Resource Mobilization Through Social Media: Ukrainian Case

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Tiivistelmä – Abstract

Social media has become an important part of our everyday life. Easy access from any part of the world, the possibility to follow famous people or share your opinion to a broad audience, provide great opportunities for education, business, politics. Social movements also benefit from social media to acknowledge a broad audience about their ideas, needs, and demands. This work explores the ways to mobilize people for social movement and the role of social media in this process. The study uses resource mobilization theory as a conceptual background since resources are one of the components of any social movement. Analyzing two major Ukrainian social movements: the Orange Revolution (2004) and the Revolution of Dignity (2014) we can see the effect of social movement on resource mobilization. Resource mobilization theory unveils the major problems that any social movement can face, this research suggests the ways these issues can be resolved with the help of social media.

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Tiivistelmä – Abstract

Sosiaalisesta mediasta on tullut tärkeä osa jokapäiväistä elämäämme. Helppo pääsy mistä päin maailmaa tahansa, mahdollisuus seurata kuuluisia ihmisiä tai jakaa mielipiteesi laajalle yleisölle tarjoaa hyvät mahdollisuudet koulutukseen, liiketoimintaan ja politiikkaan. Sosiaaliset liikkeet hyötyvät myös sosiaalisesta mediasta tunnustamalla laaja yleisö ideoistaan, tarpeistaan ja vaatimuksistaan. Tässä työssä tutkitaan tapoja miten on mahdollista saada ihmiset sosiaaliseen liikkeeseen ja mikä on sosiaalisen median rooli tässä prosessissa. Tutkimuksessa käytetään resurssien mobilisointi teoria käsitteellisenä taustana, koska resurssit ovat yksi komponentti kaikissa sosiaalisissa liikkeissä. Analysoimalla kahta ukrainalaista sosiaalista liikettä: Oranssia vallankumousta (2004) ja Ukrainan vallankumous 2014 voimme nähdä sosiaalisen liikkeen vaikutuksen resurssien mobilisointiin. Resurssien mobilisointi teoria paljastaa suurimmat ongelmat, joita kaikki sosiaaliset liikkeet voivat kohdata, tämä tutkimus ehdottaa tapoja, joilla nämä kysymykset voidaan ratkaista sosiaalisen median avulla.

Asiasanat – Keywords
Oranssi vallankumous, resurssien mobilisointi teoria, Ukrainan vallankumous 2014, sosiaalinen media, sosiaalinen liike.

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1. Introduction

Communication is an important element in coordination for any social movement (Kurochkin & Nikiforov, 2015; McAdam, 2007; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The key point is to transmit the information in the shortest time, which will give the advantage to organize the group of people in the best way during the time of crisis (Skobelina, 2010).

If we get back to history, it shows us different tools of communication and the way they have developed. First, communication has been held with the help of architecture: Ukrainian Cossacks were using beacons to warn people about approaching enemy (Yavornytsky, 1990), the same technology was used on the Great Wall of China and the Hadrian's Wall. Admiral Nelson has successfully used the flag system controlling his ships at the Battle of Trafalgar (Sterling, 2008, p. 25). Napoleon has developed and used the Chappe semaphore system for better logistics across the country. According to Sterling, it "could achieve message transmission speeds as high as 120 miles per hour in ideal conditions" (ibid., 27). During the Second World War communication had a huge variety of options: wired and wireless. They allowed political and military leaders to control the battlefield from a safe place (ibid., 33). All these efforts were done to transmit the information in the shortest time. On the other hand, the counterpart has always tried to break the communications and deprive the action and organization of the combat-ready units. Vladimir Lenin, the famous Russian revolutionary, wrote: "Certainly to be captured a) telephones, b) telegraphs, c) railway stations." (Lenin, 1920).

The Internet lets people communicate freely during the last decades, opening many previously tightly closed borders. Kurochkin and Nikiforov (2015) found that "New

technologies enabled the communication type unknown before: remote interactive cooperation, that can even function without human guidance." (p. 241). Such technologies caused a decrease in the traditional ways of communication. Furthermore, the replacement of the traditional communication systems caused governments to lose total control over it. The possibility to spread information in seconds to a huge amount of people was so attractive that Internet users seized this opportunity.

Kurochkin and Nikiforov also state that being the perfect instrument of instantaneous communication that unites the whole world, the Internet gave rise to the fundamentally new ways of interaction and management technologies (ibid., 214). The validity of this statement can be seen as fast-growing Internet services influence our everyday life.

The independence of social media let people choose the most reliable source of information according to the researchers' opinion (Kurochkin & Nikiforov, 2015; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Etling, 2014). Considering that traditional media is usually influenced by the government, the usage of social media in communication and organization purposes is reasonable.

The sociological research stated that Ukrainian youth watch less television than their predecessors and use the Internet instead (Anonymous in Unian, 2013). Ukrainian politicians saw the possibility to involve them into political life with the help of social media. They were following the principles of participatory culture that were described by Henry Jenkins (2016) and Nico Carpentier (2011):

- lower barriers of creativity and public involvement;
- the possibility to create anything and share it with others;
- sharing the experience and informal mentoring;
- every participant believes that their involvement is important;

- social connection between the members.

This made an important contribution in the success of the Revolution of Dignity and the Ukrainian Presidential elections campaign in 2019.

I wanted to see the way social media transforms social movement and compare it to the social movement that did not use social media. However, it is difficult to find a country that had two social movements and used social media only in one of them. One country is needed for the research to exclude variables that can gravely influence social movement: different cultures (Jasper & Polletta, 2001), different locations (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011), different political situations (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Morozov, 2012). This makes Ukraine a unique country that had two revolutions just during a critical period of social media development in the early 2000's: the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. Facebook was founded only in 2004 (Carlson, 2010), and vk.com in 2006 (Durov, 2007), therefore there were no users in Ukraine that could use social networks during the Orange Revolution. Online blogs and discussions on the forums didn't make a vital influence on social movements. I can compare it toRevolution on Dignity in 2014 where social media was actively used (Etling, 2014; Szostek, 2014; Rozov, 2014; Pashkov, 2015).

Observing both revolutions, I found it interesting to research them from the resources availability point of view. The Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT from now on) by Zald and McCarthy (1977) has been a good choice as a theoretical framework to discover the way Ukrainian revolutions have developed. This theory states that in order to stay viable any social movement needs a big amount of resources to be available. Resources can be mobilized from different suppliers and in different ways, one of which is international support. It can perform two important tasks: organize political support of other countries' authorities, and

mobilize resources from people who moved abroad some time ago, but have not lost connection with their home country (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).

To explore this discourse I compare two Ukrainian revolutions and social media use during social movements. The following research questions were put forth:

RQ1: How does social media transform the whole process of achieving social movement goals?

RQ2: To what extent does social media change the way of resource mobilization from abroad?

Based on these questions I am trying to prove the hypothesis, mentioned in works of Eltantawy and Wiest (2011), Kurochkin and Nikiforov (2015), Morozov (2012), that social media is not only the independent source of communication, or the smart mechanism to motivate people for offline protests, but is a great tool to manipulate public opinion, use the authority of famous people, and excellent way to mobilize resources.

I will focus on Russian social media VKontakte (vk.com. VK from now on) as it's been mostly used among Ukrainians (Legotkin, 2014), but I will also take a look on the usage of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.

My entire interest in this topic was born from observing the events in Ukraine from Finland. I have been detached from the tension in society and the only places I could get any pieces of information were national news, social media and personal experience of my friends, which varied differently. I have been wondering how fast my mood has been changing after every blog post I read. After one, I wanted to take a break in my studies and to participate, because I thought that something important has been happening there and wanted to be part of it, after another, my motivation cooled down because I read that many of those who were protesting, have been paid per day while been on Maidan (Karpenko, 2015; Ivanov,

2013). I was impressed with the way such information can manipulate people, thus, I decided to explore this topic.

2.   Theoretical Framework

2.1. Theories of Social Movements

Recently, there has been renewed interest in social movements (Lopes, 2014; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Lim, 2012). The wave of revolutions in different parts of the world became a great source for research data (Morozov, 2011). Prominent scholars started to apply 50 years old theories to this phenomenon and tried to understand if they can explain current social change (Lopes, 2014).

The first mentions about social movements appeared in works of Lorenz von Stein in his book "The History of the Social Movement in France, 1789-1850" (Heberle, 1951), however, Charles Tilly states that there was no "Social Movement" term before the end of the 18th century, even though the process itself has ancient history (Tilly, 1977).

There are different definitions of a social movement which were evolving throughout the years. Shults (2014) has united and modified the definitions of Zald and McCarthy (1977) and Tilly (1977), explaining social movement as organized collective efforts focused on social change or preventing it. I think this is the most precise explanation of social movement.

The research of social movements started in the second decade of the 20th century by the Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (Michels, 2001). In the 1960s the new social movements for human rights appeared, starting a new wave of research. The basic principle of the new approach was that social movements became the main tool to show the disagreement with governmental policy and push the authorities for social change (Schults,

2014). The social movements in the United States of 60s: African-American civil rights movement, the civil rights movement, the feminist movements heated the interest of researchers in the way how social movements were organized and managed (ibid., p 23).

Mayer Zald and Robert Ash (1966) who introduced the social movements theory to the world, created several approaches in social movements theory: resource mobilization theory, political opportunities concept, new social movements theory, etc. The basis of resource mobilization theory lays in understanding effective resource mobilization and resource spending to achieve the desired social change. The new social movements theory formed around the explanation of the origin, peculiarities and cultural importance of new movements.   The political opportunity theory argues that the success or failure of social movements is affected by political opportunities.

These theories change the way to research social movements. The most prominent sociologists of 60-70s Ted Gurr (1970), Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (1972), and Neil Smelser (1963) had a strong common assumption that discontent caused by some social instability of structural changes (economic crises, the increase of technical processes, and urbanization) led to the rise of a social movement. The new approach introduced discontent as an essential part of society explaining that with the fact that there's always someone who is not happy. However, scholars focus on the dependency of social movements on resources that belong to society and the possibility to mobilize them.

Defining what is a social movement and the ways it is developed, I noticed that every scholar has his own approach towards the main theories explaining the social movement. Irina Dementieva (2013) and Natalia Skobelina (2010) state that there are three main groups of theoretical models that try to explain social movements and protest (Figure 1).

Social movement

Concept of collective action	Resource Mobilization Theory	Concept of relative deprivation
Le Bon G. Allport H. Turner R. Smelser N.	Zald M. McCarthy J. Asim M. Wilson K.	Merton R. Runciman W. Stouffer S.

Protest is psychological aspect and connected to emotional tension.	Protest depends on social conditions.	Protest based on socety's well being.	If ambitions of people equals their possibilities, political stability is guaranteed, otherwise the protest begins.

Figure 1: Social movements model, based on ideas by Dementieva (2013) and Skobelina (2010).

The one approach is mainly the uncontrolled behavior of a group of people who react to some uncertain or threatening situation. Dementieva (2013) names it as the concept of collective action and relates some theories to it: the group contagion theory, convergence theory, norms origin theory, political protest theory, value added theory. The researcher also mentions that the authors who support the concept of collective action (see Figure 1) can be divided into two groups. The first group believes that protest is based on the psychological aspects and connected to high emotional tension. Another group thinks that the reason for protests is based on social conditions. Smelser (1963) states that social conditions force

people to protest or change these conditions. I would disagree with Dementieva (2013) and Skobelina (2010), I think that these two ideas should be united and it will give us a more precise idea of what social movement is. The second group is the resource mobilization theory. McCarthy and Zald's (1977) research illustrates that social movement is a conflict type of collective action when the conflict always happens between the governmental and social interests. Moreover, they state that the well-being level is directly linked to social movement development. Tilly (1977) argues that there is always someone unhappy in society, thus the discontent is hidden up to some point. Consequently, there should be a trigger that will start the process of a social movement. The third group is the concept of relative deprivation. Dementieva (2013) describes the limitation in the society that can create social tension in society as a core idea in this concept. Political stability is maintained until people have enough possibilities to work for achieving their goals. The protest and violence trigger is the increase in the gap between the fast growth of expectations and the possibilities to satisfy them.

Schults (2014) has a similar approach, with certain differences. He defines only two main ways in understanding the social movement (see Figure 2): the concept of relative deprivation and the theories developed by Zald and Ash (1966). The author tries to understand what triggers the collective action of social movement and he inclines to McAdam's (2007) idea that collective action starts not from the tension, but from the increase of resources.

The second approach is the new social movements theory which appeared quite recently. It's a combination of different theories and ideas since the 1960s and it claims that social movements are not focusing on the materialistic qualities as Zald and McCarthy states but on human rights. This makes sense (for instance feminist or civil rights), however, in the

end, these rights give access to the resources for some group that didn't have it before, therefore, non-materialistic turns to materialistic.

Social movement

Social movement theories	Concept of relative deprivation
Protest depends on social conditions and quantity of resources.	Protest is psychilogical aspect and connected to emotional tension.

Resource Mobilization Theory	New Social Movements Theory
Social tension is the result of increase of material resources used by social movements and their possibility to mobilize those resources. Social movement is a fight for materialistic resources.	Social tension is the result of structural change (urbanization, economic crises, techological revolution). Social movement is a fight for non-materialistic resources.

Figure 2: Social movements model, based on ideas by Schults (2014).

