

SECURING PEACE

Article 9 and Security Policy under Koizumi Junichiro and Abe Shinzo

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Tarkastelen maisterintutkielmassani Japanin perustuslain sodan ja sotajoukkojen kieltävää 9. pykälää sekä Japanin turvallisuuspolitiikkaa kahden japanilaisen pääministerin, Koizumi Junichiron ja Abe Shinzon, puheissa. Tutkimuksen tehtävänä on selvittää, miten Koizumi ja Abe perustelevat 9. pykälän tulkinnan ja turvallisuuspolitiikan muutoksia heidän kausillaan sekä verrata tästä syntyviä tuloksia. Tutkimukseni monipuoliseen teoreettiseen viitekehykseen kuuluvat turvallisuus, kansainvälinen yhteisö, utopia ja realismi, rauha sekä retoriikka. Aineiston muodostaa rajattu määrä Koizumin ja Aben puheita, jotka olen valinnut käytyäni puheita läpi laajemmin.

Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että Japanin muuttuvaa turvallisuuspolitiikkaa perustellaan monin eri tavoin suhteessa perustuslakiin. Muutokset voidaan esitellä perustuslaillisina, mutta tämä kysymys sivuutetaan usein. Yhdysvaltojen vaikutus Japanin turvallisuuspolitiikkaan oli merkittävä erityisesti Koizumin kaudella. Sekä Koizumi että Abe naamioivat poliittiset tavoitteensa esimerkiksi humanitaarisuudeksi tai turvallisuudeksi. Koizumin ja Aben väitteistä huolimatta on kuitenkin selvää, että he joutuvat perustelemaan linjauksiaan perustuslain 9. pykälän olemassaolon vuoksi. Tämä luo ristiriidan lain ja käytännön välille. 9. pykälän rauhanomaiset tavoitteet eivät pääse toteutumaan, koska sekä Koizumi että Abe kohtelevat sitä esteenä turvallisuudelle rauhan mahdollisuuden sijaan.

Avainsanat: Japani, perustuslaki, turvallisuuspolitiikka

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction	4
2. Security, Peace, and Rhetoric	7
2.1. Securitisation	7
2.2. International Society	8
2.3. Utopia and Realism	10
2.4. Peace	11
2.5. Rhetoric	12
2.6. Rhetorical Commonplaces	14
3. Article 9 and the Japanese Constitution	16
3.1. The Origins of the Constitution	17
3.2. International Law and Its Influence on Article 9	20
3.3. The Official Interpretation of Article 9	22
3.4. Pacifist Constitution?	26
4. Koizumi Junichiro	28
4.1. The United States and the Iraq War	30
Securitising Iraq?	33
United in Values	35
4.2. International Relations	39
4.3. The Self-Defense Forces	41
Reconstruction, Not War	46
4.4. Peace	48
5. Abe Shinzo	51
5.1. Rhetoric, the Audience, and Abe	53
5.2. Collective Self-Defence and International Relations	57
5.3. The Self-Defense Forces	63
5.4. Peace	67
6. Conclusions	71
Bibliography	75

1. INTRODUCTION

Article 9 was enacted alongside the current Constitution of Japan under the Allied occupation in 1947. It renounced Japan's right to war as well as the right to maintain war potential. Today, it remains the most extensively debated article of the Constitution. Like the rest of the Constitution, Article 9 has never been amended. However, its interpretations have varied over the years to suit the changing security policy of Japan. In this thesis, I will approach the practice of Article 9 and Japan's security policy through selected speeches of two Japanese prime ministers, Koizumi Junichiro (2001–2006) and Abe Shinzo (2006–2007 & 2012–).

I thought of the idea for my master's thesis while on student exchange in Kanazawa, Japan, in 2014. In July, one of my teachers introduced her class to a speech given by the current Prime Minister of Japan, Abe Shinzo, because this speech had become a hot topic in the country. In the speech, Abe declared that Japan has the right of collective self-defence under Article 9 – a right that had been officially considered unconstitutional until that day, even by Abe himself during his first term (see Abe 2007). This directed my interest towards Article 9 and its relation to Japan's security policy in the speeches of prime ministers. Since research on the matter does not usually appear to involve speeches, I find it a meaningful angle to approach the topic from. I chose to analyse Koizumi's speeches in addition to those of Abe's because not only was he Abe's predecessor during the latter's first term, he is one of Japan's longest-ruling prime ministers. Most importantly, the controversial Iraq War began during Koizumi's term. Therefore, I believe that Koizumi will be a fruitful point of comparison to Abe.

In this thesis, I will analyse a number of speeches given by Koizumi and Abe. I will examine the change in the interpretation of Article 9 and Japan's security policy during and between their terms. I will explore the justifications given for the changes in policy and their relation to Article 9. As both Koizumi and Abe are members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with a nationalistic reputation, they can be assumed to represent fairly similar policies. Therefore, a comparison between the two may offer insight into the trajectory of Japan's security policy and the influence of Article 9. Although the time period is short compared to the history of the Constitution, much has happened in the 21st century since the September 11 attacks of 2001. While I did consider comparing the early years of the Constitution with the present, the availability of data became an issue. As such,

I chose this particular time period from the beginning of the war against terrorism to the unprecedented event of declaring collective self-defence as an exercisable right under Article 9.

In my analysis of Koizumi, I will emphasise a speech given by him at a press conference on December 9th, 2003. This speech concerned the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq. Statements from various other speeches will be analysed at times to broaden the image of Koizumi's policy. As for Abe, I will focus on the opening statement he gave on July 1st, 2014. In the statement, he discusses the Cabinet Decision made on the same day. The decision in question enabled collective self-defence for Japan. A few supporting statements have been chosen from his other speeches as well.

Although there is a discrepancy in the number of speeches between Koizumi and Abe, I believe that this is not a problem due to the difference in their style. While Koizumi is a convincing speaker both in his own right and when compared to Abe, his style is less confrontational and straightforward out of the two. Therefore, he generally appears less opinionated in his speeches than Abe, which necessitates examining him from a broader point of view. In addition, I do not wish to refer to the newest speeches given by Abe to retain a certain distance between myself and the speeches. Thus, the pool of speeches available for Abe is smaller. I have, however, familiarised myself with both of their speeches at large in order to determine the most suitable ones for this thesis. I focused on the English translations of them as my Japanese skills are not on par with political speeches. Since the translations of the speeches are written in American English, they will include spellings different from the rest of the thesis.

The international academic community tends to be against the alleged constitutionality of laws widening the role of the SDF. Accordingly, I will take a critical stance towards Koizumi's and Abe's claims from the point of view of an outsider who is relatively familiar with Japan. Although my spatial distance to Japan creates room for objectivity, I fully acknowledge that no researcher is completely objective; a human element is always involved in research, after all. However, the question in this thesis will not be whether Japan is entitled to armed forces or not. Attention will only be brought to whether or not the incremental increases in armed forces are considered justified under Article 9. Therefore, I shall look at how Koizumi and Abe justify the constitutionality of the laws themselves.

Chapter 2 will present the theoretical framework of this thesis. Rather than focusing on a single theory, multiple theories will be used to different ends to produce various angles to the speeches. These theories include securitisation, international society, utopia and realism, peace, rhetoric, and rhetorical commonplaces. Chapter 3 focuses on Article 9. As it is central to my thesis, it is necessary to examine the article in detail before proceeding to the analyses. The origins of Article 9, the influence of international law on it, the history of its interpretation, and its alleged pacifism shall all be discussed.

In chapter 4, I will analyse Koizumi's speeches. As the Iraq War was the most significant event affecting Japan's security policy during Koizumi's term, it shall be the point of departure of my analysis. Since Japan's participation in the war cannot be separated from the influence of the United States, Japan's relations with the U.S. will be considered simultaneously. While Japan's primary security environment is East Asia, the U.S. will be emphasised due to its significant role during Koizumi's term. After this, other international relations will be accounted for, followed by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Finally, I will examine Koizumi's take on peace.

Chapter 5 consists of the analysis of Abe's opening statement and supporting arguments. Rhetoric will be considered before proceeding to collective self-defence and international relations. To match my analysis of Koizumi, the U.S. will be emphasised in this chapter as well. After this, the SDF will be discussed before finishing the chapter with peace. In chapter 6, I will conclude this thesis by summarising and comparing my analyses of Koizumi and Abe.

2. SECURITY, PEACE, AND RHETORIC

In this chapter, the theoretical framework of this thesis shall be introduced. Instead of focusing on a single theory, multiple theories will be used to different ends in my analysis. These theories include securitisation, international society, utopia and realism, peace, rhetoric, and rhetorical commonplaces.

2.1. Securitisation

In their work *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde develop a new framework for analysing security. Questioning the traditional primacy of military and state in conceptualising security, Buzan et al. examine multiple security sectors to form a framework for widened security. They discuss e.g. the concept of securitisation, which is of special interest for the purposes of this thesis as Japan's security policy will be in focus. Therefore, securitisation shall be detailed below.

Security can be analysed on different levels, such as units or international systems. Buzan et al. argue that with the bipolarity of the Cold War gone, regions will become important. Regional scale is claimed to be the most relevant one because security does not usually transform globally. While a global web of security interdependence exists, insecurity is often associated with proximity. In addition, building rivalry between collectivities is easier than it is on individual and system scales. These regionally based clusters are called security complexes. They are durable and consist of patterns of amity and enmity, arrangement of units, and distribution of power among the principal units. Security complexes may transform by e.g. contracting or expanding. If the regional states are weak or they are externally suppressed, there might be no security complex in the respective region. (Buzan et al. 1998, 5–13.)

Buzan et al. define international security as a question of power politics. Security is about survival: when something is presented as an existential threat, extraordinary measures to defeat it are justified. However, military action is not necessarily about security. Peacekeeping, for example, is not a measure taken against an existential threat but a political question. Buzan et al. argue that security can be used to stage existential threats to referent objects by a securitising actor, such as the state. Possible referent objects,

including states as well, are objects which have a legitimate claim to survival. Therefore, securitisation can be used as a political tool. In the realm of politics, sovereignty often acts as the referent object of securitisation. Presenting a threat as existential is called a securitising move. If the issue is accepted as an existential threat by the audience, the issue is securitised and extraordinary measures against the threat are legitimised. Buzan et al. argue that the word “security” in itself does not necessarily signal a securitising move. For example, “defence” is often understood as an urgent matter. They continue that while securitisation constitutes intense politicisation, their meaning is opposite: politicisation is an open question, a matter of choice. Securitisation, on the other hand, signals the failure of politics. (Buzan et al. 1998, 21–29.) It can be used to circumvent political processes by overriding legislation and existing policies. Thus, if successful, it allows the securitising actor to advance their own interests. While full securitisation does not appear in this thesis, weaker forms of securitisation will be highlighted.

Institutionalised securitisation is most likely to appear in the military sector, with states as the most important referent objects. States are territorial, and force is particularly effective in acquiring and controlling territory. However, non-traditional threats, such as terrorists and cyberwar, have overcome the issue of distance. The main issues are internal and external threats to the government. Desecuritisation is possible as well. One example would be proceeding from arms racing to arms control. History, however, can make desecuritisation difficult. Such has been the case for Japan. As power has diffused after the Cold War, military security has descended from the global level to regional and local levels. Potential rivals have been bound into organisations such as the EU and NATO. However, history and the lack of cooperation hinder desecuritisation in East Asia. The relations between North and South Korea as well as the relations between China and Taiwan have been securitised. (Buzan et al. 1998, 49–66.)

2.2. International Society

In his work *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (2004), Barry Buzan restructures the English school theory’s triad into a social structure. The traditional triad consists of international system, international society, and world society. Of these, we shall concentrate on international

society. It refers to the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity among states. It is centred on the creation and maintenance of norms, rules, and institutions, which in turn condition the states' behaviour. There are two schools regarding the extent of these norms. Pluralism focuses on coexistence: sovereignty and non-intervention, the basis of the states-system, restricts international society to minimal rules for enhancing self-interest and survival. However, even enemies can establish extensive cooperation out of e.g. the fear of nuclear war. This was the case during the Cold War. Pluralism does also not exclude the possibility of a shared identity, such as sovereignty, and thus enables communities. However, the gap between "us" and "them" remains. (Buzan 2004, 7–146.)

Solidarism builds on pluralism. Buzan detects two possible principles for solidarism: abandoning difference and homogenising states consciously, or coordinating policies, institutions, and other fields after acknowledging that the common values of states reach beyond survival and coexistence. States recognise that a significant degree of similarity is valuable. Buzan reminds us that such enterprises must not necessarily be liberal. In regards to the joint pursuit of human rights, a theme well-developed in solidarist literature, Buzan raises a dilemma: whereas solidarism is more likely to be combined with belief and calculation than coercion, human rights have also been spread by coercion. Buzan, however, notes that if values are understood as sustained patterns of behaviour, it is not necessary for solidarism to be built on belief even if it is preferable. Overall, solidarism represents a "thick" international society while "thin" international societies are pluralist. (Buzan 2004, 146–153.) In this thesis, Japan's relations with the U.S. will be evaluated on the pluralist-solidarist scale. South Korea and China shall be briefly discussed as well.

The number of institutions in an international society depends on where it lands on the pluralist-solidarist scale. Buzan detects five types of interstate societies, omitting asocial societies as they would hardly have common institutions. A power political society is unlikely to host secondary institutions. Diplomacy, trade, and territoriality are likely to exist, but there are necessarily no shared values. A coexistence society rests on balance of power, adding institutions such as sovereignty, war, and international law on top the ones found in power political societies. A cooperative society is likely to develop secondary institutions and more elaborate membership criteria. War becomes an institution of self-defence, not a mean to violate national self-determination. A convergence society deepens shared values, leaving even less room for war and balance of power. Finally, in a confederal society, diplomacy and international law become similar to domestic politics

and laws. Institutions of collective enforcement exist. (Buzan 2004, 190–195.) These interstate societies will be a part of the pluralist-solidarist evaluation of Japan’s foreign relations.

As Buzan argues several times throughout his work, international societies are not necessarily global. He continues that sub-global societies may find ways to coexist or that they might lead to a vanguard-led strengthening of the global interstate society. Buzan suggests that solidarist societies are more likely on the regional level. This, however, has not been the case in East Asia: while cooperative qualities, such as the acceptance of markets, exist, the East Asian society is heavily based on coexistence, sovereignty, and nationalism. Buzan questions whether the region would have faced another war if it were not for the presence of the U.S. However, economic interdependence has restricted balance of power and conflict in the region. (Buzan 2004, 212–238.)

2.3. Utopia and Realism

In *The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (1946), Edward Hallett Carr traces the history of the study of international relations. Beginning from its utopian origins, he proceeds to realism, power, morality, and questions of international law. In this thesis, his concepts of utopia and realism will be used to evaluate the stances of Koizumi and Abe as well as to compare Article 9 with practice.

Utopia and realism are opposing forces: utopians focus on what ought to be while realists focus on what is and what has been. Utopians build their theory upon free will. They prefer concepts such as “collective security” over specific measures to reach their goals. Although their relative classlessness as intellectuals heightens their objectivity, this makes them detached from the masses affecting politics. As they are unable to translate theory into practice, they often abandon utopianism when entering political office. Realists, on the other hand, believe in predetermination and the relativity of morality. In their minds, morality is born from politics rather than outside it. Due to their belief in facts and their lack of ideas, they are unable to change reality. Instead, they codify practice into theory, preferring precedence as a criterion for action as they value experience over conscious reasoning. (Carr 1946, 11–20.)

Jeremy Bentham's idea of the greatest happiness of the greatest number defined natural law in the 19th century. He claimed that humans automatically seek pleasure and avoid pain. Thus, the infallibility of public opinion became the basis of democracy. Benthamism reappeared in international politics after World War I when the search for a new utopia began. Since liberal democracy had succeeded in some countries, it was believed that it could be transplanted anywhere. As a consequence, the League of Nations attempted to transplant democratic rationalism from the national sphere to an international arena. Taking a utopian direction, the League believed that prohibiting war would create a barrier against war in itself. (Carr 1946, 22–31.) This led to the birth of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war in 1928 and ultimately affected the drafting of Article 9.

2.4. Peace

In *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (1996), Johan Galtung tackles the concepts of peace, conflict, development, and civilisation, seeking a way to achieve peace by nonviolent means. As peace is a central concept when discussing Article 9, Galtung's theory shall be utilised when analysing the references to peace made by Koizumi and Abe.

Galtung presents two definitions of peace: the absence/reduction of violence of all kinds, and nonviolent and creative conflict transformation. Negative peace refers to the absence of symptoms while positive peace refers to building resistance against violence. Galtung continues that peace work means reducing violence by peaceful means, and peace studies study the conditions of peace work. As the core value of its studies, peace should be defined well but not too well: if the criteria are too strict, it becomes highly unlikely that the described situation would exist in real life. (1996, 9–24.) Koizumi's and Abe's implied definitions of peace will be compared to that of Galtung's.

Galtung defines violence as something that harms life physically or mentally. Cultural violence refers to the aspects of culture that are used to justify and legitimise direct and structural violence. Cultural peace would mean the opposite: justifying and legitimising peace. One of the examples Galtung gives of cultural violence is the elite blaming the victims of structural violence for protesting. While such conflicts can be overcome by struggle, violently struggling or reversing the roles of the parties will likely result in further

violence in the name of revenge. Due to this, Galtung finds nonviolence preferable. For this end, nonviolence has to become a part of the common discourse as a practical rather than a moral matter. Galtung claims that the legalistic perspective on conflict and peace fails to question law as a source of cultural violence – although it can potentially breed cultural peace as well. (Galtung 1996, 2–124.) Article 9 will be briefly discussed from this legalistic perspective.

