

STUDIA PHILOLOGICA JYVÄSKYLÄENSIA 16

JUHANI SARSILA

SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONCEPT OF VIRTUS
IN ROMAN LITERATURE UNTIL LIVY



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ACADEMIC DISSERTATION TO THE PUBLICLY DISCUSSED, BY PERMISSION
OF THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF JYVÄSKYLÄ, IN AUDITORIUM S 212,
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UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ, JYVÄSKYLÄ 1982

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URN:ISBN:978-951-39-8309-3
ISBN 978-951-39-8309-3 (PDF)
ISSN 0585-5462

ISBN 951-678-661-8
ISSN 0585-5462

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Jyväskylän yliopisto monistuskeskus
Kirjapaino Oy Sisä-Suomi. Jyväskylä 1982

ABSTRACT

Sarsila, Juhani, Some Aspects of the Concept of *Virtus* in Roman Literature until Livy / Juhani Sarsila. - Jyväskylä Jyväskylän yliopisto, 1981. - 153 s. - (Studia Philologica Jyväskyläensia, ISSN 0585-5462; 16)
ISBN 951-678-661-8
Diss.

This study is an interpretation of some essential occurrences of *virtus* in the Roman literature from the beginnings until Livy. The method can be characterized as philological, more precisely comparative-diachronical. Despite the great variety of literary genres, *virtus* remains rather similar from one author to another. The fact that the Romans repeatedly emphasized the importance of *virtus* goes to show the fundamental significance of this concept for their society. Originally the conception of *virtus* was quite narrow consisting in the readiness of the agrarian and militant community to wage war and to endure hard toil. Gradually *virtus* was expanded to contain intellectual values, and *virtus*, which should mean 'manliness', included all individual virtues in the ethical terminology of Cicero. The result of the terminological expansion and the conceptual extension was that, by the time of Livy, *virtus* connoted the ideal combination of the characteristics of any living organism or artificial product. Thus it had become identical with ἀρετή. In the world of values of the practically-minded Romans, *virtus* was impervious to contemplation, it was unremitting action. Some authors, however, considered action for displaying *virtus* and acquiring fame ambivalent. Here an individualistic tendency against a collectivistic world of values becomes apparent. *Virtus* is a rationalistic value; there is not a single occurrence where *virtus* should imply reverence to gods. In the expressly masculine Roman culture *virtus* is the combination of the characteristics of men of will and action. The opposite of this Stoically-coloured Roman *virtus* is Epicurean quietism and amiable sensibility. *virtus*. ἀρετή. ideal characteristics. unremitting action. heroism. military efficiency. intellectual faculties. select few. men of will.

PREFACE

The interpretation one attempts to give on the abstract concept of *virtus* is mainly hypothetical and, consequently, subject to ever-recurring discussions. *Virtus* cannot be explained away. In the course of the present study, I have become more and more conscious of the difficulties of interpreting the emotional aspects of values. A *Lebensbegriff*, so to speak, eschews definition and involves one's personal opinion.

I owe much to Professor Päivö Oksala who, in the early seventies, first directed my attention to the Roman idea of history and guided my first steps in the field of classical philology. My interest in *virtus* was aroused by Professor Tuomo Pekkanen. He has given me valuable advice and stimulating suggestions through all the stages of my work. I am deeply grateful to him for his support. I would also like to thank Doctor Matti Sainio for his helpful criticism. Constant encouragement and constructive criticism have been provided generously at all times by Doctor Unto Paananen. I also wish to thank Doctor Teivas Oksala, who has shown interest in my work and also read the manuscript. I would like to offer my thanks to Erkki Palmén, Lecturer of Latin, for our inspiring discussions on Roman literature during all these years. I am much obliged to Professor Heikki Solin and Anneli Solin for their kind help in practical arrangements in Rome.

The generous financial assistance from the Academia scientiarum Fennica Foundation, the University of Jyväskylä, and the Emil Aaltonen Foundation has enabled me to carry out my work in Munich, where I studied the collections of literature and index cards of the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae Library. These visits (1976 and 1978) were of great help in the work of checking. Further on, I have received the valuable economic support from the Institutum Romanum Finlandiae Foundation, permitting me to make acquaintance with several libraries in Rome in the first half of 1979.

My discussions with Mr. Hannu Votka have been of great help particularly in linguistic problems.

I thank Professor Kalevi Tarvainen and the publishers of Acta Philologica Jyväskyläensia for accepting this work to be printed.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my wife Marjatta for her practical support and patience through these years of reading and writing.

Jyväskylä, December, 1981

Juhani Sarsila

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. *On the previous studies*

Virtus is the most central of the abstract concepts which are characteristic of the Roman sphere of values.¹ How did the Romans understand *virtus* and what did they include in it? The answer should be sought by the comparative analysis of the significant occurrences of the word in Roman literature. As *virtus* has been formed in other age and place than those where the author is now studying it, the concept turns out to be rather difficult to be approached. *Virtus*, as well as *libertas*, is rather explosive than exact.² In the Roman mind, these concepts arouse an emotional response for the social norms and values they express or arise from. Problems due to the extent and the interpretation of the material had made D.C. Earl give up his plans to draw up the history of the concept of *virtus* from its first occurrences up to St. Augustine.³

In his lexicographically exacting work Eisenhut accomplished what Earl had considered to be impossible. In order to sift the source material as exhaustively as possible, Eisenhut interpreted the occurrences from the Laws of the Twelve Tables up to Christian literature. The diachronic approach indisputably does credit to Eisenhut as well as to the early work of K. Büchner.⁴ In both works each author is studied in chronological order, and the variability of the conceptual contents is illustrated. Both works are based on the principle that the study of any author's use of *virtus* is satisfactory only when it is known to what extent he uses the word in original meanings on one hand, and in the traditional meanings on the other hand.

After the edition of Eisenhut's chronologically extensive study (1973) Büchner's article became in a sense obsolete. Eisenhut pointed out that Büchner had dealt with only part of the material and therefore come to a wrong conclusion about the contents of the so-called

1 Cf. Hellegouarc'h 1963:242ff. 1974:207f.

2 Cf. Koebner - Schmidt xivf.

3 Earl 1967:8

4 Altrömische und Horazische Virtus, *Antike* 15, 1939:145ff. *Studien zur römischen Literatur* III, 1962:1ff.

"Old Roman (i.e. pre-Horatian) *virtus*". According to Büchner, before Horace *virtus* contained "standhaftes Ausharren, trotziges Sicheinstemmen, hartes Nichtwanken"¹. A definition emphasizing solely the defensive character of the quality is undoubtedly appropriate in many cases, but as the general contents of the concept it is unfounded. Eisenhut's quotations from the Laws of the Twelve Tables (Plin.nat.21,7; Cic.leg.2,60), Plautus (Amph.191; Mil.12 and 32; Epid.445), Terence (Eun.778), and Claudius Quadrigarius (fr.12 Peter) demonstrate *virtus* to be aggressive.² Besides firmness in defence, the quality can also appear as determination in offence.

The other course of study is synchronic. Although it has certain justifications, it has the restriction of being an attempt to illustrate only one author's world of values without making comparisons with others. H. Haas (1938) and R. Feger (1944) have written their *virtus* monographs about Tacitus, in whom the Germans were particularly interested at that time because of ideologico-national reasons. In addition to Tacitus, only Cicero has got a *virtus* monograph by Liebers in 1942. In the light of these monographs, the interest in (and the need of) *virtus* seems to have been at its highest at the time of the Second World War, which offered ample opportunities to display that more or less admirable characteristic called *virtus* by the Romans. V. Pöschl (1940) has said a great deal about *virtus* in Sallust leaving, however, the question open for future interpretations, which, a generation later, have been written almost solely by Eisenhut³ I do not think it necessary to mention the numerous studies which have had their aims elsewhere and have dealt with *virtus* only in passing.

The aim of my study is to motivate the analysis of other Roman abstract concepts besides *virtus*. The challenge is in the effort towards as exhaustive interpretation as possible. I gladly accept the challenge, but, at the same time, make the reservation that I do not think that I can exhaustively explain the conceptual essence of *virtus*. On the other hand, I do believe that I can further the study by offering new knowledge of the concept. The less ambitious

1 The same thing is formulated in another way in *Humanitas Romana* 1957:311.

2 Cf. Eisenhut 34f. and 40

3 Eisenhut 48

aim is necessary not only because of the abundance of the material, but also because of the diversity of reality. In a sense, the study of concepts is always a matter of personal preference, which is sometimes unnerving. The present study should not be regarded as an exhaustive explanation, but rather as an estimation looking for new aspects of what belongs to the concept. The thought that someone would explain *virtus* exhaustively is as impossible as it is dreadful.

I cannot share the opinion of J. Burian that Eisenhut has analysed *also* the sub-concepts on which the totality of *virtus* is founded ("welche untergeordnete Begriffe es umfasst") in each author's works.¹ Eisenhut does not do so, although one could have expected it on the basis of the sub-heading "Ihre Stellung in römischen Wertsystem". The relation of *virtus* to the other Roman values separately and to the system of values as a whole remains to be explained. If Eisenhut illustrates the subject in some respect, he does so implicitly. Under the circumstances, the sub-heading is obscure, to say the least of it. Everyone who has closely studied *virtus* is aware of the indisputable status of this concept at the top of the Roman system of values.²

Burian's point of view that *virtus* is in a hierarchic relation to certain strictly determinable conceptual elements which form the totality of it and which can be expressed using Roman concepts, is appropriate only in philosophical and theoretical connections. I think that I can deal with *virtus* in this work as a certain totality, since the Romans presumably understood it as a certain totality (cf. Lucil.fr.1326ff. Marx). *Virtus* does not consist of certain terminologically traceable sub-concepts, although it consists of attitudes, norms, and values. Forming an axiological theory of *virtus* as the sum total of its so-called sub-concepts is not among the aims of the present work.

Although Eisenhut's work very well fulfils the requirements of the diachronic study of concepts, and therefore motivates more profound study of the conceptual contents in individual authors, it cannot totally avoid the most evident danger of the diachronic

1 Burian 157

2 Cf. Meister 1; Heinze 83; Knoche 1962:105; Syme 157

course of study. If the course of study of the conceptual analysis is diachronic and the material abundant several significant instances will easily remain half-interpreted or without any interpretation at all.¹ Concerning the fragmentary material from the Republican Age, Eisenhut sees nothing new worth recording except the further popularisation of the expression of gratitude *macte virtute*. Here Eisenhut's orthodox interpretation comes for a moment near to a collection of sources. The fact that my work partly consists of my critical comments against Eisenhut can be seen in the treatise proper. As a matter of fact, the present work has grown on the basis of criticism of Eisenhut as well as it has been inspired by him.

1.2. Task and method

In this study that falls between the disciplines of linguistics and historical research I intend to make use of the means of traditional philology. I seek to explain the concept in question by going through the whole of the Roman literature from the first occurrences until Livy, and bringing up essential aspects of the conceptual contents in different authors. In this way, the function of the concept closely connected with state and society will get better illustration.

Feger has already pointed out that the study of *virtus* can give us knowledge of the historical thought of the people who created this virtue.³ On the other hand, Büchner does not consider the utility of linguistics for history to be very evident. According to him, the meaning of semasiology indicating the Roman reality is rather questionable, "for the explanation of the meaning of a word always remains an abstraction".⁴ A concept characterizing the sphere

1 Ogilvie (135) erroneously believes that Eisenhut had dealt with "almost every occurrence in classical Latin".

2 The interpretation under the heading "Weitere Zeugnisse in fragmentarisch erhaltenen Schriften der Republic" (32ff.)

3 Feger 1

4 Büchner 1962:1 -Büchner is right in the respect that the emotional (experiential) meaning of a word cannot be documented. It is just the opposite with the cognitive meaning. The discrepancy is hardly reconcilable.

of values -*virtus* is more than a mere word- can, in the last analysis, be understood only in the politico-social environment that has created it and expresses its highest appreciation in the attribute of that concept. It would mean transcending the present reality if it were possible to interpret *virtus* as a Roman concept.

The method used in the study of concepts is often called historico-critical with its politico-social problematics.² For my part, I shall content myself with using the philological method. By this method I mean the interpretation of the material in every respect. I do not directly claim to use the semasiologic method irrespective of the fact that in connection with the interpretation proper I seek to illustrate *virtus* by giving as a translation the meaning that I think to be present in the passage concerned. It is practically impossible to estimate *virtus* as a concept without the description of its semasiological development. The argument will be valid, no matter how untranslatable the concept is considered by Earl, or on the basis of what I have said above. The difference between a word and a concept is that a word can be translated whereas a concept can be only interpreted.⁴

To say that *virtus* occurs in one author in one meaning, and in another author in another meaning, is saying a great deal, but, nevertheless, it is not saying enough. In addition to the analysis of meaning, an explanation should be given about the thoughts and the attitudes behind the contextual meaning. Since a concept is always at the same time a word, but a word is not always at the same time a concept, I seem to reduce a concept that is hard to explain into a word while trying to translate *virtus*. The method is certainly not an end in itself but a means of illustrating a concept.

The general Roman conception of *virtus* -if there is one- can be found out by comparing the use of *virtus* in different authors. Do different authors conceive *virtus* in a different way, or, is *virtus* rather an "Allgemeinbegriff", which remains the same from one author to another? Consequently, the philological method mainly consists of

1 Cf. Camus 79f.

2 Koselleck 84f.

3 Earl 1967:8 and 20

4 Koselleck 84f. -This is connected with the difficult problem of the relationship between linguistics and historical research. W. Bauer (38) has appropriately pointed out that frontier controversies appear particularly when the contents of language are discussed.

the comparative consideration of the significant occurrences in every respect.

The explanation of the conceptual contents may help in tracing the norms and values of the society whose members use the concept concerned. One could argue that, in the last analysis, a concept has (only) the contents that the author happens to give it, and not the contents it possibly had in general usage at the time he is telling about, or at the time he lived in. The conclusion of this is the fact that the study of concepts elucidates the author's world of values. Whether this kind of a value subjectivist view will prove to be overestimated or not, is an interesting question.

Koselleck asserts that the study of the history of concepts rather offers its help to the history of events or ideas than belongs itself as such to those disciplines.¹ As far as this is true, the study of the history of concepts in a sense I conceive it is not exclusively study of the Latin language, although it may further it. Briefly: the present study is philology in the sense I gave it in the foregoing.

This study falls into two parts: on one hand into the part that can be read between the covers, and on the other hand into the part that I have not written. In the first part I have intentionally left a great number of important occurrences of *virtus* without interpretation, and this gives meaning to the second, unwritten, part of my study. As Polybius the historian says (6,11,7f.), the honest criticism should not in the first place look for that which the author is silent of, but that which he deals with, and if a critic notices inaccuracies in this respect, he can draw the conclusion that the omissions are due to ignorance. But if everything that the author deals with is true, the critic has to admit that the author is silent deliberately and not unknowingly. I do not want to deny the fact that the occurrences of *virtus* that I have left without consideration might have given this study another direction than that which it has got now.

The original material consists of those occurrences of *virtus* which are significant or regarded as significant for this study. The

1 Koselleck 84

last author to be dealt with is Livy, who, to be sure, partly belongs to the Imperial Age. Yet this historian, as it will be seen, has summarized the use of *virtus* in the Republican Age, or is at least one of the most representative examples of it.

1.3. Word formation and meaning

All those who have studied *virtus*¹ have followed Cicero (Tusc. 2,43; Sest.76 and 93) and have argued without an exception that the word has been formed of the noun *vir*² and the Indo-European suffix *-tūt-*³ The other Latin words which have been formed with the same suffix are *iuventus*, *senectus*, *servitus*, and the Old Latin *tempestus*.⁴ The words with the suffix *-tūt-*⁵ indicate state, form of existence.⁶ Thus *senectus* indicates the state of being *senex*, or the form of existence in which *senex* is, i.e. old age as a period of life, and *servitus* indicates the state of being a slave, i.e. the form of existence of *servus* as a social status. On the other hand, *iuventus* appears only relatively late in the meaning presupposed by the suffix 'young age', 'time of youth'⁷ or the age in the life of *vir* when he is able to defend *res publica* weapon in hand.⁸ Until the Classical Age *iuventus* occurs only in the collective meaning 'iu-

1 Büchner 1962:1; Pöschl 1940:14₂; Haas 163; van Omme 3f., and Eisenhut 12

2 *Vir* contains a positive intrinsic value and means 'man' as a fighter, a warrior as e.g. Plaut. Amph. 210ff. shows with many occurrences. Cf. Irish *fer* and Gothic *waír*. The basic form is the Proto-IE **wiro-*. On the other hand, Lithuanian *výras* and Sanskrit *vīra* derive from the secondary form of the proto-language **wiro* (cf. Ernout - Meillet 1112). The meaning 'warrior' is common to all these forms -including Latin *vir*.

3 E.g. Gothic *gamainduþs* and *mikilduþs*; Leumann - Hofmann 244

4 *Tempestus* = '*augurii tempus*'; cf. Varro l.l.7,51; Leumann - Hofmann 244; van Omme 6f.; in a more detailed manner Ernout 225ff.

5 As well as the words with the suffix *-tat-*; Haas 163; Leumann - Hofmann 243

6 Haas 163; Leumann - Hofmann 243; van Omme 6f.; Eisenhut 12

7 Van Omme 7 and 13f.; Eisenhut 12

8 In Tacitus (Germ.6) *iuventus* connotes all the able-bodied men of the Germans, as in Liv.5,14,1 those of the Romans.

venes'.¹ It is possible that the suffix first made the meaning of the noun collective (which did not prevent it from getting later an emphatically abstract notion). This is the point of view of van Omme.² His theory explains the development of the meaning of *iuventus*³, but leaves us at a loss as regards the other words. Van Omme is, to be sure, of the opinion that *servitus* and *tempestus*, too, were originally collective.⁴ He does not make the same argument as regards *virtus* (and *senectus*), although the logic of the hypothesis (the same suffix) would presuppose the collective (original) meaning 'the warriors' or 'the male adults of the community' of *virtus*. Van Omme has not found *virtus* in the collective meaning, neither has he found *servitus* or *tempestus* in that kind of meaning.⁵ The analogy of *iuventus* alone does not give support to his hypothesis.

In this connection it is not appropriate to pass silently those examples where *virtus* contrary to expectations approaches the collective meaning 'viri' or 'iuvenes', and which van Omme *et al.* have obviously left unnoticed. In the Annals of Ennius (333f.) it is said that Flamininus the commander-in-chief, *aspectabat virtutem legionis suae / expectans si mussaret* (i.e. *virtus*!). If Flamininus did not look at (*aspectabat*) his legion but the *virtus* of his legion, the syntactic connection presupposes the translation 'the warriors' rather than 'valour' (which is too abstract) *Virtutem legionis* is a pleonasm and the connection negative.

All the more clearly *virtus* means 'army', 'troops' in the Latin Bible in the Psalms 135,15, where it is said that the God of the Israelites, *excussit Pharaonem et virtutem eius in mare Rubro*. A comparison with the Septuagint shows that St. Jerome has translated *δυνάμεις*, which means 'troops', into *virtus*. As Eisenhut has not noticed the fact that *virtus* approaches the meaning 'militēs' even elsewhere, he has overlooked this passage of the Vulgate.⁶ Moving

1 Van Omme 7 and 13; Eisenhut 12

2 Van Omme 14f.

3 It is possible that the same thing is true in the case of *Skr. gadōtus*. According to Brugmann (453f.), *gadōtus* does not mean only 'a band of robbers' (Räuberbande) but also 'robbery' (Räubertum) *Gada* means 'a robber' (Räuber).

4 Van Omme 14

5 Van Omme 14f.

6 Eisenhut (195ff.) is rather thorough-going in his treatment of the early Christian literature and the translations of the Bible. The note 574 on page 195 does not refer to the interpretation above.

to another age of history of literature, I note that *virtus* occurs in the collective meaning 'men' in a song of Hungarian guards, which dates from about the year 900 (102 Raby). The fourth stanza of this song begins as follows (vv.19ff.):

Fortis iuventus, *virtus* audax bellica,
 vestra muros audiantur carmina,
 et sit in armis alterna vigilia,
 ne fraus hostilis haec invadat moenia.

Iuventus and *virtus* are vocatives, as the 20th line indicates. Adam of Bremen uses *virtus* even more clearly in the collective meaning: *Sueones et Dani victores totam virtutem Saxonum optrivere* (2,31 Trillmich). A close parallelism to these is the passage of the Vulgate that I have dealt with above. On the basis of these examples it is not totally groundless to incline to read *virtute pro iuventute* in Vell.Pat.2,107,1, in a passage which is problematic in terms of textual criticism, *cum citeriorem ripam fluminis castris occupassemus et ulterior (ripa) armata hostium virtute (virtute A; iuventute P) fulgeret*. If *virtute* is approved the meaning is 'warriors' or 'troops'. It does not matter which one of these two abstract nouns with the suffix *-tut-* is the correct one, the meaning is collective in any case.

In the absence of certain arguments *virtus* cannot be considered to have a collective original meaning. The examples above are indications of the occasional concretisation of the meaning.¹ Perhaps the analogy of the plural *virtutes* is the explanation of the phenomenon.

Virtus seems to have developed in a more inconsistent way than the other abstract nouns formed with the same suffix. The meaning 'state of being a man', 'age of man' cannot be found anywhere.² On the other hand, it should be noticed that *servitus* does not primarily indicate the age when a slave is at his best for the work of a slave, but slavery as a social status as opposed to the status of a free *vir*.³ *Virtus* is, however, both semantically and terminologically far more complicated than *servitus*. *Virtus* occurs in such meanings as 'manliness' (as 'manly efficiency', 'capability', 'ability'),

1 *Virtus* occurs in the concrete-collective meaning also in Claudius Quadrigarius and Caesar, as will be seen later on.

2 Thus Ernout 225; cf. Ernout - Meillet 739

3 "A free *vir*" is, of course, a pleonasm.

courage , 'valour', 'excellence', 'virtue' (as referring to some individual virtue or an ethical composite concept), 'good characteristic', and 'good quality' (roughly speaking everything that fulfils the requirements of its appropriateness).¹

Haas has presented something rather curious stating that *virtus* originally had the meaning 'manhood', 'age of man' presupposed by the suffix, this meaning should have been forgotten until it, quite unawares, comes forward in Tacitus.² Eisenhut has pointed out that in both of the passages that Haas refers to (Germ.20 and 31) it suffices to interpret *virtus* as 'valour' (Tapferkeit), and that there is nothing to prove that Haas has founded the supposed original meaning.³ In Germ.20 Tacitus writes that the children of the free and the slaves live for a long time unsegregated with each other, and that there is not yet any difference between the categories of *dominus* and *servus*: *inter eadem pecora, in eadem humo degunt, donec aetas separet ingenuos, virtus agnoscat*. Not until as adults are the free separated from the non-free. The characteristic of the free is fierce manliness both at war and in time of peace (as in the case of *Chatti* in Germ.31), for having it is the sign of a free man, and lacking it the sign of a slave. Slaves are not *viri* but *res*, i.e. speaking chattels of *vir*, as Varro (rust.1,17,1) and Aristotle (eth.Nic.1161 b4) categorize them.⁴

According to the typically Roman idea, *virtus* cannot occur unless connected with freedom (*libertas*); i.e. the external conditions do not thwart the action. Crawley places *libertas* in the world of values of the hereditary nobility.⁵ *Libertas* means the right to do what one wants without treading too heavily on the toes of other *nobiles*. According to Juvenal the satirist (sat.1,151ff.), *libertas* that was both cherished and insisted by the nobility was identical with the privileges it wanted to defend resolutely. On the other hand, *libertas* can be defined as the strength to live in the way one wants to (Cic.par.Stoic.5,34). This kind of *libertas* is the characteristic of the men of will and action. On the other hand,

1 Cf. Ernout 225: "Il (*virtus*) marque l'activité et la qualité".

2 Haas 163f.

3 Eisenhut 175f.

4 Cf. Suolahti 11f.

5 Crawley 33

libertas was -more often perhaps- conceived of as the right of saying what you please, as Horace puts it (epist.1,18,5ff.). It was typical of the Romans to regard *libertas* as an external advantage pursued even by slaves.¹

If a difference is made between active and passive freedom, it can be roughly said that the Romans tended towards the former. The greatness of man was to them exceedingly more active than contemplative, which made freedom as a manifestation of mental independence to remain in the background. Active (positive) freedom is free action of a practically minded person, passive (negative) freedom -it seems to me- mental independence (on the part of an individualist confronted by external pressure), for which action is not of the first importance.³ Democritus speaks of active freedom in a fragment (fr.226 Diels - Kranz): "Courage (παρρησία) is characteristic of a free man, but the difficulty lies in the choice of the right moment." Οὐκῆτιον ἐλευθερίας παρρησία, κίνδυνος δὲ τοῦ καιροῦ διαγνώσις. Παρρησία means either 'openness', 'courage', or 'publicity' (or actually all this at the same time). Perhaps it is better to translate: "Openness is characteristic of free action, In this way, I have concretized ἐλευθερία. For the Stoics freedom means the strength for independent action whereas servitude means the prevention from it (Diog.Laert. 7,121). I return to *virtus*. A slave can have *virtus* only as far as it is characteristic of the quality that makes him worth becoming free (Lucil.fr.787; cf. Liv.24,15,6). As descriptively Cicero (or. 35) said that he was afraid of *tempora* .. *inimica virtuti*, when he had reason to believe that the dictatorship of Caesar restricted his activity as an author and a politician sympathizing the members of the Senate Party. Cf. Tac.Agr.1: *tam saeva et infesta virtuti tempora*. In Agr.41 Domitianus, whom Tacitus hates, gets the epithet *infensus virtutibus princeps*. Both Cicero and Tacitus had the opinion that absolute power is the enemy of *virtus*. *Virtus* is inseparably connected with the concept of freedom.

1 Arnold 322

2 Cf. Wirszubski

3 Active liberty means 'liberty to', passive liberty means 'liberty from'.

It has been said above that *virtus* derives from the noun *vir*. According to Lactantius (opif.12,6), in addition to the preceding, *vis* belongs to the same group of derivation: *vir itaque nuncupatus est quod maior in eo vis est quam in femina, et hinc virtus nomen accepit* (cf. Isid.etym.11,2,17). The interpretation is a so-called folk-etymology. Cicero knew the etymology, as Tusc.2,43 indicates, *appellata est enim ex viro virtus; viri autem propria maxime est fortitudo, cuius munera duo sunt maxima mortis dolorisque contemptio*.

To sum up: In spite of the suffix *-tūt-* *virtus* does not mean 'manhood' as the age of a man but 'manliness' as an abstract characteristic. The part of this work in which Ovid is dealt with will, however, show that this thesis needs a slight revision. Secondly, a collective original meaning cannot be proved by a few occurrences in Roman literature and its after-effect. It is most natural to explain them as suggestive consequential or transitional meanings due to the occasional concretization of the meaning of the abstract word. Thirdly, it is noteworthy that *virtus* and *libertas* are interrelated. Not contrary to expectations, perhaps, it is the active (positive) notion of freedom that *virtus* seems to be connected with.

1 Cf. Ernout - Meillet 1112: "Les anciens ne séparaient pas *vis* de *virtus*, et ont confondu *virosus* et *viriosus*."

2. INTERPRETATION

2.1. *Livius Andronicus and Naevius*

Eisenhut¹ has excellently dealt with the only occurrence in the Laws of the Twelve Tables (Plin.nat.21,7; Cic.leg.2,60), in which *virtus* means 'excellence'. I move straight to Livius Andronicus.

The semantic problem connected with the extant occurrence in the drama *Aias mastigophorus* is left unsolved by Eisenhut. According to him, the following sentence seems "entirely inappropriate to the idea of the strict Old Roman morals"²: *praestatur virtuti laus, sed gelu multo ocius vento tabescit* (trag.16f. Ribbeck).³ It appears to come as a surprise to Eisenhut that *virtus* occurs in this kind of negative connection. According to him, "Livius Andronicus bestreitet damit die Beständigkeit des Ruhmes (*laus*), und sogar dessen, der durch *virtus* erworben ist". He continues: "da der Zusammenhang nicht bekannt ist, lässt sich der genaue Bedeutungsgehalt von *virtus* nicht feststellen".⁴ Further on, Eisenhut once again comments on the passage concerned: "An einer der frühesten Stellen, in denen uns *virtus* begegnet, ist mit bedrückender Resignation ausgesprochen, wie wenig dauernd die Anerkennung (*laus*) ist, die der *virtus* gewährt wird."⁵ Eisenhut has overlooked some noteworthy considerations, by virtue of which the context needed for the definition of the meaning can be constructed.

1) The above mentioned play of Andronicus, which is retained in only two fragments, may be presumed to be based on a play called *Aias* by Sophocles. Sophocles describes how the hero kills a herd of cattle in an outburst of rage, and how he immediately brings shame and disgrace on himself and, in the end, commits suicide. Despite his previous valour, Ajax was not even allowed to be burnt on a pyre with the last honours (cf. Soph.Ai.817ff.). 2) The parallelism *virtus* - *laus* refers to Ajax and the deeds of valour he performed at

1 Eisenhut 23

2 Eisenhut 23

3 An equally acceptable reading: *praestatur laus virtuti, sed multo ocius / verno gelu tabescit* (Ribbeck, Bücheler)

4 Nonius (207,32) quotes the sentence only because of the gender of the word *gelu*.

5 Eisenhut 39

the gates of Troy. This is indicated by the interrogative sentence (trag.15 Ribbeck), *mirum videtur quod sit factum iam diu?* This probably refers to Ajax' deeds of valour in general as well as to his duel with Hector, which took a whole day and still remained unsettled (Il.7,206ff.). 3) Livius Andronicus has formed the aphorism out of the passage 1266f. in Sophocles' tragedy *Aias*. In this case, it is not a matter of translation, and the linguistic form is typically Roman.¹

By virtue of the above considerations, the only occurrence of *virtus* in Andronicus means (Ajax') 'military valour'. In that case, the translation is inclined to be as follows: "Valour will win fame, which, however, melts much quicker than ice in the wind." According to this aphorism, people remember the deeds of a hero only for a passing moment, for glory is transitory. This does not indeed give the impression of being typically Roman² and so, after all, it must recur to Greek thought. At this point it is appropriate to illustrate the Roman concept of fame.

The Roman ethos of state, which was based on ancestral pride (Pol.6,54,1), naturally presupposed the permanence of fame, and so there was no need for fearing its vanishing (Pol.6,53,1ff.; cf. Sall. Iug.4,5f.). The pursuit of fame is psychologically motivated, for instance, by the waxen masks (Sall.Iug.4,5; Pol.6,53,6). Fame was a value in itself⁴, and a Roman was willing to unending war efforts in order to achieve it (Pol.6,52,11). Polybius says that the Romans purposefully retained the deeds of their ancestors in the consciousness of the people, and that their funeral orations not only dealt

1 I have not found an elucidating comment on these scanty fragments of Andronicus. Ribbeck and Warmington, the Loeb translator, are on the same lines as I, however, without trying to give their views any particular reasons (*ad locum*). They make probability their starting-point "in want of something better" (Warmington). Warmington mentions the passage of Sophocles without bringing about anything conclusive. Cf. Leo 87f.; Schanz - Hosius 1,47ff.

2 Eisenhut 23

3 About the interpretation of the passage in *Iugurtha*, cf. Sarsila 1978:138

4 Plat.rep.347b seems to indicate that the Greeks did not regard ambition as a positive quality to the same extent as the Romans did. Rather, it was just the opposite. Socrates asks Thrasymachus, "Do you not know that ambition and greed for money are said to be shameful, and that they, indeed, are shameful?"

with the merits of the one who was being buried, but also the merits of those whose waxen effigies were displayed, beginning from the most ancient of all.¹ This inspired young men to endure anything for the good of the country in the hope of winning the fame of outstanding men (Pol.6,54,3). The Roman ethos of state was based on tradition. History had the didactic function of retaining the heroic figures of the past in fresh memory, and *virtus* could be shown by acting in accordance with the celebrated paragons (Sall.Iug.4,5f.). Moral examples were not found in the virtues of the previous generation but in the patterns of the national tradition.³

Caesar (Gall.7,80,5) says, *et laudis cupiditas et timor ignominiae ad virtutem excitabat*. Hunger for fame is not the only factor in building up valour. Fear of shame has its share. Virgil (Aen.6,823) connects insatiable greed for fame with patriotism, *vincet amor patriae laudumque immensa cupido* (cf. ecl.4,26f.). Fame did not exclude material profit, and such a heroic figure in Livy as Mucius Scaevola is awarded with land for his valour (Liv.2,13,5). But for Cicero the concept of fame becomes almost transcendental and gives permanent meaning to individual existence. He affirms (Att.2,5) that he likes to listen the voices of the generations to come better than the babble of his contemporaries.⁴ It is not a question of living for the everyday world but taking one's stand before the judges "who will judge after many centuries and presumably far more incorruptibly than we" (Marc.28).⁵ In addition, Cicero tells about the incorruptible judges of posterity that their judgments on the men of the past are not distorted by either love and passion or hate and envy (Marc.28).

1 The mimetic character of the Roman ethos of state is shown in Sen. ep.11,8: *aliquis vir bonus nobis diligendus est ac semper ante oculos habendus*. The standard of individual activity is *vir bonus* (cf. Boeth. cons.3,6,20f.).

2 Just the same idea is contained in the following examples: Sall. Iug.4,5; Cic.Tusc.1,3 and fin.5,21f.

3 Cf. Crawley 24

4 This kind of sublime sense of strength is completely lacking in fam.14,4,1 where Cicero complains of the ingratitude of his contemporaries, *neque homines, quibus ego semper servivi, nobis gratiam rettulerunt*.

5 The passages of Cicero Att.2,5 and Marc.28 I owe to Stanka, who quotes them as well (265). According to Tacitus (ann.6,46), Tiberius cared more for the favour of posterity than that of his own time (cf. Cic.Arch.29).

The future will be neutral in its relation to the past. The Roman world of values and experiences is not, in the last analysis, based on the presentistic principle of "here and now". The classic expression of this ethos is the last poem of Horace's third Book of Odes (carm.3,30), where the poet estimates the meaning of his literary activity (cf. Ov.met.15,871ff.):

Exegi monumentum aere perennius
regalique situ pyramidum altius,
quod non imber edax, non aquilo impotens
possit diruere aut innumerabilis
annorum series et fuga temporum.
Non omnis moriar multaque pars mei
vitabit Libitinam: usque ego postera
crescam laude recens, dum Capitolium
scandet cum tacita virgine pontifex

Fame means immortality, and Horace's thoughts that I have just quoted are related with what Cicero writes in Att.2,5 and Marc.28. In Plautus' play *Captivi* (690), Tyndarus, a slave, says, *qui per virtutem perit at non interit*. The concept of immortal fame is typically Roman and unchangeable as such, it is only its linguistic expressions that vary.

Under the circumstances, the only occurrence of *virtus* in Livius Andronicus is contrary to the Roman timocratic ethos of state and the concept of fame presupposed by it.

The only occurrence in Naevius is in the comedy *Tarentilla* (com. 92f. Ribbeck). The fathers reproach their sons who have returned home having spent all their money on entertainments, *primum ad virtutem ut redeatis, abeat ab ignavia / domi patres patriam ut colatis potius quam peregrini probra*. I have previously¹ said that *virtus* here means 'moral decency' which is demanded from the sons by the fathers, who have the absolute power over the life and death of the members of their family.² *Virtus* characterizes the moral consciousness of

1 Sarsila 1978:137

2 When using *patria potestas* for the good of all his family, the Roman man served above all his state. It was a most important moral duty to keep the affairs of the family in order. Extreme forms of

the family. Naevius is the first Roman author to use *virtus* as a politico-social value. The demand of the fathers is that the sons should honour *patres* and *patriam*. The submission of the Romans to the absolute power of the *pater familias* does not analogically differ at all from the discipline on which their military operations were based.¹ Since *virtus* in Naevius means 'activity' on the terms of the father of the family, it actually implies absolute submission to his authority. The *pater familias* alone decides what *virtus* is, and a son -even an adult man- has to obey. As a politico-social value *virtus* refers to decency², obedience and submission.

