FINNISH YEARBOOK OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 2003

1 TRANSLATING POLITICS

2 "NATION" IN FINLAND, SWEDEN AND THE NETHERLANDS

3 OTHER ARTICLES & BOOK REVIEWS

KARI PALONEN
Translation, Politics and Conceptual Change

REVIEWED: QUENTIN SKINNER'S VISIONS OF POLITICS

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vol. 7

SoPhi 79

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SoPhi | University of Jyväskylä | 2003

SoPhi 79

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ISBN 952-5478-15-7

Printed at Kopijyvä Ltd., Jyväskylä 2003

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EDITORIAL

WAS KANT WRONG?

Some Republican Reflections on War and Peace

Never since the Second World War has war been so popular as it is now. After three, at least apparently succesful military showdowns (Kosovo/Serbia, Afganistan, and Iraq) the leaders of the world are, again, convinced that wars are useful, and that they can be won. We have returned to the world of von Clausewitz: war is not an uncontrollable process – as Tolstoy thought – it is, again, seen as "continuation of politics by other means".

If war is a political process, it should be a legitimate subject of political theory. And so should be peace. What does our political theory tell us about the questions of peace and war? Not much. The history of the subject during the last 2500 years consists of works that are mainly historical, jurisprudential, or strategic, plus a series of short comments and footnotes in the works mainly devoted to the "normal" politics. With a slight exaggeration, there exists only one work in the Western canon that is simultanuosly (a) political theory proper, (b) written by a classic author of the first rate, (c) theoretically innovative, and (d) exclusively owed to the questions of war and peace. That work is, of course, Kant's *Zum Evigen Frieden*.[1]

Kant's argument is a deceptively simple one. A republic is, for him, a State in which the content of important political decisions is

dependent on the will of its citizens. But ordinary citizens do not want war; here, moral and egoistic motives always converge. Hence, in a world of republics, there will be no war. Kant's short work has become a symbol of political movements and of schools of thought. Before and after the First World War, Kant's essay inspired both the academic study of International Relations – which for first time emerged as in independent discipline – and practical politics, especially President Wilson's peace programme and the establishment of the League of Nations.[2] (Bruns) Arguably, it has played a similar role in the recent years.

Partly because of its status as a symbol, *Perpetual Peace* has always been criticized from different angles. Classical realists, from Friedrich von Gentz and Hegel onwards, have seen Kant's theory as a blueprint for an unfeasible utopia, inconsistent with the basic nature of the State and of human beings. Modern "neorealists", who see international conflicts as inescapable consequences of the structural properties of the international system cannot accept Kant's idea that an internal transformation of the states could change the nature of their external relations. For radicals and Marxists, Kant's reliance on bourgeois republicanism and the "commercial spirit" are often seen as pieces of an apologetic ideology of capitalism.

However, Kant's book may equally be a disappointment for its internationalistically minded readers. Although Kant sketches a plan for a global "federation", and gives some very detailed instructions for its workings, his proposal does not contain any idea of *international institutions*. In his "federation" there is no international authoritative body comparable to those "senates" or "councils" imagined by many of his predecessors (like abbé de Saint-Pierre or Rousseau) and by almost all of his followers. Most importantly, In Kant's plan, there is no room for *coercive* institutions: no international court, no international enforcing mechanisms, not even a collective system of defence like the one established by the League of Nations. The sovereign rights of the member states are, at least *de jure*, left intact. Because almost all internationalists have seen strong institutions as a necessary condition for the permanent peace, it is no wonder that many internationalist readers of Kant's essay insisted that Kant *must* have held the idea that international institutions were necessary. How could he otherwise use the term "federation" at all?[3]

Several commentators have conclusively shown that Kant did not suppose his "federation" to have any international institutions.[4] At least he did not give them any role in the process that would lead to a global peace. After these clarifications, one could not sincerely defend the interpretation that Kant *actually* wanted to establish some kind of world government. One could, however, still claim that from his own point of view, he *should* have recommended it.[5] *Prima facie*, this sounds plausible. Kant agreed with Hobbes that coercion was the essence of the state. A legally unregulated state of nature was a state of permanent conflict, and at the individual level it could be terminated only by establishing a system based on authoritative coercion. According to him, the States were in a legally unregulated state, and he rejected both the decentralized legal solution of the classical International Law, and the realist solution, based on the balance of power. How could he, then, refuse to accept the only solution that seemed to remain, the one based on international coercive institutions?

For Kant, a republican government – which was a necessary condition for the legitimacy of any State – did not mean an identity between the rulers and the ruled. Instead, his republicanism meant a complex system of institutional mediations between the will of the citizens and the actual application of law. All these institutional elements were necessary for the solution of the problem. They included (1) representative institutions, (2) the separation of powers, (3) a *Rechtsstaat,* or the rule of law, and, last but not least, (4) a free and enlightened public opinion. Now, an international organization with coercive powers would constitute a State, however minimal this World-State might be. Hence, it could be made legitimate for its subjects through republican institutions only. What would that mean in practice? What would, for example, be the appropriate way to realize the principle of citizens' representation in a world state? Is it possible to have a world-wide public opinion which could exercize critical control over that world state? Here, the recent discussion on the institutions of the European Union is illuminative. Of course, the problems faced by an organization covering only a half of Europe, with just 20-25 member states, and without dramatic economic inequalities or cultural tensions, are small compared to the problems of a global state. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the European

Union in its present form does *not* satisfy the republican principles. Its representative institutions and its internal separation of powers are not sufficiently developed, nor is there any working, all-European public opinion. Consequently, its decisions do not adequately reflect the reasoned will of its citizens. Could these problems be solved at the global level? If they cannot, a coercive global state cannot made be as legitimate, however pacifying its effects might be.

The second coming of *Zum Evigen Frieden* was intiated by the seminal essays of Michael W. Doyle in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (1983).[6] For the second time in history, Kant's short and somewhat incomplete treatise created a new research programme for the academic studies of international relations. And again, it has had certain influence on practical politics, most notably in the politics of the Clinton regime in the United States. Unlike the old Idealist tradition which flourished before and after the First World War, the new Kantian paradigm is able to generate empirically testable hypotheses.The empirical observation which made by Doyle and precised and modified by others, is that there has been almost no wars between "liberal democracies" during the last two hundred years. This seems to give empirical support for Kant's conjecture.

I shall not discuss the reliability of this evidence, for the real problem lies elsewhere. Even if liberal democracies have not fighted with each others, they have fighted numerous wars against non-democracies during the last two hundred years. Some of them have been defensive wars, and justifiable from Kant's point of view. However, since the Second World War, the United Kingdom, the USA and France have also been involved in numerous wars and conflicts which cannot possibly be justified in terms of self-defence. Consider the US involvement in Vietnam. Wasn't it a clear counterexample to Kant's thesis that republics are peaceful by their nature?

Here we have to draw the distinction between *Kant's thesis* and the thesis put forth by the Neo-Kantian political scientists. Those who have tried to test Kant's conjecture have unproblematically identified Kant's "republics" with modern liberal democracies. But would Kant himself accept that equation? Since the 19th century, Kant's first three conditions, the separation of powers (1), representative institutions (2), and the rule of law (3) have been realized in those states charaterized as "liberal democracies" by modern political sci-

entists. But the fourth condition, the existence of an *enlightened public opinion* is a more complex one. The problem is that Kant's republic was an *ideal*; empirical states may approximate it more or less closely. In a footnote in *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, Kant formulates an extremely strict "test" for the republican character of constitutions:

> What is an *absolute* monarch? He is one at whose command war at once begins when he says it shall do so. And conversely, what is a *limited* monarch? He is one who must ask the people whether or not there is to be a war, and if the people say that there will be no war, then there will be none. For war is a condition in which *all* the powers of the state must be at the head of state's disposal.
>
> Now the monarch of Great Britain has waged numerous wars without asking the people's consent. This king is therefore an absolute monarch, although he should not be so according to the constitution. But he can always bypass the latter, since he can always be assured, by controlling the various powers of the state, that the people's representatives will agree with him; for he has the authority to award all officies and dignities. This corrupt system, however, must naturally be given no publicity if it is to succeed.

Thus, what Kant is after is not a juristic definition of a "republic" but a real, political definition. A Kantian answer to the criticism would be that the warlike politics of the modern republics is partly due to the *insufficiently republican* nature of the states. The unrepublican practices which prevailed in foreign policy, and the insufficiently developed and sometimes manipulated public opinion made wars possible. In modern times, Robert MacNamara's recent account on the American involvement in the Vietnam war provides illuminative examples of this[7]. First, MacNamara shows that the intervention was clearly supported by the American public opinion in the early sixties; but at the same time, he makes clear that the conflict was perceived to take place between democratic and totalitarian principles. Second, while President Johnson got the Congress' blessing to the further deployment of forces, the Congess never made a decision on waging a real war. In Vietnam, as in several cases before and after, the US President acted like the King of England in Kant's example: he actively produced the required consent for a military interven-

tion. (A striking example of this is the crucial resolution of the Congress concerning the Tonkin incident in the 7th August 1964.) Third, it was the American public opinion which forced the President finally to withdraw.

Would the present situation provide a more convincing counter-example to Kant's "republican peace" -thesis? Or could it be analysed in the same way, as an example how the leaders of the world may manipulate the public opinion by violating the Kantian principle of sincerity? I shall leave the judgment to the readers.

* * *

This is the present Editor-in-Chief's last issue of the *Yearbook*. I want to express my gratitude to all the co-editors. The new Editor will follow his/her own guidelines; the *Yearbook*, however, shall continue as an interdisciplinary journal, addressed to all who are interested in the theoretical aspects of politics.

Notes

1 Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Political Writings*. Ed. Hans Reiss. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997; Immanuel Kant, *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Gesichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik 1. Werkausgabe XI.* Ed. W. Weischedel. Suhrkamp Frakfurt am Main, 1978.

2 Tomas Bruns, *Kant et l'Europe*. Universität des Saarlandes, 1973.

3 This mistake appears e. g. in otherwise excellent books of C.J. Friedrich and J. G. Murphy. See Carl J. Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1948; J. G. Murphy, *Kant: The Philosophy of Right*. Macmillan, London, 1970, pp. 147-8.

4 W. B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, 8-36; F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, 62-80; Howard Williams, *Kant's Political Philosophy*. Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.

5 Thomas L. Carson , '*Perpetual Peace*: What Kant Should have Said'. *Social Theory and Practice* 14 (1988), 173-214. Jürgen Habermas, 'Kants Idee des Ewigen Friedens -aus dem historischen Abstand von 200 Jahren'. *Kritische Justiz* 28 (1995), 293-319; Otfried Höffe, *Vernunft und Recht:*

Bausteine zu einem interkulturel-len Rechtdiskurs. Suhrkamp,Frankfurt am Main, 1996.

6 Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. Parts 1 & 2'. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (1983), 205-235 and 323-353; Michael W. Doyle, 'Liberalism and International Relations'. In . R. Beinar and W.J. Booth (eds.) *Kant and Political Philosophy. The Contemporary Legacy*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993, pp. 173-203.

7 Robert MacNamara. *In Retrospect. The tragedy and lessons of Vietnam*. Vintage Books, New York, 1995.

ARTICLES

Topic 1:
Translating Politics

Kari Palonen

TRANSLATION, POLITICS AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE

Jede Übersetzung in je eigene Gegenwart impliziert eine Begriffsgeschichte", writes Reinhart Koselleck. (1986, 90) With this ambitious thesis, he attributes both a first rank significance to the understanding of the process of conceptual change and suggests that we reconsider the act of translation as a dimension of conceptual history. Koselleck's qualification that we should speak only of translations "into our own present" is only relative, for in a strict sense any translation is a movement in time, a move between the translatable and the translated.

In this essay take up the issue of conceptual changes due to translations. I will first present my reflections on the politics of translations, illustrated with historical examples. I will then present fragments of what I would like to call a political theory of language and translation, based on a Weberian nominalistic perspective. Comments on recent retranslations of Max Weber offer me a representative anecdote (in the sense of Burke 1945) for a preliminary discussion of analysing conceptual changes through translation. At the more concrete level of the politics of translations, I shall elucidate my argument by examining conceptual changes that are present in translations between different languages. For this purpose, I will explore translation strategies and neglected alternatives from the context of

the formation of Finnish political vocabulary during the nineteenth century. Finally, I shall return to the general implications of the politics of conceptual change through translation as a primary source of inspiration.

1. The Omnipresence of Translations

In this essay, I shall speak of 'translation' in a broad and etymologically literal sense. The Latin verb *transferre* can be counted among the expressions, which originally had the concrete spatial meaning of conveying something, but later served as basis for the shift to a more abstract temporal meaning (cf. Koselleck 1972b). We can easily understand how a translation is always a 'transport' or 'transfer' between different contexts. The point of the translation of concepts lies in their selectivity, in the fact that in a transfer between contexts there always is the possibility that something else and unintended creeps into the concept. The intention of translation marks a move that intends to regulate, although by no means always to eliminate, this 'something else'.

My specific point of departure is to insist that a translation between individual speakers is always required, on the simple basis that there are no two human beings that would have exactly the same context when speaking, listening or reading. I consider a 'methodological individualism' of this kind as a condition for understanding the insight that in the use of language the need for translation is omnipresent. Between two individuals there is always an 'existential' distance that renders a spontaneous understanding impossible. Simultaneously, such existential distance indicates the presence of a political dimension in inter-individual relationships, in the sense of both a *Spielraum* for alternative translations as well as a built-in conflict between the users of the 'original' and those using a translation.

From this perspective there cannot be any spontaneous 'linguistic common sense' that would shared by all 'normal human beings'. This point is directed against the reliance on a Habermasian type of 'ideal speech situations' as well as against the tacit ideology of elementary language teaching, both which are based on the assumption of a correspondence between translatable and translated. My

main point is, however, to understand the contingent and controversial, that is, the political dimension in the inter-individual and inter-linguistic relationships of translation which always involves conceptual change. To specify this political dimension, we have to realize that translation does not refer to exceptional situations, but, on the contrary, forms an omnipresent procedure of interpretation of the relation between speakers and audiences in two different contexts.

Translation does not merely signify a relationship between different so-called natural languages but is, in the sense of Koselleck's remark, a general procedure to render intelligible conceptual changes. Translation is no exceptional situation but a rule in our daily linguistic actions.

This does not necessarily imply radical alterations in our linguistic practices, only an inversion of the understanding of what kinds of speech acts we are using when translating. In most cases, translation obviously relies on shared conventions and is quasi-automatic. I simply want to claim that it remains, and we frequently encounter situations in which this automatism does not work and conventions break down. Conceptual changes are actualized in a situation in which we have to stop our linguistic action to reflect on the meaning and point of a concept, but it can also take place as the unintended consequences of linguistic actions. For translation we have to consider both types of situations (cf. Skinner 1996, 7-8).

We can speculate about the various grounds for an internal conceptual history that enables us an inversion of perspective on translation. My source of inspiration is Max Weber's famous article *Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Forschung* of 1904, in which Weber, above all, defends the perspectivist character of all knowledge in *Kulturwissenschaften*. Behind Weber is the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, and behind this aspect of Nietzsche's perspectivism are the ancient rhetoricians and Sophists, as it has only recently been made clear with the publication of Nietzsche's lectures on ancient rhetoric (in: *Werke* 2/4).

To trace the implications of perspectivism on the omnipresence of translation, I want to insist on three theses. My main nominalistic contention is that all use of language is based on the human acts of naming, not on the 'nature of things'. For example, the entities called

'men' and 'women' are contingent results of certain modes of naming and classifying things, which can always be replaced by others. This means, secondly, that even long-lasting historical consensus about such naming remains contingent, and such established names rather indicate a success in political struggles to exclude alternatives, but one day even such a success may evaporate. Today a growing number of people already experience difficulties in locating themselves through the public and largely 'statistical' categories of men and women, and we can imagine that it will not be long before the universal and unreflected use of that categorical dyad will decline. Thirdly, conceptual changes are omnipresent expressions of the controversiality of concepts, of rhetorical moves in such controversies and of their unanticipated consequences. Just as Tuija Pulkkinen (2002) has recently thematized the conceptual and rhetorical history of the concept 'woman', I think that we have now reached a point at which an allegedly 'anthropological' or 'metahistorical' category (to use Koselleck's (1987) terms, partly to opposed conclusions that he himself has drawn) has been replaced by a historical and political concept.

It is in this sense we can also better understand Koselleck's thesis that every translation, as an act in time, involves a conceptual history of the movement between the translatable and translated. We could even speak, with Koselleck (1972a), of translation as a 'method' of conceptual history, not just as a metaphor, but as a procedure that renders conceptual changes from past to the present as well as the inevitable use of contemporary language in the analysis of such changes intelligible (cf. Koselleck 1983). Indeed, the competent translation presupposes a readiness to regard the translatable as something alien that deserves a paraphrase or an interpretation in order to be intelligible to the present-day audience (cf. also Skinner 1970, 1988). You have to treat a word, a concept or a phrase as something that can be transferred to an audience only through an explication of its point and significance. Hence it is no wonder that Koselleck also uses the Brechtian figure of *Verfremdungseffekt* to redescribe the procedure of conceptual history (cf. Koselleck 1972a).

2. The Politics of Translations

A further political implication of the contingency of translations is that a number of alternative translations for a text, a passage or a concept, can always be provided. None of them is perfect, but each of them indicates a different perspective on the transfer between the concepts as well as on the changing styles or fashions of doing so. All of these aspects are accentuated in the politically and historically controversial translations of concepts.

How do the various alternatives achieve or legitimize a conceptual change through translation? Here we have to shift the discussion from single moves to conventional entities, such as languages. My point is, however, not to apply the linguistic criteria of the formation of 'natural' or 'technical' languages to politics. On the contrary, I want to understand all languages as historical and political entities, of which the so-called natural languages are only one specific type.

A metaphorical use of political languages was mentioned already in the early twentieth century. It seems, however, that it was more systematically introduced by John Pocock in his *Politics, Language and Time* in 1971, and has since become a commonplace. With Anthony Pagden's edition of the book *Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe* (1987), the metaphor has even been taken so seriously that certain languages have been named, as if they would be entities independent of the context and specific problematic of each scholar. I think this leads, already in the book edited by Pagden, to questionable quasi-naturalizations of definite political languages that could also engage us in rather fruitless debates about the borders and separateness of languages.

Moreover, such a quasi-naturalization of languages tends to provide the political languages with a similar status of quasi-autonomous entities rather than the 'natural languages' that we have in everyday use. It is, however, eminently political whether Serbian and Croatian have now become separate languages or remain politically conditioned dialects of Serbo-Croat with either a Latin or Cyrillic orthography. The example shows, however, that even so-called natural languages are political constructions (with linguists acting as part-time politicians).

Speaking of political languages as loosely related but historically relatively distinct theory complexes has an obvious advantage towards the more common use of 'isms'. This can be found also in academic literature, where 'isms' are discussed as if they would be real things instead of historical constructions, mainly of the nineteenth century. 'Liberalism', for example, can be defended with a number of opposed political languages (cf. Leonhard 2001), and it is often more fruitful to replace the isms by more specific political languages, such as contractarianism or evolutionism. This was a difference that provoked politically significant theoretical differences among the 'liberals', the understanding that contractarian 'liberals' and 'socialists' might have more common than with their party colleagues believing in an evolutionist philosophy of history.

We should, however, use political languages and the divisions between them only in thematically and rhetorically specified manners, making different classifications for different purposes. Thus, we must be cautious when speaking about contractarianism, as if there would be a single language from Hobbes to Rawls. There can be cases in which the common assumptions may be thematized critically, but in others the contractual basis of a polity remains of secondary importance, and the variations between types of contracts and the utilization of contractarian arguments may play a contextually highly different role.

Accordingly, I shall treat the so-called natural languages in the manner of political languages and not vice versa. By this move I do not merely intend the elementary insight that 'natural' languages have been politically constructed, some in more explicit forms than others. I would rather underline the fact that the fluid, diffuse, historical and always comparative character of political languages also holds true for the political dimensions of so-called natural languages. In this sense, there is no difference in principle to compare, for example, republican and contractarian languages than to compare the French and German languages.

In the Weberian mode of proceeding, all types of languages, whether 'natural', technical or political, can be considered as specific, although flexible and historically contingent complexes of *Chancen*[1]. All of them contain a limited but complex repertoire of resources for action that consist of a profiled distribution of certain

shares of power. What is easily possible in one language cannot be done so easily in another, whereas there may be some inbound implications favouring certain uses and not favouring others and so on. Such limits change historically and may be altered by political moves.

My next move is to distinguish between different aspects of language. To simplify matters, we can distinguish between the resources in vocabulary, in references to reality and in conceptualization. For the study of conceptual change, the vocabulary as well as the modes to refer to non-linguistic events and processes form a way through which 'natural languages' and 'real history' can intervene in the conceptual discussions, in so far as they are conducted in different political languages. What Koselleck calls *Sache* (1972a), namely, the modes by which the events or processed are referred to and the facticities of the situation are established, I will rename as referential languages, avoiding a recourse to non-linguistic instances. The facticity of the events and processes is, in other words, always mediated by and interpreted through referential languages.

The description of events is never given, but usually not problematic. Hannah Arendt quotes Georges Clemenceau as remarking about future historians' views on the outbreak of World War I: "I know for certain that they will not say Belgium invaded Germany." (Arendt 1968, 239) However, we have to understand that this is just a statement of facticity, and although we do not dispute its validity, the significance and the point of it is always disputable. Or, to put it in terms of speech acts: the strictly locutionary mention of a 'fact' is at the same time only a possibility among the numerous illocutionary modes of *doing* so (cf. Skinner 1971).

I sometimes call sociology a discipline in which 'nothing happens', that is, a discipline in which no names, dates, persons or events are either mentioned at all or referred only in a symptomal manner. More generally, in massive systems of concepts à la Rawls or à la Luhmann, interventions due to the diversity of vernacular languages and to the acuteness of historical events referred to tend to be regarded as disturbances. As opposed to this, conceptual history, as a mode of studying politics, should be keenly interested in names, dates, persons and events. For an understanding of conceptual change, contingent interventions into referred events, proper names of individual agents and the use vernacular languages appear as challenges.

Studying the politics and history of conceptual changes does not mean a study of the competition between a small and finite number of political languages. It forms, rather, a process of mixture, dissolution and formation of such languages, including constant interventions of both the vocabulary of 'natural' languages and of references to the historical events and processes. If we, with Koselleck (1996), understand concepts as 'pivots', around which the language turns, they mark singularizing breaking points in the fluent use of the languages. Actualization of a key concept, such as power, democracy or politics, occurs in a speech act that actualizes a break with the fluent use of language, as an occasion to revise the conceptual horizon or its relations to other linguistic dimensions of the situation.

To sum up, translating refers to a singularizing speech act that is related to a horizon of the concepts. The three levels – 1) the vocabulary of 'natural' languages, 2) the theorizing in political languages, and 3) the modes of referring to the facticities – serve as mediating contextual instances modifying both the conditions and the modes of reconceptualization-by-translation.

It is certainly uncommon to understand translation as an occasion for reconceptualization, using the contextual instances as mediating layers. The 'normal' situation for EU translators, for example, is, rather, to avoid such a reconceptualization. My point is that due to the tacit presence of such contextual instances, unintended conceptual changes are frequently introduced. This is by no means to be avoided at all costs, rather they should be closely analyzed with specific cases and with varying types of conceptual alterations.

3. Translating Max Weber

In a recent issue of *Max Weber Studies* several contributions dealt with the recent retranslations of Weber's *Protestantische Ethik*. The only existing translation of the famous text was done by Talcott Parsons in 1931. It has been known for some time that Parsons' translation is severely misleading and shaped by his own ideological preferences, which at key points were opposed to those of Weber (Cf. for example Kalberg 2001, 47).

Peter Ghosh has gone further and reconsidered the point of translation of classics, such as Weber. Ghosh claims that translation is primarily not a "linguistic act" but "a historical and conceptual act". He consequently insists on the principle that a linguist should not translate a work on German "social and political theory", but that it is the task of an historian. According to Ghosh, "the only properly equipped historian is an historian of ideas, who is familiar not only with Weber's conceptual world, but more or less the entire tradition of German social and political thinking to which Weber has reference". Only by dispensing with an historical *Bildung* can we have any chance "that the full range of meaning attaching to concepts can be revealed and explored". (Ghosh 2001, 60)

Although Ghosh does not speak about conceptual history, he clearly has insight into the general historicity and contextuality of the concepts and the need, to use Quentin Skinner's (1969) old expression, to avoid the "mythology of prolepsis". In addition, Ghosh is also clearly aware of the singular character of Weber's mode of using concepts – which, in my view, causes him to practice a variant of *Begriffsgeschichte avant la lettre* in several respects. (cf. Palonen 2000) Ghosh thus proposes the following procedure for the translation of *Die protestantische Ethik*:

> Thus, in Weber the translation of concepts is more important than the translation of any other word; and any attempt to calibrate a set of translations of Weber's most celebrated work should proceed in the first instance not from the translation of selected passages … but from a sample mapping in English of the conceptual lexicon of the PE. (Ghosh 2001, 61)

Now we can better understand Koselleck's point about the presence of conceptual history in any translation. In order to render intelligible both Weber's contextual horizon and his singularizing speech act in using a certain concept, a comprehensive "lexicon" of Weber's own conceptual map would be required, in the best case one which takes into account both the *Werkgeschichte* of both Weber's *œuvre* and of the writings in question.

Perhaps we could recommend that Weber translators take the indexes of the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* as their point of departure

to better understand what were "key concepts" of that time and how Weber's work was related to them. Weber was, however, a post-*Satt elzeit* thinker and has not been analyzed in detail in most of the GG articles, which sometimes tend to miss Weber's singularity as theorist and practitioner of conceptual change (cf. Palonen 2000). A second step would be to write a lexicon of the Weberian *Grundbegriffe*. The glossaries, which are used in new translations (such as Lassman's & Speirs's in *Political Writings* 1994), could be understood as minimal versions of such lexica, attempting to reconstruct Weber's singular conceptual horizon in order to then understand his specific "moves in argument" (Skinner 1988) in the conceptual act of translation. Such lexicready exist for several classics and they are, of course, themselves controversial both in their mode of composition and in their content of interpretations. Such author-specific conceptual lexica could also serve as a critical instance for general conceptual lexica, including the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*.

4. Translation of the Political Vocabulary

After this speculation I now arrive to the translation of concepts dealt within political theories as a move between languages. More specifically, I shall discuss the topic of turning new vernacular languages, such as the Finnish of the 19th century, into written and academic languages, in which both fluent everyday political activity and independent political theorizing became possible.

What differentiates political languages from technical ones is the insight that modern European political languages have largely retained the old Greek or Roman vocabularies for speaking about contemporary political phenomena. The words we use for politics, citizenship, democracy, republic, society, public and private sphere and so on can be traced to either Greek or Roman origins. Of course, there are such concepts as state, representation and parliamentarism, which are of later origin, but it is rather astonishing just how far the ancient vocabularies have been retained, even if they are now used in an entirely different political and conceptual world.

Reinhart Koselleck (1998) has suggested that we can detect a divide between the modern languages in so far as the Romanic languages and the English have retained much more of this ancient vocabulary than the Germanic ones, while the Slavic ones are still farther from the classical political vocabulary. In other words, the vernacularization has added to these languages further instances of revising, intentionally or not, the conceptual commitments bound to the vocabularies. Through such unintended conceptual revisions something of the theoretical commitments and referential connections, which are retained in the 'more ancient' languages, will be lost.

While re garding this geography of language, as Koselleck puts it, as a valuable hypothesis, I think its significance should not be overrated. The remarkable thing is that conceptual horizon shifts have been achieved by retaining the old vocabulary. Koselleck himself has paradigmatically shown this with the formation of *die Geschichte* as a collective singular noun that took place between 1760-1780 (cf. already Koselleck 1967). My own work during the last 20 years has been shaped by the insight that we can hardly speak about the activity of politics before the year 1800 in German, French or English as well. It is a new concept of politics, politics-as-activity, that has been formed, and I have explicated what is done by this conceptualization around a number of different, part competing, part overlapping *topoi*. This process has been obliged to struggle with linguistic remnants of the old vocabularies, for example by using the English noun politics in plural, or the unavailability of a single word for politicking in languages such as French, German or Swedish (Palonen, forthcoming).

The recourse to the 'original' Greek or Roman sense of the concepts would be an impossible claim, neglecting the changed world of references and the corresponding opportunities to reconceptualization. Still, which word has been chosen as a linguistic sign of a concept for the modern European languages is interesting in several respects. Why has for example the word *polites* vanished of the *polit*-vocabulary in favour of *citoyen* in French, *citizen* in English and *Staatsbürger* in German, while otherwise the polit-vocabulary has largely been retained? (cf. Sternberger 1986). This has led, already in the United States of the late 19th century, to the opposition of good citizens to bad politicians (cf. Ostrogorski 1903). I think here a revision of vocabulary would still be possible, and an interest-

ing suggestion is offered by Max Weber with the expression *Gelegenheitspolitiker* (1919, 41), which, in a sense, makes of all citizens politicians, the ones rather occasionally, the others professionally. With the depoliticizing inflation of the citizenship vocabulary, I think the Weberian alternative could be singled out when speaking of anyone acting politically, an alternative open also to those 'displaced persons' who have lost their citizenship.

When translation is understood as a 'conceptual act', as Ghosh says, it leaves space for a number of alternatives strategies or translation styles. Taking the Finnish as an example of a language, for which an academic and political vocabulary was created mainly in the middle decades of the 19th century, I will speculate with the question of which types of translation strategies are available to people to introduce the political concepts into their own vernacular language?

By retaining the distinction between the international vocabulary used in established 'natural' languages, as well as in existing political languages, and the resources of the vernacular languages we can propose at least five ideal typical alternatives:

1) adopting the international word as an untranslated loan-word into the vocabulary. For example *Realpolitik* is used in many languages in this manner, or the French expression *raison d'Etat* in English.

2) adopting the international word but formulating it according to the grammar and pronunciation of the language in question, as for example *politiikka* in Finnish (cf. Palonen 2001).

3) adapting the resources of the vernacular language to the meaning of an international word, for example turning the Italian *lo stato* into *l'Etat* in French, *state* in English, *der Staat* in German, *en stat* in Swedish.

4) adapting the meaning of an international word into the resources of the vernacular language. This is an interesting, although rather anachronistic case, but for example in the older Finnish usage of *valta* (power), there are clearly such tendencies that have then been replaced by conceptions closer to the contemporary academic languages (cf. Hyvärinen 1998, 2003).

5) creating a neologism that would take into account both the concepts in the international vocabulary and the linguistic resources of the vernacular language, such as *valtio* for the state in Finnish (cf. Pulkkinen 2000).

Thus, the result of judging *a posteriori* the political vocabulary as it has been adopted in a language, such as Finnish, is a contingent

combination of all those strategies. Initially, the 'Fennoman' language politicians set up a program to replace the international vocabulary by a 'native' one. Such attempts were not easily realized, and proposals for translations remained successful only in a few cases, such as *valtio* or *kansalainen* for citizenship. In other cases, however, it became increasingly clear that the use of Finnish concepts has been adapted to international political languages. For example a number of neologisms, based on state or government vocabulary were suggested in the nineteenth century in order to replace politics. However, they never gained a wider usage outside programmatic documents, such as dictionaries. Although there was a definite difference in the frequency of the polit-vocabulary between Swedish- and Finnish-speaking Finns around the parliament reform of 1906, the Finnish-speaking Finns have learned to use *politiikka* as well as their Swedish-speaking co-citizens use *politik* (cf. Palonen 2001).

The intentions of the creators of a 'political Finnish' were, to considerable extent, pedagogical. They wanted to render journals capable of reporting on the world events surrounding 1848, and to mediate an already existing sense of the international vocabulary to Finnish readers. To understand themselves as political agents was, of course, not an easy task for the academics, journalists and state officials in the Finnish Grand Duchy, even after the reopening of the Estate Diets in 1863. The creation of Finnish political vocabulary surely was a translation strategy that improved the chances to understand the possibility of a 'citizen' to act politically. Later it was no longer important whether the word used was of Finnish or foreign origin. For example the word *kansan valta* (*people's power*), as Matti Hyvärinen (2003) has illustrated, has recently more or less been replaced by *demokratia*, using the international word in a fashion that is even closer to the ancient Greek than the corresponding word in other modern languages.

Similarly, the downplaying of political controversies is expressed in some of the key political concepts. One of them is the name of the Finnish parliament, *eduskunta* – approximately, *house of representatives*, a term already used for the four-estate Diet after 1863. In writing a conjectural conceptual history, advocated by Terence Ball (2002), I have speculated whether a retranslation would be

possible that could do better justice to the character of the parliament as a deliberative space using speech (including voting) as a medium of contestation and decision. My proposal is *puhekunta* – roughly: house of speakers – that would connect to the etymology of *parlare*, *parler* or parliament, as a specific *locus* of a politics of speech. The Estate Diet was, of course, not such a deliberative space, and in the debates of the Finnish parliament reform committee of 1906 the name of the parliament was not evoked. The phase of creating neologisms for political concepts had already passed. Still, the retention of the old name is an indicator that the new unicameral parliament elected by the universal male and female suffrage, was more considered to "represent" the people than to deliberate and decide about politics.

The vocabulary that was adopted for political concepts in Finnish in the second half of the nineteenth century remained a highly contingent matter. In certain respects, the contextual origins of the specific Finnish translation remain in contemporary Finnish, largely in a harmless manner, but sometimes containing, as I have indicated, questionable depoliticizing tendencies.

My proposal to replace *eduskunta* by *puhekunta* is, of course, mainly a proposal intended to evoke the historical contingencies of the translation policies in Finnish. I hardly harbour the illusion that after our volume *Käsitteet liikkeessä* (Concepts in Motion, as Matti Hyvärinen has translated the title) is published with my postscript on translations (Palonen 2003), that an MP would put forward the corresponding motion to change the name of the Finnish parliament. However, it would be enough if there would be an increasing consciousness in the Finnish politico-academic debates that speaking in a parliament is one of the preeminently political acts. It is my impression that in Finnish political culture the distinction between speaking and doing, between rhetoric and reality, between verbal games and the seriousness of politics has been even harder to overcome than elsewhere. Perhaps this is also the reason why the "rhetorical turn" has, after all, played a prominent role in Finnish political science of the past two decades.

5. Shares of Conceptual Power in Translations

It is not uncommon to consider the concepts used as in a certain sense as 'determined' by the language used. Surely nobody denies the constraining role of language in political thought, action and judgment. Some system theorists or structuralists may even celebrate this as a healthy limit to 'anarchistic' tendencies. Others would rather claim that for this reason we have to get rid of "conceptual thinking", for example in favour of a narrative one (Guaraldo 2001), or distinguishing à la Sartre (1971) between rigid *concepts* and flexible, multi-dimensional and historical *notions*.

There are certainly tendencies to connect concepts with the magic of words, to capture things by "knowing their names" or by giving names that are so suggestive that the phenomena named appear in a thing-like fashion. Such tendencies are especially strong when concepts are connected with a strong normative colour of positive or negative colour. For example, the German Christian Democrats once used the electoral slogan *Freiheit statt Sozialismus*, combining a magical positive value with a magical negative value, thus claiming to obtain mutually exclusive concepts. Something of this magical tendency to refuse to distinguish between the word, the meaning and the normative colour of a concept is still present in normative political theory: for Rawls or Habermas, concepts such as justice, freedom or democracy appear to be valuable "as such", independent of their history and controversies surrounding their interpretation (cf. Palonen 2002a).

The normative project of conceptual history is directed against such essentialist tendencies of speaking about concepts. We could speak about *Entzauberung der Begriffe*, when they are understood as instruments (Weber) or as tools (Wittgenstein) in human activities and in the understanding of these activities. In this sense we can also understand Quentin Skinner's claim to treat concepts from the perspective of their "uses in argument" (1988) or as dimensions in "linguistic action" (1996). Indeed, Koselleck has also subscribed to a nominalistic perspective, in which the formation and reconceptualization of concepts gain over modification through reception (cf. esp. 1983, 1996).

Translations are a good illustration of the case that even minor differences in vocabulary may sometimes be politically significant, whereas in other cases the vocabulary remains subordinated to conceptual debates. In this sense, we can regard conceptual variation and alternative strategies to use them as strategic resources for linguistic action.

My first conclusion is to affirm that concepts can serve well as power shares for political action. They should be interpreted in a strictly nominalistic manner, not bound to fixed 'networks' or 'discourses' but closely connected to politics-as-activity. However, concepts are above all significant in 'theory politics', in that which is considered to be possible, realizable, legitimate and so on, but not in the facticities of actual political decisions and taking responsibility for them.

'Weighing the significance' of instances is hopeless to do in general terms, independent of the situation and constellation. For students of conceptual history, there is no more reason to declare that concepts are 'most important' phenomena than for a pacifist must declare her faith on the superior efficiency of peaceful means over violent ones. When concepts are used as political instruments, the power of concepts does not indicate any idealism, for example regarding World War I as one between Descartes and Kant.

Still, if we wage an attempt to assess the role of concepts as power shares in strictly Weberian terms, we can relate them to two further types of power shares, the number (*Zahl*) of the adherents and the recourse to violent means. Interestingly enough, Max Weber (1917, 1919) considers both of them to be the *ultima ratio* in politics. I think the *ultima ratio* of *Gewaltsamkeit* should be regarded as a limit-situation for politics in a modern state characterized by the monopoly of violence. The *ultima ratio* of the number serves as the specific criterion of a modern parliamentary democracy, in which the monopoly of violence is controlled by a parliament elected by universal suffrage.

The power of concepts, within this Weberian conceptual horizon, does not transcend these criteria marking the limit-situation of the regime. It concerns the question of what is possible within the horizon of accepting these criteria as *ultima ratio* within democratized states. In his polemics against the Prussian tripartite electoral sys-

tem, Weber (1917) regarded as the great advantage of democracy that votes are counted and not weighed. This by no means makes the use of concepts meaningless, but rather increases their role as instruments of legitimating past or future moves in both parliamentary deliberations and electoral campaigns.

Historicity, controversiality and contingency of concepts also indicate resources in the struggle with other kinds of shares of power. It is the power of alterability that characterizes the power of concepts, as opposed to fixed conceptual commitments in 'gallup-democratic' interpretations of the power of numbers. It is the omnipresent possibility to contest any interpretation of a concept concerning the naming, meaning, range of reference or normative colour of a concept that serves as a power share in the political struggle. And it is the contingency of politics-as-activity that always enables us not to regard concepts as definitions that close the situation, but as a complex of chances. The views of a majority have no authority but can at anytime be delegitimated in their conceptual commitments that may play a role both in parliamentary deliberations and in the chances of political alteration in next elections.

