die Umsiedler nach Ansiedlungsgebieten. RKF Stabshauptamt: Bericht über den Stand der Um- und Ansiedlung am 1.6.1943; Tabelle 1b Die Ostumsiedlung: Ansiedlung - a) Personen. RKF Stabshauptamt: Bericht über den Stand der Um- und Ansiedlung am 1.10.1943. BArch R 49 / 85.

¹²⁹³ Location of the main communes is described in Appendix 6.

¹²⁹⁴ Tann: Die Deutschen Dörfer im Kreise Zamosc. Not dated. APL 510 / 3 / 8.

¹²⁹⁵ Nachweis über ausgebene Gewerbe im neuen Siedlungsgebiet: Ansiedlung am 9.7.1943. APL 510 / 2 / 5.

¹²⁹⁶ Nachweis über ausgebene Gewerbe im neuen Siedlungsgebiet: Ansiedlung am 10.7.1943. APL 510 / 2 / 5.

¹²⁹⁷ Nachweis über ausgebene Gewerbe im neuen Siedlungsgebiet: Ansiedlung am 12.7.1943. APL 510 / 2 / 5.

¹²⁹⁸ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

partisan operation on 8/7/1943.¹²⁹⁹ Frank received additional information about the matter within a few days and wanted to have a report on the state of affairs in the target areas.¹³⁰⁰ The affairs of Distrikt Lublin remained a subject of debate in the administration of the Generalgouvernement.¹³⁰¹ Eventually Frank demanded both the immediate suspension of the operation and its permanent termination.¹³⁰² However, it should be noted that Frank only wanted to postpone the Germanisation operation until the war was over.¹³⁰³

Frank was able to demand the cessation of operations because there was severe unrest in Distrikt Lublin. A report concerning the situation in Kreis Hrubieszow in July 1943 shows that the Germans were unable to maintain order in the area, and that there were large partisan units operating actively there. The police operations of the SS and the deportation and settlement activity had not pacified the area and had led to problems in agriculture.¹³⁰⁴ Other reports describe how general the attacks of the resistance were, how uncoordinated the actions of the SS were and how the different population groups had begun to take the law into their own hands against each other.¹³⁰⁵ A

¹²⁹⁹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Besprechung über Polizei- und Verwaltungsfragen.* 8/7/1943, p. 699.

¹³⁰⁰ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Besprechung mit Präs. Naumann über Ernährungsfragen.* 13/7/1943, p. 701.

¹³⁰¹ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Regierungssitzung.* 22/7/1943, pp. 705–707; Empfang den Leiter des Polnischen Hauptausschusses Graf Roniker. 23/7/1943, pp. 708–711; available in print: Dokument 309. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹³⁰² Frank stated: "Polizeiliche Großaktionen sollen künftig im Generalgouvernement weder unter dem Thema Bandenbekämpfung noch unter dem Thema Umsiedlung stattfinden." *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Empfang SS-Obergruppenführer von dem Bach.* 2/8/1943, p. 712; available in print: Dokument 323. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹³⁰³ Frank stated: "Wir wissen alle, daß dieses Land einmal deutsch wird, daß wir die Polacken hier nicht dulden werden. Aber dazu kommt die Zeit, wenn wir den Krieg gewonnen haben. Jetzt siedeln zu wollen und das Land dadurch in Aufruhr zu bringen, ist unmöglich." *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945. Empfang SS-Obergruppenführer von dem Bach.* 2/8/1943, p. 714.

¹³⁰⁴ Lagebericht des Kreishauptmannes in Bilgoraj für Juli 1943 für den Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin. Dokument 332. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹³⁰⁵ Schreiben des Beraters der RGO für den Bezirk Lublin, A. Skrzynski, an den Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin betreffend die Pazifikation des Dorfes Wirkowice im Kreise Zamosc durch eine SS Abteilung. 12/8/1943. Dokument 338; Schreiben des Kreishauptmannes in Zamosc an den Chef des Amtes des Gouverneurs des Distrikts Lublin über das strafwürdige Verhalten einiger volksdeutscher Umsiedler. 13/8/1943. Dokument 340; Vermerk des Kreislandwirts Kettner über die Ausschreitungen der deutschen Siedler - Raubüberfälle und Morde. 14/8/1943. Dokument 343; Protokoll betreffend den Einbruch in die ukrainisch-orthodoxe Kirche in Sztatyn, übersandt dem Gouverneur in Lublin vom Ukrainischen Hilfskomitee in Tomaszów Lubelski. 19/8/1943. Dokument 347; Auszug aus dem Rapport des Kommandeurs der Ordnungspolizei des Distrikts Lublin über die Erschiessung durch die Widerstandsbewegung des deutschen Dorfführers in Pasiaki. 8/9/1943. Dokument 367; Auszug aus dem Rapport des Kommandeurs der Ordnungspolizei des Distrikts Lublin über den Überfall von Partisanen auf das angesiedelte Dorf Rachanie. 17/9/1943. Dokument 372; Meldung des Kommandeurs der Gendarmerieabteilung für den Kommandeur der Gendarmerie im Distrikt Lublin über den Sicherheitszustand im Kreise Bilgoraj. 8/12/1943. Dokument 401. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

few months later, the situation had become so serious that it was considered that a battle was being waged in the southern and eastern areas of Kreis Zamosc between the Poles and the Ukrainians, which the German administration did not try even to suppress.¹³⁰⁶

Frank was able to deal with situation in Distrikt Lublin actively during the first part of August 1943. The essential message that he repeatedly sent out demanded both the rapid termination of the Germanisation and police operations and also the transferral of Globocnik.¹³⁰⁷ Surprisingly, Frank still met Globocnik on 14/8/1943.¹³⁰⁸ Himmler had already decided to transfer Globocnik away from Lublin on 10/7/1943 and informed Globocnik and Krüger about his decision immediately. His plan was to appoint Globocnik as *HSSPF Russland-Mitte* and to replace him with Gruppenführer Jakob Sporrenberg in Lublin. Sporrenberg was to arrive in Lublin to become acquainted with his new duties in mid-July.¹³⁰⁹

The decision to discard Globocnik did not come as a surprise because, although Himmler and Globocnik had been in close contact with one another from summer 1941 to autumn 1942, thereafter Himmler had distanced himself from Globocnik. He had met Globocnik in the beginning of July 1943, when the latter had expressed his willingness to work in cooperation with the new *Gouverneur* and to clarify his relations with Krüger. All this was of no avail because Himmler had already decided to transfer Globocnik elsewhere.¹³¹⁰

Globocnik's situation had become more shaky when Richard Wendler was appointed *Gouverneur* of Distrikt Lublin on 28/5/1943 to succeed the temporary *Gouverneur* Ludwig Fischer. Wendler was a Brigadeführer in the SS. This was a high rank, but most significantly he was an in-law relative of Himmler.¹³¹¹ Wendler could criticise Globocnik directly to Himmler, and he insisted that he be transferred.¹³¹²

Even though Himmler decided to transfer him, he had a high opinion of Globocnik's energy,¹³¹³ and his transfer can be seen primarily as an attempt to improve relations between the SS and the authorities of the Generalgouvernement. Another aim was obviously to make Krüger's position

¹³⁰⁶ Schreiben des Finanzinspektors der Kreishauptmannschaft im Zamosc an den Leiter der Hauptfinanzabteilung der Regierung des Generalgouvernements über die Steueraufkommen. 4/7/1944. Dokument 414. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹³⁰⁷ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945*. Wirtschaftstagung. 3/8/1943, pp. 717-718; Empfang Professor Kubijowitsch. 4/8/1943, pp. 718-719; Besprechung über Ablösung von SSuPolF Globocnik. 5/8/1943, p. 720; available in print: Dokument 330. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*; Empfang Professor Kubijowitsch. 5/8/1943, pp. 720-721; Besprechung mit GenLt d. Polizei Becker. 9/8/1943. p. 722.

