

This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version may differ from the original in pagination and typographic details.

Author(s): Ahonen, Pertti

Title: The Dynamics of Expellee Integration in Post-1945 Europe

Year: 2020

Version: Accepted version (Final draft)

Copyright: © Cambridge University Press 2020

Rights: In Copyright

Rights url: <http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=en>

Please cite the original version:

Ahonen, P. (2020). The Dynamics of Expellee Integration in Post-1945 Europe. In J. C. Jansen, & S. Lässig (Eds.), *Refugee Crises 1945-2000 : Political and Societal Responses in International Comparison* (pp. 29-54). Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 2

“The Dynamics of Expellee Integration in Post-1945 Europe”

*Pertti Ahonen*¹

The end of the Second World War in Europe was accompanied by enormous involuntary population movements. Tens of millions were uprooted, people of every European nationality, who fell into various partly overlapping categories: forced laborers, liberated concentration camp inmates, POWs, civilian evacuees. The further category of expellees – refugees expelled across emerging inter-state borders as national minorities – assumed particular significance because of its centrality within wider postwar blueprints. There was a widely held belief that the existence of substantial ethno-national minorities, especially in Eastern Europe, had been a key cause of the instability of the interwar order. To preempt similar hazards, architects of the post-1945 system wanted to build ethnically homogenous nation states, to be created by shifting not just boundaries but also populations. Winston Churchill encapsulated this idea in late 1944 with his oft-quoted call for a “clean sweep” to ensure that “there will be no more mixture of populations to cause endless trouble.”² Ultimately this drive to relocate people to match ethnically defined state borders displaced at least sixteen-seventeen million Europeans between 1944 and 1948.³

The sweep failed to remove concerns about specific populations groups, however. Instead, it created severe refugee crises as fragile postwar societies struggled to cope with the sudden influx of expellees. These crises, in turn, provoked fears about the forced migrants. Domestically, there were concerns that the expellees could “crystallize into dissident and disruptive groups” susceptible to political extremism.⁴ Internationally, contemporaries worried that their desire “to go back home” might generate dangerous irredentist pressures.⁵

In the aftermath of WW II, the victims of expulsions were perceived as major potential threats to the emerging postwar order.

By the 1960s, the perception of an acute expellee threat had faded. Fears of destabilizing irredentism driven by uprooted minorities were no longer pressing, although residual worries remained. Even more significantly, expellees had ceased to be regarded as significant hazards to the internal stability of European states. On the contrary, in several countries their integration was celebrated as a national success story, within wider public narratives of postwar redemption.⁶ Such jubilant claims were exaggerated, and the complex process of expellee integration would extend well beyond the 1960s. But given the severity of the early postwar crisis, the relatively rapid taming of the destabilizing potential of the European forced migrants was a striking achievement, and it raises important questions. What made it possible? What developments and policies contributed? At the same time, did the quick solutions to the expellee crisis perhaps engender new problems?

This chapter aims to provide answers to these questions in a comparative perspective that is largely missing from previous scholarship, most of which has remained country-specific or, at most, offered two-way comparisons, typically between the two Germanys.⁷ It adopts a triangular framework comprising the two Germanys and Finland – three states that shared wartime defeat and similar challenges posed by the sudden arrival of large numbers of forced migrants, while differing in their societal structures and international positions. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany) became a seminal parliamentary democracy anchored in the Cold War West; the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) grew into a socialist stalwart of the Soviet bloc; while more peripheral but geopolitically significant Finland strove to maintain a parliamentary democracy and a non-aligned posture in an exposed position next to the USSR. A comparative analysis of the dynamics of expellee integration in these polities can illuminate

both transnational trends and national specificities. It can also highlight contrast and parallels between the Cold War blocs and illustrate some peculiarities of non-aligned countries. The chapter will first survey responses to expellees in the three states and then provide comparisons.

Responses

Germany and Finland were inundated by expellees after the Second World War. Predictably, the influx was particularly massive in Germany, the main defeated power. The post-WW II settlement stripped Germany of its easternmost territories: the Sudetenland, annexed from Czechoslovakia in 1938, the parts of interwar Poland the Third Reich had incorporated after 1939, and the former German provinces east of the post-1945 Polish-German demarcation line along the Oder and the western Neisse rivers. As the vast majority of the Germans from these areas – along with large numbers of people defined as “ethnic Germans” from Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and other parts of Eastern Europe that had never belonged to Germany – either fled or were expelled, the number of the uprooted exceeded 12 million. The easternmost part of post-1945 Germany, the Soviet occupation zone, which became the GDR, faced the onslaught with a particular intensity. By 1950, East Germany housed 4.3 million expellees, a staggering 22.3 of its population, while in the FRG the 8 million expellees constituted 16.1 percent of the populace.⁸

As a Nazi ally from 1941 onwards, Finland, too, faced major territorial losses and forced migration at the war’s end. Through its September 1944 armistice with the Soviet Union, Finland ceded to the USSR several chunks of territory, most importantly large parts of the border region of Karelia near Leningrad. Consequently, some 420,000 Finns – all but 10,000 from Karelia – had to go. For the vast majority, this was their second forced exit during WW II: the first had occurred in March 1940, as the USSR annexed Karelia after the

Fenno-Soviet Winter War. Most uprooted Karelians had then returned after Finland reconquered the region in 1941, but once the Red Army overwhelmed Finnish defenses in late summer 1944, the population had to escape again – this time for good. The Karelian expellees – “evacuees” in Finnish parlance – constituted 11 percent of Finland’s postwar population.⁹

To promote the integration of the forced migrants, the West German, East German and Finnish authorities pursued multi-faceted strategies that featured varied combinations of four key elements. The first comprised targeted socio-economic assistance. The earliest major initiatives came from Finland, where two flagship measures were passed in May 1945. The Compensation Law (*Korvauslaki*) provided partial restitution, financed primarily by property taxes, for losses suffered by Karelians and others particularly damaged by the war, on a sliding scale from 100 percent compensation for small losses to 10 percent for very large ones. The Land Acquisition Law (*Maanhankintalaki*) was a moderate land reform: it redistributed agricultural acreage held by the state or larger-scale private owners to the landless, primarily war veterans and uprooted Karelian farmers, and made uncultivated land available to those willing to establish new farms. Unlike its subsequent counterparts in the emerging Soviet bloc, however, the Finnish measure provided reasonable compensation for requisitioned land and lacked revolutionary aspirations.¹⁰ Both initiatives were implemented quickly, with 96 percent of evacuated Karelian farmers resettled by late 1948. The speed was facilitated by initial versions of both laws having been passed during the war to address the consequences of the forced migrations of 1940. Additional monetary recompense for expellees followed later, mostly during the 1950s, as did special consideration in housing and other social programs.¹¹

In Germany, targeted aid for expellees began earliest in the Soviet occupation zone. In October 1946, expellees facing particular economic difficulties became eligible for

cash payments, which two million received during the next two years.¹² The radical land reform of September 1945, which confiscated large estates without compensation and redistributed the land to small-scale farmers, singled out “resettlers and refugees” as priority recipients. Some 43 percent of the beneficiaries were expellees, and attempts to accelerate housing construction for these new farmers ensued.¹³ The September 1950 Resettler Law directed credits and other benefits to the forced migrants. All these provisions were more generous than their contemporary counterparts in western Germany, although their practical effects lagged behind expectations, largely because of insufficient resources.¹⁴