In the Weberian perspective the rhetorical power of the concepts can thus be, in the first instance, a power-share in the politicking of oppositions, minorities and of competent individual politicians to reduce the simple numerical power of the governmental majority. All of them can use conceptual reflections and revisions as instruments illustrating the weaknesses of the policy of the government, in constructing alternatives to them as well as introduce new questions or new dimensions in the old ones into the political agenda.

Perhaps more interestingly, we could claim, with Weber (1918), that the power of concepts using their historicity and contingency, is a power of politicians subjected to competition in parliaments, elections and parties, as opposed to the bureaucracies (in state, party and business). Bureaucracy is ideally an atemporal order, based on stability and continuity. Its use of the power of concepts tends to be characterized by a reliance on clear and unchanging definitions, which are from time to time replaced by others, but not understood as historical and controversial themselves. As opposed to this, the main advantage of the experience of politicians in parliamentary democracies is the temporality of the regime. This concerns not only the

alternation in government through elections but also the plural temporalities of parliamentary control and procedure (cf. Riescher 1994, for a detailed description of the 19th century British practices cf. Redlich 1905).

Thus, conceptual history is an approach that is poorly understood by bureaucracies, and it is a vain hope to expect it to find its way to the numerous documents of planning and administration, for example at the level of the European Union. Nonetheless, I claim that the temporal condition of politicians is much better than that of the bureaucrats suited to the understanding the contingency, historicity and controversiality of concepts.

Notes

1 In principle, the political treatment can be extended also to 'technical' languages, such as computer programmes. Today we can, for example, explore the majority languages of the PC party, the minority languages of the Mac party, the computer Esperanto of the RTF and the computer Latin of Microsoft Word and other programmes applicable to both PC and Mac parties. Between the majority and minority we can detect an asymmetric conceptual opposition: every Mac computer contains a inter-party translation programme, such as MacLinkPlus, whereas the PC remains monolingual and upholds the (vain) hope of extinguishing the Mac party. The *lingua franca* of Microsoft also allows translations only to the RTF Esperanto, but not to Mac languages (such as Apple Works). In this sense, the PC party tends towards hegemonic monolingualism, whereas the adherents of the Mac languages clearly admit and accept the plurality of languages and the omnipresence of translation.

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Matti Hyvärinen

'THE PEOPLE'S POWER' (DEMOCRACY) AS AN ARGUMENT IN FINNISH PARTY MANIFESTOS

1. 'The Peoples Power' (*kansanvalta*) and Democracy (*demokratia*)

The Finnish language has two separate translations of democracy, or of the Swedish *demokrati*. This apparently trivial fact gives me an opportunity to study the relationships between word, concept and vocabulary. The first word, *kansanvalta* ('the people's power', or rule by the people), is a fairly direct translation from the ancient Greek. The other and later term is the more academic *demokratia,* which illustrates a typical Finnish strategy of coining new words by giving a morphologically new Finnish form to foreign words (such as post -> *posti*; bank -> *pankki*; dictator -> *diktaattori*).

My interest in *kansanvalta* does not derive primarily from an interest in the concept of democracy as such but from my work with the Finnish concept of power (*valta*) (Hyvärinen 1997,1998,1999). Why then study a totally different concept of democracy? I hope

that I can somehow investigate the tricky relationships between a word, a concept and particular vocabularies by using this opportunity given by two separate expressions for the same concept. What I suggest is that local words can resist or selectively adapt connotations of internationally shared concepts precisely because of their local translations and their particular lexical ties.

The Oxford English Dictionary's definition of the word 'democracy' seems, at first, to present the words as fully synonymous:

> Government by the people; that form of government in which the sovereign power resides in the people as a whole, and is exercised either by directly them (...) or by officers elected by them (...) b. A state or community in which the government is vested in the people as a whole. (OED, 1989).

The first point of diversion, as Russel L. Hanson has noticed, lies in the difference between the Greek *demos* and the English 'people', the first referring more to the 'ordinary people'. The Finnish *kansa* has both of the meanings, even if its 'ordinary people' covers a much larger part of the population than *demos* did.

The most significant differences are related to the different levels of abstraction of these terms: 'democracy' or *demokratia* do not invite their dictionary definitions or the concepts of 'the (ordinary) people' or 'power'. However, *kansanvalta* does. Because of its clear lexical ties it is far less malleable for abstract formulations. Participatory democracy or democratic management or leadership cannot properly be translated with *kansanvaltainen*, the adjective *demokraattinen* is always used in these kinds of expressions. The problems of democracy within the EU are not discussed in terms a deficit of *kansanvalta* but in terms of a deficit of *demokratia*. As a very general rule, one could say that after the 1960s and 1970s, *demokratia* has become more urban, international, intellectual and leftist in its connotations, where *kansanvalta* tends to be more national, traditional, rural, and bourgeois. These 'synonymous' expressions seem thus to have, at least partly, different conceptual and lexical surroundings, and thus different uses and different histories.

The particular properties of the term 'the people's power' derive from the multiple and smoothly overlapping meanings of the Finnish

word '*kansa*'. The first thing to note is that Finnish language does not make a difference between the concepts of folk and the people. Thus, *kansa* refers both to the whole population and all of the voters. In the old usage, *kansa* referred simply to the members of the Estate Diet, as a counter-concept of Monarch or Grand Duke. It can have the meaning of 'ordinary people' as against all economic, urban or political elites. It can allude to an ethnic and linguistic whole, as if it were a single, national character struggling with foreign nationalities. When we add this multi-valence of 'the people' to the concept of 'power', a new array of possibilities opens up. 'The people's power' may be seen as a popular power, a power of poor people, a power of a nation, a power of an ethnic totality – or in similar terms of fair and open process as democracy is often conceptualized. To conclude, the term suits well in populist rhetoric, be it nationalistic, leftist, or agrarian.

The second purpose of this article is to demonstrate the merits of conceptual history in the study of such relatively trivial or worn source materials as party manifestos, which do not contain the nuances of the works of the great theorists. This focus on a very narrow section of potential material and contemporary debates has its problems and risks by evaporating the actual contexts, on the other hand it seems to offer important visions of the diachronic change of concepts.

As my source material, I use the relatively comprehensive and computerized corpus of party manifestos collected at the University of Jyväskylä by Eeva Aarnio (based on the work by Olavi Borg, 1965). When reading the party manifestos, I am not particularly interested in their impact on the consequent action of the parties, aside from further programs, rather I see them "as action, as a genre, which is used to interpret the political culture of a certain point of time" (Aarnio 1998, 21).

2. *Kansanvalta* before the Republic

Democracy and 'the people's power' were not self-evident values or points of departure for political or moral evaluation before the foundation of Finnish Republic in 1918 – nor even immediately after the birth of the new state.

In written Finnish, the concept surfaces for the first time during the era of Swedish rule in a statute dating from 1794, and then in an entirely pejorative form:

> ... to leave room for the unbridled and infectious lunacy of the people's power (Dictionary of Old Literary Finnish, II, 259).

Interestingly, this old formula does not use the genitive form but a typically Finnish strategy of coining compound nouns, making a word like 'folk-power'. The noun does not, therefore, emphasize the *possessor* of the power but its essential quality as lunacy. In the 20th century, this same strategy of naming various powers by compound nouns is basically reserved only for the deviations of legitimate the people's power.

From 1809 onwards, until the declaration of independence in 1917, the provinces that currently comprise Finland belonged to the Russian Empire as the Grand Duchy of Finland. Finland inherited its constitution and Estate Diet from the Swedish period, but the Grand Duke did not summon the Diet between 1809 and 1863. Until the Crimean War (1854-56), the Russian authorities had a strongly restrictive policy against the use of written Finnish except in religious literature, disregarding a short period of Finnish publicity around 1848-50. Knowing these restrictions and the diligence of the Russian censorship, it is understandable that such republican words as 'democracy' and 'the people's power' were not in used lavishly.

The emerging Finnish nationalism and interest in the Finnish language, culture and history did not, at first, take Russian impact as its target. The cultural and political attack was directed against the hegemony of the Swedish language and Swedish-speaking elite. However, for many Swedish-speaking intellectuals, the national awakening meant an obligation to learn to speak and write Finnish – a language that was not yet codified or much used in political or scientific texts. The opening of the Estate Diet, and its more or less regular meetings since the 1860s, gave the birth to the first party cleavage between the Finnish and Swedish 'parties'. The Finnish Party found its support chiefly from the peasantry and clergy, whereas the aristocracy and bourgeoisie largely supported the Swedish side. Of

course, these 'parties' were far from modern mass organizations with their elected leadership and fixed membership, yet they shaped the public debates and struggles for parliamentary seats.

In particular, the Finnish Party was notoriously reluctant to establish any definite organization or formulate its objectives into the form of a program (Liikanen 1995; Koskinen 1904-1906, IV, 404-405). According to the self-understanding of the Fennomen (from 'Fennomaniac'; 'Fenno' meaning Finnish), they were not establishing or representing a separate 'party' as such, but the common 'national cause', Finnish culture and language. This strategy of dissolving the divides between language, culture and state still lives in the word Finnish (*suomalainen*), which used to refer to the language group, and still refers both to ethnic origin and citizenship. This means that the term which was later chosen to refer to the citizens of the new state, earlier on referred to the Finnish-speakers, and to the loose party formation supporting the Fennification of the culture. The Swedish-oriented intellectuals emphasized Swedish heritage, culture and language as the best protection against the Russification of the province. The opposing party was called 'Dagbladians' (according to the newspaper Helsingfors Dagblad). Instead of the language issue, this group emphasized political rights and identified itself as 'liberal' (Kurunmäki 2003).

Instead of party manifestos, one should then look first at the programmatic articles of the Fennoman leaders. Yrjö Koskinen (1830-1903) was famous for his militant employment of language and insistence on demanding the use of Finnish in his presence. From the 1860s onwards, he was the most influential politician of the amorphous Finnish Party. His influential text *Fennomania as a Political Party* (1863; Koskinen 1904-06, II, 50-58) elevates "the Finnish people" as the key political figure. He also acknowledges how the "greatest power" resides in the hands of those who retard the Finnish cause. However, these themes are not linked to each other, and the concept of 'the people's power' is not used.

In 1863, before the elections for the new estate Diet, Koskinen wrote a series of short articles to introduce the principles of representation to the Finnish audience. Koskinen resorts strongly to the British discussion and uses Jean-Jacques Rousseau mostly as a shocking contrast. Koskinen is careful not to advertise democracy or the

souveregnity of the people as such. He reminds his readers that Finland has a mixed government and the Grad Duke as the monarch. However, in one of these texts, Koskinen approached 'the people's power' as if it already were the existing state of affairs in the process of representation:

> But since the power actually belongs to the people, and only has been given to a representative to exercise, it is natural that this power exercised by a representative may only last a stipulated time, and will return to the possession of the people" (Koskinen, op. cit., 162)

A few years later (1869), in a fierce debate on the Finnish department of a school, Koskinen was less careful in his formulation, even if he still avoided the direct use the word:

> The question is already one of who should rule in this country, it is hardly that slight minority, whose standing relies on old social ills, or the majority of the people (Koskinen 1904-06, II, 585-6; Liikanen 1995)

Koskinen was accused of incitement to treason, which made him more careful for the next years. In 1879, Koskinen published his popular and programmatic book *The Leading Ideas in the History of Humankind*, which notifies 'the people's power' in the context of the Roman Republic, not among the consequences of the French Revolution or the challenges of contemporary politics. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that to Koskinen the concept was still secondary in comparison with language, nation and culture.

The theme of democracy finally entered the party programs in the form of challenging the Finnish term and questioning its conventional content. The Finnish translation of the first program of the Swedish-minded *Liberal Party* (1880) contains a complicated statement:

> For the reason that misconceptions often occur with concern to the *common power* [principle of democracy], we wish to make a brief reminder here. Understood from a legal stance, this basic principle signifies the same as: every person's equality before the law, namely, equal rights for every person, high and low, poor and rich, to insist on their rights, and

> also the same rights and duties, determined in the same proportion, towards the society. (Liberal Party, 1880. My italics in all further quotations)

The program attempts to do two things at the same time. On the one hand, it tries to define democracy strictly in terms of process and exclude all connotations of policy or material equality. Democracy thus means the dissolution of any estate privileges and the observance of equality before the law. On the other hand, the program wants to replace the established translation of 'democracy' with *yhteisvalta*, common power (cf. Europaeus, 1853; Ahlman 1865). Liberals were apparently annoyed with the way the Fennomen used the concept of (Finnish) 'people/folk' (*kansa*) to provide legitimacy for their own politics. They clearly did not endorse the power of the 'ordinary people' or the 'folk-as-a-character of history', as Koskinen conceived it. Thus, they tried – without much success – to give a new translation for 'democracy' by referring to the common use of power. However radical this move was, the Liberals did not take any version of the current *demokratia* into use. Even the Liberals needed the word of power (*valta*) to perform their conceptual opening and to coin the new term.

From the first meeting of Estate Diet in 1863 towards the end of the century, there was indeed an ongoing debate on the forms and processes of representation. However, no general consensus on the people's power emerged. The Young Finns (*Nuorsuomalaiset*), a liberal-minded fraction of the Finnish Party, finally gave up their basic resistance to programs and published their own in 1894. In this program, the Party declares:

> The party of Young Finns will in the future act, as it has done so long, in order to develop our political (*valtiollisten*) and social circumstances into a liberal and democratic (*kansanvaltaiseen*) direction. (Young Finns, 1894)

Even in this program, 'the people's power' is not an absolute or clear state of being, but rather a principle which defines the direction of action. This direction is clarified in two ways. Firstly, the strengthening of the position of the Parliament is argued for with the help of 'the people': "We consider the harmony between the people

and the Government to be the guarantee of the success of this country". Remarkably, this demand was presented in the context of "maintaining Finland's inner independence". Secondly, it is obvious that the program does not demand any immediate realization of democracy. In contrast, it presents detailed changes in the processes of electing the representatives of the clergy, bourgeoisie and peasantry. The sovereignty of the people is not declared, instead the program seems to be fully satisfied with the 'common power', both in the sense of harmony and the balanced representation of estates.

'The people's power' was not a key concept for the Young Finns, and it disappeared entirely from their next program of 1906. The formative years of the Russian reduction of Finnish autonomy (1899-1905) had just passed, as had the General Strike of 1905. After the parliamentary reform of 1906, Finland had received a unicameral parliament with universal suffrage. 'Legality' and 'constitutionalism' had been key concepts in the resistance towards Russian policy, and the program of Young Finns was written strictly within the horizon of legality and constitutionalism. In that sense, the program is very constitutional, and demands the strengthening of the position of the parliament. The real problem was the 'political' or Russian issue, not the emerging 'social issue' attached to the growing working class movement.

The entire political field, however, had changed radically by the birth of two major mass political organizations. The Social Democratic Party practically copied its first program (1903) from the Austrian Social Democrats, and the Rural League published its first program in 1908. As a translation, the program of the SDP does not say a word about 'the people's power'. Interestingly enough, 'the people' and the 'power' almost meet each other in the program:

> ...and that the transformation of the means of production from private property into the people's property must be its objective, conquering *political power* must be the instrument in the struggle to free the proletariat. (SDP 1903)

The SDP wanted to give the means of production to the people, but the proper and only owner of power in the divided society was regarded to be the workers. Political power was needed to transform

economy and society. In general, the program was not concerned with constitutional forms but rather with the division of social power and in ways of achieving the maximum influence of workers within the state. In this regard, the programs of the Young Finns and Social Democrats did not only assume different positions, they simply discussed totally separate social and political worlds.

The first program of the Rural League (1908) mentions the adjective *kansanvaltainen* just once, and does it within the context of school reforms. Democracy neither appears as a general horizon of objectives nor as a ground of legitimatization of politics.

In 1917, the program of the Rural League already contained the demand that Finland must be "established as a republic". This demand is still made in order to emphasize the power of the Parliament, not of the people. 'The people's power' surfaces in a totally new context:

> But then again, the society must guarantee an employer such conditions that under them he is able to make contracts as the manufacturer of the goods he produces in such a way that *high-handed* offenses against provisional labor contracts and other refusals and trouble-makings on the part of the workers can not take place without the law interfering with them. The interest of the entire Finnish society demands that industrial and productive peace shall be regulated by law, taking into account the terms of healthy, democratic (*kansanvaltainen*) development. (Rural League, 1914/1917)

'Democratic' (*kansanvaltainen*) is not used here as a counter-concept to the power of estates, monarchy or élite. Instead, it is used for the first time in party manifestos to criticize the politics of one part of the 'ordinary people'. 'Democratic' begins here its future, successful career as a legitimizing concept. In the passage, a 'democratic development' is assumed to exist as the true background of the industrial and productive peace. This way of speaking, indeed, assumes, that a substantial amount of 'the people's power' *already* exists, and that there already is a natural development that continuously increases it. For a long time, the leftist parties typically separated the *demands* for democracy and the *recognition* of its existence. The reference to the 'interest of the entire Finnish society' emphasizes that the 'the people's power' is already regarded as an ordering power, which

means a critical attitude towards the disruption of industrial peace. The counter-concepts of democratic (*kansanvaltainen*) development comprise thus troublemaking and disturbance.

3. The Struggle for Hegemony: 1918-1945

Even though 'the people's power' occasionally entered the party manifestos over the last years of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, its position was far from central. Surely one cannot conceive of it as a hegemonic horizon of understanding social and political power. Between 1918-19, two major conflicts and the establishment of the 'highest power' after independence (1917) changed this setting substantially. In the Civil War of 1918, the country was divided between the Reds (mainly supporters of the Social Democrats) and Whites (mainly bourgeois middle class and the land-owning peasantry). On the side of the defeated, the new Finnish Communist Party at first explicitly rejected the whole objective of 'the people's power'. The losers of the constitutional debate of 1918-19, the monarchists, had similar problems. The conservative National Coalition Party allowed 'the people's power' to enter its manifesto as late as in the 1950s, whereas the Swedish People's Party has never accepted the rhetoric of 'the people's power' in its programs. The republican parties, instead, now elevated the people's power as a key programmatic concept between the world wars.

The Rural League (1921) parallels the slogans of the republic and the people's power, and positions itself against the losers of both formative conflicts:

> The republican form of government realized by *the immense majority of the people*, who have played a crucial part in its achievement, the Rural League will still defend and support it against all possible revolutionary attempts.

In order to support these objectives, the party also demands:

> the development of a *democratic political life* that relies on the entire social strata. (Rural League 1921)

The objective of the people's power is no longer attached to any particular disputes but from this manifesto onwards the concept is set to define all objectives concerning the arrangement of the government. The concept is in use when legitimizing, strengthening and 'developing' the newly established power. Various reform objectives are attached to the tasks of the 'democratic (*kansanvaltainen*) state'. When discussing the need for cooperatives and economic sectors that require "developed high capital" the manifesto concludes that one

> ... must strive for transferring this high capital and the consequent, both *economic* and *political*, *power* to the *people*. (Rural League 1921)

This is one of the instances where the program withdraws from the purely constitutional discourse of power and considers the social relations of power. 'The people' functions now as the basis for legitimizing public power. This kind of democracy is not divided but it is the ordering and productive power of one people, realized with the help of the parliament. Similar demands for the 'democratization of the economy' were presented by the two smaller republican parties, the National Progressive Party (1918) and the People's Party (1932).

Social Democrats faced a more problematic situation. In the Civil War, they had been on the side of the defeated, whereas in the constitutional debate they belonged to the republican winners. In the end of the 1920s, the rising power of the right-wing popular movement, *Lapuan liike*, put Social Democrats into a new dilemma. To undermine the progress of the movement, they needed to alienate the Rural League form the movement, and thus, to take themselves more distance from the Communists. In order to constitute some common ground with the Rural League and other republican parties, a new position towards the people's power was needed. (Kettunen 1986, 307)

The contradictory attitudes towards the people's power can easily be seen in the three major programs the SDP approved in 1930. The SDP required the democratization of both the foreign policy and the army. The party demands democratization (*kansanvaltaistaminen*) without assuming any existing democracy in the field. With the army, the position was definite:

> In the hands of the bourgeois, the army has developed into a power that threatens both the peace between nations and their internal *democratic freedom.* (SDP 1930)

Here Social Democrats subscribe to the very same democratic values as the Rural League and the People's Party, however they acknowledge that the people's power prevails in a sorely inadequate way. *The Program of Socialization* is fully located within the horizon of unevenly divided social power, and does not say anything about the people's power. In this program, the objective of the party is to abolish "the power of the capitalist class in the economy" and help workers achieve "as much influence as possible". The most interesting of manifestos is still the Policy Program (*Menettelytapaohjeet*). In this manifesto, the party acknowledges the existence of political democracy (*kansanvalta*). The SDP here uses the old word *valtiollinen* for political, so they literally confirm the existence of democracy in the context of state.

> Among the most significant preconditions for the successful political class struggle of the Social Democratic Party is political *democracy*, which the Party attempts to change from an instrument of the supremacy of the bourgeois classes into an instrument for the working classes to realize their goals. The Party strives for bringing *political democracy* as close to perfection as possible. By educating as much of the large masses of people as possible about the *significance of democracy* as an instrument of their social liberation, the Party strives for creating guarantees for *preserving democracy*. It interferes, in cooperation with other democratic parties if necessary, with the plans of certain bourgeois elements to limit the citizens' political rights or to destroy the *democratic system*.(SDP 1930)

Social Democrats make it clear that the people's power covers only the state, and definitely not the society. The link to the Hegelian idea of the state as a sphere of freedom is quite obvious (Pulkkinen 1998, 20-21). Nevertheless, even in the state, democracy is not yet ready but requires completion. Being democratic is also approved as a general principle, which can even unite various political parties against those who want to restrict the people's power. Yet the attitude towards the people's power is contradictory. At the end of the quotation, democracy is perceived as a general and positive goal, but in

the first sentence it is seen as an instrument – either as an instrument of bourgeois domination or as an instrument to achieve the goals of workers' movement. In this asymmetrical comparison, democracy can be either a tool of condemned domination, or it can establish a strategic and teleological power to realize the good policy of workers (Räsänen, 1997, 77, 108). Political power (democracy) was a transformative force in Social Democratic thought: its purpose was always to transform the social relations of power. In this sense, a mere constitutional democracy was not an autonomous or absolute objective for Social Democrats.

The manifesto sees threats to democracy both in the Right and in the Communist movement. There is a constant need for enlightenment among the great masses. The objective of the education is to clarify the significance of the people's power "as an instrument of their social liberation". Again, social liberation is the primary value, and the shared point of departure in argumentation with the competing Communists. Finally, the program unmistakably recognizes its antagonists

> In this enlightenment work, first and foremost it is necessary to demonstrate that the nouveau Communist doctrine about the armed *revolution* led by the few, the minority dictatorship of the Communist Party, and creating *social revolution* with such resources, are ruinous delusions. (SDP 1930)

The opposites of political democracy, thus, comprise both the social power of the capitalist class, the minority dictatorship by the Communists, and the restrictions of the people's power by the extreme Right.

4. The Critics of the Republic

The extreme left and right-wings on the political map negatively evaluated the republican constitution, but their criticism was exposed by employing diametrically opposite strategies. The Patriotic People's Movement (*Isänmaallinen kansanliike*, IKL) considered that "Finland is a completely democratic (*kansanvaltainen*) state". This portrayal of

the state of affairs did not prevent the party from proposing a thoroughly fascist system in which occupational representation would have replaced the old parliament. The role of the new occupational representation would have been merely advisory. The IKL also suggested an "extended suffrage" to the parents of extended families and well-educated people. The people of the IKL needed both enhanced breeding and education. The same programmatic direction is observable in the manifesto of the Finnish National Socialist League (1932). The National Socialists formulated the counter-concepts of the people's power more explicitly than the IKL:

> After democracy has been brought to rely on an occupational and professional parliament, parties that are based on different ideals become totally unnecessary as state organs, although they may appear even in the future as free organizations. (IKL 1930)

After proposing the use of referendum and citizens' initiatives, the party crystallizes its program:

> Hence, *the people's real power* is put in the place of the purposeless *party oligarchy*. (IKL 1930)

The demand for 'the real the people's power' was presented in the same year also by the People's Party, but certainly without the same meaning. Practically all parties have used this idiom one time or another. The use of the idiom characterizes well a situation where the participants of a complex conflict have to subscribe to one and the same glorified concept. By using the philosophical distinction between the apparent and the real, new and even divergent ideas may be presented together with the affirmation of the basic values just by attaching the word 'real' to the valued term (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969).

In the use by the extreme right, the people's power is far from democracy. 'The people' is one solidified agent, which shall hold the power. The republic has, however, in a worrisome way, caused a splintering of this unbroken the people's power and the birth of a divided 'party oligarchy'. This has prevented the manifestation of the 'real will of the people'. In various ways, the right-wing parties

wanted to open the constitutional debate, and reformulate the monarchist arguments. Räsänen (1998, 266-67) analyzed this position aptly: "The hatred between brothers, factionalism and selfish interests are contrary to the real the people's power, where power is something sovereign, unanimous and undivided", whereas "oligarchy involves the possibility of division of power, power struggle and different power blocks". This sovereign, unanimous and undivided power was, indeed, the undeniable objective of all right-wing parties in the 1930s.

The Finnish Communist Party (SKP) assumed a reverse strategy in its founding meeting in Moscow right after the Civil War (1918). The manifesto, written largely by Otto Wille Kuusinen, maintains that "the revolutionary masses have lost their confidence in the former ways of struggle, goals and their leaders who have entered in the service of the imperialism". This loss of confidence concerns, in a particularly bitter way, the demand for the people's power. Now the workers need all power, and therefore their objective is "an iron dictatorship of the proletariat". The manifesto explicitly declares that the people's power is not the objective, "not before the revolution, and not through it":

> No longer it is even a question of the poor awakening and organizing the class struggle, the striving for a people-powered republic (*kansanvaltainen tasavalta*), but it is the goal of the proletariat to aim for the power of the proletariat; to seize all state and political *power* in its own hands. (SKP, 1918)

The style discloses an admiration for the victorious Russian Revolution and disappointment with the lost Finnish Revolution. A leather-jacketed commissar has replaced the mild parliamentarian as the ideal image. One cannot detect a trace of the horizon of democracy in the state, as cherished by the Social Democrats: the enemy is straightforwardly 'a bourgeois robber state'. In this way of speaking, power is never just a *chance*, it has to be, in order to be effective, causal and deterministic domination (on Max Weber, chance and power, see Palonen 1998, 168-176). The people's power would now refer to two precarious and objectionable things: either to the democratic principles that the genuine commissars do not follow, or to

the solidity of the people, which would create vain illusions about the chances to cross the divide between bourgeoisie and the working class. Nevertheless, the real power can only be suppression and dictatorship.

However courageous the manifesto was, it soon appeared that the open cheerleading for dictatorship was not the perfect way to win the support of the Finnish workers. The Communist Party was illegal until 1944, therefore the Socialist Workers Party was established for public action. Its manifesto (1920) tries to solve the problem by a double strategy. The first step is to rename the old republic as a dictatorship:

> The bourgeois republic, the economic foundation of which lies on the private ownership of the means of production, has never been a true *all the people's power*, neither has it been an *impartial power* that lies beyond classes, but in reality it has remained a *dictatorship* of the bourgeois... (Socialist Workers Party, 1920)

The argumentation begins with the almost self-evident premise that the republic has never been the power of the *whole* people, nor a neutral power. The argument leaves no room at all to the process aspect of democracy or to possibly changing majorities, but quickly concludes that republic has indeed been a dictatorship. When Social Democrats emphasized the process and room given by the state, the Communists reduced the power entirely to social categories, which possess the power. Because of this reasoning, the Party concludes that it is impossible to attain socialism with the help of republic. Only Soviet power can be a solution. Workers' councils, the program concludes, are "the most general and democratic (*kansanvaltainen*) mass organizations of the working majority of the people". Therefore, the new Soviet power was democratic after all. When the SKP became public, and published its new manifesto in 1957, this paradox of democracy and dictatorship was not solved but intensified. The program proudly presents proletarian dictatorship to be the highest form of the people's power:

> The transitional state is *workers' power* brought to replace the *power of the minority dictatorship* of the capitalist class; the power of the proletariat. This state, that enforces the *power of the people* in its most ex-

> tended form, must learn to be powerful enough to strike back to the attempts of those exploiters that have lost their power, and strive to regain it. (Finnish Communist Party, 1957)

This is certainly not the same interpretation of the people's power that the rest of the Finnish parties shared, nevertheless this statement confirms the people's power as an incontestable objective and basic value. The same republic that Kuusinen had rejected as a democracy, is now re-named as the dictatorship of the minority. As a dictatorship, the future 'workers' power' or the people's power can neither be the power of a divided people nor the power of quarrelling citizens. There is *one* people, which has one causal supremacy, a power which imposes order on its adversaries as well. The people's power thus means the accomplishment of the political program of the working class. The old republic means dictatorship, and the new dictatorship means democracy.

These odd verbal acrobatics were needed to resolve the double need to legitimize the state structure of the Soviet Union and at the same time to convince the Finnish constituency. In more practical issues of Finnish politics, the program does not hesitate to discuss workers' 'democratic rights'. According to the program, municipalities have 'democratic self-government'. The trade union movement is considered to be one of the 'cornerstones of the people's power'. Step by step, the existence of the people's power is confirmed.

5. The Hegemony of the People's Power: the Left-wing

After the Second World War, a growing hegemony of the perspective of the people's power is undeniable. "The ideas concerning the people's power have been greatly clarified in our party since the Forssa Meeting [1903]", maintains the introduction to the manifesto of SDP (1952). The change of attitude concerns, above all, the point that after the war the prevailing republic was approved, without reservations, as a 'political democracy', or 'the people's power in the state'. Yet the political democracy was not enough, because

> The *power* of money both in politics and culture is a known fact. Therefore, the freedom and *leading power* of the working class can be secured only by the unification of *political democracy* and *socialism*. By the means of democratic socialism, the capitalists' opportunities of utilizing *economic power* in politics are thwarted. (SDP, 1952)

The people's power in the state (*valtiollinen kansanvalta*) emphasizes – besides the loyalty to the constitution of the republic – the deficit of the people's power in society. 'The power of money' and 'economic power' function in the program are the counter-concepts of the genuine the people's power. The more the horizon of the people's power becomes generally accepted in the manifestos, the more of a central obligation it is to name the most important deviations of this principle. The idiom 'the leading power of the working class' (*työväenluokan johtovalta*) is also an interesting rhetorical move. Clearly, it is a democratized equivalent to the communist 'proletarian dictatorship'. At the same time, the idiom is reminiscent of the rule, according to which in only very rare occasions is it possible to demand pure 'power'. A typical idiom is, instead, to require 'power of decision', 'power of conclusion', or influence (*vaikutusvalta*, 'power to effect'). This kind of strategic power is power to realize a respected policy. To demand power without any qualifiers, in contrast, is attached to the struggle for power and lust for power – which is easily understood as domination.

Finland People's Democratic League (SKDL) was a post-war 'democratic front' organization of the Finnish Communist Party. Since the mid-1960s, the league sought to increasingly distance itself from the Communist Party and its leading role. In 1967, the SKDL approved a new manifesto which was thoroughly pervaded by the vocabulary of the people's power. According to the program, the SKDL had even "acted as a stimulator of democratic (*kansanvaltainen*) development". This formulation legitimizes two separate things. Besides the legitimizing of the good deeds of the league itself, it presumes and constructs as a fact that the SKDL has only accelerated a general 'democratic development' in Finland. The numerous idioms that use the people's power include, for instance, democratic practice, decision-making, democratic ideals, principles, freedom of speech, the economic democracy (the people's power), and finally, 'the people's com-

plete power'. The manifesto supports the cooperation of the 'democratic forces', just as the SDP did in 1930. In accordance with the programs of the SDP, the manifesto complains that the people's power does not yet extend to the economy, where an oligarchy prevails. Indeed, 'economic oligarchy' is a primary counter-concept of 'the people's power, just like 'the concentration of power'. The old dilemma of the SKP is turned into an entirely new position, when socialism is portrayed as 'the people's economic power':

> Finland has reached the stage of development where the expansion of democracy, the progress towards the *people's* total *power* (...) signifies a gradual transfer towards a socialist society system. (SKDL, 1967)

The SKDL now shares with the Social Democrats the view that has been realized to certain extent within the state and politics, and that the key demands concern the extension of this principle into the economic sphere. The manifesto does not leave its evaluation of the political institution of the republic overly vague:

> The People's Democratic League highly esteems the achievements of Finnish democracy, national independence, the unicameral parliament, universal suffrage, proportional representation, the freedom of association and the freedom of speech, as well as, the right to strike and the right to demonstrate. Essentially, they are expressly the consequences of the activities of the labor movement. (SKDL, 1967).

Here the SKDL resolves the problem of the legitimacy of the peoples' power in two directions. With regard to the political divides born in the Civil War, the manifesto chooses without reservation the Social Democratic position and rejects the heritage of Otto Ville Kuusinen and the SKP. The manifesto makes this radical move, not to legitimize the bourgeois state as such, but rather to legitimize the political achievements of the workers' movement. In order for the struggle of the working class to have been considered successful, however, the state could not have been essentially the mere dictatorship of the bourgeoisie as the SKP had maintained. Regarding the republic and the people's power, the manifesto was a long step towards social democracy, the cooperation of the left, and thus towards eligibility for government. In that sense, the manifesto is a

momentous speech act both in terms of the immediate political situation and in terms of the long political heritage of the SKP/SKDL.

A similar, although more modest move was made at the 1969 party congress of the SKP. The new manifesto is generally characterized by growing richness of the vocabulary of power. The counter-concept of the people's power is no longer a totalizing 'bourgeois dictatorship' but typically 'the oligarchy of the big business', 'one-sided bourgeois supremacy' or 'economic oligarchy'. One can read here a clear move from essentialist conceptions of the state towards a slightly more empirical approach. The critical passage concerning 'the transitory state' was thoroughly re-formulated:

> Such a state is *the real the people's power* that is set free from the narrow outlook of bourgeois democracy. It is *power of the workers*, socialist democracy where the working class is the leading power. (SKP, 1969)

No doubt, this statement documents a turn of almost 180 degrees after 1918. The people's power is not ridiculed, but it is desired. There is no trace of the romanticized 'iron dictatorship of the proletariat', instead the 'power of the workers' is defined as 'socialist democracy'. It was precisely this formulation that was among those that the Stalinist party minority was not able to approve. The party congress ended up in an open rupture, and there were prolonged attempts to 'unify' the party throughout the 1970s. As it goes, the minority never used the manifesto except as an example of revisionism. Still the passage carries with it traces of the past. The smooth equalizing of the people's power and 'the workers' power' implies the displacement of the less important elements of the people, and the conception of the workers as a pre-determined core and leader of the people.

6. The Hegemony of the People's Power: the Right-wing

A parallel development towards the acceptance of the vocabulary and the horizon of the people's power took place in the National

Coalition Party, a supporter of monarchy in the constitutional debate of 1918-19. The term democracy (*demokratia*) surfaces for the first time as late as in the program of 1970. Similarly, the people's power is not at all at use in the manifestos of 1918, 1922 or 1945. The border against the Reds or revolutionaries was not drawn in these manifestos in terms of democracy or the people's power. This seems to be connected to the larger phenomenon that 'power' did not, as a matter of fact, belong to the programmatic vocabulary of the Coalition Party before the 1960s. For example, in its manifesto of 1945, the party complains of how the "authority (*arvovalta*) of the law has been diminished". The vocabulary of the people's power enters, however, vigorously to the language of the party in the manifesto of 1957. The people's power characterizes the state system, and it is the foundation for legal protection and independent legal system.

> The government must reinforce the society and the *democratic* state system, to see to the unification of the people (...) Revolutionary communism, as well as any other activity that aims at changing the weakening our *democratic* state system, must be solidly resisted. Power aspirations that are contradictory to the constitution and foreign to the spirit of *democracy*, as well as, extraparliamentary activities targeted towards our governmental organs must be arrested. (National Coalition Party, 1957)

The people's power is now a vital concept of *defense* and legitimacy. One has to protect and strengthen it. Revolutionary Communism is outlined as a threat to the people's power. The 'democratic state system' aptly crystallizes this conception: it is primarily order and thus related to the 'authority of law' of the previous manifesto. Why did the Coalition Party not present these kinds of arguments earlier in its manifesto of 1945? Was there the threat that this kind of an emphasis on the people's power could have merged into the 'people's democratic' demands of the far left or to the general leftist wave? One possible explanation is that the leftist and agrarian rhetoric, which emphasized people and the people's power, was such a major breakthrough that the Coalition Party had to follow. The main author of the manifesto, social scientist Onni Rantala, had familiarized himself with the new programs of the other conservative parties in

Nordic countries, and was thus able to modernize the outlook of the party (Aarnio, 1998, 65-67). This international impact, however, was translated into the old Finnish, republican language of the people's power. At any rate, by speaking about the people's power the party draws clear lines of defense and depicts the pursuits of the Communists alien to the spirit of the people's power.

In contrast to the traditional rhetoric of the left or Rural League, no demands for the democratization of any sphere of life are presented in this program. The people's power is not, therefore, any direction of development or distant goal, but a state of being which has to be protected. The concept does not, at least explicitly, cover any social power relations but exclusively the constitutional, state-related power relations. One can describe the situation by saying that over the four decades, the originally monarchist Coalition Party learned to turn its opponents' concept of demand into a better fitting concept of defense and legitimacy.

The concepts of power and democracy are increasingly used, in most parties, to define one's own political identity. For the Coalition Party, it was important to define revolutionary Communists as a threat to the people's power. The Finnish word for 'revolution', *vallankumous*, literally means 'reversal of the power'. It is interesting, that in its criticism of Communism, the program never uses the full term but systematically leaves the 'power' out. There is no *power* to be reversed in the first place, therefore the Communist action is just subversive, disruptive and negative. As late as in its manifesto of 1970, the party resists "all such action, which is aimed at changing our democratic (*kansanvaltainen*) system". Democratic system is *our* order, and its opponents are thus advancing a foreign cause.

The Coalition Party's programmatic relation to the people's power changes again in the manifestos of 1981 and 1993. The previous perspective of defense disappears almost entirely. Instead, the manifesto legitimizes both the own party and the republic by assuming the people's power as their key principle. Another substantial move takes place towards the Social Democratic and Agrarian/Center traditions:

Democracy must be extended to cover all significant forms of *exercising power* in the society.

