


DIS-EMBALMING



Max

WEBER

PERTTI AHONEN & KARI PALONEN (eds.)



DIS-EMBALMING  
MAX WEBER

---

PERTTI AHONEN & KARI PALONEN (eds.)

## **SoPhi 34**

University of Jyväskylä 1999

SoPhi publishes social sciences at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland, and it is located at the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy. It provides a forum for innovative studies in social policy, sociology, political science and philosophy. SoPhi publishes 10–15 titles per year, both in Finnish and in English. Manuscripts are selected for publication on the basis of expert opinion.

Correspondence should be sent to publications editor Olli-Pekka Moisio, Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy/Publications, University of Jyväskylä, P.O. Box 35, FIN-40351 Jyväskylä, Finland, tel. +358-(0)14-2603123, fax +358-(0)14-2603101, e-mail olmoisio@cc.jyu.fi.

Visit SoPhi home page at <http://www.jyu.fi/yhtfil/sophi>

ISBN 951-39-0426-1

ISSN 1238-8025

Copyright © authors and SoPhi 1999

Printed at Kopijyvä Ltd., Jyväskylä 2001

Cover printed at ER-Paino, Laukaa 1999

Cover Tuija Tarkiainen

Layout Juha Virkki

# CONTENTS

<i>Kari Palonen</i> Embalming and Dis-embalming a Classic. The Case of Max Weber .....	5
<i>Sven Eliäson</i> A Present-Day Classic? Interpreting Max Weber. On Creative, Ultimate and Eclectic Interpretations .....	16
<i>Kari Palonen</i> Max Weber as a Text .....	40
<i>Hans-Ulrich Derlien</i> On the Selective Interpretation of Max Weber's Concept of Bureau- cracy in Organization Theory and Administrative Science .....	56
<i>Pertti Töttö</i> Max Weber – a Sociologist? .....	71
<i>Kyösti Pekonen</i> Max Weber's Concept of Charisma.....	84
<i>Olivia Guaraldo</i> The Concept of Objectivity in Max Weber .....	109
<i>Pertti Ahonen</i> "Wirtschaft" in Max Weber .....	133



*Kari Palonen*

## EMBALMING AND DIS-EMBALMING A CLASSIC. THE CASE OF MAX WEBER

Imagine that Max Weber were to “rise from his grave”, to use his own formulation on “the many old Gods” in *Wissenschaft als Beruf*. Continue to imagine that someone would implore him to read the contemporary textbooks on public administration, sociology or political science. He would note that every student in the fields of political and social sciences knows the name Max Weber. My guess is that the resurgent Weber would think: “Funny, the hero of all of these textbooks has the same name as me. Obviously he has many trivial views, but he seems to write more or less on the same topics as I once wrote on.”

Merely looking at the references would probably not be sufficient for Weber to understand that *he* is the hero of the textbooks and understand that *he* is the writer in question. Max Weber has become a victim of his own reputation. The original titles of Weber’s publications do not always appear in the quotations. We often find, especially in the older English translations, additions by the translators, who – in order to explicate Weber’s point – invent new sentences or combine formulations from different contexts (cf. some of the references to Parsons’ translations in Kyösti Pekonen’s contribution to this volume). The process of canonization into a classic does not

only elevate the significance of the author but also selectively simplifies her/his views.

Weber has probably suffered the effects of canonization more than many other author. If only he could see the names of the original publications attributed to him, he might begin to wonder whether he is actually the author of those conventional views. In one of his replies to the critics of *Die protestantische Ethik*, Weber quotes his teacher in *Finanzwissenschaft* G.F. Knapp:

Ich lese gewiß nicht gern gedruckt: ich sei ein Esel. Aber ich freue mich auch nicht, wenn jemand glaubt, drücken lassen zu müssen: ich sei kein Esel. (Weber, "Bemerkungen zu der voranstehenden 'Replik'", *Die Protestantische Ethik II: Kritiken und Antikritiken*, Hg. Johannes Winckelmann, Gütersloh: Siebenstern TB 1978, 52)

Weber's case illustrates more generally the problems associated with the construction of a "classic". A common theological metaphor used to characterize the process is canonization, which relates to the paradigm of the sanctification of a person by the Catholic church. Canonization as a process has, of course, a complicated history of its own, and the questions of who should be canonized and when are always subject to all kinds of politicking. The same is true of the analogies of canonizing, for example naming streets after a person.

In the context of this essay, I am not concerned with these interesting questions, but remain in the core of a metaphor and its applications to Weber. I also want to distinguish simple canonization from a special version of it, namely the embalming of a classic. The situation of studies on Weberian studies can be characterized as being in the midst of a metamorphosis from simple canonization to embalming.

## The classic as a "forerunner"

It is easy to enumerate some of the grounds for misinterpreting Weber by canonizing him. One of them is to count him as a "classic" of a discipline which did not exist in his lifetime. The most obvious case is that of public administration, an American discipline first created



largely after World War II. Of course, administration has been studied since the times of the 17th-18th century *Polizeiwissenschaft*, but there is neither an intellectual nor an institutional continuity between the contemporary 'administrative sciences' and these studies. Weber's analyses of bureaucracy are, accordingly, more modern when viewed through the paradigm of *Polizeiwissenschaft* (for a caricature of Weber in the administration studies cf. Hans-Ulrich Derlien and Pertti Ahonen in this volume).

The cases of political science and sociology are not much better. The names already existed, at least on the international level, although neither of the disciplines was institutionalized in European universities in a manner which even remotely resembles the present-day situation. The positive and negative competition between the content of these disciplines' names was complex. So much so that nobody could have predicted the modeling of both of them into the quite unitary institutionalized traditions dominated by the American paradigms of the post World War II period. To make Weber into a "classic" or at least "forerunner" of these disciplines is a form of canonization that undoubtedly would have angered Weber.

It has almost been forgotten, outside the sphere of Weberologists, that Weber was a professor of political economy. Weber's historical fate in the present-day economics is really sad. The name Max Weber does not appear in textbooks of the discipline, and his historical fate in contemporary economics is really one of an 'unperson'. Weberian economics has lost academic battles to the point of him going unmentioned in the textbooks of past doctrines. A clever young contemporary economist might even be able to collect ideas from Weber's studies on historical economics and present them as his/her own invention.

There are at least two reasons for the misinterpretation of both the content and points of Weber's studies through its disciplinary canonization. Both are closely related to the legitimating narrative. Weber would probably have had nothing against the evocation of his name in the legitimization of new disciplines: he might have been the first person to realize that everything has the possibility of becoming an instance of legitimization.

The point is that Weber is only considered a classic, in the sense of being a forerunner, as opposed to a real participant in the history

of the discipline. By the very structure of 'evolutionary' narrative academic disciplines, his views are bound to be judged as 'elementary', 'simple', 'superseded' etc. in relation to later thinkers. However, this presupposes that Weber's views are interpreted in a manner which makes them sufficiently similar to the later 'developments' which meet the criteria for success and, therefore, made both of them commensurably and easily rejected as 'old-fashioned' or superseded. However, in disputing this sort of evolutionist 'history of winners' in new academic fields, Weber would have insisted that what he did was entirely different.

Like other 'modern classics', the story of Weber has been revised during the process of specialization, 'the Weber industry', which has arisen since the seventies. A 'Weberology' has been resurrected since the decline of fashionable Marxism. This specialization has had many fine effects which have acted as catalysts in overthrowing the canonized view of Weber held by specialists, through a more historical reading of Weber's own texts. It has hardly reached the level of writing in the textbooks or even the more general theoretical discussions in political science, sociology etc. The distinguished colleagues who quote Max Weber do not consider the possibility that the picture of his views which they had once learned might be so entirely erroneous, that they are forced to revise their own views on the pasts of their own disciplines or theoretical areas of specialty.

## Canonization and embalming a classic

Still, the industrialization of 'Weberian studies' and the formation of Weberology leave me feeling uneasy. We are now moving from the first degree of canonization to the second. Of course, this new canonization has a higher level of competency and is limited to professionals whose ambition is to know 'everything that Weber wrote' and relate that knowledge to his 'contemporaries' in various fields.

Although this second canonization is intended to be critical, it easily becomes more glorifying in practice. The tacit, though still elementary formation of technically perfect Weber-editions, creation of Weber-societies, arrangement of Weber-conferences, and per-

haps soon also the publication of specialized Weber-journals, Weber-e-mail-lists, Max-Weber-homepages and, I hope, also Internet-editions of *Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe*, illustrates what I mean by the embalming of a classic. Wanting to publish everything someone has written necessarily means intruding into the privacy of the person in question. This would also be the case with a biography which would contain a daily register of the doings of a classic. Imagine what the resurgent Weber would say about the sort of hero-worship surrounding his name. The metaphor of embalming, of course, also secures that a resurrection would not even be thinkable.

Of course, this sort of embalming creates all kinds of valuable effects by the very professionalization of Weberian studies. The improved conditions of knowledge about all sides of Weber's writings and life are, however, easily transformed into barriers for too original interpretations. The mastery of an enormous amount of pages is a necessary primary criteria of seriousness, and, at least indirectly, of the quality of Weber scholarship. If you want to be included among first rank Weber scholars, you have to become an insider among Weberologists.

Any one-sided interpretation would easily be criticized by narrowly technical arguments concerning the textual details of the texts or facts about Weber's life, lectures, acquaintances and so on. A certain endurance is required from an outsider in defending an original idea in the face of normalizing technical criticisms by high ranking specialists. Criteria of quality in Weberian studies should include the point of his writings studied from a definitive perspective. The Weberian idea of 'one-sided accentuation' in the formation of ideal types should also concern Weber studies themselves, as a condition of pluralism and competition for the 'eternal youth' of Weber-studies (cf. the *Objektivität*-article of 1904 and Olivia Guaraldo's contribution in this volume).

However, an excellent Weber scholar need not be a 'Weberologist' in the narrow sense. The primary problems of Weberologists are the scholarly editions of Weber's work, studies on the details of timing and publication of his texts, as well as the questions of its reception. To study Weber as a classic of political theory presupposes a detailed study of Weber's texts and their *Werkgeschichte*, and also sometimes of his life. Still, the main topic of a study on Weber should be

the problems he dealt with as interpreted by the writer her/himself, as opposed to Weber as such. To be an excellent Weber scholar, one must do more than be a Weber scholar who merely studies Weber.

## Towards dis-embalming Weber

To a certain degree, writing on Weber today presupposes both the de-canonization and dis-embalming of his writings. Doing so requires positioning Max Weber as an 'old God'. In other words, the imaginary pitting of Weber against his later interpreters is required of anyone writing on Weber. But you are, of course, not Max Weber, and this sort of imaginary scenario remains limited. You also know Max Weber in a manner in which he did not even know himself, namely as an object of canonization and embalming. The process of rendering Weber as someone other than what he himself knew, cannot simply be discarded.

The paradigm of dis-embalming is, of course, the removal of Stalin's corpse from the Lenin Mausoleum, to which the de-canonizing acts of tearing down monuments dedicated to him, as well as the interruption of the publication of his collected works can be seen as a series of secondary events. Let me compare the dis-embalming of a theorist, such as Max Weber, to this paradigm.

Above all, the dis-embalming of a theorist cannot be reached by a Luddite act of destruction, of denunciation of the acts of canonization and embalming. The 'fresh' Weber, posited against the 'embalmed' one, is only partial and selective, and understanding the point of partiality already presupposes a knowledge of the existing editorial works, interpretations etc. As Reinhart Koselleck writes, *Umschreibung* in history is possible only after *Aufschreibung* and *Fort-schreibung* are already available ("Erfahrungswandel und Methodenwechsel", in: *Die historische Methode*, München: DTV 1988, 13-61).

There are two sorts of innovating interpretations concerning a classic text. One is related to the experience of confronting the primary texts with canonized views, and the realization that the received view is entirely wrong, and you can easily play your own interpretation against it. Thus, you can either cast attention to some

of the faults in the received view, or to some of the neglected aspects in the work of the classic. This sort of experience is quite common when one closely and attentively reads the works of a classic. In the case of Max Weber, it is due to the specific histories of canonization (which it is not at all difficult to dispense with the received views and achieve a sort of de-canonization through your own interpretation).

Still, whether or not you have reached a dis-embalming of Weber by this move is an entirely different question. It is very possible that all you have done is move from the level of a dilettante to that of a professional, where you continue the ongoing work of specialists to embalm Weber. Your contribution only adds a new piece to the construction of embalming. In Koselleckian terms, this is still an act of *Fortschreibung* rather than *Umschreibung*.

If you know what is going on among the specialists, it is probably easier to detect the weak points in the existing interpretations and present something entirely new. However, this is the point at which professionalization can easily be interpreted as an act of inclusion amongst insiders. The readiness to break from ones fellow professionals, and not just participate in academic insider debates, appears as somewhat of a return to dilettantism, for a professional *Fortschreibung* is always easier than *Umschreibung*. The point is, if you want to present a profiled and provocative interpretation of a classic, you must not fear being accused of being a dilettante amongst insiders.

Thus, you need not be included among those already initiated in order to present an original interpretation of a classic. Rather, you must rhetorically persuade some insiders to accept that your reinterpretation is also worth being considered amongst these professionals. As a theoretical contribution, the creation of an *Umschreibung* is sufficient, and you can leave its 'further development', or *Fortschreibung*, to the narrow minded specialists.

\* \* \*

## Perspectives of dis-embalming

This book is not primarily intended for specialists on Weber's work. Max Weber is in these essays just an author we happen to be interested in – as one of the greatest modern political theorists etc. But in a sense, it is really a contingent matter that we deal with Weber. We think that our papers illustrate some general problems and chances of reading modern classics in general. In this sense, we think that the papers give also some links about the contemporary debates of conceptual change, reception and historical interpretation also to those who happen to be rather interested in other classics than Weber or in other concepts than just those dealt in the text or who have met in the textbook production i.e. in the field of literary or philosophical classics similar problems as we have found in the common sense picture of Weber.

The background of the papers is a joint political science – administrative sciences doctoral course held at Virrat, Finland, in late September, 1996. The aim of the book is mainly pedagogical: a sort of deconstruction of the textbook picture combined with a presentation of a plurality of alternatives approaches, perspectives and disciplinary backgrounds. The intellectual background of the authors differs both regarding the academic “establishment” and the intensity in the interest in Max Weber's work. Still, it is justified to claim that every article, in its own way, contributes to a dis-embalming the “second hand Weber” of textbooks and introductory courses<sup>1</sup>.

The strategies of dis-embalming practised in this book can roughly be divided into reception analyses, textual perspectives and conceptual approaches. The first ones, here practised by Sven Eliaeson, Hans-Ulrich Derlien and Pertti Töttö, start with the received view, but take a distance from it with different means. They are contrasted by approaches, who take the texts of Weber as the point of departure, as done, by different manners by Olivia Guaraldo and myself, in order to get closer to the argumentation of Weber. The third practice of revisiting Weber takes his practice of reinterpreting all the concepts used (cf. my *Die Umstrittenheit der Begriffe bei Max Weber*, forthcoming in the *Sonderheft Die Interdisziplinarität der Begriffsgeschichte*, of the *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* ). Kyösti Pekonen and Pertti Ahonen use especially a rhetorical perspective to understand

Weber's conceptual revisionism concerning to of his well-known concepts.

*Sven Eliäson* is a Swedish political scientist from the University of Karlstad. He has worked with Weber and especially with the reception of Weber (his dissertation from 1982 was called *Bilden av Max Weber*) since the seventies. The article published here gives us an overview on the situation of the contemporary Weber studies in both Germany and in the Anglophone world and he problematizes the theses of applying Weber to present-day problems and of the thematic inactuality of Weber in the contemporary world. Eliäson's main point for the dis-embalming is a defense of the plurality of perspectives in the Weber interpretation against the un-Weberian attempts to present a "total" interpretation, *Gesamtdeutung*.

*Hans-Ulrich Derlien* is Professor of *Verwaltungslehre* at the University of Bamberg in German. His contribution, originally published in German in 1989, is an important illustration, how Weber's view has been misinterpreted in the administrative and organizational studies, not only at the textbook level but also in the research proper. Weber's views on bureaucracy have been understood anachronistically, when put into a perspective the US style administration and organization studies. Derlien shows, among other things, how this reading is also based on a narrow textual basis in the reading of Weber, especially the neglect of Weber's political writings, in which his critical attitude towards bureaucracy becomes obvious. Furthermore, the received view at this field also neglect in their interpretation of the Weberian concepts the historical context and Weber's specific point in reinterpreting the concepts themselves.

*Pertti Töttö*, a sociologist from the University of Jyväskylä, questions the most common disciplinary classification of Weber, namely his labelling as a sociologist. This questioning follows a broader trend in the Weber studies since the eighties, but Töttö discuss the problem within the discipline of sociology. He thematizes the attempts to establish sociology chairs in early 20th century Germany as well as the contemporary critiques of them. He then confronts Weber's position with two common self-identifications of sociology, *Gesetzeswissenschaft* and *Gesellschaftswissenschaft*, but draws attention to the paralellity of Weber's critique of these labels to some contemporary, "post-modern" sociologist's self-identification.

*Kari Palonen* from University of Jyväskylä, currently research professor of the Academy of Finland, has reinterpreted Weber's key role in the history of the concept of politics in his book *Das Webersche Moment* (1998). In his contribution to the present volume Palonen takes as his point of departure the simple fact that Weber was an author who wrote a number of text of different kinds at several intellectual levels and academic fields. Palonen gives a closer look at Weber's idiosyncratic style of concept formation. He also stresses, with studies of textual interpretation and rhetoric, the significance of distinguishing various dimension of textuality in reading Weber's work and proposes a preliminary classification of the types of texts written by Weber.

*Olivia Guaraldo* is a political philosopher from Verona who now prepares her dissertation in political science on Hannah Arendt's interpretation of totalitarianism at the University of Jyväskylä. Her contribution to the present volume is a fresh reading of Weber's famous article on the objectivity from 1904. Using a close reading of the text Guaraldo explicates the key concepts of Weber, such as *Verstehen* and the ideal type, often repeated in the 'methodology' lectures of social and human sciences, but seldom analyzed in the context of the narrative of the objectivity article itself. Guaraldo puts Weber also to a wider historical perspective as a critic of both the essentialist and the naturalist currents in the intellectual history of his time.

*Kyösti Pekonen* is professor of political science at the University of Helsinki. He has at various occasions problematized the central but much misused Weberian concept of charisma. In his contribution here he stresses the rhetorical character of the Weberian concept of legitimation in general and of the legitimation of the charisma in particular. Pekonen goes, however, a step further than Weber towards a rhetorical analysis of politics by emphasizing, with Paul Ricœur, the role of the charisma as a living metaphor, which can be used for a politicization of the situation. This rhetorical approach allows Pekonen to see charisma always as "democratic", in the sense of being dependent on acceptance of the followers of a leader.

*Pertti Ahonen*, political scientist by vocation but professor of financial administration at the University of Tampere by profession, discusses some historical and rhetorical dimension in Weber's use of



the concept *Wirtschaft*. Against the discourse of the professional economists and administration scholars Ahonen insists on a close textual and historical analysis of Weber's vocabulary. In Ahonen's perspective Weber appears as a critical *political economist*, who analyzes dissolves the total figure of "the economy" into economic actions. He further discusses especially the unanticipated consequences of economics in a political perspective of a struggle by economic means. In this perspective both the discourse of "economic rationality" and the heroic figure of the entrepreneur, as a parallel to the politician, look entirely different as in the legitimacy jargon of the contemporary economists and their apologets.

## Note

1 At the technical level this collection does not always correspond to the criteria of first rank Weber scholarship. The quotations are partly made from originals, partly from English translations of different quality. A systematic coordination of translations, editions or the English use of the Weberian concepts has not been made, partly due to insurmountable problems of translating, especially of the concept of *Herrschaft*: It is well-known that *domination* is a poor translation, but the alternatives, such as *rule*, *ruling* or *authority*, are not universally applicable either, and for example Hans-Ulrich Derlien has in certain cases preferred to use *domination*.

Sven Eliæson

## A PRESENT-DAY CLASSIC? INTERPRETING MAX WEBER\*

*On creative, ultimate and eclectic interpretations*

### Weber in context vs Weber today

There might be reasons for a certain pessimism concerning the prospects of clarifying the elusive image of Weber. We have studied some prominent failures (Eliæson 1995). From competing “creative interpretations” of Weber’s contribution to the scientific enterprise we have moved towards less selective and more all inclusive attempts at a *Gesamtdeutung*. “Ultimate” interpretations claiming to have found the true meaning of Weber are themselves ambitions which fall back on pre-Weberian essentialism. German Weber scholars especially seem to be haunted by a strong inclination to achieve coherence. This flight from ambiguity might generate more profound interpretations. However, it will erroneously fail to catch the tacit key to Weber’s work as a whole. There is no such key.<sup>1</sup>

This, however, does not diminish Weber as a key figure in the history of social science doctrine, rather the reverse. To read Weber’s methodological texts involves an encounter with his context.

---

\* This essay is a polished version of a chapter in my book *Max Weber’s Methodologies*, forthcoming with Polity Press in Cambridge, UK.

Even if no single approach in modern social science could be successfully and reliably singled out as the true Weberian approach, the general notion of scientific value relativism is after all a retrospective creation by Arnold Brecht (1959). Although it is certainly less vulnerable to refutations than the attempts at what might be characterized as “substantial methodological” paradigms.

The wishful search for a thematic unity in a fragmented *œuvre* has – selectively assimilated – the positive effect of generating an ever more profound level of awareness of the complexity of the evaluation of Weber’s roots, as well as historical significance. The proper balance between retrospective, contextual and immanent approach to Weber as an object in intellectual history is not easily accomplished. Most endeavours in intellectual history are methodological mixtures.

The immanent reading of Weber, as a contrast, shows that he shares the shortcomings, limitations and restricted horizons of his own day with the difference that he has the sensibility to affect the course of social science. As the co-founder of a new discipline he has the opportunity to start anew, a “Stunde Null”. The stalemate of *Methodenstreit* provides Weber an attentive audience, the receptivity of which, however, depends upon Weber’s sensibility to dress in the guise of his recipients, sharing their language, preconceptions – and anguish. Weber – as a dutiful citizen in the spiritual republic of German historicist scholars – responded adequately to the difficulties his generation of scholars had to face, which, because of Carl Menger’s (in effect, Gustav Schmoller, as we recall, started the quarrel, the famous controversy over method, *Methodenstreit* between history and theory) *Herausforderung* (challenge), happened to be mainly methodological.

Weber as a diplomat adjusting his message for optimal resonance is of course a bold suggestion, touching the heart of the methodological problem of intellectual history.

There is little point in treating Weber’s texts as canonical, as a matter of exegesis when what is needed is adjustment and correction. Treating the authority of the texts as hewn in stone leads to the further danger that we suggest that the author has himself misunderstood his own canonical text.<sup>2</sup>

There are, however, so many scholars working with Weber’s legacy that it is hardly possible any longer to annex his scholarship and to

claim it for obscure purposes. Ideally intellectual history in its initial phase contributes to cumulative cognitive science.

Looking at the post-paradigmatic world of Weber studies we can note the divergence between a German Weberology that is contextualist and an Anglo-Saxon tradition that is presentist. This divergence is itself a product of a differential seminar practice.

Accordingly recent German Weberology has increased the knowledge of various aspects of Weber's scholarship. In part this is driven by the elusive goal of discovering the thematic unity within Weber's *œuvre* (Schluchter, Hennis, Tenbruck).<sup>3</sup> In part, as in the Mommsen & Osterhammel-reader *Max Weber and his Contemporaries* (1987), it displays an ideographic mastery in covering the most varied aspects of Weber's scholarship and tends towards a restoration of a German *Kultur*-orientation. This is not all wrong, for instance Weber's stress on cultural values as points of view (ultimate or "top" values) has very deep roots. The contextual time horizon should preferably transcend the proximate neo-Kantian influences and be brought back at least to Enlightenment in its German guise. However, the Germans are prone to overlook the new elements Weber contributes to the German setting, with its traditional historicist hegemony and Hegelian idealist legacy. Many learned discussions about "Weber and..." appear as in a strange way lacking in perspective, almost appearing as a *l'art pour l'art*-contextualism. Reducing Weber to his roots and context appears as exaggerated. After all Weber was not fully assimilated in his own days and transcends the very time-horizon which the retrospectivists (or "presentists") tend to overlook.

The Anglo-Saxons by contrast have enormous blind spots due to their lack of knowledge of the German language and history; in many cases rather unaware, moreover, of the intellectual setting for Weber's intellectual performance. This promotes a bold textualist or retrospective (presentist) approach, rather than a contextualist or historicist one. There is a strong tendency to pass verdicts on Weber or to apply him from modern vantage points.<sup>4</sup>

While the Anglo-Saxons in general are more retrospectively inclined and motivated by utility, the Germans – as a general judgement – tend to be too contextual, unable to transcend the original German context, risking to neglect Weber's role as a link between past and present.

It appears sensible to me to place Weber in a context from the retrospective interest of the pursuit of social science. Making Weber's methodology an object for the history of ideas, social science doctrines, might appear as an almost paradoxical approach. In the case of Weber this is the most appropriate way to catch his significance. His role as a dutiful and receptive commentator on his contemporaries makes for that. I have pleaded that the utility of the classics rests not so much with their immediate applicability, as with their role for our sense of identity. The role of the classics is limited - but indispensable. It is for the historian of social doctrines a sort of self-destruction to deny the applicability of the classics, a sacrifice in the name of science, "walking out on a limb" in reducing the relevance and scope of one's own undertaking.

## Weber's lack of relevance today

Weber had no notion of a modern welfare state and would probably have been astonished by today's egalitarian mass-democracies, as Edward Shils reminds us (1987: pp. 554 and 565). He had a sceptic attitude to modern mass democracy, yet pioneered the transformation in Germany from a *Machtstaat* to a *Volksstaat*. Although Weber's elitism is cognitively adequate (compare Robert Dahl's "polyarchy"-concept), it still today appears as exaggerated considering the immense change in the distribution system brought about by modern mass democracy. Voters are certainly still manipulated – in big nations by competing elites – but the shift of emphasis in taxation from consumption goods to income as well as the more and more (in a longer time-span, I overlook the debate on the most recent development) egalitarian allocation of material values in Western societies could hardly be explained otherwise than with the breakthrough of mass-democracy and effective government. A certain grey mediocrity is the price we pay for this peaceful transformation, when the passions over basic political issues gradually are replaced by practical considerations of a more routinized character. In modern Sweden, as the most extreme case, the whole constitution is totally changed after decades of parliamentary committees, almost without public debate, while elections focus on details of social reforms, like VAT-rates and the

“fair” taxation of retired people – although passions might still arise over environmental issues Weber could not possibly have foreseen. Weber was focusing on more burning fundamental matters of nation-building.

Nor did Weber foresee the options for mass-manipulation inherent in modern techniques of mass communication. He died before Goebbels’s theatrical mass rallies and FDR’s fireside chats. The Carl Schmitt dimension is significant albeit the infrastructure for plebiscitary practice by means of mass communication is on another magnitude than Weber could foresee.

Weber must be reconsidered, adjusted and mended in order to become useful in modern applications, even if some of his general considerations about participation vs efficiency, as well as his dark vision of ever growing institutionalization and routinization – only interrupted by occasional charismatic eruptions – still appear as basically viable as a diagnosis of Western civilization. One might say that Weber is outdated in many respects, although less refuted than Marx. Recent events in Eastern and continental Europe could even be seen as a confirmation of Weber’s basic notion of bureaucratic socialism as damaging to the viable innovative and productive forces in society.

Weber does not write anything about the “Third World”. For instance in his wide-ranging studies on the Indian religions he hardly even find the British colonization worth mentioning. Weber’s concept of imperialism focused on the impact of imperialism in German domestic politics and its effects on the relations between the dominating European world powers. The hegemony of European civilization is something Weber had few incitements to question.

Yet, as an outmoded character (a label applied to him by his brother Alfred) Weber is surprisingly alive.

Weber’s concepts are rarely of immediate applicability. Furthermore, the classics are maybe not needed to provide guidance in order to explain phenomena in modern society. Curiosity and scientific criteria are more urgent. Certainly, however, the classics have at least an indispensable mediating role to fill in the cumulative process of science. Institutionalization of a research tradition allows for a more intense focusing, simply more powerful, than any single intellectual hero could manage. The role of the hero, the myth, is to serve

as a cohesive factor in such a process. Weber has been a more popular victim for this retrospective penetration than any other classic, except for Marx.<sup>5</sup>

## Weber's relevance today – after all

Historically Weber has had several applications.<sup>6</sup> Considering all the lacunas in Weber's work his prevailing and astonishing relevance to present-day European affairs is surprising, even if the peculiar German background – delayed nation-building as well as modernization of the governmental system – is ever present in Weber. Part of the explanation is that 1989 (*die Wende*) meant a return to the situation before 1914 and even back to 1848; the peculiarities of German history being at the core of various European scenarios.

We have noted the vivid Japanese engagement with Weberian scholarship. Weber is, moreover, also now being translated to Chinese, although the study of Weber in China now experiences a backlash because of repression, Weber being labelled an *Unruhstifter* (subversive character) by the ruling elite (according to personal conversation with Mrs Wang, Weber's Chinese translator, in Munich in 1989).

Even in developmental research Weber attracts interest. His concept of Western rationality is naturally intriguing to nations in a position to avoid mistakes made by the most advanced Western societies. Weber could thus because of the contribution of his comparative studies to the enlightenment of Occidental uniqueness gain a relevance today as a point of reference to the ongoing nation-building in Africa and Latin America. Weber's concept of legitimacy is here in focus, as well as the dichotomy traditional vs modern, and the Tönnies-distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Also Weber's East of Elbe-studies have a general significance for nation-building, with regard to conflicts between national values and economic self-interest of the ruling class.

Still, any attempt to utilize Weber in order to build a "good government" is un-Weberian, at odds with Weber's dark vision of a routinized and bureaucratized modern world, without any attractive alternatives – but pre-Enlightenment Romanticism, reactions in vain. Weber is not a prophet.

There is a tendency that German affairs – intellectually as well as politically – almost automatically touch upon the world as a whole. German universities were models for many institutions, in the New World especially, when the “1848rs” escaped over the ocean, followed by the 1919 and 1933 and 1938 waves. The peculiarities of Germany has a wide bearing on universal scholarly life, as an almost tacit dimension. In the case of the University of Chicago these contacts are frequent and the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* (social policy association) contributed to a more “state-friendly” attitude than naturally tuned in with the general American creed, of Spencerian Social-Darwinism.

German state inspired nation-building with its strong patrimonial elements might be a better (more realistic one) paradigm than the more alien ones of liberal utilitarianism. In his East of Elbe-studies, on the rural labour force and its composition, Weber studies the effects on a national economy of foreign competition, as well as the tensions between class structure and national common interest, in a way that actually could guide normative political action. In the East the German so called *Sonderweg* in fact might provide a viable model.

The paradoxical and wide interest in Weber is not quite as surprising as one at first glance would be inclined to believe, although any interpretation of Weber neglecting the importance of *deutscher Sonderweg* to the proper interpretation of Weber’s authentic thought is adventurous, again obscuring the genuine image of Weber. Just as merely utilizing the classics somehow make them superfluous, merely interpreting Weber’s texts exegetically simply won’t suffice either. The contextual approach is basic for a genuine understanding of what the classic tried to articulate. It helps us to avoid mixing up the genuine positions of the classics with the mended and modernized versions in trade. Application interest is quite legitimate but might cause a deformation of the classic authors, when we try to extend them beyond their own scope or tell them what they ought to have meant .

It seems that Weber has something to say to everyone. Just like his exclusive focus on Western uniqueness, only approaching the rest of the world for the sake of historical comparison and negative supportive evidence, in the vein of John Stuart Mill (the canons of induction) paradoxically might attract present day “Third world”-



research, his focus on the long trend secularization process also paradoxically implies the “other side of the coin”, emphasizing the immense importance of religion in the human history and placing Weber within a Judaic-Christian tradition.

Weber’s scepticism to Marxian claims likewise could be conceived as an incorporation of the Marxists in the scientific cumulative process.

## Weber and modernity

Weber’s substantial studies focus upon the most significant and puzzling phenomenon in world history. How could tiny and fragmented Europe, a mosquito on the nose of the Asiatic giant, in such a short period of time rise to total world dominance? Considering the recurrent European civil and religious wars as well as repeated invasions from East and South this is truly puzzling. The growth of calculability and a rationalized order in ever more spheres promotes the breakthrough of modern capitalism. Weber’s answer in ascribing the peculiar and unintended innerworldly rationality of the Protestant ethic a central role is no final answer. Behind the Protestant attitude similar dedications to systematic ways of life, treating in effect time as a scarce product, had occurred already in Ancient Judaism.

Any attempt at scrutinizing the nature and causes of modernization calls for Weber. The unintentional innerworldly effects of the Protestant’s otherworldly rationality could cause some pessimism concerning the possibilities to plan any breakthrough to a society of affluent mass consumption and mass production, while on the other hand, again, Prussia-dominated Germany a century ago in fact was in a situation not without clear parallels with some so called NIC-countries (or would be NIC-countries) today, the state having a role in promoting development “from above”, in drawing on previous experiences (this is not only a theme among the German national economists in Weber’s days, already Friedrich List had pioneered this approach, long before the public sector research among the “socialists of the chair” in *Verein*). Russia today might profit from a comparative Weberian analysis, comparing it with the breakthrough situations in Western countries.

An interesting counterfactual hypothesis is what would have happened in case China had by bureaucratic initiative managed to pioneer capitalism. In such a case Weber would have been forced to reformulate his problem.

Without getting lost in this vast debate we might note that undeveloped young nations might have good and varied reasons for an interest in Weber's thought, maybe even only to avoid some sinister effects – like lost sense of community (*Gemeinschaft*), etc. – of Western utilitarianism and market society.

It is by no means necessary to be tuned in with Weber's dark visions in order to find his intellectual craftsmanship elucidating and challenging, paradoxically demonstrated by Marcuse's love-hatred syndrome towards Weber in Heidelberg 1964 (see Stammer ed.).

Weber responded to external stimuli in the way he proceeded with his work. This is one main reason why he is not a genuine classic with an *œuvre* the structure of which could be easily subsumed under one principle. However, the "Zwischenbetrachtung" essay is enlightening with regard to his comparative studies of the great world religions and the "Objectivity" essay illuminates his methodological creed, as does of course also his public lecture "Science as a calling" from 1917. The persisting interest in the interpretation of Weber's thought is due to his relevance for the diagnosis of Modernity, disenchanting science failing to replace religion as the source of meaning and throwing us into the dilemma of (moral) choice or the lethargy of nihilism. Jaspers has written that "After Nietzsche, man had found, at any rate up to now, his last and definite personification in Max Weber" (Jaspers, 2nd ed 1958: p. 88, here quoted after Mommsen 1989: p. 170). On a very general level one might agree with Hennis's thesis – as well as Parsons's (see for instance Schluchter's eulogy at the funeral of Parsons 1979) – that the concern with the human predicament is Weber's central concern. This, however, does not sufficiently clarify Weber's role for social science doctrine and is thus misleading for any scientific evaluation of Weber's paradigmatic contribution.

