Miia Huttunen

Suitable for Western Audiences

UNESCO and the Self-fulfilling Prophecy of Cinematic Cultural Diplomacy

UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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ABSTRACT

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Through a reading of cinematic cultural diplomacy in the post-World War II UNESCO context, this study focuses on the potential cinema holds for speaking to the politics of difference. Traditionally seen as problematic and conflictual, this study suggests that for UNESCO, difference is not the source of war and conflict, but of peace. It provides an analysis of *Orient: A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture,* a 1959 film catalogue published by UNESCO and the British Film Institute with the aim to "stimulate the presentation of films which might give audiences in the West a fuller and more informed idea of the ways of life of Eastern peoples". This study treats the catalogue as research material on three different levels: the catalogue itself; the documents leading to its publication; and the films included in it. It approaches the catalogue as a multilateral cinematic cultural diplomacy initiative, which, somewhat surprisingly, aimed to improve understanding between the East and the West through emphasising the differences between the two.

The study positions the Orient catalogue as marking a critical turning point in UNESCO's take on world affairs from the explicit recognition of difference as conflictual to an implicit understanding of it as a necessary factor within the UNESCO system. It turns to intertextual analysis to locate the interfaces where the catalogue intersects with the post-war world order and UNESCO's constitutionally embedded mandate to promote peace through the means of culture. It proposes that cultural differences are a necessary precondition for cultural diplomacy itself and suggests that cinematic cultural diplomacy can be understood as a result of a process of transferring meanings between political realities and imaginary worlds.

This study puts forward three arguments. First, it proposes that UNESCO's treatment of cultural and political polarisations holds promise for a critical intervention in the ways difference is understood as a mechanism of cultural diplomacy. Second, it suggests that with the Orient catalogue, UNESCO turned to cinema to propagate its message of peace, directly addressing the global population as a whole and bypassing the confines of the state centric understanding of doing politics. Third and finally, it emphasises the need to explore the ways cinematic representations can be used to speak to the politics of difference in global governance and stresses how such explorations both widen our understanding of the political potential of popular culture and demand a more inclusive understanding of the meaning of the international.

Keywords: UNESCO, cultural diplomacy, cinema, east and west, global governance, politics of difference, intertextuality

TIIVISTELMÄ (ABSTRACT IN FINNISH)

Huttunen, Miia
Läntisille yleisöille sopivaa: Unesco ja elokuvallisen kulttuuridiplomatian itseään toteuttava ennuste
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Tutkimus tarkastelee elokuvan potentiaalia käsitellä erontekemisen politiikkaa elokuvallisen kulttuuridiplomatian kautta toisen maailmansodan jälkeisessä, Unescon tarjoamassa viitekehyksessä. Se esittää perinteisesti ongelmallisuuden ja ristiriitaisuuden kautta näyttäytyvien erojen ja erontekemisen määrittyvän Unescon näkökulmasta sodan lähteen sijaan rauhan lähteeksi. Se hyödyntää aineistonaan vuonna 1959 Unescon ja Britannian elokuvainstituutin julkaisemaa elokuvakatalogia, *Orient: A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture.* Katalogin tavoitteena oli ”edistää sellaisten elokuvien esittämistä, jotka voisivat tarjota länsimaisille yleisöille kokonaisemman ja asiantuntevamman kuvan itäisten kansojen elämäntavoista”. Tutkimus lähestyy katalogia aineistona analysoiden itse katalogia, sen julkaisemiseen liittyviä dokumentteja sekä siihen sisältyviä elokuvia. Se tarkastelee katalogia monenvälisenä elokuvakulttuuridiplomaattisena aloitteena, joka yllättäen tavoitteli päämääräänsä parantaa idän ja lännen välistä ymmärrystä korostaen eroja näiden välillä.

Tutkimus asemoi katalogin kriittisenä käännekohtaa Unescon maailmanpoliittisessa lähestymistavassa. Se paikantaa käänteen eksplisiittisestä ymmärryksestä eroista konfliktin määrittäminä implisiittiseen ymmärrykseen niistä välttämättöminä tekijöinä Unescon maailmassa. Tutkimus hyödyntää intertekstuaalista analyysia paikantaakseen rajapinnat, joissa katalogi risteää sodanjälkeisen maailmanjärjestyksen ja Unescon peruskirjan saneleman rauhanrakentamiseen kulttuurin keinoin kehottavan mandaatin kanssa. Analyysissä kulttuuriset erot määrittyvät kulttuuridiplomatian välttämättömäksi edellytykseksi ja elokuvallinen kulttuuridiplomatia seuraukseksi merkitysten siirtämisen prosessista poliittisten todellisuuksien ja kuvitteellisten maailmojen välillä.

Tutkimus esittää, että Unescon tapa lähestyä kulttuurisia ja poliittisia polarisaatioita tarjoaa mahdollisuuden kriittiseen väliintuloon tavoissa ymmärtää erontekeminen kulttuuridiplomatian mekanismina. Toiseksi se ehdottaa Unescon kääntyneen elokuvan puoleen pyrkimyksenä levittää rauhan sanomaansa. Kataloginsa kautta se puhutteli maailman väestöä suoraan ohittaen näin valtiokeskeisen politiikan tekemisen tavan asettamat rajoitteet. Kolmanneksi se korostaa tarvetta tarkastella tapoja, joilla elokuvallisia representaatioita voidaan käyttää erontekemisen politiikan käsittelyssä globaalin hallinnan kontekstissa. Samalla se painottaa, kuinka tämänkaltainen tarkastelu sekä laajentaa ymmärrystämme populaarikulttuurin poliittisesta potentiaalista että edellyttää inklusiivisempaa ymmärrystä kansainvälisen merkityksestä.

Asiasanat: Unesco, kulttuuridiplomatia, elokuva, itä ja länsi, globaali hallinta, erontekemisen politiikka, intertekstuaalisuus

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Here we are. The moment I've been dreading since the all work and no play Jack Nicholsonesque idea of writing a PhD thesis first wormed its way into my head. It is not the letting go of a massive project, nor the public defence that I dread (although I must admit it all seems quite unnecessarily horrendous), but this, writing the acknowledgements. Supposedly, doing research is lonely work. Yet, as the acknowledgements section in every academic book or dissertation proves, it is anything but. As quite a substantial endeavour (which now that it's finally over and done with suddenly seems rather small and insignificant), this dissertation would not have taken its current form, or perhaps even never seen the light of day, without the support and encouragement of a number of colleagues, friends and family. Enough to make one feel a bit soppy and sentimental, really. How on earth am I ever going to remember to thank everyone? I won't. Therefore, I can only hope that I've done justice to even those of you not acknowledged here by name, as each and every one of you will hear your voice in the pages that follow (sneaky, you now think, now I'm going to have to read through this whole thing just to find out if that's true).

In the autumn of 2014, when I was finishing my master's thesis, I thought that was me done. Never again. Oddly, just a few months later I found myself sitting in Professor Emerita Anita Kangas' office and heard her tell me that of course I should do a PhD. It was Anita who first marched me to Professor Pekka Korhonen and announced that we would be working together from there on – and for that I am extremely grateful. Whether it was out of respect for Anita or a genuine interest in my topic, Pekka agreed to supervise my work. It was an excellent match; one I would never have thought of myself. But Anita knew better. Since then, Pekka has been there for me every step of the way. It is also thanks to Pekka that I was fortunate enough to spend a semester as a visiting researcher at Kyoto University. Docent Karina Horsti agreed to join the team and act as my second supervisor. To know Karina is to know what a privilege it is to work with her. Through the years, she has provided invaluable support not only in matters of academic practice, but also in coming out the other end with at least a trace of my personal wellbeing intact. It is largely thanks to the two of you that I kept continuing on this path instead of giving in to the occasional urge to just go and get a normal job.

My preliminary examiners, Professor J.P. Singh and Dr. Saara Särmä gave a much appreciated nudge to push me to give this work the form it was always meant to have. I feel honoured that you took the time to lend me your insights, experience and expertise to help me finish this dissertation in a much improved form. Professor Singh also accepted the invitation to serve as my opponent in the public defence of my dissertation. Even though the form of the defence is not exactly what any of us had in mind, I can't think of anyone I would rather have publicly humiliate me – remotely or not.

In addition, so many of you have helped me improve my work over the years that, honestly, I've lost count. The support of my colleagues at the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy (and recently, as a result of the new KUMU programme, those at the Department of History and Ethnology as well) has been indispensable. The PhD and research seminars (not to mention the post-seminars) in Cultural Policy and Political Science have been an endless source of inspiration. Whether hosting, presenting, commenting or just showing up, you have all made attending those gatherings a pleasure. Through shared experiences, interests and/or wine many of you have become more friends than colleagues – you know who you are. The administrative staff have helped me successfully navigate university bureaucracy to the extent that I am now able to give my dissertation these finishing touches. Everyone with whom I have shared an office, had lunch or a cup of coffee with, or just said good morning to in the hallways of Opinkivi have given me the best possible environment to work in. You can fit quite a few such encounters in five years and so, instead of attempting to list all of you here and likely failing miserably, I'll just say thank you.

The backbone of this study was put together at the UNESCO archives in Paris. I want to thank the staff there for helping me find my way to the treasure at the centre of their labyrinth of archival documents. Also, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to everyone at the Graduate School of Letters at Kyoto University for making my visit the productive and eye-opening experience it was. This study and all the travel I was fortunate enough to be able to do as a part of it, was funded by the Kone foundation, the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, and the Association of Researchers and Teachers of University of Jyväskylä. During the time I spent in Kyoto, I was employed in Pekka's Academy of Finland funded project. My gratitude thus extends to the Academy and (ready yourselves for the compulsory Academy joke, ha ha), let's face it, especially after writing a study like this one, getting a chance to thank the Academy is – well, priceless.

Outside the more formal setting, I have a bunch of friends and punks (although these categories intertwine and overlap, as is customary to state whenever categorising) that deserve to be acknowledged. It never ceases to amaze me that so many of you have taken an interest in what I do (or at least have been nice enough to pretend to). As you, too, are too numerous to thank here individually, you'll have to make do with a collective expression of gratitude.

Finally, my family that has both grown and shrunk in size during these years. My husband Frankie for standing by me all these years with infinite patience and an endless sense of adventure. Thank you for helping me hold on to the joy of watching films that this project came very close to taking away from me. On the practical side, thank you for not only fixing the occasional linguistic slip and awkward expression but also for patiently serving as a practice target for formulating my ideas. While on several occasions I would have preferred a smiling and nodding response to my often extremely vague half-thoughts, it was in fact the often frustrating but always relevant "but what does that even mean"

questions that kept me from getting lost in my own head. My son Oiva the Investigator for reminding me that curiosity is quite an excellent way to approach not only work but life in general. Sitting down in every muddy puddle, inspecting every rabbit poo and tearing off every skirting board in the house just to see what's behind it (it's a wall) is not only enough to keep everyone on their toes at all times but also surprisingly enlightening. To both of you a very big and not in the slightest sarcastic thank you for never letting me forget that diplomacy starts at home. My sister Mari for making sure I'll never have to face the tricky bits of life, let alone bitch about them, on my own. It is rare, I am told, to have a sister you would be proud to call a friend even without family ties, and strangely comforting to know that I'll never need to look very far when in need of someone to plan a series of hamster themed remakes of classic Westerns with (Hang 'Em Hamster!). My dad Jari for never losing interest in what I was doing even when I myself was on the verge of doing just that. Finally, my mum Sinikka. I wish you could have been here to see this happen. You always knew I could.

Mum, this one's for you.

Jyväskylä 22.4.2020
Miia Huttunen

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION: PEACE IS SHOWBUSINESS

This is a study about cinematic cultural diplomacy and the politics of difference in global governance. It is an inquiry into the potential cinema holds for speaking to the politics of difference as a mechanism of cinematic cultural diplomacy in the post-World War II UNESCO context. Traditionally seen as problematic and conflictual, it suggests that for UNESCO, difference is not a source of war and conflict, but of peace[1]. Cinema can help us envision alternative ways of seeing the world, and one such way is to open up our political imaginaries to make room for cultural difference (Shapiro, 2009). Focusing on cinema's disruptive power to address the dynamics of differentiation, it provides an account of how UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) turned to cinema to make the unorthodox argument that it was in the recognition and appreciation of cultural difference where the foundations of peace were to be constructed.

This study provides an analysis of *Orient: A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture,* a 1959 film catalogue published by UNESCO and the British Film Institute. The aim of the catalogue was to "stimulate the presentation of films which might give audiences in the West a fuller and more informed idea of the ways of life of Eastern peoples" (Holmes 1959). The catalogue is approached here as a multilateral cinematic cultural diplomacy initiative. The films included in the catalogue were not specifically commissioned to be exhibited in the cultural diplomacy context, but rather harnessed for the purpose of serving cultural diplomacy aims through their inclusion in the catalogue. This study therefore focuses on the politicisation, understood as "an opening of something as political" (Palonen 2003 , 171), of seemingly "apolitical" films through their interpretation and repurposing in the catalogue. Building on the notion that cultural products are integral to a general social text, and therefore we need not separate the world as represented through these artefacts from the world we live in (Shapiro 2009, 2013), this study turns to intertextual analysis to locate the interfaces where the catalogue intersects with the post-war world order and

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1 I first presented this idea at the Popular Culture and World Politics conference in Wolfville, Canada in 2018.

UNESCO's constitutionally embedded mandate to promote peace through the means of culture.

This study sets out to address the following question: *How can the politicisation of cinema serve to address the politics of difference in global governance?* This wider question is approached through the case study of the Orient catalogue leading to the following supporting question: *How does the conceptualisation of culture as a marker of difference direct the catalogue's approach to cultural diplomacy and guide the interpretation of the films in it?*

This study brings together three fields of study: 1) cultural diplomacy; 2) global governance; and 3) Popular Culture and World Politics (PCWP). Such a transdisciplinary approach – if you will – comes with some baggage. This research setting sets focus on the tension between state centric and non-state centric approaches to world politics, with the UNESCO framework lending itself to a similar problematic. As cultural diplomacy is traditionally understood as state business, studying it demands the acknowledgement of state-to-state interaction. Studying cinema, however, brings forth a willingness to legitimise other kinds of research material and ways of understanding the political, thus working towards a broadening of our conceptions of global governance and setting focus on the importance of film in seeing (Harman 2019) and showing (Shapiro 2013) rather than explaining politics.

The Orient catalogue provides for a fitting case study to address these issues for two primary reasons. First, the catalogue is remarkably explicit about its political aims, which guide the ways the films are presented in it. Second, it provides a means to tie together the state centric and non-state centric understandings of how, where and by whom global politics is conducted and what constitutes it in the first place. In order to clear up a conceptual space for addressing such a problematic, I use the term world politics instead of international relations throughout this study (see e.g. Walker 2009), except in instances where I want to emphasise that the specific topic under discussion is clearly a matter of state-to-state interaction. When I refer specifically to the interactive aspects of world politics, I use the term transnational relations, since world relations does not really have a very descriptive ring to it.

In my treatment of the Orient catalogue, I start from the premise that engaging with the visual can help address global political issues (Bleiker 2018), an assertion which can be strengthened by analyses of actual historical cases. The aim here, then, is to examine the potential cinema holds for bringing about change and the ways that potential can be put to use through a specific case study. The question of whether the attempts to harness that potential ever had identifiable, causal impact on political decision making is rather challenging if not altogether impossible to address within the scope of this study[2]. To address this level within this research setting would mean we needed information on who exactly saw the films, where and why and whether or not they walked out of the screenings with a more enlightened view of the Eastern world, along with a deeper

[2] For an account of cinema's political impact through its effect on audience perception and attitudes, see Mulligan and Habel 2013.

engagement with the question of what exactly do we mean by political impact. Regrettably, no such evidence readily exists, and the temporal distance renders it practically impossible to produce such data myself. The issue of impacts is a widely recognised problem within cultural diplomacy related research, and while the impacts are generally expected to exist, the practical outcomes remain "more a matter of faith than of evidence" (Isar 2010, 37; see also Mitchell 1986)[3]. Therefore, this study prioritises meaning making and interpretation over behaviour as a methodological framework.

Proposing that cultural differences are a necessary precondition for cultural diplomacy itself, I pose the question of how we can utilise often abstract cultural argumentation to construct and deconstruct political realities. I address the role culturally argued conceptual construction plays in cultural diplomatic strategies through Patrick Jackson's concept of rhetorical commonplace, which refers to the discursive ways of framing a specific issue by using existing frameworks that are taken as given (Jackson 2006)[4]. Looking at UNESCO's cinematic cultural diplomatic strategy through the analytical lens of rhetorical commonplaces helps unveil the mechanisms of difference inherent in it. The claims for legitimacy forming rhetorical commonplaces do not appear out of thin air, but are a result of conscious strategies and justified through carefully planned argumentative moves. Rhetorical commonplaces are constructed on the basis of commonplaces that existed before them. Chaïm Perelman points out that arguments have to proceed from starting points acceptable to the chosen audience in order for the rhetor to achieve any level of success (Perelman 1982). In other words, one may reasonably expect a level of familiarity with the core of the arguments made. Furthermore, rhetorical commonplaces do not necessarily have beginnings or ends with precisely defined timing and placement, but we can usually distinguish moments when existing commonplaces intersect and form a new one. The catalogue project is precisely such a moment.

This study started taking its form at a time when us Europeans were yet again forced to re-evaluate our attitudes towards the solidarity of mankind and the role of difference in it, as we were hit by the political consequences of the "refugee crisis" of 2015. At the same time, the New Cold War discourse started gaining prominence. While it was primarily understood in terms of geopolitical and geoeconomic polarisations, it soon became evident that cultural factors were no stranger to these dichotomisations. Simplified cultural polarisations were again utilised to aggravate political tensions and our understanding of intercultural interaction was defined by ethnic and national juxtapositions. Difference was to be approached if not with bars or barriers, then at least with a healthy amount of suspicion. In the years that followed, UNESCO itself was faced with

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3 For a rare account of the reception of several UNESCO initiatives over the years, see Duedahl 2016. As especially the impacts of initiatives growing out of UNESCO's mission to influence people's minds are truly challenging to trace, the edited collection focuses primarily on the impacts of individual local initiatives, rather than discussing the organisation's global initiatives and the ideas behind them.

4 This builds on a conference presentation at the International Conference for Cultural Policy Research in Tallinn, Estonia in 2018.

the challenge of dealing with an internal rupture: the withdrawal of a founding member, the United States. Alongside these events came accusations of political bias and, ironically, ridiculing allegations of the dilutional apolitical nature of the organisation's decision making processes. To me, these were primarily an indication of a crisis of credibility UNESCO was facing. It seemed our trust in international organisations was crumbling[5].

To set focus on the apparently endless need for mediating between conflicting values to promote peace and implement change in the surrounding world, I decided to turn to the power of hindsight and look back to the early decades of the Cold War, a time when such polarisations came close to putting the whole world to a halt. I wanted to examine the part visual politics played in tackling this challenge in the context of global governance, how the issue of difference was debated, and what kind of conceptual problems needed to be solved. Equipped with just this vague idea and a determinism to carry it through, I visited the UNESCO archives in Paris in the summer of 2015. I was not entirely sure what I was looking for but knew it had something to do with cinema and multilateral cultural diplomacy. In my head, cultural diplomacy was still largely a residue of the Cold War, and so some sort of an East-West framework seemed like a good starting point. After several days of skimming through literally anything even remotely relevant I could get my hands on, I came across a catalogue entry entitled simply "Orient". Fascinating, I thought. I read through the documents describing the negotiations and debates surrounding the compilation of the film catalogue contained in a surprisingly thin folder, growing more and more intrigued as I read. Still, I was not entirely sure if it would be of any use to me. The catalogue itself was nowhere to be found[6]. I packed my notes and returned home. Eventually, I managed to get a hold of the catalogue, oddly initially through the Finnish National Repository Library. I looked at the opening line: "New countries, old civilisations – with talented artists and technicians to interpret them – whole new regions of thought, feeling and action are being revealed to the rest of the world" (Holmes 1959).

Rather unexpectedly, the catalogue seemed to place heavy focus on introducing Eastern cultures to the West through an emphasis on cultural differences. I assumed that a project aiming to promote understanding between the two halves of the world would choose to lay emphasis on the similarities between Eastern and Western cultures as manifested through their traditions of filmmaking. Instead, I found the exact opposite, since the catalogue's focus is on the ways a distinction can be made between the two. The catalogue lays out a list of seven assorted characteristics extracted from the collection of films included in it. They

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5 This is not a challenge faced by UNESCO alone, as indicated by phenomena such as Brexit and the distrust and doubt faced by the World Health Organization in its response to COVID-19.

6 I am still not sure whether the archives hold a copy of the catalogue, hidden in plain sight within an indexing system I possibly did not manage to navigate adequately. Later the same year, I visited the BFI library in London, but could not find it within their holdings either.

are presented as differences separating Eastern cinema from its Western counterpart. The list covers a wide array of social phenomena ranging from the way love and sex are treated to the role of music in the films and from the attributes of the standard female character to representations of violence. The differences address the relationship between the individual and society, interpersonal relationships and cultural expressions. The list of cultural differences as manifested in these films is presented as a probable obstacle for achieving the catalogue's aims of enhancing intercultural understanding through cinema. So, the question then becomes, why would they put together such a list in the first place? That was it. This was what I would write my dissertation about.

This study takes a concrete approach to the functions of cultural difference within the UNESCO system. It positions the Orient catalogue as marking a critical turning point in UNESCO's take on world affairs from the explicit recognition of difference as conflictual to an implicit understanding of it as positive – and ultimately as a necessary factor within the UNESCO system. Thus, this study starts from the premise that traditionally, we tend to think of difference as by nature conflictual. It is a major cause of war, crisis and conflict; a dangerous deviation from order and stability, which supposedly derive from relative similarity among actors. This is an often unspoken presumption that is left unquestioned as an unproblematised grand narrative. The widely held assumption is that – in the conduct of world affairs – difference is a problem that needs to be addressed and solved (Weber 2005, 153). While difference is a source of instability, sameness brings with it stability. Therefore, it is sameness we must strive for. This line of thinking leads us to think that "international politics is a nasty and dangerous business", as formulated by John J. Mearsheimer (2006, 160).

This is hardly a novel way of thinking. The peace of Westphalia (1648) left the Western world not only the legacy of sovereignty, but also provided the means to utilise cultural differences as justification behind many a conflict[7]. The concept of culture itself gained prominence in the nation state discourse most paradigmatically through the work of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) towards the end of the eighteenth century (Herder 1966). Since then, the idea of cultures as static entities confined by the borders of the nation state and labelled by internal coherence and cohesion, and external distinctiveness and discrimination has become a basic premise – despite the absurd implications that can be reached when this axiom is taken to its logical conclusion.

The "one nation, one state" myth, building on the state as a political entity and the nation as a cultural one, sees the ideal model of the nation state as a situation where "a single ethnic and cultural population inhabits the boundaries of a state, and the boundaries of that state are coextensive with the boundaries of that ethnic and cultural population" (Smith 1995, 86). Sameness is thus placed within the sovereign nation state, a conveniently containable political unit, whereas difference is conceptually banished to exist in the gaps between them (Walker 1993).

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7 This conventional narrative is, of course, just a simplified version of the process of the state becoming the primary unit in international politics (see e.g. see Ashworth 2014).

Visual politics play a crucial part in maintaining and reinforcing such dynamics (Dodds 2018). This dilemma is, however, not only a problem in the study of world politics, but also one shared by the field of cultural studies: While it is recognised that the question of difference is necessary for the construction of culture and identities, and thus for the production of meaning, it is simultaneously positioned as a major site of hostility towards the other (Hall 1997a, 238). It is, perhaps, this grain of orthodox thought that keeps us from seeing the alternative, buried under our pre-programmed ways of thinking and acting, being and understanding.

Recognising that cinema can be one of the most versatile and accessible devices available to us for deconstructing our rigid conceptions and picturing alternative ways of understanding the world (Shapiro 2009), this study turns to film as a means of addressing the politics of difference. On the one hand, cinema can derive its stories from the socio-political context that surrounds it, and on the other hand, we construct our understanding of the world upon cinema as a source of meaning making. It is a site where issues of even the most contradictory and sensitive nature, such as war and violence or otherness and difference, can be addressed and analysed from a safe distance. Cinema is not merely a product of our imagination that we should study as an entity separate from our political reality, but a constituent and active part of it (Shapiro 2013). Moreover, popular culture should neither be regarded as mere illustrations of world politics nor shrunk to a mere superstructure reflecting a political base (Grayson, Davies and Philpott 2009).

Terrell Carver suggests that world politics takes place in the "life-worlds" of academic knowers, state-actors, and ordinary people. What we all share is "common ground as movie-goers". (Carver 2010, 421-2; 429.) Popular culture is not imposed upon people but instead, made by them at the interface of the cultural artefacts and everyday life (Fiske 1990, 25). This implicitly suggests shifting the focus of cultural diplomacy towards the part ordinary people can play outside the more formal, traditional sites of politics; to recognise the national, international and the transnational as equally legitimate sites of cultural diplomatic practices, therefore locating it within, between and beyond the nation state. Furthermore, popular culture provides a space in which meanings can be constructed, contested, reinforced or criticised. Cinema, therefore, is not to be understood merely as an instrument of politics. From this perspective, cinema *is politics*.

Much of the work done on the cinema-world politics intertext sets off from the premise of identifying films with a critical agenda in order to deconstruct or challenge normative conceptions of world politics[8]. These explorations focus on the potential cinema holds in interpreting and representing world politics through critical analyses of films selected specifically for the purposes of assessing the interconnectedness of theories of world politics and everyday life (see e.g. Weber 2005); the transformative potential cinema holds in provoking critical re-examinations of the dominant modes of framing the political and questioning

[8] On the notion of "good", politically progressive films versus the "bad" ones that abstain from politics, see e.g. Rushton 2011.

rigid political nation-building narratives (see e.g. Shapiro 2004, Chapter 5; 2009); or cinematic representations of particular political events, such as the War on Terror (see e.g. Philpott 2010). The recognition of the innate part cinema plays in the production and dissemination of knowledge makes visible the way politics itself is seen to be constructed and negotiated through cinema. Cinema, then, *is inherently political*.

Cinema can help uncover different presumptions, conceptions and interpretations that hold up understandings of how world politics is conducted and what it is composed of. Some scholars have explored the political potential of film for critical interventions in world politics by producing documentary films (Callahan 2015; Der Derian 2010; Weber 2010) or even a narrative feature film (Harman 2019). These accounts set focus on the question of what cinema itself can do to articulate a specific political agenda instead of just being read from a specific theoretical starting point. Addressing film as a method of seeing on the one hand and being seen on the other hand, Sophie Harman argues for the ways the production of a narrative feature film can both challenge and widen the scope of methods and outputs in the study of world politics, thus writing world politics instead of reading them through film (Ibid.).

The relevance of the question Harman raises on the ways different forms of transnational relations shape what we see and how we see it, the modes of formal and informal politics this reveals and the potential of cinema for making visible such politics reaches beyond the film production process she herself describes. Living, as we are now, in an era of global cultural flows should mean that the boundaries between us and them have become blurred and illusive as we now have practically unlimited access to other cultures through a variety of media, with far corners of the world sometimes more familiar to us than our own neighbours. Yet, when we stumble upon difference, we struggle. Perhaps the problem is not so much the way specific groups or communities seek to shut out that which is different but rather the often invisible politics behind such differentiation in the first place. Rendering such politics visible can challenge the ways in which they have become to be seen as a normal and natural state of affairs.

That is not to say, however, that films in and of themselves need to be seen to hold power to bring about direct political consequences. Instead, it is the transformative potential of cinema that can be put to use. Understandings of the political in popular culture are highly contextual and can therefore be read in various ways (Philpott 2010). These readings are not immutable, but rather open to various counter-readings and meanings that can change over time (Grayson 2013, 381). While cinema might be a key source of not just entertainment but also of education and information with which to make sense of the world, different audiences engage with and interpret films in different ways (Dodds 2008, 238-241). In the words of Gabriel Rockhill, "works of art are collective phenomena that are politicized precisely through their production, circulation, and reception in the social world" (Rockhill 2014, 188). Building on Roland Bleiker's call to engage more profoundly with the interpretative aspects of global politics (Bleiker 2001), I wish to shed light on the notion that, when studying cinema, we need to be

aware of the fact that it is not only cinematic representations but the interpretations of those representations that we should turn a critical eye to. While it is evidently important to understand how the products of popular culture create, enhance, critique or even challenge our understanding of how the world is, it is just as crucial to examine how they can be used to do so. Therefore, through my treatment of the Orient catalogue, I want to argue for the importance of studying the ways the interpretation of specific films can be guided to serve a specific political agenda, even when the films themselves were originally produced with very different aims in mind. In other words, what I am interested in here, is how the competing meanings of what a film can be used to do and what it can do in itself are negotiated. Thus, my reading focuses on the way cinema *is politicised*.

Taking as a starting point the notion that the contribution of cultural difference to world affairs is not only problems, but opportunities alike (Blaney and Inayatullah 2002, 104), I turn to the critical promise cinema holds as a transformative force agitating old modes of political thought rooted in nationalist geopolitics and the resulting oppositional policy making (Shapiro 2009). Popular culture, then, is a site of struggle due to its potential to question the powers that be, but at the same time, it carries at its core endless liberating optimism in its capacity to bring about change (Fiske 1990, 20-21). It is in this hope that this study tells the story of an alternative world in which within difference lies not a source of war, but one of peace. It is the story of a world as imagined by UNESCO through the means of cinema. This study therefore sets out to expand Akira Iriye's notion of how international organisations can be looked at as the producers and platforms for the creation of alternative political realities (Iriye 2002).

Difference, as a term, carries multiple meanings, ranging from deviation to disagreement. Here, difference is understood in terms of the act of making a distinction between categories: as the politics of differentiation. This study proposes that, to UNESCO, the primary source of political polarisations is misguided, negative attitudes towards cultural differences. The organisation's whole existence is constructed upon an unyielding belief that ignorance and misunderstanding, most often manifested in the form of culture, have been the underlying cause of the wars and conflicts afflicting humankind throughout history. I look at UNESCO through its role as an international post-war organisation with a mandate to promote peace through mediation between cultural differences and the political oppositions created through them.

UNESCO, full of good intentions but often fuzzy and imprecise in its conceptual terminology, is addressed as one of the earliest actors and platforms for action in the field of multilateral cultural diplomacy (Kozymka 2014). It is approached both in terms of its place among those organisations that provide the architecture of international society, and the peculiar identity problems manifested through the clashes between its cultural role and its political engagements (Singh 2010b). There are two understandings of global governance at play here: first, as the organisational management of global affairs in the form of international organisations and second, as an analytical concept providing a specific view on the study of world politics (see Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006). UNESCO

as the object of study is framed through its mandate to construct peace "in the minds of men" (UNESCO 1945, Preamble) – in other words, aiming to change the world by changing the way people understand and define their own place and agency within it and how they perceive these in relation to those of others.

UNESCO's early history reflects the turbulent changes that define the mid-twentieth century. Founded in the aftermath of World War II, the organisation's agenda of "the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind" (UNESCO 1945, Preamble) as set out in its constitution was put to the test early on. The 1950s beheld two major events with a profound impact on the organisation and its future direction. First, during the first decade of UNESCO's existence, the number of member states had almost doubled since the organisation's founding in 1945. This was for the most part a result of the accelerating decolonisation process, re-awakening the division of the world into the West and the rest on a cultural basis. Second, the world had sunk deep into the Cold War polarisation, further ensuring that the East-West dichotomisation remained central to world affairs at the time also in geopolitical terms. While these events reflected UNESCO's expansion to a truly worldwide organisation, they also introduced an issue the organisation was forced to address: The world was changing rapidly, and new challenges needed to be tackled by new means.

Well aware of the fact that nearly half of the world's population was estimated to be non-literate (UNESCO 1957g), UNESCO turned to new means of spreading its message of peace and understanding – with cinema at the forefront. With its accessibility, pervasiveness and immense popularity, cinema is not only a key instrument for engaging mass audiences, but also a powerful vehicle for constructing understandings of specific events, particular national characteristics and identities, and relationships to others (Dodds 2008b, 1621). Cinema does not belong only to the elites, nor is it confined by state borders. As such, it holds the capacity to shape public opinion, conceptions and debates, speaking a language of universalist aspirations across geographical and temporal boundaries. Thus, in 1959, UNESCO, together with the British Film Institute (BFI), published a catalogue of films produced in UNECO's Eastern member states. The catalogue was titled *Orient: A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture.* The catalogue included 348 feature films, short films and documentaries from 21 countries: Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, [the Republic of] Korea, Malaya, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Republic[9], the U.S.S.R.[10] and [the Republic of] Vietnam.

This study analyses the Orient catalogue as a multilateral cinematic cultural diplomacy initiative. Starting from the premise that "definitions, if they are useful, come at the end of an enquiry and not at the beginning" (Kamenka 1973 , 3), cinematic cultural diplomacy is understood here as a highly contextual phenomenon instead of approaching it as a concept definable in general, overarching

9 A 1958-61 political union between Egypt and Syria. Egypt kept this as its official name until 1971.

10 Only the Asian Soviet Republics were included.

terms. Therefore, one of the underlying aims of this study is to work towards an understanding of the concept in the context of the Orient catalogue through a focus on UNESCO's conceptualisation of culture as a marker of difference. In the catalogue, the contents of the films are served to Western audiences through ready-made conceptualisations of the essential characteristics of Eastern cultures. More specifically, the cultural differences between the two halves of the world are clearly spelled out, serving to establish a relationship between the films and the outside world. The conceptualisations in the catalogue are therefore, first and foremost, cultural conceptualisations, and the meanings made in the catalogue are made through cultural argumentation. It all thus boils down to the question of UNESCO's conception of culture.

Ultimately, this study emphasises the need to explore the ways cinematic representations can be used to speak to the politics of difference in global governance and stresses how such explorations both widen our understanding of the political potential of popular culture and demand a more inclusive under-standing of the meaning of the international. This wider claim is approached and expanded through two lines of argumentation. First, this study proposes that UNESCO's treatment of cultural and political polarisations in the Orient catalogue holds a promise for a critical intervention in the ways the functions of difference are understood as a mechanism of cultural diplomacy. Second, it suggests that with the Orient catalogue, UNESCO turned to cinema to propagate its message of peace, directly addressing the global population as a whole and bypassing the confines of the state centric understanding of doing politics to which UNESCO, as an international organisation of member states by name and nature, is inherently tied.

1.1 Original Articles and Objectives of the Study

This compilation dissertation consists of this introductory overview and the following four original research articles, ordered from more general to more specific:

1) Huttunen, Miia (2018): The Enduring Vision of a World without War: UNESCO's Orient Catalogue 1959 and the Construction of an International Society. *Arts & International Affairs* 3 (1), 7-27. DOI: 10.18278/aia.3.1.2.

2) Huttunen, Miia (2018): UNESCO's Humanity of Hope: The Orient Catalogue and the Story of the East. *Annals of Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Linguistics, literature and methodology of teaching*, XVII (1), 70-87.

3) Huttunen, Miia (2017): De-demonising Japan? Transitioning from War to Peace through Japan's Cinematic Post-war Cultural Diplomacy in UNESCO's Orient project 1957–1959. *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 23 (6), 751-764. DOI: 10.1080/10286632.2017.1375479. (Also appears in Bennett, Oliver (ed.) 2009. Cultural Diplomacy and International Cultural Relations: Volume 1. Routledge.)

4) Huttunen, Miia (2019): Five Kurosawas and a (De)construction of the Orient. *Politics* Online First. DOI: 10.1177/0263395719883759.

In addition to the four articles listed above, this introductory part, in particular subchapter 2.1, builds on a background article not included in this study, but written as a part of my doctoral project (see Huttunen 2017).

The four articles originally set off to address the question of how cinema can be utilised as a means of cultural diplomacy between the socio-culturally constructed conceptual binaries we call East and West in the UNESCO context. This can be broken down to four main components with each one of the articles taking one of these as its main focus: UNESCO; East and West; cultural diplomacy; and cinema, respectively. I came into this with very little knowledge about UNESCO and even less about cultural diplomacy. As you read through the original articles, this probably shows. The beauty and challenge of an article based dissertation is that the way the author's thinking has developed over the course of a project spanning over several years becomes clearly visible, as once the articles have been published you cannot go back and rewrite them even if towards the end you come to realise that they are not entirely in line with what you now want to communicate.

This work was originally intended to be primarily about developing a more conceptually oriented understanding of cultural diplomacy with cinema as one of its instruments, as is evident in the original question mentioned above. As you have probably figured out by now, that is not the case anymore. As you read the original articles and this introductory section (strictly speaking, you might be better off reading the articles first, but due to the constraints of the thesis format this introduction is likely your first point of entry), you will see my interests and focus shift from policy to politics, from nation state oriented uses of cinema to its wider political potential, from – if you consider such border drawings helpful or relevant – constructivist inspired frameworks of reading to more poststructuralist ones. And that is how it should be, for if it was not so I would not have learned very much. As such, these shifts, changes and developments are indicators of my attempts to search for the best conceptual, theoretical and methodological tools for understanding my topic of study at given times and in different contexts.

The articles draw from the same research material, approaching the Orient catalogue from different starting points, through different questions and aims, each paving the way for the next. The original articles treat the catalogue as research material on three different levels: the catalogue itself; related documents – primarily consisting of correspondence between UNESCO and the BFI – leading to its publication; and the films included in it. The documents describing the project leading to the catalogue's publication are held at the refreshingly freezing UNESCO archives in Paris, where I escaped the heatwave of July 2015. The catalogue itself my husband purchased for me from eBay for seven euros to replace the library copy I had been using – I myself was hesitant to carelessly spend that amount of money when, surely, we would have more pressing uses for it.

When it comes to the films listed in the catalogue, the focus of the original articles was on the films produced in Japan, the U.S.S.R. and India[11]. Out of the 139 feature films in the catalogue, 103 are listed under these three countries – 75 percent of the total number of feature films. All three countries were among the biggest film producers the year the catalogue was published, with Japan as number one, India as number two, and the U.S.S.R. as number six (UNESCO 1981). These countries approached the catalogue's aim of promoting intercultural understanding with very different aspects in mind, as explained further in articles 2 and 3, providing occasionally contracting depictions of the differing interests and needs of the member states in question. For Japan, the aim was to dismantle the persistent image of the nation as an enemy constructed during World War II through choosing films that told stories of a post-war nation reinventing itself and struggling with societal changes; Indian representatives chose to depict a post-colonial nation reflecting upon the hopes and disappointments independence brought with it; and the U.S.S.R. utilised the catalogue as a part of the attempts to continue to promote the ideals of the Soviet socialist empire. While the countries participating in the catalogue project were clearly concerned with pursuing their national interests, they all came together in acknowledging the wider ideal of intercultural understanding.

The individual films analysed in articles 2 and 4 were chosen partly on the basis of availability – surprisingly many were not accessible in any shape or form. Thus the option of selecting only films with a critical agenda suited for some predetermined purpose, such as the discussion of multilateral cultural diplomacy and the politics of difference, was not a viable one even if I had wanted to follow the route most often taken in the literature on cinema-world politics intertext. I did, however, want to select films which seemed to resonate with the puzzles I was trying to solve in writing the articles. My choice to position the politicisation of cinema at the centre of my analysis was therefore partly a result of my own interests and partly dictated by the research material I was working with.

Not that surprisingly, the majority of the films available were ones that are in circulation even today, and as a result still hold some prestige in our shared popular imaginaries – such as the films by Kurosawa Akira. In other words, I did not seek to select films that quite obviously addressed issues of international politics from a predetermined perspective, but rather ones that were both easily obtainable and seemed to have something interesting to say in terms of the cultural diplomatic agenda set in the catalogue. Another determining factor in my choosing to focus specifically on Japanese films was the time I spent at Kyoto University as a visiting researcher in the autumn of 2016, where I wrote article 3. While the member states seem like an obvious unit of analysis – UNESCO being first and foremost an organisation of sovereign states – in this introductory section, the focus shifts away from individual countries and towards a reading of the catalogue as a multilateral cultural diplomatic initiative primarily looking at

11 The Japanese, Indian and Soviet films included in the catalogue are listed in appendix 1 of article 2.

UNESCO's position as a political actor outside of and distinct from the member states' role.

The original articles centre in on either the introduction of the catalogue or its feature film part. I chose to focus on the feature films instead of the documentaries and short films based on the way the catalogue itself utilises them to make a distinction between the East and the West. The introduction of the catalogue builds heavily on the feature films as a source for explaining to the readers what Eastern cinema is like, and, in fact, uses these characterisations as a means of constructing the Western audiences' understanding of the East. More importantly, it utilises them as a means for arguing for a world within which the function of difference is turned on its head. Article 1 reads the introduction of the catalogue along with the documents leading to its publication. Article 2 unpacks the general descriptions of the films in the catalogue. Article 3 looks at the selection criteria and compares the descriptions of the films with the contents of the films themselves. Finally, article 4 focuses on the connections between the film contents and the general interpretations made in the introduction.

Article 1 begins by examining the notion of interests and ideals, setting focus on the seemingly contradictory coexistence of a society of states structured along national borders and a society of people transcending such boundaries as constitutive parts of the UNESCO system. It conceptualises UNESCO in the analytical framework provided by what is known as the English School of world politics theory. The article analyses the Orient catalogue as part of UNESCO's early attempts to communicate its principles of peace, understanding and solidarity, and to shape values accordingly. It provides a reading of the catalogue project through the methodological approach of propaganda, understood as a tool for analysing processes of influence. It presents the idea that aiming to unite the peoples of the world in a battle against ignorance, prejudice and misinformation through the means of cinema can be understood in terms of peace propaganda, setting light on the interplay of ideology, power and politics in the UNESCO context. It focuses on the question of how UNESCO utilised something as seemingly meaningless as a film catalogue in its aspirations towards world peace.

Article 2 analyses the catalogue as an attempt to propagate the ideal of hope in the pursuit of the organisation's agenda of "the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind". It reads the plot summaries of the collection of films produced in Japan, India and the U.S.S.R to explore how the catalogue was used to employ the rhetoric of hope through the stories told in the plot summaries. It notes that while there was not much UNESCO could do to influence the geopolitical realities of the time, what they could do was influence how those realities were perceived and how the representations of the other half of the world were constructed. Focusing on the question of how the representations of the East were constructed, the article suggests that with the catalogue project, UNESCO argued for the importance of adapting to a new world in which humanity was not one divided by internal differences but one united by hope for a better future. It

leaves us with the question of whether there is room for difference in the world of UNESCO and if so, what its function is.

Article 3 analyses the Orient catalogue project through the eyes of one of the Eastern countries represented in it. Through a discussion of the descriptions of the films given in the catalogue, the article provides an account of Japan's post-war cultural diplomacy in the context of the Orient project, asking the question of what purpose the Japanese films chosen for the catalogue served in terms of cultural diplomacy. The article suggests that the Japanese representatives aimed to position the nation in the international arena outside the Cold War political and ideological framework. Instead, they promoted national interests by utilising the catalogue project to renegotiate the country's position in the post-war world with the larger ideal of intercultural understanding guiding the selection process and the meanings created for Western audiences. The article points to the apparent juxtaposition between interests and ideals and notes that sometimes the ways films are used and the contexts they are placed in become of more significance than the films themselves.

Finally, article 4 focuses on the significance of difference and the problem it presents for the realisability of the catalogue project's aims. It explores the catalogue's list of seven general characteristics of Eastern cinema, reading them as attempts to distinguish Eastern filmmaking from its Western counterpart and to provide ready-made interpretations of the essential characteristics of the Eastern world. It asks the question of how the films can be reinterpreted and repurposed to articulate a world they perhaps never intended to depict. The article provides an analysis of five films in the catalogue, all directed by Kurosawa Akira, reflected against the catalogue's seven characterisations of Eastern cinema in the political framework of World War II and its aftermath. It suggests that the cinema of Kurosawa and its characterisations in the catalogue are implicated in the politics of structuring and constructing the world, while at the same time enabling critical contestations of the same structures and constructions. It concludes that the catalogue was utilised to provide a reimagining of political realities constructed on a cultural basis and given a concrete form through cinema.

The original articles point out that cultural difference in the context of the Orient project is both a possible source of conflict and a solution to it: In a sense, seeing in cultural distinctiveness made visible through creative expressions the possibility of a common culture. The articles do not, however, address this notion further. Therefore, this introductory part starts from where the articles left off. The aim of this study is to discuss the potential cinema holds for speaking to the politics of difference as a mechanism of cinematic cultural diplomacy in the post-World War II UNESCO context. This aim is delineated with the help of the following research question:

How can the politicisation of cinema serve to address the politics of difference in global governance?

This wider question is approached through the case study of the Orient catalogue leading to the following supporting question:

How does the conceptualisation of culture as a marker of difference direct the catalogue's approach to cultural diplomacy and guide the interpretation of the films in it?

In line with the broader aims and motivations guiding this study, these research questions are formulated with the aim to set focus on two levels of inquiry. First, the ways in which abstract cultural argumentation can be utilised to shape political realities (Jackson 2006). Second, the ways in which aesthetic subjects can be involved in a critical reassessment of the political, and the conceptions and juxtapositions through which we can challenge our orthodox modes of political thought (Shapiro 2013).

1.2 Structure of the Dissertation

In this introductory part, the conclusions of the articles are interpreted in terms of their contribution to the research question presented above. It therefore provides a linking narrative to bring together the main findings of the four original articles. The structure of the study is as follows: In chapter 2, I provide a brief history of UNESCO, followed by an introduction to the catalogue and the events leading to its publication. UNESCO's approach to difference is discussed through the paradoxical notion of the one world ideal, which has provided both a backbone for UNESCO's actions and a target of scholarly focus since the founding of the organisation. The catalogue's birth story is contextualised through the internal ruptures within the UNESCO system, taking the form of both the East-West division and the juxtaposition between national interests and cosmopolitan ideals. Thus, the discussion is contextualised in terms of the threat posed to the attainability of the Orient catalogue's goal by cultural difference as manifested through the East-West polarisation within the UNESCO system. Structuring the world on the basis of an East-West division was not in any way a new or unique idea. But how exactly was it that this division came to be understood not on geopolitical or geoeconomic terms but instead as a cultural issue?

In chapter 3, I set focus on the tension between macro and micro politics underpinning this study. I provide an account of the complexity of the concept of cultural diplomacy and point out that in order for cultural diplomacy to be necessary, we need a situation where at least two actors are separated by a boundary – meaning that difference is a necessary precondition for cultural diplomacy itself. I raise the question of how we can utilise often abstract cultural argumentation to shape political realities – in this case, to construct the realm of cultural diplomacy. I turn to Patrick Jackson's concept of rhetorical commonplace (Jackson 2006) to discuss the conceptual construction that marks out cultural diplomatic strategies, and define the Orient project as a descriptive example of such a process. Addressing the decisive role of popular culture artefacts in the construction and shaping of the political world, I discuss cinematic representations

as crucial sites of meaning making in order to grasp the dynamics of cinematic cultural diplomacy. Drawing from Michael J. Shapiro's notion of a general social text where popular culture artefacts and politics are treated as equal components in the production of meaning, I introduce intertextual analysis as my main methodological device and position my own take as focusing on the interfaces, where different texts relate to one another in different ways. I describe my analysis process as following Shapiro's writing-as-method, where the aim is not so much an attempt or a claim to uncover underlying truths about the world by making evidence-based statements, but more to propose options and alternatives for understanding it by juxtaposing aesthetic subjects (Shapiro 2013).

In chapter 4, I bring together the results from the articles with the discussions of the previous chapters. I propose that the catalogue marks a turning point in UNESCO's understanding of world affairs, manifested in the form of a shift from the explicit recognition of difference as conflictual to an implicit understanding of difference as a necessary component within the UNESCO system. First, I note that positioning the primacy of intercultural understanding between the East and the West forms the basis of UNESCO's cultural diplomatic strategy and treat this as a recognition and refinement of an existing commonplace constructed upon the conflictuality of cultural difference between the East and the West. Second, I look at the ways UNESCO turned to the disruptive power of cinema to question the basis of that commonplace through a shift towards dismantling the proclaimed link between difference and conflict ultimately aiming to clear a space for a rhetorical commonplace that positions cultural difference as a necessary factor for the peaceful conduct of world affairs. While the catalogue makes no attempt to define its core concept of culture, for UNESCO, culture carries special significance. I note that in the case of the catalogue project, culture serves two functions: it is a concept describing ways of life and differences between them made visible through creative expressions, but also a means of representing those differences and negotiating between them.

