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Balancing Between Narratives of the West and Hindu Nationalism in Emerging India

Jukka Jouhki

In the Indian news media, it is difficult to find recent articles about the West without having to read about political populism, the alt-right, Brexit, refugees, military ventures, economic stagnation, and the threat of militant Islam, to name a few. Especially the flamboyance of President Donald Trump, the leader of a country most often viewed as the hegemon of the West, and the center of Western world order has sparked the Indian press to reflect on what the West is or does, and where Trump is taking it. There are narratives where the liberal West is in crisis, and they have created a need for Indians to reflect on the position of their nation in the possible new world order where the West might not have the global prepotency it currently does. In this chapter, I am examining these narratives in the Indian news media. I am focusing particularly on India's role and prospects in the world system particularly in relation to the 'liberal West'. To do this, I am examining the recent contents of major daily English-language newspapers published in India together with academic literature on the topic.¹

As people identifying as Westerners have looked to India to construct an idea of an Orient vis-à-vis a 'Western self', Indians have generated their own Occidentalisms to create grand narratives of Westerners and to reflect on what it means to be an Indian.² Many Indians believe there are valuable ideologies, values, policies, and innovations in the West that India has benefited from and will continue to do so in the future. Contrastingly, there are nationalist narratives –even by the same people – emphasizing Indian self-reliance from and even superiority to the West.³ Indians may have an uneasy relationship with 'Western modernity'. As Pankaj Mishra, the author of *Age of Anger* and one of the most influential analysts of Indian society in the world system observes, there is a 'growing awareness that the Western history of modernization is just one of several possible courses'.⁴ Yet, in this millennium, Indian foreign policy narratives have emphasized democracy, pluralism, and, increasingly, economic liberalism. The international forums, as Western-dominated as they might be, are nowadays considered 'less a threat than an opportunity'.⁵

In the West, there is a sort of rediscovering of India which applauds a born-again India with liberal democratic values and celebrates what is thought to be India's new generation of pragmatic 'doers' who promote democracy and modern citizenship. Cosmopolitan Indian politicians add to the narrative claiming that India's soft power, including yoga and Bollywood, will make it a global leader and a beacon of democracy in Asia.⁶ The 'New India' under Narendra Modi has indeed concentrated on taking a more active role in the world. The exotic, spiritual, and traditional – if not mythological – dimensions of Indian tradition have been revitalized for the purposes of international branding as well as domestic identity construction.⁷ Hence, one of the aims of this chapter is to analyze the way this New India manifests itself in relation to the West in the narratives of *Hindutva*, Hindu nationalism. It is a worldview supported not only by Narendra Modi and his followers but also on the left of the political spectrum. *Hindutva* sees Hindu tradition as the essence of Indian society, if not a model valuable enough to be followed on the global scale. These nationalist narratives are also widely reflected on in the Indian news media. The main newspapers analyzed in this chapter are *The Times of India* and *The Economic Times*, both published by the Times Group, which is India's largest media conglomerate; *The Hindu* published

¹ To select relevant articles for closer analysis, I have conducted keyword searches using various combinations of words (the West, Western, crisis, India, future, world order, emerging India, etc.) in the online versions of the aforementioned newspapers. The selected articles comprise 120 news reports, editorials, opinion pieces, and essays by mostly the editorial staff but also by expert guest writers such as politicians, book authors, and scholars. The treatment of the gathered content is nontheory-driven but qualitative and content driven.

² Said (1978/1995), Spencer (2003).

³ Wojcieszki (2016), 100–113.

⁴ Mishra (2017), 120.

⁵ Wojcieszki (2016), 147–150.

⁶ Mishra (2013), 86–87; Chandra (2017), 106–107.

⁷ Commuri (2009), 162; Kerrigan et al. (2012).

by The Hindu Group; *Hindustan Times* published by the HT Media; *The Telegraph* published by the ABP Group; and the *The Indian Express* published by Indian Express Limited.⁸

The West in Crisis, Asia Rising

‘The West’ examined here is a concept often used in a way that connotes a political, geopolitical, and/or cultural category that is difficult to verify by empirical observation. It is a solid entity in narrative whereas empirical study reveals a fuzzy network of heterogeneous populations with multiple agencies, platforms, and levels for interaction. Hence, ‘the West’, like many other titles for complex social categories, is bound to almost violently condense and make a monolith out of the sociocultural reality of a billion people divided into dozens of diverse states, and international and national organizations and groups. Hence, ‘the West’ is quite often a product of what I call banal Occidentalism, the reification of complex reality under an overarching concept.⁹

States, international organizations, and alliances/networks of states might have agency to the extent that one can talk about them as actors. For example, it is reasonable to speak of ‘the US’ as deciding something or ‘the EU’ as passing a law, but it is often more problematic to speak of ‘the West’ as an agent having similarly coherent agency, because it is not a juridical entity nor does it have a government or sovereignty. Many commentators of and in ‘the West’, and in the newspapers analyzed here, are aware of the conceptual problematics of ‘the West’, but far more imagine and/or narrate the West as having agency and being more homogenous than is warranted.¹⁰ Still, in many cases it is sufficiently reasonable – albeit not very accurate – to do so, particularly when it involves international organizations or alliances where the decision-making power is dominantly shared between countries or organizations that can be called ‘Western’.¹¹ In media discourses in India, the West is roughly synonymous to the US, or at least it means a coalition, organization, or a social sphere of influence largely dominated by the US and mostly Western European countries. The word ‘liberal’ is strongly connected – if not synonymous – to ‘Western’ in India as it is elsewhere. The West is considered liberal in the sense of promoting free market economy as well as having social and political views advocating reform and individual freedom. Krishnan Srinivasan, the former Foreign Secretary of India, described the Western liberal tradition and its relation to the world order in *The Telegraph*, and reflected the general stance of Indian media quite well:

