

JYU DISSERTATIONS 344

Maria Jufereva-Skuratovski

Russophone Journalists in Estonia

Redefinition of Professional Roles



UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES

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YHTEENVETO

Jufereva-Skuratovski, Maria

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Tämä tutkimus keskittyy Virossa asuvien, venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien toimittajien käsityksiin heidän ammatillisesta roolistaan. Tutkimuksen kontekstina on maan poliittisten ja yhteiskunnallisten muutosten aika alkaen vuodesta 1991, jolloin Viro palautti itsenäisyytensä, vuoteen 2016 saakka.

Toimittajien ammatilliset roolit ja kyvyt ovat monessa suhteessa riippuvaisia siitä yhteiskunnallisesta kontekstista, jossa he kulloinkin työskentelevät. Tämän vuoksi tässä tutkimuksessa on keskitytty sosiaaliin, poliittisiin, historiallisiin ja taloudellisiin tekijöihin Virossa vuosina 1991-2016. Toimittajien kokemukset Virossa työskentelystä erottuvat useimmista muista siirtymävaiheessa olevista valtioista Neuvostoliiton jälkeisessä mediamaailmassa lähinnä kahdesta näkökulmasta: 1) kahden erillisen, kielipohjaisen informaatiotilan olemassaolon tiedostamisesta sekä 2) Venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien toimittajien liittämisestä yhteiskunnallisen integraation prosessiin.

On huomattava, että ominaisuuksiltaan Baltian maiden, erityisesti Viron ja Latvian, kansallisten vähemmistöjen journalismi on melko erilaista verrattuna ns. vanhojen eurooppalaisten demokratioiden (Saksa, Iso-Britannia, Ranska) kansallisten vähemmistöjen journalismiin. Näiden eroavaisuuksien suurimpana aiheuttajana voidaan nähdä se, että Baltian maiden venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvista toimittajista tuli kansallisten vähemmistöjen edustajia vasta vuoden 1991 jälkeen, jolloin kyseiset valtiot palauttivat itsenäisyytensä. Tämä muutos Neuvostoliiton imperiumin etuoikeutetun enemmistön jäsenistä osaksi kansallisvaltion etnistä vähemmistöä on epäilemättä vaikuttanut Viron venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien toimittajien kansalaisasenteen vakiintumiseen sekä heidän ammatillisten rooliensa uudelleenrakentumiseen ja -tulkintaan.

Tärkeimmät tutkimuskysymykset ovat:

1. Mitkä ovat olennaisimmat muutokset, joita on tapahtunut venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien toimittajien käsityksissä ammatillisista rooleistaan sekä ammattietiikasta Viron yhteiskunnallisen ja poliittisen muutoksen aikana vuosina 1991–2016?
2. Millä tavoin venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvat toimittajat näkevät roolinsa ja tehtävänsä Viron venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvan väestön integroitumisessa yhteiskuntaan?

Teoreettisesti tutkimus perustuu journalistisen profession käsitteeseen sekä käsityksiin ammattimaisista journalistisista rooleista, joita on perusteellisesti käsitelty Thomas Hanitzschin tutkimuksissa (2007, 2011, 2013, 2017), Claudia Mellado et al. (2017). Tutkielma nojautuu myös yhteiskunnallisen muutoksen ja integraation käsitteisiin (Jakubowicz, 2001; Gross, 2004; Vihalemm, 2004, 2008, 2011).

Tutkimuksessa yhdistetään määrällisiä ja laadullisia tutkimusmenetelmiä. Käsityksiä journalistisesta roolista ja eettisistä arvoista tutkittiin standardoidun kyselyn avulla. Tutkimushaastattelut puolestaan mahdollistivat yksityiskohtaisemman analyysin toimittajien ammatillisista kyvyistä.

Tutkimuksen määrällisen aineiston pohjalta tehdyt havainnot osoittavat, että venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvat toimittajat kokevat vahvaa yhteenkuuluvuutta oman etnisen ryhmänsä kanssa. Selvä enemmistö (78%) heistä pitää venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvan vähemmistön etujen ilmaisemista ja puolustamista tärkeänä tai erittäin tärkeänä työssään toimittajina. Tutkimushaastattelut vahvistavat, että sosiopoliittisen integraation kannalta venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvat toimittajat eivät koe omaa rooliaan "valvojina", jotka haastavat vallassa olevia, vaan pikemminkin "uskollisina avustajina", joilla on samat tavoitteet kuin maan hallituksella sosioekonomisissa kysymyksissä. He pyrkivät myötävaikuttamaan venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvan vähemmistön sosiaaliseen integraatioon Virossa. Tästä tilanteesta aiheutuu sisäisiä konflikteja monille venäjää äidinkielenään puhuville toimittajille, koska Viron hallituksen integraatiotoimet eivät aina ole olleet venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvan väestön erityisten etujen mukaisia.

Avainsanat: venäjää äidinkielenä puhuvat toimittajat, Viro, toimittajan ammattiroolit, toimittajan kyvyt, journalismin etiikka, yhteiskunnan integraatio, informaatiotilat.

ABSTRACT

Jufereva-Skuratovski, Maria

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This research focuses on the formation of perceptions of professional roles among Russophone journalists in Estonia during the political and societal transformation from 1991 when Estonia regained independence up to 2016. Since the character and scope of journalists' professional performance largely depend on the contextual conditions in which journalists work, the social, political, historical and economic factors are also brought into focus in this thesis.

Two main factors make the Estonian experience different from most of the other transitional states in the post-Soviet media landscape: 1) the existence of two separate, language-based, informational spaces and 2) the inclusion of Russophone journalists in the process of societal integration.

It should also be noted that a range of characteristics makes the journalism of national minorities in the Baltic States, especially Estonia and Latvia, very different in comparison to the journalism of national minorities in the so-called old European democracies (Germany, United Kingdom, France). This is because Russophone journalists in the Baltic States became representatives of national minorities only after 1991, when the countries in question regained independence. The change of status from being members of the privileged majority in the Soviet empire to being part of an ethnic minority in a nation state has undoubtedly influenced the establishment of the civic stance and the reinterpretation of professional roles by Russophone journalists in Estonia.

The leading research questions are:

1. What changes in the perception of professional roles and ethics of Russophone journalists have occurred during the process of societal and political transformation in Estonia from 1991 to 2016?
2. How do Russophone journalists see their roles and tasks concerning the integration into society of the Russophone population in Estonia?

Theoretically, the thesis relies on the concepts of journalistic professionalization and perceptions of professional journalistic roles, which are thoroughly elaborated in the works of Thomas Hanitzsch (2007, 2011, 2013, 2017), Claudia Mellado et al. (2017). It relies too on the concepts of societal transformation and integration (Karol Jakubowicz, 2001; Peter Gross, 2004; Vihalemm, 2004, 2008, 2011).

The study combines quantitative and qualitative methods such as a standardized questionnaire and in-depth interviews with journalists. The main trends in the perception of journalistic roles and ethical values were outlined in the standardized questionnaire. The interviews-in-depth allowed for a more detailed analysis of journalists' professional performance in the Estonian context.

The quantitative findings demonstrated that Russophone journalists felt a strong affiliation with their own ethnic group. A distinct majority (78%) of them regarded expressing and defending the interests of the Russophone minority as important or very important in their professional work. The interviews-in-depth confirmed that in terms of socio-political integration Russophone journalists did not position themselves as “watchdogs” challenging those in power, but more as “loyal facilitators” who had the same goals as the government in terms of socio-political integration. They aimed to contribute to the social integration of the Russophone minority. The situation meant an inner conflict for many Russophone journalists, as the government's integration actions were not always in line with the specific interests of the Russophone population.

Keywords: Russophone journalists, Estonia, professional roles, journalistic performance, ethics, societal integration, informational spaces.

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PREFACE

When I started doing research into the topic of this thesis in 2008, one could hardly foresee what structural, ideological and professional transformations would take place in society, politics and journalism. One of the most fascinating changes, which will also be described in this thesis, is related to the rapid development of online media, which have had an impact both on journalism and its audiences.

I would like to thank all the journalists who responded to my surveys and took part in interviews. I would like to thank them for their sincerity and frankness, and for speaking openly about the problems and conflicts they have to face in their daily work.

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor and good friend Prof. Epp Lauk for the continuous support of my Ph.D. study and related research, for her wisdom, patience, motivation, immense knowledge and high professionalism. Her guidance, support and advice helped me throughout the research and writing of this thesis. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my Ph.D. study. And it was thanks to Epp Lauk that I started my PhD studies and believed I could complete them.

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Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family: my husband, my parents and my sons for supporting me spiritually throughout writing this thesis and through my life in general.

Tallinn, 25.08.2020.

Maria Jufereva-Skuratovski

LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

- I. Jõesaar, A., Rannu, S., Jufereva, M. (2013). Media for the minorities: Russian language media in Estonia 1990-2012. *Media Transformations / Mediju Transformacijos* 2013 | 9 | 118-154.
- II. Jõesaar, A., Jufereva, M., Rannu, S. (2014). Media for Russian language minorities: The role of Estonian public broadcasting (ERR) 1990-2013. *Central European Journal of Communication* 2014 | 7 | 2(13) | 253-272.
- III. Jufereva, M., Lauk, E. (2015). Minority language media and journalists in the context of societal integration in Estonia. *Medijske Studije / Media Studies* 2015 | 6 (11) | 51-66.
- IV. Jufereva, M. (2016). Ethical orientations of Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia. *Mediální Studia / Media Studies* 2016 | 10 (2) | 6-23.

AUTHOR'S CONTRIBUTION TO ORIGINAL ARTICLES

- I. The 3rd co-author:** I analysed the formation of Estonia's Russian-language media in terms of press freedom, change of technologies and economies. I prepared the detailed overview of the development of Russian-language media after 1991, providing data on circulation within the period 1998-2012 and outlined the main trend of these processes. My contribution to the article can be estimated as 40%.
- II. The 2nd co-author:** I wrote the description of the Russian language media landscape in Estonia and proposed systematic analysis of the main periods and development trends of Russian-language media. On the basis of analysis I elaborated a list of arguments supporting and opposing the creation of the Public Service Television channel in Russian language. My contribution to the article can be estimated as being 50%
- III. The 1st co-author:** I conducted a quantitative survey among Russian-speaking journalists from Estonia and presented the results, as well as writing the discussion section. I also performed the search in the literature in order to explain the concept of minority language media, and I drafted that part of the article. My own contribution to the article can be estimated as 70%.
- IV. Sole author**

In the text Articles will be referred to as Studies.

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1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates how the perception of the professional roles and tasks of Russophone journalists has changed since Estonia regained independence. The study covers the period from 1991 to 2016, in which the transformation of professional roles evolved. It focuses on the transformation of the perception of their professional roles and tasks in the context of the historical background, social and political events and economic as well as market-related factors (see Study 1 and Study 2). For McQuail (2010), politics, technology and economics are among the principal factors that influence media institutions. This research pays little attention to technology because the establishment of the professional identity of Russophone journalists was primarily influenced by the social, political and economic factors.

In my Master's thesis (Jufereva, 2006) I analyzed the professionalization of Russophone journalists in Estonia and described their socio-demographic profile. The study of 2006 shows that Russophone journalists experienced a crisis of professional identity and refrained from carrying out their professional role after the collapse of the USSR. In this thesis I go further by providing an analysis of how Russophone journalists perceived the transformation of their professional roles, including journalists' views on being representatives of ethnic minorities.

One of the most fascinating changes which has had an impact on journalism and its audiences (Vihalemm, Lauristin, Kalmus, Vihalemm, 2017) – the transfer of print media into the Internet environment – will also be taken into consideration. In general, this study deals with so-called “classical” journalists rather than “citizen journalism” (Örnebring, 2013) or bloggers and social networks.

After Estonia regained independence, the status of the Russian-speaking population of the country was defined as an ethnic minority in legal and political terms. The place and role that Russophone mass media and journalists occupied in the media field changed as well. The Estonian Russophone mass media went from being part of the Soviet media system in which Russian was the main language to being a media using the language of an ethnic minority. Russophone journalists lost their elite role in society as representatives of the ruling power.

Russophone journalists had to survive severe times during the transitional period. This affected not only their socio-political status, but also influenced them economically. Study 3 states: “During the period of radical political, social and economic reforms in the 1990s, the status of the large, mostly Russian-speaking non-titular population (in 1989, 38,5%) had to be determined”. Also, the new status of Russophone journalists and a new socio-political situation in Estonia demanded redefinition of their professional roles and tasks. One such new task was helping the Russian-speaking population to adapt to the new social and political environment and to integrate into Estonian society (see Study 3).

This transformation was not at all easy. It took a long time for Estonia’s Russophone media to reorientate itself as it sought a media model that could combine democratic media traditions with the traditions of Russian journalism. However, because of economic pressures, commercialization and media concentration in Estonia, the Russophone media have also oriented themselves towards the democratic corporatist model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Study 4). The free market and capitalist economy dictated new terms to mass media owners (making profit). Consequently, the journalists were facing new demanding requirements which reflected the economic interests of mass media owners.

One of the key concepts in this thesis is the “informational space”. The scholars who have studied the characteristic features of the media and audience of national minorities in the Baltic States refer to the existence of two informational spaces separated along the linguistic lines - one in Estonian and the other in Russian - which hinder the effective integration of Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states (Rozukalne, 2017; Lauk & Jõesaar, 2017; Vihalemm, P., Lauristin, Kalmus, Vihalemm, T., 2017).

These two different informational spaces developed in the Soviet period. As is noted in Study 3, during Soviet rule there was no need for integration between the Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking populations as a single citizenship existed in the Soviet Union – the Soviet one – with Russian as the shared official language throughout the Soviet empire. Soviet migration resulted in Estonian and Russian-speaking communities living side by side, using different information channels and having little in common. In spite of the problem of there being two different information spaces being obvious in the early stages after independence

in Estonia, politicians did not pay much attention to it and did not propose solutions for getting the different information spaces closer to each other.

In 2000s onwards the problem of divided informational spaces became a practical one for Estonian society. Lauk and Jõesaar (2017: 21) stated it as follows: “Due to political and historical circumstances, the two language communities have very little in common, including their media consumption patterns”. Studies confirm that 85% of the Russian-speaking population of Estonia regularly watch TV channels broadcast from Russia (Vihalemm, P., 2017). According to some politicians, scientists and public figures, this factor can be viewed as a ‘red flag’ that mass media based in Russia exert influence on how Russian-speaking residents perceive social and political events in Estonia. In this study, the existence of the two different, and sometimes even opposing media spaces was seen to impose additional obligations which the journalists had not faced before.

This study is relevant from the perspective of Russophone journalists being charged with an important task of not only informing the Russian-speaking minority about what is happening in the country but also contributing to its inclusion and active participation in social and political processes (see Study 3). The goal of promoting the inclusion of the Russian-speaking population in Estonian society by means of mass media was first introduced in the national integration strategy for 2008–2013. This programme viewed Russophone journalists as agents of integration. The study may be regarded as an indicator of the success of the national integration strategy for 2008–2013 because it shows to what extent the media and journalists were aware of the tasks entrusted to them by the state and considered them important. The research can also be considered one of the starting points for establishing the integration goals of the public broadcasting in the Russian language.

The creation of the public broadcasting television channel ETV+ was mentioned in the integration programme for 2014–2020¹. The implementation of this project became one of the examples of undertakings aimed at integrating minorities and at increasing convergence of the two media spaces within the integration programme. However, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of ETV+ by its low ratings alone at the moment because people’s media

¹ http://www.kul.ee/sites/kulminn/files/le2020_arengukava_uuendatud_2016.pdf (Retrieved 02.08.2018)

habits are slow to change, and a period longer than a couple of years is required for more comprehensive research.

Regarding the economic context of the transformation, the Russophone mass media market endured challenging times in the period between 1991 and 2016. Print media changed from one owner to another and faced financial hardship at the beginning of this period. The salaries of Russophone journalists were lower in comparison with their Estonian colleagues and sometimes delayed. As a result most print outlets in the Russian language went bankrupt. All these transformations eventually resulted in a situation where there is not a single nationwide daily newspaper in the Russian language in today's Estonia. The functions of print media were taken over by online information portals. The number of radio stations and TV channels in the Russian language also decreased (Study 1). This unstable economic situation may also influence Russophone journalists' perception of their professional roles. At the same time, the Estonian-language media market enjoyed a more favourable situation due to the Scandinavian media groups which had become the owners of the main Estonian media outlets.

The primary argument of this study is that the perception of professional roles of Russophone journalists in Estonia underwent major transformations in the period between 1991 and 2016. First, the journalists had to accept the change in their social and political status. Second, the journalists had to assume a new role in the social and political integration of the Russian-speaking population in the transformed society (See Study 3). These changes became the foundation of the present-day media in the Russian language and keep shaping journalists' perceptions of their professional roles and their ethical values and attitudes. It is important to study journalists' perceptions of their professional roles, as journalists play a significant role in society and are largely responsible for shaping public opinion among the Russian-language minority in Estonia. Study 4 confirms that a certain number of institutional factors – such as the editorial policy as well as the political and economic background – are significant influences on the work of the Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia.

Russophone journalists in the transitional period had to handle different challenges simultaneously. They worked in highly unstable economic conditions and being the part of this population, they had to serve and defend the interests of the Russophone population.

Questions in this study aim to provide insight into inner and external factors which influenced the professional performance of Russophone journalists in Estonia. Both of those factors are equally important in understanding how journalists perceive their roles and positions in society as representatives of the ethnic minority.

1. What changes in the perception of professional roles and ethics of Russophone journalists have occurred during the process of societal and political transformation in Estonia from 1991 to 2016?
2. How do Russophone journalists see their roles and tasks concerning societal integration in Estonia?

This dissertation consists of a contextual framework used as background for the study, a theoretical and methodological overview, results, conclusions, discussion and four peer-reviewed articles.

The background chapter presents an overview of the main trends and developments of the Russophone media from 1991 up to 2016, and also an overview of the development of Estonian Russophone journalism.

Different concepts were used within the study. The concept of informational space (Vihalemm, 2004; Vihalemm, 2008; Vihalemm, 2011) and the concept of minority language media (Jakobson, 2002; Husband, 2005; Jufereva, 2005, 2015; Georgiou, 2006; Cormack & Hourigan, 2007) made it possible to contextualize the study. The concept of the professional roles of journalists provided an outline of those roles that Russophone journalists see as the most important ones in their work (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986, 1996, 1998; Weaver, Beam, Brownlee, Voakes & Wilhoit, 2007; Tandoc, Hellmueller & Vos, 2012; Waisbord, 2013). Also, the concept of journalistic role performance was considered (Donsbach and Patterson, 2004; Hanitzsch et al., 2011; Örnebring and Mellado, 2018). Combining these concepts allowed for the Russophone journalists' perceptions of their professional roles to be analysed in the context of and the process of integration in Estonia.

The methodological overview chapter introduces the methods used for this study. The studies included in the thesis utilize both qualitative and quantitative research methods.

The conclusion of the research paper features the results, conclusions, discussion and four peer-reviewed articles and appendices.

My personal motivation for writing this thesis lies in my employment as a journalist in the daily show “Novosti Estonii” [News of Estonia] on PBK, one of the most popular TV channels, between 2004 and 2011. From 2015 to 2019 I had occupied the position of head of Lasnamäe (Tallinn) district administration, where a predominantly Russian-speaking population resides, whose main means of gaining information is the media outlets in the Russian language, both local and from Russia. In 2019 I was elected to the Estonian Parliament. The issue of social adaptation and integration of the Russian-speaking population through mass media activities has always played a huge role for me as a journalist, social scientist and politician.

1.1. Structure of research

Next will be presented Table 1, which outlines the topics of the articles, the theoretical frameworks of the articles, the methods and the main findings.

Table 1. The structure of the research

Article	Topic/theme	Theoretical framework	Method(s)	Main findings
1. Media for the Minorities: Russian language Media in Estonia 1990-2012	Russian-speaking journalists in transition period	McQuail's (2010) theoretical framework of media institutions' influencers – politics, technology and economics	Document analysis, Qualitative text analysis	Coexistence of two information fields. These information fields are separated by linguistic borders.
2. Media for Russian language minorities: The role of Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) 1990-2013	Russian-speaking journalists and media system in transition period	McQuail's (2010) theoretical framework of media institutions' influencers – politics, technology and economics	Document analysis, Qualitative text analysis	Necessity of launching PSB Russian-language TV-channel has been proved: the channel will support the enhancement, development and servicing of social, political and cultural citizenship.
3. Minority Language Media and Journalists in the Context of Societal Integration in Estonia	Russian-speaking journalists representing Russian-speaking minority in Estonia	Concept of minority language media and the position of Russian-language media in the context of societal integration. in Estonia	Key informant interviews-in-depth, Standardized questionnaire	Russian-speaking journalists perceive themselves as mediators between Estonian and Russian communities, but are not positive about the possibilities of Russian-language media to fulfil their role as representatives of the minority.
4. Ethical orientations of Russian-speaking journalist in Estonia	Ethical values and beliefs	Concepts of media accountability and journalism culture	Key respondent, interviews-in-depth, Standardized questionnaire	Though the journalists' supervisors and managerial staff proclaim their orientation towards principles of a democratic corporatists system, in reality it is not always attained.

2. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS OF RUSSOPHONE MEDIA IN ESTONIA 1991-2016

Many European countries currently experience an increase in ethnic minority populations as a consequence of immigration from other parts of the world. Estonia's Russian minority population emerged differently, through Soviet colonization in the post WWII era. The integration of this minority into Estonian society became a socio-political challenge after the country regained its independence in 1991 (Study 3: 52).

As a result of changes in the political and economic system, the media market also experienced a significant change. The state ceased to be the owner of the media and the forms of control over media content also changed. Findings suggest that in the course of these changes, Russophone media in Estonia were more economically affected than Estonian language media. While Scandinavian companies (Schibsted, Bonnier, Alma Media) acquired a significant part of the Estonian media market, the local Russophone media were far less successful in gaining the attention of foreign investors. They were mostly owned by local entrepreneurs of Russian origin. Investors from Russia did not express any interest in supporting and developing Russophone print media in Estonia, and because of that the Russophone private media found itself in the 1990s in a situation where journalists were not paid on time, and print channels changed owners several times and were shut down due to insufficient funding (Study 2: 256-261).

A range of characteristics makes the journalism of national minorities in the Baltic States, especially Estonia and Latvia, very different in comparison with the journalism of national minorities in the so-called old European democracies (Germany, the United Kingdom, France). This is because Russophone journalists in the Baltic States became representatives of the Russian minority media only after 1991 when the countries in question regained independence. Study 1 and Study 2 deal with the fact that from the end of 1980s Eastern and Central European countries started transition from the communist regime towards becoming democratic states. Among important aspects of that development were changes in the media systems.

In the scholarly discourse (see, e.g., Splichal, 1994; Paletz et al., 1995; Hiebert, 1999; Vihalemm, 2002; Jakubowicz, 2006) it is agreed that 'transition' is used for the relatively

brief period immediately preceding and following the collapse of the Communist system, the years 1988 to 1992/93. This encompasses the internal contradictions and conditions that led to the collapse of the Communist system, and the breakthrough that destroyed the main elements of the old society and paved the way to the creation of the new. During the transition, the social processes capable of changing the old system were set in motion, for example, radical economic reforms were started, and the foundations of the democratic nation states were laid. The essence of the 'transition' on the societal level is reflected in two developments: 1) a change from 'closed', authoritarian and totalitarian societies toward democracy and civil society with the freedom of expression, and 2) economic change from communist planned economy to the capitalist free market economy (Jakubowicz, 2006). Developments in both the economic and the political sphere directly influenced the news media, which in the communist regimes had been an ideological instrument in the hands of the Communist Parties and a component of command economy.

The period that followed immediately after 'transition' is called 'transformation' – the gradual reformation of the institutional structure of the societies, adaptation to the democratic government and leadership, adaptation to the free market economy, the development of civil society structures (Gross, 2004). Social scientists see 'transformation' as a process of reforms in all spheres of society, which are oriented towards the creation of a consolidated democracy. The 'transformation' phase has been achieved, when the changes have reached the point of no return, the old order no longer functions, and it cannot be returned, even though the new order has not yet emerged. Within this process, the elements of new order are strengthening and maturing until the features of new order have taken roots, although there are still shortcomings. Consolidation of the new order is achieved when the problems and policy issues that the 'transition' countries face, will resemble to those faced by the other consolidated democracies (Jakubowicz, 2006).

The fall of communism created preconditions for the change toward the free and independent media. There were two crucial elements as the preconditions for further transformation: 1) liberation from censorship and the Communist party control, and achieving the freedom of expression, and 2) turn to the free market. These two elements involve transformation of legislation, media policy, economic conditions, and journalistic professionalism (Jebril et al., 2013). While the starting point and the basic nature of these changes were similar for all

countries because of the general uniformity of the communist media systems, later transformation took various routes and resulted in various outcomes in different countries. (See: Dobek-Ostrowska & Glowacki, 2015). Similarly to the societal processes, media transformation has not been a smooth process. The main impeding factors are the lack of economic resources, underdeveloped political cultures, autocratic ambitions of new political leaders in some countries (Hungary, Poland), inefficient and vague media policy, corruption, lack of journalistic professionalism etc. As the result, by today, there are big differences among the countries, how the media systems function (Balčytienė & Lauk, 2005; Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013).

In February 1992 when the Estonian Citizenship Law was adopted, 88% of local Russian-speakers found themselves stateless (they possessed USSR passports) and no status in Estonia with the exception of 'propiska' (registration at the place of residence) (see Järve & Poleschuk, 2013: 5). In accordance with the Language Law, the Russian language lost any official status in Estonia, having formally been turned into a 'foreign language' Further, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Estonian state institutions and politicians refused to take part in a dialogue with the Russian-speaking population, including via the Estonian Russophone press (Jakobson 2002: 46).

Attitudes of Estonians towards the western world, and people's readiness to accept the capitalist social, political and economic models, have clearly been more positive than those of Russians living in Estonia. While the majority of Estonians welcomed the idea of 'returning to the west' (Lauristin & P. Vihalemm, 1997), for many Russians the new social and political order was shocking and strange, creating a high level of uncertainty for most of them (Lauristin & Heidmets, 2002: 21).

2.1. Challenges of two separate informational spaces in Estonia

Two separate informational spaces in Estonia emerged during the Soviet period, but at that time they were not regarded as a problem or challenge for the society. After Estonia regained independence in 1991 the situation became a great challenge for Estonian society in terms of integration.

During the transition period, watching television channels from Russia became one of the mechanisms of continuity for the Russian-speaking population, and it was especially important in the period of the irregular and inconsistent development of the local Russophone media system (Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun, 2013; Jakobson, 2004). At the same time, that continuity did not generate regret and nostalgia for the old time or the wish to return to one's homeland. The researchers studying the consumption of media by migrants and their descendants state that media do not transfer people of migrant background to their former homeland but rather come to their homes in their new locations of residence. Also, media in their native language and within a cultural context they understand is one of the consumable utilitarian goods alongside other goods, for example the national cuisine and clothing, and cultural experiences such as concerts and religious rituals in their native language (Robins & Aksoy, 2005).

In his description of the issue, Triin Vihalemm (2017: 279) says that from the viewpoint of the identity formation of the Russian-speaking minority the most significant thing is the competition that is going on between the channels of the local (Estonian) broadcasts and the channels from Russia. This competition for the Russian-language audience in Estonia resulted in the phenomenon of '*hargmaisuus*', which describes the media habits of the Russian-language minority and its perception of the socio-political situation. The Estonian word '*hargmaisuus*' stands for being connected with at least two societies simultaneously (in most cases, with the person's state of residence or the person's inner circle and the country of origin) through the family, work, educational, political or entertainment environment (Leppik & Vihalemm, T., 2017: 594).

A common opinion among Estonian politicians holding nationalistic views is that the Russian-speaking population of Estonia has been substantially influenced by Russian media, especially television. This is quite a controversial opinion, which is usually expressed within

political debates in order to attract the attention of the audience. In fact, there are different opinions even among sociologists as to whether Russian media can really influence the opinions of the Russophone population in Estonia.

According to surveys, over half of the Russian-speaking population of Estonia maintain close contact with people in Russia, and over a quarter with people in Belarus and Ukraine, and the overwhelming majority watch television shows on Russian channels and read Russian online portals on a daily basis (Leppik & Vihalemm, T., 2017). In this respect the situation in Estonia is very similar to the one in Latvia where large proportions of each of the ethnic minorities (Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Jews etc.) receive their daily information from Russian TV channels (Rozukalne, 2017: 108).

Tendencies in the development of state-minority relations in the 1990s thrust the problem of separated media spaces (Dougherty & Kaljurand 2015) or information spaces (Study 3; Vihalemm, P., Lauristin, Kalmus, Vihalemm, T., 2017; Rozukalne, 2017) into the limelight. The definition of “two information spaces” in Latvia perfectly applies to Estonia: the term “...represents a situation where the audiences, which are split by language, receive their daily information from different sources, thereby not only receiving asymmetric content, but also perceiving the events in the world and Latvia differently“ (Rozukalne, 2017: 109). Vihalemm and Jakobson (2011: 721) wrote about “stylistic-discursive differences” in reflecting on the same events in both media. Jakobson (2013) points out the divided memory and its reflection in Russian minority media, and she also demonstrates that formal acceptance of Estonian political agenda by the Russophone press did not alter its assessments of important issues. The tendency to use different sources of information resulting in differences in reflection on the same events also revealed itself in the reflections on the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 in Estonian media (Schneider & Cheung, 2015: 2). On one hand, the existence of such differences is a sign of a certain level of pluralism in the public media space. On the other hand, in order for the political system of the state to remain stable over the long term there is a need for some common public space where these different views can meet and lead to the formation of the ‘common ground’, mentioned as one of the goals in the Integration program. By increasing the availability of information on Estonian issues and events in Russian and providing more of the same information in Russian that is provided in Estonian, Russophone

journalists may potentially bridge two informational spaces and thereby contribute to integration and societal coherence (Study 3).

Therefore, the state integration strategy document for 2008-2013 (EL 2008-2013) specifically emphasized the significance of media and journalists as agents of societal integration in Estonia. To diminish the gap between two language and cultural communities, the promotion of “linguistic-communicative integration in society” was strongly emphasized, meaning “the re-creation of a common sphere of information and an Estonian-language environment in Estonian society under conditions of cultural diversity and mutual tolerance” (Study 3: 52).

A rapidly growing snowball of such problems as increasing Russia – NATO tensions, the immigration crisis in the EU and the admission by Estonia of new immigrants, who are added to the number of already existing ones (a high share of non-citizens (stateless people), negative attitudes towards other nationalities and especially newcomers) increases the importance of the issue: how did the Russian-speaking minority journalists adapt to the new circumstances?

In the early 1990s both Estonian and Latvian policymakers expected that all the inhabitants from these countries would gradually consume media in the Estonian or Latvian language. This has not happened because the Russian-speakers prefer to receive information in their own language.

With the aim of addressing the Russophone audience in their mother tongue, the public TV channel ETV+ was launched in September 2015. Media surveys showed that the daily share of ETV+ among Russophone audience was less than 0,8% while the daily share of the most popular channel among local Russian-speakers, Russia’s PBK, was 13,7%².

We can only speculate on the reasons for such low popularity of ETV+ among the Russophone audience in Estonia, but the main assumption is that policymakers were late with the creation of this channel, and Russia’s TV channels better meet the expectations and media habits of the Russian-language audience in Estonia. Considering the fact that formation of

²<https://rus.err.ee/681285/v-janvare-jefirnyj-rejting-etv-vyros-do-0-8-za-schet-uvelichenija-chisla-russkojazychnyh-zritelej> (Retrieved 02.08.2018)

media habits takes a longer period of time, I assume that ETV+ has reasonable expectations for future audience growth. In Latvia such a channel has not been launched yet. As surveys carried out among Latvian Russian-speakers confirm, interest towards such a channel is quite low (Rozukalne 2017).

2.2. Minority media and integration in Estonia

The primary objective of this subchapter is to give an overview about which role media and Russophone mass media in Estonia can have in the process of societal integration. I argue that the issue of societal integration that emerged after Estonia regained independence in 1991 was linked with the process of the redefinition of professional journalistic roles. The redefinition of professional roles was an inevitable process for all journalists from post-communist regimes in East-Central Europe and Russia (Jakubowicz, 2017). The main focus of this study is on the Estonian case.

Epp Lauk (2009: 69) pointed out that after the collapse of Communism, journalists and media professionals in former Communist countries faced the task of re-evaluating and redefining the role of the media and journalists in society. It was generally assumed that the newly free media in democratizing societies would naturally follow the path of the “liberal” model of journalism. She argues that this model, also called the “Anglo-American”, “professional”, and “social responsibility model”, is widely recognized as a universal model for journalism practice and theory all around the world.

According to Jakubowicz (2001: 76) journalists were assumed to be redefining themselves from being propaganda tools to providers of competently collected and written information, and to being non/partisan, impartial and neutral interpreters of social reality.

In the case of Estonia, the process of the redefinition of the professional roles of journalists should be considered in terms of the commercialization of media and societal integration. Integration influenced minority-language journalists the most, as they produce media content for the representatives of the Russophone minority in Estonia and are themselves representatives of this minority group. According to *Integration Monitoring 2017*, 70% of the Russophone population regularly watched PBK (*Pervõi Baltijski kanal/First Balti Channel*), which is available in Baltic States. 65% of this group regularly watched a daily

news programme (*Aktualnaja Kamera/ Actual Camera*) in the Russian language on ETV+ (Estonian Public Broadcasting television channel in Russian language)³.