In western Germany, the first major social policy initiative came only in August 1949 when the FRG passed the Immediate Aid Law (*Soforthilfegesetz*), granting expellees modest support payments and the opportunity to apply for limited additional assistance. More significantly, the Equalization of Burdens (*Lastenausgleich*) Act of August 1952, which resembled the Finnish Compensation Law, created a partial restitution program for material losses suffered by expellees and others hard-hit by the war. Financed by taxes on intact assets, the *Lastenausgleich* fund paid out compensation on a sliding scale, from 100 percent of the smallest claims to below 10 percent of the largest during a prolonged period, disbursing 145.3 billion DM by 2001.¹⁵ It also provided credits which expellees could use to establish businesses and construct housing. Further measures followed, mostly in the 1950s, including housing programs, pension provisions, and attempts to redistribute expellees more evenly within the country. However, the initiatives stayed within clear limits. There was no major land reform or any other policy that could have disrupted the social market economy.¹⁶

The second key feature in the three countries’ efforts to integrate their forced migrants involved autonomous collective action by expellees – and contrasting attitudes to it. West Germany adopted a very permissive stance. Following a brief repressive phase immediately after the war, during which independent expellee associations were banned, a

panoply of organizations soon emerged. Although a political party built primarily around expellees enjoyed fleeting success in the 1950s, the most enduring organizations defined themselves as non-partisan pressure groups.¹⁷ Two rival groupings dominated. One set of associations – the Homeland Societies (*Landsmannschaften*) – formed on the basis of their members' pre-1945 domiciles, while the competing organizational network sought to unite expellees around their current places of residence. After prolonged infighting, the two sets of associations established a united umbrella organization, the Bund der Vertriebenen, in late 1958, but internal rivalries simmered on.¹⁸

The expellee lobby quickly became a potent political force in West Germany. The organizations provided various services to their followers, ranging from advice and limited material assistance to publications, cultural activities, and mass rallies. With a self-proclaimed total membership of two million and oft-repeated claims about a mandate to represent all expelled Germans, the organizations forcefully pushed their main causes, which were twofold -- and ultimately contradictory. First, they wanted measures to compensate the expellees and help them re-establish themselves as West German citizens with equal rights. Second, they demanded a radical revision of the post-1945 territorial status quo, aiming to reclaim at least some of the lands the Reich had lost and to enable German expellees to return to them. From the early 1950s, the organizations normally avoided openly irredentist public rhetoric, pushing their revisionist agenda with legal constructs instead. Their strategy was to demand two particular "rights" for the German expellees. The first was *Heimatrecht* (the right to one's homeland): the principle that individuals and ethnic groups had the inalienable right to reside in their traditional homeland and to return if they had been forced out. The second was the right to self-determination, to be coupled with *Heimatrecht* so that expellees could first return to their homeland and then determine the modalities, including the territory's national affiliation.¹⁹

The Finnish attitude toward autonomous expellee representation broadly paralleled that of West Germany. Karelian refugees, too, were allowed to organize independently, and they established a united, non-partisan pressure group in early 1940, immediately after the Winter War. The Karelian League (Karjalan Liitto, KL), which claimed to be the official representative of Karelians and their collective interests, played a prominent role during the Second World War, and after 1945 its societal significance increased further. Much like its more fragmented West German counterparts, it pursued a two-pronged agenda. It lobbied for support programs to help expellees adjust to their new surroundings. But it also entertained hopes of regaining Karelia. Accordingly, it pressured the government and the political parties to pursue border revisions, particularly before the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty had confirmed the territorial settlement.²⁰ Although the KL occasionally made openly irredentist public pronouncements, usually it framed its cause in broad ethical terms akin to those of the West German expellee lobby, portraying Karelia's return to Finland as beneficial for "justice" and a "lasting peace."²¹

The GDR's stance on autonomous expellee activity contrasted starkly with West German and Finnish policies. The Soviet occupiers and the local Communist authorities had never tolerated independent expellee groups, and by the late 1940s their attitudes grew increasingly repressive. The ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) proceeded to "liquidate" all such organizations and to ban any "events that cater specifically to the East Pomeranians, Silesians, Sudeten Germans, or Danzigers etc."²²

The regime's uncompromising attitude showed particularly clearly in its language policy. The East German authorities had originally used euphemistic terminology, addressing the newcomers as "resettlers" (*Umsiedler*) while studiously avoiding the West German term "expellee" (*Vertriebene*), itself politically charged, but better expressive of the forced nature of the mass migrations. By the early 1950s even the word "resettler" disappeared from public

use.²³ After that, forced migrants no longer officially existed in the GDR: there was no permitted terminology to describe them; they did not surface in statistics; nor were they supposed to stand out from other citizens. The expectation was that they would assimilate into the socialist society without further ado.

The third key variable in the three countries' integration policies was the level of expellee inclusion in the political and administrative systems. In the FRG, such inclusion was extensive. Expellee representatives participated in relevant policy formulation at federal and state levels. They occupied important executive and administrative positions, especially in the Ministry for Expellee Affairs, and held significant posts in all the main parties, while remaining excluded from the topmost enclaves of federal executive power. The government also cultivated systematic links to the expellee organizations, particularly through extensive public funding, much of it rooted in the Federal Expellee Law of 1953, which obligated the state to nurture the expellees' cultural heritage.²⁴

The Finnish authorities were comparably inclusive toward the Karelians and their purported organizational representatives. The Karelian League featured prominently in the bargaining that culminated in relevant social measures, and its representatives were closely involved in their implementation. Politicians with a Karelian background reached significant positions in the main political parties and the government, but prominent KL activists were excluded from top-level leadership posts. While all this mirrored West German trends, in two key respects the Finnish authorities stopped short of their Bonn counterparts. The expellees never obtained a dedicated ministry – responsibility for relevant matters was divided among several branches of government – and the KL's public funding remained minimal. The organization relied primarily on its own fund-raising and apparently began to receive modest state subsidies only in the late 1950s.²⁵

In East Germany, too, the authorities initially included considerable expellee representation in the emerging governmental machinery. They established a co-ordination organ – the Central Administration for German Resettlers (ZVU) – in 1946, long before the Western occupation zones. They allowed “controlled participation” by expellees in the ZVU and the resettler committees subordinate to it. Ideologically acceptable expellees were also co-opted into the SED party, albeit predominantly at relatively low levels.²⁶ However, these parallels with West German and Finnish practices ended in the late 1940s and early 1950s when the GDR declared the expellee problem solved and dismantled all relevant structures. The ZVU and the resettler committees were abolished before the GDR was even founded. All special expellee assistance ceased soon thereafter, with the 1950 Resettler Law the last such measure.