According to the general Roman thought, the state and the native country are all in all.³ An individual has meaning only in his relation to the state and the native country.⁴ The last two lines of Lucilius' definition on *virtus*, which will be closer dealt with further on, are as follows (fr.1337f. Marx):

commoda praeterea patriai prima putare,
deinde parentum, tertia iam postremaque nostra.

In his outstanding work on Roman-Stoic philosophy, *De officiis*, Cicero says that our devotion to our native country is even more profound

the authoritative power exerted by the *pater familias* were taking the life of a member of the family or selling him into slavery. According to Gaius (inst.1,132), the fact that he was getting on in his years did not release an adult son from the absolute authoritative power of his father. There were two exceptions. The death of the father of the family changed the situation. Secondly, a son was released from the *patria potestas* at the moment he took and during the time he held a high office. By virtue of this office he in turn became the authority of his father as well as the other citizens (cf. Liv.24,44,1ff.). This may explain something essential about the insatiable hunger for fame which was characteristic of the Romans, and about their historical achievements, too. The absolute authoritative power of the father probably nurtured ambitious attempts to be released from it and to acquire it in turn by means of a high office.

1 As a supplementary note to Adcock (17)

2 I do not find it needless to remark that in the Roman historical conditions decency was above all experienced as an activity.

3 As for the Republican (and Augustan) literature, the most important exception is Lucretius, the Epicurean, whose non-Roman qualities will be discussed later on.

4 What about the Greeks? Their instinctive character did not tend towards building up a state, but towards the free gratification of individual desires. There was room for free development of individuality in Greece, but not (so it would seem) in Rome. A Roman man could show his ability and vigour (his *virtus*) only to a limited extent, in other words, in the service of the state. This also meant canalizing ambition into a narrow area.

than our devotion to our parents and children¹ as well as to our other intimates (1,57f.), *cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares, sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus* (an honest citizen) *dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus .. quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus*², *proximi liberi totaque domus, quae spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium, deinceps bene convenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque est.*³ Practically speaking, Cicero has not said in this passage anything that were not contained in the final verses of Lucilius' definition of *virtus*. To Romans, parents⁴ meant more than children, but the native country, however, was all in all.

In the non-Roman context of Livius Andronicus, *virtus* means 'military valour'. Moving to Naevius, *virtus*, in the peaceful activities, implies submissive reverence to and in sight of one's authoritative father and native country. It is in accordance with the collective interests that *virtus* is displayed. Further on, *virtus* means essentially the same as *pietas erga patrem et patriam* but not -and this is crucial- *pietas erga deos*.⁵

2.2. Plautus

Virtus occurs in Plautus 66 times all told.⁶ When the individual plays are separately considered, it can be noted that the word occurs in *Amphitruo* 12 times and in *Miles gloriosus* 13 times. The relatively

1 Concerning devotion to children and offspring in the doctrine of the earliest Stoics, cf. Stoic.vet.frr.3,340 Arnim

2 The content of the occurrence of *virtus* in Naevius is quite this.

3 The renaissance author Campanella describes the citizens of his utopian *Civitas Solis* as being even more patriotic than the Romans (44). Campanella could not have discovered a better point of comparison.

4 Gellius (2,15) says that the old were externally respected in an equal measure in Rome as in Sparta.

5 Ferguson (171) plausibly asserts that "*pietas* is not an abstract virtue; it is realized in personal relationships, and is applicable to the confrontation alike of man and god and man and man".

6 Cf. Lodge s.v.

great number of occurrences is due to the military context of these plays, in which *virtus* and, as regards *Miles gloriosus*, also the plural *virtutes*, is one of the most central words of the language. Among the eleven occurrences of plural in all, *virtutes* appears in *Miles gloriosus* altogether five times.¹ Military exploits are the leit-motiv of the play, as it can well be expected on the basis of the title.

According to Eisenhut² the meaning 'valour' comes to the foreground only in the later literature. He is hesitant about including Epid.106; 381 and Amph.191 into the category of 'Tapferkeit' (valour) or that of 'Tüchtigkeit' ('excellence'). Eisenhut's argument is not felicitous, for the meaning 'valour' is to be considered quite central in Plautus. I do not actually mean that nearly all the cases could not be translated with the term 'Tüchtigkeit'; but I do mean that, as far as possible, the accurate interpretation should be aimed at. Sosia, the slave of Amphitryon says in Amph.191f.: *id (Theba) vi et virtute militum victum atque expugnatum oppidum est / imperio atque auspicio eri mei Amphitruonis maxime*. Military aggression (*vis*) and valour (*virtus*) are successful only as far as the commander knows how to use the two components of military efficiency, i.e. the physical (*vis*), and the psychological (*virtus*).³ In Amph.212ff. Sosia goes on with his description of Amphitryon's military operations, and 'valour' appears as an attribute of the enemy, (*Teloboae*) *magnanimi viri* ('warriors') *freti virtute et viribus / superbe nimis ferociter legatos nostros increpant, / respondent bello se et suos tutari posse, proinde uti / propere irent, de suis finibus exercitus ducerent*. *Virtus* is a war-like characteristic of soldiers who are conscious of their aggressive strength. It is a characteristic that leads to war, in spite of all diplomacy. The merits of Amphitryon are listed in Amph.250ff., and the following conclusion is given (260), *post ob virtutem ero Amphitruoni patera donata aurea est*. The fact that a slave speaks of his master's *virtus* has an impressive effect. Elsewhere in the same play (534ff.) Jupiter says to Alcmene referring to Amphitryon, *nunc tibi hanc pateram, quae dono mi illi ob virtutem data est .. Alcumena, tibi con-dono*. Stratippocles' valour in war is not enough to make him an en-

1 vv. 12; 32; 619; 649; and 1027

2 Eisenhut 25

3 Cf. Publ.S.159: *ducis in consilio posita est virtus militum*.

tirely respected figure, for Chaeribulus tells him: *praeter aetatem et virtutem stultus es, Stratippocles* (Epid.106).¹ Military achievements do not necessarily presuppose intellectual faculties. This is completely opposite to the intellectual moral of Socrates-Plato, according to which valiant activity presupposes a clear knowledge of what valour is. When meaning 'valour' as the characteristic of an ordinary soldier, *virtus* is not straightway an intellectual virtue. On the other hand, Amphitryon's *virtus* is intellectual in Amph.250ff. and 534ff. in which cases it is a question of the characteristic of a commander.

The importance of military valour in the content of the comedy *Amphitruo* is illustrated by the thoughts of Alcmene which are motivated by the absence of her husband (633ff.). Alcmene feels lonely when Amphitryon stays on the battlefield, *ille hinc abest quem / ego amo praeter omnis* (639f.). At length, she begins to console herself with the hope that Amphitryon would return home from the expedition *laudis compos* (642). Alcmene overcomes her feeling of solitude contenting herself with the objective respect brought about by her husband's prospective achievements, *apsit, dum modo laude parta / domum recipiat se; feram et perferam usque / abitum eius animo forti atque offirmato, id modo si mercedis / datur mi, ut meus victor vir*² *belli clueat* (644ff.). The beginning sequence of *canticum* indicates how the social dimension of military valour becomes clear to the contented Alcmene:

*virtus praemium est optimum;
virtus omnibus rebus anteit profecto:
libertas salus vita res et parentes, patria et prognati
tutantur servantur:
virtus omnia in sese habet; omnia adsunt
bona quem penest virtus* (648ff.).

Alcmene thinks that military valour is a social and political value ensuring a safe and stable life (in the material sense as well) for all the members of the (Roman, by implication) society. At first

1 The parallelism *aetas - virtus* appears in a controversial passage of Tacitus, Germ.20, discussed above; cf. p.20

2 Expressly *vir* in the meaning 'warrior', and not *maritus* in the meaning 'husband'

sight it is hard to believe that *virtus* even here means 'valour'. The analysis of the preceding verses (633ff.), however, indisputably shows what it is all about. The concept has to be interpreted as 'valour' also in the conclusive sentence *virtus omnia in sese habet* (652). The sentence surprisingly brings to mind Lucilius' famous fragment on *virtus* as a composite ethic virtue of universal dimensions.

Eisenhut has overlooked Plautus' *canticum* of *virtus* since he suggests the fragment of Lucilius to be "die erste Reflexion über *virtus*"¹. To what extent does Plautus' praise of military valour correspond with the Roman views at the turn of the third and the second century BC? E. Segal has written that Plautus emphasizes moral aspects because his purposeful attempt to influence social morals is in truth serious behind all comedy.² By virtue of this, Plautus may have composed the *canticum* in question consciously and with the purposeful attempt to influence his contemporaries' view of life. From this, two mutually controversial conclusions can be drawn. 1) Plautus wanted to emphasize military valour as a value of paramount importance for the reason that his contemporaries did not regard it as highly as they ought to have done in his opinion. 2) The praise of *virtus* is to be understood as irony³ on the part of Plautus mocking the militarist phraseology of the Romans or their political leaders, not to say the militarist character of the Roman society. The irony in the latter case would be unheard of. Negative flavour of *virtus* everywhere in the *corpus Plautinum* would be the price to be paid for it. The negation would, however, refer to the conception, but not to the word, for at the same time as the concept becomes negative, the word remains explicitly positive. Further on, if the praise of military valour were ironical, the concept of heroism as the source of the Roman glory would not be as deeply rooted in Plautus as the material used in this work indicates, or the historical experiences of the Roman people presuppose it to be the case. Plautus would have considered *virtus* repugnant, if he had meant the

1 Eisenhut 35

2 Segal 252ff.

3 *Virtus* is ironical in Most.32f.; Pseud.581f. and Asin.557. Plautus has his own purposes in mind when he dedicates *virtus* to worthless and comical figures. The use of irony is characteristic of Plautus but original as well (cf. Forehand 633ff.). Pöschl (1973:29ff.) proves Plautus more original as it has been believed previously.

praise of it to be sarcastic irony. Plautus would appear non-Roman if his attitude towards heroism were reserved or negative. Inasmuch as I can see, the latter interpretation is more probable. Segal's idea of Plautus as a supporter or a promoter of social morals may prove overestimated, if not downright erroneous. For the time being, the solution to the problem is out of sight. I have to content myself with saying that Plautus places *virtus* in the world of Greek mythology by means of *interpretatio Romana*. This results in a comical effect. Plautus presents Alcmena as a fairly typical Roman housewife whose attitude towards heroism is such as can be expected from an ambitious Roman.

The substance of the comedy *Amphitruo*, is as far as I can see, in the fact that Alcmena's *amor* of her husband and Amphitryon's heroic *virtus* do not come into a psychological conflict. As such, the relation *amor* - *virtus* is a serious theme despite the fact that the play is basically a comedy. Plautus considers the conflict between *amor* and *virtus* potential in principle. In Trin.648 the antithesis *amor virtus* emphasizes the antagonism between an enervating love-affair and the aspiring manly sense of honour.²

The archaists Fronto, Gellius, and Apuleius are, in Eisenhut's opinion, indirect proofs of the fact that the Old Roman authors did not include into *virtus* anything particularly magnificent and Roman ("nicht besonders Grossartiges und Römisches"); "jedenfalls haben es die nachahmenden Archaisten nicht gemerkt, und sie hatten mehr Texte zur Verfügung als wir."³ Not until the time of Sallust was *virtus* elevated into the dominant position in the life of the Roman man and state.⁴ Plautus' *canticum* of *virtus*, which I have interpreted above, does not give support to the thesis of Eisenhut. *Virtus* is not, to be sure, explicitly "besonders Römisches", but implicitly it most certainly is. Moreover, if anything, *virtus* is something "besonders Grossartiges".

In addition, the occurrences in Cist.197f.; Epid.381; 442f.; Mil. 55f.; 1041f. 1326ff., and Most.144f. mainly refer to 'valour'. On

1 Elucidation on this problem cannot be found in Forehand (633ff.) or in Earl (1960:235ff.), either. But M. Fuhrmann's comment (Der kleine Pauly 4,916) supports my view: "einige seiner (des Plautus) Karikaturen grenzen ans Phantastische".

2 Burck (1954:32ff.) leaves the potential conflict between *amor* and *virtus* undiscussed.

3 Eisenhut 221

4 So Eisenhut 48f. and 55

the basis of so great a number of occurrences of the meaning 'valour' the statement of Eisenhut that 'Tapferkeit' as an interpretation of *virtus* is only occasionally appropriate ("die gelegentliche Beispiele") is left without pertinent arguments.¹ It cannot be stated, as Eisenhut does, that the meaning 'valour' comes to the front only in the later literature.² As early as in the only extant occurrence in Livius Andronicus, *virtus* means 'military valour'. In connection with the usage of Plautus, this, in my opinion, indisputably shows that, from the early beginnings of literature, *virtus* has as evident a tendency to mean 'valour' as, say, in Caesar and Livy.

Eisenhut rather often assures that the disturbing etymological connection with the root-word *vir* long prevented *virtus* from being attributed to a woman.³ According to him, it would not have been until in a letter of Cicero to his wife (fam.14,1,1) that the meaning of *virtus* was extended to contain the characteristics of woman.⁴ As the characteristic of Terentia *virtus* means 'manly firmness' and 'courage' to endure the adversities of the family, as Eisenhut⁵ quite correctly interprets. But the *virtus* of Terentia is the first *virtus* attributed to a woman only inasmuch as it as a quality demanded from a warrior means essentially the same as *fortitudo*.⁶ This far, Eisenhut is right. When he arrives at the result⁷ that *virtus* (or the plural *virtutes*) means more womanly virtues only as late as in Pliny the Younger (7,19,4; 8,5,1), Juvenal (sat.2,20f.), and Ovid (pont.3,1, 115f.), he is wrong. Ovid, of course, understands the *virtus* of Livia

1 Cf. Eisenhut 25

2 Eisenhut 25

3 Eisenhut 41; 42⁹⁸; 44; 108; 129; and the note 506 on the same page; further on, 185; 189; 191⁵⁶⁶; 210, and 220

4 Eisenhut has overlooked passage Rosc.Amer.147, where *virtus* also appears as a quality of woman, *spectatissima femina (Caecilia), quae cum patrem clarissimum, amplissimos patruos, ornatissimum fratrem haberet, tamen, cum esset mulier, virtute perfecit, ut, quanto honore ipsa ex illorum dignitate adficeretur, non minora illis ornamenta ex sua laude redderet*. The concessive clause *cum esset mulier* placed before *virtus* is, as it were, an effective *figura antietymologica*. Cicero implies that *virtus*, applied to a woman, is solecistic, suggesting the possession of masculine characteristics.

5 Eisenhut 108

6 In fam.14,1,1 *virtus* appears together with *fortitudo* in such a way that the conceptual contents are equivalent.

7 Eisenhut 185 and 189

as *pudicitia*¹ in his letter from Tomis, but this is not so remarkable and new ("auffallend und neu") as Eisenhut supposes it to be.² Much earlier, Plautus had written towards the end of his comedy *Amphitruo* (925ff.), *ego (Alcumena) istaec feci verba virtute irrita; / nunc, quando factis me impudicis abstini, / ab impudicis dictis avorti volo*. It was in this way that Alcmene replied to Jupiter, who had been trying to conciliate her. *Virtus* belongs to Alcmene herself. Since neither *facta impudica* nor *dicta impudica* are worthy of *virtus*, it means having moral backbone in words and deeds, *pudicitia*, if the Latin term is used. The same correction I have here made for Eisenhut also applies to the article of Büchner.³ When using *virtus* the Romans of the Republican Age did not consider the connection with the word *vir* as disturbing and compelling as the earlier study has led to believe.⁴

The "virtue" of Alcmene and numerous other examples of Plautus prove that, no later than at the time of Plautus, *virtus* had actually approached the Greek ἀρετή in its meaning. W. Jaeger defines ἀρετή as what is the best and the most pleasant.⁵ Büchner, on his part, writes that "ἀρετή bezeichnet zunächst die spezifische Eigenschaft eines Dinges und zwar in ihrer Vollendung"⁶ In Plato's *Politeia* (335b) ἀρετή occurs in dogs, horses, and men. In this passage the idea is that ἀρετή can be influenced in whomever or whatever it may occur. Causing damage to dogs, horses, and men, in turn causes damage to their ἀρετή. In a positive sense dogs, horses, and men can be improved by trying to improve their characteristic ἀρετή, i.e. the combination of the specific characteristics that make up dogs, horses, and men into *good* dogs, horses, and men.

Inadvertently, as it were, I have been characterizing *virtus*, too at the same time.

Besides Plato, Homer (Il.23,276 and 374) and Polybius (10,27,1) attribute ἀρετή to horses as their characteristic. In Herodotus (4,

1 About *pudicitia*, cf. the article in RE (1942ff.) by Radke; cf. Wissowa 333f.

2 Eisenhut 185

3 Büchner 1962:6

4 At the time of Cicero an unknown author wrote *Laudatio Turiae* for the praise of his deceased wife, where *virtus* (*virtutes*) occurs three times (according to the edition by Wistrand), and every time meaning the characteristics of Turia as an exemplary wife.

5 Jaeger 26

6 Büchner 1962:6

198 and 7,5) and Thucydides (1,2) we have found ἀρετὴ γῆς. I define ἀρετὴ as the good quality of a living organism or an artificial product, excellence, and usefulness for some purpose. Eyes and ears have at their best the ἀρετὴ of perception, while the ἀρετὴ of the body is health (Plat.rep.353; Gorg.479b; cf. Arist.eth.Nic.1106 a17). A soldier fighting in the Trojan War needs ἀρετὴ in the meaning 'valour' (Il.20,411; 15,642). In accordance with the epics of Homer, Polybius also uses ἀρετὴ in the meaning ἀνδρεία. Such a quality is attributed, for instance, to the Romans (2,33,9; 2,38,2f.; and 2,43,3). On the other hand, the Arcadians are famous for their virtue, ἐπ' ἀρετὴν φῆμην, for Polybius characterizes them as being humane, hospitable, and profoundly religious (4,20,1f.). As an indication of the conceptual extension and terminological expansion of ἀρετὴ could be mentioned the fact that it is attributed even to quick and strong feet (Il.20,411). It can also be attributed to a woman (Od.2,206; cf. Epicharm.fr.35 Diels - Kranz).

In philosophical literature, ἀρετὴ was used as the term indicating the highest value, and it meant then either some individual virtue or the composite concept of all virtues.¹ On the basis of etymology, the content of meaning of ἀρετὴ was at first indubitably more extensive than that of *virtus*. Yet there is no need of presupposing that the relatively early extension of the meaning of *virtus* into an attribute of woman in Plaut.Amph.925 was directly influenced by ἀρετὴ. The "virtue" of Alcmene is an oxymoron and to be understood on the basis of the original meaning 'manliness'.

Further on, a Latin explanation is possible in connection with several other oxymorons, too. In Aul.166 it is said that *ego virtute deum et maiorum nostrum dives sum satis*. According to Eisenhut², *virtus deum* tends towards the meaning 'favour of gods' in this conventional phrase, while *virtute maiorum* refers to 'the excellence of the ancestors'. I find this kind of analysis rather questionable because it violates the Latin phrase and because the translation presupposed by it would be unnecessarily tortuous. Trin.346f.: *deum virtute ... pater, et maiorum et tua / multa bona bene parta habemus* (cf. Per. 390f.). The family has got material benefit (*bona*) because of *virtus*. The only basis of material well-being is *virtus deum* in passages Mil.

1 Walzer 20

2 Eisenhut 25

676 and 679: *deum virtute est de unde hospitio accipiam apud me comiter* .. -nam mihi, *deum virtute dicam, propter divitias meas* .. (cf. Trin.355). Most attributes of *deum* presuppose the interpretation 'because of', 'thanks to' (Trin.346f.; Per.390f.), while, as far as the attribute *deum* alone is concerned, 'by favour of gods' is a comparatively appropriate translation. The expression *deum virtute* that occurs twice in *Miles gloriosus* can be considered so conventional that it is best to translate it clearly and simply 'thank gods', or 'thank heaven'.¹ Van Omme is probably right when he claims that colloquial Latin very early used an expression similar to the French *en vertu de* (cf. *by virtue of*).² This explains the fact that *virtus* occurs in connections similar to those presented above. Truc.741: *de eo nunc bene sunt tua virtute* ('because of you', 'due to you', 'thanks to you'). Cicero uses an equally conventional expression in the ablative when writing to the Proconsul D.P. Lentulus, *me meae* ('my personal adversities') *tamen ne nimis poeniteret, tua virtute* ('thanks to you') *perfectum est* (fam.1,7,8; cf. ep. ad Brut.25,10). It can be presumed that it hardly was Plautus who started the conventional usage separated from the original meaning 'manliness'. On the other hand, he made use of it.

It is hard to find a more impressive effect than a colossal oxymoron in Plautus. Since the theme of *Miles gloriosus* is *virtus* showed in war or *virtutes* performed by means of it, *virtute deum* additionally emphasizes the ironical-sarcastic tone of the play.

The connection with the root-word *vir* did not prevent Plautus from attributing *virtus* to a woman or gods. The *virtus* of elbows (Asin.545ff. Leo; plurimi editt.) is to be understood on the basis of the original meaning 'manliness'. Libanus says to Leonidas (an apt name here!), another slave: *perfidiae laudes gratiasque habemus magnas, / quom nostris sycophantis, dolis astutiisque, / scapularum confidentia, virtute ulnorum freti*. In this pleonastic (*confidentia, freti*) and ironical expression *virtus* means the same as *vis*³, that is to say simply 'physical strength', 'brute force'. The word occurs in a negative connection, and again Plautus attributes *virtus* to worthless and comical figures. I do not consider the extension of

1 "Goddank" -as van Omme (29) expresses it in Dutch

2 Van Omme 29f.

3 *Vis* = Skr. *vāyas* and Gr. *ῥίς* Walde - Pokorny 1,225

context noteworthy in any way. *Virtus ulnorum* can be explained in terms of the separate semantical development of Latin, and there is no need to look for a Greek model. This has been implicitly pointed out by Ernout - Meillet: "les anciens ne séparaient pas *vis* de *virtus*, et ont confondu *virosus* et *vīriōsus*."¹ The passage of Lactantius (opif.12,6) I have quoted above shows that this is true at least in principle. In Asin.545ff. Plautus simply used or wanted to use *virtus* as a synonym of *vis*. It is impossible to say whether Plautus realized that these words do not belong to the same etymological group. In any case, Ernout - Meillet has offered a solution by answering in the negative.

A more notable extension of context occurs in Mil.727ff., where *virtus* of merchandise (*merx*) is mentioned. It means 'excellence' and 'good quality' that increases sales. The Latin explanation without the influence of ἀρετή does not seem to be sufficient any more, and I cannot but accept the commentary *ad locum* by van Omme³ and Eisenhut⁴. Eisenhut considers the expression *virtute formae* (in some editions: *formai*) to be another indication of the direct influence of ἀρετή (Most.173; Mil.1211). In the former passage Scapha, the servant, addresses her mistress, *virtute formae id evenit, te ut deceat quidquid habeas*. By the *virtus* of her beauty Philematium looks fine in any dress. The influence does not necessarily and exclusively come directly from ἀρετή. The analogy of the colloquial expressions in ablative may have extended the use of the term without the influence of ἀρετή as a model. Moreover, it is a question of a pleonastic expression of a quality of woman.

The great many oxymora show, besides variety of the conceptual contents, also the fact that Plautus consciously uses *virtus* as a stylistic effect. An impressive effect is produced expressly by the fact that Plautus places an unquestionably positive word in an ironical-negative connection. For instance, in Asin.545ff. Plautus places *virtus* in connection with such negatively coloured words as *dolus* and *astutia*, which results in a sarcastic parallelism. The *virtus* that is completely independent of intellectual faculties (Epid.106) ap-

1 Ernout - Meillet 1112

2 Cf. p.22

3 Van Omme 50f.

4 Eisenhut (27) probably repeats the interpretation of van Omme unknowingly.

pears sarcastic in comparison with the laudatory words of Alcmena in Amph.644ff. *Virtute deum* which occurs twice in *Miles gloriosus* puts those *virtutes* which the play mainly reports into a comical light. At the time of Plautus, at the latest, *virtus* must have occurred in conventional expressions.

In several *loci*, the foundation of the material well-being rests on *virtus*. Consequently, in Plautus, *virtus* tends to be a material value.

'Valour' as the appropriate translation of *virtus* is applicable more often than it has been believed this far. Besides, this important aspect has, contrary to previous expectations, remarkable conceptual cogency, as it is shown by the almost lyrical praise of heroism by Alcmena. Amph.644ff. suggests attitudes, norms, and values of a militarist society. For a society based on military achievements, it is most natural to have its greatest esteem for a characteristic shown at war. In Rome, the historical circumstances created the type of excellence that was later regarded by the Romans as their ideal. The praise of *virtus* may implicitly characterize the views prevalent at an earlier stage of development in a militarist society. On the other hand, Epid.106, where the *virtus* of a soldier means 'valour' and 'efficiency' without necessarily presupposing intellectual faculties, characterizes the later stages of the same society, when the military impression had somewhat faded. The fact that the (Roman) soldier was not (any longer) esteemed solely for his valour on the battlefield indicates a gradual change in the complex contained in *virtus* in accordance with the social system. The society that was safeguarded by the heroism of Horatius Cocles and Mucius Scaevola valued and needed valour that was connected with patriotism and covered the whole of the semantic content of the concept. *Virtus*, on the battlefield, simply meant 'valour' without further implications. But, in the course of time, peaceful activities became a matter of more and more interest for the people. This meant a change in *virtus*.

Amphitruo proved to be the most rewarding for the discussion of the conceptual essence. The praise of heroism by Alcmena and the *virtus* she attributes to herself both occur in the same play. At first, Alcmena praises (644ff.) the decisive and beneficial influence of military valour on the life of society. Nevertheless, *virtus* and *amor* can be diametrically opposed. *Virtus* is to the advantage of

a militarist society, but not necessarily of an individual (or rather, an interrelationship of two people). This germinating conflict between society and individual remains, however, at the stage of a passing doubt and changes into the certainty that *virtus* does not contravene *amor* but actually reinforces it. This resolution characterizes the Roman milieu at its most typical. What is beneficial to society is beneficial to individual as well. The uniting link is the tendency, deeply rooted in the Roman mind, to acquire esteem in the eyes of society at any price. "At any price" implies canalizing individual desires towards passionate service for the good of the country. But there is something Greek in the suspicion that *virtus* and *amor* might end up in insoluble antagonism. Plautus has paved the way for Catullus.

We can conclude that the conception of *virtus* in the *corpus Plautinum* is not so expressly positive as it might have been expected. The praise of heroism by Alcmena is obviously ironical. Secondly, it is evident that *virtus* is not just another word for Plautus but has noteworthy dynamic content in his plays.

2.3. Terence

In addition to Eisenhut¹, who interprets all the nine occurrences of *virtus* in Terence's plays, I present the following points. It is said in Eun.778, *imperatoris virtutem noveram et vim militum*. As Eisenhut quite plausibly notes², the meaning 'valour' ('Tapferkeit') does not occur elsewhere in Terence. This is due to the paucity of military contexts. As an excellent object of comparison is the above-discussed Epid.106 of Plautus, where the *virtus* of Stratippocles is acknowledged, but he is also regarded as unwise at the same time. If *virtus* is interpreted as 'Tapferkeit-valour' both in Plaut.Epid. 106 and in Ter.Eun.778, it should be borne in mind that it is a matter of two different aspects of 'Tapferkeit' with their different intrinsic values. The *virtus* of a commander (in the meaning 'Tapfer-

1 Eisenhut 29f.

2 Eisenhut 29

keit') includes intellectual faculties, *consilium* (cf. Cic.Phil.10, 20). Accordingly, 'valour' is an appropriate interpretation in the passage of Terence, as far as it presupposes an active and successful participation in the battle on the part of the commander (cf. Pol.10,49,14; Cic.Phil.5,47; Liv.21,4,9). In military contexts *virtus* tends to mean 'valour', but in order to define it more precisely the peculiarities of the text concerned have to be taken into account.

Contrary to Plautus, *virtus* used by Terence does not receive the same kind of diversified, dynamic contents. It is difficult to avoid drawing the conclusion that *virtus* was diversified and connected with a variety of subjects especially in colloquial language. Thus the unaffectedness and diversity of *virtus Plautiana* would come from the unaffectedness and diversity of colloquial language, whereas the coherency of *virtus Terentiana* would reflect the coherency of refined language. When compared to Plautus, nothing of the ambivalence of *virtus* can be found in Terence's plays.

2.4. Ennius

The extant fragments of Ennius are fragmentary to such a degree that it is rather difficult to draw reliable conclusions about the author's conception of and attitude towards *virtus*. In the whole of his production, or at least in his descriptions of war, the word is likely to have had the meaning 'valour' rather emphatically. In the *Annales*, this emphasis probably corresponded with Plautus' *Amphitruo* and *Miles gloriosus*. This argument seems to be supported by ann.189f. and 478. In the former instance, there is the parallelism *Fors - virtus*, for Pyrrhus tells Fabricius, *quidve ferat Fors, / virtute experiamur*. It is in accordance with true *virtus* to show valour in everything that Fate brings along. In the foregoing, I have interpreted ann.333f., where *virtus* occurs in the collective meaning 'warriors'.¹ The meaning 'Tapferkeit' is not solely the best possible interpretation in all the four extant occurrences of the *Annals*, although Eisenhut makes an allegation to that effect.²

1 Cf. p.18

2 Eisenhut 30

Eisenhut's category of meaning 'Tapferkeit' does not apply to Phoen.308f. There the word means 'manliness', 'manly firmness of character', *virum vera virtute vivere animatum addecet / fortiter-que innoxium stare adversum adversarios*. In this expression, which, typically enough as Ennius is concerned, is amply alliterative, 'manliness' as a shade of meaning of *virtus* is quite appropriate because of the figura etymologica *virum - virtute*.¹ 'Valour' is the relevant interpretation only when *vir* is interpreted as 'warrior' instead of 'man'.

In the fragment of *Hectoris lytra* (200f.) the philosophical value of *virtus* is not only brought in question but also entirely denied. It is said in that deliberative and proud passage, *melius est virtute ius, nam saepe virtutem mali / nanciscuntur; ius atque aecum se a malis spernit procul* (cf. Aesch.fr.259 Nauck). Unfortunately, the context of this aphorism is not known more closely. In any case, the idea is that the morally worthless (*mali*) are (too) often recognized for *virtus*. There appears to be some kind of difference from the *virtus* in Plaut.Epid.106. In spite of his stupidity and comicality, or just because of them, a warrior belonging to Plautus' gallery of types can be acknowledged for his *virtus*. In the aphorism of *Hectoris lytra* it is a characteristic of the morally worthless. The antithesis *virtus - ius, aecum* is impressive, so that *virtus* appears here to be used *in malam partem*.

The aphorism does not necessarily characterize military context. 'Valour' is acceptable provided that it does not contain only the consciousness of courageous mind as the emotion at the moment of perceived danger but also the physical strength. With this provision, I think that van Omme gives an appropriate interpretation

1 Cicero often juxtaposes the words *vir* and *virtus* aiming simultaneously at figura etymologica and alliteration. Sest.93: *quotusquisque invenitur tanta virtute vir, qui optimam quamque causam rei publicae amplectatur*; cf. Sest.86: 88; 89; Tusc.2,43. On the other hand, in Planc.12 it seems to be equally well a question of mere alliteration rather than alliteration plus figura etymologica. Cicero does not admit *virtus* to Cn. Manlius: *Cn. Manlium, non solum ignobilem, verum sine virtute, sine ingenio, vita etiam contempta ac sordida*. Eisenhut (13) reads *virum sine virtute* due to his emphasis on figura etymologica. However, the price of this reading is an anacoluthon. Of course, it is not entirely improbable in the light of the other juxtapositions of *vir - virtus* (about anacolutha in Cicero, cf. Wistrand 45), but the continuation would seem to presuppose two co-ordinate clauses introduced by the combination *non solum - verum*.

According to van Omme, *virtus* occurs here as the synonym of the word *vis*.¹ As they did not make an etymological difference between *virtus* and *vis*² the Romans were apt to use these terms as in fact identical. *Vis* simply means nothing but 'brute force'. So the philosophical background of the aphorism appears to be the flaming conflict between the use of physical strength and the views of law and justice. In a way, the aphorism is a reply to the doctrine of the Sophists, especially that of Thrasymachus of Chalcedon. He had argued (Plat.rep.338e) that the concept of law and justice has no other content than what is given them by the advantage of the stronger party. The aphorism composed by Ennius does not dilute the concept of law and justice, and so it must originate from another Greek tradition.³

The theory of the conflict between mental powers and physical strength is applied by Xenophanes (fr.2 Diels - Kranz). While Ennius, or Ennius in Greek disguise, conceives a conflict between moral categories and physical capacity, Xenophanes, for his part, is exacerbated with the chasm between the intellectual virtue of men like him and the capacity of performing (ῥώμη) of successful athletes.⁴ The ῥώμη) of a successful athlete is awarded by the πόλις with honour and material benefit such as meals at the expense of the state, a pension, and a seat of honour at the games. According to Xenophanes, it is not a victorious athlete who is worthy of all this but he himself, because his σοφία ('practical wisdom') manifests itself in political decisions and ensures prosperity and welfare to the πόλις. The athlete is not useful in this way. Curiously enough, the πόλις does not appreciate the poet-politician but the successful athlete. Xenophanes warned not to appreciate physical capacity of performing too highly, ῥώμης γὰρ ἀμείνων / ἀνδρῶν ἢδ' ἱππων ἡμετέρη σοφίη (fr.2,11f. Diels - Kranz). As far as I can see, the most appropriate Latin parallel is that of Phaedrus the fabulist, *virtute semper praeualet sapientia* (1,13,14).

1 Van Omme 49

2 Here I have taken advantage of the theory of Ernout - Meillet quoted above; cf. p.227.

3 About the simple identification of justice as power and strength in the doctrine of the Sophists, cf. Plat.leg.889dff.; about the ethical problems involved in this connection, cf. Bourke 14; Zeller 1931:103

4 In the case of Xenophanes I have taken advantage of Adkins' interpretation *ad locum*; cf. Adkins 1960:70f. and 1970:12.

As if paying homage to Xenophanes, Diogenes Laertius (8,49f.) drew up a letter to Anaximenes in the name of Pythagoras. It says that if the best men like Anaximenes forsake their πόλεις -where they are not shown due respect- these πόλεις will lose their harmony, and the danger caused by the Medians will become more and more evident.

The aphorism of Ennius possibly refers to Stoic thought, according to which non-intellectual¹ ἀρεταί, such as health (ὕγεια) and manliness (ἀνδρεία), also occur in worthless people, περὶ φαύλους (Diog.Laert.7,90).² This kind of ἀρετή is not essentially based on knowledge and theory. Generally speaking, ἀρετή means 'the excellence' of anything, for instance, of a statue (Diog.Laert.7,90). The Cyrenaic School, which followed Aristippus, did not differ from the Stoics in its belief that some virtues occur even in irrational beings, περὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας (Diog.Laert.2,92). The attributes φαῦλοι and ἄφρονες show that ἀνδρεία is not solely intellectual. On the other hand, Plato considers ἀνδρεία to be an intellectual virtue, for, while such things as beauty, health, and strength, which are thought to be good, are physical qualities (Diog.Laert.3,80), and, further on, friends and the prosperity and welfare of the native country belong to external benefits (τὰ ἐκτὸς ὄντα), δικαιοσύνη, φρόνησις, ἀνδρεία, and σωφροσύνη are ἐν ψυχῇ (Diog.Laert.3,80). 'Ανδρεία prevents man from giving up and makes him stand firm in fear and danger (Diog.Laert.3,91). According to Democritus, ἀνδρείη abates adversities (fr.213 Diels - Kranz). In addition, Democritus regarded manliness as effective resistance to the enemy, and, moreover, to sexual passion: "Not only he who defeats his enemy is considered courageous, but also he who overcomes his passions (ἡδονάς). There are many who are rulers of πόλεις and slaves of women at the same time." (fr. 214 Diels - Kranz; cf. fr.111). This kind of ἀνδρεία is as intellectualized as in Plato, and therefore it cannot occur περὶ φαύλους.