Finally, in chapter 5, I conclude by defining my understanding of cinematic cultural diplomacy in the framework provided by the catalogue as a result of a process of transferring meanings between imaginary worlds and political realities. I suggest that UNESCO's approach to cultural diplomacy is best looked at as cultural relations politicised and positioned broadly in the realm of international cultural politics. Proposing that, essentially, cultural diplomacy is dialogue across cultural dividing lines, I suggest that in the context of the catalogue, the East and the West are best treated as conceptual, cultural constellations that primarily serve the purpose of categorising, thus opening up a space for the practice of cultural diplomacy. I propose that cultural diplomacy can be understood as a self-fulfilling prophecy, a phenomenon which through politicised cultural argumentation creates the need for its own existence. I conclude that turning a critical eye to the ways the politicisation of cinema can help make visible the politics of differentiation calls for a more inclusive understanding of the international and a wider conceptualisation of what can be understood as political cinema in the context of global governance.

2 UNESCO'S ONE WORLD PARADOX AND THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE

In 1945, British prime minister Clement Attlee addressed the Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation:

> Today the peoples of the world are "islands shouting at each other over seas of misunderstanding." They do not understand each other's history, each other's ways of living, each other's way of thinking. The better they understand each other, the more they will realise how much they have in common and why and how much they differ, the less prone they will be to take up arms against each other. (UNESCO 1946, 22)

Attlee thus proposed that understanding was the key to a more peaceful conduct of world affairs. Understanding, however, was not to be constructed merely based on what we have in common, but also on the points where we differ. Differences, for Attlee, were an integral part of and a basis for structuring and categorising the world. Attlee clearly recognised that the peoples of the world no longer lived in isolation, but in a world of influential interdependencies. These interdependent relations could have both positive and negative implications: They could either generate new possibilities for understanding, coexistence and cooperation or they could widen the scope for causes of conflict between them. He saw the differences in terms of ways of life, thus recognising that he was speaking at a time when it seemed preferable to categorise the people of the world according to their culture. It would then make sense that the issues of misunderstanding arising from such differences should also be addressed through cultural means.

With World War II still fully raging, a group of visionaries had been summoned to London to make plans for a new post-war organisation. Present at the meeting held on the 16th of November 1942 were the representatives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia – exiled in the United Kingdom from their home countries (Dorn 2006, 307-308). They had been called together by the president of the Board of Education of the United Kingdom, Richard Butler, and the chairman of the British Council, Sir

Malcolm Robertson. The presence of these representatives in the United Kingdom provided an opportunity to discuss issues of education with which the Allied countries of Europe would have to deal with both during and after the war. The meeting was followed by twenty others and came to be known as the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) with the last meeting held on the 5th of December 1945. In total, 18 governments were represented in the meetings[12], widening the scope of participants beyond Europe. The CAME meetings gave birth to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1945[13], aiming to abandon the obsolete procedures in world politics seen to have led to the war and tasked with building the foundations of peace in the minds of men. (De Capello 1970.)

The UNESCO Constitution, negotiated on the basis of a draft constitution prepared by CAME and another one prepared by the French Government was adopted[14] at the Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, called by the government of the United Kingdom and held at the Institute of Civil Engineers, London, from the 1st to the 16th of November, 1945[15]. Article I of the constitution[16] defines the purposes and functions of UNESCO, according to which the organisation's main purpose is "to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations".

The Constitution outlines the conditions of membership (Article II) and UNESCO's three primary organs: the General Conference, the Executive Board, and the Secretariat (Articles III-VI). The General Conference is composed of representatives of UNESCO's member states. The policy determining plenary body was to meet every year[17] to determine the main lines of work of the organisation and to make decisions on the budget and programme. Additionally, its tasks in-

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12 Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America, Union of Soviet socialist Republics and Yugoslavia

13 For accounts of how CAME became UNESCO, see e.g. Cowell 1966; De Capello 1970; Haigh 1974, 47-60. In addition to the CAME meetings, UNESCO recognises three predecessors: International Committee of Intellectual Co-operation (CICI), Geneva 1922-1946; International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (IICI), Paris 1925-1946; and International Bureau of Education (IBE), Geneva 1925-1968 (since 1969 it has been a part of the UNESCO Secretariat under its own statutes).

14 The constitution came into force on the 4th of November 1946 after ratification by the following twenty countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States.

15 Referred to as the Founding Conference from here after.

16 The constitution has been amended 22 times since 1945. The version referred to in this study is the original one, adopted at the Founding Conference on the 16th of November 1945 (UNESCO 1946, 93-97).

17 Currently, the General Conference meets every two years.

clude the election of members of the Executive Board, and, on the recommendation of the Board, the appointment of the Director-General. The General Conference also provides advice to the United Nations Organisation on educational, scientific and cultural matters.

The Executive Board originally consisted of 18 members[18] elected by the General Conference from among the delegates appointed by the member states for a term of three years. When electing the members, it was seen as desirable to include "persons competent in the arts, the humanities, the sciences, education and the diffusion of ideas"[19], taking into account "the diversity of cultures and a balanced geographical distribution" (UNESCO 1945, Article V). The Board meets at least twice a year and is responsible for the execution of the programme adopted by the General Conference. Its other primary functions include recommending to the General Conference the admission of new members. The Secretariat functions as the policy executing body of the organisation and, consisting of the Director-General and other staff, is responsible for the practical running of the organisation. The Director-General is nominated by the Executive Board and appointed by the General Conference to serve as the chief administrative officer and the face of the organisation for a period of six[20] years[21].

The Constitution also includes articles concerning national cooperating bodies (Article VII), reports by member states (Article VIII), budget (Article IX), and relations with the United Nations and other specialised international organisations and agencies (Articles X-XI). In addition, it includes notes on the legal status of the organisation (Article XII), amendments (Article XIII), interpretation (Article XIV), and entry into force (Article XV).

The most widely known and quoted part of the Constitution is its preamble, which has remained unchanged since the founding of the organisation. In his opening address to the Founding Conference, Clement Attlee set focus on the necessity of creating an organisation for educational and cultural cooperation (De Capello 1970, 19). Stating that "wars begin in the minds of men", he pointed out that supranational co-operation in fields such as "labour, health, food and agriculture, transport [and] finance" (UNESCO 1946, 22-23) was incomplete (Dutt 2009, 86). Furthermore, a new order of peace would have to be established on the basis of understanding and co-operation, to fight "the forces of ignorance, prejudice and misunderstanding" (UNESCO 1946, 23). Thanassis Aghnides, the delegate of Greece, continued: "Let us therefore begin with the task of co-ordinating our minds and of attuning them to the works of science and the arts, which are

18 Currently 58

19 Currently formulated as "a person qualified in one or more of the fields of competence of UNESCO".

20 Currently four

21 It is common to write histories of UNESCO structured around the Directors-General. Most notably the first Director-General, Julian Huxley, makes frequent appearances as the organisation's hero, charting "the broad course to which the organization became committed" (Laves and Thomson 1957, 295), whose ideas of universal humanism (Huxley 1946) are read as the roots of UNESCO's cosmopolitan mission. Huxley's booklet *UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy* in which he presented his ideas was, however, distributed as a paper representing only his personal views.

the safest road to Peace" (Ibid., 32). Attlee's words, concluded with those by Archibald MacLeish[22] "it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed", therefore were adopted as the principal idea upon which the foundations of the organisation were built (Dutt 1995, 3).

UNESCO's founding ideal sets focus on two fundamental challenges to the ways the organisation could reach its goals. First, in the words of Jacques Maritain, the French delegate to the 1947 General Conference, is the fact that UNESCO operated in a heterogenous world characterised by differences: "what makes UNESCO's task seem paradoxical for a start is that it supposes an agreement between men whose outlook on the world, culture and even knowledge are different, if not in conflict" (Maritain 1947, quoted in Maritain, 1966, 46). Second, while UNESCO's primary actors were the member states, it was still expected to influence the values, attitudes and opinions of the global population as a whole. The idea that UNESCO could engage people directly, bypassing the state, is slightly problematic: "With a view to preserving the independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures and educational systems of the States Members of this Organisation, the Organisation is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction" (UNESCO 1945, Article I(3)). As Irena Kozymka notes, this domestic jurisdiction reservation clause, which essentially aims at dispelling the possible fears of the member states that their sovereignty might be jeopardised through their participation in UNESCO, is a major marker of the central restrictions of the organisation (Kozymka 2014, 32). UNESCO, in essence, is a nonterritorial actor with its primary components consisting of states rather than individual human beings. Within the UNESCO system, governments act under authority granted by their peoples, as is made evident in the opening words of the Constitution "The Governments of the State Parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare"[23].

At the same time, the clause provides means for UNESCO to maintain a façade of appearing politically neutral or even apolitical. UNESCO's ideological basis was constructed upon the humanist philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Auguste Comte and Jan Amos Comenius (Singh 2010b, 3-5). Accordingly, the Constitution operates at a highly idealistic macro level. On this level, the organisation's strategy is one that aims to benefit humankind as a whole, but the attempts to put the ideals of the Constitution into practice have proven challenging (see e.g. Duedahl 2016). As James Sewell laconically points out,"[i]nternational organizations' charters proclaim a better future for mankind; yet, unavoidably, their human participants live in this world" (Sewell 1975, 5). Such attempts have later led to accusations of "politicisation" seen to be a departure from not only the

22 The American poet MacLeish served as the US delegate to the Founding Conference.

23 Even though sovereign states are UNESCO's primary actors, non-state actors, such as nongovernmental organisations also contribute to the organisation's policymaking. The Constitution authorises NGO participation at UNESCO meetings as observers, and provides them the opportunity to be parties to "suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation" and to undertake specific tasks (UNESCO 1945, Article XI). Furthermore, the members of the UNESCO Secretariat do not serve as representatives of their national governments and, when conducting their duties, "they shall not seek or receive instructions from any government" (UNESCO 1945, Article VI(5)).

innocent seeming idealism but also the organisation's functionalist role (see e.g. Dutt 1995). The origins of these accusations are in the functionalist approach to international organisation[24], constructed upon a separation between "the technical" and "the political", and particularly between "high politics" encompassing issues of diplomacy and strategy and "low politics" encompassing those of welfare (Wells 1987, 5). Within the UN system this is indicated by the fact that the UN itself is often seen as the "political" component, whereas the specialised agencies are positioned as its functional and thus "apolitical" aides (Ibid.).

The founders of UNESCO believed that "a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind" (UNESCO 1945, Preamble). Archibald MacLeish explained at the Founding Conference:

> [W]e must choose to live together or we must choose, quite literally, not to live. At San Francisco[25] we chose to live together. But it sometimes seems as though our choice had been made by our wills, not by our minds and hearts. Until the choice to live together is the choice of the minds and hearts of men, the alternative of life will not truly have been chosen. As I understand it, it is the purpose of this Conference to support the choice made by will with a choice made by mind and heart. This Conference has been called to prepare the instrument through which the common understanding of mankind may be increased. Only when the peoples of the nations – not their governments – not their scientists even or their learned men – but the peoples, all the people – recognize each other's common manhood, common humanity, can the choice of will become the choice of heart. (UNESCO 1946, 20.)

UNESCO recognised the crucial importance of better intercultural understanding among the world's peoples and thus the promotion of such understanding was included in the primary aspirations of the organisation. The basic logic behind UNESCO's conception of world affairs is that the deficiency of intercultural understanding and "ignorance of each other's ways and lives" is an intrinsic cause of international disputes (UNESCO 1945, Preamble). Consequently, UNESCO cultivates the advancement of mutual understanding as a way to sustainable peace. This ideological basis quite unarguably explains the role of understanding in intercultural relations conducted according to UNESCO's stance. This, by necessity, requires that there exists someone to be understood and someone to do the understanding. In other words, for UNESCO's reasoning to have a logical basis, a division into at least two parties is imperative, implying that the ideal of the "moral solidarity of mankind" falls short even when reflected against the organisation's internal logic.

The mission to promote peace through culture seems to question whether it actually is "each other's ways of lives" that culture for UNESCO entails, for that is precisely where cultural differences and the challenges they pose to peace

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24 This approach is traditionally accredited to David Mitrany (see Mitrany 1944).

25 MacLeish is referring to the United Nations Conference on International Organization held earlier the same year, which resulted in the creation of the UN Charter. Article 57 of the Charter provided for specialised agencies in the field of, among others, education and culture.

are located. Therefore, cultural differences in the ways of life sense were seen as a problem, a cause of tensions and thus an obstacle to intercultural understanding. Raymond Williams distinguished three historical traditions in terms of understandings of the concept of culture. UNESCO's reference to ways of life is rooted in his notion of the anthropological sense of culture (Williams 1958). The Constitution continues: "That the wide diffusion of culture and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern" and therefore, "for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind" UNESCO was founded (UNESCO 1945, Preamble).

Education for international understanding was, in fact, UNESCO's focus in the early years (Wells 1987, 43-58). Education in the UNESCO context must, however, be understood in the wider German sense of *Bildung*, also comprising culture in the sense of cultivation of the mind and corresponding with Williams's second, normative tradition, referring to culture as intellectual development, closely tied to the idea of human perfection (Williams 1958). Thus, culture also provided a solution to the problems it posed, suggesting an underlying assumption that cosmopolitan values would countermand cultural differences. For UNESCO, the cosmopolitan value base evidently consisted of both world citizenship and a political community comprised of sovereign states but bound together by a strategy of global cultural governance, thus providing the means to simultaneously reject and recognise particularistic attachments[26].

"'Know your neighbour' we say today. And the whole world is our neighbour. How are we to know our neighbours? To understand their culture, if you will pardon my use of that much abused word?" Attlee addressed the Founding Conference. "Surely through their books, their newspapers, their radio and their films", he continued (UNESCO 1946, 22). Thus, it was cultural differences as manifested in diffusible concrete expressions of culture that were seen to carry a promise of mutuality. To achieve its aims, UNESCO was to "[m]aintain, increase and diffuse knowledge [b]y assuring the conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science" (UNESCO 1945, Article I(2c)). It would seem that this understanding of culture would be one based on Williams's third sense of culture as the aesthetic, seeing culture in terms of the arts and creative expressions (Williams 1958).

Based on a reading of UNESCO's official texts, mainly the Reports of Directors-General and Medium-Term Plans, Katérina Stenou distinguishes five phases in the meaning of the term "culture" for UNESCO (Stenou 2007). The first one, culture and knowledge, characterised the early post-war reconstruction period with culture seen primarily in terms of works of art. The second phase, culture and politics, took place in the 1950s and early 1960s, with culture being brought into the political domain through an emphasis on culture as a marker for identity,

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26 For an account of the history and a discussion of different understandings of the term cosmopolitanism, see e.g. Delanty 2006; Vertovec and Cohen 2002.

and the understanding of culture shifted towards "ways of life". The factors defining this stage were seen to be the decolonisation process, the Cold War ideological polarisation, and technological development. However, as noted above, references to this understanding were already present in the original Constitution. The third phase, culture and development, took place between the mid-1960s and the late 1990s. It was seen as a continuation of the previous stage, but with culture linked to endogenous development. The fourth one, culture and democracy, was seen to partially overlap with the preceding one and began in the 1980s. Culture was seen as a building block for democratic societies, and focus was set on cultural relations within states in addition to those between them, thus paving the way for UNESCO's understanding of cultural diversity in the form it takes today. The fifth phase, culture and globalisation, was seen to have begun in the beginning of the 2000s, setting focus on the role cultural diversity plays in issues of sustainable development, peace, and social cohesion. While a useful genealogy, it merely provides a rough outline that seems to primarily work on paper when reflected against UNESCO's practical initiatives[27].

Due to UNESCO's essential role as an organisation of member states, culture, too, was to be held within the national frame, allocating to each nation a particular culture. Ellen Wilkinson, the British Minister of Education and the President of the Founding Conference, pointed out: "It is for us to clear the channels through which may flow from nation to nation the streams of knowledge and thought, of truth and beauty which are the foundations of true civilization. Here are things on which, and through which, men can so readily come together. Music knows no barrier of tongues and pictures speak without speech" (UNESCO 1946, 23). UNESCO's role, therefore, was to act as a forum where the member states could showcase their national cultural expressions and cultural property, both seen as somewhat static and fixed. Cultural difference was thus understood as differences between sovereign states and intercultural understanding was, in fact, international understanding. The Constitution seems to use the terms "state" and "nation" interchangeably, indicating an understanding of entities that are simultaneously cultural and political. While culture perhaps primarily consisted of works of art particular to a specific nation, there was something universal to be found in these expressions.

The main challenge UNESCO faced could therefore be formulated in the words of T.V. Sathyamurthy as "the irreconcilable demands of nationalism and internationalism" within the UNESCO system (Sathyamurthy 1964, 16). Edward H. Buehrig, commenting on UNESCO's "tribulations", suggested that this was

27 For a reading of this development in terms of UNESCO's understanding of cultural diversity as it is seen through its normative declarations and conventions, and their practical implications see Kozymka 2014. Stage five in this scheme, especially, has been a major source of criticism in the form of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which in fact seems to reduce "culture" back to the meaning it was given in stage one while simultaneously remaining vague enough to provide for interpretations that could place it in any one of the other stages (see De Beukelaer, Pyykkönen and Singh 2015, and especially Isar and Pyykkönen 2015).

the result of a fundamental contradiction: The relationship between the organisation's internationalist aims and its practical influence on fields like national education, which he saw to be "by nature parochial" (Buehrig 1976, 680), was marked by an intrinsic juxtaposition. This, in turn, would suggest a reinforcement of national differences instead of promoting internationalism. S.E. Graham alike identifies the elasticity of the cultural internationalism doctrine as the main dilemma characterising early UNESCO, complemented by the lack of common cultural interests on a world wide scale (Graham 2006, 233). Just as UNESCO's first Director-General, Julian Huxley, had declared before the start of his term[28]: "A central conflict of our times is that between nationalism and internationalism, between the concept of many national sovereignties and one world sovereignty" (Huxley 1946, 13). The problem was thus not merely one faced by UNESCO, but by the world as a whole.

UNESCO's aim to contribute to peace was much more than a reference to the mere absence of open hostilities and armed conflict. Instead, peace was to be understood as "a condition of solidarity, harmony of purpose and co-ordination of activities in which free men and women can live a secure and satisfactory life – a condition in which war is affirmatively prevented by the dynamic and purposeful creation of a decent and human relationship between the peoples of the world – a condition in which the incentives to war are neutralized by the social, spiritual and economic advances created and achieved" (UNESCO 1947, 219). UNESCO therefore aimed to tackle a central problem of peace: people's attitudes towards each other and their conceptions of the part international cooperation played in human welfare (Laves and Thomson 1957, xx). As could be expected, it was not all smooth sailing from then on. Since its outset, internal ruptures have shaped the organisation by creating polarisations and leading to the current form of UNESCO as not only a political but also a highly politicised organisation.

In practice, the birth story of UNESCO already reveals the intrinsic ruptures within the organisation. One of the driving forces behind the coming together of the architects of UNESCO was to present a counterbalance to the propaganda of the Axis powers, "the Fascist system which had led to the capturing of men's minds"[29] in the first place (Laves and Thomson 1957, xix), and to make sure the events leading to World War II would never again be made possible. As Attlee explained in the Founding Conference: "One of the evil things against which we fought in the war was the totalitarian practice of drawing a curtain around the minds of the people to prevent them knowing what others thought. Another was the deliberate indoctrination of the minds of the people with a set of rigid narrow ideas in order to prevent them from using their reasoning faculties and from having any criterion on which to form judgment" (UNESCO 1946, 22). Therefore, there really should have been no room for the parochial notions of culture that would categorise, differentiate and divide people in an organisation aiming to

28 At the time Huxley served as the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for UNESCO, established by the Founding Conference.

29 It was primarily Nazi Germany that was seen to be the problem, not Italy or Japan.

counteract Nazi propaganda and ultimately fight against the biases created by such notions (Singh 2015, 21).

The UNESCO Constitution overtly points the finger to the source of past errors and their consequences by defining World War II as "a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races" (UNESCO 1945, Preamble). The admission of the Axis powers in the late 1940s and early 1950s[30] would then not only come across as an attempt to abandon the geopolitical divisions of the Second World War, but also as letting what were seen to be possible stirrers of trouble slip in through the gates. Furthermore, it seems, it was the politicisation of culture that was seen to have triggered the events that made the founding of UNESCO necessary in the first place. Interestingly, UNESCO turned to the very same means in its attempts to make sure these events would never happen again. In other words, UNESCO was to fight fire with fire and thus, all claims to political innocence were thrown out the window.

Along with the breakdown of the wartime divisions, another rupture has shaped the design of the organisation. Historically, the dichotomised paradigm of the East and the West has been a decisive factor in UNESCO's actions. It was only a few short years after the founding of UNESCO, when the belief shared worldwide that it was time to leave the antagonistic nationalism leading to the conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century behind gave way to a world order that was defined in terms of a new opposition created by the bipolarity of the Cold War. The opposition was not merely a geopolitical one, as "[t]hroughout the Cold War the iron curtain would be envisioned as a barrier of quarantine," writes Larry Wolff, "separating the light of Christian civilization from whatever lurked in the shadows" (Wolff 1994, 2)[31].

When the Founding Conference met in London in 1945, the Soviet Union was absent. The reason given was that the proposal made by the Soviet Union for the conference to be delayed until the United Nations Economic and Social Council had been organised and could call the founding conference had not been agreed to (Armstrong 1954, 217). The conference was instead summoned by the British Labour government. A few weeks later, the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission, established at the Founding Conference, held its first meeting and elected Alfred Zimmern to the post of Executive Secretary[32]. The Committee consisted of fourteen members, with the fifteenth seat left vacant for the USSR, suggesting that the Soviet absence was hoped to be temporary.

The Soviet Union had sent official observers to the CAME meetings starting from 1943, as had the United States. The U.S. became a member in July 1944. The Soviet Union would not engage formally, as it regarded international cooperation in education as interfering in its domestic affairs (De Capello 1970, 5; Sewell

30 Italy joined in 1948, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1951.
31 On the relationship between Christianity and civilisation see Toynbee 1948.
32 Following Zimmern's illness, he was replaced by Huxley only a few months later.

1975, 62). Consequently, the Soviet Union withheld from joining UNESCO, cautious of the West's leading role in its creation and the bias that was due to follow, with UNESCO's effect upon the public opinion of peoples in the non-communist world as possibly the determining factor (Armstrong 1954, 226). As the ex-Axis powers entered UNESCO, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were withdrawing. The fact that UNESCO "lacked adequate institutional safeguards" and could therefore "be used as weapons in a struggle against the Socialist system under the existing political circumstances" was offered as a reason for the resignation of the Socialist states (Morawiecki 1968, 502). "For a moment, at least", Sewell writes, "the UNESCO line-up looked rather like a cold-war alliance" (Sewell 1975, 151).

At the 8th session of the General Conference (Montevideo, Uruguay, 1954), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics finally became a member state, accompanied by the Byelorussian S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R.. The Soviet entry brought with it the re-engagement of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and led to the admission of Bulgaria (1956), Romania (1956) and Albania (1958).

By that time, however, a different type of a rupture had appeared. In the UN General Assembly of 1952, another form of the East-West division started surfacing, supplementing and partially even substituting the Cold War tensions (Bell 1953). According to this perception arising from the accelerating decolonisation process, the definition of the East differed radically from the Cold War division. It was no longer the Soviet Union and its satellites but, instead, the non-West, consisting of Asian, Arab and to a certain extent the Latin American regions. This connoted a significant transition within the whole UN system, as the polarisation was no longer that of the United States and the Soviet Union, but that of the Euro-American West and the Third World [33]. From the late nineteenth century until the end of the First World War, Western imperial nations had conjured up Civilisation as a signifier to justify their conquests. Emerging in the context of European domination over the non-Western world, the singular conception of Civilisation constructed upon Christian and Enlightenment values became dominant (Duara 2001, 100). Therefore, the shift essentially implied a return to the classical East-West conceptualisation.

Thus, in terms of this study, there are two basic premises to keep in mind. First, the crucial importance of promoting intercultural understanding. Second, the division of the world into at least two. These are both what could be called metanarratives or grand narratives that circulate within and shape the UNESCO system – often unnoticed, unaddressed and uncriticised. And, as I will discuss in more detail later on, also function as the basic premise of cultural diplomacy. These notions set focus on a central paradox when it comes to UNESCO's call for the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind as the basis of a peaceful conduct of world affairs. Commenting on this abstract and hard to put into practice principle, Reinhold Niebuhr[34] famously noted: "In one sense the intellectual and

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33 On the division of the world into three conceptual "worlds" in response to the Cold War, see Pletsch, 1981.

34 Niebuhr was a delegate of the United States to the 4th General Conference in 1949.

moral solidarity of mankind is an unattainable goal. The world community will be distinguished from particular national communities for ages to come by the higher degree of heterogeneity in its moral, intellectual, ethnic and linguistic forms of culture" (Niebuhr 1950, 10). However, it was precisely the notion of differences and the need to manage their dreaded consequences that gave birth to UNESCO. Recognising that the categories existed as instruments of differentiation, it became more a question of what to do with them and how.

2.1 The Orient Catalogue: Suitable for Western Audiences

In 1954, UNESCO's 8th General Conference selected mutual appreciation of Eastern and Western cultural values as one of the key issues to be emphasised in the organisation's future programme (UNESCO 1954). Two years later, UNESCO's 9th General Conference recognised that the understanding between peoples, necessary for peaceful cooperation, could only be achieved through appreciation of one another's cultures (UNESCO 1956a). Thus, in order to increase the flow of information and ideas between East and West, a ten year long Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values[35] was authorised and initiated later the same year. The Major Project cleared a space for Arab and Asian states to exhibit their cultures as both equal to and distinct from their Western counterparts (Wong 2006; 2008), set focus on the issues of cultural diversity and cultural unity (Maurel 2010), and celebrated the development of UNESCO into a truly worldwide platform of intercultural dialogue, thus setting in motion an ongoing discussion of the nature of intercultural relations within the UNESCO system (Huttunen 2017).

It was noted that the flow of information had largely been from Occident to Orient[36] which was seen to have caused two problems which the Major Project aimed to address. Firstly, the conception of the Occident which Eastern nations received was a distorted conception of Western culture (UNESCO 1958c). This distortion of cultural representations was a direct reference to Western media content, including film (Havet 1958, 20). Secondly, the Orient had not been presented sufficiently to the Occident (UNESCO 1958c). During the Project, the focus was on addressing the second issue.

An International Advisory Committee was composed to direct the practicalities of the Major Project. Selected by the Executive Board and the Director-General Luther Evans, the Committee consisted of 18 members. The governments of the following UNESCO member states were asked to make nominations: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom (European); Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Vietnam (Asian); the United States of America

35 The discussion of the Major Project in this chapter builds on my earlier article on the topic. See Huttunen 2017.

36 In the Major Project, the pairs of terms East and West, and Orient and Occident were used interchangeably. Thus, I make no distinction between them here either.

(North American); Egypt (African); and Mexico (Latin American)[37]. The members were to serve as individuals instead of representing their governments and thus it was perhaps seen as unnecessary to officially state which ones were considered to represent East and which ones West. It was implied that the members of the Advisory Committee were to be distinguished scholars or experts in their own fields, such as university professors from various disciplines, ambassadors, and national delegates to UNESCO, and were to represent a variety of cultural and linguistic groups. They were not, however, to be experts specifically in their own cultures, as the purpose of the Advisory Committee was not to discuss cultural values per se.

The International Advisory Committee was faced with the task of defining the two parties the Major Project aimed to forge connections between: Where does the Orient begin and the Occident end? And more importantly: How can we name, define and conceptualise the East for the West to understand? For their first session in 1957, the International Advisory Committee was provided with a summary of the attempts at defining the core concepts of the Major Project made by the national delegations at the 9th session of the General Conference (UNECO 1957d). Three different options for defining the concepts of East and West were considered.

First, a geographical definition was thought to perhaps prove to be a clear one. According to this approach, the Orient would include Asia and the part of Africa bordering the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, while the Occident would consist of Europe, the Americas, Australia and New Zealand. It was recognised that this approach lacked the recognition of cultural features, along with the role of certain intermediary countries. Also, according to this definition, Sub-Saharan Africa did not fit in with the two categories. Second, a definition based on the "spirit of cultures" was suggested (Ibid., 1). This understanding was based on UNESCO's previous studies and meetings, proving "beyond doubt" the existence of two distinct cultural traditions "with very real differences between them", while it was simultaneously acknowledged that "no people today can probably be said to be purely Eastern or purely Western" (Ibid). What exactly these studies and meetings were, was not stated. A problem with this approach was that it enabled excessive simplifications of the two civilisations. Importantly, however, the idea of two differing traditions was understood as playing a notable part in human relations between, and occasionally even within, countries. Third, an alternative from the "purely historical point of view" was suggested (Ibid., 2). This approach saw the obstacles to East-West understanding as being the result of the economic and political expansion of the West manifested through colonialism, accompanied by the lead it had gained since the beginning of the nineteenth century in all things technical.

Finally, it was established that the understanding of the East and the West "had to take into account of the three criteria together, without attempting to make unduly clear-cut distinctions. It considered Western culture as that prevailing in the European countries and in all others whose culture is of European

[37] The countries are categorised here according to UNESCO's definition.

origin, and it treated as Eastern all non-European cultures, particularly those rooted in Asia and fashioned by an ancient, written tradition" (Ibid., 2). This definition was seen to be free of both an artificial unification within each of the two regions as well as any undesirable reference to a drastic contrast between them. In addition, it left some room for the inclusion of countries with cultures combining Eastern and Western traditions. The diversity of cultures within the two halves was emphasised, and the border between Eastern and Western cultural values was not seen as the result of fundamental contrasts, but rather of historical factors. In the proposed work plan, focus was set on the relativity of the words Orient and Occident as "[n]either from the geographical point of view, nor still less from the cultural point of view, is it possible to make a clear-cut distinction between the so-called 'western' and 'eastern' peoples" (UNESCO 1957e) even though it was precisely between these two civilisations that better understanding was to be promoted.

The idea of including the distribution of films from different cultures in the agenda of the Major Project was a part of the initial suggestion to launch the Project made by the Indian delegation and strongly supported by the Japanese at the Regional Conference of Representatives of National Commissions for UNESCO in Asia in 1956 (UNESCO 1956b). According to the proposal the main elements of the project were to be 1) translations of classic literature from both East and West, 2) exhibiting art that would reveal the artistic achievements of Asian countries, 3) exchange of persons in the fields of education, science and culture, and 4) production and distribution of cultural films and recordings (Ibid.).

Consequently, a decision to engage in a subproject focusing specifically on the distribution of Eastern films in the West was made by UNESCO's department of Mass Communications. Thus, as a part of the Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, the Orient catalogue project was initiated. A UNESCO proposal for conducting a Survey of Asian Films from 1957 noted that "[t]he promotion of mutual understanding between East and West has been adopted by Unesco as a Major Project" (UNESCO 1957f). The aims of the project "include on the one hand understanding countries which may be said to have an Asian civilisation and countries of Islamic culture, and on the other hand countries of Western civilisation in Europe, North America and Oceania", it clarified. The Orient project was to address the former aim, since the emphasis during the current period was defined to be "mainly on enhancing understanding of the East in countries of Western civilisation". Film "can efficiently serve to promote an understanding of these countries", it continued.

An outside organisation was to be contracted to determine which films would best illustrate the culture of UNESCO's member states in Asia and to compile a list of films to illustrate selected themes of the Major Project. The British Film Institute agreed to prepare the survey[38,39]. At the time of the Orient project, the focus of the BFI was on encouraging and fostering the development of the art

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38 The CAME commission on Audio-Visual Aids had already worked together with the BFI starting from 1943 (Sewell 1975, 40-41).

39 For an account of the history of the BFI, see Nowell-Smith 2008.

of film and public appreciation and study of it, as article 1 in this study further explains. The BFI was to prepare the catalogue, whereas UNESCO's role was to be in charge of distribution and to provide assistance with having the National Commissions comment on the film selections to avoid later criticism (UNESCO 1957b). Mrs. Winifred Holmes of the BFI agreed to compile the catalogue in practice.

And so, in 1959, a catalogue of Eastern films titled *Orient: A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture* was published. Officially, the catalogue's aim was to promote "the presentation of films which might give audiences in the West a fuller and more informed idea of the ways of life of Eastern peoples" (Holmes 1959). The catalogue was pre-ordered in 400 copies, but the number was soon increased to 600, and eventually to 1000. UNESCO decided to distribute the catalogue to people and organisations who were likely to make practical use of it – to what extent they did is not clear. These organisations included, among others, National Commissions for UNESCO, television stations, national federations of film clubs, film distributors, and film critics. In 1960, after the printing of an additional 2000 copies, the demand was noted to be so great that its distribution needed to be restricted. The BFI suggested charging a nominal fee for the catalogue, but UNESCO decided it was not worthwhile to do so. A decision was made to give copies only to those most likely to continuously use it. Others would have to make do with information on where in their country the catalogue could be consulted.

The Orient catalogue includes 348 films produced in 21 countries. The films are divided into two sections. Part one introduces 139 feature films suitable for festival screening from 13 countries: Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, [the Republic of] Korea, Malaya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, and the U.S.S.R.. Part two introduces 209 documentaries and short films for television distribution from the following countries: Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Malaya, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, the U.S.S.R., and [the Republic of] Vietnam.

It was from the discussions of the International Advisory Committee that the definition of the East and the West in the context of the Orient catalogue emerged, although some massaging was required before it would reach its final form. The East to be understood was all non-European cultures, particularly "those rooted in Asia and fashioned by an ancient, written tradition" (UNECO 1957d), while the West that was to do the understanding consisted of Europe, North America and Oceania, thus defining civilisations as hierarchical cultural programmes organised around specific cultural values. According to this approach, the existence of only two major civilisations was recognised, providing justification for initiating the project in the first place.

It was acknowledged that this definition left no place for non-Islamic Africa. This was not, however, a major issue for the catalogue project, since by the phrasing "Arab and Asian culture" in the title, non-Islamic Africa was conveniently ruled out. To be fair, this was more an issue on the level of rhetoric rather than

practice for two primary reasons. First, UNESCO statistics on film and cinema note the output of African countries (excluding the Arab states) in terms of estimated film production to be "negligible", as there really was not much filmmaking activity to report and even if there was, no official, reliable data was obtainable (UNESCO 1981). Second, as the decolonisation of Africa in the early 1960s, and the resulting expansion of UNESCO's geographical scope had not yet taken place, only three out of the seven African UNESCO members at the time were Sub-Saharan, and therefore not part of the Arab world[40].

By the time the Orient project was launched, UNESCO had 78 member states. According to the organisation's own categories, out of these 24 were European, 23 Asian, 20 Latin American, 7 African, 2 North American, and 2 Oceanian. The countries presented in the catalogue were "Countries of Arab and Asian Culture" (Holmes 1959) that were UNESCO member states at the time - with a couple of exceptions. Out of the 23 Asian member states, 15 are included in the catalogue. In addition to these, Malaya (joined in 1958), Qatar (joined in 1972) and Hong Kong (never a member[41]) are represented in the catalogue. While the inclusion of Malaya makes sense as it joined half-way through the catalogue project, the decision to include Qatar seems slightly odd. At the time, Qatar was a British protectorate and should strictly speaking from the geopolitical angle have been considered a part of the West and thus not included in the catalogue – even if it had been a member.

Similarly, Hong Kong is a source of major confusion. Like Qatar, it was firmly under British rule, but it had become something of a safe haven for traditional Chinese culture after mainland China fell under communist rule in 1949. Two reasons for its inclusion seem apparent. First, it was one of the biggest film producing countries in the world at the time (UNESCO 1981). Second, mainland China was not represented in the catalogue despite the BFI's efforts. The reason for this was most likely the fact that as a result of the Chinese Communist Revolution, the heated debate about which government should represent China at UNESCO – the People's Republic of China, based in mainland China, or the Republic of China, based in Taiwan – perhaps meant the authors of the catalogue did not want to stir up any further trouble. At the time, UNESCO recognised the Kuomintang based in Taipei as China's representative in the organisation whereas mainland China had no direct representation[42]. Thus, Hong Kong was to represent the Chinas as a cultural whole, as is implied by the description of one of the Hongkongese feature films: "A genuine Chinese film with a purely Chinese story which can only happen in China. The characters 'seem to step out of a Chinese society when Chinese culture had not yet been assailed by Western culture'" (Holmes 1959).

Similarly, much ink was spilled over the discussions about the possibility of including Singapore in the catalogue. Suggestions had been made for includ-

40 Ethiopia, Ghana and Liberia

41 Hong Kong has its own National Organising Committee as a member state dependent territory of China, which has been a member since 1946.

42 The People's Republic of China became the representative of China in 1971.

ing Malayan feature films in the catalogue, but during her trip to Singapore, Winifred Holmes found out they had all been produced in Singapore: "[T]he reason for the exclusion of the feature films we had chosen to represent Malaya, is that they were all made in Singapore. This has a separate administration and I understand is not a member of U.N.E.S.C.O. I am not sure whether there is any formula under which these films could be brought into the survey. I should be very grateful for your views on this point" (UNESCO 1959b).

A meeting was held in London to discuss this and other points related to the catalogue, the results of which were confirmed in a letter from a BFI representative to UNESCO: "[y]ou agreed that films made in Singapore might be included under a separate heading" (UNESCO 1959c). UNESCO representatives responded: "On looking through previous correspondence, we find that in letter number 4614(4) which the Malayan Ministry of Education wrote to us […], the Malayan Ministry of Education did not reject the seven feature films because (as Mrs. Holmes seems to think) they had been made in Singapore, but because they did not consider these films as [..] ones that are the best representation and will do credit to our country" (UNESCO 1959a). Singapore was under British control but had become an associate member[43] of UNESCO in 1958. "The letter clearly states that the Ministry would not give official recognition to these films. […] Singapore is now an Associate Member of Unesco and we would have been willing to list these films under "Singapore" had it not been for the Government of Malaya's very definite letter refusing its recognition to these films." Singapore was not included, but the Malayan feature films eventually selected to present the country are all noted to be produced in Singapore.

Of the seven African member states, three were included in the catalogue – although strictly speaking only half of the United Arab Republic was geographically located in Africa. These were considered a part of the Arab world and thus chosen to be included. Originally, the catalogue was planned to cover only UNESCO's Asian member states, but it was expanded to include films produced in North Africa and finally in countries of "Arab and Asian culture", although it was referred to as Survey of Asian Films throughout the project. The use of the term Arab culture is quite a fascinating choice for the title of the catalogue. While Asian culture is something determined on a geographical basis, the Arab world is quite clearly being defined based on religion. This was probably the reason behind the inclusion of Turkey. In September 1958, enquiries were made to find out if Turkey, which according to the British Film Institute saw itself as more of a Western than an Asian nation, wanted to participate – they did (UNESCO 1958b).

Religion as a basis for defining the Arab world is further suggested by the fact that Albania was also considered to be featured in the catalogue. At the time,

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43 "Territories or groups of territories which are not responsible for the conduct of their international relations may be admitted as Associate Members by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority of Members present and voting, upon application made on behalf of such territory or group of territories by the Member or other authority having responsibility for their international relations." (UNESCO, 1945, Article II(3))

the People's Republic of Albania, like all the other Balkan states excluding Greece, was a socialist state. However, the catalogue project took place outside the Cold War framework. For example, none of the other "Eastern Bloc countries in-between" (Miklóssy 2010) – Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and to a certain extent Yugoslavia and the German Democratic Republic – were included. Thus, the reasons for the discussions about Albania's placement in relation to the East-West border need to be searched for elsewhere. During its history, Albania has been an Italian colony as well as a part of both the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman Empire, and is thus shaped by both Christian and Islamic tradition. Therefore, the cultural legacy of the Ottoman Empire may also have played a part in the discussions. In practice, the decision to change the phrasing to include the Arab world did not do much to widen the geographical scope of the project, and so the decision seems to indicate a heavier focus on cultural issues as a determining factor in dividing the world into two parts. The discussion about possibly including Liberian films in the catalogue also reflects the flexible nature of the East-West border in the catalogue project, since placing it within the vague borders of Arab and Asian culture seems rather farfetched – perhaps its inclusion could simply have been justified through it belonging to the culturally non-European half of the world.

Dividing the world on a vague cultural basis also allowed the catalogue project to approach the East in other, somewhat flexible ways. The U.S.S.R.'s position in the post-World War II world, especially, turned out to demand serious consideration. The Soviet Union was eventually included in the catalogue after lengthy negotiations about whether it should be regarded as an Eastern country or not. The discussions concerning the U.S.S.R indicate that the East-West border along the Eastern border of Europe[44] was seen to be almost as shady as it was in Africa – as could well be expected. The information concerning the films from the U.S.S.R. in the catalogue also noted the producing region instead of simply listing them as Soviet films. The 28 films came from parts of the U.S.S.R. which can roughly be defined as Asian Soviet Republics. Of the films, 3 were listed under Armenia, 1 under Azerbaijan, 6 under Georgia, 4 under Kazakhstan, 2 under Kirghizia, 3 under Tadjikistan, 1 under Turkmenia, and 5 under Uzbekistan. The remaining 3 were noted to have been produced in the U.S.S.R., possibly implying multiple or unknown locations within the Soviet Union. Thus, the East-West division within the U.S.S.R. was ambiguously defined by the vague Europe-Asia border within the country, as article 2 points out.

According to the initial comments made on defining the core concepts of the Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, the understanding of East and West was to take into account, in addition to the two major civilisations, "1) intermediary countries, which have always been traditional meeting places; 2) countries, which have, long since, deliberately

44 The authors of the catalogue were not alone in having trouble locating the borders of Europe. For an account of how the understandings of Europe, especially in the direction of the East have evolved over time see Korhonen 2010.

assimilated foreign cultural features; and 3) countries which have recently acquired political independence and wish to continue the harmonious integration into their own cultures of certain Western features which they consider necessary to their vitality" (UNECO 1957d). What these countries were, was not defined. However, it might be that this notion further explains the hazy nature of the East-West border, as the list above clearly notes examples of cultures within these two civilisations that are pluralist, distinctive and combine the traditions of both East and West.

Furthermore, according to the International Advisory Committee, some categorisations could be made of groups of cultures based on the evolution of cultural values through criteria such as social science, religion, history, geography, linguistics and anthropology. However, it was made clear that any definitions of "such complementary concepts" as "East and West", "Orient and Occident" or even "Europe and Asia" would not be provided (UNESCO 1958a). Orient and Occident specifically were not seen to be entities in themselves but were "definable only as the two halves of a whole and in terms of the ideas they hold about each other" (Ibid.). Their confusion was understandable. Even today, the question of what the Orient and the Occident, "as well as their relationship to the closely related but never identical categories of East and West" actually encompass lacks adequate mapping (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 47-48). We might be tempted to interpret the terms East and West as references to geopolitical entities, whereas the terms Orient and Occident would perhaps refer to cultural ones. In the Orient project, however, these pairs of terms were used interchangeably.

With the East and the West now defined in this rather vague manner and positioned as the two parties the catalogue aimed to construct understanding between, it was merely a question of determining what it actually was that needed to be understood. The films are contextualised through the one-and-a-half page introduction of the catalogue. It was written by Winifred Holmes of the BFI, but her text was edited into its final form by UNESCO. The catalogue provides a detailed description of each of the films, complete with information on production and distribution, a general introduction, and a plot summary. "Details of the main creative and technical credits and any film-festival awards have been documented as correctly as possible, having regard to the magnitude of the task and dependence on information from many far-distant sources", the catalogue explains (Holmes 1959).

In part one, the feature films are categorised by country and presented in alphabetical order. The introduction of the catalogue notes that in the films listed in part one, we can distinguish characteristics typical of the Eastern world and as such, these films will have the capability of familiarising Western audiences not only with Eastern cinema but also with Eastern cultures. It would seem that the understanding of cinema that the Orient catalogue turned to was two-fold. First, it speaks of the filmmakers who "interpret" the cultures they are depicting, and refers to the films as "stories", implying the films were understood as representations of the Eastern world (Holmes 1959). Second, it speaks of the ways in which "whole new regions of thought, feeling and action are being revealed to

the rest of the world" through these films, suggesting that to some extent, the films were seen as constituent parts of what was understood as the reality they emerged from (Holmes 1959).

The introduction explains the selection process of the films. The films were chosen by representatives of the countries in question following general guidelines defined by UNESCO. "[A] selection has been made from among many thousands of films, of those which best illustrate significant aspects of life, feeling or thought in their country of origin and have outstanding technical and artistic qualities", the introduction notes (Holmes 1959). The films in the catalogue were chosen based on three official criteria. First, "they have been shown or received awards at recognised international film festivals" (Holmes 1959). This criterion has two clear implications when it comes to evaluating the films. First, the fact that the international film festivals were primarily European ones seems to position the Western tradition of evaluating cinema as the norm. Second, the festivals which make the most recurring appearances when the selection of individual films is described are Berlin and Venice, traditionally focused on showcasing the artistry of the films exhibited. This seems to imply that this criterion placed focus on the artistic quality of the films. Furthermore, having already been shown or awarded internationally would be an obvious guarantee that the films were pre-reviewed to be suitable for Western audiences.

Second, "they have enjoyed box-office success and wide distribution in their own countries" (Holmes 1959), which suggests that these films could equally well be treated as popular culture artefacts – as I have done in this study. This makes sense, as it was Western audiences that were targeted by the catalogue, be they movie goers, as was the case with part one, or tv watchers, as was the case with part two. However, whether these films would ever end up in cinemas or television was to up to intermediaries with possibly completely different selection criteria. Third, "they are of historical importance in the development of the art of the film in the country concerned" (Holmes 1959), implying that artistry by Western standards or domestic popularity alone were not adequate enough criteria, but instead giving room for subjective interpretations of which films held specific national importance.

In addition, films dealing with "sources of international misunderstanding" were incontrovertibly omitted despite their possible quality or popularity. This specifically meant avoiding references to the past war. Suggestions to clarify the selection process in the introduction were made by the BFI to be included in the catalogue's second round of printing, but UNESCO insisted the two editions were to be identical (UNESCO 1960a). The BFI was advised to respond to possible criticism on their own. As it later turned out, the BFI did, in fact, receive criticism on the choices of films included in the catalogue (UNESCO 1960b). Efforts to explain the selection process were, however, made in the introduction:

> Experts in the cinema of particular regions may feel that other representative films have been omitted. In some cases this is due to lack of the necessary documentation which has not been forthcoming despite repeated requests. In other cases, the National Commission for UNESCO in the member state concerned has asked for a film to be withdrawn because it considered it as not representative, as untrue to its country's

> ideas or way of life. Requests of this kind have been respected, and some films which might otherwise have been included have been omitted. However, on the whole the selection has been a free one. (Holmes 1959)

Part two, dealing with films that are by nature "factual rather than emotional and fictional", was to demonstrate that "there are many films which, however simple their techniques, produce a thrill of direct experience and comprehension, and touch the senses and the heart as well as the mind" (Holmes 1959). In other words, content wise the films in this part are ones that will provide audiences with the opportunity of understanding Eastern cultures through direct experience – although in the form they are represented on the screen. Part two is divided into six themed subsections under which the films are presented ordered according to their country of production:

> **Family Life :** town and country; domestic life; social customs; homes; betrothal; marriage. How people Live.
>
> **Art, Architecture, Arts and Crafts :** traditional and contemporary arts; craftsmen; archaeology. How People Express Themselves.
>
> **Music, Dance, Drama, Festival, Religion :** The life of the Spirit.
>
> **Today and Tomorrow :** old and new methods in fishing agriculture and industry. How People Work.
>
> **Games, Sports and Recreation :** How People Play.
>
> **New Horizons :** the child, education, medicine and health, co-operation, e.g. community projects; civic rights and duties. (Holmes 1959)

According to initial plans, the information on in which languages dubbed or subtitled versions were available and from whom they could be obtained was to be included in the description of each film (UNESCO 1957c). It was hoped that at least an English version could be provided for all films in the catalogue. However, it apparently proved to be a rather impossible task to find a sufficient number of films with English versions available, as this requirement was later completely dropped with English subtitles, dubbing or commentary[45] being available for only 49 of the 139 feature films included in the final publication – most of these were Japanese. Based on this, it can be assumed that the interpretations of the films were largely built on the English descriptions provided during the selection process. It is not, however, clear who wrote them. In addition, this indicates that the UNESCO and BFI thinking focused more on the visual aspect whereas understanding the dialogue was seen to be less significant. Thus these films were seen to address audiences across borders through the universal language of the visual.

The introduction is filled with both praise and criticism, with the former directed at the feature films and latter at the documentaries and short films:

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45 Other Western languages with subtitles, dubbing or commentary available in included Polish, Spanish, French, German and Czech.