The final key variable in the three countries’ integration policies involved the degree to which expellee concerns became politically instrumentalized. This tendency was particularly pronounced in the FRG. The inclusionary policy toward expellees was largely driven by ulterior motives; personal links and financial subsidies enabled the authorities to exert control over the expellee movement and co-opt some of its leaders. But the most glaring instrumentalization occurred at the interface between foreign policy and domestic political rhetoric. Well into the 1960s, the government and all the main parties cultivated the impression of an extensive rapport with the expellee lobby, suggesting an interest in border revisions and endorsing the expellees’ rights to their homelands and self-determination. That impression was deliberately deceptive. Bonn’s key politicians realized early on that the revisionism advocated by the expellee groups was neither viable nor desirable in the postwar setting. Instead of true beliefs, the political elites were driven by instrumental, especially electoral, considerations. The ‘millions’ of ‘expellee votes’ were a prominent theme within the main parties, and responsiveness to the expellee lobby’s Ostpolitik agenda was

considered crucial in courting expellees – and other nationalistically minded voter groups.²⁷ The presumed expellee threat also provided a useful tool for extracting concessions from the Allies and portraying the government as an irreplaceable pillar of stability. In addition, a preoccupation with the expulsions and their consequences promised even broader benefits. It was well-suited to deflect attention from the Third Reich's crimes; promote the creation of a forward-looking, anti-Communist identity; and ease the FRG's admission into NATO.²⁸

In a surprising parallel, East German politicians, too, initially reacted to revisionist popular pressures with manipulative, instrumentalized rhetoric. The main motive was, again, electoral gain, primarily during the October 1946 local and regional election campaign. Most key politicians, particularly the Communists, understood that Germany's eastern frontiers would not change.²⁹ But as rival parties vocally criticized the Oder-Neisse line, the SED was forced to respond, especially as its leaders considered the expellees an electorally "decisive factor."³⁰ With tacit Soviet approval, the party issued carefully calibrated statements vaguely suggestive of a desire to readjust Germany's eastern boundaries. Shortly before the October 1946 elections, the future Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl declared his "unshakeable wish" to be that "when the eastern borders are determined in a peace treaty, the German people will be taken into consideration."³¹ However, such rhetoric proved to be a short-lived aberration born of tactical expedience. Open discussion of border revisions became taboo soon after the elections, once the Kremlin had warned the SED leadership in early 1947 that "questioning the eastern borders means questioning other borders – means war."³²

Relevant Finnish policies combined permissive and repressive elements. The government was acutely aware of its vulnerable postwar position vis-à-vis the USSR, and although many key figures initially sympathized with the Karelian League's revisionist interests, officially the top leadership urged Karelian activists to avoid public agitation about

border changes. Expellee leaders internalized these instructions, and particularly after Finland had signed its peace treaty in 1947, territorial revisionism faded into a marginal feature of Finnish public discourse, just when it was gaining prominence in West Germany and becoming a taboo in the GDR. This, however, did not translate into full suppression of the Karelian question. Behind the scenes, governmental leaders kept discussing the border issue with Karelian delegations, at least until the late 1960s, and occasionally the former raised the issue in meetings with the Soviets, albeit cautiously and unsuccessfully. Revisionism also became instrumentalized domestically, as top politicians, particularly Urho Kekkonen, the towering national figure thanks to his 26-year presidency from 1956 onwards, used hints and half-promises to “fish for Karelian votes.”³³ The instrumentalization remained much more limited than in West Germany, however, and it unfolded on terms defined predominantly by leading politicians who promptly reined in discussions they deemed threatening.³⁴

Overall, then, these national cases present three models of expellee integration. The Federal Republic’s approach was permissive-inclusive, with a strong element of targeted social policy that contained limited redistributive aims but lacked revolutionary aspirations, and with a pronounced tendency to instrumentalize key expellee concerns, particularly foreign policy aspirations. In East Germany, after some initial hesitation, the regime adopted a repressive, economically driven policy. The authorities denied expellees an autonomous voice or participatory role, viewing integration as a material problem to be solved through economic progress and revolutionary transformations. To cite Michael Schwartz, East Berlin offered expellees “uncompromising integration” on terms defined by the SED, without interactive bargaining – but also without instrumentalized public discourse.³⁵ The Finnish approach, in turn, lay between these two extremes. It was permissive and inclusive on domestic issues, with considerable targeted, partly redistributive social spending – but no revolutionary objectives. In external affairs, Finnish policy was relatively repressive, albeit

with limited political instrumentalization whose terms the top political leadership managed to control.

Comparisons

What can these cases reveal about the dynamics of defusing the dangers that the millions of expelled Europeans were widely feared to pose after 1945? What developments and policies facilitated their integration? What downsides did the varied responses to expellees have?

Three broad transnational trends were instrumental in taming Europe's expellee threat. The first was the Cold War itself. The heavy superpower presence helped to suppress potential conflicts. Irredentist causes lost most of their appeal when any international clash could easily have culminated in a nuclear Armageddon. Dramatic changes in domestic political systems also became unlikely once the Cold War fronts had solidified. This broad political context affected the three countries examined here in fundamental but contrasting ways. The GDR's suppression of the refugee problem and the FRG's permissive but instrumentalized approach were in good part inherited from respective bloc hegemons. Finland's desire to find quick social policy solutions to the refugee challenge while restraining its potential territorial implications reflected the vulnerabilities of a small state in search of a non-aligned existence. In each case, Cold War realities exerted a restraining and guiding influence, without which national responses could have been profoundly different – and less pacific.

The second major transnational trend with a strong beneficial impact was economic growth. These three states, as indeed continental Europe in general, recorded impressive growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s. Economic advances in this "Golden Age" translated into job opportunities, improving living standards, and, from the late 1950s, transformations in lifestyles and consumption patterns. This facilitated the acceptance of the

existing system among most population groups, including the forced migrants, even if their average socio-economic status typically lagged behind that of longer-established residents. Michael Schwartz's observation that expellee integration in the two Germanys equaled "economic growth plus time" is deliberately reductionist, but it contains a core of truth that also applies to other countries, including Finland.³⁶

Europe's economic boom also triggered the final major transnational facilitator of expellee integration: rapid modernization and social change. The postwar devastation and the urgency of reconstruction shattered old certainties. In ravaged urban areas, established patterns crumbled, together with familiar infrastructures, and even in rural regions, where life had typically been less disrupted, earlier equilibriums no longer held. As the mass arrival of expellees magnified the chaos, many traditions were disrupted: confessional boundaries, cultural and linguistic patterns, local power structures. Nor was it only the forced migrants who felt disoriented; many others struggled too, even if the upheaval hit them in more familiar milieus. Faced with the challenge of postwar reconstruction, the entire cohort of the uprooted had to interact. Through that process a new kind of society gradually emerged: a more dynamic and diverse society that required adjustments from everyone and offered numerous niches for expellees to re-establish themselves.

The creation of this "new era," to adopt Alexander von Plato's phrase, proceeded most fluidly in urban settings.³⁷ In both Germanys, the rapid changes that characterized towns and cities during postwar reconstruction facilitated the acceptance of forced migrants. In Finland, the integrative pull of urban settlements was initially less obvious, both because they had suffered much less wartime damage and because the Karelians were a predominantly rural population group, to be resettled in the countryside of what was still a highly agricultural society. However, once rapid urbanization commenced in the 1950s, new urban worlds in which expellee integration made good headway also began to emerge in Finland.³⁸

Rural areas, by contrast, were initially considerably more resistant to fundamental societal changes in all three states, as greater continuity in local structures sustained sharper divisions between locals and newcomers. But in the longer term old patterns increasingly crumbled in the countryside too, under the cumulative weight of economic, social and cultural transformations, many of them fostered by the forced migrants, whose integration was, in turn, expedited by these changes.³⁹

Although these transnational developments provided the framework within which expellee integration in post-WW II Europe proceeded, particular national policies also mattered. Here the Iron Curtain was an important divider. In several ways, the parliamentary democracies on its Western side – including West Germany and Finland – were more effective in placating their forced migrants than the GDR or other state socialist systems. The considerable appeal of the targeted social policies implemented in West Germany and Finland highlights this point. The *Lastenausgleich* program was instrumental in winning expellees' loyalties for the FRG, not because it fulfilled all their wishes – the expellee lobby complained loudly about its shortcomings – but because it provided partial compensation and, crucially, symbolized the authorities' recognition of the expellees' plight.⁴⁰ In Finland, the compensation legislation and the land reform performed similar functions.⁴¹ In the GDR, by contrast, the cessation of expellee aid in the early 1950s, just as West Germany's *Lastenausgleich* program was being launched with considerable fanfare, caused heavy discontent and undermined the state's legitimacy among the refugees.⁴² The presence or absence of specific assistance thus mattered a great deal, materially but especially symbolically.