Weber's "value-aspect-choice-methodology" reflects the general philosophical predicament of Modernity. Method can also be put into context and studied as an object in the history of ideas. This is

to be understood as an attempt to find orientation and understand – and relativize – the predicament of the discipline or rather tradition within which one's work is to be pursued and assimilated, as a chain in the explanatory endeavour as a whole. That the social sciences today tend to lose their "hard core" (Lakatos's term) and to be cannibalized by their empirical pendants (specialities) or economics (Udéhñ 1996) is probably a symptom of premature closure in the name of hypothetical-deductive method as the one and only correct method. In actuality the options are obviously more mixed, as already noted by Weber. There is no reason to denounce unity of science and the possibility in principle of standard positions in the philosophy of social science, but it would be an illusion to mistake this eventual option for actual reality, which is certainly more scattered, due to a lack of interrelated and integrated discourse.<sup>7</sup>

Behind the various reactions to Weber we encounter, again, different conceptions of Enlightenment. Modernity is conceived in different ways depending on how one evaluates Enlightenment. The transformation in Occidental mind brought about by Enlightenment appears as a genuine *Weichenstellung*, switch-point, in the history of ideas, although the process is a gradual one. Humans replace God as the masters of their destiny, as Jeff. Alexander expressed it (1989: p. 74). For primitive Man God was ever present in everyday life, while the Medieval Man tried to find out his intentions and directives. "Once God directed man, now man chooses his Gods" (Alexander, *Op. cit.*: p. 79). Today's innerworldly mastery of a secular society might rather bring us in conflict with natural environment than with God.

The problem of theodicy and meaning remains an issue despite the optimism about scientific progress reflected in the mixed ideological and cognitive scientific claims of liberals as well as Marxists.

As reflected in for instance Jürgen Kocka and Detlef Peukert (1991) there is a more humanistic idealistic conception of modern post-Enlightenment, carrying on Condorcet's idea of progress into new applications, like in the case of Habermas's normative consensus through communicative competence. This cultural idealist progressivism has, in common with American neo-Straussians, like Robert Eden (1984), the hope of a successful discourse in ethics, as a way to come to grips with the nihilist dilemma. As Horst Baier (1987)

notes, the Europeans are more apt to assimilate Nietzschean (Weberian) Modernity, in accepting the tragic stalemate between ultimate values as an inescapable tragedy of all attempts at political ethics.<sup>8</sup> Weber's *Freiburger Antrittsrede* could be read as a Nietzschean argument for political modernization and "education", something pre-Enlightenment neo-Straussians, neo-Aristotelians (MacIntyre, Bloom), as well as (value) philosophical Weberians ought to be able to agree upon, albeit with very different verdicts. "Philosophical Weberianism", i.e. neo-Kantianism, is methodologically refining the existentialist dilemma of choice and responsibility, what Horst Baier refers to as "the long shadow of the dead God" (1982) or "der Schatten Nietzsches über Webers Wissenschaftslehre" (1987: p. 433). In the modern nihilist tradition (Axel Hägerström and various modes of legal realism) one cannot possibly ascribe any (eventual) cognitive value to "moral force", "good" or "bad". Weber's scientific value-relativism, as a more radical non-cognitive form of value-ontology than Kelsen's legal positivism (parallel to the Finnish anthropologist Westermarck and Hägerström) is not an enchanting position – it is simply difficult to escape. Value-positions seem to rely on self-evidence, an act of faith, not shared by modern social science, a realization that in its infancy caused Weber and his colleagues much agonizing.<sup>9</sup>

When underpinning my own "value-nihilist" interpretation of Weber as a "Nietzschean" methodologist it is thus neither as decline or progress, rather it is conceived of as a phase in a process of demystification, secularization, the meaning of which we have to come to terms with ourselves.

## Weber and secularization

In "Vorbemerkung", "Einleitung", as well as in "Zwischenbetrachtung" we find supportive evidence of Weber as a manifestation of a long trend of secularization, of which his value-aspect-methodology is an expression in a strategic sector of societal development. Weber carries straws to the same stack as Machiavelli, Samuel Pufendorf, Bentham and Gunnar Myrdal, just to mention a few important scholars. In Machiavelli's instrumental manual for statecraft we see

the rational economic actor emerging as a paradigm. Pufendorf's main effort is to bring about a mode of analyzing civil society in a way that accommodates various religious denominations, in the wake of the 30 Years War. Bentham characterizes natural law thinking as "non-sense on stilts". Myrdal pleads for "significant" but explicit value points of departure.

The above mentioned key-texts from Weber's sociology of religion, frequently referred to in the modern *Gesamtdeutungs*-debate, are written "on the level of wisdom", i.e. Weber on a meta-level reflecting upon the context in which his comparative sociology of religion, his substantial main work, is to be understood.

In "Vorbemerkung" Weber explicitly refers to Machiavelli, in contemplating why Occidental rationalism takes a more fatal course than for instance Indian, evidently with Kautilya and his *Arthashastra* in mind. It is noteworthy that Weber immediately mentions rational concept formation as a central instance of uniqueness, in this root-centred context referring to Aristotelian systematics.

The theodicy-problem is discussed at length in "Einleitung". Referring to Nietzsche Weber develops an almost "functional" view on religion and society, in scrutinizing material and ideal interests in terms of religious rationalism and its relation to rationalization of practical life. Confucianism, for instance, appears just as anti metaphysical and utilitarian as even Bentham's system, nevertheless distinctly different. When religious sublimation takes the form of methodical application of practical rationality, calculating the appropriate means for instrumental action, the Take-off to Occidental Modernity results.<sup>10</sup>

As long as asceticism and contemplation merely remains in the realm of methodical abstraction without practical application it has no such innerworldly consequences, as compared with when the ascetic Protestant started to make the world the object for his accumulation of salvation – and mundane – "credentials".

The affinity between Weber's methodological enterprise and his meta-reflections about his own work is strong, even striking. His methodology certainly has a role in the societal change he studies. Weber is thus in a way part of his own object, secularization and world-mastery, through systematic rationality systematic, *methodische Lebensführung* and *Zweckrationalität*.<sup>17</sup>

In discussing the gradual secularization of meaning Weber notes that empirical research, even natural science, is less a threat to religiosity than philosophy, especially to the ascetic Protestant. However, as soon as the rational process of cognitive science brings about the full secularization and demystification of the world, so transforming it more to a causal mechanism rather than an arena of wonders, miracles, revelations, the tension between the mundane and secular attitude, on the one hand, and the religious ethics of the world as a rule of God, on the other hand, becomes apparent. Calculating cognitive science as such is not promoting a meaning-oriented mode of thought. Religion is more and more identified with the diminishing sphere of the irrational and supernatural (*GARS I*: p. 564, in “Zwischenbetrachtung”).

This is hardly the place to scrutinize closely the *Stufen von Welt-ablehnung* and predestination as the link between innerworldly and otherworldly rationality. But the open-ended nature of Weber’s value-aspect-choice methodology (the “norm-sender problem”, as Bruun writes, 1972: p. 93 *et passim*) needs to be noted and is only partly answered by Weber in his “Zwischenbetrachtung”, and its concluding subsections on the changing attitudes to death and culture. The meaninglessness of death in modern time-conscious fully secularized society is in sharp contrast to the natural sense of fulfilment of Abraham, or any other primitive farmer with a strong sense of belonging to the cycle of nature. Death is natural recycling, if it does not occur accidentally or prematurely, while to the *Kulturmensch* it is rather accentuated meaninglessness, as a reflection of the increased problem of meaning of life itself, questions with no answers, in anti-meta-physical Modernity. We are stuck with the anguish of the existentialist, “Nietzschean” or “Kierkegaardian”, dilemma on which ever refined methods of instrumental science have no bearing.

## Understanding Weber

It takes time to assimilate Weber, as a – on the methodological level – non-paradigmatic (or multi-paradigmatic) classic. As Collins observes (1974: p.147), in important respects we have not yet gone beyond the classics, rather similar to the Renaissance-scholar

rediscovering the Greeks. The basic alternatives of history vs theory are at least in effect not reconciled with each other. We are thus to quite an extent continuing an old debate between the alternatives of Leopold von Ranke vs Auguste Comte, or Gustav von Schmoller vs Carl Menger. Extreme caution of interpretation is required, however, in order to re-establish lost links, instead of extending the classics way ahead of their possible scope.

That we should avoid Scylla as well as Charybdis might appear as a very feeble and anaemic conclusion. But the serious Weber discussion is better served by nuancing than launching intriguing suggestions, simplifying our image of Weber. Cleaning up in the chaos of paradigmatically flawed conceptions is merely a first step in the direction of a full and diversified reception of Weber. Realizing when interpretations become extensions marks another step.

Weber connects past and present. As a social and methodological thinker at the polemical cross-roads he has many predecessors as well as followers. The creative interpretations as well as the ultimate interpretations both are erroneous. The tensions Weber had to react on still prevails and Weber's role was to promote the debate between history and theory to a higher level of scientific rigour, without finding the final solution – which does not exist, in the infinite process of learning. The basic paradigmatic divides in pre-paradigmatic social science are pretty much the same today as two hundred years ago.

Weber, moreover, also connects, in effect, the Anglo-Saxon and German intellectual worlds. The role of neo-Kantianism to quite some extent is to adapt Baconian and Humean notions to historicist Germany. It appears as erroneous that Weber performs this mediating function without being much of a philosophic mind and probably with a limited acquaintance with Hume's texts. As world champions in history writing the Germans are no great pioneers in theory and calculating reason. These elements of Enlightenment – embryonic already in the Renaissance – are only slowly integrated into the idealist and romantic realm of German scholarship. In doing this mediating effort, Weber naturally speaks his mother's tongue, in order to (or so it works, anyway) be understood by his fellow countrymen. This, however, is only one aspect of Weber's work. Regarding Weber as a crude Germanization of Anglo-Saxon innovations would of

course leave us with a very partial understanding of his work. The German development followed its own course and the process of secularization was delayed, owing to the strong romantic creed that went with nation-building, delayed because of the 30-years war. However, England, as a related country with a different history, appeared as an interesting model to relate to, although with a certain ambiguity. This is also reflected in Weber's response to the *Methodenstreit*.

Weber is more to be understood with Kant and Nietzsche than Marx in mind. Although Weber is by no means cut off from Marxian currents in the way he seemingly is without links to Durkheim it is nevertheless a *cul-de-sac* to dwell in the Weber-Marx-juxtaposition industry, as I call it (Eliæson 1986). Marx, no matter his theoretical contributions to the understanding of the development of capitalism, belonged to a pre-neo-Kantian generation with all the Hegelian ballast prevailing in his epistemological luggage, precisely those impediments Weber jettisoned. Marx, moreover, only wrote a dozen of pages on methodology, in "Einleitung zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie", a tiny basis for the endless dogmatic exegesis to follow among later disciples. Marx simply appears as old fashioned in comparison, with an obsolete view on concept formation. For political ideological reasons Marx's theoretical accomplishments were only slowly assimilated within the body of scientific knowledge, especially slow in social Darwinist America. Mostly Marx has been marketed as a "package-deal", while Weber is utilized more eclectically. Dahrendorf (1987: p. 574) is probably right in suggesting that the eclectic use of Weber has proved more successful than dogmatic and totalizing ones (speaking about the modern Weberians as "happy epigones").

Weber as a "conjunctural" and "middle-range" analyst of political life, modified or not, is doomed to become increasingly irrelevant, although – in contrast – his emphasis on routinization and bureaucratization will have a general relevance of persisting character. Moreover, the persistence of old forces in history will make Weber's analyses fertile for a considerable time.

We cannot foresee the future of Weber's methodology. Weber's multidimensionality is not hard to relativize historically – put into context – as we have tried, but it would be an inappropriate form of



neo-Hegelianism to believe that Weber's incomplete and in some respects already transcended rational teleological "pluralistic" – or "perspectivist" – methodology would not become antiquated. It was a compromise already in its day, a synthesis bringing about a *modus vivendi*, between history vs theory – or anti-positivism vs positivism. However, just like Machiavelli and Hobbes, Weber would still be one of the most central characters in the history of social science, moreover a few basic features certainly still viable, like *Zweckrationalität*, ever refined but basically the same notion of calculability, instead of magic or mere contemplation as the way to master reality.

In Machiavelli's world of *virtue* and *fortuna* scientific explanation was most embryonic – but – the stress on calculability renders his statecraft a new dimension as a useful manual for the power game of politics. To Hobbes the world as a whole was a proper realm for deductive unified science, thus leaving God with an essential function only in context of justification, a marginal honorary position, suitable for the balance of powers between faith and knowledge in early Enlightenment.<sup>12</sup>

The main reason for Weber's prevalence is that he fought a battle which has to be continuously re-fought. Uncompromising search for scientific – anti metaphysical, secular – truth is constantly under siege by extramural interests, and moreover the Barbarians are already inside the walls, as Bloom might put it. Weber's persistent scientific creed, as we meet it already at the turn of the century and later in several essays until the *peripeti* in the late twin-lectures, is the hard kernel in his contribution to posterity. Weber's break with historicism is very tender and unostentatious, rather offering his hand to those lagging behind, not "slamming the door". Weber did, however, as we recall, once slam the door, at the legendary *Werturteilsdiskussion* in the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*. As an illustration to what was close to his heart. Although a passionate man Weber was otherwise able to control himself from such outbursts.

## Notes

- 1 The various attempts to find some sort of unifying principle in Weber's work are, moreover, chimeras. Even if we were fairly convinced about which extrascientific ultimate intentions Weber had, in terms of *Lebensführung*, *Erziehung*, or whatever "secret love" we might find, it would still only – in contrast to Hennis's alleged aspirations – serve as a sort of fallible vehicle for extrapolation, in rendering his work more coherent and wholesome than Weber did himself.

Mommsen, again, incarnates the agony of the German debate on Weber, on the one hand acknowledging the evolutionary character of Weber's work, reflecting changing positions over time, and still continuing to build, on the other hand, models for two dimensions of social chance in Weber's universal historical sociological conception. He thus remains a participant in the *Gesamtdeutungs*-debate we ought to transcend.

In the case of Tenbruck the same predicament is reflected. Even if Tenbruck has triggered off the major recent debates on Weber's methodology since 1959, incidentally the year of also Mommsen's re-evaluation of Weber from a good liberal to an instrumental nationalist, he was haunted by a search for the lost foundations - or lost continuity - of German cultural science. In line with the spiritual manifestations of *deutscher Sonderweg* Tenbruck is apt to stress the historicist elements in Weber, who is not regarded as a sociologist. Obsolete as it might be, it still is evidently well tuned in with a deep and viable streak in German social thought, since this basic historicist revival of sort is something he shares with his domestic intellectual opponents, otherwise confronting each other.

Both Wagner & Zipprian (1985) as well as Hennis (1985) want to save the historicist element. Wagner & Zipprian in criticizing Tenbruck still regard historicism as a secular current, understood more as a part of than reaction against the Enlightenment, as its self-reflection.

It is a recurring observation that we find something in common to all diverse German receptions of Weber, basically to characterize as a spiritual reflection of *deutscher Sonderweg*, in a sense imprinted by pre-Weberian positions. This is reflected in Wagner & Zipprian, Tenbruck, Hennis and Mommsen.

Hennis as a "Straussian" is not really prone to see the problem of Enlightenment demystification shifting the burden and responsibility of choice from God to man, the polytheistic dilemma of which also Weber's neo-Kantian methodology could be seen as a reflection, a methodology which Hennis prefers to ignore, in favour of a unitarian refoundation of

a firm human meaning. I cannot *refute* Hennis's interpretation, merely countervail it from the presuppositions of post-Enlightenment concern for the scientific endeavour, no matter how primitive that might be in the realm of social science. Hennis might cast light upon Weber's extrascientific concerns but abstains from dealing with the methodological consequences of Weber's "nihilism", as Strauss would put it; in this respect he represents a reaction to Modernity.

All these voices in the debate contribute to clarifications and expansion of Weber-scholarship. Tenbruck has once and for all brought about a shift of emphasis from WuG to GARS. Wagner & Zipprian have revealed Weber's shortcomings – or more specifically Rickert's shortcomings as a mentor to Weber – in the light of modern epistemology. Hennis – as well as Scaff – has brought our attentions to for long neglected manuscripts in Weber's intellectual quarry, on "Weber als Erzieher", the title of a lecture originally delivered by Hennis at *Wissenschaftskolleg* in Berlin in 1988. To anticipate misunderstandings, Tenbruck does not defend the posthumous constructions of GAW and WuG, as well as GARS. As a non member of the MWG-crew he was the "alligator in the pond". However, Riesebrodt (1980) has published some critical remarks on crucial matters of dating Weber's contributions, with some bearing upon the Tenbruckian "idealist" interpretation, in effect paradoxically close to Lukács's, according to Riesebrodt (1980: p. 123). It is erroneous if modern German Weberology should be persistently lingering in pre-Weberian and pre-neo-Kantian modes of metaphysics, still in the shadows of delayed Enlightenment and delayed nation-building, focusing on the concept of culture in an almost nostalgic manner.

- 2 Which I have, again, demonstrated in a few prominent cases, like Parsons and Schutz.
- 3 The revival of a New German Weberology has generated several fascinating studies on various aspects of Weber's scholarship, to the benefit of the whole scientific community. These studies are, however, continuing the tradition of a scattered Weber-image, but now rather in the form of competing final conceptions of Weber's unifying basic meaning, than in the form of methodological paradigms. From an erroneous and really outdated ambition they still contribute to the promotion of Weberology, increasing our knowledge of various aspects of Weber's scholarship, although in search for the ever elusive thematic unity. Weber can no longer be hijacked by paradigmatic "imperialists", thanks to the development of German scholarship on most aspects of Weber's work.

One might say that the image of Weber is simply gradually diversified, in the ever ongoing Weber-renaissance, although – with few exceptions

– reliable handbooks tend to be hard to accomplish. The new Weberology is flawed by its pre-Weberian *Drang nach Wertung*, frantic chase for finally finding the firm Archimedian point, so in contrast to the infinite regress of the scientific endeavour which Weber envisages and which is also valid for the study of social science doctrines. “Moving horizons” might give us new insights about also the intrinsic aspect of the classic, which is part of the explanation to why we have a changing market for the classics, Marx sometimes being “in”, de Tocqueville later becoming a la mode, etc. This is a very risky predicament, creating the danger of the classic as being captured as helmet man for various ornamental purposes.

- Instead of being motivated by their own urge for an authority to build on, after all its being more and more clear that Weber no matter his greatness does not match or endorse their accomplishments, modern Weber scholars are now for various reasons haunted by the strong inclination to achieve coherence. This flight from ambiguity might generate more and more profound interpretations, although erroneous in so far they reach for something which is hardly ever to be caught, the tacit key to reveal the whole of Weber’s work. As all true classics – and Weber’s work not being a genuine paradigmatic, innovative, classic is paradoxically part of his status as a classic, reflecting the immature but maybe slowly maturing social science – Weber remains an enigmatic and elusive figure.
- 4 This goes especially for Runciman and the “Californians”. For those having the starting-point in substantial sociology this is not necessarily a doomed approach. Classics might be interpreted (reinterpreted) for various purposes. Problems arise in the case of conflicting interpretations of what they actually meant. I have merely tried to imply the problems in Weber’s Vienna-lecture “On Socialism”, so vehemently attacked by Marcuse in Heidelberg in 1964. Weber as a non-Utopian prophet gains in credibility when Eastern economies go into bankruptcy; his writings on Russia in early century again becoming “hot stuff” (published in MWG in 1989).
- 5 This cohesive role of the classics is a main point in Alexander (1987).
- 6 We have studied his role as a basic classic – authentic or not – of Parsons’s structural functionalism, Lazarsfeld’s & Oberschall’s survey techniques and Schutz’s phenomenology. We have further mentioned his role as a modern mentor, in recent years even an inspiration for Habermas’s communication theory (Habermas 1984).

Weber has, moreover, been the starting point for Giddens’s class analysis and he has exercised a decisive influence on Morgenthau’s power realism, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, Norbert Elias’s cultural evolutionism, as well as Edward Shils’s studies on institutionalization, not to forget H U Wehler’s history of the second *Reich* or Bellah’s studies

on Japanese religious norms, Merton's "middle range theorizing" or Donald Levine's studies on Ethiopian rationality (the Amhara people). These are still merely only further examples of Weber's influence, in addition to being the path-breaker for the dominating scientific value relativism as developed by Arnold Brecht. Some of these efforts are indeed made as a supplement to, rather than merely application, of Weber. He had no really elaborated, manifest, notion of either nation or society, concepts he takes for granted in his construction of ever more complex societal structures from the basic unit of social action.

- 7 Viewing social science as merely a "language-game" in the vein of Donald Davidson (1980) would not be helpful to the advancement of cumulative discourse from this juvenile predicament, rather it would have the character of pouring petrol instead of water over a threatening fire. Both the proponents of instrumental applied science – what Weber would call *Zweckrationalität* and I have called normative empirical theory, an in itself perfectly legitimate undertaking – in the name of "social interest", etc., as well as the proponents of methodological anarchy and unreflected pluralism are therefore in a way threats to the balanced process of the pursuit of learning and growth of instrumental well-tested knowledge, in which basic research and reflection on fundamentals still appear seminal to more conjectural applications.
- 8 We could speak of Robert Eden (1984) vs the Germans, including the normative liberal Mommsen. Nietzsche has bad ideological connotations which is almost disastrous to his image in the USA, with the natural law inclination still prevalent there. See Baier's comments on this topic (1982, 1985 and 1987). American neo-Straussians typically are ascribing the Nietzschean elements in Weber an inappropriate moral dimension, since the very a-moral and nihilist character of post-Enlightenment polytheism is exactly the predicament we have to learn to accept and to live with.
- 9 To me it has been a striking experience that so many criticize Weber's alleged "nihilism", or try to dismantle these tenets in his body of ideas. Instead, I like to defend the nihilist interpretation as the only truly viable, from a scientific aspect, taking it seriously and accepting it as the predicament we have to live with, as the typical condition of post-Enlightenment Modernity. See also Aron (1957), in his comments upon Strauss's views on Weber. Further, see also the Sadri-brothers' contribution in *IJPCS* (1988).

The example of Axel Hägerström's reception in Sweden of course demonstrates some seamy sides of philosophical nihilism, top-heavy state and welfare bureaucracy thriving from a sort of empty state mysticism, almost an antipode to American extreme individualism, although nothing

prevents a combination of philosophical nihilism, understood as negative value-ontology, and subjective natural law, as a deliberately chosen standpoint, in matters of individual property rights, etc. The seamy side of empty state-utility (or collective utility) replacing objective norms based in natural law does not follow from Hågerström's nihilism as such. It was merely *one* alternative to fill the vacuum, that appeared as natural to some of his followers, like the law-scholar W. Lundstedt, whose ideas provide the basis for the so called "functional socialism" of the Swedish social democrats. Metaphysics return "over the transom". See Geiger (1946). Even if it might hurt the consensus-building within the political community, a privileged position for bourgeois natural law as a basis for natural rights is simply no longer philosophically tenable and credible, after Enlightenment – and the modern combination of utilitarianism and natural law never ceases to astonish me, since historically utilitarian calculus eroded natural law (Hobbes). Value-nihilism might – just as well – promote a healthy sceptical tolerance, due to an awareness of the undemonstrability of ultimate values. The Inquisition belongs to the past, totalizing any ideas appears as adventurous in the era of Nietzschean existentialist value plurality, since all value positions are tentative, absolute values having lost their credibility. They might, however, be replaced by expanding civilisatory praxis, not to put us back into a pre-Leviathan state of pure nature. Rapid de-politicization in the West luckily enough goes hand in hand with demystification of political ideologies. Problems in political aggregation might emerge, as the basis for the political parties increasingly appear as anachronistic. On the other hand the fundamental social tensions in the process of nation-building and political integration, "mass democratization", are basically resolved. Ethnic tensions and minor technicalities of welfare-distribution have taken the place of the more fatal issues in the destiny of the nation and its constitutional order.

- 10 With Machiavelli as midwife in our scholarly field. See also Harvey C. Mansfield jr (1979) who evidently shares the interpretation of Machiavelli as the pioneer of Modernity, although from a "Straussian" perspective.
- 11 The "Calvinist" project, with its rational awareness of "time-management".
- 12 Weber's letter to Tönnies of 19 February 1909 (in MWG II/6: p. 63 *et passim*) is very explicit on how Weber combines a searching attitude in matters of personal convictions and the scientific and anti-metaphysical creed. Weber here makes a very clear demarcation between faith and science, yet indicates that on the personal level he is neither anti-religious, nor a-religious, even if he is religiously unmusical (Op. cit.: p. 65).

## References

### *Weber editions*

- GARS = *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I-III*. Hg. Marianne Weber. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.
- GASS = *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*. Hg. Marianne Weber. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.
- GASW = *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*. Hg. Marianne Weber. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.
- GAW = *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. Hg. Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: Mohr 1973.
- GPS = *Gesammelte politische Schriften*. Hg. Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: Mohr 1973.
- MWG = Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe (most of the political volumes already published, by Mommsen and his assistants; several volumes remain to become published, for instance of letters – one volume is published, at least eight are planned).
- MWS = Max-Weber-Studienausgabe
- PE = Protestantische Ethik
- WuG = Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft

### *Literature*

- Alexander, Jeffrey: "The Parsons Revival in Germany", in *Sociological Theory*, 1984.
- Alexander, Jeffrey: *Structure and Meaning. Relinking Classical Sociology*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1989.
- Alexander, Jeffrey: "The Centrality of the Classics", pp. 11-57, in A. Giddens & J. H. Turner (eds.): *Social Theory Today*. Cambridge: UK. Policy Press 1987.
- Aron, Raymond: *German Sociology*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1957.
- Baier, Horst: "Die Gesellschaft – ein langer Schatten des toten Gottes. Friedrich Nietzsche und die Entstehung der Soziologie aus dem Geist der Décadance", *Nietzsche-Studien*. Bd 10/11, 1981/82, pp. 6-22)
- Baier, Horst: "Friedrich Nietzsche und Max Weber in Amerika", in *Nietzsche-Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch für die Nietzsche-Forschung*, Bd 16 (1987), pp. 430-36. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987.

- Baier, Horst: "Friedrich Nietzsches 'neue Aufklärung' – oder: Das 'metaphysische Bedürfnis' im Traumschatten der Vernunft", pp. 263-94, in: *Der Traum der Vernunft. Vom Elend der Aufklärung*. Darmstadt: Luchterhand 1985.
- Brecht, Arnold: *Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought*. Princeton: Princeton Univ Press, 1959.
- Bruun, H. H.: *Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1972.
- Collins, Randall: "Reassessments of Sociological History: The empirical validity of the conflict tradition." *Theory and Society* 1974, 1: pp. 147-178.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf: "Max Weber and Modern Social Science", pp. 574-80 in Mommsen, W. & Osterhammel, J. (Eds): *Max Weber and His Contemporaries*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1987.
- Davidson, Donald: *Essays on Actions and Events*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1980.
- Eden, Robert: *Political Leadership and Nihilism*. Tampa, FL: Univ. Press of Florida, 1984.
- Eliäson, Sven: "The Utility of the Classics. The Estate of Weber unsettled", pp. 45-78, in *Jahrbuch für Soziologiegeschichte* 1993. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1995.
- Eliäson, Sven: "Kommentar zu den Beiträgen von W. Küttler/G. Lozek und H.-U. Wehler", in Jürgen Kocka (Hrsg.): *Max Weber. Der Historiker*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986.
- Geiger, Theodor: *Über Moral und Recht. Streitgespräch mit Uppsala*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1979, orig. in Danish 1946.
- Habermas, Jürgen: *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*. Bd 1. Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp 1982 (Engl. transl. 1984).
- Hennis, Wilhelm: "Im langen Schatten einer Edition. Zu Erscheinen des erstes Bandes der Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe (MWG)", in *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 1985 (Jg 32), pp. 208-17.
- Kocka, J. & Peukert, D.: "Max Weber und die Geschichtswissenschaft. Neuere Entwicklungen in der Bundesrepublik". Berlin: mimeo, 1991.
- Mansfield, Harvey C: *Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders. A Study of the Discourses of on Livy*. Ithaca : Cornell, 1979.
- Mommsen, W: *The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber*. Chicago & Cambridge: Univ. of Chicago Press & Polity Press, 1989.
- Mommsen, W. & Osterhammel, J. (eds.): *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987. German version 1988: *Max Weber und seine Zeitgenossen*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, ed. by Wolfgang Mommsen & Wolfgang Schwentker.



- Riesebrodt, Martin. "Ideen, Interessen, Rationalisierung: Kritische Anmerkungen zu F. H. Tenbrucks Interpretation des Werkes Max Webers", in *KZfSS*, Jg 32 (1980), pp. 93-110.
- Sadri, A & Sadri, M: "Intercultural Understanding: Max Weber and Leo Strauss", in *International Journal of Political Culture and Society*, 1988 (1), pp. 392-411.
- Shils, Edward: "Max Weber and the World since 1920", in Mommsen, W. & Osterhammel, J. (Eds.) *Max Weber and his Contemporaries*. London: Allen & Unwin 1987, pp. 547-73
- Stammer, Otto (Hrsg.): *Max Weber und die Soziologie heute. Verhandlungen des 15. deutschen Soziologentages*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1965. Engl. transl. by Kathleen Morris, Oxford, 1971.
- Udén, Lars: *The Limits of Public Choice* London & New York: Routledge 1996.
- Wagner, Gerhard & Zipprian, Heinz: "Methodologie und Ontologie. Zum Problem kausaler Erklärung bei Max Weber," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 14 (1985), pp. 115-30.
- Weber, Max: GARS, GAW, GPS, MWG, WuG, etc. (See list of abbreviations).
- : *Political Writings*. Ed. by Lassman, Peter & Speirs, Ronald. Cambridge: CUP, 1994.
- : *Critique of Stammer*. Transl. with Introduction by Guy Oakes. New York & London: Free Press & Mcmillan, 1977.
- : *Roscher and Knies. The Logical Problem of Historical Economics*. Transl. with Introduction by Guy Oakes. New York & London: Free Press & Macmillan, 1975.
- : *Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Transl. by Edward Shils and Henry Finch. London & New York: Macmillan & Free Press, 1949.
- : *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. Ed. with an Introduction by Talcott Parsons. New York & London: Free Press & Macmillan, 1947.

Kari Palonen

## MAX WEBER AS A TEXT

To my surprise, I found that I had given this paper a title “Max Weber as a text”. I cannot exactly remember why I did so. But let me start to think about it with some demarcations related to the Weber studies, with some difficulties and experiences in the Weber interpretations by classifying the arts of textuality. Then I will say a few words on Weber as a classic in political theory. In the Addendum I will illustrate the textual genres with examples from Weber’s work.

By dealing with Max Weber as a text, I do *not* mean that Max-Weber-the-person did not exist. I am by no means a structuralist or a discourse analyst who denies the existence of the individual.

There is obviously a kind of textbook-Max-Weber. He is a “German sociologist, 1864–1920” or a legend present in the innumerable memorial narratives from that time (cf. esp. the special Weber volume of *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* of 1963). Surely Max Weber was a fascinating personality, and this is part of his reputation as a classic. My point is that this kind of preliminary view on Weber’s “life and work”, whether a raw textbook variant or a richer and more anecdotic biographical variant, rather prevents than promotes a close and attentive reading of the texts written by him. In a problematizing reading of his text we more or less need to forget our received view on Max-Weber-the-figure in order to find there something different.

Closely related to the previous point is that the earlier readings of Max Weber's texts not only contribute to the figure of Weber but also to the construction of the texts themselves. So different the forms of Weber-reception are, as demonstrated by Sven Eliasson (1982 and further publications) and others, that I think their common effect is rather to simplify than to diversify the horizons of reading Weber. Not only the figure of Weber but also the texts themselves have been canonized in a rather questionable manner.

The next step outside the Weber-of-the-reception is the Weber-of-the-context. An important move in the Weber scholarship in the eighties and nineties is to remove Max Weber from the received context of the 20th century Anglo-American academic sociology and to put him back to his "contemporary contexts", in plural, of course – otherwise he would not have been Max Weber (cf. esp. Mommsen & Osterhammel [eds] 1986). So important this contextualization is that it seems to lose its heuristic value, when comparisons are multiplied and Weber again appears as only one of the turn-of-the-century "German mandarins". This sort of contextualization comes surprisingly close to the view on Weber held by his contemporaries, who, according to my opinion, hardly had the patience to read his texts in detail. They found it difficult to understand that he perhaps was not only one of them but also something else. A new move towards contextualization can, in the worst cases, lead to a reading of Weber, in which his footnotes and allusions to the persons or formulas of the contemporaries appear as the main point.

By this I do not deny that a contextualizing reading of Weber has also obvious advantages besides removing something of the ex-post-wisdoms in the reception literature. This presupposes that the contexts thematized and the aspects of Weber-the-text as well as of Weber-the-person are specified to be sufficiently one-sided or perspectivistic, in the sense of the Nietzschean-Weberian theory of knowledge. For example I am waiting with great interest for my friend Wolf-Dieter Narr's yet unpublished writings on "Max Weber und der Wilhelminismus", trying to understand the both sides in the title with the other. There surely are typically Wilhelminian traits in the figure and even in the thought of Max Weber and the typical phenomena of the era can be well understood through analyzing its presence in such an untypical figure as Max Weber. But the question in which

respect Weber, exactly, was a Wilhelminian, remains to be discussed through, above all, close and perspectivistic readings of his text.

The key point in my claim to cast a fresh look to Weber's texts can be formulated in the thesis that he is deceiving simple readers, by intention or not. His texts often are both seemingly familiar and seemingly modest in relation to the contemporaries – a paradigm is the introductory paragraph of *Soziologische Grundbegriffe* (WuG, 1). Both contemporary and present-day readers of Weber tend to classify Weber's writings too easily in an anachronistic manner, with categories which would not have been acceptable to Weber himself. Paradigmatic examples of obviously misleading readings of Weber are especially mediated by translations, which appear to be, or at least have been until the very last ones, systematically erroneous (Breiner 1996, xv, for example has made translations of his own). However, the German concepts often have also connotations, which make the reader link them to some familiar views, although Weber's interpretations of them have an entirely different point.

One of the obvious case is *Auslese*, which was read by numerous Weber-scholars as a sign that he was a Social Darwinist. It is only recently that, due to the work of Wilhelm Hennis (1987), Catherine Colliot-Thélène (1990) and others, the Freiburg inaugural lecture *Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik* (1895) has been distanced from this connection. The point is that in order to characterize some of the aspects of the chances of becoming, for example, professional politicians, Max Weber borrows a term made popular by the contemporary Darwinists, but in the context of his anti-naturalistic thinking the concept gains a different significance. How different it was and how important the difference was, remains, of course, an open question to be answered by detailed studies. The Weberian figure of unintended consequences does not only concern the reception but also the chances and their limits in this sort of borrowing.

Another example is the formula on the first page of *Politik als Beruf*: "Was verstehen wir unter Politik"? (MWS Edition, 35). My point here is not his answer to it but the formulation of the question. Who are the "we" in Weber's formula? Is it the actual audience, the contemporary German politicians, journalists and academic scholars writing on politics or who? In the text, Weber shortly refers to

some common usages, makes a demarcation concerning them and then starts to reinterpret the concept. Through the singularity of the interpretation he moves himself gradually from an inclusive to an exclusive “we” (cf. Wilson 1990) and finally it becomes clear that Weber is using *pluralis majestatis*: “We, Max Weber...”.

Max Weber had an highly individual style of thinking. Both the creation or modification of new verbal forms and the reinterpretation of the meanings of the concepts used by others and borrowed by Weber himself are distinctive features of his writing. If you have learnt both the present-day and Weber’s day’s conventional meanings of some concepts, you cannot be sure that you understand Weber’s usage of the same concepts, even if there appear to be nothing specific in them. The more important a concept was for Weber, the more you can be sure that he reinterpreted it for his own purposes and in order to make it suit to his own linguistic profile.

This is not due to some stylistic brilliance. It becomes obvious when one of Weber’s central philosophical commitments is taken into account. Max Weber was, above all, a *nominalist*, who, so to say, wanted to purge the whole language of his contemporaries. Idealists, naturalists, empiricists etc., all of them appeared to Weber to have in common a tacit assumption that the “things really are” so or so, even if their interpretations were opposed to each other. Weber’s whole world-view is opposed to this sort of naïve realism or essentialism concerning the concepts and their usage. This did not only or even mainly mean a Kantian critique of *das Ding an sich*, although he sometimes quotes Rickert’s Neo-Kantian views and understands *Wirklichkeit* as an analytical borderline concept, to which he refers not as something knowable but, on the contrary, as something inexhaustible by any sort of conceptualizations (cf. esp. *Roscher und Knies*, 15, 35).