Earlier research into media, paying primary attention to the interrelation of media and integration, primarily focuses on the analysis of the formation and transformation of the image of national minorities in the mass media and on the coverage of interethnic relations and political inclusion/exclusion (Kirch A. et al., 1993; Jakobson 2002; Kirch M., 1997; Vetik, 1999; Kõuts, 2004; Hallik, 2005; Pettai, 2006; Vihalemm P., 2008, 2011; Aidarov and Drechsler, 2013; Jõesaar et al., 2014). The above studies essentially describe stages of integration and the understanding of the concept of this process by Estonians and Russian-speaking residents. While integration was interpreted as a one-sided process at the beginning of the 1990s, implying that the Russian-speaking minority were supposed to learn the language and demonstrate loyalty to the state, over time such a perception of integration transformed into an awareness of the necessity to move forward together and for greater involvement of the Russophone population in the process of political decision-making.

Another major range of studies focuses on the Russian-speaking audience (Jakobson & Iljina, 2002; Vihalemm, T. & Leppik, 2017). These works helped to identify various clusters within the audience of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, which is characterized by varying perceptions of the social and political situation in the country and different levels of civic activism. The level of education as well as language skills and income determine how integrated people believe they are and which mass media they use in daily life.

The development and implementation of integration programs was one of the conditions for the country's accession to the EU and NATO. Heidmets and Lauristin (2002: 323) stated that in April 1996, Minister of Education Jaak Aaviksoo established an inter-university research team designed to develop research-based principles for the governmental strategy regarding the Russian minority in Estonia. This program, entitled VERA, was efficient in that already in the following year the team issued a book (Järve, 1997) in which both an analysis of the situation and future prospects for possible governmental intervention strategies were presented. This was actually the starting point for the whole Estonian integration project.

³ <https://www.kul.ee/en/integration-monitoring-estonian-society-2017> (Retrieved 02.08.2018)

In 1998 the Government formed the Integration Foundation to support actions and projects directed towards integration. In 2000 the Government approved the first State Integration Programme for 2000-2007 – a framework and guide for governmental institutions for the implementation of integration policy, in which media were tasked with an important role in integration.

The first recommendation regarding the role of the media in the integration and development of an inclusive public sphere can be found in the policy document “The Role of Media in the Integration of Estonians and Russian-Speakers in Estonia: Towards an Inclusive Public Sphere” dated 2003-2004⁴. In respect to politics, the mass media have gradually become an essential element in the process of democratic politics by providing a channel for wide debate, and for distributing diverse information and opinion as well as being the primary arena for public events and discussions, both at the national and international level.

However the integration policies seem to assume that anyone willing to integrate and be informed and participate in the public sphere (and there should be one public sphere, the Estonian-language one) should at first learn the Estonian language. But in spite of an extensive language teaching programme set up by the government, the majority of non-Estonians have difficulties in mastering the language on the level that would allow them to receive sufficient information about Estonian society. The situation is particularly problematic in Ida-Virumaa county (where Russophones comprise 74%) and among the elderly. The situation shows that the process of language learning and accessibility to the mainstream media need to be better coordinated in order to complement each other effectively.

Research has repeatedly confirmed that the main source of information for non-Estonian speakers is Russia’s media channels. However, up to 71% of Russophones also regard Estonian-produced media in Russian as important sources of information on Estonian issues. Therefore, the state integration strategy document for 2008-2013 (EL 2008-2013) specifically emphasized the significance of media and journalists as agents of societal integration in Estonia (Study 3: 52).

⁴ <http://www.policy.hu/keedus/research.paper.pdf> (Retrieved 02.08.2018)

Sara Signer (2011: 422) argues that although mass media cannot be considered core agents of integration on par with the educational system, the media still contribute to intercultural integration in two important ways: 1) minorities working in journalism contribute to media diversity by introducing minority-specific issues; 2) the use of mainstream media by minorities is considered important for their intercultural integration (Study 3: 53).

By increasing the availability in Russian of information on Estonian issues and events and providing more of the same information in Russian than is provided in Estonian, Russophone journalists may potentially build a bridge between the two informational spaces and ethnic communities and thereby contribute to integration and societal coherence in Estonia. Agreeing that the key aim of the media in a minority language is cultural and political self-representation (Cormack, 2007: 10), Russophone journalists have a professional duty to express the views and expectations of the Russophone minority. Therefore, it is important to explore what in fact Russophone journalists' professional attitudes and aspirations in fact are in order to understand their position in the context of societal integration in Estonia (Study 3: 53).

2.3. Challenges of the small minority media market in Estonia

Within two next sub-chapters a contextual overview of the small media market in Estonia and its challenges will be provided. Traditions of PSB programming and new trends in the Russian language will also be outlined.

Market size plays an important role in media development (Puppis, 2009; Lowe et al., 2011). It has been an advantage in building up the Estonian e-State (Charles, 2009), but a disadvantage where national journalism is concerned (Study 1: 120, Study 2: 254). Market size also determines the availability of resources. In smaller states there are fewer resources available (Lowe et al., 2011; Jõesaar, 2011). If the market is big enough for a business to be profitable, and resources are available, general requirements such as variety, pluralism etc. can be fulfilled, and the launch of niche media outlets will follow. On the other hand, restricted market entry and global concentration of ownership encourage common denominator provision for the mass market. A market-led media system is incapable of presenting a full range of political and economic interests in the public domain (Curran, 1997:140; Study 1: 120; Study 2: 254).

Due to market limitations it is unprofitable to launch a wide range of media products in smaller markets. The diversity of content offered will be lower in smaller states than in countries with large markets. In the first place, commercial media focus on mainstream content. But if the market is not even big enough for the private sector to deliver a variety of media products in the national language, how can interests of minority groups be adequately served, when minority language groups in small countries are a tiny unprofitable niche market (Study 2: 254)?

When describing the economic background of multilingual markets, Hesmondhalgh (2013) refers to the tastes of different ethnic groups. Even if there is a shared history, its interpretation still differs between the main ethnic groups. It is more relevant to talk about geolinguistics and diasporic media. The separation of the Russian-speaking audience from the Estonian information field promoted by foreign Russian channels creates many challenges for society (Study 2: 254).

The Estonian media market is dominated by two major media houses. First, the Postimees Grupp AS (formerly owned by the Norwegian corporation Schibsted ASA but owned by Estonian based capital since a management buyout in 2013). Postimees Grupp AS owns the largest daily newspaper and the major national free-to-air commercial TV-channel with subsidiary channels on a pay-TV platform, six radio stations, an internet portal, several local newspapers, magazines and a printing house. The second largest private media company is Ekspress Grupp AS, which runs the biggest Estonian internet portal Delfi (also in Russian, and broadcast also in Latvia and Lithuania) and publishes a weekly newspaper and is co-owner of the second biggest Estonian daily newspaper Eesti Päevaleht. On the public service media side there is the non-commercial Estonian Public Broadcasting with three TV-channels, five radio channels and a web portal.

According to the Integration Monitoring of 2017, about 30% of Russian-speakers cannot follow the media (print, online, radio and television) in Estonian because of insufficient knowledge of the language⁵. The development of Estonian Russophone media can be divided into five periods as shown in Table 1. More detailed information on the audience figures for

⁵ https://www.kul.rik.ee/sites/kulminn/files/5_keeleoskus.pdf (Retrieved 23.03.2018).

Russophone radio channels, Russian-speakers' viewers' share of the main Russian language TV channels, and the financial results of Russian language TV channels, is presented in Study 1 and Study 2.

In contrast with the investment in media in the Estonian language during the years of independence, no investments in the Russophone media have come from abroad. Media channels were owned or created by local non-Estonian entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, they did not have sufficient resources to create good quality popular media products. There was a lack of critical mass – of quantity, quality and audience. Considering the smallness of the potential market, foreign capital did not have any interest in contributing to this narrow sector (Study 2: 261).

Table 2. Periods and main development trends of Russophone media 1991-2016

Time period	Trends in development of Russophone media
I.1991-1999 Active development	1. Active development of print-outlets in Russian language: emergence of new outlets - 8 newspapers with general socio-political content in Tallinn and north east Estonia in 1991, 16 by end of 1999.
	2. The growth of radio stations: in 1992 there was only one radio station transmitting in Russian (a public service one), by the end on 1999 there were six, among them five commercial stations.
	3. Growth of radio broadcasting - 1 radio station in Russian (public service) in 1992, 6 by end of 1999, including 5 commercial stations.
	4. State-owned Estonian Television becomes a public service TV channel. Commercial channels emerge and are sold to foreign capital. By the end of the period there are 2 nationwide commercial TV-channels. Some local Russian-language TV-channels established.
	5. 1999. First internet-portal in the Russian language, Delfi, emerges in Estonia.
II.2000-2006 Stabilization	1. Stabilization of the Russian-language press market. Between 12 and 15 newspapers.
	2. Emergence of new commercial TV channels. By end of 2006, 5 commercial TV stations in Russian are on air. PSB Estonian Television produces several programmes in Russian language.
	3. 7 Russian language radio stations in this period, including Estonian Radio's programme Raadio 4. Commercial radio stations were profiled mainly towards mainstream music, short news and entertainment programmes.
	4. Still only one regular news internet portal in Russian language (Delfi).
III.2007-2010 Economic crisis, rise of	Economic crisis causes advertising market collapse. Due to the sharp decline of revenues several newspapers are closed. By the end of 2010 only 10 newspapers with general content. 2 of the three oldest dailies go out of business.

internet- portals	1. Second PSB TV channel ETV2 launched offering some programmes in Russian language, but again the initial plan was not as developed as a PSB TV channel in Russian language.
	2. No changes in radio media compared to previous period.
	3. The active growth of web-portals begins to have a negative influence on the printed press market. While in 2006 there were only two web-portals, now all newspapers have created web-portals on the basis of print content.
IV. 2011-2012 Modest development of the internet and TV. Stagnation of print media	1. Stagnation of Russian-language press market. The only daily newspaper issued only three times a week since June 2013.
	2. Seven TV stations which broadcast at least partly in Russian operate in Estonia. The quality of programmes depends on channels and may vary a great deal.
	3. Eight Estonian radio stations broadcast in Russian language, one of them is PSB, others are commercial.
	4. Web portals took strong position in Russian-language media market in Estonia. By the end of 2012 there were eight Russian-language news media portals in Estonia. Growth of importance of social networks in terms of popularity and trust of users, especially among the under 35s.
V. 2013-2016 Active development of internet-platforms and social networks, 2 newspapers closed in 2016.	1. Reduction in Russian-language press-market. Weekly “Den za Dnjom” and “Postimees na russkom yazyke” issued 3 times a week are closed for financial reasons.
	2. Internet portals rus.delfi.ee and rus.postimees.ee become the most popular among Russian-speaking media audience.
	3. Internet platform of public service TV channel in Russian language etvpluss.err.ee became more viewed than the channel itself
	4. Social networks (facebook, vkontakte, odnoklassniki) became a part of media system.
	5. PS TV channel ETV+ in Russian language launched

Source: author

A major trend during the last four periods described in Table 1 is that the circulation of all print-press has been decreasing since 1998. By the end of 2016 the last daily with a circulation of 5500 copies (Table 2) was closed. Within four years its circulation halved, a drop that can be explained by popularity of the internet-resource rus.postimees.ee, where a great deal of information is available.

2.4. PSB traditions in Russian language in Estonia

The former Director General of Estonian Radio Peeter Sookruus envisioned Estonian Radio as a public service broadcaster producing and broadcasting three programs in Estonian and one in Russian. Such a vision was in accordance with the linguistic distribution of the population. This proportion - one to four - was achieved in public service radio already in 1993, when in addition to the three programs in Estonian a Russian-language program was launched (Study 2: 258). Public service Radio 4 was once the indisputable leader among Russian-language radio stations, but commercial music radio stations are gaining market share (Study 1: 143).

Research conducted by Lauristin (2004, 2009), Lauk (2008), Lõhmus et.al. (2004) underlines the special role of public service broadcasting (PSB) for small countries like Estonia. It is especially important in markets where private broadcasting is commercialized that PSB maintains its role as a reliable and trustworthy source of information. The roles of public service media in the public sphere, pluralism and democratic development are described as the crucial ones (Study 2: 264).

In the Soviet-era ETV produced news, and primarily cultural and educational programmes in the Russian language during the 1960s and the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, the offer of pan-Union Russian programmes intensified. In the context of the USSR, local Russian language programmes were never targeted to a minority, because the speakers of the non-native language among the population of the “Republics” of the Union were never considered as minorities (Study 2: 265).

From 1980 to 1991, ETV produced approximately only one hour of domestic programmes in Russian (including news) daily (Šein, 2005). Few television journalists spoke Russian as their mother tongue, and the content they produced was limited mainly to music, culture and

education, and locally produced analytical journalism in Russian was non-existent (Study 2: 265-266).

From 1990, with the exception of news programmes, the ETV's Russian programmes were aired in the daytime on Saturdays and the scope of the content ranged from information to entertainment. Programme time was less than 200 hours per year. Due to the lack of viewers, attempts were made to find a better time slot, and in the middle of the 1990s a programme strip in Russian was created to be aired before the prime news in Russian on work days (Study 2: 266).

At the beginning of the 2000s, the recession led to a crisis in all activities, including the production of Russian programming in ETV. By April 2000, the budget for Russian programmes had decreased five-fold since 1998, and just one half-hour programme per week was possible (PRTM, 2000) (Study 2: 266). The budgetary crisis resulted in cutbacks in several programming sectors and produced changes in management logistics. The Russian-language programme unit of ETV was closed. The production of Russian programmes was initiated on the orders of ETV's programme management, mainly in the form of co-productions between independent producers and ETV. It was primarily the production of the news that continued to be financed from ETV's budget. The remainder of the in-house production received funding from the Integration Foundation or from other public funds. Part of the schedule was acquired from Russia, and re-runs of some Estonian programmes with Russian subtitles were also scheduled for Russian time slots (Study 2: 266).

Trapido (2000: 112) stressed that the majority of the print media of Estonia appears to have comparatively low effectiveness as a promoter of the integration process. He suggested that the local Russian television has a huge but until now poorly used potential for becoming an arena for dialogue between Estonians, non-Estonians and the Estonian state.

Estonian Television's position among the Russian-speaking audience was complicated. A summary of the arguments supporting and opposing PSC TV- channel in Russian is as follows:

FOR: The channel will support the enhancement, development and servicing of social, political and cultural citizenship; it will offer adequate and reliable information to all citizens

and inhabitants; it will lessen tensions between the two ethnic groups; it will serve as a balancing force to Moscow, lowering national security risk.

AGAINST: To attract a Russian audience (extra) high quality programmes are needed. It is too expensive; sufficient additional financial resources are unavailable; whatever the programme, it is unrealistic to expect it will attract the attention of the Russian audience due to stiff competition from abroad; there is no need for such a channel – in the long run, all citizens will understand Estonian and will therefore be capable of watching Estonian programmes; if state financed propaganda is required, these programmes should be ordered from, and aired on, PBK.

As result of all these discussions, the Public Service TV channel in the Russian language ETV+ was launched in September 2015. The audience of ETV+ is slowly increasing, in June 2018 its audience share was 2.4%, whereas share of PBK was 12.4%⁶. ETV+ is often blamed by leaders of public opinion for its soft content, which cannot attract the attention of a broader audience. A longer period of time is needed to estimate how much this TV-channel is needed among the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, and what its significance may be.

⁶ <https://etvpluss.err.ee/v/sobytiya/1daf7cdf-dee1-47bf-b60f-677c18d3c48a/novyy-rekord-etv-dolya-efimoy-auditorii-telekanala-vyrosla-do-24> (Retrieved 25.09.2020).

3. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF JOURNALISTIC ROLE PERFORMANCE

Much of the scientific debate on the professional roles of journalists tackles the gap between their role conception and their actual role performance (Hanitzsch, 2011; Weaver & Willnat, 2012; Tandoc, 2013; Mellado & Van Dalen, 2014; Hellmueller & Mellado, 2015; Mellado, 2015). According to Hallin (2017: xi) “role conceptions are normative understanding of what journalism is and what it should do”. Mellado (2015: 597) understands journalistic role performance as ‘the collective outcome of concrete newsroom decisions and the style of news reporting, influenced by different internal and external forces that potentially inhibit but can also enable the practice of journalism’. The idea is that normative conception of professional journalistic roles can differ from the practical performance of journalists. This gap can influence different factors such as the news routine, organizational values, journalists’ relationships with those in power, and their perception of their audiences. Hallin (2017: xii) argues that ‘role conceptions are multiple, not mutually exclusive and sometimes conflicting’ and that journalists have to balance different tasks they have to fulfil, since news organizations they work for simultaneously serve commercial interests and the interests of the public at large.

In summary, journalists adopt the specific professional and ethical values of the news organization during their daily practice and these are realized in the performance of their job. Simultaneously, journalists can face an inner conflict when their ideal perception of journalistic tasks and ethical values differs from their actual performance.

I will now present the main conceptual terms which I apply in my study.

3.1. Main concepts

Minority language media. Matsaganis, Katz and Ball-Rokeach (2011: 8) emphasize that there is no consensus on which terms to use when talking about the media for minority groups. “*Minority media, immigrant media, diasporic media, and community media* are terms often used along with or instead of the term *ethnic media*. Term preferences are often related to how different countries understand differences between people based on their ethnic or racial background”.

Such terms as *immigrant media, diasporic media, and community media* seem not to be suitable for the Russophone media in Estonia. The Russophone minorities who settled in Estonia before Estonia regained independence in 1991 do not perceive themselves as

immigrants or diaspora. The term *community media* refers to a kind of closed group with a degree of common identity, that promotes some specific interests of one given community – characteristics not exactly applicable to the Russian minority in Estonia.

Cormack and Hourigan (2007) use the term *minority language media*, as the most crucial aspects they point out are the maintenance and promotion of the minority language within ethnic minority groups. In Study 3 and in the Summary ('Cover text') of the thesis the term *minority language media* is applied, for the reason that media markets and informational spaces in Estonia are divided into two along the linguistic lines – the Estonian-language information space and the Russian-language information space.

Several scholars (Jakobson, 2002; Husband, 2005; Jufereva, 2005, 2015; Georgiou, 2006; Cormack & Hourigan, 2007) report that minority language journalists often perform like a bridge between communities, playing a crucial role in preserving the cultural heritage and language of the ethnic minority, delivering the political agenda of the host state to minorities while at the same time preserving and defending the interests of ethnic minority.

Information spaces. Vihalemm, Lauristin, Kalmus, Vihalemm (2017) who studied media consumption in the period 2002-2014 emphasize that the Estonian and Russophone populations live in *different information spaces*. These two main audience groups in Estonia are linguistically separated. In practice this means that the Russophone population consumes not only Russophone media in Estonia but Russia's media channels even more, a fact which can influence their perceptions of the socio-political situation in Estonia and be an obstacle to their integration into Estonian society.

Professional roles of journalists. Different scholars who studied the professional roles of journalists within Western journalism tackled different aspects. Cohen (1963) and Weaver & Wilhoit (1986) examined intrinsic factors which influence the perception of professional roles among journalists. A range of scholars (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986, 1996, 1998; Weaver, Beam, Brownlee, Voakes & Wilhoit, 2007; Tandoc, Hellmueller & Vos, 2012; Waisbord, 2013) demonstrated that not only individual, but also organizational aspects are important concerning the conception, perception and performance of journalistic roles. A range of comparative studies (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986, 1996; Patterson & Donsbach, 1996; Weaver,

Beam, Brownlee, Voakes, & Wilhoit, 2007; Hanitzsch et al., 2011; Weaver & Willnat, 2012) have demonstrated that journalists see information dissemination as their main role in society.

Journalistic role performance. According to Hanitzsch (2017) journalists understand and perform their roles at two different levels, as “role orientations” (normative and cognitive) and “role performance” (practiced and narrated). Therefore, in their daily work journalists have to balance four extremes: “what journalists ought to do, what they want to do, what they really do in practice, and what they think they do” (Hanitzsch, 2017: 1).

Several studies have confirmed that these four aspects often get into conflict and then journalists may face ethical dilemmas (Tandoc, 2013; Mellado, Hellmueller, Donsbach, 2017; Hanitzsch, 2017).

Next, I will introduce the most influential studies on journalistic roles, including studies on journalistic role performance, and I will elaborate further on the conceptual model which serves as the basis for the present study.

3.2. Studies on professional roles of journalists

The professional roles of the journalist is one of the key issues in journalism studies. Journalists’ professional roles are also reflected in their values, ideals and journalistic practice (Zelizer, 1993; Shudson, 2003; Mellado et al., 2017). Research on the professional roles of journalists has undergone a remarkable evolution since the 1960s up to today. In general, I would argue that the earlier studies determined *what professional journalistic roles are* and serve as the base for contemporary concepts of journalistic roles.

Cohen (1963) proposed two models of journalists: the “neutral reporter” and the “reporter as participant”. Studies in the 1970s highlighted the existence of two basic types of journalists: the *gatekeeper* and the *advocate* (e.g., Tunstall, 1970; Janowitz, 1975). Janowitz (1975: 618-626) pointed out that according to these models, the main aspiration of the *gatekeeper* model was “to distinguish fact from opinion”. The division into ‘active’ vs ‘neutral’ triggered a range of studies on journalists’ involvement in politics and business (Kalogeropoulos, Mølgaard, Svensson, van Dalen, Vreese, Albæk, 2015). Though these two models were not able to describe the complexity of professional roles of journalists, they did serve as the basis for further work on understanding the roles.

McQuail (2010: 283), explaining the essence of these two types of journalistic roles, stated that “the first refers to ideas of the press as informer, interpreter and instrument of government (lending itself as channel or mirror), the second to the traditional ‘fourth estate’ notion, covering ideas of the press as representative of the public, critic of government, advocate of policy and general watchdog”. Weaver and Wilhoit (1986) in their survey of US journalists proposed three general types of professional journalistic roles – ‘interpreter’, ‘disseminator’, and ‘adversary’. The role of ‘interpreter’ included the necessity for journalists to analyse and interpret complex socio-political issues, to investigate the government’s delivery of information quickly and to reach a broad audience. The role of ‘adversary’ could be applied both to government and business with the aim of assisting them to achieve their goals. It is necessary to point out that these roles were not represented purely in the perceptions of journalists and were most often combined. Weaver and Wilhoit (1986: 116) mentioned that “only about two percent of the respondents are exclusively one-role oriented”. Further Weaver and Wilhoit (1996) improved their typology and extracted four general types of professional journalistic roles – the ‘disseminator’, ‘adversary’, ‘interpreter-investigator’, and ‘populist-mobilizer’. The general idea of earlier studies on journalistic roles that all researchers highlighted was the neutral and informative role, as the most preferable among journalists (Johnstone et al., 1976; Shudson, 1978; Tuchman, 1978).

Christians et al., (2009) elaborated on previous studies by proposing four general journalistic roles: the ‘monitorial role’ monitors the interests and actions of those in power and makes them accountable to the citizens; the ‘facilitative role’ aims to provide the citizens the possibility to take part in socio-political discourse in the media; the ‘radical role’ seeks possibilities to bring changes into society; the ‘collaborative role’ facilitates the government achievements of its aims.

Hanitzsch (2011) on the basis of Bourdieu’s (1984) field theory and the approaches of Weaver and Wilhoit (1996) and of Donsbach and Petterson (2004) who distinguished ‘passive-neutral’, ‘passive-advocate’, ‘active-neutral’, and ‘active-advocate’ roles, presented four global professional milieus among journalists across the globe. These are the ‘populist disseminator’, ‘detached watchdog’, ‘critical change agent’, and the ‘opportunistic facilitator’. He uses the term ‘professional milieu’ to describe “different groups of journalists who share similar understandings of the social functions of journalism” (Hanitzsch, 2011: 478). Professional milieus can be also viewed as perceptions of professional roles and socio-

political orientations of journalists which influence the professional performance of journalists. Hanitzsch also pointed out that a detached watchdog milieu clearly dominates the journalistic field in most western countries, while the milieu of the opportunist facilitator reigns supreme in several developing, transitional and authoritarian contexts (Hanitzsch 2011: 477).

Mellado et al. (2013: 257) in their study on journalism students in seven countries demonstrate a number of similarities, but also important differences between “pre-professional cultures in journalism around the world.”

While students in all countries reject a loyalist approach and favor a citizen-oriented role, they also do so to different extents. Brazilian and Chilean students believe in the citizen-oriented and watchdog roles, whereas their counterparts in Australia, Switzerland, and the United States favor the consumer-oriented approach. Mexican and Spanish students on the other hand, while supporting the citizen-oriented role, reject the loyalist role comparatively less than students of the rest of the countries in the study (Mellado et al., 2013: 257). This indicates that even within university training, students adopt professional values of journalists which are related to the socio-political situation in a particular country.

The influential European research project Journalistic Role Performance (JRP), established in 2013, analyses journalistic cultures across the globe. This study “aims to deeply address the disconnection between professional and/or normative ideals and journalistic practices, explaining the gap between the importance that journalists and the media give to different professional roles, and journalistic role performance”⁷.

In the section that follows I will analyse how Russophone journalists perceive their professional roles in the socio-political context, and what their ethical values are. These perceptions of the professional roles and ethical values will be compared with those of journalists from other countries (Europe and Russia). The analysis of professional role perceptions and ethical values will be conducted within the frame of the Hanitzsch (2011) and Mellado (2017) model of three dimensions of journalistic roles.

⁷ <https://www.journalisticperformance.org/the-project> (Retrieved 02.08.2018)

3.3. Dimensions of professional journalist roles

Continuing the topic of professional conflicts which professional journalists could face while carrying out their work, we can refer to the Hanitzsch (2011: 481) model that describes how “general areas of disagreements over the social function of journalism relate to three general dimensions”.

According to Hanitzsch (2011) the dimension of ‘Interventionism’ refers to the practice of journalists who are socially committed, and at the other end of the scale stand neutral, professional and objective journalists. The second dimension ‘Power distance’ describes those types of journalists who act as representatives of “Fourth Estate” and at the other end of the scale those who support those in power. The third dimension tackles ‘Market orientation’ and describes the types of journalistic roles which are oriented towards the audience and informed citizenry and, at the other end of the scale, those who perceive the audience primarily as consumer.

Mellado’s model (2017: 948) which correlates to Hanitzsch’s model of three dimensions as “areas of disagreements over the social function of journalism (that) relate to three general dimensions” proposes to “operationalize role performance in three main domains or dimensions: ‘the journalistic voice in the news’, ‘the relationship between journalism and those in power’, and the way in which journalism ‘approaches the audience’”. These dimensions also demonstrate journalists’ divergent attitudes in the respect to their professional roles within described dimensions.

I consider that the models of three dimensions by Hanitzsch (2011) and Mellado (2017) provide the most comprehensive way to analyse how perception of professional roles and ethical values within these dimensions may manifest in journalists’ perceptions of their professional roles and their performance in carrying them out.

3.4. Professional ethics and role perceptions of journalists

Plaisance, Skewes and Hanitzsch (2012) examined ethical orientations of journalists from 18 countries. Their goal was to study “the extent to which the professional ethics of journalists varies across news organizations and societies, and the factors that explain these variations” (2012: 642). They found that in some countries professional journalists tend to rely on their own ethical standards and make ethical decisions according to the situation. This opinion was supported by the majority of journalists in China, Russia, Indonesia and Uganda. Journalists with longer experience of free press systems, for example in the USA and Germany, did not tend to agree with ethical decisions based on situations or personal views. The research reveals quite a controversial situation in terms of ethical values and behaviour among professional journalists across the globe. On one hand, universal ethical standards and values are familiar to all media professionals, but on the other following these values largely depends on the particular socio-political situation of their countries and the values of their news organizations.


Ryfe (2017: 127) argues that “today, journalism faces a series of severe economic and symbolic disruptions. In this rapidly changing environment, the question of whether and the extent to which journalists can adapt their routines is a pressing one”. I think that the present situation in journalism is somewhat similar to the situation described by scholars in the 1970s and 80s who stated that news was an output of routine choices made “within a context of shared values and inside organizational structures...” (Sigal, 1973: 2-3), and so ethical values established within given journalistic organization influence journalistic performance more than personal ethical beliefs and values. To sum up, a range of different factors, such as the socio-political situation, economic pressures, and the values of an organization have an impact on the professional routines and performance of journalists.

Below is presented a conceptual model (Figure 1), which describes the emergence of a discrepancy between the perception of professional journalistic roles and ethical values and the performance of professional roles and values. This model indicates that the same factors influence the perception and performance of journalistic roles and ethical values, but there discrepancy can occur between “how journalists see their roles and ethical values” and “how journalists realize them in practice”.

In the socio-political context of Estonia, the existence of two different information spaces significantly influences the perception and performance of the professional roles of Russophone journalists. For this reason, this factor was outlined separately in the model.

Despite the fact that technological changes also impact the perception and performance of professional journalistic roles, the present study only sketches them as background factors. The main attention is paid to the socio-political situation in general and to two different informational spaces in particular.

Figure 1. Perception and performance of roles and ethical values influenced by external factors



4. DATA AND METHOD

The choice of research method for this thesis became a kind of challenge. In order for the research questions to be answered it was not enough to use a single research method or one type of research method – quantitative or qualitative. First, I had to collect quantitative data on Russophone journalists' perceptions of their professional roles, tasks and ethical values. The aim of quantitative means was to study the frequencies of their perceptions of the professional roles and ethical values. Second, studying perceptions of their professional roles in the context of two information spaces and the process of societal integration was the aim of the qualitative research methods, such as an interview-in-depth, a semi-structured interview, an interview of a focus-group etc. In those ways for the purpose of the present study I combined both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Next will be presented data gathering and data analysis methods for each of the Studies.

Study 1 and Study 2. Data gathering and data analysing methods for Study 1 “Media for the minorities: Russian language media in Estonia 1990-2012” and Study 2 “Media for Russian language minorities: the role of Estonian public broadcasting (ERR) 1990-2013” were similar, as both articles examined the formation of the Russophone media market and the role of public television in terms of the informational space of the Russophone minority in Estonia. By referring to McQuail's (2010) theoretical framework of media institutions' influencers, these articles investigated how media policy, economic conditions and technology have influenced these processes. This analysis has confirmed the need to launch a PSB Russophone TV-channel that will support the enhancement, development and servicing of social, political and cultural citizenship.

First and foremost, text analysis was used to study the basic documents regarding regulation of broadcasting media. The following documents were analysed: the First Broadcasting Act, the Audio-visual Media Service Act, the Act for Estonian Public Broadcasting, the Audio-visual Media Service Directive, and European Union Media Policy.

Then, in order to study the economic trends to which Russophonemedia in Estonia were exposed in 1990-2013, the authors analysed annual financial reports of media companies as available in the Commercial Register. Earnings and losses of publishers of *Den za Dnjom* newspaper in 2001-2013 were analysed along with financial results of RussophoneTV channels in 1998-2013. In order to compare economic trends in the Russophone media with those in Estonian-language media, annual financial reports of Estonian-language TV

channels *TV3* and *Kanal2* were analysed along with some financial figures of Postimees. In order to obtain the complete picture of economic trends, reports of the advertising market in Estonia for 1996-2013 were also reviewed. During the analysis of financial indicators, answers to the following questions were sought:

1. How stable was the financial situation of the Russophone media in Estonia compared with the Estonian-language media?
2. What are the major financial risks faced by the Russophone media?

Then based on the information of the Estonian Newspaper Association were analysed what trends in circulation of the Russian-language media in 1998-2013 have been recorded. Answers to the question of how the circulation of the Russian-language media was changing in 1998-2013 and what could be the reasons for such changes were also sought. The circulation of Russian-language print outlets was in constant decline.

Study 3 “Minority language media and journalists in the context of societal integration in Estonia” examined Russian-language journalists’ perceptions of their professional roles and tasks in Estonia. The study also aimed at finding out how the journalists see their roles in connection with the integration processes among the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia.

A survey using a standardized questionnaire was conducted among Estonian Russophone journalists in January and February 2011 – the year of the latest integration monitoring report that was used to prepare the new *Strategy of Integration and Social Cohesion in Estonia* (for 2014-2020). The questionnaire was hand-delivered to all 140 journalists who worked full time in the editorial offices of Russian-language media outlets (the press, news portals, radio and television) with a 71% response rate. The SPSS programme was used for data analysis. For comparison, results of a 2006 survey (Maria Jufereva 2006, unpublished MA thesis) of 120 Russophone journalists were used. Additionally, from January till March 2012 in-depth interviews were conducted with 11 journalists with different work experiences and lengths of careers (Article 3: 57).

For this Study two research methods were combined, the qualitative and the quantitative. The first, qualitative research, was used to understand and explain the implicit reasons, opinions,

and motivations of Russophone journalists in Estonia. This method also helped us to uncover trends in the thoughts and opinions of these actors. We used the techniques of in-depth individual interviews as a common qualitative method.

The in-depth interviews were conducted with the following logic: the questions were divided into three groups, each corresponding to a particular research question. The first group of questions helped me to understand what factors contributed to the formation of the professional identity of Russophone journalists in the transition period. A second group of questions aimed to investigate how Russophone journalists perceive themselves as representatives of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia. Finally, the third group of questions asked about the ethical beliefs and values of Russophone journalists in Estonia (see Appendix 2).

The questions on the actual questionnaire were also divided into the same three groups. (See Appendix 1).

The respondents for the in-depth interview were chosen using the following criteria:

- journalists of the Internet news media with an audience of at least 60 000 sole users per week;
- journalists of national print media with a circulation of over 7 000 copies;
- journalists of radio stations with an audience of at least 96 000 listeners per week;
- journalists of the most popular Russophone TV channel with an audience share of at least 16.5% per month.
- men and women as reporters and editors were represented.

The quantitative data established general perceptions of the professional roles and tasks of the Russophone journalists. Since these perceptions could be more complex and details of the context of the journalistic practice were needed, in-depth interviews were analysed using qualitative text analysis.

Study 4 “Ethical orientations of Russian-speaking journalist in Estonia” aims to find out what the ethical beliefs and values are of Russophone journalists and what ethical violations they encountered most often in the course of their professional careers.

