


Kari Palonen

Politics,
Rhetoric and
Conceptual History



Jyväskylän yliopisto
Valtio-opin laitos

University of Jyväskylä
Department of Political Science

Studia Politica Jyväskyläensia

Kari Palonen

POLITICS, RHETORIC AND CONCEPTUAL HISTORY
Studies on modern languages of political theory

URN:ISBN:978-951-39-8235-5
ISBN 978-951-39-8235-5 (PDF)
ISSN 0786-2245

ISBN 951-34-0363-7
ISSN 0786-2245

Julkaisuja

Publications

6

Jyväskylä 1994

CONTENTS

Rhetoric and conceptual history in the study of politics

Conceptual history as a perspective to the study of political thought. Reflections on intellectual operations.

Appendix: Finnish Social Democrats on 'society'

The existential language of politics: from Weber to Sartre

Sartre on politics as a 'loser-wins-situation'.
Counter-finality in *Les Séquestres d'Altona*.

Sartre as an election researcher.
The rhetoric of ethos in *Kennedy and West Virginia*.

Max Weber's rhetorical construction of the politician as an ideal type

The citizen as 'occasional politician'.
A Weberian perspective.

Epilogue: 'Le politique' comme notion dans la pensée française au 20^e siècle

References

Author index

Index of key concepts

Postscript, July 2020

Rhetoric and conceptual history in the study of politics

Ancient and even Renaissance manners of speaking about politics are incommensurable with those of the twentieth century and, incomprehensible to modern readers. Reinhart Koselleck's *Sattelzeit* thesis about the shift in the art of using concepts (1972) helps us to understand, why it is so. My studies on the conceptual history of politics have led me to conclude that to speak of politics as a concept referring to a specific quality of action is a novelty only to be found in twentieth century political thought (more closely in Palonen 1985, 1989b).

A linguistic sign of the late conceptualization of politics in English is to be found in the neologism 'the political'. It is either formed after the model of the German *das Politische* and the French *le politique* or as a sign for the conceptualization of the phenomenon of politics, which has now, some decades after German and French, reached even English (cf. Palonen 1993b, 6-10 for the French usage the *Epilogue*, below). In order to express the degree of abstraction, that allows us to speak in the entire polit-vocabulary – politics, polity, policy, politicking, politicization etc. – a recourse to 'the political' has become a remedy.

Maurizio Viroli's recent monograph (1992) on the replacement of the language of politics by the language of the reason of the State supports my interpretation in so far that it explicates the change in the context of Renaissance Italy which has rendered a direct recourse to the Greek and even Roman republican language obsolete. Viroli shows convincingly how the figure of the 'reason of the State' has become the dominant reference for the polit-vocabulary since the seventeenth century.

Viroli, however, still looks for a renaissance of the ancient vocabulary instead of seeking alternative approaches to oppose the dominance of the etatist view on politics. In this respect Koselleck's (1979) idea on the transition from static concepts to concepts of 'movement' (*Bewegungs-begriffe*) gives a hint, which I have interpreted as a chance to understand the political as a qualifying aspect of action. In Pocockian (1972) terms, this chance could be expressed as a transition of the many 'languages of politics' based on different disciplines and traditions to 'a language of the political', which makes the concept itself the subject matter of the controversies.

Max Weber was probably the first who more or less consistently spoke of the political as a quality of action as well as of politics as a qualified type of action. After him we can detect until now only very few, mainly continental, thinkers, who have constructed their own profiled conception of politics. Carl Schmitt, Helmuth Plessner, Walter Benjamin, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Hannah Arendt and Michael Oakeshott are, besides Weber, perhaps the most obvious modern classic thinkers in this field, to whom even the present-day debate, more or less directly, is indebted (cf. hints to the contemporary French literature in the *Epilogue*).

In terms of my own research the case studies in this volume could be titled 'From Sartre to Weber'. In *The existential language of politics* I consider Weber as an 'existentialist avant la lettre'. In the same way I could contend that Sartre

– and not Raymond Aron (cf. Palonen 1990b) – is the French heir to the central tenets of the Weberian perspective to politics. Weber's nominalist, anti-collectivist and conflictual view of human action, history and politics, are modified, but not overthrown by Sartre's utilization of figures from the dialectical tradition.

In order to detect the originality of Weber in the conceptual history of politics we have to study in detail the figures qualifying politics, the politician and the opposition between politics and bureaucratization on Weber's conceptual horizon. In this respect my Weber studies connect the political with the concept of contingency, so actual in the present-day debate, in which Weber is hardly mentioned.

Conceptual history, rhetoric, hermeneutics

In the present volume I have used mainly two research approaches, conceptual history and rhetoric. Both are expressions of the 'linguistic turn' in the study of politics, but as opposed to the structuralistic, semiotic etc. approaches, neither of them views language as a 'prison house' but, on the contrary, as an indispensable medium of politicking in or politicization of the action situations. In this sense language is for both conceptual history and rhetoric not only an instrument of politics but a horizon of action. It can be seen as a dimension of all politics, as constitutive as space, time and the agents.

One can, of course, understand conceptual history as a sub-discipline in historiography, like the history of ideas or mentalities or intellectual history and then try to explicate how conceptual history differs from them. A possibility is to understand conceptual history as a variant of the 'linguistic turn', an aspect more or less absent in the other historiographical approaches. In this respect conceptual history becomes related to hermeneutics, semiotics, symbolism, rhetoric, but it is opposed to them in that it holds concept to be the key linguistic unit. Another view takes conceptual history as a specific 'method' for studying any texts from the viewpoint of analyzing the concepts used and their history. Still another possibility is to understand conceptual history as a perspective for the study of political theory, one which considers concepts as opposed to the diversity of 'answers', as a kind of names, which introduce breaks in the manner of questioning.

I have understood conceptual history as an approach to political thought, while its role as a 'method' is illustrated in the *Appendix* to ch. 2. Here I will give some complementary remarks on conceptual history's relation to the rhetorical reading of political thought, related to my papers on Weber and Sartre.

'Rhetoric' is here not, of course, meant in the sense of a classical school discipline, as it is rehabilitated today in literary research, like in the tropological approach of Lausberg (1963). Neither do I mean by rhetoric primarily that kind of argumentation theory, which is re-activated by the Perelmanian 'New rhetoric', even if I am using some of its ideas, like the relation of position to audiences as well as the distinction between associative and dissociative rhetoric. The Perelmanian version of rhetoric remains too classicistic and consensual (cf. Palonen 1992a).

As an alternative, I have quoted in the essays below Kenneth Burke's rhetoric, especially his attention to classifications and the partisan usage of them as well as the implicit, non-intentional character of the rhetoric contained in a text. From this viewpoint, the questions of intention – presupposed by the classical rhetoric and still by Perelman – appear to me less interesting in a rhetorical

reading of a text than in a historical reading à la Quentin Skinner. The point is to use rhetoric as an instrument to 'read out' of a text something which is not intended by the author but which acts as a classificatory, structuring or narrative principle and helps to explicate some less obvious aspects of the text.

In a sense, my use of rhetoric is close to Hayden White's, not so much his 'four master tropes' (White 1978) or his general vision of history (White 1973), but the idea of the interconnectedness of 'content and form' (White 1987). The point of the rhetorical approach lies just in the emphasis that conceptual commitments are not only a question of content but also that of form, i.e. of presentation, narration, classification etc.

Rhetoric remains for me, finally, a kind of complementary approach, used in order to radicalize the conceptual history or to introduce a textualist element into it. This element is by no means absent in the research programmes of Skinner, Pocock and Koselleck, all of whom not only on occasion emphasize the role of 'rhetorical language' (cf. esp. Skinner 1993), but also try to detect the 'rhetorical significance' of concepts.

Speaking of 'rhetorical language' of political thought refers to another possibility. The renaissance of rhetoric in its diverse idioms in the second half of the present century could also be analyzed as a political language of its own, with its specific conceptions of politics (cf. Palonen 1992a). In a wider perspective rhetoric can be linked with the anti-Platonic or neo-sophistic tendency to rehabilitate the contingent and to re-think politics – as stated by Pocock (1975, 156) and others – in terms of 'dealing with contingency'. In this sense the diverse forms of New rhetoric could be interpreted as idioms within a conceptual horizon of politics, which I am presently studying under the title 'the Weberian moment'.

The Pocockian metaphor of 'political language', both used and criticized below, has a heuristic value in its flexibility. As he himself admits in one of his recent programmatic statements, the concept is rather an overall title for more specific ways of speaking than an analogy to natural languages: "we mean for the most part sub-languages: idioms, rhetorics, ways of talking about politics" (Pocock 1987a, 21).

In a similar manner we should understand the study of political languages in the present volume. The common denominator of 'existential language' e.g. is a certain vocabulary, around which I have made certain re-arrangements of modern political thought. The existential language is, however, not the only one present in the work of both Weber and Sartre, but the presence of other diverse vocabularies can easily be detected. Weber's and Sartre's specific language of politics is, however, neither a simple combination of several vocabularies nor an idiom. It is in both cases a highly idiosyncratic political language. For the study of this kind of language rhetoric and conceptual history should be complemented by 'individual hermeneutics' (Maler 1986, cf. Frank 1977, 1986). This kind of study is used in my Sartre-monograph *Politik als Vereitelung*, in the present volume it is perhaps strongest in the essay on *Les Séquestres d'Altona*.

A 'textualist' style of argumentation

During the years I have, more or less intentionally, constructed a style of argumentation, which appears self-evident to me today, while it is highly idiosyncratic to others. Maybe this is the place to explicate some of its practices and presuppositions, which it does not share with others.

The huge number of quotations I use may give the reader an impression of a descriptive style. A closer look at my quotations also shows that illustrative quotations concerning the 'typical' for something are rare – except in *The existential language of politics*, originally written for lexical purposes – and mostly marked by signs like 'e.g.'. The main type of quotations are those commented on in the text, where argumentation is largely structured by moving between quotations.

The quotations do usually not follow the order of the original text, but they are chosen and presented from the perspective of my specific purposes. They take up only tiny fragments of the text, often consisting of passages, to which the author has given no special attention. The operation of selecting the passages worth commenting on from the selective thematic perspective is as important as the discussion of the selected passages. Instead of summarizing the work of an author – all too often found among both Sartre and Weber scholars – I assume that the text itself is more or less known to the readers, while its **argument, point or significance is problematic**. The detailed exegesis of the quoted formulas serves to emphasize the points.

Proceeding more or less between quotations signifies a highly 'textualist' approach, although one quite different from that criticized by Quentin Skinner (esp. 1969). My approach presupposes that **texts make a privileged material for the study of politics**. One reason for this is that texts use a language comparable to that used by the researcher: a certain commensurability between the object-language and the presentation-language can be presupposed, even if the two texts are using different 'natural' languages.

Studying of pictures is too difficult for the purposes of conceptual history and individual hermeneutics, for me do research based on them. Picture studies should explicate the procedures of textualization needed for interpreting them in the texts. This textualization is perhaps less important in the 'media rhetoric' than in the study of political thought.

A further reason for my 'textualist' approach is to oppose what psychoanalysis or Althusserian Marxism have called 'symptomal reading'. This kind of reading confronts the text with ready-made 'theories' in which the ideas, concepts, arguments and references to action presented in the texts are 'explained' by these 'theories'. This kind of research adopts a kind of paternalistic *Besserwisser* attitude towards the texts. I even doubt, whether the present bad reputation of politicians is partly due to political scientists' paternalistic attitude towards the actions, speeches and writings studied, which are used as a mere raw material, with which a dialogue or confrontation is unimaginable (cf. Palonen 1993a.).

An old canon of hermeneutics is to try to 'understand the text better than the author' (cf. Frank 1977). In a sense, my specific 'textualism' is a reaction to my experience that the majority of the commentators and interpretations have either not tried to do it or they have done it from a *Besserwisser* position. I try – even if highly selective in the presentation of the quotations, related to my specified research interests – to interpret the presented quotations in a careful

and detailed manner, which attempts to make the point more explicit and the position adopted more 'clever' than the author could have imagined.

My specific 'textualism' in the study of political thought can, furthermore, be interpreted as a program for **a new kind of empiricism in political science**. Texts, if anything, in the study of politics like in other kinds of literature, are the closest to the 'data'. They are 'given' in the specific sense of simply 'being there', as instances whose origins may be 'explained' contextually, but which, as boring as they may be, always transcend the context, the more if they are read in a detailed and imaginative manner. They are, however, by no means 'given' in another sense, often presupposed by the statistical paradigm of social sciences, which tries to go 'behind the data' by 'explaining them away'. My 'textualist' approach claims, on the contrary, that almost everything is already in the texts, they must only be read properly, i.e. explicated and interpreted as a problematic and inspiring bulk of ideas, concepts, arguments etc. If the texts are 'explained' at all, this is done, *pace* Skinner, by understanding them as political 'moves' in specified contexts.

The studies of political thought in the present volume, as opposed to my monographs on conceptual history, mainly discuss single authors using highly individualized languages. But I advocate, like Terence Ball (1988), the application of conceptual history, rhetoric and even individual hermeneutics to less 'outstanding' texts, to writings of politicians, parliamentary debates, party programmes etc. The *Appendix* to the programmatic chapter is an illustration of the procedures, which actualize recourse to conceptual history and to the history of political thought in general as an instrument to explicate, interpret and appraise a text of the 'everyday language of the established politics'. Studies of texts like party programmes also highly emphasize the 'move' character of texts, or positions or arguments adopted in them, in a manner, which would often be valuable even in the study of more 'academic' or 'classic' texts.

At the level of 'everyday language of established politics' linguists in several countries have provided interesting research. Much of their microscopic discussion of short texts deserve the attention of political scientists and theorists, although the linguistic studies often are not critical enough of the language of conventional political science or of the everyday 'journalistic language of politics' (cf. Palonen 1993a). What is, however, regularly missing from these studies, is the sense of radical historicity and 'contestedness' of the 'political' vocabulary, sometimes also the idea that language itself is a constitutive dimension of politicking and politicization. A combined use of rhetorical and conceptual 'turns' in the study of 'everyday political thought', its implicit innovations and tacit conceptual shifts, would make a textual empiricism into a paradigm for the study of contemporary politics.

The linguists' growing interest towards 'political' texts can also be taken as step towards treating politics as 'literature', i.e. studying the linguistic instruments, expressions and by-products of politics as comparable to other forms of writing. In this sense my 'textualist' approach has analogies to Richard Rorty's (1982) view on "Philosophy as a kind of writing". Like Rorty I question the conventional rhetoric of 'reality' as a 'given' instance, which suppresses all opposition. Conversely the new horizons created by the conceptualization of the political have also actualized the 'poetic' or 'aesthetic' aspect **within** politics (cf. e.g. Rancière 1990, 1992, Guggenberger 1992).

English mixed with German, French and Finnish

The study of political thought is always also a study of 'natural' languages (cf. Pocock 1987a). A comparison of ideas, concepts, figures etc. between different languages is an indispensable heuristic tool in the craft of studying political thought. Political theory requires from its practitioners an ability to read works in several languages.

For a scholar from a peripheral country (cf. Kanerva & Palonen 1987), other languages than the native one are needed also in writing, in order to become involved in the international academic discussion. The peripheral scholar either tries to learn one foreign language well and neglects the others or attempts to use different languages in different contexts.

My own language policy has been a mixture of these strategies. My 'serious', monographic works have been written in German (Palonen 1985, 1989b, 1992b). In this volume I publish some – with the exception of *The existential language of politics* – previously unpublished, slightly re-written conference papers from the recent years (one from 1989, the others from 1992 or 1993) in English, with an *Epilogue* in French.

The main reason for not sending the volume to any Anglo-American publisher is that I regularly use extensive quotations from German, French or even Finnish original texts. My work is, furthermore, characterized by internal references, without which single articles are not so easily understandable. A collection of articles based largely on my monographic works can give a better glimpse of the problems.

My manuscript has been read and commented by Kia Lindroos, Tuija Pulkkinen and Tapani Turkka. For the improvement of my English I am indebted to Kimmo Peltari, Pekka Korhonen, Leena Subra, for a re-writing of my French essay to Kaarina Järventaus. The English of the was checked as a native speaker by Mark Woods. Important final revisions were suggested by Tuija Pulkkinen, who after her three and half years in Santa Cruz was able to detect and correct many of my typical Finnish or German expressions.

Conceptual history as a perspective to political thought

Reflections on intellectual operations¹

Concepts are no definitions. But in order to delimit my present problematic, I offer first some demarcations. By **political thought** I mean that what is possible to think about politics as action. This demarcation presupposes already a modern action concept of politics, related to Koselleck's *Sattelzeit* around 1750-1850, during which all 'socio-political concepts' underwent a thorough change (Koselleck, *Richtlinien, Einleitung*), a horizon shift as I would prefer to say (cf. Palonen, *Handlungsbegriff, Thematisierung*).

The political thought of earlier times must be studied in a more indirect manner, either by ignoring the language of the authors, and speaking of 'classical' politics in terms of the modern action concept (as indicated e.g. by the title of Christian Meier, *Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen*) or by relating 'political thought' to the 'disciplines about politics', through which the relation of action was mediated. The Pocockian program of speaking of the 'Languages of political theory' (cf. the title of Pagden [ed] 1987) is using this indirect manner, although e.g. Pocock himself in *The Machiavellian moment* (1975) often speaks of politics 'anachronistically' as an action concept.

To simplify the matter, I will here speak mainly of 'political thought' after horizon shift to an action concept of politics. The conceptualization of politics into a definite notion, referring to a definite aspect or quality of action instead of an umbrella concept of power, domination, states, societies, parties etc., has occurred much after the horizon shift, according to my interpretation we can speak of a conceptualization of politics only in the early 20th century. With a strict notion of politics, the study of political thought again must be indirect: not the states, societies, parties or power, domination or authority as such are its subject matter but rather their relation to politics as an action concept. But for present purposes this strict notion would be too restrictive.

As a political scientist I am also confronted with the question: **why study thought** rather than action? One answer for that question is that action could be better studied indirectly, through a study of the thoughts it presupposes and concepts it uses (cf. also Vollrath 1991). In this manner one could obtain the distance needed for a research, a relativization of alleged 'facts' and 'rules'. Already Max Weber saw non-realized possibilities as an inevitable means for an historical study (*Kritische Studien*, 266-268) and even unrealistic possibilities and mere curiosities are often more important for understanding politics than realized practices taken for granted.

'Conceptual history' is, of course, a not very fortunate translation of German *Begriffsgeschichte*. This term has been used already by Hegel (cf. White 1973, Koselleck 1986, 90). *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* was founded 1955 by Erich

¹ The original version was presented in a conference on *Liberalism. Historical and Political Keywords in the Baltic Sea Region*, Helsinki, 7 to 9 January 1993). A revised version will also be published in the conference papers, edited by Henrik Stenius in the series of the Renvall Institute of University of Helsinki 1994.

Rothacker. Here I use the title in a narrower sense, referring paradigmatically to the volumes of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, edited by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck. The medievalist Brunner's *Land und Herrschaft* (1939) forms a starting point for the tradition, and since the sixties Koselleck has written the most important programmatic articles on *Begriffsgeschichte*. Although not using the title, an Anglo-American tradition of a linguistic approach in the study of political thought, starting with J.G.A. Pocock's *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* (1957) and represented besides him above all by Quentin Skinner, has obvious similarities with *Begriffsgeschichte* (cf. Richter 1990) and I will treat it also under the heading of conceptual history. With the work of Claude Nicolet (esp. 1982) and especially of Pierre Rosanvallon (1979, 1985, 1992) it would also be possible to speak of a French variant of conceptual history, but I will leave it out here (cf. Palonen, *Thematisierung, Case, 'Le politique'*).

By **concepts** in a narrower sense I mean titles or notions like politics, State, power, while I call **conceptions** the more comprehensive and detailed attempts to interpret the concepts. Not all usages of a concept or ways of talking about it deserve the title of conception. This is relevant especially for the possibility of speaking of a **conceptualization** of a word by formation of conceptions about it. In another direction concepts linked to each other can be called à la Pocock **languages**, or more restrictively 'vocabularies' or 'idioms' (cf. Pocock *Texts*, 21). In general, when I speak of 'conceptual history', I speak of the whole of this field, i.e. I using 'concept' in a wider sense.

Conceptual history is to me less of a method than an approach around certain heuristic practices and background assumptions, which together give it a definite profile, which is difficult to grasp within the conventional scientific rhetoric. My intention here is to discuss aspects of conceptual history as problems of political thought, or to express it otherwise: to explicate the intellectual operations and artisan practices, which are required in the study of conceptual history. I will in Pocockian manner, explicate the **languages of conceptual history**, but also try to relativize them as compared to certain other forms in the study of political thought, especially the rhetorical ones. I will treat the points of and the differences between the programmatic texts of Pocock, Skinner and Koselleck. Instead of discussing their substantial monographs, I will use a personal approach: the empirical 'basis' of the following reflections consists of my own research of the last ten years. Related to my interests, there is also a certain 'Teutonic' bias in my problems and references.

Conceptual history as a critique of academic languages

Also modern academic disciplines and 'schools' around them may be called 'languages'. My first question is to ask what kinds of breaks the languages of conceptual history claim to make with the current academic languages and idioms.

For Pocock, a break with philosophy is perhaps the most obvious. His argument is directed against the philosopher's tendency to systematize thinking:

"Since the philosopher's business is to formalize the relations between ideas, he very properly drew out the bodies of political thought presented to him into systems of philosophy at least as formalized as their authors had sought to make them, and at times more so. ... the philosopher's explanation of how the ideas in a system are related to one another is generally different from, and only contingently coincident with, the

historical explanation of what the author meant to say, let alone of why he wanted to say it or chose to say it in that way...." (*Politics*, 9).

Pocock, or Skinner, who makes a similar point (esp. in *Meaning*), seems unduly to limit the conceptual history to concern one of central operations in the study of political thought, namely exploring the implicit assumptions and presuppositions, which *per definitionem* transcend the authorial intentions. I would rather stress the break with the normative tendency of philosophers to classify things as good or bad, true or false etc. They are seldom sensitive towards odd and curious ideas (Cf. also Skinner's critique of Leo Strauss in *Meaning*). The point is rather to bracket philosophical commitments in favour of an **heuristic** analysis of those assumptions and presumptions found in the texts studied. Another dissociation from 'political philosophy' is to avoid making global, ahistorical comparisons and not minding about conceptual breaks (cf. e.g. the otherwise well-written study of Henning Ottmann, *Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche*).

Equally important is the break with the archivalist ideology of the mainstream historiography, which uses texts only as documents. With Koselleck (*Erfahrungswandel*) we could say that conceptual history rejects a mere *Fortschreibung* of history and presents a perspective to its *Umschreibung*. In this practice politicians have in general been more inventive than craft-minded historians.

A central target of criticism in conceptual history, especially in the Anglo-American variety, is also the conventional 'history of ideas'. The main objective is the textbook tradition with its emphasis on continuity, on the 'myth of tradition', as John Gunnell has called it in his *Political theory*. Maybe a single author could be studied at least in a more polyvalent manner by historians of ideas, but the historians of concepts would present more profiled interpretations. There are, however, besides this, also differences in the research practices. One of my displeasures with many 'history of ideas'-studies lies in their reconstructive or even summarizing character: the reader cannot make contact with the author's formulations, neither does the interpreter make explicit, how s/he draws the conclusions. 'Results' are more or less presented in their final form, with references of course, but with only few quotations and comments on them. As in 'political philosophy', an attention to vocabulary, formulations and rhetoric of presentation is often neglected, as if they would be secondary to and different from 'pure' ideas. I find the history of ideas often too impressionistic: the reader has hardly a chance to discuss its details without making another study her/himself.

A provocative aspect in conceptual history is the **break with the language of sociology**, the hegemonic discipline for our generation, which entered into the university in the sixties. To break with the vocabulary of structures, functions, roles, processes, with the implicitly normative criteria of progress, development, modernization etc., and above all with the omnipresence of the figure of the social or with 'the society' as a sort of universal context, has had an important liberating effect from the deterministic, naturalistic or scientific rhetoric, at least implicitly present in the language of sociology. A critique of 'symptomal reading', used e.g. by Niklas Luhmann (1984, 1989), is clearly emphasized e.g. in Skinner's critique of contextualism already in 1969 (*Meaning*, 59-63). Pocock still uses formulas like "a society thinks of itself" (*Politics*, 240), but in 1987 also he defends the priority of language over 'society' against 'an intelligent Marxist' in this manner:

“The language-oriented historian ... will want to discuss the language as a historical phenomenon that operated autonomously enough to provide the primary ... set of condition within which the illocution was performed. The history of political thought becomes primarily, through not finally, a history of language games and their outcomes.” (*Texts*, 25-26)

I would formulate the thesis heuristically: to study political thought let us start from the presence of certain texts, in which a concept to be studied is found, and not from their social conditioning. Another point is, of course, to understand that ‘society’ is nothing given, but a concept with a long and ambivalent history of its own. Furthermore, it is by no means necessary for the study of politics – authors as different as Weber (1913), Arendt (1958), Oakeshott (1975) and Sartre (1985) dispense with that concept. A turn against sociology is an important even if perhaps unintended aspect in the rhetoric of conceptual history. A republican rhetoric (cf. e.g. Skinner, *Idea*, Pocock, *Moment*), in all its classicism, has become modern again today, when the language of sociology is losing its hegemony. It has, however, difficulties with new forms of present-day politics, e.g. with the ‘personal is political’-view (cf. also the opposition between Mendès France and Sartre, Palonen, *Case*).

Conceptual history contains a variant of the ‘linguistic turn’. But this does not render it into a kind of applied linguistics, although the alternative German title, *Historische Semantik*, may convey such an idea (cf. Busse 1987). Its perspective to language is very selective and heuristic. All this does not exclude the fact that linguists sometimes write highly interesting monographs close to conceptual history, e.g. in Alain Rey’s study of Revolution (1990), Fritz Hermanns’ studies of German party pro-grammes (1989, 1990) or Patrick Brauns’ study of chances and variants of modernity in the French socialist party in the 1980’s (1988).

One aspect of conceptual history could be viewed as a transition from studies in the ‘language of politics’ – e.g. the study of ‘political symbols’ and of ‘symbolic politics’ à la Edelman (1964, 1977) – to ‘politics of language’. Conceptual history is especially opposed to the structuralist tendency to see in language **only** a ‘prison house’, tending to lose sight of its temporal dimension altogether. Conceptual history views language as a subject matter of politics itself (cf Pocock, *Concept*, 24). To take just one quotation, Keith M. Baker writes on playing with language:

“Human agents find their being within language; they are, to that extent, constrained by it. Yet they are constantly working with it and on it, playing at its margins, exploiting its possibilities, and extending the play of its potential meanings, as they pursue their purposes and projects.” (*Inventing the French Revolution*, 6).

For a student of political thought this view of language signifies a **politicization** of language: with the historicity of language and with the playing potentials in language present in conceptual history, it opens a perspective to contingencies, conflicts, controversies and changes, making a kind of **politicizing reading** of the situations possible. As opposed to the languages of both ‘political science’ and ‘political history’, this signifies an attempt to interpret **the political** in any phenomena. In this sense conceptual history could also be used, as proposed especially by Terence Ball in *Transforming political discourse* (1988), even for a re-orientation in the study viewing “the present as history” (ibid., 10). Ball even sees the contemporary situation as one of conceptual shifts worth closer studies:

“My own view ... is that we are living through and participating in a period of profound, exhilarating, and in some ways deeply disturbing conceptual shifts.” (ibid.).

In the final chapter of this paper I will present a somewhat similar thesis. But now let me turn to the practices of conceptual history.

Some strange assumptions

After a quarter of a century of conceptual history, there are already many programmatic statements and responses to critics, but rather few monographs, at least on the political thought of the twentieth century. One reason for this is that conceptual history requires very special forms of abstraction, usually not taught in the universities, and a certain obstinacy to counter or rather to dismiss simple objections. Both refer to some background assumptions of research, which appear quite strange to ordinary academic ideologies and practices.

A first step in learning the practice of conceptual history is not simply to read the programmatic articles etc. It rather consists in closing our eyes to certain manners of doing research, in which we, whether political scientists, historians, philosophers, linguists etc., have all been trained, what I will describe as a kind of **unlearning**. In the Husserlian sense, we shall reject a ‘natural attitude’ of ‘research’ and learn to put things into bracket, in order to cast attention to definite questions otherwise not marked in the texts and contexts to be studied.

I want to make explicit a few of such bracketings. My first thesis is: **concepts are not to be subordinated to reality**. I use the word ‘reality’ here in a trivial sense. I do not maintain that concepts should be ‘more important’ than reality – the Engelsian ‘in the last instance’-questions are futile. This does not exclude speaking of ‘reality’ instrumentally, as a ‘reality-reference’, which is important above all to select contexts, in which a certain concept has been actualized in texts (Cf. Palonen, *Handlungsbegriff*, 10-11). Let us take a problem studied by Anu Riila (1993, 1994): the debate about ‘political asylum’ in recent decades. It presents a practical controversy, in which the criteria of the political are actualized, even at the level of governmental decisions. A conceptual historian can only turn her/his attention to the conflicts and changes in the usages of the political, leaving the practical questions outside his/her research. The significance of a reality reference lies there in that it offers concrete opportunities to re-think the concept, and the re-orientations in the interpretation of the political in the twentieth century are almost always linked to practical controversies of this kind, not to the boring introductions to political science.

A variant of the previous thesis is: **concepts are not to be subordinated to language**. The discourse theoretical studies of the ‘language of politics’ tend to find the interest in concepts outmoded and unlinguistic. For political thought certain concepts obviously have a central significance both as keys to the history of political thought and as indices of actual controversies, which no words, sentences, texts, discourses, languages etc. can undo. The key significance of concepts for political thought is missing e.g. from the contemporary studies of German linguists discussing the ‘definitions’ of politics (cf. e.g. Volmert 1989, Tillmann 1989, Holly 1990). Also Dietrich Busse’s critique of Koselleck’s distinction between words and concepts (*Historische Semantik*, 50-60) misses the point. Koselleck claims that words are not *vieldeutig*, but concepts cannot avoid being *vieldeutig*, subject to diverse interpretations. Busse maybe rightly insists that even the ‘common’ words are *vieldeutig*, but this does not extinguish the difference to concepts. Koselleck’s

thesis rather signifies that concepts are always subject to controversies; they form a knot of questions, which can be both answered and thematized differently. This view helps us to understand that a break occurred in the whole manner of speaking about politics and the conceptualization of politics introduced in early 20th century by Weber, Schmitt and others.

Koselleck often quotes Nietzsche's formula: "definierbar ist nur, was keine Geschichte hat" (e.g. *Vergangene Zukunft*, 120). In other words: **concepts cannot be defined**. Against Aristotle and modern essentialists it is easy to maintain a nominalist thesis: a concept is not something inherently linked with some subject matter (cf. also Skinner, *Reply*, 250), but rather a kind of general name. To study the usages, their conflicts and changes, and to reconstruct conceptual assumptions and singular interpretations of the concepts is also opposed to a Popperian conventionalism: a concept like politics has not been used at all in a unitary and coherent manner in any modern context. Attempts to 'define' politics by any short-cut formula whatsoever have been hopeless. Even in Carl Schmitt's *Der Begriff des Politischen* it is not difficult to find usages, in which the 'political' does not refer to his famous friend-enemy-distinction. The same holds for 'definitions of politics' in political science textbooks, independent of their content.

My next thesis is already indicated above: concepts are not true or false, right or wrong, good or bad. This does not signify a total relativity concerning concepts, an impossibility to judge the value of certain interpretations of a concept or the use of this rather than another concept (cf. also Skinner, *Reply*). The judgments of heuristic value contain rather a pluralistic or incommensurable aspect, like modern art: I have compared conceptions of politics in their 'artistic' qualities of an individual profile, of capacities to open new problems, or internal breadth or conversely of ability to one-sided profilation etc. (esp. *Thematisierung*, 154-155).

Another thesis against the current scientific rhetoric could be: concepts are not to be explained. Neither a causal explanation from the context nor a quasi-logical derivation from other concepts appears to be of any heuristic value for a historical study of political concepts. I do not want to wage a polemic against thinkers, including Skinner ('*Social meaning*) or Max Weber, who claim explanation to be possible. When concepts are understood as a kind of names for a knot of questions, it is interesting enough to look at introduction, interpretation and revision of concepts themselves and to appraise their political significance as contingent moves in the *Spielraum* of possibilities than to try to explain why just this variant in the use of a concept has been presented for just that occasion.

Conceptual history will **never become a 'normal science'**. For all historical disciplines Weber claims an 'eternal youthfulness' (*Objektivität*, 206), in the sense of continually renewed problems and of a re-formation of their concepts. A Popperian idea of 'approaching the truth' does not consider e.g. that the material in these matters is more or less borderless, and new perspectives with corresponding problem shifts may at any instance break specific lines of 'progress in research'.

This situation may be better understood by personal experiences than by philosophical considerations. I often worried how little primary research is done around conceptual history and I seldom can rely on earlier research. Finally I have grasped that this is not only due to my rather exotic selection of problems for research, but rather a normal situation in specialized studies: we can speak

of progress, even by negation, only within specific perspectives, and even then in rather marginal questions

A final thesis of unlearning could be: **the presence of a concept as a sign is no result, only a starting point of research.** In the case of concepts which are used by almost all – today: freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, peace, democracy – a rule of thumb is not to be interested just in the mention of the concept but rather in its interpretation, in the attempt to answer the knot of questions present in the concept. But the same can be said of analytic concepts, like politics, power, domination, State, society etc. Even in the case of Koselleck's asymmetrically opposed concepts (*Vergangene Zukunft*), the interpreter cannot directly 'see', whether a concept is used parodically or pejoratively. New verbal forms and conceptual neologisms shall also be related to their opposites and alternatives, often only implied in the text.

Historicity and novelty

But why do concepts change? In this respect the Wittgensteinian idea that the meaning of a concept lies in its use (cf. Skinner, *Meaning*, 55) gives a key: **concepts change, when they are used**, like other tools of action: Platonic ideas do not change because they are not mixed with the world. As with politics in general, the use of concepts is a play with dirty hands.

The practice of conceptual history is opposed to that of dictionaries, which attempt to give to words an 'ordinary' and a 'derived' or 'metaphorical' meaning, more or less suggesting that the later ones are either misuses or practices reserved for special speech situations (For dictionaries as sources of conceptual history cf. Rohe & Dörner 1990, 1991). Concepts do not have an 'ordinary' meaning, an authoritative interpretation, which could exclude others. 'Original' meanings are often historical curiosities: shifts, differentiations, reformulations and oppositions in the horizon of concepts are generally more interesting than the original meaning, related to a definite context. Those who use concepts, are continually thrown into new situations, to which one possible response is always to change the conceptual tools in some manner or another, as also the title *Political innovation and conceptual change* indicates. I quote from this volume James Farr's view about conceptual changes:

"Conceptual change is one imaginative consequence of political action criticizing and attempting to motive the contradictions which they discover or generate in the complex web of their beliefs, actions and practices as they try to understand and change the world around them."
(*Understanding conceptual change politically*, 25).

For political thought, a special significance for conceptual changes is the use of concepts themselves as a *politicum*, as related to politics in a more or less partisan manner. Concepts are always potential instances in political struggle, partly invented as a means to improve one's own position or to discredit the positions of opponents, partly unintended by-products, whose political significance remains more or less ambivalent and subject to clever playing with them. Even purely academic conceptual interpretations, revisions, precisings, inventions etc. are liable to have this character of a *politicum*, independent of the intentions of their creators and users. In this sense, conceptual history is inherently interested in such conceptual changes, which attempt either to radicalize or to relativize, to extend or to limit the partisan character of certain conceptual commitments (cf. Skinner, *Language*).

A central experience for the student of conceptual history is the radical **discontinuity** in the use of concepts. We can speak of conceptual breaks in the horizons of interpretation, in the thematization of a concept, in the vocabularies used, and in relations to reality references etc. Although changes in vocabulary and in reality references are distinct, conceptual changes are related to both. The horizons of meaning and significance of a concept are discontinuous – even where the participants of a current debate appear to understand each other well, like present-day politicians who speak of ‘democracy’.

Perhaps the strangest situation in the practice of a conceptual historian is to claim that someone cannot have used a concept in a certain sense, paradigmatically in a sense becoming familiar with it only much later. This is a contention which cannot, of course, be proved, at least when rejecting a determinist view of history. We can always imagine that some author could have made a conceptual innovation, say, 200 years before it was done according to the current opinion in the historiography, and by looking for signs of this imagined possibility, they are often also ‘found’. The conceptual historian’s point is to doubt these findings, i.e. to reject the ‘similarity’ of the interpretation of a concept in relation to the later conceptual horizon. The usual experience of an historian to find ‘origins’ earlier and earlier in history is reverted. Quentin Skinner’s article *The State* forms a paradigm for reversing the long-held thesis that it was Machiavelli, who both coined the word *lo stato* and thereby introduced the modern notion of the State once and for all.

One of the most striking experiences learnt by practicing conceptual history is that many concepts, which today appear doubtlessly central in political thought, are much later than usually assumed as concepts. The work of a conceptual historian from the viewpoint of present-day political thought consists largely of trying to demonstrate how new many conceptual commitments, which appear today as commonplaces, there actually are. In this sense Koselleck sees an intention of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* in establishing “eine semantologische Kontrolle für unseren gegenwärtigen Sprachgebrauch” (*Einleitung*, XIX).

Let me illustrate this strange novelty of concepts by a personal experience. When writing my *Politik als Handlungsbegriff* I found – not exactly by accident, for it was I who ordered the book to Jyväskylä University library – in a book of Rüdiger vom Bruch (1980) the remark that the substantive *Politisierung* was first used by Karl Lamprecht in a newspaper article in 15.1. 1907. This remark did not refer to conceptual history at all, but it made me to go through my huge volume of material about the concept of politics in Germany, which I had collected, without thinking about the possibility that *Politisierung* was a neologism. By this second check I found, to my surprise, that I could not find earlier expressions of *Politisierung*, but there were already three examples of the use of it in 1908, some of them already using the word in a different sense than Lamprecht. This was an important clue, which led to re-arrangement of my interpretation. I began to argue that late 19th century authors – say Holtzendorff, Bluntschli, Treitschke, Schäffle or Jellinek – still could not speak of politicization, i.e. in the whole range of their conceptual horizon the place of ‘politics’ remained more or less fixed and that kind of re-interpretation of the current meaning was inconceivable within their whole manner of speaking about it. Lamprecht’s view on politics was by no means new, but the very introduction of the neologism *Politisierung* created a new conceptual horizon, which contained possibilities, that were soon utilized, especially by the expressionist *literati* Ludwig Rubiner and Kurt Hiller.

In *Politik als Handlungsbegriff* I did not yet speak of the introduction of politicization as a clue to a conceptualization of politics. I got this idea only when using French material from approximately the same period, in which *politisation* appears to have been used at first by the Russian-born philosopher Alexandre Koyré 1929. This was a step towards an interpretation that conceptualization of politics had begun some decades later in French than in German texts. (cf. also Palonen, *Korrekturen*).

The problem is not to date the introduction of *Politisierung* but to claim that the word cannot have been used much earlier. Still it always remains the question, especially as I have excluded newspapers and read books and articles in a very selective manner, that there could have been someone, who had used the term and even realized its potential for a revised conception of politics in general. Later I have found the verb *politisieren* in a text of Schleiermacher from 1814, not referring simply to talking about politics, but I do not think it forms an objection to my thesis about *Politisierung*. Maybe one day someone will make it plausible that Schleiermacher in fact was a kind of precursor of a radicalized and non-sectoral action concept of politics.

In this sense I can also quote Pocock concerning the revision of his old interpretation:

“It is now being questioned – I think it ought to be questioned and I am not committed to any particular answer – whether the English ‘common-law mind’ was in fact as monolithically insular as I suggested in *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*, published in 1957; but the effect of this criticism is to make the doctrine of the ancient constitution explicable as a good deal less of a mentalité and a good deal more of a move.” (*Concept*, 28).

To insist on the novelty of speaking about politicization is an example of a ‘result’ of doing conceptual history, which is not always easily accepted. ‘Generalists’ in political science or in the history of ideas seem easily to find counter-examples, without considering the specific sense in which the novelty is presented. My rhetorical problem is rather that there are no other experts at the original sources, for my research has been the first occasion to collect disparate materials to a ‘polit-literature’. To wait for an empirical critique by another expert of more or less the same texts is to wait for Godot. I hope I can meet her/him one day.

The situation refers to a problem not present for those who try to work within a ‘great tradition’ or within a more or less given canon of ‘classical’ authors and texts. One of the objections is: why is this and that thinker not taken into account? But not all of the theorists, who have been canonized as ‘classics of political thought’, have something definite and original to say about all central concepts. This is especially true about politics, which often does not appear at all as a concept in conceptual handbooks – not even in *Political innovation and conceptual change* –, although the situation is changing in this respect even in the anglophone literature.

One aspect of the work of the conceptual historian, especially when studying conceptual changes, is to reject the academic disrespect for politicians and try to read their writings in a manner comparable with more academic constructions of conceptions. Politicians engaged in actual struggles are at least sometimes more daring in inventing neologisms, in re-interpreting a concept or in dropping out a current usage than careful scholars. The same holds for the views on politics by *literati*, so often despised by academic political

scientists who already claim to 'know' what politics means. Raymond Aron's critique of his old friend Sartre is typical: it is well known that Aron is more 'in' in the conventional international and domestic politics than Sartre, but just this distance allows Sartre to sketch a more original vision of politics, which is especially relevant for situations, in which the established politics has lost its monopoly (cf. Palonen, *Thematisierung* and *Vereitelung*).

As a rule, the conceptual historian is her/himself obliged to construct the subject matter of research and collect the material. Even s/he cannot know in advance, without searching for the relevant texts and going through them, who is to be counted as a contributor to the history of a concept. One of the pleasures in doing this kind of research is to find wholly unknown authors, who do not even appear in bibliographies. Another pleasure lies in the unforeseeability of texts in relation to their titles. Most of the texts called 'What is politics' say hardly anything about it, in the specific sense in which I am discussing the question: they either repeat formulas found a thousand times in the material or leave the question in favour of another, without even indirectly contributing to the subject the researcher is interested in. For this reason to find an original text not mentioned in the secondary literature is a delighting chance to find something new. All this presupposes curiously selective practices of reading, in order to make a second-degree selection of texts which should be read carefully.

Quentin Skinner attempts to avoid *a priori* selections concerning the significance of texts' in the study of political thought. He reads also the contemporaries of classics in order to understand both the 'contemporary linguistic conventions' and the transcendence of them by some other authors present in the contexts. But it is a mistake to call Skinner's approach even 'soft contextualism' (Bevir 1992). Texts potentially contributing to a concept are the primary materials, reading and interpreting are the primary operations, not a 'placement' of authors, ideas and concepts as in a contextualist approach.

An analogous problem concerns periodizations. It may be harmless to use conventional periodizations of intellectual, 'political' etc. history, which often condition the writing and publication, e.g. wars and revolutions, which, of course, should be noted. But already the quantity and quality of the material the researcher has collected for her/his purposes may be sufficient to show that for conceptual history other periodizations are needed. For the concept of politics it is rather wise to seek after specific controversies. The depoliticization controversy in France around 1960, gave, according to my interpretation, special opportunities to re-think the concept and produced a huge amount of literature related to the history of the concept of politics. On the contrary, the 1968 revolt rather postponed the conceptual discussion for years: Régis Debray began to write his *Critique de la raison politique* first in a Bolivian prison. It is only around 1980 we can find something more interesting about the concept of politics in France (cf. Palonen, *Case*, *Thematisierung*, *'Le politique'*).

Languages, moves and concepts

Until now, I have mainly treated the approaches to conceptual history more or less as if they would complement each other – as I have used them in my own research. But, of course, there are important differences between them, and in this chapter I will give a sketch of them and comment on Pocock, Skinner and Koselleck from my own viewpoint of research (highly different from Richter's 1990).