> The Survey contains a number of films of the very highest quality. […] the big film-producing countries of the Orient are not newcomers to the cinema, although it is only recently that their films have received world recognition. As a result of their work, the art of the cinema has been immensely enriched. […] Beauty of photography – a marked characteristic of these short films – is sometimes spoilt by inferior scripting and presentation, making the film a surface record rather than a true interpretation. Sometimes a well-meaning desire to reform has marred the fresh vision of the film and loaded it with a heavy commentary of facts and figures. (Holmes 1959)

In addition to the attempts to influence the attitudes of potential Western audiences through highlighting the excellence of the films or admonishing them, their attention is turned to what the catalogue sees as the main source of problems related to understanding. With the first lines of the catalogue's introduction, a border is drawn, as the world the catalogue represents is divided into the familiar and the unfamiliar:

> New countries, old civilisations – with talented artists and technicians to interpret them – whole new regions of thought, feeling and action are being revealed to the rest of the world. The cinema, a highly-charged emotive medium, explores these new worlds and publishes its findings in vivid pictures and sounds. For many of us, for example, to see a film of a wedding in Asia is to have a fresh vision, a new experience, sharp and imprinted on the mind and sense for all time. (Holmes 1959)

The main function of the unfamiliar seems to be to intrigue the imagination of the Western audiences: There is something curious, exotic and novel about the Eastern world and these films will introduce it to us. On the other hand, the catalogue points out that where this unfamiliarity is manifested, may actually be something as familiar as a wedding. A "wedding in Asia" is a reference to the only Korean film in the catalogue as is made evident by the fact that in an earlier draft version, the word Asia was replaced by Korea. The Wedding Day (dir. Byeong-il Lee) from 1957 is a drama comedy that could best be described as having aspects of almost a Shakespearean farce to its storytelling. Whether this type of film would in reality provide Western audiences with a fresh vision or a new experience is slightly questionable. However, it does an excellent job at enhancing the idea of recognising the familiar in the unfamiliar, and even manages to blur the distinction between the two thus questioning the sense in making this distinction in the first place.

Such blurring of boundaries is, however, quickly undone. It was the following sentence that completely caught me off guard and gave this study its direction: "To Western audiences, some of the films listed here will seem strange, even incomprehensible", the catalogue warns (Holmes 1959). As I pointed out in the introduction, I was assuming that a project aiming to promote understanding between the two halves of the world would choose to lay emphasis on the similarities between Eastern and Western cultures as manifested through their traditions of filmmaking. Instead, as it soon transpired, the catalogue's focus is on the ways a distinction can be made between the two. In other words, the catalogue speaks of cultural differences as manifested through these films as a way of separating the East from the West. And it is not by accident. It is very clearly a consciously chosen strategy as is made evident by what comes next: "Despite this

underlying similarity, and despite also the difficulty of generalising, there are a few main comparisons which can be made" (Holmes 1959). A seven-point list of the differences then follows:

> (a) There is a greater emphasis on the struggle for existence, both in town and country, in oriental films.
>
> (b) Love is treated more tenderly and reticently and sex seldom exploited as such.
>
> (c) Courtesy in human relations, even among the very poor or the very tough, is seldom forgotten.
>
> (d) Violence usually has a heroic tinge, connected with the traditional warrior codes which foster national pride.
>
> (e) Sentiment and emotion are presented without apology or disguise.
>
> (f) In many countries, whatever the subject, music, song and dance are indispensable ingredients for the success of a film, among the cinema hungry, low-paying audiences for whom it is made.
>
> (g) The role of the woman as wife, mother, sister or daughter tends to be more important. Far from being a soft, clinging, submissive creature, she has strength, courage and singleness of purpose; and is often the keeper of the moral concepts of her society. Her moral fibre and practical nature are depicted as supporting the man – a dreamer, capable of poetic fancy and quixotic action but liable also to disaster through some form of weakness. (Holmes 1959)

The differences are not constructed in terms of a set of binary opposites nor do they carry positive or negative connotations. Thus, no value-loaded tension between Eastern and Western cinematic tradition is created. Instead, the phrasing used to describe the characteristics of Eastern cinema implies that the differences the authors of the catalogue observed were mainly quantitative in nature, as hinted by the recurring use of the comparative form. Essentially, based on these differences we cannot distinguish Eastern cinema from its Western counterpart on a qualitative level. Instead, we are told that the key concepts used to describe and evaluate cinema are similar in both the East and the West. The catalogue continues:

> Yet, except for religious differences, the strangeness is superficial rather than fundamental, lying rather in manners, customs, dress and social behaviour than in anything more profound. Love, marriage, family relationships, the interplay between good and evil are here, as elsewhere, the stuff of most of the stories. (Holmes 1959)

None of the differences, thus, reach beyond the surface level. As article 4 points out, this could be read as an acknowledgement of the differences in fact being of a rather artificial nature. At the same time, they are framed as being significant enough to pose a problem to UNESCO's guiding mission as they are positioned as an obstacle to intercultural understanding.

3 THE CULTURAL DIPLOMACY CONUNDRUM

On the 20th of September 1785, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison:

> You see I am an enthusiast on the subject of the arts. But it is an enthusiasm of which I am not ashamed, as its object is to improve the taste of my countrymen, to increase their reputation, to reconcile to them the respect of the world and procure them its praise. (Jefferson 1785)

Jefferson's notion of the use of cultural products to boost relations between two (political) entities was not so much a novel revelation as an assertion of an age-old practice. Using culture as an instrument in international relations to showcase assets, build relationships or project power is by no means a new invention, but the prominence given to it alters in response to the changing architecture of world politics (Reeves 2004). For UNESCO, however, it is invariably paramount. In her discussion of UNESCO as both a diplomatic forum and as an autonomous diplomatic actor, Irena Kozymka ties the organisation to the concept of cultural diplomacy and to that of the diplomacy of culture (Kozymka 2014). Basing her reasoning on the diplomacy of culture's broader understanding of culture contrasted against cultural diplomacy's focus on the arts, she differentiates the former from the latter as follows: "diplomacy for the purposes of culture rather than culture for the purposes of diplomacy". She positions UNESCO as a key actor in the field of the diplomacy of culture and as an instrument of cultural diplomacy for the member states to deploy. (Kozymka 2014, 9-10.) While Kozymka's distinction might help differentiate between the two levels of discussion, these two understandings often intersect and overlap in ways that make drawing sharp borders between them impossible. This distinction, however, helps contextualise what follows.

In this study, I conceptualise the Orient project as a multilateral cinematic cultural diplomacy initiative, even though it was never referred to as such. Already in 1958, Walter H.C. Laves proposed that UNESCO could serve to foster understanding among the citizens of the world through "cultural diplomacy" (Laves, 1958, quoted in Sathyamurthy 1964, 19). Currently, the organisation defines the concept as striving "to foster the exchange of views and ideas, promote

knowledge of other cultures, and build bridges between communities. Ultimately, it seeks to promote a positive vision of cultural diversity, highlighting it as a source of innovation, dialogue and peace" (UNESCO n.d.).

Anthony Haigh, discussing the development of cultural diplomacy in the European context, or "the activities of governments in the sphere […] of international cultural relations" (Haigh 1974, 28), distinguishes between three phases (Ibid., p. 27-60). The first one, cultural propaganda, reflects the selfish interests of governments, using the curiosity and sympathy of the citizens of another country for their own ends. The second stage of the development of cultural diplomacy, bilateral cultural cooperation, is based on enlightened self-interest and describes a situation where two countries engage in cultural propaganda aimed at the citizens of each other's countries. In this phase, both governments will have to recognise the right of the other to engage in propaganda and to provide a framework of cooperation to facilitate each other's activities.

Haigh's third phase, multilateral or collective cooperation, builds on the previous phases by acknowledging that the advantages of bilateral co-operation can be increased by the inclusion of other governments in the agreement. As a result, a regional organisation with its own treaty may develop, or the agreements and their parties may reach a scope wide enough to be incorporated into a convention by an international organisation. In the words of Robert O. Keohane, multilateralism refers to "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions" (Keohane 1990, 731). This is where international organisations, such as UNESCO, can be seen to emerge from. This requires recognition that nations and their peoples share interests across borders and that their problems can better be solved by cooperation than through the unilateral efforts of a single state. These multilateral arrangements are created voluntarily with the purpose of enhancing the capability of individual states to further the interests they share with others through cooperation and coordination of policies.

Haigh notes that the tradition of including references to international cultural cooperation in post-war treaties can be traced back to the CAME meetings held in London during World War II and, as discussed previously, it was these meetings that gave birth to UNESCO. CAME, therefore, "started a new fashion in cultural diplomacy" (Haigh 1974, 49). In the case of UNESCO's Orient project, the idea of cultural diplomacy was there even if the word was not. Promoting intercultural understanding between the East and the West through cinema is thus read here as a cultural diplomatic strategy even though it is not articulated as such or through any specific alternative term. It is instead in various expressions that we find the basis of UNESCO's understanding of the phenomenon. The justification for applying the term cultural diplomacy to actions not labelled as such by UNESCO arises from the distinction between a word and a concept: A concept may exist prior to us possessing a word to express it (Skinner 1989, 7-8).

The state-to-state level understanding of world politics intrinsic to diplomacy and its cultural forms constitutes a rather narrow and limited conception

of the study and conduct of global politics (Walker 2009), but as is indicated in Haigh's discussion above, the UNESCO framework demands the macro politics level to first be addressed in more detail. As Akira Iriye notes, international relations are, essentially, relations among nations, and as nations are cultural systems, they each have their own traditions, conventions and concerns that guide the conduct of such relations. Therefore, international relations are intercultural relations. (Iriye 1979.) The relationship between cultural diplomacy and intercultural relations is, however, slightly problematic. Just as in Haigh's definition above, cultural relations are usually seen to turn into cultural diplomacy through government involvement. Richard Arndt turns to the distinction between governmental and non-governmental actors to draw a line between the two:

> ''Cultural *relations*'' […] means literally the relations between national cultures, those aspects of intellect and education lodged in any society that tend to cross borders and connect with foreign institutions. Cultural *relations* grow naturally and organically, without government intervention—the transactions of trade and tourism, student flows, communications, book circulation, migration, media access, intermarriage—millions of daily cross-cultural encounters. If that is correct, cultural *diplomacy* can only be said to take place when formal diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance national interests. (Arndt 2005, xviii, emphasis in original)

Ien Ang, Yudhishthir Raj Isar and Phillip Mar (2015, 365) suggest that in a strict sense, cultural diplomacy can be understood as governmental practices, driven by interests, in contrast to cultural relations practiced by non-state actors, driven by ideals. However, as I have noted in article 3, between the categories of citizen and state we need to add the category of commercial actors, with motives likely different from either. In the field of cinema this is precisely where some of the biggest actors, such as film producers and distributors, are found. Given that often the film industry is tied to the state in various complex ways through regulation, policy and economic planning, but does not constitute a state actor as such, any attempt to insert it into a purely state/non-state scheme would be rather forced. Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried quite similarly propose that cultural diplomacy can be considered from two different perspectives: structural, referring to the actors involved, and conceptual, referring to the motives behind engaging in cultural diplomacy (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010, 16-17). According to this model, different definitions and their relations can be studied by placing them in relation to two axes: the structural, moving from state institutions to NGOs; and the conceptual, moving from propaganda to information. They thus abandon the actor-aim criterion as a basis for distinguishing cultural diplomacy from cultural relations, but rather treat it as means of comparing different understandings of cultural diplomacy. The main problem here seems to be that defining either propaganda or information as goals to aim for does not seem valid, since they are not goals as such, they are means to reaching a goal. This then implies that in addition to the actors and aims, we need also to be aware of the means deployed.

John M. Mitchell, too, suggests a continuum, where propaganda is placed at one extreme and cultural relations at the other, while cultural diplomacy occupies the place in the middle (Mitchell 1986, 28). His intention, perhaps, is to distance cultural diplomacy from the unwanted but often drawn parallel with propaganda. Mitchell also sets focus on the actors: international cultural relations are conducted by independent agencies, while governments manage cultural diplomacy (Mitchell 1986, 5). While useful distinctions for analytical purposes, and helpful for locating the key concepts and their differences on a flexible scale not preoccupied with strictly defining the exact meaning of the concept of cultural diplomacy, these distinctions are slightly problematic as on a practical level the differences are often non-existent and the aims and objectives of these practices quite naturally often intersect.

Used as an analytical concept, diplomacy becomes a term for differentiating between not only actors, but also the ends they strive for – both understood through state involvement. Or, as Simon L. Mark puts it, "[s]tated simply, cultural diplomacy is the deployment of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy" (Mark 2010, 43). "Diplomacy", James Der Derian, writes, "is a system of communication between strangers. It is the formal means by which the self-identity of the sovereign state is constituted and articulated through external relations with other states. […] It is also", he continues "according to the American humorist Will Rogers, 'the art of saying "Nice doggie" until you can find a rock'" (Der Derian 1993, 244). It is the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states through the application of intelligence and tact (Satow 1922, 1).

Harold Nicolson favours the contemporaneous definition given by the Oxford English Dictionary to avoid confusing the term with the intricacies of foreign policy on the one hand and international law on the other. Diplomacy, according to this definition, is understood first, as the management of international relations through negotiation; second, as the method used by ambassadors to manage these relations; and third, as the "business or art of the diplomatist" (Nicolson 1939, 15). Diplomacy, therefore, is located in the realm of international relations and conducted by professional diplomats in the name of the governments they represent. It takes the form of negotiation, whether carried out in terms of persuasion or threats, attacks or defences. One could fairly reasonably expect the same level of premediated professionalism from cultural diplomacy too, if the distinction between cultural relations and cultural diplomacy indeed is as proposed by Arndt.

In the case of the Orient project, Arndt's distinction falls flat. The catalogue project does not seem to effortlessly slide into either one of the slots but, rather, is a strange hybrid. The project was quite evidently carried out without the required level of diplomatic professionalism and involved governmental actors only indirectly. Yet, it was clearly an attempt to shape those naturally and organically flowing cross-cultural interactions that constitute cultural relations between the East and the West. A more fitting basis for making a distinction between the two here might be simply in terms of whether the role given to culture

and cultural products is an instrumental or non-instrumental one, respectively. Cultural diplomacy in this case is held up by positioning "art, language, and education […] among the most significant entry points into a culture" (Goff 2013, 420-421).

Partly, the scholarly confusion surrounding cultural diplomacy can be seen to be a result of a persisting disagreement about the term's relationship with its neighbouring concepts. Cultural diplomacy is currently commonly treated as a subset of public diplomacy (see e.g. Cull 2008; Mulcahy 1999), but it has also been approached through its possible connections with cultural imperialism (Topić and Siniša 2012), as a vehicle for nation branding (see e.g. Clerc & Valaskivi, 2018; Hurn and Tomalin 2013, 224-240; Iwabuchi 2015), or even as "the manipulation of cultural materials and personnel for propaganda purposes" (Barghoorn 1960, 10) and "self-interested national-propaganda" (Higham 2001, 138). Here, I categorically treat cultural diplomacy as a distinct phenomenon, separate from, although intertwining with, its neighbours.

Cultural diplomacy's position on the world political stage is commonly defined in terms of soft power. Soft power refers to the ability of a country to influence the preferences of another and, most importantly, to do so through the means of attraction instead of coercion. The concept was coined by Joseph Nye in 1990 within the context of the Cold War, but it has since gone through some reformulation, reflecting the shifts in the political contexts it tries to explain (see Nye 1990; 2002; 2004). Currently, soft power is the ability to get "others to want the outcomes that you want" (Nye 2004, 5). Cultural diplomacy, then, is positioned as a form or an expression of, or a claim to soft power.

Some of the earlier works on cultural diplomacy treat it as an aspect of international relations (McMurry and Lee 1947) or foreign affairs (Frankel 1965). Later accounts take a more policy oriented approach, suggesting that cultural diplomacy is best looked at as a component of foreign policy (see e.g. Mitchell 1986) – perhaps as a continuation of the work of Philip Coombs, defining culture as "the fourth dimension of foreign policy" (Coombs 1964) – while others quite determinedly locate it within the realm of public policy (see e.g. Arndt 2005), or as "an explicit cultural-policy instrument" (Singh 2010a, 12).

One of the most striking features of recent academic works on the topic is that they often open with an acknowledgement of the problematic and contested nature of the concept, followed by an attempt to position the author(s) in this debate. Perhaps to do with the fundamentally contradicting and gloriously nebulous nature of the concept, cultural diplomacy remains among the most neglected areas of not only international relations research, but political science and cultural policy studies alike, and as a result, it can rather effortlessly be labelled as one of the most problematic concepts in the history of modern diplomacy (Chay, 1990; Gienow-Hecht, 2010; Topić and Sciortino 2012; Nisbett 2016). Accordingly, definitions of the concept vary from the strict and narrow – "state-sponsored deployments of culture and education for foreign audiences" (Carter 2015, 479) – to the all-encompassing, world embracing ones: "an actor's attempt to manage the international environment through making its cultural resources

and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad" (Cull 2008, 33). A widely quoted definition by Milton C. Cummings widens the possible scope of what can be labelled as cultural diplomacy and significantly adds to the vagueness of what can comfortably be fitted under the term: "the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding" (Cummings 2009).

A major source of controversy among the various existing definitions of cultural diplomacy arises from the choice of which of the constituent concepts to emphasise. The choices of how the connections are drawn stress different focuses in relation to culture and diplomacy, implying that not only is the concept's relationship with related concepts highly contested, but so too is the relationship between the two parts of the concept. The mere fact that the term diplomacy carries ultimately political connotations not only projects political motivations onto the concept but demands that we acknowledge that the symbiosis of the terms does not, by any means, imply separating the realms of politics and culture.

Indeed, it truly is a peculiar concept if there ever was one – ruffling to those who believe that an inquiry must begin with clearly stating a definition for the key concepts. What often goes unnoticed is that being contested, contextual and highly debated are basic characteristics of any concept. Conceptual history teaches us not to be fooled by the apparent simplicity of the terms in question. Instead, we should approach them with an open mind and observe how not only our political vocabulary but also the actual meanings of words change over time, place and circumstance. As Perelman (1982) points out, the mere fact that we take a shot at defining a concept means that we implicitly admit that other, competing definitions can not only exist but that they are just as possible and likely to establish a presence as our own. This then means that whichever definition becomes dominant is the one best suitable for the given context. In other words, the means of argumentation are adjusted according to the circumstance – a textbook example of basic rhetorical strategies.

This would imply that perhaps we should not preoccupy ourselves too much with attempts to formulate a general, overarching definition of the concept of cultural diplomacy either. Acknowledging this allows us to instead focus on conceptual construction as rhetorical moves, describing the relevant world from a new perspective (Skinner 1989). To understand the meaning of a concept means looking beyond its literal meaning and focusing on how it can be applied and what it can do in a given context. Thus, here, the concept of cultural diplomacy is seen to serve as an instrument for political strategies and action, and refer to the complexity of its vocabularies, meanings and references to the external world (Palonen 1999, 42). The basic premise, however, must be that for cultural diplomacy to be necessary, we need a situation where at least two actors are separated by a boundary and recognise the need for establishing a relationship based on communication. This is in line with James Der Derian's approach to diplomacy: "Like the dialogue from which it is constructed, diplomacy requires and seeks to

mediate otherness" (Der Derian 1993, 244). Difference, therefore, becomes a necessary precondition for cultural diplomacy itself.

At the core of the fundamental conceptually manifested confusion surrounding cultural diplomacy lays the question of how we can utilise often abstract cultural argumentation to shape political realities – in this case, to construct the realm of cultural diplomacy. Therefore, I set my focus on the role culturally argued conceptual construction plays in cultural diplomatic strategies. In order to make sense of UNESCO's cultural diplomatic strategies and the embedded politics of difference, I turn to Patrick Jackson's (2006) concept of a rhetorical commonplace. Rhetorical commonplace refers to making a context defined argument through the introduction of language, which can then be utilised for legitimising particular policies at the expense of others. Simply put, it refers to the construction of arguments for justifying specific courses of action and helps understand and give meaning to the rhetorical contestations over the legitimisation of such action.

The relevance of argumentation and rhetoric is tied to the fact that language can never be politically neutral, as "[w]ho and what we are, how we arrange and classify and think about our world – and how we act in it – is deeply delimited by the conceptual, argumentative and rhetorical resources of our language" (Ball, Farr and Hanson 1989, 1-2). There is a direct correlation between the contradictory usages of concepts and our attempts to claim legitimacy for the versions of the world we are using them to describe, with these attempts being fundamental in the social construction of meaning (Hodge and Kress 1988 , 121-123). Thus, changes in our political world are intimately related to the changes in the language we use to narrate it.

A rhetorical commonplace does not require unanimity of arguments, suggesting we need not take the political world to be static, immutable, and constructed only upon mutual agreement. However, it seems quite a natural course of events for the negotiations to lead to a situation where one of the understandings ends up in a position of hegemony. As Perelman (1982) notes, such a situation does not necessarily imply an accept-reject set-up, but rather describes different levels of adherence to the different arguments made. As arguments are always addressed to specific audiences in order to establish or increase adherence, the arguments must set off from premises acceptable to said audiences. In other words, every audience-speaker-topic combination is characterised by a set of existing rhetorical commonplaces to draw from. Thus, there are two stages distinguishable to the legitimation process (Jackson 2006, 27). First, there exist general rhetorical commonplaces among the target audience. Here, these consist of UNESCO's grand narratives of the importance of intercultural understanding and the division of the world into at least two parts on the one hand, and the notion of cultural difference as conflictual on the other hand. It is the combination of these commonplaces that provides legitimation for cultural diplomacy in the UNESCO context. Second, more specific articulations link and deploy them in a particular strategy. Here, this is the primacy of intercultural understanding between the East and the West in the Orient catalogue and its reframing of cultural

difference from conflictual to a necessary factor for the peaceful conduct of world affairs.

Jackson's account, however, only addresses the power of natural language to bring about change. As the focus here is specifically on cinematic cultural diplomacy, this approach alone is not adequate. Therefore, we must widen the scope of inquiry to include non-textual symbols alike. In terms of my understanding of cinematic cultural diplomacy, we have two underlying axioms to acknowledge. First, words are not merely used to report and describe things but also to do things and, as such, language needs to be understood in terms of its ability to both invent and affect realities (Austin 1962, 1-11). Second, pictures and images function like a language, being symbols, which carry, construct and transmit meaning (Hall 1997b, 19; Mitchell 1986, 8). We must thus implicitly accept that cinema holds power equal to natural language to bring about change.

3.1 Cinematic Cultural Diplomacy and Representation: Between the "Real" and the "Imaginary"

The macro level understanding of cultural diplomacy implies that only initiatives involving official governmental participation or actors who are tied to a nation state by some other means – often attempting to reach goals defined by foreign policy aspirations – can be defined as cultural diplomacy. The nation state is thus taken as foundational and a top down view prevails. In the words of Ang et al.: "on the one hand, cultural diplomacy is supposed to advance the national interest by presenting the nation in the best possible light to the rest of the world; on the other hand, it is expected (mainly by non-state actors) to promote a more harmonious international order to the benefit of all" (Ang, Isar and Mar 2015, 370). To me, it seems that this contradiction is essentially rooted in the tendency to locate cultural diplomacy primarily in the realm of state-to-state interaction. However, the trend in both cultural diplomacy related research and practices alike seems to have been moving towards the recognition of non-state interactions alongside state centred ones. A practical example is the recent emergence of terms such as yoga diplomacy, twitter diplomacy and dance diplomacy, moving cultural diplomacy further and further away from the cabinets occupied by governments and ambassadors.

Turning the focus of study to cinema marks a move towards a broadening of the ways of understanding cultural diplomacy and global governance from a state centric to a non-state centric and everyday focused approach. This shift can be read in terms of a desire to study relations international rather than international relations, with the former laying emphasis on "varieties of connection, including politics, across the lines, fences, wires, walls, imaginations, sound bites, politics, and immigration and customs guardhouses of the world" (Sylvester 1994, 219) and giving a nudge in the direction of a more inclusive understanding

of the international and international politics. It means taking a serious look at those forms of political relations and interactions that "sort of fly under the radar of official inter-national politics" (Särmä 2014, 69) – including those that take place under the surface even within the official framework of an international organisation. In terms of the conceptual space I am working within, it means acknowledging the world politics of the everyday[46].

"The raw material of cultural diplomacy is thought", Anthony Haigh notes, "the perception of thought, the expression of thought, the communication of thought, the diffusion of thought" (Haigh 1974, 29), by implication through the means of cultural artefacts. Cultural diplomacy encompasses a wide range of activities, ranging from cultural and educational exchanges to photography exhibitions and film screenings. In general, these activities can be divided into two categories, with the exchange oriented ones operating on the basis of mutuality and the cultural product focused ones taking a one-directional form. The latter is the case with the Orient project, which, aiming to familiarise Western audiences with Eastern cultures through the promotion of Eastern films, approaches cultural products as the medium that societies utilise to construct, shape and define themselves – and, by implication, others – through fact and fiction (Neumann and Nexon 2006). As is also the case with the Orient project, the works exhibited in the cultural diplomacy context are rarely produced for such purpose. Even in the cases where the art works are commissioned to serve cultural diplomacy aims, such as Joel Meyerowtiz's 2002 photography exhibition "After September 11: Images from Ground Zero" (Kennedy 2003) touring around the globe with the goal of supporting the US's response to 9/11, the art products themselves cannot be reduced to existing only for the purpose of conveying foreign policy aims (Clarke 2016).

Cultural products, then, are not to be seen as subordinate to the concept, policy and practice of cultural diplomacy, even though positioning them as instruments of, or activities under cultural diplomacy suggests approaching them as a means of political argumentation. The extent to which cultural products existing outside the realm of policy are made use of in cultural diplomacy points to the fact that they are best understood not as detached aesthetic artefacts, but rather as constituent components of our political imaginaries. As Cynthia Weber argues, "*[A]ll cultural sites are powerful arenas in which political struggles take place.* […] Culture is not opposed to politics. *Culture is political, and politics is cultural*" (Weber 2005, 187-188, emphasis in original).

If we wish to understand how cultural factors shape politics, we must take seriously the broad cultural resources, such as popular culture, that influence political processes. Popular culture is recognised as a pivotal space in which political life is portrayed. These depictions, however, are not seen merely as passive mirrors[47]. Instead, their decisive role in constructing and shaping the political world becomes the focal point of argumentation. This enables us to challenge the

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46 By everyday I refer to a site of political activity that is in contrast with the more formal and official sites of politics. For other uses, see e.g. Stanley and Jackson 2016.

47 This was, however, a significant stream of research in earlier takes on cinema and International Relations (see especially Gregg 1998, 1999).

dominant idea that cultural diplomacy as a component of world politics is located in the public sphere alone (cf. Dittmer and Gray 2010; Enloe 1989), and to both recognise and to dismantle the dualistic oppositions between the private and the public, and the personal and the political (Caso and Hamilton 2015). Furthermore, positioning popular culture as a site of politics allows for a reconsideration of how visual politics shape the socio-political world (Bleiker 2001) and sets focus on the importance of film in seeing (Harman 2019) and showing (Shapiro 2013) politics. Popular culture is a significant site of micro politics, where identities, political subjectivities and geopolitical imaginaries are produced, contradicted, negotiated – and torn down (Fiske 1990; Shapiro 2009). Popular culture artefacts, therefore, should be thought of as a part of world politics through their ability to open ways to deconstruct dominant geopolitical norms instead of approaching them as simply a representational medium (Carter and Dodds 2014).

A key question in my approach to cinematic cultural diplomacy is what exactly the function of the popular culture artefact in politics is and how the two are linked. In general, we can distinguish two separate approaches as providing the starting point for analysing the relationship between popular culture and world politics[48]. The distinction is made in terms of two different conceptions of whether and in what way the popular culture artefact and the world that creates it are linked. The first approach echoes the ideas of Stephen Greenplatt (1988), starting from the assumption that the socio-cultural-political realities supply the material for the making of popular culture products, and that these products in turn act upon and influence these realities – a circulation of representations or an exchange of social energies (Neumann and Nexon 2006).

Second, the position taken here follows the seminal works of Michael J. Shapiro, starting from the premise that cultural artefacts are integral to a general social text (Shapiro 2009; 2013). Studying popular culture products is studying our reality, as they are born out of the same general grammar as all other social phenomena, and therefore we need not separate the world represented through the artefacts from the world we live in. The "real" and the "imaginary" are parts of the same general text and thus, cinema in itself is a worthy object of study also in the field of world politics[49]. While the two general approaches differ to a great extend in terms of their understanding of how and why to study popular culture and world politics, most fundamentally in their conceptualisation of politics as a

48 Note that in this study I focus primarily on cinema and world politics in the PCWP literature. On the preceding debates on art and politics more generally, see Adorno et al. 1977. For an overview of developments and approaches to the visual in the field of geopolitics, see Hughes 2007; and for the use of film in both geopolitics and security studies, see Dodds 2008a. However, drawing sharp disciplinary boundaries and treating the fields of both (critical) geopolitics and security studies as separate and distinct from that of PCWP in this regard seems rather arbitrary, as is perhaps best exemplified by Michael Shapiro's body of work, see also Caso & Hamilton 2015.

49 As is indicated by the use of scare quotes here, I do not treat cinema and politics as separate spheres, nor do I understand one to be more real than the other. The terms real and imaginary in the sense they appear here are merely used as a writing shorthand.

sphere and as activity[50], respectively, they both recognise popular culture as a crucial site of meaning making.

Jutta Weldes and Christina Rowley, through theorising the connections between popular culture and world politics, list five ways of studying the interaction between the two in practice (Weldes and Rowley 2015). These include state uses of popular culture; the global political economy of popular culture; cultural and political global flows; the politics of cultural consumption and cultural practices; and representations, texts and intertexts. Thus, in terms of the popular culture side of the equation, we can focus on either the aspect of production, reception or content with every approach providing a specific analytical starting point. As Weldes and Rowley point out, the majority of the work done on popular culture and world politics is situated within the analysis of visual, cultural and textual representations. This approach is primarily concerned with popular cultural delineations of world politics, as these are presumed to have political effects and play a pivotal part in the constitution of the political world.

Iver Neumann and Daniel Nexon, alike, turn to a similar understanding when determining different forms of relations between orders of representation (Neumann and Nexon 2006, 17-19). Starting from a firm belief that to a large extend, politics not only relies upon, but also produces and operates through representations, they suggest that popular culture can have constitutive effects on world politics in four different ways, proposing the effects popular culture has on the conduct of international affairs as one possible direction for research. The effects, they argue, can be determining, informing, enabling or naturalising. Determining effects, although perhaps only existing in theory, can be identified when popular culture portrayals are utilised to fill a gap in knowledge or experience in policy making. The informing effects also focus on the knowledge obtained from popular culture, but instead of looking at whether and how these artefacts can determine political outcomes, this idea starts from an understanding that in order to truly understand political power one must look at the "non-political" sites of representation. Enabling effects, on the other hand, turn to the power of metaphors. Relying on familiar narratives, political speech can draw analogies and make allusions in order to justify specific policies.

Finally, the naturalising effect of popular culture refers to its ability to make a specific way of understanding the world seem to be beyond questioning, just the way things are. It relies on resemblances between the politics of a popular culture artefact and other political representations to construct rhetorical commonplaces. "With the exception of some resistant forms," Michael Shapiro points out, "music, theater, TV weather forecasts, and even cereal box scripts tend to endorse prevailing power structures by helping to reproduce the beliefs and allegiances necessary for their uncontested functioning" (Shapiro 1992, 1). According to Cynthia Weber, too, "the myths" and "unconscious ideologies" of the imaginary worlds of popular culture function as "sub textual pillars of the real", and naturalising gestures can be read as a phenomenon of political power, for it

50 On the wider debate on politics as a sphere versus politics as activity, see Palonen 2006.

is through myths that power works (Weber 2005, 6-7). Thus, popular culture can function as a means of maintaining and reinforcing existing rhetorical commonplaces.

Shapiro, on the other hand, suggests that the fictional narratives of popular culture can also be disruptive, with cinema holding the greatest potential for such interventions (see e.g. Shapiro 2009)[51]. Popular culture can serve as a means of unseating what we think of as common truths we find difficult to argue against. As I have been searching for evidence of how exactly the Orient catalogue was meant to provide us with an alternative view of the world, I have taken the disruptive effects of popular culture as my main point of entry. Combining Shapiro's take with that of Jackson allows me to address how cultural argumentation made through the politicisation of cultural artefacts holds the potential to construct and deconstruct political realities and to make visible the politics of differentiation embedded in the notion of cinematic cultural diplomacy.

As Shapiro suggests, reality is always mediated by representation in one form or another, "[b]ecause the real is never wholly present to us—how it is real for us is always mediated through some representational practice – we lose something when we think of representation as mimetic" (Shapiro 1988, xii). Furthermore, representations are not to be looked at as descriptions of a factual world but rather as ways of constructing one (Shapiro 1989, 13-14). Slightly problematic, however, is the fact that representation as a term is not unequivocal. Does it refer merely to the end product; the chain of events leading to it coming into existence – the writing, the filming, the distribution and other necessary steps of giving meaning to the topic that is being depicted –; or to the social construction of meaning through images, narrative, dialogue and sound? Is representation to describe and depict, or to symbolise and signify; to stand in place of or to stand for (Hall 1997, 16)?

The first option, setting focus on the end product itself, would implicitly mean treating popular culture as constituted merely of objects. Popular culture, however, is not to be reduced to production or consumption, but to be treated as an active process of producing and circulating meanings (Fiske 1990, 23). If we were to take the second approach, we could for instance set focus on the production process through Richard Peterson's suggestion that the form cultural artefacts take is moulded by the dynamics of their production: "the processes of creation, manufacture, marketing, distribution, exhibiting, inculcation, evaluation, and consumption" (Peterson 1976, 10). While it is true that it is the production process where representations as cultural products take their concrete form and while the aspects listed by Peterson point to the interconnectedness of cultural products and the social structures behind them, they still do not grant us access

[51] The films Shapiro uses as examples are often not "popular" in the box-office or wide distribution sense, with many of them produced in the peripheries of the Hollywood hegemony. There are two slightly contradictory points I might be hinting towards here. Either such films are more likely to set off with a critical political agenda in the first place or alternatively, one with a more refined taste for the high arts might be more prone to reading political potential in these artefacts. As this is a bit of a sidestep from the argument I am trying to make here, I will just leave it that.

to the ways meanings are produced and transferred through representations. Or, as John Fiske notes, "popular culture lies not in the production of commodities so much as the productive use of industrial commodities" (Fiske 1990, 28) – in other words, the ways people use and abuse these commodities to create their own meanings. In addition, even though unarguably a methodologically solid starting point, the instances in which we can gain access to information concerning an adequate amount, let alone all, of the aspects Peterson lists as significant in the production process are regrettably scarce.

Therefore, in order to better grasp the dynamics of cinematic cultural diplomacy, I address representation as the production of meaning through communicative acts, in which case the focus is one suggested by Stuart Hall. Hall breaks representation down to three elements: things, concepts and signs (Hall 1997b, 17-19). Things, in this distinction, can take the form of people, objects or events. Signs can consist of words, sounds or images. To move from things to signs, we need first to construct a set of correspondences between things and concepts which represent those things. Next, we need a chain of equivalences between concepts and a set of signs which represent those concepts. Following Roland Bleiker, we must recognise the paramount indispensability of representation in our understanding of politics, and acknowledge that this, in turn, is dependent on the social construction of our political reality (Bleiker 2001)[52]. For Hall, representation is the production of meaning through language (Hall 1997b, 16). However, as the prefix *re-* implies, it is also a question of presenting and assigning meaning to something which already holds meaning. This, as Hall argues, must mean that there can be no final fixed meaning, as meaning is always dependent on the context within which it is being seen or presented. It then follows, that one additional, and possibly crucial, factor that has been implicitly or explicitly recognised in many of the takes discussed here, is that of interpretation.

3.2 Thinking with the Orient: Interpretation, Intertext and Writing-as-Method

As Walter Benjamin famously noted, an essential characteristic of modernity is an artwork becoming reproducible. For Benjamin, cinema was the most paradigmatic example of an artform in the age of mechanical reproduction. This transformation meant that art was no longer tied to institutional contexts with specific uses but, instead, it could be reused, repurposed and reinterpreted in accordance with the audiences' own recontextualisations. (Benjamin 2008.) In article 4, I built on Paul Ricouer's proposition that the messages cultural artefacts communicate and the effects they produce are created in an interplay of alternative readings piled one on top of the other. Everyone encountering the

[52] Bleiker proposes that the gap between representation and the represented is where politics, in fact, takes place. This, however, assumes separating representations from reality.

story and its previous interpretations thus adds another level of interpretation. While, according to Ricoeur, every text – such as a film – must be read at least partially in relation to the context within which it was produced, the mediation of texts decontextualises them, and every interpretation is another recontextualisation. This allows for new levels of meaning to be added, which then act or compete in a conflict of interpretations with each other. (Ricoeur 1976, see also Barthes 1977.) Thus, circulating stories and adding levels of interpretation changes the stories themselves. The position taken here and further discussed in article 4, is that the ways the films are described in the Orient catalogue provide one possible way of interpreting the films, and these interpretations themselves become stories that are open for interpretation.

In the original articles, I have consciously steered away from the restrictions of applying a specific method of analysis in the positivist sense and instead aimed to approach the films and their descriptions from a critical, conceptually and analytically oriented, starting point. By this, I simply mean that I have chosen not to apply a specific method to the analysis of a specific case or phenomenon in a predetermined way with the expectation to uncover some singular, correct truths about the films, the catalogue and what sense they make of the world (see also Bleiker 2009; Rose, 2012). Additionally, to me this has meant a focus on meaning making and interpretation as a methodological starting point.

Thus departing from an interpretative methodological starting point, I have begun my inquiry from puzzles and tensions arising from the catalogue and my prior expectations, or rhetorical commonplaces, such as the East-West polarisation in the form it took in the mid-twentieth century, UNESCO's peace building mission and the role of culture in the conduct of world affairs. Focusing on the politicisation of "apolitical" films demands that I acknowledge the political potential of films to extend beyond the ones directly engaging with issues understood as formally political activities (cf. Rockhill 2014; Rushton 2013). However, the films' possible political agenda, be it explicit or implicit, only speaks to one level of meaning making. In my treatment of the catalogue, I wanted to set focus on acknowledging agency on three levels: the one the films (or their makers) themselves might hold, the one imposed upon them through their inclusion in the catalogue, and the one read into them by me.

My approach could be, in Michael J. Shapiro's terminology, labelled writing-as-method (Shapiro 2013). Writing-as-method can be understood as the act of *thinking with* artistic texts. As opposed to seeking to explain or reproducing institutionalised and accepted frames of knowledge, thinking with the texts means creating "the conditions of possibility for imagining alternative worlds" (Shapiro 2013, xv). Writing is the practical form thinking takes, and the method – in the widest possible sense of the term – is simply a practice of critique given a visible form though engaging in the ways in which aesthetic subjects can be involved in a critical re-thinking of the political.

Building on David Bordwell's and Noël Carroll's approach to film studies, I have turned the focus away from traditional content analysis and taken a problem driven approach (Bordwell 1989; Bordwell and Carroll 1996) – or, sticking

with the writing-as-method mindset, a problematising driven approach. In practice, this means posing specific questions to the cinematic material analysed and, in this case, to the ways the films have been spoken of and the ways these two levels of meaning making intersect. However, this brings us to a central challenge for analysis, since we encounter sets of separate systems of meaning making. For the purposes of analysis, the meanings derived from cinematic material need to be interpreted and presented in word form – narrated in order to be understood.

Here, the questions posed to the films and the catalogue's reading of them concern how UNESCO turned to the politicisation of cinema to address the politics of difference and guided the reading of the films in the catalogue with each of the original articles taking on a different angle: How can we conceptualise the use of cinema as an expression of UNESCO's aims to promote its principles of peace, understanding and solidarity, and to shape attitudes and opinions accordingly (article 1)?; How can cinema serve to employ the rhetoric of hope in arguing for the importance of adapting to a post-World War II world in which humanity was not to be divided by internal differences but rather united by hope for a better future (article 2)?; How can cinema function as a vehicle for national image transformation in the context of a multilateral cultural diplomatic initiative aiming to promote the ideal of intercultural understanding (article 3)?; and how did UNESCO utilise cinema's disruptive powers to propose a post-war world order where the structuring of the world on the basis of Cold War and post-colonial polarisations gives way to the primacy of the cultural aspect of world politics (article 4)?.

Simply put, all one needs to do is know how to watch a film and ask interesting and relevant questions. While it is true that anyone can watch a film or listen to a piece of music and draw some form of politically inclined interpretation from it, it does not mean that we are automatically and effortlessly able to acquire an intellectual understanding of it (Monaco 2000, 152). It is, of course, possible – and in fact quite common – to analyse popular culture artefacts as separate entities, isolated from the political contexts of those artefacts. There is something undeniably universal about the visual aspect of cinema, which allows for meanings to be drawn from it without a prior set of skills. However, it is the recognition of the contexts within which these meanings emerge that allows us to grasp the full potential of what these artefacts can do, and what can be done with them. The contexts this study places my interpretations in are two-fold. In this introductory part, the context is provided by UNESCO itself, while in the original articles I have also contextualised the films through the contemporaneous political contexts they emerged from. These contexts are not seen to exist outside of and separate from the catalogue or the films in it, but rather as parts of the same metatext.

In other words, I see popular culture representations as being constructed intertextually, with popular cultural products and world politics read in relation to each other (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989). In fact, popular culture can only be read intertextually, for no single text is a sufficient, complete object (Fiske 1990,

126). My take on intertextuality is not preoccupied only by locating parallels between texts, but also the possible contradictions between them. In other words, looking at the interfaces, where different texts relate to one another in different ways (Weldes 2003, 15). Intertextual analysis or intertextual theorising is therefore understood here in the sense of meaning being derived from an interrelationship of texts (Der Derian 1989, 6). In the original articles, the texts between which the parallels are drawn, or contradictions identified are the films, the catalogue, the documents leading to its publication, official UNESCO documents, and literature in post-war politics in varying combinations. This, again, draws from Shapiro's notion of a general social text which allows for popular culture artefacts and politics to be treated as equal components in the production of meaning.

How, then, do we investigate an intertext in practice? Shapiro suggests that finding a popular culture artefact which, when placed in juxtaposition with what we tend to label as the real world, offers a critical way of thinking about the questions of politics and thus constitutes a new way of thinking (Shapiro 2013) – such as the films and their readings in the Orient catalogue placed against the sociopolitical situation within which they emerged. The clearest example of this can be found in the discussion in article 4, which notes that as the project was aiming to promote intercultural understanding, films "dealing with sources of international misunderstanding" were omitted (Holmes 1959). In practice, this meant avoiding references to the recent war and, by implication, the geopolitical turmoil that followed. However, the catalogue does contain films where such references are not difficult to detect – most notably the five films directed by Kurosawa Akira. The article then juxtaposes the films and the interpretations in the catalogue against the political situation of post-war Japan.

Shapiro further proposes utilising the means of juxtaposing aesthetic subjects, defined as "those who through artistic genres, articulate and mobilize thinking" (Shapiro 2013, 11), to bare the burden of analysis. Shapiro's aesthetic subjects are primarily the protagonists in artistic texts (in the wide sense of text). Similarly, my readings of the films and the catalogue's interpretation of them zoom in on how it is primarily through the characters that the ways in which the films themselves have been recontextualised and repurposed for the catalogue becomes apparent. In this sense, the notion of aesthetic subjects helps make concrete the ways the films have been politicised in practice. Article 2 sets focus on how, through the characters of the Japanese, Soviet and Indian films as described in the catalogue, a general storyline of hope has been created, even though all three countries clearly came into the project with an agenda of promoting specific national interests. Article 3 brings attention to the occasional contradiction between the contents of two of the Japanese films included in the catalogue and the way they are described in it, setting focus on the characters which are left out of the catalogue's descriptions possibly because their inclusion might have worked against the catalogue's goals. Article 4 looks at five films by Kurosawa Akira and, primarily through their characters, contrasts them with the general characterisations of Eastern cinema provided in the introduction of the catalogue. Article 1

focuses on the actors making these comparisons possible in the first place: the people and organisations behind the conceptions and descriptions in the catalogue.

Additionally, as Shapiro implies, my own subject position as a relevant component of inquiry must also be recognised (Shapiro 2013, 15). As Fiske puts it, "the text is a text only when I read it" and thus, one cannot study a text without studying oneself as a viewer (Fiske 1990, 59). Therefore, my own writing should also be juxtaposed with the other aesthetic subjects under examination, as is done most transparently in article 4. Meaning is thus not hiding behind the artefacts waiting to be discovered, but in front of them: Meaning stands with the interpreter, and comes into being as a result of the interaction between the interpreter, the object of interpretation and the context within which the interpretation takes place (Ricoeur 1976). Thus, another point that needs to be acknowledged is the interpreter's own position in conceptualising the meanings derived from the objects under analysis. As the meanings one reads into a popular culture artefact necessarily rise from one's own cultural framework(s) and are contextualised according to the choices of analytical frameworks, the nature of the interaction between the object of representation, the popular culture artefact itself, and the interpreter would be dependent upon the context. I therefore recognise Stuart Hall's notion of culture as "a process, a set of practices" primarily concerned with "the production and exchange of meanings", which is dependent on its participants to be able to meaningfully interpret what is around them in roughly similar ways (Hall 1997b, 2).

As Kyle Grayson aptly points out, if we are to take Hall's argument seriously – as I believe we should –, we must be willing to reflect upon our own interpretative practices and the contexts that shape them in a straightforward manner (Grayson 2015). Thus, occasionally inserting myself into the text throughout this study and talking about how I ended up doing what I have done is a decision arising not from a desire to have the reader come out of this knowing more about me than the topic of my study, but rather from wanting to be open and upfront about the choices I have made throughout the interpretation process. Thus, while I wish to let the films and the catalogue do the talking, it is crucial to be forthright about my role in determining how I hear what they have to say – I am, after all, specifically interested in the politicisation of cinema in the context of cultural diplomacy and global governance. In a sense, then, what is at stake here, is recognising the interplay of representations and the representations of those representations, while simultaneously staying aware of my own position in interpreting them. In other words, the main methodological consideration here is that of recognising both the ambivalence of cinematic representations and the variety of possible interpretations resulting from both the recognition of several forms of agency at play and the continuous negotiation of meaning making.

In this introductory part, the juxtaposition of aesthetic subjects takes the form of contrasting the catalogue's attempts to argue for cultural differences as a road to peace against the realities constructed through its understanding of the conflictuality of Eastern cultures as different from those of the West. The primary

texts to be analysed thus are the catalogue's notions of cultural difference reflected against the functions of these differences within the UNESCO system, bringing focus to the internal contradictions presented in the next chapter. Here, I follow Jean Bethke Elshtain in her deconstructive treatment of Freud. "Freud, it seems, was more hopeful than he knew", she notes, "[b]ut his texts know better and work to undermine his own explicit arguments in vital and interesting ways" (Elshtain 1989, 65-66). In other words, counterposing what is explicitly stated to what the text implicitly says when reflected against UNESCO's mandate and mission.

4 THE ORIENT AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENTIATION

The original articles point out that culture in the context of the Orient project is both a possible source of conflict and a solution to it: In a sense, seeing in cultural distinctiveness—made visible through creative expressions—the possibility of a common culture. To understand this apparent contradiction forming the basis of UNESCO's cultural diplomatic strategy in the catalogue and the politics of differentiation embedded in it, I return to Patrick Jackson's concept of a rhetorical commonplace (Jackson 2006). As explained in chapter 3, rhetorical commonplaces refer to the discursive ways of framing a specific issue by using existing frameworks that are taken as given.

Firstly, I note that positioning the primacy of intercultural understanding between the East and the West forms the basis of UNESCO's cultural diplomatic strategy and treat this as a recognition and refinement of an existing commonplace constructed upon the conflictuality of cultural difference between the East and the West. Secondly, I look at the ways UNESCO turned to the disruptive power of cinema to question the basis of that commonplace through a shift towards dismantling the proclaimed link between difference and conflict ultimately aiming to clear a space for a rhetorical commonplace that positions cultural difference as a necessary factor for the peaceful conduct of world affairs. The distinction between the two is made here through the explicit and implicit levels of meaning making. The former is read through the explicitly stated aims of the catalogue, and the latter through motives detectable from UNESCO itself as manifested in the organisation's conception of culture.

However, crucially for my account, Jackson's concept has one major shortcoming: the omission of motives. While agency is central to his approach, he notes that the fact that "individuals might easily be lying about their motives" (Ibid., 22) poses a problem. He does nevertheless quite explicitly recognise the existence of motives as a determining component in the construction of commonplaces (Ibid., 24). Therefore, while we cannot necessarily know the motives and so must exclude them from our account, they are still a factor. In the case of UNESCO, this dilemma is easily solved since the motives at play must stem from

the organisation's constitutionally dictated mandate. In what follows, the catalogue is thus reflected against UNESCO's aims along with the unavoidable restraints the UNESCO system itself poses to the attainability of those aims as a result of its intimate and irrevocable relationship with the nation state and national culture.

4.1 The Primacy of the Nation State and the "Moral Solidarity of Mankind"

Officially, the Orient catalogue aimed to "stimulate the presentation of films which might give audiences in the West a fuller and more informed idea of the ways of life of Eastern peoples" (Holmes 1959). Through a reading of the catalogue with an emphasis on the actors involved in the project, article 1 describes the three key actors behind the catalogue project and their distinct, although intertwining motives: UNESCO, the British Film Institute and the National Commissions for UNESCO. In practice, the aims defining the catalogue project were three-fold. First, it was to promote the art of film, echoing the ideas of the British Film Institute. Second, it functioned as a platform for national image building for the member states. Third, it was to promote UNESCO's objectives to build the foundations of peace in the minds of men and to influence opinions accordingly through providing information and education. It was, however, UNESCO's aims that overruled those of the others.