The pattern of interaction between the government and the expellees proved an even bigger trump for Western democracies. The permissive stance toward autonomous collective action by the forced migrants yielded various benefits in West Germany and Finland, for the

integration process and for the wider polity. The existence of independent expellee associations significantly facilitated adjustment, especially in the early postwar years. The organizations made a difference by giving a collective voice to a mass of discontented refugees. With their lobbying, they helped to secure important social benefits. They also organized rallies and other events, which often featured strident rhetoric and backward-looking pageantry but also provided opportunities for social interaction and cultural communion, qualities which average expellees valued most of all.⁴³

Even the expellee lobby's territorial revisionism probably had useful effects immediately after the war. Amidst considerable conflict between impoverished, homesick expellees and fearful, frequently prejudiced native populations, it performed important integrative functions. For the expellees, the prospect of a return to the old *Heimat* gave hope of a brighter future and diverted attention from harsh present-day realities. Many longer-standing residents of Germany and Finland also welcomed the possibility of the newcomers ceasing to demand scarce resources. In this way, illusionary hopes fueled by the expellee organizations reduced tensions between locals and expellees and diminished the appeal of political radicalism, especially in the difficult early postwar years.⁴⁴

Furthermore, the wider inclusion of expellee associations and representatives in the political and administrative machineries of parliamentary democracies nurtured moderation and restraint. Participation brought experience, perspective, and career opportunities for potentially radical expellee leaders, giving them a stake in the system. Political prudence and democratic commitment were fostered among the expellee elites and their followers too.⁴⁵ Even more importantly, the relative moderation among expellees was part of a broader pattern whose implications were particularly momentous for West Germany's transition to democracy. The habits of give-and-take in a parliamentary framework that grew in the expellee milieu also characterized the FRG's other disadvantaged, potentially destabilizing

minorities. Pressure groups representing war veterans and different types of civilians victimized by the war came to accept compromise solutions within the existing system. Such constructive behavior stood in stark contrast to Germany's previous democratic experiment, the Weimar Republic, in which various groups had frequently pushed their own narrow interests, regardless of wider repercussions. Thanks in part to this creeping democratization, Bonn's path increasingly diverged from Weimar's, a pivotal development significantly facilitated by the moderation of the mainstream expellee lobby and its followers.⁴⁶

In Finland, the implications of similar moderation were somewhat less far-reaching because the democratic institutions established after WW I had endured through the inter-war years, albeit with considerable initial instability. The political and administrative infrastructure had also survived the Second World War without fundamental ruptures, even if the wartime regime had hardly constituted a model democracy. Nevertheless, the willingness of the Karelian forced migrants to accept the consensus-oriented ground rules of the postwar Finnish polity – as exemplified by the KL's avoidance of irredentist agitation – significantly contributed to the solidification of democratic conditions on the Baltic's northern shores, too.

A comparison with East Germany further highlights the advantages of an inclusive, pluralistic approach to the expellees. The GDR's repressive turn provoked intense frustration among the "resettlers". The banning of "special resettler organizations" as a threat to "the desired assimilation process" exasperated the newcomers, who longed to voice their concerns and maintain their traditions.⁴⁷ Although the resulting discontent was mostly expressed in private, it also triggered occasional open protest, especially in the early postwar years. Some so-called Sudeten German anti-fascists, for instance – Communist and left-wing socialists who, as a reward for their anti-Nazi stances, had been evacuated to eastern Germany under reasonably tolerable conditions – actively resisted the crackdown. Such action failed to stop the repression, however, which stoked further dissatisfaction among the GDR's expellees.⁴⁸

The most dramatic sign of the disillusionment was the high rate at which expellees fled from East Germany. Although constituting some 22 percent of the GDR's population, they made up nearly a third of the 3.1 million refugees who crossed to the Federal Republic by 1961, and in the early postwar years the proportion was even higher.⁴⁹ To be sure, the disproportionately high westward mobility among these expellees was partly a function of their general uprootedness, but discontent with the prevailing conditions in East Germany also played a key role. According to the ZVU, flight from East to West Germany was driven by "a dissatisfaction that is most prominent among the resettlers, who think they can make a better life for themselves in the West."⁵⁰

The mass flight posed obvious problems for the East German polity, whose viability was threatened by this human hemorrhage, and for the westward-bound expellees, who had to adjust to yet another new environment. The situation was also challenging for the forced migrants who stayed in the GDR: they struggled under an imposed silence about painful issues, and although most did ultimately adapt, they remained suspect in their own government's eyes. The GDR's repressive practices thus brought various negative repercussions.⁵¹

Overall, the comparative evidence accentuates the advantages of an open, inclusive approach to the expellee problem. However, it does not support triumphalist generalizations about the universal superiority of Western permissiveness. On closer inspection, East-West comparisons also yield countervailing data about the potential pitfalls of Western policies, including the dangers posed by a political instrumentalization of expellee concerns and by other over-reactions to particular societal pressures.

The clearest indications of the potential hazards of a permissive approach lay in the long-term consequences of the contrasting attitudes toward instrumentalized public rhetoric about territorial revisions. In West Germany, the expellee lobby's proclamations about

reacquiring the old *Heimat* probably facilitated societal integration in the early postwar period, as argued above. However, in the longer term the revisionist public discourse did considerable damage, especially after the political elites became involved, with ulterior motives. The ritualized public rhetoric sustained illusionary hopes among a shrinking minority of true believers, composed largely of older and less well-adjusted expellees, even in the late 1960s and afterwards, when steadily growing majorities of their compatriots had accepted the existing realities. The consequences of this siege mentality showed in the excessively acrimonious Ostpolitik debates of the early 1970s that accompanied Bonn's normalization of relations with Eastern Europe on the basis of a de facto recognition of the postwar status quo. Even if some conflict was inevitable and the embittered minority's hardline positions probably facilitated wider social integration by alienating more moderate expellees, the embattled radicals suffered serious personal strain, and the public debate grew unnecessarily polarized.⁵² Nor did the legacies of revisionist rhetoric disappear with the new Ostpolitik; they remained evident in the forging of Germany's unification settlement in 1990 and have persisted beyond it, complicating German-Polish relations in particular down to the present.⁵³ Over the long haul, instrumentalized irredentist rhetoric thus partly backfired in the FRG.

In Finland, the instrumentalization of territorial revisionism remained considerably more circumscribed, as described above. Once the open advocacy of border changes vis-à-vis the USSR became unacceptable by the late 1940s, the Karelian League channeled its energies to domestic causes, urging its followers to "fulfill our duty to the Fatherland" in the postwar setting.⁵⁴ It also emphasized the importance of preserving Karelian cultural traditions as a counterpoint to the ongoing readjustments.⁵⁵ Such activities, combined with the accommodating attitude of the authorities, helped to promote a sense of inclusion and self-worth among the expellees, preventing radicalization and promoting societal engagement.

Even so, the cause of border revision never fully disappeared in postwar Finland. It stayed on a semi-hidden agenda, encouraged by the self-interested calculations of top politicians, surfacing periodically in meetings between Karelian leaders and key decision-makers and, occasionally, in public discussions. This partial instrumentalization perpetuated unrealistic expectations among some Karelian activists and their more socially marginal followers and later stoked their resentment, particularly after the late 1960s, as irredentism grew into an ever stricter taboo in a country increasingly trapped in a peculiar kind of “Finlandized” self-censorship vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. These resentments, in turn, burst into the open after the USSR’s collapse, when divisive, unrealistic debates about a reacquisition of Karelia raged for a time in the 1990s.⁵⁶ In Finland, the instrumentalization of border revisionism was more circumscribed than in West Germany and its effects less disruptive, but it nevertheless caused long-term problems.