The liberal tradition comprises the platform of ideas that underpinned the post-World War II international system, meaning democracy, free trade, international law, multilateralism, environmental protection and human rights, with the United States of America as the self-styled guarantor of this liberal world order.¹²

Gautam Adhikari, the executive editor of *The Times of India*, wrote about how earlier it was the Chinese, Indians, Romans, or Persians who ‘played prime roles in the march of humanity’, but today the world leader is ‘the European-American civilization, *loosely called the West*’. He continued that a significant proportion of practiced and debated aspects of ‘modern life’ such as nations, nationalism, democracy as well as colonialism and anticolonialism ‘emerged from ideas that sprouted from circumstances in the West’.¹³ Indeed, in many articles that I analyzed, the West is lauded as the source of technological innovations as well as the source of democracy, the inspiration for freedom fighters around the world, and the advocate of human rights.¹⁴

One of the reasons the West is seen to be in crisis in the Indian media is the internal division between the (leftist) liberals and (right-leaning) conservatives. According to *The Times of India*, Donald Trump’s presidency is ‘the flash of a declining civilization’, an epitome of the problems of Western

⁸ *The Times of India* is estimated to be most favorable to Prime Minister Modi’s government and leaning toward the center-right on the political spectrum, whereas *Hindustan Times* is perceived to oscillate between supporting the center-left and Modi’s government. The other news media analyzed here are more left-center leaning, supporting the Congress Party. *The Hindu* and *The Telegraph* are estimated to be most left-leaning of the six in their coverage. Maheswari and Sparks (2018); Sonwalkar (2016); The Press Freedom Index (2019); Media Bias Fact Check (2019); Barclay et al. (2014); Thakur (2013). Circulationwise, the printed press in India unlike in the West is thriving albeit India does not do well in the global press freedom ranking.

⁹ Jouhki (2016); see also Billig (1995).

¹⁰ Anderson (2006); Stephens (2013); see also Zheng (2017); Hall (2011).

¹¹ For example, NATO-, US-, or EU-led ventures are often very roughly, and for the sake of brevity, summarized as ‘the West’ doing something, although there is a risk that the reader forgets that most countries that identify as ‘Western’ might be excluded from those ventures.

¹² Srinivasan (2017).

¹³ Adhikari (2014). Emphasis added.

¹⁴ For example, Breting-Garcia (2017); Malik (2017); Vaidya (2017).

(neo)liberalism, liberal democracy, and populism – if not Western civilization altogether. Trump was elected ‘because the corrupt establishment of liberals and conservatives couldn’t even acknowledge the existential crisis the US faces’.¹⁵ ‘Angry voters in the US and around the West were seen to rebel against the ‘liberal democratic system’. Indeed, from the Indian perspective, different forms of fundamentalism are winning at the expense of the liberal center in the West. Voters are seeking desperate, extreme, and ‘even gross solutions’ such as Trump and Brexit, and it means that the era of liberal democracy might be over. The West is facing ‘a civilizational crisis’ as ‘the veneer of civilization’ is peeling off. According to the Indian media, conspiracy theories blaming immigrants, academics, and minorities flourish in the West. Western countries are becoming more withdrawn ‘politically and economically’ because globalization is seen as ‘a threat, not an opportunity’.¹⁶ Neelan Deo, the director of the Indian Council on Global Relations, criticizes Western liberalism for double standards. On one hand, it is adamant in removing restrictions on how capital moves globally, but it is also highly restrictive of the movement of labor into the West, labeling it as immigrant problem. This, according to Deo, is an essential issue to India who is one of the biggest labor-exporting countries in the world.¹⁷

It is a rather common view in the Indian news media that the West has hastened its own downfall by forcing liberal democracy, not only on Western nations but also around the globe, and applying double standards by supporting undemocratic powers at the same time. Even when the West is defending democracy, it holds the ideology in such value that it justifies military intervention.¹⁸ Professor H. Vasudevan from Calcutta University and Krishnan Srinivasan wrote in *The Telegraph* that the West has made the world unstable by having excess confidence in its political and moral leadership.¹⁹ Other critical observations of the West in the Indian media accuse it for a ‘missionary dogma on nation-building’,²⁰ and, as the author Mihaz Merchant purports in *The Economic Times*, ‘self-interested, disruptive and intrusive’ foreign policy that has ‘propped up brutal Arab dictators, bankrolled a terrorist state like Pakistan and destabilized countries ranging from Syria to Ukraine’.²¹ At the same time, Indian media might criticize the West for *not* doing anything about illiberal terrorist-harboring countries, perhaps because of its deepening crisis of status.²² Moreover, Western interventions in Muslim countries are seen to have led to the birth of the uncontrollable ‘hydra-headed monster’ of Jihadi Islam, which, on its part, has manifested in the form of Islamophobic attitudes toward immigrants and has stoked ‘primordial ethno-religious fears’ in the West.²³

The rise of Islamism is clearly the most significant moral outcome of Western military ventures in the narratives of Indian news media. It is also seen as the reason of anti-Muslim views and acts among Westerners, or vice versa, compensatory relativist ‘toleration’ of Islamic illiberalism. The existential dilemma of tolerating the intolerant Islam is seen to cause tension between Western liberal multiculturalists and conservative nationalists. As Singh claimed in *The Times of India*, there will be ‘a profound rearrangement of the world order’ during Trump’s term as the West’s social liberalism has ‘succeeded to the point of hubris and corruption’ compromising the West’s ‘economic and social vitality’. That is the major reason why voters were ready to ‘put America first’.²⁴ Moreover, according to Singh, globalization has ‘empowered existential enemies of the West while suppressing the organization and ability of the West to outcompete these enemies’, and ‘pandering to Islamists and totalitarians at the cost of democratic, secular, free republics’ has caused Brexit, Donald Trump, and also Narendra Modi to occur.²⁵ Singh’s view concurs widely with the views of the Indian media sources analyzed here.