The official aim stated clearly spells out the basis of the rhetorical commonplace that forms the explicit basis of the catalogue project. Firstly, it makes a clear reference to the basic logic of UNESCO's conception of how world affairs are to be conducted in a peaceful manner: through understanding. Secondly, the aim also suggests that the world within which the preconditions of such understanding were to be constructed was divided into two on a civilisational basis. In Jackson's account, the first and central mechanism in the emergence of rhetorical commonplaces is that of specifying a weakly shared notion, referring to a situation where an actor tries to redefine an existing rhetorical commonplace. In this case, the roots of this specific rhetorical commonplace reach deep into the very foundations of the organisation, while its justification also borrows aspects from being woven together with the geopolitical realities of the time. Like is the case here, rhetorical commonplaces do not refer to anything materially real, but are instead approached as conceptual constructs. Therefore, their use comes across as fundamentally political. In the catalogue, cultures are both implicitly and explicitly referred to as something to be understood and as such, fundamentally different. Since the existence of cultural differences is not only acknowledged but also emphasised and even reinforced in the catalogue, it would appear that this is seen as a problem to be overcome. This does not, however, mean that the catalogue would attempt to dismantle the borders between cultures.

The countries included in the Orient catalogue were categorically classified as part of the East. If we understand the process of defining a concept as marking its boundaries – that is, mapping the space within which the concept exists as itself without merging into other related concepts, or in this case, turning into its polar opposite – we need only to look at the cover page of the catalogue to find a point of departure. In the Orient project, East was defined as "Countries of Arab and Asian Culture" – referred to in the singular –, tying together country and culture, and furthermore, approaching the East as a "supracontinental block" (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 10) definable on a civilisational basis.

Through an account of Germany's reconstruction in the post-World War II period, Jackson argues that the rhetorical construction of "Western civilisation" played a key role in the emergence of the post-war world order as we now understand it. He builds his argument around the exploration of how Germany's post-war reintegration into the vaguely defined Western community was largely achieved through civilisational discourse, implying that Western civilisation as we now know it is, in fact, a political construction, being created and recreated as a result of a conscious process of cultural argumentation: constructing a civilisational entity argued for in terms of culture. A rhetorical commonplace therefore has practical implications since it would influence the policies leading to the legitimation of such a reimagining of how the world is constructed.

Quite similarly, the Orient catalogue constructs our understanding of the East. As article 3 notes, in addition to presenting their countries of origin, the films in the catalogue were to construct the East as it was to be represented to the West. However, article 4 points out that it is impossible to determine for certain whether constructing the East as a single distinguishable cultural system was a conscious aim of the Orient project, even though that is what ended up happening in practice. The cultural diplomatic strategy of utilising the East and the West as discursive concepts in this manner is somewhat baffling for two primary reasons.

First, it seems to speak against the Westphalian principles of sovereignty that lurk behind UNESCO's relationship with the nation state, as a focus on the nation state is an intrinsic characteristic of the UNESCO system. "With a view to preserving the independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures and educational systems of the States Members of this Organisation, the Organisation is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction", the UNESCO Constitution states (UNESCO 1945, article 1(3)). Simply put, the primacy of the nation state must not and cannot be overruled: UNESCO is, after all, an international organisation.

It then logically follows that the films in both part one and part two are categorised by their country of origin, and thus, what the West needs to understand is in fact specific national cultures confined by state borders. As Iriye notes, "[t]he world consisting of […] cultures may be different from one made up of sovereign states, but it is still a world with national and territorial boundaries" (Iriye 2002, 6). Therefore, the catalogue's approach to culture could be argued to

lack legitimacy as a basis to structure the world in the objective sense as the cultural differences essentially seem to be national differences. Thus, culture is conceptualised as something that belongs to a particular group of people. It can be pluralised and utilised to refer to something associated with national heritage and identity, and their cinematic representations. The films are thus seen to be a cinematic expression of national cultures and to reveal their distinctiveness in relation to others – primarily the West. There is thus the question of whether the films reflect an existing truth or produce meanings through representation, creating a community assumed to have a shared, coherent existence to be considered (Bromley 2010, 11). Whether specific films adequately and accurately express the essence of a culture is not, however, a very productive question. Taking this approach would mean assuming that films can represent the whole diversity of a culture compressing it into what is seen on the screen (Thornley 2009, 109). Instead, we can look at them as choices about which aspects are seen as worthy of representing to others. The choices were essentially choices about how to represent Eastern cultures to Western audiences, dictating both which meanings are produced and how they are produced.

Nevertheless, cultures in the catalogue become entities confined by borders and comprising groups sharing basic values and customs. National cultures can thus be compared and placed in opposition. The practical implications of the "myth of the nation-state" (Mikesell 1983) are taken to their logical conclusion in the way one of the differences listed in the catalogue is formulated: "Violence usually has a heroic tinge, connected with the traditional warrior codes which foster national pride" (Holmes 1959). As article 4 suggests in its analysis of Kurosawa Akira's Seven Samurai (1954), this is quite likely a reference to the several samurai films in the catalogue. Drawing a connection between national cinema, national culture and national pride seems like an odd move to make – especially as such a connection is drawn on the grounds of heroic violence. However, great effort has been put into making sure that Western audiences would not read too much into claims such as this one. Take a look, for example, at the discussion of Kinugasa Teinosuke's Gate of Hell (1953) in article 3, which compares the plot summary of the film in the catalogue with the film's actual contents. One of the main characters is samurai lord Taira no Kiyomori, an actual historical character known in Japanese epics as a ruthless and violent man. This real life warlord is not mentioned in the catalogue's description of the film.

It seems that the catalogue's understanding of a nation and national culture echoes Johann Gottfried Herder's ideas of a nation's unique character as a collective spirit, which compels its cultivation through the celebration of its culture (Herder 1966). From the end of World War I, Herder's notion of *Kultur* had slowly replaced the notion of a universal civilisation, measuring and accrediting value according only to certain Western standards, with a new idea of civilisation (Duara 2001, 102-103). The German concept of *Kultur* was thus opposed to the French Enlightenment concept of civilisation. UNESCO's underlying idealism, however, is usually read to be a continuation of the Enlightenment universalist ideals. It seems, then, that UNESCO's ideals were mostly communicated in

transnational terms, while the practicalities of culture were understood in the national context. It was not, however, that the catalogue's understanding of the construction of a national imaginary as a particular, socially constructed, imagined political community (Anderson 1991) was one accomplished through the mediation of cultural forms such as cinema. Rather, the role of cultural products as understood in the catalogue is primarily to represent and cultivate what Herder saw as already existing raw material comprising the essence of a nation.

It is, of course, perfectly possible for cinema to serve as a means of national image building both internally and externally thus advancing overtly political goals, with propaganda and censorship being the most obvious forms through which cinema can be involved. A focus on these forms demands a shift to looking at national film policy and the workings of the film industry – production, distribution and exhibition. Turning a critical eye to the gatekeeping practices and hierarchies of film governance can reveal the huge impact they have on the stories that get told through cinema and thus help us see the politics of knowledge production embedded in the industry itself (see Harman 2019). Articles 3 and 4 address the level of film policy through the mechanisms of film censorship. Article 4 specifically, points out how the political agenda imposed upon the films in the catalogue was completely turned on its head when put into a different context of interpretation. Kurosawa Akira's *Walkers on Tigers' Tails* (1945), for example, was interpreted as overly patriotic and nationalistic in the context of post-war Japan with its U.S. driven censorship, but was reinterpreted as being an instrument for enhancing intercultural understanding when included in the catalogue.

UNESCO's take on world affairs is best understood as a form of internationalism, which, by definition, cannot exist without nations. For UNESCO, the national and the international are two sides of the same coin, dependent on each other rather than in conflict. The British Minister of Education and the President of the Founding Conference, Ellen Wilkinson, explained in her opening speech at the Founding Conference: "We here could not be interested in international work if we were not firmly rooted in our national loyalties. You cannot build a bridge unless there is solid earth at each end of the bridge. Our international organisation, intended to be a bridge between nations, must rest firmly on foundations dug deeply in the national life and tradition of the member states. International fellowship and national personality are not incompatible" (UNESCO 1946, 24).

As article 2 explains, UNESCO's understanding of global politics bares notable resemblance to the idealist school of world politics theory, or the interwar liberal internationalists as Paul Rich proposes to call them (Rich 2002) [53]. It draws connections between Norman Angell's concept of adaptation (Angell 1910) and UNESCO's reactions to the changing world. The liberal internationalists' impact upon the organisation also has a concrete dimension, as among the architects of UNESCO was Alfred Zimmern. Zimmern's approach to world politics was a version of liberal internationalism, which highlighted both the significance of the

[53] In his 1939 book *The Twenty Years Crisis*, E.H. Carr from the opposing realist school labelled this intellectual tradition idealism, which he saw as misguided and utopian (Carr 1939). Thus, using a label originally intended to mock and undermine their work seems rather insulting.

British Empire and Commonwealth in setting international standards of civilisation (Zimmern 1926) and the role of the League of Nations in the establishment of an international framework of law (Zimmern 1936). (Rich 2002.)

Zimmern had served as the Deputy Director of one of UNESCO's predecessors, the League of Nations' Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, from 1926 to 1930. Zimmern had then been engaged in CAME and continued by guiding UNESCO's preliminary working committee. He also served as Director-General at the Founding Conference. He was elected the first executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission, but following his illness, was replaced by Julian Huxley. After his recovery he returned and was appointed to an office named, rather vaguely, Adviser. In the running for UNESCO's first Director-General, Zimmern was, again, replaced by Julian Huxley as the British candidate for reasons possibly ranging from his anti-scientific views through political ties to personal grudges (Toye and Toye 2010). On the other hand, it may also have been a question of differing views on the functions of education for peace and international cooperation: Whereas for Huxley the basis of scientific humanism was to construct loyalty to a world state, Zimmern believed in educating people towards global responsibility without them needing to sacrifice their national ties and allegiances (Sluga 2010; Toye and Toye 2010). In the late 1940s, Zimmern moved to the U.S., becoming Deputy Director of the Hertford Council for UNESCO at Hertford, Connecticut, and was involved in the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. (Markwell, 1986; Rich, 2002; Sewell, 1975.)

It was not the liberal internationalists alone, who placed their hopes on internationalism as manifested in international organisations, primarily the specialised agencies of the United Nations. Even the more hardcore representatives of the realist school acknowledged the role of the UN and its special agencies in the creation of a peaceful world (Sluga 2013, 1-2). Hans Morgenthau quotes David Mitrany on the significance of overlaying "political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually integrated" (Mitrany 1944, 6), and continues to assert that:

> The specialized agencies of the United Nations, serving peoples all over the world regardless of national boundaries, could create by the very fact of their existence and performance a community of interests, valuations, and actions. Ultimately, if such international agencies would be numerous enough and would serve the most important wants of most peoples of the earth, the loyalties to these institutions and to the international community of which they are agencies would supersede the loyalties to the separate national societies and their institutions. (Morgenthau 1948, 413)

Following article 3, it needs to be noted that while the primary task of the national representatives unquestionably was to define what aspects of their national cultures were to be represented to the West, underlying this was the task of constructing the East for the same purpose. In the case of Japan, this was done by zooming in on Japan as the core of Eastern civilisation in a form fitting the purposes of the catalogue project. Japan as a nation was thus placed in the East

through naming it as a central pillar of Eastern culture while simultaneously constructing its international stance through emphasising the similarities between Japan and the West. The cinematic representations of national cultures, while being represented as unified, therefore became more of a vehicle for dividing the world into two.

There is, however, one notable exception. The choice to note specific regions within the U.S.S.R. instead of treating it as a monolithic whole seems an attempt to shift the focus from the nation state towards a recognition of cultural difference within a state, therefore suggesting an alternative understanding of both the national and the international[54]. Furthermore, while the differences the catalogue recognises are derived from expressions of national culture, it is not stated which difference corresponds to which nation. Instead, the differences describe groups of cultures, or "Arab and Asian culture" (Holmes 1959), again moving away from the state centric understanding of culture. The treatment of the Soviet films in the catalogue could be read as a recognition that national cultures should be thought of as discursive devices which represent internal difference as unity through the exercise of cultural power (Hall 1992, 297). Here, the one exercising that power is UNESCO.

In article 1, I suggested conceptualising UNESCO in terms of it possessing and exercising the power to move actors by persuasion as a form of cultural power as understood by Johan Galtung (Galtung 1996, 2) instead of Nye's conception of soft power (Nye 1990; 2002; 2004). UNESCO aims to position itself as a moral force in global politics, since the organisation's actual enforcement powers are barely worth mentioning (Singh 2010b). UNESCO's practical functioning is restricted, as its immediate elements are nation states (Sewell, 1975; Wells, 1987) and thus, regulatory and juridical strategies as such are alien to the organisations with legislation only being possible through multilateral treaties, which themselves are subject to ratification by their signatories (Buehrig 1976, 679). As is evident in the UNESCO Constitution, its strategy is based on its suggested ability to actively influence attitudes and opinions: "That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed" (UNESCO 1945, Preamble).

For contemporary UNESCO, the terms cultural diplomacy and soft power, however, go firmly hand in hand: "Cultural soft power – sometimes referred to as cultural diplomacy – is a form of soft power" (UNESCO n.d.). I am, however, tempted to view this more as just another instance of conceptual confusion than a clear indication of a conscious choice to link the two terms together. This is primarily to do with the fact that Nye's concept with its embedded neoliberalism simply does not fit in with UNESCO's culturally oriented way of perceiving the world. Soft power, while being concerned with persuasion, is centred around global markets. As Melissa Nisbett notes, the focus on free trade can be at odds with cultural diplomacy's aims of promoting mutual understanding (Nisbett

54 UNESCO's relationship with the Soviet Republics is slightly odd. The Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR both joined UNESCO as full members in 1954, even though they were legally represented by the Soviet Union in their foreign affairs.

2016) – at least if mutual understanding in all its ambiguity does not coincide with economic interests. Even though some of UNESCO's later policies, initiatives and instruments aiming for the protection and promotion of cultural and creative industries call for, among other things, more equal access to global markets (UNESCO 2005) and can thus clearly be thought of in economic terms, drawing direct connections between the concept of soft power and UNESCO's constitutionally dictated mandate would be rather farfetched. Moreover, when it comes to free trade and cultural products – one of the primary instruments of cultural diplomacy – the latter hold a unique position. The disputes about whether or not cultural industry products could or should be subjected to free trade agreements taking place in The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and World Trade Organization contexts led to what is known as the "cultural exception". This means that cultural products are treated differently from other commodities as they hold special significance for national identities. Thus, when it comes to culture, free trade can also be at odds with national interests. (Meunier, 2000; Singh 2015, 34-37.)

Alfred Zimmern noted in 1923, that in the traditional sense of the term, internationalism is concerned with cooperation between states, not between nations (Zimmern 1923). Thus, he proposed, the term should instead be inter-state organisation, as it has little to do with the direct relationship between nations and everything to do with the mutual relations of sovereign states. For him, true internationalism was about contact between nations. Thus, the treatment of the Soviet films implies a shift towards Zimmern's understanding of the term, thus widening the scope of what can be fitted under UNESCO's understanding of cultural diplomacy. The form of internationalism particular to UNESCO, then, could be thought of as cultural internationalism in Akira Iriye's terminology: "the fostering of international cooperation through cultural activities across national boundaries" (Iriye 1997, 3) – especially if we understand the "international" in this definition to be the one proposed by Alfred Zimmern. While Zimmern himself was slowly being smoked out of the organisation, it seems that his ideas stuck – not, however, on the level of practice. Zimmern had, for example, proposed the establishment of an international studies centre near UNESCO headquarters, but his vision was never executed.

Internationalism alone, however, is not a term adequate to describe UNESCO's stance. As a form of political principle with a focus on interests instead of ideals it lacks the value basis characteristic of UNESCO and thus, conceptualising the organisation by squeezing it into this frame would only give us a rather limited part of the picture. As article 1 notes, it is UNESCO's constitutionally embedded idealism that provides it with a mandate to implement change. Since its outset, UNESCO's approach to peace building has been labelled by the dichotomy between national culture, rooted in the primacy of the nation state, and world culture, rooted in the ideal of the unity and solidarity of humankind. This is evident in the organisation's Constitution, in which "[t]he Governments of the States Parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples" call for the "intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind" (UNESCO 1945, Preamble). In other words,

UNESCO, by its legal essence, is an intergovernmental organisation of member states, constructed upon the primacy of national culture. However, within the organisation there also exists a persistent belief in the emergence of the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind, which can be achieved through intercultural understanding and which in turn will result in a shared world culture.

Therefore, the second source of confusion arising from the catalogue's way of utilising the East and the West as discursive concepts is that such a bipolar understanding of the structure of our world seems to problematise the very basis the organisation is built on: "the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind" the UNESCO Constitution firmly sets its hopes upon (UNESCO 1945, Preamble). An evident rupture in an envisioned unity of all humankind, one might argue. Thus, UNESCO, while by nature tied to the confines of the 300-year-old tradition of the nation state and national culture, turned to its founding ideals of cosmopolitan values.

It could thus be argued that for UNESCO, nation states exist within what Manfred Steger has termed a "global imaginary" (Steger 2008). Referring to the consciousness of belonging to a shared global community, a global imaginary is a discursive construct, which represents the world as a coherent whole within which the relations among peoples and nations can be mapped and defined. Building on Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities", it constructs nations, peoples and cultures, but unlike Anderson's idea, which centres around shared ideologies within nations, it looks at the ways global interconnectedness is transcending state borders and creating a shared sense of world community. While Steger's account seeks to dismantle the imagined borders of nationhood, UNESCO, on the other hand, recognises the coexistence of two levels of such global communities: one of states confined by formal borders, and one of people transcending them. The forms the connections between nations take can be international as well as transnational, as the catalogue makes evident.

As I suggested in article 1, this set-up can be conceptualised with the help of a set of terms associated with the English School of world politics theory. The English School tradition is built on a triad of concepts for theorising the conduct of world politics: international system, international society and world society. First, the concept of international system focuses on power politics among states and places the structure of international anarchy at the centre of world politics theory. Second, the concept of international society focuses on the institutionalisation of common interests among states and places the construction of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of world politics theory. Finally, the concept of world society focuses on individuals and non-state organisations and places transcendence of the states system at the centre of world politics theory. This triad of concepts captures the concurrent existence of both state and non-state systems operating through and together with each other, without finding this conceptually problematic. Like UNESCO, the English school stands for the belief that it is ideas instead of material factors that shape world politics. From this starting point, this intellectual tradition explores the option of peaceful co-operation within the international system. (Bull, 2012; Buzan, 2001; Buzan, 2004.)

In other words, this notion as it is used in article 1 was my first attempt to bring together the state centric and non-state centric understandings of doing global politics within the UNESCO framework. This made sense to me, as the English school terminology seemed to allow for a more inclusive understanding of the international – one quite evidently characteristic to UNESCO.

While the high ideals UNESCO speaks of are ones we should all share as members of the human race, there are restrictions to how UNESCO as an organisation can pursue its goals. Thus, one might question how well the practicalities of cultural difference rooted in the acknowledgement of separate national cultures fits together with the equally forceful ideal of globally shared values. Furthermore, one could argue that in terms of UNESCO's higher aims, the practical form of international or intergovernmental organisations would be a step back from the task of denationalising politics, rejecting the state as the primary unit in the international system, dismantling the assumed dependencies attaching people to specific cultures, and establishing a global society defined in terms of links between people and communities. This set up does not, however, need to be looked at as contradictory, or these two components as mutually exclusive. Instead, the coexistence of these two within the UNESCO system not only makes perfect sense but forms, in fact, the basis the organisation is built on. For UNESCO, we are all representatives of both national culture and world culture; We are citizens of a nation state and citizens of the world.

With the Orient catalogue, the primacy of intercultural understanding between the East and the West was positioned at the core of UNESCO's cultural diplomatic strategy. The strategies of argumentation behind this rhetorical commonplace are a part of a process where social boundaries are defined. They become visible through the creation of both actions and actors: the promotion of peace, understanding and appreciation between the culturally defined political reifications labelled East and West. The backbone of this commonplace in its form specific to the Orient catalogue is evidently constructed drawing on the two metanarratives circulating within the UNESCO system as distinguished in chapter 2: the crucial importance of promoting intercultural understanding, and the division of the world into two.

The actors defined in cultural terms became manifested as political reifications resulting from them being placed in opposition: They are politicised through polarisation. A rhetorical commonplace thus creates actions and actors, but it also constructs the goals the actors are aiming for, defining not only the frame of the process but the process itself. UNESCO, then, functions as both a mediator and an enabler. It provides the platform for cultural diplomatic action, along with constructing a situation where these relations in this specific form are positioned as being of primary importance. Therefore, the world the catalogue explicitly describes leans on existing rhetorical commonplaces that are merely refined to provide legitimisation for the catalogue project and built upon the conflictuality of cultural difference between the East and the West.

4.2 The Necessity of Cultural Difference

The list of cultural differences in the catalogue, presented as the main source of problems related to understanding, covers quite a wide array of social phenomena ranging from the way love and sex are treated to the role of music in the films, and from the characteristics of the standard female character to representations of violence. None of the differences listed in the catalogue, however, reach beyond the surface level as the catalogue itself points out. The catalogue recognises the existence of differences as a possible source of conflict, but instead of attempting to dismantle or even smooth them over, it essentially embraces them. It presents them in concrete, almost tangible terms while making sure to emphasise that they are ultimately minor, primarily quantitative and can be discussed in terms western audiences are familiar with. Casting these differences in a clearer light is evidently hoped to reduce intolerance, bigotry and superstition.

As the catalogue lists the cultural differences between the East and the West from a Western perspective, it could rather effortlessly be interpreted as reflecting the relationship of the West to the East. However, *Orient: A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture* is not read in this study as an orientalist text, as article 4 explains. At the heart of Orientalism as originally formulated by Edward Said lays an ideology of difference (Said 1979). It constructs the East and the West as both internally coherent and mutually exclusive entities through creating oppositions, which serve to place the East in a subordinate position. A central notion in Said's critique also applies to the East in the catalogue: An Orient does not exist without its discursive construction. Since the publication of Said's *Orientalism*, the radical East-West dichotomisation has become the go-to framework for analysing Western depictions of the East, widening the scope beyond Said's original focus on the Middle East.

It does, however, need to be pointed out that the project took place in a post-colonial setting determined by the decolonisation process, which had further polarised the world into East and West bringing the older paradigm of the two as opposite cultural forces back to the centre of focus of world affairs. Thus, it is evident that the attitudes and linguistic conventions of the time were highly influenced by this development. Analysing the Orient catalogue from the perspective of Orientalism would only lead to stating that these attitudes and conventions were present, just as was excepted.

I must, nevertheless, admit that when encountering the catalogue for the first time my initial instinct was to push it precisely into this framework. When I originally stumbled upon mentions of the catalogue at the UNESCO archives in Paris, it was the title of the catalogue that first awoke my interest. Surely, with a title like that, Edward Said would be shivering with anticipation to turn a critical eye to it. How wrong I was, it soon transpired, and how little justice such a restricted reading would do to such a fascinating story. The rationale behind making the distinction between the East and the West in the catalogue was to propose a critical re-examination of who and what the East and the West consisted of and

how they were to be spoken of. In the catalogue, rather than reproducing orientalist discourse, the notion of cultural difference serves the purpose of illuminating and providing means to understand the values underlying distant national and regional cultures and to encourage reflection on the basic problems of intercultural understanding.

While the catalogue positions Eastern peoples as not only representatives of the Eastern world but also as representatives of individual nation states, the way it describes the cultural characteristics of these determinants is universal. The wordings chosen to describe the aspects of Eastern culture in the catalogue are exactly the same as we might use to describe our own cultural conduct to someone from a different cultural background or to ask questions about theirs. "To Western audiences, some of the films listed here will seem strange, even incomprehensible", the introduction notes. "Yet, except for religious differences, the strangeness is superficial rather than fundamental, lying rather in manners, customs, dress and social behaviour than in anything more profound. Love, marriage, family relationships, the interplay between good and evil are here, as elsewhere, the stuff of most of the stories." (Holmes 1959) Thus, what separates us is the practicalities of everyday cultural conduct, while the similarities are found on the deeper level of shared values.

In the UNESCO context, this way of thinking can be traced back to the work of anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. In the beginning of the 1950s, UNESCO commissioned a text on ethnocentrism from Lévi-Strauss. Later regarded as a classic work on anti-racism, his booklet *Race and History* (Race et Histoire) put forward the idea that cultures could not be ranked in terms of their level of development (Lévi-Strauss 1952). Instead, they were to be regarded as different but equal. The Orient catalogue thus echoes his ideas: Cultures were not only to be understood as being different, but also appreciated as equals. Within Lévi-Strauss's structuralist cultural relativism was hidden a belief that underpinning cultural distinctiveness, were cultural universals.

UNESCO's main instrument in its peace building mission is culture, which for the organisation carries special significance and is closely tied with the organisation's way of conceptualising and understanding the world. As a post-war peace organisation, UNESCO's purpose is "to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture" (UNESCO 1945, Article 1(1)). Since its founding, UNESCO has evoked questions of what culture is and how it can serve as an aspect in world politics, working towards the ultimate goal of peace. For UNESCO, culture is not merely a subfield of policies and activities. It is a means of communication, aiming to promote understanding through science and education. Carrying so much value, it is no wonder that modern day UNESCO tends to define it in rather vague and overly inclusive terms. The Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity from 2001 defines culture as "the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs" (UNESCO 2001).

Back in 1959, the situation was, not that surprisingly, slightly different. Even though the establishment of UNESCO was sparked by a belief in a relationship between cultural understanding and peace, the question of what culture in fact was and, more importantly, how it could serve as a means to building peace remained somewhat hazy. What was clear, however, was that by identifying itself as a cultural organisation, UNESCO placed culture to serve the political aspirations of the United Nations system. The Orient catalogue makes no attempt to define its core concept, culture, even though it is precisely cultural differences that separate the East from the West. Thus, the understandings and meanings given to it must be searched for through different, implicit expressions instead of explicit explanations.

Cultural studies pioneer Raymond Williams famously defined culture as one of the most "complicated words in the English language" (Williams 1985, 87). This is hardly surprising, considering that, for example, in 1952 A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn loaded the term with more than 200 possible definitions (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952). In his book *Keywords*, Williams specifically spoke of the difficulty of defining the *word* culture. However, as Quentin Skinner in his discussion of *Keywords* points out, if we truly wish to understand the ways others see the world, what we need to know is not the words they use, but the concepts they possess (Skinner 1989, 7). There exists a systematic relationship between a word and a concept, Skinner suggests. While standardly the possession of a concept becomes visible through the possession of a corresponding term, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for possessing a concept to be able to correctly apply the corresponding term (Ibid. 7-8).

Despite the difficulty of providing a general definition for the concept, four approaches to the concept of culture can be distinguished. In 1958, Williams offered an account on the history of the idea of culture and its development as a response to the surrounding changes in the social and economic conditions of industrialisation in England (Williams 1958). As noted in chapter 2, he discussed three historical traditions, or broad categories of usage, in terms of understandings of the concept of culture: the normative, the aesthetic and the social/anthropological concept of culture. The normative tradition refers to culture as the cultivation of the mind and intellectual development, closely tied to the idea of human perfection. The aesthetic, on the other hand, sees culture in terms of the arts and creative expressions. Finally, the anthropological sense of culture positions culture as a whole way of life. Interestingly, all three of these seem to be simultaneously at play in the catalogue. This is most descriptively visible in the ways the documentaries and short films are categorised as described in more detail in Chapter 2.1: 1) Family Life; 2) Art, Architecture, Arts and Crafts; 3) Music, Dance, Drama, Festival, Religion; 4) Today and Tomorrow; 5) Games, Sports and Recreation; 6) New Horizons.

In this list, great effort seems to have gone into making a distinction between the three understandings, although they also overlap in quite interesting ways. The first, fourth and fifth categories evidently see culture in Williams's anthropological sense, while the second one turns to the aesthetic understanding.

The third one quite fluently seems to envision an understanding where the normative notion gets a concrete form through the aesthetic one. The phrasing of the sixth and final one is rather fascinating, encompassing "the child, education, medicine and health, co-operation, e.g. community projects; civic rights and duties" (Holmes 1959). While it appears to be a mix of the anthropological and normative senses of culture, it also raises a fundamental question when it comes to UNESCO's understanding of culture. By placing education under culture, it questions whether the "E" (education) in UNESCO is in fact just a component of its "C" (culture). Category four, similarly, referring to agriculture and industry, poses the same question in terms of the organisation's "S" (science).

However, it is the anthropological understanding of culture that takes the centre stage. Culture is seen in terms of continuity: It is rooted in tradition and history. In Williams' original phrasing, culture in this sense is indicative of a particular way of life. The word "particular" holds special significance, as it makes it possible to speak of distinct cultures in the plural. As Williams points out, the pluralising of cultures, traceable back to the ideas of Herder, means recognising that the idea that there is only one correct pattern of development is disputable. "New countries, old civilisations", the catalogue describes the Eastern world (Holmes 1959), speaking of cultures in the plural and thus implying a recognition of a plurality of cultures within the Eastern world. The world, therefore, consists of both a plurality and pluralism of civilisations, meaning that civilisations not only exist in the plural within one civilisation of modernity, but also that they are internally pluralist rather than being unitary (Katzenstein 2009). It could be argued that the limited notion of Eastern and Western cultures was, in fact, more flexible than it might at first glance seem, containing and making space for a conceptually unlimited number of cultures quite possibly compressed into the East-West dichotomy for practical reasons.

Interestingly, the purpose of part one was originally stated as being to assist film festival organisers in finding suitable film content produced in the East in order to help the West both comprehend and appreciate the culture, life and ideals of Asian and Arab countries (UNESCO 1957a), thus making a distinction between the aesthetic and anthropological senses and even adding ideals as a separate component to be understood. Since the emergence of cultural studies as a separate discipline and field of research, a dominant understanding among cultural theorists, most notably Raymond Williams (Williams 1981) and Stuart Hall (du Gay, et al. 1997) has been one of culture as a set of signifying practices. This tradition approaches culture in terms of shared meanings. While this idea was merely hinted towards in the times of the catalogue, the recognition of variation, change and exchange suggests an understanding of culture in terms of communication and mediation of meanings.

Anthropologist Clifford Geertz defines culture as a "historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life" (Geertz 1973, 89). More importantly, he suggests a possibility of interpreting cultures as collections

of stories we tell about ourselves to ourselves (Ibid., 448) – and, surely, about each other to each other as well. What this means from the perspective of analysis, Geertz explains: "Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning" (Ibid., 5), setting focus on an essentially semiotic understanding of culture. Searching for meaning through the stories we tell thus requires interpreting them. The films in the catalogue can be looked at as stories told about the cultures from which they emerged – primarily to themselves, as most of them were originally produced for the domestic market, but eventually to others alike through their inclusion in the catalogue. The catalogue then uses these films as an instrument in the process of signifying and meaning making, and furthermore, as an instrument for shedding new light on the notion of difference and its function within the UNESCO system.

With the list of differences, we see the aim of understanding in a slightly different light: The West should look at the East as different enough to find it exotic and fascinating and consider it as something worth appreciating. The catalogue speaks of differences in such a way that we cannot really help but be intrigued. The differences build up expectations of spectacles of adventure with intriguing exotic heroes and heroines, struggles, dancing, honour and sword-fights. There is something curious, exotic and novel about the Eastern world and these films will introduce it to Western audiences. Presented like this, the differences become a positive.

This makes sense. The world the Orient catalogue emerged from was drastically different from the one that originally gave birth to UNESCO. The Allied and Axis powers were now on the same side, working together towards a world of peace. Even the U.S. and the Soviet Union had found in UNESCO not another ideological battlefield, but a platform for cooperation – at least for the time being. Clearly, it was time to forget about what had gone wrong in the past and focus on what the future could bring. With the old hostilities set aside, it made very little sense to play a new game by the old rules. For its first decade UNESCO, like the whole of the UN, had remained essentially a Western organisation. In its early years, the cultural differences UNESCO had to deal with within its own system were thus more a question of gradience than clear-cut distinctions. It would therefore have been rather easy to imagine that given enough time, the differences could have been smoothed over, if not erased altogether. The problem of conflictual difference was solvable.

Largely resulting from the accelerating decolonisation process, UNESCO had nearly doubled in size since its founding by the mid-1950s. UNESCO was now turning into a truly global organisation, which brought about a new set of challenges that needed to be tackled to honour the principles stated in the UNESCO Constitution. In 1955, representatives of 29 governments of mainly newly independent countries from Asia, Africa and the Middle East had gathered in Bandung, Indonesia, to discuss decolonisation, economic and cultural co-

operation, and the role of the Third World in the Cold War (Acharya 2016). Representing over half of the world's population, the Bandung Conference constructed the foundations for the nonaligned movement during the Cold War (Jansen 1966). More importantly, it was a demonstration of the demands of the emerging Asian and African nations to be treated as equal actors in world affairs (Köchler 1982). However, in many cases the Third World countries remained economically dependent on the "developed" nations, often their former colonising powers (Alavi and Shanin 1982). The independence meant therefore not so much economic independence, but rather a formal acknowledgement of "nationhood" within organisations like UNESCO (Tomlinson 1991, 15).

Whether by design or merely an intriguing coincidence, about half of the countries featured in the catalogue had participated in the Bandung conference. Thus, it seems, it would have made sense to separately distinguish the "third" part of the world in the catalogue in order to recognise the inadequacy of such polarisations as the East and the West in the first place. However, as the Orient catalogue's conception of the world implies, in practice the East-West discourse is fundamentally embedded in the conceptualisations of the Third World as well. The East-West division the catalogue turned to was not based on the West and the Third World as polar opposites either. Japan, for example, could by no means be positioned as a part of the Third World, even though it was one of the Bandung participants.

The East in the catalogue seems to include representatives from every one of the three worlds of the Cold War scheme. Among the countries with the biggest number of films are countries from opposite sides of the Cold War polarisation: Japan and the U.S.S.R.. Keeping them company in the top three is India, an ex-colony, representing what can only be awkwardly labelled as the third half of the Cold War world. While it would be tempting to reduce UNESCO to a puppet of its member states, especially in the context of the Cold War Realpolitik (see e.g. Graham 2006), the catalogue suggests an alternative understanding of post-war UNESCO itself, as article 4 explains. Much of the research on the post-war period tends to be excessively preoccupied with the Cold War as the determinant of political, economic and cultural practices alike, and the legacies of the inter-war period in the shaping of the post-war order are all too easily cast aside (Aitken 2011; Isaac 2007). Moreover, it is evident that despite the Cold War divide, cultural diplomacy initiatives between the East and the West continued in the form of exchanges of people, cultural artefacts and ideas (Mikkonen, Parkkinen and Scott-Smith 2018). Initiatives such as the Orient catalogue assured that internationalist tendencies remained alive and well also within the UNESCO system, positioning it as a highly political and politicised organisation, and most importantly, an active contributor to the construction of the international system as discussed further in articles 1 and 4.

While my discussion here positions UNESCO's post-war cinematic cultural diplomacy beyond the geopolitical polarisations of the Cold War, the restraints posed by the conflict must still to some extend be acknowledged. This is not least

due to the fact that during the Cold War, cinema became a key means of influencing "the minds of men". Recently scholarly attention has increasingly focused on the intellectual and cultural aspects of the Cold War in addition to the more traditional military and diplomacy oriented dimensions. The "cultural turn in Cold War history", as Robert Griffith has labelled it, has set focus on how culture shaped and was shaped by the Cold War (Griffith 2001).

Recent accounts of the cinematic Cold War approach cinema either as an ideological battlefield (see e.g. Shaw and Youngblood 2010; Roth-Ey 2011) or as a platform for cooperation (see e.g. Siefert 2012; Siefert 2014; Kozovoi 2016). In other words, cinema's contribution to the conflict is conceptualised in terms of either propaganda or diplomacy. During the Cold War, cinema indeed emerged as a major site for constructing meaning for the general public within and between the two blocs, being utilised to aggravate tensions through simplified cultural and ideological conceptions. As I have discussed in article 2, the collection of Soviet films paints a picture of a future of solidarity, which seemed to primarily be a means of promoting the ideals of the Soviet socialist empire. Thus the U.S.SR. participation in the catalogue project does to some extend imply the catalogue becoming yet another arena of the Cold War by both constructing internal cohesion within the Soviet Union and representing its values to the West in the best possible light. It was the same hope of solidarity, however, that directed the whole catalogue project, but covering the whole of humankind.

UNESCO reacted to the Cold War polarisation by turning to cultural diplomacy as one of the key means of smoothing over these tensions, engaging in what article 1 refers to as peace propaganda. Cultural diplomacy, in fact, became one of the key means of governing the tensions and preventing the situation from escalating into another worldwide armed conflict (Hixson 1996; Richmond 2003). Yet, framing UNESCO's cinematic cultural diplomacy strategies only in terms of the Cold War would be drastically misleading. Thus, while it would be tempting to approach the Orient catalogue in the Cold War geopolitical frame, addressing it as an aspect of the cinematic Cold War, this was not the reality UNESCO operated in. One might thus argue that UNESCO, true to its nature, responded to the dynamics of a bipolar world by positioning itself and its operations firmly outside of it. While the catalogue carried implications of the Cold War along with the West and the Third World divisions, it followed purely neither structure. Instead, the East-West issue was primarily a question of civilisations, a term frequently used synonymously with cultures in the catalogue and the documents leading to its publication. The differences between these two halves of the world remained central to UNESCO's understanding of world affairs.

Difference, however, is not reduced to a mere source of evoking interest or appreciation. Recognising that dialogue between cultures can be established and intercultural understanding promoted only if cultures are categorically seen as different, therefore following Wolfgang Welsch's assertion that the traditional notions of culture are models that essentialise cultures as static and separate (Welsch 1999), differences become a necessity. No matter how small, the differences simply had to exist. As article 4 asks: If there were no cultural differences,

why would we need an organisation dedicated to negotiating between them? Thus, the differences presented as a necessity are utilised to justify not only the catalogue project but the whole existence of UNESCO.

In the catalogue, difference itself appears in word form, as an instrument for polemical labelling. The meanings given to it are derived from the cinematic material presented in the catalogue and thus it functions as a tool bridging popular culture artefacts with political realities as lived and perceived by those encountering the catalogue. More specifically, it is the interpretations of popular culture artefacts that need to be given the centre stage. Popular culture and its interpretations can question whether what we think of as the natural order of things is actually by necessity so, therefore creating a critical space for reflecting upon our expectation that things will always be the way they are now (Shapiro 2009).

The catalogue sets focus on two levels of action: To replace ignorance with knowledge, and misunderstanding with understanding on the one hand, and to negotiate cultural differences between the Eastern and Western worlds through cultural means on the other hand. Understanding, for UNESCO, is not the ability to quote by heart the quirks and characteristics of the other half of the world, but rather a demand for the recognition of the significance of the peaceful coexistence of cultures. As the UNESCO Constitution puts it: "That ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war" (UNESCO 1945, Preamble). Therefore, it is not the differences themselves that lead to war and conflict, but the misguided, negative attitudes towards them. It then follows that it is not on the organisation's agenda to rid the world of these problematic differences: "[T]he States Parties to this Constitution […] are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives". Therefore, cultural variation becomes a necessary condition for structuring UNESCO's world and understanding the positions of the people in it. The catalogue thus turned to the disruptive power of cinema to question the linkage between difference and conflict and to lay the foundations for a rhetorical commonplace, where difference was to be an indispensable factor in the peaceful conduct of world affairs.

For the founders of UNESCO, the best of all possible worlds – to borrow Gottfried Leibniz's expression – was not this one, but one just around the corner. As the UNESCO Constitution phrased it, this new world carried with it the promise of understanding, solidarity and peace. It would not be brought about by chance, destiny or the whimsical will of a higher being, but by humankind itself – it merely required an adjustment of attitude. With the Orient catalogue, UNESCO officials thus placed their hopes in the people of the world and determinately started guiding them towards a time when the emergence of such a world would be possible.

5 CONCLUSIONS: NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCE

This study set out to address the potential cinema holds for speaking to the politics of difference as a mechanism of cinematic cultural diplomacy in the post-World War II UNESCO context, posing the question of how the politicisation of cinema can serve to address the politics of difference in global governance. It started from the premise that engaging with the visual can help address global political issues (Bleiker 2018), noting that this assertion could be strengthened by analyses of actual historical cases. Consequently, the aim was to examine the potential cinema holds for bringing about change and the ways that potential can be put to use through a specific case study. It suggested that the Orient catalogue was a fitting case study to address these issues because of its openness about its political aims and its bringing together of state centric and non-state centric understandings of world politics. Approaching the Orient catalogue as a multilateral cinematic cultural diplomacy initiative, it asked how the conceptualisation of culture as a marker of difference directed the catalogue's approach to cultural diplomacy and guided the interpretation of the films in it. Working towards an understanding of the concept of cultural diplomacy in the context of the catalogue was positioned as one of the underlying aims of the study.

Since its outset, one of UNESCO's primary concerns has been to emphasise the role cultural co-operation can play in the establishment and strengthening of peaceful intercultural relations. However, it took two decades for the organisation to outline the principles nations and their peoples should follow when engaging in such relations. In 1966, UNESCO's General Conference at its 14th session adopted a Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation (UNESCO 1966). The aim of the declaration was to promote peace and welfare in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations through international cultural co-operation, which was noted to take the forms of either bilateral or multilateral, either regional or universal. The Declaration notes: "1. Each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and preserved. 2. Every people has the right and the duty to develop its culture. 3. In their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal influences they exert on one another, all cultures form part

of the common heritage belonging to all mankind"(Ibid., Article I). It seems the Declaration explicitly verbalises what was only hinted towards in the Orient catalogue project. As the Orient project was initiated almost a decade prior to the official adoption of these jointly held and universal principles, one could argue that the project perhaps served as a practice round for the organisation's attempts towards the establishment of peaceful international cultural relations as a key component in its national policy guiding mission and for an axiomatisation of its high ideals.

This study put forward three main arguments. First, it proposed that UNESCO's treatment of cultural and political polarisations in the Orient catalogue holds a promise for a critical intervention in the ways the functions of difference are understood as a mechanism of cultural diplomacy. The catalogue's premise is that Eastern and Western culture differ from each other to such an extent that understanding between the two must be promoted. Thus, differences had to be present in order to argue for the necessity of promoting understanding between the two in the first place – even if it required coarse generalisations or even some degree of fabrication. This would suggest that East and West were seen as two distinct entities definable mainly in relation to each other but also as possessing enough actor like qualities to engage in cultural exchanges aimed at mutual understanding of their respective cultural values. This sets focus on the discussion of what and who East and West actually signify, as the attempts to define these categories reveal the essential problems of homogenous identities. However, in the context of the catalogue, the East and the West are best understood as conceptual, cultural constellations that primarily serve the purpose of categorising, thus opening a space for the practice of cultural diplomacy.

In the catalogue, the world is divided into two along a cultural border between the East and the West, and there exists a lack of understanding between these two halves. In other words, the world consists of two major civilisational entities distinguishable by their values and practices. This type of highly politicised cultural argumentation lies at the heart of cultural diplomacy. It emphasises identity based differences most commonly on the national level (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), but also in the context of the local, regional and global. This in turn creates and enhances international and intercultural polarisations. Cultural diplomacy, in turn, is expected to serve as a means towards easing these tensions (Arndt 2005; McMurry and Lee 1947). To put it more simply, cultural diplomacy helps create the very problem it is trying to solve, thus legitimising its own existence.

A willingness to establish communication in order to settle a dispute, negotiate, or advance one's goals implies envisioning a solution through argumentation instead of turning to the use of force. Cultural diplomacy can therefore be understood as dialogue across cultural dividing lines – in this case, one separating the East from the West. We must then recognise that in the context of UNESCO's Orient catalogue, cultural diplomacy must essentially be about negotiating between and through cultural differences between the East and the West.

Moreover, cultural diplomacy in general can, in fact, be understood as a self-fulfilling prophecy, constructed upon the politics of differentiation. The categorisation of East and West, however, is not particularly specific, let alone analytical. The East and the West, instead, are polemical labels. Furthermore, they are UNESCO's authoritative attempts to define the division of the world on a civilisational basis, thus marking the organisation's understanding of culture as both political and politicised.

Second, this study suggested that with the Orient catalogue, UNESCO turned to cinema to propagate its message of peace, directly addressing the global population as a whole and bypassing the confines of the state centric understanding of doing politics to which UNESCO is inherently tied. With cultural diplomacy and global governance as the topic of study, the tendency to equate a political unit with a territorial unit, framing the state as the primary actor in world politics and state-to-state interaction as the unit of analysis must function as the primary point of departure.

The main dispute surrounding UNESCO's understanding of culture and its relationship with the state centric understanding of world politics can be read in terms of the opposition created through the national culture versus world culture set up. People representing their national cultures need to communicate in order to understand and appreciate each other, the catalogue suggests. This would then mean that with the catalogue, UNESCO does not argue for a universal world culture. Instead, cultures remain distinct, separate and bounded. While the catalogue might come across as attempting to appear politically innocent, or perhaps even apolitical, the political conclusions that can be drawn from the catalogue's understanding of culture carry heavy connotations. A simple conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is that the description of the world as read through the concept of culture in the Orient catalogue does not necessarily reflect the universalistic shared value base UNESCO aims to promote. On the other hand, it seems the catalogue's solution to this problem is also rather simple: It is the practicalities that separate cultures, while the shared values unite them. Thus, the catalogue deals with both the relativity of (national) cultures and the universality of values.

The expressions used to represent UNESCO's understanding of the concept of culture in the context of the Orient catalogue are anything but self-explanatory and consistent. Instead, they are labelled by internal contradictions and debates. It seems there are two primary conceptions of culture at play in the catalogue: the anthropological understanding of culture as a way of life of a particular group and the understanding of culture as creative expressions. However, the notion of culture in the catalogue also carries normative aspects and positions culture as a policy area and as an issue of identity and civilisation.

UNESCO's universalistic approach to cultural diplomacy casts initiatives such as the Orient project as somewhat non-political. Positioning culture as something to be understood and appreciated and holding deeper value of its own comes across as highly non-instrumental, whereas framing culture as the facilitator of understanding and appreciation holds fundamentally instrumental value in its consolidation of inherently political objectives. Thus, steering away from

the policy aspect of politics and towards politicisation, and recognising that the motivation behind cultural diplomacy is inherently political (Mitchell 1986), UNESCO's approach to cultural diplomacy in the framework provided by the catalogue is best looked at as cultural relations politicised and positioned broadly as a multidimensional process in the realm of international cultural politics. It is characterised by the surrounding socio-political contexts and various national objectives intertwining with UNESCO's grand cultural narratives of mutual understanding and education for peace.

While the catalogue might suggest several concepts of culture, it seems to be dominated by a view one might label as cultural relativism, seeing cultures as bounded entities characterised by their distinguishing sets of practices and values. While different, they still hold an equal position of significance in UNESCO's world. This distinctiveness is something the catalogue seems to want to maintain and promote, suggesting that a glimpse over a cultural border will provide ideas for alternative ways of living and understanding the world and others who inhabit it. For UNESCO, this does not mean merely tolerating difference or even respecting it. It means celebrating the plurality of cultures, as it is implied that it is precisely in this distinctiveness where we can find the factors uniting us across cultural and national borders.

However, tying the study of cultural diplomacy and global governance together with an interest in the political potential of cinema demands we broaden our understanding of global governance to also address the everyday, non-state centric forms of politics as equally legitimate sites. For UNESCO, the primary player in world politics may be the nation state, but the most powerful political force is the global population as a whole. There is something undeniably universal about the visual aspect of cinema, which allows for meanings to be drawn from it without a prior set of skills. This is precisely where UNESCO placed its hopes for addressing global audiences beyond and outside the framework of state centrism. The ambiguity of meaning and its negotiation between a number of agencies and contexts of interpretation was, however, clearly recognised as they went to great lengths to guide the ways the films in the catalogue were to be interpreted. In their attempts to ensure that the films would be read in a way that would promote the catalogue's cultural diplomatic aims of fostering intercultural understanding and dialogue between the East and the West, the focus was set on culture as a marker of difference between the two.

Third, and finally, this study sought to emphasise the need to explore the ways cinematic representations can be used to speak to the politics of difference in global governance, and to stress how such explorations both widen our understanding of the political potential of popular culture and demand a more inclusive understanding of the meaning of the international. My reading of the catalogue provides one account of UNESCO's understanding of the world, which at times seems at odds with the reality that the rest of the world perceives. The idea that an international organisation can completely reimagine the world through something as seemingly innocuous as cinema is quite radical, and to me a pretty great example of alternative ways to bring about political change. This glimpse into a

reality in which the promotion of intercultural understanding is of crucial importance and replaces geopolitical and economic issues as the dominant paradigm reminds us not to mistake the political world for something to be taken for granted.