¹³⁰⁸ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945*.

Empfang Distriktsstandortführer Globocnik. 14/8/1943, p. 723.

¹³⁰⁹ Himmler - Globocnik, Krüger. 10/7/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2846.

¹³¹⁰ Himmler - Krüger. 5/7/1943. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

¹³¹¹ Musial 1999, p. 39.

¹³¹² Wendler - Himmler. 27/7/1943. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

¹³¹³ Himmler - Wendler. 4/8/1943. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

easier, and he was given the task of telling the news to Frank.¹³¹⁴ Himmler let Globocnik go, but he did not yet give up the idea of Germanising Distrikt Lublin,¹³¹⁵ and the Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS informed the RKF Stabshauptamt about the continuation of the Germanisation operation in Distrikt Lublin on 16/7/1943.¹³¹⁶

The fact is that the situation had already started to change in early July 1943. Ulrich Greifelt, the Director of the RKF-Stabshauptamt, had proposed the settlement of *Volksdeutsche* in the area of Zichenau because he thought that the Germanisation operation in Distrikt Lublin had been suspended.¹³¹⁷ The idea of settling *Volksdeutsche* in Distrikt Lublin was abandoned definitively in mid-August 1943, and the area of Zichenau was considered to be the next settlement area.¹³¹⁸

The ending of the operation is also evident in the fact that Globocnik was ready to release children under six years of age from the camps at the end of July to a children's home which had been established by Count Zamojski.¹³¹⁹ A few days later, the release of much bigger groups of people was discussed. However, the idea was to place those who were able to work at the disposal of agriculture and the employment authorities, so for them it was not a question of a return to the situation preceding the operation.¹³²⁰

The SS broke off the Germanisation operation in August 1943. Information about the results of the operation is quite scant. For example, a UWZ report indicates that it was not possible to make exact reports and that the anti-partisan operation had not succeeded in removing resistance from the area.¹³²¹ A final account of the matter was given in October 1943. The UWZ stated that Operation *Werwolf I* had been carried out between 27/6/1943 and 15/8/1943, and that Operation *Werwolf II* had been terminated before completion.¹³²²

Even though the SS suspended the Germanisation operation in late summer 1943, the UWZ in particular was unwilling to give up it. The representatives of the UWZ planned deportation and settlement operations in

¹³¹⁴ Himmler - Krüger. 5/7/1943. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

¹³¹⁵ Himmler - Krüger. 5/7/1943. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

¹³¹⁶ Brandt - Greifelt. 16/7/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2648.

¹³¹⁷ Schreiben des Stabes des RKFDV an den Persönlicher Stab des Reichsführers-SS mit dem Vorschlag der Ansiedlung der deutschen Umsiedler aus Bosnien und Litauen im Regierungsbezirk Ciechanów. 7.7.1943. Dokument 300. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹³¹⁸ Creutz - Himmler. 14/8/1943. BArch NS 19 / 3607; available in print: Dokument 342. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom I.* Cf. Dokument 344. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹³¹⁹ Notiz. 24/7/1943: Fernmündliche Unterredung mit SS-Sturmbannführer Höfle am 22.7.1943 gegen 18.00 Uhr. APL 513 / 0 / 1; available in print: Dokument 312. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹³²⁰ Höfle: Notiz an den Herrn Regierungsrat Ramm und an die UWZ Zamosc. Nachrichtlich an Herrn Amtschef. 2/8/1943. APL 513 / 0 / 1.

¹³²¹ Fragment eines Berichtes des Leiters der Umwandererzentralstelle in Łódź, H. Krumey, über die Lage im Distrikt Lublin, für Juli. 8 / 1943. Dokument 359. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

¹³²² "Ergebnisse der Aktionen Werwolf I" und "Werwolf II" im Kreise Bilgoraj, bearbeitet von der Umwandererzentralstelle in Łódz. 1/10/1943. Dokument 382. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.*

the towns of Zamosc and Tomaszow.¹³²³ The preparations were on a large scale, and for example the housing stock of Zamosc had been surveyed and classified according to its usability.¹³²⁴ Moreover, the Polish inhabitants of the town had been examined, and comprehensive plans for the rearrangement of the economy had been drawn up. In addition to all this, the deportations had been planned thoroughly: the intention was to deport those members of the Polish population who were designated as unnecessary in a single day with a force of 1000 policemen.¹³²⁵

From the annual report of the year 1943 of the UWZ, it appears that the planned actions were suspended time and again and were eventually abandoned.¹³²⁶ However, this did not mean that the UWZ gave up its other large-scale projects, and it planned to extend the establishment of the Z farms to the whole of the Generalgouvernement and to establish UWZ offices in every Distrikt.¹³²⁷ The Z farms were the pet project of the UWZ, and it had outlined their advantages in a monthly report in September 1942.¹³²⁸ The UWZ had at that time made what it regarded as a successful experiment on a farm called Szopinek in Kreis Zamosc, which inspired it to plan the extension of the project.¹³²⁹

The plans of the UWZ turned out to be not that significant in the end because Himmler had lost interest in continuing the Germanisation operation in the Generalgouvernement. The first indication of this is Globocnik's transfer. Even though the decision had already been made in July 1943, Globocnik did not take up his post as *Höhere SS und Polizeiführer in der Operationszone Adriatisches Küstenland* until 13/9/1943.¹³³⁰ The second clear indication of a change of the situation is the decision to transfer Krüger from his post in October 1943.¹³³¹

¹³²³ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Lagebericht für das Generalgouvernement und den Warthegau / Juli 1943. Not dated. BArch R 75 / 4.

¹³²⁴ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹³²⁵ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹³²⁶ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹³²⁷ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹³²⁸ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Bericht Monat September 1942. 2/10/1942. BArch R 75 / 4.

¹³²⁹ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Abschlussbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹³³⁰ Dienstaufbahn. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik; Himmler - Globocnik. 13/9/1943. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik; Himmler - Globocnik, SSPHA. 13/9/1943. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

¹³³¹ Himmler - Frank. 22/10/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 1165.

