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1. Introduction

Employment is becoming less secure. In the wealthy economies of the Global North, the traditional permanent job from which a worker could expect to earn a living wage over years or decades has become scarce, while short-term, unpredictable and poorly paid positions have proliferated. Labeled as "precarious" work, these jobs are widely viewed as either symptoms or causes of rising inequality, poverty, and reduced economic and social mobility. Precarity is often associated with non-standard work contracts, but it is not necessarily the outcome of non-standard employment, and not all standard jobs are secure. While there are many forms of precarity, we are concerned most centrally with employment precarity, or who bears the risk in an employment relationship: a precarious worker's livelihood is more likely to be at the whim of her employer, who may choose to unilaterally and arbitrarily discipline and dismiss her, or alter her terms and conditions of employment.

This is a book about efforts by workers and labour unions to contest the expansion of precarious work. Trade unions once effectively regulated employment in ways they no longer effectively do, for most people. Many scholars diagnose unions as more a part of the problem than a part of the solution, arguing that they often promote the job security of their 'insider' core members at the expense of 'outsiders' (e.g. Hassel, 2014; Rueda, 2014). We recognize that unions sometimes accede to employer demands to shift jobs to precarious contracts and deregulate labour markets; or neglect the interests of precarious workers. However, these exclusive strategies are rarely sustainable in the long term. Where core workers do not show solidarity with vulnerable workers, they often undermine their own bargaining power through creating lower cost competition. Ensuring equal treatment for all workers, particularly those in unstable work, is essential to the long term viability of the labour movement. The chapters show that labour unions increasingly seek to regulate precarious work and represent precarious workers, both to protect their members from low cost competition and following from broader commitments to equity and social justice. Our central concern is to better understand the conditions under which they succeed in these objectives.

The empirical focus of this book is European industries and workplaces. Western European unions and social democratic political parties in the past succeeded in establishing a high degree of solidaristic and

encompassing employment regulation supported by a diverse range of national and sectoral institutions, while in Eastern Europe state-socialist regimes ensured widespread stable employment. While many of these institutions have been formally preserved, globalization, changes in technology and skills and the integration of markets have made capital less dependent on national labour markets, and weakened unions' bargaining power in their traditional strongholds. A free market ideology of policy making in Europe has driven a shift away from traditions of social regulation and toward neo-liberal employment deregulation. Reduction in social protection is argued to enhance social inclusion through fostering the participation of vulnerable groups in the labour market. . Those countries most affected by austerity measures, including those in southern Europe, have experienced especially severe degradation in the quality of jobs without (yet) the promised job creation effects (Heyes 2013). The chapters demonstrate that these factors are associated with expanding options for employers to use precarious work in a range of industries, but also to declining labour power to contest these measures and their negative effects on the core workforce. In this sense, there is no distinct precariat, as a class in itself (as, for example, Standing 2011, would assert), as the condition of precariousness is one shared in greater or lesser degrees by workers generally.

In this introduction, we develop an original framework to explain why unions are more or less successful in containing the spread of precarious work, defined in terms of both non-standard contracts and insecurity across different aspects of employment. It can be applied to analyze the reasons for variation in the extent of precarity in employment contracts and relationships across different time periods, in different countries, or in different industries. We argue that precarious work is both an outcome of and a central contributing factor to mutually reinforcing feedback relationship between labour market and collective bargaining institutions, worker identity and identification, and employer and union strategies. Where employers are better able to exploit institutional exit options and divisions in the workforce, they are increasingly likely to seek cost containment and control via precarious employment relationships. The most compelling and consistent finding from the case studies examined in this book is that unions' success in responding to these challenges depends on mobilizing power resources derived from inclusive institutions and inclusive forms of worker solidarity.

The framework we develop builds on academic discussions of institutional change, dualism, and precarious work from three broad research traditions: comparative political economy, critical sociology, and comparative employment relations. We review this literature, outline our framework, and then discuss the chapter findings with reference to the framework.

2. Past research on precarious work: three traditions

2.1. Comparative political economy debates: dualism and liberalization

The first perspective we draw on is the comparative political economy (CPE) literature; particularly the recent debates on institutional change and dualism in coordinated models of capitalism. This literature treats nations as coherent political-economic systems, which can be systematically categorized based on their economic structures and institutional characteristics.

In the CPE literature on national models of capitalism, 'Social Europe' was held out as the standard-bearer of a region with well-functioning non-market institutions that appeared to balance equity with efficiency, containing trends towards expanding inequality evident elsewhere in the a post-Bretton Woods global economy. CPE scholars seeking to explain Europe's relative success at normalizing economic equity and social solidarity typically start with national archetypes formed from the 1950s

through the 1980s. National systems were each unique, but nonetheless fell in common patterns. 'Neocorporatist' systems, such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Benelux, and the Nordic countries, were characterized by centralized, tri-partite bargaining that supported competitiveness through promoting wage restraint (Katzenstein, 1985; Schmitter & Lehmbruch, 1979) and labour cooperation in industrial adjustment (Zysman, 1983).

The varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature adapted these arguments to explain why employers continued to benefit from different institutional arrangements under intensified globalization in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Liberal market economies (LMEs) like the US generated high levels of precarity, due to employers' reliance on highly flexible labor markets, short-term capital investment, and market-based skill provision; while coordinated market economies (CMEs) such as Germany and the Nordic countries enjoyed less precarity due to lead firms' reliance on long-term labour cooperation, 'patient' capital, and high levels of industry- and employer- specific skills. Under coordinated capitalism, employers and investors may not have exactly supported inclusive institutions, but at least they did not fight back against their creation as long as they derived some benefits from these arrangements.

Since at least the early 2010s, CPE scholars have largely retreated from claims that social European institutions are stable and resistant to trends of market liberalization observed elsewhere in the world. Precarious work has grown sharply in all European countries, reflecting common trends of union decline, weakening employment protections, deregulation of industry, and growing inequality (Kretsos & Livanos, 2016). Germany now bases its export regime on cheap labour while retaining high-value added production in its old 'core' industries (Baccaro & Benassi, 2016). At the same time, European countries have sustained many of their protective institutions, including often high collective bargaining coverage and inclusive social insurance systems. Meanwhile, trade unions are seeking to adjust their strategies to mitigate or contest expanding precarity under increasingly diverse competitive conditions and with shifting configurations of power resources.

In broad terms, the current CPE literature views the expansion of precarious work in the coordinated economies of Western Europe as a symptom of the declining coverage of coordinating institutions. However, scholars disagree on whether these trends result in the general liberalization and weakening of labour market and collective bargaining institutions (Baccaro & Howell, 2011; Streeck, 2009, 2016) (Add B&H 2017; Paster 2013) or in their sharp dualization (Palier & Thelen, 2010; Rueda, 2007, 2014). The former dynamic increases uncertainty for all workers, while the second protects the security of labour market insiders at the expense of outsiders, who bear increasingly high levels of economic risk.

The dualism thesis shows most continuity with the VoC framework. Dual labour market arguments assume that the institutions of coordinated market economies continue to support competitive advantage with high pay and job security – although only for a decreasing circle of firms and workers in high-value added production. Those workers and firms have built productivity alliances, which shelter the position of the core workforce in stable jobs at the expense of precarious and unemployed workers. This drives a process of dualization, whereby policies 'increasingly differentiate rights, entitlements, and services provided to different categories of recipients' – allowing insiders to maintain good terms and conditions, while existing and new categories of outsiders experience declining pay and security (Emmenegger, Hausemann, Palier, & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012: 10). Unions are often implicated in dualizing strategies, as they cooperate with employers and Social Democratic political parties to preserve the status of insiders, who are more likely to be union members, while permitting the deregulation of institutions and bargaining arrangements that protected service workers, subcontractors, and nonstandard employment contracts (Rueda, 2007). Close ties between capital and unions often support

the global competitiveness of large firms in export sectors, by reducing the cost of services, and of low-skill activities in the production chain. Unions use their increasingly constrained power resources to shore up pay for their members, at the expense of more vulnerable workers (Hassel, 2014; Palier & Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 2012).

In contrast, CPE scholars associated with the liberalization thesis view dualism (where it occurs) as a temporary state or 'way station' on a trajectory toward convergence on market liberalization – associated with a more general decline in labour power and union influence (Baccaro and Howell 2017). Their arguments draw more heavily on the power resources school of the CPE literature typically associated with Korpi (1978 and 1983), which traces Europe's coordinating institutions to capital's historic compromises with strong and militant labour movements rather than employer interests. As globalization frees capital from its dependence on labour or the nation state, 'unruly' employers grow increasingly aggressive and creative in seeking to escape from institutional constraints (or 'relentlessly whacking away at social rules') – even in the high skilled 'core' sectors of the economy (Streeck 2009: 241).

We can draw useful insights from both recent veins of the CPE literature. Comparative research findings demonstrate a common trend of institutional change and expanding precarity across Europe, including in the post-communist CEE countries (Bohle & Greskovits 2012). They document the insider-outsider political dynamics associated with the shrinking scope of the core workforce, particularly in manufacturing sectors in Germany and other Bismarkian welfare states. This helps to explain the challenges unions face in expanding their representation domain to new groups. They also provide differentiated analyses of how national collective bargaining structures and the structure of welfare states influence these political dynamics. One set of arguments in the dualism literature holds that the spread of precarious work is more likely to be contained where institutions are encompassing across, and support coalitions between, lower productivity, lower wage service or non-traded sectors and high productivity tradable or high value-added sectors (Martin & Swank, 2012; Thelen, 2014). CPE researchers broadly agree that these conditions have been most stable in (at least some of) the Nordic countries, resulting in greater continuity in policies and union strategies promoting social solidarity and reducing inequality (Emmenegger et al., 2012). According to scholars associated with the liberalization thesis, this may be traced to residual (if ultimately declining) union power (Baccaro and Howell 2011) or more balanced 'growth models' in these countries that depend on the export of knowledge-intensive goods and services (Baccaro and Pontussen 2016).

However, the CPE literature has fewer tools to analyze the reasons for different (more encompassing) union strategies in different contexts; or the conditions under which unions change their approach to outsiders, particularly as the core workforce continues to shrink. Union strategies focusing on insiders may be self-defeating, particularly where the skills and productivity of the precarious workforce is similar to the core. The CPE literature's focus on lead industries and national political coalitions means that it has less sensitivity to (or the empirical tools to evaluate) these strategic interactions between labor and employers at firm or industry level, particularly as regards the expansion of precarious work. Its methodological nationalism leads to the neglect of trans- and supra- national actors and institutions, such as multinational companies and the European Union. Labor is also assumed to be national in outlook and organization – and its challenges as well as resources for pursuing collective action are conceptualized in national terms. This gives the CPE literature few tools to analyze the institutions and interests promoting dualism, liberalization, or, alternatively, worker solidarity and re-regulation, that emerge within or between national systems.

2.2. Critical sociology literature: identity, subjectivity, and solidarity

The comparative political economy literature provides useful tools for analyzing how dualization or liberalization dynamics create precarity. However, CPE scholars typically approach these two trends from a standpoint of mechanical institutionalism and economic rationality, with no systematic analysis of how the interests of different groups are constructed. They typically only mention in passing the overlap between labour market segments and identity-based categories, such as ethnicity, gender, nationality, immigration status, and class. The analysis of social identity and social boundaries is more centrally the focus of the critical sociology literature (Bonacich, 1973; Castles & Kosack, 1973). This literature provides in many ways a mirror of the strengths and weaknesses of the CPE dualism literature, producing more differentiated analyses rooted in the experiences of precarious workers within workplaces and industries, but with less developed theorization of how these experiences are embedded within, or influenced by, political-economic institutions. Because critical sociology is a large and diverse field, we focus on two related streams of research focusing on labour market segmentation and on the social construction of precarious employment.

The analysis of how social boundaries between groups are constructed and maintained has been a central concern of critical sociologists studying labour market segmentation or dualism. One influential framework is Bonacich's (1973) 'split labour market' hypothesis, which addresses social boundaries that derive from ethnic antagonism; and in which both employers and 'insiders' are of one race or ethnicity while 'outsiders' are of another. Bonacich was concerned with ethnic groups that were able to exploit their dominant position to exclude competitors from the core labour market and thus maintain their above-market wages, at the expense of both the subordinate group and employers. In her schema, ethnicity is a strong source of solidarity; however, relationships and constructions of racial groups are dynamic, and change over time. Employers may come to an accommodation with higher paid groups, or attempt to undermine them by introducing workers from the lower paid group into jobs where they can compete with the higher paid groups.

