

Jukka Leinonen

Beginning of the Cold War as a Phenomenon of Realpolitik

U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes
in the Field of Power Politics 1945 - 1947



JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN HUMANITIES 175

Jukka Leinonen

The Beginning of The Cold War as a Phenomenon of Realpolitik

U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes
in the Field of Power Politics 1945 - 1947

Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston humanistisen tiedekunnan suostumuksella
julkisesti tarkastettavaksi yliopiston Historica-rakennuksen salissa H320
maaliskuun 23. päivänä 2012 kello 12.

Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of
the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Jyväskylä,
in building Historica, hall H320, on March 23, 2012 at 12 o'clock noon.



UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 2012

The Beginning of The Cold War as a Phenomenon of Realpolitik

U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes
in the Field of Power Politics 1945 - 1947

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN HUMANITIES 175

Jukka Leinonen

The Beginning of The Cold War
as a Phenomenon of Realpolitik

U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes
in the Field of Power Politics 1945 - 1947



UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 2012

Editors

Pasi Ihalainen

Department of History and Ethnology, University of Jyväskylä

Pekka Olsbo, Ville Korkiakangas

Publishing Unit, University Library of Jyväskylä

Jyväskylä Studies in Humanities

Editorial Board

Editor in Chief Heikki Hanka, Department of Art and Culture Studies, University of Jyväskylä

Petri Karonen, Department of History and Ethnology, University of Jyväskylä

Paula Kalaja, Department of Languages, University of Jyväskylä

Petri Toiviainen, Department of Music, University of Jyväskylä

Tarja Nikula, Centre for Applied Language Studies, University of Jyväskylä

Raimo Salokangas, Department of Communication, University of Jyväskylä

Cover picture: Secretary of State James F. Byrnes at his desk.

Photo: Beth Gore, ca. 1945. Harris & Ewing, Courtesy of The Harry S. Truman Library.

URN:ISBN:978-951-39-4686-9

ISBN 978-951-39-4686-9 (PDF)

ISBN 978-951-39-4685-2 (nid.)

ISSN 1459-4323

Copyright © 2012, by University of Jyväskylä

Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä 2012

ABSTRACT

Leinonen, Jukka Antero

The Beginning of The Cold War as a Phenomenon of Realpolitik - U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in the Field of Power Politics 1945-1947

Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2012, 393 p.

(Jyväskylä Studies in Humanities

ISSN 1459-4331; 175)

ISBN 978-951-39-4685-2 (nid.)

ISBN 978-951-39-4686-9 (PDF)

Finnish summary

Diss.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of James Francis Byrnes at the beginning of the Cold War. Byrnes was one of the most powerful actors in the American domestic and foreign policy of his time. Until the end of the Second World War he had served as a member of the House of Representatives, a Senator, a Justice of the Supreme Court and Secretary of State. This study focuses on his actions during an important transition period - the actual onset of the Cold War - when classical power politics changed radically. By studying Byrnes's role in that process as a phenomenon of realpolitik, the study goes on to analyze Byrnes's intentions on the basis of classical interpretations of realpolitik. The concept of realpolitik is used as a heuristic instrument to describe the character of his politics. Using this conceptual framework, the aim is to find out whether he was a "practitioner of realpolitik" or a peddler of the Cold War. In the light of Byrnes's political actions, the origins of the Cold War appear mostly as a farce in which both sides believed very naively in the potential of realpolitik to produce possible peace arrangements. Consequently, the process was defined above all by a drift toward an irreversible situation in the field of power politics. A connection between Byrnes's actions, different types of realpolitik and the origins of the Cold War is manifested as a type of game theory. Since the drift into the game meant at the same time a shift toward the Cold War, realpolitik and the process leading to the Cold War became elements that reinforced each other.

Keywords: Cold War, power politics, realpolitik, Wilsonism, James F. Byrnes, spheres of influence, balance of power

Author's address Jukka Leinonen
Satamakatu 27 A 6
FIN-40100 Jyväskylä
jukka.a.leinonen@edu.jyu.fi

Supervisors Satu Matikainen and Kalevi Ahonen
Department of History and Ethnology
P.O. Box 35 (H)
FIN-40014 University of Jyväskylä
FINLAND

Reviewers Juhana Aunesluoma
Dept. of Social Science History
Political History
P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 University of Helsinki
FINLAND

Patrick Jackson
School of International Service
American University
4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016-8071
USA

Opponent Juhana Aunesluoma
Dept. of Social Science History
Political History
P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 University of Helsinki
FINLAND

PREFACE

Originally, I had thought of my intended dissertation work as a kind of ordeal, which I just had to work through efficiently and in a decent period of time. Judging from what some friends had told me, writing a dissertation, with all the trials and tribulations involved, is like descending into hell and coming back. I believe that nothing of the sort has happened to me. Instead, the past seven years of postgraduate studies have been a fantastic period of time. Not merely because of the evident progress of my dissertation but mainly because of the opportunity I had to learn. During these postgraduate years I had an excellent chance to extend my awareness of the interpretation of the past. It has been a pleasure to discover the complexity of human behavior, the diversity of many possible realities and the mystery of human intentionality as key qualities of humanity itself. After nearly 10,000 miles on American freeways, numerous hours in reading rooms, 6,000 photographed documents and huge piles of books and papers, these few pages just feel like the tip of the iceberg.

For the successful completion of this document I am indebted to my supervisors, Satu Matikainen and Kalevi Ahonen, who have been with me throughout this process. For my interest in Cold War history, I would like to express my special gratitude to Kalevi, who has supervised my theses ever since the first seminar. I also want to extend special thanks to Professor Seppo Zetterberg for being an unending source of advice and encouraging me to pursue further studies. I would like to express my appreciation to Professors Pasi Ihalainen, Kia Lindroos, Kari Palonen and Jerome Reel and the many archivists and librarians who have guided me through the collections of Clemson University Libraries, Columbia University Libraries, the Library of the Finnish Parliament and Jyväskylä University Library. I would like to thank my reviewers, Dr Juhana Aunesluoma and Dr Patrick Jackson, for their criticism and suggestions on the manuscript. Gerard McAlester deserves special thanks for proofreading and language consultation. I would also like to thank Professor Tiina Kinnunen, who has kindly agreed to act as the custodian in the public examination of my doctoral dissertation. My sincere recognition is also due to Matti Roitto and Mikko Nislin for fertile discussions and assistance. This research has been funded by the Emil Aaltonen Foundation and the Department of History and Ethnology of the University of Jyväskylä, and for this I extend my sincere thanks to the Foundation and the Department.

Jyväskylä, February 2012
Author

FIGURES

- FIGURE 1. The confidence of the Americans in the Soviet Union's ability to cooperate in world politics 333
- FIGURE 2. Americans' view on the status of Eastern European countries with regard to the Soviet Union in the fall of 1947 341
- FIGURE 3. Americans' beliefs regarding the United States being involved in another great war in the next 25 years..... 342

ABBREVIATIONS

ACC = Allied Control Commission
AEC = United States Atomic Energy Commission
AFL = American Federation of Labor
AFL-CIO = American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AIPO = American Institute of Public Opinion
BIPO = British Institute of Public Opinion
BP = Byrnes Papers
CFM = Council of Foreign Ministers
CIO = Committee of Industrial Organization
CPD = Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945
CPS = Columbia Broadcasting System
CR = Congressional Record
CUOHROC = Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection
DAFR = Documents on American Foreign Relations
FAM = Foreign Affairs Manual
FEAC = Far Eastern Advisory Commission
FEC = Far Eastern Commission
FOR = Fortune
FRUS = Foreign Relations of the United States
ICD = Information Control Division
IIS = Interim International Information Service
ITO = International Trade Organization
JCAC = United States Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
KKK = Ku Klux Klan
KMT = Kuomintang of China
KPD = Communist Party of Germany (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*)
MIT = Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NBC = National Broadcasting Company
NORC = National Opinion Research Centre
OCS = Office of Contract Settlement
OEM = Office of Emergency Management
OES = Office of Economic Stabilization
OIAA = Office of Inter-American Affairs
OWI = Office of War Information
OWM = Office of War Mobilization
OWMR = Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
BP = Byrnes Papers
PCdR = Communist Party of Romania (*Partidul Comunist din România*)
PNL = National Liberal Party, Romania (*Partidul Național Liberal*)
PNT = National Peasants' Party, Romania (*Partidul Național Țărănesc*)

PPP = Public papers of the Presidents of the United States
PWW = Papers of Woodrow Wilson
SMD = Senate Miscellaneous Documents
TL = Truman Library
UN = United Nations
UNAEC = United States Atomic Energy Commission
WHO = World Health Organization

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

PREFACE

FIGURES

ABBREVIATIONS

CONTENTS

1	REALPOLITIK OR PROLOGUE TO THE COLD WAR? - INTRODUCTION	13
1.1	Thematics	13
1.1.1	The setting.....	13
1.1.2	The aims of the study	15
1.2	Sources.....	17
1.2.1	Archive materials and published primary sources	17
1.2.2	Memoirs as primary sources.....	20
1.2.3	Sources dealing with public opinion	25
1.2.4	Literature.....	27
1.2.5	The pathology of Cold War research.....	29
1.3	Realpolitik as an ideal type and methodology	38
1.3.1	How to interpret realpolitik?	38
1.3.2	Texts as political acts.....	44
1.4	James F. Byrnes - All in One Lifetime	50
2	FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S WILSONISM TOWARDS THE NEW ARRANGEMENT OF POWER POLITICS	62
2.1	The ideological legacy of Roosevelt's "closed club politics"	62
2.1.1	The Wilsonian framework of the anti-isolation policy	62
2.1.2	The voices of progressivism and Americanism	67
2.2	Power politics on the threshold of the end of the war	72
2.2.1	The observer of Yalta	72
2.2.2	The United Nations and the unilateral compromise of Yalta ...	79
2.2.3	Byrnes and the Yalta Axioms.....	85
2.3	From Roosevelt to Truman - The new climate of the White House and the expanding domestic policy-dimension of foreign policy	90
2.3.1	The starting points for the change in foreign policy	90
2.3.2	"The Tide Begins to Turn"	92
2.3.3	A New Foreign Policy without Changes?.....	96
3	"FIRMNESS AND PATIENCE" - SECRETARY OF STATE BYRNES AND THE NUMEROUS CHALLENGES OF FOREIGN POLICY.....	106
3.1	Potsdam: From the Cabinet Policy of Heads of State to a Ministerial arm-wrestle.....	106
3.1.1	From a "Quid Pro Quo" policy to Byrnes's tactics	106

3.1.2	The Far East Agreements and the Problems of Conquering Japan.....	116
3.1.3	Atomic Diplomacy?.....	122
3.1.4	The Birth of the Council of Foreign Ministers.....	128
3.1.5	The Legacy of Potsdam and the Yalta Axioms.....	133
3.2	London – the first litmus test of the Council of Foreign Ministers .	136
3.2.1	To old problems with a new optimism	136
3.2.2	The Balkans chill the atmosphere?.....	144
3.2.3	The domestic policy answer to the London problems	153
3.2.4	The multi-faceted problems of power politics and the rehashing of cooperation – from the London setback towards the meeting in Moscow	159
3.3	The New Challenges of Superpower Relations.....	172
3.3.1	Moscow appeases sensibilities.....	172
3.3.2	Atomic energy – the tranquilizer in foreign policy, the bone of contention in domestic policy.....	181
3.3.3	The Iranian Crisis – a step towards a strained superpower atmosphere.....	195
4	ACCUMULATING PROBLEMS AND THE FADING ROMANCE OF POWER POLITICS.....	206
4.1	The rocky road towards peace in the summer of 1946.....	206
4.1.1	Suspensions and cool emotions – the legacy of spring 1946 in the playing field of power politics	206
4.1.2	The Paris Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers – Italian issues as black spots of power politics.....	219
4.1.3	Towards the final Peace Conference by force – the second act of the Paris Conference	231
4.2	A war of nerves in the name of world peace.....	242
4.2.1	The 21-Nation Paris Peace Conference.....	242
4.2.2	The German issue dampens the mood?	249
4.3	Byrnes and the issue of Germany – a turning point or a continuum of foreign policy?.....	255
4.3.1	The Stuttgart Speech	255
4.3.2	The Stuttgart Speech and historical research.....	257
4.4	Rethinking the Stuttgart Speech – the Stuttgart Speech as a power-political gambit	262
4.4.1	The speech as a type of isolation policy	262
4.4.2	The speech as a type of security policy	267
4.4.3	The speech as a type of ideology	271
4.4.4	The speech as a type of economic policy.....	275
4.4.5	The Stuttgart Speech as a synthesis of territorial and reparations policy.....	280
5	THE RISE AND FALL OF BYRNES’S FOREIGN POLICY.....	290
5.1	The Domestic Policy Reactions to Foreign Policy.....	290

5.1.1	“Too much debate, too much propagandizing and too little harmonizing” - The aftermath of Stuttgart and the end of the Paris Peace Conference.....	290
5.1.2	A new majority on Capitol Hill and foreign policy’s tightening pressures of change.....	302
5.2	Byrnes and the cost of world peace.....	305
5.2.1	The New York meeting of Foreign Ministers	305
5.2.2	Byrnes’s resignation	312
5.3	Reconsidering the Byrnes era.....	318
5.3.1	From Byrnes to Marshall - the need for a new foreign policy?	318
5.3.2	Byrnes’s inner circle and a question of the State Department’s competence.....	326
5.3.3	The observation post of the spring of 1947 and an intensifying of the War of Nerves.....	329
6	REALPOLITIK AND THE COLD WAR.....	346
	FINNISH SUMMARY	360
	REFERENCES.....	368
	APPENDIX	379
	INDEX	387

1 REALPOLITIK OR PROLOGUE TO THE COLD WAR? - INTRODUCTION

1.1 Thematics

1.1.1 The setting

The transition from the Second World War to the Cold War is traditionally approached from the perspective of dissent caused by the division and allocation of war spoils. The prevailing context behind this dissent was the competition for influence, which had already partially developed during the last phases of the war. By the end of the war, the United States had achieved the status of being the supreme military and economic power in the world, while, the Soviet Union, empowered by the Red Army, had obtained a strong position in Eastern and Central Europe. Both of these situations defined the starting positions of the forthcoming super-power race. Naturally, the competition between the different dominant ideologies of each country had its part to play as well. The actual starting point of the disagreements can be traced all the way back to the great power conflicts that were already apparent during the war. These were left aside or postponed for the benefit of the greater cause of fighting the war, but when the war ended, the issues became acute again. The Soviet Union, geographically vast and bordering numerous other countries, was intent on establishing a position and situation in which it would be surrounded only by democratic, friendly nations and governments. The Soviet ideology of a "world revolution" defined the ways and means by which this position was to be obtained. The ideology was, at least in theory, characterized by a striving for inevitable but peaceful expansion. The role of the Soviet Union itself was seen to be that of a sort of *primus motor* of this grand mission.

In the West, the Soviet concern for security was understood in principle, but as Soviet influence spread further and further in the name of "democracy" and "security interests", the course was set for an inevitable collision with the West; a collision course that would lead to the processes related to the

emergence of the Cold War. While the Cold War can be seen mostly from the perspective of spheres of influence, another important aspect is the different understanding of the concept of democracy. In the West, democracy had mostly been perceived as representational and parliamentary, whereas the Soviet idea of a people's democracy was understood in terms of the dominance of the communist party. The Western conception included the idea of taking account of public opinion and the people's will on matters of foreign policy as well as on other issues. This was particularly the case in the United States, where the interaction between politics and the people was reciprocal. For example, there was a close relationship between the press and the outlining of policies through public speeches. The actual responsibility for cooperation in great power politics was passed down to the ministerial level, and in some cases even further because of changes in executive personnel. This left the responsibilities, and thus also the possibilities for influence, in the hands of a larger number of government officials. Though the number of democratic states in the world had increased to 37 percent since 1922 along with the progress of democracy, at the eve of the Second World War, democracy was still the exception rather than the rule. By the end of 1941, numerous democracies had fallen, and only 14 percent of all the countries in the world could be counted as democracies. In the case of the United States, this development was reflected in the demise of Wilsonism and the return to isolationism.¹

Despite different perspectives, schools of interpretation and various methods of interpretation, it is obvious that the period between the end of the Second World War and 1947 had a strong effect on the development of the Cold War. Nevertheless, there are few individual courses of events in history that can be considered so revolutionary that they totally and directly changed ways of thinking and influenced long-time trends. Unquestionably the Marshall Plan and the formation of the Cominform were events that solidified confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but neither of these events could alone have been the cause of the Cold War.² However, while it is easy to claim that relationships between the Allies developed in an unfavorable direction which naturally led to a confrontation, this point of view embodies a remarkable amount of anachronism.

In one sense, therefore, both superpowers really were doomed to become antagonists, and the antagonism was exacerbated by a combination of different traditions, belief systems, propinquity, convenience and goodness knows what other factors. From this perspective, there most likely was never any real possibility that the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union after the War could end otherwise than in disaster. The most

¹ Ferguson 2006, pp. 227-228.

² The Cominform was the first official forum of the international communist movement after the dissolution of the Comintern, and it has been considered a counterpart to the Marshall Plan, which was elaborated by Byrnes's successor George Marshall. Besides the communist parties of the Soviet Union and people's democracies, Cominform had member parties from Italy and France, but the intended purpose of the forum was to coordinate actions between member countries under Soviet direction.

unambiguous and general answer to the question of the origins of the Cold War is the fact that during the years which followed the Second World War, something one way or another led to the phenomenon that was called the Cold War. It is equally indisputable that the impetus for this development was the confrontation that developed between the superpowers. This confrontation reverberated in the arena of power politics. The purpose of this study is to examine this development in the foreign policy of the United States during the James Francis Byrnes era. James F. Byrnes served in top-level foreign policy as President Roosevelt's "assistant president" and as Secretary of State from February 1945 to January 1947. The period after Roosevelt's era saw a struggle over control of the direction of United States foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. The subject of this examination is the change in foreign policy and in the practical situations which affected the political conduct of both foreign and domestic policy.

1.1.2 The aims of the study

The principal purpose of this study is to discuss the development of James F. Byrnes's political role as an observer and actor, the nascence of the Cold War and the complex changes in power politics from the Yalta Conference in February 1945 to Byrnes's resignation from the State Department in January 1947. These problems are approached on four different levels: 1) the nature of Byrnes's foreign policy, 2) the United States' diplomatic and political relations with its war-time Allies, 3) influences relating to American party politics and public opinion and 4) the historical debate on the genesis of the Cold War.

The analysis of Byrnes's role as a political actor is based on the concept of *realpolitik*. The idea of *realpolitik* has not been interpreted from the perspective of pure realism as such, as many historians have done, but in the context of its intricate historical character. The historical character is highlighted by the juxtaposition of Bismarckian and Liebknechtian versions of *realpolitik*. Further, the concept of *realpolitik* is clarified with relation to a cluster of particular political taglines. Whether Byrnes himself knew the history of the concept of *realpolitik* or not, different manifestations of the phenomenon are used as a heuristic instrument to study the nature of Byrnes's foreign policy. In the context of these ideas about *realpolitik*, Byrnes's own political parlance and concepts are reconsidered as representing a new form of American foreign policy. By viewing Byrnes's politics in the light of *realpolitik*, I wish to conceptualize the nature of his politics – certainly not to claim that every manifestation of foreign policy could be regarded as *realpolitik*.

As far as the United States' diplomatic and political relations with the other Allies are concerned, Byrnes's attitudes to the politicians and ministers responsible for foreign affairs were crucial. In view of this, it is essential to summarize his world view, his world of ideas and his mindset. On the other hand, Byrnes's foreign policy was strongly determined by a domestic policy that was no longer under the war-time control of the Democratic Party. This study attempts to give answers to questions of how and by what means the

Republicans, on the one hand, and radical Democrats, on the other, sought to influence foreign policy. Naturally, Byrnes's foreign policy was also influenced by public opinion. Despite the fact that certain problems were linked with the connection between public opinion and policy, Byrnes claimed that the foreign policy he was making was that of the people. But was the people's foreign policy the product of democratic responsiveness, political direction from above or the manipulation of opinion?

The reason for the outbreak of the Cold War has become one of the perennial problems of historical research. My purpose is not to destroy the traditional analysis of the three-phase process nor to weaken the significance of the year 1947, but instead to offer a perspective on the developments that unquestionably led to a complete bipolarization of the world at the end of the 1940s, and eventually to the Cold War. The roots of this process lay in the power politics conducted between the two superpowers; the United States and the Soviet Union. On the basis of this, it is impossible to dispute the fact that there was no single prime mover behind the processes which led to the Cold War during the period under consideration. Albeit implicitly, the development of power politics between 1945 and 1947 unquestionably supports this conclusion. Byrnes inevitably contributed to this process. Even if the President had constitutional responsibility for foreign policy, the highest executive power relating to foreign policy had moved to the State Department as a result of various factors connected with President Roosevelt's death and the aftermath of the Second World War. In this study, the most critical phase of the evolution of the Cold War is considered in relation to the wider context of power politics on the one hand, and the development of issues relating to domestic affairs on the other. Here, it is fundamental to consider certain controversial issues relating to the process that led to the Cold War.

Regarding the beginning of the Cold War as specifically a phenomenon of *realpolitik* means seeing it as an ideal type which breaks the mold of the myths of origin. An examination of the politics of James F. Byrnes, a man who substantially contributed to the United States' foreign policy during that period of time, offers an outstanding framework within which to test the hypothesis that the Cold War was a question of *realpolitik* as well as the processes that initiated the it in general.

My aim of studying Byrnes's role more thoroughly and fairly in its authentic context is similar to certain trends in historical research towards objective interpretation. According to the view which Max Weber borrowed from Friedrich Nietzsche, any phenomenon can be examined from an infinite number of perspectives, and no phenomenon can be understood outside its relation to its perspective. Owing to the fact that that all knowledge is inevitably determined by the perspective from which it is seen, no all-embracing knowledge is possible. On the basis of the Weberian view, it is essential to emphasize the role of ideal types, which unilaterally accentuate the significance of the perspective of the interpretation. An ideal type is an artificial creation which need not to be interpreted. In fact it is itself a model of explanation and it is founded on a *causa finalis*. The concept of the ideal type

represents a heuristic model which guides the conceptualization of reality but is simultaneously above matters of truth and falsehood. It belongs to the category of objective possibility (*objektive Möglichkeit*), and thus ideal types represent genuinely possible tools for analyzing certain phenomena.³ As far as the Skinner's rigid proscription of anachronism is concerned, there is no real conflict between that and using heuristic devices to go beyond the original meaning of the actor. This process is not necessarily anachronistic in that it justifies its interpretations with reference to historical sources and distinguishes the significance attached by the interpretation to a phenomenon in its historical context from the value it possesses in modern philosophical usage. For Weber, an ideal type is tantamount to the means by which the meanings of reality are traced. However, the success of an ideal typologization cannot be prejudged *a priori*, so the evaluation of every ostensibly possible type calls for careful study.⁴

1.2 Sources

1.2.1 Archive materials and published primary sources

This research attempts to shed light on Byrnes's role as an observer and an actor in the field of power politics from the Yalta Conference in 1945 to the spring of 1947 from three different positions. Firstly, the study is based on official documents of the United States. Secondly, the framework created by those documents is linked to Byrnes's person through his memoirs. The third position is generated by opinion polls. Based on these positions, the study will offer an answer to the following question: Realpolitik or a prologue to the Cold War? Here, "realpolitik" refers to a type of politics based on a certain functional realism that was bound to public opinion, while "prologue" refers to purposeful actions executed in order to exacerbate disagreements between the Soviet Union and the United States. The point of view in this study is moderately "American" - not because American sources were more ample or informative than Russian, British or French, but because Byrnes was an American and the purpose of this study was to shed light on his role in postwar power politics.

³ As far as the comprehension of concepts is concerned, Quentin Skinner belongs to the Weberian tradition as well. According to him, concepts do not just change over the course of time, but they also are unable to offer us anything but a series of variable perspectives from the world in which we live and exist. Skinner 2006, p. 176; Palonen 1998, pp. 142-144; Guaraldo 2001, pp. 129-130. Skinner criticizes Arthur O. Lovejoy's approach to the history of ideas, and, appealing to the later thinking of Wittgenstein, he claims that the history of "unit-ideas" cannot exist as such. Instead, there is "only a history of the various uses to which they have been put by different agents at different times". Skinner 2006, p. 176. On the other hand, for instance Jaro Julkunen has suggested that despite their criticism, both Skinner and Jaakko Hintikka (1975) would have accepted the concept of unit-idea and its use as a methodological instrument in principle. According to Julkunen, the sheer atomistic character of the unit-idea in Skinnerian thinking makes it unattainable and thus is premised on guesswork. Julkunen 2006, *passim*.

⁴ Sihvola 1997, *passim*.

For the purpose of this study, the most essential sources are Byrnes's personal archives, *The James F. Byrnes Papers*, which are located in the Special Collections of Clemson University Library, and printed source material of the State Department and Congress. *The Byrnes Papers* comprise predominantly speeches, conference notes and memoranda and private correspondence. This material, which was donated to Clemson University by Byrnes in 1966, covers in all 163.5 cubic feet of various written documents, and also numerous official documents concerning foreign policy and economics during the Second World War.

The James F. Byrnes Papers consist of advertisements, architectural drawings, articles, artifacts, audio-visual materials, campaign materials, certificates, clippings, correspondence, editorials, executive orders, galley proofs, journals, laws and legal documents, legislative bills, lists, maps, minutes, petitions, political cartoons, postcards, photographs, publications, reports, scrapbooks, speeches, telegrams, transcripts, and other material. The material in this collection covers the period 1931–2007, with the bulk of it dating from the period from midway through his first term as a US Senator in 1933 to his death in 1972. This collection is organized into sixteen series, which are arranged alphabetically by folder title, while the correspondence files in the series are usually arranged alphabetically by surname. *The James F. Byrnes Papers* document Byrnes's career as a US Senator, US Supreme Court Justice, Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR; previously known as the Office of Economic Stabilization and then the Office of War Mobilization) during World War II, US Secretary of State and Governor of South Carolina. There is also material relating to his personal life, his business affairs and the writing of his two autobiographies, *Speaking Frankly* and *All In One Lifetime*. The papers document Byrnes's role in the immediate postwar peace process and the beginning of the Cold War, especially with regard to US policy on the reconstruction of Germany and its reintegration into world affairs.

The most important part of the Byrnes Papers is *The State Department Series*, which includes agendas, proceedings, and minutes of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) meetings in London, Moscow, New York, and Paris, as well as documents from the Paris Peace Conference and the Potsdam Conference. The minutes are closer to transcripts and appear to be the drafts for the versions published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, although some of the London CFM minutes are slightly different from the published versions. Of particular interest are excerpts from Walter Brown's diaries relating to the Potsdam Conference. At Potsdam, Brown had secretly kept a detailed daily journal recording Byrnes's activities and his private utterances concerning the negotiations. Byrnes was not happy with this, and he edited Brown's diary entries so as to relate his own views. The bulk of the correspondence consists of congratulations on Byrnes's appointment as Secretary of State, reactions to his resignation and items regarding postwar negotiations. For instance, there is material relating to proposals for the international regulation of nuclear energy and weapons; copies of telegrams between Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and Truman, and material relating to the reconstruction of Germany, including the

Morgenthau Plan to pastoralize the country and reactions to it both in Germany and elsewhere as well as Byrnes's Stuttgart Speech, which laid out a more liberal policy for Germany's reconstruction by the United States. Briefing materials accompanying the correspondence can also be found in the State Department series.

The proceedings of Congress, the *Congressional Record*, and a separate document collection of the Senate, *Senate Miscellaneous Documents*, are utilized to relate the impact of Byrnes's foreign policy to the actions of the House of Representatives and the Senate. In practice, foreign policy also became an issue in domestic politics. The *Congressional Record* is a substantial verbatim account and the official record of the proceedings and debates of the United States Congress. It is published by the United States Government Printing Office, and is issued daily when the United States Congress is in session. The *Congressional Record* is similar to Hansard, which reports parliamentary debates in the Westminster system of government. The House and Senate sections contain the proceedings of the separate chambers of Congress. The portion of the *Congressional Record* entitled "Extensions of Remarks" contains speeches, tributes and other extraneous utterances that were not actually made during the open proceedings of the full Senate or the full House of Representatives. Both the *Congressional Record* and *Senate Miscellaneous Documents* are used with reference to the 79th and 80th Congresses.

From the perspective of Byrnes's role as a foreign policy actor, the most essential source is *Foreign Relations of the United States*, which provides a broad documentary picture of the United States' foreign policy. In the case of the great power meetings of foreign ministers, it also lends depth to the broader perspective of great power politics with its relatively comprehensive transcriptions of discussions held in conferences. The *Documents on American Foreign Relations* series consists of material from the *Department of State Bulletin* and foreign policy documents collected for the *Congressional Record*. The principles according to which material was collected for the *Foreign Relations of the United States* were stated in Department of State Regulation 2 FAM 1350 of 1961, which was based on a regulation originally ordained by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg in 1925. According to the regulation, *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States and "subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies". With regard to considerations of source reliability, it is interesting that the editorial preparation was the duty of the special Historical Office, which operated under the Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. According to the regulation, *Foreign Relations of the United States* was compiled "in accordance with the principles of historical objectivity" and is without omissions or alterations except where indicated. Accordingly, "nothing has been omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be

regarded by some as a defeat of policy." However, it was permissible to omit four kinds of matters, mainly for security purposes.⁵

The following collections of *Foreign Relations of the United States* dealing mainly with the years 1945–1947 have been used: "The Conferences of Malta and Yalta, 1945"; "The Conference of Berlin, 1945"; "General: The United Nations"; "General: Political and Economic Matters"; "The Council of Foreign Ministers" and "The Paris Peace Conference". As their titles indicate, these collections have been divided so as to cover the documentation of each conference, and they comprise preliminary memoranda, the most important correspondence and also memos from several informal meetings outside the formal agenda. Deviating from the established categorizing practice, the documentation of the London and Moscow Conferences is included in the volume "General: Political and Economic Matters." In addition, these collections have been divided into annual series, which are numbered by volume and constitute independent collections. This study follows the State Department's classification of these collections into volumes.

1.2.2 Memoirs as primary sources

In this study, the significance of the documents of Congress and the State Department is considerable, and these materials are utilized in tandem with *The Byrnes Papers*. The persona of James F. Byrnes is also situated in the context created by the above-mentioned sources through by his own memoirs: *Speaking Frankly* (1947) and *All in One Lifetime* (1958). An examination of his memoirs reveals his attempt to tell his own story in relation to collective and historical accounts without losing his individual identity. On the one hand, his written memoirs are unquestionably intentional political acts, in which he engages in the struggle to be remembered and to go down in history. On the other hand, they were directed toward the future, and therefore one must ask what their view of the future was like. Byrnes's *Speaking Frankly* became a best seller when it was published in 1947. The book deals with the super power political order after the Second World War from a personal point of view, but it was judged to have been published too early. Byrnes himself wanted to write his memoirs while "he was still able to read his shorthand notes".⁶ However, political

⁵ E.g. FRUS 1946. Principles for the Compilation and Editing of "Foreign Relations". Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, III. Certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons: a) To avoid publication matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business. b) To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details. c) To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments. d) To avoid giving needless offence to other nationalities or individuals. e) To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification - in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made. Exercise of these principles in selecting material has been noted. Typically, the regulation has been applied on the grounds of item c), but officially the reason has been item b). Nevertheless FRUS includes a lot of material which could have been edited out in accordance with item d).

⁶ Byrnes 1947, *Speaking Frankly*, Prologue, p. xi.

memoirs are rarely written without deeper intentions or hidden agendas. It is not hard to perceive that in *Speaking Frankly*, Byrnes aimed to offer simultaneously an objective analysis of historical events and to burnish his own image as a politician. In the foreword, Byrnes proclaims that he has tried to give the reader a seat at the conference table. However, the seat is clearly among the American advisory committee.

In this study, Byrnes's books, *Speaking Frankly* and *All In One Lifetime*, are considered to be memoirs, not autobiographies. Unlike autobiographies, memoirs depict only limited parts of the memories that the authors want to communicate, and there is also the possibility that they involve historical hindsight, in view of the fact that the narrator actually depicts certain events after they have happened. As a kind of subgenre of autobiography, memoirs straddle the borderline between literature and historical records.⁷ Although most autobiographies are treated as literature, the subject of a memoir actually existed in the form of a past event or a figure. This allows us to regard memoirs as historical sources or records. Since the main structure of the memoir is a narrative one, because of the first-person viewpoint and certain other literary devices, readers feel as if they were reading a novel or a fictional plot. And the fact that whole content of a memoir is composed of what the author directly experienced in the past lends validity to its historical aspects. A second feature is the range of topics that memoirs cover compared to other autobiographical works. Maybe the difference is as Michael Gorra has claimed:

Autobiography is about fashioning a self, shaping a consciousness, and I. But memoir looks out, not in – looks toward the external world in which that self must live and carries a corresponding density of social detail. Memoir seems modest. Autobiography almost never does.⁸

According to Gorra, memoirs are about certain areas of life from which the author can glean significant messages or meanings, while autobiographies can be interpreted as the product of the entire life of a person. Memoirs focus on life's highlights, thus the entire time period covered is relatively shorter than that in autobiographies. This can be seen more clearly in *Speaking Frankly* but also to some extent in *All in One Lifetime*.

The third feature of memoir is the expression of thought and emotion in the context described. Compared to official historical records, the memoir exhibits more personal thinking and judgment of the situation and the event experienced by the author. In the memoir, the narrator tries to evaluate an event or person by his/her own standards, which creates the existence of a single viewpoint in the memoir. Moreover, the narrator of a memoir is more honest in revealing his or her feelings about the situation. Because the narrator of a memoir is the one who witnessed and experienced every occurrence in the story, the author can freely express emotions like happiness or horror that he or she felt in these situations.

⁷ Wallach 2004, p. vi.

⁸ Gorra 1995, pp. 143-144.

A fourth feature of memoir is the author's interpretation and evaluation of the subject covered in his or her work. The writer is in a position in which he or she can re-consider past experience at leisure. This enables the author to recall the bits of the situation which he or she might have previously have missed. Moreover, the author can reflect deeply on how the events or persons he or she encountered in the past affected him or her in terms of new ideas, perceptions, feelings and actions in later life. Put together, these help the author to evaluate the meaning and value of past events or persons.⁹

According to Philippe Lejeune, the difference between a memoir and an autobiography resides in the manner in which the subject is treated. In a pure autobiography, the subject must be primarily the individual life or "the genesis of personality", although social and political history can also be part of the narrative. Consequently, there is a thin line between memoir and autobiography as separate genres, but with in terms of the subject it is a matter of proportion and hierarchy.¹⁰

Byrnes's memoirs are central historical documents which epitomize the temporal aspect of the development of the Cold War, and the importance of the picture painted by them cannot be overemphasized. The narrative method of interpretation used in this study is based on the idea that a life history is an interpretation of a life produced at the time of writing and that language does not provide not a transparent representation of reality. Telling about one's own life is seen to take place in a particular historical, cultural and social context, and the mode of narration is determined by its context. If we consider Byrnes's memoirs to be actively produced narratives and hence political acts or moves as well, then the question of the veracity of the narrative is connected with the power relations of the narrator. As far as this study is concerned, in order to examine what kind of political acts Byrnes's memoirs constitute, they have to be understood in the context of their own time. As source material, there are well-known risks associated with memoirs; these risks are a consequence of their function and the writer's inability to accept the mistakes and inconsistencies which occurred in his or her own activities. Memoirs are always written for a certain place and time, and it is essential to take account of this in evaluating the above-mentioned risk factors. Nevertheless, memoirs give the reader insights both into what really happened in the past and into the way the past is remembered. Indeed, the way the past is remembered quite often seems to be at odds with what really happened.

It is typical of memoirs that they offer explanations for, and give new meanings to, earlier events, thus creating a kind of teleological history by prioritizing prophetic hindsight. However, the subjectivity and intentionality of memoirs constitute challenges which need to be addressed. Furthermore, they are also factors without which researchers would not be able to understand the momentous nature of the contents. In practice, a writer constructs his or her past through narrative, which is form of awareness that

⁹ Lejeune 1995, pp. 4-5, 143-145.

¹⁰ Wallach 2004, pp. 49, 76.

helps us to comprehend temporality. Memoirs can then no longer be considered merely subjective interpretations; rather, they are always intersections of the personal and the social.¹¹ If we also examine what is not written in them, memoirs make extremely interesting sources. That claim certainly holds true for *Speaking Frankly*, in which subjectivity is manifested in the denial or total absence of certain embarrassing matters. The idea of reading between the lines is attractive because the existence of such information gaps tends not to be permanent. In the course of time, obscurities are wont to be elucidated, and then the person who broaches the matter has the advantage with his or her knowledge of the truth. However, in the case of memoirs, this does not create sufficient tension between veracity and textuality for memoirs not to be considered a genre that genuinely offers material for historical research.¹²

As a good memoirist, Byrnes succeeds in plausibly creating what Lejeune calls an “illusion of perspective” for the reader. He addresses himself directly to the reader, and I as his reader and researcher of his political life, become subject to the illusion that he has abolished time. On the other hand, he has written like a historian, setting out to construct lucid, defensible narratives about the past. Thus Byrnes’s memoirs should be read as a historical document: first by attempting to understand the story that the historian is trying to tell and secondly by critically analyzing how the historian’s belief system might influence the shape the story takes. Lejeune has claimed that this “transformation” of reading must itself become the subject of historical study, but it cannot not be its foundation.¹³ Therefore, in relation to other historical sources, Byrnes’s memoirs have to be studied as interpretations of past life written at a certain moment in time, not as documents relating what has really happened. However the distinction does not mean a difference between some sort of “narrative truth” and “historical truth”. In this respect, memoirs offer a different kind of “historical evidence” than other conventional primary source documents and thus they must be understood and used differently as evidence. Memoirs give us at least partial access to a past reality, and typically it is the job of the historian to reconstruct the past.¹⁴

In *Speaking Frankly*, for instance, delicate information regarding military operations during the Iranian crisis, dollar diplomacy and personal relations between Truman and Byrnes were ignored. Byrnes denied that he ever took a stand against the president. However, a dispute that reached serious proportions in the 1950s between Truman and Byrnes in which the former sent the latter an admonishing note about his lack of confidence after the Moscow Conference is dealt with in *Speaking Frankly*, in which Byrnes denied receiving any admonition from Truman. The same kind of delicate issue seems to have arisen in the case of atomic energy, which Byrnes approved of, but he did not want to be connected with the destruction caused by the atom bombs dropped on Japan. For the reader it is a good thing that for its time Byrnes’s view was

¹¹ Hyvärinen 1998, p. 312.

¹² Hyvärinen 1998, passim; Vilkkö 1997, p. 53.

¹³ Lejeune 1995, p. 145.

¹⁴ Wallach 2004, p. 75.

truly stated frankly, but from the point of view of the present day reader who has become accustomed to scandalous biographical literature the frank talk of the late 1940s is tame. The most malicious critics have claimed that the juiciest bits of Byrnes's statements were invented by others. As an explanation of historical acts, memoirs have a dual character. On the one hand they can be read as retrospective explanations of the writer's motivation and on the other hand as forward-looking representations of the writer's intention to explain forthcoming political manoeuvres in advance.¹⁵

Beyond dispute is the fact that *Speaking Frankly* offers a contemporary view of a widely studied period of time. When it was published on October 19, 1947, *The New York Times* reviewed it under the headline "James F. Byrnes Discloses." The secrets revealed by Byrnes focus mainly on Stalin's and Truman's deliberations behind closed doors, and they include the first public revelation of the secret supplementary protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Generally, *The New York Times* called Byrnes's book "a useful, fair and wonderfully human account of an important phase in our foreign policy." Criticism was leveled mainly at the book's lack of analytical content, for which there might have been considerable demand in the fall of 1947. According to *The New York Times*, the wide variety of issues addressed by Byrnes in *Speaking Frankly* was justified, because "he was responsible for so much of the material being released as the negotiations proceeded, in one way he scooped himself on much of the material." Because of Truman's position, Byrnes's decision to concentrate on Soviet relations was regarded as right-minded by *The Times*:

...he might very well have been tempted to get down on record the story of his dealings with F.D.R. on the Vice-Presidential nomination in 1940 and again in 1944. Instead, perhaps wisely, he stuck to the Soviet issue and left the political story for another day. Meanwhile, he has produced the kind of book that is not only informative but readable - for like the good politician he is, he wrote it for the average reader.¹⁶

After the publication of *Speaking Frankly*, *The New York Times* predicted that Byrnes would never again write another book. However, to counter certain interpretation in Harry S. Truman's two-piece autobiography *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, in 1958 Byrnes wrote second book of memoirs entitled *All in One Lifetime*, which covers a broader period of time than its predecessor. Compared with *Speaking Frankly*, *All in One Lifetime* is more extensive, and it deals in depth with the period of this study. A comparison between the two memoirs does not reveal any revolutionary differences and has, in fact, no significance for this study. The beginning of the thaw in the mid-1950s and the end of the second phase of the Cold War are presented in *All in One Lifetime* more as simplifications of political problems and slight hindsight than a revision of the view presented in *Speaking Frankly*. For the most part, *All in One Lifetime* was a riposte to public speculations about the condition of foreign policy that had been instigated mainly by Truman, and it tried to clear the air.

¹⁵ Kenny 1969, pp. 94-95.

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, 19.10.1947. James B. Reston "James F. Byrnes Discloses".

In addition to the various treatments of the foreign policy of the time, *All in One Lifetime* also offers us a broader view of Byrnes's life by concentrating on his activities as a citizen and a Governor of South Carolina. It is from this perspective that the book is also discussed in this study.

Later perspectives can be found in the memoirs of Byrnes's Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who analyzed the origins of the Cold War from the viewpoint of a public employee and a later Secretary of State in his Pulitzer-award-winning book *Present at the Creation*. Another memoir by a close associate of Byrnes was that of his aide and Russian interpreter Charles Bohlen, who critically reassessed Byrnes's time in the State Department in his book *Witness to History: 1929-1969*. If remembrance of the past is the key resource of memoirs, the same holds true of the oral history evidence used in this study. Oral history has indeed a great deal to tell us about the dialectical relationship between memory and history, how memory becomes history and vice versa. A few transcripts of individual interviews from the Columbia University Oral History Collection and the Truman Library are also used here to broaden the range of Byrnes's circle of acquaintances.¹⁷

The concept of memoir employed in this study argues for the suitability of memoirs as genuine historical primary sources. Memoirs, like other historical source material, unquestionably refer to a real past that exists independently of historical documents. Against the critical voices representing an extreme or naïve veracity that claim that the touchstone of historical truth must be the direct observation of, or an acquaintance with, the object concerned, a different approach is needed with regard to the veracity of memoirs. Hilary Putnam's idea of "internalism" or internal veracity, upholds a belief in a real past existing externally to the memoir written about it. At the same time, internal veracity acknowledges that historical truth is determined by the perspective, so it looks different depending on where the viewer is standing. Moreover, it would be extremely arrogant to claim that historiography can mirror the past precisely. There is undoubtedly always a gap between reality and the representations made of it. Memoirs, like other historical sources, refer to a real and to some extent knowable past, and they offer valuable insights into particular historical moments.¹⁸

1.2.3 Sources dealing with public opinion

A third type of source that must be mentioned is material that is essentially concerned with public opinion. Representing this type of source, for instance, are the statistics of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, which has been published since 1937 as a leading publication on communications research and opinion polls. In 1948 it became an official publication of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, which reinforced the journal's position as a forum of opinion poll methods and research results. In this study, the essential information about

¹⁷ Grele 2007, passim.

¹⁸ Putnam 1981, pp. 49-50.

public opinion is used for a two-way comparison of Byrnes's foreign policy and the public opinion of the time. From this point of view, politicians and their policies themselves also affect public opinion. The harmony that existed between foreign policy and public opinion was very evident in the postwar United States, as appears in the different types of sources. However, the effects of public opinion on policy are extremely complex and little studied. Page and Shapiro have suggested that public opinion is often "a proximate cause of policy," which affects policy more than policy influences opinion. Especially foreign policy decisions have usually been relatively more autonomous of public influence than domestic policies. Clearly the wider autonomy of foreign policies might also involve more direction from above and manipulation of opinion. On the other hand, the causal relationship is somewhat uncertain and problematic. It is difficult to sort out whether the correspondence between public opinion and policy arose from democratic responsiveness, from direction from above, the manipulation of opinion, or from some combination of these, as Page and Shapiro have suggested.¹⁹

According to Page and Shapiro's statistical studies, there has always been substantial congruence between public opinion and policy in the United States. Contrary to common beliefs, the difference between foreign (62 percent) and domestic issues (70 percent) was small and statistically insignificant. However, the degree of congruence does not tell us very much about which caused which. It might indicate a democratic responsiveness to public opinion with the latter causing changes in policy. On the other hand it might be a result of the influence of policy leading the citizens to change their opinions. This could happen when a skilled politician convinces the citizens with his rhetoric or merits or when people just feel that whatever the government does must be acceptable.²⁰ Because of the postwar period of transition, the democratic responsiveness of policy to public opinion cannot be taken for granted even in the United States. On the contrary, it may well be that Roosevelt's legacy and bipartisan foreign policy might have resulted in some kind of manipulation of opinion. This suggests the idea of a possible two-way interaction whereby public opinion could, when necessary, be manipulated to match political ambitions.

Statistics are also necessary for the study of realpolitik. *Public Opinion Quarterly* generally offers a researcher an extensive font of information, which has been used all too frugally in previous studies. Of the studies about Byrnes, only Patricia Dawson Ward has used statistics to reassess the American people's attitude to the Soviet Union.²¹ However, the role of public opinion seems to be so significant in the formation of foreign policy that the statistics offered by *Public Opinion Quarterly* cannot be ignored. Unfortunately, there is little background information about the compilation of the data. More information about methods of collecting the information and its analysis would

¹⁹ Levering 1976, passim; Page & Shapiro 1983, pp. 175-186.

²⁰ Page & Shapiro 1983, pp. 187-189.

²¹ Ward 1979, pp. 78-79.

would enhance its usability and plausibility. Even so, at the time such shortcomings did not give rise to any misgivings about the validity of the statistics. In order to maintain its position as a credible journal, *Public Opinion Quarterly* refused to accept opinion polls from organizations whose data acquisition methods were not based on a population covering the whole nation.²² A very different side of the public sphere is represented in this study by the articles of *The New York Times*.

1.2.4 Literature

There is some research literature concerning Byrnes's role in the Council of Foreign Ministers. In particular, the latter half of the 1970s seems to have been a heyday of Cold War studies. The subject of this study is touched on by the thorough studies of Patria Dawson Ward, Robert L. Messer and Daniel Yergin. In addition, there are several studies which have focused on individual events or phenomena rather than on a comprehensive analysis of Byrnes political person.

Ward's *The Threat of Peace – James F. Byrnes and the Council of Foreign Ministers 1945–1946* is a chronological disquisition on Byrnes's influence on the change that took place in great power relations during the Council of Foreign Ministers. Unlike other studies, it presents a very Byrnes-centered and analytical perspective. Conversely, these advantages are also its weaknesses. By focusing strongly on politicking in the Foreign Minister's meetings, Ward separates Byrnes's foreign policy from the wider context, which was unquestionably affected by the domestic policy of the United States, the Iranian crisis and atomic diplomacy, among other things. Even so, Ward's emphasis on the role of the Council of Foreign Ministers in power politics in general is well justified.

Robert L. Messer's *The End of an Alliance – James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War* deals with power politics after the Second World War from a wider viewpoint. He has taken it as his mission to explain the origins of the Cold War in terms of the combined personal relations between Roosevelt, Byrnes and Truman. From his initial premises, Messer tries to set up a certain Caesar-Brutus kind of opposition in the field of foreign policy, which actually determined the nature of the whole foreign policy of the United States. From Messer's perspective, the personal relations of these political actors is seen as some sort of Greek tragedy, in which the power struggle following Roosevelt's death created a situation that was conducive to the outbreak of the Cold War. Messer's study was extremely successful in its analysis of the significance personal relations as a turning point in great power relations. However, in interpreting the overall situation, Messer ends up with a

²² The Quarter's Polls. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Volume 10, Issue 2 (Summer 1946), p. 246.

conclusion that posits a kind of Cold War driftwood theory. According to him, there were “no heroes, no Caesar or Brutus – just victims.”²³

Daniel Yergin’s *Shattered Peace – The Origins of The Cold War and the National Security State* is a mixture of national security policy and great power relations. According to his own statement, he assumed the task of studying everything behind the myths concerning the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States – not as people wanted to remember it but as it happened in reality.²⁴ Despite his high-flown proclamation, Yergin himself failed to find the reality without falling foul of the risks of intentionality inherent in memoirs, interviews and numerous official records. Instead, Yergin’s study follows an obsessively revisionist line, in which the progression of great power relations was all along moving towards the Cold War. At its best, however, *Shattered Peace* is an excellent analysis of the entities and long-term continuities whose origins lay in the positions and interests of nation-states.

Only two biographies of Byrnes have been written, and both of them focus strictly on his political career. This focus is understandable because of Byrnes’s engagement in politics for almost his entire life. The first biography was written by George Curry as part of the series *The American Secretaries and Their Diplomacy*, and it is based on State Department documents. Curry, who assisted Byrnes in the process of writing *All in One Lifetime*, had the opportunity to use Byrnes’s personal correspondence and unofficial memoranda, but evidently he chose not to exploit them extensively. Generally, Curry’s biography is very neutral, and he does not commit himself about the nature of Byrnes’s foreign policy or his personal relations. David Robertson’s 1994 book *Sly and Able – A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes*. It paints a broad picture of Byrnes as a political actor, but it is not successful in connecting him to the general development in international relations of the time. Robertson’s focus is clearly on the United States’ domestic policy and earlier events.

Typically, later Cold War research has in a manner that borders on the paranoid tried to come up with final answers regarding the conclusions made by earlier studies which hinged on “inadequate sources” and to fit Byrnes’s role into that context. Instead of final answers, the new documents released for the use of researchers have confirmed that earlier research results were on the right track. This also applies to the question of the origins of the Cold War, which has not been of interest to the most recent research. Changing political situations and different phases of the Cold War have also resulted in changes in Cold War research. In the same way as Cold War research changed with the zeitgeist during the 1960s and 1970s, it also changed when the structures of the Cold War collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s. An emphasis on phenomena that had been crucially associated with the end of the Cold War in connection with its origins has also been a general feature of later research.²⁵ Warning of the

²³ Messer 1982, p. 240.

²⁴ Yergin 1977, p. 6.

²⁵ For instance, the treatment of the dominant role of Germany in the research of Marc Trachtenberg and Carolyn Eisenberg, contains a considerable degree of anachronism relating to the structural dissolution of the Cold War as a reason for the rapid

dangers of studying the Cold War *post factum*, Melvyn P. Leffler remarked: "We should not confuse its ending with its origins and evolution."²⁶ In the case of historical research, it is even more important to note that similar risks could be found in the opposite direction.

This study will seek its place in the widely published field of Cold War research through the research question that it addresses. This analysis of the Cold War specifically as a phenomenon of *realpolitik* is intended to help discover whether James F. Byrnes was a practitioner of *realpolitik*, whose aim was to obtain the maximum benefits for his own country, or a mongerer of the Cold War, who intentionally fanned the flames of conflict between the great powers. Using the concept of *realpolitik* in both its Bismarckian and Liebknechtian manifestations as a theoretical framework offers a rewarding and novel approach to the onset of the Cold War. This position emphasizes the Cold War as a phenomenon which must to be regarded as belonging to the highest level of great power politics. Setting political action the contingent phenomena it generates is justifiable because great power relations were fixed by a relatively small group of people. Another new methodological choice relates to Byrnes's political speeches. The renowned Stuttgart Speech is examined by means of illocutionary reconstruction. By profiling the speech text in relation to its possible contextual worlds, it will be shown that the illocutionary force of the text did not correlate particularly well with the idiom of the Cold War. Rather, the illocutionary force pointed to loose ideologies or ideals such as Americanism, Wilsonism and progressivism.

An examination of Byrnes politics is justifiable especially in view of the attention paid in the most recent Cold War studies to geopolitics and their major focus on the German question.²⁷ This study also has its own place outside the large number of Cold War studies that eschew biographical or psycho-historical approaches. Biography certainly has a place in studying the early Cold War, when power politics was dominated by a few individuals. Earlier studies have been content with conventional approaches, brushing aside the influence of the manysided personalty of Byrnes during an extremely crucial transitional stage. On these foundations, this study will justify itself and establish its own place in the broad field of Cold War studies.

1.2.5 The pathology of Cold War research

How should we regard Byrnes's policies in the Cold War context in the light of earlier studies? As a contemporary concept, the meaning of 'the Cold War' was much narrower in the mid-1940s than it is today. On the general level, the Cold

integration of the Democratic Republic of Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany.

²⁶ Leffler 1999, p. 524.

²⁷ Revisionists in particular have considered Byrnes's Stuttgart Speech, which was delivered in September 1946, as a turning point in power politics. During the Byrnes era, Germany's fate was "frozen": the country was at first economically divided and then politically. This has been emphasized by more recent studies - for instance that by Marc Trachtenberg.

War seems to comprise a cluster of concepts such as ‘a war of nerves’ and ‘a polarized world.’ As an individual concept, the phrase “the Cold War” appeared for the first time in October 1945 in George Orwell’s essay “You and the Atomic Bomb”, published in the *Tribune*. The essay discussed the political effects caused by the bombs dropped on Japan. In Orwell’s vision, the atomic weapon would soon lead to the dominance of two or three atomic powers, which “unable to conquer one another,... are likely to continue ruling the world between them, and it is difficult to see how the balance can be upset except by slow and unpredictable demographic changes.” Pursuing his ideas further, Orwell referred to the radical theories of James Burnham,²⁸ an American political theorist who in 1941 had attempted to construct a theory about the future of world capitalism based upon observations of its development in the interwar period. Even if Burnham’s prophecy did not come true, Orwell was interested in the ideological implications of his theory, such as the “world-view, the kind of beliefs, and the social structure that would probably prevail in a state which was at once unconquerable and in a permanent state of ‘cold war’ with its neighbor.”²⁹

Bernard Baruch, who was appointed the United States representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), had probably read Orwell’s essay. He articulated the concept of a cold war in Congress on April 16, 1947. The concept quickly established itself, and Walter Lippmann used it in his book *The Cold War*, which targeted Truman’s containment policy. In order to express the descent of the deadlock into some kind of political game, in spring 1946 *New York Times* reporter Gene Currivan used the term “a war of nerves”, which can be understood as a synonym for “cold war.” Byrnes likewise talked about the threat of “a war of nerves” at the Overseas Press Club in late February 1946, but he did not use it in his Stuttgart Speech.³⁰

²⁸ James Burnham’s 1941 book *The Managerial Revolution* apparently had an influence on Orwell’s thinking. However, Burnham had predicted that the winners of the Second World War would be the United States, Germany and Japan. Between 1929–1953 Burnham was a professor of philosophy at New York University and he was associated with the Trotskyites. However, Soviet aggression against Poland and Finland made him lose faith in Marxism. Ruotsila 2001, p. 235.

²⁹ *Tribune* 19.10.1945. George Orwell “You and the Atomic Bomb”.

³⁰ In March 1946 the complex situation of Persia was reported in detail by *The New York Times*. The article written by Gene Currivan reported very precise facts about the Soviet troops and their location in the Russian “zone” of Iran. According to the article, the Soviet activity in Kurdistan had also caused a shock in Iran because of the possible return of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who was a Kurdish nationalist leader. Barzani had been a commander of the Kurdish army in the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, which was under Soviet military control, and in autumn he had promised to return to the Iranian side. The Iranian Minister of War, General Supehed Amir Ahmedi, feared the possibility of a Soviet invasion so much that he announced that Iran would fight to the death if the Russians moved in the direction of Tehran. Currivan considered Soviet intentions in Persia unclear, but he noted that the Soviet Union had succeeded well in its “war of nerves” so far. *The New York Times* 16.3.1946. Gene Currivan “Red Army Deeper Into Kurdish Area”; Overseas speech: CR. Stop the Appeasement Policy Toward Communism, Remarks of Hon. John E. Rankin of Mississippi in The House of Representatives, Friday, March 1, 1946. Congressional Records 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. A1056–A1058.

After the Second World War, Cold War research focused predominantly on United States diplomacy, but during the 1950s and 1960s it began to bifurcate into two schools. In many respects, the so-called orthodox school, which was personified in State Department officials like Arthur M. Schlesinger Junior, Herbert Feis and Louis Halle, was challenged by revisionists. The distinctive feature of revisionism did not relate to the methodology of Cold War research – rather, the revisionists wanted to re-examine the “fundamental causes of the struggle.”³¹ Typically, the traditional, or orthodox, school used extensive diplomatic sources but at the same time maintained close personal relations with the political actors involved. For instance, Herbert Feis was particularly influenced by personal ties when he was writing his book *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference* (1960). However, Byrnes strongly challenged his former collaborator’s reading of politics during the Potsdam Conference.³² According to the revisionist interpretation, the drift towards the Cold War could not be blamed on the Russians alone. Instead, they argued that many of the other parties involved, including the United States, contributed to the process to a greater extent than the Soviet Union. The reasons for the revisionist interpretations of two kinds: either they argue that the Cold War was a consequence of certain pressures exerted by the capitalist system, which was seeking a kind of imperialism; or alternatively, they put it down to an alteration in US foreign policy after President Roosevelt’s death.³³

The earliest research on the outbreak of the Cold War was characterized by a fairly practical approach. From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, the drift towards the Cold War was considered an irrevocable outcome of the Second World War, which had left just two superpowers on the globe. Behind this view lay a prophecy of Alexis de Tocqueville a hundred years earlier, in which the world was dominated by two superpowers, the United States and Russia. There were numerous different theories expounding the genesis of the Cold War. In 1965, Desmond Donnelly interpreted the Cold War as an imperialist struggle, whose roots could be located in nineteenth-century conflicts between Russia and Britain in Central Asia.³⁴ John F. O’Conor (1961) and André Fontaine (1967) approached the phenomenon using the history of ideologies and found that the

³¹ Thompson 1981, p. 41.

³² BP. Series 10: Books, B9:F1, Feis to Byrnes, 3.3.1958; Byrnes to Feis, 4.8.1958; Talk with former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes (c. November 25, 1957) about his experience at the Potsdam Conference.

³³ Notable studies of the traditional school are Herbert Feis’s *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (1957), Louis Halle’s *The Cold War as History* (1967), and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr’s *The Crisis of Confidence, Ideas, Power and Violence in America* (1969).

³⁴ Donnelly 1965, pp. 10–11. “The Great Game”. The conflicts included, for instance, the two Anglo-Afghan Wars (1838–1842) and (1878–1880). Donnelly’s observations on the real origin of the Cold War enjoyed something of a renaissance during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s. Among others, Joseph Collins, who examined the invasion from a military strategic perspective, equated the Soviets’ intentions in foreign policy with the expansionism planned by State Chancellor Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov in 1864. Collins 1986, *passim*. Byrnes, too, claimed in *Speaking Frankly* that the Soviet Union was following in the footsteps of imperial Russia.

bedrock of the Cold War lay in the October Revolution of 1917.³⁵ Taking an opposite point of view, D.F. Fleming (1961) and Frederick L. Schuman (1962) denied that the Bolsheviks' proclamation was an ideological declaration of war against the West. According to them, Western efforts to restore the old order in Russia and eventually isolate the new Russia were the real reason for the beginning of the Cold War.³⁶

Nevertheless, most of the Cold War research pioneers believed in explanations that were related to the war. Traditionalists emphasized the radical change in Europe, which had developed when the Soviet Union challenged the European balance of power. In addition, it was regarded as almost a foregone conclusion that the Soviet Union would not withdraw from Eastern Europe for a long time - maybe ever. The genesis of the Cold War began to be closely associated with postwar power politics, in which Soviet demands collided with the Western way of thinking. The Soviets' aggression and the containment policies of the United States were regarded as a logical cause-effect relationship.³⁷

The gap between the traditionalists and the revisionists, who emphasized a totally opposite cause-effect relationship, had already emerged during the war. In November 1944, E.H. Carr denied in his *Times* article that the Soviet Union had exhibited even greater expansionism towards Europe than Britain had. Carr thought that Russia's claims for security zones were justified, while the traditionalists regarded those claims as imperialist or as moves designed to promote a world revolution. According to the revisionists of the 1960s, the United States could have prevented the Cold War, but by allowing itself to be provoked by Russia's attitude it had instigated a process that led to the Cold War. D.F. Fleming's 1961 book *The Cold War and Its Origins 1917-1950* was for a long time the quintessential exposition of revisionist thinking, in which the genesis of the Cold War was explained by a long-term aversion of the United States to Russia's ideology and actions.³⁸

In his 1967 book *America, Russia and the Cold War*, Walter LaFeber emphasized the United States' financial advantages as a main reason for the Cold War. LaFeber demonstrated that the Americans had tried to force their way into Europe by "dollar diplomacy", culminating in the Marshall Plan. According to him, the strategy, launched by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, isolated the Soviet Union and its allies from the outside world and forced the Russians to administer their economy alone.³⁹ A more or less analogous "conspiracy theory" was elaborated by Gar Alperovitz, who claimed that the Americans had instigated the disintegration of power politics by using the atomic bomb. In his book *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam*, published in 1965, Arperovitz asserted that the United States had toughened up its foreign policy after the Potsdam Conference, when the success of the first bomb test

³⁵ O'Connor 1961, passim.

³⁶ Fleming 1961; Schuman 1962.

³⁷ E.g. Graebner 1962, passim.

³⁸ Fleming 1961, pp. 30-31. Fleming's reference to Carr's article published in *The Times*.

³⁹ LaFeber 1967, pp. 6-20.

came to Byrnes's notice. According to Arperovitz, the use of dollar diplomacy rocked the delicate balance of power between the great powers and eventually led to the Cold War.⁴⁰ Daniel Yergin's *Shattered Peace* can be considered one of the revisionist classics of the 1970s because of its strong influence on later research. Yergin linked the genesis of the Cold War to an ideological collision between Wilsonism and realpolitik. Yergin's theory of the "Yalta axioms", which defined the United States' relations with Russia, has paved the way for subsequent studies with regard to the history of ideas.⁴¹

At the end of the 1970s, Cold War research started to analyze the causes that led to the Cold War more carefully and to produce more challenging interpretations than traditional diplomacy-centered research. Moreover, Byrnes's involvement in the Cold War process was studied in a more critical light, though on a very small scale compared to the whole field of Cold War research. In 1979, the Institute of International Studies at South Carolina University held a jubilee symposium to celebrate the centenary of the birth of Byrnes. The symposium was titled "James F. Byrnes and the Origins of the Cold War". Four researchers, John Gimbel, Gregg Herken, Robert Messer and Patricia Dawson Ward, had written their papers on very limited areas, focusing only on regional policy, atomic diplomacy, personal relations and the Paris Peace Conference. Later, the same researchers published broader studies, but the sudden boost created by the centenary of Byrnes's birth failed to arouse any wider interest, especially outside South Carolina. Actually, the papers produced in the symposium were examples of studies that betokened a change within both the traditional and the revisionist research traditions. The narrowness of those studies enabled the researchers to present radical new points of view and to discover new responsible parties in the Cold War – but on the basis of old evidence.⁴²

To put it simply, the difference between traditionalist and revisionist points of view depended on whether the actions of the Soviet Union were considered the causes or the effects of Western politics. At the beginning of the 1970s, the extremists on both sides of the Cold War research dichotomy differed mainly over whether the Cold War was instigated by the unintentional actions of both the United States and the Soviet Union or whether the superpowers just reacted to the international situation as great powers had done in the past. This problem was elucidated by later research, which, unlike the earlier studies, took

⁴⁰ Alperovitz 1965, pp. 240–242; *passim*.

⁴¹ Yergin 1977, pp. 44–45. Apart from Arnold Offner's study, the latest Cold War studies have considered Yergin's theory old-fashioned. Even so, *Shattered Peace* is the first and most complete study of the Cold War that regards it as a long-lasting and complex phenomenon that should be studied without considerations of guilt and morality.

⁴² BP. Series 11: Posthumous series, B1:F3, University of South Carolina, Institute of International Studies, October 8, 1979; James F. Byrnes and the Origins of the Cold War, A Centennial Year Symposium, 9 November 1979. Walter LaFeber commented on Gregg Herken's paper on atomic diplomacy.

geopolitics and the balance of power into account. The new approach was called "postrevisionism."⁴³

John Lewis Gaddis became the leading proponent of postrevisionism at the beginning of the 1980s. In his 1982 book *Strategies of Containment*, he discarded the idea of the United States' financial interests as a key reason for the Cold War, which had been a central element in the revisionist way of thinking. According to Gaddis, by clamping down on leftist movements at home and intervening strongly in world politics, the United States tried to curtail the power of the Soviet Union. This approach established America's own empire, which was in many respects much better than Russia's. It was believed that behind the emergence of the United States' empire lay mainly its allies' hopes of benefiting from the alliance, as in the case of France.⁴⁴

At the beginning of the 1990s, Cold War research took on new features when it was generally accepted that the war come to an end along with the liberation of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet empire. With regard to historical research, multidisciplinary Cold War studies had previously embodied some rather special features. Hitherto, the Cold War had necessarily been approached from the inside with no temporal distance or external viewpoint. It had been regarded as an on-going process, and this was inevitably reflected in the interpretations. Changes in the process clearly influenced the development of different schools of thought. On the other hand, the research problems did not change. Among other things, questions about the genesis of the Cold War or those responsible for it continued to go unanswered.

The end of the Cold War brought researchers new material, mainly from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in general, but also from American, British, German, French and Italian archives.⁴⁵ Earlier Cold War

⁴³ According to Douglas J. Macdonald, the history of Cold War studies has developed in accordance with the Hegelian dialectic, like many other historical phenomena. The traditional position represents the thesis, the revisionist approach the antithesis and the postrevisionist interpretation the synthesis. Macdonald 1996, p. 154. In the 1970s, methodological confrontations also appeared. Perhaps the most important opening was made by Charles Maier, who hit back at the criticism promulgated by revisionists and leftists: "In the end it is this attempt by the revisionists to analyze specific historical issues on the basis of a priori values about the political system that most strongly affects the controversies their writings have touched off. For their values cannot be derived from the mere amassment of historical data nor do they follow from strictly historical judgements, but rather underlie such judgements." According to Maier, it was impossible to find reasons for the Cold War without inductive research. Maier thought that the reasons presented by the revisionists were produced on the basis of selectively chosen evidence. This screening was a result of the researchers' set of values, which preferred some evidence to other evidence. Maier's vehemence was evidently inspired by the zeitgeist and the USA's involvement in the Vietnam War, which in many respects had also increased the revisionists' criticism. One of the most fervent revisionist interpretations was published by William Appleman Williams in his 1962 book *The Tragedy of American diplomacy*.

⁴⁴ Gaddis 1982, passim. The same point of view has been emphasized by the postrevisionist Geir Lundestad in his book *Empire of Invitation* (2003).

⁴⁵ After 1992, thousands of documents from the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc were translated into English and published in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*.

research in the United States had mainly focused on studies of diplomacy, and it looked forward to finding final answers from foreign archives. Even a partial opening-up of those archives was expected to bring solutions to problems and gaps in knowledge. Such solutions proved to be illusions when the Russians quickly reclassified documents and when, for instance, China and Japan restricted access to their archives. In general, the material released for the use of researchers confirmed earlier interpretations rather than turning history on its head.⁴⁶

For studies about the beginning of the Cold War it was ironic that its passing brought forth more material related to the contingent phenomena that it gave rise to than to its genesis. New documents concerning the Hungarian Revolution, the Prague Spring, the Solidarity movement in Poland and the Cuban missile crisis were quickly released, but nothing specifically concerning the process leading to the Cold War. Jonathan Haslam put the blame for that on the Cold War International History Project (inspired and initiated by John Lewis Gaddis), which “understandably but unfortunately chose to seek evidence on a scattered range of crises across the entire span of the Cold War, instead of a less sensational but more thorough unearthing of documents in sequence from the very beginning of the conflict.”⁴⁷

One of the first significant products of post-1991 Cold War research was Melwyn P. Leffler’s *A Preponderance of Power*. This book was published in 1992 and sheds light on the multidimensional and global character of the Cold War. Leffler saw the origins of the phenomenon as a result of the convulsion which occurred in the “Eurasian balance of power.” This is the same idea that the revisionists had been wont to promote. Moreover, Leffler thought that the foreign policy of the United States had been influenced by numerous foreign countries that were part of an “empire.” According to Leffler, the Americans aim had been to act in every way according to their “grand design,” but a large number of accidents and events elsewhere in the world led to the Cold War. Behind these accidents were the Soviet Union and Stalin, whose activity had to be stopped by using economic weapons. Therefore, the globalization of the Cold War was brought about by the United States, which with its anti-communist stance and mistaken risk-analysis was primarily responsible for sparking the conflict. The Soviets’ counter-measures were purely “reactive.”⁴⁸ Contrary to the revisionist way of thinking, “dollar diplomacy” was not a reason for the Cold War, but rather was a natural reaction to a changed international situation.⁴⁹

The latest Cold War research has been characterized by a strong pursuit of publicity and an endeavor to develop an all-embracing theory. John Lewis

In the United States, too, it was not until the 1980s that a number of offices just started to declassify secret documents.

⁴⁶ For instance, it confirmed the guilt of Alger Hiss and that secret information about the atomic energy project was leaked to the Soviets by Julius Rosenberg. Pineo 2003, pp. 80–81.

⁴⁷ Haslam 2003, p. 82.

⁴⁸ Leffler 1992, pp. 511–513.

⁴⁹ Leffler 1992, pp. ix–xi, 8–17 and 496–498.

Gaddis has become the most notable researcher in post-1991 Cold War studies. His 1997 book, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, attempts to demonstrate in a rather provocative way that the old traditionalist view of the guilt of the the Soviet Union was correct in the light of new documentary evidence. Even if Gaddis admits that he was still writing on the basis of "imperfect evidence", he nevertheless claimed that the origins of the Cold War were not caused by the actions of the West.⁵⁰ According to Gaddis's new interpretation, the Cold War no longer appears as a simple matter of Soviet expansion and the American reaction to that expansion. Undoubtedly, ideologies did play a major part in Soviet policies, but rather than world revolution, on this occasion the Russians were striving to insure their territorial security. Certainly, both superpowers sought to establish different kinds of empires, but, pace his own earlier postrevisionist views, Gaddis claims that the personality of Stalin together with the communist ideology was really the only reason for the outbreak of the Cold War.⁵¹

Along with Melvyn P. Leffler and John Lewis Gaddis, notable post-1991 Cold War researchers include Marc Trachtenberg, James McAllister, Arnold Offner and Carolyn Eisenberg. Their studies differ from earlier research especially with regard to their subjects. The universal character of the Cold War, emphasized notably by Melwyn Leffler, has motivated the latest researchers to cast their nets wider, for instance to Germany and China, in search of a solution. This kind of approach was not foreign to 1960s and 1970s revisionism, but the newer studies were led in this direction by declassified archive documents as well as by academic tendencies in the direction of the social sciences.⁵² Marc Trachtenberg disagrees with Gaddis about the origins of the Cold War. According to Trachtenberg, who has essentially used the same sources as Gaddis, the reason for the Cold War was not the ideological difference between the superpowers but rather the fact that Stalin wanted to handle foreign policy in a classical pre-First-World-War style.⁵³ Trachtenberg returns to the revisionist research tradition when he emphasizes the United States' desire to intervene in the postwar situation in Germany for economic reasons. The most recent research has underlined Germany's role as a determining factor of the Cold War, which is a justifiable claim in the light of subsequent events.

⁵⁰ Gaddis 1997, pp. 290–294. According to revisionist interpretations, Gaddis's new material shows that the traditional school was wrong. E.g. Pineo 2003, pp. 82–83.

⁵¹ Gaddis 1997, passim. John Lewis Gaddis has a very wide and apparently still expanding corpus of research dealing with the Cold War from the 1970s. The end of the Cold War had a clear influence on his studies. Differing from many other scholars, Gaddis's attitude to the phenomenon has always been open-minded and even positive. At the end of the 1980s, he noticed that the past forty years had been, in fact, historically quite a stable time, which he credited to well handled power politics. After the Cold War, his enthusiasm subsided and it was no longer viewed as "a success story".

⁵² The importance of Germany and France at the beginning of the Cold War has been highlighted especially by John Gimbel. The Cold War has also been studied from the viewpoint of international relations by authors like James McAllister.

⁵³ Trachtenberg 1999, pp. 4–20.

James McAllister has approached the problem of the origins of the Cold War through international relations. The neorealist approach of McAllister demonstrates that the Cold War phase was an inevitable consequence of the bipolarized state of the world right after the Second World War, albeit in actual fact on only on a theoretical level. According to McAllister, the United States had prepared itself to control Germany together with the Russians, but that plan was changed by Byrnes, who in Potsdam lobbied for a divided Germany. Byrnes was forced to adopt this policy because by committing itself to sharing control of Germany with the Soviet Union, the United States would also have been committing itself to a conflict with the Russians. According to McAllister and Trachtenberg, in Potsdam Byrnes sought a kind of "amicable divorce." For these historians, Byrnes was became an instigator of the Cold War insofar as the shift of the superpowers onto separate courses was definitive. Instead of keeping Germany united, Byrnes would have preferred to draw a clear dividing line running through Germany, although this was not decided at the Potsdam Conference. McAllister has even suggested: "It was Byrnes more than anyone else who consistently took the lead in dividing Germany both during and after Potsdam." A similar view has been presented by Carolyn Eisenberg in her book *Drawing the Line*.⁵⁴

In addition to these capable American scholars, the European point of view has been highlighted by Anne Deighton. Like McAllister and Eisenberg, she has stressed the German issue as a touchstone of power politics. Deighton is obviously critical of America historians for their predominantly bipolar approach and treating the United States and the Soviet Union as the only significant actors. By emphasizing Britain's role after the war as a serious world power, Deighton has suggested that the British government played a significant role in clarifying and shaping American foreign policy after President Roosevelt's death. As for the German question, it was the British who invented the "Western option," which made the total unification of Germany an undesirable alternative.⁵⁵

Arnold Offner, who has focused widely on Truman's role, returns to the position of 1960s and 1970s revisionism in his controversial book *Another Such Victory*, in which he emphasizes security policies as the motive behind the Russians' behavior. In contrast to Marc Trachtenberg, Offner does not believe that Germany actually had such a significant economic importance for the United States that it would have caused the Cold War. Rather, the origins of the Cold War lay in the anti-sovietism that existed in Truman's administration. This stance was adopted by some American politicians as a sort of axiom. Offner does not trace this axiom back to US anti-communism in general or American ideological history, a defect that seems to vitiate the whole field of recent Cold War studies.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ McAllister 2002, pp. 76-77; Trachtenberg 1999, pp. 15-34; Eisenberg 1996, passim.

⁵⁵ Deighton 1990, p. 225.

⁵⁶ Offner 2002, pp. 153-154. Offner refers with his axioms to Daniel Yergin's book *Shattered Peace*: "...by spring 1946 U. S. policy makers had not only assumed as an

There are few radical differences between earlier and later studies on the Cold War as a historical phenomenon. Little attention has been paid to the origins of the Cold War, and the few studies interested in that subject have concentrated on offering simplistic answers to complicated questions. Studies that focus on the issue of guilt have not benefited an examination of the actual substance but rather have often contrived to blur the real goals. A number of important questions have also gone unasked and even been ignored. Moreover, the most essential question – why the Cold War started – is still without a satisfactory answer. Clarification has been sought from a wide spectrum of factors, including ideologies, geopolitics, personal relations and economics. However, no single one of these elements alone could have produced the Cold War, although as products of the politics involved they might have had great significance.

Evidently, the uniqueness and temporal proximity of the Cold War make it a very difficult phenomenon for researchers to conceptualize. It seems illogical to break the antithesis between war and peace with some kind of intermediate phenomenon like the Cold War. Even if international relations can always be condensed into the concepts of either politics or warfare, *à la* von Clausewitz, the end of the Second World War, as the actual end of armed conflict, should have meant a transition from a state of war to a state of politics. And even if, on the other hand, war is considered to be a manifestation of politics, the interface between the two forms of politics has to be detectable. Only on this basis is it possible to precisely analyze the politics of the superpowers in the context of the origins of the Cold War. For instance, the Cold War implications of Byrnes's Stuttgart Speech have to be regarded as more or less heuristic. If the bellicose nature of the speech, which has been canonized as a Cold War text by several Cold War researchers, is studied as an integral product of a period of time that saw a cooling in international relations, our understanding of the origins of the Cold War appears not only in the context of the history of events but also ever more clearly as a conflict on the textual level.

1.3 Realpolitik as an ideal type and methodology

1.3.1 How to interpret realpolitik?

Realpolitik is one of those German words that has come into English usage. In spite of its familiarity, however, the origins and connotation of the phrase remain, to most people, including most historians, rather obscure. The use of the concept 'realpolitik' to characterize the United States' foreign policy entails a great deal of contextual pressure because of the very broad range of

axiom that the Soviet Union was aggressively expansionist, but they perceived every Russian claim, or any conflict, as a threat to national security".

interpretations assigned to it. The roots of realpolitik can be traced back to Otto von Bismarck's Germany in the 1850s. Realpolitik was a concept first established by German journalist and politician August Ludwig von Rochau in 1853 with a book titled *Grundsätze der Realpolitik*. The Principles of old teleological view that prevailed at the time emphasized success as the only criterion in politics. This attitude created the foundation of Bismarck's view of politics as the "the art of the possible" (*Kunst des Möglichen*). In the real world, this meant the ability of politics to adapt quickly into different modes in order to achieve the projected goals. For the purposes of this study, however, the Bismarckian interpretation of realpolitik does not offer a single and exhaustive solution. The new world order, power politics and the collision of great power interests after the Second World War were phenomena which under a one-sided realpolitik would not have been feasible purely as the art of the possible.⁵⁷

From the perspectives of power vacuums and the Cold War, the politicians strove to achieve more than was possible. In this respect, the realpolitik suggested as a cause of the Cold War would have been motivated by the art of the impossible as much as of the possible.⁵⁸ With regard to the examination of change in foreign policy, realpolitik is clearly a form of activity that responds quickly to transient circumstances and demands results. Distinguishing different forms of realpolitik on the basis of the possible-impossible dimension means taking account of the temporal development in foreign relations, i.e. the actions and reactions in power politics that could no longer be kept within the limits of the set political goals and which eventually led to a conflict between the superpowers. In this study, the concept of realpolitik stands for an active reaction-sensitive policy. Such a conception of realpolitik, seen from the perspective of the possibilities and impossibilities of its goals, best serves the requirements of an examination of change in foreign politics.

The concept of realpolitik has been used inconsistently and in many different contexts. Generally, realpolitik has been connected to images of strong leaders, morality, virtuous political interests or realism. Understanding realpolitik properly requires a conceptual interpretation of the concept and the elimination of misleading foreign etymologies. Kari Palonen has pointed out

⁵⁷ In line with Bismarck's idea, politics, too, also been considered the "art of the possible" or "*Kunst des Möglichen*" in German. This view has been advocated most strongly by Max Weber and Karl Liebknrecht, who thought that to attain the best possible goal it was essential to set political objectives above realities. "*Das gehabte derer, die so zu schieben glauben machen und tatsächlich geschoben werden, ist die Politik als ,Kunst des Möglichen'. Wer die Entwicklung jeden Augenblicks bis zur Realisierung der äußersten Möglichkeit zu treiben bestrebt ist, muß sich anders verhalten. Er muß Ziel und Richtung seiner Politik weit jenseits nach der äußersten praktischen Möglichkeit nehmen. Das äußerste Mögliche ist nur erreichbar durch das Greifen nach dem Unmöglichen. Die verwirklichte Möglichkeit ist die Resultante aus erstrebten Unmöglichkeiten.*" Liebknrecht 1976, p. 253; "*Es ist – richtig verstanden – zutreffend, daß eine erfolgreiche Politik stets die ,Kunst des Möglichen' ist. Nicht minder richtig aber ist, daß das Mögliche sehr oft nur dadurch erreicht wurde, daß man nach dem jenseits seiner liegenden Unmöglichkeiten griff.*" Weber 1968, p. 514.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

that the German word “Realpolitik” does not refer to realism or realistic politics. On the contrary, “Realpolitik” refers to German Bismarckian politics after the Year of Revolution, 1848. Palonen regards realpolitik not so much as an explicit doctrine as a cluster of political slogans like *Staatsräson*, *Primat der Aussenpolitik* and *Politik ist eine Kunst des Möglichen*.⁵⁹ Hajo Holborn has argued that the concept of realpolitik can only be used in a historical sense with reference to the period between 1848 and 1858 and that even then, it needs to be carefully defined.⁶⁰ In this respect, the role of Otto von Bismarck is relevant, but why should we not avail ourselves of the concept of realpolitik in more recent times as well? In contrast to Kari Palonen, Holborn bases his claims on the young Bismarck’s views of politics, which were influenced by the German cultural and philosophical revolution of the time, in which critics of idealism questioned realism, and, according to Holborn, rationalism became more influential. Ludwig Feurebach, Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx exemplify the rationalist movement, which gained strength through its neo-Hegelianism.⁶¹

Palonen, on the other hand, wishes to emphasize the tradition of realpolitik through more precise contextualization. He argues that realpolitik ought to be seen first and foremost as a form of politics that opposes all liberal ideas by appealing to their unrealistic nature. Realpolitik thus draws its strength from the irrationality of liberal ideas in general.⁶² This aspect has been highlighted by many respected scholars of international relations, like E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. As John Mearsheimer has stated, liberalism and realism are two bodies of theory which hold privileged places on the theoretical menu of international relations.⁶³ As far as international politics are concerned, the opposition between liberalism and realism is obvious. Studies of international relations regard realists as pessimists who, unlike liberals, focus on power and state security above all else. Because of all the categorical features realism may have had as a precept for formulating foreign policy, realism seems to conflict with Western ideas and especially with basic American values. Liberalism, by contrast, fits perfectly with the American sense of optimism and morality. Perhaps because of the Americans’ dislike of realism, the public discourse about foreign policy in the United States has usually been put across in the language of liberalism: “Foreign policy discourse in the United States often sounds as if it has been lifted right out of a Liberalism 101 lecture.”⁶⁴

According to Palonen, the antithesis between realism and liberalism is not so radical: rather “*Realpolitik* is rather a skeptic shadow of the 19th century liberal-progressivist *Weltanschauung* [world view] tending both to reduce

⁵⁹ Wayman & Diehl 1994, pp. 3–4; Palonen 2007, p. 137.

⁶⁰ Holborn 1960, p. 95.

⁶¹ Holborn 1960, p. 85.

⁶² Palonen 2007, p.140.

⁶³ Mearsheimer 2003, p. 14.

⁶⁴ Almond 1960, pp. 50–51; Mearsheimer 2003, pp. 22–25.

policy demands and to intensify politicking.”⁶⁵ Respectively Natascha Doll has suggested that while Rochau did underrate an idealistic politics and praise the realities of power, his choice of facts and realities of power included bourgeois consciousness or *bürgerliches Bewußtsein*, the idea of freedom or *Freiheitsgedanke*, a sense of the nation or *Nationalsinn*, the idea of equal rights for all people (*Idee der Menschlichen Gleichberechtigung*), the spirit of political parties (*politische Parteigeist*) and the press (*Presse*). Far from accepting the defeat of idealistic demands of liberalism, Rochau rephrased them as realities of power, reasserting these demands in the language of the 1850s era of reaction.⁶⁶ Palonen defines the tradition of realpolitik as intrinsically embodying a number of conflict-centers, like ideas of morality and justice, and the connection of economic and social stability with progress, prosperity and rationality. He regards these phenomena as quite strictly limited to the spheres of foreign polity and diplomacy. Coming back to the historical roots of the concept of realpolitik, Palonen concludes that the tradition of realpolitik was however dominated by the paradigm of domestic politics. When August Ludwig von Rochau was striving to reduce over-bold policy demands to a more “realistic” scale, his paradigm was one of domestic politics – irrespective of the reality of international relations. The view of *Primat der Aussenpolitik* or the primacy of the foreign policy was Bismarckian. From the perspective of Bismarckian realpolitik, foreign policy and diplomacy could not be only of residual importance, because “in order to maintain and strengthen the state’s position in the concert of states active politicking in relations towards others becomes a necessity to which domestic politics should be subordinated.”⁶⁷

In agreement with Natascha Doll and Palonen, von Rouchau’s anti-normativism has two approaches to interpreting what actually was real. One is the naturalistic contention, according to which the same kind of laws apply in politics as, for instance, in physics. Von Rochau sees powers and laws in both realms. In another sense, however, von Rochau’s realpolitik is opposed to normativism and naturalism and hence to the weighing-up of alternatives. According to Palonen, the possibility dimension that von Rouchau emphasizes in the person of Otto von Bismarck refers rather to Bismarck’s antinormativism (his onslaughts against principles), his opportunism and relativism. Seen in terms of his politics, Bismarck appears to Palonen as having had a natural sense of proportion, in which the concept of politics merged with a romantic version of naturalism. On the basis of this *Augenmass* theory, the politician’s actions manifested natural gifts.⁶⁸

Extending the concept of realpolitik beyond the restrictions set by Hajo Holborn permits us to attach new meanings to it. As a heuristic instrument, using the concept of realpolitik to analyze foreign politics yields many useful results. In particular, it manifests itself in certain tensions, for example in the possibility-impossibility dimension, which are tailor-made for reflecting the

⁶⁵ Palonen 2007, p. 140.

⁶⁶ Doll 2005, p. 45.

⁶⁷ Palonen 2007, p. 140.

⁶⁸ Doll 2005, p. 37; Palonen 2007, p. 139.

genuine intentions of political actors. A Kantian analysis of the relations between politics and morality and the significance attached by international research to *realpolitik* contributes an important addition to the studies of the activities of past politicians, especially those with a bias toward biography. Here, the political actions of the past could be studied by reconstructing the phenomenon of *realpolitik* in terms of what at the time might reasonably have been expected in the future.

Seen in the light of this framework, *realpolitik* appears more as an embodiment of idealism than of realism.⁶⁹ In analyzing Byrnes's foreign policy, it seems perfectly justifiable to invoke the original idealistic nature of *realpolitik*. Questions about the behavior of sovereign states in great power conferences could be examined purely from the perspective of the pursuit of national interests, as a realist might do. On the other hand, the same question could be studied more broadly by considering the different emphases articulated by the superpowers on cooperation, the principle of legality and the significance of international organizations. This kind of idealistic approach is valid, especially for a period when the world repeatedly descended into a state of chaos, which it tried to control by establishing international organizations. Idealism was unquestionably the greatest political force of the time, and it was realized in the League of Nations, the United Nations and in emergent discussions about the principle of legality, international law and human rights. Additionally, idealism was manifested in the political legacy of President Woodrow Wilson, to which Byrnes was committed at the beginning of his political career.

In the case of Byrnes's political person, *realpolitik* could also be studied from the perspective of moral action, after the fashion of Immanuel Kant, by considering how the states represented in the conferences should have acted.⁷⁰ The tradition of realism calls for a discussion of the complex relationship between the American people and the politicians who represented them by questioning whether they were similar in terms of morality. A realist might also ask whether the morality of the leaders of great powers should be more ruthless than that of the citizens because the goal of leaders is to secure their nation's survival. However, Byrnes appears to be more of an idealist than a realist of the type described above. He stressed the fact that his own political line followed the "people's foreign policy" and that the foreign policy embodied by him could reflect nothing other than the Americans' common goals and standards. As an idealist, Byrnes considered that it was imperative for nations to cooperate in order that the welfare and security of his own homeland might be increased as well. The difference between idealism and realism in *realpolitik* was starkly actualized in security policy. Whereas militarily guaranteed security was the ultimate goal of realistic foreign policy, idealistic foreign policy involved a number of other goals, which were often related to high moral questions.

⁶⁹ Wayman & Diehl 1994, pp. 13-15.

⁷⁰ See for instance: Doll 2005, pp. 37-41.

The realistic interpretation leads us to regard foreign politics as a furtive, amoral and ruthless activity, whose main goal is militarily guaranteed security. Then a diplomat is just “an honest man who has been sent abroad to lie for his country.” As an “ideological follower” of Wilson or a “Wilsonian internationalist”, Byrnes supported openness and transparency and actually opposed everything that could be counted as belonging to the old “secret diplomacy.”⁷¹ Nonetheless, Byrnes’s activities have to be considered in relation to power politics, which constituted the central instrument of realistic foreign policy. Seen in the light of the principles of idealism, the League of Nations and the United Nations were intended to be institutions that would finally discard the old ways of acting based on the balance of power, spheres of interest and military alliances.

Byrnes’s *realpolitik* at the time of the development of the United Nations and the Council of the Foreign Ministers also has to be measured in the context of the law of nations and international rights. The post-Westphalian period had seen the ascendancy of sovereign states acting without external interference, but this system was called into question when the First and the Second World Wars showed its ineffectiveness. From the idealistic point of view, nations were to be seen as an entirety bound together with mutually unifying moral and legal arrangements. In this respect, Byrnes’s conception of the laws of nations and the ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union should be noted. Also important is the number of the political actors involved, which on the grounds of pure realism would be restricted to sovereign states. In terms of language, we have to examine Byrnes’s ways of speaking and parlance regarding sovereign states and nations in different contexts.

As Palonen has noted, political theory often constructs in advance a set of normative requirements, even if everyone in the situation is aware that they are not governed by political realism. With regard to *realpolitik*, the solutions to this problem lie somewhere between the maximization and minimization of the realization of the requirements. In addition to the above-mentioned conceptual aspect of the realist-idealist dichotomy, the “realist” element of *realpolitik* seems to take on an interesting role when the “action perspective on political thought” is adopted. According to Quentin Skinner’s view of language as action, an act involves more than its realization, and the role of principles in politics is different than the demand that they be realized.⁷²

⁷¹ In his memoirs, Byrnes states that Americans must leave behind the era of secret diplomacy: “We must make sure that our people have an opportunity to know the problems their diplomats confront so that they can judge properly the proposed solution. The right of people to know is a basic element in the development of a people’s foreign policy.” Byrnes 1947, p. 233. Winfred Moore has suggested that Byrnes was essentially a Wilsonian internationalist, who preferred that American leadership should be used “on behalf of disarmament and peace through the League of Nations. Moore 1975, p. 363.

⁷² Palonen 2003, p. 38.

1.3.2 Texts as political acts

Rather than “historical truth”, this study aims to establish Byrnes’s role by examining his actions in their own time and space. The idea of revealing an actor’s real intentions involves the creation of the possible perspectives from which Byrnes might reasonably have been expected to view his world. From the point of view of historical possibilism, an investigation of the possible has to be carried out strictly within the framework of the particular time involved. The material for such an investigation is provided by documents of Congress and the State Department, which unquestionably functioned as instruments of political action. The idea of a speech as a political act appears to offer an extremely interesting tool in the controversial field of Cold War studies. Political talk seems indeed to be a Weberian conscious and unconscious determination of reality that reaches beyond the literal level of the locutionary act.⁷³

Along with stating the facts, a speech is also an act outside the phenotype of its text. Even if questions about what actually happened or what was in fact said do lead to unanimous answers, they do not preclude the possibility of contradictory assumptions and conceptions about the reasons, the real motives and the intentions of the actors and the consequences of the action concerned. For instance, previous research on Byrnes’s Stuttgart Speech could well be characterized by Murray Edelman’s view, according to which political action is not shaped by what we can see, but rather what we imagine and presuppose. In this respect, it is understandable that a present-day researcher who studies the political activity of the past becomes sensitive to certain political news items or events that have some point of reference in the social context of the time. Nor, in this case, can the bare surface level of the texts guide the interpreter in the right direction.⁷⁴

The material used in this study is composed mostly of written textual artifacts; documents, books, and letters. With regard to the methodology of historical study, this research process is undoubtedly a textual analysis that calls for a foundation on which it is possible to discover from the text more than its surface indicates. As a deconstructive and reconstructive process, text analysis does not absolve a researcher of the responsibility of considering his/her own epistemological theory: Why do I interpret the text as I do? At worst, texts always manifest themselves as polluted by their own contexts, which leads to frustration when the researcher is faced with an infinite number of perspectives and truths, as Nietzsche saw the situation. My aim to examine Byrnes’s activity in its “genuine” context calls for a consideration of the

⁷³ Max Weber has shown that politics in public is conducted to a great extent by means of the spoken or written word. Weber 1964, p. 95.

⁷⁴ Pekonen 1991, p. 56; I have used both the original version of the speech and the drafts made by Byrnes. DAFR 1945-1946. Restatement of United States Policy on Germany by the Secretary of State (Byrnes), Stuttgart, Germany, September 6, 1946. Volume VIII, pp. 210-218; BP. Mss 90, James F. Byrnes Papers, Series 9: Speeches, Box 8, File 4. The speech in its entirety is given in the Appendix.

perspectives of previous studies and how they situated the studied texts in different contextual worlds. When construed by different researchers, the same material can reveal many different meanings and intentions; this is understandably a consequence of different choices connected with contextualization and selections of material that limit the interpretation to one all-embracing explanation. In the light of these considerations, I wish to claim that Byrnes's actions, both physical and linguistic, can be considered as a group of numerous different acts, which may have distinct meanings and intentions when viewed separately or as part of a whole.

The action perspective of political thought is embodied in the use of language. Rather than an understanding of the literal meaning of the words, or what is said, the questions of why and how it is said seem to be more interesting. The source material for this study consists of texts, and these texts constitute a body of evidence that describes a past reality. However, it is not really possible to make a distinction between the reality and the language that describes it. In this study, the purpose of the text-analytical approach is not an analysis of the empirically observable consequences of texts (perlocutions), but rather an analysis of the content of the acts manifested by the texts (illocutions).⁷⁵ This means endeavoring to discover the meaning of political speech acts within their own framework relative to time and space. Quentin Skinner discusses speech acts which express the actor's own intentions. He uses the concept of 'the point', to refer to an illocutionary reconstruction, i.e. studying actions and politics from the situation of the actor. The point refers to the actor's specific intentions in the text. Therefore, the point should be located within its linguistic context, which in practice means texts that have genuine contact with other textual environments dealing with the same issue or debate. Analyzing texts means primarily asking questions. It is necessary to find out why certain speech acts were worth making.⁷⁶

A speech act is related to its context by being located in a certain situation, a functional framework that is revealed by the linguistic context. Thus, a speech act responds to questions which the actor regards as being significant. According to Kari Palonen, the strength of the point is predicated on its ability to move outside the framework, for instance, by being profiled or provoking.

⁷⁵ Behind this lies the idea that the relation of language to the outside world goes beyond mere reference. Speech act theory, which was introduced by J.L. Austin, divided language's operational dimensions (or powers) into three types of act: locutionary (a statement, literal meaning), illocutionary (to utter something is to do something) and perlocutionary (the effect(s) produced an utterance on the listener). Austin 1965, p. 120. According to Skinner's views, the locutionary statement forms only one level of language and the illocutionary and perlocutionary uses constitute just as important levels as the "informative function" of language.

⁷⁶ Skinner 2002, p. 2. To find out intentionality, it is interesting to compare differences between the actual spoken text and the original drafts. Skinner places the concept of illocutionary act in a wider context by demonstrating the possibility of illocutionary acts whose performative character has nothing to do with an actual advantage. In addition, Skinner shows that certain forms of Austin's perlocutionary and expositives, cannot be regarded as performative. In practice, this means verbs that express various degrees of intention. Skinner 1970, pp. 123-128.

The determination of relevant contexts is however a challenging task. When speaking about contexts, Skinner, according to Palonen, emphasizes the diversity of contexts and categorizes contexts in relation to the speech acts and points in the text.⁷⁷ For Skinner the most important concern of scholar is to trace the relations between the given utterance and this “wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer.” In this respect the “concept” is not a question of determining but a horizon for the possible as an “ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognizable meanings, in a society of that kind, it might in principle have been possible for someone to have intended to communicate.”⁷⁸ In Skinner’s thinking, the analysis of the point reveals certain rhetorical moves. As he puts it, to understand a statement and its meaning it is necessary to understand why that statement has been performed.⁷⁹ From this perspective, it is possible to evaluate the rhetorical move as an act – in other words, to penetrate into the meaning of the text and actor’s intention – by searching for the conditions and intentions that determine its performance. As outlined by Skinner, understanding an illocutionary act means the same as understanding the speaker’s intentions behind an utterance.⁸⁰

A scrutiny of previous Cold War studies on political speeches and texts reveals that they have mainly been explanations of the unanalyzed meanings of the texts and have paid little attention to the writers’ intentions. There has been inadequate research on contextualization and the historical actors’ intentions. The detection of a writer’s illocutionary intentions, which ideally means everything possible that the writer wished to perform with his text, is in Skinner’s view a genuinely historical way to interpret political thinking. He does not regard the complexity of the intention as a disadvantage in this respect, but sees it rather as an opportunity to restore intention as the grounds for explanation. The intention included in the speech act of a text s creates a

⁷⁷ Palonen 2003, pp. 38–39. Skinner does to deal with the conceptual definition of text and context. A text can be understood broadly as a matter of meanings, evidence and clues. The contexts of speech acts are more like the implicit aspects of the text than its explicit form. As such, contextualization is essential for understanding a text, but only in this direction, because methodologically the context can naturally only be used to interpret the text but not to define it. What then manifests itself as a text on the one hand and a context on the other depends on the questions being studied. Thus, contextualization means first and foremost explicating the possibilities related to a certain historical occasion. Considered linguistically, a text exemplifies the whole language system, and the utterance situation is verified in the text. On the other hand, the utterance situation embodies a culture, and the culture is also embedded in the linguistic system. The context is manifested through to the text. From the perspective of Skinner’s linguistic action, contexts are an implicit part of the text rather than opposed to it. Register, genre and ideological potential are actualized in texts. The context can be understood as the situation surrounding the text (expressed in register), culture (expressed in genre) or a more abstract common circumstance (reflected in ideology). The context is written into the texts and thus could be interpreted as the linguistic choices and meanings determined by the writer.

⁷⁸ Skinner 1969, p. 49.

⁷⁹ Skinner 1988, p. 274.