Himmler had probably already formed the idea of transferring Krüger in summer 1943. He was dissatisfied with Krüger, as appears for example in a telegram sent in late July 1943.¹³³² It seems that Krüger was also dissatisfied with the situation because he had been on leave in early July 1943,¹³³³ and he wanted to have more time off from his duties. One reason given in his application for leave was the need to recover from the stress caused by the operations in Distrikt Lublin and in Distrikt Galizien.¹³³⁴ Himmler allowed Krüger to go on leave for the period 15/9/1943–5/10/1943 and even recommended that he take four weeks off instead of three.¹³³⁵

Himmler's decisions to transfer both Globocnik and Krüger from the Generalgouvernement indicate a change in the policy of the SS. Moreover, relations between Himmler and Frank seem to have improved, and Himmler informed Frank about the transfer of Krüger well in advance.¹³³⁶ Frank's message to Himmler before the latter's visit to the Generalgouvernement in November 1943 was very polite,¹³³⁷ and the visit itself indicated an improvement in relations.¹³³⁸ Correspondingly, the relations between Krüger and Himmler became inflamed, as exemplified by Himmler's telegram to Krüger on 13/11/1943.¹³³⁹

The civil administration hoped for a new era relations with the SS, although the Kreishauptmann of Kreis Zamosc, Helmuth Weihenmaier, for one, was still fascinated by the idea of Germanisation. He describes in glowing terms the actions that had been carried out in his *Kreis* in a report written at the end of September 1943, and he was ready to continue the demographic reorganisation in the way planned by the SS. His view is encapsulated in a sentence in which he considers the Germanisation of Zamosc the ideal objective.¹³⁴⁰

An examination of the second stage of the Germanisation project as a whole reveals that the SS planned to target not only the southern areas of Kreis Zamosc but also the towns of Zamosc and Lublin in the operation. The operation was integrated with an extensive anti-partisan operation, and about

¹³³² Himmler - Krüger. 29/7/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2653.

¹³³³ Himmler - Krüger 5/7/1943. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

¹³³⁴ Krüger - Himmler. 7/6/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2653.

Krüger - Himmler. 27/8/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 2653.

¹³³⁵ Himmler - Krüger. 27/8/1943. BArch NS 19 / 2653.

¹³³⁶ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945.* Gouverneurssitzung, 27/10/1943, p. 752.

¹³³⁷ Frank - Himmler. 8/11/1943. Telegram. BArch NS 19 / 1165.

¹³³⁸ Minutenprogramm anlässlich des Besuchs des Reichsführers-SS am 18. und 19. 11.1943 in Krakau. BArch NS 19 / 1794; *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945.* 18/11/1943, p. 757.

¹³³⁹ The telegram read as follows: "Habe Dein FS erhalten. Über Deine Abmeldung bin ich nicht glücklich. Ich ordne an, daß Du in Krakau bleibst bis ich dorthin gekommen bin. Ich beabsichtige Dich im Rahmen der SS- und Polizei zu verabschieden und Koppe dort einzuführen. Gegenüber dem G:G hast Du nichts weiteres zu tun und jede Verschärfung der Lage zu vermeiden." Himmler - Krüger. Telegram. 13/11/1943. BArch NS 19 / 1165.

¹³⁴⁰ The words used in the report were: "Für den Kreis Zamosc selbst aber wird es eine ideale Aufgabe sein, den ersten deutschen Kreis zu errichten und aufzubauen. Bericht des Kreishauptmannes von Zamość für den Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin über die ausgeführten Arbeiten betreffend den Aufbau der Verwaltung im Kreise Zamosc seit dem Jahre 1939." 24/9/1943. Dokument 376. Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II.

5000 persons of German descent were settled in the countryside of Kreis Zamosc as result of it. The number of settled persons was only about a quarter of what Himmler and Krüger had planned, but only about 800 less than Globocnik had envisaged.

7.4 The situation after the Germanisation operation

During the Germanisation project, about 13,000 persons of German descent were settled in Kreis Zamosc. Of them about 9000 persons were *Volksdeutsche* and about 4000 *Deutschstämmige*.¹³⁴¹ According to the RKF Stabshauptamt, about 4000 *Volksdeutsche* came from Bessarabia and about 2500 from Bosnia.¹³⁴² In the operation, the SS expelled at least 100,000 non-German inhabitants¹³⁴³ from nearly 300 villages.¹³⁴⁴ By the end of the project, Distrikt Lublin had become an important centre of SS operations, as is indicated by the size of the personnel employed by Globocnik in the following organs and capacities:

Staff of the SSPF	49
RKF operations	16
The SS-Mannschaftshaus	42
The Deutsche Ausrüstungswerke	10
Interpreters impressed into the employ of the KdS	7
Trawniki labour camp	3
Trawniki training camp	26
Operations connected with the Germanisation and the SS and police base projects	186
The WVHA / Deutsche Ausrüstungswerke	19
Aktion Reinhard / Kanzlei des Führers	92
Total	450 ¹³⁴⁵

The distribution of the personnel employed in Globocnik's project indicates that the local SS organisation practised operations in a wide variety of fields in attempting to carry out the National Socialistic ideology. However, the size of the personnel directly involved in the Germanisation activities was not very large, although when the personnel of the SS and police bases is added to it, it constitutes the largest individual sector in Globocnik's organisation.

The documents of the Zentralbauleitung der Waffen-SS und Polizei in Lublin also yield information about the SS organisation in Lublin. They show

¹³⁴¹ According the UWZ the number of *Volksdeutsche* was 8887 persons and the number of *Deutschstämmige* was 4022 persons. Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ Posen: Lagebericht für das Generalgouvernement und den Warthegau / Juli 1943. Not dated. BArch R 75 / 4. According to the RKF Stabshauptamt the number of resettled *Volksdeutsche* was 8721 persons. RKF Stabshauptamt: Kleiner Umsiedlungsspiegel. Januar 1944. BArch R 49 / 87.

¹³⁴² RKF Stabshauptamt: Tabelle 1b Die Ostumsiedlung: Ansiedlung - a) Personen. Bericht über den Stand der Um- und Ansiedlung am 1.10.1943. BArch R 49 / 85.

¹³⁴³ Madajczyk 1987, p. 422; Wasser 1993B, pp. 65, 91.

¹³⁴⁴ Wasser 1993B, p. 91.

¹³⁴⁵ Globocnik - von Iierff. 27/10/1943. BArch SSFPA Odilo Globocnik.

that the SS engaged in construction activities in at least 16 locations around Distrikt Lublin. Most of the building was connected with the maintenance of the SS organisation, but some was also carried out for the RKF.¹³⁴⁶ The situation in the town of Lublin also provides an indication of the strength of the SS, which possessed almost a hundred properties,¹³⁴⁷ thus occupying a considerable area of the town.¹³⁴⁸

Globocnik's transfer deeply affected the SS organisation in Distrikt Lublin because he took the key members of staff with him.¹³⁴⁹ They included Lerch, Michalsen, von Mohrenschildt, Bareuther, Hanelt and Stanglica.¹³⁵⁰ In practice, this meant that he took the whole administrative staff of the Germanisation operation with him, an action which did not arouse a purely affirmative reaction in the SS.¹³⁵¹ Globocnik's solution was certainly not unusual because he had surrounded himself with people from his home state of Carinthia, and some of his close relatives had moved to Lublin during the war.¹³⁵²

Even though Globocnik seemed to have taken a large number of key persons with him, Herrmann Dunkel for one does not seem to have left Distrikt Lublin.¹³⁵³ The reason was obviously that he was not one of Globocnik's intimate circle but acted more or less under the RuSHA. Another person who can be regarded as a key figure and whom Globocnik did not manage to take with him was Richard Thomalla, the official responsible for construction,¹³⁵⁴ although he had operated in Lublin since August 1940,¹³⁵⁵ and Globocnik held him in high esteem.¹³⁵⁶

Thomalla's remaining in the area also affected the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte because he ordered detailed village maps (*Dorfskelettpläne*) for the use of the SS-Bauleitung Zamosc. The Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte prepared maps of following villages: Hajowniki, Czesniki, Komarow, Zdanow, Suchodebie, Ilowiec, Laziska, Zarudzie, Podstary Zamosc, Staw Noakowski and Chomeciska Male.¹³⁵⁷ Maps were also to be drawn also for the southern part of Kreis Zamosc, but the results of the required land survey would not be ready until March 1944.¹³⁵⁸

¹³⁴⁶ Aktenplan der Zentralbauleitung der Waffen-SS und Polizei Lublin. 6/11/1943. APL 516 / 0 / 6.