More important is the Nietzschean consequence that Weber draws from this situation. Instead of imagining that it is possible to “approach the reality” or to detect to it some analogous but coherent descriptions, or resigning to the skeptical idea of the unknowability of *Wirklichkeit*, Weber adopts, following Nietzsche, a *perspectivistic* view on the conceptualizations. They are partial, one-sided and temporal constructions concerning some aspects of *Wirklichkeit*. The constructions are formed in order to be replaced by others one day

or another, and they are all the time competing with each other without a common measure or a given criterion. The first thing to understand about concepts is that they cannot be taken “from the reality” but that they are constructions of the interpreters, who make use of them according to their heuristic value. (For the problematic cf. esp. *Objektivität*).

It is from this viewpoint of a constructionist nominalism that Weber always wants to start afresh, while at the same time making use of the vocabularies created by others. He probably underestimated the situation, bearing in mind how radically he reinterprets the concepts by the very move of borrowing them and recontextualizing them into his own thinking. This holds, for example, some Marxian concepts which he uses as ideal-typical constructions and takes away e.g. their links to evolutionistic philosophy of history. Still, already in the *Freiburger Antrittsrede* Weber denied that there could be something like “economic *Weltanschauung*” and sees himself more or less in opposition to the whole craft, most often turning the same arguments against the opposed parties in a controversy.

To speak of Max-Weber-as-text refers to an assumption that he had formed an inimitable profile of both thinking and writing, which takes him outside all the academic and other sorts of parties. He experienced the world in which he lived as radically contingent, both foundationless and without salvation. His whole political, academic and philosophical project is linked to this *Entzauberung der Welt* in the wider meaning of the concept (to be found especially in *Wissenschaft als Beruf*). This does not mean any resignation or pessimism but serves as a starting point both for action and for the analysis of those religious and quasi-religious projects in which the adherents believed to some foundations or solutions. He was not worried about the lack of order but about the tendencies to return to the kind of monolithic orders which he had encountered in ancient cultures (cf. *Agrarverhältnisse*).

This is, according to my perspectivistic interpretation, also a reason for treating Weber’s writings, to a certain extent, as a single text. This reading emphasizes the opposition of Weber to his contemporaries, predecessors and later thinkers. The single Max-Weber-the-text was, however, continuously moving into different and unexpected directions and it had all the time unintended consequences,

which put limits to its coherence. Max-Weber-the-text has a history of its own. We could even use an anachronistic metaphor and speak of *Max-Weber-the-hypertext*. This also corresponds to the fragmentary character of his writings and actualizes the problems of edition of his both published and unpublished writings, which are prominent in controversies between Weberologists.

## Dimensions of textuality

I will not go into the details of the *œuvre* of Max Weber and its history. The constructive part of this essay, rather, consists in the use of some elementary categories borrowed from linguistic and literary theory. The point of using them is to make Max-Weber-the-text more readable and to demonstrate some specific difficulties in reading Weber.

I assume that everyone has heard two slogans, context and intertextuality. I will bring them into a simple but more systematic schema of references, either explicit or implicit, which could be used in reading any text, at least any hypertext like Max-Weber-the-text.

I want to distinguish between four dimensions of textuality:

- intratextuality
- intertextuality
- cotextuality
- contextuality

Intratextuality concerns single texts, like *Politik als Beruf*, and emphasizes both the internal links and the internal oppositions between its parts or different narrative levels. Max Weber was not an author who tried to solve one problem at a time and then move to next ones. On the contrary, he was involved all the time in several controversies and problematics seemingly unconnected to each other. My impression is that any major texts were used by him as an occasion to treat at least one problematic from a new angle and to put it in relation to others and to the controversies around them. In this sense, Weber's writings remain in most cases difficult to read: the readers are not told when he moves from one level or one problematic to other.

For example, *Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland* is at the same time a pamphlet on German politics at the final phase of World War I and a treatise on political theory in the age of an overwhelming tendency towards bureaucratization. Weber certainly used both the fragmentary theorizing as a means to his interpretation of the German situation and the German situation as a test case for the fate of modern politics in general. He, however, never explained how he moved between these levels of interest. A look at the original newspaper articles in comparison to the book refers to an increase of theoretical reflections. Maybe Weber himself realized that he was doing something more than a war-time pamphlet when he published the articles in the book form.

So, I have shifted the discussion to the problems of intertextuality, a concept I am using here in a narrow sense of a relation between the different Weberian texts. A problem of Weber-the-text is thus the internal reference to his own earlier writings. The title *Politik als Beruf* does not only refer to his colleague and fellow-editor of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* Werner Sombart (1907) and his in-married-uncle and early mentor in politics, Hermann Baumgarten (1866). The fact that both of them used the formula was doubtlessly known by Weber. Above all, the title refers to his famous own treatment, in *Die protestantische Ethik*, of Luther's duplication of the concept of *Beruf* (NWB Edition, 34-51), visible in the title of the translation of Lassmann and Speirs: *The Profession and Vocation of Politics*.

I have also found some astonishing similarities in the formulations concerning the puritan in the *Antikritiken* and the politician in *Politik als Beruf* (cf. Palonen 1995). Still, here we have to note not only the similarities but also to reflect upon the differences both in the formulation and in the meaning of the slogans. The above mentioned problems of both the internal coherence and the historical character of Max-Weber-the-text are problems of intertextuality within the hypertext.

*Textum* means in Latin a tissue which has been knit together. Cotext and context refer to that what has been knit together with the text but which, in a sense, are not in the text but around it. I said once, in *Tekstistä politiikkaan*, that context is the implicit part of the text (Palonen 1988). Now I want to distinguish, partly following Dietrich



Busse's *Textinterpretation* (1991), between cotext and context as two different dimensions implied by the text. In this sense neither cotext nor context refers to the 'social background of the author', nor there are some given conventions about which cotext and context should be discussed. What is a cotext and a context is determined by if and how they are used in the text. The author decides which references and allusions s/he makes in the text, which s/he leaves implicit and which s/he disregards, even if they are judged by others as obligatory.

By cotext I speak of the references to other texts, whether explicit quotations or implicit allusions known to the insiders. "Texts" here can also be mere slogans, like *Wahlverwandschaft*, the title of a novel by Goethe used by Weber in *Die protestantische Ethik*, but also longer narratives paraphrased and reinterpreted by Weber or the contemporary works against which Weber polemizes. Allusions to Goethe, the Bible etc. were obvious to the *Bildungsbürgertum* of early 20th century Germany, but they are no longer obligatory readings to political theorists of the late 20th century. A problem which I myself, reading intensely Max-Weber-the-text, have faced, how far I also have to read the co-texts to which he refers explicitly or implicitly. Until now I have not experienced a greater need to read Gustav Schmoller, Rudolf Stammeler or even Goethe or the Bible to understand Weber, but well to read Nietzsche, to some extent Heinrich Rickert, and maybe I should still start reading authors such as J.S. Mill or James Bryce as co-texts to Weber.

By contexts I refer here to the problematics of the time or of a long-term debate which are thematized in the text. These problematics were those of the contemporaries, but more or less radically revised by Weber. *Max Webers Fragestellungen*, to borrow a formula of Wilhelm Hennis but, unlike him, to put it into plural, are modifications of the questions which serve to him as contexts. To ignore the problematics of the contemporaries is to miss the contexts of Weber's questions, to ignore his problem shifts in relation to them is to miss the text. Weber's *Antikritiken* (published in the volume *Die protestantische Ethik II*), by which he answered the polemics against *Die protestantische Ethik* are perhaps the best manifestation of how astonished Weber was over the fact that the readers could not go into his singularized problematics but read his texts as if he would

have spoken of the Protestant ethic “in the normal sense of the word”, as demanded by a critic (*Antikritisches...*, PE II, 176). In addition, Weber’s numerous polemics against thinkers such as Eduard Meyer, Stammler, Lujó Brentano (in GAW) are less answers to their specific problems than media to Weber himself and his audience to link them to Weber’s own problematics and to give a new nuance to them.

If we start reading an example of Max-Weber-the-text, we should thus relate it to the four levels of textuality presented here. Their internal relations depend, of course, on the actual research problems. When our concern is understanding a historical point, like Weber’s problem shift, the contextual level may be the best starting point, in analyzing the relations to the contemporaries the cotext is perhaps the most important, in studies of the whole Weberian *œuvre* and its history, intertextuality becomes a main problem, while the explicitation of a single text requires a keen attention to intratextuality.

If the problem is taken as given, this classification helps to explicate the primary types of reading. Especially in writing academic theses, you can also adapt the problematic to the question which kind of work you are willing, interested and competent to do. Intratextuality is something for those interested in a close reading needed in studying poetry and philosophy, intertextuality cannot dispense with an interest in textual biography and problems of edition, cotextuality is more closely related to the intellectual history of the period and country, while contextuality presupposes a competence of dealing with the interpretations and assessments of the ‘eventual’ history of the period and the culture in question and with the ways in which the events were conceptualized. If you want to be a specialist on Weber, you have to be more or less an expert on all of the fields, and the real problem often is how not to leave Max-Weber-the-text in the shadow of your newly-created specialization in the fields presupposed in order to read Weber properly.

With a Weberian perspectivistic view of knowledge, it is also easy to say that you can have a ‘true and complete interpretation’ of his work – it is better not even try to give a ‘total view’. To some extent, you can say that some interpretations are erroneous: you can demonstrate this by criticizing the translation used by the author, by showing some only recently published letters of Weber or by correcting some errors in dating Weber’s work. Expressed in the

Koselleckian (1988) terms: corrections are possible at the level of *Fortschreibung*, but when you move to the *Umschreibung* of history, it is your own imagination in sketching the perspective, in finding a strategy of reading or interpreting a single passage in a Weber-text, which gives a new profile. Despite the huge ‘Weber industry’ – or perhaps because of it – anyone studying Weber has still good chances of saying something new about his work. My experience has been that to do so is not even especially difficult, if you do not worry about the other commentators but start to read Weber with your own ideas.

## Max Weber as a classic

Max Weber serves here as an example of a classical political theorist, whose work I happen to be familiar with. To a great extent all I have said, especially concerning the degrees of textuality, suits to any classical thinker, especially to the European ones in the 19th and 20th century. In certain respects the case of Max Weber is however, a special one, which makes a knowledge of his work both more difficult and perhaps more important than that of others, say Carl Schmitt or Karl Mannheim.

I just want to stress two points here. The first point is that he was a kind of “decathlonist of human sciences”, not to be understood by the classifications of a later and more specialized university systems and, above all, a figure of a past time who cannot be imitated any more. Do not strive for becoming a Max Weber of the 21st century! Read him as a person who had a range and profile of readings, interests and experiences no longer available to anyone.

The second point is, once again, Weber’s militant nominalism, which made it difficult if not impossible to rely on the conceptual categories of others. Whether this aspect of his work can be followed and even radicalized or not, is an open question. I myself try to do so in certain respects, especially in trying to dispense with such misleading collective concepts as *die Gesellschaft* (Cf. Palonen 1998). Perhaps the most important Weber-inspired research programme of today is to be seen in the work of Quentin Skinner – not recognised among the Weberologists, of course – who has been able

to combine the Weberian approach with some aspect of the Austinian speech act theory and classical rhetoric. (cf. Palonen 1997)

My main point here is, however, that when reading Weber, you cannot overestimate the significance of his nominalism. Even in occasional writings, in which the commitment to the vocabulary of the contemporaries is a rhetorical strategy to persuade some special audience, you can detect some nuances which make clear how Weber distanced himself from the customary meanings. Denaturalization, desubstantialization, decollectivization as purifying moves as well as the temporalization of concepts into horizons of action, expressible by opposite ideal typical alternatives, are some of the main strategies in Max-Weber-the-text. They are all related historically to a shift towards both an appraisal and a conceptualization of contingency in terms of *Chancen*. This historical singularity I have called the Weberian moment in the history of political thought (cf. Palonen 1998).

## Addendum: A classification of Weber-texts

With this list I want to distinguish between different sorts of texts written by Max Weber. The point of the list is to relativize the content of the text to the specific rhetorical audiences and stylistic demands of each sort of text. The problem in Weber scholarship has sometimes been the non-distinction between different sorts of texts, at other times they have been distinguished too neatly, as if Max Weber himself would have had a full command a linguistic theory of *Textsorten*. In this sense, my classification serves rather pragmatic purposes of Weber scholars than an attempt to contribute to the theory of *Textsorten*.

As a decathlonist of human sciences who also was more or less involved in the political life of his time, Weber wrote all kinds of texts. The classification here takes into consideration at first, the distinction between publications and private texts, and, secondly, the degree of theoretical ambitions. With these categories in mind, I arrive to following classifications of Weber's work:

### 1) Monographs

According to a legend, Weber wrote after his dissertation (*Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter*, 1889, contained in GASW), the habilitation thesis (*Die römische Agrargeschichte*, 1891, published in MWG and MWS 1/2) and the monumental *Die Lage der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland* (now in MWG 1/3) no monographs. Even if this is more or less true in the sense of a separate publication, writings like *Die protestantische Ethik* (cf. the differences between the original and revised version of this study see the NWB-Edition), *Die Stadt* (included in WuG), *Das antike Judentum* (=GARS III) etc., can well be read as separate monographs, maybe even *Die Rechtssoziologie* (included in WuG)

### 2) Programmatic writings

To this category belong the Freiburg inaugural lecture *Der Nationalstaat...* (besides GPS now also in MWG 1/4), the methodological articles *Die 'Objektivität'* and *Der Sinn der 'Wertfreiheit'...* (included in GAW) as well as *Wissenschaft als Beruf* and *Politik als Beruf* (now together in MWG and MWS 1/17).

### 3) Lexical writings

The lexical form is visible in real lexical articles, although the most important of them, the third edition of *Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum*, rather seems like a monograph (published in GASW). The lexical character is also obvious in the style of the most parts of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, although the older parts are rather like background research to this volume

### 4) Polemical 'journalism'

Weber characterized himself his two huge articles on Russia 1906, *Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie* and *Rußlands Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus* (now included in MWG and MWS 1/10) as journalism, although they contain important pieces of his political theory. Even more importantly, his journalism contains the war-time writings, although the most important of them, *Wahlrecht und Demokratie* as well as (the book version of) *Parlament und Regierung* are also explicitly related to political theory (both included now in MWG and MWS 1/15).

### 5) *Methodological polemics*

Most of the essays published in *Wissenschaftslehre* consist of methodological polemics against earlier or contemporary authors, such as Meyer, Stammerl or Brentano. Weber's style was that he usually sketched his own thinking better through polemic than through declarations of principles, although this does not make it easy to discern his own points in the texts.

### 6) *Popularizing writings*

Especially in the 1890's Weber held public lectures and wrote popular articles, of which *Die Börse* (included GASS) is probably the most important – it was based on a series, published in *Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht*, of huge comments on the work of a committee intending to reform the German stock market. They are rather technical and the political point comes up in the two popular articles.

### 7) *Research project plans*

As a professor, Weber was a kind of project leader to studies on the East Elbian peasants, later he took a more active role in the sketching of the project *Die Psychophysik der industriellen Arbeit* (now published in MWG 1/12) as well as in planning an enquête on the German press (published by Wilhelm Hennis in *Jahrbuch Politisches Denken* 1995/1996).

### 8) *'Opinion statements'*

Some of Weber's most controversial formulations are due to his statements in *Verein für Sozialpolitik* and *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie* (included in GASS). To this or to journalism we can also include his polemics on the *Lehrfreiheit* in the universities around 1908-1912 (published so far only in English in *Minerva* 1973)

### 9) *Reviews*

As the editor of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* Weber occasionally wrote reviews to his own journal, which are sometimes interesting, as well as some prefaces, as the one to Blank's article on Social Democracy in 1905 (now published in MWG 1/8).

10) *Lectures*

Of Weber's lectures not much has been published. Only a *Grundriß* for the Heidelberg lectures on *Allgemeine (theoretische) National-ökonomie* in 1898, as the posthumous edition of *Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, based on the student notes.

11) *Letters*

Earlier only a collection of *Jugendbriefe*, edited by Marianne Weber during the NS-period, in 1936, a few *Politische Briefe*, included in the first but not in later editions of *Gesammelte politische Schriften* as well as some fragments of letters published by Eduard Baumgarten in his *Max Weber. Werk und Person* (1964) have been available. Now three letter volumes of *Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe*, concerning the years 1906-1912, have been published (MWG II/5,6,7).

12) *Academic statements*

An important source hardly known until now could be Weber's statements on dissertations, professorial *Gutachten* as well as remarks to faculty, plans for new academic institutions etc. Some of them have been published in the letters from 1907 and 1908 (MWF II/5).

## References

*Abridgements of Weber Editions*

GARS = *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* I-III. Hg. Marianne Weber. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.

GASS = *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*. Hg. Marianne Weber. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.

GASW = *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*. Hg. Marianne Weber. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.

GAW = *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. Hg. Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: Mohr 1973.

GPS = *Gesammelte politische Schriften*. Hg. Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: Mohr 1973.

MWG = *Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe*.

MWS = *Max-Weber-Studienausgabe*.

PE = Protestantische Ethik.

WuG = Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.

### *Texts of Max Weber referred*

- (1895): *Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik*. MWG I/4, 543-574. GPS, 1-25. Tübingen: Mohr 1971.
- (1903-1906): *Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie*. GAW, 1-145. Tübingen: Mohr 1973.
- (1904): *Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis*. GAW, 146-214. Tübingen: Mohr 1973.
- (1904-1905): *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*. NWB-Edition, Hg. Klaus Lichtblau und Johannes Weiß. Bodenheim: Athenäum-Hain-Hanstein 1993.
- (1909): *Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum*. GASW 1-288.
- (1910a): *Antikritisches Schlußwort zum 'Geist des Kapitalismus'*. PE II, Hg. Johannes Winckelmann, 286-345. Gütersloh: Siebenstern 1978.
- (1910b): *Antikritisches zum 'Geist' des Kapitalismus*. PE II, Hg. Johannes Winckelmann, 149-187. Gütersloh: Siebenstern 1978.
- (1918): *Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland*: GPS, 306-443. Tübingen: Mohr 1971. MWS I/15, 202-302. Tübingen: Mohr 1988.
- (1919a): *Politik als Beruf*. GPS, 505-560. Tübingen: Mohr 1971. MWG I/17, 157-253. Tübingen: Mohr 1992, MWS I/17, 35-88. English Translation: Lassmann and Speirs: *The Profession and Vocation of Politics*. In: Max Weber: *Political Writings*. Cambridge: CUP 1994.
- (1919b): *Wissenschaft als Beruf*. GAW, 582-613. Tübingen: Mohr 1968. MWG I/17, 71-111. Tübingen: Mohr 1992.

### *Literature*

- Baumgarten, Hermann (1866): *Der deutsche Liberalismus. Eine Selbstkritik*. Frankfurt/M: Ullstein 1974.
- Breiner, Peter (1996): *Max Weber & Democratic Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell UP.
- Busse, Dietrich (1991): *Textinterpretation*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Colliot-Thélène, Catherine (1990): *Max Weber, la leçon inaugurale de 1895 ou: Du nationalisme à la sociologie comparative. Les cahiers de Fontenay* 58-59, 103-121.
- Eliæson, Sven (1982): *Bilden av Max Weber*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Hennis, Wilhelm (1987): *Max Webers Fragestellung*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie-Sonderheft* 1963.



- Koselleck, Reinhart (1988): Erfahrungswandel und Methodenwechsel. In: Christian Meier & Jörn Rüsen (Hg.): *Die historische Methode*, 13-61. München: DTV.
- Mommsen, Wolfgang & Osterhammel, Jürgen (eds.) (1986): *Max Weber and His Contemporaries*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Palonen, Kari (1988): *Tekstistä politiikkaan*. Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Palonen, Kari (1995): Max Webers *Politik als Beruf*. Eine rhetorische Lektüre. In: Jürgen Matthies & Kari Palonen (Hg.): *Max Weber. Stadt, Politik, Geschichte*, 46-69. Universität Jyväskylä.
- Palonen, Kari (1997): Quentin Skinner's Rhetoric of Conceptual Change. *History of Human Sciences* 10, 83-82.
- Palonen, Kari (1998): 'Das Webersche Moment'. Westdeutscher Verlag: Opladen.
- Sombart, Werner (1907): *Politik als Beruf. Morgen* 1, 145-149.
- Wilson, John (1990): *Politically Speaking*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hans-Ulrich Derlien

## ON THE SELECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF MAX WEBER'S CONCEPT OF BUREAU- CRACY IN ORGANIZATION THEORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE<sup>1</sup>

### Introduction

Max Weber is undoubtedly one of the last, if not the last German author, who can claim to represent intellectually, with his economical and sociological writings including the sociology of law, the unity of the old *Staatswissenschaften*. This unity had organizationally already broken down at his time. The breadth of his writings has contributed to a great variety of disciplines, not at least to organization theory and the study of public administration, who claim Weber for themselves. In the following, I will speak of two misinterpretations, to which Weber's theory of bureaucracy was exposed in these disciplines and their neighboring field. In order to be brief, I shall not deal with the causes of these misinterpretations as sociology of knowledge would do: the specific route of Weber's post-war reception, which, as is well known, swept over from the USA, where a comprehensive translation of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* was published only in 1968. The ensuing misinterpretations are

- first, the selective and ahistorical interpretation of the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy and
- second, the noteworthy misinterpretation of the so-called efficiency thesis, which allegedly claims that bureaucratic organization is superior to other forms of formal organization;
- third, I shall point out an implication of this misunderstanding for future research: The theoretical gap created by this reduced view of bureaucracy could be precisely the place where that specific form of efficiency could be found which is missed by the popular critique of Weber's theory of bureaucracy: voluntary organizations as anti-bureaucratic organizations that, however, lead a "Cinderella life" in mainstream organization theory.

Before elaborating these three theses, I would like to characterize shortly the picture of Max Weber's treatise, as it is painted by organization theory and the administrative sciences: The characteristics by which Max Weber defines bureaucracy as a type are usually, albeit not comprehensively, taken as features of formal organizations. Consequently, a parallel is constructed between Weber and the classical organization theorists, especially with Taylor and his machine model of organization, and the Weberian presentation is seen as an analogous command model (*Befehlsmodell*) of organization<sup>2</sup>.

In addition, due to the misinterpretation of the methodological status of the ideal type, Max Weber is supposed to have presented a prescriptive model as the classics of organization theory typically did. In other words, the ideal type is interpreted as a model of how a formal organization should be structured<sup>3</sup>. Consequently, much of empirical sociology of organization claimed "falsification" of this model of organization by referring to "dysfunctions", thus supposedly refuting the Weberian efficiency thesis.

## The ideal type of bureaucracy in historical and systematic perspectives

This very short outline should be justification enough to reconstruct the entire Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy in the historical context which Max Weber had in mind. Against this background I want,

secondly, to discuss the so called efficiency thesis in the context of the sociology of domination (*Herrschaft*), where, as might be known, Weber deals with bureaucracy. In other words: I would like to direct the attention to the theoretical context from which Weber's theory of bureaucracy originated and which is, in a characteristic manner, left unnoticed by organization theory, as others<sup>4</sup> have already shown.

### *Completing the list of bureaucratic characteristics*

Structuralist organization theory<sup>5</sup> usually presents only the following characteristics by which Max Weber characterizes bureaucracy:

- division of labour and specialization,
- formalization of the organizational structure and procedures in the form of written rules,
- hierarchy in the patterns of decision-making, communication and control,
- employment and advancement of personnel based on performance,
- impersonal mode of interaction with the public<sup>6</sup>,
- and occasionally mentioned: written communication and record keeping (*Aktenkundigkeit*).

These characteristics can, of course, be applied to a broad range of formal organizations in modern societies, organizations extending from private economy to public agencies. However, most of the organizations, which are empirically analyzed, do not belong to the class of public agencies. This could even be justified as Max Weber repeatedly emphasized that bureaucratization can be observed not only in administration, but also in industry and – in agreement with Robert Michels<sup>7</sup> – in political parties, too. What tends to be overlooked, though, is the fact that Max Weber had in mind the phenomenon of political domination (*Herrschaft*) as the theoretical context of his discussion of bureaucracy; consequently, he focused primarily on public organizations. If the above mentioned characteristics are compared to those which Max Weber himself had used to characterize the ideal type bureaucracy in *Wirtschaft und Gesell-*

*schaft*<sup>8</sup>, we easily notice that the list of characteristics used by organization theorists must be complemented by the following ones:

- full-time status of the personnel,
- monetary reward,
- professional education,
- discipline and ethos of vocation,
- separation between household and enterprise, private and public possession of the means of production.

Most of these characteristics refer to the bureaucratic personnel and are overlooked by systematic organization theory, probably because these characteristics are nowadays self-evident and ubiquitous in modern private economic and public organizations; they do no longer constitute empirical differences between types or organizations. They are obviously no longer significant for the contemporary, primarily system-theoretical organization theorist<sup>9</sup> for understanding and explaining the internal functioning of formal organizations.

### *Historical significance of the characteristics of bureaucracy*

Precisely these mostly overlooked characteristics are essential for the relationship between the concept of bureaucracy and Weber's sociology of domination (*Herrschaftssoziologie*); Max Weber considered them significant in historical and comparative perspective. Let me explicate this historical core of the characteristics, which Max Weber had in mind: When Weber emphasized the hierarchy and especially the monocratic office management as a characteristic of bureaucracy, he did this on the background of the collegial "system of chambers" (*Kammersystem*), which was practiced in Prussia till 1806; it was then replaced by the hierarchical system of decision-making, the so called bureau system.

What is nowadays simply called division of labour and specialization in organization theory includes, according to Weber, the replacement of territorial departments for individual provinces by a functional system of administrative offices (*Ressortsystem*) covering the entire state. Part of the Weberian concept of division of labour is

furthermore the division of governmental powers and their functionally restricted spheres of jurisdiction.

Decision-making according to fixed rules (*Regelbundenheit*) is reflecting the emerging *Rechts- und Gesetzesstaat* during the 19th century. This makes political domination, to use Max Weber's words, calculable for both the rulers and the ruled as well. Unnecessary to mention that rule orientation is a central element in Weber's fundamental thesis of increasing rationalization; it presupposes universalistic norms, which replaced the provincially fragmented, historically grown law penetrated by all kinds of privileges (for example tax-privileges). This rule-conformity favours the standardization, schematization and the typical impersonality in official-client interaction.

The written nature of internal and external communication of public administration, which is today self-evident, is historically by no means insignificant. For it requires from the public at least the ability to read and write and, consequently, the introduction of general compulsory education. The law, once positivized in codifications, could be read in intelligentsia and governmental journals (*Intelligenz- und Regierungsblätter*).

Professional education as a characteristic of bureaucracy reminds of the establishment of the cameral and policy sciences (*Kameral- und Polizeywissenschaft*), later of jurisprudence, basic academic training at least of the higher civil service personnel in the 18th and 19th centuries<sup>10</sup>.

Crown prerogative of hierarchic appointment became to replace election to public office and inheritance of or even office sales after the absolutist state had created with the military a standing and with the expanding administration a "sitting" army, to quote Hans Rosenberg's word *play*<sup>11</sup>.

When full-time service in this apparatus is emphasized, it is juxtaposed to the feudal system, in which public office was only an annex to fiefdoms<sup>12</sup>.

The full-time-status of officials corresponds to monetary rewards of bureaucrats, who tended to be recruited from non-propertied social strata. Their number became simply too huge to be supported, nurtured and to live in the household of the ruler; they could no longer be provided with natural goods for securing their own and

their families' reproduction. Naturally, the monetary reward system required, at the macro-economical level, a well-functioning and trustworthy system of tax collection and thus a monetary economy.

Discipline and vocational ethos, too, had first to develop historically. In materialist perspective, a connection with the feudal system of secondary offices (*Nebenamt*) and widespread corruption can be supposed; a rather idealist perspective would emphasize the relationship with what Max Weber called a methodical conduct of life (*methodische Lebensführung*)<sup>13</sup>; it emerged from domestication in monasteries, in the military service and finally in the factory<sup>14</sup>. I refer here to the dissertation by Fritz<sup>15</sup>, who has shown in great detail how the officials, during the 18th century, had to get accustomed step by step to systematic work in the bureaus: After having coped with the problem of inducing officials to go to their office at all, the next task was making them do so every day; finally (and still today), one had to make them actually work in their bureaus.

Last but not least, the separation between household and office, between private and public means, also has historical bearing, which is left unnoticed by organization theory and which is not easily recognizable today. This separation not only means the spatial separation of the bureaus from the princely court, but also the expropriation of the personnel from the ownership of the means of production, as Weber formulated it consciously alluding to Karl Marx<sup>16</sup>. Today, no scientist owns the expensive equipment of laboratories with which he works, and while in previous times it was not unusual for a cavalryman to equip himself, for us it is entirely unthinkable that his historical follower, the "tank-scout", would still be in possession of this means of production.

## Bureaucracy's place in Weber's sociology of domination

It is precisely the combination of these characteristics and their historical contents that prove that the type of bureaucratic organization is not presented by Weber from the point of view of organization theory, but has its place in the framework of Weber's sociology of political domination<sup>17</sup>. Weber puts the legal-rational type of ruling by means of a bureaucratic staff of administration in opposition to

the other types of legitimate domination, traditional and charismatic rule. This – to say it shortly – bureaucratic rule is a product of the historical rationalization in the political subsystem of society. As each of the individual characteristics already expresses the increase of rationality: for instance rule-conformity or professional training, so does the combined effect of these characteristics; it gives the type of rational-legal rule a higher level of rationality than both of the other forms of political rule can claim for themselves<sup>18</sup>:

– From the point of view of the citizen (*Bürger*) it secures a historically unique amount of predictability on the basis of the state as a *Rechts- und Gesetzesstaat*.

– From the perspective of the ruler – whoever that may be – a maximum of predictability as well, for the officials can hardly emancipate themselves from the political leadership or become politically independent because they are existentially dependent on him, as a consequence of the system of monetary rewards and the appropriation of the means of the office by the ruler.

Traditional rule, for example, is, on the contrary, dependent on the allocation of fiefdom, which, in turn, provided the basis for political independence and centrifugal tendencies in the medieval empire. Charismatic rule is economically based on gifts, trophies and alms and therefore on an unreliable flow of resources and on unstable followers (*Gefolgschaft*).

## Reformulating the so-called efficiency thesis

I can now begin to discharge the second task and to restate and specify the so-called efficiency thesis.

### *Dysfunctions of bureaucratic organization*

I shall discuss the customary critique of bureaucracy as it is presented in the organization theory<sup>19</sup> only with a broad brush. Rule-orientation was criticized by Robert Merton<sup>20</sup> for its potential for goal displace-



ment; in this case the rules are applied even when their aims have obviously become obsolete. Furthermore, Crozier<sup>21</sup> observed the rigidity-circle; organizations can enter a vicious circle of increasing ossification because ever new rules are produced for preventing deviant behaviour; finally the system collapses in crisis.

The popular conservatism thesis of bureaucracy, scarcely asserted as it is in organization theory, contains a grain of empirically established evidence of structural conservatism. Structural conservatism can be explained by recalling the existential interests of officials in maintaining their positions and status. Weber himself, by the way, had observed this tendency long ago and inferred from it (and bureaucracy's functional indispensability for modern society) the thesis of indestructibility of the bureaucratic apparatus.

Of course, there are also pathologies typical for characteristics of the decision-making process in bureaucracies, among them selective perception within departmental jurisdiction and, subsequently, sub-optimal decisions with a tendency to externalize the costs of planning decisions to other sectors. Furthermore, it is a well-known fact that the hierarchy in organizations functions as a filter in intra-organizational decision-making processes ultimately producing fictions and leading to a loss of reality at the top of organizations.

Finally, especially German administrative science has emphasized the problematic lack of citizen orientation (*Bürger Nähe*)<sup>22</sup> of bureaucratic organization, more precisely the concern is about the social distance between officials and clients especially in providing personal social services. I emphasize this critique as I shall return to it in the next chapter.

### *Formal versus substantial rationality*

Max Weber would never have contested these dysfunctions and inefficiencies. As might be well known, in his political writings he was one of the most ardent critics of bureaucracy as a social phenomenon. In so far we need not deal with the discussion about the interpretation of the concept of the ideal type<sup>23</sup> and its methodological status; it tends to be misunderstood in organization theory as a prescriptive model of organizing. Weber's personal political critique of bureau-

crazy is though not found in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, a work which he considered as scientific and free from value judgements; there we find the formulation of the so-called efficiency-thesis (on page 128 in the 1976-edition, 5th printing).

First of all, we should note that Weber does not use the term “efficiency” but speaks of the formally most rational mode – not of organization in general but – of exercising political domination, especially when compared to traditional and charismatic rule with their well-known instabilities. That he is addressing formal rationality can be inferred from the criteria he enumerates: precision, continuity, rapidity, discipline, predictability, intensity and extensity of services, universal applicability to every task, and the technically most perfectionable form of rule<sup>24</sup>.

Weber does not speak, in this context, about conservatism or about the bureaucracy’s hostility towards innovations, nor about lacking responsiveness to citizens’ needs (*Anliegensgerechtigkeit*) or social (or geographical) distance to citizens (*Bürgernähe*). The claim of the highest degree of formal rationality arises, on the one hand, from his historical perspective by juxtaposition with the historically older types of traditional and charismatic rule. On the other hand, his proposition contains a systematic point, the comparison with voluntary organizations and their “dilettante” administration or the contrast to cumbersome collective decision-making bodies. The theoretical perspective on formal rationality thus is derived from the functional requirements of political domination, not from the material accomplishment of policy goals, services to society, participatory needs of employees or responsiveness to citizen needs – criteria we would apply today in assessing organizational efficiency<sup>25</sup>. The selection of criteria like these is necessarily normative or unwittingly dependent on special interests quite like pointing out dysfunctions is, in the last instance, oriented towards the normative expectations of the researcher or a clientele.

Judgements on inefficiency or dysfunctions like these, however, come close to Weber’s concept of substantial rationality, which he occasionally presents as a counterpoint to his emphasis of formal rationality, for example when he does not deal with the mode of production but with the distribution of public goods. The popular paradox of formal rationality and simultaneous substantial irration-

ality draws on the evidence of societal consequences of administrative actions. To assert substantive irrationalities presupposes value judgements like those which are clearly articulated in Weber's political critique of bureaucracy: the ultimately aristocratic model of life and personality of the "Kulturmensch"<sup>26</sup>, whom he saw endangered by the rise of the specialist and diploma man (*Fach- und Diplommenschen*) generated and needed by bureaucracy. Weber's substantial reservation against formal rationality as the only yardstick can still be recognized even in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* where he adds to the superiority-thesis of bureaucracy: "in so far as the highest value is seen in the production of mass-goods" (*Massengüter*).

## Voluntary organizations and substantial rationality – a synthesis

When Weber emphasized the merely formal rationality of bureaucratic rule, he did so on the basis of abstaining from value judgement (*Werturteilsfreiheit*). I would like to put forward as my third thesis that a part of the popular critique of bureaucracy, especially the critique of social distance in personal social services, for example, in public hospitals and in the social service administration, is first of all a critique of their lack of substantial rationality. I would like to add the disputable thesis that the ahistorical and systematic reduction of the concept of bureaucracy in organization theory also prevents us from bringing into view that very class of organizations that are most likely to respond to the implicit criteria of substantial rationality in cases like these: the type of voluntary organizations, amateurish "dilettante administrations" (*Dilettantenverwaltungen*) as Weber preferred to name them in the original Roman sense of these terms.