The GDR, by contrast, suppressed public discussion of territorial changes early on, insisting that its post-1945 boundaries were irrevocable and silencing dissent. Consequently, the border issue disappeared from East German public discourse. That approach was highly authoritarian, but over the long haul – particularly after the Berlin Wall had made westward flight nearly impossible – it probably helped East German expellees reconcile themselves to the status quo. Secret GDR opinion polls from the mid-1960s testified to that, showing much higher popular acceptance of the existing borders than contemporary West German surveys.⁵⁷ As Philipp Ther has argued, with its repressive approach the East German leaders succeeded in removing irredentism “from the political agenda”— an outcome that spared the GDR the long-term problems that instrumentalized border politics inflicted on the other Germany and, partly, on Finland.⁵⁸

The potential of over-reactions to expellee pressures also existed in other policy fields. A case in point was Finland’s 1945 land reform. The measure was a direct response to

the expellee problem, underpinned by a desire to sustain independent farmers. It brought quick results, with the resettlement of the uprooted Karelian farmers completed within a few years. Predictably, it was promptly trumpeted as a national success story. An early major study stressed that Finnish expellees, unlike many of their German counterparts, “did not have to spend years withering away in collective accommodation,” and semi-official pamphlets praised the Finnish model to international audiences.⁵⁹ But the policy also had a significant downside. From the start, its architects and intended beneficiaries alike worried that many new farms would be too small and unproductive.⁶⁰ Such fears proved well-founded. The reform significantly increased the total number of farm units in Finland and decreased their average size, just as a wave of postwar industrialization, urbanization, and agricultural rationalization was starting. The result was a structural crisis in rural regions that had just endured one major upheaval – the sudden influx of Karelians – only to face another – a swift exit of many residents. Expellees constituted a disproportionately high percentage of the internal migrants who moved from the Finnish countryside to the rapidly expanding urban centers in the 1950s and 1960s, and they were prominently represented among the large number of Finns – some 210, 000 between 1960 and 1970 alone – who sought employment in Sweden.⁶¹

This upheaval came with significant costs for many migrants, and the well-intentioned Finnish farm-creation program arguably exacerbated that turmoil, as well as the wider structural crisis of postwar reconstruction, by adding an extra sojourn of short-lived promise and subsequent disappointment to the postwar journeys of many Karelians. In this sense, Finland’s eagerness to provide for its uprooted farmers elicited a policy over-reaction that created untenable conditions for many of the people the decision-makers had intended to assist. Such problems were not unlike those in the GDR, where efforts to give refugees preferential treatment in the 1945 land reform also created unsustainable farm units and

propelled further migration, both within the country and across its western border.⁶² The wider postwar trajectories of Finland and East Germany diverged, but the comparison accentuates the fact that expellee policies on the Western side of the Iron Curtain were not necessarily more effective than in the East.

Indeed, the long-term effects of Eastern and Western expellee policies sometimes ran parallel; two particular policies pursued in comparable ways by all three states examined here generated similar complications whose societal repercussions extend to the present. The first was the positioning of the expulsions and the expellees within wider national narratives. Given each state's need for popular legitimacy and the expellee issue's centrality as a postwar challenge, it was no surprise that in all three countries the expulsions and the expellees featured prominently in politicized public discourses. The GDR's official storyline was the most straight-forward – and striking in its silences. Because the “resettler” problem was declared officially solved shortly after the GDR's founding, the expellees did not feature in the narrative, except as regular socialist citizens, victims of Nazi elites and their aggressive capitalist backers whose redemptive postwar role was to labor as dedicated builders of a progressive and peaceful Germany.⁶³ The Finnish narrative was more elaborate. It addressed the group history of the Karelians, particularly the hardships of their forced migration. But the main focus lay on the postwar story of exemplary, plucky evacuees who had lost everything, only to pull themselves up again with hard work and a little help from a cohesive national community.⁶⁴ In West German public narratives the expellee theme grew even more pronounced, with two areas of emphasis. The first centered on the expulsions, more forcefully than its Finnish equivalent, with frequent reiterations of their extreme viciousness. The second celebrated the expellees' successful societal integration, building its supposed speed and smoothness into a kind of “refugee miracle,” closely related to its more celebrated economic counterpart.⁶⁵

The contents of these postwar national narratives have been analyzed extensively and perceptively, particularly in the West German case. Robert G. Moeller and others have shown that decontextualized portrayals of the victimhood of German expellees were instrumental in the creation of a “useable past” that helped the FRG with Cold War mobilization, anti-Communist consensus-building, and guilt relativization vis-a-vis Nazi crimes.⁶⁶ The narrative of a swift expellee integration in the Bonn Republic, completed within a decade or two, has, in turn, been exposed as a myth.⁶⁷ Amidst these analyses of broad collective processes, however, another important aspect of the public narratives has received less attention: their impact on rank-and-file refugees. Rainer Schulze has explored this topic insightfully in the German setting, and his points also relate strongly to Finland. According to Schulze, the prevailing public narratives of the expellees “represented ... a highly selective remembering” that included “only those aspects of the individual pasts ... which served a broader function” useful for “stabilizing society” and giving the polity “some form of legitimacy.”⁶⁸ This left little room for other kinds of recollections, above all individual reminiscences of postwar conflicts and prolonged adaptation processes that were difficult to reconcile with the official narrative of a largely harmonious integration. Many forced migrants felt that their experiences had been marginalized or ignored, which helped to sustain feelings of uprootedness. Such sentiments among sizeable minorities inflicted significant costs on postwar societies, on both individual and collective levels. Although the direct costs have declined with time, particularly as the generation that experienced the expulsions has increasingly passed away, their indirect variants have lingered, through traumas passed from the frontline generation to its children and grandchildren.

The second policy issue that has caused significant long-term challenges in both Germany and Finland was a key component of the public narratives: the collective ethno-national categorization of the forced migrants. In all three polities, particularly in the longer

term and on the official level, the newcomers were defined as unambiguous co-nationals of the majority population and members of an ethnically homogenous national community. In West Germany and Finland these points featured repeatedly in public discourses, and in eastern Germany they were also asserted openly in the early postwar years, before becoming more implicit by the early 1950s within the silence that surrounded the entire expellee issue.

On closer inspection, however, the assumption of an automatic acceptance of the forced migrants as co-nationals in postwar Germany and Finland proves highly problematic. Their acknowledgement as fellow human beings in particular communities was itself far from smooth, as numerous historians have documented. The arrival of expellees typically unleashed fierce conflicts with more established residents, which have usually been interpreted as struggles over material resources and local identities.⁶⁹ These factors were important, but the clashes also featured an additional, less explored key element: the definition and negotiation of boundaries between perceived ethno-national communities.