The catalogue illustrates unyielding trust in the potential of cinema to overcome the conflictual notions of difference and to instead embrace it on the basis of understanding and appreciation and ultimately, to celebrate difference as an imperative asset in the construction of a peaceful world order. The politicised battle over dismantling the proclaimed link between difference and conflict becomes a strategy in UNESCO's broader fight against prejudice and intolerance. The Orient project provides a practical example of historical processes of social construction and points out that any decision to employ a rhetoric of difference in practice cannot be seen as an inevitable consequence of historical context alone: We can always distinguish conscious strategies at work in the background. Echoing the words of Patrick Jackson, whether we decide to base policies or practices on these bases is merely a normative and political question – nothing more. Cultural differences for UNESCO, therefore, are not an obstacle to international cooperation. In the world of the Orient catalogue, even major cultural conflicts such as the Cold War and the decolonisation process can be reframed in service of UNESCO's cultural diplomatic agenda. As if to underline this, the differences are recognised, respected and even emphasised, but bridged together through UNESCO's foundational narrative of moral solidarity and mutual understanding.

It seems the role of culture in the catalogue is regarded in terms of its unifying potential and its capacity to prevent cultural differences from escalating into a conflict based on misunderstanding between nations. While the catalogue explicitly recognises and reinforces the idea that Eastern and Western culture differ from each other to such an extent that understanding between the two must be promoted, it implicitly argues for the recognition of these differences as a necessary precondition for the peaceful conduct of world affairs as is made visible when reflected against UNESCO's mandate and mission. The differences drawn from the films in the catalogue are described in a way to carefully avoid feeding political anxieties over cultural difference. They make the potentially intimidating unknown known. The films, then, serve to connect across the difference they supposedly reveal. The films themselves were not originally produced with this aim in mind, which sets focus on both the multiplicity of competing meanings to be derived from cinema and the ways interpretation of specific films can be guided to serve a specific political agenda. Thus, in order for us to identify the ways in which politicised popular culture artefacts can be used to address global political issues, we must recognise that the interaction between popular culture and politics is a result of negotiating between competing meanings. Furthermore, such negotiations can be analysed with the aid of visualising the process of meaning making as a spiral circling between four factors: the object of representation, the popular culture artefact, the interpreter, and each of the three's embedded context.

Implicitly, the catalogue argues for the emergence of a world order of peace, solidarity and understanding as envisioned in the UNESCO Constitution, while simultaneously justifying the significance of UNESCO within this world order, as exemplified by the emphasis laid on the cultural differences distinguished in the catalogue. This critical turning point in UNESCO's take on world affairs from the explicit recognition of difference as conflictual to an implicit understanding of it as a necessary factor within the UNESCO system was argued for through reinterpreting and repurposing the films included in the catalogue to serve the catalogue's cultural diplomatic agenda. Cinematic cultural diplomacy in the context of the catalogue can therefore be understood as utilising imaginary worlds to influence political realities, or more precisely, as a result of a process of transferring meanings between these two realms through the politicisation of cinema.

Why, then, does any of this matter? It matters because "increasingly the world is comprehended and acted upon not through speech-acts but word-pictures" (Der Derian 2010, 183). While for many, social media might now be the preferred forum for casually sharing and absorbing information, cinema still remains a significant site that people turn to to make sense of the world – with services such as Netflix making cinema more conveniently accessible than ever before. Even those with not enough patience to sit through a whole two hours cannot escape the embedded trailers and adverts, memes, casually dropped quotes and references, or carefully crafted strategic analogies (in this regard no one still has the good old Top Gun moment by George W. Bush beat (see Dodds 2008a, 479)). Cinema is what links together human interventions and world politics, connecting the everyday to the practices of global governance. It matters because of the integral part visual politics plays in maintaining and strengthening the dynamics of difference, drawing borders between peoples and cultures.

But why turn to the Cold War era, and what exactly are we to learn from it (besides the obvious fact that living in the constant fear of eminent doom is simply quite unpleasant)? Perhaps slightly surprisingly, hidden under the surface of the political polarisations rooted in the exaggeration of cultural differences, we find stories that help us question the idea of labelling difference as a problem. Taking place in the late 1950s, the Orient catalogue provides insight into a specific case where cinema's disruptive potential was put to use to question the mechanisms of such dynamics within a political context in which the tensions based on cultural difference were clearly visible.

There is something comforting in the fact that even during the destruction of World War II and the era of political polarisations that followed, at a time when it seemed as if the world was doomed, there still remained a group of people who categorically refused to give up hope. This hope is something that is less visible in UNESCO's policies and practices today, although it still prevails in the organisation's official rhetoric. This might, in fact, be where UNESCO's current credibility problems partially arise from, but that is a story to be told at another time. Nevertheless, as I hope this account has demonstrated, that hope was there, and I believe that is something worth not only remembering, but also learning from. This suggests a wider and more inclusive understanding of the means and forms

of global governance and the variety of surprisingly innovative ways international organisations can work towards the aims that define and justify their existence, and find ways of working around the confines dictated by their own form and functions. It seems that UNESCO does indeed hold the capacity to cultivate the foundations of peace directly in the minds of men – and even to reimagine what those foundations could be.

It matters because cinema, speaking a language of universalist aspirations across geographical and temporal boundaries, continues to enable dialogue connecting the politics of the everyday with wider political issues. In the context of cultural diplomacy, this is likely to become all the more relevant, as the era of global cultural flows facilitates engagements with other cultures in ways that are not conducted under official, state run cultural diplomacy initiatives. A focus on popular culture thus enables a move away from state-to-state analysis and towards the recognition of alternative dynamics of cultural diplomacy.

My reading of the catalogue has set focus on the ways the films listed within it were utilised to provoke reactions ultimately aiming to nurture intercultural understanding in a world labelled by cultural and political polarisations. It has sought to address the numerous points of agency in interpretation and negotiation over meaning making. In describing the process of the politicisation of seemingly apolitical films, this study calls for a wider conceptualisation of what can be understood as political cinema in the context of global governance. It must be one that sees political potential beyond direct impacts and causal outcomes, and addresses cinema as a site of imagining and analysing change. Furthermore, it demands that we not treat cinema or politics as fixed entities but rather as practices the form of which and relationship between must be understood as a context dependent negotiation over meaning making. It advances a commitment to a more inclusive conception of the international – one that belongs not only to states, but to people alike.

Ultimately, it matters because of the ways cinema's potential can be put to use to address culture as a marker of difference and to question such difference as a site of conflict and hostility. In the 61 years since the publishing of the catalogue we have learned to acknowledge cultural diversity as an integral part of our world – in part through international declarations and conventions facilitated by UNESCO. But the problem remains. As a reaction to the current "flaring conflicts, acts of violence and intolerance", UNESCO is engaged in the International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures 2013–2022 (UNESCO 2019). It is seen to be a commitment to addressing the need for peoples and nations to join forces "for the development of a universal global consciousness free from stereotypes and prejudices" and to address new "articulations between cultural diversity and universal values". Diversity and difference are frequently equated both on the level of the everyday and official political rhetoric, but in practice the discourse celebrating diversity can in fact camouflage the politics embedded in it (see Weber 2010). Looking at this issue through the lens of cinematic cultural diplomacy, the notion of rhetorical commonplaces uncovers the mechanisms of difference inherent in UNESCO's cultural diplomatic strategies and so helps us to see

the ways cinematic representations can be used to speak to the politics of difference in global governance. Studying the politicisation of cinema can thus help make visible the politics of differentiation.

SUMMARY IN FINNISH

Tämä väitöskirja tarkastelee elokuvan potentiaalia käsitellä erontekemisen politiikkaa elokuvallisen kulttuuridiplomatian kautta toisen maailmansodan jälkeisessä Unescon (Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien kasvatus-, tiede- ja kulttuurijärjestö) tarjoamassa viitekehyksessä. Lähtökohtanaan se esittää perinteisesti maailmanpolitiikan kentällä ongelmallisuuden ja ristiriitaisuuden kautta näyttäytyvien erojen, erilaisuuden ja erontekemisen (Weber 2005, 153) määrittyvän Unescon näkökulmasta sodan lähteen sijaan rauhan lähteeksi.

Tutkimus hyödyntää aineistonaan vuonna 1959 Unescon ja Britannian elokuvainstituutin yhdessä julkaisemaa elokuvakatalogia, *Orient: A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture.* Katalogin tavoitteena oli "edistää sellaisten elokuvien esittämistä, jotka voisivat tarjota länsimaisille yleisöille kokonaisemman ja asiantuntevamman kuvan itäisten kansojen elämäntavoista". Tutkimus lähestyy katalogia aineistona kolmella eri tasolla tarkastellen itse katalogia, sen julkaisemiseen liittyviä, pääosin UNESCOn ja Britannian elokuvainstituutin välisestä kirjeenvaihdosta koostuvia, dokumentteja sekä katalogiin sisältyviä elokuvia.

Katalogi listasi 348 elokuvaa, lyhytelokuvaa ja dokumenttielokuvaa seuraavista 21 maasta: Burma, Ceylon, Filippiinit, Hongkong, Intia, Indonesia, Iran, Irak, Jordania, Korea[n tasavalta], Malaija, Neuvostoliitto, Marokko, Pakistan, Qatar, Thaimaa, Tunisia, Turkki, Vietnam[in tasavalta] ja Yhdistynyt Arabitasavalta. Katalogissa nimettyjä elokuvia ei ollut alun perin tehty esitettäviksi kulttuuridiplomaattisissa tarkoituksissa. Katalogiin sisällyttämisen kautta ne kuitenkin valjastettiin palvelemaan tätä päämäärää. Näin ollen väitöskirja keskittyy näennäisesti epäpoliittisten elokuvien politisointiin tarkastelemalla tapoja, joilla elokuvia tulkittiin ja joilla niiden tarkoitusta muokattiin. Tutkimus lähestyy katalogia monenvälisenä elokuvakulttuuridiplomaattisena aloitteena, joka hieman yllättäen tavoitteli päämääräänsä parantaa ymmärrystä idän ja lännen välillä korostaen näiden eroavaisuuksia suhteessa toisiinsa.

Väitöskirja lähestyy aihettaan seuraavan tutkimuskysymyksen kautta:

Kuinka elokuvan politisointia voidaan hyödyntää erontekemisen politiikan käsittelyssä globaalin hallinnan kontekstissa?

Tätä laajempaa kysymystä lähestytään *Orient*-katalogin tapauksessa seuraavan alakysymyksen avulla:

Kuinka kulttuurin käsitteellistäminen erojen ja erontekemisen merkitsijänä suuntaa katalogin tapaa lähestyä kulttuuridiplomatiaa ja ohjaa siihen sisältyvien elokuvien tulkintaa?

Väitöskirja tuo yhteen kolme tutkimusalaa: 1) kulttuuridiplomatia; 2) globaali hallinta; sekä 3) populaarikulttuuri ja maailmanpolitiikka. Tutkimusasetel-

man monitahoisuus nostaa esiin jännitteen makro- ja mikrotason maailmanpolitiikan välillä. Kulttuuridiplomatia on perinteisesti ymmärretty valtiolähtöisenä toimintana, kun taas elokuvan poliittisen potentiaalin tarkastelu tutkimuskohteena vaatii laajempaa ymmärrystä, joka tunnustaa myös jokapäiväiset politiikan tekemisen tasot. Unesco viitekehyksenä edellyttää samanlaisen problematiikan tarkastelua, sillä se on ensisijaisesti jäsenvaltioista koostuva kansainvälinen järjestö, jonka pohjimmaisena tavoitteena on ongelmallisesti rakentaa ”rauhaa ihmisten mielissä” (UNESCO 1945). Toisin sanoen Unescon pitäisi kyetä puhuttelemaan maailman väestöä suoraan ohittaen keskeisimmän komponenttinsa, kansallisvaltion. Tunnistaakseen näiden kahden lähestymistavan välisen jännitteen ja raivatakseen käsitteellisen tilan niiden tarkastelulle, tutkimus käyttää termiä maailmanpolitiikka kansainvälisten suhteiden sijaan (ks. esim. Walker 2009).

Tutkimus tarkastelee Unescoa moraalisena mielipidevaikuttajana maailmanpolitiikan kentällä (Singh 2010b) asemoiden organisaation yhdeksi varhaisimmista ja merkittävimmistä poliittisista toimijoista ja poliittisen toiminnan alustoista monenvälisen kulttuuridiplomatian areenalla (Kozymka 2014). Se valottaa Unescon kulttuuridiplomaattista strategiaa, jonka pyrkimyksenä on kyseenalaistaa ymmärryksemme vastakkainasetteluista pohjimmiltaan negatiivisina konfliktien ja ristiriitojen lähteinä. Se tarkastelee Unescon elokuvakulttuuridiplomaattisia strategioita Patrick Jacksonin retorisen selviön käsitteen kautta (Jackson 2006) pyrkimyksenään valottaa niihin olennaisesti sulautuneita erontekemisen mekanismeja. Retorisella selviöllä viitataan diskursiivisiin tapoihin kehystää tietty kysymys tai ilmiö hyödyntämällä olemassa olevia, itsestäänselvyyksinä pidettyjä viitekehyksiä. Lähtökohtanaan se käyttää ajatusta siitä, että kulttuuristen erojen maailmanpolitiikkaan tuoma kontribuutio ei käsitä ainoastaan ongelmia, vaan yhtä lailla mahdollisuuksia (Blaney & Inayatullah 2002, 104).

Tutkimuksessa populaarikulttuuri näyttäytyy yhtenä merkittävimmistä välineistä Unescon päämäärän tavoittelussa. Tutkimus asemoi *Orient*-katalogin merkitsemään kriittistä käännekohtaa Unescon maailmanpoliittisessa lähestymistavassa. Se paikantaa käänteen eksplisiittisestä ymmärryksestä eroista konfliktin määrittäminä implisiittiseen ymmärrykseen niistä positiivisina ja viime kädessä välttämättöminä tekijöinä Unescon maailmassa. Tutkimus käsittelee Unescon tapaa lähestyä eroja, erilaisuutta ja erontekemistä organisaation keskiössä vaikuttavan yhtenäisen maailman ideaalin kautta. Se kontekstualisoi elokuvakatalogin syntytarinan organisaation sisäisten murroskohtien kautta fokusoiden erontekemisen problematiikkaan sekä itä–länsi-polarisaation että kosmopoliittisten ideaalien ja kansallisten intressien välisen jännitteen pohjalta.

Tämä tutkimus hyödyntää intertekstuaalista analyysia paikantaakseen ne rajapinnat, joissa elokuvakatalogi risteää sodanjälkeisen maailmanjärjestyksen ja Unescon peruskirjan saneleman rauhanrakentamiseen kulttuurin keinoin kehottavan mandaatin kanssa. Se nojaa ymmärryksessään elokuvan ja maailmanpolitiikan välisestä suhteesta Michael Shapiron esittämään ajatukseen politiikasta ja populaarikulttuurista osana samaa sosiaalista tekstiä (Shapiro 2009; 2013). Tämän myötä ei ole tarpeen erottaa populaarikulttuurituotteiden representoimaa maailmaa maailmasta, jossa elämme.

Väitöskirja koostuu neljästä tutkimusartikkelista ja johdantoluvusta. Artikkelit on järjestetty väitöskirjassa sisältönsä mukaan fokukseltaan laajemmasta kapeampaan. Artikkeli 1 analysoi *Orient*-katalogia osana Unescon varhaisia yrityksiä levittää rauhan, ymmärryksen ja solidaarisuuden periaatteitaan ja muokata arvoja ja asenteita sen mukaisesti. Se käsittelee rauhanpropagandana katalogin pyrkimystä käyttää elokuvaa välineenä ihmisten ja kansojen liittämisessä yhteiseen taisteluun tietämättömyyttä ja ennakkoluuloja vastaan. Artikkeli tarkastelee kansallisten rajojen varaan rakentuvan, valtioista koostuvan yhteisön ja nämä rajat ylittävän ihmisyhteisön ristiriitaiselta vaikuttavaa yhteiseloa Unescon järjestelmässä maailmanpolitiikan teorian englantilaisen koulukunnan käsitteistön kautta. Se valottaa ideologian, vallan ja politiikan yhteen kietoutumista Unescon kontekstissa keskittyen kysymykseen siitä, kuinka organisaatio hyödynsi jotakin niin näennäisen merkityksetöntä kuin elokuvakatalogi pyrkimyksissään rakentaa rauhaa.

Artikkeli 2 analysoi *Orient*-katalogia osana Unescon peruskirjassa määritettyjä pyrkimyksiä kohti solidaarisempaa ihmiskuntaa. Nostaen esiin kysymyksen siitä, kuinka itäisen maailman representaatioita rakennettiin katalogissa, artikkeli keskittyy Japanissa, Intiassa ja Neuvostoliitossa tuotettuihin, katalogiin sisällytettyihin elokuviin. Tätä kautta se tarkastelee, kuinka elokuvien juonitiivistelmien pohjalta rakentuu yhtenäinen, toivon retoriikkaan pohjaava tarina. Vaikka jokainen näistä kolmesta maasta hyödynsi katalogia kansallisten intressiensä edistämiseen kukin omalla tavallaan, pohjimmiltaan ne kaikki tunnustivat katalogiprojektia ohjaavan kulttuurienvälisen ymmärryksen saavuttamisen tavoitteen. Artikkeli esittää, että katalogin kautta Unesco peräänkuulutti sopeutumista sellaiseen maailmaan, jossa ihmiskunta sisäisten erojen mukaan jakautumisen sijaan yhdistyy toiveissaan paremmasta tulevaisuudesta.

Artikkeli 3 tarkastelee katalogia osana yhden projektiin osallistuneen Unescon jäsenvaltion, Japanin, toisen maailmansodan jälkeistä kulttuuridiplomatiaa. Se keskittyy tapoihin, joilla elokuvat esitellään katalogissa ja arvioi, minkälaisia kulttuuridiplomaattisia päämääriä katalogiin valitut japanilaiset elokuvat palvelivat. Artikkeli esittää, että katalogiprojektiin osallistumalla Japanin edustajat pyrkivät yhtäältä asemoimaan maansa kansainvälisellä areenalla kylmän sodan geopoliittisen viitekehyksen ulkopuolelle. Toisaalta tavoitteena oli edistää Japanin kansallisia intressejä käyden katalogin kautta neuvottelua valtion asemasta sodanjälkeisessä maailmassa Unescon kulttuurienvälisen ymmärryksen tavoitteen määrittämässä viitekehyksessä. Artikkeli käyttää Japanin tapausta esimerkkinä siitä, kuinka toisinaan elokuvia itseään tärkeämmiksi voidaan ymmärtää tavat, joilla niitä käytetään.

Artikkeli 4 keskittyy eroihin ja erontekemiseen tarkastellen katalogin ymmärrystä eroista, joiden perusteella itäisen maailman elokuvaperinne katsottiin voitavan erottaa läntisestä. Artikkelissa esitetään kysymys siitä, kuinka elokuvat voidaan tulkita uudelleen tavalla, joka kuvaa niiden esittämää maailmaa niiden alkuperäisestä sanomasta mahdollisesti poikkeavalla tavalla. Kysymykseen vastatakseen se analysoi viittä katalogiin sisällytettyä Kurosawa Akiran elokuvaa verraten niitä katalogin esittämään listaan eroista idän ja lännen välillä toisen

maailmansodan jälkeisessä poliittisessa viitekehyksessä. Artikkeli esittää Kurosawan elokuvien ja niille katalogin kautta esitettyjen tulkintojen olevan ymmärrettävissä esimerkiksi siitä, kuinka katalogia hyödynnettiin keinona kuvitella sodanjälkeinen maailmanpoliittinen todellisuus uudelleen elokuvan kautta.

Johdantoluku kokoaa yhteen alkuperäisten artikkelien johtopäätökset ja esittelee ne niiden tutkimuskysymykseen vastaamiseen tuoman kontribuution kautta. Artikkelit nostavat esiin huomion siitä, että katalogin kontekstissa kulttuuriset erot ymmärretään yhtäaikaisesti sekä mahdollisena konfliktin lähteenä että ratkaisuna siihen. Katalogin tulkinnan mukaan konkreettisten kulttuurituotteiden kautta näkyväksi tulevat kansalliskulttuuriset erityispiirteet toisin sanoen näyttävät tuovan mukanaan myös mahdollisuuden yhtenäiseen maailmankulttuuriin. Johdantoluku lähtee liikkeelle tästä huomiosta, analysoiden Unescon kulttuuridiplomaattista strategiaa ja siihen sulautettua erontekemisen politiikkaa. Analyysi tarkastelee kansallisvaltion roolia Unescon järjestelmässä internationalismin muotona, nojaten ymmärryksessään Akira Iriyen kulttuurisen internationalismin määritelmään (Iriye 1997, 3) ja huomauttaa, että Unescolaisessa ymmärryksessä internationalismia lähestytään suhteina kansojen, ei valtioiden välillä (Zimmern 1923).

Se lähestyy kulttuuridiplomatiaa monitahoisena maailmanpoliittisena ilmiönä, jonka määritelmää tulisi tarkastella asiayhteydestä riippuvaisena. Se hyödyntää retorisen selviön käsitettä (Jackson 2006) esittääkseen, että Unescon kulttuuridiplomaattinen strategia rakentuu katalogin kontekstissa aiempien selviöiden varaa. Yhtäältä se nojaa sekä Unescon mandaatissa painottuvaan ymmärryksen merkitykseen että organisaation sisäisiin repeämiin ja toisaalta kylmän sodan ja dekolonisaatioprosessin määrittämiin geopoliittisiin jaotteluihin. Katalogin viitekehyksessä Unescon kulttuuridiplomaattinen lähestymistapa on parhaiten ymmärrettävissä kansainvälisen kulttuuripolitiikan kentälle asemoituina, politisoituina kulttuurisina suhteina. Analyysin tuloksena kulttuuriset erot määrittyvät tutkimuksessa välttämättömäksi lähtöedellytykseksi sekä Unescon olemassaololle että kulttuuridiplomatialle. Elokuvallinen kulttuuridiplomatia puolestaan määritellään seuraukseksi merkitysten siirtämisen prosessista poliittisten todellisuuksien ja kuvitteellisten maailmojen välillä.

Pohjimmiltaan kulttuuridiplomatia näyttäytyy dialogina kulttuuristen rajojen ja jaotteluiden yli, jotka katalogin tapauksessa rakentuvat idän ja lännen käsitteellisten vastakohtien varaan. Katalogin lähtökohta on, että itä ja länsi eroavat toisistaan siinä määrin, että ymmärrystä niiden välillä on edistettävä. Tällainen politisoitunut kulttuuriargumentaatio korostaa kansallisten identiteettien välisiä eroja syventäen kansainvälisiä vastakkainasetteluja (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002), mutta kulttuuridiplomatian pitäisi toisaalta kyetä toimimaan näiden jännitteiden lievittäjänä (Arndt 2005; McMurry & Lee 1947). Katalogin kontekstissa idän ja lännen käsitteiden pääasiallinen tarkoitus on toimia kategorisoinnin välineinä ja avata tila kulttuuridiplomatian harjoittamiselle niiden välillä. Kulttuuridiplomatia voidaan siis lähtökohtaisesti ymmärtää itseään toteuttavana ennusteena, jonka ytimessä näyttäytyvät eroihin, erilaisuuteen ja erimielisyyksiin liittyvät lähtöasetelmat.

Tutkimus osoittaa, että Unescon tapa lähestyä kulttuurisia ja poliittisia polarisaatioita elokuvakatalogin kontekstissa tarjoaa mahdollisuuden kriittiseen väliintuloon tavoissa ymmärtää eronteke minen kulttuuridiplomatian mekanismina. Elokuvakatalogin tapauksessa ymmärrys kulttuuridiplomatiasta määrittyy sitä kautta, kuinka kulttuuri käsitteellistetään katalogissa erojen ja erontekemisen merkitsijänä. Katalogista esiin nouseva ymmärrys kulttuurista palvelee kahta eri tarkoitusperää. Yhtäältä se on käsite, joka kuvaa elämäntapoja ja niiden välisiä eroja, jotka tulevat näkyväksi konkreettisten kulttuurituotteiden kautta. Toisaalta se on keino representoida noita eroja ja neuvotella niiden välillä.

Toiseksi tutkimus osoittaa Unescon kääntyneen elokuvan puoleen pyrkimyksenä levittää rauhan sanomaansa. Kataloginsa kautta se puhutteli maailman väestöä suoraan ohittaen näin ollen valtiokeskeisen politiikan tekemisen tavan asettamat rajoitteet. Unescon kulttuurin käsitystä katalogissa pohjimmiltaan määrittävä kiista voidaan tulkita kansalliskulttuuri–maailmakulttuuri-vastaparin kautta. Katalogi esittelee elokuvat niiden tuotantomaan mukaan jaoteltuna, mikä viittaa ymmärrykseen siitä, että pohjimmiltaan katalogin tunnistamat kulttuuriset erot ovat kansallisia eroja. Samanaikaisesti katalogi pyrkii kuitenkin Unescon mandaatin mukaisesti rakentamaan yhteisille arvoille pohjaavaa kansallisvaltioiden rajat ylittävää ihmiskunnan yhdistävää kulttuuriperustaa.

Väitöskirja nostaa esiin visuaalisen politiikan roolin erontekemisen dynamiikkojen ylläpitämisessä ja vahvistamisessa (Dodds 2018). Toisaalta se korostaa elokuvan potentiaalia samaisten asetelmien haastamisessa ja purkamisessa (vrt. Shapiro 2009). 1950-luvun lopulle, kylmän sodan ja dekolonisaation aikaan sijoittuva Orient-katalogi valottaa elokuvan kykyä kyseenalaistaa erontekemisen ja vastakkainasettelujen rooli kulttuuridiplomatian mekanismina aikana, jolloin kulttuuristen erojen pohjalle rakentuvat jännitteet määrittivät maailmanpoliittista tilannetta. Katalogi ohjaa siihen sisällytettyjen elokuvien tulkintaa juuri tältä pohjalta, asemoiden kulttuurin erontekemisen merkitsijäksi samalla viitaten siihen näiden jännitteiden mahdollisena purkajana. Tutkimus keskittää huomion tarpeeseen tarkastella tapoja, joilla elokuvallisia representaatioita voidaan käyttää erontekemisen politiikan käsittelyssä globaalin hallinnan kontekstissa. Samalla se painottaa, kuinka tämänkaltainen tarkastelu sekä laajentaa ymmärrystämme populaarikulttuurin poliittisesta potentiaalista että edellyttää inklusiivisempaa ymmärrystä kansainvälisen merkityksestä.

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ORIGINAL PAPERS

I

THE ENDURING VISION OF A WORLD WITHOUT WAR: UNESCO'S ORIENT CATALOGUE 1959 AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

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THE ENDURING VISION OF A WORLD WITHOUT WAR: UNESCO'S ORIENT CATALOGUE 1959 AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT

Propaganda is a term one rarely comes across in the UNESCO context. However, the organisation's constitutionally embedded strategy to build the defences of peace in the minds of men is based on its suggested power to move actors by influencing attitudes and opinions. This article analyses UNESCO's early attempts to communicate its principles of peace, understanding and solidarity, and to shape values accordingly. Through the methodological approach of propaganda, understood here as a tool for analysing processes of influence, this article analyses a film catalogue titled Orient. A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture, *published by UNESCO and the British Film Institute in 1959. Through a discussion of the agendas at play, the article addresses the questions of power, politics and ideology in the UNESCO context. Conceptualising UNESCO as a manifestation of an international society, the analysis sheds light on the politically motivated negotiation processes typified by contradicting preferences, emphasising the need to address UNESCO as both a political actor and a platform for political action.*

Introduction

Since its outset, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization has been the topic of conversation of a rather ontological nature. Should it be addressed as a political institution or just a political product, an instrument for its Member States? Does it merely reflect the intellectual, political and ideological trends of the surrounding international society or can it actually contribute to social change? Perhaps most descriptively, is it the hope and faith in the creation of a peaceful world or the shortcomings and limitations of the human endeavours towards such a goal that are epitomised in the organisation? Big questions with no obvious answers. J.P. Singh (2010:1) quite aptly captures the ingrained tension labelling these debates: "At its best, UNESCO is the heroic intellectual and moral force of the idealism encapsulated in its

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Preamble. [...] At its worst, UNESCO, like many other UN agencies, is a functional tragedy of our making, suffering from power politics, lack of resources, ineffectiveness, and material ineptitude."

On the ideological level, UNESCO is full of good intentions, having sprouted from the ideological tradition of humanism in the long shadow of the World Wars. From the beginning, the organisation's mission was clear: To make sure that the world would never again find itself in a situation where a "great and terrible war" such as the one that had just ended would be made possible by "the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races" as vividly described in the UNESCO constitution (1945:Preamble). In practice, however, the organisation suffers from imprecision and inefficiency in the implementation of its multiple resolutions, declarations and conventions. Despite these internal issues, UNESCO's constitutionally embedded idealism provides it with a mandate to implement change in order to steer its members towards a peaceful world.

The latest example of the potential for conflict and confusion around and within the organisation was given on the 12th of October 2017, when the United States Department of State formally notified that it was withdrawing its membership from UNESCO for the second time (foreignpolicy.com 2017). The withdrawal was officially stated to reflect their concerns with "mounting arrears at UNESCO, the need for fundamental reform in the organization, and continuing anti-Israel bias at UNESCO" (U.S. Department of State 2017). Following the U.S.' lead, Israel soon announced it had suspended cooperation with UNESCO as a result of a newly adopted draft resolution, which denied the Jewish connections with the holy sites in Jerusalem. These developments were by no means the first time UNESCO's credibility has been called into question, and despite its somewhat rocky history with the organisation, the U.S. has been merely one of the founding members to shake the very foundations of UNESCO. The Republic of South Africa, too, withdrew from the organisation in 1956, citing the criticism of its apartheid policy within the organisation (Sewell 1975:326–328), and joined again in 1994 under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. 1984 witnessed the first withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO. Back then, the decision came about as a result of a claimed bias in favour of the Soviet Union and accusations of politicising matters under its authority—especially to do with the communications sector (see Coate 1988). The United Kingdom, for reasons much resembling those of the U.S., cut its ties in 1985, only to join again in 1997. The U.S. rejoined UNESCO in 2003, but withdrew its funding in 2011 as a result of the admittance of Palestine. This led to a financial crisis within the organisation and gave birth to speculations about the need for deeper, structural reforms (Hüfner 2016).

These events must be looked at as a serious obstacle to the achievability of the driving ideal behind UNESCO: the construction of a new world built on the principles of

peace, understanding and solidarity. Through these same principles, UNESCO should have the ability to reconcile these situations. The manifestation of the political and cultural divisions within an organisation dedicated to dialogue and peace questions UNESCO's capability to smooth the tensions created by such polarisations. The accusations made against UNESCO as manifesting itself as a biased, highly politicised organisation not only attack its decision-making practices and policies, they also demand we turn our attention back to UNESCO's constitutionally embedded principles. They remind us that political motivations must not be ignored when evaluating UNESCO's policies and practical initiatives. While some of UNESCO's contemporary initiatives, such as the World Heritage Programme (see e.g. Foster & Gilman 2015) and the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity (see e.g. De Beukelaer et al. 2015), have been a source of major controversy and criticism, the ideological basis of the organisation has remained solid since its outset. The high idealism of the humanist philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Auguste Comte and Jan Amos Comenius provided the foundations for UNESCO and has continued to label its quest for a better world to this day (Singh 2010:3–5).

In what follows, UNESCO's constitutionally embedded ideological aspirations are contextualised through a set of concepts associated with what is known as the English School of International Relations theory. The English School intellectual tradition is based on a triad of concepts for theorising the conduct of international relations: international system, international society and world society—sometimes labelled Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian, respectively. The basic idea as explained by Barry Buzan (2001:474–475) seems simple enough. International system is all about power politics among states, placing the structure of international anarchy at the centre of IR theory. International society is about the institutionalisation of common interests among states, placing the construction of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory. World society, then, takes individuals and non-state organisations as the focus, placing transcendence of the states system at the centre of IR theory.

Standing for the belief that ideas, rather than material factors, shape world politics, the English School explores the option of peaceful cooperation within the international system. The concept of international society is the practical manifestation of such a possibility, forming one of the most enduring meta-narratives of IR theory. International society is essentially grounded in the simple idea that if there can be a society within states, there can also be a society between or among states. An infinite source of both criticism and praise, along with countless attempts at practical implications and redefinitions, the concept was defined by Hedley Bull (1977:13) as follows: An international society exists "when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions."

My approach to the English School's conceptual contribution is that of common values—more specifically, the common value of peace. UNESCO's existence is based on a

firm belief that the reasons behind the wars and conflicts ravishing humankind throughout history have been misunderstanding and ignorance. To set focus on the apparently endless need for mediating between conflicting values to promote peace and implement change in the surrounding world, I return to the early decades of the Cold War, when—much like today—simplified cultural polarisations were utilised to aggravate political tensions. For an organisation reaching its teenage years in the midst of the early, heated and ideologically defined stages of the Cold War, tackling the dreaded consequences of the lack of knowledge and understanding specifically between East and West came to be of key importance. For UNESCO, the division of the world into the East and the West was not defined by the geopolitical realities of the time. Instead, the border between the two was a cultural one. "The promotion of mutual understanding between East and West has been adopted by Unesco as a Major Project. The emphasis, during the current period is mainly on enhancing understanding of the East in countries of Western civilization," a UNESCO proposal for conducting a Survey of Asian Films from 1957 declares (UNESCO 1957b). Film "can efficiently serve to promote an understanding of these countries," it continues. In 1950, it was estimated that around 44 per cent of the world's adult population was illiterate, and UNESCO was well aware of this (UNESCO 1957c). Thus, turning to film as a means of spreading information and ideas between East and West was both smart and practical.

Consequently, in 1959, UNESCO together with the British Film Institute (BFI) published a catalogue of films produced in UNESCO's Eastern Member States titled *Orient. A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture* to contribute to a better understanding between the Eastern and Western halves of the world. The catalogue became a means of educating, enlightening and influencing the general public. Through a reading of the catalogue with an emphasis on the actors involved in the project, I argue for the necessity of studying UNESCO not only as a reflector of sociopolitical shifts, currents and developments, but as an active, and perhaps surprisingly agile, contributor to the construction of the world system. Within a framework of a value-based understanding of the English School conceptual contribution combined with theories of propaganda and their relationship with the cultural mission of UNESCO, this article provides an inquiry into the persuasive powers UNESCO possesses. The negotiation processes resulting in the publication of the catalogue were no exception in the world of UNESCO. Rather, they were merely an early manifestation of the peculiar problems UNESCO still continues to face. They serve as a reminder that the ideological background is not the only defining factor that has followed the organisation through the decades—the negotiations and clashes between the organisation's cultural approach and political engagement have also played their part since the outset.

Approaching the catalogue project as peace propaganda, I suggest UNESCO aimed to manifest itself as a form of international society built on the ideals of peace, understanding and solidarity. I understand peace propaganda to be about *the conscious, coherent process of employing techniques of persuasion by any media available in order to unite peo-*

ple behind the ideal of peace. The purpose of turning to propaganda as a methodological approach is to focus on both the process and the idea behind the acts of propaganda, to conceptualise UNESCO as a political actor, and to shed light on the underlying tension of the interplay of ideology, power and politics in the UNESCO context. This approach will provide the means to address the organisation's aspirations towards a peaceful world not as an unattainable dream of a better world, but as concrete endeavours towards a world finally free of the horrors of war. But how on earth were they planning to achieve such a goal through something as seemingly meaningless as a film catalogue?

Propaganda as a Method of Inquiry—The English School and the Mediation of Values

What is perhaps considered a more classic definition of the concept of international society, is a later elaboration by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (1984:1): "[A] group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements." While this definition is very handy in the sense that it clarifies the coexistence of the Hobbesian system element and the Grotian level of order as socially constructed, it lacks the reference to values made in Bull's earlier definition, even though some form of a common identity or ideology could be seen to function as a basis of common rules, institutions and interests. As values are of specific interest to my discussion, I will take as a starting point Bull's original understanding of the concept.

For Bull, society was constituted through a diversity of political practices: international law, the balance of power, diplomacy, the great powers and war. These primary institutions are built around shared understandings, but they can also be seen to be institutionalised in international organisations. As Bull himself hesitantly noted, the part international organisations play in the maintenance of order in world politics is an important one, and one best understood in terms of their contribution to the working of what he defined as the basic institutions. The role of these organisations, Bull argued, should not be approached in terms of their aims and aspirations, let alone through the hopes projected onto them. However, one could argue that these are precisely the factors which define the shape of the contribution by a given organisation to the maintenance of the basic institutions. Despite the limited amount of attention given in Bull's theory to international organisations, the emphasis on the dual challenge of not only managing power, but also mediating between conflicting values allows us to draw a direct connection with UNESCO. UNESCO does not aim to establish itself as a form of world government or a universal authority above the state level, nor does it have the means to do so. Instead, it aims to position itself as a balancing mediator between conflicting interests and a constructor of shared values in an international system defined by the lack of an unchallenged authority above the state—in other words, international anarchy as defined by

G. Lowes Dickinson (1916). UNESCO's actual powers of enforcement are not much to speak of, and thus the organisation aspires for a position of a moral force in global politics (Singh 2010). In the context of UNESCO, it thus all boils down to the question of possessing and exercising the power to move actors by persuading them what is right and what is wrong. As E.H. Carr (1939:120) reminded us at the wake of World War II: "Power over opinion is not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power [...] The art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader."

Johan Galtung (1996:2) defines this as a form of cultural power, which legitimises certain acts and structures while delegitimising others, thus distinguishing it from political, economic and military power. Following Joseph S. Nye (1990, 2004:x), this could also be understood as an expression of, or a claim to, soft power: The idea that there exist instruments of power rooted in one's ideological and cultural appeal, which promises "a way to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion." In the case of UNESCO, the main difference between these two frameworks lies in the focus on attraction versus persuasion. While it is not entirely clear whether Nye sees attraction as a natural objective experience or a social construct (Mattern 2005:591), there is no doubt that persuasion comprises a conscious process of conversion and enticement. Indeed, as is evident in the UNESCO Constitution (1945:Preamble), its strategy is based on its suggested ability to actively influence attitudes and opinions: "That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed." To clarify the conceptual map used here, the persuasion-influence-power continuum is understood in a simple, instrumental manner: influence as a mechanism of power, and persuasion as the act of influencing.

The idea of influencing opinions lies at the heart of politics. Power over opinion is also the basic principle behind a concept tying together the questions of power, influence and persuasion: propaganda. More importantly, propaganda functions as a tool for constructing and spreading values. While definitions of propaganda are as varied as those attempting to define it, one common denominator is an agreement that propaganda is concerned with influencing opinions. As the United Nations specialised agency with a mandate to promote the free flow of ideas by images and words, addressing UNESCO as an organisation engaging in propaganda might seem farfetched, for it is precisely the free flow of ideas and information we normally accuse propaganda of restricting. This conception is largely labelled by a modern understanding of the term. Writing about persuasion in the sense of rhetoric, Plato already approached the topic with reservation in his early criticism. In Gorgias, he contrasted the art of persuasion with philosophy, the art of truth, positioning the former as morally unacceptable (Plato 380 B.C.E.). Modern understandings often follow this approach to propaganda as an ultimately negative endeavour, closely tied with power, politics and the ultimate evil: war. In modern usage, propaganda is a nasty word. It is biased; it is evil; it is unfair. No wonder then, that we do not often see the words UNESCO and propaganda in the same sentence.

Propaganda might be an age-old practice (see e.g. Taylor 2003), but as a concept, it has its roots in the Roman Catholic Church. As a response to the threat to the spiritual unity of Europe posed by the Reformation, a commission of cardinals was established to spread Catholicism in heathen lands. In the seventeenth century, the commission was made permanent as the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (Holy Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith) (Welch 2014). Propaganda as a word is derived from the Latin *propagare*, the gardening practice of planting shoots to reproduce new plants—thus one implication of the sense in which the Roman Catholic Church used the term was that spreading ideas this way was a cultivated dispersion to "lead the heathen from darkness into light" (Brown 1963:10–11). The term was soon applied to any organisation spreading a doctrine; then it came to be applied to the doctrine itself; and finally to the methods employed in putting the dissemination into force (Welch 2014). The latter sense is how we understand the term in modern usage.

Film has been linked with propaganda since its outset (Reeves 1999), and the connection has also drawn attention in the UNESCO context. As Suzanne Langlois (2016:76) phrases it, "propaganda for peace, education and international cooperation" has been a defining characteristic in UNESCO's approach to cinema since the early years of the organisation. Following Langlois, the Orient project's aims are analysed here through peace propaganda. "The propaganda of peace is the work of a variety of social forces through a range of media and cultural forms, and its purpose is to bring society, culture or nation behind a core idea or principle, in this case, the promise of peace and its economic dividends after decades of conflict," as defined in the context of the Northern Ireland peace process (McLaughlin & Baker 2010:11). While a rather well-functioning definition, this formulation does not address the global level as a possible target, nor does it mention individuals—it addresses people as collectives or social units. As UNESCO specifically aims to address the minds of men and does it on a worldwide scale, this definition requires some massaging. Combining this with Philip Taylor's (2003:7) definition of propaganda as "a deliberate attempt to persuade people, by any available media, to think and then behave in a manner desired by the source" helps to address these issues and to emphasise propaganda as an ethically neutral concept. It also sets focus on propaganda as a process, again reminding us of the connection between propaganda and rhetoric, but in the likewise neutral Aristotelean sense—as the ability to detect the available means of persuasion in any given situation (Aristotle 350 B.C.E.:Book 1, Part 2).

Building on the definitions by Taylor, and McLaughlin and Baker combined with the Aristotelean approach, peace propaganda in the UNESCO context is understood here as the conscious, coherent process of employing techniques of persuasion by any media available in order to unite people behind the ideal of peace. Like Taylor's, the focus of this definition is on the process of propaganda, but also on the idea behind the acts. In addition, this definition does not suggest that the ones targeted are merely passive recipients—they can also become active participants involved in the production and dissemination of ideas, ideologies and values. It also steers away from two widely held mis-

conceptions as distinguished by David Welch (2014): The belief that propaganda serves only to change attitudes and opinions, and the assumption that propaganda operates only through lies and falsehoods. The definition used here instead leaves room for the option of enhancing existing ideas and ideologies and recognises the possibility of several levels of truth, be they subjective or taken out of context. Propaganda thus becomes merely an instrument, a means to an end. Following this line of reasoning, peace propaganda can be harnessed to function as a methodological approach for a quest to uncover the motives and the means behind the construction of UNESCO's international society.

Modern beyond Its Means—The Construction of a World Order According to UNESCO

During the Cold War, art and culture became one of the key instruments of propaganda, utilised to aggravate tensions through simplified cultural and ideological conceptions. The Cold War was a new type of a conflict, a war over hearts and minds, although labelled by the underlying fear of a nuclear war. Within the context of the "communication revolution," the propagandists on both sides attempted to sell their own ideological truth not only to their own citizens, but to the whole world (Welch 2014). Instead of falling into an outright panic over the ideological muscle bulging between the two superpowers, UNESCO took a wider approach, while the intensifying Cold War polarisation called for the organisation to put its strategies to the test like never before. Recognising the urgency of increasing mutual appreciation between the East and the West, UNESCO's 9th General Conference decided to authorise a ten-year-long Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values to promote intercultural relations (UNESCO 1956). The project opened up a space for Asian and Arab states to present their cultural values as both equal to and distinct from their Western counterparts (Wong 2006, 2008), placed focus on the questions of cultural unity and cultural diversity (Maurel 2010), and marked the development of UNESCO to a truly worldwide forum of intercultural dialogue, initiating an ongoing discussion of the nature of intercultural relations within the UNESCO context (Huttunen 2017). It was within this frame that the Orient catalogue project was initiated.

The Orient catalogue is in two parts. Part one introduces 139 feature films suitable for festival screening from the following 13 countries: Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Korea, Malaya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and the U.S.S.R.. Part two includes 209 documentaries and short films for television distribution, covering a wider collection of countries than part one: Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Malaya, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, the U.S.S.R. and Viet-nam. Even though the core of the catalogue is the films themselves, what is of interest here is the way the contents are framed. The context the films are placed in is created through the one-and-a-half page introduction to the catalogue, which explains how the films have been selected and how they should be looked at. The introduction also tells us about the

three key actors behind the catalogue project: UNESCO, the British Film Institute and the National Commissions for UNESCO.

UNESCO was founded in November 1945 as a part of the attempts to reconstruct the post-war world transitioning from war to peace. UNESCO came into existence as a result of a firm belief that the origins of World War II lay in a grotesque perversion of basic human values, "the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men" (UNESCO 1945:Preamble). A new order of peace in the world was to be built on mutual understanding and a better knowledge of each other's lives; assuming that removing ignorance and prejudice will automatically eliminate war itself. Much had, however, changed in the decade following the organisation's founding. The Korean War broke out in the summer of 1950, leading to a painful realisation that wars were not a nightmare of the past after all, and testing people's faith in international organisations dedicated to the promotion of peace. Nevertheless, during its first decade, UNESCO almost doubled in size, suggesting that not all hope was lost. The expansion of UNESCO, resulting from decolonisation, along with abandoning the political divisions of World War II through the admission of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany in the first half of the 1950s, brought about a heterogenisation of the organisation. Questions of mutual understanding and appreciation became ever more topical. The geographical areas previously closed to UNESCO were now open, but the world had slipped deep into the Cold War ideological polarisation. With these developments, the questions of peace would have to be addressed with deeper determination than ever before.

The officially stated aim of the catalogue has UNESCO written all over it:

> The aim of the Survey is to stimulate the presentation of films which might give audiences in the West a fuller and more informed idea of the ways of life of Eastern peoples. With this end in view a selection has been made from among many thousands of films, of those which best illustrate significant aspects of life, feeling or thought in their country of origin and have outstanding technical and artistic qualities. (Holmes 1959)

The basic idea behind the catalogue as clarified in this quote was to set focus on culture as both a possible source of conflict and a solution to it: In a sense, seeing in cultural distinctiveness—made visible through creative expressions—the possibility of a common culture. It seems UNESCO's understanding of culture here is two-fold and slightly problematic: On the one hand, it serves as a means of promoting mutual understanding; on the other hand, it has a broader, normative and constitutive sense with aspects of the social embedded in it. A common culture is also a distinguishing feature of international society, an aspect generally approached with deep suspicion among IR theorists. Yet, what exactly is understood by both the concept and its significance to world order is slightly unclear. The catalogue's approach to culture as a way of life bears significant resemblance to Bull's (1977:64) understanding of the concept: "By a society's culture we

mean its basic system of values, the premises from which its thought and action derive." In the culture-as-a-way-of-life sense, the catalogue thus separates the world into two major societies—the Eastern and the Western— suggesting that the idea of an international society resting upon a specific shared culture could all too easily be cast aside.

As one of the founding representatives of the English School, Martin Wight (1977:33), put it, "[w]e must assume that a states-system [referring to an international society] will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members." Thus, action needs to be taken to remedy this shortcoming detectable in the introduction. To bridge the gap between the two culturally defined societies of differing values, the catalogue aims to replace ignorance with knowledge, and misunderstanding with understanding by attacking harmful stereotypes and misrepresentations. We don't need to dig very deep to see that in the UNESCO context, the terms understanding and misunderstanding carry a lot of meaning. "[I]gnorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war" and so the UNESCO Member States aim "to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives" (UNESCO 1945:Preamble). Misunderstanding and ignorance for UNESCO are evidently the root causes of war and conflict, whereas understanding and knowledge are the road to peace. Thus, the basis of an international society according to UNESCO must be a shared culture constructed on the fundamental, universal value of peace. As Bull (1977:316) points out, all the historical manifestations of an international society have had as one of their foundations a common culture, be it an intellectual one facilitating communication or one built on values, reinforcing a sense of common interests. In the case of UNESCO's vision, both of these aspects had a part to play.

Henry Cassirer steered the project at the UNESCO end. He was the first director of UNESCO's department of Mass Communications and ran the department for nearly two decades. For Cassirer, the new forms of media were instruments of social change, education and development (The Guardian 2015). Even though direct action, such as knowledge transmission through different forms of media, textbook translations, and international conferences, has been one of UNESCO's prominent working methods, the ways they wish to change the world are of a rather ideologically profound nature (UNESCO 1950). Cassirer's approach to mass media as not only an indicator but a contributor to social development thus made him a very fitting person to tie together UNESCO's ideological aspirations with the practicalities of the real world, and to safeguard UNESCO's goals during the project. In addition to overseeing the project, Cassirer was in charge of the negotiations with the BFI and assisted with communicating with the National Commissions for UNESCO in the Member States concerned.