Altogether, these theories suggest that social movement is a collective action aimed at social change. The main task of that movement is to use and mobilize resources: cultural (this might be some specific knowledge), organizational, human, and material. The theory of social mobilization states, the bigger mobilization opportunity of a social movement, the higher chance to achieve the result (Edwards, 2011).

2.2. Resource Mobilization Theory

Resource mobilization theory (RMT) was founded by two American sociologists Mayer Zald and John D. McCarthy in 1977. Despite the common belief that social movements were the result of increased grievances generated by social change (Buechler, 2000; McAdam, 2007), RMT states that social movements are rational and strongly based on resource availability (Jenkins, 1983). In fact, Zald and McCarthy say that if there are no resources available for social movement, it can not be viable and never reaches its goal (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

In the 1960s, sociologists were talking about the concepts of some social movement, whereas, McCarthy and Zald were able to unite all concepts into one theory and offer five main principles:

- all movement actions are rational and based on costs;

- the goals of the movement are based on the conflicts of interest that transferred into power relations;

- the mobilization of social movements highly dependent on changes in resources, group organization, and opportunities of collective action;

- centralized and structured organizations are more effective than decentralized and informal organizational structures;

- the success of social movements is highly dependent on the political situation of the environment and the strategy of the movement.

Some scholars argued that constancy of discontent and collective interests are stable over time (Smelser, 1963), Turner (1982) states that the framework by McCarthy and Zald is too

narrow, other scholars wanted to develop theory further adding their ideas (Jenkins, 1983; Shin, 1994; Klandermans, 1987; Diany & McAdam 2003).

"Without attempting to produce handbooks for social change (or its supervision), the new approach deals in general terms with the dynamics and tactics of social movement growth, decline, and change." (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p.1213). Most of the theories are trying to create a guideline that will demonstrate how to organize a successful social movement. RMT, on the contrary, is focusing on the analysis of social movement, its development, and its results. It examines the resources that should be mobilized, a connection between the social movement to other groups, the dependency on external help, and the tactics which are used by social movement leaders (Lazarev, 2013; Jenkins, 1983). McCarthy and Zald mostly focused their research on political, sociological, and economic theories than social psychology or collective behavior (Klandermans, 1987).

The crucial element in any social movement is the availability, the ability to mobilize, and the ability to spend resources reasonably (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). The study of the aggregation of resources reveals some points of resource mobilization that are important for any social movement:

1. Resources are necessary for engagement in social conflict.

2. Resource aggregation requires at least some minimal organization.

3. It is important to include some groups of individuals or organizations that will support the social movement but will not be representatives of the social movement.

4. It is important to work out the supply and demand model for resource flow.

5. It is important to reward individual and organizational involvement in a social movement activity (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

McCarthy and Zald (1977) were comparing resource mobilization with traditional approaches to the support base types, strategy and tactics, and relation to the larger society. They indicate that the traditional support base consists of an aggrieved population which provides resources and voluntary work. The resource mobilization approach is based on the conscience of adherents, individual or organizational support. Traditional strategy and tactics depend on the history of relations between authorities and social movements. Resource mobilization tactics include the number of strategic tasks: mobilize the biggest number of supporters as possible, neutralize the possible opposition to the social movement and make it an ally, involve elites to a social movement. Traditional way relates to society and culture, as a "descriptive and historical context", at the same time resource mobilization is using the infrastructure that society provides. It is important to understand the difference between the traditional approach and resource mobilization because scholars (McCarthy and Zald) focus their research on different targets depending on the category.

Based on mentioned above, McCarthy and Zald explained social movement as "a set of options and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p.1217).

Researchers pay a very big attention to the social movement organization structure and state that a well organized social movement should have a strict structure (Figure 3). The smallest part of the structure is a person, people can unite into organizations (Social Movement Organization or SMO from now on), and organizations can unite into institutions (Social Movement Institution or SMI from now on). SMI or a group of SMIs will have the greatest impact on society and can start a social movement. SMI can also occur when the movement is ongoing.

Figure 3: Social movement structure by McCarthy and Zald (1977).

McCarthy and Zald focused on social movement structure because they believed that well-structured movement would gain resources faster and efficiently, would use these resources wisely, and the social movement goals could be reached faster (Shults, 2014).

Scholars stated that each SMO has its goals and ideas. The union of SMOs creates the opportunity to unite resources and reach the target in the fastest way. However, the process of the union can be difficult because each SMO has specific targets and principles. When two SMOs share their principles they can unite for the mutual benefit, if not, someone should make concessions with the risk to lose support inside the organization (Shults, 2014).

Each SMO must possess resources in order to achieve the target goals. McCarthy and Zald describe four main resources: legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor.

Scientists see the dependency between the efficiency of SMO reaching its goals and the amount of the resources SMO have (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Jenkins, 1983; Klandermans, 1987). Klandermans points out that the number of resources and the ways they

can be made up is not the sole way to reach the SMO's target. He states that the use of these resources and the possibility to decrease the loss of them is another important goal in resource mobilization. The resource distribution can be organized internally in the SMO with the help of understanding the vision of the SMO and clear distinguishing the roles of members in this SMO. Scholars state that the lack of resources can slow down or even destroy SMO, so this issue should be solved as fast as possible (Klandermans, 1987).

The biggest amount of resources is usually controlled by government, organizations or individuals. One of the SMO's tasks is to find a way to involve these constituents and to get access to their resources. McCarthy and Zald distinguish the owners of the resources into constituents, adherents, bystander publics, and opponents. They also classify masses and elites depending on the amount of the resources they have (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 1221).

According to the RMT SMO goal is to convert resource owners from one type to another by changing their attitude towards the social movement. The important role among these groups belong to authority and delegated agents. These are police, rebel police, army, local authorities. Any social movement that is setting up the aim of changing the Government or just forcing it to do major social change is trying to get the support of a delegated agent, at least make them bystanders.

McCarthy and Zald base their research on the interrelations among the social structure, SMOs, and SMIs. They categorize these concepts by resources, growth of SMIs, organizational structure, federated and isolated structure. They form 11 main rules of resource mobilization based on these concepts, like *older, established SMOs are more likely than newer SMOs to persist throughout the cycle of SMI growth and decline,* or *the greater the absolute amount of resources available to the SMS the greater the likelihood that the new*

SMIs and SMOs will develop to compete for these resources. (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 1224).

McCarthy and Zald, say that the number of resources available for social movement will increase with the growth of discretionary resources among the masses. The more available resources masses would own, the higher the chance of emerging the new social movement. At the same time the competition between different SMOs will increase, together with the competition of other industries like entertainment voluntary associations, organized religion and politics.

On the other hand, they argue that the more conscience adherents have available resources, the more likely SMO and SMI will start to change to get these resources as a part of this competition. McCarthy and Zald refer to Olson (1965) who divided the potential candidates to join SMO into two groups: fighters who can be convinced to fight for the right cause, consequently they will bring their resources to the SMO in any form, and entrepreneurs who will join the movement only in case when they will see the benefit.

Another rule states that "The more an SMO is dependent upon isolated constituents the less stable will be the flow of resources to the SMO." (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p.1228). Isolated constituents don't follow the quick social change in the country and can not react respectively to it, they are very dependent on the media and the information that they receive through the media can be distorted. Therefore, the more SMO is dependent upon isolated constituents, the more money SMO needs to spend on advertising to keep resources flow. Scholars also noticed that the more SMO or SMI is funded by isolated constituents, the more likely that professionals and beneficiary constituent workers are hired for strategic purposes (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).

McCarthy and Zald say that trying to get both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organization through federated chapter structures might provoke tensions and conflicts inside the organization. Meier and Rudwick (1976) described the involvement of conscience and beneficiary constituents and mentioned that it can lead not only to interpersonal tensions but also to tactical dilemmas.

Researchers state that new SMOs are accepting changes faster and in a more easy way than the old ones, however, old SMOs might have more resources, therefore, they are more beneficial for social movement, but innovations implementation in these organizations is slow.

Quite often, resources provide opportunities, McCarthy and Zald state that the more resources SMI has and the larger the income flow, the more professional cadre, and staff are working in this SMI. A big resource flow can also provide more opportunities for SMO and SMI growth and career development inside this organization or institution.

The resource mobilization model emphasizes the interaction between the organization of preference structures, resource availability, and SMO's attempts to meet entrepreneurial demands. McCarthy and Zald (1977) describe this model but also mention that the success of the social movement is dependent on historical circumstances, cultural aspects, and patterns of pre-existing infrastructure. These parameters will affect the SMO strategy.

RMT has very useful concepts, however, it has drawbacks as well. The RMT challenged traditional approaches used to explain social movements. The biggest discussions were between RMT and collective behavior theory. Traditional approaches distinguish social movement as any collective actions consciously oriented toward social change, they have the minimum of the organization (Turner & Killian, 1972). Social movement participants want to

have a positive change in their life, however, this change usually ends up with the focus on the institutional change (Jenkins, 1983).

RMT is focusing on institutional change in the first place. McCarthy and Zald pay attention to the change of social structures, which in the end affects the personal change of the movement members. Jenknins and Perrow (1977), Klandermans (1987) have seen the organization of previously unorganized groups against institutional elites and the representation of the interests of groups excluded from the political life as a big part of RMT.

From the changing social institutions' point of view, RMT is very strong and describes the exact peculiarities of well organized social movement: clearly defined goals, rational actions, centralized control over all the resources, clearly demarcated outcomes in succeeding the goals. Nevertheless, RMT is weak in explaining personal change movements. Such movements have expressive actions, suddenly arose goals, centralized control is weak or dependent on the leader's charisma, and the goals are blurred. This part was a topic of intense discussions between supporters and opponents of the RMT (Jenkins, 1983).

Generally, Jenkins (1983) claims that a multifaceted approach is more useful than the emphasis on organizational resources by Zald and McCarthy, at the same time saying that the classic theories of grievances were less useful explaining the social movement. I agree with Jenkins since none of the theories explains the social movement entirely. Even though these theories are 40 years old, they are still answering many questions about social movements that happen these days. As Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) claim: "New communication technologies - especially social media via the Internet - have become important resources for the mobilization of collective action and the subsequent creation, organization, and implementation of social movements around the world." (p. 1207). Consequently, resource

mobilization theory can become a basis for this research, mainly focusing on the resources which social movement can use to reach its goals.

2.3. The Impact of Social Media on Social Movements

"People have gained greater access to information, more opportunities to engage in public speech, and thus, the enhanced ability to undertake collective action" (Lopes, 2014, p. 8). Shirky stressed out that the rise of the Internet has changed world communication and social media became the new social networking tool for collective action. "Citizens, activists, non-governmental organizations, telecommunications firms, software providers, governments - are all actors that engage and participate in social media." (Lopes, 2014, p. 8)

Lopez (2014) mentioned that social media have replaced the old coordinating structures and it became a new tool of coordination of all recent world popular movements. The researcher lists speed and interactivity as the main features of social media that give the advantage over traditional media in the spread of information and the ability to express people's thoughts and feelings. Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) share their idea of examining the Egyptian revolution in 2011 and said that it is more efficient than traditional mobilization techniques like leaflets, posters, and faxes. The speed of information is the undoubtful advantage of social media, however, I believe that the independence of social media from official sources is a more important aspect in this case. Clark (2012) suggests that the ability to pass official resources filters and give the voice to those who wanted to express themselves but didn't have a chance to do so is revolutionary in terms of social media and traditional media. Therefore, social media is changing the way the information has been spread from one to many and many to many (Downey & Fenton, 2003).

Nevertheless, I can not rely on Shirky's (2011) suggestion completely. Leenders and Heydemann (2012) argue that social media did not revolutionize the social movement process. They state that social media is just correcting the rules of resource mobilization and making it easier. There is a high chance that these movements would succeed even without social media involvement.

The lack of control over social media makes the government seek ways to influence it. This leads to the so-called dictator's or conservative dilemma where a state, who has a monopoly on public speech finds itself losing control in spreading information (Lopes, 2014). The actions the government usually takes are censorship, propaganda, Internet blackout, however, they are not efficient, which the Egyptian revolution showed. People find a way to use the Internet avoiding blockage with the help of a VPN connection (Shirky, 2011; Eltantawy and Wiest 2011).

Amandha Lopes summarized Modernization theory (Huntington, 2006), Relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970), Rational theory (Olson, 1965), and developed a theory about opportunity and mobilization structures. "Social movements are caused by opportunity structures such as economic, institutional, and social contexts of a country conditioned by its access to social media" (Lopes, 2014, p. 11). Therefore, the opportunity structures create just a trigger for a social movement.

Economic contexts, as Tilly (2004) states, create conditions when people are more likely to mobilize when a stable situation turns to get worse, as an economic downturn. Institutional contexts are caused by political instability. When institutions can not keep up with expectations of society, people will aim to replace the current institutions with the ones that can meet the social and political demands (Huntington, 2006). Regime instability, repressions, and division among elites can cause mobilization among people and can be the

measurement of institutional effectivity (McAdam, 2007). Social contexts depend on social wellbeing, freedom of press, and culture of the country the social movement is about to emerge.

Mobilization structures is the second part of a successful social movement. Mobilization structures were described in 1977 by Zald and MacCarthy and they were reused by Lopes (2014) in her theory. The main resources that are mobilized are money, labor, legitimacy, facilities and internal or external (or both) support. Lopes (2014) states that social media has changed the traditional way of social movement organization and provided more sources of information, reducing the cost of coordination, at the same time increasing the speed of information exchange.