The difference between Pocock, Skinner and Koselleck seems to me to lie above all in the unit, which is the central object of study. As already mentioned, the central concept of Pocock is **language**, while Skinner is rather more interested in **moves** in the texts and Koselleck in **concepts** in a strict sense. Pocock is most strictly a historian, while Skinner is a professor of Political science with philosophical interests, and Koselleck has applied a linguistic approach also to social history. Pocock is to some extent close to the 'structuralist' history of mentalities, Skinner uses very systematically the Austinian speech act theory and is indebted to Collingwood's philosophy of history, while Koselleck's philosophical links are mainly related to the German tradition of hermeneutics (cf. Richter 1990).

Pocock has, on several occasions, presented his research program with somewhat varying formulations. For the present purposes, and by intentionally neglecting more moderate recent formulations (*Concept*, esp. 26-27), I quote from the *Politics, language and time* :

"What has hitherto been rather vaguely termed 'political thought' is now redefined as the exploration and sophistication of political language." (op.cit., 15)

"The language of one society is impregnated with terms of theology, of a second with law, of a third with economics, and so on." (op.cit. 22).

"The historian's first problem, then, is to identify the 'language' or 'vocabulary' with and within which the author operated, and to show how it functioned paradigmatically to prescribe what he might say and how he might say it." (op.cit., 25).

Speaking of a language refers to Pocock's 'structuralist' tendency to concentrate the study into larger linguistic units than single speech acts (Skinner) or concepts (Koselleck). This is a fascinating viewpoint of *einseitige Steigerung* (Weber, 'Objektivität', 196) in order to fix attention to politically central conceptual oppositions. I have (e.g. *Vereitelung*, 15) used the second quotation in order to illustrate different styles of using concepts as well as to illustrate the conceptualization of the political towards a language of its own. Creation of new ways of thinking can, at least initially, be named as languages in the Pocockian sense, if understood as ideal types.

My difficulty with Pocock, as with Foucault and other discourse theorists, concerns rather the task of the study indicated in the third quotation. Maybe **identifying** a language is the first task of the historian, but unlike Pocock I would call it rather a preliminary task, which is, for a writer who knows the subject matter well, not so interesting. To identify language is rather to illustrate the intellectual links, at best their plurality and intersection with each other. But using the concept of a language heuristically does not mean 'identifying' languages as if they simply were in the text before the historian looks at them, but treating them as ideal typical **constructions**. I doubt whether Pocock's 'neo-Rankean' self-identity could allow such a constructionist view of languages.

At least when studying single concepts, like politics, identifying languages leads hardly anywhere. Maybe the conceptualization in this case is still all too recent and fragmentary, but my conclusion is that differences in the conceptions of politics and even in the loose use of the polit-vocabulary are hardly related to the divisions between 'isms', philosophies or academic disciplines, and central 'isms', philosophic schools or academic disciplines do not have a separate and

definite 'language of politics'. In this sense, a concentration of the interest into identification of vocabularies or languages may even be misleading and lead to empty classifications, aptly criticized by Skinner (*Meaning*).

Thus, although I am using Pocock's terminology heuristically, I doubt whether it can be taken too literally. The study of concepts in a narrower sense, but also of political thought in general does not profit so much from the assumptions that thoughts and concepts are closely linked to each others as vocabularies, obtaining margins of diversity only by borrowing from other vocabularies. Perhaps this can be done in the world prior to the French Revolution (cf. also Baker 1990), but in modern, perspectivistic, post-Nietzschean, post-Weberian, post *soixante-huitard* world – which clearly does not please Pocock (cf. the final chapter of *Politics, Verbalizing*) – no strict languages are left anymore. Even collages of them appear hardly convincing for political actors. Or, if they still are languages, they are highly individualized (cf. Frank 1990).

Quentin Skinner has adopted Wittgenstein's and Austin's practice of using trivial examples from everyday life and uses a policeman warning at thin ice as a paradigmatic example ('*Social meaning*', 83-84) – instead of e.g. a demonstrant warning of a concentration of policemen. Regarding Austin's *How to do things with words* I would have preferred a discussion of the relation of different performatives to politics as action (cf. Palonen, *Polity*) to the Skinnerian type of analysis of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.

It is striking to note how 'Weberian' Skinner's approach is, partly even explicitly (cf. '*Social meaning*', 93-94), not only in his view on the State but also in his central philosophical assumptions: his approach is nominalistic, microscopic, departs from a conflictual view of human actions and relations and stresses the radically contingent character of history: as justly emphasized by James Tully (1988, 21-22), the title of Skinner's *opus magnum*, *Foundations of modern political thought* (1978) is actually a parody, for the result of the study is that the alleged foundations are results of contingent constellations and their interactions. Skinner sees ideas and concepts as actions, as a kind of politics contributing to actual controversies. He writes:

"We can hardly claim to be concerned with the history of political theory unless we are prepared to write as a real history – that is, as the record of an actual activity, and in particular as the history of ideologies." (*Analysis*, 99)

Or in the Austinian jargon:

"the making of statements is surely to be appraised as a *performance*." (*Meaning*, 59).

In all these respects my own approach is as Weberian as Skinner's, although our rhetoric and vocabulary are often different. Another point of Skinner's approach is his so-called anachronism thesis, which he formulates e.g. in this fashion:

"A great writer has been 'discovered' to have held a view, on the strength of some chance similarity of terminology, on some subject to which he cannot in principle have meant to contribute." (*Meaning*, 32)

This thesis is closely related to Otto Brunner's *quellengebundene Begriffssprache*. Both authors have used this idea just concerning the key terminus *State* or *Staat*, and I am doing almost the same when claiming that

politics is not and cannot have been spoken in the sense of an action concept before around the year 1800 in both French and German contexts. It is anachronistic to call a book *Der Begriff des Politischen bei Immanuel Kant* (Sassenbach 1992), for Kant could not have used that formula himself. I even find it questionable that Weber speaks of 'politics' in oriental cultures, while he in other respects – concerning the *polis*, the medieval city and the formation of the ideal type of a leading politician – clearly restricts politics to the occidental culture (Cf. *Citizen as occasional politician*).

Despite this, I have doubts about the universal applicability of the anachronism thesis. Although Skinner's Collingwoodian theme of ideas as responses to contemporary questions (cf. esp. *Meaning*, 56, *Reply*, 274-275) is of primary importance as well as any author's **point** – Skinner's favorite concept – in 'doing what he was doing' (cf. esp. *Motives*), they may be too restrictive, if used as more or less given questions of research. In his *Reply*, Skinner, however, grants the possibility of other kinds of questions, although concerning himself with "the historical identity of the texts" (273).

Skinner's list of excluded types of questions (in *Meaning*) is by no means exhaustive. Let us only think about conceptual history I myself am writing (cf. Richter 1990, 61-67). This has, of course, nothing to do with the Lovejoyan 'history of an idea', but it is in accordance with Skinner's claim: "we should study not the meaning of the words but their use" (*Meaning*, 55). Still, at least a vulgar-Skinnerian would reject the entire enterprise concerning authors who could not even think of contributing themselves to a history of a concept (cf. Pocock, *Texts*). It is obvious that writing conceptual history today takes as its point of departure the scholar's questions, not in that of the author's to be studied. The scholar is obliged to 'continue the work of the author', as Sartre put it in *Qu'est-ce que la littérature*. What is interesting in an author's contribution to conceptual history, is more or less a **by-product** in the texts of an author, not the point and often not intended at all. A conceptual history is obliged to make use of a reading of texts, in which the by-products are turned to be the points in the texts, but they are better intelligible, if the author's intentions and points are considered as the 'question context'.

Writing, myself, conceptual history about a single concept, it is no wonder, that *Begriffsgeschichte* à la Koselleck is close to my approach. Like it, I see in concepts key units in the language by which the ways to classify the world and shape the horizons of possible action can be made intelligible. The explicitation and interpretation of them deserve a primary attention in the study of political thought, although they do not exhaust it. Correspondingly, conceptual changes are key problems for any historical study of political thought, but changes of concepts, as central entities by which politicking and politicization is played, also constitute a problem for the study of politics in general.

I referred already to the plurality of interpretations as a Koselleck's criterion for a concept (*Vergangene Zukunft*, 118-119), and I agree with his formula: "Begriffe sind ... Konzentrate vieler Bedeutungsinhalte" (*Einleitung*, XXII). But I would prefer to reformulate this in a Skinnerian manner to a knot of questions in order to better understand the double rhythm of **thematization** and **re-interpreting** concepts. The first includes both the introduction of neologisms and the opening of new aspects in the conceptual field, while the second contains the contestation and revision of previous interpretations – although these distinctions are often a matter of perspective. In this respect the distinction of the linguist Josef Klein (1989, 1991) between *Bezeichnungskonflikte* und *Bedeutungskonflikte* could also be applied to conceptual history.

Unlike Koselleck, I am not writing any 'social history' but rather a 'history of politics-literature' concerning the texts, in which the concept is treated (*Thematisierung*, 16-17, 154-155). In a nominalistic manner I depart from the use of the polit-vocabulary and I do not use concepts as "Indikatoren geschichtlicher Bewegung" (*Einleitung*, XIV). In this sense even Koselleck has committed himself to a kind of sociologicistic language of the post-war period, opposing rather the classical philological methods and not seeing in the built-in omnipresence of the social a constraint for thought and action. This seems to commit him to a questionable realistic ontology, holding fast on 'Sachverhalte' (op.cit., XXVI-XXVII) as something not as references already conceptually and rhetorically constructed.

A heuristic use of Koselleck's categories can be made independent of his historical perspective. I have e.g. refined, in order to interpret Sartre's views of time and space, the dichotomy horizon of expectation and space of experience into formal types playing with the time politically. From this perspective the interpretations of the space of experience are treated as an important aspect of any politics, a politics of the past (Palonen, *Vereitelung*, 213-218).

Koselleck obviously has sketched a classification of different types of concepts but never explicated it: in *Einleitung* he mentions some types: (*Verfassungsbegriffe*, *Schlüsselworte*, *Selbstbenennungen*, *Leitbegriffe*, *Kernbegriffe*), in the register of concepts in *Vergangene Zukunft* about 20 types of concepts in alphabetic order are mentioned. In a most systematic manner, the diverse concepts are treated in his famous discussion of asymmetrically opposed concepts, whose linguistic roots lies "in der selbstbewußten Gegenüberstellung von Eigennamen und Gattungsbestimmungen" (*Vergangene Zukunft*, 219). This signifies not only that certain concepts are asymmetrically related to each others – as *Politiker* und *Beamte* as types by Weber (*Parlament*, *Politik*) – but also that this kind of asymmetry is a politically relevant limit situation of relating different types of concepts to each other. Someone should reconstruct Koselleck's implicit typology of concepts in order to both criticize its assumptions and render it applicable for a wider usage..

As a hypothesis concerning "den Umwandlungsprozeß der Moderne" (*Einleitung*, XIX) and its dating between 1750-1850 the *Sattelzeit* thesis is, of course, a global interpretation. I have also found that the original horizon shift concerning politics also suits this interpretation. But about the break itself, Koselleck does not say much. He introduces four expressions for the conceptual change in the *Sattelzeit* period: *Demokratisierung*, *Verzeitlichung*, *Ideologisierung*, *Politisierung* (op.cit., XV-XIX). Besides he characterizes the new type of concepts, most explicitly in the article '*Neuzeit*' (1977), the terminus *Bewegungs-begriffe*. This is directly related to the temporalization of concepts:

"Die Zeit bleibt nicht nur die Form, in der sich alle Geschichten abspielen, sie gewann selber eine geschichtliche Qualität. Nicht mehr in der Zeit, sondern durch die Zeit vollzieht sich dann die Geschichte." (*Vergangene Zukunft*, 321).

To temporalization corresponds a concept of history: "Geschichte, deren neue Dynamik zeitliche Bewegungskategorien herausforderte" (op.cit., 337). This results e.g. in a huge number of neologisms containing the word *Zeit* (ibid.) as well as in the introduction of 'isms' referring to future-oriented concepts, to *Vorgriffe* (op.cit. 345), which is also manifested in Koselleck's thesis of the growing autonomization of the horizon of expectation from the space of

experience (*'Erfahrungsraum' und 'Erwartungshorizont'*, op.cit. 349-365). In an interesting formula he writes concerning the novelty of the *Sattelzeit* :

“Neu dagegen ist die Rückkoppelung geschichtsphilosophische Zukunftsentwürfe und ihrer Begriffe in politische Planung und deren Sprachsteuerung. Das Verhältnis zum Begriffenen kehrt sich um, es verschiebt sich zugunsten sprachlicher Vorgriffe, die zukunftsprägend wirken sollen.” (*Einleitung*, XVII).

This turn in the use of concepts refers directly to their politicization and can also be read as a methodological implication. I interpret the formula to give a licence to use strictly nominalist approaches for the post-*Sattelzeit* period, in which concepts are no longer bound to the priority of their subject matter but can rather be interpreted as means of politicization of and of politicking in the situation.

Although Koselleck uses formulas like *Verzeitlichung* and *Politisierung*, he seems not to fix specific attention to the end -ung as a sign of a *Bewegungsbegriff* par excellence. This sign is also omnipresent in the *œuvre* of Max Weber. This aspect of 'movement concepts' can also be taken as a reference to a formalization of both temporalization and politicization, in a later period, no longer speaking of progress and without a pathos of the future, and no longer linking politicization to a definite partisan view but rather to opening a new playground for politicking.

From this viewpoint it may be asked, whether not another *Sattelzeit* could be found in the early twentieth century Germany (cf. Rohe & Dörner 1991). One formula for this could be a **denaturalization** of concepts. Nietzsche's *Umwertung aller Werte*, Weber's *Wertfreiheit* thesis, Husserl's rejection of the natural attitude, the formation of modern, abstract art etc. could be interpreted as its landmarks, while the feminist, the youth and the life reform movements etc. could be used as ambivalent reality references. This re-periodization of conceptual history is possible only in a post-sociological culture, breaking with both the essentialist as well as scientific variants of naturalist languages.

Rhetoric and conceptual history

Another tradition in the study of language, which departs from an action perspective, is of course rhetoric. My problem has recently been just an attempt to combine the advantages of conceptual history and rhetoric.

Today rhetoric is an intellectual fashion, and in advocating it, it seems necessary to make precise, which kind of rhetoric is meant. I would like to sketch a **rhetorical reading of political thought** with hints towards a **special rhetoric of politics**, analogous to Weber's special ethics of politics in *Politik als Beruf*. My starting point is to re-interpret the basic triad of classical rhetoric – *ethos, pathos and logos* – into a microscopic model of politics as a conflict situation: the rhetor and the auditors are opposed to each other and try to bring each other's position in movement by 'arguments', not only limited to the logos, but also making use of both the pathos towards the audience and the ethos of the rhetor. With this microscopic model a kind of politicizing lecture (cf. Shapiro 1986) identifying rhetors auditors, positions and arguments becomes possible for any text. To speak of 'moving' and not of 'persuading' deviated from classical rhetoric and its modern rehabilitation by Perelman, towards an approach insisting, like sophists, the provocations and the ability to "make the weaker side stronger", as a thesis of Protagoras has been often translated. This

provocative, asymmetric rhetoric has been stressed e.g. by Kenneth Burke, in the following formula:

“The *Rhetoric* deals with the possibilities of classification in its *partisan* aspects” (*Rhetoric*, 22).

This kind of rhetoric, manifesting attention to classifications, distinctions, demarcations and to their potential of partisanship, is something which is also practiced by conceptual history (cf. Skinner, *Language*, 7-8). Already one concept contains a vocabulary around it, and within it there are no clear hierarchies. In this sense both rhetorical – e.g. with the interests in the ways of using pronomina as arguments: ‘who is “we”?’ – and linguistic attempts to relativize the school grammar’s classification of words into nouns, verbs etc. in the name of ‘sentence semantics’ (v. Polenz 1985) or ‘text semantics’ (Busse 1992) are interesting for conceptual history. With *Bewegungsbegriffe* the verbs and forms derived from them are becoming keys to conceptual history: e.g. Weber’s use of *Vergesellschaftung* und *Vergemeinschaftung* allows him to avoid the ‘substantialist’ connotation involved in concepts of ‘community’ and ‘society’. For similar reasons I now take the verbal figures of *politicking* and *politicization* as basic units for politics (Palonen, *Politys*).

Another variant of rhetoric, which could be perhaps the closest sub-discipline to conceptual history is the rhetorical historiography. Since the seventies it has been rehabilitated above all in the work of Hayden White’s program of metahistory, at first quite schematically (White 1973) and later in a less rigid fashion (cf. White 1978, 1987). Another, more empirically oriented example of rhetorical historiography can be found in Alexander Demandt’s monograph *Metaphern für Geschichte* (1978), which in a sense, forms a one-person microscopic complement to *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*. Like the latter, Demandt’s book is also a highly valuable piece of reference for the study of political thought.

Conceptual history and multi-dimensional politics

A final word about conceptual history as ‘political science’, related to Koselleck’s theses on temporalization and politicization of concepts. They may be interpreted as a break in the very comprehension of politics as an action concept: time and concepts are no longer only instruments of politics, but they have become themselves also the subject matter of politics.

If we can still detect something like ‘normal politics’ in the late 20th century, this could be, by simplifying Weber’s conception (cf. *Politik als Beruf*, esp. 506-507) a struggle – on power as a chance to action, either to change things or to enjoy the prestige – within a more or less given sector or set of arenas. This view is thus marked by a spatial paradigm, which presupposes more or less the opponents to be present to each other in the same space as if they were playing the same game, although this may have diverse stylistic or field variants.

Time is of course present in this paradigm, in the sense that politics requires time as well as in the sense of a certain, more or less commonly presupposed temporal perspective, dominated by the future, as in Aristotelian deliberative rhetoric. Similarly, language is an important and to some extent even necessary means of conducting politics, but in a manner, in which the ‘words’ are subordinated to the ‘deeds’ and the use of concepts thus limited either to the common presuppositions of a single game or to partisan instruments, by which the opponents may be more cleverly resisted and outplayed.

Temporalization and conceptualization signify a break with this instrumental paradigm of time and language, and with it also with the single-game view of politics. If the very relation to time, language and even space becomes not only a problem or a new theme for politicking but a requirement for acting politically outside the conventional horizon at all, this transforms the complex to be called politics into a meta-level. In this sense we can speak not only of a politicization of concept but also conversely of a **conceptualization of politics for the agents**, too, and not only for the interpreters. We can speak of a changed reality reference of politics towards a situation, in which the whole relation to time, space and language have become the subject matter of political action. This transition to a meta-level temporalization and 'linguistication' of politics makes the metaphor of a direct and singular game illusory, create distances and discontinuities, even incommensurabilities between political agents. The struggle between them does not any longer concern definite and identifiable adversaries but rather a horizon of opposition, punctually and often asymmetrically actualized. In this sense we can also speak of a conceptualization of subjectivity in politics. The point is no longer so much to play definite games better than the opponents than to outplay them from some games, at least temporally, and to invent new games which others are not able to play (cf. Palonen, *Vereitelung, Polity*).

The 'substantial' questions of politics are relativized to be intelligible only from the answers given to the politicization of the meta-level questions. The art of politicking has become the art of playing with time, space and language.

Appendix

Finnish social democrats on 'society'

The following remarks do not intend to be a substantial study of the conceptual history of Finnish language. They rather try to illustrate and demonstrate, how conceptual history can be used heuristically in the study of contemporary politics, as proposed e.g. by Terence Ball in *Transformation of political discourse*. I do not try to say something 'representative' about the conceptual horizon of present Finnish political language and political thought, although this may give vague hypotheses to that direction.

I have intentionally chosen a single text, in which the vocabulary around a single concept is studied. My point is to emphasize that conceptual history is an approach to the study of political thought, which can transform even such extremely narrow material into a living picture of the use of political theories. The usages of the concept are, of course, not as a rule intended by the authors, but they can be read out of the conceptual commitments in the text. To detect these commitments requires a certain competency in the history of political thought as well as a kind of rhetorical imagination in looking after conceptual oppositions, close to Reinhart Koselleck's (1979) well-known idea of *asymmetrische Gegenbegriffe*.

The text I have chosen is the short (4 pages) party program (or manifesto) of the Finnish Social Democratic Party (SDP) from 1987. Kyösti Pekonen (1990) has already studied "the community as a topic" in the text, in relation to the earlier programs of the SDP. My remarks discuss the text in a stricter sense of conceptual history and are concentrated around the figure of 'society' (*yhteiskunta*) or 'societal' (*yhteiskunnallinen*), terms which, in a sense, are the very incarnation of modern Scandinavian Social Democracy as well as of the hegemony of the language of sociology (in the sense of Pocock 1971) in its

intellectual horizon. For this I will only quote Hans Magnus Enzensberger's note on the Swedish vocabulary:

“Sie glauben im Namen nicht nur ihrer Institution, sondern im Namen der ganzen Gesellschaft sprechen und handeln können. In ihren Äußerungen kehren immer wieder bezeichnende Sätze wieder: ‘Hier muß die Gesellschaft eingreifen.’ ‘Das kann die Gesellschaft nicht zulassen.’ ‘Darum muß sich die Gesellschaft kümmern.’ Wenn man solche Sätze genauer untersucht, wird man feststellen, daß das Wort *samhället* in ihnen gleichbedeutend ist mit ‘der Institution, die ich vertrete’. “(*Ach Europa!*, 24).

I found in the short text the expressions *yhteiskunta* or *yhteiskunnallinen* 47 times: 19 adjectives, 1 combined word, the rest of them simple nouns in various grammatical forms. In the contemporary language ‘society’ or even ‘yhteiskunta’ in Finnish is sometimes also used in a pejorative sense, but in the program of the SDP **none of the expressions have a negative connotation**. For this reason it appears interesting to search for rhetorical and historical nuances in the use of the concept, partly to deconstruct the apparent identity built in around this word, partly to reconstruct the horizon of the concept on the plural oppositions to it and identifications with it which can be found in the text. But these operations need also a recourse to some nuances of the concept relevant either in the everyday language or in the history of political thought.

* * *

Probably the least controversial sense, in which it is used is that of referred to ‘society’ as a kind of **frame for political action**, as a kind of universal context, in which politics ‘takes place’. This sense appears in the program of SDP in two variants. the first understanding the frame as a limit², the second understanding itself as changing, in a manner that requires ‘adapting’ the politics to these changes of the frame³, themselves being above politics.

Another variant of the usage of the figure, especially of the adjective, refers to the opposition of the soci[et]al (liberation) to others, not named but implied in the context: juridical, political, etatistic...⁴. ‘Societal’ changes are seen as **more comprehensive** than others.

This already refers to a further conceptual nuance, which is also used explicitly in the text, namely **the society as a totality**. By a kind of rhetoric of inclusion this is implied by the formula that gender equality should be realized “in work, family and society”⁵. Even more explicitly the program speaks of ‘the entire society’⁶.

The next nuance posits the societal level into **opposition to the individual or the private level**⁷. It is a ‘more comprehensive’ concept than those

2 Ihminen kysyy olemassaolonsa perusteita, asemaansa maailmassa ja ihmiskunnassa sekä vastausta yhteiskunnassa vallitsevaan vääryyteen ja uhkaan.

3 Yhteiskunnan muutos, saavutukset ja uudistustyön kokemukset ovat vaikuttaneet myös sosialidemokratian tavoitteisiin ja menettelytapoihin.

4 Työväenluokan taistelu yhtyi sosialismin aatteeseen, ihmisten sorretun enemmistön poliittiseen ja yhteiskunnalliseen vapauttamiseen.

5 Sukupuolten tasa-arvo on toteutettava työssä, perheessä ja yhteiskunnassa.

6 Sosialidemokratia noudattaa omassa toiminnassaan koko yhteiskunnan kehittämiseksi asettamiaan ihanteita ja demokraattisia menettelytapoja

7 Sosialidemokratia yhdistää yksilölliset tavoitteet yhteiskunnallisella tasolla.

transcending their narrow limits. This idea can be contrasted with a quotation from Hannah Arendt, for whom society is rather an extension of the *oikos* and its 'despotic' relations:

“Was wir heute Gesellschaft nennen, ist ein Familienkollektiv, das sich ökonomisch als eine gigantische Über-Familie verstehen und dessen politische Organisationsform die Nation bildet” (*Vita activa* , 32).

The opposition between **the private and the societal** appears also in the SDP program in a more specific version, which concerns **property**⁸. Talking about 'societal property' is, however, intentionally vague: it can refer either to State ownership or to looser non-capitalist forms of ownership, like the municipal or the co-operative forms. In this sense the relation between society and the State is diffuse, especially when the 'societal' ownership is accepted besides the private one.

Concerning property the text also uses at least one formula, in which **society and State are used as if they were synonyms**⁹. In speaking of the State enterprises, this usage refers rather to a euphemistic expression, which uses society instead of State.

In its very generality in the current Finnish usage the figure of society is thus well suited to an euphemistic role. In another expression it is used as a harmless **camouflage term for politics**. Social Democracy does not struggle for political power but for 'societal influence'¹⁰.

As a figure of totality society is 'more' than the individual, and the SDP program uses formulas, in which the concordance of individual and society is claimed and, by implication, the polar opposition denied¹¹. Especially the passive form of the text implies that **society becomes a supra-individual subject or agent**,¹². Questions like who acts in the name of 'the society' are, of course, not taken up in the program.

Another variant of the autonomization of the figure of society could be called **processualization**, which also acts above the actions of the individuals. The paradigmatic expression is 'societal development'¹³.

As noted above, equally interesting is, what is absent from the conceptual horizon of the figure 'society' in the program of SDP. Most surprising, in relation to the vivid discussion on 'civil society' in the eighties, not only on an academic level, is that the **opposition between the State and the civil society is**

8 Sosialidemokraatit hyväksyvät tuotantovälineiden sekä yhteiskunnallisen että yksityisen omistamisen.

9 Valtion yritystoimintaa on kehitettävä, tarvittaessa laajennettava saattamalla yrityksiä yhteiskunnan hallintaan.

10 Sosialidemokratia taistelee puolueena yhteiskunnallisesta vaikutusvallasta ja toimii samalla jäsenistönsä yhteiskunnallisen tietoisuuden kasvun yhteisönä.

11 Yksilöiden ja yhteiskunnan yhteinen etu on pyrkiä hyvään elämänlaatuun ilman luonnolle koituvaa uhkaa.

12 Yhteiskunnan on ohjattava pankkien ja vakuutusyhtiöiden toimintaa ja yleisen edun niin vaatiessa hankittava niitä hallintaansa.

Tekninen kehitys muuttaa perusteellisesti työn luonnetta ja määrää. Siksi yhteiskunnan ja palkanansaitsijain on voitava vaikuttaa tähän muutokseen.

13 Osaamisen ja tiedon merkitys kasvaa yhteiskunnan kehittyessä.

Työnteon arvostaminen on terveen yhteiskunnallisen kehityksen tae.

missing. One formula refers in a manner to this opposition, but so that the State becomes a legitimate instance of regulation or intervention 'in society'¹⁴.

Another absent aspect is the classical *societas civilis sive politica*, in a sense rehabilitated today by Michael Oakeshott, who in *On Human Conduct*, opposes *societas* to *universitas*. The first refers to a formal 'civil association', in which men are united by the law, while the latter refers to a substantive 'enterprise association', in which men are united by a 'common purpose' (*On Human Conduct*, 198-208, 108-121). It is not difficult to understand that the conceptual horizon of 'society' in the SDP is much closer to *universitas* than *societas* in the Oakeshottian sense.

Neither can we detect the Tönniesian opposition between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* in the SDP program. Rather, as shown by Pekonen, the topic of community covers both, *yhteiskunta* refers to a kind 'society as a community', not to a 'society as opposed to community'. *Yhteiskunta* is a closed whole and not a figure of *Öffentlichkeit*, as *Gesellschaft* is understood in Plessner's *Grenzen der Gemeinschaft* (1924).

Finally, the positive evaluation of the figure society, combined with the 'proletarian' tradition of the party, also prevents the use of 'society' in the sense of a High Society, or of the Establishment. 'Society' is used in this manner e.g. by Max Weber, when he speaks of the contempt for journalists, advocates and artists in 'society':

"Der Journalist teilt mit allen Demagogen und übrigens ... auch mit dem Advokaten (und dem Künstler) das Schicksal: der festen sozialen Klassifikation zu entbehren. Er gehört zu einer Art von Pariakaste, die in der 'Gesellschaft' stets nach ihren ethisch tiefstehenden Repräsentanten sozial eingeschätzt wird." (*Politik*, 525).

As different as these meanings of 'society' in the program of SDP are, they are by no means opposite to each other. They contain, of course, nuances, which could lead to opposite positions or requirements, if invoked simultaneously. But the general profile is quite coherent, even in the horizon of absences. The positive evaluation of 'society' is linked to a certain naivety in the usage: except in the two cases of using it euphemistically, 'society' is presented in the program of the SDP as if it were a 'real thing', not a rhetorical figure.

14 Vielä kuluva vuosisadan alkupuolella yhteiskuntaa leimasi jyrkkä luokkavastakohtaisuus. Sen tasoittamiseksi valtio on monin tavoin puuttunut yhteiskunnan toimintoihin.

The existential language of politics: from Weber to Sartre¹⁵

The study of political thought has undergone a paradigm shift over the recent decades. The textbook tradition of histories of political thought from Plato to the present looking for the same 'eternal questions' of political order has rightly been criticized. It has been replaced by approaches which acknowledge that not even the questions are given – as if they were determined by the object – but themselves are subject to conflicts and changes. Paying attention to the concepts, vocabularies and rhetoric in the texts has become a key strategy for historical studies of political thought, both in the Anglo-American (Pocock, Skinner, Ball etc.) and German (Brunner, Koselleck etc.) context.

Politics, understood not as an umbrella concept for diverse 'political' phenomena but as an aspect of action, has only recently and fragmentarily been conceptualized. A horizon shift from a discipline title to an action concept was initiated around 1800 and largely fulfilled during the 19th century. However, during the 19th century, the specificity of politics was still largely seen only in the differentiation of the political as a definite sphere. Certain new usages, like the qualification of the adjective to something independent of the sphere, the extension of the 'polit'-vocabulary in general, and especially the invention of the word *Politisierung* in the first decade of the 20th century signify a new turn in the conceptual horizon of politics. Politics was turned into an autonomous concept referring to qualities of action and situation (cf. Palonen 1985, 1989a,b). In Pocockian terms we could say that it has become possible to speak about politics in the language of politics (cf. Pocock 1972, 1987a,b).

If there is something common to thinkers usually called 'existentialists' concerning politics, it is not a common theory or even a common problematic but rather a common vocabulary. The use of words like the individual, action, freedom, contingency, decision and situation act as criteria qualifying the specificity of the political. The existential sub-language of politics should be interpreted as one possible type of responses to the situation, in which politics was potentially present everywhere in the human action situation.

My intention in this article is not to write a history of 'existentialist political philosophy' but, rather, to sketch a framework for writing a history of the existential sub-language or idiom concerning the concept of politics. The common point of the existential language may be at best seen in a **situational** approach to politics as action. This perspective also signifies that nobody is a pure 'existentialist' and, conversely, that existential language is occasionally used even by authors not counted as existentialists in the textbook tradition.

1. An existentialist avant la lettre: Max Weber

Søren Kierkegaard, the first thinker usually counted as existentialist, writes in 1847: "I disse tider er Alt Politik" (*Den Enkelte*, 589). These words, as pejorative

¹⁵ Published in Peter L. Eisenhardt, Kari Palonen, Leena Subra & Rainer E. Zimmermann (eds): *Modern Concepts of Existentialism. Essays on Sartrean Problems in Philosophy, Political Theory and Aesthetic*, 80-96. Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 1993

as they may have been meant, do already hint at a lived experience of the existential language: politics is related to the ways of living. Another phrase, which also can be taken as a sign of an 'existential turn' concerning politics could be Nietzsche's famous formula *Umwertung aller Werte*: there are no 'given' goals or values for human beings.

It is not difficult to find characterizations like an "existentialist avant la lettre" in the literature on Max Weber (Wrong, 1984, 117, cf. Schluchter 1988, 286 and especially Alexander 1987, 198-203). E.g. Raymond Aron's critique of Weber is always implicitly directed against Sartre (cf. Palonen 1990b with the references to Aron). Of course Weber is also using the languages of the historical school's political economy, of neo-Kantian philosophy and of non-naturalistic sociology etc., but his portraits of the researcher and especially of the politician are loaded with existential language, above all when opposed to the ideal type of the bureaucrat.

Max Weber considers individuals as the only real entities (*Kategorien*, [1913] 439, cf. also a letter to Robert Liefmann in 1920, quoted in Mommsen 1974, 256) and understands his *Wertfreiheit* thesis of research as an obligation to decide between values. This signifies to him also a struggle between values (e.g. *Objektivität* [1904], 150, 153), or – to use his favourite metaphor – one between the God and the Devil (*Wertfreiheit* [1917], 507, *Wissenschaft* [1919], 604, 610). Weber explicitly speaks about the obligation of the individual, "sich selbst Rechenschaft zu geben über den letzten Sinn seines eigenen Tuns" and demands that everyone "den Dämon findet und ihm gehorcht, der seines Lebens Faden hält" (*Wissenschaft*, 608, 613). In this sense he commits himself to the existential principle to 'choose oneself', used later by Jaspers (*Philosophie* II) and Sartre (*L'être et le néant*). Both the scientist before the values and the politician before the action are challenged to resolve the situation by a personal decision.

The microscopic core of Weber's view on politics is the triad of struggle, politics and power, whose 'definitions' refer to each other. Politics is interpreted as "Streben nach der Macht oder nach Beeinflussung der Machtverteilung" [*Politik* [1919], 506-507), where striving refers to the changing of the existing power relations; power is nominalistically interpreted as a chance in relation to others, especially to those opposing it, as "jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen" (*Wirtschaft* [1922], 28). Both are subsumed under the activity of struggle and presuppose a conflictual view on interpersonal relations: "Kampf soll eine soziale Beziehung insoweit heißen, als das Handeln an der Absicht der Durchsetzung des eigenen Willens gegen Widerstand des oder der Partner orientiert ist" (op. cit, 20). With this triad the specific contingency of politics could be related primarily to conflicts about chances to power, secondly to conflicts about the goals in using these chances and thirdly to conflicts about realization of goals.

In Weberian perspective the politician as a type of human being is asymmetrically opposed to the bureaucrat (cf. esp. *Parlament* [1918], 320-369). The three ideal qualities of leading politicians – "Leidenschaft, Verantwortungsgefühl, Augenmaß" (*Politik*, 545-548) – refer to three different aspects of the situation: the contingency of the goals, of the results and of the situational judgment. The combination of these requirements as opposed to each other in one person is the existential qualification of a politician. For acting in this kind of situation Weber also sketches an ethics of the politician, who shall combine the requirements of responsibility and conviction –

Verantwortungsethik und Gesinnungsethik – even when knowing that this is ‘an art of the impossible’ (op.cit., 551-560, cf. *Wertfreiheit*, 514-515).

The contingency of history, knowledge and politics is hardly anywhere as radically emphasized as in the *œuvre* of Max Weber. A key notion of his work is *Chance*, with all its ambivalence of references to the accidental, the possible, the probable and the opportune. For him a speculation with unrealized possibilities is a precondition of all historical research (cf. *Studien* [1906]). The presence of the chance in Weber’s ‘definition’ of power signifies that the politician is a paradigmatic figure: a person who not only has to decide how to act without sufficient reasons but who also cannot be sure about the significance of his or her actions but who nevertheless is obliged to play with chances, in the ambivalent sense of the word.

2. Variants of existential language: Jaspers, Schmitt, Arendt, Merleau-Ponty

Signs of an existential language of politics can be detected in the thought of several thinkers in Germany since the twenties and in France since the thirties, most of them thinking not only in the shadow of Husserl, Heidegger or Bergson but also that of Max Weber. This is true of such diverse thinkers as e.g. Herbert Marcuse, Karl Löwith, Helmuth Plessner, and Walter Benjamin in Germany (cf. Bolz 1989) and Raymond Aron and Paul Ricoeur in France. Here I will, however, discuss the work of four authors, each of whom has made a direct contribution to the conceptual history of politics by using, at least partly, an existential language of politics: two of them, Karl Jaspers and Carl Schmitt, are more or less inspired by Weber, while Hannah Arendt and Maurice Merleau-Ponty rather have politicized the thought of Husserl, Heidegger and Jaspers.

Max Weber was the mentor of Karl Jaspers, and beginning with the funeral address of 1920 he wrote several essays of Weber (collected in *Max Weber*), concentrating, however, mainly on Weber’s personality and contributing to the legend that Weber would have himself become a charismatic politician, if the Germans had given him a chance. Jaspers’ early psychiatric (*Psychopathologie*, 1913) and psycho-philosophical (*Psychologie*, 1920) work is indebted to Weberian ideal types, but hardly to his political thought. A Weberian approach to politics is even later used by him rather to concrete situational analyses (esp. *Bundesrepublik*, 1966) than to his political philosophy, in which communication has a priority over conflict.

The political language used by Jaspers in his *Die geistige Situation der Zeit* (1931) and *Philosophie II* (1932) is existential in a paradigmatic sense. For Jaspers action consists of struggling “für eigene gegen andere Möglichkeiten”, of deciding and daring (*Philosophie II*, 375). What the agent chooses is, however, not primarily a policy, but himself (op. cit. 182.). What is politically important is to connect the action with a situation, which not only acknowledges the facticity but also appeals to changing it (*Situation*, 19). The notion *Grenzsituation* has a heuristic value for understanding political action, although Jaspers attempts thereby to transcend politics as a condition for politics itself (cf. *Atombombe*).

Carl Schmitt was a theorist of constitutional law, and his links to existential language are found in two words: decision and situation (for the relations between Schmitt and existentialism, discussed since the early thirties by Marcuse, Löwith and others, cf. e.g. Wolin 1990, Ulmen 1991). He uses, however, both concepts in a very peculiar manner. For the Weberian politician the decision situation is a neither-nor, but Carl Schmitt applies Kierkegaard’s

paradigm of either-or to politics and law. Especially in *Politische Theologie* (1922) Schmitt opposes the liberal idea of debate to the ability to make a decision by using the paradigm of the state of emergency: "Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet" (op.cit., 11). He radicalizes the moment of decision "auf eine reine, nicht rasonnierende und nicht diskutierende, sich nicht rechtfertigende, also aus dem Nichts geschaffene absolute Entscheidung" (op.cit., 83, cf. also 18-19, 42). As opposed to Weber the decision does not for Schmitt appeal to the freedom of the individual: it is only possible for those who are capable to act sovereignly: "Er hat das Monopol dieser letzten Entscheidung" (op.cit., 20). And while for Weber the content and sense of the decision are open, for Schmitt the decision is only an exceptional but unavoidable moment in the restoration of order.

A kind of decision is also Schmitt's famous criterion of the political in *Der Begriff des Politischen*, his "Unterscheidung zwischen Freund und Feind" (1927/1932, 26). This does not signify a 'conflict theory' of politics, rather it tries to render an existing diffuse structure of oppositions into a definite 'conflict order'. The distinction is called by Schmitt "existentiell" (op.cit., 28), but the political forms a structure, which lies above politics as action. In this sense Schmitt writes in his post-war notes: "Die einzige konkrete Kategorie des Existentialismus habe ich gefunden: Freund und Feind" (*Glossarium*, 199).

Hannah Arendt was a student of Heidegger's and Jaspers'. She was one of the first to write about existentialism to the American public after World War II (*Existenz Philosophy*, 1946, *French Existentialism*, 1946). In her lectures from the fifties she, however, criticizes French existentialism for not containing a genuine political philosophy: "ils cherchent ... dans la politique la solution des problèmes philosophiques" (*L'intérêt*, 17). Arendt's *The human condition* (1958, the improved German edition *Vita activa*, 1960) can be read as a reversion of Heidegger's priority of *vita contemplativa* and a rehabilitation of *vita activa* (cf. Taminiaux 1992). But its central categories are indebted to Aristotle, and to Jaspers' division of activities to "Dienen, Organisieren und Handeln" (*Philosophie* II, 375) which corresponds to Arendt's triad of 'labour, work and action' (*Vita*, 16).

Like the classical *polis* or republican traditions, Arendt maintains a clear dichotomy between the private and the public and restricts politics to the public realm. But she emphasizes its personal and agonistic aspect in the public appearance: politics is not judged by its results but by its qualities, by the initiative and by demonstrating in speech that the agent has been 'somebody'; a person worth remembering (op.cit., esp. 164-171). But action and speech are fragile, and for Arendt the contingency of politics manifests itself both in its origin and in its limitless consequences. She considers, however, human beings unable to bear such consequences, and she tries to control it by a revised contract theory based on mutual promises (op.cit., esp., 180-185, 225-238). This presupposes, despite Arendt's emphasis of plurality and individuality of human agents in politics, a possibility of consensus in inter-individual relations, as opposed to Weber's and Sartre's conflict perspective.

In Arendt's later work republican language often overrules the existential (cf. esp. *On revolution*, *On violence*, *Civil disobedience*), although the individual citizen still holds a key role as the unit of resistance (cf. esp. *Eichmann*). A distance to the visibility and presence of agents in the late unfulfilled trilogy *The life of the mind*, renders an existential quality of action situations to the activities of thinking, willing and judging.

In France the existential language of politics was, after World War II, linked to leftist political conjuncture and sometimes overshadowed by Marxist formulas. This is true for Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Humanisme et terreur* (1947) launching a polemic against Arthur Koestler's interpretation of the Bukharin trial. But even there Merleau-Ponty's 'Marxism' is both existential and Weberian, while the post-Marxist and anti-Sartrean *Les aventures de la dialectique* (1955) invokes Weber together with a neo-republican language à la Mendès France (cf. Wolin 1985).

Merleau-Ponty views politics as a modern tragedy (*Humanisme*, 109). In a historical perspective he opposes the political to the moral and the legal with the inevitable presence of violence in politics (op.cit., esp. 62, 83, 213). His problem is how to combine a rational orientation towards the future with the omnipresence of ambiguity and contingency. The political judgment is relative (op.cit. 69.): "Le politique n'est jamais aux yeux d'autrui ce qu'il est à ses propres yeux... parce qu'ils ne sont pas lui. L'action politique est de soi impure parce qu'elle est action de l'un sur l'autre et parce qu'elle est action à plusieurs" (op. cit., 62). By discussing the Bukharin trial Merleau-Ponty pleads for an ethics of responsibility, even for acts which cannot be mastered by the agents (op.cit., 132-133.). While in *Humanisme et terreur* the future, in a Hegelian manner, forms a limit for politics, in later writings he doubts the idea of a dialectic progress and sees, against Sartre, politics to be bound with the past (*Les aventures*, esp. 171-172, 239-240).

3. The personal is political: Sartre, Beauvoir, Gorz

The young Sartre was not interested in the politics of elections, governments, parties, great powers etc. But this does not mean that he was apolitical, as he was often accused by Raymond Aron (still in his *Memoirs*, 1983) and others: he looked for politics elsewhere, in everyday situations in human life. In this sense, the political is present also in the use of the existential language in the early works of Sartre (cf. Palonen 1990c).

In the early thought of Sartre: "L'essentiel c'est la contingence" (*La nausée* [1938], 184, for the origins of the idea cf. *Er l'Armenien* and *Carnet Midy* in *Ecrits de jeunesse*). Although opposed to a politics of isms, plans and programs, it opens a realm of choice, play and conflict in which the action can turn against its intentions. Especially the Sartrean re-thinking of time with the commitment to the Cartesian *cogito* through extending it in time, shapes his views on politics. He tries to combine the idea that the present "était ce qui existe, et tout ce qui n'était pas présent, n'existait pas" with the idea "Je ne distingue plus le présent du futur et pourtant ça dure" (*La nausée*, 137, 51).