These complications were especially evident in early postwar Germany. Many arriving expellees, particularly so-called *Volksdeutsche* who had never been German citizens, lacked unambiguous national allegiances. Theirs were typically hybrid identities, formed through a long history of interaction between their German cultural and linguistic heritage and other surrounding influences. Following their expulsion, many were initially reluctant to commit to “Germanness”. An American opinion poll conducted in south-western Germany in late 1946, for instance, found that around 40 percent of the expellees there defined themselves not as Germans but as Hungarians, Czechoslovaks or members of other nationalities. Such ambivalence, even rejection, was reciprocated by many local residents. The same poll also showed that only about half of the more established population regarded the newcomers as fellow Germans.⁷⁰ Interviews conducted in northern Germany testified to

similar anti-expellee prejudices, as locals dismissed the incoming forced migrants with comments such as: “they have different blood; I do not want to get too close to them.”⁷¹

Perceptions of many expellees, especially *Volksdeutsche*, as ethno-national ‘others’ were also widespread among decision-makers – certainly in West Germany, where their position remained a matter of debate, unlike in the GDR. Some Baltic Germans, for instance, were labelled stateless displaced persons (DPs) rather than Germans in the early postwar period.⁷² West German officials regarded ethnic German peasants from remote parts of Eastern Europe as problem cases. As late as 1952, a senior civil servant in Bonn’s Ministry for Expellees proposed large-scale “emigration” to Australia and Canada for such “expellee farmers (ethnic Germans).”⁷³ Even the Sudeten Germans, the Federal Republic’s largest expellee group, were not granted full citizenship rights until 1955.⁷⁴ The acceptance of arriving expellees as Germans was far from self-evident, and a sense of significant ethnic difference between many newcomers and longer-term residents permeated early post-1945 Germany.⁷⁵

In Finland, cultural and ethno-national differences among the forced migrants – as well as between them and other residents – were less pronounced, given the much smaller numbers of expellees and the compact areas in which they had resided, within interwar Finland. However, significant contrasts existed here, too: arriving Karelians stood out because of their dialects and customs, and – in the case of some 55.000 of them – their Russian Orthodox confession, which made them a conspicuous minority in an overwhelmingly Lutheran nation. In addition, some expellees, especially so-called “border Karelians” from areas around the interwar Soviet boundary, spoke a dialect so divergent from standard Finnish that it approximated a foreign language. Predictably, then, the reminiscences of uprooted Karelians – especially the “border Karelians” – teem with references to conflicts.⁷⁶ The refugees’ own sense of “otherness” comes across strongly, as does the

frequent rejection that they encountered, not only as unwelcome rivals for resources, but also as de facto foreigners subjected to ethno-national epithets such as “Russkies” and “second class Gypsies.”⁷⁷ Subsequent proclamations of postwar national solidarity notwithstanding, many Karelians were not accepted by their new neighbors as fellow Finns smoothly and swiftly; such inclusion typically came only gradually, after the newcomers had abandoned important aspects of their cultural traditions, for instance by adjusting their dialects. Questions of citizenship were more straightforward in Finland than in Germany, as the Karelians already possessed Finnish citizenship prior to their forced migration. But there were difficulties on the margins here too, especially in the distinctions between Finns and other ethnic groups in areas Finland had occupied between 1941 and 1944, groups that spoke minority languages similar to Finnish and had frequently been subjected to wartime Fennoization measures.⁷⁸

The story of expellee arrival and post-1945 integration in Germany, Finland, and – by extension – other parts of Europe was thus not a simple tale of distinct ethnic groups being transferred across newly drawn international boundaries and finding acceptance as obvious members of the national communities in their new settlement areas. It was, rather, a complex drama of tension and perceived ethnic difference, even within groups of alleged co-nationals. This is an important point historically, as an often overlooked factor in the mix of transnational and national forces that led to the defusing of the most acute dangers associated with the expellee problem in postwar Europe – while also generating some difficult legacies. But it also has wider contemporary relevance. At a time when European societies are struggling with multiculturalism and an ongoing refugee crisis that is usually portrayed as a *sui generis* event, particularly in the ethnic otherness of the arriving people, a critique of simplistic national narratives of the integration of the enormous waves of post-WW II forced migrants can be enlightening. It can reveal that those narratives omitted most of the

considerable otherness associated with the expellees, perpetuating myths of national homogeneity and postponing a confrontation with the challenge of ethnic diversity. At least in an incipient form, that challenge began to manifest itself much earlier in post-1945 Europe than commonly appreciated, not with the arrival of so-called guest workers from the late 1950s onwards, but with the influx of early postwar expellees whom contemporaries perceived as much more ethnically and nationally diverse than subsequently acknowledged.⁷⁹ A greater awareness of the intricacies of expellee integration after 1945 could help Europe face similar challenges vis-à-vis today's immigrants.

¹ I would like to thank Jan C. Jansen and Simone Lässig for inviting me to be part of this exciting project – and for all their comments, feedback and encouragement. A big thank you as well to all the other contributors to this volume and to everyone who participated in the very fruitful two-day authors' workshop at the GHI in Washington in April 2017. Further thanks for helpful additional feedback to Gregor Thum, David Lazar, Louise Settle, Aaron Goings, the members of the General History research seminar at the University of Jyväskylä, and the anonymous reviewer of the book manuscript. The Kone Foundation has generously supported the work on this article through its funding for my project "The Vanquished as Victims".

² Robert Rhodes James, ed., *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963*, Vol 7: 1943-1949 (New York, 1974), 7064-5.

³ For this estimate, see Philipp Ther, *Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten: "Ethnische Säuberungen" im modernen Europa* (Göttingen, 2011), 233-4.

⁴ Brian Robertson to Lucius D. Clay, in Sylvia Schraut, *Die Flüchtlingsaufnahme in Württemberg-Baden, 1945-1949* (Munich, 1995), 64.

⁵ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (New York, 1950), 312.

⁶ I use "integration" as a general term for the long-term process through which expellees rebuild their material existence and adjust to their new surroundings, also forcing the majority population(s) to adjust and changing society as a whole.

⁷ On the two Germanys, see Michael Schwartz, *Vertriebene und "Umsiedlerpolitik": Integrationskonflikte in den deutschen Nachkriegs-Gesellschaften und die Assimilationsstrategien in der SBZ/DDR 1945 bis 1961*

(Munich, 2004); Michael Schwartz and Dierk Hoffmann, eds., *Geglückte Integration? Spezifika und Vergleichbarkeiten der Vertriebenen-Eingliederung in der SBZ/DDR* (Munich, 1998); Dierk Hoffmann, Marita Krauss and Michael Schwartz, eds., *Vertriebene in Deutschland: Interdisziplinäre Ergebnisse und Forschungsperspektiven* (Munich, 2000). The main exception to the lack of broader comparisons is Philipp Ther's work: "The Integration of Expellees in Germany and Poland after World War II: A Historical Reassessment," *Slavic Review*, 55 (1996): 779-805 *Deutsche und polnische Vertriebene. Gesellschaft und Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR und in Polen, 1945-1956* (Göttingen, 1998); and, in a very broad perspective that surveys several centuries of refugee movements, *Die Aussenseiter: Flucht, Flüchtlinge und Integration im modernen Europa* (Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2017). Also notable are the pioneering French-German comparisons in Manuel Borutta and Jan C. Jansen, eds., *Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar Germany and France: Comparative Perspectives* (Basingstoke, 2016).

⁸ Gerhard Reichling, *Die deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen: Teil I* (Bonn, 1986), 59; idem., *Die deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen: Teil II* (Bonn, 1989), 30-1.

⁹ Helge Seppälä, *Vuosisatainen taistelu Karjalasta* (Pieksämäki, 1994), 218-23.

¹⁰ Marita Jokinen, *Karjalaisen siirtoväen korvauskysymys* (Helsinki, 1982); Faina Jyrkkilä, *The Adaptation of the Resettled Karelian Farmers* (Jyväskylä, 1980).

¹¹ Heikki Kirkinen, Pekka Nevalainen and Hannes Sihvo, *Karjalan kansan historia* (Porvoo, 1995), 475-9.