Individuals are able to connect to each other and organize themselves at incredibly low cost (Shirky, 2011). Therefore, this aspect of social media influences all aspects of resource mobilization for a social movement. Moreover, it reduces the cost of the involvement of isolated constituents to support social movement and keep high-interest stability to the social movement events.

Opportunity structures in the form of grievances could prepare a social movement basis and social media provides mobilization structures for any sustainable social movement need (Lopes, 2014). Social media creates the feeling of "presence" and involvement of the audience even if they are located thousands of kilometers away from actual events (Shirky, 2011). This feeling motivates people to support the movement in any possible way they can.

Another issue that social media solves through participation is youth indifference to the political life of the country. Henry Jenkins (2016) was the first one to present the world the term of participatory culture.

"A participatory culture is one which embraces the values of diversity and

democracy through every aspect of our interactions with each other - one which

assumes that we are capable of making decisions, collectively and individually, and

that we should have the capacity to express ourselves through a broad range of

different forms and practices." (p. 2).

 Jenkins researched fandom in 1992 and he stated that fans have clear understanding

what they are participating at, and that their contribution is benefiting them personally and the

community in general. We can consider the SMI as a community of like-minded people who

might have their differences, but they are united with the one passion, in the Ukrainian case, it

is the thirst for justice and changes.

Jenkins (2016) didn't think that social media is a participatory culture on its own,

however, he stated that it is a tool that participatory culture uses to maintain social contact or

share cultural productions between its members. Moreover, he defines participation as a

property of culture, where groups collectively or individually make decisions that have an

impact on their well-being, on the other hand. Therefore, social media is an interactive tool

that can help to create and support the participatory culture (Jenkins, 2016). Nico Carpentier

(2011) has a similar idea, saying that blogs, forums, social media, podcasting have created the

infrastructure for people to empower their participation if people would want to (p. 271).

Nico Carpentier (2011) has an interesting approach to democracy and participation

research. He sees participation in the minimalist and maximalist perspective (p.17), where the

first one is aimed to keep the balance between governors and governed. This model is used in

the majority of democratic states and restricts the role of citizens in the political

decision-making process, consequently, it leads to empowering political elites of the country.

Quite often this principle causes the "political culture of silence" or apathy (p.50), the result

of such actions can be seen in the low turnout at elections. The other approach - maximalist democracy can be seen in a deliberate and direct democracy like referendums or petitions. However, the author also sees it as a Marxist perspective, anarchy, radical democracy.

Youth tend to use technological novelties more often than older people (Smith, 2014). This relates to the use of the Internet and social media. The younger generation escapes to the Internet to get connected to the larger community than they have at home (Jenkins, 2016). Thus, they spend less time watching TV, instead they socialize with their friends online and watch streaming services like YouTube, Netflix, HBO (Anonymous of Unian, 2013). This is another reason why young Ukrainians tend to ignore elections.

Social media helps to create the participatory culture and involve the younger generation to be more active in the political life of the country.

"The new style of participatory politics tap into what young people already know as fans, consumers, and participants within social networks and deploy this popular cultural capital as a starting point for political action" (Jenkins, 2016, p.157).

Therefore, social media as a tool creates more opportunities for people who don't have resources or political capital to become a part of a bigger political culture.

2.4. Two revolutions and social media.

Ten years is the timeframe between Ukrainian revolutions, many things have changed in Ukraine and in the world during that time. The development of the mobile Internet and smartphones made the information accessible. It was perfect timing for social media to grow from social networks for college students and alumni to a massive game-changer. Young entrepreneurs, companies and various organizations started to use the benefits of social media to sell their products (Edelman and Kominers, 2012), improve the education system (Liu,

2010; Veletsianos and Navarrete, 2012), protect the environment (Kaur and Chahal, 2018), and collect the donations (Saxton and Wang, 2014). Social media proved itself to be efficient in these spheres, and it was an obvious decision to use it during social movements.

The active use of social media during revolutions was spotted during the Arab Spring 2010-2012 (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Leenders & Heydemann, 2012; Dhillon, 2014). The technologies that were used during these movements were improved and successfully used during the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine (Golovko et al., 2015). Some researchers say that the Orange Revolution was successful without the use of social media (Nosova, 2015; Reznik, 2016). However, making the analysis of the way the revolution of 2014 went I can clearly see that social media helped Ukrainians to reach their goals faster making the impact in several main areas (described more in detail in the next chapter):

1. Resource mobilization.

2. Informing people about the social movement.

3. Organizing members of the social movement for collective action.

According to Zald and McCarty (1977), the success of any social movement mostly depends on the number of accumulated resources by social movement organizations or their union in the form of social movement institution, and the ability to create a stable resource flow to restore the resources that are used during the social movement. The sub-task of SMOs or SMIs is to decrease the loss of resources as much as possible. As I mentioned before, RMT defines four main resources: legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor. Lopes (2014) thinks that the last two are not that important as the first two, because facilities and labor can be obtained with the help of money, however, it would increase the money expense for a social movement that any organization would try to avoid.

Legitimacy in Ukraine could be mobilized by involving elites who would see their participation as another investment (Szostek, 2014). The task of SMO or SMI is to convince such people of the benefits of this social movement for elites. Usually, they are getting involved in the preparation stage.

Money can be obtained from various sources: voluntary donations, elites, and isolated constituents. Since the Ukrainians, in general, have a lack of discretionary resources, they can not create a strong flow of financial support for social movement (Reznik, 2016). Nevertheless, donations from the participants would increase with the increase of active members of a social movement (Zald and McCarthy, 1977). Ukrainian oligarchs, as representatives of elites, were supporting social movements during both revolutions following their personal interest and sharing their discretionary resources considering it as their investment. The third huge source of resources is isolated constituents. According to Poznyak (2016), by 2005 there were over 1 million of the Ukrainians living and working abroad, by 2012 this number increased to 2.1. The author of the research states that this data is showing only the migration process and does not include the Ukrainians that moved abroad before and stayed there. These people who still have connections with their relatives or friends who stayed in Ukraine could become a serious financial aid to the social movement (Chorna, 2015; Nadtochiy, 2015).

Even though the Ukrainians do not have discretionary resources, they compensate it with their incredible ability to empathize and a great will to do voluntary work (Rozov, 2014; Paniotto, 2005). In both cases, many Ukrainians decided to join the social movement, and do the work they can in order to keep the social movement viable. During the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainians were traveling from different regions of Ukraine to Kyiv to join the movement, many of them took vacations at work (Kyj, 2006). Many citizens of the capital

were coming to the Independence square to help in setting up tents or bringing some food after work or during weekends (Salamaniuk, 2013). In 2014, the labor grew to full-scale volunteer work: building barricades, providing medical aid, bringing supplies, providing informational help and active resistance to riot police (Demchuk, 2014; Salamaniuk, 2013). No doubt that there were professional cadres in both revolutions who received some financial compensation (Wilson, 2006).

Protesters were blocking the streets and occupying some buildings. In both revolutions, they were building the "camp city" on Independence square where they stayed during the active phase of protests. These "camp cities" in both cases were built using personal belongings of the protesters and resources of political parties (Syla Narodu during Orange Revolution and during the Revolution of Dignity: National resistance - the union of three oppositional political parties: Udar, Svoboda, Batkivshchyna, and Maidan organization). During both social movements, the Trade Unions Building was occupied by protesters due to its strategic location, close to the Independence square. In 2014 other buildings were occupied: Kyiv City State Administration, all Western Ukraine city state administrations, Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining building, Ministry of Justice building, Supreme Council building, President's Mezhyhirya Residence (Anonymous in "TSN", 2014). From this perspective, I can say that protesters were to some extent self-sufficient, but also, they needed supplies like food, water, tents, instruments, medications, warm cloth, personal protection gear, etc. These supplies could have been bought using money, but as it's been written before, SMIs did not want to spend resources to gain other resources or at least tried to decrease these expenses. Therefore, these supplies were provided by protesters, volunteers and external actors (Jackson, 2015).

Comparing these two revolutions we can clearly see that social media has transformed the structure of social movement: SMIs did not spend that much resources on advertising and communication during the Revolution of Dignity than they did during the Orange Revolution (Kyj, 2006; Szostek, 2014).

Social media became an independent source of information for millions of people around the world who did not trust the official sources and wanted to know what is happening by analyzing the information from its source (Szostek, 2014). By keeping everyone in the loop social media decreased the time of action of protesters during the events in 2014 and that improved the efficiency of social movement actions (Bohdanova, 2014). It decreased the cost of resource mobilization for social movement and the efficient usage of these resources (Bohdanova, 2014). SMIs started to save resources on information, mobilization, and organizing people, and started to focus on the collective action itself using saved resources there.

Resource mobilization theory by Mayer Zald and John McCarthy (1977) states that social movement can not rely only on isolated constituents but this is a huge aid for the social movement. International support in the form of volunteers and experts, financial aid and supplies, political support to members of social movement and political pressure on the country's officials can be a significant advantage in Government and social movement standoff and it was in Ukrainian case (Anonymous in Gazeta.ua, 2013). However, according to Zald and McCarthy (1977) "the more dependent a SMO is upon isolated constituents the greater the share of its resources which will be allocated to advertising" (p. 1230), therefore, social institution might spend more resources for advertising and reports of social movement productivity than it would get from the resources flow that is coming from the isolated constituents. This can be clearly seen in the example of Ukrainian revolutions. In 2004, the

leaders of the Orange revolution used a huge amount of resources to convince their partners abroad about their cause and their results (Kyj, 2006; Wilson, 2006). In fact, the active phase of the revolution was only 10 days between the 21st and the 30th of November when people were mobilized and organized for collective action. It was the time of the most interest in social movement and resources were spent mostly to support the action itself. The media covered these events without any push from the social movement because the events themselves were mainstream. In the period after the 30th of November, there were small events that were not that interesting for people and media and were leading to some solution of the crisis, therefore, social movement institutions spent resources to keep everyone abreast of a social movement. The Ukrainians felt that they can come back to their pre-holiday activities because New Year is one of the most important holidays in Ukrainian culture.

In 2014, social media has brought a huge change in the whole movement organization. The information spread quickly and if anything extraordinary happened (I refer to clashes with riot police or casualties during the riot police and protesters standoff), the international community knew about this in the following half an hour and was quick to react (Bohdanova, 2014).

Social media brought transparency to the reflection of the events: tweets and posts from eyewitnesses, participants or violence witnesses, live streams on YouTube and quick updates of information from "there", made convinced people shift from biased media to independent and uncontrolled social media (Bohdanova, 2014). Such a shift came in handy to leaders of the social movement who focused on the action instead of spreading their attention and resources to the media. The direct information from social movement participants has been accepted by the audience as trustworthy and played a significant role in resource mobilization from abroad.

The media wars distort the information and even 5 years after the events there is no reliable and precise information about the exact quantity of demonstrators during 93 days. However, checking the information from different sources (Anonymous in "LB.ua", 2013; Anonymous in "AIN.UA", 2013; etc.) I can definitely see the increase and decrease in people's attendance at Independence Square. Based on these sources I made the graph that shows activity (means the physical presence on the territory of Euromaidan) of demonstrators (see figure 4).

This information is not precise, because different sources give different data. For instance, on 1.12.2013 when the "march of millions" took place the opposition leaders stated that there were over a million people during that march (Anonymous in "LB.ua", 2013).


Figure 4: The number of demonstrators during important Euromaidan events according to the protest leaders.

At the same time, official sources, represented by the police - the counterpart of demonstrators mentioned that there were only 50 000 people (Anonymous in "AIN.UA", 2013). The independent researcher counted 270 000 with the help of Google Maps Pro and math (Anonymous in "AIN.UA", 2013). The only thing in common is the fact that the number of people increased this day and this is depicted on the graph.

The activity of the demonstrators on the Internet was in the direct ratio to the events in real life. The researcher Etling (2014) mentioned three main peaks of activity in social media regarding the events on the Euromaidan which he calls phases (see figure 5).

The first one from late November (21st) to late December – this is the beginning of demonstrations and first clashes with the police. The second one from the 20th of January to the 3d of February - the "Dictatorship laws", West Ukraine Regional State Administrations assaults and reassigning of the Azarov's Government. The third one is from the 17th of February to the 26th of February – the deadly fights between protesters and the police, the escape of Yanukovych.

The comparison of the two charts shows us similar peaks and falls. The peak in between 21.11 and 1.01 is similar to phase 1, 1.01-1.02 to phase 2, and finally 1.02-2.03 to phase 3. These results further support the idea of Etling (2014) and Szostek (2014) that media, social media, and social movements were significantly connected these days. Social media has a major impact on social events, provoking, organizing, describing them. However, it has a great but fast effect and can not last long enough by itself, thus it needs collective action in real life. All the collective actions described in social media help isolated constituents to keep up with the events in the country of their origin. Most Ukrainians who moved abroad during the 90s and 2000s felt guilty to leave the country for a better life instead of building it in Ukraine (Chorna, 2015; Nadtochiy, 2015). This guilt induced them to be

organized in volunteer groups and mobilize resources in their new home countries to send to

Ukraine. Ukrainians who were in Ukraine were able to go to Kyiv and actively support the

movement by building the barricades, providing any type of help, or standing against the riot

police. Immigrants also wanted to be a part of the revolutionary community and they were

using the tools that were available to them - social media. Ukrainian diaspora played a

significant role in providing the information to native citizens of their country, actively

showing their support, collecting and sending resources.

