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Perceptual Self-Awareness in Seneca, Augustine, and Olivi

JUHANA TOIVANEN*

I. INTRODUCTION

ACCORDING TO COMMON UNDERSTANDING, we have only five senses. Sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch allow us to perceive external objects and their properties. Modern psychology, however, teaches that in addition to external objects, we are capable of apprehending our own bodies: we receive information of the state and changes of the body by the so-called interoceptive senses, and we are aware of the posture, movement, and the relative positions of our limbs by proprioception.

Yet the idea that we perceive our own bodies is not a recent innovation. It was discussed both in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages by philosophers who deviated from the Aristotelian framework, which allows for only five sense modalities¹ and does not leave room for the idea of perceiving one's own body. In the present essay, I will take up three authors who explicitly recognize the phenomenon, namely, Lucius Annaeus Seneca (ca. 4 BCE–65 CE), Aurelius Augustinus (354–430), and Peter of John Olivi (ca. 1248–98).² My purpose is to analyze the central aspects of the views of these three authors in order to point out that there are philosophical affinities between them.

The core idea that these authors defend is that animals perceive their own bodies.³ However, the perception of one's own body differs from the perception of external objects in a crucial way: the body is perceived as something that must be protected and can be used in various ways. All three authors emphasize that there

¹Aristotle, *De anima* 3.1.

²The Stoic conception of bodily self-awareness has been discussed in Brittain, "Non-Rational Perception," 253–308; Heller-Roazen, *The Inner Touch*, 111–26; Inwood, "Hierocles," 151–83; and Long, *Stoic Studies*, 250–85. Most of these works concentrate on Hierocles's views, but the ideas that Hierocles discusses in detail seem to have been common in Ancient Stoicism, and they are presented also by Seneca. See also Brad Inwood's commentary in Seneca, *Letters*, 332–46.

³Both Seneca and Augustine use the term 'perception' (*sensus*), and even though Olivi employs more general terms, he also thinks that the apprehension of the body is not an intellectual operation but a sensory one.

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is a connection between the perception of one's own body and self-preservation. When an animal apprehends its own body, it makes a practical distinction between the body and all the other objects it perceives because it strives to protect the former but not the latter. In this way the perception of the body is a type of self-perception: an animal perceives its own body as (a part of) itself.⁴ I have chosen to use the term 'self-awareness' in addition to the more narrow 'self-perception' in order to underline the fact that although we can see, hear, taste, smell, and touch our bodies, the special kind of perception which is at stake here cannot easily be classified under any of these sense modalities.

Seneca discusses bodily self-awareness in his letter 121, where he makes four interrelated claims. (1) The ability of animals to use their bodies appropriately requires that they perceive their bodies and know the functions of the various parts thereof. (2) Animals apprehend themselves as living beings and as subjects of their own actions. (3) Self-perception must be attributed to animals, because without sophisticated cognitive information of their bodies, they would lack the necessary means for self-preservation, and because they would not strive to protect their lives in the first place if they did not apprehend themselves as living beings. (4) The ability of animals to avoid harmful things and to seek those that are useful is based on self-perception. Every animal is aware of itself in relation to external objects in such a way that when it apprehends a harmful or useful object, it apprehends the object as dangerous or helpful to *itself*.

The philosophical position that Seneca puts forth in letter 121 originates in Stoic thought, and it cannot be found in Aristotle's psychological works, even though some Aristotelian themes (such as perception of perception) are closely related.⁵ In particular, Aristotelian philosophy of mind does not recognize the connection between self-perception and self-preservation. I shall argue that despite the obvious differences between Seneca, Augustine, and Olivi—the contexts of their discussions, the argumentative role that they give to self-perception, and the metaphysical and psychological backgrounds of their views—the similarities between the positions of these three authors are significant, and in many respects Augustine's and Olivi's views are closer to Seneca's than to Aristotle's.

The first three points that Seneca puts forth reappear in Augustine's *De libero arbitrio*, where Augustine identifies cognitive processes that are more sophisticated than simple perception but fall short of being intellectual. These processes coincide with the aforementioned types of self-perception: animals perceive their bodies and themselves as living beings. Augustine also argues that without this kind of cognitive information animals would not be able to act as they do, and he establishes a connection between self-perception and self-preservation. One of the most important innovations that he poses is that he attributes these psychological functions to the so-called internal sense (*sensus interior*). Much later, Olivi continues

⁴It goes without saying that none of the three authors discussed in the present essay postulate any ontological entity that could be called the 'self' and that would be the object of perception. For discussion concerning the self in Ancient philosophy and beyond, see Inwood, "Seneca and Self Assertion," 39–64; and Sorabji, *The Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death*, 17–261.

⁵Long, *Stoic Studies*, 250–57. Inwood also thinks that the position belongs to the Stoic tradition (Inwood, "Hierocles," 152–56).

in the footsteps of Augustine when he discusses various types of self-awareness in the context of medieval faculty psychology.⁶ He defends all four points that we find in Seneca in various places of his *Summa quaestionum super Sententias*.⁷ According to Olivi, the sense of touch provides the basic level of bodily self-perception, and he attributes the higher types of self-awareness—the knowledge of the functions of the parts of the body and the awareness of oneself as a living being and the subject of one's actions—to the common sense (*sensus communis*). All these different types of self-awareness are related to the striving for self-preservation.

One of the central similarities between Seneca, Augustine, and Olivi is that they make a distinction between two ways of cognizing the soul (or “life”) in order to be able to attribute the awareness of oneself as a living being to animals: they distinguish direct sensory awareness of one's own soul from the intellectual understanding of the essence of the soul. The soul and its powers cannot be perceived in the same way as external objects, but one can be aware of them without having conceptual knowledge of them. In principle, human beings are capable of understanding the essence of the soul, but the idea that irrational animals also are aware of themselves as living beings requires that the fundamental types of self-awareness be not confined to the intellectual level. Thus, all three authors argue that animals have direct sensory awareness of themselves as living beings and that this awareness does not require conceptual knowledge of the principles behind animal life. Conceptual knowledge of these principles (especially of the essence of the soul) comes in addition to this original awareness. It is of some importance that this type of self-awareness also belongs to human beings, because animal psychology casts some light on the non-rational aspects of human cognition.⁸ Animal cognition is, from this point of view, a heuristic device to clarify certain aspects of human psychology.

I emphasize that my aim is not to argue for direct historical connections between Seneca and Augustine or between Seneca and Olivi. There is no definite proof that Olivi would have had first-hand knowledge of Seneca, and although Augustine was familiar with Seneca's works, it is uncertain whether he actually read the letter 121. Instead, my overall argument is that even if Augustine and Olivi did not take their ideas concerning bodily self-perception directly from Seneca, a philosophical analysis can show that their views are similar to those presented in ancient Stoicism. In this way my analysis will also shed some light on the Stoic influences in medieval philosophy. I shall address the possibility of historical connections between these three authors in section 2. The other three sections are devoted, respectively, to Seneca (section 3), Augustine (section 4), and Olivi (section 5).

⁶Certain aspects of Olivi's view are dealt with in Yrjönsuuri, “Perceiving One's Own Body,” 101–16; Yrjönsuuri, “Types of Self-Awareness,” 153–69; and Toivanen, *Perception and the Internal Senses*, 275–92.

⁷The critical edition of this question-commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard is published in several volumes. I will use mostly the book II (ed. Jansen) (*Summa II*) and refer to it by indicating the number of the question, followed by the page number(s). When referring to book IV (ed. Maranesi) (*Summa IV*), I will use the original numbering of questions, which can be found from Ciceri, *Petri Ioannis Olivi opera: Censimento dei manoscritti*, 103–13, but I will also provide the number of the question as it appears in the Maranesi edition in parenthesis.

⁸For discussion, see Brittain, “Non-Rational Perception,” 257–74.

2. HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS

The comparison between medieval philosophical ideas and those of the ancient Stoics may sound astonishing. It was long thought that there was no place for Stoicism in the Middle Ages because the landscape was already occupied, first by Augustinian Neoplatonism and later, after the reception of Aristotle's works, by Aristotelian philosophy. This monolithic picture is of course false. Even though scholastics knew next to nothing about the Stoic philosophical system as a whole, they still accepted and used many Stoic ideas. The assimilation of Stoicism into medieval philosophy was an unconscious process, because medieval authors did not realize that the ideas that they accepted were of a Stoic origin. Recent scholarship, however, tends to agree that even though *Stoicism* was extinct in the Middle Ages, many *Stoic ideas* were not.

Medieval authors had direct access to some works of the ancient Stoics. The works of Seneca were widely read and commented upon from the twelfth century onward, and he was the most well-known and respected Stoic philosopher in the thirteenth century. He was especially appreciated in Franciscan circles: for example, Roger Bacon wrote a textbook on ethics, *Moralis Philosophia*, which was largely based on Seneca's works. The appreciation of Seneca was undoubtedly furthered by his (most certainly forged) correspondence with the apostle Paul, which was then thought to be authentic,⁹ but the influence of the correspondence should not be overemphasized. Seneca's reputation was high and he was widely used mostly because the ethical tone of his genuine and spurious works fitted well into Christian ideals. In addition to Seneca, there were other sources through which Stoic ideas were available to medieval thinkers. Cicero's works (especially *De officiis*, *De finibus*, and *Tusculanae disputationes*) contain a considerable number of them, particularly in the field of ethics.¹⁰

Stoicism had an effect on thirteenth-century philosophy also indirectly. Stoic ideas were incorporated into Christian thought in late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages, and they were transmitted to later philosophers in a Christianized form. Also, Augustine was familiar with Stoic philosophy and was influenced by it in many respects. For instance, he employs the Stoic concept of seminal reasons in his doctrine of creation, his ideas concerning sense perception stem partly from Stoic views, and his conception of passions and prepassions is in some respects similar to the Stoic position. Moreover, it has been argued that the Stoic ideas concerning nonrational perception and the role of self-awareness in animal action—ideas that will be at the focus of the present essay—influenced Augustine. This argument is difficult to prove, to be sure, because Augustine does not reveal his sources, but we know that he read at least some of Seneca's works, and therefore it is possible that he derived the idea of bodily self-awareness from him. Another possible source is the third book of Cicero's *De finibus*.¹¹

⁹See Verbeke, *The Presence of Stoicism*, 8–11; and Colish, *The Stoic Tradition*, 1:16–20.