### *Voluntary organizations and the reduction of social distance*

My scope is not to complain about the regrettable reduction of the concept of formal organization, which has made research on voluntary organizations a special field of study<sup>27</sup>. But I find it noteworthy to point out that when the criteria "full-time employment of officials" ,

“monetary reward” and “professional training” are eliminated from the concept of bureaucracy one runs danger of overlooking the type of organization like self-help-groups; some theorists do not content themselves with solving the problem of responsiveness and social distance of bureaucratic organization but want to replace bureaucracy in this field altogether or at least suggest to combine voluntary and bureaucratic organizations. As the excesses of “apparatus-medicine” are to be fought with lay medicine and self-medication, the self-help groups are supposed to generate the amount of humanity and “warmth”<sup>28</sup> which is missed in the impersonally operating social service administration<sup>29</sup>.

We can easily agree that the opposition between two models of administration cannot be considered a mutually exclusive one. One may complain about the juridification and monetarization of social policy quite like about the technicalization of medicine, but for the basic supply of mass goods (*Massengüter*) – to use Weber’s phrasing – reliance on the bureaucratic apparatus is indispensable. However, this does not exclude voluntary organizations based on unpaid services from playing a complementary role. Furthermore, this cannot mean abolishing the historical achievement of impersonal administrative practice – this meaning in the last instance: deciding without considering personal attributes like social origin or privileges; it only means complementing it, in some sectors of service administration, with an element which the bureaucratic organization as an apparatus of political domination (and an apparatus for the mass production of goods – not only, but also – by public enterprises) is typically not designed for. For, the formal rationality of bureaucratic organization is today as indispensable as ever; therefore, reforms concerning the lack in responsiveness to citizens’ needs and of substantial rationality will encounter structural barriers. In my opinion, the transcendence of impersonality and social distance can best be achieved by complementary voluntary associations, the very class of the *dillettante* administration eliminated by definition from current organization theories. However, one will have to consider in empirical studies that self-help organizations, in turn, can gradually become bureaucratized to varying degrees depending on their legal construction, the amount of resources needed and their way of procuring resources.

## Weber's song of praise for the dilettante administration

Perhaps you are surprised, when I finally tell you that this line of reasoning can already be found in Max Weber's own writings. However, not in his scientific work, in which he merely dealt with the historical-systematic analysis of the functioning of political rule. We find the clue in Max Weber's little known report on his activity as a commander of reserve hospitals near Heidelberg during the first world war<sup>30</sup>. As he wrote, he had to organize "dilettante administrations" and he saw himself as a part of them. He praises there the "gifts from the citizenry abundantly donated and the flows of helpful warmth, without detours through the Red Cross" – obviously an organization that was perceived as rather bureaucratic. Weber continued:

"These gift administrations (*Liebesgabenverwaltungen*) achieved for the hospitals something totally irreplaceable, something that could never have been provided by the official administration owing to the nature of its other tasks. On the one hand, in purely human terms, through personal encouragement, through the procurement of books to read, through private job placement of the wounded ... on the other hand, through collecting means for needs which could not, partly all together, partly not in this quality and quantity, be provided by the hospital administration."

Furthermore, in this report we also find the final song of praise for the voluntary nurses whom Weber so-called "dilettante-nurses":

"That personalities like them were capable of working without interruption during this war time of five quarters of a year could not be expected. After overcoming initial difficulties, their performance reached at least the same level as that of a particularly well-trained professional nurse; it even surpassed the average performance of a professional nurse by being for the most part less schematic, more empathizing in treating patients, thus satisfying not only their hygienic and physical needs but also their

purely human interests, without losing the necessary social distance.”

Despite all his appreciation of these voluntary, not professionally trained nor monetarily rewarded nurses, Weber in this report as a practitioner never ran danger of overlooking the formal rationality of professional nurses and full-time hospital administration for the continuity and predictability of operations.

## Notes and references

- 1 Translation based on a lecture “Die selektive Interpretation der Weberschen Bürokratiethorie in der Organisations- und Verwaltungslehre”, in: *Verwaltungsarchiv* 80, 1989, pp. 319-329.
- 2 Cf. James G. March/Herbert Simon, *Organizations*, New York 1958, p. 36.
- 3 This misunderstanding is emphasized by Renate Mayntz, *Max Webers Idealtypus der Bürokratie und die Organisationssoziologie*, in: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 17 (1965), pp. 493-502; reprinted in: Mayntz (ed.), *Bürokratische Organisation*, Köln/Berlin 1968, pp. 27-35.
- 4 Cf. Renate Mayntz, *ibid.*; Rainer Prewé, *Max Webers Wissenschaftsprogramm*, Frankfurt 1979, p. 484; Karl Gabriel, *Analysen der Organisationsgesellschaft*, Frankfurt/New York 1979, p. 31.
- 5 See Richard Hall, *Die dimensionale Natur bürokratischer Strukturen*, in: Renate Mayntz (ed.), *Bürokratische Organisation* (Footnote 2), pp. 265-276; for the “Aston School”, see Cornelis J. Lammers/David J. Hickson (eds.), *Organizations Alike and Unlike*, London 1979.
- 6 Only mentioned by Robert K. Merton, *Bürokratische Struktur und Persönlichkeit*, in: Renate Mayntz (ed.), *Bürokratische Organisation* (Footnote 2), pp. 265-276.
- 7 *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie*, Stuttgart, 2nd Edition 1970 (1911).
- 8 5th Edition, Tübingen 1976, p. 124.
- 9 So in the influential textbook by Alfred Kieser/Herbert Kubicek, *Organisation*, Berlin/New York 1983, 2nd Edition, p. 32.
- 10 Cf. Wilhelm Beck, *Von der Kameralausbildung zum Juristenprivileg*, Berlin 1972; Bernd Wunder, *Geschichte der Bürokratie in Deutschland*, Frankfurt 1986, pp. 36-41.

- 11 Cf. Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy. The Prussian Experience 1660-1815*, Cambridge, Mass. 1958, p. 40.
- 12 Cf. Erich Wyluda, *Lehensrecht und Beamtentum. Studien zur Entstehung des preußischen Beamtentums*, Berlin 1969.
- 13 This aspect of Weber-Interpretation was thematized by Wilhelm Hennis, Max Webers Thema. "Die Persönlichkeit und die Lebensordnungen", in: *Zeitschrift für Politik* 31 (1984), pp. 11-52.
- 14 Cf. Hubert Treiber/Hans Steinert, *Die Fabrikation des zuverlässigen Menschen*, München 1980.
- 15 Hans-Joachim Fritz, *Menschen in Büroarbeitsräumen*, München 1982.
- 16 Cf. Max Weber, *Politik als Beruf*, München/Leipzig 1919, p. 8.
- 17 Cf. Johannes Winckelmann. Max Webers historische und soziologische Verwaltungsforschung, in: *Annali della Fondazione Italiana per la Storia Amministrativa*, 1964, pp. 27-67.
- 18 Cf. Hans-Dieter Siebel, Bürokratie und Charisma. Systemrationalität und Systemwandel bei Max Weber, in: *Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft* 27 (1976), pp. 342-369; Hartmann Tyrell, Gewalt, Zwang und die Institutionalisierung von Herrschaft. Versuch einer Neu-Interpretation von Max Webers Herrschaftsbegriff, in: Rosemarie Pohlmann (ed.), *Person und Institution*, Würzburg 1980, pp. 59-92.
- 19 Cf. the collection by Klaus Türk, *Grundlagen einer Pathologie der Organisation*, Stuttgart 1976.
- 20 Cf. Robert Merton, *Bürokratische Struktur und Persönlichkeit* (Footnote 5).
- 21 Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*, Chicago/London 1964.
- 22 Cf. the latest summary by Dieter Grunow, *Bürgernahe Verwaltung*, Frankfurt 1988.
- 23 In the recent literature cf. for example Hartmann Tyrell, Ist der Webersche Bürokratietypus ein objektiver Richtigkeitstypus? Anmerkungen zu einer These von Renate Mayntz, in: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 10 (1981), pp. 38-49.
- 24 Cf. Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, op.cit., p. 128.
- 25 Cf. Hans-Ulrich Derlien, Theoretische Probleme der Beurteilung organisatorischer Effizienz der öffentlichen Verwaltung, in: Andreas Remer (ed.), *Verwaltungsführung*, Berlin/New York 1982, pp. 89-105.
- 26 Cf. Wolfgang Mommsen, Max Weber, in: Hans-Ulrich Wehler (ed.), *Deutsche Historiker*, Göttingen 1973, p. 318.
- 27 Cf. D. L. Sills, Voluntary Associations. Sociological Aspects, in: *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Vol. 16, New York 1968, pp. 326-379; Heinz-Dieter Horch, *Strukturbesonderheiten freiwilliger Vereinigungen*, Frankfurt/New York 1983.

- 28 Cf. Peter Gross, Vergebliche Liebesmüh. Professionalisierung, Entprofessionalisierung und die Grenzen der Erwerbsgesellschaft, in: Alfred Bellebaum/Heribert J. Becker/Michael Th. Greven (eds.), *Helfen und helfende Berufe als soziale Kontrolle*, Opladen 1985, pp. 265-291.
- 29 In the sphere of politics we find the analogous Marxist council-model: the political distance is supposed to be diminished for the officials should no longer be appointed but elected, not hired for a life-time but revocable at any moment; the rotation system is meant to neutralize specialization, and the division of powers as one form of specialization is to be abandoned.
- 30 Passages can be found already in Marianne Weber, *Max Weber – Ein Lebensbild*, Tübingen 1926, pp. 589-93; the report as a whole is printed in Horst Baier/M. Rainer Lepsius/Wolfgang J. Mommsen/Wolfgang Schluchter/Johannes Winkelmann (eds.), *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 15, Tübingen 1984, pp. 32-48.



Pertti Töttö

## MAX WEBER – A SOCIOLOGIST?

Nearly all contemporary textbooks on the history of sociology take it for granted that Weber was a sociologist. Many writers describe him as one of the greatest sociologists, and for some, he is the greatest of all sociologists. But was Weber actually a sociologist or not? Put in this way, the question is, of course, rather naive. “Who cares?” would probably be the most appropriate answer.

A somewhat more polite reply would be to note that it all depends on your concept of sociology. If we take the contemporary meaning of the word, Weber can be classified as sociologist simply because almost everything is sociology today – from the most detailed analysis of pauses in a conversation between a doctor and a patient to the wildest speculations concerning postmodernity, the time of the tribes, and so on. It is questionable, however, if Weber himself would have been very happy about being a classic of such an intellectual “discipline”.

Even if we specify our concept of sociology, there are several senses in which Weber can be treated as sociologist. For Simon Clarke, for instance, Weber was not a sociologist but the sociologist. In his *Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology*, Clarke (1982, 192) writes: “It is in this sense that we can see Weber as the true founder of modern sociology ...” Weber’s position is determined, as if by definition. The classical political economics pretended to be a scientific theory of the modern society as a whole. The early sociologists tried to criticize

its achievements, but failed in shaking its foundations as an adequate self-understanding of the bourgeois society. Only after the marginalists reformed economics and made it an abstract theory of rational economic behaviour without history or any notions of social structure, there appeared space for sociology. "Once it is recognised that economics is an abstract discipline, not one that claims a monopoly of knowledge of society, sociology can emerge as the discipline that studies the consequences of non-rational action oriented to other than economic goals, the discipline that takes account of the normative orientation of action ..." (Clarke 1982, 17). From these premises, the conclusion is more than obvious: "The task of developing such a sociology fell to Max Weber ..."

My own presentation of Weber in my *Sosiologia teoriana modernista yhteiskunnasta*, Sociology as (a) Theory of the Modern Society was analogous: Sociology developed as a paradigm trying to conceptualize the shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*. The latter form of social relations can also be conceived of as modern capitalism, and it was undoubtedly Weber who gave the best account of the conditions under which the type of man that inhabited the "iron gage" of modern capitalism was born. Again, if we accept the premises, then the conclusion that Weber was one of the founding fathers of the sociological paradigm is sound.

This much for the contemporary notions of sociology. If we, on the other hand, consider the meaning of the word sociology in Weber's own times, the answer to our naive question seems to be a straightforward no. Weber was a lawyer by training, an economist by profession, and his empirical (or substantial) work could be classified as history – both in the sense of Weber's and of our times. From this perspective, the book *Max Weber, der Historiker* (Kocka 1986) has been given an adequate title.

Historically things were not, however, as simple as that. In consequence of the *Methodenstreit*, it was not so clear any more what was history and what was economics. Some contemporaries noticed, accordingly, that the German historical Nationalökonomie could actually be called sociology, as well. In 1922, Heinrich Herkner wrote in his article *Gustav Schmoller als Soziologe* that the German economics is distinguished from the economics of the "other great nations" by its "ungemeinenge Verbindung mit der Soziologie", extremely close

relation to sociology. “Ja bei manchen Volkswirten (Max Weber, Sombart, v. Wiese, Michels) ist es fraglich geworden, ob sie sich selbst noch als Nationalökonomien angesehen haben oder ansehen” (Herkner 1922, 3). According to Herkner, it was Schmoller who was responsible for this development. Primarily, he was not a *Wirtschaftshistoriker*, as Menger inadequately supposed, but a sociologist. “Man kommt wahrscheinlich der Wahrheit am nächsten”, Herkner (1922, 3) wrote, “wenn man sagt, Schmoller war einerder größten Soziologen, die es gibt”.

These were the times when the word sociology first began to obtain some more positive connotations in Germany. However, the old debate concerning *Soziologie als Lehrfach* (von Below 1919) still continued, books and articles were published with titles like *Die Krisis der Soziologie* (Singer 1921), *Kritik der Soziologie* (Landshut 1929) etc., and as Herkner (1922, 4) also pointed out, habilitation in sociology was not formally possible in Germany: “Der Soziologe kann die *venia legendi* nur als Philosoph, Nationalökonom, Jurist oder Historiker erwerben.” But sociology was, nevertheless, coming.

Weber’s attitude towards sociology changed together with the general trend. As Karl Jaspers (1988, 91) remembers, Weber opposed systematically every attempt to establish any chairs of sociology. On the other hand, with his own contribution he tried to improve the scientific status of a field that mainly consisted of “dem allgemeinen Gerede und den billigen Selbstverständlichkeiten und spekulativen Torheiten” (Jaspers 1988, 51). In his booklet, Jaspers quotes three times the statement Weber made in his farewell speech in Heidelberg: “Das Meiste, was unter dem Namen Soziologie geht, ist Schwindel.” Gradually Weber seems to have toned town his expressions. In 1909, he became one of the founders of the German Sociological Association, and by the year 1913 he began to use the term *Soziologie* of the intellectual effort in which he was engaged (Mommsen 1974, 221) – a fact that gave occasion to the common belief that Weber experienced a “transition from history to sociology” (Eliæson 1995, 24). And when he was appointed professor in economics in Munich, he became a sociologist by profession because the teaching of sociology was officially included in his duties.

What did the word sociology actually mean at the time when Weber “changed his identity” and began to see himself as a sociologist?

What was the meaning of the word *Soziologie* Weber had in mind at the time when he used it in a polemical sense equating it with all kinds of intellectual swindle? What did the term designate after he had changed his mind? Why did Weber change his mind? Or did he actually change his mind at all?

I don't think I'll be able to answer all these questions. Perhaps I'm not answering any of them in a properly historical manner. What I intend to do, instead, is to construct two – let's say – ideal typical concepts of sociology and reflect upon Weber's relation to these "sociologies".

These two ideal types may be named as "Soziologie als Gesetzeswissenschaft" and "Soziologie als Gesellschaftswissenschaft". In short, Weber's attitude towards these two conceptions of social science was critical. The conceptions he criticised were parties in two different but interrelated cultural debates that had started in the 1850's. In both debates, Weber tried to find a mediating solution that would lead his own way out of the prevailing confrontations. So, when he finally renounced his reluctance to use the term sociology he needed to specify the meaning of the word by adding the predicate *verstehend* to it.

## Sociology as *Gesetzeswissenschaft*

The first meaning of sociology I'm referring to comes from the debate between *Historismus* and *Positivismus*. For *historism* (not *historicism*, a term that has a misleading Popperian connotation), the ultimate goal of research dealing with the human world was to describe the cultural and historical uniqueness of the subject under investigation. For *positivism*, the purpose of all research, regardless of what the subject matter might be, was to find general laws which the explanation and prediction of singular events could be based on. Accordingly, for the Germans of the second half of the nineteenth century, sociology chiefly meant *positivism* and especially the idea of a "natural science of society and history".

To be a bit more precise, in addition to *positivism*, there were also two other traditions which represented the idea of a lawful history and the formulation of laws as the ultimate task of social science, i.e.

*Hegelianism* and Marxism. Although both positivism and Marxism were critical about the Hegelian philosophy of history because of its lack of scientific accuracy, all three may well be classified in the same category. Dilthey, in his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1883), for instance, discussed both under the heading “Philosophie der Geschichte und Soziologie sind keinewirklichen Wissenschaften”). The task of the real science of society and history was to catch “das Einmalige und Singulare”, which was impossible for sociology and philosophy of history because of their metaphysical bias. In Dilthey’s (1933, 91) mind, Comte had “nur eine naturalistische Metaphysik der Geschichtesgeschaffen, welche als solche den Tatsachen des geschichtlichen Verlaufsviel weniger angemessen war als die von Hegel ...” The kinship between positivism, Hegelianism and Marxism was discussed in a more positive tone in Paul Barth’s book *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie* (1897).

One more example deserves to be mentioned, mainly because of a curious terminological coincidence. When I use the word *historism* in my writing and let the word processing program check the spelling of my text, the program insists that I should replace it with “*historicism*”. That reminds me of Karl Popper who in his *Poverty of Historicism* (1944) criticised just those three doctrines that in my vocabulary represent the opposite of *Historismus* – Popper criticised them of “*historicism*”, i.e. a fatalistic notion of “*historical*” laws on which they pretended to establish a “*scientific politics*”. As for me, that is precisely the original idea of sociology, the idea that neither orthodox historians nor Weber did approve.

In his *Positivism Reconsidered* (1975), Christopher Bryant enumerated six basic tenets of Comtean positivism. According to Bryant, these tenets hold true for the Durkheimian version of the French positivism, as well. I should like to add that they also apply to the Marxian version of sociology. These tenets are:

- (1) There is a single objective world.
- (2) That which cannot be known scientifically cannot be known.
- (3) The discovery of laws of historical development will enable the past to be explained, the present understood and the future predicted.

- (4) Moral and political choice should be established on a scientific basis.
- (5) Social order is the natural condition of society.
- (6) Man's subjection to the laws of nature, history and society precludes evaluation of social forms in terms other than those of conformity with these laws.

It is, of course, true that Comte substituted sociology for the term "social physics", but what is usually forgotten is the idea Comte pursued when he established a new science. The idea was "scientific politics" – an idea adopted from Saint-Simon. In his "Prospectus" (1822), Comte (1973, 547) wrote that his aim was to "raise politics into the rank of a science". His criticism was directed against the axioms of the freedom of consciousness, the equality of all men and the sovereignty of the people. These tenets were "unnatural" in the sense that when they were the guiding principles of polity no social order could be maintained. Take the doctrine of the freedom of consciousness for example, Comte argues, and try to apply it in astronomy, physics or chemistry – and you will end up in an absurd situation. What is true in those fields can not be determined with a referendum. So why should things be any different when it comes to politics, asked Comte. By investigating the regularities that could be observed in the course of history one was to find out what was true/necessary in politics. The "order in progress" could thus be achieved by complying with the laws of history disclosed by the new science of politics, later named sociology.

Durkheim, already, was aware of the doctrine of value-free science, but he did not approve of it. "According to one particular theory", he wrote in the *Rules of Sociological Method*, "science can only bring light into the world but it leaves our hearts into darkness" (Durkheim 1977, 69). One of the most passionate proponents of the doctrine in question was, of course, Max Weber. His formulation of the principle of value-freedom has often been misunderstood and misused. Both the student movement of the 60s and its adversaries interpreted and used the principle as a weapon to protect science from politics. It is true that Weber in his *Wissenschaft als Beruf* used the principle for this purpose himself. Nevertheless, the original purpose of the principle seems to have been quite opposite. Weber wanted to protect

politics from science, i.e. he promoted the principle against Schmoller and other “ethical economists”, who pretended to solve political problems by means of science. According to Weber, political decisions are based on value commitments, which can not be transformed into questions of knowledge. So, if we have the original meaning of positivism in mind nothing can be more anti-positivistic than the Weberian principle of value-freedom.

So much for the points (4) and (6). As for the first point, one could say that Weber almost agreed upon that tenet. For Weber, the world was not ontologically divided into nature and spirit, as was the case in the *Geisteswissenschaft* approach. Following Rickert, he made a logical (axiological) distinction between nature and culture. But because he did not believe in the existence of objective cultural values as Rickert did, Weber met severe difficulties in formulating his concept of the objectivity of social science (cf. Oakes 1988).

I skip the second point without a further comment and pick up the tenet (3), the question of laws. I think Weber would have agreed with Popper in his denial of the existence of historical laws. However, both would have also admitted that there may well be laws in the cultural world. According to Weber, human actions were, to a great extent, predictable. As a matter of fact, if they were not, our everyday life would become impossible. Hence, the program of the natural science of society (sociology) was quite feasible. But Weber did not think that the knowledge of laws could be of much interest, in itself. In his early writings he very clearly denied the option that the formulation of theoretical laws could be the aim of social science. Social science was *Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*, interested in the cultural meaning of the particular phenomenon under investigation (the spirit of capitalism, prostitution, syphilis, are among Weber's examples). In this respect, Weber was a true successor of historicism. But unlike the orthodox historicists he stressed that theoretical laws and general concepts, interpreted as ideal types, were useful and necessary as means of understanding cultural phenomena.

As a matter of curiosity, I should like to mention a Finnish philosopher, Arvi Grotenfelt, who suggested quite a similar mediating solution to the dispute between historicism and – as he called the party of the reformers – sociology. His *Die Wertschätzung in der Geschichte* was published in Leipzig in 1903, a year before Weber's

essay on objectivity appeared. Weber may or may not have been familiar with the work, it's hard to say. Ernst Troeltsch at least reviewed the book concluding that it did not offer a solution to the problem but only a compromise. The domestic critics also blamed Grotenfelt for eclecticism. I venture to disagree with these contemporaries and claim that in some respects the critique of Rickert in Grotenfelt is more modern than in Weber (cf. Töttö 1996).

As Wolfgang J. Mommsen pointed out, the constructing of ideal types became more important in Weber's later writings, perhaps an end in itself. But the claim of Thomas Burger (1994, 81) that Weber never changed his basic conviction about the social science as cultural/historical science is equally plausible. According to Burger, the real reason for Weber's reluctance to adopt the identity of a sociologist was his effort to reform the historical research from inside, by introducing a mediating position between historicism and positivism. But even if we accept this view the question remains: Why did he, after a long hesitation, nevertheless begin to call himself a sociologist? One possible answer maybe found by looking at the point (5) in Bryant's list and reflecting upon Weber's relation to another meaning of sociology.

## Sociology as *Gesellschaftswissenschaft*

Robert von Mohl published an article *Gesellschafts-Wissenschaften und Staats-Wissenschaften* in 1851, announcing the existence of a new and important phenomenon. He had "discovered" an independent sphere between the individual and the state, a sphere which he called "die Gesellschaft". It consisted of all kinds of voluntary cooperative activities that people were engaged in, regardless of the orders of the state. Von Mohl's programme of a science dealing with the independent social sphere had some resemblance to the liberal political program.

A severe attack against this program came from Heinrich von Treitschke. In his *Die Gesellschaftswissenschaft* (1859) he claimed that it was not possible to distinguish the society from the state. Writing from an openly political perspective of the future German nation state, he insisted that the society is nothing else than the collective



*Volksleben* of a nation integrated by the state. That being the case, it would be impossible to treat society independently of the state or to have a place for social science. There could be a specialized science for each of the different forms of social activities, for example for the church, education, associations etc., but since these activities were based on egoistic interests, every attempt to grasp the integrative mechanism holding these activities together would lead us to the idea of state. So, no social science besides *Staatswissenschaft*.

That was the starting point of a lengthy debate concerning the possibility and legitimacy of sociology in Germany. The idea of an organic whole of national spirit embodied in the state, the dogma of “*der organischen Einheit aller Lebensäußerungeneines Volkes*”, became the prime obstacle to the establishment of sociology in Germany. Especially the *Zunft* of the nationalist political historians led by Georg von Below opposed the “*Soziologie als Lehrfach*”. At times, they were forced to struggle against sociology inside the field of historical research, itself. Eberhard Gothein introduced a provocative concept of *Kulturgeschichte* suggesting that the true history was cultural, not political history because the state was only one moment of culture. Furthermore, culture consisted of *Massenerscheinungen*, not of the deeds of national heroes. Karl Lamprecht and Kurt Breysig radicalized these ideas combining them with openly positivistic tenets concerning laws in history. All three were “*excommunicated*” from the craft of historians, and in the case of Lamprecht one could even apply the term *Ketzerverbrennung*. There could be no other history in Germany than national history.

According to Burger (1994), Weber took up a stand – in this dispute between the social and the political science – by adopting the identity of a sociologist. “*In Webers Überzeugung von der Unhaltbarkeit der organistischen Auffassung liegt der Ursprung seiner Wende zur Soziologie*” (Burger 1994, 95). Weber’s definition of the scope of sociology resembled that of von Mohl, and in some letters to his colleagues he occasionally expressed his intention to put an end to the organismic approaches that use collective concepts as the prime motive in his becoming a sociologist. Although he did not approve of Lamprecht – who, for Weber, was a dilettante in the worst sense of the word, to an extent that Weber could refer to him as “*sociologist*” in quotation marks (Weber 1988, 48) – he still had a

close relation to Goethe and, quite obviously, his historical works dealing with Protestantism and capitalism, and with the world religions, were not national but universal history that had been proclaimed impossible by the orthodox historians.

However, there is something very perplexing in this picture of Weber as a defender of *Gesellschaftswissenschaft* against *Staatswissenschaft*. Why? Simply because Weber did not use the word “society” at all, and did not even have a concept for the thing that the sociologists take for the subject matter of their discipline. An article by Hartmann Tyrell (1994) has a revealing title *Max Webers Soziologie – eine Soziologie ohne ‘Gesellschaft’*.

If we think of von Mohl’s idea of the *Gesellschaftswissenschaft*, it seems consistent with the subsequent sociology. Twenty years ago, my sociology professor started his introduction to the field by saying something like “the society is not located in Helsinki” meaning that the society exists independently of the state. Then we heard how sociology is about the relations between an individual and the society, about norms and interaction, about the differentiation and integration of the society, about the functions of the subsystems of society, about social order, etc. There are no such things in the Weberian “sociology”.

The basic concept in Durkheim was that of a society “hanging above the individual” and forcing her/him to things like suicide. Weber did not, however, take the opposite stand. His so-called methodological individualism did not mean that the individual would be his corresponding category, or that he would have fought against “society” as a *Kollektivbegriff*. He simply did not discuss the concept at all. His key concept in this respect was “social action”, by which he seems to have avoided the contrast between individual and society. Furthermore, “society” in the sense of Tönnies, as an antithesis of the *Gemeinschaft*, and in the sense of Simmel’s *Wechselwirkung*, is not to be found in Weber.

According to Tyrell (1994, 392), we might say that “das soziale Ganze ist in der Weberschen Soziologie kein Thema”. Brought up in the Parsonsian tradition, the sociologists are perhaps far too used to think that Weber would have had very much to say about the modern Western society and its rationalization – we tend to forget that Weber did not use the term rationalization in singular. He always wrote about many different processes of rationalization that were going on

in different *Lebensordnungen*. These spheres of life, i.e. the state, law, religion, economy, bureaucracy, science, music, etc., are the level on which we may speak of Weber's "social theory". But we have to be very careful, and resist every functionalist temptation to make Weber a theoretician of the societal subsystems and their functions. Weber never dealt with questions of integration and disintegration of his *Lebensordnungen*. The idea of differentiation was not altogether strange to Weber. But, again, he did not see only one process at work at the level of the society – as was the case in Spencer. Instead he saw many processes at the level of different spheres of life. Compared to functionalist "grand" theories, Weber's "theory" was much more – if you allow me to use one fashionable term from contemporary sociology – "grounded". What Weber was mainly interested in were the religious factors promoting or prohibiting processes in other spheres of life. Following Tyrell, we may call this the search for "Formgleichheiten" and "Kompatibilitäten" between the spheres but it can also be conceived of as a theoretically motivated historical analysis of the complex causal relations between cultural phenomena.

If Tyrell is right in his interpretation of Weber being completely blind to questions concerning the society as a whole, the problem of the causes of Weber's change of identity remains open. The ordinary view of Weber as a historian becoming gradually a sociologist hardly fits. I quote: "Webers Entscheidung gegen 'Gesellschaftslehre' and für eine Soziologie 'von unten', vom Handeln her war eine explizite; siemuß Gründe gehabt haben. Diese Gründe, die uns der fertige Kategorien-Aufsatz und die 'Soziologische Grundbegriffe' – nicht verraten, bleiben einstweilen undeutlich; sie aufzuhellen, schiene mir aber theoriegeschichtlich von größtem Interesse."

## So what?

After all, the reasons Weber might have had in mind when he decided to become a sociologist are only of historical interest. Are there any other perspectives besides the pure Weberologie that could make these kind of details more interesting?

One such perspective might be the conceptual erosion of the conventional sociology through contemporary trends of thought claiming that we need a new “postmodern sociology”. If we draw a parallel to Zygmunt Bauman’s (1992) ideas about sociology giving up such heavy concepts like “society”, “structure”, “function”, etc., we can easily conclude that Weber already made that kind of sociology.

## References

- Barth, Paul: *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*. O. R. Reisland: Leipzig 1897.
- Bauman, Zygmunt: *Intimations of Postmodernity*. Routledge: London 1992.
- Below, Georg von: Soziologie als Lehrfach. *Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft* 43: 1919.
- Bryant, Christopher: Positivism Reconsidered. *Sociological Review* 23: 1975.
- Burger, Thomas: Deutsche Geschichtstheorie und Webersche Soziologie. Gerhard Wagner und Heinz Zipprian (Hg.): *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre. Interpretation und Kritik*. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1994.
- Clarke, Simon: *Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology. From Adam Smith to Max Weber*. Macmillan: London 1982.
- Comte, Auguste: *System of Positive Polity or Treatise on Sociology Instituting the Religion of Humanity*. Fourth Volume. Burt Franklin: New York 1973.
- Dilthey, Wilhelm: Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte. Dilthey: *Gesammelte Schriften* I. Band. B. G. Teubner: Leipzig und Berlin 1933.
- Durkheim, Émile: *Sosiologian metodisäännöt*. (Finnish Transl. of *Règles de la méthode sociologique*. Tammi: Helsinki 1982.
- Eliaesson, Sven: Interpreting the classics. Max Weber’s contribution to the secularization of social science. Jürgen Matthies und Kari Palonen (Hg.): *Max Weber. Stadt, Politik, Geschichte*. University of Jyväskylä, Department of Political Science: Jyväskylä 1995.
- Herkner, Heinrich: Gustav Schmoller als Soziologe. *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* 118: 1922.
- Jaspers, Karl: *Max Weber*. Piper: München 1988.
- Kocka, Jürgen (Hg.): *Max Weber, der Historiker*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 1986.

- Landshut, Siegfried: *Kritik der Soziologie. Freiheit und Gleichheit als Ursprungsproblem der Soziologie*. Duncker & Humblot: München und Leipzig 1929.
- Mommsen Wolfgang: *Max Weber. Gesellschaft, Politik und Geschichte*. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1974.
- Oakes, Guy: *Weber and Rickert. Concept Formation in the Cultural Sciences*. The MIT Press: Cambridge/Mass. 1988.
- Popper, Karl: *The Poverty of Historicism*. *Economica* 11: 1944.
- Singer, Kurt: Die Krisis der Soziologie. *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* 16: 1921.
- Tyrell, Hartmann: Max Webers Soziologie – eine Soziologie ohne "Gesellschaft". Gerhard Wagner und Heinz Zipprian (Hg.): *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre. Interpretation und Kritik*. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1994.
- Töttö, Pertti: *Sosiologia teoriana modernista yhteiskunnasta*. Yhteiskuntatieteiden tutkimuslaitos: Tampere 1989.
- Töttö, Pertti: Arvi Grotenfelt Max Weberin aikalaisena. *Luonto toisena, toinen luontona. Kirjoituksia Lauri Mehtosen 50-vuotispäivän kunniaksi*. Filosofisia tutkimuksia Tampereen yliopistosta 60: Tampere 1996.
- Weber, Max: Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie. In: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. J. C. B. Mohr: Tübingen 1988.

---

*Kyösti Pekonen*

## MAX WEBER'S CONCEPT OF CHARISMA

### Introduction

The purpose of this article is to describe the nature of charisma as a phenomenon and to argue for its relevance as a concept today. The discussion presented here utilizes certain of Weber's formulations of charisma in order to describe and analyze charisma from a rhetorical point of view. My introduction to the problem of charisma is not a "Weberologist" in the purest sense of the word. I am not analysing the background or the social and political context of Weber's charisma analysis, nor am I presenting a rhetorical analysis of Weber's concept of charisma. That is, I am not trying to answer the question "what Weber really meant when he spoke of charisma". What I am trying to do in this presentation, however, is to describe the nature of charisma as a phenomenon by drawing on some of Weber's formulations, and then to present my point of view regarding which are the most important characteristics of charisma. Next, I will explain why charisma is still relevant for today's society and, perhaps, will become even more important in the future.

As a beginning point, it might be useful to provide a general definition of charisma. Charisma refers to the legitimacy given to an exceptional person and his or her personal leadership. A charismatic person is one who in a crisis situation appears to be capable of doing

things that most people are not capable of doing.

When analysing Max Weber's concept of charisma, we could start from many different viewpoints, especially given that charisma is not ascribed to any specific space or sector of life but, in principle, can be created anywhere. My main argument here is that charisma is more a situation-specific and aspect-specific phenomenon than it is a sector-specific phenomenon. Because I am interested here in the role of charisma in politics and administration in particular, it is reasonable to begin with Weber's basic definitions.


### Three inner justifications of *Herrschaft*<sup>1</sup>

How did Weber describe charisma? What kind of phenomenon is charisma? I will start from Weber's definition of the state. According to Weber "a state is that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory" (Weber 1994: 310-311) The monopoly of physical violence separates state from other human associations, and in a rational case this monopoly is judged to be legitimate.

What then does this legitimacy mean? When speaking about legitimate order Weber stated that "action, especially social action which involves a social relationship, may be guided by the belief in the existence of a legitimate order. The probability that action will actually be so governed will be called the 'validity' (Geltung) of the order in question." (Weber 1978, Vol. 1: 31) So, the *belief*, by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige, is very important for the legitimacy of every *Herrschaft* or authority.<sup>2</sup> The validity of a legitimate order is thus measured in terms of the degree of belief.

The basic question is then: where does this belief come from? Upon what inner justification and upon what external means does this *Herrschaft* (rule) rest? Do there exist some ideal-typical mechanisms or principles upon which one can try to construct legitimate rule? Weber's answer was that, in principle, there indeed are three ideal-typical inner justifications, hence, basic legitimations of rule, via which consent and legitimacy are mainly organised. These three types of justifications are traditional, rational-legal and charismatic.<sup>3</sup> (Weber 1978, Vol. 1: 215)

So, we have a triangle:



To *appeal* to the authority of what has always existed is to endeavor to guarantee legitimacy through tradition. To *appeal* to legal rules in order to create a belief in legality is to endeavor to obtain rational-legal authority; that is, it is a question of readiness to conform with rules that are formally correct and have been imposed on by accepted procedures. To *appeal* to an extraordinary personal talent is to endeavor to obtain the authority of charisma; that is, it is a question of the belief in a person and in his or her exceptional abilities.

This term *appeal* already shows us that in inner justifications the question is of a rhetorically created legitimacy. Depending on the situation and context, one appeals to traditions, legal rules or exceptional personal abilities, as principles justifying authority to do something. It is also evident that in different situations and institutions the justifications are not as feasible. For example, in established religious institutions, there is usually an appeal to traditions, but in new religious movements and sects it is more usual to appeal to the charisma of the founder of the movement.