If we are to believe Plato, Protagoras of Abdera -a compatriot of Democritus- had a different conception of ἀνδρεία than Plato himself, who regarded it as an intellectual virtue. In Protag.349d, it is stated as the opinion of Protagoras that the four virtues

1 It is a difficult problem to decide to what extent the concept 'intellectual' contains moral considerations; cf. p.61

2 About the different meanings of the word φαῦλος in Plato, cf. Diog. Laert.3,63

are quite close to each other while ἀνδρεία differs in an essential way from the other virtues. Since, to Protagoras, ἀνδρεῖος may also mean unrighteous, godless, reckless, and ignorant (Protag.349d), ἀνδρεία is not an intellectual virtue at all (cf. Protag.359a). It is not moral, either. Thus the contrast is quite clear. Protagoras differs in his characterization of ἀνδρεία from his compatriot Democritus and Plato, who conceive ἀνδρεία in a similar way.

This gives support to the conclusion that Ennius uses *virtus* in the fragment of *Hectoris lytra* referring to a non-ethical and non-intellectual characteristic. This far, it does not actually make any difference whether it is translated as 'courage', 'manliness', or 'physical strength'. Ennius seems to have given the concept a content that corresponds to the Greek non-ethical and non-intellectual ὁμή, ἀνδρεία, or ἰσχύς (cf. Mus.fr.4 Diels - Kranz; Diog.Laert.3,80). The interpretation is much closer to the Stoics, the Cyrenaics, and Protagoras than to Democritus and Plato. Since ἀνδρεία-*fortitudo*, however, was conceived as one of the moral virtues by the Stoics, it might be consistent to interpret the occurrence of *virtus* in *Hectoris lytra* rather as 'strength' than 'manliness' -of course provided that the aphorism is considered in the light of the moral terminology and the four cardinal virtues of the Stoics.

Ennius composed his aphorism on the basis of Greek thought. Analogically, the same explanation may also apply to Plautus, who simultaneously speaks of the valour and stupidity of a soldier. For speaking simultaneously of the valour and the stupidity of the soldier indicates speculative thinking, which cannot be explained in terms of the development of the Roman social system as such, independent of Greek thought. In their speculative mode, the Romans showed that they had learnt something from the Greeks.

Contrary to expectations, perhaps, the total impression of the Ennian *virtus* is not unquestionably positive. Among seven occurrences in all, *virtus* is rather negative three times, in ann.333f. and Hect. lytr.200f. -(with two occurrences). The conclusion, however, involves speculation due to the scanty material.

2.5. Cato

Although *virtus* means the 'good quality' and 'excellence' of the soil (agr.1,2) bringing forth prosperity to the Roman landowner¹, the word retains its central function as an attribute of man. It is evident that, in the specifically masculine society of the Romans, it was expressly man and his achievements that were characterized with the term indicating the highest degree of acknowledgement. In a constantly belligerent community, the necessity of military efficiency was so evident right from the beginning that it was impossible not to emphasize it. The community gave its highest recognition to the characteristic that had vital importance to it.

Eisenhut presumes that, even as early as in Cato, *virtus* would have been independent of what the Romans called *fortuna*.² Eisenhut considers the fragment of *Origines* (83 Peter) which says, *di immortales tribuno militum (Caedicio) fortunam ex virtute dedere*. Eisenhut's conclusion does not exclude the opposite. It is not a question of the antithesis *fortuna - virtus*³ but a parallelism. *Virtus* is independent of *fortuna* only as far as the idea that the gods could have failed to give Caedicius *fortuna* but not (presumably) undo his *virtus* is included in the connection.⁴ But, on the other hand, *virtus* depends on *fortuna* to the extent that there cannot be *virtus* without success, which, to my mind, is the meaning of *fortuna* in this case.

1 'Fertility' ('vruchtbaarheid') offered by van Omme (50) serves as a connotative meaning; cf. Lucil.fr.557: *fundi delectat virtus te*. These oxymora do not bring along anything new after the expansion of context in Plautus (p.37). Whenever *virtus* is applied as an attribute of an inanimate object or characterizes a woman or gods, it is oxymoron. As for the expression ἄρετῇ ὕψις (Hdt.4,198; 7,5; Thuc. 1,2), which could be compared to Cato's passage agr.1,2, it is not a question of an oxymoron. In accordance with its etymology, ἄρετῇ cannot generally be considered as an oxymoron.

2 Eisenhut 31

3 As Eisenhut seems to have thought while writing page 47 and as it clearly appears on page 134, where he explicitly states that *virtus* was independent of *fortuna* in Cato for the first time and then "sehr deutlich" in Nepos and became a commonplace in the end (e.g. Plin.nat.7,130).

4 *Virtus*, it must be borne in mind, does not belong to the same category as *fortuna* for the simple reason that the gods do not give man *virtus*.

The meaning of *fortuna* is passive. It is not a dangerous opponent of *virtus*, only a consequence.¹

In the same fragment of *Origines* (83 Peter) *virtus* occurs two more times. One of them is a plural and means the 'military feats' of Leonidas. Livy (34,16,1) gives a fragment of the fifth book of *Origines* (fr.92 Peter), *ubi spem nusquam nisi in virtute haberent (milites)*. This formula appears with slight variations three times and expressly in connection with the activities of Cato in the work of Livy (34,14,3f.) that it must be concluded that Livy consciously strove to imitate the style of Cato. As far as I can see Tränkle², who has extensively studied the work of Livy, has not paid attention to this detail. "*Virtus* is the only hope" is quite an appropriate motto for a *homo novus* like Cato.³ As he sought a career as a politician, Cato wanted to find support in his own *virtus*, i.e. the unwavering reliance on his ability to eliminate all the obstacles laid on his way by the hereditary nobility. In this respect Cato anticipates Cicero.

Although he was a resolute opponent of the things Greek, Cato actually came to characterize the essence of the autarchic ἀρετῇ of Stoic philosophy.

2.6. Further fragmentary instances

The rest of the fragmentary literature of the Republican Age does not make any new contributions to the conceptual content of *virtus*. This seems to be the conclusion of Eisenhut. It is, however, presented implicitly rather than explicitly. Among the innovations, Eisenhut⁴ notes only the expression of gratitude *macte*

1 Among the fragments of Democritus, I have found an expression that corresponds to the relation between *virtus* and *fortuna* in Cato, τόλμα πρῆξις ἀρχῇ, τύχη δὲ τέλος κυρίη (fr.269 Diels - Kranz). Here, too, it is not a question of an antithesis but a parallelism. Τύχη (*fortuna*) is the consequence of τόλμα (*virtus*); cf. Cic.Catil.4,16.

2 I have in mind his work "Cato in der vierten and fünften Dekade des Livius", printed in Darmstadt in 1971.

3 Cf. Caes.Gall.2,33,4; 3,5,3; 5,34,2; civ.2,41,3; Cic.Lael.51; as for the conception of *homo novus*, cf. the classic work on the subject by Vogt, e.g. p.7ff.; cf. Paananen 90ff.

4 Eisenhut 33

virtute, which first occurs in Pacuvius (trag.146 Ribbeck).

Virtus seems to get an opponent in the shape of *fortuna*, and this is something new. Cato (Orig.83 Peter) did not introduce this usage, although Eisenhut makes an allegation to that effect.¹ It is said in Accius' *Telephus* (trag.619f. Ribbeck), *nam si a me regnum fortuna atque opes / eripere quivit, at virtutem non quivit*. In this self-confident expression *virtus* is an immanent quality constantly at the disposal of man², even though capricious *fortuna*³ sometimes annuls external possessions. *Virtus* can be interpreted as the ethical composite virtue. However, there is another possibility that is worthy of consideration. I cannot see any reason why *virtus* could not be interpreted as intellectualized 'courage' or 'manliness'. A parallel is offered by Diogenes the Cynic, who claimed that he could set against capricious fortune -not ἀρετῇ but- ἀνδρεία (Diog.Laert. 6,38). This kind of concept of ἀνδρεία is highly intellectualized and identical with the *virtus* in *Telephus*. In addition, the opposition is not only between *virtus* and *fortuna* but also between *virtus* and material benefit. This is contrary to Plautus.⁴ The expression comes from Stoic thought, for the Stoics were very emphatic about the independence of virtue (ἀρετῇ, *virtus*). Stoicism, not unlike the rest of the post-Aristotelian philosophy, sought to liberate man from his bondage to the external world and elevate him into the state of absolute independence.⁵ The logical consequence of this doctrine is the self-sufficiency of virtue (Diog.Laert.7,127; Cic. fin.5,79), which I am apt to regard as an inheritance of the Cynics to the Stoics.

The shade of meaning in the occurrence of *virtus* in *Telephus* is 'mental power', 'firmness of mind'. *Virtus* bears up against adversities. In addition, the antithesis *virtus* - *fortuna* appears in the tragedy of Accius *Armorum iudicium* (trag.156 Ribbeck; cf. Verg. Aen.12,435). A Stoic influence is also evident in Decimus Laberius, a mimographer, a contemporary of Caesar: *quid ad scaenam adfero?*

1 Eisenhut 31

2 According to Seneca (ep.50,8), *virtus* cannot be lost once it has been achieved.

3 Τύχη, which stirred up the Hellenistic World

4 In several passages, Plautus lays the foundation of man's prosperity on the *virtus* of gods, which is to be understood as a comical effect; cf. p.35f.

5 Zeller 1880:484

decorem formae an dignitatem corporis, animi virtutem an vocis iucundae sonum? (com.121 Ribbeck). Here Laberius gives a list of alternative themes for his mimes deliberating which of them would best correspond with the taste of the contemporary Roman audience. Because of the opposition between *animi virtus* and *vocis iucundae sonus* and the moral framing it expresses, the pair of words *animi virtus* approaches the meaning 'excellence of mind'. The pleonasm can also be interpreted as 'excellent mind' or 'character'. Athenaeus (Anth.Pal. 9,496; Diog.Laert.7,30) tells about the Stoics in general and describes their conception of virtue: "Virtue of mind (ἀρετὰ ψυχᾶς) is the only good. Only it can maintain the life of people and πόλεις more safely than high gates and walls."¹ According to Cleanthes, virtue means 'harmonious disposition', which is desirable because of itself, not because of some external motive, or hope, or fear. Happiness is based solely on virtue, for virtue is a state of mind which makes whole life harmonious (Diog.Laert.7,89). To the Old Stoa, virtue was a consistent state of soul lasting through the whole life (Stoic.vet.frr.3,39 Arnim).²

A drastic antithesis between *ambitio* and *virtus* occurs in Titinius, the playwright, *ubi ambitionem virtuti videas antecedere* (com. 11 Ribbeck). *Ambitio* implies cold-hearted calculation on the field of politics and has nothing to do with morals (*virtus*).³ Because of the antithesis, the content of *virtus* ought to be interpreted with an expression characterizing moral consciousness. It would be something like 'manly value'. An unknown playwright presents the aphorism, *nam sapiens virtuti honorem praemium, haud praedam petit* (trag. 30 Ribbeck). Cicero points out in rep.3,40 that *sapiens* refers to a statesman whose duty is to serve his country. According to this Roman-Stoic principle⁴, *vult plane virtus honorem, nec est virtutis ulla alia merces .. multi aut inimici potentes suis virtutem praemiis*

1 The praise of virtue of mind is quite close to Plautus' praise of heroism; cf. p.30f.

2 This gives the impression of ethical rigorism. The Later Stoa found it reasonable to emphasize that virtue is not an innate quality but a result of development; cf. p.101.

3 Cf. Plaut.Amph.75f.: *virtute dixit (Iupiter) vos victores vivere, / non ambitione neque perfidia*. In other words, *ambitio* is included in the same category as *perfidia*.

4 Cf. Stanka 280; Michel 34; Sarsila 1978:140

spoliant (Cic.rep.3,40 = Lact.inst.5,18,4). *Virtus* meaning a purely mental quality is altered and perverted when materialistic considerations are included in it. In the Roman statesman, who has a great deal of Greek philosopher, *virtus* is a purely mental quality. It does not presuppose securing material benefit or attempting to acquire personal dominance. It should be enough for a statesman that he receives honour (*honor*) on account of his *virtus*. This kind of Roman-Stoic *virtus* is autarchic and anti-monarchic. Likewise, it depends on will, and is therefore a voluntaristic quality. In the aphorism of the unknown playwright, *virtus* denotes 'worthiness' of a statesman, and its conceptual content is moral.

Although it is difficult to draw any reliable and far-reaching conclusions on the basis of the fragmentary material, the examples given above show that *virtus* began to adopt more and more moral content during the second and first centuries BC. *Virtus* became moral at the same time as Roman moral consciousness became more profound. Moral content was not totally unknown to Plautus, but until and including Cato, the concept mainly characterized capacity of performing, potency, in a valiant soldier or in fertile soil (agr.1,2). The concept contained, it is true, a certain element of honour as the criterion of manly value, but the emphasis was, however, on efficiency and strength. *Virtus* was first of all a heroic virtue. The rapid expansion of the Roman Republic in the third and second centuries BC and the principles of Stoicism, which were adopted in this period, probably affected the Roman moral consciousness in such a way that the demands of moderation, as opposed to material prosperity, came into the front.² It was, of course, still important to the Romans that their soldiers should show valour in their combats with the enemy's troops, and *virtus* meant 'valour'. But since the Romans had internalized their military efficiency at a very early stage, they regarded it as self-evident.³ On the other hand, since, after the

1 Cf. Amph.75f.; 925f.; Trin.642f.

2 Cf. another passage of the unknown playwright (trag.197 Ribbeck), *sive ita virtus seu latrocinium (fuit)*. *Virtus* and *latrocinium* form an antithesis (cf. Sall.Iug.3,4).

3 Ennius, who died in 169 BC, was not the only one to realize this; in ann.470 he compares the valour of the Romans to the loftiness of the heavens, *fortes Romani sunt tamquam caelus profundus*.

fall of Carthage, enemies of any great importance became rather few, or there appeared none at all for quite a long time, the dominant position of military valour in the hierarchy of values of the community became less self-evident. The Romans had new experiences of the external world, which in turn caused a change in their narrow criterion of manliness. Absolute obedience at home and obedience and valour on the battlefield were no longer sufficient to explain the personality of a man belonging to the elite of the Roman community.

In the extant fragments of speeches, the use of *virtus* anticipates Cicero. The concept implies the excellence of a politician in striving to reach his goal rather than military valour displayed at war. The occurrence of *virtus* as a political slogan is noteworthy, and, within the scope of the extant Roman literature, something new. The extant passage of Gaius Sempronius Gracchus' speech called *Disuasio legis Aufeliae* begins, *nam vos Quirites, si velitis sapientia atque virtute uti* -- (fr.44 Malcovati). Are *sapientia* and *virtus* those qualities of the public or the orator by means of which the common political goal can be reached? In a sense, it does not actually matter what the answer would be, for the direction of reference is deliberately vague due to propagandist purposes. If the latter alternative is preferred, the translation runs as follows: "for if you, citizens, want to act wisely and courageously --". But if the fragment refers to a situation where Gaius addresses the people in order to be re-elected to his tribunate, *sapientia* and *virtus* would denote his 'wisdom' and 'courage' (to which he has reason to appeal). During his consulate Cicero self-confidently appealed to his own *virtus* (Catil.3,14; 3,29; 4,5). He wanted to assure that the conspiracy of Catiline was not subdued by chance (*casus*) but because of his own resoluteness and efficiency (*virtus*). Cf. Sull.83: *casu magis et felicitate a me quam virtute et consilio gesta esse videantur*? According to this, the contemporaries would have considered Cicero's success to be extraordinary to the extent that it might not have been possible without the favourable assistance of fortune and chance.¹

¹ According to Plutarch (Cic.24), the contemporaries resented Cicero's appearance as the saviour of Rome. In the light of this instance, *virtus* is a fair word for obtrusive and excessive reference to and emphasis on oneself and one's own importance. Cf. the self-laudatory words of Trimalchio in Petron.75,8, *virtute mea ad hoc perveni*.

Because of his political status, Cicero had good reasons to assert the opposite in his speeches against Catiline. The *virtus* of Cicero himself also appears in red. in sen.39 (*virtutem et fidem numquam amiserim*) and Quir.9. Cf. Quir.19: *quod si quis existimat, me aut voluntate esse mutata aut debilitata virtute aut animo fracto, vehementer errat*. Cicero assures that his self-confidence has not suffered a blow even though he has been politically ignored.

The words *sapientia* and *virtus* have become concepts, for they would not otherwise be used by Gaius Gracchus for propagandist purposes (cf. frr.7 and 45 Malcovati). On the basis of what has been said in the foregoing, it is evident that *virtus*, as is quite appropriate to the term characterizing the highest appreciation, was used as a political slogan in the second century BC at the latest (and probably already in earlier times, from which no literary sources have been retained).¹ In this connection the concept could be interpreted in many ways due to propagandist purposes, and, accordingly, it is difficult to give an exact translation in a word. Therefore it has to be expressed in a roundabout way, in other words, the concept has to be interpreted.

At this time, the historians use *virtus* primarily in the meaning 'valour'.² Claudius Quadrigarius uses the word in order to characterize the historical significance of a personage in deliberating style. For instance, Marcus Manlius was surpassed by no one in military valour, *virtute bellica* (fr.7 Peter). It is told of the famous Manlius Torquatus (fr.10b Peter), *Gallus et viribus et magnitudine et adulescentia simulque virtute ceteris antistabat. (Manlius) processit neque passus est virtutem Romanam ab Gallo turpiter spoliari*. The *virtus* attributed to the Gall can be interpreted with the term 'valour',³ but in the latter case this is not sufficient any more. Van Omme⁴, in opposition to Eisenhut⁵, seems to be right when he

1 Probably enough, the passage Plaut. Amph. 212ff. *mutatis mutandis* presents us with an indirect proof of the old usage on the part of the Romans to appeal to their *virtus* as a propagandist means in diplomatic connections.

2 Thus also Meister 2; 4 and 5; cf. Eisenhut 34

3 Eisenhut 34

4 Van Omme 23

5 Eisenhut (34) interprets also the latter case to be 'Tapferkeit'.

suggests that *virtus Romana* means the 'military fame of the Roman people'. The impression is due to the verb *spoliari*. It does not presuppose a very abstract interpretation. The term 'valour' as such is not totally impossible, but it emphasizes the abstractness of *virtus* more than is appropriate in this connection. 'Military fame' is more concrete. Here, too, the principle that should be followed is that the textual meaning of a word and a concept, in particular, is not always self-evident but that the context is decisive.

Above I have given examples in which *virtus*, contrary to all expectations, approaches a collective meaning.¹ Inasmuch as it is possible to translate *virtus* in a collective meaning, the passage concerned and especially the verb *spoliari* enable the translation 'a Roman troop' (which was following the duel between the Gall and Manlius from the side). Thus it is a question of *abstractum pro concreto*, i.e. metonymy. If van Omme had been aware of the potentiality of *virtus* to approach a collective meaning he would not have left this instance half-interpreted. 'A troop' is even more concrete than 'military fame', but, to my mind, not too concrete, for in this case there are no differences of degree in concreteness. *Virtus* occurs in the fragments of Claudius Quadrigarius three times all told.

There are no occurrences of *virtus* in the fragments of the *Annals* by Cassius Hemina. Neither are there any occurrences in Fabius Pictor, Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus, C. Calpurnius Piso Censorius, C. Fannius, C. Sempronius Asellio, M. Aemilius Scaurus, or P. Rutilius Rufus, nor, in addition to the foregoing, in Valerius Antias, C. Licinius Macer, Q. Aelius Tubero, Procius, C. Sempronius Libo, and Annius Fictialis. *Virtus* occurs once in Cn. Gellius (ann.fr.1 Peter). Likewise, one occurrence has been retained in A. Cremutius Cordus (ann.fr.2 Peter), and it is about Cicero, *civis non solum magnitudine virtutum sed multitudine quoque conspiciendus*. As far as I can see, the plural *virtutes* does not occur here in a concrete meaning similar to Plautus' 'merits' or 'deeds of valour'. On the other hand, it means 'mental abilities', 'virtues', as Nepos conceives them. The *virtutes* of Cicero are therefore noteworthy both qualitatively (*magnitudine*) and quantitatively (*multitudine*). Strict-

1 Cf. above p.18f.

ly speaking, this is not Stoic ethics, since, according to it, possessing one moral virtue consequently involves possessing all the other moral virtues as well (Diog.Laert.7,125). There are two occurrences of *virtus* in both L. Cornelius Sisenna and C. Asinius Pollio.

The occurrences retained in dramatic literature bear indirect evidence of the gradual moralization of the conceptual content in the second century BC at the latest. This analogy explains the *virtutes* attributed to Cicero by A. Cremutius Cordus. The meaning is 'civic virtues' in an abstract sense rather than concrete 'merits'. There is a link between Cordus and Nepos. The meaning 'valour' is still as prevailing as in the military contexts of the earlier literature. It is notable that Claudius Quadrigarius has a passage where *virtus* approaches the collective meaning a 'Roman troop', which was present at the duel between the gigantic Gall and the famous T. Manlius Torquatus watching the fight. Further on, *virtus* occurs as the characterization of personages having a great influence on Roman history, for instance M. Manlius Capitolinus, the rescuer of the Capitol, the said T. Manlius Torquatus, and Valerius Corvinus, the military tribune who, like Torquatus, started a duel with a Gall and came off victorious in rather curious circumstances (Quadrig.fr. 12 Peter). Corvinus was aided not only by his *virtus* but also a raven (*corvus*) that had settled on his helmet. Supernatural powers auspiciously gave their support to the Roman *virtus*.

2.7. *Lucilius*

From the earlier times, an extensive reflection on the essence of *virtus* composed by Lucilius has been retained. What is unique in it is not its novelty¹ but its extension and content. As it has been pointed out in the foregoing, Plautus' praise of *virtus* (Amph.648ff.) idealizes military valour because it gives support and shelter to

¹ As is implied by Eisenhut (35); cf. Lind (240) "We must wait for Lucilius to define it."

the (Roman, by implication) community. So it is a praise of heroism at the same time. A victorious army, which has beaten off the attacks of the enemy, is apt to foster military spirit that was more typical of the early Roman community than the later phases of Roman history. *Virtus* still meant 'valour' in all the four cases. Lucilius gives his praise of *virtus* on essentially different grounds. *Virtus* occurs six times in the fragment (fr.1326ff. Marx). 'Valour' does not seem to be the meaning in any of these occurrences. If the verse 652 of *Amphitruo* (*virtus omnia in sese habet*) is forcibly separated from its context and compared with the content of Lucilius' definition of *virtus*, the parallelism is quite evident:

virtus, Albine, est, pretium persolvere verum
 quis in versamur, quis vivimus rebus, potesse;
virtus est, homini scire id quod quaeque habeat res,
virtus, scire homini rectum, utile quid sit, honestum,
 1330 quae bona, quae mala item, quid inutile, turpe, inhonestum,
virtus, quaerendae finem re scire modumque,
virtus, divitiis pretium persolvere posse,
virtus, id dare quod re ipsa debetur honori,
 hostem esse atque inimicum hominum morumque malorum,
 1335 contra defensorem hominum morumque bonorum,
 hos magni facere, his bene velle, his vivere amicum;
 commoda praeterea patriai prima putare,
 deinde parentum, tertia iam postremaque nostra.

Accordingly, *virtus* is knowledge (*virtus* *scire* 1328; *virtus*, *scire* 1329), and therefore, as far as it is a characteristic it is one in an intellectual-ethical sense. Thus the contrast with Plautus' Epid.106 and Ennius' Hect.lytr.200f. is quite evident. The last word in verse 1331 is *modus*. This expression ultimately comes from the Pythagorean thought that moral virtue is the golden mean between the extremities of vices (Arist.eth.Nic.1106 a14ff.).¹ Cicero speaks of the same thing, *omnis virtutes mediocritate quadam esse moderatas* (Mur.63). And so does Horace in his well-known verse (epist.1,18,9):

¹ Cf. Democr.fr.102 Diels ~ Kranz: καλὸν ἐν παντὶ τὸ ἴσον· ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

virtus est medium vitiorum et utrimque reductum. Thus the doctrine of the golden mean has become a convention of Roman philosophy.¹

Something very important seems to be missing in the list made up by Lucilius. It appears that it is not considered to be appropriate to the ideal man to worship gods.² A rationalistic tendency, then, is included in the fragment. Secondly, in the fragment there is no explicit mention of another important aspect of *virtus*, viz. military valour.³ The difference with Plautus' praise of *virtus* is obvious. Lucilius brings forward the ethical aspects, and, accordingly, *virtus* is knowledge of the right way of life. *Virtus* (anaphorally repeated six times) could be interpreted as virtue not referring to any particular virtue but to the moral perfection in its entirety (including all moral virtues). *Virtus* is composed of the indivisible entirety of all virtues. The Stoic σοφός-*sapiens* does not possess only one moral virtue but all of them (Diog.Laert.7,125; Cic.off. 2,35). Since virtue in its entirety is knowledge, individual virtues consist of knowledge that is appropriate to different aspects of human life.⁴ Chrysippus the Stoic had written a work on the differences between various virtues (Diog.Laert.7,102).

As far as the aspect of valour has been omitted at all, the omission is not probably due to chance. The explanation might be the fact that Lucilius considered that moral perfection has not very much to do with the efficiency necessary for a soldier. Another possibility is that Lucilius would not deal with moral perfection, i.e. the composite virtue ἀρετή-*virtus*, but practical wisdom (σοφία-*sapientia*), which is only a part, even though a significant one, of the composite virtue. If this holds true, Lucilius has not defined even courage (ἀνδρεία-*fortitudo*), which was given praise by Alcmena in Plautus. As a matter of fact, the same thing happened to Nicias in Plato's *Laches*. According to Nicias (Lach. 195a), ἀνδρεία is knowledge of what is to be feared both at war and in peace. Analogically, this would imply knowledge of the good

1 *Medio tutissimus ibis*, Daedalus advises Icarus, who is preparing for his flight, with these words (Ov.met.2,137).

2 Taylor 435

3 Eisenhut (36) pays attention to this circumstance but leaves it uncommented.

4 Ueberweg - Praechter 337

and evil, and, consequently, ἀνδρεία would not be a part of ἀρετή but the whole of it. On the other hand, it is only ἀρετή that should be the composite virtue (Plat. Protag. 329d). Anyway, ἀνδρεία in Lach. 195a does not primarily refer to efficiency but knowledge. The intellectualization of the concept is unquestionable (cf. Lach. 192e). In Lach. 194c-d; 196c, and 199b Nicias means that courage can be regarded as some kind of wisdom. Besides the spectacular courage at war, courage can also be shown in perils at sea, in illness and poverty, and in political life. One can show courage not only in enduring pain and facing fear but also in struggling against lust and desire by keeping still or fleeing from them (Lach. 191d). Thus Plato has characterized courage as a philosophical concept on the same lines as Democritus of Abdera.¹

As an intellectualized concept, courage hardly differs from practical wisdom.² According to the Stoic interpretation of Diogenes Laertius, courage (ἀνδρεία) is knowledge of what we should choose and be aware of, and what we should ignore (7,92). R.D. Hicks presumes in his translation of Diogenes Laertius that the author defines practical wisdom over again although his intention had been to deal with courage.

Lucilius had got acquainted with the thoughts of Panaetius in the Circle of Scipio Aemilianus (cf. Lact. inst. 6,5,2f.). These thoughts are the basis of the concept *humanitas*. This concept notices the enemy in man himself, and Lucilius includes in *virtus* a Graeco-Roman ethical consciousness as the guiding principle of practical life. As history had made the Romans accustomed to consider *virtus* manly capacity of performing necessary in military action, it would not have been plausible for Lucilius to write a reflection full of ethical consciousness and then explicitly state that *virtus* is manliness at war. At least Lucilius was rather reluctant to admit this although he knew quite well which characteristic had made Rome great (since Polybius, who was a member of the same circle, knew it, too). The Romans do not seem to be apt to include their military valour among the proper moral virtues. According to Livy,

1 Cf. above p.43

2 Xen. mem. 3,9,5: (Σωκράτης ἔφη) πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι

3 Hicks *ad locum*

Scipio Africanus made a clear distinction between his military ability (*virtus bellica*) and his moral qualities (*clementia, benignitas*) Scipio even claimed that the moral qualities he showed on the expedition to Spain had greater historical significance than his strategic skills (Liv.37,6,6).

Thus we come to the following conclusion: In military contexts *virtus* cannot, according to Lucilius, be considered to be an ethical quality. An apology of moral consciousness cannot very well contain the ethically neutral value of valour. Valour has correspondingly more value for the community at the times when it needs courageous mind and efficiency in order to beat off the attacks of the enemy.

The foregoing argumentation holds true only in the hypothetical case that Lucilius ignores valour. The problem should still be discussed from the opposite point of view.

According to Eisenhut, military valour is missing in the fragment of Lucilius both explicitly and implicitly.¹ Eisenhut is, after all, only partly right. Valour is explicitly missing, it is true, and this is something new in comparison to Plautus' praise of *virtus*. But implicitly military valour *is* present in verse 1337f. where Lucilius says about the Roman world of values that native country has the highest position in it, then are parents, and only after that "we". Above I have compared these verses to Cicero.² The last two verses in the fragment of Lucilius do not analogically differ from Cic.off.1,57f. at all. Roman heroism and patriotism were associated with each other, and they both presupposed military valour.³ Accordingly, valour is implicitly included in the fragment of Lucilius. My point of view is corroborated by the argumentation of Lactantius, who has written critical notes on the Lucilian verse 1337: "*commoda praeterea patriae prima putare*" *sublata hominum discordia nihil est omnino. Quae sunt enim patriae commodae nisi alterius civitatis aut gentis incommoda? Id est fines propagare aliis violenter ereptos, augere imperium, vectigalia facere maiora?* (inst.6,6, 19). And further on (23), *haec itaque ut ipsi appellant bona quisquis patriae adquisierit, hoc est qui eversis civitatibus gentibus-*

1 Eisenhut 36

2 Cf. p.27f.

3 Cf. p.115

que deletis aerarium pecunia referserit, agros ceperit, cives suos locupletiores fecerit, hic laudibus fertur in caelum, in hoc putatur summa et perfecta esse virtus. Lactantius sees negative undertones in the pagan *virtus* praised by Lucilius (cf. Aug.civ.19,25).

Linds quotes the whole fragment and interprets *virtus* with the term 'manliness'.¹ Lind does not state if he considers verse 1337f. an implicit reference to military valour. On the basis of what has been said in the foregoing, I am willing to accept this interpretation provided that the concept thus interpreted is highly intellectualized, in which case it would not appear to be a conceptually restricted word referring solely to capacity of performing. The intellectualized manliness is not a part of the ethical composite virtue but the entire composite virtue. Accordingly, manliness has relinquished the emphasis on capacity of performing and become to denote 'virtue'. The intellectualization (or the moralization) of the concept is not only due to the influence of the ἀρετή of Greek philosophy but also the increase of Roman responsibility and social consciousness among the Roman elite gathered in the Circle of Scipio Aemilianus, in other words, the change of the criterion of manliness.

Virtus is that which is good for man. The only criterion of an ethical value is the good for all people -not exclusively the Romans. The ethical norms outlined by Lucilius in the fragment are universal and thus applicable to all people. The definition of *virtus* would not be conceivable without the influence of Greek thought. It is not enough to say that Lucilius has interpreted virtue of Stoic philosophy rather than *virtus* as a value of the more or less Roman masses, viz. as valour. Especially the last verses of the fragment echo traditional Roman tones with their reference to military efficiency. Greek and Roman thought have intermingled in the fragment. Since *virtus* has already appeared as a rather curiously non-Roman concept in a few earlier occurrences, the fragment of Lucilius should not be overestimated as an evidence of the triumph of Greek thought in Rome.

1 Lind 240

2 Cf. van Omme 83.; Eisenhut 36f.; Büchner (1962:10) notices the first influence of Greek ἀρετή expressly in Lucilius.

The claim that valour should be excluded from *virtus* by Lucilius turned out to be unfounded. *Virtus*, to Lucilius, is not only manliness (valour) at war but it is *also* that. Military deeds of valour must still have been contained in the Roman criterion of manliness. The intellectualization of *virtus* is rather the dogmatization than the refutation of this condition. If *virtus* is interpreted as manliness in the fragment as Lind has done, it should be kept in mind that, at the same time, the intellectualized manliness is interpreted as the ethical composite concept. According to this logic, *virtus* in the meaning of the ethical composite concept in philosophical literature could be translated as manliness.

2.8. Publilius Syrus

It is interesting to study how Publilius Syrus, not being a Roman by birth, conceived *virtus*. The antithesis *fortuna - virtus*, found for the first time in Accius, occurs in the popular maxims of Publilius Syrus, too: *virtuti melius quam fortunae creditur* (711) As far as I can see, the passive voice in *creditur* indicates that the idea expressed in the aphorism was familiar to cultured people at the time of Publilius Syrus at the latest, i.e. in the first century BC. This explains the antitheses of *fortuna - virtus* so frequently occurring in Nepos and Sallust. It is not reasonable to depend on the capricious fortune, one has better trust in one's own strength (*virtus*). *Virtus*, which connotes mental potency, can be counted among the constant factors (Caes.civ.3,73,5), but *fortuna* belongs to the category of *dubia* (Tac.Germ.30). From the point of view of the conceptual content, *non novit virtus calamitati cedere* is essential. *Virtus* can sustain adversities², and therefore it is not to be lost (cf. Diog.Laert.6,12). This opinion is shared by the

1 In the works of Tacitus, *fortuna*, *fors* or *sors* may appear together with *virtus* bringing forth the expected result (ann.13,57; 12,29; hist.4,24). On the other hand, they can also thwart *virtus* (hist.4,21); cf. Haas 166; Feger 16. In Caesar (Gall.5,34,5) the unfavourable circumstances (*locus*) prevent the soldiers from displaying their valour.

2 Cf. Sen.prov.4,6: *calamitas virtutis occasio est*. In another passage of *De providentia* (2,4) it reads, *marcet sine adversario virtus*. Cf. Tac.hist.4,2

Stoics, excepting Chrysippus (Diog.Laert.7,127), who thinks that inebriation and melancholy could efface virtue. In passage 447 of Publilius Syrus, the tone of *virtus* is most aptly characterized as 'self-confidence'.

A very typical Roman idea is concealed in the statement *quidquid fit cum virtute fit cum gloria* (590). Glory (*gloria*) is not to be separated from the quality that it arises from. If *virtus* is given objective appreciation -with or without a conscious attempt on the part of the Roman citizen-farmer- the Romans must have conceived the quality as a man's contribution to the community. A similar idea was already contained in *Tarentilla* of Naevius and *Amphitruo* of Plautus. Efficiency irrespective of all kinds of moral considerations, as in the case of *Hectoris lytra*, can no longer be contained in the expression *supplicem hominem opprimere virtus non est sed crudelitas* (690).¹ It is not necessarily a matter of military context. The expression emphasizes moral worthiness, and *virtus* refers to morally acceptable behaviour. Thus *virtus* is an intellectual-moral quality inasmuch as it is knowledge of the right way to treat a suppliant. The concept implies moral perfection in various matters in a way quite similar to Lucilius in Publ.S.723, *virtuti amorem nemo honeste denegat*. The expression appears to be a philosophical convention. The pair *virtus - amor* is not an antithesis but parallelism.

While *gloria* appears together with *virtus* in 590, which has been dealt with above, in another passage (304) *fama* is connected with *virtus*: *iacet omnis virtus, fama nisi late patet*. This kind of *virtus* is first of all heroic. The idea of glory and fame meant a value as such, without complexes, to the Romans. U. Knoche² points out that fame and glory were not, after all, virtues as such for the Romans, for their value was purely practical.³ *Fama* and *gloria* are consequences of *virtus*. The straightforward pursuit of glory and fame was an inseparable part of the Roman world of values. In order to achieve the greatest practical profit possible one had to strive for

1 Cf. Cic.rep.3,30: *iustitia est hominem non occidere*. Accordingly, Publilius Syrus has *virtus* where Cicero has *iustitia*.