⁸⁰ Skinner 2006, p. 98. "...that an understanding of the illocutionary act performed by a speaker will be equivalent to understanding their primary intentions in issuing their utterance".

wide gamut of illocutionary force, whose relevant components, conventions that are valid at the time, ideologies, and personal relations, finally reveal the “real” context and indicate the true intentions of the actor. An approach employing illocutionary reconstruction begins to seem essential for a careful analysis of power-political texts. Byrnes’s references to democracy, responsibility, communism or even national socialism constitute an important part of evidence by which Byrnes’s spoken actions can be genuinely examined without the burden of anachronism and presuppositions prejudicing the research. Similar evidence is provided by the absence in Byrnes’s idiom of certain concepts or a jargon related to the Cold War, such as the Eastern-Western dichotomy. It is only by means of such a ruthless search for objectivity through illocutionary reconstruction that it is possible to situate, for instance, the controversial Stuttgart Speech in its proper setting and bring one’s own perspective to bear on a question that the research tradition has undeniably failed to answer: Why did Byrnes say what he say?

Explaining the past typically takes the form of explaining the actions that happened in the past. The relation between the object of the explanation and the basis for the explanation could be described as causal or logical (conceptual), depending on whether the act and the motives attached by the explanation to it are logically interdependent or not. In the light of Austin’s speech act theory, the traditional models of causal explanation based on the action and the reason(s) for it interpreted texts only on the locutionary level, but illocutionary analysis challenges the old models of explanation. For instance, Emiliani’s approach emphasizes the problematic nature of an intentional act’s causality. According to Skinner, the concept of intention does not exclude the possibility that human actions could be explained causatively. He believes that insofar as an illocutionary act can be described and the illocutionary force of that utterance can be shown, the event can be reconstructed and explained. Skinner borrowed the concept of illocutionary force from Austin, who says that the force is determined by what the speaker’s (or writer’s) intention was when he produced the utterance.⁸¹

In order to explain the past, Skinner’s illocutionary reconstruction involves ascertaining the reason for the act, but it does not reveal from the action anything that could be considered, as von Wright does, a cause of which the action was an effect. If we accept illocutionary reconstruction as a model which explains an actor’s intentions (not motives), we must, according to Skinner, accept the possibility that intentions function as the causes of acts.⁸²

⁸¹ Austin 1965, *passim*. Illocutionary force is one element of the speech act. Illocutionary speech acts include utterances whose meanings are conventional, such as orders, promises or warnings. Emiliani 2005, *passim*.

⁸² Skinner’s strict distinction between motives and intentions is based on the conclusion that it is necessary find out the actor’s intentions in order to elucidate the particular features of the act, regardless of truth of the motives. Skinner 1971, pp. 16-17. Anthony Kenny has criticized this separation of motives from intentions merely on the basis of causality: if the cause of an act resides in some earlier or current event, it is a question of motives; when it refers to coming situations, it is intentional. For Skinner, motives manifest themselves as affective and personal in character, while

The ability to justify causality is in a way the ability to distinguish intentions from motives. Causal explanation is, however, only one possibility, and Skinner in particular emphasizes the acceptability of non-causal explanations. Contrary to von Wright's views, explanations of the past can also include causal links in addition to relations of logical necessity. Since the interpretation of intentions calls for a wider understanding of the research problems, intention becomes at the same time an object and a tool of the research. The explanatory potential of speech acts resides in the ability of illocutionary intentions to be genuinely intentional.⁸³

Skinner's way of talking about an actor's utterances points to a kind of built-in goal orientation, and the illocutionary reconstruction of the act involves a desire to elicit the actor's complex intention. In one sense, he wants to chart all the acts which an actor might have conventionally performed when he uttered what he uttered. In Skinner's thinking, the relation between an actor and his intentions is encapsulated in a logic whereby "no agent can eventually be said to have meant or done something which he could never be brought to accept as a correct description of what he had meant or done."⁸⁴ On this basis, Skinnerian historical reconstruction might really offer a plausible answer based on historical evidence for instance to questions about Byrnes's political intentions in the Stuttgart Speech at the time when it was made in September 1946. The possibility of intentional acts at the moment studied calls for an illocutionary reconstruction of the acts included in the text of the speech in the historico-linguistic context of Secretary of State Byrnes. Hence, the greatest challenge in employing Skinner's maxim is to be able to recognize the pitfalls of anachronism.⁸⁵

Previous studies of the Stuttgart Speech have aspired to attribute to it different significances and meanings without paying attention to the Skinnerian proviso that the possibility of an intentional act can be only considered in the historical context of the time. The possibility for carrying out an act is not independent of time. Much research has failed to relieve the burden of anachronism by carefully examining the exact significance of the act in its own time. What appears from today's perspective to be a clear progression of events cannot be attributed to the past. The proclivity typical of historical research to emphasize an actor's probable or strongest intention usually precludes any consideration of less plausible alternatives, even when all alternatives should be regarded as possible. Skinner in particular has opposed the existence of "perennial problems" and canonized interpretations. In this respect, he has

intentions can be reconstructed from speech acts with almost watertight accuracy. I have presented my own view of the distinction between motives and intentions in greater detail in Leinonen 2008.

⁸³ Skinner 1971, p. 20; von Wright 1967, pp. 320–322; Skinner 2006, p. 109. Unintentional illocutionary acts are impossible in Skinner's opinion, because the illocutionary force in speech acts cannot be involuntary or non-intentional. However, a speech act can have a greater or lesser illocutionary force, when the same act might be, for instance, both cautionary and informative. Hyrkkänen 2002, pp. 195–196.

⁸⁴ Skinner 1988, p. 48; Sami Syrjämäki 1999, p. 65.

⁸⁵ Koikkalainen 2008, pp. 72–74.

adopted the qualities of Weberian “*Objektivität*” as a researcher whose interpretations are governed by the mindset of the time studied. However, a researcher should not intentionally follow prevailing research paradigms and conventions. In his criticism of perennial problems, Skinner has been influenced by Collingwood, who called for “eternal questions” to be placed in a state of continuous transition. Every theory, concept or interpretation has to be understood in relation to the unique questions and problems generated by its own temporal situation. On the other hand, the use of the present by historical interpretations to shed light on the past inevitably creates an influential tradition that has been used to justify canonized interpretations.⁸⁶

In this study, the action perspective of political thought is highlighted in chapter 3.4 where Byrnes’s Stuttgart speech is studied in greater detail. In using a typologization of Byrnes’s possible intentions in that speech based on the Weberian concept of the ideal, it is not my intention to claim that those are all real evidence of his motives for doing something, but that they are all potential intentions of Byrnes. Because motives are seen from an essentially evaluative perspective, it is indeed quite possible to discover several possible intentions in Byrnes’s actions. In such cases, some specialists may agree on Byrnes’s intentions in acting a certain way, but disagree about his motives. Accordingly an intention can be seen as the implementation of a motive. In cognitive science Daniel C. Dennett and John Haugeland define intentionality as opposed to motive as “aboutness”: in an intentional state the mind has a certain content that is about something. Consciousness is always consciousness of something.⁸⁷ Certainly there is thin dividing line between motivation and intention, or what Byrnes had in mind and the illocutionary force of what Byrnes said and did, but in this study the difference has been explicated by employing the concept of causality. Reports of intentions give forward-looking reasons for actions and reports of motivation give backward-looking reasons. Accordingly, a distinction can be made between weak intentions and strong intentions, as Mark Bevir has put it. As far as subjectivity is concerned, the distinction cannot be explained merely by the subjective character of motivation and some sort of intersubjective character of intentionality. Rather, intentionality should be interpreted phenomenologically more as an “orientation” toward the future.⁸⁸

On the other hand, this study can be regarded as being in a way bi-methodological. Especially in the case of Byrnes’s own linguistic utterances, like speeches, the focus of this study is on intentionality and illocutionary force, but when other types of historical sources are used the focus is rather on motives and subjective plans. Plainly, how much is left to be explained by reference to either motive or intention depends on the way an action is described. When it comes to the illocutionary force of Byrnes speech acts, their intentionality is examined, and when Byrnes’s political role and the actions connected with it are explained on the basis of surface-level textual analysis without a study of

⁸⁶ Collingwood 1951, *passim*.

⁸⁷ Dennett & Haugeland 1987, *passim*.

⁸⁸ Leinonen 2008, pp. 31–32; Bevir 2000, pp. 392–397.

illocutionary force, the motivational side is considered. Anyway it would be possible to handle non-verbally expressed intentions in the same way as purely linguistic ones, as Skinner has suggested.⁸⁹

1.4 James F. Byrnes - All in One Lifetime

James Francis Byrnes was born on May 2, 1882⁹⁰ in Charleston, South Carolina to a poor Irish-Catholic immigrant family. His grandfathers had come to South Carolina around 1850. James's father died of tuberculosis at the age of twenty-six, just before his birth and the family of two children were forced to live in reduced circumstances. The young James went to St. Patrick's Parochial School, but he was forced to get a full time job at the age of 14 because of the family's poor economic situation. At the time, secondary education was economically beyond most people's reach in South Carolina. Byrnes worked in the law firm of Mordecai, Gadsden, Rutledge and Hagood in Charleston as a secretary-stenographer and obtained real experience of a lawyer's work. At the age of 21, he moved to Aiken and became an assistant to Judge James Aldrich. The change of residence made it possible for Byrnes to study law on the side. Four years later he passed the state bar examination, but kept his stenographer's job. To boost his income, Byrnes and his journalist friend, Alva K. Lorenz, borrowed money and purchased the local newspaper, the *Aiken Journal and Review*. As a business manager and newspaperman, Byrnes's maturing interest in politics was also reflected in his editorials on the public issues of the day. He was keen to express his opinions on alcohol legislation, race relations, political corruption, the condition of the highway network, tourism and industry. According to Winfred B. Moore, through these editorial statements, Byrnes began to formulate a public philosophy that focused on "bringing order to the state's politics, developing its economic potential, improving the welfare of its citizens, and bringing it closer to the mainstream of twentieth century American life."⁹¹

In 1906 Byrnes married Maude Busch. At the same time, Byrnes left the Catholic Church and became a member of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Evidently his conversion was in deference to Maude's mother, a devout Episcopalian, who had expressed reservations about marriages between Protestants and Catholics. On the other hand, Byrnes also knew that a Catholic had little chance of advancing in politics in South Carolina. Whatever the real reason for his conversion, his political opponents later accused Byrnes of opportunism. Regardless of his conversion, Byrnes got his experience of politics in 1908 when he became a candidate for a circuit solicitor, an elective office with

⁸⁹ Skinner 1971, pp. 16-19.

⁹⁰ Byrnes official date of birth was usually put on record as May 2, 1879, because in May 1900, he misrepresented his age to minimize any problems that his youth might have caused him in acquiring the stenographer's job in Spartanburg.

⁹¹ Moore 1983, p. 79.

duties similar those of district attorneys in other states. Thanks to his widespread popularity in Aiken, Byrnes was elected, and he started to work as a successful prosecutor in South Carolina. Byrnes's potential as a solicitor and politician was noticed by several powerful local politicians in the Aiken County Democratic organization, and they encouraged him to run for the United States Congress.

Byrnes's actual political career started in 1911, when he was elected to the House of Representatives as a Democrat. The outcome of the elections reflected the influence of the national progressive movement, through which many older conservative office-holders were challenged by younger and more liberal politicians. Perhaps Byrnes was a stereotypical Southern "Progressive", who came from elements of upward social mobility and who was interested in bringing order, modernization and consensus to society. In the House, Byrnes was noted for his strong opinions on economic policy, and he was considered a loyal follower of President Woodrow Wilson. Byrnes supported all Wilson's reforms except on racial issues, and he was regarded as a Southern Progressive. The young senator also opposed the president on issues connected to immigration and child labor, which he thought were strongly associated with racial policy.⁹² At the 1920 Democratic Convention in San Francisco, Byrnes worked tirelessly to keep the Democrats behind the Wilson Doctrine. He contributed to economic policy through his committee work. During the New Deal era, Byrnes became known as a supporter of conservative economic ideas. On several economic issues he accepted Keynesian principles and even some liberal ideas while at the same time remaining amenable to compromise. However, Byrnes was never known as a New Dealer, although in the Senate he promoted the program like "the leader of the Senate."⁹³ Byrnes thought that the depression called for temporary expansion of the powers of the federal government to help industry, agriculture and the economically destitute. At the same time Byrnes reasserted his standard beliefs in a limited central government and reduced expenditures and maintained an ideological flexibility. In his memoirs, Byrnes stated the thesis of his political and legislative philosophy:

I had begun to learn that in all relationships in life success and happiness can be achieved only by a willingness to make concessions.... the art of legislating is the art of intelligent compromise. No one congressman can have this way; the spirit of compromise is necessary to secure the essential majority. Frequently an obstinate man, whose political creed is 'my will be done', will attempt to justify his course by asserting there can be no compromise when a principle is involved, and he is likely to see 'principle' in every issue, even in determining the amount of money to be appropriated for some unimportant activity. In my experience there were really few

⁹² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B1:F12. Political Biography. Profile, 27.8.1945; Moore 1978, pp. 42–44. Winfred Moore has considered Byrnes as a "New South Statesman". The term "New South" has also been used to refer to political leaders in the South who embraced progressive ideas on education and economic growth and minimized racial rhetoric, even if not promoting integration. The "New South Creed" came to be the dominant ideology of the leaders of the postbellum South and Byrnes was evidently one inheritor of that creed. Moore 1975, pp. ix–x.

⁹³ Moore 1975, pp. 196–197.

bills in which great principle was involved; these issues were usually matters of policy, not principle.⁹⁴

According to Chester Bowles, Byrnes was certainly not a liberal, but he accepted some liberal ideas out of loyalty. Paradoxically, he also came to support racial equality as a part of the New Deal policy, which improved the economic situation of African Americans more than any other previous reform.⁹⁵ During his years in Congress, Byrnes established good relationships with several high-ranking politicians and diplomats. In 1917 Byrnes was appointed to the Appropriations Committee and performed an important role as Chairman of the Naval Appropriations Subcommittee. Both committees played a significant role when the United States entered the First World War. It was then that Byrnes's collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt began. Together with Roosevelt Byrnes advanced the build-up of the navy by planning and pushing through naval appropriations bills.

In the House, Byrnes served all seven terms until 1925. In autumn 1924, Byrnes ran as a candidate for the Senate instead of the House. This time his campaign was a failure, and the unsuccessful Byrnes returned to South Carolina and moved his law practice to Spartanburg. Thanks to his successful business and good investment advice from friends such as Bernard Baruch, Byrnes became a wealthy man. However, his withdrawal from politics was not to be a permanent one. Byrnes finally became a senator in 1931, and he immediately secured notable positions on several committees.⁹⁶

Byrnes's road to becoming a member of the political elite of the United States was unquestionably a challenging one, but at the top he gained unprecedented extensive experience. As a New Deal supporter, Byrnes made his mark in domestic and economic policy. Thanks to his good relationship with President Roosevelt, Byrnes became one of the most influential American politicians of the 1930s. Certainly, his timing was perfect, because the triumphant march of the Democratic Party and Roosevelt carried Byrnes along with it. According to Bowles, Byrnes became "the majority leader of the Senate."⁹⁷ When the Democrats rose to power in both chambers in the spring of 1933, Arthur Krock described Byrnes in respectful terms in his article in *The New York Times*: "Senator Byrnes is leaned upon heavily by Mr. Roosevelt as his

⁹⁴ Byrnes 1958, pp. 4-5.

⁹⁵ CUOHROC, Reminiscences of Chester Bowles, by Neil N. Gold (29 March 1963), on pages 172 and 78 in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection; Moore 1978, p. 46.

⁹⁶ Byrnes 1958, pp. 59-60.; Messer 1982, pp. 3-4; US Congressional Archives (www); Byrnes scholars (www). Because of his close association with Bernard M. Baruch, Byrnes was able to utilize the New York financier to arrange campaign funds for Democratic friends, although never for himself. On Byrnes's recommendation, Baruch contributed 4,000 dollars to Senator Harry S. Truman's primary campaign fund in 1938. Brown 1992, pp. 60-61.

⁹⁷ CUOHROC, Reminiscences of Chester Bowles (April 1, 1963), page 172 in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection.

economic champion in Congress, and his ability and effective methods in persuading difficult colleagues are renowned.”⁹⁸

During the Great Depression, Byrnes wanted to initiate extensive building projects, which would benefit economic recovery in the United States. One of the biggest building projects was the Santee Cooper Dam project, the cause of which he championed. The purpose of that massive inland waterway system was to aid commerce, control flooding and also to electrify the entire State with hydroelectric power. Through his good relations with Roosevelt, Senator Byrnes persuaded the Federal Government to authorize a loan for the entire project.⁹⁹ In fact, in the Senate Byrnes was a strong advocate of Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation and helped him to successfully manage the irritation caused by his plan to expand the Supreme Court so that he could nominate justices who would uphold New Deal legislation. He also helped the president to secure the repeal of the Neutrality Act of 1935. In the Senate, Byrnes focused mainly on issues of domestic policy and he had little to do with foreign policy. However he was strongly against the isolationist policies that were supported by interwar peace movements. On May 22, 1940 he made an address criticizing American neutrality and dismissing political views, put forward especially by the aviation hero and Nazi-sympathizer Charles Lindbergh, according to which an independent American destiny meant that the future of America would not be tied to eternal wars in Europe. Byrnes told his national audience in a broadcast over the C.B.S. radio network that on the subject of foreign policy Lindbergh was no more qualified to speak than “Wrong Way” Corrigan or any other aviator who might fly the Atlantic Ocean. Byrnes also reminded the American people that Lindbergh had received a medal from Hitler. Later Roosevelt appointed Byrnes and Carter Glass to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in order to counterbalance the reluctant non-interventionist minority. In January 1941 Roosevelt wanted to extend more aid to the Allies through the Lend-Lease bill, and in the Senate Byrnes played a major role in the passing of this bill. In fact, Byrnes was one of the first senators to endorse lend-lease. He was well aware of what had happened in Europe in the 1930s. He had made a few trips to the Far East and to Europe and even witnessed the 1937 Nuremberg Rally of the NSDAP in Germany. The military development of Germany and Japan troubled him, and as the chairman of the Naval Appropriations Subcommittee Byrnes pushed through more funds for naval construction. The European trip re-kindled Byrnes’s interest in foreign affairs. During the interwar years he had supported various disarmament and peace agreements, but with the rise of belligerent totalitarian powers Byrnes became interested in increasing American military preparedness. As an old Wilsonian internationalist this interest was consistent with his earlier views on foreign policy.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ *The New York Times* 5.2.1933. Arthur Krock “Three Cabinet Choices ‘Raid’ Senate Leadership”.

⁹⁹ Brown 1992, pp. 18–19.

¹⁰⁰ Moore 1975, p. 317; Byrnes 1947, pp. 3–4. In 1935 Byrnes joined a congressional delegation on a tour of the Orient. The main objective of the trip was to attend the

As a some sort of reward for his skills in domestic policy, Roosevelt appointed him an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 1940. Byrnes accepted the job a year later and left his senatorial position to become a member of one of the youngest courts ever. As a Supreme Court Justice, Byrnes made 16 judgments during the 1941–1942 court term, and he emphasized the difference between the three arms of federal government. According to Byrnes, the role of the Supreme Court was to interpret the laws and not to make them. However the preservation of the balance between the powers of the federal government and the powers of the states proved to be difficult because Byrnes believed that the Constitution expressed great principles in language that permitted the application of those principles to entirely new conditions. Therefore, he wanted to see the Court as the “defender of the Constitution” against the actions of the executive or the Congress.¹⁰¹

After only a year and half, Byrnes decided to resign from his wellpaid lifetime sinecure in the Supreme Court. Roosevelt needed his skills and asked Byrnes to accept an appointment as Director of the Office of Economic Stabilization (OEM). At the time the country was deeply involved in the war, and the President wanted Byrnes to relieve him of some of the problems on the home front and the jurisdictional disputes which increased with the creation of every new agency. In practice, Roosevelt nominated Byrnes, more or less *de jure*, as an “assistant president” and wanted him to have offices in the White House. In the OEM, Byrnes had also been the head of the War Labor Board and Price Control, and in practice he was in charge of balancing the economy. His major goal in regulating the economy was to ensure that the army was sufficiently equipped. On the home front, Byrnes made real progress by curbing the rise of prices. By the summer of 1942 the cost-of-living index had increased of 17 per cent over the September 1939 figure. During Byrnes’s directorship of the OEM, the cost of living increased by only 4.3 per cent, mostly because of the Hold-the-Line order drafted by Byrnes and Roosevelt.¹⁰²

The power of the OEM was perhaps too narrow for Byrnes because it did not extend to the army or the navy. Byrnes apparently wished to improve the economic coordination of the entire United States. The Office of War Mobilization (OWM) was founded mainly because of this lack of power and its birth was accredited to Byrnes. As Director of the Office of War Mobilization,

inauguration of Manuel Quezon as the first President of the Philippine Commonwealth, to survey Japanese military advances in China and to study the expanding Japanese textile industry. In 1937 Byrnes journeyed to Europe with his colleagues, senators Adams, Minton and Thomas. The main task of the delegation was to study the unemployment and relief situation in Europe. In Paris they attended the Interparliamentary Union. In Nuremberg senators stood on a platform provided for foreign dignitaries. Byrnes 1958, p. 108. Byrnes had made his first trip to Europe already in 1918, when he and other members of a congressional delegation were assigned to evaluate the efficiency of American military supply services in Europe.

¹⁰¹ Byrnes 1958, pp. 141–146.

¹⁰² Byrnes 1958, pp. 162–163. The control of inflation was one of the main tasks of the OWM. During the First World War, inflation in the United States had been virtually uncontrollable.

Byrnes was really the president of the United States in economic affairs. His economic line followed a strictly "Hold the Line" policy, according to which wage claims were to be curbed. In fact, as Director of the OWM Byrnes had the power to initiate policies and lay out programs that would coordinate the work of all the war agencies and federal departments in connection with production, procurement, transportation and distribution. In addition to that, he had the power to see to it that all his decisions were carried out. During the heavy strike wave in the early 1940s, Byrnes, who had been dubbed an "economic czar" by *TIME* magazine, had in fact struggled against rising prices. In his opinion, inflation would be good for no-one.¹⁰³

From the New Deal era on, Byrnes had been known as an expert in domestic and economic policy, but after his leading positions in the Office of Economic Stabilization and the Office of War Mobilization, Byrnes became Roosevelt's favorite, and he was predicted to be the next vice-president or at least secretary of state. However, in the vice-president candidacy of 1944, Roosevelt chose Truman over Byrnes, which was a big disappointment for the latter. Behind this decision lay the current "Negro issue", on account of which Roosevelt could not risk the losing vice-president candidacy by choosing Byrnes, who was regarded as a racist. Four years earlier, Byrnes's candidacy had been stymied by religious issues. His conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism had been regarded as too controversial although it was generally thought that the position of vice-president belonged to Byrnes,¹⁰⁴ and Roosevelt had regarded him as indisputably the best choice for the vice-presidency. Some studies have speculated that there was a gentleman's agreement between Roosevelt, Truman and Byrnes about the re-allocation of offices should the situation change, as unquestionably happened after Roosevelt's death.¹⁰⁵

The death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 gave Truman a nation that was still strongly involved in the war. From the outset, it was clear to Truman that not many of Roosevelt's cabinet members would fit in with his plans. However, there was no need for any dramatic change because of the Democrats' domination in both chambers. Luckily, several old cabinet members were ready to retire, deadened by the difficult wartime experience. This also relieved the "mudhole"¹⁰⁶ in the cabinet, which Truman had inherited from Roosevelt. Roosevelt's death had left a gaping vacuum, because one of his greatest faults was his refusal to confide in others the outlines of his policies

¹⁰³ CUOHROC, Reminiscences of William H. Davis (13. April 1958), on pages 144-145 in Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection; *Time* 19.4.1943. "Hold the Line". Byrnes 1958, pp. 186-187. In OWM Byrnes gathered his own small group of trusted people: Ben Cohen, legal adviser, Donald Russell, an assistant to the Director, Walter Brown, research and press relations and Cassie Connor, administrative assistant and confidential secretary. Several functions of the OWM, OEM, OCS and OESA were consolidated by establishing a new Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR) in October 1944.

¹⁰⁴ Yergin 1977, pp. 110-111; BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B18:F6, Walter Brown's memo, Byrnes's Election 1944, July 11-13.

¹⁰⁵ For example. Ward 1979, p. 3; Messer 1982, pp. 9-10; On choosing a candidate for the vice presidency, see Sinclair 1967, p. 1172.

¹⁰⁶ Pemberton 1989, pp. 39-41. "Mudhole of a cabinet".

and aspirations. According to George C. Herring, Roosevelt should have been more cognizant of his own mortality and should have educated Vice President Harry S. Truman. Truman had been selected as a compromise candidate, and he was not included in Roosevelt's inner circle after the inauguration. During the spring of 1945, six members of the administration in total were replaced and only four were retained. And after the Secretary of War Henry Stimson resigned in September 1945, only Henry Wallace, Harold Ickes and James V. Forrestal were left of the old cabinet. Clearly, Truman's reference to the "mudhole" was directed at Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, who relocated to the United Nations Organization and was replaced by Byrnes on July 3, 1945. Although Byrnes was better politically qualified than Stettinius, historians have argued over Truman's real reasons for choosing Byrnes. Truman might have felt a twinge of guilt at having taken the 1944 vice-presidential nomination from the more prominent Byrnes.¹⁰⁷

On the other hand, Byrnes and Truman were in similar positions. Like Truman's, Byrnes's background was provincial, and the new Secretary of State also lacked a knowledge and fixed ideas about foreign policy. In the public's view, choosing Byrnes was not a surprise because of his record but because of his invisibility in foreign policy. After Byrnes's inauguration, *The New York Times* described him as a realist who "brings to foreign affairs a philosophy gained in a long and varied public life", but the paper also questioned his skills:

Mr. Byrnes is certainly not what career diplomats or other perfectionists would call a foreign-policy expert. He has at best only a general knowledge of the mechanics of diplomacy and knows little and cares less for protocol. He is not regarded as a profound student of international politics or of the history of other countries. His fixed opinions on world matters are very few indeed and stem mostly from the national policies with which he has been associated. But Mr. Byrnes's friends and backers - including President Truman - see a new and larger chapter opening in the relations between the United States and the rest of the world and they see in Mr. Byrnes an ideal person to articulate the American point of view in practical terms. They readily concede that he lacks some of the expertness that comes from long and intimate experience in international dealing, but they are certain that he is devoid of many limitations which go with specialization.¹⁰⁸

Outside the media, Byrnes was regarded as a comparatively unknown politician, who was not clearly either a Republican or a Democrat. Maybe this point of view was useful to Byrnes when he later tried to exploit the trust of both political parties. At the same time, Byrnes, who acted in the OWM rather like a dictator and fraternized with President Roosevelt, was regarded as the shrewdest politician of the time.¹⁰⁹ Robert L. Messer's view, Byrnes's appointment as a Secretary of State was felt as a disappointment in certain circles, because he had bypassed many more eminent American specialists in foreign policy. On the other hand, Byrnes had already tasted a concentrated

¹⁰⁷ Pemberton 1989, p. 40; Culver & Hyde 2000, pp. 389-391; Kolko 1990, p. 554; Herring 2008, pp. 588-589, 599.

¹⁰⁸ *The New York Times*, 8.7.1945. Turner Catledge "Secretary Byrnes: The Portrait of a Realist".

¹⁰⁹ Pemberton 1989, p. 37. "One of the nation's shrewdest politicians".

dose of power politics when he traveled to Yalta as a member of Roosevelt's delegation. This doubtless influenced President Truman when he began to think about a new Secretary of State.¹¹⁰

According to the picture he gives in his memoirs, Byrnes, who was regarded as a snappy dresser and an elegant house guest, did not care for social functions. He participated with little enthusiasm in almost all conventional informal diplomatic occasions, like evening gatherings and especially the "vodka breaks" that were an established practice of the Soviet delegates. In the light of other sources, however, Byrnes comes across as an extrovert, who took advantage of the possibilities afforded by informal meetings and unstructured talks. Such occasions presented themselves quite frequently, and they were extremely important, especially for successful negotiations with Molotov. Byrnes was not a teetotaler, but he did not like wine much. On the other hand, he did have a liking for Scotch, which he had delivered to him when he worked abroad. Byrnes himself described his simple material needs as "two tailor-made suits a year, three meals a day and a reasonable amount of good liquor."¹¹¹

As a person, Byrnes was regarded as an extremely self-confident and tough negotiator, who closely followed American public opinion.¹¹² As a manipulator of the media, Byrnes was in advance of his time and frequently came out of difficult occasions with credit – typically thanks to his fast reactions and rhetorical skills. Imbued with these skills and a gentlemanly appearance as he was, Byrnes was designated in 1930 by *Time* as a "politician of politicians" and in 1946 the magazine chose him as Man of the Year. However, in public he preferred to represent himself as a humble and unpretentious man. Even if Mr. and Mrs. Byrnes were numbered among the elite in Washington for almost three decades, they were rarely seen at banquets or cocktail parties. Maude Byrnes did not participate in public life at all, and she never gave interviews.¹¹³ Outside of the pleasant picture of Byrnes created by the media there lay, however, a controversial person, who had enemies among Democrats and Republicans alike. Byrnes's powerful standpoints in favor of racial segregation during his time in the Supreme Court (1941–1942) had unquestionably placed a heavy burden on the Democratic Party and on himself too.¹¹⁴ One of the most

¹¹⁰ Messer 1982, pp. 69–70. Choosing Byrnes as a Secretary of State was an especially bitter pill to swallow for Henry Morgenthau, who had acted as Secretary of the Treasury. Another critic was Senator Olin Johnston, who came also from South Carolina and did not get along with Byrnes.

¹¹¹ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B14:F5, Press and Radio Conference #9, Held by War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes on Tuesday, February 13, 1945 At 4.05 P.M.E.W.T. in the Conference Room, East Wing of the White House. Byrnes remembered the special pepper-flavored vodka when he returned to Washington from Yalta; Byrnes 1947, p. 44. See Partin 1977, p. 7.

¹¹² The founder of the American Institute of Public Opinion and American pioneer of survey sampling techniques and inventor of the Gallup Poll, George Gallup, sent copies of the Gallup Political Almanac to Byrnes. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F10, To George Gallup, 4.9.1946; E.g. Ward 1979, p. 6.

¹¹³ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F2, The Woman Beside the Man, by Mary Farrell, October 1945.

¹¹⁴ According to Byrnes, President Roosevelt wanted to relieve him of his duties in the Supreme Court and make him Director of the OEM. Leave of absence from the

influential minority interest groups, The National Association of Colored People, made known its discontent with Byrnes's appointment as Secretary of State on the basis of his stubborn "hostility to equality of opportunity for Negro citizens."¹¹⁵ On the other hand, not all blacks opposed Byrnes, especially in the South. A.A. Richardson, a good South Carolina friend of Byrnes, could welcome Byrnes home without worry because in South Carolina all "niggers" would "tip their hats" if they saw Byrnes.¹¹⁶

Byrnes's juridical background influenced his activities throughout his whole life. When he was serving in the State Department, he looked at issues through the eyes of a lawyer, which also annoyed his subordinates. According to the memoirs of Chester Bowles, Byrnes allowed problems to erupt first and only then fixed them. However, as a problem-solver he was incomparable, although frequently the heaviest administrative burden in disposing of a problem fell on his assistants. Bowles's criticism of Byrnes's capability to foresee what was to come might be justified, but it reinforces the picture of Byrnes as a political realist who always acted according to the prevailing conditions. His inability to predict future developments could be regarded as a general unwillingness to speculate about an uncertain future. As in chess, Byrnes proceeded move by move without particular visible plans. When problems became evident, Byrnes relied on his abilities as a negotiator and a compromiser.¹¹⁷

Generally, the considerable contradictions inherent in Byrnes's personality have perhaps subsequently been best described by T.H. Watkins: "Racist and progressive, pro-labor and anti-communist, New Deal liberal and Cold War conservative."¹¹⁸ On the other hand, Byrnes's racist connections were not that unusual considering the time and the culture of the Southern states. Although suspicions about his connections with organizations like the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and the Order of United American Mechanics were raised, the reality of these connections was never investigated in public.¹¹⁹ Despite Byrnes's rather

Supreme Court was not possible, however, and because of the numerous political influences he would be exposed to in the OEM, Byrnes resigned from his permanent position in the Court. In his own words, the reason for doing so was his indebtedness to President Roosevelt, whom he had, after Pearl Harbor, promised to assist in every way possible. Byrnes 1947, pp. 17–18.

¹¹⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B11:F17. News Clips. Negroes Rap Byrnes, New York, 2.7.1945.

¹¹⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B6:F4, From Richardson to Byrnes, 22.8.1945.

¹¹⁷ CUOHROC, Reminiscences of Chester Bowles (29. March 1963), on pages 76–79 in Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection; CUOHROC, Reminiscences of Chester Bowles (5. April 1963), on pages 134–137 in Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection.

¹¹⁸ Robertson 1994, cover.

¹¹⁹ In May 1946, *Rocky Mountain News* reported on Byrnes's affiliation with the United American Mechanics. The Order of United American Mechanics was an American nativist organization of the mid-nineteenth century. It was founded in Philadelphia amid the anti-alien riots of 1844–45. President Truman was also questioned about the real state of affairs by citizens. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F15, From MRS. Charles B. Kober to Truman. However, Byrnes became much more liberal in the 1950s and as a senator from South Carolina he contributed the Anti-

many-sided reputation, he became one of the very few politicians who served in all three arms of the federal government while also remaining active in state government. He was a Congressman, Senator, Justice of the Supreme Court, Director of the Office of Economic Stabilization and the Office of War Mobilization, Roosevelt's "assistant president", Secretary of State and Governor of South Carolina. The title of Byrnes's memoir *All in one Lifetime* could not have described his life better. Standing aside as a justice of the Supreme Court made Byrnes into a kind of martyr, who sacrificed his well-paid post to participate in the war effort by serving as an expert specialist for Roosevelt. As an "assistant president", Byrnes had remarkable responsibilities and powers in connection with domestic affairs, which placed many of the most problematic political problems on his shoulders, thus allowing Roosevelt to concentrate better on power politics.¹²⁰

Byrnes success did not come easily even within the Democratic Party. The prohibition on racial discrimination in work in the summer of 1941 caused a state of disunion among the Democrats, especially because the Minister of Agriculture and Byrnes's former colleague, Henry A. Wallace, had made a name for himself by supporting minorities like black people and leftists.¹²¹ When Byrnes and Truman, concentrating almost exclusively on foreign politics, formed a close duumvirate that ruled the Democrats and indeed the whole United States, Wallace and his supporters mustered an opposition group inside the party. The ethos of the Civil War was invoked by the reformist Wallace, who felt strong antipathy toward Byrnes with his South Carolina origins, and the absence of Wallace from the vice-presidential elections of 1944 did not improve the atmosphere. The tension between the two had grown out of previous incidents, because Roosevelt had offloaded the task of reconciling a dispute between Wallace and the Secretary of Commerce of that time, Jesse H. Jones, onto the shoulders of Byrnes.¹²²

In the presidential election of 1944, the results of a supporters' extension campaign started six years earlier by Roosevelt were manifested. That project had had an enormous influence on black people, who now emerged as a major player in the election. The effect was intensified by a significant migration of black people to the north side of the Mason-Dixon line, where the decisive states for the election results were located. According to David Robertson, this

Mask and Cross Burning Bill. BP. Series 6: Interim Materials, B21:F4, From Knights of The Ku Klux Klan (Sam W. Roper) to Byrnes, 2.2.1951. In October 1944, a few newspapers began circulating reports accusing Vice-President Truman of being a member of the KKK, but the rumors quickly died out. After Truman's death, it was revealed that Truman had been a Klan member in 1922 for a short period of time, because he needed Klan support in order to win an election as county judge. Brown 1992, p. 227.

¹²⁰ Ward 1979, p. 1; See FIGURE 3. Office of Economic Stabilization, OEM; Office of War Mobilization, OWM; BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B18:F7, Byrnes and Calhoun by James A. Hoyt, Formerly Speaker, South Carolina House of Representatives, Released for publication when and if James F. Byrnes is nominated for Vice President, 1944.

¹²¹ Kero 1991, p. 424.

¹²² Brown 1992, pp. 150-152; Culver & Hyde 2000, pp. 305-307.

phenomenon was related to the general annulment of the social structure created after the Civil War, which caused many blacks from the Republican camp to move over to the Democratic side.¹²³ From the outside, the disagreement between Wallace and Byrnes, which had been conducted on a businesslike level, ended on September 12, 1946 as a result of Wallace's speech in Madison Square Garden, in which he vigorously criticized the Soviet policies pursued by Truman and Byrnes at the Paris Peace Conference.¹²⁴ Wallace's speech led to his resignation from the cabinet shortly afterwards.¹²⁵

Many people changed their views about Byrnes's character during his secretaryship. His activities were closely followed by the media after his period in office as well. In line with the opinion polls of the American Institute of Public Opinion, Byrnes, the Man of the Year in 1946, was ranked in March 1947 in seventh place on the list of America's most admirable living persons. He outranked Pope Pius XII and the Republican's upcoming presidential candidate, Thomas E. Dewey. However, Byrnes was not considered a potential candidate for the presidency in the postwar United States. At its highest, support for Byrnes's as the party's presidential candidate among the Democrats was in December of 1946 about ten percent, which was a little higher than that of the Republican's up and coming Dwight D. Eisenhower.¹²⁶ Even so, Byrnes refused to run for president in the primary elections of 1948.

After leaving his duties as a Secretary of State in January 1947, Byrnes bowed out of politics and returned to South Carolina. However, his withdrawal from politics proved to be temporary, and just three years later he was elected Governor of South Carolina by a landslide victory. He served as governor until 1955, after which he became a kind of political *éminence grise*. His political views were not tied as clearly to the Democratic Party as they had been earlier. On the contrary, Byrnes came out in public as a supporter and mentor of Republican candidates. Willy-nilly, Byrnes political record began to resemble that of John C. Calhoun, another Southern statesman who never was able to consummate his career with the presidency.¹²⁷

Seen as a whole, and purely in retrospect, Byrnes's life appears to be a classic rags-to-riches story. Behind this heroic picture there was, however, a passionate power-seeking person, who, when necessary, was ready to undertake questionable deeds that ran contrary to his own principles. As a convert to Protestantism, a Democrat who also supported Republicans, a racist and the Man of Year of 1946, it is easy to dismiss his life with the words

¹²³ Robertson 1994, pp. 329–331.

¹²⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, Madison Square Garden, New York City, 8 p.m., September 12, 1946, "The Way to Peace"; Byrnes 1947, p. 239.

¹²⁵ For instance, Ward 1979, pp. 143–144.

¹²⁶ The Quarter's Polls. AIPO Apr. 23, '47, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 11, Issue 4 (Summer 1947), p. 299.

¹²⁷ Byrnes 1958, passim; Robertson 1994, passim. Byrnes campaigned on behalf of Richard Nixon in 1968; BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B18:F7, Byrnes and Calhoun by James A. Hoyt, Formerly Speaker, South Carolina House of Representatives, Released for publication when and if James F. Byrnes is nominated for Vice President, 1944.

“turncoat”, “political weathercock” or “opportunist.” Not many politicians as well-known as Byrnes have been regarded in different surveys at the same time as both liberal and conservative, a friend and an enemy of the workers, a religious Democrat and a closet Republican. This kind of black-and-white and highly controversial picture is, however, exaggerated when we take into account Byrnes’s long life and the very challenging circumstances that he faced. Rather, Byrnes profile manifests itself as a picture of a very adaptable person, whose adaptation to different situations was necessary in order to be able to operate in the maelstrom of power politics. From these perspectives, it is justifiable to consider Byrnes a realist and a master of compromise.

2 FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S WILSONISM TOWARDS THE NEW ARRANGEMENT OF POWER POLITICS

2.1 The ideological legacy of Roosevelt's "closed club politics"

2.1.1 The Wilsonian framework of the anti-isolation policy

Within the United States, amity was largely accomplished due to the relationships between Democrats and Republicans as arranged by President Roosevelt. This truce, upheld in the name of bipartisanship, had allowed Roosevelt and his inner circle considerable latitude in foreign policy issues. This was mainly due to the state of emergency, even though the debate between isolationism and an active foreign policy had been multi-faceted. Some Republicans who had distanced themselves from isolationism had committed themselves to the foreign policy of the Democratic ascendancy, provided it adhered to "Wilsonian ideals". According to these ideals, the United States would return to global politics on a moralistic crusade, to make the world a safer place for democracy. The background of Wilsonian idealism and the later ideologized Wilsonism was broadly based on the relationship of American progressivism and foreign policy during the First World War. Wilsonian ideals and progressive ideology can justifiably be construed as a part of Byrnes's world of opportunities. Byrnes was an active member of Congress during Wilson's presidency and his confidence in Wilson is repeatedly evident in his memoirs.¹²⁸ Equally, the effects of the progressive movement were evident. This movement strengthened in the early 20th century because of Wilsonian ideals, the Democratic Party and especially because of Byrnes, who distinguished himself in domestic policy.

¹²⁸ Byrnes 1958, pp. 40, 59-60 Byrnes wrote in *All In One Lifetime*: "Despite his idealism, President Wilson was not above being a practical politician."; *The New York Times*, 8.7.1945. Turner Catledge "Secretary Byrnes: The Portrait of a Realist".

As purely temporal ideals, both Wilsonian idealism and progressive ideology increase in significance especially in relation to isolation policy and the role of the United States in the international system. They must also be interpreted as historical-political phenomena, which means using history as a political argument. Included in history-politics is also the need to debate what is accepted as history. This aspect is evident through processes controlling the past and in attempts to define society's core values and goals through the past.¹²⁹

Daniel Yergin has used the concept of Wilsonism in his research. By Wilsonism, Yergin means a certain ideal of liberal internationalism, according to which the United States should throw itself into global politics with full force, especially into its core question of the power balance in Europe. President Woodrow Wilson, the father of the ideal, wanted to reflect American values onto world politics, which combined a liberal society with Lockean consensus. The Wilsonian agenda sought to find the middle ground between regression and revolution, preserving national autonomy, representative democracy, the League of Nations, the closing down of titular empires, the unacknowledgement of revolutionary changes, disarmament and the belief in an enlightened public opinion and an open-door world economy. As a leader of the winning country after World War I, Wilson was able to offer his plans for the codification of international law in Versailles. The foundation of that law reflected arch-American values from the freedom of religion, to the right of sovereignty and majority government.¹³⁰

Programmatically, Wilsonism has been encapsulated in a speech given by the President in Congress on January 8, 1918. In his speech, Wilson wanted to clarify the reasons for the war and offer his outlook on the restoration of peace in the world. Central to the speech was Wilson's 14-point peace plan, which later acted as the foundation for the final peace treaty. According to Yergin, the goal of Wilsonism in foreign policy was to remove all conflict and anarchy in international affairs. At the same time, Wilsonism was used to eradicate the central substance of world politics – the balance of power, spheres of influence and power politics – which were traditionally thought to be irrevocable parts of the international system. Concepts like power politics and the European Concert carried with them a sour taste in a world battered by the First World War, the reason for which was generally thought to be outdated "secret diplomacy".¹³¹

¹²⁹ Tilly 2009, pp. 280–282.

¹³⁰ Dodd 1923, pp. 119–120; Yergin 1977, p. 10.

¹³¹ Yergin 1977, pp. 8–10. All Republicans did not ever accept Wilsonism under any circumstances. PWW 1984, p. 519. Still, Wilson's program can be studied as a less ideological realpolitik. For instance, according to Olavi Arens, Wilson's Fourteen Points was directed against Germany, because in Germany Lenin was expected to seek peace for Russia and Wilson was expected to favor continuation of the war at the same time. On the grounds of an arrant program as an embodiment of Wilsonian ideology that kind of conclusion can hardly be made. Arens 2006; Ferguson 2006, p. 91; Trachtenberg 1999, p. 15.

In the early 1920s, Wilsonism began to be studied as a neo-retro social philosophy, which was grounded in President Wilson's desire to demonstrate the necessity of accountability in US foreign policy. William E. Dodd, a professor of history at the University of Chicago and a Wilson scholar, takes accountability to mean the same kind of leadership which developed in Britain after the American Civil War. In this respect, Wilsonian ideology had a need to make politics more public. Even though the foundation for Wilson's reforms originated in the reforms regarding the relationship between the Congress and the President, its foreign policy aspect became much more significant. The Monroe Doctrine, which had dominated foreign policy for a century, had on the surface tried to protect weak American states against attacks from European nations, but behind the scenes the United States had become the big brother of all the states on the continent, and one who tried to financially capitalize on its position. From Dodd's contemporary perspective, Wilson wanted to return Monroeism to its origins and protect the weak against the strong. When Wilson ascended to the presidency, US foreign policy was paradoxically focused only on the internal affairs of the American continent. The rapid growth of prosperity in the 1910s meant that Americans applied their paternalistic attitude in the Far East as well, which was evident in the objective of the Open Door policy to invade the Chinese market. Yet, the open trade was very one sided, as the US simultaneously upheld a very conservative customs policy. Whilst the tenets of Monroe's doctrine are still apparent in many places in Latin America, Wilson became a fierce abolitionist of financial imperialism.¹³²

As the United States rapidly withdrew itself from the world stage after World War I, Wilsonism was in trouble. According to Dodd's contemporary analysis, the Americans were frightened of Wilson's far-reaching idealism, and wanted return to old ways. The return to isolation policy was then accelerated by economic policy, which was headed towards crisis due to the arrangements of reparation payments. The American public rejected Wilsonism most notably in the 1920 election; the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations were unsatisfactory. However, according to Yergin, the ideals of Wilsonism were not completely forgotten, even if the agenda was set aside. After the economic bubble burst causing a deep recession in the late 1920s, Wilsonian ideals emerged along with Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was elected president in 1932. In practice, the solution to the problem of isolation seems to have required deliberating the extent to which the United States was willing to remain fairly isolated, especially as financial factors encouraged activity. However, Wilsonism, colored by progressivism, was already at the time seen to contain its own risks. After all, the United States had moved into Latin America in the

¹³² William E. Dodd's philosophy was rooted in the South of his youth. He was supporter of Woodrow Wilson in 1912 and an advisor to the Wilson administration in planning the peace conference. Dodd was also named as the American ambassador to Nazi Germany in 1933. The Open Door Policy was often commented upon in dispatches and policy statements concerning China and Latin America. President Theodore Roosevelt regarded the Open Door Policy as a kind of Monroe Doctrine for Asia. Williams 1962, p. 64.

spirit of Manifest Destiny. This can be roughly compared to the post World War II need to create spheres of influence and buffer zones, mainly highlighted by the Soviet Union's actions. During the First World War, the internationalist way of thinking experienced its toughest resistance exactly due to the amorality of the realpolitik attached to it. On the other hand, after the war, President Wilson publicly endeavored to emphasize "peace without victors". After the Second World War, the possibility for such did not exist, especially as the new world order actively bound all parties even after the war.¹³³

The terms for the United States' return to power politics were quite idealistically defined in the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, which followed the Wilsonian ideology both politically and economically. However, the Atlantic Charter was accordant with the ideals of the United States and Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, for instance, would not have necessarily shared in its ideological foundation in its entirety. In the Charter, President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill resolved not to pursue territorial changes and emphasized the sovereignty of all nations. From the perspective of cooperation however, the question of colonial power, the abolition of which President Roosevelt had sought, proved to be most problematic. In this respect, the Soviet Union would have surely concurred with the opinion of the United States, but from many other viewpoints the only thing that connected the Soviet Union to two other significant Allies, was a common enemy.

The ethos of the Atlantic Charter was broadened in the Tehran Conference¹³⁴ in 1943. Roosevelt had assented to Stalin's demands for friendly neighbors and moving the Soviet-Polish border westwards. Also some reparation arrangements had been tentatively agreed upon, predominantly for the benefit of Poland. It was then that Roosevelt began to support the establishment of an organization like the United Nations. This signified, for its part, the fulfillment of the Wilsonian mandate and a final separating from the yearning to return to the road of isolationism. It is most apparent that from an ideological point of view, Byrnes accepted the ideals of Wilsonism and the return of the United States to the international sphere, but the other parts of

¹³³ Thompson 1987, pp. 117-122, 157. Progressivism had placed itself in a bad light in the 1950s, notably in the writing of William E. Leuchtenburg. Leuchtenburg emphasized the congruity of imperialism and progressivism, because both of them were in his opinion embodiments of the same type of governance. Progressivism might have had a minor role in claims considering the "tendencies towards imperialism" presented by Molotov during the Council of the Foreign Ministers.

¹³⁴ The Tehran Conference was the meeting of Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill between November 28 and December 1, 1943. It was the First World War II conference between the Big Three - the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom - in which Stalin was present. The central aim of the Tehran Conference was to plan the final strategy for the war against Nazi Germany and its allies, and the chief discussion centered on the opening of a second front in Western Europe. The Cairo Conference of November 22-26, 1943, held a few days before the Tehran Conference, had started the tradition of the Allies' war-time conferences, but it was not a real success because Stalin was absent. The Soviet leader refused to attend the conference on the grounds that since Chiang was attending, it might be seen by Japan as provocation on the part of the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt's legacy of foreign policy may have proved to be much more problematic, both for Byrnes and for Truman.¹³⁵

The public's opinion during Roosevelt's nearly 13 years in power was evident in the benevolent foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. From the president's point of view, both Stalin and the Soviet Union were, despite their ideology, the most effective weapons against National Socialism and against Hitler. Roosevelt had held this line in all negotiations preceding Yalta, which had also convinced Stalin of the Americans' ability to cooperate. It was generally understood however, that the US-Soviet relationship was not merely based on the personal relationship of Stalin and Roosevelt, but the President's increasingly deteriorating constitution and continuous ill health increased fears on both sides about the cooling of the relationship after the President's death.

At the top level of United States political elite there were also skeptics who would have preferred a minor military and political role for the Soviets. Byrnes was one of them, because, according to his own words, he had left for Yalta begrudgingly without the actual status of a negotiator, to just observe the progression of the Conference.¹³⁶ The reason for Byrnes's reluctance was formally his important job in the OWM, but Byrnes may have thought that observer's role was not in accordance to his ability. It has been claimed, however, that at Yalta President Roosevelt tried to pave Byrnes's road as one of his possible successors and in addition, piggyback Byrnes's impeccable public image when Yalta's achievements had to be lobbied to the people and the Congress.¹³⁷ The most obvious change occurred on July 28, 1945, when the Senate accepted the Charter of the United Nations by a vote of 89-2 and changed the course of US foreign politics from isolationism to internationalism.¹³⁸

Roosevelt, the realist, can only be considered Wilsonian in terms of objectives. Whereas Wilson was interested in ideological utopias, Roosevelt, the "Wilsonian rebel", focused on establishing the relationship of these ideals to the real world. However both of them had an intense antipathy toward balance-of-power thinking. Wilson was well-known for this because of his campaign against balance-of-power politics during and immediately after the First World War. In 1945 Roosevelt declared: "In the future world the misuse of power as implied in the term 'power politics' must not be the controlling factor in international relations."¹³⁹ Moreover, both Roosevelt and Wilson transformed the presidency from a relatively passive office into a powerful executive institution with new prerogatives. According to Olson, Roosevelt used his office to formulate public opinion and Wilson gave leadership to members of his party in Congress. Byrnes, who admired both Roosevelt and Wilson, can be expected to have components of both in his ideology.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ Yergin 1977, pp. 47-48; Gaddis 1978, pp. 62-63.

¹³⁶ Byrnes 1947, pp. 21-22.

¹³⁷ Messer 1982, pp. 31; Conover 1978, pp. 5-6. Compare to Byrnes 1947, p. 21.

¹³⁸ Remini 2006, pp. 342-343.

¹³⁹ Wight 2004, p. 29.

¹⁴⁰ Mearsheimer 2003, pp. 22-23; Dodd 1923, pp. 120-121; Yergin 1977, pp. 44-45.

2.1.2 The voices of progressivism and Americanism

One of the most significant factors that shaped the political life of the United States in the early 20th century was the progressive movement, which in its own way offered answers to the problems of an industrializing and urbanizing society. However, the movement never became unified. Progressivism included several movements aiming for economic, social or political reforms. Progressivism can be considered a part of American liberalism in the sense that the renaissance of democracy was to be implemented by taking power from those financially or otherwise privileged and giving it back to the people. On the other hand, progressivism continued along the path flagged by the Populist Party, which flourished in the 1880s and 1890s by demanding the rights of large segments of the population in political decision-making. In principle, progressivism is a political movement that “addresses ideas, impulses, and issues stemming from modernization of American society. Emerging at the end of the nineteenth century, it established much of the tone of American politics throughout the first half of the century”.¹⁴¹

Albert O. Hirschman, a researcher of the rhetoric used by conservative thinkers against social and political reform sees the promoters of the American progressivism as children of the French revolution. The development of a scientific worldview according to Hirschman led to the application of the chains of cause and effect outside of the field of physics. Action and reaction became the universal pair of opposites to reflect the world. Reactionaries lived in a “hostile world” where they were acting “against the values set by progressives to the social agenda”. The values set by progressives related to “noble objectives”, which, in the light of public opinion, were not worthy of a direct attack by reactionaries. Instead, they sought to show the weaknesses in the premises of the implementation of those who aspired to those objectives. The core of progressivism included issues central to the question of a welfare society: the prevention of social problems, crime, poverty and racism, for example.¹⁴²

Hirschman often writes about the progressives and progressivism using quotation marks, leaving the congruity of the significance of American progressivism as a broader and clearer semi-ideological whole unclear. The understanding of particularly American progressivism as such requires the broadening of thought beyond the traditional liberal-conservative dimension. When the other dimension is chosen to be either elitism or populism, progressivism is exposed as a mainstream tendency of both the right and the left. John D. Dilulio even speaks of conservatives as “carbon-copy progressives” who, as materialists, optimists and individualists, relied on “human reason” in the shaping of society.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Harriby 1999, p. 40; Kero 1991, pp. 309–311.

¹⁴² Hirschman 1991, p. 11.

¹⁴³ Dilulio 1992, pp. 720–723.

Progressivism, as interpreted by Markku Ruotsila, should be seen as an Anglo-American adaptation of European social democracy, or as “a socialism, which had lost its hold on theory and did not know Marx”.¹⁴⁴ The alternative offered by progressivism was more clearly based on the settlement of pragmatic everyday problems than the theories of socialism. A significant part of the driving force behind progressivism came from the gap between the rich and the poor, which was highlighted by the recession that began in 1893. Even though the recession at the end of the 19th century was not as deep as the recession of the late 1920s, in 1893 a significant portion of Americans lived on the margins of subsistence. According to Reino Kero, progressives were not representatives of socialism, the goal of which would have been to destroy the foundations of the American economic and social systems. They only wanted to bridle and tweak the capitalist system to make it more democratic and more concerned for the ordinary citizen. In a way, the progressive movement acted as the conscience of the people, but focused completely on the internal affairs of the United States.¹⁴⁵

From the various interpretations of progressivism, Keith W. Olson has extracted five historical stages, each of which defined attitudes towards the movement. The attitudes which are encapsulated in the concepts of “the progressive”, “the consensual”, “the new left”, “the organizational” and “the neo-progressive” represent the general line of the research of their time, but include many common factors in relation to both major parties. As Olson sees it, the “bipartisan aspect of progressivism” meant that the progressive movement, which consisted of different reforms, was widely supported in both parties at least in the case of some reforms. In this respect, the models of cooperation created by progressivism and the decision-making crossing over the party line of both major parties repeated themselves during the Second World War as the spirit of bipartisanship. This enabled the making of decisions which were reasonably satisfactory to all parties in the period of transition, which was almost completely dominated by the Democrats. The possibility to act independent of party connection undoubtedly benefited Byrnes’s operating circumstances.¹⁴⁶

The main objectives of the progressive movement focused on the improvement of economic and social justice in the United States without showing a great willingness to interfere in the matters of regressive Europe. Based on its original goals, the movement was only interested in domestic policy and economics. Only the very few among progressives, mainly the wealthy and well educated of the east coast, were internationally minded. The majority of the progressives who emphasized military non-interference consisted of socialists, organized workers and the farming population, who believed that a war would benefit the industrial and banking circles the most. The progressives’ greatest fear was the transformation of the United States to a

¹⁴⁴ Ruotsila 2001, p. 22.

¹⁴⁵ The idea of progressivism as “genuine public spirit” was emphasized in Sheldon Hackney’s neo-progressive book *Populism to Progressivism in Alabama* (1969). Olson 1979, p. 9.

¹⁴⁶ Kero 1991, pp. 311-312; Olson 1979, pp. 5-7, 10.

military state, completely forgetting to secure the internal development of the country. Preparation for the war was opposed more than Wilson's character, even fanatically.¹⁴⁷

The power of the progressive movement rested in populist elements and in the cooling of a general interest in politics, which began in the United States in the 1910s. The negativity towards politics, effectuated by mudslingers, had for its part weakened general interest in politics. In the presidential election of 1912, progressivism was re-formulated into Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism agenda, which was challenged by Wilson's New Freedom agenda. Byrnes was intrigued by both "philosophies" and studied them carefully as they unfolded during the campaign. The electoral campaign, which was almost completely tied to domestic policy, gave Wilson, who ascended to the presidency, the responsibility to take into consideration the values of the losing party as well. When running for a second term in office, Wilson announced that the Democrats has met the progressives in their central demand for social justice: "In these four years we have come very close to fulfilling the progressive election platform as our own - to be progressive ourselves".¹⁴⁸

The Democratic Party, which was used to having a strong position in the south, inevitably had to work hard to get its part of the Progressive Party votes. Wilson's re-election for a second term in a sense signified the incorporation of progressive ideals into the Wilsonian ideology with regard to domestic policy. From a foreign policy perspective, the differences in attitude towards the isolation policy had all but lost their significance. According to Link, the United States had already started to drift away from isolation in 1914 by sending troops to Mexico. On the other hand, Wilson was capable of assuming the principles of progressivism originally related to domestic policy and to alter them so they could be applied to foreign policy. In this regard it was possible to include in the 14-point plan the originally domestic ideals of free trade, democracy, sovereignty and freedom of contract and to present them in an internationally acceptable form. The Freedom Agenda's observation of radical change, in which a transition from the relationships between individuals to relationships between "impersonal powers and organizations" was happening, was also significant. According to Wilson, the change was "no less than a new social era, a time for new humane relationships and a new stage for the drama of life".¹⁴⁹

The seemingly straightforward contrast between isolation and intervention raises many important questions. According to Louis Hartz, it is essential to note that modern America assumed a "tradition of escapism", unlike that in Europe and later in Asia, which stemmed from the effects of

¹⁴⁷ Link 1954, pp. 2, 180-181; Link 1964, pp. 24-28; Townson, pp. 675.

¹⁴⁸ Moore 1975, pp. 25-26. "New Nationalism" advocated a strong and active central government which would regulate and supervise the conduct of what it felt was the inevitable growth of big business enterprises. The "New Freedom" platform called for a lower tariff, a decentralized national banking system, a stronger anti-trust law and, according to the program, for the central government to dissolve overly powerful business monopolies; Link 1965, p. 94.

¹⁴⁹ Link 1965, p. 95; Wilson 1917, *passim*.

revolution. The activities of the United States abroad and the destiny of American freedom domestically, were bound together in a complex way. The fight for national survival will inevitably lead to the limitation of internal freedoms forming what Hartz presents as a universal phenomenon. In the case of the United States, the problem is even more delicate, as in the “psychic legacy” of the people, to be *born equal* signifies immense liberal absolutism. In the war of ideologies this has two effects: it acts as an impediment to developing activities abroad by identifying foreigners as unintelligible, which in turn leads to domestic hysteria, and the fear of the development of inconceivable events.¹⁵⁰

Carl Schmitt, who has also researched international law, has in his defining of peripheral concepts, also touched upon the isolation tendencies of the United States. According to Schmitt, the Monroe Doctrine led to the desire of the entire western hemisphere to withdraw from European cooperation in the 1830s. This was caused by the political nature of international law and its purpose of governing merely the relationships between European sovereigns. The withdrawal from the European tradition of international law was, according to Schmitt, particularly a withdrawal from its norms and its justifications for intervention. As an adversary of the right of intervention, the Monroe Doctrine seems to have been followed only in the ideology of the United Nations. From the perspective of Wilsonism and the League of Nations, the withdrawal from isolation policy would not have signified the withdrawal from the Monroe Doctrine in its relation to international law as presented by Schmitt.¹⁵¹

Hartz demonstrates the relationship borne between the Americans’ world and home country by the concept of Americanism. The dualism included in Americanism is based on the strong isolationist impulse propelled by Thomas Jefferson or even by Horatio Alger’s¹⁵² whiggism, that is, the impression that “the very liberal fortune of the United States is caused by the flight from the corrupt Old World”. Europe was in a way seen as a boil that could infect the United States with its diseases. Hartz places the basis for this paradigm on a continuum that started during the American civil war, and had influence overseas in the 20th century in its Wilsonian form. Hartz considers messianic Americanism, as an embodiment of an absolute moral ethos, to be the counterpart of isolationism. It is for this reason that the presidents he considers to be Americanists, Harding and Wilson, demonstrated most clearly the pendulum motion between the United States withdrawing from the rest of the world and “embracing it too passionately”.¹⁵³

According to Hartz’s understanding, the development of the United States’ politics has been affected by the Lockean consensus, also mentioned by

¹⁵⁰ Hartz 1955, pp. 284–285.

¹⁵¹ Ojakangas 2001, *passim*.

¹⁵² Horatio Alger was well-known American poet and short story writer in the latter half of 19th century. The bulk of his production deals with an American dream as in rags to riches survival stories.

¹⁵³ Hartz 1955, p. 286.

Yergin, which latently affected the formation of political thinking and activity. In Hartz's Wilsonian view, progressivism appears as an unnecessary yearning for the better days of the past and as the development of political and economic nostalgia free from ramifications. Hartz turns Wilsonism on its head by asking the following question. When have the people ever appreciated their cultural model with such passion in relation to foreign countries? How a people can achieve unity in their country whilst still being in contact with other cultures outside their borders must be examined. When examined in Hartz's way, it means the ability of American liberalism to relegate European liberalism's internal experiences of social diversity and social conflict to the external experiences of the United States. In this respect, the problem of the United States seems to be in the lack of genuine revolutionary tradition. Since independence, Americans have defended what already existed without the tradition of reaction. While only a few Americans felt the need for a conservative social order, a need for sovereigns like de Robespierre never manifested itself in the United States. According to Hartz, Americanism was an "irrational hidden belief" which emphasizes equality at the expense of diversity. Americanism then became axiomatic, compulsive and a kind of absolute religion.¹⁵⁴

In Hartz's thinking, the Lockean tradition in fact includes all "American norms" about social freedom, social equality and a bourgeois concept of ownership in a classless society. These norms are, in Hartz's view, indisputable and their characteristics can be observed in all political debate in the United States. With less risk, Yergin speaks of a Lockean consensus, which dispels the direct similarity between Locke's social philosophy and the political tradition of the United States. The concept of consensus also better clarifies the traditional American situation of acting without true ideological extremes. The political centre is artificially fragmented by this phenomenon, where groups that differ only slightly begin to seem like complete opposites to each other.

David Gelernter, who interprets Americanism to be a specific ideology of puritanical biblical interpretation, also considers President Wilson to be its most significant figurehead. According to Gelernter, Wilson's term became a watershed which changed the nature of Americanism from the populating mission of a continent to a worldwide mission. In the United States, "the idealism of American morals" was considered to be the reason for the country's success and its application worldwide was considered to be justified. When presenting Congress with approval to declare war, Wilson remarked that the world must be made a safer place for democracy. From the perspective of Americanism, the remark can be seen to encapsulate the necessity felt by the United States to spread their way of life and their success story. Like Wilson, President Roosevelt also believed that Americanism offered the best means to a peaceful and prosperous world. According to George C. Herring, Roosevelt

¹⁵⁴ Hartz 1955, pp. 13-14, 57.

understood better than most other Americans that diplomatic problems rarely have neat, definitive solutions.¹⁵⁵

Gelernter derives the political nature of Americanism from the political objective of Puritanism, which according to him, strived for the restoration of the pure Christianity of the New Testament. This way of thinking was connected with the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, which considered Puritans to be God's chosen people living in the Holy Land. Contrary to the conventional view of the history of ideologies, according to Gelernter, Puritanism did not cease to exist, but changed into Americanism. Puritanism and Americanism were not therefore parallel or otherwise linked phenomena. Rather, they were representations of different stages of one and the same phenomenon. During President Wilson's administration, Americanism, as a continuum of Puritanism, transferred its activities from the national to the international. The most important step in this process was the re-application of progressive principles on the international scale. The achievement and acceptance of progressive ideals at home was a necessary prerequisite for the international mission.

Americanism was not only one area of Wilsonian idealism, but rather its intellectual foundation. The religious component of Americanism became characteristic of this foundation, which was defined by the individual's undisputed right to freedom, equality and democracy. These three parts, which can also be understood as the domestic policy principles of the progressive movement, were not defined so much as philosophical phenomena, but primarily as the word of God, which was locked in the constitution. Freedom manifested itself in the message of the second Book of Moses (Exodus) and equality in the creation of the first book of Moses (Genesis), where man was created as an image of God. The democratic ideal as the word of God is highlighted by verses 1:12-15 of the fifth Book of Moses, which indirectly advises the choosing of wise men as leaders. The most speculative of these three, being democracy, came to be an equal mission of Americanism along with freedom and equality.¹⁵⁶

2.2 Power politics on the threshold of the end of the war

2.2.1 The observer of Yalta

In the late winter of 1945, the war in Europe had turned for the Allies, especially on the eastern front as the German allies broke free from Hitler's

¹⁵⁵ Herring 2008, p. 588.

¹⁵⁶ Deuteronomy 1:12-15. 'How can I alone bear the load and burden of you and your strife? Choose wise and discerning and experienced men from your tribes, and I will appoint them as your heads.' "You answered me and said, 'The thing which you have said to do is good.' "So I took the heads of your tribes, wise and experienced men, and appointed them heads over you, leaders of thousands and of hundreds, of fifties and of tens, and officers for your tribes. Gelernter 2007, *passim*.

grasp. Both Romania and Bulgaria were occupied in the autumn of 1944 and the German influence was weakened, for example, in Greece due to the activation of the resistance movement. The Horthy government in Hungary, which had begun armistice negotiations with the Russians in October of 1944, was toppled and Hungarian fascists had taken over. After fierce battles, the Germans reached Budapest only in January of 1945. At the time, the eastern front stretched from the Vistula River to the Oder River and in February the Balkans and Poland were almost completely under the control of the Red Army. In February of 1945, the western front had reached roughly the old German border, and in the south the Allies dominated the southern part of Italy up to the level of the northern part of Corsica. The front, however, was stuck there due to fierce resistance by the Germans. In the Pacific Ocean, Japan's luck in the war had turned due to counter-attacks by the Americans, and the vulnerability of maintenance lines caused by long distances. In Europe, the Western Allies received a reminder about German tenacity in Arnhem and the Ardennes, and the occupation of Germany proper still lay ahead. Even though the circumstances from the Allies' perspective were still somewhat uncertain in early 1945, both the strategies to end the war, and post war arrangements, were discussed at the highest level. It is for this purpose that the superpower conference was called in the reclaimed Yalta, on the peninsula of Crimea.

James F. Byrnes had his first brush with top-level world politics before becoming Secretary of State, when accompanying Roosevelt to the Yalta conference in February of 1945. With the status of the war showing some positive improvement, the Big Three, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union began to negotiate the guidelines of post-war Europe. The heads of state had not gathered officially since the Tehran Conference of 1943, but collaboration on a practical level had been upheld intensively. The United States and the Soviet Union had signed a cooperation agreement in the summer of 1942, and Winston Churchill had unofficially met with Stalin. Even though the Americans were suspicious about Communism and the Soviet Union in general, public opinion in the United States was very Soviet-friendly. This favorable attitude was not due to accepting or even understanding the ideological convictions of the Soviet Union, rather it was mainly sympathy towards a brother-in-arms. The sympathy undoubtedly carried with it a kind of hope for a political reconsideration by the Russians.¹⁵⁷

According to his memoirs, Byrnes was not a jet-setter by nature, nor was he familiar with the ceremonies relating to foreign policy. In fact the "assistant president" was invited to join the delegation during Christmas week, and on the day of departure. Byrnes had refused on both occasions, claiming that he had pressing matters to deal with at home. Eventually Roosevelt had persuaded him to come, but obviously Byrnes's reluctance arose from vice-presidential nomination at the Democratic Party Convention the previous fall. On the way to Yalta he already felt very uncomfortable due to the numerous ceremonies

¹⁵⁷ Bemis 1957, p. 895; Kolko 1990, p. 344; Maddox 1988, *passim*; Maddux 1980, pp. 81-101. Americans attitude to Soviet's ability to co-operate e.g. FIGURE 1.

and the ill health of President Roosevelt. In his memoirs, Byrnes presumed Roosevelt's illness to have been a factor in the President's scanty preparation for the conference:

I was disturbed by his appearance. I feared his illness was not due entirely to a cold and expressed this concern to Mrs. Boettiger [Roosevelt's daughter]. She thought my opinion arose from observing him during the moving pictures, when she usually sat on one side of the President and I on the other. She explained that while looking at the pictures, the President would have his mouth open because of his sinus trouble and that this made him look badly, but he was not really ill.... I asked the President if the Department had given him any material and he advised me it was all in the custody of Lieutenant William M. Rigdon. Later, when I saw some of these splendid studies I greatly regretted they had not been considered on board ship. I am sure that the failure to study them while en route was due to the President's illness. And I am sure that only President Roosevelt, with his intimate knowledge of the problems, could have handled the situation so well with so little preparation.¹⁵⁸

Once there, a clearly prejudiced Byrnes was especially surprised by the negotiating abilities of the Soviet representatives, and tried to find a catch in every proposal made by the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁹ As the director of the OWM, Byrnes showed a clearly enhanced personal interest towards the question of Germany, which was to be divided into occupied zones. The fate of Germany was, in his view, naturally of American interest, as the success of the Red Army on the Polish front had been expedited with American military equipment.¹⁶⁰ Churchill's proposal on including France in the division of occupation zones in Germany seemed to Byrnes an incomprehensible donation to a country that had shown only a modest contribution in the war. With the purpose of lessening the weight of the Soviet Union in the matter, he too gave his support for the proposal.¹⁶¹ Although Stalin personally shunned the idea of including a fourth occupier, Byrnes saw in the situation a strange conflict between the Soviet Union and the interim government of France, who had signed a friendship agreement the previous autumn.¹⁶² With Stalin proposing Yugoslavia and even Poland as better representatives of an occupied zone, Byrnes thought it best to

¹⁵⁸ Byrnes 1947, p. 22. Later Roosevelt's capability to manage his duties was called into question when suspicions of Roosevelt's too friendly attitude toward Russia increased. In an interview, Byrnes said that he had not understood the real condition of the President at Yalta. BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F24, Interview of Pauline Frederick with Mr. James F. Byrnes, Spartanburg, S.C., Tuesday, October 14, 1947, 8:00 to 8:15 P. M., American Broadcasting Company.

¹⁵⁹ For instance, Byrnes 1947, pp. 25, 29, 37.

¹⁶⁰ Byrnes 1947, pp. 25–26.

¹⁶¹ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B14:F11, The Occupation and Control of Germany; FRUS 1944. Roosevelt Papers: Telegram, Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 569–570. Winston Churchill concluded this when he and Anthony Eden were guests of de Gaulle in Paris. The matter had been discussed further between the United States and Britain in Malta before the Yalta Conference.

¹⁶² FRUS 1944. Bohlen Minutes, Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, February 4, 1945, 4 p.m., Livadia Palace. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 569–570. At informal meetings, Stalin and Molotov took the idea with a grain of salt. Roosevelt stated that the French participation in occupying powers was not a bad idea and that after all it was just a case of friendliness. Stalin noted that friendliness was then the sole reason.

persuade Roosevelt to stand against the objectives of the Soviet Union for once.¹⁶³

Byrnes's feelings were boosted by a speech by Stalin, in which he mentioned including Charles de Gaulle as a fourth member of the Big Three. de Gaulle had been demanding equal concessions for France with England, the United States and the Soviet Union. Roosevelt notoriously thought of de Gaulle as a "problematic musketeer"¹⁶⁴ and did not warm to Churchill's proposal on giving the French a position in the meeting. According to his memoirs, it was Byrnes who had, together with special aide Harry L. Hopkins and Averell Harriman, prevented Roosevelt from stepping into Stalin's cunning trap. However, Byrnes did not, at any stage, question Stalin's motives to accept the occupation plan very easily in the end. What Byrnes was concerned about was that in the fever of consensus, no one noticed that the area designated to France was split from the area previously designated to Great Britain and the United States.¹⁶⁵

The question of reparations to be set for Germany became even more pronounced than the question of borders at Yalta. It was a somewhat delicate matter, as Roosevelt had not had a positive view about reparations before Yalta, but it seemed to have become an obsession for the Russians.¹⁶⁶ The demand made by I.M. Maisky, the Russian ambassador to London, that 80 percent of Germany's industry would be taken as reparations was based on the view that after the war Germany would be able to sufficiently uphold the country's economy with only 20 percent of its existing heavy industry. In the view of the Soviet representatives, the division of the reparations should be focused on the countries that had suffered direct material damages caused by the war, such as the destruction of industry, land, homes and the personal property of citizens.¹⁶⁷ Because damages of this kind were great, Maisky suggested prioritizing the countries entitled to reparations based on their contribution to winning the war and the material damages suffered. When converted into money, the amount of reparations demanded from Germany in the Soviet

¹⁶³ Byrnes 1947, pp. 23–24.

¹⁶⁴ FRUS 1944. Bohlen Minutes, Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, February 4, 1945, 4 p.m., Livadia Palace. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 572. Charles de Gaulle had frequently compared himself to Jeanne d'Arc and Georges "The Tiger" Clemenceau. See as well. Byrnes 1947, p. 25.

¹⁶⁵ Byrnes 1947, p. 25; Gardner 1965, p. 72.

¹⁶⁶ FRUS 1944. Executive Secretariat Files, Briefing Book Paper, Reparation and Restoration Policy Toward Germany Summary. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 193–197. Even if Roosevelt had earlier taken a negative view of reparations in general, according to Yalta's briefing papers, Americans were prepared themselves to make concessions by defining the outlook of the United States. In the definition of a reparation and restitution policy toward Germany it was emphasized: "A mistaken reparation policy may not only have adverse effects on the future economic stability of Europe but may jeopardize the political and economic objectives of this country with respect to Germany. For this reason German reparation should be supported only to the extent that it does not conflict with more important objectives".

¹⁶⁷ FRUS 1944. Bohlen Collection, Bohlen Minutes, Second Plenary Meeting, February 5, 1945, 4 p.m., Livadia Palace. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 620–623.

Union's proposal was 20 billion dollars, of which at least 10 billion dollars would go to the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁸

The lukewarm attitude of Churchill and Roosevelt towards the reparations in general originated from the First World War experience. At that time, the reparations had confused the whole global economy and indirectly led to the Nazi's rise to power in Germany.¹⁶⁹ According to Daniel Yergin, postwar planning in the United States had generally rejected reparations, because it certainly had no need for reparations and reparations had fallen into disrepute in the United States since John Maynard Keynes's *Economic Consequences of the Peace* was published in 1919. Therefore the United States was not eager to get reparations. However, Roosevelt had announced that German-owned property in the United States would be expropriated in exchange for German loans. According to Byrnes's estimate the German property was worth of 150–200 million dollars.¹⁷⁰

When discussing reparations, Roosevelt had remarked that the first task of the soon-to-be established reparations committee "should be to consider, on the basis of the discussion, the proposal put forward by the government of the Soviet Union, according to which the total amount of reparations should be 20 billion dollars and of which 50 percent should be directed to the Soviet Union".¹⁷¹ According to Byrnes, this remark was, even from the perspective of 1947, one of the fundamental causes for the misunderstanding between the United States and the Soviet Union, as it was attached to the Conference Protocol of Yalta.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁸ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B14:F11, Protocol on Talks Between the Heads of The Three Governments At The Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparation In Kind; BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B3:F7, J. 333305-mono-State Galley 826, Uncorrected Galley Proof, February 11, 1945; FRUS 1944. Page Minutes, Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 7, 1945, Noon, Yusupov Palace. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 702–703; *Ibid.* Hiss Collection, Soviet Proposal on Reparations From Germany, Basic Principles of Execution of Reparations From Germany, pp. 707–708.

¹⁶⁹ After the First World War, German's reparations to France and Britain had forced the United States to grant loans to Germany so that Americans could later demand payments from Britain and France, which were dependant on the reparations. In Germany, the situation led to an enormous inflationary spiral, which has been considered as a major reason for entrenchment of Nazis in Germany. Later at the Potsdam Conference, at the centre of reparation issue was enthroned the so called principle of primary nature, whereby the United States provided that their own German claims came first in relation to other reparations. For instance: Yergin 1977, p. 114.

¹⁷⁰ Yergin 1977, p. 64; Byrnes 1947, pp. 26–28.

¹⁷¹ According to Robert L. Messer "as a basis of discussion" -clause was attached especially by the requirement of Britain. Messer 1982, p. 94.

¹⁷² The Committee responsible for fabricating agreements which were reached about the Conference protocol had presented their drafts on the last day of the Conference, when Byrnes had already left for home, and under the circumstances he could not supervise the acceptance of the protocol. In addition to the reparations, labor force was written into the text as one possible source of reparations. Byrnes was not fond of that because the interpolation was not in line with Roosevelt's earlier decisions. According to Byrnes's own words he was later informed that both interpolations were engineered by Soviet delegate I.M. Maisky. Byrnes 1947, pp. 28–29.

With the discussions at Yalta largely concentrating on the border questions of Eastern Europe and on reparations, the establishment of the United Nations, which was Byrnes', and, according to him, the American delegations' most important goal, was sidelined. Byrnes took part in the negotiations most clearly when defining the guidelines for the Declaration of Liberated Europe. The background for the declaration was a proposal drafted by Secretary of State Stettinius on the establishment of a kind of emergency commission for securing living conditions in the liberated European countries.¹⁷³ According to Byrnes's memoirs, Roosevelt did not like the proposal, but Byrnes himself thought it to be so convincing that he decided to investigate the possibility of revising the content of the proposal to a form that would better please the President.¹⁷⁴

In negotiations with Alger Hiss, a special aide to the Secretary of State, and Gladwyn Jebb, a member of the British delegation, Byrnes disclosed his fears that at worst, a body like the emergency commission may become a permanent organization. Byrnes also emphasized that the President did not like large institutions, and remarked that the President was afraid of interfering with the internal affairs of Europe.¹⁷⁵ The negotiations were successful in completely rejecting the idea of establishing a commission and in emphasizing a more ideological cooperation by referring to the earlier Atlantic Charter. The proposal revised by Byrnes and other representatives from the State Department at Yalta, mainly by Hiss, was accepted by Roosevelt and also unequivocally accepted by Stalin at the negotiating table.¹⁷⁶ In practice, rejecting the emergency commission was in line with Roosevelt's foreign policy, as he had not even earlier showed any interest in acquiring a significant role for the United States in post-war Europe. In a way, the declaration sought to prevent, as a matter of principle, the excessive influence of other parties on post-war Europe.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ The Memorandum of suggested action items had been presented to the President by Stettinius and it had seven items: International organization, Adoption of Emergency European High Commission, Treatment of Germany (considering zones of occupation, boundaries, minorities and long range economic policies), Poland, Allied control commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, Iran and China. The memorandum had already been prepared at Malta in February. FRUS 1944. Agreed Minutes, The Secretary of State to the President. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 567-569, 504-505.

¹⁷⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 33.

¹⁷⁵ FRUS 1944. Hiss notes, Informal Discussions in the United States Delegation, February 4, 1945. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 569-570.

¹⁷⁶ FRUS 1944. Hiss Collection, United States Delegation Draft of Declaration on Liberated Europe, Yalta, February 5, 1945. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 860-863; Ibid. L/T Files, Protocol of Proceedings, February 11, 1945, pp. 977-978. Stalin's comments: Ibid. Bohlen Collection, Bohlen Minutes, Sixth Plenary Meeting, February 9, 1945, 4 p.m. Livadia Palace, p. 848.

¹⁷⁷ The essential part of the Declaration on Liberated Europe referred to the principles of the Atlantic Charter - the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by aggressor nations. Besides these, it was decided that "to foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgement conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal

When the Big Three gathered at Yalta, all parties had great expectations, but Byrnes thought the negotiating atmosphere to be too light. For instance, in the case of the occupied zones of Germany, Byrnes felt the President had been too passive. This, he later understood, was caused by the President's illness. Even though in his memoirs Byrnes often equates himself with the President's advisors, Byrnes's potential to manipulate the president was in reality, limited. Only his key foreign policy advisors were capable of influencing Roosevelt's actions. As a whole, Byrnes's influence on the Yalta conference or its outcomes is difficult to decipher comprehensively. Unquestionably, he took part in most formal and informal strategic discussions on the way to Yalta, and at least according to Byrnes, he had private conversations with the President.¹⁷⁸ At the same time, conferences were not the dynamic dialogue of today, and when new issues emerged there was ample time during the breaks to polish your point of view and develop strategy.¹⁷⁹

In all, eight formal sessions were held in Yalta, out of which Byrnes took part in four. Byrnes missed the two last sessions after heading home a day earlier than the others, and the first two days the negotiating table was occupied mainly by heads of state, foreign ministers and high-ranking officers. Byrnes sat beside the interpreter on the President's left, while Stettinius was on Roosevelt's right. According to the minutes, Byrnes took part in common lunches and dinners from the start, where he had the opportunity to affect decision making, at least indirectly.¹⁸⁰ Despite Byrnes's apparent bitterness and his reluctance to join the delegation at first, he took his role as a member of the president's party most seriously. For instance, he stayed up to discuss conference-related matters with Roosevelt and Leahy after dinner. In the light of the minutes, Byrnes seems to have been well presented in these functions. After his having proposed a toast to the Great Russian army, the ambassador Andrei Gromyko responded by highlighting Byrnes's significant career in US politics. Even though the Secretary of State Stettinius, in his speech as the representative of the United States, highlighted Gromyko's abilities and credibility, the light was once again shone on Byrnes at Molotov's initiative. Molotov proposed another toast to Byrnes, who was acting in one of the most important offices in the United States government. He also remarked that it was difficult for the ordinary person to fathom how important a person Byrnes really was.¹⁸¹

peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to inform interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population an pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections." FRUS 1944. Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 935-936.

¹⁷⁸ FRUS 1944. White House Files, Log of the Trip, President's Log, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 553-557; Byrnes 1947, p. 23; Byrnes 1958, pp. 179, 252.

¹⁷⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 26.

¹⁸⁰ FRUS 1944. White House Files, Log of the Trip, President's Log, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 553-558; Brown 1992, p. 243.

¹⁸¹ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B14:F11, United Nations Conference; FRUS 1944. Page Minutes, Luncheon Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, February 5, 1945,

2.2.2 The United Nations and the unilateral compromise of Yalta

In early 1942, a plan for the establishment of the United Nations had been developed in Washington in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, given by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1941. Development continued in the meeting held by the Big Four – China, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain – between August and October of 1944 in Dumbarton Oaks, Washington. Matters of post-war international security were hashed out in the meeting. On the surface, Dumbarton Oaks was a success story of Allied politics, where the outline of the United Nations began to take shape and only the question of voting procedure remained unresolved. This spirit was to be continued in Yalta by creating a memorandum of understanding on the General Meeting and the Security Council.¹⁸² A basis for this whole pompous endeavor was built in Yalta by seeking the acceptance of the Atlantic Charter from the Soviet Union. The four-point draft of the Declaration of Liberated Europe, which focused mainly on the sovereignty of nations, was broadly supported by the Soviet Union. To Byrnes, the acceptance of the Declaration, which was largely developed in the US State Department, seemed splendid, as on the question of the Polish border it already seemed to be in clear conflict with the earlier interests of the Soviet Union. The blessing given by Stalin to the Atlantic Charter, seemed to Byrnes to be a good striking weapon for later purposes - especially as it received wide coverage in the press.¹⁸³

The regard both Byrnes and President Roosevelt had for the Declaration of Liberated Europe was no surprise when considering the fate the League of Nations had suffered. Byrnes clearly believed that the League of Nations failed because the United States had remained outside of it. In the light of Byrnes's memoirs, the follow through of the Dumbarton Oaks ideals was, in the objectives of the United States, the most important theme in Yalta, which was eventually overshadowed by reparation and border issues.¹⁸⁴

Even though the spirit of compromises in Yalta had materialized as a mutual understanding between Roosevelt and Stalin, a separation occurred

1:30 p.m., Yusupov Palace. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 609. In his memoirs Byrnes did not mention this toast. Despite the friendly and positive picture of Byrnes given in the minutes, Byrnes did not want to give the impression of being a socialite, which could have been interpreted as adulation. That could have also weakened his brand of "patience and firmness".

¹⁸² Brinkley, Current, Freidel, Williams 1991, p. 830; Bemis 1959, pp. 596–619; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F2, Dumbarton Oaks Documents on International Organization, Publication 2192, Conference Series 56.

¹⁸³ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B14:F11, Declaration of Liberated Europe; Byrnes 1947, p. 33.

¹⁸⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 24. In Yalta discussions, central topics can be explained by the quickly developing war situation in February and March of 1945. The German counter-attack on the Western Front had been stopped at the Ardennes and the Allies started to prepare to cross the Rhine. The Red Army was heading to Berlin at full force. The victory of Allied forces had become so clear, that according to Byrnes's memoirs, President Roosevelt and Marshall Stalin "engaged in light banter as to whether they should wager that the Red Army would get to Berlin before the American Army recaptured Manila". In this respect it was understandable that specific issue of Germany and the general issue of Eastern Europe emerged in Yalta.

when discussing the right of veto of all superpowers in the decisions of the Security Council. The voting issue was one of the most central issues not resolved at Dumbarton Oaks.¹⁸⁵ Byrnes was well aware of the problems relating to the voting issue and of the report prepared in the State Department in September of 1944, according to which the bogging down of Dumbarton Oaks on the voting issue would “most likely lead to a serious political divide” between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Fears of bitterness of minority groups like the Polish, Czechs, Serbs, Croats, Greeks and Finns were also expressed in the report. At the same time, small nations were anticipated to object to Roosevelt’s bid to implement a direct rule of unanimity, and this was already reported to have happened in other American nations.¹⁸⁶

The question of the voting issue at Dumbarton Oaks concentrated on a conflict of whether all types of Security Council decisions should be made unanimously. The Soviet Union demanded that all decisions were made with the unanimity of the Big Four, whereas the United States did not accept this when it came to decisions on the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In the view of the United States, a permanent member of the Security Council could not vote if they were a party to the conflict. There were fears in the United States that the acceptance of the Soviet Union’s proposal would lead to the creation of resistance in isolationists and others who were opposed to an international organization. The State Department memorandum also expressed fear that small countries would be forced to align themselves with superpowers, making the United Nations unstable and unreliable. The Soviet Union was also seen to have more to gain than to lose by arranging what would be seen as equal footing with other nations in global opinion. The Soviet Union could, as a part of a new organization, strive for peace in any conflict between itself and other nations. At the same time, the foreign policy leaders of the United States warned that the Soviet Union’s proposal would lead to a situation where the United States would be completely at the mercy of the Security Council if it were to find itself at war with Mexico, for example. Byrnes thought this resolution to be “quasi judicial in character, where no nation should be placed above the law in an organization based on the principle of equality under the law”.¹⁸⁷

In Yalta, the detailed interest of Molotov and Stalin towards every matter relating to the voting issue was clearly due to the Soviet Union’s desire to take part in all decision-making in the UN. At the same time, they were trying to

¹⁸⁵ FRUS 1944. Executive Secretariat Files, Briefing Book Paper, Problem of Voting in the Security Council Summary. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 85–88.

¹⁸⁶ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B19:F7, Memorandum of points in favor of the compromise proposal, September 18, 1944; BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B19:F7, Problems of Voting in The Security Council, Summary.

¹⁸⁷ FRUS 1944. Executive Secretariat Files, Briefing Book Paper, Problem of Voting in the Security Council Summary. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 85–88. See. Byrnes 1947, p. 34; The Americans were ready for some kind of compromise in order to achieve unanimity in the issue of the voting procedure. Ben Cohen, who acted as Byrnes’s special advisor in legal matters, resented the proposed compromise, because in places it made concessions to the proposal of the Soviet Union. BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B19:F7, From Cohen to Byrnes.

eliminate the suspicions left by the League of Nations in the new organization. In the voting issue Stalin even gave this reminder, "My colleagues in Moscow cannot forget the case which occurred in 1939 during the Russian-Finnish war, when Britain and France used the League of Nations against us and eventually expelled us and isolated us."¹⁸⁸

The Soviet leaders certainly knew that their main problem was the total lack of sovereignty of the Soviet republics, and maybe no-one at Yalta believed in their independence. After the Tehran Conference, commissariats of foreign affairs had been established in many republics, which in principle would have allowed them to participate independently in international affairs. When Stalin proposed that all Soviet Republics should have their own representation and the right to veto Security Council decisions, Byrnes suggested Roosevelt propose that the same be allowed for all 48 American states.¹⁸⁹ This counter attack, which Byrnes thought to be clever, had been introduced in Washington even before leaving for Yalta and had the support of many Senators. The revised Soviet position would not have changed the balance of power either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council, but it would have undermined the integrity of the assembly. On the other hand, the British dominions, which were on the way to complete independence, would have had legitimate grounds for representation, while the Soviet republics were at best autonomous units of a centralized state. To Byrnes's surprise, both British Foreign Secretary Eden and US secretary of State Stettinius eventually accepted Stalin's proposal:

I was surprised at the agreement which, in my opinion, was very unwise. After the meeting I urged my view upon the President. I reminded him that before we left Washington he had told a group of Senators that if Stalin proposed granting membership to Byelorussia and the Ukraine, he would insist upon membership for each of our forty-eight states. The truth is, the soviet republics are no more independent than the states of our Union.¹⁹⁰

At issue was the quasi-established practice of *quid pro quo*, where the Allied made concessions to each other in the hope of returned favors or strictly committed to them as was in the case of the occupied zones. The voting issue of the Security Council was then resolved in accordance with the United States' resolution, with Stalin yielding in his view on the unanimous decisions of the permanent members of the Security Council. Perhaps remembering their

¹⁸⁸ FRUS 1944. Bohlen Minutes, Third, Plenary Meeting, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m., Livadia Palace. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 666. Joining the League of Nations in 1934 forced Russia to re-examine its foreign policy line and to come nearer to the Western powers. During the Finno-Russo War of 1939-1940 the Soviet Union did not confess to waging a war against Finland, but Finland's appeals to the League caused the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the organization. Because of this humiliation, Stalin called into question the idea of United Nations. In later Russian research of history the whole Second World War was seen as a consequence of the unsuccessful collaboration between Britain and France in 1939. See e.g. Pankrašova & Sipols 1970, *passim*.

¹⁸⁹ Byrnes 1947, pp. 38-40; Plokhly 2010, pp. 185-187.

¹⁹⁰ Byrnes 1947, p. 40.

difficulties in the League of Nations, the Russians were worried about their own position in a new international organization. Clearly they feared finding themselves isolated and controlled by the United States and United Kingdom with their allies and dominions. Due to this, the Russians accepted an American compromise: the Great Powers retained a veto in the Security Council and the Western leaders agreed to support the admission of two or three constituent Soviet republics.¹⁹¹

Byrnes, who shunned the strange horse-trade politics, was clearly pleased that Stalin received no slack on the western border of Poland in the form of the Oder-Neisse line.¹⁹² However, Poland seemed to be a threshold question for the Soviet Union, the follow-through of which Byrnes thought would be attempted later with better bargaining tools.¹⁹³ In the case of the Security Council, British Foreign Minister Eden accepted Belarus and the Ukraine, whereas the Soviet Union, to please Churchill, in turn agreed to include the entire British Commonwealth, including India, in the decision-making of the United Nations. Byrnes did not think the proposal to be wise, and considered the Soviet Union to be the biggest beneficiary by having to relinquish almost nothing. At the same time, Great Britain may also have been cause for trouble, as it was planned that the empire as a whole would receive six votes, making it possible to oppose the United States. Byrnes brought forward his concern the next day when having lunch with Roosevelt and Eden and reminded them about the difficulties of the League of Nations when it came to voting issues. At the time, Eden was willing to give the United States as many votes at the British Empire had received.¹⁹⁴

After Byrnes had been sent home on February 10, the following day both Roosevelt and Stalin - who had remained in Yalta - agreed behind closed doors on the favors the Soviet Union would receive for its participation in vanquishing Japan.¹⁹⁵ Later Byrnes, who had emphasized the Soviet Union's

¹⁹¹ FRUS 1944. L/T Files, Protocol of Proceedings, Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 976. Chapter three concerning the voting procedure was modified: "Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting." See Byrnes 1947, p. 34; Yergin 1977, pp. 62-63.

¹⁹² Poland was promised a yet undefined part of former Germany. Gardner 1965, p. 292.

¹⁹³ Byrnes 1947, pp. 30-34.

¹⁹⁴ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B19:F7, Memorandum as to Membership of the Ukraine and White Russia in the Assembly, Byrnes's Handnotes; The Soviet delegates used to make reckless demands at first and then diminish them as concessions. In this case they gave up on the membership of Lithuania. Byrnes 1947, p. 42.

¹⁹⁵ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B3:F7, J. 333305-mono-State Galley 826, 827, Uncorrected Galley Proof, Agreement, February 11, 1945. The terms for the Soviet entry into the war against Japan were: 1.) The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved; 2.) The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz: (a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union, (b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease

non-intervention in the predominant state of war in Asia, felt he had received a vote of no-confidence when he discovered the top-secret agreement on the Soviet Union's accession to the war against Japan only after he had become the Secretary of State, and through the reporting of the Soviet media.¹⁹⁶ Beginning already in 1947, Byrnes sought to emphasize that he had had no knowledge about the agreements:

Another agreement was made at Yalta which was to confront me later. This was the 'Top Secret' Protocol in which it was agreed that in return for Soviet participation in the war against Japan, the Kurile Islands would be 'handed over' to the Soviet Union. It also provided that 'the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored,' and listed these as the return of the southern half of Sakhalin Island, internalization of the Port Arthur as a Russian naval base, and joint Russo-Chinese operation of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads.... I did not know of this agreement, but the reason is understandable. At that time I was not Secretary of State. Mr. Stettinius was Secretary.¹⁹⁷

Based on Byrnes's memoirs of 1958, his independence from Roosevelt's and Stalin's agreements on the Far East seemed to be a relief, which was increased by the assumptions on the intentions of the Soviet Union, which later proved to be true.¹⁹⁸ Additionally, it offered Byrnes an opportunity to criticize the concessions:

When I read the signed agreement, I was troubled by the specific pledge given by the United States and the United Kingdom that 'these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.' The record shows that Roosevelt and Churchill acted because their military advisers told them the invasion of Japan planned for the following fall would result in a million casualties. Their decision was made early in February when the German army was still fighting, but in the six months that followed our enemies surrendered in Europe and in the Pacific. Today many will say that Churchill and Roosevelt should have had the foresight to anticipate these events and should have refused to woo the Soviets. This is not written in their defense, but we must remember that hindsight has some advantage over foresight.¹⁹⁹

In public opinion, including the Soviet Union in the vanquishment of Japan was not considered to be extraordinary, as in December of 1944, already 53 % and in March 1945, 65 % of Americans believed that the Soviet Union would join in the

of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored, (c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the permanent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria; 3.) The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshall Stalin. BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B19:F6, From Yalta Agreement, Top Secret.

¹⁹⁶ Byrnes 1942, pp. 42–43.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Byrnes 1958, pp. 268–269.

¹⁹⁹ Byrnes 1958, p. 269.

war against Japan.²⁰⁰ Byrnes was perplexed about the wretched nature of the foreign policy at Yalta, and above all about the several concessions Roosevelt had made in favor of the Soviet Union. *Time magazine*, covering the end of the Conference reported: “all doubts about the Big Three’s ability to co-operate in peace as well as in war seem to have been swept away”.²⁰¹ Byrnes agreed to see a somewhat similar picture: “There is no doubt that the tide of Anglo-Soviet-American friendship had reached a new high”.²⁰²

Being one of the first to leave for the trip home from Yalta, Byrnes was bound to become the focus of the media, and the President’s secretary, Stephen Early, notified Washington regarding the arrangements of Byrnes’s press conference when the media so demanded. However, in his instructions he stated that an official communiqué should be published before Judge Byrnes was to say a word.²⁰³ As the first one to return to Washington from Yalta, Byrnes held a press conference at the White House as soon as he had returned, where he, in the absence of any other views, self-importantly emphasized his own significance in the course of the negotiations. The media was especially interested in the proposals made by the President of the United States and in their acceptance, which Byrnes could not fully answer. Upon Roosevelt’s insistence, Byrnes had to refrain from commenting on the voting issue, which had also been resolved after Byrnes’s departure.²⁰⁴

Nonetheless, Byrnes counted the proposals regarding the voting procedure and the liberated areas as Roosevelt’s achievements. On the one hand, there was interest in the Curzon Line, which Byrnes thought to be a “hot” issue and proposed that the border issue be examined ethnologically. He also tried to evade questions regarding the timing of the San Francisco conference, as reporters anticipated that it pertained to the Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Japan. On the other hand, the assistant president reminded the press about the Soviet Union’s justified interests in Poland and emphasized supporting the Red Army in its efforts on the Eastern front of Germany:

We must remember that the Red Army has liberated Poland. The position of the Soviet Union is such that it does not want governments, which it cannot trust to stand behind its troops. The Russians cannot look back, as they are blazing the trail towards Berlin.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁰ The Quarter’s Polls: AIPO July 15, ‘45, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 9, Issue 3 (Autumn 1945), p. 386.

²⁰¹ Byrnes 1947, pp. 43–45. Byrnes’s citation from *Time magazine*.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ FRUS 1944. Roosevelt Papers : Telegram, The President’s Secretary (Early) to the President’s Administrative Assistant (Daniels), Yalta 10. February 1945. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 962.

²⁰⁴ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B19:F7, Memorandum as to Membership of the Ukraine and Whit Russia in the Assembly, Byrnes’s Handnotes.