The second key actor is the British Film Institute, a charity governed by a Royal Charter. An agreement with an outside organisation was to be contracted to "[a]scertain which

are the best films to illustrate the civilisation and contemporary work of individual Asian Member States of Unesco" (UNESCO 1957a). After negotiations stretching over several months, a contract was signed with the BFI, the main role of which was to prepare the catalogue. According to the initial agreement, UNESCO was to pay the BFI £1050 to compile the catalogue (£350 for part one and £700 for part two)—about £23,700 in current value (This is Money.co.uk n.d.). On top of this, UNESCO agreed to an additional payment for including the U.S.S.R. in the catalogue half way through the project after some confusion about whether or not the Soviet Union was to be categorised as an Eastern country. The BFI was founded in 1933, following a recommendation made by the Commission on Educational and Cultural Films. The Commission reported that: "A film has a national conception and an international life. [...] No nation which produces films and no nation which imports films produced by others can afford to ignore the cinema, and any society of nations such as the British Empire or the League of Nations must look on the cinema both as an international force and as an international problem" (Quoted in Druick 2007:36). As Zoë Druick notes, in the early years, there clearly was a nationalistic and imperialistic aspect to the BFI's mandate (ibid.). But of course, a lot had happened since 1933, most notably the collapse of the British Empire, which then called for a change of direction. Since 1948, the focus of the Institute has been on encouraging the development of the art of film and on fostering public appreciation and study of it.

During the project, James Quinn as the director of the BFI handled most of the communications with UNESCO. Known as a true cinema aficionado, he is credited as a key architect in the development of the BFI. He established the London Film Festival and during his tenure, 1955–64, the National Film Theatre was built and the regional film theatres system sponsored by the BFI was created. James Quinn was well aware of the geopolitical realities that framed the times of the catalogue project: "A film cleared for television distribution in the West today might be withdrawn for political reasons tomorrow," he explained his proposal for changing the wording of "available" and "cleared" for television to "films suitable for Television" based on more than just legal and technical matters (UNESCO 1958d). Quinn's correspondence also reveals an unwavering attitude towards the quality of cinema and an occasionally poorly concealed disappointment in having to compromise his vision. For example, Pakistan was nearly left out of part one, as the quality of their feature film production was not seen to be good enough for the catalogue (UNESCO 1958a). This was agreed by both the BFI and the Pakistani High Commissioner in London. Later on, it was suggested that it might, in fact, be a preferable option to include "bad Pakistani films" in the catalogue instead of not including any (UNESCO 1958b). The final publication includes four feature films produced in Pakistan. It was noted that because countries not featured in the catalogue would undoubtedly, in the future, be producing films of high enough quality to be screened abroad, the publication should be brought up to date from time to time.

Mrs. Winifred Holmes of the British Film Institute took on the task of compiling the catalogue in practice, although being aware that the process might be prolonged as "it

is a common experience not to get replies from these oriental countries 'at least for a long time, sometimes if ever'" (UNESCO 1958a). She was also in charge of writing the introduction to the catalogue, but her narrative choices proved a source of some controversy. An early draft version of the introduction referred to a "surprising number of films of the very highest quality." UNESCO's Department of Mass Communications pointed out that the "reference 'to the surprisingly' high quality of Oriental films had a somewhat condescending flavour" (UNESCO 1959), and the controversial word was deleted.

Some of her personal opinions seem to have nevertheless slipped through the editing net: "Beauty of photography—a marked characteristic of these short films—is sometimes spoilt by inferior scripting and presentation, making the film a surface record rather than a true interpretation. Sometimes a well-meaning desire to reform has marred the fresh vision of the film and loaded it with a heavy commentary of facts and figures. On the other hand there are many films which, however simple their techniques, produce a thrill of direct experience and comprehension, and touch the senses and the heart as well as the mind." (Holmes 1959). The critical tone might be explained by the fact that Winifred Holmes herself was a filmmaker. Born in 1903, she was raised in India and had previously worked as a journalist, writer and poet. Her film career took off in the 1950s and she made more than a dozen documentaries in the U.K., Afghanistan, Nepal and the West Indies. Perhaps for this reason, her criticism is only directed at the documentaries in the catalogue. Later on, she became an advocate of women's rights in the Middle and Far East as the chairman of the Women's Council (The Times Digital Archive 1995).

Even though the film-makers behind the contents of the catalogue are spoken of in the introduction with both criticism and praise, their voices are only heard filtered through Holmes' interpretation and thus they regrettably will only be mentioned here briefly. As both UNESCO and the BFI seemed unwilling to assist the potential screeners with obtaining the films, the contact information of the distributors was to be included in the descriptions. The catalogue was distributed in 3,000 copies to organisations such as the National Commissions for UNESCO, television stations, film distributors, national federations of film clubs, and film critics. Along with the film-makers, a number of other actors thus helped the catalogue to reach its goals, shedding light on the fact that UNESCO was well aware of the role individual people, commercial actors and NGOs had to play.

Thus, the nation states form merely one, although significant, level of actors within the complex apparatus that is UNESCO. The role of non-state actors is not the only factor widening the scope of the construction of a world according to UNESCO. The catalogue project clearly aims to inspire hope in people's minds that war or peace are not only something decided by governments, but something that can be influenced by people's own attitudes and understandings of each other and their world. One of the most significant principles on which the whole existence of UNESCO is based, is stated in its Constitution: Sustainable peace must be founded "upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind," which in turn can only be achieved through mutual understanding (UN-

ESCO 1845:Preamble). This doctrine, while admirable although gloriously abstract in nature, paradoxically carries with it the same exact problem it is fighting to solve. More importantly, the moral solidarity of mankind quite promptly shifts the focus beyond the confines of the state.

Thus, one might be inclined to inquire whether the concept of an international society is actually adequate to grasp the nature of the world order UNESCO was aiming to establish. The English School theory provides another conceptual option for including non-state actors into the inquiry: that of world society. As Bull (1977:22) noted, the states system is merely one part of the world political system. According to him, the fundamental and primordial units of world order are, in fact, individual people, leading him to conclude that order among mankind as a whole is something wider than and morally prior to order among states. By a world society, Bull understood a sense of common interests and values in addition to a degree of interaction linking together all parts of the human community (ibid. 279). The concept of world society thus is to universal social interaction what the concept of international society is to the international system of states.

For Bull, the universal society of all mankind only existed as an unrealised idea—although one to strive for—perhaps to do with a sceptical approach to the existence of shared values of a truly communal nature. As discussed by Barry Buzan (2004:63), there is another way of understanding the concept. This is to use world society as an umbrella term incorporating and ultimately superseding international society, or even as an ontology opposed to statism, as defined by R.J. Vincent (1978, 1986) and his followers. Buzan (2004:90–119) notes that one of the most significant underlying conceptual dyads within the discourse of international society and world society is whether or not the distinction between the state and non-state levels is what defines the difference between the two. For Buzan, three types of units are in constant play: states, transnational actors and individuals. His understanding of the interaction between the three key units or domains forms the basis of his definition of world society: The concept of world society labels situations in which none of the three domains is dominant over the other two, but all are in play together.

For Buzan, the distinction between state and non-state as a feature of analysis must be maintained. This division cannot be dismantled because the primacy of the state must not be ignored. This is also the case in the UNESCO context: The third and final actor distinguishable in the introduction is the National Commissions. The National Commissions are Member State coordinating and advisory bodies to their national governments, and form a unique feature in the UN system. Set up by their respective governments following Article VII of the UNESCO Constitution, the Commissions were initially entrusted with consultation and liaison tasks. The selection process of the films reflects UNESCO's role as essentially an organisation of Member States since the National Commissions had the final say. As the introduction explains, in some cases "the National Commission for UNESCO in the Member State concerned has asked for a film to be

withdrawn because it considered it as not representative, as untrue to its country's ideas or way of life" (Holmes 1959). These requests were respected and, as a result, some films which otherwise might have been included were left out. For the National Commissions then, the catalogue apparently functioned as a platform for national image building.

Without deeper thought, it would be easy to address UNESCO as a purely political product, an instrument for the nation states. However, it is questionable whether a direct parallel can or should be drawn between the National Commissions and the nation states they represent. One of the key points that needs to be taken into account in this assessment is the fact that the Commissions consist of individual people, whose interests cannot be assumed to be confined by the state borders—let alone their identities. While the network of National Commissions mainly acts for the purpose of associating their governmental and non-governmental bodies with the organisation and pursues tasks set by their governments, they also function to provide a network of intellectual communities across borders and link the organisation to civil society (UNESCO 2002).

Interestingly, even though the primary actors within the UNESCO system are its Member States, international society in the UNESCO sense is not merely the traditional understanding of a society of nation states. UNESCO presses us to place focus on the role that culture and shared moral ideas play in the construction of an international society. More importantly, it sets focus on the fact that international society as a functional concept presupposes elements of a world society. As the role of actors beyond the states level needs to be taken into account, the idea of international society in the UNESCO context needs to be understood in a wider and more diverse sense—encompassing actors beyond the state. Thus, UNESCO, as a framework for an international society, can be understood in terms of Barry Buzan's (2004) conception of the idea: An international society indicating situations in which the basic political frame of the international social structure is set by the states-system, while individuals and transnational actors are given rights by states within the order defined by international society in the traditional sense.

To summarise, we can distinguish three major motives at play in the introduction to the catalogue: First, it functioned as a platform for national image building for the Member States; second, it was to promote the art of film; and third, it was to promote UNESCO's objectives to build the foundations of peace in the minds of men through providing information and educating, and to influence opinions accordingly. UNESCO, then, comes across as both a political actor and a platform for political action. The sometimes contradicting aims actually brought about a change in the direction the catalogue was steered towards:

> It is true that in the beginning we made the stipulation that films should be chosen for, or shown at, a festival. This was because our understanding was that the Survey was to be highly selective and only films of the best quality included in it. [...] When we realised that a rather wider frame of reference was conceived by UNESCO, follow-up letters to all

> the countries concerned were sent, in which it was made clear that we were interested not only in festival films but also in films which had enjoyed a large box-office success and films of historical interest. (UNESCO 1958c)

To underline the nature of the negotiation process as labelled by contradicting aims and differing preferences, we need to take a brief look at the selection criteria of the films. The films were primarily chosen based on three criteria: (1) They have been shown or received awards at recognised international film festivals; (2) They have enjoyed box-office success and wide distribution in their own countries; or (3) They are of historical importance in the development of the art of the film in the country concerned. This list is clearly a combination of the aims of UNESCO, the BFI and the National Commissions. The negotiations between UNESCO and the BFI are crystallised in a draft version: "In other words, the basic criteria applied in the selection of films was whether the film contributed to a better appreciation of the Orient and whether it was a good film." As was made clear throughout the process, the BFI was mainly concerned with the quality of films, recognising the value the art form holds on its own, while UNESCO's focus was on the instrumental value of the medium as a means of promoting understanding on the one hand and battling against misunderstanding on the other.

While the aims of the BFI and the National Commissions are clearly acknowledged, in reality UNESCO's aims completely overpower those of the others: There is one, tiny sentence in the introduction that could be used to overrule any choice of film made based on the three criteria. Films dealing with "sources of international misunderstanding" were automatically left out no matter how good or popular they were (Holmes 1959). A draft version clarifies what exactly was meant by this: "In keeping with the spirit of the Survey, films dealing with recent wars and other sources of international misunderstanding have been omitted. Similarly, films which for other reasons seemed incompatible with the aims of the Survey have not been included, regardless of their box-office success." The BFI tried to assume "general responsibility for the selection of films", but this statement did not make its way into the final version. The catalogue was, first and foremost, a UNESCO project, and it was its ideologically constructed value base that was to be spread through the catalogue. UNESCO's international society was to be one of peace, understanding and solidarity, based on a profound belief that these are unquestionable, foundational social values.

Conclusions

It could be argued that through the catalogue project, UNESCO aimed to conceptualise the organisation as a manifestation of an international society as a way of building sustainable peace—never mind the fact that they did not yet have the word at their disposal. The trick to conceptualising UNESCO through a non-existent term lies in the distinction between a word and a concept. Following Quentin Skinner (1989:7–8), a concept

might exist before we have a word to express it. Like we have seen, the idea was there even if the word was not, and thus the two cannot always be equated. Read against the background of UNESCO's constitutionally manifested principles, the catalogue project demonstrates that UNESCO' focus is not on what *is* or even what *could be*. Instead, the organisation functions on the basis of what *should* or *must be*. What should be, is a world order built on the solidarity of mankind, reminding us again of the overlapping nature of the international and world senses of society in the English School conceptual triad. Moral solidarity of mankind as a road to peace is to most of us an indefinitely distant, unachievable dream. For UNESCO, however, it is a pragmatic goal, achievable through addressing and eliminating not merely the acts of war, but its root causes. Bull, like UNESCO, saw the goal of peace as one of the elementary, primary and universal goals of an international society sustained by a pattern of international activity, forming the basis of international order. Bull did not approach the goal of peace—in the sense of establishing a permanent, universal peace—as a goal seriously pursued by the international society. For UNESCO's international society this, however, is a key priority.

The word peace itself does not appear in the introduction to the catalogue and the exact nature of the term remains slightly hazy. While unarguably a significant line of inquiry, a more detailed discussion of the conception of peace as the driving force behind the catalogue project must remain beyond the scope of this article. However, a brief glance is in order. Does it refer to the absence of violent conflict and war? This would make sense considering that the intensifying Cold War ensured an ever-present threat of the situation escalating into an armed conflict. But war and peace are not absolute antonyms. This type of an understanding would lead to a situation where they are only definable in relation to each other, peace meaning merely the absence of war and vice versa. For everyday usage of the terms, this simplification may be useful, but for an organisation aiming for sustainable peace, understanding the process of achieving it to be simply eliminating war would not be a fertile starting point. Perhaps, the puzzle could be solved by turning to the conceptual binary of peace propaganda. The goal of war propaganda is not war as such, but creating a culture that legitimises and justifies the acts of war or violence—a process of dehumanising the enemy "so they can be killed without guilt" (Zur 1991). To put Johan Galtung's (1996:6, 96) terminology to good use, war propaganda constructs and maintains a culture of violence. Likewise, the goal of peace propaganda is not peace itself, but creating a culture of peace. This idea can be extended not only to cover the idea of harmony of interest and ideology in the world implying an integrated community or "the moral solidarity of mankind," but also to address the integral issues of cultural pluralism within the UNESCO system.

Good intentions or even common values are, however, perhaps not enough. The emergence of an international society might require an additional shared motivation. Cynthia Weber (2005:53) suggests that the actual uniting factor might be fear—be it humankind uniting out of fear of an alien attack or, in this case, the fear of another great war. However, following Bull, the possibility of war would not equal the emergence of an

international society. The basis of one is shared values, and fear of one another can hardly be labelled as such. Instead, the key might be the construction of a common enemy. War propaganda aims to unite people against a shared enemy, and peace propaganda is no different. The catalogue insists that the hostilities and polarisations of the past were to be set aside, so that the peoples of the world could unite against an enemy far more dangerous. The catalogue is clearly a call to arms, aiming to unite the peoples of the world in a battle against ignorance, prejudice and misinformation—all of them worthy opponents to attack, although slightly more abstract than a concrete, physical enemy. The idea echoes faith in the fact that there can exist some sort of a community of moral solidarity who will hear their appeal. This might, in fact, be where the source of UNESCO's power lies: Hope manifested through their practical implementations of a new vision of humanity unified on the basis of shared ethical understandings of right and wrong. As Richard Ned Lebow (2005:557) might phrase it, while "might often makes for right," "right can also make might."

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II

UNESCO'S HUMANITY OF HOPE: THE ORIENT CATALOGUE AND THE STORY OF THE EAST

by

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UNESCO's Humanity of Hope - The Orient Catalogue and the Story of the East

***Miia Huttunen*[1]**

Abstract: *This article analyses UNESCO's (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) early attempts to propagate the ideal of hope in the pursuit of the organisation's agenda of "the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind". An early example of such an endeavour is a film catalogue project carried out by UNESCO and the British Film Institute in the midst of the Cold War and at the peak of the decolonisation process. Titled "Orient. A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture", the catalogue was published in 1959 with the aim of familiarising Western audiences with Eastern cultures to forge solidarity of humankind through the promotion of intercultural understanding. In this article, I approach the catalogue as part of UNESCO's attempts to adapt to a changing world. The catalogue included 139 feature films, 75 percent of which were produced in Japan, India and the U.S.S.R. This article analyses the plot summaries of the collection of films produced in these three countries to explore how the catalogue was used to employ the rhetoric of hope through the stories told in the plot summaries. I suggest that with the catalogue project, UNESCO argued for the importance of adapting to a new world in which humanity was not to be divided by internal differences but rather united by hope for a better future.*

Keywords: UNESCO, adaptation, hope, the East, cinema

Introduction

In the midst of World War II, a group of visionaries gathered in London to make plans for a new post-war organisation. This meeting spawned a series of others and came to be known as the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME). The four-year series of conferences gave birth to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1945. Influenced by both the high idealism of universal humanism rooted mainly in the Western philosophical tradition of the Enlightenment and the lingering shadow

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of the war, the newly born organisation set on a path towards a better future for all mankind. The founders of the organisation chose to embark on a mission of peace, solidarity and understanding, determined to remain a beacon of hope and envisioning a future of mankind actively creating a better world.

In this article, I explore UNESCO's early attempts to propagate the ideal of hope in the pursuit of the organisation's agenda of "the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind" (UNESCO 1945, Preamble). This ideal was challenged early on, as the 1950s witnessed a series of events, which made a major impact on the direction the organisation was steered towards. First, the world had slipped deep into the Cold War polarisation. Second, by the mid-1950s, the number of UNESCO's Member States had almost doubled since the founding of the organisation. This was primarily a result of the decolonisation process, but also due to the abandonment of the political divisions of the Second World War through the admission of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany during the early 1950s. These events reflected UNESCO's expansion to an organisation of a truly worldwide nature, but also presented a problem the organisation needed to tackle: the world was changing and this called for serious attempts to adapt to the new order.

UNESCO's approach to the conduct of world affairs bears notable resemblance with the liberal internationalists, as Paul Rich (2002) proposes to call them, following firmly in the footsteps of Immanuel Kant. His *Perpetual Peace* (1795) is often noted to be one of the most influential works in the ideological background of the organisation. The liberal internationalists had an impact on the organisation not only on paper, but also in practice: among the architects of UNESCO was Alfred Zimmern, who was later replaced by Julian Huxley as the British candidate in the election of UNESCO's first Director-General[2]. Norman Angell, most notably, wrote about the necessity of adapting to a new world decades before UNESCO was faced with the same challenge. In his 1910 book *The Great Illusion*, Angell chose not to focus on the inevitability of conflict among nations and peoples, but instead turned to the idea of common interests that could unite humanity (Angell 1910). UNESCO took a similar approach, attempting to construct the foundations of moral solidarity upon intercultural understanding.

In 1959, UNESCO and the British Film Institute published a catalogue of Eastern films titled *Orient. A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture*. The aim of the catalogue project was to familiarise Western audiences with Eastern cultures through cinema. The films chosen were to best "illustrate significant aspects of

[2] For a discussion of the possible reasons behind these events see e.g. Toye and Toye 2010.

life, feeling or thought in their country of origin" in order to give Western audiences a "fuller and more informed idea of the ways of life of Eastern peoples" (Holmes 1959). In other words, the films were to contribute to intercultural understanding between the vaguely defined East and West through educating Western audiences about cultures previously alien to them. The catalogue includes 139 feature films[3] from 13 countries. Out of these, 103 are listed under Japan, the U.S.S.R. and India - a baffling 75 percent of the total number of feature films[4]. The other countries included in the feature film part are the United Arab Republic with 9 films, the Philippines with 7, Hong Kong with 5, Indonesia and Pakistan with 4 films each, Malaya with 3, and Iraq, Korea, Thailand and Tunisia with 1 film each.

Through a reading of the plot summaries the catalogue provides of the films produced in these three countries, I approach the catalogue project as part of UNESCO's attempts to guide humankind through the challenges of a changing world. There was not much UNESCO could do to influence the geopolitical realities of the time. What they could do, however, was to influence how those realities were perceived and how the representations of the other half of the world were constructed. What the Western world needed to adapt to, I suggest, was not the East with its differing cultural values. Instead, it was UNESCO's vision of a new form of humanity united by what the catalogue saw to be the fundamental human condition: hope.

The Language of Adaptation

Although more heavily associated with the constructivist tradition of International Relations theory, the importance of linguistic conventions in the changes of the conduct of world affairs was already argued by Norman Angell over a century ago. In *The Great Illusion,* Angell argued that war was futile, with the fundamental problem being that the world's leaders had failed to understand this (Angell 1910). The critics of Angell's work have all too easily cast aside his argument, claiming he saw war in the modern world as impossible. The great wars fought after the publication of his book would then be unquestionable proof that he had been mistaken. Not only the book, but in fact Angell himself, became a major target of an attack on misguided, utopian idealism, devised by the opposing realist school of IR theory. In the frontline was E.H. Carr with his 1939 book *The Twenty Years Crisis*, in which Angell became the main target of criticism and the primary representative of an intellectual tradition Carr labelled idealism. Perhaps

[3] In addition, the catalogue lists 209 documentaries and short films.
[4] The feature films from Japan, India and the U.S.S.R. are listed in appendix 1.

as a result of the realist attack, Angell and his work were practically forgotten for decades.

Angell's argument was primarily constructed upon the concept of interdependence. He utilised the concept drawn from economic theories to explain that in the second half of the 19th century, the industrialised world became increasingly dependent on each other in terms of finance and trade. It then followed that war would cause the system of interdependence to collapse bringing the whole economic system down with it. Behind interdependence, however, there existed a concept even more powerful: adaptation. On the more neglected side of his theory, Angell turned to the social-evolutionary inspired concept of adaptation to argue that, essentially, the world's leaders and scholars alike had failed to adapt to a changing world.

Language, for Angell, was what linked the two sides of his argument together. He promoted the introduction of a new vocabulary better suited to the realities of an interdependent world, discussing the ways language affects our ability to understand the world. The great illusion the book's title refers to is a collectively held perspective preventing statesmen and scholars from seeing the world the way it really is. As this illusion is sustained by an obsolete terminology, it can only be broken by education, which for Angell was proof of how language affects our ability to adapt to political realities. Thus, change could be achieved by replacing the old conceptions of that language with new ones, and ensuring that they were collectively held. Following the path paved by Norman Angell, the process of aiding the adaptation to the new world of UNESCO, shared by the representatives of both Eastern and Western cultural tradition, must begin with language. Thus, my focus here is on the ways the films in the catalogue were spoken of.

A modern version of Angell's idea is Oliver Bennett's theory of the institutional promotion of hope, referring to how a collection of established social conventions can maintain and reinforce optimism (Bennett 2015). Like Ernst Bloch famously argued, what actually drives us, is our dreams of a better world, and it is through our hopes that our visions of the future are manifested (Bloch 1959). His monumental three-volume epic, *The Principle of Hope*, lays out the principles through which hope appears in our daily lives. Through an ontology of not-yet-being, he suggests we express our hopes in the form of stories, dreams and fairytales, which he saw as the expressions of hopes which could not yet be realised. For Bennett, too, cultures of optimism answer to our fundamental social and personal needs by offering visions of a meaningful future of hope. My focus will be on what Bennett calls the ”rhetorical promise” (Bennett 2015, 49-57), approached here as an analytical tool for

an exploration of how the catalogue was used to employ the rhetoric of hope in the pursuit of the organisation's agenda and to propagate hope through the stories told in the plot summaries. It is actions rooted in various institutions that maintain and reinforce optimism and hope, Bennett argues. Institutions are understood in their widest possible sense, as established sets of social practices, such as family or religion. My approach here focuses on how a specific organisation - UNESCO - constructs, maintains and mediates the ideal of hope. Hope is understood here in terms of values and desires, as "positive expectation", a way of envisioning a brighter future (Bennett 2015, 2).

One of Bennett's institutions is democratic politics, which he approaches from two perspectives: first, democracy itself as an agent of hope; and second, the demands democracy places on the reproduction of optimistic narratives (Bennett 2015, 25-57). Even though Bennett's focus is specifically on political speeches in the realm of democratic politics, his approach arguably covers a much wider array of phenomena. The basic idea behind his account of the rhetorical promise is that hope can be harnessed to function as a powerful tool in the pursuit of one's goals - be they by nature personal or aiming to produce a wider impact. The plot summaries in the catalogue can be interpreted as a form of political speech: they are pieces of text aiming to make an impact. The formulations with which the catalogue introduces the films serve a specific purpose: to introduce the East to Western people. Although the catalogue only directly targeted those with a command of the English language, its aim was to foster understanding of Eastern peoples throughout the Western world. This understanding, according to UNESCO's logic, was meant to result in the ultimate goal of the moral solidarity of humankind. However, while the focus on hope emerges from the ways the films are interpreted and spoken of in the catalogue, the actual contents of the films themselves might not always match the descriptions in the catalogue (Huttunen 2017).

In what follows, the plots of the films as described in the catalogue are read with the help of Northrop Frye's theory of literary criticism (Frye 1957). His 1957 book *Anatomy of Criticism* offers four essays or pieces of theory attempting to distinguish categories of literature and keywords for literary criticism: modes, symbols, myths, and genres. The essays provide principles for literary criticism, derived from and applicable to not much short of the entirety of Western literature. As we will see, his theory seems to, however, also apply to Eastern forms of storytelling - or at least to the ways Eastern storytelling is described for Western audiences. Whether this is because of the flexibility of his theory or the universality of the stories themselves remains to be

discussed in a different context. Frye's proposed system is inductive, deriving underlying patterns from specific examples and moving beyond individual texts in order to find general principles across multiple works of literature. Whether there exists a coherent system of literature in the first place is, of course, up for debate, but a defense against this criticism can be found on the pages of the book itself: even Frye's own structuralist account discusses how works of literature can blur the categories in which they are placed. The focus here will be on two of Frye's four categories: modes, or the characters, and symbols, or levels and points of reference of symbolism in the stories.

The Heroes of Hope and Struggle

The reasons for the rather disproportionate number of films included in the catalogue from Japan, India and the U.S.S.R. are undoubtedly various. All three countries, for example, were among the biggest film producers of the time with Japan as number one, India as number two, and the U.S.S.R. as number six in 1959, the year the catalogue was published (UNESCO 1981)[5]. However, two interesting notions arise. First, the birth story of UNESCO positions all of the three as possible stirrers of trouble in regards to UNESCO's aims. As the CAME meetings resulting in the founding of UNESCO had specifically aimed to provide a counterforce to the propaganda of the Axis powers, the admission of Japan in 1951 was a major step for the organisation. From the other side of the wartime lines, the Soviet Union also held a peculiar position in the group of the architects of UNESCO. Their representatives attended some of the meetings, but withdrew as the East-West split started to surface. From the beginning, the Soviet Union opposed an initiative of the Western Allied countries to include media and communication as a part of the organisations agenda and, perhaps as a result, joined UNESCO only in 1954. India sent representatives to some of the later CAME meetings and joined UNESCO in 1946. From the beginning, India has been a strong but critical supporter of the whole UN system, a position most notably manifested in the statements of independent India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (see Nehru 1961). (Sewell 1975, 33-70.)

Second, the position these countries held in regards to the East-West division of the world was also quite odd. The occupation of Japan by the Allied States following World War II had ended merely five years before the launching of the catalogue project. The democratisation process embodied in the enforcement of the new constitution in 1947 had tied Japan closely together with the Western world and turned the

[5] The other three countries in the top six were the Hong Kong, the U.S.A. and Italy.

nation into a strategic pawn in the Cold War geopolitical and ideological dispute. Western influences in the socio-political development of Japan, however, reach further back. Most notably, during the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan began a conscious process of deliberately assimilating Western cultural features. India had gained independence in 1947, after almost two hundred years under British rule, and remained a part of the Commonwealth of Nations. The U.S.S.R.'s position in the post-war world proved a source of major confusion for the authors of the catalogue: after some back and forth negotiations about whether the Soviet Union was to be regarded as an Eastern country or not, it was included in the catalogue half-way through the project. The information for the films from the U.S.S.R. also includes information about the producing region instead of lumping them together as Soviet films. The 28 films come from parts of the U.S.S.R. which can roughly be defined as Asian Soviet Republics. Of the films, 3 are listed under Armenia, 1 under Azerbaijan, 6 under Georgia, 4 under Kazakhstan, 2 under Kirghizia, 3 under Tadjikistan, 1 under Turkmenia, and 5 under Uzbekistan. The remaining 3 are simply noted to have been produced in the U.S.S.R., which might have implied multiple or unknown locations within the Soviet Union. The East-West division within the U.S.S.R. was thus clearly defined by the Europe-Asia border within the country.

In the catalogue, the films are classified by country and listed in alphabetical order. For each film, production and distribution details are given, along with a description of the film's critical reception, previous festival screenings and awards, and its possible significance in the history of cinema in the country in question. The general introduction is followed by a plot summary, which is looked at here as the primary means of constructing and shaping the message mediated through the catalogue. There is great variation in the length, style and focus of the plot summaries. Some fill up to 400 words, while others have barely 100 words dedicated to them. The longer ones provide a very detailed account of the film's plot, often complete with even the conclusion of the film, while the shorter ones dedicate what little space they have to introducing the main characters and the general theme of the film without paying much attention to the actual storyline. In all of the descriptions, however, the focus is on introducing the human characters and it is through them that the cultural universe of the other half of the world is introduced to Western audiences. The heroes of the stories told through the catalogue can be roughly divided into two categories: there are the historical heroes and their counterforce, the ordinary, poor people, who often in the end realise that the life of the rich and mighty is nothing to be envious about and find happiness in their own simple way

of life. The ways the characters are described in the summaries can be looked at in terms of Frye's theory, which also begins with the characters. In the First Essay in Anatomy of Criticism, he introduces five modes, building heavily on Aristotle's *Poetics:* mythic, romantic, high mimetic, low mimetic and ironic. By mode, Frye refers to how powerful a character is in relation to his or her society, or to the power of action the characters have.

As the point of the catalogue was to introduce audiences to cultures previously unknown to them, the authors of the catalogue quite evidently wanted to make sure the context the films were placed in would create a sense of mystery and exoticism around them to intrigue Western audiences. However, the variety in regards to the historical adventure spectacles is quite striking. While all of the summaries promise exciting events in a dashing setting, it is in the characters where the main differences are found. The historical Japanese heroes are noble, honourable warriors. There is a sense of adventure and mystery in the plot summaries of the films depicting the heroes of old Japan. No matter where and when, there are bandits and rebels to fight, maidens to rescue and honour to defend. The main characters in these films, like in Frye's romantic mode, while mere men, are positioned above their environment. Many of the stories of the Indian films of a more historical nature are built on a religious theme and based on real-life characters, many of them examples of Frye's mythic mode, where the protagonist's relationship with his world is defined by god-like superiority.

Interestingly, a reference to one God with a capital G keeps appearing in the summaries. While it is possible that these were the forms the summaries were received in from the Indian representatives, it seems more likely that they would be a result of the editing process and formulated to ease the task set upon Western audiences. While suggestions for films to be included in the catalogue along with descriptions of the films were requested from film distributors and the National Commissions for UNESCO in the countries concerned, the catalogue took its final form in the hands of Winifred Holmes, a BFI employee responsible for compiling it[6]. In the Soviet films, the historical heroes are doctors, scientists and scholars. They are people of knowledge and education, who fight against religious prejudice and ignorance. The heroes are people's heroes, fighting for the common folk against the rich and powerful. The characters here, like in Frye's high mimetic mode, are people worthy of admiration, but equal to their surroundings. The differences are less present in the contemporary films, where the heroes are peasants, factory workers and railway builders. The focus is on

[6] For more information on the selection process see Huttunen (2017).

common people trying to find their way in the world defined almost without exception by fundamental societal change and challenge.

In the collection of films from Japan, India and the U.S.S.R. struggle plays a key role and defines the starting points of the stories and the characters alike. In the summaries, struggle takes many forms, such as hardship, misfortune, despair, trouble or misery. On a more concrete level it is described in terms of poverty, treachery, deceit, famine, war or struggle for a meaningful life. Out of all this emerges hope, the factor that guides the characters through the hardships they encounter and something that the catalogue seems to suggest we all share in common. In the Japanese films, struggle is what sets the events in motion and is often a result of people's attempts to adapt to society changing around them. Struggle is often talked about in a way that is bound to evoke sympathy in the reader, like we see in the summary of *The Refugee,* which deals with the hardships brought about by war. It is the year 1948, and every night Sachiko Kameda and her child, Keiko, stand at Kobe station waiting for a man who has promised to return to them. Ten years earlier Sachiko had married a Chinese man, Shao Chung, but she has not seen him since fighting between the Japanese and Chinese drove him to get a divorce to protect his family. He promised to return, and so Sachiko "does not give up hope, and continues to wait". One day, Shao Chung appears, but he is seriously ill. To only add to their hardships, he is in trouble for being involved in a smuggling ring. When Sachiko "begs him to break away from the ring and he does, but he cannot get work and it is a struggle to eke out a living", one cannot help but to cheer for the unfortunate couple. Finally, when he is promised a job and "joyously he hurries to Koyasan where his wife and child await him at the cable car", we learn that perseverance, devotion and sacrifice just might get us another chance in life.

The Refugee is quite an odd choice to be included in the catalogue. According to the introduction of the catalogue, "[f]ilms dealing with sources of international misunderstanding" were to be omitted (Holmes 1959). This referred specifically to "films dealing with recent wars", as a draft version of the catalogue explained. The film's reference is to the Second Sino-Japanese War, which, for the Japanese, together with the Manchurian Incident and World War II formed the Fifteen Years War (1931-1945). As the catalogue was primarily a Western effort targeted at Western audiences, "recent wars" in this case were perhaps limited to the two world wars. *The Refugee* is, in any case, a great example of how in all of the stories struggle is pretty much without exception spoken of in terms that will evoke sympathy in the reader. In a sense, the stories convince us of the similarities between the peoples of the Eastern and

Western worlds. The characters fall into Frye's low mimetic mode, where the character is an everyman and thus equal to everyone around him. In Kenneth Burke's terminology, this is a question of identification. For Burke, identification is a form of persuasion, which can only function when a similarity exists or is constructed between the speaker and the hearer (Burke 1969). In terms of the aims of the catalogue, identification rooted in feelings, experiences and values quite clearly comes across as the first step towards understanding, which in turn carries with it the promise of the moral solidarity of mankind.

If in the Japanese films struggle is what sets the events in motion, in the Indian films it is often constant. It is not only where the stories begin, but also where they end. In the 38 Indian films, struggle is the basic condition of life, defining existence in both town and country, and most often comes in the form of financial difficulties. To escape the poor, challenging conditions of country life, the characters of many of the films follow the call of the promise of an easier life in the cities. In Satyajit Ray's Bengal trilogy, this set-up runs as a thread through the summaries of all three films. The father of "a poor family living in a hopeless patched-up hovel in a small Bengal village" leaves for the city to find work in *Ballad of the Road*. Meanwhile, the daughter of the family falls ill and dies, as their hut cannot keep the rains out. The father returns and "[t]he three members of the family who are left, leave their old home to the snakes and sit in the wagon, waiting for what life will bring them next". In the second part of the trilogy, *The Unvanquished*, we find the family in the holy city of Benares, but only tragedy awaits the family in the big city. The father dies and the mother and the son return to the countryside. Eventually, dreams of a better future lead to the son abandoning his mother, as he decides to attend university in Calcutta against her wishes. The mother falls ill and the son returns only to find her dead. He leaves the village again "and goes to the city with its promise of a new and richer life". The third and final part of the story, *The World of Apu*, introduces us to the lonely life the son leads in Calcutta. He finds himself right back where the story began, poor and struggling to make a living. Apu's beloved new wife wishes to return to her family village to give birth to their child. A son is born, but the mother dies, leaving Apu "hysterical with grief", wandering round the countryside and refusing to have anything to do with his new-born son. Finally, Apu returns to his child, finding happiness and hope not in the empty promises of the big city, but in the simple life with what remains of his family.

While many placed their faith in urbanisation as a miraculous remedy for rural overpopulation and unemployment, these dreams turned out to be not much more than false hope, as Gunnar Myrdal's lengthy -

although rather low on hope - account of the political and economic conditions of the newly independent ex-colonies of South Asia pointed out (Myrdal 1968). For Western audiences of the time, identifying with the characters of the Indian films through shared hope will likely have been challenging. The poverty, death and suffering portrayed in the catalogue perhaps seemed beyond hope even in the eyes of war-torn Europe. India was, after all, faced with very different problems. The stories guide our attention to the hopes and disappointments brought along with the newly gained independence, and point out the inevitable gap between expectations and hope on one hand, and real-life possibilities on the other. However, hope can sometimes be found hidden in the most unexpected places, the collection of the Indian films tells us. Hope does not always require a happily-ever-after: sometimes the simple fact that life continues can be enough. The summaries of many of the Indian films read like textbook examples of Frye's fifth and final mode. In the ironic mode, the protagonist is weak and inferior to his surroundings, and instead of admiration, we feel pity towards him. Frye's categories of characters thus move from gods to great men and from people just like us to the ones beneath us. The stories told about these very different types of characters can, however, be surprisingly similar at heart.

Frye continues the First Essay by introducing four forms the five modes can be discussed in: tragic, comic, episodic and encyclopedic. The first two are what Frye calls fictional forms and, driven by plot, they are individualistic and primarily interested in the characters. Tragic forms deal with characters separated from their society, like in the Indian films, and comic forms with characters integrated into it, like the Japanese ones. Many of the Soviet films, on the other hand, could be read as falling into the latter two categories. They are, in Frye's terminology, thematic forms and preoccupied by ideas, being more collective in nature. In episodic forms, the idea expressed is an individualist one, while in the encyclopedic forms it is of a more social nature as is the case with many of the summaries of the Soviet films. They do, however, provide an example of how these four categories can easily and fluently overlap.

The 28 films produced in the Soviet Union quite predictably turn to the idea of struggle to draw a sharp line between the pre- and post-revolution eras and the hope brought about by the revolution, with Lenin himself making a frequent appearance. Struggle is often a way of describing how miserable, difficult and unjust life was before the revolution. *Doghunda the Beggar*, from Tadjikistan, most notably turns this set-up into a key element of the story. Poor Yodgor is destined from birth to work without pay for his rich master. After many a misfortune, he hears about "the man who is fighting for the dignity and happiness of

his people - Lenin". Eager to learn all he can about him, Yodgor decides to learn the language of his speeches and writings, but this does not sit well with his superiors and he is thrown into prison. Even there, however, "the news reaches him that the Russian workmen have unseated the Tsar and before long the sound of gunfire heralds the arrival of the Red Army" and Yodgor "'becomes his own master at last".

This set-up is of course a textbook example of cinema in the era of socialist realism. C. Vaughan James lists the three basic principles of Soviet aesthetics combining social function and ideological content: people mindedness, referring to the relationship between art and the masses and dictating that art must be intelligible to the masses but also spring from them; class mindedness, referring to the class characteristics of art and pointing out its social significance even in cases in which it has no obvious connection with social issues; and party mindedness, referring to the necessary identification with the Communist Party (James 1973, 1-14). Most notably, endless optimism was a built-in characteristic of socialist realism when it came to portraying the ideal socialist society, whereas pessimism and hardship only existed in a different time or place. Actual contempt towards the old rule and conservative traditions can be detected in many of the summaries. Often it comes in the form of a very traditional colonialist narrative, with the Soviet Russians spreading civilisation, knowledge and progress to the conservative, feudal people of Asia. Like in the Japanese films, people's own actions can bring about change, and that is precisely where hope is found. All of this comes across as a pretty standard strategy for deploying rhetorical optimism in political speech: under the circumstances of significant political change it is common to point attention to the hardships of the past while offering an optimistic vision of the future (Bennett 2015, 52).

A Future of Hope

In the Second Essay, Frye turns to symbols, which for him are the factor that communicates between societies in both time and space. Symbols can be talked about through five different aspects, each of them referring to the relationship between a symbol and what it refers to: motif, sign, image, archetype and monad. They each belong to a different phase of symbolism: literal, descriptive, formal, mythical and anagogic. Zooming out from small towards large, Frye begins with a motif. This is the literal symbol, with a reference only within the text itself. Instead of meanings outside the text, it considers how words take on meanings in relation to each other within the internal context of a work of literature. A sign, then, is a reference to something outside a given text, belonging to the descriptive phase. A sign does not belong merely to the text in

which it occurs but instead refers to our ways of giving meaning and describing things existing in our world. Even wider, the formal phase of an image adds the level of feelings associated to a reference made to the world outside a text and the interpretational aspect necessary for understanding this. An image is used to manipulate the tone of a text and the feelings mediated through it. A symbol of the mythical phase, an archetype is something that keeps recurring across multiple pieces of literature. Often an image that keeps appearing, an archetype can be used to draw connections between multiple texts. Archetypes can reveal categories and phenomena spreading beyond a specific text. Finally, at the top of Frye's hierarchy in the anagogic phase of a monad, a symbol refers to something universal in meaning. Monads deal with phenomena as wide as societal or human aspirations and stories with a theme transcending cultural or societal conventions. This is precisely how the descriptions of the films in the catalogue are understood here.

These five phases of symbol thus move from internal to external reference, and from small to big. They also explain how such different stories can essentially be read in the same exact terms. This does not, however, mean the categories are mutually exclusive. Instead, they are aspects of symbols, and in the end it comes down to the level which we choose as our starting point when considering a symbol. While all of these aspects could without a doubt be chosen as a starting point of analysis for any of the films, the summaries are clearly written with the widest possible interpretation in mind. The summaries of the films in the catalogue are quite evidently examples of a monad and the universal reference made is that of hope.

From the starting point of struggle, the characters described in the plot summaries work towards a better future - be it one of peace, happiness or simply one providing adequate resources for survival. As Bennett notes, the optimism expressed in political speech often takes its most striking form when it takes place during the least likely times: in the face of, for example, overwhelming struggle (Bennett 2015, 50). It would then make sense that this is precisely where the stories depart from. Like struggle, a better future also comes in many forms, and is described in terms of a new life, dreams of happiness, or merely comfort in the fact that life continues. In the Japanese stories, a better future is most often one of hope. The plot summary of *Street of Shame* tells the story of five brothel workers and teaches us that sometimes it is worthwhile to aspire for a better future by any means necessary, no matter how miserable the present situation is. "Yasumi wishes to raise enough money to bail her father out of prison; Yumeko, a widow, is anxious to give her teenage son a decent upbringing: Yoriya, to earn money enough to be able to marry

the man she loves; Mickey, to forget an unhappy home life and an American soldier lover; and Hanaya, to support a sick husband and young baby". Despite the difficulties the women encounter in life, hope maintained through their noble goals is never lost.

In the Japanese films, the way to get from the miserable present to a better future is through being or becoming a good person - someone with a noble and humble character, a sense of loyalty, devotion to others or to a greater cause, and the ability to love. Often penitence is all that is needed to continue on a path towards a brighter and happier future. *Living* gives us a rather good account of such a solution. We are introduced to the main character, who seems to be struggling with an existential crisis in the modern world: "An elderly business man is faced with the realization that he has an incurable disease and must die soon". The film's main character, Watanabe, is in fact a bureaucrat, not a business man. Mistakes such as this make one wonder who actually wrote the summaries. The submissions made by the National Commissions for UNESCO and film producers and distributors in the participating member states were to include the technical details along with a description of the films. The language used in all of the summaries, however, seems to imply that they were written by one person. The texts must have at least been edited by Winifred Holmes and a reasoned guess is that the tone of the texts carries her ideological imprint. This would also explain the occasional mistakes in the summaries. However, they could also simply be a case of lost in translation. "How has he spent his life?", the summary continues, "[a]n unproductive life it seems". He encounters a young girl, who reminds him of his responsibility. "He is left to do one worthwhile thing before he dies, by fighting bureaucracy to obtain a piece of waste land on which to make a park for the children of the neighbourhood", the summary concludes, pointing out that there is still a chance for him to find meaning for his life and, through one selfless act, to redeem himself.

In the plot summaries, selfishness in a character is balanced by selflessness in another, and the heroes are the ones who put others before themselves, even if this means risking or sacrificing one's own life. Another way to rise above the everyday is through nobility of character. In *Muhomatsu the Rickshaw Man*, the main character dedicates his life to the service of a young widow and her son. After his death the widow understands the value of the man who never asked for anything in return and weeps for "the selfless devotion she has lost and for a human being who was so truly noble". The characters are often defined through their devotion and love for others - or lack thereof. Selfish desires and duty are often at odds in the plot summaries. Selfishness gives way to

duty, honour or the needs of others - or even some greater good, such as "helping humanity" like in *Sansho Daiyu*. Zushio, having spent ten miserable years in slavery, becomes brutal and selfish in character but is convinced to change his ways by following the teachings of Buddha and to devote his life to a greater good.

In the Indian films, a better future is one defined by belonging and family. *Moral Heritage,* for example, points to love for one's family as a catalyst towards change for the better. After the death of his wife, the father of a family devotes himself to the responsibility of bringing up his three sons and a daughter. As the boys grow up, they turn on each other, shaking the peace of the household. "Heartbroken, the father dies and the brothers part in anger and hatred". Eventually, however, "the love they all share for their little sister turns their anger into love for each other once more, and their quarrels have a happy ending". While in many of the films, a new beginning required for achieving a better future is often brought about by the death of a loved one, the story beginning and culminating with death is perhaps less important here. Instead, it is love that transforms the lives of the three brothers. Being or becoming a good person is one of the central themes also in the collection of Indian films. The obvious religious enlightenment aside, there are multiple other ways of reaching this goal. In *Mother of Shyam,* family is what literally makes someone a good person: "A child is brought up by his parents with the definite plan of making him a patient and ideal citizen. He inherits a spirit of sacrifice and love of country from his father, while his mother builds up his moral and emotional character."

Seeking understanding and acceptance is another form that the characters' quest for a better life takes in the summaries of the Indian films. The hero of *Eternal Thirst* is a poet who, "in quest of fame, happiness, fulfilment, finds frustration and non-appreciation of his art from all except other outcast from society". Mistaken for dead, his poems become famous and he decides to attend a public event in honour of himself. Disgusted with the hypocrisy of the people, he denounces the audience and "walks away from the world with the other outcast - the girl who loves him and whom he loves". It takes his own "death" to understand that happiness does not lie with the people whose acceptance he was seeking. Much like in the Japanese films, selfishness leads to the suffering of others - even if your selfish desire is merely a new overcoat. In *The Clerk and the Coat*, Gidhari and his family are struggling to make the ends meet. "But there is one thing he wants badly, however, a warm woolen coat" to keep out the harsh cold of the North Indian winter. One pay day, his wife tells him to buy a new coat, in spite of their other needs. Through a series of unfortunate events, the family

ends up in trouble, but when all seems lost “the family is able to renew its old life, happy (in spite of the scrimping and saving) to be together in honesty and love, however poor”. Through their hardships, the family realises that a future not differing much from the present might actually be enough, no matter how miserable. Remorse and redemption also make an appearance in the Indian films. Based on a true story, *Two Eyes - Twelve Hands*, tells of the fundamental goodness of people. A prison officer's conscience is troubled by the harsh treatment of the criminals. He is allowed to take six of the toughest murderers to a waste ground, which they can cultivate. A jealous rival cultivator tries to destroy their flourishing field but, to everyone’s surprise, “the ex-murderers keep their tempers and their word”. The prison officer dies, but not before he has realised that he has succeeded: The men have redeemed themselves and “become normal human beings again”.

The descriptions of the Soviet films, then, stretch the idea of hope, family and belonging even further: Hope in these films does not mean much without one’s own hard work. *High Position*, from Tadjikistan, teaches us that fame and fortune need to be earned by hard work. Young, pretty and pampered Zulfia has just been offered a position in a clinic in the Tadjik capital. As a result of her upbringing, she is very sure of herself and luck seems to be with her no matter what she does. Suddenly, everything changes and she suffers one failure after another. Realising that her privileged position cannot be taken for given, “she decides to give up her high position and go to a distant mountain region to become worthy of the high post she has been holding by working humbly as a rural physician”. Happiness is often found in a modest, secure future defined by community. Family is not the centre, but instead the surrounding people as a collective whole. Produced in Kazakhstan, *Birches in the Steppes* tells the story of a courageous Russian woman who makes a better life for herself and her son through hard work and the help of those around her. Stepan and his family move to Kazakhstan in search of a better life, but there is no “easy bread” in Kazakhstan. Stepan is ready to leave, but his hardworking wife, Maria, refuses categorically. Stepan leaves, leaving Maria without resources and with a small child on her hands, “[but the people of the kol[k]hoz - both Kazakhs and immigrants - help Maria onto her feet”.