Pankaj Mishra analyzes the development of anti-liberal movement in the West and describes how it was believed that liberal capitalism would create a global middle class with ‘bourgeois values’ and ‘democratic virtues’. However, it has resulted in quite the opposite, ‘the creation of a precariat with no clear long-term prospects, dangerously vulnerable to demagogues’. Mishra joins numerous other political

¹⁵ Singh, H. (2016b).

¹⁶ Aiyar (25.12.2016).

¹⁷ Deo (2018).

¹⁸ For example, the former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal (2016) in *The Hindu*; see also Noora Kotilainen in this volume.

¹⁹ Srinivasan and Vasudevan (2014).

²⁰ Srinivasan (2017).

²¹ Merchant (2014).

²² For example, Aiyar (2016a); Singh H. (2016b).

²³ Aiyar (2016a).

²⁴ Singh (2016a); see also Narang (2015).

²⁵ Singh (2016b).

commentators in India in that Western liberalism has caused its own demise.²⁶ However, despite the overwhelmingly pessimistic views of the West's status quo, the Indian media examined here do not seem to hold the West to be morally inferior to India but in many areas quite the opposite. The West is commended and considered a model for and a promoter of a plethora of important policies and values such as the human rights, gender equality, effective economy, transparency, globalization, and science. This certainly reflects the socioeconomic and cosmopolitan backgrounds of journalists and guest writers in the English-language media in India. Their views do not reflect the majority of Indians, nor do they reflect the wide nationalistic conservative population more critical of the West.²⁷

Another, and perhaps a more fundamental reason why the West is seen to be in crisis in India, is the essential quality of liberalism in terms of the economy, which has given birth to a world order where free trade flourishes and innovations flow freely around the globe. This process has led to the developing countries emerging economically and is bound to lead to the rest of the world catching up with the West.²⁸

Plenty of articles in the Indian media envision the opportunities the weakening of the West provides to Asia – and India in Asia. As the West faces 'a civilizational crisis', it is time for the strongly competitive Asian economies to rise. China is portrayed as having already 'destroyed' American industry and 'challenging American military supremacy' together with 'the White Man's dominance'. This, according to the Indian view, is curiously something 'deeply pleasing' to Western liberals.²⁹ Aiyar repeats the common message in the Indian news media that the West's 'unseen bonanza' of 150 years is over, and although colonialism and industrial revolution gave the West a head start, Asia is catching up. India might be economically far behind China – let alone the West – but optimistic views interpret the situation meaning that India has 'growth potential' as India's age structure predicts its workforce to continue to increase at least until 2050–2060.³⁰ According to Indian views, the West attempts to solve the Asian challenge by reverting to protectionism, undemocratic populism, border walls, and ethnofundamentalism.³¹

Judging from the Indian media, the global pendulum is swinging East, but for Indians it seems to be disquieting that the precise direction of the pendulum is China, not India.³² Although China and India are in decent relations, China is viewed as India's biggest strategic challenge, if not a threat and a 'natural adversary'.³³ Not the least because of the potential of China's *One Belt One Road* project which is something India has been mostly critical of.³⁴ Some see that together China and India could become a significant force to make international institutions such as the World Trade Organization to further liberate trade.³⁵ However, the United States and Japan are eager to assist India to balance China's influence in Asia, and although India and China are cooperating on many levels, there are cultural and geopolitical differences that make India seek stronger partnership with the West.³⁶

To counter China's military power – which Modi euphemistically refers to as an 'absence of an agreed security architecture' in Asia – and its economic dominance, Indian pundits are eager to emphasize that India is the largest, liberal, and most powerful non-Western democracy in the world. India might have its flaws, they say, but its system of governance is still far better than China's. Moreover, India through Modi has been eager to state that its outlook of the world's major challenges coincides with those of the West. For example, Modi has repeatedly announced that the top three concerns of India are terrorism, climate change, and isolationism. Incidentally, China has announced similar concerns.³⁷

²⁶ Wade (2018).

²⁷ For example, Pew Research Center (2017).

²⁸ See for example Dadush and Shaw (2011) and Looney (2014).

²⁹ Singh H. (2016b); see also Merchant (2014).

³⁰ Aiyar (2016b).

³¹ Aiyar (2016a, b).

³² However, e.g. Stuenkel (2016), 195, suggests that predictions about China replacing the West in economy and military are wrong because power is too dispersed globally to allow such imperial constructions anymore.

³³ Pant (2016), 14; Bayineni (2016), 124; Chandra (2017), 108; Ramani (2016), 31; see also Babu (2016), 154; Mahalanobis (2016), 1. However, there is a minority of Indian thinkers who suggest that 'India and China need to partner to set up a new world order'. Also, Bayineni (2016), 124, describes how Nehru saw China as 'a natural friend, close to India, as both nation states had just fought off imperialism'.