Galtung's view that the opposite of peace is violence, not war, is worth noting. Peace and war are often contrasted with each other, yet it is true that the absence of war does not guarantee a peaceful life due to e.g. crime and natural disasters. Therefore, peace from war is a narrow definition of peace. If the only conceived way of resolving a conflict is war or another form of violence, it will be used. Concepts such as zero-sum game rooted in culture are in dire need of revising or abolishing if nonviolence is to achieve a significant position in resolving conflicts. According to Galtung, violence breeds violence, peace breeds peace, and the best protection against violence is positive peace (1996, 32).

Galtung makes a parallel of democracy and dictatorship as peace and war. Since Japan is a democracy, this is a point of interest in Galtung's theory. Democracies have a peace-loving self-image. Despite this, they are no strangers to war: the most frequent war-wagers since World War II have been democracies. Galtung proposes that individualistic and competitive cultures are more likely to be democratic, and also more likely to be belligerent if given the capability. Shared decision-making does not necessarily mean less violence, either: war-related decisions are made by inner circles, not by the population at large. Outer aggression can even be used for gaining support in elections, and fighting dictatorships – which are often too preoccupied with domestic coercion to wage war abroad – easily becomes to be seen as a duty. A history of inflicting traumas combined with democracy also creates belligerency due to the fear of reprisal. (Galtung 1996, 49–56.)

2.5. Rhetoric

In this section, relevant parts of Chaïm Perelman's and Roderick P. Hart's theories of rhetoric shall be introduced. These theories will mainly be applied to the opening statement given by Abe Shinzo as it is the speech analysed in most detail. Applicable pieces will be used to analyse Koizumi as well.

In his work *The Realm of Rhetoric* (1982), Chaïm Perelman introduces his rhetorical theory. According to him, the goal of rhetoric is to gain acceptance for controversial theses by using generally accepted theses. This is done by increasing the audience's adherence to the presented theses by modifying the audience's convictions or dispositions through discourse. For this to be effective, the speaker must adapt to their audience: points of departure can only be chosen from theses accepted by the audience. These premises can be based on reality or on the preferable, such as values. Perelman notes, however, that universal values are universal only as long as they are undetermined. (Perelman 1982, 2–27.)

In his work *Modern Rhetorical Criticism* (1997), Roderick P. Hart discusses rhetoric and rhetorical criticism. He lists the five basic moves of every rhetorical task. They are (1) striving for change by using language over non-symbolic forces such as weaponry; (2) being regarded as a helper instead of an exploiter; (3) convincing the audience that new choices are necessary; (4) narrowing the audience's options for these choices, although (5) the speaker may not specify the details of the advocated policies. In addition, Hart argues that there are three features that normally make a message rhetorical. These are delineations of the good, resonance for a particular audience, and clear or clearly implied policy recommendations. (Hart 1997, 7–12.) Abe's opening statement will be examined in the light of these points.

Hart speaks of the speaker on several occasions. He claims that as most people cannot separate a message from its author, persuasion is always credibility-driven. A speaker with a high credibility can deliver a speech that leaves much to be desired yet be still listened to. To enhance credibility verbally, a speaker has at least six verbal dimensions at their disposal: power, competence, trustworthiness, good will, idealism, and similarity. However, credibility is also determined by outside factors such as prejudices and media effects. In addition, Hart notes that public people are tightly role-constrained in their speeches. (Hart 1997, 84; 212–223.) This is of interest to me as both Koizumi and Abe are highly public people. Therefore, their credibility will be discussed in their respective chapters.

According to Hart, self-reference in speeches is especially significant because it signals the speaker's feelings and ambitions clearly and claims the listeners' attention through identification. Self-references can be placed in four categories: emotional/moral action, narrative action, behavioural action, and performative action. Narrative actions signal that

the speaker is being acted upon whereas behavioural actions indicate that the speaker is taking charge of the events. The number of emotional/moral actions show whether the action is internal or external, and performative statements identifies whether the speaker is personally willing to become a part of the policies they advocate. (Hart 1997, 225–228.) Abe’s self-references will be paid attention to when discussing his rhetoric.

2.6. Rhetorical Commonplaces

In *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West* (2006), Patrick Thaddeus Jackson traces the history of the rhetorical commonplace “Western Civilisation”. Rhetorical commonplaces are historically developed topological resources. They are used to legitimise policies. The available rhetorical commonplaces in each debate and their specific deployment depend on the target audience: they must have been distributed widely enough to be meaningful. Since they are vague and multifaceted, their limits cannot be predicted as it depends on social contingency. (Jackson 2006, 28–29.) In this thesis, the concept of commonplace shall be used for assessing the speeches due to their strength as a rhetorical tool.

Jackson mentions two mechanisms for defining commonplaces: breaking, an attempt to capture the commonplace from one’s opponent and dissolve the previous claimed connections; and joining, attempting to link a commonplace to support a policy direction together with other commonplaces. Jackson states that advocates and opponents struggle to control both the policy outcome and the rhetorical commonplaces: rhetorical victory often leads to victory in policy-making. It also helps to explain the causal process without resorting to motivational or external explanations. According to Jackson, such explanations are completely irrelevant. He also states that key commonplaces are not necessarily the ones most frequently used: while frequency might signal that the speaker or the audience find the commonplace important, it does not tell us about the causal impact of the arguments. (2006, 45–50.)

Jackson’s elimination of motivational and external explanations in causal processes is not without merit. Internal reasons, for one, are impossible to verify: whether a speaker has had a change of heart or not, they may lie about it. Ignoring external reasons, however, may not always be preferable: the direction of debates may well be affected by external

events. While it may be impossible to verify whether a change was truly brought about by the assumed external event, it sounds nigh impossible to make sense of a historical record of a rhetorical commonplace without studying the context as well. If the aim is to only write the history of a commonplace, focusing on actual usage is surely the best option. However, in the case of Japan's security policy, external actors and context are invaluable. While there is no guarantee that the conclusions I draw from policy changes and Japan's external environment are correct, the U.S., conservatism, and Japan's neighbouring countries cannot be ignored when discussing Japan's security policy. Therefore, context will be of central concern in my thesis.

3. ARTICLE 9 AND THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

第9条 日本国民は、正義と秩序を基調とする国際平和を誠実に希求し、国権の発動たる戦争と、武力による威嚇又は武力の行使は、国際紛争を解決する手段としては、永久にこれを放棄する。

2 前項の目的を達するため、陸海空軍その他の戦力は、これを保持しない。国の交戦権は、これを認めない。(houko.com.)

Dai kyuujiyoo: Nihon kokumin wa, seigi to chitsujyo wo kichoo to suru kokusai heiwa wo seijitsu ni kikyuu shi, kokken no hatsudoo taru sensoo to, buryoku ni yoru ikaku mata wa buryoku no kooshi wa, kokusai funsoo wo kaiketsu suru shudan toshite wa, eikyuu ni kore wo houki suru.

Ni: Senkoo no mokuteki wo tassuru tame, rikukaikuugun sono ta no senryoku wa, kore wo hoji shinai. Kuni no kousenken wa, kore wo mitomenai.

Article 9. (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet.)

Article 9 was enacted alongside the current Constitution of Japan under the Allied occupation in 1947. It renounced Japan's right to war as well as the right to maintain war potential. Today, it remains one of the most extensively debated articles of the Constitution, which has never been amended despite significant legal changes in Japan's security policy. In this chapter, I shall examine the origins of the Constitution according to Dale M. Hellegers' work *We, the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution* (2001), the influence of international law on Article 9, the history of its interpretation, and the alleged pacifism of the Constitution.

3.1. The Origins of the Constitution

After Japan's surrender in World War II, the country faced the Allied occupation, which aimed to demilitarise and democratise Japan. While constitutional reform was not initially an objective of the occupation, it was silently considered by the Japanese. When Konoe Fumimaro, a politician who had been the prime minister before Japan entered World War II, met with General Douglas MacArthur – the leader of the occupation – stated that the constitution would have to be liberally revised and that if the Japanese would not do it, the occupation forces would. Konoe treated this as a sign to initiate constitutional reform. His team's proposals were never submitted to the General Headquarters (GHQ), however, as Konoe committed suicide in 1945 after being indicted on crimes against peace. (Hellegers 2001, 438–459.)

In 1945, Shidehara Kijuroo became the prime minister. Unlike Konoe, Kijuroo had a reputation of integrity unsoiled by World War II. He had e.g. acted as an ambassador to the U.S. His government included Yoshida Shigeru as the foreign minister and Matsumoto Jooji as a minister without an assigned responsibility. Shidehara, arguing that the Meiji Constitution could serve democracy without alteration, ordered a Committee for the Investigation of Constitutional problems (*Kenpou Mondai Chousa Iinkai*, KMCI) under Matsumoto. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), i.e. General MacArthur, had made no direct mention of constitutional reform at the time. Unfortunately, Matsumoto's conviction that little reform was necessary overwhelmed the KMCI's task, and the KMCI remained disconnected from American criticism of the Meiji Constitution. For example, it appears that Matsumoto conflated "form of government" with sovereignty. According to the Potsdam Declaration, sovereignty must reside in the people. Despite this, Matsumoto argued that the articles related to the emperor could be preserved untouched. (Hellegers 2001, 461–469.)

The KMCI's plan was to submit a revision plan in early 1946. Although their study was conducted in secret, guidelines regarding the revision plan had to be published due to external pressure. These guidelines stated e.g. that a sovereign emperor and democratisation could coexist. Critics argued that such a concept of democracy merely translated as an autocracy respectful of popular will. Irrespective of the criticism and charging a subcommittee to produce a draft revision, Matsumoto proceeded to write a draft himself and to present it to the Emperor in the KMCI's name. It became known as the B

Draft, one including minimal change from the Meiji Constitution. Matsumoto submitted a translation of this draft to the GHQ without the government's approval. (Hellegers 2001, 469–486.)

Despite the mishaps on the Japanese side, SCAP's policy remained that of watchful waiting when possible due to the concern that extensive interference in the drafting process could prevent Japan's lesson of democracy. Although guidelines from Washington were received in January, they were treated as a last resort: an imposed constitution would receive less support than one of Japanese origin. These State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC 288) guidelines did not suppose a permanent abolition of armed forces. (Hellegers 2001, 495–505.) Therefore, Article 9 did not originate in Washington.

A significant gap between Japanese intentions and American expectations became apparent after an investigative reporter published the KMCI's more liberal A Draft without permission. As a result, MacArthur ordered a Government Section (GS) draft to be written. MacArthur's guidelines for the draft included limiting the emperor's powers, abolishing war as a sovereign right of the nation, and banning armed forces. In other words, Article 9 was first written at this stage. Once formally submitted, the A Draft was rejected by General MacArthur for being unacceptable as a democratic instrument. Prime Minister Shidehara was left with the impression that the symbolic status of the emperor and Article 9 were untouchable. (Hellegers 2001, 515–533.)

It is commonly agreed that the idea of renouncing war – i.e. the origin of Article 9 – first appeared in discussions between MacArthur and Shidehara (Umeda 2006). Although there is no certainty which one of them suggested the clause first, an investigation committee attributed the idea to Shidehara (Auer 1990, 173). The idea first appeared in written form in the so-called MacArthur Note, binding the GS's drafting process alongside the SWNCC 288, read that the emperor will be the head of the state while the right of war and the feudal system will be abolished (Umeda 2006). On war, the note read:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection.

No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force. (National Diet Library.)

“Even for preserving its own security” was later deleted by the Americans as unrealistic. Once the Diet examined the GS draft, they added “aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order” as well as “in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph” according to the Constitutional Amendment Committee’s suggestion. (Umeda 2006.)

With no alternative to the American draft, the Cabinet agreed to follow it while keeping its foreign authorship a secret. Arguments over wording ensued once a Japanese “translation” was ordered to be submitted to the GS. Although a literal translation had not been ordered, the GS did not approve of the Japanese “interpretation”. For example, the preamble had been erased. The Americans feared that the Japanese might exploit the ambiguous qualities of their language. The draft’s clarity was improved by the Japanese and eventually, the Cabinet had no choice but to sponsor it. Although the finished draft was very different from the B Draft that had been published earlier, the media did not comment on SCAP’s role. Despite this, the public realised that the occupation had been involved in the drafting process. (Hellegers 2001, 534–544.)

Although the U.S. played a major part in the birth of the Constitution, a national police force – which would later become the SDF – was soon formed despite Article 9 as the Korean War heated the Cold War (Umeda 2015). While this may give the impression of the article as a short-sighted addition, it was rather a case of historical continuity. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which renounced war, had a similar phrasing and ideological basis as Article 9. Therefore, the utopian idea of outlawing war – which had clearly failed due to the ignition of World War II – was included in the Japanese Constitution. For Japan, it gave an opportunity to focus on economic recovery over defence. This emphasis later became known as the Yoshida Doctrine. Due to the importance of international law in the birth of Article 9, the history of international law will be briefly outlined as per Martti Koskenniemi’s *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: the Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960* (2001) in the following section.

3.2. International Law and Its Influence on Article 9

Koskenniemi begins his recount of the history of international law from the late 19th century. In 1873, international jurists met in Ghent, Belgium to form an institution of international law after the Franco-Prussian War failed to honour the Geneva Convention, which aimed to protect victims of armed conflicts. They wished to crystallise the “legal conscience of the civilised world”, a term coined by Johann Caspar Bluntschli. He argued that international law is dynamic rather than a mere bundle of treaties and customs, and that sovereignty is always limited by human rights of citizens and non-citizens. Pasquale Fiore agreed that individual freedom and human rights are fundamental objects of protection of international law. He claimed that law is not a sovereign decision but an outgrowth of society. As such, only fully civilised states – European at the time – could be members of a juridical community. In other words, the late 19th century international law was based on collective conscience rather than sovereignty. (Koskenniemi 2001, 39–56.)

International law was approached with European concepts of political organisation. Other peoples and governments, such as the Japanese and the Tokugawa government, were considered to be behind Europe in evolution. As a result, humanitarianism was often accompanied by racism, and international law was not considered automatically transferrable to other parts of the world. Therefore, rules of warfare were only utilised between “civilised” nations. Despite this, international lawyers stressed that the civilising mission ought to be one of good example, not an unregulated race. (Koskenniemi 2001, 70–106.) Unfortunately, this was not the case in practice as the history of colonialism clearly indicates.

Towards the end of the 19th century, informal colonial empires were formalised in order to protect traders and settlers and to prevent other powers from expanding. For this end, European institutions needed to be projected into colonies. Law became a part of the moral and political controversy concerning the justice of colonialism. However, the rules agreed to in the Berlin Conference (1884–85) had little meaning in practice. They mainly served as a public cover for private interests. Although civilised non-European states, such as Japan and Persia, were considered to enjoy the right of independence and non-intervention by some, non-European states remained excluded from international law. The language of standard, of civilisation, merely acted as justification; in reality, European interests decided who could enter the international community. (Koskenniemi 2001, 117–135.)

In the interwar period, national interests overtook common interest. Hersch Lauterpacht criticised aggressive nationalism and sovereignty as the causes of World War I. He argued that the most important problem of international order was the states' ability to interpret their obligations, i.e. self-judging. He claimed that if states are allowed to self-judge the observance of treaties, they become legally meaningless. To counter this issue, public opinion, interdependence, and common interest could be utilised. (Koskenniemi 2001, 354–358.)

In 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed to outlaw war. Originally proposed by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand, as a bilateral agreement between France and the U.S., the Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg suggested that they would invite all nations to sign the pact. Due to the destruction caused by World War I, the pact was well-received as the illegality of war had become popular in international public opinion. It outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, i.e. wars of aggression, as well as called for peaceful means for settling disputes. Japan became one of the signatories. However, in 1931, Japan breached the pact by invading Manchuria. (Office of the Historian.) This proved that self-judging made treaties meaningless in practice. In addition, since the pact did not define self-defence, any given country can merely claim a war as defensive in order to avoid breaching the pact. However, the idealism of the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not vanish. In Japan, it became a law in form of Article 9. As can be seen below, the two share similar wording:

Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies [*sic*], and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means. (League of Nations 1929, 63.)

In retrospective after World War II, Carl Schmitt argued that the European order had collapsed between 1890 and 1918. Spatial distinctions and sovereignty became less important as the concept of enemies of humanity emerged. Politics was subordinated to economics, guaranteeing the political superiority of the U.S. over Europe. Moralism, an

essential part of the emerging American order, abolished neutrality. Hans Morgenthau, another analyst of the old and new orders, concluded that among nations, international law is not what matters – international politics is. (Koskenniemi 2001, 416–445.)

3.3. The Official Interpretation of Article 9

Umeda Sayuri, a foreign law specialist of the Library of Congress, offers a comprehensive summary of the interpretations of Article 9 in her legal report *Japan: Interpretations of Article 9 of the Constitution* (2015). As the interpretation of Article 9 is of central concern in this thesis, her report will be outlined below.