For the purpose of this study, I have combined qualitative and quantitative research methods. The qualitative in-depth individual interviews conducted in 2015 were used to understand and explain the implicit reasons, opinions, and motivations of Russophone journalists in Estonia.

The interviews were conducted with the following logic: the questions were divided into three groups, each group corresponding to a particular research question. The first group of questions helped me to understand what factors contribute to the formation of the professional ethics of the Estonian Russian-speaking journalists. The answers to the second group which I describe deal with practices of professional ethics. Finally, the third group of questions was devoted to the interdependence of professional ethics and politics in Estonia (Study 4: 14).

The second, quantitative research was used to quantify ethical beliefs and other defined variables, and to generalize the results from a larger sample of actors. I quantified the problem by way of generating numerical data. This data was transformed into usable statistics. More exactly, a standardized questionnaire was employed., This survey was conducted among Estonian Russophone journalists in January and February 2011.

The quantitative data established general perceptions of the professional ethical values and ethical problems of Russian-speaking journalists. Since these perceptions could be more complex and details and context of journalistic practice were needed, in-depth interviews were analysed using qualitative text analysis.

This selected research methodology, which combined qualitative and quantitative methods, has allowed the constraints on the standards and ethics of Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia to be understood (Study 4: 16).

5. RESULTS

The scope of the four studies, which analysed different aspects of work and the perceptions of Russophone journalists in Estonia, made it possible to trace the main changes in their perceptions of their professional roles during the transitional period 1991-2016. The findings of the thesis are based on the results of all four studies. Next, I will shortly present the main findings of each study and its contribution to the thesis.

The development of Estonian public broadcasting in terms of its historical, political, economic and technological transformations explained the context and conditions in which Russophone media and journalists had to act from 1991 to 2016. These developments are highlighted in Study 1 and Study 2. These studies provide a comprehensive overview of the development of Russian language media in such a small media market as Estonia's.

Study 3 focused on the perception and performance of professional roles among Russophone journalists in terms of two different information spaces. The main focus of the study was directed at how Russophone journalists positioned themselves in the context of socio-political integration and what their relations were both with those in power and with their audience.

The main ethical values shared by Russophone journalists are outlined in Study 4. The findings of this study also indicated the strong inner conflict in the journalists: they had to find a balance between their own ethical values and editorial policies. The most severe ethical violations occurred in Russophone media during election campaigns.

5.1. Sociological portrait and working conditions of Russophone journalists

The majority (52 %) of Russophone journalists in 2011 were in their 30s or 40s, with careers spanning less than 20 years which reflected the generational shift among journalists that took place in the early 1990s (cf. Lauk, 1996). Only 17 % of them had experience of working as journalists in the Soviet period and their number was decreasing. The younger generation, with about one third having a university degree in journalism, was more professionally educated than the older one. Also, female journalists were generally educated to a higher level than male journalists: 24 % of women had university education in journalism compared

to 10 % of men, and 30 % of women held a non-journalistic university degree as opposed to 20 % of men. Overall the Estonian journalistic field seemed to be gradually feminizing: in 2009 there were 58 % female and 42 % male journalists, while in 2006 there was parity between male and female journalists working in the Russophone media. By 2011 the proportions in Russophone media favored women to a remarkable extent (62 %). Interestingly, more women than men worked in online media (22 and 12 %, respectively), and more men than women worked in broadcasting (41 and 36 %, respectively) (Study 3: 57-58).

According to Country Report in the study Worlds of Journalism in 2016, the average Estonian journalist was a woman in her early 40s who holds a university degree in journalism and communication. On average in 2016 Estonian journalists were 40.94 years old ($s=11.11$), while half of all journalists were under 40.⁸

The greater feminization among Russophone journalists was probably one of the consequences of the economic hardships of those years, which hit the Russophone media even harder than it hit the Estonian media. As the Russophone press dramatically shrunk there were gradually fewer well-paid jobs, and the majority of monthly incomes after tax remained below €800 (75 %). More men than women had left the field and probably because of the low salaries. The salaries of Russophone journalists were clearly lower than those in the Estonian media. According to a survey of all Estonian journalists carried out in 2012–2013, ca 39% of Estonian journalists had a monthly salary under €800 (Study 3: 58).

Professional self-identification and commitment to the profession were relatively weak among Russophone journalists. Many (36 %) saw their job as journalists as temporary, as only a stage in their careers. Only 14 % of respondents answered a decisive “no” to the question whether they have considered switching to another field, while nearly 20% answered a clear “yes” and another 21 % had seriously thought about it (Article 3: 58). A television journalist with short working experience (Male, 23) put it like this:

If I succeed in making a career out of it, I'll stay in the profession. If not and I get a better offer somewhere else, I'll move to another sphere and won't regret it.

⁸ <http://www.worldsofjournalism.org/country-reports/> (Retrieved 02.08.2018)

According to the data of *Worlds of Journalism* project⁹, Estonian report, 16% of Russophone journalists had some other work or activities outside of journalism (such as DJ, interpreter, NGO activist). In Russia, for comparison, this tendency was even stronger: according to Pasti et al 2012, in 2008 in large cities half of the journalists had a second job and in small towns a third of them did (Pasti, Chernysh & Svitich 2012: 274).

The instability and economic difficulties of the Russophone media sector had obvious impact on journalists' job security. Job insecurity was reflected in journalists' mobility on the job market: almost a quarter (24 %) had been employed in four to nine different newsrooms, whereas 53% had had two to three jobs during their careers. It also appeared that men changed their jobs more often than women – among those who had had between four to nine different places of employment, 36 % were men and 19 % women (Study 3: 59).

Mutual comprehension of the other group's language forms the basis of interethnic communication. For Russophone journalists, knowledge of Estonian is an indispensable skill, as the majority of their sources speak Estonian. Indeed, 92% of the respondents admitted that Estonian was very important or quite important in their work. Although Estonian is the official language of the country and its everyday linguistic environment, only a quarter of the respondents said they were completely fluent in Estonian. In 2011, by contrast, 54% had said they could understand and speak Estonian. Journalists in their 30s and 40s in 2011 had the best level in Estonian (67 and 89% respectively were good or fluent in Estonian) (Study 3: 59).

According to the data obtained during the monitoring process in 2017, Estonian residents of other ethnic groups over the age of 15 evaluated their command of the Estonian language as follows: 41% had an active command (they could understand, it and speak and write Estonian fluently), 50% of the respondents had passive command of the language (they understood it and spoke a little, or understood it a little but did not speak), and 10% of the other ethnic groups had no command of the Estonian language at all. Compared to 2011 and 2015, the command of the Estonian language somewhat improved, mainly due to the decrease in the

⁹ <http://www.worldsofjournalism.org/country-reports/> (Retrieved 02.08.2018)

number of those who had no command of Estonian at all: while this share of respondents comprised 16% and 15% in 2011 and 2015 respectively, it reached only 10% in 2017.

Social networking with other ethnic groups was also linked to the command of the Estonian language. Among the residents of other ethnic groups whose social circle did not include Estonians, 37% had no command of Estonian and only 14% had active Estonian language skills, while among members of other ethnic groups who communicated with Estonians 66% reported an active command of Estonian, with only 3% having no Estonian at all. The data monitoring in 2017 suggested that social networking actually contributed to language skills, and it was the command of the Estonian language among members of other ethnic groups in particular (not Russophones) that improved most remarkably when international social networking increased.

Consequently, one can conclude that in 2018 almost all Russophone journalists had a fluent command of the Estonian language because it is one of the skills necessary for their work. All press conferences of government agencies are organized, and most press releases are provided in Estonian. Moreover, the number of government officials and opinion leaders tend to use only the state's official language in communication with journalists.

5.2. Transformations in Russophone journalists' perceptions of their professional roles

Journalists in Estonia had to redefine their professional roles and tasks after the cessation of censorship and ideological surveillance over the media. Russophone journalists had been in the position of the "official voice" of the ruling power even to a larger extent than Estonian journalists, as they represented the media in the language of pan-Soviet communication. The transformation from an ideological opinion-maker to an information provider occurred quite quickly in the early 1990s. Russophone journalists had clearly adopted the role of information disseminators (98%) and to a greater extent than they adopted the role of a "watchdog" (77%). They regarded the role of a "bridge" or "moderator" between the two linguistic communities as even more important. They emphasized the desire to discuss and explain the problems of Estonian society in the Russophone media (94%), to report on Estonian culture and history (84%) and to help the Russophone population to feel they belong to Estonian

society (83%), as the most important tasks for them as journalists. One of the interviewees, a former editor of a weekly (female, 32) expressed it in the following way (Study 3: 60-61):

The task of a Russian journalist is to identify the problem, to make the ethnic majority aware of it, to explain what its essence is and its possible consequences for Russian-speakers, and to suggest a solution or a compromise. Journalists should invite experts, public opinion leaders and people from different sections of society to a public discussion.

In spite of the fact that 98% of Russophone journalists stated that the role of disseminator of information is important, they did also adopt the interventionist role described by Hanitzsch (2011) and Mellado (2017). Russophone journalists saw their task as explaining to their audience the essence of whatever the social problem was and they said that they could indicate their own opinion on it from the way they discussed the issue. In that way journalists were acting not entirely as impartial and neutral observers but as active participants in societal processes.

According to Hanitzsch (2011: 487) for journalists in Russia the roles of opportunist facilitator (40%) and populist disseminator (39%) are more common. The opportunist facilitator refers to a readiness to cooperate with those in power that makes it less possible to act as a watchdog for the society, which is the preferred role for many Western journalists. In terms of Hanitzsch's model, in comparison with Russia's journalists Russophone journalists in Estonia adopted roles as critical agents of change. They regarded it as crucial to explain to the Russophone minority in Estonia the societal and political transformations, and they aimed to express and defend the interests of the Russophone minority in Estonia. Russian journalists did not face the task of expressing the interests of one's ethnic minority. Thus, Russia's journalists' perceptions of their professional roles were different from Russophone journalists' perceptions of their roles in Estonia.

According to Hanitzsch (2011: 481) the "audience approach" dimension indicates that Russophone journalists consider their audience as citizens first and "emphasize political information and mobilization as a means to create an informed citizenry". In the interviews journalists always stressed their socio-political role and even their social mission in respect to their audience, who can't consume information via Estonian media channels in the Estonian language.

According to Einmann (2010: 62) most often Estonian journalists described their role as a distributor of information, who, in turn, should be operative and objective. This also corresponds to the data in the *Worlds of Journalism 2012-2016, Estonian report*, where the role of distributor of information was the most common role. Therefore, we can see that both Russophone and Estonian journalists stressed the importance of reporting objective and impartial news, but Russophone journalists additionally adopted the position of interventionists.

Russophone journalists also pointed out the importance of the Russophone media in publicly discussing and interpreting these problems but they had doubts about the media's ability to improve the existing situation. The thesis indicated that while Russophone journalists adopted and fulfilled the interventionist role in the society, they did not believe that their position could have any real impact. 88% of respondents in 2011 thought that Russophone journalists and media had no influence whatsoever on the political decisions that are made in Estonia. In 2006, during the implementation of the first *Integration Programme* (2000–2007), slightly more journalists (14%) had believed that they could influence politicians' actions and decisions. Indeed, the degeneration of the Russophone news media in Estonia since the mid-2000s, and the fact that the Russian-speaking population preferred watching Russia's television channels, played a role here (Study 3: 61).

The thesis indicates that within the domain of “Power Relations” considered by Mellado (2017: 948-949) Russophone journalists could hardly perceive themselves as being in the position of watchdogs who monitor actors and institutions by denouncing their wrongdoings. As mentioned above, journalists felt that they could not hold “Power” accountable. This understandably caused a great sense of impotence and disappointment among journalists in the transitional period. It was a sort of *learned helplessness* in terms of social psychology, conditioned by trauma experienced as a result of the changed position of non-Estonians in Estonian society in general (Aarelaid 2006) and in their media in particular (Jakobson 2002). I may therefore assume that a number of Russophone journalists and media outlets took on the loyal-facilitator role acting as “loyal spokespersons and portraying institutional elites in a good light” (Mellado 2017: 949) and avoided the role of watchdog. This related to those media outlets and programmes which were supported by institutional, municipal or governmental structures.

Svetlana Pasti (2005: 89), who analysed two generations of Russian journalists, found that whereas the older generation continued to hold a cultivated view of journalism as an important societal task in natural collaboration with those in authority, the new generation was oriented towards the contemporary role of providing entertainment and perceived journalism rather as a PR role for the benefit of influential groups and people in politics and business. Despite their polarities, both generations of journalism accepted the political function of journalism as a propaganda machine for the power elite during elections and other important events.

Journalism in Russia had moved toward business and public relations, according to studies of journalists from St Petersburg (Pasti 2012). This marginalized quality journalism and the a sense of responsibility to serve the public interest, according to the study. The new generation of Russian journalists analyzed in this study was composed of pragmatic individuals who combine adapting to the political order with market orientation and prioritizing their individual careers (Pasti 2012).

5.3. Russophone journalists embodying the challenges of societal integration in Estonia

Journalists did not think that local Russophone journalism could substantially support integration and social cohesion in Estonia, and this attitude had not changed since 2006 (48% of respondents of both surveys thought that the Russophone media did not promote integration). On the other hand, 85% of them believed that people generally trusted Estonia's Russophone media, although sociological studies did not support this optimistic view (Study 3: 61).

Interestingly, the level of knowledge of the Estonian language played a significant role in how journalists saw and interpreted the integration process. 80% of those completely fluent in Estonian supported the idea that local Russophone media should help Russian-speaking people to integrate into Estonian society. The majority (71%) of those able to communicate in Estonian regarded reporting on joint integration activities and projects involving both

Estonians and Russians as important (Study 3: 61). One of the interviewees, a former editor of a weekly (Female, 32) expressed it as follows:

The minority is always an alternative, so the journalist representing the minority should articulate an opposite opinion.... In practice this means looking for key topics and problems that resonate, that need to be solved, and that directly influence the life of the minority, for example, education in the Russian language.... The task of a Russian journalist is to identify the problem, to make the ethnic majority aware of it, to explain what the core of the problem is and the possible consequences for Russian-speakers, and to suggest a solution or compromise.

Further, education seemed to influence attitudes towards the potential of Russophone media in promoting integration. Journalists with a non-journalistic university degree were the most sceptical (53% declared that the media did not promote integration). The most positive attitude appeared in the group with university degrees in journalism, 45% of whom believed that the Russophone media facilitated integration. However another 45% of those in the same group were of the opposite opinion (Study 3: 61).

According to Arnold and Schneider (2007: 118), the “representation of ethnic minorities in the media points to the ability of mass media to influence integration through the way it portrays social groups”. Russophone journalists felt a strong affiliation with the Russophone community: 78% of them saw expressing and defending the interests of Russian speakers as very important or important in their professional work. This attitude had actually strengthened since 2006, when only 38% emphasized this task as important. Journalists tried to reduce tensions in society by informing their audiences about Estonian issues and the Estonian-speaking audience about the issues of the Russophone community (Study 3: 61-62).

67% of the Russophone journalists surveyed regarded the translation of websites, television and radio programmes and other media material into Russian and English as important. Our survey results reflected Russophone journalists’ positive attitudes towards their role in building social coherence in Estonian society and helping to form a bridge between the two communities. The same attitude appeared in some of the in-depth-interviews. As a television journalist with 20 years of professional experience (Male, 53) put it:

Our role seems to be apparently to connect the two communities. We are wearing two hats. On the one hand, we have to keep an eye on what is going on in Russia, and we should tell people about that. On the other hand, it is necessary to observe how the Russian-speaking community interacts with the Estonian-speaking one. How realistic this role is, is another issue.

Simultaneously the Estonian-language media scarcely informed the Estonian community about the problems and views of the Russophone community and were not effective as a channel of communication with the state institutions. This leads to the effect described by Riggins: “As a reaction to perceived neglect and misrepresentation in mainstream media, ethnic journalism usually tends to be biased. Exercising considerable self-censorship, it concentrates on topics flattering to the minority group” (Riggins 1992: 284).

5.4. Perceived responsibilities of Russophone journalists

The Study indicated that almost all Russophone journalists in 2011 felt responsible for their own work and for the performance of their outlet. Half of the journalists felt responsible for the work of Russophone journalism as a whole in Estonia. In comparison with 2006 (Jufereva 2006) the sense of responsibility for Russian-language journalism among Russophone journalists grew, as in 2006 only 43% of journalists felt responsible for Russophone journalism as whole.

In the study journalists were asked if they feel responsible for their own work and its consequences, for the work of their editorial board, for Russophone journalism in Estonia and for Estonian journalism in general. It transpired that younger journalists with shorter working experience shared the greater sense of responsibility for Russian-language journalism as a whole, whereas more experienced journalists were not so preoccupied with such a sense of responsibility.

It is remarkable that among journalists with more than 20 years of working experience the majority did not feel any responsibility at all for the work of the Russophone media.

The research also indicated that education influenced the perception of responsibility among journalists. The biggest percentage (61%) of those who felt responsible for the performance of Russophone journalism in Estonia was among those journalists who had had higher education (see Figure 4). Professional training at university promotes a better understanding of the societal roles of journalism, and one consequence is that those with a higher education in journalism share the same values, which include seeing minority-language journalism as important. Nevertheless, some journalists spoke about the lack of possibilities for such training, and others about the lack of interest in it among the younger generation:


Many journalists today have no education and – the most terrible thing – no wish to study. They say: What for? I have had enough! (Female 60, former daily editor)

A large number of occasional people ... came to Russian journalism. The general standard of professionalism has dropped/.../ All serious collaboration for example with schools of journalism conducted by the BBC and the Nordic Council, are over (Male 56, editor)

Among journalists with higher education qualifications other than in journalism, 30% felt no responsibility for the work of Russophone journalists at all, whereas among journalists with higher education in journalism only 12% shared that view.

Knowledge of the Estonian language also influenced perceptions of responsibility for Russophone journalism. Journalists who were fluent in Estonian (51%) felt responsible for Russophone journalism (see Figure 2) while 50% of Russophone journalists with weak knowledge of Estonian indicated that they did not feel at all responsible for the Russophone media. Therefore, I assume that younger journalists with higher education in journalism and who are fluent in Estonian had a stronger sense of responsibility. Because the number of the Russophone journalists who were fluent in the Estonian language, who monitored Estonian-language media and had contacts in the Estonian-speaking environment had increased in recent years, it can be assumed that the number of the Russophone journalists who felt that they were personally responsible for Russophone journalism in Estonia had also increased.

Figure 2. Sense of responsibility of Russophone journalists for Russophone journalism



Sense of responsibility of Russophone journalists for Russophone journalism as a whole according to their fluency in the Estonian language, % of respondents. N=100a

Still we should admit that good knowledge of the Estonian language did not mean complete acceptance of the content and values of its media. A television reporter (Female, 36) put it as following:

The better I know Estonian, the less I like Estonian media. It often makes superficial and offensive conclusion about the life of Russians here.

The 2011 Integration Monitoring Report confirmed that the majority of both Estonian and Russian-speaking people expected the Russophone media to cover life in Estonia in more depth and breadth and to better explain the context of events (Vihalemm, P., 2011: 166). The journalists interviewed did not see the picture as encouraging, however, and pointed to several disturbing aspects, such as insufficient communication between Estonian and Russian-speaking journalists, the attempts by each side to cover up negative facts about itself, and the lack of interest in each other's culture or history. This resulted in the journalists of the two communities being largely isolated from each other.

The situation has recently changed. As only a limited number of jobs are available in the Russophone media, Estonian-speaking and Russophone journalists increasingly work in integrated editorial offices; numerous Russophone journalists have also found jobs in Estonian-language publications.

5.5. Ethical dilemmas of Russophone journalists

The results of this thesis show that the most frequent violation of journalism ethics in Russophone journalism was political bias. Russophone journalists pointed out that the lobbying of political parties and biased information were the main ethical problems faced by Russophone journalism. More than half the journalists pointed out that often politicians' or entrepreneurs' names had been deliberately blackened in the Russophone media and citations had been distorted. A journalist with 20 years of professional experience (male, 40) put it in the following way:

Damage to one's reputation in Russophone media could happen in two ways. First, because of a poor standard of journalistic professionalism. Second, we can't exclude the fact that such cases can occur because of political pressure. Incidents that can damage one's reputation become more frequent during election campaigns. The latter points to a low level of political culture in Estonia and insufficient independence for journalists. This situation is typical both for Estonian and Russophone journalism.

The present study indicates that in comparison with 2006 (Jufereva 2006) the whole picture of ethical violations among Russophone journalists either has not changed much up to now. In 2006 the majority of journalists stated that such ethical violations as the publication of confidential information were a violation of one's name and reputation. In the open-ended questions of the questionnaire such violations as the publication of unchecked information, the violation of an author's rights, the absence of the balance of different views, and biased information were mentioned. One can conclude that Russophone journalism could be seen as a political battlefield fought over in the interests of politicians. One of the interviewees, an editor of a weekly (Male, 50) said:

One can clearly see that major publications support the politics of one or another party, which is especially obvious in the pre-election period. It is during that period that articles that one can consider as political orders are being published. A journalist may

not refuse to follow the editorial policy as he or she may can simply be fired. This is why conflicts between their own personal ethical norms and editorial policy are not infrequent among journalists.

This study's research findings confirm that Russophone journalists faced ethical dilemmas in their work and 51% of respondents stated that the lobbying of political parties and the dissemination of biased information took place in the Russophone media. This confirmed my assumption that according to the Mellado model (2017) a proportion of Russophone journalists took on the "loyal-facilitator" role. Mellado (2017: 949) stated that "the loyal-facilitator role manifests itself in two ways: journalism cooperates with those in power by acting as loyal spokespersons, supporting official policies, and portraying institutional elites in a good light, or by focusing on the nation-state, emphasizing national triumphs and prestige".

In the case of Russophone journalists it can be assumed that they faced many ethical dilemmas before elections and during political campaigns. Study 4 on ethical values and norms of Russophone journalists in 2011 were conducted because that year had the highest number of complaints against media outlets in Estonia in comparison with other years (107 in total). Though the majority of the complaints was raised against Estonian media outlets, several dealt with controversial publications in Russian-language media (Study 3: 16). Numerous biased articles had been published highlighting positive attributes of some political actors and parties and the wrongdoings of their political rivals.

Several journalists pointed out in their interview that they had experienced some sort of interference from the editorial board. As the Editor-in-chief of a weekly newspaper (Male, 31) put it:

There is an influence, even pressure. As our newspaper is a part of conglomerate... it is clear, that we cannot afford to attract too much criticism from above.

So, the strategy of behaviour they reported was actually self-censorship. A television editor (Male, 56) said:

Maybe reporters would like to express their opinion, but they have to express the media's editorial opinion. So, reporters are free to select safe topics such as condoms. But they

are not as free at all to select sensitive topics. There is self-censorship: they understand, what is permitted and what is forbidden.

This serves as an example of how professional ethical violations arose from convergence, commercialization (Jõesaar, 2011: 12) and tabloidization. Not only the dominant media, but also media produced for the minority reflected the commercial ideology and expressed the interests of the elite. Journalists found themselves trapped in the middle of a situation in which they understood that on the one hand that they could not serve the public interest as they would like to, but on the other they were obliged to act according to the demands of their bosses if they wanted to keep their jobs. Why do people not stand up against such unwanted influence? Male 32, 14 years in profession, MA in journalism, editor-in-chief answers that question:

“Partly from despair. I can’t do anything else. /.../. I didn’t consider such options as emigrating to another country”.

“If you try to develop some topics as a freelancer and then try to sell them, it is not realistic, you won’t survive. You have to work according to the editorial expectations”.

(Male 53, TV editor)

Almost one third said that they knew when journalists took bribes. The situation had changed for the better compared to 2006. Jufereva (2006) pointed out that 63% of Russophone journalists in 2006 claimed that it was possible to bribe them and 33% actually witnessed bribes being accepted, whereas in 2011 only 23% reported that they witnessed it at their present employment. My study revealed that more than half of journalists with longer working experience (more than 20 years) witnessed their colleagues accepting a bribe. Only a few journalists with working experience (less than 3 years) witnessed such cases. The Study also showed that journalists without higher education in journalism witnessed bribes more frequently compared to those with higher education in journalism. As stated previously the experience of higher education in journalism influences the ethical perceptions of journalists, as these journalists are aware about the Code of Ethics and follow these rules in their daily work.

The majority of Russophone journalists (83%) were not members of the Estonian Journalists’ Union. The number of Russophone members had decreased, as in 2006 23% of them (Jufereva, 2006) were members of this professional organization. Perhaps the fact that the

Union did not have much authority among Estonian journalists in general (Harro-Loit & Loit, 2014) partly explained why the numbers of Russophone members had dropped. However, Russophone journalists had not established their own organisation. Einmann (2010: 26) points out that membership of such a professional organization influences journalists' perceptions of their professional roles, so this lack of membership of a professional organization has serious implications.

A Code of Ethics is another important element of journalists' professional self-identification. However, 30% of Russophone journalists were not familiar with the Code of Ethics of Estonian Journalism.

Another indicator of professional identity is a certain responsibility for one's professional community and for one's own actions as a member of a "guild". For the majority of Russophone journalists, personal ambitions and loyalty to their employers seemed to be more important than any sense of professional fellowship. A weekly editor (Male, 50) put it as follows:

I see, that many journalists are ready to compromise their own consciences and follow the editorial policy. In this case these are the rules of the game and they are followed.

Similar attitudes were also observed Europe-wide. In a 2011–2012 survey of journalists in 14 countries, 95 percent of respondents stressed they had responsibility for their own actions and consciences, yet over 80 percent reported they had responsibility for their publisher. (Jufereva & Lauk 2015: 58).

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to analyze the main changes in the perception of professional roles and ethical values of Russophone journalists in Estonia that occurred during the process of societal and political transformation in Estonia from 1991 to 2016. This study also considered societal integration in Estonia and the impact of Russophone journalists on the process. The four articles and summary of the thesis address different aspects of the Russophone media in Estonia. I analyzed how journalists' perceptions of their professional roles are intertwined with ethical values. Empirical data enabled the main changes in perception of the professional roles and ethical values of Russophone journalists to be discovered and to be compared with the perceptions of other European journalists and journalists from Russia.

The literature review established the theoretical basis from which the performance, perception of their professional roles and ethical values of journalists could be examined allowing for them to be analysed in relation to Russophone journalists through the prism of two different informational spaces.

As mentioned above, Russophone journalists in Estonia were expected to mediate the process of societal integration and act like a bridge between the two communities. Previous studies on the Russophone media and its roles in society were conducted from the perspectives of media outlets and from the perspective of the audience. Previously no studies had focused on Russophone journalists' perceptions of their professional roles and tasks. The first such study was conducted within an unpublished Master's thesis (Jufereva 2006). I realized that I could help to fill the gap by continuing to examine the subject in my PhD thesis. The importance of the topic lay in the fact that Russophone journalists are involved in how the content and development of the Russophone media are determined.

Next I provide answers to the research questions of this thesis and compare how journalists from Russia and European countries see their respective roles. I also outline the limitations of this study and suggest ideas for future research in the field of Russophone media and journalists in Estonia.

There were two central questions for the study was to answer:

1. What changes in Russophone journalists' perceptions of their professional roles and in their professional ethical values occurred during the process of societal and political transformation in Estonia from 1991 to 2016?

In Study 1 and Study 2 I described historical and societal contexts within which Russophone media developed from 1990 to 2013. I focused on technological, organizational and

economic changes that the Russophone media had undergone during those years. The changes had a great influence on the perception of the professional roles of Russophone journalists in Estonia. Russophone media and journalists faced a range of serious challenges as workers:

- First, they had to redefine their position in society after Estonia regained independence in 1991. Journalists found themselves in the role of media representatives of the ethnic minority.
- Second, Russophone journalists had to work in a highly unstable job-market, where media outlets could collapse, salaries were not paid on time and were also smaller in comparison with those of their Estonian colleagues.
- Third, the government and the public at large had particular expectations that Russophone journalists would positively influence societal integration.
- Fourth, the roots of the emergence of two different information spaces in Estonia can be found in the historical development of Estonia and its return to independence in 1991, which had a marked influence on the media market and its actors.

Study 4 focused on the professional values and ethics of Russophone Estonian journalists and studied what ethical dilemmas they encountered most often in the course of their professional careers. The main finding was:

- 51% of respondents confirmed that the lobbying of the media by political parties and biased information were the main ethical problems faced by Russophone journalists.

2. The second question of the study aimed to analyse how Russophone journalists see their roles and tasks concerning societal integration in Estonia.

Study 3 focused on Russophone journalists' perceptions of their professional roles and tasks. Journalists marked out which professional roles and tasks they saw as more important in the course of their work. The main findings in this section were:

- Russophone journalists in Estonia clearly adopted the interventionist role of socially committed and motivated involvement.

- Russian-speaking journalists considered their audience first as citizens and emphasized political information and mobilization as a means to create citizens who are informed.
- Russophone journalists with a professional journalistic education saw the task “to promote the process of integration” as being more important than did journalists who had not had higher education.

6.1. ‘Watchdog’ role reconsidered

The thesis showed that Russophone journalists have clearly adopted the ‘interventionist’ and ‘critical agent role’. While 77% of them pointed out the importance the role of ‘watchdog’, remarkably bigger number of Russophone journalists (94%) indicated that they saw their role as agents of social integration in Estonia, who had to discuss and explain the problems and issues of Estonian society to the Russophone population. 83% of Russophone journalists said that their task was to help the Russophone population to integrate into Estonian society, a task prescribed for them by the State Integration Program, and journalists did stress the importance of transmitting the information and of being active players and leaders of public opinion.

The situation of journalists being agents of social integration is not common for Western countries with developed democracies. According to Hanitzsch in such countries as Germany, Austria, USA, Switzerland and Australia journalists tend to see their professional role first of all as “detached watchdog”. Russophone journalists in this respect can be compared with journalists from Turkey and Egypt, for whom the ‘critical change agent role’ is also crucial in their perceptions (2011: 487).

According to Hanitzsch (2017) the majority of journalists in Russia had adopted two roles – ‘populist disseminator’ and ‘opportunistic facilitator’. The role of ‘detached watchdog’ did not have precise degree of importance for them. By contrast, 77% of Russophone journalists in Estonia pointed out the importance of this role in society. This finding made the difference in this respect between journalists in Russia and Estonian Russophone journalists very clear.

Therefore, I suggest that Russophone journalists in the transition period aimed to help the Russophone population to integrate into society. Valeria Jakobson (2002: 43), who studied

the role of the Estonian Russian-language Media in the integration of the Russian-speaking minority into Estonian Society, described the situation as follows: “The long-term effect of ethnic minority media is neither assimilation nor cultural preservation, but a compromise between two extremes”¹⁰. The present thesis showed that this situation is relevant nowadays. It confirmed that the Russophone media did not aim to actually assimilate the Russian-language minority into Estonian society: Russophone journalists saw their professional roles as agents of integration being rather to inform their audience and help them to adapt in the context of societal changes in Estonia. At the same time Russophone journalists regarded playing the role of informational bridge between two information spaces as an important aspect of the societal integration of the Russian-language minority.

6.2. Serving contradictory interests in society

Within the ‘Power Relation’ dimension considered by Mellado (2017: 948-949) Russophone journalists adopted the ‘loyal-facilitator’ role. 51% of respondents confirmed that lobbying by political parties and biased information were the main ethical problems of Russophone journalists. I argue that journalists survived serious inner ethical dilemmas. On the hand they were aware of the importance of the watchdog role in a democratic society, but on the other the pressure from the editorial office made them follow editorial policy.

I assume that the ‘loyal-facilitator’ role could be the enforced choice for many Russophone journalists, as the Russophone media market in Estonia is really small and they faced a difficult dilemma – to continue working as journalists or to change their profession. Many journalists indeed changed careers, moving from journalism to politics and joining different political parties. Most of them stand for the integration of the Russophone minority into Estonia society (as do I, for example).

For various reasons the role of ‘detached watchdog’ did not become crucial for the Russophone journalists. First, there was disappointment at their professional impotence to influence political decisions. Second, a number of Russophone journalists found themselves in the loyal-facilitator role, as several media outlets and programs were financially supported

¹⁰ <http://tampub.uta.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/67197/951-44-5313-1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
(Retrieved 02.08.2018)

by municipal or governmental structures. Third, Russophone journalists in comparison with Estonian colleagues had to work in a very limited job market, which made it impossible to choose another job with more appropriate editorial politics and values. Thus, many Russophone journalists had to follow editorial practice and strategy.

According to different studies, Russia's journalists did not seem to face similar inner conflict. According to Country Report on Russia, from 2012 to 2016 "Politically more assertive roles, on the other hand, were supported by only a minority of respondents. The following traits belong to these roles: influencing public opinion, setting the political agenda, and acting as adversary of the government." Hanitzsch (2011: 487) stressed that the majority of Russian journalists took on the role of 'opportunistic facilitator' and 'populist disseminator'. This indicates that Russian journalists did not see themselves in the position of 'watchdog' for society, a role which is natural for journalists from western countries. The main difference for Russophone journalists in comparison with Russian ones is that Russophone journalists took upon themselves the role of critical change agents who thought it important to defend the interests of the Russophone minority and help them to have a greater sense of belonging to Estonian society, a role for which there is no corresponding situation for Russian journalists. At the same time there is greater press freedom in Estonia than in Russia, and in Estonia there is no such thing as a press of opposition to the ruling party.

I can also stress the difference in role perceptions among Estonian and Russophone journalists in Estonia. According to the Country Report on Estonia in the 2012-2016 Study: "There seems to be no agreed defined professional role to guide Estonian journalists for providing information the people need to make political decisions, motivating people to participate in political activity, supporting national development and setting the political agenda. Generally, Estonian journalists tend to perceive their role as a critical but neutral observer who tries to serve as many people as possible, accepting also the right of people to express their views. Traditionally they see themselves as educators of the public. They have different views on the activist type of role".¹¹ This data also correlates with the results of this thesis and indicates that Estonian journalists and Russophone journalists perceived their professional roles differently. For Estonian journalists, who were not concerned with the

¹¹ https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29706/1/Harro-Loit_Lauk_Country_report_Estonia.pdf (Retrieved 02.08.2018)

topic of societal integration to be a detached observer, to educate the audience and provide news that attracts the largest audience are fairly unanimously seen as the most important roles, while on the other hand Russophone journalists stressed the importance of the role of agent of societal integration.