Similarly, in the Soviet films, selfishness is frowned upon. As the films put the focus on communities above family, the consequences of selfish acts are more far reaching. The attitudes displayed towards selfishness come across as almost ideological: people tend to push the unfitting types out of their lives not only for their own sake, but for those around them. It is all about the community, and so solidarity towards the

community must come before the individual. Many of the films take place in kolkhozes, or mention farm collectivisation as a frame. Another major factor in people's quest for a better life is the Soviet Union itself. It is a land of miracles - but not the religious type. *The Heart Sings*, produced in Armenia, tells of a family who had to flee from the massacres in Armenia. They start a new life on the Balkan coast, but lose not only their money and business, but also their musician son's eyesight. "Now the exciting news comes to the town: the exiled Armenians can return". The father hears that "in Soviet Armenia there are physicians who can restore sight". They return home and their dreams are fulfilled: the son is cured and becomes one of the most popular singers in Armenia.

The ideal of a just, equal and fair world is a fundamental part of the package that is the U.S.S.R. and, consequently, in these films there is a guarantee of a brighter future. Equality, above all else, is what the characters aspire towards and are defined by. In *Saltanat*, from Kirghizia, a young zoologist-technician of a mountain kolkhoz is fascinated by a plan to convert an arid piece of land into a pastureland. Working alongside the men to achieve this dream, "Saltanat confirms the right of women to take part in any work alongside men and wins a victory; the collective farmers achieve their high-mountain pasturage". In the films, it is the small, common people who are promised justice - occasionally, however, on the condition that their loyalties lean towards the political left.

In the summaries of films from Japan, India and the U.S.S.R. a general storyline emerges, leading us from hardship to hope. The way the characters' dreams and aspirations are described in the summaries is enough to evoke in the reader a realisation of how universal these themes in fact are. The characters become people whose position and motives we can actually relate to and understand. This is precisely where the path towards the moral solidarity of mankind in the world of UNESCO begins. Essentially, the stories tell us about hope. Hope reaches from small, personal everyday issues to wider, societal questions of positive expectations for the future. Three concrete forms hope emerges from in the summaries can be distinguished: 1) sacrifice, teaching us that selfishness only leads to downfall, whereas selflessness is the way forward; 2) nobility of character, reminding that there is always a promise of peace and happiness in the future but only when left in the hands of good, caring people; and 3) remorse and redemption, pointing out that a better world is not far out of reach, but only as long as we are willing to put the past behind us and work together for a future of understanding and appreciation. Sometimes, however, personal growth alone is not enough. In those times, you might need to surround yourself with other good people, the ones who will give you a new chance in life.

Conclusion

The films to be included in the catalogue were to be suitable for Western distribution, which might imply that the ways the chosen films were to be described in the catalogue were planned to intrigue rather than scare away potential audiences. To be fair, the themes distinguished in the catalogue are common, broad and universal enough to be present in cultural products from anywhere in the world. The films speak of the challenges and hardships people face when attempting to adapt to society transitioning around them. For Japan, it was adapting to the post-war world. Essentially, the films tell stories of a post-war nation reinventing itself, struggling with societal changes. For India, it was getting to terms with its newly achieved independence and the hopes of development that followed: A post-colonial nation reflecting upon the hopes and disappointments independence brought with it. For the U.S.S.R., then, it seemed to be an attempt to deal with the hard, pre-revolution past and to look into the future with a newly found hope of equality, justice and solidarity. Interestingly, the Soviet films do not speak about the post-war world as one might have expected. Instead, they come across as a part of a longer continuum of representations of class revolution and thus, it seems, they were a part of the attempts to continue to construct and promote the ideals of the Soviet socialist empire.

The position all three of these countries held in the construction of the post-war world order can be seen to problematise UNESCO's principles of the moral solidarity of mankind but also the division of the world into East and West. At first glance, it would seem that the catalogue defined the Eastern and Western worlds mainly based on the spatial aspect of the two cultural systems that could only be understood in relation to each other, defining these two civilisations as hierarchical cultural programmes organised around specific cultural values. However, slightly oddly, the catalogue seems to contradict itself: The East, represented in my analysis by Japan, India and the U.S.S.R., is spoken of both as a vaguely defined collective whole and a construction labelled by internal diversity. On one hand, the aims stated do very little do dismantle the division of the world into the East and the West. Instead, they construct and maintain this polarisation, presenting the coexistence of the Eastern and Western world within the UNESCO system as something the West needs to adapt to. Emphasis was laid on avoiding stereotypes of the Eastern world by representing the organisation's Eastern member states on their own terms, through their own cultural products. The plot summaries, on the other hand, do the exact opposite. The way the collection of films was spoken of implies that there actually is no such thing as East and West as polar opposites - at least in terms of

shared hope. They present the Eastern world as depicted in these films in terms familiar enough to point out that the themes in the summaries are actually pretty universal in nature and talk about what it is to be human on a level that transcends any artificial polarisations.

With the catalogue project, UNESCO argued for the importance of adapting to a changing world, where humanity was not divided by internal differences but rather united by hope for a better future. The hope portrayed in the catalogue is not one constructed upon blind optimism: it recognises the suffering and struggle of humankind as fundamental building blocks of life. In the case of the Orient project, UNESCO's ideal of the moral solidarity of mankind seems not to be constructed upon a homogenous, hegemonic understanding of the idea. This would then annihilate a major source of criticism directed at this idea: the fact that in a world inhabited by an endless collection of cultural constructs of differing values, the high ideal of moral solidarity is an unattainable dream. Instead, the catalogue envisions a world where the idea of universal humanism rooted in the moral solidarity of mankind is one founded upon the one factor we all share in common: hope. The focus on hope helps grasp the two levels of goals UNESCO aimed for with the catalogue: A shared hope was to lead to understanding, which would then eventually be followed by the higher and more abstract ideal of moral solidarity. Through the plot summaries of the films included in it, the catalogue argued for a new form of universal humanism grounded not in a homogenous understanding of humanity, but in the appreciation of similarity rooted in diversity. With the catalogue project, UNESCO argued for a humanity not divided by internal differences, but for one united by hope. This was the new world to adapt to - not the East with their cultural traditions separate from the West. UNESCO's intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind in this sense would then actually be an ideological one: uniting the peoples of the world through the propagation of hope.

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Appendix 1

A list of films from Japan, India and the U.S.S.R. included in the catalogue. The English titles and Romanisation are given as they appear in the catalogue when available.

Feature films: Japan

The Baby Carriage (Ubaguruma), 1956, dir. Tasaka Tomotaka
The Boyhood of Dr. Noguchi (Noguchi Hideyo no Shōnen Jidai), 1956, dir. Sekigawa Hideo
A Boy Named Jiro-san (Jirō Monogatari), 1955, dir. Shimizu Hiroshi
A Cat and Two Women (Neko to Shozo to Futari no Onna), 1956, dir. Toyoda Shirō
Five Sisters (Onna no Koyomi), 1954, dir. Hisamatsu Seiji
Four Chimneys or *Chimney Scene* (Entotsu no Mieru Basho), 1953, dir. Gosho Heinosuke
Gate of Hell (Jigokumon), 1953, dir. Kinugasa Teinosuke

In the Woods (Rashomon), 1950, dir. Kurosawa Akira
The Legend of Narayama (Narayama Bushi-kō), 1958, dir. Kinoshita Keisuke
The Life of O Haru (Saikaku Ichidai Onna), 1951, dir. Mizoguzhi Kenji
The Lighthouse (Yorokobi mo Kanashimi mo Ikutoshitsuki), 1957, dir. Kinoshita Keinosuke
Living (Ikiru), 1952, dir. Kurosawa Akira
The Lord Takes a Bride (ōtori-Jo Hanayome), 1957, dir. Matsuda Sadatsugu
Love Never Fails (Mugibue), 1955, dir. Toyoda Shirō
The Maid (Jochūkko), 1955, dir. Tasaka Tomotaka
The Mask of Destiny (Shuzenji Monogatari), 1955, dir. Nakamura Noboru
Men of the Rice Fields (Kome), 1957, dir. Imai Tadashi
Mother (Okaasan), 1952, dir. Naruse Mikio
Muhomatsu the Rickshaw Man (Muhōmatsu no Isshō), 1958, dir. Inagaki Hiroshi
The Refugee (Bōmeiki), 1955, dir. Nomura Yoshitaro
The Roof of Japan (Shiroi Sanmyaku), 1957, dir. Imamura Sadao
Samurai - The Legend of Musashi (Miyamoto Musashi), 1954, dir. Inagaki Hiroshi
Sansho Dayu (Sansho Dayu), 1953, dir. Mizoguchi Kenji
Seven Samurai (Shichinin no Samurai), 1954, dir. Kurosawa Akira
Snow Country (Yukiguni), 1957, dir. Toyoda Shirō
The Story of Pure Love (Jun-Ai Monogatari), 1957, dir. Imai Tadashi
The Story of Shunkin (Shunkin Monogatari), 1954, dir. Itō Daisuke
The Story of Ugetsu or *Tales of the Pale Moon after the Rain* (Ugetsu Monogatari), 1953, dir. Mizoguchi Kenji
Street of Shame (Akasen Chitai), 1956, dir. Mizoguchi Kenji
Tales of Genji (Genji Monogatari), 1951, dir. Yoshimura Kōsaburō
The Temptress (Byakuya no Yojo), 1957, dir. Takizawa Eisuke
The Throne of Blood (Kumonosu-Jō), 1957, dir. Kurosawa Akira
The Tokyo Story (Tōkyō Monogatari), 1953, dir. Ozu Yasujiro
Untamed Woman (Arakure), 1957, dir. Naruse Mikio
Walker's on Tigers' Tails (Tora no O o Fumu Otokotachi), 1945, dir. Kurosawa Akira
The White Snake Enchantress (Hakujaden), 1958, dir. Yabushita Taiji & Okabe Kazuhiko
Yellow Crow (Kiiroi Karasu), 1957, dir. Gosho Heinosuke

Feature Films: India

Babla, 1952, dir. Agradoot[7]
Ballad of the Road (Pather Panchali), 1955, dir. Satyajit Ray
Boot Polish, 1954, dir. Prakash Arora
The Clerk and the Coat (Gar[a]m Coat), 1954/-55, dir. Amar Kumar
The Cruel Wind (Aandhiyan), 1952, dir. Chetan Anand
Devdas, 1935, dir. P.C. Barua
Devdas, Later Version, 1956, dir. Bimal Roy
Eternal Thirst (Pyaasa), 1957, dir. Guru Dutt
Gotama the Buddha, 1956, Rajbana Khanna
Hum Panchhi Ek Dai Ke, 1957, dir. P.L. Santoshi
Lighthouse (Jaldeep), 1956, dir. Kidar Sharma

[7] Refers to a collective of Bengali film technicians together signing as the director.

Light in the Dark (Andhare Alo), 1957, dir. Haridas Bhattacharjee
The Lost Child (Munna), 1954, dir. K.A. Abbas
Lotus of Kashmir (Fleur de Lotus, Pamposh), 1953/-54, dir. Ezra Mir
Malaikkallan, 1954, dir. S.M. Srisamulu Naidu
The Man from Kabul (Kabuliwala), 1956, dir. Tapan Sinha
Mizra Ghalib, 1954, dir. Sohrab Modi
Moral Heritage (Shevgyachya Shenga), 1955, dir. Shantaram Athavle
Mother India, 1957, dir. Mehboob Khan
Mother of Shyam (Shyamchi Ayhi), 1953, dir. P.K. Atre
Our India, 1950, dir. Paul Zils
Parineeta, 1955, dir. Bimal Roy
The Pathetic Fallacy (Ajaantrik), 1948, dir. Ritwik Ghatak
The Philosopher's Stone (Paras-Pathar), 1958, dir. Satyajit Ray
Queen of Jhansi (Jhansi-ki-Rani), 1955, dir. Sohrab Modi
Ramshastri, 1943/-44, dir. Gajanan Jagirdar
The Return of Krishna (Bhagwan Shree Krishna Chaitanya), 1953, dir. Debaki Kumar Bose
The Royal Jester (Tenali Ramakrishna), 1956, dir. B.S. Ranga
Saint Tukaram (Tukaram), 1937, dir. V. Damle and S. Fatehal
Scout Camp, 1958, dir. Kidar Sharma
Shirdiche Shri Sai Baba, 1955, dir. Mumarsen Samartha
The Stranger (Pardesi/ Khojendie za tri moria (Russian title)), 1958, dir. Khawaja Ahmad Abbas, Vassili Pronin, B. Garga, D. Viatich-Berejnykh
Two Acres of Land (Do Bigha Zamin), 1953, dir. Bimal Roy
Two Eyes - Twelve Hands (Do Ankhen Barh Haath), 1957, dir. V. Shantaram
Under Cover of Night (Jagte Raho), 1956, dir. Shanbhu Mitre and Amit Maitra
The Unvanquished (Aparajito), 1956, dir. Satyajit Ray
The Vagabond (Awara), 1952, Raj Kapoor
The World of Apu (Apur Sansar), 1959, dir. Satyajit Ray

Feature Films: the U.S.S.R.

Adventures is Bokhara (Nasreddin V Bukhare), Uzbekistan, 1943, dir. Ya. Protazanov and N. Ganiyev
Any Girl at All (Nye Ta, Tak Ata), Azerbaijan, 1958, dir. Gusein Seid-Zade
At Lenin's Behest (Po Pootyevke Lenina), Uzbekistan, 1958, dir. Latif Faiziyev
Avincenna, Uzbekistan, 1957, dir. K. Yarmatov
Birches in the Steppes (Beryozy V Steppi), 1957, dir. A. Pobedonostzev
The Day Will Come (Yeco Vremia Pridyot), Kazakhstan, 1958, dir. Mashit Beghalin
The Distant Bride (Dalyokaya Nevesta), Turkmenia, 1948, dir. Ye. Ivanov-Barkov and D. Varlamov
Dokhunda the Beggar (Dokhunda), Tadjikistan, 1957, dir. Boris Kimyagorov
The Earth Thirsts (Zemlya Zazhdet), U.S.S.R., 1930, dir. Yuli Raizman
Fatima, Georgia, 1959, dir. Semyon Dolidze
Fishermen of the Aral (Rybaki Arala), Uzbekistan, 1958, dir. Yuldash Agzamov
The Heart of a Mother (Serdtze Materi), Armenia, 1958, dir. Grigori Melik-Avakian
The Heart Sings (Serdtze Poyet), Armenia, 1957, dir. Grigori Melik-Avakian
The Heir to Genghiz Khan / Storm over Asia (Potomok Chingis-Khana), U.S.S.R., 1928, dir. V.I. Pudovkin
High Position (Vyssokaya Dolzhnost), Tadjikistan, 1958, Boris Kimyagorov

I Met a Girl (Ya Vstretil Devushku), Tadjikistan, 1957, dir. R. Perelstein
The Last from Sabudar (Possledni Iz Sabudara), Georgia, 1958, dir. Shota Managadze
Legend of the Icy Heart (Legenda O Ledyanom Serdtze), Kirghizia, 1958, dir. [Aleksey Sakharov and Eldar Shengelaia]
Magdana's Donkey (Lurdja Magdany), Georgia, 1956, dir. Rezo Chkheidze and Tenghiz Abuladze
Otar's Widow (Otarova Vdova), Georgia, 1958, dir. Mikhail Chiaureli
Our Dear Doctor (Nash Mili Doktor), Kazakhstan, 1957, dir. Sh. Aimanov
Our Yard (Nash Dvor), Georgia, 1957, dir. R. Tcheidze
Saltanat, Kirghizia, 1955, dir. V. Pronin
Song of First Love (Pesnya Pervoy Liubvi), Armenia, 1958, dir. Laert Vagarshian and Yuri Erzinkian
The Splinter (Zanoza), Georgia, 1957, dir. Nicolai Sanishvili
Takhir i Zukhra, Uzbekistan, 1945, N. Ganiyev, assisted by Yu. Agzamov
This Is Where We Live (My Sdess Zhivyom), Kazakhstan, 1957, dir. S. Aimanov and M. Volodarsky
Turksib, U.S.S.R., 1929, dir. V. Turin

III

DE-DEMONISING JAPAN? TRANSITIONING FROM WAR TO PEACE THROUGH JAPAN'S CINEMATIC POST-WAR CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN UNESCO'S ORIENT PROJECT 1957–1959

by

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De-demonising Japan? Transitioning from War to Peace through Japan's Cinematic Post-war Cultural Diplomacy in UNESCO's *Orient* Project 1957-1959

In 1959, UNESCO published a film catalogue titled *Orient. A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture* to familiarise Western audiences with Eastern cultures. Out of the 139 feature films included in the catalogue, 37 were Japanese. Through a discussion of the descriptions of the films provided in the catalogue, this article analyses Japan's post-war cultural diplomacy in the context of the Orient project. The analysis suggests the Japanese representatives aimed to position the nation in the international arena outside the Cold War political and ideological framework. Instead, they promoted national interests by utilising the catalogue project to renegotiate the country's position in the post-war world with the larger ideal of intercultural understanding guiding the selection process and the meaning created for Western audiences.

Keywords: cultural diplomacy; Japan; film; UNESCO; intercultural relations

1. Introduction

After World War II, re-entering the international community constituted a big challenge for post-war Japan. Policymakers were faced with the tough task of renegotiating the Japanese national image of a fallen military power and one of the main players of a bitter war. During the war, the national image of Japan abroad had largely been constructed by wartime Allied propaganda. A vivid example of such negative image building is the film *Know Your Enemy: Japan* (1945), commissioned by the U.S. War Department, directed by Frank Capra and released three days after the bombing of Hiroshima. In the film, Japanese history and culture are portrayed as the cause of modern day Japan's warlike and expansionist behaviour instead of its political, military or economic aspirations. The primary sources of video footage are news clips and Japanese fiction films. In the film, the imagery has been taken out of context and

reframed to create a narrative serving a purpose of demonising Japan in Western eyes in order to build an image of the nation as something alien, unknown and hostile. Thus, sometimes the ways films are used and the contexts they are placed in become of more significance than the films themselves.

In 1959, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), in cooperation with the British Film Institute (BFI), published a film catalogue titled *Orient. A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture.* The aim of the catalogue was to promote the presentation of films which might give Western audiences a 'fuller and more informed idea of the ways of life of Eastern peoples' (Holmes 1959). Japan, as the world's most prolific film producer at the time, was featured prominently in the project. For the Japanese, it provided a means of introducing foreign audiences to Japanese culture – or at least to the aspects of it they wished to promote. The Orient catalogue is approached here as a significant cultural diplomatic initiative during a time when intercultural relations were largely determined by the bipolar Cold War geopolitics. The aim of this article is to discuss the question of what purpose the Japanese films chosen for the Orient catalogue served in terms of cultural diplomacy.

During the Cold War, film became one of the key instruments for constructing meaning and shaping the ideas of the nature of the conflict for the general public. The recent decade has witnessed an emergence of a growing amount of research on the cinematic Cold War in the form of both propaganda and diplomacy within and between the two blocs. Whether these accounts approach cinema as a Cold War ideological battlefield (see e.g. Shaw and Youngblood 2010; Roth-Ey 2011) or as a platform for cooperation (see e.g. Siefert 2012; Siefert 2014; Kozovoi 2016), the focus is placed on the states-level with the United States and Soviet Union and their allies as the main

actors, thus enhancing our understanding of the intercultural relations of the time as being positioned along this geopolitical East-West axis. With Japan's position in the post-war world as a starting point, the previously uncharted Orient project provides insight into the interplay between Cold War cinema and cultural diplomacy beyond the geopolitical East-West polarisation.

If we want to understand what exactly the Japanese representatives were hoping to accomplish by participating in the project, we need to look at how the catalogue attempts to shape the readers' understanding of the films in it. Even though the films were chosen to represent Japanese culture in the catalogue, they were not originally produced for the project. However, in the context of the catalogue, they became a means of both representing Japan and creating meaning for Western audiences. In the following sections of this article, I begin by taking a closer look at the question of defining Japan's cultural diplomacy and related film policies prior to the Orient project. Next, I move on to discuss the Orient project as an example of Japan's cultural diplomatic strategies by examining the selection process and criteria.

Finally, in order to provide an example of how exactly the descriptions in the catalogue shape and construct the films to further the agenda of image rehabilitation, I compare the plot summaries and the actual contents of two films included in the catalogue: *Four Chimneys* (a.k.a. *Where Chimneys Are Seen*, Entotsu no Mieru Basho, 煙突の見える場所, 1953, dir. Gosho Heinosuke) and *Gate of Hell* (Jigokumon, 地獄門1953, dir. Kinugasa Teinosuke). To borrow from Kenneth Burke's (1969, 59-62) terminology, the descriptions and the films they represent are looked at as a representative anecdote. Understood here in a broad sense, this term serves as a way of

unifying separate narratives under one coherent message, thus helping to crystallise the basic paradigm created through the collection of Japanese films in the catalogue.

2. Defining Japan's Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural relations formed one of the central pillars of Japan's foreign policy in the post-war decades. Article nine of the post-war Constitution of Japan, which came into effect in 1947, declares that 'Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes'. This means that alternative courses of action were required in order to secure Japan's international position and thus, the key role of cultural diplomacy in Japan's foreign policy makes perfect sense. When the means of warfare are restricted, other options for doing politics need to be found – especially if we take war to be an instrument or an expression of politics (Clausewitz 1832, 70).

Cultural diplomacy in the strict sense can be defined as interest-driven governmental practices in comparison to ideals-driven cultural relations practiced by non-state actors (Ang, Isar and Mar 2015, 365). On a practical level the difference is often non-existent as the relationship between a nation state and its citizens is rather difficult to dismantle, but here this categorisation helps to make a distinction between the motives of the different actors involved. Of course, between the categories of citizen and state we need to add the category of enterprises, with motives likely differing from the other two. Enterprises are mainly of interest here to illustrate the multidimensionality of the concept, policy and practice of cultural diplomacy. However, it must be noted that in the field of cinema, this is exactly where some of the biggest actors are found, in the form of commercial film producers and distributors.

In the Japanese context, the term cultural diplomacy (bunka gaikō, 文化外交) came about in the 1930s. Following Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, the primary goal of Japan's cultural diplomacy was to stabilise its foreign relations with the great powers. The Japanese recognised that the promotion of national culture as a part of their foreign policy would help achieve the state's political goals, and thus it became a significant aspect of an aggressive foreign policy aimed at persuading the West to acknowledge Japan's role as a leader in Asia. The chosen counterpart for Japan's cultural diplomacy was the Western powers, which were seen to hold a level of culture and civilisation equal to that of Japan. (Park 2011, 18-19; 21-22.) Film, however, served a similar purpose in justifying Japan's imperial aspirations from the end of the 1800s all the way through to the end of the Pacific War in 1945 with a very different audience in mind. Japanese cinema became a key means to argue for the benefits of the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an alternative to Western colonialism and to inspire participation in the imperial project in the occupied territories. (Baskett 2008.)

In 1939, Japan legislated The Motion Picture Law. Films were subject to strict censorship and were examined by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the gendarmerie and the Education Ministry. After the termination of World War II in 1945, the Allied Occupation (1945-1952) began, and as a result, film censorship by the government was suspended and film production freed from government control. During the Occupation period, Japan's foreign policy was dictated by the United States, to which its cultural diplomacy was also tied to (Saeki 2015). The ex-imperial power was forced to adjust to the reorganisation of its society from the outside, and the film industry was no exception. The Occupation forces established a new set of rules for the film industry, aiming to popularise their political agenda of establishing democracy. While officially

the Occupation forces promoted freedom of speech, they nevertheless established an excessive bureaucratic machine under the General Headquarters to carry out their own media control in order to root out topics that could be interpreted as attempts to resurrect Japanese militarism (Hirano 1994). Following article 21 of the post-war Constitution, which forbid censorship altogether, the existence of censorship could not be publicly acknowledged. In practice, it was an open secret.

Towards the end of the 1940s, a U-turn in the Occupation forces' policies took place. Japan was to be transformed into a stronghold against the rise of communism in Asia, even at the cost of reversing some of the earlier reforms, and the focus of the officially non-existent censorship thus turned from right-wing targets to left-wing ones (Dower 1999, 426-429). In 1949, the Motion Picture Code of Ethics was introduced, leading to the gradual shift of the Occupation forces' control back to the hands of the Japanese. As an unarguably clever way of working around article 21, the new policy placed the film industry under a form of self-regulation carried out by the Motion Picture Producers Association of Japan. In 1950, the Red Purge enforced by the Occupation forces drove a number of accomplished directors out of the film studio system (Anderson and Richie 1982, 237).

One of the first steps taken by post-war Japan to restore its status in the international community was to join UNESCO in 1951. At the 6th UNESCO General Conference, which admitted Japan, Japan's representative Mr. Maeda Tamon gave a speech stating that '[t]he spirit of UNESCO is the guiding principle for Japan, which is on the path of rebuilding itself as a peace-loving and democratic state' (National Federation of UNESCO Associations in Japan 2016). Maeda's speech reveals a dualistic attitude towards Japan's cultural diplomacy. On one hand, he refers to it as a means of promoting national interests through image construction. According to

dominant understanding, during the 1950s the primary goal and challenge of Japanese cultural diplomacy was to transform its wartime national image into a new image of the country as a peace loving democracy (Aoki-Okabe, Kawamura, & Makita, 2010, pp. 216, 220; Ogura, 2008). This focuses on the nation state as the key player in cultural diplomacy, making the – perhaps only terminological – mistake of assuming the nation state to be the natural form of the world in both a social and a political sense, even granting it actor-like qualities (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).

Taking a slightly different approach in line with the other track distinguishable in Maeda's speech, Sang Mi Park (2011) argues that in the post-war period, Japan's cultural diplomacy was characterised by an effort to place Japan in an intermediary position between the developed Western and developing Asian countries. Indeed, Maeda's speech places UNESCO's aims to promote intercultural understanding as the driving force behind Japan's cultural diplomacy. Defining intercultural understanding as the key aim of cultural diplomacy sounds rather idealistic, as it seems to eliminate the aspect of national interest altogether – at least if national interest conflicts with the idea of promoting mutual understanding.

During the transition from the Occupation to the post-Occupation era, a number of institutional mechanisms were established to support the United States' aspirations of incorporating Japan into its hegemonic Cold War sphere. Along with political, military and economic activities, this included cultural measures, like those of the United States Information Agency. Following the end of the Occupation in 1952 and 1953, significant sections of the Japanese film industry were accused by not only American but also British press of anti-Americanism for producing films dealing with the atomic bombings or the Pacific War. Allegedly these films were attempting to revive right-

wing Japanese militarism, thus posing a threat to the United States' Cold War interests in the Asia-Pacific region. (Howard 2016.)

In 1956, Mr. Haguiwara Toru, the head of the delegation of Japan, addressed the 9th UNESCO General Conference in a speech: 'Ten years ago, all the nations of the world were eager for peace. We were all entitled to think that the horrors of war were at last banished from the earth' (UNESCO, 9/C Proceedings. Records of the General Conference; Ninth session, New Delhi, 1956, p. 57). But still, 'bloody conflicts' had kept occurring all over the world. 'The experience of the last ten years surely proves that all the efforts made in the political field bring only a temporary and short-lived solution', he continued, emphasising the need for an alternative solution. His response was to turn to the promotion of intercultural understanding to build a sustainable basis for peace.

In 1958, the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO (JNCU) compiled a 1000-page encyclopaedia on Japan for foreigners titled *Japan: Its Land, People and Culture*, which attempted to 'give foreigners an authentic picture of Japan', indicating that the Japanese were on a mission to represent their country on their own terms and to challenge the wartime image constructed by others. They acknowledged that the atmosphere was finally favourable for the introduction of Japanese culture abroad, but regretted that neither the Japanese people nor the Japanese government were well prepared for 'effective cultural diplomacy' (Kurihara, Matsui and Tochiori 1958, 194). For the JNCU, cultural diplomacy held great promise as a way forward, but required a critical approach to the means at their disposal. The JNCU noted that cinema seemed to be the most effective means of promoting intercultural understanding, particularly among the general population.

In 1959, the Orient catalogue was published. The final catalogue consists of two parts: Part 1 deals with feature films suitable for screening at film festivals and part 2 focuses on documentaries and short films for television distribution. Part 1 includes 139 films[1], out of which 37 are Japanese[2]. 36 of the Japanese films in the catalogue were produced in the 1950s, when Japan was the world's largest film maker. The 1950s, when Japanese cinema finally reached European audiences, is celebrated as the golden age of Japanese cinema. During the six and a half years of Occupation around a thousand feature films were produced (Dower 1999, 426), but by the mid-1950s the number had grown to around 500 films produced annually (Motion Picture Producers Association of Japan) while the estimated total of feature films produced world-wide in 1955 was 2800 (UNESCO 1981). This might partially explain the relatively large number of Japanese films included in the catalogue. However, at the time Hong Kong was the fourth largest film producer in the world, but was represented in the catalogue with only five films. India, on the other hand, ranked third on the list of the world's biggest film producing countries, was featured in the catalogue with 38 films.

3. Categorising the Orient

The Orient project was carried out by the BFI at the request of UNESCO. The BFI was to prepare the catalogue, while UNESCO was in charge of distribution and also provided assistance with communicating with the National Commissions. The National Commissions for UNESCO are Member State coordinating bodies – part of their national governments. During the selection process of the films, draft versions were sent to the National Commissions for comments in order to avoid later criticism, reflecting UNESCO's role as an organisation of Member States (UNESCO, Extract from summary minutes of MC Departmental meeting held on Thursday, 31st October 1957). In some cases they suggested additions or asked for a film to be withdrawn as they

considered the film in question not to be representative of their country. Thus, the Japanese National Commission had the final say when it came to the collection of Japanese films chosen for the catalogue. It also provided the information on the individual films.

The catalogue's description of each of the films can be divided into three parts: production and distribution details, general introduction and a plot summary. While the production and distribution details might provide useful information concerning the collection of Japanese films included in the catalogue, the general introductions are where we find evidence on how the inclusion of each of the films was argued for. The information given can be categorised into five groups: 1) critical acclaim, 2) festival screenings and awards, 3) national importance, 4) audience, and 5) general characterisations.

In the beginning of the catalogue project the Member States were advised to submit films that were shown at an international film festival and had English subtitles or commentary. Out of the 37 Japanese films, 23 were available as a version with English, French or Spanish subtitles by the publication of the catalogue. 27 of the films came with a mention of festival screenings or awards. Most of these were major European film festivals, such as Cannes, Berlin or Venice. The significance of international recognition in the form of festival screenings and awards functions as the primary justification for a film's place in the catalogue. In fact, in the case of *Four Chimneys*, '1953 Shown at Berlin Film Festival. Won International Peace Prize' was pretty much all that was needed.

The second most important criterion seems to have been the approval of an undisputed authority: the film critic. 19 of the films come with a mention of foreign or domestic critical acclaim. The critical acclaim category contains two distinct sub-

categories: that of technical excellence, like 'the superb colour and ravishing sets' of *Men of the Rice Fields* (a.k.a. *The Rice People*); and that of artistic excellence, as exemplified by *The Boyhood of Dr. Noguchi* being ' [w]ell received by Western critics as having a charming "mood" and sincerity of feeling when shown in London'. Even though some of the films are mentioned as having been screened in Asia and in the case of *The Roof of Japan* and *The Story of Pure Love* also in Latin America, the catalogue only mentions the comments of either Japanese or 'Western' critics, who, when specified, come from either Europe or the U.S.. This would make sense, as the intended audience of the catalogue seems to have been mainly European, even though it was also distributed in North America. Defining Western audiences primarily in terms of Europe is rather fascinating, as the decade leading up to the publication of the catalogue had witnessed a drastic restructuring of world politics. The European colonial great powers had crumbled, giving way to the rise of the United States with its allies - including Japan - as the new world hegemonic power.

The purpose of part 1 was to assist film festival organisers in finding suitable film content produced in the East in order to help the West both comprehend and appreciate the culture, life and ideals of Asian and Arab countries (UNESCO, Elements of the contract to be concluded with the British Film Institute 1957). The catalogue was pre-ordered in 400 copies but the number was soon increased to 1000. A decision was made to distribute the catalogue to organisations and people who were likely to make practical use of it. There is limited evidence to determine whether they ever did. These organisations included National Commissions for UNESCO, television stations, national federations of film clubs, film distributors and film critics – mainly based in Europe. In 1960, 2000 additional copies were printed and demand was noted to be so great that UNESCO needed to restrict its distribution. It was decided that copies should

be given to those most likely to continuously use it – others would be given information on where in their country the catalogue could be consulted.

For 19 of the films, justification for their inclusion in the catalogue is based on the audience category. This encompasses both box-office success in Japan and screening abroad, with the main venue being the National Film Theatre in London, operated by the BFI. Even though in most cases the reference is to either '[h]uge box-office success in country of origin' (*The Legend of Narayama,* a.k.a. *The Ballad of Narayama*), or to successful and widespread specialised showing in Europe and the U.S., a simple '[s]hown in America' (*Sansho Dayu,* a.k.a. *Sansho the Bailiff*) seems to have been considered adequate. This category comes across as being of less importance than festival screenings or critical acclaim, as it never appears on its own. The UNESCO report on film and cinema statistics 1955-1977 (1981) observes that the few Japanese films shown abroad are the ones that are made in such a way that they cater to the tastes of audiences everywhere, which means that they are 'not really good representatives' of the national culture of their country of origin. This places the national and the international in contradictory positions. However, as Homi K. Bhabha (1990), for example, notes, a national culture need not be placed as unitary or unified neither in relation to itself nor to what lies beyond it. In this light, it is rather interesting that the films in the catalogue were to show with 'sincerity and fidelity some aspect of life and culture in the country of their origin' (UNESCO, Letter from Winifred Holmes to the Director of the Indonesian Film Centre, 5th May, 1958). This was based on the BFI's understanding that 'the Survey was to be highly selective and only films of the best quality included in it' (UNESCO, Letter from James Quinn to Henry R. Cassirer, September 24th, 1958).

Later on the requirements were altered and thus in addition to festival films also box-office successes and films of special significance in the history of film in the country in question were included. Nine of the 37 descriptions contain a reference to the latter, such as the '[f]irst Japanese Eastman Colour Film' (*Gate of Hell*) or '[h]istorically important as the first Japanese feature length documentary film' (*The Roof of Japan*). However, the historical importance of the films is often framed not only in terms of Japan, but all of Asia. *The White Snake Enchantress* (a.k.a. *The Tale of the White Serpent* or *Panda and the Magic Serpent*), for example, is described as the '[f]irst full length cartoon drama produced in Asia', and *In the Woods* - better known to modern audiences as *Rashomon* - as '[h]istorically very important as first Asian film to win international showing and reclaim'. This would suggest that through these descriptions, Japan was positioned as representing not only itself but the whole of Asia.

The praising attributes associated with some of these films in the catalogue are, in fact, stretching the truth quite significantly. The first Asian full length cartoon drama, for example, was *Princess Iron Fan*, produced in 1941 in China. The false claim of the pioneering character of Japanese animation might imply an attempt to argue for Japan's role as the core part of Eastern civilisation, made notably easier by the fact that mainland China was not featured in the catalogue. However, to confuse things even further, *The White Snake Enchantress* does not even hold this position within Japan. It was preceded by over a decade by *Momotaro's Divine Sea Warriors*, a wartime propaganda film clearly not seen fit to represent Japan in the catalogue, let alone the whole of Asia. The task of the Japanese representatives was thus not merely to define what Japanese culture was as it was to be represented to the West, but perhaps more importantly to construct the East in the same sense. As we can see from the factual

slips, this was done zooming in on Japan as the core of Eastern civilisation, but in a form fitting for the purposes of the catalogue project.

The category of additional characterisations covers 26 of the films. The logic behind this category seems to be that additional descriptions have been given to the films which do not come with a mention of festival screenings or awards. Films without a description must have mentions of festival screenings, usually alongside the categories of critical acclaim, national importance and/or international audience. Charming, kindly, gentle, light-hearted, touching and sensitive are only a few examples of the adjectives used to describe these films. Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto (2000, 10-11) argues that in the 1960s, the discourse on Japanese cinema in the West developed into one of humanist criticism, where the gap between the universal values portrayed in the films and the exoticism of Japanese cultural particularity was filled by 'humanity'. Judging by the characterisations of the films, it seems that the roots of this discourse might reach further back and that the Japanese representatives themselves were not against arguing for the recognition of their national cinema in such terms. *The Lighthouse*, distributed in the U.S. as *Times of Joy and Sorrow*, for example, is '[a] film of simple people who faithfully fulfill their duties in the face of solitude and hardship'. *Mother*, also, is '[a] charming film centering on the moving theme of a mother's love and suffering for her daughter'. *Love Never Fails* likewise places universal issues at the film's core: 'Leisurely, romantic film, about adolescent awakening, imbued with gentle fatalism'. The characterisations seem to simultaneously appeal to the emotions of the reader, and portray universal humanism and understanding as quintessential Japanese values.

The countries included in the Orient catalogue were categorically classified as part of the East, which was vaguely defined as countries of Asian and Arab culture – referred to in the singular. The sheer number of Japanese films included in the catalogue

would be enough to place Japan in a central position as a representative of Eastern culture, but the approach taken seems to have also been chosen as a strategy for building Japan's image in the eyes of the West. *The Tokyo Story*, for example, is advertised as '[a] slow, somewhat static film, but very Eastern in feeling'. *The Mask of Destiny*'s description takes more of an educational approach: It is a '[h]istorical film of interest to the West as it shows the art of the mask-maker'.

The Story of Shunkin also refers to Eastern and Western as oppositions, but adds the binaries of traditional and modern: It is set 'about fifty years after Japan emerged from her feudal past and was "groping in the full stream of Western culture"'. As the JNCU in a rather abstract manner explains it, despite the rapid importation of modern culture, Japanese culture had not lost its inherent characteristics, which would always be its underlying force and which for foreigners remained the most appealing and interesting aspect of Japanese culture (Inoue 1958, 1044). How exactly to draw a line between these characteristics and foreign influences absorbed throughout Japan's history, remains unclear. The cultural dualism the JNCU refers to is not in fact that of East and West but that of something traditional, inherent and pure versus a modern melting pot of Eastern and Western influences. The idea of Japanese culture as something pure and unique formed one of the bases of its wartime nationalistic ideology, and continued to be repeated in the post-war discourse on what it meant to be Japanese (Befu 1992, 43-44). However, the most appealing aspect of any film might in fact be a well told, captivating story and not its country of origin as is argued in the characterisations of several of the films.

The Maid (a.k.a. *The Maid's Kid*) is '[a] touching contemporary story of love and devotion of a poor servant girl for her boy charge', clearly sold to the audiences through attempting to evoke an emotional response and suggesting a very universal storyline,

but also pointing out that it is set in modern times. Similar argumentation is used with *The Baby Carriage*, which is '[a] story of modern life and family relationships, sincerely written and played, with understanding and sympathetic direction'. *The Story of Pure Love*, also, is '[a] moving film of modern city life and its social problems'. Finally, *Yellow Crow*, as the last description pointing out a film's modern setting, is '[a] tender and moving contemporary film about the relations of a father and his son.'

Other characterisations focus on the historical or traditional setting. *The Legend of Narayama* is an '[i]nteresting treatment of traditional Shinto folk-customs and beliefs in force in Central Japan many years ago', and *The Temptress* (a.k.a. *The Temptress and the Monk*) a 'historical period film' with a 'fantastic and legendary story'. Many of the characterisations tie the films to Japanese cultural history through mentioning an original novel or a folk tale the films are based on. *Tales of Genji* is a '[h]istorical film based on the legendary stories called "The Tales of Genji"'. *The Throne of Blood,* being '[b]ased on Shakespeare's Macbeth', is an interesting exception. 'The action takes place in the middle ages of Japan - the period of strife between feudal Lords.' It is thus advertised as being both Western and historical, while the pairing usually is that of western and modern, and eastern and traditional.

Sometimes the characterisations function as a means of justifying the inclusion of a film with a more controversial topic. The *Story of Pure Love* addresses the problems of modern city life, 'including the new disease of "radiation"'. The problematic topic is softened by the fact that it is '[a] film made by an independent producer with one of the major film companies of Japan'. The 'independent producer' should perhaps be a reference to the film's director, Imai Tadashi, who had been somewhat a controversial figure in the Occupation and immediate post-Occupation era film industry. He was one of the directors forced out of the studio system in the purge of 1950 and

among the film-makers attacked as anti-American by the American and British press following the end of the Allied Occupation (Howard 2016). Even though *The Story of Pure Love* was produced after the storm had settled, it was perhaps still better to justify its selection for the catalogue through extenuating circumstances. The film was chosen as 'one of the ten best films' by Japanese film organisations in 1957 and thus its inclusion in the catalogue seems inevitable.

The general introduction section relies heavily on authority to explain why these films were chosen to represent Japan. It is as if the representatives were trying to focus our attention on the excellence of the Japanese film industry and argue for its recognition not only through the films' success domestically but also by justifying the quality of the films on a world-wide scale – mainly in relation to the West. Japan's current cultural diplomatic policies seeking to establish Japan as a cultural superpower much resemble Japan's aims in the Orient project. These policies, such as 'Cool Japan', remain a one-way projection of Japanese culture, despite their emphasis on the promotion of cultural exchange and dialogue (Iwabuchi 2015), mainly aiming to promote Japanese culture abroad through positioning cultural products, such as film, as a tool for economic and diplomatic aims (Kawashima 2016).

4. Characterising Japan on the Screen

Some general policies guided the Orient project: According to the introduction of the catalogue, films that might be a source of 'international misunderstanding' were left out (Holmes 1959). This might imply that there was more to the selection process than the officially acknowledged factors discussed above. In this section, I compare the plot summaries of two films with the actual film contents in order to provide insight into the process of creating meaning for the potential audiences reading the catalogue. The films have been chosen to represent two dominant streams in the collection of the Japanese

films in the catalogue. *Four Chimneys*, directed by Gosho Heinosuke, tells the story of common people's struggles in the post-war world with the catalogue's description emphasising intercultural understanding and universal humanism. Like many of the contemporary films in the catalogue, it is interpreted here as arguing for recognition of the similarities between post-war Japan and post-war Europe, directing our attention to the universal nature of the story. *Gate of Hell*, directed by Kinugasa Teinosuke, on the other hand, reminds us of Japan's rich cultural tradition. Representative of the historical dramas in the catalogue, I approach it as an argument that under the violent and socially rigid surface the ideals of peace and humanism form a central part of Japan's unique, nation specific cultural stance.

Both of the films were produced in 1953 and were available with English subtitles at the time the catalogue was published. The black and white *Four Chimneys* is an example of post-war *shomin-geki,* 庶民劇, a Japanese film genre depicting the lives of ordinary people. The Eastman colour *Gate of Hell*, on the other hand, is an example of *jidai-geki*, 時代劇, or historical drama, depicting traditional Japanese customs often as adaptations of folk tales and traditional stories. Even though not mentioned in the catalogue, *Gate of Hell*, too, is an adaptation of a play written by Kikuchi Kan, based on a story from the Heian period (794-1185), while *Four Chimneys* is based on Shiina Rinzo's novel *Mujakina Hitobito* (無邪気な人々 lit. innocent people).

'The film concerns a cross-section of life in a poor quarter of Tokyo', the plot summary of *Four Chimneys* begins, setting the stage. What it leaves unmentioned, is the fact that it is a contemporary film, taking place in the post-war years. Reminding potential European audiences of the war and the role Japan had played in it was perhaps not seen to be the best strategy for portraying the universal values of humanism and

peace. Focusing instead on the human aspect of the societal and political conflicts that followed was better suited for their purposes. The struggle to deal with the poverty following the war and the reconstruction of their societies was something Japan and Europe had in common, which might partially explain Europe being the chosen counterpart for Japan's cinematic cultural diplomacy.

'The main characters are a struggling worker, Ryukichi, and the woman he believes to be his legal wife, Hiroko'. Even though it is implied that their difficulties might be of a financial nature, we find out that this is merely the surface of the hardships they encounter as the summary unravels. 'A baby is left with them one day' setting the events in motion. The abandoned baby is 'the child of Hiroko's worthless first husband, whom she has presumed dead, and his sluttish companion who eke out a wretched existence on some wasteground by the river's edge.' The description of Tsukahara and Katsuko, left unnamed in the summary, creates tension between the characters: There are the good ones whose hardships we are meant to feel sympathy towards and, as their counterforce, the 'worthless' and 'sluttish' ones. So, in the summary, the new hardships are brought about by other people, and not the social, let alone political, conditions of the time. In the film, however, we find out that Tsukahara and Katsuko are also struggling with difficulties of their own, not differing much from those of the main couple.

Next, the summary adds more characters to the mix: 'This event not only affects the lives of the husband and wife, but also those of a young couple to whom they have let their two upstairs rooms'. They are 'Kenzo, a tax collector, and Senko, a young girl embittered by her experiences during the war'. In the film itself, both Senko and Hiroko still carry emotional scars of the war. The two women thus become symbols of post-war Japan, attempting to push forward in life with the memories of the war still weighing

heavily on their shoulders. The summary aims for evoking sympathy towards the characters' hardships: 'The baby never stops crying and causes friction between Ryukichi and Hiroko, both of whom are at their wit's end to know what to do'. In the film, the baby is not the sole reason for their disagreements. Ryukichi feels deceived learning that in order to earn extra money, Hiroko sells gambling tickets at a bicycle race track behind her husband's back. On top of this, the surfacing of Hiroko's first husband is enough to push him over the edge, for this is the reason they are stuck with the baby in the first place: They are afraid to go to the police as they might be accused of bigamy. In the summary the couple themselves carry none of the blame, perhaps to do with the sympathy we are meant to feel for them. 'Finally Hiroko, driven to despair, tries to commit suicide', but '[t]ragedy is narrowly averted'. We can correctly assume that Hiroko is rescued, but we are still left with the situation that led us here in the first place.

'[T]he experience charges all the characters with a new optimism, a clear vision', the summary continues. To fully grasp what is being said here, we need to return to the film. One key character is completely left out of the summary. This is the newly rich, materialist and modern Yukiko, Senko's colleague. One day Katsuko appears to claim back her baby, but is confronted about her suggested inability to look after the child. She storms out breaking her shoe and it is Yukiko who runs after her. Katsuko, dressed in a kimono, and Yukiko, in a Western-style dress with high heels, confront each other on the street and Yukiko hands Katsuko one of her shoes to replace her broken geta.

In the end, duty and common good are placed first as Hiroko decides to return the baby to her mother, and Katsuko and Yukiko take on the responsibility of looking after the baby together. This not only implies an equal relationship between the two women but also between social classes. However, we can also look at this as a reflection

of a post-war nation rebuilding itself, communicating that even after defeat the Japanese nation still stands united and strong. This level of social commentary does not get a mention in the plot summary. From here, the catalogue jumps to its concluding remarks, finally revealing the idea behind the film's title: 'The husband looks up at the chimneys which always seem to be a different number depending on the position from which he looks'. The chimneys are one of the visually most dominant aspects of the film but their main purpose is to emphasise one of the central messages: Our approach to life alters through our changing perspective.

Both the film and the catalogue's summary of it provide a powerful example of the similarities between post-war Japan and post-war Europe, as they clearly communicate not only the practicalities but also the emotional aspects of rebuilding society after the war. The film *Four Chimneys* tells the story of common people's struggles in the changing post-war society where modern influences clash with traditional values. With sympathy and understanding, it shows that all the characters are only doing what they feel is necessary to adapt to society changing around them. Even though this would have been a good universal message to send through the catalogue, the focus of the summary is elsewhere. '"Life is whatever you think it is", he says, "it can be sweet or it can be bitter, whichever you are yourself"', the summary concludes, quoting Ryukichi. The key message the catalogue's summary sends is of a rather noble nature. There is a way of overcoming the hardships of life, be they societal or personal in nature – it merely requires an adjustment of attitude. Very fittingly, this is also the point the UNESCO Constitution (1945) tries to get across: It is in the minds of men, where the foundations of a new world must be constructed. Understanding is the road to peace, while ignorance is what lurks behind the causes of war, allowing us to reject the 'principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men'.

In opposition to the contemporary setting of *Four Chimneys*, *Gate of Hell is* '[s]et in the Japan of the 12th Century'. It is 'a story of intrigue and violence in times of civil war', the summary begins. The film portrays 'the character of the girl, Kesa, who substituted herself to save the fleeing Emperor's daughter, as the focus of romance, passion and sacrifice'. With its introduction of the main character, the summary sets the stage through a promise of a great adventure in a historical setting, starring the intriguing noble class. The Emperor's daughter is fleeing from rebels attacking the palace and Kesa, the emperor's sister's lady-in-waiting, volunteers to draw the attackers away from the palace. She is escorted by samurai Morito. 'Kesa is depicted as the ideal heroine of old Japan, beautiful, remote and calm but full of latent humour and capable of deep love, which she is bound by her upbringing to put after her honour.' Again, we are reminded that we are dealing with historical times, when the heroines had a true sense of mystery to them – we must not forget that we are being showcased the conflict and drama of old Japan. We are told that Kesa will have to choose between personal interests and duty, but the details of what actually happens are not revealed.