In *L'être et le néant* (1943) contingency and freedom form the basis of a microscopic perspective to politics. Human beings are condemned to be free (op.cit., 541), freedom is the first condition of action (op.cit., 487) and it is always freedom in situation. Against Heidegger's harmonistic ideology of the team, Sartre asserts the essence of relations between the consciences: "ce n'est pas le Mitsein, c'est le conflit" (Op. cit., 481). In this sense a political aspect is always present in human relations and actions concerning them. The contingency of action is linked to a doubly negative teleology: action tries to overcome the lack (*le manque*) by a project, but is doomed to failure (*l'échec*), on the basis of the coefficient of adversity present in the situation. The conflict with the others can be understood as the explicitly political aspect of this adversity.

In the post-war years Sartre still understood politics as something instrumental (cf. the title of an article of Simone de Beauvoir from 1946 *Idéalisme moral et réalisme politique*). Only after Sartre abandoned the hope of transcending the conflict perspective, which he held in his *Cahiers pour une morale* [1947-1948], politics enters as an explicit theme into his work in *Le Diable et le Bon Dieu* (1951) and in *Saint Genet* (1952). Already in 1950 Sartre links together “choix d’une politique et d’une conception de l’homme” (*Faux savants*, 32); in the period of approaching the communists, he sees politics important to the workers in order to be able to act together (*Les communistes* [1952-1954], 242), and when he later criticizes Stalinism he claims more generally: “La politique est nécessaire et nul ne peut s’en mêler...” (*Le fantôme* [1957], 146). This leads to considering the political as the dimension of the person (*L’Alibi* [1964], 132) and to the demand for making the political explicit, to turn it to a policy, *une politique* (*Le fantôme*, 158, *L’alibi*, 135).

After de Gaulle’s rise to power Sartre criticizes *apolitisme* and *dépolitisation*: voting yes in the referendum of 1958 means: “les apolitiques votent pour l’apolitisme” (*Les grenouilles*, 133). Later he even declares “Voter, ce n’est pas faire de la politique” (*L’analyse*, 146). By opposing voting, Sartre sets himself outside the modern republican tradition (for the differences cf. Palonen 1990a). To be able to deal with the ambiguity of the actions forms the criterion of a proper politician (*L’analyse*, 146.), and later Sartre also develops on this basis an oblique apology for the clever politician: “Fût-il ambitieux, dominateur et perfide, s’imposât-il par la ruse or la violence: il lui faut persuader... le pouvoir, en tant qu’il reste politique, émane d’un groupement qui le mandate et l’épaule mais en même temps le contrôle: les relations demeurent humaines, même déviées et faussées. ... bref, l’homme politique est situé. C’est sa faiblesse: l’ingénieur social ne le sera pas.” (*L’Idiot III*, 262).

An original reception of Sartre’s political philosophy can be found in the works of Simone de Beauvoir and André Gorz. *Le deuxième sexe* (1949) is still actual as a precursor to *the personal is political*-thesis and as a manifestation of the individual woman’s sovereignty over the demands of the ‘species’, often opposed by sociologicistic or psychoanalytic versions of feminisms. The work of Gorz from the fifties to the eighties is the most interesting of the normative applications of the Sartrean thought to politics. In *La morale de l’histoire* (1959) an alternative interpretation of alienation and alterity parallel to the *Critique* (1960) has been sketched (p. 47-140). *Adieux au prolétariat* (1980) is important in manifesting the turn of the intellectual conjuncture from the exclusively group-oriented perspective, visible in the ad hoc essays of Sartre and on the surface of the *Critique*. It rehabilitates the individual as a political agent, not only in the formal sense of the constitutive dialectics but also in the strategic sense of the constituted dialectics.

Politics as outplaying: Sartre’s *Critique*

Critique de la raison dialectique (vol. I 1960, fragment to vol. II 1985) is a massive and monstrous opus. Its political philosophy is based on dialectical nominalism (I, 155-156), of the constitutive praxis of abstract individuals and the constituted dialectics of the groups is an instrument of the individuals, alone powerless in face of the practico-inert (I, 445-446). Sartre rejects any hyperorganism (esp. I, 628-631) above the individual and treats the figure of ‘society’ as *anentité verbale* (II, 24).

The text starts from the abstract individual and his praxis of working the matter, from inter-individual relations, which remain antagonistic in human history, shaped by scarcity. Mediated by the forms of worked matter, the individuals get

involved in serial structures of passive collectives. The flight from a collective can, however, by specific conditions, be turned into a common activity of the fleeing persons against the upholders of the seriality: the takeover of the *Bastille* gives the paradigm. This possibility of common action is the origin of the group formation, at first as a group-in-fusion, then as a pledged group, organization and institution. At each stage the agents try to create space for effective counter-action by limiting at first freedom and then even the equality in the group, by introducing alterity and alienation as means, until the difference of groups and series is relativized in the institution: the State is an institution fighting the formation of new groups (for a detailed description of this 'cover story' cf. Catalano 1986; for vol. II, cf. Aronson 1987).

This cover story can be transcended by a reading of the *Critique*, which aims at the intelligibility of politics as a particular totalization in a radically contingent world. From *L'être et le néant* to the *Critique* the contingency is both extended and historialized. The initial negativity of the lack is no longer a formal structure of a project but related to a praxis transforming the worked matter, the failure of the praxis consists both in its subordination to the pratico-inert (*le pratico-inerte*) and in its turning into the *praxis-processus*. The scarcity (*rareté*) and the counter-finality (*contre-finalité*) further relativize and historialize the praxis, the first 'from the back', the second 'from the end' of the action situation.

The scarcity, as a complement of the lack, as a contingent but inevitable negative basis of human history (Cf. I, 237-238), temporalizes the form of conflictual relations and calls for their continued revisions. While the failure is a limiting principle for action, counter-finality adds to it a historical dimension of new unintended consequences (I, esp. 330-336), in the case of reciprocally-opposing agents (Cf. I, 869, II, 19-24). If the conflict model in *L'être et le néant* has a zero-sum-character, in *Critique* the antagonisms are related to spatio-temporal 'practical fields' (e.g. I, 440). Politics requires the ability to move in this practical field: scarcity and counter-finality can be interpreted as figures of turning, and they must not to be taken as fatalities but they are convertible into opportunities to change the situation (Cf. I, 572).

The *Critique* relies on two figures of struggle. The one is the direct, open, personalized struggle between two present opponents of the same type, individuals or groups (I, 880-894). The other is the sovereign individual who opposes the others (I, 672). The open struggle as a *temporalisation bicéphale* (I, 882) is present until the opponent is treated as a thing, and in the conflict model "la compréhension de l'ennemi est plus immédiate que celle de l'allié" (I, 883). In individual sovereignty, the idea of being condemned to freedom, explicitly gets a political aspect (cf. I, 297) and the idea of the political as a dimension of a person is intelligible through it.

Both basic forms for political action are mediated through the relations to others. "Mais si l'histoire m'échappe, cela ne vient pas de ce que je ne la fais pas: cela vient de ce que l'autre la fait aussi" (I, 74). The Other has two related but different aspects, *altérité* and *aliénation*. Alterity refers to becoming-the-other, i.e. other-than-himself (Cf. I, 205, 369), alienation to being-the-other, i.e. not oneself (I, 459, 466). Alterity is realized through fixed structures and processes, like seriality or institutionalization. It makes an open struggle impossible, renders the opponents absent in time and space, and makes them to look like impersonal powers, not identifiable as persons but as the Other as a quasi-subject. Alienation is opposed to sovereignty, it is a situation in which, mediated by the structures of alterity, the individual is more or less unable to manifest her/his sovereignty and sees her/himself as a slave (I, 292).

Open struggle and non-alienated sovereignty form limit situations in the horizon of the Other. A political reading interprets this horizon as one of oppositions, which has two linked but different aspects of alterity and alienation. This reading makes the intelligibility of alienation and alterity themselves political, resulting from oppositions, conflicts and struggles of absent – in time or in space – adversaries and as their unintended products due to scarcity and counter-finality, manifesting themselves as well in relatively fixed structures and processes as in contingent space-times for new types of action (Cf. II, 19-24) .

Boxing as a metaphor for politics (II, .26-60) illustrates the problem. The radical contingency of modern politics lies in the fact, that it is not enough to master a fight with visible and personalized adversaries, for one's action has always repercussions which confront it with a whole horizon of more or less absent adversaries, not personally identifiable without residue. The art of politicking is possible, if totalized into a meta-level. Instead of a detailed understanding of the present adversaries and their moves, the agent has, in Sartre's synthetizing perspective, to thematize the practical field and the temporalization in terms of reciprocal scarcities and counter-finalities of the conflictual action (II, 15-19).

The key term in the *Critique* for politicking in this type of situations is *déjouer* (I, 100, 245, 882; II, 19), outplaying the adversary from the present practical field of action. It includes the faculty of turning the situation of being outplayed, like other counter-finalities, into new opportunities. In this sense, outplaying can be interpreted both regressively as a common minimum for all action worth being called political and progressively as a synthetizing figure rendering by its presence any configuration of actions a policy (for a more detailed interpretation cf. Palonen 1992b).

In terms of the cover story of series and groups Sartre's contribution to the intelligibility of politics has mainly a historical value. More important is his dissociation of the Weberian conflict perspective from the image of a direct confrontation with a visible adversary. Against the fashion of anti-, post- or transpolitics Sartre makes the political origin of alienations and alterities visible, and allows a transition of politicking to a level in which space, time as well as language themselves become intelligible objects of politics in a contingent world.

5. The action languages of politics today

Today 'existentialism' is often interpreted as a phenomenon in the history of European thought belonging to the period from 1920's to 1960's. There are no 'existentialists' among young philosophers or political thinkers of today, and in present-day academic political theory the existential language of politics is hardly discussed at all. There are only a few 'Sartrians' left, while there is, as manifested in this volume, a considerable number of 'Sartrologists', who still find the work of Sartre a valuable source of research, and read it in a heuristic manner comparing his views with other thinkers using different languages.

The pathos of existentialism is clearly outmoded: anguish, authenticity, *engagement* and even existence belong to a vocabulary which hardly appeals to anyone today. But the Weberian pathos of *Distanz* and *Entzauberung* is more actual than ever, and it also gives a key, how to read and to present the existential political language. For the study of political theory this signifies a relativization of the specificity of the existential language: instead of a *Weltanschauung*, it should rather be understood as one of the available **resources** within the horizon of a broader field of action-theoretical

approaches, as opposed to structuralist, functionalist, Marxist, system theoretical, psychoanalytic etc. approaches.

The existential language rejects, above all, 'society' as an independent and supra-individual figure, as it is more or less presupposed not only in the sociological but also in the linguistic languages of the 20th century. It departs from a microscopic level of politics as action-situation, and sees in the Weberian manner any *Vergesellschaftung* as a complex and contingent result of political actions. But neither is the existential concept of the individual 'in situation' similar to the naturalistic individual of Hobbes etc., and the inescapable contingency of the results of political actions opposes it to all contract theories. Certain similarities to the republican language (cf. Pocock 1975, Skinner 1978, Nicolet 1982) are obvious in all the authors discussed above. They more or less dissociate themselves from the classicist pathos of *citoyen* in favour of a 'paradigm of the way of life' (cf. e.g. Offe 1987) as a primary concern of politics, anticipating in this respect the 'new politics' of feminists and other European 'alternative movements'.

Modern action approaches to politics – rhetoric, hermeneutics, speech act theory, conceptual history, women studies etc. – tend to stress the verbal character of politics as a sign opposing it to structures, processes etc. The 'rhetorical turn' obviously makes thinking of Arendt or Merleau-Ponty more current today, but it has also resulted in new types of readings of Sartre (cf. Morot-Sir 1979, 1986; Frank 1977, 1980/1990) and in Weber's view of the politician as a demagogue (*Politik*, 525) a rhetorical dimension is also present.

The key terms of existential political language – action, freedom, the individual, contingency, situation – are by no means outmoded as conceptual tools for interpreting modern politics, and the same is even true for decision, if purged from the specific Schmittian connotations of closure and finality. On the contrary, when politics is more clearly than ever tending to fly from the established form of a 'political sphere' (cf. Beck 1986), these concepts are valuable in detecting the political in diverse marginal forms of human ways of living and casting the attention to the microscopic forms of politicization and politicking (cf. Palonen 1993b).

Sartre on politics as a 'loser wins-Situation'.

Counter-finality in *Les Séquestres d'Altona*¹⁶

"Johanna
Donc chacun fait le contraire de ce qu'il veut.

Frantz
Exactement."
(IV,II, 281).

1. The problem

There are no privileged texts concerning the understanding of politics, but, conversely, any texts may contribute to it, i.e. may be read 'from the viewpoint of politics'. Just this situation invites us to discuss closer the role of different types of texts: one can easily understand e.g. the difference between programs and protocols as paradigms for *ex ante* and *ex post* texts in politics as action situation.

There are no 'facts' independent of presuppositions, classifications and interpretations. In this sense all texts concerning politics, including the seemingly trivial ones, like protocols of assemblies, contain an aspect of 'fiction'. The division between fictional and other literature becomes relative, and the world described in 'fiction' can act as a reference for interpreting politics as an aspect of diverse phenomena. Whether the 'fictional texts' in the conventional sense, or some genres of them, refer to politics in a special way, depends on the problem studied. One case in which their specific significance should be discussed is their relation to the non-fictional texts in the *œuvre* of a single author. I will discuss just this case here.

The author is Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). His *œuvre* consists of several types of texts: philosophy, political theory, literary history and biography, essays, journalism, interviews, prefaces to works of others, novels, short stories, plays and even signatures of manifestos and petitions written by others. Only poetry is absent. In Sartre's own classification the divisions between poetry and prose on the one hand, and between literature (in the narrow sense) and philosophy on the other hand are decisive. What is important here is his insistence on the radical stylistic difference between philosophy and fiction. Let me take a single quotation:

"Le roman, je l'écris pour que quelqu'un le lise. En philosophie,... j'explique à quelqu'un mes idées telles qu'elles me viennent aujourd'hui"
(*Entretiens avec Jean-Paul Sartre*, 226).

¹⁶ Compared with the original version, presented at the workshop 'Politics and Administration in Fictional Literature' at the Joint Sessions of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research, Paris, April 1989, I have changed the text mainly by taking into account my precisized interpretation of the concept of counter-finality and its significance to the concept of politics, as presented in my book *Politik als Vereitelung*.

Critics doubt whether Sartre himself upholds this distinction. In a sense he relativizes it e.g. in characterizing his monumental work on Flaubert as “un roman vrai” (*Sur 'L'idiot de la famille'*, 1971, 94). My concern is how far we can make use of the literary work by Sartre as a supplementary source for interpreting his philosophical works.

A simple way to answer the question is to compare a single work of each genre written more or less simultaneously, as was the style of Sartre. The play *Les Séquestres d'Altona* (1959) can be considered as one of the by-products written as a kind of relaxation from the hard work with the *Critique de la raison dialectique* (the volume I was published 1960, a fragment of the volume II posthumously 1985, but it was written in the main part in the late fifties). Some material concerning the relation between the two works is available in the several interviews about *Les Séquestres*, which have been published in the collection *Un théâtre de situations*.

To speak of politics as a 'play' is a commonplace which is mostly used pejoratively, e.g. by reproaching politics as having been turned into a mere spectacle (cf. e.g. Ellul 1965). Others, like Hannah Arendt (esp. 1968, 153-154) or Pierre Lenain (1986). have instead rehabilitated the metaphor. The classic connection between theatre and politics is well-known (cf. Meier 1985, 1988), and I have myself spoken elsewhere on "politics as a dramatic action situation" (Palonen 1983). Sartre, a well-known critics of "l'esprit de sérieux" in *L'être et le néant*, has also paid attention to the playful character of politics. In my interpretation of his *Critique* I depart from the figure of *déjouer*, i.e. I consider the figure of **outplaying** the adversary to be the key operative move of politics:

"nous retrouverons ici cette temporalisation bicéphale dont chaque moment représente ensemble une praxis, sa négation par l'autre praxis, le début de la transformation de celle-là pour déjouer celle-ci et pour ne pas être déjouée par celle-là." (*Critique* I, 882).

Here my thesis is: any play has a political aspect. It presents a conflict situation between characters who respond to it by action. In other words, with the study of a play we may in general study the 'micro-world of action which concerns inter-individual conflict relations', i.e. 'micro-politics'. This corresponds the Sartrean view of non-reality of 'hyper-organisms' above individuals, and his idea of the intelligibility of 'macro-politics' without commitment to hyper-organistic thought figures.

The studies on *Les Séquestres* use to make some reference to *Critique* but hardly anyone judges the play as a literary illustration, exemplification and concretization of the political philosophy of *Critique*. Sartre's own plea to the liberty of the reader to continue the creation of the author (cf. *Que est-ce que la littérature*, 96-99) invites to read the play against the background of the *Critique*.

2. Counter-finality as a political figure

The reading of *Les Séquestres d'Altona* presented here exemplifies and concretizes general features of the Sartrean concept of the political in the world of a play. It attempts to give a coherent 'political interpretation' of the play by using my interpretation of the character and significance of counter-finality (cf. Palonen 1992b, esp. 116-122) for the text of the play. Besides the formal structures of counterfinality I will in some cases refer to the examples in the *Critique*.

Finality, as a 'movement' which both overcomes (fr. *dépasser*) the existing situation and is oriented towards a chosen goal in the horizon of possible is a key figure in Sartrean thought, both in *L'être et le néant*. and, somewhat altered by the Sartrean dialectics, in the *Critique*. The role of finality links Sartre to the central traditions of continental philosophy, to Kant, Hegel, Marx and Weber, and simultaneously sets him in opposition with the anti-teleological thinkers, like Nietzsche. However, Sartre – like Weber – is a special case among the finalistic thinkers, because for him the finality, to which he commits himself, is primarily a negative one. He neither sets universalistic positive goals nor does he only deplore the non-achievement of actually set goals.

The originality of the Sartrean way of thinking is due to some rhetoric and conceptual commitments. Four figures, all of which contain the aspects of negation, of border and of turning are central for Sartre. Two of them, *échec* and *manque*, are present already in *L'être et le néant*, while two others, *rareté* and *contre-finalité* are introduced first in the *Critique*. The two first ones refer, in a universalistic manner, to the Sartrean interpretation of the 'human condition', while the last two include a temporal aspect. Lack and failure are related to each other in an analogous manner as scarcity and counter-finality: the first term in both pairs refers to a limit-figure for action, while the second one refers to a figure of movement in action (cf. Palonen 1992b, 103-105).

For Sartrean political theory these two pairs of concepts have a highly ambivalent significance. Mostly they are read as diverse aspects preventing a 'successful' action, but Sartrean thought which is characterized by figures of negation and of turning (cf. Palonen 1992b, ch. 4), all four aspects can be used, by the agents confronted with these situation, as opportunities both for self-change and for manifest the competence to handle difficulties better than the adversaries. All of them offer an occasion for using a kind of anti-utopian or anti-illusionist rhetoric of *Entzauberung*.

Counter-finality as a figure of both time and movement allows, in comparison with the other three Sartrean figures, the greatest degree of interpretation of the situation and, correspondingly, the best chances for an active alteration of the situation.

The paradigm of counter-finality is introduced when the action, in the world of scarcity, meets its material object. "

"... en s'inscrivant dans le milieu naturel, ... les fins humaines en se réalisant définissent autour d'elles un champ de contre-finalité" (*Critique* I, 275).

Counter-finality is explicitly understood as a special form of finality:

"De fait, les contre-finalités sont pratiquement de même structure que les pratiques téléologiques aussi, bien qu'aucune intention humaine ne les ait produites, elles ont une structure de projet et de dépassement intentionnel..." (*Critique* I, 778).

It is clear, that not just any turn away from the original intentions is called counter-finality by Sartre. Rather this concept actualizes a double turn, which consists not only of a failure of the intended activity but also of the opening of a new, unexpected form of finality. The experience of powerlessness is joined with a new horizon, which could be used as a chance to alter either one's own policy or one's power in comparison to the adversaries who do not understand the chance opened by the counter-finality.

Joining counter-finality to the struggle with the adversary is linked to the 'reciprocal' version of counter-finality, which refers to a situation, in which political agents by intention oppose each other so that the 'resultant' of their action is something which nobody has attempted. Sartre writes e.g.

"Ainsi les résultats obtenus ne peuvent être attribués tout à fait ni à l'action des insurgés ni à celle des forces gouvernementales, et nous avons à comprendre [ces journées] non pas en tant qu'elles sont la réalisation d'un projet mais en tant, justement, que l'action de chaque groupe (et aussi les hasards, les accidents, etc.) les a empêchées de réaliser celui de l'autre, c'est-à-dire dans la mesure où elles ne sont pas des significations pratiques où leur sens mutilé, tronqué, ne correspond aux plans pratiques de personne et, dans ce sens, reste en deçà de l'humain." (*Critique I*, 893).

With the reciprocal counter-finality Sartre describes a clever politician's experience, although s/he is seldom able to formulate its principle. A politician is maybe ready to accept counter-finality as an irrevocable fact but seldom also as an opportunity, which is specific for her/his situation as a politician. However, counter-finality opens important chances for the agent, if s/he consciously rejects the utopia of a complete victory which would render the adversaries into thing-like obstacles, which are incapable to act politically. One author, who is ready to accept the significance of counter-finality is, of course, Max Weber, who writes:

"Es ist durchaus wahr und eine – jetzt nicht näher zu begründende – Grundtatsache der Geschichte, daß das schließliche Resultat politischen Handelns oft, nein: regelmäßig, in völlig unadequatem, oft geradezu paradoxem Verhältnis zu seinem ursprünglichen Sinn steht." (Weber, *Politik*, 547).

The Sartrean art of politicking takes advantage of the situations of reciprocal counter-finalities. Sartre hardly uses the term counter-finality in his contemporary essays, nor, in *Les Séquestres d'Altona*. Still, the play can be read as a paradigmatic example of encountering counter-finalities and on the ability to politicize them and politick with them.

3. The story

Les Séquestres d'Altona is a story dealing with the end of a period in the history of the von Gerlach family, successful dock-owning capitalists in the midst of the *Wirtschaftswunder*. Father (le Père) is facing his death with cancer and has called his son Werner, his daughter Leni and his daughter-in-law Johanna to a traditional 'family council' in order to secure that Werner will continue his work as the head of the family enterprise, and stay in the family house. Werner is reluctant to do so, like his wife, former actress Johanna, who wishes to leave the house in Altona, which is full of reminiscences of the von Gerlach tradition.

During the meeting Johanna reveals that she is aware of the 'family secret': the oldest son Frantz did not die, as the official certificate says, in Argentina 1956, but lives secretly in the house, meeting only Leni. When Werner finally gives the oath, Johanna threatens to leave the house and him. Father conspires with Johanna in order to let her to meet Frantz and convert him to come down and see Father once more.

Frantz was designed to be the successor of Father. In 1941 Father denounces a Polish Rabbi whom Frantz had tried to hide in the house. Frantz leaves the house to become a soldier at the eastern front. He returns in 1946, but after Leni hits against an Allied soldier living in the house of the Gerlachs, he takes the guilt on himself, hides himself in the house and speaks on a taperecorder about his views of the war and the alleged guilt of Germans before a 'tribunal of crabs'.

Johanna is fascinated by Frantz and tells, like Leni, a story of Germany being still held down by the Allies. She is even tempted by stay with Frantz up-stairs for ever, but she does not, however, bear the truth – told finally by Leni – that Frantz is no innocent soldier but 'the butcher of Smolensk'.

The conspiracy of Father – playing with Johanna against Leni and with Leni against Johanna, as Frantz says (V,I, 344) – is successful so far that Frantz finally descends to meet him. In the course of the conversation Frantz comes up with a suicide pact with Father as a solution and manages to get him to accept this solution. Frantz and Father take Leni's car and drive to Teufelsbrücke. Leni responds to this by sequestering herself in the house while Werner and Johanna become "free".

4. The four policies

Michel Contat is one of the most prominent present-day 'sartrologists', one of the editors of the basic volume *Les écrits de Sartre* (1970) and one of the directors of *Sartre. Un film* (1977). He is currently participating in the edition of the writings of Sartre. His short study on *Les Séquestres* from 1968, presented originally as a Master's thesis in the University of Lausanne (1965) directly actualizes the political aspect of the play.

Contat's interpretation describes well the micro-political structure of the play. What he calls an incarnation of "une attitude spécifique qui résulte de choix différents à partir d'une situation fondamentalement identique" (Contat 1968, 36) can be interpreted as policies or strategies of the individuals and inherent to them. I borrow his apt names for these policies as background for my interpretation. Leni's policy is called **imaginary rebellion**, Werner's **conformism**, Johanna's **moralism** and Father's **lucidity**. Contat's claim is that the policies incarnated by the persons of the play are doomed to failure (*échec*).

The policies of the persons are, according to my interpretation, failures only in the specific Sartrean sense that all human projects will fail in some way or another: "Il y a échec lorsqu'il y a action" (*Cahiers pour une morale*, 450). To understand the situation described in *Les Séquestres*, the vocabulary of *L'être et le néant* and *Cahiers* should be replaced by that of the *Critique*, the ontological concept of failure by the historical concept of counter-finality. The ambiguity of the situation is, as indicated by my interpretation of the Sartrean figures, far greater in counter-finality than in failure. It is not as evident as Contat claims that the end of the play should be judged 'pessimistically', as a failure in a normative sense.

For my interpretation there already exists a 'contextualist' reading. An English translation of *Les Séquestres* is called *Loser wins*. The formula "qui perd, gagne", is already present in the earlier works of Sartre, e.g. in *Saint Genet* (192, 209). This idea is in accordance to Sartre's intention, upon which he comments in an interview with *La France nouvelle* from 1959 as follows:

"J'avais pensé donner un autre titre à ma pièce: par exemple, 'Qui perd gagne', mais il lui aurait manqué l'autre face de la médaille qui me paraît aussi importante: 'Qui gagne perd' ". (*Un théâtre de situations*, 317).

Regarding counter-finality the literature on Sartre seems to have noticed almost only the "qui gagne perd"-face. My reading of *Les Séquestres* makes an asymmetry in favour of the "qui perd gagne"-face visible. While 'the winner loses' is present in the texts only implicitly (except when Father already had consented to the joint suicide, V,I; 375), the 'loser wins'-formula is stated explicitly on several occasions.

"Leni, souriante <to Johanna,KP>
Ici, vous savez, nous jouons à qui perd gagne" (I,II, 95)

"Le Père <to Frantz,KP>
Qui perd, gagne" (V,I, 353)

"Frantz
Cette guerre, il fallait donc la perdre?"

Le Père
Il fallait la jouer à qui perd gagne: comme toujours." (V,I, 365).

I do not claim that *Les Séquestres* is a comedy or an odd success story for Werner and Johanna. The ambiguity of the end refers rather to the counter-finality in general. This serves as a basis for a search of counter-finalities and their political significance in the play. The slight asymmetry of the 'loser wins'-formula indicates a greater actualization of the opportunity or novelty side in counter-finality in an ambivalent conflict situation.

More generally, my interpretation of the thoroughly political character of Sartre's thought (cf. Palonen 1990c) implies for *Les Séquestres* a more complex view about the place of politics than Contat's. While for Contat, politics appears to be reduced to its policy-dimension, for me the framework of his discussion, *le pratico-inerte*, can be already interpreted as a dimension of politics. It is not only a result of policies but also something which confronts the present agents with 'demands' which can be understood as 'policies' of absent (and partly even impersonalized) adversaries. In this sense the double face of counter-finality helps to make visible more 'hidden' aspects of politics in the action situation of the play.

5. Conditions for policies: the pratico-inert

In the *Critique* praxis is a notion opposed by *le pratico-inerte*. The latter manifests itself as a fixation or ossification of praxis in its work on the inert matter. It conditions praxis both as a limit and as an internal tendency towards absorption by the inertia (cf. esp. *Critique* I, 301-307). The situation in which the inert tendency absorbs all the projects independently of their specific contents or directions, in which all projects turn out to be merely repetitive, corresponding to the experience of destiny or necessity, is for Sartre not a negation of freedom but its alienation (cf. esp. *Critique* I, 329-337).

The pratico-inert of von Gerlachs is – to simplify the situation – characterized by a complex consisting of three historical products: the enterprise, the family and Germany – each of them forming a fixed figure which conditions the action of the characters in the play. They are 'sequestered' just by their dependence on

these institutionalized products of 'worked matter', on the politics of earlier, now absent and partly impersonalized actors.

Sartre's program of intellection in the *Critique* can be used for identifying these actors and for imputing the products to their policies and to the conflicts between them in concrete encounters with worked material objects. *Les Séquestrés* contains names like Luther, Hitler, Hindenburg and Bismarck, in a manner of paradigmatic agents, to which the pratico-inert of the play could be to a great degree, imputed (cf. also the interview with *Der Spiegel* from 1960 *Wir sind alle Luthers Opfer*, in French in *Un théâtre de situations*, 333-355).

Here I am only interested in the response of the characters to the situation of sequestration (cf. Contat 1968, 35). The degree of fixation to the pratico-inert is different for each. For the others Father – his first name is never mentioned in the play – is an incarnation of the pratico-inert: he is even called Hindenburg by Leni and Werner (e.g. I,I, 17). He explicitly defends the demand to Werner and Johanna not to leave the house by appealing to the unity of the complex : "Une famille, c'est une maison" (I,II, 43-44). To some extent his portrait resembles that of Stalin in the *Critique*:

"en tant qu'individu commun, Staline n'est pas une simple personne : il est une pyramide humaine qui tire sa souveraineté pratique de toutes les structures inertes et de toute l'adhésion de chaque sous-groupe dirigeant (et de chaque individu); ... sa praxis est la temporalisation de toute cette inerte structuration. Mais, inversement, en tant qu'il n'est pas simplement un homme appelé Staline mais le souverain, il est retotalisé en lui-même par toutes les déterminations complexes de la pyramide..." (*Critique* II, 209).

The characters in the play do well understand, that even incarnation is, as in the case of Stalin, a kind of policy itself, not a self-movement of a pratico-inert structure. The situation of Frantz is different. While the others respond to the situation with a project of trying to use the area of action left or indicated by it, seeking to transcend the inertia of their situation, Frantz has no real projects any longer: he is only a witness before a 'tribunal of crabs' (e.g. II,II, 154-157), chosen by the History (II,I, 146):

"L'homme est mort et je suis son témoin. Siècle, je vous dirai le goût de mon siècle, et vous acquitterez les accusés." (II,I, 128).

"< to Johanna, KP >

Je ne suis pas du siècle. Je sauverai tout le monde à la fois mais je n'aide personne en particulier." (II,V, 168).

"<to Johanna, KP >

Mais je ne choisis jamais, ma pauvre amie. Je suis choisi." (II,V, 181).

"Je suis l'Homme, Johanna; je suis tout homme et tout l'Homme, je suis le siècle..., comme n'importe qui" (IV,II, 285).

"<to Johanna, KP >

La guerre était mon destin et je l'ai voulue de toute mon âme. J'agissais, enfin." (IV, V, 308).

"<to le Père, KP >

Je n'aurai rien été qu'une de vos images. Les autres sont restées dans

votre tête. Le malheur a voulu que celle-ci se soit incarnée. A Smolensk, une nuit, elle a eu... quoi? Une minute d'indépendance. Et voilà: vous êtes coupable de tout sauf de cela." (V,I, 371).

The quotations show that Frantz not only does not act but he does not even attend an occasion for acting. His praxis is radically alienated by the pratico-inert. He does not live in time, he lives before a timeless History, he does not act as an individual, he has made of himself a witness of Man, his only relation to action is reminiscence – and even in retrospect he doubts whether he has even acted –, he does not re-interpret the past but incarnates the guilt of a century. His life is a destiny, alienated by the fact of being a von Gerlach educated by Father to be the head of an enterprise in the period of nazism and World War II. This destiny renders him incapable of any politicking.

The other von Gerlachs are also sequestered by the complex family-enterprise-Germany. Even Johanna only threatens to leave the von Gerlach house and to force Werner to choose between her and the enterprise (cf. I,II, 98-99). But all this does not make them 'apolitical' like Frantz. On the contrary, just the awareness of sequestration forms a condition for their politicking in general and for the individual policies of each of them.

6. The origins of the four policies in counter-finality

By taking the names and descriptions given by Contat as points of reference I will now look for the origins of the four policies in the way they use the internal contradictions in the pratico-inert, which mediate their inter-individual relations, as opportunities for a policy towards the existing situation. Behind this approach is the common 'existentialist' idea that there are no 'quantitative' limits to freedom: if the space for action is narrow, this does not mean a pre-determination of policies but a challenge to more dramatic strategies.

Leni von Gerlach is confronted with the shared pratico-inert in an asymmetric way: the family is for her the dominant dimension, the enterprise has only an indirect significance since she is supposed to live outside history. Nobody sees her as guilty for Nazi policies. Her only direct contact with history is an attempted rape by an American soldier in 1946: she responded by striking him with a bottle – but even here Frantz takes the responsibility (I,II, 92-93). The play does not give any indication about an education or a training of Leni which could give to her an independent existence: here her fate is that of a 'family daughter'.

Within the sphere of the family Leni acts, however, as a clever politician. She sees through the rituals of family council and takes her oath by laughter. Above all, through her very loyalty to the von Gerlach tradition (I,II, 45) she has managed to evade the 'normal' fate of submitted women; marriage and children. Even her incestuous relation with Frantz can be seen as a political act against the conventional sexual morality as well as a radical re-affirmation of a von Gerlach identity (II,VI, 189). The first occasion of the play where "qui perd gagne" is also related to the 'victory' of Leni over Father and others, and consists in the monopoly to encounter Frantz.

"le Père

... Leni est venue me dire qu'il ne descendrait plus jamais. (Un temps). D'abord, j'ai cru qu'il était mort. Et puis, j'ai vu les yeux de ma fille: elle avait gagné." (I,II, 95).

"Leni <to Père,KP>

Je vois Frantz, moi! J'ai tout ce que je veux." (I,III, 108).

If the policy of Leni does not merit the name of a revolt: "elle n'est qu'une évasion hors d'un monde oppressif" (Contat 1968, 41), this judgment does not deny its political character. Today we may, better than in the intellectual and strategic context of the fifties, acknowledge that an evasion is as legitimate a policy as a revolt in the face of overwhelming adversaries of more or less absent and impersonal kinds .

Werner has participated in the war, too, but nobody accuses him of being responsible for Nazi crimes. He has received a specialist education, typical for 'second sons' in grand bourgeoisie families, in the faculty of jurisprudence, and he has acted as an advocate. As such he has entered into a sphere unknown to Father. When Johanna has learned to know him in Hamburg:

"il était libre, il était franc, il était gai" (I, I, 21).

His loyalty to family – perhaps already affirmed by the marriage with Johanna – is manifested by his return to the house and the docks on the request of Father. With all his reverence to the traditions – which he uses also as a means against the too independent Johanna: "chez les Gerlachs les femmes se taisent"(I,II, 39) – his 'modern' egalitarianism makes him afraid to be the head of the family enterprise (I,II, 28-33). His specialist training, confirmed by the affirmations of Father about changes in the role of the head of an enterprise (I,II, 31) seems, however, to teach him to accept the role designed by Father as a challenge:

"Il y a des esclaves qui se révoltent. Mon frère ne sera pas mon destin." (I,II, 58).

"J'ai l'entreprise, je la garde: on verra ce que je vaux." (III,IV, 243).

In the case of Werner, it seems that a combination of the conformisms, of the submission to the policies of the Others – family, marriage, specialism – has given to him an occasion for success. The oath and the admission "Mais nous sommes perdus: qu'est-ce que nous reste" (I,II; 96) does not signify only a resignation. More specifically: the enterprise in all its traditions enables him to transcend the narrow specialism of an advocate by retaining the occasions to utilize this competence. This is something which neither Father nor Johanna are able to realize.

Both the absence of a family tradition and the independent career as an actress have contributed to make Johanna less submissive to the traditional role of a woman than Leni. Still, her failure as an actress, a specialty allowed to women, in the time of *Wiederaufbau* and *Wirtschaftswunder*, induced her to marry Werner and to enter later with him into the von Gerlach house in Altona. "Il y a des mariages qui sont des enterrements", says Leni to her (I,II, 59). Within the fixed traditions and rituals Johanna appears, however, as a lucid outsider, who questions that inertia she had seen transform Werner into somewhat less 'free, frank and gay' than the advocate she knew in Hamburg.

Father's demand on Werner to affirm the *status quo* by an oath for the time after his death is something which makes the universalistic moralism of Johanna, who has been brought up in the post-war Germany, confronted with the anachronistic tradition of von Gerlachs. The actualization of the conflict is acute because Johanna has no return to her career, or at least she thinks so, so that her threat to leave the house and Werner merely remains an abstract

possibility (Cf. I, II, 88; III, II, 226-227). This conflict initiates the 'movement' of the play leading to a novel situation of confrontation, in which Johanna again may have recourse to her capacities as actress.

Being an incarnation of the family-enterprise-Germany-complex for others does not form an obstacle for the old von Gerlach to have a policy of his own. On the contrary, just this given commitment to the tradition allows him to act as a clever politician. Even before his death he still attempts to 'arrange' everything, (II, IV, 117) to 'draw a line' beneath his work.

"Bismarck vivait encore que notre pauvre père a contracté les siennes."
(I, I, 16).

This remark of Leni gives a hint to the personal model for the old von Gerlach. His policy of "lucidité" (Contat 1968, 54-56) can be seen as an expression of the Bismarckian *Realpolitik* which combines a 'given' and non-explicit commitment to *Staatsräson* – sometimes combined with a Social Darwinist division of human beings into strong and weak (I, II, 55) – with an opportunism and 'playful' politics in matters of detail (cf. Palonen 1985, 35-42). If the reason of the State is replaced by that of the family-enterprise, even towards the Nazis – "Ils font la guerre pour nous trouver des marches" (I, II, 79) –, von Gerlach is a perfect representative of the Bismarckian 'art of the possible'. (Cf. also Verstraeten 1972, 147).

"Frantz <to Johanna, KP>
Un renversement d'alliances? Il adore cela." (II, V, 173).

"Frantz <to le Père, KP>
Belle partie! Vous avez joué avec Johanna contre Leni puis Leni contre Johanna. Mat en trois coups." (V, I, 344).

Compared with the policies of Leni, Werner, and Johanna, Father – conscious of his situation of being an incarnation – moves at a higher level: he is able to count the contingencies and counter-finalities as something constitutive for politics as an 'art of the possible', if they do not transcend the limits of his horizon, and a part of his own policy is to prevent such a transcendence. In other words, the realm of politicking should not be diminished by principles etc., but the 'artistic' politics of this kind is possible only for someone who has himself enough power to prevent others from using forms of politics which do not remain within the horizon controllable by him. To be able to do so, he is liable to interpret the situation in a narrowly 'realistic' manner, as in the case of the Rabbi denounced by Father to Göbbels (I, II, 88). It is also for this reason that the old 'Hindenburg' is obliged – *malgré lui* – to do his best in maintaining and strengthening the pratico-inert of the family-enterprise-Germany-complex. The family council, the oath of Werner are means for securing this even in the face of death: he makes secure that he will act *in absentia* for the members of the family even in the future.

In the terms of the *Critique*, the pratico-inert shared by the von Gerlachs is upheld not only by the institutionalized complex but also by a specific constellation of inter-individual relations. The key idea of the *Critique* is the interplay of dyadic and triadic relations between persons as 'mediations between sectors of the matter': a dyad without the presence of a triad is a passivizing structure while triadic relations are a condition for action – but also a germ of hierarchy (cf. *Critique* I, esp. 208-233). In *Les Séquestres* triadic relations are always mediated by Father, the person incarnating the pratico-inert complex. There are no real chances for a joined action by Leni, Werner

and Johanna against Father. This makes the maintenance of the pratico-inert complex intelligible.

7. The encounter with Frantz: a challenge to the policies

A policy remains at the level of thinking: when action is demanded in a concrete situation, a policy must be modified in some way or another. But not only the intentional content of a policy will be modified in the confrontation with a concrete situation, but also in its relations to other policies, irrespective whether their 'subjects' are present and personal or absent and impersonal agents. The relations of a policy to the action of others are most often not obvious or predictable before the situation of confrontation: for this reason counter-finality is here of special significance.

This is also the case with the 'event' of *Les Séquestres*, Johanna's (and later Father's) meeting with Frantz. The novelty consists both in the approaching death of Father, which strengthens his efforts to institutionalize the thirds, and in the new chances for triadic relations offered by the very presence of Frantz to the others. In the former respect we can detect again a the parallel to the Stalin of the *Critique* :

"Ce pouvoir est justement un événement singulier et chanceux, pas encore une institution. ... Il s'établit par Staline et disparaît avec lui." (*Critique* II, 211).

What is the significance of the encounter of Johanna with Frantz? She has given him a watch and thus re-introduced time into his life (IV,II, 257). He is becoming jealous of Werner (IV,II, 264), is tempted by the idea of Johanna's sequestration (IV,II, 269-270), but remembers Leni and is obliged to say to Johanna "S'il y avait que nous deux, je vous jure..." (IV,II, 288). The lucidity taught by Father reappears in this situation as a clear realization of his own incapacity to act: he is a machine made by Father. "Un été de plus et la machine tourne encore. A vide, comme toujours" (IV,II, 290).

He admits that if acting is "écrire son nom"(IV,V, 308), this was for him, as a person absorbed by the pratico-inert, possible only by taking the war as a personal destiny, all the way to becoming the 'Butcher of Smolensk'. This allows him also to reproach moralists, like lieutenant Klages at the front and Johanna, for not counting for counter-finality:

Frantz
... il condamnait les nazis dans son âme pour se cacher qu'il les servait dans son corps.

Johanna
Il ne les servait pas!

Frantz (à Johanna)
Allez! Vous êtes de la même espèce. Ses mains les servaient, sa voix les servait ..." (IV,V, 307).

If Father is sketched by the paradigm of Stalin, Frantz – if we stay within the same 'discourse' – resembles an incarnation of Trotzky in exile. A clear insight about the past combined with one of being condemned to inactivity for ever is shared by both.

Leni's monopoly of present and personal relations with Frantz is broken down, a fact which weakens her position towards the others and thus limits her Spielraum of 'domestic politics' (in the literal sense of *domus*). Leni's tales about Johanna – an agent of the Occupant powers (II,I, 134) etc. – do not prevent Frantz from receiving her. In order to retain as much as possible of the *status quo* Leni conspires with Father against Johanna, being, however, unable to prevent Frantz from coming down, at the request of Johanna, to meet Father. As a response to the joined suicide of Frantz and Father Leni invents a solution which perfectly corresponds to her loyalty to the family tradition:

"Il faut un séquestre, là-haut. Ce sera, moi." (V,III, 380).

In a sense, Leni as an advocate of the *status quo* in relation to the 'events', is the most clear loser in the play. She does not interpret the death of Father and Frantz as a sign for herself to liberate herself from the restrictions of a 'family being'. Even if she 'wins', it is in the sense of being the only one remaining loyal to the von Gerlach tradition. But the invention of self-sequestration diminishes the losses: even when Frantz is absent, his presence both as a memory and as a *séquestre* upstairs is obvious for Leni. She upholds her monopoly of close relations with Frantz even after his death: "Mort ou vif, tu m'appartiens" (IV,VIII, 327). Perhaps she will 'become Frantz herself' – in the same sense as Frantz says in 1946: "Je suis Goering" (I,II, 68) – by rejecting all projects for the future in favour of a life oriented exclusively towards the past. Another aspect of the self-sequestration is the avoidance of the conventional woman's fate even after the death of Father and older brother: it is an insurance against all dangers of getting married – in combination with an extreme form of the von Gerlach principle: "the women remain silent".

Werner is another proponent of a *status quo* policy but – unlike Leni – of a passive variant. The threat of Johanna to leave the house and him does not worry him. He is surprised by the news that Johanna has seen Frantz, responding to the fascination of Johanna by Frantz with an affirmation of the "l'enfer, c'est les autres"-formula of Sartre's *Huis clos*.

<to Johanna,KP>

"Nous restons ici! Jusqu'un de nous trois crève: toi, mon frère ou moi." (III,IV, 249; cf. also the repetition of this formula by Johanna to Frantz IV,II, 262).