³⁴ For example, Park and Singh (2017); Ministry of External Affairs (2017).

³⁵ Bayineni (2016), 140; see also Itty (2014); Panda (2016); Nayar and Paul (2003), 19.

³⁶ Chandra (2017), 108; Uttam and Kim (2018), 16; Hettiarachchi and Abeyrathne (2015), 344–345.

³⁷ Mishra (2012), 34–36; Sidhu et al. (2013), 6–7; Inkster (2018); see also Chaturvedi (2009), 25. Modi has spoken about his visions, for example, in the World Economic Forum in Davos and to the US Congress in Washington. See for example Government of India (2016); Modi (2018).

In India, as well as globally, ‘democracy’ often means a democratic system favoring economic liberalism. This interpretation is quite evident in Modi’s vision where India is to take part in the world and to have the world come to India, mainly by investing in India. In this sense, India adheres to what can be called the dominant Western liberal economic and democratic model.³⁸ Democracy-wise India is actually faring relatively well for a developing country when compared to India’s positions on other global indices (e.g. freedom of press, GDP per capita, happiness) where India is in the bottom one-third of the world. But in democracy, India is among the world’s top one quarter, not quite developed enough to be included in ‘full democracies’ with the Nordic countries and states like Canada but categorized in the second level with countries like the US, Japan, and Latvia.³⁹

Thus, one can detect a proud tone of enlightened geopolitical abstinence in the Indian media when its foreign policy writers state that although India is a ‘liberal democracy’, it refrains from the Westerns-style military democracy promotion outside of the nation’s borders.⁴⁰ This policy can be seen in India having refrained from many recent UN human rights declarations and sanctions, and not taking part in international military interventions.⁴¹ This principle is actually one of the rare political stances quite unanimously respected in India regardless of the political party. Even Pankaj Mishra, who is often fiercely critical of Indian foreign policies, agrees with this one. However, he sees the abstinence laudable for a quite different reason than the Indian media and the foreign policy strategists in India do: Indian ‘democracy’ is in such a bad state that it would not be morally right to enforce it outside of India.^{42 43}

The Hindu Nationalist India as a Model

According to Srinivasan and other critical voices in the Indian media, current Indian politics has been ‘prone to glorify the Indian past and assert the superiority of Indian “spiritual” culture over “materialist” Western civilization’. It has caused Indians to imagine a ‘political unity of the country and an all-India consciousness from the earliest of times’, mixing mythology and history.⁴³ These Hindu nationalist visions are a major ideological battle fought in the political arena, and they reflect strongly in the news media.⁴⁴ Quite often, promoting Hindu nationalism gathers momentum by criticizing and protesting against various ‘Western influences’ such as shopping, gaming, or Valentine’s Day, or liberal attitudes on sexuality and gender such as public kissing, women entering temples, homosexuality, and so on. Even raping women has been seen as a Western import or caused by the use of Western attire.⁴⁵ The Hindu nationalist critique of Western culture crystallized in the statement by the Chief Minister of Gujarat. According to him, as Indians have ‘surrendered mentally and politically to Western values’, values ‘rooted in Indian culture and tradition’ had to be revitalized.⁴⁶ Mishra views this sort of anti-Western, nationalist nostalgia as a ‘bizarre lurching between victimhood and chauvinism’. To him, Hindu nationalism stems from the frustration ambitious Indians feel when their demands for higher social status are not met by Westerners.⁴⁷ The relatively liberal English-language Indian media examined here share some of the viewpoints of Hindu nationalist albeit with a significantly milder overtone. Moreover, the media are quick to criticize what they interpret as strong Hindu nationalist agenda and thus eager to call out anything they feel are illiberal nationalistic acts.⁴⁸

Hindu nationalism is similar to many other right-wing nationalist movements in encouraging economic protectionism, border security, and one national religion.⁴⁹ In this context, *The Times of India*, albeit often rather supportive of Modi, calls him rather sarcastically ‘the Hindu nationalist hero’ fighting for ‘an authentic *Bharat*’ (India’s Sanskrit name) against foreign-educated and cosmopolitan Indians.^{50 50}

³⁸ Sidhu et al. (2013).

³⁹ Helliwell et al. (2018); World Press Freedom Index (2018); GDP Ranking (2018); Democracy Index 2017 (2018). India is scoring higher than, for example, European countries such as Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary.

⁴⁰ Srinivasan (2017).

⁴¹ Wojcieszewski (2016), 109–111; see also Peetush and Drydyk (2015).

⁴² Mishra (2012), 49–50.

⁴³ Srinivasan (2006); see also Vijay (2010); Malik (2017).

⁴⁴ Alyssa Ayres, a South Asia specialist at the US Council on Foreign Relations, describes the Hindu nationalist project in a positive way, as ‘a quiet but important shift’, signaling that India is ready to describe its own identity and expects the rest of the world to respect its determination. See Ayres (2018), 43.

⁴⁵ For example, *Hindustan Times* (2018), *The Times of India* (2015), Lewis (2009).

⁴⁶ Vaidya (2017); see also Vinod (2016).

⁴⁷ Mishra (2017), 265.

⁴⁸ *Hindustan Times* (2017a, b), Desai (2015), Viju (2016).

⁴⁹ Mandalaparthi (2018).

⁵⁰ Ghose (2017).