²⁰⁵ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B14:F5, Press and Radio Conference #9, Held by War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes on Tuesday, February 13, 1945 At 4.05 P.M.E.W.T. in the Conference Room, East Wing of the White House; The New York Times, 14.2.1945. “Byrnes Press Conference on return from Yalta.

Overall, Byrnes praised Roosevelt's abilities in economic and political questions, as many reporters had brought forward their own views about the conference dominated by Stalin. Byrnes placed special weight on his insight into the voting issue, which has "saved Roosevelt and partially the whole machinery of the UN".²⁰⁶

In his report to the President on Yalta, assistant president Byrnes was able to boast about the seemingly successful positive acceptance of the communiqué. There had been few discordant notes, even though the day after the communiqué was released *The New York Times* published statements it thought to be true on the handling of the voting issue in Yalta. Byrnes blamed the matter on an information leak, but thought the statements were based more on the previous views of the United States than on the ones presented in Yalta. Senators Connally and Vandenberg of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee criticized the question of Poland. According to Byrnes the criticism was constructive, and the Senators had by no means slated the contents of the communiqué.²⁰⁷

The Wilsonian debate on power-political agreements between superpowers was put in the spotlight after *Speaking Frankly* was published. In Britain, Byrnes was interpreted to have allowed the bartering policies of superpowers to re-shape Britain's "spheres of influence" especially in the case of Greece and Romania. In his reply, Byrnes justifiably denied saying anything about spheres of influence in *Speaking Frankly*, and played down his significance as an analyst of foreign policy prior to his term as Secretary of State.²⁰⁸ At the same time, a heavy weight was placed on Byrnes's foreign policy shoulders. Before being appointed as Secretary of State, particularly economic experts had demanded from him a more Wilsonian approach. After the Soviet Union's one hundred percent success in Yalta, the United States was expected to have at least fifty percent success in Potsdam.²⁰⁹

2.2.3 Byrnes and the Yalta Axioms

During President Roosevelt's term, war-time foreign policy of the United States was strictly based on the policies made by the small group of leaders of the great powers. These policies were defined by certain basic assumptions and principles, on the basis of which post-war activities were also planned well in advance. Daniel Yergin, a history scholar who has emphasized the significance of these bases to the nature of power politics, considers the policy line agreed

²⁰⁶ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B14:F5, Press and Radio Conference #9, Held by War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes on Tuesday, February 13, 1945 At 4.05 P.M.E.W.T. in the Conference Room, East Wing of the White House; *The New York Times*, 14.2.1945. "Byrnes Press Conference on return from Yalta; Messer 1982, pp. 54–56. Robert L. Messer's citation on Byrnes's press conference; BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F24, Interview of Pauline Frederick with Mr. James F. Byrnes, Spartanburg, S.C., Tuesday, October 14, 1947, 8:00 to 8:15 P. M., American Broadcasting Company.

²⁰⁷ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B19:F9, Memorandum for The President.

²⁰⁸ BP. Series 10: Books, B1:F4. For Release for Morning Papers of October 16.

²⁰⁹ BP. Series 10: Confidential letters, B2:F10. From David T. Clark to Byrnes, 1.7.1945.

upon in Yalta to be a kind of foundation to which the United States' foreign policy had to later adapt to. With these specific Yalta Axioms, Yergin attempts to solidify the attempt at cooperation with the Soviet Union as the most important diplomatic objective during Roosevelt's presidency. Behind this phenomenon was not the will to accept the ideology of the Soviet Union or its questionable actions, but to stabilize "business-like" relations between the two countries. According to Yergin, Roosevelt's having charted the Soviet Union as one of the post-war superpowers very early on caused this approach.²¹⁰

Yergin considers the Riga Axioms to be a counterweight to the Yalta Axioms. By the Riga Axioms he means the Soviet-critical attitudes of the State Department during the period between the World Wars. Before the United States extended their diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in 1933, the American legation in Riga served as the State Department's observation post on Moscow. Members of the legation, such as George Kennan, Loy Henderson, John Foster Dulles and James Forrestal drove US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in the pre-war period. All of them were deeply suspicious of Stalin and they advocated the creation of some kind of quarantine line around the Soviet Union. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the United States was forced to come out in support of Moscow. According to the Riga Axioms the influential "Riga group" thought that it would be better to let Germany and the Soviet Union destroy each other. However, the success of the Russians against the Third Reich was better than expected and the Red Army liberated a dozen countries. Consequently, the State Department's desire to limit the scope of Russia's influence in Europe, as meant by the Riga Axioms, gave way to more realistic assessments of the Soviet Union. These realistic assessments took form at the Yalta Conference.

According to Yergin, the Yalta Axioms and Roosevelt's dominance were evident in foreign policy in the sense that the State Department's view was inextricable from Roosevelt's view, especially on issues like the UN.²¹¹ This of course led to the loss of influence by Cordell Hull and Edward Stettinius, Secretaries of State and Byrnes's predecessors, as their role in foreign policy remained ostensible with the president having the true power. This was the result of the development of bipartisanship in the United States, which emphasized unity in a state of emergency.

However, a bipartisan foreign policy was not merely an American phenomenon. In Britain, both Ernest Bevin and Anthony Eden saw bipartisan foreign policy as a way of assuring Britain's world status. British bipartisanship also meant accepting a difference between domestic and foreign policies, about which disagreements in the party or in the House of Commons could not possibly enhance Britain's position abroad. During the transition stage, foreign policy was set "above the rough and tumble of party politics."²¹² In the United States, this meant not only the cooperation and mutual understanding of the

²¹⁰ Yergin 1977, *passim*.

²¹¹ Yergin 1977, pp. 44-45.

²¹² Deighton 1990, p. 16.

two major parties, but also of the legislative and executive powers. In practice, bipartisanship reversed, at least temporarily, foreign policy's status as a contradictory question and in the end as a question of domestic policy. At the same time, it provided for a relatively stable order of business for the top actors of foreign policy – namely for the President. After the death of President Roosevelt, the domestic policy truce of foreign policy, created by bipartisanship, was also beneficial to Byrnes, although at the party level this mutual understanding was no longer self-evident. In the presidential election of 1944 both John Foster Dulles, who had acted as Thomas Dewey's foreign policy advisor, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg were given greater opportunity to criticize the course of foreign policy from a Republican point of view as Truman became president.

According to Daniel Yergin, Roosevelt's influence in foreign policy is based on two kinds of roles. With the Russians, he performed the role of the Allied, which was based on the realities of international policy. Domestically, he continued to obscure Wilsonian ideals. As regards Wilsonian ideology, Yergin underlines the fact that Roosevelt, who acted as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during President Woodrow Wilson's term, no longer believed in the operational abilities of organizations like the League of Nations outside of the public view. Instead, Roosevelt's objective was to organize the post-war world based on a union of superpowers, in which the United States would play an active role. According to Yergin, American opinion continued to be defiantly suspicious of "big power politics" during the 1940s, which was reflected in the development of the UN organization. However, the UN represented a yoking together of a Wilsonian peace and great power peace. While the former reflected values, which were realized as the General Assembly, the latter was embodied in the Security Council. Although the tension between the two approaches remained hidden during the rest of the war, the conflict later became explicit and was major source of the Cold War.²¹³

In his book *Power Politics*, Martin Wight, who has studied both the League of Nations and the United Nations, highlights the conceptual differences of the two organizations. According to Wight, the League of Nations was a significant attempt to stabilize international law and put order into the cooperation of nations, whereas the United Nations meant a turn towards revolutionary power politics. Whilst the League of Nations represented the free cooperation of its member states, the UN was designed as an authoritarian organization, entitled to use force, standing above its members. In the case of the UN, Wight even talks of a conversion towards an internationalist constitutionalism, which he sees as the direct descendant of the power politics of "the European concert". From Wight's point of view, Wilsonism includes a confidence in the ability to detach from power-political constellations, to which there was no desire to return to during the Second World War and the construction of the United Nations. Cooperation between the states was the locution of the nature of the union like the League of Nations, which according to Wight consisted of the

²¹³ Yergin 1977, pp. 44–45, 47–48.

primary institutions of the international community. International cooperation was used to show the UN's nature as a destroyer of the primary institutions, which was signified by the return to power politics.²¹⁴

According to Risto Wallin, who examined the establishment deliberations of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, the foundation of the League of Nations lies the concepts of the nation and the state. According to Wallin, when the League of Nations was established, this was a basic concept relying on universal sense and natural justice. For Wallin, the nature of the union means a political agreement between nations which is comparable to the Acts of the Congress of Vienna. The League was not understood to be a world-wide consortium, but, differing from Wight's view, a cultural sphere combined by "the kingdom of law", which Wallin sees as a descendant of European concert thinking. Only the UN led to revolutionizing the concepts relating to the balance of power and the relationships between countries by highlighting such concepts as the world community, organization and law. Quoting Skinner, Wallin sees the new vocabulary as a definite sign of the change in concepts. However, the verbal development doesn't prove to be a step forward from the standpoint of the phenomenal-world. The question of the type of opportunity that the world community was genuinely experienced as in 1946 is central. In many ways it would appear that the planning process of the UN and the new rhetoric based on it were met with the old models of basic diplomacy of various countries, including the United States.²¹⁵

Also from Byrnes's contemporary perspective, the League of Nations and the UN differed on the part of their purpose. According to the view expressed by John Dewey in 1946, the fundamental purpose of the League of Nations was to retain victory for those European nations who had come through as victors. According to Dewey, a belief of this kind was the reason the United States remained outside of the League of Nations. Joining the United Nations was instead the consequence of the slow withdrawal of isolationist thinking, in which Dewey sees features relating to public structuring. The extent of political organization is therefore the only factor on which the examination of the development of the UN can be based. "There are those, who would like to adhere to the narrowest interpretation of the United Nations Charter, signed in San Francisco. Others think it necessary to change the Charter to generate a World federation equipped with broad political powers."²¹⁶

Selecting the final operational model of foreign policy became central to the formation of the Yalta Axioms. According to Yergin, Roosevelt's only possibility to organize peace after the war was to operate between political realism and Wilsonism. In Yalta, the interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union was mostly focused on the question of German reparations. The Soviet Union's unwavering views on reparations and the United States'

²¹⁴ Wight 2004, pp. 27-28, 42-58, 85-87. Wight published the first concise version of *Power politics* in 1946. The above-mentioned analysis of the League of Nations and the United Nations is an addition of the extensive version.

²¹⁵ Wallin 2005, pp. 11-13, 60-66, 80-83.

²¹⁶ Dewey 2006, pp. 233-234.

concern regarding the border arrangements of Eastern Europe became test cases of sorts, according to which the Yalta Axioms were ultimately formed. "Roosevelt was a realist; he knew that everything depended upon implementation of the accords, and that, in turn would depend upon intentions and future alignments." On the other hand, it was Franklin D. Roosevelt who ended the isolationist policy which had started as a result of the Monroe Doctrine and was strengthened during Theodore Roosevelt's term by relinquishing military intervention in 1934 and turning to the locution of the "friendly neighbor policy".²¹⁷

Yergin reminds us that the gap between Roosevelt's external foreign policy and domestic foreign policy was significant, and operating across it would have required considerable skill in being both a realist and an idealist at the same time.²¹⁸ The difficulty of this equation is highlighted by the fact that after the Potsdam Conference, world politics became more bureaucratic in nature, and its emphasis changed from the little circle formed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin to the ministerial level and also to the UN. At the same time, the role played by the change in the political leadership of the United States in the change of the nature of world politics was limited. However, the fact must be emphasized that once Roosevelt's closed club politics ended, the definitions of foreign policy became more complicated, as more and more people had the opportunity to influence them.

When examining the development of the Cold War from the perspective of end results, it is easy to note that the death of Roosevelt in April 1945 began negative development of the relationships between superpowers. Furthermore, in the light of the Yalta Axioms and Roosevelt's objectives, the foreign policy of the United States can be seen as changed if the foreign policy is examined in the light of its success as a whole. However, both views dismiss what really started to change in the field of world politics. In addition to Roosevelt's death, the spring of 1945 saw an end to war in Europe and established the Soviet Union's position in Eastern Europe. At the same time, changes in domestic policy took place in the United States, although some of them were irrefutably caused by the change of the president.

From the perspective of examining the nature of politics, it is essential to consider whether the changes that took place in the political field of the United States had any effect on the preservation of the Yalta Axioms and the spirit of Yalta as the guiding principles of US foreign policy after the war. According to history scholar Robert L. Messer, Byrnes, who was a member of Roosevelt's inner circle, wanted the Yalta Axioms to be the foundation of US foreign policy even after the war.²¹⁹ However, upholding the axioms would require further commitment to Wilsonian idealism on the one hand, and to the realities of post-war power structures on the other. Based on the picture painted by Byrnes in his memoirs, Messer's view is well founded, but clearly only for the start of

²¹⁷ Yergin 1977, p. 65.

²¹⁸ Yergin 1977, p. 68.

²¹⁹ Messer 1983, p. 81.

Byrnes's term as Secretary of State. Later, the field of power politics was shaken with such problems, that to solve them Byrnes was willing to consider falling away from the Yalta Axioms.²²⁰

According to the view represented by Yergin and Messer, the political high wire act between *realpolitik* and domestic public opinion, which began during Roosevelt's presidency, also continued after his death. Both interpretations label the balancing act as a failure both during Roosevelt's time and later. Nonetheless, in the United States public opinion and the definitions of foreign policy were desired to be uniform. For its part, the view held by Yergin and Messer dismisses the possibility of a two-way interaction between public opinion and the makers of foreign policy. At the same time, the understanding of how to define *realpolitik* is blurred. Modernizing the dimension of *realpolitik* from a "Bismarckian" starting point to a more comprehensive strategy seems reasonable in the case of the United States, which was committed to democracy and public opinion - at least after the death of Roosevelt.

2.3 From Roosevelt to Truman - The new climate of the White House and the expanding domestic policy-dimension of foreign policy

2.3.1 The starting points for the change in foreign policy

The death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt brought to power relatively unnoticed Vice President Harry S. Truman. During his presidency, which had lasted for over 12 years, Roosevelt had established several procedures and structures which were affected by the state of emergency caused by the war. During Roosevelt's presidency, three defining factors seem to have influenced the course of foreign policy in the United States. Firstly, foreign policy was influenced by the international state of affairs, which changed as the war turned for the Allies and the wartime co- operational structures transformed into organizing the post-war world. Secondly, foreign policy was irrefutably influenced by domestic policy arrangements, which during the state of emergency were defined by bipartisanship and a respect for public opinion. Thirdly, the factor most influencing foreign policy was Roosevelt himself, who largely by his own contributions defined foreign policy even more than the State Department. The President's considerable influence over foreign policy was not in itself unheard of in the history of the United States, but the state of emergency defined by the war brought out the opportunities to exercise power in foreign policy more blatantly.²²¹

²²⁰ Byrnes 1947, *passim*.

²²¹ Gardner 1993, pp. xii-xiii.

All of the factors influencing foreign policy during Roosevelt's presidency were in existence only during the war and were due to Roosevelt's personal authority and the somewhat undemocratic features caused by four consecutive terms as president. These factors were so strictly tied to Roosevelt's position as president that they would have been nearly impossible to maintain after his death. The emerging end to the state of emergency caused by the war would have gradually started to dismantle the amity of a period of placated domestic policy. From this perspective, the timing of Roosevelt's death at the height of his foreign policy power was superb.

However, it is incorrect to say that the same factors of foreign policy could not have been in play during Truman's presidency. The international situation was still affecting foreign policy through the post-war peace process. The amity of domestic policy was starting to crack and foreign policy watchdogs emerged, but domestic policy still maintained its foreign policy dimension. Truman however, did not become, nor could he have become the new Roosevelt. The power Roosevelt had in matters of foreign policy had been unfathomably great, and it was not passed down to Truman, who was inexperienced in power politics. Ultimately, the question of the change in foreign policy caused by Roosevelt's death can be encapsulated in the question of how the power in foreign policy was divided after Roosevelt's death.

The question of where the power in foreign policy was actually transferred to includes an interesting sub-plot concerning the concept of power. Simplified, the problem lies in the interpretation of power either as a tool in the spirit of liberalism, or when examined through the peephole of modern deliberative democracy, as something closely committed to the institutions exercising it. It is probably not erroneous to interpret Roosevelt's exercise of power in foreign policy in the light of the former option as the instrumental transfer of power to the hands of one person. At the same time, President Roosevelt was an institution of his own, to which the power in foreign policy - even in the deliberative sense - was justifiably attached, and by virtue of the constitution this was actually the case. What makes the matter interesting is the argument suggested in research, that after Roosevelt, the power in foreign policy was only nominally attached to the institution of presidency.

Despite the framework set by the constitution in the history of the US, the role of the president in foreign policy has primarily been defined by his background or special interests. According to Harold Zink's research, a large part of the presidents of the United States have had a background in domestic rather than in foreign policy. The presidents admired by Byrnes, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, emerge as clear exceptions to the rule; Roosevelt especially during his last years in office.²²² In this light, Truman was not an unusually uninterested president when it came to foreign policy, but rather a typical leader who had earned his spurs in domestic policy. Although in the case of Truman one cannot speak of a lack of interest, rather of a forced delegation of sorts.

²²² Zink 1950, p. 247.

As stated in the research description, in this research the examination of change in foreign policy is focused on the question of content in foreign policy. The questions of content however cannot be completely taken out of the broader context. In this respect, the power in foreign policy is a part of the broader whole of foreign policy decision-making. Therefore, when examining the change in foreign policy, in addition to the façade created by questions of content, one must pay attention to structural and organizational components and those caused by the choice of person. Further, these components must be interpreted from the factors with which foreign policy was defined above concerning the entire period under examination.

The relationship between the State Department and realized foreign policy crystallizes through the aforementioned components as an interesting question in the light of this examination and the research description. Properly speaking, treating the Department of State solely as the ministry responsible for foreign affairs is only partially correct. The United States is one of the few countries in the world that does not have a ministry or an office solely dedicated to foreign affairs, but foreign policy, partially for historical reasons, has been attached to the State Department – although in a broader sense than from a purely domestic policy perspective.²²³ According to Zink, the practical responsibility for foreign policy lies with the State Department. This view is in glaring conflict with the constitution, according to which the president is accountable for the actions of his cabinet. In the case of foreign policy at least, it is a matter of a personal relationship of trust, where the president demonstrates confidence in the Secretary of State appointed by him, but expects them to act in cooperation with the president. In foreign policy, the problematic nature of this relationship is highlighted in international conferences, where the Secretary of State must make decisions in the absence of the president.²²⁴

2.3.2 “The Tide Begins to Turn”²²⁵

During the late spring of 1945, much happened both on the war front and in the US political field. By Mid-March of 1945, Byrnes had estimated that the war in Europe was all but over, and had requested a resignation from his post as the director of the OWMR, but he continued in the post at the request of President Roosevelt until April 2. Obviously Byrnes’s relationship with Roosevelt had changed since the Chicago convention and the vice-presidency election. After the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act, Byrnes had assumed greater control over home front policy and programs than ever before, but most likely

²²³ A Department of Foreign Affairs was founded almost immediately after the constituent assembly 1787. Because of the importance of its functions the Department became formally the first federal agency to be created under the new Constitution. In 1789 additional legislation changed the name of the agency to the Department of State and assigned to it a variety of domestic duties. E.g. Zink 1950, p. 541.

²²⁴ Zink 1950, p. 248.

²²⁵ Byrnes named the third chapter of *Speaking Frankly* as “The Tide Begins to Turn”. By that he obviously wanted to emphasize the radical changes occurred in the power politics and in his life. Byrnes 1947, pp. 64–65, passim.

this was not enough for him. Having resigned as Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, Byrnes returned home to Spartanburg to resume his law practice. Only ten days after the resignation, President Roosevelt died and the new president, Truman, sent a military airplane to pick up Byrnes and bring him back to Washington. Byrnes still did not have official status as a force in US foreign policy, but both Roosevelt's death and the experience he had gained in Yalta gave rise to his political career. In June, the superpowers had gathered on a ministerial level in San Francisco, where the United States was represented for the last time by Stettinius as Secretary of State. Truman, who had only recently become President, had already, prior to San Francisco, made the decision to appoint Byrnes as his Secretary of State, but in a private negotiation both Byrnes and Truman decided to raise the issue only after the San Francisco conference:

The following day he told me he wished to appoint me Secretary of State. I did not want to in time of peace to be head of an agency considering reconversion problems [OWRM] but I did want to take part in the making of peace. I said I would accept the appointment, and we agreed that neither the change nor the announcement should be made until the end of the San Francisco Conference which was just about to meet.²²⁶

The motives behind appointing Byrnes may have been in his recently gained experience in Yalta, or a kind of sympathy felt by Truman towards a past colleague who had only a year before been second in the race for vice presidency. However, Truman may only have sought to change the Secretary of State in general. Sidelining the Secretary of State as a potential candidate in the next presidential election may also have been a relief for Truman as he set his sights on the next presidential election. When the often-ill Stettinius, to the pleasure of the Congress, was transferred to other duties, Truman had the opportunity to offer the position of the Secretary of State to Byrnes as a kind of compensation for the past. This view has been highlighted by Charles Bohlen, special aide to Byrnes, who in his memoirs presents the view that the change in Secretaries of State was in no way due to Stettinius's abilities. Rather, it was Truman's debt of honor to Byrnes.²²⁷

Again, Byrnes was offered the opportunity to take part in the San Francisco conference as an observer, like in Yalta, but considering his previous experience Byrnes thought the role of the president's observer to be unpopular in the delegation and decided to skip the trip to San Francisco:

'Mr. President, I appreciate your suggestion very much, but I don't think you ought to send me,' I replied. 'The delegation already is appointed. It is a representative group and includes some very able people. Experience has shown that a personal representative of the President under such circumstances usually causes great

²²⁶ Byrnes 1947, pp. 48–49.

²²⁷ Bohlen 1973, p. 224; Ward 1979, p. 5.

dissatisfaction in a delegation. Almost invariably relationships become more personal than representative'.²²⁸

In Yalta, Byrnes had not complained of problems of this extent. San Francisco became the launching pad for the United Nations, but in many other areas the problems seemed to pile onto United States' shoulders – especially as the Soviet Union did not act in the spirit of Yalta.²²⁹ Due to his position, Byrnes was obviously tied to the decisions made in San Francisco in one way or another. Byrnes took part, perceptively and actively, in defining the changing members of the Security Council, where he thought that the proposed countries of Canada, Brazil, Venezuela and the United States were too favorable to the Western hemisphere. Byrnes also demonstrated his acceptance to the possibility of arranging the General Meeting in any of the “five most important countries”.²³⁰

According to Byrnes's memoirs, the spirit of Yalta had been most severely violated during the spring of 1945 in the cases of Poland and Romania. Only two weeks after the Yalta conference the government of the Soviet Union had refused to take part in the Allied Commission meeting on Romania. Three days later Molotov's colleague Andrey Vyshinski was sent to Bucharest to organize things. According to Vyshinski's report, general Radescu's government was incapable of upholding order and fulfilling the terms of surrender. According to information given to Byrnes by the US representative to Bucharest, Burton Y. Berry, Vyshinski had forced the king to dissolve Radescu's government. Prince Stirbey, who had the king's support in forming a government, did not receive communist support for his government. As early as the beginning of March the king was forced to appoint communist leader Petru Groza, who was favored by the Soviets, for the task of forming a government.²³¹

In line with Byrnes's memoirs, the affairs of the Soviet Union had been open to doubts. The questionableness was not just a consequence of the undemocratic Groza government, but in Byrnes's point of view, the Soviet Union had violated the spirit of the Declaration on Liberated Europe and the decisions made at Yalta. Indeed, the three governments had exchanged pledges to “concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples of the former Axis

²²⁸ Byrnes 1947, p. 49. Byrnes considered the assignment as unfavorable one because he had no official position in the negotiations, but he was still responsible to the public. However, Byrnes had left for home earlier than the other delegates, so he could find favor by bringing fresh news from Yalta. An unofficial position was a clear risk for Byrnes's image, which is expressed in the final clause of the citation. It was not wise to dirty his clean portfolio in a risky operation like the UN even if he supported wholeheartedly the founding of the United Nations.

²²⁹ Byrnes believed that the Soviet Union would violate the old 50-50 percent agreement by encouraging Tito's position in Yugoslavia and by neglecting to hold an election in Poland.

²³⁰ FRUS 1945. 10 Files, Lot 60-D224 : Box 89, Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Assistant to the United States Representative on the Preparatory Commission (Stettinius), Washington, August 24, 1945. Volume I, General: The United Nations, pp. 1437-1438.

²³¹ Byrnes 1947, pp. 50-51.

satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems". Furthermore, it was stated in the Declaration that the three governments would jointly assist the peoples of these areas "to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment, through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people". From the standpoint of Romania and Poland, one of the most arguable items of the Declaration was a clause, which stated: "when, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration". This item was meant to express the impermanence of the Big Three's intervention and sincere will to restore the areas back to independent administration as soon as possible. It became a serious moot point because of the inaccurate definition of the time when the parties would be released from the common obligations. This indistinctness caused serious disagreements later on, especially on the Iran issue.²³²

The attempts of the Soviet Union to gain representation for Poland's Lublin government in the coming superpower conferences and the arrests of 16 leaders of Poland's underground resistance made the issue of Poland a symbol of the first true conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.²³³ Advisors from Roosevelt's presidency, such as Henry Stimson, Joseph E. Davies and Harry Hopkins had warned Truman not to oppose the Soviet Union too strongly, but voices supporting the opposite view started to emerge. Those who had had a more pessimistic view of Roosevelt's Soviet policy, namely Averell Harriman, William Leahy, John R. Deane and James V. Forrestal, demanded a tougher stance against the Russians.²³⁴ This first bout of conflict between superpowers was mended when Davies left for London and Hopkins for Moscow. This compromise saved both parties from losing face, but the unity of the Big Three was slowly beginning to crumble. After noting that the San Francisco conference was filled with compromise based on large conflicts, starting with the choice of chairman, Byrnes was happy he had stayed at home.²³⁵

²³² Byrnes 1947, pp. 50-51.

²³³ The Lublin government was composed of Polish communists exiled to the Soviet Union. Stalin wanted to cooperate only with the Lublin government. Consequently he did not have to hurry up with proceeding to Warsaw in August 1944. In August 1944, as the Soviet armed forces approached Warsaw, the government in exile called for an uprising in the city, so that they could return to a liberated Warsaw and try to prevent a communist take-over. The Polish Home Army, led by Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, launched the Warsaw Uprising. The Warsaw Uprising allowed the Germans to destroy the Home Army as a fighting force, but the main beneficiary was Stalin, who was able to impose a communist government on postwar Poland with little fear of armed resistance.

²³⁴ Ward 1979, p. 9.

²³⁵ Byrnes 1947, p. 61. Joseph E. Davies was the second ambassador to represent the United States in the Soviet Union and Special Advisor of Byrnes and President Truman. For many years Harry Hopkins served as a chairman of the Munitions Assignment Board and lived in the White House as a Roosevelt's special advisor. Hopkins's trip to Moscow was his last assignment and he had several talks with

The time following the conference of Yalta all the way to his time as Secretary of State and to the Potsdam conference, appears in the light of Byrnes's memoirs to be a time of great change. "The Tide Begins to turn" in *Speaking Frankly* was a clear reference to Byrnes's opportunities born out of Roosevelt's exit to shape the political atmosphere and his personal status.²³⁶ Roosevelt had made Byrnes into the salesman for the Treaty of Yalta, whose task it was to market the President's foreign policy to Congress and to the public.²³⁷ Byrnes had unintentionally become Roosevelt's "number one reporter"²³⁸, and was exceptionally well suited to convincing the centre of Southern conservative Democrats and the Republicans in the senate. Due to his awkward position, Byrnes felt that Roosevelt had once again betrayed his trust and he resigned as the director of the OWM in the beginning of April, shortly before the President's death. However, Byrnes's involvement in the country's governance after Roosevelt's death was considered important. This view was highlighted especially within the Democratic Party, where fears about Truman's pressure to turn to Herbert Hoover for advice on problematic questions emerged.²³⁹

In power politics, the change was evident in the growth of the Soviet Union's influence in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland and Romania.²⁴⁰ However, the atmosphere of change described by Byrnes had not directly polarized the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, but Great Britain, as well as France and China for their part, influenced the finishing touches to the war based on their own interests.²⁴¹ Even though many Allies tried to benefit at the cost of the losing countries, one cannot speak of a contest between superpowers. The most notable conflicts concerned mainly being compensated for military or economic losses. No one embarked upon an actual plundering expedition.

2.3.3 A New Foreign Policy without Changes?

On the outside, Byrnes's appointment as Secretary of State was not considered a significant change to existing foreign policy. *The New York Times* headlined the appointment on July 4, 1945: "Byrnes promises no policy change as he takes

Stalin. During the Roosevelt's era, Hopkins had remarkable role in the US relations to the Soviet Union.

²³⁶ Byrnes 1947, pp. 46–66.

²³⁷ Messer 1982, pp. 10, 37, 61–62.

²³⁸ Messer 1982, p. 52. "Yalta legman".

²³⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 48; BP. Series 10: Books, B8:F8, From Byrnes to Roosevelt, 24.3.1945; From Roosevelt to Byrnes, 31.3.1945; BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B16:F5, From Guy L. Moser to Byrnes 13.4.1945, 27.5.1945. Congressman Guy Louis from Pennsylvania wrote to Byrnes and asked him to participate politics actively after President Roosevelt's death as well. When Byrnes retired, Truman asked former president Herbert Hoover to undertake a fact-finding survey of the German economy – mostly because he needed facts that would impress the Republicans in Congress. *The New York Times* 23.1.1947, James Reston "Truman's Choice of Hoover Called Political Maneuver".

²⁴⁰ Gardner 1965, passim.

²⁴¹ Ward 1979, pp. 7–8. Compare for instance Byrnes 1947, pp. 25, 29, 58–59, 305, 308.

Oath". The confidence in cooperation between superpowers, which he acquired during Roosevelt's presidency, was sometimes evident in public as typical political rhetoric, for which Byrnes was undoubtedly gifted. The summer of 1945 was still the golden age of Allied cooperation, the shine of which was only enhanced by the ultimately successful conferences in Yalta and San Francisco. Even though the war was still raging in Asia, in his inaugural speech Byrnes already painted a very optimistic picture of the upcoming peace negotiations:

The making of enduring peace will depend on something more than skilled diplomacy, something more than paper treaties, something more than even the best charter the wisest statesmen can draft. Important as is diplomacy, important as are our peace settlements and the basic Charter of world peace, these cannot succeed unless backed by the will of the peoples of different lands not only to have peace but to live together as good neighbours.... Today there can be no doubt that the peoples of this war-ravaged earth want to live in a free and peaceful world. But the supreme task of statesmanship the world over is to help them to understand that they can have peace and freedom only if they tolerate and respect the rights of others to opinions, feelings, and ways of life which they do not and cannot share.²⁴²

The appointment of James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State received warm-hearted acceptance in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, with the Congressmen from South Carolina speaking about Byrnes in an almost hyperbolic manner. Unlike it was implied in public after the appointment, Byrnes was not considered to be a surprising choice in the House of Representatives. In addresses given on the floor, Byrnes was considered to be "one of South Carolina's most colorful and influential people".²⁴³ Likewise, in the Senate, Byrnes was considered a well-known politician and his merits were considered to be significant to the extent that confirmation of his appointment as Secretary of State was proposed to be done directly with a unanimous decision in the Senate. The Senate confirmed his appointment and the following was recorded in the protocol:

The announcement of nomination of James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State comes as something of an anticlimax. It had long been known that in filling the top place in his official family the President wanted at his elbow a man who, in the best sense of the word, is a familiar. In Mr. Byrnes he has found his man. The President's regard for Mr. Byrnes is best attested by the fact that he went to the Democratic Convention last year all prepared to propose Mr. Byrnes for the Vice Presidential office to which he himself was nominated. Mr. Truman's conception of Cabinet responsibilities is different from that of his predecessor. He wants to delegate rather than to oversee, and a Cabinet officer who is at the same time a delegate must stand in the same personal relation to the President that Mr. Byrnes does to President Truman.... He is well known and highly respected in the legislative as well as the executive branch of Government. It is important in the years to come to have a man in the Secretaryship who will keep Congress informed on policies that the President is striving to keep above party. There is such an assurance in the Byrnes appointment. Mr. Byrnes has a talent for intimate exposition, and it impressed the Senate particularly after Yalta....

²⁴² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B6:F21, Department of State, Statement by The Secretary of State, The Honorable James F. Byrnes, July 3, 1945; *The New York Times*, 4.7.1945. Lansing Warren "Byrnes Promises No Policy Change As He Takes Oath".

²⁴³ For example: CR. Mr. Bryson, Mr. Hare Jul. 2. 1945. Congressional Record - House. 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol 91, pp. 7135-7138.

His ease and knowledge-ability testified to his capacity for absorbing new ideas and new problems. This attribute, which has served him well in a career which owes nothing to advantage, help or luck, will stand him in good stead as Secretary of State. It is united in Mr. Byrnes with a natural gift as a diplomatist – a gift which we once called the art of being Byrnes – and a genius for drawing to his assistance men of competence and experience who will serve him with loyalty and affection.²⁴⁴

Central to the Senate's ceremonial statement was the bold wheeling and dealing of the foreign policy power into the hands of Byrnes and those closest to him. Even though the President was still ultimately responsible for foreign policy, when measured in foreign policy experience, Byrnes officially became a much more significant operator than the Secretaries of State under Roosevelt. This arrangement was intensified by the fact that in the United States had been left without a Vice President and the Secretary of State was the second in charge in the hierarchy anyway. Not everyone was pleased with Byrnes's appointment. The director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, reported to Byrnes about the resistance of the colored population, and from quarters controlled by communists. Considering the background of the new Secretary of State, it was hardly surprising that especially the leaders of the Council of African Affairs were indignant about the choice of Secretary. Negro leaders Max Yergan and Channing Tobias had written to Truman about the risks associated with Byrnes:

Our government will bear the responsibility of a policy, which will affect hundreds of millions of dark-skinned peoples. Mr. Byrnes will be the greatest bearer of this responsibility. Considering his history as an objector of the rights of American Negroes, we fear he may take these procedures along with him to his new office.²⁴⁵

Byrnes was given relatively free reign in revamping the organization of the State Department. Mention of the Secretary of State operating as a team with his closest aides did not change the course of the conversation in Congress that spring about the risks of the foreign policy clique that had gathered around then Secretary of State Stettinius. On the one hand, from this clique, the only members Byrnes deemed qualified for his service were Dean Acheson and William Clayton, who were also members of Byrnes's inner circle. Byrnes agreed to the appointment of Acheson as Under Secretary of State only when pressured by Truman, but he could scarcely complain about Clayton's appointment. With Byrnes filling the appointments in the State Department, personal relationships seem to have carried more weight than normal.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ CR. Confirmation of Nomination of James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State, July 2 1945. Congressional Record - Senate, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol 91, p. 7110.

²⁴⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Files, B2:F8, From Hoover to Byrnes, 7.7.1945.

²⁴⁶ The changes which happened in the management of the foreign policy, concerning mainly Stettinius and Joseph C. Grew, had been widely attached to the so called Amerasia-case in which secret documents of the Secretary of State had been leaked. Neither was prosecuted, but this may have accelerated the need for the revamping of the Department; About Byrnes's relationship with Acheson in William Benton's memoirs: CUOHROC, Reminiscences of William Benton, in Adlai E. Stevenson project, Interviewed by Kenneth S. Davis in 1967 (August 9, 1968), on pages 160-162 in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection.

The special status of the Secretary of State continued as it had been during the state of emergency, because the war was still raging in Asia. Both the emphasis given to bipartisanship and shaping the State Department to be able to better deal with managing global peace policy were indicative of the fact that the power and status given to Byrnes were not expected to last only to the end of the war, which was all but over. On the contrary, a mandate given in a proclamation committed the United States to intervene in the aftermath of the war overseas, and, already in the summer of 1945, to actively search for methods of organizing the peace process.

The excellence of the foreign policy within the United States was not unequivocal, and the closed club politics of Roosevelt's term evoked emotions. On February 13, the day following the release of the Yalta report, William Lemke, a Congressman from North Dakota, attacked the foreign policy, which he considered in his address to be too monopolized. The target of his attack was not so much the clique formed by the leaders of the superpowers, but rather the club of "economic royalists" that surrounded Secretary of State Stettinius. In addition to the Secretary of State, the other members of this "club" were Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Interim Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, Second Under Secretary of State William Clayton and special aide Robert Wood Bliss. According to Lemke, these men did not represent the interests of the United States in foreign policy, but rather the interests of a small group of the financial elite.²⁴⁷ Even though Lemke's address did not lead to direct action, it was significant in the reworking of administrative structures that took place after President Roosevelt's death.

Truman started to change the composition of the Cabinet as soon as he took office. The reason for this was not directly fulfilling the wishes of critics like Lemke, but a clear will to solidify his own position through ministerial appointments after Roosevelt's long term in office. However, not all ministers were changed at once. Truman has interpreted the matter in his memoirs:

Every President must have a Cabinet of his own choosing. But in times of national emergency continuity of government is of paramount importance. Such continuity helps a succeeding administration to maintain the existing contacts with Congress. That is why, at my first meeting with the Roosevelt Cabinet, I asked all members to stay on. Eventually there had to be changes. I needed time to get to know each member who had agreed to stay on. I also needed time to familiarize myself with all the urgent business confronting the government. I knew that several members of the Cabinet had planned to leave even prior to the death of Roosevelt. I knew others would prefer to leave now that Roosevelt was gone, because of the special relationship they had established with him.²⁴⁸

In all, by mid-July 1945 four men were left standing from the Cabinet put together by Roosevelt: Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace, Secretary of the

²⁴⁷ CR. Monopolizing Foreign Policy. Extension of Remarks of Hon. William Lemke of North Dakota, Tuesday, February 13 1945. Congressional Record - Senate. 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol 91, p. A602; Brown 1992, p. 28.

²⁴⁸ Truman 1955a, p. 323.

Interior Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.

When acting as Senator and as “assistant president of the home front” to Roosevelt, Byrnes had largely maintained his advisors and was generally accustomed to working with a close group of people. From this inner circle Ben Cohen, Walter Brown and Donald Russell took up influential appointments in the State Department by becoming special aides to Secretary of State Byrnes. Dean Acheson, Byrnes’s Under Secretary of State later remarked in his memoirs:

He was an individual operator using half a dozen close associates upon those problems that engaged his attention. For him the four or five thousand other people in the Department and any problems upon which he was not working personally hardly existed.²⁴⁹

According to Acheson, it was no coincidence that the only changes that were made in the State Department were those that were concordant with Byrnes’s thinking. The reorganization of the State Department, which Byrnes had mentioned at his inauguration, had not been implemented in practice, and the State Department had grown even weaker in interpreting the actions of Moscow. The bitterness of Acheson’s view is highlighted by the fact that Byrnes never thought much of Acheson, who was assisted into the position by Truman. As a show of non confidence, Byrnes would often bypass his Under Secretary of State by insisting that his closest aides William Benton and William Clayton report directly to him. Acheson also thought Donald Russell to be one of Byrnes’s favorites due to both of them being lawyers and from South Carolina and doubted his abilities to carry out his duties. Byrnes was certainly egotistic and possibly cavalier about obeying orders, and he obviously disliked Acheson, who was totally ignored by Byrnes’s little coterie headed by Ben Cohen, who was nominally Acheson’s subordinate. On the other hand, Acheson was very negatively viewed on Capitol Hill. He was considered to be arrogant and uppity, which was highlighted in his way of dressing like the aristocracy. Clayton, however, was more modest and due to his southern background adapted better to Byrnes’s team. Additionally, in the absence of Byrnes, Acheson was driven to work in close cooperation with the President and as stated in his memoirs, the Under Secretary of State’s admiration for the president continuously grew after the spring of 1945.²⁵⁰

According to Charles Bohlen, a long-term aide to President Roosevelt, Byrnes’s term as Secretary of State brought about no significant structural changes to US foreign policy. One factor that had caused problems during the period of transition was, in Bohlen’s view, the independent foreign policy conducted by Roosevelt, which isolated then Vice President Truman from wartime conferences and from foreign policy in general:

²⁴⁹ Acheson 1987, p. 162; Karl 1976, p. 16.

²⁵⁰ CUOHROC, Reminiscences of William Benton (August 9, 1968), on pages 161 in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection; Acheson 1987, pp. 120, 184; Beisner 2006, p. 25.

We in the State Department shared the concern of all Americans whether 'the little man from Missouri' could rise to the occasion. I had not met Truman at the time he became president. He was an obscure president, who got to see Roosevelt much less than I did and who knew less than I did about United States foreign relations.²⁵¹

According to Bohlen, in addition to the President, the only person to hold significant status in the foreign policy of Roosevelt's term was special aide and special ambassador Harry Hopkins, who was actively present in the superpower conferences. This connection was no longer maintained between Truman and Hopkins, which according to Bohlen weakened Truman's direct influence in foreign policy. The collapse of Hopkins's position was evident when Stalin was choosing his contact person from the leadership of the United States.²⁵² Bohlen's own position changed after Byrnes was appointed Secretary of State. Having acted as a liaison between the White House and the State Department during Roosevelt's term, Bohlen's position had been even more significant than as special aide to the Secretary of State during Byrnes's term. In the light of his memoirs, Bohlen - perhaps somewhat bitterly - thought this change to be detrimental. He was clearly not so much concerned about his own status, but rather that the change would inevitably lead to the power in foreign policy to be unduly concentrated in the hands of the Secretary of State:

My job as liaison between the White House and the State Department ceased when Byrnes became Secretary of State. Byrnes told me that henceforth he would be dealing directly with the President. I remained a special assistant to the Secretary, but I was no longer called on to do the liaison work. Although I did not say so, since I was involved, I felt that this change was a mistake. Truman, lacking detailed knowledge of the wartime relations between Washington and the Allies, needed State Department expertise more than Roosevelt. The meetings between President Truman and Secretary Byrnes were too infrequent to take up all matters; a liaison officer would have been valuable in handling the day-to-day problems that naturally arose between the State Department and the White House.²⁵³

Byrnes's term as Secretary of State also changed the internal composition of the State Department. Byrnes's long-time secretary Cassie Connor followed him to the State Department. She had acted as Byrnes's secretary since 1925. In addition to Connor, other members of Byrnes's South Carolina team to move to the State Department were Donald Russell, who became the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for administration, and Walter Brown, who became the head of public relations for the State Department. Russell had been a partner in Byrnes's legal practice in Spartanburg and Byrnes had evidently met Brown during his time as a correspondent for newspapers in South Carolina. A little later Byrnes also hired Benjamin Cohen to work for the State Department, who had previously been his aide at the OWM. Cohen was very quickly promoted in the autumn of 1945 to be the advisor in charge of legal affairs and he took on a significant role in Byrnes's speech writing. Respectively, Dean G. Acheson, who had served during Roosevelt's term, was appointed Under Secretary of State

²⁵¹ Bohlen 1973, p. 212.

²⁵² Bohlen 1973, p. 223.

²⁵³ Bohlen 1973, p. 225.

and during Byrnes's absence, Interim Secretary of State on August 31, 1945.²⁵⁴ On that day, William Benton was appointed as Assistant Secretary of State and tasked with the organizational process of the United Nations. Byrnes knew Benton through Chester Bowles, a friend from the OWM days, to whom he had first offered the position of Under Secretary of State for Administrative Affairs. With Bowles having to turn down the offer, his former business partner Benton was eventually appointed to the position. Of the old civil servants in the State Department, Byrnes fired the Under Secretary responsible for Latin America, Nelson A. Rockefeller.²⁵⁵

Charles "Chip" Bohlen, whom Byrnes knew from the Yalta Conference, also joined Byrnes's inner circle. During Roosevelt's term Bohlen's significance in foreign policy had mostly been related to his ability to speak Russian, but during Byrnes's term he was, at least according to Bohlen himself, a member of Byrnes's inner circle, albeit without his former position as liaison between the State Department and the White House.²⁵⁶ In addition to Bohlen, Byrnes also thought very highly of H. Freeman "Doc" Matthews, who was a specialist in European affairs. When acting abroad, the trio of Cohen, Bohlen and Matthews was without exception an inextricable part of the aggregate led by Byrnes.

From the viewpoint of domestic policy, the appointment of Byrnes as Secretary of State marked a final shift from the foreign policy led by Roosevelt to the one led by Byrnes. Now, the practical leadership of foreign policy was no longer in the hands of the president, but moved to be a more clearly defined section of power of its own, one that, considering the circumstances, was of great importance. This was made possible by President Truman's evident willingness to provide Byrnes with a highly independent role and a strengthened willingness to transfer the focus of power politics from heads of state to the ministerial level. On a personal level, Byrnes's appointment as Secretary of State hardly impacted the number of people influencing foreign policy. In many respects, Roosevelt's inner circle seems to have been exchanged with that of Byrnes'. On the other hand, both acted in cooperation with the same officials and aides. As bipartisanship faded over Byrnes's term as Secretary of State, the domestic policy dimension of foreign policy also began to broaden. In relation to the criticisms that were given regarding the appointments to the State Department, it is important to note the tight time frame of July and August of that year. After Byrnes's appointment, neither the

²⁵⁴ Miss Cassie Connor was Byrnes's secretary for nearly four decades. Since Mr and Mrs Byrnes had no children of their own, Cassie came to occupy the place of a close blood relative. Acheson succeeded Joseph C. Grew as an assistant secretary, because Grew had asked to resign after the Potsdam Conference. Acheson acted earlier as an Assistant Secretary of State in charge of relations with Congress and of international conferences. *The New York Times* 27.8.1945. Dean Acheson is Sworn; Yergin 1977, p. 142.

²⁵⁵ Robertson 1994, pp. 441–443; CUOHROC, Reminiscences of Chester Bowles (April 13, 1963), on pages 246–247 in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection. Rockefeller did not want to leave the State Department because he liked working in public service. He was, however, replaced by Spruille Braden.

²⁵⁶ Bohlen 1973, pp. 243–245.

president nor the Secretary of State had time to pay specific attention to the appointments due to the Potsdam Conference and the surrender of Japan.

From the perspective of the agenda, there was scarcely a need for a change in foreign policy. The ending of the war and the starting the peace process, which was still in its infancy, demanded the stability and consistency of foreign policy. Some structural changes were made when Truman allowed Byrnes to restructure the State Department to nominally adapt to the demands of peacetime. A clear desire for the consistency of foreign policy was in Byrnes's case caused by confidence in the ability of power politics to solve any problems in its old manner. The appointment of Byrnes, who was hailed as the preserver of the Yalta Axioms and of Roosevelt's realpolitik and a defender of the consistency of foreign policy, did not as Secretary of State bring the world any closer to the Cold War. The quiet phase of power politics, which lasted from February to July of 1945, and the Soviet Union's activity in Eastern Europe left a lot to think about for future negotiations. However, through Byrnes's appointment no such response to these was planned in US foreign policy which could have been considered a sign of a change in foreign policy.

Instead, Byrnes had spontaneously added to his competence in foreign policy by demanding to see the protocols of the resolutions made in Quebec, Cairo, Tehran and Yalta. In other respects, Byrnes also had a power-political advantage compared to Truman, who was not present in Yalta. He was in possession of the notes he had made in shorthand about the discussions that had taken place at the conference, and out of all Americans, Byrnes was perhaps most familiar with the background to all the matters that had been agreed upon in Yalta. On April 25, Byrnes wrote to Truman to offer the President the use of his notes from the conference and his "other souvenirs". He underlined especially the conversation of February 8 regarding the voting procedure, when Roosevelt had already agreed to giving full voting rights to two Soviet Republics. Due to the highly sensitive nature of these conversations, Byrnes convinced Truman of the importance of confidentiality: "Should it fall into the hands of any one close to the columnists it could start a war on several fronts." The continuity of foreign policy seemed to have a good framework.²⁵⁷

Externally, the US State Department went through a vigorous renewal after the war. The renewal meant above all a structural reworking with some wartime organizations transferring to the State Department either as they were or modified somehow. In practice, the reworking was evident in a steep growth in personnel, which added to the risk of highly sensitive matters being viewed by the wrong people. Before the war, the State Department had had 900 members of staff, but after the war that number had grown to nearly 3000. The

²⁵⁷ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B8:F9. From George M. Elsey to Admiral Leahy, 23 May 1945; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B8:F9. Tehran Conference, December 1943; BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B14:F11, Military Conclusions of The Tehran Conference, Tehran, December 1, 1943; Byrnes memorandum on February 8th. BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B19:F7, Memorandum as to Membership of the Ukraine and White Russia in the Assembly, Byrnes's Handnotes; BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B19:F7, From Byrnes to Leahy and Truman, 25.4.1945.

biggest personnel rush happened in the months following Byrnes's inauguration, when the number of staff members nearly doubled due to structural changes. The most significant change was the transfer of the research and foreign intelligence department into the State Department.

In his memoirs, Byrnes is of the view that his task as the "undertaker" of wartime organizations was poor. According to Byrnes, the problem lied with the fact that "the most capable people were impelled to leave a dying organization, to find permanent work with a live and growing organization". In Byrnes's view, this meant that "morale sagged and problems multiplied", with which he was surely referring to the problems of communist suspicions and information leaks.²⁵⁸ According to Donald Russell's chief assistant Joseph Panuch, in September and October of 1945, the State Department became a huge, bloated organization with a confused mission. Earlier, it had been relatively small but compact policy agency, but in the autumn of 1945 the Department was swamped with inexperienced, untrained and unscreened personnel. In Panuch's opinion the ideology of the personnel was far to the left of the views held by the President and his Secretary of State.²⁵⁹

According to Byrnes, the nature of the State Department was not administrative. Rather, it should first and foremost be a policy-making ministry. By this, Byrnes was clearly referring to wartime and even post war problems of delegating, especially in the Ministry of War. These problems had been reduced since the start of the war by increasing the cooperation between the departments. Based on this cooperation, in October 1945 Byrnes had suggested the establishment of the National Defense Council, which would have included Secretaries from the State Department, War Department and Department of the Navy. In his proposal, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Navy would act as military advisors to the Council. Byrnes's proposal was never accepted, but at least in his own view elements of it were adopted in merging the War Department and the Department of the Navy into the National Defense Department.

The cooperation of the three central Departments happened in the special State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, which was established in December of 1944 with the purpose of "improving existing methods of obtaining for the State Department advice on politico-military matters in which we all have a common interest, particularly those involving foreign policy and relations with foreign nations". The original motive for establishing the committee was mostly related to questions of wartime occupation policy. These were the issues the committee focused on after the war.²⁶⁰ The Coordinating Committee held a significant role in the planning of the post-war policies of Japan. In his memoirs however, Byrnes did not consider the Coordinating Committee to be of great significance. The Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, and the Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, had very little direct contact with Byrnes, who on the

²⁵⁸ Acheson 1987, pp. 158-159; Byrnes 1947, pp. 243-245; Byrnes 1958, pp. 324-325.

²⁵⁹ Acheson 1987, p. 162.

²⁶⁰ DAFR 1945-1946. A State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. Volume VIII, pp. 63-64.

other hand actively discussed many military-political questions directly with Admiral William D. Leahy. Further, during Byrnes's absence, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson held the State Department's seat on the Coordinating Committee. For this reason, Byrnes wanted it to be Acheson who reorganized the department in line with recommendations from the Bureau of the Budget. The Secretary was not very fond of his Under Secretary, and obviously Byrnes was happy to see Acheson settling down to deal with matters of minor importance. According to Robert L. Beisner, Byrnes did not care about the reorganization issues at all and undermined most of what Acheson did attempt to do.²⁶¹

Included in Byrnes's immediate accomplishments in developing the State Department was the establishment of a committee specializing in foreign relations to serve the needs of managing international affairs with all the countries in the world. Accordingly, regional committees were established, the first of which was tasked with defining US foreign policy in Latin America. The background to establishing these committees was Byrnes's wish to establish foreign policy based on reality and the pursuit to keep the State Department as a policy-maker outside the questions of execution of the policy.²⁶²

²⁶¹ DAFR 1945-1946. A State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. Volume VIII, pp. 63-64; Beisner 2006, pp. 24-25.

²⁶² Byrnes 1947, pp. 244-247.

3 “FIRMNESS AND PATIENCE” - SECRETARY OF STATE BYRNES AND THE NUMEROUS CHALLENGES OF FOREIGN POLICY²⁶³

3.1 Potsdam: From the Cabinet Policy of Heads of State to a Ministerial arm-wrestle

3.1.1 From a “Quid Pro Quo” policy to Byrnes’s tactics

After the Yalta Conference in the spring, the war in Europe changed radically. The spring of 1945 had marked the race to Germany between the East and the West, which was defined by Churchill’s and Stalin’s desire to conquer as much of Germany as possible. The death of President Roosevelt meant that the leadership of the war was more and more transferred onto the shoulders of general Dwight D. Eisenhower. At the end of March, Bernhard L. Montgomery’s troops had reached the Rhine and about a month later the American and Russian troops met on the Elbe. On April 30, Adolf Hitler committed suicide, and on May 9 his successor admiral Karl Dönitz signed a surrender agreement, which marked the end of the war in Europe. Even in the Far East, the end of the war was only a matter of time in the spring of 1945. The conquering of Iwo Jima in March, the falling of Burma into the hands of the Allies in May, and the successful test firing of the nuclear bomb in July were important accomplishments in defeating Japan. It was from these positions that a top-level summit in the spirit of Yalta took place in July 1945 on German soil, which had been defeated only a few months earlier.

Byrnes headed for the Potsdam Conference in July not only as the new Secretary of State, but also as a fully-fledged force in power politics. The new President Truman and Byrnes were considered to be very similar both

²⁶³ Firmness and patience was the trademark of Byrnes’s foreign policy. In power politics shifting between firmness and patience meant shifting between compromises and confrontations.

externally as well as in thought. Both were joined by the notion of an effective foreign policy and partially by a striving to reject Roosevelt's "quid pro quo" policy. Even though the established line of talking politics, which had become a habit in the peace conferences, was not completely changeable by the American delegates, Byrnes especially thought that the now functioning atomic weapon would give impetus to the discussions. Prior to the Potsdam conference, both Stalin and Truman had made assurances about their ability to cooperate. Stalin was used to Roosevelt's style and as Truman tested his flexibility, illusions of easy cooperation were put to the test during the first week of the conference.²⁶⁴

All in all 13 plenary sessions were held in Potsdam. These sessions were attended by Heads of State, Foreign Ministers, foreign policy advisors and often also representatives of the armed forces. In addition to these, separate meetings were also held in the Spirit of Yalta between only Foreign Ministers and their aides. It was decided in the first plenary session that the meetings of Foreign Ministers would be continued as separate sessions as was done in Yalta,²⁶⁵ but at Byrnes's suggestion it was more practicable to hold the meetings of the Foreign Ministers simultaneously, as everyone was already present.²⁶⁶ The Foreign Ministers met on an official level 11 times. Unofficial discussions were held at least twice in addition to a lunch meeting.²⁶⁷ The primary objective for these meetings was to create a separate system of meetings for Foreign Ministers for the purpose of drafting peace agreements. In addition to this, other issues were broadly discussed in these meetings, the final approval of which happened in the plenary sessions.

The meetings of the Foreign Ministers had a significant position in defining the agenda for the plenary sessions, which was especially important in matters of dispute. Therefore, the Foreign Ministers often held a more significant position than Heads of State, as they took part in both meetings. From the US point of view this was a good solution, since Truman, who was inexperienced in foreign policy, could lean on Byrnes, who had already been to Yalta.²⁶⁸ History scholar Daniel Yergin, according to whom Truman for a large part only accepted or proposed policies and positions developed by others, has emphasized this view.²⁶⁹ The most glaring example of this was the only opinion drafted by Truman himself regarding the internationalization of the European waterways. According to Truman, the waterways had always been "a hot bed

²⁶⁴ Byrnes 1947, pp. 73–74.

²⁶⁵ FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, First Plenary Meeting, Tuesday, July 17, 1945, 5 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 52.

²⁶⁶ FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Wednesday, July 18, 1945, 11 a.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 68.

²⁶⁷ FRUS 1944. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II. Introduction, XV.

²⁶⁸ Byrnes's familiarity with the Yalta decisions and the Council of the Foreign Ministers was so convincing that Truman often gave Byrnes an opportunity to introduce issues in plenary sessions. E.g. FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, Second Plenary Meeting, Wednesday, July 18, 1945, 4 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 89.

²⁶⁹ Yergin 1977, p. 113.

for breeding wars during European history".²⁷⁰ With Stalin referring to the Suez and Panama canals, Truman's opinion caused, according to Yergin, a considerable loss of authority for the entire US delegation. On the last day of July, Truman's enthusiasm to discuss the European waterways waned as the issue proved to be unsuitable for the big table at the conference. Upon Truman's request, responsibility for deciding the question on waterways was transferred to the Foreign Ministers meetings, which in the President's view, would have ample time to investigate the matter thoroughly.²⁷¹

In his research, Yergin emphasized that Byrnes was completely responsible for most US foreign policy in Potsdam. Byrnes had also cleared out of his way old activists of power politics such as Secretary of War Harry L. Stimson and the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman.²⁷² Physically speaking, Byrnes was not completely on his own in managing foreign policy. Special Aide to the Secretary of State Benjamin Cohen, Director of European Affairs at the State Department H. Freeman Matthews and aide to the Secretary of State Charles Bohlen, who spoke Russian and had accompanied Roosevelt to all superpower conferences as an expert on the Soviet Union, also traveled to Potsdam with Byrnes. Other officials of the State Department, including William L. Clayton and James C. Dunn, who according to Byrnes's memoirs were overshadowed by the aforementioned, accompanied them.²⁷³

US foreign policy was obviously bound by State Department memorandums, in which the objectives for the conference had been broadly outlined. On the other hand, it is incontestable that Byrnes and his aides had influenced the contents of the memorandums considerably. Additionally, it must also be noted, that the memorandums contained mostly information on previous resolutions, and on those that had been moved forward and mainly drafts and proposals for new agreements. In light of the State Department documents, they did not contain any ready-made strategies for conflict resolution. According to Byrnes's memoirs, in Potsdam the United States wanted resolutions to four main issues:

We wanted to reach agreement on four major issues: first, the machinery and the procedures for the earliest possible drafting and completion of peace treaties; second, the political and economic principles which would govern the occupation of Germany; third, plans for carrying out the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, with the hope of ending the constant friction which had prevailed over Russian policy in eastern Europe since the Crimea Conference; and fourth, a new approach to the reparations issue in view of the inability of the Reparations Commission to reach agreement.²⁷⁴

The most problematic of these seemed to be the enforcement of the treaties entered into in Yalta, which the Americans thought was exhaustively regulated

²⁷⁰ FRUS 1944. Department of State Minutes, Truman Papers, Eleventh Plenary Meeting, Wednesday, July 31, 1945, 4 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 527.

²⁷¹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B16:F8, International waterways, 31.7.1945.

²⁷² Yergin 1977, p. 113.

²⁷³ Byrnes 1947, p. 67.

²⁷⁴ Byrnes 1947, pp. 67-68.

in the Declaration of Liberated Europe. Based on the Declaration, a document had been drafted in the US which stated that the execution of the treaties of Yalta was unfinished. This document was also read out loud by Truman in the first plenary session on July 17.²⁷⁵ Stalin and Molotov acknowledged that the sections in the Declaration were indisputable, but in the eyes of the Americans the Soviet Union had continued to increase its influence in Eastern Europe. Truman brought up the issue of elections in Poland, which were supposed to be organized as soon as possible, because nothing had happened on the ground. Stalin proposed that the matter be delegated to the meeting of Secretaries of State, and remarked that the Polish government had never been forbidden to organize an election.²⁷⁶

To the document presented by the United States concerning the execution of the Declaration, the Soviet Union responded with one of its own, which especially attacked the situation in Greece.²⁷⁷ The Soviet Union's reply heated the emotions of British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, who in turn compared Greece to Bulgaria and Romania.²⁷⁸ Byrnes, who was sidelined in the debate between Eden and Molotov, remarked that the United States simply wanted the execution of the treaties entered into in Yalta, and that the only interest it held towards the governments of Bulgaria and Romania was that they would be representative of the people and would allow US representatives and the press to observe the elections freely. Byrnes also reminded the delegates that in Yalta President Roosevelt had wanted friendly governments to border the Soviet Union, as in the case of Poland.²⁷⁹ Byrnes's position in the discussion can be

²⁷⁵ FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, First Plenary Meeting, Wednesday, July 18, 1945, 5 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 53.

²⁷⁶ FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, Second Plenary Meeting, Wednesday, July 18, 1945, 4 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 94.

²⁷⁷ FRUS 1944. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers, No. 1064, 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2045, Proposal by the Soviet Delegation. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 1044. A Document brought out by Molotov at the third session on July 20 emphasized: "But there is one country - Greece - in which no due order still exists, where law is not respected, where terrorism rages directed against democratic elements which have borne the principal burden of the fight against German invaders for the liberation of Greece. Moreover, the present Greek Government is breaking the peace with their neighbors and threatening Albania and Bulgaria with military action. All these circumstances create the necessity of taking urgent measures to eliminate such a situation in Greece".

²⁷⁸ FRUS 1944. Department of State Minutes, Truman Papers, Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Friday, July 20, 1945, 11:30 a.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 150. Eden stated that the description of Greece given in the Soviet proposal was "a complete travesty of fact". He added that "The Soviet Government had no representatives in Greece, although they were free to go there. The press of the whole world was free to go to Greece and see for themselves and tell the world without censorship what was going on. Unfortunately, this was not possible in either Rumania or Bulgaria. The Greeks proposed regular elections open to all parties. The present Greek Government had invited international observers to regulate these elections. Unfortunately the situation in Rumania and Bulgaria was not the same".

²⁷⁹ FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, First Plenary Meeting, Wednesday, July 18, 1945, 5 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 53. In *Speaking Frankly*, Byrnes remembers that he participated in that discussion more turgidly: "The United States sincerely desires Russia to have friendly countries on her borders, but we believe they should seek the friendship of the people rather than of any particular

considered a good example of the fact that he wanted his foreign policy to continue along the lines defined by Roosevelt and, at least in Eastern Europe, to adhere to the Yalta Axioms. The question of Eastern Europe in relation to the Declaration of Liberated Europe came to be a constant source of conflict, which maintained its potency even after Potsdam.

The Yalta Axioms and their spiritual legacy, at least from the perspective of the trouble spots of Eastern Europe, did not become the operative and ideological standing order in Potsdam, which would have dissipated the possibilities of conflict to nothingness. The procedures adopted in Yalta were largely passed down to the negotiating tables in Potsdam, where Roosevelt no longer sat. Both Stalin and Molotov, who had assumed the *quid pro quo* policy, strived to scrupulously continue along the same lines in Potsdam. The revival of the old bargaining spirit was most visibly attempted when addressing the execution of the Declaration of Liberated Europe based on the US report in the fifth meeting of the Foreign Ministers on July 22. Referring to the election question of Romania and Bulgaria, Molotov simply remarked that the Soviet Union will not accept the establishment of an election monitoring organization, but did promise that the position of the press would be improved if circumstances allowed. At the same time, Molotov also remarked that the Soviet Union's representative to the Allied Commission on Italy had not been given an acceptable position in the commission, which was the model for establishing the Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Control Commissions.

These demands however, were not sufficient for Molotov. He suddenly expressed the Soviet Union's sympathy for the United States' perspective on the election issue, provided it would be connected with the question of establishing diplomatic relationships with these countries. However, this could not be agreed to as Eden thought it to be constitutionally impossible and Byrnes announced that the United States' stand on such issues was based on their own assessment of circumstances in the country.²⁸⁰ Even though Byrnes's negative stance on the bartering policy signaled to the representatives of the Soviet Union that the Secretary of State was not interested in playing by the rules of the old superpower conferences, the *quid pro quo* suggestions made by the Soviet Union did not end there. According to the analysis made by Byrnes in his memoirs, most of the bartering attempts were somehow connected to Italy.²⁸¹

government. We, therefore, want the governments to be representative of the people. If elections are held while there are restrictions not only on newspaper and radio correspondents but upon our own governmental representatives as well, the American people will distrust any government established as a result of such election. We do not wish to become involved in the elections of any country, but, because of the postwar situation, we would join with others in observing elections in Italy, Greece, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria". Byrnes 1947, p. 73. As such, Byrnes statement could not be found from Department of State's record.

²⁸⁰ FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Sunday, July 22, 1945, 11:10 a.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 226-232.

²⁸¹ Byrnes 1947, p. 74. According to Byrnes, the United States was asked to revise the conditions of the armistice agreement for Italy in exchange for participation in war

For the Soviet Union, Italy became the baseline which defined the minimum boundaries for its influence in the situations in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and also in Finland. On the contrary, this analogy was used by Churchill who emphasized the significance of Italy, who had fought for the Allies for two years, as a free nation. In the eighth plenary session of the Heads of State, Churchill remarked that the British representatives in Romania and Bulgaria had met with considerable obstacles, considering these to be states surrounded by an iron fence. Whilst Stalin dismissed Churchill's claims as mere "fairytale", it was necessary to find new models for creating solutions.²⁸² Previously, wording of this kind had led to a never-ending cycle of accusations around the negotiating table.

Afterwards, Byrnes described the Potsdam conference as the "success that failed".²⁸³ Even though a lack of consensus was characteristic of the entire conference, at the start of the conference Byrnes's view on the global political situation was not solely based on the differences of opinion between the East and the West. The United States wanted Italy to become a member of the United Nations, which the British were opposed to, remembering their experiences in Northern Africa. The Russians on the other hand announced that they would accept Italy's membership to the UN immediately after the membership of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary had been approved, the conditions for which the British and the Americans had set as the execution of the elections and free press issues agreed upon in Yalta.²⁸⁴ The arrangement was reminiscent of Yalta with the Americans, the British and the Russians starting their bidding rounds. Although Truman and Byrnes had clearly decided to end the bartering roulette of individual interests, the options for achieving results at the conference were running low. When discussing the Polish border and German reparations, Byrnes decided to try a new strategy by bundling several proposals together into a package deal and thus reaching agreement on several issues at once. At the same time, some type of quid pro quo carrot had to be included into these package deals in order to improve their chances of being accepted. Additionally, the Secretary of State was troubled by information received by *The Washington Post* and the *New York Herald Tribune*, according to which the issue of German reparations was to have already been secretly agreed upon in Yalta. In Byrnes's staff committee meeting on July 24, everyone agreed unanimously on the fact that no other agreement had been made on the matter except the one mentioned in the Yalta communiqué.²⁸⁵

Before the last meeting of the Secretaries of State on August 1, Byrnes and Molotov met privately and Byrnes presented the situation:

against Germany and for the declaration of war on Japan. Respectively, the Soviet Union wanted the armistice agreement for Italy to be considered as the first item on the agenda. See Maddox 1988, pp. 86–87.

²⁸² FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, Eight Plenary Meeting, Tuesday, July 24, 1945, 5 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 357–364.

²⁸³ Byrnes 1947, p. 67.

²⁸⁴ Gardner 1965, p. 288; Byrnes 1947, p. 74.

²⁸⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B18:F13; Secretary's Staff Committee, 24.7.1945.

On July 31, I told Mr. Molotov there were three outstanding issues: reparations, Poland's administration of a part of the Soviet zone, and our paper entitled 'Admission to the United Nations' dealing with Italy and the Balkan states. I submitted a proposal containing the only concessions we were willing to make and requested that Mr. Molotov present the three proposals to Generalissimo Stalin so that they might be discussed at the afternoon session. I told him we would agree to all three or none and that the President and I would leave for the United States the next day. When the conference opened that afternoon the President immediately suggested that the three proposals be discussed and called on me to present them. I did so, emphasizing that it was all one proposition. Generalissimo Stalin expressed disapproval of 'the tactics of Mr. Byrnes's in asking for consideration of the three proposals at one time. I replied that we had been considering them one at time for three weeks; that we were now making concessions in one solely for the purpose of reaching a compromise on the three in order to bring the conference to an end.²⁸⁶

The border between the Soviet Union and Poland had already been agreed on in Yalta to be an arrangement roughly following the Curzon line, but the western border of Poland was again raised as an issue in Potsdam.²⁸⁷ Stalin's proposal on the Oder-Neisse line would have, when approved by Churchill, continued the *quid pro quo* policy, but Byrnes's package deal changed the situation considerably. Truman had previously expressed to Byrnes that he would accept the Oder-Neisse line in order to create a better atmosphere in the negotiations. Byrnes decided to use this concession to his advantage to stop dwelling on the question of reparations, which was important to the Russians. In addition to the Oder Neisse line, a proposal on the percent division of war reparations as well as the acceptance of the former Axis powers to the UN was included in this particular package deal.²⁸⁸

Stalin questioned making the issues dependant on one another, which Byrnes conceded to. Byrnes added, however, that the package deal had been arrived at when no other agreements had been made during the weeks of the conference and that the United States would not accept agreeing on only one issue without reaching an agreement on other issues. Stalin thought the question of reparations to be so controversial that the Soviet delegation would not discuss the question based on the "tactics of Mr. Byrnes". Even though accepting this package deal initially seemed impossible to Stalin, he did suggest that he might regard the solution favorably if the percentage of reparations due

²⁸⁶ Byrnes 1947, p. 85. There is no official record of this discussion between Byrnes and Molotov. Doubtless, it occurred at morning or early afternoon on July 31. Compare to: FRUS 1944. Byrnes-Molotov Conversation, Tuesday, July 31, 1945, Morning of Early Afternoon. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 510.

²⁸⁷ The boundaries between Poland and its neighbors was the issue of greatest dissent between the Lublin Government supported by Stalin and the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile. Nationalists adhered to the Polish-Soviet peace treaty of 1921 whereby the Polish eastern border extended to the western part of White Russia and Ukraine. Instead, The Lublin government came down on the Curzon-line, which was a notably western alternative. The consequent losses of territory were meant to be compensated by German territories in the west, for instance Silesia. Even though the Western Countries supported the government in exile, especially Winston Churchill aspired to get Curzon-line accepted. The border issue missed out on final resolution until the Yalta Conference, when the role of the Government in Exile was weakened and Stalin had gotten a firm grasp on Poland.

²⁸⁸ FRUS 1944. Department of State Minutes, Truman Papers, Eleventh Plenary Meeting, Tuesday, July 31, 1945, 4 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 512.

the Soviet Union was increased. Quite surprisingly, Stalin accepted the proposal after a relatively nominal tweaking of the reparation payments.²⁸⁹ On the one hand, his role as a hard and fast haggler, which Byrnes highlights in his memoirs, was somewhat exaggerated as was the excellence of the package deal.²⁹⁰ For example, the Oder Neisse-line, which was to be the temporary border of Poland, became a permanent arrangement. On the other hand, without the hindsight afforded by later developments, the Soviet Union can be seen to have benefited from the package deal mostly because it originally demanded more than it realistically thought it might receive – thus implementing realpolitik in the style of Karl Liebknecht.

In reality, it was the attitude of the British delegation that nearly turned out to be detrimental to the package deal, as they shunned affiliating France with the German reparations commission, and were opposed to raising the amount of reparations awarded to the Soviet Union. According to the picture painted by Byrnes in his memoirs, a partial reason for the reluctance of the British delegation was the election results which had arrived from Britain on July 26, changing the positions around the negotiating table in Potsdam. Byrnes was somewhat disappointed when the seats held by Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, both of whom had been influential in power politics for a long time, were handed over to Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin from the Labour Party in the middle of the Conference. From these “lefties”, Byrnes thought Bevin to be an even more problematic person than Churchill, as the easy-going and straightforward Bevin managed to rise as the most visible person at the Potsdam Conference and take charge of all matters at hand, bypassing Byrnes. After the election results were announced, Byrnes wrote to Churchill regretting the defeat and considered the reasons to be completely related to domestic policy. Byrnes also wrote a letter along the same lines to Anthony Eden. The Secretary of State was most upset by the interruption to years of successful cooperation caused by the election, which was credited to the wrong party, at least in Britain.²⁹¹ Byrnes found Bevin’s arrogantly energetic attitude, especially at the start of the conference, to be of great concern:

The President mentioned the Soviet demand for East Prussia and indicated on a map the changes in the boundary lines of Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union that thus would be affected. Mr. Bevin immediately and forcefully presented his strong

²⁸⁹ FRUS 1944. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-3145, Eight Plenary Meeting, Tuesday, July 24, 1945, 5 p.m., United States Delegation Memorandum. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 539–540. That was the case of typical quid pro quo, where Stalin coaxed other allies into raising the exchange values of compensatory goods (like wood, coal, and food supplies) taken away from the western zones from twelve and half to fifteen percent in exchange for the concessions he had made to Byrnes. In addition, the Soviet proportion of the non-compensatory goods increased from 7,5 per cent to 10 per cent, France was accepted to the Preparation Committee for the purpose of determining equipment available for reparations, and six months was fixed as the final term for determining of the amount of equipment available for reparation. Byrnes 1947, pp. 84–85.

²⁹⁰ Byrnes 1947, p. 86. Stalin stated “Byrnes drove a hard bargain”.

²⁹¹ BP. China B16:F5, From Byrnes to Churchill 31.7.1945, From Byrnes to Eden 31.7.1945.

opposition to these boundaries. His manner was so aggressive that both the President and I wondered how we would get along with this new Foreign Minister.²⁹²

Byrnes was satisfied inasmuch as Molotov, who had predicted certain victory for Churchill and had even questioned the integrity of the election, was to his surprise faced by a strict duo with a desultory attitude towards the Soviet Union.²⁹³ However, this restricted the latitude that Byrnes was hoping to create for his foreign policy. The promises made by the Labour Party during the election campaign to create a better relationship with the Soviet Union than the Conservatives had also been noted in the US State Department. Concerns over the ability of the Labour government's socialist agenda to maintain the Anglo-American cooperation at its current level were also expressed.²⁹⁴

However, like social democrats throughout Europe, the members of the Labour Party had been the objects of communist attack. Besides, Attlee had regarded the Russians as "ideological imperialists" for many years and the new Foreign Secretary, Bevin, was known as an anticommunist former leader of the Transport and General Workers Union. According to Anne Deighton, Attlee and particularly Bevin, who had staked out a position on Labour's postwar foreign policy, spoke for the will of the nation as a whole. Contrary to the expectations of many in the Labour Party, Bevin emphasized the continuity of the Coalition Government's foreign policy.²⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the issues which Bevin thought the Government had to address were broadly defined. The economic reconstruction of the world and the prevention of totalitarianism were represented as the common goals of both governments, but there were apparent differences about how the desired objectives were to be attained. The prevailing distrust was increased by Anglo-American left-wing tendencies which were personified in Henry A. Wallace, the Secretary of Commerce. According to the analysis of congress member Lew Foster, the victory of Attlee and the popularity of Wallace were symptoms of the same phenomenon. The person who was guilty for all this was Harold Laski, who was a well-known English political theorist, professor of political science and the chairman of the British Labour Party. In 1944 Laski had presented his Marxian interpretation of societies in his book *Faith, Reason and Civilization*. From Foster's point of view Laski was farther left than Stalin.²⁹⁶

According to Allan Bullock's interpretation, Bevin's actions in Potsdam were followed by a constant fear of Byrnes wanting to deal with the Soviet Union directly, thus bypassing Britain. Behind this fear was Bevin's inability to acknowledge that Britain's international status had changed at the end of the war, and the endeavor to maintain some status among world leaders even after the war. This view is supported by the US State Department's estimations about

²⁹² Byrnes 1947, p. 79.

²⁹³ Gardner 1965, p. 307.

²⁹⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B15:F4. Great Britain. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Policy and Information Statement on Great Britain 1946.

²⁹⁵ Deighton 1990, p. 16.

²⁹⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F8, From Foster to Byrnes, 29.8.1945.

British aspirations to establish a Western European bloc ranging from Norway through the Iberian Peninsula to Italy. It was thought that the purpose of this bloc would be to increase British dominance in Europe. Talking about any kind of bloc in power politics sounded ominous, and the United States did not think the Soviet Union would stomach the idea very well. The plan for the bloc, which was to be executed in the name of economic cooperation, may have been, in the estimation of the State Department, a contingency plan in the event that the United Nations collapsed. In order to prepare for a crisis, it was necessary for Britain to maintain a good relationship with France, which was expected to develop the Western European bloc into some form of a socialist alliance. This was supported by the Labour Party plans to convene a new Socialist International in 1947. According to the estimates of the State Department, in order to maintain its status as a superpower, Britain sought primarily to benefit from the United Nations. The second alternative was a Western European bloc and the third alternative was a British Commonwealth.²⁹⁷

Even though “the tactics of Mr. Byrnes”, as named by Stalin, had in principle moved the peace conferences from the days of bartering politics to the era of large-scale comprehensive solutions, the fastidious tinkering was returned to when examining the protocols. According to Robert L. Messer, the primary purpose of Byrnes’s package deals was not to create fast, large-scale solutions that avoided compromise, but rather to show the Soviet delegation the limited possibilities between acceptance and the exit of the US delegation.²⁹⁸ However, these package deals typically included points that were favorable to the Soviet Union, which may have seemed ill advised to France and Britain. In Potsdam, Bevin and Attlee felt that Byrnes had made a mistake by conceding the Polish border in addition to excessive reparation payments. Byrnes replied by emphasizing that the arrangement regarding Poland was by no means final. When considering the ostensible agreements, Potsdam was a success, but the atmosphere of discord had Byrnes suspecting the successful execution and future of the agreements.²⁹⁹ According to Byrnes, who had respected the resolutions made at Yalta, the Potsdam Conference, which had seized on the German and Polish border issues, was a slight disappointment:

We had arrived in Potsdam to face what amounted to *fait accompli*, so far as the Polish-German frontier was concerned. Prior to Yalta, the three powers had agreed to divide Germany into four zones of occupation, and they had made a positive declaration in Section VI of the Yalta Protocol that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace conference. Although the protocol would seem to permit no misunderstanding, we learned before leaving the United States for Germany that, without any consultation either with the United Kingdom

²⁹⁷ Bullock 1983, pp. 30, 843, *passim*.

²⁹⁸ Messer 1982, p. 95.

²⁹⁹ Byrnes 1947, pp. 86–87, 190. Compare to: Messer 1982, pp. 81–82. The question of Poland’s western border became a huge problem for decades. According to the Yalta decisions, the final resolution was left to the Peace Conference by Byrnes’s interpretation.

or with the United States, the Soviets had transferred all the German territory east of the Neisse River to Poland for administration.³⁰⁰

Nonetheless, the leaders of superpowers left the negotiating tables of Potsdam in a very amicable mood. At the end of the last plenary session, Stalin remarked that Byrnes had worked harder than anyone else and considered his contribution to be significant in reaching many important decisions. Stalin's comment was an extremely exceptional tribute from a Head of State to an actor on the ministerial level. According to Walter Brown's notes, he had rarely seen Byrnes as speechless as he was at that moment. The tongue-tied Secretary of State could only thank Stalin, who declared the conference to be an undeniable success.³⁰¹

3.1.2 The Far East Agreements and the Problems of Conquering Japan

Outside the Polish and German border questions, and in fact outside the entire official agenda of the Potsdam Conference, the superpowers had discussed the Soviet Union's engagement in the war against Japan, which had been agreed upon in the secret Far East negotiations in Yalta.³⁰² In conversations with Harry Hopkins in May 1945, Stalin had referred to the Soviet Union's desire to gain an occupied zone in Japan.³⁰³ However, many in the US political leadership knew about the atomic weapon being developed and believed that it would be wisest for the United States to conquer Japan using this weapon and not have to rely on the assistance of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the agreement on the Soviet Union's entry into the war existed, and few possibilities existed to change that. This situation was made especially difficult by the tight schedule for the weapon's development. The latest results on the nuclear tests did not arrive in Potsdam until July 16. At the time, Byrnes and Truman considered sharing the accomplishment with Stalin, but according to Walter Brown, Churchill asked them not to rush it. The following day Stalin and Truman discussed the situation in Japan and Stalin remarked that the only obstacle to Soviet Union entering the war was China, who initially refused to render the harbor city of Dairen to Soviet control.³⁰⁴ A similar conclusion was reached the following

³⁰⁰ Byrnes 1947, p. 79.

³⁰¹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 1.8.1945.

³⁰² FRUS 1944. L/T Files, Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan, February 11, 1945. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.

³⁰³ FRUS 1944. Truman Papers : Telegram, The President's Adviser and Assistant (Hopkins) to the President, Moscow, 30 May 1945. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. I, pp. 160–161.

³⁰⁴ FRUS 1944. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1745, Truman-Stalin Meeting, Tuesday, July 17, 1945, Noon, Bohlen Notes. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 43–47. The situation in the Outer-Mongolia, Manchurian railways and the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur caused troubles at the negotiations between Stalin and Chinese foreign minister T.V. Soong held in Moscow. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers No. 1418, Appendix D. Bohlen Post-Conference Memoranda on Two Truman-Stalin Meetings at the Berlin Conference. Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen), Washington, March 28, 1960. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 1583–1587; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 16.7.1945.

week when the military leadership of the Allies gathered under Grand Admiral William D. Leahy's direction. In the meeting, General Antonov stated that Soviet troops were currently being rallied in the Far East and that they would be on stand-by to cooperate by the second half of August. Even according to Antonov, the operation naturally required reaching a consensus with the Chinese.³⁰⁵

Stalin had sought to speed up the Americans' decision by telling Byrnes and Churchill about the request made by the Japanese to send peace scouts to Moscow. According to Stalin, the emperor was ready to end the bloodshed, but would not accept an unconditional surrender. When Byrnes enquired about Soviet views on unconditional surrender, Stalin assured him that it was also the objective of the Russians. According to Stalin's estimate, the activity of the Japanese was caused by expectations regarding the Soviet Union, who already had troops within sight of the Japanese borders. However, the Soviet troops would not be ready to attack until mid-August. Based on Walter Brown's diaries, it was because of this that Byrnes started to rush a joint ultimatum regarding Japan in conjunction with Britain. The ultimatum included a two-week deadline for unconditional surrender. This was also the timeframe thought sufficient for the atomic weapon to reach operational capacity.³⁰⁶

According to his memoirs, Byrnes thought that the Soviet demand was overstepping what was previously agreed, for in Yalta Roosevelt had adhered to Dairen being under the control of China. Nonetheless, it is obvious that Byrnes was afraid of the Soviet Union's authority growing in China in the same way it had in Eastern Europe, especially as China was internally in a disorganized state.³⁰⁷ Indicative of this are also the detailed reports on the Chinese and Soviet relationship, which Byrnes requested from Averell Harriman and Donald Russell. These reports highlighted China's financial resources and its regional ambiguities.³⁰⁸ All through July and with Harriman's

³⁰⁵ FRUS 1944. Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes, J. C. p. Files, Tripartite Military Meeting, Tuesday, July 24, 1945, 2:30 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 344-345.

³⁰⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 18.7.1945.

³⁰⁷ The United States had actively supported the Chinese Nationalist Party, The Kuomintang (KMT), whereas the Soviet Union had underpinned communists, who had made an agreement with the Kuomintang after the Japan offensive in 1937. The troops of Chiang Kai-shek were heavily defeated during 1944, when Japan invaded particularly the southern and central part of China. At the end of 1944, General Stilwell had disagreed with Chiang Kai-shek and was asked to return to the United States, because it was feared that Chiang would otherwise stand aside. Chiang Kai-shek had had bad experiences with power politics, because even if he had been invited to the Cairo Conference in 1943, he did not get an invitation to the more important conference at Yalta. In Yalta's secret agreements on the Far East, the composition was similar to the agreements made by Japan and the Allies in the final stages of the First World War in 1917. As far as is known, China was not conscious of the arrangements engineered by President Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta. See e.g. Spence & Chin 1996, pp. 150-151.

³⁰⁸ FRUS 1944. 761.93/7-1245 : Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State, Moscow, 12 July 1945. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. I, pp. 862-863; FRUS 1944. 761.93/7-1345 : Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State, Moscow, 13 July 1945. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. I, pp. 863-864;

assistance Byrnes was kept completely informed on the negotiations between Molotov and Soong in Moscow. It was especially Harriman's reports which interpreted the demands by the Soviets to use the harbor city of Dairen as a military base to be discordant with the policy definitions made by Roosevelt in Yalta in relation to Dairen and its status as a free commercial port.³⁰⁹ Byrnes sent a message to the Chinese government, which advised them not to make any concessions to the agreements made in Yalta.³¹⁰

Even though the effects of the atomic weapon on the negotiations in Potsdam are hard to evaluate, the issue was linked to the problem of the Soviet Union entering the war against Japan and therefore to the questions on the Soviet-Chinese relationship. In a private conversation between Byrnes and Churchill on July 23, Byrnes stated that he had sent a telegram to Foreign Minister T.V. Soong advising him to keep the negotiations with the Soviet Union running. Apparently referring to the existence of the atomic weapon, Byrnes also added that: "It is quite clear that the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan". What was important to the United States was also the threat that China would drift under the influence of the Soviet Union. In order to rescue China from a sure take-over by Stalin, Byrnes believed that by Chinese strictness China would be saved and the entering of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan could be prevented. This was highlighted by Byrnes's active communication with Foreign Minister Soong throughout the Potsdam conference. At the same time, the State Department feared that pressure for a stricter interpretation of the Yalta Treaties would mount within the United States, as according to estimates many Americans were interested in the situation in China, and particularly in preserving American interests in China. In addition, an overtly positive attitude towards the Soviet-Chinese negotiations was thought to raise suspicions about the decisions that were made in Yalta which were not public knowledge.³¹¹

FRUS 1944. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers, No. 1215. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 1227-1241.

³⁰⁹ Harriman stated: "Our experience with the control which the Soviet Government exercises over all matters under its direction, convinces me that there would be interference with the development of commerce and trade of the United States and other nations in Manchuria if the port of Dairen and the Railroads are under Soviet domination. An agreement at this time to grant to the Soviet Government such control would violate the established policy and principles which the United States has held for a long period of time. Stalin had agreed on a number of occasions to support America's open door policy for China and to respect the sovereignty of China in Manchuria. I, therefore, recommend that we stand firm on the interpretation of the Yalta agreement as indicated above". FRUS 1944. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers. Yalta Agreement Affecting China, Babelsberg, July 18, 1945, The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 1237.

³¹⁰ FRUS 1944. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers. 740.00119 Potsdam/8-745, The President to the Ambassador in China, Babelsberg, 23 July 1945, The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 1241. According to State Department documents, the sender was Truman and the telegram was sent to Patrick J. Hurley, who acted as United States' Ambassador in China; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F4, From Truman to Hurley, 23.7.1945. Compare to: Byrnes 1947, p. 205.

³¹¹ FRUS 1944. Byrnes-Churchill Conversation, Monday, July 23, 1945, Morning. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 276. There is no official document on this meeting. FRUS cites Winston Churchill and those are published also in John

However, by the end of July it began to be obvious that Soong had done everything he could to continue the negotiations. According to a memorandum from the US State Department, it was still a question of the interpretation of the Yalta Treaty, in which it would be difficult for the United States to intervene if both China and the Soviet Union reached an agreement. The Soviet Union had much to gain in China, especially regarding the railways and harbors, which were thought to give the Russians a considerable advantage in foreign trade. Options for diminishing the American economic influence did not exist in this scenario. The report calculated that neither severing trade relations, nor ending the “open door policy” with China would positively influence the development. On the basis of the risk-analysis, the State Department decided to support the development of a friendly relationship between the Soviet Union and China. Harriman suggested to Byrnes that a written assurance would be demanded from Stalin stating that the American “open door policy” could continue. From the perspective of Harriman’s written reports, financial privileges were emphasized in the US interests in China. According to Harriman, the past century had shown that “China under foreign domination or divided into spheres of foreign influence would threaten not only our commercial interests but also our security in the Pacific”. In addition Harriman stated that “The underlying cause of our involvement in war with Japan was pure refusal to accept Japanese domination in China”. According to Harriman’s radical interpretation, it was Japan’s invasion of China, and not Pearl Harbor, that had been the real reason for the United States entering the war. In this light, the Soviet Union joining the war was not in any way considered inconsequential. On the other hand, the correspondence between Byrnes and Harriman shows that in Potsdam Byrnes had no knowledge about the existence of the secret supplementary protocols of the Far East Treaties.³¹²

When the Chinese had sorted out their relationship with the Soviet Union and when Chiang Kai-shek had approved the Potsdam Declaration, whereby “the combined forces of the three Allies ‘are poised to strike the final blows

Ehrman’s book *Grand Strategy*, vol. VI, p. 292; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, China B2:F4, China issues; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown’s *Diary*, 18.7.1945; Byrnes asked Soong to carry on discussions as late as July 28. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F4, From Byrnes to Hurley, 28.7.1945; From Dooman and Vincent to Dunn, July 19, 1945; Memorandum, Proposed Chinese-Soviet Agreements, July 17, 1945; Memorandum, Suggested Protocol Pertaining to the Chinese-Soviet Agreements under Negotiation, July 23, 1945.

³¹² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F4, Memorandum for The Secretary, July 28, 1945; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F4, From Byrnes to Harriman, 5.8.1945; Memorandum to The Secretary of State, July 31, 1945; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F6, Memorandum of The Press and Radio News Conference, Tuesday, January 29, 1946. The open door policy had a bad reputation because of its historical connections to power politics and spheres of influence. Still, the concept is termed as China’s policy of opening up to the outside world until China’s position as a sovereign state was recognized and the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. On the other hand, Harriman, a very wealthy industrialist and banker, had been a well-known leader of the anti-Soviet group in Roosevelt’s administration. Moreover, Harriman’s natural antagonism to the Soviet Union was reinforced by his strong belief in open door expansion.

upon Japan", the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan became much simpler. The only technical problem was an old non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Japan, which had not been successfully dissolved. In light of this agreement, the United States could officially refuse to ask for assistance from the Soviet Union, for Japan had never violated a non-aggression pact in the way the Germans had. During a telephone conversation with Byrnes on July 27, Molotov insisted that the Soviet Union declare war on Japan within three days.³¹³ In a meeting between Truman, Byrnes and Molotov on July 29, Molotov requested that the United States, Great Britain and other allies present an official request for the Soviet Union to join the war. This was to be based on Japan's refusal to accept the ultimatum of unconditional surrender, which was done to shorten the war and to save human lives. Ultimately, joining the war required signing the agreement with China.³¹⁴ From the perspective of summer 1947, Byrnes interpreted the situation in his memoirs:

As for myself, I must frankly admit that in view of what we knew of Soviet actions in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, I would have been satisfied had the Russians determined not to enter the war. Notwithstanding Japan's persistent refusal to surrender unconditionally, I believed the atomic bomb would be successful and would force the Japanese to accept surrender on our terms. I feared what would happen when the Red Army entered Manchuria.... When the agreement on Russian participation in the war was reached at Yalta, the military situation had been entirely different. President Roosevelt and our military leaders wanted the Soviet Union in the war. No one of them could have anticipated the difficulties we encountered after Yalta. However, an agreement had been made and we had to stand by our obligation. Ben Cohen and I spent hours trying to decide how the President could properly reply to the Soviet request. It was Ben who suggested that we call the Soviet Government's attention to its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.³¹⁵

In practice, the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan was justified by referring to Sections 103 and 106 of the Charter, the latter of which made the action possible based on the Moscow Declaration which was concluded in October 1943. On one hand, the Charter had not been officially ratified in San Francisco, but in order to solve this problem the representatives of the Soviet Union were seen to have accepted the Charter and additionally the Soviet Union was to become a permanent member of the Security Council. Byrnes thought this solution to be positive in the sense that it tied the Soviet Union more closely to the United Nations.³¹⁶ Byrnes sent Stalin an invitation to join the war, as phrased by Ben Cohen on the last day of July:

It seems to me that under the terms of the Moscow Declaration and the provisions of the Charter, above referred to, it would be proper for the Soviet Union to indicate its willingness to consult and cooperate with other great powers now at war with Japan

³¹³ Byrnes 1947, p. 207.

³¹⁴ FRUS 1944. Bohlen Minutes, Truman Papers, Truman-Molotov Meeting, Sunday, July 29, 1945, Noon. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 476.

³¹⁵ Byrnes 1947, p. 208.

³¹⁶ Byrnes 1947, p. 209.

with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations to maintain peace and security.³¹⁷

In his memoirs, the image given by Byrnes on including the Soviet Union in the conquering of Japan is not one of bitterness due to having to share the glory of ending the war with the Russians, but primarily due to the Soviet Union being successful in building a relationship with China, which was a necessary prerequisite for joining the war.³¹⁸ Even though the conflict between the Soviet supported communists and the US assisted Kuomintang started to erupt in open clashes during 1946, losing China to the communist camp was not thought likely in the US prior to 1949. According to history scholar Robert L. Messer, Byrnes had primarily sought to stop the Soviet Union from joining the war by even encouraging Chinese Foreign Minister T.V. Soong to stall the Sino-Soviet negotiations, which had become a threshold question for the Soviet Union, until the atomic weapon could end the war.³¹⁹ Byrnes did not consider his actions to be stalling, but wanted to use his communications with China to remind them to remain within the boundaries of the Yalta Treaty. Highlighting the Yalta Treaties revealed a mechanism through which the slipping of China under the influence of the Soviet Union was made possible. The issue in question was a dispute between China and the Soviet Union regarding the co-ownership of a railroad built by the Russians in Northern Manchuria at the end of the 19th century. Deviating from the Yalta Treaty, the Soviet Union demanded a majority to ensure the use of the track for the transport of war supplies to the military base of Port Arthur, which it especially coveted.³²⁰

However, several factors indicate that Byrnes was willing to go to great lengths to stop the Soviet Union from participating in the conquering of Japan. With regard to the Far East, Byrnes sought to find a solution which would have in every way prevented the Soviet Union from successfully reaching its objectives in both China and Japan. It is reasonable to note that from the perspective of Byrnes's memoirs, which were written in the summer of 1947, he had predicted the sequence of events fairly well. In the end, the decision to use Soviet troops to conquer Japan, which had relatively many effects, could have been superseded. The only true means for finding a solution was the atomic weapon, the use of which became available too late with regard to Byrnes's objectives.

³¹⁷ BP. China B16:F5, From Byrnes to Stalin, 31.7.1945; CPD. Generalissimo J. V. Stalin, The Soviet Delegation. Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, volume two, correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (August 1941-December 1945), pp. 258-259.

³¹⁸ Byrnes 1947, p. 208.

³¹⁹ Messer 1982, pp. 104-105.

³²⁰ Byrnes 1947, p. 205. On the other hand, in the background was the Amerasia case, in which secret documents were leaked to the press. The documents related to military strategies particularly concerning China. In his memoirs, Byrnes did not tell much about Amerasia and thought that it was totally his predecessor's problem. See. Klehr & Radosh 1996, passim; BP. China B2:F4, China issues, Memorandum, Subject: Manchuria.

3.1.3 Atomic Diplomacy?

Even though all the wartime conferences of the Big Three were held in a seemingly egalitarian spirit, American confidence was boosted in Potsdam by successful nuclear tests in mid-July. Both Britain and the United States were bound by the old Roosevelt-Churchill agreement, in which both nations agreed to not use the atomic weapon, should one be successfully manufactured.³²¹ The Soviet Union was notified of the successful invention only a week later in Potsdam, but due to Soviet espionage Stalin was probably aware of the existence of the bomb prior to that.³²² The unofficial meeting between Truman and Stalin on July 24, in which the announcement of the atomic weapon seemed to have no effect on Stalin, supports this view. Stalin had only hoped that it could be used effectively in the fight against Japan.³²³ Recognizing that the development of the atomic weapon made the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan redundant, Stalin's decision to accept the package deal offered by Byrnes is understandable. As an added bonus, the Red Army got to join the war in the Pacific, by Truman's decision, after the bombings of Hiroshima.³²⁴

According to Byrnes, the mere possibility of creating a situation which would make it possible for the Soviet Union to detach itself from the war would be a catastrophic mistake. In his view, Britain should have stopped Hitler's ascent to power in time, because "the German people under a democracy would have been a far superior ally than Russia. This caused Byrnes to fear that the ideological differences between the United States and Britain would hinder cooperation in the future, when alarming examples were evident in the Balkans and especially in questions concerning the freedom of the press.³²⁵ The questions regarding the use of the atomic weapon and the coordination of the Manhattan District Project seem, in the light of Byrnes's memoirs, to have been awkward. Byrnes recalled having heard of the plans from Roosevelt, but thought the later statements made by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, about his role as the then-leader of OWM to be exaggerated.³²⁶

³²¹ Gardner 1965, p. 287.

³²² Soviet spies were revealed in Canada. With reference to Memoirs of Marshall Georgy Zhukov published in 1971, Gregg Herken had proved that Stalin knew about the Manhattan Project since 1942. Herken 1988, p. 20.

³²³ There is no official memo on the discussion, but according to *Speaking Frankly* and *Truman's Years of Decision* the discussion was held and its contents were of this kind. FRUS 1944. Truman-Stalin Conversation, Tuesday, July 24, 1945, 7:30 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 378-379; BP. Walter Brown's excerpts from the book, B2:F1. Walter Brown's Diary, Potsdam.

³²⁴ Bernstein 1975, pp. 42-46; Gardner 1965, p. 339.

³²⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 24.7.1945.

³²⁶ Byrnes 1947, p. 257. Compare to: Messer 1982, p. 86. According to Robert L. Messer, it is probable that Byrnes knew about the Manhattan Project already in 1943, but at the latest he was informed in March 1945. In *All In One Lifetime*, Byrnes wrote that during his work as War Mobilizer he had no further connection with the Manhattan Project "beyond continuing to see that it was accorded top priority in labor and materials." However, he admitted that he had known about the project to some extent because of disputes that arose at Oak Ridge in late 1944. Byrnes 1958, p. 247.

I DO NOT REMEMBER just when it was that President Roosevelt told me about the atomic bomb. I do remember that it was a hot summer afternoon and the two of us were sitting alone in his oval office discussing certain phases of the war mobilization program. Suddenly, and for no apparent reason, he began to tell me the awesome story of the Manhattan Project.... However, I was not directly concerned with the project and was too busy to be curious.³²⁷

Evidently Byrnes's slight interest in the Manhattan Project was also caused by the political risk that was attached to the expensive project. In his letter to Roosevelt in March 1945, Byrnes weighed the risk of failure, which would lead to "relentless investigations and criticism" of the 2 billion dollar classified project. By demanding from those involved in the planning of the project an accurate interim report about the progress of the project, Byrnes was undoubtedly trying to establish a threshold, past which further attempts would not be worthwhile.³²⁸

The final resolution to use the atomic weapon was made by the Interim Committee, which on July 1, 1945 decided to unanimously recommend to the President the bombing of Japan quickly and without warning.³²⁹ It is nonetheless clear, that as the Director of OWM, as Secretary of State or as the President's representative on the Interim Committee, Byrnes had to have known about the atomic weapon and have had a significant role in the atomic weapons project. Byrnes's connection with the top-secret group managing the use of the atomic weapon has been shown, both during the war and after it.³³⁰ Additionally, Byrnes's reluctance in Yalta to include the Russians in the war against Japan indicates that he knew that a possibly better solution to the war was in the making.