2 Knoche 1934:102ff.

3 Cf. Christ 147f.

remarkable deeds as consistently and effectively as possible.¹ *Vir-*
tus could be attributed to a person as an indication of the objec-
tive appreciation brought about by his individual excellence or by
a conspicuous share in the excellent deeds of a collective.²

In connection with Plautus I have already quoted Publ.S.159,
where *virtus* means the 'valour' and 'capacity of performing' of the
soldiers.³ Besides, the passage disclosed the fact that soldiers
cannot display valour without a strategically skilled commander.
Virtus is the offshoot of *consilium*. Further on, the meaning 'val-
our' occurs in the statements *non turpis est cicatrix, quam virtus*
parit (433)⁴ and *virtutis vultus partem habet victoriae* (717). Both
of these statements are characteristic of military context. On the
other hand, 'courageous mind' is more appropriate in 43 because of
the antithesis *virtus - timor: audendo virtus crescit, tardando ti-*
mor. Here some comparison can be made with Aristotle. In *eth.Nic.*
1103 a14ff. Aristotle argues that there are two kinds of virtue
(ἀρετή), intellectual (διανοητική) on the one hand and moral (ἠθική)
on the other.⁵ Intellectual virtue is mainly grounded on education
and thus enriched it grows constantly craving time and experience.
Moral virtue comes from habit and custom (cf. *Cic.Acad.1,38*), and
it is evident that none of the moral virtues is innate.⁶ According
to Aristotle (*eth.Nic.1103 a14ff.*), we have to learn the functions

1 Verg.ecl.4,26f.; Suet.Aug.29,2; Cass.Dio 55,10,3f.; see above p.

2 Circumstances do not change only human nature but also the attitude
towards it. Glory and fame as the publicly announced goals of a per-
son's actions would in some respects reveal pathological traits of
character in the late 20th century.

3 Cf. above p.293

4 The parallelism *cicatrix - virtus* also occurs in *Cic.Rab.Post.36*,
where the same idea is purported.

5 Sometimes this division appears forced, for, a little further on
in the same work (1105 a30), Aristotle defines moral virtue as state
of mind (ἔξις, *habitus*), by means of which one chooses that which is
good, and rejects that which is bad. It is hard to think of a moral
virtue that would not be intellectual at the same time, and vice versa.
Yet there this a certain kind of division: Corruption is generally
regarded as moral rather than intellectual degeneration.

6 This is what Democritus means in fr.242 Diels - Kranz. On the other
hand, it could be claimed that moral virtue cannot be credibly ex-
plained without natural bent. In his work *Civitas Solis* Campanella,
the Renaissance philosopher, describes his utopia which he has created
on the basis of Plato's model. According to the citizens of the State
of the Sun (or Campanella), moral virtue can hardly develop without
natural bent (62). Thus moral virtue is the result of the development
determined by custom and habit as well as natural bent.

that are the basis of our action, and it is through action that we learn them. For instance, through building we become builders, and through playing the flute flutists. Likewise, through righteous deeds we become righteous, through moderate deeds we become moderate, through courageous deeds we become courageous: οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι (1103 a30ff.). Aristotle conceives ἀνδρεῖα as moral virtue for which the conception of time is as indispensable as it is for intellectual virtue. Moral virtue is to be learnt through displaying it. The statement of Publilius Syrus *audendo virtus crescit* is closely related with the foregoing thought of Aristotle that we become courageous through courageous deeds.¹

On the other hand, it is said (728), *virtutis omnis impedimentum est timor*. The antithesis is the same as in the previous case, and thus *virtus* means 'courageous mind' in this case, too. Occasionally *virtus* is limited to the psychological component.

In accordance with Lucilius, Publilius Syrus made attempt to define the essence of the concept of *virtus*. This is indicated, among other things, by the frequent use of nominative.² The conceptual content of *virtus* is not transcendental, for it is connected with perfectly practical values of life such as *consilium* (159), *felicitas* (227), *fama* (304), *gloria* (590), *labor*, i.e. 'hard work' (716), and *victoria* (717). A scar that a soldier has received while displaying valour is not a sign of disgrace but honour (433). This certainly reflects the characteristic values of a militarist community (Roman, by implication). Antitheses such as *timor* (43 and 728), *crudelitas* (690), and *fortuna* (711) play an important part in the definition of the conceptual content of *virtus*. Thus *virtus* means 'courage' in the hour of danger provided that there are good reasons for fear. This kind of courage can be displayed in all kinds of human activities, not only at war. A conception of courage like this is highly intellectualized on the lines of Democritus and Plato. On the account of the division of moral and intellectual virtue defined by Aristotle; the conception of courage presented by Publilius Syrus

1 Of course, I do not mean that Publilius Syrus could not have had this opinion without reading a single line of Aristotle.
2 43; 159; 227; 304; 433; 447; and 690

could be called moral in the Aristotelian terms. Secondly, *virtus* is mercy showed to supplicants. Further on, *virtus* implies self-determination in man's pursuits in general (rather as opposed to fortune than the support and aid of others) *Virtus* therefore means 'courage' in all kinds of danger where one has to decide on one's attitude to those at peril, and, ultimately, it connotes self-determination.

The extant passage of Naevius' *Tarentilla* (com.92f. Ribbeck) and certain plays of Plautus bear indirect evidence of the fact that *virtus* contained moral undertones at quite an early stage. *Virtus* was an expression of a certain standard of conduct which was obeyed by the Romans as well at home as at war. Within these limits the Romans conceived *virtus* as capacity of performing, manly potency. At war it was displayed as valour in defending the *res publica* against its enemies and participating in military actions for its expansion, in peace it implied the ability of the farmer-warrior to sustain hard manual work constantly on the alert for the changes of the weather and -as Ferguson has put it- bandits and beasts. The Romans demanded that their paragons should be excellent warriors. The position of honour in the tradition was not given to legislators like Solon but to successful military commanders. According to Cicero (Rosc.Amer.50f.) and Livy (3,26,7f.), an excellent commander was never admitted of loosening the Old Roman bonds to the soil and farming.³ The Romans were both warriors and farmers. According to Seneca (ep. ad Lucil.51,10), the hands that can hold a weapon and a plough equally well can bear any kind of strain. The *ager Romanus* they ploughed with their ploughs had been taken by sword. Plough and sword can be regarded as the symbol of the Roman way of life as far as the early Republican life idealized by the retrospective moralist is concerned (Liv.3,26,7f.).

At the early stages of the militarist community *virtus* indubitably characterized the heroic capacity of performing of a rough and unsympathetic man of power without further implications. But as the community evolved, the moral undertones of the conceptual

1 Ferguson 175

2 Crawley 29

3 A similar idea is found also in *De re publica*. Scipio (Cicero) implies (2,4 and 2,7) that any state aiming at or willing to maintain political significance should adhere to the *agrorum et armorum cultus*. Disastrous as it proved to be, Carthage and Corinth had abandoned this bond to farming and warfare (rep.2,7).

content of *virtus* became more evident. All this served to pave way for Lucilius. He conceived *virtus* principally as moral perfection to the extent that he, imbued with Stoic principles as he was, considered it to be necessary to the contemporary Roman community or at least to his own literary circle. Military valour is only one, although still important, aspect of *virtus*. The *virtus* displayed at war is by no means the whole *virtus*. Publilius Syrus is the first author to use the concept consistently and doctrinally as a politico-social value. This usage had already been anticipated by Naevius, as I have pointed out above.¹ After Lucilius it would have been unexpected if Publilius Syrus had ignored the moral and intellectual undertones of the conceptual content which have such a dominant position in Lucilius' fragment of *virtus*. Publilius Syrus did not fail to make heed of that. His deliberations of the conception are as full of moral consciousness as the fragment of Lucilius. It is difficult not to draw the conclusion that Publilius Syrus has given the concept an essential part of the content it had in the cultural consciousness of his contemporaries. In the positive case, the ideal of his time would have been a courageous, valiant human being having a strong confidence in his own power and an incipient moral consciousness. A human being like that -or in the exceptionally male oriented culture of Rome- such a man would have been an offshoot of quite different education than Cato the Censor with his manly austerity.²

The conception of *virtus* presented by Publilius Syrus is essentially Roman. The conceptual content does not seem to differ noticeably from Lucilius, who contained in *virtus* conceptions characteristic of the Roman-Stoic circle around Scipio Aemilianus.

2.9. Lucretius

Virtus does not belong to the central vocabulary of Lucretius the Epicurean, for, with regard to his relatively extensive literary production, it occurs only six times.³ The paucity of the occurrences

1 Cf. p. 26f.

2 Wine, to be sure, has somewhat mollified Cato's otherwise too austere manliness, Horace (carm. 3, 21, 11f.) thought it fit to remark.

3 Paulson s.v.

and the lack of conceptual cogency are due to the fact that Lucretius dogmatically followed the doctrine of his school and considered courage as such unattractive (cf. Epicurea 317 Usener; Diog.Laert.10,20).¹ In accordance with his master, Epicurus, Lucretius did not feel sympathy towards the joys of battle but preferred the serenity of civilian life.² Secondly, Lucretius did not deal with the Epicurean philosophy of morals, which, according to Oates, explains the relatively small popularity his poem received in Rome. For these reasons it does not seem plausible that Lucretius should have made an attempt to use *virtus* as the counterpart of the Epicurean ἀρετή, which tended towards ἡδονή (Diog.Laert.10,132; Cic.Acad.2,138f.).⁴ On account of this, no explicit praise of *virtus* can be expected from Lucretius.

Lucretius describes primitive people, who had no proper weapons but, however, had to make their living by hunting wild animals, *et manuum mira virtute pedumque / consecrabantur silvestria saecula ferarum* (5,966f.). The virtue of those people was the *virtus* of their hands and feet, a vital quality to the members of a primitive community. Here *virtus* means 'strength', 'capacity of performing' (*vis*), and close parallels to it are ποδῶν ἀρετή in Iliad (20,411) and *virtus ulnorum* of Plautus (Asin.545ff.). Accordingly, *virtus manuum pedumque* could be interpreted as excellent appropriateness in the Darwinian sense. I regard the expression in itself as a conventional extension of context, and therefore it is no use looking for a Greek model. In addition to *virtus ulnorum*, another Latin parallel can be found in the extant fragment of Ennius' tragedy *Hectoris lytra*, which I have dealt with in the foregoing. Eisenhut has a different inter-

1 In Epicurea 317 Usener, the reverse side of courage is illustrated in terms of sociology, as it were: "Courage is a thing enslaved to fashions, and to the blame of men, and shaped by foreign opinion and notions." Cf. Lucr.5,113f. It is in conformity with certain role expectations that courage is displayed. Consequently, courage is supposed to be incompatible with extreme individualism.

2 Rogers 88

3 Oates xix

4 In the Epicurean terminology of ethics ἡδονή is both a means and an aim (Diog.Laert.10,132). It is the fundamental concept of ethics, whereas ἀρετή is only a derivative (cf. Cic.fin.1,42). It is a means, but not an aim at the same time (Diog.Laert.10,138). The Stoics had an opposite view: for them ἀρετή was both a means and an aim at the same time (Stoic.vet.frr.3,107 Arnim; Diog.Laert.7,97; Cic.fin.3,32; Stob.ecl.3,208).

pretation.¹ According to him, before Ovid *virtus* never meant 'sheer strength' ('blosse Kraft'), for 'strength' could only be discerned as a part of 'valour' and 'excellence' ("..sondern nur hinter Tüchtigkeit' und 'Tapferkeit' sichtbar werden konnte"). This view is open to critical remarks.²

As far as I can see, 'military valour' occurs only once (2,642), and in that case it is a question of the parallelism *patria (terra) virtus* in the same way as in the occurrence of Naevius' *Tarentilla: ac virtute velint patriam defendere terram*. Here *virtus* as a patriotic value does not refer directly to the willingness of the contemporaries of Lucretius to defend the *res publica* against its enemies. On the other hand, it refers to the conception that common origin and destiny are apt to make the members of any community valiant -in the Epicurean sense of Lucretius "violent"- in defending their own conditions of life. *Virtus* is the offshoot of the historical experiences of a community or a tribe.

An Epicurean sage does not covet fame (Lucr.3,59). This is the point where Lucretius can be contrasted with Cicero. According to Cicero, it is *virtus* that day and night incites honest citizens to aspire at honour and glory (Arch.29). But Lucretius, on the basis of his consequent Epicureanism, has *avarities* and *honorum caeca cupido* (3,63f.) where Cicero has *virtus*! Moreover, as it also reads in Lucretius (3,63f.), *avaritia* and *honorum caeca cupido*, these sores of life (*vulnera vitae*) are fed by fear of death (*mortis formido*). What about *virtus*? It would seem that *virtus* is placed among what Lucretius calls the *vulnera vitae* -granted that *virtus* is interpreted in terms of political ambition. On the other hand, Lucretius thought more highly of *virtus* as an inward -politically quietistic-quality. This is indicated by the following instance.

'Courage', 'fearlessness' is a characteristic that Lucretius saw incarnated in Epicurus (1,68f.), *quem neque fama deum nec fulmina nec minitanti / murmure compressit caelum, sed eo magis acrem / inritat animi virtutem*³... According to this, Epicurus fears neither gods nor natural phenomena. This shows his *virtus* (cf. Cic.fin.1,49) The *virtus* that Lucretius attributes to Epicurus contains knowledge

1 Eisenhut 110 and 222

2 See the chapter dealing with Ovid

3 The pleonastic *animi virtus* also occurs in Decimus Laberius (com. 121 Ribbeck), discussed above p.47f.

of the fact that all entities have their natural reasons. This kind of intellectualized conception of courage is connected with natural science, which aims at the liberation of man from the horrors of superstition. The tradition has it that Epicurus also displayed exemplary courage and firmness of mind in his attitude to the severe illness that emaciated him and deprived him of his life in the end.¹ It is through courage that an Epicurean overcomes his fear and pain (cf. Cic.fin.1,49).

Primitive people need the *virtus* of their hands and feet in the mutual struggle of species. Towards the end of the fifth book, in the history of mankind, which is to an equal extent inescapable decadence as it is advance, Lucretius mentions *virtus* twice more (858 and 863) *Virtus* is a quality characteristic of lions ('courage') in the same way as *dolus* ('slyness') of foxes and *fuga* ('fleetness') of deer. In the struggle for existence lions have survived through courage, foxes through slyness, and deer through fleetness. Lucretius introduces a new practice by attributing *virtus* to a wild animal.

Lucretius did not include any noteworthy intrinsic value into the concept. To him, *virtus* is not valuable for its own sake, but on account of its instrumental value. Lucretius seems not to have regarded *virtus* as the heroic-patriotic Roman virtue on the lines of Cic.Mur.22 and Phil.4,13. On the contrary, he, as the Epicureans in general, had obvious antipatriotic tendencies.²

Virtus may have had some value to Lucretius himself -as an individual mental quality as it is expressed in the praise of Epicurus. It is in accordance with the individual and quietistic interests that *virtus* is displayed. By no means was *virtus* all in all to Lucretius. As we come to Catullus, the value of the meaning of *virtus* appears to be on a decline.

2.10. Catullus

Catullus is noteworthy in two respects. Firstly, the plural occurs in his poems more frequently than the singular.³ There is only

1 Cf. Cic.fam.7,26; fin.2,96; Sen.ep.66,47; 92,25

2 The non-Roman qualities of Lucretius will be more closely commented in connection with Horace.

3 The plural instances are 64,51; 64,323; 64,348; 64,357; 68,90.

one singular (64,218f.) to match these five plurals. Exceptional is also the ambivalent intrinsic value which he, contrary to the previous usage except Plautus, Ennius (?), and Lucretius, includes in the concept.

In 64,218f. Aegeus says to Theseus, who is about to leave for Crete, *quandoquidem fortuna mea* ('adversity', 'misfortune') *ac tua fervida virtus* ('manliness') / *eripit invito mihi te*. The latter part of the parallelism *fortuna - virtus* indicates Theseus' fervent manly respect, which necessarily makes him seek hazards. Thus Catullus discerns a negative aspect in *virtus*. In 68,90 it is said, *Troia virum et virtutum omnium acerba cinis*. In this case, the negative flavour of *virtus* is due to the predicative with its attribute.

All the instances of plural can be translated as 'deeds of valour', and therefore it can be stated that Catullus uses the plural *virtutes* essentially in the same way as Plautus nearly one century and a half before him. To Catullus -unlike Cornelius Nepos- *virtutes* do not show any mental abilities. This is undoubtedly quite intentional. Poem 64 deserves a closer examination for two different reasons. Firstly, *virtus* occurs in it four times. Secondly, the poem, although describing the heroic age, does not present valorous deeds as adorable but questionable.¹ The theme of the poem was meant to be a hymeneal for Peleus and Thetis, but actually it is the tragic love affair of Theseus and Ariadne that takes the dominant part of the poem. Knopp has pointed out that it is not a question of the thematic pair *amores - virtutes* but the conflict between the two. The story of Theseus and Ariadne forms the central part of the poem. Therefore it illustrates the conflict threatening the marriage of Peleus and Thetis in an excellent manner. Catullus moves back and forth in time juxtaposing past, present and future events. He alternates in telling of Theseus' great deeds of valour (*magnae virtutes*) and the contradictory emotions these deeds elicit in Ariadne.⁴ The suffering Ariadne receives more sympathy than the valiant Theseus. Catullus indubitably identifies with

1 Curran 171f.; Knopp 207

2 Murley 305f.

3 Knopp 207f.

4 Knopp 207

Ariadne on account of his relation with Lesbia. When Lesbia makes conquests (*virtutes*) in the world of men, Catullus is at a loss.¹ Accordingly, Ariadne becomes Catullus, and Theseus becomes Lesbia. At the beginning of the episode it is said, *haec vestis priscis hominum variata figuris / heroum mira virtutes indicat arte* (50f.) The cloth is embroidered with male figures depicting *virtutes* of the past. Theseus has a passion for valorous deeds, and therefore he departs from Ariadne *immemor* (58). To Theseus, *amores* are surpassed in importance by *virtutes*, the accomplishment of which would make him similar to his exemplary heroes. This illustrates the typical Roman idea of the traditional heroes inspiring individual attainments.²

On account of the foregoing it is evident that between heroism and love affairs there exists an antagonism, which is conceived as unsolved by Catullus. He does not say anything about objective appreciation and fame granted to deeds of valour, which ultimately restored the mental balance of the doubtful Alcmena in Plautus' *Amphitruo*: Heroism and love relations are not contradictory provided that the heroism is accompanied with fame. Fame gives glory to the one party and delight to the other. That is not where Catullus shows originality in his dealing with the relation between *amores* and *virtutes*. What is original is in the first place the version of the theme and the conclusion Catullus comes to. Plautus and Catullus have one thing in common. They both set the relation *virtus* - *amor* into the world of myths. In this respect Catullus followed Plautus.

In the conclusion of his short discussion on Catullus, Eisenhut³ states: "Catullus Verwendung von *virtus* bleibt völlig in der römischen Tradition". What I have said above shows that Eisenhut's conclusion is not unambiguously correct. Ultimately, only the meaning of the word *virtus* (*virtutes*) is in accordance with the tradition, but not the dominance of the plural in the occurrences and the ambivalent intrinsic value the concept receives: *Virtus* is an unquestionable aid in overthrowing the unjust tyrant (Minos), but it may turn out to be disastrous to the mutual relationship of two people.

1 Cf. Harkins 102ff. and Daniels 49ff.

2 Cf. above p.24f.

3 Eisenhut 44

2.11. Caesar

Due to the general characteristics of *Corpus Caesarianum*, *virtus* mostly means either the 'valour' of soldiers or the 'ability' of a commander of leading his troops.¹ The related concept *fortitudo* appears only once (Gall.1,2,5)², whereas *audacia* occurs quite frequently.³ The continuator of Caesar's work (Afr.72,4) attributes *virtus* to war elephants, and the meaning is their 'capacity of performing' in battle and their 'strength': *quo et miles noster speciemque et virtutem bestiae cognosceret*. The Roman soldiers were not acquainted with the *species* and *virtus* of the animal because they had not had much to do with elephants before.

According to Eisenhut⁴ *virtus* is not attributed to an animal elsewhere in the Republican literature. Eisenhut has overlooked another occurrence and is therefore only partly right: Afr.72,4 is the first occurrence where *virtus* is attributed to a *domesticated* animal. As it has been pointed out above⁵, Lucretius (5,858 and 863) uses *virtus* in indicating the courage characteristic of a *wild* lion. Lucretius introduces a new practice in attributing *virtus* to a wild

1 Meusel s.v.

2 Similarly also in Livy (41,4,1), Velleius Paterculus (2,18,3), and Frontinus (strat.1,11,3)

3 *Audacia* has a neutral intrinsic value, and it can receive a positive meaning in certain contexts, e.g. civ.3,104,2, *Achillam, singulari hominem audacia*, or 3,26,1, *illi (milites) adhibita audacia et virtute naves solvunt*, and Afr.19,4, *audacia inflammatus Labienus* (further on, Gall.7,5,1). In the parallelism *audacia* - *virtus* the words do not differ essentially from each other in their semantic content. Therefore, in order to avoid repetition, the pair could be interpreted with the expression 'courage' (*audacia*) and 'valour' (*virtus*). *Audacia* occurs in a negative meaning in e.g. Sall. Cat.3,3 and 52,11, and without exception, as it seems to me, in Cicero (e.g. in his speeches against Catiline). In Cic. Vat.23 there is a mention of the *audacia* of Saturninus, a vehement opponent of the Senate and the tribune of the years 103 and 100 BC. In the same passage Cicero attributes *ferocitas* to the Gracchi. In addition, *audacia* occurs e.g. in Cluent.15 (a woman); 23; 26; 27; 29; and 32. In Phil.2,44 and 3,13 Cicero attributes *audacia* to M. Antony, whom he is addressing. In Phil.8,21 M. Antony is attributed, besides *audacia*, also *scelus*. In the first book of the said invective (13), the two Bruti are attributed, typically enough, not *audacia* but *virtus*. To Cicero, the Bruti were the champions of freedom, M. Antony its enemy. Concerning *audacia*, further cf. Weische 66f.

4 Eisenhut 44

5 Cf. p.67

animal, the continuator of Caesar's work does the same thing in the case of a domesticated animal. If the distinction between a wild animal and a domesticated one is regarded as unessential¹, it was Lucretius who introduced the practice.

When dealing with Caesar, Eisenhut erroneously mentions again that, before Cicero, *virtus* could not be attributed to a woman because of the still obvious connection with the root-word *vir* in the Roman consciousness of the concept. Yet the connection with *vir* could not dominate the Roman consciousness of *virtus* at the time of Caesar to such an extent as Eisenhut reckons.² The connection was not dominant even for Plautus one century and a half before. On account of this, the etymological connection had lost its restrictive power over the extension of meaning (oxymora) at so early a stage that there are no literary sources retained.

In addition to what Eisenhut has said about *virtus* in *Corpus Caesarianum*, the following viewpoints could be considered. The continuator of Caesar's work regards the Roman soldiers as superbly valiant to such an extent that the populous enemy would not been able to muster in men comparable to the Romans out of its numerous masses (Alex.16,5), *neque electi ad virtutem e tanta multitudine viri virtuti nostrorum possent adaequare*. Besides 'valour', both occurrences of *virtus* could be interpreted as meaning 'troops'. This concrete and collective transitional meaning has a positive intrinsic value as far as the word is not forcibly separated from its context. In addition, *virtus* approaches the collective meaning in civ.1,58,2, where Caesar writes that the Massilians *ad virtutem montanorum confugiebant*. At the time of Caesar valour had the place of honour in the Roman sphere of values, which is shown in Gall.7, 47,3, *nihil adeo arduum sibi existimabant (milites), quod non virtute consequi possent*. *Virtus* clears all obstacles out of its way (similarly e.g. Cic.Har.resp.49). A little further on (7,50,1) there occurs a commonplace analysis typical of a military context,

1 In a sense, it is *not* unessential. Tacitus implies that the intimate connection between *virtus* and *libertas* is applicable even to a wild ('free') animal, *etiam fera animalia, si clausa teneas, virtutis obliviscuntur* (hist.4,64,2). This application can be explained in terms of Tacitus' retrospective conception of history with its political allusions.

2 Eisenhut 44 *et passim*; cf. above p.33f.

hostes loco et numero, nostri virtute confiderent. The opponents of *virtus* are *locus* and *numerus*, and thus the expression is antithetic.

As far as soldiers are concerned, *virtus* in them is the result of training in the use of arms (Gall.1,39,1). Therefore it tends to be attributed to experienced veterans.¹ *Virtus* must be displayed all the time², *Helvetii .. reliquos Gallos virtute praecedunt, quod fere cotidianis proeliis cum Germanos contendunt*, Caesar writes at the beginning of the first book of *De bello Gallico* (1,4). There immediately follow four occurrences³ which could be interpreted as propaganda on the part of the Helvetians emphasizing the political significance and inexhaustible war potential of that tribe. E.g. 2,2f., *perfacile esse, cum virtute (Helvetii) omnibus praestarent* (including the Romans), *totius Galliae imperio potiri* (the opinion of Orgetorix). A militant tribe surpassing the others in *virtus* is consequently capable of and aims at territorial conquests. *Virtus* is the cornerstone of the national existence and historical consciousness characteristic of it. The idea of *virtus* as the characteristic of a militaristic nation conscious of its strength is nothing new, for it was already present in Plautus' *Amphitruo* (212ff.).⁴ The *virtus* of the Germans for its part refers to their fierce manliness, since war and peace were not essentially different to them, *cum vellet, congregederetur: intellecturum quid invicti Germani, exercitatis-simi in armis, qui inter annos XIII tectum non subissent, virtute possent* (Gall.1,36,7). Thus *virtus* is shown as the fervent valour of the invincible Germans, who were well trained in the use of arms and did not make any essential difference between war and peace.⁵

Besides the Helvetians and the Germans, Caesar attributes *virtus* to other noteworthy enemies such as the Boii (Gall.1,28,5), the Haeduanus (Gall.1,31,7), the Bellovaci (Gall.2,4,4; 7,59,5), the Treveri (Gall.2,24,4), and the Nervii. The last-named are characterized by Caesar in the second book (15,4ff.) of the *Bello Gallico*: *numquam esse aditum ad eos (Nervos) mercatoribus; nihil pati vini reliquarum-que rerum ad luxuriam pertinentium inferri* (cf. Tac.Germ.17), *quod his rebus relanguescere animos eorum virtutemque remitti existimarent*

1 E.g. Afr.81,1; 81,2; 84,1; Hirt.8,2f.

2 In the same way as ἀρετῇ according to Cleanthes and his followers (Diog.Laert.7,128)

3 2,2f.; 13,3; 13,5; and 13,6f.

4 Cf. above p.30f.

5 Similarly Tac.Germ.13; 22; and 31

6 Gall.1,36,7 (quoted above); 39,1; 40,8

(*Nervii*); *esse homines (Nervos) feros magnaeque virtutis; increpitare atque incusare reliquos Belgas, qui se populo Romano dedidissent patriamque virtutem proiecissent*. The passage offers some interesting viewpoints concerning the conceptual content of *virtus*. The *Nervii* believe that wine and other luxuries are apt to enervate their bellicose disposition (*animi*), and consequently also their manly ability to perform (*virtus*); therefore they do not admit merchants into their country (cf. Gall.4,2,6). Caesar obviously wished for the same kind of disposition in the Romans, reminding (Gall.7,77,5), *animi est ista mollitia, non virtus, paulisper inopiam ferre non posse*. It is a question of an impressive antithesis *animi mollitia - virtus*. As opposed to 'enervation', *virtus* means 'virile perseverance', 'firmness of mind' in soldiers.

According to the conception of *virtus* proposed by the *Nervii*, or the *Nervii* as Caesar conceived them, there cannot exist manliness without political freedom. The idea is a commonplace in ancient literature.¹ In conformity with Caesar, Tacitus (Agr.11) says about the Gauls that at the same time as they lost their manliness, they also lost their freedom.² Just like Caesar, Tacitus also thought that *virtus* could be lost. In ann.15,16 the Roman soldiers lose their *virtus* in the battle against the Vologesi. Aristotle (polit.1334a) explains that most military states are safe as long as they are at war but are destroyed once they have expanded to empires. At the time of peace they lose their manliness and fighting spirit. Catullus, a contemporary of Caesar, says the same thing (51a,3f.), *otium et reges prius et beatas / perdidit urbes*. Leisure (*otium*) is antithetical to *virtus* (cf. Tac.Germ.14).³ Tacitus (Germ.36) characterizes *otium* with the expression *nimia ac marcens diu pax*. According to Tacitus (ann.4,67), the misfortune of Tiberius was due to his secret debauchery and corrupting slothfulness on Capri. Velleius Paterculus (2,1,1f.) implies that the same thing happened to the whole Roman Republic after the conquest of Carthage, *in somnum a vigiliis, ab armis ad voluptates, a negotiis in otium conversa ci-*

1 Cf. Thuc.2,43; Tac.Germ.30; cf. above p.20f.

2 Cf. Pekkanen 73f.

3 *Virtuti damnosa quies* reads the illustration of Arator, the medieval poet (45,31 Raby).

vitae (cf. Sall.Cat.6,1ff.). *Vigiliae*, *arma*, and *negotia* belong to *virtus*, whereas *somnum*, *voluptates*, and *otium* are antithetical to *virtus*. In antiquity life and history were conceived in the light of the antithesis activity - inactivity. In accordance with his pragmatic conception of history, Polybius frequently advises political authorities. According to him (11,25,6f.), there is a rule that applies to armies, πόλεις, and communities in general. They should never be kept in a state of passivity and inactivity, and especially not in periods of wealth and abundance.¹ All this illustrates the conception of *virtus* of the Nervii.

The loss of freedom leads to the loss of manliness. *Patria virtus* refers to the manliness of the previous generations of the other Belgians, for the previous generations were free, the present one submitted to the Romans. The Nervii deny the *virtus* of the other Belgians than themselves. As *virtus* is attributed to the Belgians in the eighth book of *De bello Gallico* (Hirt.8,54,5), it does not mean that they were valiant as an independent tribe but as a part of the Roman troops safeguarding Gaul, which had already been conquered but was still in a state of turmoil. In addition, *virtus* is attributed to the Aduatuci (Gall.2,31,4), the Albici (civ.1,57,3), and the Massilians (civ.2, 6,1), and also to the two hundred Massilians who fought in the Civil War against Caesar on Pompey's side (civ.3,4,3f.). The marines do not lack *virtus*, at least as far as the Romans (Gall.5,8,4) and the Rhodians (Alex.10,5f.) are concerned.²

In the sixth book of *De bello Gallico*, in a passage describing the Druids (14,5), Caesar writes, *in primis hoc volunt persuadere non interire animas, sed ab aliis post mortem transire ad alios, atque hoc maxime* ("expressly this belief") *ad virtutem excitari putant metu mortis neglecto*. The belief in metempsychosis relieves the Druids of mortal fear and thus lays the firm foundation of courage in their *Weltansicht*, so to speak. According to Diogenes Laertius (1,6), the Druids and the Gymnosophists (i.e. the fakirs) exercised their abilities in philosophical deliberation by solving riddles, and demanded

1 For that reason Alcibiades insists on the Sicilian expedition by the Athenians (Thuc.6,18).

2 Cicero (Manil.54) says that the fame of the Rhodians as a remarkable maritime power has been retained until his time.

veneration of gods, abstinence from injustice, and displaying courage among themselves. Courage (*virtus*) was the principal foundation of the Druidic philosophy of life.

Besides the whole Roman army, *virtus* can be attributed to a part of it, as in the case of the tenth legion in the Helvetian War: *huic Caesar legioni indulserat praecipue et propter virtutem confidebat maxime* (Gall.1,40,15). Accordingly, a legion is reliable if it has *virtus*. In addition, this quality is attributed to the cavalry (Gall.2,27,2) as well as to the centurions and the tribunes (Gall.5,52,4). Among the Roman officers *virtus* is attributed, besides the commander (i.e. Caesar himself in Hisp.17,2), not only to Legate C. Valerius Procillus (Gall.1,40,4f.) and Military Tribune C. Volusenus (Gall.5,44,1), as well as Centurions T. Pullo (Gall.5,44,1) and L. Vorenus (Gall.5,44,3; 44,13), but also to Q. Cicero, the brother of the Consul of the year 63 BC (Gall.5,52,4).

Thus Caesar attributes *virtus* to collectives of various sizes. The attribute *virtus* is also frequently used to characterize distinguished officers. First of all, it is a Roman characteristic.

In Gall.7,6,1 there occurs a conventional expression similar to those in Plautus, *his rebus in Italiam Caesari nuntiatis, cum iam ille urbanas res virtute Cn. Pompei* ("by virtue of Cn. Pompei") *commodiorem in statum pervenisse intellegebat*.

Among the few extant verses by Caesar there occurs quite a curious expression, *comica virtus* (fr.4,1 Klotz), which connotes the impressiveness of a comedy, in other words, the qualities that contribute to making a comedy into a good one.² It is difficult to conceive on what arguments Ogilvie³ bases his claim that it is expressly this instance (or Afr.72,4; discussed above) that first shows the influence of ἀρετή as the model. If *comica virtus* cannot be understood without ἀρετή as the model, how, then, the *virtus* of L. Ambivius Turpio, the actor presented by Terence in the prologue of *Phormio*, *quem actoris virtus nobis restituit locum* (33) is to be understood? Ambivius had contributed to Terence's regaining the favour of the public by his acting.⁴ On account of this, the playwright shows a

1 Cf. Gall.1,40,4; 3,5,3; 5,34,2

2 Similarly Eisenhut (45f.)

3 Ogilvie 135

4 Büchner 1962:3

great willingness to praise the actor for his vivid and impressive performance. 'Capability' might be the best characterization of Ambivius as an actor. Analogically, *actoris virtus* in Ter.Phorm.33 is quite comparable to *comica virtus* in Caesar.¹

Contrary to Catullus, *virtus* has exclusively positive conceptual contents in *Corpus Caesarianum*. It is to be noticed that *virtus* was inseparably connected with the tribal autonomy and sovereignty of the Nervii, thus characterizing the political consciousness of its own significance on the part of the tribe. Further on, *virtus* means 'unremitting action'. The word is attributed to tribes that were worthy of consideration as enemies of the Roman Republic, either in reality or in the opinion of Caesar. Praising the *virtus* of one's enemy is an indirect way of praising one's own *virtus*. Yet *virtus* occurs first of all as a characteristic adopted and internalized by the Romans. The description of the Druids emphasizes the value of the quality as philosophy of life (in peaceful activities, as it is implied). It is not only at war that *virtus* is displayed. All in all, however, the meaning of *virtus* is concentrated on manly endurance and capacity of performing as characteristics necessary in military life. Moral considerations are not present in the semantic content. *Virtus* connotes potency. The closest points of comparison are Ennius, Cato, and Sallust. In some cases *virtus* approaches the collective meaning. A couple of oxymora are examples of the usage begun as early as in the time of Plautus at the latest and established in the course of time rather than indications of the direct influence of ἀρετή as the model.

2.12. *Nepos*

Plautus, Catullus, and Nepos have one feature in common, their relatively frequent use of the plural.² The abstract concept had

1 If an attempt is made in order to find out examples of the direct influence of ἀρετή as the model, as far as I can see, the *virtus* of a merchandise, which occurs in Plautus (Mil.727ff.), is not to be overlooked; cf. above p.37

2 The ratios of the occurrences of the plural to the total amount of the occurrences: Plautus 11/66; Catullus, as high as 5/6, and Nepos 15/41

been pluralized at a relatively early stage.¹ The pluralization presupposed concrete meanings such as 'manifestations of manliness', 'valorous deeds of a warrior', 'merits' etc., and '*virtutes*' does appear in these expected meanings without any exception until Nepos.² Contrary to his predecessors, Nepos uses the plural form of the word in a completely new meaning.³ To Nepos, '*virtutes*' does not mean solely achievements and merits characterizing them, but they can also be conceived as qualities that are either inborn⁴ or acquired through education and experience, functioning as the motives of actions. The expansion of the meaning is due to the intellectualization of the concept of *virtus* as well as the influence of ἀρετή (ἀρεταί), which derives from the Greek originals used by Nepos.⁵ It is not necessary to give more than a couple of examples in order to prove that *virtus*, contrary to Caesar, received moral contents in the works of Nepos. The biography of Agesilaus has a certain tone of resignation, *atque hic tantus vir ut naturam faultricem habuerat in tribuendis animi virtutibus*⁶, *sic maleficam nactus est in corpore fingendo* (Ages.8,1). *Virtus* is not an aesthetic but intellectual value, for the intellectual gifts in the passage quoted include both decency and strict moral principles. According to Eisenhut⁷, Nepos would have meant by *virtus* an inborn quality, "das die Natur dem einen zuteilt, dem anderen nicht". It is highly questionable that Nepos should have conceived *virtus* (or *virtutes*) so one-sidedly as an inborn gift.⁸ *Virtutes* do not mean solely inborn gifts in Them.1,1, *huius (Themistoclis) vitia ineuntis adulescentiae magnis sunt emendata virtutibus*. According to this, *virtus* results from the intellectual development and ethical consciousness of an individual.⁹

1 Küchner - Stegmann 77f.

2 Büchner 1962:8 and 12; cf. Eisenhut 46

3 As for A. Cremutius Cordus, cf. above p.52f.

4 Eisenhut (46) confines himself to this.

5 Cf. Herzog-Hauser RE 7A 1663ff.; Eisenhut 46

6 The attribute *animi* is, to be sure, pleonastic, but appropriate to prevent the readers from being misled by the traditional meaning of the word, i.e. 'valorous deeds', 'merits' etc.