According to Umeda, interpretations of Article 9 vary from absolute pacifism to the admission of the right of collective self-defence. The majority agree that the first paragraph of the article renounces war as a means of invasion. Since similar phrasing was used in the Kellogg-Briand Pact without excluding war in self-defence, it can be argued that self-defence is not renounced by the first paragraph. Therefore, since the second paragraph is meant to accomplish the aim of the first paragraph, it can be concluded that defensive wars and UN-sanctioned wars are allowed. However, critics have claimed that it can be difficult to distinguish between invasion and self-defence, and that all wars are means of settling international disputes. As such, the majority view is that self-defence through a standing military is forbidden and that the only ways of resisting aggression are police power and ad hoc militia, i.e. citizens with weapons. The government under Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei argued in 1972 that as the SDF is not powerful enough to constitute “war potential”, the SDF is constitutional. “War potential” referred to forces much greater than those minimally required for self-defence. (Umeda 2015.) It must be noted, however, that the contemporary SDF ranks among the most capable armed forces in the world (Global Fire Power 2016).

The history of the debate began in 1946. In the 90th Imperial Diet session in 1946, the then-Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru stated that under the Constitution, self-defence would be allowed but war based on self-defence would not be allowed. He claimed that admitting the right to defensive wars would be harmful as most wars are fought in defence. In other words, while the right to self-defence existed, all war potential was prohibited. When the communist threat in East Asia grew, however, MacArthur stated that the Constitution did

not negate the right of self-defence against unprovoked attacks. Once the Korean War began and the U.S. troops based in Japan were sent to Korea, MacArthur authorised a National Police Reserve to defend Japan. Yoshida stated that the police's purpose was to maintain public order and it was therefore not a militaristic organisation. (Umeda 2015.)

After the Peace Treaty of World War II was concluded in 1952 and the police received further equipment from the U.S., a debate on the meaning of war potential emerged. The San Francisco Peace Treaty recognised Japan's right to self-defence and the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan based on necessity. It admitted Japan's right to individual and collective self-defence as well as the right to voluntarily enter into collective security agreements. The U.S. forces would stay in Japan as long as Japan would increasingly assume responsibility for its defence. However, the Japanese were reluctant to rearm due to the memory of World War II and the lack of funds to do so. On the day of the Peace Treaty, Japan signed the Security Treaty with the U.S as well. (Umeda 2015.)

Following the treaties, the National Police Force was upgraded into the National Safety Force. The government argued that it was still a police force by nature. In 1954, the ruling party of the Diet asserted for the first time that Japan has a right to a defence force. Thus, the national police forces were upgraded into the Self-Defense Forces. A question was raised regarding the ambiguity between the bill and Article 9 as well as concern that the obligations of collective self-defence might include dispatching the SDF abroad. Therefore, when the House of Councillors passed the SDF Law, they simultaneously passed the Resolution on the Ban of Dispatching the SDF Abroad. (Umeda 2015.)

The official Cabinet interpretation of Article 9 has been that while Japan has renounced war, it had the right to self-defence and the right to struggle in order to defend itself. Moreover, the SDF is not unconstitutional as its mission is self-defence and its ability is limited to the necessary and adequate levels of self-defence. The three requirements on the use of the right to self-defence, formulated by the government, were a present and wrongful danger of invasion to Japan, the nonexistence of other appropriate means of defence, and that the use of force to defend Japan is limited to the minimal necessary extent. (Umeda 2015.) This long-standing interpretation changed in 2015, however, when "an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016) was added to

the first requirement in addition to Japan. In other words, collective self-defence became possible.

Until 2014, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) had a fairly consistent interpretation of the article. The CLB works under the Cabinet and is consulted with in various legal matters. It holds significant authority and reputation in matters of law. In 1994, despite the pressure to reinterpret Article 9 to allow collective self-defence, the CLB stated that if the government cannot pursue its desired policy without reinterpretation, it should amend the Constitution first. (Umeda 2015.) Amendment has not occurred, however, despite the enabling of collective self-defence in 2015.

The Supreme Court has not directly decided on the SDF's constitutionality. In 1952, it dismissed a case on the constitutionality of the National Police Reserve, claiming that there was no concrete legal dispute. In the Sunakawa case of 1959, it ruled that pacifism does not equate defencelessness or non-resistance, and that it is not prohibited to seek a guarantee of peace from another country. (Umeda 2015.)

Even under the government's understanding, limitations on the SDF exist. For one, the use of force – defined as “an act of combat by an organization consisting of Japanese people carried out with materials provided by Japan and is part of an international armed conflict” in 1991 – is not allowed. Collective defence, however, was recognised in the San Francisco Peace Treaty as well as under the UN's acknowledgment of the right of collective self-defence. In 1951, the government claimed that although Japan has a right to collective defence, it has no right to war potential and thus no means to protect the U.S. bases in Japan. In 1954, it was stated that Japan cannot act based on the right of collective self-defence. In 1959, however, the CLB claimed that as an attack on the U.S. bases would involve invasion in Japan, Japan has the right to protect the U.S. bases. While the U.S. would defend Japan based on the principle of collective self-defence, Japan would act upon its right to individual self-defence. In general, it has traditionally been admitted that Japan has the right to collective self-defence but cannot act on it due to the Constitution. Despite this, the Abe government has enabled collective self-defence based on a Cabined Decision made in 2014. While the decision did not directly mention the right to collective self-defence, the standards of the use of force were expanded. Since then, bills expanding the SDF's ability of logistic support and removing the geographical limitations of its activities have been passed. (Umeda 2015.)

SCAP designed the Constitution difficult to amend in order to ensure that Japan would not fall back to its militaristic past (Umeda 2015). According to Article 96 of the Constitution, two-thirds of both houses of the Diet must vote in favour of amendment for it to pass and the majority of the electorate must ratify this (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet). Bryce Wakefield and Craig Martin (2014) highlight that comparative research has shown that the Constitution of Japan is legally easier to amend than e.g. the Constitution of the U.S. In the U.S., two-thirds of both houses of the Congress or two-thirds of the states are necessary to propose and amendment after which three-fourths of the states must ratify the amendment (Charters of Freedom). Therefore, the difficulty of amending is not a strong argument to support reinterpreting the Constitution. According to Umeda (2015), the majority of the public did not favour constitutional amendment from the late-1950s to 1980s. Therefore, no proposals for amendment were made. Since 1993, however, the public has been in favour of amending the Constitution, not due to its foreign origin but its outdatedness. Shioda Koji (2007, 74) reports that in a poll regarding constitutional amendment in December 2007, 73% of the people stated that the reason amendment is necessary is that since the times have changed, there are problems that cannot be reacted to under the current Constitution. Of the people against amendment, 62% stated that they wish to protect Article 9.

The U.S. has consistently pressured Japan to amend Article 9 since the directive to rearm in 1948. In 2004, Colin Powell, the Secretary of State at the time, stated that Japan must consider revising Article 9 if it wishes to acquire a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. In 2005, the LDP published its first draft for amendment on the party's 50th anniversary. While it maintained the first paragraph of Article 9, it deleted the second paragraph and replaced it with one that recognised the SDF, placing the force under the prime minister's command, and encouraged participation in peacekeeping activities (Winkler 2011, 126). While the right to collective self-defence was not explicitly mentioned, it was implied. In the LDP's second draft on the 60th anniversary of the Peace Treaty in 2012, the new second paragraph explicitly admitted the right to self-defence while an added third paragraph allowed e.g. peacekeeping activities instead of activities defending Japan only. Broad, temporary power would be given to the prime minister in the state of emergency. Such a state could be declared by the Cabinet and cancelled by the Diet. (Umeda 2015.)

Overall, it would appear that Wakefield & Martin's (2014) argument that enabling collective self-defence does not continue the pattern of security legislation appears to be correct. It has overturned the traditional understanding of Article 9 irreversibly. However, as long as Article 9 remains in effect, it will be difficult to interpret it in a manner that would allow for military action similar to states that have not renounced armed forces. Despite this, collective self-defence may become a crucial turning point that greatly loosens the effect of Article 9 on new legislation. In due time, this will open a possibility for further research.

3.4. Pacifist Constitution?

The Japanese Constitution is sometimes called the Pacifist Constitution due to the principles of Article 9 and the preamble. Michael J. Kelly (2007, 492) calls the "pacifism clause" of Article 9 a unique constitutional feature. Umeda (2015) also refers to Article 9 and the preamble as pacifist. In this section, this question of pacifism shall be examined through the arguments of Akimoto Daisuke (2013) and Guy Almog (2014).

Akimoto (2013, 53–244) argues that Japan has moved from the negative pacifism of the pre-Gulf War era to positive pacifism since 1991. This coincided with the shift in public opinion regarding constitutional revision: revision started gaining support in the early 90s. Akimoto suggests that from 1945 to 1990, the prevalence of negative pacifism – that is, the prevention of war – was based on Article 9 and the trauma caused by World War II. Originally, there were also calls for absolute pacifism, i.e. abolishing war even in self-defence. Negative pacifism resulted in e.g. the 1% limit on the SDF's budget, the non-dispatch principle, and the three non-nuclear principles. After the Gulf War, however, Japan transformed from a one-nation pacifist state to a global pacifist state. Japan's national pacifism had previously made international pacifism impossible. Accordingly, Akimoto refers to Japan's core security identity as "global pacifist state". He argues, however, that negative pacifism will continue to be an influential constraint on Japan's security policy. Whichever the case, he considers it likely that Japan will remain a pacifist state.

Almog (2014), on the other hand, argues that the Constitution of Japan is not pacifist by nature or by function. He claims that pacifism is not a general inclination towards peace

but an absolutist theory which regards no war as morally justified. Almog continues that the reason for Shidehara's acceptance of Article 9 was not pacifism but pragmatism: after World War II, Japan could not finance a military and the article soothed Japan's neighbours. Moreover, Almog suggests that to MacArthur, Article 9 was merely a means of preserving the emperor, which was the new Constitution's top priority. In addition, the Ashida Amendment added the phrases "aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order" and "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph" to the article to enable the SDF. Umeda (2015) presents the same conclusion. Thus, Almog (2014) argues that Article 9 was not meant to be pacifist but insurance that Japan would not become a "menace" again. For one, the article acknowledges the right of belligerency as an existing right while pacifism would deny that such a right exists in the first place. In addition, a pacifist state would not accept a foreign military umbrella. Almog concludes that although Japan has a clear desire for peace, it is not pacifist.

Almog (2014) continues that the wording of Article 9 does not include "pacifism" and that it is not out of the ordinary compared to other constitutions. Despite this, other countries are not attacked for betraying their "pacifist" constitutions. Almog points out that even the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not deny wars of self-defence, which is problematic as both sides of a conflict tend to claim to be acting in self-defence. He adds that while the renunciation of forces is unusual, it is not unprecedented: Costa Rica, for one, does not have an official military. Almog does, however, applaud Japan for not having become an active combatant since 1945 despite the significant forces it possesses. While Japan's land forces are not remarkable, Almog argues that the SDF's air and marine forces are significant in strength. With the SDF having the ability to support the U.S., the Japanese forces cannot be called pacifist.

It would appear that the question of pacifism hinges on one's perception of pacifism, i.e. whether one accepts the existence of positive and negative pacifism in addition to absolute pacifism. While positive and – to a larger extent – negative pacifism describe Japan's security policy throughout the post-war era, absolute pacifism does not. Therefore, it is a question of defining pacifism rather than the contents of the Constitution. In either case, it can be argued that the Constitution of Japan is relatively peace-aspiring as the renunciation of armed forces is an unusual, although not unique, constitutional feature.

4. KOIZUMI JUNICHIRO

Koizumi Junichiro (1942–) was the prime minister of Japan from April 2001 to September 2006. His party, the LDP, has led Japanese politics almost continuously since its establishment in 1955. Koizumi was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1972 and held several ministerial posts during his career. As one of the longest-serving prime ministers of Japan, he and his cabinet enjoyed relatively high support, the percentage being 48.2% in 2003. 29.5% of those polled were dissatisfied with the administration. (Kabashima 2004, 335.)

Support is vital for successfully influencing people. Hart (1997, 84) suggests that a speech is never separate from the speaker, which means that persuasion depends on the speaker's credibility. Despite Koizumi's undeniable credibility as far as the polls indicate, Koizumi's reputation had its downsides. His repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were highly controversial due to the 14 Class A war criminals that were secretly enshrined in 1978 in addition to thousands of Class B and Class C war criminals that had been discreetly enshrined during the previous decade. In 1979, the enshrinement of the Class A war criminals became public. This led to Chinese protests in 1982, culminating in 1985 when the then-Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro stopped visiting the shrine due to external pressure. (Pollman 2016, 125.)

M. Erika Pollman argues that both China and South Korea interpreted the visits to the shrine as a glorification of Japan's military past rather than as an act of mourning the dead. This had led to e.g. cancelled meetings over the years. (Pollman 2016, 124.) It is notable that as the shrine does not enshrine enemy soldiers, it can be considered to be a nationalistic shrine rather than a traditional Shinto shrine (Umehara 2004), which may further deteriorate foreign views of the shrine. Politicians visiting the Yasukuni Shrine are not merely an issue of international relations, however. According to Pollman, prime ministerial visits were a normal occurrence until 1985. Despite this, the shrine had invited domestic discourse, especially in regards to the separation of state and religion. (Pollman 2016, 125–126.) Takenaka Akiko (2007) notes that Nakasone signed the guest register as the prime minister during his visit in 1985, which is an example of the possible lack of the separation of state and religion in practice. Even today, the domestic atmosphere is vital for prime ministers when deciding on a possible visit. According to Pollman, ideology and popularity to withstand a backlash are reasons for a visit As Koizumi's government was

relatively popular and the LDP has close ties with nationalistic groups, which creates pressure to visit the shrine, Koizumi's visits are a logical outcome of the circumstances. In his case, the domestic benefit must have been calculated to outweigh the negative diplomatic consequences of the visits. (Pollman 2016, 125–131.) Gavan McCormack (2004) suggests that the perceived nationalistic nature of Koizumi's visits was necessary to balance his devotion to the United States. Due to the LDP's support and Koizumi's pro-shrine disposition, however, it is likely that Koizumi would have been willing to visit the shrine without such a benefit. As Koizumi's support decreased to 38.8% in 2004 while dissatisfaction rose to 43.6% (Kabashima 2004, 335), the following visits were not likely a way of inviting wider support from the people.

In this chapter, I will analyse a variety of statements made by Koizumi. My emphasis will be on a speech he gave in 2003 in a press conference regarding the decision to dispatch the SDF to Iraq. Koizumi describes the dispatch as one of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance: it will not only help the people of Iraq but also showcase Japan's commitment to international cooperation and the security alliance with the U.S. Koizumi adds that the UN has called for its member states to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq. For those opposing the dispatch, Koizumi reads a part of the preamble of the Constitution which calls for a universal responsibility in matters of peace. Koizumi claims that if all forces were to withdraw from Iraq, the terrorist threat would destabilise the world and thereby threaten Japan as well. Finally, Koizumi refers to the success the SDF has had in various peacekeeping operations (PKO), expressing belief that the dispatch to Iraq will result in similar praises. (Koizumi 2003c.) In addition to this speech, statements from various other speeches will be analysed at appropriate times in order to broaden the image given by Koizumi. All the statements will be divided to four categories: the U.S. and the Iraq War, international relations, the SDF, and peace. With the help of the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2, I will attempt to interpret Koizumi's words.

4.1. The United States and the Iraq War

The Iraq War (2003–2011), especially its early phase, was the most significant event affecting Japan's security policy during Koizumi's term. As such, it shall be the point of departure of my analysis. Japan's participation in the war cannot, however, be separated from the influence of the U.S. Therefore, Japan's relations with the U.S. will be considered simultaneously.

The United States is a major force influencing Japan's security policy. This has been the case since the post-war Allied occupation due to the Security Treaty between the two countries and the placement of American troops in Japan. In addition, the Constitution of Japan was largely based on an American draft after a Japanese draft was rejected by the U.S. (Hellegers 2001, 527). The U.S. regretted Article 9 soon after, however, and the LDP has been determined to amend the clause (McCormack 2004). Unable to do so, the LDP has chosen to interpret the article in the most convenient way possible while the U.S. has increasingly pressured Japan to abandon the constraints of the Constitution and participate in collective security (Martin 2007). Therefore, the relationship between Japan and the U.S. reflects and affects the practice of Article 9. Koizumi speaks of the importance of this relationship on several occasions:

The United States is Japan's ally, and I believe that Japan must also be a trustworthy ally for the United States. It is from that perspective as well that I recognize the extreme importance of maintaining the relations of trust within the Japan-US alliance. (Koizumi 2003c.)

By depicting the alliance with the U.S. as a matter of paramount importance, Koizumi creates a need for Japan to answer to the requests of the U.S. regarding the Iraq War. He emphasises trust, which presents Japan's actions as a matter of integrity rather than as a duty: although Japan *could* refuse the demands of the U.S., doing so would give an insincere image of Japan. This would damage Japan's "face". Trust may also be emphasised due to the unpleasant memories of the Gulf War after which Japan was heavily criticised for only offering financial aid (Winkler 2011, 37), i.e. the U.S. made clear that Japan had not been a trustworthy ally at the time. Therefore, Koizumi expressed his support for the Iraq War in March 2003 despite the lack of a UN warrant (Koizumi 2003a). Soon after, the U.S. applied heavy pressure on Japan to honour Koizumi's commitment. Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State of the time, stated that

Japan should “quit paying to see the game, and get down to the baseball diamond”. (McCormack 2004.)