The actual information regarding the successful nuclear test arrived in Potsdam after George L. Harrison, the acting president of the Interim Committee, sent word to Secretary of War Stimson on July 16. According to Stimson's diary, he immediately showed the telegram to Truman and Byrnes "who of course were greatly interested although the information was still in very general terms".³³¹ During the following two days, Stimson received even more detailed information³³² from the test zone in New Mexico about the effect

³²⁷ Byrnes 1947, pp. 257-260.

³²⁸ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B1:F5. Atomic Energy. Memorandum for the President, 3.3.1945.

³²⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 261.

³³⁰ Messer 1982, p. 84.

³³¹ FRUS 1944. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers No. 1303. Department of the Army Files: Telegram, The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson), Washington, 16 July 1945, The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 1360; On following day Harrison telegraphed more great news regarding the atomic bomb: "Doctor has just returned most enthusiastic and confident that the Little Boy is as husky as his big brother i.e. Fat Man". FRUS 1944. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers No. 1303. Department of the Army Files: Telegram, The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson), Washington, 17 July 1945, The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 1360-1361.

³³² On July 17, information concerning the tests of "the Little Boy" arrived from Harrison. FRUS 1944. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers No. 1304. Department of the Army Files: Telegram, The Acting Chairman of the Interim

of the atomic weapon, which he passed on to Truman and Byrnes. During a conversation with Byrnes on July 17, Stimson suggested giving Japan a quick warning, which Byrnes objected to, stating the previously agreed date with Truman as the reason. Churchill also supported the use of the atomic weapon without prior warning, as payback for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Six days later, Byrnes called Stimson “asking him as to the timing of the S-1 program”.³³³ Truman had the warning message on his desk and he proposed to “shoot it out as soon as he heard the definite day of the operation”.³³⁴

Secret speculation about the effects of the atomic weapon on the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan started immediately after the first information had arrived. In a report to Truman and Byrnes, drafted by Stimson, the matter was presented in the following way:

I would therefore urge that we formulate a warning to Japan to be delivered during the course of this Conference, and rather earlier than later, along the lines of the draft prepared by the War Department and now approved, I understand, by both the Senate and Navy Departments. In the meantime our tactical plans should continue to operate without let up, and if the Japanese persist, the full force of our newer weapons should be brought to bear in the course of which a renewed and even heavier warning, backed by the power of the new forces and possibility the actual entrance of the Russians in the war, should be delivered. Whether the Russians are to be notified of our intentions in advance in this regard, would depend upon whether an agreement satisfactory to us has been reached with the Russians on the terms of their entry into the Japanese war.³³⁵

The following day Stimson met Winston Churchill, whom he told about the message sent by Harrison. According to Stimson’s diary, Churchill was interested and excited, but strongly objected to even partially revealing the secret. Stimson was of the opposite view.³³⁶ Also, Truman clearly wanted to tell the Soviet representatives about the revolutionary American invention, which is evident from the lunch discussions he had with Churchill on July 18.³³⁷ Four days later Churchill noticed a change in Truman’s behavior:

Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson), Washington, 17 July 1945, *The Conference of Berlin 1945*, vol. II, pp. 1360–1361. On the following day, a more detailed report on the Manhattan Project was completed by Major General Leslie R. Groves. FRUS 1944. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers No. 1305. Department of the Army Files: Telegram, The Commanding General, Manhattan District Project (Groves) to the Secretary of War (Stimson), Washington, 18 July 1945, *The Conference of Berlin 1945*, vol. II, pp. 1361–1368.

³³³ S-1 was a code name for atomic bomb.

³³⁴ FRUS 1944. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers No. 1236. 740.0011 P. W./7-1645, The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State, *The Conference of Berlin 1945*, vol. II, footnotes, pp. 1265–1266; Clemson University Libraries, Clemson, SC 29634. Walter Brown’s excerpts from the book, B2:F1. Walter Brown’s Diary, Potsdam.

³³⁵ FRUS 1944. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers No. 1236. 740.0011 P. W./7-1645. The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State, Potsdam, 16 July 1945. *The Conference of Berlin 1945*, vol. II, pp. 1265–1267.

³³⁶ FRUS 1944. Stimson–Churchill Conversation, Tuesday, July 17, 1945, Early Afternoon. *The Conference of Berlin 1945*, vol. II, p. 47. According to the editor the disclosure referred presumably to any disclosure to the Soviet Union.

³³⁷ FRUS 1944. Truman–Churchill Luncheon Meeting, Wednesday, July 18, 1945, About 1:30 p.m. *The Conference of Berlin 1945*, vol. II, pp. 79–82.

He told me that he had noticed at the meeting of the Three yesterday that Truman was evidently much fortified by something that had happened and that he stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner, telling them as to certain demands that they absolutely could not have and that the United States was entirely against them.... Churchill said he now understood how this pepping up had taken place and that he felt the same way. His own attitude confirmed this admission. He now not only was not worried about giving the Russians information on the matter but was rather inclined to use it as an argument in our favor in the negotiations. The sentiment of the four of us was unanimous in thinking that it was advisable to tell the Russians at least that we were working on that subject and intended to use it and when it was successfully finished.³³⁸

It was not until the dinner meeting of July 23 that Churchill was convinced that Stalin had no knowledge about the existence of the atomic weapon. Nonetheless, Stalin had spoken "with enthusiasm about the Russian intervention against Japan, and seemed to expect a good many months of war, which Russia would wage on an ever-increasing scale, governed only by the Trans-Siberian Railway." Also, as revealed by Walter Brown's diaries, the atmosphere in the conference changed completely, as the Soviet representatives reacted exceptionally cooperatively, especially to the issue of the Dardanelles.³³⁹ Stalin made assurances that the Soviet-Turkish cooperation in the monitoring of the strait was a significant part of the peace efforts. The following day Truman had, in his own words, mentioned to Stalin in passing that the US had a new and exceptional weapon.³⁴⁰ Stalin had regarded this with his usual indifference. In his memoirs, Byrnes thought Stalin's attitude to be incomprehensible:

I was surprised at Stalin's lack of interest. I concluded that he had not grasped the importance of the discovery. I thought that the following day he would ask for more information about it. He did not. Later I concluded that, because the Russians kept secret their developments in military weapons, they thought it improper to ask us about ours.³⁴¹

The picture painted by Byrnes in his memoirs about the effect of the atomic weapon invention on Stalin is surely not representative of the whole truth. Undeniably, Byrnes was disappointed at the lack of attention and would have possibly liked to see the atomic weapon used more effectively in both intimidating Japan and as an additional bargaining chip at the negotiating tables of Potsdam. As Churchill observed, after the information about the successful nuclear tests arrived, the stance of the United States changed to a stricter one, which was increasingly prominent in the fifth plenary session. However, the change was only visible verbally, as the fate of Poland, which was the main issue, had already been decided at Yalta. Truman was unquestionably

³³⁸ FRUS 1944. Stimson-Churchill Conversation, Sunday, July 22, 1945, 10:40 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 225.

³³⁹ FRUS 1944. Tripartite Dinner Meeting, Monday July 23, 1945, 8:30 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 319-320. Stalin had also stated, that their next meeting "should be in Tokyo". There is no official record of the conversation engaged at the dinner. Churchill's remarks are originally from the book *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 668-669; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 18.7.1945.

³⁴⁰ Truman 1955a, p. 416.

³⁴¹ Byrnes 1947, p. 263.

tough when he replied to several of the Soviet Union's demands in the negative. The majority of these Stalin announced would be postponed for further discussion.³⁴²

Stalin's long-time interpreter and journalist Valentin Berezhkov later noted the effect of the atomic weapon on Truman's behavior at the conference as early as July 21, when the President made an appeal for postponing the question of the Polish border until the final peace conference. In his description of history, Berezhkov was also convinced that neither Truman nor Byrnes intended to organize a peace conference at all. Instead, according to Berezhkov, the use of atomic diplomacy was a specific part of the objectives of Byrnes and Truman, and the duo sought to prevent the Soviet Union from entering the war against Japan by using atomic diplomacy. According to Berezhkov's theory, Truman wanted Japan to continue its resistance, which would morally permit the use of the atomic weapon, and would end the war before the Soviet Union was to enter it.³⁴³ With this, Berezhkov is apparently referring to the United States' reluctance to accept the conditional surrender of Japan, the conditions of which the Soviet Union had more than likely meddled with through Moscow's ambassador to Japan.

Byrnes's special aide Charles Bohlen, who according to Truman and Byrnes was as a Russian-speaker present in the capacity of an interpreter, brings his own view to the question about the conversation between Stalin and Truman. In his own words, Bohlen did not take part in the conversation, but the interpretation was done by Pavlov, a Russian. Instead Bohlen had, according to his memoirs, followed the conversation at a distance without hearing what was said. Based on his observation, Bohlen thinks it obvious that Truman either did not mention the atomic nature of the bomb, or that Stalin did not understand Truman's message at all.³⁴⁴ Walter Brown also suspected that Truman had introduced the weapon only superficially as a new explosive which had been successful. Both alternatives suggest that some attempts were made to exploit the atomic weapon diplomatically. Stalin's "performance" in this regard was more successful. Referring to the memoirs of Marshal Georgy Zhukov, which were published in 1971, Gregg Herken has shown that immediately following the conversation Stalin sent a telegram to Moscow, urging the Soviet Union to expedite their own atomic project.³⁴⁵ In principle, Churchill was correct when speaking of the changed attitude of the United States. Nonetheless, the added value brought by the atomic weapon was successfully used only to reject some demands made by the Soviet Union. At least in Potsdam, the United States either could not or would not use it as a means of applying pressure on Japan.³⁴⁶

³⁴² FRUS 1944. Department of State Minutes, Truman Papers, Fifth Plenary Meeting, Saturday, July 21, 1945, 5 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 203-215.

³⁴³ Berezhkov 1987, pp. 471-489.

³⁴⁴ Bohlen 1973, p. 237.

³⁴⁵ Herken 1988, passim.

³⁴⁶ Gardner 1965, p. 309.

As a whole, the significance of the atomic weapon to the outcome of the Potsdam Conference seems surprisingly modest. No wider knowledge about the effects of the weapon existed during the conference, and not everyone wanted to use it as a means of pressure. The atomic weapon was certainly considered to be a potential bargaining advantage of the future, for according to Byrnes's own estimates it would take other governments at least seven to ten years to catch up to the United States in nuclear technology.³⁴⁷ Demands for bringing nuclear technology under international control were made even in the United States, but Byrnes thought it better not to intentionally shorten the technological lead in times of continued instability.³⁴⁸ Even some of those who had been party to the development of the nuclear weapon thought that exclusive rights to a revolutionary weapon would lead to an armament race, which was not needed in a world coming away from a war.³⁴⁹

In his memoirs Byrnes nonetheless believed that naive international control of atomic energy or the disarmament suggested by Molotov would not achieve better results due to the unpredictable nature of the Soviet Union:

If the United States destroyed its bombs and agreed not to make any more and then desired later to violate our treaty obligations and make bombs, our alert and uncontrolled press soon would discover it and make public the violation of our pledge. But that is not possible in the Soviet Union. Should the Soviet Government obtain from the international organization the scientific information and the engineering know-how and decide to build a plant and produce bombs, no one outside the Soviet Union would know it until the Red Army was ready to use them. That would be too late.... What, then, shall we do in case the Soviet Union refuses to join in a treaty containing the safeguards it accepted in principle in Moscow and in London, and which clearly are essential to effective control? The answer is not a happy one, but I see no other. We must pray that the Soviet leaders will change their minds, and while we pray, we must use our best efforts to develop better bombs and more of them. For our own protection, we must continue pushing toward the boundaries of our scientific knowledge.³⁵⁰

In light of the predominance offered by the atomic weapon, it is remarkable that despite the optimism of several top-level politicians, the weapon was not more efficiently used to diffuse the deadlocked situations in Eastern Europe. Later Byrnes proudly underlined that atomic diplomacy was nothing to feel guilty about.³⁵¹ Nonetheless, Byrnes had been visibly irked by the lack of interest in the bomb shown by Stalin and Molotov, which is explained by the progress of Soviet espionage and the Soviet Union's own atomic weapons project.³⁵² According to Barton J. Bernstein, the lack of efficient atomic diplomacy was caused on one hand by a farrago of different objectives by the leaders of foreign policy, and on the other hand by the inability to engineer a

³⁴⁷ Byrnes 1947, p. 261.

³⁴⁸ Byrnes 1947, p. 265.

³⁴⁹ Robertson 1994, pp. 404–405.

³⁵⁰ Byrnes 1947, p. 274.

³⁵¹ Byrnes 1947, p. 275.

³⁵² Byrnes 1947, pp. 266, 268.

publicity campaign explaining the benefits of atomic diplomacy to the Americans.³⁵³

According to a view presented by David Robertson, for Byrnes, the atomic weapon was first and foremost a question of domestic policy, the success of which justified the two billion dollars spent on its development and offered support for existing policies. Further, any foreign policy advantage would merely have been a bonus, making it possible to better maneuver the Soviet Union in the future.³⁵⁴ Robert L. Messer, who strongly emphasizes Byrnes's clear desire to practice atomic diplomacy, in turn sees a clear connection between the atomic weapon and US foreign policy, which gained strength after a short lag at the start of the following year.³⁵⁵ Differing from Byrnes's own view, the latter seems a logical viewpoint when examined from the perspective of spring 1946. However, at the time, the relationships between superpowers began to demonstrate qualities which solely the atomic weapon cannot explain.

Gregg Herken, who considers Byrnes to be one of the most active supporters of atomic diplomacy, presents the strongest interpretation regarding Byrnes's willingness to use atomic diplomacy. According to Herken, Byrnes believed that the atomic weapon was a good way to end the war against Japan without involving the Soviet Union, thus preventing the establishment of Soviet military bases in Manchuria. After all, Byrnes had previously advised the President not to accept the Japanese offer of conditional surrender before the atomic bomb or the involvement of the Soviet Union would have rendered the compromise unnecessary.³⁵⁶ In this regard, Herken's theory fits in with Byrnes's own claim about having no knowledge about the agreement Roosevelt and Stalin had made in Yalta regarding the Far East. In this regard also, the US and Soviet objectives concerning Japan are intrinsically linked to the question of the nature and existence of atomic diplomacy. For his part, Lewis Gaddis has agreed with Herken. In his most recent history of the Cold War, Gaddis believes that Byrnes "definitely expected the American monopoly to induce the Russians into making diplomatic concessions".³⁵⁷

3.1.4 The Birth of the Council of Foreign Ministers

The Potsdam Conference of the Big Three ended the series of wartime conferences. It was also the last official gathering of Heads of State regarding the organization of the war prior to the actual Paris Peace Conference of 21 nations in late summer of 1946. Instead, the Council of Foreign Ministers, the continuance of which especially Byrnes had demanded, continued the spirit of the peace conferences in special Conferences of Foreign Ministers. Byrnes often

³⁵³ Bernstein 1975, pp. 44–47, 68–69.

³⁵⁴ Robertson 1994, p. 405.

³⁵⁵ Messer 1982, p. 220.

³⁵⁶ Herken 1988, p. 18.

³⁵⁷ Gaddis 1997, p. 89. In this respect, Gaddis approached the revisionist view of the Gar Alperovitz, whereby the meaning of the atomic bomb was to pressure the Soviet Union in the Eastern Europe. See Alperovitz 1985.

took credit for this institution,³⁵⁸ which later proved to be very functional, but the idea of drafting peace agreements at ministerial level meetings between superpowers had already been conceived in the summer of 1944 during Secretary of State Stettinius's term. The following year, during the San Francisco Conference the US State Department's plan to draft the peace agreements in separate Conference of Foreign Ministers was finalized. Represented in these conferences would be Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, France and the United States.

The objective was never to create a broad assembly like that in Versailles, which wasn't adequately resourced to hear all parties and which suffered from delays caused by appeals and counter-appeals, but to guarantee that smaller nations' voices were also heard. After all, the aftermath of the First World War, which had been dealt with in Versailles, had caused the start of the new major war. Thus, the first item on the agenda at Potsdam was the creation of the Council of Foreign Ministers:

One of the most urgent problems in the field of foreign relations facing us today is the establishment of some procedure and machinery for the development of peace negotiations and territorial settlements without which the existing confusion, political and economic stagnation will continue to the serious detriment of Europe and the world.... I therefore propose as the best formula to meet the situation the establishment of a council composed of the foreign ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States, namely the countries which compose the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations organization.³⁵⁹

The objective of Byrnes, who had in Potsdam acted as the chairman of the meetings of Foreign Ministers, was to create a Council of Foreign Ministers that was both broad and effective in its field of operations. Molotov on the other hand, thought that a more "restricted arrangement" would be better, which in practice referred to the Soviet Union's desire to keep both France and China out of the decision-making process. This was certainly justified by the resolution made in the Big Three's Foreign Ministers' meeting in Yalta, which British

³⁵⁸ For example: Byrnes 1947, pp. 70–71.

³⁵⁹ FRUS 1944. Truman Papers, No. 711, Proposal by the United States Delegation, Babelsberg, July 17, 1945, Memorandum. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 609–610. The citations are from the proposal by the United States Delegation which was compiled by Byrnes. The proposal included a four-part draft proposal for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers. Most significant was the third item whereby the Council would be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. To Byrnes's own copies he had made a note that Finland should also be included there, but when Molotov took the floor he did not mention Finland at all. Later Molotov asked if Finland should be mentioned in the draft proposal. Then Byrnes remarked that the United States had not been at war with Finland and under the circumstances he could not be involved with the Finnish peace treaty. Instead, Byrnes assumed that "the Council would prepare recommendations to the Governments relating to the terms of peace and in doing so would consider would consider the views of a government which had not been at war". FRUS 1944. Truman Papers, First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Wednesday, July 18, 1945, 11 a.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 66–69; Potsdam, vol. I, pp. 162–163. See also Ward 1979, p. 10.

Foreign Minister Anthony Eden also invoked. On the other hand, the war situation had changed considerably since Yalta. Also the draft³⁶⁰ regarding the Council of Foreign Ministers which had been accepted in Potsdam, had in the US State Department, been expanded to concern not just Europe but the whole world, as Byrnes thought that the objectives set for the Council might otherwise delay its operations. The attendance of the Chinese and French Foreign Ministers in the meeting did not hamper the meetings of the three countries' Foreign Ministers, according to Byrnes.³⁶¹

In the second conference of Foreign Ministers, the policy was defined so that those countries that had already concluded a ceasefire agreement with the enemy nation in question would take part in the planning of the peace agreement. In the case of Italy, France would be considered a party to a ceasefire agreement. Additionally, the role of China had at Byrnes's initiative been limited to concern only "the Far East or problems of world wide significance".³⁶² Behind this was Molotov's demand that France should only take part in drafting the peace agreements for Germany and Italy.³⁶³

According to a view presented by Patricia Dawson Ward, the purpose of the US State Department's plan for the Council of Foreign ministers was not only the drafting of peace agreements, but also seeking to prevent the Soviet Union and Britain from increasing their influence.³⁶⁴ However, Byrnes wanted to change the original plan to state that the Council of Foreign Ministers would define the agreements on a general level, after which they would be presented to the UN. Byrnes demanded that this policy be accepted in the State Department even before he took the oath of the office of the Secretary of State.³⁶⁵ With backing from Truman, the policy was adopted and the idea of creating the Council of Foreign Ministers was included in the preparatory memorandums of the Potsdam Conference, which were only distributed to all conference participants the day before the negotiations. Presented by Truman, the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers became the first item on the agenda of the fourth plenary session of the Heads of State, and when it was

³⁶⁰ BP. China B16:F8, Approved Proposal for the Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers, 20.7.1945.

³⁶¹ FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Wednesday, July 18, 1945, 11 a.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 67-69.

³⁶² FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Wednesday, July 18, 1945, 11 a.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, p. 67. Byrnes explained that if the war with Japan should end soon they would in this manner have established the organization to deal with the problems of peace in the Far East. The other reason for including China was that China was one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

³⁶³ FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Thursday, July 19, 1945, 11 a.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 101-102.

³⁶⁴ Ward 1979, p. 11. Patricia Dawson Ward poured cold water on Gar Alperovitz's view whereby Byrnes would have planned the whole Council of the Foreign Ministers just to carry on atomic diplomacy. This is highly implausible, because when the memorandum considering the creation of the Council was written, there was no real evidence of a workable atomic bomb.

³⁶⁵ Byrnes 1947, pp. 70-71.

accepted it also became the first of the decisions made in Potsdam.³⁶⁶ Stalin however, was not fully content with the number of countries participating in the Council of Foreign Ministers. Stalin still did not consider China and France to be justified in attending the future Conferences of Foreign Ministers. On the part of China, both Truman and Churchill concurred, at least until the surrender of Japan.³⁶⁷

The objective added by Byrnes to the US State Department's plan on creating the Council of Foreign Ministers to present the draft peace plans to the UN, was suddenly seized upon by Churchill, who thought that the process would prove to be too slow and laborious for the negotiations. In Byrnes's view, the spirit of the Washington Declaration given in January 1942, which was the foundation for the establishment of the UN, demanded that the drafts be presented to the UN. Stalin's view in turn focused on the idea of necessity, where presenting even carefully prepared peace agreements to parties outside of the Big Three would not accomplish anything new, as they would represent all interests.³⁶⁸ Byrnes countered this view by suggesting to Molotov that only France be allowed to make decisions concerning Italy, which was later confirmed. As a whole, the participation of France and China, as well as the functional significance of their participation, was left relatively unclear in order to reach some form of agreement.³⁶⁹

According to Robert L. Messer, the underlying purpose for Byrnes's plan for the Council of Foreign Ministers was chiefly to destroy the spheres of influence that surrounded Britain and the Soviet Union.³⁷⁰ Whilst Byrnes wanted the organization of the post-war world to be defined by the victorious nations, he also needed a tool more efficient than an organization like the UN for the effective and situation-appropriate management of superpower relationships. Further, according to Messer's thinking, Byrnes was aware of the rigidity of the system, but wanted to maintain the personal diplomacy of wartime, but now at a ministerial level. From Messer's point of view, the Soviet Union's notoriously timid attitude towards public organizations like the UN is better explained by Byrnes's desire to settle future conflict amongst Foreign Ministers behind closed doors. Like Patricia Dawson Ward, Messer also considers the Council of Foreign Ministers as presented by Byrnes to clearly be

³⁶⁶ FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, Fourth Plenary Meeting, Friday, July 20, 1945, 4 p.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 165-167. The final resolution: FRUS 1944. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers No. 713, Truman Papers, Text Approved by the Heads of Government, Babelsberg, July 20, 1945. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 612-613. See also: Messer 1982, p. 108.

³⁶⁷ Byrnes 1947, p. 72.

³⁶⁸ FRUS 1944. Thompson Minutes, Truman Papers, Second Plenary Meeting, Wednesday, July 18, 1945, 11 a.m. The Conference of Berlin 1945, vol. II, pp. 89-90. See as well: Ward 1979, p. 14.

³⁶⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 72.

³⁷⁰ The destruction of the spheres of influence was mentioned in the State Department's memorandum. Ward 1979, p. 11.

based on the plans made by the State Department to which Byrnes made some changes in accordance with his own plans.³⁷¹

In the end, the relatively little-debated issue of the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers was the first of the Potsdam decisions to be accepted.³⁷² Thus, the plans for the creation of the Council, originally drawn by the US State Department, were realized. However, the idea of choosing meeting locations outside of the capital cities of the participating countries did not receive support, but the suggested cities of Brussels and Vienna were replaced with London, which was situated between Washington and Moscow. The major purpose of creating the Council was to organize the peace agreements of Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland and later Germany. The Council's responsibilities also included the possibility of handling the peace agreements of other countries, which would, however, require an agreement with the countries in question first.³⁷³

In addition, a permanent secretariat which would reside in London was organized for the Council, as well as an alternate system for the Foreign Ministers. These alternates for Foreign Ministers were intended to be top-level politicians, who would ordinarily lead a small group of technical advisors, but in the absence of the Minister could replace them at the negotiating table of the Council with full authority. The plan to create the Council of Foreign Ministers, which Byrnes had adapted in accordance with the wishes of the Soviet Union and Britain, seemed to come to fruition without great pains. When talking about his lunch meeting with Molotov on July 24, Byrnes thought the mutual atmosphere to be optimistic.³⁷⁴ The optimism was largely due to the creation of the future problem-solving machinery rather than its significance on the agenda. It was an accomplishment for the spirit of Yalta and the UN, but it did not change the existence of the issues. According to Patricia Dawson Ward, the Council of Foreign Ministers was based on a compromise, the birth of which required postponing more difficult issues to a later date.³⁷⁵

The Council of Foreign Ministers and the closely linked agreement on a final peace conference, which was to resemble the General Assembly of the UN, were a compromise resulting from the difficulties of the superpowers to simultaneously accept the guidelines of Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks. In Robert L. Messer's opinion, the whole peace treaty machinery was constructed from two components of different origin; the Peace Conference, which was to accept the draft peace treaties, and the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was to

³⁷¹ Messer 1982, p. 108. Essential changes were mainly the starting of peace negotiations with the less controversial issues of Italy and Balkans and the deputy-system, organized by Byrnes. According to the State Department Memorandum, deputies should work closely with the foreign ministers. The mechanical phase of drafting the treaties was left to the deputies. A notable change was also a proposal for a final and universal Peace Conference, which Byrnes had made in the spirit of Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco. For instance: Ward 1979, p. 11.

³⁷² Messer 1982, p. 108. Compare to: Byrnes 1927, p. 71.

³⁷³ Ward 1979, pp. 9–15.

³⁷⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 72.

³⁷⁵ Ward 1979, pp. 16–17.

prepare the treaties. The Peace Conference was a clear continuance to the guidelines agreed upon in Yalta about continuing the cooperation of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain even after the war, but the Council of Foreign Ministers was most obviously based on the policies of San Francisco and Potsdam to cooperate amongst all permanent members of the UN Security Council.³⁷⁶ Thus it was linked, according to Byrnes's wishes, to an international organization like the UN, which Byrnes thought very highly of. Later, Byrnes himself took part in dismantling this dichotomy, when the moral questions of voting procedures were raised between the two components as the Peace Conference was approaching.³⁷⁷

Before the grand finale in Paris, all in all five Conferences of Foreign ministers were organized. In addition to the Big Three being represented in London and Paris, China and France were also represented in London, Moscow and Paris.³⁷⁸ All Conferences were branded by the Americans' desire to normalize the world as quickly as possible, whereas the inflexibility of Soviet politics and its desire to grow its influence further prolonged the decision-making. Hiding behind the outward cooperation ability of Yalta and Potsdam was an increasing battle of authority between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union clearly wanted to direct the situation in the Balkans, to build military bases on the Mediterranean, to take part in the occupation of Japan and to give benefits to Yugoslavia, which was in conflict with the US goals of sovereignty, free trade and collective security.³⁷⁹ Conversely, the US objectives also required maintaining dominance in Europe. It was no later than in London that Byrnes realized that US and Soviet interests would sooner or later collide due to the impossibility of compromise.

3.1.5 The Legacy of Potsdam and the Yalta Axioms

Even though the atmosphere in Potsdam left Byrnes with a bitter aftertaste, consensus was reached on the big issues. The redevelopment of Germany as a disruptor of world peace was to be prevented by demilitarizing Germany, establishing military tribunals and by weeding out fascism. In general, there was consensus in Potsdam about maintaining German political and economic integrity, and the resolution made in Yalta about dividing Austria, Germany and Berlin into occupation zones was approved. Instead, problems arose in the question of German and Polish borders, which would grate on superpower relationships for decades to come.³⁸⁰ As an optimist, Byrnes had a lot of expectations:

³⁷⁶ Messer 1982, pp. 152–153.

³⁷⁷ The question was about how the representatives of the states would follow their own obligations presented in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

³⁷⁸ Gardner 1965, p. 367.

³⁷⁹ Ward 1979, p. 174.

³⁸⁰ The Oder–Neisse-line was decided to be Poland's western border, but it would still have to be ratified in the final Peace Conference. In the Soviet Union, the border issue was considered definite. In the West, it was accepted that the unsettled area was temporarily under the control of Poland and the Soviet Union.

The conference ended in good spirits. But the American delegation that headed for home probably was less sanguine than the one that had departed from Yalta. Events had shown that agreements reached in conference must be hammered out on the hard anvil of experience. We thought, however, that we had established a basis for maintaining our war-born unity. Our efforts in relation to eastern Europe had been less successful than we had hoped. We had failed to exempt Italy from reparations. We thought we had succeeded in the case of Austria. We felt we had made genuine progress in the agreements about Germany, although there was ample ground for our fears that it would be a long time before we could get the Soviets to start work on a German settlement. Nevertheless, we believed our agreement on reparations enabled us to avoid denouncing their unilateral action in removing people and property from their zone.... We firmly believed that the agreements reached would provide a basis for the early restoration of stability to Europe.³⁸¹

All in all a number of decisions had been made in Potsdam, which, with the exception of the one on the Council of Foreign Ministers, had not come easy. From Byrnes's point of view, Potsdam had primarily suffered from the fact that the Soviet Union had not acted in the way that was expected after Yalta. As a lawyer, Byrnes later interpreted the guidelines given in Yalta to have been mere illusions:

It is true that following Yalta we had been somewhat disillusioned. Such things as the Bern incident [³⁸²] and the Soviet violation of the agreements on Poland and Rumania warned us that in the days to come we would encounter serious differences and would have to overcome deepseated suspicion. However, fresh in our minds were the words of President Roosevelt's last message [³⁸³] to Prime Minister Churchill, based upon his experience with the Russians, that such difficulties would straighten out. Today it is easy for one to say that President Roosevelt's advice and our assumption were not warranted. It is a trite but true statement that 'hindsight is better than foresight'.³⁸⁴

³⁸¹ Byrnes 1947, pp. 86–87.

³⁸² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B1:F11. Bern Incident, From Telegrams Stalin-Roosevelt. The Bern Incident referred to the desire of Field Marshall Alexander and some German Generals to explore peace and stop the resistance in Northern Italy. The Americans arranged a meeting in March 1945 in Bern, Switzerland. However, controversies appeared about the issue of whether the Russians should know about secret meeting between the Americans and Germans. For instance, according to Byrnes, Molotov was informed about it and they had waited for his reply before beginning the negotiations. On behalf of the Soviet Union, Molotov had refused to take part in such kind of discussions, but wanted to sent three Red Army officers to the meeting. At that time, a new meeting was arranged in Caserta, Italy, where the Allies were headquartered and where the Soviet representatives were also welcome. Nevertheless, Molotov notified them that officers could not be sent to Caserta and the negotiations ended. According to Valentin Berezkov, the Bern negotiations were held secretly and Molotov was not informed until the meeting concluded. It was also impossible to send Russian officers to Bern because the Soviet Union and Switzerland did not have diplomatic relations. In agreement with Berezkov, the Americans did not want to help Soviet officers get into Switzerland. The negotiations in Caserta were not possible because in the Soviet Union it was understood that the United States and Britain had already made the agreement to withdraw troops from Northern Italy. According to the Soviet Union, three divisions of German troops withdrawn from Northern Italy were transferred to the Soviet frontier. For example: Byrnes 1947, p. 56; Berezkov 1987, pp. 421–430.

³⁸³ Roosevelt's last message was a letter to Churchill, which he dictated an hour before his death. In this letter Roosevelt exhorted Churchill to take the acts of the Soviet Union more seriously. Compare to: Curry 1965, p. 303.

³⁸⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 71.

Whatever the truth about Roosevelt's last advice may be, it is irrefutable that the Soviet delegation expected the US representatives to continue the traditions of power politics, albeit with a new crew. Byrnes had assumed the Yalta Axioms, as termed by Yergin, as the cornerstones of his foreign policy and tried to continue the old policy of good relations with the Soviet Union in Potsdam. However, he often had to question this policy as the Soviet Union frequently violated the spirit of Yalta. Effectively, it was a question of violating the spirit of Yalta, as most of the decisions in Yalta had been made on a level of principle, and many of the resolved issues had not been exhaustively defined. In addition, what added to the burden on Byrnes was the foreign policy baggage left by Roosevelt, which left Byrnes alone with Stalin, Molotov and Churchill, all of whom had a long history of working with Roosevelt.

From a foreign policy perspective, Byrnes operated in Potsdam largely based on old procedures. The new package-deal model forced the conference to make decisions, but strategically it continued along the lines of the old *quid pro quo* bartering policy. As masters of the bartering policy, the Soviet Union seemed to have understood the name of the game better than Byrnes. By setting their sights too high, they were able to demonstrate willingness to compromise by lowering their objectives to a more realistic level. This situation was highlighted by the fact that due to its large geographic area and military successes, the Soviet Union had become a more significant nation than the United States or Britain when deciding on the matters of most of the regions related to the war. Stalin repeatedly emphasized this position by making the Soviet Union the negotiating party to make the most demands.

In Potsdam Byrnes's foreign policy aspired to the Rooseveltian high wire act between Wilsonism and *realpolitik*. This high wire act was primarily based on the desire to act within reason but when necessary to transgress ideology in the name of the benefits of practical realism. These objectives were not realized at least on the part of *realpolitik*. Even though Byrnes had obviously been ready to use the atomic weapon to speed up the negotiations, this did not happen. Considering the whole, the best practice of *realpolitik* was done by the Soviet Union, whose strategy can be characterized as *Liebknechtian*. Both the Soviet Union and the United States relied on the issues agreed upon in Yalta when defining their policies in Potsdam. The real problem in Potsdam seems to have been that only two remained out of the trio of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. The legacy left by Roosevelt to Truman and Byrnes in the Yalta treaties was not easy to accept due to the changed world situation. The situation was intensified by the conflict caused by the interpretation of the Yalta Treaties and the friction caused by the structural change in power politics.

3.2 London – the first litmus test of the Council of Foreign Ministers

3.2.1 To old problems with a new optimism

After the Potsdam Conference the war also came to an end in the Far East. The final solution to the war was brought by the two atomic bombs, which Truman had consented to dropping on Hiroshima on August 6, and three days later on Nagasaki. The Soviet Union had declared war against Japan on August 8 and started by attacking the Japanese troops in Manchuria. Also, Emperor Hirohito's strong stance against continuing the war brought Japan to accept the terms of the Allies. The surrender was executed gradually on different fronts and was formally signed on the second day of September 1945. The World War had resulted in 30 million casualties, millions more wounded and an enormous amount of economic damage. From that point onwards the only objective of power politics was to stabilize the situation along the lines drawn in Yalta and Potsdam. As practical military operations received less attention, the Council of Foreign Ministers may have seemed to be the sensible solution in the new arena of power politics. With the war completely over, the functionality of this new arena was put to the test for the first time at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in London only two days after the official surrender of Japan.

When traveling to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in September 1945, Byrnes had only held the office of Secretary of State for two months, less than a month of which he had spent at home. Even though in Potsdam the start date for the London Conference was planned to be September 1, the start date was postponed until September 11 at the request of Byrnes and Bevin. The period after the Potsdam Conference had kept Byrnes very busy and preparations for the first Conference of Foreign Ministers were largely left for the boat ride over. Byrnes's aides that joined him on the trip, namely recently appointed Legal Counsel Benjamin Cohen, Byrnes's aide in Potsdam and Under Secretary of State during Stettinius's term James C. Dunn, the State Department's Russian expert and another one of Byrnes's aides in Potsdam Charles E. Bohlen, and leading Republican politician and expert in foreign policy John Foster Dulles, were reflective of the objectives Byrnes had set for London. In order to practice a foreign policy supported by the whole United States, inviting Dulles the Republican along was a good plan. This prevented Dulles, who acted as the Republican mouthpiece at home, from voicing criticism domestically, and meant that the responsibility for the outcome of the negotiations in London could not be solely placed on the shoulders of the Democrats.³⁸⁵ On the other hand Byrnes got to attest to the press the

³⁸⁵ FRUS 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers File : Lot M-88, Record of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 11, 1945, 4 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 112-115; Byrnes 1947, p. 92.

functionality of bipartisanship and to remind them that in matters of foreign policy, all Americans were one.³⁸⁶

Before the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, I decided to invite a prominent Republican, well informed on international affairs, to accompany me. It did not occur to me then that a Senator could be away for as long as a time as the treaty-drafting business was likely to consume. I consulted Senator Vandenberg. He suggested that I invite Mr. John Foster Dulles, who for years has been keenly interested in our foreign relations and is exceptionally well qualified. Mr. Dulles accepted the invitation, notwithstanding his business commitments, and was of great assistance. Later I recommended to President Truman that Mr. Dulles be a member of our delegation to the first meeting of the General Assembly in New York.³⁸⁷

In general, the US position on the eve of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers was clearly better than only a few months prior in Potsdam. There were positive experiences of the effects of the atomic bomb, and the war had directed cash flow to the United States. In fact, the United States had come away from the war a significantly larger economic power than it had been when it joined the war.³⁸⁸ The new Council of Foreign Ministers required funds for post-war rebuilding, which gave the US a clear negotiating advantage. Stalling the decision to grant a loan to the Soviet Union, which even Roosevelt had done - possibly on purpose - and the decision of Congress, which was supported by Truman to not use the funds available from lend-lease agreements in rebuilding, coupled with the monopoly on atomic weapons, gave the US a considerably good hand at the negotiating table. From Byrnes's point of view, the starting positions looked superb and the greatest problem seemed to be to decide what kind of agreements the US actually wanted.³⁸⁹ Yet, the atomic weapon may have been an awkward issue for Byrnes. Reporters, especially in London, had asked the Secretary of State to comment on information, according to which at the time of the Potsdam Conference the Japanese had expressed their willingness for peace negotiations facilitated by Moscow. Byrnes did not wish to comment on this aspect, which was disconcerting from the perspective of using the atomic weapon, and announced

³⁸⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F2, Secretary Byrnes's Press Conference, 11.9.1945, 12:00 noon to 12:30 p. m.

³⁸⁷ Byrnes 1947, pp. 234-235.

³⁸⁸ Even if the production capacity of the USA decreased after the war the potential of industry was piggybacked fast unclear. By the end of 1946, President Truman reported to the Congress that the national product was at a higher level than ever during peace time and that the amount of production 50 percent higher than the previous record. E.g. Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz 1956, p. 51.

³⁸⁹ Byrnes 1958. In *All In One Lifetime*, Byrnes reported that Leo Crowley, head of the Foreign Economic Administration, had told him of a conversation with President Roosevelt just before his death in April 1945. In the conversation, Crowley had told the President about a rumor that the United States government was considering a loan to the Soviet Union of 10 billion dollars. Crowley had stated that it would be wise to refrain from making any loan until more was known about the Soviets' postwar attitude, and the President had agreed with him on this issue. Ward 1979, p. 22.

that the atomic weapon in general was not up for discussion as it was not on the agenda.³⁹⁰

The public had very favorably received the Council of Foreign Ministers. However, there were no assurances as to how the peace process would progress. The Council of Foreign Ministers was considered to be advisory and preparatory in nature, but there was no consensus regarding the final peace conference. In his article in *The New York Times* on August 27, James Reston depicted the setting on the verge of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers:

It is generally expected that eventually all the United Nations will be called together for what will be called a 'peace conference,' but, just as the United Nations' Charter was formed in the Big Four's conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, the complex political and boundary questions are expected to be settled by the Foreign Ministers' Council. The work of this council is said to be 'preliminary and exploratory,' but as at Dumbarton Oaks, the major powers that were responsible for defeating Germany and Italy are expected to compose their differences in the London Council and support a joint policy at the final peace conference, if one is held: This same pattern will be followed by the major powers that accept the surrender of Japan. Here again the definitive work of settling boundaries and political questions is expected to be done, not in a general conference, as after the first World War, but in a 'preliminary and exploratory' conference of the major powers.³⁹¹

Equally, it was hoped that the workings of the peace process would be less cumbersome than in Versailles after the First World War. However, the downsides of this were considered to be limited publicity and the inability of small countries to study the proposals of the Council of Foreign Ministers prior to their acceptance. According to Reston's article, the gatherings could not even be called the meetings of the Big Five, for France "under the present plan, is not to be permitted to take part in the negotiations for the peace treaties with Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland". Additionally, according to the article China was not even expected to participate in matters relating to Europe. In this way Reston's view differed greatly from the US policy at the London Conference.³⁹²

Even though the preliminary setting for the conference was favorable to the United States, at the negotiating table Byrnes encountered traditionally slow operating. Although the magnitude of the issues was considerably smaller when compared to Yalta and Potsdam, the French in particular tried to raise issues which had already been decided by the Big Three. In general, the thought of hearing the French opinion in issues other than those relating to it directly had in principle already been rejected to please the Soviet Union when planning the Council of Foreign Ministers in Potsdam. In practice, this meant excluding France from defining the Finnish and Balkan peace treaties. Underlying this was the Potsdam resolution that all members of the Council of

³⁹⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F2, Secretary Byrnes's Press Conference, 11.9.1945, 12:00 noon to 12:30 p. m.

³⁹¹ *The New York Times* 28.8.1945. James B. Reston "Big 5 Foreign Ministers to Draft Peace Treaties, Capital Believes".

³⁹² Ibid.

Foreign ministers would take part in discussions, but would not necessarily be entitled to vote. Byrnes gave a reminder of this in the first plenary session, and Molotov announced that the Soviet Union would naturally follow the procedure agreed upon in Potsdam. Eventually an agreement was reached in which all five members would have the right to participate in all meetings and in all discussions, but in questions of organizing peace, the countries that were not party to ceasefire agreements would not be entitled to vote on issues relating to the countries in question.³⁹³

A similar concession was made with China, whose interference in all matters relating to Europe was again blocked in advance at the request of Molotov. This change to the designed procedure was an undeniable setback to Molotov's aim of keeping all decision-making between the Big Three, but it did not change the original question of voting rights. Although Byrnes and Bidault were given perhaps too much credit for including France and China in the negotiations, the change pertained to taking part in the discussions only and not to the right to vote. Byrnes clearly tried for more, but with Molotov remarking that any other kind of decision would require additional authorization as matters outside of the authorities given in Potsdam. When asking Byrnes and Bidault to specify whether they meant that China and France should be allowed to take part in the discussion, both agreed.³⁹⁴

The groundwork for the agenda of the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was already laid in Potsdam. Five items were put on the agenda: a draft of the Italian peace treaty and the fate of its colonies, draft peace treaties for Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, a draft peace treaty for Finland, the retreat of troops from Persia and an agreement on the status of international waterways. However, the proposed agenda³⁹⁵ presented by the Brits in London included seven other slightly more concise items, most of which did not receive the support of other representatives. In the first plenary session in London the second and third items were combined into one and items number 7 and 10 of the British proposal were removed from the agenda mainly at Molotov's suggestion. In the latter case unanimity was easily reached, as the removed items contained questions about the Bosphorus and the Romanian political

³⁹³ FRUS 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers File : Lot M-88, Record of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 11, 1945, 4 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 114-115.

³⁹⁴ Byrnes 1947, pp. 94-95, 102. Compare to: Messer 1982, pp. 131-132. Robert L. Messer understood that Byrnes considered Molotov's claims to exclude France and China from negotiations as legally right but morally wrong.

³⁹⁵ In its entirety, the British proposal included the following items: 1. Italy (a) Draft Peace Treaty; (b) Future of Italian Colonies, 2. Draft Peace Treaties with Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, 3. Draft Peace Treaty with Finland, 4. Withdrawal of Allied Troops from Persia, 5. International inland waterways, 6. Austria (a) Long term supply arrangements; (b) Possible recognition of central government, 7. Black Sea Straits, 8. Review of Berlin Conference's decisions on German fleet and merchant ships, 10. Political situation in Roumania, 11. Work of the German Reparations Commission, 12. Hastening of the repatriation of Soviet citizens. FRUS 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers File : Lot M-88, Record of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 11, 1945, 4 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 116.

situation, both of which were in the interests of the United States. Byrnes even remarked that putting those items on the agenda was not even an objective of the US, but that he did not want to limit the number of items on the agenda.³⁹⁶

However, absent from the agenda was the question of Japan, which had been the heated focal point of the fall. Molotov was first to raise the issue, citing his correspondence with British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin in August. Bevin had referred to the emergence of the issue of Japan in London. According to Bevin, "in view of developments in the Far East it will no doubt be essential to discuss questions relating to Japan". Byrnes responded to this sharply by stating that the United States did not see the point in considering the issue of the Far East. Byrnes justified this by referring to the slowing down of the Conference if they were to focus on questions for which the United States had not prepared for beforehand.³⁹⁷ This justification was somewhat lame, as Byrnes had previously stated that he was open to new issues being raised. Evidently Byrnes sought to limit the discussion on Japan for the same reasons as in Potsdam – to try to maintain the Japanese situation purely as a US prerogative.

In the end, items 1–5 were accepted onto the agenda at the suggestion of Britain. Item number 6 was moved for consideration and the procedure to be decided by the end of the London Conference. It was decided that items 7, 9 and 10 would be removed from the agenda. Items 8, 11 and 12 were put on hold for further preparation, and the so-called back gate was left open for further additions to the agenda in case the Council of Foreign Ministers could produce results quickly.³⁹⁸ When deciding on the agenda of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, consensus was only reached on immediately starting the preparations for the Italian peace treaties and on Molotov's suggestion to take up the Finnish, Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian peace treaties as a whole. When the negotiations finally moved to the first item on the agenda, the slightly ambiguous question of discussion and voting rights seemed to complicate the situation. In accordance with the recently accepted procedure, the representatives of Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy were entitled to take part in the discussions relating to the Italian peace treaty. To Byrnes's amazement, Britain and its dominions also felt that they were entitled to be heard in the matter, which in the light of Byrnes's memoirs crushed the Council's ability to produce quick decisions.³⁹⁹

From Patricia Dawson Ward's perspective, Byrnes's demand to start off with the question of Italy, which was thought to be easy, was a clear sign that the Secretary of State wanted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Council

³⁹⁶ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/8-1545, The British Chargé (Balfour) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 15, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 99.

³⁹⁷ FRUS 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers File : Lot M-88, Record of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 11, 1945, 4 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 118 footnote.

³⁹⁸ FRUS 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers File : Lot M-88, Record of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 11, 1945, 4 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 122.

³⁹⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 94.

and to produce results immediately.⁴⁰⁰ With both Britain and the Soviet Union wanting to hash out even the smallest issues in the Conference proper instead of in the authorized collegial bodies, the sentiments had not changed. The Soviet Union wanted the border issue between Italy and Yugoslavia to be resolved in favor of Yugoslavia, to which Byrnes and Bevin would not agree. The complexity of Italy's international status was largely caused by the country's participation in the war first as an ally of the Germans and later as their enemy. From October 1943 onwards, Italy was officially a "co-operator of the United Nations", and whose terms of surrender had not officially been rescinded but whose relationship with the Allies began to otherwise normalize. The Soviet Union had reinstated diplomatic relations between the two countries in March 1944, and the United States in January of the following year. According to a briefing by the US State Department in the spring of 1946, Italians themselves felt that anti-fascist Italy had earned an honorable place in the community of nations and wanted the country's full sovereignty to be restored as soon as possible. From a territorial perspective, it was a question of the extent to which the borders of continental Italy prior to 1939 should be restored. Additionally, the fate of the Italian colonies was still up in the air. According to American estimates, the transfer of the colonies directly into the power of another nation would not please the Italians and that such an act would violate the principles of the Atlantic Charter.⁴⁰¹

According to Molotov's interpretation, Italy belonged with the defeated nations in the war. Territorially, the Soviet Union was willing to divide Italy's African colonies so that Britain would govern Cyrenaica, and Italy would govern Tripolitania. Byrnes suspected that the Soviet Union's tactics meant that they sought to establish a military base in Tripolitania, which was a threat to US interests in Africa. In his worst scenario, the Secretary of State feared that Molotov was after the uranium deposits in the Belgian Congo, where the ore used in the Manhattan Project came from.⁴⁰² In Molotov's opinion, the issue of Trieste, an important town from the perspective of European borders, was clearly defined in the Atlantic Charter, according to which the function of the Council of Foreign Ministers was to produce solutions to increase the security of all nations. The issue was in Molotov's eyes predominantly a national one, for he thought Trieste to be more a Slavic town than an Italian one. Certainly, the town was given to Italy after the First World War, but that did not make it Italian. In Molotov's opinion, consigning Trieste to Yugoslavia was supported by economic factors as well, since Italy had other good ports and Trieste had descended into a poor economic state under Italian rule. According to Byrnes, the economic problems were not caused by Trieste's withdrawal from Yugoslavia, but by the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and Molotov's ethnic interpretations would turn Trieste into a nightmare. The difficult issue was left open. In the end Trieste proved to be one of the most

⁴⁰⁰ Ward 1979, p. 11.

⁴⁰¹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B15:F1. Policy and Information Statements. Italy. Current US Policy toward Italy.

⁴⁰² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 24.9.1945.

problematic issues which was not solved until the Conference of Foreign Ministers in New York in December of 1946.⁴⁰³

In addition to these many problems, the question of Japan was suddenly raised, even though it was not included in the agenda. In the plenary session on September 24, Molotov circulated a memorandum put together by the Soviet delegation on the establishment of an Allied Commission in Japan. According to the memorandum the Commission should include representatives from the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, and it should operate as the determinant of all political, economic and military issues in Japan. In Byrnes's opinion, this attempt by the Soviet representatives was a completely unnecessary process: "This is purely a needy process, thinking criticism back home would embarrass us."⁴⁰⁴

Byrnes understood the memorandum to be a sign of Molotov's desire to put Japan on the agenda and remarked that the Council of Foreign Ministers did not even have adequate resources to deal with the question of inland waterways in item number five: "There were many questions the US Delegation deemed of great urgency but they had not thought of asking that they be put on the agenda because they thought the Council should first dispose of questions referred to them". According to Molotov, the Allied Commander in Japan, General MacArthur, acted with too much independence and that "the Soviet Government felt it could not take responsibility for the policy being pursued". According to Byrnes, MacArthur was acting in accordance with the will of the Allies and replied to Molotov that the United States and China had suffered the most from Japan's part in the war. Quite surprisingly also Britain's Ernest Bevin, who had previously supported putting Japan on the agenda, supported Byrnes's view, even though Australia supported the establishment of a broad Allied Commission.⁴⁰⁵

It was undeniably a question of Molotov's suspicion towards the United States' occupation policy in Japan, and in London he sought to bypass the agenda and proposed the establishment of an Allied Commission in Japan. With Byrnes opposing the hearing of the issue as one not on the agenda it was postponed, but based on the conversation around Japan the issue was of great importance to Molotov. According to Robert L. Messer's interpretation, Molotov signaled to Byrnes his willingness to offer the Western nations freer access to Eastern Europe in exchange for including the Soviet Union in the control of Japan. Accordant with Messer's basic assumption, Byrnes did not

⁴⁰³ FRUS 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers File : Lot M-88 : CFM London Minutes, Record of the Eleventh Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 19, 1945, 11 a.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 122. See Byrnes 1947, pp. 248-253; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 26.9.1945.

⁴⁰⁴ FRUS 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers File : Lot M-88 : CFM London Documents, Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, 24 September, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 357-358; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 25.9.1945.

⁴⁰⁵ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-1145, Record of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 24, 1945, 11 a.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 336-339.

come to London to engage in quid pro quo politics, but to dictate the terms to other parties in the meeting with the atomic weapon up his sleeve.⁴⁰⁶ From this perspective, Byrnes's reluctance to even take a stand in the Japanese issue is explained. Additionally, the emergence of the Japanese issue in London may have caused an outcry in those political circles in the US who wanted to maintain the status quo.

On the other hand, the United States had taken all Allies into consideration in the case of Japan by suggesting in August the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission. The Commission was supposed to include representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain, France, Canada, Australia, India and the Philippines. In principle, the post-war organization of Japan differed from that of Germany mainly because largely American forces had defeated Japan. However, the Soviet Union refused to participate in the Commission for a long time and a solution to the matter was not reached until later in Moscow.⁴⁰⁷

In his memoirs Byrnes mentions the matter only in passing, but the public was given a much more colorful picture of the situation. *The New York Times* headlined its story on the London Conference with: "Byrnes Bristles". Herbert L. Matthews described the issue of Japan as a bomb.⁴⁰⁸ One was certainly made of it by Molotov's claims about the poor treatment of Japanese soldiers, which was leaked to the public and rejected by Byrnes as unfounded. As an indication of Byrnes's willingness to reach some sort of solution, the article quite poignantly mentioned that the US had around the same time decided to conditionally support the recognition of Hungary.⁴⁰⁹ Additionally, the matter was awkward for Byrnes due to the cross pressures caused by the Far East agreements between Stalin and Roosevelt in Yalta and the many politicians who had opposed the inclusion of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan. On the other hand, as a matter outside the agenda, responding to it was not necessary for Byrnes. This time, the issue seems to have gone no further.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁶ Messer 1982, pp. 129–130. Compare to: Byrnes 1947, p. 102.

⁴⁰⁷ DAFR 1945–1946. United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, August 29, 1945. Volume VIII, pp. 267–275.

⁴⁰⁸ *The New York Times*, 26.9.1945. Herbert L. Matthews "Byrnes Bristles".

⁴⁰⁹ Recognition of the Balkan states was an especially problematic issue during the Byrnes's era in the State Department. The actual recognition would have been promulgated according the President's evaluation and considering the views of the State Department. In the case of Balkan states the lack of democratic elements made recognition almost impossible. In 1946, a new recognition doctrine was introduced which enabled the United States to receive diplomats from unrecognized countries to continue the negotiations without having to fully recognize these governments. E.g. Zink 1950, p. 248.

⁴¹⁰ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-1145, Record of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 24, 1945, 11 a.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 337; Byrnes 1947, pp. 105–107; Byrnes 1958, p. 315; *The New York Times*, 26.9.1945. Herbert L. Matthews "Byrnes Bristles".

3.2.2 The Balkans chill the atmosphere?

With the discussion on the Italian peace treaty underway, the Soviet representatives worked painstakingly to put together their proposal on organizing the situation in the Balkans. The peace treaty drafts, circulated by Molotov in the second plenary session in London, transferred a lot of responsibility for the future of the Balkans to the Soviet Union, but at the same time tied the area to its sphere of interest.⁴¹¹ The proposals for the Hungarian, Polish, Finnish and Romanian peace treaties were officially meant to be the foundation for actual drafts, but the Soviet Union was clearly trying to use them to get a head start, and by delaying the Italian issue, to later benefit from them in the form of the ready-made drafts for the Finnish and Balkan peace treaties.⁴¹² Evidently Byrnes himself noticed the partiality of the Soviet memoranda, but did not want to take a direct stand either for or against the traditionally pro-British or pro-Soviet governments of the Balkans. Nonetheless, on some level Byrnes understood the Soviet Union's security needs in the Balkans, but no longer wanted to give in by making concessions to the policy definitions of Yalta and Potsdam.⁴¹³

The problems in the Soviet proposals for peace treaties had been widely noted within the American delegation. In a memorandum sent to Byrnes, Cavendish W. Cannon, the delegation's political advisor, observed the problems caused by the differences of opinion:

It is hard to find in this project anything which meets our ideas of what a peace treaty should be. The necessary 'drafting changes' would be so considerable that the most that can be said for it is that it gives an idea of the topics to which the Soviet Government attaches special importance, i.e., the project may be considered as an outline of the Soviet desiderata. In effect it reserves to the Soviet Government, and gives permanent character to, all the advantages of the surrender instruments, thus substituting, particularly in the case of Hungary, bilateral arrangements (economic topics) for the present method where at least some small measure of joint Allied participation exists.... From this point of view the presentation of these proposals is a maneuver rather than a serious set of principles for permanent good relations with these states.... The acceptance of anything along these lines would have the effect of conforming the present situation under which these countries are under effective Soviet domination and would mean the abandonment of the opportunity for establishing democratic governments in these countries.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹¹ FRUS 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers File : Lot M-88, Record of the Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 12, 1945, 4 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 113.

⁴¹² Soviet memoranda CFM (45) 4,6,7 and 8: FRUS 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers File : Lot M-88 : CFM London Documents, Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, 24 September, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 147-150.

⁴¹³ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B10:F14. Mr. Byrnes's personal notes on The Council of Foreign Ministers, 11.9.-1.10.1945; Byrnes 1947, p. 104.

⁴¹⁴ FRUS 1945. Budapest Legation Files : 711.9 Peace Treaty, Memorandum by Mr. Cavendish W. Cannon, Political Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers, to the Secretary of State, London, September 14, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 182-185.

Cannon was quite correct in his interpretation. Free elections, demanded already in Potsdam, had not been arranged in the Balkans and the already agreed-upon agenda did not allow for the discussion of the Balkan treaties prior to the Italian one. Both Byrnes and Truman had knowingly kept the progression of the election issue in the Balkans public, which bothered Molotov. In Molotov's opinion, the Russians wanted to make the Romanians happy, whereas the United States was only interested in pleasing correspondents. According to Walter Brown's notes, the Secretary of State had already decided to stand firm on the question of the Balkans on the morning of September 16, but did not want to complicate things at the negotiating table. In an informal discussion with Molotov, Byrnes made it clear that the organization of a free election and the establishment of a new government based on that election would be an absolute requirement for the progression of the Balkan treaties. Byrnes's view was supported by Berry's estimate that 95 percent of Romanians objected to the Groza government.⁴¹⁵

As the discussion was heading towards a dead end, Byrnes became convinced that in order to reach a solution one had to deal directly with Stalin. In addition, the Secretary of State thought it necessary to inform the world of the Soviet attitude and the impossibility of cooperation. According to an agitated Byrnes, the Soviet Union had already received everything that was necessary to guarantee peace, and it had everything to lose if public opinion turned against its grab for power in the Balkans.⁴¹⁶ On the other hand, Byrnes's eagerness to publicly emphasize the necessity of a free election in the democratization process of the Balkans led to an awkward situation in domestic policy. The realization of the will of the people, mentioned in the Atlantic Charter, caused aggravation in the African American population of the United States, the representatives of which drew a parallel between the one-party system of Bulgaria and American society. It was estimated that in the Southern states alone, more than nine million people were left outside "the will of the people", whereas the entire population of Bulgaria was just under 5.5 million. Although the criticism came from Byrnes's home state of South Carolina, he did not respond to it in any way.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 16.9.1945.

⁴¹⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 16.9.1945.

⁴¹⁷ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B5:F11, From John H. McCray to Byrnes, 27.8.1945; The Southern Conference for Human Welfare campaigned by equating the Bulgarian situation with the right to vote issue in South Carolina with the headline: Our "Jimmy" Byrnes Is Embarrassed! In the poster people were asked to support Byrnes also in the democratization of South Carolina. It was also remarked that, for instance, Senator Maybank was elected by 2 percent of eligible voters and Senator Johnston by 9 percent. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B6:F2, Our "Jimmy" Byrnes Is Embarrassed! - We Must Help Him Out!; The matter was very bothersome because in the Southern states a ban on mix-raced marriages was in force and the ban was comparable to Nazi's manner of separating Jews from Aryans. On the other hand, the amount of lynchings was on the wane, but they did not dare to outlaw it. Fearing for his success in elections, Roosevelt had once objected to so called Costigan-Wagner Act. See Ferguson 2006, pp. 224-225.

As an unusual solution to the situation in the Balkans, on September 20 Byrnes offered Molotov an alternative which was based on the view expressed by Stalin in Yalta about the security deficit caused by the Polish Corridor. Byrnes agreed to recommend to the American press and the Congress an agreement of military support in the event that the Balkan countries threatened the Soviet Union if the Russians agreed to leave the small nations alone. Molotov thought this to be a friendly suggestion, but still felt that the Americans were questioning the situation in Romania. Quick-tempered Byrnes, who left the meeting in anger, remarked that Molotov's attitude had been destructive. According to Byrnes, who even hoped for the sidelining of Molotov, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs was leading the Soviet Union in the same direction as Hitler had led Germany and Mussolini had led Italy. Molotov was narrow-minded, and according to the Secretary of State's interpretation, did not have a comprehensive view of world affairs. Additionally, Molotov had scared France, China and Britain into the arms of the United States. Together with the American delegation Byrnes decided to end the Conference in the best way possible and to invest their energy into the next meeting in Moscow with Stalin.⁴¹⁸

On September 22, Molotov's secretary had arranged a meeting between Molotov and Byrnes in which Molotov, who had also refused to continue the Conference, wanted to discuss the situation in Japan. According to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, the Americans had not shown the required toughness towards the Japanese and therefore the Soviet Union wanted to interfere in the situation by "working them".⁴¹⁹ In a view presented by Byrnes in his memoirs, Molotov had been instructed by Moscow to avoid a solution like the non-aggression agreement suggested by Byrnes, and to further demand the establishment of an Allied Commission. According to Byrnes, the situation was "embarrassing" as Britain and especially Australia had demanded that the control of Japan be decentralized. Nonetheless, Byrnes agreed to raise the issue of Japan as soon as he had returned home and had discussed the issue. Molotov, who was obviously dissatisfied with the response, then began to question the procedure agreed upon in the first meeting in London, according to which both China and France could attend the meetings. Both Byrnes and Bevin, who had joined the conversation, underlined what was agreed in Potsdam about the voting restriction for China and France and considered the demand made for the withdrawal of these two countries an unnecessary humiliation.⁴²⁰

According to his memoirs, Byrnes called Truman immediately after the conversation to assure himself of the conformity of his view with that of the

⁴¹⁸ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 20.9.1945.

⁴¹⁹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 22.9.1945.

⁴²⁰ Byrnes 1947, pp. 102-104; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2245, Memorandum of Conversation, London, September 22, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 313-315; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2245, Memorandum of Conversation, London, September 22, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 314; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 22.9.1945.

President's. After this, Byrnes drafted a letter for Truman to send to Stalin in which he was asked to agree to the participation of France and China in the conference discussions. In order to facilitate Stalin's consent, Byrnes threatened him, at least according to Walter Brown's diaries, with the negative publicity that the Soviet Union would get by denying all other participants the right to be heard and otherwise delaying the progress of the conference.⁴²¹ The State Department documents contain no entries regarding the aforementioned conversation between Byrnes and Molotov or Byrnes's telephone conversation with Truman, so in this regard the content of the conversation relies on Byrnes's memoirs and Walter Brown's diary entries. However, judging by later conversations, the first incident did in fact take place and the content of the conversation was likely to be as described by Byrnes. This view is also supported by a telegram sent by Truman in a correspondence between the Heads of State, which has been recorded as received by Stalin on September 22. This was the only time when Truman publicly transferred the decision making to between President Truman and Stalin.⁴²² The telegram concentrated on Byrnes's view of the cause and effect of the problem:

I am informed that Mr. Molotov is considering withdrawing from the Council of Foreign Ministers in London because of difficulty in reaching an agreement as to the participation of France and China in discussions of the Balkan situation. I urgently request that you communicate with Mr. Molotov telling him that because of the bad effect it would have on world peace he should not permit the Council to be broken up.⁴²³

Stalin replied to Truman immediately, stating that he had been unable to contact Molotov but expected that the situation was caused by excluding China and France from the matters of the Balkans "in conformity with the exact meaning of the Berlin Conference decision".⁴²⁴ On September 23, Truman reminded Stalin again about the role of China and France as mere parties to the discussion regarding countries that did not concern them though cease-fire

⁴²¹ Byrnes 1947, pp. 102-104; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2245, Memorandum of Conversation, London, September 22, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 313-315; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 22.9.1945.

⁴²² FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2245, Memorandum of Conversation, London, September 22, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 314. Byrnes stated that the Potsdam Agreements were made between the heads of states and therefore "it might be a good idea to put the matter up to them for decision".

⁴²³ CPD. To Generalissimo Stalin From President Truman 22.9.1945. Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, volume two, correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (August 1941-December 1945), No. 372, p. 271; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/3-2248 : Telegram, President Truman to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin), Washington, September 22, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 329-330.

⁴²⁴ CPD. To Generalissimo Stalin From President Truman 22.9.1945. Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, volume two, correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (August 1941-December 1945), No. 373, p. 272.

agreements.⁴²⁵ In light of Truman's letter, the problem was the fact that the Soviet Union refused to accept these countries taking part in the discussions. In his response, Stalin underlined that Molotov was adhering to the agreements in Potsdam, but stressed that no agreement had been made in Potsdam about countries outside of the cease-fire agreements even taking part in the discussion: "I consider that the position of Molotov to adhere strictly to the decision of the Berlin Conference cannot make a bad impression and should not offend anybody".⁴²⁶

In a view presented by Byrnes in his memoirs, Stalin's response signified the end of the Conference of Foreign Ministers in London.⁴²⁷ In truth, the discussion in the matter was postponed as Bevin, who was especially irked by the situation, wanted to consult the French government while Byrnes was waiting for the outcome of the correspondence between Truman and Stalin. Late in the evening of the 22nd, in an informal conversation with Bidault, Byrnes assumed that Molotov might possibly use the procedural question as an excuse to interrupt the Conference, "because he could not have his own way". According to a memorandum of the State Department, Byrnes and Bevin also discussed efforts to avoid any crises caused by hasty conclusions and the possibility of France working alongside the United States as far as the Italian peace treaty was concerned, even if no consensus about the Balkan peace treaties was reached.⁴²⁸ Byrnes clearly used this conversation to pressure Bidault to object to the Allied Commission in Japan and to not recognize the Balkan countries.

In the plenary session of September 27, Molotov started his tactical game by suggesting that the final peace conference consist of three separate meetings and procedures for Italy, the three Balkan nations and Finland. Of these, the

⁴²⁵ CPD. From Generalissimo J. V. Stalin to the President of the U.S.A., Mr. Truman 23.9.1945. Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, volume two, correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (August 1941-December 1945), No. 372, p. 271; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2345 : Telegram, The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman, Moscow, 22 September, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 331.

⁴²⁶ CPD. From Generalissimo J. V. Stalin to the President of the U.S.A., Mr. H. Truman 23.9.1945. Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, volume two, correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (August 1941-December 1945), No. 372, p. 271; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2445 : Telegram, The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman, Moscow, September 24, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 334.

⁴²⁷ Byrnes 1947, p. 103.

⁴²⁸ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2245, Memorandum by Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Bidault) at London, September 22, 1945, 10 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 330-331; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B10:F14. Mr. Byrnes's personal notes on The Council of Foreign Ministers, 11.9.-1.10.1945.

Finnish and Balkan peace conferences were, according to Molotov, to be arranged in Moscow and only the Italian peace treaty could be drafted in London. Molotov could not guarantee the preparation of the Italian peace treaty during 1945. With both Byrnes and Bevin wanting to examine the Soviet proposals more closely, Molotov bluntly stated that the Soviet government would not be at all prepared to agree on the Italian peace treaty in the current year. At the same time he stated that he would possibly reconsider the signing of the Italian peace treaty if the United States would agree to the Soviet demand regarding the Allied Commission in Japan.⁴²⁹ Byrnes asked Molotov about the connection between the Italian peace Treaty and the Allied Commission in Japan, which surely Byrnes knew to be a clear insinuation of a quid pro quo compromise. Molotov replied that questions had arisen in the meeting which both the United States and the Soviet Union wanted to delay. In the end it was merely a question of policy interpretations, which in London seems to have united the US and British views against the Soviet Union. In Molotov's eyes this was clearly an Anglo-American conspiracy against the Soviet Union.⁴³⁰

As a last-chance effort to find a solution to the difficult situation, Molotov remarked to Bevin and Byrnes that a mistake had been made in the voting issue decided on the first day of the meeting, which was in conflict with the policies agreed upon in Potsdam. This was undeniably so, but Molotov himself had approved the participation of France and China in the discussions on the Finnish, Bulgarian, Romanian and Hungarian peace treaties, and this line-up had already met in London 16 times. Now Molotov stated coldly that the broad-based Council of Foreign ministers as agreed to on September 11 was not accordant with Potsdam and that "he could not discuss that question in London as he would have talk to his Government".⁴³¹ The question of the Chinese and French rights to participate in the Conferences of Foreign Ministers did not come out of the blue, however. On the evening of the 26th, Molotov had expressed the existence of the problem and further underlined the matter in his meetings on the morning of July 27.⁴³² However, according to State Department documents, no deadlock was apparent at the time. Evidently, after Stalin

⁴²⁹ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2745, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, London, September 27, 1945, 6:15 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 425-427.

⁴³⁰ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2745, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, London, September 27, 1945, 6:15 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 425-427; Byrnes 1947, *passim*.

⁴³¹ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2645, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, London, September 26, 1945, 7:45 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 410-412.

⁴³² FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2645, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, London, September 26, 1945, 7:45 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 410-412; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2745, Memorandum of Conversation, London, September 27, 1945 - 11 a.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 417-418; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2745, Memorandum of Conversation, London, September 27, 1945 - 12:15 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 418-421.

confirmed the Soviet stance that only the Big Three should participate in the discussions on peace treaties the issue seemed to have turned into a threshold question from which there was no return.⁴³³

Walter Brown noted that Molotov was using the question of procedure to play his own game and to instigate a war of nerves. According to Brown's interpretation, Molotov's tactic was to wear out the opposition to get what he wanted. Evidently, Byrnes wanted to act with patience and wait for the bursts of volition to end, but Molotov had the advantage in the deadlocked situation. The success of the Council of Foreign Ministers caused more pressure on Byrnes, who would have to answer for any possible failures in public. As both waited for the other party to make a move, a confrontation became only a matter of time. In the discussion on September 30, emotions momentarily flared up when Molotov interpreted the procedural conflict to mean that the decisions made by the Council of Foreign Ministers would cease to be decisions if one party to the decisions would denounce them. After Molotov reminded Bevin about a Russian proverb, according to which "you can't make people like you by force" Bevin replied that what he had heard had been "the nearest thing to the Hitler theory I have ever heard". After Molotov threatened to walk out of the meeting unless Bevin took it back, the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers came to the end of the road. The Americans were left with the impression that Molotov, who had embarked upon a warpath, would be willing to do business if the Soviet Union was be promised a military base in Tripolitania. Molotov was willing to be flexible in the discussions on the Italian colonies, as long as he was guaranteed access to the Mediterranean.⁴³⁴

In his memoirs, Byrnes noted that he had given the opportunity for great compromise.⁴³⁵ Byrnes's suggestion for compromise was to include only the countries that had signed the conditions of surrender in the drafting of the peace treaties. In practice, this would have meant that only Britain and the Soviet Union could have participated in the drafting of the Finnish peace agreement, in the case of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, only the Big Three, and in the case of Italy, the Big Three and France. In return for this concession, Byrnes suggested that the draft peace agreements would be sent to the primary

⁴³³ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B10:F14. Mr. Byrnes's personal notes on The Council of Foreign Ministers, 11.9.-1.10.1945.

⁴³⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 28.9.1945; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2745, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, London, September 27, 1945, 6:15 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 425-427; Byrnes 1947, pp. 426-427; Byrnes 1947, p. 102; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-1145, United States Delegation Minutes of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 30, 1945, 3:30 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 484-485; Clemson University Libraries, Clemson, SC 29634. Walter Browns excerpts from the book, B2:F1. Walter Brown's Diary, Potsdam; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 30.9.1945, 1.10.1945.

⁴³⁵ Molotov had made the point that China and France should not participate in drafting the peace treaties for Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Byrnes suggested that only the Italian treaty be discussed with France and the Finnish treaty with Britain. Byrnes 1947, pp. 103-105.

peace conference, in which both the permanent members of the Security Council as well as all other member nations of the UN would be represented. This included a trap for hashing out the issues publically in the UN against the Soviet Union's will. Byrnes held a rather optimistic view at the time about the cooperation abilities of the superpowers as evidenced by the fact that in his proposal Byrnes stated that the peace conference would assemble in the current year.⁴³⁶

Byrnes's concession provided no result. On September 28 Molotov presented the Soviet Union's proposal to diffuse the situation. The proposal limited the parties to the peace treaties in the case of Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy to "only members of the Council who are, or under the Berlin Agreement are deemed to be, signatory of the surrender terms, unless and until the Council takes further action under the Berlin Agreement to invite other members on questions directly concerning them".⁴³⁷ With the proposal hardly changing the situation, the most important issue with regard to the question of procedure became the continuance of the Conference in general. Byrnes suggested that the conference continue working on other items on the agenda, giving Molotov the option of postponing the problematic issues. Molotov thought this to be possible but remarked that he would be unable to sign any protocols until the question of procedure had been solved. At that time Molotov also highlighted the collective nature of the mistake that was made on September 11, and that the only demand made by the Soviet Union was to correct that mistake. In Molotov's view, the Foreign Ministers had the authority to do so.⁴³⁸

Again Byrnes sought to diffuse the situation with his own counter-proposal, which only included an added sentence to his previous proposal. The addition limited the final parties to a peace treaty to invited countries who had been at war with the enemy state in question. However, Molotov wanted the conference to discuss the Soviet Union's proposal before Byrnes's proposal, for "the Soviet Delegation is unable to give a reply without first studying it" and "the Soviet Delegation is unable to reply without communicating with its Government". This immersion into the examination of one sentence made it possible to postpone the problem, to the dismay of Byrnes and Bidault.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁶ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-2845, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, London, September 28, 1945, 4 p.m, Proposal by the Secretary of State. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 428-439; Byrnes 1947, p. 103.

⁴³⁷ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-1145, United States Delegation Minutes of the Twenty-Eight meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 29, 1945, 3 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 445-446. Proposal in its entirety: Council of Foreign Ministers Files : Lot M-88 : CFM London Documents, Resolution Proposed by the Soviet Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 30, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 474.

⁴³⁸ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B10:F14. Mr. Byrnes's personal notes on The Council of Foreign Ministers, 11.9.-1.10.1945.

⁴³⁹ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-1145, United States Delegation Minutes of the Twenty-Eight meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 29, 1945, 3 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 445-456; Byrnes

The linguistic interpretation of what had been agreed in Potsdam finally became the reason that forced the Council of Foreign Ministers to disband in the early hours of October 2, 1945. It is difficult to consider it such an obstacle that the participants could not overcome it. In the final meetings, both Byrnes's and Molotov's views came very close to one another. Instead, the Allied Commission of Japan was no longer discussed. As seen through State Department documents, the halting of the London Conference because of conflicts over linguistic interpretations of the Potsdam Agreement seemed to be more of a formality than an end in itself. Clearly, both Byrnes and Molotov wanted to avoid the commotion in the media caused by the ousting of France and China, and leaving the question open solved the problem. This way, creating the unnecessary notion of a breach between superpowers was avoided. According to the State Department protocols, on the surface the London Conference came to a close in an amicable fashion with Byrnes hoping that the coming days would solve all problems and with Molotov announcing that the Foreign Ministers were parting ways in "in good spirit".⁴⁴⁰

Byrnes's burden was lightened by Dulles's performance in a press conference on October 3, where he underlined the importance of the question of procedure. According to Dulles, London was indeed not a waste of time and comparing the situation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, he thought that the refining and technical success of the procedural questions was important.⁴⁴¹ According to an interpretation by Joseph E. Davies, nothing gave rise to suspicions that the Soviet Union's interests in power politics would be related to anything other than security issues. Davies, an expert in Soviet politics saw it as the Russians engaging in self-preservation in a continuously hostile world. In practice, the Soviet Union had come to London mainly to barter with Britain and to define the limits of its security needs based on this bartering. At the same time, the Soviet Union depicted by Davies sought to explore its status in world politics, which in London had come to a head on the Balkan question. In his letter to Byrnes, Davies warned Byrnes against considering the Balkan case a "moral issue", which would test the ideological and methodological superiority between the Soviet Union and the United States. Talks of defending "our kind of democracy" in the Balkans using force were unnecessary in Davies's view. Choosing the nature of democracy was also a democratic process. The non-

proposal in its entirety: Council of Foreign Ministers Files : Lot M-88 : CFM London Documents, Proposed by the United States Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 30, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 475.

⁴⁴⁰ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-1145, United States Delegation Minutes of the Thirty-Third meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, October 2, 1945, 3:10 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 541-555. Addressing the meeting the second to last time, Molotov gave this reminder: "I have only one reservation to make, that is that I cannot agree with the interpretation placed by Mr. Byrnes on the Berlin decision. I am sure I am prepared to part in good humor, and I should like to see all of us part in good humor"; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 2.10.1945.

⁴⁴¹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F3. The Secretary's Press Conference 9:30-10:30 a. m., October 3, 1945, American Embassy, London.

interference in the Balkan situation was also supported by military realities: the United States and Britain had only 160 divisions in Europe compared to the 400 divisions of the Soviet Union.⁴⁴²

3.2.3 The domestic policy answer to the London problems

The US Congress noted the problems of the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and some critical addresses were made during September. An article added to the protocol by Michigan Congressman, Roy. O. Woodruff brought out the problems of London in a very real way and loaded quite a weight onto Byrnes's shoulders regarding the success of the conference:

In a day or so Secretary of State James F. Byrnes will return from London empty handed save for a satchel full of bitter experience. On the use he makes of that experience, diplomats here say, depends the future of the United Nations peace organization. Naively Mr. Byrnes went to London expecting Russia, Britain and the rest to live up to their war aims as publicly and officially expressed, time and again. What he encountered was demands for territory and loot based on conquest. The promises of the Atlantic Charter, Yalta, San Francisco, and Potsdam had been consigned to the ashcan.... There was power politics and bargaining behind closed doors. Nations without any interest in certain problems were invited in. Others, vitally concerned, were barred. For sordidness, this first 'peace' parley made the 1919 Paris peace conference look like a thing of sweetness and light. As a result, in the opinion of foreign observers, the United States today faces a dilemma. Either it will get tough and insist on a peace which will be worth fighting for, or in disgust, turn isolationist again and refuse to implement its membership in the new league of nations.... A great deal now depends on Secretary Byrnes. The hope is that he will profit by his London experience and get tough. As the world's strongest power and greatest democracy, most of the 'little 45' members of the United Nations admit the United States is their main hope.⁴⁴³

However, the Conference heading for a deadlock was not considered to be caused by the Soviet attitude in Congress. Discussions regarding the granting of American loans to Britain caused bewilderment among the Congressmen. Behind this bewilderment was the publicly voiced idea that Britain had invested more in defeating the Axis Powers than the United States. This view was relative, as Britain's lend-lease agreements alone had cost the United States more than 19 billion dollars. According to Congressman Woodruff, the London Conference had in this regard been sidetracked to a "who won the war" powwow.⁴⁴⁴

Byrnes, who had highlighted the significance of public opinion, had in London strongly advocated for the organization of a special public relations committee as a permanent part of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The objective was to provide the media with information on any decisions made,

⁴⁴² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F8, From Davies to Byrnes, 5.10.1945.

⁴⁴³ CR. Get Tough, Jimmy. Extension of Remarks of Hon. Roy O. Woodruff of Michigan, In The House of Representatives, Thursday, September 20, 1945. Congressional Records 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 91, p. A4084.

⁴⁴⁴ CR. Who Won the War? Extension of Remarks of Hon. Roy O. Woodruff of Michigan, In The House of Representatives, Thursday, September 27, 1945. Congressional Records 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 91, p. A4084.

rather than on the course of the meetings. Hardly anyone wanted a media commotion like in San Francisco, where the press had had a field day with the conflict caused by unresolved issues. This turned out to be unsuccessful. The first plenary session of the Conference had agreed that the meetings would be classified and that all public relations would be handled by a special Public Relations Committee, which would include press secretaries from all five nations. Although Molotov was ill disposed to even this level of reporting, he approved the establishment of the Public Relations Committee as Byrnes emphasized that it would lessen the pressures on individual members of delegations to give statements to the press.⁴⁴⁵

Communication regarding the few very superficial decisions was clearly not enough for the media, and in the absence of information, the reporting was largely based on gossip and unofficial discussions.⁴⁴⁶ The brief releases prepared for the press were insufficient in content, which added to speculation. For example, the release on the final day of the conference stated that “the Council of Foreign Ministers met twice today” and that “at the second meeting the Council decided to terminate its present session”. The final press release from the London Conference caused many dramatized accounts regarding the reasons for the deadlock. C.L. Sulzberger, the London correspondent for *The New York Times* called the press releases a joke in his article on September 29, “Gems of Non-information”, and for good reason:

Today’s bulletin was another gem of non-information. It said that the Council, first under the presidency of French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and then under that of Mr. Bevin, discussed the French memorandum on control and administration of Germany and reviewed a report by the deputies on items on the agenda that the Ministers had agreed to defer.⁴⁴⁷

The charged atmosphere of the London Conference caused turmoil, especially in the United States. John Foster Dulles, who had accompanied Byrnes to London and who was then the mouthpiece of the Republican Party, lent his full support to the Secretary of State’s views on Italy and Japan. Dulles’s frank statements about the impossible actions of the Soviet Union reached many Americans and were undeniably significant in finally changing the atmosphere. According to a view presented by Robert L. Messer, Byrnes tried and failed in attempting to silence Dulles by bringing him along to London and in trying to please him by acting on the basis of bipartisanship and a stricter policy on the Soviet Union.⁴⁴⁸ Byrnes never repeated this mistake.

The London Conference signified the end to great diplomacy in the sense that power politics were now conducted on a ministerial level. Connections between heads of State were disappearing, especially between Truman and

⁴⁴⁵ FRUS 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers File : Lot M-88, Record of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 11, 1945, 4 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 115-116.

⁴⁴⁶ Ward 1979, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, 29.9.1945. C. L. Sulzberger, “Big 5 Mark Time, Molotoff Awaits Word To Ease Jam”.

⁴⁴⁸ Messer 1982, p. 133.

Stalin. And the “club of few persons” of Roosevelt’s term no longer existed. Byrnes did not think that politicking on the ministerial level was a problem, but preferred to conduct business with the Soviet Union through Stalin rather than through Molotov.⁴⁴⁹

Byrnes thought that Molotov’s explanations as to the fate of the London Conference were inconceivable:

Mr. Molotov had concluded that I was unfriendly to Russia, and he declared that our policy had changed since President Roosevelt’s death. His attitude was understandable. At the first meeting in Teheran, his need was for a second front and for further lend-lease aid. Both of these requests were agreed to by President Roosevelt. At Yalta the President had agreed to the transfer to Russia of the territory east of the Curzon Line and to offset this had agreed that there should be some extension of the western boundary of Poland. He had agreed to the transfer of the Kuriles and the remainder of Sakhalin, and to the transfer by China of Port Arthur and of certain rights in Dairen. At Potsdam, we had agreed to support at the peace conference the claim of the Soviets for Königsberg and the valuable territory of East Prussia. We had recognized for the time being their fait accompli in eastern Germany, and had made a reparations settlement they then regarded as acceptable. Now at London, Mr. Molotov saw no chance of taking home any packages. He could not understand why we would not accept his interpretation that ‘friendship’ between our governments required that we let Soviets establish complete suzerainty over the Balkan states.⁴⁵⁰

The earlier demands made by the Soviet Union were no longer significant, but the litmus test for the peace process seemed in Molotov’s eyes to be the Balkans. In Byrnes’s opinion, the inflexibility regarding the immediate planning of the Balkan peace treaties bypassing the agenda came as a shock to Soviet representatives, but from the US perspective it brought nothing new to the table. In London, Molotov tried to stretch the limits of both Britain and the United States further than he ever had before, to which Britain and the US no longer agreed.

In a radio address on the evening of Friday, October 5, Byrnes was forced to admit that his ability to compromise had been questioned, but still firmly adhered to the US’s policy as accordant with the spirit of Potsdam:

The first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers closed in a stalemate. But that need not, should not, deprive us of a second and better chance to get on with the peace. In the past I have been both criticized and commended for being compromiser. I confess that I do believe that peace and political progress in international affairs, as in domestic affairs, depend upon intelligent compromise. The United States delegation acted in that spirit at Berlin. We acted in that spirit at London.... That spirit is essential in international conferences where action can be taken only by unanimous agreement. When any one member can prevent agreement, compromise is a necessity. Men and women who have served on a jury can appreciate that.... Compromise, however, does not mean surrender, and compromise, unlike surrender, requires the assent of more than one party. The difficulties encountered at the London conference will, I hope, impress upon the

⁴⁴⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 108.

⁴⁵⁰ Byrnes 1947, p. 104.

peoples of all countries, including our own people, the hard reality that none of us can expect to write the peace in our own way.⁴⁵¹

Byrnes's report was a brilliant tactical move in the turmoil of domestic policy. Admitting the failure of the Conference and a kind of self-purification relying on hard cold facts was, at least according to Byrnes's memoirs, carefully considered.⁴⁵² Byrnes was able to lighten the load of the failed conference by taking advantage of bipartisanship. At the same time he was able to prevent overtly critical statements from John Foster Dulles:

Regardless of how Americans may differ as to domestic policies, they desire unity in our foreign policies. This unity will be essential in the days ahead of us, when we may expect differences of views by various governments as to peace settlements. However, the political party in power cannot expect this unity unless it freely consults representatives of the opposing political party. Believing this, I requested Mr. John Foster Dulles, one of the best-informed Americans in the field of foreign relations and a loyal Republican, to accompany me to London in an advisory capacity. He has been more than adviser; he has been a partner. Between us there have been no secrets. At the council table and in private conference he has participated in the making of all decisions. Our accord serves to show that on foreign affairs Republicans and Democrats can work together and that in vital matters of foreign policy we Americans are united.⁴⁵³

In his radio address, Byrnes was reluctant to identify the reasons for the deadlock of the conference and somewhat awkwardly emphasized that the London Conference had reached a consensus on the issue of the Dodecanese Islands belonging to Greece and the reinstatement of Italian sovereignty.⁴⁵⁴ According to Byrnes, significant progress had also been made in finding the guidelines for the Finnish, Bulgarian and Romanian peace treaties. Byrnes thought the reason for the deadlock of the London Conference to be the general attitude towards achieving all-embracing solutions rather than the actions of the Soviet Union. In the background was the question of using the right of veto in questions regarding procedure, which was a weakness of the Council of Foreign Ministers when compared to the Security Council of the United Nations for example. The moralization regarding the use of the veto suggested that the problems arose from the Soviet Union:

⁴⁵¹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F17, Confidential release for Publication at 9:30 p.m. EST, Friday, October 5, 1945. To be Broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System. Not to be Previously published, quoted from or used in any way.; CR. The London Council of Foreign Ministers, Extension of Remarks of Ho. Lister Hill of Alabama in The Senate of The United States, Tuesday, October 9 (legislative day of Tuesday, October 2), 1945. Congressional Records 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 91, pp. A4201-A4204.

⁴⁵² Byrnes 1947, p. 107.

⁴⁵³ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F17, Confidential release for Publication at 9:30 p.m. e.s.t., Friday, October 5, 1945. To be Broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System. Not to be Previously published, quoted from or used in any way; CR. The London Council of Foreign Ministers, Extension of Remarks of Ho. Lister Hill of Alabama in The Senate of The United States, Tuesday, October 9 (legislative day of Tuesday, October 2), 1945. Congressional Records 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 91, pp. A4201-A4204.

⁴⁵⁴ In the case of the Dodecanese Islands, the Soviet Union called for further investigations and eventually the issue remained without resolution for long time.

Peace must be based upon mutual understanding and mutual respect. It cannot be secured by procedural maneuverings which obscure from the people the real and vital issues upon which their peace depends. Undeterred by temporary set-backs and ever willing to accord to others that tolerant understanding that we wish others to accord to us, we must not relax in our efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace for ourselves and all nations. With firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in.⁴⁵⁵

Although Byrnes's communiqué regarding the London Conference was not dramatic and did not do much finger pointing, critical addresses were given in Congress in September and October directed at the Soviet Union. In his address on October 9, Noah M. Mason, a Congressman from Illinois, felt that Byrnes had in his radio address "very clearly and bluntly" done the people a favor, and expressed that the setback of the London Conference threatened not only the noteworthy efforts made in Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, but also the organization of the United Nations, which was still in its infancy:

Analyzing Secretary Byrnes's report, we deduce the following disturbing demands made by Russia at the London Conference: First. That Russia's unilateral actions (contrary to the Yalta agreements) setting up puppet governments in the Balkan states, be approved and those puppet governments recognized. Second. That Russia be given new bases both in the Mediterranean area and in the African area. Third. That Marshall Tito, Stalin's Charley McCarthy in Yugo-Slavia, be given what he asks from Italy. Fourth. That a four power commission to control and govern Japan be created to supersede MacArthur, who had been agreed upon and accepted at the Potsdam Conference. If these four demands had been agreed to at the London Conference then Russia would have been given a privileged world position and acknowledged as the world's number one power. Mr. Speaker, if Russia will not play ball with the other United Nations, under rules agreed upon by all the other players, then I believe the other nations should go ahead with the United Nations peace organization without Russia.⁴⁵⁶

The *St. Louis Star-Times*, which described the said radio address as frank, considered the rationale for the failure of the London Conference to be, that "the powers were all apparently obsessed by the idea that they were heading themselves against a Third World War by the ancient devices of unilateral agreements; by setting up power blocs friendly to themselves, and by spheres of influence". Reaching mutual understanding by any means necessary was seen as the only solution:

As we have repeatedly said, the atomic bomb has so imperiled the world and so loaded war with the powers of utter devastation that we cannot permit peace conferences to fail. In effect, we must go back and back again until understanding is

⁴⁵⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F17, Confidential release for Publication at 9:30 p.m. EST, Friday, October 5, 1945. To be Broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System. Not to be Previously published, quoted from or used in any way; CR. The London Council of Foreign Ministers, Extension of Remarks of Ho. Lister Hill of Alabama in The Senate of The United States, Tuesday, October 9 (legislative day of Tuesday, October 2), 1945. Congressional Records 1945, pp. A4201-A4204.

⁴⁵⁶ CR. The London Conference Break-Down, Extension of Remarks of Ho. Noah M. Mason of Illinois in The House of Representatives, Tuesday, October 9, 1945. Congressional Records 1945, pp. A4219-A4220.

achieved and until decisions are made that reflect our comprehension that war is simply too overwhelmingly dangerous ever to occur again.⁴⁵⁷

The situation after the deadlocked conference was not flattering to Byrnes. Americans anticipated with interest any information on the progress of the peace treaties, and the Council of Foreign Ministers had accomplished next to nothing. On the contrary, it had caused a deadlocked situation between the Soviet Union and the United States, the diffusion of which was dependant on the inflexibility of Molotov and the flexibility of the United States. The conflict, which was partially based on the decision made by Truman and Byrnes and partially on the inflexibility of Molotov, was not widely presented in the media. Byrnes even suspected that the Americans' still-strong compassion for the Russians would not, in Molotov's mind, allow the meetings to come to grief due to the inflexibility of the United States.⁴⁵⁸ Byrnes however, wanted to stop the conflict in its tracks and in his memoirs analyzed the end result of London:

Our stand at London required them to make a re-evaluation; it made them realize they could not force us to accept their position. It was, in a very real sense, a test of strength. Most of all it was a test of whether we really believed in what we said about one world and our desire to build collective security, or whether we were willing to accept the Soviet preference for the simpler task of dividing the world into two spheres of influence.⁴⁵⁹

Privately, Byrnes also criticized journalists who had "twisted" the truth due to the closed-door policy. On the other hand, he understood the media's need to speculate and to obtain information from staff without the Secretary of State being able to demand accuracy. In his letter to Felix Frankfurter, Byrnes remarked on the reluctance of Soviet representatives to even report the agreements finalized that day. Nonetheless, the Soviet representatives brought out their views indirectly and thus in contradiction of the closed-door policy. Byrnes was annoyed by the situation, since with the United States adhering to the agreement, these indirect channels produced incorrect information for the public. According to him, information should have been given more freely, which "is a difficult thing to do without giving encouragement to certain groups, which should not be encouraged".⁴⁶⁰ According to Frankfurter, the Secretary of State wanted to speak to the Americans "candidly and without encouraging the Russophobes at home and exciting sensibilities abroad".⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁷ The article from the *St. Louis Star-Times* on October 6, 1945 had been appended to the Record as a suggestion of Representative John B. Sullivan. CR. The London Conference Break-Down, Extension of Remarks of Ho. John B. Sullivan of Missouri in The House of Representatives, Tuesday, October 9, 1945. Congressional Records 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 91, p. A4443.

⁴⁵⁸ Byrnes 1947, p. 105. Compare to: Ward 1979, pp. 46–49.

⁴⁵⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 105.

⁴⁶⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F9, From Byrnes to Frankfurter, 9.10.1945.

⁴⁶¹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B6:F25, From Frankfurter to Byrnes, 6.10.1945.

3.2.4 The multi-faceted problems of power politics and the rehashing of cooperation – from the London setback towards the meeting in Moscow

Although the US-Soviet relationship and the Council of Foreign Ministers seemed to have drifted into unpredictable chaos in the aftermath of the London conference, the will to cooperate seemed to be reignited in the midst of equal bewilderment. At the end of October and in the beginning of November, the United States had demonstrated that it continued to act in the spirit of Yalta by recognizing the interim governments of Austria and Hungary. Further, the Americans had suggested that the Montreux meeting be repeated and the situation of the Black Sea be thoroughly investigated. When Ambassador Averell Harriman suggested to Stalin the re-processing of issues that were deadlocked in London in another meeting, it came as a great surprise that Stalin did not consider the Romanian and Bulgarian issues to be as central as the future of Japan. In London, Molotov had hinted at the Soviet Union's desire to intervene in the discussion on Japanese occupation, but it had not been made into a threshold question at the negotiating table since Byrnes considered the question to be outside the agenda. A few days earlier Stalin had complained to Harriman about the situation of the Soviet representatives in Japan, stating that MacArthur had treated them "like furniture". Stalin threatened the Soviet Union's retreat from Japan unless the United States would accept its presence against the principles of Allied co-occupation. At the same time, Stalin also reminded Harriman of the possibility that the Soviet Union would, if necessary, isolate itself in the same way as the United States had after the First World War.⁴⁶²

When Harriman met with Molotov in Moscow only just over a week after the London Conference had adjourned, Molotov's views on the reasons for the deadlock of the Conference had crystallized. According to Molotov, the main mistake had been too little preparation between the countries. He also stated that it would have been wise to hold an informal meeting prior to the actual conference – perhaps only between the Big Three.⁴⁶³ In a telegram sent to Harriman in Truman's name, Byrnes had wanted the Ambassador to signal to Stalin that in London he had noted that the issue of recognizing the Bulgarian and Romanian governments had "motivated an unfriendly attitude against the Soviet Union". In the media the question of recognition had been considered a significant reason for the deadlock of the London Conference, but at the start of October, Byrnes was not willing to discuss the issue publically.⁴⁶⁴ To Harriman Byrnes additionally emphasized the awkward nature of excluding France and

⁴⁶² Byrnes 1947, p. 93; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F1, Walter Brown's Diary, 8.10.1945.

⁴⁶³ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-1145 : Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, October 11, 1945-5 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 560-561.

⁴⁶⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F3. The Secretary's Press Conference 9:30-10:30 a. m., October 3, 1945, American Embassy, London.

China and asked Stalin to further examine his own proposal on the interpretation of the Potsdam decisions.⁴⁶⁵

In order to prepare for Harriman's visit with Stalin, Truman wrote to Stalin on October 24 stating that he was surprised by the information that the question of recognizing the Romanian and Bulgarian governments had motivated an unfriendly attitude towards the Soviet Union. Stalin referred to the dispute on procedure:

As I endeavored to make clear at the Berlin Conference, our Government is only trying to carry out the policy sponsored by President Roosevelt and accepted by the three Governments at the Yalta Conference.... Mr Byrnes felt unable to agree to the change in this procedure suggested by Mr Molotov on September 22. He rightly felt that our Government would not humiliate French and China by withdrawing in the midst of the Conference the invitation extended to them to participate in the treaty discussion after they had already participated in sixteen sessions.⁴⁶⁶

On October 24 Harriman got to meet with Stalin at his dacha in the Gagri. In addition to Stalin and Harriman, only interpreters were present at the highly informal discussions. In these discussions, Stalin remarked that the note written by Byrnes and sent by Truman did not mention the issue of Japan at all. Harriman had no authority to make any concessions regarding Japan, as he stated that the matter would be handled between the State Department and the Department of War, and would be resolved on November 30. Nonetheless, some issues regarding Japan were discussed, but these discussions have been omitted from the State Department protocols.⁴⁶⁷ In any event, Harriman mentioned the possibility that the Soviet Union would join the Allies in the occupation of Japan under the direction of General MacArthur. As to the question of procedure, which had formally deadlocked the London Conference, Stalin was ill disposed to begin with, but the following day he announced that he would accept the notion of a general peace conference, provided that as regarded the four peace agreements, it would adhere to the 4-3-2 formula, agreed upon in Potsdam. Secondly, Stalin wanted to test the willingness of the United States to include the Soviet Union in the occupation of Japan by threatening an isolation policy, "as the US had done after the last war" and which he had not "thought wise".⁴⁶⁸ Nonetheless, Harriman's preliminary work

⁴⁶⁵ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/9-1245, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Washington, October 12, 1945-4 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 562-563.

⁴⁶⁶ CPD. For Generalissimo Stalin From President Truman 24.10.1945. Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, volume two, correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (August 1941-December 1945), No.377, pp. 274-276.

⁴⁶⁷ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2545, Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page), Gagri, October 24, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 567-575; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B9:F10. Incoming telegram. From Harriman to Byrnes, 26.10.1945, 12:55.