7 Eisenhut 51

8 Cf. Büchner 1962:8 and 12

9 This is in accordance with the Stoic conception of virtue; cf. below p.96.

Another innovation in regard to the earlier literature is, besides the meaning of the plural, also the content that the concept receives in the context of military politics. Before Nepos, *virtus* had simply characterized valour and capacity of performing as far as soldiers were concerned, and capability in the case of officers. But Nepos attributes to Agesilaus a *virtus* that is inseparably connected with *humanitas*: *negavit (Agesilaus) id (Corinthum delendam) suae virtuti convenire* (Ages.5,3). *Virtus* means the 'manliness' of the commander whose self-esteem is not based on strategic capability alone but also ethical consciousness. The content Nepos gives to *virtus* indicates his ideal for a commander and a man in general.

At the beginning of the characterization of Hannibal (1,1) *virtus* occurs together with *fortitudo* as the attribute of the Roman people. Both of them mean 'valour', but the latter approaches the consequential meaning 'military renown'. According to this frequently quoted passage, Nepos considers the Romans to be more valiant than all the other nations. Both Ennius and Caesar were well acquainted with this idea. But *quod nemo dubitat, ut populus Romanus omnes gentes virtute superarit* refers to the fact that the valour of the Romans was generally acknowledged in the Mediterranean World at the time of Nepos. Moreover, the Romans still regarded themselves and were still regarded by others as the most valiant people. Their valour had not decreased.

According to Nepos, historically significant men ought to be appreciated on account of their *virtus*, and not on account of the good fortune that may have fallen as their lot.² As far as I can see, this idea is not very typical of the Romans, and therefore it must derive its origin from the creations of the Greek genius. Lys.1,1, *Lysander Lacedaemonius magnam reliquit sui famam, magis felicitate quam virtute partam. Felicitas, or fortuna*, which has a similar semantic content, may give its support to *virtus*, and both of them together result in the historical significance of an individual. A higher appreciation than to Lysander should be given to Eumenes Cardianus, *huius si virtuti par data esset fortuna, non ille quidem maior exstitisset -quod*

1 So Eisenhut 48

2 Practically speaking 'good fortune' means favourable circumstances.

3 The Romans used to praise not only the exploits of a hero but also his good fortune; so Mauch in his study on *disciplina* (66₁).

magnum homines virtute metimur, non fortuna- sed multo illustrior atque etiam honoratior (Eum.1,1). According to this idea of Nepos, which is full of pathos, it is only human value (*virtus*) that should be appreciated as such, even though it is evident that objective appreciation is not based on solely human value as such. Even though *fortuna* (*felicitas*) may give its support to *virtus*, it cannot revoke it, for nothing can revoke human value as such.¹ On the other hand - and this is what is important- human value as such is not sufficient to make a man historically significant. *Homo* may have value as a human being and thus possess *virtus*. But in order to make him *magnum homo*, a man of historical significance, a fair amount of *fortuna* should be added. Cicero the advocate purports a different opinion in his speech *Pro Aemilio Scauro* (1,4), *primus (Scaurus) enim me flagrantem studio laudis in spem impulit; posse virtutem sine praesidio fortunae quo contendisset labore et constantia pervenire*. If perseverance (*labor*) and firmness of mind (*constantia*) are added to *virtus*, good fortune will be rendered superfluous. This does not sound Nepos at all. Instead, it is very typical of Sallust, whom I shall deal with in the following chapter.

In the end, three important conclusions can be drawn: 1) Nepos uses the plural *virtutes* in a radically different way than his friend Catullus. 2) *Virtus* is full of ethical significance in its semantic content, and thus the difference between Nepos and Caesar is quite obvious in this respect. 3) The concept of *virtus* seems to characterize Nepos' efforts to seek human value as such and illustrate it in his biographies.

2.13. Sallust

Sallust the moralist could be expected to deal with the relation between *virtus* and *fortuna*. At the beginning of his monograph on *Iu-*

1 When Tacitus (hist.4,29) implies that circumstances may revoke *virtus*, it is not a question of the revocation of human value, but that of military valour.

2 The opinion cannot be regarded as a very realistic one. Does Cicero the philosopher think that *fortuna* is needed in addition to *virtus*, or not? Be that as it may, in Cicero's speech *Pro Marcello* one of the leading ideas is the relation *virtus* - *fortuna* (e.g. cc. 6 and 9). Here Cicero the advocate purports (as a clear contrast with Scaur. 1,4) that a successful military leader does need fortune, too.

gurtha (1,3) he says, *dux atque imperator vitae mortalium animus est. Qui ubi ad gloriam virtutis via* (cf. Vell.Pat.2,35,2f.) *grassatur, abunde pollens potensque et clarus est neque fortuna eget*. As it has been pointed out in the foregoing, Nepos does not include in *fortuna* any value as such, although he gives it an instrumental value on certain conditions. Sallust goes even further. If a man has pure *virtus*, he needs no fortune at all, for he can overrule all kinds of conditions and take advantage of them through the abilities he is endowed with on account of his *virtus*. *Neque fortuna eget!* *Virtus* refers to the ability of having the circumstances under one's control. *Fortuna* has no significance at all for him who *ad gloriam* (objective appreciation) *virtutis via grassatur*. The antithesis is even more radical than in Nepos and essentially correspondent with the idea purported by Cicero in the passage I have quoted from his speech *Pro Aemilio Scauro*. Sallust's effort was to give an outline of the manifestations of political morals whereas Nepos illustrated human value as such.

At the beginning of his work on *Catilina*, in a passage dealing with philosophy of history¹ Sallust further elucidates the content of the concept as follows, *nam divitiarum et formae gloria fluxa atque fragilis est, virtus* ('mental strength' exclusively) *clara aeternaque habetur. Sed diu magnum inter mortalis certamen fuit vine corporis an virtute animi* ("with physical strength, or with mental strength?") *res militaris magis procederet* (Cat.1,4f.; cf. Cic.Sest. 143). In the typically Roman way Sallust examines his contemporaries' values in the light of the honour they have brought forth. This applies to both material prosperity (*divitiae*) and physical beauty (*forma*), but, above all, *virtus*. *Virtus* is the only absolute value for the reason that the honour resulting from it is permanent, something that cannot be said about prosperity and physical beauty. In accordance with Nepos, Sallust does not regard *virtus* as an aesthetic value. Instead, it is an intellectual value. *Virtus Sallustiana* could not very well be called ethical. Aristotle's division between intellectual and moral virtues (eth.Nic.1103 a14ff.) could be applied as

1 *Mutatis mutandis*, I have borrowed this term from Pöschl 1940:12

a criterion.¹ To Nepos, *virtus* was simultaneously both intellectual and ethical. The same applies to Lucilius, Publilius Syrus, and -as it will become evident later on- Cicero. Sallust's conception of *virtus* is intellectual, but it is not aesthetic or ethical.

In connection with the fragmentary literature of the Republican Age it was pointed out that *virtus* occurred as a political slogan in the internal conflicts of the second century BC at the latest.² Sallust uses *virtus* referring to the strength, power, and skill of a Roman statesman.³ According to Pöschl, the concept includes the perfection of manliness and the grandeur of Rome. To Sallust, *virtus* is the only absolute value in the life of the Roman state and statesman. Yet it should be borne in mind that, as far as the values of the Roman community are concerned, Sallust has not given *virtus* any meaning that would not have been present in Plautus' praise of heroism.⁵ *Virtus* including the perfection of manliness and the grandeur of Rome is an old conception. The historical experiences and the philosophy of history resulting had implanted the idea of *virtus* as the fundamental reason for national prosperity ineffaceably in the Roman mind.

Principally *virtus* can be a characteristic of anyone who has shown mental ability (*ingenium*) and persistence (*industria*) in his own walk of life (Cat.2,7). Yet it is actually only few to whom *virtus* is attributed, for Sallust presupposes that the personages to whom he attributes *virtus* should have historical significance, i.e. they have influentially contributed to the development of the Roman state as individuals. A man has to be famous in order to deserve *virtus*. Cat. 53,4, *ac mihi multa agitantibus constabat paucorum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse*. The excellent *virtus* of a select few has accomplished everything (cf. Liv.1,25,2). *Virtus* seems to characterize the mental potency of very few men of power combined with successful action. Further on, *virtus* should be displayed all the time (Cat.2,9), which emphasizes the importance of action in the conceptual content. A life that passes in obscurity and inactivity -an Epicurean life,

1 Cf. above p.61f.

2 Cf. above p.50f.

3 Pöschl 1940:27f.; Hellegouarc'h 1963:243

4 Pöschl 1940:27

5 Eisenhut (48f. and 55) has a different opinion; see above p.30f.

as it were- is not worth living at all, according to Sallust (Cat. 2,8). *Virtus* is the value that makes life worth living. The idea that *virtus* is action could be regarded as a typically Roman, for Naeivius and Caesar were familiar with it; neither was it unfamiliar to Cicero, as it will become evident later on.

The dynamic content Sallust gives to *virtus* is an indication of the history of the concept. According to Sallust, the Romans of the early Regal Period were excellent builders of the state in every respect (Cat.6,5), *pericula virtute* ('manliness', 'courage') *propulerant (Romani)*, *sociis atque amicis auxilia portabant, magisque dandis quam accipiundis beneficiis amicitias parabant*. It can hardly be claimed that *virtus* here should include ethical considerations although it, to be sure, occurs together with morally significant action. A point of comparison could be found in Thucydides, whose ἀρετή (2,40) implies the ingenuity of the Athenians in winning friends through good and noble deeds (cf. Arist.eth.Nic.1167 b16)

According to the idealized conception given in the monograph on *Catilina*, the state of Rome had a moral basis.² Immediately after the passage quoted above Sallust goes on (Cat.7,5), *talibus viris (Romanis) non labor³ insolitus, non locus ullus asper aut arduus erat, non armatus hostis formidulosus: virtus omnia domuerat*. *Virtus* means 'unrelenting perseverance', 'capacity of performing', and 'fearlessness', and for it no obstacle is unsurpassable. Caesar seems to have had quite a similar conception of *virtus* (cf. Gall. 7,47,3; quoted above). *Virtus* is the ideal combination of all conceivable heroic characteristics. *Virtus omnia domuerat* does not refer to strength and vigour solely in military life, but to character-

1 Cicero gives a similar description of the idealistic past of the Roman people in Manil.32, *fuit hoc quondam, fuit proprium populi Romani, longe a domo bellare et propugnaculis imperii sociorum fortunas, non sua tecta defendere*.

2 This is contrary to *Historiae*, where the early history of Rome is described as a class struggle; cf. Kajanto 1958:57f. The contradiction could be explained in terms of chronological pessimism. A comparison could be made, for instance, between hist.fr.7 Maurenbrecher and Cat.6,5.

3 Pöschl (1940:20) seems to be the first to observe that, in Sallust's works, *virtus* is inseparably connected with *industria* and *labor*. It should be added that the idea is not peculiar to Sallust alone. It is typical of the Romans in general. Where action is not explicitly presented in *virtus*, it could be implicitly included.

istics shown within all spheres of practical life in general. Therefore the meaning of *virtus* in Cat.7,5 is 'manliness' or 'civic prowess' rather than 'valour'. The meaning 'civic prowess' comes even more clearly to the front in Cat.12,1, *postquam divitiae honori esse coepere*¹ *et eas gloria imperium potentia sequebatur, hebescere virtus, paupertas probro haberi, innocentia pro malevolentia duci coepit.* After the conquest of Carthage, there occurred a decadence in *virtus*, the degradation of the conceptual content. To Sallust, the only reward for *virtus* is *gloria* (Iug.1,1) or *honos*, the attendant of *virtus* (cf. Cic.rep.3,40). Sallust, Cicero, and Livy (3,26,7) give *honos* (or *gloria*) a content that does not presuppose material prosperity. After the conquest of Carthage the Romans began to identify material prosperity with *honos*, and, consequently, *virtus* was degraded from the high level where it had been in the philosophy of life of the previous generations (Cat.12,1; 53,5). *Virtus*, constantly and successfully attacked by passivity (*desidia*) and luxury (*luxus*)², was almost completely absent from Roman life for a long time.

Sallust reflects that it is only in his own time that *virtus* has been reanimated in Caesar and Marcus Cato (Cat.53,6). He does not give the same recognition to his other contemporaries, since they have not got *virtus* on account of the circumstances which they are incapable of controlling. *Virtus* is the characteristic of a select few. This implies that *virtus* cannot be *simultaneously* possessed by very many Romans. Provided that this holds true, *virtus* connotes a position in society rather than a personal quality.³ Anyone who wants to deny this has to admit that the content of the concept outlined above can be considered only in connection with social status.

'Valour', an aspect of *virtus* that was in quite a central position in the works of Plautus but moved to the background in the fragment of Lucilius, plays an important part in the military con-

1 Livy (3,26,7) gives a similar idea.

2 As for the spread of luxury as the result of the Roman conquests, Pliny the Elder has dealt with in an interesting way in the 34th book of his *Naturalis historia*.

3 Cf. Paananen 94: "He (Sallust) considers *virtus* the measure of a person's worth, and the interest of the state more important than those of an individual or a group."

texts of the Sallustian monographs. Catiline addresses his soldiers (Cat.58,11), *compertum ego habeo, milites, verba virtutem non addere, neque ex ignavo strenuum neque fortem ex timido exercitum oratione imperatoris fieri*. The conception might quite well be Sallust's own. As regards the definition of the semantic context, the claim *verba virtutem non addere* gives quite an apt illustration in terms of mass psychology. Since words (*verba, oratio*) do not add anything to *virtus*, the concept cannot primarily refer to an emotion prevalent (more or less temporarily) in the consciousness of the soldiers, courageous mind. *Virtus* is something more permanent than 'courageous mind', and thus it seems to imply continuous, active bravery in the face of personal danger, and a noble and lofty quality of courage. This argumentation is not contradictory to the statement of Publilius Syrus (159), *ducis in consilio posita est virtus militum*. *Consilium* refers to strategic capability of the commander rather than his excellence in influencing on the soldiers with encouragement and exhortation. *Virtus* in passage Cat.58,11 can be translated as 'valour' only on the condition that valour does not primarily mean 'courageous mind' as a temporary state of mind.¹ Moreover, 'valour' occurs e.g. in Cat.58,19; 58,21; and 60,3.

To Sallust, *virtus* is a characteristic consisting of intellectual manly energy and applicable to men of historical significance. It cannot be attributed to anyone but only to a select few. The capability of controlling circumstances is, according to Sallust, within the range of human possibilities, even though only exceptionally, since *virtus* is and will always be a characteristic of a select few. Those select few have such strength that they do not have to seek good fortune for their support. First of all, *virtus* is the combination of the characteristics appropriate to a capable statesman. Moreover, *virtus* is inseparably connected with the social status. Sallust's conception of *virtus* gives a total impression of having much more in common with Caesar than Nepos and Cicero, whom I am

1 If the motive of courageous behaviour is an idea (in the case of the Romans, patriotism), courage itself is undoubtedly something permanent. Idealistic enthusiasm either persistently subsists courage or revitalizes it over and over again. Courage is often thought to be based rather on an idea than, say, self-preservation or suicidal inclination.

going to deal with in the following chapter. On the other hand, to both Sallust and Cicero, *virtus* has its history. The history of *virtus* is equal with that of the Roman people.

2.14. Cicero

Cicero agrees with Sallust's monograph on *Catilina* in the fact that *virtus* belongs to the remote past rather than the present (or the recent past). In Balb.15 Cicero characterizes his own time as hostile to *virtus*: *est enim haec saeculi quaedam macula atque labes, virtuti invidere, velle ipsum florem aetatis infringere*.¹ A more spontaneous expression of opinion appears in Phil.8,23. Cicero exclaims, *pro di immortales! Ubi est ille mos virtusque maiorum?* The question is rhetorical and the answer ("nusquam" / "nowhere") is self-evident. *Virtus* is bound up with the ancient Roman way of life. The decline of the ancient Roman way of life implied the disappearance of *virtus* as a reality, and its survival as a posthumous unattainable ideal. *Virtus* was retained as a word, but not as a reality.² *Virtus* is subject to different cultural tendencies. A change in the way of life results in a change of *virtus* at the same time, since *virtus* is an offshoot and an indicator of the values prevalent in the respective way of life.

Concepts wear out at the same time as the way of life and action that they characterize wears out. People seek a concept in order to express their values and attitudes. In the course of time and in changing circumstances they include different meanings in the same word.³ The *virtus* the loss of which is deplored implicitly by Sallust in the 53rd chapter of his *Catilina* and explicitly by Cicero in the 8th book (23) of his *Philippica* is gone for ever and therefore an anachronism. Cic.Catil.1,3, *fuit, fuit ista quondam in hac re*

1 Cf. or.35; Tac.Agr.1 and 41; see above p.21

2 In rep.5,2 it is said, *nostris enim vitiis, non casu aliquo, rem publicam verbo retinemus, re ipsa vero iam amisimus* (cf. Sall.Cat.52,11).

3 One can hardly find a more forcible argumentation than that of Thucydides (3,82f.).

publica virtus, ut viri fortes acrioribus suppliciis civem perniciosum quam acerbissimum hostem coercerent. The Republican *virtus* - which could be replaced with *libertas* in many contexts- has been left behind. *Virtus* is interchangeable with the concept of the early Republican constitution. In Phil.4,13 Cicero explains his own conception of *virtus* to his audience. The apology sounds as follows, *virtus .. propria est Romani generis et seminis. Hanc retinete, quaeso, quam vobis tamquam hereditatem maiores vestri relinquerunt. Nam cum alia omnia falsa, incerta sint, caduca, mobilia, virtus est una altissimis defixa radicibus, quae numquam vi ulla labefactari potest, numquam demoveri loco. Hac virtute maiores vestri primum universam Italiam devicerunt, deinde Karthaginem exciderunt, Numantiam everterunt, potentissimos reges, bellicosissimas gentes in dicionem huius imperii redegerunt* (cf. Verr.4,81ff.; Mur.22).¹ *Virtus* connotes the civic prowess displayed by the Romans at war and in peace. It is noteworthy that this kind of *virtus* could be connected with the autarchic ἀρετή of the Stoics.² Cicero wanted to emphasize that the only defence of the Romans was *virtus*. In Cael.40 Cicero continues from where he concluded in Phil.4,13, *verum haec genera virtutum (Camilli, Fabricii, Curii) non solum in moribus nostris, sed vix iam ("hardly any longer") in libris reperiuntur* (similarly in rep.5,2). *Virtutes* have disappeared from the Roman way of life, which inevitably results in their disappearance from literature. Cicero is criticizing the conception of man in his own time and -as it seems to me- literary taste. The Romans have ceased to honour their traditions.

In his orations Cicero uses *virtus* mostly in its conventional, typically Roman meanings 'manliness', 'valour', 'courage' etc., whereas in his philosophical works the meaning 'virtue'³ comes to the front.⁴ A systematic juxtaposition of two different semantic contents of one and the same word did not occur before Cicero (Manil. 64), *non solum militaris illa virtus, quae est in Cn. Pompeio sin-*

1 The Roman *virtus* outlined here is criticized by Lactantius (inst. 6,6,19ff.). According to him, the Roman *virtus* is nothing but selfishness and violence; cf. above p.57f.

2 See above p.47f.

3 As either the composite concept of all the virtues or a certain individual virtue

4 Pöschl 1940:23; Liebers 158; Büchner 1962:11; Eisenhut 58

*gularis, sed aliae quoque virtutes animi*¹ *magnae et multae requiruntur* (i.e. in the war against Mithridates of Pontus). Just as in Nepos, *virtutes* connote mental qualities. Strategic capability (*militaris virtus*) is only one -although indubitably the most important- positive manifestation of *virtutes* in Pompey's character. It should be noticed that Cicero avoids attributing Pompey all *virtutes*, contrary to his explicit attribution of them all to king Deiotarus (Deiot.26). In the foregoing I have dealt with the only occurrence of *virtus* in A. Cremutius Cordus, according to which Cicero himself did not possess all *virtutes*² Cicero may not have regarded Pompey as an unquestionably estimable person in the first place. In Manil.67 he states, *Cn. Pompeium non cum suis virtutibus, tum etiam alienis vitiis magnum esse videamus*. The *vitia* of the others give a certain tone to the *virtutes* of Pompey. Be that as it may, in Manil.64 Cicero has not observed the Stoic dogma, according to which all the moral virtues are founded on so coherent a unity that if anyone has one of them he simultaneously has all the others as well (Cic.off.2,35; cf. Diog.Laert.7,125).³

In another speech, Cicero adds a new feature to the characterization of Pompey stating, *in quo (Pompeio) uno ita summa fortuna cum summa virtute certavit, ut omnium iudicio plus homini quam deae tribueretur* (Balb.9). Pompey's success cannot be explained solely on the basis of his *virtus*, i.e. his capability in the position of a commander. An exceptionally great amount of fortune has also made its contribution. A successful personage needs both *virtus* and *fortuna*, for *fortuna* at its best gives effective support to *virtus* (cf. Arch.24; dom.16). In Manil.47 Cicero writes that, as a rule, all the great commanders have enjoyed the favours of fortune. In order to succeed a commander necessarily needs theoretical knowledge on military subjects, courage (*virtus*), author-

1 For the sake of clarity, the context calls for the attribute *animi*, which in effect occurs in Decimus Laberius (com.121 Ribbeck), Caesar (Call.7,59,6), Nepos (Ages.8,1; Epam.1,4). As for Cicero himself, cf. Quir.20; Phil.14,4; and Sull.34.

2 Cf. above p.52f.

3 According to the teachings of Stoicism, each virtue has, however, its own field of activity and should therefore be learnt separately (Cic.Tusc.4,53).

ity, and good luck (Manil.28). *Fortuna* has played an important part in the elevation of the Roman people to its historical magnificence (rep.2,30; cf. Pol.1,6,6f.). In his oration *Pro Marcello* (6) Cicero goes so far as to say that fortune has more influence on the course of events at war than *virtus* and all the other factors, *et certe in armis militum virtus, locorum opportunitates, auxilia sociorum, classes, commeatus multum iuvat, maximam vero partem quasi suo iure Fortuna sibi vindicat*. All this is contradictory to the enthusiastic exposition in the oration *Pro Aemilio Scauro* (1,4), which I have quoted towards the end of the chapter dealing with Nepos. The idea of fortune supporting *virtus* occurs also in Nepos and Tacitus. As it has been pointed out in the foregoing, Sallust made a clear distinction between *virtus* and *fortuna* by stating (Iug.1,1f.) that veritable *virtus* does not need *fortuna* for its support even when statesmen of historical significance are concerned. Nepos has the opposite view. To him, *virtus* means "only" human value, which is not enough to make a man historically significant (or to put it in the Roman way of expression: to lead him to fame and glory). Cicero the philosopher should be placed somewhere between Nepos and Sallust in this connection. Scaur.1,4 is closer to Sallust, whereas Balb.9 and Marc.6 have closer resemblances with Nepos.¹

The Pompey of the oration *Pro imperio Cn. Pompeii* differs essentially from the Pompey presented in the letter Cicero wrote to Atticus on the 27th of February in 49 BC (Att.8,11). In the letter Pompey is depicted as an aspirant to absolutism (*dominatio*), hostile to Cicero. A statesman observing the Roman-Stoic principles should use his energy for the good of society without aspiring to personal power (rep.1,1; virt.17 Atzert).² It does not suffice for a statesman to possess *virtus*, *quasi artem aliquam* (rep.1,1f.); he is also obliged to use it persistently and coherently for the good of society (rep.1,2). Pompey does not fulfil this condition -to say nothing of Caesar- for *dominatio quaesita ab utroque est, non id actum, beata et honesta civitas ut esset* (Att.8,11). Under the circumstances, Pompey no longer possesses

1 As far as I can see, these three *loci* represent the ideas purported by Cicero the advocate.

2 Cf. Stanka 280

the *virtus* required by Cicero from the ideal aristocratic statesman. To Cicero, *virtus* connotes persistent action on certain conditions. As the general content of the concept this also applies to Caesar and Sallust, not to mention all the others.

The difference between Cicero and Lucilius is in the fact that, according to Cicero, *virtus* includes both the aspects of the semantic content 'virtue', whereas Lucilius offers reflections on the manifestations of ethical perfection never using *virtus* in the meaning 'a certain individual virtue'. In this respect Cicero has made a unique contribution to the semantic-terminological development of *virtus*. In off.3,13 *virtus* refers to moral perfection including all virtues, *etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturae vivere, id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam* ('meaning'): *cum virtute congruere semper, cetera autem, quae secundum naturae essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent*, and further on, *honestum .. in sapientibus est solis neque a virtute divelli umquam potest* (cf. off.3,12; fin.2,48). According to this passage, which has been interpreted in terms of Stoicism, *virtus* is possessed by only the few wise (*sapientes*). This idea is again related to that of Sallust, but not only Sallust, since it is common to all antiquity.

The whole ancient philosophy was convinced of the inferiority of the masses (the many, *hoi polloi*). According to Bias of Priene (Diog.Laert.1,88), "most people are worthless".¹ Heraclitus of Ephesus claimed that most people are worthless, only few are good (fr. 104 Diels - Kranz). According to Xenophanes (Diog.Laert.9,20), most people lack understanding.² Applied to wielding of power, this principle reads as follows: "The people, frankly speaking, does not notice anything but only repeats in choir what the leaders tell it." (Plat.Protag.317a). 'Αρετή-*virtus* remains the privileged characteristic of the happy few as far as it is conceived as a mental quality. In the fragment of Ennius' *Hectoris lytra*, *virtus* is not intellectualized but simply means 'capacity of performing', which can be achieved by many people (200f.; cf. Plaut.Epid.106) Intellectualized *virtus* can only be attributed to a select few. This is connected with the problem of explaining how *virtus*, which

1 Cf. Sext.math.9,133; Plut.Stoic.rep.31,15

2 Cf. V.V.Eccl.1,15: *stultorum infinitus est numerus*.

originally meant 'capacity of performing', in the course of time adopted the meaning of 'virtue' in ethical terminology. As far as I can see, the transition from manliness to virtue could be explained in terms of the intellectualization of the concept of manliness. Originally *virtus* meant 'strength' and 'courage', which were displayed above all at war. Gradually strength and courage came to be considered necessary also in resisting evil. Roughly speaking, it was in this way that *virtus* was intellectualized.

Virtus connotes an individual virtue e.g. in nat.deor.1,4 (here Cicero has reflected on the meaning of religious piety), *pietate adversus deos sublata fides etiam et societas generis humani et una excellentissima virtus iustitia tollatur*.¹ Cf. virt.3 Atzert, *usus iustitiae maximus est civitatis gubernatio et imprimis ad rectorem rei publicae pertinet haec virtus* (cf. rep.1,1). Cicero demands justice first of all from a statesman. Moreover, *iustitia* occurs as the queen of all the virtues in virt.6 Atzert. Cicero tended to see *virtus* as an ethical quality in political life (Rosc. Amer.83), *is enim mihi videtur amplissimus, qui sua virtute* ("of his own strength") *in alteriorem locum pervenit, non qui ascendit per alterius incommodum et calamitatem*. This sounds more like Nepos than Sallust. *Virtus* is here conceived as the quality presupposing individual power resources necessary for the advancement on a political career. It is not becoming to *virtus* to thwart others.

Originally *virtus* included all the qualities expected of a man. The Roman agrarian community had to work constantly in order to make the soil arable. The plains of Etruria and Latium were far more barren than Campania as regards geological formation, and therefore they were not arable without careful drying and tillage, in other words without constant toil.³ Therefore it is in highly appreciative terms that capacity for hard work and determination are characterized (cf. Liv.23,14,1). At the time of war the Roman community demanded from its men valour. It is in these circumstances that the ideas of *virtus* and *industria* developed. In peaceful circumstances *virtus* meant the 'manly industry' and 'strength' of the

1 "justice the Queen of all the virtues", as it is translated by H. Rackham in the Loeb edition of *De natura deorum*

2 Cf. Meister 2; Büchner 1957:310; Cox 85

3 Rostovtzeff 6

farmer-warrior.¹ In the times of both war and peace a Roman displayed those qualities that are comprised in the concept of *fortitudo* in the works of Cicero.

Fortitudo means 'courage', 'strength', and 'firmness of mind' in facing difficulties. Cicero defines the concept in fin.5,67, *fortitudo in laboribus periculisque cernatur*; cf. virt.19 Atzert, *fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpessio; eius partes magnificentia, fidentia, patientia, perseverantia* (cf. inv.2,163; Tusc.4,53).² Accordingly, courage and firmness of mind can be displayed only when there is certainty of the danger at hand and a real reason for fear. This kind of conception of *fortitudo* is intellectualized, and therefore it is a moral virtue. In the fragment of *Hortensius* (12 Diemel) Cicero deals with the four Stoic virtues in a highly exceptional way. According to him, in the life hereafter -supposing it exists- there cannot be eloquence since there will not be any courts of justice. Correspondingly there will not be virtues either. There will not be any courage (*fortitudo*) since there will be no need to take any efforts or face any dangers. There will not be any justice (*iustitia*) since nobody will desire others' possessions, nor will there be any moderation (*temperantia*) since passions are vanished, nor will there be any prudence (*prudentia*) under the circumstances where it will not be necessary to choose between the good and evil (cf. fin.5, 67). Using periphrases Cicero shows what he means with each virtue. In his work on virtues (cf. Hier.ep. ad Zacch.1,2) Cicero had defined the content of each virtue in the connections that are not

1 Still the Romans conceived *virtus* first of all as a quality displayed at war. Its credibility was not quite evident in peaceful activities. This is clearly illustrated by *Laus Pisonis*, from the early Imperial Age. The unknown author assures (26f.) that *virtus* will not die although wars are coming to an end. In this particular case it is a question of an advocate's *virtus* in defending his client successfully. Horace thought (epist.2,1,229ff.) that *virtus* can very well be displayed also at the time of peace, even though it cannot be attributed to an *indignus poeta*. Both at war and in peace, *virtus* refers to public recognition and general appreciation. However, it is quite evident that *virtus* was more spectacular at war than in peace.

2 In the latter instance, there are as many as three definitions of ἀνδρεία-*fortitudo* by Sphaerus.

3 The conception of *fortitudo* is intellectualized in accordance with the ἀνδρεία of Diogenes, Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. The same applies to Seneca, who says (ep.85,28), (*fortitudo*) *scientia est distinguendi, quid sit malum et quid non sit*. Instead of *fortitudo*, one would have expected *virtus*.

negative.¹

It has been pointed out in the foregoing that Plautus' praise of heroism dealt with solely the military aspect of the conceptual content of *virtus*, in other words, valour and the general security and material prosperity it brings to an individual and the community. In Lucilius' fragment on *virtus* this aspect is shifted to the background. Yet it cannot be claimed that Lucilius should have excluded military valour from the ethical composite virtue. To him, military valour is an integral part of Roman patriotism, although it is not explicitly brought out in the fragment on *virtus*. In the light of the extant literature, Lucilius does not seem to have developed Latin terminology to such an extent that he would have used *virtus* in the meaning 'a certain individual virtue' as one of the (four Stoic) manifestations of ethical perfection. The conclusion of this task seems to have been consigned to Cicero, who used both the aspects of virtue systematically in his philosophical works. Being observant of the Stoic list of ἀρεταί, Cicero intellectualized manliness² and interpreted the Greek ἀνδρεία as *fortitudo*.

The fact that Lucilius does not praise military valour explicitly does not prove that the Roman appreciation of heroism had decreased. *Virtus* was still continuously used in the meaning 'valour' in military contexts. The meaning 'valour' is not, to be sure, the only one, but it occurs repeatedly from one author to another reaching its culmination in the works of Caesar. It is a usual meaning also in Cicero (particularly in the 14th book of *Philippica*). *Virtus militaris* receives especial conceptual cogency reminiscent of Plautus in the speech *Pro Murena* (22), *rei militaris virtus praestat ceteris omnibus (virtutibus). Haec nomen populo Romano, haec huic urbi aeternam gloriam peperit, haec orbem terrarum parere huic imperio coegit; omnes urbanae res, omnia haec nostra praeclara studia et haec forensis laus et industria latet in tutela ac praesidio bellicae virtutis*. The praise differs from that in Plautus' *Amphitruo* only in the respect that Cicero places *virtus* explicitly in

1 *Fortitudo*: virt.19 Atzert; cf. inv.2,163; Tusc.4,53; *iustitia*: virt.2-3; 6-8 Atzert; cf. Stoic.vet.frr.3,262 Arnim; rep.1,2; off.3,28; Ant.Sal.6,9-12; 24-29; *temperantia*: virt.20 Atzert; *prudencia*: virt.18 Atzert; cf. Stoic.vet.frr.3,262 Arnim

2 E.g. Democritus and Plato had done the same; cf. above p.43f.

the circumstances of Roman history, whereas Plautus only refers to them placing the concept in the world of myths. The idea as such had already developed to the same stage in Plautus. In the foregoing, I have quoted the apology of *virtus* in Phil.4,13, where the concept has a wider extension than in *Pro Murena*.¹

The queen of all the virtues in *Pro Murena* is not *iustitia* as in nat.deor.1,4 and virt.6 Atzert, but *militaris virtus* in the meaning *fortitudo*. In his philosophical writings Cicero observed the commonplace and did not praise *fortitudo*, corresponding *virtus militaris* in *Pro Murena*, higher than the three other cardinal virtues. From the philosophical point of view, *iustitia*-δικαιοσύνη is the most important, whereas the historical rise of the Roman people could best be explained in terms of *virtus militaris*, military capacity of performing, which was used by Nepos as a synonym of *fortitudo* in the beginning (1,1) of his biography of Hannibal. Since the Romans did not see any difference between *virtus* and *vis*² they could not make an essential distinction between *virtus* and *fortitudo*, either. As *virtus* originally meant 'manliness' and 'valour', and as this aspect was not discarded from the conceptual content in classical Latin but the meanings in question were obstinately retained, the risk of terminological confusion became quite evident. Cicero could not translate ἀνδρεία, which belonged to the Stoic catalogue of virtues, as *virtus* but as *fortitudo*. Before Cicero, *fortitudo* was rather an unusual word, but Cicero sought to reserve the meaning 'virtue' for *virtus* as both the sum total of all the virtues and the notion of any individual virtue. On account of the original meaning 'manliness', using *virtus* as a term indicating such a moral virtue as *iustitia* could actually be regarded as an error. Cicero was well aware of this when he spoke of the *virtus* of a tree or a house (leg.1,45). The prevailing usage had led Cicero to terminological difficulties. Since Plautus, *virtus* could be connected with non-human and inanimate objects. In addition to Plautus, Cato, Lucilius, Lucretius, Caesar, Cicero, Livy (37,24,1), and Ovid (met.14,357) offer examples of this usage. *Virtus* occurred in contexts where it was quite unexpected on account of its origin. The use of the term as the composite concept

1 Cf. above p.86

2 Ernout - Meillet 1112

of the moral virtues is even more problematic and confusing in the light of its original meaning 'manliness' and the usage of attributing it to inanimate objects. In Tusc.2,43 Cicero implies that *virtus* was the common denominator of all the ethic characteristics in his time. What he is actually trying to say is that the meaning of *virtus* should be limited to capability of despising death and enduring pain; in other words, the original meaning should be observed.