¹⁰For discussion, see Colish, *The Stoic Tradition*, 2:142–302; Ebbesen, "Where Were the Stoics in the Late Middle Ages?", 108–31; Normore, "Abelard's Stoicism and Its Consequences," 132–47; Reynolds, *The Medieval Tradition*, 104–24; Spanneut, *Permanence du Stoïcisme de Zénon à Maïtraux*, 179–209; and Verbeke, *The Presence of Stoicism*, 1–19.

¹¹For a recent evaluation of Stoicism in Augustine, see Byers, *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation*, 1–231. See also Verbeke, *The Presence of Stoicism*, 29–32; Colish, *The Stoic Tradition*, 169–79.

Olivi's indebtedness to Augustine is clear. Although he is an independent thinker who does not follow his sources blindly, he cites Augustine's works abundantly and is often inspired by his ideas. When he discusses bodily self-awareness and its role in animal action, he refers to several of Augustine's works.¹² By contrast, we do not know for certain if Olivi had first-hand knowledge of Seneca. Clearly he could have read Seneca's *Epistulae* had he chosen to, and, as Sylvain Piron has pointed out, he quotes them in his *Quaestiones de perfectione evangelica*.¹³ Yet even these quotations do not prove that he read them; many thirteenth century authors quoted Seneca through *florilegia*, and Olivi may have followed this practice. Moreover, even if the citations in *QPE* are taken directly from Seneca, it is possible that Olivi did not read all the letters, which were often circulating as two collections (one comprising the letters 1–88, and the other the letters 89–124). The first collection was more widespread, and although the two sets were combined already in the latter half of the twelfth century,¹⁴ it may be notable that none of Olivi's citations come from the latter set.

A further indication of a direct connection between Olivi and Seneca is a reference to a now-lost work of Olivi, which may have been a commentary on Seneca's letters. The inventories of the Avignon library mention a certain "work of brother Peter of John on the sayings of Seneca" (*opus fratris Petri Johannis de dictis Seneca*), which ends with the words 'in eadem epistola 48.'¹⁵ However, as we know next to nothing about this work, it is difficult to say whether this reference proves that there was a direct connection between Seneca and Olivi.

All in all, the evidence for the case that either Augustine or Olivi would have taken their ideas concerning bodily self-awareness from Seneca is circumstantial. It is possible that they were familiar with the letter 121, but we cannot establish a definite historical connection in either case. However, if we leave the historical connections aside and look at the ideas of these three authors from a philosophical perspective, we can see that they are similar. Augustine's view on animal self-perception and its role in animal action resembles Seneca's arguments in the letter 121, and whether Olivi knew this letter or found the ideas only in Augustine, the philosophical position that he advances is similar to Seneca's view. Even though Stoicism in the Middle Ages is mostly invisible (because Stoic ideas were not recognized as such by medieval philosophers), the lack of explicit references and paucity of direct influence does not necessarily prevent us from finding the undercurrents through which Stoic ideas influenced medieval philosophy. As

and 207–9; Sorabji, "Stoic First Movements in Christianity," 102–6; and Brittain, "Non-Rational Perception," 255–56, 274, and 294n101. For Augustine's acquaintance with Seneca, see Byers, *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation*, esp. 20–22, and with ancient philosophy in general, TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian*, 43–55.

¹²In Summa II, qq. 63–66, Olivi refers to *Gn. litt.*, bk. 7; bk. 12, chs. 20, 25, 26, and 33; *Trin.*, bk. 11, ch. 7.11–*usque ad finem libri*, and 15.3; *De musica*, bk. 6; *De bono coniugali*; and in question 58 to *Trin.*; *lib. arb.* bk. 2; and *De musica*, bk. 6. For a general overview of Olivi's use of Augustine, see Toivanen, "Peter of John Olivi."

¹³Piron, "Les oeuvres perdues," 388–89. See Olivi, *Quaestiones de perfectione evangelica*, q. 8, pages 99, 112, 115, and 173. Olivi's citations come from letters 12, 17, and 69.

¹⁴Reynolds, *The Medieval Tradition*, 111–24.

¹⁵Piron, "Les oeuvres perdues," 388–89. The work is mentioned also by Partee, "Peter John Olivi: Historical and Doctrinal Study," 257.

Gerard Verbeke states, any study that wishes to reveal Stoic influences in medieval philosophy “cannot, of course, be limited to a collection of literal quotations. It must recognize doctrinal influences in order to uncover the perhaps indirect penetration of the Stoic legacy into medieval civilization.”¹⁶

It has been argued convincingly that the kind of bodily self-awareness that Seneca discusses in his letter and the idea that it is necessary for self-preservation are originally and distinctively Stoic ideas.¹⁷ If we agree with this argument, we are entitled to say that when Augustine and Olivi repeat these ideas, they are incorporating Stoic elements into their accounts. They may not be aware of the fact that the elements are Stoic, but that does not change the overall picture.

3. SENECA

Seneca’s discussion of bodily self-awareness is related to the Stoic concept of *oikeiosis*, which was used to explain the moral development of human beings. A person becomes morally good by identifying herself with an ever-larger group of people: first with the members of her own family, then with neighbors and fellow citizens, and, if all goes well, eventually with the whole of humanity. Due to this identification, the concern that one feels toward oneself is expanded to all humanity, and other people are treated as parts of the same whole to which the subject belongs—in a way, a morally good person conceives of other people as herself.¹⁸

The Stoics think that this moral development begins with a striving to take care of oneself. The concern that a morally good person feels toward other people is based on the process of *oikeiosis*, but the same process explains also why she has regard for herself. Human beings and other animals adapt to their own bodies and apprehend them as themselves because the process of *oikeiosis* starts with one’s own body and accounts for the identification with it. I take care of my body and protect myself because I apprehend my body as me.

The letter 121, in which Seneca discusses bodily self-perception, purports to explain how the ethical process of *oikeiosis* has this kind of a natural and non-rational starting point. Seneca’s argument is roughly that the ability of animals to strive for things that are appropriate to them and to avoid those that are harmful requires that they perceive their own living bodies as themselves. In order to establish this argument and to show the connection between *oikeiosis* and animals’ care of their own bodies, Seneca needs to do two things: he needs to show that animals are capable of perceiving their own bodies, and he must argue that the perception of the body is a form of *self*-perception, that is, animals perceive their bodies as

¹⁶Verbeke, *The Presence of Stoicism*, 15; see also Colish, *The Stoic Tradition*, 2:1–7.

¹⁷See note 5 above.

¹⁸See McGabe, “Extend or Identify: Two Stoic Accounts of Altruism,” 413–43. McGabe argues that Stoics had two different strategies to account for the expansion of one’s care outside one’s own body: either I conceive of other people *as me*, or I conceive of them *as if they were me*. In the latter case the limits of the self are not extended beyond my body, whereas in the former case they are. Yet both strategies agree that I apprehend my body as me in the first stage of *oikeiosis*, and thus the difference between the two strategies is not relevant for my purposes in this context, and I do not take a stand whether Seneca favors one of them over the other. See also Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis*, 64–100 and 122–26; Forschner, “Oikeiosis: Die stoische Theorie der Selbstaneignung,” 169–91; Long, “Seneca on the Self: Why Now?”, 31–33; and Heller-Roazen, *The Inner Touch*, 105–15.

themselves—which is a central aspect of the process of *oikeiosis*. Animals do not perceive their bodies in a way similar to the manner in which they perceive other things in the world; they perceive their bodies as themselves, and this is why they take care and try to prevent their bodies from being destroyed. The continuous perception of one's own body functions as the basis for self-interested action and self-preservation.¹⁹

Seneca supports his claim about the ability of animals to perceive their bodies by appealing to their behavior. The core of his argument is that if animals' behavior cannot be accounted for without attributing to them awareness of the body and the various functions of its different parts, we have to conclude that they are capable of apprehending their own bodies. He expresses this idea in a peculiar way by claiming that all animals perceive their own constitution (*constitutio*):

We were investigating whether all animals perceive their constitution. The main reason why it seems that they do perceive it is that they move their limbs easily and effectively just as if they had been trained to do so. . . . No-one has trouble moving its limbs; no-one hesitates in using its parts. And they do so just as soon as they are born. They arrive with this knowledge. They are born fully trained.²⁰

Seneca draws from a general observation that animals use their bodies in a skillful and appropriate way. They are capable of using their bodies in manners that are natural to them from the moment of birth, and this suggests that they are able to perceive or be aware of their bodies and the natural functions of the parts of their bodies. In this respect the body is comparable to a tool: in order to be able to use, say, a hammer appropriately, a blacksmith must have cognitive information about it. He has to perceive the hammer and know what it is used for. Similarly, an animal can use its body in an appropriate manner only if it has cognitive information about it.²¹

The comparison with the tool should not be stretched too far, however. There are several crucial differences between perceiving a tool and perceiving one's own body. In contrast to the blacksmith, animals do not have to learn to use their bodies because that ability is innate and provided by nature.²² It is also constant, as the body is all the time present to the animal, and when the bodily structure changes, the animal is immediately attached to the new structure:

There is a constitution for every stage of life, one for a baby, another for a boy, another for an old man. Everyone is attached [*conciliatur*] to the constitution he is in. . . . A baby, a boy, a teenager, and an old man: these are different stages of life. Yet I am the same human as was also a baby and a boy and a teenager. Thus, although everyone has one different constitution after another, the attachment to one's own

¹⁹For a discussion of the Stoic ideas of the continuous perception of one's own body, of the awareness of the functions of the body, and of the relation between these two and self-preservation, see Heller-Roazen, *The Inner Touch*, 117–26.