⁴⁶⁸ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B9:F10. Incoming telegram. From Harriman to Byrnes, 26.10.1945, 16:09; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2545, Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page), Gagri, October 25, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 575-576;

seemed to have had an impact on the improvement of power politics, for that same evening Washington received an announcement that Moscow had officially ratified the UN Charter. In his press conference, Byrnes remarked that the Charter had now become a part of international law.⁴⁶⁹

At the end of November, Byrnes used Harriman to send a message to Molotov that the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Three, which had been planned in Yalta to be held regularly at least every three months, would be continued in Moscow in mid-December. According to Harriman, Molotov was excited about Byrnes's suggestion and felt confident about the upcoming meeting.⁴⁷⁰ The only problem seemed to be Britain, who had some weeks before expressed through Bevin how skeptical it was about the negotiations between Stalin and Harriman.⁴⁷¹ On October 26 the US Ambassador to Britain, John C. Winant, telegrammed Byrnes that the situation was serious, as both Bevin and the entire British Cabinet were very insulted by the "unilateral action", which Byrnes had engaged in by organizing the Moscow meeting without consulting the British. The situation got worse because information from meeting organized by Byrnes and Molotov had been leaked to London before Byrnes mentioned it to Bevin. Bevin, who was offended, refused to comment on the matter and was not willing to participate in the Moscow meeting at all.⁴⁷²

Harriman managed to organize "a Trans-Atlantic Teletype Conference" between Bevin and Byrnes the following day, perhaps to prevent any leaks. During the conversation, Byrnes tried to conciliate Bevin by emphasizing the importance of the Moscow meeting prior to the first official assembly of the United Nations, which was scheduled for the following January. Byrnes also reminded Bevin that in Potsdam, Churchill and Eden had considered the meetings of the Big Three to be independent of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which is why excluding France and China from the meeting would be justified according to the Potsdam decisions. According to Byrnes, the US stance on the establishment of an Allied Commission in Japan was not about to change, but they had "as a result of communications with Molotov narrowed the issue and we proposed sending to him a statement which will be our last proposal on the subject." Bevin thought the effectiveness of the meeting to be extremely questionable and suspected that the upcoming Christmas holiday

BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B9:F10. Incoming telegram. From Harriman to Byrnes, 26.10.1945, Read 4:09.

⁴⁶⁹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B6:F26, Statement by The Secretary of State, The Honorable James F. Byrnes, On The Occasion of His Signing of The Protocol of Deposit of Ratifications of The Charter of The United Nations, October 24, 1945.

⁴⁷⁰ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/11-2445 : Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, November 24, 1945-1 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 579.

⁴⁷¹ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/11-1245, The British Embassy to the Department of State, Washington, 12 November, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 577-578.

⁴⁷² FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/11-2645, The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, London, November 26, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 581-582.

period would prove to be a trump card for the Soviet Union.⁴⁷³ According to Winant, Bevin wanted to establish three areas under which Americans accepted Monroe Doctrine tradition “with good neighborhood policy, within which smaller states exercised self-government”. On the following day, Bevin suggested that the forthcoming United Nations meeting would be a better option than Moscow because during the meeting “there should be ample opportunity, as there usually is, for informal discussion without arousing suspicion”.⁴⁷⁴

As Byrnes made it clear to Bevin that he would travel to Moscow regardless, on December 6 Bevin finally announced that he would participate in the meeting.⁴⁷⁵ At the same time a preliminary proposal for the Moscow agenda was being put together. Quite surprisingly, the first item on the agenda was the international supervision of atomic energy, which after Potsdam had been buried under other issues.⁴⁷⁶ This time around Byrnes’s proposal for the agenda received near-unreserved support from Molotov. As the only addition, Molotov demanded the retreat of US troops from Northern China and British troops from Greece.⁴⁷⁷ Otherwise, the future of the Moscow meeting seemed brighter after Stalin had, at Byrnes’s request, recommitted to supporting the activities of the Foreign Ministers.⁴⁷⁸

Because of Byrnes’s spontaneity and willingness to negotiate directly with Molotov, his relations with Bevin deteriorated further. According to Anne Deighton’s study, Bevin had not cared for Byrnes’s approach to diplomacy even before the Moscow three-power meeting was suggested by the latter. The antagonism between Byrnes and Bevin flared up because, according to Deighton, Bevin wanted to hang on to Britain’s status as an eminent world power. However, at the end of the war Britain had a weak negotiation position because of growing economic problems. In Britain, which relied heavily on lend-lease, it was clear that another loan from the American would be needed. From that perspective, Byrnes’s exercise of power was understandable

⁴⁷³ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/11-2745, Record of Trans-Atlantic Teletype Conference Between the Secretary of State and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin), Washington-London, November 27, 1945-10:30 a.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 582-585.

⁴⁷⁴ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/11-2845, The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State, London, November 28, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 585-586.

⁴⁷⁵ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-645, The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State, Washington, December 6, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 597-598.

⁴⁷⁶ FRUS 1945. Moscow Embassy Files : 500 Foreign Ministers Meeting-Moscow, The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov), Moscow, December 7, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 599-600.

⁴⁷⁷ FRUS 1945. Moscow Embassy Files : 500 Foreign Ministers Meeting-Moscow, The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Moscow, December 7, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 600-601.

⁴⁷⁸ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-945 : Telegram, The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman, Sochi, December 9, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 597-598.

and in line with his earlier actions. The British, and especially Bevin, had to content themselves with the best possible situation negotiated by Byrnes and Molotov, the shortcomings of which were interpreted in Britain as due to Byrnes's lack of diplomatic experience. Maybe British officials had believed that raw Americans like Byrnes needed "experienced British guidance", as Deighton has put it, but from Byrnes's point of view the Americans did not see it that way.⁴⁷⁹

The question of international supervision for atomic energy had been discussed in the Cabinet around the time of the London Conference, but no consensus was reached. In principle, the problems related to the interpretation included in General Stimson's report, according to which the United States would be "sharing the atomic bomb with Russia". However, the sharing was to concern only general scientific information, and not information relating to the manufacturing of the atomic weapon. By Truman's decision the legislation concerning the control of atomic energy should have both a domestic and an international aspect. Based on a memorandum presented by the President in the beginning of October, discussions should be initiated with Britain and Canada, after which the number of countries participating in the discussion should be increased. According to Dean Acheson, Truman's memorandum would have provided for the initiation of a discussion on atomic energy with the Soviet Union prior to any formal and broad-based conferences. After returning from London however, Byrnes could not stomach the idea of dealing with another problematic issue with the Soviet Union quite yet.⁴⁸⁰

The surprising improvement of atmosphere seemed in Byrnes's eyes to have resulted from the United States' unwavering desire to adhere to the Yalta guidelines, although some change may have also occurred on the opposing side. By removing the spotlight from the Balkan question, the Soviet Union was able to play for time and stall organizing the elections. In other respects the Soviet Union's objective of establishing a security zone was well underway in 1945. An agreement between China and the Soviet Union had been signed in September, and the communists had won the French elections in October.⁴⁸¹

In Patricia Dawson Ward's opinion, the conflict on procedure which Molotov announced in London and which eventually led to the deadlock of the London Conference had been a brilliant move for the Soviet Union. At the same time as the announcement was derailing Byrnes's schedule and slowing down the process of drafting the peace treaties, it was also putting pressure on the United States to recognize the Bulgarian and Romanian governments, to establish an Allied Commission in Japan, to dispel any suspicions concerning the cooperation ability of the Big Three and to limit the parties to the peace treaties to a number that was more controllable. Additionally, the conflict put forward by Molotov was clearly justified. Although the verbal decision to include France - which had been specifically examined by Molotov - was

⁴⁷⁹ Deighton 1990, pp. 45-46.

⁴⁸⁰ PPP, Special Message to Congress on Atomic Energy, October 3, 1945, pp. 365-366; Acheson 1987, pp. 124-125.

⁴⁸¹ Gardner 1965, *passim*.

irrefutable, its written content failed to reflect the consensus of the parties, especially as the matter had been clearly defined in Potsdam.⁴⁸² Byrnes also had to acknowledge this mistake, but thought that assuring peace at that stage was more important than sticking to formalities.⁴⁸³

As a whole, Ward sees the London Conference as having illustrated Byrnes's responsiveness to compromise, which was evident in his desire to prevent the recognition of Romania and Bulgaria as "quid pro quo" for the agreement on the Polish border made in Potsdam, which was beneficial to the United States. At the same time, the question of Japan, which Byrnes knowingly avoided, in his opinion finally became the main reason for the deadlock of the London Conference.⁴⁸⁴ The question of why the issues of Japan became such a threshold question is multifaceted, and one to which even Ward offers no explanation.

Behind the rise of the issue of Japan to a threshold issue may have been Byrnes's awkward position with regard to the decisions Stalin and Roosevelt had made in Yalta regarding Asia. Byrnes denied having any knowledge of these decisions. The guidelines of the Soviet Union's inclusion in the occupation of Japan had been agreed on in Yalta, and Byrnes had already then regarded them with skepticism. With Byrnes likely to have been aware of these agreements shortly after they were made, he sought to offset Molotov's insinuations regarding the execution of agreed guidelines with his feigned ignorance. Stalin and the Soviet delegation never developed an effective communication mechanism like the one between Byrnes and Truman, which may explain the Soviet Union being slow off the mark in responding to problems; Molotov was forced to turn to Stalin. Possibly in order to cover up this delay, Molotov would either demand changes to the agenda or would otherwise delay the meeting.

What was surprising from the perspective of the outcomes of the London Conference were not the multifaceted objectives of the Soviet Union, but primarily the fact that the US negotiating-machinery, armed with the nuclear monopoly and a large amount of money, could not take charge of the situation under Byrnes's direction. In Patricia Dawson Ward's view, the weight brought to the negotiating table by the atomic weapon was efficiently countered by the Soviet Union's continuous banter. With Molotov remarking that Byrnes's had the atomic bomb "in his pocket" and by turning all conversations regarding the atomic weapon into a joke, it was difficult for publicity-hungry Byrnes to even joke about the weight of the atomic weapon at the negotiating table in the charged atmosphere of the peace conference.⁴⁸⁵

According to Robert L. Messer, atomic diplomacy was not an option for Byrnes in London. Had it become an option, its purpose would have to have been to protect the wartime alliance rather than to destroy it.⁴⁸⁶ Handling the

⁴⁸² Ward 1979, pp. 48–49.

⁴⁸³ Byrnes 1947, p. 109.

⁴⁸⁴ Ward 1979, pp. 48–49.

⁴⁸⁵ Ward 1979, pp. 20–21.

⁴⁸⁶ Messer 1982, pp. 90–91.

Soviet Union by using the nuclear monopoly, which had been mainly the idea of Secretary of War Stimson, would have meant a quid pro quo-type bartering between the demands of the Soviet Union and information regarding atomic energy. But Byrnes did not use this approach.⁴⁸⁷ Messer considers it to be certain that Byrnes did not come to London to barter but to dictate terms. When atomic diplomacy proved to be powerless in London, Byrnes returned to reviving the spirit of compromise, which had been characteristic of Yalta. Unlike Roosevelt in Yalta, in London Byrnes did not become a great leader capable of great compromise. The London Conference did not turn out to be the “Byrnes Show” that Truman had planned.⁴⁸⁸

Instead of atomic diplomacy, Byrnes seems to have used varying types of diplomacy in London, partially to adhere to the objectives stated in the State Department memoranda, and partially due to the ever-surprising turns of the Soviet Union. However, Byrnes may have considered atomic diplomacy to be the last resort in the badly deadlocked negotiations. This was undeniably the situation in London, but this time around Molotov acted faster than the others. From the perspective of the problems of atomic diplomacy, Molotov’s exit from the negotiations could also be indicative of the fact that the atmosphere had changed to one where the use of atomic diplomacy became necessary. In any case, the Yalta agreement regarding the Foreign Ministers meeting every three months could be carried out through the Council of Foreign Ministers. At the suggestion of an enthusiastic Byrnes, it was agreed that the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers would be held in Moscow in December.⁴⁸⁹

The aftermath of the London Conference was widely covered in the US media all the way up to the conference in Moscow. The bitterness and partial hostility towards the Soviet Union in the beginning turned into a more conciliating tone in November. Still *The New York Times* issue on October 13 headlined the situation blatantly: “Washington Backs A Hard Approach to Russia”. The picture given of the situation was a clear conclusion about the likely reasons for the deadlock of the London Conference and a slight criticism was directed towards Byrnes’s actions:

The current trend at the State Department is to be firm with Russia. The purpose is not to minimize our cooperation with Moscow but to increase it. The theory is that the ‘soft approach’ has failed and the ‘hard approach’ will put our cooperation on a sounder basis.... The main question raised by the committee, in fact, was not whether the tough line was right but whether it was tough enough and whether it was his intention to ‘be tough’ or only ‘act tough.’⁴⁹⁰

The media’s reasoning for the necessity of a tougher Soviet policy was clearly based on Byrnes’s desire to bring the conflicts into the public eye. Conflicts like this had existed even during the war, but they had been covered up in the name of cooperation. A reason to cover up the conflicts no longer existed. The new,

⁴⁸⁷ Messer 1982, pp. 126–129.

⁴⁸⁸ Messer 1982, p. 132.

⁴⁸⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 109.

⁴⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, 14.10.1945. James B. Reston “Washington Backs A ‘Hard Approach’ To Russia”.

tougher stance of foreign policy was not publicized as an opposition to Allied policy, but purely as an instrument of diplomacy, which “must be pursued positively and at the right time in support of carefully defined and consistent American policy”. Fear of the Soviet Union’s growing influence in Europe was concealed in the background, about which very little could be done. In public at the London Conference this was veiled as one of the standard problems of participation:

There is no tendency in the capital to condone Soviet Russia’s tendency to insist that military power is the only basis of authority in the world and that the Big Three should, therefore, make the peace. Nor is there anything but apprehension at the sight of power moving like a great cloud across the face of Europe and blotting out all information as it goes.⁴⁹¹

In his speech on the anniversary of the Navy in New York on October 27, Truman also highlighted the cornerstones of US foreign policy, which even the atomic bomb could not change:

We seek to use our military strength solely to preserve the peace of the world. For we know that that is the only sure way to make our own freedom secure. That is the basis of the foreign policy of the people of the United States. The foreign policy of the United States is based firmly on fundamental principles of righteousness and justice. In carrying out those principles we shall firmly adhere to what we believe to be right; and we shall not give our approval to any compromise with evil.... We are now passing through a difficult phase of international relations. Unfortunately it has always been true after past wars that the unity among Allies, forged by their common peril, has tended to wear out as the danger passed. The world cannot afford any let-down in the united determination of the Allies in this war to accomplish a lasting peace. The world cannot afford to let the cooperative spirit of the Allies in this war disintegrate.... Differences of the kind that exist today among the nations that fought together so long and so valiantly for victory are not hopeless or irreconcilable. There are no conflicts of interest among the victorious powers so deeply rooted that they cannot be resolved. But their solution will require a combination of forbearance and firmness.... The atomic bomb does not alter the basic foreign policy of the United States. It makes the development and application of our policy more urgent than we could have dreamed six months ago. It means that we must be prepared to approach international problems with greater speed, with greater determination, and with greater ingenuity, in order to meet a situation for which there is no precedent.⁴⁹²

In his speech Truman also emphasized the nature of US foreign policy as a long process, the achievement of which’s objectives could take some time. Truman classified these objectives into 12 points of fairly general American ideals regarding the sovereignty of nations, economic freedom, the peaceful relations of the United States and the freedom to use waterways, which had always been of interest to Truman. What was especially interesting in his speech was the ambiguity relating to the internationalization of atomic energy. At the same time as Truman referred to the international supervision of atomic energy in the

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² DAFR 1945-1946. Address by the President (Truman), Navy Day, New York, October 27, 1945. Volume VIII, pp. 2-6.

future, he also emphasized the need to solve any problems here and now – as if to fully utilize the nuclear monopoly.⁴⁹³

In his speech in New York on the last day of October, Byrnes did not mention atomic energy at all, but underlined the United States' willingness to continue amicable cooperation with the Soviet Union in the future. To the prestigious audience of the Herald-Tribune Forum, the speech was a clear message that Byrnes was heading to Moscow to put the derailed Council of Foreign Ministers back on track. Byrnes pushed the existing conflicts to the background, but clearly directed his message at Moscow by comparing the United Nations and the role of the United States on his own continent:

It was no accident that President Roosevelt, who did so much to develop our inter-American system, did even more to develop the world community of the United Nations. For today all nations are neighbors, and although we may have special relations with our nearer neighbors in the Americas, we must remember that we and they are parts of a single, interdependent world. When we consider the principles which govern our inter-American system as it has been worked out in recent years, it is well to remember that these principles were not always recognized by us in our relations with our neighbors. There were times, not so far distant, when we tried dollar diplomacy and intervention and were accused of Yankee imperialism. But we have learned by experience that to have good neighbors, we must be a good neighbor.... In the inter-American system the members do not interfere in the internal affairs of their neighbors nor do they brook interference in those internal affairs by others. Freedom means more than freedom to act as we would like them to act.... The policy of non-intervention in internal affairs does not mean the approval of local tyranny. Our policy is intended to protect the right of our neighbors to develop their own freedom in their own way. It is not intended to give them free rein to plot against the freedom of others.... The world system which we seek to create must be based on the principle of the sovereign equality of nations. That does not mean that all nations are equal in power and influence any more than all men are equal in power and influence. But it does mean equal respect for the individuality and sovereignty of nations, large and small. Nations, like individuals, should be equal before the law. That principle is the cornerstone of our inter-American system as is the cornerstone of the United Nations.⁴⁹⁴

Byrnes's comparison of US relations to other American nations was a clear reference to the border policy of the Soviet Union - which it executed in the name of security - in Bulgaria and Romania. Talk of burying dollar diplomacy and the principle of non-interference may have been a somewhat gawky attempt to block Molotov's talk on imperialists, especially as the United States indeed had its own questionable history in Latin America. Inter-American cooperation had been broadened in March of 1945 by the Act of Chapultepec, in which 21 American nations committed to defense cooperation. Awkward problems were created in the US's backyard by Argentina, where the influence of Juan Domingo Perón was growing. US relations with Argentina had taken a turn for the worse during Hull's term as Secretary of State in 1944, when Argentinean funds in the US were frozen and exports to the country were limited. At the same time, Argentina was excluded from the Chapultepec

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ DAFR 1945-1946. Address by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) before the New York Herald Tribune Forum, October 31, 1945. Volume VIII, pp. 7-10.

conference. Primarily due to Nelson Rockefeller and Secretary of State Stettinius, Argentina was accepted as a member to the United Nations in San Francisco. According to Acheson's memoirs, in the fall of 1945 Byrnes had shown great interest towards Uruguayan Foreign Minister Eduardo Rodriques Larreta's idea of collective intervention in any American nation that denies the fundamental rights of its citizens or violates the country's international obligations. According to Acheson, supporting collective intervention would have been politically too reminiscent of Theodore Roosevelt's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.⁴⁹⁵ Despite inter-American problems, Byrnes emphasized his understanding of the security needs of the Soviet Union:

Far from opposing, we have sympathized with, for example, the effort of the Soviet Union to draw into closer and more friendly association with her Central and Eastern European neighbors. We are fully aware of her special security interests in those countries and we have recognized those interests in the arrangements made for the occupation and control of the former enemy States. We can appreciate the determination of the people of the Soviet Union that never again will they tolerate the pursuit of policies in those countries deliberately directed against the Soviet Union's security and way of life. And America will never join any groups in those countries in hostile intrigue against us in this hemisphere. We are concerned to promote friendship not strife among neighbors everywhere. For twice in our generation strife among neighbors has led to world conflict. Lasting peace among neighbors has its roots in spontaneous and genuine friendship. ...the policy of the good neighbor, unlike the institution of marriage, is not an exclusive arrangement. The best neighbors do not deny their neighbors the right to be friends with others.⁴⁹⁶

The content of the message was undeniably directed at defending the generally much-approved idea of including smaller countries in the drafting of the peace treaties, at the same time seeking publicity not only on the Balkan issue but also on the issue of both France and China taking part in the Conference, which had proved important to Molotov. Byrnes thought the Soviet predilection for international cooperation to be weak, but continued to believe that the world's opinion would be the only thing that could force the Soviet Union to cooperate.⁴⁹⁷ In the final draft of the speech, Byrnes struck out the sections in which he argued for his policy of friendly neighbors as a continuance of the Monroe Doctrine. Taking a stance for the Monroe Doctrine would of course have been contradictory for anti-isolationist Byrnes. Also stricken out was a

⁴⁹⁵ Acheson 1987, p. 188. On the other hand, the Chapultepec Pact received a warm reception in Europe. For instance, in Spain Foreign Minister Jose F. Lequerica asserted that Spain was in full agreement with the Chapultepec Pan-American accord and he suggested that it is a model for world peace. According to Lequerica "Unity of all the Americas is a great lesson not only for continental Europe but for the whole world". *The Evening Independent*, 15.3.1945. "Chapultepec Pact Hailed by Spain As World Model".

⁴⁹⁶ DAFR 1945-1946. Address by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) before the New York Herald Tribune Forum, October 31, 1945. Volume VIII, pp. 7-10; Byrnes 1947, p. 108. Cf. Messer 1982, pp. 132-133. Messer thinks that the real reason for the tone of Byrnes's notices was John Foster Dulles. According to Messer, Byrnes was forced to uproot Soviet policy mainly by Dulles.

⁴⁹⁷ Byrnes 1947, p. 105.

long section of Soviet-flattering text, which expressed sympathy for Soviet objectives.⁴⁹⁸

The Washington Post, at least, interpreted the message in Byrnes speech in the way he intended, as an article by Ernest Lindley did not consider Byrnes's views on the Soviet Union to contain anything new. According to Lindley, Byrnes did not take a new stance or change his policy by saying that the United States recognizes the Soviet Union's special security needs in Central and Eastern Europe and by promising that the US would never join Soviet-hostile countries. This assurance had been given several times over the past four years and, as described by Lindley, in this respect Byrnes and Truman had continued the line of Roosevelt and Hull.⁴⁹⁹ Alexander F. Ormsby, Dean of John Marshall College, who had listened to the speech together with General Marshall, thought it to be a masterpiece. Ormsby gave particular praise to the difference the Secretary of State brought out regarding the Soviet and US views on equality: "we believe in equality of political and religious rights, Russian rather of social and economic benefits. If there is any lesson for thoughtful and patriotic Americans in four terms of democratic administration, it is that this must be the way for the future in the United States. It is both our task and Russias to reconcile internally this divergence."⁵⁰⁰

Byrnes did not feel that the awkward inter-American cooperation was in any conflict with global cooperation. It was merely a question of the ability of regional arrangements like the inter-American system to respect the rights and privileges of other nations and to conform to the world system, but was by no means a replacement for the world system. By referring to the Soviet representatives' habit of speaking about regional policy as an issue of security, the Secretary of State took a clear stand on spheres of influence in the world of atomic energy:

We live in one world, and in this atomic age regional isolationism is even more dangerous than is national isolationism. We cannot have the kind of cooperation necessary for peace in a world divided into spheres of exclusive influence and special privilege. This was the great significance of the Moscow Declaration of 1943. That joint statement of policy pledged the world's most powerful nations to mutual cooperation in winning the war and maintaining the peace. It was a landmark in our efforts to create a world community of nations and to abandon the discredited system of international relations based upon exclusive spheres of influence.⁵⁰¹

Prior to the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, the issue of Poland returned to the spotlight of US foreign policy. After all, free elections were yet to be arranged, which Stalin had once again in London justified by the risk

⁴⁹⁸ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B6:F27, Neighboring Nations in One World, 31.10.1945.

⁴⁹⁹ Ernest Lindley's article in *The Washington Post* on November 4, 1945 was incorporated into the remarks by the suggestion of Representative George G. Sadowski. CR. Byrnes's Word on Russia Nothing New, Extension of Remarks of Hon. George G. Sadowski of Michigan in The House of Representatives, Monday, November 5, 1945. Congressional Records 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 91, pp. A4719-A4720.

⁵⁰⁰ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B6:F27, From Ormsby to Byrnes, 2.11.1945.

⁵⁰¹ BP. Appointments B6:F27, Neighboring Nations in One World, 31.10.1945.

posed by the Polish Corridor to the Soviet Union. In the US, the Polish issue was brought back into the limelight by a letter to Truman from the Polish-American Congress on October 20. The letter unceremoniously pointed out Poland's fate on the Soviet leash, which, according to the authors, was reminiscent of the protection which "Catherine the Great offered before she took over Poland". The Polish emigrants treated the Yalta agreements, which were the guidelines of US foreign policy, with contempt. Yalta was considered to be a "market place", at which Poland was "sold into Soviet slavery". Further, the letter referred to the observations of the poor conditions inside the country made by Congressmen and members of the Foreign Relations Committee Gordon and Ryder during their trip to Poland.⁵⁰²

The Polish-American Congress thought a solution to the situation to be that the United States refuse to recognize the communist-dominated Polish government in the absence of a free election. According to them, the US was not bound by agreements made in Tehran or Yalta, as they were made without the approval of Congress. At the same time, the letter also made reference to the atomic weapon, the sharing of which with the Soviet Union would "spell the doom of America". "This secret should be guarded carefully, for it is the only safeguard our country has against further Russian expansionism".⁵⁰³

The views of the Polish emigrants carried obvious weight in US politics, as the number of emigrants consisted of approximately six million people of Polish lineage. Interfering with the objectives of such a large group of people would have been a significant move as far as fishing for votes was concerned, but interfering with the Eastern European situation was most difficult in Poland. Poland was bound by the Yalta agreements, which the United States had also frequently relied on. In the beginning of March, a Congressman from Wisconsin, Lawrence H. Smith, requested that the cabinet pay more attention to the situation in Poland. According to him, President Truman was responsible for ensuring the Soviet-Polish relationship be based on equality and fairness. Smith summarized his message in the House of Representatives:

When the history of this situation is written, it will be to our eternal shame unless we now take action to correct the gross inequities that now exist between those two countries. As champions of the rights of smaller nations, we should immediately see that a free, untrammelled election and a representative government is chosen by the Poles themselves, and not by the Russian Government.⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰² CR. Poland Lies at Russia's Feet, Extension of Remarks of Hon. Lawrence H. Smith of Wisconsin in The House of Representatives, Tuesday, November 6, 1945. Congressional Records 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 91, pp. A4725-A4726.

⁵⁰³ A Letter addressed to President Truman by the Polish-American Congress was incorporated in the remarks by representative Lawrence H. Smith. CR. Poland Lies at Russia's Feet, Extension of Remarks of Hon. Lawrence H. Smith of Wisconsin in The House of Representatives, Tuesday, November 6, 1945. Congressional Records 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 91, pp. A4725-A4726.

⁵⁰⁴ CR. Poland Lies at Russia's Feet, Extension of Remarks of Hon. Lawrence H. Smith of Wisconsin in The House of Representatives, Tuesday, November 6, 1945. Congressional Records 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 91, pp. A4725-A4726.

A similar proposal came the day before the meeting of the Foreign Ministers was due to begin in Moscow from the Marshal Józef Piłsudski Society, and was relayed by Congressman Charles R. Clason. The Society asked the State Department to demand the retreat of Allied forces from Poland, it being the only prerequisite to achieving freedom and democracy.⁵⁰⁵ In his letter, Byrnes replied that the number of Soviet forces in Poland had already decreased significantly and described the Soviet policy on Poland quite realistically:

The policy of the United States Government in regard to Poland has been, and now is, steadfastly guided by understanding sympathy for the interests of the Polish people. The attitude, which envisages the existence of a strong, free and independent Polish state, motivated the recognition by this government on July 5, 1945, of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, which was formed as a result of consultations between democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad and which, at the time of recognition, accepted in their entirety the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question. The Polish Provisional Government thereby affirmed its intention of holding free elections, pursuant to the formation of a Polish Government. In order to ensure conditions whereby Poland may establish a government of its own choice, this government will continue to press for free and unfettered elections.⁵⁰⁶

In committing to the Yalta agreements, both the United States and Byrnes committed themselves to arrangements in which it was difficult to intervene after the fact.⁵⁰⁷ The only methods of intervening remained the rhetoric of the US political leadership, with the Soviet Union postponing the organization of the free election while in the meantime growing its authority in Eastern Europe. In Yalta Roosevelt had kept the United States from interfering with the matters of Eastern Europe after the war. After Roosevelt, what became the burden of Byrnes and others in political leadership was on the one hand to emphasize the spirit of Yalta and the continuum of the power-political structure that was created there and on the other hand to try to detach from old axioms due to pressures from different directions and the power-political game-play which had been changed by Soviet actions. Detaching from the old axioms was in practice difficult, as according to predictions, non-interference would have led to catastrophic effects in the world economy similar to World War I. The 3.25 billion dollar loan which was granted to Great Britain on December 6 guaranteed the world economy some latitude, but also bound the United States to Anglo-American cooperation, which was objectionable to the Soviet Union.

⁵⁰⁵ CR. Free and Unfettered Elections in Poland, Extension of Remarks of Hon. Charles R. Clason of Massachusetts in The House of Representatives, Tuesday, December 11, 1945. Congressional Records 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 91, p. A5440.

⁵⁰⁶ Byrnes's response letter, dated on December 10, 1945 was incorporated in the remarks by suggestion of Representative Charles R. Clason. CR. Free and Unfettered Elections in Poland, Extension of Remarks of Hon. Charles R. Clason of Massachusetts in The House of Representatives, Tuesday, December 11, 1945. Congressional Records 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 91, p. A5440.

⁵⁰⁷ Emphasizing the importance of elections was merely rhetoric in Byrnes's letter to The Józef Piłsudski Institute of America Association, because already in Yalta Molotov had promised to hold elections within a month. In reality, the elections, which did not fulfil all demands set by Byrnes, were not held until January 19, 1947. See for example: Byrnes 1947, p. 32.

The sensitive nature of Soviet policy began to be evident within the United States. After Byrnes's appearance at the Herald-Tribune Forum, Acheson was also forced to publically present his views on the state of power politics at a function of the National Council of Soviet American Friendship in mid-November. The Under Secretary of State criticized the of the Soviet security policy very mildly, but was the target of severe counter criticism and booing.⁵⁰⁸

Whether the deadlock of the London Conference was caused by any single issue or not, it is undeniable that the real reasons ran much deeper. The collision in London seemed to be caused by different desires to continue policy based on Yalta. Conceptually, the US's practical politics, when thought of as the art of the possible, collided for the first time with the Soviet desire to strive for the impossible. US flexibility had been maintained in Potsdam with the critical success of the package deal, but in London the problem materialized very obviously, to the surprise of both parties. As depicted in his memoirs, London became the place where Byrnes had to use his "get tough" policy. Afterwards, he denied ever having advocated for a tough foreign policy, but admitted that London was a place where "we had to adopt a policy of firmness in our dealings with Russia". In Byrnes's view, Molotov had responded to the friendly policies of the Americans by violating the Yalta agreements and by stabilizing his power in the Balkans. However, Byrnes's view contains the anachronistic weight of later developments. Mark Ethridge's reports on the Balkan situation were not quite ready yet, and many other problematic issues were not considered since the question of procedure severed the continuance of the Conference. Daniel Yergin's view on Byrnes's ambitions to defuse the juxtapositions between the Yalta and Riga Axioms seems possible at least on the part of the Herald-Tribune Forum speech. It was documents like the Ethridge reports that created new conflicts, the resolution of which was beyond the Yalta Axioms. Byrnes's capability to understand the Soviet Union's special security interests in Eastern Europe was hard to reconcile with the ideas of democracy and sovereignty.⁵⁰⁹

3.3 The New Challenges of Superpower Relations

3.3.1 Moscow appeases sensibilities

An optimistic Byrnes arrived in Moscow in December with an entourage smaller than in London. His most essential aides, long-time interpreter Benjamin Cohen, Charles Bohlen and special aide in military affairs Lieutenant Hugh Kelly had accompanied Byrnes to London, but a new addition to the

⁵⁰⁸ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F1, Confidential Release For Publication At 5:30 P. M., E.S.T., Thursday, December 6, 1945; Acheson 1987, pp. 130-131.

⁵⁰⁹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F24, Interview of Pauline Frederick with Mr. James F. Byrnes, Spartanburg, S.C., Tuesday, October 14, 1947, 8:00 to 8:15 P. M., American Broadcasting Company; Yergin 1977, p. 143.

delegation was James B. Conant, who replaced atomic energy expert Vannevar Bush who had taken ill.⁵¹⁰ The trip to Moscow was a well-kept secret for fairly long, as Byrnes hardly discussed the trip beforehand even with Bohlen, who was a member of Byrnes's inner circle. According to his memoirs, Byrnes, who had called Bohlen to Washington from his holiday in South Carolina, only stated that they would be traveling to Moscow.⁵¹¹ An awkward stopover was made in France - which had been excluded from the meeting this time - as European and Far East experts H. Freeman Matthews and John Carter Vincent joined the delegation from Paris. The meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Big Three started on December 16 with Molotov acting as Chairman this time.⁵¹²

According to an interpretation by David Robertson and Patricia Dawson Ward, the delegation being smaller than before was a clear indication of the sensitive nature of the meeting in Moscow. With President Truman holidaying in Florida and both the State Department and Congress preparing for Christmas, Byrnes had a good chance of operating in peace in Moscow. From the point of view of Molotov's trust, leaving John Foster Dulles out of the delegation is understandable. When heading to Moscow, Byrnes chose only the most reliable people to accompany him.⁵¹³ According to Robert L. Messer, Byrnes even questioned the reliability of White House staff when fearing that a preliminary leak of information could ruin the future of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was at a critical stage. As Roosevelt's "number one reporter" of the Yalta Conference, Byrnes considered it important to be the first one to convey the outcomes of the meeting without the previously made interpretations of others. This would surely prove to be necessary, as prior to the delegation leaving for Moscow, Henry Wallace had strongly criticized its composition.⁵¹⁴

On the question of the agenda, which was considered to be essential, Byrnes seemed to have no choice. Because the Soviet malcontent with the weak position of the Japanese issue in the conference agenda was the likely cause of the failure in London, Byrnes did not want to take a chance on the issue.⁵¹⁵ A proposal on the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission (FEC) as well as an

⁵¹⁰ James Bryant Conant was a well known chemist and the President of Harvard. Between 1941 and 1946, he also served as chairman of the National Defense Research Committee; from that position he played a key role, along with his close friend and MIT vice president Vannevar Bush, in ramping up the Manhattan Project which developed the first nuclear weapons.

⁵¹¹ Bohlen 1973, pp. 247-248.

⁵¹² FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-845 : Telegram, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Washington, December 8, 1945-noon. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 604; Byrnes 1947, p. 110; BP. Appointments B1:F2, Trip to Moscow, December 12-14, 1945. Charles de Gaulle was deeply insulted because France was excluded and above all because Britain was invited. E.g. Bohlen 1973, p. 247.

⁵¹³ Robertson 1994, pp. 450-451; Ward 1979, pp. 54-55.

⁵¹⁴ Messer 1982, pp. 147-149.

⁵¹⁵ Robert L. Messer connects the appearance of the Japanese issue with a wider cover-up of the secret Far East agreements made at Yalta which had come to nought. Messer 1982, pp. 122-123. Patricia Dawson Ward has emphasized importance of the Japanese issue as the real cause of the London setback. Ward 1979, pp. 48-49.

Allied Commission on Japan was contained in the US proposal for the agenda. The proposal included the idea of 11 nations gathering in Washington as the Far Eastern Commission to define policy for the Allied Commission on Japan, which was to include the Big Four – the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China, and was to be based in Tokyo. The proposal had been introduced at the joint meeting of the defense forces and the State Department in November 1945, and one of its objectives was to be wary of portraying the bilateral policy of the US and the Soviet Union with regard to the Far East.⁵¹⁶

The Far Eastern Advisory Commission which was established on August 21 had not received the support of the Soviet Union, which had not participated in its first session on October 30. This partially forced the United States to seek other compromises with regard to Japan. The proposal by the US delegation in Moscow intended to replace the Far Eastern Advisory Commission with the new Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Commission on Japan. In the new proposal for the Allied Commission on Japan, particular attention was paid to the authority of General MacArthur, and the Soviet Union's wishes were taken into consideration in the composition of the Commission by giving Britain and its dominances jointly one representative.⁵¹⁷ The Soviet Union accepted the proposal with little objection, which according to Patricia Dawson Ward is a demonstration of the fundamental reasons for the London conflicts.⁵¹⁸ Molotov's desire to leave the issue of atomic energy as the last item on the agenda signaled the same.⁵¹⁹

One of the most controversial issues in the preparations for the Moscow meeting, the demand for the retreat of US troops in China and the British troops in Greece, was included in the agenda at Molotov's request. Both Bevin and

⁵¹⁶ In principle, the agenda was agreed on before the Moscow Conference via Ambassador Harriman. The proposal for agenda included: 1. Consideration of the proposal for a United Nations Commission to consider the control of atomic energy. 2. The question of reconvening the Council of Foreign Ministers including resumption of work by their deputies in the preparation of settlements for a peace conference. 3. Terms of reference of the Allied Council and of the Far Eastern Commission. 4. The establishment of an independent Korean Government. 5. The disarming of the Japanese armed forces in northern China and their evacuation to Japan. 6. The transfer of control of Manchuria to the National Government of China. 7. The withdrawal of Allied Troops from Iran. 8. The conditions which would permit recognizing the Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria. FRUS 1945. Moscow Embassy Files : 500 Foreign Ministers Meeting-Moscow, The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov), Moscow, December 7, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 599-600; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B7:F17. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. Politico-military problems in the Far East, 29.11.1945.

⁵¹⁷ DAFR 1945-1946. Agreement of Foreign Ministers on Establishing the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan, Moscow, December 27, 1945. Volume VIII, pp. 275-283.

⁵¹⁸ Ward 1979, p. 48.

⁵¹⁹ FRUS 1945. Moscow Embassy Files : 500 Foreign Ministers Meeting-Moscow, The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to, Moscow, December 7, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 600-601; Byrnes 1947, p. 111.

Byrnes announced that they would only concede to discussing the issues, but thought the fulfillment of the demands to be unlikely. Molotov instead wanted to remove the item on Byrnes's agenda proposal concerning the transfer of the control of Manchuria back to the nationalist government of China. According to Molotov, the Soviet Union had made special arrangements with China, so there was no cause for ambiguities in the matter of Manchuria.⁵²⁰ According to a report drafted by Byrnes for General Marshall, the United States had committed to the development of a democratic China based on the nationalist government. Behind this commitment was eliminating Japanese influence from China, which was not to be confused with the internal power struggles in the country. Nonetheless, Byrnes had to acknowledge the nature of the nationalist government of China as a one-party government, but considered this to be a necessary and temporary solution for reasons of security policy. At the same time, he insisted that all Chinese troops be integrated into the Army of the nationalist government. By highlighting sovereignty, the Secretary of State considered it to be important that the Chinese develop their own political unity without the interference of outside parties. If this failed, it would be up to the United Nations to interfere in the matter. Truman had instructed Marshall to act openly in China, but reminded the nationalist government that the United States would not grant loans, technical assistance or military consultation to a disintegrated China.⁵²¹

In Molotov's opinion, the situations in both China and Greece should be included in the agenda since it already contained an item on the retreat of Allied troops in Iran at Byrnes's suggestion. Earlier, Molotov had suggested that the British withdraw their troops from Indonesia, and in return Molotov would object to including the issue of Iran on the agenda. However, Bevin refused to barter on issues of retreat. Somewhat surprisingly, Byrnes suggested that the issue of retreat from Indonesia, Greece and Iran would be dealt with informally outside of the agenda. With the issue of Manchuria remaining off the agenda in Moscow, the number of items on the agenda was reduced to six.⁵²²

⁵²⁰ According to the Department of State, Molotov had referred to the agreement made on August 14 which related to transportation of Soviet troops to the Eastern Provinces of China. In this respect, the agreement interconnected with Soviet's entry into the war against Japan.

⁵²¹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F5, U.S. Policy toward China, December 8, 1945; Memorandum for General Marshall, December 8, 1945; From Truman to Marshall, 15.12.1945; Memorandum for The War Department, December 9, 1945.

⁵²² FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes, First Formal Session, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 16, 1945, 5:00-7:10 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 610-617. Byrnes's proposal for agenda was accepted in principle concerning paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5 and 8. See: FRUS 1945. Moscow Embassy Files : 500 Foreign Ministers Meeting-Moscow, The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov), Moscow, December 7, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 599-600. Cf; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes, First Formal Session, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 16, 1945, 5:00-7:10 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 617.

The fact that the questions of retreat began to be discussed between Britain and the US on the third day of the conference revealed their importance. Bevin, who thought the world was sliding into an arrangement of “three Monroes”, held the most critical view toward these questions. According to him, the Soviet Union and the United States were being inconsistent in their demands for retreat, as the former continued to maintain considerable troops in Bulgaria and Hungary, and the latter “had their ‘Monroe’ on the American continent and were expanding it to the Pacific.” The problems of the retreat of British troops was, according to Bevin, defined by the fact that in the case of Greece, Turkey and the still undecided Dodecanese and Persia, the Soviet Union posed a threat to the security of the areas. With regard to Greece, Bevin was convinced that the Soviet Union would increase “pressure from the Soviet Government on Greece or some manufactured incident between Bulgaria and Greece”, if they withdrew their troops”.⁵²³

In Moscow, the deadlock of London was radically eased, as Byrnes suggested that the final drafting of the peace treaties would be transferred to only the countries that were party to them, as the Soviet Union had originally wanted.⁵²⁴ The procedural mistake which Molotov had picked up on in London and which had officially halted the Conference was rectified by the United States’ proposal on the drafting of the peace treaties only among the countries that were party to the terms of surrender. In practice this concession meant the so-called 4-3-2 template, the exclusion of France from the drafting of all peace treaties but the Italian one, and the United States being excluded from the preparations of the Finnish peace treaty.⁵²⁵

Even with Byrnes emphasizing that the question of participation had at its core remained unchanged, the US proposal was a clear concession to the demands made by the Soviet Union in London. Added to this, with France and China excluded from the negotiations, adhering to the sending of the peace treaties to a separate peace conference, especially when compared to the “change in the final paragraph” played down by Byrnes, was an insignificant accomplishment.⁵²⁶ On the other hand, with the question of Japan turning into the main reason for the failure of the London Conference and the awkward

⁵²³ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-1745, Record of Conversation, Prepared by the United Kingdom Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, December 17, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 629–631.

⁵²⁴ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645 United States Delegation Minutes, Second Formal Session, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 17, 1945, 4 p.m., Proposal of the Soviet Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow December 17, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 640–641. The agreement covered so-called 4-3-2 –based draft for a peace treaty and a pact whereby the final peace conference would be called as soon as possible.

⁵²⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F13, Treaties of Peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania and Finland, On The Preparation of Peace Treaties with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, Enclosure No. 1, Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, December 17, 1945.

⁵²⁶ Byrnes 1947, pp. 111–112.

procedural question remaining in the background, both Byrnes and the Soviet Union were spared from losing face.

Although public opinion in America had begun to shun the objectives of the Soviet Union in the wake of the London setbacks, Byrnes wanted to produce concrete decisions for the media rather than postpone the decisions indefinitely by objecting to compromise.⁵²⁷ Byrnes, who had advertised the benefits of reasonable compromise in his final report on the London Conference, found that arranging them continued to be difficult. When discussing the number of countries participating in the future peace conference, Byrnes, who was again advocating for a broad base of participants, was met with Molotov's demands regarding a meeting between each affected party and the countries who had declared war against it. Byrnes responded to this challenge by producing a list of 21 countries that had actively participated in the war, which was clearly broader than the 12 countries that Molotov considered eligible to participate.⁵²⁸

The biggest problem for Molotov seemed to be the inclusion of India, which in his mind would entitle all three Baltic countries to be included. Although the Moscow meeting was to be a ministerial level meeting as in London, Byrnes visited Stalin in the Kremlin on December 19. Dissatisfied with Molotov's authority to make important decisions on policy, Byrnes announced to Stalin that the Soviet demands were too tough. Excluding India from the participants of the peace conference would have been a loss of authority for Bevin and for Britain, but even without India, Britain and its dominions would have held four seats. The trade proposed by Molotov would have produced five seats for both Britain and the Soviet Union, but only one seat for the United States, which Byrnes sarcastically remarked to Stalin would be "difficult for me to explain in the United States". According to Stalin there were only two options: either to exclude India, and leave out Belarus and the Ukraine, or at the objection of Britain, to include India and all three Baltic countries.⁵²⁹

Quite surprisingly, Stalin reminded Byrnes of the possibility agreed on in Yalta with Roosevelt of giving additional votes to the United States, giving six votes each to the Big Three in the final peace conference which was slated to begin no later than May 1, 1946 in Paris. The outcome of the meeting was evident at the negotiating table the following day, when Molotov announced

⁵²⁷ According to opinion polls, the Americans' confidence in the Soviet ability to cooperate fluctuated during the autumn of 1945. See FIGURE 1.

⁵²⁸ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes, Third Formal Session, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 18, 1945, 4:00-7:15 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 649; Byrnes 1947, p. 112.

⁵²⁹ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, December 19, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 680-684. Byrnes tried to restore Stalin's confidence, which had faded after the London setback because of the media obsession with bad news. Byrnes said that "one of the difficulties of the United States was that our press was completely uncontrolled and often printed stories were reprinted in the Soviet press and thus led to mutual suspicion". See Byrnes 1947, p. 114.

that the Soviet Union would accept the list proposed by the United States which included the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, China, France, Australia, Belgium, the Soviet Republic of Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, the Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Republic of Ukraine in the final peace conference.⁵³⁰ Byrnes wrote in his memoirs that he had intentionally given Stalin the impression that he would be unable “to reverse Molotov’s decision that night but might do so later”.⁵³¹ With this remark Byrnes may have tried to later emphasize his role as a political strategist, but the strategy was typical of the conditions included in Byrnes’s package deals.

Both China and France, which were emphasized by Byrnes, were included in the list, but the list still did not negate the earlier decision of the parties to the final agreements. The definition of the final peace treaties was still the task of the Council of Foreign Ministers, but the countries on the list were given the right to be heard in the final peace conference. The decision was not a compromise as such, but mainly a part of a larger spirit of compromises. The earlier concession made by the United States on the procedural question that had been the bane of the London meeting may have had an effect on the fairly easy acceptance of Byrnes’s list. The Soviet Union’s traditional revulsion towards the participation of China and France no longer seemed necessary in light of the developments of the fall of 1945. However, Byrnes did not arrange a compromise with the Soviet Union on the matters of Iran and Greece⁵³², which evidently was one of the reasons for the rift between Byrnes and Truman in early 1946.⁵³³

The question of the Balkans, which had been an instrument of Soviet *quid pro quo* policy in London, remained unresolved in Moscow. The condition set by the United States of a free election as a prerequisite for the recognition of Romania and Bulgaria had not, in Byrnes’s opinion, been satisfactorily met. Mark Ethridge’s “impartial report” on the Balkan situation which was completed on December 8 stated that the developments in Romania and Bulgaria were out of keeping with what had been agreed to in Yalta.⁵³⁴ A parliamentary election had been held in Bulgaria, but neither its results nor the birth of the Groza government in Romania satisfied Byrnes, who sought to threaten Molotov with the publication of the report: “although he [Ethridge] had told the President that his findings would be published he had withheld publication because of the present meeting which would give him an

⁵³⁰ Byrnes 1947, p. 114. Compare to: Ward 1979, p. 62.

⁵³¹ Byrnes 1947, pp. 114–115; Curry 1965, pp. 170–172.

⁵³² Soviet troops were still in Iran. In Greece, a takeover was started by communists.

⁵³³ Gardner 1965, p. 403.

⁵³⁴ FRUS 1945. Mr. Ethridge to the Secretary of State. Volume V, Europe, p. 638. Mark Ethridge was the editor of the *Courier-Journal* and, according to Byrnes, he was a loyal liberal. Byrnes 1947, p. 107.

opportunity to show it to Mr. Molotov rather than make it public then.”⁵³⁵ In his memoirs Byrnes depicted the conversation of December 18 regarding Ethridge’s report:

On the third day of the conference I had called on Mr. Molotov and presented to him a copy of the report Mark Ethridge had submitted on Rumania and Bulgaria. We had intended to publish it, I told him, but instead we had held it for discussion, in the hope that Mr. Ethridge’s findings furnished a basis for an understanding. Even before looking at it, Mr. Molotov deprecated the report, saying that Ethridge, of course, knew I was opposed to recognizing these governments and therefore must have been influenced in his judgment. I pointed out to him the instructions I had given Mr. Ethridge, which were repeated at the opening of the report, and which made it clear he was a completely free observer. After an independent, unprejudiced investigation Mr. Ethridge found not only that these governments failed to meet the Yalta Declaration, I told him, but that they were authoritarian, dominated by one party, and forcibly excluded from representation large democratic segments of the population. I asked him particularly to note that in Rumania Mr. Ethridge had found former pro-Fascist collaborators and even pro-Nazi Iron Guardists occupying key government posts. Mr. Molotov had made quite a point of the fact that elections had been held in Bulgaria, and I asked him to note Mr. Ethridge’s comment that these elections signified nothing and that Ethridge had, in fact, been told a month in advance how they would come out.⁵³⁶

When appealing to the Yalta resolutions, Byrnes was most likely referring to the sections of the Yalta declaration regarding interim governments.⁵³⁷ Molotov questioned the objectivity of the report by stating that Ethridge had known Byrnes’s view on the recognition of the said governments from the start. Byrnes replied somewhat lamely to have ordered Ethridge to “wipe from his mind completely the fact”.⁵³⁸ In any case Ethridge was one of Byrnes’s confidants, who was also from the Southern states and was known as a New Age liberal and a respected journalist. An agreement had been made in Potsdam according to which each Allied government could make its own investigations, based on which the recognition issue of each country could be resolved.⁵³⁹ Ethridge’s report contained much that was incontestable. Undeniably the result of the Bulgarian elections in November were suspicious in the sense that the pro-communist Motherland Party had won by a landslide, receiving more than 90 per cent of all votes, with the opposition parties resigning themselves from the nomination of candidates altogether.⁵⁴⁰

⁵³⁵ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, December 18, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 643-647.

⁵³⁶ Byrnes 1947, p. 115.

⁵³⁷ See for example: FRUS 1944. 740.0011 EW/2-1145, Communiqué Issued at the End of the Crimea Conference, Section V of the Report of The Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 971.

⁵³⁸ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, December 18, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 643-647.

⁵³⁹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F3, Memorandum of The Press and Radio News Conference, Wednesday, October 17, 1945.

⁵⁴⁰ Gardner 1965, passim; Yergin 1977, p. 144. Mark Ethridge was also a supporter of Henry Wallace for the vice-presidency in 1944.

In the case of Romania, the demands made by King Michael on forming the government under the supervision of the Big Three were in Molotov's eyes caused by the unnecessary sympathy of the Americans and the British for the King. According to Molotov's assurances, the elections would be organized as soon as the situation in Romania was stabilized. Arranging the international affairs of the country was Russian lawyer and Molotov's number-two man, Andrey Vyshinski. In the end, Byrnes was satisfied with Molotov's desire to consider a broader base of government. Molotov made no promises with regard to Bulgaria, still citing a valid election result.⁵⁴¹

The issue was discussed in an unofficial meeting on December 22, where Byrnes tried to trigger a solution to the problem by citing the resolution of the Korean issue in accordance with the Soviet Union's wishes. According to Molotov, the Yalta Declaration did not require the three governments to have influence "in every case in the internal affairs of other countries but only when the interests of peace were involved and the furtherance of democratic processes". In Bulgaria, a secret, independent, and in Molotov's opinion significant election had been arranged and in Romania the election issue was delayed by the American and British attitudes towards King Carol II⁵⁴².

Molotov did not consider the presence of Soviet troops in Romania and Bulgaria to be problematic from the perspective of a free election, and emphasized that "the Soviet Army had not and would not interfere in the internal affairs of any country". According to Molotov, Ethridge should have traveled to Greece instead of Romania and Bulgaria, where "the situation was worse". Bevin, who considered the Balkan countries to be a headache, felt that the fairness of the elections was more important than their schedule and reminisced about the speeches of Prime Minister Gladstone he had heard in his youth. According to Bevin's somewhat sarcastic view, not organizing the elections should be considered a benefit. Likely fearing the Bulgarian and Iranian questions impairing the negotiating atmosphere or in the worst case

⁵⁴¹ Elections had been held in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary in November, 1945. In Yugoslavia, Tito's pro-republican People's Front, led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, won the elections with an overwhelming majority, the vote having been boycotted by monarchists. On November 29, 1945, King Peter II was formally deposed by the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly. In Hungary, the parliamentary election was held on November 4 and the Independent Smallholders Party won the contest in all 16 districts, and won 57 percent of the vote. The Social Democrats won slightly above and the Communists slightly below 17 percent, and the National Peasant Party (PNT) just 7 percent. After the election, on November 9, the four major parties divided the portfolios. The arrangement, in which the Smallholders took the Interior while the Communists obtained Finance, was rejected by Molotov, who instructed Voroshilov to renegotiate for the Interior and a deputy premier post for the Communists. Borhi 2004, p. 77.

⁵⁴² Carol II of Romania was forced under first Soviet and subsequently Hungarian, Bulgarian, and German pressure to surrender parts of his kingdom to foreign rule. He was outmaneuvered at last by the pro-German administration of Marshall Ion Antonescu, and abdicated in favor of Michael.

leading to a dead end, Byrnes thought it best to leave these questions unresolved until the next meeting of Foreign Ministers.⁵⁴³

While postponing the Balkan questions was a clear loss of authority for Britain, it gave the Soviet Union more time to continue interfering in the Balkan matters. This was further assisted by Byrnes's decision to not publicize the report in its entirety. The change of a few members of cabinet may have proved to be too expensive in quid pro quo politics. Additionally, the change of a few members of cabinet in Romania would hardly have filled the democracy deficit claimed by the United States and Britain, and risking a deadlocked Conference because of petty issues was not worth taking in Moscow.⁵⁴⁴ In any case, postponing unresolved issues indefinitely into the future was not new in power politics, and not terribly concerning from the perspective of outcomes.

3.3.2 Atomic energy – the tranquilizer in foreign policy, the bone of contention in domestic policy

For Byrnes, another awkward topic in Moscow seems to have been atomic energy, the transfer of which under the supervision of the UN's Atomic Energy Commission he somewhat reluctantly had to facilitate.⁵⁴⁵ The fate of atomic energy had grown more confusing in the fall of 1945. It was no longer considered just an issue of power politics, and caused more and more strife in US domestic policy. Just before the Heads of State of Canada, the United States and Britain accepted the inclusion of the Soviet Union into the Atomic Energy Commission, Byrnes had introduced the topic in the Foreign Relations Committee, where Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican, flew into a rage. In addition, the idea of broadening the information to be shared on atomic energy turned out to require consultation in Congress, not just in committee.⁵⁴⁶

The meeting of Byrnes and the Senators vexed President Truman, who thought Byrnes had acted too independently in the matter. On December 14, Truman summoned the same Senators and Acheson, who was acting in

⁵⁴³ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Kremlin, Moscow, December 22, 1945, noon. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 727-734; Byrnes 1947, pp. 116-117, 121.

⁵⁴⁴ On December 22 the political backgrounds of the Romanian Government were discussed. Byrnes thought that it would be wise to ask for the inclusion of representatives of the National-Peasant and Liberal parties. According to Molotov they had already been included and, for instance, Gheorghe Tătărescu, who was the Leader of the Liberal Party (PNL), was also a Vice Premier of the Romanian Government. Andrei Vyshinski added that Antontinescu (Petre Constantinescu-Iași) was Minister of Propaganda and Ralli (Ralea) was Minister of the Fine Arts and that there were others as well in the government. Byrnes was confused, because according to despatch 158, March 15, 1945, from Bucharest, Antoinescu, was a member of the Communist Party (PCdR) and Mihai Ralea was a member of the Communist-oriented Ploughmen's Front. FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Kremlin, Moscow, December 22, 1945, noon. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 733-734; Yergin 1977, p. 146.

⁵⁴⁵ Byrnes 1947, p. 109; Ward 1979, p. 52.

⁵⁴⁶ Ward 1979, pp. 56-57.

Byrnes's role during his trip to Moscow. After hearing the Senators, Truman ordered Acheson to telegraph a pastoral letter to Byrnes in Moscow. According to the telegraph the senators were uncomfortable with Byrnes's willingness to reveal scientific information regarding the atomic weapon or to possibly agree to the revealing of this information with no guarantees on safety inspections of the Soviet nuclear program or other security issues. According to Vandenberg, the instructions given to Byrnes on the independent handling of all items regarding the atomic energy issue meant that nothing would be agreed on until consensus was reached regarding safety inspections and security issues. In other respects, in the telegraph the senators' concern was written off as a misunderstanding.⁵⁴⁷

Byrnes replied to the telegraph with one of his own on December 17. In his telegraph, Byrnes instructed Acheson to tell Truman that he "did not intend presenting any proposal outside the framework of the three power declaration", and attached the US proposal on the fate of atomic energy which was to be presented to Molotov the following day.⁵⁴⁸ In his memoirs Truman emphasizes Byrnes's complete disregard for the need to inform him of the situation. After Byrnes's telegraph, the President did not hear from Byrnes until Christmas Eve.⁵⁴⁹ It was clearly a question of internal pressure applied on Truman by the prestigious senators on the Foreign Relations Committee under the direction of Senator Vandenberg. The conflict between Byrnes and the Committee was also leaked to the press quickly.

Byrnes healing inflamed power politics by placing the supervision of atomic energy into international hands caused quite a stir in the United States as a result of James Reston's article in *The New York Times* on December 20. The article called for the inspection of Soviet atomic laboratories before beginning any type of cooperation. According to the article, the night before leaving for Moscow, Byrnes had had "a long and sometimes angry" meeting with the subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee in which the inspections were discussed as a condition to cooperation.⁵⁵⁰

The Senators' meeting had taken place at Byrnes's initiative to elicit the Committee's opinion on the internationalization of atomic energy and more generally on "what he proposed to say to the Russians about the atomic bomb". According to the information collected by Reston, certain Senators had received the impression that "Byrnes was prepared to start exchanging scientific information and scientists with the Soviet Union in the near future before he

⁵⁴⁷ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-1545 : Telegram, The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow, Washington, December 15, 1945-noon, 2531, Secdel 10. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 609-610.

⁵⁴⁸ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-1545 : Telegram, The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow, Washington, December 15, 1945-noon, 2531, Secdel 10. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 609 footnote. The telegram cannot be found in FRUS, but the contents are recorded in a similar way by President Roosevelt in his memoirs. Truman 1955a, p. 548.

⁵⁴⁹ Truman 1955a, p. 548.

⁵⁵⁰ *The New York Times* 20.12.1945. James B. Reston "Senators Demand Russian Atom Vow".

had binding guarantees about the right of inspection and it was this doubt that produced the controversy and sent the committee away determined to insist on the prior guarantee before Mr. Byrnes had a chance to get to Moscow."⁵⁵¹

Obviously, the question of atomic energy was not problematic for the Senators due to its substance but rather due to the independent initiative Byrnes had taken in the matter. According to Reston's article, two Senators were very disgruntled with the way Byrnes had advised them on the issue. As far as they could see, the legal task of the Foreign Relations Committee was to consult those in the government responsible for execution, and not merely to be informed about what had already been decided. Regardless of the disputes, the Committee permitted Byrnes to discuss atomic energy in Moscow but demanded that all discussions be based on three principles. Firstly, that the future of atomic energy would be a matter for all nations and in time it should be subjected to international supervision. Secondly, the supervisory organization should be subordinate to the United Nations. Lastly, the Committee remarked that the commission proposed by Truman, Attlee and King was a step in the right direction.⁵⁵²

The dispute on atomic energy was every so often mingled two different issues. Byrnes's primary goal was obviously the sharing of the non-violent applications of atomic energy, and not the distribution of information on manufacturing an atomic weapon. Nonetheless, these two options cannot be considered to be totally independent of each other. According to Reston's article, some Senators understood that Byrnes was going to Moscow to trade the scientific secrets of the atomic bomb. Reston described the situation as containing many uncertainties:

Several powerful members of the committee are still uncertain about what Mr. Byrnes proposes to say in Moscow and where Mr. Truman stands in the controversy. Moreover, while the executive branch of the Government seems to be moving away from its original unilateral approach to the problem and toward a more liberal international policy, the powerful Foreign Relations Committee seems to be insisting on a clearly defined set of agreements and guarantees. This controversy has not broken the trend toward continued collaboration between the Committee and the State Department on formation of American foreign policy. Both the chairman of the Committee, Senator Connally, and one of the leading Republican members of the committee, Arthur Vandenberg, both whom opposed Mr. Byrnes in the atom discussions before he left, were appointed today as delegates to the United Nations Assembly meeting in London next month. But the friendly atmosphere of past meetings with the bi-partisan Foreign Relations subcommittee has been broken, and it appears that the Executive Branch of the Government now finds itself on the atom question somewhere in the middle between the liberal atomic scientists and conservative Foreign Relations committee.⁵⁵³

In Moscow, Byrnes became conscious on December 21 of the turbulence caused by Reston's article through Ambassador Harriman. On the same morning, Assistant Secretary of State Acheson and President Truman discussed the

⁵⁵¹ *The New York Times* 20.12.1945. James B. Reston "Senators Demand Russian Atom Vow".

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*

article and telegraphed Harriman that Byrnes should not panic. According to the telegram, Truman was fully behind Byrnes's proposals on atomic energy⁵⁵⁴ delivered on December 18, but he suggested that Byrnes inform the Soviet Government that:

The United States Government does not purport to have solutions to the very troublesome questions involved in the atomic energy problem, but is eager and willing to work with the Soviet Union and other nations toward the establishment as rapidly as possible of mutually acceptable arrangements for full collaboration in respect to the problem and that to this end the United States will be glad to consider such proposals as the Soviet Government may wish to make in respect to any phase of the problem and to discuss them with the Soviet Government both in the United Nations Commission and separately.

This procedure would prove to be used only when Byrnes himself estimated that the given possibility might make cooperation and discussion easier.⁵⁵⁵ The American proposal on the development and use of atomic energy in coordination with other governments had been initialized as early as October 3 in Truman's definition of policy. The proposal included an idea about a body which would consist of five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Canada. This body would start to work in the first UN meeting in January, 1946. The goal of the body was phrased as the spreading of atomic secrets for peaceful purposes and this aim had officially been presented as the so called Declaration on Atomic Energy between Truman, Attlee and Mackenzie King of Canada on November 15, 1945. The three heads of government favored the availability and free interchange of the "fruits of scientific research", but not "of detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy" or of its "military exploitation".⁵⁵⁶

In the December 22 session, Molotov regarded the United States' altruistic offer favorably, but still made demands regarding establishing the organization under the auspice of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy in the

⁵⁵⁴ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes, Third Formal Session, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka Moscow, December 18, 1945, 4:00-7:15, Memorandum by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 663-664.

⁵⁵⁵ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-1545, The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Washington, December 21, 1945-11 a.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 709-710.

⁵⁵⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B1:F5. Atomic energy. British Delegation, Excerpt from negotiations with the British Concerning the Quebec Agreement, November 1-16 1945, 16.10.1945; DAFR 1945-1946. Agreed Declaration by the President of the United States (Truman), the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (Attlee) and the Prime Minister of Canada (King), Washington, November 15, 1945. Volume VIII, p. 547; Acheson 1987, pp. 131-132. In August 1946 the Senate passed unanimously the Atomic Energy Act, which determined how the United States federal government would control and manage the nuclear technology. At the same time the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was founded to foster and control the peace-time development of atomic science and technology. President Harry S. Truman signed the McMahon/Atomic Energy Act on August 1, 1946, transferring the control of atomic energy from military to civilian hands, effective from January 1, 1947.

spirit of the United Nations Charter.⁵⁵⁷ In negotiations the following day, Byrnes remarked that Molotov's demand was unnecessary, as the Commission would produce reports and make recommendations rather than take an active role.⁵⁵⁸ A mutual understanding was reached on Christmas Eve, with Byrnes assigning the Committee the duty to report to the Security Council. At the same time, Byrnes dismantled the US monopoly on atomic energy, at least indirectly.⁵⁵⁹

The question of atomic energy had a significant impact on the relationship between Truman and Byrnes as well as on US domestic policy. In his memoirs, Truman suggests that Byrnes had sought right from the start to benefit from atomic energy secrets in negotiations with the Russians, referring to the discussions Byrnes had with members of the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy⁵⁶⁰ on December 13:

Hardly had Byrnes left on his trip to the Russian capital when, on December 14, I was asked by senator Tom Connally if I could see him and other members of the Senate Atomic Energy Committee. Byrnes, it appeared, had met with a number of senators the day before and had informed them that it was his plan to secure Russian concurrence at the forthcoming conference to the proposal of setting up an Atomic Energy Commission under the United Nations - A plan on which Attlee, Mackenzie King, and I had agreed the previous month. The Senate Committee members were greatly disturbed by the conversation they had had with the Secretary of State. They said they had received the impression from him that he would discuss, and perhaps agree to, the turnover of certain atomic energy information even before there had been any agreement on safeguards and inspections against the abuse of such information. Senator Vandenberg told me that he feared Byrnes might make such an agreement because the directive under which he traveled - and which had been drawn up on Byrnes's own instructions in the State Department - made it possible for him to discuss any portion of the proposal independently of other sections. I immediately informed the senators that there was no intention by the administration to disclose any scientific information during the Moscow conference, nor would there be any final commitment there on the turnover of such information. I made it clear that I had no thought of releasing any information regarding the bomb itself until the American people could be assured that there were adequate arrangements for inspection and safeguards.⁵⁶¹

In this regard, Truman depicted the issue in his memoirs somewhat contradictorily to the telegraph of December 21 which Byrnes received through Harriman. The provisional clause contained in the telegraph - which was open

⁵⁵⁷ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes, Sixth Formal Session, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 22, 1945, 5:10 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 736.

⁵⁵⁸ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Kremlin, Moscow, December 23, 1945, noon. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 743-747.

⁵⁵⁹ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, Spiridonovka, December 24, 1945, 3:15 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 762-763, 769.

⁵⁶⁰ The Senate approved S. Res. 179 on October 22 1945 establishing the Special Committee on Atomic Energy (79A-F29) to study problems relating to the development, use, and control of atomic energy and to consider all bills and resolutions coming before the Senate proposing legislation relating to atomic energy.

⁵⁶¹ Truman 1955a, pp. 587-548.

to interpretation - in practice contained a quid pro quo-type possibility of being flexible on the question of atomic energy in order to please the Soviet Union and to regenerate cooperation. According to the provision, this was completely at Byrnes's discretion.⁵⁶² After December 17, Byrnes sent the next telegraph on the progress of the negotiations on Christmas Eve. In his telegraph, Byrnes highlighted the achieved consensus on the peace conference and referred to the good atmosphere of the meeting on many issues, including atomic energy.⁵⁶³ Later Truman reminisced that "the message told me very little that the newspaper correspondents had not already reported from Moscow". He did not consider this to be "a proper account by a Cabinet member to the President", but more like "one partner in a business telling the other that his business trip was progressing well and not to worry".⁵⁶⁴

At least according to Truman's memoirs, the President was very poorly informed about the events of Moscow, but in light of State Department documents he does not seem to have been active in correcting this information deficit. Byrnes reported on the meeting for the last time on December 27 after the conference had ended, requesting that the White House arrange a press conference and attaching a communiqué drafted by the meeting participants on the decisions that had been made.⁵⁶⁵ According to Truman's memoirs, this communiqué was brought to his knowledge late at night while in Missouri, and only after the document had been simultaneously published in Washington, Moscow and London at 10 pm Eastern Standard Time. Truman, who obviously disapproved of this practice, had had the opportunity to be informed of the decisions in Moscow through other channels and to be among the first to read the telegraph. In the drafts of his book *All in One Lifetime* Byrnes blamed Truman himself, as according to State Department records the communiqué had arrived in Washington that morning, 15 hours before it was publicized.⁵⁶⁶ The contents of the communiqué were a disappointment to Truman:

⁵⁶² He suggests: "but only if you think it would be helpful in promoting cooperation and useful discussion".... FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-1545, The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Washington, December 21, 1945-11 a.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 709-710.

⁵⁶³ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2445 : Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State, Moscow, December 24, 1945-3 p.m., [Received December 24-8:59 a. m.] 4265, Delsec 25. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 760.

⁵⁶⁴ Truman 1955a, p. 549.

⁵⁶⁵ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2745 : Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State, Moscow, December 27, 1945-3 a.m., [Received December 7:30 a. m.] 4284. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 815. The Communiqué on the Moscow Conference of the three foreign ministers included in its main points the following issues: I Resumption of the preparation of peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland with the principle of 4-3-2; II Establishment of the Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan; III Korean issue; IV Situation in China; V Rumania; VI Bulgaria; VII The establishment by the United Nations of a Commission for the Control of Atomic Energy.

⁵⁶⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F17, Draft, October 23, 1957.

I did not like what I read. There was not a word about Iran or any other place where the Soviets were on the march. We had gained only an empty promise for further talks.⁵⁶⁷

In addition to being disappointed in the content of the communiqué, Truman was appalled by the way in which Byrnes announced his return date to Washington. The Secretary of State instructed Acheson to organize a press conference at the same time as his arrival. According to Acheson, Byrnes intentionally violated protocol, which would have required reporting to the President first. According to the Under Secretary of State, Byrnes, who had now arrived in Washington, was astounded by the fact that the President was still spending leisure time boating on the Potomac. Nonetheless, in his press conference on New Year's Eve, Byrnes stated that the President had been very pleased with the outcomes of the conference.⁵⁶⁸ In the last session in Moscow, the Secretary of State had attempted to include Iran into the final resolution of the Conference, the possibility of which Molotov had with some foresight rejected at the start of the Conference by leaving these questions off the agenda. Truman had to have been aware of this. On the other hand, some general solutions had been defined in the communiqué to the problems in China, Korea, Romania and Bulgaria.⁵⁶⁹ According to Truman's memoirs, the part that was most problematic for the President was the seventh section of the communiqué, which dealt with the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Truman immediately requested Vandenberg's interpretation of the communiqué. Vandenberg had highlighted the primary nature of the need for safeguards in the meeting between Byrnes and the Foreign Relations Committee. Now he interpreted the communiqué as allowing for discussion or even decisions on exchanging atomic secrets without any of the guarantees he had demanded. Truman remarked that as long as he was President, no scientific details of the atomic bomb would be given out without an international agreement on an observation system.⁵⁷⁰ However, this view, which is based on a radical interpretation of the communiqué, is somewhat exaggerated. The realization of Truman and Vandenberg's worst-case scenario would have in the end been dependant on the United States, as according to the agreement both security guarantees and information exchanges were on the Commission's agenda, and were by no means decided beforehand.⁵⁷¹ Byrnes emphasized this view in his memoirs:

⁵⁶⁷ Truman 1955a, p. 549.

⁵⁶⁸ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F5, Memorandum of The Press and Radio News Conference, Monday, December 31, 1945.

⁵⁶⁹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B11:F4. Moscow Agreement. Communiqué on The Moscow Conference of The Three Foreign Ministers, 27.12.1945.

⁵⁷⁰ Truman 1955a, p. 549.

⁵⁷¹ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2745 : Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State, Moscow, December 27, 1945-3 a.m., [Received December 7:30 a. m.] 4284. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 815-824; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B11:F4. Moscow Agreement. Communiqué on The Moscow Conference of The Three Foreign Ministers, 27.12.1945, pp. 10-11.

The language of the resolution [to establish the atomic commission] makes clear that even as to the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful purposes, the commission has authority only to make recommendations. Therefore unless the United States concurs in the recommendation, it could not be adopted. If the United States concurred and the Security Council adopted the recommendation, it would still be for the government of the United States by treaty or by Congressional action to determine to what extent the recommendation should be acted upon. If action is required by treaty it would take a two-thirds vote of the Senate to ratify the treaty.⁵⁷²

Although Byrnes came to accept the idea of transferring the supervision of atomic energy into the hands of many, his political goal was obviously to either somehow benefit from the loss or to prevent it completely by stalling. Moreover, in the fall of 1945, public opinion, which was ever so important to Byrnes, did not support the dismantling of the nuclear monopoly. In opinion polls conducted in September, 73 percent of Americans thought it best to keep the supervision of the atomic weapon in domestic hands, with only 14 percent entrusting it to a committee under the UN.⁵⁷³ In October, the corresponding figures were 71 percent and 17 percent,⁵⁷⁴ which is indicative of the unchanged views of the Americans, contrary to what Robert L. Messer, among others, has assumed in his research.⁵⁷⁵

Nonetheless, neither Robert L. Messer nor Patricia Dawson Ward thought that Byrnes wanted to dismantle the nuclear monopoly – at least not without considerable compensation from the Soviet Union.⁵⁷⁶ Such compensation may have been necessary considering the situation in Iran, which was worsening. This tendency started in London, where Byrnes had carefully offered a publicly elegant and final resolution in the question regarding the Polish border. In London, behind this elegant solution might have been conceding to the election issues of Bulgaria and Romania. With the Soviet Union being confident in the pervasion of its power, in time it became clear that the United States could not use their atomic weapon trump card directly against the Russians. What proved to be an excellent defense in the Soviet's silent battle against the US atomic weapon was the humor cultivated by Molotov which, when peppered with suggestions of disarmament, was bothersome to Byrnes.⁵⁷⁷ Talks on the international supervision of atomic energy calmed the atmosphere, as well as the speculation which had even started in the Soviet press, regarding an Anglo-American nuclear sanction, as planned.⁵⁷⁸

Although inviting the Soviet Union to the negotiations on the international supervision of atomic energy was accordant with the official policy of the US, Byrnes clearly took on the task of slowing down its development and maintaining the United States' nuclear monopoly for as long

⁵⁷² Byrnes 1958, p. 346.

⁵⁷³ The Quarter's Polls. AIPO Sept. '45, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 10, Issue 4 (Autumn 1945), p. 619.

⁵⁷⁴ The Quarter's Polls. AIPO Oct. '45, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 10, Issue 4 (Winter 1945–1946), p. 531.

⁵⁷⁵ Messer 1982, p. 139.

⁵⁷⁶ Messer 1982, p. 139; Ward 1979, pp. 52–55.

⁵⁷⁷ Byrnes 1947, pp. 273–274.

⁵⁷⁸ Dallin 1947, pp. 26–39.

as possible.⁵⁷⁹ The Atomic Energy Resolution mentioned in Byrnes's final report on the Moscow Conference emphasized the role of "safeguards" and "inspections" over the sharing of weapons information between the members of the group, and in the end Byrnes did not exhibit an active participation or a rush to begin nuclear cooperation:

The British and ourselves came to Moscow with a very definite proposal for the establishment by the United Nations of a Commission on atomic energy and related matters based on the Washington declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada on that subject. At the request of the Soviet Government the discussion of our proposal was placed at the end of our agenda. Our discussions were limited to this proposal. At no time did we discuss any technical or scientific matters, nor were we asked by the Soviet Government about the new weapon. It was happy to find that the Soviet Government feels as we do that this particular weapon is of such a revolutionary nature that we should explore through a United Nations Commission methods of international control.... Indeed, at the root of the whole matter lies the problem of providing the necessary safeguards. Neither we nor any other nation would be expected to share our armament secrets until it was certain that effective safeguards had been developed to insure our mutual protection.⁵⁸⁰

The Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers marked a turning point in the relationship between Truman and Byrnes. After arriving in Washington Byrnes received, at least according to Truman's memoirs, a cool reception from the President, who did not even bother to talk to Byrnes on the phone immediately, but made demands through his press secretary that Byrnes report to the President before any public announcements were made. In his later meeting, Truman accused Byrnes of a lack of reporting, which Byrnes considered to be his subordinates' problem. The real problem, however, was not the reporting itself, but the content of the agreements made in Moscow and the communiqué, which Truman was not pleased with:

Byrnes left a collection of documents on the conference with me, and I agreed to study them at once. As I went through these papers it became abundantly clear to me that the success of the Moscow conference was unreal. I could see that the Russians had given us no more than a general promise that they would be willing to sit down to talk again about the control of atomic energy. There was not a word in the communiqué to suggest that the Russians might be willing to change their ways in Iran - where the situation was rapidly becoming very serious - or anywhere else. Byrnes, I concluded after studying the entire record, had taken it upon himself to move the foreign policy of the United States in a direction to which I could not, and would not, agree. Moreover, he had undertaken this on his own initiative without consulting or informing the President.⁵⁸¹

Byrnes responded to Truman's attack in his memoirs of 1958. He did not refer so much to the content of the communiqué, but the way in which it was published, which was partially the reason Truman had become angry. Byrnes also recalled his meeting with the President in a much more amicable light than

⁵⁷⁹ Byrnes 1947, pp. 108–109; Ward 1979, pp. 48–49, 52.

⁵⁸⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B1:F8. Confidential release for publication at 10:00 P.M., E.S.T., Sunday, December 30, 1945; Report by James F. Byrnes, December 30, 1945, On Moscow meeting. (www).

⁵⁸¹ Truman 1955a, p. 550.

Truman did. In this “cordial” meeting, Truman understood Byrnes’s reasoning for the delay in the arrival of the communiqué. With regard to the content of the communiqué, Truman “said he understood and expressed pleasure at the progress we had made”⁵⁸².

At all international conferences it is essential that there be agreement on simultaneous release of a communiqué. At this meeting I finally succeeded in fixing a release hour acceptable to our own wire and radio services, which had often complained in the past that the British public got the news from international conferences before it reached the public in the United States.... Before I left Moscow at seven that morning I was assured by Ambassador Harriman that as soon as he could get his staff to the Embassy, he would have the communiqué coded and sent by the usual method to the State Department. He obviously made a very special effort to do this because the record shows that his long message in twenty-six sections began to come over the Department wires in Washington at 6:30 on the morning of December 27, fifteen hours before the release time. As it was Christmas week, many officials were away from Washington when the communiqué started coming through. The President had gone to Independence, Missouri, for the holidays, but I was told that Mr. Acheson made special arrangements to transmit the communiqué to him there.⁵⁸³

The reason for the rift in the relationship was undeniably Byrnes’s desire to dominate foreign policy and to scupper old-fashioned, rigid diplomacy. In his press release on Moscow, Byrnes defended his actions with the necessity of modern foreign policy to act quickly with rapidly changing events, when “there is not time to wait for agreement to be reached by the slow exchange of diplomatic communications”. By emphasizing the significance of personal relationships in dealing with foreign relations, Byrnes also elevated his role in the small circle of power politics which had been limited to the Council of Foreign Ministers, bypassing President Truman.⁵⁸⁴ On the other hand, the nature of the Truman-Byrnes relationship had already changed after the first meeting of Foreign Ministers in London. Because Byrnes had to spend so much of his time away from Washington, he was unable to join Truman’s drinking and poker-playing coterie in the White House. By contrast, Byrnes’s political critics like Admiral Leahy, Harry Vaughan and Jim Vardaman were able to join the President’s “bullbat sessions” and thereby influence Truman. According to Walter Brown, “the Palace Guard” was more important in building up Truman’s self confidence, of which there “had been very little when he took office.”⁵⁸⁵

Byrnes sought to clarify the Atomic Energy Resolution which had clearly infuriated Senator Vandenberg by emphasizing that nothing rash or final had been agreed on in Moscow. According to Byrnes’s memoirs, he had acted completely in accordance with the agreement made by Truman, Attlee and King by reminding Molotov that the United States could not “be expected to

⁵⁸² Byrnes 1958, p. 343. According to Byrnes, Truman even asked him to join his New Year’s party at Williamsburg.

⁵⁸³ Byrnes 1958, p. 342.

⁵⁸⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B1:F8. Confidential release for publication at 10:00 P.M., E.S.T., Sunday, December 30, 1945.

⁵⁸⁵ Brown 1992, p. 345.

share our armament secrets until it was certain that effective safeguards had been developed to insure our mutual protection". Evidently referring to the conflict in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that preceded the Moscow meeting, Byrnes felt that the criticisms were milder than expected: "With long experience in politics, I knew the normal disposition of senators and congressmen to criticize the achievements of public officials of opposing political parties, and I was agreeably surprised that so few expressed any serious objections to what had been done".⁵⁸⁶ The following conflict Byrnes chalked down to a misunderstanding: "I am confident that if Vandenberg had been with us at Moscow there would not have been any misunderstanding on the subject, and from that day to the end of my service as Secretary I insisted upon his accompanying us to every international conference".⁵⁸⁷

It is undeniable that the aftermath of the Moscow Conference left a permanent mark on the cooperation between Byrnes and Truman. According to his memoirs, Truman expressed his lack of confidence in a letter to Byrnes which he read aloud to the Secretary of State in the Oval Office on January 5, 1946. The letter however, did not focus on Truman's concern regarding Byrnes's independent initiative or the difficulties in reporting, but rather reflected a more whole-hearted disappointment in the successes of foreign policy during the second half of the previous year:

At Potsdam we were faced with an accomplished fact and were by circumstances almost forced to agree to Russian occupation of Eastern Poland and the occupation of that part of Germany east of the Oder River by Poland. It was high-handed outrage. At the time we were anxious for Russian entry into the Japanese War. Of course we found later that we didn't need Russia there and that the Russians have been a headache to us ever since.... I'm tired of babying the Soviets.⁵⁸⁸

According to Acheson's memoirs, the President's report was even more vivid than the one published in his memoirs, and included the memorandum which he reports having written out and read.⁵⁸⁹ In his memoirs of 1947, Byrnes did not comment on this lack of confidence at all. When the documents went out in the beginning of the 1950s Byrnes had to explain the situation more carefully. In 1955 he denied rumors that Truman had handed him a pastoral letter relating to his behaviour in the Moscow Conference. From Byrnes's point of view as expressed in 1955, he would have resigned immediately if he had known about such distrust.⁵⁹⁰ In *All in One Lifetime*, Byrnes still denied all speculations considering the letter or votes of non confidence and implied that they were at variance with the facts presented in the press conference on January 8. The President had then rallied around Byrnes's foreign policy in public.⁵⁹¹ *The New*

⁵⁸⁶ Byrnes 1958, p. 345.

⁵⁸⁷ Byrnes 1958, p. 348.

⁵⁸⁸ Truman 1955a, pp. 551-552.

⁵⁸⁹ Acheson 1987, p. 136.

⁵⁹⁰ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Materials, B18:F8, For Release Morning Newspapers Friday, November 4, 1955, Statement of James F. Byrnes.

⁵⁹¹ Byrnes's point of view got a lot of publicity at the time when *All In One Lifetime* was published in 1958. Just because of that incident, *The New York Times* described the

York Times reported the briefing as a front-page news story but not a slightest indication of the dispute between the President and the Secretary was given.

On the contrary, according to Felix Belair's article published in *The New York Times* on January 9, Truman "gave his personal imprimatur to the recent Moscow agreements of the Big Three, including the proposed United Nations Atomic Energy Control Commission". Instead of being on atomic energy issues, the main focus of the article was diverted to the situations in Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, which could not have been the reasons for the rift on the grounds of the minutes of the Moscow meeting or Truman's memoirs:

Having expressed his complete satisfaction with accomplishments of the Big Three Foreign Ministers at Moscow and his belief that the results would be constructive, President Truman cited a Bucharest report today to THE NEW YORK TIMES that one such result had been reflected in the Rumanian Cabinet reforms.... The President became emphatic when asked if the United States would consider recognizing the Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria without the guarantee of free and unfettered elections as outlined in the Yalta communiqué. They are not going to be recognized without such guarantees, the President said with some emphasis.⁵⁹²

In his memoirs, Byrnes himself cited Belair's article and on the grounds of Belair's opinion he accentuated the success of the Moscow Conference from the viewpoint of atomic energy. However, Belair emphasized Truman's desire to adhere to the Yalta agreements as a provision for the recognition of the Balkan states more heavily. Along with Balkans, the issue of the Allied Control Commission (ACC) for Japan came up, which Truman had opposed in the fall. According to Belair, Truman was flip-flopping on the issue: "However, Mr. Truman stuck to his guns, saying he had always favored a Far Eastern Advisory Commission for Japan - that it was the least our Allies were entitled to".⁵⁹³

Even if Truman had given Byrnes his total approval to almost everything decided at Moscow, as Belair expressed, the picture given to public has to be viewed as a part of the overall situation. On the day before the publication of Belair's article, Byrnes traveled to London to start the first UN General Assembly. Insofar as some contradictions had arisen between the President and the Secretary and those contradictions concerned real issues of foreign policy, publicly releasing those disputes would have caused serious problems - especially if they related to atomic energy. Without denying knowledge of the backgrounds of the documents, Byrnes stated in his memoirs that in the end the President was responsible for foreign policy, As expressed by both Byrnes and Truman in their memoirs, the President required an absolute unanimity between the President and the Secretary of State and that a lack of that unanimity would have meant resignation for the Secretary.⁵⁹⁴

In light of both Patricia Dawson Ward's research and Truman's memoirs, at the start of January Truman was already prepared to release him from his

picture created by Byrnes book as follows: "Now the bitterness is all but gone". *The New York Times* 19.10.1958. Wallace Carroll "For Him Politics Was Life Itself". *The New York Times* 9.1.1946. Felix Belair "Truman upholds Yalta on Balkans".

⁵⁹²

⁵⁹³

⁵⁹⁴

Ibid.

Byrnes 1958, pp. 346-347; Curry 1965, pp. 188-190; Ward 1979, pp. 75-76.

duties as Secretary of State, but only after the peace treaties had been formed.⁵⁹⁵ Replacing the Secretary of State in the middle of the peace process would have indicated externally, and especially to the Soviet Union, a change in foreign policy or a disappointment in previous accomplishments. With the President ultimately having the highest authority in the execution of foreign policy, he was also responsible for Byrnes's actions. By reprimanding Byrnes unofficially, Byrnes and Truman as well as US foreign policy maintained their credibility. Even though the procedures may not have left much to complain about, Truman had now dictated clear objectives for operations. As also perceived by Ward, adhering to these objectives was evident in the immediate revision of US foreign policy at the start of 1946.⁵⁹⁶

Nevertheless, Byrnes had brought back from Moscow an agreement on proposals for peace treaties, on the basis of which he announced that the world had come one step closer to a peace based on fairness and peace, and considered the meeting to be a success. To Byrnes's dismay, corresponding sentiments were not presented in the media, which used the word "appeasement" to describe the agreements.⁵⁹⁷ With the appeasement rhetoric embarrassingly referring to Neville Chamberlain's failed policies with regard to the expansion of Nazi-Germany, the choice of word can be considered quite radical, especially since the concept had become synonymous with cowardice in the 1930s.⁵⁹⁸ In his memoirs, Byrnes also referred to misled critics opposed to him based on personal reasons.⁵⁹⁹

On the whole, the Moscow meeting diffused the deadlock of the London Conference, but the problems were mainly resolved by the fine-tuning of procedures and by postponing the handling of more difficult issues to future conferences. According to Patricia Dawson Ward, in Moscow Byrnes had a new policy at his disposal, based on the understanding he had gained in the fall of the question of Japan being the reason for the deadlock of the London Conference. But this did not change the quid pro quo policy that had come into the relationships between superpowers.⁶⁰⁰ By emphasizing the significance of Japan, Byrnes was able to deflect the meeting's attention from the question of atomic energy, and could therefore expect a return favor from the Soviet Union's participation in the occupation of Japan in the form of, say, improved conditions in the Balkans.

Byrnes was indeed successful in lessening the attention placed on atomic energy, partially with Molotov's assistance, but the results of his bartering

⁵⁹⁵ Ward 1979, pp. 74–77; Truman 1955a, p. 552.

⁵⁹⁶ Ward 1979, pp. 74–77.

⁵⁹⁷ The concept of appeasement had wider meaning because it was associated with the politics which lead to the Second World War. The term is most often applied to the foreign policy of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain towards Nazi Germany between 1937 and 1939. E.g. the policy of acceding to the demands of a potentially hostile nation in the hope of maintaining peace.

⁵⁹⁸ Adams 1993, *passim*.

⁵⁹⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 122. By critics, Byrnes apparently referred to John Foster Dulles and Arthur Vandenberg, who had supported him in London but after Moscow called Byrnes an appeaser.

⁶⁰⁰ Ward 1979, pp. 75–76.

politics were modest. The concessions regarding Japan produced only thin, future-oriented promises with regard to Iran and Romania. In addition to postponing the atomic energy question to the first General Assembly of the UN, which was to be held in London in January, this was not a good result. Purely from the perspective of benefits and advantages, the quips about appeasement policy were justified, but appeasement was by no means Byrnes's objective. Byrnes continued to invest in the policies that were crucial to the success of the meetings, which he felt was the only way to a definite peace.

Additionally, Byrnes was also burdened by the secret Yalta agreements on the Far East becoming reality. At the end of January 1946, the Secretary of State clearly defended the idea of a nation's right to its territories before the war at a press conference. This situation became very complex especially with regard to the Kuril Islands. A secret agreement between Roosevelt and Stalin, which the Secretary of State had, in his own words, not seen, awkwardly compelled him to consider the islands as a part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union considered the situation to be upsetting, as Acheson, who had commented on the document from the United States first considered it to be indicative, but later changed his mind. In a press conference held on January 29 however, the Secretary of State said that he had heard of the Agreements approximately two days after the surrender of Japan. Even then he denied ever physically seeing any agreement and emphasized the need for secrecy due to military tactics. According to the Secretary of State, transferring Soviet troops from Europe to join in the war against Japan was thought to take 90 days, and one did not want to detach the Red Army from the war against Germany by publishing the Far East Agreements prior to the final defeat on the Eastern Front. To the question on the necessity of the Far East Agreements in general, Byrnes could not think of an explanation. He did, however, telegraph the US Ambassador to Britain, Winant, requesting for Bevin's view on publishing the secret document. According to Byrnes, publishing the document was eminent, as the matter was known by the American press, and suggested that it be simultaneously published in Washington, Moscow and London.⁶⁰¹

Both Patricia Dawson Ward and George Curry have emphasized that Byrnes's actions in Moscow became a turning point for US foreign policy. The reason for this was the conflict between President Truman and Byrnes, which was manifested in the pastoral letter written by Truman to Byrnes on January 5, 1946. The strong comments contained in the letter, especially regarding the settlement of the situations in Iran, Romania and Bulgaria, rescinding the Soviet Union's lend and lease contracts, the immediate return of the military equipment given to the Soviet Union and the insinuations that Japan would

⁶⁰¹ FRUS 1946. Volume VI. 611.4131/1-2946: Telegram. The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State. Moscow, January 29, 1946, 6 p.m. (Received January 29-2:17 p.m.). p. 683; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F6, Memorandum of The Press and Radio News Conference, Tuesday, January 29, 1946; FRUS 1946. Volume VI. 740.0011 E.W./1-2946: Telegram. The Secretary of State. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), Washington, January 29, 1946, 8 p.m. p. 685.

remain under an administrative machinery dominated by the United States, were clear indications of Truman's desire to put an end to pampering the Soviet Union.⁶⁰²

Changing situations like the ones in Bulgaria and Romania had proved to be almost impossible during the fall of 1945. The inability to affect the situations was intensified by the non-interference policy in Eastern Europe as organized by Roosevelt. Hints about maintaining this development, came from Byrnes's fellow-lawyer, C.T. Graydon from Columbia, SC. Graydon defended the Soviet Union's strong role in forming the Romanian and Bulgarian governments and testified that the Baltic countries and parts of Poland were historically and linguistically a part of the Soviet Union. In his own words, he wanted to write about the Moscow Conference before President Truman's comments. The conference had undeniably been "good and successful". Graydon defended Byrnes's view on compromise with an idea according to which "Democracy is the Mother of compromise".⁶⁰³ The significance of Truman's pastoral letter to Byrnes in the course of US foreign policy was merely rhetorical. At least the letter in itself did not outline any concrete procedures for rectifying the situation. Byrnes himself was not completely satisfied with the progress brought about by the Moscow Conference. Although power politics had been reignited with the cooperation of the Big Three, tensions still existed. At any rate Byrnes refrained from giving Stalin and Molotov the Swiss wristwatches purchased for them. Instead, he kept them for himself.⁶⁰⁴

In summary, the Moscow conference reflected in many respects Byrnes's own conceptions of handling foreign policy. Byrnes intensely disliked large retinues. He traveled light, taking to Moscow hardly more than a half dozen officers and counting on the embassy for essential services. The communications he sent back were few and terse. The instructions that he had had worked out for himself on atomic energy were somewhat more liberal in seeking collaboration from the Soviet Union than the terms of the Agreed Declaration of November 15.⁶⁰⁵

3.3.3 The Iranian Crisis - a step towards a strained superpower atmosphere

In addition to Germany, one of the other countries that complicated the final settlement of the Second World War was Iran, where both the Soviet Union and Britain had sent troops in 1941 to secure the oil fields and the maintenance lines of lend and lease agreements. Troops were to be withdrawn six months after

⁶⁰² Hillman & Wagg 1952, pp. 18–23.

⁶⁰³ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B11:F3. From Graydon to Byrnes, 3.1.1946; From Graydon to Byrnes, 31.12.1945.

⁶⁰⁴ Byrnes had purchased fairly expensive Swiss watches for gifts but he did not give them. Instead, he gave Molotov a gift watch which was chosen by his wife. Byrnes did not give anything to Stalin, because of a reason which he promised to tell Lucius Clay later. Byrnes had paid for the watches with his own money. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F1, From Clay to Byrnes, 16.12.1945; From Byrnes to Clay, 5.1.1946.

⁶⁰⁵ Acheson 1987, p. 135.

the end of hostilities. In the Tehran Declaration of December 2, 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had reaffirmed Iran's independence and integrity. Iranian oil reserves were starting to be of interest to the United States, whose own oil reserves were depleting quickly because of the exacerbated consumption caused by the war. Byrnes was already convinced of the extent of the problem when he was the director of the OWM by trying to advance the building of a Trans-Iranian oil pipeline from the Iranian oil fields to the Mediterranean.⁶⁰⁶ After an English-Iranian oil company agreed to increase production and some discordant voices in America had quieted, the plan was approved in 1944. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet oil industry, which had suffered damage in the war, began to strengthen its demand for a bilateral oil export agreement between the Soviet Union and Iran.⁶⁰⁷

The background to the Soviet-Iranian relationship, however, was politically more complex than the question of economy. The inhabitants of Azerbaijan, which was a part of the Soviet Union, were ethnically closely related to the population in the Azerbaijani regions of Iran. Many Iranian Azerbaijanis lived in the Soviet Union and were ready to return to their home country after it was secured by the Soviet Government. In September of 1945, the situation was complicated even further when the Soviet Union began to support the Kurds who traditionally had poor relations with both the Azerbaijanis and the Iranians.⁶⁰⁸ The Soviet Union's strategy was to build Soviet-friendly governments in these regions, and in the case of Kurdistan, to help it obtain autonomy. Behind these operations was the reluctance of Iran's official government to cooperate with the Soviet Union on their terms. In this regard the significance of oil came into the picture, and oil was not a mere accessory in US interests either.⁶⁰⁹

One piece of information that had an undeniable effect of Byrnes's activities was knowledge of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, the exposure of which had changed the US State Department's analysis of Soviet intentions.

⁶⁰⁶ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B16:F15, Memorandum of Meeting of War Mobilization Committee 2:30 P.M., August 16, 1943; Robertson 1994, pp. 460–465.

⁶⁰⁷ Hess 1974, pp. 133–134; Cottam 1988, pp. 66–76.

⁶⁰⁸ Gene Currivan reported minutely in his *New York Times* article regarding the complex situation in Persia in March of 1946. He had acquired very accurate information concerning the location of Russian troops in their "Iran zone". According to the article, Soviet activity in Iranian Kurdistan caused mistrust also in Iraq, because of the proximity of Soviet troops in neighboring Iran. In addition, the Iraqi government was uneasy about the future activities of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the current Kurdish rebel leader, who had taken refuge in autumn in the Soviet zone of Iran and threatened to return in the spring. As well, Iranian Minister of War, General Sepahpod Ahmad Amir-Ahmadi feared Russia's progression so much that he claimed that Iranian Army was prepared to fight to the last man if the Russians moved on the capital. Currivan considered Russia's aims in Persia as unclear, but expected some kind of maneuver in the "war of the nerves": "The lack of definite information here added greatly to the tension with one school of thought convinced that the Russians have designs on Tehran while another just as firmly believes that Turkey is the objective of the Russian aims. But whatever its ultimate goal, the Soviet Union has done well so far with its war of nerves". *The New York Times* 16.3.1946. Gene Currivan "Red Army Deeper Into Kurdish Area"

⁶⁰⁹ Cottam 1988, pp. 66–68.

A report by L.W. Henderson emphasized the Soviet Union's desire to take control of some of the territories of the British Empire and especially to secure a route to the Persian Gulf. In addition, it was understood that the Soviet Union was dissatisfied with the Montreux agreements of 1936. According to information obtained from the Germans, the reason for the termination of Soviet-German cooperation was largely the reluctance of the German Government to accept Soviet demands, especially concerning Finland, Romania and Bulgaria. Instead, the Germans hoped that the Soviet Union would expand into the direction of Iran, but nowhere else. According to Henderson, it was obvious that the Soviet Union's objectives in the Middle East were similar to its objectives in Germany in the late 1930s. This was followed by a situation where both Britain and the United States were, in their relationships with the Soviet Union, drifting towards a situation which was reminiscent of the Soviet-German relationship between 1939 and 1941.⁶¹⁰

According to the original Tripartite agreement from 1942 between Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, the occupation of Iran was to end in the six months following the end of the war, but the Soviet Union procrastinated withdrawing its troops from Iranian soil citing the end date of the war, which was open to interpretation. In discussions that took place in Moscow on December 19, Stalin announced to Byrnes that the procrastination was caused purely by the security of Soviet oil fields in Azerbaijan,⁶¹¹ which was guaranteed by 31,000 soviet troops placed in the Azerbaijani regions of Iran. Although Byrnes had obviously been willing to accept Soviet actions in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, he did not want to confuse the Iranian situation with the largely European points of contention in Moscow. Stalin made reference to this when responding to Byrnes's questions:

It is right to respect small nations and to safeguard their independence but the small nations are not always averse to attempting to promote friction between large powers. Some small nations come to the Soviet Government and charge that England and America are strangling and oppressing them. Others go to England and America with similar charges against the Soviet Union.... It was, therefore, impossible for the Soviet Union to withdraw those troops before the expiration date of the 1942 treaty and at that time it will be necessary to examine the situation and to see whether or not it is possible to withdraw the troops then.⁶¹²

In his address, Stalin referred to problems with the Iranian Government, which according to him was hostile towards the Soviet Union. Moreover, according to

⁶¹⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B9:F9. Iranian case. From Henderson to Byrnes, 3.1.1946. Henderson's information was based on State Department documents and interviews of German war criminals which Harry N. Howard had conducted.

⁶¹¹ BP. Series 4: War Mobilization Material, B14:F11, Declaration of the Three Powers regarding Iran; FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, December 19, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 684-687; Byrnes 1947, p. 120.

⁶¹² FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, December 19, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 680-686.