Koizumi’s reasons for supporting the U.S. in Iraq were likely deeper than simply obeying Washington, however. One of Koizumi’s agendas was normalising relations with North Korea (McCormack 2004). On one hand, he had to remain loyal to Washington to gain the freedom for this enterprise. On the other hand, the possibility of a clash between Japan and North Korea could not be ignored, which made securing the support of the U.S. necessary. Yakushiji Katsuyuki (2003) argues that while the stated reasons for supporting the Iraq War included the Iraqis’ non-compliance with UN weapons inspections and the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the true reasons were the fear of North Korea and its possible nuclear weapons as well as President Bush’s increasing unilateralism. This unilateralism likely made it impossible to remain neutral. As Koskenniemi (2001, 419) argues, the moral concept of war – the trademark of the U.S. – leaves no room for neutrality. Therefore, Koizumi had no choice but to either side with the U.S. or be against it – and for an ally of the U.S. dependent on its military, there is hardly room for “against”.

Yakushiji (2003) questions whether supporting the U.S. in the Iraq War was necessary to ensure American support against North Korea, however, and whether Japan is not allowed to voice its opinions despite being an ally of the U.S. Considering Bush’s unilateralism and pre-emptive policy, it would certainly have been likely that the U.S. would not have ignored hostility from a country belonging to the “Axis of Evil”. Therefore, although North Korea remains a perceived threat, it can be questioned whether the conservative elements in Japan deliberately used the fear of North Korea to legitimise their policies in order to stretch Japan’s military capabilities further than Article 9 has traditionally allowed. Therefore, a reason for Koizumi’s compliance has to be searched elsewhere.

According to Yakushiji (2003), a Foreign Ministry official has stated that Bush’s unilateralism is the reason why Japan had to participate in the Iraq War: since the Bush administration was increasingly reluctant to listen to other countries’ opinions, Japan would benefit from a position of being owed to. Similarly, Koizumi suggested in one of his speeches that “I do not believe that the United States alone can succeed in providing assistance for the reconstruction of Iraq” (Koizumi 2003c), presenting Japan’s help as necessary to the U.S. Yakushiji (2003), however, argues that the U.S. would privilege its own interests over the stability of any region. Maeda Tetsuo (2002) adds that while the U.S.

presence in East Asia supposedly provides safety and stability, this is not guaranteed in reality as the Bush administration had proven willing to pre-emptively strike against the “Axis of Evil”. In other words, Japan could become involved in a regional conflict initiated by the U.S. Yakushiji continues that the U.S. was also losing its moral authority due to its intolerance: the United Nations did not agree with the war, and it was labelled as a military invasion by critics. He further suggests that the SDF would be unlikely to provide no support for small-scale military action. (Yakushiji 2003.) Despite this, the SDF was dispatched to Iraq.

It is also questionable whether Japan’s support in the Iraq War left the U.S. indebted to Japan as aid is generally a logical outcome of an alliance. The Iraq War may instead have acted as compensation for the allegedly inadequate contribution Japan provided during the Gulf War. Therefore, proving that Japan could offer support outside the economic sector was likely a significant factor affecting Koizumi’s actions. He appears to have been well aware of the situation:

I do not think that this is a situation in which we can decide not to make personnel contributions because it is too dangerous and that merely giving money will be enough. (Koizumi 2003c.)

Koizumi clearly states that monetary support by itself is not adequate. As noted by Buzan et al. (1998, 173) Japan has had a tendency to respond to security concerns economically irrespective of the origin of the issue. Such a legacy has likely impacted the public’s view on the adequacy of monetary support. By using the word “merely”, Koizumi emphasises this inadequacy to the Japanese public. Furthermore, by presenting the statement as a personal feeling, Koizumi claims the listeners’ attention through identification (Hart 1997, 225–226). This brings the otherwise rather distant matter closer to the public, inviting the people to agree with Koizumi’s view. Although he admits the possible dangerousness of the situation, this may enhance the personal effect: if the situation appears threatening to the Japanese and, by extent, to Japan’s national safety, it will be necessary to contribute to its solution as much as possible. Without a threat, there would be no reason to participate.

Thus, the Iraq War led to the redefinition of the security relationship between Japan and the U.S., which in turn made redefining the role of the SDF and Article 9 necessary. Maeda T. presents that the September 11 attacks were followed by the “era of implementation”. He suggests that as a result of the implementations made, the limit to direct participation in

combat has virtually disappeared: Japan and the U.S. have moved from a defence treaty to a limitless military alliance, propelled by Bush's renouncement of deterrence and his move to pre-emptive strikes. (Maeda T. 2002.) Maeda's argument, however, is not entirely true as the limited nature of Japanese support remains even if it has become looser and more ambiguous. Nevertheless, Maeda T. correctly predicts that the dispatch time of the SDF to Iraq would later be extended (see Koizumi 2004e). He argues that Japan is clearly exercising the right of collective self-defence which was still considered unconstitutional during and after Koizumi's term as can be seen from his successor's, Abe's, speeches (see Abe 2007). This makes the "era of implementation" suspect as it calls into question the constitutionality of the implementations. As Japan itself faced no threat, it would be difficult to label the SDF's support in Iraq as self-defence over collective self-defence or collective security. Therefore, the mission was political rather than defensive. Like Buzan et al. (1998, 49) note, peacekeeping operations are a matter of politics, not of security. The Iraq War was not a question of defending Japan but of asserting Japan's international status and proving Japan's trustworthiness to the U.S.

Securitising Iraq?

Wars are linked to security. This means that unless the Iraq War could somehow be associated with the security of Japan, it would be impossible to dispatch the SDF to Iraq under the ban on collective self-defence. Therefore, while Japan did not face an existential threat itself, it was necessary for Koizumi to portray the situation in Iraq as relevant to Japan's defence. He did this by stating that:

The stability and peaceful development of Iraq is essential for Iraq itself, as well as necessary for Japan. Indeed, it is necessary for the security of the world. (Koizumi 2003c.)

Koizumi claims that peace in Iraq is necessary for Japan and, "indeed", for the security of the world. By this, he frames it as an issue that is inherently important for Japan's security, therefore requiring extraordinary measures. This can be considered a case of securitisation: the issue is politicised and extraordinary measures are taken against it. Koizumi does not, however, depict the situation in Iraq as an existential threat to Japan as he does not state that peace in Iraq is necessary for the *survival* of Japan. Moreover, a threat must be

accepted by the audience for a securitising move to succeed (Buzan et al. 1998, 25) but here, Koizumi attempts to justify a decision that has already been made. Therefore, Koizumi's words do not constitute a securitising move per se. Rather, he uses the logic of securitisation in an attempt to justify his policy. It does, however, constitute securitisation in the sense that while politicisation is an open question, securitisation signals the failure of politics and can be used to override legislation and circumvent political processes (Buzan et al. 1998, 29), as is done whenever Article 9 is bypassed in practice. Perhaps "weak post-securitisation" would be a descriptive phrase for the situation.

By creating the possibility of a threat to Japan's security if the situation in Iraq does not proceed as desired, Koizumi justifies the participation of the SDF in Iraq's reconstruction. He associates the dispatch with the importance of the U.S. to further justify his government's actions:

Japan cannot alone secure its own peace and security. It was for such a reason that we concluded the Japan-US Security Treaty and why we must accord the Japan-US alliance the importance it deserves. (Koizumi 2003c.)

By associating the alliance with the U.S. and the situation in Iraq to Japan's security, assisting the U.S. in its mission becomes a logical conclusion: if the support of the U.S. is necessary to ensure Japan's safety, Japan should extend its support to the U.S. as well. In addition, Koizumi mentions that the United Nations has called upon its member states to assist in the reconstruction and expresses his belief that Japan has a responsibility to respond to this request (Koizumi 2003c). Akimoto (2013, 184) notes that Koizumi tends to highlight the UN instead of the U.S. when speaking of the reconstruction of Iraq. This can be connected to Koizumi's call for Japan to "occupy an honored place in the international society" as per the preamble of the Constitution (Koizumi 2003b). With these associations, supporting the reconstruction of Iraq coincides with Japan's interests in the international society as well as invites the approval of other members of the UN while downplaying the fact that the Iraq War began without a UN resolution.

Relying on the U.S. to ensure Japan's safety is, however, not a straightforward matter. Maeda T. expresses concern that the American troops based in Japan may only be interested in American safety. After the September 11 attacks, the U.S. bases were in their highest state of alert, Condition Delta. It is a state of virtual war which was not used during the Gulf War. Maeda T. argues that the effect reached the main islands of Japan, albeit it

was stronger in Okinawa due to the high concentration of bases. (Maeda T. 2002.) While the bases are not considered unconstitutional due to Japan's right to self-defence and the fact that the U.S. forces are not under Japanese control (Martin 2007), such events question whether the U.S. forces are positioned in Japan for *Japan's* defence. Christian G. Winkler agrees that autonomists tend to question the motive of the U.S. He continues, however, that even the majority of autonomists are not willing to end the alliance. (Winkler 2011, 40–41.)

While it can thus be argued that Koizumi's loyalty to the U.S. was questionable from a constitutional perspective, dismissing the interests of the U.S. is hardly an option due to the deep relationship between the two states. Yet it cannot be denied that Koizumi and the LDP's policies broadened the SDF's role and, consequently, widened the gap between practice and Article 9. It is notable, however, that while Koizumi stated that he is working towards constitutional revision, he added that he does not "believe that the revision of the Constitution can be realised by the end of this year or next" (Koizumi 2005b). Thus, although Koizumi advocated constitutional reform, he retained realistic expectations as to its schedule. Similarly, Gerald L. Curtis (2013) argues that Japanese politicians have traditionally been able to distinguish between the ideal and the realistic. Therefore, they are situated between utopians and realists when compared to E.H. Carr's (1946) concepts of utopia and realism: they recognise reality without forgetting their ideals. Curtis (2013) further argues that Japanese politicians tend to take Japan's external environment as a given, which is a realist tendency. This, however, is not the whole truth as Japan has actively advocated various regional and global institutions in the spirit of liberal internationalism (Inoguchi 2014, 947–948), which must have had an effect on Japan's external environment. Therefore, Japan does not fully take its environment as a given. As far as Article 9 is considered, Koizumi leans on the realist side since he speaks as if Article 9 will conform to his practices. Article 9 in itself, however, is a utopian law. Thus, it can be concluded that an uneasy contradiction between utopia and realism, between law and practice, exists in Japan's security policy.

United in Values

One of the ways in which Koizumi associates Japan and the U.S. is highlighting the shared values of the two countries. In his comment on the re-election of George W. Bush as the president of the U.S., Koizumi states that:

Japan and the United States share fundamental values such as the respect for basic human rights, democracy and promotion of the market economy. (Koizumi, 2004d.)

Here, Koizumi refers to basic human rights, democracy, and market economy as common values between Japan and the U.S. In *The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century* (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2006), written during Koizumi's visit to the White House, freedom, human dignity, and the rule of law were added to the list. In addition, it is noted that "these values are deeply rooted in the long historic traditions of both countries". In a general policy speech, Koizumi additionally states that the Iraqi people are making an effort "to construct a peaceful and democratic nation" (Koizumi 2005d). By associating both the U.S. and Iraq with democratic values, Koizumi creates a reason for Japan to assist them both as like-minded states. This would perhaps help Japan to "occupy an honored place in the international society" and to enhance "international peace based on justice and order" as the preamble of the Constitution and Article 9 state (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet).

However, the fact that the invasion of Iraq was not endorsed by the UN raises the question of what exactly do Japan and the U.S. refer to with "the rule of law". Does it exist above states or does it refer to interpreting law at their own convenience as suggested by the Iraq War and Japan's security legislation? Due to Bush's unilateralism, it is sensible to assume that his international "rule of law" coincided with American interests. Japan, on the other hand, appears to have more interest in strong global norms and institutions as evidenced by the liberal internationalist tendencies of Japanese foreign policy (Inoguchi 2014, 947-948). This tendency does not, however, necessarily oppose Japan's national interests. As Carr suggests, the good of the world is not accepted over the good of one's country (Carr 1946, 166). Since Japan is not capable of overriding international agreements by force like the U.S. is, its quest for liberal internationalism is likely aimed at promoting an environment suitable for Japan. Thus, adherence to the rule of law in the international arena is connected to Japan's strength. As Carr (1946, 80) argues, overwhelming power can create a seeming harmony between national interests and morality. This tendency has been strengthened by the moral concept of war which emerged as the U.S. rose to power (Koskenniemi 2001, 419).

The LDP's commitment to human rights is debatable as well. Koseki Shoichi highlights that in the LDP's draft of a new constitution, published in 2005, "public good and public order" were presented as more important than the rights of individuals, making it possible to restrict human rights even during times of peace. According to Koseki, only 17% of the Japanese supported the LDP's draft in 2006. (Koseki 2006.) Even members of the LDP and scholars in favour of reform criticised the draft (Winkler 2011, 126). Yakushiji (2003) agrees that the LDP prioritises the state over the individual. In addition, Inoguchi Takashi (2014, 957) suggests that human rights are one of the thinner values promoted by Japan. Therefore, human rights do not appear to be the greatest concern of the LDP. This does not necessarily mean that the LDP has no interest in human rights as human rights are not a clearly defined concept. Even if the government of Japan and the Japanese or Japan and the U.S. defined human rights differently, they could still all claim to advocate human rights as it is a rhetorical commonplace, meaning that its contents are not the same to each person. This makes human rights a powerful common value as they can be applied to a myriad of cases, creating alleged similarity regardless of practice.

Maeda Hisao also questions the values which Japan and the U.S. allegedly share. He argues that while Japan has constitutionally renounced war, the U.S. forces its values upon others with coercion. He also notes that the Koizumi administration's Defense White Paper of 2002 praised the U.S. for its advanced military technology that "minimises civilian casualties" even though the civilian casualties in the Middle East outnumber the casualties of the September 11 attacks (CBS News 2006, September 22). Furthermore, the Defense White Paper does not question why the U.S. became the target of such attacks but instead sees the attacks as targeting the "international community, including our country". (Maeda H. 2002.) Later, Koizumi suggested "putting aside the course that led to the beginning of the war" when justifying Japan's participation in the reconstruction effort (Koizumi 2005c). In other words, he is admitting the controversial beginning of the Iraq War while attempting to stifle further discussion before it begins. Instead of admitting the truth of the situation as a whole, Koizumi only chooses to focus on the convenient sides of the Iraq War.

The discrepancy in values raises a question on the relations between Japan and the United States: are they based on shared beliefs as claimed or are they shallower? Barry Buzan's concept of thin and thick interstate societies can be utilised to assess this question. In the case of Japan and the U.S., the relations between the two countries began as coercive. In

the 19th century, the U.S. forced Japan to open its ports after centuries of isolation, leading to a calculated effort in Japan to westernise the country in order to avoid the fate of colonies. Eventually, Japan became a coloniser itself. Its oppressive policies culminated in the wars before and during World War II. At the time, Japan and the U.S. belonged to a thin and shallow interstate society if any.

This, however, significantly changed after the injection of American values, including democracy and human rights, was initiated by the U.S. after the war. Since Japan had no option but to obey, this enterprise began as coercive as well. Over the decades, however, the relationship between the countries has become a mixture of calculation and belief. While the Japanese may not wholeheartedly share American values and interests, the alliance with the U.S. must be profitable as it has not been discontinued. George R. Packard (2010) agrees that the benefits of the alliance are generally seen to outweigh the costs. Unless Japan revises Article 9 and establishes a formal military force, the alliance is unlikely to lose its importance to Japan. To the U.S., Japan assuming a larger portion of its defence would only be profitable, giving the U.S. no reason to abolish the alliance and lose its strategic regional base. However, if Japan's defence became independent from the U.S., the U.S. might run the risk of losing Japan as an ally – and possibly the bases in Japan. Therefore, Japan's complete military independence might not be in the interests of the U.S. even if it has pressured Japan to develop its forces.

With this, it seems safe to call the relations between the two countries thick and a part of a cooperative society. They may not, however, be as thick and as liberal as the states would like the public to believe. The discrepancy of concrete values and the coercive history of their relations may be used as an argument in favour of constitutional amendment. Thus, it can be concluded that the effect of the Japan-U.S. relations on Japan's security policy is primarily based on calculative politics: in order to remain in the United States' favour, which is considered profitable, Japan must stretch the limits of its armed forces even if the Constitution is not amended. Therefore, American influence and interests drive Japan's security policy further from the traditional interpretation of Article 9 instead of accommodating to the legislation of its ally.

4.2. International Relations

Throughout his term, Koizumi repeatedly states that Japan's foreign policy ought to be based on two pillars: the alliance with the U.S. and international coordination (see e.g. Koizumi 2003c). Kelly (2007, 494) argues that in addition to the U.S., the perceived North Korean threat, China's rise, and the responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council have led to Japan's contemporary security policy. One of the results of this has been the LDP's quest for normalcy. Normal statehood, as defined by Ozawa Ichiro (according to Chun 2013, 415), means that a state adequately performs the roles expected of it. It can be argued that possessing a military is one of these roles since states can be defined as organisations with a monopoly on coercion (Weber 1921, 397). On Japan's journey for a political position proportionate to its economic position, a permanent seat in the UN Security Council has also been linked to the concept of normal statehood (Chun 2013, 416). In order to acquire a permanent seat, the support of all of the five permanent members of the Security Council – the U.S., China, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia – is necessary. According to Koizumi, Japan has secured the support of the U.S.:

Mindful of Japan's significant role and contributions at the U.N., Japan and the United States will intensify their cooperation, and work together in realizing Japan's permanent membership at the Security Council. (Koizumi 2006.)