Thus, a split labour market based on ethnic differences may benefit "insiders" at a moment in time, but splits are fragile. Outsider groups may undermine the insiders as competitors and strike breakers, but they may also take the political approach of social protest. Research in this tradition has shown that labour markets are not only split into core and periphery, but also segmented in complex configurations between groups with differentiated access to various jobs (McCollum & Findlay, 2015). Groups reinforce and protect their own access to certain labour market segments through ethnic or gendered ties and reinforce employer perceptions of groups of workers belonging to a certain nationality, ethnicity, or gender as being suitable for certain kinds of work. For example, McKenzie and Ford (2009) describe how employers come to regard workers in lower (more vulnerable) labour market segments as "good workers" mainly because these will accept lower pay and are more readily exploitable.

A second stream of the critical sociology literature focuses on the social construction of precarious employment. Research in this tradition has analysed the cultural and ideological frames that legitimize precarity (Vallas, 2015) as well as the subjective experience of precarious work. Vallas and Prener (2012) describe a complex interplay between structural and discursive influences that shape the ways in which workers think about and experience the employment relationship. Precarious work reflects not only the workplace, but also the larger society: cultural and ideological processes affect public views concerning which working arrangements or conditions are accepted or not. For example, Hatton (2011) shows how the US temporary staffing industry successfully used "cultural representations" in their campaigns to legitimize agency work. Thus, groups of outsiders in precarious jobs internalize the employers' value systems and become self-disciplining – for example, via discourses praising "self-entrepreneurship"

(Murgia and Pulignano 2016). One vein of this literature examines the construction of precarious conditions as normal or standard in certain forms of highly skilled and creative employment, such as musicians (Cornfield, 2015; Umney & Kretsos, 2015) or high tech workers (Lane, 2011) – with workers coming to view themselves as entrepreneurs responsible for marketing their skills and talents.

The critical sociology literature provides distinctive tools for analyzing the factors driving the expansion of precarious work, as well as the role of precarious workers in reinforcing or combating this expansion. It adds attention to how broader societal divides by ethnicity and gender can exacerbate the interest-based dynamics of insider politics; while developing differentiated frameworks for analyzing the forms social boundaries can take. Critical sociology also provides concepts that are useful for analyzing the basis for collective action in segmented labour markets. It suggests that constructing (or reconstructing) solidarity between protected and precarious groups not only requires common interests, but also often requires overcoming ethnic divides within split labour markets to establish a broader group identity and shared ideology. For example, Virdee (2000) charts unions' progress in the UK, from attempts to exclude ethnic minority workers from labour markets to more inclusive strategies that embrace multiculturalism.

This literature also has limitations, particularly in application to comparative research. Most studies in this tradition are based on in-depth case studies of a particular group of precarious workers, from which general propositions or arguments are derived. This gives good detail on local context, but less insight on the interaction between the institutions of the political economy and the strategies of actors and organized interests within different institutional systems. While the CPE literature is centrally concerned with how institutions construct interests and power relations between groups, these relationships receive less attention in critical sociology. There is thus little guidance concerning the conditions under which employers would seek to cooperate with their core workforce or exploit segmented labour markets; or when unions are more or less likely to adopt inclusive strategies. Researchers instead posit different configurations of outcomes (employers may exploit outsiders or use them to undermine core conditions – minority ethnic groups may serve as strike breakers or form broader social movements) without specifying the contextual conditions under which different outcomes are expected. This is because researchers often view hegemonic hierarchies of power relationships among the social classes of a society as the key explanatory variable. Thus, power is embedded in class position, ethnic group privilege, or hegemonic discourse, rather than following concretely from institutions in the political economy – unions, labor laws, and collective bargaining and welfare state institutions.

2.3. Comparative employment relations

The comparative employment relations literature can be placed between the comparative political economy and critical sociology traditions, with researchers drawing on theory derived from both literatures to analyze different aspects of precarious work. In common with CPE, and in contrast with the critical sociology literature, comparative employment relations is centrally concerned with how institutions influence patterns of inequality and precarity. The focus, however, is on the employment relationship rather than national models, or state-society relations. This has led scholars to analyze the local dynamics of interest (and at times identity) construction, which are central concerns of critical sociologists. Power relations at this level are also more directly the focus of empirical study compared to either of the other traditions. These are manifested in micro-relations that are generally influenced by societal conditions, but which can also be determined by a wide range of specific contingencies, such as the actions of organizations and individuals. Agency comes to the fore much more frequently, as decisions on human resource policy, firm and union strategy, and collective bargaining play crucial roles in the outcomes of specific cases. Compared to CPE, comparative employment relations has a more

differentiated analysis of sector-, firm- and shop-floor level developments, with a focus on the strategies and power resources of employers and unions (Bechter, Brandl, & Meardi, 2012). In addition, these scholars increasingly take an international frame for analyzing multi-level relationships between industrial relations actors – in the case of Europe, integrating attention to EU-level institutions and processes (Marginson & Sisson, 2004)¹.

We can identify two main areas of empirical focus in the comparative employment relations literature on precarious work: the analysis of employer strategies to exploit different forms of precarious work via organizational restructuring and strategic benchmarking; and the analysis of union strategies to respond to this increasing fragmentation of the workforce through alternative patterns of action or strategy.

First, employment relations researchers have analyzed the impact of employers' strategies on collective bargaining institutions – and union power within those institutions. At the national level, employers and their associations may publicly lobby for the deregulation of nonstandard contracts or collective bargaining rules (Kinderman, 2005, 2016). At sectoral level, employers' associations introduce alternative membership forms that do not bind their members to collective agreements, and provide advice and legal resources that allow them to adopt non-standard contractual arrangements (Andersen & Arnholtz, 2016; Haipeter, 2011). At firm level, employers increase their use of outsourcing, subsidiaries, and temporary agency work, with the common effect of undermining solidaristic bargaining structures by intensifying worker-to-worker and inter-firm competition across new market-mediated boundaries (Doellgast and Greer 2007; Greer and Doellgast 2017; Marchington et al. 2005). These relationships have been analyzed across a wide range of industries, including (as just a few examples) auto manufacturing (Greer & Hauptmeier, 2015), construction (Lillie & Greer, 2007), health care (Greer, Schulten, & Böhlke, 2013)(Hebson, Grimshaw, and Marchington 2003), telecommunications (Doellgast, 2012; Holst, 2014), call centres (Batt, Holman, & Holtgrewe, 2009; Taylor & Bain, 2004), and privatized service industries (Hermann & Flecker, 2013)(Grimshaw, Rubery, and Ugarte, 2015).

A second area of research focus has been union strategies toward precarious work, including their response to employers' restructuring strategies. As in the CPE dualism literature, some research finds unions drawing their circle of insiders ever tighter as they come under pressure from employers, introducing two-tier agreements and temporary work, and agreeing to lower wages and conditions for 'outsiders' (Lillie, 2012). However, this exclusionary strategy is not found to be the predominate one (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011; Heery, 2004). Case studies examine how unions overcome divides and rebuild encompassing bargaining (Benassi & Dorigatti, 2015; Turner, 2009), adapt traditional channels of social dialogue to ally with diverse civil society organisations and public agencies (Grimshaw et al. 2016); or seek to restructure their own organizations to promote greater strategic coordination in campaigns targeting core and peripheral employers (Holtgrewe & Doellgast, 2012). Research findings suggest that union success in organizing and representing the interests of precarious workers is influenced in part by the institutional environment in which unions are embedded and from which they derive their resources (Boxall, 2008); but also by unions' strategic choices concerning how they extend their existing representational structures (Simms, 2017).

Comparative employment relations' most significant contribution to understanding precarious work is to provide detailed and differentiated analyses of the micro-politics associated with the expanding or contracting precarity of employment contracts. At the national or sectoral level, findings suggest the importance of inclusive institutions, deriving from some combination of labor and state power to extend

¹ This is most comprehensively exemplified by Marginson and Sisson 2004, although the introduction of multi-level elements has now become common.

institutional protections from stronger to weaker groups of workers: including uniform minimum wages, state action to extend collective agreements from well-organized to less well-organized sectors and workplaces, and universal welfare state protections that are redistributive and that raise the 'social wage' (Bosch et al., 2010; Doellgast, 2012; Hermann & Flecker, 2013); Grimshaw et al. 2016).

At the firm or workplace level, researchers also have mapped combinations of power resources worker representatives employ as they respond to pressures for labour market segmentation. Studies in multinational firms have shown that local unions' structural power, rooted in firm and workplace structures, market conditions, and technology; and associational power, rooted in the resources and capabilities unions develop through collective organization, can explain differences in concession bargaining or flexibility-security trade-offs in different national settings (Pulignano, Doerflinger and De Franceschi 2016; Pulignano & Keune, 2014). At the same time, local actors must also have the capacity to use the available power resources, or deploy them in a particular bargaining context (Fairbrother, Lévesque, & Hennebert, 2013; Lévesque & Murray, 2013; Pulignano & Signoretti, 2016). Thus, there is an iterative feedback relationship between power and strategy. Marginson (2016: 1048) argues that this is associated with significant sub-national variation in protective institutions, or a "patchwork of various forms of regulation, whose contours reflect the outcome of contestation between a range of actors in which power resources are differentially distributed".

Employment relations scholars' focus on the industry, firm, and workplace levels means that they tend to place less emphasis than the CPE literature on how configurations of national institutions are established or sustained – for example, through coalitions bringing together different configurations of state actors, representatives of capital, and major labour unions. However, they have a more sophisticated understanding of how capital and labour interacts below or beyond the national level. This results in more differentiated analyses of the conditions under which unions and employers oppose or reproduce dual labour markets; and of employers' expanding capacity to evade formal regulations. While CPE emphasizes the (potential) compatibility between employer collective interests and those of certain unions and state actors, comparative employment relations is more skeptical, usually regarding labour-management cooperation as directly tied to industry- and firm-specific union capacities (e.g. Doellgast, 2012; Lillie & Greer, 2007).

Perhaps the most universal insight or conclusion from these studies, drawn across a range of contexts, is that the analysis of unions' power resources provides a more robust set of conceptual tools for explaining variation in precarious work in contemporary European workplaces, vis-à-vis theories or frameworks focusing on alternative employer interests such as VoC or national production models approaches (Mrozowicki, 2014; Wagner, 2014; Wagner & Refslund, 2016). Employment relations scholars present a more grounded, industry- and organizational- perspective on the micro-politics of institutional change that is particularly sensitive to the multi-dimensional nature of this labour power – as well as to the limitations of state action to contain employer exit from coordinating institutions. Thus, dualization is viewed as a temporary state, as unions either devise strategies for organizing and representing precarious workers, or fail to do so and eventually lose influence entirely as precarity expands. This critique of mainstream CPE shares much in common with the recent liberalization vein of this literature (Streeck 2016; Baccaro and Howell 2017); but is more optimistic that unions can access or build alternative power resources outside of its traditional coalitions with segments of capital at national level.

Much of the comparative employment relations literature is in the structuralist institutional tradition, and thus it has less developed frameworks for analyzing worker identity and identification compared to critical sociology. Many scholars do attempt to grapple with the role of ideas, ideology, and identity (Hauptmeier & Heery, 2014) – particularly in explaining how unions develop alternative approaches to organizing precarious workers. For example, researchers have explained the encompassing strategies of unions in southern European or Nordic countries (compared to more insider-focused strategies in center Europe) with reference to their stronger class- or society-based ideologies (Benassi & Vlandas, 2016; Hyman, 2001); or as resulting from the intersection between union identity and their members' interests (Dorigatti, 2016). Research on international union campaigns describes 'identity work' as important in building solidarity among labour representatives in multinational firms or within global unions (Greer & Hauptmeier, 2012). Recently, comparative employment relations has given more attention to the subjective experience of precarious work – how attitudes toward unions among different groups of workers, for example, are shaped by their past experiences and interactions (Alberti, 2014; Berntsen, 2016; Mrozowicki, Karolak, and Krasowska 2016). However, this is still a developing area of research, and somewhat outside of the mainstream of employment relations scholarship.

The comparative employment relations literature's sensitivity to the multi-level relationships between institutional context, power, and actor strategies also means it has been less successful than CPE and (at least some) critical sociologists at generating parsimonious arguments. Most research is based on empirically rich matched case studies, within one or several industries, which can limit generalizability. The diversity of forms of precarity studied, and factors found to contribute to it, make it difficult for inductive analysis to draw out common trends across countries and sectors. Scholars have tended to cobble together theoretical propositions from other literatures to explain heterogeneous patterns of empirical findings, or to poke holes in their simplifying propositions or frameworks without proposing alternatives.