¹² Manfred Wille, ed., *Die Vertriebenen in der SBZ/DDR: Dokumente*, Bd. III (Wiesbaden, 2003), 159.

¹³ Ther, "Expellees," 64.

¹⁴ Michael Schwartz, "'Ablenkungsmanöver der Reaktion': Der verhinderte Lastenausgleich in der SBZ/DDR," *Deutschland-Archiv* 32, no. 3 (1999).

¹⁵ Andreas Kossert, *Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945* (Munich, 2008), 100.

¹⁶ Lutz Wiegand, *Der Lastenausgleich in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1985* (Frankfurt, 1985); Ian Connor, *Refugees and Expellees in Post-War Germany* (Manchester, 2007), 139-76.

¹⁷ The party was the Gesamtdeutscher Block/Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (GB/BHE).

¹⁸ Pertti Ahonen, "The German Expellee Organizations: Unity, Division, Function," in *Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar Germany and France: Comparative Perspectives*, eds. Manuel Borutta and Jan C. Jansen (Basingstoke, 2016), 115-32.

¹⁹ Pertti Ahonen, *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945-1990* (Oxford, 2003), 39-53.

²⁰ Jouko Teperi, *Karjalan Liiton taisteluvuodet 1940-1960* (Helsinki, 1994); Niilo Yrjölä, *Karjalan kansan puolesta* (Helsinki, 1960).

²¹ KL memoranda “Valtioneuvostolle. Karjalan kysymys ja rauhanneuvottelut,” August 31, 1945 and “Tasavallan Herra Presidentille,” June 14, 1946, Karelian League Archive (KLA), Helsinki: Cb6, 1955.

²² SED Zentralsekretariat, November 11, 1948 resolution, in Gerald Christopeit, “Die Vertriebenen im Gründungsjahr der DDR,” in *50 Jahre Flucht und Vertreibung*, ed. Manfred Wille (Magdeburg, 1997), 265; Manfred Wille, “Compelling the Assimilation of Expellees in the Soviet Zone of Occupation and the GDR,” in *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe 1944-1948*, eds. Philipp Ther and Anna Siljak, (Lanham, MD, 2001), 277-8.

²³ Michael Schwartz, “‘Vom Umsiedler zum Staatsbürger’: Totalitäres und Subversives in der Sprachpolitik der SBZ/DDR,” in *Vertriebene in Deutschland: Interdisziplinäre Ergebnisse und Forschungsperspektiven*, eds. Hoffmann et al (Munich, 2000), 135-66; Matthias Beer, “Flüchtlinge - Ausgewiesene - Neubürger - Heimatvertriebene,” in *Migration und Integration: Aufnahme und Eingliederung im historischen Wandel*, eds. Matthias Beer, Martin Kitzinger and Marita Krauss (Stuttgart, 1997), 145-67.

²⁴ Ahonen, *Expulsion*, 54-80, 92-100.

²⁵ Teperi, *Karjalan*, 81-102, 116-26.

²⁶ Michael Schwartz, “Zwischen Zusammenbruch und Stalinisierung: Zur Ortbestimmung der Zentralverwaltung für deutsche Umsiedler (ZVU) im politisch-administrativen System der DDR,” in *Von der SBZ zur DDR: Studien zum Herrschaftssystem in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands und in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, ed. Hartmut Mehringer (Munich, 1995), 43-96; *idem*, “Kontrollierte Partizipation: Die ‘Umsiedler-Ausschüsse’ in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands im Spannungsfeld von Sonderverwaltung, Parteipolitik und sozialen Interessen,” in *Die Flüchtlingsfrage in der deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft*, eds. Sylvia Schraut and Thomas Grosser (Mannheim, 1996), 161-92.

²⁷ Kai-Uwe von Hassel, July 11, 1958, in Günter Buchstab, ed., *Adenauer: ‘...um den Frieden zu gewinnen’*: *Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstandes, 1957-1961* (Düsseldorf, 1994), 215; Wenzel Jaksch, February 23, 1959, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn: Präsidiums-Protokolle, 23.6.58-26.10.59.

²⁸ Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley, CA, 2001).

²⁹ Andreas Malycha, “‘Wir haben erkannt, dass die Oder-Neisse-Grenze die Friedensgrenze ist’: Die SED und die neue Ostgrenze 1945 bis 1951,” *Deutschland-Archiv* 33, no. 2 (2000): 196-201.

³⁰ SED Landesvorstand in Saxony, Kommunalpolitische Abteilung, circular (Rundschreiben), August 16, 1946, in Stefan Donth, *Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge in Sachsen 1945 bis 1952* (Cologne, 2000), 198.

³¹ Grotewohl in Halle, October 13, 1946, in Torsten Mehlhase, *Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in Sachsen-Anhalt* (Münster, 1999), 195. The GDR’s subsequent president Wilhelm Pieck, whose hometown lay just on the other side of the post-war Polish-German demarcation line, was another key politician who talked publicly about the possibility of revising the German-Polish border in the early post-1945 years. See Katarzyna Stoklosa, *Grenzstädte in Ostmitteleuropa: Guben – Gubin 1945-1995* (Berlin, 2003).

³² Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, eds., *Wilhelm Pieck – Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953* (Berlin: Akademie, 1994), 112.

³³ Seppälä, *Vuosisatainen*, 228.

³⁴ Teperi, *Karjalan*, 159-72; Esko Salminen, *Porkkalan palautuksesta noottikriisiin: Lehdistökeskustelu Suomen idänpolitiikasta, 1956-62* (Helsinki, 1982), 33-43; Seppo Hentilä, *Kaksi Saksaa ja Suomi* (Helsinki, 2003), 103-6; Juhani Suomi, *Vonkamies: Urho Kekkonen, 1944-1950* (Helsinki, 1988), 266-71; *idem*, *Kuningastie: Urho Kekkonen, 1950-1956* (Helsinki, 1990), 395-6, 404-6; *idem*, *Kriisien aika: Urho Kekkonen, 1956-1962* (Helsinki, 1992), 54-60, 76-8, 114-19, 122-23, 341-3; *idem*, *Presidentti: Urho Kekkonen, 1962-1968* (Helsinki, 1994), 135-41, 339-42, 482-4; *idem*, *Taistelu puoluettomuudesta: Urho Kekkonen, 1968-1972* (Helsinki, 1996), 58-66.

³⁵ Michael Schwartz, “Refugees and Expellees in the Soviet Zone of Germany,” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 16, no. 1&2 (2000): 169.

³⁶ Michael Schwartz, “Vertreibung und Vergangenheitspolitik: Ein Versuch über geteilte deutsche Nachkriegsidentitäten,” *Deutschland-Archiv* 30, no. 2 (1997): 191.

³⁷ Alexander von Plato, “Fremde Heimat: Zur Integration von Flüchtlingen und Einheimischen in die Neue Zeit,” in *‘Wir kriegen jetzt andere Zeiten’: Auf der Suche nach der Erfahrung des Volkes in nachfasistischen Ländern: Lebensgeschichte und Sozialkultur im Ruhrgebiet*, eds. Lutz Niethammer and Alexander von Plato (Berlin & Bonn, 1985), 172-219; Alexander von Plato and Wolfgang Meinicke, *Alte Heimat - neue Zeit. Flüchtlinge, Umgesiedelte, Vertriebene in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone und der DDR* (Berlin, 1991).