> From the standpoint of *democracy*, it is essential that the political and economic *power* is not centralized. (Coalition Party, 1981)

In this passage, both of the Finnish terms for democracy are used as synonyms. The first significant move is that here the Coalition Party steps outside of the pure constitutional discourse and discusses the theme that Social Democrats opened in 1903, namely, the *social* relations of power. Their concern for the concentration of power – which also used to be an exclusively a Social Democratic idiom before the 1960s and the breakthrough of new social sciences – emphasizes this point even further. Even though this change does not signify a substantial consensus among the largest parties (Coalition party, Centre Party, SDP, SKDL/The Left Alliance), it informs of the fact that their manifestos and therefore their official discourse principally covers the same field of phenomena. Thus the complete divide, which earlier on prevailed between entirely constitutional (The New Finns, The National Coalition Party) and entirely social (SDP, SKP) manifestos, was basically closed.

In its latest manifesto (1993), the Coalition Party extends the field of the people's power even further. Now it maintains that also the "eco-social market economy functions under democratic stewardship [kansanvaltaisessa ohjauksessa]". The concentration of power as well as the trust in one, single solution is seen as threats to the people's power. The use of power is a problem, which may also turn into a threat to the people's power. The people's power requires that it will be cherished and developed towards various forms of participation. The rank order between democracy and the people's power is clearly and nicely formulated:

> Democracy must be revised and the forms of a true *people's power* must be found for it. (Coalition Party, 1993)

Democracy receives its deeper meaning by assuming the forms of the genuine people's power. The people's power gives a warmer, cozier and more thickly national legitimacy than the more intellectual democracy. By assuming the themes of 'power' and 'democracy' extensively in its manifestos, the Coalition Party subscribed to the social scientific discourse, whose popularity had been growing since the

1960s. By choosing the people's power as one of the key concepts of its last two programs, the party evidently demonstrates its urge to compete with other parties in representation of the people, to define the people anew, and dissipate so its old and restricting links to the upper middle class.

The Centre Party (formerly the Rural League) has maintained the people's power as the key foundation of legitimacy throughout the years of Finnish independence. However, even within the Centre Party, the manifestos of 1980s exhibit an exceptional preoccupation with power and the people's power. The former chair and key writer of the manifestos, Paavo Väyrynen, belongs to the generation of the 1960s, and is therefore as interested in power as his leftist competitors. The program of 1982 projects democratic decision-making into history, as a part of 'the peasant culture of our country'. The concept travels thus into a time, when it was far from being a consciously or extensively shared value. The counter-concepts of the people's power are determined quite clearly:

> Citizens feel powerless to influence decisions that concern them. On the other hand, the *power of interest groups and experts* threaten the basis of the *people's power*.
> *The people's power* must not be the *power of the majority* in cases where the question is one of the basic values in life and opportunities in life of residents of remote districts. In the final analysis, only the people concerned can be experts in these issues. (Centre Party, 1982)

When the goal of the people's power is already generally accepted, a pure demand for democratization does not much politicize. Therefore, the parties try to name particular powers, which deviate from the people's power. Instead of challenging the Social Democrats and their trade unions directly, the power of interest groups is contested. Nominalization expands the political force of the argument. When opposing the straightforward power of majority, the Centre Party also questions the old conception of one and unified people as a person, and steps towards the direction of the power of the citizens. Apparently, the experts or members of interest groups do not posses such particularity, which should be protected against a majority power disguised as a people's power.

7. The Hegemony of the People's Power: the Margins of the Republic

The Finnish Rural Party (*Suomen maaseudun puolue*, SMP) was a splinter of the bigger Rural League, and the fiercest and most successful representative of populist protest against the urbanization, 'old parties' and the President Urho Kekkonen (in office between 1956-1981). Because of the last point, it was often considered to represent far Right. Indeed, the rhetoric of the SMP (1967) elevated the people's power onto the agenda during the time when the radical left preferred talking about democracy. The SMP and its first and foremost leader Veikko Vennamo have been the last agents who were successful in attaching the people's power specifically to the ordinary and rural people: "Our party resists the supremacy of the big population centers and the capital". The SMP retreats to the Communist tradition in the sense that the people's power does not merely obtain a liberal, constitutional reference to a fair process, or a Social Democratic reference to a balanced division of social power, but the people's power also means a *distinct policy* in managing the businesses of the country in the best interest of the people and in a way approved of by the people.

> *Defending the people's power* also requires that loopholes and wastefulness in using common funds is effectively stopped as well as that all other economic looting is obstructed. (SMP, 1967)

The people's power means, thus, the monitoring of the life and economy of the political elite. Stylistically, the talk about 'loopholes and wastefulness' is aptly formulated, because the people's power is now also folksy power. Most trenchantly, this observant criticism was aimed at the 'old parties':

> Our Party stands unconditionally behind the *democratic* organizational machinery, and determinedly strives for the elimination of the *oligarchy of party leadership*, which has aptly succeeded in making the old parties powerless to realize the *people's democracy* that they have promised in their programs.

> Our Party categorically opposes the party subsidies that increases the *power of the party leadership* and has a *demoralizing effect on the people's power*. (SMP, 1967)

Expertly, the manifesto positively acknowledges the manifestos of old parties that have called for the people's power. But the 'oligarchy of leadership' in these parties prevents them causally from actualizing these manifestos. By requiring to the letter a democratic organizational machinery, the SMP steps forward to complete and advocate the best ideals of the old parties. A couple of times, the program emphatically defends 'the sound democratic (*kansanvaltainen*) development'. This is clearly an attempt to express the worn idea of 'the people's real power' in a fresh way. The Party does not even need to explicitly maintain that the prevailing democracy is not sound. When the left demanded at the very same time a *democratization* of various new fields of life, that is, a movement forward, the biological metaphor of soundness adheres to the sound past, which the party élites and election of Urho Kekkonen as the president of the republic have jeopardized. In this sense of defense, the manifesto draws near to the 1957 program of the Coalition Party.

In all of its populism, the rhetoric of the SMP is from an entirely different time than the 1930s' programs of the extremist movements. Merely the transition from 'party oligarchy' to the 'oligarchy of the party leadership' is telling. The SMP does not attack the legitimacy of the parties as such, but maintains in a fairly sociological way that the party leaderships constitute a problematic oligarchy. Instead of looking for a strong head of state, the SMP formulated a developmental program for the people's power and demanded, in particular, the narrowing of the power of president:

> *All power* in our country must originate from the Finnish *people*. Therefore, the people must be able to vote in general elections for the parliament, the President of the Republic, and municipal councils. The term of office of the parliament and the municipal councils must be three years instead of the current four years. The President of the Republic must be elected by direct election and not through the electoral college (...)
> The same person may serve as the President of the Republic for no more than two consecutive terms, which means a maximum of twelve years. (SMP, 1967)

Except for the shortening of terms of the parliament, this program of reforming the republic has been actualized. The first sentence is an interesting modification of Finnish constitution ("Power in Finland belongs to the people") and the old Anarchistic-cum-Leninist slogans ("All power to the councils"). By the external modality ("shall come from"), the text again creates a strong suspicion that the people's power is not actually at work in Finland. The same demand about the terms and power of president, which was possible to make only in the margin in the 1960s, was generally accepted in the 1980s. Therefore, it might be reasonable to consider even the consequences of the party criticism of the SMP. The parties' general interest in power, the people's power and use of power in the 1980s informs of a decreasing legitimacy of party system. The SMP was early on challenging this legitimacy, not in order to subvert the republic, but in order to ridicule the competing parties. – Almost a similar, yet a more profoundly right-wing case was the Constitutional Party (1973).

When the extremist movements of the 1930s warred against the power of the parties, they wanted to weaken the parliament and elevate a head of the state instead. The opposition movements of the Kekkonen era protested against the same power of the parties, but they wanted complete the republican tradition by limiting the power of the president and the party leaderships and by strengthening the position of the parliament.

All of the major parties adopted the rhetoric of the people's power towards the end of the 1960s. When even the most visible critics of the Kekkonen era resorted to the same concept, one can argue with good reason that the hegemony of the concept of the people's power was established and consolidated over the 1960s and 1970s.

8. Breaks and Silences

The Swedish People's Party (RKP) is the most significant deviation of this new hegemony – even if its name carries the element 'people'. The reference of 'the people' in the Party name is rather *'svenska folket'*, the Swedish-speaking folk, than the unitary people. Democracy (*demokratia*) surfaces in its manifestos once in 1937, but as a

proper ground of legitimacy and evaluation in the manifestos of 1964, 1974 and 1988. In this sense, the change in RKP's manifestos parallels the birth of the outlined hegemony. However, why is the people's power lacking so consequently? Of course, these programs are translated from Swedish to Finnish. If this is the reason, it however informs us of a consistent difference between the two Finnish words for democracy. As early as in 1880, the program of the Liberal Party ascribed the discontent of the Swedish-speaking intellectuals to the concept of the people's power. In 1918-1919, the triumphant republicans succeeded better in monopolizing the rhetoric of the people's power. In the right-wing rhetoric of the 1930s, the 'people' of the people's power was problematically one and a solid subject, a horizon within which the Swedish-speaking minority run the risk of being silenced. The recourse to the language minority (not the Finnish people), partly to the old elite (not the ordinary people) and to the bourgeois side of the political field (not the working class people) gives manifold reasons to avoid the rhetoric of the people's power.

Surprisingly, the terms are non-existent in the manifesto of Left Alliance (1990), a party which was established to gather the citizens left from the Social Democrats after the collapse of Communist Party. The manifesto is rich of complex vocabulary of power. The power relationships attached to gender, economy as well as to the position of the parliament and the president are discussed. As for the people's power, the most telling demand is this:

> *The exercise of power* that is based on *citizens'* own activity must be encouraged in every way, and new possibilities and forms must be created for it. (Left Alliance, 1990)

The old leftist program of democratization (*kansanvaltaistaminen*) has emptied itself on two different levels. Both the SKDL and SKP had already acknowledged the constitutional merits of the people's power – in comparison with the dictatorship of proletariat – twenty years earlier, and in this manifesto the current theme was a direct criticism of the Soviet power. On the other hand, the rhetoric of the people's power had become so widely and routinely employed, that

it hardly politicized anything. The manifesto seems thus to presume the constitutional democracy as self-evident, and looks for other arguments of politicization.

Be it as it may, but the most important programmatic change seems to signify a rhetorical change from the power of the (potentially one) people to the emphasis of power of the citizens. In Finnish, this is a pun, because the word 'citizen' (*kansalainen*) contains the word people (*kansa*). In a similar way, the manifesto of the SDP (1987) presents the slogan "to the participatory power of the citizens". The Greens (1990) adapted the same idea by maintaining that a proper ecological change can take place only "with the power of the citizens and by enlarging the liberties".

The people's power seems to be moving to the background with the general consensus. At the same time when the Coalition Party assumes the rhetoric profusely and without preservations, the leftist parties and the Greens seem to move towards emphasizing the power of the citizens. Yrjö Koskinen's old folk-as-a-person has apparently come to the end of its journey, after invigorating the political discourses of the old Finnish Party, extreme right (in the 1930s), extreme left (before the 1960s) and the SMP. During this journey, 'the people' has lost most of its connotations as 'the ordinary people', and has thus approved of the clerical people of the Coalition Party. At the same time, it has lost much of the political edge of the forgotten and oppressed people.

One reason for the disappearing force of the people's power is in the settling down of the constitutional debate. Since the 1930s, there has been no serious attempt at a monarchic revanche. President Urho Kekkonen's long term in office (1956-1981), and the concentration of unofficial power to enable him to intervene in public discourse, the functioning of the government, administration and even political parties, launched a twenty year long process of changing the constitution towards more parliamentarian and republican direction. The ironies of history include the fact that Kekkonen came from one the key republican parties, Rural League, and that the other leading republican party, Social Democrats, were partly retarding this development, because they have been victorious in all presidential elections since Kekkonen era. Be it as it may, but in the discussion about

'the power in Finland', the constitutional discourse is losing its edge. One decisive moment in this long process was the end of the 1960s, when the Communist party and SKDL acknowledged the existence of the political and constitutional democracy in Finland. The Social Democrats had made the same move in 1930.

If the left has been renouncing its reservations with the political democracy, it has, at the same time, successfully introduced (with the Rural League) another way of discussing power and the people's power: the power relations of economy and civil society. The Finnish right did not acknowledge this discourse before the political trend of the 1960s. To my understanding, a key factor introducing this 'social democratic' change in the political discourse was the breakthrough of modern sociology and political science into the public arena during the 1960s. The "realist school" of political science was determined to study the actual relations of power, not only the normative or constitutional relations (Jansson 1964). Behavioralistic sociology legitimized the talk about concentration of power and power relations in all fields of life.

The results of this survey reveal the fairly astonishing fact that 'democracy' and 'the people's power' were not accepted as a self-evident basis of political evaluation and legitimizing before the 1960s. The turn towards a more 'democratic' rhetoric contains a strong Social Democratic-cum-sociological undercurrent, which has legitimized the discourse of social power relations. When power was, at least until the 1950s, an indelicate and impertinent term to be discussed publicly or in educated company, it has now permeated all public political discourses. Does it mean that the political edge of detecting and naming new 'powers' will diminish in future the same way as the force of the people's power has been impaired over the last decades? Not necessarily. Instead of just repeating the mantra of the people's power or naming the possessors of the power, the programs that strive to politicize seem to be interested in the temporal movements of power: power is concentrating, it is escaping from the citizens, it slides away, it disappears. Who is first to complain of the general lack of power?

Notes

1 The Finnish Christian League (SKL) presents a bit different case. Its two manifestoes (1979, 1995) do not resort to the rhetoric of the people's power. In this case, the reason is rather the Lutheran language of *Obrigkeit*. People must obey the authorities, set by God, and not believe in the souvereign people's power.

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ARTICLES

Topic 2:
Nation in Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands

Tarja-Liisa Luukkanen

SAVAGES AND BARBARIANS?

An Example of Creating a Respectable Past for Finnish-speaking Finns in the 19th Century

R. D. Anderson has summed up the two main patterns of the 19th-century academic nationalism: (i) universities expressing cultural unity in disunited nations prior to political unification, like in Germany, and (ii) university intellectuals taking the lead in creating new nationalisms based on language and history, like within the Russian and Habsburg empires.[1]

During the 19th century, those involved in the process of building the Finnish nation within the Russian Empire did not have much to offer in terms of national history. For centuries Finland had been under foreign rule, it lacked great historical monuments, and internationally recognized achievements in the fields of art, literature, war and science were few. During the first half of the 19th century, the Finnish language was vernacular and the language of education and administration was that of a previous ruler Sweden.

Jürgen Habermas is widely known and discussed for his critical theory of knowledge and human interests. In this article I maintain that his notion of emancipatory knowledge, described as self-knowledge or self-reflection which leads to a transformed consciousness, is an interesting and useful tool of looking at the construction of Finnish national identity in the 19th century. In order to do so, an

example of the Habermas´ perspective transformation is offered from the field of education. An effort to interpret Finnish history and Finnish language as lasting national resources of genuine cultural value was made in theological lecture halls from 1850s onward. This effort turned out to be successful and win popular support in the emergence of Finnish national awareness.

Miroslav Hroch in his *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: a comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller European nations* distinguishes different periods within the development of nationalism in the smaller European nations. Phase A he describes as *Landespatriotismus* in which nationalism was confined to the educated academics of the countries. Phase B, in turn, is characterized by activists` political agitation for the national cause. This is the period when a perspective transformation took place in Finland. Hroch concludes that this period began in Finland in 1831 with the founding of the Finnish Literature Society, which started to develop the Finnish language into a literary form and to publish its works systematically in Finnish. Phase B came to an end by the 1880s, when period C, the popular national awakening, ensued.[2]

This article offers an example of the new emancipatory mentality that was introduced into the Finnish discussion of its national past. In Hroch´s terms it exemplifies phase B, when the educated university elite propagated new views among the emerging educated class, the university students. These students were theologians, future Lutheran pastors, which during the period in question formed the largest group of educated people in Finland.

University of Helsinki in the 1850s

In 1852 the new statutes regulating academic life at the University of Helsinki were passed and went into effect the following year. Their aim was to control the students more closely: to prevent their defiance and the outbursts of criticism which had taken place in the 1840s and in the beginning of 1850s. The student activism had been rather moderate: students refused to go to classes given by the Rus-

sian professors, threw rocks through some windows and even exploded some kind of device in the courtyard of one of the professors. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the Russian officials they had displayed their disobedience and their open disrespect for the authorities, as, for example, when they refused to take part in a ball held in the honor of the Russian general governor in Finland.

The political situation in Europe provided the motivation for the new statutes. The Russian officials, and especially Nicholas I, were quite displeased with the developments in Europe. Suppression of the freedom of expression, which in Russia included abolishing chairs in Philosophy, also occurred in Finland, the idea being that in this manner dangerous, liberal ideas could be prevented from entering the Russian Empire.

In this context Finnish pastors-to-be were offered, for the first time ever, a lecture series on the theme "The Development of the Church of the Fatherland" (Isänmaan kirkon kehitys).[3] During the academic year of 1853-54 Bengt Olof Lille (1807-1875), Professor of Church History, lectured two hours each week on this theme. He was one of the few members of the academic community who were fluent in Finnish. From 1853-1868 Professor Lille gave altogether what would today be considered 12 lecture series on Finnish Church History.[4]

In this article I will take a look at an important phase of the historiography of the Finnish speaking Finns before the 12th century as well as in the 12th century, during the time when Finland slowly started to become integrated into the sphere of Swedish dominance. What actually took place in Finland during this period remains almost entirely unknown and there are no known sources that depict actual historical events from a Finnish point of view. The only sources we have are a liturgical legend and a folk poem which tells the story of a Finnish peasant murdering St. Henry (Henrik), a bishop, who quite early on became the patron saint of Finland. St. Henry accompanied the Swedish king Eric to Finland. Both the legend and the poem, which exists in two versions, date from at least a century after the alleged incident. It is thought that the crusade took place in 1157, and some Russian sources even suggest an earlier one organized by the Swedes.[5]

However, as mentioned above, the actual historical events will not be my main concern, but instead the creation of national history. Here we shall see an example how an emancipatory interpretation of an ancient Finnish nation was created and passed on to students of theology. This new interpretation challenged the previously authoritative views of foreign scholars, casting the history of a time which seemed to be beyond historical research into new light.

History and Politics – the Forgotten National Past

Anthony F. Upton has pointed out that there is no nation without history; national history celebrates both the values of a nation and points out its enemies. This was recognized already in the 19th century by the circle of opposition-minded young Finnish intellectuals, the so-called Saturday Society, at the University of Helsinki. Lille as well as Gabriel Rein, Professor of History, were members of the Saturday Society, and so were also the holy trinity of Finnish nationalism: Johan Vilhelm Snellman, "the national philosopher", Elias Lönnrot, editor of the national epic *Kalevala*, and Johan Ludvig Runeberg, "the national poet".[6]

In 1846, one of the Saturday Society members, J. J. Nervander, Professor of Physics, criticized Snellman's program of national awakening, especially the high priority which was placed on the founding of Finnish national literature. According to Nervander, the Finns constituted a people because they had a common language, but not a nation since they did not have a history. Therefore, what Finland needed in the first place was not a Finnish literature, as Snellman had claimed, but a common Finnish history. Unfortunately, the creation of a national history in this sense – a history of the Finnish-speaking Finns – required political independence, and was therefore, according to Nervander, beyond the reach of the Finns. While waiting for more favorable political circumstances, Finns should in his opinion behave like the children of Israel in slavery in Egypt: prosper, multiply and wait for those seven hardships which would set them free.[7]

Not everyone shared Nervander´s views and the construction of Finnish national history began well before the country achieved political independence. The Finnish past, as pictured by Nervander´s close friend Lille, was not a recollection, but a new interpretation. It included a new interpretation or rather a new perspective on the elements which constituted the ancient Finnish "nation". It chose to examine the previous underdog, the Finnish-speaking majority of Finland, and its history.

The extant manuscript of Lille´s lecture on Finnish Church History starts with the Swedish crusade into Finland in 1156 or 1157 and with its leader, King Eric IX or Eric the Saint. Lille recalled the standard view that Eric was driven into Finland by his eagerness for the Christian cause and that the crusade had been a holy war.

> Without denying the many favors Eric performed for the Church I think that we can maintain that the crusade was strongly motivated by political reasons – it might be that the crusade was undertaken solely on political grounds.

The main reason for the crusade was, according to Lille, Eric´s security policy. He maintained that the Estonians and eastern peoples in general were dangerous and restless neighbors who every now and then raided Sweden. In his opinion it was understandable and typical of the era of the crusades that the main objective of pacifying the fierce, warlike Finns was combined with an attempt to spread Christianity. Conversion of the Finns would have been indeed the best way of removing the threat to Sweden. Lille thus suggested that the Swedish crusade in Finland was not a religious enterprise, or even motivated by religion. Instead, religion was of secondary importance and was used as a political tool.[8]

Lille's personal friend Gabriel Rein (1800-1867), Professor of History, gave lectures on Finnish history at the same time as Lille gave his in the Faculty of Theology. Rein´s lectures on Finnish history, dating from the 1850s and published in 1870-1871, offer a possibility to compare the teaching of History, on the one hand, and Church History on the other. The most notable differences were that it was Lille who emphasized the emancipatory knowledge and crusaders lack of religious motivation. Both agreed that the crusade was not

very effective in terms of producing instant religious change in Finland and that in connection with the crusade the Finnish costal areas were colonized.[9]

Relying on tradition, Professor Lille came to the conclusion that the Swedish troops came ashore somewhere in the Turku area. King Eric soon returned to Sweden, but left some of his troops to protect the missionary work. Leaving a party behind meant also a couple of other things. Lille maintained that it showed that even though the war was won, soldiers were still needed in order to control the locals. They were also needed to protect the colonization of Finland.[10]

But what were the living conditions of the Finns during the time of the invasion? As Lille stated, there are very few sources on this. However, this did not deter him from drawing conclusions. Claims that in those distant times Finland was mere wilderness and endless swamps were not correct. During the time of the Swedish crusade, Lille argued, agriculture was known and practiced in Finland. This in his opinion was evident on the basis of Finnish language, which had indigenous words, e.g., for agricultural tools and methods. "Our forefathers", as Lille repeatedly called the ancient Finns, were farmers and not nomadic hunters. The Finnish names for village (kylä), room (huone), sauna, and barn (aitta) testified to a permanent social structure of some sort and a certain stage of cultural development. In addition, if people had not lived in organized communities, it would have been impossible to get them together "so soon" to expel the "uninvited aliens". Rein spoke of the nomadic agriculture (as in slash-and-burn cultivation, kaskitalous) of the Finns. He, like Lille, used etymology in order to prove that the Finns cultivated land even before the first crusade.[11]

Although used by the most notable representative of the Finnish Enlightenment, Henrik Gabriel Porthan (d. 1804) already in 1788, this method of examining language and vocabulary as proof of cultural history and development was an international research novelty in the 1850s. The generally recognized founder of this approach was Adalbert Kuhn in his *Zur ältesten Geschichte der indogermanischen Völker*, 1845, and its developer was Adolphe Pictet (in his *Les origines indoeuropéennes ou les Arayas primitifs, essai de paléontologie linguistigue*, 1853-1863), who called his method linguistic paleontology.[12]

Lille told his students, however, that the social order of the Finns was rather undeveloped; the clans and families did not have a single, common leader. Therefore the victory of Eric the Saint was easy; his opposition was not organized enough and could be defeated in a single battle. Lille explained that although it was not known where the battle actually took place, it was recorded in the legend that Finns came to meet their uninvited guests, which naturally gave the listeners the impression that their "forefathers" had actively resisted them. They lost the battle, and many were killed when they did not submit themselves to invaders and refused to adopt the new religion. According to Lille, the Swedish soldiers were the first "missionaries" into Finland. He stated that what took place in Finland was quite common elsewhere as well. In ancient times, as he said, it was customary among the uncivilized peoples that their conversion into Christianity followed a similar pattern: defeat, submission and baptism without any personal commitment. For Lille, however, Finnish resistance was more organized than for Rein; in Lille´s opinion the organized resistance itself was a sign of the developed nature of the early Finnish society.[13]

The main intention of Lille´s lecture was, however, to re-examine the supposedly uncivilized nature and way of life of the ancient Finnish forefathers. At the very first start of his lecture he argued that the Finns had risen above the state of nature before the Swedish attack. He thought this applied to their culture as well, and as evidence of it he mentioned monogamy, which he though was already institutionalized among the early Finns. Rein disagreed with this. He taught in his lectures that Estonian sources and perhaps even the *Kalevala* gave evidence that not monogamy, but polygyndria was practiced among the pagan Finns. But more compelling evidence was yet to come. The *Kalevala*, a collection of Finnish folk poetry, was first published in 1835 and in an extended version in 1849. One cannot really exaggerate the effect it had on the early formation of the Finnish national identity. It found its way to Lille´s classes as well. Although he admitted that the early Finns were illiterate, their poetry, as shown in the *Kalevala* or in the *Kanteletar*, proved that they were not savages living in a state of nature. As a true child of the Reformation, Lille maintained that if the Catholic Church had done as it should and supported the development of the Finnish-speaking people, they

would have developed a Finnish-speaking high culture already quite early on, based on what they had already achieved.[14]

According to Lille and the popular sentiment of the time, the *Kalevala* was not only poetry, but a source of history as well. It shed new light on, among other things, the religion of the ancient Finns. Referring to M. A. Castrén (1813-1852), the first Professor of the Finnish Language and a fellow of the Saturday Society, Lille said that *Jumala* (the Finnish name for God), was the oldest god or deity in Finland. According to this kind of reasoning Lille made it look like that the Christian God of Finns (*Jumala*) was actually the God of the forefathers, and the same applied the other way round. The notion of a "primitive" religion was changed into that of an "original, uncorrupted" religion. The interpretation was not originally invented by Lille. In the first decade of the 19th century C. A. Gottlund had come up with the idea, in the spirit of Romanticism, that the pagan Finns were actually monotheists.

Challenging Foreign Scholars and Their Interpretations

Gottlund, whom Lille knew personally, had studied folk poetry and Gottlund´s main target of criticism was an influential book by Friedrich Rühs. His book *Schweden und seine Bewohner* (1809) was translated into Swedish under the title *Svea Rikets Historia från de äldsta tider till Konung Carl XII död*.

According to Rühs, the religion of the pagan Finns was fetishism. They had no cultural achievements, and they had never been free or independent as a people. In his opinion, the Finns never posed a threat to Sweden. The crusade had been organized because of "higher motives", in order to honour the Almighty and spread Christianity. Christianity, however, took root very slowly in Finland due to the primitive state of the Finnish language, which was undeveloped and lacked supernatural, abstract notions. These views reflected the standard interpretation of the Finnish history. Rühs´s books were to be found in several student libraries of the University of Helsinki of the time. From this point of view we can

understand why the *Kalevala* was so important for the Finnish-minded Fennomans. It testified against Rühs and his claims that Finnish was a primitive language and that Finns had no cultural accomplishments.[15]

Lille´s lecture manuscript includes some marginalia. The only book he mentioned was the *Chronicle of Bishops* (*Piispainkronikka*), which tells the story of the first crusade. There is also a short list of names of earlier Swedish historians whose books were available in Helsinki and who served as his discussion partners, so to speak: Rhyzelius, Lagerbring and Peringsiöld. The discussion, however, is not available for us to hear or read: in the original source material the lecturer did not comment on them. But when Lille´s lecture is compared with contents of the books by these writers, we can see the historiographical background of Lille´s own presentation and just how his opposition to the Swedish interpretation of Finnish history.

There is no way of telling today what Lille taught his students concerning Peringskiöld or how he commented on such books as *Bibliskt slächt-register* (1713, a genealogy from Adam to Jesus), *Then första boken af Svea och Götha minningmerken* (1710) and *Ättartal för Svea och Götha konungahus* (1725). They have very little to do with Lille´s own presentation. Perhaps Peringskiöld was merely used as an example of historical fables.[16]

Referring to Andreas Rhyzelius (born 1677) and his book *Episcoposcopia sviogothica*, Lille agreed that crusade was undertaken in order to secure the Swedish coast. *Svigothia munita eller historisk förteckning på borgar, fästningar, slott som fordna tider hafva varit och än till en del äro uti Svea och Götha riken* (1744), counts the Swedish castles, among other things, and could have been used to outline the ancient borders of Sweden.

However, the main target of Lille´s criticism seems to have been Sven Lagerbring (born 1707), the reformer of Swedish historiography. Lille wrote against Lagerbring, who had written a comprehensive history of Sweden (*Swea Rikets Historia*) and its second volume, published in 1773, dealing with Finland. Lagerbring´s books were well known in Finland and several copies were available in the student libraries in Helsinki.[17]

Lagerbring was convinced that the ancient Finns had lived in the state of nature. He thought that Finland and its pagan inhabit-

ants had from time immemorial been under Swedish dominion, and that the crusade had merely re-established the previous state of affairs. Lagerbring mentioned that it had been lately brought out that Finns had pillaged the Swedish coastal areas. In his opinion it was more probable that the Finns had not conducted raids into Sweden, because "living in the state of nature", they lacked political ambitions and leaders, and, in addition, there were no sources confirming these attacks. The sources testified rather the contrary; Eric the Saint offered the Finns Christian peace and Christian faith (*Guds Tro och Frid*), but was rejected. Even if Eric was a great king, said Lagerbring, he saw nothing wrong in waging a legitimate war to defend the Christian faith – it was typical of the time. Finns were killed for religion´s sake, and even if his method was wrong, king's heart was virtuous.[18]

It should be mentioned that the university students attending Lille's lectures had not studied Finnish History or Finnish Church History during their basic education; the first course book for schools on Finnish Church History was not published until 1875.[19] As a result, Lille´s lectures had some additional value for their novelty. They participated in the battle of history on many fronts, political and religious. He lectured on Finnish history from the point of view of those who had been defeated both in battle and in later historiography. He denied the right of foreign authors, especially those on the "winning side", the Swedes, to interpret the history of Finland as a footnote to the history of Sweden. The Finnish-speaking people had their own "history" not only before the Russian conquest of 1809, but even before the first Swedish crusade. One should also bear in mind that if there was a Finnish history and a Finnish-speaking culture even before the 12th century, "history" and "culture" were given to Finns neither by Swedes nor by Russians for that matter. Lille also made it clear that in his opinion the religious arguments could not be used to explain or justify the attack on Finland. In his utterances to future religious professionals of the country he was very specific on this point: political history should not be interpreted in religious terms if the aims and motivation of a historical event were primarily political.

Racially Inferior Finns? Moulding the Opinions of the Future Clergy

J. J. Nervander was of the opinion that the Finnish-minded national movement, in order to have any success at all, had to be movement of the peasants, and not of the elite.[20] In its early phase, however, it was a movement of the academic elite educated at the University of Helsinki. In 1853 the teaching of national history made its first appearance in the theological lecture hall in Helsinki. In the context of that time the Russian authorities surely saw nothing wrong in criticizing the Swedes or Swedish historiography, or in claiming that Finns had fought against the invaders. Similar criticism directed against later Russian invasions of Finland or against Russian historiography was out of question, but we can, if we like, speculate on two things.

First, the lectures painted a picture of an ancient national history that had nothing to do with Russia. Secondly, they described the unwanted invasion of a foreign power into Finland, and a similar endeavor had taken place also in recent memory as well. It is possible that these two implicit aspects of the lecture did not go unnoticed by the students, but since we have no sources on this, we can merely speculate.

Who would define what it meant to be Finnish: Swedes, Germans or Russians? Here we have seen an example of a Finnish scholar choosing to define this himself. For those students attending his lectures he created like a memory of the long forgotten past, of a time when the Finnish-speaking people were militarily defeated. The lecture gave Finns, who had gained a reputation for their cultural backwardness, savagery and primitiveness, a respectable past. When the number of Finnish-speaking students of theology started to increase during the latter half of the 19th century, the new interpretation of their noble forefathers undoubtedly fell on fertile soil.

The general theme "university and nationalism" has received some attention in recent Finnish research. As a rule, however, the role of theological education as well as of the lectures in other faculties during the middle of the 19th century have been often neglected. The lectures are, however, quite important in understanding the creation

of national history in Finland; unlike all printed publications, such lectures were not under the supervision of the censorship officials.[21]

Lille claimed that the Swedish historians were wrong. When compared with the simultaneous lectures in History, Lille´s contemporary Gabriel Rein was more moderate in his views than Lille. He did not emphasize the level of the cultural development of the ancient Finns. When we examine what Lille's follower in the chair of Church History later lectured on the Swedish attack, the change of interest is obvious. The earlier Swedish historiography was no longer being criticized in the Faculty of Theology in the 1870s.[22] In the 1850s, however, the situation called for a comment on cultural development – or the lack of it – if one wished to take part in the contemporary discussion.

The racial ideology of Scandinavism, defining race by the language people spoke, had arrived in Finland and the student circles. It proclaimed that Finland was inhabited by two races. The Germanic, Arayan people, i.e., the Swedish, were the master race with the capacity to conquer and rule. The Swedes were active, vigorous people with intelligence and beautiful features. The Finns, small clumsy people with big heads and square faces, were passive and possessed various kinds of barbaric, undeveloped traits. According to this line of argumentation, the Swedish race was the one capable of creating culture, whereas Finns were suited for a quiet life and manual labour such as farming. This ideology of the racial inferiority of the Finns and of the racial superiority of the Swedish was discussed in the student circles. It found supporters among the Swedish-speaking educated class especially after 1855, when it was propagated by the Norwegian historian P. A. Munch and the Swedish journalist August Sohlman.[23]

In the international field of anthropological research Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1852-1849) was influential in classifying Finns as belonging to the race of Mongols, and, as Aira Kemiläinen has shown, this view persisted in different forms over 100 years despite the fact that Finnish-speaking Finns did not look particularly Asian. Together with other anthropological theories that also classified Finns as a culturally inferior race, racial arguments were used against Fennomans in the battle for the cultural hegemony inside Finland. The racial argument is of vital importance in understand-

ing the language feud between the Swedish and Finnish-speaking population in Finland. Even the Finnish civil war was occasionally seen in racial terms; the less developed Finns were not only uglier than the Swedish-speaking Finns, but they also supported revolutionary socialism.[24]

The argument was interwoven in the discussions of the political and cultural rights of the Swedish-speaking Finns, later receiving new impetus from the development of genetics. "Positive racial hygienics" was actively practiced in the early 20th century in order to preserve the so-called Swedish race in Finland. The race issue remained relevant for quite a long time until the experiences of the Second World War put a sudden end to the speculations concerning the cultural superiority of an Aryan race.[25] As we have seen, starting in the 1850s, Lutheran pastors were educated in a different spirit; Finnish-speaking Finns were not a lower race incapable of creating culture.

Lille clearly criticized Lagerbring´s "state of nature" theory, but he also took part in the popular racial discussion. His lecture gave a rather different picture of the racial characteristics of the Finns than the ideology of Scandinavism. Even the Finnish forefathers of the 12th century were not savages living in and out of nature and running through the woods. They knew agriculture, there was a social order of some sort and they defended their country together against common enemies. Contrary to the claims of Scandinavism, the early Finns were not incapable of creating culture. Their religion was in no way barbaric, but in its core monotheistic. It was not "developed", but instead uncorrupted, for monotheism was considered to be the original form of religion. Although the early Finns were illiterate, they were nevertheless a people of poets, as their body of folk poetry suggested.[26]

The University of Helsinki and the Faculty of Theology were both quite small in 1853. The total number of students was about 400. About 70 of them studied theology and 40 students of theology took Lille´s class in the autumn 1853, and 30 in the spring term of 1854. Raymond Pearson has pointed out that the relationship between nationalism and history is a reciprocal one; although nationalism makes use of history at the same time it encourages the actual study of history. Lectures on Finnish Church History were an example of

this double process.[27] Nevertheless, the teaching of history was not only an academic enterprise, but in the context of the times also highly political in nature.

In 1853 the pastors-to-be heard lectures for the first time on the history of Finland. They heard Lille disavow the religious nature of the first Swedish "crusade" into Finland in the 12th century, and they heard him affirm the respectable past of their pagan Finnish forefathers, including their poetry, their cultivation of the land, and their social structure. The lectures questioned the foreign, authoritative view of early Finns as savages, incapable of ever creating any "culture" and thus took part in the contemporary discussion of the cultural development of the Finnish-speaking Finns.

The clergy of the Lutheran church formed the largest educated estate in the country. It also served the needs of the Finnish-speaking majority of the people. Throughout the country the pastors educated at the Imperial Alexander University in Helsinki were in close contact with the local people as pastors and school teachers – certainly more so than the educated, nationalistic elite of the capital. Later in the 19th century the pro-Finnish movement found support especially in the representatives of the peasants and clergy in the Finnish Diet. Therefore, it is rather natural to conclude that pastors´ academic education in creating the respectable Finnish past for the Finnish-speaking people should not be overlooked when examining Finnish nationalism and nationalistic interpretations of history. Future research will explore what kind of approach to national history the pastors represented – if any – in their local parishes and in the education of school children. Since altogether 12 courses, like the one portraying the 12th century crusade in a radically new light, were given during the period of 15 years, several student generations listened to Lille's lectures. One might expect that the interpretations by a professor in Church History did not remain within the walls of the University.

Eric Hobsbawm's treatment of Finnish nationalism in his *Nations and Nationalities* since 1780 is quite brief and his interpretation of it is largely based on Miroslav Hroch's *Social Preconditions of National Revival*. According to Hobsbawm, the nationalists did not concentrate on the Finnish language until the 1860s, and the Finns re-

mained state patriots who were loyal to the Russian Emperor until the policy of Russification changed the situation after the 1880s.[28]

However, the question of Finnish language was the key issue of Finnish nationalism throughout all of its "phases", mainly because there was little else to bargain for. With Sweden´s defeat by Russia still in recent memory in the background, disloyalty to Imperial Russia was perhaps not a genuine option, and Hobsbawm was perhaps ill-advised to use public, official speeches in order to study the popular sentiments; after all, open opposition to Russia usually resulted in deportation from Finland.

Those who write the history of nationalism from the point of view of the development of a main stream culture may not be able to do justice to those countries that witnessed a movement of previously marginalized people and like in the Finnish case, offer some rather textbook examples of Habermas´ emancipatory knowledge and perspective transformation.