In sum, comparative employment relations research cumulatively provides significant insight into the conditions under which unions are more or less successful in sustaining or re-building the collective, solidaristic institutions capable of reducing precarity in labour markets. However, there is a need to condense these insights into a more easily generalizable framework, to provide an alternative to those from comparative political economy or critical sociology.

3. Our framework

In the following sections, we develop an original framework for analyzing the factors associated with the expansion and collective regulation of precarious work. This framework draws on the insights from the above three literatures. We also seek to overcome their major limitations, with the aim of producing a robust set of propositions concerning the conditions under which collective action aimed at containing or contesting precarity can occur and be successful. Our focus is on labour unions but extends to other worker representatives, such as works councils or collectives. Our main units of analysis are industries and organizations, reflecting our grounding in the comparative employment relations literature; though we assume that institutions and actor strategies at these levels are significantly embedded in and influenced by national and (within Europe) EU-level institutions.

Our central concern is with how labour's power resources to represent precarious worker interests are generated and deployed. We argue that two key variables support labour power: first, the presence of inclusive institutions that encourage coordinated bargaining and constrain employers' ability to shift

work to precarious contracts or employment relationships; and, second, forms of worker identity and identification promoting inclusive solidarity among different segments of the workforce. This connection between macro-institutions and micro processes of worker solidarity distinguishes us from the national focus in the comparative political economy literature. It also gives us a distinct perspective on the political dynamics associated with restructuring and product market changes across countries, sectors, and firms. We seek to develop a more cohesive and parsimonious framework to make sense of these relationships, with two objectives. First, our framework provides a roadmap to communicate the insights from comparative employment relations research to a broader audience – including CPE and critical sociologists. Second, it provides an original organizing model to guide future research on precarity and institutional change – including, but not limited to, the employment relations field.

We place precarious work at the center of our model. This is because we view the expansion of precarious employment (and its contraction or re-regulation) both as an outcome and as a factor that drives subsequent changes in institutions, actor strategies, and worker attitudes or identity (Wilkinson 2013). The first section below thus provides a comprehensive definition of precarious work, which encompasses its different dimensions as analyzed in the chapters in this book.

In the following sections, we then develop our original framework, breaking our analysis down into two parts. The first addresses the problem of explaining how differences in the regulation of precarious work, once established, are sustained over time. Here we model two ideal types, which we label a 'virtuous circle' characterized by high and expanding employment stability and security across an economy or industry; and a 'vicious circle' characterized by high and expanding precarity. The second part of our analysis addresses the problem of explaining how economies or industries move from a situation of low to high precarity and vice versa. Here we introduce factors outside of our ideal type models that encourage a shift in their component parts.

The development of our ideal type models draws on past literature from the three traditions discussed above; while the analysis of change in institutions and actor strategies draws on the chapter findings from this book. Through presenting both a relatively static and a more dynamic version of our framework, we seek to do justice to both the ways in which institutional and market structure constrain power and shape action; as well as the conditions under which labour can challenge these structures through developing and accessing new power resources.

3.1 Precarious work

Past researchers have defined precarious work or precarity in the labor market in a number of different ways. Precarious employment is often associated with non-standard employment contracts, such as temporary or marginal part time work. Regulators use derogatory contracts to deregulate standard employment, by allowing employers to by-pass the job security provision which protect the 'standard' workforce. Despite the clear association of non-standard work arrangements with precarious work, non-standard contracts are not necessarily synonymous with precarity. Highly skilled or unionized workers may enjoy security working for temporary agencies or as self-employed, and 'standard' employment contracts can be insecure, depending on their regulation and associated social security rights (Vosko, MacDonald, & Campbell, 2009). Most definitions contextualize precarity more broadly. For example, Standing (2011) defines precarity as a social category in which seven forms of security are absent: labor market, employment, job, work, skill reproduction, income, and collective representation and voice. These conditions overlap with aspects of low quality or 'bad jobs' – defined in opposition to high quality jobs in increasingly polarized employment structures (Kalleberg, 2011).

Precarious employment also relates to a worker's subjective experience of uncertainty and insecurity within a given labor market. One of the most commonly cited definitions for precarious employment is Kalleberg's (2009: 1): work that is "uncertain, unpredictable, unstable and risky from the point of view of the worker" (emphasis added). Workers' subjective experiences are central to how precarity is defined and analysed in critical sociology – with a focus, for example, on how individuals experience different dimensions of insecurity, and its broader effects on their identity within particular social or institutional settings (Almanno and Murgia, 2013; Murgia and Pulignano, 2016). Along these lines, Waite (2009: 416) refers to precarity as "life-worlds... inflected with uncertainty and instability", while Leroy (2015) defines precarity as a form of subjugation and (self)-government, where subjects are subsumed into normative political and economic calls of flexibility, mobility, affective and creative work. Subjective precarity is a manifestation of a workers' experience of objective precarity; while subjective precarity can also cause objective precarity by redefining power relations between labour and capital.

The above discussion suggests that precarious work is not an absolute category but to some extent is relational -- relative to workers' expectations and past experience, or to the standard employment relationship in the worker's country, industry or social milieu. Particularly important here is whether a worker has previously experienced, and then lost or given up, more secure employment with good pay and conditions. Kalleberg and Hewison (2013) describe precarious work as a process rather than "a binary state" — marked by a shift in power between labour and capital, and mediated by the state and its policies. The critical sociological literature adds the insight that additional mediation occurs via a cultural and ideological framing process. Precarious work reflects not only the workplace, but also larger society: cultural and ideological processes affect public conceptions of work, and shape what is accepted and not.

We draw on these definitions in our framework and analysis. We base our definition of precarity on two basic dimensions: First, nonstandard employment contracts or employment relationships; and, second, the economic conditions and welfare protections (either general to the economic, or specific to the workers' job market) that compensate more or less for a lack of formal protections. Other factors, such as migration status, may also interact with contracts or protections to shape outcomes; but we have sought to focus here on dimensions that are evident in every employment relationship. Both can be observed via objective, comparative measures, but also are also subjective in that they are relative to other employment contracts and conditions in a given workplace, employer, sector, or country.

The first dimension of precarious work is characterized by nonstandard contracts and employment relationships. Precarity typically increases where there is a shift away from standard contracts and employment relationships to nonstandard contracts and employment relationships. This may involve temporary, self-employed, freelance, or even part time contracts. Work may also shift from large firms to subcontractors or from public to private sector organisations, both of which typically have weaker collective representation (Marchington, Grimshaw, Rubery, & Willmott, 2005) and more market-based employment terms and conditions (Weil, 2014).

The second dimension of precarious work is characterized by employment instability and insecurity, which encompasses variability of income, job security, social status, and career progression. Precarity increases on this dimension when these employment conditions are eroding. This dimension of precarious work can apply to both standard and nonstandard employment contracts and employment relationships, as well as to skilled and unskilled workers - where each group experiences growing insecurity across one or more of these areas. Increased precarity may also relate to decreasing access to

welfare protections, which decreases the reservation wage and makes transitions between jobs less secure.

We model configurations of precarious work along these two dimensions as follows:

Figure 1. Dimensions of Precarious Work

| | Economic stability and/or strong welfare provisions | Economic instability and/or weak welfare provisions |
|--|---|---|
| More contractually (or legislatively) protected employment | <p>Quadrant 1 Stable and secure jobs for workers on standard contracts</p> | <p>Quadrant 2 Insecure, unstable jobs for workers on standard contracts</p> |
| Less contractually (or legislatively) protected employment | <p>Quadrant 4 Stable and secure jobs for workers on nonstandard contracts</p> | <p>Quadrant 3 Insecure, unstable jobs for workers on non-standard contracts</p> |

Precarity is lowest when employees are in contractually protected jobs in an economically stable environment with strong welfare protections (Quadrant 1). Expanding precarity in European countries often involves growing worker insecurity due to economic instability and cuts in the welfare state, as well as an associated increase in non-standard contracts with insecure and unstable terms and conditions of employment, as firms use their increased relative power to shift rising economic risk to workers (Quadrant 3). However, in other contexts, other combinations of these conditions apply. Workers with standard employment contracts may also become increasingly insecure due to possible firm closures and mass redundancies, and shrinking social spending (Quadrant 2). This dynamic has been observed over a range of industries, from expanding service industries such as telecommunications and call centers (Doellgast, 2012; Holst, 2013) to traditional sectors such as auto assembly (Greer & Hauptmeier, 2015).

In some contexts, workers may be less protected contractually (for example, if their job market involves taking gigs or project work), but may receive a steady stream of income because their situation is economically stable, or there are strong social protection mechanisms (Quadrant 4). The 'flexicurity' model, often argued to be characteristic of Denmark (Viebrock & Clasen, 2008), seeks to achieve this in the context of high union density and extensive bargaining coverage in the temporary agency sector (Benassi & Vlandas, 2016). Although nonstandard contracts usually increase insecurity and instability, governments and unions often seek to compensate for these effects by regulating them in ways which


make them more comparable to standard employment relationships – for example, through equal pay rules for temporary contracts (Adams & Deakin, 2014) ‘and more inclusive eligibility conditions for employment and social protection (Grimshaw et al. 2016) Greer et al. (in the current volume), find state mechanisms to achieve this in the music industry, where most work comes in the form of unpredictable temporary gigs. In this way, precarity can be reduced within a firm or sectoral labor market without necessarily moving work back to standard, permanent contracts within core firms.

3.2 Two models: low precarity and high precarity

As described above, the first problem we address concerns how differences in the regulation of precarious work, once established, are sustained. Put another way, we seek to explain why similar kinds of jobs, with roughly equivalent skill levels and technology, are characterized by different patterns of precarity or employment stability – either across countries and industries or at different points in time. Drawing on the comparative employment relations literature, we model these outcomes as following from alternative ‘ideal type’ sets of conditions linking institutions (inclusive vs. fragmented welfare state, labour market, and collective bargaining institutions), employer strategies (voice- vs. exit-oriented), union strategies (inclusive vs. exclusive), and worker identification and identity (solidaristic vs. particularistic). These are linked in self-reinforcing positive feedback loops, in which each factor serves to reinforce the others, largely through their role in shaping the relative power resources of capital and labour. Precarious work itself is at the center of the model, as a factor that can serve as a resource for employers to exploit; a wedge dividing groups or workers or encouraging exclusive union strategies; and a source of systematic inequalities in countries or industries undermining broad support for encompassing institutional arrangements.

Our first model presents a ‘virtuous circle’ in which four factors contribute to reducing precarious work in a mutually reinforcing feedback loop: inclusive institutions, inclusive worker solidarity, voice-oriented employer strategies, and inclusive union strategies (Figure 2).

Figure 2: The 'virtuous circle' associated with sustaining low levels of precarity



We define institutional inclusiveness, following Bosch, Mayhew, and Gaudié (2010: 91), as the degree to which welfare state protections, labour market legislation, and collective agreements extend the pay and conditions secured by employees having relatively stronger bargaining power to those with weaker

bargaining power. More inclusive welfare coverage is characterized by broader formal eligibility criteria and lighter obligations relating to eligibility (Berclaz et al. 2004). Comprehensive coverage of welfare state protections, such as unemployment insurance, health insurance, or income protection during retirement, can affect subjective insecurity (Carr & Chung, 2014) as well as workers' dependence on employers – and thus their countervailing power in the employment relationship (Korpi, 1978). Encompassing labour market legislation takes such regulatory forms as high minimum wages; employment protection legislation; legal restrictions on the use of temporary staff; equal pay rules for temporary and part time staff; and paid parental and sick leave. These measures improve job security, as well as pay levels and working conditions at the bottom of the labor market (Adams & Deakin, 2014).

Encompassing collective agreements can substitute for or complement legislated protections. They extend the protective frameworks enjoyed by workers in strong labour market positions to those in weaker positions. The degree of inclusiveness of a collective agreement is typically assessed in terms of the extent of bargaining coverage; as well as bargaining coordination, or the extent to which 'minor players' (such as company level managers or union representatives) adhere to agreements reached by 'major players' (such as peak associations) (Hall & Gingerich, 2009). Coordination in bargaining can be an explicit goal of peak business and labor associations or the state; or can be achieved through pattern agreements at large firms or in leading industries. Bargaining coverage and coordination are traditionally compared at industry and national level, but can also vary across firms' (increasingly vertically disintegrated) production chains (Benassi, Doellgast, & Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2016). Legal extension of collective agreements to cover entire industrial sectors is the primary mechanism in many countries for ensuring that collective agreements are encompassing, preventing firms from legally paying below wage rates in those agreements.