Stalin, the Soviet Union had entered into a bilateral agreement with Iran in 1921, which overrode the agreement of 1942 and allowed for the troops to remain in northern Iran. Furthermore, Stalin made assurances that the Soviet Union would not have any interest in interfering in the internal affairs of Iran, let alone in making any territorial demands to it.⁶¹³ In the Moscow Conference in early December 1945, keeping all discussion relating to the retreat of troops from Greece, Iran and Indonesia outside the agenda had mitigated the agenda conflict. According to Harriman's report, these issues would be discussed on an informal basis between the three Foreign Ministers.⁶¹⁴

In the negotiations held at the Kremlin on December 23, Byrnes was perceptibly disappointed with the attitude of Stalin and he wished to talk primarily about Iran because, according to him, it was probable that the issue would be raised at the General Assembly in January. Byrnes pointed out that he had no details but considered that "the United States was sincerely desirous of avoiding this embarrassing position since it did not wish to take sides because of its close alliance with the Soviet Union during the war and now during the peace". Stalin indicated that the Soviet Union was not afraid of the topic and said that he was prepared to talk about it at the General Assembly. In agreement with Byrnes, the American press had written a great deal about foreign troops in Iran and partially because of this, the United States decided to withdraw the rest of its troops from Iran. When Stalin told Byrnes that that the Soviet Government had never asked the US to remove its troops, Byrnes remarked that "the desire of the United States was to avoid any embarrassing situation at the forthcoming General Assembly meeting".⁶¹⁵

Responsibility for mediating the Iranian conflict was this time taken by Britain, who according to the old sphere of influence agreement was more involved in the Iranian question than the United States. Bevin's proposal on establishing the Tripartite Commission on Iran⁶¹⁶ to deal with Iranian issues received partial support from Molotov, but the minor addition to Bevin's proposals demanded by the Soviet Union created a significant obstacle for consensus. In effect it was a question of the addition Soviet Union wanted in the second paragraph of Bevin's proposal, where the clause concerning the retreat of Allied troops included an "if possible" provision.⁶¹⁷

⁶¹³ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F1, To The Secretary of State, Unsigned Message, 23.12.1945.

⁶¹⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F1, From Harriman to The Acting Secretary of State, 17.12.1945.

⁶¹⁵ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, December 23, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 750-752.

⁶¹⁶ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/1-346, Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, December 25, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 779-780.

⁶¹⁷ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 25, 1945, 5:15-11:30 p.m., Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (Enclosure 2). Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 798-799. "With a view to removing the apprehensions of the Iranian Government and causes of international friction, the Commission shall

Both Bevin and Byrnes could not accept this provision, as both wanted and exact deadline for the final withdrawal of troops rather than clauses that already contained contradictory interpretations. Bevin suggested that the clause would be changed to read “maximum possible acceleration”, which did not please Molotov. The Soviet Union’s assertion of the 1921 agreement Byrnes rejected with information he had received from the Iranian government detailing that the agreement had not otherwise been adhered to.⁶¹⁸

The negotiations on the Iranian situation on December 26 reached a stalemate. Byrnes pleaded for continuing discussion on the matter by falsely reminding Molotov that the issue of Iran was on the agenda. When deciding on items on the agenda, Molotov had had the foresight to keep the Iranian discussions as informal discussions and he clearly defeated Byrnes in the debate that ensued.⁶¹⁹ Discussions on the Iranian issue, as agreed at the start of the Conference, had indeed taken place but without result. At Molotov’s insistence and as a matter outside of the agenda, no information regarding the discussions on Iran was included in the meeting’s official communiqué.⁶²⁰

Unlike the Balkan countries, Iran had never joined the Axis Powers in the war against the Soviet Union, and Byrnes therefore thought that the matter was not directly connected with the aftermath of the Second World War. There was very little the United States could do with regard to the developments in Eastern Europe, but lifting the Iranian issue from the state level to wider publicity in the upcoming first General Assembly of the United Nations seemed to Byrnes a good reason to move the Soviet troops. Also lurking in the background was the support given by the Soviet Union to Iran’s Tudeh party, which had been counteracted well in advance by the United States’ support for the 21,000-strong Iranian State Police. However, this classified operation, which was reportedly led by Byrnes and executed by Colonel Herbert Norman Schwarzkopf, had unfortunately been leaked to many prior to the Moscow Conference.⁶²¹

The leak stirred up the resistance of Republican isolationists in the United States, making Byrnes the scapegoat. In the Soviet Union, the situation was seen to have restored balance. The settlement of either party’s Iranian affairs in the

deal with the question of the acceleration, as far as possible, of withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran and make corresponding recommendations to the Governments of the Three Powers”.

⁶¹⁸ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 25, 1945, 5:15-11:30 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 795-797.

⁶¹⁹ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 26, 1945, 3:20-5:30 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, pp. 805-806, 808.

⁶²⁰ FRUS 1945. 740.00119 Council/12-2645, United States Delegation Minutes of Seventh Formal Session of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 26, 1945, 11 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 814.

⁶²¹ Robertson 1994, p. 465; Curry 1965, pp. 194-195. Byrnes did not say anything about Schwarzkopf’s operation.

UN would not be well advised. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Iran announced in January of 1946 that it was bringing Soviet actions before the UN Security Council for investigation, which prompted Stalin to promise that Soviet troops would vacate Iran no later than March 2.⁶²²

The UN, however, delegated responsibility for the final resolution of the conflict to the bilateral negotiations of Moscow and Tehran, which gave both the Soviet Union and the United States an opportunity to resolve the matter without putting anyone in an awkward position.⁶²³ At the same time, the Prime Minister of Iran changed, and immediately received an ultimatum from Stalin to either recognize the independence of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan in northern Iran and to sign a cooperation agreement to establish an oil company between the two countries, or alternatively to allow the Soviet troops to remain in Iran even after the beginning of March.

New Iranian Prime Minister Qavam tried to play his own game by waiting for better offers from elsewhere. When the Soviet Union started moving additional troops closer to Tehran on March 6, it became clear to Byrnes that more powerful diplomatic weapons would be needed to resolve the problem.⁶²⁴ This resolve was partially forced by a telegraph⁶²⁵ from George Brennan in Moscow, which for the first time clearly warned of the threat of Soviet troops against the interests of the West. Moreover, *The New York Times* reported in mid-March that some Soviet destroyers had flown only a few miles from Tehran.⁶²⁶ The State Department began an 18 million dollar publicity operation.⁶²⁷

The cornerstone of this publicity operation was reportedly a conversation initiated by Byrnes to establish the US international information service. A report by the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee⁶²⁸ on December 17, 1945 stated as the objective of this service to be to "enable the Department of State more effectively to carry out its responsibilities in the foreign field by means of public dissemination abroad of information about the United States and promotion of interchange of persons, knowledge and skills between the United States and other countries". The matter, which was introduced as House Bill HR 4982 had not at the time been considered, but Byrnes at any rate sought to advance the passing of the bill. In the background was a larger organizational change which Truman had granted Byrnes. The change included merging the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of

⁶²² Byrnes 1947, p. 119.

⁶²³ Hess 1974, p. 137.

⁶²⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 126.

⁶²⁵ The so-called "Kennan's Long telegram", which is seen as a catalyst of the Cold War by, for instance, David Robertson.

⁶²⁶ *The New York Times*, 16.3.1946. "Our Military Strength Will Be Used".

⁶²⁷ "The Voice of America", Byrnes 1947, p. 253.

⁶²⁸ The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives is a standing committee of the United States House of Representatives which has jurisdiction over bills and investigations related to the foreign affairs of the United States. It is less powerful than the Senate Foreign Relations Committee because the House committee does not consider the ratification of treaties or the confirmation of presidential appointments, such as are made for ambassador and Secretary of State.

Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) into an Interim International Information Service (IIIS) under the State Department. At the same time, Truman authorized Byrnes to investigate the international needs of the United States and to formulate a program based on them, which was what the Committee's proposal was about.⁶²⁹ In a letter from Byrnes to President Truman on December 31, 1945 which was attached to the Protocol of Congress, Byrnes noted that all demands had been met:

All of this consolidation, reduction, and planning has taken place without a break, anywhere in the world, in the effort to present what you described on August 31 as a 'full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States Government.'... Detailed proposals for the future overseas information service, in terms of money and personnel required after July 1, 1946, have been submitted to the Bureau of the Budget for submission to you and to the Congress. These proposals call for the maintenance of American libraries of information abroad, the supplying of documentary and background material by wireless and by mail to our missions overseas, the scoring of documentary films into foreign languages, the continued publication of a Russian-language magazine for distribution in the Soviet Union, the continuing supply of visual materials about the United States, and the maintenance in 62 countries of small staffs to conduct our informational and cultural relations, under the direct supervision of the chiefs of our diplomatic missions.... We would defeat our objectives in this program if we were to engage in special propagandist pleading. Our purpose is, and will be, solely to supply the facts on which foreign peoples can arrive at a rational and accurate judgment. It is my firm belief that the proposed informational and cultural activities of the Department of State abroad will help to achieve the security and peace which our people so ardently desire.⁶³⁰

In all, the publicity operation was not tinkering around on a small scale, but was a carefully constructed organization. Contentually, the program was conformant with Byrnes's desire to publicize world politics and to rectify the misunderstandings that according to Byrnes's memoirs clearly bothered him. The worst example had been a film presented by Stalin in Moscow, where Japan surrendered to the Red Army on the deck of an American battleship.⁶³¹

⁶²⁹ CR. Secretary of State Byrnes on Need of International Information Service by our Government, Extension of Remarks of Hon. Luther A. Johnson of Texas in The House of Representatives, Friday, February 1, 1946. Congressional Records 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. A423-A424.

⁶³⁰ Byrnes's letter from December 31, 1945 was attached to the remarks as a suggestion of Representative Luther A. Johnson. CR. Secretary of State Byrnes on Need of International Information Service by our Government, Extension of Remarks of Hon. Luther A. Johnson of Texas in The House of Representatives, Friday, February 1, 1946. Congressional Records 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. A423-A424.

⁶³¹ Byrnes 1947, pp. 212-213. Ceremonies for Japan's surrender had been thought over carefully and the Allies decided to assign the duty to General MacArthur. The decision to hold the ceremony on the battleship USS Missouri was a tactical move. By doing so, the Americans wanted to signal in public that the downfall of Japan was accredited to the United States; the ship was American and it was named after President Truman's home state. Later at the Moscow Conference, Stalin had shown a moving picture of the Soviet Army entering Manchuria. The film pictured Japan's preparation for war as being directed only against Russia. According to the film, the principal participants of the surrender ceremonies were representatives of Japan and the Soviet Union. The scene was described as "signing the surrender terms" on "a battleship".

Overall, the end of February and beginning of March formed a clear threshold in the United States' and Britain's policies towards the Soviet Union. At the same time, the extremely tense atmosphere in Eastern Europe and Greece started to erupt partially due to the events in Iran. Public speeches and appearances were more and more clearly directed against the policies of the Soviet Union.⁶³² The old silent cabinet policy had been rejected, but now even the newest lines of publicity were crossed. A surprisingly open "Diplomatic Showdown"⁶³³ lifted the problems of world politics into the public eye with the help of Byrnes and Churchill, albeit from a very one-sided perspective.⁶³⁴ In Byrnes's opinion, making the Iranian situation public was the only way of reaching a final solution.⁶³⁵ The Soviet Union could not meet the challenge of publicity at all, and as Stalin gave his first interview to *Pravda*, public opinion was already turning against the Soviet Union.⁶³⁶ In a bulletin published on February 11, the Secretary of State saw the public showdown in a very positive light:

The newspapers and the radio broadcasts have been filled with accounts of the disputes which have been aired these past weeks in the Security Council. Iran and Greece have been the subject of direct and frank debate, particularly between the representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of Great Britain. I cannot feel that the open discussion of these disagreements is cause for alarm. Quite contrary. Open discussion has not prevented agreement with respect to the disputes over Iran and Greece.⁶³⁷

The first days of March were crucial with regard to the Soviet Union losing face. The inefficiency of the United States led Byrnes to force a decision by the UN despite shadows such as the Schwarzkopf operation. At the end of March, Byrnes saw to the matter being resolved in one way or another in the Security Council, whilst Qavam, who also had been drifting towards a cooler relationship with the Soviet Union, showed signs of the same. Although Iran and the Soviet Union had reached a bilateral agreement on the withdrawal of troops on March 22, the decision publically, and to the Soviet Union's dismay, was given a final blessing by a vote of 7-2 only five days later. In the background was an opportunity given by Byrnes to the Iranian representatives to comment on whether proceedings in the matter should be postponed until April 10. With Iran answering the questions of the members of the Security Council, the Soviet Union left the proceedings and thus did not take part in the hearing of the Iranian matter. Byrnes showed his ruthlessness towards the Russians by suggesting that the Security Council investigate the negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union to ensure the "unconditional removal of

⁶³² Such speeches were Byrnes's speech at the Overseas Press Club on February 28, 1946 and Churchill's "Iron Curtain speech" in Fulton on March 5, 1946.

⁶³³ "Diplomatic Showdown", Hess 1974, p. 135.

⁶³⁴ Byrnes 1947, pp. 253-255.

⁶³⁵ Byrnes 1947, p. 251.

⁶³⁶ Ward 1979, pp. 78-82.

⁶³⁷ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B7:F7, Confidential Release For Publication At 9:30 P.M., E.S.T., Monday, February 11, 1946. Not to Be Previously Published, Quoted From or Used In Any Way.

troops from Iran". Although the Secretary of State publically questioned the unconditional nature of the bilateral agreements, he left the Security Council the option to take "the next step", in the event that further study would produce new information.⁶³⁸ Afterwards, Byrnes has been seen to have a significant role in persuading Prime Minister Qavam to take the matter to be decided by the United Nations.⁶³⁹ The Iranian crisis was finally resolved on May 6 as the last of the Soviet troops retreated, but the Schwarzkopf, operation, which had received less attention, continued its operations as the Iranian State Police stormed into the weakened Azerbaijani Province in the last part of 1946.⁶⁴⁰

As a whole, the Iranian crisis erupted at such a time and place where neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could back away. However, Britain and the United States had more to lose, as they understood the importance of the Middle Eastern oil countries in the future. On the other hand the crisis was largely caused by the Soviet Union's habit of testing the flexibility of the Western countries, which had previously been done in the spirit of *quid pro quo*. In this respect, there was no return to the old ways, as largely due to Byrnes the Iranian events and meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers were strictly kept as separate issues. The UN, who as a separate entity handled the complaint of Iran and had not participated in the war, successfully enforced this separation. Public diplomacy, tested by Byrnes, seemed on the outside to have been caused by the Soviet Union's reluctance to find a clean bilateral solution, but the Schwarzkopf operation or the fact that as many Azerbaijanis lived in the Soviet Union as in Iran was not in public knowledge.

In the Senate, the resolution on the Iranian issue was largely received positively. Tom Connally of Texas, in his address to the Senate on April 4, highlighted the Security Council's first case as a victory for the UN Charter. Not everyone shared his positive attitude, however. A radical Senator from Florida, Claude Pepper, saw the Security Council decision as being purely one-sided, and not representative of the general policy. In Pepper's opinion, the decision by which the Soviet Union was evicted from Iran would have been out of the question in the case of Britain, for example. This could have been the case in Iraq or in Trans-Jordan, which had both been joined to Britain's sphere of influence by a mandate from the League of Nations. Pepper also considered it likely that an Anglo-American bloc in forums like the Security Council would cause blocs to be directed against them. The Senator also referred to earlier statements made by Byrnes in which the Secretary of State had promised to reject *quid pro quo* thinking. Pepper wanted to resign from all actions that were indicative of a "conspiracy" against the Soviet Union. He was alone in his position as the discussion moved on to the spreading of spheres of influence and the application of the Monroe Doctrine in the interpretation of the Iranian

⁶³⁸ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B7:F12, Statement By The American Representative On The Iranian Case, March 1946; Remark, Clemson University, 22.2.1980.

⁶³⁹ Harbutt 1982, pp. 14–15.

⁶⁴⁰ Robertson 1994, p. 475.

crisis.⁶⁴¹ Byrnes also acted carefully to prevent the appearance that the United States had acted only to accomplish selfish interests in the form of Iranian oil. Byrnes had insisted that due to negotiating tactics, US interest in the Baluchistan oil fields would not be discussed in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops and related problems. Relating to this the Secretary asked the Tehran Embassy make clear to representatives of interested American oil companies in Iran that they should not approach the Iranian Government on the subject until clearance had been given by Embassy.⁶⁴² In addition, the Americans wanted to highlight to the UN their suspicion of Russian interest in attaining a foothold in the Iranian oil fields.⁶⁴³

Henry Wallace's reactions to the development of the Iranian crisis were more influential than Senator Pepper's. The very delicate issue of the American military bases located in Iceland was leaked to the newspapers by an article published in *The New York Times* on March 22. In the article Wallace stated that United States troops should be withdrawn from "the independent Republic of Iceland in the North Atlantic" and asked the Icelandic government to give full clarification on all documents concerning the military bases. The Prime Minister of Iceland, Ólafur Thors, was very indignant about the situation and had complained to Harry E. Carlson, the Charge d'Affaires, that his position had become almost untenable following Henry Wallace's interview. In his opinion, the issue had been badly mishandled because the question was raised just prior to important municipal and Alting elections in the next year.⁶⁴⁴ From another point of view, Wallace commented on the issue as a question of the balance of power, because a bit earlier Soviet troops had withdrawn from the Baltic Islands of Bornholm. From Wallace's point of view, "The only interpretation the Russians could place on continued occupancy of bases in Iceland by American troops would be that it was aimed at them". Byrnes, who had become perceptibly accustomed to the obstinate activities of Wallace, considered the issue serious but reminded him that the "United States press is free and uncontrolled and government can, therefore, exercise no influence on subjects which press or individuals may wish to discuss publicly". On the other hand, in the same message, Byrnes was forced to request the Prime Minister "not to issue any public statement at this time" in view of Iranian situation. When dealing with Reykjavik, Byrnes did not try to disguise the motives of his opponents:

⁶⁴¹ CR. Settlement of Russian-Iranian Dispute. Apr. 4. 1946. Congressional Records 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. 3086–3091.

⁶⁴² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B9:F9. Iranian case. From Byrnes to Embassy Tehran, 8.4.1946.

⁶⁴³ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B7:F12, Statement By The American Representative On The Iranian Case, March 1946. Everything included in the memorandum had not been presented in the Security Council and these were only written in a note which the US government sent to the Soviets on March 6.

⁶⁴⁴ *The New York Times* 22.3.1946, "Wallace Says United States Force Should Quit Iceland"; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F8, From Carlson to Byrnes, 2.4.1946.

It is perfectly clear to United States that much of public comment regarding Icelandic-United States relations is inspired by communist sources and that Soviet government would like to use Iceland as a red herring in the Iranian matter.⁶⁴⁵

Fraser J. Harbutt has proposed in his research that Byrnes's attitude towards the Iranian issue, which changed during the spring of 1946, was a clear indication of domestic pressure. According to Harbutt, as a type of "political animal", Byrnes took a tougher stand on the Soviet Union by exploiting the United Nations.⁶⁴⁶ From the perspective of opinion polls, Harbutt is clearly right. In US public opinion, confidence in the Soviet Union's ability to cooperate had been declining since the London Conference in the fall of 1945. However, as a phenomenon that took place after the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers in which the atmosphere had showed positive signs of superpower relations, it is difficult to consider the Iranian issue to be purely tied to public opinion. Nonetheless, Iran was significant enough to the United States both in terms of military strategy and economics that leaving it solely to the responsibility of the Soviet Union could not be accepted, at least in the long-term. Obviously, US motives in the Iranian situation were dependant on more than one factor. Charles Bohlen has encapsulated the issue insightfully in his memoirs:

While it is often difficult to determine motives in diplomatic situations, it is simple when narrowly defined national interests are involved. In the case of Iran, the full motivation of the United States is not easy to put on paper. There was unquestionably a feeling that in this first important case before the Security Council the United States should demonstrate that one of the great powers should join the other nations in a group action against a recalcitrant great power. Soviet motives in Iran were a clear violation of United Nations principles. If the test had not been met, the United Nations would have been a dead letter when it had no more than started. While Iran could be viewed as a clear-cut issue of principle, power considerations also entered into our decision in that we took a stand in an area remote from normal United States national interests because of the realization that if we did not, we would have to do so someplace much closer to our shores.⁶⁴⁷

The time between the Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers and the Iranian crisis can be considered significant with regard to momentum for the Cold War. The players on both sides of the field started to move. The Soviet Union's retreat from Iran was undeniably a public humiliation, but the United States was unable to make the Soviet Union fall back into line even by this method. What caused the crisis was not the Soviet Union's black and white need to grow its spheres of influence, but also the United States' and Britain's desires to monitor the oil fields. Actually, the Soviet Union was the only party whose motives included other, somewhat unwarranted reasons of ethnicity and territoriality. Prime Minister Qavam's intentions to gain maximum benefit from the situation were not surprising. When examining the Cold War from a longer perspective, the Iran crisis contains some very familiar components.

⁶⁴⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F8, From Byrnes to American Legation Reykjavik Iceland, 3.4.1946. However, the Soviet occupation at Bornholm did not end until April 5, 1946.

⁶⁴⁶ Harbutt 1982, passim.

⁶⁴⁷ Bohlen 1973, p. 251.

4 ACCUMULATING PROBLEMS AND THE FADING ROMANCE OF POWER POLITICS

4.1 The rocky road towards peace in the summer of 1946

4.1.1 Suspicions and cool emotions – the legacy of spring 1946 in the playing field of power politics

In addition to the Iranian crisis in the spring of 1946, much happened in world politics in the arena of international cooperation. The UN General Assembly in London in January, and the two meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four in April - July in Paris were aiming for permanent peace treaties. In Byrnes's opinion the greatest significance of the former was the centralization of the supervision of atomic energy to the UN, whilst the latter continued the rough-and-tumble of the London conference in the fall of 1945 on a ministerial level.⁶⁴⁸ In his report to President Truman, the Secretary of State reminded the President that the atomic age had significantly changed the status of the long-prepared Charter and required special attention for the Atomic Energy Commission. Success in this area was, according to Byrnes, due to the Moscow meeting in December, and its unilateral acceptance at the General Assembly was indicative of the willingness to collectively share the responsibility of this big issue.⁶⁴⁹

In his press conference on January 14, Byrnes emphasized that the vision of the nations that had ratified the UN Charter was not only limited to war-time cooperation. In the Secretary of State's view, it was the objective of all nations to stop the rise of tyranny and aggression by committing to each other. To Byrnes,

⁶⁴⁸ Byrnes 1947, pp. 123–124.

⁶⁴⁹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F2, The United States and the United Nations, Report of The United States Delegation to the First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly of The United Nations, London, England, January 10 - February 14. 1946, Letter of Transmission from the Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, to the President of the United States, 1.3.1946.

commitment meant defending peace whilst keeping in mind the realities of the world. In his typical manner he compared the relationships between nations to people:

The purpose of these nations which united in the defense of their freedom was not to escape, but to face the realities of the world in which we live. They recognized as the peace-loving nations failed to recognize after the last war that in this modern world nations like individuals cannot live unto themselves alone. They realized the lives and treasure which might have been saved if the free nations of the world had heeded in time the practical idealism of Woodrow Wilson, Lord Robert Cecil, Aristide Briand and Maxim Litvinov.⁶⁵⁰

Byrnes believed that the United Nations would be long-lived, as it “springs from the impelling necessities of the age in which we live”. As an institution the UN was a threat to no one and its objective was to take part in the resolution of conflicts without heeding the interests of any single party. Although according to Byrnes the only thing the United States had to fear was fear itself, taking part in the UN’s operations was also beneficial to the Americans. The Secretary of State considered the change in the isolationist way of thinking to be the most important contribution to the UN and called for The United States’ to take responsibility in the world:

Twenty-five years ago we in the United States were not fully aware of our responsibility. But with others, we have learned from experience. This time, both the United States Government and its people are deeply conscious of their responsibility. This time on their behalf I pledge full and wholehearted cooperation.⁶⁵¹

In his speech, the responsibility for atomic energy was instead shown in a collective light. By responding to the insinuations made in the fall of 1945 regarding an atomic weapons monopoly, Byrnes underlined that science was not the prerogative of any one nation alone. Like many other accomplishments in science, the development of atomic energy had been the result of inventions made in many different countries.⁶⁵²

Byrnes, who had traveled to the General Assembly in London only five days after the Moscow Conference, had set establishing international supervision for atomic energy as the official objective of the meeting, which had caused quite a stir in the United States. The US proposal already reaffirmed the importance of the safeguards mentioned in the final report on Moscow, which meant that the UN had only the ability to recommend the exchange of information. The US also had the right of veto in the Security Council on any recommendations that seemed to be a threat to its national security. Yet another back door remained, for even if the United States had accepted the Security Council’s recommendations on a possible information exchange, Congress would still have the authority to define the extent to which the information

⁶⁵⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B7:F5, Reading Copy of Speech By James F. Byrnes, Made January 14, 1946.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

⁶⁵² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B7:F5, Reading Copy of Speech By James F. Byrnes, Made January 14, 1946.

exchange would take place. In practice, the last clause concerning safeguards gave the United States wide berth in holding back all the information required to manufacture an atomic weapon. Nonetheless, consensus on transferring atomic energy to international supervision was reached easily in London.⁶⁵³

Right before the start of the London General Assembly it was expressed in public that the United States' purpose was not to hand over atomic secrets to be freely used by other nations. Senators Connally and Vandenberg, who had also traveled to London, were considered as a kind of assurance for US actions in London. In his article in *The New York Times* on January 9, James B. Reston projected that Byrnes would make good use of the Senators when establishing the kind of framework desired by the US for the Atomic Energy Commission:

It is understood that Mr. Byrnes not only reassured the Senators that the United States would not give away any secrets about the atomic bomb until an effective international policy for controlling it had been reached and approved by the United States but offered to make clear to the United Nations Assembly, which meets here Thursday, that our security must be preserved at all stages.⁶⁵⁴

Notoriously, both Connally and Vandenberg had considered an open atomic energy policy to be dangerous, which had resulted in the incident at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prior to the Moscow Conference. Byrnes wanted to express in public, both for Truman and the Republican Senators, that no disagreement existed with regard to atomic energy. *The New York Times* called his bluff:

As a result of last night's agreement, it can be stated that the United Nations Assembly will be told that its Atomic Energy commission will not have authority to get any information about the manufacturing processes of the bomb or any other information that is not fully protected by a foolproof international guarantee. The urgency with which the Secretary of State got to work on this problem with the two Senators was in direct contrast to the attitude he took when he first arrived in President Truman's private plane. His attitude then was that he had heard nothing officially about any complaints by Senator Vandenberg, that he had received no protest from the Michigan Senator - though one was radioed to the State Department by the delegation officials last Saturday - and that, anyway, if there was any difficulty, he was sure that he could soon straighten it out.⁶⁵⁵

In Byrnes's opinion, outside the issue of atomic energy, the London General Assembly of the UN was plagued by the same issues that had dampened the atmosphere in Moscow. Although Byrnes had by his tactics driven the entire Council of Foreign Ministers to postpone problematic issues, his astonishment at the lame atmosphere of cooperation seems peculiar. Only less than a week after the Moscow Conference, Byrnes thought it to be concerning that no development had happened in the reorganization of the Groza government of Romania, that nothing had been done to broaden the base of the government in

⁶⁵³ Curry 1965, pp. 191–192.

⁶⁵⁴ *The New York Times* 9.1.1946. James B. Reston "Byrnes Unifies Delegation; Senators in Accord on Bomb".

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

Bulgaria and that the Iranian issue was becoming more acute.⁶⁵⁶ Surprisingly, Byrnes's concern showed similar traits as Truman's pastoral letter to Byrnes which became public seven years later. Byrnes never admitted to receiving this letter. In the beginning of February, the media began to suspect a rift between the White House and the State Department. Neither party leaked anything to the public about the conflict.⁶⁵⁷ Whatever the truth about the letter may be, during the spring of 1946 Byrnes's actions began to exhibit seriousness beyond mere concern towards the actions of the Soviet Union and perhaps even a compulsion to stop pampering the Russians. This phenomenon is strengthened by the development of US public opinion.⁶⁵⁸

The US becoming more active in regard to the development of Eastern Europe⁶⁵⁹ was evident in increasing correspondence in February - March 1946 and in the sharpening of more clearly defined conditions for the recognition of governments. In January, Byrnes had had the opportunity to discuss the Bulgarian and Romanian election issues with Vyshinski at the UN General Assembly in London. The Secretary of State wrote to Ethridge that he was convinced of the Russians consensus to adhere to what was agreed on in Moscow, and that recognizing the Romanian government would become possible in the near future. The situation in Bulgaria he thought to be much more complex and unsatisfactory, for Stalin had stated in Moscow that he could affect the organizing of the election by giving "nothing more than friendly advice". In his own words, Vyshinski had acted according to Stalin's instructions by choosing two members of the countries opposition parties to participate in the government, but the US government's representative to Bulgaria, Mr. Maynard Barnes, had urged the opposition parties to not participate.⁶⁶⁰

In a letter sent by Byrnes to the Romanian government on January 5, the election issue, which remained unresolved, was condemned but at the same time other conditions set for the recognition of the Groza government were expressed in detail.⁶⁶¹ The United States' political activity towards Bulgaria was defined by the desire to interpret the decision of the Moscow Conference on the composition of the government to mean that the position of the opposition parties was contrary to the decision. In correspondence between Byrnes and the Soviet Union's Chargé d'affaires Nikolay Novikov, the latter not only accused Maynard Barnes of the systematic incitement of the Bulgarian opposition

⁶⁵⁶ Byrnes 1947, pp. 123–124.

⁶⁵⁷ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F7, Memorandum of The Press and Radio News Conference, Friday, February 1, 1946.

⁶⁵⁸ Americans attitude to Soviet's ability to co-operate e.g. FIGURE 1.

⁶⁵⁹ See for example: Wegs 1977, pp. 35–37.

⁶⁶⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F7, From Byrnes to Ethridge, 29.1.1946.

⁶⁶¹ DAFR 1945–1946. Exchange of Notes Between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania (Tatarescu [Tătărescu]) and the United States Political Representative for Romania (Berry) on Recognition of Government of Rumania. Department of State Press Release, February 15, 1946. Volume VIII, pp. 339–340; Ibid. Statement by the Secretary of State (Byrnes). Department of State Press Release, August 22, 1945. Volume VIII, pp. 335–337; Ibid. Recognition of Government of Romania. Department of State Press Release, February 5, 1946.

against the decision made by the Big Three, but also sought to impose new conditions for joining the Bulgarian government which had not been supported in Moscow. According to information received by Ethridge, Barnes had specifically emphasized that the opposition groups opting out of the government would be their decision, and furthermore he could not, in the name of the United States, request the delay of the assembling of the government any longer. With Byrnes demanding the spirit of cooperation in the interpretation of the Moscow decision it was clear that the Soviet Union's inflexibility in questions of interpretation would not be tolerated even by the United States, unlike some other cases were. However, both Ethridge's report and the situation in Bulgaria pleased Byrnes more than the situation in Romania.⁶⁶²

In the United States, suspicions about Soviet interests were increased by a speech given by Stalin in Moscow on February 9 in which he interpreted capitalism to be the cause for all wars. Both the First and Second World Wars were, according to him, the result of the development of economic and political powers based on monopoly-capitalism. Capitalist nations with scarce natural resources typically sought to change their financial predicament by the redistribution of spheres of influence, which was executed by using military force. Although Stalin presented his Marxist theory on the nature of world capitalism as one that from time to time leads to financial crises and military conflicts, at the same time he showed respect towards the Allies. Stalin spoke of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union as an anti-fascist coalition, by which he was referring to the nature of the Second World War as anti-fascist, liberating and restoring democratic rights.⁶⁶³

The United States did not react to Stalin's speech until February 22, when the State Department received a report analyzing the Soviet Union's actions prepared by George Kennan, the US Chargé d'affaires for the Soviet Union. Kennan felt that Soviet intentions required extensive discussion, which the 5500-word telegraphed report attempted to do. Kennan examined the Soviet Union as a part of a historical continuum, which involved a clear ideological objective. The report clearly shows the effect of Stalin's speech. Stalin's views on the conflict-seeking nature of the capitalist world and of the inferiority of the bourgeois-capitalist society formed Kennan's premises, based on which he presented his opinions of the Soviet Union's objectives. Based on Kennan's premises, the Soviet Union sought to maximally exploit the post-war state of world politics, which also meant exploiting "democratic-progressive elements" overseas. By the exploitation of democratic-progressive elements, Kennan was referring to measures with which capitalist nations could be pressured into

⁶⁶² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F7, From Ethridge to Byrnes, 1.2.1946; DAFR 1945-1946. Aide-Mémoire Delivered by Counselor of the Department of State (Cohen) to the Representative of Bulgaria in Washington (Stoichew [Stoychev]), February 22, 1946. Volume VIII, pp. 319-322; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F7, Memorandum of The Press and Radio News Conference, 8.2.1946.

⁶⁶³ Stalin 1950, pp. 19-44.

better conforming to Soviet interests. On the other hand, the United States was on the warpath against foreign socialist and social-democratic heads of state.⁶⁶⁴

In his lengthy telegraph, Kennan stated however, that the data he had collected did not represent the views of the Soviet people, and that the co-existence of capitalism and socialism was not impossible, even when examined from a historical perspective. Instead, it was a question of the “Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs”, which manifested itself as a hereditary and instinctive feeling of insecurity. According to Kennan’s analysis, the Russians’ sense of insecurity was cloaked in factitious psychological explanations instead of in a cultural inability to combat the political systems of the Western countries. The Soviet Union’s talk on security was, as exhibited by Kennan, based on the Russians’ historical fear of facing the Western world, and to prevent this they were waging a war without compromise. When attached to this foundation, international Marxism posed a serious threat. Kennan reiterated, however, that the Soviet Union remained weaker than the entire Western world put together. Restricting the Soviet Union’s activities was a question of maintaining the unity of the Western world in its sphere of influence. Because of this, the United States could in Kennan’s view regard the Soviet Union “calmly and with good heart”. As recommendations for action, Kennan advised that the State Department increase Americans’ knowledge of the Soviet Union and publically disclose any conflicts in power politics even at the risk of a negative impact on the US-Soviet relationship. Much attention was to be paid to American society, which was to be protected from the “malignant parasite” of Communism. Kennan considered overcoming domestic disagreements in the United States as a diplomatic loss for Moscow. He also emphasized the dissemination of the American ideal world overseas, where Kennan thought the Americans would succeed better than the Soviet Union.⁶⁶⁵

Interest towards foreign policy seems to have grown in Congress in the spring of 1946, especially among Republicans. March seems to have been an important landmark in this respect, and became the most critical month in power politics at least from the perspective of the Iranian crisis and the policy speeches, which gained a significant role. After returning from the first Assembly of the United Nations in London, Byrnes defined US policy in a speech given in New York at the Overseas Press Club dinner on the last day of February:

The common goal of victory served to unite us and to give purpose and direction to our efforts. Now that we have come into calmer waters, our relief and gratitude are

⁶⁶⁴ Kennan had reported to Byrnes on Stalin’s speech already on February 12. However, he did not correlate the ideological contents of the speech with the wider historical background until a telegram he sent on February 22. FRUS 1946. Volume VI. 861.00/2 - 1246: Telegram. The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State. Moscow, February 12, 1946, 3 p.m. (Received 4:58 p.m.). pp. 694–696.

⁶⁶⁵ FRUS 1946. Volume VI. 861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram. The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State. Moscow, February 22, 1946, 9 p.m. (Received February 22-3:52 p.m.). pp. 696–709.

mixed with uncertainty. Our goal now is permanent peace, and surely we seek it even more anxiously than we sought victory.⁶⁶⁶

The beginning of 1946 was, above all, a time for the stabilization, organization and normalization of superpower relationships. The spring, which brought to a head the Iranian crisis, produced some noteworthy comments. The first steps of the United Nations focused on bringing atomic energy under international supervision. Likewise, the Council of Foreign Ministers institution, contrived a year earlier, aimed for complete peace treaties in the meetings of the Big Four, held in Paris in April-July. Conversely, inter-American relationships, emphasized by Byrnes in the fall, began to crack when Juan Perón won the Argentinean presidential election, held on February 24. From the perspective of a positive solution to the Iranian crisis, the Americans also had to review the situation “in their own back yard” and to re-examine the definitions of inter-American affairs. In order for the United States to rightly interfere in the Soviet Union’s activities performed in the name of security policy in Iran, the Americans had to pay attention to their own “security zones”.

What especially demanded re-interpretation was the speech Byrnes held at the Herald-Tribune Forum at the end of October 1945, where he had spoken about both power politics and spheres of influence as well as about the exemplary nature of inter-American relationships for the rest of the world. In the beginning of April, Byrnes gave a public account of the consultation on the Argentinean situation, which had been conducted in October in the name of the inter-American system, assuring the public that it had not been hostile in nature. According to the Secretary of State, the memorandum on the political development of Argentina, which came to be known as the Blue Book, was only the “desire of the United States to strengthen the friendly relationships between the people of the United States and the people of Argentina”.⁶⁶⁷

While we adhere to the policy of non-intervention, we assert that knowledge of what other people are thinking and doing brings understanding; and understanding brings tolerance and a willingness to cooperate in the adjustment of differences. The policy of non-intervention in internal affairs does not mean the approval of local tyranny. Our policy is intended to protect the right of our neighbors to develop their freedom in their own way. It is not intended to give them free rein to plot against the freedom of others.⁶⁶⁸

According to Acheson’s memoirs, the Secretary’s comments did not warm the diplomatic atmosphere. In the State Department’s opinion, the inter-American consultation had produced completely cohesive views on “the changed position, resulting from the recent election” in Argentina, although responses for the consultation were received from only half of the American nations.

⁶⁶⁶ CR. Stop the Appeasement Policy Toward Communism, Remarks of Hon. John E. Rankin of Mississippi in The House of Representatives, Friday, March 1, 1946. Congressional Records 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. A1056–A1058.

⁶⁶⁷ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F13, Department of State, For The Press, April 8, 1946, No. 232.

⁶⁶⁸ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F13, Department of State, For The Press, April 8, 1946, No. 232.

According to a State Department communiqué, all governments concurred with the principles presented by the United States on the indivisibility of the unity of the peoples of America. The security of the hemisphere was mentioned as the most important objective, which was based on the inter-American cooperation agreement, the Mutual Assistance Treaty, and on the Chapultepec Statute, which had been agreed on by 21 American nations. In order to guarantee these principles also in Argentina, a gentle ultimatum was made, the nature of which returned the conversation to raw power politics and spheres of influence. "While it is not clear that the election will remove the conditions which prompted the Government of the United States to initiate a consultation on the Argentine situation, the Government of the United States does not believe that the people of Argentina intended to approve the continuance of conditions which would threaten the safety of the inter-American system" On the other hand, at the end of May in a hearing of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Byrnes emphasized the significance of the UN as a replacement for inter-American defense cooperation.⁶⁶⁹

When thought of in a Vonclausewitz manner, the almost-ready new world order and normalization led to an imperative to return from the procedures of war back to politics. During the spring of 1946, interest towards foreign policy seems to have grown in the US Congress, especially among Republicans. When interpreting the world situation, Byrnes considered the first operational year of the United Nations to be a good indication of an open policy:

I should be lacking in candor if I said to you that world conditions today are sound or reassuring. All around us there is suspicion and distrust, which in turn breeds suspicion and distrust. Some suspicions are unfounded and unreasonable. Of some others, that cannot be said. That requires frank discussion between great powers of the things that give rise to suspicion. At the Moscow Conference there was such frank discussion. It was helpful. But the basis of some suspicions persists and prompts me to make some comments as to our position.... We have openly, gladly and wholeheartedly welcomed our Soviet ally as a great power, second to none in the family of the United Nations. We have approved many adjustments in her favor, and in the process resolved many serious doubts in her favor. Only an inexcusable tragedy of errors could cause serious conflict between us in the future. Despite the differences in our way of life, our people admire and respect our allies and wish to continue to be friends and partners in a world of expanding freedom and rising standards of living.⁶⁷⁰

Although in his speech Byrnes did not believe in a future war between superpowers, the issue was publicly raised for the first time as a possibility:

I am convinced that there is no reason for war between any of the great powers. Their present power relationships and interests are such that none need or should feel insecure in relation to the others as long as each faithfully observes the purposes

⁶⁶⁹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F13, Department of State, For The Press, April 8, 1946, No. 232; BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F18, Statement Made By The Secretary of State At Hearings Before The House Foreign Affairs Committee On H.R: 6326, May 29, 1946, No. 367.

⁶⁷⁰ CR. Stop the Appeasement Policy Toward Communism, Remarks of Hon. John E. Rankin of Mississippi in The House of Representatives, Friday, March 1, 1946. Congressional Records 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. A1056-A1058.

and principles of the Charter.... To banish war, nations must refrain from doing the things that lead to war. It has never been policy of the United States in its internal affairs or in its foreign relations to regard the status quo as sacrosanct.... It is not in our tradition to defend the dead hand of reaction or the tyranny of privilege.... We must not conduct a war of nerves to achieve strategic ends.⁶⁷¹

Byrnes's openness and the nature of the speech as an enlightener of public opinion were well received. The speech was meant to convince Americans about the possibility of foreign policy being something other than mere rhetoric. The speech was also seen to have severed the tradition of US foreign policy reacting to situations too late. What Byrnes said in his speech did not startle as much as the way it was delivered. Byrnes's performance was even compared to President Roosevelt.⁶⁷² Arthur Capper, a Republican Senator from Kansas, praised the Secretary of State's views on the Soviet Union and felt that he had reflected the sentiments of the majority of Americans.⁶⁷³ L.S. Rowe, the leader of the Pan American Union also drew attention to Byrnes's ability to enlighten public opinion about existing issues.⁶⁷⁴

John. E Rankin, an ultra-conservative Congressman from Mississippi, used the speech as a debate opener in the House of Representatives. Referring to the statements made by Arthur Vandenberg and Byrnes, he was convinced that the "appeasement of Communism is getting America nowhere except into trouble". Rankin was also ahead of his time in his anti-communist sentiments:

The American People are behind them in this attitude and are demanding that they stiffen up, go forward with it, and let the world know that we mean what we say, and that we do not propose to have our country undermined and destroyed. I am going to suggest to Secretary Byrnes that he not only stop appeasement abroad but that he begin to clean out his own department and every other department that has these Marxist Communist on the Federal payroll. Let us help to maintain peace among the nations of the earth. But at the same time let us see that our country is protected at home and respected abroad.⁶⁷⁵

Other strong anti-communist statements were revealed in the beginning of March. The most power-politically peculiar of those was a speech given by Winston Churchill in Fulton on March 5 called "Sinews of Peace". According to the speech, Eastern Europe had diverged into the power sphere of the Soviet Union, separated by the Iron Curtain. In the somewhat unusual position of

⁶⁷¹ Byrnes's speech was attached to the remarks as a suggestion of Representative John E. Rankin. CR. Stop the Appeasement Policy Toward Communism, Remarks of Hon. John E. Rankin of Mississippi in The House of Representatives, Friday, March 1, 1946. Congressional Records 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. A1056-A1058.

⁶⁷² BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F9, From L.S. Rowe to Byrnes, 1.3.1946; BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F9, From Alfred A. Knopf to Byrnes, 1.3.1946; BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F9, From Jack O'Connor to Byrnes, 28.2.1946.

⁶⁷³ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F9, From Arthur Capper to Byrnes, 1.3.1946.

⁶⁷⁴ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F10, From Rowe to Byrnes 1.3.1946.

⁶⁷⁵ CR. Stop the Appeasement Policy Toward Communism, Remarks of Hon. John E. Rankin of Mississippi in The House of Representatives, Friday, March 1, 1946. Congressional Records 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. A1056-A1058. Rankin's view reminds one a lot of the communist persecutions which started in 1950s by Joseph McCarthy.

opposition leader, Churchill disclosed his fears about the spread of Communism and demanded that atomic secrets be kept outside of the international system, which was still being developed. As in Byrnes's Overseas speech, he rejected the possibility of another war, but restated that the power to save the future still rested in the hands of the Allies. In Churchill's view, the Soviet Union's activities conducted in the name of security policy reflected the exact fruits of war that the Russians strived for; the endless expansion of power and the spreading of doctrine.⁶⁷⁶

Molotov was not happy with Churchill's speech and stated to Byrnes that he had become a victim of an "anti-Soviet campaign".⁶⁷⁷ The speech was a clear response to the Soviet Union's earlier activities and required brotherly cooperation from Britain and the United States against the Soviet Union.⁶⁷⁸ Byrnes evidently knew of Churchill's speech beforehand, as the Secretary of State was set to meet with Churchill and Bernard Baruch in Miami. In public however, Byrnes wanted to remain outside the unpopular opinions on power politics expressed in the speech. In the American press, the speech at Fulton was interpreted to have defended Anglo-American military cooperation and to have demanded the development of a Western bloc to counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union. When asked about the State Department's view on blocs and spheres of influence, Byrnes remarked that he had said all he was going to say on the topic in his speech at the New York Herald-Tribune Forum at the Waldorf Hotel in October 1945. Most critical of Churchill's speech was Wallace, who wanted to remind Americans to be grateful to the Soviet Union. According to him, supporting Churchill would signal the strengthening of Anglo-American cooperation in the area of atomic energy policy, which would lead to deep tragedy before long.⁶⁷⁹

In Kennan's estimate, Western criticisms towards the Fulton speech put a damper on the Soviet Union's desire to criticize the speech publicly. The discussion conducted in the aftermath of the speech was a signal to the Soviet leadership of the inability of Western democracies to form a common front against the Soviet bloc. Only in Stalin's interview which was published in the Soviet press on March 14 was an irritation towards Churchill's views discernable. Nevertheless, the Fulton speech had been quoted in the Soviet press only when applicable and by no means as a whole. In his report to Byrnes, Kennan considered it a good thing that Churchill's speech coincided with the Soviet Union's aggressive actions in the Iranian issue. According to Kennan's view, it was possible to use the speech to show the Soviet people the correlation between these two events and to signal that the changes in superpower

⁶⁷⁶ Kishlansky 1995, pp. 298–299.

⁶⁷⁷ Byrnes 1947, p. 126.

⁶⁷⁸ In the Security Council of the United Nations, the Soviet Union had intimidated the British and the French into negotiating for immediate withdrawal of their troops from Syria and Lebanon. In addition, power politics was afflicted by the Italian border question and Soviet actions in Iran.

⁶⁷⁹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F7, Memorandum of The Press and Radio News Conference, February 15, 1946; Culver & Hyde 2000, p. 414.

relationships were the result of the “arrogant and unnecessary policies of the Soviet regime”.⁶⁸⁰

The change from a consensus policy to a stricter Soviet policy was expedited by both the rift between Truman and Byrnes following the Moscow Conference and public opinion, which Truman was increasingly interested in. At the end of the war, the American Institute of Public Opinion had measured that 54 percent of Americans had confidence in the cooperation with the Russians, which after the London Conference of Foreign Ministers declined to 44 percent. In February, the corresponding figure was 35 percent.⁶⁸¹

After Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech and Byrnes’s Overseas speech in March, as many as 71 percent of Americans did not accept the Soviet Union’s foreign policy and 60 percent considered the US policy on the Soviet Union to be too soft.⁶⁸² Generally, US policy was considered leftist by 44 percent in February, when six months earlier that figure had been only 10 percent. Following party lines, foreign policy was considered leftist by Republicans (63 percent) and Democrats (30 percent).⁶⁸³ The public’s opinion in the spring of 1946 may have been more valuable than usual due to the impending Congressional election, especially since the Republicans, particularly Dulles, had used Byrnes’s consensus policy as a striking weapon in the elections. US foreign policy has been seen to have reacted to the rapid change in public opinion surprisingly swiftly, and Truman particularly insisted on a tougher stance. However, the picture given by Byrnes does not support the former view of a significant change in policy, as Byrnes generally thought he had always been building the “People’s Foreign Policy”.⁶⁸⁴ However, out of the public eye Byrnes was under great stress. He had told his close friend Walter Brown that his work at the State Department was getting him down. According to Brown, Byrnes had said that he “did not know how long he could stand the pressure.”⁶⁸⁵

Winston Churchill’s speech at Fulton seems to have had more of an effect on public opinion in the US than on US foreign policy. As a concept, the Iron Curtain became a part of the political glossary and the Americans’ confidence in the Russians dipped considerably. In addition to Byrnes, Truman was also well aware of the content of Churchill’s speech beforehand, but refused to comment on it. Contrary to what public opinion indicated, Churchill’s speech was met with negativity in the press. Generally, the press reflected the critical views of Wallace, according to which the talk about blocs would only expedite the birth of a new conflict. Walter Lippmann, who was reportedly a supporter of Wallace, but did not directly take part in the debate about Churchill’s speech,

⁶⁸⁰ FRUS 1946. Volume VI. 741.61/3 – 1446: Telegram. The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State. Moscow, March 14, 1946, 4 p.m. (Received 6:20 p.m.). pp. 716–717.

⁶⁸¹ Ward 1979, p. 78.

⁶⁸² Ibid.

⁶⁸³ The Quarter’s Polls. AIPO Feb. 4, ‘46, Public Opinion Quarterly, vol 10, issue 1, (spring 1946), p. 112.

⁶⁸⁴ Byrnes 1947, pp. 233–234.

⁶⁸⁵ Brown 1992, p. 345.

also affected the view of the press. In the State Department, particularly Acheson regarded Wallace's views critically, but Byrnes sought to distance himself from the matter. On the other hand, there was no need for a reaction, as Churchill had spoken more as a private person than as a representative of Britain, and even in his own words he only spoke for himself. Although on a level of principle Churchill's views were not in line with the plans Byrnes had made in Moscow regarding atomic energy, according to Ward even Byrnes was forced to consider a tougher stance.⁶⁸⁶

However, adopting a hard line was not supported by the report prepared by a working group in March in Dumbarton Oaks led by Under Secretary of State Acheson, according to which the supranational authority supervising atomic energy would prevent the manufacturing of atomic bombs. This monopoly of dangerous activities by an international authority would still leave a large and tremendously productive field of safe activities open to individual nations, their industries, and their universities. The Acheson-Lilienthal⁶⁸⁷ plan would have established an international authority to control the extraction, refinement, and use of atomic materials. Added to that, plants would be made difficult to convert to military use and would be scattered so that no single nation could gain a dominant position. Especially Bernard Baruch was set against the Acheson-Lilienthal report and he favored the efficient use of the atomic monopoly for as long as possible. According to George C. Herring, by appointing Baruch to head atomic negotiations, Truman "sealed the demise of nuclear internationalism".⁶⁸⁸ Acheson marked Baruch as a ruthless businessman, who had made good use of his wealth for the satisfaction of his political goals. According to Acheson's memoirs, Byrnes and Truman had fallen under Baruch's manipulation as well. In June, Truman sent Baruch a statement of the United States' policy with reference to atomic energy. He reminded him that the statement was general in character, because Truman wanted Baruch "to have authority to exercise your judgment as to the method by which the stated objectives can be accomplished". The disputes focused on the means of punishment outlined in the plan and the impacts of the power of veto in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.⁶⁸⁹

⁶⁸⁶ Culver & Hyde 2000, pp. 412-414; Leitzinger 2003, pp. 203-205; Ward 1979, p. 82.

⁶⁸⁷ David Lilienthal was the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee (AEC) and the head of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

⁶⁸⁸ Herring 2008, p. 607.

⁶⁸⁹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F8, Memorandum for Mr. Baruch, June 7, 1946; State Acheson 1987, pp. 151-156. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) was a United States congressional committee that was tasked with exclusive jurisdiction over "all bills, resolutions, and other matters" related to civilian and military aspects of nuclear power. It was established by the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and was the overseer of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). JCAE was one of the most powerful congressional committees in U.S. history because it was the only permanent joint committee in modern times to have legislative authority. The panel coupled these legislative powers with exclusive access to the information upon which its highly secretive deliberations were based. The joint committee was also entitled by statute to be kept "fully and currently informed" of all commission activities and vigorously exercised that statutory right, demanding information and attention from the executive branch in a fashion that

In public, the events of spring 1946 and the Iranian crisis carried the weight Byrnes had hoped for. A more realistic Soviet policy seemed to have been drawn in the media. *The New York Times* headlined an article interpreting the direction of foreign policy in early March: "A more realistic basis for Russian relations". According to the paper, the strong comments made in the spring had "confounded the parlor pinks" and that it was "time for an end to the idea that it is wrong to criticize Russia and to stand up to Russia". This was clearly a response to the views of the *Daily Worker*, in which the tendency named as the Truman-Byrnes-Vandenberg-Course referred to "an ominous agreements to launch the United States on a course of world domination".⁶⁹⁰ A strict policy did not mean the impossibility of working with the Soviet Union, but rather seemed like the only way to play power politics by the Soviet Union's own rules. In this regard, the quid pro quo policy seems to have had the strong support of the press.

And as for the Russian desire to have in the control of the Mediterranean we may have to decide what we desire there. The Russians wish a unique trusteeship in Tripolitania. Britain is opposed to that and Washington has said it is opposed. Here is a matter in which diplomacy may be able to function since the Russians have got armies on the spot. And there is perhaps room for settlement by giving the Russians a preferred position in the Dardanelles. There are the elements for a bargain with Russia.⁶⁹¹

In terms of power-political tension, the spring of 1946 was unparalleled. The tensions were most evident on the level of power-political rhetoric. A speech given by Stalin in February, which referred to the Soviet Union's growing military industry, can be seen as the start of this chain. Both Byrnes's Overseas speech and Churchill's speech at Fulton were clear Western responses to Stalin's innuendo. On a practical level the Soviet Union had had established its buffer zone between its own territories and Western Europe. Communist forces also played a significant role in both China and Greece in inciting civil war. On the other hand, the United States had granted Britain a low-interest loan of 3.75 billion dollars, completely overlooking the Soviet Union's earlier requests for a six billion dollar handout. At the same time the Americans had also strengthened their own security status by establishing military bases in Iceland, Greenland, the Aleutian Islands and Okinawa, which may have seemed to the Soviet Union like they were being besieged. In addition to the Iranian crisis, the US-Soviet relationship further deteriorated with the discovery of a communist espionage group in Canada.⁶⁹²

However, the articulation of ideological and power-political discourse which was started by Stalin's speech did not expand to public comments or

arguably has no equivalent today. One major power wielded by the JCAE was the "legislative veto." This unique power enabled the JCAE to influence policy decisions while matters were pending.

⁶⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, 3.3.1946. Edwin L. James "A More Realistic Basis for Russian Relations". *The New York Times'* citations from *Daily Worker*.

⁶⁹¹ *The New York Times*, 3.3.1946. Edwin L. James "A More Realistic Basis for Russian Relations".

⁶⁹² Culver & Hyde 2000, p. 412.

addresses at the Council of Foreign Ministers. Stalin's speech raised more concerns in the quarters of foreign policy which would otherwise have regarded Communism skeptically. These included particularly Kennan, who followed the Soviet Union's activities from a front row seat. Dean Acheson's interpretation in his memoirs of Stalin's willful offensive towards the United States and the West in general seems warranted only from the perspective of the early 1950s, when the Korean War and the "hate America campaign" can be considered as manifestations of Stalin's speech.⁶⁹³

4.1.2 The Paris Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers – Italian issues as black spots of power politics

Byrnes truly got to exercise the people's foreign policy in the two conferences of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris in during April-July 1946. In Moscow, the parties had agreed ceremoniously that the peace Conference would be organized as soon as the draft peace treaties were completed and before the start of May. Officially, these conferences have been considered as one whole conference, simply divided into two different sessions. As recorded in the documents, the Paris Conference was therefore the second official Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers, as the Moscow meeting in December was not – at least in the thinking of the US State Department- considered a part of the Council of Foreign Ministers.⁶⁹⁴ Senators Tom Connally and Arthur H. Vandenberg,⁶⁹⁵ who were critical of Soviet policy, were sent to Paris to check up on Byrnes. Both Senators were particularly concerned about the growth of Soviet influence and especially about the transfer of atomic energy secrets to others. Both carried special weight in foreign policy as members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Connally the Democrat acting as its chairman and Vandenberg, the Senator from Michigan, acting as the foreign policy spokesperson of the Republican Party.

Not starting the Conference until the end of April was clearly caused by Byrnes's desire to resolve the Iranian crisis first. On the one hand using the Iranian crisis as a quid pro quo trade-in was thus avoided, but at the same time it made it impossible to start the peace conference by the first of May as agreed in Moscow.⁶⁹⁶ At Byrnes's initiative the proposal put forward by France's Bidault, who was chairing the Conference, regarding the Big Four participating in the drafting of the peace treaties of Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland was surprisingly widely supported.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹³ Acheson 1987, pp. 194–195.

⁶⁹⁴ FRUS 1946. Introduction. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, V–VII.

⁶⁹⁵ FRUS 1946. Members of Delegations to the Second Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, April 25–May 15 and June 15–July 12, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 88–90.

⁶⁹⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B1:F8. Confidential release for publication at 10:00 P.M., E.S.T., Sunday, December 30, 1945.

⁶⁹⁷ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, First Meeting, Paris, April 25, 1946, 5. p. m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 94–96.

This formerly problematic issue for the Soviet Union was included in item 4 of the proposal prepared by the officials working in London.⁶⁹⁸ According to the minutes of the US State Department, the proposal was accepted without amendments with Molotov's support. This was quite a change, as including France had become a threshold question at the London Conference and had now been resolved with the surprising acquiescence of the Soviet Union.⁶⁹⁹ In a telegraph to Truman, Byrnes considered Molotov's attitude to be evidence of "a striking withdrawal from the Soviet position at the September Council meeting".⁷⁰⁰ According to the general explanation, the Soviet Union did not want to adhere to its former position primarily to guarantee the success of the French Communist Party in future elections.⁷⁰¹

This possibility was discussed in a roundabout way in the informal meeting between Byrnes and Bidault on May 1. According to the memorandum on the discussion, Bidault had been very optimistic about the elections and estimated that the support for the Communist Party had remained steady. However, Bidault thought that support for the Communist Party would start to decline only upon "finding Cossack on the Place de la Concorde". At the same time Byrnes enquired into Bidault's opinion on the effects on the election of the loan that was being considered for France. Bidault thought the effects of the loan would be positive, if it was announced in time. That same day President Truman authorized Under Secretary of State William Clayton to take action on arranging the loan.⁷⁰²

The atmosphere of the Paris Conference was undeniably affected by the Iranian crisis which was brewing in the background, and which had been turned over to be decided by public opinion and the Security Council. As part of the discussions on the proposal for the Italian peace treaty, territorial questions, and especially the fate of the Italian colonies, was hotly contested. Lurking in the background was a proposal drafted by the Americans in

⁶⁹⁸ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2065 : Deputies Documents, Proposal by the French Representative to the Conference of Deputies of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, 18 April, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 79-80.

⁶⁹⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 124.

⁷⁰⁰ In his telegram on April 25, 1946 Byrnes reported to Truman: "Soviet representative [Molotov] stated that he agreed to paragraph four of proposed rules of procedure, under which French were permitted to participate in discussions even about Balkan and Finnish treaties on which they are not allowed to vote, although he considered this an exception to previous practice. This was in fact a striking withdrawal from Soviet position at September Council meeting". FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, First Meeting, Paris, April 25, 1946, 5. p. m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, p. 96 footnote. In his memoirs, Byrnes considered this as a limit of Molotov's amenability. Byrnes 1947, p. 124.

⁷⁰¹ Ward 1979, p. 90.

⁷⁰² FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews), Paris, May 1, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 203-206. Stated Department Director in Office of European Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews participated in discussion as well. William Clayton had a notable role in foreign policy and economics and he acted as an assistant secretary in charge of economic affairs.

September that suggested placing the Italian colonies in Africa under the trusteeship of the United Nations.⁷⁰³ Bidault announced that France would support the United States' proposal, but alternatively proposed a model of governance under both Italy and the UN. Molotov thought the proposal to be good in theory, and suggested that the colonies be directly divided with Italy and an Allied country considering the joint trusteeship of Tripolitania possible between the Soviet Union and Italy.⁷⁰⁴

Molotov's proposal provoked a counter-proposal from Britain, suggesting that all Libyan territories would be granted independence, including Tripolitania and Kyrenaica. When the official stance of the United States still preferred the trusteeship under the UN, all parties found themselves in the cross-pressure of differing objectives. Surprising sympathies were formed, when France, who was previously left out by the Soviet Union, joined forces with them in opposing the British proposal. The United States would have ultimately agreed on some form of bilateral trusteeship in the colonies, but only with assurances that the colonies would gain independence in the next ten years. With the French being opposed to this condition, the United States remained on the side of collective governance.⁷⁰⁵

Doubts about the future independence of the former Italian colonies were voiced by Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone of the US Navy, who in a memorandum sent to Truman thought it likely that these territories would gradually slide under the influence of either Britain or the Soviet Union. Moreover, he thought the possible support of the Italian Communist Party for the demands of the Soviet Union would weaken its position in Italy to such an extent that they would not want to risk the extraction of Tripolitania from Italy. According to Stone's memorandum, the best alternative would be to return all colonies Italy had acquired prior to the fascist era as they were.⁷⁰⁶

The French demonstrated their ability to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the Italian-Yugoslavian border issue as well. The French suggested a compromise by drawing the border between the US- British and the Soviet-Yugoslavian models. However, the proposal did not receive support as it stranded 130,000 Italians in Yugoslavia and 115,000 Yugoslavians in Italy. The Soviet representatives continued to be the only ones to support the transfer of Trieste to Yugoslavia, justifying their proposal by the military-strategic location

⁷⁰³ FRUS 1945. Suggested Directive from the Council of Foreign Ministers to Govern Them in the Drafting of a Treaty of Peace with Italy, Memorandum by the United States Delegation, C. F. M. (45) 16, September 14, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 179.

⁷⁰⁴ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Fourth Meeting, April 29, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 155-163.

⁷⁰⁵ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Third Informal Meeting, Paris, May 10, 1946, 5 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 333-341. See also: Byrnes 1947, p. 127.

⁷⁰⁶ FRUS 1946. Rear Admiral, Chief of the Allied Military Government in Italy, Ellery W. Stone's memorandum for President Truman. Volume IV, Paris Peace Conference: Documents, pp. 77-78.

of the city. According to Byrnes, transferring the 300,000-inhabitant city of Trieste to Yugoslavia was not justified and he was ready to consider a compromise like the French suggestion. Instead of Trieste, Byrnes suggested that the valuable coalmines of Arsa would be transferred to Yugoslavia. However, Molotov, Bevin and Bidault did not agree with the proposal, and even Byrnes did not want to go any further in his concessions.⁷⁰⁷

Although the Soviet representatives had consistently adhered to their strict demands on Italian reparations of 300 million US dollars for the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania, in a discussion that took place in Molotov's hotel suite⁷⁰⁸ after dinner on May 5, Molotov announced to Byrnes that the Soviet Union would be willing to reconsider the question of reparations and its earlier demands regarding Italian colonies if the Italian-Yugoslavian border issue would be resolved for Yugoslavia and Trieste would become a part of it. Nonetheless, Byrnes stated that 100 million dollars would be a reasonable amount of reparations and also the final sum which the Soviet Union would be offered. Byrnes understood Molotov to be proposing a trade to which he did not want to agree.⁷⁰⁹

Both Molotov and Andrey Vyshinsky, who had been an active participant in the discussion, were perceptibly disappointed at Byrnes's reluctance to engage in bartering politics. By referring to the presence of the US army in Northern China and the possible military base in Iceland, Vyshinsky dubbed Byrnes's obstinacy as a "policy of imperialist expansion". Molotov considered the US desire to obtain military bases in Turkey, Egypt and Iran as "expansionist plans in customary style to "imperialist circles" in the US, which had a strong influence on US policy".⁷¹⁰ The information submitted by Byrnes on the 720-man strong service unit in Iceland and about the situation in Northern China which had been agreed on in Moscow, when compared to the Soviet troops in Austria, for example, did not convince Molotov.⁷¹¹ According to a US State Department memorandum, the discussion was concluded with Molotov's in-depth theory from the roots of Anglo-Saxon imperialism to the

⁷⁰⁷ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : CIYB Meetings, Summary Minutes, Commission on Italo-Yugoslav Boundary, Council of Foreign Ministers, 73rd Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, April 28, 1946, 9:50 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 148-153.

⁷⁰⁸ In his memoirs Byrnes emphasized that it was the case of common dinner discussion with Molotov, but according to the memorandum of the United States' Delegation Byrnes and Molotov had taken their meals separately and after that convened to Molotov's suite. FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, May 5, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, p. 247. Compare to: Byrnes 1947, p. 128.

⁷⁰⁹ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, May 5, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 247-249.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹¹ The issue of the Icelandic military base had become problematic and received embarrassing publicity in March 1946. Byrnes doubted whether the Soviet Union wanted to take advantage of it and use it in favour of its own anti-imperial argumentation. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F8, From Byrnes to American Legation Reykjavik Iceland, 3.4.1946.

American expedition to Siberia in 1919.⁷¹² Nonetheless, the crux of the matter was that the United States refused to barter. Alexander Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador to France, best summed up the matter by stating to Charles Bohlen: "I don't understand you Americans. You are supposed to be the world's greatest traders, yet here you are, not prepared to trade on Trieste."⁷¹³

The statements made by Soviet representatives referred to the effect of Connally and Vandenberg's presence on the atmosphere in Paris. According to his memoirs, Byrnes thought that Molotov's assertion of "imperialist expansion and capitalist domination" was alarming when considering the use of these ideas in propaganda-campaigns later on. Byrnes described the late-night discussion with Molotov to Connally and Vandenberg, who shared his pessimism.⁷¹⁴ According to Byrnes, the atmosphere after the discussion was so unstable that he did not believe the meeting to have any hope of resolving any conflicts. In a view presented by Byrnes in his memoirs, it was particularly for this reason that Byrnes decided three days later to propose that the peace conference be held in Paris starting on June 15. According to Byrnes's proposal, the public officials could in the interim prepare reports on the agreed-upon peace treaties and re-prepare any conflicting issues for discussion.⁷¹⁵

Byrnes's enthusiasm to organize the peace conference whilst many individual questions remained unresolved cannot simply be explained by the desire to celebrate "the first anniversary of V-E Day" as Byrnes himself put it.⁷¹⁶ Clearly the objective was to exploit the composition of the final Peace Conference in the resolution of conflicts, where all parties would be widely represented. In his proposal Byrnes stated: "at the Peace Conference the other nations represented, coming to these problems with fresh minds, might help the Four Powers represented here to solve them".⁷¹⁷ With both Bidault and Bevin attesting their approval, Molotov considered the commencement of the peace conference before consensus was reached in the fundamental issues before the Council of Foreign Ministers contrary to what was agreed on in Moscow. This complication did not exclude the possibility of reaching an agreement before the deadline of mid-June, which was defined by Byrnes.⁷¹⁸ Senator Tom Connally, who presented the events of the Paris Conference to the Senate on July 19, said on the pursuit of the final peace conference:

⁷¹² FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, May 5, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, p. 248.

⁷¹³ Bohlen 1973, p. 254.

⁷¹⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 129.

⁷¹⁵ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirteenth Meeting, Paris, May 8, 1946, 11 a.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 289-309.

⁷¹⁶ Byrnes 1947, p. 129.

⁷¹⁷ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirteenth Meeting, Paris, May 8, 1946, 11 a.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, p. 301.

⁷¹⁸ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirteenth Meeting, Paris, May 8, 1946, 11 a.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 301-307.

Under the leadership of Secretary Byrnes the American demand for the calling of a peace conference was put clearly and firmly before the Council. At first it met with resistance. However, as the sessions progressed and problems were gradually solved, the resistance lessened and finally agreement was reached to convene the conference in Paris on July 29. In the Moscow agreement it had been stipulated that a peace conference would be called by May 1, 1946. This pledge, which it had been impossible to keep, was strongly urged and pressed before the Council by the Secretary of State. It was felt that the Council could not break faith with the 21 nations involved and that its solemn pledge should be redeemed. We may therefore look forward with hope and expectation to the convening in Paris of the accredited representatives of the 21 nations involved. There, in a free and open forum, the views and attitudes of the various nations may be made known and the various political, economic and territorial aspects of the peace settlement shall be given full and complete consideration.⁷¹⁹

Certainly the Soviet Union had also noted the negative effect of the Iranian crisis on their reputation, and wanted to take no risks by voluntarily postponing the issues to a more open Peace Conference when a clear interpretation of an agreement existed to prevent it. Nonetheless, this attempt for quid pro quo was not departing from earlier Soviet policy. Partially, the Soviet announcement was a response to the US desire to smoke the Soviet troops out of Iran, but it also included the need to divert the attention away from the Balkans. There is reason to suspect the great desire of even the Soviet Union to use the problematic issue of the Italian-Yugoslavian border to destroy the success of the Communists in Italian politics. Nonetheless, Molotov stood his ground and the Paris Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers recessed on May 16. Byrnes remarked in the final session:

The Council should frankly face the facts which it confronts. There are several minor Treaty problems which require further study by our Deputies or by special Commissions which have them under inquiry. There is every prospect of agreement when these studies are concluded. But decisions must await this event. There are also a few major Treaty problems upon which the Council is presently divided. Decisions must await further clarification and mutual study in a spirit of good will. In some instances these decisions may be favorably affected by the reports which we await from our Deputies. Our whole purpose is to seek and to find agreement as quickly as possible.⁷²⁰

As a whole, the first Paris Conference was a demonstration of Byrnes's new foreign policy, which was on the one hand based on public inflexibility, but on the other hand continued to be based on personal diplomacy. The former quality required persistency on the questions of Iran and the Balkans, demanded by Truman and public opinion, and the latter was more evident in the personal abilities of the cadre formed by Molotov, Byrnes, Bevin and Bidault at the negotiating table, and more narrowly within the US delegation primarily as the flow of bipartisanship. Arthur Vandenberg's view⁷²¹ on

⁷¹⁹ SMD: Document No. 243, 79th Congress, 2d Session, Senate, Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris – Remarks of Hon. Tom Connally, pp. 2–3.

⁷²⁰ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Seventeenth Meeting, Paris, May 14, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 387–388.

⁷²¹ *The New York Times*, 22.5.1946. "The 'Peace Offensive'".

achieving consensus in six days without the Soviet Union was a clear comment on the notion of a bipolarized world which was formed by public opinion. It did not, however, take into account several situations in which both the British and the French had a positive attitude. A clear change also happened on the level of rhetoric, with the Americans inheriting the imperialist status Molotov had previously attributed to the British.

Although tensions mounted on an intellectual level between the Soviet Union and the United States, in practice they were more evenly spread among the Big Four. After the Soviet suspicions regarding France were dispelled, the ability to cooperate was perhaps at its highest point since Potsdam, which is why the Foreign Minister agreed on another meeting again in France in July 1946 after a short break. The Americans' expectations of the swift emergence of the peace treaties were raised accordingly. After returning from Paris, Byrnes said in a radio interview:

A people's peace cannot be won by flashing diplomatic triumphs. It requires patience and firmness, tolerance and understanding. We must not try to impose our will on others, but we must make sure that others do not get the impression they can impose their will on us.⁷²²

At the same time Byrnes was forced to admit that the progress made in the first Paris Conference had been "disappointingly small in light of the expectations we had when it was accepted at Moscow". Nonetheless, the meeting had exceeded the expectations of the Secretary of State in reaching an agreement on things other than just the organization of the final peace conference. On the other hand, Byrnes had imposed a condition to the swift assembly of the peace conference, according to which the United States would be forced to otherwise demand the General Assembly of the UN to take action in accordance with article 14 of the Charter to organize peace.⁷²³

Byrnes again intervened in security policy which earlier that spring had placed the Americans in an awkward light with the Argentinean elections and the demands of inter-American relationships. Now the Secretary of State strove to speak of the differences between security needs and an expansive policy on a broader level:

Security is the concern of every nation. But the effort of one nation to increase its security may threaten the security of other nations and may cause them in turn to try to increase their own security. The quest for security may lead to less rather than more security in the world. It is in truth extremely difficult to know to what extent the action of any nation may be ascribed to its quest for security or to its desire to expand. But some so-called security moves are said to originate in the fear of the revival of German military might.⁷²⁴

⁷²² BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F16, Report By Secretary Byrnes, after his return from meeting in Paris, May 20, 1946; Byrnes 1947, p. 130.

⁷²³ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F16, Report By Secretary Byrnes, after his return from meeting in Paris, May 20, 1946.

⁷²⁴ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F16, Report By Secretary Byrnes, after his return from meeting in Paris, May 20, 1946.

Senator Vandenberg in particular approved of Byrnes's speech and found that its contents echoed his conception of the condition of power politics. The Senator felt that Byrnes had responded so well to the expectations of bipartisanship that he might not necessarily need his "Senatorial advisers" in the second session of the Conference. Vandenberg believed that the Americans would understand the Senator-less Conference, but suspected that the Soviet Union would interpret it as some sort of surrender. The latter scenario was supported by the Soviet delegation's attacks on Vandenberg and the Senator's plans to give policy speeches at the end of June and the beginning of July. Vandenberg restated that several meetings were ahead in which the Republicans could participate. Vandenberg refused to directly volunteer for the meetings due to the Senate's domestic policy rush and the upcoming election. Vandenberg reminded Byrnes, however, that neither the elections nor domestic policy would be negatively affected, if the Senator should be chosen for a task which would have "my total dedication for the balance of my days".⁷²⁵

In public, Byrnes actions in the first Paris Conference were rated surprisingly high. *The New York Times* reported on Byrnes's "working like a beaver to make some headway on the first three categories of suspicions". These were the questions on the placement of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union's obvious support for the leftist parties in the region and the control of the Danube. Unlike six months earlier, the public was given to understand that the follow-through of the Conference and the progression of the peace treaties were solely dependent on the Soviet representatives.

Time and again he has sought to have fundamental agreements registered that would work toward his ends. Mr. Molotov has very carefully brought all such deviations - as he views them - back to the agenda and dodged all such issues, much to Mr. Byrnes's controlled chagrin.⁷²⁶

Doubts were also woken about French-Soviet relations which had improved since the London Conference:

He [Molotov] has been exceptionally friendly to the French - readily agreeing to their presence in all treaty discussions, unlike his London attitude.... Elections are going to be held in France this month and next - for a Constitution and for an Assembly. The United States is probably trying to assist moderate parties by promising food and money, so the Soviet is using subtle propaganda to show what a great friend it is.⁷²⁷

The picture given to the public of the possibility of compromise was very skeptical. Only in the question of the control of the Danube was the United States considered to have to retreat in their demands for changing the river into a free-trade area. Accordingly, in the situation of Bulgaria a resolution satisfactory to the United States could be compensated by ceasing all demands

⁷²⁵ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F16, From Vandenberg to Byrnes, 23.5.1946.

⁷²⁶ *The New York Times*, 5.5.1946. C. L. Sulzberger "Two Basic U. S. Policies Emerge at Paris Parley".

⁷²⁷ Ibid.

for the retreat of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, on which even the press thought the United States could have very little effect.⁷²⁸ As a whole, the first Paris Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers was branded a questionable success in public. Quoting Byrnes's radio address on May 20, the "peace offensive" emphasized by *The New York Times* was an obvious disappointment for those expecting swift results, who sought to blame the Soviet Union. The positive development in superpower relationships which had begun after the London Conference in the fall of 1945 was even seen to have ended at the Paris Conference.⁷²⁹ According to the press, the open foreign policy, which had become central to the resolution of the Iranian crisis, had further strengthened the assumed understanding of the current state of power politics:

It not only discloses frankly all the differences that prevented agreement in Paris, and our delegation's bold effort to overcome them by entering into formal alliances to prevent a revival of German and Japanese aggression. It just as frankly reveals that agreement at Paris was prevented by one nation, Soviet Russia, which must bear responsibility for the present deadlock.⁷³⁰

The comparisons to deadlock were exaggerated as compared to London in 1945. An agreement had been reached on the next meeting, and no individual issue formed an apparent threshold question. The aftermath of the first Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers sparked a debate in Congress. In his address, Congressman Mundt from South Dakota considered the fruitlessness of the Paris Conference to be caused by too broad a participant base and proposed that the necessary option for making progress would be bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. According to Mundt, there were no insurmountable barriers to the mutual understanding of the two countries.⁷³¹

Congressman John Rankin from Mississippi once again represented the other extreme. In his address he remarked that "anyone who listened to the speech made by Secretary of State Byrnes last night must realize that the conflict between Communism and civilization is growing daily". The conflict was highlighted in Rankin's views more broadly as a threat to US domestic policy, a practical example of which he considered the Committee of Industrial Organization (CIO), which was "infested, if not dominated" by communists.⁷³²

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ *The New York Times*, 22.5.1946. The "Peace Offensive".

⁷³⁰ Ibid.

⁷³¹ CR. Report of Secretary of State Byrnes to the Nation, May 21, 1946. Congressional Records 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, p. 5367.

⁷³² The CIO (Committee for Industrial Organization) was founded on November 9, 1935, by eight international unions belonging to the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The CIO failed to change AFL policy from within. On September 10, 1936, the AFL suspended all 10 CIO unions (two more had joined in the previous year). In 1938, these unions formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations as a rival labor federation. In 1955, the CIO rejoined the AFL, forming the new entity known as the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). Bardes, Shelley, Schmidt 1990, pp. 204-205.

According to Rankin, the threat had already materialized in the town of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which was central to the manufacturing of the atomic weapon, and where the CIO had already attempted to unionize. As a solution he urged President Truman to interfere by banning “the workers that are producing that great weapon of national defense for the United States from being organized by any force that has within its ranks Communists who are dedicated to the service of a foreign power and who are plotting the overthrow of the Government of the United States”.⁷³³ Byrnes had been aware of the “organizational activities” threatening the secret project, and he had already had to intervene when director of OWM.⁷³⁴

From the perspective of foreign policy, the time of the first Paris Conference led more and more clearly to the polarization of power politics between the United States and the Soviet Union and to a more analytical examination of this relationship. This was highlighted in a report completed May 15 on US policy regarding the Soviet Union. The report considered the most notable problem to be the reluctance of the Soviet government to rely on international assistance in matters of security:

In reality the Soviet Government has placed no great confidence in international action but has pursued an alternative policy of self-reliance which is now quite clear. In his victory proclamation at the end of the war in Europe, Stalin emphasized the necessity of building up the military and economic potential of the Soviet Union. Various indications since that time have pointed with increasing clarity to departures from the international idea and the revival of the Marxist hypothesis of the inevitability of conflict between the Soviet State and the capitalist world.⁷³⁵

According to the report, this trend had been confirmed by Stalin’s election speech at Moscow’s Bolshoi Theatre on February 9, when he had clearly differentiated the Soviet Union and the capitalist world and had asked that the Soviet people prepare themselves for anything and everything.⁷³⁶ From a domestic policy perspective the time of the first Paris Conference clarified differences of opinion. On May 18 the Press Alliance reported on the scheme of “a liberal cabal” to displace Byrnes as Secretary of State. According to extreme liberals, the Secretary of State was guilty of the rejection of Rooseveltian policy and had given the Soviet Union reason to suspect the actions of the United States. According to the source, this secret society hoped for the new Secretary of State to be a true liberal the likes of Henry Wallace, who would be capable of working in cooperation with Moscow. The Press Alliance accused these liberals of self-hypnosis, under which they were able to see the Soviet Union as a liberator from the shackles of imperialism. Instead, the Soviet Union was an empire equipped with a facade of democracy and seeking to expand. According

⁷³³ CR. Secretary Byrnes’s Speech – Communism and the Atomic Bomb, May 21, 1946. Congressional Records 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, p. 5368.

⁷³⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B1:F5. Atomic Energy. Memorandum for the Under Secretary of War, 28.11.1944.

⁷³⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B15:F4. The Soviet Union. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – Policy and Information Statement, 15.5.1946.

⁷³⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B15:F4. The Soviet Union. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – Policy and Information Statement, 15.5.1946.

to the Alliance, Byrnes's policies were directed against this expansion, and should not be judged as a desire for a nuclear war or for a showdown in general.⁷³⁷

Criticism of Byrnes's governance was also expressed within the State Department. Acheson, who managed the State Department during Byrnes's absence, felt his own job description to be too vague with Byrnes acting as high-handedly as in Moscow in 1945. Acheson considered himself to be subordinate to both the Secretary of State and the President, and as expressed in his memoirs, was unable to act in a situation where the chain of command was unclear. The Under Secretary of State did offer to resign if a public dispute erupted between the Secretary of State and the President. The letter of resignation was already backdated, so that the dispute could not be considered a reason for his resignation in public. According to Acheson, Byrnes added a made-up assertion about a murmur discovered in Acheson's heart. William Clayton, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs also expressed his willingness to return to civilian life. In Acheson's opinion, the reason for this was Clayton growing tired of his inferior position, which was remedied by establishing a special position for Clayton as the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.⁷³⁸

In the Senate, Arthur Vandenberg and John Foster Dulles, whose two in-depth articles on the issue were published in *Life Magazine* in the beginning of June, had examined the issue. Dulles's articles were in fact the first broadly analytical reviews of the Soviet motives to build "Pax Sovietica" and the methods of achieving it.⁷³⁹ According to Dulles, for the first time the cornerstone of power-political issues was encapsulated in conceptual differences, which Byrnes also later drew attention to in many parts of his memoirs. The conflicts of interpretation were most apparent with concepts like democracy, fascist and friendly, the first of which meant in the Soviet Union a dictatorship of the proletariat, the second all anti-Soviet views and the third a belief in the Soviet ideology and a constant desire to prove it. Even the State Department's report in May expresses a patois differing from Byrnes's policy by mentioning the inevitability of a bipolar world order. However, the attention to the thinking polarized between the Soviet powers and the capitalist world is

⁷³⁷ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B17:F15. Plot against Secretary Byrnes, Press Alliance, Inc., 18.5.1946; Political fever had risen by the foreign trade week. Byrnes committed himself to the targets of the United States by stating that United States' interests were tied up primarily with furtherance of world peace and secondarily with the increase of America's prosperity. BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F15, Confidential Release For Publication In The Morning Newspapers of Sunday, May 19, 1946, Which Do Not Appear On The Streets Before 9:00 p.m. E.S.T., Saturday May 18, 1946. Not To Be Previously Published, Quoted From or Used In Any Way.

⁷³⁸ Acheson 1987, pp. 162-163, 186. President Truman nominated William Clayton as Undersecretary on August 1. *The New York Times* 2.8.1946, "The Day in Washington". It is the first time the State Department has had two undersecretaries. *The New York Times* 18.8.1946, "Clayton Sworn as Undersecretary".

⁷³⁹ CR. Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What To Do About It - An International Expert Analyzes Russia's Motives In Seeking A "Pax Sovietica" and the Methods by Which She Would Impose It on the World. Jun. 20. 1946. Congressional Record - Senate 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. 7169-7175.

not linguistically comparable to such conventions of the Cold War to which the polarization between the East and the West later referred.⁷⁴⁰

According to Dulles the Soviet Union had a clear agenda, pursuant to which it acted in power politics. In practice, this was evident in the Soviet Union's actions in three nested power zones, which are divided into the innermost zone encompassing the Soviet Union, the middle zone encompassing the occupied areas and the outer zone encompassing the rest of the world. The role of the outer zone is highlighted in Dulles article, for it meant the zone in which the battles over the importance of the East and West had been fought and would be fought. It was largely a question of filling power vacuums, in which the dynamic foreign policy of the Soviet Union was seeking a foothold. Vacuums like this existed in Asia, Africa and South America, which were lacking "healthy societies". Dulles believed that the Iron Curtain would benefit the Soviet Union both with regard to domestic and foreign policy, for it simultaneously kept the country's internal orthodoxy in check and isolated any external influences.⁷⁴¹

The views presented by Dulles contained surprisingly many of the same ingredients that marked the Cold War during the following four and a half decades. Even he did not consider it impossible for the Soviet Union to change course, but believed that the Pax Sovietica project would crash from the lack of capable leaders in foreign policy or the inevitable collapse of the Iron Curtain. In one way or another, the Soviet Union's actions in power politics had required the Americans to respond to its quests for power and in this regard the initiative for diffusing the tension would have to come from the Soviet Union. Dulles compared the situation quite pessimistically to the establishment of the US relationships with France and England during the past 130 years.⁷⁴² In the Senate, Dulles's articles appeared in an address by the Senator from New Jersey, Alexander H. Smith, on June 20, 1946. The issue did not attract greater attention at this time, but the Senator did call for observing the issues brought forward by Dulles in an "enlightened American foreign policy". With the Paris Conference underway, the Senator's interpretation of the articles was surely in the minds of many as a more realistic scenario of the future:

War with Russia is unthinkable, but it will take statesmanship of the highest order to prevent the slow development of the kind of misunderstandings that might ultimately lead to war. Our experience between World Wars I and II must teach us how important it is to allay international suspicions and misunderstandings.⁷⁴³

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid.

⁷⁴² Ibid.

⁷⁴³ CR. Soviet Foreign Policy - Articles By John Foster Dulles. Jun. 20. 1946. Congressional Record - Senate 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, p. 7169.

4.1.3 Towards the final Peace Conference by force – the second act of the Paris Conference

After Byrnes crossed the Atlantic for the eleventh time to attend the second Paris Conference, the only objective of the American delegation was to force readiness for the final peace treaties. This thinking included the assumption that after Molotov discovered that there was no possibility of concessions he would be driven to accept the existing proposals as peace treaties. However, in Byrnes view, the meeting started with the “customary preliminary skirmishes” when Molotov announced that he objected to the American proposal on the Austrian peace treaty which had been attached to the agenda, supporting instead Bidault’s suggestion of a closer examination of the situation in Austria. Molotov made the same demand for closer examination with regard to the situation in Italy, which had already changed since the referendum on abolishing the monarchy in June, and was in itself a good source of criticism towards the Anglo-American occupation policy.⁷⁴⁴ Byrnes desire to include the issue of the Austrian peace treaty on the agenda was not binding on the other parties; rather it was a question of the Soviet Union’s and France’s desires to change the agenda. According to the State Department minutes, Molotov remarked - quite justifiably - that the meeting should follow agreed-upon procedure and therefore start by resolving the Italian issues. The Soviet delegation wanted quite rightly to decide later whether the US proposal would be included in the agenda.⁷⁴⁵

The conflict took a positive turn on June 27, when Molotov suddenly announced that the Soviet Union would agree to assign the Dodecanese Islands to Greece. Also the questions regarding the Italian colonies were resolved after Molotov accepted the Americans’ proposal from May with only minor reservations.⁷⁴⁶ However, the question of Trieste and Italian reparations remained unresolved. The question of Italian reparations became even more complicated with the discussion on the sources of the 100 million dollar reparations, which even the United States agreed belonged to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union accepted that the sum be comprised of products of the military industry, merchant vessels or Italian holdings in the Balkans, but not with booty such as the war ships received by the Americans or the British, which even Byrnes thought to be fair.⁷⁴⁷ However, Molotov had already previously reiterated that the Soviet Union had a right to a part of the Italian

⁷⁴⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 132.

⁷⁴⁵ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Nineteenth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, June 15, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 493-499.

⁷⁴⁶ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Twenty-Eighth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, June 27, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, p. 661. Byrnes was so embarrassed by the turn of events that he asked the meeting for few minutes to recover from the news.

⁷⁴⁷ Byrnes 1947, p. 136.

war fleet anyway, as it was agreed in Potsdam that it should receive some of the German war ships the British and the Americans had received as booty.⁷⁴⁸

According to Byrnes, the Potsdam decision was a gift, which pertained only to German vessels, and did not by any means signify the constant giving of gifts or the applying of the decision to the Italian war fleet. In May Molotov would have had to accept other sources of reparations, but complained that the United States had grossly over-estimated their value. Molotov proposed that the Soviet Union would accept the reparations in the form suggested by the Americans if the issues of Trieste and Bulgaria would be resolved to the satisfaction of the Soviet Union.⁷⁴⁹ Byrnes, who had always regarded the question of reparations with reluctance, had previously considered the sum of 300 million dollars, which was the total sum of the Italian reparations, to be unfounded, and in April the question of reparations had been delegated to consideration by a working group of public officials. Byrnes had then remarked that "his good friend Molotov was so convinced of his arguments that the figure of 300 million should be accepted" and that "there is nothing sacred about the figure of 300 million". The discussion turned to Molotov's advantage when reparations of the same amount had been agreed on with Britain regarding Finland with a population of 1/12 of the population of Italy.⁷⁵⁰

Before the second session of the Paris Conference the Italian government had voiced its concerns to Byrnes about the matter of reparations. According to a memorandum by the Italian embassy, granting the Soviet Union reparations worth 100 million dollars alone would be devastating to the Italian economy and would likely result in further demands from other countries. The memorandum stated:

The Italian Government trusts therefore that the problem be considered in its entirety and that the question of principle be not solved in such a way as to jeopardize by concession to one single country the overall problem encouraging demands from other countries. The Italian Government realizes the difficulties encountered by the American delegation in dealing with the Russian requests. It is felt in this respect that some way out would be found if Italian warships which are going to be given to Russia could be accounted for as overall payment of Italian reparations. If on the contrary reparations should be imposed on Italy with supplies or services to be furnished in a certain number of years, no doubt a situation will follow, similar in its

⁷⁴⁸ FRUS 1946. United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Second Meeting, Paris, April 26, 1946, 4:30 p. m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 115–117.

⁷⁴⁹ FRUS 1946. Record of Decisions, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Tenth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, May 4, 1946, 5 p. m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 247–249.

⁷⁵⁰ FRUS 1946. United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Second Meeting, Paris, April 26, 1946, 4:30 p. m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 118–119. Molotov used Finland as a moral barometer of reparations for instance in the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September 1945. See: FRUS 1945. Council of Foreign Ministers File : Lot M-88 : CFM London Minutes, Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Lancaster House, London, September 17, 1945, 4 p.m. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 216.

consequences to that which came about for Germany after the First World War, i.e. inability to pay.⁷⁵¹

The Italian appeal hit directly at the black spot which had horrified President Roosevelt in Yalta. No one in the United States wanted to instigate a financial crisis, but it was mainly a question of the possible increase of the sum. Quite surprisingly Byrnes sought to mediate the situation in a completely different light after discussing it with Molotov on June 25. This time the Secretary said that “he did not feel that reparations would present insuperable difficulties”.⁷⁵²

Byrnes signaled a clear desire for a trade by suggesting that if the Soviet delegation was flexible in the matter of Trieste, “the United States Delegation was prepared to modify its views on reparations”.⁷⁵³ Eventually a compromise was made, when Byrnes announced that the United States would accept 100 million dollar reparations for the Soviet Union over seven years from Italy’s military industry, its assets in the Balkans and its industrial production leaving the type and quantity of the reparations to be decided between Italy and the Soviet Union. It was agreed that the reparations for at other nations, namely France, Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania would be discussed at the final peace conference.⁷⁵⁴ According to Byrnes’s memoirs, this decision was reached after everyone was exhausted from dwelling on the subject.⁷⁵⁵

In light of the State Department memorandums, Molotov was, perhaps in return for the favorable resolution of the reparations issue, apparently willing leave his other demands open to be resolved by the final peace conference. Thus, both the issue of recognizing the Bulgarian government as well as the fate of Trieste remained unresolved. A committee was established to examine the situation of Trieste, which was to begin operations immediately.⁷⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the discussions surrounding Trieste evoked emotions at the negotiating table and led the discussions to a deep level. In the sessions in May prior to the recess Byrnes had stated that Trieste had been a part of Italy since 1472 and that the three-quarter Italian majority that still lived in the city was a demonstration of the town’s ethnic heritage. Molotov had replied sarcastically that Italy itself did not exist prior to the 19th century and that the Illyrian provinces established by Napoleon in 1810 encompassed the Slavic-speaking towns of Trieste, Gorizia and Gradisca. Both thought that the issue of Trieste was a central issue of the Conference, but also one of the toughest issues. For the first time, the problem

⁷⁵¹ FRUS 1946. 740.00119 EW /5-3146, The Italian Embassy to the Department of State, Washington, May 31, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 460–461.

⁷⁵² FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, June 25, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 614–617.

⁷⁵³ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁴ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2061 : CFM Documents, Draft Article on Reparations for the Italian Peace Treaty, Prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris, 9 July, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 854–855.

⁷⁵⁵ Byrnes 1947, p. 136.

⁷⁵⁶ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : CMF Records of Decisions, Record of Decisions, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Forty-Second Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 12, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, p. 937.

of peace policy in territorial issues seems to have been ethnic questions over economic or military-strategic questions. The decision to take into account ethnic issues when deciding on borders had already been made at the London Conference.⁷⁵⁷

The discussion surrounding the issue of Trieste was an apparent change to old ways. Each Foreign Minister took turns in proposing a compromise, which in itself may have been alien to Byrnes who had grown accustomed to Molotov's inflexibility. Byrnes was no longer a beginner in diplomacy and foreign policy, but a seasoned negotiator. According to some scholars, in Paris Byrnes even started to adopt – consciously or unconsciously – some of the negotiating tactics that Molotov had successfully used against him earlier.⁷⁵⁸

This view is justified at least by the similar objectives of the agenda issue, which was ever so important for Molotov, and the package deals favored by Byrnes. Both the agenda and the packaging of individual issues were excellent tactics in postponing the most difficult issues to a later date and in securing acceptance without concessions on questions that had already been agreed on and were much higher in priority. As such, even the package deals did not differ from Molotov's promises to consider concessions if a certain wish for returned favors would materialize, but bundled together by Byrnes they became more clearly defined and strictly formed barter-agreements. Byrnes bundled the issue of Trieste together with the question of Italian reparations, which forced Molotov – partially due to Byrnes's procrastination – to accept the question of arranging the final peace conference which was next on the agenda even before the question of Italian reparations was actually discussed. In this case, Byrnes beat the old master in two of his strongest areas – procrastination and the agenda.

During the spring and summer of 1946 the change in foreign policy was evident in the apparent piling up of concrete conflicts between the East and the West. The British got tangled up in the activities of the Greek Communist Resistance, citing an old percentage agreement, and in return the Soviet Union dragged its feet in Iran. The situation in the Dardanelles forced Truman to defend Turkish interests against the Soviet Union, even by force if necessary.⁷⁵⁹ The significance of Britain as the closest ally of the United States was confirmed in a State Department report in the spring of 1946, when the continued existence of the Commonwealth was considered a significant factor from the perspective of US security and prosperity. In the report, the locations of British dominions were considered to be strategic worldwide, and protecting them from war, especially against the Soviet Union, was emphasized. The State Department projected that the next worldwide conflict would be born as a

⁷⁵⁷ FRUS 1945. United States Delegation Record, Council of the Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Tenth Meeting, Paris, May 4, 1946, 5 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, p. 241; BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F16, Report By Secretary Byrnes, after his return from meeting in Paris, May 20, 1946.

⁷⁵⁸ For example: Ward 1979, p. 125.

⁷⁵⁹ The Soviet Union wanted to play a part in a battleship supervisory organization of the Black Sea area which was against the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits from 1936. Acheson 1987, pp. 195–196.

result of the deterioration of the Soviet-British relationship. In this scenario the role of the United States would be to act as a middleman and to show solidarity with both Britain and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the State Department wanted to recognize Britain's international status and at the same time the changes in the whole world order:

Britain is no longer the most powerful nation in the world. Such pre-eminence is now held by the US and USSR. This change has been a psychological shock to Britain's people and has had a profound effect upon all aspects of her international affairs.⁷⁶⁰

During the spring, conflicts were passed over to the Security Council, which in practice raised the dispute concerning the use of the right to veto. Despite several attempts by Molotov, after redefining foreign policy Byrnes could not agree to the point-by-point review of articles, but emphatically remained with the package deals.⁷⁶¹ According to a State Department report, the English-Soviet relationship had deteriorated since the London Conference of Foreign Ministers. The Labour Party, which had been in power for less than a year, despite its election promises, had arranged better relationships with the Soviet Union than even the Conservatives. At the Security Council Soviet allegations towards British activities in Greece and Indonesia bordered on a diplomatic crisis from the American perspective.⁷⁶² As a whole, the two Paris Conferences showed that an even stricter stance on the Soviet Union had brought about a relatively successful outcome for the Americans – especially as France was represented in the conferences. Byrnes felt that the contribution of the French representative Bidault to the closing of the Conferences and especially to determining the final peace conference had been crucial and admired that.⁷⁶³ On July 4, American Independence Day, Byrnes showed his gratitude to the French by highlighting the significance of the French in the Americans' struggle for independence in 1776. Strategically, he also noted the Philippines, which was celebrating its first independence day on the same day, as an example of "the freedom which we have been taught to cherish is a freedom that must be shared". Speaking from a liberated Paris, Byrnes's words on American peace and spreading it to the rest of the world must have been a conscious comment against the Soviet security zone policy:

The Secretary in agreeing to these proposals said that he wished it clearly understood that when the conference convened the United States was entirely free to accept or reject on its merits any amendment or new proposals concerning rules of procedure which might be offered. He [Byrnes] said he had no particular changes or amendments in mind but he could not bind the United States in advance to taking a

⁷⁶⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B15:F4. Great Britain. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – Policy and Information Statement on Great Britain 1946.

⁷⁶¹ Byrnes 1947, p. 136.

⁷⁶² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B15:F4. Great Britain. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – Policy and Information Statement on Great Britain 1946.

⁷⁶³ Byrnes 1947, p. 137.

dishonest position in regard to any amendment or new proposal on rules of procedure because of prior agreement with his three colleagues.⁷⁶⁴

Public opinion about success without concessions was, however, clearly one-sided. Before the Paris Conferences, high expectations had been placed on Byrnes's shoulders regarding the execution of the new foreign policy. Senator Vandenberg had publically announced that the time of appeasement was gone.⁷⁶⁵ After the Conference, many saw Byrnes to have met the expectations commendably, which was largely due to the success of the Italian treaty which was of interest to the media at that time. In his radio address on the evening of July 15, Byrnes himself gave the Americans a slightly dramatized version of the rigorousness of the negotiations and the arm-wrestling over the draft treaties:

The whole world knows how great the struggle has been during the last ten months to harmonize the views of the great powers so as to make possible the presentation of tentative drafts of treaties to a peace conference. That struggle has now been brought to a successful conclusion and the Peace Conference has been called to meet in Paris on July 29.... The draft of treaties agreed upon are not the best which human wit could devise. But they are the best which human wit could get the four principal Allies to agree upon. They represent as satisfactory an approach to the return of peace as we could hope for in this imperfect and war-weary world.⁷⁶⁶

In addition the Secretary commented on Soviet's aims by the same conventional means:

I am ready to believe it is difficult for them to understand us, just as it is difficult for us to understand them. But I sometimes think our Soviet friends fear we would think them weak and soft if they agreed without a struggle on anything we wanted, even though they wanted it too. Constant struggle, however, is not always helpful in a world longing for peace.⁷⁶⁷

The fancy turns of phrase blurred the fact that the Balkan agreement had still not been organized, which has later been seen to have partly strengthened Soviet power politics in Eastern Europe.⁷⁶⁸ Moreover, Byrnes had to reluctantly

⁷⁶⁴ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F20, Statement on radio in Paris by Secretary of State on July 4, 1946.