In the project of Father, mediated by Johanna, to meet Frantz once more, Werner does not see a sign of liberation from the sequestration, for he has been converted to meet the challenge of leading the enterprise. Werner sees the only merit of Johanna's encounter with Frantz to be his liberation from being the shame of the family:

"Pas de famille sans déchet'. ... Seulement, jusqu'ici, le déchet, je croyais que c'était moi. ... Merci, ma femme: tu m'as délivré."(III,IV, 245).

This can be understood as a sudden insight to the inversion of the roles of a monstrem and a specialist due to changes in German history and in the enterprise itself. Another insight making the conformist policy of Werner even more obvious in the face of a crisis concerns his 'marriage policy'.

"Je voulais une femme, je n'ai pas possédé que son cadavre. ... Tu feras tout pour rester une épouse honnête: c'est le rôle de ta vie."(III, IV, 248-249).

In other words, his marriage with Johanna is not 'propre' à la von Gerlachs. The final 'success' of Werner through the end of Father and Frantz is of no merit to Werner himself. Even his career as the leader of a modern enterprise could be threatened by his conformist view on marriage and women, inapplicable to Johanna. Still, she says to Leni – Werner does not appear in the final act at all as a person present – concerning their staying in the house: "Werner en décidera" (V, 380). Despite this, the unity of the enterprise-family-complex learnt by Werner in his 'apprentice time' is threatened by the discrepancy in his views on enterprise and marriage respectively.

Even if Johanna's threat to leave the house remains abstract, the novel situation involves a challenge to her boring life as a housewife as well as to her marriage-salvation project. Encouraged and advised by Father – "et surtout, sois belle" (II,IV, 115) – she begins to reinvent her abilities as an actress. The experience of Johanna as a performing artist, for whom success is in her playing and in the reception of the public, opposes, however, as a form of politicking the instrumental 'art of the possible' of Father. Above all, for Johanna only the reception of the public counts, she does not consider in advance the counter-finalities in her relations to the thirds.

The marriage signifies a monopoly of Werner as a public to Johanna. To meet Frantz is to be introduced to a new public. In her universalist moralism Johanna does not see, at first, a danger to her relations with Werner. Her artistic performance before Frantz soon transcends the salvation project, and Werner realizes that for Johanna even being a housewife is only a role. Her personal project of minimizing the hell of family life by her abilities as actress becomes in this situation transparent to Werner.

The mutual fascination between Frantz and Johanna does not blind either of them more than for a moment – and even the moments are different. Not only Frantz' complete fixation in the past but also the pratico-inert of German history are 'too much' for Johanna's moralism. Although she affirms to Father: "Là-haut, l'Allemagne est plus morte que la lune" (III,II, 231), this change of the 'world' concerns only herself: unlike Leni she 'lies badly' to Frantz (e.g. IV,II, 280).

The moralism of Johanna is enough to detect the faults of the *Realpolitik* of Father – "Le sens commun. Voilà ce qu'il y a ... dans cette tête" (III,II, 232) – but before the experiences of Frantz it remains naïve. She is not ready to accept that "Sur toutes les routes il y a des crimes" (IV;IV, 299). Her universalism does not account for the singularity of situations.

Johanna
En général, les partisans ne parlent pas.

Frantz
En général, oui!..." (IV,VIII, 315).

No wonder that the fascination of Frantz by Johanna does not bear the 'test' of Leni to accept Frantz even as the 'Butcher of Smolensk' (IV,IX, 337-338). Her abilities as an actress are countered by her incapacity to meet the singularity of history: for politicking both capacities are demanded, but in the contexts of von Gerlachs and in facing the *Realpolitik* of the 'Hindenburg', the performing art of an actress is not enough. It is for this reason that Johanna does not experience her 'liberation' by the finale as a real one: it is rather a paradigmatic case of a 'winner loses'-situation in the play. It is because of her second failure as an actress – the failure of her attempt to turn herself into an artist-politician – that

she resigns herself to marriage – acting before a single-person-audience – a second time: "Werner en décidera".

If a person knows and acknowledges that he has at most half a year to live, this may lead to a resignation or to an intensification of politicking for the period left. The pratico-inert and the œuvre achieved by himself make it easy to understand that the old von Gerlach adopts the latter policy. "J'essaie de sauver la mise" (V,I, 345). In fact, this policy is the original impetus for the 'events' described in the play.

But why to meet Frantz once more? The pratico-inert of the family is surely not enough for Father. Frantz's role of the 'Butcher of Smolensk' was revealed to him by returning prisoners of war (V,I, 358-359): to tell this to Frantz as a novelty is hardly a reason strong enough for meeting him. He too, of course, realizes that he cannot make Frantz his successor. The point is rather to tell him of his inability to lead the von Gerlach enterprise, to take away from Frantz his imagination of a lost possibility.

Before his death the old von Gerlach is the most perfect incarnation of the qui gagne, perd-aspect in the play.

"Frantz (haussant les épaules)
Vous finissez toujours par faire ce que vous voulez.

Le Père
C'est le plus sûr moyen de perdre." (V,I, 345).

The reason for this is the realization that a leader like himself has nothing to do in a modern enterprise. "Il y a beau temps que je ne décide plus rien. Je signe le courrier." (I,II, 31). There are many reasons why Frantz is told this. One of them is to get Frantz to resign, to end his half-life as a ghost for others. This is also a sign for Werner: 'I recognize that today you are a better leader than your brother or myself – as an advocate you would miss your chance'. There is also a final victory of the enterprise over the family in the policy of Father when he admits to Frantz:

"Les parents sont des cons: ils arrêtent le soleil. Je croyais que le monde ne changera plus. Il a changé." (V,I, 368).

The decisive sentence leading to the 'final solution' of the play is when Father admits to Frantz: "je suis seul coupable" (V,I, 370). This liberates Frantz from his 'own' acts in Smolensk. "Alors, j'accepte" (ibid.). But the condition: "tous les deux, tout le suite" (ibid.) is at first too much for the eternal player von Gerlach, until he realizes that he can play with his own death, too.

In a sense, the insight that he has been wrong both about the family and about the enterprise, is a final expression of "qui perd, gagne" in the life of Father: through his own work he has realized that a policy like his cannot be followed any more. His 'last will' is to express this to Frantz, who has done nothing (if not at Smolensk):

"L'entreprise qui nous écrase, je l'ai faite. Il n'y a rien à regretter." (V,I, 375).

However, the 'final solution' is by no means predetermined by histories Frantz's and Father's life histories and pratico-inert commitments of. For both the approaching death is already a given horizon of their life. The question is only

when and how. As Sartre had learnt from Merleau-Ponty's 'Bucharin' in *Humanisme et terreur* the art of facing death may already be a political choice. "La liberté sera libre de choisir la sauce à laquelle elle sera mangée" (*Cahiers pour une morale*, 344).

As a response to the "l'enfer, c'est les autres"-situation with Johanna and the others Frantz comes to the conclusion:

"Toutes les voies sont barrées, même celle du moindre mal. Reste un chemin qu'on ne barre jamais, vu qu'il est impraticable: celui du pire. Nous le prendrons." (IV,II, 277).

But this is no answer to the 'when-and-how-question'. During the encounter he still speaks of returning upstairs (V,I, 356). The joined suicide is an invention made possible by a changing constellation in their conversation. Also Father suddenly realizes the value of the solution as a sort of *deus ex machina* for the situation, but perhaps already a chance given by Frantz to re-think the situation could have been enough to change his mind.

When Leni invents her self-sequestration, the 'freedom' of Werner and Johanna consists of being liberated from triadic relations with others present in the context of the play. When Werner is enchanted by the docks and Johanna has no career left in the theatre, yet there are no alternatives to marriage in their horizon of the possible, they are doomed to each other. When Johanna describes the situation to which her sequestration with Frantz would lead, she also describes her marriage with Werner as well as the specific 'dyadic' version of the "l'enfer, c'est les autres"-situation, which is the political significance of the institution of marriage:

"Chacun sa bouteille, face à l'autre et seul. ... Savez-vous ce que nous serons, témoin de l'Homme? Un couple comme tous les couples!" (IV,II, 288)

8. The politics of second order plays

'Loser wins' and 'winner loses' of *Les Séquestres d'Altona* are central themes of all politics, which differs from other types of playing situations just in this ambiguity of success and failure. "Ainsi, tout triomphe est un échec." (*Cahiers pour une morale*, 452). Sartre's contribution to the understanding of politics consists of not trying to play down ambiguity but of trying to play with it.

In the end of the first volume of *Critique de la raison dialectique* Sartre describes two 'pure' situations of conflict and contestation: that of two present and 'symmetric' adversaries, whose actions are immediately intelligible by the situation (ibid, 884-885) and that in which one tries to treat the other as if he would be inert matter (ibid., 890). The intelligibility of the counter-finalities would be relatively easy in these pure cases, for the politics of the 'Others' is excluded. The one is a situation of 'open politics', the other a limit situation in which politics tends to be absorbed by work (*travail*) (cf. Palonen 1992b, esp. ch. 3.).

Between them lies the vast horizon of 'dirty politics' of more or less absent, asymmetric and impersonalized agents. The Sartrean idea of counter-finality can give a key to a systematic interpretation of the perspectives, aspects and dimensions of this 'dirty politics' compared with the pure limit situations. One of its central aspects is to understand, that politics is an activity, which opposes not only present and personifiable adversaries but a whole horizon of adversity,

which contains also absent – both spatially and temporally – others. In this sense it is possible to speak of the pratico-inert institutions as incarnations of 'past others' and of their living personalizations, which, however, must be singularized through concrete agents. *Les Séquestres d'Altona* can be read as a politological thesis by means of play on this type of a situation. Counter-finality is a figure, which renders intelligible the politics of absent others (cf. Palonen 1992b, ch.5-7).

If politics is understood as “dealing with the contingent event” (Pocock 1975, 156), counter-finality, especially its reciprocal version, can be seen as a figure, through which the specific contingency of politics can be understood. This is, of course, mainly related to the contingency of the results, but equally to the contingency of goals: if nothing is realized just as intended, all goals are relative and play only a momentary role. The combination of the “Qui gagne, perd”- and “qui perd, gagne”-experiences, can be seen as an incarnation of this kind of double contingency. This is presented in a paradigmatic manner in *Les Séquestres*.

Furthermore, the idea of the play is a kind of growing lucidity, by which all the agents more or less become aware of the combination of the “Qui gagne, perd”- and “qui perd, gagne”-experiences. This signifies a transition to a meta-level of playing, of 'dealing with the contingent event'. Politics becomes a play of second order: in it, winning and losing are less important than the ability and virtuosity to play **even if** one knows that 'winner loses' and 'loser wins'. Or, to express it in a Weberian manner, a politician is a person, who **despite all this** is ready and able to play.

Sartre as an election researcher.

The rhetoric of ethos in *Kennedy and West Virginia*¹⁷

For a political scientist the publication of the fragment *Kennedy and West Virginia*, written for his cancelled Cornell lectures in mid-sixties, in the volume *Sartre alive* offers a self-legitimization to deal with such an esoteric author as Sartre. Unfortunately, when I found the text, my monograph on Sartre, *Politik als Vereitelung. Politik-konzeption in Jean-Paul Sartres 'Critique de la raison dialectique'* (1992) was in print. The self-legitimization presented in this paper is thus both *ex post* and ironically distanced.

My training as a political scientist helps to take up some aspects of the fragment, which are not so easily accessible to philosophically oriented Sartrologists (cf. Stone & Bownan 1991, Simont 1987). With regard to the audience of political scientists, I can play with the idea that Sartre is not so esoteric at all, for he has something to say about the US presidential primaries, too.

Philosophers in particular, have often either blamed Sartre for never having written his Ethics, promised at the end of *L'être et le néant*, or then tried to reconstruct the missing ethics from Sartre's other writings. *Cahiers pour une morale* and the unpublished manuscripts on ethics have given support to the latter strategy. But the fragments so far published on his lectures in the sixties as well as comments on them can also be interpreted otherwise: Sartre has not rejected his anti-moralist stand taken in *Saint Genet, Reponse to Albert Camus* and *Le diable et le bon dieu* in early fifties, but the *Critique* as well as the lectures and essays from the sixties continue to follow Sartre's anti-moralistic tendency.

What interests Sartre in the sixties, is not normative ethics. He is not interested in a set of principles according to which people should act. He rather asks, **what role the ethics plays in an argument**. In this sense Sartre had made in his discussion of ethical questions a 'rhetorical turn' *avant la lettre*. This is obvious in *Kennedy and West Virginia*, in which Sartre, furthermore, explicitly uses the rhetorical term *ethos* when speaking of the use of ethics in politics.

The rhetorical usage of ethical argumentation also suits Sartre's interest in the special ethics of politics. From this viewpoint, *Kennedy and West Virginia* supports my interpretation of Sartre as one of the few theorists – Max Weber, Hannah Arendt, Carl Schmitt, Helmuth Plessner, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michael Oakeshott –, who have said anything specific and distinctive of politics as an action situation (cf. Palonen 1985, 1989b). Sartre's discussion of the ethos of politics – or of a politician – refers to conceptual horizon of politics, to his specific negativist version of the metaphor of politics as playing, which operates with the figure of *déjouer*, of outplaying the opponent from the situation (cf. Palonen 1992b). What role can the ethos of politics play within such a conception?

¹⁷ Presented originally at Sixth Biennial Meeting of The Sartre Society of North America, May 7-9 1993, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada.

Finally, when Sartre speaks of the ethos of politics, he, probably without being aware of it, takes up the question posed by Max Weber in *Politik als Beruf*: “Was ist das Ethos der Politik als Sache?” (GPS, 548). It should be noted that Weber also uses the rhetorical term Ethos, and his discussion on the opposition between ethic of conviction and ethic of responsibility can be read rhetorically. This means that also for Weber the ethics of the politician is rhetorically mediated (cf. Palonen 1993d and *MaxWeber’s rhetorical construction of the politician...*, below). My point is to compare Sartre’s and Weber’s views on the rhetoric of ethos in politics in relation to their general conceptions of politics.

Elections, rhetoric and ethics

Sartre was, or he claimed to be, a notorious non-voter. *Élections – piège à cons* is the title of his most militant polemic against voting as an institution. It is written in his pro-Maoist period (1973), but already his critiques of the Gaullist referenda (*Les grenouilles qui demandent un roi* [1958], *L’analyse du référendum*, [1961]) are harsh in tone (cf. Palonen 1990a). These contributions give the impression that the elections are a totally irrelevant decision situation for Sartre, and that he is not interested in their results, whatever they are.

Against this background *Kennedy and West Virginia* is a surprising text. In it the elections are seen as a “real and measurable event”, enabling a study of “the practical effectiveness of ethos” (39). Here Sartre clearly invokes the old ‘existentialist’ idea of choice as a self-choice (Jaspers 1932) and studies elections from the perspective of the voters self-choice’. The significance of John F. Kennedy’s victory over Hubert Humphrey in West Virginian Democratic primaries 1960 lies in a new self-definition of the voters: “they chose him *above all* in order to act themselves as good persons” and therefore we can say: “Here ethos motivates the political choice” (ibid.).

At first I will shortly discuss the fragment as a contributor to ‘election research’. In it we can distinguish different approaches, some oriented towards the ‘explanation’ of the results, some towards the analysis of the electoral campaign.

A mainstream election research takes an causal deterministic approach: “Tell me, who you are, I will tell you, who you vote” could be its motto, independently of the question, whether the results are ‘explained’ by sociological, historical, psychological, economic, geographical or even geological ‘factors’ (as in the French *géographie électorale* of André Siegfried as his school). Since the fifties this approach has been opposed by a tradition, originated by Anthony Downs’ *An economic theory of democracy* (1957), which makes use of a teleological explanation, of the ideal type of ‘the rational voter’. A politological point in Sartre’s approach is that he understands Kennedy’s victory over Humphrey as something, which can be ‘explained’ neither by the practico-inert being of the voters nor by their ‘rational interests’. As opposed to them, it rehabilitates the heuristic significance of studying the normative dimension of election research.

Of equal importance as these result-oriented forms of election research are today the studies on campaigns. Such studies are made in political science and sociology, with the organization of the campaign and the mobilization of voters as foci of interest. These studies continue the tradition of classical party sociologists, like Moisei Ostrogorski, Robert Michels and James Bryce, to whom Max Weber referred in his discussion of the historical types of politicians in *Politik als Beruf*. Another tradition of campaign research is related to media research and rhetoric, presented in journals like the *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. A sub-discipline of ‘Presidential rhetoric’ on the borderline of

departments of Speech communication and Political science has been developed in the United States (cf. e.g. Simons & Aghazarian [eds] 1986).

Sartre's ethos approach could be compared with the rhetorical variant of campaign studies: it can be read as a rudimentary research program concerning the question of the effectivity an ethical appeal, when it is directed towards the self-choice of the voters. From the point of view of campaign rhetoric, the significance of the ethical appeal remains an open question. As Sartre writes, neither Humphrey nor Kennedy offered the voters of West Virginia any concrete programs for change: "everything remains vague" (41). This thesis can, however, be read as a sign of a common tendency towards a 'personalization of elections'. Kennedy's appeal to the ethos is rather a sign of the acknowledgement of this tendency, which he tries, successfully, to turn to his favor. This perspective gives a further reason for understanding the usage of ethical appeal as a rhetorical move in an electoral campaign.

Also in a general sense, rhetoric can be used heuristically in order to interpret the struggle between Kennedy and Humphrey. To the Aristotelian triad, *ethos*, *pathos*, *logos*, as it is applied in the New Rhetoric of Chaïm Perelman and his school (cf. esp. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, *Traité de l'argumentation*), can also give a political interpretation. The terms of the triad refer in this interpretation to an inherently political action situation. *Ethos* refers to the rhetor, *pathos* to the audience and *logos* to the argument, by which the rhetor tries to change the opinion of the audience. There is a micro-politics in the conflict between the rhetor and the audience, and it will be 'moved' by the argumentation. The struggle between opposing rhetors on the same audience brings a first degree of complication to this micro-politics.

In Sartre's 'research design' the two rhetors, Kennedy and Humphrey, acting in an early phase of the nomination contest, appeal to the Democratic voters of West Virginia. Sartre says, however, hardly anything about Humphrey, who seems to appeal, in accordance to the dominant forms of election research, both to the 'practico-inert' being of the voters as well as to their rational interests. Sartre's interest lies exclusively in Kennedy's more unorthodox campaign, which makes use of a normative appeal: "he *imposes* a normative option to the voter" (42). By it he tries both to transcend the being of the voters and to avoid false promises of promoting their special interests. Sartre's problem lies in the intelligibility of Kennedy's victory by his unorthodox *ethos* campaign.

In rhetorical terms, the *pathos* of Kennedy's normative appeal lies in his attempt to meet the prejudices of a predominantly Protestant electorate towards a Catholic like Kennedy by an appeal to tolerance, to a virtue widely acknowledged by this audience. According to Sartre, the point which Kennedy could turn to his favor, was an actualization of the tolerance principle in the election situation. He did this so that it not only contains a vote for Kennedy but also a sign, which challenged the voters to re-interpret their *ethos*:

"... he did not demand of the voter that the voter vote for Kennedy, but rather that his vote is not to be conditioned by any outside determination." (42).

The political significance of the ethical appeal thus does not appear, at least exclusively or even primarily, as an *ethos* of the rhetor Kennedy. Of course, Kennedy's argument – as quoted by Sartre– "Never would I have thought in my adolescence that one could exclude a man from the presidency because of his religious opinion" (41-42), contains also an appeal to his own *ethos*, which is

different from Humphrey's. But the turn of the religion into a question of tolerance already refers to a use of the *ethos* as an argument, as a part of *logos* in the situation. However, in the argumentation of Sartre, the *ethos* and *logos* aspects are subordinated to the *pathos*, to the persuasion of the audience. This signifies, however, at the same time a change in the rhetor: the question is turned from the speech of Kennedy to the self-deliberation of the voters (cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, *Traité*, 53-59), to their re-definition of their own ethos. This is described by Sartre's imagination as follows:

"Kennedy gives the exercise of a civic right – voting – all its value by demanding that it be for the West Virginians the opportunity of reaffirming their freedom" (43).

In order to understand Sartre's point, his 'election research' should be placed into a more general horizon of the special *ethos* of politics and into a historical context of this problematic.

The ethical appeal in politics

The relations between ethics and politics have often appeared as antithetical, for example in late 19th century Germany. In this context the range of ethical requirements was limited in the name of *Staatsräson* and *Realpolitik* by Bismarck and his adepts like Treitschke, while this position was usually countered by a moralistic attempt to reduce the range of politics in general in the name of ethics. The situation was somewhat changed in the early twentieth century, e.g. by the Nietzschean ethic of the expressionist *literati* like Kurt Hiller, who tried to find both a teleological dimension of ethics and a normative dimension in politics. During the World War I new attempts to transcend the classical positions were undertaken. (cf. Palonen 1985).

Max Weber's *Politik als Beruf*, given first as a lecture in Munich in January 1919, in the aftermath of war and during the 'Revolution', re-determines the terms of the debate. It was a critique in two directions, both against the apolitical moralism, paradigmatically exposed by the pedagogue F.W. Foerster (1918), and the amoralistic *Realpolitik* of the Bismarckian tradition. Weber sketched something inconceivable for both of the opponents, a special ethics of politics, incarnated by the figure of the politician. The ethical horizon of politics in *Politik als Beruf*, as a dimension in the construction of the ideal type of the politician (for this cf. Palonen 1993d and the next essay below), is characterized by the pair *Gesinnungsethik* (ethic of conviction) and *Verantwortungsethik* (ethic of responsibility). The two ethics are opposed to each other, in a sense they re-formulate the conventional *Realpolitik* vs. moral-distinction, but at the same time they are both indispensable to the politician. Even if the politician knows that the two ethical approaches are incompatible to each other, s/he is supposed to combine them, making thus of politics 'the art of the impossible', as Weber converts the pseudo-Bismarckian formula (cf. *Politik*, GPS, 559-560 and *Wertfreiheit*, 514).

In France the relations between ethics and politics were discussed, during the Third Republic, in somewhat similar terms. However, in the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair, even the pro-political Republicans, like Alain and Georges Guy-Grand, tended to be strongly moralistic, while other moralist Republicans like Charles Péguy or Julien Benda were highly anti-political. The anti-moralist stand in favour of the *raison d'Etat* was paradigmatically represented by Charles Maurras and his neo-monarchists, who were pro-political within a narrow etatistic view on politics. In the Fourth Republic, the moralistic and even anti-political view was proposed e.g. by Albert Camus, while Maurice Merleau-

Ponty in *Humanisme et terreur* (1947), with a provocative and mostly misunderstood rhetoric, takes a stand against moralism, with arguments which explicitly refer to the Weberian paradox of consequences. (cf. Palonen 1989b, 1990b)

Sartre's position since the early fifties is shaped by Merleau-Ponty's polemic against moralism imbued with the Weberian paradoxes (cf. the posthumous apology in *Merleau-Ponty vivant*). He did not, however, subscribe to the position of Merleau-Ponty from *Humanisme et terreur*, in so far as both morality and politics were subordinated by Merleau-Ponty to a philosophy of history. This subordination was not altered in *Les aventures de la dialectique* (1955) either, when Merleau-Ponty replaced the future-oriented pro-Marxist view with a past-oriented philosophy of history. In Sartre's *Critique* there is, too, a tendency, e.g. in the figure of "totalisation d'enveloppement" (II; 198ff), to subordinate both morality and politics to the philosophy of history. It seems, however, that when Sartre in his lectures in the sixties takes up again the Weberian problem of the ethics of politics, he has got rid of this subordination

The fragment *Kennedy and West Virginia* is somewhat ambivalent in its vocabulary. When Sartre writes about "the curious dialectic of the political and the normative" or of "the manipulation of the ethos by the politician" (both 39) as well as when he uses the formula "put ethical action in place of politics" (47), then 'the political' simply refers to the teleological judgment of the situation, as opposed to the normative. Sartre admits that it is well possible to understand the ethical appeal of Kennedy as "a ruse of politics", but the text does not support such an interpretation, on the contrary "everything leads us to believe his sincerity" (44).

It is, however, just this assumption which enables Sartre to revise the classical opposition between teleological and normative judgments and to see in Kennedy's appeal "an ethical invention":

"Invention is put in the service of political ambition, but it cannot itself be political." (45).

In this quotation the narrowly teleological usage of the adjective 'political' is subordinated to a more comprehensive conception of politics, in which also the normative aspect can have a place. According to Sartre's interpretation this can be understood as follows:

"... in West Virginia Kennedy invents the idea of addressing himself to the ethos of its voters to the exact extent that he produces himself... as ethical agent. A politician can in any number of cases imitate ethical attitudes in order to elicit the same from his co-citizens or militants of his party. But in that case, the collective ethos is so well known that he can foresee the reactions of the social group. In the typical case that we have chosen, analysis shows that imitation of the prevailing ethos did not pay off due to the uncertainty of the candidate's situation. The political undertaking, regardless of its reasons and its objective, is forced to undergo the normative moment. The ethical can here become the clever maneuver of the political on the condition of living the ethical in its purity." (46).

Ruse and ethics do not appear here as opposites. On the contrary: the more pure the ethical appeal appears to be, the more effective it will be to an audience, to which an open ruse is suspect. It is just in this sense as we can speak of a rhetorical usage of the ethical, which does turn it into a dimension of

the political. According to Sartre, "it put *ethical effectiveness* in the service of politics" (ibid.). In this case, the normative aspect retains the character of an 'exigency', and it will be at the same time, through the rhetorical usage, subordinated to a finalistic figure of politics.

Besides the re-interpretation of the relations between the normative and the finalistic aspects of politics, Sartre also relativizes the conventional opposition between morals and politics both existentially and contextually. In the first sense, the normative and the finalistic aspects are, in the self-deliberation of the voters, subordinated to the 'decisionistic' aspect of self-choice, referring to their existential situation. The contextual dimension of the situation refers to the diversity of the auditories. The efficiency of the ethical appeal is made visible by extending the audience from West Virginia to the U.S. political culture in general.

"... the West Virginia voter only produced himself as an American: it is a trait of puritanism in the United States to live politics ethically" (47).

The situation can be described as a contradiction between the written and partly sanctified Constitution and the unspoken criteria of success for presidential candidates – only the WASP:s have a chance:

"At this level the problem takes a moral dimension: Americans are not worthy of the Constitution they made since they reject unity founded on the equality of rights." (45).

The normativity of the exigency is thus bound to contextual brackets. The exigency acceptable to a wider audience is applied in order to question the narrow brackets of the definite audience. Or, the normative appeal serves to de-particularize the present audience, it appeals to the voters to extend their judgment and, accordingly, to transcend their traditional identity.

However, this confirmation of the ethical dimension in the election is also relative. The particularity of the 'American' identity remains, Kennedy's appeal to tolerance even strengthens it and makes further brackets visible:

"he who votes for a Catholic would certainly not vote for a black." (47).

Considered rhetorically, the political significance of Kennedy's ethical appeal remains thus limited. It can become politically effective in so far as the existing prejudices of the audience can be shown to be relative. Of the tacitly assumed WASP criteria of a 'presidentiable' the case of Kennedy only takes the last one away: the rejection of Catholicism had – during the papacy of John XXIII – become obsolete. It only needed someone who dared to provoke the audience by denying its validity. The second, AS-criterion, was tested in 1988 by Michael Dukakis, and maybe he failed just for not fulfilling this criterion.

The success of Kennedy is thus intelligible by the fact than he succeeded in removing an contextual obstacle, considered until then as valid by the actual audience. The provocation of the expectation horizon (for the term cf. Koselleck 1979) was in this case just adequate: the candidature of Kennedy in the primaries offered an occasion, which allowed the voters to transform themselves, which actually could have happened earlier.

From ethics to rhetoric of the politician

Even if he offers rhetorical mediations between ethics and politics, for Sartre the opposition between the ethical and the political in the situation is not wholly abolished. There remains a limit for the rhetorical inclusion of the normative under the finalistic aspect. It lies in the requirement to consider the unintended consequences of action, in Sartrean terms the counter-finalities of action, in a conflict situation. Politics is an activity, in which, according to Sartre – as well as to Weber (cf. *Politik*, GPS, 547) – we should always take notice of the existence and significance of counter-finalities.

“At this level, the difference between ethics and politics ... is that politics must assume even the unforeseen consequences of its action. The ethical person, however, refuses a priori the nonethical consequences of the action, as in the maxim: ‘Do what you must and let the chips fall where they may.’ (50-51).

The situation described here corresponds exactly to the Weberian opposition between *Verantwortungsethik* and *Gesinnungsethik*. Sartre’s rhetorical point lies in a situational relativization of the political significance of the unintended consequences. This enables him to reduce the unconditional priority of the finalistic dimension and to recognize the autonomous role of the ethical aspect in politics. This relativization is for Sartre a temporal one, limited to the period of the election campaign:

“The ethical absolute – that is, the moment when the historical agent denies his conditioning – is realized in the precise moment when the voter votes. The ethical result, to the extent that it holds ethical interests for the community, lasts no longer than the tabulation of the votes. The television says: ‘Kennedy wins,’ and the listener understands: ‘Tolerance triumphed in West Virginia’. Or, if you prefer, ‘We have proved by putting our interests aside that the relationships of reciprocity are always possible’. (51)

With this temporalization of the role of the ethos in politics, Sartre opposes a conventional view; the unquestioned priority of long-term calculations over the short-term ones, which is still present in Weber’s apology of the ethic of responsibility. While the popular critique of politicians blames them just for their short-sighted view, oriented towards the next elections, Sartre, on the contrary, sees just in the election orientation of the politicians a chance for the introduction of the ethical aspect, even in the sense of an ethic of conviction, which does not care about the consequences. The election situation as a ‘lived experience’ (*le vécu*), as a potential existential situation in which momentary decisions are needed, can thus be turned into a basis for rejecting the conventional ideology of the value of ‘long-lasting solutions’ in politics. This kind of ideology is tacitly presupposed both in the ethic of responsibility of a politician and in the popular anti-political rhetoric with its implicit fear of unpredictable changes.

The ambivalent role of the counter-finalities in politics is, in the work of Sartre, also related to what has been called his ‘double register’ (cf. e.g. Frank 1980/1990) of lived experience and significance of actions. This duality is expressed in a paradigmatic manner in this formula:

“The result of this unconditional exigency is limited but absolute: it is the election of a *Catholic* (and not Kennedy) by a protestant majority. ‘Let the chips fall where they may’ means either: it matters little that this Catholic

is Kennedy since we accept in advance all the consequences of our choice; or though it comes down to the same thing, we brush aside the consequences, assuming them politically but not ethically.” (51).

Perhaps the most interesting aspect in the introduction of the ethical aspect into politics lies in the rehabilitation of the lived experience as a criterion of judging an action. It is opposed to its functionalizing inclusion to the calculation of its consequences, and Sartre argues that these consequences are either indifferent or secondary as compared to the act of voting itself. If the consequences are not judged fatal, it is just possible to test something new. Simultaneously it becomes possible for the voter to re-determine her/his own *ethos* in the context of the elections, for example to ‘de-provincialize’ her/his ethical prejudices. It is just this experience, which also rehabilitates the possible significance to the elections, as opposed to choosing a ‘secure’ or ‘convenient’ alternative.

Although Weber in *Politik als Beruf* opposes the one-sided ethic of conviction, he is well aware of the limits of this critique. Partly, this is due to his realization that in politics as a conflict situation, the consequences of actions are regularly in paradoxical relation to their intentions (GPS, 547). Through this counter-finality, Weber admits that an intentionally unpolitical form of action may have a greater political significance than a ‘realistic’ assuming of responsibilities. He refers especially to the example of the Quakers (GPS, 555-556) and points, à la Luther, to the political significance of the ability of setting a priori limits for consequence calculation: “Ich kann nicht anders, hier stehe ich” (GPS, 559). Weber also mentioned, how William Gladstone cleverly combined the ethical appeal to the voters with an effective electoral apparatus (GPS., 535).

Sartre’s fragment on Kennedy takes a further step into the direction of acknowledging the potential efficiency of ethic of conviction from the viewpoint of the electoral campaign. The horizon of the possible for the ethical appeal of a politician appears to be, for Sartre, wider and more nuanced than the Weberian polemics against the ethic of conviction indicates. A condition for this shift of problematics is that Sartre, even more clearly than Weber, understands the rhetorical dimension in the normative appeal. The Kennedy campaign forms a paradigm, which allows Sartre to speak of a strategically wise *Gesinnungspolitiker* – he speaks of Kennedy’s “supreme political cleverness” (46). The discussion above manifests, at the same time, that this clever use of the *ethos* is both conceptually and contextually limited.

Unlike Weber, Sartre is not interested in the *ethos* of the politician as such. For him it is rhetorically mediated by being related to the opportunities to turn the elections into a situation of re-determining the self among the voters. For this purpose, an appeal to the *ethos* of the politician is not necessary, but the specificity of a *Gesinnungspolitiker* lies just in an attempt to actualize the *ethos* of the voters. The ethical in this rhetoric becomes both a means for winning the elections and an attempt to re-orient the electorate in a manner which assures an ethical argumentation chances also in the future.

A rhetorical ethos of playfulness

Next to Weber Sartre is the most uncompromising modern thinker in his rejection of all kinds of harmony. Correspondingly, the *ethos* of the politician always refers to the adversary. One of the interesting passages in *Kennedy and West Virginia* lies in a description of the situation of Humphrey’s in relation to Kennedy’s clever rhetoric:

“The trap functions all the better because Humphrey cannot fight on this terrain. Protestant, he cannot demand the votes of the Protestants in the name of tolerance: Democrat, he cannot demand them in the name of religious intolerance. In a word, Humphrey remains in the terrain of facts while his adversary, making his handicap into the source of an unconditional exigency, has raised himself to the terrain of norm.” (43).

Here we can detect the contours of Sartre’s conception of politics as a sort of playing. However, this does not correspond to the popular view of politician as a kind of gambler. Above all, for Sartre, politics is no single game with a given playground, but rather a flexible and changing complex of plays of diverse arts. This conception refers neither to a zero-sum game, nor to an addition game, in which the participants count points from diverse disciplines. The political struggle is, at least today, characterized by the absence of a given centre – of a *polity* – and by more or less fragmentary relations of the plays to each other (cf. e.g. Beck 1986, 1993 on sub-politics). In this sense, politics as activity, or rather: the operations of politicking and politicization (cf. Palonen 1993b), do consist less in direct confrontations than in the chances of the participants to find and even to invent playgrounds, which their adversaries do not master, but which indirectly oppose the plays of the others.

This kind of plural complex of plays is the presupposed conceptual horizon of the Sartrean figure of politics as *déjouer*, in **outplaying the adversary** from the actual situation. This figure can be interpreted either analytically, as a kind of minimum requirement for all politics – and in this sense the Sartrean *déjouer* is a concise explication of how any clever politician understands her/his political action – or synthetically as the singular totalizing figure of politics as activity, one connecting politicization and politicking together. (cf. Palonen 1992b, ch.7.).

This plural complex of playgrounds does not only refer to the chances of creating forms of ‘alternative politics’, it may well be also used within an established *polity*. Sartre does just this in the Kennedy fragment, when he discusses diverse variants or styles as playfields of politics. In this way the invention and use of the *déjouer* conception becomes highly relevant, also being actually used in the quotation above. The normative appeal of Kennedy is rhetorically efficient as a surprising move, which opens an unusual playground in the ritualized struggle of presidential primaries. This move explicitly plays Humphrey out of the situation: he not only “remains in the terrain of facts”, which his adversary has left behind himself, but it is also for him, as a Protestant, impossible to imitate Kennedy. In other words, Kennedy played Humphrey out not only by moving from the terrain of facts to that of norms but also by turning his “handicap” into an advantage in a manner, which was inapplicable to his adversary.

This refers to another central figure in Sartre’s outplaying conception of politics, to **reversing** as a movement which can alter the constellation. It re-interprets the situation by reversing something that has, until then, been considered as a handicap into an advantage in the situation. This re-interpretation has its best chances when it is a surprise to the adversary, when the latter supposes her/himself to have driven the opponent into a dead end, in which, however, s/he still detects something ‘by which can be played’. The political cleverness of Kennedy lies according to Sartre in this kind of reversion of the situation, which enables him to make his both unexpected and inimitable political move:

“Consequently, Kennedy takes the bull by the horns. Catholics have a reputation of being intolerant. He solemnly commits himself to tolerance.” (41)

The figures of turning and reversion play, in general, a key role in the rhetorical apparatus of the Sartrean philosophy. As it is well known, Sartre has often – most violently by Merleau-Ponty in *Les aventures de la dialectique* – been accused of being a dualistic thinker, who neglects the medium ground between the opposite poles. In a sense this is true, but even this can be turned from a handicap to an advantage. The figure of turning just refers to the situation, in which the agent cleverly plays with the polar oppositions; if driven to a situation, which appears like a dead end, s/he still can hope to reverse the situation by ‘changing its sign’, by detecting chances to act in a surprising manner by re-interpreting the situation. The rhetoric of reversion operates intentionally by the limits and extremities of the situation; metaphorically, to meet a border does not necessarily signify an end or a retreat, but becomes a challenge or an opportunity to reverse the situation. By this the player not only finds a way out but can also invent or detect playfields, which were not acknowledged as such. (cf. Palonen 1992b, ch.4).

In this perspective, the role of the ethical appeal in politics becomes better intelligible. It is a possible medium in playing, which can be utilized rhetorically. A rhetorical dimension is well present also in Weber’s ideal type of the politician, who attempts to overcome the dualism between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. But for Weber, despite all his insistence on the contingency in the situation of the politician, the ethics plays the role of delimiting the contingency (cf. Palonen 1993d and the next essay, below). As compared with Weber, who more or less explicitly defends a “Politik des Ernstes” (cf. Jaspers 1962, 122), Sartre’s *déjouer* conception of politics is still closely related to his critique of *l’esprit de sérieux* in *L’être et le néant*.

Above all, Sartre understands better than Weber the *Spielraum* available for the ethic of conviction. He realized that in politics we can well ‘play with the ethic card’ without denying its role as an ethic. With the case of Kennedy, Sartre demonstrates a possibility to make use of an ethics of politics by subsuming it to a rhetoric of politics. Like Weber, Sartre also advocates an *ethos* of the politician, but, as opposed to Weber’s, the Sartrean is an *ethos* of playfulness. This can also be seen in Sartre’s oblique apology of the politician in the third volume of *L’idiot de la famille*:

“On voit que la *politique* est tout entière disqualifiée; la raison fût-elle machiavélienne, elle s’adresse aux hommes et demande leur approbation. Fût-il ambitieux, dominateur et perfide, s’imposât-il par la ruse ou la violence, le politicien dépend des masses ou d’un groupe social privilégié: il lui faut *persuader* ainsi le gouvernement provisoire de la Seconde République était bien décidé à tromper les classes travailleuses; mais, précisément par cette raison, il fallait qu’il tint compte, au moins en partie, de leurs exigences, pour les retourner contre elles. De toute manière, le pouvoir, tant qu’il reste politique, émane d’un groupement qui le mandate et l’épaule mais en même temps le contrôle: les relations demeurent humaines, même déviées et faussées. ... bref, l’homme politique est *situé*. C’est sa faiblesse: l’ingénieur social ne le sera pas.” (op.cit., 261-262).

Max Weber's rhetorical construction of the politician as an ideal type¹⁸

'The rhetorical turn' (cf. Simons [ed] 1990) is the slogan, which has persuaded me to extend my railway and bookstore tourism to the United States. Of course, I can find a lot of literature on rhetoric in French bookstores today, and even in Germany and in Scandinavia the 'coming' of rhetoric is clearly visible, not the least among the political scientists. Still, the rhetorical turn is the most visible today in the United States, where its significance for political theory has also become obvious (cf. e.g. Nelson 1990).

The rhetorical approach can be applied to political theory in several ways. Here my approach is a heuristic one: I apply rhetorical ideas and terms selectively for specific purposes, as a medium for conceptual history. What I am doing here, might be called a **rhetorical reading of political thought**. The present case study concerns Max Weber's *Politik als Beruf*. It is connected to my studies on the history of the concept politics (Palonen 1985, 1989, 1992) and to my present research project on the relations between the concepts of politics and contingency.

Weber's rhetoric of the politician

Max Weber is famous for his alleged anti-rhetorical bias, which holds violence constitutive for politics (cf. e.g. Ferber 1970). Still, it is by no means artificial to introduce a rhetorical turn to 'Weberology'. The rhetorical aspect of politics is present in Weber's own texts (cf. also Beetham 1974, 77; Bruun 1972, 253). If we look closely at *Politik als Beruf*, we can see that Weber presents **politics as a verbal activity**¹⁹.

"Denn die heutige Politik wird nun einmal in hervorragendem Maße in der Öffentlichkeit mit den Mitteln des gesprochenen oder geschriebenen Wortes geführt." (524; 189).

When participation in politics is a matter of personal choice, there is no natural clientele for the politician, but s/he²⁰ must create the support by operations which here are rhetorical throughout:

"...eine relativ kleine Zahl primär am politischen Leben, also an der Teilhabe an der politischen Macht Interessierter schaffen sich Gefolgschaft durch freie Werbung, präsentieren sich oder ihre

18 The paper was presented New York State Political Science Association 1993 Annual Meeting April 23-24, 1993, Hunter College, Panel A Weberian look at politics, and 3.5. 1993 University of Iowa, Project of the Rhetoric of Inquiry (POROI), Iowa City May 3, 1993. For the revisions I am indebted to comments given in these occasions, especially to Peter Breiner, David Kettler, John S. Nelson, Donald McCloskey and Bruce E. Gronbeck.

19 In so far as new Weber editions are available, I have used here double references, the first to the old edition, the second to MWG or MWS.

20 Although Weber often speaks of politician as if all of them would be men, he had nothing against women as politicians, and his wife Marianne was elected 1919 to the *Landtag* of Baden. I will use the splitting forms for the figure of the politician.

Schutzbefohlenen als Wahlkandidaten, sammeln die Geldmittel und gehen auf den Stimmenfang." (528-529; 197).

In *Politik als Beruf* an explicit reference to rhetorical vocabulary can be found the formula "das Ethos der Politik als 'Sache'" (548; 230). Weber's purpose for studying, in the final pages of his essay, the ethos of the politician is not to construct a normative ethic of what s/he should do as a politician. The use of the classical rhetorical term *Ethos* rather turns the *ethos* of the politician into an aspect in the rhetorical construction of the ideal type of the politician.

When discussing Weber's ideal type of the politician, I will take up four different aspects equally constitutive for this type, roughly corresponding to the internal division of *Politik als Beruf*. As the first step I will present the general horizon of Weber's conception of politics, especially in relation to the concept of contingency. The figure of the politician, as a perspective to this concept, will at first be discussed as far as it concerns the *logos* of the situation and of its requirements to the politician. The next aspect deals with the *pathos* of the politician, i.e. with Weber's discussion of the historical types of the figure of the politician, as differentiated in their relation to the audiences. Then, discussion of the *ethos* of the politician completes the rhetorical construction of the Weberian ideal type of the politician. Finally I will ask for the actuality and significance of Weber's contribution to political theory.

An obvious aspect of Weber's lecture, which I will, however, not discuss in this paper, is the provocative rehabilitation of the politician before an idealistic student audience, on the occasion of the original delivery of the speech in Munich January 1919. My interest is rather in making explicit Weber's manners of presentation and in his figures of argumentation, as media of re-interpreting his conception of politics. Compared to the mainstream Weberology, my rhetorical approach directs the attention to Weber's narration, to nuances in its vocabulary and formulation. In this sense, it is highly 'textualistic', although using tacitly contextual background knowledge.

As clues to this kind of rhetorical reading I use two quotations from Kenneth Burke's *A rhetoric of motives*:

"The *Rhetoric* deals with the possibilities of classification in its partisan aspects" (op.cit. 22).