6.3. Limitations and further research

In this study I wanted to combine the economic and social-political backgrounds and trace changes which took place through the period 1991-2016. Second, this period allowed me to present the main trends in the Russophone media and perceptions of professional roles and tasks among Russophone journalists. Within this period of research important technological changes took place which also influenced journalists' perceptions of their professional roles, and in particular the emergence of social networks which have been integrated into media systems. Within the present thesis the influence of social networks on Russophone journalists were not investigated at all, but it is important for the Russophone journalists' perceptions of their professional roles to be studied through the prism of technological developments within the media including the emergence of different interactive media platforms.

Considering two different information spaces in relation to the process of societal integration, the present situation has not much changed while this research has been carried out so the data presented in the research are relevant today.

While the development of professional journalistic identity and the perception of professional journalistic roles and ethical values are in constant progress, I consider it important to continue research into Russophone journalists' perceptions of their professional roles in the country. I argue that a new generation of journalists who have entered the profession in recent years represent a kind of new journalistic identity which is highly influenced by on-line technology and new professional standards in journalistic culture. Simultaneously the task of informing and promoting societal and political inclusion among the Russian-language minority in Estonia still remains important for Russian-speaking journalists.

I use the perspective of the Mellado (2017) model for studying contemporary journalists and pay particular attention to the dimension of "Power Relations". One can assume that the younger generation of Russophone journalists has actively taken it upon themselves to adopt the "watchdog" role and stepped away from the "loyal-facilitator" which was quite typical for the journalists from 2011-2016. Young journalists with a better command of the Estonian

language have more job possibilities in the Estonian media so they don't face the same pressures of a small Russophone media market. I suggest, that the younger generation of Russophone journalists can have different views on societal integration.

SUMMARY

This thesis confirmed that the professional identity of Russophone journalists in Estonia underwent major transformations between 1991 and 2016. These changes became the foundation of the present-day media in the Russian language and keep shaping the journalists' professional standards which are largely responsible for shaping the media space, public opinion and to some extent the political agenda. Russophone journalists aimed not only to inform the Russophone minority about socio-political events in the country but also to contribute to its inclusion and active participation in social and political processes – the process of integration in society.

The thesis outlined historical, economic and political aspects of developments in the Russophone media in Estonia. These aspects also influenced Russophone journalists' perceptions of their professional roles. The term of “two different informational spaces” was considered in this dissertation as a central relevance to the minority language media since, as this thesis confirmed, Russophone journalists assumed the role of “information bridge” between two information spaces existing in Estonia, and they stressed the importance of the role in defending and representing the interests of the Russophone minority.

Russophone journalists's perceptions of their professional roles were investigated with the aims of three dimensions elaborated by Mellado (2017). These were: 1. Journalistic Voice, 2. Power Relations, 3. Audience Approach. This model was enlarged with the dimension of ethics. The starting point of the theoretical framework of this thesis was that ethical values serve as the basis for journalists' professional roles and standards.

The thesis confirmed that Russophone journalists who worked in the beginning of the 2000s perceived their roles as quite contradictory. On one hand they realised the importance of their mission in society – to assist Russophone minorities to integrate into Estonian society. On the other they confirmed their impotence in influencing political processes and political agenda. Many Russophone journalists adopted the “loyal-facilitator” role which led to inner conflict and made several of them change profession in favour of politics, so that they could have more influence and better defend the interests of the Russophone minority.

Four original articles tackle different aspects of the Russophone media in Estonia, answering questions about changes in Russophone journalists' perceptions of their roles and assessing their ethical values and views.

This thesis serves as the basis for future research in the field of Russophone journalists' perceptions of their professional roles. The process of integration has led to the emergence of joint Estonian-Russophone editorial offices and programmes on TV and radio, which definitely influence journalists' views of their profession.

YHTEENVETO

Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien toimittajien ammatillisen identiteetin muotoutumista Virossa vuosien 1991 ja 2016 välillä. Tutkimus osoittaa, että heidän ammatillinen identiteettinsä joutui kohtaamaan suuria muutoksia. Näiden muutosten pohjalta muodostui nykypäivän venäjänkielisen median perusta Virossa. Toimittajien ammattistandardit ovat suurelta osin vastuussa mediatilan, yleisen mielipiteen ja jossain määrin poliittisen asialistan muokkaamisesta. Venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvat toimittajat eivät ainoastaan ole pyrkineet tiedottamaan äidinkieleltään venäläistä vähemmistöä Viron sosiopoliittisista tapahtumista vaan myös edistämään tämän vähemmistön sisällyttämistä sekä aktiivista osallistamista sosiaalisiin ja poliittisiin tapahtumiin – siis prosessia yhteiskuntaan integroitumiseksi.

Tämä tutkimus kokoaa yhteen historiallisen, taloudellisen sekä poliittisen kehityksen näkökulmat Viron venäjää äidinkielenä puhuvien mediassa. Nämä näkökulmat vaikuttavat myös venäjää äidinkielenä puhuvien toimittajien käsityksiin ammatillisista rooleistaan. Ilmausta ”kaksi erilaista informaatioaluetta” pidetään tässä väitöskirjassa keskeisenä vähemmistökielten tiedotusvälineille, sillä kuten tutkimus vahvistaa, venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvat toimittajat ovat ottaneet ”informaatiosillan” roolin kahden Viron informaatioalueen välillä, ja korostavat tämän roolin merkitystä venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvan vähemmistön intressien puolustamisessa ja edustamisessa.

Tutkimuksessa selvitettiin venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien toimittajien ammatillisesta roolistaan käsin tekemiä havaintoja kolmen Melladon (2017) kehittämän näkökulman avulla. Näitä ovat: 1. toimittajan ääni, 2. voimakkaat suhteet ja 3. yleisön asenne. Tätä mallia laajennettiin ottamalla lisäksi huomioon eettinen näkökulma. Tämän tutkimuksen teoreettisen viitekehyksen lähtökohtana ovat eettiset arvot toimittajien ammatillisten roolien ja standardien perustana.

Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että ne venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvat toimittajat, jotka työskentelivät 2000-luvun alussa, asennoituivat rooliinsa melko ristiriitaisesti. Yhtäältä he ymmärsivät päämääränsä tärkeyden yhteiskunnassa: auttaa venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvia vähemmistöjä integroitumaan virolaiseen yhteiskuntaan. Toisaalta he omalta osaltaan samalla myös vahvistivat kyvyttömyyttään vaikuttaa poliittisiin prosesseihin ja poliittiseen asialistaan. Monet venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvat toimittajat omaksuivat ”uskollisen fasilitaattorin” roolin, mikä johti sisäiseen konfliktiin ja sai monet heistä vaihtamaan

ammattia voidakseen vaikuttaa ja puolustaa paremmin venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien vähemmistöjen etuja.

Väitöskirjaan sisältyvät neljä artikkelia käsittelevät Viron venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien median eri puolia vastaamalla kysymyksiin venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien toimittajien käsitysten muutoksista rooleissaan ja arvioimalla heidän eettisiä arvojaan ja näkemyksiään. Tämä tutkimus toimii perustana tuleville tutkimuksille koskien venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien toimittajien näkemyksiä heidän ammatillisesta roolistaan. Integroitumisprosessi on johtanut vironkielisten ja venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien toimittajien yhteisten toimitusten syntymiseen sekä lukuisiin TV- ja radio-ohjelmiin, ja kaikilla niistä tulee epäilemättä olemaan vaikutuksensa toimittajien näkemyksiin ammatistaan.

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APPENDICIES

Appendix 1

Questionnaire for Russian-Speaking Journalists in Estonia, Conducted in January-February 2011

Dear colleague! Could you please answer the questions in the following survey? The responses will be used as the basis for a doctoral thesis titled "Russian-speaking journalists' perception of professional roles and objectives in Estonia". The survey is anonymous and will take about 15 minutes to fill in. Thank you in advance for your help.

Maria Jufereva, journalist and doctoral student

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I. PROFESSION: "JOURNALIST"

*What does the profession called "journalist" mean for you personally?

(1 – yes, 2 – rather yeas than no, 3 – rather no than yes, 4 – no, 5 – cannot comment)

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| 1. Opportunity for the fulfilment of my creative potential | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 2. Opportunity to become famous | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 3. This is just a stage of my career path | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 4. A way to make money | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 5. Something else: | 1 2 3 4 5 |

* How important for yourself do you consider the following journalist's objective?

(1 – very important, 2 – rather important, 3 – not very important, 4 – not important, 5 – cannot comment)

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| 6. Providing high-quality up-to-date information in real time | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 7. Influencing people's minds and attitudes | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 8. Helping people in specific everyday situations | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 9. Offering entertainment and leisure options | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 10. Investigating controversial matters; exposing corruption | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 11. Protecting and expressing the interests of Russian-speaking residents of Estonia | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 12. Helping Russian-speaking residents feel that they are a part of Estonian society | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 13. Bringing up current problems in Estonian society | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 14. Giving a coverage of what is published by mass media in Estonian | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 15. Giving an overview of Estonian culture and history | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 16. Giving a coverage of joint projects with the participation of Russians and Estonians | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 17. Attempting to change society for the better | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 18. Something else: | 1 2 3 4 5 |

* From your point of view, how important are the following issues for Russian-speaking population?

(1 – very important, 2 – rather important, 3 – not very important, 4 – not important, 5 – cannot comment)

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| 19. Getting education in the Russian language in Estonia | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 20. Obtaining Estonian citizenship | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 21. Insufficient Estonian language proficiency | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 22. Economic difficulties | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 23. Inequality in treatment by government institutions | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 24. Inequality in employment opportunities | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 25. Unemployment | 1 2 3 4 5 |

26. Which of the above issues is the most relevant for you at the moment?

(Please state the number of the question on the empty line below)

.....

*** From your point of view, which role does Russian journalism play in Estonia?**

(1 – yes, 2 – rather yes than no, 3 – rather no than yes, 4 – no, 5 – cannot comment)

27. Influences politicians' decisions	1 2 3 4 5
28. Brings up current problems of Russian-speaking residents	1 2 3 4 5
29. Helps people navigate what is happening in the country	1 2 3 4 5
30. Allows people to express their opinions	1 2 3 4 5
31. Fosters the process of integration	1 2 3 4 5
32. Impedes the process of integration	1 2 3 4 5
33. Something else:	1 2 3 4 5

34. From your point of view, how much do people trust mass media in the Russian language in Estonia?

- Trust fully	1
- Sometimes they do, sometimes not	2
- Mainly do not	3
- Do not trust at all	4
- I cannot comment	5

35. From your point of view, how important is an education in the field of journalism for a journalist?

- Very important	1
- Rather important	2
- Not very important	3
- Not important at all	4
- Cannot comment	5

***Which professional characteristics do you consider important for a journalist?**

(1 – very important, 2 – rather important, 3 – not very important, 4 – not important, 5 – cannot comment)

36. Skill at writing journalistic texts	1 2 3 4 5
37. Skill at conducting interviews	1 2 3 4 5
38. Ability to navigate massive torrents of information	1 2 3 4 5
39. Ability to grasp the essence of the problem quickly and express it	1 2 3 4 5
40. Ability to keep track of everyday events	1 2 3 4 5
41. Lack of bias	1 2 3 4 5
42. Empathy	1 2 3 4 5
43. Broad-based knowledge	1 2 3 4 5
44. Responsibility	1 2 3 4 5
45. Self-sufficiency	1 2 3 4 5
46. Self-criticism	1 2 3 4 5
47. Credibility	1 2 3 4 5
48. Ability and willingness to interact with audience	1 2 3 4 5
49. Personal writing or spoken style	1 2 3 4 5
50. Excellent command of the Russian language	1 2 3 4 5
51. Command of the Estonian language	1 2 3 4 5
52. Command of a variety of journalism genres	1 2 3 4 5
53. Competent use of modern equipment and software	1 2 3 4 5
54. Ability to work within time constraints	1 2 3 4 5
55. Management skills	1 2 3 4 5
56. Time planning and management skills	1 2 3 4 5
57. Skills for creating a network of permanent information sources	1 2 3 4 5
58. Multimedia content creation skills (in online mass media)	1 2 3 4 5
59. Something else:	1 2 3 4 5

60. What is the degree of your satisfaction with your own professional skills?

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| - Absolutely satisfied | 1 |
| - Rather satisfied than not | 2 |
| - Rather not satisfied than satisfied | 3 |
| - Not satisfied | 4 |
| - Cannot comment | 5 |

*** What creates difficulties in your everyday work?**

(1 – constantly, 2 – sometimes, 3 – very rarely, 4 – never, 5 – cannot comment)

- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 61. Difficulties expressing my thoughts in writing or speech | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 62. Poor command of the Estonian language | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 63. Poor command of foreign languages | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 64. Lack of time (no time to study a topic thoroughly) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 65. Insufficient knowledge of the theory of journalism | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 66. Insufficient knowledge of the topic I am covering | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 67. Competition with colleagues | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 68. Workplace stress | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 69. Insufficient technical skills for working in online mass media | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 70. Something else: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

*** Which languages are you proficient in?**

(1 – fluent command, 2 – sufficient command, 3 – can understand, but cannot speak, 4 – no command, 5 – cannot comment)

- | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| 71. Russian | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 72. Estonian | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 73. English | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 74. German | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 75. Something else: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

76. How important is the Estonian language in your work?

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| - Extremely important | 1 |
| - Rather important | 2 |
| - Not very important | 3 |
| - Not important | 4 |
| - Cannot comment | |

77. Are you a member of the Estonian Union of Journalists?

- | | |
|-------|---|
| - Yes | 1 |
| - No | 2 |

78. If “yes”, how long have you been a member?

- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| - Less than 1 year | 1 |
| - 1–4 years | 2 |
| - 5–10 years | 3 |
| - Over 10 years | 4 |

*** As a journalist, do you feel responsible for the following?**

(1 – greatly, 2 – to some extent, 3 – slightly, 4 – not at all, 5 – cannot comment)

- | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| 79. Your work and its consequences | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 80. The work of your editorial office | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 81. Russian journalism in Estonia | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 82. All journalism in Estonia | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

83. Which topics/sphere do you primarily cover? (Please choose only one option)

- | | |
|--|----|
| - I cover all topics / there are no specific topics that I work with | 1 |
| - Politics | 2 |
| - Culture | 3 |
| - Life of society | 4 |
| - Investigative reports | 5 |
| - Sports | 6 |
| - Business / finance / labour market | 7 |
| - Entertainment | 8 |
| - Foreign news | 9 |
| - Crime / court / police | 10 |
| - Common people's stories | 11 |
| - Science/technology | 12 |
| - Monitoring online comments | 13 |
| - Editing and posting news online | 14 |
| - Other (please specify) | 15 |

***From your point of view, which types of professional misconduct have been the case among Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia?**

(1 – often, 2 – sometimes, 3 – seldom, 4 – never, 5 – cannot comment)

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 84. Tarnishing someone's reputation deliberately | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 85. Disclosing confidential information | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 86. Paying to the source in order to receive confidential information | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 87. Presenting oneself as someone else (deceiving the source in order to get information) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 88. Going to work for an organization in order to get inside information | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 89. Using a hidden camera and microphone | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 90. Altering photos | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 91. Altering quotes | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 92. Providing biased information | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 93. Lobbying the interests of a political or commercial organization | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 94. Concealing important information from people | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 95. Using someone's materials without citing the source | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 96. Something else: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

97. Are you familiar with the Estonian journalists' code of ethics?

- | | |
|-------|---|
| - Yes | 1 |
| - No | 2 |

98. Are you aware of any cases when a journalist has received a bribe or some other reward for publishing or refraining from publishing certain information?

- | | |
|-------|---|
| - Yes | 1 |
| - No | 2 |

99. If "yes", when did it happen?

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| - During your current employment | 1 |
| - During your work in journalism | 2 |

II. Place of employment and employment relations

100. How many editorial offices have been your employers during your work in journalism?

- | | |
|--|---|
| - Only the current place of employment | 1 |
| - 1 editorial office | 2 |
| - 2–3 editorial offices | 3 |
| - 4–5 editorial offices | 4 |
| - 6–9 editorial offices | 5 |

- Over 10 editorial offices 6

101. Your primary place of employment

- Daily newspaper 1
- Weekly newspaper 2
- Magazine 3
- Public radio station 4
- Commercial radio station 5
- Public television channel 6
- Commercial television channel 7
- News agency 8
- Internet portal (online publication) 9
- Freelancing for various mass media channels 10
- Something else: 11

102. Do you contribute to some other mass media channel?

(1 – yes, regularly, 2 – yes, from time to time, 3 – no)

- Daily newspaper 1 2 3
- Weekly newspaper 1 2 3
- Magazine 1 2 3
- Radio 1 2 3
- Television 1 2 3
- Internet portal 1 2 3

103. Apart from work in journalism, do you do any other work that you do not consider journalism?

- Yes 1
- No 2

If you are a freelance journalist, please proceed to question 121

104. What is your position?

- Executive editor (head of department) 1
- Editor 2
- Reporter 3
- Commentator 4
- Show host 5
- News presenter 6
- Online portal editor 7
- Producer 8
- Other: 9

105. What are the terms of your employment contract?

- Full-time employment, open-term employment contract 1
- Part-time employment, open-term employment contract 2
- Full-time employment, fixed term contract (for instance, for 6 months) 3
- Part-time employment, fixed term contract 4
- Project-based contract concluded for one-time job 5
- Other: 6

***Please rate your satisfaction with the following aspects of your job on a scale of one to five.**

(1 – absolutely satisfied, 2 – reasonably satisfied, 3 – more or less satisfied, 4 – not satisfied, 5 – absolutely not satisfied)

106. Salary	1 2 3 4 5
107. Fringe benefits (company car, company phone, etc.)	1 2 3 4 5
108. Leadership style	1 2 3 4 5
109. Relationships with colleagues	1 2 3 4 5
110. Equipment (workplace comfort, information technology, etc.)	1 2 3 4 5
111. Opportunities to be proactive	1 2 3 4 5
112. Interesting and purposeful work	1 2 3 4 5
113. Opportunities for advancement	1 2 3 4 5
114. Opportunity to choose topics and interpretation focus	1 2 3 4 5
115. Feeling needed and irreplaceable in the organization	1 2 3 4 5
116. Workload (number of tasks) and responsibility	1 2 3 4 5
117. Freedom of monitoring and organizing your own work	1 2 3 4 5
118. Conditions for your personal development as a journalist	1 2 3 4 5
119. The editorial office's compliance with ethical principles	1 2 3 4 5
120. Opportunities for attending advanced qualification courses	1 2 3 4 5

121. Please assess your overall satisfaction with your work

- Absolutely satisfied	1
- Reasonably satisfied	2
- Insufficiently satisfied	3
- Absolutely not satisfied	4
- Cannot comment	5

122. Are you going to seek other employment in the nearest future?

- Yes	1
- No	2
- Cannot comment	3

123. Do you feel that you can easily lose your job?

- Yes	1
- No	2
- Cannot comment	3

124. Would you like your child to become a journalist? (Please answer even if you do not have children)

- Yes	1
- No	2
- Cannot comment	3

125. Have you ever considered changing your occupation?

- Yes, I am planning to change my occupation in the nearest future	1
- Yes, I was considering it but decided to stay in journalism	2
- No, I have always wanted to be a journalist	3
- Cannot comment	4

126. How long have you been working as a journalist?

- Less than 3 years	1
- 3–5 years	2
- 6–10 years	3
- 11–20 years	4
- Over 20 years	5

127. Your age?

- Under 21	1
------------	---

- 21–29	2
- 30–39	3
- 40–49	4
- 50–59	5
- 60 or older	6
128. Gender?	
- Female	1
- Male	2
129. Your education?	
- Secondary	1
- Vocational secondary education	2
- Incomplete higher education	3
- Higher education in journalism	4
- Higher education in another field	5
- I am in the process of completing my education	6
If “yes”, please state the facility	

The following two questions are meant for journalists with higher education in journalism.

*** What did higher education in journalism give you?**

(1 – to a great extent, 2 – to some extent, 3 – insignificantly, 4 – not at all, 5 – cannot comment)

130. Journalistic sense of mission	1	2	3	4	5
131. Basic theoretical knowledge in journalism	1	2	3	4	5
132. Practical skills (writing [online] articles, production of radio and TV shows)	1	2	3	4	5
133. Skills in recognizing and using various journalistic genres	1	2	3	4	5
134. Understanding the journalist’s role in society	1	2	3	4	5
135. Skills for navigating contemporary society and journalism	1	2	3	4	5
136. Something else:	1	2	3	4	5

137. Have the skills and knowledge obtained in the course of education been of any use in your work?

- Yes, absolutely	1
- Fractionally	2
- Very little	3
- Not at all	4
- Cannot comment	5

138. Your monthly salary (net)?

- Below 300 EUR	1
- 300-400 EUR	2
- 401-500 EUR	3
- 501-600 EUR	4
- 601-700 EUR	5
- 701-800 EUR	6
- 801-900 EUR	7
- Over 901 EUR	9

139. Are you a member of a political party?

- Yes	1
- Not	2

Thank you for responding! The survey is anonymous!

Appendix 2

Programme for In-Depth Interviews with Journalists, Conducted from January till March 2012

1. What changed in journalism in the Russian language after 1991? What kind of journalists came to work? What was different about them compared to those of the so-called Soviet school? What has happened to those young journalists by now?
2. Should online journalism follow the same standards and criteria as traditional journalism?
3. What is more characteristic of the journalism in the Russian language: the American model (the editor decides on the focus, and the reporter has little decision-making authority) or the German model (no-one changes the content of the texts)?
4. Have you felt pressured by owners or advertisers? If yes, please specify.
5. How have you been affected by the “economic thinking”? Should one write stories that sell better? What sells well?
6. Is your work rather creative or “industrial”?
7. Why are you working in journalism?
8. What are the main challenges of your work?
9. How would you assess the work of your colleagues in your publication? How professionally qualified are they? Do you feel responsible for their work?
10. How would you assess the work of your counterparts in other publications? How professionally qualified are they? Do you feel responsible for their work?
11. How would you assess the professional competence and quality of the journalism in the Russian language as a whole? Which problems are there? How can the situation be improved?
12. What are the primary professional roles of a contemporary journalist representing a national minority in Estonia?
13. What does being a journalist from a national minority mean for you personally? How do you interpret your role? Is there such a role?
14. In your opinion, what is integration in the context of Estonia?
15. Can mass media influence the integration process and how exactly?
16. Do you follow mass media in the Estonian language regularly?
17. What can you say about the content? Does the content differ from that in the press in the Russian language?
18. Would you like to work in a publication in the Estonian language?
19. In your opinion, is the Russian-speaking public sufficiently informed about the life of Estonian society through mass media in the Russian language?
20. In your opinion, is the Russian-speaking public sufficiently informed about the life of Russian-speaking people through mass media in the Russian language?
21. Does the information awareness of the Russian-speaking population need to be improved? In which aspects specifically?
22. How can the information awareness of the Russian-speaking population be improved?
23. Does the information awareness of the Estonian-speaking population need to be improved? In which aspects specifically?
24. How can the information awareness of the Estonian-speaking population be improved?

25. Is cooperation between mass media in the Russian and Estonian languages necessary?
26. What could be the format of such cooperation?
27. How often does your publication cover the issue of education in the Russian language, and what is the focus of the coverage?
28. How often does your publication cover cultural events in Estonia, and what is the focus of the coverage? Could you name the most important cultural events of the past six months?
29. How often does your publication cover joint projects with the participation of Russians and Estonians, and what is the focus of the coverage? Which projects are these?
30. Do you regularly follow mass media in Russia? Which namely?
31. Which major changes in Estonian journalism in the Russian language in the past years would you make a note of?
32. How would you assess the professional competence of the journalism in the Russian language in Estonia?
33. Do you have an ideal vision of what the journalism in the Russian language in Estonia should be like?
34. How would you assess the independence of the journalism in the Russian language in Estonia? If it is dependent, who is it dependent upon?
35. How would you assess the credibility and social standing of the journalism in the Russian language?
36. How would you assess your own weight as a journalist representing national minorities?
37. What would you like to be doing in 10 years? What should “good” journalism in the Russian language be like? Please give 4–5 statements.
38. What are the basic principles that guide your work?
39. Do you try to avoid certain topics? Which exactly? Why?
40. Dilemmas
41. Could you recall some ethical dilemmas that you have had to face in your work?
42. What kind of conflict of interests is the most common for your work?
43. What does “truth” mean for you as a professional? Have you ever been untruthful? Have you ever given misinformation?
44. Have you had to make amends?
45. What does “the protection of human dignity” mean for you?
46. Do you feel that your personal principles contradict those common for journalism? Which principles are these?
47. How could these contradictions be eased?
48. Have you ever given the coverage of a topic with bias? Why?
49. Have you heard about cases when a Russian-speaking journalist was offered a bribe? Could you describe such cases?
50. Have you ever been offered a bribe? What was your reaction?
51. How would you assess the extent to which Russian-speaking journalists adhere to ethical values?
52. Are you familiar with the Code of Ethics and the code of good practice of the Estonian Public Broadcasting?

Appendix 3

Programme for In-Depth Interviews with Journalists, Conducted from November till December 2015

I. Russian-speaking journalists in transition period

1. Name, age, position, publication, how long have been working in the sphere, education
2. What changed in journalism in the Russian language after 1991? What kind of journalists came to work? What was different about them compared to those of the so-called Soviet school? What has happened to those young journalists by now?
3. Should online journalism follow the same standards and criteria as traditional journalism?
4. What is more characteristic of the journalism in the Russian language: the American model (the editor decides on the focus, and the reporter has little decision-making authority) or the German model (no-one changes the content of the texts)?
5. Have you felt pressured by owners or advertisers? If yes, please specify.
6. How have you been affected by the “economic thinking”? Should one write stories that sell better? What sells well?
7. Is your work rather creative or “industrial”?
8. Why are you working in journalism?
9. What are the main challenges of your work?
10. How would you assess the work of your colleagues in your publication? How professional are they? Do you feel responsibility for their work?
11. How would you assess the work of your counterparts in other publications? How professionally qualified are they? Do you feel responsibility for their work?
12. How would you assess the professional competence and quality of the journalism in the Russian language as a whole? Which problems do you see there? How can the situation be improved?

II. Russian-speaking journalists representing Russian-speaking minority in Estonia

13. What are the primary professional roles of a contemporary journalist representing a national minority in Estonia?
14. What does being a journalist from a national minority mean for you personally? How do you interpret your role? Is there such a role?
15. In your opinion, what is integration in the context of Estonia?
16. Can mass media influence the integration process and how exactly?
17. Do you follow mass media in the Estonian language regularly?
18. What can you say about the content? Does the content differ from that in the press in the Russian language?
19. Would you like to work in a publication in the Estonian language?
20. In your opinion, is the Russian-speaking public sufficiently informed about the life of Estonian society through mass media in the Russian language?
21. In your opinion, is the Russian-speaking public sufficiently informed about the life of Russian-speaking people through mass media in the Russian language?
22. Does the information awareness of the Russian-speaking population need to be improved? In which aspects specifically?

23. How can the information awareness of the Russian-speaking population be improved?
24. Does the information awareness of the Estonian-speaking population need to be improved? In which aspects specifically?
25. How can the information awareness of the Estonian-speaking population be improved?
26. Is cooperation between mass media in the Russian and Estonian languages necessary?
27. What could be the format of such cooperation?
28. How often does your publication cover the issue of education in the Russian language, and what is the focus of the coverage?
29. How often does your publication cover cultural events in Estonia, and what is the focus of the coverage? Could you name the most important cultural events of the past six months?
30. How often does your publication cover joint projects with the participation of Russians and Estonians, and what is the focus of the coverage? Which projects are these?
31. Do you regularly follow mass media in Russia? Which namely?
32. Which major changes in Estonian journalism in the Russian language in the past years would you make a note of?
33. How would you assess the professional competence of the journalism in the Russian language in Estonia?
34. Do you have an ideal vision of what the journalism in the Russian language in Estonia should be like?
35. How would you assess the independence of the journalism in the Russian language in Estonia? If it is dependent, who is it dependent upon?
36. How would you assess the credibility and social standing of the journalism in the Russian language?
37. How would you assess your own weight as a journalist representing national minorities?
38. What would you like to be doing in 10 years?

III. Ethnical values and beliefs

1. What should “good” journalism in the Russian language be like? Please give 4–5 statements.
2. What are the basic principles that guide your work?
3. Do you try to avoid certain topics? Which exactly? Why?
4. Dilemmas
5. Could you recall some ethical dilemmas that you have had to face in your work?
6. What kind of conflict of interests is the most common for your work?
7. What does “truth” mean for you as a professional? Have you ever been untruthful? Have you ever given misinformation?
8. Have you had to make amends?
9. What does “the protection of human dignity” mean for you?
10. Do you feel that your personal principles contradict those common for journalism? Which principles are these?
11. How could these contradictions be eased?
12. Have you ever given the coverage of a topic with bias? Why?

13. Have you heard about cases when a Russian-speaking journalist was offered a bribe? Could you describe such cases?
14. Have you ever been offered a bribe? What was your reaction?
15. How would you assess the extent to which Russian-speaking journalists adhere to ethical values?
16. Are you familiar with the Code of Ethics and the code of good practice of the Estonian Public Broadcasting?

Appendix 4

Table 1. Circulation of Russian-language outlets 1998-2016 (in thousands)

	1998	2000	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2016
Molodjozh Estonii	7.2	4.9	7.7					
Estonia / Vesti Dnja	8.7	7.9	8.5	9.2				
Vesti Nedelja Pljus	21.2	23.5	16.1					
Den za Dnjom (weekly)	16.7	19.4	14.5	17	13	13.2	10.4	11,3
(closed autumn 2016)								
Delovyje Vedomosti								3
(weekly)	4.8	4.8	5.3	6	5.8	4.8	7	
Molodjozh Estonii								
Subbota	9.9	7.1	11.3	11.5				
MK Estonii (weekly)				14.3	11	11.1	12.9	12,5
Postimees na Russkom Jazyke								5,5
(closed autumn 2016)				17.1	12.3	11.5	9.6	

Source: Newspaper industry statistics by Estonian Newspaper Association. Retrieved April 25, 2014 from <http://www.eall.ee/ajalehetootus/index.html>.


Appendix 5

Table 3. Number of radio channels in Estonia

	1995	2013	2016
Private radio channels in Estonian	41	21	35
Private radio channels in Russian	2	8	6
Public service radio programs in Russian	1	1	1
Public service radio programs in Estonian	3	4	4

Appendix 6


Figure 1. Russian language radio stations, listeners in thousand



Source: TNS Emor radio audience survey 2004-2016

Appendix 7

Figure 2. Russian-speakers' share of viewing of the main Russian language TV channels in 2003-2016



Source: TNS Emor Peplemeter Survey 2003-2012 and TNS EMOR, Teleauditooriumi Mõõdikuuring 2016

LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

MEDIA FOR THE MINORITIES: RUSSIAN LANGUAGE MEDIA IN ESTONIA 1990–2012

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ABSTRACT: This article aims to explore the ways in which Estonian public broadcasting tackles one specific media service sphere; how television programmes for language minorities are created in a small country, how economics and European Union media policy have influenced this processes. The article highlights major tensions, namely between Estonian and Russian media outlets, Estonian and Russian speakers within Estonia and the EU and Estonia concerning the role of public service broadcasting (PSB). For research McQuail's (2010) theoretical framework of media institutions' influencers – politics, technology and economics – is used. For analyses media regulatory acts and audience surveys are accomplished with media institutions financial data from the beginning of 1990s until 2012. This kind of approach gives a comprehensive overview of development of Russian language media in such a small media market as Estonia is.

KEYWORDS: public service broadcasting, Russian language media, European media policy, Estonia

INTRODUCTION

From the end of the 1980s, Eastern and Central European countries had the noble aim of changing from the communist regime towards free democratic welfare states. Among the important aspects of that development were changes in the media systems. In transition states, commercial broadcasters were founded, state-owned print media was mainly privatized, state radio and television companies became public service broadcasters. ‘Europeanization’, as defined by Jakubowicz (2009), took place. The overall aims of Pan-European media policy were preserving cultural diversity and safeguarding media pluralism. For doing so there are two main approaches to organizing the media – the free market liberal and collectivist-statist strategies (Curran, 1997: 139). Coming from the communist regime, an alternative, the collective provision, was difficult to introduce due to the experience from the recent past. Therefore, the first strategy was introduced mainly in CEE countries, especially in the Baltic states. The free market liberal approach was supported by European Union media policy, which is a common market ideology. Several researchers claim that economic welfare is a dominating value in communications policy (Picard, 2002a; Croteau and Hoynes, 2001: 21; Murdock and Golding, 1989: 192). Private ownership of media was also idealized by ruling politicians (Jõesaar, 2011). The former Television Without Frontiers Directive (TVWF), now the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), does not take into account country-specific circumstances such as size of the national (and media) market, economic conditions, cultural and historical specific context. However, these are important factors which have a strong influence on media development and performance (Lowe et al., 2011). Implementation of the same EU legal framework in different circumstances gives different results in different member states (Jakubowicz, 2007a).

Knell and Srholec (2007) have analysed the post-communist countries using a Varieties of Capitalism framework defined by Hall and Soskice (2001). Their finding provides a solid cornerstone for further media analyses – Estonia is described as a country with a liberal market economy. Bohle and Greskovits’ (2012) and Buchen’s (2007) researches come to the same conclusions after comparing Estonian and other Eastern European countries economies.