In his criticism of E. J. Hobsbawm's treatment of nationalism Adrian Hastings, Emeritus Professor of Theology at the University of Leeds, has maintained that in order to understand the "construction of nationhood" the role of religion and the clergy should not be overlooked.[29] At least in the case of 19th century Finland, Hasting's claims seem to be of importance. In Finland, the demands of the emerging Finnish-speaking nationality focused on the status of the Finnish language. Lille´s lectures were in Swedish, which was the official language of the University of Helsinki. But at the same time he started his emancipatory lectures on Finnish history, the students of Theology made the vernacular-is-beautiful -choice and in February 1853 they declared Finnish as the main language of the Theological Student Body.[30] It was the first Finnish-speaking organisation within the University of Helsinki.

Thus the students of theology in the University of Helsinki took sides with the Finnish language and were offered a new emancipatory interpretation of Finnish history already in the 1850s.

Notes

1 R. D. Anderson, *The Formation of National Elites: The British Case. In University and Nation. The University and the Making of the Nation in Northern Europe in the 19th and 20th Century.* Studia Historica 53. Finnish Historical Society: Helsinki 1996, 113; Raymond Pearson, History and Historians in the Service of Nation-Building. In *National History and Identity. Approaches to the Writings of National History in the North-East Baltic Region Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.* Ed. Michael Branch. Studia Fennica. Ethnologica 6. Helsinki 1999.

2 Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: a comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller European nations* (originally published in Prague in 1968). Cambridge 1985, 23, 72, 178.

3 The first Finnish professor in Church History, B. O. Lille, received his historical training from August Neander at the University of Berlin during 1836-1837. Church History did not become a part of the education of the Finnish clergy until 1840. Index praelectionum in imperiali litterarum universitate Alexandrea Fenniae publice privatimque habendarum. Helsingforsiae. 1830-1839; Tarja-Liisa Luukkanen, *B. O. Lille ja kirkkohistorian opetuksen alkuvaiheet Aleksanterin yliopiston teologisessa tiedekunnassa.* Historiallisia tutkimuksia 216. Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura: Helsinki 2000, 32-44; Die Deutsche Kirchenge-schichtsforschung und die Entstehung der Disziplin Kirchengeschichte als universitäres, theologisches Lehrfach in Finland. - *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 1/ 2002, 76-80.

4 *Förteckningar öfver föreläsningar och öfningar, hvilka vid Kejserliga Alexanders-Universitet i Finland af Professorer och öfvriga Lärare under Läseåret – komma att anställas.* Helsingfors 1853-1867, 3.

5 For a modern account of the first crusade to Finland, see Eino Jutikkala & Kauko Pirinen, *A History of Finland.* Helsinki 1996, 40-47; Mauno Jokipii. *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja* 2002.

6 Anthony F. Upton, History and National Identity: some Finnish Examples. In National History and Identity. Approaches to the Writings of National History in the North-East Baltic Region Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Ed. Michael Branch. *Studia Fennica. Ethnologica* 6. Helsinki 1999, 153, 56.

7 Nervander reminded Snellman that the language spoken by the majority of the people had never yet replaced the language of the educated anywhere in the world, if the latter was a living language. He raised

serious doubts whether this could be accomplished in Finland for the first time in the world history. With his delightful sarcasm Nervander added that if one believed in the rise of the Finnish-speaking culture, one should also believe in all kinds of absurdities like in the rise of Estonian culture or, indeed, in the culture of the Lapps. J. V. Snellman, *Samlade arbeten* V, 1992, 627-628 (in Nervander´s private letter to Snellman in 1846).

8 HUL (Helsinki University Library), Coll 127.1, Föreläsningar i Finsk Kyrkohistoria [Lectures on Finnish Church History], 1.

9 HUL (Helsinki University Library), Coll 127.1, Föreläsningar i Finsk Kyrkohistoria [Lectures on Finnish Church History], 1; Gabriel Rein *Föreläsningar öfver Finlands historia. Förra delen.* Helsingfors 1870, 43-51, 87 (on Eric´s motives for the crusade).

10 Rein agreed already in 1831 that the Finnish costal areas were colonized in connection with the crusade. HUL, Coll 127.1, Föreläsningar i Finsk Kyrkohistoria [Lectures on Finnish Church History], 1, s.a.; Rein *Finlands forntid i chronologisk öfversigt, åtföjld av de förnämsta händelser ur Rysslands och Sveriges historia. Ett försök.* Helsingfors 1831, 4; 1870, 43-51.

11 HUL, Coll 127.1, Föreläsningar i Finsk Kyrkohistoria [Lectures on Finnish Church History], 1; Rein 1870, 17-18, 25, 88.

12 Osmo Ikola, Porthan suomalaisen kielentutkimuksen tiennäyttäjänä. In *Porthanin monet kasvot*. Ed. Juha Manninen. Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura: Helsinki 2000, 115-116.

13 HUL, Coll 127.1, Föreläsningar i Finsk Kyrkohistoria [Lectures on Finnish Church History], 1.

14 HUL, Coll 127.1, Föreläsningar i Finsk Kyrkohistoria [Lectures on Finnish Church History], 1.

15 Friedrich Rühs, *Svea Rikets Historia från de äldsta tider till Konung Carl XII död.* Stockholm 1823, 143, 144-145 (the pious Eric weeping for the Finns slain in the battle, because as pagans they could not enter Heaven); M. G. Schybergson, Historiens studium vid Åbo Universitet. Åbo universitets lärdomshistoria. 3. *Historien.* Helsingfors 1891, 24, 150; Ilmari Heikinheimo, *Kaarle Aksel Gottlund. Elämä ja toiminta* 1. Porvoo 1933, 289-292; Päiviö Tommila, Historiantutkijan muotokuva. *Suomen historian käsikirjoja* 17:2. SHS. Porvoo 1998, 158; Luukkanen 2000, 136-137.

16 For a list of Peringskiöld´s books available to students in Helsinki, see *Finska student-bibliotekets katalog. Suomalaisen ylioppilaskirjaston luettelo 1872.* Helsingfors 1873, 128, 133; On Peringskiöld and his contribution in creating a great past for Sweden, see Sten Lindroth *Svensk lärdomshistoria. Stormaktstiden.* Södertälje 1989, 330-332.

17 Sten Lindroth, *Svensk lärdomshistoria. Frihetstiden.* Södertälje 1989, 678-687.

18 HUL, Coll 127.1, Föreläsningar i Finsk Kyrkohistoria [Lectures on Finnish Church History], 1. Sven Lagerbring, *Swea Rikes Historia. Ifrån De äldsta tider Till De närvarande. Andra Delen som innefattar Rikets öden från år 1060 til 1300.* Stockholm 1773, 154, 155.

19 L. L. Laurén, *Sammanställning af de viktigaste kyrkohistoriska fakta i Finland.* Helsingfors 1875.

20 Snellman, *Samlade arbeten* V, 627-628 (in Nervander´s private letter to Snellman in 1846).

21 Eino Murtorinne, Suomalainen teologia autonomian kautena (1828-1918). Helsinki 1986, 58; Den fennomanska rörelsen och Finlands kyrka 1850-1914. In *Kyrkan och nationalism i Norden. Nationalism och skandinavism i de nordiska folkkyrkorna under 1800-talet.* Utg. Ingmar Brohed. Lund. 1998, 381-391; Ilkka Liikanen, *Fennomania ja kansa. Joukkojärjestäytymisen läpimurto ja Suomalaisen puolueen synty.* Historiallisia tutkimuksia 191. Suomen historiallinen seura: Helsinki1995, 98-102; Tommila 1998, 154-177; Markku Heikkilä, Teologia. In *Suomen tieteen historia* 2. Humanistiset ja yhteiskuntatieteet. Porvoo 2000, 18-63; Päiviö Tommila, Historia. In *Suomen tieteen historia* 2. Humanistiset ja yhteiskuntatieteet. Porvoo 2000, 66-71.

22 HUL, Archive of the Swedish Literature Society 629.4 (Professor Herman Råbergh on the arrival of Christianity in Finland).

23 Kemiläinen´s informative book deals with the various theories of the Finnish race that had been advanced in international discussions and anthropological research beginning with 17th century. Most of these ascribed negative or inferior racial characteristics to the Finns. Aira Kemiläinen, *Suomalaiset, outo, pohjoinen kansa: Rotuteoriat ja kansal-linen identiteetti.* Historiallisia tutkimuksia 177. Suomen historiallinen seura: Helsinki. 1993, 145; On race ideology, on student discussions and hopes of Finland becoming reunited with Sweden, see also Sakari Kuusi, *Aksel August Granfelt. Elämä ja toiminta.* Otava: Helsinki. 1946, 117-130; Pirinen & Jutikkala 1996, 318-319, 320-325; Päivi Molarius, "Veren äänen" velvoitteet – yksilö rodun, perimän ja ympäristön puristuksessa. In *Uusi uljas ihminen eli modernin pimeä puoli.* Ed. Marja Härkämaa & Markku Mattila. Jyväskylä 1998, 95-97.

24 Pekka Hämäläinen, Suomenruotsalaisten rotukäsityksiä vallankumouksen ja kansalaissodan aikoina. In *Mongoleja vai germaaneja – rotuteorioiden suomalaiset.* Ed. Aira Kemiläinen. Historiallinen arkisto 86. Suomen historiallinen seura: Helsinki 1985, 409-415. Marjatta Hietala, Rotuhygienia. In *Mongoleja vai germaaneja – rotuteorioiden suomalaiset.*

Ed. Aira Kemiläinen. Historiallinen arkisto 86. Suomen historiallinen seura: Helsinki 1995. For a comprehensive study on the relations of class, language, and the civil war in Finland, see Pekka Hämäläinen, *Luokka ja kieli vallankumouksen Suomessa*. Historiallisia tutkimuksia 107. Helsinki 1978.

25 Tuija Aro, Suomalaisten rotu saksalaisissa ja pohjoismaisissa tietosanakirjoissa. In *Mongoleja vai germaaneja – rotuteorioiden suomalaiset*. Ed. Aira Kemiläinen. Historiallinen arkisto 86. Helsinki 1985, 195-208; Kemiläinen 1993, 168-183; Markku Mattila, Suomen ruotsinkieliset ja laadukkaamman väestön vaatimus. In *Uusi uljas ihminen eli modernin pimeä puoli*. Eds. Marja Härkämaa & Markku Mattila. Jyväskylä 1998, 117-136; Markku Mattila, *Kansamme parhaaksi. Rotuhygienia Suomessa vuoden 1835 sterilointilakiin asti*. Bibliotheca Historica 44. Suomen historiallinen seura: Jyväskylä 1999; Molarius 1998, 97-99, 110-111.

26 It is interesting to note that Professor Lille´s son, Axel Lille, became a radical advocate of the Swedish-minded movement, founder of the Swedish-minded party in Finland and he shared the ideas of the racial superiority of the Swedish-speaking Finns. Kemiläinen 1993, 149, 169, 217-218.

27 In the Faculty of Theology 1853-1868.

28 Hroch 1985, 75; Hobsbawn 1994, 27, 99, 117, 119.

29 Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood. Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge University Press 1997, 3, 12-13, 185-209.

30 HUL, Minutes of the Theological Student Body, Feb 7, 1853.

Jussi Kurunmäki

REDESCRIBING THE POLITICAL PAST

National Rhetoric in the Swedish debate concerning the Parliamentary Reform of 1866

Nation and Representation

In 1866, the political Estates in Sweden — the Nobility, Clergy, Burghers, and Peasants — gave way to a bicameral Diet in which both chambers were equal in power, but different in terms of their socio-economic composition.[1] In this article I analyse how the rhetoric of the "nation" and "national representation" was used against the political Estates in the debate over reform, i.e. how "the nation" was defined when the political nation based on the Estates was to be replaced with something new.[2] This leads me to examine the temporal commitments included in the debate, and especially the ways of the rhetorical redescription of the past that the main participants of the debate used in order to legitimise their different political goals.

A reform of political representation deals with questions concerning what and who are to be represented, and by what means. Since the French Revolution, the represented were viewed, in several European pro-reform campaigns, in terms of "the nation" as opposed to particular interests and privileges of Estates and orders. This led to a contest over the meaning of the term "the nation". The combina-

tion of the concepts "representation" and "nation" was first presented during the French Revolution by Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès who stated that a nation is "a body of associates living under *common* laws and represented by the same *legislative assembly*" (Sieyès 1963 [1789], 58). It has been possible to maintain that a nation is 'established' only after the creation of an independent representative body. The issue of national representation was, together with the "social problem", one of the main topics of the political debates during the era of European parliamentary reform (e.g. Podlech 1984, 509; Baker 1990, 244-246; Colley 1992, 336; Wokler 1998, 48-54).[3]

There was a lively debate on the issue of reform in newspapers, pamphlets, and the Estates. The Minister of Justice, Louis de Geer, who took the initiative and wrote the proposal for the reform, defended the need for reform by maintaining that "the changes in the nation and the changes of the times require changes to the form of representation" (e.g. Central-Komité 1864, 17). The question of whether or not to reform political representation was clearly a "national" matter in Sweden in the 1860s. As the pro-reform, "national liberal", journal *Politisk Tidskrift* argued, the reform dealt with "a political rebirth of the nation" (*Politisk Tidskrift* 3/1862 [1863], 138).[4] Those who opposed the Bill, in turn, often claimed that the proposal was not based on a national political tradition (e.g. KU 7 1863, 14-21; Nordström 1865, 90).[5]

The idea of creating a representative body based on a national gathering of individuals instead of the representation based on corporate privileges had already been discussed in 1809. The 1809 Instrument of Government and the Riksdag Act of 1810 were not "Swedish history translated into legal paragraphs", as has been maintained (Lagerroth 1942, III), but neither did they lead to the creation of "the young nation" that the radicals had hoped for (see Petterson 1993, 34). Radical proposals presented in the memorandum of the Committee on the Constitution in 1810 were defeated in 1815 (e.g. Hildebrand 1896, 629; Edén 1935, 229).

Despite some signs of the revolutionary idea of national representation in the 1860s it was of great importance for the political actors to be able to show that representation was based on the national tradition instead of "theories" and that the proposed new representation was in accordance with this tradition. It was, therefore, im-

portant for those participating in the debate to be able to give the tradition an appropriate meaning. To a considerable extent, the reform debate was about interpretations of the past. Swedish discussions of the political system and democratisation have usually referred, and often still refer, to the domestic political tradition (e.g. Premfors, 115-116).[6] The weight of the domestic tradition has not only been emphasised by *ex post facto* academic commentators, but also by contemporary political actors. Yet, the future of "the fatherland" was in question when the reform Bill was debated in the 1860s. And all this was to be decided upon at once, in the present. Consequently, there was also a question of timing involved in the debate. It was asked, whether the moment was right for reform. Different views regarding the nature of the domestic political tradition, the appropriateness of constitutional change and expectations for the future were combined together to shape the debate over parliamentary reform. It was of the utmost importance to be able to argue with "time". The past tense was the most important, for it was the ground for arguing in favour of, as well as against, the need for the reform. The future was dependent on the interpretation of the past, yet it was quite obvious that those who could argue convincingly with the demands of the future were in a better rhetorical position in the debate.

Parliamentary Reform, Rhetoric and Conceptual History

It has often been argued that the realisation of bicameral political representation and the replacement of the political Estates in 1866 was more or less a natural step in the course of political progress and a consequence of social changes. In other words, the Riksdag Act of 1866 has usually been interpreted as a necessary adjustment in line with socio-economic demands and foreign constitutional examples. According to this view, the Estates did not adequately represent the various interests in Swedish society, so they had to be reformed (e.g. Rexius 1915; Andrén 1937; Stjernquist 1996). Although I acknowledge the importance of socio-economic changes, the problem with

this manner of reasoning is that it often presents a story of progress which is linear and one-sided, and implies that there was only one direction for political actions at the time. Contrary to common understandings of the reform, I argue that the reform was neither an automatic consequence of the social and political demands of the time, nor an uncontested matter.[7] It is understandable that the necessity-line of explanation is so common because the political actors themselves often used this kind of rhetoric. However, it is striking that this kind of rhetoric has not been subjected to empirical analysis.

When we take political and social concepts as historical and always at least potentially contested (e.g. Koselleck 1972, XXII), we can better understand that political struggles were often, and still are, a matter of redefining what the question in dispute was. Concepts can be understood as "pivots around which all arguments turn" (Koselleck 1996, 65). Moreover, it should be noted that the concepts were to be recycled in order to make the argument understandable to other participants in the debate (cf. ibid., 63). This means that, in practice, certain interpretations of the concepts were picked up from history. Accordingly a synchronic analysis must be complemented with a diachronic analysis, i.e. with an analysis that scrutinises the concepts diachronically through time (see Koselleck 1972, XXI). This is why I take the reform debate as a matter of a rhetorical redescription in relation to the key concepts involved in the debate (cf. Skinner 1996, 138-180; Skinner 2002, 153-155, 182-187). Concepts like "representation" and "nation" were used in a rhetorical manner for partisan purposes and were produced by referring to their historical meanings.

It is possible to view the debate on political reform as a case for an "innovating ideologist" and an "apologist". The task of an "innovating ideologist" is to use linguistic conventions rhetorically in a manner that even a problematic or radical action can seem to be acceptable (Skinner 1988, 112; see also Skinner 1978, xii). It is an issue of a contest over meanings of concepts and, consequently, of potential conceptual changes. Because an "innovating ideologist" is supposed to use commonly accepted evaluative concepts, such a strategy seems moderate. This is why Skinner has stated that "every revolutionary is [...] obliged to march backwards into battle" (Skinner 1988, 112).[8]

While an "innovating ideologist" aims to change politics by applying commonly evaluated positive terms in a new way in order to bring about a change in the existing state of affairs, an "apologist" defends the existing system by describing it in favourably evaluative terms. In such cases, the purpose is to answer critics by applying a rival evaluative description to the same political system. Two conditions must then be fulfilled. Firstly, it must be plausible to apply the rival evaluative description; secondly, the description must be made with such commending terms that the unfavourable evaluations can be defeated or overruled. The commendatory force of the term used must also be strong enough. (Skinner 1973, 302-303).

Both an "innovating ideologist" and an "apologist" rhetorically redescribed the political situation. The task was, through this redescription, to re-evaluate the action that was proposed (cf. Skinner 1996, 145; Skinner 2002, 153-155, 182-187).[9] There are two ways of performing this redescription. One is to claim that the concept is misleadingly defined. The other is to claim that the concept is correctly defined but that the state of affairs, or the action in question, does not have the quality or character that the term alleges (Skinner 1996, 139-143). Thus, the contestedness of a concept can refer either to its meaning or its applicability. It is possible to assume that, for example, the concept of "patriotism" is evaluated and understood in a consensual manner, but there is a disagreement on its application. In other words, the question is not necessarily *about* "patriotism" but about who is allowed to speak *with* a "patriotic" voice. Given the centrality of the "nation" and "national" in the rhetoric, both an "apologist" and an "innovating ideologist" tried to describe the reform as corresponding to the national tradition of the country.

National Representation

The struggle for Parliamentary Reform in Sweden in the 1860s dealt with a redefinition of the polity, i.e. the political nation. "The nation" was used as a rhetorical tool in order to legitimise the need, or the lack of need, for the reform in the debates. There were two different,

yet not mutually exclusive, views of "representation" and "nation", the one that took as its point of departure the idea of nation-by-representation and the other that was based on the idea of representation-by-nation. We can call these views constructive and descriptive models of representation (see Jones 2000, 17) or aesthetic and mimetic views on representation (see Ankersmit 1996; 2002).

The concept of "national representation" often meant the current institution of political representation, in which case the Estates were included in the concept. This kind of use of the concept was common to both the supporters and opponents of the reform Bill. It was a part of the political tradition to speak about "national representation" without any overtly radical connotations. The supporters of the Bill sometimes used the term in such a manner. Despite the shortcomings of the body of representation it was, nevertheless, "national" in the meaning of "historical". (e.g. KU 7 1863, 21-22). The fact that the idea of the representation of provinces, as well as social interests, was believed to be outdated among many of the supporters of the Bill did not hinder the use of such a language.

However, there were those who supported the Bill and made a clear distinction between the current representation and "the national representation". "The national liberals", as they called themselves, often used the concept of "national representation" in a consciously revolutionary manner. "The national representation" in its "complete and valid sense" was something other than the representation based on the Estates or classes (*Politisk Tidskrift* 3/1861, 40). As mentioned earlier, a creation of a real "national representation" was also seen as "a political rebirth of the nation" (*Politisk Tidskrift* 3/1862 [1863], 138). This idea of nation-by-representation indicates a constitutive idea of nation and a constructive model of representation, according to which "the nation" was recreated by the political representation.

Thus, the Swedish national liberals joined the European tradition of political radicalism which took many of its ideals from the French Revolution. It was sometimes stated very explicitly. For example, Carl Fredrik Ridderstad, a national liberal politician and newspaperman, maintained that the French Revolution opened a new period after which there was no historical ground for representation (Protokoll, Borgare-Ståndet 3 1862-1863, 645 [Ridderstad]). This kind of radicalism was,

however, often combined with the common way of referring to the domestic political tradition. In particular, the idea of the coalition between the people and the kings was often repeated. (e.g *Politisk Tidskrift* 1/1860, 21-23, 53). This mixture of radicalism and traditionalism made the national liberal rhetoric appealing to a wide audience, but at the same time it watered down their radicalism.

The Estates abolished themselves in Sweden without having declared themselves a Constitutive Convention or a National Assembly. Unlike in France in 1830 and 1848, there was no revolutionary situation in Sweden. The Parliament Act of 1832 in Britain was, in turn, not a reform which had considerably changed the structure of political representation. In this light, the 1866 Riksdag Act was of a quite special character. The task of an "innovating ideologist" was, therefore, particularly demanding. His (sic) task was to use linguistic conventions rhetorically in a manner that even a radical action could be made to seem acceptable. Because the traditional Estates were to decide upon the Bill, it was necessary to appeal to tradition in order to legitimise the need for a thorough reform. Had there been a constitutive assembly, then, in principle, the legitimising power of tradition might have been of less importance.

The task of an "innovating ideologist" fell, first of all, upon the Minister of Justice, Louis de Geer. He had to convince the opponents of the Bill that the reform would be in accordance with tradition. Yet, simultaneously, he also had to demand great changes in representation. What he, and other supporters of the Bill, did was to use favourably evaluative-descriptive terms to legitimise the actions he proposed. He appealed to a language of organism in his defence of the Bill. Instead of the Estates or classes, the organism was now maintained by the municipalities which were included in the formation of the First Chamber. The rhetoric of "nation" and "patriotism" was also useful in this respect. (Central-Komité 1864, 26).

An "apologist" who opposed the Bill would try to describe the existing system in favourably evaluative terms. It was important to be able to argue convincingly that society and, as a consequence, the political institutions were organic in character. In principle, this was not a difficult task. The problem for an "apologist" was that there were different interpretations of what organic meant. It was important for an "apologist" to refer to the ancient freedom of the country

which was under serious threat if the Bill was passed. (e.g. Södergren 1865, 51-52). The opponents of the Bill also tried to play the role of an "innovating ideologist" by introducing the system of class elections as a substitute for the Estates. (e.g. Nordström 1865, 93). However, this attempt was neither new nor successful.

An "innovating ideologist" had more scope to use foreign examples than an "apologist". The opponents of the Bill did not have many inspiring examples outside their own domestic political tradition, whereas supporters of reform could draw upon Norway, with its unicameral *Stortinget*, and Denmark with its universal male suffrage. It was argued that Sweden should develop its parliamentary representation in line with that of other Scandinavian countries so as to improve the chances of a future union with them. (*Politisk Tidskrift* 3/1861, 54-55). Neither side in the debate wanted to refer to Napoleon's France or Bismarck's Prussia in the 1860s. The English political system offered some inspiration to both sides of the debate. For the supporters of the Bill, England was the model of modern parliamentary politics, although they did not openly argue for parliamentarism. They also directed some criticism towards the "aristocratic" – as it was referred to – House of Lords. (e.g. Preste-Ståndets Protokoll 3 1862-1863, 147 [Almqvist]). An "apologist", in turn, held that only England and Sweden had a constitution of ancient origin. (e.g. Preste-Ståndets Protokoll 3 1862-1863, 139 [Annerstedt]). However, the opponents of the Bill had difficulties in using England as an example in support of an organic understanding of the constitution, because it could also be used to support the very kind of parliamentary reform they sought to stop.

The Estates vs. the Nation

The task of an "innovating ideologist" was to redescribe the tradition in a manner which would show that the role of the political Estates needed to be reduced. It was important to argue that the Estates were not the original form of political representation. (e.g. Protokoll, Ridderskapet och Adeln 3 1862-1863. 211-212 [de Geer]). Even if the Estates had served the country well, as it was often held, it was

nevertheless necessary to maintain that they were outdated and actually divided the nation. An "apologist" tried to affirm that the Estates, the Nobility in particular, had often saved the country from foreign threats as well as from absolutism. The current dangers were parliamentary rule and democracy, and, as a consequence, the decreased power of the monarch. (e.g. KU 7 1863, 7).

Different interpretations of the Age of Liberty (1719—1772), the period of rule of the Riksdag and especially of the two parties within it, are of special interest in this respect. Both sides of the debate viewed it in a negative light. For the opponents of the Bill, it was a period of parliamentary rule and party divisions. The reason for these had been the lack of the separation of powers between the King and the Riksdag. The supporters of the Bill, in turn, considered the period as characterised by the rule of the Estates. (e.g. Protokoll, Bårgareståndet 3 1862-1863, 168 [Blanche]). Both sides viewed the absolutist regimes of the monarchs before and after the Age of Liberty with distaste. There was also consensus over the idea of the free and egalitarian origin of Sweden's political culture.

The rhetorical redescription of the meaning of the 1809 Instrument of Government and, in particular, the memorandum of the 1810 Committee on the Constitution was highly important. Both sides of the debate used the "men of 1809", who had formulated the Constitution, as their support. An opponent of the Bill argued that the Constitution of 1809 was based on the idea of the separation of powers which was in danger if the Bill was passed. The Riksdag Act of 1810, which preserved representation by Estates, was a natural consequence of the Instrument of Government, or so the argument went. As the basic idea of the constitution was commonly positively evaluated, the purpose of an "apologist" was to maintain that the existing political system was in accordance with the idea of the "men of 1809". (e.g. Södergren 1865, 70-71). For many supporters of the Bill, the rhetorical strategy was more complicated. The "men of 1809" were positively evaluated, the Riksdag Act of 1810 was not. The memorandum of the 1810 Committee on the Constitution, which stated that the Estates had divided the nation, was used to support the demands for the reform. (Central-Komité 1864, 6, 11). The "men of 1809" and the memorandum of 1810 were rhetorically associated with each other in order to show that the original idea of the "men of

1809" had been to abolish the political Estates. Thus there was a possibility to be critical of the Instrument of the Government while still considering the "men of 1809" as part of the appreciated tradition.

The opponents of the Bill argued constantly that it was based on foreign "theories" instead of the domestic tradition. (e.g. Protokoll, Ridderskapet och Adeln 3 1862-1863, 221 [Tersmeden]). In principle, the argument was powerful: hardly anyone wanted to publicly maintain that "theories" should replace the continuity of the political system. However, the opponents of the Bill also based their ideas of organism and continuity on foreign theories and echoes of Burke were clearly heard in their argumentation (e.g. Södergren 1865, 94-95). The supporters of the Bill referred to the Norwegian and Danish systems rather than to "theories" in order to avoid the label of "theorists". It was much better to argue using "public opinion" and "the demands of the times" than to present some theoretical patterns. It was important to find good examples in the domestic political past. The "men of 1809" and the memorandum of 1810, as well as the famous historian Erik Gustaf Geijer, who in the 1840s was the foremost promulgator of liberal ideas of free associations and the "principle of persons", were then of crucial importance. (de Geer 1865, 60). The political theorist who was used by both sides of the debate was Tocqueville, since his views on the inevitability of the progress of democracy, and his cautious attitude towards its consequences was well suited – selectively – for both sides of the debate. (de Geer 1865, 6-13; Preste-Ståndets Protokoll 1 1865-1866, 316-322 [Palmlund]).

For many of the opponents of the Bill, the concept of "freedom" was something that was inherited in the tradition. The passing of the Bill would jeopardise the existence of "freedom". The country was free because there was neither foreign oppression, absolutist rule, nor rule of the mob. The power of the masses was the worst threat imagined. (e.g. KU 7 1863, 28). Often the supporters of the Bill also appealed to the idea of inherited freedom. However, there were some exceptions. For example, *Politisk Tidskrift* questioned the general view that the Swedes were, or had been, free (*Politisk Tidskrift* 5/1862 [1863], 298). The radical opponents of the Bill, for example the newspapers *Söndagsbladet* and *Fäderneslandet*, which were close to workers' asso-

ciations, upheld rhetoric which also pointed out the lack of freedom in the country. (*Söndagsbladet* 14.5. 1865; *Fäderneslandet* 14.11.1863).

A New Nation?

The concept of "nation" was used in a manner which would suggest that the contest dealt with the ability to convincingly use the concept rather than to associate it with a radically new meaning. However, the concept of "nation" also gained several different interpretations. There are several examples of "the nation" being presented as opposed to the Estates and classes in the debate. It was argued that it should be "the nation" which would be represented in the Riksdag, not any particular classes or corporate interests (e.g. Preste-ståndets Protokoll 3 1862-1863, 146 [Almqvist]). The concept of "nation" was also associated with "the people" and contrasted with "caste interests" (*Politisk Tidskrift* 3/1861, 40). Moreover, the supporters of the Bill associated "the nation" with "the principle of persons". (e.g. Protokoll, Borgare-ståndet 3 1862-1863, 151 [Witt]). "The principle of persons" was in turn closely linked with "the principle of associations" which meant that "the nation" was considered as consisting of individual persons, who were gathered in free associations, which were formed without any limitations of Estate privileges. Following the "liberal" ideals these slogans expressed, "the nation" was also identified with "the public opinion". (e.g. *Politisk Tidskrift* 2/1862, 127).[10]

Among the opponents of the Bill, "the nation" was associated with "the King" and "the Estates" (e.g. Palmstierna 1865, 5). Most of them understood "the nation" as an organic whole. The conservative organic view of the nation was not necessarily in conflict with the views of the pro-reform side, since "the principle of associations" was understood as a transformed version of the idea of an organic togetherness, rather than opposed to it. Both sides of the debate usually took "the nation" to be the bearer of tradition and the unit which was based on common origin and experiences. However, this view was also criticised. For example, *Politisk Tidskrift* required "political life" within "the nation" and was critical towards the rhetoric of "originality" of "the nation". The argument was directed against "the histori-

cal school" in Sweden (*Politisk Tidskrift* 3/1861, 40). Here *Politisk Tidskrift* described "the nation" in terms of free political life instead of its originality. The periodical viewed "the nation" as having an aspect of voluntaristic characteristics instead of purely primordial ones. However, the interpretation did not deny the existence of the ancient nation, it simply stated that it had lost its original character.

The supporters of the Bill often spoke in the name of "the whole people" and "the public opinion". It was the unprivileged nation that ought to be the source of righteous representation. However, the pro-reform side was by no means free from the idea of the representation of interests. Despite their rhetoric of "persons" as well as their criticism of privileges, their rhetoric maintained a clear line of demarcation between the educated sections of society and the masses. In their view, giving representation to the interests of educated people was the best way to guarantee the representation of the interests of the whole. Moreover, the language of "interests" was used in order to legitimise the need for reform. For example, de Geer argued that new social interests made the Estates outdated (de Geer 1865, 60).

Citizens of Capacity and Property

The application of the system of census was difficult for the supporters of the Bill. To argue against privileges and, at the same time, for a system of census required considerable rhetorical skills. As with nineteenth-century liberals elsewhere, Swedish reformers used the idea of *citoyen capacitaire* to legitimise a restricted franchise. According to the argument made by Sieyès and other liberal theoreticians of political representation, the right to vote should be tied to property and income qualifications. The census was the best way to distinguish those who had the capacities to participate in political life from the uneducated and labouring masses. (e.g. Central-Komité 1864, 19). Capacity was most often equated with wealth. Thus, in practice, the idea of *citoyen capacitaire* was applied as *citoyen propriétaire*. The idea that the right to participate in the formation of political representation was reserved for "the politically thinking part of the nation" – as de Geer put it (ibid.) – was clearly a version of the idea of *citoyen capacitaire*.

Despite the general appeal to the representation of "the whole", the argument for a census was linked to the idea of representing different interests. Even de Geer admitted that "the basic principle of national representation" was limited to the representation of "the most important interests" of society. "The mobile element" of society was meant to be represented by the Second Chamber, "the lasting element" by the First Chamber. (Central-Komité 1864, 19-21). The 1863 Committee on the Constitution saw the proposed reform as being "in accordance with the times" because it followed the idea of "national representation without any other restrictions than" what was needed in order to give the society "a safe guarantee". This guarantee was ensured by the application of the census and the two chamber system. (KU 7 1863, 13).

The opponents of the Bill made a case against the inner contradiction of this kind of argument by asking how plausible the "liberal" principles were if the protagonists of reform did not dare to follow their central principle to the end? How could the proposed system achieve equality and speak in the name of "persons" when it was to be based upon "plutocratic" criteria? (Södergren 1865, 16-19). de Geer and other supporters of the Bill argued that the proposal was not plutocratic in character, but it contained necessary guarantees against "democracy" and the power of the uneducated masses (de Geer 1865, 52). Some radical national liberals clearly had difficulties with this balancing act. For example, *Politisk Tidskrift* and *Fäderneslandet* printed both supportive and critical arguments in their columns. It was partly a question of a rhetorical strategy – the purpose of which was to show some threats as well as to ask for more than what they realistically expected. Yet, it was also a sign of confusion. Sometimes the radical consequences of the Bill were presented in order to hide the scepticism of the radicals.

In fact, there was also opposition to the Bill from the 'left' of the political spectrum. Some radical papers gave the concept of "national representation" a pejorative meaning. For example, *Söndagsbladet* contrasted "national representation" with the "representation of the people" (*Söndagsbladet* 14.5.1865). In 1863, when it still was against the Bill, *Fäderneslandet* wrote that de Geer's proposal dealt with "plutocratic representation" rather than the "representation of the people" (*Fäderneslandet* 14.11.1863). The criticism these radical papers

voiced was on the fringes of the debate and was not a threat to de Geer or his Bill. However, it offered some arguments to conservative opponents of the Bill. It also showed the limits of "the national" in the national liberal rhetoric by replacing "nation" with "the people".

The Rhetoric of "Time", "Opinion" and "Patriotism"

The rhetoric of "time" played a crucial role in the struggle over reform. For example, the 1863 Committee on the Constitution maintained that the Bill was "in accordance with the times". *Politisk Tidskrift* argued in favour of progress and stated that "each and everyone who wants to go forward" should work for "the rebirth of the nation" (*Politisk Tidskrift* 1862 [1863], 138). Those who supported the Bill had "the time" on their side in terms of "horizon of expectations" (cf. Koselleck 1985, 272-279, 284). The concepts of "progress" and "public opinion" were linked with the concepts of "nation" and the "fatherland" in the rhetoric of the national liberals. The progress of civilisation had its expression in "public opinion" which demanded the reform.

The language of "time", "progress", and "public opinion" was problematic for the conservative opponents of the Bill. Accordingly, they had difficulties with the rhetoric of "patriotism", since the concept was closely linked with "public opinion" and "progress" in the pro-reform campaign. (e.g. *Politisk Tidskrift* 2/1862, 127) Some conservatives tried to appeal to "progress" in their defence of the existing system. An "apologist" tried to take the favourably evaluated "progress" on the side of the opponents of the Bill by stating that the progress of society in fact suggested that no drastic changes were needed. Progress would take care of the needed changes in the political system. (e.g. Preste-Ståndets Protokoll 3 1862-1863, 150 [Anjou]). In the 1860s, Swedish conservatives were in a similar position to that of the English Tories in the early 1830s: both displayed an inability to use "opinion" effectively (cf. Steinmetz 1993, 243-259, 291).

The supporters of the reform also referred to the domestic tradition. Thus, it cannot be concluded that "the space of experience"

would have lost its position as a crucial point of reference to "the horizon of expectations" (cf. Koselleck 1985, 272-279, 284). Rather, the supporters of the Bill had a wider arsenal of arguments due to their ability to speak more convincingly in terms of the future than those who were against the Bill, and who had problems with the concepts of "progress" and "public opinion". "The opinions of the twinkling of an eye" were described as "anti-Swedish" (Borgare-Ståndets protokoll I 1863, 462). It was also argued that "the wind of opinion" was to be stopped (Preste-Ståndets protocoll I 1865, 385-386). The opponents of the Bill had difficulty in creating a positively evaluated picture of the future. They tried to appeal to "progress", but they were unable to give it a new meaning which would have allowed them to create a convincing view of a better future. They were more or less forced to adjust and respond to "the demands of the times" without being able to question those demands.

The reform of 1866 was promulgated by using the rhetoric of necessity. It was argued that social changes, the progress of political ideas and constitutions in other countries, as well as "public opinion", all indicated the need for reform. Most of the participants in the debate had a strong sense of the inevitability of reform. "Public opinion" was not on the side of the opponents of the Bill. The concept of "public opinion" was often used in a manner that implied that it was beyond human actors. However, "public opinion" was actively created, and it can be viewed as a relevant audience for political life rather than just a kind of *Zeitgeist*. In this sense, the reform signifies the breakthrough of a new political culture in which it was necessary to appeal to "the public".

It was important for political actors to be able to speak in the name of "the fatherland". Those who supported the Bill were more successful in doing so. They were able to combine "patriotism" with concepts like "public opinion" and "time" and were thus able to imply a certain necessity in their demands. Those who were against the Bill were losing hold of "patriotism" primarily because they were not effective enough in using the rhetoric of "opinion" and "time".

Despite the ethos of togetherness as the elementary part of the rhetoric of "patriotism" the concept was contested. Different understandings of "patriotism" followed the inner tension within the history of the concept. In the republican tradition, "patriotism" re-

ferred to a political citizenship, civic virtues and laws. (e.g. Dietz 1989; Viroli 1995; Skinner 1992) However, it also carried within it loyal meanings, which were inspired by understandings of a real or mythological common origin and by meanings that come from a privileged hierarchy of society. (e.g. Dietz 1989; cf. Nordin 2000 and Ihalainen 2003 on patriotism in eighteenth-century Sweden). The national liberals had an explicitly political concept of "patriotism", but this political civic patriotism was often combined with an ethos of natural togetherness. (e.g. *Politisk Tidskrift* 1/1860, 8-9). The ethos of togetherness, combined with social and educational paternalism, had a tendency to override intended political aspects. This is one of the reasons why the rhetoric of patriotism can be said to have played an important role during the debates on the Bill. One could show respectability by using the rhetoric of patriotism. This way one could limit the politicising potential of the reform. The old was to be reformed, not left out.