²⁰*Quaerebamus an esset omnibus animalibus constitutionis suae sensus. Esse autem ex eo maxime apparet quod membra apte et expedite movent non aliter quam in hoc erudita. . . . Nemo aegre molitur artus suos, nemo in usu sui haesitat. Hoc edita protinus faciunt; cum hac scientia prodeunt; instituta nascuntur* (Ep. 121, para. 5–6/Letters, 85–86). The English translations of Seneca's texts are by Inwood, although I have made small emendations to them.

²¹Ep. 121, 5–6.

²²Ep. 121, 6.

constitution is the same. For nature does not commend me to the boy or the youth or the old man, but to myself.²³

However, the most crucial difference is that unlike the hammer, the body is not perceived as an external object. The animal identifies itself with its body. We can see this idea already in the cited passage, because Seneca employs the concept of *conciliatio*, which was used as a Latin translation of the Greek ‘*oikeiosis*.’²⁴ Animals do not perceive their bodies in a disinterested manner. They adapt to them through the process of *oikeiosis* in such a way that despite the constant changes that take place in the body, the animal always apprehends its body as itself.

In addition to this kind of awareness of their bodies, Seneca endows animals with a further ability to perceive themselves as living beings and as subjects of their actions. He defines the notion ‘constitution,’ which plays a central role in the previous passage, as follows: “[T]he constitution is the principal part of the soul in a certain relation to the body.”²⁵ Constitution is defined as a ruling power of the soul, as *principale animi*, which refers to the Stoic concept of *hegemonikon*, an octopus-like command center of the soul, which extends itself to different parts of the body, receives information from various external senses and directs their activities.²⁶ Thus, although it is clear that Seneca lays great emphasis on the perception of the body, he does not think that it is sharply distinct from the awareness of one’s soul. In spite of the apparent soul–body dualism of some of his expressions, Seneca accepts the Stoic doctrine of ontological monism²⁷ and thinks that animals’ perception of their bodies conveys at the same time awareness of their souls and the principal parts of their souls.²⁸

The Stoics insisted that animals lack reason and are therefore incapable of having conceptual or propositional thoughts.²⁹ One might think that they cannot be aware of the principal parts of their souls because they are incapable of understanding the definition of ‘constitution.’ Seneca raises this objection³⁰ and uses it as a rhetorical device that enables him to make a distinction between two kinds of knowledge:

Your objection would be sound, if I was saying that all animals understand the definition of constitution rather than the ‘constitution’ itself. Nature is more easily understood than explained. And so that baby does not know what a constitution is

²³ *Unicuique aetati sua constitutio est, alia infanti, alia puero, <alia adulescenti>, alia seni: omnes ei constitutioni conciliatur in qua sunt. . . . Alia est aetas infantis, pueri, adulescentis, senis; ego tamen idem sum qui et infans fui et puer et adulescens. Sic, quamvis alia atque alia cuique constitutio sit, conciliatio constitutionis suae eadem est. Non enim puerum mihi aut iuvenem aut senem, sed me natura commendat* (Ep. 121, 15–16/ *Letters*, 87).

²⁴ The translation was provided by Cicero in the third book of *De finibus*, where he expounds Stoic philosophical doctrines in order to refute them later in the following book. See *fin.*, bk. 3, ch. 16.

²⁵ ‘*Constitutio*’ inquit ‘est, ut vos dicitis, *principale animi quodam modo se habens erga corpus*’ (Ep. 121, 10/ *Letters*, 86). Although the definition appears within an objection to the position Seneca is promoting, he clearly accepts it.

²⁶ See e.g. Inwood’s commentary in Seneca, *Letters*, 337; Long, *Stoic Studies*, 224–49; and Løkke, “The Stoics on Sense Perception,” 35–46.

²⁷ See Bartsch and Wray, *Seneca and the Self*, 4.

²⁸ See Inwood, “Hierocles,” 163 and 176; and Long, *Stoic Studies*, 257n14. Cicero uses the term ‘*constitutio*’ to refer to the structure of the body (Cicero, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De officiis*, bk. 3, para. 117).

²⁹ See e.g. Sorabji, *Animal Minds*, 20.

³⁰ Ep. 121, 10.

yet it knows its constitution; and it does not know what an animal is, yet it is aware of being an animal.

Moreover, it does have a crude, schematic, and vague understanding of the constitution itself. We too know that we each have a mind. But we do not know what the mind is, where it is, what it is like, or where it comes from. Although we do not know its nature and location, our perception of our own minds stands in the same relation to us as the perception of constitution stands to all animals. For, they must perceive that through which they perceive other things. They must perceive that which they obey and by which they are governed.

Every one of us understands that there is something which sets in motion his own impulses, but does not know what this is. And he knows that he has a tendency to strive, though he does not know what it is or where it comes from. In this way, too, babies and animals perceive their own principal part, though it is not adequately clear or distinct.³¹

We see that Seneca's idea is to make room for a middle ground between complete unawareness and articulated propositional knowledge. He uses expressions that refer to intellectual operations ('to understand,' 'to know'), but it is clear that he uses them quite loosely and does not mean that animals have intellectual knowledge. Rather, he distinguishes the perception of one's constitution from the theoretical and propositional knowledge of the definition of constitution. The former amounts to a sensory and nonpropositional awareness, whereas the latter is propositional and conceptual knowledge about the constitution. This same division between conceptual knowledge and sensory self-awareness applies also to human beings: we have minds, and that is—according to Seneca—an evident fact to us even though we do not know the essence of the mind without further rational inquiry. Similarly, animals are aware of their constitution, the principal part of the soul in relation to the ever-changing body, but as irrational beings, they are incapable of searching for a rational definition for it.

When Seneca argues that we know that we each have a mind even when we do not know what the mind is, his idea is that we are aware that we are living, ensouled creatures that sense, move, feel, understand, and so on. We do not necessarily have a scientific or conceptual knowledge of the reasons behind these properties, abilities, and actions, but we experience them within us. The upshot of Seneca's distinction between being aware of something and having conceptual knowledge of that thing is that both humans and animals perceive or are otherwise aware of themselves as living beings without necessarily being able to know anything specific about what they are aware of. Animals cannot have the latter kind of knowledge, and human beings need to engage in rational investigation in order to arrive at a

³¹ *Verum erat quod opponis si ego ab animalibus constitutionis finitionem intellegi dicerem, non ipsam constitutionem. Facilius natura intellegitur quam enarratur. Itaque infans ille quid sit constitutio non novit, constitutionem suam novit; et quid sit animal nescit, animal esse se sentit. Praeterea ipsam constitutionem suam crasse intellegit et summam et obscure. Nos quoque animum habere nos scimus: quid sit animus, ubi sit, qualis sit aut unde nescimus. Qualis ad nos [pervenerit] animi nostri sensus, quamvis naturam eius ignoremus ac sedem, talis ad omnia animalia constitutionis suae sensus est. Necesse est enim id sentiant per quod alia quoque sentiunt; necesse est eius sensum habeant cui parent, a quo reguntur. Nemo non ex nobis intellegit esse aliquid quod impetus suos moveat; quid sit illud ignorat. Et conatum sibi esse scit; quis sit aut unde sit nescit. Sic infantibus quoque animalibusque principalis partis suae sensus est non satis dilucidus nec expressus (Ep. 121, 11–13 / Letters, 87). For a discussion, see Inwood's commentary in *Letters*, 337–39.*

definition of a soul (or whatever it is that explains these properties and actions). The rational investigation comes *in addition* to the original awareness.

The “crude, schematic, and vague” perception that animals have of the principal part of their own souls makes them aware that they are living beings. To be sure, they are not capable of entertaining the propositional thought “I am alive,” and they do not understand what “a living being” means, but they are aware of their own lives and themselves as sensing, feeling, and acting beings, as the principal part of the soul is the center of all psychological activity of animals and the source of impulses, striving, and shunning.

Having argued that animals perceive themselves, Seneca goes on to claim that there is a connection between the perception of the body and self-preservation: bodily awareness is necessary for survival, because animals could not take care of themselves by striving for useful things and avoiding harmful ones unless they could perceive their bodies. It has been argued that it was a Stoic truism that an animal could not love itself unless it was able to perceive itself, that is, unless “it was aware of itself as something to be concerned about.”³² Seneca expresses this view in the following way:

And it is not surprising that the animal is born with those things without which its birth would be pointless. Nature has bestowed on animals this primary tool for survival, attachment to and love for oneself. They could not keep safe unless they want to.³³

Animals are attached to and love themselves and their bodies, and this love gives them motivation to take care of themselves. The link between self-preservation and perception of the body shows that the latter is a form of *self-awareness*. Animals apprehend their own bodies and bodily states in a special way that differs from the perception of other objects: they apprehend their bodies as their own, and that is why the perception of the body incites action that is aimed at self-preservation. Animals protect their bodies because they are aware that the destruction thereof would be detrimental to them as living beings.

One can be aware of one’s own body, for example, by looking at it. But looking at the body does not count as self-awareness proper, since my vision of my hand does not in principle differ in any way from my vision of your hand; if I look at my arm when it is numb, I may wonder to whom it belongs. In this case I apprehend my arm as an external object, not as a part of me. The special kind of awareness of one’s own body that Seneca attributes to animals and human infants is different, because it enables them to apprehend their bodies as themselves. Even though this kind of self-awareness is not conceptual—animals and young children cannot form propositions with which to attribute their bodies and bodily states to themselves—the fact that they take care of their bodies in a way that does not happen with respect to external objects shows that they conceive of their bodies as themselves.³⁴

³²Long, *Stoic Studies*, 254. The same idea appears also in Cicero, *fin.* 3.16.

³³*Nec est mirum cum eo nasci illa sine quo frustra nascerentur. Primum hoc instrumentum <in> illa natura contulit ad permanendum, [in] conciliationem et caritatem sui. Non poterant salva esse nisi vellent* (Ep. 121, 24/ *Letters*, 89).