Cicero reflected on the introduction of an entirely new term, which is probably the general idea in Tusc.3,17, where he says that *frugalitas* includes *fortitudo*, *iustitia*, and *prudentia*.¹ In Deiot. 26 Cicero states, *ego tamen frugalitatem, id est modestiam et temperantiam, virtutem maximam iudico*. In this case *frugalitas* consists of only two component virtues, whereas there were three of them in Tusc.3,17. Cicero considers the principal virtue to be sometimes *virtus militaris* (Mur.22), sometimes *iustitia* (nat.deor. 1,4; cf. virt.6 Atzert), sometimes *frugalitas* (Tusc.3,17; Deiot.26) As an additional proof of the terminological difficulties Cicero faced without being able to find a final solution to them, I further present Planc.29, *meo iudicio pietas fundamentum est omnium virtutum*. According to Cicero, *pietas* gets down to the roots of morality. Accordingly, it swells the number of the principal virtues. Further on, in the speech *Pro Plancio* (80), there is one virtue which comes before all the others, *et gratum esse et videri*. To Cicero, it is *una virtus non solum maxima, sed etiam mater virtutum omnium reliquarum*. This kind of susceptibility to variation could be explained in terms of the subject concerned (on the part of Cicero the advocate), which required emphasis on different virtues in different connections. At the same time it is an indication of incoherency and defective conceptual analysis.

Sometimes Cicero uses *virtus* as a political slogan. This kind of usage is not, however, a novelty since it derived from the position taken in the class conflicts of the previous century.³ Cicero introduced something entirely new in the semantic development of the Latin language using *virtus* as a *terminus technicus* in rhetoric.⁴

1 Cf. Valente 57; Pohlenz 57; Eisenhut 65

2 Cf. Mur.22; Lig.37; Rosc.Amer.27; Verr.4,73; 4,81ff.; Mil.105; Pis. 27; Arch.15

3 Cf. above p.50f.

4 This is well elucidated by Eisenhut 71ff.

The intellectualized concept of *virtus* is illustrated in Arch. 28, *nullam enim virtus aliam mercedem laborum periculorumque desiderat praeter hanc laudis et gloriae*. Here *virtus* is correspondent with ἀνδρεία-*fortitudo* since it is displayed in labours and perils. Instead of *virtus* one could have expected *fortitudo*, for Cicero states in fin.5,67, *fortitudo in laboribus periculisque cernatur*.¹ Under the circumstances, the conception of *virtus* in Arch.28 is inconsistent in the respect of philosophical terminology. At any rate, in this particular passage it should be interpreted as manliness or courage. Furthermore *virtus* is the primary element of the timocratic ethos of the Roman state, as Arch.29 clearly indicates, *nunc insidet quaedam in optimo quoque virtus, quae noctes ac dies animum gloriae stimulis concitat* (cf. Phil.11,17). Day and night *virtus* incites honest citizens to aspire at honour and glory. Lucretius, on the basis of his orthodox Epicureanism, has in a passage (3,63f.), which curiously reminds of Cic.Arch.29, *avarities* and *honorum caeca cupido* where Cicero has *virtus*.²

Virtus is inseparably connected with the conception of freedom in the life of an individual as well as the state.³ The rule is corroborated in Catil.4,16, where Cicero sets the *virtus* of the liberated as an example for the Senate, *operae pretium est, patres conscripti, libertinorum hominum studia cognoscere, qui sua virtute* ("of their own strength") *fortunam huius civitatis consecuti*. *Virtus* is not a characteristic of a slave but a free man, or a man liberated from slavery. The idea is not peculiar solely to Cicero but universally Roman⁴, or it could be regarded even as a commonplace in ancient thought since Homer (Od.17,322f.). Pericles the demagogue addresses the Athenians in his famous funeral oration (Thuc.2,43) "May freedom mean happiness, and manliness freedom. Fear not the perils of war." (cf. 5,9; 5,100). The *virtus* of the liberated is closely related to the *virtus* of a *homo novus* (Balb.51; Phil.9,4)⁵ In Phil.14,36 Cicero combines the *virtus* ('valour') of the legion

1 Cf. above p.91

2 Cf. above p.66

3 E.g. Sest.118; Flacc.25; Catil.4,19

4 Cf. above p.20f.

5 Some additional examples: Verr.3,7; 2.agr.1; Planc.67; Mur.16

formed of his followers and the freedom of the Roman people (*libertas populi Romani*). The *virtus* Cicero attributes to the Senate is conservative in its nature, *ad rem publicam conservandam* (Sull.82). It is the desirable quality through which the republic can be preserved (Phil.5,2; 8,1). Moreover, it is not only *fortitudo* that is demanded from the Senate but also *sapientia* (Phil.13,6; cf. Liv.39, 40,1). Consequently, the *virtus* of the Senate consists of these two qualities. In *virtus* Cicero saw a power that created and preserved a state (rep.1,1; off.1,19).

Virtus is not an innate quality in a man but it grows and develops, *summi homines et clarissimi cives fuerunt, quorum cum adulescentiae cupiditates defervissent, eximiae virtutes firmata iam aetate exstiterunt* (Cael.43). According to Gellius (6,8), Scipio Africanus had not a spotless fame in his youth (cf. Pol.10,19). The fact that *virtus* is the result of ripening and development is clearly presented in the beginning of Nepos' biography of Themistocles (1,1) and the Q. Caeso episode in Livy.¹ Cicero goes on in Cael. 43, *multi a me summi atque ornatissimi viri praedicarentur, quorum partim nimia libertas in adulescentia*², *partim profusa luxuries, magnitudo aeris alieni, sumptus, libidines nominarentur, quae multis postea virtutibus oblecta adulescentiae*³, *qui vellet, excusatione defenderet*. In the same oration (76) Cicero further illustrates the same idea as follows, *in adulescentia .. tamquam in herbis significant, quae virtutibus maturitas et quantae fruges industriae sint futurae*, and further on (79), *hunc (Caelium) nunc primum florecentem firmata iam stirpe virtutis*. Cicero emphasizes that *virtus* requires growing and development. This is typical of Roman-Stoic ethics. According to Seneca, *virtus* is a result of practice, not an inborn quality (dial.4,10,6). In ep.90,44 Seneca writes, *non dat natura virtutem, ars est bonum fieri*.

Elsewhere Cicero the advocate (as it seems to me) gives the impression of *virtus* as an inborn quality rather than a result of practice. In his oration *Pro Archia poeta* he says, *ego multos homines excellenti animo ac virtute fuisse et sine doctrina naturae ipsius*

1 Cf. below p.127f.

2 Cf. Nepos (Them.1,1) about the young Themistocles, *liberius vivebat*

3 Cf. Nep.Them.1,1, *Themistocles vitia ineuntis adulescentiae magnis emendavit virtutibus*.

habitu prope divino per se ipsos et moderatos et graves exstitisse fateor: etiam illud adiungo, saepius ad laudem atque virtutem naturam sine doctrina quam sine natura valuisse doctrinam (15). Democritus seems to have had the opposite view. According to him (fr. 242 Diels - Kranz), πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος. *Natura* corresponds with φύσις, and *doctrina* with ἀσκησις, roughly speaking. When speaking of *virtus* in Arch.15 Cicero did not mean only military valour but also the capability and significance of a man participating in the political life of Rome. Accordingly, a man can become a successful politician on account of his inborn qualities. Xenophon (mem.3,7; cf. Diog.Laert.2,29) relates that Socrates encouraged Charmides to go in for politics since he believed in his natural gifts. On the other hand, Socrates kindly advised Glaucō, Plato's brother, not to take up politics because of his inexperience. To Cicero the philosopher, *virtus* was (presumably) both an innate quality and an acquired one, even though the emphasis seems to be on the latter.¹

A theme of the oration *Pro Archia* is the opportunities of acquiring *virtus*. Interest in arts and sciences clearly advances the acquisition of the quality (Arch.16). C. Laelius, L. Furius -and presumably also Cicero himself- *profecto si nihil ad percipiendam colendamque virtutem litteris adiuventur, numquam se ad earum studium contulissent*. If erudition were of no help in the advancement and maintenance of the understanding of *virtus*, these national *exempla* would never have taken any interest in it. *Virtus* has to be learnt and understood before it can be cultivated.² This is a commonplace. Virgil formulates the aim of Roman authoritative education

1 In Flacc.63 Cicero claims that the *virtus* of the state of Sparta is both a natural gift and the result of the disciplined authoritative education, *civitatis spectata ac nobilitata virtus non solum natura corroborata sed etiam disciplina putatur* ("is generally believed"). Here Cicero repeats an ancient commonplace.

2 The same applies to ἀρετή, which is certainly no surprise. In the beginning of the 11th book of his history (8,1f.), Polybius characterizes the ἀρετή of a commander, which is the combination of the qualities that contribute in making a commander successful. These qualities can be acquired firstly by entering deeply into the memoirs of military leaders and taking advantage of their teachings, secondly, by systematically observing the instructions of experienced men, and thirdly, by acquiring practical experiences personally (cf. 6,19,5).

as follows (ecl.4,26f.), *at simul heroum laudes et facta parentis / iam legere et quae sit poteris cognoscere virtus*. The conception of *virtus* was not quite clear to the Romans themselves, which is indicated by Velleius Paterculus (1,9,3), *L. Aemilium Paulum virum in tantum laudandum quantum intellegi virtus potest*. As far as *virtus* can be understood at all, it made L. Aemilius Paulus a right-fully praiseworthy personage.

Virtus is not only displayed on the battlefield (Mur.22) but also in political life (Mil.34), *vos adepti estis, ne quem civem metueritis; hic* (Milo the defendant) *exercitationem virtutis, suffragationem consulatus, fontem perennem gloriae suae perdidit*. The accused Milo had lost the opportunity of displaying manliness characteristic of a free citizen when he had been arrested. Further on (41), Cicero appeals to the judges, *vos et omnes boni vota faceretis, ut Miloni uti virtute sua liberet*. Milo thinks that exile (*exsilium*) is where there is no place for *virtus* (101). In the same passage *virtus* occurs as *abstractum pro concreto*, in other words, as a metonymy, *et erit dignior locus in terris ullus qui hanc virtutem* (nearly the same as "this man") *excipiat quam hic* (*locus*, i.e. *urbs Roma*), *qui procreavit?* *Virtus* is true and understandable only in the politico-social circumstances which have created it. As the characteristic of Milo *virtus* connotes an individual citizen's right to be allowed to continue his political career without interruption. *Virtus* is the content of life of both a free citizen and a state.

1 A parallel idea found in Thucydides deserves to be illustrated. According to Thucydides (1,95), the Spartans were prone to thinking that they would lose their native manliness on foreign campaigns. An example of this is Pausanias, it has been said. Now, the respective passages of Cicero and Thucydides serve to illustrate the only occurrence of *virtus* in Naevius' *Tarentilla* (discussed above). Here *virtus* is a strictly local characteristic. To the opposite effect, there is the Athenian idea of manliness in Thuc.7,77. In this case, Nicias the demagogue implies that the Athenian soldiers are accompanied by their manliness everywhere. Their manliness -unlike that of the Spartans- is not reduced by the fact that they depart from their πόλις, for Athens is not conceived of as a territorial unit (cf.7,64). -As for Livy, he implies in the speech of Camillus that the Roman *virtus* could quite easily be transferred to Veii (5,54,6). Here Livy, contrary to Cicero in *Pro Milone*, subscribes to the Athenian conception of manliness. To Livy, as it will be seen later on, *virtus* is not strictly Roman but Pan-Italic.

In Manil.59 Cicero says that the state ought to profit from the life and manliness of a significant man, viz. Pompey, *res publica .. frui debet summi viri (Pompei) vita atque virtute*. Aliteration (and often also *figura etymologica*) is a rhetoric effect typical of Cicero when dealing with *virtus*.¹ The expression *vitae socia virtus, mortis comes gloria* (Font.49) has a lyrical tone reminiscent of the timocratic ethos of the Roman state. Sometimes this timocratic ethos of state is projected into the world of myths. In Sest.143 Cicero relates that Hercules' immortality as the result of his *virtus* was a general belief among common people. Before this he reflects, *cogitemus denique corpus virorum fortium magnorumque hominum esse mortale, animi vero motus et virtutis gloriam sempiternam*. The *immortalitas* of the heroes became manifest in the *animi motus* it effected in the posterity, in other words, commotion and emulation.² This leads to the emergence of the timocratic ethos of the Roman state, which Livy (1,7,15) traces back to Romulus, *haec tum sacra Romulus una ex omnibus peregrina suscepit, iam tum immortalitatis virtute partae, ad quam eum sua fata ducebant fautor*. Once again *immortalitas* results from *virtus*. Here Livy does not refer principally to the military achievements of Romulus but the cultic proceedings on which Romulus based the political organisation of Rome (1,7,14). The *virtus* of Romulus was a characteristic of a statesman, which implied organizing ability, or in a wider sense, excellence. The conception of linking *virtus* with *immortalitas* proves out to be typically Roman. The conclusion need not to be corroborated with additional references. The idea of *virtus* clearing all obstacles out of its way is also a commonplace (Har.resp.49), *omnes angustiae, omnes altitudines montium obiectas semper vi ac virtute perfregit (Pompeius)*.³

Cicero divides all virtues, i.e. all good and appropriate qualities, into two categories. The first category includes innate and involuntary virtues, and the second voluntary virtues (fin.5,36), *plures sunt virtutes, sed duo prima genera, unum (1) earum quae ingenerantur suapte natura appellanturque non voluntariae, alterum (2) earum quae voluntate positae magis proprio*

1 E.g. Tusc.2,43; Pis.27; Sest.86; 88; 89; 93; Vat.28; Mur.16

2 Cf. above p.24f.

3 Similarly e.g. Caes.Gall.7,47,3 and Sall.Iug.1,1

nomine appellari solent . . Primis generis (1) est docilitas, memoria; quae fere omnia appellantur uno ingeni nomine, easque virtutes qui habent ingeniosi vocantur. Alterum autem genus (2) est magnarum verarumque virtutum ("the great virtues proper") quas appellamus voluntarias, ut prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, iustitiam et reliquas generis eiusdem (cf. fin.5,59) Thus the Stoic cardinal virtues are voluntary (cf. Sen.ep.95,57). It could be added that these virtues require time and experience for their development. Time is very important for the virtues of the second category since they result from growing and experience. According to E.W. Mayer, Machiavelli showed profound knowledge of the ancient Romans by considering will power as the essential part of Roman character and setting it as the example for his own time.¹ True manliness is inseparable from the heroic will power that (ironically enough) made Theseus forget Ariadne and seek opportunities of displaying his fervent valour. Thus *virtus* is a voluntary quality. The acquisition of it requires will power. *Virtus* cannot be displayed involuntarily. On the other hand, *virtus* can also be lost through unwillingness to display it. This idea is closely related to Aristotle's conception of virtue. Accordingly, virtue is not only a matter of knowledge but also a matter of will, even though knowledge is essential for the development of virtuous will (eth.Nic. 1145 a35). Besides, virtue does not manifest itself in unfulfilled will but in continuous action directed by virtuous will.

Man is not given *virtus* as a natural gift but it is consciously set as the goal to be striven for. In order to acquire *virtus* one should do what Cn. Manlius left undone, *Manlium plerique notatis: non ille honorem a pueritia, non studia virtutis, non ullum existimationis bonae fructum umquam cogitarat* (Cluent.39) First of all, *virtus* is a voluntary quality.

It is time to make a summary. As it has been pointed out in connection with the fragmentary orations from the Republican Age, Cicero attributes *virtus* to himself several times.² In those cases *virtus* characterizes Cicero's manly self-confidence, which is unshaken in difficulties. In accordance with Sallust, *virtus* has its history for Cicero, too. The fate of it was adverse in Cicero's

1 Mayer 24f.

2 Cf. above p.50f.

own time. As an apologist for the disintegrating old order, Cicero turned his attention to the past. According to him, *virtus* in the meaning of a national characteristic is liable to decay. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain that Cicero purposefully demands (Phil.4,13), *hanc (virtutem) retinete!* In political life *virtus* is an ethical quality that should be constantly displayed for the good of society setting aside personal ambitions. In strictly logical terms *virtus* will be lost if opportunities to display it are lost. This is what happened to Milo. To a statesman, the sufficient reward for his *virtus* is objective appreciation. *Virtus* implies political action that observes aristocratic views for the preservation of the Republic. Moreover, it is the characteristic of a free man. *Virtus* alone is not enough for a successful commander, in addition, he needs fortune to support *virtus*. Nepos seemed to agree with the views of Cicero in this point, but Sallust did not. Observant of the typically Roman way of thinking, Cicero presented *virtus* as the primary cause of the historical rise of Rome. Cicero the philosopher thought that *virtus* was not only given man as a natural gift but that it resulted from development and ripening, too.¹ Erudition somewhat advances the development of *virtus*. The quality is the primary element of the timocratic ethos of the Roman state. It is a voluntary quality, but it is also based on knowledge. This conception is related to that of the Stoics since, to them, knowledge and will meant two different manifestations of one and the same thing (Sen.ep.89,4).

The cases in which Cicero explicitly places now one and now another virtue at the top of the world of values indicate variation of themes and terminological inconsistency. There are altogether five variations. Ultimately, this is the indication of the definite difference between philosophical and non-philosophical contexts. In his non-philosophical writings Cicero does not observe the philosophical and ethical terminology because of thematic reasons. It is only in non-philosophical contexts that *virtus militaris* and *gratum*

1 In addition to Nepos and Seneca, this seems to have been the prevailing Roman-Stoic point of view. Cf. above p.96 and below p.103f. Although virtue requires growing ripe, there is, however, no place for decrease or increase in it (Simpl.categ.61,13). It is perfect right from the beginning (Cic.fin.3,34). Man either possesses virtue or lacks it altogether (Diog.Laert.7,161). Moreover, there are no differences of degree in virtue (Sen.ep.66,9; Cic.fin.3,48; Epict. disc.3,51f.). The Stoics conceived virtue as the result of development in such a way that it is perfect right from the beginning.

esse et videri occur as the queen of all the virtues. In the philosophical writings *frugalitas* appears as the supreme concept besides *virtus*, which is terminologically rather ambiguous, but cannot displace it. Cicero establishes the position of *virtus* as the ethical composite concept. All this had presupposed painstaking conceptual work of creation.

2.15. Virgil

There are 38 occurrences in the Aeneid, and two in the *Eclogae*, in the fourth poem. The plural is related to the pre-Nepotian meanings (e.g. ecl.4,17; Aen.1,566).² When *virtus* is presented as a quality demanded from soldiers the meaning 'valour' is central (e.g. Aen.5,754). 'Manliness' occurs less frequently, e.g. Aen.3,342, *ecquid in antiquam virtutem animosque virilis / et pater Aeneas et avonculus excitat Hector*. *Virtus* means 'manly energy', 'firmness', and 'strength', and exhortation and incitation have influence on it. Therefore the quality can be considered to include a mimetic and emotional element. If this element is preferred to 'potency' *virtus* can be interpreted as 'courage', awareness as the prevailing emotion at the moment of danger. The philosophical usage of Cicero has not had any effect whatsoever on Virgil. In short, in Virgil *virtus* denotes 'manly strength', which is displayed as courage and capacity of performing on the battlefield, as well as in athletic sports. In Virgil *virtus* shows a remarkable similarity to the ἀρετή as a non-ethical quality characterizing warriors in the Iliad.⁵ In the Iliad ἀρετή is not an ethical term, neither is *virtus* in Virgil.

1 Cf. Wetmore s.v.

2 In the latter case there is alliteration and *figura etymologica*.

3 Cf. Cox 86f.; Eisenhut 78

4 E.g. Aen.5,258; 344; 363. I have also found *virtus* in connection with sports in Velleius Paterculus (1,8,1). He implies that the Olympic Games offer an opportunity to display *virtus*.

5 'Αρετή has not primarily an ethical meaning as its semantic content but denotes the 'excellence' of a warrior in the Trojan War, e.g. 15,642; 20,411; 22,268. In these instances ἀρετή hardly means anything else than 'valour' and 'physical strength' (cf. Hoffmann 93ff.)

According to Virgil, *virtus* can be learnt although not by anyone. Aeneas advises his son Ascanius (Aen.12,435f.), *disce, puer, virtutem ex me verumque laborem, / fortunam ex aliis..* *Virtus* is here comparable to ἀρετή. It is displayed in action, and therefore it does not presuppose words or literary erudition (Diog.Laert.6, 11). The Cynics conceived virtue in this way. Cicero (de orat.3, 137) contrasts the Roman *virtus* with the Greek *doctrina*, *ut virtutis a nostris sic doctrinae sunt ab illis (Graecis) exempla petenda*. The Roman *virtus* is displayed mainly in action and is not based on any such external influence as, say, a Greek theory. On the other hand, the Roman conception of *virtus* illustrated by Cicero in de orat.3,137 is essentially related to the virtue of the Cynics -provided that *virtus* is *not* conceived as a quality presupposing national and political activity.

To the Stoics, mindful practice and careful teaching lead to virtue (Diog.Laert.7,8). Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Posidonius, and Hecato were convinced of the fact that virtue could be taught (Diog. Laert.7,91). Cleanthes and his followers emphasized the importance of practicing virtue continuously (Diog.Laert.7,128). According to Epictetus, virtue can be acquired only through learning (disc.1,18, 3f.), and this presupposes continuous practice (disc.2,18,2ff.). Seneca states tersely (ep.123,16), *nemo est casu bonus, discenda virtus est* (cf. dial.4,12,3). Virgil, on his part, would hardly have connected *virtus* with *labor* unless he had conceived *virtus* as action. Cicero claims in off.1,19, *virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit*, and (nat.deor.1,110), *virtus autem actuosa (est)*. According to Aristotle (Diog.Laert.5,31; cf. Arist.eth.Nic.1099 a3f.), true education, παιδεία, has three qualifications: natural gifts (φύσις), learning (μάθησις), and continuous practice (ἄσκησις). Studies required by conventional education are of great use in achieving virtue (Diog.Laert.5,31).¹ According to Protagoras of Abdera, learning (of virtue) requires natural gifts and practice, and studies must be begun at an early age, φύσεος καὶ ἀσκήσεος διδασκαλία δεῖται καὶ ἀπὸ νεότετος δὲ ἀρξαμένων δεῖ μανθάνειν (fr.3 Diels - Kranz). Democritus, who also came from Abdera, thought that continuous practice (ἄσκησις) makes people better than their natural gifts (fr.242 Diels - Kranz).

¹ Cicero has this view in Arch.16, but not, as we have seen, in de orat.3,137.

As he tells Ascanius, *disce virtutem*, Aeneas implies that *virtus* is not primarily a natural gift, and that Ascanius has not acquired the possession of it (as yet). Since this quality is the criterion of manliness it cannot be possessed as a boy. Aeneas cannot give Ascanius *virtus*, but Ascanius can acquire it for himself through learning; and it is through learning *virtus* that Ascanius becomes *vir*. *Virtus* characterizes a man's contribution to the community both at war and in peace. On the other hand, nothing prevented any Roman of whatever age from showing *virtus* in his own private life. CIL I² 1924 = IX 5557 characterizes a boy who has died at the age of sixteen, at the threshold of manhood, *pueri virtus indigne occidit*.¹

Returning to Virgil, the idea that the criterion of manliness includes *labor (industria)* is typically Roman.² As the essence of manly greatness *virtus* implies potency appearing in practical life, and the ethical dimension could not be introduced in this connection. In a community the organisation of which primarily aims at military success education creates and demands (as Aeneas from Ascanius) heroic qualities. In this kind of education traditions play an important part. Accordingly, in the fourth book of the Eclogues, Virgil gives a rule of life (26f.), *at simul heroum laudes et facta parentis / iam legere et quae sit poteris cognoscere virtus*. The content is nearly similar in both of the verses. *Virtus* means 'manliness' in the sense that its achievements (*facta*) cannot be separated from the quality they result from. A militarist community presupposes and demands from its members endurance in endless adversities and courage in situations where there is real reason for fear. There is no place for amiable characteristics in a militarist community, it is only voluntarist-heroic qualities that come to the foreground. Rome was this kind of community through the long period of time when it had not yet begun to wage war of transmarine conquest, and when Greek philosophy was not known yet. As a militarist community develops towards civilization in the course of time the need of amiable qualities gradually becomes

1 Büchner (1962:7) describes the extension of the use of *virtus* from the first occurrences to Horace and states, "*virtus* wird der Bedeutung entsprechend von Grünschnäbeln und von Frauen .. nicht gebraucht."

2 Cf. pp.26f.; 82; 90f.

primary, whereas heroic characteristics remain in the background. The change also implies a change in the criterion of manliness. The general tendency of cultural development outlined in the foregoing applies to Roman Republican history only to a certain extent. Virgil is not the only author whose use of *virtus* indicates that the Roman criterion of manliness had not essentially changed from the times when Roman statesmen and Greek philosophers had not yet gathered in the Circle of Scipio Aemilianus to apply the Stoic conception of man into the administration of the state. The Roman community still needed heroic qualities. Virgil's non-ethical use of *virtus* is an afterimage of the criterion of manliness in the Old Roman community. It should be noticed that the original character never disappeared totally in the pagan Rome, not even when the moralistic ideal included amiable qualities of which there was no trace in the sturdy Cato the Censor. The heroic qualities lived side by side with amiable qualities. The continuity of the heroic qualities was guaranteed by Stoicism. This philosophy was naturally applicable to the Romans. Long before they had begun to philosophize the Romans had been observant in their actions to principles which were later put into theoretical form. From the second century BC onwards some Romans began to speculate, and Stoicism was the philosophy that appealed to them most of all.²

Disce, puer, *virtutem* ex me verumque laborem,
fortunam ex aliis..

Tu facito, mox cum matura advolverit aetas,
sis memor et te animo repentem exempla tuorum

et pater Aeneas et avonculus excitat Hector (Aen.12,435ff.)

The idea is connected with the Roman ethos of family and state, which has been dealt with earlier in this work.³ The idea purported by Aeneas-Virgil in the concluding book of the Aeneid is actually political rather than philosophical.⁴ Aeneas suggests that *virtus* should not be learnt from himself alone but also from his brother

1 It should be noticed here that "Panaetius and Posidonius succeeded at Rome only because they adapted their philosophy to the demands of the Roman tradition, rejecting whatever ran counter to it, as, for instance, the doctrines of inherent superiority of monarchy and of the brotherhood of man." (Earl 1967:40; cf. Syme 57)

2 Lecky 172 -The above interpretation is inspired by his excellent work "History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne".

3 Cf. above p.24f.

4 Maurach 3

Hector who was killed in a duel. Ascanius will not learn *virtus* only by observing his father here and now, but the retrospective reverence to Hector is equally necessary. This kind of *virtus* is not strictly Roman, since Rome is nothing else but the New Troy. Virgil's aim to connect Roman history with Troy explains the mythological and historical aspects of *virtus*. On the other hand, Virgil says towards the end of the last book of the Aeneid (827ff.),

sit Latium, sint Albani per saecula reges
sit Romana potens Itala *virtute* propago;
occidit, occideritque sinas cum nomine Troia.

In this anachronistic prophecy *virtus* is no longer Trojan, or even Trojan-Roman, but Pan-Italic, which is due to Virgil's North Italian origin, as well as the general conception of Italian unity at the time of Caesar and Augustus. Virgil did not regard *virtus* as a quality born and developed within the narrow borders of the city of Rome. This is further indicated in a passage of the second book of the Georgics (532ff.; cf. 167ff.).

On the basis of the foregoing, *virtus Vergiliana* proves to be a term of appreciation. Yet *virtus* has its reverse side quite in accordance with Plautus, Ennius, Lucretius, and Catullus. The *fervida virtus* attributed to Theseus by Catullus has its related expression in Virgil, viz. *ferox virtus* in Aen.12,19ff.: *o praestans animi iuvenis, quantum ipse feroci / virtute exsuperas, tanto me impensius aequum est / consulere.. Ferox virtus* and *consulere* are antithesized. In this instance, *virtus* does not include mental abilities, which reminds of the passages Plaut.Epid.106 and Enn.Hect.1ytr.200f. The *virtus* of the *pious Aeneas* (Aen.12,435) and that of the *fervidus Turnus* (Aen.11,441) lead to the war between the Trojans and the Rutulians. Consequently, Virgil's attitude towards heroism is ambivalent. This aspect will be further illustrated in the following chapter.

Thus the conclusion can be drawn that *virtus Vergiliana* is the Roman characteristic only in a very wide sense. It contains a Trojan and Pan-Italic element. Virgil's use of *virtus* is connected with an older Roman tradition. Lucilius, Publilius Syrus, Nepos, and Cicero made an attempt to give the concept moral content. This does not seem to have had any effect whatsoever on Virgil. The philosophical dimension is also lacking, for *virtus Vergiliana* refers neither to

an individual virtue (Cicero), nor to the composite concept of all the philosophical virtues (Lucilius, Cicero). In certain occurrences *virtus* gives us a negative impression. It seems to me that Virgil held *virtus* in high esteem only as far as it has some connection to *pietas*. *Virtus* alone would not connote anything but violence.

2.16. Appendix Vergiliana

Without taking any definite stand in regard to the alleged unauthenticity of the poems of *Appendix Vergiliana*¹, I would like to pay attention to the following aspects. *Virtus* occurs six times in *Culex*, only once in *Ciris* (118), and three times in *Aetna*. The examination of the use of *virtus* in *Culex* and *Ciris* does not justify the conclusion that these poems were written by someone else than Virgil. As regards *Aetna*, the opposite seems to be true. It is hard to believe that Virgil would have written a poem in which *virtus* is totally different from the *virtus* in his authentic works. As I have pointed out in the foregoing, Virgil did not use *virtus* in the meaning of an individual 'virtue'. On the contrary, it is said in *Aetna* (633), *pietas homini tutissima virtus*. As far as I can see, Virgil, who loved peace and hated war², could not have written in this way, although *pietas* did have a central part in the *Aeneid*.³ *Virtus* is the quality of an unsympathetic man of power rather than a virtue of a sensitive and gentle person. *Pietas homini tutissima virtus* is a terminological contradiction for Virgil. The world that had experienced the horrors of the Civil War had had more than enough of frequent displays of heroism, which had led the state to the verge of ruin.⁴ Concepts tire, wear off, and are perverted along with the actions and phenomena which they characterize. This is what happened to *virtus*, too. An indication of this process is the astounding epithet attributed to Sertorius by Florus (2,22,1)

1 Cf. among others, Löfstedt 52ff.; Fraenkel 1ff.; Jachmann 579ff.

2 Ferguson 178

3 *Virtus* is a rationalistic value and it essentially includes the conception of *pietas erga patres et patriam*, but not *pietas erga deos*. It is as early as in Naeuius that this kind of *virtus* occurs.

4 Cf. Earl 1967:68f. and 73

(*Sertorius*) *vir summae quidem sed calamitosae virtutis malis suis maria terrasque permiscuit*. *Virtus* characterizes the efficiency of an anarchist. On account of the heroic undertones conventionally included in *virtus* Virgil was unwilling to give the concept the semantic content expected from him on the basis of his humanistic view of life. Therefore he made a conscious and consistent restriction in order to give *virtus* the exclusive meaning of heroic potency. In verse 633 the author of *Aetna* says something that Virgil himself could not have said.

The remaining two occurrences of *virtus* in *Aetna* give support to the view that Virgil would not have been the author of the poem.¹ Virgil did not attribute *virtus* to inanimate objects, which is an indication of his conscious terminological restriction. But in two passages of *Aetna* *virtus* is attributed to stones. It is said in verse 417, *miranda est lapidis vivax animosaque virtus*. Further on, it is said in 530f. that the *propria virtus* of certain volcanic species of stones is their burning and melting.² *Propria virtus* has here the meaning 'specific' or 'characteristic quality'. A change connotes a potentiality, which is immanent in a living organism or an artificial product as potency, and which is capable of realization. The species of stones referred to in these passages of the poem are susceptible to change in a way that is not characteristic of all kinds of stones. Their *virtus* is their susceptibility to change. At the same time the conception of *virtus* has greatly changed from that of Virgil himself. In *Aetna* *virtus* refers to an individual virtue (*pietas*) and is twice attributed to inanimate objects. Thus it has moved towards the semantic field of ἀρετή. Diogenes Laertius (7,91) implies that ἀρετή has among its meanings the 'excellence' of any living organism or artificial product, e.g. statue. This definition, however, cannot alone cover

1 I do not purport to say that the examination of the use of *virtus* straightaway solves problems of identification. On the other hand, it can elucidate them. As regards *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which has been assigned to Cicero, the following aspect should be considered, *non potest virtutem sine doctrina comparari, quoniam ne equus quidem indomitus idoneus possit esse* (4,59). This does not sound like Cicero, who assured in Arch.15 that *virtus* could quite well be acquired without any *doctrina*. Be that as it may, the contrast is rather clear.

2 Cf. Eisenhut 80

both of the occurrences of *virtus* attributed to inanimate objects in *Aetna*. In connection with them, the conception of the neutralization of value of *virtus* could be introduced. In verse 417 it is only the positive semantic context (*vivax, animosaque*) that replenishes *virtus* with similar semantic content, and *virtus* alone has the meaning of a 'quality' that is neutral as regards its value. *Propria virtus* on its part could be interpreted as the 'characteristic quality'. This kind of usage anticipates Vitruvius, Paracelsus, and the Middle Ages. *Virtus propria* occurs in a poem of conflict between a rose and a violet by an anonymous 12th century author (210, 11 Raby). The rose and the violet present their special qualities to each other, *de virtute propria multa disserentes*. The *virtus* of a flower is the combination of all the specific qualities distinguishing it from other flowers, living organisms, or artificial products.

The conclusion can be drawn that the attributes needed for support in order to make *virtus* positive and not neutral (or even negative) as regards its value indicate the tiring, wearing off, and perversion of the concept. On its own *virtus* would have appeared faded.

2.17. *Tibullus and Propertius*

Virtus occurs in the works of Tibullus and Propertius only six times altogether, which could be considered a small number in relation to the large amount of text. The word does not occur at all in Tibullus' authentic works. On the other hand, it occurs once in *Panegyricus in Messallam* (3,7,1), which is included in *Corpus Tibullianum*. There *virtus* means the 'excellence' of Messalla.¹ The other five occurrences are in the elegies of Propertius. It should be noticed that the relation *virtus - amor* is not made thematic. Tibullus and Propertius do not present the conflict between heroism and love, which was considered possible by Plautus, and conceived as irresoluble by Catullus on the basis of his own personality and the

1 Eisenhut 102

experiences from his relation with Lesbia. As regards the use of *virtus* by Tibullus and Propertius, I have nothing more to add to what Eisenhut has written on the subject.¹

2.18. Horace

If we posed the question whom *virtus* occurring 69 times serves in the works of Horace, the answer would definitely be Horace himself. In the works of Horace *virtus* serves as the means of interpreting positively the poet's individual views of life.²

It has been pointed out in the foregoing that *virtus*, according to Accius, is an immanent quality constantly at the disposal of man. Further on, we saw that *virtus Luciliana* does not imply reverence to gods. It is Cicero who clearly states that the virtue of man is independent of deity (nat.deor.3,86 and 88). Accordingly, *virtus* remains on the rational level. The same idea is implied in Hor.epist. 1,18,111f., *sed satis est orare Iovem, qui ponit et aufert, / det vitam, det opes: aequum mi animum ipse parabo*. This is our starting-point for dealing with the Horatian *virtus*.

The conception of the influence of capricious Fortune further indicates Horace's individualistic view of life (carm.3,29,49ff.).

Fortuna saevo laeta negotio et
ludum insolentem ludere pertinax
transmutat incertos honores
nunc mihi, nunc aliis benigna.

Laudo manentem; si celeris quatit
pinnas, *resigno* quae dedit et mea
virtute me involvo probamque
pauperiem sine dote quaero.

The conception of *aequus animus* in epist.1,18,112, and that of *virtus* in carm.3,29,55 are identical.

If Fortune bereft Horace of her favours he would actually lose nothing since he could always rely on his own *virtus*. The verses indicate belief in Τύχη, which was typical of Greek thought. Courage

¹ Eisenhut 101ff.