Weber's well-known conclusion was that today the most usual basis of legitimacy is the belief in legality, that is, in rational-legal authority. (Weber 1978, Vol. 1: 37) Legitimacy that is based on legality is more developed and rational than, for instance, custom, convention, tradition or emotion. In rational-legal rule, the ground for the validity of legitimate authority is rational when the validity is based on the belief in the legality of normative rules. Thus, in obedience based on legal authority, the question is of the belief in the "legally established impersonal order" (Ibid: 215)




If the belief in legality is, according to Weber, the most usual basis of legitimacy in the modern democratic state, is there then any role for charisma? And if there is, what might that role be? Charisma is not, after all, so rare or exceptional a phenomenon as one might conclude from the definitions presented above. Weber somewhat broadens these ideal-typical descriptions in several connections. Four examples are presented below:


As a first example, Weber stated (1978, Vol. 1: 266-267) that when charisma moves toward an anti-authoritarian direction “the validity of charismatic authority rests entirely on recognition by the ruled” .... “Instead of recognition being treated as a consequence of legitimacy, it is treated as the basis of legitimacy: *democratic legitimacy*.” “The personally legitimated charismatic leader becomes leader by the grace of those who follow him since the latter are formally free to elect and even to depose him.” Through these quotations, we come back to the triangle drama between belief, inner justifications, and legitimacy.

Weber paints here a picture with two possibilities: a) Recognition of the validity of charismatic authority (by those subject to it) functions as the basis of overall legitimacy, i.e., the belief in the abilities of an exceptional person comes first; and b) legitimacy is first given on the basis of belief in the validity of legal rules or tradition, and, after that, rulers or those in power positions have the authority to govern. As you can see there is a shift in emphasis. In some *situations*, persons mean more, and in other situations rules and traditions mean more.

Case A:



## Case B:



The second example concerns the coexistence of the three inner justifications of the authority structure. Weber stated that *usually traditional, rational-legal and charismatic authorities are overlapping*, i.e., they must exist together, side-by-side, and at the same time. Weber thought that the composition of the belief in legitimacy is seldom altogether simple. In the case of 'legal authority', it is never purely legal. The belief in legality comes to be established and habitual, and this means it is partly traditional. Furthermore, it has a charismatic element, at least in the negative sense that persistent and striking lack of success may be sufficient to ruin any government, to undermine its prestige, and to prepare the way for charismatic revolution. (Weber 1964a: 382)

As a third example, Weber stated also that revolutions under a charismatic leader, directed against hereditary traditional powers or the powers of office, are to be found in all types of corporate groups, from states to trade unions. (Weber 1964a: 370)

And, fourth, Weber tied charisma to the early formative process of new movements. According to him, charisma is a phenomenon typical of prophetic religious movements or of expansive political movements in their early stages. (Weber 1964a: 370)

These examples taken from Weber show that the phenomenon of charisma and the effects of charisma may be found in many circumstances, in different institutions, organisations, and situations, and also in the early formative phases of new movements. The examples also show that traditional, rational-legal and charismatic authorities may overlap. Therefore, the secret of charisma cannot be revealed

by trying to locate “areas” in which charisma can be found. The secret of charisma lies in the special “function” of charisma, in its being the vehicle of the “new” in an extraordinary situation.

## The idea of charisma

Motto: “Charisma can only be ‘awakened’ and ‘tested’; it cannot be ‘learned’ or ‘taught’.” (Talcott Parsons’s not so strict translation: Weber 1964a: 367)

As we all know, the term charisma is used very widely nowadays; it is used in many senses and studied from many viewpoints. This makes the phenomenon of charisma difficult to handle in a proper way. Since it is not possible in this brief article to analyse thoroughly Weber’s concept of charisma, here we consider some key interesting and important viewpoints.

A starting point for understanding the idea of charisma is to identify the specific characteristics of the authority of charisma. We stated before that the authority of charisma is obtained by *appeal* to an extraordinary personal talent; that is, appeal to belief in a person based on his or her exceptional abilities. Accordingly, the following question must be: When and in what kind of situation or institution is it usual, necessary, important or possible to appeal to extraordinary personal abilities? Weber argued that an *exceptional situation* forms a real ground for the function of genuine charisma. (Weber 1978, Vol. 2: 1111-1112, 1121) Extraordinary situations are the fruitful soil for the creation of charisma. What does this phrase “extraordinary” in fact mean? One way to begin considering the notion of “extraordinary” is to start with its opposition, with normal and ordinary. “Normal and ordinary” may simply mean ‘that which we are accustomed to expect’. Correspondingly, “extraordinary” means simply that the existing consensus, that which is predictable, cannot – for whatever endogenic or exogenic reasons – continue without change. (For this kind of argument, see Cavalli: 319-320).

The extraordinary situation might then mean a situation in which those concerned are not themselves able to restore the balance by the cultural means available to them (this is what a crisis situation

means here). Fulfilling this task requires a person who has both the vocation and the requisite capabilities. However, success in the mission requires approval from the audience, from those whose expectations have become affected by the crisis.

Why is charisma mostly connected with extraordinary situations? The answer is simple: In times of crisis the situation is far more open and contingent than is usually the case. There are more opportunities for, and even much more need for, new action.

One classical dispute in the analysis of charisma has been concerned with the question of whether we should study charismatic leaders as exceptional persons, or whether we should study instead the relationship between leaders and followers in certain exceptional situations. The latter is the point of view taken here. Thus, the main interest here is not in charismatic leaders as persons, or with the kind of exceptional persons they are or have been. While these concerns, of course, are not insignificant, the point of view taken here is that in order to understand the essence of charismatic politics it is necessary to focus on the specific social and political situations of the followers themselves. I think we can find reasons for this argument from Weber himself. Weber meant by charisma ("gift of grace": Weber 1978, Vol. 1: 216) self-appointed leaders who are followed by those who are in distress and who follow the leader because they believe him or her to be extraordinarily qualified. Accordingly, we can argue that the followers, the spectators of the political drama, in fact judge and "decide" what kind of leaders they need and whom they judge as strong or charismatic. The last decisive decision belongs to the followers.

On the other hand, the followers' judgement is affected not only by the leader's personality and by the substance of his or her message, but also by the rhetoric he or she uses in telling about his or her mission. When the audience identifies and acknowledges a person as its leader for moving out of a crisis situation, this acknowledgement, however, is not a passive expression of a self-identity pre-existing in society. Rather, it is a creating of a kind of self-identity, or active articulation. The charismatic leader creates, in his or her personality and discourse, a meeting place for a signifier and signified which the followers are willing to hear and see.

Charisma and charismatic leadership usually arise in times of cri-

sis in which the basic values, institutions, and legitimacy are in question and become challenged. In this sense, genuine charisma is the problem of the "new". This "new", that is, the extraordinary nature of the times of crisis, calls forth a charismatic authority structure so that charisma, at least temporarily, leads to actions, movements, and events which are extraordinary, not routine, and outside the sphere of everyday life. In this sense, *charisma* is, according to Weber, *both revolutionary and irrational*. It is *revolutionary* when it "repudiates the past" and "irrational" in the sense of being foreign to all rules. (Weber 1964a: 361-362)

The decisive characteristic of charisma is its contradiction to the everyday order and routine way of action. Charisma means transcending the everyday order and this transcending creates the aura of exceptionality. Thus, in extraordinary situations a charismatic person, as a private person without a "past" and without any other authority other than himself or herself, can function as an organising and mobilising force. (Bourdieu 1987: 129-130)

I mentioned before that there is no one or proper space or sector or territory in life for charisma; rather, charisma is connected with a particular time and moment, following the logic "now it is the right time to do this". Charisma is, in this kind of situation, an ability and talent to make right decisions and to take right action at that very moment. However, this means also that charisma is necessarily temporally<sup>4</sup> and locally tied: it is a local phenomenon. (Weber 1978, Vol. 2: 1113)

When analysing charisma and rationalisation<sup>5</sup> from the viewpoint of an exceptional situation, it is easy to see that these two concepts necessarily must not confront each other. Charisma refers to abilities to utilise the contingency of an exceptional situation and its new chances. Therefore, rationality and charisma may also be complementary. Charisma may mean using new occasional rationality in a situation in which the principal rationality is not incidentally valid enough. (Spinner 1989: 250-295)

In fact, we have here two possibilities, two different viewpoints, in understanding the role of Weberian charisma: As a first perspective or point of view, we can see charisma bringing order to chaos. According to this viewpoint the overall rationality of charisma in a crisis situation is to bring up a "new order", i.e., to rationalise in a

“new level”. One can argue that in this case the social and political “task” of a charismatic leader is to create a new “balance”. Taking the second point of view, charisma is understood as a vehicle of politicisation, as a vehicle of the “new”, when charisma is irrational in the sense that all rules are foreign to it, and revolutionary in the sense that it repudiates the past. Politicisation means here breaking down existing self-evidence and unanimity, describing things from a new perspective and in a new way by using a new language. Perhaps the second viewpoint, charisma as a vehicle of politicisation, is somewhat closer to the rhetoric of Weber and his method of argumentation.

In any case, the “new” is the major keyword of charisma. Weber’s argument was that traditional and legal authorities are in fact patriarchal and bureaucratic structures which aim at and represent stability and are woven into daily routines. In a way, they represent the status quo. Transcending everyday routines requires charisma with its extraordinary way of using language, “charismatic rhetoric”, so to speak.

## The rhetoric of charisma

Here too, we can take many viewpoints. I deal with four points which I believe are important and timely.

### *Politics is conducted by spoken and written words*

First, we must recall Weber’s important starting point when he stated that modern politics is conducted in public mainly by spoken and written words. We cannot understand politics without taking into account the language used in politics. Language usage in politics does not refer only to “what is said” but also, and importantly, to “how something is said”.

### *The rhetoric of charisma as “politicising language”*

Second, as I have proposed in an earlier article (Pekonen 1991: 21-33), it is possible, following Weber’s basic ideas, to distinguish

between "political rhetoric" and "administrative technical rhetoric". I have defined a "politicising language" as an attempt to find a new way to describe the past, present or future. In a politicising language, we are dealing with a change in a "form of life" (Wittgenstein used this phrase) and, accordingly, a change in language.<sup>6</sup> This kind of new, politicising, language can be described as breaking the silence (unquestioned self-evidence) which the past so easily produces by means of sedimented language and dead metaphors. In a silence, everything goes without questioning. The function of criticism, in the form of politicising language, is to bring the undiscussed under discussion. There is no need for a critique or an attempt to break the immediate fit between the subjective and the objective structures unless there is a crisis which, through new experiences, forces us to see how conventional concepts and symbols no longer adequately describe these new experiences. But when something new has taken place, one has to find new words for the novel situation, and these new words and the new language name the situation and, in so doing, tell us what the significance of all this is.

Political language can also be described by the friend-enemy metaphor. When the question is of a political mode of action, a political actor usually presupposes that somewhere out there he or she has an opponent, and understands that this opponent is, in the same way as he or she is, in the role of a political speaker. And so, the speaker tries, by the aid of language, to influence the opponent and also to mobilise people behind his or her language, in other words, to convince those people to take seriously the reality principle which is communicated by his language. This is one important aspect of Weber's emphasis on modern politics as a contest before the public.

If the presence of politicising language is a presupposition of the "new", is there some special way of using language in a bureaucratic structure which, according to Weber, aims at and represents stability and is woven into daily routines? I have proposed that there really is a technocratic mode of action and a characteristic way of using language that accompanies it. In a technocratic mode of action, the opponent is reified. In a way, one loses sight of the opponent because the aspect of consciousness, the political nature of action, has no directive role in this type of action. Opponents are no longer other people with their languages, but facts and regularities in soci-

ety, or people as “things”. Accordingly, the political role of language is more or less excluded – or attempts are made to exclude it – from the domain of technocratic action. An apolitical administrative action often tries to simulate this kind of action. Its usage of language may be such that it tries to argue that administrative action is not directed against anybody, but is value-free, neutral, and for the general welfare or the common good. Administrative action and the administrative way of using language are in most cases realised under existing power relations and their use is targeted toward maintaining the status-quo; in contrast, the use of politicising language is targeted toward challenging the existing power relations.

On the basis of these general remarks, we can see that, on the one hand, charisma and politicising language “resemble” each other and, on the other hand, traditional and rational-legal authority structures come close to “administrative technical rhetoric”. Utilising politicising language does not, however, guarantee the aura of charisma; creating the aura needs something more.

### *Charisma as living metaphor*

Weber argued that genuine charisma is irrational in the sense that all rules are foreign to it, and that it is revolutionary in the sense that it repudiates the past. Where and how can a person or a movement try to make its charismatic appeal and try to show its charismatic nature? There is no way other than through its rhetoric. Pierre Bourdieu puts this in the following way: “The relationship between language and experience never appears more clearly than in crisis situations in which the everyday order (*Alltäglichkeit*) is challenged, and with it the language of order, situations which call for an extraordinary discourse (the *Ausseralltäglichkeit* which Weber presents as the decisive characteristic of charisma) capable of giving systematic expression to the gamut of extra-ordinary experiences that this, so to speak, objective epoche has provoked or made possible.” (Bourdieu 1977: 170)

In order that a charismatic representation of reality would be genuine and so that it could obtain the effect of charismatic authority, it should be both a communicable and a somehow exceptional representation of reality. *Genuine charisma should be irrational and revolu-*



tionary and the same characteristics should also hold true regarding "charismatic rhetoric"; that is, the way of using language should be somehow irrational and revolutionary. Charisma should "re-present" reality from a new perspective which, in turn, requires a rhetoric of transcendence.

The problem here is the rhetorical strategy of charisma; that is, how charisma is able to express that it really is charismatic. The expression should be such that via the leader candidate's appeal the leader himself or herself is in a fascinating way both a "revolutionary" and an "irrational" force. *Living metaphor, as a type of expression that cannot be understood literally, is a classic example of this kind of an exceptional language usage.*<sup>7</sup>

But what is metaphor? As we know, it is very difficult to find a definition of metaphor that pleases everyone. Therefore, I will not even try to define what a metaphor really is, but I will only try to describe how a metaphor functions and how it can fulfil the rhetorical requirements that charisma as a political and social phenomenon imposes.

Quite often metaphor has been described through the use of connotative categorisation. Let's take a simple example (from Koski 1992: 13-32): Let us imagine a situation in which my dog should be taken out. My spouse has many rhetorical possibilities in asking me to do that. She can say for example:

*Direct categorisation:*

"The dog should be taken out."

*Connotative categorisation:*

"Take that rat out."

When she uses direct categorisation regarding the dog, she only states 'the dog to be a dog'. Interpreting the second statement correctly requires connotative categorisation: 'the dog which is somehow like a rat'. In the latter case, my wife's statement does not necessarily coincide with the extralinguistic reality. In fact, there is no rat which I should take out. More important here is the way my spouse interprets and wants me to interpret the situation. As we can see, it is impossible to interpret literally a metaphorical statement with its connotative categorisation. Rather, by using connotative categorisation, my wife wants to say that "of course, I know that our dog is

not a rat but, however, I call it a rat because I want to give the impression that the dog somehow resembles a rat or that, in this situation, I regard our dog as a damned rat". As we can see here, the connotative categorisation brings with it the transition of meaning and the transition of values. The dog is compared to a rat and you know what to think about rats. It takes two ideas to make a metaphor, and a successful metaphor reconciles these two otherwise separate ideas.

This type of connotative categorisation is the necessary starting point for a metaphorical statement with its metaphorical effect, but it is not, however, enough. A living metaphor must have some other special characteristics. One of Paul Ricoeur's basic ideas concerning metaphor (Ricoeur 1986) is that we can, depending on the viewpoint, situate a metaphor in different places. First, there is the form of metaphor as a word-focused figure of speech. Then there is the sense of metaphor as a founding of a new semantic pertinence. According to Ricoeur, however, *the most important aspect is the power of a metaphorical reference to "redescribe" reality.*

When the starting point of a metaphorical effect is a word, statement, or a description of a reality, that cannot be understood literally, the metaphor results in many kinds of tensions. According to Ricoeur, the tensions of a metaphorical utterance can be located on three different levels: the tension between the terms of the statement, the tension between literal interpretation and metaphorical interpretation of the statement, and the tension in the reference between 'is' and 'is not' when the metaphorical 'is' at once signifies both 'is not' and 'is like'.

The problem of reference is important and interesting. By giving 'alien names' (as in calling the dog a rat in the example), the speaker is not interested in any well known reference or exact correspondence with extra-linguistic reality. Instead, the speaker aims at some "new characterisation", something which is not ordinary but which, however, is possible. In addition to the first, familiar and primary, signification, i.e., that which the sentence 'states', there is also 'the secondary signification', i.e., that which the sentence 'suggests'. A metaphorical statement suggests something other than what is stated. The logical absurdity of the sentence forces the listener/reader to move into the secondary signification. This second meaning relates

to a referential field for which there is no direct characterisation, and for which we consequently are unable to make identifying descriptions by means of appropriate predicates.

Using metaphors has here at least two functions. On the one hand, using metaphor means that one wants the described phenomenon to mean something more than the mere words as such convey. On the other hand, one can, by the help of metaphor, bring into discussion something unknown, something which one cannot directly characterise, or something that does not yet exist but is in the process of becoming. Through metaphor, one can create images of this "not yet known".

Asking "what a metaphorical statement says about reality" carries us towards the problem of the reference of the discourse. The tension between 'is' and 'is not' makes possible the poetic effect which a living metaphor can have. Here, "living metaphor" no longer means using words figuratively, but the power and possibility which the fictional reference of the metaphorical statement has in describing the world from a new, unusual and surprising viewpoint. Ricoeur argues that, in this kind of discourse, a metaphor becomes woven into the verb 'is' in two tensional ways. The metaphorical predication 'is' means at the same time both 'is not' and 'is like'. The similarity or resemblance between two things that normally are separated is more constructed and created than really seen. Metaphor discloses the structure of logical similarity because similarity or resemblance ('is like') is understood ('is') in spite of difference and conflict ('is not'). Therefore, Ricoeur's conclusion is that *the truth at which the metaphorical predication aims, cannot mean the same as 'what is'. However, this truth, characterised by the tension between 'what is' and 'what is possible', can be very penetrating as a multi-dimensional description. A metaphor also bears information because it 're-describes' reality.*

Ricoeur tries in his idea of metaphor to unite the basic aims of rhetoric and poetry. Ricoeur's argument is that rhetoric means using language persuasively, with the aim of persuasion being 'seeing as'. The aim of poetic discourse is 'feeling as'. So, living metaphor should be the result of both seeing and feeling. Living metaphor should have one structure but two functions, persuasion and feeling, both of which should be "embodied" in representation. (Ricoeur 1986: 212-213)

According to Wittgenstein's well-known definition, poetic language

is that language game in which the aim of words is to arouse images. We have already noticed that 'seeing as' and 'is like' require productive imagination. 'Seeing as' is the sensible aspect of poetic language. Half thought, half experienced, 'seeing as' is the intuitive relationship that holds sense and image together. In metaphor, the non-verbal and the verbal are firmly united at the core of *the image-ing function of language*. In living metaphor, it should be possible to unite that which is discursively created and the interpreter's own experience. This is the viewpoint according to which one can argue poetic reference to put the interpreter in the position of subject. 'Seeing as' is the product of an active process the interpreter must go through. At its best, this process may include the joy of discovering. (Ricoeur 1986: 210)

Whether metaphor functions the way the speaker wishes it to function depends on whether the statement can make active within the listener's mind different areas, schemes and patterns of knowledge, and whether the listener is "ready" to follow the path of meanings and signification the speaker wants to show. For the listener to be ready to follow this path, the speaker and the listener must have enough common knowledge and experiences. In spite of these common characteristics between the speaker and the listener, a metaphorical statement does not, however, introduce the listener to any ready and right interpretation but, rather, allows the listener to make many connotatively different conclusions. When one right interpretation is missing and, consequently, many meanings and significations are present, this calls forth in the metaphorical statement different mental pictures.

In sum, transcending everyday routines requires charisma with its extraordinary way of using language, "charismatic rhetoric" so to speak. "Living metaphor" seems, on the one hand, to be the suitable rhetorical means which charisma tries to use, because in living metaphor the non-verbal and the verbal are firmly united at the core of the "image-ing" function of language. On the other hand, the image and aura of charisma seem to function in the same way as living metaphor does. Charisma is metaphorical in the sense that it is exciting and captivates imagination. The aura of the rhetoric of charisma arises, in particular, in its opposition to the everyday and routine in particular. Living metaphor as a linguistic strategy that at

least transiently transcends everyday life, challenges traditional beliefs and gets imagination into motion. Routinization, on the contrary, means the death of the power of imagination.

*How to distinguish between authoritarian and anti-authoritarian charisma*

Irrational and revolutionary characteristics of charismatic rhetoric, and the use of living metaphor as its language form, make charisma an even more fascinating but, at the same time, a paradoxical and dangerous phenomenon. There is always something paradoxical and even dangerous in the phenomenon of charisma and in the rhetoric of charisma in particular. In order to somehow handle the "danger" hiding in charisma, it has been quite usual to speak of authoritarian and anti-authoritarian charisma. Weber himself spoke of anti-authoritarian charisma, but, on the other hand, many scholars have heavily criticised Weber for underestimating in his methodology the possibility of an authoritarian destructive charisma. Wolfgang Mommsen (1974: 91), for instance, states this criticism in the following way: "Many scholars have been puzzled by the fact Weber's ideal-typical theory of 'charisma' does not allow any distinction between the genuine charisma of responsible democratic leaders, as for instance, Gladstone or Roosevelt, and the pernicious charisma of personalities like Kurt Eisner or Adolf Hitler. Where then is the borderline between a type of charismatic rule which guarantees freedom within a democratic social order, and that which may result in the emergence of a totalitarian or quasitotalitarian regime? Weber's political sociology is so designed that this question must be left unanswered." And Mommsen continues: "The essential weakness in Weber's concept of 'charismatic leadership' is not so much the irrational quality of charisma, although this is certainly of no small importance, but rather the notion that charisma not only qualifies a personality as leader, but that it simultaneously legitimises his authority, thus, at least indirectly, entitling him to unrestricted obedience from his followers." (Ibid: 92-93)

I would argue that the paradox of charisma lies in the fact that, in a way, charisma is always "democratic", even in the case of an authoritarian charisma. Charisma always resembles "democracy" be-

cause the acknowledgement of charisma depends on the followers. They are in a position of giving someone the authority of charisma. If someone is given the authority of charisma and charismatic leadership, the followers follow the leader freely and on their own will. This explains partly why the following in a charismatic movement can be so spontaneous and whole hearted, even in the case of an authoritarian charisma.

The other problem mentioned by Mommsen concerns the possibility that charisma cannot only qualify a personality as leader, but that it can simultaneously legitimise his authority. I am not so sure that Mommsen's critique is justified in every respect. That is, if our starting point for analysing charisma is not an individual as an exceptional personality, but rather an extraordinary situation which makes possible new solutions and new personal leadership, and if we also accept that the authority of charisma is dependent on the acknowledgement of the followers, then we should conclude that it cannot be merely a personality that legitimises a charisma's authority. There must be something else involved. When we take this kind of viewpoint and apply it to Weber's analysis of charisma, we can then argue that Weber only described the phenomenon of charisma and its characteristics, but that it is not possible in advance to determine the criteria of good and bad charisma. I think that Weber, after all, was well aware that an authoritarian charisma would always be possible. However, it was not in his power, in advance and abstractly, to decide what is good and bad in each situation. It is the citizens' duty to decide what kind of charisma they wish for and are ready to follow.

I have elsewhere (Pekonen 1991: 56-58) tried to bring into the discussion of charisma some points that might be helpful in solving the problem concerning the criteria of authoritarian and anti-authoritarian charisma. These points emphasise the role of discourse in the process of creating a charismatic authority structure. On the basis of certain criteria, we should be able to make reasonable judgments about the true nature of charisma, and what charisma actually represents. Thus, by using such criteria, the audience of a charismatic appeal should be able to judge and make conclusions on the basis of charisma's discourse, whether the question is of an anti-authoritarian or authoritarian charisma.

One possibility for developing criteria of authoritarian and anti-

authoritarian charisma might be the discourse represented in charismatic politics. Such discourse might be useful since the principles of authority of charisma are in fact defined within it.

Max Weber already, in fact, debated this problem. In his famous essay, *Politik als Beruf*, he argued that an inner vocation, as a condition for a person's inner strength and action, requires the existence of a cause for action and subsequently servicing this cause. However, this servicing must be "secularised". Charismatic politics must take a secular moral responsibility for its actions. Passionate devotion to the cause must be relativized by a schooling in the realities of life. Such realism directs one toward "secular ascetism" rather than toward individuation as "cosmology". The advantage of individuation is gained in the ability to meet these realities of life and to measure them internally.

The problem concerns what kind of secularised charismatic discourse devoted to the service of a cause this might be. What criteria are required in order to render it charismatic and modernist in such a way as to inhibit its degeneration into authoritarian, traditional or merely populist charismatic politics?

One further way to analyse the essence of charismatic authority is to analyse the language used in charismatic discourse, especially the language of legitimacy. Jean-Francois Lyotard (1989) has proposed such a viewpoint and he attempts to separate the different languages of legitimisation and ways of discourse, starting with the pragmatics of language and speech. From the pragmatic point of view it is emphasised that distinguishing between the speaker, audience, and referent is absolutely necessary for a deeper understanding of language and speech. According to Lyotard, the specific ways of legitimating languages and discourses are determined according to how the speaker, audience, and referent are interpreted in a legitimating narrative. This means that the differences between legitimating discourses culminate in the different kinds of authority principles produced in discourses. The most important of these principles is "who authorises the authority and how".

Lyotard in his article is especially interested in two ways of governing: the despotic and the republican. These are characterised by two different types of attempts at legitimisation (two legitimisation discourses): the mythical narrative and the republican authority dis-

courses. I think that we can utilise these also in analysing the principles of charisma.

Lyotard sees despotic government as a typical example of a mythical narrative and its normative way of legitimisation. A government is despotic when authority does not exist in any genuine sense and it is not constructed according to modern (republican) rules. The necessary division between law (norm) making and execution do not exist. In a mythical authority discourse, legitimacy as persuasion, the giving of information, and confirmation, hide behind the argued homogenous, necessary and unavoidable nature of things. The organic and totalitarian character of the narrative does not favour analysis, deliberation and discussion.

Republican authority discourse, Lyotard argues, takes into account the necessary contingency of things, values, and language. Only these really enable and legitimise deliberation and dialogical discussion. Republican authority discourse and politics aim not at providing reasons for belief, but at providing reasons for deliberation and providing the ability to judge. The goal of republican authority discourse is the situation described by Lyotard (p. 174) as: "It (politics) wills itself." Because this will must be characterised by necessary (modernist) uncertainty with respect to the future and goals, republicanism emphasises freedom more than security.

Emphasising the role of discourse in the creation of a charismatic authority structure illuminates charisma as a representative process in which the followers too have to bear their responsibility.

## The relevance of charisma today: The tendency towards the personification of politics and administration

I hope it has already become clear that Max Weber's concept of charisma is still interesting and topical, despite the difficulties and contradictions hiding in the concept of charisma. Finally, I would like present a few more examples which, to my mind, clearly demonstrate that we cannot, even if we would like to, escape the phenomenon of charisma.



(I) A few decades ago, it was a standard argument that the authority principle of Max Weber's pure charisma better described premodern and traditional societies than modern society. Rationalisation, for its part, was defined as a phenomenon which described modernisation.

Today the relationship between Weberian charisma and rationalisation is seen as a more complicated one. Wolfgang Mommsen (1987: 46-51), for instance, emphasises the view that Weber never understood charisma as a phenomenon characteristic only of past traditional societies. We have also presented examples above to show that Weber understood charisma as overlapping with other authority structures, that charisma and rationalisation are not necessarily contradictory phenomena in every situation, and to show that charisma effects can easily be found in modern society, too. Mommsen also emphasises that Weber's intention was to study charisma and rationalisation as contrasting phenomena. This opposition may be described in the following way: Charisma involves creative action which obtains its appeal from untypical and extraordinary personal ideals. Rationalisation, on the other hand, involves adaptation to existing ideals, material interests or institutional conditions. Accordingly, Mommsen summarises Max Weber's concept of charisma as personal leadership. Can the idea or claim of personal leadership be judged primarily as premodern or traditional? I do not think so. It may even be that the contrary holds true.

(II) According to Wolfgang Mommsen's interpretation (1987: 49), anti-authoritarian charisma was for Weber almost the only still-existing potential means of providing democratic government which does not lead to routine modes of action or to inefficiency as a result of the shortage of leadership. By this anti-authoritarian nature of charisma, Weber meant that the legitimacy of a charismatic leader should depend on the consent of the voters; and, of course, this consent should be realised within the constitutional system and constitutional political situation. Consequently, Weber described the political arena of charismatic politics as leadership based on plebiscite.

Weber also thought that the situation in which political leaders are recruited through struggle and rivalry may in itself realise the essence of modern politics. "The essence of politics... is struggle, the

recruitment of allies and of a voluntary following...” (Weber 1968: 1414) One cannot be schooled to this within the administration but the best place for schooling is “the parliament and the party contests before the general public...” (Ibid) Accordingly, the legitimacy of the political struggle cannot be legality, as in the case of administration it would have to be, but the force of the ability to convince; politics is necessarily persuasion.

We could say that in his concept of plebiscitary democracy Weber in a way anticipates the strengthening of plebiscitary tendencies as a struggle about the democratisation of democracy. This struggle concerns the people’s right, possibility, and ability in reality, to elect their own leaders. Weber’s argument is that until now, party oligarchies have in fact continued to decide about such elections.

At a general level we may cite many factors which are presently emphasising plebiscitary tendencies in Europe. Factors such as the following have been mentioned quite often: the secularisation of the ideological *Weltanschauung* parties (the best example of this has been the crisis found in communist parties all over Europe); the change in the basis of the class struggle (the expansion of the middle class and the strengthening role of individualist world views); the weakening of traditional ideologies; and, the strengthening role of the mass media. (Cavalli 1987: 332-333) There has also been quite a lot discussion concerning the new type of parties which new social movements have created. It has been argued that the new social movement parties have not been organised as mass or cadre parties like the old parties but that they follow new principles of networks and personal leadership. All of these phenomena strengthen the tendency toward the personification of politics, and prepare the soil for charismatic effects in politics.

(III) Weber thought that the modern state in particular is the “territory” of the rational-legal rule. Today, we can ask, what happens to the bureaucratic rational-legal state when we are, as the slogan goes, moving from the welfare state to the competition state. Does not the shift from the bureaucratic state to management and leadership in public organisations mean, there too, the personification of leadership and administration?

(IV) Finally, I would like to offer a cautionary example concerning inflammatory ways of using Weberian charisma analysis. Weber's observation that the charismatic dimension is more or less present in every leadership has led, I think, to curious and unhappy dead-end conclusions in the so-called neo-Weberian organisation theories. By "dead-end" conclusions, I mean the notion, as proposed within some leadership theories, that organisations should all the time, continually, be looking for ever more efficient charismatic leaders who are able, via some type of "magical" tricks, to get followers (employees) to do ever more miraculous works and deeds for the organisation. This kind of future does not sound very promising for the members of any organisation, since people as a rule cannot stand revolution every day; it is too stressful. One should not underestimate the ease that routines bring to everyday life. I think that Weber thought this way, too.

## Notes

- 1 Weber defined *Herrschaft* in the following way (1978, Vol. 1: 53): "Herrschaft ('rule') is the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons."
- 2 There has been and still is a wide debate concerning whether belief alone is enough, a proper criterion, to guarantee legitimacy. Well known, in this respect, is Jürgen Habermas' critique of Weber: "Max Weber's concept of legitimate authority directs our attention to the connection between belief in the legitimacy of orders (*Ordnungen*) and their potential for justification, on the one hand, and to their actual validity on the other." (Habermas 1975: 95) "What is controversial is the relation of legitimation to truth." (Ibid: 97) Habermas thinks that if "the truth-dependency of belief in legitimacy" is missing, the principles of the legitimacy of authority are merely psychological. Then the organisation of legitimacy also would be merely the organisation of belief where mere passive belief would be enough for the interpretation of consent.

I am not so sure if Habermas' critique after all hits the target. Perhaps, Weber did not discuss much about the nature of the belief but, as far as I know, neither did he argue that belief was merely psychological. I think that even the opposite may be true, or, at least, we should discuss more thoroughly what is meant by "psychological".

David Beetham (1991: 3-25) wants on his part to pay attention to the misconception according to which the belief in legitimacy is sometimes identified with the results of opinion surveys. According to Beetham, belief is more complicated because legitimacy is both constructed and evaluated in many arenas. According to Beetham (p. 16), power can be said to be legitimate to the extent that: "(i) it conforms to established rules; (ii) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate; and, (iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation."

The other debate, of course, concerns how, where and by whom the belief in legitimacy is in fact created or constructed.

- 3 Here we can see one of the limitations of Weber's analysis. Weber could not, for example, forecast the Welfare State and its opportunities to "buy" legitimacy by its services. The other dimension that might be of some importance in this connection, and one to which Weber did not give much attention, is the role of disciplinary power. According to disciplinary power, the individual himself or herself is both the subject and object of his or her "taming" to discipline. Accordingly, the "source" of legitimacy does not necessarily lie "outside" the individual but the individual may himself or herself function as the subject. That is, he or she may "freely and on the basis of his or her own will" be obedient to the everyday order.
- 4 Charisma is temporal also in the sense that it becomes sooner or later routinized. (Weber 1978, Vol. 1: 246-254, Vol. 2: 1121-1123.)
- 5 Weber meant by rationalization, among other things, the process in which explicit, abstract, and calculable rules and procedures are increasingly substituted for sentiment, tradition, and rule-of-thumb in all spheres of activity. Accordingly, rationalization demystifies and instrumentalizes life and makes it more and more predictable. "It means that .... there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted." (Talcott Parsons's free translation: Weber 1964a: 139)
- 6 New forms of life kill old forms of life. Language is the vehicle of this death struggle. (For more on this, see Rorty 1989: 19).
- 7 When metaphors are successful they "die" and become "dead or sleeping metaphors": in other words, they become part of our ordinary language in such a way that the meanings of the words and statements become "frozen" and, accordingly, they can usually be understood literally. Accordingly, this means that they are no more metaphors in the genuine sense of metaphor: "dead metaphors" do not produce metaphorical poetic

effects. Synonyms and dead metaphors do not bring into imagination new areas of knowledge, they do not put listener into the position in which he or she must start thinking what all this means, that he or she can make more than one interpretation and conclusion.

## References

- Beetham, David (1991): *The Legitimation of Power*. London: MacMillan.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1977): *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1987): 'Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber's Sociology of Religion'. In Sam Whimster and Scott Lash (Eds.), *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Cavalli, Luciano (1987): 'Charisma and Twentieth-Century Politics'. In Sam Whimster and Scott Lash (Eds.), *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1975): *The Legitimation Crisis*. Boston: The Beacon Press.
- Koski, Mauno (1992): Erilaisia metaforia. In Lauri Harvilahti, Jyrki Kallio-koski, Urpo Nikanne, Tiina Onikki (Eds.), *Metafora. Ikkuna kieleen, mieleen ja kulttuuriin*. Tampere: Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura.
- Liotard, Jean-Francois (1989): 'Notes on Legitimation'. In Reiner Schürmann (Ed.), *The Public Realm: Essays on Discursive Types in Political Philosophy*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Mommsen, Wolfgang (1974): *The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mommsen, Wolfgang (1987): 'Personal Conduct and Societal Change'. In Sam Whimster and Scott Lash (Eds.), *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Pekonen, Kyösti (1991): *Essays on Political Representation*. Studia Politica Jyväskyläänsia, Publications 3/1991. University of Jyväskylä.
- Ricoeur, Paul (1986): *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Rorty, Richard (1989): *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Spinner, Helmut F. (1989): 'Weber gegen Weber: Der ganze Rationalismus einer "Welt von Gegensätzen"'. Zur Neuinterpretion des Charisma als Gelegenheitsvernunft. In Johannes Weiss (Ed.), *Max Weber heute. Erträge und Probleme der Forschung*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Weber, Max (1964a): *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York: The Free Press.