-
- ³⁸ Leena Alanen, *Laatokankarjalaiset toisen maailmansodan jälkeen* (Joensuu, 1975); Tarja Raninen, "Siirtokarjalaiset muuttuvassa yhteiskunnassa," in *Rintamalta raiviolle. Sodanjälkeinen asutustoiminta 50 vuotta*, ed. Erkki Laitinen (Jyväskylä, 1995), 303-32.
- ³⁹ Rainer Schulze, "Zuwanderung und Modernisierung: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene im ländlichen Raum," in *Neue Heimat im Westen: Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, Aussiedler*, ed. Klaus J. Bade (Münster, 1990), 81-105.
- ⁴⁰ Wiegand, *Lastenausgleich*; Michael L. Hughes, *Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat: West Germany and the Reconstruction of Social Justice* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999).
- ⁴¹ Kirkinen et al, *Karjalan*, 483-7; Jokinen, *Karjalaisen*.
- ⁴² Schwartz, "Ablenkungsmanöver."
- ⁴³ Johannes-Dieter Steinert, "Flüchtlingsvereinigungen – Eingliederungsstationen: Zur Rolle organisierter Interessen bei der Flüchtlingsintegration in der frühen Nachkriegszeit," *Jahrbuch für ostdeutsche Volkskunde* 33 (1990): 55-68; Ulrike Haerendel, "Die Politik der 'Eingliederung' in den Westzonen und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Vertriebene*, eds. Hoffmann et al, 109-33; Andrew Demshuk, *The German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945–1970* (Cambridge, 2012); Raninen, "Siirtokarjalaiset," 320-4.
- ⁴⁴ Pertti Ahonen, "The Impact of Distorted Memory: Historical Narratives and Expellee Integration in West Germany," in *European Encounters: Migrants, Migration and European Societies since 1945*, eds. Rainer Ohliger, Karen Schönwälder and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos (London, 2003), 238-54.
- ⁴⁵ Haerendel, "Politik,"; Teperi, *Karjalan Liiton*, 81-102.
- ⁴⁶ Michael L. Hughes, "Restitution and Democracy in Germany after the Two World Wars," *Contemporary European History* 4, no. 1 (1994): 1-18.
- ⁴⁷ The ZVU's 1947 Annual Report, cited in Philipp Ther, "Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR und in Polen 1945 bis 1950," in *Geglückte*, eds. Hoffmann and Schwarz, 156.
- ⁴⁸ Manfred Wille, "Die 'freiwillige Ausreise' sudetendeutscher Antifaschisten in die sowjetische Besatzungszone Deutschlands - erfüllte und enttäuschte Hoffnungen und Erwartungen," in *Die Sudetendeutschen in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands*, ed. Manfred Wille (Magdeburg, 1993), esp. 54-5.
- ⁴⁹ Helge Heidemeyer, "Vertriebene als Sowjetzonenflüchtlinge," in *Vertriebene*, eds. Hoffmann et al., 237-8.
- ⁵⁰ Wille, "Compelling," 268.
- ⁵¹ Gerald Christopeit, "Verschwiegene vier Millionen: Heimatvertriebene in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone und in der DDR," *Jahrbuch für deutsche und osteuropäische Volkskunde* 38 (1995): 223-51.

-
- ⁵² Eva Hahn, “Die Sudetendeutschen in der deutschen Gesellschaft” in *Im geteilten Europa. Tschechen, Slowaken und Deutsche und ihre Staaten 1948-1989*, eds. Hans Lemberg, Jan Kren and Dusan Kovac (Essen, 1998), 111-34.
- ⁵³ Norman Naimark, “‘The Persistence of ‘the Postwar’: Germany and Poland,” in *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe*, eds. Frank Biess and Robert G. Moeller (New York, 2010), 13-29.
- ⁵⁴ KL circular “Karjalan Liiton jäsenille,” December 28, 1945, KLA: Db1, Kiertokirjeet jäsenjärjestöille, 1945.
- ⁵⁵ Teperi, *Karjalan*, 173-85.
- ⁵⁶ Kirkinen et al, *Karjalan*, 511-21; Veikko Saksi, *Karjalan palautus* (Vammala, 2005).
- ⁵⁷ “Bericht über eine Umfrage zu einigen Problemen der nationalen Politik in beiden deutschen Staaten (20.7.1965),” in *Meinungsforschung in der DDR: Die geheimen Berichte des Instituts für Meinungsforschung an das Politbüro der SED*, Heinz Niemann (Cologne: Bund, 1993), 106-7; Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, eds., *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung, 1968-1973* (Allensbach, 1974), 525.
- ⁵⁸ Ther, *Deutsche*, 324.
- ⁵⁹ Heikki Waris, *Siirtoväen sopeutuminen* (Helsinki, 1952), 78; Urho Kekkonen, *Finnlands Lösung der Flüchtlingsfrage* (Munich, 1953).
- ⁶⁰ Jokinen, *Karjalaisen*, 126; Jyrkkilä, *Adaptation*, 341-51.
- ⁶¹ Alanen, *Laatokankarjalaisen*, 26-34; Raninen, “Siirtokarjalaisuus”, esp. 303; Elli Heikkilä, “Siirtolaisuus Suomesta Ruotsiin ja tämän päivän maastamuuton kuva,” accessed June 1, 2018, http://www.migrationinstitute.fi/files/pdf/presentation/Elli_Heikkila_PohjolaNorden_28042014.pdf, 8.
- ⁶² Ther, “Integration,” 794.
- ⁶³ On the GDR, see Schwartz, *Vertriebene*.
- ⁶⁴ Keijo K. Kulha, *Karjalan siirtoväen asuttamisesta käyty julkinen keskustelu vuosina 1944-1948* (Jyväskylä, 1969).
- ⁶⁵ Connor, *Refugees*, esp. 139-76.
- ⁶⁶ Moeller, *War Stories*.
- ⁶⁷ Paul Lüttinger, “Der Mythos der schnellen Integration: Eine imperische Untersuchung zur Integration der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 1 (1986): 20-36.

-
- ⁶⁸ Rainer Schulze in Pertti Ahonen, Gustavo Corni, Jerzy Kochanowski, Rainer Schulze, Tamas Stark and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, *People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and Its Aftermath* (Oxford, 2008), 150.
- ⁶⁹ Kossert, *Kalte Heimat*; Pirkko Sallinen-Gimpl, *Siirtokarjalainen identiteetti ja kulttuurien kohtaaminen* (Helsinki, 1994).
- ⁷⁰ OMGUS poll, November 14, 1946, cited in R. M. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War* (New Haven, CT, 2012), 314.
- ⁷¹ Schulze, “Zuwanderung,” 84.
- ⁷² Pascal Maeder, *Forging a New Heimat: Expellees in Post-War Germany and Canada* (Göttingen, 2011), 105-6.
- ⁷³ Werner Middelman, “Auswanderung - ja oder nein?” October 29, 1952, Bundesarchiv Koblenz: B 150, 526, file 1, p. 13.
- ⁷⁴ Hahn, “Die Sudetendeutschen,” 115.
- ⁷⁵ For insightful observations about the so-called *autochtones*, people defined as ethnic Germans who, at least initially, stayed in post-war Poland and faced considerable ethno-national othering, see Gregor Thum’s chapter in this volume.
- ⁷⁶ Heli Kananen, *Kontrolloitu sopeutuminen: ortodoksinen siirtoväki sotien jälkeisessä Ylä-Savossa, 1946-1959* (Jyväskylä, 2010).
- ⁷⁷ Raninen, “Siirtokarjalaisuus,” 307, 315.
- ⁷⁸ Helge Seppänen, *Suomi miehittäjänä 1941-1944* (Helsinki, 1989).
- ⁷⁹ Pertti Ahonen, “On Forced Migrations: Transnational Realities and National Narratives in Post-1945 (West) Germany,” *German History* 32, no. 4 (2014): 599-614.