² To Catullus, as it has been pointed out in the foregoing, *virtus* (*virtutes*) had negative undertones.

is an effective counterbalance to Fortune. Diogenes the Cynic (Diog. Laert.6,38) claimed that he could counterbalance Fortune (Τυχή) with courage (ἀνδρεία), and, in the same way, convention (νόμος) with nature (φύσις), and passion (πάθος) with reason (λόγος). How little -if at all- this conception of ἀνδρεία and *virtus* differs from ἀρετή can be seen in the view of Antisthenes of ἀρετή being a weapon that could not be taken away (Diog.Laert.6,12). As far as it is known, Antisthenes was the author of the treatise Περὶ ἀνδρείας (Diog.Laert. 6,16). Athenaeus, an epigrammatic poet, wrote of all Stoics (Anth. Pal.9,496; cf. Diog.Laert.7,30) that virtue of mind (ἀρετὰ ψυχᾶς) is the only good. It is virtue of mind alone that maintains the life of men and πόλεις more safely than high gates and walls.¹

Capricious Fortune makes the phenomenal world unstable and individual human life erratic. Horace is able to succumb, but he can also manage on his own. The expression *mea virtute mea involvo* emphasizes his spontaneity and self-confidence (cf. Plaut.Pseud.725f.).² To Horace, man is the ultimate cause and not a means of some authority higher than man himself. This is an instance where Stoic and Epicurean thought approach each other. *Virtus* characterizes individual power resources, the active use of them, and, accordingly, personal responsibility of one's own existence. This refers to Epicurean morals which want to categorize individual pleasure as the aim of all human activity.³ An Epicurean is happy under all circumstances since fate cannot much affect him (Cic.fin.1,61). On the contrary, seeking support from Fortune can easily be disheartening. The antithesis *Fortuna - virtus* is equally obvious as the parallelism *pauperies - virtus*, which emphasizes the ideal characteristics of the Old Roman farmer-warrior (cf. Liv.3,26,7). In *carm.*3,21,11f. Horace attributes *virtus* to Cato the Censor, *narratur et prisci Catonis / saepe mero caluisse virtus*. This case of *virtus* could quite well be interpreted as peculiarly austere, 'manly character', which should be regarded as voluntaristic-heroic rather than amiable. Wine, however, softens Cato's sturdy and austere resolute manliness. *Virtus* is not only a single character-

1 The very same idea is purported by Polybius as the following example indicates (9,10,1), οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἔξω κοσμεῖται πόλις (Συρακοῦσα) ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν οἰκούντων ἀρετῆς (cf. 10,27,1)

2 This conception of *virtus* closely reminds that of Accius and can therefore be regarded as traditional.

3 Zeller 1880:472

istic but the entire character and combination of manly qualities.

It reads in *carm.* 3,3,1ff. that no storms can shake the man of quiet conviction, for he is not afraid of the howls of the *mobile vulgus* or the threats of the tyrant,

iustum ac tenacem propositi virum
non civium ardor prava iubentium,
non vultus instantis tyranni
mente quatit solida..

This is what one could call the passive aspect of courage, mental calm of a quietist, as it were. On the other hand, it is quite in accordance with the Stoic system¹ that *virtus* has its active aspect, too. It is the spectacular characteristic of men of will and action. Ulysses the superman is one of those examples to all men of endurance and vigour (*epist.* 1,2,17).² All those who take part in public life, have a wide field for the exercise of their active *virtus*. It is expressly this kind of *virtus* that the Roman militarist community demands from its members (*epist.* 1,12,25ff.),

ne tamen ignores, quo sit Romana loco res:
Cantaber Agrippae, Claudii *virtute* Neronis
Armenius cecidit..

The discrepancy between the two aspects of *virtus* is hardly reconcilable (*epist.* 2,1,229ff.; cf. *epist.* 2,1,123),

sed tamen est operae pretium cognoscere, qualis
aedituos habeat belli spectata domique
virtus, indigno non committenda poetae.

The active aspect of *virtus* is not within the reach of the *indignus poeta*.

In *carm.* 2,7,9ff. Horace addresses Pompey,
Tecum Philippos et celerem fugam
sensi relictæ non bene parmula,
cum fracta *virtus* et minaces
turpe solum tetigere mento.

To what or whom does *fracta virtus* refer? Kiessling - Heinze's presumption that *fracta virtus* refers primarily to Brutus³ cannot be confirmed factually although Horace states in the first verses (1f.),

1 Cf. Arnold 285f.

2 Cf. *sat.* 1,7,112 (Hector and Achilles); *epod.* 9,25f. (Scipio Africanus)

3 Kiessling - Heinze *ad locum*

*o saepe mecum tempus in ultimum / deducte (Pompei) Bruto militiae
duce* ("under the leadership of Brutus"). As far as I can see, it is not a question of a collapse of *virtus* on the part of the commander in the first place. Eisenhut agrees on this point. According to him, the semantic context (*celeris fuga, relictæ non bene parmula, and minaces turpe solum tetigere mento*) does not give support to the presumption of Kiessling - Heinze.¹ Eisenhut has nothing more to add concerning the problem of attribution; yet he states that *virtus* occurs here in the meaning 'military valour' ('militärische Tapferkeit').² Dominicus Bo gives a differing interpretation in his dictionary of Horace.³ He places the expression *fracta virtus* into the category *militaris potentia, vires exercitus*. The conceptual consequences are noteworthy. It is not only the military valour (*virtus*) of Brutus, Pompey, or Horace himself that has collapsed, but the same thing has happened to all members of the republican party and troops. *Fracta virtus*⁴ approaches a collective meaning to the extent that *virtus* with its epithet could be translated as 'subdued, crushed troops', 'army'. Some earlier occurrences offer close parallels in this respect. Thus *fracta virtus* (cf. *caesa virtus* Prud.perist.1,49) means the 'troops' themselves rather than their 'capacity of performing' or 'strength'. *Virtus* has been concretized to such an extent that it has become to have a collective meaning.

Another way of interpretation would be to regard *fracta virtus* as referring to Horace himself. Then it would be a question of the collapse of his own personal valour. This way of interpretation is given support as the poem continues (2,7,13ff.),

Sed me per hostes Mercurius celer
denso paventem sustulit aere
Te (Pompeium) rursus in bellum resorbens
unda fretis tulit aestuosis.

Fracta virtus and *me paventem* could be interpreted as being almost identical in their meaning. In that case, *fracta virtus* would not refer to Pompey, preparing to renew the fight, but Horace, who urges the weary hero to turn about-face and come to him to enjoy the rec-

1 Eisenhut 95²⁶⁴

2 Eisenhut 95²⁶⁴

3 Bo s.v.

4 *Virtus* occurs in connection with the verb *frangere* also in Cicero (Planc.9).

reation of peace and the wine casks especially provided for the guest,

Ergo oblitam redde Iovi dapem
longaque fessum militia latus
depone sub lauru mea nec
parce cadis tibi destinatis (17ff.)

The interpretation of *fracta virtus* as referring to Horace himself receives further support from the expressly personal confessions in the middle part of the seventh poem in the second book of Odes, such as *celer fuga* (9), *relicta non bene parmula* (10), and verses 13 and 14, where Horace confesses that he was overcome by fear.

Consequently, *fracta virtus* does not refer primarily to Brutus or Pompey (or Brutus and Pompey). On the other hand, it characterizes all the defeated republican troops in general (including Brutus, Pompey, and Horace), or, according to another way of interpretation, Horace alone. *Virtus* occurs either in a collective meaning ('troops') or in the conventional meaning (Horace's 'valour'). The latter alternative is supported by the third strophe of the poem, which describes Horace's sentiments amidst the defeat at Philippi. The former alternative, however, cannot be categorically excluded. *Virtus* may quite well have had the meaning 'troops', 'army' even before Horace.¹

In the second poem of the third book of Odes Horace reflects on the essence of *virtus* in a manner widely differing from Lucilius. In the fragment of Lucilius the word occurs in a conceptually expanded meaning. As for Horace's passage *carmin. 3, 2, 17ff.*, *virtus* has been restricted to mean 'military valour' which might seem quite odd at first sight,

Virtus repulsae nescia sordidae
intaminatis fulget honoribus
nec sumit aut ponit securis
arbitrio popularis aurae:

Virtus recludens immeritis mori
caelum negata temptat ire via
coetusque vulgaris et udam
spernit humum fugiente penna.

Virtus cannot be interpreted as ethical perfection in the meaning 'virtue' but as the heroic characteristic, i.e. 'military valour'. This is given support by the immediately preceding verses (13ff.),

¹ Cf. above p.18

dulce et decorum est pro patria mori
 mors et fugacem persequitur virum
 nec parcit imbellis iuventae
 poplitibus timidoque tergo (cf. *carm.* 3,5,29ff.).

Plautus in *Amphitruo* and Cicero in his speech *Pro Murena* have characterized the climate surrounding *virtus* in the same way as Horace in *carm.* 3,2,17ff.

Heroism and patriotism are inseparably connected with each other. To a Roman more or less inclined towards Stoicism, patriotism appeared primarily as a moral duty. This argument could be applied to Horace more aptly than to Lucretius. This genuine Epicurean alludes to the heroes of the Roman history only once (3,1025ff.).² Lucretius was not inspired by Roman military achievements. Since he was not inclined to admire heroism (which was a curiously non-Roman feature) patriotism did not mean very much to him. J.S. Reid comments *ad* *Lucr.* 1,28, "Of all schools of ancient thought, the Epicurean school alone was untouched by the glamour of war."³ Reid and Litchfield, who has quoted him⁴ have overlooked the views of non-Epicurean philosophers, who thought on the similar lines as Aristippus of Cyrene. According to the Cyreneans, nothing is respectable and just by nature but only by custom and convention (*Diog.Laert.* 2,92). As far as *Diogenes Laertius* (9,45) could be trusted, Democritus would have agreed with the Cyreneans in his presumption that things could only have qualities brought forth by convention.⁵ When he said that he greatly loved his country Anaxagoras pointed the heavens (*Diog.Laert.* 2,7). Theodorus went to extremes claiming that it would be reasonable for a good man not to risk his life in defending his country since it would not be sensible to give up one's wisdom because of the unwise (*Diog.Laert.* 2,98). He regarded the whole world as his native country (*Diog.Laert.* 2,99) as Democritus also did (fr.247 *Diels - Kranz*), ἀνδρὶ σοφῶι πᾶσα γῆ βατή· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἀγαθῆς πατρὶς ὁ ξύμπας κόσμος. The school of Anniceris did not go as far as Theodorus but admitted that a good citizen is sometimes inspired by patriotic motives (*Diog.Laert.* 2,96). Lucretius could be

1 Cf. Litchfield 10f.; Lecky 181f.

2 Thus Litchfield 12₃

3 Reid 1

4 Litchfield 12₃

5 Cf. *Democr.fr.* 117 *Diels - Kranz*; *Cic.Acad.* 2,32; *Isid.etym.* 8,6,12

characterized -if not by a total absence of patriotic impulses- at least by the paucity of them. Perhaps Maurach is slightly too emphatic about this absence when he states, "es gibt keine Stelle im ganzen Lucrez, wo er deutlich und eine Umwertung aufgrund seiner Nationalitätszugehörigkeit ausspricht".¹ On the other hand, the *locus* Lucr.3,1025 mentioned by Litchfield² does not make any serious objections against the argument of Maurach.

An Epicurean sage does not crave for fame³, which makes him completely different from a Roman statesman, either *nobilis* or *novus*, inspired by the timocratic ethos of state. An Epicurean was not, however, totally indifferent of other people's opinion about him. He cared about other people's opinion to the extent that he avoided arousing despise (Lucr.3,993). In contrast to Stoicism, Epicureanism was philosophy of renunciation both in a political and social sense. The school did not recommend participation in public life to its members. This kind of activity would prevent them from reaching the only real aims, happiness and wisdom (Lucr.5,1125; cf. Epict.disc.1,23,6). In this respect, the Epicureans approached the Cynics. When applying the principle *ἀσθε βιωσας* in his life Atticus, a friend of Cicero (Nep.Att.6), proved to be as observant to Epicurus as Lucretius. To a Stoic, participation in political life would be a matter of honour unless some particular reason excluded him from it (Diog.Laert.7,121; cf. Stoic.vet.frr.3,697 Arnim). According to a dialogue by Seneca called *De otio* (3) it is not worthy of a wise man to take pains and sacrifice his life at a time when the government of the state is in the hands of the worthless. Contrary to this, the Epicureans advise their followers to make it their principle to stay out of politics and participate in it only when exceptional circumstances occur (Cic.fin.3,68).

We can conclude that Horace recognized two parts in *virtus*, one passive and private, which consists in despising buffs of fortune. The other part of *virtus* is active and political. The former is displayed in accordance with what we can call personalism. The latter, for its part, is displayed in accordance with the collective interests of the Roman state. Consequently, it is Horace who implies that

1 Maurach 2

2 Litchfield 123

3 Zeller 1880:487f.

virtus is not incompatible with the passive (negative) notion of freedom.¹ Horace was not an Epicurean like Lucretius but a typical Roman as regards his relationship with heroism and his native country. To Horace, *virtus* is uncomplicatedly positive. In his works *virtus* has the conceptual cogency which is absent in the poems of Lucretius, Catullus, Virgil, Tibullus, and Propertius.

2.19. Ovid

Eisenhut has clearly pointed out that Ovid, contrary to Horace, Tibullus, and Propertius, has made *virtus* an erotic term.² I, for my part, move to other aspects.

In the *Fasti* and the *Metamorphoses* the meanings 'courage' and 'valour' frequently occur on account of the theme.³ Eisenhut claims that the meaning 'Tapferkeit' is not quite strange ("nicht ganz fremd") even if the *Ars amatoria* is concerned.⁴ He refers to verse 184 of the first book,

Parcite natales timidi numerare deorum
Caesaribus *virtus* contigit ante diem.
Ingenium caeleste suis velocius annis

surgit, et ignavae fert male damna morae (amat.1,183ff.).

The verses before these ones have dealt with Gaius Caesar, the son of Julia, the daughter of Augustus, and Agrippa (177ff.). Gaius, *iuvenum princeps*, was killed in the war against the Parthians, and, moreover, Ovid's prophecy in verse 194 that Gaius was in the long run to become *princeps senum* never came true. The verse concerned is translated by J.H. Mozley, the Loeb translator, and reads as follows, "valour falls early to the lot of Caesars." Eisenhut interprets it similarly ('Tapferkeit').⁵ Both of them, however, have left the problem half-discussed. Why to interpret *virtus* as 'valour', since, by virtue of the conceptual content, 'manhood' in the meaning *virilis aetas* ('Mannesalter') comes to the front?⁶ When criticizing

1 Cf. above p.21f.

2 Eisenhut 106

3 Eisenhut 106

4 Eisenhut 106

5 Eisenhut 106

6 According to Eisenhut (175), *virtus* in the meaning 'Mannesalter' never occurs during the period of literary history he deals with.

Haas Eisenhut notes that *virtus* in Tac.Germ.20 and 31 means nothing but 'Tapferkeit'.¹ Be that as it may, verse 184 implies that the Caesars come of age earlier than other men. This idea is found in Cicero, too. In Phil.5,47 he reflects on the implication of certain Roman laws, which presuppose a definite age for any candidate of the consulate. The minimum age is not unfounded on account of the fact that legislators were afraid of fanaticism typical of (too) young men (*adulescentiae temeritas*). According to Polybius (6,19, 5), a Roman was not allowed to enter any political office unless he had served at least ten years in the army. The criterion of the consulate was *virtus*, C. Caesar *ineunte aetate docuit ab excellenti eximiaque virtute progressum aetatis non oportere. Itaque maiores nostri veteres admodum antiqui leges annales non habebant, quas multis post annis attulit ambitio, ut gradus esset petitionis inter aequales* (Phil.5,47). These laws had not proved to be appropriate in every respect, for Cicero continues, *ita saepe magna indoles virtutis, priusquam rei publicae prodesse potuisset, extincta est* (Phil.5,47). Cicero implicitly includes in the antithesis *leges - virtus* the fact that laws cannot only prevent capable persons from going in for politics but also extinguish their *virtus*. On the other hand, this is not the fate of C. Caesar. His *virtus* had exceptionally developed to its full maturity *ineunte aetate*. Accordingly, Cicero (Phil.5,48) draws the conclusion, *ex quo iudicari potest virtutis esse quam aetatis cursum celeriozem*. *Virtus* and *aetas* form an antithesis.

In amat.1,184 *virtus* means 'manhood' ('Mannesalter'). This cannot be denied with any appropriate argument. If one insists on interpreting *virtus* as 'manly capacity of performing' ('valour'), it should be added that the immediate semantic context presupposes emphasis on 'manhood' in the meaning *virilis aetas* (or sometimes *iuventus*). Accordingly, the argument of Haas² that *virtus* does not mean 'Mannesalter' elsewhere than in Tac.Germ.20 and 31 does not hold true. On the other hand, even if *virtus* meant 'manhood' in these two passages of *Germania*, and the contextual interpretation of Haas were correct, his theory of 'Mannesalter' as the original meaning of *virtus* is, in want of further evidence, erroneous. The theory of 'Mannesalter' is not, however, without merits, in the

1 Eisenhut 175; cf. above p.20

2 Haas 163

3 What Eisenhut 175f. seems to regard as impossible

light of Ov.amat.1,184. *Virtus* had not the primary original meaning presupposed by the suffix. On the other hand, *virtus* characterizes from the very beginning of literature an abstract quality or the combination of abstract qualities which imply 'manhood'. Ovid, and possibly also Tacitus, more clearly than other authors, have emphasized the component of age as an essential part of heroic capacity of performing. Every time *virtus* directly or indirectly refers to the characteristic required by the Romans from their soldiers, it implies the entire period in the life of *civis* when he is trusted by the community and considered fit for military service.¹ Livy (5,40,1) relates that the Romans were withdrawing into the citadel of Capitol driven by the invasion of the Gauls in the year 390 BC. The Romans were followed by their able-bodied men whose valour they relied on, *versae inde adhortationes ad agmen iuvenum quos in Capitolium atque in arcem prosequerantur (seniores), commendantes virtuti eorum iuventaeque urbis per trecentos sexaginta annos omnibus bellis victricis quaecumque reliqua esset fortuna*. The parallelism *virtus - iuventus* is noteworthy (cf. Vell.Pat.2,107,1). *Virtus* means 'valour' as the safeguard of the continuation of Roman history. *Iuvenes* and *iumenta* refer to all the able-bodied men of the Roman community, and *virtus* is their characteristic. The able-bodied are contrasted with *seniores*, who are not fit for military service and, accordingly, are not in possession of *virtus* for the simple reason that they have ceased to be able-bodied. According to Q. Aelius Tubero (fr.4 Peter), Servius Tullius had divided the male population of Rome into three classes: 0-17 years, *pueri*; 17-46 years, *iuvenes* or *milites*; and those over 46 years, *seniores*. In accordance with this classification *virtus* would be the characteristic of those between 17 and 46 years of age. The concept implies having the powers of a full-grown man.

In the meaning 'the individual valour of an able-bodied man' *virtus* implies the capacity brought along by age as the prerequisite and instrument of heroic mind. *Virtus* makes a citizen fit for fighting and is in itself an indication of this quality. *Virtus* differs from

1 This interpretation is illustrated by *virtutis flos*, which is a metaphor found in Iust.30,4,15. It occurs in Florus, too. According to Florus' morphology of culture, Roman history is divided into four ages (*infantia*, *adulescentia*, *iuentus* or *robusta maturitas*, and *senectus*). Florus characterizes the second age (*adulescentia*) as *aetas* when the Roman people *maxime viruit et quodam flore virtutis ferbuit* (1,22,1).

the other words formed with the same suffix only in the respect that the component of age and condition inevitably lies in the background, whereas the related words are more closely connected with the suffix. In any case, the foregoing shows that *virtus* differs from its related words less than it has been believed. *Virtus* means not only 'manliness' but also 'the state of being a full-grown man'.

Eisenhut claims that *virtus* occurring in Ovid in the meaning 'strength' ('Kraft') is something new. He remarks that 'Tapferkeit' has included 'Kraft' from the very beginning, "den für die naive Auffassung ist Tapferkeit ohne Kraft nicht denkbar".¹ It is not without significance that Eisenhut makes a distinction between the concepts of *Tapferkeit* (valour) and *Kraft* (or more exactly *blosse Kraft*, pure physical strength, brute force). Concerning met.9,62, where Achelous says, *inferior virtute, meas divertor in artes*, Eisenhut interprets *virtus* as 'physical strength'. Further on, *virtus* seems to mean 'strength' in met.5,188. In his agony of death Hercules addresses his burnt hands claiming that he has performed his exploits *vestra virtute*. According to Eisenhut² "die *virtus* der Arme kann nur ihre Kraft, Stärke sein." Eisenhut's interpretations of both of the passages are quite correct, but the conclusion he draws on page 110 is not quite convincing, "dazu (the introduction of *virtus* into the erotic language) kommt eine *neue* (my italics -JS) Variante: Während früher *virtus* niemals die blosse 'Kraft' bezeichnete, sondern nur hinter 'Tüchtigkeit' und 'Tapferkeit' sichtbar werden konnte, zeigt sich bei Ovid diese Bedeutung in aller Klarheit." This is not true. If the *virtus* of hands (met.5,188) can be only in their strength, as it is undoubtedly the case with Hercules, I find it difficult to believe why *virtus ulnorum* in Plaut.Asin.545ff. and probably also the *virtus* of hands and feet regarded as the virtue of primitive men by Lucretius (5,966ff.) would not primarily mean 'strength'. Eisenhut³ characterizes *virtus ulnorum* by comparing *virtus* to ὀρετή, "die ὀρετή der *ulni* würde dann darin bestehen, kräftig zuschlagen zu können". Is it a question of the strength of elbows or, more generally speaking, excellence, which included strength? Eisenhut does not state clearly which meaning is on the foreground on page 27, but if he had been consistent in his conclusion of Ovid's use of *virtus*

1 Eisenhut 106

2 Eisenhut 106

3 Eisenhut 27₅₂

on page 110 he would have interpreted *virtus ulnorum* as the 'excellence' of elbows. As far as I can see, the primary meaning is 'strength'. What about Lucretius? Eisenhut¹ states that primitive people hunted with very simple weapons "nur vertrauend auf die *virtus*, die 'Kraft' und 'Tüchtigkeit' ihrer Arme und Beine" (Lucr.5,966f.). Thus Eisenhut's final remark on Ovid² shows consistence with his interpretations of Plautus and Lucretius. But if *virtus* in the meaning 'strength' occasionally comes to the front as early as in Plautus (Asin.545ff.) and in Lucretius (5,966f.) Eisenhut would be mistaken in regarding Ovid as the introducer of the new variant. Namely, if it is true that *virtus* can mean primarily 'strength', as it actually does in some passages of Ovid, it has that meaning in accordance with the same principles of content as in the passages of Plautus and Lucretius. Contrary to the argument of Eisenhut, Ovid did not introduce a new variant. Dealing with Statius (silv.5,2,33f.) Eisenhut repeats his argument that the meaning 'Kraft' ("körperliche und geistige") occurs first in Ovid ("zum erstenmal bei Statius' Vorbild Ovid")³ We should confine ourselves to state that the meaning 'strength' is more common in Ovid than in the previous literature. In met.14, 357 Circe relies on the 'potency' of her herbs (*herbarum virtus*) According to Eisenhut⁴, the *virtus* of living plants (met.15,205) does not mean 'potency' ('Wirkungskraft') but 'force' ('Kraft'). The *virtus* in this passage dealing with Pythagoras means the ever-renewing 'living force' of nature in Pythagorean terms, *neque adhuc* (before the year passes into summer) *virtus in frondibus ulla est* (cf. Mus.fr.5 Diels - Kranz). *Virtus* is not present all year round. It is only in summer that nature is filled with life and energy.

In the works of Ovid *virtus* occurs as a quality of a woman. Eisenhut considers Ovid to be the second author to attribute *virtus* to a woman.⁶ According to him, the first was Cicero, who speaks of the *virtus* of his wife Terentia in fam.14,1,1. Yet Eisenhut has overlooked Plautus' *Amphitruo*, where Alcmena interprets her own

1 Eisenhut 39

2 Eisenhut 110

3 Eisenhut 171

4 Eisenhut 110

5 Cf. met.8,387 (Atalanta); epist.4,117 (Antiope, Queen of Amazons); trist.1,6,15; 3,1,94 *et passim* (Ovid's wife); Pont.3,1,115f. (Livia, Augustus' wife) cf. Eisenhut 108

6 Eisenhut 108

moral backbone as *virtus*. Together with Plautus, Cicero, and Livy, who will be dealt later on, Ovid gives evidence of the usage of the last two centuries of the Republican Age and the reign of Augustus. Contrary to its etymology, *virtus* could almost equally well be attributed to a woman as to a man. Attributing *virtus* to a woman Ovid did not follow the example of Cicero but an old and established usage.

What is noteworthy in Ovid is the explicit meaning 'manhood' of *virtus*. The fact that 'the state of being a man' is included into 'manliness' is not a simple platitude. Ovid is not the introducer but the establisher of the meaning 'physical strength'. Noteworthy is the *virtus* of nature, interpreted as the ever-renewing living force in Pythagorean terms. In accordance with the cycle of the seasons, this *virtus* alternately blossoms and withers. Ovid gives evidence of the fact that during the reign of Augustus *virtus*, contrary to its etymology, could be regarded as a female characteristic.

2.20. Livy

Eisenhut claims that the plural *virtutes* is "an allen 18 Stellen ganz allgemein 'gute Eigenschaften'.¹ The argument is inconsistent since '*virtutes*' also occurs in its pre-Nepotian meaning 'deeds of valour'. Eisenhut himself quotes passage 7,7,3 and states that the meaning is here 'Taten, Äusserungen der Tapferkeit'. '*Virtutes*' means 'Heldentaten' also in 33,3,12 as Eisenhut quite correctly notes. *Virtutes* imply the military and political merits of Camillus in 6,11,3, since Livy says that Marcus Manlius Capitolinus envied Camillus his *virtutes* and *honores*. It is an undeniable psychological truth that people envy each other's remarkable deeds rather than mental qualities. The *virtutes* of Marcus Manlius, the rescuer of the Capitol, have quite a concrete meaning (6,20,15), *populum brevi, postquam periculum ab eo (Manlio) nullum erat, per se ipsas recordantem virtutes desiderium eius tenuit*. Common people remembered also the more general social merits of Manlius, not only his military deeds of valour (cf. 5,47,7; 6,11,4f.). Manlius had

1 Eisenhut 125

2 Eisenhut 125

won the common people to his side helping a centurion who had fallen into debts (6,14,2ff.). Yet alongside with the concrete meaning, abstract meanings also occur. Hannibal's *virtutes* (21,4,9f.) refer to his admirable characteristics as a commander. The same explanation also applies to Scipio, *responsa inde legationibus suspensis varietate tot casuum dare coepit (Scipio), ita elato ab ingenti virtutum suarum fiducia animo ut nullum ferox verbum excideret, ingensque omnibus quae diceret cum maiestas inesset tum fides* (26,19,14). The meaning cannot be 'deeds of valour' (or 'merits') but rather 'mental faculties' since people are less inclined to rely on their merits than their ability to display them. In the characterization of Numa Pompilius, in which Livy uses a reflective style, *virtutes* mean 'moral characteristics' in accordance with Nepos and Cicero, *suapte igitur ingenio temperatum animum virtutibus fuisse opinor magis instructumque non tam peregrinis artibus quam disciplina tetrica ac tristi veterum Sabinorum* (1,18,4). The *virtutes* of Numa are not strictly Roman but Sabino-Roman, in other words, Italic (cf. 4,3,12ff.; 1,34,6). They could be compared to Virgil's conception to *virtus*.¹ Following Cicero (rep.2,43f.; Tusc. 4,3) Livy polemicizes against the conception brought forth by Ovid (met.16,547ff.; cf. Plut.Num.8) *et alii* that Numa would have been an adherent of the Pythagorean School.² According to Livy, Pythagoreanism has not had any particular influence on the *virtutes* of Numa as opposed to his natural gifts (*ingenium*) with his strict Sabinian way of life (*disciplina*). The fact that Numa's *virtutes* characterize moral qualities is guaranteed by the words that are used to describe his properties (*iustitia*, *religio*, and *consultissimus vir* 1,18,1f.).

In antiquity it was thought that history was made by significant men (praef.9). Thus Livy, as well as Sallust, conceived *virtus* as the characteristic of the happy few.³ Hannibal's claim that in Rome there were only *pauca felicitatis virtutisque exempla* (30,30,23) is

1 Cf. above p.106

2 Concerning this problem, cf. Glazer RE XVII 1936:1245f.

3 *Virtus* is the characteristic of those who are far exalted above ordinary men. In the light of the occurrences of *virtus*, the most celebrated national paragons are Tullus Hostilius (2), Mucius Scaevola (3), Q. Cincinnatus (3), Camillus (5), Manlius Capitolinus (3), and, above all, Scipio Africanus, the favourite figure of Livy (12). The quality is attributed to Hannibal the enemy no less than five times.

undoubtedly Livy's own opinion. On the other hand, Hasdrubal implies that *virtus* is rare among people (*inter homines*) in general (29,31,3). This kind of *virtus* is identical with the ἀρετή of Polybius. According to Polybius (6,43,4) Thebes had been elevated to historical significance by only one man (or, at the most, two), or, pleonastically speaking, his ἀρετή. Polybius further claims that the success of the Thebans was not due to the excellent constitution of their state but the ἀρετή of their leading men, προεστώτων ἀνδρῶν ἀρετή (6,43,5). Further on, ἀρετή -but also ἀνδρεία and φιλοπονία- was the characteristic of the very few men who elevated Macedonia from an insignificant kingdom into an empire (8,10,5f.). Livy describes the legendary battle between the triple brothers of Rome and Alba Longa, *consederant utrimque pro castris duo exercitus periculi magis praesentis quam curae expertes; quippe imperium agebatur in tam paucorum virtute ac fortuna positum* (1,25,2). The expression *paucorum virtute ac fortuna* could be compared to Sallust's *egregia virtus paucorum civium* (Cat.53,4). As it has been pointed out in the foregoing, Sallust thought that anyone in possession of pure *virtus* was such an exceptional man of power that he was not dependent on fortune.¹ Nepos and Cicero the philosopher seem to have had the opposite view, as well as Livy. In his work *fortuna (felicitas)* occurs repeatedly in connection with *virtus*.² In 9,17,3 Livy considers that the most decisive factors at war are the number and valour (*virtus*) of the soldiers, the mental faculties (*ingenia*) of the commanders, and, in fine, fortune (*fortuna*), which appears most potent at war.³ In his 37th book Livy claims, *plurimum tamen, quae solet, militum virtus* (the 'valour' of the Roman and Rhodian marines) *in bello valuit* (30,6). The *virtus* of soldiers usually plays a more important role than fortune.⁴

The idea of *virtus* as the only safeguard in the hardships of the soldiers is implied everywhere in Livy's work. Flaminius the commander-in-chief advises his soldiers, *nec enim inde votis aut imploratione deum, sed vi ac virtute evadendum esse* (22,5,2). Human *virtus* is independent even of deity and, accordingly, remains on the rational level. This is quite typical of the Roman Republican thought.⁵

1 Cf. above p.80

2 Cf. Kajanto 1957:98

3 Cf. Caes.Gall.6,30,2, *multum cum in omnibus rebus, tum in re militari potest fortuna*. Alex.43,4, *fortuna plurimum in bellis potest*.

4 In Marc.6 Cicero purports the opposite view; cf. above p.88

5 Cf. above p.110

Virtus shows a clear tendency to be connected with *victoria* (e.g. 1,28,4; 1,42,3; 5,36,6). *Ex analogia*, *virtus* can be lost at the moment of a military disaster. The Capuan noblemen characterize the humiliation of the Romans at Caudium as follows (9,6,13f.), *habere Samnites victoriam non praeclaram solum sed etiam perpetuam, cepisse enim eos non Romam, sicut ante Gallos, sed, quod multo bellicosius fuerit, Romanam virtutem ferociamque*. The Gauls had, to be sure, captured the city of Rome but nothing more. The Samnites, who had won a permanent victory of the Roman *virtus*, were more significant than the Gauls. It is not only the troops defeated at Caudium that *virtus* refers to but also the identity and mental foundation of the Romans.

Virtus had the similar provocative and inciting influence on the Roman mind as *libertas*. Accordingly, *virtus* could be used appropriately as a slogan in militarist propaganda. Attempting to make the defenders of Nola surrender Hanno appeals to the *virtus* and military success of Hannibal, *Hannibalis virtutem fortunamque extollit: populi Romani obterit senescentem cum viribus maiestatem* (23,43,10). The political authority (*maiestas*) of the Roman people depends on its military resources (*vires*). It is Hannibal's *virtus* together with his *fortuna* that has outdone the Roman *maiestas*. The next occurrence of *virtus* in the 23th book (45,2ff.) indicates that Livy uses *virtus* as a stylistic effect in order to cause semantic tension. Now, it is Marcellus' turn to emphasize the loss of strength of the Carthaginian troops. Marcellus encourages his soldiers, *non omnis (Carthaginienses) esse in acie; praedantis vagari in agro; et qui pugnent, marcere Campania luxuria, vino et scortis omnibusque lustris per totam hiemem confectos. Abisse illam vim vigoremque, dilapsa esse robora corporum animorumque quibus Pyrenaei Alpiumque superata sint iuga. Reliquias illorum virorum vix arma membraque sustinentis pugnare. Capuan Hannibali Cannas fuisse: ibi virtutem bellicam, ibi militarem disciplinam, ibi praeteriti temporis famam, ibi spem futuri extinctam* (23,45,2ff.). According to Livy himself (23,18,10f.) Hannibal's decisive mistake was to hibernate in Capua, where the material temptations gave the death-blow to the disciplined fighting morale of the Carthaginian army.¹

¹ It was also a grave mistake not to attack Rome immediately after the battle of Cannae (23,18,13). Livy's conception (cf. 23,18,15ff.) is repeated by Strabo the geographer (5,4,13). As for Polybius, he

Livy's conception of history is similar to that of Polybius, and also Caesar, Sallust, and Tacitus. Inactivity (*desidia*, *otium*) and extravagance (*luxus*, *luxuria*) with their various manifestations ruin the *virtus* of a people or its army, i.e. its military capacity or, in a wider sense, the military way of life in general. Therefore it is not only in a military catastrophe that the *virtus* of a people or an army can be destroyed.

The *virtus* of an individual is not stable but can be lost. That is what happened to Philopoemen, who was captured after a lengthy illness at the age of seventy (39,49,1f.).¹ *Virtus* is the manly characteristic of a man only as long as he is free and conscious of his power (cf. 4,3,14; 5,41,2).² This could be considered to present the *virtus* of a people in miniature.

Virtus is not an innate quality but requires development and ripening. Firstly this idea could be regarded from the military point of view. Consul Marcus Horatius Barbatus assures his soldiers,

does not seem to know anything of the military decadence of Hannibal's army (cf. 11,19,3) or even of the hibernation at Capua. In another passage (7,1,1), Polybius, however, states that the prosperity of the Capuans was due to the fertility of the soil and that they, consequently, were debased into luxury and extravagance (cf. Athen.Anth.Pal.12,528a; Liv.23,2,1).

1 According to Polybius (10,22,1ff.), Philopoemen, his favourite figure, had surpassed all his contemporaries in courage and endurance.

2 It does not seem conceivable that a sick man (Philopoemen) would be in possession of *virtus*. In this connection, the difference between the concepts of *vir* and *homo* can be illustrated. As regards the Latinity of Victor Vitensis, R. Pitkäranta claims that *vir* "bezeichnet zunächst einen durch seine soziale Stellung oder seine Charaktereigenschaften hervorragenden Mann". And further on, "Intressant ist der stilistisch-semantische Unterschied zwischen *vir* und *homo* in der Geschichte von einem blinden Mann namens Felix 2,47 (24,3ff.). Er erhält von Gott in Traum die Aufforderung, zum Bischof Eugenius zu gehen, um sein Gesicht zu bekommen. Als er noch blind ist, heisst er *homo*: 2,49 (24,14). Später als das Wunder geschehen ist, heisst er *vir*" (Pitkäranta 114). Consequently, a blind man is not a *vir* but a *homo*.