⁷⁶⁵ Ward 1979, p. 100.

⁷⁶⁶ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F21, Confidential Release For Publication At 9:00 P.M., E.S.T, Monday, July 15, 1946. Not To Be Previously Published, Quoted or Used In Any Way; CR. Secretary Byrnes's Report on Meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris. Extension of Remarks of Hon. Walter F. George of Georgia, in the Senate of United States, Tuesday, July 16 (legislative day of Friday, July 5), 1946. Congressional Records - Appendix to the Congressional Record. 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. A4152-A4154. Byrnes's speech was attached to the remarks as a suggestion of Senator Walter F. George. Citations as they were written in Byrnes's memoirs: "...great struggle and tremendous difficulties the four governments had in harmonizing their view. ...they [drafts] are the best which human wit could get the four principal Allies to agree upon". Byrnes 1947, p. 137.

⁷⁶⁷ CR. Secretary Byrnes's Report on Meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris. Extension of Remarks of Hon. Walter F. George of Georgia, in the Senate of United States, Tuesday, July 16 (legislative day of Friday, July 5), 1946. Congressional Records - Appendix to the Congressional Record. 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, p. A4153. See as well: Byrnes 1947, p. 137.

⁷⁶⁸ Ward 1979, p. 126.

concede to the 100 million dollar reparations the Soviet Union demanded from Italy, with only minor conditions on the sources of the reparations. The Secretary of State omitted mentioning a section in his speech regarding the conditions, according to which the United States “did not intend to finance Italy’s payment of reparations to the Soviets or any other government”.⁷⁶⁹ Reaching an agreement on the questions surrounding the Italian peace treaty was undeniably a prerequisite for calling the final peace conference, to which Byrnes had publicly committed in Paris. The existence of this prerequisite was also recognized by Senator Connally, who for apparent reasons of authority considered the resolution regarding Trieste, which had been left open, to be more significant than the others. Senator Lucas, on the other hand, considered leaving the question of Trieste unresolved as a kind of power-political victory, which allowed for breathing room to refine strategy.⁷⁷⁰

The questions regarding Germany and Austria remained unresolved, although they had not even been included into the objectives on the agenda. In his radio address, Byrnes showed a clear desire to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the truth about the fact that achieving peace would be a long-term process. Byrnes compared the situation to the independence of the United States and called for patience and understanding. Byrnes summed up his vision in a sentence, which might as well be considered the definition of Bismarckian *realpolitik*: “It requires the will and ability to seek the best, to accept the best obtainable, and then to make the best obtainable work”.⁷⁷¹

The positivity exhibited by Byrnes regarding the latter half of the Paris Conference was received even in public with surprisingly little criticism. Even in the month-long summer break between the two meetings, the US press described the situation as a dead end nearly corresponding to that of London in 1945, and especially achieving compromise was seen as impossible simply due to the inflexibility of the Soviet Union. With *The New York Times* quoting Senator Connally’s radio address, even the attitude towards compromises had returned to that of the old days:

‘The progress thus far,’ Mr. Byrnes said, ‘is the product of compromise. There is no use to pretend that more compromises will not be necessary if we are to go the rest of the way. But the compromises we have reached and those I hope we will reach will

⁷⁶⁹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F21, Confidential Release For Publication At 9:00 P.M., E.S.T, Monday, July 15, 1946. Not To Be Previously Published, Quoted or Used In Any Way.

⁷⁷⁰ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F23, Confidential Release For Publication At 6:00 P.M., E.S.T., (7:00 P.M., E.D.S.T), Saturday, July 27, 1946. Not To Be Previously Published, Quoted From or Used in Any Way.

⁷⁷¹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F21, Confidential Release For Publication At 9:00 P.M., E.S.T, Monday, July 15, 1946. Not To Be Previously Published, Quoted or Used In Any Way; CR. Secretary Byrnes’s Report on Meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris. Extension of Remarks of Hon. Walter F. George of Georgia, in the Senate of United States, Tuesday, July 16 (legislative day of Friday, July 5), 1946. Congressional Records – Appendix to the Congressional Record. 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. A4152–A4154.

be compromises intended to reconcile honest conflicts of opinion and no to secure selfish advantage for ourselves or others.⁷⁷²

In his address at the Senate on July 16, Senator Vandenberg remarked that in Paris the US delegation did not compromise on the questions that made it possible to move towards the final peace conference. Furthermore, Vandenberg denied that the United States was guilty of a compromise policy, but left some room to maneuver in his speech:

Failure is preferable to a pretense of success at the price of unsound compromise or appeasement. Munich forever personifies this warning, but the measure of failure is not the presence of compromise. Rather the measure of success is the preservation of essential principles in spite of compromise.⁷⁷³

Comparing the threats of the Paris Conference to the events of Munich in the fall of 1938 was undoubtedly an exaggeration, but in highlighting his own contribution to the success of the conference, the view is understandable. Even with Vandenberg's contribution, Paris was unlikely to prevent the Soviet Union's demands which it justified by security needs, and in the light of compromises it did not become a display of the new, hard-line foreign policy, outside the question of Trieste. In hindsight it is easy to note that Paris did not turn out to be a kind of Munich-in-reverse, which would have halted the development of power politics. Perhaps due to Vandenberg's earlier role as an observer of foreign policy he had misconceptions about the realities of the negotiating tables. When adding up the successes of the Paris Conference, Vandenberg listed the draft peace treaties as a positive achievement, but expressed that fundamental differences of opinion existed between the superpowers:

Someone said at Paris that if this recent council had been confined to America, France, and Britain it would have achieved total agreement, including preliminary plans for the German and Austrian treaties, in 10 days. This is simply another way of saying that eastern communism and western democracy are the forces which confront each other in planning for a new and better world. They differ in ideas, ideals, and ideologies. For example, they certainly could not agree upon a definition of 'democracy', although this is the objective to which both profess to subscribe. The great trouble is mutual distrust and suspicion, which the 'iron curtain' between us and the insatiable Soviet appetite for proselyting and propaganda do not dispel.⁷⁷⁴

In hindsight, Vandenberg's address defined relatively accurately the settings which were essential to the development of the Cold War. At the same time, the possibility of war between the Soviet Union and the United States was raised – albeit in a roundabout way. According to Vandenberg, Soviet activities

⁷⁷² *The New York Times*, 28.7.1946. Bertram D. Hulen "Truman Declares U. S. Backs Byrnes on Peace Mission".

⁷⁷³ SMD: Document No. 240, Senate, 79th Congress, 2d Session, Council of Foreign Ministers At Paris, Remarks of Hon. Arthur H. Vandenberg, July 16, 1946. In Senate Miscellaneous Documents, p. 2.

⁷⁷⁴ SMD: Document No. 240, Senate, 79th Congress, 2d Session, Council of Foreign Ministers At Paris, Remarks of Hon. Arthur H. Vandenberg, July 16, 1946. In Senate Miscellaneous Documents, p. 15.

demonstrated a desire to organize the world against “the western democracy”, but he considered a war between the two superpowers to be an unthinkable disaster. In this regard the inevitability of some sort of conflict was distinguished from reality only by thoughtlessness.⁷⁷⁵ Whilst listing “a few simple truths to Moscow” for the Senators, Vandenberg raised the attitude of foreign policy in his fourth item:

You should understand, with complete conviction, that we are just as determined as you are that military aggression – from any source and no matter what its guise – shall never curse the earth again; and we are enlisted in this cause for keeps.... and, with equally complete conviction, that we cannot be driven, coerced, or pressured into positions which we decline voluntarily to assume; and that we will not ‘bargain’ in human rights and fundamental liberties anywhere on earth.⁷⁷⁶

In this regard the end of the bartering-policy remained clearly linked with the unresolved question of Trieste. According to Vandenberg’s interpretation, the success of the peace conference was completely dependent on three factors: The effective actions of the United Nations, the preservation of atomic secrets and the development of friendships between large and small peoples.⁷⁷⁷ For his part Byrnes, who assured the United States’ definitive commitment to international operations, also emphasized the first item:

We are of one mind that America must never return to isolation. However difficult may be the paths of international cooperation, we know there can be no security in isolation.⁷⁷⁸

Although the final defeat of the Monroe Doctrine and the inevitable imperative for the United States to intervene in the matters of foreign powers had practically been sealed even before the Second World War, Byrnes’s message undoubtedly had elegant political charisma. At the same time it communicated the fact that there were few alternatives. The expansion of Soviet influence in the world could not be stopped with atomic diplomacy or with publicity policy. Publicity seems to have remained, in Byrnes’s opinion, the most effective weapon against the Soviet Union and the highlighting of international cooperation served that purpose well.

Vandenberg’s words in the Senate added to suspicions in the House of Representatives about the operational capacity of the State Department. In passing, the inefficiency of the State Department was chalked down to inadequacy of resources and many Congressmen suspected that poor salaries had even combed out some of the best personnel in the Department. Chester E. Mellow, a Congressman from New Hampshire, had listed 12 different

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid. “...on the one hand, that the United States is attempting to organize the world against our western civilization. War between us would be an unthinkable calamity, which I am certain, they as well as we, abhor”.

⁷⁷⁶ SMD: Document No. 240, Senate, 79th Congress, 2d Session, Council of Foreign Ministers At Paris, Remarks of Hon. Arthur H. Vandenberg, July 16, 1946. Senate Miscellaneous Documents, pp. 1-16.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁸ *The New York Times*, 28.7.1946. Truman Declares U. S. Backs Byrnes on Peace Mission.

examples of concrete weaknesses in the State Department. As the most central of these, Merrow saw the structural expanse of the Department and an unsound ability to cooperate with other departments and with Congress. According to the Congressman, the State Department had considered Congress “a necessary evil” and connections between the two were fragile, which was also highlighted by Byrnes’ desire to reduce State Department connections with the White House.⁷⁷⁹

According to the view presented by Merrow, the positive development during Hull’s and Stettinius’s terms to “build good will between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue” had been somewhat severed and had caused insecurity as to what was really happening with foreign policy. In addition to communication problems, the State Department was, in Merrow’s opinion, plagued with a lack of long-term plans, as foreign policy was made “on a day-to-day basis”. In practice, the execution of long-term plans had still proved to be impossible. Merrow overturned the cornerstone of Byrnes’s foreign policy by pointing out that the State Department had completely rejected public opinion in its operations. According to him, once given all the information, the American people were capable of making well-advised decisions, and thus there was no real reason for withholding information.⁷⁸⁰

Many of the flaws listed by Merrow were undoubtedly justified, but there were deeper reasons for their existence, such as bipartisanship and the need for an “industrial peace” as required by the circumstances. Ultimately the question of the weaknesses of the State Department seems to boil down to when foreign policy would be broadly normalized to the circumstances of peacetime. The normalization development, which had been well underway earlier in Paris, had understandably experienced a setback with power politics being at its most susceptible. Clearly Byrnes’s policy in Paris was footwork between the hard line demanded by the public on the one hand and the internal issues of compromise and negotiation in the conference room on the other. The former was largely successful because of Byrnes’s rhetoric and firm policy – whereas the latter meant in reality a return to the *quid pro quo* policy.

A structural reorganization of the State Department had undoubtedly been Byrnes’s intention, and the topic was also raised at the time of his inauguration. In the minds of Congressmen, the structural reorganization meant predominantly a complete or at least a partial detachment of the US Foreign Service from the leash of the State Department. Properly speaking, the Foreign Service was accountable for its actions to the State Department, but operationally and administratively it was its own unit. The last reorganization of the State Department had taken place 22 years earlier,⁷⁸¹ and due to the

⁷⁷⁹ CR. The State Department Has Definite Weaknesses. Mr. Smith, Mr. Merrow, Mr. Ramey, Mr. Richards, Mr. Weichel. Jul. 16. 1946. Congressional Records – House. 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. 9154–9159.

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁸¹ Rogers Bill from 1924. The Rogers Act of 1924, often referred to as the Foreign Service Act of 1924, is the legislation that merged the United States diplomatic and consular services into the United States Foreign Service. It defined a personnel system under which the United States Secretary of State is authorized to assign diplomats abroad.

upheaval following the Paris Conference, pressures for concrete reorganization began to mount.

New legislation was being prepared, obviously expedited by the Iranian crisis and the incidents of espionage that had been in the spotlight in July, which would give the Foreign Service more independence from the State Department. The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives on July 8, and it was widely supported. Most attention was focused on preventing any ambiguities between the State Department and the Foreign Service on foreign policy. In the experience of Congresswoman Edith Rogers from Massachusetts, the officials of the Foreign Service were in many countries unaware of what was expected of them or what the State Department's stance was on matters. Although instructions on foreign policy were still to be directed abroad through the State Department, an apparent between-the-lines criticism was directed at the State Department, which had been passive in this regard.⁷⁸²

From the perspective of reforms, the bill remained shallow. On a practical level a new committee was established whose task it was to act as an advisor to the Secretary of State in matters relating to the Foreign Service and it was to receive support from the departments of Labor, Commerce and Agriculture. In addition to this, the reform was mainly focused on improving the salaries and pension benefits of the personnel of the Foreign Service and on establishing the Foreign Service Institute. The reforms were also aimed at the reliability of Foreign Service officials, which had been brought up due to the investigations of State Department personnel in July. Bartel J. Jonkman, a Congressman from Michigan, who was au fait with the issue and who - quoting Under Secretary of State Acheson - considered legislative reform to be a better solution than the ongoing investigations, particularly highlighted this outlook. Acheson's role in passing the Foreign Service Act was, however, trivial, as the matter was in William Benton's domain. With the bill hanging in the balance due to Republican suspicions, Benton had Byrnes call Connally and Vandenberg to ensure the passing of the bill.⁷⁸³

The time of the Paris Conferences brought many violent changes to power politics, which reflected onto the United States. The upheaval of power politics had undoubtedly raised suspicions in the United States about the ability of foreign policy to guarantee that the country's voice would be heard in the

⁷⁸² CR. Foreign Service of The United States. Part E - Effective Date of Act. Mr. Kee, Mr. Sabath, Mr. Rabaut, Mr. Colmer, Mr. Chipfield, Mrs. Rogers, Mr. Hinshaw, Mr. Stefan, Mr. Jonkman. Jul. 20. 1946. Congressional Records - House. 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. 9572-9590.

⁷⁸³ CR. Foreign Service of The United States. Part E - Effective Date of Act. Mr. Kee, Mr. Sabath, Mr. Rabaut, Mr. Colmer, Mr. Chipfield, Mrs. Rogers, Mr. Hinshaw, Mr. Stefan, Mr. Jonkman. Jul. 20. 1946. Congressional Records - House. 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. 9572-9590; CUOHROC, Reminiscences of William Benton (August 9, 1968), on pages 171 in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 replaced the Board of Foreign Service Personnel, a body concerned solely with administering the system of promotions, with the Board of the Foreign Service, which was responsible more broadly for the personnel system as a whole, and created the position of Director-General of the Foreign Service.

world in the future. The ignorance and weaknesses in the flow of information were caused by the inefficiency of the negotiations in Paris to produce binding decisions which would have made it possible to define a more farsighted foreign policy. In the House of Representatives this was typically interpreted as structural communication problems in the State Department. It was in this they wanted to intervene. The problematic nature of the situation was enhanced by the fact that Connally and Vandenberg's activity towards the House Foreign Affairs Committee and its Foreign Relations sub-committee gave exaggerated alarm signals about the state of foreign policy. Accordingly, Byrnes's poor accessibility in Washington did nothing to improve the Secretary of State's direct contact with Congressmen. Moreover, due to the Paris Conference, Byrnes was forced to drop out of the weekly *Our Foreign Policy* program on NBC, in which foreign policy was thereafter commented on only by Senators Connally and Scott E. Lucas.⁷⁸⁴ With the internal and structural reorganization of the State Department drawing more and more attention in Congress, Byrnes was forced to return to Paris during the last week of July to commence the 21-nation peace conference, which was intended to be definitive. Speaking at the departure ceremony, Byrnes called for bipartisanship, and swore the end of the isolation policy:

We are all working together not as partisans of any political party, or of any branch of Government, we are working together as Americans. We are of one mind that America must never return to isolation. However difficult may be the paths of international cooperation, we know there can be no security in isolation. We are deeply conscious that if we as a nation are to exert our influence on the affairs of the world, we must be united. The world cannot rely upon the cooperation of a divided America whose foreign policy is guided by temporarily political expediency.⁷⁸⁵

4.2 A war of nerves in the name of world peace

4.2.1 The 21-Nation Paris Peace Conference

The 21-nation Paris Peace Conference commenced on July 29, 1946 in the wake of the seemingly good atmosphere of the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers, which had ended only a few weeks before. The Council of Foreign Ministers was extended to five members when China was included in the Big Five and in the countries required to ultimately accept the peace treaties. In addition to these, representatives of the 16 nations that were entitled to comment on the discussions of the proposed peace treaties were present. However, in addition to the Big Five, only those countries that were interested parties, were assembled in the separate committees for politics, economy and military affairs.

⁷⁸⁴ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F23, Confidential Release For Publication At 6:00 P.M., E.S.T., (7:00 P.M., E.D.S.T), Saturday, July 27, 1946. Not To Be Previously Published, Quoted From or Used in Any Way.

⁷⁸⁵ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F22, Reply of The Secretary of State to Farewell Greetings on Departing for Paris on July 27th, 1946.

What was also new was the principle of transparency, which Byrnes had already insisted on at the second meeting of the Paris Conference. The publicity, which had proven to be beneficial in the case of Iran, now made the Conference open to the press.⁷⁸⁶

Transparency also led to suspicions about the motives of the complicated peace process. The roles of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Peace Conference were muddled in the public eye, as the hierarchy between them was very unclear. According to Byrnes's statement, the objective of the Council of Foreign Ministers was still to "harmonize their viewpoints so far as possible to avoid conflict, friction and misunderstanding" before the actual Peace Conference. If this objective was not reached, the Peace Conference would serve in an advisory and recommendatory capacity. In Byrnes's opinion, the Soviet Union had violated this principle by announcing that it would not accept the commencement of the Peace Conference until all "fundamental" issues had been decided at the Council of Foreign Ministers. This had been done, but only where the Soviet Union was concerned. On August 15 Byrnes complained and regretted that all questions that were fundamental to the United States were instead the object of fierce objection from the Soviet government and thus remained unresolved:

We do not object to the Soviet Government's vigorously presenting its viewpoint on these issues before the conference. We did not and do not ask the Soviet to come to agreement with us on these issues before we would be willing to discuss them with our Allies in this Conference. But we do object to a misrepresentation of our position and our motives. We do object to accusations being made against the Italian Government because in its opening statement it did not on all issues associate itself with the Soviet point of view.⁷⁸⁷

Although on the surface Byrnes addresses at the Paris Peace Conference had become unusually emphatic, the Secretary of State's speeches contained much bitterness towards the tactics of the Soviet Union. Perhaps by relying on the Russian volition to engage in unwritten bartering based on a gentlemen's agreement, Byrnes had already conceded certain benefits to the Soviet Union in the Council meetings in the summer. The Italian issue had been resolved with the questions of reparations and dominions, which the Soviet Union considered to be fundamental. Only with regard to Trieste was the United States able to fight for its own objectives. Only by re-emphasizing his concept of the sovereign equality of peoples could the Secretary of State express his condemnation towards the satellite state ideology. On the other hand, Byrnes exploited the transparency of the Peace Conference by reiterating the lend-and-lease program worth over 11 billion dollars which was directed toward the Soviet Union during the war. At the same time he emphasized that the war had cost American taxpayers over 400 billion dollars. With the United States having officially resigned from all demands for territory or reparation, the Soviet

⁷⁸⁶ Curry 1965, pp. 242–243. "Open diplomacy". Ward 1979, p. 133.

⁷⁸⁷ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F3, Remarks of The Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State and Delegate of The United States of America To The Paris Peace Conference, At The Plenary Session Morning of August 15, 1946.

Union and its significant demand for reparations were placed in a bad light. In the case of Italy it was obvious that the United States, who had supported Italy with 900 million dollars since the signing of the truce, had in practice financed the reparations promised to the Soviet Union.⁷⁸⁸

In the Paris Peace Conference an agitated Byrnes brought out an incident which had taken place in the summer at the Council of Foreign Ministers in which Molotov had already accepted the convening of the Peace Conference, but the following day had set as its condition the formulating of the Conference procedure. Ever since the London Conference, procedural issues had had a bad taste and moreover, not sending the invitations to the Peace Conference suggested that Molotov wanted to reach an agreement on some issues on a ministerial level. Byrnes was in favor of a procedure formulated by the Conference itself and was frustrated by the Soviet Union's desire to once again meddle with procedural issues. Now in Paris, the Secretary of State advised the Peace Conference to draw its attention to the content of the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers rather than the procedure, and threatened to submit the protocols on the matter to the court of public opinion:

In the United States we have a free press, therefore, the Soviet Representative can be sure that his charges impugning the motives of the United States have been published today in the United States press. I challenge him to secure or permit publication in the Soviet Union of the statement I have now made. I have confidence in the people of the Soviet Republic. When their backs were to the wall and they were making a gallant fight against great odds, the United States promised aid. They didn't question the good faith of the United States. To the best of our ability we came to their aid. Today we have only admiration and respect for the people of the Soviet Union and we will not permit that admiration and respect to be lessened by any attack by Mr. Molotov.⁷⁸⁹

Before moving on to content issues, the voting issue caused problems. The British suggested both a simple majority as well as a three-fifths majority instead of the simple majority and a two-thirds majority. The letter had been suggested previously. With both the Americans and the Chinese supporting this proposal, the Soviet Union and France suggested the application of a simple two-thirds majority to all proposals, but in the case of a simple qualified majority, the freedom to choose would be transferred to the Council of Foreign Ministers accepting the terms of the peace treaties. Byrnes did not consider the difference between the British and Russian views to be great, and when voted on, the British proposal was accepted with a 16-5 majority with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland, Belarus and Czechoslovakia being in the minority.⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁸⁸ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F3, Remarks of The Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State and Delegate of The United States of America To The Paris Peace Conference, At The Plenary Session Morning of August 15, 1946.

⁷⁸⁹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F1, Remarks of The Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State and Delegate of The United States of America, At The Meeting of The Committee of Procedure, Paris Peace Conference, Tuesday, August 6, 1946.

⁷⁹⁰ Byrnes 1947, p. 140.

Molotov had been defeated on the voting issue and considered the defeat to be the result of an Anglo-American bloc. Molotov's comments were a sore spot for Byrnes, and he thought it was impossible for Molotov to understand that less significant countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa, Australia or New Zealand could have opinions of their own.⁷⁹¹ The British policy supported by Byrnes seemed justified in that in the case of a two-thirds majority, Byrnes promised that the United States would adopt the position of the majority in the Council of Foreign Ministers regardless of previous objectives. Even in the case of a simple majority, Byrnes promised to seriously consider the final position of the United States at the Council of Foreign Ministers, which still required unanimity on all decision:

In accordance with our belief, I announced in my opening speech that the United States would support the agreements made in the council, but, as I had stated in the council, I would vote on each proposal of procedure regardless of the suggestions submitted by the council. Should the conference, on any question of substance not agreed to by the council, make a recommendation by a two-thirds majority. I would exert every effort to secure adoption of that recommendation by the council regardless of how the United States voted in the peace conference. Mr. Molotov immediately charged that our position, which was also taken by the rules of procedure for the conference. The first time I overlooked his accusation, but when it was renewed with the evident purpose of giving offense, I read from the record of the council six different statements I had made reserving for the United States the right to vote for any amendment on procedure. I stated I had made the reservation so often only because I knew the tactics of Mr. Molotov.⁷⁹²

On August 5, Byrnes specified his position to more strongly support the two-thirds majority decisions, for he suspected the ability of a simple majority to convince the US Senate to ratify the decisions in question. This is why the Secretary of State, differing from his previous approach, wanted to refrain from supporting all decisions accepted with a qualified majority:

The Secretary in agreeing to these proposals said that he wished it clearly understood that when the conference convened the United States was entirely free to accept or reject on its merits any amendment or new proposals concerning rules of procedure which might be offered. He [Byrnes] said he had no particular changes or amendments in mind but he could not bind the United States in advance to taking a dishonest position in regard to any amendment or new proposal on rules of procedure because of prior agreement with his three colleagues.⁷⁹³

Thus the Paris Peace Conference produced two kinds of recommendations for the Council of Foreign Ministers: ones made with a simple majority and others made with a two-thirds majority. The results of the voting issue were clearly ambivalent, but one cannot speak of a bloc as such, except in the case of the Soviet Union and its allies, and even then only mildly. After all, power relations had already been agreed on in Yalta, where Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill had

⁷⁹¹ Ibid.

⁷⁹² Byrnes 1947, p. 139.

⁷⁹³ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F27, Following are remarks of the Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State and delegate of the United States of America. Delivered at meeting of the Commission on Procedure, Paris Peace Conference, August 5.

planned a 6-6-6 division. On the one hand, Byrnes's peace policy demanded visible results, which a simple majority clearly facilitated. Again, it was a question of postponing fundamentally difficult issues, as the voting results at the Peace Conference would continue to have only a suggestive, albeit publicly very strong effect on the decision of the Council. On the other hand, Byrnes saw the matter in a reverse light:

The Council of Foreign Ministers in the drafting of the final treaties is pledged not only to take into account the recommendations here made, but not to reject any of them arbitrarily. The United States will stand by its agreements in the Council. But if the conference should, by a two-thirds vote of the governments here represented, make a contrary recommendation, the United States will use its influence to secure the adoption of that recommendation by the Council. The United States believes that those who fought the war should make the peace.⁷⁹⁴

Presumably, Molotov's definitive two-thirds majority on all decisions would have delayed the meeting, as from the previous meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers some two dozen central and very controversial issues already remained unresolved. In response to Molotov's comments on a bloc, Byrnes considered it a good thing that many of the Soviet Union's proposals lost by even more than a two-thirds majority.⁷⁹⁵ In practice, this meant at least one country from the Slavic bloc breaking away from the common position, which happened only rarely and even then largely because of tactical reasons. On the other hand, Molotov's bloc produced some good results. Because of it, Greece's proposal of a simple majority on all points of discussion, The Netherlands' proposal regarding the participation of all countries in all commissions and New Zealand's proposal to elect Bidault as the permanent Chairman of the Conference were all toppled.

In Paris, Byrnes thought it remarkable that the Soviet representatives wanted simple and swift acceptance of the draft peace treaties from the Council meetings in the spring.⁷⁹⁶ Since the spring, the situation had turned on its head. In his opening address Byrnes demanded that each point should be voted on separately regardless of previous proposals.⁷⁹⁷ Both the issues of Trieste and the Danube, which were expected to be the most problematic of all contentual questions, came no closer to a solution in Paris. The violation of Yugoslavian air space in August and the shooting down of an American military aircraft had an undeniable effect of the atmosphere between the US and Yugoslavia, but after Molotov had pulled the Slavic bloc back into line, the incident diffused. The shooting down of an American aircraft may have had a greater significance to

⁷⁹⁴ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F24, Remarks of The Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State and Delegate of The United States of America, July 30, 1946.

⁷⁹⁵ Byrnes 1947, p. 140.

⁷⁹⁶ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F24, Remarks of the Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State and Delegate of The United States of America, July 30, 1946; FRUS 1946. Draft Peace Treaties With Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. Passim.

⁷⁹⁷ Byrnes 1947, p. 139.

the ordinary American, who certainly experienced it as the first clear attack on friendship and alliance.⁷⁹⁸

Eventually, the Italian-Yugoslavian border question, which was resolved along the lines of a compromise suggested earlier by the French, was passed on to the Council of Foreign Ministers for acceptance by a vote of 15–6. Also a compromise on achieving the “ethnic balance” of the Trieste free-trade area was passed on for acceptance.⁷⁹⁹ On the issue of control of the Danube, the Soviet Union received atonement, when both Bevin and Vandenberg, who had supported the international control of the river for historical reasons, were forced to settle for a supervisory body made up of the Big Four and the nations along the river.⁸⁰⁰ On the issue of the Danube, bipartisanship seems to have worked in the opposite direction for a change, as even Vandenberg had previously been opposed to Byrnes’s idea of giving the rights of the coastal states to other nations.⁸⁰¹

The question of reparations also remained unresolved. From Finland, Romania and Hungary, the Conference accepted reparations worth 300 million US dollars, which the Soviet Union had stipulated in its terms of peace in 1945. The proposal Byrnes had promised on the right of the Soviet Union to reparations from Italy to the sum of 100 million US dollars was also accepted, but the discussions regarding it included a peculiar twist. Apparently to lessen the possibility of smaller countries demanding reparations from Italy, the United States demanded reparations of 20 billion dollars and Britain demanded reparations of 11 billion dollars⁸⁰² which they had no intention of collecting according to Byrnes.⁸⁰³ In the end, a proposal for 100 million dollars in reparations to Yugoslavia and Greece and 25 million dollars to Ethiopia was also accepted. Albania was excluded from the reparations issue.⁸⁰⁴

During the two-and-a-half-month Conference, much progress was made with regard to the peace treaties which Byrnes had thought would be easy a year earlier in London.⁸⁰⁵ However, outside the Italian, Romanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Finnish peace treaties, the fate of Austria and Germany was still uncertain. Byrnes’s hard-line policy towards the Soviet Union was largely due to bipartisanship and especially to the influence of senators Vandenberg and Connally. During the Peace Conference, the shooting down of an American

⁷⁹⁸ The Yugoslavian Government paid compensation for the bereavement of 150,000 dollars on October 9. BP. Series 10: Books, B3:F14, Chronology.

⁷⁹⁹ FRUS 1946. Memorandum on the Territorial Clauses Concerning the Frontier Between Italy and Yugoslavia and the Free Territory of Trieste. Articles 3, 4, and 16. Volume IV, Paris Peace Conference: Documents, pp. 127–128.

⁸⁰⁰ Byrnes 1947, p. 149.

⁸⁰¹ Ward 1979, p. 138.

⁸⁰² FRUS 1946. Record of Conference Recommendations by the Conference on Draft Peace. Treaty With Italy. Articles 64 A and B. Volume IV, Paris Peace Conference: Documents, pp. 901–902.

⁸⁰³ Byrnes 1947, p. 148.

⁸⁰⁴ FRUS 1946. Draft Peace Treaties, Section I – Reparation, Article 64 A and B. Volume IV, Paris Peace Conference: Documents, pp. 25–26.

⁸⁰⁵ The Paris Peace Conference was actually held in Paris between July 27 and October 17, 1946.

military aircraft in Yugoslavian air space, which received much publicity, increased the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Apparently, it became evident to Byrnes that the high wire act between public demands and consensus was no longer possible.

With Molotov again speaking of the Anglo-American bloc that had been created against the Soviet Union and of American fascists, it was altogether a miracle that any kind of agreement was reached. Also peculiar was the fact that Byrnes had invited both Vandenberg and Connally to Paris, both of whom had been highly critical of Byrnes in the past.⁸⁰⁶ Perhaps by Republicanizing his own image in public Byrnes could, in the event that the Conference failed, abandon ship with a broader political crew. On the other hand, cooperation between the parties in matters of foreign policy had been a generally accepted principle even during the war.⁸⁰⁷

Undoubtedly bipartisanship also had significance abroad, as the return to isolation policy after the First World War had caused disagreement between the two parties. Now the successful cooperation across party lines was used to signal to the world the United States' desire to take part in world affairs. Byrnes clearly did not want to make the same mistake as President Woodrow Wilson had 27 years earlier, when he traveled to the Paris Peace Conference in Versailles with no leading Republicans aboard.⁸⁰⁸ This led to the victory of the Republicans in the Congressional elections and to the refusal of the Senate to ratify the peace treaty before July 1921. Conflict between the parties was also partially the reason why the United States remained outside of the League of Nations, which Byrnes did not want repeated with regard to the publicly significant UN.

Byrnes's new Republican tendency was a clear result of a change in the public opinion. Already in the spring, opinion polls had shown the Americans' growing desire for right-wing politics, which during the summer and fall of 1946 was evident in the fading of confidence towards and a fear of the Soviet Union. In September, only 24 percent of British people considered the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union to continue to be allies, whereas 50 percent felt the wartime relationships between the countries had ended.⁸⁰⁹ This trend walked hand in hand with the fear of another major war, which was rapidly growing in the United States. In the spring of 1945, only 38 percent thought it likely that the United States would be driven to another major war in the next 25 years, but a year later the figure was 69 percent. The peak in the spring 1946 was probably largely caused by concrete crises, but in August 1946 the figure was still quite high at 65 percent. The numbers of those who thought

⁸⁰⁶ Byrnes 1947, pp. 140–141.

⁸⁰⁷ Bipartisanship. Haugse & Hill 1952, pp. 355–369; Messer 1982, p. 143.

⁸⁰⁸ Kero 1991, pp. 341–343.

⁸⁰⁹ The Quarter's Polls. BIPO Sept. '46, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Volume 10, Issue 4 (Winter 1946–1947), p. 619.

another major war was unlikely was on respective dates, 54 percent, 19 percent and 16 percent.⁸¹⁰

In the spring of 1946 in the United States, which possessed a monopoly on the atomic weapon, 47 percent of people believed that the atomic weapon would reduce the risk of a major war, and in Britain the corresponding figure was 51 percent.⁸¹¹ But already in August, 46 percent of Brits considered the downsides of an atomic weapon to be greater than its upsides.⁸¹² In May of 1946, 42 percent of Americans⁸¹³ believed that another state was already manufacturing atomic bombs and in September, 78 percent⁸¹⁴ approved of surrendering the manufacture and use of atomic energy to the supervision of an international organization, which seems to have been a clear reaction to the inefficiency of atomic diplomacy and a result of it having proved impossible. Nonetheless, the tense superpower atmosphere of 1946 required action, which was illustrated by the publicity campaign from the Iranian crisis. This time the bone of contention was Germany, into which all the problems of the Soviet Union and the United States seemed to have been drawn.

4.2.2 The German issue dampens the mood?

One of the continuous issues of post war Europe, the issue of Germany, had once again been raised in the summer when Molotov demanded reparations of 10 billion dollars from Germany. The Russians still considered a weak Germany central to their defense, whereas in the West the significant financial repression of Germany was not considered sensible. Even in Byrnes's opinion, Germany was not to be punished with made-up demands for reparations, and the issue presenting itself when the negotiations were in the home stretch gave him much chagrin. Germany had been of interest to Byrnes even before becoming Secretary of State. In the fall of 1944, President Roosevelt had even suggested a post as Ambassador to Germany, an essential part of which would have been the economic reorganization of Germany. However, Roosevelt needed the director of the OWM at home and had to lament the impossibility of splitting Byrnes into two. Byrnes later declined the post.⁸¹⁵

The guidelines of the US policy on post-war Germany had been sketched in the fall of 1944. In the beginning of September, the State Department defined its views on terms of surrender, occupation zones and military administration. With regard to the partition of Germany it was considered important that the

⁸¹⁰ The Quarter's Polls. AIPO Aug. 14, '46, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 10, Issue 3 (Autumn 1946), p. 426.

⁸¹¹ The Quarter's Polls. BIPO Feb. '46, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 10, Issue 1 (Spring 1946), p. 106.

⁸¹² The Quarter's Polls. BIPO May '46, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 10, Issue 3 (Autumn 1946), p. 401.

⁸¹³ The Quarter's Polls. AIPO May 22, '46, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 10, Issue 2 (Summer 1946), p. 247.

⁸¹⁴ The Quarter's Polls. AIPO Aug. 7, '46, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 10, Issue 3 (Autumn 1946), p. 402.

⁸¹⁵ BP. Series 10: Books, B8:F8, Memorandum for Hon. James F. Byrnes, September 7, 1944; From Byrnes to Hopkins, 9.9.1944; From Byrnes to Roosevelt, 13.9.1944.

segmentation of the country not mean the adjustment of its external borders or the removal of its territories. Although it was feared that the partition of Germany would increase the economic risk of all of Europe, it was the position of the US that “if any tendencies toward spontaneous partition of Germany arise, they should not be discouraged”. In an economic sense the report demonstrated the Americans’ far-reaching right to control the German economy after surrender. A report by Secretary of War Stimson, prepared at the time of the Potsdam conference, recommended that the return to peace in Europe be handled as one whole. The US position on reparations was clear. It was not in the objectives of the Americans to demand reparations and the United States otherwise had “no interest in building up German economy in order to collect continuing reparations. This position did not concern small, war-torn countries, whose rights to reparations were recognized. As an economic-political whole, the Americans’ wanted to bring the German standard of living down to the limit of subsistence in order to eliminate German economic might in Europe and to change the structure of the German economy to become dependent on imports and exports, so that it could not return to the military industry on its own.”⁸¹⁶

Byrnes had tentatively outlined the German issue already in the final stretch of the Paris Conference, when the issue, which was not on the agenda, had been preliminarily discussed mainly with representatives from Britain.⁸¹⁷ However, French representatives whose interest in Germany was geographical as well had brought up the existence of the German issue in several meetings of Foreign Ministers. Particularly in the Paris Conference that summer, the issue had been actively brought out at Bidault’s initiative.⁸¹⁸ At that time, Byrnes suggested a five-point four-power disarmament agreement, which kept the political and economic issues aside.⁸¹⁹ This was understandably not in the interest of the Soviet Union, as the Soviet representatives emphasized receiving reparations from Germany, and perhaps even felt that Byrnes’s draft was a threat to their demands. Byrnes noticed Molotov’s dissatisfaction in the matter and according to his memoirs even warned him to not consider the reparations and other “minor difficulties of the occupation” as more important than the European security sought by the United States.⁸²⁰

⁸¹⁶ BP. Series 10: Books, B8:F8, American Policy for Treatment of Germany after Surrender, September 1, 1944; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F8, Memorandum for the President. The Rehabilitation of Europe as a Whole, 22 July 1945, Berlin, Germany; BP. Series 10: Books, B8:F8, Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany From The Cabinet Committee For The President, September 4, 1944.

⁸¹⁷ FRUS 1946. C.F.M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 ; US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Seventh Informal Meeting, Paris, May 15, 1946, 11 a.m. Volume II, pp. 393-400.

⁸¹⁸ Ibid.

⁸¹⁹ DAFR 1945-1946. Draft Treaty for the Disarmament and Demilitarization Treaty of Germany, Submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers by the Secretary of State (Byrnes), April 29, 1946. Volume VIII, pp. 205-208.

⁸²⁰ Byrnes 1947, p. 175.

In the beginning of July 1946, Molotov gave two statements about the German issue which were obvious counterblasts to the draft proposal of a disarmament agreement for Germany drafted by Byrnes. In his statements Molotov questioned the capability of the proposal to disarm Germany both militarily and economically:

The said document is confined to the enumeration of certain military and war economy measures but even those measures are set forth in it in a less comprehensive form than this was done in the decisions of the Berlin Conference of the leaders of the three powers which in addition indicated other no less essential conditions of safeguarding security and lasting peace. For this reason the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that if the treaty between the four powers is confined only to what it says regarding Germany's disarmament it cannot be a reliable guarantee of security in Europe and the world. On the contrary the inadequacy of the measures it sets forth might harbor the danger of Germany's resurgence as an aggressive power.⁸²¹

Molotov had also irritated the French by highlighting Germany's important status in the world economy and by deploring the idea of the pastoralization of the country. According to Molotov such development would only benefit the reactionary circles in Germany and would weaken Europe's stability and lasting peace.⁸²² At the same time the Soviet Union had further reiterated the status of the reparations as accordant with the Potsdam Agreement. Once again the problems of power politics seemed to have welled from the interpretation conflicts of conferences like Yalta and Potsdam which defined broad policies. In his memoirs Byrnes believed that the Soviet Union was not interested in the execution of the Potsdam Agreements, and that it would take years before it would accept a peace treaty for Germany without being "forced by world opinion".⁸²³

The statements Molotov made in Paris infuriated Byrnes firstly because Molotov had given a copy of his speech to the press before it was brought to the attention of his colleagues, which was unusual. Secondly, according to Byrnes's memoirs, Molotov sought to please the Germans by criticizing "fashionable" talks on the division of Germany into several autonomous states and being completely silent about "the Soviet Union's support of Poland's claim for Silesia and all the territory east of the Oder and Neisse rivers". The image Byrnes had received of Soviet objectives in Germany was otherwise quite negative:

They would utilize their veto power on the Allied Control Council and in the Council of Foreign Ministers to secure adoption of their conception of a 'democratic' government; to secure a part in the control of German industry, the industries of the Ruhr in particular, and to enforce the payment of 10 billion dollars of reparations.⁸²⁴

⁸²¹ FRUS 1946. C.F.M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 ; US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Eight Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 9, 1946, 5 p.m. Volume II, pp. 842-847.

⁸²² FRUS 1946. C.F.M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 ; US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Ninth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 10, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, pp. 869-873.

⁸²³ Byrnes 1947, pp. 180-182.

⁸²⁴ Ibid.

The German issue was largely a question of whether Germany should be maintained as an economic whole or whether its industries should be paralyzed in order to avoid the threat of war. The current situation was beneficial to the Soviet Union both politically and economically as it was able to maintain its control over East Germany. In this situation, the delay was to the advantage of the Soviet Union, as it was able to assert more pressure on the issue of reparations and to increase the political and economic authority it desired in its occupation zone. From a corresponding economic perspective, France was also interested in the perpetuation of the occupation zones. However, another important factor with regard to France was the fear of a united Germany and of losing its position between the Soviet Union and the United States and Britain.⁸²⁵

According to Byrnes, a materially and ideologically “airtight compartmentalization” of Germany into four different compartments would lead to inflation and economic stagnation therefore causing considerable costs to the occupiers and unnecessary suffering for the Germans. Treating Germany as one economic whole had in Byrnes’s opinion been defined in Potsdam and therefore the United States could join its sector with that of other occupiers if it so wished. Britain “accepted in principle” the treatment of its sector as an economic unit together with the American sector.⁸²⁶ Britain had three alternative approaches to the peace of Europe. These were crystallized in Paris by Bevin, and they were about to be adapted to the German situation: “A balance of power between states of equal strength; Domination by one power or two blocs of powers; united Control by the four powers with the cooperation of their Allies”. Britain had clearly chosen the third way as paved by Byrnes. Bevin however could not convince France that there was no danger of united Prussia.⁸²⁷ The initiative made by Byrnes on the day after Molotov’s speech, July 11, is justly considered on one hand a counterblast to Molotov’s outlook and on the other hand a testimony to United States’ reluctance to approve all Soviet aims in the German case.⁸²⁸

⁸²⁵ FRUS 1946. C.F.M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 ; US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Ninth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 10, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, pp. 860-864.

⁸²⁶ DAFR 1945-1946. Statement by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) on American Policy in Establishing Central Controls for Economic Unity of Germany, July 11, 1946. Volume VIII, pp. 208-209.

⁸²⁷ FRUS 1946. C.F.M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 ; US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Ninth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 10, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, p. 865. The fear of a united Prussia was central in French German attitudes during the whole Cold War. That was also the key factor which influenced François Mitterrand, when the German issue became acute in 1989. In the United States, Herbert P. Lee considered a united Prussia as worse scenario than a united Germany in general. Lee had respect within anti-isolationist circles, because in his book, *Friends of Democracy, Awake and Act*, published in 1938, he estimated that isolation politics would lead to the Second World War. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F10, Germany is An Atomic Bomb, Herbert P. Lee.

⁸²⁸ Conover 1978, p. 123.

Four days later Byrnes spoke even more emphatically against a compartmentalized Germany and demanded a procedure in accordance with Potsdam for the organization of an economically unified Germany. The Secretary of State was extremely concerned that the division into occupation zones had led to the inability of each zone to be self-sustaining. According to Byrnes's calculations, the American occupation zone alone cost 200 million dollars a year of taxpayers' money and despite this, Germany was under threat of inflation and economic paralysis. The central administrative systems required to organize an economically unified Germany had raised objections among the French. In his press release on July 15, Byrnes described the setting quite openly:

The French Government which had previously opposed the establishment of central administrative agencies indicated their willingness to accept our proposal when we suggested that the Saar be excluded from the jurisdiction of these agencies. The British agreed. But the Soviets said they could not agree to the exclusion of the Saar without further study, and therefore no immediate progress was possible. I made clear that we were unwilling to share responsibility for the economic paralysis and suffering we felt certain would follow a continuance of present conditions in Germany.⁸²⁹

Byrnes considered the threatening economic status of Germany to be irresponsibly caused by the Soviet Union and France. At the same time the Secretary of State indicated that the Americans had prepared to "administer our zone in conjunction with any one or more of the other zones as an economic unit". In his own words Byrnes sought to explain that the objective of the Americans was not to divide Germany, but on the contrary to bring it together.⁸³⁰ Anne Deighton has suggested that Byrnes's idea came originally from Bevin. A day before Bevin had announced that Britain would unilaterally revive the economy of its own occupation zone, which Deighton has seen as the origin of the "Anglo-American bizon" and the precursor of the eventual West German state.⁸³¹ Nevertheless, Byrnes, who had earned his spurs with his economic competence, was hardly provoked by Bevin's "threat to organize the British zone" as "the most logical consequence of the military zonal division", as Deighton claims. From Byrnes's point of view, his offer to merge the zones economically was totally in line with the Potsdam agreements and in addition to that it offered a great opportunity to save money and improve on the economic situation in Germany. Contrary to the idea that the "Anglo-American bizon" developed into the later West German state posited by the revisionists, Byrnes might have seen an economically unified Germany as a precursor of "the United States of Germany".⁸³²

⁸²⁹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F21, Confidential Release For Publication At 9:00 P.M., E.S.T, Monday, July 15, 1946. Not To Be Previously Published, Quoted or Used In Any Way.

⁸³⁰ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F21, Confidential Release For Publication At 9:00 P.M., E.S.T, Monday, July 15, 1946. Not To Be Previously Published, Quoted or Used In Any Way.

⁸³¹ Deighton 1990, pp. 93-102.

⁸³² Byrnes had an idea of a "United States of Germany". See Chapter 4.4.1.

At any rate, in Byrnes's attitude towards the German situation, he seems to have transposed the soft peace in his patois with a hard peace. Leon L. Rice, a friend of the Secretary of State from South Carolina, wrote to Byrnes about only now gaining an understanding of how softly the Americans had regarded world politics after the First World War, and felt that he had converted into a supporter of a hard peace. Rice considered this forgiving nature to be a characteristic of the English-speaking world in general, and assumed that the Soviet Union would adopt an even tougher position on Germany.⁸³³

The *Policy and Information Statements* report, which was completed under Byrnes's direction on August 9, updated US policies with regard to all foreign countries. In the case of Germany, the policy sought to prevent Germany from starting a new war and to give Germans the opportunity "to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis". The bases for this objective were Directive 1067, which had been formulated in the spring of 1945 regarding military leadership, and the Potsdam Agreement. The German policy was to be formulated on the basis of internal guidelines, but also under the cover of the Potsdam Agreement, which brought international acceptance.⁸³⁴

What became the most important variable in defining German policy was undeniably the formation of the economic circumstances which had developed quite distinctly in each occupation zone. Politically, the situation was anticipated to culminate in an economically unified Germany in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, or in an economic unit encompassing only the American occupied zone. The report highlighted France as the greatest objector of the former option. Reluctant France was seen to emphasize its demands for detaching the Ruhr and the Rhineland from Germany. France's obstructionist policy was seen in this regard to work to the advantage of the Soviet Union, and the report had no confidence in the genuine desire of the Soviet Union to organize a central administration of Germany. From the American perspective, the division of Germany into occupied zones was seen to favor the Soviet Union, as it was able to operate with sovereignty in its own occupied zone and was also able to operate in other occupied zones through the German Communist Party.⁸³⁵ At the same time, the Americans' concern highlighted the uneven distribution of natural resources in the disconnected Germany. A well founded argument about the link between the economic separation and the

⁸³³ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F21, From Rice to Byrnes, 16.7.1946.

⁸³⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B14:F6. Policy and Information Statement, Germany, 5.8.1946.

⁸³⁵ In the Department of State they had been analyzed very carefully the views of French socialists which were unfolding in Félix Gouin's and Léon Blum's speeches, for instance. Many of them wanted to break with the line of de Gaulle and Bidault whereby the security of France could only be achieved by disconnecting the Ruhr, the Rhineland and the Saar from Germany politically, economically and regionally. According to the report, the socialists were ready to content themselves with the occupation of Rhine's western bank and international control over the Ruhr's economic resources.

German capacity was never effectively used in the politicking among Foreign Ministers.⁸³⁶

4.3 Byrnes and the issue of Germany – a turning point or a continuum of foreign policy?

4.3.1 The Stuttgart Speech

The speech held by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946 was an exceptional statement of foreign policy. Byrnes, who had gone to the American occupied zone of Germany as a recreational excursion during the ongoing 21-Nation Paris Peace Conference, had not written a heading for his speech in his notes, but in State Department records the speech has been titled *Restatement of Policy on Germany* or *The Stuttgart Speech*. The former title is justified as the speech is about Germany and demonstrates the problems of the German situation and presents solutions to them from an American perspective. In his speech Byrnes emphasized that the Americans would adhere to the reparations agreed upon in Potsdam and to the demilitarization of Germany. At the same time the Secretary of State objected to the ideas presented by Henry Morgenthau about transforming Germany into an agricultural state. Byrnes intervened in the July discussion on occupation by criticizing the severity of the border zones and demanding that Germany remain as one economic unit in the spirit of Potsdam. Territorially, he favored the incorporation of the Saar territory into France, but wanted both the Ruhr and the Rhineland to remain connected to Germany.

The exceptional nature of the speech is also evident in the setting, which was significant for a speech of its time. Byrnes arrived in Stuttgart in Hitler's private train, and according to *Time Magazine*, he slept the night in Hitler's bed. From the Stuttgart railway station he was taken under army escort to the State Theater where diplomats, soldiers and civilians from Germany and the United States had gathered. Also present were journalists from the Soviet Union and other countries. Although the Secretary of State gave his speech in English, it was broadcast on the radio across Germany through simultaneous interpretation. In the US, a short summary of the speech was shown on film, and only Byrnes arriving at the State Theater and the segment of the speech regarding the economic future of Germany were edited.⁸³⁷ Stuttgart held special significance as a location for the speech, as the city had had an important role in the administrative reorganization of Germany almost a year earlier, when the Länderrat – a cooperative organization of the states located in the American occupied zone of Germany – was established there. What was initially intended

⁸³⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B14:F6. Policy and Information Statement, Germany, 5.8.1946, p. 36.

⁸³⁷ *Time Magazine* 16.9.1946, "Journey to Stuttgart"; Internet archive (www), Universal Newsreels. Byrnes Sets U.S. Policy for Germany, 10.9.1946.

to be an advisory body was quickly flooded with economic issues, and its administrative powers in economic issues were increased. The significance of the *Länderrat* in US foreign policy was highlighted when the economic cooperation between the military administration in Berlin and the *Länderrat* increased. In this light, choosing Stuttgart as a venue for the speech served a clear economic policy purpose, which sought to advance Germany's economic recovery and the decentralization of power by reforming administrative structures on all levels.⁸³⁸

In his memoirs Byrnes did not specify the target audience of his speech. In his view, the speech was not specifically targeted at anyone, but just focused on Germany.⁸³⁹ Although Byrnes's own observations about the target of the speech can be considered justified, the speech includes a significant amount of preparation to prevent possible negative repercussions as well as the desire to completely separate any interpretations from power politics. The State Department's interest in the reactions to the speech speaks of a more accurate interpretation. This is highlighted by an exceptionally large amount of inquiries into the effects of the speech, for which preparations had clearly been made beforehand. In the days following the speech, the US military administration in Germany produced reports on the views of the press and the radio and film industry, as well as on public opinion.⁸⁴⁰ People's reactions were researched through the ICD Surveys Unit's surveys in three counties. In light of the research, the speech was judged to be a significant report on the status of Germany on the one hand, and as an assurance of the rejection of isolation policy on the other. In general, the speech was seen to have clarified US policy on Germany "in practically all important respects". Except for Byrnes's statement on the Saar territory, Byrnes message was received with the utmost positivity. According to estimates, the end of speculations on US policy had a more significant effect on the future of Germany.⁸⁴¹

As stated in the report, the Stuttgart Speech seems to have had the intention of intervening in power politics, and not just of being relevant to Germany:

A race for armaments, a race for power is not in the interest of any country or any people. We want to stop the race for armaments and we want to stop the race for power. We want to be partners with all nations, not to make war, but to keep the peace. We want to uphold the rule of law among nations. We want to promote the freedom and well-being of all peoples in a friendly civilized world.

⁸³⁸ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B14:F6. Policy and Information Statement, Germany, 5.8.1946.

⁸³⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 194.

⁸⁴⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F6, Office of Military Government For Germany, Office of the Director of Information Control, 12.9.1946.

⁸⁴¹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F6, German Reactions to Byrnes's Speech. The ICD and its subordinate commands had two missions: the first was to act as the communications link between the German people and the US occupation authorities; the second was to control and reconstitute the German information services "as instrumentalities of a democratic, peace loving society".

This perspective, which is contrary to the view presented by Byrnes in his memoirs, was supported by Munich radio, among others, according to which the speech was directed at other occupying forces more than it was directed at Germany. The same body also considered the speech to clearly be a part of a dialogue, the first part of which Molotov had given in Paris on July 10. As anticipated, the leaders of the KDP reacted to the speech negatively. The Communists' criticism was firstly directed at the decision to resolve the Saar territory issue for the benefit of France, and secondly at the undemocratic way that Byrnes spoke for all of Germany. According to the report, an economically unified Germany, which had been one of the key issues in the speech, raised a lot of interest. However, enthusiasm on the topic was later coupled with insecurity regarding the desire of the other Allies to favor Byrnes's views on economic unity, to which the Secretary of State had linked his view on reparations which interpreted the Potsdam Agreement favorably for Germany. In a way the situation can be seen as a consciously constructed setting in which the other Allies were interpreted to be the barrier to treatment which was both legally correct and agreeable to Germans.⁸⁴²

4.3.2 The Stuttgart Speech and historical research

In his memoirs Byrnes describes the Stuttgart Speech primarily as a response to the insinuations Molotov had made in Paris in July regarding the pastoralization of Germany,⁸⁴³ but taking into consideration the content and extent of the speech, its consequences cannot have been completely unexpected. The significance of Byrnes's Stuttgart Speech has been much debated. Cold War research, which is abundant in conflicts between schools of thought, differentiates mainly in the guilt aspect. The connecting factor between the classical, the revisionist and later the neo-revisionist schools was an understanding that the decisive turn towards the Cold War happened somewhere between 1945 and 1947. However, earlier research has examined the turn purely in the light of historic events. Although the political aspect of this turn has been taken into account, the analysis of actual political activities has remained weak. The birth of the Cold War as a political phenomenon requires more analytical examination. The political message of the turn is thus lurking in speeches and texts. When cooperation in power politics was encapsulated into the political interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union, the birth of the Cold War must be understood more clearly as a collision on the level of political speeches.

The role of the Stuttgart Speech was put in the spotlight by Cold War researchers when the temporal distance from the event demanded an examination of broader development. Anniversaries forced contemplation on the significance of the speech in the aggregate. In the early 1970s, especially in

⁸⁴² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F6, German Reactions to Byrnes's Speech. About 500 Germans had participated in this survey.

⁸⁴³ Byrnes 1947, p. 187.

Germany, the speech was seen as a clear turning point in post-war power politics and as the starting point for German-American cooperation. From within the Cold War and the perspective of the 1970s, it was easy to gather the past 25 years into a political continuum with a unified objective, where only external variables demanded different operational models. Compliant with the thinking of its day, Byrnes's speech was encapsulated into the Truman Doctrine. Ideologically, the same unified objective was also evident in the "Nixon Doctrine", whose conditional globalism represented national interests accordant with Byrnes's thinking.⁸⁴⁴

Research by Patricia Dawson Ward, for example, has highlighted the direct effect of the Stuttgart Speech on the division of the world into two camps and ultimately on the Cold War. According to her, the speech was a sign of clear differences between the East and the West – mainly on the issue of Silesia⁸⁴⁵ – the resolution of which Byrnes wanted to be an economically unified Germany and one that would include the Ruhr and Rhineland regions.⁸⁴⁶ Robert L. Messer, on the other hand, sees Byrnes as always having sought the peaceful resolution of issues, and that his actions were not so much the cause of Cold War but rather its consequences. This view requires regarding the Cold War as a long-term process, and one earlier than Churchill's speech or the events of the fall of 1946. Also in Messer's view, the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union started on a collision course indirectly through the questions of territorial policy, where Byrnes had consciously sought to lessen the authority of the French Communists by promising the area of the Saar territory to France. Quoting Robert Murphy's research, Patricia Dawson Ward has seen the issue in the exact opposite light claiming that the speech primarily served the interests of the Germans by objecting to the internationalization of the Ruhr and Rhineland regions – to the dismay of the French.⁸⁴⁷

According to Denise Conover, an expert on Byrnes's policy on Germany, three things in the Stuttgart Speech motivated Byrnes. Firstly, Byrnes wanted to put an end to the ambiguity regarding the long-term commitment of the United States to Germany and to all of Europe. Secondly, Byrnes wanted to give a definitive response to the policy definitions Molotov had made in the summer by emphasizing that Morgenthau's plans were in no way reflective of US policy on Germany. Thirdly, he sought to receive the acceptance of the Soviet Union and France regarding his plans for the four-power cooperation in Germany and its dependency on the Potsdam decisions. According to Conover's research, these factors were in no way indicative of focused activities against the Soviet Union:

⁸⁴⁴ *Stuttgart Zeitung* 1971. "Wendepunkt der Nachkriegspolitik Beginn der Freundschaft zu den USA", 18.10.1971; *Stuttgart Nachrichten* 1971. "Peace, but not at the Expense of Others", 18.10.1971.

⁸⁴⁵ In practise the Silesian question was a comment on the dispute relating to the Polish western border; whether the border should follow the Oder River and the Eastern Neisse or the Oder River and the Western Neisse.

⁸⁴⁶ Ward 1979, pp. 139–141.

⁸⁴⁷ Messer 1982, passim; Ward 1979, p. 140.

Rather than just a challenge to the Soviets, it represented an attempt to force issues out into the open, with the hope of clarifying the differences, as well as similarities, between the Russian and Western positions. It also aimed to provide a more intelligent basis for continued negotiations. Byrnes was not so pessimistic as to believe that the truncation of Germany was inevitable and cooperation with the Russians impossible.⁸⁴⁸

John Gimbel brings a closely corresponding view to the discussion, as he does not consider the speech to reflect new policy nor even anti-Soviet policy. According to Gimbel, the objectives of the speech were primarily to rectify the fallacies presented by Molotov, to increase the authority of the US occupying forces in order to create an economically unified Germany and especially to resolve the problems caused by France in the application of the Potsdam Agreements. Gimbel shows that the real villain in the Potsdam Agreement and in its relatedness to Byrnes's speech was France, whose economic interests would have been served by a disparate Germany and especially by the Ruhr region.⁸⁴⁹ According to Gimbel, the US State Department had to all intents and purposes paved the way for the plan when the problems of the Allies – which were largely caused by the opinions of the French – had been intentionally chalked down to the Soviet Union in public. Furthermore, this was used to test the Soviet Union's ability to adhere to the Potsdam Agreements⁸⁵⁰, although a large part of what had been agreed there in the summer of 1945 had turned into "a pile of rubbish" much earlier.⁸⁵¹

John Gimbel's perspective is supported at least from the reverse perspective of the French. The immediate reaction of the French to Byrnes's speech was anything but positive, as Byrnes had demanded both the centralization of German administration – which the French abhorred – as well as the separation of the Ruhr and Rhineland regions. In the opinion polls of June 1946, particularly the separation of the Ruhr region from German territory and its demilitarization had been supported by 71 percent of the French whilst only 14 percent had approved of it remaining as a part of Germany.⁸⁵² More than half of those in Britain who were aware of the issue were also in favor of separating the Ruhr region. On the other hand, there was also support in Britain for bringing the area permanently under international control if it were to remain a part of Germany.⁸⁵³ Only the Saar region and the continued presence of American troops on German soil were satisfactory demands for the French – which from a publicity perspective was not a satisfactory solution. Neither was it a satisfactory solution for the Soviet Union, who had already demanded reparations from Germany worth 10 billion dollars and a share in the four-nation monitoring system of the Ruhr industrial region in Yalta.

⁸⁴⁸ Conover 1978, pp. 149–150.

⁸⁴⁹ Gimbel 1972, pp. 265–267.

⁸⁵⁰ Gimbel 1972, pp. 254–254.

⁸⁵¹ Gimbel 1972, p. 266.

⁸⁵² The Quarter's Polls. CIPQ June 22. '46, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 10, Issue 3 (Autumn 1946), p. 431.

⁸⁵³ The Quarter's Polls. BIPO July '46, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 10, Issue 3 (Autumn 1946), p. 432.

However, John Gimbel's theory falters in the respect that in early October Byrnes conciliated the French in his speech at the American Club in Paris where, instead of the centralized administration of Germany, Byrnes emphasized a federalist Germany with state-based administration. Now the question of German disarmament – which inflamed the French – was focused on the United States guaranteeing that Germany would not fall out of line for the entire duration of the peace treaty. *The New York Times*, which reported on the speech with the headline "Speech of Byrnes Mollifies French" described the French reception of the speech as positive. However, in France the speech was not interpreted to be an expansion of an existing policy as Byrnes put it, but largely – quoting *Le Monde* – as "Byrnes's changed policy".⁸⁵⁴ The speech had an apparent effect on economic life, which unarguably supports categorizing the speech as one on economic policy. According to the *Herald Tribune* the day after the speech industrial shares on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange climbed over ten percent on average, and banking shares climbed over thirty percent. Even though the start of September at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange had been reminiscent of a roller-coaster ride, the *Herald Tribune* attributed the climb in the share values to the "growing optimism among German industrialists and financiers". What was peculiar was the rise in the value of shares of companies operating in the Soviet occupation zone, which in the West was explained as the companies' expectations to later return to independence from under Soviet rule.⁸⁵⁵

Although the purpose of the Stuttgart Speech was, in John Gimbel's view, to put France in its place, in the long term Byrnes was easily forced to eat his words. Also, the significance of the Soviet Union as the target of the Stuttgart Speech increases after the specifications Byrnes had made in his speech towards the French, and the speech was only in conflict with Soviet demands regarding the Ruhr region. In this regard, the speech would have meant departing from the Yalta-Potsdam policy, which Gimbel does not accept. The conflict was nonetheless borne, which in itself says nothing about the original intentions of the speech. In this regard, Gimbel's theory completely excludes the possibility that the conflict which arose from the speech would have set in motion the development that ultimately led to the Truman Doctrine, regardless of the original intentions of the speech. In other words, the Stuttgart Speech could have acted as a catalyst for the Cold War only if its intention had been based on a thorough and conscious change in foreign policy against the Soviet Union. At the same time, the theory completely disregards the improved relationship between the Soviet Union and France, and the significant dominance of the French Communists.

The better part of those who have examined the speech consider it to be a gambit due to its focus on territorial policy, but only in a clearly defined, goal-oriented historical context. Even if territorial issues are considered to be the

⁸⁵⁴ *The New York Times*, 5.10.1946. Harold Callender "Speech of Byrnes Mollifies French".
⁸⁵⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B11:F18. Newsclips. *Herald Tribune*, 12.9.1946. Edwin Hatrich, German Stocks Rise in Value As Result of Speech by Byrnes.

central content of the speech, the justifications of their contribution to the Cold War prove to be completely different. In historical research, territorial issues have an established role in leading to excellent speculations about different confrontations. At the time the speech was published, radical discussions regarding territories were no longer being held in the meetings of Foreign Ministers. Instead, the territorial issues can be seen in a different light when examined in hindsight from the perspective of Germany's definitive border arrangements. All territorial questions mentioned in the speech were either settled in Potsdam or had been agreed in Potsdam that the decisions be postponed until the final peace conference. The issues of the western border of Poland and the Kaliningrad⁸⁵⁶ region ultimately eventuated differently than what was envisaged in the speech, which has unarguably had an effect on the views of the researchers emphasizing territorial policy. Nonetheless, intervening in political issues cannot be belittled as a political act, as the author of the speech considered them worth mentioning.

The Cold War debate, which was very active especially in the late 1970s, divided the historical research on Byrnes's Stuttgart Speech into two camps. One interpreted the speech to be either a radical destroyer of US-Soviet relationships, and the other to be perfectly in keeping with the long-term foreign policy of the day. However, the interpretations of the revisionist and the moderate schools of thought carry with them an enormous amount of baggage and ambiguity on whether the interpretation is based on the objectives Byrnes expressed in the speech, or on the larger aggregate. The latter view would put the speech into perspective with regard to the reasons behind its objectives and the consequences of the speech. This way, the alternative that the speech as a whole could somehow have been a turning point in power politics – even if it wasn't Byrnes's intention – would not be excluded. On the other hand, the intentions of the speech and the response it caused can hardly be completely separated. Moreover, the examination of the effects of the speech retrospectively in different periods understandably produces different interpretations. In general, the interpretation of change is likely to reflect the interpreter's relationship with the nature of the combined effect of several phenomena dependent on one another, either as a radical and short-term or moderate and long-term process, as was previously found in relation to the Cold War more broadly.

Accordingly, the question of whether the speech was such a turning point in US foreign policy which at the latest set the scene for the Cold War is a difficult one, albeit very significant. The interaction between politics and public opinion is irrefutable, but the rationalization of a conscious charging of the tensions between the East and the West to the extent they grew in the 1950s and 1960s contains a lot of hindsight and "rethinking". The Stuttgart Speech did not become the heart-stopping turn towards the Cold War even in the United States, but on a practical level it reinforced the course the Americans had

⁸⁵⁶ Königsberg was renamed Kaliningrad in 1946 after the death of Mikhail Kalinin, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.

chosen. The problems between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had slowly escalated since Roosevelt's death, were frequently tested in the issues of Germany and Iran among others, and added to the calls for a more aggressive foreign policy in the United States. In Stuttgart Byrnes took stock of the situation and dealt with the problems according to his "firmness and patience" policy.⁸⁵⁷

Nonetheless, moving to the policy of an aggressive firmness can only be considered an extremely calculated act. The risks relating to it had been estimated in a report by the State Department, completed in May, which brought out the vantage point of the Soviet Union in the event of a crisis erupting between superpowers. In foreign policy, the Soviet Union was able to act quickly and without regard to public opinion. The United States' ability to affect any possible expansionist pursuits by the Soviet Union was considered to be very weak. Financial sanctions, such as slowing down the payment of reparations or freezing foreign credit, were not believed to be effective against the centralist Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, the mobilization of public opinion in the United States and the rest of the free world was considered to be the only channel of influence towards Soviet leaders. Outspokenness was also considered necessary at home with politicians seeking support for "firm dealings with the Soviet Union". At the same time, the possibility of teaching the public to demand a policy which corresponds with the thought of a public, two-way foreign policy was justified.⁸⁵⁸ With the possibility of a military intervention proving to be impossible and a purely diplomatic protest proving to be ineffective, the Stuttgart Speech can be seen as an attempt to execute the State Department's plan by the means of public diplomacy. From a purely ideological perspective, the speech was a weapon of public diplomacy without being directly tied to financial or military sanctions. In this light, the speech is a long way away from containment or the Truman Doctrine, which was launched in March 1947.

4.4 Rethinking the Stuttgart Speech – the Stuttgart Speech as a power-political gambit

4.4.1 The speech as a type of isolation policy

In all, Byrnes refers to democracy in his speech ten times. On the one hand, in the speech the democratization of Germany relates to the content of the Potsdam Agreements, and on the other, it is presented as a condition for the normalization of living conditions and thus as the only possibility to restore the

⁸⁵⁷ Byrnes 1947, p. 316. According to John Lewis Gaddis the concept of "the patience and firmness" later became known as an ominous term of 'containment'. Gaddis 1972, p. 284.

⁸⁵⁸ BP. Appointments and Correspondence B15:F4. The Soviet Union. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – Policy and Information Statement, 15.5.1946.

country's independent latitude. The role of the German People's Assembly also relates to the German democratization, and is mentioned in the speech repeatedly. The German people would not, by virtue of sovereignty, be completely excluded from decision-making regarding Germany, which had been the case after the First World War. In a Wilsonian fashion, Byrnes draws a picture of the future in his speech, in which the People's Assembly will take part in the drafting of the new democratic constitution. In the drafts of his speech the Secretary of State refers to the constitution as federalist, and in this context uses the concept of the "United States of Germany". These statements, which were conflicting from the perspective of an economically unified Germany, were left out of the actual Stuttgart Speech.⁸⁵⁹

In addition to democracy, Byrnes makes repeated references to responsibility. When speaking about the concept of responsibility he adopts clear locutions of Americanism, in which the United States' pre-determined and sovereign status as the one responsible for the fate of the world is by no means uncertain. On a lower level, responsibility means the ability of other nations like France, Germany and the Soviet Union, to bear responsibility. Achieving such responsibility however, would mean achieving American "moral idealism" in a true democracy, the endogenous satisfaction of which could not be accomplished elsewhere in the world. In this light, the actions of Byrnes's speech do not merely state the constellation of politics, rather they attest to the horrifying consequences of the non-intervention of the United States: anti-American immorality, anti-Wilsonian tyranny and a world drifting towards a Lockean natural state.

With regard to isolation, the Stuttgart Speech seems to have truly had Wilsonian force. Byrnes gives his explanations for the reasons of isolation and the processes leading to it in the way of Wilson. As a simplified story of evolution, entering the war is not presented as a consequence of an attack by a foreign power or a military threat, but first and foremost as a consequence of the violation of rights. This violation was directed towards the right to live in a peace-loving country, and restoring or achieving this state was the core of Wilson's 14-point plan. The concept of a "peace-loving nation" is central, and is comparable to the United States both by Wilson and by Byrnes. With Wilson, the Americanistic locution of a peace-loving nation also relates to the freedom of defining one's own institutions and of relying on justice and the management of international affairs based on honesty.

In the Wilsonian locution, stabilizing the world into a state of a more permanent peace was not possible to achieve by excluding a country from the international system. The impossibility of isolation policy is in a way evident as immorality: "All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it

⁸⁵⁹ An original draft: BP. Mss 90, James F. Byrnes Papers, Series 9: Speeches, B8:F4. Stuttgart Speech original handnotes exceptions.

will not be done to us".⁸⁶⁰ Byrnes displays this inverted Wilsonian moral instruction as more of a threat:

I hope that the German people will never again make the mistake of believing that because the American people are peace-loving, they will sit back hoping for peace if any nation uses force or the threat of force to acquire dominion over other peoples and other governments.⁸⁶¹

In the light of the Stuttgart Speech the Yalta Axioms merged into the Wilsonian foundation somewhat like progressivism had. The resignation from the isolation policy had been motivated by an Americanistic mission, which in turn secured the progressive values that Wilsonism had cunningly merged into itself. In foreign policy, the transition to the active phase was by no means a result of its necessity in the realpolitik tradition. As a victorious nation, it could have just as easily returned to a more isolationist path, but the choice in this regard was not defined by the Second World War. The most significant factor in relinquishing the isolation policy seems to have been a long-term process of ideological change. In foreign policy this was apparent as a Wilsonian ideology, which could have been encapsulated in the Yaltan values hiding behind Yergin's fictional Yalta Axioms.

From the perspective of Risto Wallin's analysis,⁸⁶² Byrnes appears to have adopted locutions relating to the League of Nations and the establishment of the United Nations. In Byrnes's thinking, "the nation" is accentuated as the most legitimate actor in world politics. Even with regard to the rules of the game, Byrnes uses power-political turns of phrase. He accepts the organization concepts to be a part of the sovereignty of the United Nations, but from an operational perspective the Secretary of State seems to have focused on the pluralist Council of Foreign Ministers. The Council, which Byrnes - partially rightly so - considered to be his own invention, certainly proved to be a necessary step between the cliquy decision-making of Heads of State and the establishment of the United Nations. Yet it is impossible not to consider it as some kind of precaution for the future, in case the United Nations should fail. It may be possible to think that emphasizing the world community could in Byrnes's thinking lead to an unfavorable stand-off, where one would have to resort to the old power politics between nations.

The question of what made Byrnes speak for the rejection of the isolation policy will only lead to answers regarding his motivational foundation. When speaking about the experiences following the First World War, Byrnes bases his policy on concrete facts from the past. Any speech acts referring to these facts can only be interpreted on a locutionary level. No particular conflict can be perceived from these references, based on which the speech acts could be considered to have illocutionary significance. On the other hand, the speech contained acts in the light of which one can sooner ask for a reason as to why

⁸⁶⁰ President Wilson's Fourteen Points, Delivered in Joint Session, January 8, 1918.

⁸⁶¹ Appendix.

⁸⁶² Wallin 2005, pp. 11-13, 60-66, 80-83.

the Secretary of State said what he said. The Wilsonian conventions evidenced by the reinterpretation of speech acts are Byrnes's undeniable reasons for the future explanations. These conventions contain more ideological charge against isolation policy than the historical motivational background or the locutionary expression of the issue. As an extension of Wilsonian ideology, anti-isolationist policy can justifiably be considered as Byrnes's intention in the Stuttgart Speech.

The fact that Byrnes does not directly refer to Wilson or categorize the political acts of the past under specific headings does not bring the previously proven point into question. When thought of in a Skinnerian manner, Byrnes's argumentation contains an opening through which he bypasses characters like Wilson and Roosevelt. However, a polemic silence regarding names does not signify the severance of ideological continua. Instead, it is relevant to ponder why Byrnes did not want to more effectively highlight his anti-isolationist views with Wilsonian arguments. If by his silence he wanted to emphasize his policy as the people's foreign policy separate from personality cults, the *ex silencio* conclusion can be justified. On the other hand, in his memoirs Byrnes emphasized the very mistakes that Wilson made in hindsight. The deterioration of the League of Nations and the Versailles Peace Treaty, which produced poor results, had in Byrnes's writing made Wilson an ideologist who failed in the execution of his good intentions. The basis of these reflections or beliefs is in the contemporary evidence, meaning that they can in general be perceived to be Byrnes's possible beliefs or intentions or a part of his world of possibilities.

In relation to the *Herald-Tribune* speech held in October 1945, Byrnes did not associate isolation politics with issues of power politics. Talk about isolation politics is affiliated in the Stuttgart Speech text with a certain need to prove to the outside world that the United States really wanted to withdraw from isolation as a political choice. In the context of *Herald-Tribune* speech, abandonment of national or territorial isolation meant abandonment of spheres of influence and power politics in general, which in the Stuttgart Speech became evident as the security policy politicized by the Russians. In Stuttgart, isolation politics was not comparable to Byrnes's idea of sovereign equality of the peoples, which he had spoken in favor of a year ago.

Emphasizing the rejection of isolation policy can be considered a statement of domestic policy, with which Byrnes ensured the tenability of the major parties' policy on an international level. Even in Byrnes's earlier power-political policies, the rejection of isolation policy was connected to Wilsonian ideals regarding the international responsibility of the United States. Adopting the international responsibility and anti-isolationist task clearly called for an unambiguous policy that could be applied to a genuine international problem situation. With Byrnes guaranteeing the presence of American troops on German soil, he irrevocably tied the United States to international politics. The expedients presented in the Stuttgart Speech refer to economy and a common American foreign policy. Economically, Byrnes refers to the United States' intentions to support the international nature of Wilsonian economic ideals. The common American foreign policy in turn had a significant role in solidifying

the international conception regarding the Democrats' and also the Republicans' commitment to anti-isolationist policy. As a part of the bipartisanship mindset of foreign policy, Byrnes wanted to convince foreign nations of the tenability of the commitment even after any changes caused by the election.⁸⁶³

The apparent content of the locution, which emphasized bipartisanship, was an ambition to separate any major problem questions from partisan politics and to maximize the resources available for problem solving. Bipartisanship is a type of operational mode and a norm, the transition to which requires initiative from the opposing party. The leadership of Roosevelt's transitional period was bipartisanship at its best. The Democrats' supreme dominance over both houses of Congress and the White House had nonetheless managed to establish reasonably good cooperation with the Republicans, and foreign policy in particular had been given a partisan immunity of sorts. The fall of 1946, however, would bring with it midterm elections, in which the 14-year predominance of the Democratic Party would, according to estimates, be under serious threat. Thus it can be posited that Byrnes directed his speech toward foreign policy watchdogs of the Republican Party, but also to ordinary voters concerned about the United States' international position.

The ability of the US government to affect public opinion and thus further legitimize new political acts is a possibility. Traditionally in the United States, a naïve allegiance to public opinion had not been met only with a positive attitude. Byrnes had more than likely been aware of the flip side of his people's foreign policy, and was possibly aware of Walter Lippmann's writings from the 1920s on public opinion. According to the view presented by Lippmann, the advocates of democracy were guilty of idealizing citizens by relying on the ability of their knowledge and opinions to solve the complex problems of modern society. Instead of enlightened public opinion, one should rely only on expert knowledge. In this regard, the people's foreign policy, talked up by Byrnes, must be considered mere rhetoric.⁸⁶⁴

When contextualized in the discussions in the Senate and the House of Representatives, in Stuttgart Byrnes seems to have had to humble himself at the end of the amity created by bipartisanship. The critique regarding the lack of clear foreign policy is evident in the Secretary of State's willingness to demonstrate that everything that took place in the Council of Foreign Ministers simply executed the will of the Potsdam Agreement. However, the harshness of the speech cannot be measured only on the locutionary level. Compared to the Overseas Press Club speech, the Stuttgart Speech seems rather soft. However, when reinterpreted on an illocutionary level, the text shows the intransigence of Byrnes's intention and argumentation. The intransigence regards the ending of the *quid pro quo* setting, which both Connally and Vandenberg demanded. From the perspective of the people's foreign policy and public opinion, Byrnes's intentions seem congruent. A substantive change in the long-term trend of

⁸⁶³ Bipartisanship.

⁸⁶⁴ Dewey 2006, p. 12.

public opinion may have also guided the speaker's motivational background. On the other hand, an argument based on Americans' changed public opinion and a foreign policy that changed accordingly would have led the Stuttgart Speech to become a paradigm of both the changed will of the people and a successor of a consistent and well-established foreign policy.

4.4.2 The speech as a type of security policy

The demands made by the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War were largely defined by the debate on security, to which significant improvements would have to be made in order to improve the Soviet Union's geopolitical status. A concrete example and worst-case scenario of the security issues was the so-called Polish Corridor, along which invaders like Napoleon and Hitler had made their way to Russia. In Yalta and in Potsdam, the other Allies had shown support for the Soviet Union's security concerns on a level of principle. The United States was an outsider to this concern, as its territorial integrity had not been significantly violated during the war, especially in Europe. Discussing security needs as a part of buffer zones and the policies of friendly neighbors leads to a logically unlimited process, in which even the neighbors of friendly neighbors have to be evaluated based on security guidelines. The border between security policy and an expansive foreign policy seems rather hazy. In his Stuttgart Speech, Byrnes uses security concepts only a few times, but as an illocutionary reinterpretation of the text it is argued here that the intention of the Secretary of State with regard to security needs was to show what would be reasonable.

As understood by Barry Buzan, an international affairs researcher, security manifests itself in a type of gambit, which "is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics". Thus, in a conceptual light, securitization is an extreme version of politicization, for in theory any question can be placed on the line formed by what cannot be politicized and what is politicized or securitized. Questions that cannot be politicized must be understood as ones with which the state does not interfere in any way, and which are not the subject of a public debate or decision-making process. Questions that can be politicized are a part of public policy which demand administrative decisions and the distribution of resources. In sum, securitization is evident in presenting public problems as "an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure".⁸⁶⁵

However, the bipolarity of this line is broken up by the possibility that some questions can be both politicized and securitized at the same time. The actions of the Soviet Union after the Second World War appear to be the merging of politicization and securitization. In this regard, the scope of the concept of securitization expands even beyond the traditionally unpolitical and

⁸⁶⁵ Buzan 1998, pp. 23-24.

politicized. Punishing Germany in accordance with the Soviet Union's objectives becomes crucial to the future of the whole world and leaves any nonconformist interpretations deprived of significance as outside of the world-political operational conventions. Adding the dimensions of place and time to the trinity of what cannot be politicized, what is politicized and what is securitized seems justified at least from the perspective of the modern international system. The establishment of relationships between nation-states which happened after the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War created the foundation for the organization of international relations, at least from a European perspective. From the perspective of securitization, the only relevant question pertained to achieving equilibrium and encapsulating it in the *realpolitik* thinking of the later 19th century. The materialization of equilibrium-thinking and international relations in the bipolar world of the Cold War in effect reduced the problematics of securitization to tensions between the securitization needs of two superpowers. In the case of the Cold War, securitization could even be considered a slogan of the Soviet Union, by which it justified arranging the world in accordance with its interests after the Second World War.

As the other significant victor, the United States could not really act based on its own securitization⁸⁶⁶ concerns, as the country had joined the war largely for economic reasons and had been territorially threatened only in the Pacific Ocean and only by one enemy state. In Europe, the United States acted for the securitization concerns of the other Allies, though it had to face contradictory pressures in defining the fairness of its allies. The situation was further complicated by Germany, a losing state, for whose existence and the fairness of its punishments the United States had to fight. In retrospect, securitization in the denouement of the Second World War meant for the United States attempts to restore equilibrium politics and to secure its own economic interests, whereas the Soviet Union could - under the cover of its securitization-concern - increase its influence especially in Europe.

The example of the Cold War lends itself well to Buzan's et. al. definition of security as a self-referential activity, according to which a question of security becomes one not because a threat actually exists but because a problem is presented as a threat. Referring to Ole Wæver's research, the questions of international security surpass any other questions in importance due to the ability to argue the perspective. It was easy to argue security issues as a top priority because evidence was not difficult to publicize after the Second World War. Non-interference with a security issue would have inevitably lead to the logical irrelevance of other questions in the future, in which case the Soviet Union could have blamed the United States for inadequate willingness to

⁸⁶⁶ This term is used by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. In their book, *Security – A New Framework for Analysis*, security is considered as a certain speech act in a political game. Accordingly the concept of 'Securitization' refers to a rhetorical move that either turns the issues at hand over to a very restricted politics, or raises those issues totally over politics. Buzan 1998, p. 23.

prevent future conflicts.⁸⁶⁷ Unlike the patois of Soviet representatives in the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Byrnes's speech on security contained more qualifiers relating to impermanence and necessity, the basis of which was not the direct punishment of Germany. From Byrnes's perspective, Germany was not a trophy of the war one could endlessly exploit. In his Stuttgart Speech he brings out the "security purposes" behind many of his viewpoints. Based on security reasons, the Secretary of State justified the presence of occupying forces and his views on the supervision of the Ruhr and the Rhineland. Whereas the Russians were interested in paralyzing Germany to minimize the threat of war, Byrnes brought out the other side of the Potsdam Agreements. In Stuttgart the Secretary of State was interested in demonstrating what had actually been agreed on regarding the restoration of local autonomy after the security threats had been removed.

Had Byrnes fully embraced Roosevelt's Yalta Axioms, which were dominated by a liberal internationalism, questioning the security-political needs of the Soviet Union would not have been necessary. On the other hand, what was also relevant was the question of the extent to which Germany would be punished, which in itself was to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union. In the negotiating process, the concept of punishment seems to have been poorly defined, which has been reflected in research. In the Potsdam Agreement, the guilt and punishment of Germany had been mutually agreed on by the Allies, but in the spirit that the punishment would primarily seek to prevent the rise of National Socialism and secondarily compensate the victorious parties for the destruction caused by the losing nation. However, the latter fused so closely into the former, that in the end it was impossible to distinguish between the two. This was especially highlighted by the Soviet Union's interests in building its own buffer zone in the name of security policy and in transferring the poorly defined military industries into its own zone in the name of the first principle.

Provided that Byrnes's intention really was to act as an advocate for the more moderate punishment policy and thus against the interests of the Soviet Union, the content of the illocutionary acts must in one way or another differ from the principles of the Yalta Axioms and the Wilsonian tradition. In other words, Byrnes's speech acts, which advocated a moderate punishment policy, must be examined in relation to the context of contemporary criticism. One of the most notable critics of foreign policy was Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace, who as a staunch liberal wanted to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union. In his "Century of the Common Man"-ideology the Soviet Union's actions of foreign policy often appear in a very understandable light, which caused disapproval in more conservative circles. Conversely, Wallace's manner of talking about the relinquishment of colonialism contained many elements of classical progressivism. In May of 1942, the Secretary of Commerce had already called for the abolishment of colonialism and economic slavery and the

⁸⁶⁷ Buzan 1998, p. 24.

demolition of cartels that lacked international control. Wallace also gave a warning about “going solo” after the war:

When the time of peace comes, the citizen will again have a duty, the supreme duty of sacrificing the lesser interest for the greater interest of the general welfare. Those who write the peace must think of the whole world. There can be no privileged peoples.⁸⁶⁸

In the spring of 1943, Wallace continued to make his radical statements in Ohio, where the Vice President warned of the dangers of “the new isolationism”. In his view, the objective of the shortsighted foreign policy seemed to once again be the selfish isolation after the war. In his second speech entitled “Three Philosophies”, Wallace examined the differences between Marxism, Nazism and the democratic Christian philosophy. Wallace connected individualistic thinking to freedom and obligations of this thinking that emphasized communality, demonstrating the conflict between freedom and obligation. In his view the conflict was so apparent that in the near future the Americans would have to decide on their willingness to “plant the seeds for World War III”. Wallace considered World War III to be inevitable unless “the Western democracies and Russia come to a satisfactory understanding before the war ends”. The greatest threat of conflict was the “fascist interests motivated largely by anti-Russian bias getting control of our government”. After being appointed as Secretary of Commerce in Truman’s Cabinet, Wallace began to suspect that the President’s and the Secretary of State’s attitudes towards the Soviet Union forebode war. In Wallace’s opinion, the threat of war was also exacerbated by the question of internationalizing information relating to atomic energy, and in September he warned Truman not to brandish the atomic weapon “rather ostentatiously on our hip”.⁸⁶⁹

The opposition to atomic diplomacy was evident in his locution, with which he sought to differentiate power politics aiming for the peace process from the struggle regarding the superiority of ideologies. In the middle of the Iran crisis in March of 1946, Wallace spoke at a dinner held in honor of Averell Harriman in opposition to the thinking that “atomic bombs, bases, huge appropriations for armaments and arctic expeditions” were the way to peace. Instead, the only way of eradicating Communism from the world was to do one’s best to increase production and to supersede the Russians in the “friendliest way possible”. According to Wallace’s interpretation, neither of the two superpowers had the possibility of winning over the other for good using military means. When separating the ideological struggle from the efforts for peace, he especially objected to the insinuations of Anglo-American cooperation which anti-communist Churchill had made in his speech at Fulton. As

⁸⁶⁸ Culver & Hyde 2000, pp. 275–277, passim; Daniel Yergin has considered Wallace as a one of the most significant followers of the Yalta Axioms along with President Roosevelt.

⁸⁶⁹ Culver & Hyde 2000, p. 398.

presented by Wallace, the struggle for security policy needs and the struggle for the supremacy of ideologies should peacefully take place in separate arenas.⁸⁷⁰

In a sense, Churchill had combined his power-political views with elements of both idealism and realism, the purpose of which was to reveal the ideological grounds and the real meaning of the Soviet Union's expansionary actions, done in the name of security policy. Although the ominous prospects presented by Churchill of the danger of Communism to the Christian civilization created pressures in Congress to examine the communist connections of public officials, the locution presenting the connection between ideologies and realism did not catch on with Byrnes until the publication of *Speaking Frankly* in 1947. When taking into consideration Byrnes's character, his lack of interest towards ideologies, philosophies and religion was understandable. In his Stuttgart Speech Byrnes does not interpret questions of security policy as politico-ideological aggregates as depicted by Churchill, nor does he interpret them as the radical interpretations of the nearly endless concession policy of the Yalta Axioms, as depicted by Wallace. Instead, he interprets security policy as a lawyer in the light of earlier agreements. For Byrnes, agreements were exhaustively drafted text, the analysis of which contained no ambiguous references to a common spirit or ideology.

4.4.3 The speech as a type of ideology

In the Stuttgart Speech the Soviet Union is mentioned 12 times, mainly in the context of describing world events or explaining the Potsdam Agreement. The only clear confrontation arises from the Königsberg region, the transfer of which to the Soviet Union had been conceded to in exchange for the normalization of the situation in the eastern parts of Germany. Although the Polish border had not been definitively accepted, a large part of the area of the former Nazi-Germany had already been integrated into Poland. In his speech, Byrnes threatened to adhere to the more strict interpretation of Potsdam in the matter unless the Soviet Union changed its stand. In his own context of discourse on territorial policy, the threat cannot be considered out of the ordinary, but rather an example of *quid pro quo* policy. If one wishes to interpret the speech as anti-communist or anti-Soviet Union, this must be manifested on a purely illocutionary level.

From the perspective of his memoirs in the spring of 1947, Byrnes talks about the Soviet Union's objectives without alternatives. However, in the Stuttgart Speech the Secretary of State evaluates and refers to the objectives of the Soviet Union on a textual level as well. The clear desire of the Soviet Union to increase its influence in the areas weakened by the war was, according to Byrnes, to be understood purely through the history of Russia. According to Byrnes, the many points of convergence in the diplomacy of the Bolsheviks and the Tsarist period was no coincidence, but rather a manifestation of Russian expansionism, the latest trends of which had been defined by Karl Marx. In

⁸⁷⁰ Culver & Hyde 2000, p. 414; Kishlansky 1995, pp. 298-302.

over two decades, Russia had acquired a territory that was only slightly smaller than the mightiest Russia of the tsarist period. According to the interpretation Byrnes presented in his memoirs, Communism had no significant effect on the expansionist ambitions of the Russians.⁸⁷¹

With regard to Wallace's progressive thinking Byrnes seems to have adopted a completely opposing position. Provided that the Stuttgart Speech can heuristically be considered the opening move in the conversational context continued by Wallace's "The Way to Peace" speech, the argumentation regarding the Soviet Union's actions is based on anti-progressive views. The explanation presented by Wallace in his speech of the "Russian character" contained the history of invasions by the Tatars, the Mongols, the Germans, the Poles, the Swedes and the French, and was further exacerbated by the British-French-American interference in the internal matters of Russia between 1919 and 1921. Contrary to Byrnes's interpretation of Wallace in his memoirs, history had proved exactly that a "get tough with Russia policy" would not succeed. According to Wallace, the Soviet Union would always respond to toughness with even tougher measures. However, the setting in the Stuttgart Speech is the reverse. By speaking about the interpretation of the Potsdam Agreements in a manner containing exercitive power, Byrnes assumes a power-political dominance for the United States by standing above the earlier political conversational context. Instead of a hard or a soft peace, Byrnes's vision is a lasting peace, which undefined is mere rhetoric. By writing his interpretation outside conventional locution, the Secretary of State refers to the supremacy of US foreign policy without once mentioning the atomic bomb.⁸⁷²

In his memoirs Byrnes adopted Dulles's aggressive manner of talking about Communism as a filthy alliance of Marxian Communism and imperialistic Russia,⁸⁷³ which corresponds with Ruotsila's thinking on the anti-Bolshevik movement that started in the late 1910s. In the summer of 1946, senators Vandenberg and Dulles had held anti-Bolshevik oriented discussions which analyzed the Soviet Union's motives to base its politics on the pursuit of peace. An interpretation presented by Dulles in his article published in *Life Magazine* demonstrated the possibilities of conceptual interpretation risks in power politics especially when referring to the Soviet Union's way of speaking about democracy, fascism and friendliness with a meaning differing from the American one.⁸⁷⁴

⁸⁷¹ Byrnes 1947, p. 283. On the other hand, it is debatable that Byrnes knew Russian history already in the autumn of 1946. The more accurate clarification was completed in June 1947 by Llewellyn E. Thompson. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B11:F17, From Thompson to Byrnes, 11.6.1947.

⁸⁷² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, Madison Square Garden, New York City, 8 p.m., September 12, 1946, "The Way to Peace"; Byrnes 1947, p. 239.

⁸⁷³ Kero 1991, p. 444.

⁸⁷⁴ CR. Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What To Do About It - An International Expert Analyzes Russia's Motives In Seeking A "Pax Sovietica" and the Methods by Which She Would Impose It on the World. Jun. 20. 1946. Congressional Record - Senate 1946, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 92, pp. 7169-7175. Questions of conceptual interpretation came forward clearly in the cases of "democracy", "fascist" and "friendly". According to Dulles, in the Soviet Union democracy meant a

Possibly due to the conceptual risks demonstrated by Dulles, Byrnes felt it was necessary to emphasize the interpretation of the concepts of democracy in the Potsdam Agreements from the American perspective. Nonetheless, in the interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement the concept of democracy played a significant role. With regard to Germany, several sections of the agreement required the “democratic development” of different sectors, the definition of which was, however, overlooked. In the Stuttgart Speech Byrnes encapsulates the volition of the Potsdam Agreement into a condition, according to which “it never was the intention of the American Government to deny to the German people the right to manage their own internal affairs as soon as they were able to do so in a democratic way, with genuine respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Byrnes does not otherwise define his view on democracy. With regard to the question of the timetable for organizing the German central government, Byrnes sets as the only requirement that “some sort of democracy has rooted into the soul of Germany”. In this regard, the Secretary of State was obviously reluctant to require a long process of democratization, which would have been in conflict with the policy calling for an economically unified Germany.

No speech acts referring to democracy in Germany can be found in the Stuttgart Speech. Nonetheless, it is possible to think that Byrnes ambition had been to demonstrate the expansiveness of the Soviet Union through a negation. The treatment of the Potsdam Agreement, which acts as the argumentative lead of the Stuttgart Speech, does not from this perspective seem to rely on the juridical deciphering of the written agreement, but rather on presenting the facts based on which the United States had precisely acted in accordance with the agreement. When demonstrating the allegiance to the Potsdam Agreement that the United States had shown in its occupied zone, Byrnes creates an apparently conscious setting in which a passive Soviet Union and even France, to a certain extent, are pitted against an active United States and Britain.

With anachronistic reservations, the Stuttgart Speech also comes across as a conscious effort to avoid Wallace’s later interpretation of democracy as a question of power politics. In Wallace’s views, power-political development was inevitably heading towards a direction where the Soviet Union was seeking to socialize its sphere of influence whereas the United States was seeking to democratize its sphere of influence. This development was also evident in the situations of Germany and Japan. According to Wallace, the United States was acting in its occupied zone of Germany in order to apply democratic thinking, whilst the Soviet Union sought to socialize eastern Germany. Furthermore, he compares the Soviet Union’s political interests in Eastern Europe to the United States’ objectives in Latin America. In his Stuttgart Speech, Byrnes skillfully avoids speaking directly in a power-political manner, although when speaking about an economically unified Germany, the setting presented by Wallace demands an explanation. Provided that Byrnes, like

dictatorship of the proletariat, fascism meant all anti-soviet opinions and friendliness meant a continuous desire to make their point.

Wallace, believed in the Soviet Union's efforts to socialize its own occupied zone, the term "economically unified" must be more clearly understood to mean unified with the economy of the American occupied zone.⁸⁷⁵

When compared to the Overseas Speech of February 1946, the surface level of the Stuttgart Speech seems milder in power-political tensions and otherwise more polished. The effects of the war of nerves in the spring of 1946 are not evident in the speech. Although in his Overseas Speech Byrnes did not believe in a future war between superpowers, the issue was publicly raised for the first time. The war of nerves was for Byrnes a worst-case scenario specifically in a strategic sense, and getting caught up in it was a clear sign of the Soviet Union's reluctance to transfer its security policy to the United Nations. At that time Byrnes announced the United Nations to be the determinator of reason in security policy, not individual victorious nations.

In the Stuttgart Speech, the role of a more open forum for debate was played by the Potsdam protocol and the jointly accepted procedures for the drafting and production of the peace treaties. Only one locutionary reference is made to the war between superpowers, and even then it is made from the perspective of German interests. When compared to the speech at the Overseas Press Club, the Stuttgart Speech comes across as less ceremonious and nothing short of an issues speech. Both undeniably contain a strong security-political charge. In this regard, the difference can be explained by a different contextual space. The Overseas Press Club speech in the spring is contextualized in the conversational conventions in the Council of Foreign Ministers, which started in late 1945, and in this way seems to be congruent with Churchill's Iron Curtain speech.