SMALL MARKET, BIG PROBLEMS

For development, small market size plays an important role (Puppis, 2009; Lowe et al., 2011). This has been an advantage in building up the Estonian e-State (Charles, 2009), but a disadvantage where national journalism is concerned.

Market size determines resources' availability. In smaller states there are fewer resources available (Doyle, 2002; Lowe et al., 2011; Jõe-saar, 2011). If the market is big enough for profitable business and resources are available, the general media tasks (variety, pluralism etc.) are fulfilled and launch of niche media outlets will follow. On the other hand, restricted market entry and global concentration of ownership encourage common denominator provision for the mass market. Market-based media system is incapable of presenting a full range of political and economic interests in the public domain and finding expression in popular fiction (Curran, 1997: 140).

Functioning base for private media is driven by the basic principles of market economy, not by the needs of civil society in the first place. "One dollar, one voice" is a generalization of market economy principles by Croteau and Hoynes (2001: 21). This is a simplification of the essence of mass media, but also a relevant factor which shapes commercial media in particular and through this the whole media economy. Privatized communication markets primarily address people in their role as consumers rather than as citizens (Murdock and Golding, 1989: 192).

Market forces do not guarantee that the media will serve their non-economic function as institutions of the democratic public sphere, and in many ways the breakdown of the forces that counterbalanced market forces has already taken its toll on the quality of news, sensationalism and other ethical problems, biases in the segments of society served by the media, and in some cases potentially dangerous concentrations of media power (Hallin, 2008: 55).

Due to market limitations, it is unprofitable to launch a wide range of media products in smaller markets. The diversity of content offered will be lower in smaller states than in large markets. In the first place, commercial media focuses on mainstream content. If the market is not big enough for the private sector to deliver a variety of media

products in a national language, how then are the interests of minority groups served? Minority language groups in small countries are a tiny, unprofitable niche market. This case study examines one such niche market – the Russian language media in Estonia.

When talking about economical background of multilingual markets, Hesmondhalgh (2013) refers to the taste of different ethnic groups. Can we talk about common culture or about geocultural markets as defined by Hesmondhalgh (2013: 279)? Even if there is a shared history, the interpretation of it still remains largely different for the main ethnic groups. It is more relevant to talk about geolinguistics and diasporic media. There are definitely some positive examples of cross border television progressive with cultural consequences (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 285), but the separation of the Russian-speaking audience from the Estonian information field caused by foreign Russian channels creates many challenges for Estonian society. Gitlin (1999: 173) argues whether democracy requires a public or a set of publics, a public sphere or 'separate public sphericules'. It can be so, but according to the habermasian theory of public sphere, these sphericules must also have a higher communication space or sphere. Otherwise there will be isolated 'islands of different groups' in the society. It is argued that if there are no ongoing negotiations among members of different groups then media can provide help. If this is true, then how can media policy support these processes?

According to McQuail (2010), influencers of media institutions are politics, technology and economics. In the next chapters an analysis of these three aspects is carried out. As already noted, Estonia had and still has a very liberal media policy. Print media is unlicensed. There is no need for extra permission or registration. Establishing of a newspaper or a magazine is as easy as founding of any private company. From the language perspective there are no differences in publishing in Estonian or in other languages.

Due to the scarcity of transmission frequencies broadcasting was, and still is, regulated on the state and European level. The question is, however, not only a technical one. Licensing of broadcasting companies is an important part of overall media policy.

FORMATION OF ESTONIA'S RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MEDIA: INTRODUCING LIBERTY OF PRESS, CHANGING OF TECHNOLOGIES

In the first half of the 1990s, dramatic changes on the Estonian media landscape took place: a) Privatization of the print media; b) Terminating re-transmission of pan-Soviet radio and TV channels; c) The sharp decline of availability of pan-Soviet newspapers issued in Russia (Russian newspapers which were previously widely and cheaply available were to be ordered on the same basis as all other foreign editions); d) Transition radio frequencies from UKV to FM and closing of medium wave radio stations; e) Replacing SECAM television standard with PAL; f) Opening radio and TV frequencies so far strictly used by the state only for emerging private broadcasters.

As already mentioned, according to McQuail one of the influencers of the media institutions is technology (2010). During the 90s, the impact of technology in Eastern Europe was related to the replacement of Soviet broadcasting standards with western ones. All production, transmission and receiving equipment was replaced. Large investments were needed on both sides – on the side of media companies and on the side of audience. Print industry needed modernization as well. Old Soviet technology was amortized and did not meet the needs of modern print industry.

Radio programmes could be listened to with old Soviet radios on UKV frequencies whereas FM frequencies could be heard only with technology compatible with western standards that could not be purchased in the Soviet Union. The use of UKV frequencies ended by the beginning of 1993 with the national frequency plan and the programmes using those frequencies were either shut down or transferred to FM frequencies.

Though one can say the impact of technology was the same for all media companies, there was still a difference in the impact on audiences. It was easier for wealthier population groups to buy new radio and TV sets. People with lower incomes, especially among the Russian-speaking population in the eastern part of Estonia, who could not afford new sets, continued to follow Russian radio stations and TV channels which broadcasted in the old standards. So it can be said that, at least for a certain time period, technology was an ad-

ditional producer of separation between the two language groups. Roots of this process are hidden in economy.

RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE PRESS MEDIA IN ESTONIA

After regaining independence, Estonian media became dependent on economic, social and political factors to a great extent. This concerned media in Estonian and Russian language as well. In the process of privatization two of the oldest newspapers, *Estonija* and *Molodjozh Estonii*, were involved. Until 1991, the papers were financially and ideologically controlled by Soviet authorities.

The editorial staff of both newspapers created joint-stock companies; the majority of shares belonged to the editors who indeed became owners of these newspapers. However, step by step, journalists who were not able to invest lost their shares and further sales of newspapers to other owners took place without their participation (Interviews with Ella Agranovskaja and Leivi Sher, 2013).

After a turbulent transition period, relative stability was achieved in the market of Russian-language press by the end of the 1990s. Jakobson pointed out that new journalists, formats and contents of outlets, (*Russkii Telegraf*, *Russkii Potshtaljon*, *ME-Subbota*, *Stolitsa*) etc. have appeared. Due to the economic crisis in the years 1998–2001, the audience's purchasing power decreased and the main tasks of the Russian-language press were to survive, to preserve or find audience and finances (2004: 211). The local Russian language press market reached its peak in number of outlets by 2001 when there were 17 newspapers with a circulation of at least 1000 outlets each.

During this period, the first news portal *Rus.delfi.ee* (1999) in the Russian language emerged. Other news portals in the Russian language began to appear after 2005. Today *Rus.delfi* has 200 000 unique readers per week. The second most popular Internet-portal in the Russian language, *Rus.postimees.ee*, has ca 90 000 readers per week¹.

The period between 2004–2007 in the Russian-language print and on-line markets, which ended with worldwide economic crisis, can be described in terms of concentration of capital. Huge media companies with foreign and Estonian capital – Bonnier Group, Schibsted Media Group, BMA Estonia, Ekspress Grupp – appeared in the Es-

¹ Estonica.org –
Современные
русскоязычные
СМИ Эстонии.

tonian media market. All of these companies also launched Internet news portals on the basis of their newspapers.

The second economic crisis, in 2007–2011, had a drastic impact on the Russian language press landscape and its after-effects can be noticed through today. Both national and local outlets suffered severe fluctuation. Only four national newspapers survived.

The circulation of *Molodjozh Estonii* dropped from 90 000 in 1990 to 8000 by 2001 and to 5900 by the middle of 2008. *Molodjozh Estonii* was not an economically profitable project. It was financially supported by the Onistar company, which produces alcoholic beverages. Financial crisis in the company resulted in the bankruptcy of the newspaper.

Estonija (*Vesti dnja* since 2004) had a circulation of 76 000 in 1990 that dropped to 6400 by the end of 2003. After shifts in ownership in 2004, the paper changed its format and title (*Vesti Dnja*) and became the representative of the political interests of the Central party².

Weekly *Komsomolskaja Pravda v Estonii* started and stopped appearing in 2010 and 2011 respectively.

Simultaneously with the extinction of national Russian-language press there has been an active appearance of on-line news portals, which actually replaced the function of Russian-language national dailies in Estonia. Several on-line outlets were created on the base of existing newspapers (*Postimees na russkom jazyke*, *Den za Dnjom*, *Delovyje Vedomosti*, *MK-Estonija*, *Stolitsa*). The Public Service Broadcasting company launched the Internet-portal *Rus.err.ee* in May of 2007. Tallinn City Government launched their Internet-portal *Stolitsa.ee* (since 2008) in addition to the weekly *Stolitsa*.

In 2011, among national newspapers, there was one daily, *Postimees na russkom jazyke* (with circulation ca 11600), and two weeklies with general content, one business paper and one weekly which was delivered in the Baltic countries (with circulation between 4 700 and 12 500 each)³. The circulation of all six local newspapers was between 1 000 and 40 000 each.

² Estonica.org –
Современные
русскоязычные
СМИ Эстонии.

³ [http://www.eall.ee/
tiraazhid/2011.html](http://www.eall.ee/tiraazhid/2011.html).

There is no national daily published in the Russian language nowadays. *Postimees na russkom jazyke* has been issued only three times a week since June 2013. Anvar Samost, editor-in-chief, explained that with the shortage of advertisement market⁴.

⁴ <http://rus.err.ee/culture/dcfcc2ad-cc0a-473d-86ec-a6e48558f3f7>.

CIRCULATION OF RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE OUTLETS 1998–2013

During the crisis between 1998–2001, two weeklies, in the beginning *Vesti Nedelja Pljus* and *Den za Dnjom*, reported growth of circulation, but the period ended with downturn. Circulation of dailies *Molodjozh Estonii* and *Estonija* was constantly dropping. Only Business Weekly demonstrated quite a stable position on the market, its circulation even grew between 1998 and 2001.

The years 2002–2005 were quite difficult for Russian-language press in Estonia. Circulations of weeklies *Vesti Nedelja Pljus* and *Den za Dnjom* were constantly decreasing. Finally *Vesti Nedelja Pljus* stopped appearing in 2004, *Den za Dnjom* – in 2005. Weekly (and brand) *Den za Dnjom* was saved by Schibsted which purchased this paper. In 2006, the weekly *Den za Dnjom* appeared again with a circulation of 17 000 copies. During this period, circulation of dailies *Molodjozh Estonii* and *Vesti dnja* increased, decreased and finally ended with bankruptcy in 2007.

In the years 2005–2006, two new newspapers were launched in the Russian language press market: weekly *MK-Estonija* and daily *Postimees na russkom jazyke*. They both started quite successfully, but then circulation began to drop. Most remarkable was the continued drop of circulation of *Postimees na russkom jazyke* while weekly *MK-Estonija* managed to increase its circulation in years 2009–2012.

Business weekly *Delovyje Vedomosti* has a relatively stable position. This can be explained by the fact this paper has a stable readership, whose income is quite high. However, its circulation has still decreased in last two years.

A major trend is that circulations of all print-presses have been decreasing since 1998. Dailies are in the most vulnerable position whereas weeklies have a more preferable situation. It is obvious that production of dailies is not profitable, especially with the active appearance of Internet-portals since 2003 (See *Table 1*).

Table 1.


Circulation of Russian-language outlets 1998–2013 (in thousands).
Source: www.eall.ee.

	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
Molodjoz Estonii	7.2	4.9	7.5	7.7				
Estonia / Vesti Dnja	8.7	7.9	6.3	8.5	9.2			
Vesti Nedelja Pljus	21.2	23.5	19.9	16.1				
Den za Dnjom	16.7	19.4	18.6	14.5	17	13	13.2	10.4
Delovyje Vedomosti	4.8	4.8	5.1	5.3	6	5.8	4.8	7
Molodjoz Estonii Subbota	9.9	7.1	10.3	11.3	11.5			
MK Estonii					14.3	11	11.1	12.9
Postimees na Russkom Jazyke					17.1	12.3	11.5	9.6

Tallinn's local weekly newspaper *Stolitsa*, with the largest circulation of 40 000 outlets, is published by the Tallinn city government and delivered for free via subscriptions and special newspaper-boxes in Tallinn. This paper shares the political views of the Central Party which governs Tallinn and is oppositional on a parliamentary level. In recent times, it has become a considerable player in the Russian-language press market because of the shortage of Russian-language press and its free availability. Therefore one can notice that political and economic benefits of the newspaper and news portal *Stolitsa* are intertwined and serve the interests of Tallinn city government.

Figure 1.

The trends of the development of Russian-language press and on-line outlets market 1993–2011.



It is obvious the Russian-speaking population still prefers to consume information in Russian language and this trend will continue in the future. According to Integration Monitoring 2011 ca 50 per cent of Russian-speakers cannot follow media (print, online, radio and television) in Estonian because of insufficient knowledge of the language⁵.

⁵ http://www.kul.ee/webeditor/files/integratsioon/Int-mon_2011_pt_5.pdf.

LICENSING OF BROADCASTERS: FIRST RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE BROADCASTERS

Until the beginning of the 1990s, the main TV channels that broadcast in the Estonian territory were Estonian Television (ETV) and three channels from Russia: Ostankino TV, Russia TV (both re-transmitted from Moscow) and Leningrad TV. The re-transmission of all Russian television and radio channels (Majak, Junost) was terminated in 1993–1994. The frequencies and networks they had occupied were licensed to newly born Estonian private broadcasters.

For the Russian-speaking audience, the changes taking place at the beginning of the 1990s were dramatic; the number of programme hours offered through terrestrial broadcasting in Russian dropped substantially. No domestic national TV channel targeting speakers of Russian was established. The market demand for programmes in Russian was met by cable operators who rapidly expanded their networks and started to re-transmit Russian channels available on satellites.

The primary objective of the first Broadcasting Act (RHS, 1994) passed in Parliament in 1994 was to establish a dual media system; the co-existence of PSB and a commercial sector. The former State Radio and Television Committee was reorganised into two independent public service institutions: Estonian Radio and Estonian Television. Licenses for private broadcasters were issued through public tenders.

In order to ensure political consistency and awareness of the Estonian population, Director General of Estonian Radio Peeter Sookruus (1991: 19) envisioned Estonian Radio as a public service broadcaster producing and broadcasting three programmes in Estonian and one in Russian. Such a vision was in accordance with the linguistic distribution of the population. The following period shows that this

proportion – one of four – was achieved in public service radio in 1993 when, in addition to the three programmes in Estonian, a Russian-language programme was launched.

Table 2.
Number of radio channels in Estonia. Source: Ministry of Culture.

	1995	2013
Private radio channels in Estonian	41	21
Private radio channels in Russian	2	8
Public service radio programmes in Russian	3	4
Public service radio programmes in Estonian	1	1

Finding the appropriate balance between the state language and local Russian-speaking media space design has been one of the key media policy issues.

During the licensing process for new private broadcasting companies in the early 1990s, media policy makers were particularly concerned with the protection of emerging markets from foreign capital, enrichment of Estonian culture and development of media space. In the context of this article we can point out two important general criteria in the terms of licenses issued. First, the requirement that in the broadcasting organization, Estonian capital must have at least 50 per cent of the votes, and secondly, the requirement that Estonian authors' work share must be at least 35 per cent of the daily output of a radio program.

The first three radio licenses were granted by the Minister of Culture on 21 May 1992 to the newly created private companies (AS Trio and AS Rumor) and a municipality (Viljandi county administration's office of culture). National Estonian Television and Radio received their broadcasting licenses three weeks later. The first private TV license was issued to a local entrepreneur (AS Alo TV) on 8 June 1992.

From the total of 29 broadcasting licenses issued in 1992, there were nine for television and 20 for radio. The language requirement was not shown separately in any of them. Programmes in Russian were produced and aired by Estonian Television, Estonian Radio, by private AS Reklaamitelevisioon, Orsent TV and by one AS Trio radio

channel. The first three broadcasted some output in Russian within Estonian programmes. Orsent TV's full offer was in Russian and was targeted at a Russian-speaking audience, but in total they broadcasted only around six hours weekly. In their license application to the Supreme Council of Information and Journalism Commission, Orsent described the aim of the channel as an endeavour to contribute to the integration of the local Russian minority into Estonian and global culture⁶. In the application submitted, Orsent declared they intended to produce and transmit broadcasts three hours a week in the Tallinn area only (the same frequency was also used by AS Reklaamitelevision for broadcasting their programme RTV). Orsent's application was accepted and they were given permission to air programmes no less than three and not more than ten hours per week on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays after the end or before the start of RTV's program. Although the channel had a small output of hours, and programmes were aired on inconvenient time for viewers, Orsent must be counted as the first free-to-air television station broadcasting for a Russian language audience. Nowadays, Orsent has their own channel and is transmitting considerably more programme hours which are viewable over cable networks. Unfortunately, Orsent's audience figures were, and still are, very small, which again was a reason for low revenues and minimum profitability. The station never became an important platform and voice for the Russian-speaking audience.

AS Trio launched Raadio Tallinn as the first legal⁷ Russian-language private radio station in autumn 1992. The station started broadcasting at a UKV frequency and later transferred to FM.

In the spring of 1993, Estonian Radio launched Russian-language broadcasts on an FM frequency, which rapidly evolved into a full-time program, Raadio 4. The same year, 20 private broadcaster licences were issued (5 for TV and 15 for radio). Out of those, 2 were issued for broadcasting in Russian language. The national company Viru Information Centre was given permission to broadcast through a radio relay network and AS Trio to expand the coverage of Raadio Tallinn (later known under the names Raadio 100 FM/ Narodnoje Radio) to Eastern Virumaa. One local TV broadcaster – EMPI TV – was issued temporary licences for broadcasting in Kiviõli.

⁶ AS Orsent. Application letter. Ministry of Culture (March 9, 1992).

⁷ In the beginning of the 1990s, Soviet-minded Radio Nadezhda functioned on the territory of Soviet Army's Keila Tank Regiment. This station had neither the permission to use radio frequencies of the Estonian Republic nor broadcasting licence. Radio Nadezhda closed along with the departure of Soviet armed forces from Estonia in 1994.

In the spring of 1994, AS Narva Televisioon and Sillamäe Municipal Information Centre obtained licences. The applications to launch both TV channels were also supported by local authorities. The political motives were also important for these municipalities, at the same time being minimal or non-existent for the owners of Estonian-speaking broadcasting organisations. Ensuring 'correct political undercurrent' of broadcasting stations was a crucial issue for both legislative and executive powers. Free journalism was promoted forcibly. However, when issuing broadcasting licences, 'Russian danger' or possible infiltration of Russian capital into Estonian media was closely guarded. At the same time, satisfying the needs and considering the interests of the Russian-speaking audience was considered important.

With the passing of the Broadcasting Act in the summer of 1994, all current licences became invalid and 32 new five-year broadcast licenses were issued in tight competition. Estonian Radio and Estonian Television did not need to apply for broadcasting licences anymore, as they now functioned according to the rules set in Broadcasting Act. The already active Russian channels Narva Televisioon, Orsent TV and Raadio Tallinn were granted new licences. Similarly to Orsent, Narva TV was given broadcasting time only on certain days of the week before or after the programme of the main channel. They were given permission to broadcast 7.5 hours a week. By now, Sillamäe and Narva TV channels have stopped working.

1995 saw the continuation of expansion of private broadcasters. 19 new radio and 1 TV licences were issued. Only one of those – Narva Päikeseraadio, owned by Mediainvest AS – aimed to broadcasting Russian radio programs.

1996–1998 saw a decrease in the number of broadcasting licences issued due to the shortage of free frequencies. A total of 13 licences were issued in three years. Among those was Taevaraadio AS-owned Raadio Sky Klassik, originally intended to broadcast classical music, that was renamed Russkoje Radio in 1998 and started Russian broadcasts. Under new conditions, original Russian programme produced or acquired for this station had to be aired during daytime (between 7:00 and 20:00). The majority of the programme was to be Russian music; at least 15 per cent of the day's programme had to be speech.

In 2000, the conditions of this broadcast licence were mitigated and the requirements for speech and Russian music broadcasts were dropped.

Eesti Sõltumatu Televisioon AS started with TV1 programmes in 1997. The broadcast licence issued to TV1 stated that the programme had to include at least 30 minutes of news in Russian every day. TV1 did not do that. There were only 5 minutes of news in Russian per day and these were broadcast at 23:30 or later. The Ministry of Culture gave two warnings to TV1 for the violation of their licence. Despite promises (TV1 letter to Ministry of Culture 14 Sept 1998) TV1 did not manage to produce and broadcast Russian language programmes in bigger amounts before their bankruptcy.

In the 1990s and even during some years after the millennium, other Estonian commercial channels had a business-driven aim to maximize their audience by offering Russian-language programmes on certain time slots. This kind of limited offer was unsuccessful in commercial terms and audiences were attracted by channels of the Russian Federation.

In 1999–2002, most of the valid five-year broadcast licences were renewed. No terrestrial TV channels were created. There were 12 cable TV licences issued in 2001, out of which five belonged to the operator AS STV and targeted Russian audience. Also AS Nom's programme Infokanal was aimed at Russian viewers.

In the field of radio, there were 24 newcomers, most of them either replacing closed down programmes or reflecting a change and consolidation of owners. Local studios were shut down and instead of their own programmes, centrally produced programmes were aired over the networks. The roots of this process were in affordability – in smaller regions there was not sufficient (advertising) money and human resources to produce and air so many local programs. The Tartu Pereraadio Ühing-owned Christian radio station operating under international broadcasting licence Semeinoje Radio (later Radio Eli) and AS Trio LSL's Russian music Radio Katjusha started Russian broadcasts in 2000.

In 2004, the list of Russian radio stations was lengthened with Russkoje Radio Tartu, Euro FM, Raadio DFM and AS Trio LSL's Raadio


Uuno Pluss Dynamit FM. The licence conditions for most Russian-speaking radio stations were even more laconic than before, usually including the requirement to broadcast local news (that can be produced in cooperation with several broadcasters), cover local life and contain a 20 per cent ratio of Estonian authors in their daily programme.

During 2004–2008 there were just few new TV licenses given. All of them were local. OÜ Lites LT started the programme LiTeS in Eastern Virumaa in 2004, MTÜ AB Video started the programme TV-N in the cable network of Harjumaa and Tallinn in the end of 2006 (nowadays it is available all over Estonia). And in 2008, SA Lastekaitsefond's programme LNTV was launched, which showed mostly cartoons over a couple of years' existence.

The spread of Russian-speaking radio and TV programmes follows the location of Russian-speaking communities – most broadcasters are active in Tallinn, Eastern Virumaa and Tartu. The content regulation of all media service providers is minimal according to Estonia's liberal media policy. This and the smallness of the advertising market have resulted in the cluster of music radio channels mostly playing mainstream music and TV channels mostly showing feature films.

Out of 29 radio licences, 8 were given to broadcast Russian-language programmes, while Raadio 4 functions under the National Public Broadcasting Act. Thus it can be said that by 2013, the radio landscape in Estonia reflects the ratio of 3:1, the linguistic distribution of population as drafted in the 1990s, where there are three Estonian radio programmes to one Russian one.

There are 14 valid TV licences in Estonia as of 1 July 2013. Three of those – Orsent-TV, TV-N ja LiTeS – are targeted to Russian-speaking audience. With the widespread use of cable networks and IPTV in the living areas of the Russian-speaking population these programmes are now easily accessible. At the same time, they are not as popular as Russian TV programmes (see thereafter). It is noteworthy that there are a number of foreign thematic TV channels in Russian available in cable packages. In total, these 'other' channels reached 87 per cent of Russian speakers weekly and took up 39 per cent of their viewing time in 2012 (see *Figure 2*).

**Figure 2.**

An evaluation of Russian-speakers' share of viewing of the main Russian language TV channels. Source: TNS Emor.

The most popular TV station among Russian speakers is Pervõi Baltiiski Kanal (First Baltic Channel, PBK), which is owned and operated by a Latvian independent legal entity working under two jurisdictions, a broadcasting license issued by LNRT Latvia and by OfCom U.K. The PBK programme is available in all Baltic countries on all technical platforms: satellite, cable, IPTV and DTT pay TV packages. It primarily re-transmits the Russian commercial TV channel ORT (controlled by the Russian government), but also includes a daily newscast produced locally in each country in the format of ORT's main news programme (*Vremja*), which is scheduled immediately after the latter on prime-time.

Based on these facts it can be said that a big part of Russian-language Estonian population is mainly following Russian television channels and is therefore more integrated into the Russian information field than into the Estonian one.


ECONOMICS – FINANCIAL RESULTS OF MEDIA: MINORITY LANGUAGE AUDIENCE AS A MARKET FAILURE

The third influencer of the media institutions is economics (McQuail, 2010). A significant difference in the development of Estonian and Russian-language private media is the inclusion of private capital. Estonian media enterprises developed mostly with the help of western investments – Nordic media companies generally became the owners of these enterprises. Norwegian Schibsted AS purchased the most widespread national newspaper Postimees, several county newspapers, TV channel Kanal 2, a printing house and later shares in

the Trio radio group. Finnish Mainos TV invested in AS Reklaamitelevisioon that later merged with EVTV to form TV 3, part of Swedish Modern Time Group. MTG also founded two radio stations. Bonnier Group acquired shares in newspapers Eesti Ekspress and Äripäev. The main goal of all these foreign companies that invested in Estonian media sector was to gain profit in a newly opened market.


Contrary to the Estonian market, no foreign investments came to Russian-language media. Media channels were owned or created by local non-Estonian entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, they did not have sufficient resources to create good quality, audience-capturing media products. There was a lack of critical mass – of quantity, quality, and audience. Considering the smallness of the potential market, foreign capital did not have any interest in contributing to this narrow sector. Taking into account Russia's close foreign countries policy, Russian money could have come to the Estonian media sector with political aims. This however did not happen, at least not in the extent to start and keep up a local Russian-language TV programme, newspaper and/or radio station. Probably such investment was not considered important as Russian-speaking people living in Estonia followed Russia's main TV channels anyway. Attempts to involve foreign capital from either East or West were not successful.

The profit and outcome of Russian-language media companies provide a good description of the shortage of resources. Analysis of Russian-language print media indicates that because of unprofitable business, the newspapers often went bankrupt or changed owners frequently. In several cases the official financial results were not declared. As an example, the financial standing of the newspaper *Den za Dnjom* by the owners in 2001–2008 can be considered. There is no data regarding the financial status of the company in official databases before that time and data from the years 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008 is missing. In 2008, the publisher of the newspaper was purchased by AS Postimees. In 2012, the publisher was merged with Postimees and the financial results of the newspaper are no longer available separately (see *Figure 3*).

**Figure 3.**

Profit and loss of newspaper Den za Dnjom publishers. Source: e-Business register.

In comparison with the financial results of the two biggest private TV channels (see *Figure 4*) the turnover of Russian-language broadcasters follows a similar pattern (see *Figure 5*). There is nevertheless a difference in the profitability of the channels. As the main source of income for major TV channels is advertising sales, the economic crises at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2008 influenced their income far more than that of small companies functioning on project support.


**Figure 4.**

Financial results of TV3 and Kanal2. Source: e-Business Register.

While the financial results of Estonian-language media companies can usually be found in official databases from the mid-90s to the present, the same information regarding Russian-language publica-


tions is incomplete in the national register. Despite that a general trend in Russian-language printed media can be pointed out – this is the decrease in income.

Figure 5.
Financial results
of Russian
languages
TV-channels.
Source:
E-Business
Register.



Comparison of financial results of the two biggest newspaper publishers (see *Figure 6*) and Russian-language newspaper publisher (see *Figure 3*) in Estonia indicates a magnitudinal difference. The same difference occurs when financial parameters of Estonian commercial TV channels (see *Figure 4*) are compared with the Russian languages' TV ones (see *Figure 5*).

Figure 6.
Financial
characteristics
of media
companies Eesti
ajalehed (EA)
and Postimees.
Source:
E-Business
Register.



Differently from the Russian languages print media there has been no change of ownership or bankruptcy of Russian-language TV channels but it must be pointed out that there is still no domestic TV channel producing and broadcasting nationwide full-time free-to-air Russian-language programme in Estonia.

The private sectors' unwillingness to work for these niche audiences is understandable from a business point of view. Investments into expensive niche media products are not profitable. A potential audience of around 300 000 Russian-speaking viewers is not big enough for the launch of a commercial TV channel, especially in the situation where there are plenty of attractive foreign Russian TV channels available through cable networks and satellite platforms. A cheaper form of mass media – newspapers – is facing problems to gain enough readers needed for sustainable business. Economic regression which started in 2007 has heavily decreased advertising revenues. Traditional newspapers lost more than 60 per cent of their yearly advertising revenues (see *Figure 7*). While major media companies had some internal resources which helped them to survive under extensive cost cuttings, smaller companies were forced to close down their activities. Private media companies with Russian-language media products belong to the latter group. Russian-language media's already unfavourable economical situation deteriorated dramatically.




Figure 7.
Estonian
advertising
market value.
Source: TNS
Emor.

ROLE OF PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING

When all circumstances (resources available, market conditions, economical atmosphere, etc.) are not favouring commercial media then this kind of market failure should be balanced by public service media (PSM). Therefore PSM is even more responsible for delivering diverse content and high-quality information for all citizens, including minorities, on a smaller market. Despite fast and large changes in the media, public service media still has an important role to play in the public sphere from this point of view.

This argument is supported by the broader definition of public service broadcasting (evolving into public service media). Public service broadcasting (PSB) is defined by McQuail (2010: 569) ‘as the system of broadcasting that is publicly funded and operated in a non-profit way in order to meet the various public communication needs of all citizens.’

In other words – PSB’s ultimate function is to serve public interest. In normative criteria this is described as enhancing, developing and serving social, political and cultural citizenship; being universal with high quality standards (Born and Prosser, 2001: 671).

The justification for PSB existence is to serve public interest. According to McQuail (2010: 568), public interest ‘expresses the idea that expectations from, and claims against, the mass media on grounds of the wider and longer-term good of society can be legitimately expressed and may lead to constraints on the structure or activity of media.’ Critics of PSB declare that public interests are also served by commercial broadcasters and PSB rationale no longer exists (Jacka, 2003). On the other side, scholars are convinced that PSB is needed more than ever in new, rapidly changing, communication contexts (Murdock, 2005). It might be a case that commercial broadcasters are fulfilling some public interest tasks, but mainly only these, which are commercially profitable, unprofitable services are (most likely) left out of scope. Jakubowicz (2007c) argues that the underlying aims of public service broadcasting are still to enhance culture, promote education, maintain social cohesion and strengthen democracy. For successful fulfilment of these four criteria, PSB needs to have sufficient resources (human, financial, technical etc.) and favourable legislative framework.

Researches made by Lauristin (2004; 2009), Lauk (2008), Lõhmus et al. (2010) underline the special role public service broadcasting carries for small countries like Estonia. It is especially important, in markets where private broadcasting is commercialized, that PSB maintains its role as the reliable provider of trustful sources of information. PSB's important role in the public sphere to substantiate, support for democratic development and pluralism are described as crucial ones. All these factors have direct influence on society and citizens. Enhancing democracy and cultural heritage, improving social cohesion, developing platform for open debate, guaranteeing media pluralism, being a source of reliable and independent information – these are important functions of PSB. Without fulfilment of these functions, overall development of democratic society is under serious threat.

EUROPEAN UNION MEDIA POLICY IMPACT ON PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA

On the EU level there are no tools or mechanisms dictating a minimum PSB quantity or quality level a Member State should guarantee for citizens. There is no binding legal EU regulation towards PSB. There are no European Union's financial instruments, for example solidarity funds for infrastructure development, dedicated for the enhancement of public service media. Decisions on remit, funding model and funding level of PSB are totally left to Member States. There is no common PSB model or standard which applies to all countries (European Commission, 2011). Governance and financing models, remit, legal framework and relations with political powers, accountability obligations towards society, etc. vary a lot. But overall, EU media policy is subordinate to economic policy and the public service media is treated in a similar manner to any other industry (Harcourt, 2005; Jõesaar, 2011). In a similar way to other industries' regulations, media regulations are shaped by market forces in a large extent. The result of a liberal regulatory process is that media will be more and more commercialized. As shown by Lowe et al. (2011) and Jõesaar (2011), in the poorer, smaller states commercial media tends to be more entertainment oriented than in smaller, wealthy states.

To balance entertainment biased commercial media, PSB should have strong and interesting own-production, which is more costly

than mass production acquisition programs. This results in the conclusion that for strong PSB, the PSB funding on small markets should be on a relatively higher level than on large markets. In reality the situation is opposite. The level of available funding is (an immediate) cause for PSB performance. It gives reason to assume that sufficient funding will support high quality production which is needed to attract an audience. In the case of Estonia, there actually exists two main audiences – national language speakers and Russian speakers. This means that for serving both communities in the best way, a double amount of funding is actually needed. It is evident that private media is not able to serve Russian-language citizens on a proper level. There is no nationwide daily newspaper nor full-scale TV-channel in Russian; Russian language music radio stations are oriented on entertainment of young audiences; newspapers in Russian have a very moderate penetration.

In the case of Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR), the question of serving minorities has been debated for a long time (Jõesaar and Rannu, 2013). The idea to increase ERR output in Russian on all media platforms, especially in television, has not received political support and because of that is heavily under-financed. Therefore television programmes offered in Russian still do not have the critical mass to attract its target audience in a large scale. Only the Estonian Public Broadcaster's nationwide radio programme in Russian, Raadio 4, is offering quality journalistic content for a Russian-speaking audience.

The next part of this article focuses on Russian language TV-programme of Estonian Public Broadcasting.