The national liberal idea of "fatherland" was based more on a paternalistic social implication, than on an idea of a political citizenship (cf. Rosanvallon 1994). Potentially radical political consequences were taken back and made harmless. After the question of political representation was solved, the national liberals began to lose their grip on the concepts of "nation" and "patriotism". Before the reform the national liberals were able to use the question of an unsolved representation in their national cause, but the patriotism they had wanted to show had not allowed them to distance themselves from the moderate reform. After the reform the national liberals presented more radical demands, but these were then presented in a marginal position. Accordingly, it has not been common to call Sweden after 1866 "the new nation". August Strindberg, who was also an excellent political observer, named his satire about the Era of Oscar II *Det nya riket*, "The New Empire", in 1882 (Strindberg 1992 [1882]).

Conserving Reform

The Swedish Parliamentary Reform of 1866 can be viewed as a conservative strategy. Often political reforms are motivated by a con-

servative desire to avoid uncontrollable changes in the future. The reform act of 1866 tried to safeguard the principles of the 1809 Instrument of Government. Formally, the reform did not touch upon the existing separation of powers. Even the most radical supporters of the Bill were relatively quiet about parliamentarism. However, the 1866 Riksdag Act has been interpreted as a crucial step towards parliamentarism. As has been correctly noted, annual sessions of the Riksdag changed the rhythm of political life. (e.g. Verney 1957, 125). Although the debate on the reform dealt, to a large extent, with the past and tradition, the present became a more important point of reference than it had been before.

By analysing the rhetoric of "the nation" in the Swedish reform of political representation, it is possible to argue that the reform marked an important point in the formation of the modern nation-state. The Estates lost their formal political status. The King did not become as weak as the opponents of the reform Bill thought. However, the centre of political power changed. Even if the constitution was not formally changed, and even if there was no parliamentary rule after the reform, the old power of the King and the Estates was undermined. When the Estates were no longer represented in the Riksdag, something new replaced them. Often this new entity was referred to in terms of the "nation". Consequently, this change can be viewed as a sign of the formation of a modern nation-state. As the Estates before, the "nation" that was represented by the Riksdag was exclusive in character. The "masses", including women, were excluded from the "political nation". Moreover, it was more or less defined in terms of a common origin and common tradition. The deliberative potential that was involved in the reform of political representation did not actualise as the "nation" was understood exclusively and traditionally rather than politically.

Notes

1 The destiny of the Government's reform Bill was in the hands of the Noble Estate who voted for the Bill on December 7, 1865. The Burghers and the Peasants had already given their support to the Bill, the Clergy waited for the Nobility. According to the 1866 Riksdag Act, the suffrage

was limited by a high census in the case of the Second Chamber, and by even higher tax and property qualifications in the First Chamber. Only about six per cent of the population, about 20 per cent of the adult male population, were able to partake in Parliamentary elections. The election was joint and direct to the Second Chamber, indirect to the First Chamber, which was elected by the Provincial Councils and by the representatives of the larger towns. Only 6000 men were eligible to be candidates for the First Chamber.

2 For a more extensive analysis, see Kurunmäki 2000.

3 This relationship between "representation" and "nation" is not solid and unchanging, as noted by Hanna Pitkin: "The history of representative government and the expansion of the suffrage is one long record of changing demands for representation based on changing concepts of what are politically relevant features to be represented. The nation is not like a geographic area to be mapped – solidly there, more or less unchanging, certainly not changed by the map-making process." (Pitkin 1967, 87).

4 The concept of "liberalism" as well as "liberal" was commonly used yet contested in Sweden in the middle of the nineteenth century (see Liedman 1995, 35-37, 45). The French word "libéral" was translated into Swedish as "generous" (*frikostig*) and "libéralité" as "equality" (*jämlighet*) in 1808. In 1809, "liberal" was used in order to denote the political group behind the new constitution. To be "liberal" meant first of all that one was willing to give up the privileges of the Estate. The concept was linked with the ideas of equality before the law, and the separation of powers in a constitutional manner reminiscent of Montesquieu. "Liberal" and "constitutional" were often used as synonyms (Thomson 1926, 153-154, 169-174, 185-186). It was the fraction of Spanish constitutionalists who introduced the term "liberal" as a party label to European use during the first decade of the nineteenth century (Vierhaus 1982b, 751; Liedman 1995, 35). In Sweden, "liberal" became commonly used in the 1820s and 1830s. It meant the opposition to the King and, moreover, ideas which were imported from English and French political life by papers like *Argus* and *Stockholms Courier* (Andersson 1917, 58-63; Hellqvist 1980, 571). *Aftonbladet*, a newspaper founded in 1830, became the flagship of "liberalism" in the country. It was against political and economic corporations, and according to it "the social question" was best answered by voluntary associations. (e.g. Christensen 1997, 26-31).

5 The concept of "conservatism" was a neologism and a counter concept to "liberalism", "democracy", and "radicalism" at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Vierhaus 1982a, 531-541, 562-564). During the

first half of the nineteenth century, it was more common to claim that one was "a true liberal" instead of "a conservative" (Heckscher 1939, 88-89). Characteristic to "conservatism" was an organic view on society and state, as well as traditionalism and anti-individualism (e.g. Elvander 1961, 5-14; Tingsten 1939, 11-19, 94).

6 Against this background the role of foreign impulses behind constitutional and parliamentary reforms has been an issue of some controversy. Especially in the case of the constitution of 1809 there has been much scholarly debates on its possible Montesquieuan features. The reform of 1866 has been associated mainly with the bicameral model as formulated by Tocqueville (e.g. Rexius 1915).

7 The idea can be formulated as follows: "Inversely, inasmuch as the extension of the franchise in Western Europe in the course of the nineteenth century was achieved in a fairly gradual and peaceful manner, the temptation is to think that opposition to that process was not particularly strenuous. Nothing could be farther from the truth". (Hirschman 1991, 20).

8 In a later article Skinner has radicalised his rhetorical view and stated that there is no standard meaning in evaluative terms (Skinner 1999, 67). In my mind, this radicalisation does not water down the task of "an innovating ideologist", rather it makes it more open. In the minds of contemporary actors, there are always more correct and more illegitimate uses of concepts. This does not deny the point that 'correct' uses of concepts are ideological in character, yet some uses are more easily acceptable for contemporaries than others. Nevertheless, an "innovating ideologist" needs to be skilful in her/his rhetoric.

9 Skinner writes about description and re-evaluation: "We simply replace whatever descriptions our opponents may have offered with a different set of terms that serve to describe the action with no less plausibility, but place it at the same time in a different moral light. We seek to persuade our hearers to accept our redescription, and hence to adopt a new emotional attitude towards the action involved – either one of increased sympathy or acquired moral outrage." (Skinner 1996, 145).

10 "The principle of persons" (*personlighetsprincipen*) together with "the principle of associations" (*associationsprincipen*) were set against the privileges which were understood in terms of the Estates, the guilds, the state, and the bureaucracy. In the middle of the nineteenth century, "liberals" were both protagonists of the right to create free associations, and opponents of the economic restrictions that the state had in economic life (e.g. Nilsson 1988, 17). The new political language that emerged during the first half of the nineteenth century was linked with new political and social practices which emerged at the same time. Voluntary

associations, public meetings and banquets as well as "liberal" newspapers were examples of them. "Public opinion" was viewed as the forum, the result, as well as the primary subject of the new public life. (cf. Johannesson et al. 1987; Jansson 1985).

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Pasi Saukkonen

THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF DIFFERENCE

The purpose of this essay is to analyse politics from a special point of view which will be called *the political organisation of political, economic and cultural difference* (cf. Koenis 1997).[1] The political organization of difference can be considered as a special case of any social organization of difference (cf. Barth 1969), a case in which the political is defined by the central role of *state institutions* in the organization of difference within the context of a *society*.

Nevertheless, despite the recognition of the salience of the state institutions, politics is not being considered as a sphere or a sector but rather, in an Aristotelian-Arendtian manner as *a special form of activity* which is directly related to the human condition of plurality and diversity (cf. Arendt 1998). The political organization of difference is, in turn, not a state of affairs or a special content in politics. Rather, it can be conceived as an inevitable and never-ending process the limits of which could be presented as follows: the political organization of difference comes to an end where physical *violence* starts (the end of politics), and where *anarchy* or *laisser-faire* prevails (the end of organization).

This essay is devoted to the theoretical and conceptual exploration of what the political organisation of difference means, what are its key concepts and to some suggestions how national cases can be analysed and evaluated empirically. Our aim is not to provide the reader with a sophisticated theory on the political organization of difference but rather to offer analytical tools for empirical analysis of modern Western societies. The main objective is to mark out the limits of the political organization of difference and to demonstrate the main components and fields of action. In the end, some illustrations are made by referring to the political organization of difference in Finland.

Political, Economic and Cultural Differences

The political organisation of political, economic and cultural differences has always been a principal task in any society. A society is a territorially demarcated large social unit which demands developed power structures in order to function as a whole. These power structures, in turn, mean that even in a democratic society, there are *political differences* between those who have a better access to power positions and those who lack full power resources. Furthermore, societies contain *economic differences* between those who have control over the means of production and who are well-off in a more general sense and those who are without or wanting material resources and welfare. Finally, societies are *culturally heterogenous* because it is practically unavoidable for a society not to contain any cultural cleavages whether they are defined linguistically, religiously, or in a sociological-anthropological sense as values, norms, habits or ideals.

The differences within a society can be assumed to become politically relevant when they are socially organized. The social organization of difference takes place when relatively stable and permanent social groups and categories are being formed on the basis of differences which unite the members of the group or category and distinguish them from others. In other words, the political organization of difference becomes necessary when social and collective identities are constituted on differences in politics, economy or culture.

A *society* is thus an internally heterogeneous social unit, in contrast to *communities* which can be considered as (relatively) homogeneous groups. Here we are following John Rawls, for whom a community is characterized by comprehensive views, conceptions of "the good life", whereas a society is by definition diverse (Rawls 1993; cf. Margalit 1998). From this point of view, it is important to point out that many local settings often referred to as "communities" are in fact societies because of their inherent multicultural character, complex system of administration and advanced division of labour. London is definitely a society whereas Iceland could be considered a community. The so-called international community is, needless to say, a *contradictio in terminis*.

Furthermore, the differences within a society can be divided between major and minor ones. *Major political differences* mean, in an extreme case, that an individual, a group or a social category has absolute power to decide on public matters whereas the rest of population lacks all public power. We can, however, think ourselves major political differences also in a less polarized system. This can be the case, for example, if the power relations within a society are clearly biased and if the ruled are not able to change the rulers without overthrowing the whole political system. A democracy, in turn, is a political system which is supposed to contain only *minor political differences*. That is, the political decision-makers are restricted by the rule of law, the limits of public power are constitutionally defined and the ruled have an opportunity to replace the rulers in free and genuine elections. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to consider public power as equally divided among all citizens even in a democracy. Furthermore, the distance in terms of power between the rulers and the ruled can increase or decrease as a result of domestic or international development or of intentional action or unintended consequences.

Major economic differences can be imagined to exist especially in circumstances where the means of production are very centralized or if some social groups or categories are excluded from the right to own the means of production. No doubt, the distribution of wealth in a society can also be characterized as producing major differences if some members of the society are immensely rich whereas some others are living in poverty or even in starvation without any hope

for the better. Again, in modern Western societies, the economic differences are expected to be *of the minor type*: everyone has the right to own capital and means of production, the freedom to decide what she or he does with his/her material and economic resources and the opportunity for social mobility upwards on the social-economic ladder. Nevertheless, the differences, i.e. social-economic inequalitities are ubiquitous, and the economic relations differ both from country to country and from time to time.

The same goes, *mutatis mutandis*, for cultural differences, even though a bit more specification is necessary here. *Linguistically*, major differences exist when people cannot communicate verbally with each other, whereas minor differences can be observed between dialects and languages close to each other. *In terms of religion and morals*, we can also speak of major differences between religions where the concept of God or the conception of the good life are clearly different, as is, for example, between Christian and Hindu religions. Minor differences then exist between denominations within the same religion as between the Catholic and the Protestant Christianity or between Shiite and Sunnite Muslims. Certainly, the demarcation lines between major and minor differences are always difficult to draw, and probably nowhere is this more apparent than when culture is at stake. Nevertheless, the division is practical as an analytical device.

All sources of social difference can contribute to the production of *social inequality*. This is most obvious in the fields of political and economic difference, albeit it is possible to think that a difference does not yet mean serious structural inequality, for example, if the differences are small enough or if the positions can turn over in a reasonable time. On the other hand, even cultural differences can produce inequality. This is the case, firstly, if the system of meanings within a culture contains conceptions which put members of one cultural community clearly in favour of another causing, for example, humiliation or other social mistreatment on grounds of ethnic or cultural difference.

The second point is probably even more relevant for our purposes. Cultural differences form a part of structural inequality when cultural categories coincide with political and/or economic difference, thus producing a stratified society. In extreme cases, there can be a culturally unified power elite which differs from the rest of population po-

litically, economically and culturally or there can be cultural minorities which are politically marginalised and socioeconomically deprived.

In principle, we may suppose that major differences are more likely to produce inequality and, in turn, social instability and political tensions rather than minor ones but, in practice, the relationship is not quite as clear. Especially when considering cultural differences, history provides us with lots of cases where fine differences have led to strong commitment among members and persistent confrontations between adversaries. In addition to the above mentioned mutual links between various dimensions of difference and the specific characteristics in local settings and histories, the subjective perception and judgment also have to be taken into account. Thus, inequalities indeed exist if people perceive it so, to paraphrase W.I. Thomas, irrespective of if the differences in wealth, for instance, could be considered as minor ones in a larger international comparison.

The Levels and Dimensions of the Political Organization of Difference

As mentioned above, the political organization of difference can be considered as one of the main tasks in any society. It has indeed been one of the classical questions in political theory, at least from Plato onwards: how to manage and control the social problems, tensions and conflicts which arise from the fact that some have more power than others, some are more prosperous than others and not everyone understands each other or otherwise does not belong to the same ethnic or national community.

Therefore, any large and internally divided human group has to solve, one way or another, which structures of difference and their manifestations are tolerated, which are favoured or supported and which are restricted or prohibited and how the problems, tensions and conflicts that emanate from structural differences are negotiated or otherwise managed. The history of political thought is full of different, more radical or more moderate proposals about how to organize diversity and plurality and political history is, in turn, full of examples about how these ideas have been put into practice.

The range of possibilities in the political organization of difference reaches from utopian and revolutionary forms of political theory and practice (like the communist, national socialist and religious fundamentalist ideological literature and totalitarian political systems) through more moderate means and objectives in modern Western circumstances (like the ideas on liberal democracy or multiculturalism or the construction of a Nordic welfare state, the Swiss and Belgian federal systems and the decision upon the British devolution) and to piecemeal or incrementalist policies to increase or decrease popular participation in political decision-making, to strive for social equality, to organize the relations between cultural groupings or to relieve restrictions upon immigration, just to mention a few.

Even though state institutions have been put at the centre of the political organization of difference, an exclusively state-centred institutional analysis would not produce a sufficient picture of the situation within the society as a whole. We shall here enlarge the focus by adding the *collective and individual levels of political action* in order to take the civil society and the citizens' relationship to the state into account. In a representative democracy, political leadership is at least partly determined by democratic elections where citizens have a chance to change the rulers. Political activity is, in turn, for the most part channelled into the so-called political forces: parties, trade organizations, market forces, the media and many kinds of voluntary organizations which play a role in the political organization of difference.

Furthermore, we shall complement *the traditional focus* on political processes within political institutions by paying attention to the *symbolic dimension* of organization of difference within a society (cf. Cohen 1985). The notion of a society that political decision-making is based on cannot be taken for granted as knowledge shared without objection by everyone. In fact, ideas on the nature of the society, on its internal structure, its external differentiation and its history, in short, on its identity, are always contested even in the most consensual society.

Nor are these notions invariable, but in a constant process of reproduction. This reproduction takes place in the form of a wide range of textual and visual representations of the social reality ranging from literature to documentary films and scientific reports. In the symbolic representation of a society, reality is always being fabricated: one makes choices what to present and how, one makes interpretations, com-

ments, explains, evaluates and so on. It is this imperfect, man-made nature of representation that gives the symbolic dimension in the organization of difference a clear political function (cf. Leerssen 1991).

In the formation of a collective identity, there is also power involved, for example, in the setting of criteria for who belongs to the group (inclusion/exclusion) and who does not, in the production of structures of expectations concerning normality and traditionality and in the constitution of grounds and arguments for social hierarchy. All these, in turn, get extra strength in the context of a society from the connection with state institutions. (Cf. Anttonen 1996.)

As a result, the political organization of difference can be considered as taking place on six fields: on two dimensions, traditional and symbolic, each divided into three levels (Table 1). Firstly, on the *systemic or macro level* (Field 1), the political institutions of the state affect the structures of difference by legislation, through the distribution of resources and through targeted administrative, economic or cultural policies. Secondly, on the *collective or meso level* (Field 2), the political forces within the civil society (parties, interest organizations, NGO's, media) reflect the structures of difference and also as social actors aim at influencing the structures of difference and the state policies. Thirdly, on the *individual or micro level* (Field 3), the political culture consists of orientations towards and predispositions to (conceptions, values, attitudes and ideals) the structures of difference and the political organization of difference (cf. Kavanagh 1972).

The fourth, fifth and sixth fields of the political organization of difference belong to the *symbolic* (or cultural) activity which can be conceptually situated under the denominator of a *nation-state identity* (cf. Saukkonen 1999). The nation-state identity is here understood as a system of meanings which makes a state a nation-state, reflecting both the structural basis of a society and the hopes and expectations concerning the social structure. On the *systemic or macro level*, the nation-state identity is represented by the state identity and its institutional production under the auspices of state authorities (Field 4). Furthermore, the identity of the nation as a social group and the various conceptions of the nation within the civil society are located on the *collective or meso level* (Field 5). Finally, the identification of an individual to his/her nation and state coincides with the *micro level of individual thinking and doing* (Field 6).

	Traditional dimension	Symbolic dimension
Systemic level	**Field 1. State institutions** – create, maintain and change the social structures of difference and their reciprocal relations through legislation, targeted policies and the distribution of economic resources.	**Field 4. Identity of the state** – reflects the structures of difference and the values, attitudes and ideals concerning those structures in representations of the state, nation and society produced, subsidized or authorized by the state.
Collective level	**Field 2. Political forces of the civil society** – reflect the structures of difference and try to affect those structures – both react to the political organization of difference by the state institutions and respond to the hopes, expectations and claims from the grassroots level.	**Field 5. Identity of the nation** – contains conceptions and descriptions of the national (or ethnic) community and its relation to the state produced directly or indirectly by the collective actors in the civil society: e.g. political parties, voluntary associations, cultural communities.
Individual level	**Field 3. Political culture** – contains orientations towards and predispositions to the structures of difference and the political organization of difference by state authorities and civil society actors.	**Field 6. Individual's national identification** – contains cognitive, affective and evaluative relations between the individual and the national community (nation) and the political unit (state).

Table 1. The dimensions, levels and fields of the political organisation of difference

We can also supplement the conceptualization by understanding it as a political system. In practice, the political organization of difference consists of a chain of events and actions, in which individual, collective and institutional actors react to the prevailing structural conditions, changes in those conditions and activities on the same or other fields of levels of the society. Furthermore, on the whole we can assume that the political organization of difference within a society is partly determined by the relations to the most relevant external actors like neighbouring states, and, in turn, changes in those relations or in the whole international system affect the political organization of difference within a society.

In the case of a Western nation-state, the state institutions can be thought of as organizing plurality from a top-down perspective with intentional objectives and using the repertoire of political instruments to execute political plans and programs ("outputs"). The individual-based political culture, in turn, produces "bottom-up" hopes, demands, claims and expectations ("inputs"), which find their direct expression in the electoral process when citizens have a chance to choose on the political market between different conceptions of reality and action proposals for the future.

Political parties have a prominent role in this process as an intermediary level between the state and the citizens functioning both upwards and downwards. Nevertheless, various other organizations, associations, corporations, social networks, media and public mass events are also important in the political organization of difference. These collective actors and events receive and compile claims and expectations from below and articulate them to the state level. Conversely, they filter and sometimes even execute political decisions at the basic level of social life.

Outline of the Historical Development

As mentioned above, the political organization of difference can be considered as a classic problem in social and political theory. We shall now briefly pay attention to the development of structures of difference within the Western European states and to the political thinking related to that development.

The political-administrative system in *premodern Europe* consisted of numerous overlapping authorities and regions without the juridical conceptions of territorial governance, sovereignty or citizenship in the contemporary meaning. The political entities lacked clear borders and the arrival and departure of people was practically unhindered – even though in practice mobility among lay people was scarce with the exception of migration waves due to catastrophes like famine or the settlement policies by the ruler. Latin was the lingua franca among the educated class irrespective of their place of origin or nationality. Social status was based on a divine order which dictated for everybody his and her place and role and rights and duties in the totality. Catholic Christianity was the only accepted religion, heretics were persecuted and heathens were converted.

This complex but still relatively stable system started to crumble in Western Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. Simultaneously, the modern notion of a state as a territorially defined public space began to emerge with Thomas Hobbes as the most prominent political philosopher. The rulers tried to incorporate their possessions and to extend their authority to the whole territory and the people inhabiting it.

The notion of *territoriality* began to emphasize contiguity, effective authority, defined limits and public space. Furthermore, the territory started to gain sanctity which it had previously lacked whereas the divine basis of political rule gave way to more rationalistic and secular argumentation of the sources and foundations of social hierarchy and political power. The territorial definition of a state also brought about the modern concept of citizenship, because, thanks to borders and the notion of nationality, those who belonged to the state and to the ruler could now be much more effectively separated from those who did not. Economic development brought about the rise of the bourgeoisie as a social class which, in turn, increased the attention paid to civic rights and duties, economic relations and political liberties. In political philosophy, most apparently in Locke, this showed itself as a quest for the optimal political system to guarantee the greatest possible freedom for individuals to pursue their interests and to protect them from the harm caused by mutual competition.

The development of a territorially organized national state thus increased the relevance of the political organization of difference because the population under political rule became more precisely defined than previously was the case and because the bulk of population grew in importance economically and militarily.

A third element which also reached new heights in the modern era was the increase in cultural difference as the *Reformation* destroyed the unchallenged supremacy and unity of the Catholic church and also brought about the rise of vernacular languages as the main media of communication instead of Latin as a *lingua franca* in Protestant regions. The Augsburg Treaty (1555) declared the ruler had the right to decide upon religious freedom or its absence in his territory (*cuius regio, eius religio*) which also means that the emphasis of the political organization of religious difference shifted from the church to the secular government.

Nationalism, in turn, stressed the importance of cultural, especially linguistic unity. In the established states, nationalism mainly took the form of a top-down (*staatsnationaal*) ideology which strengthened the relationship between the citizens and the dominant national culture of the state through education and other media, with history, geography, linguistics and the arts at its core. This process was assisted by the overall modernization of societies which increased mobility within the national territory thanks to new vehicles as the train; the knowledge and consciousness of the nation as a social entity thanks to such modern media as the newspaper and consolidated the state-individual relation thanks to systematic taxation of property and income and a conscripted army. Contrary to that state-led nationalism, for the state-seeking nationalism which aspired for the establishment of an independent state, the nation-to-come had to be defined. This definition was usually made on the grounds of language which also accentuated the need for cultural unity within a political unit thus producing a *volksnationaal* concept of the nation.

During the political turmoils related to the First World War, the Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires collapsed almost simultaneously producing a large number of new states mainly in Central Europe. Since then, and especially when nationalism had been discredited as an ideology after the Second World War, most attention in political theory turned to the political and economic

dimensions of organizing difference. According to Sven-Erik Liedman (1977, 234), the political debate concentrated on two themes: on the organization of political life, that is, on the question of state form, and on the relationship between economic and social development. Instead of organizing a multitude of differences, politics seemed to be reduced to a rather limited range of issues and spheres of activity.

In spite of national variations, the Western European model of the political organization of difference seemed to have found a final solution. This solution combined the sovereignty of the people understood as representative democracy, the market economy together with advanced social security arrangements and the national state, supplemented with the protection of minorities.

For some, the development seemed to make political imagination superfluous. Daniel Bell's *End of Ideology* was published as early as in 1960 and the years to come witnessed a lot of books analysing political life after the Utopia. When the state-socialist system collapsed after the newest European *annus mirabilis*, in 1989, the victory of liberal democracy seemed final and global. In 1992, Francis Fukuyama presented his thesis on the end of history understood as the end of ideological conflict, as a remarkable consensus had developed in the world concerning the legitimacy and viability of liberal democracy which remains, along with market principles, the only truly world historically significant course of development.

The last few years have, however, activated the classical questions anew. The reality is full of new problems which seem to need urgent solutions. Politically, the emergence of supranational institutions, with the European Union as the primary example, has generated political reorganization in the post-state context where decision-making has shifted both upwards and downwards from the more or less democratically ruled national institutions. Economically, the neoliberal reforms in the 1980's and 1990's have altered the relationship between politics and economy, and the economic inequality between the rich and the poor has increased as well as the consciousness of this inequality which manifests itself both on the global scale and on the local scale in European cities and heartlands. The literature dealing with these issues seems to be blooming, witnessing that at least until now intellectual life does not resemble that self-satisfied "dog's life" which Fukuyama had envisioned.

From the point of view of the political organization of difference, however, the most essential change has been the return of culture and identity to the focus of political considerations. There are many reasons for this of which suffice it to mention the general fragmentation and individualisation of post-industrial societies, the demands of traditional minorities for more recognition, autonomy and resources, the new immigrant communities as a result of guest workers' permanent residence and the seemingly uncontrollable migrations of refugees.

Some authors have even proposed that culture, instead of politics or economy, will be the main source of social conflict in the future. According to the much debated thesis of Samuel P. Huntington (1993, 22), "the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural". Even though his main ideas have been quite efficiently rejected as overly simplistic, he has also been credited for paving the way for the development of a more sophisticated and politically sensitive cultural analysis (cf. Heiskanen 2000a; 2000b).

In our approach, culture will be taken seriously as a factor influencing social and political life but not as an inevitable source of problems and conflicts. As the starting point of the analysis is that all modern societies are unavoidably multi-cultural by nature, it would be futile, indeed very pessimistic, to see culture in that light only – quite as useless as the notion of cultural pluralism as an exclusively positive feature. We stress the importance of analysing more carefully the cultural structures of difference and the political organization of those structures in different national settings in order to draw lessons of good practice as well as of bad experiences. More specifically, attention should be paid to the transition from difference to inequality and particularly to the cases where cultural cleavages are being reinforced by political and economic divisions. In this essay, we have endeavoured at developing a modest conceptual tool kit for empirical analyses. This project will now be continued below.

Descriptive and Evaluative Analysis

The concepts presented above (the dimensions, levels and fields of the political organization of difference) make a systematic descriptive analysis of different national cases possible. The analysis can, for example, start by focussing on the examination of the existing structures of difference and their historical development. Secondly, the relations between political, economic and cultural differences can be more carefully analysed. Thirdly, the analysis can be focused on the above mentioned six fields of the political organization of difference and the relationship between different fields. (Cf. McRae 1984; 1986; 1999.)

This stepwise analysis of national cases enables comparative studies between states and also examinations of the pressures generated by new challenges to traditional forms of the political organization of difference. All national models are historically and culturally developed under specific conditions and over a long period of time. No two countries are alike in terms of social structures and political institutions even within the relatively homogenous category of Western democracies. Therefore, it can be expected that there exists a diversity of national experiences and that nations are unevenly equipped to face new tasks and challenges. Furthermore, it needs to be accentuated that it is difficult to imagine a theoretical model which would consist of positive features and consequences only and which could be exported and applied to other societies without much adjustment.

In sum, descriptive analyses on the political organization of difference, especially in a comparative setting, can be imagined to produce valuable information for contemporary discourses on historical nation-building and the emergence of the multicultural society, for example. However, our analysis also strives at reaching an evaluative level by pointing out the most important advantages and disadvantages in the national models (cf. Kymlicka & Norman 2000, 15). Below, we shall present some conceptual instruments for the evaluation of the political organization of difference. These should nevertheless be considered only as preliminary findings of a research just started rather than as final achievements.

On a very general level, we can agree with Colin H. Williams (1998, 207) who has defined the watchwords of open society as redistributive social justice, participatory democracy and mutual tolerance. This definition is not, however, very practical for comparative empirical purposes. On the one hand, it is still too vague and would require much conceptual elaboration. On the other hand, it can be easily taken as a remote ideal, but none of the historical or contemporary national cases fulfill its criteria in a strict sense.

Here, we shall apply another approach which focuses on the negative side-effects or consequences of the political organization of difference rather than on the positive outcomes – without renouncing the basic idea that all models have at least some favourable implications for some members of the society. It is, nevertheless, easy to agree with Avishai Margalit (1998, 4) who has said that: "... there is a weighty asymmetry between eradicating evil and promoting good. It is much more urgent to remove painful evils than to create enjoyable benefits."

Furthermore, it is important to recognize that in the case of complex contemporary societies, a single-minded aspiration for some theoretical ideal only could be fatal for another field of activity or even for the foundation for the existence or functioning of the society. The political organization of difference is, as any politics, essentially like sailing between Scylla and Charybdis. A modern state should be able to maintain and enhance, in political terms, democratic participation while sustaining effectively functioning decision-making institutions. In economic terms, it should avoid both strident social injustice and the loss of competitive productivity. And culturally, while the human suffering that derives from intolerance and persecution should, of course, be evaded, the lack of social cohesion and solidarity may in some circumstances form a real threat for the society.

We can divide the evaluative focus into three specific target areas: pain spots, problem areas and internal tensions (Table 2). With *pain spots* we mean the situation where two or more dimensions of difference become entangled, and particularly when the result is some kind of a cultural division of labour or politics. In an extreme case at the top-level, the pain spot may contain a Marxist *"ruling class"* or a Millsian *"power elite"* when a political or economic elite can be con-

sidered as culturally or ethnically homogeneous and excluding large parts of the society. At the bottom-level, the pain spot may consist of a "*fourth world*" within a society, in an extreme case of a group or groups which are politically marginalised, economically pauperized and culturally isolated and despised.

With *problem areas* we mean the difficulties the society is facing in the political organization of one or more dimensions of difference, either political, economic or cultural. Firstly, there might be political problems which in the one extreme manifest as a *participation deficit* when a smaller or larger amount of the members of the society are voluntarily or involuntarily excluded from political participation, and in the other extreme as a *functional deficit* when the decision-making capacity of the political system becomes endangered because of over-participation and the lack or disability of coordinating power. Secondly, there might be economic problems which in the one end contain an *equality deficit*: great inequalities between the prosperous and the poor, and in the other end, an *efficiency deficit*: weak economic productivity because of the absence of personal and collective incentives to improve one's situation. Thirdly, there might be cultural problems which, on the one hand, can be characterized as an *inclusion deficit* when one or more ethnic or cultural groups are not practically recognized as full members of a society, and on the other hand, as a *cohesion deficit* when the pursuit for autonomy among the members of cultural communities is greater than their solidarity towards the society as a whole.

With *internal tensions* we are referring to the imbalance or lack of congruence between the societal areas of the political organization of difference, i.e. between the state institutions, the civil society, the political culture and the nation-state identity. An imbalance may in principle occur in several forms, of which here it suffices to mention three examples which can be considered as most important in modern Western societies. Firstly, we can speak of a *symbolic problem* if the political organization of difference otherwise functions in a satisfactory manner but the nation-state identity is culturally exclusive. This tension easily produces a dual citizenship: the formal one which is attained through the judicial process and the symbolic one which is much more difficult to reach if one does not belong to one or more of the ethnic or cultural communities which are counted as corner-

stones of the national identity. Strange as it might seem, the contrary is also possible. The concept of the nation and notions of national identity may emphasize tolerance and openness while the criteria for official citizenship can be relatively restrictive.

Secondly, a *representation problem* appears when the civil society does not properly reflect the structures of difference within a society or the claims and expectations existing in the political culture. Because democracy in Western countries mainly works through organized representation, groups and communities which are not represented easily get marginalised from the political decision-making process. A representation problem is likely to have two special manifestations in contemporary societies. On the one hand, the move towards the ideological middle among the established parties during the last decades has meant that many citizens, probably those who would prefer more radical solutions to social problems in particular, do not find an advocate to promote their ideas in the political system. On the other hand, it always takes time before new immigrant communities are mobilized and find their own organizational forms through which to participate in the political system.

Finally, we can speak of a *systemic problem*, when the political organization of difference at the state level clearly deviates from the ideas, opinions, conceptions etc. prevailing in the civil society and in the political culture. This can probably be the case especially in national contexts where a distance between the political elite and the rest of the society has grown for one reason or another. Seen from a slightly different point of view, it can also be a result of the political elite acting to conform with supranational or international trends, expectations or obligations which are not in harmony with the domestic political will among the electorate.

The Political Organization of Difference in Finland

By way of conclusion, we can illustrate the theoretical and conceptual considerations above by making some remarks on the political organization of difference in Finland.[2] The historical development

of Finland has been, approached from the political organization of difference perspective, quite interesting in its combinations of continuity and change and cooperation and conflict. In the mid-19th century Finland was still an economically backward estate society with a stratified power-elite which occupied high positions in the state administration and was united by the Swedish language, nobility status, wealth and even family ties.

Through the Civil War in 1918, the language dispute in the 1920's, the crisis of democracy around 1930, the consequences of the Second World War and the rehabilitation of a strong communist movement, the country has become a post-industrial or an information society and a democratic welfare-state with strikingly stable political institutions. According to Max Jakobson (1999, 159), Finland has emerged as a winner from the ordeals of the past 100 years and is "a homogeneous, well-functioning, orderly society, with a civil service that overall is competent and efficient".

Before going to the Finland in 21st century, we shall take a glance to Finland in the mid-1980's. The Finland of that time can be characterized as a "consensus-society". Consensus has normally been used to denote the mutual understanding concerning economic development between the state and the labour market organizations. In this context, consensus can be taken as a more encompassing term to refer to the widespread agreement in a society concerning the basic social, political and cultural structures of the society, the main objectives for future development and the basic means to achieve future goals. In the terms of Dennis Kavanagh (1987, quoted Praag 1993, 152), there was a high degree of both substantial consensus on the main lines of public policy, institutional consensus on the institutional characteristics of the political system and on the rules of the political game and procedural consensus on the way in which disputes and conflicts should be resolved.

Using the previous specification of the fields of the political organization of difference (Table 1), we can fill in the Finnish situation in the mid-1980's as follows (Table 2).

Table 2. The political organization of difference in Finland in the mid-1980's

Field 1. State institutions Main ideologies and policies - strong state, representative democracy, municipal autonomy and efforts to increase popular participation - regionally equal social and economic development, controlled construction of the Nordic welfare state - support for the national culture, recognition of the traditional minorities; gradual extension of cultural rights - restrictive immigration policy	**Field 4. Identity of the state** Basic components: - Finland as a neutral country between the East and the West politically, economically and culturally - a strong nation-state identity formed by a tight combination of the state, territory, linguistic community and historical origin - emphasis of internal homogeneity, external difference and historical continuity
Field 2. Political forces Institutional features: - a plural system based on the cleavages at the turn of the century - a solid system with small structural changes and stable popular support - consensus on moderate methods to develop Finnish society - radical movements small and marginal	**Field 5. Identity of the nation** Main conceptions: - the Fennoman conception of the nation and of the state as a cultural nation-state shared by the majority of Finnish-speaking political and civic organizations - most other conceptions (Swedish nation, Sami nation etc.) including themselves to the dominant discourse or not challenging it openly
Field 3. Political culture Mass popular support for: - the political system (albeit fall in electoral activity) - the social and economic system (market economy and welfare state) - the cultural structure and policies	**Field 6. Individual's national identification** - strong and positively valued national identification among the majority of the population (albeit criticism among the intellectual elite) - few expressions of identifications to other nations or countries

That consensus-Finland can also be evaluated by using the above-mentioned dimensions for analysis. Some positive features strike out. For example, the political system is remarkably stable and most political forces, in fact, all nation-wide relevant political actors accept the existing structures and institutions. That civic culture is relatively strong and enjoys popular participation on a high level, even though regarding voter turnout there is already a diminishing tendency since the mid-1960's as well as in party membership. Furthermore, there is a strong agreement on the positive sides of the Nordic welfare state and a widely accepted "super-ideology" to promote social, economic and regional equality. The status of larger traditional minorities, with the Swedish-speaking population in a special position, is legally guaranteed, and the attention paid to the improvement of the position of other minorities is slowly increasing.

However, there are also negative sides, the most striking of which could probably be characterized as a cultural problem area, an inclusion deficit to be more precise. Finland has a long and strong tradition of high esteem for national homogeneity and, in turn, of suspicion towards immigration and internal differences. The immigration policy of Finland had already traditionally been very restrictive, and by the mid 1980's the rules had not been much liberalized. Of the national minorities, the Sami and Roma populations were also still lacking full recognition and financial resources for cultural preservation and political participation. In fact, the situation of the Roma population in particular, could, in the Finnish standards of that time, even be defined as a "fourth world".

As a symbolic problem, one should also mention the strong position of the language-based conception of the Finnish nation, which together with the alleged common ethnic origin of the Finnish-speakers formed a symbolic core national community. This community of "true Finns" was difficult if not impossible to enter for outsiders. The political citizenship did not yet mean membership in the symbolic national community. Even the Swedish-speakers were not considered as being equal members of the nation by everyone.

In the last two decades Finland has changed a lot, probably more than ever before in peace time history in such a short period of time. This change has its origins both in external and internal development and includes, for example, the change in the international en-

vironment since the end of the Cold War, the partial constitutional reforms and the wholesale revision in 2000, the profound reform of public administration, economic liberalization and internationalization, the economic recession in the early 1990's, the rise of information technology, and increased immigration and worker mobility. No doubt, the period has also left its marks to the political organization of difference even though it is risky to give any final interpretations so soon. Nevertheless, some of the consequences for the Finnish political organization of difference can be presented in the table below (Table 3).

State institutions Slow transformation of former ideologies: - pursuit for economic growth more prominent - increased toleration of differences.	**Civil society** - institutional actor structures unchanged - growth of internal tensions within parties - popular support and activity decreasing.
Nation-state identity - emergence of a more "European" and "future-oriented" nation-state identity in addition to the traditional identity.	**Political culture** - increased anti-party and anti-political sentiment - growing distance between supportive and resisting attitudes.