¹³⁴⁷ Aufstellung der im Bereich der SS-Standortverwaltung Lublin liegenden Grundstücke. Not dated. APL 516 / 0 / 23.

¹³⁴⁸ Lageplan der Stadt Lublin. Not dated. APL 516 / 0 / 23.

¹³⁴⁹ Globocnik send a list of 16 names to SS-Personalhauptamt. von Herff - Krüger 18/9/1943. BArch SSFPA Gustav Hanelt.

¹³⁵⁰ HSSPF in der Operationszone Adriatisches Küstenland - SS-Personalhauptamt. 14/1/1944. BArch SSFPA Adolf Bareuther.

¹³⁵¹ Krüger - von Herff. 21/9/1943. Telegram. BArch SSFPA Adolf Bareuther.

¹³⁵² Rieger 2007, pp. 47-48, 85, 88-89.

¹³⁵³ For example: Verfügung! 6/5/1944. BArch SSFPA Hermann Dunkel.

¹³⁵⁴ Thomalla - SS Personalhauptamt. 20/3/1944. BArch SSFPA Richard Thomalla.

¹³⁵⁵ HSSPF Ost - SS- und Selbstschutzzführer, SSSPF Lublin, SS Personalhauptamt. 22/8/1940. BArch SSFPA Richard Thomalla.

¹³⁵⁶ Globocnik - Krüger. Not dated. BArch SSFPA Richard Thomalla.

¹³⁵⁷ Tann: Aktenvermerk. 13/12/1943. APL 510 / 3 / 8.

¹³⁵⁸ Tann: Aktenvermerk. 13/12/1943. APL 510 / 3 / 8.

In addition to the village maps, the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte drew up detailed accounts of the use of land in the villages. There is detailed information available about the village of Zarudzie, for example, and it is thus possible to examine the outcome of the deportation and settlement operation in an individual target. The new population of German descent had been given for its use altogether almost 445 hectares of land, 325 hectares of which was arable. The area sufficed for the establishment of 23 farms, and the area of the individual farms varied between just under five to over 50 hectares. The most common farm size was about 15–30 hectares. The bulk of the farms had been formed by combining several previous holdings, and the largest farm of 51.86 hectares had been formed from five earlier farms.¹³⁵⁹

Similar information can be obtained about some other villages, and generally one can see that the disposition of the land had been changed almost totally. The documents also show that the names of the settlers were German, that family relations had been taken into consideration and that some farms were given to women. It is also possible to see that permanent inhabitants had not been obtained for all the farms.¹³⁶⁰

The SS also continued the project to enrol persons of German descent. The Director of the EWZ ordered that the work should be continued in September 1943. The objective was to divide the population of the area into four groups and to distinguish people of German descent from rest of the population.¹³⁶¹ The operation lasted until spring 1944, and the final report of Kommission XV indicates that the survey comprised altogether 30,947 persons. However, 4122 of them had not arrived for the examinations, and the number of persons rejected had amounted to 13,569.¹³⁶² The EWZ also examined the "Germanic" persons who had moved into Distrikt Lublin.¹³⁶³ This group consisted of 121 persons, the majority of whom came from the Netherlands.¹³⁶⁴

Kreis-specific EWZ reports in late winter 1944 indicate that Kommission XV travelled around Distrikt Lublin, examined a few hundred people, and that it suffered from the uncertain security situation.¹³⁶⁵ According to the EWZ, the

¹³⁵⁹ Dorfvermessungsliste von Dorf Zarudzie. Not dated. APL 510 / 3 / 12.

¹³⁶⁰ Dorfvermessungsliste von Majdan. Not dated. APL 510 / 3 / 10; Dorfvermessungsliste von Kolonie Podstary Zamosc. Not dated. APL 510 / 3 / 11.

¹³⁶¹ Leiter der EWZ: Anordnung Nr. 212. 27/9/1943. BArch R 69 / 922.

¹³⁶² Abschlussbericht über die Erfassung der Deutschstämmigen im Distrikt Lublin / Generalgouvernement durch die Einwandererzentralstelle des Sicherheitspolizei und des SD. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 128.

¹³⁶³ Staatsangehörigkeitsstelle / Fliegende Kommission XV: Bericht über die Schleusung germanischer Einwanderer vom 31. Januar bis 3. Februar 1944 in Lublin. 4/2/1944. BArch R 69 / 987; Staatsangehörigkeitsstelle: Ergänzungsbericht über die Schleusung der germ. Einwanderer vom 7.2. bis 18.2.44. 19/2/1944. BArch R 69 / 987.

¹³⁶⁴ Staatsangehörigkeitsstelle / Fliegende Kommission XV / EWZ: Statistik der germ. Einwanderer vom 31. Jan. bis 18. Feb. 1944. 1/3/1944. BArch R 69 / 987; Gesamtausstellung der im Distrikt Lublin eingesetzten Germanen. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 1097.

¹³⁶⁵ Arbeitsplan der Kommission XV für die Zeit vom 11.–15.2.1944. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 923; Kommission XV / EWZ: Erfahrungsbericht Kreis Pulawy. 22/3/1944; Kommission XV / EWZ: Erfahrungsbericht Kreis Biala-Podlaska. 22/3/1944; Kommission XV / EWZ: Erfahrungsbericht Kreis Radzyn. 22/3/1944; Kommission

security situation was worst in Kreis Krasnik. This county had a common border with Kreis Bilgoraj, which the EWZ considered to be a hotbed of resistance activity.¹³⁶⁶

The surveying of the population was Globocnik's method of acquiring "Germanic" settlers for his Germanisation project. Consequently, the results of the survey for Kreis Zamosc should be studied in more detail. By March 1944, the EWZ had enrolled altogether 11,758 persons in the *Kreis*. Of them 5004 persons were classified as *Volksdeutsche* or *Deutschstämmige*, and 6754 persons had been rejected.¹³⁶⁷ Not all of the persons included in the survey had participated in the examination, and in fact only 9903 were actually examined,¹³⁶⁸ so just under than 2000 persons had avoided the closer examination by the EWZ.

The EWZ was not able to produce enough people of German descent for Globocnik, but it should be noted that the EWZ had never attempted to do so even at the very beginning of the Germanisation operation. Given that it never expects much to come of the operation, the bleak assessment given by Kommission XV of the population of German descent in the *Kreis* hardly came to the EWZ as a surprise. The *Deutschstämmige* suffered from tuberculosis and undernourishment, and the impression they had left in the examinations was one of primitiveness.¹³⁶⁹

Kommission XV was not the only source that had received a backward picture of the *Deutschstämmige* of Distrikt Lublin: a farming consultant working in the village of Bortatycze in summer 1942 told about their resistance to change and their uncommunicativeness,¹³⁷⁰ and an agricultural trainee in the village of Skierbieszow in summer 1943 made some rather similar observations,¹³⁷¹ although his report places more emphasis on practical work, productivity and uncertainty about the future.¹³⁷² A statement of the agricultural authorities

XV / EWZ: Erfahrungsbericht Kreis Krasnik. 22/3/1944; Kommission XV / EWZ: Erfahrungsbericht Kreis Lublin. 22/3/1944. BArch R 69 / 932.