³⁴For a discussion, see Long, “Seneca on the Self,” 31–33.

In addition to providing the motivation for protecting one's own body, self-awareness is required also as a means for self-preservation. In order to be able to avoid danger and pursue beneficial things, animals must be capable of apprehending external objects as harmful or useful. Seneca writes,

Why is it that a hen does not flee from a peacock or a goose but does flee from a hawk, even though it is so much smaller and not even familiar to the hen? Why do chicks fear a cat but not a dog? It is obvious that there is within them a knowledge of what will harm them. This knowledge has not been derived from experience, for they display caution *before* they have the experience.³⁵

Seneca thinks that animals are innately capable of grasping³⁶ which external things are dangerous and which are useful.³⁷ Perceiving one's own body is necessary for this ability:

If, however, you demand it of me, I will tell you how it is that every animal is compelled to understand what is dangerous. It perceives that it is constituted of flesh, and so it perceives what can cut flesh, what can burn it, what can crush it, which animals are equipped to do it harm; it regards their appearance as hostile and threatening.³⁸

The crucial point here is that an animal perceives something about itself, namely that it consists of flesh. Seneca's formulation of this idea may sound naive; at least it remains sketchy. The awareness of the nature of one's own flesh offers a basis for apprehending predators as harmful, but as the idea stands, it does not explain why a chick fears a cat but not a dog, which has equally sharp teeth. The central philosophical point, however, becomes clear: self-awareness is a prerequisite for being able to perceive other things as harmful or useful to oneself. This is due to the relational nature of these features:

An animal has a primary attachment to itself; for there must be something to which other things can be referred. I seek pleasure. For whom? For myself. Therefore I am taking care of myself. I avoid pain. For whom? For myself. Therefore I am taking care of myself. If I do everything because I am taking care of myself, then care of myself is prior to everything. This care is a feature of all other animals; it is not grafted onto them but born in them.³⁹

There must be something to which usefulness and harmfulness can be related. And when they are related to me, I have to be aware of myself so as to be able to see this relation and act accordingly. Therefore, according to Seneca, it is necessary

³⁵*Quid est quare pavonem, quare anserem gallina non fugiat, at tanto minorem et ne notum quidem sibi accipitrem? quare pulli faelem timeant, canem non timeant? Apparet illis inesse nocituri scientiam non experimento collectam; nam antequam possint experisci, cavent* (Ep. 121, 19 / Letters, 88).

³⁶Actually Seneca uses the word 'understanding' (*intellego*). Given the overall picture, however, he must be using the word in a loose sense and not referring to actual understanding, which is reserved for adult humans only; see e.g. Ep. 121, 14 / Letters, 87; and Sorabji, *Animal Minds*, 20.

³⁷*Inter se ista coniuncta sunt; simul enim conciliatur saluti suae quidque et iuvatura petit, laesura formidat. Naturales ad utilia impetus, naturales a contrariis aspersiones sunt* (Ep. 121, 21 / Letters, 88–89).

³⁸*Si tamen exigis, dicam quomodo omne animal perniciose intellegere cogatur. Sentit se carne constare; itaque sentit quid sit quo secari caro, quo urī, quo opteri possit, quae sint animalia armata ad nocendum; horum speciem trahit inimicam et hostilem* (Ep. 121, 21 / Letters, 88). See Gontier, *L'Homme et l'animal: La philosophie antique*, 73–74; and Sorabji, *Animal Minds*, 26.

³⁹*Primum sibi ipsum conciliatur animal; debet enim aliquid esse ad quod alia referantur. Voluptatem peto. Cui? mihi; ergo mei curam ago. Dolorem refugio. Pro quo? pro me; ergo mei curam ago. Si omnia propter curam mei facio, ante omnia est mei cura. Haec animalibus inest cunctis, nec inseritur sed innascitur* (Ep. 121, 17 / Letters, 88).

that a being is aware of itself in order to apprehend the usefulness and harmfulness of different objects that are external to itself.

Even a short analysis shows that Seneca attributes to animals an ability to perceive their bodies and to be aware of the functions of the different parts of their bodies. This ability is attested to by the fact that animals use their bodies in appropriate ways. Animals also have perceptual awareness of the principal parts of their souls, and even though they are incapable of entertaining propositional knowledge of the essence of the soul, they apprehend themselves as living beings and as subjects of their actions. Finally, Seneca argues that the kind of bodily self-awareness animals have is a precondition for self-preservation and necessary for apprehending external objects as useful or harmful.

4. AUGUSTINE

Augustine's view concerning perceptual self-awareness is similar to that of Seneca in many respects. Although his discussion contains no trace of a connection between the perception of one's body and ethical development, and no expansion upon the idea that estimating external objects with respect to one's well-being requires self-awareness, he still thinks that animals perceive the functions of their body parts, their bodily senses, the activities thereof, and themselves as living beings, and he holds these abilities as necessary for self-preservation. He also appeals to the distinction between rational (propositional) knowledge and sensory cognition of one's soul and its powers. One of the most important features of Augustine's discussion of self-perception is that he provides a theoretical framework for analyzing it as a function of one of the powers of the soul, the so-called internal sense (*sensus interior*). We shall see below that Olivi was influenced by this innovation.

It needs to be noted that Augustine's conception of the soul is very different from the material monism of the ancient Stoics. He understands the soul in light of Neoplatonist ontological hierarchy and thinks that it is a spiritual entity that is ontologically distinct from and superior to the body. Yet, he does not agree with the negative conception of the body as a prison for the soul, which is a central aspect of Manichean anthropology. He thinks, rather, that the body is an integral part of a human being, a part without which a human being is not a complete whole. This kind of positive attitude toward the body remained central throughout the Middle Ages, and it manifested within the belief in the resurrection of the body on judgment day.⁴⁰ From this perspective it is not surprising that Augustine accepts the idea that human beings apprehend their bodies as parts of themselves.

We may begin unfolding Augustine's position concerning perceptual self-awareness by looking at a passage from one of his early works, *De quantitate animae*:

The soul attends to itself in touch, and it senses and discerns hot and cold, rough and smooth, hard and soft, and light and heavy things by touch. It also distinguishes the countless differences between flavors, odors, sounds, and shapes by tasting, smelling, hearing, and seeing them. In all these properties it accepts and desires those which are in accordance with the nature of its body, and it rejects and avoids the opposite. . . . Nobody denies that the souls of beasts can do all this as well.⁴¹

⁴⁰Bynum, *The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity 200–1336*, 94–104, 115–343.

⁴¹*Intendit se anima in tactum et eo calida, frigida, aspera, lenia, dura, mollia, levia, gravia sentit atque discernit. Deinde innumerabiles differentias saporum, odorum, sonorum, formarum gustando, olfaciendo,*

Augustine begins by listing the five external senses and their objects, and then he tells us that animals are capable of distinguishing the objects of different senses from each other. The most important idea, however, is that animals distinguish those external objects that are in accordance with the natures of their bodies from those that are not. The nature of the body of an animal somehow influences the way it reacts to its perceptions. Augustine does not develop this idea further in this context, and although he seems to attribute some kind of self-reflexivity to the soul when it senses the objects of touch, it is not clear whether he thinks that the influence of the nature of the body is based on some kind of awareness of the body or whether it functions below the level of awareness. The text lacks an explanation for the psychological mechanism that enables animals to make distinctions between the proper sensibles of the various external senses and to apprehend external objects as being in accordance with the natures of their bodies. It nevertheless hints that animals may perceive their bodies.

More substantial evidence for the ability to perceive one's own body can be found from *De libero arbitrio*, which is Augustine's early anti-Manichaean treatment of the problem of evil and freedom of the will. Augustine rejects the Manichaean understanding of the nature of evil and argues that evil does not truly exist; it is nothing but the absence of good. Within the Manichaean framework, the material world, including the human body, is inherently evil, but Augustine envisages it in a more positive light. Against this background it is understandable that he conceives of the body as an integral part of the human being.⁴²

The central argument of the book is that there is no inconsistency between free will (*liberum arbitrium*) being a source of evil and it being a positive gift from God. In the course of the argument, Augustine establishes a hierarchical order within the powers of the soul and introduces a power that occupies the place between the external senses and reason. It is a nonrational power, and therefore nonhuman animals have it as well:

- Aug.* Can we settle what pertains to each sense by means of any of these senses? Or what they all have in common with one another, or some of them?
- Ev.* Not at all. These matters are settled by something internal.
- Aug.* This is not by any chance reason itself, which animals lack, is it? For I think it is with reason that we grasp these things and know that they are so.
- Ev.* I think instead that with reason we grasp that there is an "internal sense" to which the familiar five senses convey everything. Surely that with which an animal sees is one thing, whereas that with which it pursues or avoids what it senses by seeing is another. The former sense is in the eyes, the latter is within the soul itself. With it, animals either pursue and take up as enjoyable, or avoid and reject as offensive, not only what they see but also what they hear or grasp by the other bodily senses. Now this [internal sense] cannot be called sight, hearing, smelling, taste, or touch. I do not know what to call it, but it presides over all of them. We do grasp it

audiendo videndoque diiudicat. Atque in his omnibus ea, quae secundum naturam sui coporis sunt, adsciscit atque appetit, reicit fugitque contraria. . . . Sed haec rursus omnia posse animam etiam in bestiis nemo negat (Aurelius Augustinus, *De quantitate animae*, ch. 33.71).

⁴²For Augustine's relation to Manichaeism, one may begin with e.g. Coyle, *Manichaeism and Its Legacy*, 209–328. For the development and contextualizing of Augustine's thought, see e.g. TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian*, 19–131.

with reason, as I pointed out, but I cannot call it reason itself, since it is clearly present in animals.⁴³

In this text, Augustine coins the term '*sensus interior*,' which becomes important later in medieval faculty psychology.⁴⁴ This internal sense has a similar kind of function as the *hegemonikon* in Stoic psychology, and it is reminiscent of Aristotle's *koine aisthēsis* as well (although Aristotle cannot be a direct source for Augustine). The functions that he attributes to the internal sense include integration of the input from the external senses and second-order perception of the acts of perception.⁴⁵ Second-order perception adds further information to the perceptual contents of the external senses, as it makes the perceptions pleasurable or painful. In this way it accounts for the motivation for acting in certain ways with respect to perceived objects.