The second factor contributing to a virtuous circle is patterns of collective identification or consciousness within the workforce that are conducive to inclusive worker solidarity. We define worker solidarity as the adherence to principles and patterns of behaviour that support mutual aid and collective action; particularly those that concern labour union strike and bargaining strategy. Solidarity can arise out of objective realities and pre-existing human relations, but can also be (strategically) (re)constructed; indeed this is considered by many scholars as one of the major purposes of trade unions (Hyman, 2001). We define solidarity as "inclusive" if it is amenable to redefinition to include new groups of workers, particularly those in disadvantaged positions in terms of social rights and their position in the production process. Patterns of worker identification associated with exclusive forms of solidarity, from our perspective, are those that are difficult to redefine to include new groups of workers. These may be based in strongly held shared interests and identities. For example, highly skilled professionals, or members of an ethnic or migrant group, may have strong solidarity within their groups, but not with non-members. Worker identification can also take on a decidedly non-solidaristic form, based on narrow individual aspirations or more entrepreneurial identities.

Fantasia (1988) makes the point that the process of moving from having common interests to understanding them as common and acting on them is filled with contingency. In describing a wildcat strike that he observed, Fantasia (1988: 88) remarks, "solidarity among the workers was not an a priori 'fact', but grew out the interactive processes among the workers in their confrontation with management." Solidarity emerges in specific contexts, out of circumstances creating common interests or perceptions that norms have been violated, as well as frames and narratives which shape a common understanding of the appropriate remedial action to take. Both exclusive and inclusive solidarity can be a formidable source of countervailing power, and mobilized by unions to achieve significant gains via strikes and collective bargaining. However, even dominant groups that are able to control the labour

market at one point are vulnerable to employers introducing groups to the labour market to break their monopoly (Bonacich, 1973). Exclusive practices and narratives create a path dependency which make it difficult to change to inclusive solidarity when it becomes strategically necessary (Penninx & Roosblad, 2000b).

In contrast, inclusive worker solidarity is grounded in broader forms of collective identification that involve forming common cause across groups holding diverse material interests and identities. Banting and Kymlicka (2015: 1) argue that “the claims of solidarity require individuals to tolerate views and practices they dislike, to accept democratic decisions that go against their beliefs or interests, and to moderate the pursuit of their own economic self-interest to help the disadvantaged.” Inclusive solidarity is a commitment to establishing common interest with other worker groups who may hold more or less power in a labour market or production process.

A feeling of common identity and purpose is an important basis for solidarity, which is very much mixed up with class, but it is not identical to it. Although embedded in various pre-existing sources of identity, there is also a strategic aspect to how unions construct identities and “build solidarity” in ways that maximize leverage given existing political and economic opportunities. Workers are best served in terms of collective power by organizing into the kinds of structures best suited to giving them leverage over employers. This logic is not always the same, and can even contradict, the logic of solidarity arising from pre-existing identities (Lembcke, 1988) - for example, it has often been the case that when immigrants enter the labour market, unions have tried to exclude them from membership, and have lost leverage as a result (Virdee, 2000). Solidarity is thus a question of worker identity, ideology, and personal narratives, as much as it is one of organizations, interests and institutions. Because pre-existing forms of identity may not be those best suited to exerting leverage over employers, unions often engage in identity work to build and rebuild solidarity (Greer and Hauptmeier 2012); the project of building inclusive solidarity to extend representation to precarious workers is frequently one of identity reconstruction.

Inclusive institutions and inclusive worker solidarity both serve as resources that enhance union power. Wright (2000) and Silver (2003) distinguish between associational power, derived from workers’ collective organization, and structural power, derived from workers’ distinctive skills, tight labour markets, or location in a key industrial sector. Employment relations scholars, drawing on social movement theory, typically describe a third dimension of institutional power, which concerns unions’ position within existing institutional arrangements that are themselves the product of historic power relationships, contestation, or coalitions (Brinkmann and Nachtwey 2010). We view structural power as an important concept for understanding differences in worker capacity to contest precarity across industries and workplaces, as well as for explaining change over time in this power. Indeed, those workers most vulnerable to precarity may be seen as those possessing systematically weaker structural power. However, this can be viewed a constant or external condition in modeling positive feedback loops associated with sustaining strong or weak regulation. Thus, we focus here on institutional power and associational power – which can be traced directly to encompassing institutions and inclusive forms of worker solidarity.

Institutional power may be derived through participation in institutions such as sectoral or tripartite bargaining (Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013), or, more broadly, from labour market protections, welfare state support, and collective bargaining rights. Institutional power is strongest where institutions include unions in formal platforms, where they can secure agreements and extend them to different groups in the labour market (e.g. tripartite agreements, sectoral agreements,

company-level agreements). Encompassing bargaining is particularly important for institutional power, as it allows unions to negotiate these agreements with less fear of employer exit.

Associational power is defined as the resources and capabilities unions develop through collective organization (Kelly 1998). One indicator of associational power is union density, but worker attitudes and union commitment are also crucial to mobilize workers for collective action. It is thus grounded most directly in worker solidarity. This is because power in collective bargaining negotiations depends on the capacity to strike, and the economic leverage of the strike 'weapon'. This is the case even though the strike weapon is rarely used: it nonetheless hangs as a threat over every collective negotiation, and determines the power relationship between actors (Hicks, 1932). This leverage, in turn, depends to a large extent on the degree of solidarity among workers, who they include as members of their community of fate, and what norms justify or mandate their collective responses. Inclusive forms of worker solidarity grounded in more broadly collectivist forms of identification provide associational power at a broader scale than the workplace or identity group (e.g. industry, national, or across a production chain). This serves the economic interests of workers, which in turn shores up the organizational stability of unions (Zhang & Lillie, 2015).

Strong institutional and associational power resources encourage more inclusive union strategies concerning approaches to represent and organize different groups of workers. These emphasize extending welfare state coverage and employment protections across the workforce, and/ or pursuing solidaristic bargaining across groups of workers having different degrees of labor market power (Schulten, 2002). Unions may also be less likely to oppose the shift of work to non-standard contracts or employment relationships where these are regulated or employment conditions protected: due to encompassing welfare state protections and collective agreements. For example, in a comparison of local government outsourcing in four European countries, Grimshaw et al. (2015) showed that unions were more willing to cooperate with outsourcing where workers in core and peripheral jobs were protected by strong labour market rules setting high wage floors and employment protections.

Institutions and solidarity intersect in shaping the broader alliances of cooperation that are forged across different unions and other worker representatives (such as works councils); between labour and civil society organizations; and across different worker groups (e.g. migrants and non-migrants; workers in standard and non-standard employment relationships). Where collective bargaining coverage is high and strongly coordinated, this provides a platform for cooperation among worker representatives in different (potentially competing) sectors and workplaces. Every industrial relations system has its own divides or competitive relationships within the labour movement, falling along industry and sector lines, or along ethnic, ideological, or craft divisions. Bargaining structures that include these groups within a common union or confederation -- or with centralized coordination by strong unions -- may more effectively bridge these potential divides (Gordon, 2014; Oliver, 2011; Thelen, 2014). At the same time, workers themselves have to be willing to support 'solidaristic bargaining' within these structures, extending gains from core to peripheral workers (Baccaro, 2002). Research shows that unions' success in promoting the inclusion of migrants depends in part on the legitimacy they derive from the broader activism of the migrant rank and file (Connolly, Marino, & Martinez Lucio, 2014; Marino, 2015); which may be best supported by decentralized bargaining and strong union presence in the workplace (Marino, 2012). Institutional inclusion at industry level has been found to influence union strategy and success within countries in contesting precarious contracts or employment relationship. For example, Refslund (2016) compares four sectors in Denmark, and shows that unions were most successful in preventing segmentation based on migrant status in those sectors with high bargaining coverage.

Inclusive institutions and inclusive worker solidarity also constrain employer power, making it more difficult for them to adopt unilateral strategies to reduce labour costs or to employ precarious workers. Inclusive institutions prevent employers from exploiting exit options to avoid or re-negotiate internal employment relationships through shifting work to poorly regulated non-standard contracts or non-union subcontractors. Inclusive forms of worker solidarity have a related but distinct effect in reducing employer power to exploit divisions in the workforce – for example, based on occupation, workplace, ethnicity, or gender. Low access to precarious work in turn encourages voice-oriented employer strategies. We assume that employers may pursue a range of potentially contradictory objectives (e.g. to reduce labor costs while securing worker commitment) – but typically they seek to secure labour cooperation in the production process (Edwards, 2003). One way to secure cooperation is through real or threatened exit from internal employment relationships, via shifting production to non-union workers or those on precarious employment contracts. When they are constrained from shifting production, employers may instead seek to engage with labour through social partnership-oriented or corporatist channels of interest intermediation that rely on voice- rather than exit-based mechanisms. This is consistent with early arguments by CPE scholars such as Streeck (1991), who described Germany's dual apprenticeship training system, occupational labor markets, and industry-wide collective bargaining as "productive constraints" on employers, which allowed them to reconcile high wages and egalitarian social outcomes with (functional) flexibility and profitability. More recently, Benassi et al. (2016) show that incumbent telecommunications employers adopted cooperative approaches to restructuring (associated with less precarity) in those European countries that had established encompassing collective bargaining and high inter-union cooperation, both at sector level and across core firms and their subcontractors.

The factors outlined above constitute a mutually reinforcing positive feedback loop. Inclusive institutions directly reduce the incidence of precarious work and provide power resources to labour while constraining employers' ability to exploit exit options. These patterns of opportunities and constraints encourage inclusive union strategies and voice-oriented employer strategies. The strength and form of worker solidarity determines when unions have the associational power to enforce or defend existing encompassing institutions, to create new ones, or to undertake collective actions outside of institutional frameworks. Worker solidarity is stronger and more inclusive where there are more constrained possibilities for employers to exploit divides in the labour movement or among worker groups in the interest of reducing labour costs. These factors contribute to reducing the incidence of precarious working conditions and contracts. The contraction of precarity then further enhances worker solidarity, bolsters inclusive union strategies, closes off options for employers to segment work, and contributes to broad public support for encompassing institutions.

This 'ideal type' model describes more or less the dynamics of labour regulation within contexts such as national-sectoral bargaining. Some aspects of this 'virtuous circle' applied in most western European welfare states in the post-WWII decades, when precarious work was less prevalent. The 'normal' worker in the core jobs of the industrial economy worked full-time hours, was paid sufficiently to keep a family in a decent standard of living, and, to a greater or lesser degree, was protected against capricious discharge. Relatively strong unions and encompassing labour market protections sustained these systems even after the economic and political crises in the 1970s, which were followed by several decades of deregulation and steady union decline in the US and the UK.


Western European labour markets were never completely free from precarious employment, with often significant segmentation by gender and ethnicity. However, low paid, insecure work was the realm of young workers making their transitions into real jobs, women who would not normally be expected to support a family (Pfau-Effinger, 1998), or immigrants and ethnic minorities (Castles & Kosack, 1973). This

suggests that worker solidarity was never all-encompassing, and always had exclusive elements. At the same time, it is noteworthy that particularistic identities were often recognized as a threat to sustaining social democracy, and challenged by labour unions and workers themselves. The Nordic countries were particularly successful in the past in establishing inclusive welfare state protection and solidaristic bargaining structures that (at least superficially) overcame these divisions (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

In pre-1989 Central and Eastern European (CEE), state-socialist societies, a different set of dynamics occurred: but which are partially consistent with our model. In these countries, the state unilaterally enforced encompassing institutions based on universal welfare coverage and employment security, and state-owned firms adopted strategies prefaced on full employment with reduced (but not eliminated) differentiation in pay or conditions by skill or industry. Union membership was semi-obligatory or obligatory, and unions were required to be inclusive of all groups, as the arm and “transmission belts” of the communist party. Worker identification was assumed (and indeed required) to be broadly solidaristic -- at least within the state-socialist nation-state or east of the iron curtain. The main difference between a virtuous circle in the CEE countries and the Western capitalist welfare states were related to its sources, as a “compromise” between capital and labour was impossible in the context of top-down imposition of political and economic systems and the lack of autonomous interest representation of workers and employers. However, there was a similar effect of establishing strong and encompassing regulation, which maintained low levels of precarity – particularly in a relative sense as measured across groups of workers within industries and countries.