Table 3. Changes in the political organization of difference in Finland since the mid-1980's

Basically, there have been no great changes. The continuity can partly be explained by the vocabularies of welfare society and traditional national identity which politicians go on using in spite of policy changes and adjustments. The direction, nevertheless, seems clear as do some tensions which the changes have produced. To overstate the issue a little, Finland is about to move from a country which tolerated hardly any differences to being a country which embraces or at least abides both political, economic and cultural diversity.

The development has also produced a kind of a dualism in many fields of the political organization of difference. As mentioned, in state politics and policies, there is an increased toleration of social,

economic and cultural differences while the welfare society and national unity are still highly valued. In the nation-state identity, the new forward-looking identity emphasizing European roots and culture has become prominent while some parts of the society still hold on tight to the traditional concept and content of national identity. In political attitudes and values, there is a segment which relatively strongly opposes changes in political ideologies and identity construction while others agree with the new objectives for societal development.

However, the field of civil society has remained mostly unaltered. This means, on the one hand, that the changes elsewhere in the political organization of difference have not been produced by demands from new political actors (parties, media etc.) but from the tradititional players of the domestic political game. On the other hand, it means that for those critical of the shifts in focus, emphasis and identity there is yet no alternative political party or organization. This means that, at least for the time being the problems in the Finnish political organization of difference are mainly "representational" in nature in addition to the participation deficit which the low voter turnout, for example, imply.[3] In the long run, these problems may have serious consequences for political legitimacy and social stability.

Notes

1 Due to space limitations, this article contains the necessary references only. For a more extensive version see Saukkonen 2003a, available from the author.

2 A more detailed presentation of this analysis can be found in Finnish in Saukkonen 2003b.

3 In the parliamentary elections 2003, there were two new parties with an obviously xenophobic programme which, however, did not get candidates into the Finnish Parliament. Nevertheless, a candidate on the list of the True Finns (Perussuomalaiset), Tony Halme, received after a strongly populist campaigne 16 390 votes in Helsinki and received a seat in the Parliament.

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Other Articles

Tapani Turkka

DANBY'S MEASURES

*A Study in the Management of Parliament**

A discussion will be offered here of a single event in English history, namely the phenomenon known as the management of parliament orchestrated by the Earl of Danby[1] in the context of Restoration England. In relation to this, I will pose two questions. Firstly, what did that phenomenon involve? Secondly, what import would it assume in the context of Restoration England? In addition I will also ask the possible significance this phenomenon may assume in the history of parliamentarism.

As to why this phenomenon should merit attention it may be said that in his efforts at the management of parliament Danby resorted to methods which in a more sophisticated form were to play a major role during Walpole's long ascendancy as Prime Minister of Britain in the years 1721-1742. This period of rule has been known to posterity mainly as an exceptionally arbitrary regime by reason of

* An earlier version of this article was presented in December 2002 at the conference *Democracy and the Modi of Voting*, University of Jyväskylä, Finland. For comments I thank especially professor Hubertus Buchstein and professor Kari Palonen. I would also like to thank the anonymous referee as well as Kauko Pietilä and Tarja Seppä for their comments on my article. For language correction I thank Robert MacGilleon.

Walpole's use of corruption in the form of offices, pensions and other favours as means of control.[2] In this perspective Danby may be said to assume the role of predecessor to this exceptionally arbitrary mode of government.[3]

There is, however, a further aspect involved. It may namely be said that Walpole's period in power assumes special importance as regards the history of the parliamentary mode of using state power. If that mode of government is not only seen to consist in specific ways of organising the use of state power but is also understood to bear testimony to the very *political* nature of that exercise, then Walpole's ascendancy assumes a specific burden: it may be seen to constitute the first practical emanation of that very political mode of using state power.[4] If this line of approach is adopted then Danby's measures may also assume an additional import: in one way or another they may also possess some significance for parliamentarism in its political aspect, referring i.e. to such ideas which highlight, among other things, the very man-made nature of human institutions in the way *Locke* defines it in his doctrine of political power in the Second Treatise.[5]

The plan of the present paper is the following: in the coming section I will briefly describe Danby's main measures in the management of parliament. I will then move on to outline the contours of the context in relation to which an assessment of his policies will be undertaken here. In this part of the study the bulk of the article addresses different understandings of monarchy in the context of Restoration England. In the final chapter I will propose several meanings attributable to Danby's measures, some of them also pinpointing to the direction in which his measures may possibly assume some significance in the history of parliamentarism in its political aspect.

Danby's Measures: the Management of Parliament

The public career of the Earl of Danby covers a long period of time in English history, breaking up roughly into two distinct periods. The first of these covers Restoration England, while the second is

related to events associated with the Glorious Revolution. Danby's actions are here under consideration only as regards the first-mentioned era;[6] he appears as one of Charles II's prime ministers[7] during the years 1673-1678, and here a further limitation is made: in focus in this chapter are only the major methods used in his efforts to maintain control of parliament.

By the notion 'management of parliament' reference is made to a phenomenon of great importance as regards the exercise of state power in the context of seventeenth-century England; what is involved is an effort to control the power potential of the English Parliament. This Danby aspired to accomplish during his ascendancy by creating an "artificial co-operation of Crown and Parliament".[8] Means instrumental to this purpose comprised secret service money, loaves and fishes of office, and pensions allocated to members of Parliament sympathetic to government policies.[9] As Morrill has emphasised, it was not a question of buying consciences of members but simply of the buying of their attendance in sessions of Parliament and their readiness to vote in a manner propitious to the wishes of the government.[10]

Other methods were also used to Danby's purpose. In the constituencies he aspired to secure a more solid power base for his rule by remodelling recalcitrant town corporations and their franchises.[11] To the purpose were also the government's efforts more directly to exercise influence in by-elections to the prolonged Cavalier Parliament from 1661-1679.[12] Recalcitrant members of Parliament or men of otherwise notable position were also influenced on a more personal level: offices not given for life[13] were in some cases returned whereas persons sympathetic to the government were rewarded to the chagrin of those left without.

These methods already provoked the contemporaries to react with severe criticism.[14] A telling testimony to this effect are the articles of impeachment against Danby.[15] They in fact number six, but only two of them need be taken into account here. The first would only seem to reiterate the viewpoints set out above.[16] Article II, in contrast, conveys a description of Danby's exercise of state power and culminates in the shocking conclusion that

> he hath traitorously endeavoured to subvert the ancient and well-established form of government in this kingdom, and instead thereof to introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical way of government (...).[17]

Danby's methods did thus indeed provoke criticism in Restoration England![18]

A Regulated Monarchy

The Restoration period in English history was decisively defined by three closely interlinked experiences. The first was the memory of the Civil War and especially of the Regicide. This latter aspect was of particular importance in its implication that

> kings were answerable for their conduct, that they would be disciplined, and that there was within the constitutional structure of the civil society a legitimate, institutional means for calling them to account. In extreme cases, that means included the execution of a king and the abolition of the monarchy itself.[19]

It may be said that this memory marked the end of one monarchical culture and practice.[20]

The second aspect was a testimony to the apparent failure of the republican experiment.[21] As Morrill writes, it had caused Englishmen to lose faith in paper constitutions and overmighty parliaments.[22] Morrill also notes that the assumption that to increase the power of both Houses of Parliament would be the proper way to "restrain untrustworthy kings" was shaken by parliamentary tyranny.[23] In the context of these two experiences the third aspect, at the dawn of Restoration, was more than apparent: the insecurity of the foreseeable future as to how Englishmen would successfully govern themselves without again succumbing to the horrors of tyranny. It was in the midst of these experiences that the monarchy was restored in England in the years 1660-1662.

The Restoration Settlement comprised three elements: the repeal of all legislation of 1641-42 but that assented to by Charles I, the enactment of new legislation and the undertakings given in the Dec-

laration of Breda.[24] As regards the first aspect two exceptions were made: the statute excluding bishops from the House of Lords and the Triennial Act were repealed.[25] The reform legislation of 1641-42 was completed[26] and otherwise left intact. The new legislation in question was twofold. Firstly, it consisted of laws designed to protect and further strengthen the monarchy.[27] Secondly, it included the important statute whereby the command of the armed forces was vested in the king.[28] This paucity of new legislation reflected the "unconditional"[29] restoration of Charles II.

The restored monarchy did not, however, signify a return to royal absolutism and to this the *Declaration of Breda* is a telling testimony. It opens with the king's solemn appeal, directed to all, for an awakening to a "desire and longing that those wounds which have so many years together been kept bleeding, may be bound up".[30] The document further manifests that the king finds it "his duty to declare how much we desire to contribute thereunto".[31] To the same effect it continues

> nor do we desire more to enjoy what is ours, than that all our subjects may enjoy what by law is theirs, by a full and entire administration of justice throughout the land, and by extending our mercy where it is wanted and deserved.[32]

These declarations may be found to be no more than noble sentiments, but it may also be asked what would have been more in keeping with the hopes of Englishmen against the background of memories of unlawful actions committed during the preceding two decades than declarations at least pinpointing a direction of security of rights in the future.[33] In this latter perspective the document was also more concrete, and this in a matter of the utmost importance, namely religion. That there prevailed "several opinions in religion" was envisaged as the very product of the "passion and uncharitableness of the times".[34] And as regards the future in religious matters it not only declared "a liberty to tender consciences" but expressed the readiness of the Monarch not to solve differences at his own discretion but to be "ready to consent to such an Act of Parliament, as, upon mature deliberation, shall be offered to us, for the full granting that indulgence".[35]

Note should also be taken of the fact that in the document the king's readiness to consent was not limited to matters of religion.[36]

In all of these respects, general and more concrete, the *Declaration of Breda* reflects a monarchy far different from that which may best be characterised as absolute. The monarchy it reflects is of the kind the *Answer to the Nineteen Propositions* had conveyed in 1642.[37] It was so in the expressed readiness of the Monarch to 'consent' to legislation to be passed by Parliament. Precisely in this respect it conveyed one of the most basic statements of the *Answer*, namely that to the effect that in England the monarch was but one *estate* beside the Lords temporal and the Commons and that they would *share* in the government of England.[38]

This latter component in the *Answer* advances more fully in two steps: in respect of legislation it establishes that "the laws are jointly made by a king, by a house of peers, and by a House of Commons chosen by the people, all having free votes and particular privileges".[39] As regards government it may be found that the document defines it as "entrusted" to the king, but a notable specification is also made here:[40] it is a question of government "according to these laws", i.e. laws "jointly made" by the King and both Houses of Parliament.[41] To such a monarchy the document attributes an important definition: "regulated monarchy".[42] It may now be said that it was basically to this kind of *regulated monarchy* that Restoration England made a return at its very inception; the *Declaration of Breda* manifests one of its possible realisations.

The Drive towards Comprehension

In the perspective of the *Declaration of Breda* Charles II was bound to follow a definite line of policy making for *religious and political comprehension*. In relation to the latter aspect, it would also comprise his and his father's former enemies as the *Declaration of Breda* had it:

> Let all our loving subjects, how faulty soever, rely upon the word of a King solemnly given by this present declaration, that no crime whatsoever, committed against us or our royal father before the publication of this, shall ever rise in judgement, or be brought, in question, against any

> of them, to the least endamagement of them, either in their lives, liberties or estates or (as far forth as lies in our power) so much as to the prejudice of their reputations, by any reproach or term of distinction from the rest of our best subjects.[43]

Only those would be excluded from indulgence "as shall hereafter be excepted by Parliament".[44] These statements implied acceptance of the "fact of the Restoration"[45] as the proper prerequisite for comprehension. Favour, reward and office would be within the reach of almost each and every one regardless of the possible faults or even crimes committed against the Royal cause during the preceding twenty years.

In relation to religion Charles' commitment to comprehension was equally clearly expressed: "no man shall be disquieted or called in question for differences of opinion in matter of religion".[46] Also in this aspect limits to indulgence were nonetheless clearly set; the *Declaration of Breda* continues with this specification: "which do not disturb the peace of the Kingdom".[47]

To accomplish his chosen policy the monarch was equipped with the efficient powers returned to him in the Restoration; of particular importance was that ministers and officers of state would be of his choosing and that the repeal[48] of the Triennial Act in 1664 further consolidated his power in that the move "removed any lawful means of ensuring regular elections".[49] Notwithstanding this he was, as every king would be in a regulated monarchy, dependent on the consent of Parliament. In this perspective the right to choose his ministers and officers of state was but a prerequisite for efficient rule, the practical efficacy of which would prove itself in the varying constellations of power. It was thus no a great surprise that the accomplishment of comprehension proved no easy task.

The king's readiness for comprehension towards his and his father's enemies, however, carried remarkable success. The *Act of Indemnity and Oblivion*[50] passed by parliament in 1660 restricted the set of men to be excepted from comprehension to a minimum,[51] and likewise important was that a period of three years was launched allowing men implicated, by speech or writing, to reflect on their conduct during the past twenty years.[52] Equally successfully manifested was Charles' readiness for a political comprehension with

those whose commitment to the Restoration was, if anything, at least involuntary.

It appears from Morrill's analysis, namely, that almost half of the privy councillors in 1660-61 were enemies to Charles I's father; the majority of the civil servants of the 1650s were allowed to retain their offices; the same applied, though to a lesser degree, to positions in the Restoration Army and Navy. Further to the point was that "(a)bout thirty per cent of all JPs had served under the Protectorate; and a further thirty per cent had identified to some extent with the parliamentarian cause in the 1640s, while distancing themselves from the Interregnum".[53] As regards those with a royalist background it may be said that those who had actively supported the cause of Charles II's father by going into exile did less well in matters of office than those who had stayed at home.[54] What was manifested e.g. in these respects was twofold in its burden: on the surface they betrayed the fact that the king favoured more his enemies than friends.[55] A more profound implication, however, was that they bore testimony to political comprehension in the form of the king's readiness to allow a share in power to all accepting the fact of Restoration regardless of their commitments during the two preceding reigns.[56]

In matters of religion differences emerged already before the Restoration settlement. Among Royalists and moderate Parliamentarians there prevailed a general consistency of views: the Church should be established on a model more uniform than what had been the case in the 1650s.[57] In this context Charles' actions even in the early months of his reign testified to a firm commitment to comprehension in the direction of indulgence. Against this background of different views and the necessity of the consent of Parliament, the religious settlement of the Restoration proved unfavourable to the king's aspirations.

The *Act of Unanimity*[58] of 1662 imposed a narrow Anglicanism allowing no concessions to the Puritans in matters of worship or episcopacy.[59] Nonconformist worship was subjected to severe punishments.[60] Charles' further attempts in the direction of toleration were defeated by the Cavalier Parliament established in the elections of 1661.[61] This took place not only in 1660 and 1662 but subsequently in 1663, in 1668 and in 1672.[62] This sequence of frustrations of Charles' aspirations proved disastrous not only in matters of

religion but more broadly as well: the king's drive for comprehension collapsed and as a result a new era was launched in the context of the Restoration. Charles' appointment of Danby as his prime minister signalled the king's surrender to 'his (Anglican, T. T.) friends'[63].

The Anglican Establishment in Power

In frustrating the monarch's drive for religious comprehension the Cavalier Parliament, dominated by an Anglican lay and spiritual establishment, had achieved a great deal more besides. As Pocock and Schochet write, they secured the Anglican domination of the English state "from top to bottom".[64] Basically this was a consequence of the implications of the *Corporation Act* (1661) and the *Act of Uniformity* (1662), forming now, in the context emanating from the king's loss of hope of religious comprehension, the religious settlement of Restoration England.

In the very generality of their tone these documents bore witness to aspirations different from those of the *Declaration of Breda*. Whereas that document had deemed the "passion and uncharitableness of the times" to be the very reason for diversity in religious opinions, the *Act of Uniformity* placed sole responsibility on men themselves: diversity in religious opinions was a consequence of men's "following their own sensuality and living without knowledge and due fear of God".[65] In this spirit the *Act of Uniformity* manifested a drive not for inclusion but exclusion. In the words of the *Declaration of Breda*, it may be said that it reflected a drive towards "disquieting and calling in question of differences in matters of religion".

In the perspective of this change in tone, the nomination in 1673 of Danby as prime minister, signalling the king's final surrender to 'his friends', entailed much indeed. It may be said that in the English state of the 1670s it activated to the full a *mechanism* making for the exclusion implied in the *Corporation Act*. Its composition was threefold; the first element stipulated that

> all persons who upon 24 December, 1661, shall be mayor, aldermen, recorders, bailiffs, town clerks, common councilmen and other person

> then bearing any office or offices of magistracy, or places or trusts or other employment relating to or concerning the government of the said respective cities, corporations and boroughs and cinque ports and their members and other port towns, shall at any time before 25 March 1663 (…) take the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy (…).[66]

The second aspect of the mechanism made apparent what would happen to those failing to take the said oaths: they should be "removed and displaced of and from the said offices and places respectively (…)".[67] The third had the following burden:

> And nevertheless be it enacted … that the said commissioners or any five or more of them shall have full power by virtue of this Act by order and warrant under their hands and seals to displace or remove any of the persons aforesaid from the said respective offices … if the said commissioners or the major part of them then present shall deem it expedient for the public safety, although such persons have taken and subscribed or be willing to take and subscribe the said oaths and declaration.[68]

This enactment rendered the mechanism extremely efficacious; persons in positions specified in the first component in the mechanism were, in the end, removable from their offices irrespective of their willingness to take the *Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy*. They were removable if it were deemed "expedient". In the context of the king's surrender to 'his friends' it made manifest how the 'mechanism' provided the Anglican establishment, now firmly in power in government as well as in Parliament, with means freely and aggressively to advance its temporal interests and power.[69] It accomplished this in making the position of a considerable number of people vulnerable in the extreme.

Especially vulnerable were now those having either kept or risen to their positions as a sign of the king's now collapsed policy of comprehension. This included all those in office having served the Commonwealth or Protectorate or possessing a position regardless of less telling proofs of personal commitment to the Royalist cause. Both groups of men had now to countenance the fact of the vulnerability of their positions because there was no more comprehension towards their doings or behaviour in the past, present or, for that matter,

foreseeable future. In addition, there was no longer any guarantee of comprehension; after Charles' surrender to 'his friends', the king's policy, conducted by ministers and officials of his choosing, had a different burden. It was now dictated by the Anglican establishment headed by Danby in the government.

In this context little need be said of those who at the dawn of the Restoration had resorted to the possibility to clarify their past, either in speech or writing. By these very acts, if for no other reason, these men had implicated themselves in possible threats to the public safety in the state. A third group of persons, however, must be singled out more carefully. It is a question of men with Anglican attitudes but whose commitment towards the adopted line of policy was, in one way or another, open to suspicion. This was so for two reasons: on the one hand there was an alternative line of policy to the adopted one residing in the memories of attempts at comprehension. However, this alternative was important because, and on the other hand, unity in government had now to be esteemed more than ever before; public safety in the state was now a matter of highest priority in the government's policies, whereas previous to this there had been inconsistencies and irregularities in this respect.[70]

A further dimension to the strength of the mechanism was lent by the king's decision to allow Danby an "exceptional degree of control over the king's patronage".[71] The implication of this was that the vulnerability of positions also reached the highest echelons in the exercise of state power. It would now be faced by every one whom Danby might implicate as a possible threat to public safety in the state. In this respect Danby's measures are well known and have, to some extent, already been mentioned in this article. Some additions may now be made by way of clarification.

The measures in question included the removal from office of those who had served the Commonwealth and Protectorate.[72] In nominations to local offices the king was urged to prefer those, or their sons, who had personally resorted to arms in support of the Royal cause.[73] Favours were concentrated among those whose support to Danby's ascendancy was beyond doubt: his followers and relatives.[74] Of those whose commitment to the adopted line was suspect, supposed rivals to Danby's ascendancy or those who defied him, were dismissed from their offices.[75] The habit of 'taking off' vocal critics of government

ceased altogether; in Danby's view men in positions were either supporters to or in opposition to government.[76]

The necessity to secure unity in the government found manifestation especially in the mode of *management of parliament*. Here the repertoire of Danby's actions was broad indeed: it ranged from repeated urges to his supporters to attend the meetings of parliament to the sending of letters to those regarded as sympathetic to the Crown's now prevailing policy as well as to measures imposing greater discipline upon his supporters. Even lists were developed singling out not only those favourable to government but those also who could be persuaded to adopt a line favourable to the government.[77] On the basis of these lists secret service moneys, under the direction of a confidant to Danby,[78] were paid to MPs in order to guarantee the success of the government in parliament. It was this distribution of money in addition to the practice of allocating places and pensions which formed the nucleus of Danby's aspirations to the management of parliament.

The Import of Danby's Measures

In the context following upon the king's surrender to 'his friends' Danby's measures making for control of parliament assume a specific burden: consistency. In all essential aspects they manifest, on the one hand, a tendency towards the exclusion of all those not of the same political or religious persuasion; on the other they are conducive to securing and perpetuating the possession of state power solely in the hands of the 'king's friends'. Next we must ask the significance Danby's efforts bear.

To answer this question a plurality of contexts is available. In what follows I will concentrate firstly on the context of Charles II's reign and ask how does it indeed come about that Danby's measures may assume in it the essence of arbitrary government.[79] In the context of Restoration England this is in no way self-evident. Danby's efforts had as their basis the king's choice of a prime minister, and the policies he conducted were not without the king's approval, however reluctant it may have been.

It may also be said that in Restoration England understanding for Danby's measures naturally prevailed not only in Royalist theories of monarchy but among wider circles of society as some kind of answer to this very question: why, in the end, should comprehension be shown and a share in the exercise of state power be allowed to those whose commitment to the cause of monarchy during the preceding three decades had often proved so questionable.

In this context 'arbitrary government' as the ultimate nature of Danby's measures may be seen to have its origin in a decision made by Charles II in 1660 in an "unprecedentedly powerful position"[80] but reflecting at the same time the very realities of royal power beyond his own reach: the realities of monarchy in the context brought about by the *Answer to the Nineteen Propositions*. In this document Charles I had declined to subscribe to one theory of monarchy and instead expounded another.[81] In the perspective of the doctrine of *monarchical sovereignty* Danby's measures would only manifest the king's policies conducted by ministers and officers of his choosing beyond *any* questioning by Parliament.[82] Accordingly the rights of Parliament did not pose a limit on the king's policies nor did "liberties and properties"[83] of the subjects impose restrictions.[84]

Otherwise it was in the perspective of the theory accepted in the *Answer* in 1642. The *Answer* had not only exposed the English monarchy as a "mixture" of the three estates or given Parliament a share in the government of England. This latter it had also done in the form which manifested the *equality* of partners.[85] The monarchy was not entrusted with a role supreme over the other estates, but only one acting in co-ordination with the other estates. Instead of supremacy of the monarch a *balance* should prevail between the estates.[86] This aspect of the document bore witness to an important consequence. In denying the king a supreme role in government Charles I at the same time allowed that not only the king but also Parliament could represent its actions as necessary to the maintenance of that balance in which both houses of Parliament "were of equal weight with him"[87].

On this basis it may be said that Danby's efforts to gain control of Parliament must not be assessed as they appear in the context of their original realisation in the 1670s but in the perspective in which Charles II's monarchy emerges as a *regulated monarchy*. This it does

in its very inception and finds proper expression in the *Declaration of Breda*. In this perspective the English Parliament was not without a say in respect of the policies conducted by ministers and officers of the king's choosing but had an important share in the exercise of state power. It is in this perspective that Danby's measures would assume the aspect of 'arbitrary government', since 'management' of parliament would mean the shaking of that very balance which should, in a regulated monarchy, prevail between the estates. This is the effect of the "novelty of the Age",[88] i.e. the intrusion into Parliament of Danby's pensioners and placemen to the effect that it would lose its very independence.

In this very aspect of 'arbitrariness' one perceives, however, another sense which Danby's measures may also be said to assume, this time in the context of their original realisation, opening up from the king's surrender to 'his friends'. It is now a question of the *artificial* nature of the co-operation between Crown and Parliament which the management of parliament made possible. In this respect Danby's procedure may be said to be in apparent contravention of those legitimations which the English monarchy possessed in patriarchal theories[89] in the context of the Restoration period.

It was, namely, no easy task to lend to the arrangement of relations between Crown and Parliament effected by the management of parliament such a burden of *naturalness* as e.g. Filmer's theory would necessitate.[90] In all its *newness* the disposal effected by the management of parliament bore testimony all too convincingly and palpably to human *contrivance* pure and simple as the proper legitimation of the arrangement and, by implication, of the exercise of state power more generally as well.

It is also by reason of this very 'artificiality' of the arrangement brought into being by Danby's measures that he may possess some significance for parliamentarism in its *political* aspect. The artificiality of the arrangement of the relation between the Crown and the Parliament embodies namely such an *idea* which a decade and a half later indeed found its theoretical exposition in Locke's Second Treatise. It is here also a matter of the very notion of human convention and contrivance as the sole legitimations of human institutions and practices, the state included.

In Locke's Second Treatise this idea finds manifestation in relation to *political power*, this at the very beginning of the book in the exposition of its purpose. Locke's manifest aim is to establish political power on a basis of men's own choices.[91] The result of his effort is such an understanding of that power in which the *constitution* of state power as political is possible precisely to 'us', i.e. to Locke's contemporaries and succeeding generations.[92] In this context note should also be taken of Locke's motive for this endeavour: in Locke's view the understanding of the origin of political power in the mode Filmer had propounded as an emanation of God's grant to Adam had resulted in such problems that even the supporters of that "hypothesis" must recoil from them.[93]

As regards parliamentarism in its *political* aspect, a further significance may be attached to Danby's measures. As noted at an earlier point in this article, the *Answer to the Nineteen Propositions* had defined the "government" of the country as "entrusted" to the King. The fate of the King's policy of indulgence testified, however, to something altogether different; the failure of his policies was due to the pressure exerted upon him not only by those in power in Parliament but also by those in the government of his own choosing. The burden of these developments was that power relations in the state were, in the context of the 1670s, indeed in a state of flux *and* that in this regard it was not a question only of relations between King and Parliament; the body of men in the government had also to be reckoned with. Factually, they had assumed a role beyond that of mere advisors to the King.[94] To this end the management of Parliament had proved to be an effective means.

From the point of view of Locke's political thought, so constitutive of parliamentarism in its political aspect, these developments assume a twofold significance. On the one hand they comprise testimony that already in the context of the 1670s ample evidence had accrued to indicate that the understanding and legitimation of state power in the mode propounded e.g. by Filmer had indeed lost much of its *practical* validity.[95] On the other hand, and in close connection with the former aspect, they may also have possessed some significance as regards the accrual of that *evidence* which prompted Locke to embark on his effort in the Second Treatise. The phenomena Locke

explicitly mentiones in this respect[96], were to him consequential results of those premises which Filmer had attached to political power. In this context Locke found his effort necessary[97].

Notes

1 Thomas Osborne (1632-1712), 1st Earl of Danby, later Marquis of Carmarthen and Duke of Leeds.
2 See e.g. Kluxen 1983, 89-111; Kenyon 1977, 189-193, 198-199.
3 This link between Danby and Walpole has been made e.g. by Colley 1982, 11. See also Pocock 1975, 424, 478.
4 Turkka 2000.
5 On the doctrine see Turkka 2000, 71-129; Turkka 2002, 196-200.
6 On Danby's activities in this respect see generally Hutton 1989, 314-316, 320-345, 357-374; Hill 1980, 195-196.
7 On Charles' system of 'prime ministers' in his three kingdoms see Hutton 1989, 321-324. Of Danby's rise to a position of Charles II's prime minister see Hutton 1989, 261, 297, 307, 321-322, 326-328; Browning 1913, 17-23.
8 Morrill 1994, 417.
9 Morrill 1994, 412; Harris 1993, 62-63.
10 Morrill 1994, 412 cf. Harris 1993, 63.
11 Goldie 1983, 62-63.
12 Morrill 1994, 412-413; Kishlansky 1986, 152-154.
13 See Miller 2000, 223-224.
14 On this see Hutton 1989, 328-331.
15 "Articles of impeachment against the earl of Danby, 1678", in *English Historical Documents 1660-1714*, 1966, 198-199.
16 "V. That he hath wasted the king's treasury by issuing out of his Majesty's Exchequer and several branches of his revenue, for unnecessary pensions and secret services, to the value of two hundred thirty-one thousand six hundred and two pounds within two years (...) and he hath removed two of his Majesty's commissioners of that part of the revenue for refusing to consent to such his unwarrantable actings therein and to advance money upon that branch of the revenue for private uses." *English Historical Documents 1660-1714,* 1966, 199.
17 E*English Historical Documents 1660-1714,* 1966, 198.
18 On the impeachment see Miller 2000, 250-252; Goldie 1990, 90-92; Hutton 1989, 365-369; Hill 1980, 196; Weston 1965, 93-95, 101-102.

19 Pocock and Schochet 1993, 148.
20 See Mendle 1985, 7-9, 20, 21-22. Cf. Peck's (1993, 115) comment on the significance of the War of Three Kingdoms as an end to the political culture of court and counsel.
21 Pocock and Schochet 1993, 172; Hutton 1985, 119-120.
22 Morrill 1994, 398.
23 Ibid. See also Mendle's (1993) discussion, in the context of Restoration England, of Parliament as the very locus of 'absolutism'.
24 Kenyon 1966, 361.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Morrill 1994, 397 cf. Hutton 1985, 126. Of the reflection of this aspect on the proclamation of Charles as monarch of England see Nenner 1995, 95-96.
30 "The Declaration of Breda", in Kenyon 1966, 357-358 at 357.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 On this see e.g. Morrill 1994, 398. – Note should also be taken here of the fact that the document invites "our subjects" not only "for the re-settlement of our just rights" but "theirs" and this "in a free Parliament". See "The Declaration of Breda", in Kenyon 1966, 358.
34 "The Declaration of Breda", in Kenyon 1966, 358.
35 Ibid.
36 Here it was a question of "the full satisfaction of all arrears due to the officers and soldiers of the army under the command of General Monk", "The Declaration of Breda", in Kenyon 1966, 358.
37 On this document see Mendle 1985, 1-20, 171-183; Weston 1965, 5-6, 24-26. Of the significance of this document in the history of political thought in England see e.g. Pocock and Schochet 1993, 149-150; Mendle 1993, 116-118; Schochet 1992, 14-18; Pocock 1987, 309-314, 342-343; Sommerville 1986, 175-176.
38 See "The King's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions", in Kenyon 1966, 21-23 at 21.
39 Ibid.
40 The powers "entrusted" to the king included "power of treaties of war and peace, of making peers, of choosing officers and councillors for state, judges for law, commanders for forts and castles, giving commissions for raising men, to make war abroad, or to prevent or provide against invasions or insurrections at home, benefit of confiscations,

power of pardoning, and some more of the like kind are placed in the King." The King's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions", in: Kenyon 1966, 21.

41 Ibid.

42 "And this kind of regulated monarchy, having (…)". "King's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions", in Kenyon 1966, 21.

43 "The Declaration of Breda" in Kenyon 1966, 357-358.

44 "The Declaration of Breda" in Kenyon 1966, 357.

45 Morrill 1994, 401.

46 "The Declaration of Breda", Kenyon 1966, 358.

47 Ibid.

48 See "An Act for the assembling and holding of parliaments once in three years at the least" in Kenyon 1966, 382-383.

49 Goldie 1983, 62. – The move was made, Kenyon (1966, 361) notes, "on the mistaken ground that it might oblige Charles to dissolve his present parliament".

50 See "An Act of free and general pardon, indemnity and oblivion" in Kenyon 1966, 365-371.

51 On exceptions see Hutton 1985, 132-133, 162-163; Kenyon 1966, 362, 371. On the aftermath see Wedgwood 1964, 216-224.

52 Kenyon 1966, 362.

53 Morrill 1994, 403.

54 Morrill 1994, 402.

55 It was because of this that it was (Goldie 1990, 75) "joked bitterly that the Act of Indemnity and Oblivion meant indemnity for rebels and oblivion for loyalists". On the topic see also Hutton 1985, 136-138.

56 Morrill 1994, 402.

57 Miller 2000, 132.

58 See "An Act for the uniformity of public prayers and administration of sacraments and other rites and ceremonies " in Kenyon 1966, 378-382.

59 Miller 2000, 132-135, 148, 174-181; Spurr 1998, 130; Hutton 1985, 175-178.

60 On the persecutions see Coffey 2000, 169-187.

61 According to Kenyon (1966, 363) the "elections in March and April 1661 returned a Parliament opposed to any compromise".

62 Goldie 1983, 76 n. 86 cf. Spurr 1998, 138.

63 Goldie 1983, 76 n. 86. See also Miller 2000, 181.

64 Pocock and Schochet 1993, 173 cf. Harris 1993, 71.

65 "The Act of Uniformity", in Kenyon 1966, 379.

66 "The Corporation Act", in Kenyon 1966, 376-377.

67 "The Corporation Act", in Kenyon 1966, 377.

68 Ibid.
69 Goldie 1990, 83, 85; Goldie 1983, 75. Browning (1913, 33) writes in this context of "Danby's scheme of an Anglican autocracy".
70 Miller 2000, 222.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Miller 2000, 222-223.
75 Ibid.
76 On Danby's contribution to division members of parliament into "court" and "country" see Harris 1993, 61-65.
77 Miller 2000, 224.
78 That is, under Danby's brother-in-law Charles Bertie, who (Miller 2000, 224) after Sir Stephen Fox's dismissal in January 1676 took charge of the distribution of secret service money.
79 As it in fact did. On contemporary criticism of Danby's measures see Morrill 1994, 407-408; Goldie 1983, 63-68.
80 Goldie 1983, 62.
81 Pocock and Schochet 1994, 149.
82 See here Goldie's (1983, 69-71) illuminating exposition of e.g. Philip Heylyn's thought, to whom (*Stumbling Block of Disobedience*, written c. 1645, published in 1658) "the king was the sole, omnicompetent and illimitable source of law" (69) and "Parliament was subordinate, not co-ordinate, and that Parliament and political rights existed by the king's gracious permission alone" (69). As Goldie (1983, 69-70) has it, Royalists agreed that the King "was the sole maker of the law. He gave 'life', 'being', 'force' to the law; Parliament advised, petitioned, consented".
83 "Answer to the Nineteen Propositions", in Kenyon 1966, 21.
84 In Heylyn's doctrine of condescending power (Goldie 1983, 70) "English liberties and the limitations upon the Crown existed only by virtue of the gracious condescensions of Kings in past ages. Such liberties were privileges not entitlements; there were customary limits to the crown, not intrinsic or irrevocable limits". In this perspective the *Answer to the Nineteen Propositions* was, as John Nalson put it (*The King's Supremacy Asserted*, London, 1660, 12) but a "slip of his late Majesties Pen" (Weston 1965, 30).
85 On this see Pocock and Schochet 1993, 149-150; Schochet 1992, 15; Mendle 1985, 11-13; Pocock 1975, 362.
86 Ibid.
87 Pocock and Schochet 1993, 150.
88 Goldie 1983, 63 cf. Morrill 1994 A, 426; Pocock 1975, 406-407, 412.

89 On the primary role of patriarchal theories among Royalists see Goldie 1983, 74.
90 On this aspect see Filmer 1949, e.g. 57-63, 71-74, 95-96. On Filmer's political thought in this context see Schochet 1975, 116-119, 126-127, 136-139; Laslett 1949, 10-20.
91 See Locke, II, Chap. I § 1-2. As an interpretation to this effect see Turkka 2002, 195-197, 204-206.
92 On this aspect in Locke's doctrine of political power see Turkka 2000, 71-81, 98-104; Turkka 2002, 199-200.
93 Locke, II, Chap. I § 1.
94 On counsel to the King in the context of early seventeenth century England see Guy 2000, 305-310; Peck 1993, 98-102, 115.
95 To this 'validity' Filmer (1949, 93) posits stringent conditions, e.g. to this effect: "For if a King but once admit the people to be his companions, he leaves to be a King, and the state becomes a democracy. At least, he is but a titular and no real King, that hath not the sovereignty to himself: for the having of this alone, and nothing but this, makes a King to be a king." On Filmer's understanding of the relation of civil law to a king see Filmer 1949, 95-96. On Hobbes' political thinking to the same effect see Hobbes 1986, 363-373.
96 Locke (II, Chap. I, § 1) refers here to "perpetual Disorder and Mischief, Tumult, Sedition and Rebellion".
97 Locke, II, Chap.

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Book Reviews

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THE POINT OF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

Quentin Skinner (2002): Visions of Politics, Vol. 1: Regarding Method. Cambridge: CUP.

As Skinner informs his readers in the general preface to all three volumes of *Visions of Politics,* they are linked together by both theory and practice. In the philosophical and methodological Volume 1, he preaches the virtues of a particular approach. In volumes 2 and 3 he attempts to practice what he preaches. My task here is to review the first of these three volumes. Had I been asked to review all three, I would have declined, that is, I would have practiced what I have myself preached: if you have nothing to say it is better to remain silent. I am not an expert of Renaissance political philosophy, nor am I acquainted with the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, the themes of volumes 2 and 3 respectively. The idea of method, however, presupposes that it can be applied to many subject matters. Thus I will use this review as an opportunity to reflect on my own intellectual historical practice and as an occasion to rethink the approach I myself have recently preached (cf. Hyrkkänen 2002). I will note at the outset that my attitude towards theory is instrumental. A theory has to work in practice. From this it follows that I take theory seriously, and, accordingly, I place a great deal of value on theoretical reflection.

In the introduction, Skinner says that he has written the methodological and theoretical chapters of the volume under review "as a practicing historian", urging, however, his practically minded fellow historians to listen to some of the most powerful voices in recent philosophy, which question the view that there are any indisputable facts to be acquired. In chapter 2 he considers the still familiar view that historians should first assemble all the facts about a given problem and recount them as objectively as possible. One of the most visible and aggressive proponents of this approach has been Sir Geoffrey Elton. Elton has in fact disparaged the numerous intellectual operations required by what has been deemed "good historical practice". Skinner reminds us in that it is not the sole task of the historian to tell what *Quellen* wish to say. Or, as Reinhart Koselleck (Koselleck 1979, 206) once aptly formulated, *Quellen* forbid us to say what we please, yet they do not tell us what we can say. History should not be written, as R.G. Collingwood reminded us, "by copying out the testimony of the best sources, but by coming to your own conclusions" (Collingwood 1973, 260). Here, it is helpful to remember that the word *fact* is derived from the Latin *factum*, or something that is made. Similarly, the German concept *Tatsache* means *eine getane Sache*, a thing that is made or done, i.e. a thing made or done by the historian her/himself.