Figure 5: Post volume by language during the Revolution of Dignity by Etling (2014).

Social media helped to receive and process the information very fast which impacted

the speed of the decision-making process and the next day representatives of the European

Union, United States, Canada, and other countries showed their concern about students being

beaten on the 24th of November. International support has motivated various experts to go to Ukraine to join social movements as professional cadre and train protesters (Wilson, 2006).

The Revolution of Dignity might have had the same dynamics as the Orange Revolution: a big push of interest and then a slow decline of it (see figure 4), however, two factors were different. First is that the Revolution of Dignity had more triggers for collective action than the Orange Revolution. Second is that these triggers were covered by social media very well, so the whole world knew what was happening. I believe that these triggers, their media coverage and opportunity structures (Lopes, 2014) helped the social movement to succeed. Social media has created a stable resource flow from abroad. Social media decreased the investment of resources for "advertising the movement" from social movement leadership because Ukrainians did it freely and on a voluntary basis. Such an approach brings resource mobilization theory to the other level and solves one of the biggest issues Zald and McCarthy pointed out: that social movement would spend a huge amount of resources for advertisement being dependent on isolated constituents for stable resources flow.

The Ukrainian revolution of 2014 revealed the importance of social media use during any social movement. It shifted the focus of SMIs from the resource mobilization to the collective action itself, they became more focused on the goals of social movements and the ways to achieve them instead of the actions they should make to keep the movement viable. Social media revealed access to the great resources pool - isolated constituents and let them be informed about the changes in social movement with the low cost which is changing some of the RMT approaches.

2.5. The role of external actors

Ukraine has tight cultural, economic, and political relations with Russia. Russians can not imagine their country without Ukraine, beginning from Kyivan Rus where everything started, continuing with uniting Russia and Ukraine in 1648 and then becoming the Soviet Union in 1922. Sociological research by Levada Centre in Moscow, says that 71% of Russians wanted to form a united country together with Ukraine (Wilson, 2006).

Even if Russians would like to unite with Ukraine and become one, strong and bigger Russia, many Ukrainians want to be good neighbors, but they don't want to lose independence. Many times, the choice of Ukraine was Europe and it has been moving that direction (Yavornytsky, 1990). The Western world always supported Ukraine in these intentions, thinking that Russia might lose a strong potential ally. Consequently, Ukraine has been always on the crossroads and the Presidential elections were of significant importance because usually, the President was the one who set up the direction and priorities of the country. Therefore, the elections in 2004, and the elections of 2014 were mostly about the influence of these two sides on Ukraine (Etling, 2014).

Orange revolution and traditional methods of influence from abroad.

Ukraine can be divided into Eastern Ukraine which is generally supporting Russia and Western Ukraine which is generally against Russian influence and seeing Ukraine as a part of the European community. During the Second World War, Western Ukraine tried to form a sovereign state and fought against Russia. The candidate from the East - Viktor Yanukovych had strong support from Russian President Putin (Solchanyk, 2001), at the same time the

candidate from the West - Viktor Yushchenko had support from EU and the United States. (Paniotto, 2005).

During the elections, Russia supplied about half the campaign expenses for Viktor Yanukovych (Wilson, 2006). Russia sent specialists in PR to support its favorite candidate and started the television campaign on behalf of Yanukovych (Wilson, 2006). Russian President visited Ukraine twice to show his support to Yanukovych during his election campaign. Ukraine accused the Russian government of two assassination attempts against the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko (Kuzio, 2005). On the other hand, Yushchenko has received huge support from the European Union and United States governments (Walsh, 2004; Traynor, 2004).

Orange Revolution had strong international support and funding (Traynor, 2004; Walsh, 2004). According to various sources, the Orange revolution received nearly $100 million as a "Support of Democracy" (Ash & Snyder, 2005). The informational support came from other countries where similar revolutions were successful: Serbia and Georgia. The members of these social movements created their organizations Pora and Otpor and started teaching the strategy of successful social movement based on their experience. Aleksandar Maric, one of Otpor's members said: "we trained them in how to set up an organization, how to open local chapters, how to create a ''brand'', how to create a logo, symbols, and key messages." (Wilson, 2006, p. 348)

Diplomatic support for social movement and pressure for the Government did not allow to use force as it was in 2004 and to let Ukrainians protest peacefully. Ukrainian oligarchs were dependent on European contracts and international trade, therefore, EU politicians had leverage to create pressure on the Government from the Ukrainian business sector (Kuzio, 2005). Poland played a significant role in social movement support as

Ukrainian oligarchs had many connections with Polish business and political life which they wanted to use in their business development (McFaul, 2007, Wilson, 2006).

As we can see, both sides of the Orange revolution had strong foreign support and were organized to mobilize resources internally and externally. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), the more social movement is dependent on isolated constituents, the more workers are recruited for strategic purposes rather than for organizational work. This can be seen by the amount of work done to keep the interest in the events in Ukraine abroad.

The game of trolls in the Revolution of Dignity.

10 years later, Eastern and Western neighbors of Ukraine did not want to give up on their influence, but some of them started to use new methods. As the inheritor of the Soviet Union, Russia has been applying propaganda techniques, improving them to the challenges of contemporary society (Pynnöniemi & Racz, 2016). Such techniques involve the strategic deception - "measures undertaken to hide military objects, or strategic information using different camouflage techniques, including disinformation" (Pynnöniemi & Racz, 2016). Strategic deception is discussed on the highest Governmental level: Russia's information security doctrine (Information Security Doctrine, 2000). From the information point of view, this means that information would be manipulated in favor of Russia using different channels: troll campaigns; official government statements; speeches at rallies or demonstrations; defamatory YouTube videos; direct messages by SMS (Giles, 2016).

Troll campaigns, or trolls in social media - this is a new concept that has appeared during the Revolution of Dignity and then kept developing. Benkis explains the process of trolling as "behavior such as publishing provocative comments on the Internet with the intention of causing conflict" (Benkis, 2016, p.54). One could find trolling just as a harsh

discussion between two conflicting sides, however, it is not that innocent that it could look like. The recent study (Helmus et al., 2018) claims that organized trolling - the "public provocative comments on the Internet with the intention of causing conflict" (Benkis, 2016, p.54), organized by government funded "troll factories", can strongly affect public opinion and within time, even change it.

Benkis (2016) with the help of Hardaker (2010) defines four main characteristics of troll behavior: aggression, success, disruption, and deception. Scholars (Benkis, 2016; Pynnöniemi & Racz, 2016; Giles, 2016; Helmus et al., 2018) trace such activity in the Ukrainian mediasphere during the Revolution of dignity in a smaller scale and following events (the annexation of Crimea, War in Donbass) in a bigger scale. Moreover, they have defined two major groups: pro-Russia activists, who disseminated anti-Ukraine and pro-Russia propaganda and pro-Ukraine activists who were trying to fight them back (Helmus et al., 2018).

This interference has been well organized and researchers (Kurban, 2016; Benkis, 2016; Giles, 2016) have no doubts that it has been done on the highest governmental level. "In the case of Russia's information campaign, it is widely known that people used it to support military intelligence and propaganda activity on the Internet" (Benkis, 2016). Such examples can be Russian online propaganda capacities in Estonia (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014), by cyberattacks on banks, government entities, media outlets; various online narratives about justifying the actions of Russia in Georgia in 2008 (Helmus et al., 2016).

Benkis (2016, p. 54) defined 3 main phases of trolling:

1.   Luring, when the troll tries to attract attention and involve the target into a conversation. Quite often they try to evoke some emotions.

2. Taking a bait, when the target is getting involved in the conversation, or another troll is doing that. In the case of another troll, such a strategy helps to make the conversation genuine.

3. Hauling in, when the discussion continues and the topic might be changed to something else.

Analyzing trolls behavior, Benkis (ibid., p.65), defined six main communication strategies:

1. Denial.

2. Creating information chaos by spreading disinformation and gossip.

3. Fueling internal conflict.

4. Threatening and discouraging.

5. Creating the image of the enemy.

6. Building conspiracy theories.

The researcher has made a deep analysis of various posts and comments, and saw that these activities were "facilitated, coordinated, and synchronized by command and control" (Benkis, 2016, p.69). Other researches (Luhn, 2015; Butsenko, 2014; Walker, 2015, Chen, 2015) prove Benkis' suggestion and describe the "factory of trolls" in St.Petersburg. The location of this place was in one of the areas of Russian cultural capital - Olgino, hence their name became: the trolls from Olgino. Afterward, people started to name all trolls from Russia as trolls from Olgino or Kremlin trolls.

According to the former employees of the "factory", this was a full-time job with 12 hours shifts two days after two. Russians went there because the salary was quite competitive: $500/month according to Walker (2015), and $777/month according to Chen (2015). Employees had two main roles: commenters, who had to write 126 comments and 2 posts,

and bloggers, who had to write 10 posts per shift (Butsenko, 2014). The main rhetoric was that the government abroad is bad and the government in Russia is great (Butsenko, 2014).

Such a 24/7 workforce has made an extensive influence on the public opinion in Ukraine. Todd Helmus (2018) described it as following:

> "Given the presence of Russia in Ukrainian media space and popularity of Russian social networks, Russia was able to actively use social media to mobilize support, spread the information and hatred, and try to destabilize the situation in Ukraine. Hundreds of thematic groups have been created in social media and became a channel for distributing disinformation to, engaging, and influencing the public." (p.14).

According to Helmus (2018) community-lexical analysis of Russian language tweets in Ukrainian Twitter, 3 main groups of Kremlin trolls were discovered during the Revolution of Dignity (p.10):

1. Russians in Russia. The main task was to support Russian media and convince the Russian community that there was a coup d'état in Ukraine. This led to resource mobilization in Russia to support "People of Donbas" and increased support of the strong Russian government.

2. Russian speaking Ukrainians in Ukraine. The main task was to convince Ukrainians that there is a coup d'état and Russia is supporting the Yanukovych government because it is legit and does not support the new Government. Also, there was a media identification campaign where Russian media tried to convince as many Ukrainians as possible of the "tale of one nation" (Pynnöniemi & Racz, 2016). This have built the grounds for Russian aggression in Crimea after the end of the Revolution of Dignity.

"Russia has a responsibility to protect Russians and compatriots living in Ukraine"

(ibid., p.90) and it gave the formal cause for military actions.

3. Russian speaking people abroad and foreigners. The main task was to create a better

   image of Russia, create the image that the Revolution of Dignity was conducted from

   abroad of Ukraine to justify the actions of Russia in Crimea and Donbas.

Aro (2015) describes that Kremlin troll became active in Finnish social media space

right after the Revolution of Dignity, sharing many images, posts, and videos of Ukrainian

cruelties in Donbas. They tried to create a good view of Russia in Finland. Such activity has

been spotted in many other countries (Pynnöniemi & Racz, 2016). Thereby, the majority of

research defines trolls activity with the beginning of Crimea annexation.

I have been talking mostly about Russian influence, however, Ukrainian society has

been working on countermeasures to fight that influence, creating its own trolls. There is no

documented evidence that there was a Ukrainian "factory of trolls", but the Twitter research

(Helmus, et al., 2018) stated that there were 2 groups of users in Ukrainian Twitter:

Pro-Russian (41,000 unique users) and Pro-Ukrainian (39,000 unique users). It is natural that

society and the government started to fight back and create some mechanisms to defend itself.

Ukrainian researcher Kurban (2016) described the practical ways to recognize the troll and

the ways to create accounts that can not be easily traced as fake. Therefore, Ukraine has been

using its own trolls to accomplish the same three goals as Russian trolls, but with the main

focus on internal media space.

I think that the European Union and the United States, who were proactive during the

Orange Revolution were surprised by the whole trolls campaign that started during the

Revolution of Dignity. Scholars Benkis, Hardaker, Pynnöniemi & Racz were working on

their research already after the Revolution of Dignity, when trolls were most active, offering

NATO the countermeasures. Therefore, the United States and European Union just started to plan their strategy and counter measures against troll campaigns.

Generally, Western support consisted of different officials coming to Ukraine to show the concern and support of Revolution of Dignity: Mikhail Saakashvili, the former President of Georgia, Olexandr Susko, the Research Director of Institute of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, the Ambassador of the United States Geoffrey Pyatt, and many other diplomats of the European Union and senators of the United States. They were trying to create a dialog between the Government and protesters and gave speeches assuring their support to the Revolution of Dignity (Carpenter, 2017). However, these were the old methods, which their counterpart Russia decided to abandon and focus on social media.

In the previous chapters, I have been talking about social movements, resource mobilization and the importance of social media in the modern world. I have discussed that social media could become a great tool for resource mobilization, but at the same time, it became another battleground where fake accounts are created to spread disinformation and change public opinion towards some events, government actions or governments in general.

I believe that social media's role in the social movement is still underestimated. The recent research (Pynnöniemi & Racz, 2016) shows that public opinion can be manipulated via social media even in a more efficient way than traditional media because it is based on interaction and participation (Carpentier, 2011; Jenkins et. al, 2016). I think social media will show more potential in the following years.