The process of expanding precarity takes the opposite form, as a vicious circle, seen in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3: The ‘vicious circle’ associated with expanding precarity



Here, fragmented institutions, characterized by less inclusive welfare state protections, weak labour market protections, and low bargaining coverage and coordination, are associated with high or expanding precarity. The deregulation of encompassing institutions has been generally linked with higher incidence of precarious employment contracts or relationships in cross-national or industry-based comparative research (Shire et al. 2009; Vosko et al. 2009; Hipp, Bernhardt, & Allmendinger 2015). Gaps in institutional coverage also affect patterns of inequality based on gender or ethnicity. For example, gender inequality in welfare protection (e.g. discriminatory eligibility rules that exclude short hours part-time workers) has been found to contribute to gender inequality in pay bargaining and to partly explain women's over-representation in low-wage employment (Rubery and Grimshaw 2011). Unlike the CPE dualism literature, we do not distinguish between more or less dualistic welfare states or collective agreements, based on their employment protections for different categories of workers. While these differences are relevant for patterns of inequality in the short-term, we view declining coverage of these institutions as broadly contributing to a dynamic of expanding precarity within the workforce as a whole, including in core workplaces enjoying formal job security protections.

Fragmented institutions produce a range of exit options, enhancing employer power to shift work to non-standard contracts or non-union subcontractors, or to leave collective bargaining arrangements altogether. These exit-oriented employer strategies take advantage of growing differences in pay and conditions across employee groups to leave internal employment relationships or renegotiate them under more flexible terms. A major comparative study of low wage service occupations in the US and five European countries showed that pay and working conditions were strongly affected by employers' capacity to take advantage of different institutional exit options to bypass employment standards (Bosch, Mayhew, & Gautié, 2010). These have been found to vary not only at the national level, but also at industry level; with existing exit options becoming increasingly accessible and attractive as employers face intensifying price competition (Jaehrling & Méhaut, 2012). Research has shown employers in a particular sector or area of work copy successful practices used by other employers to bypass collective regulation or introduce more precarious employment contracts (Holtgrewe, 2001). As this process of institutional isomorphism progresses, the cost of exit further declines due to well-developed subcontractor industries; and the benefits of threatened exit increase due to the downward adjustment of demands by internal workers (Benassi & Dorigatti, 2015; Eichhorst & Marx, 2011) (remove Benassi & Dorigatti; insert Doellgast & Berg). As such, employers play a key role in shaping the extent and character of precarious work, as well as the blurring of boundaries between protected and unprotected labour market segments (Rubery and Wilkinson 1994; Rubery 2015; Grimshaw et al. 2017).

One set of employers that have become particularly important in this dynamic are the staffing agencies and subcontractors themselves, who are often entrepreneurial in avoiding institutional constraints or exploiting gaps in regulations (Andrijasevic & Sacchetto 2016). Wagner and Lillie (2014) document the strategies of subcontractors in the construction industry to exploit poor coordination between EU-level and national regulation of posted work. Research in Europe and the US has shown that transnational staffing agencies take advantage of migrant workers' poor familiarity with local institutions and practices to tie them to short term and exploitative jobs, often constraining their ability to challenge the illegality of their employment conditions or to organize collectively to improve them (Samaluck 2016a; Verma, forthcoming).

Fragmented institutions may also (at least initially) encourage more exclusive union strategies. The CPE dualization literature has shown that under conditions of declining institutional coverage, trade unions (and works councils, where these exist) may be pushed by their members to focus resources on defending their own conditions and status – often at the expense of a precarious workforce (Emmenegger et al., 2012). However, employment relations research emphasizes that unions tend to

enter these coalitions from a position of weakness, with findings showing that they typically serve to further exacerbate competition between labour market segments and thus expose both groups to increasingly precarious conditions (e.g. Benassi and Dorigatti 2015). Thus, where workers focus on workplace- or firm-centric strategies to protect their jobs and conditions, this tends to result in further declines in union power across the sector or along the production chain.

Often what we might describe as exclusive union strategies are simply a result of unions focusing limited resources where they still enjoy some residual (institutional or associational) power (Frege 2004). For example, in a comparison of union strategies toward call center outsourcing in ten European countries, Doellgast et al. (2016) showed that unions more often agreed to large concessions on pay and conditions to bring work back in-house where they primarily or exclusively represented core workers, and where there was a significant wage premium relative to (largely non-union) subcontractors. In those countries where industry bargaining structures and labor market institutions were encompassing, unions had a more credible route to developed strategies that focused on 'bringing up the bottom' through bargaining and campaigning work. Exclusive union strategies that fall along lines of ethnicity, race, or nationality may be motivated by a narrow racism or chauvinism; but are often reactions to employer strategies aimed at exploiting these divisions. These exclusive strategies are also ultimately self-defeating: for example, major German construction union initially sought to combat employer use of precarious migrant workers through sending representatives to construction sites to ask for worker papers; which undermined efforts to build common cause with an exploited workforce (Lillie and Greer 2007).

Employers' segmentation strategies and exclusive union strategies together contribute to undermining existing or potential worker solidarity; particularly the more inclusive forms of solidarity built within and through encompassing collective bargaining. Instead, growing precarious work is accompanied by the expansion of more particularistic forms of worker identity and identification. One form of particularistic identification is along the lines of ethnicity or migrant status. Research in the critical sociology tradition finds that ethnic groups in ethnically segmented labour markets become the "good workers" they are expected to be, taking pride in their endurance of privation (Caro and Lillie, forthcoming); while new arrivals may strategically use positive views of their work ethic to access entry-level precarious jobs (Samaluk 2016b). Workers embrace the market-based "exit" strategies open to them as outsiders, rejecting contestation and collectivism as ways to re-regulate labour markets (Alberti, 2014; Berntsen, 2016). This "normalization of precariousness" may take distinctive forms in post-socialist countries: for example, Mrozowicki (2016) shows that young Polish workers have been reluctant to protest against the expansion of precarious employment due to broad internalization of "market-individualistic discourses" (p.108).

Across countries, particularistic identities may be associated with nationalism or anti-immigrant movements. The rise of support for far-right populist political parties and candidates in the US and much of Europe has been attributed by many to growing insecurity and inequality. According to this view, economically vulnerable groups or formerly privileged workers who see their former status threatened become susceptible to narrow forms of in-group solidarity (Bornscier 2010): "Anxiety arising from contemporary events – boatloads of migrants and refugees flooding into Europe, images of the aftermath of random acts of domestic terrorism in Paris, Brussels, and Istanbul, and austerity measures – are blamed for exacerbating economic grievances linked with rising income inequality, the loss of manufacturing jobs, and stagnant wages" (Inglehart and Norris 2016).

This 'vicious circle' is associated with a negative feedback loop, whereby expanding precarity undermines the institutions and union strategies necessary to combat it, as employer power to exploit

differences expands and union power to re-collectivize risk declines. Dualisation dynamics and benchmarking strategies by management can inhibit the state of workers' solidarity while fragmenting workers' pay and conditions across different national borders, and between industry and local levels. Research has shown that employers exploit divides in the workforce on the basis of race or migrant status to prevent successful collective action (Penninx & Roosblad, 2000b). Unions seeking to organize precarious workers often face the additional challenge of overcoming entrenched negative perceptions of collectivism or individualistic, entrepreneurial identities (Berntsen, 2016). Particularistic identification may itself underlie exclusive union strategies, as unions face challenges in bridging segments of the workforce adopting narrow forms of solidarity focusing on their own workplace, profession, or ethnic group.

Together, these two models emphasize the importance of institutional structure in constraining the action of labour and capital and in shaping processes of collective identification within the workforce. They also hypothesize a self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms associated with the interactions among these factors. However, they both depict ideal-typical conditions that are only approximated in any given country or industry. They thus cannot do justice to the complex external and internal factors shaping employer or union strategies, institutional change, and the construction of and change in worker identity and solidarity. Even the more pessimistic 'vicious circle' described above is inherently unstable: re-framings of the narrative resulting as solidarity between core and periphery, enlightened self-interest within the core, and solidarity and self-organization among precarious workers are all important dynamics that can bring about change in employer and union strategies in significant ways – even where institutions are highly fragmented.

Thus, the second question we seek to answer is what explains change over time in unions' capacity to establish and maintain encompassing regulation of precarious work. What factors undermined or are undermining the regulation of precarious work? To what extent do some aspects of a virtuous circle still apply in European countries, even under more challenging conditions? What are the possibilities for unions to challenge the loss of traditional institutional power resources; or to build new forms of worker solidarity where particularistic forms of worker identification prevail?

Below we use the rich empirical findings from the chapters in this book to demonstrate the usefulness of the basic components of our framework for answering these questions – with the broader goal of explaining differences in union strategy and success in regulating precarious work. Together, they show that most countries and industries fall somewhere between the two ideal types described above: while structure constrains action to no small extent, unions can be entrepreneurial in building new institutional and associational resources to re-construct solidarity under challenging conditions.

3. Chapter findings: Expanding precarity and re-constructing solidarity

In the following sections, we draw on the case study findings from the chapters in this book to analyze why unions succeed or fail to regulate precarious work. The chapters cover nine different industries and occupations, including metal, retail, manufacturing, chemical, cleaning, local government, freelance musicians, logistics, slaughterhouses; and fifteen countries, representing UK, Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Greece, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary. Table 1 summarizes the chapters' main focus and outcomes.

Table 1: Summary of the book chapters

| Authors, sectors, countries | Dimensions of precarity | Comparative outcomes |
|---|--|--|
| Benassi & Dorigatti: metalworking sector in Italy and Germany | Focal group: Nonstandard workers (agency workers) in core metal plants Outcome: improving agency worker wages, conditions, and prospects to be hired on permanent contracts; restricting employers' use of agency work | Union success: 1) much higher in Italy until mid-2000s; 2) improving in Germany (from 2008); weakening in Italy (from 2003) |
| Mrozowicki, Bembič, Kall, Maciejewska, and Stanojevic: Retail sector in Estonia, Poland, and Slovenia | Focal group: Standard and non-standard workers (agency, temporary, self-employed, part time) in retail stores Outcome: improving pay and conditions for all workers; reducing inequality between standard and non-standard workers | Union success: 1) highest in Slovenia; 2) moderate in Poland; 3) weakest in Estonia |
| Pulignano and Doerflinger: metalworking and chemical sectors in Germany and Belgium (MNC focused) | Focal group: Standard and non-standard workers (agency, contractor staff, subcontractors) in metal & chemical workplaces of 2 MNCs Outcome: avoiding concessions for standard workers; reducing use of nonstandard work; improving pay, benefits, security, training for non-standard workers to reduce inequality with standard workers | Union success: 1) highest in Belgian Chemical & Metal cases; 2) moderate in German Metal case; 3) lowest in German Chemical case |
| Greer, Samaluk, and Umney: Freelance musicians in London (UK), Paris (France), and Ljubljana (Slovenia) | Focal group: Non-standard workers (self-employed freelance) in diverse music 'gigs' Outcome: providing collective goods that improve income and employment opportunities, reducing income insecurity, preventing exploitation (non-payment, requesting to play for free) | Union & collective success: Moderate in: access to welfare or protecting welfare support (Ljubljana and Paris); campaigns to raise awareness of exploitative conditions at employers (London); support for entrepreneurs via collectives (all) |
| Benvegnú, Haidinger, Sacchetto: Logistics sector in Italy (warehousing) and Austria (courier services) | Focal group: Non-standard workers (self-employed, cooperatives, subcontractors) at the bottom of supply chains. Migrants in these segments. Outcome: Improving pay and conditions for non-standard workers; resisting exploitation and illegal practices; winning collective agreements | Union success: 1) higher in Italy; 2) lower in Austria |
| Wagner & Refslund: Slaughterhouse sector in Denmark and Germany (MNC focused) | Focal group: Standard and non-standard workers (subcontractors, posted and individual migrants) at slaughterhouse workplaces a in both countries. . Outcome: reducing segmentation/inequality between standard & non-standard workers + migrants; resisting concessions in pay and conditions for standard workers; extending collective representation to non-standard workers | Union success: 1) higher at Danish Crown's Denmark workplaces 2) lower in Danish Crown's German workplaces |

| | | |
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| <p>Tapia & Holgate: Migrant workers in the UK, Germany, and France</p> | <p>Focal group: migrant workers in standard and non-standard employment</p> <p>Outcome: union adoption of more inclusive strategies toward migrant workers.</p> | <p>Union strategy: All national unions adopted more inclusive strategies. The form this took differed: 1) Recognition of difference approach in UK; 2) Republican assimilation in France; 3) Institutional approach in Germany.</p> |
| <p>Danaj, Caro, Mankki, & Sippola: Estonian migrants in Finland and Albanian migrants in Italy and Greece</p> | <p>Focal group: migrant workers in standard and non-standard (temporary, informal, self-employed) employment in construction, manufacturing, cleaning, hospitality, domestic work</p> <p>Outcome: migrant unionization rates; migrant union engagement</p> | <p>Union success: 1) highest in Finland; 2) moderate in Italy; 3) lowest in Greece</p> |
| <p>Grimshaw, Marino, Anxo, Gautie, Neumann, & Weinkopf: Local government in Sweden, Hungary, France, Germany, and the UK</p> | <p>Focal group: standard and non-standard workers (subcontractors) providing local government services</p> <p>Outcome: improving pay levels for lowest paid standard workers; reducing pay inequality between standard & subcontracted workers</p> | <p>Union success: 1) highest in Sweden; 2) moderate in France; 3) Lowest in Germany, UK, Hungary (but with strong local variation in Germany & the UK)</p> |

The first set of findings discussed below concern the factors driving the expansion of precarious work in Europe. The second concern the conditions under which unions: a) adopt more inclusive strategies across labour market segments, and b) succeed in building countervailing power to challenge precarious employment.