PSB'S TRADITION OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE PROGRAMMING

The next section of the article will focus on PSB programming for minorities. Soviet-era ETV produced news and primarily cultural and educational programmes in Russian during the 1960s and 1970s. In the mid-1970s, the offer of pan-Union Russian programmes intensified. In the context of the USSR, local Russian language programmes were never treated as those targeted to a minority, because the speakers of the non-native language among the population of a republic of the Union were never considered as minorities. Programmes in Russian, broadcast by the TV stations of the republics, expressed one of the Russification methods used by the USSR; the production of

these programmes was not driven by the modern idea of complying with the informational needs of a minority. In Estonia, where only one local TV station existed, a third of its schedule was filled with the Central Television programmes of the Soviet Union. The content scope of local programmes in Russian developed only partially. From 1980 to 1991, ETV aired only approximately an hour of domestic programmes in Russian (including news) daily (Shein, 2005). Few television journalists spoke Russian as their mother tongue, and the content they produced was limited, mainly cultural, music and educational programmes; analytical journalism was almost non-existent. Even the topic of ethnic minorities was subsequently raised by Estonian-speaking journalists, after the founding of The Union of Estonia's Nationalities in 1988.

From 1990, with the exception of news, the Russian ETV programmes were aired on Saturday daytime and the content scope extended from information to entertainment. The volume of programmes was fewer than 200 hours per year. Due to the lack of viewers, attempts were made to find a better timeslot, and in the middle of the 1990s, a programme strip in Russian was created to air before the pre-prime news in Russian on work days.

In the early 1990s, Russian language TV journalism existed only in ETV. Independent producers had not yet appeared and when they did, around the end of the decade, the majority were individual producers fully dependent on their financiers. Commercial stations did not pay to show programmes in Russian, instead, barter deals were offered: the producers could sell advertisement time inside their programmes. The budget of PSB television was also highly dependent on advertisements, so, as the volume of other productions grew, the programmes in Russian were pushed into the background, as something unattractive to advertising agencies.

Although some good publicists emerged among the Russian-speaking television journalists, they probably felt the air of suspicion of disloyalty, and therefore tried to choose topics as neutral as possible, which, in return, did not help to increase the interest of viewers. The integration programme, launched in the second half of the 1990s and funded by the EU, produced a shift in the content focus, which moved to integration-related topics (Lauristin, 2004).

Notwithstanding the incompleteness of the statistics covering the end of the 1990s, we can estimate the volume of Russian language programming rose above 200 hours in 1998-1999, when over 10 different series' were aired on ETV (Trapido, 2000: 112; Shein, 2005). Unfortunately, this was the time of the economic downturn, and the attempt by the management to increase its own production's output, in circumstances whereby the state grant had been cut back by 10 per cent, caused a serious budgetary crisis. At the beginning of the 2000s, the crisis led to a recession in all activities, including the production of Russian programming on ETV. By April 2000, the budget for Russian programmes had decreased five times since 1998, and enabled the production of just one half-hour programme per week (PRTM, 2000).

After the crisis, it was primarily the production of the news that continued to be financed from ETV's budget of the original Russian programmes. The remainder of the in-house productions received funding from the Integration Foundation or from other public funds. Part of the schedule was acquired from Russia, and re-runs of some Estonian programmes with Russian subtitles were also scheduled for Russian timeslots.

A budgetary crisis in ETV in 2000-2002 resulted in cut-backs in several programming sectors and produced changes in management logistics. The Russian-language programme unit was closed. The production of Russian programmes was initiated on the orders of ETV's programme management, mainly in the form of co-productions between independent producers and ETV employees; several former employees of ETV now work as independent producers, acquiring the necessary additional financing from public funds.

However, a specific centre of competence, which should work on developing a cohesive concept of television programmes aimed towards non-Estonians and executing related ideas, does not currently exist in Estonia. This fact has also been pointed out in the debates discussing the launch of a television channel in Russian (Ajustrust Konsultatsioonid, 2007).

TODAY'S CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA

Public service Raadio 4, once the indisputable leader among Russian-language radio stations, is still a leader, but the listening trend is clearly negative (see *Figure 8*). Commercial music radio stations are gaining market share. It will be challenging for PSM to retain its position in the Russian language radio market.




Figure 8.

Russian language radio stations share of listening.
Source: TNS Emor.

Estonian Television's position among the Russian-speaking audience is even more complicated. The launch of the PSB Russian language channel, ETV2, has been debated for almost two decades. It has been mentioned in parliamentary debates and has been part of a number of PSB's development plans. A short list of arguments supporting and opposing ETV2 in Russian is as follows:


FOR: The channel will support the enhancement, development and servicing of social, political and cultural citizenship; it will offer adequate and reliable information to all citizens and inhabitants; it will extenuate tensions between two ethnic groups; it will serve as a balancing force to Moscow, lowering national security risks.

AGAINST: To attract a Russian audience (extra) high quality programmes are needed; It is too expensive; sufficient additional financial resources are unavailable; whatever the programme, it is unrealistic to expect it will attract the atten-

tion of the Russian audience due to high competition from abroad; there is no need for such a channel — in the long run, all citizens will understand Estonian and will therefore be capable of watching Estonian programmes; if state financed propaganda is required, these programmes should be ordered from, and aired on, PBK.

In 2008, another economic downturn forced ETV to make budgetary cut-backs and the volume of Russian language programmes dropped to a level last experienced in the middle of the previous decade (see *Figure 9*). Only one series was produced for the Russian audience, which also received funding from external sources. Despite the lack of funding, ETV2 started broadcasting in the summer of 2008 and continues to be on air. However, the original concept of this new channel, broadcasting in Russian at least on prime-time, was revised. Today, the main scope of the channel is cultural and educational programmes and this task is primarily fulfilled by using ETV's archives. As no extra financial resources are allocated from the state budget, new in-house production is minimal, primarily consisting of original children's programmes, which also have an important role in ETV2.

Figure 9.
ETV's yearly total programme hours targeted at the Russian-speaking audience. 1994–1996; 2001–2010.
Source: Authors' calculation.



Notwithstanding, the launch of ETV2 opened up new possibilities and, from 2009 onwards, the volume of Russian language programming has significantly increased, although the major part of in-house productions (with the exception of the news) was still financed from external sources. Furthermore, re-runs from the ETV archives and Estonian language current affairs programmes with Russian subtitles

increased the output. The result is that a prime-time slot, including news and some information and discussion programmes scheduled for Russian speakers, today exists on ETV2. The decline in 2012 was caused by the cut in the production of original programming in Russian (see *Figure 9*). In 2012, ETV's channels occupied only 1.8 per cent of the viewing time of non-Estonians (TNS Emor).

Particularly, a remarkable increase in output of Russian language news occurred after the news was transferred to ETV2, where a longer timeslot was available. Unfortunately, the shift to ETV2 meant that the Russian-language news lost some of its viewers. Since 2010, the news is repeated on MTG channel 3+, but the audience remains quite small.

Despite all these ERR efforts, it is not efficient enough to attract the Russian-speaking audience and integrate them into the Estonian information field.

DISCUSSION

After the regaining of Estonian independence, the following presumptions were applied to establishing Estonian media system politically, economically and technically regarding the Russian-language population:

1. Domestic Russian-language media does not need national support because the Russian population will decrease because of emigration and those remaining will acquire sufficient language skills to be able to follow Estonian media to satisfy their information needs.
2. Free market principles in media will provide a solution for the issues of informing and integrating language minorities without specific state-initiated regulations.

These presumptions proved only partially right in reality. The Russian-speaking population is decreasing and their Estonian language skills are improving but only 14 per cent of them prefer Estonian media. Domestic Russian-language media is preferred by 21 per cent of non-Estonians. 2/3 of Russians consider the media channels, mainly television, of the Russian Federation more important for themselves (Vihalemm, 2011). The end of transmitting Russia's TV channels in

the beginning of 1990s brought along an explosive spread of cable TV in Russian-speaking residential areas in Estonia, thus transferring viewers to Russian-language satellite channels within a few years. In the market economy situation, Russian-language printed media has undergone a severe decline, resulting in the cessation of publishing national daily newspapers. Weeklies and local newspapers have fared slightly better. Private enterprise has shown considerable ability in developing radio and Internet media; private TV channels, however, have desisted from engaging a Russian-speaking audience after short-timed attempts. Public broadcasters have been relatively successful in developing Russian-language radio, while TV programmes are confined to broadcasting Russian-language news and translating Estonian programmes into Russian because of lack of resources.

In broadcasting, this has resulted in a situation where two communities are influenced by different independent information fields; Estonian-speakers (mainly) receive daily information from national broadcasting channels, while Russian-speakers receive such information from Russian Federation TV stations and global TV channels. This could be acknowledged, if the Russian population's strong beliefs towards foreign television channels did not constantly raise problems with regard to their participation in Estonia's everyday life and the degree to which they are informed about this. It has been hoped that one solution could be the target ordering of specific Russian television series' on themes of integration, but their audience is more Estonian- than Russian-speaking. The reasons for this lie in the contents of the broadcasts, as well as in the environment. Media research has claimed that the Russian-speaking audience views itself more like integration objects than subjects in these shows. This is not useful, as it decreases the attractiveness of the programmes. As a rule, these programmes are aired on Estonian-language ETV channels in flexible volumes and slots. Therefore, the Russian-speaking audience has not developed a viewing habit. No agreement has been reached on the strategies or funding of the development of Russian language television programming. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that anything will change in the (near) future, unless there is a substantial increase in the Russian programme funding that is required for the production of high quality programming on a considerably larger scale.

CONCLUSIONS

When observing the development of Russian-language media in Estonia after the country regained its independence, its political, economic and technological influencers, it can be seen how a market failure occurs in an important sector of everyday life of a small country, resulting in linguistically different population groups ending at different information fields. These information fields are separated not only by linguistic but also notional national borders.

It must be admitted that such division has its roots in the Soviet era when non-native populations, settling in USSR's republics, consumed mostly pan-Soviet media – newspapers, magazines, TV and radio that were ideologically and economically strictly controlled by the central power. Establishment of liberal media principles in re-independent Estonia ended undemocratic supervision and gave media independence. One of the prerequisites to this was economic independence that subjected to free market principles only. However, to Russian-language media in Estonia, free market proved disadvantageous. While Estonian media companies soon found investors from the Nordic countries, Russian-language enterprises had to rely on domestic resources only which turned out to be scarce. The number of readers decreased rapidly and in 2013 no Russian-language daily newspaper was published in Estonia. The weeklies have done slightly better. The newspaper with the widest circulation is a city newspaper reflecting the political interests of the capital's city government.

Domestic Russian-language broadcasting in Soviet Estonia limited itself to some educational and cultural programmes as the only national TV channel, while the choice of programming at pan-Soviet TV channels was abundant. A number of Russian-language TV channels were created after the end of re-broadcast of Soviet TV programmes with the hopes of making a profit from the advertising market. Unfortunately, broadcasting such channels was limited. Therefore the amount of viewers was not considerable enough to rouse the interest of advertisers. In addition, satellite TV offered fierce competition, making Russia's TV channels accessible to the Russian-speaking audience in Estonia. This however did not fulfil the duties of a democratic media system. Information and debate on the development and functioning of Estonia's society could only

come from domestic media, mainly from Estonian Radio and Estonian Television that were being transformed into public service broadcasting organisations.

Estonian Radio was successful at launching a Russian-language radio program. Estonian Television had one Estonian-language channel only, where the Russian-language slots did not find viewers, and the political agreement to launch the second channel was not reached. At present, the amount of time spent on watching any Estonian-language TV channel, including commercial channels, is decreasing to a marginal level among the Russian-speaking audience. From the viewpoint of Estonia's social and cultural coherence, this is a negative trend but altering an established framework presupposes a clearly stated political program.

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Media for Russian language minorities: The role of Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) 1990–2013



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ABSTRACT: This article aims at exploring the ways in which Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) tackles one specific media service sphere; how television programmes for Russian language minorities are created in a small country. For that task development of the whole Estonian media landscape must be overviewed. By referring to McQuail's (2010) theoretical framework of media institutions' influencers, this article investigates how media policy, economic conditions and technology have influenced these processes. The article gives an insight into the development of Russian language media in such a small media market as Estonia.

KEYWORDS: public service broadcasting, Russian language media, media for minorities, Estonia



INTRODUCTION

From the end of the 1980s, Eastern and Central European countries started transition from the communist regime towards free democratic states. Among important aspects of that development were changes in media systems. In transition states, commercial broadcasters were founded, state-owned print media was mainly privatized, state radio and television companies became public service broadcasters; Soviet technical standards were replaced with Western ones. "Europeanization," as defined by Jakubowicz (2009), took place. The overall aims of the Pan-European media policy are preserving cultural diversity and safeguarding media pluralism. For doing so in Baltic countries the free market liberal approach was used (Curran, 1997, p. 139). Market forces and the private ownership of media were and still are idealized by Estonian government(s) (Jõesaar, 2011). The free market liberal approach is supported by European Union media policy, which is a common market ideology.

television progressive with cultural consequences (Hesmondhalgh, 2013, p. 285), but the separation of the Russian-speaking audience from Estonian information field caused by foreign Russian channels creates many challenges for society. Gitlin (1999, p. 173) argues whether democracy requires a public or a set of publics, a public sphere or “separate public sphericules.” It can be so, but according to the Habermasian theory of public sphere, these sphericules must also have a space or higher sphere where to communicate. Otherwise there will be isolated “islands of different groups” in society. It is argued that if there are no ongoing negotiations among members of different groups then the media can provide help. If this is true, then how can media policy support these processes?

For McQuail (2010) influencers of media institutions are: politics, technology and economics. In the next chapters an analysis of these three aspects is carried out. As already noted Estonia had and still has a very liberal media policy. Print media is unlicensed. There is no need for extra permission or registration. Launching a newspaper or a magazine is as easy as founding a private company. From the language perspective there are no differences in publishing in Estonian or in other languages.

Mainly due to the scarcity of transmission frequencies broadcasting was, and still is regulated at the state level. But the question is not only a technical one. Licensing of broadcasting companies is an important part of overall media policy.

ESTONIAN MEDIA MARKET AND KEY PLAYERS

In 2013, the total population of Estonia was 1.32 million, among whom 69.1 per cent were Estonians (Statistics Estonia, 2013). Among the non-Estonians living in Estonia, half were born in Estonia and one-third in other former Soviet states. From the language perspective, at least 93 per cent of non-Estonians are Russian speakers, and in Estonia these people are referred to as Russians. Nowadays, Russian is the mother tongue of 29.6 per cent of the Estonian population and 16 per cent of Russian-speaking people claim they do not understand Estonian at all (Lauristin et al., 2011). One can say that the size of the Russian language media markets is around 300,000 people.

The Estonian media market is dominated by three major media houses. The first is Eesti Meedia AS (until 2013 owned by Norwegian corporation Schibsted ASA, after management buyout belonging to Estonian capital). Eesti Meedia owns the biggest daily newspaper, a main national free-to-air commercial TV-channel accompanied with sister channels on a pay-TV platform, six radio stations, second largest Estonian internet portal, several local newspapers, magazines and printing house. The second largest media player is the Swedish Modern Times Group (MTG). MTG owns TV3 AS broadcasting, the second main free-to-air commercial TV channel, several pay-TV channels and two commercial radio stations. MTG also operates the Viasat sat-TV platform. The third largest private media company is Ekspress Grupp AS, which runs the biggest Estonian internet portal, publishes

one daily and two weekly newspapers and is co-owner of the biggest Estonian tabloid. On the public service media side there is the non-commercial Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) with two TV-channels, five radio stations and web portal.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

McQuail's (2010) first influencer of media institutions is policy. As mentioned earlier, Estonian media policy is considered as liberal. Estonia's press freedom index is high (Freedom House, 2013). Estonia does not have specific press law; there is no licensing of online and print media companies. The first Broadcasting Act was passed in Parliament in 1994 and the primary objectives of this were to establish a dual media system — the co-existence of PSB and a commercial sector — as to secure editorial freedom and independence in broadcasting. Nowadays broadcasting is regulated by The Audiovisual Media Service Act and there is a separate Act for Estonian Public Broadcasting. Among many other aspects, such as licensing of broadcasting companies, commercial communication, programming quotas etc. dictated by Audiovisual Media Services Directive, finding the appropriate balance between the state language and local Russian-speaking media space design has been one of the key media policy issues.

During the licensing process for emerging private broadcasting companies in the early 1990s media policy makers were particularly concerned with the protection of emerging markets from foreign capital, enrichment of Estonian culture and media space development. The political motives were also important, whereas these were minimal or non-existent for the owners of Estonian-speaking broadcasting organisations. Ensuring the “correct political undercurrent” of broadcasting stations was a crucial issue for both legislative and executive powers. Free journalism was promoted forcibly. However, when issuing broadcasting licences, “Russian danger” or possible infiltration of Russian capital into Estonian media was closely guarded. At the same time, satisfying the needs and considering the interests of the Russian-speaking audience was considered important.

According to McQuail the second influencer of media institutions is technology (2010). During the 1990s the impact of technology in Eastern Europe was related to the replacement of Soviet broadcasting standards with western ones. All production, transmission and receiving equipment was exchanged. Large investments were needed on both sides — on the side of media companies and on the side of the audience. The print industry also needed modernization. Old soviet technology was amortized and did not meet the needs of the modern print industry.

FORMATION OF ESTONIA'S RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MEDIA

According to Integration Monitoring circa 50 per cent of Russian-speakers cannot follow media (print, online, radio and television) in Estonian because of an insufficient

knowledge of the language (Vihalemm, 2011). Whilst electronic media to some extent meets this demand, print media offerings are in decline. Development of Estonian Russian-language media can be summarised into time periods as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Periods and main development trends of Russian-language media

Time period	Trends in development of Russian-language media
1991–1999 Active development	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The active development of print outlets in Russian language. Emergence of new outlets: if in 1991 there were eight newspapers with general socio-political content in Tallinn and North-eastern Estonia, by the end of 1999 there were already 16 newspapers. 2. The growth of radio broadcasting: in 1992 there was only one radio station transmitting in Russian (a public service one), by the end of 1999 there were six, amongst them five commercial stations. 3. The state-owned Estonian Television was transformed to a public service TV channel; commercial channels emerged and were sold to foreign capital. By the end of the period there were two nationwide commercial TV-channels. Some local Russian-language TV-channels were established. 4. First internet-portal in Russian language emerged in Estonia in 1991.
2000–2006 Stabilization	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Stabilization of the Russian-language press market. The number of newspapers varied from 12 to 15. 2. Emergence of new commercial TV channels. By the end of 2006 five commercial TV stations were on air. PSB Estonian Television produced several programmes in Russian. 3. The number of Russian language radio stations in this period constituted seven, among them Estonian Radio 4. Commercial radio stations were profiled mainly towards mainstream music, short news and entertainment programmes. 4. Still only one internet portal in Russian language.
2007–2010 Economy crisis; rise of internet portals	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Economic crisis caused advertising market collapse. Due to the sharp decline of revenues several newspapers were closed. By the end of 2010 there were only ten newspapers in Russian with general content. The two oldest dailies were closed, only one remained. Second PSB TV channel ETV2 was launched. It offered some programmes in Russian, but against the initial plans was not developed as a PSB TV channel in Russian. 6. There were not big changes in the radio sphere in comparison with the previous time period. The active growth of internet portals began to have a negative influence on the printed press market. If in 2006 there were only two internet portals with general content, by 2010 there were seven of them. All newspapers created internet portals on the base of print content.

Time period	Trends in development of Russian-language media
2011–2013 Modest development for the internet and TV; stagnation for print media	Stagnation of Russian-language press market. The only daily newspaper has been issued only three times a week since June 2013. Seven TV stations which broadcast at least partly in Russian operate in Estonia. The quality of programmes depends on channels and may vary a lot. Eight Estonian radio stations broadcast in Russian language, one of them is PSB, others are commercial. Internet portals occupy a strong position in the Russian-language media market in Estonia. One new internet portal was established. By the end of 2013 there were eight Russian-language media portals in Estonia.

Source: authors.

The major trend for the last three periods described in Table 1 is that circulations of all print press titles have been decreasing since 1998. The most vulnerable position is among dailies whereas weeklies are in a more preferable position (Table 2).

Table 2. Circulation of Russian-language outlets 1998–2013 (in thousands)

	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2013
Molodjzh Estonii	7.2	4.9	7.5	7.7					
Estonia / Vesti Dnja	8.7	7.9	6.3	8.5	9.2				
Vesti Nedelja Pljus	21.12	23.5	19.9	16.1					
Den za Dnjom	16.7	19.4	18.6	14.5	17	13	13.2	10.4	10.5
Delovyje Vedomosti	4.8	4.8	5.1	5.3	6	5.8	4.8	7	3.8
Molodjzh Estonii Subbota	9.9	7.1	10.3	11.3	11.5				
MK Estonii					14.3	11	11.1	12.9	31.1
Postimees na Russkom Jazyk					17.1	12.3	11.5	9.6	7.8

Source: newspaper industry statistics by Estonian Newspaper Association. Retrieved April 25, 2014, from <http://www.eall.ee/ajalehetoostus/index.html>.

DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE BROADCASTERS

Director General of Estonian Radio Peeter Sookruus (1991, p. 19) envisioned Estonian Radio as a public service broadcaster producing and broadcasting three programmes in Estonian and one in Russian. Such a vision was in accordance with the linguistic distribution of the population. This proportion — one of four — was

achieved in public service radio already in 1993, when in addition to the three programmes in Estonian a Russian-language program was launched.

Table 3. Number of radio channels in Estonia

	1995	2013
Private radio channels in Estonian	41	21
Private radio channels in Russian	2	8
Public service radio programmes in Russian	1	1
Public service radio programmes in Estonian	3	4

Source: authors' calculations based on the statistics of issued broadcasting licenses by the Ministry of Culture.

Today, of 29 radio licences, eight are given to broadcast Russian-language programmes, public service Radio 4 functions under the National Public Broadcasting Act. Thus it can be said that by 2013 the radio landscape in Estonia reflects the ratio of 3:1 of the linguistic distribution of population (Table 3).

Until the beginning of the 1990s, the main TV channels that broadcast on Estonian territory were Estonian Television (ETV) and three channels from Russia: Ostankino TV, Russia TV and Leningrad TV. The re-transmission of all Russian television and radio channels was terminated in 1991–1994. The frequencies and networks they had occupied were licensed to newly born Estonian private broadcasters.

For the Russian-speaking audience, the changes taking place at the beginning of the 1990s were dramatic; the number of programme hours offered through terrestrial broadcasting in Russian dropped substantially. No domestic national TV channel targeted at Russian speakers was established. The market demand for programmes in Russian was met by cable operators. They expanded their networks rapidly and started to re-transmit Russian channels available on satellites.

Today there are 14 valid TV licences in Estonia as on 1 May 2014. Three of those are aimed at a Russian-speaking audience. With the widespread use of cable networks and IPTV in areas of the Russian-speaking population, these programmes are now easily accessible. At the same time, they are not as far as popular as Russian TV programmes (see thereafter). It is noteworthy that there are a number of foreign thematic TV channels in Russian, available in cable packages. In total, these “other” channels reached 87 per cent of Russian speakers weekly and took up 39 per cent of their viewing time in 2012 (see Figure 1).

The most popular TV station among Russian speakers is Pervyi Baltijski Kanal (First Baltic Channel, PBK), which is owned and operated by a Latvian independent legal entity working under two jurisdictions; they have a broadcasting license issued by LNRT Latvia and by the British Ofcom. The PBK channel is available in all the Baltic States on all technical platforms: satellite, cable, IPTV and DTT pay TV packages. It primarily re-transmits the Russian commercial TV channel




Figure 1. Russian-speakers' share of viewing of the main Russian language TV channels

Source: TNS Emor Peoplemeter Survey 2003–2013.

ORT (controlled by the Russian government), but also includes a daily newscast produced locally in each country in the format of ORT's main news programme (*Vremja*), and is scheduled immediately after the latter at prime-time.

Among the most watched channels only Viasat 3+ is not Russian. This is owned by the Modern Times Group and broadcasts mainly Western series and movies with a Russian voiceover; in addition a considerable amount of entertainment programming acquired from Russia fills the channel's schedule. So, one can say that a big part of the Russian-language Estonian population is following mainly Russian television channels and is therefore more integrated into a Russian information field than an Estonian one.

MINORITY LANGUAGE AUDIENCE AS A MARKET FAILURE

The third influence on media institutions is economics (McQuail, 2010). A significant difference in the development of Estonian and Russian-language private media is the inclusion of private capital. Estonian media enterprises developed mostly with the help of western investments — Scandinavian media companies generally became the owners of these enterprises. Norwegian Schibsted ASA purchased the most widespread national newspaper *Postimees*, several county newspapers, TV channel Kanal 2, a printing house and later shares in the Trio radio group. Finnish Mainos TV invested in AS *Reklaamitelevisioon* that later merged with EVTV to form TV 3, a part of Swedish Modern Time Group. MTG also founded two radio stations. Bonnier Group acquired shares in newspapers *Eesti Ekspress* and *Äripäev*. The main goal of all these

foreign companies that invested in the Estonian media sector was to gain profit from a newly opened market.

No investments have come from abroad into Russian-language media. Media channels were owned or created by local non-Estonian entrepreneurs. Unfortunately these did not have sufficient resources to create good quality audience-capturing media products. There was a lack of critical mass — of quantity, quality, and audience. Considering the smallness of potential market, foreign capital did not have any interest in contributing to this narrow sector. Taking into account Russia's near abroad foreign policy, Russian money could have come into the Estonian media sector with political aims. This however did not happen, not at least to the extent to start and maintain a local Russian-language TV programme, newspaper and/or radio station. Probably such investment was not considered important as Russian-speaking people living in Estonia followed Russia's main TV channels anyway. Attempts to involve foreign private capital from either East or West by Russian-language media companies were not successful.

The profit and outcome of Russian-language media companies provide a good description of the shortage of resources. Analysis of Russian-language print media indicates that because of unprofitable business the newspapers often went bankrupt or frequently changed owners. In several cases the official financial results are not declared. As an example, the financial standing of the newspaper *Den za Dnjom* by owners in 2001–2008 can be considered. There is no data regarding the financial status of the company in official databases before that time and data from years 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008 is missing. In 2008 the publisher of the newspaper was purchased by AS Postimees. In 2012 the publisher was merged with Postimees AS and the financial results of the newspaper are no longer available separately (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Profit and loss of newspaper *Den za Dnjom* publishers

Source: authors' calculations based on company annual reports from Business Register.

In comparison with the financial results of the two biggest private TV channels (see Figure 3) the turnover of Russian-language Estonian broadcasters follows a similar pattern (see Figure 4). There is however a difference in the profitability of the channels. As the main source of income for major TV channels is advertising sales, the economic crises at the end of 1990s and beginning of 2008 influenced their income far more than that of small companies functioning on project support.




Figure 3. Financial results of TV3 and Kanal 2

Source: authors' calculations based on company annual reports from Business Register.




Figure 4. Summarized financial results of Russian languages TV-channels

Source: authors' calculations based on company annual reports from Business Register.

While the financial results of Estonian-language media companies can be usually found in official databases from the mid-1990s to the present, the same information regarding Russian-language publications is incomplete in the national register. Despite that a general trend in Russian-language printed media can be pointed out — this is the decrease in income.




Figure 5. Financial characteristics of media companies Eesti Ajalehed (EA) and Postimees

Source: author's calculations based on company annual reports from E-Business register.

Comparison of financial results of the two biggest newspaper publishers (Figure 5) and Russian-language newspaper publisher (Figure 2) in Estonia indicates a difference. The same difference occurs when financial parameters of Estonian commercial TV channels (Figure 3) are compared with their Russian counterparts (Figure 4).

Differently from the Russian language print media there has been no change of ownership or bankruptcy of Russian-language TV channels but it must be pointed out that there is still no domestic TV channel producing and broadcasting nationwide full-time, free to air Russian-language programmes in Estonia.

The private sector's unwillingness to work for language niche audiences is understandable from the business point of view. Investments into expensive niche media products are not profitable. A potential audience of around 300,000 Russian-speaking viewers is not big enough for profitable launch of a commercial TV-channel, especially in the situation where there are plenty of attractive foreign Russian TV channels available through cable networks and satellite platforms. A cheaper form of mass media — newspapers — is facing problems to gain enough readers needed for sustainable business. Economic regression which started in 2007 has heavily decreased advertising revenues. Traditional newspapers lost more than 60 per cent of their yearly advertising revenues (Figure 6).




Figure 6. Estonian advertising market value

Source: author's calculations based on TNS Emor media market monitoring reports 1996–2013.

While major media companies had some internal resources which helped them to survive under extensive cost cuttings, smaller companies were forced to close down their activities. Private media companies with Russian language media products belong to the latter group. Russian language media's already unfavourable economic situation deteriorated dramatically.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING

Research conducted by Lauristin (2004, 2009), Lauk (2008), Lõhmus et al. (2010) underlines the special role public service broadcasting (PSB) carries for small countries like Estonia. It is especially important in markets where private broadcasting is commercialized, that PSB maintains its role as a reliable provider of a trustful source of information. The roles of public service media in the public sphere, pluralism and democratic development are described as the crucial ones. All these factors have a direct influence on society and citizens. Enhancing democracy and cultural heritage, improving social cohesion, developing a platform for open debate, guaranteeing media pluralism, being a source of reliable and independent information — these are important functions of PSB. Without fulfilment of these functions the development of democratic society is under serious threat.

Even if this seems to be a strong and relevant statement it is not everywhere and always supported from the political level with sufficient public service broadcasting

funding. In the Estonian case the only source of revenues is from the state budget (ERR does not have commercial revenues, sales of advertising airtime is prohibited). One reason for that is the European Union media policy which is subordinate to economic policy (Harcourt, 2005; Jõesaar, 2011). In a similar way to the other industries' regulations also media regulation is shaped by market forces to a large extent. The result of a liberal regulatory process is that media will be more and more commercialized.

As shown by Lowe and Nissen (2011) as well as Jõesaar (2011) in the poorer smaller states commercial media tends to be more global entertainment oriented than in smaller wealthy states. To balance global entertainment, PSB should have strong and interesting own-production, which is more costly than mass produced acquisition. This results in the conclusion that for strong public service broadcasting, PSB funding in small markets should be at a relatively higher level than in large markets. In reality the situation is the opposite. The level of available funding is (an immediate) cause for PSB performance.

In the case of Estonia, as shown earlier there actually exist two main audiences — national language speakers and Russian speakers. This means that for serving both communities in the best way, double the amount of funding is needed. It is evident that private media is not able to serve Russian-language citizens at a proper level. There is neither a nationwide daily newspaper nor full-scale TV-channel in Russian, television programmes offered in Russian still do not have a critical mass to attract its target audience on a large scale; Russian language music radio stations are orientated towards entertainment of young audiences, only the Estonian public broadcaster's nationwide radio programme in Russian Radio 4 offers quality journalistic content; newspapers in Russian have a very moderate penetration.

PSB'S TRADITION OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE PROGRAMMING

In the Soviet-era, Estonian Television (ETV) produced news and primarily cultural and educational programmes in Russian during the 1960s and the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, the offer of pan-Union Russian programmes intensified. In the context of the USSR, local Russian language programmes were never treated as those targeted to a minority, because the speakers of the non-native language among the population of a republic of the Union were never considered as minorities. Programmes in Russian, broadcast by the TV stations of the republics, expressed one of the Russification methods used by the USSR; the production of these programmes was not driven by the modern idea of complying with the information needs of a minority. In Estonia, where only one local TV station existed, a third of its schedule was filled with the Central Television programmes of the Soviet Union. The content scope of local programmes in Russian developed only partially. From 1980 to 1991, ETV aired only approximately an hour of domestic programmes in Russian (including news) daily (Shein, 2005). Few television journalists spoke Russian as

their mother tongue, and the content they produced was limited, mainly cultural, music and educational programmes; analytical journalism was almost non-existent.

From 1990, with the exception of news, Russian ETV programmes were aired on Saturday daytime and the content scope extended from information to entertainment. The volume of programmes was fewer than 200 hours per year. Due to the lack of viewers, attempts were made to find a better timeslot, and in the middle of the 1990s, a programme strip in Russian was created to air before the pre-prime news in Russian on work days.

In the early 1990s, Russian language TV journalism existed only in ETV. Independent producers had not yet appeared, and when they did, around the end of the decade, the majority were individual producers and fully dependent on their financiers. Commercial stations did not pay to show programmes in Russian, instead, barter deals were offered: the producers could sell advertisement time inside their programmes. The budget of PSB television was also highly dependent on advertisements, so, as the volume of other production grew, the programmes in Russian were pushed into the background, as something unattractive to advertising agencies. Although some good publicists emerged among the Russian-speaking television journalists, they probably felt the air of suspicion of disloyalty, and therefore tried to choose topics as neutral as possible, which, in return, did not help to increase the interest of viewers. The integration programme, launched in the second half of the 1990s and funded by the EU, produced a shift in the content focus, which moved to integration-related topics (Lauristin, 2004).

Notwithstanding the incompleteness of the statistics covering the end of the 1990s, we can estimate that the volume of Russian language programming rose above 200 hours in 1998–1999, when over 10 different series' were aired on ETV (Trapido, 2000, p. 112; Shein, 2005). Unfortunately, this was the time of the economic downturn, and the attempt by the management to increase its own production's output, in circumstances whereby the state grant had been cut back by 10 per cent, caused a serious budgetary crisis. At the beginning of the 2000s, the crisis led to a recession in all activities, including the production of Russian programming in ETV. By April 2000, the budget for Russian programmes had decreased five times since 1998, and enabled the production of just one half-hour programme per week (PRTM, 2000).

The budgetary crisis resulted in cut-backs in several programming sectors and produced changes in management logistics. The Russian-language programme unit was closed. The production of Russian programmes was initiated on the orders of ETV's programme management, mainly in the form of co-production between independent producers and ETV. It was primarily the production of the news that continued to be financed from ETV's budget. The remainder of the in-house production received funding from the Integration Foundation or from other public funds. Part of the schedule was acquired from Russia, and re-runs of some Estonian programmes with Russian subtitles were also scheduled for Russian timeslots.