3. Method

My main focus was to achieve a general perspective on resource mobilization through social media and resource mobilization from abroad in particular. Two revolutions in the same country, where one revolution was influenced by social media and another not, can provide reliable data for the research. I believe that for this case the quantitative approach is the best tool to conduct the analysis and answer the main questions:

RQ1: How does social media transform the whole process of achieving social movement goals?

RQ2: To what extent does social media change the way of resource mobilization from abroad?

I have researched many articles about resource mobilization and social media and came up with 5 hypotheses:

H1 - the active use of social media has increased participation in a social movement. H2 - the use of groups in Vkontakte has increased participation in a social movement. H3 - social movement has increased resource mobilization with the help of social media. H4 - social media has increased the interest in social movement and has decreased the fear of personal safety. H5 - The age of social movement activists has decreased because of social media influence.

Participants

As my research method, I chose an online questionnaire posted in selected social media platforms. A total of 163 respondents completed this study. The majority of the participants self-identified themselves as Ukrainians - 144 (88.3%), 16 as Russians (9.8%), 1 as Jewish (0.6%), 1 as Korean (0.6%), and 1 as Kyrgyz (0.6%). The participants ranged in age

from 14 to 61 ($M = 26.66$, $SD = 5.372$) Men accounted for 32.5% ($n = 53$) of the sample and women for 67.5% ($n = 110$).

The respondents' educational background is diverse: 3.7% ($n = 6$) reported their level of education as vocational school, 11% ($n = 18$) as Bachelor's degree, 57.7% (n = 94) have Specialist's diploma, 24.5% (n = 40) graduated with Master's degree and 2.5% (n = 4) have the highest level - PhD.

Social movements often tend to change society, therefore it has an influence on politics. Only one respondent is a member of a political party (0.6%), three respondents did not want to answer this question (1.8%), and 159 (97.5%) are not actively involved in the political life of the country through a political party.

Social media selection

Ukrainians use many social media platforms: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Vkontakte, Odnoklassniki. Vkontakte (vk.com) was the most popular during the Euromaidan uprising. It was developed by Russian entrepreneur Pavel Durov and appeared in Ukraine in 2003 before any other global social media platform. Ukrainians just started to use it during the Orange Revolution, therefore, Vkontakte did not have any effect on the revolution, however, 10 years were enough to make a difference in 2014. Having strong positions on post-soviet territory and focusing on the Russian speaking audience as a main target group, gave Vkontakte a huge audience. The amount of active users (users who visited the website at least once during this day) on the 13th of November 2014 reached 12,1 million users (Legotkin, 2014). Vk.com is the most popular social media platform among the respondents: 85.9% (n = 140) use Vkontakte, 25.8% (n = 42) use Facebook, 2.5% (n = 4) use Twitter, 4.9% (n = 8) use Instagram, 1.2% (n = 2) use Youtube, 6.7% (n = 11) use Odnoklasniki, 0.6% (n = 1) consider Skype as social media and use it, and 0.6% (n = 1) use ukr.net -

Ukrainian news portal with forum. Almost a half of respondents answered that they are actively using social media more than once per day - 44.2% (n = 72), and once per day - 46.6 % (n = 76), the lesser part of respondents use it once per week - 7.4% (n = 12) and once per month - 0.6% (n = 1). Only 2 people reported that they never used social media in their life and that is 1.2% of the respondents.

Facebook and Twitter were actively used during Arab Spring (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Morozov, 2009; Dhillon, 2014), thus researchers can find many papers about Facebook and Twitter influence and use it as a reference. I believe that this gave a great opportunity for scientists to compare Facebook and Twitter influence on events in Ukraine during the Revolution of Dignity also in other countries (Surzhko-Harned & Zahuranec, 2017, Onuch, 2015). However, there was no decent research done about Vkontakte use and I think that Vkontakte also had a big influence on the mobilization process, especially when the trolls from Olgino activity started to change society's opinion. That is why I decided to focus on Vkontakte.

Instrument

Participants completed the online survey that has been created by using Google Forms, it contained 43 questions. Google Forms had several strong advantages: creating the forms itself is an easy process and all the answers are saved in a spreadsheet. All the answers were exported as .xlsx file format for further analysis in IBM SPSS program. The survey is hosted on Google servers and can be sent to anyone with a sharable link.

The survey was divided into five parts: description, general information about the respondent, the relation of respondent to the Orange Revolution, the relation of respondent to the Revolution of Dignity, and social media activity.

The first part described the importance of the research and explained the impact of social media use to the social and political life of the country. I mention that this survey is anonymous and no one would know the answer of some particular interviewee. Since this section has the descriptive function, I did not add any questions into it.

Participants gave information about themselves in the second part. I use it for comparison between different groups. I asked about the age, gender, education and the location of participants.

The third and the fourth parts were focused on online and offline participation in the revolutions. Our task was to know how many people felt that they were the participants of the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity and what level of participation was required to feel involved. I didn't define any side on purpose to receive the results of those who were supporting protests and those who were against social change in the form it was presented. I also asked what exactly they did if they participated, and tried to define to what extent their life changed after both revolutions.

The last part gave us the idea of the traditional media trust in comparison to social media. I measured the social media activity and tried to define the use of Vkontakte comparatively to the other social media.

Procedure

I conducted the research among my contacts in Vkontakte and Facebook. This was the easiest way to reach people, since data collection among strangers is quite problematic. I have surveyed people who lived or live in Ukraine, those who never lived in Ukraine didn't participate. I didn't have a case when the Ukrainian who never lived in Ukraine would participate in the questionnaire. This decision was made considering that these people know

social and political life "from the inside" and they are very sensitive regarding any social change that happens in Ukraine.

Every participant received a private message on social network. There is a limit of 100 messages per day in Vkontakte, and I spent 5 days sending 468 messages. Some of my friends also have accounts on Facebook and I didn't send the request for the second time. I have spent 2 days sending messages on Facebook.

Social media platforms are taking care about their users and they are blocking mass messaging, therefore, each message should be unique, otherwise, the moderators can ban the account for spamming other users for some time, or can block the account once and for all. Considering that Facebook and Vkontakte spam filters were far from perfect in 2015, I had to be very careful. Every message was written differently than the other, and the receiver should have understood that I have sent the message, otherwise they could report spam.

Facebook and Vkontakte were working to improve their security system in 2015, however, that time, user accounts were hacked quite often. Russian social media platform was more vulnerable than American one, subsequently, all the contacts that this account was associated with received messages with phishing links that helped hackers to break into other accounts and also sent money transfer requests. Therefore, many people were afraid to go through links or even open messages like that. My task was to write the message in the way that it's not suspicious and participants are not afraid to open the link that I sent them. Many people asked if I sent the message and when they knew that it was me, they were eager to answer the questionnaire.

Every message that I sent contained the link to the landing page, where every participant could have selected the language they want to fill the form in. Ukraine is a multilingual country and the main languages used are Ukrainian and Russian. To make it

convenient for the respondents, I have translated the form into three languages: Ukrainian, Russian, and English. I also considered the situation in Ukraine at that moment: the military actions on the East of Ukraine, blaming Russia for interfering with Ukrainian inner politics, and confrontation between Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking population. All these factors made me think that the questionnaire in one language could have resulted in the negative attitude to the whole research.

Data collection started during the large escalation on the East of Ukraine, which followed exactly after the Euromaidan uprising and the Crimea annexation. The whole process took 6 weeks: from the 23d of March till the 7th of May.

Many Ukrainians realized that they are patriots and confirmed that by participating in the Revolution of Dignity in any possible way. However, the majority of Ukrainian population was disappointed in the Orange revolution in 2004, that did not bring any significant change and thought that this social movement is the same and were trying to stay away from the protests. After the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of military actions in the East of Ukraine, Ukrainians were forced to make a choice: either to be the patriots and support new Ukrainian Government that consisted of the leaders of revolution, or to support the previous Government, the Russian speaking population and the country-aggressor - Russia. This division happened exactly during our data collection and the discontent in the society reached its peak.

4.   Analysis and Results

35.6% ($n = 58$) of respondents replied that they were participating in the Orange Revolution, 50.3% ($n = 82$) answered that they participated in the Revolution of Dignity. Only 21.5% ($n = 35$) of respondents participated in both social movements. The Spearman correlation test has been conducted to see the correlation between active social media use and social movement participation. The variable "Social media use" was transformed into the new variable that contains answers only from respondents that use social media once per day or several times per day, and they form 90.8% ($n = 148$) of the whole number of respondents. The analysis showed that there is a weak back correlation ($p = -.143$), so active social media use decreases social movement participation.

Nahed Eltantawy and Julie Wiest (2011) in their research about Egyptian revolution of 2011 defined that people who have experience in any social movement would likely support sharing their experience or participate in a new social movement (p.1214). Considering the statement of Eltantawy and Wiest, and the current data: 21.5% ($n = 35$) of people were participating in both movements, we could say that people who have experience in participation in the Orange revolution don't actively use social media. This might have influenced the correlation results.

The analysis of the second hypothesis shows that 34.4% ($n = 56$) of respondents subscribed to special groups to receive information about social movement and 71.8% ($n = 117$) saw the information about the Revolution of Dignity in their news feed. The previous test doesn't show the influence of social media on the social movement, but the variation in subscription to special groups in Vkontakte statistically explains 15% of the variation in the Revolution of Dignity. The Spearman test showed a moderate correlation between these two

variables ($p = 0.383$). The result says that there is a moderate relation between social movement participation and subscription to the social movement themed groups. Therefore we can see the influence of vk.com groups on social movement mobilization and organization processes. Nevertheless, the same test shows the weak correlation between activity in social movement and the information in Vkontakte feeds on friends' group subscription ($p = 0.086$). This data seems to indicate that the information from the groups that users can see from their feed does not make a strong influence on the user's opinion about the events. We can make a conclusion that the information that vk.com users didn't specifically subscribe to and is shown by social network algorithms, is not seen relevant to them.

According to McCarthy and Zald (1987, p. 22), any successful social movement should accumulate, mobilize and correctly distribute resources. The question about the types of support was formed based on 4 types of resources that respondents share:

1. Legitimacy - "Support with legitimacy (promoting or blocking some of the laws, legal support)".

2. Money - "Financial support".

3. Facilities - "Support with facilities (food, facilities, cloth)".

4. Labour - has 4 different questions defining what type of work was done:

    a. "Reading, writing comments in forums of Internet resources or social media".

    b. "Voluntary support (work)".

    c. "Passive participant of the demonstrations".

    d. "Active participant of the demonstrations".

Figure 6 shows the decrease in 2014 in legitimacy support for 2.5% ($n = 4$) and in financial support for 1.2% ($n = 2$), and the increase in support with facilities 3% ($n = 5$) and labor 15.3% ($n = 25$). I can see that the increase of labor support during the Revolution of

Dignity in comparison to the Orange Revolution doubles because of respondents' activity in social media and their passive participation in protests.

Orange Revolution support

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	reading and writing comments in forums	3	1.8	5.2	5.2
	legitimacy	5	3.1	8.6	13.8
	financial support	22	13.5	37.9	51.7
	support with facilities	6	3.7	10.3	62.1
	voluntary work	7	4.3	12.1	74.1
	passive participant	6	3.7	10.3	84.5
	active participant (clashes with police)	9	5.5	15.5	100.0
	Total	58	35.6	100.0	
Missing	0	105	64.4		
Total		163	100.0		

Revolution of Dignity support

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	reading and writing comments in vk.com	24	14.7	29.3	29.3
	legitimacy	1	.6	1.2	30.5
	financial support	20	12.3	24.4	54.9
	support with facilities	11	6.7	13.4	68.3
	voluntary work	2	1.2	2.4	70.7
	passive participant	23	14.1	28.0	98.8
	active participant (clashes with police)	1	.6	1.2	100.0
	Total	82	50.3	100.0	
Missing	0	81	49.7		
Total		163	100.0		

Figure 6: Support of the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity by type.

The lack of control over social media makes people feel free in expressing their thoughts and opinions. The Government uses traditional methods to oppress social movement

activists like arrests, censorship, or propaganda, but social media makes them inefficient (Shirky, 2011; Eltantawy and Wiest 2011).

The hypothesis that I analyzed says that social media decreases the fear for personal safety and increases the interest in the social movement. 48.5% ($n = 79$) of respondents did not participate in the Revolution of Dignity, therefore they answered the question of why not. A simple cross tabulation on Figure 7 shows the number of respondents who actively use social media (once per day or more than once per day), and it makes 93.7% ($n = 74$) of all respondents who answered this question and 50% of all the respondents who answered the survey. The cumulative percentage of those who wanted but was afraid is 5.46% ($n = 7$), and the cumulative percentage of those who didn't support any side of the conflict and didn't want to get involved is 65.38% ($n = 51$). Hence, social media seems to decrease fear of personal safety, but does not necessarily increase the interest in the social movement itself.

Social media use. * Reasons to avoid Revolution of Dignity Crosstabulation

Count

		0	I wanted but I didn't find the way	I wanted but I was afraid	I didn't support anyone	I didn't want to get involved	other	Total
Social media use.	Never	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
	Once per month	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Once per week	5	1	1	2	3	0	12
	Once per day	36	2	2	15	11	10	76
	Several times perday	38	2	4	10	15	3	72
Total		79	5	7	28	31	13	163

Figure 7: Cross tabulation: reasons to avoid the Revolution of Dignity and social media use.