Modi himself is reported claiming that *Hindutva* is an inclusive ideology which the whole humankind – not just the nation – can relate to, because it treats it as a family. Hence, Modi thinks Hindu nationalism is actually a valuable tool in foreign policy.⁵¹ This certainly appeals to Modi's voter base, but his domestic challenge is to be the prime minister of all Indians.⁵² The opposition is constantly criticizing his Hindu centrism, and as the political Right is demanding constitutional changes such as the removal of the secularism clause, the opposition is eager to warn Indians how the government 'will tear the constitution' and make India 'a Hindu Pakistan' if Modi is to win again in the elections of 2019.⁵³

Criticism against Modi's *Hindutva* ideology might be exaggerated at times, but since Modi's election in 2014, Hindu nationalism has been on the rise, and there have been more anti-minority (anti-Muslim and -Christian) sentiment and violence. Critics of Modi have even claimed that this development is in contradiction of India's foreign policy aspirations to be a stabilizing force in the region.⁵⁴ However, as Modi's rhetoric aimed at international audiences takes place in a different realm than the narratives deployed in domestic politics, Modi can apply a more geopolitically pragmatic and Hindu-inspired but not Hindu nationalist narrative for the international audience while his domestic policies can have a more Hindu-centric stance.⁵⁵ In other words, Modi brands himself as a liberal cosmopolitan with slightly exotic Indian flavor to the foreign press, and as a conservative reviving Hindu traditions to his domestic followers. In a way, Modi's *Hindutva* is thus banalized and Westernized for foreign policy use and Hinduism is harmoniously and almost unnoticeably conflated with India.⁵⁶

However, Modi's Hindu nationalism is not merely a rhetorical device. For example, Modi's Minister of Culture, Mahesh Sharma, appointed a 14-member academic committee to 'help the government rewrite certain aspects of ancient history'. Knowing that Mr. Sharma is a dedicated follower of *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS), the right-wing Hindu nationalist organization behind Modi's *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP), and that the committee is a part of a larger attempt to reinterpret Indian history to prove its 'Hindu essence', the project is most likely more ideological than scientific. Sharma was even quoted to say that the new version of Indian history will eventually prove that 'Indian culture' existed already 12,000 years ago. The committee was also said to replace the contemporary theory about central Asian populations migrating to the area of present-day India and mixing with the local populations 3000–4000 years ago. To renew a theory might not be so alarming if the result of the research came *after* the process, not before it as a given aim.⁵⁷

Shiv Visvanathan, a professor at Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, presented a wider progressive stance in the lead article of *The Hindu* claiming that the marriage of religion and nationalism in India 'has led to a decline of the political debate'.⁵⁸ According to Mishra, India has never been closer to 'making India a land of the Hindus'. Modi's neo-Hindu devotees and his government move 'decisively against ostensibly liberal and Westernized Indians', who are seen as 'Trojan horses of the West' to be 'purged from Indian institutions'.⁵⁹ Even the Constitution is in danger to be changed to reflect Hindu nationalist Indian values.⁶⁰ There is a growing sentiment that the secularist influence of the Congress party had, for decades, deteriorated the interests of the Hindu majority in India.⁶¹ Hindu nationalism is a powerful and lucrative political tool as it draws on the idea of 'one religion – one country' being the solution to unify a country. Moreover, like nationalism elsewhere, *Hindutva* is fueled by its rejection of foreign influence. According to the ideology, India is potentially rich but because of the reverberating effects of colonial history and national disunity caused by religious, ethnic, and cultural differences, India has remained a third world country. *Hindutva* sees India as an essentially Hindu culture, and its proponents assume that materializing *Hindutva* as a political reality would make India powerful,

⁵¹ See for example the interview by Kuber (2014) entitled after Modi's claim according to which his 'Hindutva face will be an asset in foreign affairs'.

⁵² Adeney (2015), 30.

⁵³ In the words of Congress representative Shashi Tharoor quoted in the interview by *The Economic Times* (2018); see also Anand (2007), 259. Changing the constitution was also discussed in a wide array of newspaper articles such as Singh, P. (2016c), Ashraf (2017), Puniyani (2018).

⁵⁴ Mandalaparthi (2018).

⁵⁵ Diwakar (2017), 24.

⁵⁶ Jaffrelot (2013), 82–83; Nanda (2011), 139–143; Rao (2018), 171–172.

⁵⁷ Jain and Lasseter (2018). It should be noted that the majoritarian Hindu nationalism is not exclusive to BJP voters, but a large proportion of Congress voters support it as well. See Nanda (2011), 159.

⁵⁸ Visvanathan (2016).

⁵⁹ Mishra (2017), 162.

⁶⁰ *The Times of India* (2017); *Hindustan Times* (2017a, b).

⁶¹ Ayres (2018), 20. See Kailash (2017) for an analysis of the BJP and electoral politics in India.

wealthy, and united as well as give it a supreme role in the international arena.⁶² However, even Hindu nationalists welcome economic growth caused by India taking part in the global liberal order, and they seem to widely accept the logic of the market economy behind it, and thus endorse economic liberalism more or less explicitly.