The film is loosely based on the events of the Heiji Rebellion of 1160[3] and portrays a nation in the midst of a series of civil wars, dominated by samurai clans fighting for political power. Samurai lord Taira no Kiyomori has left Kyoto, leaving opportunity for rival samurai clans to attack the royal palace. Taira no Kiyomori is an actual historical character and known in Japanese epics as a ruthless, proud and arrogant man. Instead of even mentioning a real-life war-lord, the summary keeps us focused on the seemingly distant but sympathetic character of Kesa. The rebels are defeated and to set the events of the film in motion, Taira no Kiyomori rewards his warriors by granting each of them a wish. Morito asks for a marriage to be organised between himself and Kesa. 'This forces her to sacrifice herself on behalf of her husband and his companions',

the summary continues. As is revealed here, Kesa is already married to another samurai lord, Wataru, and thus Morito's wish cannot be granted. But Morito is obsessed and determined to acquire what he wants, even if it means committing murder. Morito sneaks into Wataru's room, slaying him in his bed. As we are told with '[t]he sword which kills her is that of her lover', the light of the full moon reveals he has made a horrifying mistake: It is Kesa, sleeping in her husband's bed.

Morito confesses his crime to Wataru, offering his head as reconciliation. His offer turned down, Morito dramatically grabs his knife and cuts of his hair tied into a traditional samurai top knot. With this gesture, he renounces his social status, declaring to dedicate the rest of his life to suffer the tortures of hell for what he has done. With 'Moritoh, the great warrior, who thereafter becomes a monk to expiate the crime', the summary concludes the story and its underlying lesson. Morito of the film, left to live with the consequences of his actions, tells us that the use of force is futile, at least for selfish purposes. Having tried to acquire what he wanted by force only resulted in him destroying it. The catalogue's message, on the other hand, is one of remorse and redemption. Under the violent and dramatic surface, it is a story of appreciation, understanding and peace. In this sense, the story is very much in line with the aims of UNESCO as it clearly portrays the pacifistic ideals of the 1950s. Or, as Mr. Haguiwara Toru in his speech at the UNESCO General Conference in 1956 phrased it: 'The Japanese people have learnt by experience the ills that result from national selfishness and the blessings of international collaboration' (UNESCO, 9/C Proceedings. Records of the General Conference; Ninth session, New Delhi 1956, 58).

Both of the plot summaries seem to guide our attention back to the roots of the humanist discourse on evaluating Japanese cinema, pointing out Japan's capability to integrate the world's cultures into its own, in order to present its unique contribution to

promoting a peaceful coexistence of cultures. We can also detect the Japanese representatives trying to make a break with the war-filled past and drawing our attention to the difficulties of adjusting to the post-war societal conditions. *Gate of Hell* uses the historical wars as a background against which to showcase the splendour of old Japan, whereas the approach *Four Chimneys* takes on modern wars is as a source of human suffering. Thus, the descriptions of the films come across as a means of reconstructing Japan's national image through their contribution to mediating a new, peace loving image of the nation. One way of defining cultural diplomacy is as the construction of a national culture by projecting it outward (Aoki-Okabe, Kawamura and Makita 2010, 212). Traditionally a national culture may seek to unify its members into one cultural identity, but here lies a significant challenge: This notion compresses cultures into externally distinguishable, internally homogenous systems shared by the members of their corresponding societies.

Thus, Japan's cultural diplomacy in the context of the Orient project can be defined as the promotion of national interests through illustrating the positive aspects of its national culture abroad, and its cultural diplomatic strategy as being tied to the process of image construction. However, the aim of promoting intercultural understanding is also strongly present – perhaps dictated by the framework provided by UNESCO. As we can see from a 1958 speech by Maeda Tamon, the head of the delegation of Japan and the chairman of the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO at the time, in the UNESCO context, national interest is by default tied to the promotion of mutual understanding: 'All nations should be glad of the opportunity Unesco affords them […] to bring the world nearer to universal harmony and peace, so that we may face the future with greater confidence than we have done in the past'

(UNESCO, 10/C Proceedings. Records of the General Conference; Tenth session, Paris 1958, 124).

The intertwining references to national interest and mutual understanding illuminate what is a central problem of the concept, policy and practice of cultural diplomacy. Its primary aim is seen to be to cater to the strategic interests of national governments while simultaneously hinting towards a possibility of moving beyond the national interest in order to support a common good through mutual cultural exchanges and understanding (Ang, Isar and Mar 2015). However, while it might be tempting to view this relationship as a dichotomy, it is not necessarily so black and white. We can question the existence of such contradiction through Richard Rosecrance's (1986) distinction between two major tendencies in how international relations are organised in any given time: the military-political and the trading world. The latter involves a peaceful balance of trade and production in a world where, despite power differences, nations are dependent on each other and therefore equal in status. Thus, creating an international society based on the peaceful coexistence of nation states does without a question belong in the realm of national interest. For Japan, taking this approach could, of course, also be interpreted as a necessary consequence of its post-war position, defined by the peace treaties and the new Constitution, essentially eliminating the military-political option.

5. Conclusions

In the Orient project, we have seen evidence of two approaches to Japan's cultural diplomatic strategy. On one hand it can be defined as the promotion of national interests through projecting Japan's pacifist and peace-oriented image, and constructing Japan's image in relation to the West. With the Orient project, the Japanese representatives had the opportunity to project their nation on their own terms and to challenge the wartime

image constructed by the Allied forces. The challenge would then be erasing the old demonic image and replacing it with a picture of Japan as a modern, democratic nation while also recognising its long historical and cultural background – in a sense, redefining Japanese nationalism through image transformation. The heavy emphasis placed on justifying the inclusion of the films in the catalogue through critical acclaim and festival awards argues for Japan's role in the post-war world as a cultural force that should not be ignored.

On the other hand, the larger ideal of intercultural understanding seems to guide the related policies. The coexistence of these aims, which can be at odds with each other, may partially be the result of the context provided by UNESCO. It could also be argued that the Japanese representatives were aiming to position the nation in the international arena not through political or ideological factors but as a cultural mediator between the East and the West. The fact that Japan's cultural diplomacy of the time was not tied to promoting a specific political ideology is especially interesting considering that the catalogue project was carried out in the early and heated ideological stages of the Cold War. Even though the Cold War set-up may have been a contributing factor in the selection process of the films, despite Japan's alliance with the U.S., in the context of the Orient project the Japanese seem to have followed a policy of separating intercultural relations from politics: The East-West polarisation in the context of the catalogue is not that of the Soviet Union and the U.S., but that of Asia and Europe. However, we need also to consider the option that participating in the Orient project was merely an attempt to boost the export of Japanese cinema, which despite 'an active demand for Japanese films on overseas markets', was not making as much money as imported films were making in Japan (Ikeda 1958, 465).

The project brought Japan into contact with the West not only as a nation but

also as a significant representative of Eastern civilisation. Similar narratives were utilised to argue for West Germany's position in the post-war world as belonging to the equally vague Western civilisation (Jackson 2006). Although somewhat similar, Japan's case might be even more multifaceted. In the project, Japan was placed in the East through naming and representing it as a central pillar of Eastern culture while simultaneously constructing its international stance through emphasising the similarities between Japan and the West. The seemingly apolitical humanism portrayed through the choices of films was an unarguably skillful way of renegotiating the position of a former enemy as a part of both of the two major civilisations recognised in the catalogue project: the East and the West. Like in the case of West Germany, the process of international image reconstruction was primarily built on cultural argumentation, showcasing in a very concrete manner how the image of a nation can, in fact, simply be born as a result of cultural policy strategies (ibid.) The descriptions of the films in the Orient catalogue remind us that culture is a social construction: It can be not only utilised, but also shaped for political purposes.

Notes

[1] The other countries included in the feature film part of the catalogue are Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Korea, Malaya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and the U.S.S.R..

[2] See Appendix 1 for a list of all the Japanese films included in the catalogue.

[3] The Japanese name of the events, 平治の乱, refers to violent political disorder or disturbance but it is most commonly translated into English as 'rebellion'.

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Appendix 1

A list of the Japanese films included in the catalogue. The English titles and Romanisation are given as they appear in the catalogue.

The Baby Carriage (Ubaguruma, 乳母車), 1956, dir. Tasaka Tomotaka

The Boyhood of Dr. Noguchi (Noguchi Hideyo no Shōnen Jidai, 野口英世の少年時代), 1956, dir. Sekigawa Hideo

A Boy Named Jiro-san (Jirō Monogatari, 次郎物語), 1955, dir. Shimizu Hiroshi

A Cat and Two Women (Neko to Shozo to Futari no Onna, 猫と庄造と二人のをんな), 1956, dir. Toyoda Shirō

Five Sisters (Onna no Koyomi, 女の暦), 1954, dir. Hisamatsu Seiji

Four Chimneys or *Chimney Scene* (Entotsu no Mieru Basho, 煙突の見える場所), 1953, dir. Gosho Heinosuke

Gate of Hell (Jigokumon, 地獄門), 1953, dir. Kinugasa Teinosuke

In the Woods (Rashomon, 羅生門), 1950, dir. Kurosawa Akira

The Legend of Narayama (Narayama Bushi-kō, 楢山節考), 1958, dir. Kinoshita Keisuke

The Life of O Haru (Saikaku Ichidai Onna, 西鶴一代女), 1951, dir. Mizoguzhi Kenji

The Lighthouse (Yorokobi mo Kanashimi mo Ikutoshitsuki, 喜びも悲しみも幾歳月), 1957, dir. Kinoshita Keinosuke

Living (Ikiru, 生きる), 1952, dir. Kurosawa Akira

The Lord Takes a Bride (ōtori-Jo Hanayome, 鳳城の花嫁), 1957, dir. Matsuda Sadatsugu

Love Never Fails (Mugibue, 麦笛), 1955, dir. Toyoda Shirō

The Maid (Jochūkko, 女中ッ子), 1955, dir. Tasaka Tomotaka

The Mask of Destiny (Shuzenji Monogatari, 修禅寺物語), 1955, dir. Nakamura Noboru

Men of the Rice Fields (Kome, 米), 1957, dir. Imai Tadashi

Mother (Okaasan, おかあさん), 1952, dir. Naruse Mikio

Muhomatsu the Rickshaw Man (Muhōmatsu no Isshō, 無法松の一生), 1958, dir. Inagaki Hiroshi

The Refugee (Bōmeiki, 亡命記), 1955, dir. Nomura Yoshitaro

The Roof of Japan (Shiroi Sanmyaku, 白い山脈), 1957, dir. Imamura Sadao

Samurai – The Legend of Musashi (Miyamoto Musashi, 宮本武蔵), 1954, dir. Inagaki Hiroshi

Sansho Dayu (Sansho Dayu, 山椒大夫), 1953, dir. Mizoguchi Kenji

Seven Samurai (Shichinin no Samurai, 七人の侍), 1954, dir. Kurosawa Akira

Snow Country (Yukiguni, 雪国), 1957, dir. Toyoda Shirō

The Story of Pure Love (Jun-Ai Monogatari, 純愛物語), 1957, dir. Imai Tadashi

The Story of Shunkin (Shunkin Monogatari, 春琴物語), 1954, dir. Itō Daisuke

The Story of Ugetsu or *Tales of the Pale Moon after the Rain* (Ugetsu Monogatari, 雨月物語), 1953, dir. Mizoguchi Kenji

Street of Shame (Akasen Chitai, 赤線地帯), 1956, dir. Mizoguchi Kenji

Tales of Genji (Genji Monogatari, 源氏物語), 1951, dir. Yoshimura Kōsaburō

The Temptress (Byakuya no Yojo, 白夜の妖女), 1957, dir. Takizawa Eisuke

The Throne of Blood (Kumonosu-Jō, 蜘蛛巣城), 1957, dir. Kurosawa Akira

The Tokyo Story (Tōkyō Monogatari, 東京物語), 1953, dir. Ozu Yasujiro

Untamed Woman (Arakure, あらくれ), 1957, dir. Naruse Mikio

Walker's on Tigers' Tails (Tora no O o Fumu Otokotachi, 虎の尾を踏む男達), 1945, dir. Kurosawa Akira

The White Snake Enchantress (Hakujaden, 白蛇伝), 1958, dir. Yabushita Taiji & Okabe Kazuhiko

Yellow Crow (Kiiroi Karasu, 黄色いからす), 1957, dir. Gosho Heinosuke

IV

FIVE KUROSAWAS AND A (DE)CONSTRUCTION OF THE ORIENT

by

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Five Kurosawas and a (de) construction of the *Orient*

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Abstract

In 1959, UNESCO published a catalogue of Eastern films suitable for Western audiences, titled 'Orient. A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture'. The aim of the catalogue was to familiarise Western audiences with Eastern cultures through cinema. The catalogue lists seven general characteristics of Eastern cinema to distinguish it from its Western counterpart and to provide ready-made interpretations of the essential characteristics of the Eastern world. Of the 139 feature films listed in the catalogue, five were directed by Kurosawa Akira – the biggest number of films by a single director. This article provides an analysis of the five Kurosawa films within the frame provided by the characterisations in the catalogue in the political framework of World War II and its aftermath. Reading the cultural differences listed in the catalogue as a means of constructing the East in Western eyes, the article suggests UNESCO's world was defined neither in terms of the contemporaneous geopolitical polarisation of the Cold War nor the ongoing decolonisation process. Instead, the catalogue served the purpose of proposing a cultural intervention in geopolitics, providing a reimagining of political realities constructed on a cultural basis and given a concrete form through cinema.

Keywords

cinema, Cold War, Kurosawa Akira, the East, UNESCO

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Introduction

As Paul Virilio (1999) has taught us, the history of cinema is intimately wrapped up with the history of war. Indeed, from propaganda to surveillance technologies, and from representation to perception, the history of the two runs in parallel. Or, as Roger Stahl (2010: 4) phrases it, 'the line between war and entertainment has always been permeable and negotiable'. The conduct of war and peace itself is becoming dependent on visual media's aid in comprehending and representing our world, resulting in a co-constitutive relationship between geopolitics and visual culture. Film, however, also holds a critical promise for a

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disruptive intervention in our traditional models of political thinking, ones rooted in nationalist geopolitics and the antagonist policy making that follows (Shapiro, 2009).

This article looks at an instance when cinema's disruptive powers were summoned to serve as an instrument for a radical reimagining of world affairs in the post–World War II world. In the aftermath of the World War II, the number of international organisations grew exponentially. This was due to a shared belief that it was finally time to move past the antagonistic nationalism that had led to the world scale conflicts defining the first half of the 20th century. UNESCO, especially, stood out as a vanguard of the idealistic post-war endeavours to stretch the realm of state-centred multilateral diplomacy to the spheres of science, education and culture. Indeed, as Akira Iriye (2002: 44) notes, 'In those days, no international organization better exemplified the renewed faith in world-wide cooperation than the United Nations, Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)'.

The standard narrative of what followed describes the short period from 1945 to the beginning of the Cold War as the height of the optimism held for the role of these organisations, only to fall flat as the fall out between the United States and the USSR forced the hopes of multilateral diplomacy to give way to the realpolitik of the bipolar Cold War conflict (Sluga, 2013). However, as Akira Iriye (2002: 65) has argued, far from powerlessly observing the conflict from the sidelines, international organisations became 'actors in the Cold War drama'. Thus, I look at UNESCO as an active contributor to the construction of the international system, suggesting that initiatives taken to improve international relations outside the Cold War geopolitical framework assured the liberal internationalist hopes for peaceful cooperation remained alive and well.

In 1959, during the ideologically heated stage of the Cold War and at the peak of the decolonisation process, 139 feature films produced in UNESCO's Eastern Member States were chosen to represent the Eastern world to the West in a film catalogue titled *Orient. A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture*, published by UNESCO in cooperation with the British Film Institute. As the project was aiming to promote intercultural understanding, films 'dealing with sources of international misunderstanding' were omitted (Holmes, 1959). This meant avoiding any references to the recent war and, one would assume, the geopolitical turmoil that followed. The catalogue does, however, contain films where such references are not difficult to detect – most notably five films directed by Kurosawa Akira. These included *Walkers on Tigers' Tails* (*Tora no O o Fumu Otokotachi*, 虎の尾を踏む男達, 1945); *Rashomon* (*Rashōmon*, 羅生門, 1950); *Living* (Ikiru, 生きる, 1952); *Seven Samurai* (*Shichinin no Samurai*, 七人の侍, 1954); and *Throne of Blood* (*Kumonosu-Jō*, 蜘蛛巣城, 1957).

Despite the 'underlying similarity' of Eastern and Western cinema, the catalogue points out that, to Western viewers, some of the film content will seem incomprehensible due to cultural differences, such as manners, customs and social behaviour (Holmes, 1959). These differences are represented as an obstacle for achieving intercultural understanding between the East and the West. During the times of the catalogue, both the Cold War and the ongoing decolonisation process ensured that the East–West paradigm remained central to UNESCO's understanding of world affairs. Following Michael J Shapiro (2009), this article turns to film as a cultural medium perhaps most exemplary of the ways popular culture can generate alternative geopolitical worldviews, proposing an alternative to the traditional black and white conception of world politics in the 1950s. Just as understandings of the realities of the Cold War world were partially constructed upon cultural products (see, for example, Sharp, 2000), so were its alternatives. This

article thus explores the promise cinema holds in its capability to shape the conditions for the perceiving of alternative political realities.

The catalogue provides a seven-point list of general characteristics of Eastern cinema, ranging from the way love is depicted to the representations of violence, derived from the films in the catalogue. Thus, meaning for Western audiences is created not only through the films themselves, but also by the ready-made, culture-specific interpretations of the East. Following Paul Ricoeur, the categorisations provide one possible way of interpreting the films and so, the messages the films communicate are created in an interplay of alternative readings piled one on top of the other. While every text must be read at least partially in the context in which it was produced, the mediation of texts decontextualises them, and every interpretation is another recontextualisation. This allows for new levels of meaning to be added, which then act in a conflict of interpretations. Meaning is not to be found hidden behind the films, but in front of them: Meaning lies with the interpreter, constructed through interaction between the interpreter, the object of interpretation and the context within which the interpretation takes place (Ricoeur, 1976).

Kurosawa's Orient

The Orient catalogue introduces 139 feature films from 13 countries: Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Korea, Malaya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and the USSR. The catalogue was distributed in 3000 copies to organisations such as the National Commissions for UNESCO, film distributors and television stations with the aim to stimulate 'the presentation of films which might give audiences in the West a fuller and more informed idea of the ways of life of Eastern peoples' (Holmes, 1959). This provides an intriguing starting point for analysis. First, the world is divided into two along a line separating the East from the West. Considering the geopolitical realities of the time, one might be inclined to interpret this as a reference to the Cold War East–West division. The catalogue's world, however, was not structured along those lines. Among the countries with the biggest number of films are countries from the opposite sides of the Cold War polarisation: Japan and the USSR. For its first decade, UNESCO had remained a primarily Western European organisation and, perhaps to do with the absence of the Soviet Union, the geopolitical division of the Cold War was hardly visible.

The Soviet Union finally joined UNESCO in 1954. By that time, another form of the East–West division had started to emerge in the UNESCO context. The discussions in the UN General Assembly of 1952 focused on the decolonisation process, adding to and partially replacing the Cold War tensions (Bell, 1953). Now, the definition of the East was drastically different from that of the Cold War. It was no longer the Soviet Union and its satellites but, instead, the non-European, namely, Asian, Arab and to a certain extent the Latin American, world. This marked a shift within the whole United Nations (UN) system, as the set-up now was that of the West and the Third World. In the catalogue alike, keeping Japan and the USSR company in the top 3 contributors of films is India, an ex-colony.

While the catalogue carries implications of both the Cold War and the West and the Third World divisions, it follows purely neither structure. The Orient project was carried out as a part of UNESCO's *The Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values* (1957–1966). Within this frame, the UNESCO (1957) Secretariat considered as Eastern 'all non-European cultures, particularly those rooted in Asia and

fashioned by an ancient, written tradition'. The fluid way of drawing the East–West border suggests that UNESCO recognised it was treading on politically problematic and unstable ground.

Second, the films can introduce to the West the ways of life of the East. The films in the catalogue were selected based on three criteria: (1) they have been shown or received awards at international film festivals, (2) they have enjoyed box-office success and wide distribution in their own country or (3) they are of historical importance in the development of cinema in the country concerned. Suggestions for films were solicited from the representatives of the countries in question, while the National Commissions for UNESCO had the final say.

Out of the 139 feature films, 37 were Japanese. These can be categorised into two groups. The first category, *jidai-geki* (時代劇) or period dramas, tells stories of the heroes, legends and myths of old Japan. Usually taking place during the Edo period (1603–1868) and often based on folk tales, they depict traditional Japanese customs. The second category, post-war *shomin-geki* (庶民劇), depicts modern Japan. It focuses on the struggles and aspirations of common people and is characterised by the tension of traditional values clashing with societal changes.

By the publication of the catalogue, Kurosawa had directed 19 films, and thus about one in four of his films were seen fitting to familiarise Western audiences with not only Japanese, but Eastern cinema as a whole. The collection of five films is the biggest number of feature films by a single director in the catalogue. The Kurosawa films selected for the catalogue represent different political contexts of 1940s and 1950s Japan: *Walkers on Tigers' Tails* is a wartime film; *Rashomon* and *Living* are from the Allied Occupation period (1945–1952), and *Seven Samurai* and *Throne of Blood* represent the immediate post-Occupation era. As the political conditions changed, so did the conditions of filmmaking along with the not always subtle references to societal issues in Kurosawa's films.

Breaking down the categories

In what follows, I read the five Kurosawa films in relation to the list of seven key differences between Eastern and Western cinema distinguished in the catalogue: (1) struggle; (2) love and sex; (3) courtesy in human relations; (4) violence; (5) sentiment and emotion; (6) music, song and dance; and (7) the role of women. Winifred Holmes of the British Film Institute was in charge of compiling the catalogue. The categorisations are thus primarily hers – they do, however, carry UNESCO's blessing.

Struggle

The catalogue's list opens with the *emphasis on struggle*, of which *Rashomon* stands out as a textbook example. It was released in 1950 in Japan and while it was a box-office success, the Japanese critics were not impressed. A year later, the film premiered at the Venice Film Festival, winning the Grand Prix followed by critical acclaim throughout the West. The Japanese were puzzled. The reasons behind the film's success in the West were attributed to either its exoticism or the fact that it was Western enough in style. More generally, when praised, Kurosawa is mentioned equal to legendary Western filmmakers; when criticised, he is placed in opposition to other masters of Japanese cinema, such as Ozu Yasujirō or Mizoguchi Kenji,[1] for not being Japanese enough. Kurosawa responded by a simple 'Oh, I'm Japanese all right' (Richie, 1970: 197). 'I don't think I'm Western at

all. [. . .] I feel that among Japanese directors today I must be the most Japanese' (Yakir, 2008: 74). Thus, for Kurosawa, Japan was a member of the Eastern world – that is, assuming his world consisted only of two halves.

Under the ruined *Rashōmon* gate in 11th- or 12th-century Kyoto, three men take shelter from the rain. Two of the men, a woodcutter and a Buddhist priest, have spent the morning at a trial, leaving them deeply disturbed. A bandit, Tajomaru, had been brought to justice as a suspect in a murder case. The story takes place in times of civil war, when human life has little value and, as the priest explains, people are killed like insects. The priest verbalises the pessimism of the characters: 'War, earthquake, winds, fire, famine, the plague. Year after year, nothing but disasters'. This brings to mind another time in history when Japan was brought to its knees by hunger and hardship: the post-war years. On the 15 August 1945, Emperor Hirohito addressed the Japanese nation in a radio broadcast. His message was short and simple: Japan had accepted the Potsdam Declaration, which demanded Japan's unconditional surrender and ended World War II. Following Japan's surrender, Allied – in practice primarily American – forces were set up to supervise the Occupation, aiming for the democratisation of Japan.

Like in *Rashomon*, looking for the guilty party was a burning issue in the post-war world. In spring 1946, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East gathered in Tokyo to bring Japanese war criminals to justice. Emperor Hirohito, however, was not to face the court, following the advice of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur.[2] Hirohito was regarded as a symbol uniting the Japanese people, and thus putting him on trial might have had drastic consequences. In reality, the Japanese were ready for political and social change, and so the Occupation's political mission of democratisation sat well with them. They were not only ready to discard the legacy of the wartime government but also had already shown interest in establishing democracy before the war (Kawai, 1960: 34–50). Maintaining the status of the Emperor was thus not a priority for the people struggling with poverty and famine. More likely the Emperor became a means for the United States to secure an ally for the future.

'There is a greater emphasis on the struggle for existence, both in town and country, in oriental films' (Holmes, 1959), the catalogue states. The underlying struggle portrayed in *Rashomon* is the struggle for truth. In his testimony, the bandit Tajomaru explained he had come across a couple and was drawn to the wife's beauty. He decided to have her, even if it required killing her husband. He lured them into a grove and tied the husband to a tree. Of what happened after, we are told four different versions. In Tajomaru's version, he killed the husband at the wife's insistence, following what may or may not have been rape. The wife fought fiercely for her honour, but eventually consented. In the wife's version, she asks her husband to kill her now that she has been disgraced. She faints and wakes up to find her husband dead, with her own dagger stabbed through his chest. The husband, through a spirit medium, explains he could not live with his shame and killed himself with his wife's dagger. Thus, *Rashomon* turns into a cynical story of relative truths.

'Who can we trust to tell us the truth' is of course an important question to ask in any political context. In post-war Japan it was perhaps even more topical, as the Allied Occupation forces' first formal directive on 'freedom of speech and press', issued in September 1945, had explicitly declared that 'there shall be an absolute minimum of restrictions on freedom of speech' as long as they would stick 'to the truth' (quoted in Dower, 1999: 406–407). The truth, now, was dictated by the Occupation forces. 'Lies, all lies', the woodcutter repeats and reveals that he witnessed the crime. He tells a story

resembling Tajomaru's version and for a moment we believe the truth has finally come out. Instead, it transpires that the woodcutter had stolen the wife's dagger, implying that his story was not entirely honest either, thus making us question whether we should trust his story any more than those of the others.

Love and sex

Next, the catalogue points to the attitudes towards *love and sex*. Love, let alone sex, is not a theme frequently explored in Kurosawa's films. *Living*, however, is a notable exception. It tells the story of Watanabe Kanji who is diagnosed with terminal stomach cancer. Watanabe is a widower, living together with his son and daughter-in-law. Watanabe explains that everything he has done, he has done for his son, but has not been present at the most critical points of his life. Now, the two are estranged, and the son is more interested in his father's pension than his well-being. Thus, Watanabe conceals the truth about his crumbling health. Reflecting upon his death sentence, he realises he has never truly lived. For the first time in his life, Watanabe takes a sick leave and dives into the exuberance of night time Tokyo. A novelist leads drunken Watanabe through a night of gambling, nightclubs and predatory prostitutes. Drinking, dancing and pachinko provide only a short-term escape from the painful realisation of his own mortality.

'Love is treated more tenderly and reticently and sex seldom exploited as such' (Holmes, 1959), the catalogue claims. In *Living*, too, the possibility of sex serves a higher purpose: The slightly misguided night of exploration turns out to be the most meaningful adventure of Watanabe's life. He bumps into Toyo, a young girl who has been working at the City Hall, where Watanabe has done his life's work as a petty bureaucrat. Charged with unprecedented determination and lack of concern over what is expected of him, he is reminded by Toyo, that there is still time to do one good thing before he dies. He remembers a group of local women being transferred from counter to counter in a futile quest to find a bureaucrat brave enough to respond to their demand of turning a bit of wasteland into a park and finds meaning for what little time is left for him. After Watanabe's death, his family and colleagues are thoroughly confused about the motives behind his altruistic deed: Was it seeking for glory, or the influence of an assumed mistress, or was it perhaps to do with him knowing he had cancer. They argue about who should get the credit for the accomplishment as it definitely is not the deceased – his department was not in charge of building parks.

Living is a film about loneliness, universal humanism and hope. Following the work of Donald Richie, the discourse on Japanese cinema in the West has long been labelled by humanist criticism, where the gap between the universal values portrayed in the films and the exoticism of Japanese cultural particularity was filled by 'humanity' (Yoshimoto, 2000: 10–11). If we were to continue in this vein, one could argue that the categorisations of the catalogue only covered a part of the ground they were aiming to map. We could, in addition to the seven differences distinguished in the catalogue, detect other unifying themes as a means of constructing the East, such as universal humanism, hope for a better future and trust in the goodness of mankind.

Living is also a film about strongly caricatured bureaucracy, rigidly bent on not making any useful decisions on any sensible matter. The film places the public institutions and civil service in a rather ridiculous light, hinting that the bureaucratic problems faced by common people are tied to the new political system imposed by the Occupation. The group of women on a mission to build the park make this perfectly clear: They question

the existence of democracy, responsible for the bureaucratic carousel they have been taken on a ride on. During the Occupation the power set-up had been completely turned on its head as the ex-imperial power was forced to adjust to the reorganisation of its society from the outside. With the arrival of the Occupation forces, despite their noble goals of establishing democracy, the Japanese people were condemned to another 6.5 years of authoritarian military rule. In a strict sense, the Occupation did not constitute a military government, but functioned as a superstructure over the existing Japanese government. While officially the role of the Occupation was to supervise, assist and advice, in practice, it was clear who held the highest authority when it came to the reforms. Thus, from the Japanese perspective, while different to the wartime ones, the rules were still dictated from above. The film industry with its new rules of censorship exemplifies this perfectly. And, as we can see from *Living*, these developments did not go uncriticised.

Courtesy in human relations

The catalogue continues with *courtesy in human relations. Walkers on Tigers' Tails* is based on a kabuki – a classical Japanese theatre form – play *Kanjinchō*, which in turn is based on a famous noh – another form of classical Japanese musical drama – play *Ataka.* It is an adaptation of a well-known 12th-century incident. Minamoto no Yoshitsune, one of the most famous samurai warriors of all time, has led his troops to victory against the rivalling Taira clan. Yoshitsune's half-brother, shogun Minamoto no Yoritomo, perceives him as a threat and orders him to be captured. The escaping Yoshitsune and a group of six samurai disguised as monks are joined by a silly little porter who guides them to a frontier post set up to capture them.

The film was hailed 'mysterious and beautiful' by Western critics, the catalogue advertises. There is no mention of the reactions of Japanese critics to the film, perhaps to do with the events surrounding the film's release. The film was examined according to The Motion Picture Law of 1939, which had established state authority over the film industry and subjected films to strict censorship. The Stan Laurel–like character of the porter does not appear in *Kanjinchō*, the overall structure of which Kurosawa based the script on. The censors found the inclusion of a known comedian to be 'a mockery' of a classic kabuki play (Kurosawa, 1983).

The film was released in September 1945, when the Allied Occupation of Japan was already in full swing. Without delay, the Occupation forces began their project of popularising their political agenda of establishing democracy, including dictating a new set of rules for the film industry and dismissing the censors. Officially the Occupation forces promoted freedom of speech and emphasised ending government control over media, while simultaneously constructing an excessive bureaucratic machine to carry out their own censorship in secrecy. The Japanese censors failed to submit the file on *Walkers on Tigers' Tails* to the US Army's General Headquarters (GHQ), who thus banned it as an 'illegal, unreported' production (Kurosawa, 1983). In November 1945, *Walkers on Tigers' Tails* was included on a list of Japanese wartime films, which were to be destroyed as 'feudal and militaristic' (Dower, 1999: 426). The story does indeed have all the makings of a patriotic, even nationalistic film, depicting traditional values and bowing in respect to the samurai. The film could easily be interpreted as a wartime propaganda film, as the other characters are portrayed in relation to a feudal lord, whose face is kept hidden and position never questioned.

The escaping Yoshitsune disguises himself as a porter and they make their way to the border where they are cross-examined by Magistrate Togashi. If they truly are monks collecting funds, surely they will have a letter of intent, Togashi inquires. Benkei, Yoshitsune's cunning, heroic and devoted chief samurai, pulls out an empty scroll and without blinking an eye reads an improvised justification for their passage. Even after Benkei's monologue, Togashi is suspicious. Benkei is faced with a moral dilemma: Pretending to blame Yoshitsune the porter for the delay, Benkei must beat him to avoid breaking their disguise, at a time, when raising a hand against one's master was considered a grave sin. Finally, Togashi lets them through. Benkei throws himself at his master's feet to apologise for his unthinkable action. Yoshitsune forgives him, revealing his face for the first time.

While *Walkers on Tiger's Tails* was seen by some as a manifestation of nationalistic heroism, from the perspective of the catalogue it speaks of the code of conduct of the samurai: 'Courtesy in human relations, even among the very poor or the very tough, is seldom forgotten' (Holmes, 1959). It is impossible to determine for certain where exactly Holmes' categorisations of Eastern cinema sprouted from. Furthermore, evaluating the accuracy of the categories proves a challenging task, as due to their universal nature they are almost impossible to argue against. As the categorisations showcase, unifying narrative themes are possible to detect even in the vague 'Eastern' of the catalogue, at least as long as one is willing to interpret topics such as courtesy and good manners as a basis for categorisation.

Violence

The fourth category is formulated through *violence*, which is seen to be tied to nationalistic heroism. It is almost as if the catalogue is referring directly to the several samurai films in the catalogue, the most famous among which is *Seven Samurai*. A peasant village harried by bandits decides to hire a group of samurai to protect them. The task is not easy: Fighting for farmers in exchange for food is not exactly in line with the type of work the samurai are accustomed to. Eventually, they succeed in finding a group of seven and the preparations begin.

'Violence usually has a heroic tinge, connected with traditional warrior codes which foster national pride', the catalogue explains. While reading a samurai film through its depiction of violence makes sense, one of the main themes of the film is people adjusting to changing times – the end of the era of the samurai. Fighting side by side, the villagers and the seven win, but a sense of loss hovers over the surviving samurai. As Kurosawa himself describes the conclusion, 'it is the samurai who were weak because they were being blown by the winds of time. They won the battle for the peasants, but then they were dismissed and went away' (Mellen, 2008: 61). However, it might be less a depiction of an end of an era than a story of the beginning of a new one. In *Seven Samurai*, the fate of the village is decided in an epic battle where different social classes fight side by side for a common goal, vividly bringing to mind the democratisation process of post-war Japan. For the Japanese, World War II had not been a separate conflict. Merged with the Manchurian Incident and the Second Sino-Japanese war, it formed The Fifteen Years War (1931–1945), fought against not only the Anglo-American demons but also the 'Chinese bandits' (Dower, 1986: 42). As defined in a secret government report *An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus*, the wartime propaganda had, in addition to nationalistic ideology, largely been constructed around arguments of Pan-Asianism, but not on equal grounds (Dower, 1986: 263). Instead, it was built on the superiority of

the Yamato race in relation to other Asian nations, aiming to rationalise Japan's political, economic and cultural dominance to justify their imperialistic endeavours in Asia.

Starting from the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japanese intelligentsia had attempted to find equivalences of the idealised Western civilisation in pre-industrialised Japan. This discourse, as a counterbalance to Westernisation as a civilising phenomenon, was utilised to claim an equal position between Japanese civilisation and that of the West. The counter discourse, built on writings such as Nitobe Inazō's *Bushidō: The Soul of Japan* (1900), argued that just like the Europeans and Americans, Japan also had an old, refined civilisation (Takeuchi, 2010: 41). The samurai were the embodiment of such a civilisation as in addition to duty, honour and loyalty their code included chivalrous virtues. The warriors were seen to possess qualities essential to civilisation, as described in the bushidō discourse.

Whether Kurosawa's *Seven Samurai* can in any way be read as justifying the catalogue's suggestion of the link between violence and nationalism in Eastern films remains up for debate. One may, in addition, wonder how well the decision to set focus on nationalistic representations of violence fits together with UNESCO's internationalist nature. UNESCO is, in essence, an organisation of member states, standing for the sovereignty of nation states. On the other hand, it is characterised by its cosmopolitan mission and, at the times of the catalogue, by its attempts to clear space for ex-colonial subjects as equals in the international arena. Thus, in the UNESCO context, nationalism and internationalism walk firmly hand in hand.

Sentiment and emotion

The catalogue continues with *sentiment and emotion*. The *Throne of Blood* is Kurosawa's take on William Shakespeare's Macbeth. Two warriors, Washizu and Miki, are returning to Spider Web Castle after a victorious battle and encounter a witch, who foretells their destiny. Washizu will assume control of a neighbouring fort and eventually become the lord of the castle. Miki will take Washizu's place as the commander of the First Fortress, while his son will take over Spider Web Castle after Washizu's time is through. Part of the prophecy comes true, and Washizu's wife, Asaji, devises a plan to realise the rest. She tries to convince Washizu that Miki and his son must die, but he hesitates as he has decided to name Miki's son his heir. Asaji reveals that she is pregnant and will give Washizu an heir of his own blood, sealing the fate of his friend and bringing questions of lineage and heritage to the centre of the story. Asaji's child is born dead and Miki's son manages to escape.

In the *Throne of Blood*, emotion is represented through a figurative noh mask. Kurosawa felt that 'while staring at it, the actor becomes the man whom the mask represents' (Mellen, 2008: 65). Washizu was based on a mask called Heida, the strong and powerful warrior. Asaji, in turn, was based on a mask called Shakumi, the mask of a woman no longer young, torn by her suffering at the loss of a loved one. For Kurosawa, the mask represented a woman about to go mad. 'Sentiment and emotion are presented without apology or disguise', the catalogue phrases this particular categorisation.

In the West, it was questioned whether the film was a proper Shakespeare adaptation 'because it doesn't use the text' (Brook and Reeves, 1966: 117). What actually separates the *Throne of Blood* from Macbeth is that whereas Macbeth is centred around questions of choice, Washizu and Asaji are never given that luxury (Davies, 1988: 155; Prince, 1991: 143–149). Their actions are defined only by destiny. It is precisely being deprived

of choice that ties the film together with the post-war years. Even though the 1950s in Japan was a time of growing support for antimilitarism and pacifism, one of the goals of the Allied Occupation had been securing US military bases in the strategically important Pacific region. The beginning of the Korean War in 1950 marked the end of the complete demilitarisation of Japan. Thus, the Occupation forces ensured that Japan would remain tangled in Cold War geopolitics – whether it wanted to or not.

Miki's son leads the attack against Washizu's castle in the final battle and Washizu once more visits the witch. But she mocks Washizu's thirst for blood and power. She promises Washizu will not be defeated in battle until the forest surrounding Spider Web Castle starts to move. Bragging about his invincibility, Washizu announces this to his followers. Next morning, they wake up to see the forest approaching the castle from a thick mist: The enemy has cut it down to mask their attack. Washizu's own men turn on him and shoot him down with arrows.

As the *Throne of Blood* is based on a Western text, utilising it to distinguish differences between the East and the West seems peculiar. The same could be said about Kurosawa's films in general, as Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto argues that they problematise both Japan's self-image and the West's image of Japan (Yoshimoto, 2000). As the catalogue overtly suggests, the categories create a prototype of Eastern film, the coherence of which, however, comes across as rather suspect. The list could then be interpreted as reflecting the relationship of the West to the East. Despite this, the catalogue need not be read as an orientalist text. That is, if our understanding of Orientalism follows the original definition by Edward Said (1995 [1978]). At the heart of Said's Orientalism lays an ideology of difference, constructing East and West as both internally coherent and mutually exclusive entities through oppositions, which serve to place the East in a subordinate position. Since Said's influential work was published, the radical dichotomisation of East and West has become a self-evident and often automatically applied framework for analysing Western depictions of the East.

The rationale behind the distinction between the Orient and Occident in the catalogue was not to reproduce orientalist discourse, but to provoke critical re-examination of who and what the Orient and the Occident consisted of and on what terms they were to be spoken of. The vagueness of the border suggests an understanding that neither East nor West represented a self-contained monolithic unity. Simultaneously, it brings attention to how our understanding of the world is determined by normative vocabularies and how difficult it is to challenge the binary notions embedded in specific discourses. As Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen (1977) have pointed out, we tend to approach the world through a set of uncritically accepted series of geographical myths, which, while convenient, are mistakes based on often groundless simplifications of global spatial patterns.

Music, song and dance

Number 6 on the list builds on music, song and dance. This is perhaps meant as a reference to the numerous Bollywood films in the catalogue, but the Kurosawa films also capture this in a more subtle manner. *Walkers on Tigers' Tails* utilises songs not only as a means of storytelling but also as a nod to the theatre tradition the film derives from. As the samurai take camp after safely passing the checkpoint, a messenger from Togashi catches the party and brings them gifts to apologise for his disrespectful behaviour – or perhaps to let them know that their identity was known all along. As the gifts mostly

consist of alcohol, they drink and Benkei orders the porter – the representative of the common folk, jovial but lacking in self-discipline – to dance in order to celebrate. 'I too will perform a dance before we bid farewell', Benkei announces, pulls out his folding fan – the most important prop of noh plays – and sings to the beat of drums. The stout samurai continue their journey, leaving the little porter behind.

Walkers on Tiger's Tails was not released in Japan until 1952 after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the end of the Occupation period. If the ban was in fact initiated by the wartime censorship practices, this would indicate making a clear break with the wartime authoritarian regime and their censorship policies. If the main censors were the Occupation forces, including the film in the catalogue was perhaps an even more interesting decision. The post-war Constitution of Japan, drafted under the supervision of SCAP, had come into effect in 1947 and following the new values of democracy and free speech, article 21 forbid censorship altogether. Thus, the existence of censorship could not be publicly acknowledged, leading to censoring the existence of censorship itself.

In addition to Japanese films and other media products, foreign media content was censored during the Occupation as a part of a larger policy to 're-educate' and 'reorient' the Japanese (Kitamura, 2010: 86). While the main goal was to spread the values of American style ideal democracy, censorship allowed for the Occupation to keep the Japanese in the dark when it came to the changing geopolitical conditions of the post-war world. For example, any references to the collapse of the victorious wartime alliance or to the emergence of the Cold War were not acceptable (Dower, 1999: 425–426). Perhaps the news reached the Japanese public through other channels, but officially, the Japanese existed in a political vacuum created by the Occupation forces. Thus, the inclusion of the film in the catalogue could be looked at as an attempt to communicate that even though the political ties established during the Occupation era might be difficult to break, culturally Japan was now free to stand on its own.

'In many countries, whatever the subject, music, song and dance are indispensable ingredients for the success of a film, among the cinema hungry, low-paying audiences for whom it is made', the catalogue summarises its interpretation. Of the seven differences, this is the only one pointing out alleged differences in technical execution. Thus, what actually differentiates Eastern cinema from its Western counterpart are minor stylistic differences. As if to underline the fact that some of the differences were, in fact, of a rather artificial nature, the catalogue points out that 'Yet, except for religious differences, the strangeness is superficial rather than fundamental' (Holmes, 1959). As Michael J. Shapiro implies, harnessing the disruptive political power of cinema might, in fact, simply require us to subject ourselves to the ways film can help us envision worlds other than our own. One such way is to open up our political imaginaries to make room for cultural difference (Shapiro, 2009). The main goal of the catalogue, then, seems to have been to lower the barrier for intrepid Westerners to watch an Eastern film and providing tools to better understand what is being displayed on the screen.

The role of women

The final item on the list turns to *the role of women*. While at first glance Kurosawa's female characters seem to lack depth, they play a crucial role in mediating the key messages of his stories. A notable exception is *Walkers on Tigers' Tails* with no female characters whatsoever, but in the kabuki version, Yoshitsune is usually played by a male

actor specialising in female characters – as seems to be the case with the film as well. In *Rashomon*, it is the wife's physical appearance that sets the events in motion, even though all three shape the events that unfold and their different retellings. In every version of the story, the characters are presented as slightly different, everyone depicting themselves in the best possible light. In the wife's story, she is weak, virtuous and victimised, but in the other ones, she becomes a fierce fighter, immoral or even deceitful.

The catalogue explains this category:

> The role of the woman as wife, mother, sister or daughter tends to be more important. Far from being a soft, clinging, submissive creature, she has strength, courage and singleness of purpose; and is often the keeper of the moral concepts of her society. Her moral fibre and practical nature are depicted as supporting the man – a dreamer, capable of poetic fancy and quixotic action but liable also to disaster through some form of weakness.

Western viewers, including the authors of the catalogue, would perhaps have expected women in the style of Hollywood. The lack of a female character as the target of romantic infatuation and a weak object of masculine protection is perhaps what evoked this description. The historical Kurosawa films simply ignore our expectations of a compulsory female character of a specific, predetermined type. This categorisation is the most detailed among the seven, implying the topic was perhaps close to the author's heart. Winifred Holmes herself was raised in India. Around the time of the catalogue project her own filmmaking career took off, and she made more than a dozen documentaries in the United kingdom, Afghanistan, Nepal and the West Indies. Later, she became an advocate of women's rights in the Middle and Far East as the chairman of the Women's Council (*The Times*, 1995).

Seven Samurai also sends an unexpected message through a female character. The film introduces a sub-story of a romantic infatuation between the youngest samurai and a farmer's daughter. Pointing out the collision of the peasant and samurai classes on a personal level, the romance reminds us that despite external conflicts, we are not defined by the social and political conditions that surround us and that even in times of war we can turn to each other for comfort and security. As in Macbeth, Asaji is one of the key characters in the *Throne of Blood*. Loyal to the original story, she is the complete opposite to the catalogue's description of women in Eastern cinema, at least if we interpret 'strength, courage and singleness of purpose' as positive attributes. Asaji is portrayed as the embodiment of pure evil and instead of maintaining and guarding the moral codes of the society, Asaji becomes the one tearing them down. Thus, Kurosawa's women are not necessarily a positive element of a story. They are active influencers and actors – sometimes for the good, sometimes for the bad.

Living provides us with a very practical example of how Kurosawa utilises his female characters as a means of framing the actions of the men. The messenger of a new era and the teacher of the old bureaucrat is a young woman who gives Watanabe the courage to rise against his superiors to get the park built. He should make something, Toyo advises Watanabe, reminding him of the park the neighbourhood mothers wanted built. It is the mothers' wish that gives Watanabe the opportunity to do something meaningful with his life. In *Living*, the women are dynamic and powerful: Toyo leads her life the way that best suits her, and the mothers get their park. In the end, it is the women who give Watanabe the chance to turn his life around. Following Toyo's example, he does what is likely the first brave act of his life and redeems himself.

Conclusion

The discussion of the five Kurosawa films in the catalogue read against the seven categorisations listed in it exemplifies how cinema can derive its stories and themes from the surrounding socio-political context and how, in turn, our understanding of the world is then constructed upon cinema as a source of meaning making. As Michael J. Shapiro (2009: 11) notes, a critical film does not merely articulate a specific drama within a world, but rather a world itself. In the case of the Orient catalogue, this notion stretches to the ways films can be reinterpreted and repurposed to articulate a world they perhaps never intended to depict. Thus, in UNESCO's Orient project, the cinema of Akira Kurosawa and its reading is implicated in the politics of structuring and constructing the world, while simultaneously enabling critical contestations of those very same structures and constructions.

It is impossible to determine for certain whether constructing the East as a single distinguishable system was a conscious aim of the Orient project, even though that is what they ended up doing in practice. Through the act of constructing the East in this manner, the catalogue attempts not only to explain what these films tell us of the East but also to change the world through enhancing intercultural understanding. Interestingly, it creates a problem in doing so: The differences are presented as obstacles to this aim. Thus, it would be tempting to question the rationality of compiling such a list in the first place. As the five Kurosawa films seem to simultaneously justify and question separating the East from the West on the grounds of cultural differences, they were perhaps meant to be seen through their ability to reveal the manifold and occasionally contradictory nature of drawing the East–West border in this manner. Furthermore, Kurosawa had shot to international fame in the beginning of the 1950s – a state of affairs well worth exploiting when aiming to lure new audiences into the world of Eastern cinema in an exciting but safe way.

The catalogue displays notable determination to interpret the five Kurosawa films in terms of cultural characteristics, completely disregarding the references in the films to 'sources of international misunderstanding', namely, World War II and Cold War politics. Instead, it positions the alleged East–West dichotomy primarily as a question of differences articulated on cultural grounds. The catalogue's proposed way of structuring the world, therefore, is one where the world order constructed upon the Cold War and post-colonial polarisations gives way to the primacy of the cultural aspect of world politics. The differences thus become an instrument for a cultural intervention in geopolitics through the catalogue's reconstruction of both Cold War and World War II political reality. UNESCO's Orient catalogue therefore comes across as a radical reimagining of political realities constructed on a cultural basis and given a concrete form through cinema. Furthermore, the act of distinguishing the East from the West on a cultural basis becomes a reflection of UNESCO's attempts to justify its own existence – for if there are no cultural differences, why would we need an organisation dedicated to negotiating between them – and its constitutionally dictated mandate to promote peace through intercultural understanding.

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Notes

1. Ozu was featured in the catalogue with one film and Mizoguchi with four.
2. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) refers to both General MacArthur and his successor Matthew Ridgway, as well as the whole institutional apparatus of the Occupation.

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