Again, Japan's relations with the U.S. are made important. This time, however, Japan does not have to prove its trustworthiness to the U.S. Instead, the U.S. is cooperating with Japan with an implied sense of equality as they will work *together*. Koizumi's implied belief in cooperation may not have accurately depicted the attitude of the U.S., however. According to Christopher W. Hughes (2009, 854), the U.S. has taken a passive stance towards Japan's membership. Kent E. Calder (2006) agrees by arguing that the U.S. is lukewarm towards Japan's request. A journalist at one of Koizumi's press conferences also notes that Washington does not seem to be interested in reforming the Security Council despite previously expressing support for Japan's membership (Koizumi 2004b). Thus, it would seem that while the U.S. originally supported Japan's aim, its stance has become more neutral. Although Koizumi claims to believe that Japan is capable of serving in the Security Council while maintaining its Constitution (Koizumi 2004b), Kelly (2007, 494) suggests that there is a pragmatic belief that Japan cannot assert its status as a permanent

member without the potential to assert it. Therefore, a permanent seat could perhaps later become an additional reason for constitutional amendment. Whichever the case, Japan's bid for a permanent seat is an additional incentive to retain and improve relations with all five permanent members of the Security Council.

Of these four, China is likely to be the main obstacle to Japan's membership as it clearly opposes Japan's request (Hughes 2009, 854). Since China's relations with Japan were sour during Koizumi's term and they suffer from continuing territorial disputes and historical issues, China's attitude comes as no surprise. Calder (2006) suggests that historically, there has always been a clear distinction in power between China and Japan, with one being more powerful than the other. Since this status belonged to China until the Meiji Restoration of 1868, it is likely in China's interests to restore its status as the regional leader. For this end, granting Japan a permanent seat might not be preferable as it would improve Japan's regional and international status. Since China and Japan belong to the same security complex, such a significant change in the international security role of Japan would undoubtedly be of concern to China. Moreover, due to the importance of patriotism to the CCP's legitimacy (Gustafsson 2011, 120), the Chinese government may be unable to support Japan's claim as long as the relations between the two countries remain lukewarm at best and occasionally hostile.

Hughes (2009, 846–852) argues that Japan is not willing to cede regional leadership to China – on the contrary, it uses regional organisations as well as countries such as Australia, India, and Russia to dilute China's influence and attempts to match China's presence in the Middle East and Africa. Japan is therefore using its broad foreign policy of bilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism to ensure that China does not gain a regional edge. Accordingly, Kwang Ho Chun argues that China is worried about containment by Japan and the U.S. However, Chun also suggests that newer generations will overcome the historical constraints which have long plagued the relations between the two countries. He notes that while nationalism is a major force behind the drive to a normal state status, it is also a very different nationalism compared to the militant past of Japan. (Chun 2013, 420–428.)

Whether China will acknowledge this is a different matter, however. To return to the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine for a moment, Karl Gustafsson (2011, 127–128) argues that in the eyes of China, the visits of prime ministers negate the apologies made by Japanese

politicians over the state's imperialistic past. In addition, cultural and linguistic differences may exacerbate the issue. Kelly (2007, 505) questions whether Japan is still in denial about its past since the Japanese have not offered extensive apologies like the German have. Gustafsson (2011, 71) explains that while the Japanese tend to be ambiguous, the Chinese are rather straightforward. Therefore, an apology that is sufficient from the Japanese perspective might not appear so from the Chinese perspective. Even Koizumi himself acknowledges the issue of the shrine by stating that his visits are not "the only major issue that lies between Japan and China" (Koizumi 2005b).

Although Koizumi acknowledges China's importance by stating that Japan's relations with China are "one of the most important bilateral relationships for Japan", he isolates China in terms of values in the same speech by suggesting that

Japan shares the values of democracy with its closest geographic neighbor, the Republic of Korea, and the importance of this relationship cannot be overstated. (Koizumi 2001.)

From this, it can be deduced that Japan's relations with South Korea have a solidarist tone when compared to Japan's relations with China. Democracy is used as a rhetorical commonplace to associate the two countries. A gap is created between democracies, "us", and the rest of countries, "them", including China. This is one way of containing China or diluting its influence. However, the relations between Japan and South Korea are still plagued by territorial and historical disputes. Therefore, they are pluralist rather than solidarist even if they are not *as* pluralist as with China. It can be concluded that the East Asian society is largely based on coexistence.

4.3. The Self-Defense Forces

The Self-Defense Forces (自衛隊, *jietai*) is, as the name indicates, the self-defence forces of Japan. They are considered constitutional under the right of self-defence that Japan possesses (Martin, 2007). They can, however, be considered the *de facto* military of Japan. Even so, the SDF is carefully dissociated from the term "military". The bases of the U.S. in Japan, for example, are called 基地 (*kichi*). The bases of the SDF, however, are called 駐屯地 (*chuutochi*) even though the bases of the Japanese military were called *kichi* until the

end of World War II. (Pekka Korhonen, pers. comm.) This is one way to dissociate the SDF from “war potential” which is prohibited under Article 9. Therefore, the status of the SDF represents the interpretation of the article in practice. While the unconstitutionality of the SDF has been overruled (see Martin 2007), the details of their activities are questioned as can be seen from the concern that the security-related laws enacted under Koizumi may be unconstitutional. Perhaps for this reason, Koizumi did not often refer to constitutionality in his speeches. In regards to the Iraq Special Measures Law, however, Koizumi states that:

In addition, in this Diet session we passed the bill for assistance to Iraq ... in conformity with Article 9 of the Constitution. (Koizumi 2003b.)

The Iraq Special Measures Law, valid for four years, allowed the SDF to offer humanitarian relief and logistical support even if small-scale fighting were to continue in Iraq (Umeda 2006). Here, Koizumi directly states that the new bill conforms to Article 9. This is a rare occasion in his speeches. Why, then, did he mention the article when referring to the Iraq Special Measures Law in particular? To answer this question in more detail, an overview of other security-related laws enacted under Koizumi is in order.

In 2001, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was enacted as a response to the September 11 attacks. It allowed the SDF to operate abroad with the consent of the regional government. This law was considered unconstitutional by many. In 2003, the Iraq Special Measures Law was enacted, as were three war contingency laws due to pressure from the United States. These laws included an organised nation-wide emergency system and the ability to pre-emptively react to expected attacks. They were followed by seven new war contingency laws in 2004 which e.g. allowed the SDF to share goods and services with American troops placed in Japan. They also gave the prime minister the right to allow the U.S. military to use private land or buildings if Japan were to come under attack. (Umeda 2006.)

According to Umeda (2006), the government argued that these laws did not violate Article 9 as they are defence-oriented and do not include collective self-defence. This is, however, questionable. The long-standing interpretation of Article 9, stemming from the Cabinet Legislation Bureau of 1954, is that Japan can neither deploy forces abroad nor participate in collective self-defence (Martin 2007). Yet in the case of Iraq, Japan sent the SDF abroad for the sake of U.S. interests without the UN’s approval. Therefore, Koizumi may have had

to underline the alleged constitutionality of the dispatch law in order to sell his foreign policy.

One should note, however, that the laws enacted during Koizumi's term were not the first to grant the SDF the right to operate abroad. In 1992 under Miyazawa Kiichi of the LDP, the Peace Keeping Operations Law enabled the SDF to work under the command of the United Nations in peacekeeping operations, excluding the use of force. In 1999 under Obuchi Keizo of the LDP, following the New Guidelines of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Law was enacted, allowing Japan to operate in its surrounding areas as the name implies. This law was met with strong opposition and was considered unconstitutional by many. (Umeda 2006.) While the ability to operate outside Japan was thus no new development, the September 11 attacks marked the beginning of a new era for Japanese security. New laws were enacted at an increasing pace, broadening the dispatch possibilities of the SDF.

Seeing the questioned constitutionality of many of these laws, it might not be surprising that Koizumi did not usually invoke Article 9 in his speeches. Akimoto (2013, 192) agrees that Koizumi generally avoided mentioning negative pacifism or Article 9 by focusing on positive pacifism and the preamble. Aside from the Iraq Special Measures Law, the debate on constitutionality invited by the mention of Article 9 might not have been worth the trouble. Furthermore, if Koizumi shared his party's general opinion that Article 9 ought to be amended, his foremost concern may not have been constitutionality. C. Douglas Lummis (2013) suggests that rather than focusing on what the article actually says, its interpreters often seem to think that "it would make no sense for Article 9 to mean what it says; therefore it doesn't". This may have applied to Koizumi. Martin (2007) seems to have noticed the same tendency as Lummis. He argues that what the article *ought to be* is irrelevant to what it *is*. The problem with his statement, however, is that Japan's developing security legislation has made it unclear what the article actually is. Maeda T. (2002) argues that instead of amendment, the article has been attacked by changing the laws which are intended to implement it. In this light, Article 9 has become a concept that is increasingly freely reinterpreted by different parties rather than a law with a fixed meaning. As such, it can be argued that Article 9 is being used as a rhetorical commonplace.

As a commonly known clause throughout Japan, Article 9 is available for national debates as a commonplace. It is used for legitimising policies by simply stating that whichever policy or law is being advocated by the government is in accordance with the article. At the same time, the interpreted definition of the article changes to accommodate the desired “self-defence” activities. By gaining the “right” to define Article 9 by breaking its previous connections and by associating it with favourable policies, it is possible to mould its meaning to suit a more active security role. Buzan et al. (1997, 146) note that regarding state security, actor legitimacy is clearer than in the case of other security sectors. Therefore, members of the government – including Koizumi – have an inherent advantage when it comes to defining Article 9. Despite this, Koizumi did not seem keen on “capturing” Article 9 as a rhetorical resource as he did not refer to it often. Had he brought up the article, he would have faced a difficult confrontation. Therefore, he opted to evade the issue. He could not trust his chances of controlling the debate of Article 9 as a law or as a commonplace. It should be noted, however, that the frequency of a commonplace does not define its importance or causal impact (Jackson 2006, 46–50). Yet a victory over commonplaces often leads to a victory in policy-making. Therefore, even if Koizumi decided to justify his policy through means other than direct control of the commonplace, he must have been able to downplay its importance in order to push his policies.

There is, however, another part of the Constitution which Koizumi occasionally refers to; that is, the preamble. The preamble states that the Japanese people have “resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government” and that they “desire peace for all time” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet). Koizumi has addressed the problem of constitutionality by referring to the preamble’s claim that Japan will “occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace”.

Japan working with other countries around the world and extending a helping hand for another country's nation-building is in accord with the spirit of Japan's "desire to occupy an honored place in the international society," as stated in the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan. (Koizumi 2005c.)

Here, Koizumi justifies the SDF’s operations in Iraq by stating that assisting in nation-building is in line with the preamble of the Constitution. Instead of referring to Article 9, he invokes the preamble to enable a favourable interpretation of the article. Akimoto (2013,

235) notes that revisionists tend to focus to the international aspect of the preamble in order to incrementally normalise Japan's military power. In other words, Koizumi is attempting to define the meaning of the Article 9 indirectly or to decrease its importance in relation to the preamble. Overall, however, Koizumi may not have had much faith in the Constitution since according to McCormack (2004), Koizumi claimed that the Constitution is out of touch with "international common sense", and that the debate on constitutionality being "theological quibble". While no direct source from Koizumi has been found, this argument will be discussed assuming that it is based on facts. Umeda (2006) notes that as religion does not play a major role in Japan, "theological" can be used as a sarcastic word, which in this context implies idealism and impracticality. It has, for example, been used against scholars claiming the SDF as unconstitutional. While the importance of religion has increased since Koizumi's term (Pekka Korhonen, pers. comm.), he likely used it in the sarcastic manner outlined by Umeda. Koizumi's reference to "international common sense" may therefore have indicated that the Constitution is outdated and too idealistic to serve practical purposes. Thus, he privileged practice and "international common sense" in a quest to decrease the authority and significance of the Constitution.

Thus, instead of taking the legal route, those in favour of a more active global security role for Japan often simply use the power of interpretation in order to legitimate their policies. While interpretation is always present in legal questions, the policies of Koizumi's government were doubted as they stretched beyond the commonly perceived scope of Article 9. A question posed by a journalist to Koizumi in one of his press conferences regarding the situation in Iraq illustrates the matter perfectly:

Question: You have just mentioned that the reconstruction assistance activities will be performed within the framework of the Constitution of Japan. However, up until now Japan was not able to join the multinational force due to the issue of interpretation of the Constitution. What is the reason this time then to determine that Japan joining the multinational force complies with the Constitution? (Koizumi 2004a.)

The journalist questions the sudden change in policy which enables the SDF to join a multinational force despite this having been prohibited earlier. Koizumi answers that the SDF will only participate in humanitarian and reconstruction effort under the United Nations after Iraq regains its independence, and that the Iraqi people have requested

assistance. He does not state how the SDF's assistance relates to the Constitution nor does he admit that the government's understanding of Article 9 has changed. In other words, he dodges the actual question. While this is to be expected of a politician, dodging the question signals that the journalist had an excellent point which would be of negative impact to the government – if it had been faced squarely as an opening for direct public debate. Koizumi makes no mention of the U.S., either. Akimoto (2013, 184) suggests that Koizumi highlights the UN instead of the U.S. in his speeches when referring to the reconstruction of Iraq. In other words, Koizumi chose to disregard the role of the U.S. in the illegal war. This was not a tendency indigenous to Japan, however: the illegality of the war was largely treated with silence throughout the world (Pekka Korhonen, pers. comm.).

Reconstruction, Not War

Koizumi stressed the dispatch of the SDF as a mission of reconstruction assistance. This is reasonable due to the ban on the use of force and the fact that the SDF was only allowed to operate in non-combat areas. By emphasising humanitarianism, Koizumi depoliticises the mission as per his usual strategy. In addition, humanitarianism is a widely accepted commonplace, which makes it a strong argument in favour of the dispatch as it would be difficult to dispute.

First of all, this dispatch of SDF is for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq. They will not engage in the use of force. They will not participate in combative activities. They are not going to war. (Koizumi 2003c.)

In addition to presenting the SDF's reconstruction mission as humanitarian, Koizumi stresses that the forces will not participate in combat activities or go to war. He presents these statements as facts. According to Hart (1997, 71), rhetorical factual statements are not necessarily scientific truths but commonsense facts. By stating that the SDF personnel “are not going to war”, Koizumi invites the public to simply accept his statement as a fact. While it is true that the SDF were not to participate in combat, they were still a part of the aftermath of the Iraq War. By honouring Koizumi's commitment to Washington, Japan technically overlooked the ugly truth of the invasion which had included e.g. mass bombings, torture, and assassinations (McCormack 2004). Junkerman (2008) mentions that

a U.S. soldier attending a global conference on Article 9 stated that he became an objector to war after witnessing the abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison, proving that the war had a dark side. Therefore, politics overrode moral and humanitarian concern. This supports Buzan et al.'s (1998, 49) argument that peacekeeping operations are not about security but about politics.

Even if the SDF's mission was humanitarian in practice, it may not have been quite as effective as Koizumi would have liked the public to believe. On several occasions, Koizumi claims that the SDF's activities were highly valued as well as requested by the people of Iraq. For example, he states that the efforts of the SDF are "highly appreciated" and bring into reality the "goodwill of the people of Japan" (Koizumi 2004c). According to McCormack (2004), however, Japan's participation in the war damaged its reputation; previously, Japan had been respected in the Middle East as a non-Western, neutral power that is constitutionally opposed to the use of force. Watai Takeharu (2005) also suggests that the people of Iraq were not satisfied with the SDF's activities; on the contrary, they felt that the city had been more peaceful before the Japanese forces arrived. While this may be true, it is unlikely that the grim picture Takeharu presents is the whole truth. Even if the troops might not have corresponded to the locals' wishes and expectations, they likely supported the region in other aspects.

It seems apparent, however, that the SDF's effort resulted in some negativity. This means that their activities were likely not *highly* appreciated. It is also doubtful whether the "goodwill of the people of Japan" was felt by the locals. Although the SDF may have received praise on a political level, the mission may not have been especially successful in humanitarian terms. However, by claiming that the Iraqi people appreciated the SDF's effort, Koizumi creates an illusion of necessity: as the Iraqi people appreciated the goodwill of the Japanese, the mission was worthwhile. Despite this claim, Koizumi's Cabinet's support decreased towards the end of 2003, indicating that the people of Japan did not agree with Koizumi's stated view. In October 2003, his government's support was at 62% with 28% opposing while in December, the government's support was at 46% with 44% opposing (NHK).

There is one group in particular among the Japanese to whom the type of support offered is an especially serious matter: the SDF personnel. For decades after World War II, the SDF was not involved in military operations. In other words, the SDF provided a safe job.