3.1. Explaining the expansion of precarious work and the challenge for solidarity

A number of factors can be identified that triggered a shift from a virtuous cycle to a vicious circle in the European countries and industries discussed in this book. We focus on three here: the globalization of firms, product markets, and financial markets (associated most recently with financial crisis and austerity); EU market-making policies; and policies and practices associated with migration and labour mobility within and from outside of the EU.

The globalization of firms, product markets, and financial markets pressure employers to cut costs and also give them new exit options from formerly encompassing institutions. First, narrowing profit margins combined with increased pressure from financial markets for short-term returns lead employers to become more aggressive in pursuing labour cost reductions. The CPE dualization literature observes that lower productivity, lower wage services and non-traded sectors are more vulnerable to deregulation and liberalization than high productivity tradable or high value-added sectors. The chapters show some evidence of this and outline the effects this produces on wages and working conditions of workers. For example, the retail (Mrozowicki, Bembič, Kall, Maciejewska, Stanojevič) and logistics (Benvegnù, Haidinger, Sacchetto) industries have experienced both intensifying competition and dramatic growth in precarious conditions, across traditionally 'core' as well as peripheral worker groups. However, higher skilled manufacturing case studies similarly show that employers often use competitive pressures as an

excuse to shift work to more precarious contracts, and to seek concessions for internal workers as a condition for job security or further investment at particular production sites (Benassi and Dorigatti; Pulignano and Doerflinger). Similar dynamics occur in the public sector, where economic crisis intensifies fiscal pressures. In their case studies of local government agencies, Grimshaw, Marino, Anxo, Gautiè, Neumann, and Weinkopf show that public sector austerity encourages pay concessions and subcontracting, and also reduces union power to contest the erosion of conditions. In Pulignano and Doerflinger's case study 'Metal', the company's heavy reliance on public sector customers meant that austerity increased cost pressures, which in turn justified demands for increased labour flexibility. Thus, pressure for labour cost reduction is an important background condition pushing employers to shift risk to workers.

Second, the globalization of production and distribution provides incentives and opportunities to segment work via outsourcing and value chain restructuring. In logistics, Benvegnú et al. show that the boundaries that previously differentiated sectors (e.g. postal, transportation), and were the reference point for collective agreements, are increasingly irrelevant. Value chain restructuring has resulted in higher levels of inter-organizational contracting across an array of multinationals specializing in different segments – often contracting across national borders. In both the warehousing and courier segments of the industry, workers at the bottom of the supply chain predominantly have non-standard contracts resulting in unstable and insecure employment. In the slaughterhouse industry, multinational firms increasingly locate similar meat processing jobs in different countries, allowing them to benchmark cost and performance (Refslund and Wagner).

EU market-making policies undermine institutional inclusion by opening up employer exit options. While some EU policies aim to extend institutional protections and re-build encompassing institutions, there is an overall deregulatory bias built into both the EU's normative underpinnings, as well as in to its institutional decision rules (Höpner and Schäfer 2012; Jabko 2006). EU directives have established minimum parental leave, sick pay, and limits on working time and established requirements for equal treatment for agency, temporary, and part-time workers. However, the political-economic logic of European integration undermines national labour market regulation and fuels regime competition (Streeck 1991). By decoupling integration from social protection, the EU permits and encourages "lower tax burdens, further deregulation and flexibilization of employment conditions, increasing wage differentiation and welfare cutbacks to reduce reservation wages" (Scharpf 2002: 646).

"Posted work" has become a common way for employers to exploit the heterogeneity in institutions across European countries and the lack of inclusive institutions at EU level. Posted workers are sent by their employers from one EU country to another to work for a limited time. Generally employed by subcontractors or work agencies, posting allows employers to "regime shop" around Europe to obtain the cheapest workers. Posting is most prevalent in industries such as construction and shipbuilding where subcontracting practices are highly developed because there are already organizational processes in place to facilitate multi-employer worksites (Lillie 2012). As a result of posting, there is now a transnationally mobile precarious workforce available to employers, who have low wage expectations and do not have full social security or union representation rights in the host countries where they work (Lillie 2016).

EU integration can also affect patterns of worker identity formation and union strategic orientation; for example, encouraging competitive cross-border benchmarking within MNCs or new forms of European-based transnational campaigns. Refslund and Wagner give the example of Danish Crown, a MNC in the meatpacking industry, which relocated thousands of jobs from Denmark to Germany in the mid-2000s. These relocated jobs did not go to Germans, but to posted workers from Eastern Europe, who were not

protected by German minimum wages or collective agreements until recently. The company subsequently used benchmarking of labor costs with the workforce at the German facilities to try to gain concessions in higher wage Denmark.

The chapters demonstrate the importance of the interaction between globalization and EU policies in encouraging both institutional fragmentation and exit-oriented employer policies. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, EU institutions have been central in directing European governments (most dramatically in the case of Greece) to adopt austerity policies and deregulate their labour markets - organized through the troika of the EC, the European Central Bank, and the IMF (Koukiadaki and Grimshaw 2016). These policies were legitimized by arguments that reducing wage costs was necessary to boost competitiveness (Rubery et al., 2016). In their chapter comparing restructuring in local municipalities across five countries, Grimshaw, Marino, Anxo, Gautiè, Neumann, and Weinkopf illustrate how in the public sector, labour market deregulation, which followed the 2008 financial crisis, has led to a general degradation of pay and working conditions. This was less the case where existing encompassing institutions could mediate the effects of austerity. For example, local governments in Germany, Hungary, and the UK were under more fiscal pressure than Sweden and France. Strong fiscal pressure, in turn, was more likely to lead to a 'vicious cycle' characterized by labour concessions, declining public sector pay, and increased precarity via outsourcing. On the other hand, Greer, Samaluk and Umney's comparison of freelance musicians shows that austerity pressures associated with crisis in the UK, France, and Slovenia resulted in reduced job opportunities and stability for freelance musicians in all three countries as state support for the arts declined.

Policies and practices associated with migration within and from outside of the EU is a third external factor providing employers with new resources to exploit divides in the labour force. Benvegnù, Haidinger and Sacchetto argue that Italian employers in the warehouse segment of the logistics industry use ethnic recruitment to undermine employment standards. Austrian courier firms exploit small ethnic businesses and self-employed migrant couriers. Refslund and Wagner show extensive use of migrant workers in lower paid, subcontracted employment segments in the meatpacking industry, particularly via posted work in the German context. Again, broader economic and policy changes form the backdrop for these employer strategies, which foster segmentation by reducing working conditions and challenging workers' solidarity. In Danaj, Caro, Mankki and Sippola's comparison of migrant worker experiences in Finland, Italy, and Greece, they find that the economic crisis and accompanying austerity were associated with increased precarity and informality among migrants in all three countries. However, these effects are most severe in Greece, where fiscal constraints and far-reaching labor market deregulation measures imposed by the Troika form the backdrop for a significant expansion in informality among migrants. This weakened their interest in and access to unions, and undermined solidarity among migrants and native workers.

In sum, the chapters show that processes of industry and organizational restructuring, European integration, market liberalization, and dynamics of austerity have increased employers' power to shift risk to workers via precarious arrangements. In line with our framework, this takes two different, but related, forms. First, employers are able to exploit expanding exit options linked to increasingly fragmented institutions and the associated growing divides in pay and conditions between groups of workers. This either involves shifting work to more poorly regulated worker groups and firms; or demanding (and winning) concessions that increase precarity for their core workforce through benchmarking and exit threats. Second, employers exploit divides in the labour force associated with particularistic or individualistic forms of identity and identification. These divides can be across companies and occupations, or between the native and migrant workforce - with worker posting combining both of these forms. Another form of particularistic identity is self-exploitation of

entrepreneurial or highly skilled professionals (e.g. freelance musicians) or migrants; which divides the workforce and reduces workers' solidarity – though at an individual rather than group level. These factors are closely linked: increasingly fragmented institutions make the work of building inclusive solidarity between the native and migrant workforce, between local and posted workers, or across entrepreneurial workers particularly challenging.

3.2 Re-constructing solidarity: conditions for regulating precarious work

The chapters all show that precarious work has expanded across industries and countries; with their analyses pointing to some common causes. However, the central focus of this book is to explain the conditions under which unions are able to sustain regulation of precarious work or reverse trends to expanding precarity. Under what conditions do unions succeed in maintaining or re-building encompassing institutions? When do they break out of exclusive strategies and challenge the segmentation strategies of employers, overcoming particularistic forms of worker identity to promote more inclusive forms of worker solidarity? What explains their success in reducing precarity in certain workplaces, firms, and industries? Our framework of virtuous and vicious circles highlights the factors which explain unions' success or failure in 're-constructing solidarity' and regulating precarious work. We argue that union strategies to represent precarious workers derive from institutional conditions and the form and content of solidarity among workers. The central condition for unions' success is their willingness and ability to mobilize power resources to challenge employers' capacity to use precarious employment contracts to increase competition in the labour market.

3.2.1 Union strategies to represent precarious workers

If our primary concern is with understanding the conditions under which unions are more or less successful in regulating precarious work, the first question concerns the enthusiasm with which they pursue this goal in the first place. Based on our framework, unions are more likely to pursue inclusive strategies where welfare state, legislative, and collective bargaining institutions are inclusive across workers in different labour market segments; and where unions and their members adhere to principles and patterns of behaviour consistent with inclusive worker solidarity. Either condition can lead unions to focus on organizing and representing precarious workers, or to seek to extend regulation to workers outside of the collective bargaining system. However, the erosion of formerly inclusive institutions can pose a significant challenge to sustaining or re-building inclusive worker solidarity, as it opens possibilities for employers to exploit latent divisions in the workforce or labour movement.

Findings from the chapters show that institutions and worker solidarity strongly influence union strategies. Benassi and Dorigatti's comparison of the German and Italian metal sector traces the impact of changing the regulation of temporary agency work on union strategies. IG Metall initially experienced a dramatic erosion of formerly encompassing institutions, when changes to labour law deregulated these TAW contracts and the DGB's negotiated a separate, much cheaper, collective agreement permitting a significantly lower wage for agency workers. Employers exploited these expanded exit options by increasing their use of agency workers, which opened up divisions between workers, works councils and unions. Plant-level works councils increasingly viewed their interests and identities as separate from each other and from precarious agency workers, undermining bargaining coordination.

This set German unions and works councils down an insider-focused exclusionary path, undermining past forms of bargaining power. In Italy, conversely, stronger national regulation of agency work and more centralized and encompassing bargaining structures supported cooperation across unions, which continued to jointly pursue a more inclusive strategy for organizing and representing agency workers. Bridging ideological splits in the Italian labour movement was important for developing a successful, solidaristic response to regulating precarious work. When this approach came under pressure, CGIL was the only union confederation that continued to seek to maintain encompassing regulation of agency work and to organize these workers at the local level, due to its stronger ideological commitment to inclusive worker solidarity.