"Classical rhetoric stresses the element of explicit design in rhetorical enterprise. But one can systematically extend the range of rhetoric, if one studies the persuasiveness of false or inadequate terms which may not be directly imposed upon us from without by some skillful speaker, but which we impose upon ourselves, in varying degree of deliberativeness or unawareness." (op.cit., 35).

The important points of a text are seldom expressed by explicit standpoints or definitions. A rhetorical reading approaches the text in a more oblique manner, casting attention to classifications, conceptual oppositions, implicit presuppositions, excluded alternatives etc. This is also required by Weber's 'dissociative' rhetorical style (cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, *Traité*). In making Weber's rhetorical strategies explicit Burke's distinction between the 'four master tropes' (cf. *Grammar*, esp. 503-517) also gives valuable devices to my discussion..

'What do we mean by politics'?

Politik als Beruf refers, of course, to the double Lutheran sense of *Beruf*, not only as the practice of a profession but also as a vocation or calling: Weber speaks of both the external and the 'internal' side of the politician. A key to the text is also the figure of the 'occasional politician':

“ ‘Gelegenheits’politiker sind wir alle, wenn wir unseren Wahlzettel abgeben oder eine ähnliche Willensäußerung: etwa Beifall oder Protest in einer ‘politischen’ Versammlung vollziehen, eine ‘politische’ Rede halten usw., – und bei vielen Menschen beschränkt sich ihre ganze Beziehung zur Politik darauf.” (op.cit., 512; 167)

In this sense, everyone who acts politically, is a politician. This can be related to Weber's student audience: you cannot blame the politicians, you are one too. The professional politician is not only the most competent and passionate politician, s/he is also the paradigm for understanding anyone acting politically. One of Weber's several perspectives for interpreting the concept of politics is to use the paradigm of the politician to explicate the type of action which is special to politics. The title *Politik als Beruf* signifies a specification of a perspective to the question posed by Weber on the first page:

“Was verstehen wir unter Politik?”(op.cit., 505; 157).

Weber's answer to this conceptual question is by no means easy. Firstly, he soon turns the inclusive 'we' of the audience and of the common vocabulary into an exclusive, into a *pluralis majestatis*, 'We, Max Weber...', i.e. gives a highly personal and profiled view on the subject. But even this view is ambivalent. If someone looks for a 'definition of politics', s/he meets the problem of finding several different "Politik ist..."-Formulas, often met in textbooks as 'the Weberian definition of politics'.

This does not make Weber a confusing thinker, rather it is a sign of his awareness of the multi-faced character of the phenomenon. Against to the history of the concept, just the plurality of these formulas indicates an innovation. It signifies a break with the entire manner to speak of politics by simple quasi-definitions invoking this or that aspect present in the vocabulary. Attempts to find the best possible quasi-definition was characteristic to the German discussion of the concept of politics in the late 19th and early 20th century, e.g. to Bluntschli, Jellinek or Stier-Somlo (cf. Palonen 1985).

For present purposes it is not necessary to repeat the palette of Weber's "*Politik ist...*"-formulas. In order to understand the paradigmatic role of the politician it is sufficient to quote only the most famous of them:

“ ‘Politik’ würde für uns also heißen: Streben nach Machtanteil oder nach Beeinflussung der Machtverteilung, sei es zwischen den Staaten, sei es innerhalb eines Staates zwischen den soll Menschengruppen, die er umschließt.” (op.cit., 506; 159).

This quotation provides the conceptual horizon for discussion. But it is important to make explicit what exactly is contained in this formula. Above all, politics is submitted to the category of **striving** for something, i.e. it is classified as a finalistic activity. This commitment is directed against two opposed positions. It is asymmetric in so far as it is oriented towards changing the existing state of affairs as something which has a conceptual priority over preserving it. And conversely: maintaining an existing order can be counted as politics only in so far as it is related to attempts to change it.

As a finalistic activity, politics is for Weber opposed to those views, e.g. to be found in Hannah Arendt's *The human condition*, which regard politics as an action which is inherently valuable, which has its goal in itself. Of course, as just noted, Weber's finalism is mainly negative: striving-against has priority over striving-for.

'Defining' *Macht*, 'power' or 'might'²¹, as the general aim of politics, does not signify that Weber subordinates politics to power, defines politics by power or anything of that sort. On the contrary, the first sentence implies that power is conceptually subordinated to politics as activity. Power as the 'medium' of politics cannot be understood without its relation to the activity of striving. Politics is a type of activity, and power is a goal term component of this activity. Weber is one of the first authors to re-conceptualize politics as an aspect of human actions, an idea still poorly understood today by the Anglo-American sociology and political science.

In *Politik als Beruf* Weber does not give any quasi-definition of *Macht*. An explication of the concept is given only the introductory *Grundbegriffe* of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, published posthumously (1922) and probably written later than the lecture *Politik als Beruf*. Still, I think that the famous quasi-definition of politics can be precisely understood only, if we relate it to Weber's conception of power:

"Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung, den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf die Chance beruht." (WuG, 28).

The most important aspect in this formula is the recognition that power is to be treated as a **chance**. Power is neither a possession of something nor a mere relation of subordination. In relation to politics, this signifies that the goals strived for are just **chances**, a phenomenon of the possible, not of the realized. Weber's chance-concept of power is opposed to the classical figure of omnipotence. Striving for power confirms in its formality the priority of the negative finality: power is only a chance to alter the existing conditions, no guarantee that this will be actually done.

But power is an inevitable means, a *condition sine qua non* of all politics. Moralistic approaches, which reject striving for power, are apolitical, because they do not understand that without power there are no chances to alter the matters. But, of course, an anti-political rhetoric – e.g. of a György Konrad (1985) or Václav Havel (1984) – can also be used as a power resource (*Machtanteil*). The point of Weber is to formalize the character of politics: the chances are the primary aim, to what substantial goals they are used is a secondary and, how substantial goals are realized is only a tertiary question of politics.

A final point is the relation of power as a chance to resistance, not as a given condition but as an ever-present possibility of the situation. This should be related to Weber's quasi-definition of *Kampf*, in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*:

²¹ Cp. the comment to translations: "When speaking of *social power*,..., we are most often using the word in its English sense of *might*, a sense derived directly from the German *Macht* (OED: 439), as is the word itself. Hence, one could translate *Macht* as *might*; however, English commentators have avoided might and offered *power* almost universally.", Wallimann et. al. 1977.

“Kampf soll eine soziale Beziehung insoweit heißen, als das Handeln an der Absicht der Durchsetzung des eigenen Willens gegen Widerstand des oder der Partner orientiert ist.” (op. cit., 20).

Politics as *Streben* implies a perpetual possibility of *Widerstreben* or *Widerstand* in the situation. Politics is an activity oriented towards conflict: **Politik ist Kampf** is a common topos of Weber (e.g. 524; 190). By considering the three quasi-definitions, we can detect a hierarchic structure: power is an element of politics, and politics is a sub-type of struggle: politics is that struggle, which is related to striving to improve and use the chances of action.

To this minimal apparatus of interpretation a further terminus, hardly mentioned by Weber but well suited to emphasize his point, may be added; namely contingency. To link politics with contingency has become also a common topos in the recent literature on the concept of politics. J.G.A. Pocock in his *The Machiavellian moment* for example speaks of politics as “the art of dealing with the contingent event” (op.cit., 156). For Weber it would be trivial just to speak of the contingency, what is important to distinguish diverse aspects and levels in the concept.

By making *Chance* a key to politics, Weber radicalizes the contingency of politics in relation to two older conceptions. The one is, of course, to understand politics only as a realization of given goals, such as ‘the good life’ or *Staatsräson*. This conception was dominant in the German texts on politics in the 19th century, but it was later opposed by authors in the neo-Kantian tradition, as Hans Kelsen (1925) and his school, who saw in the choice of the goals the key to politics. (cf. Palonen 1985, ch.4.-5.).

Weber’s view on power as a chance also makes the conditions of politics, i.e. the questions about the possible, contingent. In this sense, we can also understand how he turns the pseudo-Bismarckian formula of politics as the ‘art of the possible’ upside down and claims that politics is *Die Kunst des Unmöglichen* (*Wertfreiheit*, 514), i.e. it has to strive for what is considered generally as impossible, in order to best achieve one’s own goals (cf. Palonen 1985, 55-56, 107-110).

In addition to the contingency of the **chances**, we can detect three other aspects of contingency in Weber’s conception of politics. The first is related to the figure of **striving**, i.e. to the contingency of the existing state of affairs, which is to be changed. The fact that something exists, does not give to it an inherent dignity: it is a contingent product, which could have become otherwise and which is alterable by human action. Another is, of course, the contingency of the **struggle**, i.e. the intentional action to oppose. Unlike the harmonistic prejudices of classical political theory, Weber sees it both impossible and undesirable to eliminate struggles for power. But these struggles are no zero-sum ones. On the contrary, Weber also stresses the contingency of the **results** as a regular feature of political action (547; 230): here we could speak with Sartre (1960) on counter-finality as characterizing the Weberian ‘paradox of consequences’ in its specific political dimension.

The figure of the politician

Weber’s figure of the politician gives, as indicated, a perspective to understand more closely the specificity of politics as activity. The ideal typical portrait of a professional politician gives an indication of the singularity of politics as an action situation.

Weber's first step in the rhetorical construction of the politician is to detect a counter-figure, namely *der Beamte*, the official or the civil servant. In *Politik als Beruf* Weber explicitly contrasts the activity of politicking – *Politik treiben* – with that of administering – *verwalten*:

“Der echte Beamte ... soll seinen eigentlichen Beruf nach nicht Politik treiben, sondern ‘verwalten’, unparteiisch vor allem – auch für die sogenannten ‘politischen’ Verwaltungsbeamten gilt das, offiziell wenigstens, soweit nicht die ‘Staatsräson’, d.h. die Lebensinteressen der herrschenden Ordnung, in Frage stehen. Sine ira et studio, ‘ohne Zorn und Eingenommenheit’ soll er seines Amtes walten.” (op.cit., 524; 189).

Another dimension of the opposition between the two types lies in their relation to struggle. For Weber the civil servant does not have to struggle, while the politician not only cannot avoid it, but sees it as a value.

“Er soll also gerade das nicht tun, was der Politiker, der Führer sowohl wie seine Gefolgschaft, immer und notwendig tun muß: kämpfen. Denn Parteinahme, Kampf, Leidenschaft – *ira et studium* – sind das Element des Politikers. Und vor allem: des politischen Führers” (op.cit., 524; 190, cf. *Parlament*, 335; 224.).

The history and political significance of the opposition between the civil servant and the politician is more closely discussed in *Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland* (1918) and in *Wahlrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland* (1917). For *Politik als Beruf* the opposition remains equally constitutive, and even when not explicitly stated, all that what Weber says on the politician, should be related to the counter-figure of the civil servant..

In Weber's war-time writings there are *ad hoc* characterizations of the requirements the politician as a person should fulfil (esp. *Rußlands Übergang zur Scheindemokratie*, 202). The short discussion in *Politik als Beruf* is of a different kind. The portrait of the politician presented by Weber is, according to my reading, closely linked to his conceptual horizon of politics in general. In this sense, Weber's famous triad should not be understood ‘additively’ but as a tacit typology:

“Man kann sagen, daß drei Qualitäten vornehmlich entscheidend sind für den Politiker: Leidenschaft – Verantwortungsgefühl – Augenmaß.” (op.cit., 545; 227).

This triad corresponds closely to the aspects of contingency presented above. If the capability to struggle distinguishes the politician from a bureaucrat, this triad refers to the other aspects of contingency. The ‘passion’, a “leidenschaftliche Hingabe an eine ‘Sache’” (545; 227) corresponds to the contingency of striving for change, to a passionate commitment for changing the existing state of affairs. The sense of responsibility in turn refers to the contingency of the consequences, to a willingness to bear the personal responsibility for them – whatever the final results of one's action in a conflict situation may be. The Bismarckian quality of *Augenmaß*, the *coup d'œil*-judgment, is transformed by Weber into an appraisal of the situation, especially of the chances (of power) present in it. *Augenmaß* is described as “die entscheidende psychologische Qualität des Politikers” (546; 227)²².

22 John S. Nelson (The University of Iowa) suggested to me to translate *Augenmaß* as ‘prudence’, which would directly link Weber to the rhetorical or *phronesis*-tradition. The proposal is highly interesting for a rhetorical re-reading of Weber, but I prefer to link Weber's concept, as

For Weber the politician is a person, who endeavours to combine these three qualities, how ever opposite their requirements may obviously be. He does not accept a 'division of labour' between the three sub-types of politicians, but for him a politician is the one who is able to unite these requirements in her/his own person. Here we can detect a further dimension of the opposition with the official, who is by necessity a specialist.

The qualities of the politician differ from each other also in their relation to time. The quality of passion refers to the past, to overcoming the results of past politics, while the sense of responsibility is oriented towards the future, the unpredictable consequences of action. The *coup d'œil* operates with the present, judging the existing situation and the chances available in it. Interpreted in this manner, the decisive quality of a modern politician would be an ability to combine the three temporal dimensions, in some manner or another, as a central theme of politics.

The Weberian triad of the politician's qualities is also marked by internal dangers; by two 'deadly sins' for the politician, *Unsachlichkeit* and *Eitelkeit* (547; 228). They are signs which make manifest the necessary combination of the three qualities is missing. Both refer to the ambivalence of power as a chance, as in this sentence:

"Macht entweder als Mittel im Dienst anderer Ziele (idealer oder egoistischer) – oder Macht 'um ihrer selbst willen', um das Prestigegefühl, das sie gibt, zu geniessen." (507; 159).

In a formal sense, the 'deadly sins' misinterpret the character of power as an achievement instead of an opportunity, which can be used for some ends, even highly personal. In Weber's text this is mixed with the ethical dimension in order to exclude *unsachliche* forms of using the chances (see below).

In rhetorical terms, Weber's ideal type of the politician can be understood as a synecdoche, in the Burkean sense of a 'representative anecdote' (cf. *Grammar*, 59-61, 323-325). In the horizon of politics as an activity, constituted by the contingencies of diverse kind, the *logos* of the politician incarnates the requirements of acting politically. In relation to the empirical historical types of the politicians the synecdochic ideal type is obtained by Weber's procedure of *einseitige Steigerung* (cf. '*Objektivität*', 191) of some 'representative' aspects common to the relevant historical types of politicians.

The 'representation' lies here in a structuring of the contingency and the corresponding horizon of temporality into a triad of requirements, which together form the specificity of the situation of a politician. Central arguments concern the paradigmatic analogies to and the internal limits of the situation of the politician. By such means it becomes possible also to analyze the art and degree of 'politicalness' in the activities of the empirical types of politicians.

Types of politicians as responses to audiences

For Weber, the ideal type of the politician is to be found only in the occidental world (*Politik*, 508, 511-513; 161, 167-169). The first professional politicians were Greek demagogues, and Pericles was the paradigm for this type (525;

well as his general 'vocabulary of judgment', widely used already in his Freiburg inaugural lecture (Weber 1895), rather to the Kantian figure of reflective judgment, recently re-actualized by Arendt's Kant-lectures and others (Beiner 1983, Vollrath 1987, Lyotard 1984).

191). This origin hints to the constitutive role of rhetoric for politicians in general – the civil servant cannot be a demagogue and if s/he tries to be one, s/he will be a bad one.(524; 190).

The rhetoric of a modern politician, however, is different from the classical one. The eloquence, the inherent value of the art of speech or writing, the strong 'epideictic' element in classical politics and in modern 'literary' rhetoric, has become less important. Still, as Weber emphasizes, the advocate and the journalist are modern types of politicians, who use eloquence as their central resource of power, as their special chance. But the rhetorical efficiency of a politician depends on her/his ability to adapt the argument to the audience, and the the modern condition is characterized by a pluralization and particularization of the auditories. For Weber the differences between contemporary types of politicians are mainly due to the different strategies of persuading special audiences. New kinds of audiences are also a challenge to construct new types of politicians.

For an individual's relation to politics Weber uses several, partly overlapping classifications. For the present purposes the characterization of the contemporary political enterprise as an *Interessentenbetrieb* is important. The number of people actively interested in politics is by necessity relatively small, and any attempt to renew obligatory forms of participation are, correspondingly, futile (Cf. *Citizen as 'occasional politician'*, below). The citizenship and the electorate are, *de facto*, divided into 'passive and active' persons, into occasional and professional politicians:

“Praktisch bedeutet er [der Interessentenbetrieb, KP] die Spaltung der wahlberechtigten Staatsbürger in politisch aktive und politisch passive Elemente, und da dieser Unterschied auf Freiwilligkeit beruht, so kann er durch keinerlei Maßregeln... gegen die Herrschaft der Berufspolitiker gerichtete Vorschläge, beseitigt werden. Führerschaft und Gefolgschaft, als aktive Elemente freier Werbung: der Gefolgschaft sowohl wie, durch diese, der passiven Wählerschaft für die Wahl des Führers, sind notwendige Lebenselemente jeder Partei.” (529; 197).

The active citizens are, furthermore, divided by Weber into leaders and their following, *die Gefolgschaft*. Especially when he speaks of the 'internal' side of the politician's life, he discusses mainly the political leader's horizon, while when discussing historical types of the politician, the dependence of the leader on the type of the following and of the passive citizens becomes obvious. The rhetorical difference between the historical types of the politicians are also mainly related to this triadic structure of participation in politics, above all to the differentiation concerning the *Gefolgschaft*.

For the advocate and the journalist, the oratorical skills play, as mentioned, an immediate role in politics. Both act best in an situation in which the differences between leaders, followers and voters are diffuse and the degree of partisan organization is low. In their social position both are marginal (525; 191). Eloquence does not only provide them with a means of appealing effectively to their special audiences but also a means to their individual distinction as a politician. The advocate appeals to the special interests of the clients of *ad hoc* character, while the journalist appeals directly to the non-organized of the 'occasional politicians'. Both types of politicians are highly sympathetic to Weber, but are not well suited to modern party politics, characterized with organized interests and mass suffrage.

Weber's paradigm of the politician in the modern era of mass politics is the party official, with the English caucus-politician and the American boss as the main variants. Compared with the advocate and the journalist, his rhetoric is more strictly deliberative, oriented towards persuasion of definite audiences. Also for them politics is, still, mainly a verbal activity.

Instead of literary canons of eloquence, the party official's rhetoric is thus dominated by the *pathos* dimension. The diverse audiences may have opposite or even constantly changing criteria of what kind of speech or text is persuasive. The activity of a boss or a caucus-politician demands a plurality of opposed rhetorical skills and their adaptation both to the specific audience and to the actual situation.

Weber's point can be seen there that the political struggle itself has become more complicated in the age of mass participation. Politicians do not only struggle with opposite or concurrent politicians, but with their following and their potential supporters, too. They have to organize their own support. In Weber's rhetorical construction of the politician's audience, the following obtains an independent position in the selection of the party leaders as well as in the organization of voters or party members.

In other words, the growth in the number of passive citizens and the tighter organization of the following also changes the rhetorical situation of the party leader, as compared to the parliamentary and notable base of the older bourgeois parties. The number as well as the degree or art of the organization become conditions for acceptability of certain positions, and the type and the quality of speech and writing has to be adapted to them.

But the number of votes, the organization of interests as well as the financing of the party or election apparatus become themselves mediated rhetorically. The boss is, in Weber's description, a politician, who is a master of persuading specialized audiences for special purposes. But s/he avoids speaking in public and will not take a public office, except that of the Senator (539-540; 215-216). The reverse side has been, according to Weber, that in American politics independent men outside the party apparatus, have had better chances to become presidents than to obtain leading positions in the more formally organized European parties (540; 217).

The party leader cannot be elected without the support of the machine, but once elected, the machine will follow her/him. An effective appeal to the masses requires rhetorical skills different from those of the agitation by *Gefolgschaft* politicians, i.e. a direct appeal. The paradigm for this type for Weber is William Gladstone, "der Diktator des Wahlschachtfeldes" (534; 209), i.e. a sovereign rhetorician in the persuasion of the voters. As Weber remarks, Gladstone used an ethical appeal, a rhetoric acceptable to the audience of the electors and directed again the other pole of his support, the party machine, but his following had to accept this in order to retain their own position. In this sense, Weber also makes a plea for the plebiscitary element, for a "Führerdemokratie mit Maschine", including a strong directly elected president for Germany (544; 224).

This discussion of the audiences and the oratory of a leading politician is also to be related to the opposition between the ideal types: the politician and the official. Especially a *Weltanschauungspartei*, such as the German Social Democracy, is susceptible to the tendencies of bureaucratization, preventing the election of strong, independent leaders with visions. Weber is ready to make use of the metonymy of the machine but against its self-sufficiency.

Throughout bureaucratic parties there is a tendency to abolish the opposition to the State bureaucracy from within, replicating it and being unable to raise politicians who could fight against them. The tragedy of German party politics is, according to Weber, that bourgeois *Honoratiorenparteien* are too ineffective before the bureaucracy, while the Social Democrats have been, at least since the death of August Bebel (1913) not only a fruitless opposition party but also a thoroughly bureaucratized party, unable to build a counterweight to the State bureaucracy (542; 221).

Considered rhetorically, the modern types of professional politicians can be seen as diverse responses to the increase of contingency introduced by the multi-faced audiences. The simplifications, by which they operate, consist in reducing the contingency of the situation in order to deal better with particular audiences. The rhetoric strategies, by which the *Gefolgschaft* politicians operate, are **metonymic**: simplifications, which absolutize some central aspects of activity and disregard others. Paradigmatic metonymic operations are quasi-equations: power equals the greatest number, which equals the efficiency of the organization, which equals the maximization of votes. The more the politician can disregard other factors, the more effectively s/he can, *ceteris paribus*, operate with the formula.

But metonymic simplifications can turn disastrous, especially in times of changing conditions or forms of political actions, when the diverse aspects of contingency are not a mere background for, but an actualized dimension in politics. But at the level of the daily practices of the *Gefolgschaft* politicians, it is mostly possible to assume the metonymic connections as given, or sometimes to make new innovations of the metonymic type, such as in the case of the Birmingham caucus (535-536; 207-210). The differences between modern types of politicians refer to differences in the metonymic identifications.

The difference between metonymic and synecdochic operations is related to the opposition between the *Gefolgschaft* and leading politicians. The latter, who have to take a "Distanz zu Dingen und Menschen" (546; 227), are well aware of the relativity of the metonymic simplifications. An aspect of the bureaucratization of the party apparatus would also result in a replacement of synecdochic representations by metonymic identifications. A leading politician, on the contrary, is one for whom the contingency of the situation has a double face, it is both an obstacle for his plans and an opportunity to be exploited. This ambiguity, with its latent paternalistic tone towards the *Gefolgschaft* politicians (cf. also Beetham 1974, 58), also forms the point of departure for Weber's discussion of the ethos of the politician.

The ethos of seriousness

The last pages of *Politik als Beruf* discuss the relation between *Gesinnungsethik* and *Verantwortungsethik*, between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. It is not clear, whether Weber takes a stand in favour of the ethic of responsibility (cf. eg. Beetham 1974, 174) or whether he regards both as equally indispensable for the politician (cf. e.g. Scaff 1989, 172-175). The latter view seems, however, to be closer to Weber's point. He sees in politics the 'art of the impossible', in the sense that neither of these ethics can be given up; although a politician knows that their combination is impossible, s/he has to try it (cf. 560; 251-252 and *Wertfreiheit*, 514).

But are *Gesinnungsethik* and *Verantwortungsethik* exhaustive alternatives?²³ The pair in this form is obviously inspired by Weber's religion studies (cf. Schluchter 1988). More importantly, it may also be asked, what are the alternatives for the *ethos* of the politician implicitly excluded by presenting this seemingly exhaustive dyad of alternatives?

The *ethos* of the politician was obviously meant by Weber to be the final peak in the narration of *Politik als Beruf*, as an appeal to his actual audience in Munich. For the construction of the ideal type of the politician the *ethos* is related especially to the *logos* of the politician's situation. In this perspective, the problem is Weber's reduction of the three constitutive aspects in the *logos* of the politician to only two aspects in the *ethos*. This has puzzled Weberologists, especially when responsibility appears both in the triad and in the dyad (cf. e.g. Bruun 1972, 267-268). It is not difficult to find a connection between *Leidenschaft* in Weber's sense and *Gesinnungsethik*. But why is *Augenmaß* excluded from the *ethos* of the politician? Which kind of *ethos* is rejected by its exclusion? What does this exclusion signify for the rhetorical construction of the ideal type of the politician?

A key to this question can be found in Weber's appeal to *Sachlichkeit*²⁴. As quoted above, he speaks above all of "das Ethos der Politik **als Sache**" (emphasis added) and his discussion of the dangers of the politician already refer to *Unsachlichkeit*, by which he means the vanity (*Eitelkeit*) and the use of power for self-enjoyment (*Machtgenuß*) instead of substantive policy goals (cf. Palonen 1994, Ch. VI.). The ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility together form, in this sense, an *ethos* of *Sachlichkeit*: the conviction represents the normative and the responsibility the consequential aspect of it.

But which kind of ethic of the politician would reject the *ethos* of *Sachlichkeit*? What kind of hints is it possible to find in Weber's text for detecting the excluded alternative, if *Augenmaß* is used as a *Leitfaden* of the investigation?

The exclusion of the *Augenmaß* aspect in Weber's triad of the politician corresponds to this interpretation: it is one which operates with the problems of relative judgment and of the appraisal of chances present in the situation. Literally, *Augenmaß* is opposed to an exact measurement or calculation. It is important in politics, which requires an ability to appraise that which exists only as a possibility, not as a measurable reality. At least one aspect of *Augenmaß* refers to playing with opportunities

In this respect a central passage, quoted above, concerns the possible uses of power as a chance (507; 159). Weber by no means opposes the possibility of enjoying the power or the prestige, but he explicitly considers them as necessary conditions for "innere Freuden", without which hardly anyone would engage her/himself in politics:

"Selbst in den formell bescheidenen Stellungen vermag der Berufspolitiker das Bewußtsein von Einfluß auf Menschen, von Teilnahme an der Macht über sie, vor allem aber die Gefühl, einem

23 A possibility indicated by Weber in *Zwischenbetrachtung*, more or less as a parody of an ethic, is the arch-conservative *organische Sozialethik* of a community experience on the front, cf. op.cit., 215-220.

24 The term belongs to Weber's untranslatable vocabulary. Beetham (1974, esp. 23) and Scaff (1989, esp. 21) use the formula 'matter-of-factness' but only together with the German word. John S. Nelson proposed the translation 'conventionality', which, however, would be too anglophone to Weber.

Nervenstrang historisch wichtigen Geschehens mit in den Händen zu haben, über den Alltag hinauszuhoben." (545; 226).

The point is, however, that the enjoyment of power chances should not become the main thing. In so far as the chances are not used to some ends but taken as if they were realities, Weber's polemic against *Selbstbe-rauschung* is adequate (cf. also Scaff 1989, 174-175). Rhetorically, it is a question of *logos*, not of the *ethos* of the politician. It makes a further precision in the situation of the politician by excluding a possibility, which does not correspond to the Weberian finalistic interpretation of politics as activity.

But Weber has also 'ethical' grounds to exclude *unsachliche* forms of the power chances. A revealing passage in this respect is this one:

"gerade weil Macht das unvermeidliche Mittel und Machtstreben daher eine der treibenden Kräfte aller Politik ist, gibt es keine verderblichere Verzerrung der politischen Kraft, als das parvenümäßige Bramarbasieren mit Macht und die eitle Selbstbespiegelung in dem Gefühl der Macht, überhaupt jede Anbetung der Macht ein als solcher. Der bloße 'Machtpolitiker', wie ihn ein auch bei uns eifrig betriebener Kult zu verklären sucht, mag stark wirken, aber er wirkt in der Tat ins Leere und Sinnlose." (547; 229).

Another passage concerns the grounds for vanity as the counter-criterion of a politician:

"Die Eitelkeit, das Bedürfnis selbst möglichst sichtbar in den Vordergrund zu treten, führt den Politik am stärksten in Versuchung, eine von beiden oder beide zu begehen. Um so mehr, als der Demagoge auf 'Wirkung' zu rechnen gezwungen ist, er ist eben deshalb stets in Gefahr, sowohl zum Schauspieler zu werden, wie die Verantwortung für die Folgen seines Tuns leicht zu nehmen und nur nach dem 'Eindruck' zu fragen, den er macht." (547; 229).

A further formula links vanity to the appearance of power, as opposed to its reality. To sum up, *Schein*, *Leere*, *Sinnlose*, *Schauspieler* – appearance, emptiness, meaningless, actor – are signs which indicate the dangers inherent to an *unsachlich* usage of the chances. They are opposed to *Sinn* and *Wirklichkeit* as paradigmatic figures of *Sachlichkeit*. With Karl Jaspers (1962, 122) we can speak of "Max Weber's Politik des Ernstes", of seriousness, as the key rhetorical figure of the ethos of *Sachlichkeit*.

In the rhetorical construction of the politician the ethical aspect can be interpreted as a move of a normative self-limitation of the contingency in the situation of the politician. The play is a figure opposed to seriousness, refers to the presence of contingency in the situation, and is often used as a metaphor for politics. We can say that Weber excludes the possibility of an **ethos of playfulness**. In this respect his rhetoric is not provocative at all, rather it conforms to the conventional topos of accusing the politicians of turning everything into moves in political games.

In modern political thought we can find also authors, who explicitly rehabilitate the metaphors of play (or of theatre). One of them is Hannah Arendt, who explicitly compares politics with performing arts (cf. esp. *Between past and future*, 153-154). An ethos of playfulness is also explicitly in Sartre's critique of *l'esprit de sérieux* in *L'être et le néant*. In *Critique de la raison dialectique* Sartre even sketches a conception of politics as a complex of plays, in terms of

déjouer, of outplaying as the key figure of politics as an activity (cf. Palonen 1992b).

In terms of my interpretation of the temporal dimension of contingency, Weber's exclusion of the *Augenmaß* from the ethos of the politician also corresponds to the exclusion of the present from the ethical horizon. An ethos of playfulness would insist on the priority of the present in the temporal experience of the politician, combined with a critical distance towards both the past and the future. Weber, on the contrary, insists, in a traditionalistic manner, on the priority of the future (549; 232, cf. *Zwischen zwei Gesetzen*).

The politician: a player with contingency

The constitutive role of contingency for politics is emphasized by important modern thinkers of the political, – by Hannah Arendt in *The human condition*, Michael Oakeshott in *On human conduct*, Jean-Paul Sartre in *Critique de la raison dialectique* and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in *Humanisme et terreur*. Like them, Max Weber is ambivalent in his appraisal of contingency. With his uncompromising emphasis on struggle, his insight into the paradox of consequences and his view of power as a chance, Weber sees, perhaps more radically than anyone, contingency as a second degree subject matter of politics, to which all aims and standpoints should be related.

Correspondingly, in Weber's portrait, the politician appears as a figure, who has not only to tolerate but also to be both ready and able to encounter aspects of contingency and to bring them in relation to each other. At the *logos* level of the situation of the politician, his rhetoric stresses the irreducibility of contingency and attempts to classify and structure it in a synecdochic manner. The politician should be a clever player who tries to combine opposite requirements in her/his own person.

Weber's rhetorical construction of the politician, and his conception of politics in general, is in many respects surprisingly modern. Above all, it well understands a tendency, that William Connolly has called the globalization of contingency in politics (1991, 24-27). His list of the aspects of contingency could well have been subscribed by Max Weber:

“As a prelude to such a reflection we might note the multifaceted character of the term ‘contingency’ itself. By contrast to the necessary and the universal, it means that which is changeable and particular; by contrast to the certain and constant, it means that which is uncertain and variable; by contrast to the self-subsistent and causal, it means that which is dependent and effect; by contrast to the expected and regular, it means that which is unexpected and irregular; and by contrast to the safe and reassuring, it means that which is dangerous, unruly and obdurate in its danger.” (op.cit., 28).

The *ethos* of the leading politician thus presupposes, according to Weber, a dealing with contingency: s/he has to combine indispensable but incompatible ethical requirements. But the very construction of the ethical alternatives is obtained by reducing the range of contingency, as compared with the situation of the politician. In a classical manner, for Weber the *ethos* plays the role of a normative limit for what a politician is allowed to do, although the excluded third is only indirectly indicated and presented as an asymmetric counter-concept (cf. Koselleck 1979), as if nobody could advocate it seriously.

When a politician plays with contingency, a reduction of contingency should be, of course, included into the repertoire. An instrumental reduction of contingency through metonymic simplifications, for example, is an obvious possibility to utilize other and more important aspects of contingency. Neither will it be questioned that ethical considerations can act as normative limits to acceptable contingency.

Still, Weber's exclusion of the ethos of playfulness contains more. In some respects it corresponds to that which Connolly calls a "domestication of contingency" (op.cit., 28-30). According to Connolly, the domestication of contingency has its roots in the author's "social ontology" (op.cit., 28). I do not want to discuss here Weber's *Weltanschauung* in detail (some aspects of its are discussed in Palonen 1993d). I only want to point out that which seems to be of immediate relevance for the exclusion of an ethos of playfulness. As a ground for exclusion of the enjoyment of the power chances Weber writes:

"Aber deshalb darf dieser Sinn: der Dienst an einer Sache, doch nicht etwa fehlen, wenn anders das Handeln inneren Halt haben soll." (547; 230).

Der innere Halt" is a metaphor for the internal consistency of a person's decisions. This is related to his view of a person's hierarchic structure of value choices, which form a *Stufenbau* in the Kelsenian sense. What are chosen, are "die höchsten und letzten Werturteile" (*Objektivität*, 152) or "die letzten höchst persönlichen Lebensentscheidungen" (*Wertfreiheit*, 491). Other choices appear to Weber as if they were quasi-logical consequences of these fundamental decisions and not contingent attempts to combine acts in concrete occasions with some regulative ideas. The person appears as a rigid figure.

Correspondingly, Weber does not see in politics a contingent and occasionally chosen set of moves of politicking. It is rather understood in the manner of an internally consistent policy: its 'basic standpoints' can be revised but not changed in an *ad hoc* manner. (For a discussion of a politics of 'stands' cf. also Nelson 1984). An ethos of playfulness would open the door to an opportunistic or occasionalistic style of politicking.

As compared with the *ethos* of playfulness, Weber's rhetoric of responsibility appears as moralistic as *Gesinnungsethik*, justly criticized by Weber. The normative and consequential dimensions of *Sachlichkeit* form together an *ethos* of worrying. Weber's political leader is a figure who carries the whole world on her/his shoulders. In view on the inevitable counter-finality of the consequences this attitude is highly unrealistic. But it is intelligible as an *ethos* of a leader within the hierarchy of politicians. An ethos of playfulness would, rather, take the occasional politician as the paradigm.

The citizen as 'occasional politician' A Weberian perspective²⁵ .

"All language is political; and we all are, or had better become, politicians" (Lakoff 1990, 2).

These words of the feminist linguist Robin Lakoff in the Introduction of her book *Talking power* contain interesting implicit references to the relations between citizenship and politics. Above all, they turn against the fashionable populist rhetoric, which opposes good citizens to bad politicians. Historically, this can be defended by re-establishing the connection between citizen and *polites*, which is lost in the dominant vocabulary based on the Roman *civitas*. (cf. esp. Sternberger 1986, 91). Furthermore, related to the subject of this conference, Lakoff's thesis also implies that even those who are not 'citizens', like foreigners, should 'become politicians', in spite of the fact that they are officially more or less radically excluded from 'politics'.

Similar ideas of relationship between citizenship and politics have been expressed by a 'modern classic' of political thought, namely by Max Weber. He writes in *Politik als Beruf*²⁶ :

" 'Gelegenheits'politiker sind wir alle, wenn wir unseren Wahlzettel abgeben oder eine ähnliche Willensäußerung: etwa Beifall oder Protest in einer 'politischen' Versammlung vollziehen, eine 'politische' Rede halten usw., – und bei vielen Menschen beschränkt sich ihre ganze Beziehung zur Politik darauf." (512; 167).

Here I will take the Weberian figure of *Gelegenheitspolitiker* as a departure for a re-appraisal of the concept of citizenship. The idea with its tacit conceptual commitments contains a kind of research program for a both historical and contemporary study of citizenship. Through the figure of the occasional politician Weber provoked his Munich student audience of 1919: it is vain to blame politicians, for when doing so, you already belong to them. **Anyone who acts politically is a politician.** The occasional and the professional politician are only limit situations, ideal types, which are always related to each other.

In this way Weber rehabilitates the conceptual link between the citizen and the politician. Weber's two ideal types of the politician indicate, however, a break with the ancient *zoon politikon* idea in favor of a concept which emphasizes the voluntary character of political participation in a modern *Interessentenbetrieb* (*Politik*, 529; 197), see below).

In this paper I deal with the citizenship from a Weberian perspective in relation both to the history of the concept and to present controversies. I will a) discuss more closely Weber's vocabulary and approach concerning the relations between politics and citizenship, b) relate them to the historical opposition between the figures of *polites* and *civis* as well as c) to the discussion on

25 Presented at IPSA Research Committee Political philosophy, Conference *Citizenship in multi-cultural societies*, Budapest, May 19 to 22 1992

26 In so far as new Weber editions are available, I have used here double references, the first to the old edition, the second to MWG or MWS.

citizenship and suffrage around and after French Revolution. Against this background I will d) make some remarks on the contemporary discussion on the political rights and chances of foreigners²⁷ and finally e) reinterpret this discussion in the Weberian perspective.

The idea of citizenship is often used rhetorically to marginalize the chances to act politically, both by preventing individuals from understanding the opportunities to act politically as a citizen and by legitimizing the exclusion of non-citizens from politics. In short, the concept of citizenship has been used for a depoliticization, primarily in the name of the Reason of the State. My idea of linking citizenship with politics in a Weberian perspective is a move of constructing a conception of citizenship, by which the depoliticization of the concept could be criticized in detail. In this paper this criticism is, however, presented only as an illustration for the construction of the alternative.

I have used the general literature on the citizenship (cf. e.g. for Germany Riedel 1972, for France Réat 1988, for the United States Shklar 1990, for an older view cf. Brinkmann 1940) as a background of discussion. Studying the conceptual relation between citizenship and politics I have instead commented on certain contributions (Meier, Nicolet, esp. Rosanvallon), which are directly relevant to this problem. I have connected the present theme with my studies on the conceptual history of politics as an action concept (cf. Palonen 1985, 1989b, 1993b).

Politics, politician and citizen in Weber's conceptual horizon

The conceptual link between the figures of the politician and the citizen in the work of Max Weber is best discussed in his works on ancient and medieval history, especially in *Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum* (1909) and in *Die Stadt*, probably written 1910-1913, published posthumously in 1921 and now contained in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. They are usually not treated as contributions to political theory, but his conception of citizenship is most explicit in them. If they are read through the classifications used in Weber's later 'political' writings – *Wahlrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland* (1917), *Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland* (1918) and *Politik als Beruf* (1919) – we can realize, how closely citizenship is connected with the Weberian conception of politics.

In Weber's works on ancient and medieval history, the political seems to be a thematically secondary, but still important by-product. A recourse to his more explicitly 'political' writings helps to emphasize the specificity of his vocabulary as well as the implications and presuppositions concerning the political in his historical writings.

In this perspective, the figures of the citizen and the politician appear to be correlative to each other and related to their 'asymmetric counter-concepts' (for the term cf. Koselleck 1979). Indeed, Weber's vocabulary in these writings is 'republican' throughout: he opposes republic to monarchy or empire, *polis* to *oikos*, political to despotic, citizen to subject (*Untertan*) as well as the politician to the official. Within this horizon Weber's interpretation of the concept of citizen is inspired both by the opposition between ancient and medieval cities as well as by his interpretation of the contemporary Germany and the world situation.

²⁷ Klaus Sondermann should originally make a more intensive contribution to these problems on the basis of original documents, but because he could not attend the conference, I have restricted myself to 'remarks' on these problems using the Weberian perspective but only fragments of empirical material.

Perhaps the most illustrative statement of the republican vocabulary is to be found in a passage in *Agrarverhältnisse*, at the end of Weber's discussion on Greece before turning to the situation in Rome.

“ ‘Soziale Probleme’, die als solche *subjektiv* empfunden werden, sind im Altertum: *politische* Probleme des freien Polisbürgers: die Gefährdung der Bürgergleichheit, die Deklassierung durch Verschuldung und Besitzverlust. Wo der *bureaukratische* Staat und dann das Weltreich seine Hand über die Bürgerfreiheit gelegt, der Polisbürger in den Kreis der ‘Untertanen’ getreten ist, da schreit wohl der Arbeiter nach seinem traditionellen ‘täglichen Brot’,... – aber als ‘soziale Probleme’, die durch eine Neugestaltung der Gesellschaft gelöst werden müßten, werden diese Nöte der Individuen nicht empfunden. Sie rufen nicht ideale Konstruktionen des Zukunftsstaates (Platon) oder ideale Vergangenheitsbilder (Lykurg) ins Leben, wie einst in der hellenischen Polis, sondern fließen in den allgemeinen Apolitismus über, der *seitdem* im Orient den Beherrschten eigen geblieben ist.” (op.cit., 189).

Here we can see the opposition between the political attitude of the citizens and the apolitical attitude of the subjects. It is analogous to the opposition between politics and bureaucracy as opposing types of activities (cf. the opposition between *Politik treiben* and *verwalten in Politik*, 524; 189.) as well as to that between occidental and oriental cultures. One key to this vocabulary is Weber's insistence that the figure of the politician is to be found only in ‘the Occident’:

“Dem Okzident eigentümlich ist aber, was uns näher angeht: das *politische* Führertum in der Gestalt des freien ‘Demagogen’, der auf dem Boden des nur dem Abendland, vor allem der mittelländischen Kultur, eigenen Stadtstaates, und dann des parlamentarischen ‘Parteiführers’, der auf dem Boden des ebenfalls nur im Abendland bodenständigen Verfassungsstabes gewachsen ist.” (*Politik*, 162, 508).

The final pages of *Agrarverhältnisse* are shaped by Weber's views on history so characteristic of his writing in the first decade of the century (cf. Beetham 1974). Weber writes e.g.:

“Von der Qualität seiner Vorfahren in der Zeit der Städtebünde hat der heutige deutsche ‘Bürger’ schließlich nicht sehr viel mehr als der Athener in der Zeit der Cäsaren von denjenigen der Marathonkämpfer. Die ‘Ordnung’ ist sein Panier, – meist auch wenn er ‘Sozialdemokrat’ ist. Die Bureaukratisierung der Gesellschaft wird bei uns des Kapitalismus aller Voraussicht nach *irgendwann* ebenso Herr werden wie im Altertum.” (*Agrarverhältnisse*, 278).

This passage contains some further indications of Weber's conceptual horizon. Above all, speaking of the ‘citizen’ of the contemporary German Empire in inverted commas refers by implication to the *Bürger* of the independent cities of late Middle Ages. To Weber the established vocabulary appears as a parody: it would be more appropriate to speak of *Untertan*.. This opposition is also related to the end of the Antiquity, in a manner implicitly referring to the contemporary era:

“Durch den Schutz der *Untertanen* einerseits, durch die *Befriedung* der Welt andererseits, setzte das Kaiserreich den Kapitalismus auf den

Aussterbeetat. ... Daß er im diokletianischen Leiturgiestaat keinen archimedischen Punkt für die Verankerung seine Gewinnstrebens fand, ist selbstverständlich. Die bürokratische Ordnung tötete, wie jede politische Initiative der Untertanen, so auch die *ökonomische*, für welche die entsprechenden Chancen fehlten." (op.cit., 276-277.)

The bureaucratization is the figure in which the opposition both to capitalism and to politics 'from below' is concentrated. Weber's point is to maintain an opposition between the Antiquity and contemporary era in this respect:

"*Jede Bürokratie hat die Tendenz, durch Umsichgreifen die gleiche Wirkung zu erzielen. Auch die unsrige. Und während im Altertum die Politik der Polis den 'Schrittmacher' für den Kapitalismus bilden mußte, ist heute der Kapitalismus der Schrittmacher der Bürokratisierung der Wirtschaft.*" (op.cit., 277).