- Weber, Max (1964b): 'Politics as a Vocation'. In H.H. Gertz and C. Wright Mills (Eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, Max (1968): 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany'. In *Max Weber, Economy and Society*. Vol. 3. New York: Bedminster Press.
- Weber, Max (1978): *Economy and Society*. Volume One and Volume Two. (Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press..

Olivia Guaraldo

## THE CONCEPT OF OBJECTIVITY IN MAX WEBER

In this brief essay I will refer exclusively to Max Webers essay “Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis” in Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* and the English quotations are my own translations from the original German text.

The importance of Webers essay on objectivity goes far beyond its being a *petitio principii* for the epistemological status of the social sciences. Its significance is not only a clear and limiting statement of what science can achieve. Nor does it deal merely with the difference between natural science and cultural science (*Kulturwissenschaften*).

I find it interesting to analyze the specific nature of the Weberian *Verstehen* in the context of its possible use in understanding contemporary cultural phenomena, and also in dealing with questions related to the problem of partial perspective, which are closely related to the identity debate in contemporary feminist philosophy.

### *Die Kulturwissenschaften*

In the first part of the essay Weber chiefly confronts the problem of defining the sciences of culture, as such. What are the limits of their

domain? What are their goals?

First, Weber states what is excluded from the *Erfahrungswissenschaften* (the sciences of experience), namely, the intention to produce Norms and Ideals which would then provide useful recipes for practical living: “Wir sind der Meinung daß niemals Aufgabe einer Erfahrungswissenschaft sein kann, bindende Normen und Ideale zu ermitteln, um daraus für die Praxis Rezepte ableiten zu können.” (p. 149) In this context, Weber repudiates the general economic influence on the social sciences during that period. The economic laws, which were supposed to have general and universal validity, were also believed to possess the inevitability of natural laws, the laws of the natural sciences. Weber is strongly opposed to this attitude, as it belongs to the positivist tradition which held that society possessed its own inevitable and natural laws.

The positivistic scientists believed in the universal founding of society through the laws which they believed would eternally rule it. Society was conceived as a static figure which was subsumable to universal laws. In accordance with this epistemic faith in sociology (as the new science founded by Auguste Comte was called), the general attitude of social scientists was to predict various developments, thereby proposing various organizational societal models. Weber is far removed from this limited perspective of social science, primarily because he does not believe that such a thing as universal law exists within the realm of human experience. The main domain to which the science of culture applies is that of cultural institutions and cultural facts : “...unsere Wissenschaft, deren Objekt Kulturinstitutionen und Kulturvorgänge sind...” (p.148).

The perspective from which the *Kulturwissenschaften* approach such objects is not necessarily economic, as economy is merely one specific viewpoint within the world of human experience. I will clarify this point later. At this point it is crucial to understand how Weber builds his own point by limiting the possibilities of a science as such. If a cultural science deals with human relations, behaviors, contexts – in a word, experience – it must necessarily also deal with actions. Actions as such must be judged from an ends-means perspective in order to understand what means are appropriate to which ends, and by applying this criterion an action can be judged as either meaningful or meaningless (*sinnvoll-sinnlos*).



At this point, I think it is necessary to go back a step. In order to define a human science it is important to keep in mind that what it strives for is understanding (*Verstehen*). This is the starting point of Weber's perspective, in the sense that he presupposes that a scientific approach to experience primarily means a human understanding of it.

It is interesting to see how this presupposition is now only a limiting statement, and how it later becomes precious to the definition of the importance of the social and cultural sciences. It is limiting in the sense that by defining the range of the sciences he is dealing with, Weber also gives an important account of the perspective. The perspective of a scientific approach to human conduct cannot be defined objectively in the sense of the exact sciences. Neither human experience nor its study, can yield a perfectly objective result as it is intended in the natural sciences, i.e. a law, a normative aspect. This is because the approach to the human sciences is always human, and as such it invariably begins from its own positioning within the human context. This is because the approach to the human sciences is always a human approach and as such it is always starting (*ausgehen*) from its own positioning within the human context. A human approach it is always immanent, nevertheless it can still strive for objectivity.

### *Ideen und Werten*

As I noted above, *Verstehen* is crucial to understand Weber's perspective. *Verstehen* has to do with ideas and values (*Ideen und Werten*). According to Weber, they exist in each of our backgrounds and are the starting points of all of our actions: "... alles Handeln, und natürlich auch (...) das Nichthandeln in seinen Konsequenzen eine Parteinahme zugunsten bestimmter Werte bedeutet, und damit (...) regelmäßig gegen andere." (p. 150) Acting always contains a certain value by which it is directed. The operative meaning of values is very important in order to understand Webers conception of human actions and therefore also the sciences connected to them.

As we move within a cultural horizon, that is, a horizon which is colored by certain values, our actions are always determined by these

values. Moreover, our comprehension of them will always be directed by such values. There is no objectivity outside the cultural framework in which we act, speak and think.

This cultural horizon plays a determinant role in the way in which we approach history. In order to judge an action from the perspective of the ends-means criterion, we have to take into account such values and ideas. This is why understanding not only deals with the causal relationship between the means and the end, but is mainly concerned with the intellectual understanding of such ideas: "Denn es ist selbstverständlich eine der wesentlichsten Aufgabe einer jeden Wissenschaft vom menschlichen Kulturleben, diese Ideen, (...) dem geistigen Verständnis zu erschließen." (p.150)

What does Weber mean by this intellectual understanding? First and foremost, a cultural science must seek the complete cultural meaning and significance of actions, events and situations. As it is cultural, this understanding must take into account the values of a specific cultural context. Returning to the ends-means criterion, it is important to note that the understanding of actions, as determined by such ideas and values, is not analytical in the sense that we do not want to understand actions as causally determined by ideas. Nor do we intend to deduce them from the ideas. This is an important aspect of understanding Weber's interesting perspective. The world of human actions and human relations can be neither totally nor even partially determined by general laws. This obviously applies to ideas and values. They do not determine human conduct in the causal sense, rather they are guiding principles of actions. By no means can their *leitende* (guiding) nature be confused with radical determinism.

Human relations and actions are quite unpredictable, and the task of a science which is involved in its understanding can only be to follow this unpredictability through ever-changing means of interpretation. It cannot provide laws of durable validity.

The main task is nevertheless understanding, which also implies critique: "(...) die wissenschaftliche Behandlung der Werturteile möchte nun weiter die gewollten Zwecke und die Ihnen zugrunde liegenden Ideale nicht nur verstehen und nacherleben lassen, sondern vor allem auch kritisch beurteilen lehren." (p. 151) In order to understand what this *Kritik* means it is necessary to reiterate Weber's

intention, namely, the definition of the limits of the social sciences without diminishing their scientific character. Ideas and values are decisive factors in the understanding of cultural phenomena, and we cannot neglect them.

A scientific approach to cultural phenomena cannot, on the one hand, be a value judgment in itself. In other words, sciences that deal with culture and human relations take a cultural approach, i.e., their analysis will always be determined by a value. On the other hand, we can neither judge nor question these values from within our cultural horizon. All we can do is criticize them from a dialectical point of view, namely, from the point of view of their logical consistency: "Diese Kritik (...) kann nur dialektischen Charakter haben (...), sie kann nur eine formal-logischen Beurteilung des in den geschichtlich gegebenen Werturteilen und Ideen vorliegende Materials, eine Prüfung der Ideale an dem Postulat der inneren Widerspruchslosigkeit des Gewollten sein." (p. 151)

*Das Gewollte* is the subjective starting point of the acting individual. Investigating the ethical and moral implications of such values is not a scientific matter, mainly because it is not the task of a social science to teach how one must act, but rather how one can act or what one wants: "Empirische Wissenschaft vermag niemand zu lehren, was er soll, sondern nur was er kann und – unter Umständen – was er will."

There is a clear distinction among values, their importance for the cultural perspective in social sciences, and the task of such sciences in dealing with these values. Values must somehow be taken into account, mainly from an epistemic point of view – they must play a role within the analysis of human phenomena. On the other hand, they cannot be judged from the viewpoint of their moral validity. Only their logical, dialectical validity can be investigated.

## Values and *Weltanschauungen*

A *Weltanschauung* – the cultural background that constitutes our vision of the world – is always determined by certain values, and this means that our cultural identity is also determined by these values. Moreover, it means that the cultural background determines the

scientific approach we may have, but not in the sense of a cultural relativism. It determines it from the viewpoint of the choices we make in approaching reality, it is our guiding principle, the coloring of our research work. However, it can by no means interfere with the validity of the research as such, in the sense that its objectivity does not rely upon the values.

*Weltanschauungen* deal with the meaning (*Bedeutung*) of the world which they determine through certain values. They are somehow interpretative frameworks that satisfy the human existential need for meaning. However, this has nothing to do with the task of a social science, in that a social science can neither change nor deduce this meaning through an empirical analysis of reality. *Weltanschauungen* are not the product of an empirical science; they are metaphysical values per se, which do not enter the range of the social sciences.

To express any kind of judgment on these values is a matter of faith (*Glauben*): "(...) *Weltanschauungen* niemals Produkt fortschreitenden Erfahrungswissens sein können, (...) die höchsten Idealen, die uns am mächtigsten bewegen, für alle Zeit nur im Kampf mit anderen Idealen sich auswirken, die anderen ebenso heilig sind, wie uns die unseren." (p. 154)

Therefore, it is important to understand that values (and their *Weltanschauungen*, which could be defined as a permanent constellation of values) are decisive for the empirical research in the sense that they are the starting point, they direct it as viewpoints, or perspectives from which we approach the multifaceted aspects of reality. Values, nevertheless, do not undermine the scientific objectivity of the research. This is, as we said before, internal to the field or spectrum of reality that we want to understand. It is internal in the sense that objectivity relies entirely upon the *Widerspruchslosigkeit* (without contradictions) of its statements. This does not mean that every attempt to understand reality can be defined as scientific. There must be some kind of standards (*Maßstäbe*) through which we define the formal and logical characteristics of objectivity. The kind of objectivity that Weber strives for is by no means open relativism.

There is still a strong commitment to truth in the sense of a result which can be universally recognized as valid (also by someone Chinese). We need standards in order to be able to understand reality

and express judgment on it. The crucial point here is that social sciences need not interfere with moral values, they cannot express a value judgment on them, because, as we said before, their validity is a question of faith. On the other hand, values are important, they are vital to acting human beings. Since a social science must strive for a better understanding of human actions and cultural phenomena, and since this better understanding culminates in the acquisition of a clearer consciousness of what one can and wants to do, then the objective understanding that the science provides is a helpful element in guiding the action. That is to say that values are not part of the scientific analysis as such, but are its beginning and ending points.

Factors such as understanding the significance of a value, the role it has played in determining certain behaviors, the influence ideas have had throughout history etc., are all important in providing a scientific account of reality. The analysis of such values, as we have already stated, is not concerned with their meaning, but only with their *Widerspruchslosigkeit*.

### Moral indifference as a criterion?

Still, the idea of objectivity has yet to be fully expressed. "Gesinnungslosigkeit und wissenschaftliche Objektivität haben keinerlei innere Verwandtschaft" (p. 171). Moral indifference and scientific objectivity are by no means related: it is important to understand that what Weber is looking for is a definition of the social sciences which would dissociate them from the exact natural sciences. In fact, he wants to keep a certain idea of science alive, a certain idea of validity (*Getlung*), and he is somehow constantly forced to explicate the true essence of this cultural science. Weber is continually forced to distinguish it from the natural sciences. There is no need for moral indifference, primarily because moral indifference is impossible to achieve and also because it is hypocritical in dealing with cultural phenomena.

Each individual approach to a cultural matter involves some kind of personal involvement in it; that is to say, values guide our scientific approach to the world. There is no indifferent (*gesinnungslos*) analysis of cultural reality: "die bloße Anerkennung des Bestehens

eines wissenschaftlichen Problems in Personalunion steht mit einem bestimmt gerichteten Wollen lebendiger Menschen." (p. 158)

Even the mere recognition of a scientific problem is already a sign of the will which directs our attention. Knowledge is always determined by specific interests. As, for example, the socio-economic nature of a specific phenomenon is not pre-existent. Contrarily, its socio-economic nature is dependent on our attribution: "Die Qualität eines Vorganges als sozial-ökonomischer Erscheinung ist nun nicht etwas, was ihm als solches objektiv anhaftet. Sie ist vielmehr bedingt durch die Richtung unseres Erkenntnisinteresses, wie sie sich aus der spezifischen Kulturbedeutung ergibt, die wir dem betreffenden Vorgange im einzelnen Fall beilegen." (p. 161) This statement is crucial in order to understand the perspectivist nature of our knowledge, and in order to define the range of our possibilities.

Each attempt to grasp (*greifen*) reality, namely the possibility to read reality through concepts (*Be-griffen*), is limited by our perspective. Now, this limitation is not necessarily a diminishing attitude or some sort of skeptical opinion to which we must adhere in order to adjust to the times. It is simply a statement that has to do with objectivity. Objectivity depends on our perspective, on our interest, and on our personal commitment to reality. Objectivity is, therefore, directed by our engagement to reality. And since reality is not a pre-constituted entity that we must discover in its entirety, we simply must decide which portion of it is meaningful to us. This decision legitimizes our analysis, because it is far more real than any attempt at global conceptualization.

Reality, the multifaceted and infinite world of human relations, institutions, actions and phenomena, does not allow itself to be approached systematically. Or, more clearly put, one can attempt a systematic approach, but the results will be far less objective than those of the partial perspective: "Es gibt keine schlechthin objektive wissenschaftliche Analyse des Kulturlebens oder der sozialen Erscheinungen unabhängig von speziellen und einseitigen Gesichtspunkten, nach denen sie als Forschungsobjekt ausgewählt, analysiert und darstellend gliedert werden." (p. 170)

The aim of the social sciences is to understand the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move, and in order to grasp this uniqueness we must first decide what exactly we are attempting

to grasp. Reality and our knowledge of reality are undoubtedly related to the way we position ourselves in and towards it. We always face reality from a specific standpoint, never from an Archimedean Point.

### *Sozialwissenschaft als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*

“Wir wollen die uns umgebende Wirklichkeit des Lebens, in welche wir hineingestellt sind, in ihrer Eigenart verstehen...” (p. 170) The main goal of the social sciences is to understand the uniqueness of the reality which surrounds us and in which we find ourselves. This explication is significant, in that the *umgebende* reality implies the reality that surrounds us, but also means the reality which is related to us. It is only through this special relationship with reality, our living in it, that we are able to approach it. As I noted above, we can only understand it from the partial perspective of our positioning in it. Moreover, this sentence also refers to the uniqueness of reality, its *Eigenart*. Uniqueness, in my opinion, is another word for contingency. The uniqueness of each phenomenon is related to its contingency, to the fact that it is, in its temporal dimension, related to unpredictable factors.

Facts, the fabric of an empirical science, primarily take place in a temporal dimension. In order to grasp the contingent nature of facts, we must be well aware that a social science cannot possess a meta-temporal scheme enabling it to displace facts from their contingent-temporal context. This is why a science dealing with facts is primarily a historical science. Here, historical refers primarily to the significance of its individuality – in other words, a given phenomenon is individual and unique within the temporal dimension in which it appears. And in order to give full importance to its individuality, a phenomenon must first be understood as historical.

The specific nature of this concept of history is quite different from the usual connotation we give to history. As a matter of fact, historical in the traditional, Hegelian sense has a strong universal connotation, namely, the connotation of necessity. Events happen in history as if they were following a rational or teleological direction. Events abandon their contingency as soon as they occur in history,

becoming constitutive parts of the long chain of particulars that justify the universal, the consciousness of the Spirit.

This is simply to clarify the distinct differences between the Weberian and the Hegelian concepts of history. Historical does not imply any meta-historical entities or values. Historical does not mean universal, but rather it means particular and situated in a precise context. The context itself is history, nothing more than a framework that we create in order to understand phenomena. The main characteristic of this framework is that it is always able to accept new facts, which is its primary function in the sense that the temporal dimension does not signify each occurrence as a part of a greater *telos*. Temporal means the ability to highlight the new, as each fact is new in its uniqueness, and history is nothing more than a framework that shelters the new. In other words, history does not presuppose any kind of rationality or sense. History as a framework that can enable us to understand is primarily a means of understanding. In this de-substantialised sense, every interpretative attempt is historical, in the measure by which every interpretation moves from a specific standpoint and is concerned with a certain value. History and reality are strictly linked together in this historical horizon. Moreover, history and the social sciences are undoubtedly linked together as well: "...den Zusammenhang und die Kulturbedeutung ihrer einzelnen Erscheinungen in ihrer Gestaltung einerseits, die Gründe ihres geschichtlichen So-und-nicht-anders-Gewordenseins andererseits." (p. 170-171)

For Weber, the aim of the social sciences is not only to understand the uniqueness of the *umgebende* reality, but also its historical nature. The *So-und-nicht-anders-Gewordensein* is the historical nature of events, namely the fact that they happen in a certain specific way. They are exposed to history, they are inserted in the historical framework and become so-and-not-otherwise entities. In my opinion, this has nothing to do with the concept of historical necessity as it was discussed above. In fact, the perspective from which Weber analyses this historical dimension has primarily to do with understanding its contingency. Contingency obviously transforms into a so-and-not-otherwise entity as soon as it has occurred and has crossed the threshold of reality, and the factuality of reality is this so-and-not-otherwise entity. It is the inevitable temporal nature of history that produces this so-and-not-



otherwise entity, while in Hegel, it is the objectivity of the Spirit that accounts for every single fact in history.

There is a great difference among these approaches to temporality. The former allows reality its own *Eigenart*, which is also its freedom, and the latter subsumes it all to the laws of thought, which is embodied by a meta-historical entity, the *Geist*. If we continue the parallel, we shall further notice that reality as such acquires a totally different connotation in Weber: reality as *Wirklichkeit* is as powerful and effective as its own so-and-not-otherwise historical nature allows it to be. Reality maintains its power as it does not become neutralized in the greater scheme of necessity. Reality and its uniqueness can only be understood, and this *Verstehen* must first maintain its true uniqueness. The importance of Webers reflections on objectivity must be understood within this parallel with the apologetic and neutralizing character of Hegelian concepts. Only then do the perspectivist and political nature of his points emerge as new and interesting also in current reflections on philosophy.

That is to say, Weber does not mine the multifaceted and polymorphous character of reality through the implementation of another system of thought, which, as has been the case throughout the entire history of philosophy, would once again deny reality, subsuming it in the system as such, thereby confirming our hypothesis. Conversely, Weber is primarily concerned with the problem of maintaining this kind of multifaceted and *umgreifbar* nature of the *Wirklichkeit*. On the other hand though, Weber is also concerned with a possible scientific approach to reality, an approach that could enable us to understand it, while simultaneously not providing a completely relativistic view of it.

### *Endlich und Unendlich:* the problem of grasping reality

In order to produce a new kind of scientific approach to reality, an approach that would take into account the aforementioned multiple aspects of reality, Weber develops an operative concept that can satisfy the premises.

Based on the fact that a comprehensive and total knowledge of reality as such is impossible, and also recognizing that our limited capacity for understanding is not suited to the complete understanding of infinite reality, Weber develops the concept of the ideal type. "Alle denkende Erkenntnis der unendlichen Wirklichkeit durch den endlichen Menscheng Geist beruht daher auf der stillschweigenden Voraussetzung, daß jeweils nur ein endlicher Teil derselben den Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Erfassung bilden, daß nur er wesentlich im Sinne von wissenschaftlich sein solle." (p. 171)

A scientific approach to reality can only deal with a finite portion of it. The striking opposition between infinite and finite must not give way to a scientific impasse, but, on the contrary, must convince us of the structural limitations of our knowledge and proceed from there to a realistic concept of it.

Historically, the attitude of many social scientists was an expectation that reality would respond to some sort of natural law, which would have been detected through the analysis of the regular recurrence of causal relationships. As for the elements in each event that cannot be subsumed under the law, and which have no place in the regular recurrence, they are considered simply as accidents, elements that have no effect whatsoever on the legitimacy of the law as such. This is a clear example of the tyrannical attitude of such sciences towards reality. Their criteria and their assumptions simply expect reality to respond to some mental project that they have in mind. Therefore, according to such a conception, reality would be reduced to a mere system of propositions, as in mathematics. Experience would therefore become predictable, deducible from the laws that govern reality. But, according to Weber, regardless of whether or not this mathematical approach were to be corrected, what is at stake here is the fact that knowing laws and possessing a so-called general knowledge of reality, a principle that could explain all kinds of occurrences, has no meaning or significance to us. The meaningfulness, the significance of reality lies in this specific idea, in the individual and unique character of its events, in the limited and concrete sphere of facts. "Ausgangspunkt des sozialwissenschaftlichen Interesses ist nun zweifellos die wirkliche, also individuelle Gestaltung des uns umgebenden sozialen Kulturlebens in seinem universellen, aber deshalb natürlich nicht minder individuell ge-

stalteten, Zusammenhänge und in seinem Gewordenseins aus anderen, selbstverständlich wiederum individuell gearteten, sozialen Kulturzuständen heraus." (p. 172-173)

As we have already stated, if from a general, or universal, point of view the problem of *Verstehen* is connected to the significance (*Bedeutung*) that a certain phenomenon has to us, it also means that our knowledge is undoubtedly connected to values. However, this also means that when dealing with the social sciences, the nature of our knowledge is unquestionably linked to the qualitative aspects of phenomena, whereas the natural sciences are only concerned with their quantitative aspects. This implies that the nature of the cultural *Verstehen* is completely different from the *Verstehen* of the natural sciences (which actually is not a *Verstehen* at all. It is quite easy, then, to comprehend what Weber means by the *Färbung* of reality, which occurs during its analysis from a cultural perspective. Here, *Färbung* signifies the special nuance of meaning we attribute to a certain phenomenon or fact. *Färbung* then means the way we approach such phenomena or facts, and at last it will mean the particular understanding of that fact. *Verstehen*, then, is strictly linked to the qualitative aspect of our knowledge.

The question here is whether or not it is important to have a set of general laws or factors through which to analyze social and cultural facts. Weber does not deny that each formulation of a general law can be useful, although only as a first step in the analysis, not as a final result of it. The widespread tendency to assume that society can somehow be explained through the detection of general laws or primary factors that would provide us with a complete account of it in terms of formulas, does not tell us any more than what chemistry could tell us about the bio-genetic aspect of the animal kingdom. That is to say, general principles do not explain the uniqueness of phenomena, or their particular contingent and historical character. The problem lies entirely in the use we make of such general laws, which is obviously nothing more than hypotheses. The specific nature of research in the field of social sciences has more to do with the configuration of such factors or laws than with their universality. In other words, it is the *Gruppierung* of such factors, their configuration, which is at stake in the cultural analysis. And of course the specific character of such *Gruppierung* is both the beginning and the

end of the research, in the sense that it is determined by the significance we attribute to a phenomenon, and simultaneously will determine the results of the analysis, the understanding of the portion of reality we have analyzed. "...weil es uns für die Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit auf die Konstellation ankommt, in der sich jene (hypothetischen!) Faktoren, zu einer geschichtlich für uns bedeutsamen Kulturerscheinung gruppiert, vorfinden..." (p. 174)

The hypothetical factors are such that they gain significance only if inserted into a constellation, which makes them useful to the historical understanding of a cultural phenomenon.

Weber distinguishes four different phases in the analysis, the first of which would be that of determining the hypothetical laws and factors. The second, and most important one, would be that of determining the historical nature of such hypotheses, namely their individual nature and their significant concrete interaction ("ihre(s) ...bedingten konkreten, in seiner Art bedeutsamen Zusammenwirkens" (p. 174-175)). In other words, each hypothesis must have a concrete historical nature, its own individual character, in order to become legitimate. Only in this manner does it become suitable for the type of analysis that Weber has in mind. Moreover, this legitimacy is connected to the clarification of the meaning that the hypotheses possess.

The choice of a particular hypothesis must be legitimated by the explanation of its own significance ("die Verständlichmachung des Grundes und der Art dieser Bedeutsamkeit" (p.175)). The third phase, or task, in the analysis would then be the historical tracing of the configuration of the factors, namely, their origins as individual factors and the development of their actual configurational character and significance. This could be seen as further verification that the specific configuration must go through in order to become scientific. Finally, the fourth phase would be the predication of possible future configurations on the basis of the historical analysis.

It becomes clear that Weber makes use of the hypothetical factors and general laws only as a heuristic medium, or, better put, as an analytical instrument (*Erkenntnismittel*). As we have already stated, the notion of general laws is useful, but has nothing to do with the specific qualitative understanding of the *Kulturwissenschaften*. The specific character of its understanding is strictly linked to values,

namely, to the values which orient the research. The only *Voraussetzung* of the cultural sciences is that culture in itself is primarily a value-concept ("Der Begriff der Kultur ist ein Wertbegriff" (p. 175)). This means that in order to understand reality, empirical reality, we have to relate to it in cultural terms, or, better put, we can only understand reality through the mediation of culture:

"Die empirische Wirklichkeit ist für uns Kultur weil und insofern wir sie mit Wertideen in Beziehung setzen, sie umfaßt diejenigen Bestandteile der Wirklichkeit welche durch jene Beziehung für uns bedeutsam werden, und nur diese." (p.175)

This interesting definition of culture can be referred to as relational. Culture is the complex network of values in which we find ourselves and through which we relate to reality. Reality is, therefore, a cultural entity, inasmuch as we can understand it only through the cultural values that are significant to us. Culture, as a value concept, is always historically determined, that is, is always dependent on the specific values of the historical moment. However, the importance of a given value depends on culture, on the specific configuration of numerous factors which combine together in that particular historical period to form a tendency.

The only *Voraussetzung* of the Weberian notion of culture is therefore that it is a value concept, namely, a concept that has to do with a specific orientation, in which values can be seen as preferences which then indicate some kind of path to be followed. This is why whenever we approach a phenomenon in reality, we simultaneously approach a cultural phenomenon, that is, a phenomenon inserted in a specific context. In order to understand such a phenomena in its essence we must understand it culturally, which means in its own context, in its own peculiarity, in its own *Geschichtlichkeit*.

Our approach will simultaneously be historical, cultural and value oriented. This is because we move from within a cultural context and also from the standpoint of a cultural individual, guided by certain specific values to understand each phenomenon in cultural terms. Culture is at the same time the medium and the content of the research.

## *Bedeutungsvoll & logisch sinnvoll:* the interwoven approach to reality

There is also another interesting aspect of this epistemological approach to culture: aspect which is interesting in this epistemological approach to culture: “Und das Entscheidende dabei ist: nur durch die Voraussetzung, daß ein endlicher Teil der unendlichen Fülle der Erscheinungen allein bedeutungsvoll sei, wird der Gedanke einer Erkenntnis individueller Erscheinungen überhaupt logisch sinnvoll.” (p.177)

In order to understand culturally, that is, to have a meaningful understanding of a phenomenon, an understanding which is strictly connected to our cultural and value-oriented character, we must isolate a single *Erscheinung*. This particular isolation is necessary simply in order to understand, and the quest for the *Verstehen* is what causes us to isolate. In other words, the *Bedeutsamkeit* lies in this, in the fact that we choose one specific aspect of reality according to our values. And this choice is strictly linked to the fact that we consider this portion of reality important or significant, *bedeutungsvoll*. Significance is the only criterion that guides our research. And since this unique criterion is related to the qualitative aspect of the phenomenon which is meaningful to us, the result of the research will be qualitative as well. It will have nothing to do with the formulation of universal laws, which supposedly will govern all the future occurrences of similar phenomena, but on the contrary, it will yield a comprehension of the phenomenon in its specific and unique character of historical fact (“die historische Tatsache”).

The presupposition that significance is achievable only through the analysis of a selected portion of reality legitimates a the logically correct knowledge of an individual phenomenon: “... wird der Gedanke einer Erkenntnis individueller Erscheinungen überhaupt logisch sinnvoll.” (p.177) The difference between *bedeutungsvoll* and *logisch sinnvoll* cannot aptly be expressed in English, with the former as significant and the latter as something closer to logical correctness, or better yet, logical plausibility, as opposed to meaningfulness – as it appears in the English translation. Nevertheless, it is quite interesting to speculate some on this decisive difference.

On the one side we have significance as the qualitative nature of the *Verstehen*, on the other hand we have logical plausibility as the necessary scientific standard. Weber cannot conceive of one without the other. As a matter of fact, the scientific nature of the cultural sciences, being qualitatively different from that of the natural sciences, must bear this combined approach. There is no significance without individual knowledge, and at the same time there is no plausible individual knowledge if it is not significant to some extent. The two approaches are strictly interwoven, one is legitimated by the other and vice versa.

Logical plausibility, the possibility of a thought that deals with the individual phenomenon, is a peculiarity of the social sciences, where this and only this kind of knowledge is important, that is, is significant and deserves analysis. Therefore, for Weber, the epistemic nature of the social sciences lies in the knowledge of historical facts (meaning the ability to grasp the *Eigenart* of historical phenomena), although it is a scientific knowledge, the objectivity of which is to be achieved through the concept of the ideal type.

## The ideal type

The problem of knowledge in the social sciences is primarily a problem of imputation; namely, it is a problem of the imputation of causes. Causal explanation is strictly connected to the understanding of historical phenomena, although, again, Weber's conceptions go far beyond the traditional historical conception of causality. Causal relations that exist among phenomena cannot account for each phenomenon in the same way: there are some specific causal links whose nature is essential to the understanding of the phenomenon. In this context essential means the unique and individual nature of the phenomenon. But how can we determine the essential character of causes? It is, once again, a problem of imputation:

"Nur diejenigen Ursachen, welchen die im Einzelfalle wesentlichen Bestandteile eines Geschehens zuzurechnen sind, greifen wir heraus." (p.178) The essential character of causes has to do with the uniqueness of the phenomenon, each cause is essential inasmuch as it accounts for the historical *Eigenart* of the phenomenon.

Moreover, it is important to remember that there are different essential causes according to which selected portion of reality we intend to analyze. Therefore, the problem of imputation is simultaneously strictly linked to the problem of significance and to the value-orientation. In other words, by stating that essential causes are those which account for the uniqueness of the phenomenon, we are essentially saying that they are chosen or attributed according to the specific portion of reality we have selected. Or, in other words, when we refer to essential causes, we mean those causes that will clarify and explain both the selected aspect of reality that we have chosen, and its uniqueness.

Here, essential and particular have shared meaning, as essential does not refer to a metaphysical substance to be revealed under the surface of facts, but rather refers exactly to the factual contingent nature of reality which we are unable to understand in its naked contingency. We must mediate contingency through concepts such as causality or essence, the closest analogies to the conceptual means of grasping reality. The interesting thing here is that these concepts are taken only as analogies, namely, they do not attempt to exhaustively explain reality, which would be impossible, but rather operate as instruments per se, or as a heuristic medium, which only aims at providing as accurate an account of cultural phenomena as possible.

I use the word analogy because it seems to me that the traditional concept of causality does not have much to do with Weber's, although it does at least share a similar way of operating, since causal means a chronological approach to things, in which a before is followed by an after. In this sense, I do intend to refer to Weber's concepts as analogies of the traditional concepts. Weber wishes to find particular relations among phenomena, which he calls causal relations, whose nature, however, does not have anything to do with the necessity of causality as such. In other words, the analogy aspect lies in the fact that causal does not necessarily mean necessary for Weber; at the most it can mean essential in the sense that we have discussed above. Causal does not have to do with the universal character of causality, nor with the formulation of general laws of causality.

The unique and individual character of a phenomenon can be explained only through its imputation to a specific historical constellation of facts, not to a universal law as a proof of it. Therefore,



causality is a medium of retracing some essential causes which can provide an account of an individual phenomena. Causality is nothing more than an instrument through which we can reduce the overwhelming multiplicity of reality, a sort of decoding device. Is not science itself some sort of decoding device as well?

Now, the function of the ideal type within the context of objectivity becomes clearer. The knowledge of causes is helpful inasmuch as it is possible to retrace the character of a phenomenon through inserting it in a constellation of facts. However, in order to retrace such causes with precision, we must acquire nomological knowledge.

Nomological knowledge is nothing more than the knowledge of recurrent causal sequences. It is a sort of device by which we are able to impute causes and effects, and by which we are able, in cases of doubt, to decide what the most adequate causes are. The important thing about this *nomologische Kenntnis* is that it legitimates the imputation, it is a medium by which we can trace back and attribute importance to some causes more than to others.

The application of the *nomologischer Kenntnis* is such that it is only the means of the research, not its end. This is because the value of general recurrences in history are only helpful inasmuch as they are able to orient the research, providing examples or directions for the most adequate causes. Weber explicitly explains that the nomological knowledge acquires its important function in cases of doubt, when the imputation of causes and effects is somehow problematic. The broader and more general our knowledge is, the better we will be able to apply this nomological knowledge. It is interesting to note that nomological knowledge has to do with the category of objective possibility, in other words, the imputation of causes has to do with the plausibility of reality, and therefore it follows that the broader our general knowledge, the better our imputation of causes.

What might seem here to be a universalistic or abstract turn is, on the contrary, an important means of acquiring the objectivity that Weber has in mind. As a matter of fact, Weber continuously points out that general laws are not the aim of the social sciences, they are only a *Hilfsmittel*: "Der Umfang eines Gattungsbegriffes führt uns von der Fülle der Wirklichkeit ab. Er ist abstrakt und inhaltsarm" (p. 180).

Since, as we have already stated, culture is a specific point of view that specific individuals have on reality, the main transcendental presupposition that must be made when speaking about cultural sciences is that points of view are decisive in this domain. What follows from this is that points of view produce sections of meaningful reality, which differ from the insignificant infinite reality as viewed from an Archimedian point. How do we conciliate the general approach of the nomological knowledge to the particular one of the decisive point of view?

The answer to the question of Weberian objectivity lies here. The question can also be formulated by quoting Weber: "Welche ist die Bedeutung der Theorie und der theoretischen Begriffsbildung für die Erkenntnis der Kulturwirklichkeit?" (p.185)

The mistake that is often made within the field of social sciences is understanding single phenomena as examples of the general law, as if they were there, in reality, just to be subsumed to our general hypotheses. This obviously leads to an unfair approach to reality, because the single and unique phenomenon becomes generalized, therefore losing its uniqueness and becoming a part of the whole. Reality would then be nothing more than an example of the general idea that we have, or that we intend to find in it, according to our hypotheses. In addition to being unfair to reality, this approach is also illegitimate, in the sense that we can by no means have a truthful, general, comprehensive view of the entirety (*Totalität*) of reality, since reality is *unendlich*, and in its *Unendlichkeit* is not accessible to our *endliche* knowledge. This is clearly stated by Weber:

"Es handelt sich bei den Aufstellungen der abstrakten Theorie nur scheinbar um Deduktionen (...) in Wahrheit vielmehr um einen Spezialfall einer Form der Begriffsbildung." (p. 189-190)

Reality cannot be deduced from general principles, and is always a matter of the hypotheses that we formulate and the assumption, that they are to be found in reality *de facto*. General laws do not tell us any more about reality than the hypotheses on which the law, as such, is based. It is always a matter of the construction of thoughts, namely, each approach to reality starts off as a constructive approach, as a *Gedankenbild* that we apply to reality in order to understand it.

Therefore, general laws that expect reality to correspond in toto to the theory of reality are misleading and, moreover, fallacious. What we must strive for, according to Weber, is a knowledge that neither expects to understand reality through general laws, nor possesses the ambition to reveal reality in its completeness. A knowledge, as we have already stated, that is interested in the understanding of single portions of reality, and in which the historical-temporal character of our being in reality is somehow reflected. A cultural knowledge that is fair to reality in the sense that it does not attempt to annihilate its constitutive unpredictability. This knowledge, however, must have an objective status. The ideal type, according to Weber, is the necessary instrument for this knowledge.