Benvegnú, Haidinger and Sacchetto's findings similarly suggest that the ways in which unions define solidarity, and in particular who is 'in' and who is 'out', help explain different union responses to fragmenting institutions. As gaps opened up in collective bargaining coverage and legislative protections in the logistics industry, traditional Italian unions were slow to organize precarious workers in warehousing, due to their focus on better organized industry segments. However, new rank and file unions like Si Cobas and Adl Cobas took up the militant Italian tradition to organize coordinated campaigns by cooperative workers based on direct action and grassroots mobilization, with the help of NGOs and other political activists. In Austria, there was less space to respond to increasing bargaining fragmentation with innovative grassroots approaches as sectoral bargaining was dominated by ideologically conservative unions who used their shrinking institutional resources to protect core workers. Benvegnú et al. argue that the Austrian unions' strength in traditional, highly organized workplaces in logistics – for example, in the Austrian Post – led them to focus on preserving the conditions of these workers, rather than on organizing more precarious (mostly migrant) workers at the bottom of logistics supply chains. These self-employed workers organized alternative forms of collective action, building solidarity under challenging conditions. This had, however, a more limited impact on conditions than it might have had there been bridging solidarity to unions and workers in core jobs.

Differences in the inclusiveness of institutions and worker solidarity also explain union approaches to migrant workers. Tapia and Holgate trace the shift over time in unions' migration policies in the UK, France, and Germany, from racist and exclusive to more inclusive from the 1970s. They attribute this change to a combination of interests and changing identities and ideologies within the labour movement. On the one hand, unions sought new members among migrant groups as their own membership declined. On the other hand, growing activism from members who opposed racist and exclusionary policies (some of them migrants) shifted union positions. At the same time, union approaches to organizing migrants are different in each of Tapia and Holgate's case study countries. There is also strong variation between unions, and at local level. They document militant campaigns mobilizing the most precarious groups of workers (The French CGT's sans papiers campaigns to gain recognition of undocumented workers in France), organizing campaigns in new industries and workplaces with large numbers of precarious migrant workers (Unite's Justice for Cleaners campaign in the UK), and policies encouraging migrants to take leadership roles in works councils and unions (Migration committees at IG Metall). They suggest that each union's target for action can be traced to their different traditions concerning the appropriate sphere in which to build or re-build solidarity; such as UK unions' focus on the workplace and historical emphasis on multiculturalism, which encouraged setting up separate structures to integrate migrant workers; or the republican ethos in France, which led unions to organize workers at community level and target broader civil rights issues.

Greer, Samaluk and Umney's chapter on freelance musicians examines the challenges union face in organizing and representing workers whose professional identity is highly individualistic. They document the role of institutional inclusiveness in shaping union strategies toward this group. For example,

stronger welfare and social security support for artists and public sector support for the arts in France and (to a lesser extent) Slovenia encourage unions to adopt strategies aimed at extending and defending this state support, or helping musicians to navigate it. However, they show that collective action by freelance musicians to fight anarchic conditions in the market for freelance work is limited by workers' own artistic aspirations. Wages, working conditions, and job security have a lower priority than creative freedom; musicians often accept low or no payment for certain kinds of performances to have the opportunity to have their music heard by a wider audience. They find that the most effective collective action was via 'collectives' focusing on creating new spaces for making music controlled by the musicians themselves, replacing exploitative club owners and promoters. However, this only benefited the narrow group of musicians that were members. This suggests that musicians' individualistic and entrepreneurial identities limit their capacity to mobilize any form of worker solidarity – frustrating union attempts to address precarity via traditional institutional routes.

Danaj et al. add the perspective of migrant workers to the discussion of worker identity and solidarity. Similar to Greer et al., their chapter illustrates that the challenges to building inclusive worker solidarity are related to the nature and the composition of the workforce. Migrant workers come with very different life experiences than host country workers, and often feel that inclusive solidarity is irrelevant to them; this feeling lessens with host country integration, but is also very much affected by host country institutions. Based on biographical interviews with migrants and union representatives, the authors shed light on the reasons migrant workers join unions or participate actively in them. Overall, the migrants they interviewed were more likely to be union members and use union services if they were in standard jobs in highly unionized workplaces; and these unionized migrants largely viewed unions in an instrumentalist way, as providing needed services or benefits. However, among those migrant workers in the most precarious informal or nonstandard jobs, unions differed in their efforts to adopt more inclusive strategies: while both Italian and Greek unions set up special structures for migrants, Greek unions showed broad disinterest in organizing the Albanians that were the focus of the study and were viewed less favorably as a result. In addition, the migrants in the most vulnerable, informal jobs were most likely to reference the negative experience of unionization under socialism as a reason for not joining a union (what they refer to as post-socialist quiescence). Their findings suggest that multiple forms of labour segmentation put many migrants into extreme precarity, particularly on first arrival or during periods of austerity politics. Only through strongly enforced inclusive institutions, which did not depend on building solidarity among migrants themselves, was it possible to extend minimum labor regulation to this workforce.

3.2.2 Union success in regulating precarious work: Building and accessing power

The above discussion shows that institutions and solidarity are jointly implicated in the strategies that unions adopt toward precarious work. This is an important starting point for understanding why unions (or the workers they represent) may become trapped in exclusive strategies; or alternatively decide to pursue inclusive strategies aimed at organizing across labor market segments. At the same time, an inclusive strategy does not ensure inclusive outcomes. Our primary concern is to analyze the conditions under which unions are more or less successful in contesting or reducing precarity. This includes success in opposing employer efforts to segment labor markets and undermine regulation of pay and conditions. It can also include winning more encompassing regulation that shifts jobs to standard contracts or reduces precarity for workers on non-standard contracts.

First, findings show that more inclusive institutions constrain employers from exploiting exit options to increase precarity. Conversely, employers take advantage of fragmented institutions to introduce more precarious employment contracts and relationships. This emphasizes the importance of institutional structure in shaping employer strategy via their own power resources. Mrozowicki, Bembič, Kall, Maciejewska, Stanojević's retail sector case studies in Estonia, Poland, and Slovenia show this most starkly, as retail jobs are lower skilled and most likely to be affected by regulations establishing minimum pay and conditions. In all three countries, minimum wages, employment protection legislation, and equal treatment provisions for non-standard workers in national laws were important in limiting the precarity of retail workers. Slovenia was the only country with sectoral bargaining in retail, extended by the state to all companies; and also had the strongest provisions for equal treatment, established by the law which is an outcome of tripartite negotiations. This led to better pay, stronger job security, and better conditions for non-standard workers compared to the other two countries -- where unions faced more substantial battles simply getting weaker minimum treatment laws enforced in MNCs (Estonia) or across a dispersed atypical workforce in SME and franchise stores (Poland). In Estonia, precarious working conditions characterized both standard and non-standard workers; while in Poland and Slovenia employers had various options for evading minimum standards. This influenced the form of precarious work employers chose to use. For example, in Slovenia students were excluded from coverage by the sectoral agreement, and so this became an employer exit strategy. In Poland, self-employed franchise owners were not regulated by minimum wage, working time and union representation rights covering others and therefore had poor conditions and limited social security rights.

Several of the chapters show a spectrum where on one end institutions are so weak that all employees are precarious: this is the case with Estonian retail employers (Mrozowicki et al.) and Hungarian municipalities (Grimshaw et al.). On the other end, encompassing regulation with high bargaining coverage reduces cost-based incentives for externalizing work; while also reducing precarity for all workers. This is seen in Slovenian retail (Mrozowicki et al.), Swedish municipalities (Grimshaw et al.), and Danish slaughterhouses (Refslund and Wagner).

In the middle, institutions reduce precarious conditions for the core workforce but provide significant opportunities to cut labour costs through non-standard working arrangements via, e.g., agency work, outsourcing, or self-employment. This helps to explain why the Polish retail sector has the highest incidence of temporary and self-employment of Mrozowicki, Bembič, Kall, Maciejewska, Stanojević's three national case studies. Grimshaw, Marino, Anxo, Gautiè, Neumann, Weinkopf find the largest gaps in pay and union strength between municipalities and subcontractors in Germany and the UK, with the effect that municipalities in these countries faced the largest incentives to outsource. This, in turn, intensified pressure on public sector unions to develop creative responses that either reduced pay and conditions in-house to discourage subcontracting or that used other scarce resources to fight against these strategies. Sweden's high bargaining coverage in both the public and private sectors reduced incentives for government outsourcing; but also meant that outsourcing did not result in increased precarity for affected workers.

Refslund and Wagner's comparison of union campaigns in German and Danish locations of the meatpacking MNC Danish Crown show how more fragmented institutional coverage in Germany gave management its own power resources to contest union attempts at building more inclusive forms of worker solidarity. The majority of the MNC's employment in Germany was organized through subcontractors that used posted workers and were not covered by collective bargaining or minimum wages until recently. At one point, management withdrew orders from a subcontractor whose migrant workforce tried to organize a works council with union support. Conversely, more encompassing

collective agreements in Denmark reduced incentives and opportunity for Danish Crown to use posted workers and agency work. Neither was allowed by the union and both were subject to more stringent equal treatment requirements in Denmark. At the same time, Danish Crown was still able to take advantage of Germany's less encompassing institutions by segmenting its workforce across national borders. This points to the limitation of sectoral agreements that are only encompassing within countries in sectors, whereas capital is highly mobile.

Second, unions relied on a combination of institutional power, rooted in inclusive institutions, and associational power, derived from worker solidarity, to fight the expansion of precarity at sector- and workplace-levels. Thus, inclusive institutions do not only affect employer power and strategies, but also give unions different possibilities to mobilize against precarity and to negotiate constraints on precarious work in collective agreements. At the same time, unions must mobilize the workforce to access institutional forms of power and to defend or extend those institutions in the face of employer resistance. Findings from the chapters demonstrate that unions have more success in contesting precarity where they are able to tap into strong and inclusive forms of worker solidarity at workplace level and across the core and peripheral workforce.

Pulignano and Doerflinger similarly show that Belgian unions in the metal and chemical relied on a combination of inclusive institutions and strong associational power rooted in high union density to defend members' pay and conditions and resist outsourcing. They argue that Belgium's stronger equal pay provisions in national legislation and more restricted possibilities for local deviation from central agreements together gave unions institutional power to resist concessions for their core workforce and improve conditions for the staff of agencies, contractors, and on-site subcontractors. In the Belgian chemical subsidiary, the union demanded and won improved job security for agency staff through the application of an inter-sectoral collective labor agreement affecting employee transfer to subcontractors. In the Belgian metal subsidiary, the union secured an agreement to extend voluntary benefits to tenured agency workers. Unions and works councils in these MNCs' German subsidiaries also sought greater equity between standard and non-standard workers, but faced greater challenges due to a regulatory and collective bargaining framework permitting large differences between agency, permanent, and fixed-term staff. This led to concessions for the permanent workforce to prevent outsourcing (chemical case) and growing use of precarious agency work (metal case). At the same time, similar to Benassi and Dorigatti, they observe a change in union strategy over time in the German metal industry, with unions demanding and securing numerical limits on the use of fixed-term and agency worker, as well as training investments for these workers. Both chapters show that the works councils benefitted from the 2012 metal sector agreement empowering them to conclude agreements on agency work.

The regulation of posted work is a particular challenge for countries and industries lacking legally established encompassing collective agreements or universal minimum wages, as the CJEU has ruled that non-universally applicable forms of collective bargaining and social standards in public procurement violate the free movement rights of contractors (CJEU 2007; CJEU 2008). While German unions have faced particularly steep challenges in responding to posted work, this is not an inevitable outcome: Grimshaw, Marino, Anxo, Gautié, Neumann, and Weinkopf give the example of a region in Germany where the local government introduced a pay clause in local contracts requiring subcontractors, including those using posting workers, to match minimum pay in collective agreements. This case showed adaptation to the legal limits imposed by the Rueffert decision, which was successfully defended before the CJEU (CJEU 2016). This demonstrates the heterogeneity of institutional 'power resources' across sectors and workplaces.

In contrast, in Refslund and Wagner's comparison of meat packing plants, the German union was unable to oppose the introduction of posted workers through foreign on-site contractors, while the Danish union succeeded in incorporating newer migrant workers under the same pay and conditions enjoyed by the established workforce. They argue that this was in part due to a stronger sectoral agreement in the Danish meatpacking industry, which prevented management from staging competition between production sites to gain concessions. At the same time, Danish unions in this industry enjoyed a favorable combination of high union density and strong local union representation. Union membership was a social norm, with migrant workers integrated into the union as members and activists. They argue that this integration promoted labour solidarity and reduced management's ability to segment the workforce. This gave the Danish union stronger bargaining power compared to the German union in the same industry and even the same MNC, Danish Crown. Thus, although encompassing sectoral bargaining in Denmark was historically an important power resource for sustaining better pay and conditions relative to more decentralized Germany, unions relied on local mobilization to resist concessions. Mobilization was more difficult in Germany because of low union density combined with weaker capacity to coordinate across contracting firms with no union representation.