Augustine does not dwell upon the psychological functions of the internal sense. He says next to nothing of the details of them—presumably because the discussion concerning the internal sense is incidental to the argument of *De libero arbitrio*. However, he does provide a more substantial discussion of second-order perception, as he argues that the internal sense apprehends the external senses and their acts:

Aug. Thus, when we sense a color, we do not likewise also sense our sensing by the selfsame sense. When we hear a sound we do not also hear our hearing it. . . . In touching something we cannot also touch the very sense of touch. In short, it is clear that none of the five senses can be sensed by the selfsame sense or by any of the others, even though the senses sense all physical objects.

Ev. That is clear.

Aug. I think this point is also clear: The internal sense not only senses the things it receives from the five bodily senses, but also senses *that* they are sensed by it. Animals would not move themselves to either pursue or avoid something unless they sensed themselves sensing—not for the sake of knowledge, for this belongs to reason, but only for the sake of movement—and they surely do not sense this by any of the five bodily

⁴³A. *Quid igitur ad quemque sensum pertineat et quid inter se uel omnes uel quidam eorum communiter habeant, num possumus ullo eorum sensu diiudicare?* // E. *Nulla modo, sed quodam interiore ista diiudicantur.* // A. *Num forte ipsa est ratio, qua bestiae carent?* Nam, ut opinor, ratione ista comprehendimus et ita se habere cognoscimus. // E. *Magis arbitror nos ratione comprehendere esse interiorem quandam sensum ad quem ab istis quinque notissimis cuncta referantur. Namque aliud est quo uidet bestia et aliud quo ea quae uidendo sentit uel uitat uel appetit. Ille enim sensus in oculis est, ille autem in ipsa intus anima, quo non solum ea quae uidentur, sed etiam ea quae audiuntur quaeque ceteris capiuntur corporis sensibus, uel adpetunt animalia delectata et adsumunt uel offensa deuitant et respuunt. Hic autem nec uisus nec auditus nec olfactus nec gustatus nec tactus dici potest, sed nescio quid aliud quod omnibus communiter praesidet. Quod cum ratione comprehendamus, ut dixi, hoc ipsum tamen rationem uocare non possum, quoniam et bestiis inesse manifestum est* (*lib. arb.* bk. 2, ch. 3.8/*Free Choice*, 36–37).

⁴⁴For Augustine's conception of *sensus interior*, see also *Gn. litt.* 12.6–7 and 16. For a discussion, see O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, 88–151. O'Daly suggests that Augustine's idea of *sensus interior* may be derived from Stoics, but he seems to be more inclined to accept a Neoplatonic origin for the idea (*Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, 102–5).

⁴⁵Augustine does not express the integrating function very clearly, but the idea that all the external senses convey the information they receive from the external world suggests that it has this function: *Manifesta enim sunt, sensu corporis sentiri corporalia; eundem autem sensum hoc eodem sensu non posse sentiri; sensu autem interiore et corporalia per sensum corporis sentiri, et ipsum corporis sensum* (*lib. arb.* 2.4.10/*Free Choice*, 37).

senses. If this is still obscure, it may shed some light to consider what is sufficient in the case of a single sense, for instance sight. An animal could not even open its eyes or turn its gaze to what it wants to see unless it sensed that it did *not* see when its eyes were closed or were not turned in that direction. But if the animal senses that it does not see when it does not see, it must also sense that it sees when it *does* see: When it sees, it does not turn the eyes with the desire with which it turns them when it does not see. This shows that the animal senses itself sensing in each case.⁴⁶

Augustine begins by arguing that the internal sense is responsible for the second-order perception of the acts of the senses. He does not make a distinction between apprehending the acts and apprehending the senses themselves, but it seems that the latter accounts for the former: the internal sense constantly apprehends the senses and their states, and when some of the senses do not function—say, the eyes are shut and do not provide any sensory input—the internal sense makes the animal aware of the inactivity and thus of the fact that the animal does not see.⁴⁷ Similarly, when the animal opens its eyes, the internal sense apprehends the ensuing act of seeing because of the constant attention that it pays to the sense of sight. Without this kind of awareness, the animal would lack the motivation to open its eyes, and second-order perception also explains why animals act on the basis of the cognitive information that they receive from the senses. This interpretation is supported by another passage, where Augustine argues that

the internal sense controls and judges the bodily senses. If the latter miss anything while carrying out their job, the internal sense demands what its agent owes to it. . . . The sense in the eyes does not see that it sees or does not see—and since it does not, it cannot judge what is missing or what is enough—but rather the internal sense does, which prompts even an animal's soul to open its closed eyes to fill in what its senses is missing.⁴⁸

In order for an animal to know that it has to open its eyes in order to see, the internal sense has to provide awareness of the functions of the senses and their bodily organs. Animals are aware that the eyes are for seeing and the ears for hearing, and so forth. Otherwise they would not know that they have to open their eyes in

⁴⁶A. *Quoniam ergo, cum colorem sentimus, non itidem sensu ipso nos sentire etiam sentimus, neque cum audimus sonum nostrum etiam audimus auditum . . . nec tangentes aliquid ipsum etiam tangendi sensum possumus tangere, manifestum est quinque istos sensus nullo eorum sensu posse sentire, quamvis eis corporalia quaeque sentiantur. // E. Manifestum est. // A. Arbitror etiam illud esse manifestum, sensum illum interiorem non ea tantum sentire quae accepit a quinque sensibus corporis, sed etiam ipsos ab eo sentire. Non enim aliter bestia moueret se uel adpetendo aliquid uel fugiendo, nisi se sentire sentiret, non ad sciendum, nam hoc rationis est, sed tantum ad mouendum, quod non utique aliquo illorum quinque sentit. Quod si adhuc obscurum est, elucescet, si animaduertas quod exempli gratia sat est in uno aliquo sensu, uelut in uisu. Namque aperire oculum et mouere aspiciendo ad id quod uidere adpetit nullo modo posset, nisi oculo clauso uel non ita moto se id non uidere sentiret. Si autem sentit se non uidere dum non uidet, necesse est etiam sentiat se uidere dum uidet, quia, cum eo adpetitu non mouet oculum uidens, quo mouet non uidens, et indicat se utrumque sentire (lib. arb. 2.3.9–4.10/Free Choice, 38–39).*

⁴⁷It is clear that the internal sense apprehends the senses themselves. Augustine writes that *sensu autem interiore et corporalia per sensum corporis sentire et ipsum corporis sensum* (lib. arb. 2.4.10).

⁴⁸*Quia moderatorem et iudicem quandam huius illum esse cognosco. Nam et si quid huic in officio suo abfuerit, ille tamquam debitum a ministro flagitat. . . . Non enim se uidere aut non uidere sensus oculi uidet, et quia non uidet, non potest quid sibi desit aut quid satis sit iudicare, sed ille interior, quo admonetur et anima bestiae aperire oculum clausum et quod desse sentit implere* (lib. arb. 2.5.12/Free Choice, 41).

order to see. Augustine insists on the ability to perceive one's own body and bodily functions in order to account for animal action. The internal sense governs the perceptual activities and the body of an animal in light of its desires because, as Augustine argues, an animal opens its eyes in order to satisfy its desire to see. The internal sense is, as he says, the governor (*moderator*) in the animal soul.⁴⁹

Of course the idea of second-order perception originates in Aristotelian psychology, but Augustine's view differs from the one that we find in Aristotle because he fuses Stoic elements into his account of the animal power to perceive the activity of the senses.⁵⁰ Aristotle thinks that when an animal perceives an object, it also perceives that it perceives, but the second-order perception is not based on the awareness of the senses and their states. Rather, it is concomitant with the first-order perception that is caused by an external object.⁵¹ When the senses are not functioning, they remain in potentiality and cannot be apprehended. Even the perception of the inactivity of the senses is placed on a par with the perception of external objects: "It is clear therefore that 'to perceive by sight' has more than one meaning; for even when we are not seeing, it is by sight that we discriminate darkness from light, though not in the same way as we distinguish one color from another."⁵² It seems to me that Aristotle considers seeing darkness as comparable to seeing colors—that we really see darkness, although not in the same way as we see colors because our sight is not actualized by anything external. According to this reading, we do not actually apprehend the inactivity of our senses, because we perceive the darkness rather than the sense of sight. The experience is comparable to the perception of external objects rather than the perception of ourselves, and discriminating darkness from colors is not a form of self-perception in the same way as it is for Augustine. However, it is possible to think that Aristotle is here speaking of the perception of the inactivity of the senses, so that when we do not see, we become aware that our sense of sight is not functioning. This reading was suggested in the commentary tradition of Late Antiquity when the perception of the activity and inactivity of the senses was attributed to the common sense; Aristotle himself denies that there is a separate sense that perceives that we perceive or do not perceive. Thus, Aristotle's conception of second-order perception may be one of the origins of Augustine's view that the apprehension of the absence of perception belongs to a distinct power of the soul, the internal sense. Be that as it may, it is clear that Aristotle's understanding of second-order perception differs from the continuous awareness of the senses that is the heart of the Stoic idea that Augustine defends.⁵³

Augustine makes an important further move when he argues that the internal sense perceives its own activity. It is a power of self-perception in a strong sense because it apprehends itself. This ability enables animals to be reflectively aware of themselves as living beings:

⁴⁹See *lib. arb.* 2.5.12/*Free Choice*, 40.

⁵⁰See e.g. Heller-Roazen, *The Inner Touch*, 135. Byers (*Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation*, 1–214) provides a detailed discussion of the Stoic elements in Augustine's theory of perception.