Although both capitalism and politics require activities opposed to bureaucracy, it appears to Weber that capitalism is now even more than politics threatened by bureaucratization. A defense of politics is needed in order to maintain a 'margin of liberty'. For this purpose the politician is presented as the counter-figure of the official (esp. *Parlament*, 333-339; 218).

The polemic against bureaucracy is, however, only the contemporarily most prominent example of his broader critique. The common denominator of all the non-republican forms of Herrschaft is their **apolitical** character. In *Agrarverhältnisse* Weber speaks of "unpolitischer, vom König kontrollierter Lokalverwaltung" (38), of "...tiefen Apolitismus der orientalischen Völker" (82), of " 'Apolitismus' der beherrschten Völker" (83), of "Absentismus der an der Politik beteiligten stadtsässigen Grundherren" (248). All this refers to the historical choice between the presence and the absence of the political dimension in the way of life of human beings. As for historical forms of domination in ancient cultures, Weber presents in *Agrarverhältnisse* the following ideal types:

"... die vorstehenden 'Typen' des 'Bauerngemeinwesens', der 'Adelspolis', des 'bürokratischen Stadtkönigtums', der 'Hopliten'- und 'Bürgerpolis', der 'Leiturgiemonarchie'..." (op.cit., 43).

This typology as well as Weber's more concrete analysis of each of the types stresses the opposition between two conflicting lines of history departing from the traditional 'community of the farmers', the political and the apolitical. To this conflict Weber presents his paradigm of the origins of the *polis* through *synoikismus*.

"Die entscheidende Wendung der hellenischen Sozialgeschichte ist die Entwicklung des kriegerischen Städte*partikularismus* und damit des charakteristischen Typus der 'Polis'. im Gegensatz zu dem Verlauf im Orient, wo das Königtum auf der Basis der Stadtherrschaft die bürokratische Territorial- und schließlich "Welt"-Monarchie entwickelte." (op.cit., 102).

The mechanisms, by which the contingent situation was resolved, are described by Weber as follows:

"So wuchs hier aus den Tisch- und Waffengenossen des Königs die rein königliche, bürokratisch equipierte, verproviantete and deshalb auch geleitete Armee, aus der der immer universeller werdenden

Königsklientel die königliche *Bureaukratie* heraus, und weiter aus dem Kampfe dieser bürokratischen Schöpfungen die erste 'Weltmacht', die Assyrerherrschaft. Umgekehrt schrumpfen in Hellas die Gefolgschaften der Burgkönige... . Damit sinkt die ganze Position der Herrscher, und es beginnt eine Entwicklung, welche in ihrem Ergebnis, im Beginn der 'klassischen' Zeit, die Wehrpflicht und mit ihr die politische Macht in die Hände der selbständigen, sich selbst equipierenden *Ackerbürger* gleiten und damit zugleich jene weltliche Kultur erscheinen läßt, die das Hellenentum charakterisiert und die auch der *kapitalistischen* Entwicklung ihr vom Orient verschiedenes Gepräge verleiht." (op.cit., 102-103).

Weber discusses the apolitical forms of rule in his studies on the Asian religions as well as in the chapters on patriarchal, patrimonial and feudal forms of rule in the older parts of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (580-653). The concepts of citizen and politician are only intelligible within the 'republican' line of political forms, discussed in *Agrarverhältnisse* and in *Die Stadt*.

The Weberian concept of citizen – as a counter concept to the subject (*Untertan*) – already refers to politics, to an arena of action opposed to administration or to despotic rule. In accordance with the Greek vocabulary he opposes *polis* and *polites* to the despotism of the *oikos* and to apolitical regimes in general. Although the idea of the citizen as an occasional politician does not appear in Weber's writings on ancient and medieval history, it is implicit in his interpretation of the relations between the *polites* and the specialized politicians in Greek polis (*Agrarverhältnisse*, esp. 129, 136).

Weber uses, however, the 'polit-vocabulary' also in another sense, visible in his determinations of the concepts *politischer Verband* (*Wirtschaft*, 28) and *politische Gemeinschaft* (op.cit., 514). In this sense, the oriental regimes also are 'political': the adjective refers to a sphere in relation to other spheres (cf. *Zwischenbetrachtung*). Related to the conceptual history of politics, this vocabulary refers to a **differentiation** of the political as a sphere or domain; a phenomenon central in the 19th century conceptions of politics and commonplace in the literature of Weber's own time (cf. Palonen 1989b, 17-18).

By contrast, the figures of the politician and the citizen as well as the emphasis of their occidental character refer to another vocabulary, to a **qualification** of the political as an aspect (op.cit., 17-18, 153-155). This vocabulary is newer, only fragmentarily present in the late 19th century literature on politics, but used consistently by Weber already in his Freiburg inaugural lecture of 1895. He did not seem to have noticed himself the opposition between his 'two vocabularies of politics'; the one more conventional, the other more demanding and linked to a 20th century understanding of politics as an action concept (cf. Palonen 1993b).

Weber's most general interpretation of politics as activity also accords to the qualifying view:

“ 'Politik' würde für uns also heißen: Streben nach Machtanteil oder nach Beeinflußung der Machtverteilung, sei es zwischen den Staaten, sei es innerhalb eines Staates zwischen den Menschengruppen, die er umschließt. (*Politik*, 506; 159).

This formula emphasizes that politics, as **striving**, is an activity oriented towards change, politics from 'below'. Weber's view on the origins of the *polis* in *synoikismus* as well as on the character of medieval cities as *nicht-legitime Herrschaft*. (cf. also *Die Stadt*, 744) also corresponds to this paradigm. The

paradigm also manifests the opposition between **politicking from below** and **administration from above**: to maintain existing power relations is politics only as a response to attempts to change them.

Polites vs. civitas

Secondary to the opposition between the political and the apolitical, but highly relevant for present purposes, are Weber's discussions on the character and limits of citizenship. This especially concern the differences between Athens and Rome as well as those between the ancient *polis* and the medieval European city. I will here take Weber's viewpoint as the basis of discussion and confront it with contemporary literature.

The differences between the types of *polis* are relevant for the chances of a citizen of becoming a politician. In this respect Weber sees a decisive difference between the Greek 'demokratische Bürgerpolis' (*Agrarverhältnisse*, 40, 128-129) and the Roman experience, where a radical democratization of citizenship was never realized (op.cit., 217-218). Roman citizenship alone was not sufficient for a chance to become a politician, for in Rome the privileges of old families were never abolished as radically as in Athens. Furthermore, in Rome citizenship was, in the period of expansion, depoliticized into a status concept, by which no established forms of participation were connected. It is also only consistent that in the classical Latin the Greek *polis*-vocabulary was not adopted.

Modern historiography also emphasizes the difference between Greek and Roman views on citizenship. Christian Meier speaks of a 'political identity of the Greeks' and maintains that the concepts of *polis* and citizenship became identical, as manifested in the concept *politeia* in the democratic period of Athens (Meier 1980, 40-43). Claude Nicolet emphasizes the opposition between 'the political class' and simple citizens in the Roman republic (Nicolet 1976, 8-13). He points to the degrees of citizenship in relation to the political positions (e.g., op.cit., 15-16) as well as to the primary status character of the Roman *civitas*:

"La citoyenneté romaine, c'est avant tout, et presque exclusivement, le bénéfice de cette sorte d'*habeas corpus* avant la lettre qu'est le droit d'appel au peuple romain..." (op.cit., 34).

The exclusions and restrictions of citizenship, present both in Greek *polis* and in Roman republic, were themselves, of course, an important subject of politicking in both contexts. Also the Roman *civitas* was directly related to the chances of becoming a politician: "c'est par elle, et par elle seule, que passent les voies d'ambition" (op.cit., 35). But by extending citizenship outside the city of Rome also the *civitas sine suffragio* was invented (op.cit., 43). Nicolet refers, using the authority of Emile Benveniste's *Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, also to the etymological opposition between the concepts of *polites* and *civis*:

"... le citoyen est foncièrement, pour les Grecs, l'habitant, mot latin *civis* se rattache par l'étymologie à des mots indo-européens, qui ... connotent l'idée de famille, l'hôte admis dans la famille, ami. *Civis* est un terme de compagnonnage: 'il signifie à proprement parler pas citoyen mais concitoyen' [Benveniste, KP]." (op.cit., 38).

We can notice that while *polites* directly refers to the opposition between *polis* and *oikos*, between *arkhé politiké* and *arkhé despotiké*, the Roman *civitas*

rather refers, in Greek terms, to a concept, which includes *polites* in the *oikos* of old families. The fact that modern languages use the Roman term *civitas* instead of the Greek *polites* has an obvious significance for the later relation between citizenship and politics.

Homines politici vs. homines oeconomici

Maurizio Viroli (1992) has recently reconstructed the history of the discipline of *Politica* in the republican language of late medieval Italy and its replacement by the *ragioni di stato* in the 16th century. Viroli understands well the priority of the Roman example over the Greek in this context, and this is also emphasized by a vocabulary which turns *Politica* more or less into a mere title: its subject matter is neither the *polis* nor 'the political' in general, but the *civitas* referring both to the city and to citizenship (cf. Viroli 1990, 145-152; 1992, 11-70, cf. Palonen 1985). This vocabulary was not always republican: it placed political forms of ruling against tyrannical, but not necessary against monarchical or even imperial forms

In the final chapter Viroli also discusses modern conceptions of politics. Referring to Weber's above quoted quasi-defining formula from *Politik als Beruf* and to its reception in the contemporary debate, he includes Weber in the tradition of the Reason of the State, as opposed to politics (Viroli 1992, 282). From this perspective Weber's interpretation of the medieval city and of its relation to the *polis*, not mentioned by Viroli, deserve a closer look.

Max Weber's problem in *Die Stadt* lies in the specificity of the medieval autonomous cities. In several respects the essay continues the discussion in *Agrarverhältnisse* to the Middle Ages, with a thesis that while the *poleis* were consumers' cities, the medieval cities were producers' cities (*Die Stadt*, 803). One of the aspects of this distinction is the difference between the human types characteristic for each of them:

“Die politische Situation des mittelalterlichen Stadtbürgers wies ihn auf den Weg, ein *homo oeconomicus* zu sein, während in der Antike sich die Polis während der Zeit ihrer Blüte ihren Charakter als des militärtechnisch höchststehenden Wehrverbandes bewahrte: der antike Bürger war *homo politicus*.“ (op.cit., 805)

This thesis seems to open a gulf between the concepts of politics and citizenship. While the medieval cities distinguished themselves from the agrarian countryside just by their autonomy and citizens' self-government, the medieval *Bürger* did not have such a 'political identity' as the Greek *polites*. In the Weberian conceptual horizon this does not, however, mean that they did not engage themselves in politics. On the contrary, the autonomy of the cities was created and defended as a *Sondergebilde*; as a form separating them from the non-political, i.e. feudal or patrimonial, realms (op.cit., 742-743). The paradigmatic figure of the cities' autonomy, the *coniuratio*, which corresponds to the Greek *synoikismus*.

“Der italienische Popolo war nicht nur ein ökonomischer, sondern ein politischer Begriff: eine politische Sondergemeinde innerhalb der Kommune, mit eigenen Beamten, eigenen Finanzen und eigener Militärverfassung: im eigentlichsten Wortsinn ein Staat im Staate, der erste ganz *bewußt illegitime und revolutionäre Verband*.“ (op.cit., 776).

According to Weber, *homines oeconomici* could act well politically, i.e. as citizens and not as subjects. They were paradigmatically occasional politicians,

among whom the professional politicians could arise (cf. also *Politik*, 517-523; 177-188). How he understands the Greek *polites* as *homo politicus* is seen from these quotations:

“Die antike Polis war, können wir resumieren, seit der Schaffung der Hoplitendisziplin eine *Kriegerzunft*.“ (*Die Stadt*, 809).

“Nach außen war es gerade die radikale Demokratie in Athen, welche die angesichts der beschränkten Bürgerzahl nahezu phantastische, Aegypten und Sizilien umspannende Expansionspolitik stützte. Nach innen war die Polis als ein militaristischer Verband absolut souverän. Die Bürgerschaft schaltete in jeder Hinsicht nach Belieben mit dem Einzelnen.” (ibid.).

Weber links *homo politicus* to the military and regional basis of the *polis*, as opposed to the economic, interest basis of citizenship in the medieval autonomous cities. Weber seems here to recourse to the differentiation criterion of the political, by which the political and the military together constitute a *politischer Verband*. In terms of his qualitative criterion, opposing political and unpolitical forms of action, **the medieval autonomous and republican cities, based on an active citizenship, are as political as the antique cities.** They are, however, politicized in a more indirect manner. Weber, the author of ‘the modern definition of the State’, based on the ‘monopoly of violence’, also regretted the replacement of autonomic cities by centralistic and unpolitical ‘patrimonialbureaucratic’ States:

“Die ökonomische Entwicklung der Städte rein als solche ist aber nirgends prinzipiell bekämpft worden, sondern die politische Selbständigkeit. Ebenso wo sonst spezielle ökonomische Interessen der Herren in Kollision gerieten mit den verkehrspolitischen Interessen und Monopoltendenz der Städte, was oft der Fall war. Und natürlich betrachteten die Interessenten des feudalen Wehrverbandes, die Könige an der Spitze, die Entwicklung autonomer Festungen im Bereich ihrer politischen Interessensphäre mit dem allergrößten Mißtrauen.” (op.cit., 793).

It was in view of their special interests in favor of the city autonomy and against the interests of the feudal princes that the citizens of the medieval cities acted politically. A consequence of this position is Weber’s conception of the voluntary character of participation in politics in a modern *Interessentenbetrieb*. He rejects all attempts to render political participation obligatory, like the compulsory vote or the corporate representation.

“In allen irgendwie umfangreichen, das heißt über den Bereich und Aufgabenkreis kleiner ländlicher Kantone hinausgehenden politischen Verbänden mit periodischen Wahlen der Gewalthaber ist der politische Betrieb notwendig *Interessentenbetrieb*. Das heißt, eine relativ kleine Zahl primär am politischen Leben, also an der Teilhabe an der politischen Macht Interessierter schaffen sich Gefolgschaft durch freie Werbung, präsentieren sich oder ihre Schutzbefohlenen als Wahlkandidaten, sammeln die Geldmittel und gehen auf den Stimmenfang.” (*Politik*, 528-529; 196-197).

When participation in politics becomes a matter of personal interest and choice, the degree of participation tends be lower than when it is obligatory. Weber speaks explicitly of a division between ‘active and passive citizens’ (op.cit.,

529: 197). But the figure of the occasional politician means, conversely, that Weber sees the citizen as a sub-type of the politician.

As opposed to this, the Greek *homo politicus* appeared to Weber to be a person compelled to politics on the military basis of polis as a *Kriegerzunft*. For Weber the 'politics', in which the Athenian citizen engages himself, was not the deliberations in *Ekklesia* on the future policy of the city, but the activity of an soldier:

“Der Bürger blieb in erster Linie Soldat. ... Auf Markt und Gymnasion verbringt der Bürger den Hauptteil seiner Zeit. Seine persönliche Inanspruchnahme: durch Ekklesia, Geschworenendienst, Ratsdienst und Amtsdienst im Turnus, vor allem aber durch Feldzüge: jahrzehntelang Sommer für Sommer, war in Athen gerade in der klassischen Zeit eine solche, wie sie bei differenzierterer Kultur weder vorher noch nachher in der Geschichte erhöht ist.“ (*Die Stadt*, 810).

It may be asked, whether Weber not only exaggerates the intervention of the polis into the life of *polites* but also misunderstands the political activity of citizens in Athens. According to Christian Meier, Weber's view is biased by his medieval and modern perspective: he did not discern that “eine bestimmte Form der Öffentlichkeit”, rather than the war, was characteristic to Athenian citizens' life (Meier 1988, 21). This *Öffentlichkeit* Meier calls 'the political identity of the Athenians'. Even if, for the simple citizens, the political was also in Athens a 'side-role', it shaped their way of life.

“Das Politische muß ja bei Nicht-Spezialisten notwendig im Denken und Leben, in Kraft und Zeit der Einzelnen mit vielem anderen den Platz teilen. Aber diese Nebenrolle wurde für relativ sehr viele die Hauptrolle außerhalb des Hauses, die einzig beachtliche, wenn auch abgestuft etwa nach den Tätigkeitsfeldern in den einzelnen Gemeinden und in der Polis im ganzen. Die Bürger-Eigenschaft setzte sich damit für sehr viele, für die Anspruchsvollen, maßgebend ins Zentrum und forderte sie heraus, mit einem wichtigen Teil ihrer Zeit, ihres Denkens, Trachtens und Handelns 'politisch' zu sein. Sie veränderten sich, indem sie in die Politik kamen.“ (Meier 1980, 254-255).

Meier's point is that Weber did not fully realize that for the Athenian citizens the engagement in polis also contained a challenge to act in an arena which they otherwise could not do. The engagement in polis signified a chance to transcend the narrow limits of the *oikos* with its 'despotic' internal structures (cf. Arendt 1960, 34 and Meier 1980, 256). In this perspective politics appeared for the Athenian politicians rather as an arena of excellence and virtuosity, to be remembered as somebody, as Arendt says (1960, 169-171).

A correlate of this view was that politics in Athens was 'thematically limited' (Meier 1980, 243). Above all, the border between political and non-political questions was in principle given, at least in the sense that politics was for the Athenians a 'way of being and life'. It could not be turned into a means for 'interests from other sectors' (op.cit., 248), neither could the citizens "als Interessengruppen in der Politik auftreten" (op.cit., 259).

Just in this respect, however, Weber's view on politics as *Interessenten-betrieb* deserves attention, when considering the chances of modern citizens to act politically. He realizes that modern persons cannot be, in the Rousseauian manner, 'forced to be free', i.e. forced to act politically. Not only do they experience a compulsory participation as an intrusion to their freedom, but it

would also lead – to use a favorite word of Weber – to dilettante forms of politics. But turning diverse interests to ‘political questions’ also signifies an extension or, rather, a re-interpretation of the political as an aspect of any activity. In this perspective, Weber’s opposition between the ancient *polis* and the medieval city is related to his double conception of politics; if the men of polis are *homines politici*, they are bound to a more or less given *polity*, while the medieval *homines oeconomici* act on the basis of a *politicization* of certain interests in the sense of an aspect view of politics.

Weber does not speak of *homo oeconomicus*, in this context, in the canonized meaning of classical political economy. For him it rather signifies a negation of the compulsory participation of the classical *homo politicus* in favor of a freedom to privacy. Weber here seems to adopt a Constantian ‘modern’ concept of liberty, for which the requirement of continuous participation into the affairs of the *polis* appears as an intolerable intrusion into the freedom of the individual (cf. Constant 1819). Viroli’s classification of Weber’s position remains within the horizon of a classicist republican rhetoric, which connects politics to a given polity and is suspicious towards the politicization of interests. Weber, with his political re-interpretation of the economy as struggle (cf. *Wirtschaft*, esp. 49-53), seems to be ready to accept as a factum for the world after the First World War that “Das Wirtschaftsleben wird politisiert, die Politik ökonomisiert” (op.cit., 176).

The ‘modern’ or ‘negative’ concept of liberty does not necessarily mean a depoliticization. On the contrary, it can be also taken as a step towards the ‘personal is political’-thesis, in the sense of making the way of life – *Lebensführung* in the Weberian language – a question of choice and struggle (cf. also Honig 1993, 115-125 for her critique of Arendt’s exclusion of the private realm from politics).

For citizenship, the ‘official’ and institutionalized forms of participation within a polity are hardly convincing as a paradigm today. By using a nominalistic approach, inspired by Weber, **the polity should be taken as a borderline case of established politicizations**, both confirming the ‘legitimate’ forms of politicking and excluding attempts to further politicizations. It could be related to the chances for politicking and politicization of questions in general (cf. Palonen 1993b). The questions of limits, exclusions and restrictions of citizenship should be related to chances of activities rather than to questions of status and rights.

Rosanvallon on citizenship, suffrage and politics in France

Pierre Rosanvallon has published a great study on the conceptual history of universal suffrage in France, *Le sacre du citoyen* (1992). He sees in universal suffrage “la grande affaire du XIX^e siècle” (op.cit., 12), and he discusses its relationships to citizenship and politics in a detailed manner. It is possible to confront both his approach and his interpretations with the Weberian view.

Already in 1979 Rosanvallon published a provocative essay *Le capitalisme utopique*. It formed a research program for discussing the ambivalent relation to politics in the new ‘languages of politics’ (in the sense of Pocock 1971), like the Scottish moral philosophy and Physiocracy in France. In relation to the *l’ancien régime* they had a politicizing role, but in their internal argumentation they tend to replace politics by economy or society. The same problem is central also in the monograph *Le moment Guizot* (1985) on Guizot’s and the ‘Doctrinaires’ attempts to ‘end the revolution’. The new monograph can be, at the level of conceptual history, directly linked to the problematic of these

studies, now concentrating on the key question of suffrage and the conceptions of citizenship presented in its context.

Rosanvallon's thesis in *Le sacre du citoyen* opposes the modern idea of citizenship to old figures of *citoyen-propritaire* and *citoyen-capacitaire*. The modern citizen, *citoyen-individu* signifies the "avènement du règne de l'homme sans qualité" (op.cit., 446), as he says with allusion to Musil's famous novel.

In the discourse of suffrage, Rosanvallon distinguishes several levels, especially the topoi of inclusion, autonomy and mode of elections. He rightly emphasizes that what today is called universal suffrage – a term invented only in 1793 (op.cit., 196) – was not introduced during the French Revolution. Except for the constitution of June 1793, which was never applied, an indirect system of voting was retained. It was only in 1848 that (male) 'universal suffrage' by direct vote was introduced (cf. the texts quoted in op.cit., 457-461). The renaissance of the pathos of *citoyen* around 1789 (op.cit., 41, 87-88, for a more specific discussion cf. Réat 1988, 76-90) was only marginally a right to participate in politics. Proper politics was reserved to an electoral collegium, to which much more restrictive criteria of qualification were applied. The Roman *civitas sine suffragio* was not far from the political experience of the rank-and-file Frenchmen during the Revolution, in so far as they used the official channels of representation.

"La participation aux assemblées électorales traduit un statut social – celui de membre de la nation – et elle n'est pas considérée comme l'expression d'un pouvoir politique" (*Le sacre du citoyen*, 58).

In the same way as Judith Shklar (1990) in the case of the United States, Rosanvallon sees the extension of citizenship in France in terms of a rhetoric of inclusion. As opposed to the feudal idea of rights as privileges, the Physiocratic idea of *citoyen-propritaire* contained a new principle of inclusion into citizenship:

"Au critère traditionnel d'appartenance fondé sur l'*incorporation* (être membre du corps), ils opposent l'idée d'une *implication* sociale déterminée par les facteurs économiques. Le membre du nation est pour eux celui qui participe par sa production à l'enrichissement de la société." (*Le sacre du citoyen*, 47).

In this figure the citizen is still a privileged person. This idea was gradually rejected during the Revolution. It was replaced either by abolishment of privileges – if not by an exclusion of the aristocrats as persons comparable to foreigners! (op.cit., 63) – or by universalization of citizenship into a sign of equality. The universality never became total, but the principle of privilege was replaced by that of 'justified' exclusions from equality. Rosanvallon's point is that a 'social implication' was retained in the determination of both citizenship and suffrage. The equality obtained through them remained "prépolitique et prédémocratie" (op.cit., 57):

"La forme d'égalité politique qui se manifeste dans ce contexte [the election of April 1789, KP] exprime simplement un fait d'appartenance sociale" (ibid.).

Citizenship remained a question of belonging to a collective, but the corporate society was replaced by "un être collectif nouveau, la nation" (op.cit., 58). The politicization of the social status in the Revolution of 1789 signified accordingly

“une entrée collective dans la souveraineté (op.cit., 59). This non-political equality of citizenship still remained the ideology of the 1848 Revolution:

“Le suffrage universel n’est pas tant appréhendé comme une technique du pouvoir populaire que comme une sorte de sacrement de l’unité sociale. ... Le suffrage universel est compris comme un rite de passage, un cérémonial de l’inclusion.” (op.cit., 286).

The universality could, of course, never be understood literally. Thus, it is worth asking, with Rosanvallon, who were excluded from citizenship in the context of the French Revolution and how this was done?

Sieyes argued in 1789 in favour of a distinction *citoyen actif-citoyen passif*, which corresponds to the distinction between the political and the merely civil rights of the citizens (op.cit., 69). The reverse side are the exclusions, in which the Physiocratic approach becomes obvious: Sieyes cannot understand “les mendiants, les vagabonds, les non-domiciliés” as citoyens (quoted in op.cit., 68). Rosanvallon summarizes the discussions of 1789 by identifying these and other marginals as those excluded from ‘society’:

“Les exclus du suffrage ne sont que le exclus de la nation: aristocrates, étrangers, marginaux déterritorialisés, criminels mis au ban de la société.” (op.cit., 71).

The rhetorics of exclusion and inclusion practiced in the early phase of the French Revolution refer to a normative ideal of the **citizen as an established person well rooted ‘in the society’**. He was a figure, who without any doubt was included into the nation as a ‘useful member’. In accordance with the Physiocratic theory the ideal was based on a social implication, which, however, did not say anything about the political interests and judgments of those persons. The ‘social implication’ was assumed to be sufficient because the political was a derivative from the social. Rosanvallon gives three criteria to the social: “l’appartenance juridique (la nationalité), l’inscription matérielle (le domicile) et l’implication morale” (op.cit., 72,).

These criteria were also applied to obtain French citizenship: “L’acquisition de la nationalité superpose de façon variable trois degrés d’implication: passive (la résidence), politique (le serment) et active (activité économique or lien familial)” (op.cit., 72-73). With these criteria “la notion de nationalité finit par se confondre avec celle de citoyenneté” (op.cit., 73). However, the criterion of nationality was in the revolutionary phase, interpreted loosely, admitting the nationalization of famous foreigners, on the basis of “consanguinité philosophique” (op.cit., 74).

In any case, the criteria had hardly anything to do with the political competence of the individual. The ‘social implication’ was used as a sign of a kind ‘collective usefulness’ of the citizen. It interpreted the classical *raison d’Etat* either as a *raison de Nation* à la Physiocrats or as a *raison de Révolution* à la Jacobins. The discussions about the census or on the exclusion of some marginal groups sometimes brought, as Rosanvallon shows, conflicts, but they did not essentially alter the rhetorical construction of citizenship by social implication.

For Rosanvallon, this appears as a negation of the autonomy of the ‘sphere of politics’, which was understood only as an extension of “les données immédiats de la société civile”. Politics constituted the society only formally and legally, “il ne l’institue d’aucune manière” (op.cit., 87). This is reflected also in the conception of citizenship:

“La notion politique de citoyenneté est dans ce cas purement *dérivée* d’une économie (le système du marché), d’une sociologie (le propriétaire) ou d’une histoire et d’une géographie (le fait national).” (ibid.).

The most important consequence of this reductionistic rhetoric of inclusion and exclusion was identification of the equality of the citizens with the figures of unity and harmony. Commenting on the events of 1848 Rosanvallon writes:

“Comment comprendre le curieux amalgame d’aspiration à l’unanimité et de formalisme égalitaire qui s’opère en France autour de l’idée du suffrage universel. Ce qui est ici en cause, c’est la manière dont le pluralisme est appréhendé. Tout conflit est perçu comme une menace contre l’unité sociale dès lors qu’on ne ait le rapporter qu’à une division radicale, celle du vieux et du neuf, de l’Ancien Régime et de la Révolution. A moins de renvoyer à la coupure originelle, le pluralisme n’est pas pensable.” (op.cit., 292).

There was, however, although only fragmentarily present in the discussions around the French Revolution, an alternative paradigm of citizenship, which was not based on a social implication. In a contractualist perspective à la Kant the criterion of citizenship is based on the opposition between autonomy and dependence. Kant’s *Rechtslehre* even sees the faculty to vote as a qualification to citizenship. In this sense the question of suffrage concerns the capacity of the individual for autonomy, as opposed to dependency (op.cit., 109-110). Rosanvallon insists that this question

“... trace plutôt une ligne de partage entre la nature et la société, l’espace domestique et l’espace politique, *l’oikos* et *l’ekklesia*” (op. cit., 110).

The important point here is an opposition between two conceptions of politics. One tends to reduce politics to a mere sector of ‘society’ among others, the other insists on the rehabilitation of the classical sense of *polis*. For the latter the political, or more precisely: the **polity**, has a priority over the social questions, whose proper space is the domestic one; a space of dependence. The reference to the specificity of the *polis* is opposed to the socio-economical language of the Physiocrats and the Scottish Political Economy (cf. also Rosanvallon 1979). From this viewpoint the rhetoric of inclusion may well be as depoliticizing as that of exclusion from suffrage.

Rosanvallon furthermore points to a possibility of re-determining the division between active and passive citizens in political terms. This was at least indicated by Lanjuinais, who distinguished between the two aspects of citizenship, “la commune appartenance au corps social et l’accès différencié au suffrage” (op.cit., 111). For the exclusion from suffrage the question of capacity for autonomy was hardly raised at all in cases central today:

“A l’automne 1789, les femmes, les mineurs et les domestiques furent ainsi écartés du droit de suffrage sans que cela suscite de réels débats et sans que le concept d’autonomie de la volonté soit vraiment construit, tant il paraissait simplement résulter de données supposées évidentes.” (op. cit., 111).

The criterion of autonomy as a condition of suffrage was discussed in certain cases, contributing especially to remove *patria potestas* of non-married men, who had a right to vote (op. cit., 112-115). A clear paradigm for demands to restrict suffrage in the name of the autonomy of the will concerns the monks:

“Ils étaient... appréhendés comme des *non-individus absolus*, symbolisant au plus haut degré l’anéantissement des personnes dans les corps dont elles n’étaient que des parties dépendantes.” (op.cit., 119).

Similar arguments were applied to consider the servants and the women as non-individuals. But in their case the limits of the individual were directly related to a kind of strengthening of the opposition between the public and the private during the French Revolution (cf. esp. op.cit., 136-137). The exception to this was, however, manifested in the argumentation of Pierre Guyomar, whose argument is reconstructed by Rosanvallon in this way:

“Ce n’est pas aux femmes, dans leur spécificité (en tant que groupe social, corps, moitié du monde etc.), que Guyomar souhaite voir accorder le vote: c’est à *l’individu absolu*, dont la détermination sexuelle est parfaitement secondaire.” (op.cit., 140).

The criterion of autonomy and the specificity of the political as conditions for citizenship, are close to the Weberian view. I only quote two passages from *Wahlrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland*. The first views citizenship as a manifestation of an indifference to the figures based on the social condition:

“Denn diese *Gleichheit* des Stimmrechtes entspricht in ihrer ‘mechanischen’ Natur dem Wesen des heutigen Staates. Dem modernen Staat erst gehört der Begriff des ‘Staatsbürgers’ an. Und das gleiche Wahlrecht bedeutet zunächst schlechterdings nichts anders als: daß an diesem Punkt des sozialen Lebens der einzelne *nicht*, wie sonst überall, nach seiner Besonderung in beruflichen und familienhaften Stellungen und nach den Verschiedenheiten seiner materiellen oder sozialen Lage in Betracht kommt, sondern eben nur *als Staatsbürger*. Die Einheit des Staatsvolks an Stelle der Gespaltenheit der privaten Lebenssphären kommt darin zum Ausdruck.” (*Wahlrecht*, 266; 170).

Weber, of course, admits that the modern centralized State is no self-governmental *Sondergebilde* based on *synoikismus* or *coniuratio* (cf. *Parlament*, 329; 218). Still, his concept of *Staatsbürger* retains within the State an analogous opposition. Like the politician the citizen as *Staatsbürger* is in opposition to bureaucracy, not in the sense of overthrowing but of controlling it. The suffrage is the only instrument which makes this control possible:

“Gegenüber den nivellierenden unentrinnbaren Herrschaft der Bürokratie, welche den modernen Begriff des ‘Staatsbürgers’ hat entstehen lassen, ist das Machtmittel des Wahlzettels nun einmal das *einzigste*, was den ihr Unterworfenen ein Minimum von Mitbestimmungsrecht über die Angelegenheiten jener Gemeinschaft, für die sie in den Tod gehen sollen, überhaupt in die Hand geben kann.” (*Wahlrecht*, 268; 172).

These remarks on citizenship are enough to show that Weber, like Rosanvallon, links the concept to politics, and not to social status. But while Rosanvallon insists on the connection between the political concept of citizenship and the contractualist idea of the autonomy of the will, Weber’s perspective is based on his concept of action, in which the individuals appear as “allein für uns verständliche Träger von sinnhaft orientiertem Handeln” (*Wirtschaft*, 6). The politician obtains for him a kind of paradigmatic position as an agent, who forms a model for the singular citizen to act as an occasional politician. The Weberian view that includes politics in the category of struggle (*Kampf*) (e.g. *Parlament*, 347, 351; 232, 235; *Politik*, 524; 190) requires the

abilities to oppose, confront and outplay the adversary etc. not only from the professional politicians but also from citizens as occasional politicians.

Citizenship and nationality

In the final chapter of his book Rosanvallon discusses the modern controversies of the citizenship, especially the foreigners' right to vote (for the more general discussion in France cf. the contributions in *Citoyenneté et nationalité*). In this respect he sees an ambivalence in the universalization of the suffrage:

“S'il tend à faire de chaque être humain un électeur, la sphère de la citoyenneté se dilatant au rythme de l'individualisation du social, il s'accompagne parallèlement de l'érection d'une impérieuse frontière: celle de l'identité nationale. Impossible ainsi d'en séparer en 1848 l'éveil des nationalités et la sourde revendication de souveraineté populaire.” (*Le sacre du citoyen*, 422).

After an interesting interpretation of the history of the relations between suffrage and citizenship in French colonies, Rosanvallon presents his view on the bases of the citizenship:

“Nous touchons là au plus profond de l'idée de citoyenneté. Au-delà de la simple proximité que traduisent les mœurs communes, l'histoire partagée et le territoire habité de concert ... la citoyenneté renvoie à une vision plus exigeante du vivre ensemble, au-delà même du combat côte à côte, face à un même ennemi: *La cité est en dernier ressort un espace de redistribution accepté*. ... Le citoyen moderne est indissolublement membre d'un Etat-providence et membre d'une nation. C'est là que passe l'irréductible frontière de la citoyenneté.” (op.cit., 436).

The citizenship will thus be linked together with the *pluriversum* character of the 'political units' of the world in the sense of Schmitt's *Begriff des Politischen*. Its correlate is the inclusion of any individual to a State, which gives her/him an identity card and other signs of being classified into that particular nationality. The division of world to (Nation-)States corresponds to a classification of individuals according to their citizenship.

This view of the States as primary units of division, distribution and distinction between individual citizens does not as such, of course, exclude foreign residents from suffrage. A look at the literature on inter-national law shows interesting tendencies of revision in the foreigners' political rights. According to the traditional view, even those who were accepted as 'political refugees' did not have any right to politicking in the receiving country. In 1962 Otto Kimminich still holds: “die Teilnahme am politischen Leben des Aufenthaltslandes ist begrifflich ausgeschlossen “ (Kimminich 1962, 134), while he is prepared to admit the right to “exilpolitische Betätigung” without greater restrictions (op.cit., 136-140). Since then, a paradigm shift from the sovereignty of nations to the human rights of foreigners (cf. Marx 1984) has gained acceptance and brought even their political rights in their country of residence to the core of the political agenda and as well as actualizing the disputes about criterion of the political in international law (cf. Riila 1993).

The suffrage of the foreigners has been practiced in limited forms at local level in several European countries since the seventies (cf. e.g. Thüerer 1990, 31-33). Especially in the course of the European integration this tendency has been emphasized and in 1988 the European commission proposed the introduction

of a right for the citizens of the EC-countries to vote in municipal elections (for the discussion of this proposal from the juridical viewpoint cf. e.g. Gramlich 1989, Jahn & Riedel 1989, Scholl 1989). Green parties for example have proposed more radical extensions of foreigners' suffrage. The German Greens proposed in 1989 a suffrage for foreigners after five years of *Aufenthalt* in West Germany by this argument:

“Wer den Lebensmittelpunkt hier gefunden hat, hat einen Anspruch darauf, seinen/ihren politischen Willen geltend zu machen – niemand soll sich den Anordnungen von Politikerinnen und Politikern und den Entscheidungen von VerwaltungsbeamtInnen fügen müssen, an deren Kontrolle er/sie keinen Anteil hat.” (*Die multikulturelle Gesellschaft*, 14-15).

Who is concerned – *betroffen* – by the acts in the name of the State, should also have a right to vote on its affairs, this is the core of the argument. This argument and the idea of a ‘territorial democracy’ behind it is questioned e.g. by Thurer (1990, 34) in the name of “das kollektive Selbstbestimmungsrecht”, although he sees in a federal State like Switzerland a possibility to grant a right to vote at the cantonal or local level (op.cit., 34-36).

The principle of *Betroffenheit* is not subscribed by Rosanvallon either. The proposals of the vote of foreigners make him further to make explicit his conception of citizenship:

“C’est un motif plus philosophique qui conduit à interroger le principe d’un tel droit de suffrage: l’impossibilité de récuser la catégorie d’étranger. Fonder un droit de vote, même limité, sur des critères de pure civilité y conduit directement. Cela reviendrait à vider de tout contenu l’idée de nationalité, puisque l’on pense le social dans son immédiateté, détaché de toute inscription l’interaction quotidienne entre les hommes.” (op.cit., 438).

This view does not well accord to Rosanvallon’s view of the citizens as individuals. Nationality as a conventional unit of classification is experienced by individuals, in a growing degree, both as a criterion of classification, which prevents the treatment of human beings as individuals. The common place of presence is only a playground for politicking among others, not a substantial unity. In this line of argumentation lies also the conclusion of Le Cour Grandmaison in his polemic against the utilitarian argumentation in the question:

“Parce que les libertés individuelles sont toujours mutilées lorsqu’elles ne se prolongent pas par un égal accès de tous aux libertés politiques, chacune renforçant et soutenant les autres” (Le Cour Grandmaison 1993, 164).

Rosanvallon, however, continues with a more interesting argument, which links the exclusion from suffrage to his conception of politics:

“C’est à nier du même coup l’existence d’une *société politique* distincte en son essence de la société civile, surtout si cette dernière est appréhendée sur un mode ‘différentialiste’... Plus aucun principe d’unité et d’identité collective ne peut alors être formulé: le social et le local deviennent des catégories terriblement abstraites...” (*Le sacre du citoyen*, 438).

Furthermore, he draws the conclusion:

“Il n’y a pas de citoyen démocratique possible si la figure de l’étranger est niée, si l’étranger n’est pas pensé *politiquement*, dans son extériorité vis-à-vis de la cité.” (op.cit., 438-439).

This view presupposes a conception of politics, which rightly opposes a reduction of the political to the social and rejects the view on politics as a ‘sphere’ or ‘sector in society’ among others. Rosanvallon obviously bases his view of *le politique* not on *la politique* as a type of activity, but on *cité, société politique* or *espace politique* – as a type of ‘community’ or at least of a spatial horizon of relations. In this sense he is not nominalistic enough, he does not see the *polity* as conceptually contingent in relation to politics as activity.

Weber’s qualitative conception of politics an **action concept** corresponds to Kosellecks (1972,1979)idea of of changing mode of concepts; a turn into *Bewegungsbegriffe* in the era between 1750 and 1850. For the concept of politics this turn is fully realized only in the 20th century, paradigmatically through the work of Weber. The polity, *politischer Verband*, is only a specific contingent constellation of political actions and struggles, which, however, has a certain stability and internal coherence. The Weberian politician is less a figure acting in a *polity* as rather a person acting **politically**. This perspective also allows him to understand the **politicization** of questions outside the established polity, indeed to view the polity as a result of earlier politicizations, continuously subject to revision through politicizations and depoliticizations reforming the chances and forms of politicking available²⁸ .

Although e.g. the argument of the German Greens perhaps resembles a sociologicistic view on politics, it can also be interpreted in terms of the turn into *Bewegungsbegriffe*. Politics as activity can be nominalistically understood as a common product of two verbal figures of activities, of the operations of politicization and politicking, of an interpretative and a performative move (cf. Palonen 1993b).

The question of the foreigners’ vote is, in this perspective not only a question of extending human rights to politicking on the basis of *Betroffenheit*. It is an also a proposal for a politicization of the borders of a polity. As such it not only challenges the established types of professional politicians but also introduces a new element of contingency into the horizon of occasional politicians. An individual without strong ‘identities’ and with experiences from different countries as well as a capacity to oppose adversaries and resist authorities would be a paradigm for the occasional politician.

This nominalistic re-orientation of citizenship does, of course, mean a radical break with any form of ‘communitarian’ ideology. Politicking can be understood as an existential right of individuals independent of their qualities. If combined with the Weberian figure of the occasional politician, this existential view on the citizen can well be combined with a kind of non-communitarian republicanism (cf. Skinner 1984, 1986, 1990).

²⁸ I do not deny, of course, that Weber himself remained committed to the figure of the nation as a ‘we’-unit in politics or claim that he would, today, take stand in favor of the foreigners’s vote.

The occasional politician as a paradigm for citizenship

The conventional paradigm of citizen, especially strong in the Roman tradition and in the modern figure of *citoyen-proprétaire*, is a person – or rather: a man – with strong ‘roots’ economically, socially, locally, intellectually, morally etc. This ideal of rootedness presupposes that the person should be something else before becoming a politician, and as a politician s/he should always remember her/his roots. The rhetoric of exclusion makes the rootless politically suspect – not only foreigners or cosmopolitan intellectuals but also migrants within a country. The rhetoric of inclusion appeals to an integration of the rootless among the rooted, although those included lately and for specific reasons remain suspect to the insiders. (For the role of inclusion in national anthems cf. Sondermann 1992).

Proposing the politician as a counter-paradigm is a move against the apology of roots. Of course, a politician can appeal to her/his roots in an electoral campaign or even make them a part of her/his ideology. But a central condition of the politician is the ability and willingness to break with the roots, if needed in the situation. For example s/he should be a person who transcends the provincial interests of a region, and for this reason the experience of migration between countries would be a clear advantage. In the European context e.g. a break with the locally oriented type of politician in favor of a cosmopolitan type is obviously needed. The capacity to break with the ‘us’-figures tends, however, to make the politicians suspect in the conventional populist rhetoric.

In a Weberian nominalistic perspective, citizenship is only a **chance**, not a result. With it no substantial advantages are achieved, only a chance to act politically, either occasionally or more or less permanently. But interpreting and utilizing a chance requires inventiveness and also a willingness to ‘devalue’ those chances which have become too obvious and established, practices which have turned to obstacles for the judgment and action in the situation. Weber’s famous criteria of the qualities of the ideal type the politician – *Leidenschaft, Verantwortungsgefühl, Augen-maß* (cf. *Politik*, 545-547: 227-229) – pose opposed but equally indispensable demands for the politician: s/he must be able to combine these opposite qualities in her/his own person, i.e. invent ways of doing so in the present situation. The politician has to **play with the contingency of situation**, to look for chances, opportunities, alternatives, contestations, subversions etc. even where traditionally none of them has been seen or admitted as legitimate.

Although Weber stresses the role of economic independence for a politician, social roots seem rather to prevent a person from acting like a politician. The professions, which Weber sees as bases of recruitment for political leaders – the advocate, the journalist and the party official – are, according to him, despised in ‘Society’ (op.cit., 525, 539; 191, 216). As a player, a nomad is often better than a local hero.

An important aspect of Weber’s critique of the Prussian bureaucrats concerns their lack of capacity to act politically; they did intervene into politics all the time and by their opposition to parliamentarism and party government they even prevented the formation of politicians, but they remained politically dilettante, simply because the requirements of the politicians are opposed to that of the official (op.cit., 524-525, 189-191; *Parlament*, 334-335; 223-224). In a similar manner the current attempts to place citizens against politicians are dilettante: they renounce the challenge for citizens to be occasional politicians, on some occasions even better politicians than the professionals, who are too rooted to established practices.