Accordingly, the majority of the Japanese public still consider disaster relief and the maintenance of national security as the reasons for the SDF's existence while 48.8% named international peace cooperation activities in 2012 (Cabinet Office 2012, 7). This is not a remarkably high percentage considering the fact that the SDF has participated in peacekeeping since the early 90s. The Iraq War in particular appears to have had a heavy effect on the SDF personnel considering the number of suicides in the SDF at the time. While the number had decreased to 69 in 2014, suicides peaked around a hundred per year in 2004–2006. Overall, the number of suicides was higher than the national average from 2003 to 2014. (Japan Times 2015, June 6.) Despite this, Koizumi claims to have been informed that many SDF members are “burning with a sense of mission” and “firmly resolved to go to Iraq” (Koizumi 2003c).

4.4. Peace

Article 9, also known as the peace clause, seeks to establish international peace by renouncing war. As such, peace is a central concept when examining its interpretations. In this section, Koizumi's use of the concept of peace will be examined through the lens of Johan Galtung and his work *Peace by Peaceful Means* (1996).

Due to its centrality in the Constitution, peace and its maintenance are a powerful argument for selling security policies. Peace is not, however, a universally defined value. Therefore, it is a rhetorical commonplace. This supports Perelman's (1982, 27) argument that universal values are universal only as long as they are undetermined. In his policy speech to the 151st session of the Diet after assuming office, Koizumi states that:

In order for Japan to continue to enjoy prosperity in peace, it is essential that we steadfastly devote ourselves to international cooperation. Japan must never again isolate itself from the international community and must never again wage war. (Koizumi 2001.)

Here, peace is presented as a desirable state contrary to war. This differs from Galtung's theory in which violence is the opposite of peace (1996, 1). International cooperation in the name of peace, however, may contribute to preventing further violence. Therefore, it can be argued that the peace that Koizumi sought fulfilled Galtung's criteria for positive peace (1996, 1). While international cooperation does not necessarily contribute to positive peace,

Inoguchi (2014, 947) names liberal internationalism – the strengthening of global norms and institutions – as an important aspect of Japanese foreign policy. He argues that Japan’s commitment to transnational policy regimes is the greatest of all countries. Hughes (2009, 846) similarly suggests that in response to China’s rise, Japan has been e.g. engaging its neighbour in various regional frameworks. Based on Inoguchi’s and Hughes’ arguments, a case can be made that Japan’s take on international cooperation focuses on nonviolent multilateral engagement. In this aspect, Koizumi’s statement is in line with the ideals of Article 9. In the same speech, however, Koizumi states that the Japanese must not be complacent with peace and “become oblivious to the possibility of disturbances” (Koizumi 2001). He proceeds to claim that it is the “fundamental responsibility of politics to plan for all eventualities and be ready to respond to any situation”. These arguments lead to Koizumi’s intention to “move forward with consideration on Emergency Legislation”. In other words, Koizumi used the possibility of disturbances of peace to justify pre-emptive legislation.

The safety and prosperity of Japan is dependent on peace and stability in the international community. (Koizumi 2005a.)

Koizumi claims that the safety and prosperity of Japan depends on the peace and stability of the international community, which Japan is a part of. He mirrors this statement when addressing the 161st session of the Diet in 2004, replacing the “international community” with “the world” (Koizumi 2004c). In 2003, Koizumi also stated that the stability and peaceful development of Iraq is essential for Iraq, for Japan, and for the security of the world (Koizumi 2003c). With such statements, he establishes that Iraq is a source of instability, and that the events in Iraq affect the peace and security of Japan as well. In other words, the Iraq War is brought closer to Japan and made meaningful to the people by association.

If peace is best achieved by peaceful means as Galtung suggests, Japan’s orientation in Iraq may have been correct as it included humanitarian and reconstruction assistance over use of force. However, as the Japanese government technically endorsed the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., they indirectly contributed to violence. While the SDF’s mission was humanitarian, it likely resulted in more of a political effect than local relief. Furthermore, as the SDF is allowed to logistically support its allies, they must have indirectly supported military action as well. In conclusion, while Japan did not directly participate in violence,

Koizumi's term did not have much of a contribution to international peace despite the alleged attempt. Behind the reconstruction effort rested the Iraqi and American lives that were lost in the war. After a hostage crisis in 2004 in which three Japanese citizens were threatened to be burnt alive unless Japan withdrew its troops (CNN 2004, April 15), Koizumi deemed the situation so dangerous that only a well-armed military unit was sent to Iraq. The political purpose of the mission overrode both economic sense and humanitarianism. (McCormack 2004.)

Furthermore, Galtung notes that the legalistic perspective on conflict and peace fails to question law as a source of violence, although it can potentially breed peace as well. (1996, 35–36.) The latter is what Article 9 and the preamble of the Constitution aim to accomplish. If these peaceful ideals could be actualised, Japan would be a forerunner of peace in practice, not only in theory. Unfortunately, this is not the case as the standing of the SDF disappears further and further beyond traditionally conceived constitutional limits. While Koizumi did recognise the discrepancy, he neither rectified the article to correspond to reality nor improved the peacefulness of the actions of Japan. Although Article 9 has the potential to realise nonviolence through delegitimising arms and non-military defence – both of which are defensive means suggested by Galtung (1996, 5) – this has not been the direction Japanese politics have taken.

5. ABE SHINZO

Shinzo Abe (1954–) is the current prime minister of Japan since 2012, his first term dating back to 2006–2007. Like Koizumi, who preceded Abe in his first term, Abe is the president of the LDP. He was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1993. While his first term ended as his popularity plummeted to 29% in August 2007 with 58% opposing, his second term has withstood its downs. In September 2016, the Abe Cabinet’s support stands at 57% with 26% opposing. (NHK.)

On his second season, Abe has e.g. launched a campaign called Abenomics to improve the economic situation of Japan. This differs from his first term when his government lacked economic focus (Katz & Ennis 2007). Like Koizumi, however, Abe has a strong nationalistic image. Although Tessa Morris-Suzuki (2013) argues that Abe himself is trying to avoid the label and while Kevin Doak (2013) believes that he is a civic nationalist rather than an ethnic one, Abe can hardly escape the label. Doak (2013) argues that Abe refers to the people of Japan as the people of a nation (国民 *kokumin*) rather than as an ethnic people (民族 *minzoku*). Focusing on the word used for “people” does not necessarily explain much of Abe’s nationalism, however, as “ethnic people” is not a sensitive term in East Asia even if it is nationalistic (Pekka Korhonen, pers. comm.). In addition, Morris-Suzuki (2013) argues that civic nationalism is often associated with liberalism and human rights, whereas Abe is not committed to human rights in a liberal sense. However, Richard Katz and Peter Ennis (2007) argue that during Abe’s first term, the image of him as an ultranationalist was a misperception: he was, in fact, attempting to improve ties with China and South Korea in the wake of the damage Koizumi did, visiting both countries soon after assuming office.

Abe’s nationalism is perhaps best showcased by his drive for constitutional reform and his revisionist attitude towards history. Abe holds a central role in several political groups promoting the unique national character of Japan, including the creation of a new constitution built on this character (Morris-Suzuki, 2013). During his first term as the prime minister, he revised the Fundamental Law of Education to strengthen state control of education (Pix, 2015) as well as enacted the National Referendum Law to enable the eventual amendment of the Constitution (Umeda 2015). Textbooks suggesting that the Nanjing massacre has been exaggerated and that the Pacific War aspired to drive Western

imperialism out of Asia have appeared (Lummis 2013). This places suspicion on the nature of Abe's nationalism, which may be harmful both domestically and internationally.

Unlike Koizumi, Abe did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine during his first term. While he expressed his support for visits, it would have been an international loss for him as Japan's relations with China and South Korea were back on track for improvement due to his efforts. Therefore, instead of visiting, Abe sent an offering to the shrine. (Pollman 2016, 126–135.) During Abe's second term, however, the situation has changed since Abe has begun to visit the shrine. He has been the first prime minister after Koizumi to do so. Pollman (2016, 126–127) attributed this to the neutrality of the visit: Japan's relations with China and South Korea have deteriorated in terms of history and security since Abe's election, which means that there is nothing to lose by visiting the shrine. In addition, the support of the domestic right wing is important to Abe. Christopher Woolf, on the other hand, suggests in Pri (2003, December 26) that Abe's visits are a personal statement as Nobusuke Kishi, Abe's grandfather and a member of Japan's war cabinet in World War II, was suspected as a war criminal. Abe has, however, stated that the intention of his visits is not to "hurt the feeling of the Chinese and Korean people" and expressed his regret that his visits have become a political and diplomatic issue (Abe 2003c). Moreover, Abe's actions should be examined as those of a prime minister rather than as personal behaviour as Woolf suggests. As Hart (1997, 212) reminds us, public figures are highly role-constrained.

In this chapter, I will focus on an opening statement given by Abe in a press conference on July 1st, 2014 concerning the Cabinet Decision made on the same day. The Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People, published on July 1st, 2014, states that Japan must continue to fortify its position as a peace-loving nation through defence-oriented policy, observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and cooperating with the international community. Since the security environment surrounding Japan has fundamentally changed since the Constitution was enacted, domestic legislation enabling seamless responses to threats is necessary to prevent armed conflicts. This legislation includes responses to infringements that do not amount to an armed attack, support activities in scenes where no combat activities are not being conducted, and use of force to the minimum extent should an armed attack against a foreign country threaten Japan's survival. (Cabinet Decision 2014.) Legislation based on the Cabinet Decision was eventually passed on September 15, 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016). A speech Abe gave on the government's decision four months

prior to this greatly resembles the opening statement regarding the Cabinet Decision (see Abe 2015). As this Cabinet Decision can be seen as the beginning of Japan's participation in collective self-defence which has traditionally been prohibited until Article 9, the related opening statement is undoubtedly one of the most significant speeches Abe has given during his second term. In addition to this speech, statements from his other speeches will be used as supportive material.

In his opening statement, Abe declares that the Cabinet Decision has been made to secure the lives and livelihood of the Japanese people. He declares that the discussion in question does not concern the permission of collective self-defence but securing the lives of the people under the Constitution. After giving an example of how Japanese citizens might be endangered abroad during a conflict, Abe states that the Constitution cannot require him to renounce his responsibility to protect the people of Japan. Abe underlines, however, that any action would be limited to minimum extent and that as a general rule, the overseas dispatch of the SDF will not be allowed. Abe emphasises that Japan will not participate in wars. Rather, the Cabinet Decision aims at deterrence. After bringing up Japan's path as a peace-loving nation, Abe states that these words in themselves have not been adequate for this development. Instead, opposed decisions such as establishing the SDF, revising the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and participating in PKOs have been necessary. While the peace-loving nature of Japan will continue, Abe claims that the international environment surrounding Japan has changed, which has made legislation targeting new situations necessary. However, Abe calls for solving disputes diplomatically rather than by coercion. After announcing the commence of a legislation team, Abe finishes his opening statement by declaring that Japan's peace has not been bestowed by an outside actor – instead, the Japanese must establish peace by their own hands. (Abe 2014.)

The analysis will be presented in four parts: rhetoric, collective self-defence and international relations, the SDF, and peace. By utilising the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2, I aim to interpret Abe's opening statement.

5.1. Rhetoric, the Audience, and Abe

Abe's opening statement fulfils Hart's (1997, 7) list of the five basic moves of rhetorical tasks. He uses language over non-symbolic forces since we are examining a speech, not a

military confrontation. He seeks to be seen as a helper instead of an exploiter, which is made evident by the content of the speech. Abe speaks of securing the “lives and peaceful livelihood” (Abe 2014) of the citizens, which indicates that the reforms he seeks are intended to benefit the people. As securing these lives is – in Abe’s words – the duty of the prime minister, he is clearly portraying himself as a helper rather than an exploiter. As for convincing the audience that the choices are necessary, Abe states e.g. that “the only way to achieve it [peace] is to establish it with our own hands” (Abe 2014). Abe’s message is that maintaining peace requires enhanced legislation whereas peace is a taken-for-granted desirable condition. By leaving no other option, he executes the fourth move of narrowing the audience’s alternatives. He eliminates opposing views by stating that the new security legislation will not lead Japan to war and that collective self-defence is not unconstitutional despite critics claiming otherwise. Finally, Abe does not specify the details of the advocated policies. He does not e.g. mention the improved possibilities of the SDF to use weapons despite it being a prominent part of the Cabinet Decision (2014, 5–6).

Abe’s opening statement matches Hart’s (1997, 12) three features which normally make a message rhetorical as well. He clearly implies that the policy advocated by the Cabinet Decision is recommended. It is delineated as good since peace is a positively loaded concept, especially for a nation that has enshrined peace in its Constitution. Finally, the opening statement resonates for a particular audience: that is, the people of Japan. It is Japan that is a “peace-loving nation”, the people of Japan whose “peaceful livelihood” is protected, and the people who must “establish it [peace] with our own hands” (Abe 2014).

Perelman (1982, 14) argues that an audience is not necessarily only those expressly addressed in a speech. While Abe’s explicit audience is the people of Japan, there is no doubt that foreign governments follow his speeches as well. However, Abe does not directly target this audience. His goal is to convince the people that the Cabinet Decision and the reinterpretation of Article 9 are valid and necessary. Although the citizens are not present in the press conference itself, the opening statement includes the nation by referring to *our* participation and *our* ally. “The Japanese people” also appears several times in Abe’s speech as the object whose “lives and peaceful livelihood” should be secured as the duty of the prime minister and through new legislation. By painting the people as the ones who will benefit from the new Cabinet Decision, Abe attempts to gain the audience’s acceptance and participation by convincing that the decision has been made for their sake.

Despite this, the Cabinet Decision has not been made by the people. Abe states that he would like to “continue my efforts to provide thorough explanations of the matter and thereby gain the understanding of the Japanese people” (Abe 2014), which indicates that the decision has not yet been adequately explained to the citizens even though Japan’s sovereignty resides within the people. While the Diet holds the power of legislation as the representatives of the people, cabinet decisions are made inside the Cabinet before drafting legislation which will be submitted to the Diet (Cabinet Legislation Bureau). Wakefield and Martin (2014) argue that the Cabinet Decision in question was made with no debate in the Diet or in public. Therefore, the decision has been made by the government, not by the people. While the Diet would be able to reject any legislation following the decision, the Cabinet Decision itself has already been made even though Abe asks for the cooperation of the people. With this, Abe creates an illusion that the people will have a say in the decision even if they do not. Accordingly, legislation based on the Cabinet Decision was eventually passed on September 15, 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016). According to Repeta (2015), scholars have claimed that this process has trampled popular sovereignty.

It would appear that the Japanese public is not united on the issue, and that the resistance would be enough to block a constitutional amendment. According to Guardian (2014, June 30), a poll of the Japanese newspaper Nikkei published on the day before the press conference revealed that 50% of voters were against enabling collective self-defence while 34% supported it. A poll by Asahi Shimbun (2015, March 17) also reveals that 52% of voters were against the expanded overseas role of the SDF, with 33% of voters supporting the change. This strengthens the argument of Abe using reinterpretation as a way to circumvent the legal amendment of Article 9. Combined with the other problematic aspects of the LDP’s plan for constitutional reform, such as e.g. undermining human rights for the benefit of public order (see Repeta, 2013), one cannot but wonder whether Abe is committed to the principles of democracy. Abe offers the people a chance to be a part of the process by asking for their participation even though the decision has already been made. Will the people be truly able to have a say on the matter?

Since public people are tightly role-constrained (Hart 1997, 212), Abe cannot abandon his position as an advocate for constitutional reform. Thus, he must enhance his credibility. He begins his opening statement by showcasing his good will: as the prime minister, he is responsible for the people, which is why their well-being concerns him. Instead of producing similarities between himself and the people, Abe tends to keep the posts of the

prime minister and the citizens separate, creating a dimension of power through the difference in status. Whereas Abe has not personally triumphed as a reformer of security policies, he brings up the acts of past prime ministers which were criticised in their time yet successfully implemented. With this, Abe creates both power and competence – like the past leaders, he will act resolutely in the face of criticism, and will be victorious like his predecessors.

What is Abe's role in the opening statement, then? Self-reference in speeches is especially important because it signals the speaker's feelings and ambitions especially clearly and claims the listeners' attention through identification (Hart, 1997, 225–226). Abe starts by describing himself, the prime minister, as an object upon whom the responsibility to protect the people is bestowed. It is unclear who is conferring said responsibility. With this statement, Abe establishes himself as a person who has the authority to decide on security: if he has the responsibility to protect the people, surely he ought to have the means to fulfil this task. He also expresses his respect for the ruling coalition, i.e. the parties included in his Cabinet, which has made the Cabinet Decision. Although the rest of the decision-makers are thus credited, they remain an object. The government is, however, the one who made the Cabinet Decision, the one who will “give adequate considerations” on the to-be-drafted legislation, and the one submitting the said draft to the Diet. The Diet is never an actor. The government and the Diet are thereby dissociated from each other in the sense that the government is an actor while the Diet is a passive recipient of the government's decisions. Therefore, they ought to accept the Cabinet Decision instead of taking action against it.

Abe does not take direct responsibility for the Cabinet Decision, however, although he supports it. Instead, he claims that he will “establish a team for drafting legislation and commence the tasks to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people of Japan”. Whether he will play a role in this team is unclear, but he positions himself as the person in charge of its initiation. By taking personal responsibility and directing attention to himself, Abe may become the target of criticism instead of the draft. This directs the audience's attention away from legislation. As Hart (1997, 15) mentions, rhetoric aims to distract the audience's attention away from all things undesired by the speaker. By mentioning the tasks securing the lives and livelihood of the Japanese people in the same sentence, the legislation becomes associated with these tasks. Abe becomes the author of them as well,

and the legislation becomes a means of achieving peace and security. With these words, Abe once again reassures the people that the decision is made for their sake.