“Ein Gedankenbild vereinigt bestimmte Beziehungen und Vorgänge des historischen Lebens zu einem in sich widerspruchslosen Kosmos gedachter Zusammenhänge. Inhaltlich trägt diese Konstruktion den Charakter einer Utopie an sich, die durch gedankliche Steigerung bestimmter Elemente der Wirklichkeit gewonnen ist.” (p.190)

The concept of the ideal-type is taken from abstract economic theory, and is used to determine the extent to which an abstract economic construction can be found in reality. It is a kind of theoretical instrument through which it is possible to orient the empirical analysis, that is, make the abstract construction pragmatically clear and understandable. It is primarily an heuristic means, which can be helpful in the imputation of causes. The specific relationships that are part of the ideal type are taken from the historical context and constructed in a non-contradictory system (*Kosmos*).

“Er wird gewonnen durch einseitige Steigerung eines oder einiger Gesichtspunkte und durch Zusammenschluß einer Fülle von diffus und diskret, hier mehr, dort weniger, stellenweise gar nicht, vorhandenen Einzelercheinungen, die sich jenen einseitig herausgehobenen Gesichtspunkten fügen, zu einem in sich einheitlichen Gedankenbilde.” (p.191)

The ideal type is an accentuation of historically determined features.

These features are chosen and combined in the constructive pureness of the ideal type, in accordance with the viewpoint of the analysis. It is precisely an objective construction, in the sense that it is consistent and plausible, but at the same time it neither formulates general laws nor general statements about reality. It is as if a single portion of reality were purified of its accidents and reduced to a finite and comprehensible *Gedankenbild*. This does not necessarily mean that the ideal type should be exemplar or imperative in a moral sense: “Vorweg sei hervorgehoben, daß der Gedanke des Seinsollenden, Vorbildlichen von diesen in rein logischem Sinn idealen Gedankenbilden, die wir besprechen, hier zunächst sorgsam fernzuhalten ist.” (p.192)

The ideal aspect of the ideal type has to do exclusively with its logical, non-contradictory nature. It is not a synthesis of many empirical occurrences, in the sense of it being an average of the most frequent elements. It is utopian, in the sense of a nowhere, in its pureness and consistency, since it cannot be found in reality as such. The ideal type is constructed according to the category of objective possibility (*objective Möglichkeit*): “Es handelt sich um die Konstruktion von Zusammenhängen, welche unsere Phantasie als zulänglich motiviert und also objektiv möglich, unserem nomologischen Wissen als adäquat erscheinen.” (p. 192)

In other words, the ideal type must pay a convincing price to plausibility, or, better put, to the objective possibility that such a construction can have certain relations to reality. That its being ideal in the sense of a logical pureness would not endanger its grasp on reality, its possibility of occurring, or having already occurred. However, this should not be viewed in terms of it being an exemplar model to be followed, but rather, more scientifically, as being a possible way of looking at things.

The aim of the ideal type is to be able to reveal the connections between cultural phenomena, and most importantly their significance. The ideal type is a means of detecting significance in reality. Through the ideal type we have the possibility to give significance to portions of reality – those which are colored by our interest in them, by our values – inasmuch as the ideal type is able to detect some significance in them. The success of the ideal type, though, cannot be decided a priori. It is the means, not the end of the research, and

therefore its efficiency can only be demonstrated once it becomes operative. Since reality cannot be analyzed in its entirety, but only in the relationships we detect within its different and multiple aspects, the ideal type is the means by which we can detect these relationships according to their significance to us. They bear a meaning (*Bedeutung*) which is the necessary pathway to our understanding (*Verstehen*). Therefore, the ideal type is the means by which we can read the multiple aspects of reality from a single, embodied viewpoint, that is, our individual and concrete nature of human beings.

The ideal type is a sort of decoding device through which the immediate totality of reality can be reduced to a perspective: a specific light is thrown over phenomena so that we can relate to them in a mediated form, that is, so that we can understand them. However, it is not as if the ideal type would give us a final and exhaustive knowledge, the pureness of which would be reflected in the logical consistency of the construction.

Logical consistency simply helps, in the sense that its pureness is able to detect the impurity of reality. In other words, the ideal type works as a decoding device inasmuch it is also able to show how reality as such, with its infinite variations and unpredictability, can never totally correspond to the pure construct. In this sense, the ideal type is a precious element of analysis, because it allows reality to become manifested as a non-ideal type; reality emerges as everything that does not comply to the construction. This is also a way of understanding reality, namely, that there always exists a residue incomprehensible for concepts.

It is important to keep in mind that Weber developed the ideal type for the specific purpose of knowledge and understanding in the social sciences. Nevertheless, it appears to be a very precious element of analysis when dealing with matters such as the contemporary problem of thought after the end of metaphysics, and also the question of thought on the contingent, or rather, thought on the political. It allows us freedom in thinking, in the sense that we can approach reality through the constructive character of the ideal type, knowing that the construction does not harm reality, it merely tries to frame it and cast some light on it. Moreover, in a speculative context, the ideal type can offer an interesting constructing approach, in the sense that it offers the objective possibility of different ways of

thinking. Of course, the price that has to be paid is that of giving up the obsessive quest for comprehensive knowledge. More importantly, the obsession with a thought that would be more real than reality, the obsession with what is supposed to lie beyond reality, which is still nothing more than meta-physics.

---

*Pertti Ahonen*

## “WIRTSCHAFT” IN MAX WEBER

### Introduction

I organise this article around a single concept in the German language, “*die Wirtschaft*”. More exactly, I deal with certain aspects and implications that are related to this concept, as *Max Weber* uses it as one of the core words in his renowned posthumous work *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (“WuG”). I also discuss the context made up of the related vocabulary in Weber’s work to facilitate my account of the core word.

I do not primarily address my article to the very specialists in political theory and conceptual history. I also want to meet the interests of scholars in the lesser fields of public policy-making, public administration and public management, political economy and business administration. It is my estimate that the latter target audience is made up of industrious readers many of whom want to see rapid instrumental utility in their scholarship.

### *Benefits from analysis of words, sentences and texts*

There are strengths in the analysis of words, concepts, sentences and texts for the scholar whose interest is instrumental altogether or in part. In this respect, strengths emanate from following sources:

- a) The perspective on words, concepts, sentences and texts necessitates delineation through a definite research corpus and therefore contributes to nothing else than what are instrumentally called validity and reliability.
- b) The perspective helps the scholar reflect better upon his or her own research effort than many an alternative approach. For the instrumentally oriented scholar this involves improved control of the research process. S/he can reduce the guesswork unavoidable in going too “straight to the matter”, such as trying to study “Max Weber’s conception of the ‘economic’” without analysing Weber’s texts much at all but relying on secondary, tertiary and even more indirect sources on Weber.

The perspective I apply, in particular, helps a reader to avoid seeing in texts only that which one has decided to see:<sup>1</sup>

“If ... depictions ... follow from meta-pragmatic assumptions..., they are counterempirical. And ... one may ask if they ... tell us ... (only) ... about ... social scientists’ narrative preferences, visions of self, and ultimate values.”

One of the important meta-pragmatic assumptions frequently made among the scholars whom I address here is the model of rational choice.<sup>2</sup> It has been gradually elaborated during at least 150 years from its origins in what preceded the neo-classical economics that subsequently evolved. The result is the perspective that enjoys a hegemonic perspective in economics, and has many extensions in political science, sociology, and elsewhere. When dealing with matters economic, the pitfall of a simplistic reception of rational choice is a particular risk to avoid.

### *Limitations and delimitations of the article*

Limitations in my approach and delimitations of the material I cover arise already from the nature of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. As is well known, WuG was in fact ultimately put together on the basis of the master’s drafts by his spouse, *Marianne Weber*, a well-read scholar



herself. The compilation took place in the years immediately following the master's death. The first part of WuG is known to have been written later by Weber than the latter, the more "empirical" parts, which originate from Weber's many special studies on topics he dealt with. WuG was also written to be part of a major handbook in the social and economic sciences.<sup>3</sup>

This article is not an effort towards a complete analysis of the core word "*die Wirtschaft*" nor is it intended to cover systematically the entire relevant vocabulary in the focal book. Even less can I cover the whole economic vocabulary in Weber's entire work. Instead, I confine myself within definite limitations and delimitations:

- a) Beside the focal book WuG, I omit consideration of other work by Weber with only a very few exceptions.
- b) I concentrate on the first, conceptual part of the focal book.
- c) I do not plunge into studies of literatures contemporary to Weber, such as texts representing the two orientations in economics contemporary to Weber with such representatives as Werner Sombart of historical economics and Carl Menger in what preceded contemporary neo-classical standard economics.

I am writing in English on Weber who himself wrote in German. To ensure some compensation of the deficiencies that might therefore ensue, I take the following measures:

- a) I work to preserve a bilingual aspect in my intervention.
- b) To a minor degree I also work to preserve a trilingual aspect, at least at the beginning of my intervention. To pursue limited multilingualism, I make comments regarding selected "economics" words not only in the German and the English languages but also my own native language, Finnish.
- c) In a few cases, I also refer to the etymological origins of certain words in classical Greek and in Latin, still taking care to avoid very vague interpretations.
- d) In a few places I make critical comments on the existing English translations.
- e) All in all, I work not to take any existing translations for granted and to sensitise the reader to the problems of translation.

### *Aims of the article*

In this article, within the limitations of my approach and the delimitations of the material I work to meet selected challenges posed by the particular nature of Weber's work in WuG. Many of the challenges I refer to are such that they might not be encountered in analysing certain other grand classics. However, they are still worth stating explicitly here:

- a) Weber was inter-disciplinary more than merely multi-disciplinary.
  - In his work one encounters an admixture of perspectives of legal, historical, political, social and other research instead of a focus developed only from the point of view of some individual established discipline.
  - This inter-disciplinary nature is not fully explained by the relative “underdevelopment” of social research in his day; it is also likely to be an aspect of Weber's research strategy and his interpretation of his own intellectual calling.
- b) Weber was not only pursuing research on concrete themes, but was also engaged in methodological pursuits.
  - He reflected profoundly upon what a workable methodology of the social sciences could be.
  - There, he also worked back and forth between his own concrete research on the one hand, and on the other his methodological studies.
  - The theoretical concept of the “ideal type”, also to be taken into account in this article, is the widest known result of these efforts.
- c) Weber also focused upon the predicament of the individual of his day, upon grand political and economic questions, and upon the way in which those questions were embedded in culture and history.
- d) Work nowadays pursued regarding Weber is burdened by previous work, dominant interpretations in that work, and certain gross misinterpretations.
  - However, even the misinterpretations tend to be “social facts” in the Durkheimian sense.

–That is, even where we are assured that they have little to do with their alleged origins, we have to struggle with them and their proponents without certainty of victory.

Beside the above general aims I also have a few more selected aims. They pertain to commonplace problems in the reception of grand classics in specialised, usually very instrumentally oriented academic disciplines. In the particular case of Weber, my aims take the following form:

- a) There have been endless efforts by responsible university teachers during the years to alienate students from the received textbook view that Weber is only a figure of the past who invented the outdated model of hierarchical, rule-bound bureaucratic administration. However, efforts continue to be needed towards this end, as the misplaced view, once received, is very steadfast.
- b) In an indirect way, I will pursue the above effort at “alienation” by studying Weber’s view not of bureaucracy but of economic action.
- c) I want to pinpoint that regarding both bureaucracy and economic action Weber carefully delineated the limits of the pure so-called “formal rationality” at hand in each case. This concerned bureaucracy on the one hand, and on the other rational economic calculation as exemplified by business accounting.
- d) From the point of view of another mode of rationality, namely “substantive rationality”, both bureaucracy and pure formal economic rationality involve the risk of serious contradictions and adverse secondary consequences.
- e) The above suggests that as little as Weber can be seen to have been a defender, let alone the inventor, of the “bureaucratic model”, as little was he a defender of unconstrained pure formal economic rationality, either.
- f) I want to continue efforts to keep Weber’s models and their reception connected to his methodology and its relativism as well as to the history-bound nature of the concrete interpretations he made on the basis of his models.

## Economic vocabulary in WuG: *Wirtschaft, Ökonomie, Haushalt*

The existing literature on the development of economic vocabulary in the German language provides an interesting view to such parallel words of the economic domain as *Wirtschaft*, *Ökonomie*, and *Haushalt*.<sup>4</sup> I briefly suggest some ways to proceed, but I myself refrain from going truly deeply into an analysis of the genesis and anchoring of the target vocabulary within the bounds of this article.

### *Wirtschaft*

In Weber we can see a frequent emphasis on *das Wirtschaften* as an action concept instead of utilisation of the noun *Wirtschaft* only. As opposed to *Wirtschaften*, such an English word as “economy” easily refers only to structure and institution. About the same holds true as regards such a corresponding word as the Finnish *talous*. That “talous” is related to structure and institution in Finnish is suggested by the commonplace separate word *taloudenhoito*, “management of the economy”. The latter word probably first arose as an attempted literal translation of the German *Haushalt* and the Swedish *hushåll*, to refer to the action aspect of “talous” at the stage when “modern” vocabulary was introduced and created in the Finnish language in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries.

One etymological possibility to try to give an “original” meaning to *Wirtschaft*, or even more, *das Wirtschaften*, can be mentioned. It is to see the word as something carried out by a “host” or a salaried keeper of a house, both covered by the word *ein Wirt*. The “host” can also be seen as the person responsible for maintaining the house, both *an sich* and for the people he hosts.

### *Ökonomie*

*Ökonomie* seems, but in part only seems, to be related to the ancient Greek word *oikonomia*. The latter word is loaded with historical denotations and connotations. *Oikonomia* would be literally something like the “law” or “order” (*nomos*) of a house (*oikos*). Even more, it would be the law or order of a household shared by given people

under the monocratic head of the household, the *oikosdespotes* or, in Latin, the *pater familias*. A "dining room" is another original albeit trivial meaning of *oikos*. However, even that meaning becomes less trivial if the aspect of an orderly satisfaction of the household member's daily needs through the means the household provides is observed.

One of the proofs one gets of the vulnerability of etymological analyses is the circumstance that in contemporary usage, the present meaning of the "economic" rather resembles the domain of the ancient Greek word *chrematistike*. It was economic activity pursued with the purpose of earning a profit, instead of the *oikonomia* in an autarchic one-family household. The contemporary contradiction becomes less if we note that what is true regarding relationships *between* economic actors whose relationships are mediated by markets may not be true *within* such actors as far as they are organised.

Even where the rules applied within organisations are not directly bureaucratic ones, at least the economic rationality of the markets may be qualified in many ways and may apply only poorly if at all in the intra-organisational context. *Oliver Williamson* points out that intra-organisational matters are matters of managerial fiat and that no court of law will ever accept for consideration a complaint that a manager has made a decision that, albeit legal, is inappropriate, inefficient, or ineffective.<sup>5</sup> Intra-organisational economies thus still bear a resemblance to despotic one-family households and their managers continue to carry the mantle of the ancient *oikosdespotes*.

### *Haushalt*

*Haushalt* refers, firstly, to "holding" a "house", *ein Haus halten*. The etymological study of the words *Haushalt*, *Ökonomie* and *Wirtschaft*, and respectively, in Finnish *talous*, has since the 19th century been fundamentally blurred. This arises already from new words created by the means of such attributes as *National-*, *Volk-*, *Gesamt-* and *Staats*, joined to the three above words.<sup>6</sup> In the Finnish language, equivalent attributes such as *valtio-*, *yhteiskunta-*, *kansan-* and *kokonais-* have been joined to the ending *-talous*. In contemporary usage the situation is even more unstable, as the "economic", including *das Wirtschaftsliche*, has come to refer predominantly to matters related to the

markets or determined by them. This is so at least in the sense of a prevalence of market-like economic calculation. However, market and commercial terminology has also many different sources and origins than those related to *oikos*, *der Wirt*, and few other words that have been discussed above.

The question of a “moral economy” vs. a “chrematistic” one continues to be a critical issue in the economic anthropology of today. For instance, have “traditional” peasants been people of moderation and therefore “moral economists” by definition? Or conversely, have they always been no less “utility maximizers” than the shrewdest businessmen, sticking to their “moral economy” only due to calculated self-interest or having to stick to it due to circumstances constraining their pursuit of self-interest?<sup>7</sup>

### *A concise history of the word Wirtschaft until Weber's time and beyond*

To sum up, in the centuries preceding Weber's time, the conceptual history of *Ökonomie* und *Wirtschaft* first evolved as two quite separate developments, well discernible in the Middle Ages. The former had to do with the management of the agricultural household, the church and princely courts, whereas the latter was related to commercial activities pursued in the markets. The “economic” and the “commercial” were in point of fact separated even more than they had been in the discourses of ancient Greece and Rome.<sup>8</sup>

During the 16th century parallel developments took place in the German language regarding *Ökonomie* on the one hand and *Wirtschaft* on the other. *Wirtschaft* became one of the standard translations of the venerable *oikonomia*, and *Wirtschaft* and *Ökonomie* therefore became synonyms.<sup>9</sup> In the 18th and the 19th centuries, the crucial division between groups of words in the German language had moved to prevail between words like *Ökonomie* und *Wirtschaft* on the one hand, and on the other words like *Handel* und *Kommerzien*.<sup>10</sup> The two former had at that time still little or nothing to do with markets and commerce. This is something we may nowadays find very curious given contemporary talk and writing on economic matters.

Note the etymological origin of *Handel* in *das Hand*, “the hand”,

and note also one of the English meanings of "handle" as "to engage in trade". Note also the contemporary use of *handeln* not only to signify "to engage in business" but also what in English is, simply, expressed with the verb "to act". This usage is also present in Weber. Finally, note the constitution of *Kommerzien* as well as "commerce" from the prefix *com-* and the word *mercatus*, the Latin for "marketplace". This makes "commerce" something like "to engage in activities in the marketplace".

Another period preceding Weber had been that of the so-called cameralism and related doctrines of the 17th and the 18th centuries. These doctrines had provided concepts in the administration of government finances and in activities that governments assumed vis-à-vis what we nowadays know as the entire "economy" of a nation. The doctrines also had their role in the elaboration of the first systems of civil service training in Europe. From the point of view of two key words in cameralism, *Wirtschaft* on the one hand and *Politik* on the other, *der Markt* tended first towards the latter. Words such as *Landwirtschaft*, "agriculture", and *Fiskus*, "government as economic actor" including its role as recipient of tax revenue, tended towards the former.

Already within cameralism the two key words began to merge in such combinations as "political economy" and "economic policy", both still used today although in several different senses. It is notorious that lately "political economy" has signified both Marxist economics and, recently, New Right economics created as the diametric opponent to Marxism. Since cameralism *Politik*, in turn, was differentiated in the German principalities into what we nowadays know as *Polizei* and "police" on the one hand, and *Politik* concerning foreign affairs.<sup>11</sup>

In the leading European languages, market terminology had fully intertwined with economic terminology only by the end of the 19th century, although final results evolved only over more than one hundred years.<sup>12</sup> This is one of the final consequences of a period of fundamental changes in political, social and economic terminology. That period of transformation was named by Koselleck *die Sattelzeit*<sup>13</sup>. This was a period of "the birth of the modern" in the sense that many of those vocabularies and meanings related to vocabularies arose which are still quite familiar to us. The transformations, on the

contrary, made many preceding vocabularies and meanings alien to us.

The administrative vocabulary was also among those that were transformed during *die Sattelzeit*. This vocabulary was transformed to cover – and through this transformation to enable – the elaboration of systematically organised rule-bound corps of professionals working under a discipline on the basis of written documentation of the acts of the administration.<sup>14</sup> Many important relationships have prevailed and continue to prevail between the economic, political and administrative vocabularies. However, I will not elaborate these relationships within the bounds of this article.

Even after *die Sattelzeit*, placed to about 1750-1850 in the German language, not all European languages ended with syntactically similar words for semantically similar objects. For instance, *Ökonomie* was becoming well established in the German language in Weber's time as a translation of *economics* and *l'économie*. After a period of certain setbacks in this respect, the same has been true again after World War II. There was also an interlude in the 1970s when *politische Ökonomie* in the Marxist sense was rising once again. However, words that include the word *Wirtschaft* have proved to be stronger so far.<sup>15</sup>

## Economic action in WuG

### *The sociology of "ruling" vs. economic sociology*

In reception of Weber, a stereotypical distinction between a "sociology of ruling" (*Herrschaftssoziologie*) on the one hand, and on the other an "economic sociology" (*Wirtschaftssoziologie*) is common. This is especially so as regards WuG. However, on a closer inspection, "ruling" turns out also to be present as a theme in activities which bear an economic character on the one hand, while on the other inside "ruling" different degrees of economic action can frequently be found. Interestingly, this aspect suggests that the translation of *Herrschaft* as "domination" is so misleading that a better translation as "ruling" or the "pursuit of ruling" should be applied.

As will be pinpointed in detail further below, Weber ascribed strug-



gle, *Kampf*, a key position in his account of *Wirtschaft*; so he did not do this only in his account of *Herrschaft* as one might first expect. As an example of *Herrschaft* within *Wirtschaft*, relationships that involve ruling (commonly mistranslated into English as "domination") are not absent in the economic domain, either. One example of this is that most really existing economic firms have a considerable organisation of their own, both internally and in their relationships with other firms and other organisations.<sup>16</sup> As an example of *Wirtschaft* within *Herrschaft*, in turn, to sustain, even law courts need public finances and corresponding public sector accounting for a minimum of financial regularity and a minimum of rational allocation of scarce resources to administer the law properly.

### *Economic action: A definition and a few questions*

Weber gives the following definition regarding economic action:

"Wirtschaftlich **orientiert**' soll ein **Handeln** insoweit heißen, als es seinem **gemeinten Sinne** nach an der Fürsorge für einen Begehr nach Nutzleistungen **orientiert** ist. '**Wirtschaften**' soll eine friedliche Ausübung von Verfügungsgewalt heißen..."<sup>17</sup>

There are many reasons why the standard English translation must here be seen as unacceptable or at least misleading. The point cited above reads in that translation:<sup>18</sup>

"Action will be said to be 'economically oriented' so far as, according to its subjective meaning, it is concerned with the satisfaction of a desire for 'utilities' (...). 'Economic action' (...) is any peaceful exercise of an actor's control over resources..."

The standard translation uses the expression "subjective meaning" for the *gemeinten Sinn*, "utilities" for *Nutzleistungen*, and the reifying word "economic action" for *das Wirtschaften*. These are all translations that can be called into question. They convey in an excessive degree meanings of American social science of the 1940s and the 1950s. There is an almost comical aspect in these translations, as they work

to transform Weber towards a character who bears much resemblance to American social scientists of the period of translation and the culture where the translation was made. This also works towards removing Weber from his period of departure and from his indigenous intellectual culture.

A more acceptable translation could read, for instance:

“Let us call action ‘economically oriented’ as far as it is according to its intended sense oriented towards the satisfaction of a need for benefits. Let us call ‘pursuit of economic action’ peaceful exercise of rights of disposal...”

*Verfügungsgewalt* is a word that is particularly difficult to translate. In Weber its origin is in a special legal term referring to a different form of “command” over a piece of property than ownership proper. One may own something but be denied the right to dispose of it, such as when one is deprived of a right to live in an apartment the shares of which one owns. Conversely, there may be disposal of resources that one is only allowed to use but not to relinquish, such as in many a lease. In Finnish legal language there is an exact equivalent to *Verfügungsgewalt*, namely *hallinta* or *hallintaoikeus*. Here, the meaning is quite unequivocal, although there are other meanings in other discourses in the Finnish language.<sup>19</sup>

It has been pointed out to me that Weber’s emphasis upon economic action as peaceful exercise of rights of disposal would arise from the usage coined by the sociologist *Franz Oppenheimer* in his book *Der Staat* of 1907. I readily accept the reference to Weber’s direct intellectual debt to Oppenheimer. However, the division between economic action exercised by peaceful means on the one hand and on the other political action exercised through coercion originates ever since cameralism. Therefore I deem it possible that Weber drew quite knowingly also upon the more arcane conceptual history.<sup>20</sup>

Several substantive questions regarding the above brief passage can be raised. Answering the questions mostly serves the edificative purpose of making the passage clear with reference to other selected parts of Weber’s work. The questions I choose here are:

- a) What is action, or as well, "acting", that is, *das Handeln*, in Weber? What does it signify if economic action is also seen as one type of *das Handeln*? What is unique in Weber's approach to *das Handeln* in general and economic *Handeln* in particular?
- b) In general, what is at stake when in Weber action is oriented in one or another way?
- c) What is the position of the economic orientation among diverse conceivable orientations in Weber?
- d) What is the position of the *gemeinten Sinn* in Weber? Through whom does this sense make sense, how, and to what effect? How does the approach focusing upon the *gemeinten Sinn* differ from other conceivable approaches? For instance, how is it different from the study of only external "behaviour" of human beings in the same vein as the "behaviour" of animals is studied?
- e) What exactly could be said of *das Wirtschaften*?

### *Action and its orientations in Weber*

"Action" in Weber's sense involves the attachment by the acting individual of a subjective sense to his or her conduct or comportment, whether this attachment be overt or covert, or whether it take place by omission or by acquiescence. In Weber, action is "social action" insofar as it in its subjective sense takes account of the conduct of other actors and insofar as the action is thereby oriented in its course.<sup>21</sup> The "orientation" thus refers to the influence of the behaviour of others towards the focal individual's actions through the latter individual's interpretations. I will return to the matter of this aspect of inter-individual interaction below in this section.

Any systematic, comprehensive account of the diverse conceivable orientations of actors seems to be ruled out in Weber. By such orientations I do not mean Weber's distinction of different rationalities of action (instrumentally rational, value-rational, affectual, and traditional),<sup>22</sup> but I mean something more substantive. No elaborate account of the orientations really arises in Weber's work. In Weber I find only the view that actors may be oriented in these or those

ways. Some of the ways can well be seen as economic ones. However, many an orientation that includes the economic aspect may also be mixed with other orientations.

One conceivable reason for the absence of the systematic account referred to above in Weber may be that he wished to study the orientations of the actors themselves according to the sense that the actors themselves ascribe to their own actions. This is a possible reason why Weber did not try to superimpose any ready-made categorisation of actors' conceivable orientations. There is also his methodologically individualist aversion towards the subsumption of actors' actions under what can be called "collective figures" such as structures, value systems, ideologies, or the like.

### *Economic orientation of action and its intended meaning in Weber*

Without any *ex post facto* depth necessarily involved, "religious", "traditional", "political", "ethical", "aesthetic" and other commonplace determinations can be seen as other conceivable orientations of actors in their social action beside the economic one. We may suggest that action in Weber can only be seen as oriented in this or that way, such as *oriented in the economic way*. However, "Weberian" *economic action* in any strict sense as action neatly taking place within any definite "sector of society" may not exist. Despite this, the text passage cited at the beginning of this section comes close to the Weberian conceptual "definition" of the economic orientation of actors. In the same, we are dealing with Weber's "ideal type"<sup>23</sup> model of economic action in a sense that will be discussed a little later. As it is an ideal type, in the so-called real world we may not often find economically oriented action that is even close to being pure. Instead, we may find actions oriented simultaneously in many ways, that is, actions that are "overdetermined", as one common contemporary way of putting it goes.

Weber's emphasis upon studying the actors' *gemeinten Sinn* in their actions can be seen as connected to Weber's scientific approach. There are orientations of social and political research that are interested in that sense which actors themselves attach to their actions, and We-

ber's is one of them. There are also orientations that could not care less about what such a sense might be in each action episode. Two examples of definitely non-Weberian approaches can be given:

- a) There is the registration of attitudes by the means of the quantification typical of analysis based on "data" amassed by the means of surveys and then translated into the quantitative and formal language of variable analysis.
- b) There is the way in which mainstream economics takes actors' preferences for given in the famous maxim – incidentally often cited also by contemporary economists – *De gustibus non est disputandum*.<sup>24</sup>

Weber sees sociology as a particular science. It is a science, "welche soziales Handeln deutend verstehen und dadurch in seinem Ablauf und seinen Wirkungen ursächlich erklären will."<sup>25</sup>

The translation of *deutend verstehen* in the standard English version of WuG as "interpretive understanding" can be seen as acceptable, but the translation of "in seinem Ablauf und seinen Wirkungen ursächlich erklären" as "causal explanation of its course and consequences" can be seen as an anachronism. It would, again, make Weber appear as an American social science professor working to pursue causal analysis of social phenomena in the fashion of the 1940s and the 1950s. Weber rather aimed at something less, or rather, something different with respect to causes than causal explanation in the sense that it is understood in such sociology as is aiming at "causal explanation".

In particular, Weber wants sociology, and *mutatis mutandis*, social, political and economic research in general, to study such causes of actions by actors which are based upon the actors' various intended senses to their actions as the actions emanate on the basis of the actors' understanding of the conduct of other actors. It goes without saying that the other actors, in turn, orient their own actions in an analogous way, and therefore need and can be studied in the same way as the former actors.

À la Weber, actors can be said to act in a socially or sociologically relevant way to the effect that they intentionally ascribe sense to their actions through their interpretations regarding how their ac-

tions and the processes and the consequences of their actions are conditioned by other actors. The former actors can be seen to be well aware of the other actors not only acting causally but also making their own interpretations, and so on, in an infinite regress of complex social interactions. In Weber the reasons actors have for their actions are the causes of these actions in the sense of the *ursächliche Erklärung* regarding the actions.

### Das Wirtschaften as an action concept in Weber

*Das Wirtschaften*, which is a concept already referred to above, is interestingly an “action concept” instead of a hypostatized conceptual entity. The standard English translation as “economic action” leads to the loss of much of the sense conveyed by Weber in using the word *das Wirtschaften*. As such, the word *das Wirtschaften* is very appropriate in Weber’s work. It refers to his aim as if to catch the actors in the midst of their action. Indeed, Weber definitely does not see the actors as first ascribing a sense to their actions and then acting, but as doing both simultaneously.<sup>26</sup>

There is another important concept in Weber, regarding which it is necessary to consider how it applies to economic action. This is the generic concept of “social relationship”:

“Soziale ‘Beziehung’ soll ein seinem Sinngehalt nach aufeinander gegenseitig eingestelltes und dadurch orientiertes Sichverhalten mehrerer heißen. Die soziale Beziehung besteht also durchaus und ganz ausschließlich: in der Chance, daß in einer (sinnhaft) angebbaren Art sozial gehandelt wird, einerlei zunächst: worauf diese Chance beruht.”<sup>27</sup>

“The term ‘social relationship’ will be used to denote the behavior (better: “conduct”, P.A.) of a plurality of actors insofar as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms. The social relationship thus consists entirely and exclusively in the existence of a probability (better: “chance”, P.A.) that there will be a meaningful course of social action – irrespective, for the time being, of the

basis of this probability ("chance", P.A.).<sup>28</sup>

Thus economic action, too, – and not differently from, say, political action – is in Weber action which is dependent upon *chances*. Importantly, these chances offer themselves due to interaction occurring amongst a mass of many individuals. Any focal individual finds him- or herself in a situation where actions by other individuals offer him or her chances s/he can utilise, but only if s/he possesses sufficient competence.<sup>29</sup>

## Formal economic rationality

I now turn to what I call Weber's two ideal types of formal rationality, one of which is economic in character. I find in Weber the view that "rationality" as such is nothing more than any way of doing something out of some given point of view or perspective that is defensible at its face value.<sup>30</sup>

I am first interested in Weberian formal rationality of ruling and Weberian formal rationality of economic action. I will also be considering the substantive rationality which Weber juxtaposes with formal rationality.

### *Weber's ideal types of formal rationality*

How do I conceive of the "ideal type" as a generic concept? I conceive of it as a historically bound device to gain an interpretive grasp of historically bound phenomena by means of emphasising some and de-emphasising other of the features of the phenomena being studied. Ideal types may be useful or not, but they may not right or wrong as such. Ideal types also presuppose phenomena that are being modelled by the typologist. It is the phenomena that the interpreter tries to purify for his inspection by the very means of the ideal types.<sup>31</sup>

"This conceptual pattern (that is, the ideal type, P.A.) brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system.

Substantively, this construct in itself is like a *utopia* which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality. Its relationship to the empirical data consists solely in the fact that... we can make... *characteristic* features... pragmatically *clear* and *understandable* by reference to an *ideal-type*. ... Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to... reality... . . . (The ideal type) is no 'hypothesis' but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. ... (T)he ... 'fundamental concepts' of economics... can be developed in genetic form only as ideal types."

"Dieses Gedankenbild vereinigt bestimmte Beziehungen und Vorgänge des historischen Lebens zu einem in sich widerspruchlosen Kosmos gedachter Zusammenhänge. Inhaltlich trägt diese Konstruktion den Charakter einer Utopie an sich, die durch gedankliche Steigerung bestimmter Elemente der Wirklichkeit gewonnen ist. Ihr Verhältnis zu den empirisch gegebenen Tatsachen ... besteht ... darin, daß da ... wir uns die Eigenart (jedes) Zusammenhangs an einem Ideatypus pragmatisch veranschaulichen und verständlich machen können ... (F)ür die historische Arbeit erwächst die Aufgabe, in jedem einzelnen Falle festzustellen, wie nahe .. die Wirklichkeit jenem Idealbilde steht... . . . (Der Idealtypus) ist keine 'Hypothese', aber er will der Hypothesenbildung die Richtung weisen. ... (Die) 'Grundbegriffe...' der Nationalökonomie ... sind in genetischer Form nur als Idealtypen zu entwickeln."<sup>32</sup>

*For comparison: Bureaucracy as an ideal type of formal rationality*

I find it useful to clarify the ideal type of the formal rationality of economic action by juxtaposing it first briefly with the ideal type of the formal rationality of ruling or "domination". "Bureaucracy" in a specific sense can be seen as the essence of the latter, with the often cited but almost as often misunderstood features connected to that ideal type by Weber.



I am not going to cite here the contents Weber gives to his ideal type of bureaucracy.<sup>33</sup> I am only making reference to this ideal type to support my coming argument on the ideal type of economic action.

What Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy should *not* be seen to be is well known, except in canonic textbooks for students of administrative science. Some of these textbooks still often represent that ideal type – or a collection of certain of its ephemeral features – as a *bête noire*. This "beast" was allegedly invented by Weber through his "misconception" of conditions of efficient administration, organisation and management. This typically opens the path for the commonplace story of this *bête noire* being challenged by some heroic figure of some popular management doctrine. In the 1980s and 1990s that doctrine has very often been what is known by the acronym NPM, the New Public Management. Before NPM, the heroic figures of various "humanistic" orientations of administration, organisation and management had their turn.

To be more exact, the above weird interpretation of Weber may also be a matter related to the novice years of the present generation of those individuals who bear the practical charge of public sector reform in many of the world's countries. It is probably they who once, during their academic studies ten to thirty years ago, adopted the misconceived idea of Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy from American textbooks of the day. They may also have received vulgarisations of the already vulgar message of those textbooks in their home countries. Nor can we completely rule out the possibility that the rhetorical value of the vulgarized model of "Weberian bureaucracy" in the legitimation of the public sector reforms continues to play a role.<sup>34</sup>

### *Accounting as an ideal type of formal rationality*

In Weber, the essence of the ideal type of the formal rationality of economic action is "rational economic calculation" or "accounting".<sup>35</sup> Here, we have four elements, which are quite well-known to the economist and the business accounting specialist, albeit usually under different names. The first three derive from Weber's convenient

characterisation of pure, general formal rationality, that is, formal rationality both in economic action and outside it.

- a) There are purposes (*Zwecke*).
- b) There are means (*Mittel*).
- c) There are secondary consequences (*Nebenfolgen*).