The populist rhetoric of roots both depoliticizes the figure of a citizen and makes the politicians suspect. The bureaucratic and the populist critique of politicians are basically similar. But even if the depoliticized citizen does not trust politicians, s/he still less does consider her/himself as one when criticizing them. S/he rather abhors not only the 'ruses' of the politicians but also that kind of involvement in ambivalences, moral and existential dilemmas, that s/he well sees to be required from them. Or, to use a term of William Connolly, the anti-political rhetoric attempts to 'domesticate the global contingency' of the present world (Connolly 1991, esp. 21-35). Weber's problem of the lack of the politicians (cf. esp. *Parlament*, 336; 224) is today even more obvious than in his time.

Against this background it is possible to think that a potential for the politicians today may be found rather among the rootless, who do not have too much experience of the established politics but who also are suspect to the populist anti-political rhetoric. In Arendtian (1978) terms, the rootless *pariahs*, not the populist *parvenus*, seem to be today a reserve for the formation of both occasional and professional politicians. The figure of the pariah can be used for a kind of feminist re-thinking of the political (cf. Parvikko 1993), but also the foreigners today have an existential interest to act politically.

This interest transcends, however, the mere *Betroffenheit* by the measures of the police, immigration bureaucracy and other fields of administration as well as of populist politicians. The modern migrants cannot rely on the official measures of reform, pressure and direct action by the 'friends of foreigners' among the citizens. Without a Machiavellian politicking by ruses, obstinate refusals, strategically clever actions and subversive forms of politicization of questions in the daily confrontation with the establishment, the theme of multiculturalism would not have become part of the agenda of the established politics today. The foreigners' continuous confrontation with the 'Society' does teach them cleverness in politicking, even in forms which the established politicians do not understand themselves.

For the foreigners of today 'the personal is political' is no slogan but a lived daily experience. In this perspective, the question of extension of suffrage and other 'political rights' to those classified as foreigners appears in a different light than it is usually seen. Expressed in Weberian terms: the point is thus not to include the foreigners into the *Stimmvieh* but rather to recruit clever politicians among them.

'Le politique' comme notion dans la pensée française au 20^e siècle²⁹

De nos jours, on utilise souvent *le politique* comme notion dans les titres des ouvrages, des collections et des numéros spéciaux de revues françaises. Pour la plupart, les interprétations de la notion qu'on y trouve n'ont pas de perspective historique, ou sont même opposées à l'idée de l'historicité de la notion du politique. En fait, le seul historien de la notion du politique dans les textes français au vingtième siècle, c'est moi. Or, j'ai traité le sujet uniquement en allemand, sous le titre *Die Thematisierung des Begriffs Politik im Frankreich des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Palonen 1989b, v. aussi Palonen 1985, 1992). Aujourd'hui, c'est la première fois que j'essaie de présenter et de développer les thèses de mon interprétation en français.

Dans mon ouvrage, j'ai choisi l'approche de l'histoire conceptuelle (v. Koselleck 1972, 1979), que j'ai radicalisée vers une thèse nominaliste: **est politique ce qui est appelé politique**. Aujourd'hui, je vais y ajouter une dimension d'inspiration linguiste sur les conflits conceptuels dans le langage politique.

Prenons, suivant ma thèse nominaliste, le terme *politique* et ses dérivés en français comme point de départ pour l'interprétation des conflits conceptuels et de leur histoire dans les textes français. Les nuances dans la connotation, sens prescriptif et sens descriptif et la diversification du vocabulaire peuvent être pris comme indices sur les conflits au niveau conceptionnel (v. Klein 1991, 50-67). Ici j'utilise cet appareil pour étudier l'histoire de la notion du *politique* au niveau conceptionnel en le mettant en rapport avec les autres niveaux des conflits conceptuels³⁰.

Pour ou contre la politique

Il y a, dans les textes français une richesse du vocabulaire péjoratif sur la politique. Selon les études de Jean Dubois (1962) sur le lexique autour de la Commune de Paris, on trouve déjà les adjectifs *antipolitique*, *impolitique*, et même trois noms péjoratifs sur la personne qui fait de la politique: *le politicien*, *le politiqueur*, *le politiquant*, ainsi que le verbe *politiquer* non pas dans le sens de 'faire de la politique' mais seulement de 'parler politique'. Tout cela veut dire que, depuis la Révolution, il y a dans les textes français des courants militamment antipolitiques, même en plusieurs versions: scientiste, moraliste, bureaucratique, syndicaliste etc. Ces courants se sont même intensifiés pendant la Troisième République.

L'attitude envers la politique devient un problème surtout dans le contexte de l'affaire Dreyfus. Parmi les dreyfusards comme aussi parmi les anti-dreyfusards, il y avait et des opposants et des partisans de la politique. La tradition républicaine de la Troisième République était toujours pro-politique (v. Nicolet 1982), comme l'étaient les dreyfusards tels que Alain (p.ex. 1925) ou Georges Guy-Grand (surtout 1911), les idéologues républicains peut-être les plus originaux de l'époque. A partir de Zola lui-même (1901), il existe entre les dreyfusards une tendance moraliste qui voit dans l'affaire un échec des

²⁹ Présenté dans l'Institut Finlandais à Paris, le 1 octobre 1992.

³⁰ J'écris ici *le politique* comme une notion toujours en italique, pour souligner la différence à l'usage courant de ce mot.

politiciens (v. aussi Péguy 1910, Benda 1927). Mais, bien sûr, Il n'est pas difficile de trouver parmi les anti-dreyfusards des militants apolitiques, comme Paul Valéry. Plus originaux sont les monarchistes pro-politiques de l'Action française, comme Charles Maurras avec son mot d'ordre *politique d'abord* (1900).

Un autre contexte où on trouve une controverse un peu analogue, c'est le débat autour de la dépolitisation vers l'année 1960 (v. Vedel [dir.] 1962, *Dépolitisation et consensus*, 1962, *Le problème de la dépolitisation*, 1963, Foygeyrollas 1963). A l'exception de certains politiciens de droite comme Antoine Pinay ou Michel Debré, il est difficile de trouver des partisans de la dépolitisation. Même Jacques Ellul (1965), qui parle de l'illusion politique, assure qu'il ne défend pas *l'apolitisme* ou *la dépolitisation*, sa thèse étant plutôt celle de la marginalisation de la politique.

En Allemagne, le mot *Politisierung*, lancé par Karl Lamprecht en 1907, a été utilisé surtout parmi les littéraires expressionnistes, comme Ludwig Rubiner et Kurt Hiller, pour une réinterprétation de la politique et pour les exigences de la politisation, non seulement de la littérature mais aussi des politiciens eux-mêmes (v. aussi Palonen 1989a). En France, le premier à parler de la politisation semble avoir été Alexandre Koyré (1929), philosophe d'origine russe. En général, le terme politisation a gardé en France un sens péjoratif, faisant penser à la 'politisation' partisane des nazis et des communistes (v. Mankiewicz 1937 ainsi que Grosser et Merle en Vedel [dir.] 1962). Pour ceux qui déplorent la dépolitisation, le terme signifie une 'diminution de l'intérêt des gens à la politique' plutôt qu'un manque de volonté d'ouvrir des questions aux controverses, aux conflits et aux choix, à la contingence.

Dans le débat public en France, le problème de politique a été celui des conflits de connotation ou de sens prescriptif plutôt qu'une question conceptionnelle. Cependant, il y a suffisamment d'exemples pour démontrer que la connotation et la prescription peuvent être liées aux sens très divers du mot. Tout cela montre l'importance d'une transition de la discussion vers le niveau conceptuel.

La politique comme concept d'action

On sait que *Tà politika* d'Aristote ne signifie pas une action mais une discipline, dont l'objet est *la polis*, la cité grecque. Dans le post-aristotélisme, à partir du Moyen Age jusqu'à l'Ere des Lumières, le problème, c'est qu'il n'y a plus de *polis*, et que le contenu de la discipline politique devient vide ou est remplacé par l'Etat, unité nouvelle. Dans les textes français du 18e siècle, on utilise la politique seulement comme titre d'une discipline, non tellement pas comme discipline scientifique mais plutôt comme discipline d'art (v. p.ex. Rousseau, *Du contrat social*, II.3.).

Vers 1800, on trouve dans les textes français, en même temps et de la même manière qu'en Allemagne, un *changement d'horizon*, selon lequel *la politique* commence à signifier **l'action** dans la sphère de l'art politique. Pour Rousseau, *la politique* signifie encore une discipline normative, dont l'application à une matière est un art. Or, pour Guizot déjà, *la politique* signifie une activité, qui devient un art seulement si elle est qualifiée comme 'artistique': sinon, on ne peut pas comprendre la distinction de Guizot entre la politique factice et la politique vraie (Guizot 1822, 145).

Vers la fin du 19^e siècle, on peut constater que la transition du terme *la politique* de la dénomination d'une discipline à une notion d'action est menée à terme, comme c'est le cas aussi en Allemagne. Les tentatives de revenir à une

notion aristotélicienne ne manquent pas complètement. On en trouve p.ex. chez le thomiste Jean Dabin (1957) ou chez Eric Weil (1956), mais ils ne réussissent pas non plus à éviter l'horizon d'action. Le juriste Emile Giraud dit même que confondre *la politique* et *la science politique* serait une erreur monumentale, analogue à celle de "confondre criminalité et criminologie" (Giraud 1966, 470). À ce signe de changement d'horizon on peut en ajouter d'autres, comme, au moins partiellement, les tendances vers la différenciation de l'adjectif et le changement de son sens envers l'idée de qualité.

Mais ce que signifie *la politique* comme notion d'action est également sujet aux controverses et aux interprétations diverses. L'idée de *la politique comme science* se présente dans l'horizon d'action, surtout dans les écoles positiviste et naturaliste, de Comte jusqu'à Maurras, où elle se traduit par la notion de la 'politique scientifique', et, plus précisément, par l'idéal de la 'scientification de la politique'. Cette idée a suscité des critiques militantes, entre autres par le républicain Guy-Grand (1911), qui la dénonce comme antidémocratique.

L'idée de la politique comme activité artistique a des interprétations diverses qui vont de la technologie de *raison d'Etat* ou de l'idée de l'artisanat - "La politique est l'art, la volonté, la passion de gouverner" écrit l'ancien premier ministre Louis Barthou (1923, 16) - vers les conceptions de *policy* comme moment régulateur qui donne à *la politique* une qualité artistique (v. e.g. Chamson 1931). Je cite un vieil exemple qui spécifie la métaphore artistique.

"Comme les formes des arts et des sciences, les formes de la politique sont infinies... tous les genres s'y trouvent: la politique de cabaret ou de salon qui est l'art du chic; la politique extérieure qui est le paysage, la politique intérieure qui est l'académie." (Th. Funck-Brentano 1892, 37-38).

Dans les conceptions de l'après-guerre, comme en Allemagne déjà sous la République de Weimar, la controverse entre les métaphores de la science et de l'art perd sa signification. Cependant, ces métaphores, surtout celle de l'art, ne disparaissent pas totalement. Pour Edgar Morin (1958,16), *la politique* est "l'art du compromis et le refus du compromis, l'art de l'intransigeance et de la transaction". Morin utilise aussi une autre métaphore qui tend à remplacer celle de l'art: la métaphore du jeu.

Bien sûr, l'esprit de sérieux, et surtout celui de la raison d'Etat - ou du bien commun dans la version catholique, du salut public dans la version républicaine etc. - est encore puissant dans le débat de l'après-guerre. Dans d'autres approches, plus tard, on compare *la politique* avec le jeu, comme le fait Kostas Axelos (1957), ou, plus récemment, Pierre Lenain (1986). Selon mon interprétation, la critique sartrienne de l'esprit de sérieux a une dimension politique, elle aussi; l'idée de *déjouer* est chez lui à la fois un critère minimal de toute politique et une figure totalisante qui unifie toute politique comme action (v. Palonen 1992b).

Les interprétations de *la politique* comme jeu sont surtout opposées à celles qui se basent sur le sens du mot anglais *policy*. **La politique comme jeu** souligne le rôle de l'opportunité, de la virtuosité d'agir dans de diverses situations, la faculté de profiter de la contingence davantage que les opposants etc., tandis que **la politique comme policy** souligne l'importance d'une ligne de conduite, d'un programme à suivre ou d'une coordination des mesures. *Policy* est orienté vers le futur, tandis que le temps primaire du jeu est le présent. Parfois, *policy* se traduit en français plutôt par *une politique* que par *la politique*.

Un problème avec *la politique*, comme avec *la politisation*, c'est le rapport entre l'aspect normatif et l'aspect formel. Surtout ceux qui favorisent les interprétations de la politique comme *policy* et souvent aussi ceux qui la considèrent comme *art politique* focalisent sur l'idée de 'meilleure politique', sur 'la politique à suivre', sans s'interroger sur la conception générale qu'ils ont adoptée. La politique est souvent considérée comme une simple question normative: p. ex. Ricœur (1957), Freund (1965) et Debray (1981), qui veulent diriger l'attention vers *le politique*. Par contre, le titre de l'oeuvre de Alan Badiou, *Peut-on penser la politique?* (1985), marque un pas vers la conceptualisation de *la politique*.

Des deux sens de politique

Dans les années vingt (Dankworth 1929), on a dit que pour les Allemands, c'est le substantif *Politik* qui est le primaire, et, pour les Français, c'est l'adjectif. Depuis ce temps, on peut parler d'une conceptualisation croissante de la politique aussi dans la langue française. Etudions quand même d'abord les conflits de sens descriptif dans l'adjectif *politique*.

On peut trouver, et c'est tout à fait clair à partir du début du siècle environ, un conflit entre un sens quantitatif et un sens qualitatif, ou, si vous voulez, un sens sectoriel et un sens aspectuel. Le premier porte sur différenciation de politique se rapportant à une sphère spécifique qui s'oppose aux sphères morale, économique, juridique etc. Ce sens est devenu courant au 19^e siècle. Par exemple Guizot (1821, 1822) a voulu ranger les crimes politiques dans une catégorie différente que les autres crimes. Cela signifie déjà une opposition à l'usage post-aristotélien, dans lequel *politique* a pour référence toute chose publique, mais aucun objet spécifié.

Au début des temps modernes déjà, on trouve en français, comme en allemand ou en anglais (*politic*), un usage qualitatif de l'adjectif: politique signifie 'fin', 'adroit', 'prudent' (tandis qu'en allemand *politisch* a un sens plus péjoratif à cette époque-là, v. Sternberger 1978). Au 19^e siècle, on trouve, surtout chez Tocqueville, des indices d'une interprétation qualitative de l'adjectif *politique* qui réfère à une qualité d'un phénomène ou d'une action, en qualifiant ce qui est spécifique pour rendre politique un phénomène ou une action. Pour lui, dans un sens très wébérien, "dans le monde politique tout est agité, contesté, incertain" (Tocqueville 1835, 91).

Le conflit entre les deux sens de *politique* a des répercussions immédiates dans le droit international: faut-il différencier, selon le paradigme sectoriel, simplement entre les conflits juridiques sujets à la juridiction et les conflits politiques non justifiables, ou faut-il déterminer les notions juridique et politique d'une façon autonome et qualitative? Dans le domaine du droit international dans les années vingt et trente, Hans Morgenthau, jeune allemand vivant à Genève, est celui qui opte le plus clairement pour l'usage qualitatif.

Dans le titre de son livre paru en français en 1933, *La notion du 'politique' et la théorie des différends internationaux*, Morgenthau fait l'usage du substantif *le politique* renvoyant à l'adjectif dans le sens qualitatif. Cet usage est courant dans la discussion allemande. En 1900 déjà, dans son *Allgemeine Staatslehre* Georg Jellinek utilise le terme *der Begriff des Politischen*, devenu ensuite célèbre grâce au titre de l'ouvrage de Carl Schmitt (1927/1932), auquel aussi celui de Morgenthau fait allusion. En français, j'ai trouvé le terme *le politique* en ce sens à partir des années vingt seulement, utilisé surtout en opposition avec le social, l'économique, le moral etc., dans un sens plus ou

moins sectoriel, mais aussi comme traduction du terme allemand *das Politische*, quelquefois avec une connotation péjorative (v. Mankiewicz 1937).

Le politique - domaine ou critère?

Avec l'intensification de la discussion française sur la notion *du politique* après la guerre, surtout vers 1960, la différenciation entre *la politique* et *le politique* est devenue courante. Une analyse détaillée de l'emploi de ces termes chez divers auteurs (p.ex. Aron 1960, 1965, Dabin 1957, 1965, Ellul 1965, Freund 1965, de Jouvenel 1955, 1963, Ricœur 1957, de Visscher 1953) fait constater, cependant, que la différence entre les deux termes n'est aucunement claire et que les différents auteurs ne les comprennent pas d'une seule et même façon. Le recours courant à l'usage anglais ou allemand ne clarifie pas la situation, mais montre plutôt l'absence d'une interprétation unique. Pour l'histoire conceptionnelle, cela n'est pas à regretter, c'est plutôt un signe intéressant de diversification, dû à la présence des conflits de sens descriptif ou des conflits conceptionnels.

Le terme *le politique* est lié, surtout après 1945, aux métaphores spatiales: "Pour moi *le politique* est le domaine, *la politique* est l'action relative à ce domaine" écrit Jacques Ellul (1965, 13). Cependant, le sens spatial ne correspond pas forcément à un secteur ou à une sphère dans le sens étroit: le titre de l'œuvre monumentale de Julien Freund, *L'essence du politique* (1965) comprend le rapport entre *le politique* et les autres 'essences' d'une façon abstraite, définie par moyen de 'présupposés' spécifiques. Il souligne, suivant Carl Schmitt, que *le politique* contient un aspect de stabilité, de pesanteur, à l'opposé de la fluidité de la politique, et, sur ce point, les conceptions de Ricœur (1957) aussi bien que celles de Debray (1981) sont en accord avec lui.

Une autre possibilité d'utiliser des métaphores spatiales sont les analogies théâtrales, avec des mots comme **spectacle** (Ellul 1965, 88) ou **scène** (Maspétiol 1951, 345). Sur cette voie, *le politique* se rapproche aussi des figures de l'art ou du jeu. L'opposition des conceptions dans le terme *la politique*, comme l'utilisent Merleau-Ponty (1947, 1955), Sartre (1960) et Morin (1958, 1965) n'est plus celle de la science contre l'art ou celle du secteur contre l'aspect, mais plutôt une opposition entre les métaphores **spatiales** contre les métaphores **temporelles**.

Or, il n'est pas nécessaire du tout de comprendre *le politique* dans le sens spatial. On peut aller, suivant l'usage de Schmitt et de Morgenthau, plus loin dans la formalisation et voir dans *le politique* justement le **critère**, qui non seulement définit ce qui 'est politique' mais qui le 'rend politique', c'est-à-dire qui lui donne un caractère politique. Dans ce sens, se référant à Morgenthau, le juriste belge Charles de Visscher écrit: "le politique est ici au plus haut point d'expression des forces vitales en mouvement" (1953, 97). *La politique*, par contre, a chez lui un sens sectoriel conventionnel.

Cet usage *du politique* s'oppose surtout à l'aspect normatif d'une *politique* comme un *policy* à suivre et signifie une conceptualisation, qui ne doit pas être liée à la stabilité, comme c'est le cas pour Freund et autres, mais plutôt à ce que les allemands appellent *Politikum*, c'est-à-dire au moment politique d'une question. Pour cela sont possibles les critères comme l'intensité, utilisée p.ex. par Morgenthau et Schmitt.

La désétatisation de la politique

Un autre changement dans la façon dont on parle du phénomène *du politique* dans les textes français du 20^e siècle peut être exprimé par la dissociation de la politique et de l'Etat. Au début du siècle, l'identification de ces deux concepts est encore dominante dans les approches françaises, non seulement dans les approches directement liées à la *raison d'Etat* dont Maurras est le représentant le plus militant, mais aussi dans les textes du juriste célèbre Léon Duguit (1907) ou dans l'apolitisme syndicaliste de Georges Sorel, qui fait une distinction entre **une grève prolétarienne** et **une grève générale politique** (1908), ou bien dans le républicanisme de Guy-Grand.

En Allemagne, on voit déjà avant la première guerre mondiale un renversement de la priorité de l'Etat au politique par rapport à *Allgemeine Staatslehre* de Jellinek, chez les littéraires expressionnistes Hiller et Rubiner. Dans les années vingt, cela se voit dans la première phrase de *Der Begriff des Politischen* de Schmitt, et, d'une manière explicite p. ex. chez l'historien Otto Hintze (1929). En France, c'est aussi dans le contexte littéraire, vers 1930, chez Emmanuel Berl et André Chamson que l'on peut trouver les premiers signes d'une conception dont l'idée a été exprimée plus tard par les féministes: **politique à la première personne**.

Un phénomène de désétatisation sont les divers clubs, mouvements, groupuscules etc. qui font leur entrée à la politique française vers 1960, réagissant contre l'impuissance de la gauche traditionnelle d'empêcher de Gaulle de retourner au pouvoir. Dans les textes de Pierre Mendès France (1962) ou d'André Philip (1959), on trouve une rénovation du républicanisme sous une forme moins étatiste.

Une formalisation et généralisation de la désétatisation de la politique est effectuée par Edgar Morin dans son livre *Introduction à la politique de l'homme* (1965). Il y développe tout un système de préfixes relativisant le paradigme conventionnel de la politique dans "une politique de l'être humain ou l'anthro-politique". D'un point de vue de l'anthropologie philosophique, il trouve plusieurs aspects de la présence *du politique* dans la situation humaine: *l'infra-politique* réfère aux "nécessités de survivre", *les supra-politiques* sont des formes de la politique dont l'objet est "le sens de vie", *l'onto-politique* a pour l'objet "l'être de l'homme", et finalement *la cosmo-politique* lie *l'anthro-politique* avec la "dimension planétaire" (Op.cit., surtout 10-13). Morin politise ainsi la condition humaine d'une façon originelle. Mais il utilise des préfixes aussi dans une fonction plus concrète, quand, en parlant de *la politique multidimensionnelle*, il divise *la politique* en *micro-*, *méso-* et *macro-politique*, voyant en politique conventionnelle seulement une méso-politique (op.cit. 63-69).

L'idée existentielle de la politique présente dans la condition humaine a été exprimée déjà par Camus dans un texte publié à la libération de Paris 1944. Ensuite, Camus a bientôt incliné vers un moralisme, et c'est surtout chez Maurice Merleau-Ponty, dans l'antimoralisme wébérien de *Humanisme et terreur* (1947), que l'on trouve le tragique de la politique dans son rôle constitutif pour la situation des hommes contemporains, ce qui s'exprime d'une façon paradigmatique dans la situation de Boukharine dans le procès de Moscou: il sait qu'il sera condamné à mort, mais il peut choisir une manière de rencontrer la mort politiquement.

Bien que la politique comme horizon de toute pensée sartrienne soit présente déjà dans *L'être et le néant* (1943) comme perspective conflictuelle aux

rapports humaines (v. Palonen 1990b), c'est seulement à partir de 1956 environ que Sartre esquisse une conception originale de *la politique*. Outre la *Critique de la raison dialectique* (1960), les commentaires et les entretiens révèlent une réflexion originelle (v. Palonen 1990a). Il faut souligner surtout l'opposition de Sartre au vote, paradigme de l'acte politique de la tradition républicaine française (v. Nicolet 1982). "Tous les apolitiques votent pour l'apolitisme", écrit-il devant le référendum gaulliste de 1958 (Sartre 1958, 133), et, "voter n'est pas faire de la politique", avant le référendum de 1961 (Sartre 1961, 146). Ce n'est pas qu'il favorise l'abstentionnisme (pas même en Sartre 1973), c'est plutôt que, pour lui, les situations formalisées et ritualisées telles que les élections ne sont pas très politiques. Au contraire, "la politique est une dimension de personne", "on naît politisé" (Sartre 1964, 132); selon la conception de souveraineté de la *Critique*, **faire de la politique est l'aspect politique d'être condamné à être libre** (v. Palonen 1992b). En prenant en considération l'ambiguïté présente dans toute situation politique, il aboutit même à une apologie indirecte de l'homme politique contre l'ingénieur social, qui n'est pas "situé" (v. Sartre 1972, 261-262).

Ce qui est commun à Merleau-Ponty, à Sartre et à Morin, c'est l'attention prêtée à la micro-politique de la situation existentielle. On peut trouver un autre type d'approche **micro-politique** dans l'œuvre de Bertrand de Jouvenel. Dans ses livres *De la souveraineté* (1955) et *De la politique pure* (1963), il essaie de trouver l'élément minimal de toute politique, une politique "pure par ... par sa matière comme par sa forme" (Jouvenel 1955, 32). Son point de départ est l'idée de "la politique comme activité bien plus quotidienne, plus répandue et plus nécessaire qu'on ne pense" (op.cit.7). Selon lui, nous avons tous agi politiquement. Il n'est pas étonnant qu'il ait reçu des critiques violentes des étatistes persévérants comme Raymond Aron (1960). Chez Jouvenel, l'idée même de la politique est celle de *faire faire*: "Le plus petit élément identifiable de tout événement politique ... c'est l'homme faisant agir l'homme" (de Jouvenel 1963, 29). Chez lui, à l'opposé de la perspective existentielle, le rapport entre les acteurs reste prioritaire sur leur action.

La thématization du politique comme notion en France

Un des résultats les plus inattendus de mes recherches sur l'histoire de la notion du politique est la découverte de la nouveauté *du politique* comme notion en soi. Il n'est pas possible de comparer la notion moderne *du politique* comme phénomène d'action avec les notions de la *polis* ou de l'Etat. Il s'agit d'une notion de mouvement (*Bewegungsbegriff* chez Koselleck). Même si le changement d'horizon a eu lieu à partir de 1800, pendant le Sattelzeit koselleckien, la conceptualisation du politique dans l'horizon de l'action s'est passée au 20^e siècle: en Allemagne, environ à partir de 1910, et en France, à quelques exceptions près, seulement après la deuxième guerre mondiale. La **différenciation** de la politique comme sphère n'était pas une condition suffisante pour sa conceptualisation, mais il fallait la **qualification** du politique comme aspect pour qu'un changement se produise dans la manière de poser la question du politique.

Ce qui a été décisif pour ce changement, c'est le processus de **repenser** le phénomène, qui consiste, en premier lieu, en une compréhension *du politique* comme notion nouvelle, dont le caractère est sujet à différentes interprétations, voire à des controverses ouvertes. Les conceptions élaborées et détaillées sont bien rares - et elles ont leur propre profil selon l'auteur. En France, selon mon interprétation, avant 1939, on peut dire qu'il y a des conceptions du politique seulement chez Alain et chez Guy-Grand, et après la guerre, ce sont Aron,

Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Morin, Freund et Jouvenel qui ont des profils individuels quant à la notion *du politique*.

La conceptualisation *du politique* comme notion distincte, comme manière de penser, présuppose avant tout une **abstraction**, non seulement de la politique concrète, mais aussi de l'idée de la politique liée à un objet donné. Cela veut dire également que les diverses conceptions *du politique* n'ont pas d'objet commun. L'abstraction signifie plutôt que l'objet *du politique* lui-même est problématisé. Il en résulte une **mise en perspective** des conceptions, dont la corollaire est qu'aucune conception ne peut plus atteindre une notion totale et exhaustive *du politique*. Dans ce sens, les conceptions françaises de l'après-guerre ne sont plus commensurables entre elles, car chacune d'elles thématise des aspects divers de la notion *du politique*.

Tout cela rend l'approche historique et nominaliste encore plus actuelle. Chaque conception étudiée doit être marquée par un index à la fois historique et thématique. Mais cela veut dire aussi que la construction de nouvelles conceptions *du politique* a, aujourd'hui, de très différentes conditions de ce que c'était le cas encore dans les années cinquante et soixante. Je veux en formuler quelques-unes dans les thèses suivantes:

- on ne peut plus imaginer qu'une conception quelconque soit généralement acceptée, chaque conception étant seulement une contribution à une controverse;

- on ne peut plus juger les conceptions *du politique* par référence à la 'réalité', mais seulement les mettre en rapport avec de différentes façons de parler;

- on ne peut plus chercher des conceptions globales mais seulement telles qui visent à approfondir **l'aspect politique** de quelques thèmes particuliers dans une perspective singularisée.

Thèses sur la littérature récente sur la notion du politique en France

Dans cette conférence, j'ai traité, comme je le fais dans mon livre sur le sujet, la notion *du politique* dans la littérature de la période qui se termine vers le milieu des années soixante. Dans cet épilogue, je ferai quelques remarques sur ce sujet en ce qui concerne la littérature française plus récente. Mes thèses sont formées à travers une lecture plutôt rapide et partisane, et adaptées à la perspective que j'ai utilisée dans mes ouvrages sur ce thème. Mon intention primaire est d'aboutir à une rhétorique provocative en me profitant de ma distance de la vie politique et intellectuelle française.

Une première observation: ce n'est pas autour de l'année 1968 ou dans les années de militantisme qui l'ont suivie que l'on trouve une littérature particulièrement riche sur la notion *du politique*. Les traditions académiques sur lesquelles les militants se sont basés - le marxisme, l'anarchisme, le structuralisme et la sociologie - n'ont pas thématisé la notion *du politique*. Au contraire, elles tendent à la réduire, ou au moins la subordonner à la notion 'société'. Régis Debray a formulé une autre explication: "... la politique m'a longtemps masqué le politique" (*Critique de la raison politique*, 15). Ou mieux: **faire de la politique a masqué la notion du politique**. Debray a commencé son livre dans une prison bolivienne, d'autres ont repensé la notion *du politique* dans des conditions moins tragiques, mais c'est seulement à partir des années quatre-vingt que la littérature sur la notion est florissante.

Actuellement, il est facile de trouver des numéros spéciaux de revues, des ouvrages collectifs, des études historiques, ainsi que des monographies dont les titres semblent promettre une contribution à l'histoire de la notion *du politique*. Mais après m'être spécialisé en ce thème, j'ai été déçu dans la plupart des cas, et je n'attends plus beaucoup de ces titres prometteurs.

Cependant, il y a des choses à découvrir dans cette littérature. Surtout les études historiques sur le sujet, en premier lieu *L'idée républicaine en France* de Claude Nicolet (1982, v. aussi Nicolet 1992) et les ouvrages de Pierre Rosanvallon³¹ (comme *Le capitalisme utopique* [1979] et *Le moment Guizot* [1985]) m'ont beaucoup aidé: elles sont issues des imaginations sur l'histoire conceptuelle proches de la mienne. Et, bien sûr, dans les études françaises sur Weber, Arendt, Schmitt etc., il y a des choses importantes du point de vue de la notion *du politique*.

Ce qui est décevant, c'est que *la politique* ou *le politique* dans les titres des ouvrages, des revues etc. n'est souvent pas prise dans le **sens nominaliste**. On sait que la plupart de ce qui est institutionnalisé sous le nom de science politique est, en France comme ailleurs, peu intéressant (v. Palonen 1988). Même les volumes de *Philosophie politique* de Luc Ferry et Alain Renaut (1984-1985) ne thématisent pas du tout la notion *du politique*. Ils traitent plutôt la philosophie de la morale, du droit, de l'Etat etc. Ce sens non-thématisé reste présent dans l'usage quotidien, et rend p.ex. le numéro intitulé *Que reste-t-il de la politique?* de *La liberté d'esprit* (1986) ou le numéro intitulé *Faire la politique d'Autrement* (1991) peu intéressantes.

L'absence de la **dimension historique** de la notion *du politique* est évidente. Les auteurs français ne sont sensibles ni à l'historicité de la notion comme thème ni aux changements qu'elle a subies dans l'emploi du vocabulaire ou au niveau conceptuel. Soit ce sont les références historiques qui manquent presque totalement, soit les remarques historiques sont très sommaires et superficielles (p.ex. Baudrillard 1978).

On doit constater également l'absence des études concrètes sur l'usage du terme politique et ses dérivés en français, sur la **diversification massive** de ces termes, évidente en France déjà dans les années cinquante et soixante, comme dans beaucoup d'autres pays à la même époque, même en Finlande. Dans la plupart des ouvrages, l'argumentation sur **la politique** ou **le politique** est basée sur des impressions d'un sens quotidien ou traditionnel, comme si ce sens était donné par la nature de l'objet, généralement connu et accepté par tous (v. le numéro cité d'*Autrement*).

Il y a un autre aspect encore: c'est **la rupture manquée entre le social et le politique**. Dès qu'on considère que le social est déconstruit, on prend cette déconstruction pour une réalité quant *au politique*, comme si celui-ci était seulement une sous-sphère du social. On trouve ce réductionnisme sociologique p. ex. chez Baudrillard (1978). Une exception intéressante à cet égard est, cependant, le livre de Jacques Donzelot, *L'invention du social* (1984), ainsi que les ouvrages historiques de Nicolet et de Rosanvallon. Ici, on peut mentionner aussi la réhabilitation de l'individualité existentielle et sa signification politique dans l'œuvre de André Gorz, surtout à partir de *Adieux au prolétariat* (1980).

La perspective étatiste ou sectorielle dans la compréhension de la notion n'ôte pas forcément l'intérêt aux ouvrages, mais elle ne les rend pas originaux

31 Pour *Le sacre du citoyen* v. chapitre 7 au-dessus dans ce volume.

du point de vue de la notion *du politique*. C'est le cas des ouvrages de Guy Dhoquis (1983) ou de Guy Haarscher (1988), ou des essais de Claude Lefort (1986).

J'ai déjà indiqué que l'idée **de parler du politique au sens d'un facteur de pesanteur**, comme le fait Régis Debray (1981, v. aussi 1980), ne me paraît pas très valable. Une conception du même type est visible dans les approches heideggériens de Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy et d'autres dans les volumes *Rejouer la politique* (1981) et *Retrait du politique* (1983), de même que dans *Politique et modernité* (1992) La thématisation *du politique* comme notion du mouvement y est absente.

Ce qui désigne plus d'attention, c'est l'apparition de nouveaux préfixes dans le vocabulaire en question. Ce sont des préfixes qui visent à déconstruire *la* ou *le politique*, mais sans revenir à *la dépolitisation* ancienne (comme fait p.ex. Tenzer 1990). Surtout dans le numéro *Politique – fin de siècle* de *Traverses* (1985), les néologismes *post-politique* (métaphore temporelle) et *trans-politique* (métaphore spatiale) sont utilisés dans plusieurs contributions, et des fois d'une façon intéressante, comme dans la critique de Schmitt par l'Italien Mario Perniola en *La politique de l'entre-deux* ou dans la critique de l'Etat-nation par le politologue Serge Latouche. Malheureusement, ces néologismes présupposent, eux aussi, faussement que *la* ou *le politique* serait quelque chose de plus ou moins donné.

Ainsi, que reste-t-il de la notion *du politique* dans les contributions françaises à partir de années vingt? Avant tout, une opposition aux figures hégéliennes de l'unité, du progrès et des sphères bien limitées aussi bien qu'une réhabilitation de *la politique* comme point d'appui pour repenser la notion *du politique*. Tout cela se voit sous formes diverses dans des ouvrages des auteurs dont les itinéraires politiques et philosophiques sont très divers.

Le plus célèbre parmi ces auteurs est Jean-François Lyotard, avec *Le différend* (1983). Il défend l'originalité *du différend* en contraste avec *le litige*, il voit que *la politique* n'est pas un genre, et il réhabilite la rhétorique sophistique. Un autre auteur qui doit être mentionné ici est Alan Badiou, qui, dans son *Peut-on penser la politique?* (1985), veut libérer *la politique* comme événement interprétatif du *jou du politique* comme structure fictive, et pour lequel le temps paradigmatique de *la politique* est le futur antérieur. Jacques Rancière, dans l'ouvrage *Aux bords du politique* (1990), s'engage dans une polémique contre l'idéologie anti-maritime de Platon et veut réhabiliter la pluralité maritime de Thémistocle, et voit le présent comme temps originel de la politique.

Badiou et Rancière veulent également échapper à la dominance de la philosophie et réhabiliter *la politique* comme pratique empirique. Pierre Lenain, ancien économiste qui essaie de se situer totalement en dehors du discours philosophique, va jusqu'à défendre *la politique politicienne* méprisée par les Français. Depuis les années quatre-vingt, il a publié chaque année un ou deux petits volumes sur *la politique* sous des angles diverses, et, dans son amateurisme, il a réussi à dire des choses originales sur *Le jeu politique* (1986), sur *Le temps politique* (1988), et, avant tout, sur *L'instant politique* (1989).

Mon intention était d'attirer de l'attention à ces ouvrages sur la notion du politique, mais je n'ai aucune intention d'en faire des interprétations détaillées: il faut bien laisser quelque chose aux autres.

REFERENCES

- Alain (1925): *Éléments d'une doctrine radicale*. Paris: Gallimard 1933.
- Alain (1934): *Propos de politique*. Paris: Rieder.
- Alexander, Jeremy C. (1987): The dialectic between individuation and domination. In: Scott Lash and Sam Whimster (eds): *Max Weber, rationality and modernity*, 185-206. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Arendt, Hannah (1946a): French Existentialism. *The Nation* 23.2., 226-228.
- Arendt, Hannah (1946b): What is Existenz philosophy, *Partisan Review* 8/1, 34-56
- Arendt, Hannah (1958/1960): *Vita activa*. München. Piper 1981.
- Arendt, Hannah (1963a): *Eichmann in Jerusalem*. Leipzig: Reclam 1990.
- Arendt, Hannah (1963b): *Über die Revolution*. München. Piper 1965.
- Arendt, Hannah (1968a): *Between Past and Future*. New York: Harcourt & Brace & Jovanovic.
- Arendt, Hannah (1968): On violence. In: *The crises of the republic*, 83-164. Harmondsworth: Pelican 1971.
- Arendt, Hannah (1970): Civil disobedience. In: *The crises of the republic*, 43-82. Harmondsworth: Pelican. 1971.
- Arendt, Hannah (1977): *Das Leben des Geistes*, ed. by Mary McCarthy. Bd. 1, *Das Denken*, Bd. 2. *Das Wollen*, München: Piper 1979.
- Arendt, Hannah: (1978a): *The Jew as a Pariah*, ed. by Ron Feldman. New York: Grove Press.
- Arendt, Hannah (1978b): *Lectures on Kant's political philosophy*, ed. by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Arendt, Hannah (1987): L' intérêt pour la politique dans la pensée européenne récente (1954). *Cahiers de la philosophie* 4.
- Argumente. Die multikulturelle Gesellschaft*. ed. Die Grünen im Bundestag. Bonn 1989.
- Aristoteles: *Rhetorik*. German transl. & ed. by Franz G. Sieveke. München: Fink 1980.
- Aron, Raymond (1960): Thucydide et le récit historique. In *Dimensions de la conscience historique*, 111-147. Paris: Plon 1985.
- Aron, Raymond (1965): *Démocratie et totalitarisme*. Paris: Gallimard 1985.
- Aron, Raymond (1983): *Mémoires*. Paris: Julliard.
- Aronson, Ronald (1987): *Sartre's Second Critique*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Autrement - mutations* 122. Faire la politique (1991).
- Axelos, Kostas (1958): La politique planétaire. *Esprit* 26/II, 76-96.
- Badiou, Alan (1985): *Peut-on penser la politique?* Paris: Seuil.
- Baker, Keith M. (1990): *Inventing the French Revolution*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Ball, Terence (1988): *Transforming political discourse*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Barthou, Louis (1923): *Le politique*. Paris: Hachette.
- Baudrillard, Jean (1978): *A l'ombre des majorités silencieuses. La fin du social*. Paris: Denoël & Gantier 1982.
- de Beauvoir, Simone (1946): *Idéalisme moral et réalisme politique*, In: *Existentialisme et la sagesse des nations*, 47-85. Genève: Nagel 1986.
- de Beauvoir, Simone (1949): *Le deuxième sexe*. Paris: Gallimard 1981.
- de Beauvoir, Simone (1981): Entretiens avec Jean-Paul Sartre, août-septembre 1974. In: *La cérémonie des adieux*, 163-559. Paris: Gallimard.
- Beck, Ulrich (1986): *Risikogesellschaft*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Beck, Ulrich (1993): *Die Erfindung des Politischen*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Beetham, David (1974): *Max Weber and the theory of modern politics*. London: Polity 1985.

- Beiner, Ronald (1983): *Political judgment*. London: Methuen.
- Benda, Julien (1927): *La trahison des clercs*. Paris: Laffont 1977.
- Berl, Emmanuel (1929): Premier pamphlet. Les littéraires et la révolution. *Europe* 73., 47-74, 74., 229-245, 75., 397-414.
- Bevir, Mark (1992): The errors of linguistic contextualism. *History and theory* 31., 276-300.
- Bolz, Norbert (1989): *Auszug aus der entzauberten Welt*. München: Fink.
- Brauns, Patrick (1988): *Die Zeiten sind hart aber' modern'. Sprachliche Inszenierung der sozialistischen Politik in Frankreich 1983-1986*. Konstanz: Göre.
- Brinkmann, Carl (1940): Citizenship. *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* vol. 3, 470-473. NewYork: Macmillan.
- vom Bruch, Rüdiger (1980): *Wissenschaft, Politik und öffentliche Meinung*. Husum: Mathiesen.
- Brunner, Otto (1939): *Land und Herrschaft*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaft-liche Buchgesellschaft 1987.
- Brunner, Otto (1968): *Neue Wege für Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1980.
- Bruun, H.H. (1972): *Science, values and politics in Max Weber's methodology*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
- Burke, Kenneth (1945): *A grammar of motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1969.
- Burke, Kenneth (1950): *A rhetoric of motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1969.
- Busse, Dietrich (1987): *Historische Semantik*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Busse, Dietrich (1992): *Textverstehen*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Camus, Albert (1944): *La Résistance et la politique. Essais, 1522-1524*. Paris: Gallimard 1975.
- Catalano, Joseph (1986): *A commentary of Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique of dialectical reason, Volume 1, Theory of practical ensembles*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Chamson, André (1931): *La politique comme l'esprit. Revue des vivants*, 5/II, 783-786.
- Citoyenneté et nationalité* (1991). *Perspectives en France et au Quebec*. Sous la direction de Dominique Colas, Claude Emeri, Jacques Zylberberg. Paris: PUF.
- Connolly, William (1991): *Identity/difference. Democractic negotiations of political paradox*. Ithaca: Cornell UP.
- Constant, Benjamin (1819): *La liberté chez les Modernes*. In: *De la liberté chez les Modernes*, ed. by. Marcel Gauchet, 491-515. Paris: Hachette 1980.
- Contat, Michel (1968): *Explication des Séquestres d'Altona de Jean-Paul Sartre*. Paris: Archives des lettres modernes n:o 89.
- Dabin, Jean (1957): *Etat ou le politique. Essai de définition*. Paris: Dalloz.
- Dabin, Jean (1965): *Droit et politique*. In *Mélanges offerts à René Savatier*, 183-218. Paris: Dalloz.
- Dankworth, Herbert (1929): *Die Deutschen und die Politik. Abendland*, 5., 56-60.
- Debray, Régis (1980): *Le scribe*. Paris: Grasset.
- Debray, Régis (1981): *Critique de la raison politique*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Demandt, Alexander (1978): *Metaphern für Geschichte. Sprachbilder und Gleichnisse im historisch-politischen Denken*. München: Beck.
- Dépolitisation et consensus dans la société industrielle (1962). Un débat avec Raymond Barrillon, Maurice Duverger, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Georges Lavau, André Philip, Paul Vignaux, *Cahiers de la république* 44., 368-385.
- Dhoquis, Guy (1983): *Critique du politique*. Paris: Anthropos.
- Donzelot, Jacques (1984): *L'invention du social*. Paris: Fayard.