The age of the participants of the Revolution of Dignity has decreased compared to the age of participants or the Orange revolution to 7.62% (1.71 years). The average age of the Orange of Revolution participants is 28.6 ($SD = 7.346$), and the Revolution of Dignity is 26.89 ($SD = 5.788$). I think that social media involves the younger generation since, on average, younger people tend to use technological novelties in a better and faster manner than

people of the older age. However, we can not ignore the fact that SMOs were using other resources to mobilize people, and the mobilization techniques have improved since 2004.

To answer RQ2 a simple comparison was made between respondents who supported the social movement from abroad. 1.8% ($n = 3$) of respondents were abroad in 2004, and 15.6% ($n = 26$) were abroad in 2014. Only one person supported the Orange Revolution from abroad and that equals 0.6% of the overall number of respondents and 12.6% ($n = 21$) supported the Revolution of Dignity. 95% ($n = 20$) of respondents were using social media either once per day or several times per day. According to the statistical analysis on the time people spend in social media (Clement, 2019), respondents might have used around 100 minutes per day in social media. They saw the information about the Revolution of Dignity in their feeds coming from their Ukrainian connections. Social media seems to become a great resource for isolated constituents to be in the loop of the Revolution of Dignity events. The respondents were asked if they think that social media influenced their decision to help the social movement. 95% ($n = 20$) of respondents who were abroad during the Revolution of dignity answered positively and 1 person didn't answer at all. This information leads us to the conclusion that social media increased the efficiency of resource mobilization from isolated constituents.

5.   General Discussion and Conclusions

The present study was designed to explore how social media transforms the social movement. In addition, the purpose of the research was to determine if social media has changed the way social media mobilize resources from isolated constituents.

The first research question of the study was divided into five hypotheses. The first hypothesis anticipated that active social media use will increase social movement activity. Despite the prediction of the hypothesis, the Spearman correlation showed that social media use decreases social movement activity. The possible explanation of that result might be that participation in social movement does not require much of an effort. One can be in the warm apartment writing posts on their laptop or phone, at the same time another person would participate in clashes with the riot police, risking being wounded or killed. They both make their contribution to the social movement, however their participation can not be seen equal. Many participants of the Orange Revolution joined the Revolution of Dignity and mostly were present on the Independence square, since it became the symbol of both revolutions. They considered themselves as "true participants" and the ones who supported online were the "sofa generals". This understanding became popular in Ukraine that time, so many of the questionnaire respondents didn't consider themselves as participants in the social movement.

Leenders and Heydemann (2012) indicated that social media is not making a huge impact on social movement but rather shaping it or correcting the rules of mobilization. The result of our first research proves this statement, however, my opinion was closer to Shirky's (2011) that social media has made a drastic change in social movement processes, in resource mobilization in particular.

Vkontakte has a similar timeline to Facebook where account owners can see the recent activity of their friends, groups, and communities. However, new algorithms started to show more information from groups and communities, therefore account owners see more information prepared by these communities and groups. Vk.com shows posts from subscribed groups and groups from friends' subscriptions. This study found a 15% effect of the Vk.com group subscription on social movement activity. This data indicates that there is a small positive influence of groups in Vk.com to the social movements since through these groups the information is spread better than from active individuals. Such thematic groups became the social nodes that connect like minded people and forward them into the most useful for social movement direction. Social movement representatives have a better control of the group produced content and they can control the quality of posts, consequently the efficiency of these posts for resource mobilization. Another great asset is the control over people who write comments, the commenters from people with the opposite point of view can be removed and these people can be banned from further conversations.

Considering the significant influence of Vkontakte's groups on the social movement we should keep in mind the influence of trolls through such communities. Pynnöniemi & Racz (2016) research declares that public opinion can be manipulated via social media and I believe using groups is the best way to achieve this goal because it is based on interaction and participation (Carpentier, 2011; Jenkins et. al, 2016). Benkis (2016) and Luhn (2015) explain the techniques of trolls that were used during the annexation of Crimea, and the Presidential elections in the USA in 2016. These techniques were actively used in social media in the final phase of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 by "Trolls for Olgino" and they were used by the Ukrainian counterpart to decrease the influence of the Eastern neighbor (Butsenko, 2014).

Shirky (2011) states that social media have improved old coordinating structures. And I agree with this, speed and interactivity gave the advantage over traditional media in the ability to express people's thoughts and feelings. Special thematic groups (Pravyy Sektor, EuroMaydan, AntiMaydan) were created for this sole purpose: to coordinate, mobilize and let people freely discuss their ideas.

Hypothesis 3 anticipated that social movement increased resource mobilization with the help of social media. The research data shows the decrease of legal, voluntary and active support. Ukrainians do not possess a decent amount of discretionary resources, therefore they don't share their finances actively and that is shown by the figures (Reznik, 2016). Although, they compensate it with their labor as volunteers (Paniotto, 2005). We can see that voluntary work decreased in 2014 in comparison with 2004. These results can explain that Ukrainians discovered another opportunity to participate in a social movement without any damage to their health or loss of their belongings. Participation in the Revolution of Dignity through social media required less effort. As Zald and McCarthy (1977) claim, there are four main types of resources. I do not consider activity in social media as another, fifth type, but rather a new form of labor. In the same way as traditional labor, social media activity can fulfill various tasks: mobilize more resources, involve more people, organize and coordinate activists, spread the ideas, and promote social movement in the best way (Kyj, 2006; Szostek, 2014, Bohdanova, 2014).

The comparison of the reasons why respondents didn't want to participate in social movements showed that social media decreases the fear for personal or family safety and shows the alternative ways to participate. Researchers (Kurochkin & Nikiforov, 2015; Etling, 2014, Shirky 2011) state that social media has no limitations or filters that can be set by the

government. As a result, people feel free to express their ideas or thoughts, coordinate actions or mobilize resources with less fear that they would be recognized, tracked and threatened (Clark, 2012). The study also shows that the number of respondents who didn't support anyone or were apathetic during both revolutions remained almost the same. This might mean that social media does not affect the interest in a social movement, or the interest has increased indeed, but there might have been some other factors that affect the results.

The last hypothesis stated that the age of social movement participants decreased. The study shows the difference in age between revolutions is 1.71 years, the participants of the Revolution of Dignity were 1.71 years younger than the participants of the Orange revolution. The age of the participants has been calculated based on the age stated during the time of the surey. This is not crucial, however, considering that generally, the respondents are young, I think that 7.62% difference is quite much. Young people tend to use technological novelties faster and in a better way than people in older age. Carpentier (2011) and Jenkins (2016) connect it with the participation culture and explain the participation in the political life of the country as participation in another online community, but the topic is more lively and interesting. Jenkins also explained that social media helps to share cultural products among the members of the benefit of themselves and the community. A great example of it is Maidan post stamps, paintings, musicians playing piano on the streets. All these cultural attributes are spread with the help of social media and youth want to get involved in this community.

The second research question sought to determine whether social media ease the process of resource mobilization from the isolated constituents. Schults (2014) summarized the idea of Zald and McCarthy (1977) that if a well-structured movement would gain and use resources better, then it reaches its goal faster. Klanderamns (1987) proves that the lack of resources can slow down and weaken the social movement. Zald and McCarthy (1977)

highlighted that important resource flow can come from abroad but it is highly resource-consuming. "The more dependent a SMO is upon isolated constituents the greater the share of its resources which will be allocated to advertising." (ibid., 1230). I see the support of isolated constituents very important: mobilizing resources, informing citizens of the country they live, seeking for the political support of the host country. Isolated constituents can not follow quick-change in the country and can not react to it respectively. In some cases, the expense of keeping the isolated constituents in the loop is bigger than the number of resources they can provide. On the other hand, the information broadcasted by the national news can be distorted.

My data reveals that social media decreases the cost of informing isolated constituents and makes the mobilization process cost-effective. 95% of respondents stated that they used social media activity. Comparing both revolutions, the support from abroad significantly increased from 1 person to 20. Therefore, the conclusion can be made that social media increased the efficiency of social movement support from abroad.

Though some of the results were unexpected and surprising, the study found that social media has transformed the social movement and has changed many processes in resource mobilization. The results of this study show a significant relationship between social media use and social movement support from abroad.

Implications

The present study confirms some of the previous findings and examines the changes in Resource Mobilization Theory. Research highlights the pros and cons of social media use

for social movement, the youth involvement and the cultural part of a social movement, it unveils a great source of resources for social movement and the way to keep that flow stable.

A better understanding of the connection between social media and social movement is significant as social movements happen often and unknown areas in this sphere exist. The findings of this research are useful for sociologists, and researchers interested in social media research.

Limitations and directions for future research

Three limitations should be addressed in this study. First, the sample included many questions that were not used in the analysis due to the Master's thesis limitations. Second, the data collection was difficult since many people thought that I shared the spam messages. Even though I have a relatively high response rate, many requests were left unanswered and several people refused to complete the survey because the other form was in Russian. Some of the people didn't trust their personal information to Google, and they also   refused to participate in the study. Third, the form was filled by people from my friend's list in Vkontakte and Facebook. These are like minded people, so the answers to the survey might be similar.

Future studies on the current topic are therefore recommended. A further study should focus on trolling, youth participation, dictatorship dilemma, or the use of social media on high-profile events, like Presidential elections. It is advisable to make in-depth interviews as a part of the research, since some of the respondents answered free questions with their opinions and stories.

The present study researched the relationship between social media and social movement. The findings of the study highlight the important role of social media in the contemporary social movement process. Social media became a great tool for communication, organization, and mobilization resources, at the same time it is a dangerous mechanism for public opinion manipulation. One of the biggest problems for social movement has been solved with the help of social media - keeping a resource flow from abroad.

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7. Appendixes

Social media use questionnaire (English version)

This questionnaire is made to collect the data for social media impact on the behavior of the Ukrainians. We compared the events that happened in Ukraine in 2004 better known as the Orange revolution and in 2014, well known as the Revolution of Dignity. The Ukrainians use different social media and we decided to focus on the most popular: Vkontakte (website: http://vk.com). We expect that the results of this research will show the importance of social media use for the social and political life of the Ukrainians.

This survey is anonymous and we will show only the general result. Taking this survey will take you only 10 minutes. We have divided the questionnaire into four parts for your convenience: general information, your attitude and participation to the Ukrainian events in 2004 - Orange revolution, your attitude and participation to the Ukrainian events in 2014 - the Revolution of Dignity, your trust to the traditional media and activity in social media.

This research is a part of my master's thesis. I am a student of the master's degree program: Digital Culture and Intercultural Communication at the University of Jyväskylä. If you have any questions or you are interested in the results of this research, you can write to me to vomelnyc@student.jyu.fi. If you need any additional questions, you can contact my research advisor professor Raine Koskimaa (raine.koskimaa@jyu.fi).

Thank you for your participation! Every answer is very important to me! Thank you all!

Chapter 1. General information.

1.1. Please, write your age:

1.2. Please, select your gender:

☐ Male.

☐ Female.

1.3. Please, write your nationality:

1.4. What is your level of education:

☐ Vocational school.

☐ Bachelor's degree.

☐ Specialist's degree.

☐ Master's degree.

☐ PHD.

1.5. What is your Occupation?

1.6. Are you member of political party?

☐ Yes.

☐ No.

☐ I don't want to answer.

1.7. In what part of Ukraine do you live in right now? (If you do not live in Ukraine right now, please skip this question and answer the question 1.8.)

☐ Central.

☐ Northern.

☐ Southern.

☐ Eastern.

☐ Western.

1.8. If you do not live in Ukraine right now, in what country country do you live?

1.9. In what part of Ukraine you lived in the period from the 22 of November 2004 to the 23 of January 2005 (Orange revolution)? (Skip this question if you did not live in Ukraine that period and answer question 1.10)

☐ Central.

☐ Northern.

☐ Southern.

☐ Eastern.

☐ Western.

1.10. In what country did you live in the period from the 22 of November 2004 to the 23 of January 2005 (Orange revolution)? (Skip this question if you answered question 1.9).

1.11. In what part of Ukraine did you live in the period from the 21 of November 2013 to the 22 of February 2014 (Revolution of Dignity)? (Skip this question if you did not live in Ukraine that period and answer question 1.12)

☐ Central.

☐ Northern.

☐ Southern.

☐ Eastern.

☐ Western.

1.12. In what country did you live in the period from the 21 of November 2013 to the 22 of February 2014 (Revolution of Dignity)? (Skip this question if you answered question 1.11)

1.13. How often do you use social media? (For example Vkontakte (vk.com), Facebook, etc.)

☐ Never.

☐ Once per month.

☐ Once per week.

☐ Once per day.

☐ Several times per day.

1.14. What social media do you use the most?

1.15. Do you have an account in Vkontakte (vk.com)?

☐ Yes.

☐ No.

Chapter 2. Your relation to the events of Orange revolution (November 2004 - January 2005).

2.1. Did you participate in these events on any side of social movement?

☐ Yes.

☐ No.

2.1.1. How did you support any side of social movement? If you answered "Yes" on question 2.1, please answer this question, if you answered "No", please, skip it.

☐ Reading, writing comments in forums of Internet resources (for example http://www.pomaranch.org.ua/, or forums related to Orange Revolution).