Indian politicians, and especially Modi's government, reproduce the idea of the future world order as a macro-version of the ideal image of India. The world would be a hotpot of languages and ethnicities, formally secular but encouraging people's wide range of religiosity. India's long history of being a diverse society is seen to give India the credibility to be a mediator between the West and the East, and as a model for different countries – democratic and less democratic – in the developing and developed world.⁶³ In a way, this vision is the liberal ideal of multiculturalism, a sort of meta-utopia where a diverse, heterogeneous population can form different groups with their own values, and the role of the government is to uphold the legislative structure designed to allow citizens liberty in economy, ideology, creed, and so on.⁶⁴ However, this India would have a Hindu-centric default setting, emphasizing ideas that are seen as historically based on Hindu tradition. Such hopes for India's future role in the world order are tangible in this Denmark-based Indian journalist's view where the West is applauded for its technical solutions and India for more spiritual qualities:

Whilst living away from India we can see the beauty of our heritage and how it has helped enrich the West with vegetarianism, yoga, Ayurveda, astrology, to name a few. At the same time, we can also appreciate the western way of life, the ease of travel and services [...]. India is now working hard to improve its living standards, and by using western technology together with its ancient knowledge, there is no doubt that India will soon become the best of both worlds.⁶⁵

In India one does not have to be a fervent nationalist to think that the ancient Hindu scriptures are applicable in modern times and/or contain ideas and wisdom that were progressive and tolerant even by contemporary standards already millennia ago. Whether it is the Hindu epic *Rig Veda*'s 'modern progressive ethical message',⁶⁶ early 'Hindu scientists' solving the 'mysteries of the cosmos and mathematics',⁶⁷ or Buddha's 'proto-democratic values',⁶⁸ many Indians believe that not only was ancient India an advanced society but it was even up to par when compared with societies today. It is certainly true that Indians were at some point ahead of the West in science (astronomy, math, medicine), but the nationalist narrative often supported by Indian journalists seems to suggest that even though in many measurable aspects, India is lagging behind the First World, it can use its 'ancient wisdom' to 'revitalize', and eventually even surpass the 'decadent West'.⁶⁹ For *Hindutva* proponents, Indian society was democratic and pluralistic a long time before the West, and now this latent potential is believed to materialize if Hindu traditions are observed more closely.⁷⁰ However, there are many, usually progressive and cosmopolitan Indians who shy away from these nationalist historical interpretations, not the least for political reasons as it is Modi's party and RSS who are the most eager to reproduce them. To Gautam Adhikari, the executive director of *The Times of India*, this kind of thinking is 'irrational infantilism', 'aggrieved nationalism', and 'anti-Western righteousness'.⁷¹

In international forums, Modi's *Hindutva* ideology has more lenient manifestations. When he spoke at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2018, he described India as an investment destination for those who want 'wealth with wellness and peace with prosperity'. He went on to describe how India is 'selflessly' helping other countries and has even fought wars *without* strategic interest. India, according to Modi, is also against climate change, because in Indian culture, Nature is treated as people's mother. Hence, India is willing to take lead in mitigating the effects of climate change.⁷² One of Modi's first international achievements was the International Yoga Day.⁷³ According to him, yoga is 'India's gift to the world' and 'one of the most precious gifts given by the ancient Indian sages to humankind' as the

⁶² Wojciewski (2016), 181, 202; Chatterjee Miller and Sullivan de Estrada (2017), 36–38.

⁶³ Wojciewski (2016), 146; Tharoor (2007, 2012); Mishra (2012), 40.

⁶⁴ See for example Nozick (1974).

⁶⁵ Mishra (2016); see also Wojciewski (2016), 181; Nayar and Paul (2003), 3.

⁶⁶ Ghose (2015).

⁶⁷ Vijay (2018); see also Katju (2014a, b).

⁶⁸ Khobragade (2016).

⁶⁹ Mishra (2017), 163–165.

⁷⁰ For example, Viju (2016); see also Vijay (2012); Wojciewski (2016), 208; Ayres (2018), 38.

⁷¹ Adhikari (2014).

⁷² Modi (2018).

⁷³ Chatterjee Miller and Sullivan de Estrada (2017), 43.

‘world could be united through yoga’. To Modi, yoga represents India’s growing soft power.⁷⁴ Promoting yoga goes well with Modi’s Hindu-centric rhetoric of India as the ‘World Guru’ and India as ‘destined to work for the welfare of the world’.⁷⁵

In the same vein, Ramgopal Agarwal, the author of *India 2050: A Roadmap to Sustainable Prosperity*, estimates rather optimistically that in 10–20 years in a ‘post-western economic world’, there will be a shift from ‘conflict/violence mode to harmony/nonviolence mode’. According to Agarwala, ‘western civilization has conflict at its core’, and this conflict happens in many fronts such as between different nations, religion and science, labor and capital, men and women, humans and nature. In contrast, he claims, ‘Asian civilizations have been guided by the principle of underlying harmony behind apparent conflicts’.⁷⁶ Apparently, in this ideal version of democracy there would be no need for interest groups negotiating – sometimes even fiercely – on common resources. As harmonious and promising as this may be to many, it is also a vision that does against the grain of perhaps a more Western idea of democracy where interest groups debate about social issues whereas harmony connotes something totalitarian like uncritical obedience or forced submission.

In the nationalist narratives promoting India as a model to the world, ‘Western’ technology, statecraft, and science are embraced but somehow merged with ‘eastern’ culture, morality, and spirituality, resulting in a superior combination producing ‘a healthier, happier, and more purposeful life than what the western civilization has produced so far’.⁷⁷ According to Meera Nanda, India is becoming more Hindu as it globalizes, and Hindu nationalists celebrate an India that is ‘barely a couple of decades away from becoming the Number One in everything from IT, science, [...] technology, higher education, medicine, economy, culture, and of course spirituality’.⁷⁸ Perhaps it is too obvious to mention that the narratives about the spiritual and harmonious Indian spirit ignore many shadowy sides of India’s history and contemporary social problems in caste, gender, human rights, and health. Plenty of articles examined here contrast the nationalist romanticism with India’s problems. As *The Times of India* article noted, nationalists see:

no inconsistency of these aspirations vis-à-vis keeping the country carpeted with garbage and filth. What is more, we see no irony in our posturing before the world as a representative of a morally superior culture. We see no ignominy in accepting the state of our towns and cities, perennially tottering on the verge of epidemics. Our tolerance towards using the streets as toilets goes to show that we see little shame in accepting that people can live without basic dignity.⁷⁹