Skinner's message seems to be that a good historian must also be a moderate constructionist. But in chapter 3 Skinner highlights that historians should also be moderate relativists. In order to be able to understand the beliefs of alien cultures or earlier societies, historians must be trained to avoid considering the truth of the beliefs under study. To assess the universal rationality of beliefs "is fatal to good historical practice" (p. 2), or at the very least strikes the historian "as strange" (p. 53). A clear case in point is the suggestion that we should read the classical texts as if they were written by our contemporaries, that it should be our task to examine what they have to tell us about perennial issues. This view is the target of chapter 4, the much abbreviated and extensively revised version of the now classical article "Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas", published in 1969. The article has effectively questioned and discredited the efforts to search for and consider the perennial relevance of past thinkers. We can safely say that these efforts now belong to the history of intellectual history.

Drawing on the philosophies of language of W.V.O. Quine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, John Searle and H.P. Grice, Skinner advises historians to investigate the actual uses as opposed to the meanings of words and terms within various languages. Of particular value for Skinner are the speech act theories developed by Austin and Searle. They have persuaded us to see that "we are always doing something as well as saying something" (p. 2). The merits of the philosophies of language exploited by Skinner for his own purposes lie in their holism. Skinner summarises the practical consequences of the holistic view as follows: "I seek to elucidate concepts not by focusing on the supposed 'meanings' of the terms we use to express them, but rather by asking what can be done with them and by examining their relationship to each other and to broader networks of beliefs. I assume in turn that the question of what is rational to believe depends on in large measure on the nature of our other beliefs. I attempt to interpret specific beliefs by placing them in the context of other beliefs, to interpret systems of belief by placing them in wider intellectual frameworks, and to understand those broader frameworks by viewing them in the light of the *longue durée*" (pp. 4-5).

Skinner illustrates, particularly in chapters 5 and 6, and partially in chapters 3, 4 and 7, how this programme is carried out. The core of Skinner's argument is that if we want to practice intellectual history "in a genuinely historical spirit", we must "situate the texts we study within such intellectual contexts as enable us to make sense of what their authors were doing in writing them". For Skinner, the philosophies of language serve as a legitimation and justification of "the ordinary techniques of historical enquiry". By using this "technique" an historian can hope to grasp the concepts of past thinkers, "to follow their distinctions, to appreciate their beliefs and, so far as possible, to see things their way" (p. 3).

One way of addressing the relationship between thought and action, or more specifically of understanding how understanding thought can help us to understand action, is to consider the rhetorical aspects of writing and speech, or the rhetorical techniques "concerned with exploiting the power of words to underpin or undermine the construction of our social world" (p. 5). In the concluding chapters, 8, 9 and 10, Skinner demonstrates the dependence of social action upon the normative descriptions available to historical

agents for legitimating their behaviour, presents some rhetorical strategies of how re-descriptions of the social world simultaneously revaluate it, and investigates in greater detail how these ideological tasks are performed by means of rhetorical techniques.

The chapters of the book summarised above are a juxtaposition of the intellectual history (or autobiography) of the intellectual historian Skinner and an updated version of his methodological views. Here, Skinner reveals his willingness and ability to use criticism as an occasion for discussing and clarifying his own work. He has worked hard at developing, i.e. more or less extensively revising, sometimes extending and at times abbreviating, his earlier texts. An alternative approach might have been to deliver the updated version, that is, to give a compact and systematic presentation of the philosophical foundations and the methodological insights derived from them. In this way, the methodological precepts might have been more understandable. For a reader acquainted with Skinner's career as a theorist of intellectual history it is hard to resists the temptation to compare the articles with the original texts. Initially, I attempted to do just that, although I came to the conclusion that it was best to avoid the temptation. It is the updated version of Skinner's methodological approach which merits evaluation. It would still be useful to trace the evolution of Skinner's views, not so much in order to illustrate and complain about the way in which Skinner constantly alters his views (he has had good reason for doing so) but instead to learn how the dialogue between theory and practice can work in a fruitful way. Skinner has convincingly illustrated how the stimulus provided by philosophers may turn "the working historian into a thinking historian" (Fogel and Elton 1983, 1).

The meaning of the texts Skinner wants to recover is the meaning in terms of an answer to the question of "what does a writer mean by what he or she says in a given text" (p. 93) in contrast to other meanings of the concept of meaning, that is, as answers to the questions of "what do the words mean, or what do certain specific words or sentences mean, in a given text" and "what does this text mean to me" (pp. 91-92). Only in the first sense of the meaning is it necessary, Skinner contends, to attempt to recover the intentions of the writer. These are so-called illocutionary intentions, and understanding them would be the equivalent of understanding the illocutionary

acts performed by the authors, such as promising, warning, entreating, informing and so on (pp. 98-99). Skinner's central contention is that in the case of writers' illocutionary intentions, that is "what they may have intended *in* writing in a certain way", their recovery requires "a separate form of study". To be able to characterise a work in terms of its intended illocutionary force is "equivalent to understanding what a writer may have *meant by* writing in that particular way" (pp. 99-100, Skinner's italics).

The point of emphasising the distinction of what historical agents were doing with their words, terms and concepts in contrast to what they themselves meant is to remind us of the "doing in" aspect as an indispensable element of good practice. The distinction does not, however, mean that understanding the meanings of the words, terms and concepts of texts should be neglected. Consider e.g. the much quoted example originally put forward by P.F. Strawson. A policeman sees a skater on a pond and says: "The ice over there is very thin". In order to understand this episode we need to know not only the meaning of the words but also what the policeman was doing in saying what he said. To understand that he was warning the skater presupposes the understanding of the meaning of the words, too. But to understand the meanings of the words alone can be very misleading. The consideration of the "doing in" aspect in the context of prevailing conventions saves us, for instance, from making false or inanely literal interpretations of ironical and satirical texts. In his *Shortest Way with the Dissenters*, Daniel Defoe clearly demands that religious dissent should be ranked among capital offences. But his illocutionary intention is that of ridiculing intolerance. (cf. pp. 80, 104-107, 112 and 133-134)

The recovery of intentions is possible if we "focus not merely on the particular text in which we are interested but on the prevailing conventions governing the treatment of the issues or themes with which the text is concerned". Because writers are normally engaged in an "intended act of communication", it follows that "whatever intentions a writer may have, they must be conventional in the strong sense that they must be recognisable as intentions to uphold some particular position in argument, to contribute to the treatment of some particular topic, and so on" (pp. 101-102). Understanding intentions also presupposes seeing them in the context of their con-

ceptual relation with beliefs. Thus the "intentional" chapters 5 and 6 should be read in connection with chapters 3 and 7, in which Skinner offers his useful precepts for the description and explanation of beliefs (pp. 40-56, and 140-142). What is rational in one culture is not rational in another, and in order to grasp the specific rationality the historian has to consider the specific beliefs of the culture in question. Understanding them in turn presupposes an understanding of the conceptual relations of the beliefs, or the consideration of the specific networks of beliefs of the people under study. Only in this way is it possible to detect deviations from the specific rationality of a culture and start to question the reasons for the appearance of dissident views. To insist on the need to recover the conceptual relation between beliefs and intentions is reminiscent of Collingwood's logically analogical demand for the identification of the conceptual relation between a question and its presuppositions. Skinner reads the texts as expressions of intentions, and Collingwood as answers to questions. For Skinner, the Collingwoodian presuppositions of questions are beliefs (cf. pp. 115-116).

I doubt very seriously that anyone wants to question this moderate intentionalism, especially as Skinner explicitly notes that a given work may indeed have meanings which its author could not have intended. He is merely stressing that "*among* the interpreter's task must be the recovery of author's intentions *in* writing what he or she wrote". Nor is he claiming that we should be prepared to accept whatever statements the authors make about their own intentions (p. 101, Skinner's italics, see also pp.110-111). Skinner does not deny the worth of the study of texts and their reception, but at the same time he also does not deny the possibility of considering the intentional activity of human beings with the help of their texts. Skinner is, however, not supposing that the meanings of texts could or should be identified with the intentions of their authors (pp. 113-114). Nor should we think that uncovering intentions presupposes certitude. Take an example delivered by Jacques Derrida, a fragment found among Nietzsche's manuscripts, which reads "I have forgotten my umbrella". It is very unlikely that we will ever be able to know for sure what Nietzsche may have intended to say with these words (p. 121). Uncertainty in uncertain sciences such as history simply must be accepted, but it is untenable to infer from this una-

voidable uncertainty that the recovery of intentions is altogether impossible. If this were the case, it would also follow "that we can never hope to establish that life is not a dream". The moral here is that the sceptic is simply "insisting on too stringent an account of what it means to have reasons for our beliefs" (pp. 121-122).

In the light of the way in which Skinner emphasises the conceptual relations between beliefs and intentions, it seems strange that he so heavily stresses the difference between motives and intentions (pp. 135-138, see also pp. 97-99) – that he thinks a sharp line needs to be drawn between motives and intentions in action, that it is intentions in this sense, not motives, that we need to recover if we are to decode the meaning of social actions. Skinner describes the distinction as follows. To know about intentions is "to know what speech acts [writers] may have been performing in writing what they wrote", but to know about motives "is to know what prompted those particular speech acts" (p. 96). Thus to speak of a writer's motives "seems invariably to speak of a condition to, and contingently connected with, the appearance of their works", that is, in the case of motives we seem "to be alluding to a contingent antecedent condition of the appearance of the work". In the case of intentions, we seem "to be alluding to a feature of the work itself", or more specifically, we seem "to be characterising it in terms of its embodiment of a particular aim or intention". In some sense, the intentions seem to be somehow "inside", and the motives "outside" their works (pp. 98-99).

On the basis of this distinction Skinner concludes that motives can function as causes, but there can also be non-causal explanations of action. An illocutionary re-description will explain the point of a social action, and grasping the point means removing the inherent puzzlement, which in turn means providing an explanation. To supply this re-descriptive form of explanation is to supply something other than a causal explanation. The attempt to uncover what the policeman meant in saying that "the ice over there is very thin", i.e. understanding not just what his utterance meant, "but what his act of issuing that utterance meant in the circumstances", is supplied by decoding the conventions governing the illocutionary force attached to the utterance. This is not a causal explanation because the explanation requires that we focus on a feature of the policeman's action, "not on an independently specifiable condition in the way

that causal explanation requires". What Skinner urges us to do is that before asking about someone's motives, or – as he adds ironically – "any deeper causes of their behaviour", it is appropriate to ask whether the performance of their action itself bears any conventional element of illocutionary meaning or force (pp.137-38). The point seems to be that if the distinction between motives and intentions (and between them and reasons and purposes as well) is not made, an important, even necessary stage in the process of explanation is elided. Skinner proceeds by admitting that causal explanations are also possible, even necessary. After decoding the intentions, the interpreter might enter the next stage: that of providing a causal explanation in terms of motives, and yet a further stage might "be to provide an explanation in terms of the grounds for the agent's possession of just those motives" (p. 139).

I agree with Skinner that it is indeed necessary to recover the illocutionary meanings of utterances. By applying the "naturalist" theory of causation, he has succeeded in showing that there are non-causal explanations of actions. But he has perhaps succeeded in aim at an excessively high price. His adoption of the "naturalist" theory of causation forces him to accept the ontological commitments of this theory. What actually troubles me is why, in the realm of thought, it should be reasonable to draw such a sharp line between contingent and non-contingent dimensions of thought, or actually, if we re-describe the distinction of motives and intentions in terms of their contingency grade, I must wonder if such a distinction is even possible.

As intellectual history is concerned with the realm of thought, it is reasonable to see the dimensions of thought as holistically internally or logically connected as possible. Explanations, at least in intellectual history, should be (in the "naturalist" sense of the concept of cause) as "non-causal" as possible. If an explanation is left on a non-conceptual level, it remains incomplete. A satisfactory explanation has been reached when we have traced all conceptual relations. Motives would also belong to this "total" network of conceptions, and as such would remain within the reach of our holistic view. Elsewhere Skinner seems to admit the conceptual relation between intentions, beliefs and motives. Not only do intentions depend on beliefs, but they are "always closely connected with our motives", too. This connection has significant explanatory value in that it "pro-

vides a vital means of corroborating any hypothesis to the effect that a speaker or writer may have intended a certain utterance to bear a particular illocutionary force" (p. 119). I am not urging intellectual historians to search for the correct definitions of intention, motive or belief. I merely think it useful to construct a working conceptual relation between these dimensions of thought, a combination that facilitates our arrival at valid interpretations of thought, and accordingly, also of action.

I am also slightly dissatisfied with Skinner's treatment of the influence model (pp. 74-76). It seems that he has not yet uncovered a tenable means of treating the model from a satisfactory non-causal (causal in the "naturalist" sense) perspective. First he stressed the impossibility of making the model work (Skinner 1966, 203-215), then he stressed that the concept of influence is "extremely elusive (if it is to be distinguished from a cause)", albeit not completely devoid of explanatory force (Skinner 1969, 25). In the updated version the remark on the elusiveness and the allusion to causality has been deleted, and his criticism has now been diminished to the conclusion that he does not suggest "that the concept of influence is devoid of explanatory force". In the footnote (p. 75, n. 106), Skinner even admits that not only is the concept of influence capable of being fruitfully used but that he also sometimes uses it himself (as he indeed does and has done). Now the requirements, which have to be met if the model is to be used, can be read as recommendations for the fruitful use of the influence model. To maintain that a given writer B has been influenced by an earlier writer A the following three conditions must be met: 1) that B is known to have studied A's work, 2) that B could not have found the relevant doctrine in the work of any other writer than A, and 3) that B could not have arrived at the relevant doctrines independently (for a more sophisticated treatment of conditions for influence, see Hermerén 1975, 156-262).

Whether or not a satisfactory explanation can be reached in this way, however, remains questionable. The mere identification of an influence is not yet an explanation of thought. The fact that somebody has adopted an influence must also be explained. Although adopting influence is in itself an indisputable fact, it is still necessary to decide why somebody should have been influenced by somebody

else (or something). Adopting influence entails the reflection on alternatives, in other words thought. Invoking influence as an explanation of thought means ignoring thought, the fact that choices are made. One way to proceed would be to view an adopted influence as an answer to a question, and this in turn leads to the consideration of the presuppositions of the question, that is, beliefs. This in turn means that the explanation has to include the interpretation of the conceptual relation of intentions and beliefs in order for the interpreter himself to be able to decide why one influence has been adopted over many other possible influences. In other words, the process of influence is more or less determined by thought, or more or less dependent on the conceptual network of both beliefs and intentions. As is the case with motives, it is useful in practice to treat influence not as a cause (in the "naturalist" sense), but as an alternative that is chosen more or less consciously. Here, as elsewhere, an explanation should be as "non-causal" or conceptual as possible.

Apart from the distinction between motives and intentions, I think Skinner has succeeded very well in justifying the need to study thought. Skinner's discussion of the rhetorical techniques of how the power of words is exploited in order to underpin or undermine the construction of the social world (chapters 8, 9 and 10) is a further justification of the need to take thought seriously. Skinner shows (pp. 147-157), among other things, that referring to professed ideals helps us to understand behaviour, even in cases where historical agents do not believe in any of their professed principles. Skinner illustrates his recommendation with the example provided by Max Weber. Entrepreneurs in early-modern Europe either profited or expected to profit from their large-scale commercial undertakings, but in the light of the social and religious standards of their age or culture their conduct was liable to appear morally and even legally dubious. In this hostile atmosphere, the entrepreneurs tried to describe their behaviour in such a way as to override the widespread accusation that they were behaving avariciously and dishonestly. The task the entrepreneurs were faced with was a hard and rhetorical one, the same task faced by all innovative ideologists: "Their goal is to legitimise questionable forms of social behaviour. Their aim must therefore be to show that a number of favourable terms can somehow be applied to their seemingly questionable actions" (p. 149).

Skinner elucidates numerous rhetorical tactics and strategies of how to apply a prevailing moral vocabulary to legitimise a questionable way of life. The most significant of them seems to consist of "manipulating the criteria for applying an existing set of commendatory terms". The aim is to insist that in spite of contrary appearances, strategically important favourable terms "can be applied as apt descriptions" of an apparently questionable behaviour (p. 153). So e.g. the meaning of the word *religious* soon became stretched and confused, denoting interest in punctuality and exactitude in order to be recognised and commended as a genuinely *religious* form of commitment. So a British professor might say that "I attend my departmental meetings religiously" (p. 167). This might apply to their everyday life, too. *Harrap's Easy English Dictionary* – which, as the editor P.H. Collin assures the users in the preface, aims "to list the most commonly used English words and phrases with simple definitions and examples of usage" – defines *religiously* as "regularly/at a fixed time of day", with the example as promised: "He religiously washes his car every Saturday morning".

The crucial conclusion to be drawn here is that the innovative ideologists can never themselves set the terms that they hope to apply in order to legitimise their behaviour. The question of what terms are available to be applied innovatively depends on the prevailing morality of their society, and their applicability is in turn a question of the meaning and use of the terms involved. The application cannot be stretched indefinitely. The terms must be applied with a certain amount of plausibility, determined by the moral vocabulary, the ordinary and legitimate meanings and uses of the terms. The entrepreneur cannot, for instance, "hope to describe *any* actions he may choose to perform as being 'religious' in character" (p. 173, Skinner's italics). In this way, the study of the principles they invoke is indeed the study of one of "the key determinants of their behaviour" (p. 156).

The important point to notice here is that the moral vocabulary of Protestantism not only contributed to the legitimisation of the rise of capitalism, but also helped to channel it towards an ethic of industriousness (p. 157). The next chapter can be read as a generalisation of this case. Skinner closes his critical assessment of the key word studies of Raymond Williams by posing the "vertiginous question"

(p. 172) of the nature of the role played by our appraisive vocabulary in the explanation of social change. The image of language as a mirror of social reality implies that the process of social change is the primary cause of developments in vocabulary. The metaphor is, however, misleading in that it "encourages us to assume that we are dealing with two distinct and contingently related domains: that of social world itself, and that of the language we then apply in our attempts to delineate its character" (p. 172). The normative language is not "an epiphenomenon" of social agents' projects but one of the "determinants of their behaviour" (p. 174).

A more general conclusion that can be drawn here is that the social vocabulary and the social world "mutually prop each other up" (p. 174). The most general lesson is that it is not only language that is simultaneously a constraint and a resource. This also applies to the social world, or the "mind-independent world" (p. 46). In interpreting thought and action both language and the social world, with their constraining and resourceful dimensions, have to be considered. How things proceed, or what happens in history, at present or in the future, is always dependent on thought. Thinking and acting people themselves decide how they react to these constraints and use the available resources, in other words how they make history. Thus it follows that understanding history presupposes the consideration of more than just the conceptual relations between intentions, motives and beliefs. In addition to the intentions, beliefs and motives of historical agents, the "total" network of dimensions of thought must include their conceptions of both their social world and of the ideas and ideologies of their age or culture. In this sense, all history must be the history of thought.

Skinner's description of the aims of intellectual history quoted above – that the intellectual historian's aspiration is to grasp historical agents' concepts, "to follow their distinctions, to recover their beliefs and, so far as possible, to see things their way" (p. vii, 3 and 47) – is also an apt rhetorical re-description of Collingwood's re-enactment thesis. Collingwood's "unfortunate phrase" (p. 120) of re-enacting the thoughts of historical agents does not oblige the historian to enter the heads of historical agents. The re-description helps the historian to grasp that re-enactment is not a method but an end or objective, something that he or she has to reach with the help of

methods. When the historian has succeeded in seeing things from the perspective of the historical agents, he or she is able to consider the alternatives pondered by the people of the past, in other words the future of the past. If historians succeed in arriving at valid interpretations (which sometimes seems to happen), they have simultaneously succeeded in understanding past actions, and, indeed, history itself.

The volume ends with a typically Skinnerian, i.e. modest statement. He compares his own approach with "the vastly more ambitious programme" pursued by Reinhart Koselleck. In Skinner's view, the Koselleckian *Begriffsgeschichte* is interested in the entire process of conceptual change, whereas Skinner himself is – referring to his analysis of rhetorical technics and strategies – chiefly interested "in one of the technics by which it takes place". These programmes are not, as Skinner appropriately notes, incompatible, and therefore he hopes that "both of them will continue to flourish as they deserve" (pp. 186-187), a view which Koselleck also shares (see e.g. Koselleck 1996, 62-65). Skinner's comparative remark on *Begriffsgeschichte* is a very mild reaction to Melvin Richter's efforts to re-approach and even to fuse the German *Begriffsgeschichte* and Anglo-American history of political languages. Richter's – no doubt well-meaning – proposal can also be interpreted as intrusive, and, accordingly, has the potential to lead to fairly irrational outbursts. John Pocock for instance, has declared that he is as unwilling to learn German as he is to seek to seek advice from a "*deutschsprechende*" community of historians. Pocock's own history of discourse is not in a "state of crisis" that would urgently call "for innovative rescue or assistance". Pocock is apparently tolerant enough to alleviate his outburst by concluding that he sees no reason why the two approaches "should not reinforce, stimulate, challenge, and enrich one another" (Pocock 1996, 47-48 and 58). His conclusion can also be interpreted as a warning or demand: "Please, leave us alone".

I am fairly sure that Skinner might consider learning German, and perhaps even staying in Germany for a while, in order to learn how the two programmes could indeed reinforce and stimulate each other, to see how they could be each other's *Hilfswissenschaften*. In order for this to happen, it would be useful to see that Koselleck's views are somewhat inappropriately identified with the lexical form

of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (1972-1992), in which concepts are indeed presented and analysed separately. We should (even for a moment) forget the lexical form of this *Lexikon* and keep in mind that, according to Koselleck, *Begriffsgeschichte* deals with concepts in the sense that experiences and expectations are stored in concepts. Thus the history of concepts could be more properly defined as conceptual history, which helps to understand how people have perceived and conceived of concepts and ideas as well as their social world. In this interpretation, the primary object of research is not a specific concept but the way people conceptualise their world. Similarly, intelligent intellectual history is not a social history of ideas, because ideas are not a mere reflection of the social world. Nor is intellectual history the history of autonomous ideas, as ideas are not making history. The true historical agents are human beings, who conceive of ideas and circumstances in their own peculiar way. The dichotomous question of whether concepts are indicators or factors of reality and social change deserves to be answered only in the affirmative. At least I cannot see why it is logically inconsistent to see concepts both as the indicators and factors of something. Skinner is only consistent with regard to his own theory of intellectual history when he affirms that there is "a genealogy of all our evaluative concepts to be traced, and in tracing their changing applications we shall find ourselves looking not merely at the *reflections* but at one of the *engines* of social change" (p. 178, italics mine).

It is a great achievement to explain or understand how conceptual changes take place. To maintain that his contribution is vastly less ambitious or more modest than Koselleck's *Begriffsgeschiche* is an understatement. Modesty can also be interpreted in another way, denoting a conception of what historians can hope to achieve. In order to arrive at reasonable and valuable historical knowledge one must avoid giving the impression of having achieved more than is possible for an historian to achieve. In an interview, Skinner has criticised the history of mentalities precisely for the fact that it has not been modest enough. It allows us to understand the treatment of "the whole *Weltanschauung* of people at different periods". He contrasts his own "much more modest enterprise" to the history of mentalities by saying that "I have never had the confidence to work on that kind of broad canvas, have never asked myself about the mental

world of the Renaissance, and, in fact, if I found a book with that title I am not sure I would want to read it". So he would advise his students to be modest: he would not "recommend a student to study a *mentalité*", because "to ask about an entire ensemble of beliefs is, for me, the wrong type of unit to take" (Pallares-Burke 2002, 231-232). Similarly, both the history of concepts and the history of ideas could be understood in an equally totalitarian way, assuming or presupposing a concept or an idea as being embraced in the same sense by every single human being of an epoch. In order to avoid this misunderstanding, it is indeed reasonable to demand that historians be as modest as they can possibly be.

Skinner's approach is not only a demonstration of the connection of thought and action and of the need to take this connection seriously. It is also a legitimation or justification of ordinary historical practice. Practice minded historians are used to reading texts in their intellectual, cultural and social contexts. Skinner has in his own way explained why this practice has worked so well, and the point of his theory of intellectual history is to make the practice work better. A good theory helps us, as the etymology of the word theory indicates, to *see* possible contexts, and the ensuing careful research will sort out the most probable and illuminating. Historians rarely come to think of how much they have to actually think in carrying out their work. Historians have, perhaps even more rarely, come to imagine how much they have to imagine in their work. Imagination is a necessary aspect in the search for (and at times in the construction of) proper contexts. A proper context is determined by the aims of interpretation. The proper or "very precise context of presuppositions and other beliefs" cannot be known in advance. One has to be able to find, identify or construct "whatever intellectual context that makes best sense of them". A relevant context, that is, a means of solving a problem at hand, need not be inherently immediate. Writers may be responding to problems which may have been posed in a remote period or culture. In order to recover a relevant context, "we may need to engage in extremely wide-ranging as well as detailed historical research" (p. 42 and 116). A relevant context is, in other words, in itself an outcome of research. Imagination, accompanied, aided and controlled by historical knowledge and reasoning, is also required in identifying possible illocutionary forces or in considering

the resources of language, as well as in attempting to recover the illocutionary acts or ways in which agents exploit these resources in communication (cf. p. 109).

Skinner has, in his own albeit simultaneously exemplary way, derived various insights from relevant philosophies, tailored or hammered them skilfully and at his own risk into shapes and forms that are suited to his own purposes. Here he is cherishing the best traditions of the nineteenth century *Historismus*, conducting his work in the spirit of one of his most esteemed "masters", R.G. Collingwood. Collingwood reminded us that history is a special form of thought. From this it follows that questions about the nature, object, method, and value of this form of thought must be answered by people possessing two specific qualifications. First, they must have experience with that form of thought: they must be historians. Second, in addition to possessing the experience of historical thinking, they must be able to reflect upon that experience: they must also be philosophers. This is also the ranking of the qualifications, because "experience comes first, and reflection on that experience second" (Collingwood 1973, 7-9).

Skinner has, in his own manner, kept historical agents alive, rescued them from the grip of the once influential version of the history of ideas, in which ideas were considered agents of historical change, as well as from the grip of the opposing version of the social history of ideas, in which ideas were seen only as indicators of social change, and finally, or recently, from a textual version of history in which texts alone were supposed to make history. He has, in his own peculiar manner, contributed to the re-inclusion of human agency into the sphere of history. This is a trend that is once again becoming fashionable, even in global history (see e.g. Adas 1998). I hope this time it will also remain in fashion, that it remains acknowledged as an indispensable dimension of the historical explanation. From this perspective it is also possible to convincingly pose and answer the question of the point or relevance of historical studies. Historians must not fail to ask and answer this question. It has to be answered in a way that obliges both historians and their audience, that is, reminds both of their own responsibility. Skinner, the historian of political thought, sees the relevance of his own studies as follows: "The alien character of the beliefs we uncover constitutes their 'relevance'.

Reflecting on such alternative possibilities, we provide ourselves with one of the best means of preventing our current moral and political theories from degenerating too easily into uncritically accepted ideologies. At the same time, we equip ourselves with a new means of looking critically at our own beliefs in the light of the enlarged sense of possibility we acquire" (p. 126, see also pp. 6-7, 26, 50, 54-55, 87-89).

By reading, and especially by doing good intellectual history we may learn to better think about what we think; we may even learn to think better. We may also learn from history if we are equally well informed about both the past circumstances, from which the lessons are derived, and the present circumstances, to which they are applied. Self-understanding presupposes the avoidance of anachronisms, and vice versa. Avoiding anachronisms seems to be a rather antiquarian enterprise; it seems to reduce "the study of history of thought to nothing more edifying than a conducted tour of a graveyard". This objection only embodies "a depressingly philistine failure to appreciate" the possibility to learn from a serious study of history (p. 125). But if we use the opportunity to learn, historical study "might have the power to transform us, to help us think more effectively about our own society and its possible need for reform and reformation" (p. 26). The relevance of history depends on us ourselves, on our will and capacity to think historically.

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Paul-Erik Korvela

"NASCONO LIBERI E NON SCHIAVI"

Quentin Skinner (2002): Visions of Politics, vol. II. Renaissance Virtues. Cambridge: CUP.

The second part of Skinner's three-volume "Visions of Politics" includes the revised versions of his principal essays on Renaissance political theory – many of which are nowadays regarded as classics. As always, Skinner's book is rich with profound philosophical argumentation. Yet it is exceptionally lucid in exposition[1]. Skinner has an enviable ability to deliver his message in an elegant package combining both of these features.

Generally, Skinner's interest is in the revival of *studia humanitatis* and what followed of that revival during the Renaissance – namely the wider study of ancient rhetoric, poetry, history and moral philosophy. That revival took place when, from the twelfth century onwards, the commentators of Roman law noticed that persuasive delivery, along with actual legal proofs, forms a part of successful forensic oratory and thus revived the interest for rhetoric and the language of ancient Rome. Skinner has little to say about the revival of poetry, but the revival of the other three elements of the *studia humanitatis* are discussed at great length and with outstanding expertise. However, the element apparently most important to Skinner is the revived study of ancient moral and political philosophy.

Reading political theory contextually, Skinner shows how actual political alterations had their effect on theories. He shows, to take one example, how the genre of advice-books for city magistrates transformed into the so-called mirror-for-princes literature, Machiavelli being the most famous exponent of the latter. This shift did not happen only in the realm of theory but also in actual political life, for there was a widespread shift during the period of *dal' commune al principato*, from traditional systems of elective government to the strong governments of a single *signore* or hereditary prince. Of the more important states, Venice alone preserved the forms of a republican aristocracy (the leading group known as the *ottimati*). But also Florence managed to cling onto its status as independent city-republic for a relatively long time. The outcome of this was a debate about the rival merits of self-government and princely rule, a debate that according to Skinner is of unparalleled historical significance. One of the chapters deals with that debate. Skinner's analysis of the genre of advice-books deals also with visual attempts to represent the virtuous rule and distinctive forms of government of the city-republics. The greatest surviving attempts in this genre are the so-called *Buon governo* frescoes by Ambrogio Lorenzetti, analysed by Skinner in two distinct chapters.

These ideals of citizenship and self-governing republicanism initially arose in the city-republics of the *Regnum Italicum*. One of Skinner's main points throughout the whole book is that this development actually pre-dates the Aristotelian revolution, the acquisition and translation of Aristotle's moral and political writings in the mid thirteenth-century, and also lived through that 'revolution' virtually unchanged, even though many previous studies have stressed the decisive role of that revolution. The writers of the *dictamina*, like Giovanni da Viterbo, Guido Faba, and the anonymous author of the *Oculus Pastoralis*, had no direct acquaintance with the works of Aristotle, and they completed their treatises before the translations of Aristotle's moral works began to circulate. Surprisingly, as Skinner shows, among the writers of the *dictamina* and similar compilations in the next generation, the doctrines of Aristotle appear to have had virtually no impact. Instead of ancient Greek authors, the writers relied on Roman sources.

Skinner's discussion of Renaissance political theory is also motivated by his wish to contrast certain features of it with the astonishingly pervasive 'gothic' visions that have surpassed them. According to Skinner, the archenemy of the Renaissance view of freedom, freedom endorsed in the writings of e.g. Machiavelli, is Hobbes. Nowadays that gothic vision is carried on in the writings of Rawls, Nozick, and their endless disciples. In this sense, Skinner's pursuit reminds me of Maurizio Viroli's "unrepentant nostalgia", the latter claiming that the evolution of political theory away from rhetoric toward analytic philosophy, which began with Hobbes and attained its perfection with John Rawls, has been in stylistic terms a decay, not a progress (cf. Viroli 2002, 18). Skinner labels 'gothic' the vision of politics in which liberty is a natural right, the antonym of liberty is coercion, and the maximising of liberty is seen as the chief, or even the sole, duty of enlightened governments. The opponents of this view, Skinner argues, are the classical and especially neo-Roman theories of government, in which freedom is oxymoronically seen as a form of service, since devotion to public service is held to be a necessary condition of maintaining personal liberty. Analysing Machiavelli's account on how to maintain civic and personal liberty, Skinner concludes that this account reverses the relationship between liberty and the law expressed by many contemporary theorists of liberty. According to the Machiavellian perspective, the law needs to be viewed as a liberating agency, without which there would not be a greater degree of personal liberty, but a rapid slide towards a condition of complete servitude due to the selfish nature of men. Skinner's Machiavelli has no quarrel with the Hobbesian assumption that the capacity to pursue our various ends without obstruction is what the term liberty properly signifies. Machiavelli merely argues that certain duties and the cultivation of virtues needed for performing them prove upon examination to be instrumentally necessary to the avoidance of coercion and servitude, and thus for assuring any degree of personal liberty in the Hobbesian sense of the term. We have been born in freedom and not as slaves, asserts Machiavelli, but for things to remain that way we must keep our community free from any *dependenza* or *servitù*.

Same kind of formulae can be found in the debates about the liberties of subjects prior to the English civil war, also analysed by

Skinner. From the parliamentary perspective, the civil war began as a war of national liberation from servitude, in defence of a free people, who are not born slaves. After the regicide, the newly established republic stood in urgent need of legitimation, and several different strands of political thought were immediately pressed into service. Thinkers defending the commonwealth, like John Milton for instance, drew extensively on classical ideas, and one of Skinner's aims is to sketch the evolution of this neo-Roman vision of the British polity.

Instead of being strictly philosophical or 'scientific', political disputes and conflicts in the real world tend to be rhetorical in character. In regard to Renaissance rhetoric and later English discussions, Skinner highlights the inability to agree about the proper application of evaluative terms. Challenging former interpretations, Skinner argues that the anxiety expressed by the seventeenth-century philosophers about moral ambiguity stems less from the rise of Scepticism than from the Renaissance revival of classical eloquence. The writers in question were seeking to overcome the humanist insistence that in moral reasoning it will always be possible to construct a plausible argument *in utramque partem*. Against this view, writers like Hobbes sought ways to limit the play of ambiguity and to arrive at authorised versions of potentially subversive texts.

For Renaissance humanists, *ratio* and *oratio*, reason and speech, were closely related. But the basic assumption, from which the whole idea of rhetoric springs, is that words and deeds, or words and things, are necessarily disjunctive – that there is no natural affinity between words and things. If *res* and *verba* were fixed together steadfast, there would be no room for rhetoric. In my view, Machiavelli is among those who ponder over the impossibility of correspondence between *cose* and *discorsi*. Machiavelli argues that things have often happened apart from (*fuora* – 'outside of') the discourses and concepts one forms about them. During the Renaissance, Lorenzo Valla's historically grounded linguistics offered an alternative to the traditional view that had held that words stand for things, and that this relation between word and thing is neither random nor contingent (cf. Najemy 1995). The wish to harness language to a mimetic, representational function emerges from the ambivalence we feel towards the use of words. This anxiety expressed by Valla, and to some extent by

Machiavelli, can been seen as challenging the entire tradition central to Renaissance humanism, that had accepted the beneficent power and utility of language and eloquence in politics, but in my view this is more like a confirmation of the fact that there is no such evaluative description that could not be contested with a rival one. As Skinner shows, faced with the problem of moral ambiguity and paradiastolic speech, some proposed the creation of a new language, some suggested the abolition of language altogether, and some proposed the regulation of meanings and definitions by fiat. The legacy of the Renaissance in this matter is that we cannot hope to solve our problems of moral ambiguity within the framework of our existing linguistic resources.

Sometimes, the most important clue in a criminal investigation is the fact that the dog *did not* bark. This fact is of the highest importance especially if it normally barks at strangers and the leading suspect is well known to the dog. Thus we can infer, as Sherlock Holmes does in the episode *Silver Blaze*, that the dog most likely knew the nightly visitor. This Holmesian form of inference is quite handy for scientists too. It is often quite relevant to ask why something did not happen, or why a given book does not deal with certain topics[2]. To conclude this review, I briefly raise one such question concerning Skinner's book.

While reading both this and some earlier works of Quentin Skinner, I have always wondered why it comes about that there is no sustained discussion on reason of state in his works. That term, almost formulated by Guicciardini in his *Dialogo* when he spoke of *la ragione e uso degli stati*, mentioned for the first time by Giovanni della Casa in 1547, and finally coined as a European literary *topos* by Botero in 1589, had its heyday during a period expanding roughly from 1580's to 1680's. It is inseparably connected with the emergence of the state, and, as far as I can see, plays quite an important role in that development. For even though the term *ragion di stato* was in fact used for the first time by della Casa in an oration composed around 1547 to the emperor Charles V, the seeds of reason of state can be found in classical antiquity and a number of medieval sources. For both Guicciardini and della Casa the concept intimated a distinction between the demands of (Christian) morality, justice, legality and the exigencies of the state. As Skinner among others has shown, the

use of the term 'state' during the period was ambiguous and could refer to the ruler's status, regime, territory, and finally, with the flowering of Renaissance republicanism, to an independent apparatus of government. But the gap between this new language of the state and the traditional republican public language of legitimation was exceptionally wide. Thus reason of state carried overtones of political cynicism, since it aimed at stabilising the position of the new and *eo ipso* illegitimate princes (cf. Höpfl 2002). Furthermore, reason of state was most commonly associated, and sometimes even felt interchangeable, with the interest of the state. However, as Sheldon Wolin has noted, the vital interests of the state were not necessarily identical with the interests of those who happened to be ruling, and consequently *Staatsräson* could not be invoked simply because rulers believed that it was in *their* interests to exercise exceptional powers or ignore recognised norms (Wolin 1987, 480). This is a development that, in my opinion, is perhaps not adequately emphasised by Skinner. Rulers quite often separated their own interest from the interest of the state, royal marriages being more than once the ultimate test. Even though it was considered a sin, many, if not most princes of absolutism, in their *Maitressenwirtschaft*, proceeded along the line that princes ought to have two wives, one for *ragione di stato* and the other to please themselves. Later, marriages overriding true love and arranged solely for state reasons, or forbidden by them, are standing subjects of e.g. the *Staatsroman* of the Baroque age[3]. In my opinion, when we discuss the emergence of the state, we should also discuss the interest and reason of the state. After all, as Meinecke put it, raison d'Etat is the "State's first Law of Motion" (Meinecke 1984, 1). Even though it is naturally debatable what is the 'reason' of the state, the crucial question is, what is meant by the word 'state' in the formula 'reason of state'. That is something that would require more research.

Notes

1 We may also note the fact that the book is edited with meticulous attention, and one cannot find many misprints. In fact, I noticed only two: in the

Index, Hegel's initials are G. F. W., when it should have been G. W. F., and on page 369, the German word 'staat' should have been 'Staat'.