⁵¹See *De anima* 3.2; *Somn.* 2, 455a13–22; *Met.* 12.9, 1074b35–36; *EN* 9.9, 1170a20–31; *Phys.* 7.2, 244b10–245a4.

⁵²*De anima* 3.2, 425b20–23.

⁵³See Heller-Roazen, *The Inner Touch*, 79–89 and 117–26.

But if it is not clear whether this life, a life that senses itself sensing corporeal things, senses itself, unless it is for the following reason. Anyone putting the question to himself realizes that every living thing avoids death. Since death is contrary to life, life must also sense itself, for it avoids its contrary.⁵⁴

Here Augustine equates the internal sense with “life” and thus with the soul of the animal, as to be alive is to have a soul. The question that he takes up is whether animals are aware of their own souls and that they are alive. Even though he leaves room for some doubt, it seems more likely that he just wants to avoid lengthy discussions that do not directly bear on the subject matter at hand. He raises no real doubts about the existence of this ability. His idea is the same we have already seen with Seneca: living beings avoid death and endeavor to preserve themselves, and the striving for self-preservation requires awareness of oneself as a living being.⁵⁵

Further evidence that Augustine is favorable toward attributing this kind of self-perception to nonhuman animals can be found in *De Trinitate*. In his famous argument from analogy for other minds, Augustine argues that when we perceive the movements of other people, we also perceive that they have minds because we already are aware of our own minds. The argument rests on a premise that is important because it shows that for Augustine the awareness of one’s own body is fundamental: we are immediately aware of the movements of our own bodies and that these movements are caused by our minds (or souls). This kind of self-perception explains why we perceive other people’s movements as being caused by their minds. Augustine attributes this kind of perception to nonhuman animals as well:

Nor is such perception something peculiar to, as it were, human prudence and reason. For indeed beasts perceive as living, not only themselves, but also each other and one another, and us as well. Nor do they see our souls except through the movements of our bodies, and that at once and very easily by a sort of natural agreement.⁵⁶

We do not reason that other people have minds; we perceive it. This is why non-human animals are capable of perceiving other animals as living as well. Because the argument is based on self-awareness, nonhuman animals must be aware of their own souls.

Augustine’s view that animals are capable of perceiving their bodies, the functions of their bodily parts, and their souls is based on a distinction between intellectual knowledge and sensory awareness that echoes the one that Seneca makes in the letter 121. Augustine distinguishes perceptual objects, external senses, the internal sense, and reason from each other and argues for a hierarchical order between these levels: the external senses perceive objects, the internal sense per-

⁵⁴*Sed utrum et se ipsam haec uita sentiat, quae se corporalia sentire sentit, non ita clarum est, nisi quod se quisque intus interrogans inuenit omnem rem uiuentem fugere mortem; quae cum sit uitae contraria, necesse est ut uita etiam se ipsam sentiat, quae contrarium suum fugit* (lib. arb. 2.4.10/Free Choice, 39).

⁵⁵Whether Augustine takes this idea directly from Seneca or from Neoplatonist thinkers remains a disputed question among modern scholars. For references, see Brittain, “Non-Rational Perception,” 294n101.

⁵⁶*Neque quasi humanae prudentiae rationisque proprium est. Et bestiae quippe sentiunt vivere, non tantum se ipsas, sed etiam invicem atque alterutrum, et nos ipsos. Nec animas nostras vident, sed ex motibus corporis, idque statim et facillime quadam conspiratione naturali* (*Trin.* 8.6.9; translated by S. McKenna, in Augustine, *On the Trinity*, 14).

ceives the external senses and also itself, and (in the case of adult human beings) reason provides intellectual understanding. Even though Augustine calls the cognitive operation by which the powers of the soul are apprehended a “perception,” it is clear that he does not mean that perceptual self-awareness is perception in the same sense as the perception of external objects. It is sensory awareness that belongs to a higher level. Intellectual understanding is based on this kind of awareness but is distinct from it.⁵⁷ The nature of the soul and its powers can be understood intellectually, but Seneca and Augustine (and, as we shall see, Olivi) think that they also have to be objects of sensory cognition. This kind of cognition is the domain of the *hegemonikon* and the internal sense in the animal soul.

Whether or not Augustine took the preceding ideas directly from Seneca (or from some other Stoic author) remains an open question. At any rate, it is clear that the philosophical position he defends is in many ways identical to the one we find from Seneca. And if the claim that this philosophical idea originates in Stoic thought is true, it is a Stoic strand in Augustine as well.

5. OLIVI

The general context of Olivi’s view concerning the various forms of perceptual self-awareness is his discussion of sensory cognition. It is well known that he presents an original theory of perception, which is a result of his critical engagement not only with the Aristotelian species theories of his time but also with Augustine’s ideas concerning sensory perception. He conceives of perception as an active process in which the soul pays attention to external objects by intentionally directing itself toward them, and the soul is the cause of its own perceptual acts. The common sense (*sensus communis*) plays an important role in this process, because it functions as a kind of cognitive center of the sensitive soul by which the soul directs its attention to the external world and pays constant attention to the body of the subject.⁵⁸ This constant attention enables human beings and animals to apprehend their own bodies and themselves as living beings, and like Seneca and Augustine before him, Olivi thinks that this kind of self-perception is a condition for using the body in an appropriate way and striving for self-preservation.

The most elementary type of self-perception is carried out by the sense of touch. Olivi’s conception of the sense of touch is manifestly un-Aristotelian. Aristotle argues that the primary organ of the sense of touch is the heart and that the flesh of the body is only a medium that transmits the information from the external object to the heart. The sense of touch is not a means for perceiving one’s own body.⁵⁹ By contrast, Olivi argues that the organ of touch is “almost the whole body

⁵⁷See *lib. arb.* 2.3.9–4.10.

⁵⁸For Olivi’s theory of perception, see e.g. Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle-Ages*, 121–24, 130–34, and 168–81; Perler, *Théories de l’intentionnalité au Moyen Âge*, 43–75; Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham*, 39–54; Silva and Toivanen, “The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi,” 245–78; and Toivanen, *Perception and the Internal Senses*, 115–22. The most important places where Olivi discusses his views concerning sensory cognition are *Summa II*, q. 58, 461–515; qq. 60–67, 569–624; and qq. 72–74, 1–135.

⁵⁹See *De anima* 2.11, 422b34–423b27. In *De partibus animalium* 2.1, 647a19–21 and 2.8, 653b24–30, the flesh is depicted both as the organ and as the medium of touch.

of an animal,”⁶⁰ and external objects are perceived because they cause changes in the organ of touch. In this way, the sense of touch is primarily a power for bodily self-perception: “[T]he proper object of the sense of touch is the intrinsic state of its own organ, and thus all the things which change or affect the organ intrinsically are objects of the sense of touch.”⁶¹

One central idea that emerges from Olivi’s discussion is that the sense of touch is necessary for self-preservation. Without the sense of touch, animals and human beings could not avoid pain and pursue pleasure, and as the primary object of touch is the body of the percipient, there is an essential connection between self-perception and self-preservation.

The next level of perception of one’s body comes with the highest cognitive power of the sensitive soul, namely, the common sense. Olivi adopts the common sense from Avicennian–Aristotelian faculty psychology, which is based on the idea that the soul contains several internal senses in addition to the five external ones. These internal senses were supposed to account for cognitive processes that are more complex than the simple perception of the proper sensibles of each of the external senses: for instance, the perception of common sensibles, memory, imagination, estimation, and second-order perception were attributed to various internal senses.⁶² Olivi follows the traditional account of the higher cognitive functions of the sensitive soul in many ways, but he also gives a new twist to it and adds elements that he takes from Augustine and that come close to certain Stoic ideas that we have seen above. The clearest example of these elements is his interpretation of the role of the common sense. Instead of being the lowest of all the internal senses, the common sense is the governing power of the sensitive soul, and it is responsible for all the higher cognitive functions that are attributed to nonhuman animals. There are no other internal senses, because there has to be one power that is capable of apprehending and combining various kinds of cognitive acts that an animal has. The common sense performs all the higher cognitive functions in the animal soul.⁶³ In this respect, Olivi’s conception of the common sense is reminiscent of Augustine’s *sensus interior* and the Stoic concept of *hegemonikon*.⁶⁴

Olivi thinks that the common sense apprehends the acts of the senses and thus enables animals to perceive that they perceive. In addition to second-order perception, the common sense provides awareness of the inactivity of the senses. Olivi quotes *De libero arbitrio* 2.3, where Augustine argues that animals perceive that they do not see when their eyes are closed. The quotation is not verbatim, however,

⁶⁰[F]ere totum corpus animalis est organum tactu (Summa II q. 61, 581).

⁶¹[P]roprium obiectum tactus est intrinsecus status sui organi, et ideo omnia illa quae ipsum intrinsecus variant vel afficiunt sunt obiecta sensus tactus (Summa II q. 61, 578). For discussion, see Yrjönsuuri, “Perceiving One’s Own Body,” 101–16.

⁶²The single most important work that initiated the Latin discussions concerning the internal senses is the sixth book of Avicenna’s *Shifā’ De an.* This work was translated into Latin by Gundissalinus and Avendauth in the middle of the twelfth century, and it was an important source of psychological ideas in the Latin West. On the influence of Avicenna’s psychology in the Latin West, see Hasse, *Avicenna’s De Anima*. For a general overview, see Hasse, “The Soul’s Faculties,” 305–19.

⁶³See Toivanen, “Peter Olivi on Internal Senses,” 435–38; Toivanen, *Perception and the Internal Senses*, 247–65.

⁶⁴Yrjönsuuri, “Types of Self-Awareness,” 165.

and where Augustine claims that the internal sense perceives that the external objects are perceived by it, Olivi's version states that the internal sense (i.e. the common sense) perceives the senses: "It is clear that the internal sense not only perceives the objects of the five senses but also the senses themselves."⁶⁵ Despite this difference, Olivi accepts the core of Augustine's argument, as he thinks that the ability to perceive the senses explains why animals notice that they do not see.