The above examples all show that associational power is an important pre-condition for securing and sustaining institutional power. This can also be seen in Mrozowicki, Bembič, Kall, Maciejewska, and Stanojević's retail case study: Slovenian unions enjoy the highest union density in retail of their three case study countries; but high density both depends on and helps to shore up strong and encompassing sectoral bargaining.

Grimshaw, Marino, Anxo, Gautiè, Neumann, and Weinkopf give perhaps the most nuanced analysis of how institutional and associational power interacts, in their comparison of how local government unions mobilized different power resources to contain downward pressure on pay. They show that Swedish unions' high density and coordinated bargaining allowed them to win more sustained improvements in pay for core workers, as well as to secure more equitable pay structures in subcontracted workplaces. However, the other countries, including France, Germany, the UK, and Hungary, also showed some examples of local union success in defending workers' pay or in making gains for low wage workers – which they trace to local union strength and the strikes or campaigns this allowed. They also show the additional importance of transfer of undertakings rules and social clauses in procurement, as resources unions can draw on to extend negotiated protections and reduce precarity along the supply chain. For example, in Sweden, all municipality workers enjoyed the right to refuse to transfer to private sector contractors; while only civil servants had these rights in France, Germany, and Hungary (see, also, Grimshaw et al. 2015). At the same time, the extensive use of social clauses in Germany allowed unions to extend better pay and conditions to subcontractor workforces not covered by collective bargaining.

Even under more unfavorable conditions, unions could use strong localized member support to win patchwork gains. Benvegnù, Haidinger and Sacchetto's logistic case studies show examples of successful mobilization based on organizing migrants outside established institutions. These are important for the workers affected, but limited to the affected sites and vulnerable to management exit without integration into law or collective agreements.

High union density within sectors or firms also can encourage a strong norm for diverse groups to join unions – allowing them to more easily mobilize potentially precarious workers, and to incorporate their interests and demands into their bargaining agenda. Tapia and Holgate's German case study shows unions had most success in integrating migrants as union leaders where union density was already high. Danaj, Caro, Mankki and Sippola show that high union density in Finland, combined with high bargaining coverage, normalized union membership and incorporated migrant Estonian workers into the union.

This, in turn, shaped migrant worker attitudes toward unions, leading them to view unions more favorably and to engage in union campaigns. They report similar findings for Albanian migrants in Italy working in heavily unionized sectors or workplaces, such as manufacturing or construction. In contrast, migrants in Italy and Greece in the informal economy or in smaller, non-union employers either were not aware of unions, or were more likely to feel that their negative views of unions were confirmed through their general neglect of, or irrelevance to, their concerns.

Third, unions were most successful in fighting precarity where they were able to build coordinated bargaining and coalitions within the labour movement and with other civil society groups. Encompassing legislation and collective agreements both support and rely on strong cooperation between worker representatives at industry level, across firms' production chains, and in different labor market segments. These worker representatives are not only unions, and may organize at different scales or in different countries. Put another way, inclusive forms of solidarity between organizations representing different groups of workers is a central condition for building and sustaining inclusive institutions in the face of employer strategies that seek to escape or weaken those institutions (Benassi et al. 2016).

Tapia and Holgate argue that the most effective strategies to organize migrants rely on coalitions. For example, within France that the CGT led a successful campaigns to reduce precarity among migrants in coalition with civil society and immigrant rights groups, including the sans Papiers campaign; while in the UK, the success of the Justice for Cleaners campaign relied on joint work between UNITE and a community organization, Citizens UK. In contrast, while German unions have made some attempts at building broader coalitions – for example, IG Bau's initiative to create the European Migrant Workers' Union (Greer, Ciupijus, & Lillie, 2013) – they were least likely to organize joint campaigns outside of already organized workplaces.

Mrozowicki, Bembič, Kall, Maciejewska, and Stanojević show that Estonian unions accessed new resources for organizing retail workers through both cooperative campaigns among unions in different sectors and through international solidarity with Nordic unions through the Baltic Organising Academy. This allowed them to raise union density, improve monitoring of labour standards, and negotiate new collective agreements. In Poland, the retail branch of Solidarnosc benefited both from international support and from its location within the general union, which could shift resources from other sectors to retail organizing campaigns. They show that the union succeeded in winning major improvements in pay and conditions in their case study stores, despite having no collective agreement and low union density. Coalitions thus helped the unions to compensate to some extent for their weaker institutional power. In Slovenia, associational resources derived from inclusive solidarity and coordination within the labour movement: sectoral bargaining provided a platform for labour cooperation that did not exist in the other two countries.

The form and extent of labor cooperation is to some extent influenced by collective bargaining structure. In their comparative analyses, Refslund and Wagner (meatpacking) as well as Pulignano and Doerflinger (chemical and metalworking) find similar challenges to building or sustaining labour coordination across company or workplace level representatives associated with 'dual channel' representation in their German case studies. While this can be overcome by strong union leadership within well-coordinated sectoral bargaining (as in the German metal sector), dual channel bargaining can be associated with exacerbating competition between worker representatives at workplace or company level where bargaining is more fragmented. Benvegnú, Haidinger and Sacchetto show that despite high bargaining coverage overall in Austria, the large number of unions and agreements in the logistics industry and in the courier segment effectively prevented coordinated union responses to

expanding precarity in a fragmented supply chain. This was made worse by the extensive use of self-employed workers who were not covered by these collective agreements, and who did not enjoy works council representation.

Unions' capacity to overcome divides to forge more solidaristic positions is not static but changes over time. Benassi and Dorigatti, for example, illustrate that in the Italian metal sector, cooperation among the three Italian trade union confederations was facilitated by legislation that restricted the conditions under which agency workers could be used. This provided a high base of encompassing regulation on top of which unions were able to negotiate even stronger sectoral agreements, with both agency and metal employers, respectively, investing in training and pay between assignments for agency workers, and limiting the proportion of and conditions for use of agency work. However, union cooperation unraveled as agency work was progressively liberalized after 2003, and employers demanded an end to these arrangements. Deregulation of agency work in Germany initially had similar effects, opening divisions between plant-level works councils. IG Metal was eventually able to re-establish some degree of cooperation via a coordinated national campaign. This resulted in restricting agency work and improving conditions for agency workers via collective agreements, as well as supporting stronger legislation at national level (see also Pulignano and Doerflinger).

In sum, the chapters demonstrate that institutional structure can facilitate or inhibit inter-union cooperation – but also that a commitment to building more inclusive solidarity within the labour movement is a central condition for sustaining or building encompassing institutions capable of containing the spread of precarious employment.

The chapters thus show, compellingly and consistently, that differences in the extent of precarity across similar industries, organizations and workplaces can be traced to differences in employer power to exploit exit options and workforce divides; and labour's countervailing power to challenge these strategies via institutional and associational resources. This may be seen as supporting the 'power resources' theoretical approach to analyzing cross-national differences in labour market segmentation and institutional change.

In line with the analytical framework developed above, we have focused on institutional power and associational power. We do not include structural power as a primary explanatory variable, defined by Wright (2000: 962) as power resulting from workers' location and role within the economic system – either due to tight labor markets or "the strategic location of a particular group of workers within a key industrial sector." Several of the chapters acknowledge that labour market conditions and structure and production processes can influence union willingness and ability to contest precarious work. For example, in Pulignano and Doerflinger's Belgian metal sector case study, high local unemployment somewhat weakened unions' willingness to pursue tightened regulation of agency work. Poor labour market conditions after the financial crisis similarly contributed to the already steep challenges faced by retail unions in Slovenia, Poland, and Estonia (Mrozowicki et al.); exacerbated already highly competitive market conditions for musicians in the UK, France, and Slovenia (Greer et al.); and contributed to further weakening the fragile cooperation among Italian metal sector unions, leading to divisive concessions in sectoral bargaining (Benassi and Dorigatti). However, these labour market factors more typically explained common challenges rather than the differences in outcomes between cases – for example, why precarity is experienced more often by certain groups of workers based on, for example, age, education, gender, migration status. Similarly, while the chapters show that unions faced systematically high, often seemingly insurmountable, barriers in organizing migrant workers in the most precarious and informal jobs (Danaj et al.), unions also drew on different sources of power to overcome these

challenges. For example, grassroots unions in Italy mobilized precarious migrants in warehousing to negotiate collective agreements (Benvegnú et al.), while traditional unions built coalitions to organize successful campaigns to organize migrant cleaning workers and gain citizenship rights for undocumented migrants in diverse service industries (Tapia and Holgate).

The decline in the structural power of labor undoubtedly undermines unions' ability to regulate precarious work under existing institutions and forms of solidarity. The trends that are driving an expansion of precarious work more generally across Europe – expanding competition, migration, EU market-making – are all implicated in the weakening of labour's structural power. However, workers and unions can change the rules of the game, by reshaping the institutional environment and (re)building solidarity within a diverse workforce.

Conclusions

Recent research on precarious work has largely developed within disciplinary silos. Comparative political economy studies focus on macro- or national-level institutions and processes to analyze alternative patterns of labour market dualisation and segmentation. Critical sociologists rely on ethnographies, case studies, and biographical interviews to analyze the interplay between different forms of power and ideology in exacerbating or legitimizing precarity. Comparative employment relations scholars have gone farthest in integrating theoretical insights from these disciplines, examining how institutions and (in some accounts) union identity shape union strategies toward precarious work, as well as their success at reducing precarity in a firm or labour market. In this book, we bring together cross-national, primarily industry-based studies from this comparative employment relations tradition, and use their findings to build a coherent and generalizable framework for analyzing the conditions under which unions are successful at moderating or reducing precarity. This framework incorporates insights from the CPE literature concerning how institutional structure shapes employer and union strategy toward precarious work; as well as those of critical sociologists concerning how worker identity and identification affects both employers' power to exploit divisions in the workforce and unions' ability to resist narrow or exclusive forms of worker identification. We model two alternative 'ideal type' sets of conditions. Under a 'virtuous circle', a low incidence of precarious work in the labour market both sustains and is supported by a positive feedback loop linking highly inclusive institutions, inclusive union strategies, inclusive worker solidarity, and social partnership-oriented employer strategies. Under a 'vicious circle', these conditions are reversed. Employers' power to exploit exit options and workforce divisions grows, while labour's capacity to mobilize workers across these divisions declines.

The chapter findings show that conditions in contemporary Europe are broadly consistent with a 'vicious circle'. Labour market and collective bargaining institutions are increasingly fragmented across industries and countries. This gives employers increased scope to use precarious employment contracts and relationships to reduce labour costs and promote intensified worker-to-worker competition in labour markets and across production chains. At the same time, these developments differ in intensity and effect due to two main factors: first, persistent variation in national, sectoral, and firm-level institutions; and second, differences in the forms that worker solidarity take, at the level of individual unions or within the labour movement. Across the industry case studies, research findings show that where institutions and worker solidarity are more inclusive, unions are better able to fight precarity. These factors are complementary: inclusive institutions make it easier for unions to organize and represent diverse groups of workers; while unions rely on inclusive forms of worker solidarity to mobilize the broad forms of collective action necessary to sustain or re-build encompassing institutions.

Most crucially, labour power grounded in inclusive solidarity depends on building or sustaining coordinated bargaining within the labour movement, as well as coalition-building across unions and among organizations representing workers and their communities.

Growing popular support for far-right populist parties and candidates in Europe and the US demonstrates the growing hold that 'exclusive' forms of solidarity, based on more narrow forms of worker identity and identification, have on workers in the global North. This trend is often attributed to growing economic insecurity, which, in turn, encourages a backlash against both the elite institutions and individuals promoting trade liberalization, and groups of precarious outsiders viewed as competitors for increasingly scarce jobs. The case studies in this book show that unions can combat these divisive politics, to build inclusive forms of solidarity that incorporate migrants, minorities, and other labour market outsiders most at risk of experiencing precarity and exploitation at work. However, this requires increasingly creative collective action that both looks up to closing gaps in welfare state, labour market, and collective bargaining institutions; and looks inward to building inclusive solidarity across the workforce and within the labour movement.

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