- Downs, Anthony (1957): *An economic theory of democracy*. London: Allen & Unwin 1965.
- Dubois, Jean (1962): *Le vocabulaire social et politique en France de 1869 à 1872*. Paris: Larousse.
- Duguit, Léon (1907): *Manuel du droit constitutionnel*. Paris: Boccard 1923.
- Edelman, Murray (1964): *The symbolic uses of politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1985.
- Edelman, Murray (1977): *Political language. Words that succeed and policies that fail*. New York: Academic Press.
- Ellul, Jacques: *L'illusion politique*. Paris: Laffont 1977.
- Enzensberger, Hans Magnus (1987): *Ach Europa!* Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Farr, James (1989): *Understanding conceptual change politically*. In: Terence Ball & James Farr & Russell L. Hanson (ed): *Political innovation and conceptual change*, 24-29. Cambridge: CUP.
- Ferry, Luc & Renaut, Alain (1984-1985): *Philosophie politique* 1-3. Paris: PUF.
- Foerster, Friedrich Wilhelm (1918): *Politische Ethik und politische Pädagogik*. München: Reinhardt.
- Foygeyrollas, Pierre (1963): *La conscience politique dans la France contemporaine*. Paris: Denoël.
- Frank, Manfred (1977): *Das individuelle Allgemeine. Textstrukturierung und -interpretation nach Schleiermacher*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Frank, Manfred (1980/1990): *Das Sagbare und das Unsagbare*. Erweiterte Neuauflage. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp 1990.
- Frank, Manfred (1986): *Die Unhintergebarkeit der Individualität*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Freund, Julien (1965): *L'essence du politique*. Paris: Sirey 1981.
- Funck-Brentano, Th. (1892): *La politique. Principes, critiques, réformes*. Paris: Rousseau.
- Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, Eds. Otto Brunne &, Werner Conze & Reinhart Koselleck. (1972-1992): Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 7 volumes.
- Giraud, Emile (1966): *Le droit international public et la politique. Recueil des cours*, 110., 419-809.
- Gorz, André (1959): *La morale de l'histoire*. Paris: Seuil 1959.
- Gorz, André (1980): *Adieux au prolétariat*. Paris: Galilée.
- Gramlich, Ludwig (1989): *Wahlrecht für nicht-deutsche Inländer. Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht* 2/1989, 51-57.
- Guggenberger, Bernd (1992): *Die politische Aktualität des Ästhetischen*. Eggingen: Isele.
- Guizot, François (1821): *Des conspirations de la justice politique*. Paris: Fayard 1984.
- Guizot, François (1822): *De la peine de mort en matière politique*. Paris: Fayard 1984.
- Gunnell, John. G (1979): *Political theory. Tradition and interpretation*. Cambridge, Mass.: State University of New York Press.
- Guy-Grand, Georges (1911): *Le procès de la démocratie*. Paris: Colin
- Guy-Grand, Georges (1928): *L'avenir de la démocratie*. Paris: Rivière.
- Günther, Horst (1979): *Freiheit, Herrschaft und Geschichte*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
- Haarscher, Guy (1988): *La raison du plus fort. Philosophie du politique*. Liège: Mardaga.
- Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich*, eds. Rolf Reichardt & Eberhard Schmitt (1985ff). München: Oldenbourg, 14 volumes.
- Havel, Václav (1984): *Politik und Gewissen*. In: *Am Anfang war das Wort*, 81-113. Rowohlt: Reinbek 1990.
- Hennis, Wilhelm (1987): *Max Webers Fragestellung*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Hermanns, Fritz (1989): *Deontische Tautologien. Ein linguistischer Beitrag zur Interpretation des Godesberger Programms (1959) der*

- Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. In: Josef Klein (ed): *Politische Semantik*, 69-149. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Hermanns, Fritz (1991): Leistung und Entfaltung. Ein linguistischer Beitrag zur Interpretation des Ludwigshafener Grundsatzprogramms (1978) der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschland. In: Frank Liedtke u.a. (ed): *Begriffe besetzen*, 230-257. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Hintze, Otto (1929): Soziologische und geschichtliche Staatsauffassung. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft* 86., 35-106.
- Historisches Wörterbuch für Philosophie* (1971ff): Eds. Joachim Ritter and Karl Gründer. Basel: Schwalbe. 7 volumes.
- Holly, Werner (1990): *Politikersprache. Inszenierungen und Rollen-konflikte im informellen Sprachhandeln eines Bundestagsabge-ordneten*. Berlin: de Gruyter 1990.
- Honig, Bonnie (1993): *Political theory and the displacement of politics*. Ithaca: Cornell UP.
- Jahn, Ralf & Riedel, Norbert K. (1989): Der Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission für ein Kommunalwahlrecht für EG-Ausländer und seine Auswirkungen auf das innerstaatliche Recht. *Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht* 2/1989, 58-62.
- Jaspers, Karl (1913): *Allgemeine Psychopathologie*. München: Piper.
- Jaspers, Karl (1920): *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*. Berlin: Springer 1922.
- Jaspers, Karl (1931): *Zur geistigen Situation der Zeit*. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Jaspers, Karl (1932): *Philosophie II*. Berlin: Springer 1983.
- Jaspers, Karl (1958): *Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen* 1983. München: Piper.
- Jaspers, Karl (1962): Bemerkungen zu Max Webers politischem Denken. In: Karl Jaspers, *Max Weber. Gesammelte Schriften*., 115-127 München: Piper 1988.
- Jaspers, Karl (1966): *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?* München: Piper.
- Jaspers, Karl (1988): *Max Weber. Gesammelte Schriften*. München: Piper.
- Jellinek, Georg (1900): *Allgemeine Staatslehre*. Berlin: Häring.
- Jouvenel, Bertrand de (1955): *De la souveraineté*. Paris: Genin.
- Jouvenel, Bertrand de (1963): *De la politique pure*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy 1977.
- Kanerva, Jukka & Palonen, Kari (1987): Introduction. In: Jukka Kanerva & Kari Palonen (eds): *Transformation of ideas on a periphery. Political studies in Finnish history*, 7-15. Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association.
- Kelsen, Hans (1925): *Allgemeine Staatslehre*. Berlin: Springer.
- Kierkegaard, Søren (1847): *Den Enkelte, Forord. Samlede værker*, XIII bind. København: Gyldendalske boghandel 1906.
- Kimminich, Otto (1962): Völkerrechtsfragen exilpolitischer Betätigung. *Archiv des Völkerrechts* 10, 132-165.
- Klein, Josef (1989): Wortschatz, Wortkampf, Wortfelder in der Politik . In: Josef Klein (ed): *Politische Semantik*, 3-50. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Klein, Josef (1991): Kann man 'Begriffe besetzen'? Zur linguistischen Differenzierung einer plakativen Metapher. In: Frank Liedtke u.a. (ed): *Begriffe besetzen*, 44-69. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Konrad, György (1985): *Antipolitik. Mitteleuropäische Meditationen*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Koselleck, Reinhart (1959): *Kritik und Krise*. Frankfurt/M. Suhrkamp 1972.
- Koselleck, Reinhart (1967a): *Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1988.
- Koselleck, Reinhart (1967b): Richtlinien für das Lexikon politisch-sozialer Begriffe der Neuzeit. *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 11., 81-99.
- Koselleck, Reinhart (1972): Einleitung. *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*. Bd.I , XIII-XXVIII. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

- Koselleck, Reinhart (1979): *Vergangene Zukunft*. Frankfurt/M: Suhr-kamp.
- Koselleck, Reinhart (1980): 'Fortschritt' und 'Niedergang' – Nachtrag zur Geschichte zweier Begriffe. In: Reinhart Koselleck & Paul Widmer (eds): *Niedergang*, 214-230. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Koselleck, Reinhart (1986): Sozialgeschichte und Begriffsgeschichte. In: Wolfgang Schieder & Volker Sellin (eds): *Sozialgeschichte in Deutschland*, 89-109. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Koselleck, Reinhart (1988): Erfahrungswandel und Methodenwechsel. Eine historisch-anthropologische Skizze. In: Christian Meier & Jörn Rüsen (eds): *Historische Methode*, 13-61. München: DTV.
- Koselleck, Reinhart et. al. (1990): *Staat und Souveränität. Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*. Bd.V I, 1-154. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Koselleck, Reinhart & Spree, Ulrike & Steinmetz, Willibald (1991): Drei bürgerliche Welten? Zur vergleichenden Semantik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in Deutschland, England und Frankreich. In: Puhle, Hans-Jürgen: *Bürger in der Gesellschaft der Neuzeit*, 14-58. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Koselleck, Reinhart (ed) (1979): *Historische Semantik und Begriffs-geschichte*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Koyré, Alexandre (1929): *La philosophie et le problème national en Russie au début du XIX^e siècle*. Paris: Gallimard 1976.
- Lakoff, Robin (1990): *Talking Power. The Politics of Language*. New York: Basic Books.
- Latouche, Serge (1985): La fin de société de nations. *Traverses* 33-34, 36-45.
- Lausberg, Heinrich (1963): *Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik*. München: Huber 1984.
- Le Cour Grandmaison, Oliver (1993): Immigration, politique et citoyenneté: sur quelques arguments. *Les Temps modernes* 539, 141-164
- Lefort, Claude (1986): *Essais sur le politique*. Paris: Seuil.
- Lenain, Pierre(1986): *Le jeu politique*. Paris: Economica.
- Lenain, Pierre(1988): *Le temps politique*. Paris: Economica.
- Lenain, Pierre(1989): *L'instant politique*. Paris: Economica.
- La liberté de esprit* 13.(1986): Que reste-t-il de la politique?
- Luhmann, Niklas (1984): Staat und Politik. Zur Semantik der Selbstbeschreibung politischer Systeme. *Politische Vierteljahrs-schrift*, Sonderheft 15, 99-125.
- Luhmann, Niklas (1989): Staat und Staatsräson im Übergang von traditioneller Herrschaft zur modernen Politik. In: *Gesellschafts-struktur und Semantik* 3. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Lyotard, Jean-François (1983): *Le différend*. Paris: Minuit.
- Maler, Eduard (1986): *Sartres Individualhermeneutik*. München: Fink.
- Mankiewicz, H. (1937): *La Weltanschauung Nationalsocialiste*. Lyon: Bosc.& Riou.
- Marx, Reinhard (1984): *Eine menschenrechtliche Begründung des Asylrechts*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Maspétiol, Roland (1951): Qu'est-ce que l'Etat. *Revue politique et parlementaire*, année 78., 343-351.
- Maurras, Charles: *Dictionnaire politique et critique*, t. 4. Paris: A la cité des livres 1933.
- Maurras, Charles: *Dictionnaire politique et critique, complément* 21. Cahiers Charles Maurras 1970.
- Meier, Christian (1980): *Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Meier, Christian (1985): *Politik und Anmut*. Berlin: Siedler.
- Meier, Christian (1988a): *Max Weber und die Antike*. In: Christian Gneuss & Jürgen Kocka (eds): *Max Weber. Ein Symposium*, 11-24. München: DTV.

- Meier, Christian (1988b): *Die politische Kunst der griechischen Tragödie*. München: Beck.
- Mendès France, Pierre (1962): *La république moderne*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1947): *Humanisme et terreur*. Paris: Gallimard 1980.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1955): *Les aventures de la dialectique*. Paris: Gallimard 1977
- Mommsen, Wolfgang J. (1974): *Max Weber. Gesellschaft, Politik und Geschichte*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Morgenthau, Hans (1933): *La notion du 'politique' et la théorie des différends internationaux*. Paris: Sirey.
- Morin, Edgar (1958): Dialectique et l'action. *Arguments* 7., 8-17.
- Morin, Edgar (1965): *Introduction à la politique de l'homme*. Paris: Seuil 1969.
- Morot-Sir, Edouard (1981): La pratique du discours philosophique dans *Critique de la raison dialectique*. In: Sartre et les arts. *Obliques* 24-25, 57-64.
- Morot-Sir, Edouard (1986): La théorie des significations et du langage dans *Critique de la raison dialectique*. In: *Études sartriennes* II-III, 159-171. Nanterre: Université de Paris X.
- Nelson, John S. (1984): Stands in politics. *Journal of Politics* 46, 106-131.
- Nelson, John S. (1990): Political foundations for the rhetoric of inquiry. In: Simons, Herbert [ed]: *The rhetorical turn*, 258-292: Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Nicolet, Claude (1982): *L'idée républicaine en France*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Nicolet, Claude (1992): *La République en France. Etat des lieux*. Paris: Seuil.
- Nicolet, Claude (1992a): Citoyenneté française et citoyenneté romaine. Essai de mise en perspective. In: Serge Bernstein & Odile Rudelle (eds.): *Le modèle républicain*, 19-56. Paris: PUF.
- Nicolet, Claude (1992b): *La République en France: Etat des lieux*. Paris: Seuil.
- Oakeshott, Michael (1975): *On human conduct*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991.
- Offe, Claus (1987): *Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics: social movements since the 1960s*. In: Charles S. Maier (ed.), *Changing boundaries of the political*, 63-105. Cambridge: CUP.
- Ottmann, Henning (1987): *Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche*. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Pagden, Anthony (1987): *Introduction*. In: Pagden, Anthony (ed): *Languages of political theory in early-modern Europe*, 1-17. Cambridge: CUP.
- Pagden, Anthony (ed) (1987): *Languages of political theory in early-modern Europe*. Cambridge:
- Palonen, Kari (1985): *Politik als Handlungsbegriff. Horizontwandel des Politikbegriffs in Deutschland 1890-1933*. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.
- Palonen, Kari (1988): Die Thematisierung des Politikbegriffs in Frankreich: In: Marjatta Erharuyi & Klaus Sondermann (éds): *Politikwissenschaft. Geschichte eines Erfolgs? Studia Politica Jyväskyläensia* 1- 1988, 48-75.
- Palonen, Kari (1989a): Korrekturen zur Geschichte von 'Politisierung'. *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 30., 224-234.
- Palonen, Kari (1989b): *Die Thematisierung der Politik als Phänomen. Eine Interpretation der Geschichte des Begriffs Politik im Frank-reich des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.
- Palonen, Kari (1990a): A case of politics for politics. Jean-Paul Sartre's existential apology of politics as an alternative to the republican one. In: Sakari Hänninen & Kari Palonen (eds): *Texts, contexts, concepts*, 121-139. Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association.
- Palonen, Kari (1990b): La politique en tant que situation de lutte chez Weber et chez Sartre. In: Kari Palonen & Leena Subra (eds): *Jean-Paul Sartre – un philosophe du politique*. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 74,

- Palonen, Kari (1990c): Le rapport sartrien au politique. In: Kari Palonen & Leena Subra (eds): *Jean-Paul Sartre – un philosophe du politique*, 10-32. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 74.
- Palonen, Kari (1992a): Argument som politik. Om den implicita politik-konceptionen hos den perelmanska retoriken. Paper presented in Uppsala, February 1992.
- Palonen, Kari (1992b): *Politik als Vereitelung. Die Politikkonzeption in Jean-Paul Sartres 'Critique de la raison dialectique'*. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Palonen, Kari (1993a): Are the linguists better political scientists? Revier article on Johannes Volmert, "Politikerrede als kommunikatives Handlungsspiel" *Semiotica* 94, 1/2, 135-145.
- Palonen, Kari (1993b): From polity and policy to politicking and politi-cization. In: Kari Palonen & Tuija Parvikko (eds): *Reading the political*, 6-16. Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association.
- Palonen, Kari (1993c): Max Weber och 'det Machiavellianska momentet'. Paper presented at Nordic Political Science Conference, Oslo, August 1993.
- Palonen, Kari (1993d): Politik als Beruf – eine rhetorische Lektüre. Paper presented to Max Weber-Symposion, University of Jyväskylä, february 1993.
- Palonen, Kari (1994): *Streben, Kampf und Chance. Ein Kommentar zu Max Webers 'Politik als Beruf'*. Forthcoming.
- Parvikko, Tuija (1993): The pariah as a rebel of the postmodern political condition. In: Kari Palonen & Tuija Parvikko (eds): *Reading the political*, 50-61. Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association.
- Péguy, Charles (1910): *Notre jeunesse*. Paris: Gallimard 1969.
- Pekonen, Kyösti (1990): *The community as a topic in Finnish social democratic discourse*. In: Sakari Hänninen & Kari Palonen (eds): *Texts, contexts, concepts*, 81-95 Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association.
- Perelman, Chaïm (1989): *Rhétoriques*, ed. Michel Meyer. Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles.
- Perelman, Chaïm & Olbrechts-Tyteca, Lucie (1958): *Traité de l'argumentation. La nouvelle rhétorique*. Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles 1983.
- Perniola, Mario (1985): La politique de l'entre-deux. *Traverses* 33-34, 99-105.
- Philip, André (1959): Qu'est-ce que la démocratie? *Cahiers de la république*, 15., 288-302
- Plessner, Helmuth (1924): *Grenzen der Gemeinschaft*. In: *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. 5. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp 1981.
- Pocock, J.G.A. (1971): *Politics, language and time*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989.
- Pocock, J.G.A. (1973): Verbalizing a political act, *Political Theory* 1, 27-45.
- Pocock, J.G.A. (1975): *The Machiavellian moment*. Princeton: UP.
- Pocock, J.G.A (1985): *Virtue, commerce and history*,. Cambridge: CUP.
- Pocock, J.G.A (1987a): The concept of a language and the *métier d'historien*: some considerations on practice. In: Anthony Pagden (ed.): *Languages of political theory in early-modern Europe*, 19-38. Cambridge: CUP.
- Pocock, J.G.A (1987b): Texts and events. Reflections on the history of political thought. In: Kevin Sharpe & Steven N. Zwicker (eds), *Politics of discourse. The literature and history of seventeenth-century England*, 21-34. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Political innovation and conceptual change*(1989): Eds. Terence Ball & James Farr & Russell L.Hanson. Cambridge: CUP.
- Politique et modernité* (1992): Paris: Osiris.

- Le problème de la dépolitisation et l'opinion publique en France. In: *Démocratie à refaire*, 13-74. Paris: Les éditions ouvrières.
- Rancière, Jacques (1990): *Aux bords du politique*. Paris: Osiris.
- Rancière, Jacques (1992): *Les mots de l'histoire. Essai de poétique du savoir*. Paris: Seuil.
- Reichardt, Rolf (1985): *Einleitung*. In: *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1820*, Bd. 1/2, 39-148.
- Rejouer la politique* (1981). Paris: Galilée.
- Rétat, Pierre (1988): Citoyen - sujet, civisme. *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1820*, Bd. 8, 75-105. München: Oldenbourg.
- Retrait du politique* (1983). Paris: Galilée.
- Rey, Alain (1990): *Révolution. Histoire d'un mot*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Richter, Melvin (1990): Reconstructing the history of political languages: Pocock, Skinner and Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, *History and theory*, 29., 38-70.
- Ricœur, Paul (1957): Le paradoxe politique. *Esprit* 26/1, 721-745.
- Riedel, Manfred (1972): Bürger, Staatsbürger, Bürgertum. *Geschicht-liche Grundbegriffe* Bd. 1, 672-725. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Riila, Anu (1993): Who is a political refugee? In: Kari Palonen & Tuija Parvikko (eds): *Reading the political*, 91-102. Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association.
- Riila, Anu (1994): The Varfolomejev case. Forthcoming. *Ius Gentium.Finnish Yearbook of International Law*.
- Rohe, Karl & Dörner, Andreas (1990): *Political culture and concepts of politics: linguistic investigations into the British and German understanding of politics*. In: Sakari Hänninen & Kari Palonen (eds): *Texts, contexts, concepts*, 50-68. Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association.
- Rohe, Karl & Dörner, Andreas (1991): *Politische Sprache und Politische Kultur. Diachron-kulturvergleichende Sprachanalyse am Beispiel von Großbritannien und Deutschland*. In: Manfred Opp de Hipt & Erich Latniak (eds): *Sprache statt Politik? Beiträge zur politikwissenschaftlichen Semantik- und Rhetorikforschung*, 38-65. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Rorty, Richard (1982): *Consequences of pragmatism*. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.
- Rosanvallon, Pierre (1979): *Le capitalisme utopique*. Paris: Seuil.
- Rosanvallon, Pierre (1985): *Le moment Guizot*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Rosanvallon, Pierre (1990): *De l'Etat en France de 1789 à nos jours*. Paris: Seuil.
- Rosanvallon, Pierre (1992): *Le sacre du citoyen. Histoire du suffrage universel en France*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1762): *Du contrat social*. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion 1966.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1938): *La nausée*. Paris: Gallimard 1975.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1943): *L'être et le néant*. Paris: Gallimard (TEL) 1977.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1944): *Huis clos*. Paris: Gallimard 1975.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1948): *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?* In: *Situations II*. Paris: Gallimard 1949.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1950): *Faux savants ou faux lièvres*. In: *Situations VI*, 23-68. Paris: Gallimard 1964.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1951): *Le Diable et le Bon Dieu*. Paris: Gallimard 1969.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1952a): *Réponse à Albert Camus*. In: *Situations IV*, 90-125. Paris: Gallimard 1964.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1952b): *Saint Genet*. Paris: Gallimard 1978.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1952-1954): *Les communistes et la paix*. In: *Situations VI*, 80-384. Paris: Gallimard 1964.

- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1957): *Le fantôme de Staline*. *Situations* VII, 144-307. Paris: Gallimard 1965.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1958): *Les grenouilles qui demandent un roi*. In: *Situations* V, 113-144. Paris: Gallimard 1978 .
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1959): *Les Séquestres d'Altona*. Paris: Gallimard 1967.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1960): *Critique de la raison dialectique*, I. Paris: Gallimard 1985.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1961a): *L'analyse du référendum*. In: *Situations* V, 145-159. Paris: Gallimard 1978.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1961b): *Merleau-Ponty*. In: *Situations* IV, 189-287. Paris: Gallimard 1964.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1964): *L'Alibi*. In: *Situations* VIII, 127-145. Paris: Gallimard 1972.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1969): *Masses, spontanéité, parti*. *Situations* VIII, 262-290. Paris: Gallimard 1972.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1971-1972): *L'idiot de la famille* I-III. Paris: Gallimard.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1973a): *Élections – piège à cons*. In: *Situations* X, 75-87. Paris: Gallimard 1976.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1973b): *Un théâtre de situations*. Textes choisis et présentés par Michel Contat et Michel Rybalka. Paris: Gallimard.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1983): *Cahiers pour une morale* (1947-1948), ed. by Arlette Elkaim-Sartre. Paris: Gallimard .
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1985): *Critique de la raison dialectique* II, ed. by Arlette Elkaim-Sartre. Paris: Gallimard.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1990): *Écrits de jeunesse*. Ed. by Michel Contat et Michel Rybalka. Paris: Gallimard.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1991): *Kennedy and West Virginia*, transl. by Elisabeth Bowman. In: Ronald Aronson & Adrian van den Hoven (eds): *Sartre alive*, 37-52. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Sassenbach, Ulrich (1992): *Der Begriff des Politischen bei Immanuel Kant*. Würzburg: Königshausen +Neumann.
- Scaff, Lawrence (1989): *Fleeing the iron cage*. Berkely: The University of California Press.
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich (1814): *Über die Begriffe der verschiedenen Staatsformen*. In: *Philosophische Schriften*. Berlin-Ost: Aufbau 1984.
- Schluchter, Wolfgang (1988): *Religion und Lebensführung* Bd. 1. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp 1991.
- Schmitt, Carl (1922): *Politische Theologie*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1979.
- Schmitt, Carl (1927/1932): *Der Begriff des Politischen*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1979.
- Schmitt, Carl (1991): *Glossarium. Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951*. Ed. by Eberhard Medem. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Scholl, Stefan (1989): *Der EG-Richtlinienentwurf zum Kommunalwahlrecht für Ausländer*. *Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht* 2/1989, 62-67.
- Shapiro, Michael (1986): *Literary production as a politicizing practice*. In: Herbert W. Simons & Aram A. Aghazarian (eds): *Form, genre and the study of political discourse*, 159-194. The University of South Carolina Press.
- Shklar, Judith (1990): *American citizenship: The quest for inclusion*. *The Tanner lectures on human values* 11, 385-439. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Simons, Herbert W. & Aghazarian, Aram A. (eds) (1986): *Form, genre and the study of political discourse*. The University of South Carolina Press.
- Simons, Herbert W. (1990): *The rhetorical turn*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Simont, Juliette (1987): *Autour des conférences de Sartre à Cornell*. In: *Sur les écrits posthumes de Sartre*, 35-54. Bruxelles: Annales de l'Institut de Philosophie et de Sciences morales.
- Skinner, Quentin (1969): Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas. In: James Tully (ed): *Meaning and context. Quentin Skinner and his critics*, 3-53. London: Polity 1988.
- Skinner, Quentin (1972a): Motives, intentions and the interpretation of texts. In: James Tully (ed): *Meaning and context. Quentin Skinner and his critics*, 68-78. London: Polity 1988.
- Skinner, Quentin (1972b): 'Social meaning' and the explanation of social action. In: James Tully (ed): *Meaning and context. Quentin Skinner and his critics*, 79-96. London: Polity 1988.
- Skinner, Quentin (1974): Some problems in the analysis of political thought and action. In: James Tully (ed): *Meaning and context. Quentin Skinner and his critics*, 97-118. London: Polity 1988.
- Skinner, Quentin (1978): *Foundations of modern political thought 1-2*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Skinner, Quentin (1979/1989): Language and political change. In: Terence Ball, James Farr & Russell L. Hanson (ed): *Political innovation and conceptual change*, 6-23. Cambridge: CUP.
- Skinner, Quentin (1981): *Machiavelli*. Oxford: Oxford UP.
- Skinner, Quentin (1984): The idea of negative liberty: philosophical and historical perspectives. In: Richard Rorty, J. Schneewind & Quentin Skinner (eds). *Philosophy in history*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Skinner, Quentin (1986): The paradoxes of political liberty. *The Tanner lectures on human values* 7, 225-250. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Skinner, Quentin (1988): *A reply to my critics*. In: James Tully (ed): *Meaning and context. Quentin Skinner and his critics*, 231-288. London: Polity 1988.
- Skinner, Quentin (1989): The State. In: Terence Ball & James Farr & Russell L. Hanson (eds): *Political innovation and conceptual change*, 90-131. Cambridge: CUP.
- Skinner, Quentin (1990): The Republican idea of political liberty. In: Gisela Bock & Quentin Skinner & Maurizio Viroli (eds): *Machiavelli and republicanism*, 285-309. Cambridge: CUP.
- Skinner, Quentin (1993): *Scientia civilis* in classical rhetoric and in the early Hobbes. In: Nicolas Phillipson & Quentin Skinner (eds): *Political discourse in early modern Britain*, 67-93. Cambridge: CUP.
- Sondermann, Klaus (1992): Reading national anthems politically. Forthcoming in: Terrell Carver & Matti Hyvärinen (eds): *New interpretative methodologies*. London: Routledge.
- Sorel, Georges (1908): *Réflexions sur la violence*. Genève: Slatkine 1971.
- Sternberger, Dolf (1986): *Die Politik und der Friede*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
- Stone, Robert V. & Bowman, Elisabeth (1991): *Sartre's morality and history. A first look at the notes for the unpublished 1965 Cornell lectures*. Ronald Aronson & Adrian van den Hoven (eds): *Sartre alive*, 55-82. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Taminiaux, Jacques (1992): *La fille de Thrace et le penseur professionnel. Arendt et Heidegger*. Paris: Payot.
- Tenzer, Nicolas (1990): *La société dépolitisée*. Paris: PUF.
- Thürer, Daniel (1990): Der politische Status der Ausländer in der Schweiz. *Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik*, 26-36.
- Tillmann, Alexander (1989): *Ausgewählte Textsorten politischer Sprache. Eine linguistische Analyse parteilichen Sprechens*. Göppingen: Kümmerle.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de (1835): *De la démocratie en Amérique*. 1. Paris: Gallimard 1986.
- Traverses* 33-34 (1985): Politique - fin de siècle.

- Ulmen, Gary (1991): *Politischer Mehrwert. Eine Studie über Max Weber und Carl Schmitt*. Weinheim: VCH.
- Valéry, Paul, *Cahiers* II. Paris: Gallimard 1974.
- Vedel, Georges (ed.) (1962): *La dépolitisation - mythe ou réalité?* Paris: Colin.
- Verstraeten, Pierre (1972): *Violence et éthique. Esquisse d'une critique de la morale dialectique à partir du théâtre politique de Sartre*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Viroli, Maurizio (1990): Machiavelli and the republican idea of politics. In: Gisela Bock & Quentin Skinner & Maurizio Viroli (eds): *Machiavelli and republicanism*, 143-171. Cambridge: CUP.
- Viroli, Maurizio (1992): *From politics to reason of State*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Visscher, Charles de (1953): *Théories et réalités en droit international public*. Paris: Pedone 1960.
- Vollrath, Ernst (1987): *Die Grundlegung einer Philosophie des Politischen*. Würzburg: Königshausen + Neumann.
- Vollrath, Ernst (1991): Was studiert man, wenn man das politische Denken studiert? In: Martyn P. Thompson (ed): John Locke und/and Immanuel Kant, 378-393. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Volmert, Johannes (1989): *Politikerrede als kommunikatives Handlungsspiel*. München: Fink.
- Wallimann, Isidor, Tatsis, Nicholas Ch. and Zito, George V. (1977): On Max Weber's Definition of Power. *Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*. 13., 231-235.
- Weber, Max (1895): *Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik*. GPS, 1-25. Tübingen: Mohr 1971. MWG I/4, 543-574. Tübingen: Mohr 1993
- Weber, Max (1904): Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Forschung. GAW, 146-214. Tübingen: Mohr 1973.
- Weber, Max (1906a): Kritische Studien auf dem Gebiet der kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik. GAW, 215-290. Tübingen: Mohr 1973.
- Weber, Max (1906b): Rußlands Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus. *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 23., Beilage, 165-401. MWG I/10, 293-684. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.
- Weber, Max (1906c): Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Rußland. *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 22., Beilage, 234-353. MWG I/10, 86-279. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.
- Weber, Max (1909): Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum. GASW, 444-469. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.
- Weber, Max (1913): Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie. GAW, 427-474. Tübingen: Mohr 1973.
- Weber, Max (1915/1920): Zwischenbetrachtung. Theorie der Stufen und Richtungen religiöser Weltablehnung. GARS I, 536-573. Tübingen: Mohr 1988. MWS I/19, 209-233. Tübingen: Mohr 1991.
- Weber, Max (1916): Zwischen zwei Gesetzen. GPS, 142-145. Tübingen: Mohr 1971. MWS I/15, 39-41. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.
- Weber, Max (1917a): Der Sinn der 'Wertfreiheit' in den sozialen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften. GAW, 489-540. Tübingen: Mohr 1973.
- Weber, Max (1917b): *Wahlrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland*. GPS, 245-291. Tübingen: Mohr 1971. MWS I/15, 155-189. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.
- Weber, Max (1918): *Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland*. GPS, 306-443. Tübingen: Mohr 1971. MWS I/15, 202-302. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.
- Weber, Max (1919a): *Politik als Beruf*. GPS, 505-560. Tübingen: Mohr 1971. MWG I/17, 157-253. Tübingen: Mohr 1992.
- Weber, Max (1919b): *Wissenschaft als Beruf* (1919). GAW, 580-613. Tübingen: Mohr 1973. MWG I/17, 71-111. Tübingen: Mohr 1992.
- Weber, Max (1921): *Die Stadt*. In: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 727-814. Tübingen: Mohr 1980.

- Weber, Max (1922): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, ed by Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: Mohr 1980.
- Weil, Eric (1956): *Philosophie politique*. Paris: Vrin 1984.
- White, Hayden (1973): *Metahistory*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
- White, Hayden (1978): *Tropics of discourse*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
- White, Hayden (1987): *The content of the form*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Wolin, Richard (1985): Merleau-Ponty and the birth of Weberian Marxism. *Praxis internationale* 5,355-370.
- Wolin, Richard (1990): Carl Schmitt. L'existentialisme politique et l'Etat total. *Les Temps Modernes* 523.
- Wrong, Dennis (1984): Marx, Weber and contemporary sociology, In: Ronald M. Glassman & Vatro Murvar (eds): *Max Weber's political sociology*, 69-81. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Zola, Emile (1901): La vérité en marche. In: *J'accuse! Vérité en marche*. Bruxelles: Complexe 1988.

Abridgements for the Weber Editions:

- GARS = Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie
 GASW = Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte
 GAW = Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre
 GPS = Gesammelte politische Schriften
 MWG = Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe
 MWS = Max-Weber-Studienausgabe

Author index

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| Alain (Chartier, Emile) | 76, 127, 135 |
| Arendt, Hannah | 6, 17, 36, 42-44, 50, 52, 72, 87, 91, 99, 112, 113, 124, 137 |
| Aron, Raymond | 6, 24, 40, 42, 45, 131, 134, 135 |
| Badiou, Alain | 130, 138, 139 |
| Baker, Keith M. | 17, 27 |
| Ball, Terence | 10, 18, 34, 39 |
| Beauvoir, Simone de | 45, 46 |
| Beck, Ulrich | 50, 81 |
| Beetham, David | 84, 96, 105 |
| Benda, Julien | 76, 127 |
| Brunner, Otto | 14, 28, 39 |
| Bruun, H.H. | 84, 96 |
| Burke, Kenneth | 7, 32, 86 |
| Busse, Dietrich | 17, 19, 33 |
| Chamson, André | 129, 133 |
| Contat, Michel | 56-58, 60-62 |
| Dabin, Jean | 128, 131 |
| Debray, Régis | 27, 130, 132, 136, 138 |
| Dörner, Andreas | 21, 32 |
| Ellul, Jacques | 127, 131, 132 |
| Frank, Manfred | 8, 10, 27, 50, 79 |
| Freund, Julien | 130-132, 135 |
| Gorz, André | 45, 46, 138 |
| Guizot, François | 114, 128, 130, 137 |
| Guy-Grand, Georges | 76, 127, 129, 133, 135 |
| Jaspers, Karl | 40, 42, 43, 78 |
| Jellinek, Georg | 23, 87, 131, 133 |

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| Jouvenel, Bertrand de | 6,131,134,135 |
| Kelsen, Hans | 89,101 |
| Klein, Josef | 29,126 |
| Koselleck, Reinhart | 5,8,13,14,16,19,21,22,26,29,31,33,35,39,78, 100,104,122,126,135 |
| Lenain, Pierre | 52,129,139 |
| Lyotard, Jean-François | 91,138 |
| Mankiewicz, Harold | 127,131 |
| Maurras, Charles | 76,127,129,132 |
| Meier, Christian | 13,52,103,108,112 |
| Mendès France, Pierre | 17,44,133 |
| Merleau-Ponty, Maurice | 6,42,44,50,68,72,76,82,99,132-135 |
| Morgenthau, Hans | 131,132 |
| Morin, Edgar | 129,132-135 |
| Nelson, John S. | 84,91,97,101 |
| Nicolet, Claude | 14,50,103,108,109,127,132,136,137 |
| Oakeshott, Michael | 6,17,38,74,99 |
| Péguy, Charles | 76,127 |
| Pekonen, Kyösti | 35,38 |
| Perelman, Chaïm | 7,32,73,75,86 |
| Plessner, Helmuth | 6,38,42,72 |
| Pocock, J.G.A. | 5,8,11,13-17,23,26,27,29,35,39,50,70,89,113 |
| Rancière, Jacques | 11,139 |
| Richter, Melvin | 14,26 |
| Ricoeur, Paul | 42,130-132 |
| Riila, Anu | 19,120 |
| Rohe, Karl | 21,32 |
| Rosanvallon, Pierre | 14,103,114-119,121,137 |
| Rousseau, Jean-Jacques | 113,128 |
| Sartre, Jean-Paul | 6-9,17,24,29,30,39-41,44-83,90,99,132,134,135 |
| Scaff, Lawrence | 96,98 |
| Schmitt, Carl | 6,19,42,43,50,72,120,130-132,137,138 |
| Shklar, Judith | 103,115 |
| Simons, Herbert | 75,84 |
| Skinner, Quentin | 7-10,14-17,19-22,25-29,32,39,50,122 |
| Sondermann, Klaus | 103,123 |
| Sternberger, Dolf | 102,130 |
| Tocqueville, Alexis de | 130,131 |
| Viroli, Maurizio | 5,109,110,113 |
| Vollrath, Ernst | 14,91 |
| Weber, Max | 6-9,14,16,19,20,26-28,30-33,38-45,49,50,53- 55,70,72,73,75,76,79-81,83-114,118,119,122-125,137 |
| White, Hayden | 7,14,33 |
| Wolin, Richard | 43,44 |

Index of key notions

- action
citizen
conceptual history
conflict
contingency
decision
party
play
policy
polis
the political
politician
politicization
depoliticization
politicking
politics
polity
power
republicanism
rhetoric
situation
society
State
struggle
- passim
44, 87, 93, 94, 102-125
5-38, 42, 50, 103, 107, 114, 126-139
6, 17, 19, 28, 32, 39, 41-45, 47-49, 53, 57, 58, 62, 69,
74, 78, 86, 89, 91, 106, 116, 126, 128, 130, 131, 134
6, 8, 40, 41, 44, 47, 48, 50, 70, 83-85, 89-92, 95, 96, 98-
100, 122, 124, 128, 129
19, 40, 43, 50, 72, 77, 79, 101
10, 11, 17, 35-38, 73, 77, 94-96, 124
17, 21, 29-31, 33, 34, 43, 45, 46, 49, 51-72, 81, 82, 93, 97, 99-
101, 111, 121, 123, 124, 129, 130, 132, 139
5, 11, 42, 46, 49, 54, 56-63, 65, 67, 68, 97, 101, 112,
129, 130, 132
5, 28, 33, 104-113, 117, 128, 135
5, 6, 11, 18, 19, 26, 39, 40, 43-46, 48, 50, 53, 76-78, 99
104, 106-108, 111-113, 116, 118, 120, 121, 124, 127, 130-132, 136-138
6, 10, 16, 22, 24, 28, 40-43, 46, 50, 54, 60, 62, 67, 70,
72, 73, 75-87, 90-112, 118, 119, 122-125, 127, 139
5, 6, 11, 17, 23-25, 29, 32-34, 50, 81, 82, 112, 113, 115,
122, 125, 127, 130
25, 103, 113, 123, 125, 138
5, 6, 11, 29, 31, 33, 34, 49, 50, 55, 60, 63, 66, 67, 81, 82,
90, 100, 101, 107, 109, 115, 120-122, 124, 125
passim
5, 81, 82, 113, 117, 122
13, 14, 21, 33, 37, 41, 42, 47, 48, 54, 62, 87-93, 97-
100, 108
5, 17, 44, 46, 50, 76, 104, 108-110, 113, 122, 127, 129,
133, 134, 136
5-11, 15, 16, 20, 24, 28, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 50,
53, 54, 71-103, 113, 115-117, 122, 124, 136, 138
passim
16, 17, 21, 26, 33-38, 47, 50, 114-117, 121, 122, 125
5, 13, 14, 21, 22, 27, 28, 36-38, 47, 62, 95, 103, 109-
111, 118, 120, 121, 128, 129, 132, 133, 135, 137, 138
21, 24, 33, 34, 37, 40, 41, 48, 54, 74, 81, 82, 89-91, 94,
99, 113, 119, 122

Postscript, July 2020

Kari Palonen

Politics, Rhetoric and Conceptual History was published in autumn 1994, before my inaugural lecture as the first full Professor of Political Science at the University of Jyväskylä.

Since 1983 I was tenured Associate Professor and the main representative of the discipline. I had recently published three books in German:

- *Politik als Handlungsbegriff. Horizontwandel des Politikbegriffs in Deutschland 1890-1933*. Helsinki : Societas Scientiarum Fennica. (Commentationes scientiarum socialium; 28), 1985.
- *Die Thematisierung der Politik als Phänomen. Eine Interpretation der Geschichte des Begriffs Politik im Frankreich des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica (Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium 38), 1990,
- *Politik als Vereitelung. Die Politikkonzeption in Jean-Paul Sartres 'Critique de la raison dialectique'*. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1992.

The English had, however, become the academic *lingua franca*. I included here a number of conference papers, one of them in French, instead of sending them separately to scholarly journals. I thought that such a collection would offer a better view of my intellectual profile than single articles. I could send the book to interested colleagues abroad, including Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck.

The title aptly marks the three styles of my academic studies at time. It contained aspects continuing my studies on the conceptual history of politics, applied a rhetorical perspective, which I since around 1986 had adopted and, for the first time, included an attempt to compare the approaches to 'conceptual history' in the works of Reinhart Koselleck, Quentin Skinner and John Pocock.

The programmatic second chapter is still a quite amateurish attempt to make sense of the point of conceptual histories. Among political theorists Melvin Richter and Terence Ball had undertaken such comparisons a few years earlier, but I did my own reading. Calling my view amateurish does not mean that I would now disagree with the main points: the advantages of a distanced judgment remain. However, at that stage my knowledge of the research programmes of Skinner, Pocock and Koselleck as academic speech acts was quite superficial. The chapter might be compared my books *Quentin Skinner. History, Politics, Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Polity 2003); *Die Entauberung der Begriffe. Das Umschreiben der politischen Begriffe bei Quentin Skinner und Reinhart Koselleck* (Münster: LIT, 2004) and in the articles of *Politics and Conceptual Histories. Rhetorical and Temporal Perspectives* (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2014).

The ongoing shift from Jean-Paul Sartre to Max Weber as my favourite political thinker is visible the book. Since late 1970s I had dedicated an extensive reading to the *œuvre* of Sartre. In *Politik als Vereitelung* I identified *déjouer*, outplaying of adversaries and derailing their policies, as a key to Sartre's thinking of politics in his *Critique de la raison dialectique* (1960, the unfinished second volume published posthumously in 1985). This is an original and thoroughly rhetorical view on politics, hardly discussed by Sartre scholars or political theorists. However, I had got tired of Sartre's Hegelian-style dialectic turns, illustrated in the chapter on his play *Les séquestres d'Altona* (1959, written parallel to the *Critique*). The politics of outplaying is asymmetric, whereas the relations between professional politicians dealing with parliamentary respect to each other, Weber's major topic, are in principle symmetric. The chapter 'Sartre as an election researcher' illustrates,

however, that his disregard for daily politics was not complete and he was capable of an ingenious rhetorical analysis of an electoral campaign.

An Academy of Finland sabbatical allowed me to spend the academic year 1992/93 in Frankfurt am Main with a new project on Max Weber's political thought. I was inspired by Wilhelm Hennis, who in the 1980s revised the Weber scholarship with a stricter historical approach. The 'occasional politician' is an important figure but leaves an un-Weberian suspicion towards professional politicians. In the sixth chapter I speak of both *Chance* and on the contingency of the politics, but still unrelated each other. In my *Das 'Webersche Moment'* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag 1998) I oppose 'the Machiavellian to the Weberian moment' of contingency, *fortuna* to *Chance*, a key Weberian concept that is guiding my Weber studies.

Have I written this? This was the impression I now got from the first chapter. The 'textualist style' is not opposed to the con-textualist but marks a 'linguistic turn' in political analysis. For me it meant taking political actors' own words as the point of departure for the interpretations, instead of 'explaining' them with ready-made academic categories. This strategy of analysis contributed to my profile of connecting political theorising with parliaments, elections and politicians, in short with the practices of politicking.

The *Thematisierung* and *Sartre* books manifest my keen interest in French political thought in the preceding years. In final chapter I present the results of the *Thematisation* book, focusing on the contrast between *la politique* and *le politique*. In the last section I discuss up-to-date Francophone views on politics with a critical edge against *le politique* in favour of making sense of *la politique*, even *la politique politicienne*. However, I continued to use 'the political' in a wider sense (still in the subtitle of *Das 'Webersche Moment'*) and only later adopted the Francophone contrast as a dividing line of the twentieth century concepts (see my article in 'Politics or the Political?', in *European Political Science* 6, 2007).

In 2002 I wrote that I no longer identified myself with the author of my 1975 dissertation. This volume contains thoughts and readings that I had forgotten, ideas and formulations that I encounter myself with curiosity. Although my current studies quite far from them, a certain 'Palonen style' of writing and arguing is there. I welcome the initiative of Jyväskylä university library to republish this volume.