¹³⁶⁶ The activities of the EWZ had been prevented in Kreis Bilgoraj because of partisan activity. Abschlussbericht über die Erfassung der Deutschstämmigen im Distrikt Lublin / Generalgouvernement durch die Einwandererzentralstelle des Sicherheitspolizei und des SD. Not dated. BArch R 69 / 128.

¹³⁶⁷ Kommission XV / EWZ: Erfahrungsbericht Distrikt Lublin. 23/3/1944. BArch R 69 / 932.

¹³⁶⁸ Kommission XV / EWZ: Erfahrungsbericht für den Distrikt Lublin. 21/3/1944. BArch R 69 / 932.

¹³⁶⁹ Kommission XV / EWZ: Erfahrungsbericht Kreis Zamosc. 16/10/1943. BArch R 69 / 931.

¹³⁷⁰ Hofmann - Himmler. 26/8/1942. Appendix: Bericht über meine Tätigkeit als landwirtsch. Beraterin in den Wysokie-Dörfern. 4/8/1942. BArch NS 2 / 59.

¹³⁷¹ The Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte had invited students to do practical training in Kreis Zamosc in late summer 1943. Bitte der deutschen Forschungsstelle für Ostprobleme in Lublin, an die Leiterin der Studentenabteilung in Wien, Gerda Scheuble, 40 Studenten zur Praxis im Osteinsatz in die ausgesiedelten Gebieten im Kreise von Zamość zu schicken. 21/7/1943. Dokument 306; Bitte der deutschen Forschungsstelle in Lublin, an die Leiterin der Studentenabteilung in Wien, Gerda Scheuble, 80 Studenten zur Praxis im Osteinsatz in die ausgesiedelten Gebieten im Kreise von Zamość zu schicken. 21/7/1943. Dokument 308. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹³⁷² Stud. agr. Kurt B.: Bericht. 3/9/1943. APL 510 / 3 / 4.

concerning the villages inhabited by *Volksdeutsche* supports these observations and shows that external support was a *sine qua non* for the survival of the German settlement.¹³⁷³

Thus one source of concern for the representatives of the SS was the population of German descent. Another was the resistance movement, which occupied a very important position with regard to the whole Germanisation operation, and the UWZ, for example, dealt with that question in its annual report for 1943. In the opinion of the representatives of the UWZ, the deporting of the Polish intelligentsia to the Generalgouvernement had made peaceful development possible in the Warthegau, but it had caused problems in the Generalgouvernement. The UWZ did not actually admit that the operation was a mistake, claiming that the problems in the Generalgouvernement indicated that the Polish intelligentsia should not have been set free at all.¹³⁷⁴

Kreis Zamosc and the surrounding area was not pacified as a consequence of the anti-partisan operation of summer 1943, and it was the resettled Ukrainian population that ended up as the target of the intense partisan activities.¹³⁷⁵ In fact, the position of the Ukrainians had weakened as the Germanisation project of the SS had proceeded, and several reports concerning it were drafted in the course of 1943.¹³⁷⁶ Madajczyk's assessment indicates the

¹³⁷³ Bericht über die gemeinsame Sitzung der Abteilung Ernährung und Landwirtschaft und des Vorstandes der Siedlerwirtschaftsgemeinschaft (SWG) am 6. Oktober 1943, auf der die Lage der deutschen Siedler im Kreise Zamosc und die Veränderungen der bisherigen Formen der SWG besprochen wurden. 11/10/1943. Dokument 384. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹³⁷⁴ Dienststelle Litzmannstadt / UWZ: Abschlußbericht über die Arbeit der Umwandererzentralstelle im Reichsgau Wartheland und Generalgouvernement für das Jahr 1943. 31/12/1943. BArch R 75 / 3b.

¹³⁷⁵ Bericht über Tätigkeit des Beirats des Ukrainischen Hauptausschusses beim Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin und über die Lage der ukrainischen Bevölkerung im Distrikt Lublin bis zum 10/12/1943. BArch R 102 II / 20a.

¹³⁷⁶ *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939 - 1945*. 5/8/1943, p. 720. Also available: Dokument 331; Notiz des Leiters des Ukrainischen Hauptausschusses, W. Kubijowicz, über die Situation der ukrainischen Bevölkerung im Distrikt Lublin. 28/9/1943. Dokument 377; Dienstnotiz des Leiters des Ukrainischen Hauptausschusses, W. Kubijowicz, über die ukrainischen Familien, die auf Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc warten. 28/9/1943. Dokument 379; Bemerkungen des Beraters des Ukrainischen Hauptausschusses beim Gouverneur des Distrikts Lublin, W. Lewycki, zur Dienstnotiz des Leiters des Ukrainischen Hauptausschusses, W. Kubijowicz, in Krakau vom 28. September 1943, die die ukrainischen Familien, die auf Ansiedlung im Kreise Zamosc warten, sowie die Situation im Distrikt Lublin betrifft. 7/10/1943. Dokument 383; Information des Ukrainischen Hilfskomitees über die Situation der ukrainischen Bevölkerung im Kreise Bilgoraj - für den Chef des Amtes des Distrikts Lublin. 18/10/1943. Dokument 387; Schreiben des Ukrainischen Hilfskomitees in Zamosc an die Abteilung Bevölkerungswesen und Fürsorge der Kreishauptmannschaft in Zamosc betreffend die Umsiedlung der ukrainischen Familien aus Aleksandrów. 25/10/1943. Dokument 389; Schreiben des Ukrainischen Hilfskomitees in Zamosc an die Abteilung Bevölkerungswesen und Fürsorge der Kreishauptmannschaft in Zamosc in der Angelegenheit der ukrainischen Umsiedler aus Aleksandrów; Bitte um Ermöglichung der Rückkehr in das Dorf, aus dem sie ausgesiedelt wurden. 28/10/1943. Dokument 391; Schreiben des Beraters des Ukrainischen Hauptausschusses, W. Lewycki, an die Abteilung Innere Verwaltung der Dienststelle des SD betreffend die schwierige Lage der ukrainischen Ansiedler in Tarnogród und die Notwendigkeit der Besetzung Tarnogróds durch ukrainische Selbstschutzeinheiten. 28/10/1943. Dokument 392; Schreiben des Beraters des

seriousness of the situation: the Polish and the Ukrainian populations had become engaged in an internecine struggle in *Kreise* Hrubieszów, Chelm and Włodawa.¹³⁷⁷ Taken as a whole, the situation indicates that the SS failed in this endeavour as well.