Indeed, in India, over 20% of the population still lives below the extreme poverty line. Most people in rural areas do not have toilets, pollution is a serious problem, and there is a lack of safe drinking water. Urban infrastructure is struggling to adapt to the influx of migrants from rural areas, and jobs are scarce for young people. The IT industry might be promising, but its domestic manufacturing is weak. Corruption is sapping growth, there is lack of transparency, the democratic structures are weak, and although the poor are the biggest voter group in India, they are ill-informed and vote for short-term benefits, if not for plain cash.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, Hindu nationalists either fail to acknowledge the discrepancy between their view of model India and the existing social problems, or trust that they are due to national disunity which should not obscure the fact that India, in essence, is a tolerant, pluralist, and pacifist nation, with morally advanced agency in global affairs as well.⁸¹ Quite accurately, Nanda refers to a study pointing out that Indians rank number one in the world in thinking they are number one in the world. She also notes that *Hindutva* is also supported by ‘Western Indophiles’ and scholars who are ‘critical of their own societies and looking at India to find options’. It is indeed common to observe Westerners and Hindu nationalist Indians together celebrating India as an essentially nonviolent society because of Gandhi and *ahimsa*, and

⁷⁴ Madan (2018); see also Ayres (2018), 62.

⁷⁵ Modi’s (2014a) Independence Day speech on 15.8.2014 transcribed by *The Indian Express*.

⁷⁶ Agarwala (2014), 214–215. See also Matti Puranen’s chapter in this book. Puranen shows how also the Chinese portray the West as a society of conflict.

⁷⁷ Agarwala (2014), 215.

⁷⁸ Nanda (2011), 154–146.

⁷⁹ Raghunathan (2010); see also Srinivasan (2017).

⁸⁰ Alam (2017), 287–288; Ayres (2018), 19; Gordon (2014), 207–208; Jouhki (2017).

⁸¹ Wojcowski (2016), 167.

a democratic state as per its ‘ancient Hindu essence’, or applauding India being so ‘tolerant in nature’ as its population comprises so many religions and ethnicities.⁸²

In a way, India is struggling with the dualism of its grand narratives, a pacifist, enlightened India ready to prosper and take lead, and a nuclear military power in internal social conflict struggling to secure the basic needs of a major part of its heterogeneous population. Nevertheless, there is no denying that India today is confident to take part and not simply react to global politics. For example, in climate negotiations, India has moved up to the group of agenda-setting states in the global climate change negotiations.⁸³ India is also using its economic power to develop militarily, and it has even sent probes to the moon and Mars – at a very low cost compared to Western space agencies.⁸⁴ But for India to be a world model, there is a long way to go. It is evident that India’s sages, yogis, and freedom fighters have inspired countless of people around the world.⁸⁵ However, they do not add up to a very significant global impact, as much as Hindu nationalists would hope them to do so.⁸⁶

India Will Not Change the Liberal World Order

Scholars in India see the emerging world order of the twenty-first century as multipolar, tripolar (India, China, and the US), apolar/nonpolar, or even bipolar with India and China in charge. Some envision a ‘multiplex’ order where power is distributed among many political entity networks on various levels.⁸⁷ Many politicians in India are enthusiastically predicting a post-American or post-Western global order and India in it as a ‘great power’, even a ‘super power’ or at least a regional hegemon. Some among the more liberal-minded commentators also lament India’s old ‘mistakes’ of not joining ‘the Democracies’, ‘the Free World’, or ‘the First World’ earlier when the West wanted it to adopt market economy, be a part of global institutions, fight communism, and promote democracy. In this narrative, India could have become the first ‘non-Western, liberal democratic, great power’ but it chose the costly path of nonalignment. The lesson of this interpretation of history is that if India will play by the norms of the liberal world order, it will become a ‘great power’ similar to the US very soon. However, it seems that India becoming a great power has for a long time been about to happen ‘very soon’ making it a perpetually impending, almost metaphysical idea.⁸⁸

On the other hand, there are views according to which the West’s liberalism has created its own crisis, so India should not take example from the West anyway. ‘Liberal’ is also a concept that allows multiple interpretations, most of them with negative connotations in India. For example, the old colonial powers are interpreted as being essentially liberal, and in that context, liberalism means oppression.⁸⁹ Liberalism also connotes individualistic values that lead to excessive freedoms such as promiscuity, abandoning of traditions, and anti-collectivist action endangering conservatism. Interestingly, communism which is viewed as illiberal in the West is viewed as a liberal ideology in India, because communists criticize all sorts of conservative phenomena such as caste ideology and arranged marriage. Moreover, as liberalism is almost always accompanied with the image of a morally dubious West, it is a value that the conservative majority of India is vigorously against. Because of this connotative baggage, it is a concept often avoided even among its endorsers in India.⁹⁰

In practice, liberalism in India materializes particularly in international trade and domestic economic policies rather than in liberalizing the traditional values of the people. India is poor, and to get wealthier, it needs to create jobs. The more liberal its financial regulations become, the easier it is to do business in India, and the more employment is likely to emerge. India has indeed increased its position in global trade quite significantly, and most major corporations in the world have businesses in India. Yet, many feel India’s economic boom has not resonated enough in its global status. Like many emerging countries, India also remains wary of ‘Western dominance’ in international organizations and is prone to counter that power and the related moral authority through organizations such as BRICS, and by

⁸² Nanda (2011), 151–156.