Several former employees of ETV now work as independent producers, acquiring the necessary additional financing from public funds. However, a specific centre of competence, which should work on developing a cohesive concept of television programmes aimed towards non-Estonians and executing related ideas, does not currently exist in Estonia. This fact has also been pointed out in the debates discussing the launch of a television channel in Russian (Ajustrust Konsultatsioonid, 2007).

TODAY'S CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA

Public service Radio 4, once indisputable leader among Russian-language radio stations, is still a leader, but the listening trend is clearly negative (Figure 7). Commercial music radio stations are gaining a market share. It will be challenging for PSM to retain its position in the Russian language radio market.




Figure 7. Russian language radio stations share of listening

Source: TNS Emor radio audience survey.

Estonian Television's position among the Russian-speaking audience is complicated. In 2008, another economic downturn enforced ETV to make budgetary cut-backs and the volume of Russian language programmes dropped to a level last experienced in the middle of the previous decade (Figure 8). Only one series was produced for the Russian audience, which, too, received funding from external sources. Despite the lack of funding, ETV2 started broadcasting in summer 2008 and continues to be on air. However, the original concept of this new channel, broadcasting in Russian at least on prime-time, was revised. Today, the main scope of the channel is cultural and educational programmes and this task is primarily fulfilled by using ETV's archives. As no extra financial resources are allocated from

the state budget, the new in-house production is minimal, primarily consisting of original children's programmes, which also have an important role in ETV2.

Notwithstanding, the launch of ETV2 opened up new possibilities and, from 2009 onwards, the volume of Russian language programming has significantly increased, although the major part of in-house productions (with the exception of the news) was still financed from external sources. Furthermore, re-runs from the ETV archives and Estonian language current affairs programmes with Russian subtitles increased the output. The result is that a prime-time slot, including news, some information programmes and acquired drama series scheduled for Russian speakers, today exists on ETV2. Still, these programmes are not sufficiently efficient to attract the Russian-speaking audience and to integrate them into the Estonian information field. The decline in 2012 is caused by the cut in the production of original programming in Russian. In 2012, ETV's channels occupied only 1.8 per cent of the viewing time of non-Estonians.




Figure 8. ETV's yearly total programme hours targeted at the Russian-speaking audience: 1994–1996; 2001–2013

Source: authors' calculation.

Particularly, a remarkable increase in output of Russian language news occurred after the news was transferred to ETV2, where a longer timeslot was available. Unfortunately, the shift to ETV2 meant that the Russian news lost some of its viewers. Since 2010, the news is repeated on MTG channel 3+; the audience remains but quite small.

CONCLUSIONS

The development of Russian-language media in Estonia after the country regained its independence in 1991 were influenced by the range of factors (political,

economic and technological influencers) and resulted in the rapid changes on the media landscape, the severe shortage of Russian-language media channels and the decrease of volume of advertisement market. One more impact resulted in the creation of two different information fields, which is based on linguistically different population groups: native Russian-speakers and Estonian-speakers. Only one third of the Russian-speaking population consider themselves regular consumers of media channels in Estonian (Vihalemm, 2011).

The whole media system in Estonia has been changed. Establishment of liberal media principles in re-independent Estonia ended undemocratic supervision and gave media independence. Newspapers, magazines, TV and radio that were ideologically and economically strictly controlled by the central power of USSR had to reorganize their activity, according to free market principles. Due to different reasons, to Russian-language media in Estonia free market circumstances proved disadvantageous. While Estonian media companies soon found investors from the Nordic countries, Russian-language enterprises had to rely on domestic resources only which turned out to be scarce. They could not establish cooperation either with Nordic, or Russia's investors. Furthermore, the number of readers decreased rapidly and in 2013 no Russian-language daily newspaper was published in Estonia. The weeklies have done slightly better. The newspaper with the widest circulation is a city newspaper reflecting the political interests of the capital's city government.

Local Russian-language broadcasting in Soviet Estonia produced some educational and cultural programs on the only national TV channel while the choice of programming at pan-Soviet TV channels was abundant. A number of Russian-language TV commercial satellite channels were created after Estonia regained independence, aimed to create programs oriented at Russian-speaking viewers and making profit from the local advertising market. Unfortunately, broadcasting such channels was limited and the lack of the resources did not allow to produce high quality programs which could compete with Russia's television and programs of Public Service Television. Therefore the amount of viewers was not considerable enough to rouse the interest of advertisers. Russia's television channels remain the main source of information for Estonia's Russian-speaking minority. This however did not fulfil the duties of a democratic media system. Information and debate on the development and functioning of Estonia's society could only come from domestic media, mainly from Estonian Radio and Estonian Television that were being transformed into public service broadcasting organisations. When availability of creative resources, market conditions and economic atmosphere do not favour commercial media, this kind of market failure should be balanced by public service media.

Estonian Radio was successful at launching a Russian-language radio programme — Raadio 4, which is the most popular radio among the Russian-speakers. There is also a number of commercial radio stations in Estonia which

produce mainly entertainment content, while the biggest amount of socio-political discussions and news programs belong to Estonian Public Service Radio — Raadio 4.

Estonian Television, however, had two Estonian-language channels (ETV1 and ETV2). Single Russian-language slots on ETV 2 did not find many viewers. At present, the amount of time spent on watching any Estonian-language TV channel, including commercial channels, is decreasing to a marginal level among the Russian-speaking audience. From the viewpoint of Estonia's social and cultural coherence this is a negative trend but altering an established framework presupposes a clearly stated political programme. Regrettably, various ideas to increase PSM output in Russian on all media platforms, especially in television, have not received political support and because of that the Russian language content is heavily under-financed.

The launch of the PSB Russian language TV-channel, ETV2, has been debated for almost two decades. It has been mentioned in parliamentary debates and has been part of a number of PSB's development plans. A short list of arguments supporting and opposing ETV2 in Russian is as follows:

For

- The channel will support the enhancement, development and servicing of social, political and cultural citizenship;
- It will offer adequate and reliable information to all citizens and inhabitants;
- It will extenuate tensions between two ethnic groups;
- It will serve as a balancing force to Moscow, lowering national security risks.

Against

- To attract a Russian audience (extra) high quality programmes are needed;
- It is too expensive; sufficient additional financial resources are unavailable;
- Whatever the programme, it is unrealistic to expect that it will attract the attention of the Russian audience, because of high competition from abroad;
- There is no need for such a channel — in the long run, all citizens will understand Estonian and will therefore be capable of watching Estonian programmes;
- If state financed propaganda is required, these programmes should be ordered from, and aired on, PBK.

The topic gained new importance during the crisis in Ukraine, when it appeared that a considerable proportion of the Russian population supports the annexation of Crimea. The subject of a full-time Russian-language TV channel, either a domestic, pan-Baltic or pan-European one, was an important issue on the hustings for the European Parliament. The discussions concluded that development of Russian-language media may prove to be an issue of national security in Estonia. The ex-Prime Minister, however, stated that a stable economy and individual welfare have a stronger influence on people's mentality than a media channel. This indicates that reaching political consensus is still the main obstacle to developing minority language media.

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MINORITY LANGUAGE MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIETAL INTEGRATION IN ESTONIA

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ABSTRACT *The article focuses on the role of Russian-speaking journalists and the potential of Russian-language media in advancing societal integration in Estonia. As a consequence of socialist colonization during the Soviet regime a quarter of Estonian population today is Russian-speaking. The two main language communities have different informational spaces separated by a language barrier. Integration can only be successful if there is unhampered communication between minority and majority groups, and equal opportunities for individuals and groups to participate in the public sphere. First, we discuss the concept of minority language media and the position of Russian-language media in the context of societal integration in Estonia. Using a quantitative survey we depict the current professional status of Estonian Russian-speaking journalists, and display their perceptions about their role in integration. We conclude that Russian-speaking journalists perceive themselves as mediators between Estonian and Russian communities, but are not positive about the possibilities of Russian-language media to fulfil their task as representatives of the minority.*

KEY WORDS

MINORITY LANGUAGE MEDIA, ESTONIA, SOCIETAL INTEGRATION

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INTRODUCTION

Many European countries currently experience an increase in ethnic minority populations as a consequence of immigration from other parts of the world. Estonia's Russian ethnic minority population emerged differently: through Soviet colonization in the post-WWII era. The integration of this minority into Estonian society became a socio-political challenge since the country regained its independence in 1991. During the period of radical political, social and economic reforms in the 1990s, the status of the large, mostly Russian-speaking non-titular population (in 1989, 38.5 %) had to be determined. During Soviet rule, there was no need for integration between Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking populations, a single citizenship existed in the Soviet Union – the Soviet one – with Russian as a shared official language throughout the Soviet empire. Soviet migration policy resulted in Estonian and Russian-speaking communities living side by side, using different information channels and having little in common.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russophone residents of Estonia and Latvia (unlike those of Lithuania) were not granted citizenship but were offered passports of non-citizen residents. Furthermore, the first Citizenship Act in 1992 reinforced the division of society along ethnic lines: all ethnic Estonians became citizens, while 85 % of the Russophone population were non-citizens (for more see Lauristin and Kallas, 2008). In the 1990s integration policy focused primarily on increasing the knowledge of Estonian among the non-titular population but failed to address many other problems. Only as late as 1998, was the first minority policy document issued (for more see Lauk and Jakobson, 2009). Although the knowledge of Estonian has remarkably improved, 16 % of the Russophone population still claim that they do not understand any Estonian (Vihalemm T., 2011: 115). Research has repeatedly confirmed that the main sources of information for non-Estonian speakers are Russia's media channels (Kirch M., 1997; Jakobson, 2002; Hallik, 2006; Vihalemm P., 2004, 2008, 2011; Lauristin et al., 2011). However, up to 71 % of Russophones also regard Estonian produced Russian media as important sources of information on Estonian issues (Vihalemm P., 2011: 159). Therefore, the state integration strategy document for 2008–2013 (EL 2008–2013) specifically emphasized the significance of media and journalists as agents of societal integration in Estonia. The first state integration strategy *Integration in Estonian Society 2000–2007* defined integration as harmonisation of society and as an opportunity to preserve ethnic differences offering ethnic minorities "opportunities for the preservation of their cultural and ethnic distinctiveness" (Riiklik Programm 2000–2007: 5). To diminish the gap between the two language and cultural communities, the promotion of "linguistic-communicative integration in society" was strongly emphasized, meaning "the re-creation of a common sphere of information and Estonian-language environment in Estonian society under conditions of cultural diversity and mutual tolerance" (*ibid.*: 6). Integration is regarded as a two-way process that requires efforts on the part of the majority and minority alike, and is based on the mutual acceptance and respect of various social groups (Integration in Estonian Society, 2014).

Sara Signer et al. (2011: 421–422) argue that although mass media cannot be considered a core agent of integration on par with the educational system, the media still contribute to intercultural integration in two important ways: 1) minorities working in journalism contribute to media diversity by introducing minority-specific issues; 2) the use of mainstream media by minorities is considered important for their intercultural integration.

By increasing the availability of information on Estonian issues and events in Russian and providing more of the same information in Russian that is provided in Estonian, Russian-speaking journalists may potentially bridge two informational spaces and thus, contribute to integration and societal coherence. Agreeing that the key aim of the media in a minority language is cultural and political self-representation (Cormack, 2007:10), we suggest that Russian-speaking journalists have a potential to express the views and expectations of the Russophone minority. Therefore, it is important to explore Russian-speaking journalists' professional attitudes and aspirations and their position in the context of societal integration in Estonia.

So far, only one – unpublished – study exists that deals with these questions (Jufereva, 2006). Overwhelmingly the studies dedicated to media and integration issues focus on media contents in both Russian and Estonian, and on the coverage of interethnic relations and political inclusion/exclusion (Kirch A. et al., 1993; Jakobson, 1996, 2002; Kirch M., 1997; Vetik, 1999; Kõuts, 2004; Hallik, 2006; Pettai, 2006; Vihalemm P., 2008, 2011; Lauk and Jakobson, 2009; Vihalemm T. and Jakobson, 2011; Aidarov and Drechsler, 2013; Jõesaar et al., 2014).

In contrast, our study focuses on Russian-speaking journalists' perceptions of their role in the context of societal integration in Estonia. The main research questions of this study are: 1) How do Russian-speaking journalists position themselves as professionals in the media field? 2) What are Russian-speaking journalists' perceptions of their role as agents of integration? We also discuss some contextual aspects: the concept of minority language media and the place of Russian-language media in societal integration in Estonia. We conclude with analysing the intersection of Russian-speaking journalists' professional values with the contextual conditions of their media environment.

CONCEPTUALISING MINORITY LANGUAGE MEDIA

In this study, we use the term minority language when speaking about Russian in Estonia, referring to the definition given in the *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* (1992). According to the Charter, minority languages are "traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population". The Charter distinguishes among five categories of minority languages. Russian in Estonia represents the fourth category: "languages spoken in communities constituting a minority in the nation state where they live that are majority languages in other countries". Mike Cormack (2007) fairly criticizes

this definition as inadequate. As he claims "the concept of a linguistic minority is essentially a political one" – it is the nationalism of the majority group that creates the situation where "one community is constructed by the other as a minority" (Cormack, 2007: 1) and marginalized by the majority community. The Russian language is not threatened with disappearing in Estonia because of a large number of native speakers, the geographic proximity of Russia and easy access to Russian language media both locally produced and from Russia. The Russian-speaking minority forms a distinct minority language community in Estonia. There also seem to be strong links between citizenship and the sense of belonging to Estonia: 80 % of Russian-speaking Estonian citizens and two thirds of all Russian-speaking residents regard themselves as being Estonian people (Vihalemm T., 2011: 134–156).

Various labels are used in scholarly literature for the media produced in minority languages: minority media, ethnic media, diasporic and minority language media. A common consensus does not seem to exist about the meaning and use of these attributes. For example, Anne-Katrin Arnold and Beate Schneider (2007) use the terms ethnic media and ethnic journalists to distinguish the media of large immigrant communities from mainstream media. Matthew Matsaganis et al. (2011: 8–9) define ethnic media as media produced by and for (a) immigrants, (b) ethnic, racial, and linguistic minorities, and (c) indigenous groups living in various countries across the world. Mark Deuze (2006: 262) does not distinguish between ethnic and minority media, he understands ethnic or minority media as media produced by and for minority groups, living in the host country. Valeria Jakobson (2002) who studied the Russian-language media's role in societal integration in Estonia used the terms ethnic minority media and Russian language media. We use the term minority language media adopting it from Cormack who argues that the status of a language in a state is crucial in forming identities and values, and also that official languages of one state may be minority languages in another, such as Russian in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, or Arabic in France (*ibid.*: 1). In Estonia, we find media and journalists that belong to and work for the Russian-speaking minority community and also a huge range of easily accessible Russian media produced in Russia. This situation is complicated in terms of societal integration and the coherence of Estonian society, as Russian media largely serve the Russian state's policy of "protecting Russian minorities abroad", even at the expense of aggression. This situation clearly makes the role of Estonian produced Russian-language media even more important in supporting integration and social cohesion.

In his seminal article *Minority Language Media in Western Europe* (1998) Mike Cormack suggested seven conditions necessary for the successful emergence and development of minority language media: number of users of the language; mass campaign for media; leadership and organization; political culture; political weakness of the central government; symbolic status of the language and international trends. Cormack restricted his study to the Western European minorities of Celtic languages and the regional languages of Spain. Later, he further developed minority language media studies (Cormack, 2004, 2005, 2007) defining, among other issues, their core concerns such as the status of media in the context of a specific language and culture, and the economic basis of minority language media.

Enrique Uribe-Jongbloed (2014) critically examined Cormack's seven conditions within the non-European context of Colombia and concluded that with slight modifications, the factors proposed by Cormack are also applicable in (comparative) research on minority language media outside Europe. However, we do not attempt to make another test of Cormack's seven conditions by examining them in the context of Estonia's Russian-language media. Instead, we use this framework for explaining the media environment in which Estonian Russian-speaking journalists operate. As Cormack argues, "in any discussion of minority language media careful attention needs to be given to the specific context", and that "central to any discussion to these media must be consideration of the political environment" (1998: 48–49).

RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE MEDIA AND TWO INFORMATIONAL SPACES

The historical and political contexts of Russian-language media in Estonia differ from those of Western European countries that are discussed more frequently in literature. During Estonia's independence between 1918 and 1940, only 8.2 % of Estonia's population were ethnic Russians. The Russian-language press emerged in Estonia in the 19th century, and in the inter-war period, over 100 titles of newspapers and magazines existed for shorter or longer time. However, during the nearly five decades of post-WWII Soviet regime, the proportion of Russians increased to 30.3 % and that of other minority nationalities to 8.2 %. The shared language of those of non-Estonian origin was Russian as this was the only language in which they were educated in Estonia. In addition to the Russian-language newspapers and broadcasts produced in Estonia, media existing throughout the Soviet Union were widely distributed and consumed.

After Estonia regained its independence in 1991, Soviet subsidies stopped along with changes in media ownership, and the Russian-language media of the Soviet period did not survive. The new private investors faced economic difficulties, which led to the dramatic decline of Estonia's Russian-language press during the economic recession of the late 1990s and to its eventual collapse in the economic crisis of 2008–2011. While in 2001, 17 Russian language dailies existed, by 2011 only one daily newspaper and nine weeklies survived. Even the single remaining Russian language daily (*Postimees na russkom jazyke*) reduced its appearance to three times a week in June 2013.

The emergence of news portals to some extent compensates for the lack of available newspapers in Russian. Since 2005, several on-line versions have been created on the basis of surviving newspapers (*Postimees na russkom jazyke*, *Den za Dnjom*, *Delovyje Vedomosti*, *MK-Estonija*, *Stolitsa*). The first Internet portal in Russian (*Rus.delfi*) emerged in 1991 and now has 200,000 unique readers per week, followed by *Rus.postimees.ee* with 90,000 weekly readers (Современные русскоязычные СМИ Эстонии). In addition, the public service broadcaster *Eesti Rahvusringhääling* (ERR) launched the internet-portal *Rus.err.ee* in 2007. The Tallinn city government has run their Russian language portal *Stolitsa.ee* since 2008.

According to Cormack (1998), the number of language speakers is one of the factors for assessing the potential success of minority language media. He suggests that one million could be the minimum size of a population to maintain the full range of modern media. The overall estimated size of the Russian-language media market in Estonia is about 300,000 people. According to *Integration Monitoring 2011*, 71 % of Russophone population listened to the Estonian public service channel Radio 4 (Vihalemm P., 2011: 162) and over 80 % of the Russophone population regularly watched PBK (*Pervyi Baltijski Kanal/ First Baltic Channel*), which is available in all Baltic states. In addition to re-transmitting government controlled Russian TV channels (NTV-Mir and REN-TV), PBK also produces a daily newscast in each country. Along with PBK, other Russian TV channels are the main information source for 75 % of the Russophone population (*ibid.*: 165). These channels are also deemed most trustworthy by Estonia's Russian-speaking population. Estonian media channels are regarded as much less trustworthy by the majority of their total Russian-speaking audience (Vihalemm P., 2011: 162). There is very little interest in newspapers, the circulation of the most popular Russian-language national weekly *Postimees in Russian* is about 8,000 to 9,000 (EALL, 2014).

As the Russian-speaking audience has always been more oriented towards Russia's media channels rather than those of Estonia there has not been a "mass campaign for media" (Cormack, 1998). Although some Russian politicians have raised the issue, no substantial pressure exists from the audience for establishing and maintaining the full range of Russian-language news media in Estonia. However, the development plan *Integrating Estonia 2020* identifies the Estonian public service broadcaster (ERR) as an important actor in promoting a common media field (Report, 2014: 16). After a long and lively debate in the media and among politicians the government decided to launch a Russian-language television channel as a part of ERR at the end of 2014. This is not a sign of the "political weakness of the central government" and willingness "to concede power to regions" as Cormack's fifth factor declares (Cormack, 1998: 41), but an additional attempt to expand the common informational space. The channel will begin broadcasting in autumn 2015. According to a survey, about 66 % of Estonia's Russian-speaking population are potentially interested in watching the new channel (Kuul, 2014).

The results of a range of national studies (Kirch A. et al., 1993; Jakobson, 1996; Kirch M., 1997; Vetik, 1999) have demonstrated that Estonian and Russian language media produce different and separated semantic fields and informational spaces. In her study on Russian-language media and integration Jakobson concludes that in the 1990s, the Russian-language press mostly performed as a constructor of social barriers between the Russian population and Estonians, as well as a creator of distrust towards the Estonian state and societal institutions (Jakobson, 2002). As several studies confirm, no significant progress has yet been achieved in developing a common informational space for the two linguistic groups (Vihalemm P., 2008; Vihalemm T. 2011; Vetik, 2012). Therefore, producing and distributing information on Estonian affairs in Russian and through Russian-language media continues to be very important. An experienced journalist interviewed by the authors of this article (male, 56) emphasized this:

The two communities live separate lives. I think the Russian community is better informed but not about the life of the Estonian community but about Estonian political life. The Russian community knows very little about the lives of ordinary Estonian people. And Estonians know nothing about how the Russians live. They cannot even name the top ten celebrities of the Russian community.

Arnold and Schneider point out some important interrelations between media consumption and integration, such as "diffusion of information and knowledge about values, meanings and identity [...] and reduction/ alteration of social distances and cultural prejudices" (2007: 119). Hence, "an essential part of the study of any minority language media is the role of intellectuals and cultural producers" (Cormack, 1998: 49), which journalists certainly are. By supplying the discourse through which the world is understood and defining the world in the minority group's terms they contribute to "empowering the group and its identity" (*ibid.*: 45).

DATA AND METHOD

A survey, using a standardized questionnaire was conducted among Estonian Russian-speaking journalists in January and February 2011 – the year of the latest integration monitoring report that was used to prepare the new *Strategy of Integration and Social Cohesion in Estonia* (for 2014–2020). In 2011, more than half of Russian-speaking journalists worked in online outlets. Most of them worked in the capital of Tallinn (where the majority of Estonian mass media are concentrated) and in northeast Estonia, where 78 % of the population is Russian-speaking. The questionnaire was hand-delivered to all 140 journalists who worked full time in the editorial offices of Russian-language media outlets (the press, news portals, radio and television) with a 71 % response rate. The SPSS programme was used for data analysis. For comparison, some results of a 2006 survey of 120 Russian-speaking journalists are used. Additionally, from January till March 2012, in-depth interviews were conducted with 11 journalists with different work experiences and lengths of careers.

STATUS OF RUSSIAN-SPEAKING JOURNALISTS AS PROFESSIONALS

The majority (52 %) of Russian-speaking journalists are in their 30s or 40s, with careers spanning less than 20 years, which reflects the generational shift among journalists that took place in the early 1990s (cf. Lauk, 1996). Only 17 % of them have experience of working as journalists in the Soviet period and their number is decreasing. The younger generation is better professionally educated than the older one, about one third of them have a university degree in journalism. Also, female journalists are generally educated to higher levels than male journalists: 24 % of women have university education in journalism compared to 10 % of men, and 30 % of women hold a non-journalistic university degree as opposed to 20 % of men. Overall, the Estonian journalistic field seems to gradually feminize: currently there are 58 % female and 42 % male journalists. While in 2006,

parity existed between male and female journalists in Russian-language media, by 2011 the proportion had remarkably changed in favour of women (62 %). Interestingly, more women than men work in online media (22 and 12 %, respectively), and more men than women work in broadcasting (41 and 36 %, respectively).

The greater feminization among Russian-speaking journalists is probably one of the consequences of the economic hardships of the past six to seven years, which hit Russian-language media even harder than Estonian ones. As the Russian-language press has dramatically shrunk there are fewer well-paid jobs, and the majority of incomes after tax remain below €800 (75 %). More men have, probably, left the field because of low salaries. The salaries of Russian-speaking journalists are clearly lower than those in Estonian media. According to a survey of all Estonian journalists carried out in 2012–2013¹, the proportion of those paid less than €800 is considerably lower than in Russian-language media (39 %), the share of those paid between €800 and 1,200 is 45 %.


Professional self-identification and commitment to the profession are relatively weak among Russian-speaking journalists. Many (36 %) see their journalistic job as temporary, only as a stage in their careers. Only 14 % of respondents answered a decisive “no” to the question whether they have considered switching to another field, while nearly one fifth answered a clear “yes” and another 21 % had seriously thought about it. About the same number of journalists thought they could easily lose their current job and only a little more than a third (36 %) had a more positive view of the future. The majority of Russian-speaking journalists (83 %) are not members of the Estonian Journalists’ Union, whereas those who are, belong to the generation aged 50 and above. Perhaps, the fact that the Union does not have much authority among Estonian journalists in general (Harro-Loit and Loit, 2014) partly explains this situation. However, Russian-speaking journalists have not established their own organisation either.

A code of ethics is another important element of journalists’ professional self-identification. However, nearly one third (30 %) of Russian-speaking journalists are not familiar with the Code of Ethics of Estonian Journalism. Another indicator of professional identity is a certain responsibility for one’s professional community and for one’s own actions as a member of a “guild”. For the majority of Russian-speaking journalists, personal ambitions and loyalty to their employers seem to be more important than any sense of membership of a profession and responsibility for its operations (see Figure 1). Similar attitudes are also observed Europe-wide, in a survey of journalists in 14 countries in 2011–2012², 95 % of respondents stressed responsibility for their own actions and conscience, and over 80 % for their publisher.

¹ The survey was part of the global project *Worlds of Journalism Study*: <http://www.worldsofjournalism.org/>.


² Online survey conducted in 2011–2012 as part of a EU-funded research project “Media Accountability and Transparency in Europe (MediaAcT)” among journalists in 12 European countries (Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Switzerland) and two Arab countries: Jordan and Tunisia; with a total of 1,762 respondents. The project’s homepage: www.mediaact.eu.

The instability and economic difficulties of the Russian-language media sector have an obvious impact on journalists' job security. Job insecurity is reflected in journalists' mobility on the job market (see Figure 1): almost a quarter (24 %) of journalists had been employed in four to nine different newsrooms, whereas 53 % had had two to three jobs during their careers. It also appears that men change their jobs more often than women – among those with four to nine employments, 36 % were men and 19 % were women.



▲ Figure 1.
Job stability among Russian and Estonian journalists
(% of respondents)
 $N_E = 278$, $N_R = 100$

The mutual comprehension of the other group's language forms the basis of interethnic communication. For Russian-speaking journalists, knowledge of Estonian is an indispensable skill, as the majority of their sources are Estonian. Indeed, 92 % of the respondents admitted that Estonian is very important or quite important in their work. Although Estonian is the official language of the country and its everyday linguistic environment, only a quarter of the respondents stated that they were completely fluent in Estonian. Another 54 % said they could understand and speak Estonian. Journalists in their 30s and 40s have the best Estonian skills (67 and 89 % of the respective age group are good or fluent in Estonian). In comparison, 72 % of respondents declared they are sufficiently good in English (see Figure 2). The younger generation's command of English seems to be even better than that of Estonian (89 % of those in their 20s and 71 % in their 30s reported being good or fluent in English). One can speculate that the quality of English language teaching in Russian language schools has been higher than that of Estonian (which is true at least for the Soviet period). However, it also seems to be a matter of attitude and motivation – knowledge of Estonian is not valued as highly as that of English.



▲ Figure 2.
Command of Estonian and English in different age groups
(% of the age group)
N = 100

There was, still, a substantial group (19 %) of those whose knowledge of Estonian was passive (understanding to a degree but not speaking) or non-existent. This group has diminished since 2006, when about a third of Russian-speaking journalists did not communicate in Estonian.

It seems, however, that the self-assessment of knowledge of Estonian is somewhat misleading. When asked additionally about the root of difficulties in their work, 31 % mentioned insufficient knowledge of Estonian (as the fourth difficulty after lack of time, insufficient knowledge of the topic and high levels of stress).

RUSSIAN-SPEAKING JOURNALISTS LIAISING BETWEEN ESTONIAN AND RUSSOPHONE COMMUNITIES

Journalists in Estonia had to redefine their professional roles and tasks after the cessation of censorship and ideological surveillance over the media. Russian-speaking journalists had been in the position of the "official voice" of the ruling power even to a larger extent than Estonian journalists, as they represented the media in the language of pan-Soviet communication. The transformation from an ideological opinion-maker to an information provider occurred quite quickly in the early 1990s. Russian-speaking journalists have clearly adopted the role of information transmitter (98 %) and did that to a greater extent than the role of a "watchdog" (77 %). They regard the role of a mediator between the two linguistic communities as even more important. They emphasize discussing and explaining the problems of Estonian society in Russian-language media (94 %), reporting on Estonian culture and history (84 %) and helping the Russophone

population to feel that they are part of Estonian society (83 %) as the most important tasks for them as journalists. One of the interviewees, a former editor of a weekly (female, 32) expressed it in following way:

The task of a Russian journalist is to identify the problem, to make the ethnic majority aware of it, to explain what its essence is and its possible consequences for Russian-speakers, and to suggest a solution or a compromise. Journalists should invite experts, public opinion leaders and people from different sections of society to a public discussion.

The journalists mentioned economic difficulties and unemployment (95 % in both cases) as the most urgent problems of the Russophone population, which, although common throughout Estonian society, have a greater impact on the Russophones. As specific problems of minorities, 86 % of respondents mentioned unequal job opportunities and 75 % unequal treatment by officials in state institutions. The journalists also pointed out the importance of the Russian-language media in publicly discussing and interpreting these problems but they were dubious about the media's ability to improving the existing situation. Furthermore, 88 % of respondents thought that Russian-speaking journalists and media have no influence whatsoever on political decisions that are made in Estonia. In 2006, during the implementation of the first *Integration Programme* (2000–2007), more journalists (14 %) believed that they could influence politicians' actions and decisions. Indeed, the degeneration of the Russian-language news media in Estonia since the mid-2000s and the fact that the Russian-speaking population prefers watching Russia's television channels, plays a role here. Journalists do not think that local Russian-language journalism can substantially support integration and social cohesion in Estonia, and this attitude has not changed since 2006 (48 % of respondents of both surveys thought Russian-language media do not promote integration). On the other hand, 85 % of them believed that people generally trust Estonia's Russian-language media, although sociological studies do not support this optimistic view.

Interestingly, the level of knowledge of Estonian plays a significant role in how journalists see and interpret the integration process. 80 % of those completely fluent in Estonian supported the idea that local Russian-language media should help Russian-speaking people to integrate into Estonian society. The majority (71 %) of those able to communicate in Estonian regarded reporting about joint integration activities and projects involving both Estonians and Russians as important.

Also, education seems to influence attitudes towards the potential of Russian-language media in promoting integration. Journalists with a non-journalistic university degree were the most sceptical (53 % declared that the media do not promote integration). The most positive attitude appeared in the group with university degrees in journalism, 45 % of whom believed that Russian-language media support integration. However, another 45 % of those in the same group were of the opposite opinion.

According to Arnold and Schneider (2007: 118), the "representation of ethnic minorities in the media points to mass media's ability to influence integration through the way it portrays social groups". Russian-speaking journalists feel a strong affiliation with the

Russophone community: 78 % of them see expressing and defending the interests of Russian speakers as very important or important in their professional work. This attitude has actually strengthened since 2006, when only 38 % emphasized this task as important. Journalists try to reduce tensions in society by informing both their audiences about Estonian issues, and the Estonian-speaking audience about the issues of the Russophone community.

67 % of surveyed Russian-speaking journalists regarded the translation of websites, television and radio programmes and other media material into Russian and English as important. Our survey results reflect Russophone journalists' positive attitudes to their role in building social coherence in Estonian society and bridging between the two communities. The same attitude appears in some of our interviews. A television journalist with 20 years of professional experience (male, 53) put it in the following way:

Our apparent role is to connect the two communities. We are sitting on two chairs simultaneously. On the one hand, we have to keep an eye on what is going on in Russia, and we should tell people about that. On the other hand, it is necessary that we observe how the Russian-speaking community interacts with the Estonian speaking one. How realistic this role is, is another issue.

The 2011 Integration monitoring report confirmed that the majority of both Estonian and Russian-speaking people expected Russian-language media to cover life in Estonia in more depth and breadth and to better explain the context of events (Vihalemm P., 2011: 166). However, the interviewed journalists did not see the picture as encouraging and pointed to several disturbing moments, such as insufficient communication between Estonian and Russian-speaking journalists; the attempts by both sides to cover up negative facts about the other; lack of interest in each other's culture or history etc.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Both Cormack (1998, 2005, 2007) and Uribe-Jongbloed (2014) emphasize the relevance of political culture as a condition for the development of minority language media. In addition to everyone's right "to freely disseminate ideas, opinions, beliefs and other information by word, print, picture or other means" (Art. 45), the Estonian Constitution provides minority groups with the right "to establish self-governing agencies under such conditions and pursuant to such procedure as are provided in the National Minorities Cultural Autonomy Act" (Art. 50). Estonia's Public Broadcasting Act defines transmitting "programmes which [...] meet the information needs of all sections of the population, including minorities" (Art. 5 (8)) the task of the public service broadcaster ERR. No legal act or procedure exists to prevent the development of minority language media, neither are there any restrictions on access to various media. However, Russian-language media are not typical minority media which aim to maintain the language and cultural traditions of a minority, since Russian is the official language spoken by millions right across the border, and satellites make a variety of Russian television channels available. In addition to the economic problems of Estonia's Russian-language media, the audience's consumption habits weaken the opportunities that Russian-speaking journalists have to influence

the process of integration. Estonia's Russian-language media are unable to compete for an audience with the flow of information and entertainment from Russia, including propaganda that is hostile to the Estonian state. As our research indicates, within the existing Estonian media environment Russian-speaking journalists have difficulties in positioning themselves simultaneously as professionals and as representatives of the Russophone community.