The situation of the target area of Germanisation project occupied the civil authorities right up to the end of the German administration. For example, Richard Wendler, the Gouverneur of Distrikt Lublin, described the problems of the area to Jakob Sporrenberg, the new SSPF, in the spring of 1944, claiming that the impression that he had obtained was of an area that was nearly dead. Furthermore, he stated that the self-defence units lacked weapons, that those weapons that were available were of several disparate types and that there was not enough ammunition. Wendler demanded reinforcements and required that Himmler should be informed of his complaints.¹³⁷⁸ Sporrenberg could not ignore Wendler's views, and he ordered the establishment of a *Selbstschutzregiment* in the target area of the Germanisation operation. This was to be formed out of the police battalion stationed in Zamosc combined with the local self-defence units, which had a total strength of 3331 men.¹³⁷⁹

In spite of Sporrenberg's actions, Wendler turned directly to Himmler and sent him the same letter he had earlier sent to Sporrenberg. He described the situation to Himmler and expressed his concern that the German settlement was in great danger. Wendler also suggested that Himmler should consider suspending the settlement of Germans. He further clearly brought out the fact that, according to information received from the SS, only 25,000 Germans lived in the area of the Germanisation project while the Ukrainians numbered 26,000 and the Poles 170,000.¹³⁸⁰

The overall outcome of the SS operation was bad. The security situation deteriorated so much that the resettled people did not succeed in establishing themselves in their new abodes. The operation demonstrated that it was possible for the SS to carry out some of its plans, but that it was incapable of anticipating the consequences of its actions, and that it did not have the resources to regain control of the situation.

Ukrainischen Hauptausschusses, W. Lewycki, an die Abteilung Innere Verwaltung betreffend die Ermöglichung der Rückkehr der ukrainischen Ansiedler aus Aleksandrów zu ihren früheren Höfen in den Dörfern Panków-Dolina. 29/10/1943. Dokument 394; Fragment eines Berichtes der Abteilung Wirtschaftshilfe des Ukrainischen Hauptausschusses über die Tätigkeit für das Jahr 1943. 18/12/1943. Dokument 403. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹³⁷⁷ Madajczyk 1987, p. 535.

¹³⁷⁸ Schreiben des Gouverneurs des Distrikts Lublin, R. Wendler, an den SS- und Polizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin, J. Sporrenberg, über die Lage im Siedlungsgebiet im *Kreise* Zamosc. 26/4/1944. Dokument 410. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹³⁷⁹ Schreiben des SS- und Polizeiführers im Distrikt Lublin, J. Sporrenberg, über die von ihm unternommenen Mittel zwecks Garantierung der Sicherheit im Siedlungsgebiet von Zamość. 28/4/1944. Dokument 411. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

¹³⁸⁰ Schreiben des Gouverneurs im Distrikt Lublin, R. Wendler, an den Reichsführer-SS über die beunruhigende Lage im Siedlungsgebiet von Zamosc. 3/5/1944. Dokument 412. *Zamojszczyzna - Sonderlaboratorium SS Tom II*.

Globocnik's resources sufficed to carry out the genocide and some parts of the Germanisation project, but they were not enough to suppress the resistance movement or to quell the general unrest. Neither were Himmler's anti-partisan troops able to stabilise the situation in Distrikt Lublin. In other words, the resources of the SS were sufficient to plan and partly carry out the operations but not to control the consequences. The reason to some extent lay in the shortage of manpower caused by the war, but we must also ask whether the human resources of the SS would have been enough even in peacetime if Germanisation operations in more extensive areas had caused the same kind of unrest as in Distrikt Lublin.

8 RESULTS

The ideological background of the Germanisation project was based on the National Socialist racial ideology and the idea of territorial expansion to ensure the survival of the German people. The National Socialists had adopted a racial ideology in which different groups of people were evaluated according to their apparent characteristics. The Germans and peoples who spoke Germanic languages in northern and western Europe were defined as superior to other peoples and therefore entitled to subject them.

The numerical superiority of the Germans made it possible to develop the idea of a Greater German State centred around Germany. The intention was that Germany should first conquer an area that would ensure its self-sufficiency, in other words a living space, in eastern Europe. In practice, this meant conquering areas up to a line running from Archangel to Astrakhan or even as far as the Urals. The conquered living space was to be populated with Germans and other so-called Germanic peoples, while the local non-German inhabitants were to be enslaved, expelled or exterminated to ensure the welfare of the new inhabitants.

The SS was from the outset a separate elitist part of the NSDAP. Originally, the SS performed duties related to the internal security of the NSDAP, but it succeeded in extending its security operations to cover the whole of society. Later on, the SS succeeded in combining its activities related to the National Socialist ideological policy of demographic reorganisation with its tasks in the field of security.

The success of the SS was based on its absolute commitment to carrying out Hitler's will and its independent development of the National Socialist ideology. The commitment to Hitler made it possible for the SS to grow and expand the scope of its operations. The ideological initiative for its part enabled the organisation to develop into the organ that implemented the National Socialist racial ideology.

The development of the National Socialist ideology, which took place within the organisation, was manifold and comprehensive. The SS reinforced its members' commitment by representing the organisation as an order of

knighthood and by creating a substitute for religion which would abolish earlier values and unite the members of the organisation. The SS also elaborated the National Socialist racial and expansionist ideology in greater detail than before and strove to carry it out to the best of its ability.

In the National Socialists' view, the Generalgouvernement was a part of the eastern living space, and it formed a link with other eastern areas. The Generalgouvernement was placed under a National Socialist administrative organisation to await Germanisation. During the waiting period, it was to be a place for locating undesirable groups.

Although the administration of the Generalgouvernement did not have a clear view about how the Germanisation would should be carried out in practice, it supported the project. The administration first accepted an idea of collecting undesirable elements in the Generalgouvernement, but it soon changed its stance and considered that the economic utilisation of the area should be the primary object and consequently that the Germanisation project should wait until the war was over.

The SS cared little about the views of the administration of the Generalgouvernement and clung to the idea of utilising it as target area for placing undesirable groups. The objectives of the SS also included the Germanisation of the Generalgouvernement, and some individual representatives of the SS were interested in beginning the project while the war was still on.

The operations of the SS focused particularly on Distrikt Lublin because the regional *SS- und Polizeiführer* there was exceptionally active and had direct contact with Himmler. Another reason was the fact that the area was geographically in the eastern part of the Generalgouvernement and lay along the routes to the east.

The SS had a clear view of what the future tasks would be like, but so far it has not been possible to show that the organisation produced a detailed plan covering all the expansion areas. The *Generalsiedlungsplan* of the RKF-Stabshauptamt came closest to achieving this, but it only dealt with all the targets superficially.

That the plans were not finished can be explained by the fact that the planning work was not carried out centrally within the SS organisation. The RSHA was responsible for the that part of operation related to the non-German population and for determining how many people were to be deported from the target areas. The RKF-Stabshauptamt generally based its own plans for the non-German groups on the principles of the RSHA, but it was also able to produce quite independent plans particularly during the early years of the war.

The influence of the RSHA was not very visible in the *Generalplan Ost* of 1942, and it is possible to consider the plan as the culmination of the planning work of the RKF-Stabshauptamt. The *Generalsiedlungsplan* followed the plans of the RSHA for the extermination of non-German groups so closely that the RKF-Stabshauptamt seems to have lost its control of planning in the latter half of 1942 to the RSHA. The result was a situation in which the two organs shared a

basic common view, but there was no detailed joint plan concerning its execution in practice.

The Germanisation project carried out in Distrikt Lublin reflects the disagreement that prevailed in the SS over ideologically interesting projects. Distrikt Lublin was from the outset a region that differed from the other *Distrikte* of the Generalgouvernement, and after the inception of the Eastern Campaign, the area began to differ even more from the other districts. The main reason for this was the SSPF, Odilo Globocnik. The Germanisation of the towns of Lublin and Zamosc were also included in the plans of the RKF-Stabshauptamt, but the idea of Germanising the whole of Kreis Zamosc was purely Globocnik's vision, for which he obtained Himmler's support.