It is true that Olivi underlines that the common sense is incapable of directly perceiving anything other than the acts of the external senses and that it needs the sense of touch to apprehend the state of the other senses when they are not active.⁶⁶ This limitation suggests that the awareness of the inactivity of the senses should not be understood as perception proper. However, Olivi clearly thinks that we (and nonhuman animals) are aware of the inactivity. For instance, he points out that when we close one eye, we perceive that the act of seeing that used to be in that eye disappears: "The common sense readily perceives one act to be in one eye and the other in another eye, which is also why it perceives that one act of seeing is taken away, and the other remains when one of the eyes is closed."⁶⁷ We perceive the state of our senses and know whether they are functioning or not, and our ability to tell the difference between our imagination and reality is based on a comparison between the imagined objects and the contents of our perception. Thus, if we close our eyes and imagine, say, a bird, we are aware that we do not see the bird and that it is only a product of our imagination.⁶⁸ By contrast, when we are asleep, our ability to apprehend the state of our senses is lost. For this reason we experience dream images as if we are really seeing them.⁶⁹ What is missing during sleep is present when awake.

It is worth noting as an aside that when Olivi argues that the soul cannot be acted upon by external objects in the process of perception, he puts forth a thought experiment that is based on the ability to be aware of the functions of the senses:

For example, suppose that only a man whose eyes are open would have been created before the creation of everything else, and he would endeavor with all his effort to see with his eyes, as if there were external visible things: it is clear that in that case his attention [*aspectus*] would not be terminated at or determinately carried to any external object. If, after a while, all the external objects (which exist now) were created, the same attention of the eyes would be fixed on external objects.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ *Manifestum esse per sensum interiorem non tantum sentiri obiecta quinque sensuum sed etiam ipsos* (Summa II, q. 62, 588–89; cf. note 46 above). It is of some importance that Olivi quotes Augustine and not Aristotle's *De anima* 3.2, which he certainly knew. Probably the reason for this choice is that, in question 62, Olivi wants to prove that the common sense is distinct from the external senses, and *De anima* 3.2 is a non-starter for this purpose.

⁶⁶ Summa II, q. 62, 594–95.

⁶⁷ *Sed tamen bene sentit alium actum videndi esse in uno oculo et alium in alio, unde et cum unus eorum clauditur, sentit unum actum videndi esse subtractum alio remanente* (Summa II, q. 73, 94).

⁶⁸ See Summa II, q. 63, 599–600.

⁶⁹ See Summa II, q. 49, 9; and q. 59, 533 and 553–54.

⁷⁰ *Ut verbi gratia, detur quod solus homo apertis oculis esset ante omnia creatus et sic toto conatu niteretur per oculos intendere ad videndum acsi essent visibilia extra: constat quod tunc aspectus eius non terminaretur nec determinate ferretur in aliquod extrinsecum obiectum, et si paulo post omnia exteriora sicut nunc sunt crearentur, eo ipso primus aspectus oculi determinaretur ad obiecta exteriora* (Summa II, q. 73, 69; see also q. 59, 543–44).

The thought experiment resembles to some extent the so-called “floating man” of Avicenna.⁷¹ However, whereas Avicenna’s point is that the floating man does not admit the existence of his body, Olivi’s “man before creation” seems to be aware of his eyes and his ability to see. To be sure, the thought experiment is based on the idea that perception is not a passive but an active process, and its main purpose is to show how the undetermined attention turns into actual perception when external objects are created for the man to see. However, the fact that Olivi depicts the man as trying to use his eyes—he is not only created with his eyes open but he tries to see with them even though there is nothing to be seen—shows that even in this condition the man is aware of his eyes and their purpose. If he did not have any idea that the eyes were for seeing, he would not try to use them.

One of the most refined functions of the common sense is to provide awareness of the functions of the bodily members.⁷² Like Seneca and Augustine, Olivi establishes a link between the ability to use the members in an appropriate manner and the awareness of their functions. He writes,

As it is necessary that the appetitive power controls all the bodily members and senses which it leads to their acts or detaches from them, so it is likewise necessary that it is assisted by a judging power which makes judgments in relation to all the acts of the senses, notices their pleasures and pains, and prefers or shows the preference of one over the other. Moreover, when a dog or a snake sacrifices one of its members in order to save its head or sacrifices some part in order to save the whole, then it prefers the whole over the part and the head over the other member. Therefore, these animals must have some common power which shows both extremes simultaneously, their mutual comparison, and the preference of one over the other—although it does not do this with the same fullness and degree of reflective judgment as does the intellect.⁷³

Olivi’s purpose is to point out that the sensitive soul contains a central cognitive power, the common sense. It is distinct from the external senses, and it provides cognitive information necessary for intentional action. Animals are capable of using their bodies and of controlling their limbs and senses, and this requires some kind of awareness of the members of the body and their functions. The common sense enables animals to perceive their own bodies, the parts and their functions, and the relative value of the parts for the wellbeing of the animal as a whole, thus making animals capable of self-preservation that goes beyond the ability to avoid pain.

Note that Olivi is not explaining how the perception of perception takes place. An animal is aware of the function and the importance of the parts of its body

⁷¹*Shifā’ De an.* bk. 1, ch. 1, 36–37. Avicenna’s thought experiment was sometimes used in Latin philosophy: a list of Latin authors who quote *Shifā’ De an.* 1.1 can be found in Gilson, “Les Sources gréco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant,” 41–42. For a discussion of the influence of the “flying man” in Latin philosophy, see Hasse, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 80–92.

⁷²Note that Olivi does not use the term ‘perception’ or ‘sensation’ but speaks more generally about ‘apprehension,’ ‘judgment,’ and the like.

⁷³*Ergo sicut illam appetitivam oportet dominari omnibus membris et sensibus quos ad suos actus applicat vel ab eis retrahit: sic oportet unam iudicativam sibi assistere quae de omnibus actibus eorum iudicet et eorum delectationes vel dolores advertat et alteram alteri praeferat vel praeferendam ostendat. Praeterea, quando canis vel serpens pro conservatione capitis exponit aliud membrum aut pro conservatione totius exponit aliquam partem, tunc praeferit totum parti et caput alteri membro. Ergo oportet in eis esse aliquam communem potentiam quae in simul ambo extrema et mutuam eorum comparisonem et unius ad alterum praeferentiam ostendat, quamvis non cum illa plenitudine et altitudine reflexivi iudicii cum qua fit hoc ab intellectu* (Summa II, q. 62, 587–88).

before it uses them, and it protects its head before it feels pain. Like Augustine, he deliberates about the perception of the body (and its various parts and senses) that is devoid of any direct perception of external objects. In effect, this illustration repeats the Stoic argument that animals perceive the weaknesses and strengths of their bodies because they can protect the weak parts with the strong ones. Thus, where Augustine emphasizes the awareness of the functions of the bodily parts, Olivi emphasizes the awareness of their relative value for the animal.⁷⁴

After presenting the illustration of the dog and the snake, Olivi goes on to quote several passages from Augustine's *De libero arbitrio* 2.3–4, including the one that attributes the reflective awareness of one's own life to the internal sense.⁷⁵ Although he does not develop this theme further, the fact that he cites the passage from Augustine without refuting it shows that he accepts the idea that the awareness of oneself as a living being is a requirement for striving for self-preservation. The mere possibility of self-interested action presupposes both the perception of one's own body and the awareness of oneself as a living being. Although medieval philosophers usually think that corporeal powers are incapable of reflexivity, Olivi attributes a lower type of reflexivity to the common sense, apparently because he thinks that the awareness of oneself as a living being requires it. For instance, he writes,

And so, this does not prove that the common sense would apprehend anything that is present—other than the acts and orientation [*aspectus*] of the external senses—except insofar as it perhaps reflectively turns towards its proper act sensibly and incompletely [*semplice*]. But in that case, the act towards which it turns first has something else as its object.⁷⁶

Unfortunately, Olivi does not determine what kind of reflexivity the common sense is capable of when he states that it may reflect itself *semplice*. It is clear, however, that it differs from the intellectual reflexivity of spiritual substances, which enables human beings to be directly aware of their own minds and to act freely. The less sophisticated type of reflexivity can be attributed also to corporeal powers, such as the common sense and the sense of touch. In an illuminating text Olivi argues that

it is not inconvenient that the intellect is able to turn reflectively towards itself and its own acts even though it is an organic power [that is, a power that is a form of a bodily organ]; for, the common sense apprehends the simple acts of the external senses although it is an organic power. And it is also proven above that the common sense reflectively turns towards itself and also upon its own subject [*suppositum*] by pointing out that a dog or a snake chooses [*praeeligit*] to expose to death a less

⁷⁴The latter argument is most clearly presented by Hierocles in his *Elements of Ethics*. For discussion, see Heller-Roazen, *The Inner Touch*, 124 and 135.

⁷⁵Summa II, q. 62, 588–89.

⁷⁶*Et ideo ex hoc non probatur quod sensus communis apprehendat aliquid praesentiale praeter actus et actuales aspectus particularium sensuum, nisi forte pro quanto super suum actum proprium sensualiter et semiple reflectitur. Sed tunc actus ille super quem reflectitur habuit primo aliquid aliud pro obiecto* (Summa II, q. 62, 595). See also Summa II, q. 67, 615–24; q. 62, 587–89; q. 111, 270–71. In Summa II, q. 58, 421, Olivi suggests that, in addition to the will, other powers (note the plural) of the soul may be capable of reflectively turning towards themselves, and on some occasions he seems to think that it is possible to attribute the middle level of reflexivity even to the external senses (Summa II, q. 61, 583; Summa IV q. 13 [= q. 1 in the Maranesi edition], 107–8 and 112).

important part in order to save the whole and more radical and noble part of itself. The animal cannot do this unless it discerns the whole from the part and the more radical consistence of its life from the less radical one in its sensory judgment. The same point is proven there also by Augustine, who explicitly teaches this idea and argues for it in *De libero arbitrio* II [4.10].⁷⁷

Olivi does not accept the corporeality of the intellect that the argument is supposed to prove, but he does not criticize the idea concerning the ability of animals to apprehend their own lives. Rather, his refutation is based on the distinction between two kinds of reflexivity. The intellect cannot be a corporeal power, because it is capable of turning toward itself in a free and intellectual way. In other words, Olivi accepts the description of the ability of animals to have self-reflexivity that the cited passage provides.