According to our results, journalists working in Russian-language media are not too positive about their ability to promote the interests of the Russophone minority. Instead, they are more oriented towards general professional standards and their role as mediators between Estonian and Russian communities within existing possibilities. However, Estonia's Russian-speaking journalists are aware of their audience's needs for more information on everyday life in Estonia. They are also aware of the importance of diminishing the distance between the two linguistic communities and contributing to the development of a common information space for both communities. As professionals, Russian-speaking journalists do not have a strong professional identity, they are not organized and are therefore more exposed to unfavourable employment conditions. In addition, a limited command of Estonian by many of them restricts their range of sources and possibly, their ability to explain issues facing the Estonian society to their audience. We can conclude that professional qualities and contextual conditions that are necessary in order for minority language media to represent a minority's needs and interests and to contribute to their integration in the host society, are only partly present in the case of Russian-language media in Estonia.

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MEDIJI NA MANJINSKIM JEZICIMA I NOVINARI U KONTEKSTU DRUŠTVENE INTEGRACIJE U ESTONIJI

Maria Jufereva :: Epp Lauk

SAŽETAK U fokusu ovog članka jesu uloga novinara koji govore ruski jezik i potencijal medija na ruskom jeziku u unaprjeđivanju društvene integracije u Estoniji. Posljedica socijalističke kolonizacije za vrijeme sovjetskog režima jest ta da četvrtina estonskog stanovništva danas govori ruskim jezikom. Te dvije glavne jezične zajednice (estonska i ruska) imaju različite informacijske prostore koje dijeli jezična barijera. Integracija može uspjeti samo ako postoji nesputana komunikacija između manjinskih i većinskih skupina te ako pojedinci i skupine imaju jednaku mogućnost sudjelovanja u javnoj sferi života. U članku se prvo bavimo konceptom medija na manjinskim jezicima te ulogom medija na ruskom jeziku u kontekstu društvene integracije u Estoniji. Koristile smo metodu ankete kako bismo doznale kakav je trenutni profesionalni status estonskih novinara koji govore ruski jezik te kako oni percipiraju svoju ulogu u procesu integracije. Zaključile smo da novinari koji govore ruskim jezikom sebe doživljavaju kao posrednike između estonske i ruske zajednice, ali i da nisu sigurni da mediji na ruskom jeziku mogu ispuniti zadaću da budu predstavnici manjine.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI

MEDIJI NA MANJINSKIM JEZICIMA, ESTONIJA, DRUŠTVENA INTEGRACIJA

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Ethical orientations of Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia

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ABSTRACT

This study explores ethical orientations and ethical distortions that can be spotted with some Russian-speaking journalists in Russian-language journalism in Estonia. The article builds upon the assumption that a number of external indicators and institutional factors such as editorial policies as well as the political and economic background have a major influence on the ethical orientation of the journalists in Estonia. The study, employing the concepts of media accountability and journalism culture, utilizes both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The qualitative semi-structured individual interviews were used to understand and explain the implicit reasons, opinions, and motivations of the Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia. The quantitative research then enables the quantification of the journalists' attitudes, opinions, behaviours, and other defined variables – and generalizes the results from a larger sample of actors.

KEYWORDS

Russian-speaking journalists – ethical orientations – journalism culture – media accountability – Estonia

Introduction

The subject of media acting according to ethical norms in European democratic countries is very important and relevant. Whereas in Nordic countries there is a long history of democratic media, post-communist countries which gained independence in the 1990s do not have such extensive experience regarding independent media. In this context, it is very important to analyze to what extent these countries managed to adapt the principles of independent democratic media.

After 1991, Estonian media oriented themselves towards the media model of Nordic countries also called *democratic corporatists system*. The description of such a type of the system was proposed by media scholars Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini in their monograph *Comparing Media systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). According to these authors, the democratic corporatist model may be described in terms of external pluralism especially in national press, historically strong party press, shift toward neutral commercial press and a politics-in-broadcasting system with substantial autonomy (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 67). For Estonia's Russian-language media, it took a longer time to reorient, looking for a media model enabling to combine democratic media traditions with the traditions

of Russian journalism. However, because of economic pressures, commercialization and media concentration in Estonia, Russian-language media have also oriented themselves towards the democratic corporatist model.

The topic of the role of Russian-language journalism in Estonian society has recently appeared with its professional standards and its links to political parties and the influence of politics on journalism was largely covered by the scholars. Jufereva and Lauk (2015) point out that Estonia's Russian ethnic minority population emerged mostly through Soviet colonization in the post-WWII era. The Soviet migration policy resulted in Estonian and Russian-speaking communities living side by side, using different informational channels and having little in common. Up to 71% of Russian-speaking people consider Estonian-produced Russian media as their primary source of information on Estonian issues (Vihalemm, 2011: 159).

The general question addressed by this study is how successful Estonia's Russian-language media were in implementing the democratic corporatist model principles in the context of ethical orientations of Russian-speaking journalists. In this regard, this study shows that a certain number of institutional factors – such as the editorial policy as well as political and economic background – importantly influence the work of the Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia. Moreover, I also explain which ethical distortions may be detected in Russian-language journalism.

The article is organized as follows: First, the conceptualization of *journalism culture* developed by Thomas Hanitzsh (2007) is outlined in order to depict the main dimensions of ethical orientations of the Russian-language journalists in Estonia. Secondly, I explain the concept of *media accountability system* (Bertrand, 2000) and its link with the ethical orientations of journalists. Afterwards, a brief description of the Russian-language media system in Estonia follows. To finish with, I explain the data and method of the research.

The main research questions of this study are:

1. What are the general ethical orientations of Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia?
2. Which ethical distortions may be detected in Russian-language journalism?
3. Which factors influencing professional performance of Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia can be considered as the most important?

Ethical orientations and norms of professional journalists

In this study, I analyze what ethical orientations are followed by the Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia. Media scholars confirm that influence of politics and economy on the work of journalists became much more obvious (Harro-Loit and Saks; 2006; Hanitzsch, 2007; McQuail, 1997). Consequently, the autonomy of journalists is dramatically challenged by external forces, which contributes to the recent trend towards a destabilization of journalism's boundaries. Over the years, the journalistic field has been losing more and more of its autonomy (Hanitzsch, 2011, p. 479-480). Furthermore, media concentration and a modest job market has made the ideology of professional independence extremely vulnerable since journalists tend to be less loyal to their professional ideals than to the ideology of their employer (Harro-Loit & Saks, 2006,

p. 313). Hanitzsch (2007, p. 477) points out that relatively little professional autonomy was found in contexts with rather strong corporate and commercial influences. Harro-Loit and Saks (2006, p. 313) report that media organisations that operate in small media markets (like Estonia) are especially vulnerable to the intervention of promotional materials, as media organisations are eager to maximize advertising revenues.

Epp Lauk (2008, p. 59) recently confirmed that a common understanding of the quality of journalism is closely related to the basic values of a free and democratic society. In this type of society, the general values of the journalistic profession are impartiality, objectivity, providing public service, ethics, validity, independence and autonomy. The image of a “detached watchdog” dominates the journalistic field in most western countries (Splichal & Sparks, 1994; Deuze, 2005; Weaver, 1998; Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011; Plaisance, Skewes & Hanitzsch, 2012).

Simultaneously, some scholars point out that substantial differences between national journalistic cultures exist (Weaver, 1998; Donsbach & Patterson, 2004; Berkowitz, Limor, & Singer, 2004; Shoemaker & Cohen, 2006; McQuail, 1997). Plaisance, Skewes and Hanitzsch (2012, p. 651), who studied ethical orientations of journalists in 18 countries, confirm that journalists’ ethical orientations differ according to the national media system. In order to explain these differences, Hanitzsch (2007) proposed a concept of journalism culture in terms of three essential constituents (institutional roles, epistemologies, and ethical ideologies), further divided into seven principal dimensions: interventionism, power distance, market orientation, objectivism, empirism, relativism, and idealism. Hanitzsch claims that such deconstruction of the concept of journalism culture allows tapping the existing cultural diversity of journalism:

Journalism culture becomes manifest in the way journalists think and act; it can be defined as a particular set of ideas and practices by which journalists, consciously and unconsciously, legitimate their role in society and render their work meaningful for themselves and others.

(Hanitzsch, 2007, p. 369)

The power distance refers to the journalist’s position towards power in society. Adversarial journalism has a long tradition in liberal democracies, often understood in terms of serving as the “fourth estate” or as countervailing force of democracy. Journalists of this type posture themselves as “watchmen” or “watchdogs” and as agents of social control. The other extreme end of the power distance dimension is a form of journalism that positions itself as “loyal” to those in power. The market orientation is high in journalism cultures that subordinate their goals to the logic of the market; it is low in cultures that produce the news primarily in the “public interest”. In journalism cultures prioritizing the public interest, the audience is clearly addressed in its role of citizenry. It is assumed that the primary purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need to be free and self-governing (Kovach & Rosentiel, 2001).

The concept of interventionism introduced by Hanitzsch (2007, p. 372–375) reflects the extent to which journalists pursue a particular mission and promote cer-

tain values. There is a dividing line between two types of journalism: on the one hand, the interventionist, socially committed, and motivated, and, on the other hand, the detached and uninvolved one, dedicated to objectivity and impartiality. For the purpose of the present study, I focused on the first element of journalism culture proposed by Hanitzsch – on institutional roles. It comprises three principal dimensions: interventionism, power distance and market orientation. As a number of media scholars point out, institutional roles have a major importance for the organizational forces and journalists' work and decisions; moreover, institutional roles are more powerful than individual factors, such as ethical values and beliefs (Plaisance, Skewes & Hanitzsch, 2012; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Patterson & Donsbach, 1996; Zhu et al., 1997; Voakes, 1997; Kepplinger, Brosius & Staab, 1991; Berkowitz, Limor & Singer, 2004; Hallin & Mancini, 2004).

Plaisance, Skewes and Hanitzsch (2012, p. 644) note that professional ethics is firmly believed to be an essential curricular component in journalism education. The authors claim that professional education as well as perceived levels of professional influence and membership in professional organizations (e.g. journalist unions) may therefore have a positive effect on idealism and may be negatively linked to relativism. These scholars find that measuring individuals' orientation to different moral philosophies, conversely, has enabled researchers to tie degrees of idealism and degrees of relativistic thinking to proclivities to view ethical questions in certain way. Idealists generally express greater concern for avoiding harm to others and generally reflect a Kantian sensibility that emphasizes moral obligations. Less idealistic individuals tend to believe that some degree of harm is unavoidable, reflecting a more utilitarian outlook.

Media accountability and social role of journalists

For the study, I consider useful to refer to the concepts of *responsibility* and *accountability* of media and journalists. I consider that the concept of media accountability, developed among others by Dennis McQuail, represents an analytical grid applicable on situation in the Estonian journalism.

Lauk (2008, p. 59-60) points out that press freedom is definitely a fundamental element in democratic media reform. Society grants the media both the freedom of expression and free access to information. The prerequisite is that journalists enjoying these freedoms uphold moral values and norms of professional ethics. On the other hand, freedom of expression, however, is not necessarily directly correlated to responsible and ethical performance of media as the situation in several newly liberated countries demonstrates.

Since the 1940s the concepts of media's social responsibility and accountability has been articulated in order to maintain the balance between the business, politics and media (Bertrand, 2000). This concept develops the means for monitoring the quality of media performance and the institutionalized media accountability instruments (Bertrand, 2003, Eberwein *et al.*, 2011). In the frames of the discussions on the possibilities to limit the power of the media and put them at the service of society, the scholars have reflected on the means of accountability of media.

McQuail (1997) proposes an essential distinction between notions of media *responsibility* and *accountability*. He points out that these terms are often used interchangeably, but it is useful to distinguish them (1997, p. 515). However, responsibility refers essentially to obligations which are attributed, in one way or another, to the media, and relating to the issues just outlined. As for accountability; it refers to the process by which media are called to account for to meet their obligations. Hodges puts it simply:

The issue of *responsibility* is the following: to what social needs should we expect journalists to respond? The issue of *accountability* is as follows: how might society call on journalists to account for their performance of the responsibility given them. Responsibility has to do with defining proper conduct; accountability with compelling it.

(Hodges, 1986, p. 190)

McQuail favours a practical description of the concept of media responsibility, and defines it as the “obligations and expectations that society has regarding the media” (McQuail, 2000, p. 11). He distinguishes between four types of responsibility: assigned, contrasted, self-assigned and denied responsibilities. *Assigned responsibilities* are obligations established by law, which the media must meet. *Contrasted responsibilities* arise from self-regulated agreements between the press or broadcasters on the one hand and society or politicians on the other in regard to the desired conduct of media. *Self-assigned responsibilities* indicate voluntary professional commitments to maintaining ethical standards and public goals. Finally, McQuail refers to *denied responsibilities* in order to refute accusations of irresponsibility that are thought to be undeserved or inapplicable:

A full consideration of media accountability has to take account of all four categories [...] Accountability follows on from responsibility and I leave the content of media responsibilities behind and concentrate on the means by which they might be ‘enforced’.

(McQuail, 1997, p. 516)

At the same time, media scholars (Bardoel & Haenens, 2004; McQuail, 1997; Tetley, 2006) pointed out that media responsibility may be located on different levels: in the media institution as a whole, in the ownership, in the organization and its management, in the professional employee, in the individual author and performers, in society as a whole. McQuail (2000) defines four accountability frames: law and regulation; the market; public responsibility and professional responsibility. Bardoel and Haenens (2004, p. 9) refer to Bardoel (2000, 2001), who slightly remolds that typology into the following four media accountability mechanisms:

Political accountability, which refers to formal regulation stipulating how broadcasting companies and newspapers will be structured and how they function;

Market accountability or the system of supply and demand in which the free choices of the public are given free reign and consideration of efficiency also play a role;

Public accountability, which is linked to the media's assignment of maintaining more direct relationships with citizens, in addition to their relationship with the market and the state; and

Professional accountability, which is linked to ethical codes and performance standards used within the media that should help counterbalancing any excessive dependence upon politics and the market.

Other media scholars (Fengler et al., 2015; Bardoel & H'Haenens, 2004) confirm, that "media accountability" and "social responsibility in the media" are back to the European political agenda. They ask: "How can we ensure a free and responsible press across Europe?" (Fengler et al., 2015, p. 1). The same question is relevant for Russian-language media in Estonia, as Russian-speaking journalists have been facing pressure from various economic and political powers.

Media scholars (Russ-Mohl 1994; Bertrand 2000; Hafes, 2000; Bardoel & D'Haenens, 2004; Fengler et al., 2015) consider various media accountability instruments (MAIs) enable to ensure journalistic quality and demonstrate responsibility towards various stakeholders. Bertrand's (2000) concept of media accountability systems includes professional codes of ethics or conduct that govern journalists associations. In 1947, five accountability-oriented expectations were proposed by the Commission on Freedom of the Press (Hutchins Commission). The requirements are stated as follows:

Today our society needs, first, a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning; second, a forum for the exchange and criticism; third, a means of projecting the opinions and attitudes of the groups in the society to one another; fourth, a method of presenting and clarifying the goals and values of the society; and, fifth, a way of reaching every member of the society by the current of information, thought, and feeling which the press supplies.

(Hutchins Commission, 1947, p. 20–21)

The conclusions of the Hutchins Commission led to the basis of elaboration of *the social responsibility theory* formulated in 1956 by Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm in their *Four Theories of the Press*. The social responsibility theory recognizes that the importance of the press in modern society makes it absolutely necessary that an obligation of social responsibility be imposed on the media of mass communication. A number of media scholars (Metzgar & Hornaday, 2013; Pickard, 2010; Christians & Nordenstreng, 2004) studied the role of media in democratic society and they showed how should that role be regulated. They stand that responsible and accountable media and journalists should remain independent from government and business and serve society instead.

Our study will focus mainly on professional accountability, as it aims to outline journalists' views on ethical issues in their profession. In this study I seek for mechanisms of media accountability influence ethical orientations of Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia.

Russian-language media and media's accountability mechanisms in Estonia

Due to the historical and political events, there are two media systems in Estonia, one of which is Estonian and the other one Russian-language. Jufereva and Lauk (2015, p. 55), who studied minority language media and journalists in the context of societal integration in Estonia, point out that the historical and political contexts of Russian-language media in Estonia differ from those of Western European countries. During Estonia's independence between 1918 and 1940, only 8.2% of population were ethnic Russians. The Russian-language press emerged in Estonia in the 19th century, and during the interwar period over 100 titles of newspapers and magazines existed at least for some time. However, for nearly five decades of post-WWII Soviet regime, the proportion of Russians increased to 30.3% and that of other minority nationalities to 8.2%. The shared language of those of non-Estonian origin was Russian. In addition to the Russian-language newspapers and broadcasts produced in Estonia, media existing throughout the Soviet Union were widely distributed and consumed.

After Estonia regained its independence in 1991, commercial broadcasters were founded, state-owned print media were mainly privatized, state radio and television companies became public service broadcasters. Jõesaar, Jufereva and Rannu (2014, p. 260) pointed out a significant difference in the development of Estonian and Russian-language commercial media – the inclusion of private capital. Estonian media enterprises developed mostly with the help of western investments as Scandinavian media companies generally became the owners of these enterprises. However, no investments have come from abroad into Russian-language media. They were rather owned or created by local non-Estonian entrepreneurs. Eventually, the new private investors faced economic difficulties leading to a dramatic decline of Estonia's Russian-language press during the economic recession of the late 1990s and to its actual collapse in the economic crisis of 2008–2011 (Jufereva & Lauk, 2015).

In 2016, in Estonia there were four Russian-written weeklies, one newspaper issued three times a week, ten internet-portals, four Russian-speaking private TV-channels which issued Estonian news and programs, one public service TV channel and one public service and six private radio channels in Russian language. According to *Integration Monitoring 2011*, 71% of Russophone population listened to the Estonian public service channel Radio 4 (Vihalemm, 2011, p. 162) and over 80% of the Russophone population regularly watched PBK (Pervyi Baltijski Kanal [First Baltic Channel]), which is attainable in the Baltic states. Along with PBK, other Russian TV channels are the main information source for 75% of the Russophone population (ibid., p. 165). According to *Estonian Society Monitoring*, there have not appear any changes in the Russian-speaking population's opinions on the importance of media channels as sources of information since 2011. At the same time, the Russian-speaking population rather prefers local radio channels, newspapers and news portals to Russian-language newspapers, radio stations and news portals. Estonian Public Broadcasting (ETV) is considered to be the most important among Estonian-language channels.

Moreover, there are significant generational differences in media consumption – television (both PBK and Russian-language news programmes produced in Estonia) and Radio 4 are mostly important to the older generation. Younger generations

are ever more clearly oriented towards online media, including those in Estonian. The importance of social media as an information source is higher among the Russian-speaking population than among ethnic Estonians. About 45% of the Russian-speaking population follows the Estonian-language media on social networking sites. About two thirds of them also follow the Russian media and local Russian-language media, but one third clearly prefer the Estonian media. A third of the Russian-speaking population then falls mainly within the sphere of influence of the Russian media, and a quarter follows the media very little.¹ In September 2015, Estonian Public Broadcasting launched ETV+, a television channel in Russian language, aiming to become important source of information for the Russian-speaking population in Estonia.

Both media systems – the Estonian- and the Russian-language system – operate within the same regulatory mechanisms. Statutory rules regulate the broadcasting and advertising sectors while the written press relies on self-regulation. Estonia is one of the rare post-Communist countries where state regulation remained minimal and confined itself only to *Broadcasting Act* (1994) (cf. Lauk, 2008, p. 60). In December 1997, the Estonian Newspaper Association passed a *Code of Press Ethics*. The broadcasters promptly approved it. This code has served as a source document for the press councils. Estonian Public Broadcasting has its own set of principles “good practice”, on which the employees of Estonian Public Broadcasting have agreed. The existence of the *Code of Press Ethics* itself does not guarantee the quality of reporting or prevent violations of ethical norms. Lauk (2008) argues that Estonian media owners, publishers and executives strive for their sole right to define “good journalism” and decide how to interpret and apply the principles of the *Codes of ethics*.

Moreover, Lauk and Jufereva (2010, p. 31) who explored the efficiency of self-regulation in the Baltic States, suggest that due to the imbalance between market forces and regulation within the conditions of immature civic and media cultures, the media in Baltic countries have developed a unique form of “reversed” censorship. Lauk stated as follows:

The example of Estonia, a “model” of transformation to a democratic free-market economy, demonstrates that in one of the “freest” of environments the media elite have developed an abusive “simulation of self-regulation” to protect their self-serving interests and pursuit of profit. Where state media policy remains extremely liberal and civic and political cultures are undeveloped, the social responsibility model of journalism does not work.

(Lauk, 2008, p. 59)

Because of dissensions on principles of self-regulation, two press councils have existed since 2002. The majority of mainstream media organisations (including online media and TV broadcasters) only recognise *Press Council of Estonia* (*Pressinõukogu*) affiliated with the Estonian Newspaper Association and chaired by Jevgenia Vära, the editor-in-chief of Russian-language newspaper *Postimees na russkom jazyke*. The original *Estonian Press Council* (*Avaliku Sõna Nõukogu*) works jointly with the

¹ See http://www.kul.ee/sites/default/files/kokkuvoteim_2015_en.pdf.

Journalists' Union, still finding cooperation with some media outlets and channels.² In 2014 *Pressinõukogu* discussed 51 complaints, whereas *Avaliku Sõna Nõukogu* only nine.

In addition to the above mentioned mechanisms of media accountability and self-regulation, the Estonian National Broadcasting has employed an ethical advisor – an ombudsman, whose task is to deal with the viewers' and listeners' complaints and to make the broadcasting organisation more transparent for the public by explaining the programming policy and to watch over the adherence of the ethical principles of journalism in broadcasting (Lauk, 2008: 63).

Data and Method

For the purpose of this study, I have combined qualitative and quantitative research methods. The qualitative semi-structured individual interviews were used to understand and explain the implicit reasons, opinions, and motivations of the Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia.

The interviews were conducted with the following logic: the questions were divided into three groups, each group corresponding to a particular research question. The first group of questions helped me to understand what factors contribute to the formation of the professional ethics of the Estonian Russian-speaking journalists. The answers to the second group which I describe deal with practices of professional ethics. Finally, the third group of questions was devoted to the interdependence between professional ethics and politics in Estonia. The survey using standardized questionnaire thus allows understanding fully the internalized normative perspective of the interviewed journalists. Also, it helps us to seize the influence between mechanism of media accountability and ethical orientation of the Russian-speaking Estonian journalists and to understand ethic values and norms of social actors.

Tab. 1: Themes and questions applied in the survey

Theme	Questions
1. The ethical sources of Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By which ethical sources were you guided in you work? • What determines the ethical convictions of journalists? How are they formed? • What is more important to you: the ethical standards of the journalist or the editorial policy of your media? • Could you give the examples of a conflict between ethical standards of journalists and editorial policies? (A conflict of conscience, the conflict at the level editor and journalist)? • Have you ever had to compromise with their ethical beliefs while working? Do you know examples of your colleagues?

² See http://ejc.net/media_landscapes/estonia.

Theme	Questions
2. The violations of ethic by Russian-speaking journalists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What kind violations of ethical norms and standards have you come across in your professional practice? • Have you personally committed this kind of violations? • Why did you commit ethical violations? • What was the reaction of editors, colleagues and audiences on violations of ethic? • What kind of reasons makes a journalist to commit ethical violations in the work?
3. Ethical violations and pressure of the political actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do you feel the pressure or influence of political forces on the Russian-language journalism in Estonia? • Can you give any examples of this kind of pressure or influence? • How do you evaluate the level of political corruption in the Russian media in Estonia? • Is this kind of pressure permanent or temporary? • Personnaly, have you ever had the experience of corruption of the ethial norms? • Do you know the cases of corruption of the political order among your colleagues?

The respondents for the interview were chosen according to the following criteria: Journalists working for online news media with an attendance of minimum 60,000 unique users per week; journalists working for national print media with a circulation of over 7,000 copies; journalists working for radio stations with no less than 96,000 listeners per week; journalists for the most popular Russian-speaking TV channel with audience share of 16.5% per month.

Tab. 2: Profiles of the interviewed journalists

Gender and age	Position	Type of media
Male 37	Reporter	Online portal
Male 55	Editor-in-chief	Online portal
Female 35	Reporter	Online portal
Female 35	Reporter	Weekly
Male 38	Reporter	Weekly
Male 50	Editor-in-chief	TV-channel
Female 33	Reporter	TV-channel
Male 30	Reporter	TV-channel
Male 45	Reporter	Radio station
Female 45	Editor-in-chief	Radio station

The second, quantitative research was used to quantify attitudes, opinions, behaviours, and other defined variables – and generalize the results from a larger sample of actors. I quantified the problem by way of generating numerical data. This data was transformed into useable statistics. More exactly, a standardized questionnaire was employed. In January and February 2011, this survey was conducted among Estonian Russian-speaking journalists.

This period was chosen because of the biggest number of complaints against media outlets in Estonia in comparison with other years (107 in total). Though majority of the complaints was raised against Estonian media outlets, several dealt with controversial publications in Russian-language media.

The questionnaire was hand-delivered to 140 journalists who worked full time in the editorial offices of Russian-language media outlets (the press, news portals, radio and television) with a 71% response rate. The SPSS programme was used for data analysis. Some results of the 2006 survey of 120 Russian-speaking journalists are used for the purpose of comparison. Additionally, from November till December 2015, in-depth interviews were conducted with ten journalists with different work experience and careers length.

So our method represents an inductive approach that starts with the observations and proposed the theories towards the end of the research process as a result of observations. This selected research methodology has allowed us to understand the constraints on the standards and ethics professionals of Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia.

Professional responsibilities of Russian-speaking journalists

According to the results of our survey, the majority (52%) of Russian-speaking journalists are in their 30s or 40s, with career spanning less than 20 years, which reflects the generation shift among journalists that took place in the early 1990s (cf. Lauk, 1996). Only 17% of them have experience of working as journalists in the Soviet period and their number is constantly decreasing. Moreover, the Estonian journalistic field seems to feminize gradually: currently there are 58% female and 42% male journalists. A similar situation can be seen even in the Russian-language media – while in 2006, parity existed between male and female journalists, by 2011 the proportion had remarkably changed in favour of women (62%). As the data from the 2011 survey show, more than half of the Russian-speaking journalists worked at the time in online outlets. Most of them worked in the capital (where the majority of Estonian mass media is concentrated) and in northeast Estonia (where 78% of the population speak Russian as their native language).


As data from this research suggest, professional self-identification and commitment to the profession are relatively weak among Russian-speaking journalists. About 36% of them see their journalistic job as temporary, only as a stage in their careers. Only 14% of the respondents answered a decisive “no” to the question whether they have considered switching to another field, while nearly one fifth answered a clear “yes” and another 21% have seriously thought about it. About the same number of journalists thought they could easily lose their current job and only a little more than a third (36%) had more positive view of their future. The majority of Russian-speaking journalists (83%) are not members of the Estonian Journalists’ Union, whereas those who are belong to the generation aged 50 and above. The number of members among Russian-speaking journalists decreased, as in 2005 23% of them were the members of this journalistic organization (cf. Jufereva, 2006). Perhaps the fact that the Union does not have much authority among Estonian journalists in general (Harro-Loit and Loit, 2014) partly explains this situation. However, Russian-speaking journalists have not established their own organisation either. Einmann (2010, p. 26) points out that membership in the professional organization and perception of professional ideology influence on the perception of professional roles of journalists.

A code of ethics is another important element of journalists’ professional self-identification. However, 30% of Russian-speaking journalists are not familiar with the Code of Ethics of Estonian Journalism. Another indicator of professional identity is a certain responsibility of a member of a “guild” for one’s professional community and for one’s own actions. However, for majority of the Russian-speaking journalists, personal ambitions and loyalty to their employers seem to be more important than any sense of professional fellowship. Similar attitudes are observed even in other European countries – a survey of journalists conducted in in a 2011–2012³ in 14 countries indicated that 95% of its respondents stressed responsibility for their own actions and conscience, and over 80% for their publisher.

³ Online survey conducted in 2011–2012 as part of a EU-funded research project “Media Accountability and Transparency in Europe (MediaAcT)” among journalists in 12 European countries (Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Switzerland) and two Arab

Our research indicates that almost all of the Russian-speaking journalists feel responsible for their own work and for the performance of their editorial office. Half of them feel responsible for the work of whole Russian-language journalism in Estonia. In comparison with 2005, the sense of responsibility for the Russian-language journalism among the Russian-speaking journalists grew, as in 2005 only 43% of journalists felt responsible for Russian-language journalism (Jufereva 2006).

Fig. 1: Sense of responsibility of the Russian-speaking journalists for Russian-language journalism as whole % of respondents (N=100)




The younger journalists with short working experience share a greater sense of responsibility for the whole Russian-language journalism, whereas more experienced journalists are not so preoccupied with the sense of such responsibility (see Fig. 1). It is remarkable that among journalists with working experience longer than 20 years, there was the highest percentage of those who do not feel any responsibility for the work of Russian-language media at all.

Our data also indicated that perception of responsibility among the respondents is influenced by their education. Journalists with higher journalistic education (58%) feel responsible for the performance of Russian-language journalism (see Fig. 2). Also, the knowledge of the Estonian language influences the perception of responsibility towards the performance of Russian-language journalism among journalists. Journalists fluent in the Estonian language (51%) feel responsible for Russian-language journalism (see Figure 2). 50% of those journalists who have weak knowledge or do not speak the Estonian language indicated that they do not feel responsible for Russian-language media at all. Thus, it is possible to conclude that younger journalists with higher journalistic education and fluent Estonian have a stronger feeling of journalistic mission and sense of responsibility.

This suggests that professional training at universities promotes better understanding of the societal roles of journalism and those with higher journalistic education share the same values as well as highlight the significance of minority-language journalism. Among journalists with other than journalistic higher education, 30% feel no responsibility for the work of Russian-language journalists at all, whereas among journalists with higher journalistic education only 12% share the same attitude.

Fig. 2: Sense of responsibility of the Russian-speaking journalists for Russian-language journalism as whole % of respondents (N=100)



Ethical values and distortions of Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia

The study showed that the main ethical distortion of Russian-language journalism is political bias. Russian-language journalists pointed out that lobby of political parties and biased information are the main ethical problems of Russian-language journalism. 51% of journalists pointed out that often one's name has been consciously profaned and citations have been distorted in Russian-language media.

A journalist with 20 year of professional experience (male, 40) put it in the following way:

Violation of one's reputation in Russian-language media could occur for two reasons. First, because of a low level of journalistic professionalism. Secondly, we can't exclude that such cases could occur because of pressure of political forces. The cases of violation of one's reputation become more frequent in the period of election campaigns. The latter can indicate quite a low level of political culture in Estonia and insufficient independence of journalists. This situation is suitable both for Estonian and Russian-language journalism.

It is possible to say that in comparison with 2005 (Jufereva 2006), the whole picture of ethical distortions among the Russian-language journalists has not been changed a lot. In 2005, majority of journalists indicated ethical violations and publication of confidential information. In answers to the open-ended questions, violations such as publication of uncontrolled information, violation of author's rights, or the absence of different positions or biased information were mentioned.

Moreover, Russian-language journalism can be seen as a political battlefield that has been used by politicians or in their interests. One of the interviewees, an editor of a weekly (male, 50) expressed it in the following way:

One can clearly see that major publications support the politics of one or another party, which is especially obvious in pre-election period. It is during that period articles that one can consider as a political order are being published. A journalist cannot refuse to follow the editorial policy, otherwise, he or she may simply be fired. This is why conflicts between their own ethical norms and the editorial policy are not infrequent among journalists.

Almost one third of the respondents said that they know some journalist that took a bribe. The situation changed to the better in comparison with 2005. In one of the previous studies, I have pointed out that 63% of Russian-language journalists in 2005 claimed that this is possible to bribe them and 33% witnessed bribes being accepted (Jufereva, 2006). In the survey conducted in 2011, only 23% reported that they witnessed it at their present job. This study revealed that more than half of journalists with longer working experience (more than 20 years) witnessed their colleagues accepting the bribe. Only several of the respondents with short working experience witnessed such cases. The data at the same time show that that journalists with other than journalistic higher education witnessed more frequently "bribe cases" in comparison with those with higher journalistic education. One may conclude that higher journalistic education influences ethical perceptions of journalists.

Conclusions and discussion

In the case of Estonia, the work of the Russian-speaking journalists strongly influenced by "power distance" – there is an obvious dependence of Russian-language media on the Estonian political forces, and this political influence can be specifically traced in the period of election campaigns. For example, the number of complaints from the public about material in the media grows drastically in the period of election campaigns. In 2011, at the time of Estonian presidential and parliamentary elections, the number of such complaints hit the record – 107 complaints in total were filed.

The journalists participating in this study agree that there is an element of conflict in their work between their ethical beliefs and the editorial policy. In order to secure their work position, the journalists may need to compromise with their conscience. It is obvious that the biggest number of politically motivated articles is published during pre-election period, primarily intended to harm political adversaries' reputation. The Russian-speaking journalists included in the sample indicated

such ethical violations like publishing biased information (83%), lobbying of political forces (82%), the absence of the source of information (74%), and distortion of their reputation (55%).

As for *accountability* of the Russian-speaking journalists, they feel responsible for their own work (98%), for the work of their editorial office (85%) and for Russian-language journalism in general (48%). However, only 29% of them feel responsible for Estonian journalism as whole. Similarly to their Estonian colleagues (cf. González-Esteban, García-Avilés, Karmasin & Kaltenbrunner, 2011), the Russian-speaking journalists do not show a strong connection to journalistic professional organization and do not consider it as an institution of high authority. In McQuail's terms (2000), for the Russian-speaking journalists there are inherent *self-assigned responsibilities*, which indicate voluntary professional commitments to maintaining ethical standards and public goal.

The analysis of the Estonia's Russian-speaking journalists' ethical orientations and accounting principles of Russian-language media showed that though the journalists' supervisors and managerial staff proclaim their orientation towards to principles of Democratic corporatists system, in reality it is not always attained. In case of the Estonian- as well as Russian-language media in Estonia, the political influence on media content is still quite significant. That suggests that Estonian media are still in transition from post-communist media to democratic corporatist system.

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