The RKF-Stabshauptamt had no reason to begin a Germanisation project in Distrikt Lublin, and this hindered the preparations for the operation. However, Globocnik had succeeded in establishing such a broad-based SS organisation in Distrikt Lublin that the task of the RKF-Stabshauptamt was reduced to mainly delivering inhabitants for Globocnik to settle. If had been possible for Globocnik to get the inhabitants he needed through the services of the EWZ, he would not have required the assistance of the RKF-Stabshauptamt at all.

The RSHA reacted considerably more warmly to the project than the RKF-Stabshauptamt, even though the individual representatives of the EWZ had doubts concerning the so-called *Deutschstämmige*. Above all the representatives of the UWZ committed themselves to the project and would have liked to continue and to extend it despite the problems it encountered.

The organisation of the SS was comprehensive, and it included in principle all the organs needed for carrying out Germanisation operations. Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler had also succeeded in obtaining such a position for himself that he was able to control the demographic operations involved in the Germanisation project. The crucial factor here was his appointment as RKF in October 1939.

Various organs and the authority of the RKF enabled a limited implementation of the demographic rearrangement policy during the period 1939–1941, but even then it enjoyed only partial success. This is clearly shown by the fact that the SS was not able to settle the *Volksdeutsche* from eastern Europe in the annexed Polish territories. A contributory reason for Himmler not being able to push his projects through was the fact that the administration of the Generalgouvernement had started to resist them.

Issues relating to Globocnik's operation also clearly show the problems attached to both the authorisation and the organisation: The authorisation of the RKF in itself was no guarantee that it would be possible to execute the Germanization of an area that had been transferred to the civil administration, and the organisation of the SS was not up to the task.

A closer examination of Globocnik's operation shows the problems related to the activities of the SS:

The planning of the operation was difficult because Himmler and Globocnik had developed it between themselves and because the RKF

Stabshauptamt did not react very positively to it. This was reflected above all in the problems affecting the preparations and the acquisition of inhabitants. The administration of the Generalgouvernement was not consulted during the preparation of the operation, and the SS attempted to conceal the real nature of the project from the officials of the Generalgouvernement except those at the local level.

Some of the problems related to the planning stemmed from Globocnik himself because he had fallen out with both Generalgouverneur Frank and Gouverneur Zörner. There was also insufficient cooperation between the planning organisation of the SSPF Lublin and the RKF Stabshauptamt. This is indicated by the fact that the Germanization plan was drafted by Globocnik's own planning organ, the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte, which seemed to look askance at other planning agencies. However, it did have the planning instructions of the RKF Stabshauptamt at its disposal, and its plans did not deviate from the general policy of the SS as such.

The implementation of the Germanisation project in practice brought out other defects: The organs established by the SS for the operation were not able to keep control of the area, and an exceptionally strong resistance movement formed there. Ultimately, the failure was a result of trying to carry out the operation phase by phase and of the attempt to annihilate the original population of the area. Those of working age would have ended up either as slave labour or in the extermination camp of Auschwitz. The children and the old would have been placed in villages in which they would have been left to their own devices to survive. When the objectives of the SS operation were revealed, the Polish population rose in resistance, and the SS was incapable of suppressing it.

The result of the operation indicates that it was possible to settle a population of German origin in areas that were of interest to the National Socialists, but also that it was not possible to guarantee the continued survival of the settled population in the area. The main reason for this was the deliberate policy of annihilating the Polish population.

The availability of settlers was the most important of the other factors. The example of Distrikt Lublin indicates that the population of German origin whom it was not possible to classify as *Volksdeutsche* would not have made suitable settlers of the eastern territories for the SS. It also is very questionable whether the SS would have succeeded in transferring millions of inhabitants from the heartlands of Germany far away to the east immediately after the war.

The example of Zamosc also indicates that a large and united group of people whose lives were intentionally threatened did not passively accept their fate but engaged in effective resistance. This suggests what would have happened if the SS had tried to carry out more extensive operations with corresponding methods in similar conditions.

The intention of the SS was to create an area in the east that would incorporate an extreme National Socialist dictatorship. It was to be governed by the SS, whose regional and local leaders would wield considerable power. Thus

the German population, too, would have been subjected to strict surveillance, coercive measures and despotism. Furthermore, the German settlers would have been the objects of the hatred of the local non-German population. In such circumstances, it is justified to ask whether there would have been more than ten million inhabitants available for settling in the east even if their material living conditions might have improved as consequence of their moving. In practice, all the target groups of the National Socialist population policy would have ended up as victims.

It is possible to use Globocnik's Germanisation operation to produce a general view of the situation, on the basis of which the ability of the SS to carry out more extensive National Socialist plans must be questioned. The operation indicated that the resources of the SS were inadequate for an operation carried out in a restricted area and that the activities of the SS were intimately tied up with individual persons.

This close linkage of the operation to individuals was typical of the National Socialist administrative system, and it was the Achilles' heel of the SS. Heinrich Himmler was the absolute leader of his organisation. His position is indicated by the fact that after Heydrich's death he had no deputy, nor was there a clear candidate to succeed him. The example of Globocnik shows how an individual leader could rise to a very significant position indeed with Himmler's patronage and even initiate independent operations of his own. After falling into Himmler's disfavour, Globocnik no longer received support for his projects; he was transferred elsewhere, and his Germanisation project was terminated.

The Germanisation of the east would have required a large number of extreme National Socialists like Globocnik, but he was an exception. This is reflected in the exceptionally strong SS organisation in Distrikt Lublin, which included an independent planning organ. If there had been numerous persons like Globocnik around, the Eastern Project would have been initiated simultaneously in several locations. After that Himmler would have had to support and protect his representatives even if they caused wide and irreversible chaos in several different areas at the same time.

It is also worth speculating whether the project would have failed if Himmler had been eliminated. Himmler's style of leadership was prone to risk because he travelled almost constantly, flying from one place to another, and he spent much of his time during the war in the east. Flying in itself was dangerous enough with the technology of that era, and it would have become even more precarious if the SS had begun extensive Germanisation projects that caused severe unrest in large areas. Sabotage, human error, weather conditions, technical faults or a combination of any of these could easily have caused a flying accident.

Questions related to the individual SS organs also raise doubts about the ability of the organisation to carry out more extensive Germanisation operations.

The UWZ was a very small organ for carrying out bigger operations, and in practical actions it needed the assistance of the Ordnungspolizei. The available forces of the Ordnungspolizei consisted of police regiments and police battalions. If the SS had wished to carry out more extensive operations, it would have needed to concentrate considerably stronger units of the Ordnungspolizei in the target areas or to use other armed SS units.

It is also justified to ask if the resources of the SS would have been adequate to deport and exterminate tens of millions of people even in peacetime. Furthermore, we can ask whether the troops of the Ordnungspolizei would have been able to expel and murder endless numbers of innocent people in peacetime.

The Vomi and the EWZ were able to deliver a few thousand *Volksdeutsche* to Zamosc after taking care of the transfer and accommodation of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans early on in the war. The registering and examining of tens of millions of people and making them into inhabitants of the east would have been an impossible task for these organs with the resources at their disposal.