5.2. Collective Self-Defence and International Relations

Collective self-defence (集団の自衛権, *shuudanteki jieiken*) is a right enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, referring to the right of UN countries to use military force to defend other member states from attacks. It has been the basis for all UN-sanctioned military operations since the Korean War. However, while Japan possesses this right as a member of the UN, it has been unable to practice it under its Constitution. (Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA 2015.) According to Martin (2007), the accepted interpretation of Article 9 has long been as follows: self-defence and the maintenance of minimum defence forces are allowed, while the deployment of said forces abroad is not. Although this interpretation has been overturned in practice since 1992 when a law permitting support activities for United Nations peacekeeping missions was enacted, the prevailing understanding remains that collective self-defence is not allowed under Article 9. Despite Gerald L. Curtis (2013) arguing that Abe is cautious of enabling collective self-defence, however, Abe presents it as a given in his opening statement:

This is not some kind of abstract or ideological discussion such as whether or not the right of collective self-defense is permitted under the Constitution. (Abe 2014).

To highlight the change between Abe's two terms, below is a statement from his first term:

We will continue to study, based on individual and specific cases, to identify which case constitutes exercise of the right of collective self-defense that is prohibited under the Constitution. (Abe 2007.)

During his second term, Abe presents collective self-defence as self-explanatory, something that does not need to be discussed, despite having explicitly stated that the exercise of the right of collective self-defence is prohibited under the Constitution during his first term. Therefore, he is using collective self-defence as a premise, thus contradicting Perelman's (1982, 21) advice that premises ought to be accepted by the audience. This implies Abe's frontal attack towards changing the language of discussion. As he says

during his second term, he is not discussing whether collective self-defence is allowed; he simply asserts it is, contradicting his past words. In rhetoric, after all, factual statements are often commonsense facts rather than scientific truths (Hart 1997, 71). Abe steers the audience to simply accept collective self-defence as a fact even though it has been traditionally considered unconstitutional. Abe's behaviour is that of a realist: he expects theory, the law, to conform to his practices. This supports Carr's (1982, 20) argument that politicians tend to be realists.

Abe and the LDP are, in effect, circumventing the democratic process of amending the Constitution. Martin (2007) sees that the reinterpretation process undermines the integrity and normative power of the Constitution. To him, "revising the current interpretation" is a nonsensical concept: laws are revised, not interpretations. Together with Bryce Wakefield, Martin claims that the argument that the change in Abe's term fits in a pattern of reinterpretation is a mere myth. To them, government "reinterpretation" is not a legitimate method. In addition, Martin and Wakefield note that PKOs do not constitute use of force under international law. The security legislation under Abe, however, removes the traditional pre-condition of a direct attack for the SDF to operate. (Martin & Wakefield 2014.) Therefore, the changes made during Abe's term differ from the past significantly more than Koizumi's did.

One reason Abe presents for enhanced collective security cooperation is deterrence. In his opening statement, Abe states that "the reinforced Japan-U.S. alliance has contributed significantly to the peace of Japan and this region over many years, by serving as a deterrent" (Abe 2014). While it is impossible to determine whether Japan would have faced a war in the post-war era without its alliance with the U.S., the involvement of a superpower would naturally give a potential aggressor a reason to reconsider their actions. Therefore, referring to collective security and collective self-defence as a deterrent is a realistic argument. Julie Gilson (2012, 214) presents that the presence of the U.S. is indeed regarded as a stabilising force in the region. Therefore, Japan's increased ability to work with the U.S. ought to enhance the deterring factor.

Lummis sees the question of deterrence rather differently from Abe. He notes that neither the history of Japan nor that of the world gives reason to believe that a strong military equals peace and security. On the contrary, the culmination of a strong Japanese military corresponds with World War II and the Second Sino-Japanese War. Thus, Lummis

concludes that it is “a kind of romantic wishful thinking” to believe that the military and the state would act differently in the future than they have in the past. (Lummis 2013.) Abe, however, does not compare defence capabilities to war:

There is a misunderstanding that Japan will become caught up in wars in order to defend foreign countries. In fact such a case is also entirely out of the question. (Abe 2014).

Abe dissociates the Cabinet Decision from foreign wars by claiming that they are “entirely out of the question”. He goes as far as to say “I state that fact clearly once again” in order to make his point absolutely clear to the audience. By doing so, he attempts not only to depoliticise but also to desecuritize the Cabinet Decision: an existential threat, war, will not follow the decision. A threat must exist somewhere, however, for the Cabinet Decision to be meaningful. Early in his opening statement, Abe uses a fictive example to clarify what types of self-defensive situations are to be addressed with the upcoming legislation. This example is a U.S. vessel coming under attack while rescuing and transporting Japanese citizens away from a conflict zone. Such narratives are powerful rhetorical tools because they are hard to discredit due to their fictional status (Hart 1997, 93). Moreover, as the U.S. does have a history of belligerent behaviour, this particular narrative is not unimaginable in practice. Therefore, Abe attempts to win the people’s support by evoking a sense of danger that may be realised if new legislation is not enacted. What he leaves unsaid is the scope of the policy change: in effect, the SDF could gain the right to use weapons to protect cooperating forces and to operate anywhere in the world even if Japan is not directly under attack.

Claiming that such collective self-defence would not lead to Japan defending other countries in wars is arguable at best. Winkler (2011, 153) suggests that Japan has tended not to resist Washington’s requests. While conservatives claim that a more active role in security would allow Japan to decline requests more often, it is unlikely that the U.S. would quietly accept Japan’s newfound self-assertion. So far, Japan has been able to invoke Article 9 against American demands but with the increasing security legislation, this may become more difficult in the future. If Article 9 were to be amended, Japan would lose its most powerful institutional cover to defend its right to decide. Moreover, if Japanese troops were to assist a U.S. vessel carrying Japanese citizens, would it not face criticism from the U.S. if the troops were to withdraw the moment the Japanese citizens

are secured? Abe does not discuss the possible ramifications of participating in collective self-defence with the U.S.

Abe further reinforces the validity of the Cabinet Decision and the reinterpretation of Article 9 by referring to the unfounded criticism that followed the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 – a revision which was executed by his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke of whom Abe makes no mention – and the permission of the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Although critics claimed on both occasions that Japan would be drawn into wars due to these events, Japan has not faced a single war since World War II. Such a historical argument certainly enhances the credibility of new turns of events. However, as Lummis (2013) mentions, a strong military does not guarantee peace historically speaking; quite the opposite, countries with a strong military force tend to be more belligerent. As such, it may only be a matter of time until Japan lifts the ban on the use of force if Japan's security legislation continues on its current trajectory. However, as belligerency is explicitly banned under Article 9, this should be impossible without amending the Constitution.

Abe further justifies the Cabinet Decision and collective self-defence by arguing that the Constitution cannot be meant to renounce the responsibility to protect the lives of the Japanese people in “such situations”, i.e. in the case of an attack on a U.S. vessel transporting Japanese citizens:

I cannot possibly believe that the Constitution of Japan, which was created in the hopes of bringing happiness to the people, requires me to renounce my responsibility to protect the lives of the Japanese people in such situations.
(Abe 2014.)

Abe's point is valid: it would be ridiculous for the Constitution, enacted in the name of the sovereign people of Japan, to renounce the protection of the citizens. Therefore the Diet, as representatives of the people, should act in a manner that will benefit and protect the people. Thus, permitting collective self-defence in cases concerning the safety of Japanese nationals is understandable. However, simply because Abe does not believe this is not what the Constitution meant does not necessarily validate his point. To quote Lummis (2013) once more, Abe appears to operate on the basis that “it would make no sense for this Article to mean what it says; therefore it doesn't”. Abe focuses on what the article

ought to say instead of what it truly says. Such a train of thought may be dangerous: if it can be applied to one article, why not any law? (Martin 2007.)

By associating the Constitution and collective self-defence with the happiness of the people, Abe creates a positive emotional connection between them. In doing so, however, he overlooks a flaw in his argument. He implies that the Constitution was never meant to renounce the protection of the Japanese people although both Shidehara and General MacArthur originally suggested that even self-defence is prohibited under Article 9 (Umeda 2015). While the suggestion that self-defence is prohibited is by no means relevant today, Abe's dismissive attitude towards the history of Article 9 further signals that he prioritises his policy over the traditional interpretation. Although Abe does make mention that "there was an argument that Japan had gone so far as to also renounce war as an exercise of the right of self-defense" (Abe 2014), he fails to mention that this argument came from a position of significant authority. This gives the statement a dismissive tone.

One reason for the changes is that the U.S. has long pressured Japan for greater involvement in collective security (Martin 2007). A major catalyst for Japan's involvement in PKOs was the criticism Japan's financial-only contribution to the Gulf War received (Winkler 2011, 37). Therefore, even if Article 9 is not amended, it is necessary for Japan to expand its contribution to collective security in order to nurture its close relations with the U.S. This may have been a significant motive for Abe and the LDP to reinterpret the article in such a manner, although Abe and the LDP's conservative ideology likely has much to do with the decision as well. Therefore, the decision was not necessarily made for the sake of the people although Abe attempts to portray it as so.

How do the people perceive the U.S., then? According to a poll conducted by Pew Research Center in 2015, 75% of the Japanese trust the U.S. while 68% of the Americans trust Japan. While the percentage of trust is higher towards the U.S., the Japanese claimed a lower intensity of trust than the Americans. As for Japan's military role, 47% of the Americans supported a greater role for Japan while 43% opposed it. In Japan, 23% of those polled were in favour of a greater role while 68% were against it. In the U.S., the people who claimed not to trust China were more likely to support Japan's increasing role. Only 30% of the Americans trusted China while in Japan, the number was as low as 7%. (Pew Research Center 2015, 2–12) This supports Buzan et al.'s (1998, 11) claim that insecurity is associated with proximity. 60% of the Americans agreed that China's rise makes

relations with Japan more important. Over 80% of the Americans support continued close ties with Japan. (Pew Research Center 2015, 7–12) Therefore, it would seem that while Americans have a greater interest in Japan's role in regional security than the Japanese, a mutual trust and will to cooperate exists. A more active Japan would benefit the U.S. in terms of the defence costs of Japan while Japan profits from the fact that the U.S. is capable of doing what Article 9 forbids from Japan. Although enabling collective self-defence does bring Japan closer to the capabilities of the U.S., the SDF and the activities allowed for it is unlikely to ever be on par with the U.S.

One more important point Abe does not make is that the response to situations surrounding remote islands will be improved as per the Cabinet Decision (2014, 3). In terms of international relations, this is an extremely important observation to make. Japan is contesting the ownership of certain remote islands with countries such as China and South Korea. In 2013, Abe states that:

History and international law both attest that the [Senkaku] islands are Japan's sovereign territory. After all, for the long period between 1895 and 1971, no challenge was made by anyone against the Japanese sovereignty. (Abe 2013a.)

Abe uses the authority of history and international law to justify Japan's claim to the Senkaku islands. He implies that the decades during which Japan single-handedly controlled the islands prove Japan's sovereignty, both due to the length of the time period and the lack of opposition from another party. This matter, however, is not as simple as Abe presents it as, which is likely why he did not make mentions of "remote islands" in his opening statement. Pan Zhongqi (2007) offers insight into the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute from a Chinese perspective.

The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands have been disputed since the 1960s. They were annexed by Japan in 1895 but did not emerge as a major issue until the possibility of rich natural resources in the area was discovered. China claims that it had sovereignty of the islands before their annexation by Japan, supported by ancient documentation, and that it was ceded to Japan alongside Taiwan. The Chinese also argue that as Japan only annexed the islands shortly before the Sino-Japanese War ended, they must have known that they were clearly Chinese territory. Thus, the Chinese point of view is that the islands were returned to China under the peace treaties. The Japanese, however, argue that the islands were not

originally owned by China and that they were returned to Japan alongside Okinawa in 1972. Japan also does not recognise there being a dispute between the states regarding the question. (Pan 2007, 73–83.)

In addition to natural resources, questions of politics affect the issue as well. As this particular territorial dispute is not the only such dispute to either China or Japan, neither wants to create an unfavourable precedent. In addition, since Beijing regards the islands as a part of Taiwan, the issue is potentially linked to the reunification of China. Finally, as the dispute is a question of sovereignty, it is a question of nationalism. Therefore, it is tied to the legitimacy of the ruling parties. Pan concludes that while a military conflict over the islands is unlikely, so is the resolution of the dispute. (Pan 2007, 85–87.) Curtis (2013) agrees that unless the Abe government admits that there is a dispute, the situation cannot be defused. Therefore, mentioning the response to situations surrounding remote islands in the opening statement might have created international tension as it would have signalled further action to secure the islands rather than a will to solve the situation peacefully.

5.3. The Self-Defense Forces

There is no need to explain what a large role the SDF has played ever since in securing the lives and the livelihood of the people (Abe 2014).

Abe claims that the role of the SDF as a protector of the people and peace since its establishment is self-explanatory. He backs this claim by referring to history: past criticism that changes in the role of the SDF would lead to war have been proven wrong. He mentions that the SDF was established by Shigeru Yoshida, the then-Prime Minister of Japan. It has also been feared that allowing the SDF to participate in PKOs would bring war upon Japan. Abe disagrees and claims that despite such criticism, the reinforced alliance with the U.S. and the SDF have contributed to the peace of Japan and that of the world.

By mentioning Yoshida, Abe brings a past authority into the conversation, enhancing the credibility of the SDF and reinforcing the validity of the Cabinet Decision while transferring responsibility to Yoshida. Whether Yoshida would have been in favour of *collective* self-defence is not discussed. It is also not mentioned that Yoshida originally argued against self-defence under Article 9 (Umeda 2015). It could even serve as a

precedent: just like Yoshida changed his stance on self-defence due to the changed circumstances – the Korean War, to be exact – Abe changed his stance on collective self-defence between his two terms. While this can be attributed to the change in Japan’s security environment, there is no threat as imminent as the Korean War was. However, bringing attention to such a change in policy might not give a stable and trustworthy image of a politician, especially when Abe attempts to paint himself as resolute in his opening statement. In addition, Abe’s nationalistic stance begs to question whether he agreed with the unconstitutionality of collective self-defence during his first term or whether the circumstances were simply unfitting for such a change in policy. “Firm determination brings criticism with it”, Abe states (Abe 2014). Perhaps so – but the “firm determination” of a politician does not justify superseding legal procedures in a parliamentary democracy.

From the statement that there is “no need to explain” the role of the SDF, it can be assumed that the positive character of the SDF is an accepted truth. Indeed, 91.7% of the people had a positive impression of the SDF in 2012 (Cabinet Office 2012, 5). Those who disagree, however, are excluded from the conversation. “No need” is a strong negative statement emphasising the self-evident character of the “large role” of the SDF. Thus, the importance of the SDF is a crucial premise of Abe’s opening statement. He leaves the audience no option but to agree.

The usefulness of the SDF’s contribution to peacekeeping missions can be questioned, however. As the Japanese state does not have the right of belligerency, the SDF does not technically have the legal right to kill without being prosecuted. The only legal basis for using weapons is the individual right to self-defence. (Lummis 2013). However, the SDF troops are legally civilians, which leaves the consequences of their possible use of arms unclear. As a result, the SDF cannot provide armed support for peacekeepers. Whereas other types of support such as logistics may provide help to them, they have to protect the Japanese forces in return. In other words, it is arguable whether the SDF are providing any substantial support for the UN forces or not. It is noteworthy, however, that no one has been killed under the right of belligerency of the Japanese state since the Constitution was enacted (Lummis 2013). This is undoubtedly in line with Article 9.

This does not mean that the LDP necessarily agrees with the ban on belligerency, however. According to Lummis, the belligerency clause is deleted without a single comment in the LDP’s proposal for the amendment of the Constitution of 2012. To him, the right of

belligerency is the key to war and the difference between the present Constitution and the draft. (Lummis 2013.) While returning the right of belligerency to Japan would not necessarily mean that Japan would enter a war or that the LDP desires this, the potential to do so would exist. Meanwhile, Martin (2007) argues that Abe seems to expect that the SDF possesses the right of belligerency under international law when deployed overseas; he does mention “the importance of the rule of law to the international community” in his speech. Although this statement is preceded by a call to resolve disputes diplomatically in accordance with the law instead of force or coercion, Abe does not mention whether Japan would enjoy international rights prohibited by the Constitution. Japanese politicians may therefore benefit from international law if they wish to broaden the SDF’s activities: since international law is technically above state level, it is arguably a higher authority than domestic legislation. However, as international law has not been established and cannot be enforced in a manner similar to domestic legislation, it should not be used as a way to escape inconvenient laws. Repeta (2015) wonders whether Abe’s legacy will be that of a man who abandoned the rule of law.