2 In fact, with regard to classical texts, this resembles something that Skinner has called "polemical ignorance". Skinner's example concerns the fact that Locke in his "*Two Treatises of Government* makes no appeal to the alleged prescriptive force of the ancient English constitution" (Skinner 1978, xiv), which could only have been seen by Locke's contemporaries as a remarkable lacuna. When a given writer dismisses certain common topics of the time, we should get interested of that omission, since it may turn out to be very revealing and illuminate those topics that are in fact discussed by the writer. But this is also a point where we must proceed with extreme cautiousness. We must be careful not to impose the context on the text – we cannot disregard the text in favour of the context, since we cannot know better than the thinker the thinker's stance toward a given context. J. G. A. Pocock, to take one example, argues in respect of Machiavelli that the air of Florence was heavy with apocalyptic, and "Machiavelli could not have been as impervious to it as he may have liked to pretend" (Pocock 1975, 113; see also Sullivan 1992, 315). Especially as regards Machiavelli this kind of assertion is rather daring, for we know that Machiavelli omitted many topics that his contemporaries felt important. No references to natural law, to the artistic grandeur of Florence, to the emerging banking industry, trade etc. No greater discussion on the importance of colonies or navy. Machiavelli was, or pretended to be, impervious to many things, and we can not assert that he "could not have been" ignorant of something. We can always think that he really was acquainted with those matters and only pretended to ignore them or ignored them polemically, but if we follow the dictate of Ockham's razor, we must take into account the possibility that if he seems to be ignorant of those things, then he possibly was.

3 For the discussion, see Vagts 1969

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Juhana Lemetti

QUENTIN SKINNER AND THE HEYDAY OF HOBBES THE HUMANIST

Quentin Skinner (2002): Visions of politics, volume III, Hobbes and the Civil Science. Cambridge: CUP.

The year 2002 was a splendid year for Hobbes studies. The research community was cosset, one could say, when two major scholars, Professor Quentin Skinner and Doctor Noel Malcolm, reissued a set of their earlier essays with the addition of several new ones. In this review, I will concentrate to the former work, i.e. *Visions of politics, Volume III, Hobbes and the Civil Science*.

Skinner's work is charming and precise. The quality of his expertise is demonstrated, for example, in his discussion of the second edition of *De Cive* (p. 16). His essays comment on all the major puzzles of "Hobbesiology", e.g. the authenticity of H*orae Subsecivae* (p.46, p. 55) and the scepticism/humanism -debate (pp. 77-79). The editorial work is of a high standard; however, I have assumed that the ninth essay was originally published in 1966, not 1996. As you can expect, everything is well documented; the total number of footnotes is over 2200. Even so, if we raise our heads out of the labyrinth of details, we find a Socratic lesson in this book and in Skinner's work in general. Instead of an impatient desire to say what

something is, we should start from a look at what it is not. This is especially true with Hobbes.

The last decades have proved that Hobbes has become the pet child of intellectual history. A number of reasons exist for why historians are assumed to be those who say the most interesting things about Hobbes. To name the principal reason, for philosophers, Hobbes appears to be a toy-boy, or 'a whipping boy', to borrow from Doctor Malcolm's vocabulary, and thereupon, a philosophical study of Hobbes is in the state of nature. I think that there are at least two reasons for this. The first is that it has become a standard to study Hobbes having one's eye on some present purposes or political and philosophical currents, not from his own footing. Although this is a quiet normal practice in Anglo-American political philosophy, it does not advance our understanding of Hobbes or help to us to see our own political reality – a promise often given, but less frequently kept. Secondly, philosophical interpretations appear to be written, for a reason unknown to me, with a modern assumption that Hobbes had one, solid doctrine. Both presuppositions are, I believe, mistaken, and against this background Professor Skinner's essays are a welcome reminder. Yet it should be underlined that even our knowledge of the early modern political thought, and especially of Hobbes, has grown and will grow; the table has not been cleared to make way for the instant remedies for the political inconveniences that we face today.

In what follows, I have chosen, instead of an inclusive analysis, issues that I found interesting while reading the book. The first is the status of the book, which is not such a simple question, after all. In the general preface Skinner explains some of the major changes made and clarifies what is the role of the third volume in the trilogy. All the essays have been revised in a way that does not alter the original ideas, as the author himself writes, "one ought not to start moving targets" (p. vii). The text has, naturally, encountered changes, especially in relation to factual mistakes and secondary literary, and we do not hear of so many "noisy polemics" or struggle with "the long sentences" (p. vii). It is, certainly, in the eye of the beholder whether or not the simplification and softening of the text provides a *vision* of politics, and, personally, I had enjoyed the noisy polemics. Parenthetically, Hobbes himself moved from rather moderate texts to the furious and baroque style of his most visionary work, L*eviathan.* Along

the way he acquired enemies as well as a few friends and admirers (see essay eleven), but, above all, a lasting concern.

The inner dynamic of the trilogy is pointed out in a helpful way. Skinner explains it by the following trails of thought. "As we turn from Renaissance theories of civic virtue to Hobbes's civil science, we turn at the same time from the ideal of republican self-government to its greatest philosophical adversary", and methodologically speaking, "I seek to trace between the philosophical argument of volume I and the historical materials presented in volumes 2 and 3" (p. viii-ix). After this, a full stop? Not necessarily, for sometimes it turns out to be valuable to speculate on what is not explicated. More precisely, we may ask two questions: what is the relationship between other areas of Skinner's work and Hobbes? How does his R*eason and Rhetoric in the philosophy of Hobbes* communicate with these essays?

Broadly speaking, Skinner's interest in Hobbes concentrates on the origins, development and nature of Hobbes's thought on the one hand, and his conceptions of state, liberty and political obligation on the other hand. R*eason and Rhetoric* mapped, principally, the origins, development and nature of Hobbes's idea of civil science. The central idea was that Hobbes has been depicted as too modern a thinker, a proponent of the brave new science of politics. The collection consolidates Skinner's idea that perhaps Hobbes was eager to give the impression that he is a maverick on the steppes of scientific politics and that in some ways, he was. However, we should not see this change as dramatic and without predecessors, as it has been sometimes understood to be. In brief, Hobbes was "a product of the literary culture of humanism" (p. 3).

Essays three and four, as earlier drafts of R*eason and Rhetoric,* echo its thesis. Essay two is written after the publication of R*eason and Rhetoric,* but does not provide any new, substantial information. The repetition makes one's mind wander, and, to flirt with an idea, those who do not see Hobbes predominantly as a humanist political thinker, but are aware of Professor Skinner's profound knowledge of rhetoric, feel that he enforces the theoretical insights at issue. Purely pragmatically, the solution is user-friendly. Instead of reading a long monograph, the civilised academic public can enjoy one of the compact essays.

It can be stated that Skinner defends his central tenet also indirectly. For example, he gives the impression that Hobbes's adventures in theoretical philosophy is not so pleasant chapter to read and that "[a]t some stage Hobbes decided to stop banging his head against this particular wall and returned to the study of civil science" (p. 11, see also p. 17). Luckily, we learn, the intellectually annoying personal odyssey was supplanted by the translation of the Greek original (see fn. 205 in p. 65). Another instance, and not fully independent, relates to the role of D*e Cive*. To Skinner this first published work, the one that was widely known, especially in the Continent and considered there to be his principal work for a substantial period, is a "*rupture*" (p. 65). The collection shows that, especially in Skinner's late work, D*e Cive i*s used instrumentally, as an interlude, not an independent work. In short, Skinner is primarily interested in what influenced Hobbes, not so much in what his influence was. Related to this one may raise objections (see below).

Even thought Hobbes has been a central interest of Skinner from the beginning of his intellectual career, he has been occupied more and more with three other themes: renaissance, republicanism and, in particular, rhetoric. This shift can be found also in this book. I believe that there is a unifying idea. Skinner's early essays on Hobbes concentrate on demonstrating that he was not without predecessors or contemporaries in the storms of mid-17th century English politics and more into down-to-earth historical analysis. The later writings concentrate on the clarification of this general conviction. The outcome can seem different, especially when connected to other fields Skinner has studied.

Regarding the very composition of the book, it contains three types of essays, if the fifth essay is understood as a hop to the history of civilisation process. The first, essays reflected on above, seek to show how Hobbes's thinking can be seen as a continuation and reaction to renaissance humanism in the spirit of Cicero. The second group, including essays eight and ten above all, investigate broad historical developments that surfaced in the nuances of the turbulent political climate of the age. The third group of essays relate more straightforwardly to political theory and analyse Hobbes's conceptions of state, liberty and political obligation.

Essays concentrating on political arguments are, roughly speaking, the most un-historical ones. I do, however, believe that their value lies in the synchronic analysis of politics. Essay six, which studies the complexities between natural and artificial persons, state, authorisation and representation, is an awakening in many respects and indicates Skinner's growing engagement to the present political problems and debates. The entry into the slippery world of interpretation ("To construe. [...and...t]o construe again" (p. 181, 185)) is usually well established, but we do not meet the same success everywhere in the book. That Cicero and Quintilian ("deliberative oratory" (p. 70)) could contribute the problems of modern politics and to enlighten some contemporary core problems of metaethics with a piece of classical rhetoric (see pp. p. 122) are in principle good and welcome, but when these possibilities are simply alluded to and left to the level of remark, they lose some of their force.

Furthermore, there are a number of general issues that may strike the reader. Skinner's enthusiasm for Latin leaps out of the pages of the book. If we put aside the most obvious influence of Thucydides and Aristotle, the influences of Greek thinkers and heritage are somewhat embedded. What could also count as imperfection is the fact that in Skinner's works on Hobbes during the last decades the influence of strictly medieval thought, scholasticism have had always small role. Yet another unilateralism is the claim that Hobbes's theory of state (see the General Preface and essays six and seven) is the most enduring piece of his political thinking. This is an exaggeration. Surely Hobbes was the first to articulate clearly the modern notion of state, but he was also among the first who realised the cultural and symbolic dimensions of politics and its purely artificial and visionary nature. This aspect is present in his analyses of faith, church and religion. Skinner's Hobbes is rather secular, although he was, to an increasing degree, interested in religion, especially in such phenomena as fanaticism and superstition. To Hobbes, politics was about vision, which is defined in OED as "something which is apparently seen otherwise than by ordinary sight; e*sp.* an appearance of a prophetic or mystical character, or having the nature of a revelation, supernaturally presented to the mind either in sleep or in an abnormal state". The trick was how to tame this in a way that security and

commodious living would possible. Thanks to Professor Skinner, we have made some, and not minor, steps in understanding this process.

Notes

1 Noel Malcolm, *Aspects of Hobbes*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002).
2 Noel Malcolm, 'Thomas Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology', (PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1983), p. 202
3 For a how-to-read-this-book, see the first essay.
4 Some developments see Malcolm 2002, essay fourteen.
5 See, for example, Quentin Skinner, 'On Justice, the Common Good and the Priority of Liberty', in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citzenship, Community,* (Verso, London 1992, pp. 211-224). It should, however, be noted that Skinner is not offering the past as a ready-made solution to the present problems. His inaugural lecture (published as *Liberty before Liberalism,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998) is illuminating, and especially the third part gives some guidelines for this widely debated issue concerning the relationships between political theory, political practice and history of political thought.
6 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, 1989.

Pasi Ihalainen

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AGAINST, OUT OF AND WITHIN RELIGION

David A. Bell (2001): The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.

New approaches to the history of political thought and political cultures are producing interesting reinterpretations of the intellectual developments of the eighteenth-century, which was for long studied as one dominated by the Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution and emancipation of the middle class. Three approaches appear as particularly apt to lead to new findings: Firstly, the linguistic approach continues to reveal important aspects of mental changes experienced during the transition to modernity. Secondly, the religious (or pseudo-religious) contexts of much of eighteenth-century political thought are being taken seriously by an increasing number of historians, whereas some studies affected by modern social sciences still tend to ignore this dimension of past political thought. Thirdly, scholars in several countries are involved in the study of the formation of national sentiments and identities before the invention of the idea of national representation at the time of the French Revolution.

As a result of these approaches, it has become evident that the modern concept of nation did not simply appear out of nothing during the French Revolution to replace previous religious frames of mind and to become the new foundational concept of political discourse.

David A. Bell's new book *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* skilfully combines these three approaches to the study of eighteenth-century thought. Bell is one of those historians who aim at reconstructing an authentic picture of the eighteenth century without teleologically exaggerating the degree modernity of the era. Yet the simultaneous consideration of both the traditionalist and innovative dimensions of the eighteenth-century mental world convincingly demonstrates how fundamental conceptual shifts the contemporaries actually experienced. Bell's book provides an important, innovative, thought-provoking, and with proper historical evidence documented interpretation of the rise of nationalism in the leading state of eighteenth-century Europe. Bell shows how, in the course of the eighteenth century, the love and even cult of the nation rose to the core of political discourse, taking the place which had previously belonged to religion. He argues, however, that this rise of nationalism was based on the application of concepts and strategies adopted from religious life, which continued to provide the most useful analogies for the new cult of the nation as well.

Bell's methodological choices are closely related to what is known as conceptual history. Bell does not apply the category to himself, but he is aware of work done in the field, and his own approach could well be seen as one application of the genre. Bell defines his research strategy as an attempt to "trace the different things that the *nation* and *patrie* meant to educated French people during the eighteenth century, and the extraordinary actions they took to try and make the world conform to their ideal visions." (p. 20) He does not believe in such explanations of changes in consciousness which are based on causal relations to structural changes. He rather maintains that the languages of politics and the conceptual changes within them have their independent histories which cannot be reduced to mere reflections of economic, social or technological changes. He says to be "departing from the linguistic approach" (p. 227), however, and trying to consider the religious and cultural backgrounds of the conceptual changes he is studying.

Bell opens the discussion with a helpful conceptual distinction between the old phenomenon of national sentiment and the new one of modern nationalism. French national sentiment had existed ever since the Middle Ages, but modern nationalism, which was invented in the late eighteenth century, was a political program, which aimed at actively constructing a new nation instead of merely defending and praising an old one. During the eighteenth century, the meanings of the term *nation* changed in fundamental ways throughout Europe so that the nation turned from a divinely ordered division of humanity into a conscious human construction. According to Bell, already the beginning of the eighteenth century marked a major turn in the development of the cult of the nation, as the concepts of *nation* and fatherland (*patrie*) began to gain new roles in political discussions. In conventional understanding, *nation* referred a people united by common qualities, whereas *patrie* referred to the area to which the speaker was emotionally attached and to the ruler of which he or she was loyal.

Bell sees the rise of French nationalism as being connected with a profound change in the vocabulary of human relations used by the French, which started in the late seventeenth century. New political terms were taken into use, older terms were used in increasing frequencies, and conventional terms were given new and sometimes revolutionary meanings. The transformation included the emergence of new, secular or redefined concept such as *peuple*, *société*, *civilisation* and *public*, and above all *patrie* and *nation*. By the late eighteenth century, *patrie* and *nation* had already become the most important words in the French language of politics. The rise of this new semantic field also opened the way to the emergence of a newly defined concept of citizenship which, after 1760, allowed the French political elites to understand themselves as active political agents rather than as mere passive subjects of the king of France. The idea of nation-building through political action was not, however, invented before the years preceding and following the Revolution of 1789. Thereafter, the active construction of nation could mean the reduction of regional differences, the strengthening of division into citizens and foreigners, and intensified political education to the citizens, among other things.

Bell rejects previous interpretations of nationalism as a purely political strategy. He sees nationalism, patriotism and religion as deeply intertwined phenomena the relationship of which has not yet been thoroughly investigated. His own solution has been to study the use and changing meanings of the concept of nation in different discursive areas, including religion. He suggests that French nationalism rose both *out of* and *in opposition to* Christianity. Even though the Gallican Church did little to contribute to the actual invention of modern nationalism, Bell considers the emerging new understanding of the role of religion in society as a primary factor explaining change in the language of nation. It was the increasing separation drawn between God and this world, the deepening division into politics as public business and religion as a private matter, and the bitter memories of religious strife, which led to the rise of the concepts nation and fatherland in political discourse, Bell argues. As the conception of divinity changed, new conceptual tools were needed. The concepts *nation* and *patrie* emerged to fill the gap left by the exclusion of divinity from the political order. In the long run this conceptual transformation meant that the French became capable of seeing themselves as equal members of a distinct, uniform and sovereign nation, which was a product of human will and thus changeable.

Yet the cult of the nation did not suddenly replace all religion. Early French nationalism, while attempting to reorganise political reality in this world, often built on the long tradition of Catholic propaganda. Bell's work shows that no modern distinction between religious and secular yet existed, nor was there a deep division into traditionalists and rationalists in this era. It points to numerous analogies between the eighteenth-century French language of nation and traditional religious thought: The redefined eighteenth-century concepts of human relations such as *patrie* carried a sense of sacrality which had been characteristic of religious concepts. In the war propaganda of the Seven Years' War, ideas and practices from the Wars of Religion were followed. The division into "barbarians" and "savages", for instance, recalled earlier religious divisions of men. Also the construction of the canon of "sacred" Frenchmen built on the use of religious language and symbolism. Finally, Bell suggests that attempts to regenerate the French national character before and after the Revo-

lution also copied Catholic practises of propaganda, which provided the only available model for the conversion of the masses into supporters of a single ecclesiastical — or national — community.

The rise of the language of French nationalism is particularly important to understand because of the overwhelming cultural and linguistic dominance of France in eighteenth-century Europe. Bell does not consider influences outside the French borders, but, in future studies it might be worthwhile to focus on parallel changes in the language of nation in countries of Northern Europe on a comparative basis and thereby also to test Bell's central theses on the analogous relationship of religious and early nationalistic thought. As Bell himself suggests, a parallel rise and semantic change of the vocabulary of nation and fatherland can be discovered from other European states as well, even though the exact timing varies from country to country. In England, the term *nation* had been in frequent use ever since the first biblical translations. In Sweden, the term *fäderneslandet* had equally old roots, as had the Dutch *vaderland*. All of these became redefined in the course of the eighteenth century. Bell sees the French development as peculiar due to its high degree of reflectivity, its emphasis on political will as the basis of nation and the rapid rise of a nationalist program soon after the Revolution. In eighteenth-century France, the meanings of the words nation and fatherland became objects of conscious discussion. Bell's learned analysis of sometimes heated debates on the nature and even existence of the French *nation* and *patrie* helps to understand the fast rise of modern nationalism after the Revolution. Bell argues, for instance, that already in the 1710s and 1720s it became possible to speak about nation or fatherland as an authority that might rise above the monarch or exist independently of him.

Bell's thesis on the importance of religious analogies in eighteenth-century political discourse should be tested in other contexts, as it is known that national churches continued to play a role in the development of the language of nation in other European countries as well. Indeed, some preliminary findings suggest that nationalism could rise not only *out of* and *in opposition to* but also to some extent *within* the established religion. The scholars should, by focusing on the religious semantics of the language of nation, consider the possibility that religion was not merely replaced by nationalism but could

itself develop into the direction of a civil religion supporting nationalism. Evidence from several Protestant countries, at least, suggests that the national churches could be actively engaged in the construction of national sentiment and perhaps even the nations themselves. A number of Protestant preachers spoke about a distinct and uniform nation in their state sermons. Through frequent use in states sermons, nation and fatherland became gradually redefined, though not with the same radical conclusions on equality and popular sovereignty, which can be found in some late eighteenth-century French political treatises.

Bell's synthesis of French conceptual developments calls for studies in which the role of the clergy of the established churches in the redefinition of nations is taken seriously. Such conceptual studies are needed, as our understanding of some eighteenth-century conceptual changes continues to be limited. For instance, Bell's comparison of French and English language of patriotism reveals not only differences in the degree of xenophobia between the countries but also the underdeveloped state of the study of some eighteenth-century English political concepts, including that of nation. Bell sees differences in the use of the concept of fatherland in these countries but does not really have a study of the English language of nation on which to build, not to say one that considers its religious dimensions with the care with which Bell has studied France. In the lack of such work, Bell's conclusions on the relationship between religious universalism and definitions of nation in different countries remain somewhat vague. Between Protestant national churches, huge differences in definitions of the boundaries of "the second Israel" existed, and hence Bell's point about an easy union between Protestantism and the classical concept of *patria* cannot be taken as a self-evident generalisation.

The pace of the rise of the French cult of the nation, as reconstructed by Bell, deserves attention as well, as some of the major turning points seem to correspond with or may have affected parallel discourses in other countries. Bell suggests, on the basis of scarce sources, that the early years of the reign of Louis XV already allowed such public debate on *patrie* and nation in which the natural rather than divine origin of these was emphasized. Bell illustrates the growing frequency of the concepts with somewhat rough statistics drawn

from library catalogues and from a database of French texts. These show that the concept of *nation* became increasingly popular in France after the 1730s, whereas the concept of *patrie* had been quite frequently used as early as in the 1710s and 1720s. Its political importance, however, remained marginal until the 1750s. The major breakthrough of the language of nation seems to date from the time of the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), that is, about the same time as the intensity of the discourse on nation and fatherland increased in other Western European countries as well. What was new in the French history of war propaganda was the presentation of the conflict as one between mobilized nations rather than monarchies or religions. Bell gives an abundance of instances of the fashionable character of the concepts *nation* and *patrie* in the cultural and political life of the France of the mid-1750s. Even some contemporaries pointed out in the 1750s and 1760s that the word *nation* had never been repeated as often as in their days and that nothing else but works recommending patriotism was printed. As in some other countries, the crown was particularly active in sponsoring patriotic war propaganda in France, attempting to show that the love of *patrie* could be compatible with a monarchical constitution, turning the kings of France into leading patriots, and defining the patriotism as the love of king. The critics of the crown, in turn, used the terms to restore the power of some institutions or the moral community of citizens working for the common good.

By the 1760s, the concept of nation had become central to French political culture. The neologism *national* seems to have emerged after 1730, been used to form expressions such as "national character" and "national spirit" in the 1750s and to have gained real popularity in France in pre-revolutionary years. The frequency of the terms *patriote* and *patriotique* rose dramatically in the early 1770s, which Bell takes to reflect readiness for political action to create a proper *patrie*. It was after 1771 that such new interpretations of nation and *patrie*, which enabled the development of nationalistic doctrines after the Revolution, began to emerge. It became possible to think of nation as something to be constructed, and it was no more difficult to imagine a fatherland distinct from or even without a monarch. Once such concepts were possessed, it was not a long step to proceed to the invention of the modern concept of representation, which

saw the nation as the sole source of political power. *Nation* and *patrie* could now both become revolutionary concepts.

Bell demonstrates how the meanings of the concepts of nation and fatherland became widely debated and "radically destabilized" as a consequence of the collapse of the old regime. The discussants did not agree on their meaning or even on the very existence of a nation. Many felt that so diverse a compilation of peoples as late eighteenth-century France was did not yet constitute a proper nation, and hence the nation had to be constructed. Such nation-building work meant the birth of French nationalism, which was, because of the very need of creating a nation through political action, stronger than that of smaller states where a relatively uniform nation was already felt to exist. The way to the construction of a unique French nation — which was neither a copy of Old Israel or a version of Rome but something much more — had opened.

To this reviewer, Bell's analytical account of the rise of French nationalism appears as overall convincing. This book has many features of a classic work, and it will be essential reading for all future scholars of the eighteenth-century language of nation. Its important thesis on the analogous character of modern nationalism and traditional religion provides a starting point for an authentic understanding of the eighteenth-century mental world. The thesis will certainly be supplemented and perhaps partly revised by future studies, but the main argument stands on a solid ground: nationalism developed both *against* religion and *out if* it. It may even have developed *within* it as well.

Notes

1 Pasi Ihalainen, "The Concepts of Fatherland and Nation in Swedish State Sermons from the Late Age of Absolutism to the Accession of Gustavus III", forthcoming 2003.

2 Ihalainen 2003; Peter van Rooden's analysis of the Dutch eighteenth-century discourse on *vaderland* refers to the same possibility. Peter van Rooden, "Godsdienst en nationalisme in de achttiende eeuw: het voorbeeld van de Republiek", *Vaderland. Een geschiedenis vanaf de vijftiende eeuw tot 1940*, edited by N.C.F. van Sas (Amsterdam 1999), pp. 201-236.

3 See Hans-Martin Blitz, *Aus Liebe zum Vaterland. Die deutsche Nation im 18. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg 2000); Ole Feldbaek, *Dansk identiteitshistorie*, vol. 1: *Faedreland og modersmål* (Copenhagen 1991);

Bruce E. Gronbeck

DE JOUVENEL'S PURE POLITICS: REDEFINING THE POLITICAL IN POST-WORLD WAR II THEORY

Jouni Vauhkonen (2002): A Rhetoric of Reduction, Bertrand de Jouvenel's Pure Theory of Politics as Persuasion. Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 209. Jyväskylä, FIN: University of Jyväskylä.

I had the honor of being thesis opponent for Jouni Vauhkonen's *A Rhetoric of Reduction: Bertrand de Jouvenel's Pure Theory of Politics as Persuasion* (2002). The study explores the theoretical writings of de Jouvenel from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, the period during which he wrote in both French and English on political power, politics and politicians, forms of government, political groups, authority, and political process. The focus of Vauhkonen's attention is the formula de Jouvenel articulated as the essence of political process: "A tells B to do H". That formula (a speech act) is understood to be doubly reductionistic, that is, both a microscopic lens through which to redefine or purify political science/theory and an essentialization of pragmatic political acts. I am writing this article as both a review

of and a commentary upon Vauhkonen's study and the subject matter with which he is dealing.

The study is framed rhetorically and textually. Vauhkonen develops the book with the help of Quentin Skinner and Kari Palonen: Skinner's understanding of the historical-rhetorical contexts of theory and Palonen's conceptualization of *texta*, i.e., intra-texts, inter-texts, co-texts, and context as interpretive approaches to more fully analyzing political writing. Vauhkonen wants "to find out what de Jouvenel may have been doing in saying what he said" (p. 3). The saying is interpreted principally with the help of Palonen, and the doing, more with guidance from Skinner.

The book rolls out in roughly three sections: (1) It opens with what is termed an intra-textual strategy: internal relationships between ideas developed in various of de Jouvenel's writings are probed in an attempt to discover dynamic as well as sustained aspects of his thinking over the two decades under scrutiny. (2) The second section deals with what are identified as co-texts in a so-called historical-rhetorical reading of de Jouvenel's thought. The book provides a demonstration that de Jouvenel's book chapter "Pseudo-Alcibiades" attempted a reversal of Plato's ethical analysis of relationships between philosophy and politics. In the heart of the second section, the end-of-ideology debate in France and the United States is expertly reviewed, and then the French exploration of depoliticalization (*dépolitisation*), including discussions of political banality and various political parties' moves toward so-called unpolitical beliefs, is featured. The idea of *dépolitisation*, particularly, is shown to have both theoretical and practical-pragmatic implications. (3) Third comes the rhetorical study, termed a rhetorical-historical reading, involving a search for what Aristotle called enthymemes (see below), and a probing of "A tells B to do H" as a formulation that reduces the scope of politics to its most basic unit — one person asking another to pursue a line of conduct, that is, a political policy.

Questions can be raised about Vauhkonen's handling of each of these three sections of the work. I raise them less to criticize the book than to open dialogues on theoretical and metatheoretical issues that his work suggests. To begin: The intra-textual approach essentially collapses de Jouvenel's writing from the '40s, the '50s, and the '60s into a single body of thought. While that is not necessarily a serious problem

in political studies committed to philosophical propositions and comparisons, it certainly seems to do damage to a work committed to rhetorical principles. A kind of semiotic — almost semantic — emphasis comes through, as concepts are explicated largely for their definitional qualities. De Jouvenel's understanding of what it means to be *un politicien,* his discussion of the *terminus ad quem* (the ultimate regime), his conceptualization of relationships between politicians and citizens, and the classic worry over relationships between political means and ends are explored systemically in writings across the time period. Such a reading of de Jouvenel has the feel of a formalist exegesis; de Jouvenel's thoughts are de-historicized, even de-rhetoricized in part, by such moves. The rhetorician's — and Skinner's — commitments to the study of discourse-in-use, language-in-context, are left behind in this intra-textual analysis.

More interesting to students of rhetoric and politics is the second section, to co-textual study: In what ways were de Jouvenel's inquiries related to other, contemporaneous political questions, practical and theoretical? One should note that the question is answered in this book by de Jouvenel, not Vauhkonen; that is, the author argues that there are allusions to the end-of-ideology debate and *dépolitisation* in de Jouvenel's writings. Granted, one can argue that we better understand authors' intentions by following their allusions to related contexts. And granted, there is a good chance that the co-texts — and their contexts — as identified by authors will reveal something of their skills in analysis, refutation, and theorization. But, one should not grant that contexts so referenced are the end of the matter.

De Jouvenel's writings over the two decades under examination came during the author's residencies in France, Great Britain, and the United States, meaning that numerous political contexts were potentially relevant even if de Jouvenel did not mention them. His concerns for theoretical simplification and focus, for ideological miasmas, govrenmental responsibility, etc., would take on more and equally interesting implications if explored vis-à-vis: the debates over centralization and nationalization of educational and transportation industries in post-war Great Britain; the sorrow expressed over the end of socialism in the 1947-48 numbers of the *Partisan Review;* not only the end-of-ideology but also the much broader end-of-liberalism arguments in the United States; the decolonialization uproar in

France; the analysis of language games and pictorialization in Wittgenstein; the coming of speech act theory in England and the United States as a tool for understanding political discourse; the discussion of the role of tradition and traditionalism in the new science of political anthropology as it was developing in the work of Georges Balandier in France and Edward Shils in the United States, for example; and even the coming of game theory as a method for analyzing political disputation in the work of economist Kenneth Boulding and political theorist Anatol Rapaport at the University of Michigan.

I do not mean to suggest that Vauhkonen should have explored all of these contexts in hopes of finding all of the possible historically based applications of de Jouvenel's work. Rather, I would argue that social-historical contexts other than those too easily identified as "co-texts" could enrich and make even more relevant de Jouvenel's works in three different countries. The rhetorical force of works always must be understood within contexts — even contexts not salient to the author of those works. Plato could have had no idea of how his writings would be used in fascist contexts, nor could Marx have predicted Stalinism. The 1950s architects of Third-World African nationalism and post-colonialism likely were surprised with the applications of their arguments by First-World American black nationalists in the late 1960s.

The assessment of rhetorical force depends, often, less on explicit argumentation than on the contextualization and even recontextualization of discourses. The power of the enthymeme lies less in rational demonstration than in the moral perceptions of an audience, as de Jouvenel well understood: "The views of the good which are presently held are the politician's data which he uses to move people as he desires" (de Jouvenel quoted in Vauhkonen, p. 27). Those views spring from people living in a here-and-now, not from philosophical abstractions and general logical demonstrations.

The point here is this: I applaud Vauhkonen's analysis of the end-of-ideology debates (I came to appreciate not just its American champion Daniel Bell but likewise its French ambassador, Raymond Aron) and *dépolitisation* (a movement so far as I know without American support immediately after World War II). But, I hunger for more contexts within which to view de Jouvenel, all the more to appreciate the many facets of his thought.

I come now to the third section, that which is explicitly rhetorical in its focus; I begin where I left off in the examination of the second movement of the study: the enthymeme. Vauhkonen has relied upon a definition of enthymeme from the famous Oxford philosopher-historian of skepticism, Myles F. Burnyeat. Burnyeat defines an enthymeme as it often was in the late nineteenth century, as a truncated syllogism (or argument, *sullogismos*), constructed for "the simple audience" by "the speaker [who] is no specialist on the question to be decided" (quoted in Vauhkonen, p. 15). Such a definition (1) makes the enthymeme rationally inferior to a proper or complete syllogism, (2) suggests that political reasoning must be bifurcated because of intellectual or class differences between audiences, and (3), worse, ignores the source of its persuasive power, its bases in audiences' generally accepted beliefs (*doxa*). De Jouvenel, as I suggested earlier, emphatically understood doxastic power in his "Pseudo-Alcibiades", and indeed used that source of persuasion to suggest politics'/politicians' virtues in the face of philosophy's/philosophers' critiques.

The issue here, of course, is really not over which is the better definition of *enthymeme*. Rather, I am interested in where definitions of *enthymeme* lead one's inquiry. Burnyeat's definition leads Vauhkonen to construct chains-of-reasoning out of de Jouvenel's ideas, so that the chains themselves become the objects of our attention. A more rhetorically (situationally) attuned definition might lead us to examine de Jouvenel's writing as doxastic, that is, as grounded in the values and beliefs of his readers. Then we are positioned to ask the rhetorician's foundational question: *For what audiences was de Jouvenel writing?* People in the international Congress for Cultural Freedom, with whom he worked? French leftist intellectuals, his genealogical kin? American or British liberals and socialists, his English-speaking interlocutors? With Quentin Skinner, I believe that "understanding any proposition requires us to identify the question to which the proposition may be regarded as an answer" (quoted in Vauhkonen, p. 10), with the corollary that we cannot identify such questions without knowing who might be asking them. Who sat in de Jouvenel's audiences? Who was expected to read him? A rhetorical analysis that ignores particular audiences, in my view, is not complete.

Additional facets of the audience question come to mind when we think rhetorically about de Jouvenel's formula, "A tells B to do H" [simply, ABH]. While I am willing to accept the assertion that the formula/speech act is the heart of de Jouvenel's deliberative political rhetoric, I think that it can be further developed. For one thing, if the ABH formulation is the conclusion of an enthymeme, then as I have been arguing we must inquire into audiences: What is it in de Jouvenel's French, British, and American audiences that led him to attempt to persuade them that politics is a matter of A telling B to do H? For another, de Jouvenel complicates the formula by identifying three different species of As: A! is another politician or person of equal rank, A!! is a political/party leader, and A!!! is a sovereign. So, the formula can be written in three forms: A!BH, A!!BH, and A!!!BH. It should follow rhetorically, then, if there are three different kinds of speakers with such different *ethoi*, are there not different speech acts depending upon how we understand the idea of telling?

More specifically, the English verb "tell" is a speech act termed a directive—a saying that, if successful, culminates in an action by the person-told-to. (To be sure, "tell" can also have declarative or performative dimensions when it refers to a verbal act of story-making or story-reciting. From the ABH sentence structure, however, we clearly are not dealing with declaratives or performatives here.) The force of "to tell" when understood as a directive speech act cannot be assessed independent of context generally and, more important, independent of social and power relations between the interlocutors at the moment of the telling. This is what the rhetorical perspective brings to speech act theory: A!'s telling can probably best be understood contextually as a *request*; A!!'s telling, as *advice* or an *order*, depending upon the degree of party discipline involved in the political system; and A!!!'s telling, as a *command*. If there are three different possible directives in the illocutionary act "A tells B to do H", then of course there also are three different possible responses (uptakes): B might *comply* with A!'s request, *deliberate* or *approve* of A!!'s advice in a party congress, and *obey* A!!!'s command.

Returning to the general point, a speech act analysis done by a rhetorician cannot and should not decontextualize utterances, no matter how much some of J. L. Austin's or John Searle's followers would wish they could. Or, to put this in the language of the for-

mula, rhetorical analysts should be committed to (1) determining the sources of A's social and power relations with B, (2) exploring B's options in response to A's telling, and (3) even asking what it means "to do H" in particular situations. Does "doing H" involve extra-political (extra-institutional) behavior, voting or other marks of personal response or political commitment, some collective organizational activity such as party formation, or even just a rethinking of B's social-political identity in light of the recommendation to "do H", as we could have witnessed in the *uhuru* days of African decolonialization or the 1970s height of women's consciousness raising?

The question about doing-H brings us to one more level of analysis of de Jouvenel and of Vauhkonen's interpretation of ABH as a "rhetoric of reduction". It is tempting to argue, as does Vauhkonen, that de Jouvenel has reduced politics to a single speech act. If he is suggesting that "the political" has been reduced by being divested of its institutional activities — governing, administering, judging, redistributing, punishing and rewarding, etc. — then, yes, there is a reduction in the scope of the political. All of those assertive, directive, expressive, and commissive speech acts have been reduced to a single directive: telling someone to do something. But, it can be argued with equal force that he was expanding, not reducing, politics in the ABH formula. In "A tells B to do H" de Jouvenel was exploring what it means, not to administer government, but to act politically. In focusing on what it means to act politically, he was radically inflating the idea of politics by depicting it in even everyday acts wherein one person tells another what to do, what conduct to pursue.

And herein, to me, lies the genius of de Jouvenel's theorizing and Vauhkonen's exposition of that theorizing: *"The political" potentially becomes deeply imbedded in all speech directives, whenever and wherever A tells B to do H.* I certainly am not asserting that de Jouvenel was conscious of all of the possible implications of such a position, and Vauhkonen does not pursue them. The fact that he touches upon matters of political ethics, the demands of responsibility in civic politics, and de Jouvenel's concern for political order in his writings about sovereignty all suggest that Vauhkonen is aware of the formula's potentials, yet he leaves them alone.

That de Jouvenel was reformulating the idea of what it means to act politically in the period lying between the fascist and Stalinist regimes of the '30s and the great western popular political actions of the '60s is a fact that begs for more development. De Jouvenel's reformulation of political behavior, I should think, is best understood as the precursor to the West's attempts to grapple with both the personal and the social understood as politics, that is, with both the identity and class politics of our time. When "acting politically" comes to be understood, not as actions taken by Aristotle's or Cicero's magistrate, but as popular activity designed to affect or even revolutionize the operations of the *polis* and the perceptions of the citizens residing within it, the world of politics has been made anew.

I will go no farther. In this review-commentary, of course I have cheated. I have asked Vauhkonen to write a different book — one without an intra-textual analysis, one where co-textualization is controlled by the historian-critic and not the author, and one where the rhetorical is defined wholly in terms of the popular. Of course, too, I hope that he will pursue one or more of these lines-of-inquiry in future work and in dialogue with additional scholars; de Jouvenel is such a rich thinker because of his associates and possible interlocutors, and the 1940s to 1960s, such a turbulent era in which to examine political theory. When political theory is explored for its grounding in time and place, for its contestation of a variety of other practical and conceptual discourses, and for its abilities to makes demands of assent and allegiance upon its readers, then it breaks free from philosophically governed regimens and is assessed by its persuasive powers. That, ultimately, is the lesson we should derive from Vauhkonen's study. And that, too, I think, is what de Jouvenel was "doing in saying what he said".

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Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought
2003 vol. 7

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Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought is published in collaboration with the Faculties of Social Sciences and Humanities, and the Department of History, University of Jyväskylä.

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