Analogically and *mutatis mutandis*, *virtus* is not the characteristic of a *homo* -so it would seem- but expressly that of a *vir*. Losing one's health implies the loss of one's *virtus*, and, as regards Victor Vitensis, gaining one's health implies the elevation from *homo* to *vir* and, on implication, getting *virtus* at the same time.

ut in dies spes virtusque vestra crescat, eadem qua institui disciplina efficiam (3,62,4). Military discipline increases mental readiness for valorous deeds. In another passage (21,49,13), *memoria*, i.e. the memory of the deeds of valour accomplished previously on the same battlefield gives support to *virtus*. Accordingly, *virtus* and patriotism are united. Further on, the *virtus* of soldiers results from exercise and depends on the strategic measures of the commander (22,12,10). Soldiers are not valiant by nature. This idea also occurs in Polybius, who thought that the rise of Rome was based on the military ability of the citizens (1,6,7). This ability was not innate since the Romans had learnt to exercise it during a long period of time by continuously waging war against the Samnites and the Gauls (1,6,7f.). According to Polybius, the success of the Romans in the second Punic War was due to patriotism (6,52,7). The Romans accomplished valorous deeds (ἀρεταῖ) even at sea although they were far less experienced in this theatre of war than the Phoenicians (6,52,8). Thus ἀρετῇ results from patriotism and military ability. The same applies to *virtus*.

A further instance of the idea that *virtus* results from development and ripening appears in the political lawsuit against Quinctius Caeso. Caeso was a patrician, who had displayed courage on the battlefield and been so eloquent on the forum that the ambitions of the tribunes were frustrated (3,11,9f.). A. Verginius, a courageous tribune, ventured to oppose Caeso, who was supported by the other patricians, and sued him (3,11,9). Verginius wanted to exile Caeso, whose activity threatened the freedom of the plebeians (3,11,12f.) The patricians sympathized with Caeso unanimously (3,12,1f.). The famous T. Quinctius Capitolinus defended Caeso appealing to his military accomplishments, *adfirmabat neque in Quinctia gente neque in civitate Romana tantam indolem tam maturae virtutis unquam exstitisse; suum primum militem fuisse, se saepe vidente pugnasse in hostem* (3,12,3). Capitolinus claimed that there was nobody among the Quinctii and the citizens in general whose *virtus* had developed to such maturity as that of Caeso. C. Lucretius, the second defensor, emphasized the military accomplishments on the lines of Capitolinus. But Lucretius, contrary to Capitolinus, admitted that the defendant was not without faults,

quod offendat in eo, fervorem et audaciam, aetatem cottidie magis auferre; quod desideretur, consilium, id in dies crescere. Senescentibus vitiis, maturescente virtute sinerent tantum virum senem in civitate fieri (3,12,7). According to Lucretius, Caeso was too young to have all the good qualities of maturity. *Maturescens virtus* does not refer to the battlefield. On the contrary, it is the combination of the qualities necessary for citizen living in conformity and desiring to be appreciated for his honesty and responsibility. The developing civic prowess of Caeso is not a virtue of nobility but a civic virtue. *Virtus* is presented as a politico-social characteristic of a man who is conscious of the norms of the community he lives in. This kind of *virtus* occurred for the first time in Naevius, and later on, in Publilius Syrus. In accordance with Nepos and Cicero, Livy implies that *virtus* requires time in order to develop and ripe.

The lawsuit of Caeso implies a conflict between two opposite conceptions of *virtus*. Heroic capacity of performing differs from civic prowess presupposed by peaceful activities, and Livy interprets both as *virtus*. Capitolinus defends *matura virtus*, which connotes full maturity for heroic accomplishments, whereas *maturescens virtus* purported by Lucretius could be conceived as daily increasing civic virtue. The culmination of this dramatic episode is the verdict of guilty on Caeso for homicide (3,13,1f.) A hero is not forgiven everything, for the Roman community (at the time of Livy, on implication) was not exclusively militaristic.

Eisenhut writes that Livy "empfindet ihr (*virtus*) gegenüber keine patriotische Ehrfuhr, sondern Achtung nur insoweit, wie er diese vor jeder menschlichen Grösse empfindet".¹ Accordingly, *virtus* would not mean to Livy an emphatically patriotic Roman value but a concept including human greatness independent from national interests.² "Des Livius *virtus* is also nichts typisch Römische." This does not, however, conclude the discussion. Camillus addresses his soldiers (5,27,8), *ego Romanis artibus, virtute opere armis, sicut Veios vincam*. Since *virtus* is *Romana ars* it is at least in

¹ Eisenhut 126

² One must admit that this characterization is applicable to many instances; cf. 26,13,19; 26,15,14; 26,16,3

a sense typically Roman. In the 36th book (44,9) the Roman soldiers are advised "to bear in mind Roman manliness and not to regard the king's slaves as men", *meminisse Romanae virtutis, nec pro viris ducere regia mancipia*. *Virtus* is the characteristic of a free Roman, and since a slave is not *vir* it is analogically impossible for him to be in possession of *virtus*. The conception of *virtus* as the cornerstone of Roman greatness occurs in several passages.¹

In accordance with the beginning of Caesar's description of the Helvetian War, Livy uses *virtus* as a propagandist term in diplomacy. *Virtus* is the characteristic of a tribe conscious of its power, prosperity, and military efficiency. The Gauls give the Roman legates the message, *ut nuntiare domum possent quantum Galli virtute ceteros mortales praestarent* (5,36,4). "They can announce at home how greatly the Gauls surpass other mortals in valour." Appealing to their *virtus* the Gauls want to make impression on the Romans with whom they were contending for the fertile areas near Clusium (5,36,3f.). It is, however, the Roman *virtus* that displays its inherent force in the battle (5,36,6), *tantum eminebat peregrina virtus* (i.e. in the eyes of the Gauls). But the Gauls do capture the city of Rome excepting the Capitol, which is valiantly (*virtute*) defended by the able-bodied men of Rome (5,42,7). Consequently, the Gauls have to leave Rome and move to the countryside *ad Romanam experiendam virtutem* (5,43,6).

In the third decade there is another conflict between the *virtus* of the Romans and that of the Gauls. As Hannibal was approaching across the Italian Alps the Roman legates came to the Gauls inhabiting Northern Italy in order to arouse them against Hannibal, *cum verbis extollentes (legati) gloriam virtutemque populi Romani ac magnitudinem imperii petissent ne (Galli) Poeno transitum darent* (21,20,2). The Gauls, however, regarded the Roman *virtus* propagated by the legates only as a good joke, which brought scornful roaring of laughter (21,20,3). The Roman *virtus* was a novelty for these Gauls.

Virtus is a recurring theme in *Ab urbe condita*. The *virtus* of the Romans struggles with the *virtus* of the enemies who were significant opponents of the Romans or presented as such by Livy.

¹ E.g. 9,14,10; 9,31,13 (*par excellence*); 21,20,2; 26,41,9; 26,41,12 (*in hac ruina rerum stetit una integra atque immobilis virtus populi Romani*); cf. Cic.Phil.4,13

The meaning 'valour' is central to Livy, who mainly deals with military history.¹ The same applies to Caesar as well as Tacitus. Haas states that *virtus* occurs in Tacitus 144 times all told, and that the meaning is 'Tapferkeit' in about 80 occurrences.² The ratio equals approximately that in Livy, who uses *virtus* more than 300 times and with the meaning 'valour', according to my estimation, about 160 times. *Fortitudo* occurs only once (41,4,1), and, consequently, it is *virtus* that fills the function of the semantic content of 'valour'.

Eisenhut does not say anything about the philosophical meaning 'an individual virtue', which occurs in 30,14 5.³ Scipio addresses his ally Masinissa, *atqui nulla earum virtus est propter quas (virtutes) tibi adpetendus visus sim qua ego aequae ac temperantia et continentia libidinum gloriatus fuerim. Hanc (virtutem) te quoque ad ceteras tuas eximias virtutes, Masinissa, adiecisse velim*. Scipio adds to the excellencies of Masinissa self-restraint and continence.

The terminological expansion of *virtus* in Livy is, to be sure, nothing new compared to his predecessors but this aspect deserves to be elucidated. In 1,9,3f. *virtus* is metonymically used twice as the characteristic of cities (first of all, Rome) explaining their development to political significance and material prosperity. On the other hand, the unique oxymoron of the *virtus* of battleships (37,24,1) is not metonymic, *sed momento temporis et navium virtus et usus maritimae rei terrorem omnem Rhodiis dempsit* (cf. 35,48,7). In this case, *virtus* is not a quality of a living organism (or a part of a living organism) but an artificial product. *Virtus* refers to the efficiency of the battleships since *robur* and *agilitas* are characteristic of them (37,30,2). Here 'excellence' seems to be the appropriate interpretation of *virtus*.⁴ The *virtus* of gladiators (28,21,2f.; cf. Mart.11,92; 29,10) is comparable to Virgil and Velleius Paterculus, who sometimes used *virtus* as a term of athletic sports.⁵ Livy attributes *virtus* to a woman four times. According to Livy, Cloelia was the first woman in Roman history

1 Cf. Burck 1967:126; Bruckmann 123; Eisenhut 120

2 Haas 164

3 Cf. Eisenhut 120ff.

4 In Petron.76,6 Trimalchio asserts, *magna navis magnam fortitudinem habet*.

5 Cf. above p.102

to display *virtus* in the meaning 'heroic valour' (2,13,11). This and the other instances of *virtus* attributed to a woman (2,13,9; per.38; 29,49,15) indicate that *virtus* is displayed in perils and adversities, and that it is not solely a man's privilege.

The plural *virtutes* occurs in both a concrete and abstract meaning. Both of the usages have proved constant. The extension of *virtus* in Livy is wider than it could have been expected in comparison to the authentic works of Virgil but not unexceptionally wide. Before Livy *virtus* had already occurred in all the meanings that the Greek-English dictionary by Liddell - Scott gives to ἀρετή. *Virtus navium* is not an evidence of direct Greek influence, for ever since Plautus *virtus* could have been attributed to non-human and inanimate objects. This kind of usage had become a literary convention. The *virtutes* of Numa Pompilius are not exclusively Roman but Sabino-Roman, and therefore Italic. This indicates Livy's readiness to conceive *virtus* as the combination of the ideal characteristics of the Romans in a wide rather than strict sense, which was undoubtedly due to Livy's North Italian origin, as it was the case with Virgil, too. It is not by chance that Virgil and Livy, the main proponents of the idea of Italian unity in the Augustan Age, included Pan-Italian tendencies in *virtus*.

Virtus is the characteristic of a select few men of power, which is a commonplace in the Roman and, respectively, Greek thought. According to Livy, *virtus* is more efficient at war than fortune or the other factors that he specifies in 9,17,3. *Virtus* can be lost when the troops that have been in possession of it suffer a catastrophic defeat, but also when disciplined military life degenerates into pernicious inactivity and vicious indulgence. Similar tones can be found in the works of Caesar, Sallust, and Tacitus. The *virtus* of a private person is not imperishable. Philopoemen lost his *virtus* along with his freedom and health. Further on, *virtus* is not only a natural gift but also the result of development and ripening. Besides, it is the essence of Roman greatness. Consequently, Livy used *virtus* as a propagandist term in diplomacy.

3. SUMMARY

Virtus means not only 'manliness' but also 'manhood', i.e. that period in man's life when manly accomplishments are physiologically and mentally possible. Thus *virtus* is reinstalled in the category of the words formed with the suffix *-tūt(i)-*, where it was included by Haas but more or less excluded by Eisenhut.

In Livius Andronicus *virtus* can be traced to Greek or at least non-Roman thought according to which fame achieved by military exploits is only ephemeral. Naeivius is the first to present *virtus* as a politico-social value. It presupposes obedience and submission to the absolute power of *pater familias*, as well in the relation of a son to his father as of a citizen to his country. It is in accordance with certain collective interests that *virtus* is displayed. As early as in Plautus *virtus* can mean a 'good characteristic' of almost anything. In the semantic point of view, it is essential that the meaning 'valour' is central in military contexts. By implicating that *virtus* and *amor* can lead to a psychological conflict Plautus anticipates Catullus. Originally *virtus* meant 'manly endurance' that an agrarian and militant community demanded from its members. By the time of Plautus it had developed into an expression for the Roman consciousness of national existence.

Contrary to Plautus, *virtus* in Terence is not so dynamic and diversified. In the extant fragments of Ennius 'valour' is not the only appropriate interpretation even in military contexts. In *Hectoris lytra virtus* does not mean anything but 'brute force'. Ennius has apparently interpreted the Greek non-ethical and non-intellectual ἀνδρεία or ἰσχύς as *virtus*.¹

Virtus retains the meaning of 'manliness' also in Cato. In military commentaries, most of which have been lost, *virtus* indubitably had the emphatical meaning of 'valour' in the same way as in the Annals of Ennius. Further on, while commenting on Cato's activities Livy seems to consciously imitate his style by repeating the formula that *virtus* is the only safeguard in the hardships of the soldiers.

¹ Plautus in the light of his irony, Lucretius as an Epicurean, Catullus in his sensibility, and Virgil because of his hatred of war could easily have understood the sentence of Ennius *melius est virtute ius*. As for Nepos, Sallust, Cicero, Horace, and Livy, who had a great esteem for *virtus*, this sentence of Ennius would have appeared as a terminological contradiction.

The *virtus* of fertile soil, on which a farmer's prosperity is based, indicates Greek origin as it is the case with the *virtus* of merchandise of Plautus.

It is in Accius that *fortuna* becomes a dangerous opponent of *virtus* but cannot, however, displace it. Evidently this idea corresponds to those of the Cynics and the Stoics. In a fragment of an anonymous playwright *virtus* is independent of material prerequisites even in political life. Generally speaking, the rest of the Republican fragmentary literature indicates that the original criterion of *virtus*, which had been quite narrow, was extended when *virtus* was intellectualized.

In the fragments of speeches from the second century BC *virtus* seems to have been used similarly to Cicero. The historians for their part appear to have continued to use *virtus* in the meaning 'valour'. Claudius Quadrigarius attributed *virtus* to individuals significant for the Roman Republic. It is indubitably due to the influence of Ennius and Cato that *virtus* had been established as the characteristic of historically significant personages.

Two conscious reflections of the conception of *virtus* are retained from the earlier literature. Plautus had been deliberating on the benefices of *virtus* to community and individual in rather ironical terms. Lucilius, for his part, included in *virtus* moral perfection, i.e. virtue, as a whole. For him, military *virtus* is only a part of the composite *virtus*. It is due to the intellectualization of manliness that *virtus* developed into the normative characteristic pertaining to all human intentions and actions. *Virtus* remains on the rational level, it is a human characteristic. Publilius Syrus conceived *virtus* similarly to Lucilius. Coming to Lucretius, *virtus* loses something of its value. This is not so surprising considering the dogmatic Epicureanism of Lucretius. Catullus has given *virtus* an ambivalent total impression. It was because of his Neoterism, which put an emphasis on individual sensibility, that his conception of *virtus* was antagonistic to the traditional collective heroic value.

Caesar returns to *virtus* the high value it had before Lucretius and Catullus. To Caesar there can be no *virtus* without political freedom, which is a recurrent idea in ancient political thought.

Virtus is the characteristic of a community in full consciousness of its power. This idea was already purported by Plautus. Further on, *virtus* is unremitting action, which emerged as early as in Nae-vius and was the essential content of Roman *Weltansicht*. Caesar does not include ethical aspects in *virtus*. For him, it is the composition of the characteristics of an assiduous man of will. While Caesar sees *virtus* as pure potency, Nepos includes ethical consciousness in it. In his biographies the plural *virtutes* connotes mental qualities as well as concrete accomplishments. Analogically, this novelty must be due to the intellectualization of the concept of manliness. According to Nepos, *virtus* alone is not enough to make a man historically significant; *fortuna* has its share, too. For *virtus* in Nepos has the meaning of 'human value' as such, which is not in itself an apt explanation of fame. Sallust also deals with the antithesis *virtus* - *fortuna* and, contrary to Nepos, comes to the conclusion that if a man has pure *virtus* he does not need *fortuna*. *Virtus* is potency for controlling any circumstances whatever. *Virtus* in Sallust does not contain ethical significance and resembles *virtus Caesariana* in this respect. It is quite in accordance with ancient political thought that Sallust conceives *virtus* to be attainable for only a select few. In addition, *virtus* is a politico-social quality since it cannot be displayed apart from the politico-social status (of a superman, as it were).

Cicero conceives *virtus* as manly self-confidence, which cannot be broken by hardships. In accordance with Sallust, Cicero thinks that *virtus* has history. It was in the glorious past of the Republic that the retrospective mind of Cicero saw *virtus* realised. *Virtus* is inseparably associated with the aristocratic Republic, the decline of which at the same time implies that of *virtus*. Cicero synonymizes the aristocratic Republic and liberty; consequently, *virtus* connotes liberty. Together with Caesar and Sallust, Cicero implies that *virtus* has to be continually displayed. It is only within the Roman aristocratic institutions that *virtus* can be displayed. Without them it loses its inherent force. In accordance with Nepos, Cicero purports that *virtus* alone does not suffice to make a military leader successful. *Virtus* is the fundamental reason for the historical rise of the Roman Empire. It is from development and ripening that *virtus*

results; it is not received as a natural gift alone. Literary erudition can partly help in attaining *virtus*.

Virtus Vergiliana is not strictly Roman but Roman in the meaning 'Trojan' and 'Pan-Italic'. It was in the same way that Livy, another North-Italian, conceived *virtus*. In line with Caesar and Sallust, one of the main characteristics of *virtus Vergiliana* was manly potency. But apparently Virgil held *virtus* in high esteem only as far as it had some connection to *pietas*. *Virtus* alone would lead to hateful consequences and then it would not mean anything but 'violence'. In this respect Virgil resembles Catullus. As for *Appendix Vergiliana* *virtus* is twice attributed to stones in *Aetna*, which indicates the deterioration of the intrinsic value of *virtus* or the neutralization of the concept. Tibullus and Propertius do not thematize the antithesis *virtus amor* as it was done by Catullus. According to Horace, there are two parts in *virtus*; one passive and private, which connotes inward harmony of the individual confronted by external pressure. The other part of *virtus* is active and political; it is displayed in accordance with collective interests. It is expressly the passive aspect of *virtus* that gives an impression of Horace's individual philosophy of life. On the other hand, Horace implies that it is the patriotic duty of a Roman to display valour (the active aspect of *virtus*) at war. For the foundation of the Roman greatness lies in national heroism. It is in Ovid that *virtus* once explicitly has the meaning 'manhood'. The meaning 'strength' occurs several times although Ovid cannot be considered as the introducer of the new shade of meaning. In addition Ovid interprets *virtus* in terms of Pythagorean philosophy of nature. Ovid, who dealt with women rather often in his works, frequently attributes *virtus* to women.

In accordance with Sallust, Livy conceives *virtus* as the characteristic of only few men of will, who determine the course of history. At war *virtus* overwhelms *fortuna*. This is also a response to the antithesis *virtus - fortuna* put forward by Nepos. Further on, the parallelism *virtus - victoria* analogically implies the loss of *virtus* when a troop is defeated. And, since *virtus* connotes action, a troop fallen in pernicious inactivity loses its *virtus*. And, since *virtus* means restraint towards material prerequisites, it is lost when a troop is overpowered by vicious indulgence. *Mutatis mutandis*, this is in line with Caesar and Sallust. As *virtus* presupposes liberty, the loss of

liberty results in the loss of *virtus*. As *virtus* is a vitalistic value, the loss of health implies the loss of *virtus*. Livy agrees with Cicero the philosopher that *virtus* is not received as a natural gift alone but is the result of development and ripening, too. Livy resembles Caesar in the respect that he uses *virtus* as a propagandist term in diplomacy.

The content Livy gave to *virtus* does not essentially differ from the general conception of the Romans in the light of the extant literature. To various Roman authors, *virtus* was a general conception (*Allgemeinbegriff*) rather than a specific conception (*Sonderbegriff*). There are remarkable similarities in the conceptions of *virtus* of the authors dealt with in this study. Yet it does not imply that *virtus* should be regarded as the same concept from one author to another. The relatively unanimous conception of different authors reflects the general valuation of *virtus* as the cornerstone of the Roman greatness. Nevertheless, the way Plautus, Lucretius, Catullus, and Virgil use *virtus* indicates an ambivalent attitude towards heroism on the part of these authors. The conclusion as such is not noteworthy since the Romans, as far as I can see, did not cherish war. Be that as it may, the ambivalence of *virtus* shows a tendency towards individualism.

In the course of this study *virtus* has proved to have such a wide conceptual extension and terminological expansion that it would be rather futile to make an attempt to give an all-pervading definition. Be that as it may, *virtus* could be defined as the ideal combination of the specific characteristics that make up a living organism or an artificial product into a good living organism or artificial product.

It is vitally important to decide if I have only filled *virtus* with my own values, norms, and attitudes, or if this study has brought forth something of the way the Romans conceived *virtus*. In the course of this study I have become more and more convinced of the fact that *virtus* was so deeply rooted in the Roman mind and way of life that the emotional aspect of *virtus* totally overshadows the cognitive aspect. It is paradoxical to discover that I have had to complete this study which has almost exclusively dealt with the cognitive aspect of the concept to find out the all-pervading importance of the emotional aspect in the end. The fear of having filled *virtus* only with one's own conceptions neglecting those of the Romans is due to the difficulties of interpreting the emotional, which is irrevocably connected with time and place.

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SUOMENKIELINEN TIIVISTELMÄ

Virtus ei eroa muista samalla *-tut(i)*-suffiksilla muodostuneista sanoista siinä määrin, kuin aikaisempi tutkimus (H. Haasia lukuunottamatta) on esittänyt. *Virtus* merkitsee 'miehuutta' paitsi suorituskykynä myös sinä ikä kautena roomalaisen *virin* elämässä, jolloin hän on voimiensa tunnossa.

Livius Andronicuksella sanan käsittemerkitys palautuu siihen individualistiseen ajatukseen, että sotaisten sankaritekojen tuoma maine on ohimeneväistä. Naeivius puolestaan on ensimmäinen kirjailija, jolla *virtus* esiintyy tyypillisesti roomalaisena poliittis-sosiaalisena arvona. Se edellyttää ehdotonta alistumista *pater familiasin* valtaan, olipa sitten kysymys pojan suhteesta isäänsä tai kansalaisen valtioonsa. Tällaista *virtusta* osoitetaan kollektiivisten intressien nimissä. Jo Plautuksella *virtus* voi tarkoittaa melkein minkä tahansa asian tai esineen hyvää ominaisuutta. Sotilaallisissa yhteyksissä merkitys 'urhoollisuus' on keskeinen. Alkuaan *virtus* merkitsi 'miehistä kestävyyttä', jota agraarinen ja sotaa käyvä yhteisö edellytti jäseniltään. Plautukseen tultaessa sana oli kehittynyt roomalaisen kansallisen olemassaolon ilmaukseksi. Vihjaamalla, että *virtus* ja *amor* voivat johtaa psykologiseen ristiriitaan, Plautus ennakoii Catullusta. Terentiuksella *virtus* ei ole niin moni-ilmeinen ja dynaaminen kuin Plautuksella.

Enniukselta säilyneissä katkelmissa 'urhoollisuus' ei ole ainoa relevantti tulkinta edes sotilaallisissa yhteyksissä. *Hectoris lytrassa* *virtus* ei merkitse sen enempää kuin pelkää 'raakaa voimaa'. Ennius näyttää tulkinneen kreikkalaisen ei-eettisen ja ei-intellektuaalisen *βῆλην, ἀνδρείαν* tai *λαχύγιν* *virtusina*.¹ Merkitys 'miehuus' säilyy myös Catolla. Hänen valtaosaksi kadonneissa sotilaallisissa selonteoissaan *virtus* epäilemättä painottui merkitsemään 'urhoollisuutta' Enniuksen Annaalien tapaan. Selostaessaan Caton toimia Livius näyttää tietoisesti jäljitelleen tämän tyyliä toistamalla formulaa, että *virtusissa* on sotilaiden ainoa tuki ja turva. Hedelmällisen maaperän *virtus*, johon maanviljelijän onni perustuu, on kreikkalaista

1 Plautus ironiansa, Lucretius epikurolaisuutensa, Catullus herkkätunteisuutensa ja Vergilius sodanvihansa vuoksi olisivat helposti ymmärtäneet Enniuksen lauseen *melius est virtute ius*. Sen sijaan Nepokselle, Sallustiukselle, Cicerolle, Horatiukselle ja Liviukselle, jotka pitivät *virtusta* korkeassa arvossa, tämä Enniuksen lause olisi ollut terminologinen mahdottomuus.

alkuperää kuten myös kauppatavaran *virtus* Plautuksella. Jo varhaisessa vaiheessa sana on ollut terminologisesti paisunut.

Acciuksella *fortunasta* tulee *virtusin* vaarallinen vihollinen voimatta kuitenkaan syrjäyttää sitä. Tämä on kyynikkojen ja stolaisten käsitysten mukaista. Tuntemattoman näytelmäkirjailijan katkelmassa *virtus* on jopa poliittisessa elämässä riippumaton aineellisista edellytyksistä. Yleisesti ottaen tasavallan fragmentaarinen kirjallisuus viittaa siihen, että roomalainen, alkuaan kapea miehuuden kriteeri laajeni *virtusin* henkistyessä.

Toiselta esikristilliseltä vuosisadalta säilyneissä puhekatkelmissa *virtusta* on käytetty Ciceron tapaan. Historioitsijat puolestaan käyttävät sanaa merkityksessä 'urhoollisuus' ja ennakoivat näin Caesaria ja Liviusta. Johtui epäilemättä paljolti Enniuksen ja Caton vaikutuksesta, että *virtus* vakiintui historiallisesti merkittävien hahmojen ylistäväksi epiteetiksi.

Aikaisemmasta kirjallisuudesta on säilynyt kaksi tietoista *virtus*-käsitteen pohdiskelua. Plautus oli korostanut jokseenkin ironisesti heroismin merkitystä yhteisölle ja yksilölle. Lucilius sen sijaan sisällytti *virtusiin* moraalisen täydellisyyden, hyveen kokonaisuudessaan. Hänelle sotilaallinen *virtus* on vain osa koko hyveestä. Miehuuden käsitteen henkistymisestä johtuen *virtusista* kehittyi normatiivinen ominaisuus, joka koskee kaikkia aikomuksia ja tekoja. *Virtus* pysyy rationaalisella tasolla, sillä se on ihmisen ominaisuus jumalasuhteen ulkopuolella. Publilius Syrus ymmärsi *virtusin* samalla tavalla kuin Lucilius.

Lucretiuksella *virtus* menettää jotakin arvostaan, mikä ei ole yllättävää runoilijan dogmaattisen epikurolaisuuden valossa. Individualismiin taipuvaisille epikurolaisille rohkeus ja urhoollisuus ovat vain vastaamista kollektiivisiin rooliodotuksiin. Myös Catullus on tulkinnut *virtusin* individualismin kannalta. Hänen neoterisminsa korosti yksilöllistä sensitiivisyyttä ja suhtautui nurjasti sankaruuteen joka oli perinteisesti kollektivistista. Siten *virtus* ja äärimmäinen yksilöllisyys näyttävät yhteensopimattomilta.

Caesar palauttaa *virtusille* sen korkean arvon, joka sillä oli ennen Lucretiusta ja Catullusta. Caesarille *virtus* on mahdollon ilman poliittista vapautta. Tämä käsitys on keskeinen antiikin poliittisessa ajattelussa. *Virtus* näyttäytyy voimiensa tunnossa olevan yhteisön

ominaisuutena. Jo Plautus toi esiin saman idean. *Virtus* on herpaantumaton toimintaa, mikä ilmeni jo Naeviuksella ja oli sellaisenaan roomalaisen maailmankatsomuksen mukaista. Caesar ei tuo esiin *virtusin* eettistä puolta. Hän tarkoittaa *virtusilla* heroisten tahtoihmisten rautaisia ominaisuuksia. Sen sijaan Nepos näkee *virtusin* eettisenä. Hänen elämäntekijöissään pluraali *virtutes* viittaa henkisiin ominaisuuksiin konkreettisten ansioiden rinnalla. Tämän uutuuden selittää miehuuden käsitteen henkistyminen. Nepoksen mukaan yksin *virtus* ei riitä tekemään miehestä historiallisesti merkittävää; *fortunalla* on tässä osansa. *Virtus* merkitsee 'ihmisarvoa', joka ei sellaisenaan johda maineeseen. Myös Sallustius käsittelee suhdetta *virtus* - *fortuna* ja sanoo -Nepoksesta poiketen- että jos miehellä on puhdas *virtus*, hän ei tarvitse *fortunaa*. *Virtus* on voimaa kontrolloida mitä hyvänsä olosuhteita. Sallustiuksella *virtus* ei ole eettinen ja muistuttaa Caesaria tässä suhteessa. Aivan antiikin poliittisen ajattelun mukaisesti Sallustius ymmärtää *virtusin* vain harvojen ja valittujen ominaisuudeksi. *Virtus* on poliittis-sosiaalinen ominaisuus eikä sitä voi osoittaa erillään (yli-ihmisen) poliittis-sosiaalisesta asemasta.

Cicero käsittää *virtusin* miehekkääksi itseluottamukseksi, jota vaikeudet eivät horjuta. Sallustiuksen tapaan Cicero ajattelee, että tällä käsitteellä on historiansa. Cicero näki *virtusin* reaalisoituneena Rooman tasavallan kunniakkaassa menneisyydessä. *Virtus* kuuluu erottamattomasti yhteen aristokraattisen tasavallan kanssa, jonka *rappio* merkitsee samalla myös *virtusin* rappiota. Cicero samastaa aristokraattisen tasavallan ja vapauden. Näin ollen *virtus* merkitsee 'vapautta'. Caesarin ja Sallustiuksen tapaan Cicero esittää, että *virtusta* on osoitettava jatkuvasti. Tämä käy päinsä vain Rooman aristokraattisten institutioiden puitteissa. Niiden ulkopuolella se menettää todellisen merkityksensä. Ciceron mielestä yksin *virtus* ei riitä tekemään sotilaallisesta johtajasta menestyksellistä. *Virtus* on Rooman valtakunnan historiallisen nousun ja poliittisen merkityksen perussyy. *Virtus* on kehityksen ja kypsymisen tulosta; sitä ei saada pelkästään syntymälahjana. Kirjallinen sivistys auttaa osaltaan *virtusin* hankkimisessa.

Virtus Vergiliana ei ole ahtaasti roomalainen vaan roomalainen merkityksessä 'troijalainen' ja 'yleisitaallinen'. Samalla tavalla *virtusin* käsittää Livius, toinen pohjoisitalialainen. Caesarin ja Sallustiuksen tavoin Vergilius ymmärsi *virtusin* heroiseksi suoritukseksi.

kyvyksi. Ilmeisesti Vergilius piti *virtusta* korkeassa arvossa vain sikäli, kuin se liittyy *pietasiin*. Yksinään *virtus* johtaa vihattiin seuraamuksiin merkitsemättä sen enempää kuin 'raakaa voimaa ja 'väkivaltaa'. Tässä mielessä Vergilius muistuttaa Catullusta. *Appendix Vergilianaan* kuuluvista runoista *virtus* tavataan kahdesti vulkaanisten kivilajien ominaisuutena *Aetnassa*. Tämä osoittaa *virtusiin* sisältyneen arvolatauksen heikkenemistä tai käsitteen neutralisoitumista. Toisin kuin Catullus, Tibullus ja Propertius eivät tematisoi suhdetta *virtus - amor*. Horatiuksen mielestä *virtusissa* on kaksi puolta: yksi passiivinen ja yksityinen, joka viittaa yksilön sisäiseen harmoniaan; toinen puoli *virtusta* on aktiivinen ja poliittinen. Sitä osoitetaan kollektiivisten etujen nimissä. Nimen omaan *virtusin* passiivinen aspekti antaa vaikutelman Horatiuksen individualistisesta elämänfilosofiasta. Toisaalta Horatius antaa ymmärtää, että roomalaisen isänmaallinen velvollisuus on osoittaa urheutta (*virtusin* aktiivinen puoli) sodassa. Näet roomalaisen suuruuden perusta on kansallisessa heroismissa. Juuri Ovidiuksella *virtus* kerran merkitsee 'miehuusikää'. Merkitys 'voima' tavataan useita kertoja, vaikkakaan Ovidiusta ei voida pitää uuden merkityksen käyttöönottajana. Lisäksi Ovidius tulkitsee *virtusin* pythagoralaisen luonnonfilosofian valossa. Odotusten mukaisesti Ovidius käyttää usein sanaa naisen ominaisuutena.

Myös Livius näkee *virtusin* niiden harvojen ja valittujen ominaisuutena, jotka ohjailevat historian kulkua. Sodassa *virtus* voittaa *fortunan*. Parallelismi *virtus - victoria* merkitsee analogisesti *virtusin* menetystä sotajoukon joutuessa häviölle. Koska *virtus* merkitsee toimintaa, turmiolliseen joutilaisuuteen vaipuva sotajoukko menettää *virtusinsa*. Koska *virtus* merkitsee pidättyväisyyttä suhteessa aineellisiin houkutuksiin, se katoaa, kun sotajoukko vaipuu paheelliseen yltäkylläisyyteen. *Mutatis mutandis* tämä on sopusoinnussa Caesarin ja Sallustiuksen kanssa. Koska *virtus* edellyttää vapautta, vapauden menetys on samalla myös *virtusin* menetystä. Koska *virtus* on vitalistinen arvo, terveyden menetys merkitsee *virtusin* menetystä. Livius on samaa mieltä kuin filosofi Cicero siinä käsityksessä, ettei *virtusta* saada yksin syntymälahjana vaan että se on myös kehityksen ja kypsymisen tulosta. Caesarin tavoin Livius käyttää sanaa propagandistisena terminä diplomatiassa.

Säilyneen kirjallisuuden valossa Liviuksen *virtus*ille antama sisältö ei olennaisesti eroa hänen edeltäjistään sen kummemmin kuin aikalaisistaankaan. Eri kirjailijoille *virtus* oli enemmän yleiskäsite kuin erilliskäsite. Tässä tutkimuksessa käsiteltyjen kirjailijoiden *virtus*-käsitelyksissä on huomattavia samankaltaisuuksia. Tämä ei kuitenkaan tarkoita sitä, että *virtus* olisi sama käsite kirjailijalta toiselle. Eri kirjailijoiden suhteellisen yksimielinen *virtus*-käsitely heijastaa tämän ominaisuuden yleistä arvostusta roomalaisen suuruuden kulmakivenä. Kuitenkin se, miten Plautus, Lucretius, Catullus ja Vergilius käyttävät *virtusta*, osoittaa näiden kirjailijoiden ambivalenttia asennetta heroismiin. Johtopäätös ei kuitenkaan ole kovin merkittävä siitä syystä, etteivät roomalaiset ymmärtääkseni ihannoineet sotaa. Joka tapauksessa käsitteen ambivalenttisuus osoittaa pyrkimystä individualismiin.

Tämän tutkimuksen kuluessa *virtus* on osoittautunut niin terminologisesti paisuneeksi ja käsitteellisesti laaja-alaiseksi, ettei kaiken kattava määrittely oikeastaan ole edes tarpeellista. Kuitenkin *virtus* voidaan määritellä niiden spesifien ominaisuuksien ihanteelliseksi yhdistelmäksi, jotka tekevät elävästä organismista tai keinotekoisesta tuotteesta *hyvän* elävän organismin tai keinotekoisen tuotteen.

On välttämätöntä ratkaista, olenko täyttänyt *virtusin* omilla arvoilla, normeilla ja ihanteillani, vai onko tämä tutkimus tuonut esiin jotakin siitä, miten roomalaiset käsittivät *virtusin*. Tämän tutkimuksen kuluessa olen tullut yhä tietoisemmaksi siitä, että *virtus* oli juurtunut niin syvälle roomalaiseen mieleen ja elämäntilanteeseen, että käsitteen emotionaalinen puoli tulee verrattomasti tärkeämmäksi kuin kognitiivinen puoli. On vaikeaa interpretoida tunneperäistä, joka väistämättä rajoittuu aikaan ja paikkaan ja siten kadottaa merkityksensä yksilöllisten kokemusten ulkopuolella. Siitä syystä tämä tutkimus on pääasiallisesti rajoittunut kognitiiviseen aspektiin.