If the SDF’s support overseas is not as significant as Abe presents, why would he adamantly insist on it? The answer to this question has not changed since Koizumi’s term: politics. As Buzan et al. (1998, 49) argue, PKOs are a matter of politics, not of security. Lummis (2013) agrees that the first international dispatch of the SDF to Cambodia in 1992 stemmed from political reasons rather than becoming an actual contribution. During the Gulf War, Japan learnt that money alone is no longer an acceptable contribution to collective security (Winkler 2011, 37) which meant that Japan could no longer practice its tendency to respond to problems in any given security sector with money (Buzan et al. 1998, 173). However, since the SDF cannot participate in actual battles, its presence remains mainly symbolic. Thus, Abe’s call for enhanced collective self-defence can be seen as partially caused by the drive to ensure that Japan’s international image is elevated and maintained. Despite this, Abe claims that the “general rule” of not deploying the SDF overseas has not changed:

Neither has the existing principle of not, as a general rule, permitting overseas deployment of the SDF changed in the slightest. (Abe 2014).

If the principle has not changed, when are the SDF allowed to deploy overseas? Perhaps at times when “there is no other appropriate means available” and as long as their activities

are “limited to the minimum extent necessary” like Abe says. This would be in line with the long-standing requirements for deployment, although arguably the most significant requirement – that of a present danger of invasion to Japan – has been broadened (Umeda 2015). In addition to Japan, an attack against “a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan” is an eligible reason for the use of force if the attack “threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2016). Therefore, the long-standing pre-condition of a direct attack is no longer in place. Wakefield and Martin (2014) express doubt that this may lead to a slippery slope as far as the enforcement of Article 9 is concerned. They argue that undermining the Constitution appears to be a central goal of Abe’s in addition to Japan’s defence agenda.

Abe’s description is rather vague and does not reveal who is allowed to decide on the necessity and extent of a dispatch. In this sense, he speaks in a utopian manner – by presenting undefined concepts over specific means (Carr 1946, 14) – despite being a realist in general. He is dissociating decision-making from the acceptance of collective self-defence. Unless these concepts are defined by law, they can easily be abused. Whereas the judiciary has the power to judge the lawfulness of the SDF’s operations, the courts would not necessarily stand against the government even if they were in the right: the Supreme Court in particular has a tendency to avoid matters related to Article 9 (Martin, 2007). In other words, the government is granting itself undefined power. During the press conference, one of the reporters pointed out that Abe’s “expression seems abstract”, to which Abe answers that the new criteria are “more or less” the same as the old criteria, and that they serve as “clear” constitutional limits. While he is right that at least two out of the three traditional requirements for a dispatch remain the same – fulfilling the criterion of being “more or less” the same as the old criteria – they do not constitute clear constitutional limits. If they did, there would never have been a debate on security legislation to begin with.

The Cabinet Decision itself uses some undefined concepts as well. We are not informed what constitutes “very passive and limited” use of weapons (Cabinet Decision 2014, 3). Abe does not refer to weapons in his opening statement at all despite them being a relatively important topic in the Cabinet Decision. Seeing how the use of weapons might depart from self-defence because the limits are unclear, this is a rather important change. Will the SDF be able to use their weapons for purposes other than self-defence? If so, will

they be allowed to exercise the right of belligerency, despite it being directly prohibited by Article 9? Abe provides us no answers. It is possible that the topic of weapons is avoided for its ambiguity and the possibility of a public backlash which would endanger the Cabinet Decision. If this is the case, foreign and security politics may have bypassed the will of the sovereign people.

In addition, Abe does not mention the change in the areas the SDF will be allowed to operate in if new legislation is enacted based on the Cabinet Decision. So far the SDF's activities have been restricted to non-combat areas, but the Cabinet Decision suggests that they should be allowed to conduct e.g. supply and transportation activities wherever combat activities are not actually being conducted (Cabinet Decision, 4). One could assume that this means any location where a battle is not currently being fought, including previous and future battlefields. This would make the SDF more useful to foreign powers, improving Japan's image as a member of international security cooperation with the U.S. Not mentioning this aspect in the opening statement is curious as it does constitute a clear change in policy without necessarily making the activities of the SDF aggressive. The SDF might, however, face an attack if combat were to be suddenly commenced in the area they are operating in. This may be the reason Abe does not mention this point.

5.4. Peace

Peace and the peaceful livelihood of the people are recurring themes in Abe's opening statement. As peace is an important commonplace to the people, it can be taken advantage of by politicians as it is a powerful premise. The phrase "peace-loving nation" (平和国家, *heiwakokka*) is mentioned in the first sentence of the Cabinet Decision as well. Abe notes, however, that the "peace-loving nation" of Japan has not been realised by the phrase only:

However, this is not something that was brought into being only by chanting the term "a peace-loving nation". (Abe 2014.)

Despite the claimed inadequacy of words alone, Abe proceeds to refer to peace and the "peace-loving nation" of Japan multiple times throughout the latter half of his opening statement. Before the statement above, he only referred to Japan as the "peace-loving nation" once, in the preceding sentence. This combined with his insistence that the Cabinet

Decision will not lead Japan to war paints the decision as a peaceful enterprise, as something that does not contradict Article 9. According to Hart (1997, 16), persuaders rarely ask for a major expansion of the listeners' worldview. In this case, continuity with the demilitarised post-war era is used for such an end. In addition, Samuels (2007, 146) refers to the phrase "peace-loving nation" as "Yoshida rhetoric", which means that Abe's argument is further strengthened by implying a connection to a past prime minister. Abe even states that "there are no changes in today's Cabinet Decision from the basic way of thinking on the constitutional interpretation to date" to emphasise this point.

Claiming that the Cabinet Decision is in line with the traditional way of constitutional reinterpretation may, however, be a smokescreen. Although Abe claims that Japan will not "become caught up in wars in order to defend foreign countries" (Abe 2014), Wakefield and Martin (2014) argue that the only thing which now prevents Japan from entering a war is Abe's words. Moreover, one of the three traditional requirements for the use of force has clearly been transformed to accommodate collective self-defence in addition to individual self-defence. By attempting to assure the people that there has been no substantial change, Abe directs the public's attention away from the change in policy.

In addition to the "peace-loving nation" of Japan, Abe refers to the "peaceful livelihood" of the people of Japan several times during his opening statement. It is handled as an object that should be protected and will be further secured by new legislation. By referring to the daily lives of the people, Abe connects ordinary citizens to the topic. The people have been able to live peacefully due to the "efforts of our predecessors who acted resolutely in facing the changes in the international community", including the establishment of the SDF and the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (Abe 2014). The people can contribute to peace by supporting these "resolute" leaders, including Abe. By depicting "peaceful livelihood" as a desirable goal and making it an object to be secured by legislation, it can be used to justify the necessity of the Cabinet Decision.

Galtung (1996, 49) argues that democracies tend to have a peace-loving self-image, which leads them to stress the peaceful pursuit of goals. Peace and pacifism stand in stark contrast to the common images armed forces and conflicts evoke: war, violence, and destruction. Although Galtung (1996, 9) contrasts peace with violence, Abe speaks of war as the opposite of peace in his opening statement. Since the Japanese public has not embraced expanding the role of the SDF as indicated by polls, disassociating the Cabinet Decision

from such images is important. In 2012, 61.3% of the public supporting the current level of engaging in international peace cooperation activities while 28.1% supported further engagement (Cabinet Office 2012, 12). Galtung (1996, 6) argues that under opportune conditions, people are brought up to see violence as legitimate – the opposite appears to be the case in Japan under Article 9. This means that it is necessary for Abe to sell his policy by all means available if he is to gain the people’s acceptance. However, as only 5.7% of the public supported reducing engagement or not engaging at all (Cabinet Office 2012, 12), the international role of the SDF in itself no longer appears to be an issue.

The fear of war is likely a major reason for the public’s resistance to the development of the SDF’s rights as Abe states that there is a “misunderstanding” that Japan will become caught up in wars on the behalf of foreign countries (Abe 2014). Therefore, it is important to stress the Cabinet Decision’s non-belligerent nature and to assert that “Japan will never become a country that would wage war again”. The necessity of this is supported by a poll in 2012 which revealed that 72.3% of the public believed that Japan faces or may face the risk of war. International tensions and confrontations were named as the most likely reason for war. (Cabinet Office 2012, 20–21) Abe, however, contradicts himself in his opening statement. On one hand, he claims that Japan will never wage war again. On the other, however, he states that “today’s Cabinet Decision will result in an even smaller possibility of Japan becoming caught up in a war” (Abe 2014). “Never” and “an even smaller possibility” cannot be simultaneously true. However, he may only be referring to wars of aggression as wars that will never be waged again. While this is a reassuring thought, it may not be of much use in practice since few countries label their wars of aggression as such. Instead, self-defence is usually invoked.

The peace we enjoy today is not bestowed upon us by someone else. The only way to achieve it is to establish it with our own hands. (Abe 2014).

Abe states that the peace Japan enjoys is not granted by an outside actor. The people themselves must take their destiny into their own hands, so to say, in order to guarantee peace. Transforming “our hope for peace” – a phrase which makes peace a state desired by the whole nation – into responsible actions is how the peace-loving nation was born. The two sentences seem to contradict each other, however: if peace is not bestowed upon Japan by someone else, why must it now be established with Japanese hands? If it has not been bestowed by someone else, would it not already have been achieved by the Japanese

themselves? Is the cooperation of the U.S. no longer desired? It does not appear so considering how Abe underlines the importance of the security alliance in his opening statement. It can therefore be concluded that here, his words are motivational rather than logical: the Japanese have made an effort to maintain peace, and must continue to do so in order to maintain it in the future as well. Abe may also imply that while the security alliance in the U.S. is beneficial, Japan should not depend on an outside force for its defence completely.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis set out to explore the changes in the interpretation of Article 9 and security policy evidenced in the speeches of Koizumi Junichiro and Abe Shinzo. I approached the topic by analysing a variety of speeches by the two prime ministers in context with the help of a multi-faceted theoretical framework. By examining the justifications presented for these changes, it is possible to compare the similarities and differences in reasoning in the 21st century. Therefore, I will conclude my thesis by summarising and comparing the findings.

As prime ministers, both Koizumi and Abe have a nationalist image. This has had negative consequences for Japan's foreign relations in East Asia. They have faced strong domestic and international reactions against their policies. Domestically, however, their nationalist dispositions have also brought them support from the nationalist wing of the people. This has resulted in e.g. Koizumi's and Abe's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine which have further deteriorated Japan's relations with its neighbours. Therefore, Koizumi and Abe share similar profiles. As a speaker, however, Koizumi tends to be less confrontational although he is known as the more convincing speaker of the two.

On a closer look at Abe's rhetoric, his explicit audience are the people of Japan. They are included in Abe's speech both as actors and as objects of protection. They are not, however, actually actors in the decision-making process: Abe merely creates an illusion of this in order to sell collective self-defence. He also positively associates the livelihood of the people with collective self-defence by portraying further security legislation as a way to protect the people. To enhance the influence of his rhetoric, Abe enhances his credibility by showcasing good will towards the people as well as power through his position as a prime minister. To conclude, rhetoric has a significant role in justifying the reinterpretation of Article 9 and the subsequent changes in security policy.

One of the ways in which Koizumi justifies the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq is the importance of retaining relations of trust with the U.S. He clearly refers to the criticism received after the Gulf War as a reason to provide troops over monetary support for the reconstruction of Iraq. Behind this front, however, lurks President Bush's unilateralism: the moral concept of war left no room for neutrality. In addition to the U.S., Koizumi invokes the United Nations to downplay the fact that the Iraq War began without a UN resolution.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the U.S. had a significant influence on Japan's security policy during Koizumi's time. While the U.S. remains important today as well, Abe is less vocal about the alliance.

Shared values are one way in which Koizumi brings Japan and the U.S. closer. However, the depth of these shared values is questionable. One example of this is the illegality of the invasion in Iraq, shadowing the common value of the rule of law. Japan's renunciation of war does not match the forceful ways of the U.S. To distract the public from this, Koizumi only focuses on the convenient sides of the Iraq War while downplaying its origins. Overall, however, it can be argued that the relations between Japan and the U.S. are thick and calculative: Japan stretches the limits of its armed forces to remain in the favour of the U.S., while the U.S. benefits both from Japan's increasing defence capabilities as well as its bases in Japan. Japan's relations with South Korea, on the other hand, appear to be solidarist in comparison to the relations between Japan and China, although they are still on the pluralist side as well. The East Asian interstate society is therefore largely one of coexistence.

Both Koizumi's and Abe's insistence on the overseas role of the SDF had a political goal rather than one of security or humanitarianism. However, humanitarianism is a necessary cover for Koizumi in order to depoliticise the dispatch as well as to create an illusion of a worthwhile mission. Abe, on the other hand, claims that the general principle of not dispatching the SDF abroad has not changed. This is only partially true: now that the SDF has been given the right to react to an attack against another country, it depends on the government and the Diet when this right will be invoked. No clear constitutional limits exist even though Abe claims so. Therefore, Abe is highlighting the most convenient aspects of the Cabinet Decision in order to sell his policy, much like Koizumi did in regards to the Iraq War.

Abe transfers responsibility for the SDF to Yoshida by referring to him in his opening statement. He does not, however, mention that Yoshida originally argued against self-defence. Abe could have used the change in Yoshida's stance to create a parallel between Yoshida and himself: while Yoshida originally considered self-defence unconstitutional, Abe initially declared collective self-defence as unconstitutional. This could have enhanced Abe's credibility as he would have been compared to a significant historical figure. However, admitting such a change in policy might not have offered a stable and

trustworthy image of him, especially not when he depicted himself as a resolute leader. It would also have invited questions on the change of policy, much like happened to Koizumi when the dispatch of the SDF had been decided on. Therefore, the comparison to Yoshida would not have necessarily helped Abe to justify the reinterpretation of Article 9.

Koizumi rarely refers to Article 9 in his speeches. Had he done so, he would have invited a difficult confrontation on constitutionality which he could not have been able to control. Despite this, he appears to have been able to downplay the importance of Article 9 as he prevailed in policy-making. One of the ways in which he did this is invoking the preamble of the Constitution. Due to the international aspect of the preamble, it is a less risky option for justifying the dispatch of the SDF. Despite this, he was unwilling to explain why the SDF is suddenly allowed to operate abroad. This signals that this question would have been of a negative impact to the government if it had become an opening for a public debate. Therefore, the Constitution itself was not a strong argument in favour of the security policy advocated by Koizumi. This makes the policy suspect: if it cannot be supported by the Constitution, is it not unconstitutional?

Abe, on the other hand, uses the Constitution as justification for collective self-defence. Irrespective of the traditional interpretation of the Constitution which prohibits Japan from participating in collective self-defence, Abe treats collective self-defence as a given in his opening statement. He claims that the Constitution cannot possibly renounce the prime minister's responsibility to protect the citizens of Japan. In order to distract the audience from the fact that this is merely an interpretation offered by Abe, Abe associates the Constitution and collective self-defence with the happiness and security of people to create a positive association between them. By using collective self-defence as a premise despite it not being accepted by the audience, Abe launches a frontal attack towards changing the language of discussion.

Both Koizumi and Abe present peace as a desirable state contrary to war. Since peace is an important value to the public, it can be taken advantage of by politicians. Koizumi uses this by justifying pre-emptive security legislation in the name of peace. Similarly, Abe calls collective self-defence a means of deterrence. Therefore, both Koizumi and Abe seem to advocate positive peace. However, as the dispatch to Iraq silently endorsed the illegal war on Iraq as well as led to e.g. the hostage crisis, the effects of his policy may not have been

as peaceful as he argued. Whether collective self-defence will produce peaceful results is yet to be seen.

Abe frequently refers to the “peace-loving” nation of Japan as well as the “peaceful livelihood” of the people of Japan. This is an important strategy as it associates the Cabinet Decision with peace, thereby disassociating it from war. The fear of war is a significant reason for the public’s resistance to overseas operations, which makes disassociating the decision from such possibility important. Accordingly, Abe stresses that Japan will not be drawn into wars. Similarly, Koizumi emphasises that the SDF is not going to war. Both he and Abe disagree with the common view that PKOs will lead Japan to war. Abe, however, contradicts himself in his opening statement by both claiming that Japan will *never* wage war again and that it is *less likely* for Japan to be caught up in a war. Although he may refer to wars of aggression in the first case and to self-defence in the latter, the distinction is questionable since states have a tendency to label their wars as self-defence.

In conclusion, the influence of the U.S. on Japan’s security policy has decreased since Koizumi’s time if measured by direct references in prime ministerial speeches. Otherwise, Japan’s security policy under Koizumi and Abe shares a number of similarities. Although they both mask international security cooperation as a matter of humanitarianism and/or security, the underlying reason for such cooperation is politics. By highlighting the convenient aspects of security issues, they justify the changes in policy regardless of their relation to Article 9. Despite this, it is clear that both Koizumi and Abe are affected by the need to defend their desired security policy in the face of the Constitution. While Koizumi mostly avoids mentioning the article, Abe uses the Constitution to justify collective self-defence. Both of them, however, claim that the policy changes will not lead Japan to war. Despite this, it cannot be denied that an uneasy contradiction between utopia and realism exists between law and practice in Japan. This feature is visible in both Koizumi’s and Abe’s speeches.

As long as the constant undermining of Article 9 is justified by politicians, the article will be seen as an obstacle rather than as a possibility. While Japan does have the right to amend the Constitution and to dispose of the article, circumventing the amendment process with reinterpretation is not the intended way to proceeding with security development. At worst, it may lead to the weakening of the rule of law. This is, however, a question for future research to assess once the consequences of collective self-defence will be known.

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