The lower type of reflexivity accounts for the ability of animals to compare the relative importance of the various parts of their bodies, as we have seen, and it is a necessary condition for self-preservation. In effect, the distinction between two types of reflexivity enables Olivi to attribute to irrational animals a cognitive operation that is above simple perception but falls short of being genuine intellectual understanding. In this way, he adheres to the same idea that we already encountered with Seneca and Augustine, namely, that animal behavior shows that they are aware of their souls even though they are incapable of understanding what 'soul' means.

Unlike bodily self-awareness, the human mind's ability to be aware of itself was a central topic in thirteenth-century philosophical psychology.⁷⁸ In the case of Olivi, the two topics are not directly connected to each other, but the idea that one can be aware of the soul without having conceptual knowledge of the essence of the soul is central also for his explanation of human self-knowledge. He argues,

The soul knows or is able to know itself in two ways. The first of them is an experiential and as if tactile sensation by which the soul undoubtedly senses that it is, lives, cognizes, wills, sees, hears, moves the body, and likewise for its other acts, whose principle and subject it knows and senses itself to be. And this to such extent that it cannot actually know or consider any object or any act without always knowing and sensing itself to be the subject [*suppositum*] of the act by which it knows and considers that [object or act]. . . . The other way of knowing itself is by reasoning. In this way the soul investigates the genera and differences that it does not know in the first way.⁷⁹

⁷⁷*Sexto, quia non est inconueniens quin intellectus, quamvis sit organicus, possit reflecti super se et super suum actum; quia sensus communis, quamvis sit organicus, attingit simplices actus sensuum particularium. Et etiam probatum fuit supra quod reflectitur super se et etiam super totum suum suppositum per hoc quod canis vel serpens praelegit partem viliorem morti exponere pro salvando toto et parte sua radicaliori et nobiliori; quod non potest, nisi suo sensuali iudicio discernat totum a parte et radicaliorem consistentiam suae vitae a minus radicali. Quod et ibidem probatum est per Augustinum, II De libero arbitrio, hoc expresse docentem et argumentantem* (Summa II, q. 67, 615–16). 'Probatum fuit supra' refers to Summa II, q. 62, 587–88, and Olivi's answer can be found from q. 67, 624.

⁷⁸For a detailed analysis of the medieval debate, see Putallaz, *La connaissance*, 13–375.

⁷⁹*Sciendum quod anima scit se vel potest scire duplici modo. Primus est per modum sensus experimentalis et quasi tactualis. Et hoc modo indubitabiliter sentit se esse et vivere et cogitare et velle et videre et audire et se movere corpus et sic de aliis actibus suis quorum scit et sentit se esse principium et subiectum. Et hoc in tantum quod nullum obiectum nullumque actum potest actualiter scire vel considerare, quin semper ibi sciat et sentiat se esse suppositum illius actus quo scit et considerat illa. . . . Secundus modus se sciendi est per ratiocinationem per quam investigat genera et differentias quae per primum modum non novit* (Summa II, q. 76, 146–47). For Olivi's theory, see Putallaz, *La connaissance*, 85–133.

The basic idea behind this division is to challenge the Thomistic picture of the soul's self-knowledge (which was defended by Olivi's rival, Arnaud Gaillard), according to which the mind cannot be directly aware of itself. First it must be actualized by a cognitive act, and only after that can it have self-knowledge by rationally analyzing itself as the principle behind the cognitive act.⁸⁰ Olivi criticizes this theory by arguing that the human soul must be immediately and directly aware of itself before it can begin the rational process of trying to understand the essence of the soul or the mind. The rational knowledge of the nature of the soul comes in addition to direct awareness and is based on it. One can easily notice the similarities between this division and the views of Augustine and Seneca, who both make a distinction between the experience of oneself as a living being and the subject of one's psychological acts and the rational analysis or propositional knowledge of the nature and essence of the soul. I am certain that I have a soul, but what kind of an entity the soul is, is a further question, which I do not necessarily pose—and if I were an animal, I could not pose. But the first kind of self-awareness, it seems, can be attributed even to animals. Olivi explicitly states that it is a quasi-tactile sensation (*sensus*) and the list that he provides of its contents belongs to the sensitive level (save, of course, the only specifically human act, that of the will). To be sure, he does not mean that experiential self-awareness can be achieved by the sense of touch—in the case of human beings it clearly belongs to the intellectual mind—but the lower type of reflexivity of the common sense may be sufficient for it.

Finally, the ability to evaluate external objects with respect to their usefulness and harmfulness requires that the subject is aware of itself. Olivi understands usefulness, harmfulness, and the like as relational features. He uses the traditional illustration from Avicenna but gives a different interpretation for it by arguing that a sheep has to apprehend three things in order to estimate that a wolf is dangerous and to become afraid of it:

[S]ince the intentions of usefulness, uselessness and the like cannot be apprehended by any power unless it at the same time apprehends the sensible or imaginary forms to which these intentions belong; that is because [intentions] mean only some relational states [*respectivas habitudines*] of those forms. For, when a sheep estimates that a wolf is hostile towards the sheep itself, it is necessary that it apprehends [1] the thing that it judges to be hostile; for to apprehend only [2] the property [*ratio*] of hostility is not to apprehend that the wolf is hostile. This is why it is necessary that the animal at the same time apprehend—besides the two preceding things—[3] itself as the end [*terminum*] of that hostile relation.⁸¹

The sheep has to perceive the wolf and its hostility, which is a relation between the sheep and the wolf. In order to be able to apprehend a relation, one has to be aware of both end-terms of the relation, and thus the sheep has to be aware

⁸⁰See Putallaz, *La connaissance*, 91–93.

⁸¹. . . *quia intentiones utilis et inutilis et consilium non possunt ab aliqua potentia apprehendi, nisi in simul apprehendant formas sensibiles vel imaginarias quarum sunt huiusmodi intentiones; quia dicunt solum quasdam respectivas habitudines illarum formarum. Quando enim ovis aestimat lupum sibi esse inimicum, oportet quod apprehendat illam rem quam sibi iudicat inimicam; apprehendere enim solam rationem inimicitiae non est apprehendere lupum sibi esse inimicum. Unde etiam ultro duo praedicta oportet quod simul apprehendat se tanquam terminum illius hostilis respectus* (Summa II, q. 64, 603). For Avicenna's illustration, see *Shifā' De an.* 1.5, 4.1, and 4.3.

of itself in addition to the wolf. Olivi's idea is similar to the one we have already seen in Seneca. He does not speak about perceiving one's own flesh, but we may suppose that his idea here is related to the bodily self-perception that he discusses in other contexts.

To sum up, Olivi thinks that the perception of pain and pleasure, which are necessary for self-preservation, is based on an ability to perceive one's own body by the sense of touch. All animals have a sense of touch, and this makes them capable of avoiding pain. Further, the common sense provides awareness of one's own body, which enables animals to protect the vital parts of their bodies and to use their bodies in appropriate manners. This ability allows them to avoid things that cause pain even before they actually feel pain. Finally, the ability to evaluate external objects with respect to their usefulness and harmfulness to oneself is based on self-perception. These cognitive capacities allow animals (including human beings) to strive for self-preservation and to live the kinds of lives that are appropriate to them.

6. CONCLUSION

Seneca's argument that animals perceive themselves directly and immediately as living bodily beings is related to the Stoic ethical theory, as self-perception functions as a natural starting point for human moral development. A few centuries later, Augustine takes up the psychological aspects of the Stoic view but places them in a radically different context. He elaborates on the psychological capacities of the so-called internal sense, which is a centralizing power of the animal soul and the locus of self-perception, in the midst of his anti-Manichean treatment of the problem of evil. Later still, Augustine's view influences Olivi to the extent that he rejects the idea that the sensitive soul contains several internal senses, which was widely accepted at the time. Instead, he argues that there is only one power, the common sense. The common sense accounts for the higher cognitive functions of the sensitive soul and provides animals with the ability to apprehend themselves as living bodily beings. Olivi's discussion is not connected anymore to any theological or ethical considerations but stems from his interest in psychological issues.

Despite the contextual differences, these authors agree that animals (and, by consequence, human beings) must perceive their bodies and the functions of the senses and bodily members, because otherwise they would not be able to use their bodies efficiently. Moreover, they think that animals must perceive themselves as living beings and as subjects of their psychological acts, and that this ability is based on a kind of perceptual awareness of one's own soul that is distinct from the intellectual understanding of the essence of the soul. All these forms of self-perception are necessary for self-preservation. Seneca and Olivi also think that the evaluation of external objects with respect to one's well-being is based on self-awareness.

It cannot be established with certainty that Augustine or Olivi would have read Seneca's letter 121, although it is possible that they were familiar with it. However, even if the direct historical connections are dubious, it is clear that the philosophical idea of the connection between self-perception and self-interested action at a non-rational level is highly similar in all three thinkers.

Can we say, then, that Olivi and Augustine defend a Stoic theory of self-perception? The answer to this question depends on what is required of a theory before it can be labeled 'Stoic.' It is clear that neither of them considered the theory as a Stoic one, and in this sense they were not consciously adding a Stoic element into their psychological views. However, if we admit that an idea may be called Stoic on the proviso that its origins are in Stoic philosophy, we can say that both Olivi and Augustine defend a Stoic view. Its presence in medieval philosophy may be a result of an indirect penetration or direct transmission—either way, the philosophical affinity between the three authors shows that some elements of Stoic psychology continued to survive in medieval philosophy.⁸²

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