⁸³ Ayres (2017); see also Narlikar (2017), 102–105; Chaturvedi (2009), 15.

⁸⁴ Ayres (2017).

⁸⁵ Modi (2011, 2014b); Alam (2017), 287; Mishra (2017), 120.

⁸⁶ See for example Stuenkel (2016), 66–67; Sullivan (2015).

⁸⁷ Buraga (2016), 5813–5814; Stuenkel (2016); Acharya (2017), 1; Acharya (2014).

⁸⁸ Mishra (2013), 70–71.

⁸⁹ Ayres (2017).

⁹⁰ Madan and Friedrich (2017); Mishra (2012), 40. Subrata K. says there is a “bumpy cohabitation of Hindu nationalism and India’s liberal democracy”. See Mitra (2016), 100; also Srinivasan (2017); Mishra (2012), 41.

demanding membership in the G7 or UN Security Council.⁹¹ In BRICS, India is certainly taking part in some diffusion and decentralization of global power, but the world seems to remain stubbornly (neo)liberal, and Western-centric, particularly in terms of finance and military hegemony.⁹² As Stuenkel notes, ‘emerging powers agree with fundamental issues such as international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, and the rule of law’ because ‘it was this rules-based and relatively open order that significantly contributed to their phenomenal economic rise over the past sixty years’.⁹³

Hence, India’s counter-hegemonic actions remain mostly on a rather symbolic level as it has no Asian alternative to the ‘Western-dominated values-based liberal system’.⁹⁴ In fact, the Indian government has been known for wanting to take part in preserving, strengthening, and only slightly reforming the existing global institutions, and accommodating itself within them with a higher status it feels it has deserved.⁹⁵ Both India and China might talk about ‘changing the rules of the game’, but it certainly does not mean rejecting the growth-oriented market economy.⁹⁶ Actually, instead of hoping that India will change the world order, many Indians fear that their country will be shunned by the new populist and protectionist Western order parting from global liberal ideals.

In the media, India is often portrayed as convincing the world of its importance in world politics by referring to its population and area size, its material resources, significant geopolitical location, and the strong civilizational heritage predating Western achievements. Hindu nationalism takes these commonly shared ideas further. In its narrative, India is morally and spiritually superior, and its Hindu values will eventually spread out to the world. They will compensate for – if not replace – Western values that are seen overly rational, materialistic, and even destructive. In this respect, Hindu nationalism does not differ from any other nation’s rhetorical self-confidence. It produces a consistent and revered history with a traceable origin of its ‘people’, and outsiders whose influence needs to be mitigated if not rejected. It imagines an unbroken chain of national tradition and reproduces a myth of a unified collective of superior people that ‘conceals that nations are inherently fluid and contentious entities’.⁹⁷

However, India cannot shake off the West from its self-image however self-reliant or Hindu nationalist its narratives are. According to Mishra, India understands itself ‘through the eyes of the West’. There are institutional spaces such as think tanks, learned societies, initiatives, and conferences in the West that guide India to see itself as a potentially great power, and address its shortcomings, and prospects ‘on its great power trajectory’. Applying what I would call a neo-Saidian critical view, Mishra sees all the policy papers, books, and popular articles aiming at ‘truly understanding India’ to serve the global liberal economy that regards Indian past ‘as a deficit period’ that should be ‘swiftly compensated by efforts of its business leaders, young entrepreneurs and new strategists’.⁹⁸ Hinducentric nationalism is certainly worth worrying about among the non-Hindu minorities in India, but it is of little concern to the world order because, as *The Diplomat* observes, ‘[e]ven with the most ardent Hindu nationalist prime minister in office, Indian foreign policy will be driven by economic growth and preserving national security’.⁹⁹

It seems that, at the moment, India is rather happy to be in the company of Western nations. In that sense, the ‘crisis’ of the West does not seem that critical from the Indian viewpoint. It looks more like a temporary recession of hegemony – even a branding glitch – or, at most, a slight power downgrade not significant enough to cause the West (namely, the US) to lose its global power position. When looking for solid clues of a downturn – let alone a civilizational collapse – in the Indian media, there are none despite all the dramatic warnings that in the end seem more like gleeful anecdotes of the embarrassing troubles of the old colonial West than verification of its actual downfall.

⁹¹ Alam (2017), 287; Wojczewski (2016), 9, 142–143; Ayres (2018), 7–11; Gordon (2014), 207; Sinha (2016), 2.

⁹² Juutinen (2017); Stuenkel (2016), 21–22, 63–65; Mishra (2013); see also Jaffrelot and Sidhu (2013), 334; Kurečić and Bandov (2011).

⁹³ Stuenkel (2016), 184.

⁹⁴ Srinivasan (2017).

⁹⁵ Even President Obama stated that India is ‘taking its rightful place in Asia and on the global stage’. Mishra (2013), 82 citing an article by Rahi Gaikwad in *The Hindu* in November 7, 2010; Sidhu et al. (2013), 9; see also Shahi (2014), 18.

⁹⁶ Kähkönen (2013); Stuenkel (2016), 198.

⁹⁷ Wojczewski (2016), 162, 239; see also Nayar and Paul (2003), 3, 9–11; Anderson

⁹⁸ Mishra (2013), 29, 78–79.

⁹⁹ Panda (2014).

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