Weber writes:

“Zweckrational handelt, wer sein Handeln nach Zweck, Mittel und Nebenfolgen orientiert und dabei sowohl die Mittel gegen die Zwecke, wie die Zwecke gegen die Nebenfolgen, wie endlich auch die verschiedenen möglichen Zwecke gegeneinander rational abwägt...”<sup>36</sup>

“Action is instrumentally rational ... when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed. This involves rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of the relations of the end to the secondary consequences, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends.”<sup>37</sup>

I am not yet dealing here with how an important *fourth* element of an action situation is also present in Weber’s sociology of ruling including politics and bureaucracy:

- d) There are “*die Chancen*”.

I discuss that fourth aspect only in the context of economic action. To proceed in that direction it is first important to point out that Weber inserts calculation in terms of money into the core of his ideal type of the formal rationality of economic action:

“Rein technisch angesehen ist Geld das ‘volkommenste’ wirtschaftliche Rechnungsmittel: das heißt: das formal rationalste Mittel der Orientierung wirtschaftlichen Handelns.” Geldrechnung, nicht: aktueller Geldgebrauch, ist daher das spezifische Mittel zweckrationaler Beschaffungswirtschaft.”<sup>38</sup>

"From a purely technical point of view, money is ... formally the most rational means of orienting economic activity. Calculation in terms of money, and not its actual use, is thus the specific means of rational, economic provision."<sup>39</sup>

The commonplace vulgar interpretation of Weber's emphasis on the pure technical superiority of bureaucracy<sup>40</sup> as a defence of bureaucracy falls under a particularly ironic light given Weber's analogous emphasis on the superiority of money. Nor was Weber in any way exercising *idolatry* of the virtues of money as an efficient medium of exchange!

*Relating chances and secondary consequences to formal rationality*

The above determinations of formal rationality on the one hand and on the other calculation in terms of money are abstract. They are not yet inserted into a context of social relationships by Weber at the point where they first appear in WuG.<sup>41</sup> That insertion does take place in the case of the formal rationality of ruling, and it does take place in the case of the formal rationality of economic action. In both cases, the word "chance" appears as the keyword to enable the insertion. In the case of economic action itself Weber writes:

"Erwerben soll ein an den Chancen der ... Gewinnung von neuer Verfügungsgewalt über Güter orientiertes Verhalten, Erwerbstätigkeit die an Chancen des Erwerbes mitorientierte Tätigkeit..."<sup>42</sup>

"'Profit-making' ... is activity which is oriented to opportunities (better: "chances", P.A.) for seeking new powers of control over goods... 'Profit-making activity' is activity which is oriented at least in part to opportunities ("chances", P.A.) of profit making."<sup>43</sup>

Calculation in terms of money relates the four above elements, purposes, means, secondary consequences and chances to each other in ways that well resemble what we know well if we are familiar

with economics and accounting. This concerns budgeting, *ex ante* and *ex post* cost accounting, investment calculation and auditing as well, to mention only a few examples.

It is the *Nebenfolgen* which one more rarely sees references to in the contexts where accounting, business and other economic action and economic research are pursued. Mainstream economics and even more business economics are practically by definition a field of knowledge where it is *hors de discours* to account for the possibility that economic action could have adverse secondary consequences that could count. Accounting for those consequences is rarely a legitimate part of the rational calculations let alone a basis for doubt regarding the calculations.

Such orientations as cost-benefit analysis to take into account adverse secondary consequences have never attained full legitimacy in mainstream economic doctrine. The belief that unregulated markets involve the “best of all possible worlds” has never died out among professional economists nor makers of economic policy. Since the 1970s that belief has been as strong as ever.

Certain interesting orientations and authors have indeed dealt with related relevant questions. Yet it has been pointed to me that analogy with Weber should not be seen as an implication of any identity. Many economists have dealt with external effects and spill-overs. Friedrich v. Hayek and Ludwig v. Mises elaborated the notion that government activity especially would have rather negative net effects due to its multifarious adverse secondary consequences. In sociology, Robert K. Merton elaborated the notion of secondary consequences of generic action. This is one of the motivations why Merton is not infrequently mentioned as the intellectual father of such orientations in political science as policy analysis and public policy evaluation.<sup>44</sup>

It is conceivable that any accounting system has secondary consequences, which may mean that after imposing such a system we are doing worse than had the system never been introduced. This is a possibility to which friends of accounting are averse. However, they may accept the view that there is nothing wrong with accounting as such, but circumstances where accounting is introduced may be hostile enough to prevent the realisation of the opportunities that accounting offers.

It is only slowly that such intriguing questions have received critical and informed attention. As a consequence, perspectives on accounting and other types of quantitative measurement as socially or politically constituted practices have arisen. Here, accounting and measurement are ascribed no unquestionable objectivity to remain *hors de discours*.<sup>45</sup> Motivating such a critical analysis, Rieder writes about the common danger that threatens accounting and other quantitative measurement alike:

"Rhetoric of reason becomes an instrument for an expressive affirmation in the value of rationality, and we become the audience for dramaturgies of reason."<sup>46</sup>

### *From economic calculation to struggle by economic means*

Weber continues his argument with a further important addition. This addition is related to the nature of actual economic action as action taking place in a context of social relations defined in the way Weber does. Weber applies a general concept of his social science, namely conflict, or rather struggle, *Kampf*.<sup>47</sup> He defines this word originally as follows:

"Kampf soll eine soziale Beziehung insoweit heißen, als das Handeln an der Absicht der Durchsetzung des eignen Willens gegen Widerstand des oder der Partner orientiert ist."

Let me be content with giving only the English translation of Weber's passage on economic action taking place in its context of social and political relations between actors:

"(T)he capital accounting ... of the market entrepreneur (is) oriented ... to profitability. ... (T)he (chances) of profit are ... dependent on the income of consumption units... (E)ven though the consumer has to be a position to buy, his wants are 'awakened' and 'directed' by the entrepreneur. ... (C)apital accounting... is oriented to expectations of prices (*Preis Chancen*) and ... conflicts of interests in bargaining and competition and the resolution of

these conflicts. ... Capital accounting ... presupposes battle (better: "struggle", P.A.) of man with man (this is no more a politically correct translation, P.A.). ... (T)he fact that the battle ("struggle", P.A.) ... on the market is an essential condition for the existence of rational money-accounting further implies that the outcome of the economic process is decisively influenced by the ability of persons who are more plentifully supplied with money to outbid the others, and of those more favorably situated for production to underbid their rivals on the selling side."<sup>48</sup>

Besides emphasising the importance of struggle, *Kampf*, Weber also deals with the actors' positions in the struggle and their competence to engage in the struggle. The more plentifully provided and the more favourable situated are those with the best chances of beating the other actors. The important thus is that all this indeed takes place in circumstances where chance prevails. Therefore there is always also the chance of loss and ruin instead of mere prospects of gain.

Chance, and if in any way capable of estimation as a quantity, uncertainty and risk, prevail already in the supply of money in the markets. Exchange rates and interest rates may change, which, if it happens, changes the profitability of the alternative investment targets. Favourable situations are something that market actors crave for, but no sure blueprint to attain or exploit them exists. Did it exist and were it known to all the actors, all the actors would certainly use it, which they definitely are not doing nor can they do so. Did it exist but were it only known to some of the actors, some of the actors would show phenomenal success due to the reason of their superior knowledge, but this circumstance definitely does not prevail. In markets, we are indeed far removed from the "moral economy" of the ideal typical *oikos* seeing in front of itself autarchy as a realistic option.

If we are to believe Green,<sup>49</sup> Weber's style in WuG frequently promises a lot with statements on power and struggle, on possibilities regarding the rise of situations where exploitation of man by man may take place and on potential contradictions between rationalities. However, according to Green, Weber often fails to fulfil the promises thus arisen. Although this may largely arise from the genre of WuG as an intended part of a multi-volume encyclopaedia in the social sciences, the observation is still worth a brief elaboration.

Beside the earlier citation on capital accounting, consider also the following example in Weber, pinpointed by Green:<sup>50</sup>

"The fact that the maximum *formal rationality* in capital accounting is possible only where the workers are subjected to domination by entrepreneurs, is a further specific element of *substantive irrationality* in the modern economic order."<sup>51</sup>

Weber adds the further possibility that formal and substantive rationality may run into a contradiction where entirely private wealth interests or a pure gambling interest become decisive.<sup>52</sup> Next, Weber writes that he sees speculation on capital goods as one of the reasons for the periodic economic crises of market economies. However, he soon goes on to add that he cannot consider the matter further.<sup>53</sup>

If we are to believe Green, Weber's style in WuG and the WuG's genre frequently lead to a rapid if not premature closure of his argument. This takes place irrespective of how promising from the point of view of practical political and ethical relevance the arguments might be. In other instances, although Weber may continue the argument, he may leave so many possibilities open regarding the situations that actors of the practical world may feel that the relevance of his argument is diminished or annihilated. Nor can it be ruled out that these features of Weber's discourse involve his conscious choices to avoid political and ethical commitment and also to honour the relativism he himself has chosen to subscribe to.

## The question on a general ideal type of rationality

I do not attempt to present any features of a general ideal type of "rationality". It cannot be ruled out that devising such an ideal type would be feasible, common to both the formal rationality of "ruling" ("domination") and the formal rationality of economic action. Weber does not fail to attempt much of this<sup>54</sup>, but still somehow his accomplishment and the resulting definition seem to remain quite focused upon the rationality of economic action. This is so especially as regards formal rationality. For instance, one can ask what other forms of action there are beside economic action that may fall under

the general ideal type of formal rationality. One can also ask what the position of the formal rationality of economic action is with regard to the various instances and applications of that ideal type.

The exercise referred to above might well be useful despite the obvious difficulties. I have previously found Weber himself to have had difficulties in combining his analysis in terms of formal rationality on the hand and substantive rationality on the other in the important case of money. At least I accomplished a classification of presuppositions of monetary theories I still regard as useful.<sup>55</sup>

I must here leave open a further interesting question. This is the question regarding the relationships between Weber's *Zweckrationalität* and *formale Rationalität*<sup>56</sup> to his *Wertrationalität* and his *materiale Rationalität* in the particular case of economic action.<sup>57</sup>

## Relationships between rational calculation and “ruling” in Weber

### *“Ruling-free” economic action in standard economic thought*

In contemporary neo-classical economic thought the organisational dimension of the competitive firm in competitive markets is very little developed and frequently spirited away altogether. That a noteworthy part of economic theory had assumed that direction already in Weber's day was visible that early.

It is where there are no markets (including inside business firms) that organisation and therefore ruling also have a place in mainstream economics. One interesting contemporary explanation is that given by Oliver Williamson, whose keyword there is – in a somewhat misleading way for an analysis of Weber – “governance”. He offers the explanation that the reason why firms have an internal organisational dimension is their willingness to do away with the market to preserve and nurture resources that are specific to their needs and that the markets therefore cannot provide on a spot basis.<sup>58</sup>

The standard restricting assumptions, taught to every economics student in the first introductory course to the science of economics, spirit away much of all that in Weberian terms consists of ruling



("domination"). Allocation of given means between given purposes in a situation of perfect competition, perfect homogeneity of goods, static and fully known technology and perfect information are elements of the well-known economic model. The consequence is that the mere formal rationality of economic calculation remains after the restricting assumptions have been imposed. In actual practice, the road is opened for the stereotypical constrained optimisation by the means of algebraic partial derivation, which continues to be the essence of the economist's standard toolkit. That toolkit already existed in Weber's time, although its applications were still narrow in comparison to those of our day.

In recent decades we have witnessed a veritable avalanche of applications of the venerable apparatus of standard neoclassical economics to deal with public sector problems according to the public choice school of economics.<sup>59</sup> This has been particularly so since the 1980s. One can ask what the true implications are of the restricting assumptions, which support the modelling efforts whose results are then presented as true results of analysis and as valid sources of prescriptions for political reform.<sup>60</sup>

Not even the revisions of the neoclassical standard economics have sufficed to change the picture in a comprehensive way. Those revisions have involved the analysis of situations of imperfect as opposed to perfect information, the so-called endogenous as opposed to exogenous production technology or the so-called bounded as opposed to perfect rationality. However, I do not dwell on these orientations here.

### *Avoiding determinist and collectivist solutions*

One conceivable way to proceed towards an alternative viewpoint to that of neoclassical economics might be some type of anti-individualism. This might involve some type of sociological determinism or collectivism imposed upon economic phenomena to account for them. Even that has been frequently tried, but I will not dwell in those efforts here.

Weber's own critical response to the problems encountered but largely bracketed away by the immediate predecessors of today's

neoclassical economics was unique. The result was that we see Weber frequently to admit that economic action may take place in a context of what is in Weberian terms “ruling” of one kind or another. Thus the notion of *Kampf* was important not only in Weber’s so-called “sociology of ruling” but also in his “sociology of economic action”.

### *The entrepreneur as an heroic actor figure in Weber*

What was Weber’s solution to avoid the two above pitfalls? There is the neoclassical pitfall of reducing actors to their formally rational sets of preferences and telescoping actual choices and preferences into each other, on the one hand. The latter involves the assumption that people prefer what they choose and choose what they prefer. On the other there is the determinist and collectivist pitfall.

At least a partial view of Weber’s solution can be given with reference to his theorisation around a few key actor figures. They are definitely individualist instead of docile members of collectives, nor are they puppets of some predetermined set of values on the one hand. However, on the other hand they are not in any way reduced to mere preferences and the formally rational calculi of ends, means, secondary consequences and chances.

In Weber the figure of the entrepreneur (*der kapitalistische Unternehmer*) is explicitly inserted into the domain of economic action. The figure of the entrepreneur is also particularly interesting in that Weber sees him or her as a rare figure free of bureaucracy and without need of relying upon the pursuit of “ruling” in working towards his or her goals. The entrepreneur can thus be seen as a potential figure for an actor of “ruling-free” or “domination-free” action.

“Ueberlegen ist der Bureaukratie an Wissen: Fachwissen und Tatsachenwissen, innerhalb seine Interessenbereichs, regelmäßig nur: der private Erwerbsinteressent. Also: der kapitalistische Unternehmer... ist die einzige wirklich gegen die Unentrinnbarkeit der bureaukratischen rationalen Wissens-Herrschaft (mindestens: relativ) immune Instanz.”<sup>61</sup>

"Superior to bureaucracy in the knowledge of techniques and facts is only the capitalist entrepreneur, within his own sphere of interest. He is the only type who has been able to maintain at least relative immunity from subjection to the control of rational bureaucratic knowledge."<sup>62</sup>

The joint-stock corporation, on the contrary, is hardly a ruling-free domain, especially if there is true differentiation between ownership and operational management. Weber also makes it clear that firm size is of importance here. Even if the entrepreneur were to work only in his or her own name but have a substantial number of employees, division of labour, hierarchy, ruling and bureaucracy would ensue.

What one could relate Weber's view with is, for instance, his acquaintance *Joseph Schumpeter's* writings on innovation and entrepreneurship. I shall not do that here.

*For comparison: The heroic figures of the "politician" and the "scientist" in Weber*

In Weber's article "Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order", I find at least the following statements about the second "bureaucracy-free" actor figure:<sup>63</sup>

"(T)he meaning and purpose ... of (the politician's) position differs from that of other officials in the same way as the position of the entrepreneur and managing director in a private firm is a special one. ... If a man (sic, P.A.) in a *leading* position performs his leadership function in the *spirit* of an 'official', ... if he is accustomed to performing his work dutifully and honourably in accordance with regulations and orders, then he is useless, whether he is at the head of a private firm or a state. ... The struggle for personal power and the acceptance of full *personal responsibility for one's cause (Sache)* which is the consequence of such power – this the very element in which the politician and the entrepreneur live and breathe." (Original emphases in the English translation text.)

Finally, a third key actor figure, analogous both to the entrepreneur and the true politician, can be found in Weber as a third key actor with potential to follow Weber's preferred "heroic ethic of responsibility". In "Science as Vocation" Weber writes on the "scientist":

"In the field of science only he who is devoted solely to the work at hand has 'personality' ... (I)n politics matters are not different..."<sup>64</sup>

"'Persönlichkeit' auf wissenschaftlichem Gebiet hat nur der, der rein der Sache dient. ... Es steht in der Politik nicht anders."<sup>65</sup>

Any political scientist would certainly crave for more elaboration exactly at that point. However, Weber bluntly continues his statement equating the scientist's and the politician's calling with a disappointment: "...but we shall not discuss that today."<sup>66</sup> "Davon heute nichts."<sup>67</sup>

## On substantive rationality of economic action in Weber

Weber defines substantive rationality:

"Als materiale Rationalität ... eines Wirtschaftens ... soll ... bezeichnet werden der Grad, in welchem die jeweilige Versorgung von gegebenen Menschengruppen ... mit Gütern durch die Art eines wirtschaftlich orientierten sozialen Handelns sich gestaltet unter Gesichtspunkt bestimmter ... wertender Postulate ... ethische, politische, utilitarische, hedonische, ständische, egalitäre ..."<sup>68</sup>

"The 'substantive rationality' ... of economic action ... is the degree to which the provisioning of ... persons ... is shaped ... under some criterion ... of ultimate values ... ethical, political, utilitarian, hedonistic, feudal ..., egalitarian..."<sup>69</sup>

For instance, formally rational economic calculation may take place with respect to responsibility, ethical values and conscience ethical values as well. In actual political practice, it may also have taken

place as well with respect to Leninist as Keynesian welfarist as Old Right or New Right political values. All value sets may give rise in exactly the same formal way to what resembles that which we, if technocrats, know as "effectiveness". This is the relationship of a result accomplished to objectives or values concerning that result.

The implicit valuation of individualism in adhering to utilitarian values is, in turn, only one of the options of substantive rationality. The valuation is visible, for instance, in the efforts in economics to aggregate individual preferences, individual demand or individual supply to achieve various figures of totalities transcending individuals, but seen as derived only from them, their preferences and their choices.<sup>70</sup>

The fact that Weber inserts the "political" criteria of values among substantive criteria that may guide action which, however, is economic, might be seen as misleading. One might ask why we need any reference to the "political" within the economic domain. The circumstance should, all in all, not be seen as a contradiction but an indication of Weber's inventiveness and sensitivity to the possibility of mutual interpenetration of the "political" and the "economic". In one place Weber explicitly puts it:

"Jede rationale 'Politik' bedient sich wirtschaftlicher Orientierung in den Mitteln und jede Politik kann im Dienst wirtschaftlicher Ziele stehen."<sup>71</sup>

"Every rational course of political action is economically oriented with respect to provision for the necessary means, and it is always possible for political action to serve the interest of economic ends."<sup>72</sup>

Egalitarian values, in turn, if they are subscribed to, subordinate formally rational economic calculation to some of the many conceivable criteria of redistribution. The redistribution may take place, for instance, from the alleged better-off to the alleged worse-off in terms of region, gender, ethnicity, sexual preference, income, wealth, age, and so on and on. Regressive redistribution is also conceivable, such as in economic policies working to increase differences in income and wealth in the name of motivating the worst-off to improve

- 23 For more, see further below.
- 24 Yet it is of great importance to find out the differences exactly. It is also very important to work to find out if the gap between the two approaches and the Weberian approach has occasionally been successfully narrowed.
- 25 WuG, 1; Weber 1978, 8. Then follow the definitions of "action" and "social action" referred to above.
- 26 The closest equivalent to *das Wirtschaften* in actual contemporary Finnish is *yrittää*, but it refers only to the pursuit of entrepreneurship. To *yrittää* is attached through counter-connotation to *erehtyä*, where the pair of words becomes that of "trial and error".
- 27 WuG, 13.
- 28 Weber 1978, 26-27. It has been pointed to me that "probability", used in the standard English translation, mistakenly refers to degrees of chances, not the chances themselves. I also suggest changing the "behavior" of the standard translation into "conduct" as I have done already above.
- 29 Further explication is available in Kari Palonen, *Das 'Webersche Moment'*, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag 1998.
- 30 Cf. WuG, 12-13; Weber 1978, 24-26.
- 31 Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy", in Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch (transl. and ed.) *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press 1949, 49-112, p. 90, 100.
- 32 For the original text, see Weber, "Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis", in Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Johannes Winckelmann (ed.), 6. ed., Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck) 1985, orig. 1904, 146-214, 190, 191, 190, 202. – Comparison between the original and the English translation, again, suggests several points where the translation could be amended, or where the reader should at least also consult the original text. However, here the English original satisfies the minimal requirements posed by my present research purposes.
- 33 WuG, 126; Weber 1985, 220.
- 34 On this, see Pertti Ahonen & Ari Salminen, *Metamorphosis of the Administrative Welfare State: From Depoliticisation to Political Rationality*, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang 1997.
- 35 However, even here caution is needed. "Accounting" is at stake only in a generic sense, but not in the sense of any of the existing systems and principles of accounting widespread in contemporary private business or government.
- 36 WuG, 13, cf. p. 12: "(S)oziale(s) Handeln... kann ... sein 1. zweckrational: durch Erwartungen des Verhaltens von Gegenständen der Außenwelt und von anderen Menschen und unter Benutzung dieser Erwartungen als 'Bedingungen' oder als 'Mittel' für rational, als Erfolg, erstrebte und abgewogene eigne Zwecke...." It has been pointed out to me that the idea

- is even better explained in Weber's "Die 'Objektivität'...", *art. cit.*, 149-150.
- 37 Weber 1985, 26. The adequacy of the standard translation of "Nebenfolgen" as "secondary consequences" instead of "side effects" could be discussed critically. "Secondary consequences" is, admittedly, somewhat heavy and with extra connotations, e.g., to what happens in the long term and not only over and above what was first aimed at. However, for the purposes of this article there is no particular need to suggest and introduce the revision.
- 38 WuG, 45.
- 39 Weber 1978, 86. The standard English translation of *Beschaffungswirtschaft* as "economic provision" is inadequate. That concept refers to an opposite to a barter economy and other primitive economies on the one hand, and on the other hand to an opposite to planned economies and such public sector and other non-profit economies where business accounting proper can hardly come into question. Interestingly, at least in the Finnish language there is a venerable albeit nowadays rare equivalent to *Beschaffungswirtschaft*, namely *ansaintatalous*.
- 40 WuG, 128; Weber 1978, 223.
- 41 But of course the context had been analysed by Weber well before he coined his abstract definitions at the beginning of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. In point of fact, the latter parts of the book are commonly seen as earlier than the first, conceptually densest parts.
- 42 WuG, 48.
- 43 Weber 1978, 90. I would neither rule out the standard translation as "opportunities". However, I have already above opted for "chances".
- 44 I am not supplying references to these three authors or the later arguments in question.
- 45 Anthony Hopwood & Peter Miller (ed.) *Accounting as a Social and Institutional Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994; Theodore M. Porter, *Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995.
- 46 Rieder, *art. cit.*, p. 209.
- 47 WuG, 20.
- 48 Weber 1978, 92-93; cf. WuG, 49. It has been suggested to me that here, "struggle" could be substituted for "battle" to avoid connotations that are problematic in translating *Kampf*. It is *Schlacht* that could more literally be translated as "battle".
- 49 Bryan S. Green, *Literary Methods and Sociological Theory: Case Studies of Simmel and Weber*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988.
- 50 Weber 1978, 138; WuG, 78.
- 51 For more about substantive rationality, see the end of this article.

52 Weber 1978, 140, WuG, 79.

53 *Loc.cit.*

54 WuG, 13, Weber 1978, 26.

55 See my "Tracing the Meaning of Money," in Janice Deledalle-Rhodes (ed.), *Proceedings of the IV Congress of the International Association of Semiotic Studies, Humanity and Its Signs, Barcelona and Perpignan, March 31 - April 8, 1989*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter 1992, 99-112. Cf. Ludwig v. Mises, "On the Classification of Monetary Theories," in Mises, *The Theory of Money and Credit*, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics 1981 (1. ed. in German in 1912), 503-524. Mises's article first appeared in German as a journal article in 1917-1918.

56 WuG, 12; Weber 1978, 24-26.

57 WuG, 44; Weber 1978, 85-86. Regarding *Herrschaft*, I have together with a colleague already taken related steps, also to encounter the ensuing analytic difficulties, see Ahonen & Salminen, *op.cit.*

58 Williamson 1991, *art.cit.*

59 Starting from such early works as William A. Niskanen, *Bureaucracy in Representative Government*, Boston: Little, Brown 1971, which is really only an exercise of mathematical constrained optimisation. For a critical account, Lars Udehn, *The Limits of Public Choice*, London: Routledge 1996.

60 See also Ahonen & Salminen, *op.cit.*, Udehn, *op.cit.*

61 WuG, 129.

62 Weber 1978, 225. The gendering in the translation and in the original are of course politically incorrect in contemporary discourse.

63 In Weber, *Political Writings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994, 130-71, p. 160-1. The original text, "Parlament und Regierung in neugeordneten Deutschland: Zur politischen Kritik des Beamtentums und des Parteiwesens" originally appeared as a series of newspaper articles between April and June, 1917, and for the first time as a book in 1918.

64 In H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (ed.) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, London: Routledge 1985, 1. ed. 1948, 129-156, p. 137.

65 "Wissenschaft als Beruf", in Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, op.cit.*, 591.

66 Weber in Gerth & Mills, *loc.cit.*

67 "Wissenschaft als Beruf", *loc.cit.*

68 WuG 45-46.

69 Weber 1978, 85.

70 To mention two examples: there has been the "social welfare function", and there have also been many efforts to derive the just domain of "government" in this way in welfare economics and in rational choice political science.



71 WuG, 32.

72 Weber 1978, 65.

73 About this, see above, section 5, last subsection.

74 Kristian Knudsen, "Equilibrium, Perfect Rationality and the Problem of Self-Reference in Economics", in Uskali Mäki, Bo Gustafsson & Christian Knudsen (ed.) *Rationality, Institutions and Economic Methodology*, London: Routledge 1993, 133-170, 162.

## References

- Ahonen, Pertti. "Tracing the Meaning of Money." In Janice Deledalle-Rhodes (ed.) *Proceedings of the IV Congress of the International Association of Semiotic Studies, Humanity and Its Signs, Barcelona and Perpignan, March 31 - April 8, 1989*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter 1992, 99-112.
- Ahonen, Pertti & Ari Salminen. *Metamorphosis of the Administrative Welfare State: From Depoliticisation to Political Rationality*. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang 1997.
- Bödeker, H.E. "'Verwaltung', 'Regierung' und 'Polizei' in deutschen Wörterbüchern und Lexika des 18. Jahrhunderts." In E.V. Heyen (ed.) *Formation und Transformation des Verwaltungswissens in Frankreich und Deutschland (18./19. Jh.). Jahrbuch für europäische Verwaltungsgeschichte 1*. Baden-Baden: Nomos 1989, 15-32.
- Booth, William James. "Household and Market: On the Origins of Moral Economic Philosophy." *The Review of Politics* 56 (1994):2, 207-236.
- Brunner, Otto. "Das 'ganze Haus' und die alteuropäische 'Ökonomik'." In Brunner, *Neue Wege der Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte*. 2. expanded ed. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1968, 103-127.
- Burkhardt, Johannes et al. "Wirtschaft" In Otto Brunner, Werner Conze & Reinhart Koselleck (ed.) *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*. Band 7. *Verw.-Z.* Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1992, 511-594.
- Green, Bryan S. *Literary Methods and Sociological Theory: Case Studies of Simmel and Weber*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988.
- Hopwood, Anthony & Peter Miller (ed.). *Accounting as a Social and Institutional Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994.
- Knudsen, Kristian. "Equilibrium, Perfect Rationality and the Problem of Self-Reference in Economics". In Uskali Mäki, Bo Gustafsson & Christian Knudsen (ed.) *Rationality, Institutions and Economic Methodology*. London: Routledge 1993, 133-170.

- Koselleck, Reinhart, "Begriffsgeschichte, Sozialgeschichte, begriffene Geschichte. Reinhart Koselleck im Gespräch mit Christof Dipper. *Neue politische Literatur* 51, 1998, 187-205.
- Mises, Ludwig v. *The Theory of Money and Credit*. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics 1981 (1. ed. in German in 1912).
- Niskanen, William A.. *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*. Boston: Little, Brown 1971.
- Porter, Theodore M. *Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995.
- Palonen, Kari. *Das 'Webersche Moment'*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag 1998.
- Rieder, Jonathan, "Rhetoric of Reason, Rhetoric of Passion: Sociolinguistic Aspects of Instrumental and Expressive Rhetorics." *Rationality and Society* 2 (1990): 2, 190-213.
- Udehn, Lars. *The Limits of Public Choice*. London: Routledge 1996.
- Weber, Marianne. *Max Weber: A Biography*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 1988 (1. Amer. ed. 1974). First German ed. 1926 by J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Weber, Max. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Transl. Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press 1978. 1. printing 1968.
- Weber, Max. "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy." In Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch (transl. and ed.) *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press 1949, 49-112.
- Weber, Max. "Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis." In Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Johannes Winckelmann (ed.) 6. ed. Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck) 1985, orig. 1904, 146-214.
- Weber, Max. "Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order" In Weber. *Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994, 130-271.
- Weber, Max. "The Profession and Vocation of Politics." In Weber, *Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994, 309-369.
- Weber, Max. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie*. 5. ed. Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck). 1. ed. 1922. (Abbreviated in the text as "WuG".)
- Williamson, Oliver. "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 36 (1991), 269-296.

## Other SoPhi titles

### FINNISH YEARBOOK OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

"This contribution from Finland should both expand the domain of the terra cognita of political thought and encourage more of the encounters that have helped make Finland such a vibrant intellectual milieu." Professor Michael Shapiro on Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought 1997, *Theory & Event*

1997

The first volume of the *Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought* is dedicated to Reinhart Koselleck's work on conceptual history. Contents: *Reinhart Koselleck*, Temporalisation of Concepts; *Melvin Richter*, Appreciating a Contemporary Classic – Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe and Future Scholarship; *Kari Palonen*, An Application of Conceptual History to Itself – From Method to Theory in Koselleck's Begriffsgeschichte; *Sisko Haikala*, Criticism in the Enlightenment – Perspectives to Koselleck's Kritik und Krise; etc.

**SoPhi 10, 1997, ISBN 951-34-0926-0, 165 pages, paperback**

1998

The main topic of the second volume is *Political judgement by Hannah Arendt*. Contents: *Simona Forti*, Judging Between History and Politics; *Tuija Parvikko*, Hannah Arendt as a Judge. A Conscious Pariah in Jerusalem; *Thomas Mertens*, Arendt's Judgement and Eichmann's Evil; *Robert Fine*, The Equivocations of Politics. On the Significance of Totalitarianism in Hannah Arendt's Political Thought; *Jussi Kotkavirta*, Observations on Arendt, Kant and the Autonomy of Political Judgement; etc.

**SoPhi 22, 1998, ISBN 951-39-0192-0, 290 pages, paperback**

1999

Volume three's three topics are *History of concepts*; *Contingency: politics, art, philosophy*; and *Finnish intellectual history*. Contributors include Quentin Skinner, Janet Coleman, Melvin Richter, Maureen Whitebrook, John S. Nelson, Kari Palonen, Juha Manninen, Mikko Salmela & Risto Eräsaari.

**SoPhi 36, 1999, ISBN 951-39-0432-6, 244 pages, paperback**

## 2000

The fourth volume of the Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought discusses several interesting themes: the Eichmann case, death of the author, the discussion of representation, and the constitution of the Finnish concepts of the 'state' and the 'society'.

The publication of the diaries of Adolf Eichmann in Israel has once again shed light at the atrocities of the Nazis. The extreme horrors have been and still are a complex issue also for legal experts, because they shattered the principles of the Western legal system. In her article Tuija Parvikko (University of Jyväskylä, Finland) analyzes the judicial debates on the Eichmann case and suggests that the key to understanding the Nazi crimes is neither legal nor ethical but political.

"Reception theorists are far too ardent in their attacks on the author," argues Mark Bevir (University of California, Berkeley). His solution to the death of the author is 'methodological individualism'. Stuart Jones (University of Manchester, UK) studies the French discussion on the electoral reform in 1880-1914 in order to answer to the question about the fate of the classical concept of representation. Jones' views are commented by Frank Ankersmit (University of Groningen, Netherlands) and Hannu Nurmi (University of Turku, Finland).

In the "Finnish section" Pauli Kettunen (University of Helsinki, Finland) explains how the Finnish concept 'society' (yhteiskunta) combines the adjective 'common' (yhteinen) with the noun 'commune' (kunta). In her essay Tuija Pulkkinen (University of Helsinki, Finland) examines the early history of another important concept in Finnish, the 'state' (valtio).

*SoPhi 51, 2000, ISBN 951-39-0662-0, 303 pages, paperback*

## 2001

How conceptions of politics have changed in Finland? How 'politics' ought to be understood at large? What is going to happen to political action in the present context shaped by rapidly developing electronic innovations? Volume 5 of the Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought will approach these issues by dint of three articles which include Kari Palonen's article on conceptual changes in the understanding of "politiikka" in Finland, Michael Greven's critique of the common one-dimensional concept of politics and John S. Nelson's essay on rhetoric's for electronic politics and political communication. The conceptual changes in political thought are also studied in the context of English Renaissance. Patricia Spingborg approaches English Renaissance Classical Translations as Politically Coded Texts. Ari Helo discusses the moral point of Republicanism and Markku Peltonen focuses

on Francis Bacon's political philosophy. James Connelly writes about politicization and political participation. This book also includes an article by Michael Shapiro in which he writes about politics of "Word Abundance". This year's edition of the Yearbook also includes the index of all previous volumes from 1997 to 2001.

*SoPhi 62, 2001 ISBN 951-39-0925-5, 234 pages, paperback*

## **KIA LINDROOS: NOW-TIME/IMAGE-SPACE**

*Temporalization of Politics in Walter Benjamin's  
Philosophy of History and Art*

Kia Lindroos' book is a philosophical reconstruction on Walter Benjamin's thinking, and it elaborates a cairologic perspective on political and aesthetic time. As Benjamin's thinking has actualized especially in the 20th fin de siecle, the book opens a detailed view to his thinking. Kia Lindroos constructs an alternative interpretation on history, time, politics and art, approached through the moment of the Now (*Jetztzeit*).

"Kia Lindroos has been able to dig out of Benjamin's rather neological and hermetic terms new insights, and to show the stimulating originality of this thinker, often misunderstood as he and his work are."

Professor Wolf-Dieter Narr, Freie Universität Berlin

*SoPhi 31, 1998, ISBN 951-39-0341-9, 303 pages, paperback*

## **SoPhi**

University of Jyväskylä  
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy  
Olli-Pekka Moisio  
Box 35 (MaB), FIN-40351 Jyväskylä, Finland  
tel. +358-(0)14-2603123, fax +358-(0)14-2603101,  
e-mail olmoisio@cc.jyu.fi

Visit SoPhi home page at  
<http://www.jyu.fi/yhtfil/sophi>

For SoPhi distribution and sales outside Finland please contact:

Drake International Services  
Market House, Market Place, Deddington,  
Oxford OX 15 QSE, UK  
telephone (+44) 01869 338240 fax (+44) 01869 338310  
e-mail info@drakeint.co.uk





PERTTI AHONEN & KARI PALONEN (eds.)

DIS-EMBALMING MAX WEBER



**MAX WEBER WAS** a 'deathlonist' of the human sciences. Today he has a reputation of a first rank classic in several academic fields. If we imagine, however, Weber resurging from his grave today, he would not recognize himself in the textbook-Weber or in the popular use of Weberian formulas, such as charisma or rationality.

**THE WEBER STUDIES** in two recent decades have 'dis-embalmed' Weber from the ex post-classifications, such as sociologist or theorist of bureaucracy. Weber's political and intellectual context, the specific points he intended to make and his tacit but systematic revisions of central concepts are given a closer attention. Contemporary scholars can use their freedom of imagination to construct new perspectives on Weber's work.

**THIS VOLUME ILLUSTRATES** some trends in newer Weber studies. A number of scholars with different backgrounds, working especially in the fields political and administration studies, construct their own modes of reading Weber. Some of them 'deconstruct' the received views, others, rather, take a fresh look to some Weberian concepts and problems.



AHONEN & PALONEN (eds.)

DIS-EMBEDDING  
MAXWELL-BREWER  
SOPHIA