☐ Support with legitimacy (promoting or blocking some of the laws, legal support).

☐ Financial support.

☐ Support with facilities (food, facilities, cloth).

☐ Voluntary support (work).

☐ Passive participant of the demonstrations (I did not participate actively in the clashes with police, or other side of the conflict, I just showed my concern).

☐ Active participant of the demonstrations (I participated actively in the clashes with police, or other side of the conflict, I just showed my concern).

2.1.2. If you have answered "No" to the question 2.1., please, answer why did you stay apart

from the Orange revolution:

☐ I wanted but I did not find the way to do it.

☐ I wanted to but I was concerned about personal and family safety.

☐ I did not support any side of the conflict.

☐ I did not want to participate at all.

☐ Other.

2.2. Do you think the Orange Revolution change your life for better?

☐ Yes.

☐ No.

☐ Nothing has changed.

2.3. Do you think the Orange revolution changed life in Ukraine for better?

☐ Yes.

☐ No.

☐ Nothing has changed.

Chapter 3. Your relation to the events of the Revolution of Dignity (November 2013 -

February 2014).

3.1. Did you participate in these events on any side of social movement?

☐ Yes.

☐ No.

3.1.1. How did you support any side of social movement? If you answered "Yes" on question

3.1, please answer this question, if you answered "No", please, skip it.

☐ Reading, writing or commenting posts in vk.com.

☐ Support with legitimacy (promoting or blocking some of the laws, legal support).

☐ Financial support.

☐ Support with facilities (food, facilities, cloth).

☐ Voluntary support (work).

☐ Passive participant of the demonstrations (I did not participate actively in the clashes with police, or other side of the conflict, I just showed my concern).

☐ Active participant of the demonstrations (I participated actively in the clashes with police, or other side of the conflict, I just showed my concern).

3.1.2. If you have answered "No" to the question 3.1., please, answer why did you stay apart from the Revolution of Dignity:

☐ I wanted but I did not find the way to do it.

☐ I wanted to but I was concerned about personal and family safety.

☐ I did not support any side of the conflict.

☐ I did not want to participate at all.

☐ Other.

3.2. Do you think the Revolution of Dignity changed your life for better?

☐ Yes.

☐ No.

☐ Nothing has changed.

3.3. Do you think the Revolution of Dignity changed life in Ukraine for better?

☐ Yes.

☐ No.

☐ Nothing has changed.

3.4. If you answered question 1.12 and 3.1.1, how do you think, did social media influenced your decision to help social movement?

☐ Yes, it influenced.

☐ No, it didn't influence.

Chapter 4. Trust to traditional media and social media activity.

Please, read every question carefully and select the number that will be best for you:

1= totally agree;

2 = agree to some extend;

3 = I don't know;

4 = I don't agree to some extend;

5 = I totally disagree.

4.1. I trust national media in my country.

0% trust   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   100% trust.

4.2. I trusted national media during the Orange revolution.

0% trust   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   100% trust.

4.3. I trusted national media during the Revolution of Dignity.

0% trust 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 100% trust.

4.4. I compared information about the Orange revolution between Ukrainian national news and the news of the other countries.

Totally agree   1 2 3 4 5 totally disagree.

4.5. I compared information about the Revolution of Dignity between Ukrainian national news and the news of the other countries.

Totally agree   1 2 3 4 5 totally disagree.

4.6. I searched the other sources of information apart of television.

Totally agree   1 2 3 4 5 totally disagree.

4.7. I used social media as a source of information about the Revolution of Dignity.

Totally agree   1 2 3 4 5 totally disagree.

4.8. I used vk.com as a source of information about the events in Ukraine during the Revolution of Dignity.

Totally agree   1 2 3 4 5 totally disagree.

4.9. I used Internet resources (for example http://www.pomaranch.org.ua/) as a source of information about the events during Orange revolution.

Totally agree   1 2 3 4 5 totally disagree.

4.10. I actively posted and commented in social media in Ukraine during the Revolution of Dignity.

Totally agree   1 2 3 4 5 totally disagree.

4.11. I subscribed to special groups in social media, to receive the information about the events in Ukraine during the Revolution of Dignity. Groups like «Pravyy Sektor», «EuroMaydan», «AntiMaydan», and others.

☐ Yes.

☐ No.

4.12. Some of my friends in vk.com are the members of special groups and I could see re-posts in my news (feeds) from those groups about the events in Ukraine during the Revolutions of Dignity. Groups like «Pravyy Sektor», «EuroMaydan», «AntiMaydan», and others.

☐ Yes.

☐ No.

4.12.1. These posts were interesting and informative. If you negatively answered the questions 4.11 and 4.12, please, skip questions 4.12.1 and 4.12.2.

Totally agree   1 2 3 4 5 totally disagree.

4.12.2. These posts were not interesting and annoying.

Totally agree   1 2 3 4 5 totally disagree.

4.13. Did you change your opinion about social media after the Revolution of Dignity?

☐ Yes.

☐ No.

4.14. If you answered positively to the question 4.13, please, write why.

4.15. Do you want to add anything to the answers to this survey?

Social media use questionnaire (Russian version)

Этот опрос разработан, чтобы собрать информацию для изучения влияния социальных сетей на поведение украинцев. Мы сравнивали события 2004 года известные как Оранжевая революция и 2014 года, известные как Революция Достоинства. Учитывая то, что украинцы пользуются разными социальными сетями, мы решили сфокусироваться на самой популярной: ВКонтакте (вебсайт: http://vk.com). Мы ожидаем, что результаты исследования покажут всю весомость использования социальных сетей в социальной и политической жизни украинцев.

Опрос полностью анонимен и только общий результат будет предан огласке. Ответы на вопросы займут у вас всего 10 минут. Для вашего удобства мы поделили все вопросы на 4 группы: общая информация, ваше отношение и участие в событиях 2004 года - Оранжевой революции, ваше отношение и участие в событиях 2014 года - Революции достоинства, и измерение вашего доверия к медиа наряду с активностью в социальных сетях.

Это исследование является частью моей дипломной работы. Я учусь на магистра гуманитарных наук по специальности: цифровая культура и межкультурные коммуникации. Если у вас возникли какие-либо вопросы, либо вам интересны результаты исследования, вы можете написать мне по адресу электронной почты: vomelnyc@student.jyu.fi. Если у вас возникли дополнительные вопросы, вы также можете связаться с руководителем моей дипломной работы: профессором Раине Коскимаа (raine.koskimaa@jyu.fi на английском языке).

Благодарю за участие в этом исследовании! Каждый ответ очень важен для меня! Спасибо всем!

Часть 1. Общая информация.

1.1. Пожалуйста, напишите свой возраст:

1.2. Пожалуйста, выберите свой пол:

☐ Муж.

☐ Жен.

1.3. Пожалуйста, напишите свою национальность:

1.4. Какой ваш уровень образования:

☐ Профессиональное техническое училище.

☐ Бакалавр.

☐ Специалист.

☐ Магистр.

☐ Кандидат, доктор наук.

1.5. Кем вы работаете?

1.6. Являетесь ли вы членом какой-либо политической партии?

☐ Да.

☐ Нет.

☐ Я не хочу отвечать.

1.7. В какой части Украины вы живете сейчас? Если вы не живете в Украине сейчас, пожалуйста, пропустите этот вопрос и ответьте на вопрос 1.8.

☐ Центральная.

☐ Северная.

☐ Южная.

☐ Восточная.

☐ Западная.

1.8. Если вы не живете в Украине, в какой стране вы живете сейчас?

1.9. В какой части Украины вы жили в период с 22 ноября 2004 по 23 января 2005 (Оранжевая революция)? (Если вы не жили в Украине, пожалуйста, пропустите этот вопрос и дайте ответ на вопрос 1.10).

☐ Центральная.

☐ Северная.

☐ Южная.

☐ Восточная.

☐ Западная.

1.10. В какой стране вы проживали в период с 22 ноября 2004 по 23 января 2005 (Оранжевая революция)? (Пропустите этот вопрос если вы ответили на вопрос 1.9).

1.11. В какой части Украины вы жили в период с 21 ноября 2013 по 22 февраля 2014 (Революция Достоинства)? (Если вы не жили в Украине, пожалуйста, пропустите этот вопрос и дайте ответ на вопрос 1.12).

☐ Центральная.

☐ Северная.

☐ Южная.

☐ Восточная.

☐ Западная.

1.12. В какой стране вы проживали в период с 21 ноября 2013 по 22 февраля 2014 (Революция Достоинства)? (Пропустите этот вопрос если вы ответили на вопрос 1.11).

1.13. Как часто вы пользуетесь социальными сетями? (К примеру, ВКонтакте, Фейсбук и др.).

☐ Никогда.

☐ Раз в месяц.

☐ Раз в неделю.

☐ Один раз в день.

☐ Несколько раз в день.

1.14. Какие из социальных сетей вы используете больше всего?

1.15. Есть ли у вас профиль ВКонтакте?

☐ Да.

☐ Нет.

Часть 2. Ваше отношение к событиям Оранжевой революции (ноябрь 2004 - январь 2005).

2.1. Вы участвовали в этих событиях на любой стороне конфликта?

☐ Да.

☐ Нет.

2.1.1. Как вы поддерживали любую сторону конфликта? Если вы ответили «Да» на вопрос 2.1., пожалуйста, ответьте на этот вопрос, если вы ответили «Нет», пожалуйста пропустите его.

☐ Чтение, написание и комментирование записей в Интернет ресурсах (например http://www.pomaranch.org.ua/, или форумах связаных с Оранжевой революцией).

☐ Легитимная поддержка (продвижение или блокирование законов, юридическая поддержка).

☐ Финансовая поддержка.

☐ Материальная поддержка (продукты, помещения, одежда).

☐ Волонтерская помощь (работа).

☐ Пассивный участник демонстраций (не принимал активного участия в массовых беспорядках против милиции или с другой стороны конфликта, просто показывал свою обеспокоенность).

☐ Активный участник демонстраций (принимал активное участие в массовых беспорядках против милиции или с другой стороны конфликта).

2.1.2. Если вы ответили «нет», пожалуйста, ответьте почему вы не принимали участия в событиях Оранжевой революции:

☐ Я хотел, но я не нашел способа.

☐ Я хотел, но я боялся за свою безопасность и безопасность своей семьи.

☐ Я не поддерживал ни одной стороны конфликта.

☐ Я не хотел участвовать вообще.

☐ Другое.

2.2. Как вы считаете, принесла ли Оранжевая революция позитивные изменения в вашу жизнь.

☐ Да.

☐ Нет.

☐ Ничего не изменилось.

2.3. Как вы считаете, принесла ли Оранжевая революция позитивные изменения в Украину.

☐ Да.

☐ Нет.

☐ Ничего не изменилось.

Часть 3. Ваше отношение к событиям Революции Достоинства (ноябрь 2013 - февраль 2014).

3.1. Вы участвовали в этих событиях на любой стороне конфликта?

☐ Да.

☐ Нет.

3.1.1. Как вы поддерживали любую сторону конфликта? Если вы ответили «Да» на вопрос 2.1., пожалуйста, ответьте на этот вопрос, если вы ответили «Нет», пожалуйста пропустите его.

☐ Чтение, написание и комментирование записей в vk.com.

☐ Легитимная поддержка (продвижение или блокирование законов, юридическая поддержка).

☐ Финансовая поддержка.

☐ Материальная поддержка (продукты, помещения, одежда).

☐ Волонтерская помощь (работа).

☐ Пассивный участник демонстраций (не принимал активного участия в массовых беспорядках против милиции или с другой стороны конфликта, просто показывал свою обеспокоенность).

☐ Активный участник демонстраций (принимал активное участие в массовых беспорядках против милиции или с другой стороны конфликта).

3.1.2. Если вы ответили «нет» на вопрос 3.1, пожалуйста, ответьте почему вы не принимали участия в событиях Революции Достоинства:

☐ Я хотел, но я не нашел способа.

☐ Я хотел, но я боялся за свою безопасность и безопасность своей семьи.

☐ Я не поддерживал ни одной стороны конфликта.

☐ Я не хотел участвовать вообще.

☐ Другое.

3.2. Как вы считаете, принесла ли Революция Достоинства позитивные изменения в вашу жизнь.

☐ Да.

☐ Нет.

☐ Ничего не изменилось.

3.3. Как вы считаете, принесла ли Революция Достоинства позитивные изменения в Украину.

☐ Да.

☐ Нет.

☐ Ничего не изменилось.

3.4. Если вы ответили на вопрос 1.12 и 3.1.1, как вы считаете, повлияли социальные медиа на ваше решение помочь социальному движению?

☐ Да, повлияли.

☐ Нет, не повлияли.

Часть 4. Доверие к медиа и активность в социальной медиа.

Пожалуйста, прочитайте каждый вопрос внимательно и выберите номер который лучше всего опишет ваше мнение:

1 = полностью согласен;

2 = согласен в какой-то степени;

3 = не знаю;

4 = не согласен в какой-то степени;

5 = полностью не согласен.

4.1. Сейчас я доверяю национальным каналам в моей стране.

0% доверия   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   100% доверия.

4.2. Я доверял национальным каналам во время Оранжевой революции.

0% доверия   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   100% доверия.

4.3. Я доверял национальным каналам во время Революции Достоинства.

0% доверия 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 100% доверия.