An examination of our sample operation as a whole indicates that the SS would have encountered severe difficulties if it had tried to carry out Germanisation projects in almost totally non-German areas like Distrikt Lublin. It also indicates that the SS did not have sufficient resources for the implementation of large operations. Nor was the involvement of the SS with individual persons of help in the execution of projects either, and an examination the Zamosc operation shows just how great was the significance of individual persons in it.

The Germanization operation in Zamosc would not have been carried out without Globocnik's initiative and Himmler's enthusiasm. Even so, the significance of the lower-ranking SS officers in Distrikt Lublin should not be underrated because the implementation of the operation was their responsibility. Bareuther, Krumej and the planners of the Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte were the most significant actors with regard to the whole operation.

If we consider the most important actors, we can notice that only Himmler came from the heartlands of Germany while Globocnik, Bareuther and Krumej were born in Austria-Hungary. Correspondingly all of them had done military service, and every one of them had lost at least some kind of opportunity for training as a consequence of the First World War. Later on their paths had led them into the service of the SS, and every one of them can be regarded as having adopted the National Socialist ideology.

Even though the SS has been described as an elitist organisation that only recruited educated persons, this does not hold true of Globocnik and his staff. On the contrary, they were a group of persons with little education or training who had diverse vocational backgrounds. Of them, Globocnik in particular tried to carry out the most fantastical projects that had little to do with the

realities of the situation. It is also worth noting that Himmler, too, can be included in this category, albeit with certain reservations.

Taken as a whole, the Zamosc operation creates a picture of an organisation that operated in a random fashion and did not organise itself effectively. The major shortcoming was the lack of clear leadership to coordinate all the functions connected with the operation. Because there is no evidence of any development that might have led to the establishment of an adequate administration for more extensive operations, it is justified to question the ability of the SS to carry out such operations in similar circumstances.

YHTEENVETO

Kuuluiko Itä SS-järjestölle? SS järjestön uudelleenjärjestelypolitiikan realistisuus SS- ja poliisijohtaja Odilo Globocnikin germaanistamisoperaation valossa.

Tässä tutkimuksessa käsitellään SS-järjestön harjoittaman kansallissosialistisen väestön kohdistuneen uudelleenjärjestelypolitiikan realistisuutta ja arvioidaan SS- ja poliisijohtaja Odilo Globocnikin Zamoscin kaupungin ympäristössä Puolassa toteuttamaa karkotus-asutushanketta esimerkkinä käyttäen, olisiko SS-järjestö kyennyt toteuttamaan laajempia hankkeita saksalaisen väestön asuttamiseksi miltei täysin muiden kuin saksalaisten asuttamille itäisen Euroopan alueille, jos se olisi saanut siihen tilaisuuden.

Tutkimustulokset osoittavat, että SS-järjestö oli kansallissosialistisessa järjestelmässä sellaisessa asemassa, että sen olisi ollut mahdollista yrittää laajempien asutus-karkotushankkeiden toteuttamista, mutta niiden epäonnistuminen olisi ollut hyvin todennäköistä. SS-järjestön toimintamahdollisuudet perustuvat siihen, että se saavutti poikkeuksellisen vahvan aseman kansallissosialistisessa valtiossa ja pystyi sen takia ulottamaan toimintansa miehitetuille alueille. SS-järjestön vahvuus perustui huomattavassa määrin SS-valtakunnanjohtaja Heinrich Himmlerin saavuttamaan asemaan, mutta siihen vaikutti myös järjestön pyrkimys muodostaa itsestään kansallissosialistisen valtion eliitti, jolla oli oma kansallissosialistisesta ideologiasta kehitetty aatemaailmansa.

Vaikka SS-järjestö saavutti vahvan aseman ja vaikka se vaikutti myös sisäisesti vahvalta, se ei ollut organisaatioltaan tai henkilöstöltään yhtenäinen. SS-järjestö koostui lukuisista päävirastoista ja niiden alaisista toimielimistä, joiden toimialat olivat osittain päällekkäisiä ja jotka kilpailivat keskenään. Myöskään SS-järjestön alueellinen rakenne ei edistänyt keskitettyä alakohtaista linjajohtamista, vaan eritasoiset alueelliset SS- ja poliisijohtajat saattoivat henkilökohtaisten ominaisuuksiensa ja suorien yhteyksiensä avulla nousta sellaiseen asemaan, että erilaisten yksityisluontoisten hankkeiden toteuttaminen mahdollistui.

Zamoscin hankkeessa oli kyse yksittäisen SS- ja poliisijohtajan hankkeesta, joka toteutettiin SS-valtakunnanjohtajan tuella. Väestöllisen uudelleenjärjestelyyn erikoistuneet SS-päävirastot ja toimielimet osallistuivat hankkeeseen vaihtelevasti, eikä se noussut kovin merkittävään asemaan koko järjestön toimintaa ajatellen. Siitä huolimatta Zamoscin ympäristössä toteutettu hanke heijasti SS-järjestön laajempia suunnitelmia ja tavoitteita, ja sen avulla on mahdollista kyseenalaistaa SS-järjestön toimintakyky vastaavissa olosuhteissa vastaavin menettelin.

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Appendix 1

Abbreviations

APL	Archiwum Państwowe Lublinie
BA	Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde
BdO	Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei
BdS	Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD
CdZ	Chef der Zivilverwaltung
DAG	Deutsche Ansiedlungsgesellschaft
DAWI	Deutsches Auslandwissenschaftliche Institut
DUT	Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand GmbH
EWZ	Einwandererzentralstelle
Postu	Forschungsstelle für Ostunterkünfte
Gestapo	Geheime Staatspolizei
GG	Generalgouvernement
HSSPF	Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer
KdO	Kommandeur der Ordnungspolizei
KdS	Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD
Kripo	Kriminalpolizei
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
Orpo	Ordnungspolizei
RfR	Reichsstelle für Raumordnung
RFSS	Reichsführer-SS
RKF	Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums
RMEuL	Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft
RMI	Reichsministerium für das Inneren
RSHA	Reichssicherheitshauptamt
RuSA	Rasse- und Siedlungsamt
RuSHA	Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt
SA	Sturmabteilung
SD	Sicherheitsdienst
SDHA	Sicherheitshauptamt
Sipo	Sicherheitspolizei
SS	Schutzstaffel
SSFHA	SS-Führungshauptamt
SSHA	SS-Hauptamt
SSPF	SS- und Polizeiführer
SSPHA	SS-Personalhauptamt
SWG	Siedlerwirtschaftsgemeinschaft
UHA	Ukrainischer Hauptausschuss
UWZ	Umwandererzentralstelle
Vomi	Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
WVHA	SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt

Appendix 2

SS Officer Ranks

SS Rank	British equivalent
Reichsführer-SS	Field Marshal
SS-Oberstgruppenführer	General
SS-Obergruppenführer	Lietenant-General
SS-Gruppenführer	Major-General
SS-Brigadeführer	
SS-Oberführer	Brigadier
SS-Standartenführer	Colonel
SS-Obersturmbannführer	Lieutenant-Colonel
SS-Sturmbannführer	Major
SS-Hauptsturmführer	Captain
SS-Obersturmführer	Lieutenant
SS-Untersturmführer	Second Lieutenant

Appendix 3

Administrative Arrangements for the Polish Territories Conquered by Germany in 1939


Appendix 4

Administrative Arrangements for the Soviet Territories Conquered by Germany in 1941



Appendix 5

Generalplan Ost 1942



The Area of Zamosc