4.4. Я сравнивал информацию о событиях Оранжевой революции между украинскими национальными каналами и каналами других стран.

Полностью согласен   1 2 3 4 5 полностью не согласен.

4.5. Я сравнивал информацию о событиях Революции Достоинства между украинскими национальными каналами и каналами других стран.

Полностью согласен   1 2 3 4 5 полностью не согласен.

4.6. Я искал другие источники информации помимо телевидения.

Полностью согласен   1 2 3 4 5 полностью не согласен.

4.7. Я использовал социальные сети как источник информации о событиях Революции Достоинства.

Полностью согласен   1 2 3 4 5 полностью не согласен.

4.8. Я использовал vk.com как источник информации о событиях в Украине в период Революции Достоинства.

Полностью согласен   1 2 3 4 5 полностью не согласен.

4.9. Я использовал Интернет ресурсы (например http://www.pomaranch.org.ua/) как источник информации о событиях в Украине в период Оранжевой революции.

Полностью согласен   1 2 3 4 5 полностью не согласен.

4.10. Я активно постил и комментировал в социальных сетях события в Украине в период Революции Достоинства.

Полностью согласен   1 2 3 4 5 полностью не согласен.

4.11. Я подписался на специальные группы, чтобы получать информацию о событиях в Украине в период Революции Достоинства.   Группы как «Правый Сектор», «ЕвроМайдан», «АнтиМайдан», и прочие.

☐ Да.

☐ Нет.

4.12. Некоторые из моих друзей подписаны на специальные группы, потому я видел репосты в своей ленте новостей с тех групп о событиях в Украине в период Революции Достоинства. Группы как «Правый Сектор», «ЕвроМайдан», «АнтиМайдан», и прочие.

☐ Да.

☐ Нет.

4.12.1. Эти посты были для меня интересны и информативны. Если вы негативно ответили на вопросы 4.11 и 4.12., пожалуйста пропустите вопросы 4.12.1 и 4.12.2.

Полностью согласен   1 2 3 4 5 полностью не согласен.

4.12.2. Эти посты были для меня не интересны и надоедливы.4.12.2. Эти посты были для меня не интересны и надоедливы.

Полностью согласен   1 2 3 4 5 полностью не согласен.

4.13. Поменялось ли ваше мнение про социальные сети после Революции Достоинства?

☐ Да.

☐ Нет.

4.14. Если вы ответили на вопрос 4.13. "Да", пожалуйста. напишите почему.

4.15. Хотели ли бы вы что-либо добавить к ответам данного опроса?

Social media use questionnaire (Ukrainian version)

Дане опитування розроблене з метою збору інформації, щоб простежити вплив соціальних мереж на українців. Ми порівнювали подіі 2004 року відомі як Помаранчева революція і 2014 року, відомі як Революція Гідності. Зважаючи на те, що українці використовують багато різних соціальних мереж, ми сфокусувались тільки на найбільш популярній: ВКонтакте (веб сайт: vk.com). Ми очікуємо, що результати дослідження покажуть вагомість використання соціальних мереж у соціальному і політичному житті українців.

Опитування повністю анонімне і оголошеним буде тільки загальний результат, тому ніхто не дізнається конкретно вашої відповіді. Відповіді на запитання займуть у вас всього 10 хвилин. Для вашої зручності, ми поділили усі питання на 4 групи: загальна інформація, ваша участь і відношення до подій 2004 року - Помаранчевої революції, ваша участь і відношення до подій 2014 року - Революції Гідності, і вимірювання рівня вашої довіри до медіа, у той самий час із активністю у соціальних мережах.

Це дослідження є частиною моєї дипломної роботи. Я навчаюсь на магістра гуманітарних наук за спеціальністю: цифрова культура і міжкультурні комунікації. Якщо у вас виникли будь-які питання, чи вам просто цікаві результати дослідження, ви можете написати мені на електронну адресу: vomelnyc@student.jyu.fi. Якщо у вас виникли додаткові питання, ви також можете зв'язатись із моїм керівником: професором Раіне Коскимаа (raine.koskimaa@jyu.fi англійською мовою). Дякую вам за участь у цьому дослідженні! Кожна відповідь важлива для мене! Дякую усім!

Частина 1. Загальна інформація.

1.1. Будь ласка, вкажіть ваш вік:

1.2. Будь ласка, виберіть вашу стать:

☐ Чол.

☐ Жін.

1.3. Будь ласка, напишіть свою національність:

1.4. Яка ваша освіта:

☐ Професійне технічне училище.

☐ Бакалавр.

☐ Спеціаліст.

☐ Магістр.

☐ Кандидат, Доктор наук.

1.5. Ким ви працюєте?

1.6. Чи є ви членом політичної партії?

☐ Так.

☐ Ні.

☐ Я не хочу відповідати.

1.7. В якій частині України ви зараз живете? Якщо ви не живете в Україні зараз, будь ласка пропустіть це запитання і дайте відповідь на питання 1.8.

☐ Центральна.

☐ Північна.

☐ Південна.

☐ Східна.

☐ Західна.

1.8. Якщо ви не живете в Україні, в якій країні ви живете зараз?

1.9. В якій частині України ви жили у період із 22 листопада 2004 по 23 січня 2005?

Якщо ви не жили в Україні, будь ласка, пропустіть це питання.

☐ Центральна.

☐ Північна.

☐ Південна.

☐ Східна.

☐ Західна.

1.10. В якій країні ви проживали в період з 22 листопада 2004 по 23 січня 2005 (Помаранчева революція)? (Пропустіть це питання якщо ви відповіли на питання 1.9)

1.11.В якій частині України ви жили у період із 21 листопада 2013 по 22 лютого 2014?

Якщо ви не жили в Україні, будь ласка, пропустіть це питання.

☐ Центральна.

☐ Північна.

☐ Південна.

☐ Східна.

☐ Західна.

1.12. В якій країні ви проживали в період з 21 листопада 2013 по 22 листопада 2014 (Революція Гідності)? (Пропустіть це питання якщо ви відповіли на питання 1.11)

1.13. Як часто ви користуєтесь соціальними мережами? (Наприклад ВКонтакте, Фейсбук та ін.)

☐ Ніколи.

☐ Раз на місяць.

☐ Раз на тиждень.

☐ Один раз на день.

☐ Декілька разів на день.

1.14. Які з соціальних мереж ви використовуєте найчастіше?

1.15. Чи є у вас профіль ВКонтакте?

☐ Так.

☐ Ні.

Частина 2. Ваше відношення до подій Помаранчевої революції (листопад 2004 - січень 2005).

2.1. Чи приймали ви участь у цих подіях на будь-якій стороні конфлікту?

☐ Так.

☐ Ні.

2.1.1. Як ви підтримували будь-яку сторону конфлікту? Якщо ви відповіли «Так» на запитання 2.1., будь ласка, дайте відповідь на це запитання, якщо ви відповіли «Ні», будь ласка, пропустіть його.

☐ Читання, написання та коментування записів Інтернет ресурсах (наприклад http://www.pomaranch.org.ua/, чи форумах пов'язаних з Помаранчевою революцією).

☐ Легітимна підтримка (Просування / блокування законів, юридична допомога).

☐ Фінансова допомога.

☐ Матеріальна підтримка (продукти, приміщення, одежа).

☐ Волонтерська підтримка (праця).

☐ Пасивний учасник демонстрацій (не приймав активної участі у заворушеннях проти міліції, чи з іншої сторони конфлікту, просто виражав свою занепокоєність).

☐ Активний учасник демонстрацій (приймав активну участь у заворушеннях проти міліції, чи з іншої сторони конфлікту).

2.1.2. Якщо ви відповіли «Ні», будь ласка, дайте відповідь чому ви не приймали участі у подіях Помаранчевої революції:

☐ Я хотів, але не знайшов способу як.

☐ Я хотів, але боявся за свою безпеку та безпеку моєї сім'ї.

☐ Я не підтримував ні однієї зі сторін конфлікту.

☐ Я не хотів брати участь взагалі.

☐ Інше.

2.2. Як ви вважаєте, чи принесла Помаранчева революція позитивні зміни у ваше життя?

☐ Так.

☐ Ні.

☐ Нічого не змінилось.

2.3. Як ви вважаєте, чи принесла Помаранчева революція позитивні зміни в Україну?

☐ Так.

☐ Ні.

☐ Нічого не змінилось.

Частина 3. Ваше відношення до подій Революції Гідності (листопад 2013 - грудень 2014).

3.1. Чи приймали ви участь у цих подіях на будь-якій стороні конфлікту?

☐ Так.

☐ Ні.

3.1.1. Як ви підтримували будь-яку сторону конфлікту? Якщо ви відповіли «Так» на запитання 2.1., будь ласка, дайте відповідь на це запитання, якщо ви відповіли «Ні», будь ласка, пропустіть його.

☐ Читання, написання та коментування записів у vk.com.

☐ Легітимна підтримка (Просування / блокування законів, юридична допомога).

☐ Фінансова допомога.

☐ Матеріальна підтримка (продукти, приміщення, одежа).

☐ Волонтерська підтримка (праця).

☐ Пасивний учасник демонстрацій (не приймав активної участі у заворушеннях проти міліції, чи з іншої сторони конфлікту, просто виражав свою занепокоєність).

☐ Активний учасник демонстрацій (приймав активну участь у заворушеннях проти міліції, чи з іншої сторони конфлікту).

3.1.2. Якщо ви відповіли «Ні», будь ласка, дайте відповідь чому ви не приймали участі у подіях Революції Гідності:

☐ Я хотів, але не знайшов способу як.

☐ Я хотів, але боявся за свою безпеку та безпеку моєї сім'ї.

☐ Я не підтримував ні однієї зі сторін конфлікту.

☐ Я не хотів брати участь взагалі.

☐ Інше.

3.2. Як ви вважаєте, чи принесла Революція Гідності позитивні зміни у ваше життя?

☐ Так.

☐ Ні.

☐ Нічого не змінилось.

3.3. Як ви вважаєте, чи принесла Революція Гідності позитивні зміни в Україну?

☐ Так.

☐ Ні.

☐ Нічого не змінилось.

3.4. Якщо ви відповіли на питання 1.12 и 3.1.1, як ви вважаєте, чи вплинули соціальні медіа на ваше рішення допомогти соціальному руху?

☐ Так, вплинули.

☐ Ні, не вплинули.

Часть 4. Довіра до медіа і активність в соціальній медіа.

Будь ласка, прочитайте уважно кожне питання і виберіть номер, який більше всього опише вашу думку:

1 = повністю згоден;

2 = згоден в певній мірі;

3 = не знаю;

4 = не згоден в деякій мірі;

5 = абсолютно не згоден.

4.1. Зараз я довіряю національним каналам в моїй країні.

0% довіри   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   100% довіри.

4.2. Я довіряв національним каналам під час Помаранчевої революції.

0% довіри   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   100% довіри.

4.3. Я довіряв національним каналам під час Революції Гідності.

0% довіри   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   100% довіри.

4.4. Я порівнював інформацію про події Помаранчевої революції поміж українськими національними каналами та каналами інших країн.

Повністю згоден   1 2 3 4 5 повністю не згоден.

4.5. Я порівнював інформацію про події Революції гідності поміж українськими національними каналами та каналами інших країн.

Повністю згоден   1 2 3 4 5 повністю не згоден.

4.6. Я шукав інші джерела інформації окрім телебачення.

Повністю згоден   1 2 3 4 5 повністю не згоден.

4.7. Я використовував соціальні мережі як джерело інформації про події Революції Гідності.

Повністю згоден   1 2 3 4 5 повністю не згоден.

4.8. Я використовував vk.com як джерело інформації Революції Гідності.

Повністю згоден   1 2 3 4 5 повністю не згоден.

4.9. Я використовував Інтернет ресурси (наприклад http://www.pomaranch.org.ua/) як джерело інформації про події в Україні в період Помаранчевої революції.

Повністю згоден   1 2 3 4 5 повністю не згоден.

4.10. Я активно постив та коментував в соціальних мережах події Революції Гідності.

Повністю згоден   1 2 3 4 5 повністю не згоден.

34. 4.11. Я підписався на спеціальні групи, щоб отримувати інформацію про події в Україні в період Революції Гідності. Групи як «Правий Сектор», «ЄвроМайдан», «Антимайдан», та інші.

☐ Так.

☐ Ні.

4.12. Деякі із моїх друзів підписані на спеціальні групи, тому я бачив репости у своїй стрічці новин з тих груп про події в Україні в період Революції Гідності. Групи як «Правий Сектор», «ЄвроМайдан», «Антимайдан», та інші.

☐ Так.

☐ Ні.

4.12.1. Ці пости були для мене цікавими та інформативними. Якщо ви негативно відповіли на питання 4.11 та 4.12., будь ласка пропустіть питання 4.12.1 та 4.12.2.

Повністю згоден   1 2 3 4 5 повністю не згоден.

4.12.2. Ці пости були для мене нецікаві та надокучливими.

Повністю згоден   1 2 3 4 5 повністю не згоден.

4.13. Чи змінилося ваше ставлення до соціальних мереж після Революції Гідності?

☐ Так.

☐ Ні.

4.14. Якщо ви відповіли "Так" на запитання 4.13., будь ласка, напишіть чому.

4.15. Чи хотіли би ви щось додати до відповідей з опитування, що не вказано у питаннях?