In his locution, Byrnes even separates the American way of thinking from ideologies and isms. In the Secretary of State's thinking, the Communism represented by the Soviet Union seems to be a complex mental structure, which is contrary to common sense and has proven to be an unsatisfactory solution. Self-evident truths about equality and liberties are the products of an untitled sense on which Communism cannot be based. However, Byrnes does not speak about socialism, leaving his ability to differentiate the conceptual matter of socialism, Communism and bolshevism unclear. Differing from Henry Wallace, Byrnes seems to avoid interpretations of ideologies and philosophy. Perhaps the Secretary of State had not analyzed his own progressive overtones in accordance with Markku Ruotsila's thinking as an Anglo-American application of socialism. Rather, the Secretary of State had to balance between liberal anti-Communism and the growing conservative anti-Communism. For instance, the strongly liberal view represented by Wallace became impossible when overtones of that nature were paralleled with socialism and the totalitarianism formed by bolshevism. With this in mind, the nascent "intellectual Cold War" would have, in Byrnes's speech acts, taken a step towards the real Cold War. Despite the foreign policy constructed by Truman and Marshall which led to

⁸⁷⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, Madison Square Garden, New York City, 8 p.m., September 12, 1946, *The Way to Peace*; Byrnes 1947, p. 239.

permanently colder relationships between the superpowers, Byrnes remained the same in the summer of 1947: “there is no iron curtain that the aggregate sentiments of mankind cannot penetrate”.⁸⁷⁶

In light of Byrnes’s thinking, it is irrefutable that he understood the paradigm attached to the security needs and the expansiveness of the Soviet Union. The latter seems to have been supported by the notion of a cultural thirst for territorial power, independent of the ruler at any given time. Byrnes’s locution reflects a clear duality. On the one hand, he clearly classifies the Soviet Union as a type of socially oriented legal person, with which the United States must operate in international politics without deliberating it ideologically on any level. On the other hand, he views the Soviet Union in an anti-bolshevist manner as a coalition of autocracy and Communism, the adhesive of which is the thirst for power which has always been a part of Russia. Whereas the Overseas Speech can be reinterpreted in the framework of the latter option, the Stuttgart Speech seems to be representative of the former. Irrespective of ideologies, Byrnes treats the Soviet Union pragmatically as a party to the Potsdam Agreement. The crux or the point, as Skinner would put it, of the speech is the inability of the Soviet Union to act in accordance with the objectives set for a legal person and to play by the rules. When examining the Stuttgart Speech more broadly in relation to conversational contexts like the Fulton and Overseas Speeches, Byrnes’s intention to demonstrate expansiveness as the motive for the Soviet Union’s security policy seems justified. When contextualizing the power-political manifestations of the spring, the Stuttgart Speech exploits previous argumentation conventions on an illocutionary level, in which the actions of the Soviet Union are questioned. The topics during the spring were fundamental questions, whose framework and problematics related to the wartime conferences such as Yalta. In the Stuttgart Speech, the Potsdam protocol is placed as a more established operational framework, the threatening of which enables Byrnes argumentation as a purely legal question.

4.4.4 The speech as a type of economic policy

The third point of Wilson’s 14-point plan covered the global organization of economic affairs. In order to achieve a kind of utopia of liberal economic policy, eradicating economic barriers as far as possible and establishing equal opportunities for trade among all nations acceding to peace were set as objectives. Also the second point advocates for free trade, as it contains a demand for free merchant shipping outside of territorial waters in both times of war and peace. When acting as a Congressman between 1918 and 1925 Byrnes, who was known to be an admirer of President Wilson, adopted a conservative view on economics which was changed by the question of the amount of reparations to be set for Germany after the First World War. The predictions expressed in the book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* by John Maynard

⁸⁷⁶ Byrnes 1947, pp. 290–296.

Keynes regarding the collapse of the German economic system became true in 1923. The credit crisis, which was caused by excessive reparations eventually extended to American economic life, making it natural for even Byrnes to adopt Keynesian doctrine. Examining the Stuttgart Speech as an ideal type of economic policy represents – in the context of its time – first and foremost latitude in the middle ground between the reparations policy and Keynesian elements of the speech. Keynes's thoughts on the economic support for Germany and the re-tuning of its economy were not purely altruistic, but were in an enlightened theory aimed at securing the interests of the United States. In the background was an understanding of the fact that Central Europe would never reach stability without resurrecting the German economy: "The United States will not agree to the taking from Germany of greater reparations than was provided by the Potsdam Agreement".⁸⁷⁷

As an ideological construction, Wilsonism is nonetheless more political than economic. According to William Diamond, President Wilson was not interested in economic affairs unless they contained a strong political dimension. In Wilson's quest for world peace, the organization of the economy had very little significance, for, as expressed by Diamond, his mindset was "more political than economical". However, he sees the New Freedom agenda as a conscious effort by Wilson to restore the US economy to the golden era of capitalism.⁸⁷⁸ Keynes, who had also taken part in the Paris Peace Conference which ended the First World War, did not like Wilson or his 14-point plan at all, but remarked that Wilson's "theological or Presbyterian temperament" would prove to be dangerous. According to Keynes, Wilson's idealistic peace program was becoming "the intellectual apparatus of self-deception, by which, I daresay, the President's forefathers had persuaded themselves that the course they thought it necessary to take was consistent with every syllable of the Pentateuch". David Gelernter's idea about Americanism as the second phase of Puritanism would appear to explain Wilsonism's economic policy more through the religious than the political aspect of Americanism.⁸⁷⁹

Byrnes, who was distinguished in economic and domestic policy, must have had a memory of the mechanism with which the reparations demanded from Germany by its neighboring nations some 30 years earlier had also had far-reaching effects on US economic policy. However, when examined from the theological perspective of Americanism, Byrnes displays the conversational conventions of a Wilsonian economic policy. In his speech, Byrnes in effect applies the entire beginning of Wilson's 14-point plan when referring to open agreements, removing the barriers to free trade and sovereignty. The Wilsonian thinking about the supremacy of agreements is evident in Byrnes's attitude towards the text of the Potsdam Agreement. To him, the Potsdam Agreement becomes a kind of normative frame, which no party to the agreement can go

⁸⁷⁷ Aldcroft 1977, pp. 80–84. Derek H. Aldcroft had studied the Commission for reparations and reparations handed down to Germany after the First World War; Ferguson 2006, p. 185.

⁸⁷⁸ Diamond 1943, p. 169.

⁸⁷⁹ Gelernter 2007, p. 177.

beyond. As a lawyer, Byrnes deals with the text of the agreement analytically by referring to it 23 times. The openness of the agreement is its Wilsonian virtue, which cannot be broken by politicizing or bartering with different interests. In the spring of 1946, Byrnes had already spoken about the significance of the world economy to the welfare of the United States. With the authority of the former director of the OWM, the Secretary of State sought to demonstrate his competence as the settler of the mechanisms of world economy:

Here in the United States we are in mid-passage in our reconversion. Despite the pressure of events abroad, even a Secretary of State is aware of the storms that delay pure passage. Certainly a Secretary of State who was formerly Director of War Mobilization is uncomfortably familiar with the thorny character of price and wage disputes. But as Secretary of State I suggest to you that when we have settled the industrial disputes and other problems that are crowding in on us so insistently, we shall become more keenly aware that our ultimate prosperity heavily depends upon whether the economy of the world is free or in chains.⁸⁸⁰

It must be noted that the consequences of the First World War had revealed the mechanisms of international economy more broadly. Byrnes's own understanding of the effects of movements in the global economy was strongly based on realism, the evidence of which was the failed reparations policy at Versailles.

We take for granted the interdependence of the national economy. The interdependence of the world economy is less apparent. But it is quite as real. Prosperity here and abroad requires the expansion both of production and markets.... Those who remember how the last war's debts haunted the world will welcome the expeditious disposal of this issue.⁸⁸¹

With the Potsdam Agreement institutionalizing into imperative law, it was easy for Byrnes to form it into the economic lead of his own interpretation. From within the text of the agreement, Byrnes highlights questions of economic policy in a Wilsonian spirit. By emphasizing an economically unified Germany, the Secretary of State demonstrates a traditionally progressive thinking – and one that was later even adopted by Wilson – about international trade relations. Byrnes seizes the ideology of free trade by understanding it as a system of institutions to stabilize the flexibility of foreign trade and to remove the barriers to free trade as efficiently as possible. From this perspective, in the Stuttgart Speech Byrnes clearly starts the debate that was continued by Secretary of Commerce Wallace on September 12.

The most significant charge of Wallace's "The Way to Peace" speech is undeniably in its Wilsonian views on economic policy. Wallace's worst scenario was a situation like the one following the First World War, in which the world

⁸⁸⁰ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F7, Confidential Release For Publication At 9:30 P.M., E.S.T., Monday, February 11, 1946. Not to Be Previously Published, Quoted From or Used In Any Way.

⁸⁸¹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F7, Confidential Release For Publication At 9:30 P.M., E.S.T., Monday, February 11, 1946. Not to Be Previously Published, Quoted From or Used In Any Way.

economy would suffocate from the inability of debtors to attend to their payments. In his thinking, the political reluctance to interlock the repayment of credit with industrial production inevitably led to a recession and the rise of seditionists. According to Wallace, a central element on the road to peace was a moderate customs policy, which would enable the economic growth of debtor nations caused by increased imports and thus guarantee the repayment of credit. The main opponent of this policy was the Republican Party, who, as “the party of economic nationalism and political isolation”, had irreversibly committed to the tariff and trade policy leading to a worldwide recession.⁸⁸² For Byrnes, the reparations policy was largely an economic policy which sought to maximize the interests of the United States. Much like Keynes, Byrnes was an advocate of granting rather generous credit in order to deal with reparation arrangements whilst seeking to ensure a minimal effect on inflation for the United States.⁸⁸³

When examined on a purely locutionary level, it can be understood from the Stuttgart Speech that its function was mainly to demonstrate and to rectify one misunderstanding concerning the economic policy of the Potsdam Agreement. In a fragmented Germany grappling with a chaotic economic situation, Byrnes demonstrates his concern for this insufficiency by connecting this economically apparent consequence with an error in the agreement. The primary problem is not in the Wilsonian international trade, but in a Germany divided into occupied zones. In Byrnes’s thinking, an economically unified Germany maintains its sovereignty in an economic sense, even though the occupied forces of four countries remain within it. He compares the barriers between the four occupied zones of Germany as higher than the barriers between two independent nations.

The economic policy aspect of the Stuttgart Speech is undeniably reparations policy, but is linked closely with territorial issues. As was previously observed when examining the punishment dimension, reparations and territorial transfers were, in the spirit of the Potsdam Agreement, to primarily have a preventative effect on a new German military threat. Interpretatively, the line between reparations and territorial transfers was blurred into a general transfer of German property to victorious nations, which was apparent in the discussions at the Council of Foreign Ministers on the pricing of transferable fixed materials. On the other hand, territorial questions were an essential part of economic policy purely for the reason that the regions to be transferred could have significant value due to their natural resources or geopolitical location. The questions of territorial policy became the most important themes of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the summer of 1946.

From a territorial policy perspective, the dialogue between superpowers was colored by questions of the administration of certain strategic territories of

⁸⁸² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, Madison Square Garden, New York City, 8 p.m., September 12, 1946, *The Way to Peace*; Byrnes 1947, p. 239.

⁸⁸³ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F7, Confidential Release For Publication At 9:30 P.M., E.S.T., Monday, February 11, 1946. Not to Be Previously Published, Quoted From or Used In Any Way.

the losing nations by different arrangements. The proposal made by the Americans at the London Conference regarding placing the Italian colonies under the trusteeship of the United Nations acted as an opening of sorts. The Soviet Union and France had their own objectives regarding some Italian territories, whereas Britain sought to – partially tactically – grant independence to all Italian colonies. The Americans' perspective was supported by a memorandum authored by Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone, according to which the separation of the colonies in accordance with the interests of either Britain or the Soviet Union would lead to the entire country slipping under the influence of either Britain or the Soviet Union.⁸⁸⁴

Lurking in the background of territorial policy was the ideology of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreement texts to implement territorial changes to prevent the resurgence of hostilities and to compensate the victorious nations for the financial losses they had suffered in the war. The latter perspective is undeniably more broadly connected with the reparations policy, as territorial arrangements were in many instances much more economically significant than currency-based reparations or portions of industry. In his Stuttgart Speech, Byrnes connects the reparation and territorial policies in the case of the Saar territory: "if the Saar territory is integrated with France she should readjust her reparation claims against Germany". Moreover, the Secretary of State himself interpreted the foundation of the Potsdam Agreement as a part of "a combined program of demilitarization and reparations". The situation had materialized somewhat correspondingly in the Italian-Yugoslavian border question in the summer of 1946, when Molotov sought a quid pro quo deal. Byrnes's reluctance to take part in the bartering dictated by Molotov significantly changed the course of the discussion. With Byrnes sticking to his policy of maintaining the integrity of nations as far as possible, the debate moved on to ethnic questions and the historical rights of some peoples to some territories.⁸⁸⁵

The debate surrounding Trieste in particular evoked considerable emotions at the negotiating table and led the discussions to a profound level. In the sessions conducted before the meeting broke for recess, Byrnes had already stated that Trieste had been a part of Italy since 1472 and the three-quarter Italian majority still residing there was a demonstration of the town's ethnic

⁸⁸⁴ FRUS 1945. Suggested Directive from the Council of Foreign Ministers to Govern Them in the Drafting of a Treaty of Peace with Italy, Memorandum by the United States Delegation, C. F. M. (45) 16, September 14, 1945. Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, p. 179; FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Fourth Meeting, April 29, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 155-163; FRUS 1946. Rear Admiral, Chief of the Allied Military Government in Italy, Ellery W. Stone's memorandum for President Truman. Volume IV, Paris Peace Conference: Documents, pp. 77-78.

⁸⁸⁵ FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : CIYB Meetings, Summary Minutes, Commission on Italo-Yugoslav Boundary, Council of Foreign Ministers, 73rd Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, April 28, 1946, 9:50 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 148-153; FRUS 1946. CFM Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 : US Delegation Minutes, Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, May 5, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 247-249.

heritage. Molotov responded sarcastically that before the 19th century Italy did not even exist and that the Illyrian provinces established by Napoleon in 1810 encompassed the Slavic-speaking towns of Trieste, Gorizia and Gradisca. Both considered the question of Trieste to be central to the conference, but also one of the most difficult issues. For the first time in territorial dealings, the problems of peace politics seemed to be ethnic issues more than economic or military strategic factors.⁸⁸⁶

The territorial policy debates regarding Trieste formed one of the most difficult themes between the superpowers. The issue of Trieste, which became a rather significant threshold question from the perspective of US foreign policy, raised some eyebrows among Americans who considered the small town's significance to power politics to be minor. However, during 1946, Trieste seems to have formed its own conversational convention, which instead of being related to territorial policy is related to Byrnes's policy of a lasting peace. From a territorial policy perspective, losing Trieste to Yugoslavia would not be a great loss, but in the light of the experiences of the First World War and the ethnic justifications presented at the London Conference, the town was reflective of the extremes of political flexibility. US interests in Trieste were most clearly related to securing the peace in a region whose transfer to the complete control of another party had led and would still lead to a state of war.⁸⁸⁷

4.4.5 The Stuttgart Speech as a synthesis of territorial and reparations policy

The examination of the surface level of the text seems to have been characteristic of earlier research. The revisionist historical research of the 1960s and 1970s could, based on observed development, justify the purpose of the Stuttgart Speech as attacking the Soviet Union, or at least embarrassing it. On the same grounds, it has been interpreted to be the precursor of the Truman Doctrine, developed in 1947. The discussion surrounding the significance of the speech has been more about its significance to the researcher rather than to the presenter. What the text says on a locutionary level does not pose an problem, but the interesting questions regarding the purpose and intentions of the text cannot be answered on this level. A critical reinterpretation leads to the need to define genuinely possible worlds and corresponding context spaces.

In light of the foregoing, Byrnes's intentions in the speech or the purposes of the speech are part of the conversational context of its time in the different manifestations of politics regarding the ideology known to Byrnes and beliefs possible to him. From the perspective of examination, when speaking of rejecting isolation policy, Byrnes offers the final view in a long historical

⁸⁸⁶ FRUS 1945. United States Delegation Record, Council of the Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Tenth Meeting, Paris, May 4, 1946, 5 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, p. 241.

⁸⁸⁷ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F23, Confidential Release For Publication At 6:00 P.M., E.S.T., (7:00 P.M., E.D.S.T), Saturday, July 27, 1946. Not To Be Previously Published, Quoted From or Used in Any Way.

conversational context. Undeniably familiar with Wilson's thinking and Wilsonian principles, Byrnes's point is to return the United States to the international arena. When noting that the Americans were restoring their interest in European affairs, he undeniably sought to expand the Americanist mission onto European soil, but also to secure the economic interests of the United States. Byrnes introduces his own motives by making a locutionary reference to the return to isolation policy being the cause of the Second World War and the general indisposition in the world. However, according to Anthony Kenny's view, these cannot be considered relevant intentions.⁸⁸⁸ With the objective of arguing against isolation-mindedness, Byrnes makes a significant move in the conversational context of world politics. The interpretation of isolation policy as some kind of an intention of the Cold War violates the justification of the move as the last in the chain. In other words, any other kind of interpretation requires the speech to be anachronistically linked to the linguistic context far beyond that of September 1946.

Viewed in light of his memoirs, Byrnes's attitude towards the Soviet Union appears to be dualistic. On the one hand, the Soviet Union is the immutable promoter of ancient Russian cultural values, and on the other, the earthly embodiment of socialism. On a locutionary level, this dualism cannot be observed in the Stuttgart Speech. The Soviet Union is primarily a party to the Potsdam Agreement who has not fulfilled the requirements set by the agreement. On an illocutionary level, however, Byrnes digs into the paradigm of security and expansiveness, which in his thinking cannot be explained by socialist internationalism but rather by being Russian. He understands the Russians' point of pursuing a better security-political position and its corresponding actions in executing the Potsdam Agreement, but seeks to object to it as a means of reparations policy.

The problem caused by the Soviet Union and in a sense the motivation for Byrnes's speech appears to be quite pragmatic. The problem is not in Byrnes's relation to Communism or socialism, but rather in the economic policy aggregate formed by the security policy, territorial policy and reparations policy of the Soviet Union. Germany's part in this economic-policy intention seems to be quite incidental. The decision regarding the fate of Germany had right at the start been pushed back in the Council of Foreign Ministers' agenda, and it was completely left out of the agenda in the summer of 1946. The discussion on the fate of Germany was thus conducted in anticipation of the country's peace process, but also applicable to the paradigm of security policy more broadly.

From a domestic policy perspective, the Stuttgart Speech appears to be a statement of justification for the policy and the criticism directed towards it. The context of the people's foreign policy, emphasized by Byrnes, is irrefutably reflected in the opinion polls' response to previous developments. The context of the criticism lies in the arguments of the nonconformists in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Toughness is apparent on an illocutionary level

⁸⁸⁸ Kenny 1969, *passim*.

as real strictness towards the Soviet Union. In order to resolve the interpretation differences of the Potsdam Agreement the Secretary of State sets a bartering policy - the backbone of his earlier operational model - in which efforts were made to reach consensus by concessions and by bundling several problematic issues together. Byrnes's interpretation of an economically unified Germany seeks to definitively limit the issue to an arena outside bartering politics. Demonstrating this to both the Soviet Union and the critics at home is an undeniable move towards a different course in foreign policy.

Defending the economic unity of Germany becomes the most important component of the speech. In fact, all other argumentation leads to and supports the Secretary of State's view on the interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement. Arguing for an economically unified Germany at the same time leads to arguing for more profound values. The ideal of an economically unified Germany represents liberal Wilsonian economic thinking and the related concept of a reasonable punishment for the country. On the other hand, it seeks to consciously import progressive values to Germany to affect its own destiny in the future through democracy.

Being economically unified is necessary to the internal economic unity of Germany on the one hand but also to the economic uniformity with other western systems on the other. It appears to be a brilliantly selected argument based on an interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement, and can be considered as the purpose Byrnes wanted for his speech from the perspective of September of 1946. An economically unified Germany was a superb intentional political move, which would lead to optimal possible worlds in accordance with Byrnes's thinking: a reasonably punished Germany, a more secure world economy, a new operational model with the Soviet Union and controlling domestic criticism of foreign policy.

The scale of these possible worlds depicts in part the humane nature of intention as distinct from causal physical relationships. When explaining the political actions of the past, the possible reasons produced by the intentional explanation model also show that human action does not follow a simple causal structure other than when randomly interpreted from the outside. The potential beliefs of the actor contained in the possible worlds form a sphere based on which he acts. At the same time it rules out a group of impossible intentions. When thought of in a Skinnerian manner, beliefs must somehow be consistent and the sphere formed by them must be coherent. No single intention or meaning can be placed on the Stuttgart Speech, but the foregoing possible worlds fulfill the requirements of consistency and undeniability. Intention is a truly complex phenomenon, which cannot be explained by a single forceful factor. On the other hand, the "economically unified" of the Stuttgart Speech must be considered a type of main argument chosen by Byrnes himself and also as the common denominator of the aforementioned intentions.

The illocutionary reinterpretation of the Stuttgart Speech reveals earlier research which justified narrow minded and even impossible intentions for Byrnes. According to this research, the speech brought no fundamental changes to the United States' attitude towards Europe or Germany. Byrnes intention

was not to instigate the Cold War, but to show the Soviet Union the extreme limits of the bartering policy. The Potsdam Agreement had not become a pile of rubbish, but a framework for power politics set by the United States. Referring to the classical example of the speech act theory the Soviet Union adopts the role of the “skater” and Secretary Byrnes the role of the “speaker”.⁸⁸⁹ The speaker’s understanding of the direction where the Soviet Union is heading and of “thin ice” is the previously charted world of Byrnes’s beliefs. Instead of strongly exercitive interpretations, the illocutionary force of the Stuttgart Speech appears to be rather expositive, verdictive and behabitive. Despite its power-political context, the speech was also a significant move in US domestic policy. From the perspective of intentions, the example of one skater on the ice is insufficient. In the case of the Stuttgart Speech, the skaters on the ice are the Soviet Union, the critics of US foreign policy and the citizens of the German occupied zones.

From the perspective of territorial policy, Germany and Italy were not officially in a similar position in the fall of 1946. In the early stages, the actual peace treaty negotiations had concerned only the Balkan countries, Hungary, Finland and Italy, whereas cases like Germany and Austria had been postponed until later. In the case of Germany, the scrambling for positions and defining policies for the foundation of future decision-making processes stigmatized the territorial policy discussion in the fall of 1946. Understandably the balancing act between financial compensation and the prevention of hostilities proved most difficult in the case of Germany, who had become the main culprit of the war. This setting was formatted by the ten billion dollars Molotov demanded of Germany, whereas in the United States views on the economic repression of Germany were negative even for historical reasons. Attitudes towards Germany were quickly polarized between the security emphasized by the United States and the reparations justified by the Soviet Union, even though the questions were officially outside of the agenda of power politics. This setting clearly had many points of convergence with the situation after the First World War, as Keynes’s proposal of the rather modest reparations of four million pounds over 30 years changed in May of 1921 to the one-off payment of 6.5 million pounds.⁸⁹⁰

In the summer, Molotov had rejected Byrnes five-point plan for the disarmament of four nations. Molotov considered the contents of the plan to be significantly abridged compared to the Potsdam Agreements and criticized its ability to make Europe safe.⁸⁹¹ He also took a stand against the Morgenthau-

⁸⁸⁹ The example was originally presented by P.F. Strawson and it was used by Austin and Skinner as well.

⁸⁹⁰ FRUS 1946. C.F.M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 ; US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Seventh Informal Meeting, Paris, May 15, 1946, 11 a.m. Volume II, pp. 393-400; Ferguson 2006, pp. 185-186.

⁸⁹¹ DAFR 1945-1946. Draft Treaty for the Disarmament and Demilitarization Treaty of Germany, Submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers by the Secretary of State (Byrnes), April 29, 1946. Volume VIII, pp. 205-208; FRUS 1946. C.F.M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 ; US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of

plan, sensing that the pastoralization of Germany would benefit reactionary movements in Germany and erode European stability and lasting peace.⁸⁹² However, the pastoralization of Germany, which Molotov objected to, did not in his argumentations relate to the demands of an economically unified Germany. During the summer of 1946, Potsdam's idea of an economically unified Germany begins to parallel the idea of a unified Germany in general, the acceptance of which was evidently most difficult especially in Britain and in France. In the context of Molotov's addresses, Byrnes saw the threat-scenario for Germany to be a country divided into four, with each segment having a different economic and political atmosphere. The Secretary of State sought to argue against the "airtight compartmentalization" of Germany, advocated by Molotov, using mainly economic factors.⁸⁹³

In his Stuttgart Speech, Byrnes emphasized that the United States would adhere to the demilitarization of the whole of Germany, agreed upon in Potsdam. Equally, an industry guaranteeing the welfare of an average European nation should be secured for Germany. Byrnes attacked Molotov's statements most clearly by promising the Germans that no reparations other than those agreed upon in Potsdam would ever be set for Germany, and hinted at the eventual unification of Germany.⁸⁹⁴ The speech was also in clear conflict with the former Secretary of the Treasury and the then adviser to President Truman Henry Morgenthau's plan from 1944. Morgenthau's plan had envisaged turning Germany into an agricultural state.

The German people were not denied, however, the possibility of improving their lot by hard work over the years. Industrial growth and progress were not denied them. Being obliged to start again like the people of other devastated countries, with a peacetime economy not able to provide them more than the average European standard, the German people were not to be denied to use such savings as they might be able to accumulate by hard work and frugal living to build up their industries for peaceful purposes.⁸⁹⁵

In this regard, Byrnes's illocutionary intention by no means appears to lead to the defense of a strongly punished Germany burdened with excessive reparations. The arch-American and puritan values of work and

Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Eight Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 9, 1946, 5 p.m. Volume II, pp. 842-847.

⁸⁹² FRUS 1946. C.F.M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 ; US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Ninth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 10, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, pp. 869-873.

⁸⁹³ DAFR 1945-1946. Statement by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) on American Policy in Establishing Central Controls for Economic Unity of Germany, July 11, 1946. Volume VIII, pp. 208-209; FRUS 1946. C.F.M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2063 ; US Delegation Minutes, United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Ninth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 10, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, pp. 860-864.

⁸⁹⁴ Appendix. DAFR 1945-1946. Restatement of United States Policy on Germany by the Secretary of State (Byrnes), Stuttgart, Germany, September 6, 1946. Volume VIII, pp. 210-218; Pratt 1955, p. 718.

⁸⁹⁵ Appendix. DAFR 1945-1946. Restatement of United States Policy on Germany by the Secretary of State (Byrnes), Stuttgart, Germany, September 6, 1946. Volume VIII, pp. 210-218.

industriousness as the shapers of a country's destiny are the Secretary of State's guideline for the condemned state. By directing Germans towards their own economic good, Byrnes is at the same time acting in the field of US economic interests and the territorial reformation of Europe. On a locutionary level he proves to be a liberal defender of Germany, but below the surface he is crafting a Keynesian economic policy with US interests, in which the milking cow will not be slaughtered. On the other hand, the context of his speech acts is in the territorial policy addresses at the Council of Foreign Ministers, where most notably the Soviet Union's interest was directed at the exploitation of the possessions of a divided Germany. At that time the starting point was an idea of the Potsdam protocol about a temporary division into zones, done only in the name of security, which by its nature was intermingled with the territorial policy discussions about the western border of Poland. Byrnes also made reference to this when highlighting Germany's position distinctly between the East and the West:

It is not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world peace that Germany should become a pawn or a partner in a military struggle for power between the East and the West.⁸⁹⁶

The idea of Germany being a pawn in a struggle between the West and the East was first mentioned in Byrnes's radio address on July 15. At that time the Secretary considered this situation synonymous with giving the German militarism again a chance to divide and conquer. According to Byrnes, there had to be one and only one unequivocal answer to the pawn question, because equivocation will increase "unbearably the tensions and strains which men of good will everywhere are striving to relieve".⁸⁹⁷

The idea accepted in Potsdam about maintaining Germany as a unified economic unit was, in Byrnes's opinion, destroyed by border zones more onerous than those between nations. At the same time he announced that the United States was ready to combine its occupied zone economically to the zones of other occupiers if they so wanted. The Polish-German border issue, which had already become a problem in Potsdam, was evident in Byrnes reminding the Germans about the burden of inhabiting and supporting the population of the Silesia region - which Poland wanted - and in unequivocally refusing to recognize a definitive border along the Oder-Neisse river:

Germany needs all the food she can produce. Before the war she could not produce enough food for her population. The area of Germany has been reduced. The population in Silesia, for instance, has been forced back into a restricted Germany. Armies of occupation and displaced persons increase demands while the lack of farm machinery and fertilizer reduces supplies.... At Potsdam specific areas, which were part of Germany, were provisionally assigned to the Soviet Union and to Poland, subject to the final decisions of the Peace Conference. At that time these areas were being held by the Soviet and Polish armies. We were told that Germans in large

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁷ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F21, Confidential Release For Publication At 9:00 P.M., E.S.T, Monday, July 15, 1946. Not To Be Previously Published, Quoted or Used In Any Way.

numbers were fleeing from these areas.... The heads of government agreed that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, Silesia and other eastern German areas should be under the administration of the Polish state and for such purposes should not be considered as a part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. However, as the Protocol of the Potsdam Conference makes clear, the heads of government did not agree to support at the peace settlement the cession of this particular area.⁸⁹⁸

On a locutionary level the breach of the Potsdam Agreement seems categorical and reprehensible from the perspective of the populist ill effects demonstrated by Byrnes. On an illocutionary level, however, the speech acts must be seen as political gambits in the bartering policy which the Soviet Union had previously sought. The border issue of Trieste, which remained unresolved, offered a conversational context of territorial policy, in the light of which the question of the Polish border can also be evaluated. With Trieste, the debate on the historical-cultural foundations of territorial borders led to widely varying interpretations, but in itself the cultural segmentation of regions was not in the objectives of the Yalta or Potsdam Agreements. On the contrary, the goal had been to achieve a culturally unified arrangement which was reminiscent of the German borders before the war. Byrnes's slightly exaggerated statements about the migration from the eastern parts of Germany to the west were demonstrations particularly for the Germans about the Soviet Union's objective to colonize the area in a cultural sense as well. Thus, it was Byrnes's objective to demonstrate to the German audience the ideological framework of the US occupied forces, which did not include an outright will to repress the German people. On the contrary, Byrnes seems to completely pull away from Bevin's fear of the reinforcement of Prussia. Byrnes was particularly familiar with Herbert P. Lee's views on the risks of a unified Germany, but apparently did not accept his views on the different positions of the Germans and Prussians as culprits. According to Lee, the division of Germany would only expedite the democratization of the country, for even the history of democracy came from small townships. As a lawyer Byrnes was only interested in the economically unified Germany agreed upon in Potsdam, and unlike Lee, his thoughts did not include historical or ethnic explanations, which, for example, Molotov had referred to in the case of Trieste.⁸⁹⁹

Earlier research which has considered the Stuttgart Speech to be territorially inflammatory has emphasized Byrnes's statements regarding the fate of the German industrial regions, which were abundant in natural resources. In his speech the Secretary of State defended the incorporation of the Saar territory into France on the one hand, and on the other hand appealed for maintaining as part of Germany the Ruhr and Rhineland regions, which were of significance to Nazi-Germany, and which the French had long objected to. After the First World War the Saar territory had been left on the shoulders of the League of Nations, and it was economically connected to France. Hitler's

⁸⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F10, Germany is An Atomic Bomb, Herbert P. Lee.

victory march had begun by returning the Saar territory in 1935. The integration was based on the principle of same language and it was done on the basis of a landslide referendum which was colored by strong propaganda. With regard to the Saar territory, Byrnes's speech acts refer to a conversational context differing completely from the Trieste situation, the natural convention of which was to artificially lead to cultural questions. Talking about a linguistic and cultural unity was a brilliant argument in the case of Trieste, in which the support for these values was congruent with economic interests. With the eastern parts of Germany the locution was supported by the normative framework of the Potsdam Agreement, but also the mandate Roosevelt had given to the Soviet Union in Yalta regarding a border compensation of sorts in the name of security policy. With regard to the Saar territory, Byrnes both knowingly and contrary to the conversational context forgets the cultural and linguistic arguments. These values are surpassed by economic factors and security policy, to which he makes direct reference.

This is not the case with the Ruhr and the Rhineland, the remaining of which as a part of Germany turns out to be a culturally relevant alternative. The Rhineland had already become a significant concept in territorial policy at the Vienna Congress of 1815, when it was largely integrated into Prussia. The Rhineland's economic significance to Germany was lessened after the First World War when it – including the Ruhr – was demilitarized and separated from Germany in accordance with the objectives of Wilson, among others. With the occupation of neighboring states, the Rhineland was primarily turned into a buffer zone against any future attacks from Germany, but also to secure the payment of German reparations. Through an illocutionary reinterpretation, Byrnes's intention refers most clearly to upholding the second objective, or the Keynesian threat-scenarios of the liquidity of an economically destroyed Germany and thus a global economic crisis:

The United States does not feel that it can deny to France, which has been invaded three times by Germany in 70 years, its claim to the Saar territory, whose economy has long been closely linked with France. Of course, if the Saar territory is integrated with France she should readjust her reparation claims against Germany. Except as here indicated, the United States will not support any encroachment on territory which is indisputably German or any division of Germany which is not genuinely desired by the people concerned. So far as the United States is aware the people of the Ruhr and the Rhineland desire to remain united with the rest of Germany. And the United States is not going to oppose their desire.⁹⁰⁰

On the other hand, Byrnes's intentions in territorial policy were aimed at an economically unified Germany. However, when speaking of economic unity Byrnes had no need to highlight the conceptual difference between economically unified and territorially unified. Economic unity was an arrangement in accordance with the Potsdam protocol, and the desire to adhere to it was strengthened especially by US economic interests. Territorial unity

⁹⁰⁰ Appendix. DAFR 1945–1946. Restatement of United States Policy on Germany by the Secretary of State (Byrnes), Stuttgart, Germany, September 6, 1946. Volume VIII, pp. 210–218.

would have referred to cultural, historical and ethnic questions, and would have produced a unity without similar benefits.

When thought of in a Skinnerian manner, no historical linguistic competence can be found for two separate Germanies. The contrast between “an Eastern and a Western” which was part of the locution of the Cold War is not apparent in the Stuttgart Speech, although Vandenberg had brought out the juxtaposition in this light in July, followed by Wallace in September.⁹⁰¹ The Soviet Union is still understood as a part of the Allies, and the dichotomy between the Soviet Union and the “free world” is indistinguishable. On the other hand, Byrnes avoided speaking in a power-political manner in general. Perhaps the publication of the secret Far East agreements of Yalta estranged the Secretary of State from Rooseveltian closed club politics. The term “economically unified” means especially the economic unity of the occupied zones of the Western Allies – the United States, Britain and France – which on the part of Britain was a reality when the speech was given. From a territorial policy perspective, Byrnes’s intentions regarding the Ruhr, the Rhineland and the Saar territory can be better understood as purely minimizing the risks of economic policy. If the Allies, including the Soviet Union, would end up permanently dividing Germany somehow, the division into occupied zones would have greater significance. In this situation, the Rhineland would be part of the occupied zones of both France and Britain and economically unified with the US occupied zone – without the US having any other external intentions besides security.

From a Buzanian perspective, the conversational context of territorial policy appears to contain speech acts belonging to security policy. The safety of Europe as a common goal is the commonly accepted denominator of German territorial policy, the means achieving which both the United States and the Soviet Union viewed differently. The conventions evident in the conversations conducted in the name of European security contain clear tensions on territorial policy, which demonstrate the dead-end nature of bartering politics. Unable to reach solutions like the percentage agreements, the conversation on European security takes its approach outside the established rules as new and even as above politics. From the perspective of securitization, territorial policy is politicization stretched to its limits, in which concrete threats are at hand. Applying Buzan’s thinking, the Stuttgart Speech responds to Molotov’s

⁹⁰¹ SMD: Document No. 240, Senate, 79th Congress, 2d Session, Council of Foreign Ministers At Paris, Remarks of Hon. Arthur H. Vandenberg, July 16, 1946. Senate Miscellaneous Documents, p. 15. “Someone said at Paris that if this recent council had been confined to America, France, and Britain it would have achieved total agreement, including preliminary plans for the German and Austrian treaties in 10 days. This is simply another way of saying that eastern communism and western democracy are the forces which confront each other in planning for a new and better world. They differ in ideas, ideals, and ideologies”; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, Madison Square Garden, New York City, 8 p.m., September 12, 1946, “The Way to Peace”.

initiative to securitize the German territorial politics containing the questions of reparations.⁹⁰²

⁹⁰² Buzan 1998, p. 24.

5 THE RISE AND FALL OF BYRNES'S FOREIGN POLICY

5.1 The Domestic Policy Reactions to Foreign Policy

5.1.1 "Too much debate, too much propagandizing and too little harmonizing"⁹⁰³ - The aftermath of Stuttgart and the end of the Paris Peace Conference

Vandenberg, who had watched Byrnes in Stuttgart, characterized the speech as earth-shattering. If the purpose of the speech had been to shame the Soviet Union for its actions in Eastern Europe, it had succeeded. In the following days, the Stuttgart Speech had the European Soviet-minded press writing about the neglect of the Potsdam Agreements and the violation of the German-Polish border.⁹⁰⁴ After returning to Paris, Byrnes was congratulated for a forthright speech by both Bevin and Churchill, who happened to be in town unofficially.⁹⁰⁵ Although the speech was considered to be the perfection of Byrnes's foreign policy, during the fall some discordant notes were heard within the Democratic Party regarding a too-strict policy on the Soviet Union. Leading the critics was Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace, who in his own opinion was the only one of Truman's ministers who had maintained his belief in the Rooseveltian moderate policy on the Soviet Union. With this Wallace meant the interpretation he had presented in his speech, *The Way to Peace*,

⁹⁰³ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F6, Delivered by Secretary Byrnes at closing session of Peace Conference, 15.10.1946.

⁹⁰⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 191.

⁹⁰⁵ Winston Churchill had arrived in Paris to meet Byrnes even if the British Government considered it unwise. Earlier, Churchill and Bevin had had a quarrel which was caused by Bevin's and Attlee's reluctance to share information on foreign policy with Churchill. Byrnes came to the meeting unnoticed through the side door of the Embassy and the meeting was held at the Library room. BP. Series 10: Books, B8:F8, Statement with Reference to a visit to Paris by Winston Churchill on September 38, 1946; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F6, Confidential Memorandum for The Secretary, Paris, October 2, 1946.

regarding the policy of national internationalism, constructed during Roosevelt's term. This was the only policy that could protect the sovereign rights of each nation while at the same time strengthening the world order.⁹⁰⁶

According to Wallace, the behavior expected by Byrnes and Truman from the Soviet Union was in conflict with the US peacetime defense budget of 13 billion dollars and the ongoing nuclear tests. Previously, both Truman and Byrnes had ignored the critics citing public opinion, but only six days after the Stuttgart Speech Wallace gave his own speech at Madison Square Garden in New York. In his speech Wallace remarked, that "either we are preparing ourselves to win the war which we regard as inevitable, or that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind".⁹⁰⁷

Byrnes took the critique very personally and felt that he had only been acting in accordance with the wishes of the American people and under the supervision of President Truman. Unofficially, Truman stood behind Byrnes and suspected that he would not be able to silence Wallace even in the future. Even more concerned about the speech than Truman was Deputy Secretary of State William Clayton, who had received inquiries regarding the change towards favoring spheres of influence and power politics in foreign policy.⁹⁰⁸ However, Truman had to admit to his inability to intervene in foreign policy, for on the morning of Wallace's speech he had publicly announced "that he approved of the whole speech" and that the speech was "exactly in line" with Byrnes's policy on the Soviet Union. Perhaps President trusted Wallace too blindly, as Wallace had even written in his speech that "when President Truman read these words, he said that they represent the policy of his administration".⁹⁰⁹ The following day Truman explained that he had only wanted to accept giving the speech, and not the contents of the speech itself.⁹¹⁰

According to Wallace and Acheson's memoirs, what was more astonishing was the lack of Truman's knowledge regarding Byrnes's actions in Germany rather than the congruity of his speech with the President's opinion, for Truman and Wallace had gone through Wallace's *The Way to Peace* speech together, line by line. Because several mimeographed copies of the speech were already circulating on the morning of the speech, a sure foreign policy scandal could have been avoided by preventing Wallace from giving the speech. Truman did not seem to understand, even after Byrnes had made contact, how Wallace's speech had diminished the confidence of foreign countries in US foreign policy. The contents of the speech were even known to the delegation at the Paris Peace Conference a few hours before Wallace gave the speech, but the attempts made by William Clayton to change the speech from Europe were too late. Although Wallace had spontaneously shortened and revised the speech to

⁹⁰⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, Madison Square Garden, New York City, 8 p.m., September 12, 1946, *The Way to Peace*.

⁹⁰⁷ Ward 1979, p. 141.

⁹⁰⁸ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, For Secretary from Clayton, 13.9.1946, 5. p.m.

⁹⁰⁹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F11, White House Press and Radio News Conference, September 12, 1946, 4:00 p.m., est, No. 25.

⁹¹⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, From Clayton to Byrnes, 14.9.1946.

be better suited for radio, the public was not happy with what they heard. Senator Pepper, who had spoken before Wallace, had warmed up the crowd, who booed and cat called in many places during Wallace's speech.⁹¹¹ External pressures led to Truman asking for Wallace's resignation for creating a "fundamental conflict",⁹¹² but wanted Byrnes to remain in his position until the peace treaties were finalized.⁹¹³

The discussion in the press surrounding Byrnes's and Wallace's speeches reached never before seen dimensions and varying interpretations. Wallace's resignation from the position of Secretary of Commerce was in the French moderate press interpreted as a "hardening of Washington's foreign policy toward Russia", but the clearly leftist *l'Humanite* considered Wallace's resignation to be a loss to those who supported the societal development and international cooperation of Roosevelt's era: "It is a victory for business men whose satisfaction was immediately made evident by a rise of shares on the New York Stock Exchange". In Britain the *Daily Telegraph* described the events as a "domestic showdown", which cleared the air. The Communist *Daily Worker* labeled the Wallace resignation as the "beginning of a nation-wide fight by American Progressives against the brutal war policy of Bevin and Byrnes". According to *The New York Times*, on the Moscow radio Wallace had been praised as a leader of the progressives seeking world peace, whose resignation was designed "to assure Anglo-Saxon domination over Europe and another war against the Soviet Union".⁹¹⁴

In the United States, the whole drama was generally written off by the fact that no change had happened during the Paris Peace Conference, at least not in US foreign policy. President Truman was the one put in the position of making excuses, as he was forced to explain that Wallace had only had his permission for giving the speech, but that even he had had no knowledge as to its contents. In an interview by *The New York Times*, Truman emphasized that he supported Byrnes's policy fully and denied that changes were needed: "There has been no change in the established foreign policy of our Government. There will be no significant change in that policy without discussion and conference among the

⁹¹¹ Culver & Hyde 2000, pp. 419-421; Acheson 1987, pp. 192-193.

⁹¹² *The New York Times*, 21.9.1946. "Mr. Wallace's Resignation"; "Cabinet Unity Is Restored Through Exit of Wallace".

⁹¹³ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, From Clayton to Byrnes, 18.9.1946. At first Truman tried to keep Wallace in his cabinet by demanding that the Minister of Commerce not make any public statement or give any talks on foreign policy before the end of the Paris Peace Conference. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, From John Edgar Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, Director of Office of Controls, State Department. Suspension of Wallace became more necessary when the head of the FBI, John Edgar Hoover gave a warning that the organizations which supported American-Soviet cooperation had activated. According to the information Hoover had received from reliable sources, those organizations were planning a public festival at Yankee Stadium and Wallace was supposed to be a keynote speaker; Byrnes 1947, p. 240.

⁹¹⁴ *The New York Times*, 22.9.1946. Wallace Receives Praise of Moscow. *The New York Times'* citations from foreign magazines.

President, the Secretary of State and congressional leaders".⁹¹⁵ This was justified, as properly speaking, the issue of Germany was not on the agenda for the peace treaties in the first stage. Wallace, who had also attacked Britain's imperialist policy in India, made Churchill – who had given his full support for Byrnes's speech – concerned. Leland Harrison, who had met with Churchill in Bern, messaged Washington that the former Prime Minister considered the Soviet Union's expansive policies to be a reaction to the United States' nuclear monopoly. Churchill considered it to be a very good idea to keep the atomic secrets "in safe hands".⁹¹⁶

After *Speaking Frankly* was published, Byrnes left himself entirely outside of the conflicts caused by Wallace, and did not want to "further confuse world opinion". At Truman's request, the Secretary of State refrained from commenting on the matter, and publicly the debate remained between Truman and Wallace. However, Byrnes revealed that he had started to doubt the President's position when at the start Truman had not taken a clear stand on the issue. In order to resolve the deadlocked situation, Byrnes had, in his own words, written a new letter of resignation for the President, with which he sought to test the confidence for his new foreign policy.⁹¹⁷

According to Denise Conover, who researched the relationship of Byrnes's foreign policy to Germany in her doctoral dissertation, at the first stage of the peace process Byrnes was not only committed to the Finnish, Balkan and Italian peace treaties, but also to resolving the issues of Germany. In Conover's opinion, Byrnes's interest towards Germany was inherited from Roosevelt, who had on the one hand come across as the punisher of Germany and on the other as a supporter of a more moderate approach.⁹¹⁸ Byrnes, however, adopted the latter approach, which was evident in the moderate defense of German economic interests starting in Potsdam, and according to Conover's research, this was only fortified by the Stuttgart Speech. With the Wallace incident connecting the objectives of Byrnes's foreign policy closer to the Republicans, this is well justified. According to Conover, Byrnes's concern over Wallace's speech was not so much a fear of the Secretary of Commerce being too Soviet-minded, but rather that the incident would have negative effects by transferring party-political elements into a sensitive foreign policy. This had happened to President Wilson in 1919. The author of Byrnes's biography, George Curry, remarked that Wallace's accusations only demonstrated that Byrnes executed the agenda started during Roosevelt's term.⁹¹⁹

The origin of Byrnes's speech has also been the cause of much debate. John Gimbel believes the Stuttgart Speech to have been largely authored by

⁹¹⁵ *The New York Times*, 15.9.1946. Bertram D. Hulen "Truman Supports Byrnes, Says Policy Is Unchanged; Explains Stand on Wallace".

⁹¹⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B5:F2, From Harrison to Truman, Bern, 18.9.1946.

⁹¹⁷ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F24, Interview of Pauline Frederick with Mr. James F. Byrnes, Spartanburg, S.C., Tuesday, October 14, 1947, 8:00 to 8:15 P. M., American Broadcasting Company.

⁹¹⁸ Conover 1978, pp. 32–48.

⁹¹⁹ Curry 1965, pp. 257–259.

General Lucius Clay and considers this to be the main reason for the attention the speech received.⁹²⁰ The significance of the author or the development of conspiracy theories is, however, secondary to the objectives of the speech, for coming from the Secretary of State it represented current foreign policy. What was more relevant was the dialogue between the policy presented in the speech and publicity and public opinion. The opinion polls of the spring and summer of 1946 had attested to the Americans' fears regarding tensions in power politics and demands for a stricter Soviet policy. Less than a month before Byrnes's speech in Stuttgart only 7 percent of Americans considered the Soviet Union's foreign policy to be acceptable and 60 percent believed that the objective behind its foreign policy was a pure pursuit of influence. When asked what the US foreign policy leaders should do if the Soviet Union was to continue its foreign policy, 61 percent supported a tougher foreign policy, maintaining military preparedness, financial sanctions or even severing the relationship with the Soviet Union completely. Only 11 percent believed in the appeasement policy or in the resolution of issues in the UN.⁹²¹

Although evoking an almost year-old and largely blurred section of the Potsdam Agreement in Stuttgart may have come across as childish to the political elite, coming from Byrnes it had the capability of affecting the press and the public opinion in the West. After the Stuttgart Speech in September, as many as 62 percent of Americans and 41 percent of British considered the Soviet Union to be less friendly than a year before.⁹²² In October, Americans' opinion on the policy Byrnes had presented in Stuttgart was surveyed. All in all, 67 percent considered Byrnes's policy to be hard but fair and only 7 percent felt he had conformed to the Soviet Union's will. At the same time, 50 percent understood Wallace's views to be representative of an appeasement policy and more than 30 percent considered them to be Soviet-minded or even communist. As a whole, 78 percent were in favor of continuing Byrnes's policy and only 16 percent believed that Wallace's views would lead to a better end result.⁹²³ The numbers confirm that the course chosen by Byrnes was truly the people's foreign policy.

As a whole, September of 1946 clarified Byrnes's foreign policy perhaps more than ever before. The Stuttgart Speech was a clear stand in favor of a tougher foreign policy and Wallace's *The Way to Peace* speech a progressive analysis on the effects of Byrnes's policy. From a domestic policy perspective, the dialogue between Byrnes and Wallace seems to have ultimately exemplified the differences that can exist between two cabinet politicians of the same party. In addition, American marginal groups began to activate and clarify their own thinking on foreign policy. For example, it was known that *The National*

⁹²⁰ Gimbel 1972, p. 248.

⁹²¹ *The Quarter's Polls*. AIPO Aug. 16, '46, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Volume 10, Issue 4 (Winter 1946-1947), p. 639.

⁹²² *The Quarter's Polls*. AIPO Sept. 18, '46, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Volume 10, Issue 4 (Winter 1946-1947), p. 640.

⁹²³ *The Quarter's Polls*. AIPO Oct. 13, '46, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Volume 10, Issue 4 (Winter 1946-1947), pp. 640-641.

Council of American-Soviet Friendship was planning a protest against Wallace's resignation. Behind the protest was an understanding that the Truman administration had detached itself from Roosevelt's foreign policy legacy. Moreover, according to FBI investigations, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People had, together with the communist party, started campaigning against foreign policy and Wallace's resignation as fascist materializations of aggressive imperialism.⁹²⁴

The decision to demand Wallace's resignation from the position of Secretary of Commerce was not an easy one for Truman. The domestic policy situation was extremely sensitive with regard to the upcoming election, for even the President seemed to be unaware of the internal discursion of his own party especially with regard to foreign policy. With his *The Way to Peace* speech, Wallace had also personally attacked some Republicans, which was sure to change conceptions regarding the functioning of bipartisanship. In the Republican camp, Wallace was seen to have disgraced the United States. Truman's efforts in keeping Wallace in the position of Secretary of Commerce in exchange for his silence on matters of foreign policy would most certainly have kept the surface of the Democratic Party unscathed, but even the media considered this arrangement to be poor mainly due to its temporary nature. Wallace's withdrawal from the Democratic ticket for the Senate and the Governorship of Rhode Island further complicated the situation. Byrnes's own reaction in Paris to the aftermath of Wallace's speech remains unclear. Washington asked the Secretary of State to refrain from commenting on the matter. However, Donald Russell informed Byrnes of the possibility that Wallace might "return to his attack on the foreign policies of his cabinet associate and that the president will be satisfied to have him do so, etc." According to Byrnes, Wallace could do even further damage to foreign policy if he were allowed to act during the New York meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, during which the peace treaties were to be finalized. Although the policy of the State Department would have been more affected by domestic policy pressure in the US, the change in course only gained significant proportions as a result of Wallace's speech.⁹²⁵

In a telegraph Byrnes sent to Truman from Paris he reminded the President about the public image damaged by Wallace: "when the administration itself is divided on its own foreign policy, it cannot hope to convince the world that the American people have a foreign policy". At the same time, he suggested that the US losing its reputation in foreign policy would be the responsibility of the President, who himself had only moments earlier emphasized his leadership in foreign policy. In his letter Byrnes also considered the possibility that Wallace had directed his criticism only to Byrnes as a person and expressed his willingness to resign if that was the case. On the other hand, the Secretary of State emphasized his role as the representative of

⁹²⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, From John Edgar Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, Director of Office of Controls, State Department.

⁹²⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F14, From Russell to Byrnes, 19.9.1946; For The Secretary of State's Eyes only From The Acting Secretary, 19.9.1946.

American foreign policy, and not as the representative of different parties. In his own words, in Paris Byrnes sought to convince the Foreign Ministers of other countries of the heavily bipartisan base of the US's foreign policy, which would not change along with any changes to the parties themselves. With regard to bipartisanship, Byrnes always ranked uniformity in foreign policy higher than domestic policy: "regardless of how much he and his party may disagree with the administration about domestic issues, in our relations with foreign governments we have but one policy, the policy of the United States".⁹²⁶

When examined retrospectively, the Stuttgart Speech did not so much cause a strong turning point in attitudes towards the Soviet Union or towards Communism in general, but it first and foremost meant the fine-tuning of tactics and focus. In his foreign policy, Byrnes had continued the Rooseveltian *realpolitik* by striving for power-political aggregates which would not lead to tensions enabling another great war. What seemed to have become a problem of politics however, was the demarcation between two ideologically different worlds, one of which was actively expanding all over the world. The prevention of this expansion had proved to be extremely difficult partially due to the legacy of foreign policy left by President Roosevelt, and partially due to Byrnes's tactics, which were based on compromise. On the last day of September 1946, Byrnes wrote about his policy on occupied territories to Mark Ethridge, who had been acting as a prominent expert to the Secretary of State especially in the Balkan region:

You know, too, that it was the policy of Roosevelt, who at Yalta presented the Declaration as to liberated areas. That policy and the fact that we have consistently tried to follow it has given encouragement to people in every one of those countries. We might seriously question whether we have been aggressive enough in supporting the policy, but certainly at this time we cannot abandon and leave these people without any hope.⁹²⁷

As a close friend of Wallace and one who had supported him in the vice-presidential election, Ethridge gave Byrnes's foreign policy his full support and announced that he had lost confidence in Wallace along with the speech. Instead of the liberal path, Wallace had, in Ethridge's opinion, chosen a narrow-minded path. As a journalist, Ethridge revealed that he had started a minor lobbying campaign for Byrnes's foreign policy and had received the backing of Barry Bingham, the owner of the extremely notable *The Courier-Journal* newspaper empire.⁹²⁸ On the other hand, the fall following the Stuttgart Speech had clarified Byrnes's own views on the justification of his foreign policy and its basic values. At the start of October the Secretary of State spoke about his own political past at the American Club in Paris:

⁹²⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F14, For The President From The Secretary, September 19. 1946 at Paris; BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F16, Report By Secretary Byrnes, after his return from meeting in Paris, May 20, 1946.

⁹²⁷ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F7, From Byrnes to Ethridge, 20.9.1946.

⁹²⁸ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F7, From Ethridge to Byrnes, 24.9.1946. Later Bingham travelled to the Paris Peace Conference to meet Byrnes.

In 1918 I was a follower of Woodrow Wilson. I gloried in his idealism and in the magnificent effort he made to build the peace upon the covenant of the League of Nations. But the American people expected too much from Woodrow Wilson and supported him too little. While he was in Paris working for peace, political enemies at home bitterly criticized his course and questioned his motives. They exaggerated and exploited the shortcomings of the Treaty of Versailles and they belittled and besmirched what Woodrow Wilson had accomplished.⁹²⁹

In his own opinion Byrnes had managed to steer clear of the pitfalls Wilson had encountered. Roosevelt's objective of avoiding the formation of a political opposition was, in the Secretary's reasoning, the most significant change to Wilson's methods. In the continuum of US foreign policy, based on the speech, Byrnes seems to have adopted a combination of Wilson's ideological and Roosevelt's pragmatic legacy.

In Byrnes's view, the failure of world peace had previously been largely caused by the reluctance of the United States to intervene in European matters. The theory of the isolation policy was, according to the Secretary, demonstrated in the reluctance of the Americans to intervene in matters outside of the continent and to take part in trade. However, it had become clear to the Americans that in the event of a war erupting in Europe, the security of the United States would be compromised before long. According to Byrnes's reasoning, when getting caught up in a war was from this perspective inevitable, the Americans started to support the policy of intervention in order to prevent wars in Europe. The history within living memory was the clearest empirical evidence:

Twice in my generation the soldiers of France and the soldiers of America have fought side by side in defense of their common heritage of freedom.... Twice in our generation doubt as to American foreign policy has led other nations to miscalculate the consequences of their actions. Twice in our generation that doubt as to American foreign policy has not brought peace, but war.⁹³⁰

Isolation policy was the reason for the failed peace efforts and it was caused by the inability to conduct a foreign policy accepted by both major parties. Byrnes's views – which, unlike Wilson's, had been successful in bipartisanship – were in even greater demand at home, where preparations were being made for the November elections.⁹³¹

However, with regard to Germany Byrnes polished his views during the rest of the year. With regard to demands for central administration, the Secretary of State refused to call for “an over-centralized” administration and changed his manner of speaking to support the economic unification of Germany. In the American zone, developments had already been made towards the “United States of Germany”, which Byrnes had mentioned in the

⁹²⁹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F5, Address of The Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State of The United States of America, At The American Club, Paris, France, 8:00 A.M., E.S.T., Thursday, October 3, 1946.

⁹³⁰ Ibid.

⁹³¹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F5, Address of The Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State of The United States of America, At The American Club, Paris, France, 8:00 A.M., E.S.T., Thursday, October 3, 1946.

drafts of his Stuttgart Speech. According to Byrnes, the forming of states had already lessened the pressure for Germans to look towards centralized administrative institutions in matters, where “national action” is not required. According to the Secretary, the central administration should be subordinate to the states, which emphasized Byrnes more as a federalist than an advocate for a unified Germany. Despite the legacy of the Democratic Party, he spoke in favor of the federalist government of Germany, but referred in his examples only to the US occupied zone. At least on the level of public addresses, the chances of a unified Germany seemed to have significantly decreased during October of 1946.⁹³²

With Byrnes still in Europe, Truman had started to show signs of a deeper interest towards foreign policy. Already in the spring of 1946 the President had instructed his special aide Charles M. Clifford to draft a confidential memorandum on US-Soviet relations. On September 24, Clifford presented his detailed report to Truman, which was put together in cooperation with experts on the Soviet Union and representatives of the State Department. According to the report, the relationship between the superpowers had become problematic to the extent that resolving the problems was seen as congruent with the questions regarding a third world war. Soviet interests were seen to be aimed at world dominance and their methods were seen to be in complete conflict with American ideals. The historical analysis included in the report showed that the Soviet Union had been heading in a different direction in international cooperation and friendship for some time. The Soviet Union had also continued to breach the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Agreements or had interpreted them in a manner beneficial to itself. In light of Clifford’s interpretation, the dogmas of the communist philosophy did not include the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of capitalist and communist peoples, and the Soviet Union’s actions were seen to aim to fight against the capitalist world.

Clifford’s report brought to light a paradox according to which the Soviet Union, which was historically at its strongest was still acting under the guise of its security policy interests, was blaming “monopoly capitalism”, and “capitalistic encirclement” for its fears. However, his views were largely based on Kennan’s reports and the “long telegram”, which was sent in February. Based on Stalin’s speech, Clifford was also convinced of the Soviet Union’s wretched objectives in foreign policy, which were apparent in the weakening of the cooperation between the Big Three and the lack of confidence in the operational ability of the United Nations. Although the conversation referring to ideologies was not had directly in the Council of Foreign Ministers, Kennan’s desire to investigate the intentions of the Soviet Union had increased the need to analyze the Russians’ actions from an ideological starting point. According to

⁹³² BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F5, Address of The Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State of The United States of America, At The American Club, Paris, France, 8:00 A.M., E.S.T., Thursday, October 3, 1946; Later Byrnes supported wholeheartedly federalist policies in the United States as well. See e.g. BP. Series 6: Interim Materials, B22:F7, Address by Hon. James F. Byrnes at Bicentennial Celebration of Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, June 18, 1949.

Clifford, the key to understanding Soviet foreign policy was accepting the idea that the Soviet leaders had committed to the Marxist theory on the eventual destruction of capitalist nations. Whilst waiting for the inevitable conflict, the Soviet Union was in his opinion only playing for time in order to prepare and strengthen.⁹³³

According to a view presented later by Clifford, neither Kennan's long telegraph nor his report made an impression at the State Department. Instead, he saw that the report he had confidentially prepared for Truman contained the "seeds" of the Marshall Plan, NATO and the growth of the Truman Doctrine. According to Clifford, the report clarified thinking and set up the framework within which "these great foreign policy decisions were made". However, in the fall of 1946 neither Kennan's nor Clifford's ideas were paid much attention to at the State Department. Truman was evidently more interested in new views on foreign policy. On the other hand, the American people had little knowledge about Clifford's and Kennan's views prior to Kennan's article, which was published in the July edition of *Foreign Affairs* in 1947 under the pseudonym X. Clifford's report only became public in 1968 when published by Arthur Krock.⁹³⁴

Byrnes, who had returned to Washington from the Paris Peace Conference on October 18, considered the 15-month long peace process to have been a difficult and tough period. In his radio address, the Secretary of State reminded his listeners that after each war the victorious parties have been in disagreement regarding the terms of peace. In this regard, the Paris Peace Conference was no exception, as many problematic issues were left to be decided by the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York. From the perspective of Byrnes's final report, the decisions of the Peace Conference, which concluded the drafting of the peace treaties, seems to have been unusually sparse. The opposition of Yugoslavia had formed the final barrier to establishing the Freetown of Trieste, the issue of the Italian-Austrian border remained unresolved and the liberation of European waterways, which Truman had personally pushed, was objected to by the Soviet Union. According to the Secretary of State, the division into different camps was real, and differences in "interest, in ideas, in experience, and even in prejudices" had been characteristic of the conversations. However, in his own words he was not so much disappointed in the draft peace treaties sent to the Council of Foreign Ministers, but rather in the "continued if not increasing tension between us and the Soviet Union".⁹³⁵

According to Byrnes, the tensions were the result of the Soviet Union's inability to understand the boundaries of reason. Mutual understanding

⁹³³ TL. Report, "American Relations With The Soviet Union" by Clark Clifford ["Clifford-Else Report"], September 24, 1946. Conway Files, Truman Papers.

⁹³⁴ TL. Oral History Interview with CLARK M. CLIFFORD Assistant to White House Naval Aide, 1945-46; Special Counsel to the President, 1946-50. Washington, D. C. April 13, 1971 by Jerry N. Hess, [80].

⁹³⁵ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F7, Report on the Paris Peace Conference, Address by The secretary of State, 18.10.1946.

between superpowers could not mean that one accepts all demands set by the other. Byrnes was also astounded by the Soviet Union's ruthlessness in using its right to veto and in engaging in misleading propaganda. According to the Secretary of State, even the interaction between superpowers could be nothing more than cooperation between two sovereign nations, which was the only way to build a new world order. However, the sanctification of status-quo thinking could not be included in the building of the new world order, for it was to be based on fairness. This was the purpose of the UN Charter as Byrnes interpreted it, and it had also been the guideline of US foreign policy. The Secretary of State, who had operated in the light of these principles, saw that his foreign policy had been the subject of unfounded criticism:

Those are the policies we have pursued. In following those policies we have been criticized at times for being too 'soft' and times for being too 'tough'. I dislike both words. Neither accurately describes our earnest efforts to be patient but firm.⁹³⁶

Byrnes's exceptionally powerful radio address aroused conflicting emotions in the American public. Byrnes's critics considered the speech to be a demonstration of the ongoing appeasement of the Soviet Union. Apparently, a part of this appeasement was the observation Byrnes had made in his speech regarding the Soviet Union's colonization of three Baltic countries during the war. According to the critics, the State Department had acquiesced "to the murder of the three nations" when the Secretary of State failed to comment on the injustice of the Baltic situation. Conversely, Byrnes was accused of being unrealistic, which he was guilty of by taking into too much consideration the needs of the losing party. More ruthless power politics and the use of "diplomatical tools" typical to the bartering policy was expected of the Secretary of State. The most radical considered Byrnes's way of speaking about democracy using American examples futile, since, for example, the subjugation of the Negro population and the discrimination the government had engaged in the case of the Panama Canal made the speech hypocritical. However, even the other members of Cabinet could not suggest better diplomatic tools. Secretary of War Patterson's advice on reminding the Russians about Germany's secret overtures for peace during the spring of 1945 would hardly have made a difference. Invoking neither reason or sympathy carried weight in the power politics of the time.⁹³⁷

Lionel L. Yard saw Byrnes to be guilty of a fundamental fallacy in his thinking. The Secretary of State's view on the peaceful coexistence of two different political systems was not possible according to Yard. "A dollar democracy or a food democracy", executed by the Americans in their foreign policy could not fight against the expansion of Sovietism. Yard also reminded

⁹³⁶ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F7, Report on the Paris Peace Conference, Address by The secretary of State, 18.10.1946.

⁹³⁷ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F12, From Knights of Lithuania to Byrnes, 20.10.1946; Unknown to Byrnes, 21.10.1946; Jack Wallace and Julius F. Wallace, 18.10.1946; Joseph Boley to Byrnes, 19.10.1946; BP. Series 5: State Department Files, B2:F8, From Patterson to Byrnes, 19.10.1946; From Byrnes to Patterson, 31.10.1946.

Byrnes of the possibility that superpowers could be at war with one another, not physically but mentally. According to Yard, mental wars were already being fought between different religions.⁹³⁸ Despite the criticism, many felt that Byrnes had been successful in Paris and that the Secretary was the right man to “clear the way for even closer cooperation between the U.S. and Russia”. The Republicans also supported Byrnes by condemning “sentimentalists and leftists” for objections. The Secretary was also seen to have read the Russians the “truths of life”. Alan W. Heylton warned Byrnes that the relationships between superpowers were developing in such a way that the United States was headed for a war with the Soviet Union before long. On the other hand, it was felt that Byrnes understood the Russian temperament and that in his report he had brought the realities of power politics to light. The debate surrounding Byrnes and Wallace’s speeches was felt to have significantly molded people’s opinions rather than created confusion as to the direction of foreign policy. Nonetheless, former Secretary of War Stimson noticed the optimism in Byrnes’s thinking about the Russians “coming to their senses”. William H. Rankin was extremely satisfied with Byrnes’s courage to stand his ground in Paris and hoped that he would instill the same attitude in the President and the United Nations.⁹³⁹

From a domestic policy perspective, Byrnes’s speech scarcely had an effect on the upcoming elections, which was certainly not the intention. It was nonetheless clear that the Democrats were losing support, especially due to Wallace’s radicalism. Dr. Gerard A. Ryan Ridgewood wrote to Byrnes that he had recently joined the Republican Party purely because of Wallace. The defection of Ridgewood, who was a seventh generation Democrat to the Republican Party, was not unusual. Ridgewood, who had in his letter emphasized progressive values, was in favor of smoking the Democrats out of both houses of Congress in order to wake the American people to “a realization of what is important and what could be accomplished in our domestic scene”.⁹⁴⁰

⁹³⁸ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F12, From Yard to Byrnes, 19.10.1946.

⁹³⁹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F8, From Lionel A. Aucoin to Byrnes, 19.10.1946; From Philip Marshall Brown to Byrnes, 19.10.1946; From Boyd to Byrnes, 21.10.1946; BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F9, From Owen C. Emery to Byrnes, 18.10.1946; From C.W. Hegeman sr. To Byrnes, 19.10.1946; From Hyelton to Byrnes, 18.10.1946; From Joseph Henig to Byrnes, 24.10.1946; BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F10, From Henry L. Stimson to Byrnes, 27.10.1946; From Rankin to Byrnes, 18.10.1946; From Rankin to Byrnes, 20.10.1946; From R. Moulton Pettey to Byrnes, 18.10.1946; From George P. Messersmith to Byrnes, 22.10.1936. Messersmith acquainted the State Department with reactions of the Argentine press on Byrnes’s speech: “I can’t tell you what a sense of satisfaction I had in reading this speech which I think is an extraordinarily useful and constructive public document. The responsible press in Buenos Aires all commented most constructively on the speech.”

⁹⁴⁰ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F10, From Ridgewood to Byrnes, 18.10.1946.

5.1.2 A new majority on Capitol Hill and foreign policy's tightening pressures of change

The mid-term elections on November 5, 1946 swept the Democrats from their dominance in both houses of Congress for the first time in 14 years. Understandably, the rise in Republicanism had raised questions in the United States as well as abroad about a possible change in foreign policy, and it had even raised suspicions of the country returning to some level of isolation policy. However, this fear had been battled by the leaders of the Republican Party, Vandenberg and Dulles, who since the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers had actively participated in superpower conferences alongside Byrnes. Under the direction of the Democrats, the truce between the parties and bipartisanship had especially pertained to foreign policy, but as the state of emergency faded and the Republicans rolled into power, the preservation of the status quo was no longer a foregone conclusion. On November 11 Truman thought defining US foreign policy was warranted following the elections, and saw no need for radical change:

The change in the in the Congress does not alter our domestic or foreign interests or problems. In foreign affairs we have a well charted course to follow. Our foreign policy has been developed and executed on a bipartisan basis. I have done my best to strengthen and extend this practice. Members of both parties in and out of the Congress have participated in the inner council in preparing and in actually carrying out the foreign policies of our Government. It has been a national and not a party program. It will continue to be a national program insofar as the Secretary of State and I are concerned. I firmly believe that our Republican colleagues who have worked intelligently and cooperatively with us in the past will do so in the future.⁹⁴¹

Truman also drew attention to fact that the Senate and the House of Representatives, both with a Republican majority, would have to work together with a government formed by Democrats. Further, Truman wanted to uphold at least the legislative dimension of bipartisanship by appealing to the Republicans not to try anything sensationalist by contriving problems:

My concern is not about those in either party who know the seriousness of the problems which confront us in our foreign affairs. Those who share great problems are united and not divided by them. My concern is lest any in either party should seek in this field an opportunity to achieve personal notoriety or partisan advantage by exploitation of the sensational or by the mere creation of controversy. We are set upon a hard course. An effort by either the executive or the legislative branch of the Government to embarrass the other for partisan gain would bring frustration to our country. To follow the course with honor to ourselves and with benefit to our country, we must look beyond and above ourselves and our party interests for the true bearing. As President of the United States I am guided by a simple formula: to do in all cases, from day to day, without regard to narrow political considerations, what seems to me to be best for the welfare of all our people. Our search for that welfare must always be based upon a progressive concept of government.⁹⁴²

⁹⁴¹ DAFR 1945–1946. Statement by the President (Truman) on the Bipartisan Program for Foreign Affairs, November 11, 1946. Volume VIII, pp. 38–39.

⁹⁴² Ibid.

Truman clearly transferred the challenge of maintaining the stability in foreign policy onto the shoulders of the Republicans. For his own part Truman wanted to emphasize that he had always sought to do what was best for the people. In his memoirs, Byrnes referred to the same idea by emphasizing that he had always exercised the people's foreign policy. Both views reflect a compulsory need to clarify that previous methods have been bipartisan and thus accordant with the will of the people. Neither Truman nor Byrnes wanted to consider the humiliation the Democrats had suffered in the election a demand by the people to change the focus of foreign policy. According to Byrnes, foreign policy should always originate from and develop in the hands of both parties and it "is national rather than political in its conduct and its character; and that, consequently, is a continuing policy worthy of the confidence of other nations".⁹⁴³ In his memoirs of 1947, Byrnes explained the secrets to the success of bipartisanship:

The political party in power cannot ask the opposition party to share responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations unless the leaders of the opposition are fully advised of our policies. This is true when the Congress and President are of the same party. It is particularly true when a majority of the Congress and the Chief executive are not of the same political party. The executive branch of the government cannot announce a policy of importance requiring congressional action and then inform the leaders of the opposition. Even if the opposition leaders think the proposal unwise they must support it or create abroad the impression of dissension. A policy of bypassing the Congress would make possible a bipartisan policy.⁹⁴⁴

Afterwards Byrnes also emphasized that the participation of Senators Connally and Vandenberg in the meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Peace Conference and the meetings of the United Nations "served to let the people of the world know that the foreign policy of the United States was continuing policy and would not end with the defeat of a political party". This was partially connected to Byrnes views on the State Department becoming more and more "sensitive to the public opinion".⁹⁴⁵ The people's foreign policy in turn demanded a well-informed people. The relationship of foreign policy to the November 1946 elections seems to have meant, for Byrnes, only a framework of sorts, for foreign policy was the people's foreign policy irrespective of the change in the relative power of partisan politics. On the other hand, the elections had a surprising significance in foreign policy, as the election results had aroused some tactical interest in the Soviet Union. Dr. Harold Lasswell, who was observing the situation in Eastern Europe, reported to Under Secretary of State Benton that the Soviet Union was seeking to support the Republicans' victory with its propaganda. According to Lasswell's analysis, the Soviet Union sought to emphasize the reactionary nature of Republican politics in order to establish the credibility of its propaganda in the United States.⁹⁴⁶

⁹⁴³ Byrnes 1947, p.233.

⁹⁴⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 236.

⁹⁴⁵ Byrnes 1947, pp. 236, 248.

⁹⁴⁶ BP. Appointments and Correspondence B1:F2. From William Benton to Byrnes, 28.10.1946.

In his annual message to Congress sent on the verge of Byrnes's resignation in January 1947, Truman further called for the necessary cooperation between a Republican-majority Congress and a Democratic President, as well as the ties between domestic policy and foreign policy:

It is not unusual in our history that the majority of the Congress represents a party in opposition to the President's party. I am the twentieth President of the United States who, at some time during his term in office, has found his own party to be in the minority in one or both Houses of the Congress. I realize that on some matters the Congress and the President may have honest differences of opinion. Partisan differences, however, did not cause material disagreements as to the conduct of the war. Nor, in the conduct of our internal relations, during and since the war, have such partisan differences been material.... Process in reaching our domestic goals is closely related to our conduct of foreign affairs. All that I have said about maintaining a sound and prosperous economy and improving the welfare of our people has greater meaning because of the world leadership of the United States.... The delay in arriving at the first peace settlements is due partly to the difficulty of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on the terms of settlement.... Our policy toward the Soviet Union is guided by the same principles which determine our policies toward all nations. We seek only to uphold the principles of international justice which have been embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.⁹⁴⁷

Truman clearly tried to garner the sympathies of Congress by highlighting the predominance of US resources and perhaps also the possibility that a new Secretary of State could use these resources in foreign policy better than Byrnes. What was significant, however, was the fact that Truman did not highlight the Soviet Union's role behind all failures, but considered the Soviet Union to be only partly to blame and the problems to still lie in the differing views of both superpowers. In a kind of farewell speech on January 11, 1947, Byrnes connected his success in foreign policy to the unity of the American people:

We were determined to do our part to bring peace to a war-weary world and we have not sought any excuse, however plausible, for shrinking our responsibilities... But we would never have made the progress that we did during the last year if the American people had not been united on a foreign policy. For the past year our foreign policy has not been the policy of a political party, it has been the policy of the United States.⁹⁴⁸

If one wanted to emphasize the effects of foreign policy, the mid-term elections of November 1946 became in a way a repeat performance of the 1918 elections. The appeals of then President Wilson did not prevent the Republicans from claiming victory in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. During his last six years in the House of Representatives, Byrnes was a representative of the minority party, which was particularly emphasized in the 1920s when Republicans also gained power in the White House. Truman, on the other hand, maintained the Democratic nomination, albeit with a very tight margin, for another four years in 1948.

⁹⁴⁷ DAFR 1947. Annual Message of the President (Truman) to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 6, 1947. Volume IX, pp. 1-2.

⁹⁴⁸ DAFR 1947. Address by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) before the Institute of the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, January 11, 1947. Volume IX, p. 3.

From a foreign policy perspective, the two periods are very similar. The reaction to the great wars was evident in both elections, which undeniably reflected – at least in the long term and against Byrnes', Marshall's and Truman's views – a political party change in foreign policy. The 1918 elections returned the United States to the road of isolation. Less than 30 years later a similar change in the relative power turned foreign policy in the opposite direction – towards an active and interfering foreign policy. The debate of September 1946 and the November elections had a clear effect on Byrnes's actions. Both the pressures created by foreign countries and growing pressure domestically influenced foreign policy, which the Secretary of State relatively independently ran, even within his own party. Differing from the early days of his term as Secretary of State, Byrnes no longer wanted to actively comment or give speeches on foreign policy. On the other hand, Byrnes paid more attention to the custom established during Cordell Hull's term to not participate in political campaigns. Byrnes himself felt that he had gone even further than Hull by declaring all foreign policy speeches as bipartisan. Senator Vandenberg had also refrained from taking part in foreign policy discussion during the election campaign and thus had sought to not exploit foreign policy as a campaign tool for the Republicans. In this light Byrnes could be content that foreign policy was not used to decide the November elections.⁹⁴⁹

5.2 Byrnes and the cost of world peace

5.2.1 The New York meeting of Foreign Ministers

Before the 21-nation Paris Peace Conference culminated in the signing of the Bulgarian, Romanian, Italian, Finnish and Hungarian peace treaties on February 10, 1947, the draft peace agreements were still revised clause by clause in the New York meeting of Foreign Ministers in November and December 1946.⁹⁵⁰ The meeting, which was Byrnes's last, began in New York with the purpose of resolving all matters relating to the peace treaties that had been left unresolved in previous meetings. Now the Foreign Ministers had committed to accepting final decisions regarding the peace agreements based on the

⁹⁴⁹ In his letter to John Davis, Byrnes remarked that he hated making speeches especially when they considered United States' foreign policy en bloc. Byrnes had refused all invitations providing a foreign policy speech except the Foreign Press Association's invitation because all four foreign ministers were invited. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F2, From Byrnes to Davis, 22.11.1946; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B6:F5, From Byrnes to Will Rogers Jr, 29.10.1946; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B6:F12, From Vandenberg to Robert E. Hannegan, 28.10.1946.

⁹⁵⁰ The Paris Peace Conference was in motion 27.7.1946–10.2.1947 and it ended the Second World War in the cases of Bulgaria, Italy, Romania, Finland and Hungary. The Conference was not in session the whole time, however, and results achieved between were polished on a deputy level in the framework of the New York meeting of Foreign Ministers 4.11.1946–16.12.1946.

recommendations made at the Paris Peace Conference during the spring and summer. By December 6, the Peace Conference, which Byrnes had characterized as tedious, had in total produced 53 proposals with a two-thirds majority and 41 proposals with a simple majority regarding the peace treaties for Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. The Conference, which convened a total of 79 days, had generated 855,000 documents which comprised the peace agreements in three official languages and additionally in the language of each former Axis state. With the objective in New York fulfilled in this regard, towards the end of the meeting the Foreign Ministers began to turn their attentions to the peace processes of Germany and Austria.⁹⁵¹

At the Foreign Press Association dinner on November 11, Byrnes told about the victories that open diplomacy achieved in world politics and emphasized his own role in this process despite criticism:

The forums of the United Nations and of the Peace Conference have been open to the public not for the purpose of letting the public witness a spectacle but to enable the peoples of this world to know what are the differences of opinions. Unless the peoples of various lands do know what their statesmen are trying to do, they have little influence on their actions. The open forums of the United Nations are not only a test of statesmanship; they are also a test of the press and of public opinion generally. World statesmanship cannot long ignore informed world opinion.⁹⁵²

Paradigmatically, the public opinion which Byrnes had often emphasized required attention, as after the US mid-term election the world press had speculated on the change in foreign policy. The Secretary of State had to remind the public that the representatives of foreign press or foreign governments would be making a mistake if they were to report that the elections had changed the course of US foreign policy in any way. In his speech Byrnes was convinced that the Americans had voted only to turn over Congress to the Republicans and not to change the course of US foreign policy. He continued to adhere to his guiding principle in foreign policy of operating above the party sphere and only in the name of American foreign policy, which was supported by the Republicans' reluctance to attack Byrnes on issues of foreign policy. In addition, Byrnes and Vandenberg had agreed in the summer that foreign policy would not be mixed up in campaigning. Under no circumstances could the result of the election have influenced the broad strokes of US foreign policy, as both parties had committed to the UN Charter and thus to the majority of the established institutions in world politics.⁹⁵³

⁹⁵¹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B10:F14. NY CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers, New York, Minutes; Byrnes 1947, p. 150; FRUS 1946. Introduction. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, p. IX. The translation, documentation and editing of the documents took time and final signature ceremonies were held on February 10, 1947.

⁹⁵² BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F15, Confidential Release for Publication At 10:30 P.M., E.S.T., Monday, November 11, 1946. Not to be previously published, quoted from or used in any way.

⁹⁵³ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F15, Confidential Release for Publication At 10:30 P.M., E.S.T., Monday, November 11, 1946. Not to be previously published, quoted from or used in any way.

The spirit of the New York meeting of Foreign Ministers seemed hopeful – at least at the start – with Bevin emphasizing that, like Byrnes, he would support all recommendations decided with a two-thirds majority despite any positions he may have adopted in previous meetings.⁹⁵⁴ Of course Bevin had nothing to lose with regard to the already prepared proposals with known voting results, but it showed clear support from Britain for the recommendations of the Peace Conference. The question of Trieste, which was beforehand assumed to be a difficult one, had in Paris been accepted in accordance with the French proposal with a two-thirds majority, but the Soviet Union had even then objected to the finality of the decision. Molotov did suggest that both Yugoslavia and Italy be heard in the matter and that the French proposal⁹⁵⁵ for a border and the establishment of the free territory of Trieste would only serve as a basis for discussions.⁹⁵⁶ The latter demand was justified, as during the Peace Conference in the spring Molotov had repeated his understanding of the recommendation being only suggestive. Molotov's understanding was not directly corrected and only Bidault announced that he had not understood it to be so.⁹⁵⁷ Otherwise the matter was disregarded in the actual Peace Conference. But as it now presented itself in New York, it caused Byrnes to fear that the Soviet Union would want to make further changes.

Before the New York meeting of Foreign Ministers Byrnes had publicly defined his position on the Trieste issue by comparing the situation to the free territory of Fiume, which was established after the First World War: "there must be no seizure of power in Trieste after this war as there was in Fiume after the last war". In May Byrnes had already intervened in corresponding border arrangements executed on ethnically erroneous grounds, when he condemned the transfer of the entire Venezia-Giulia territory solely to Italy after the First World War. Byrnes's views aroused much interest in immigrant circles from that region and the ethnic discussion, which even Molotov had exploited in Paris, regarding the correct rulers of the region continued. According to the interpretation presented to Byrnes by Stanley Hroncich, who defended Yugoslavia's demands, Italy did not have rights to Fiume, nor the Americans or the British to Trieste.⁹⁵⁸

⁹⁵⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 152.

⁹⁵⁵ FRUS 1946. Record of Conference Recommendations by the Conference on the Draft Peace Treaty With Italy. Volume IV, Paris Peace Conference: Documents, pp. 895–897.

⁹⁵⁶ FRUS 1946. United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, First Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, NY, November 4, 1946, 3:30 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 969–979.

⁹⁵⁷ FRUS 1946. United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Second Meeting, Paris, April 26, 1946, 4:30 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 118–119.

⁹⁵⁸ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F16, Report By Secretary Byrnes, after his return from meeting in Paris, May 20, 1946; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B5:F3, From Hroncich to Byrnes, 5.11.1946. Rijeka (Fiume) had become the first notable international problem after the First World War which President Woodrow Wilson wanted to solve by making it an independent state. Wilson had planned that Rijeka might be the home town of the League of Nations. On the grounds of the Treaty of

According to Patricia Dawson Ward, the final acceptance of the Trieste issue created a chain of negotiations, which were the most difficult in the 10-year history of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Several appeals made by Byrnes and Bevin about the moral imperative of the decisions made with a two-thirds majority remained secondary with Molotov announcing that it would have significance only in the acceptance of the whole, not in the acceptance of individual clauses.⁹⁵⁹ By tireless efforts, Molotov managed to gain some concessions in the question of Trieste. The matter had again gone to the level of minute details. The concessions, which focused mainly on the administration, policy system and infrastructure of Trieste, were borne largely as the result of fatigue. With Molotov overstepping the mark in the justifications of some concessions by bringing to light the development chapters of the trade between Yugoslavia and Trieste, a jaded Byrnes remarked:

I don't care whether it is 7, 17, or 70%. We agreed to create a Free Territory of Trieste and not to turn the area over to Italy and Yugoslavia. If we don't stand by that decision I would rather honestly turn the territory over to Italy or Yugoslavia. I am not going to say that it is a Free Territory and then let Yugoslavia control it in any way, shape or form.⁹⁶⁰

Based on the minutes of the State Department, Byrnes showed signs of a tireless negotiator and ruthless tactician when disentangling the hotbed of problems focused on Trieste. In an informal discussion with Molotov⁹⁶¹ on November 25, Byrnes said at the outset that the meeting was so discordant, that it should just admit failure and discontinue. This time Molotov was nowhere near as pessimistic as Byrnes, but said that the problem lied in the fulfillment of Yugoslavia's "minor wishes". Byrnes remarked that Molotov was a true friend of Yugoslavia and showed sympathy for his work, but reminded him that the Yugoslavs had been ungrateful for his efforts. After this, referring to the still-deadlocked question of Trieste, Byrnes requested that Molotov forget the handling of the issue in New York. However, Molotov was apparently willing to reach an agreement and was quite flexible in the questions concerning the administration of Trieste and the removal of foreign troops. In order to fulfill Yugoslavia's little wish, Byrnes approached an earlier demand made by the

Rapallo in 1920, Rijeka was to be an independent state, but it was subjected quickly to fascist influence.

⁹⁵⁹ FRUS 1946. United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, First Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, NY, November 4, 1946, 3:30 p.m. Article 10A. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, p. 981.

⁹⁶⁰ FRUS 1946. United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Fifth Informal Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, NY, November 21, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, p. 1218.

⁹⁶¹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B10:F14. New York, Informal, Nov. 25. Details of the place where the discussion was held are contradictory. According to Byrnes, Molotov had come around to his hotel room in Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, but according to his assistant Charles Bohlen, they had met Molotov in his suite in Hotel Ritz.

Soviet delegation about lowering the compensation of the United Nations to property lost in Italy to 50 percent.⁹⁶²

According to Charles Bohlen's memoirs, after the conversation between Molotov and Byrnes, Molotov "handed out concessions like cards from a deck" in the following day's negotiations.⁹⁶³ Byrnes also later emphasized the effects of the discussion on Molotov's ability to cooperate. In his memoirs Byrnes felt he had succeeded so well, that this time Molotov accepted "some of the recommendations which were merely changes in words rather than substance".⁹⁶⁴ The State Department's memorandum on the following day's meeting paints the same picture. On the other hand, Byrnes agreeing to lower the percentage of compensation caused friction with Britain and France. The matter, which was dealt with in Chapter 4 of Article 68, had already been discussed in the beginning of November in the presence of Yugoslavian and Italian representatives. It was then that Bevin and Couve de Murville from France reminded the ministers that the Peace Conference had supported the compensation percentage of 75 by a vote of 13-6, even though 100 percent compensation had been sought.⁹⁶⁵

The plans made by Byrnes and Molotov bypassing France and Britain brought the suspicious Bevin to the verge of rage.⁹⁶⁶ According to Alan Bullock's biography of Bevin, Bevin's eternal fear had been the inner circle of Byrnes and Molotov which would exclude Britain from power politics. That scenario had largely come true, as starting from the Moscow meeting in December 1945, Britain had remained in the shadow of the Soviet Union and the United States.⁹⁶⁷ The dispute regarding compensation was eventually halved, and the percentage set at 66.3.⁹⁶⁸ The decision itself did not follow the resolution of accepting all decisions made at the Peace Conference with a two-thirds majority as they were. As a whole, Byrnes considered the ultimately accepted resolution on Trieste to be one that gave "reasonable hope that serious conflict may be avoided in the future".⁹⁶⁹

⁹⁶² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B10:F14. New York, Informal, Nov. 25; FRUS 1946. C. F. M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2080 : CFM Minutes, Memorandum of Conversation, New York, November 25, 1946. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 1264-1269.

⁹⁶³ Bohlen 1973, p. 256.

⁹⁶⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 154.

⁹⁶⁵ FRUS 1946. C. F. M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2080 : CFM Minutes, United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Second Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, November 5, 1946, 3:30 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 1000-1005.

⁹⁶⁶ FRUS 1946. C. F. M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2080 : CFM Minutes, United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Eight Informal Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, November 25, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 1269-1278.

⁹⁶⁷ Bullock 1983, p. 116, *passim*.

⁹⁶⁸ FRUS 1946. C. F. M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2080 : Records of Decisions, Record of Decisions, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Sixteenth Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, December 5, 1946, 4 p.m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 1434-1437.

⁹⁶⁹ Byrnes 1947, p. 154.

Despite setbacks, the New York meeting produced documents for the peace treaties of Italy, the Balkan countries and Finland. In Byrnes's eyes, however, the meeting had not gone as he had expected. Molotov's demands regarding specification of the details decided upon in France interfered with words rather than with issues, in Byrnes's opinion, which in itself shows Byrnes to have trivialized Molotov's contribution and achievements in New York. Moreover, Byrnes felt that at the start of every day Molotov wanted to object to the recommendations of the Peace Conference, just so he could later agree to them in an ostentatious way. In Byrnes's opinion this was evident in the fact that 47 out of the 53 recommendations made with a two-thirds majority were ultimately accepted and in the case of a simple majority, 24 out of 41. However, this perspective did not take into consideration those recommendations or parts thereof, to which changes were made in New York prior to accepting them. Byrnes also disregards Soviet achievements in individual questions, as in the case of Trieste, in which it was able to change the recommendations made in Paris quite considerably.

In a private letter to Mark Ethridge dated December 16, Byrnes stated that he was more satisfied with the international situation than he had been in a long time. Despite everything the Secretary of State reminded Ethridge that things were far from perfect, "they are not what we would write if it were in our power to dictate terms". Instead, it was in Byrnes's eyes a salvation, which ensured the optimal result under the circumstances.⁹⁷⁰ In her research, Patricia Dawson Ward has discovered that in the New York meeting of Foreign Ministers Byrnes regretted his attitude at the Peace Conference to disregard the unanimity principle in the hopes of productive progress.⁹⁷¹ From the perspective of Byrnes's memoirs the claim seems justified, as in them Byrnes acknowledges his doubts:

The treaties were not written as we would write them if we had a free hand, but I was convinced they were as good as we could hope to get by general agreement for a long time to come. They did represent an important step in the restoration of stability. As long as the armistice terms remained in effect, all five of these countries were subject to uncertainty and interference in every phase of their international life. No planning for the future, particularly in respect to economic development, was possible under these conditions.⁹⁷²

Molotov was successful in using the compromises made in Paris for the benefit of the Soviet Union, largely as a base for difficult issues by demanding compromise even on the basis of compromise. In Patricia Dawson Ward's view, neither party wanted the New York conference to become deadlocked in the way the London conference had in 1945, but for different reasons. Whereas Byrnes's objectives were largely fulfilling the requirements set by public opinion and bipartisanship, Molotov's actions had a direct utilitarian angle for the Soviet Union.⁹⁷³ Accepting the treaties benefited the Soviet Union's

⁹⁷⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F7, From Byrnes to Ethridge, 16.12.1946.

⁹⁷¹ Ward 1979, p. 168.

⁹⁷² Byrnes 1947, p. 154.

⁹⁷³ Ward 1979, p. 168.

objectives by leading to the withdrawal of American and British troops from Italy by the end of 1947 and in the case of the Balkans, leaving Soviet troops in the region until the German and Austrian peace treaties were concluded. The same happened with Finland. In that case the Soviet Union gained clear benefits outside of territorial concessions as the growth of influence in the form of leasing Porkkala, for example. On the other hand, in the fall the withdrawal of troops no longer caused a conflict as in the case of Iran. The number of US forces overseas at the end of 1946 was approximately 550,000 with the majority of them stationed in Germany, Japan, Korea, Austria and Venezia Giulia. In addition, some troops were stationed in the Philippines, Iceland, the Azores, Panama and China. The right of US occupation forces to be stationed in China, which the Soviet representatives particularly condemned, was in Byrnes's opinion no different to the rights acquired by the Soviet Union to place occupying troops in Porkkala.⁹⁷⁴

Byrnes's surprising naivety regarding the swift acceptance in New York of the proposed treaties that were railroaded into compromise in Paris cannot be explained by only his willingness to fulfill the people's demands for a swift peace. From the perspective of Paris, the quick acceptance of the most difficult issues with the unanimity required by the Council of Foreign Ministers seems absurd, knowing the Soviet Union's position on the issues. On the one hand, only the Soviet Union had something to lose with regard to the difficult issues, leaving her to say the final word in New York. This way, Byrnes was also able to play for time and to wait and see what the Soviet Union's demands for the peace treaties actually were. Even a year before the order of importance had only been discovered in the aftermath of the London Conference. On the other hand, playing for time was easy with Molotov demanding that both Yugoslavia and Italy be heard and with Bevin concurring. However, these hearings wasted a great amount of time.⁹⁷⁵

According to a second theory by Patricia Dawson Ward, during the time of the New York meeting, Byrnes's new stricter policy on the Soviet Union was directed only towards publicity needs, and Byrnes hardly used it at the negotiating table. According to Ward, in New York Byrnes continued on the line of negotiations designed to produce treaties that all four nations could accept. At the same time they started to become such that he no longer could present them to the American people as great victories in his radio addresses.⁹⁷⁶ That is perhaps why the toughness against the Soviet Union erupted over the unresolved issue of Germany in the Stuttgart Speech. After all, an almost corresponding phenomenon had taken place just over six months prior, when

⁹⁷⁴ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F18, Address by The Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, Before Plenary Session of General Assembly of The United Nations, New York, December 13, 1946.

⁹⁷⁵ FRUS 1946. C.F.M. Files : Lot M-88 : Box 2080 : CFM Minutes, United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, First Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, November 4, 1946, 3:30 p. m. Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 972, 978.

⁹⁷⁶ Ward 1979, p. 169.

the Iranian issue evoked emotions outside the actual Council of Foreign Ministers, partially absorbing influences from Churchill's speech at Fulton.

In public Byrnes started to more clearly bring forward the attitude according to which it would be years before the United States would relinquish its monopoly on the atomic weapon. The discussions on sharing the information regarding the manufacture of the atomic weapon were transferred from politicians to the media. In his speeches in the last part of 1946, Byrnes used the atomic bomb as a diplomatic weapon, connecting it with larger disarmament developments. According to the Secretary of State, disarmament was a necessary requirement to ensure safety regarding the development of the peaceful use of the atomic weapon. Emphasizing the lack of control over the world's armament, Byrnes referred to the abilities of only the United States, Britain and Canada to take responsibility for the secrets of the atomic weapon. Nonetheless, the Secretary of State made out to the UN, among others, that the compulsory preservation of the atomic weapon and playing for time was not in the objectives of the United States. The question of sharing the atomic weapon began to transform into a question of an armament race:

A race for armaments, a race for power is not in the interest of any country or any people. We want to stop the race for armaments and we want to stop the race for power. We want to be partners with all nations, not to make war, but to keep the peace. We want to uphold the rule of law among nations. We want to promote the freedom and well-being of all peoples in a friendly civilized world.⁹⁷⁷

At the same time, Byrnes had to come to terms with the reality which the nearly 18-month long peace process had revealed about the relationships between superpowers. Peace treaties or an understanding about the boundaries of reason no longer defined power-political spheres of influence. The equality of sovereign nations, which Byrnes had called for, was threatened in ways that could not be fettered with treaties:

Sovereignty can be destroyed not only by armies but by a war of nerves and by organized political penetration. World peace depends upon what is in our hearts more than upon what is in our treaties. Great states must strive for understandings which will not only protect their own legitimate security requirements but the political independence and integrity of the smaller states.⁹⁷⁸

5.2.2 Byrnes's resignation

The New York meeting of Foreign Ministers became Byrnes's last as Secretary of State. The reasons leading to his resignation, which was effective on January 20, 1947, was much debated at the time with none of the theories revealing the whole truth. According to Byrnes, the decision to resign had been made of his

⁹⁷⁷ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F18, Address by The Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, Before Plenary Session of General Assembly of The United Nations, New York, December 13, 1946, No. 9.

⁹⁷⁸ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F18, Address by The Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, Before Plenary Session of General Assembly of The United Nations, New York, December 13, 1946, No. 9.

own volition already in April 1946, when a medical examination had revealed the deterioration of a pre-existing cardiomyopathy.⁹⁷⁹ In a letter to President Truman dated April 16, Byrnes compared his situation to the resignation from the post of the Director of the OWM a year earlier. At the recommendation of the doctor, Byrnes expressed his willingness to resign effective July 1, 1946, as according to estimates the peace treaties would have been concluded by then. However, in his own words Byrnes did not want to publicize his letter or resignation, nor the state of his health.⁹⁸⁰ Moreover, as the peace negotiations turned out to be longer than initially estimated, Byrnes staying on until the peace treaties were concluded was urged by President Truman. For Byrnes the decision was made easier by his improved health and new test results, in which the cardiomyopathy was not even detected.⁹⁸¹

Truman received the final letter of resignation on December 19, 1946.⁹⁸² The President accepted the request for resignation in the beginning of January and said that he had deeply weighed the vital matters Byrnes had presented in both his letters of resignation. By this Truman was apparently referring to the opportunity offered by Byrnes to begin the handling of the German and Austrian issues with a new Secretary of State. According to a view presented in Acheson's memoirs, in the summer of 1946 Truman had already taken action to replace Byrnes. According to Acheson, the suggestion of general Marshall being appointed Secretary of State came from Eisenhower, and the matter had not been disclosed to Byrnes. Perhaps due to the awkward nature of the matter, in his letter Truman did not draw attention to the issue of the Secretary's health, but emphasized Byrnes's fate of ending up in the midst of "arduous and complex problems".⁹⁸³ Despite this, a conception of health problems being the decisive factor in Byrnes's resignation was broadly spread in the public. With the resignation becoming public, cardiac surgeon Fran Paul Firey even offered to treat Byrnes's health issue at no charge.⁹⁸⁴

A slight conflict appears between Byrnes's own memoirs. From the perspective of 1947, the final reason for the resignation was connected to Wallace's speech and the difficult fall of 1946, whereas from the later perspective of 1958, the negotiations for the peace treaties having finally concluded after New York allowed Byrnes to resign – not so much obligated by

⁹⁷⁹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B11:F1. Secretary of State James Byrnes, 12.4.1946; BP. Mss 90, James F. Byrnes Papers, Strom Thurmond Institute, Clemson University Libraries, Clemson, SC 29634; Series 6: Interim Materials, B21:F10, National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, Electrocardiograph Study, 6.4.1946.

⁹⁸⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F19, From Byrnes to Truman, 1.4.1946; Byrnes 1947, p. 240; Byrnes 1958, pp. 354–355; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F19, Secretary of State James Byrnes, 18.4.1946. A report on Byrnes's health became public on April 18, 1952.

⁹⁸¹ Byrnes 1947, p. 240.

⁹⁸² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F19, From Byrnes to Truman, 19.12.1946.

⁹⁸³ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F19, From Truman to Byrnes, 7.1.1947; Acheson 1987, pp. 192–193.

⁹⁸⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F21, From Firey to Byrnes, 7.1.1947.

an agreement, but because his work was done. Neither perspective connects the resignations with the deterioration in the relationship between Byrnes and Truman, the signs of which could be seen right after the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers at the start of 1946.⁹⁸⁵ Apparently, what was undermining the relationship was foreign policy dominated by Byrnes, over which Truman had very little influence. In his memoirs Truman describes the setting quite radically:

In his executive position during the war years Byrnes had enjoyed unprecedented freedom of action. President Roosevelt had delegated to him whatever necessary powers could be marshaled to keep the nation's economy behind the war effort. This arrangement had left President Roosevelt free to devote his time and energies mainly to the conduct of the war and to foreign relations. But this delegation of presidential powers had an extraordinary influence on Byrnes. It caused him to believe that, as an official of the executive branch of the government, he could have a completely free hand within his own sphere of duty. In fact, he came to think that his judgment was better than the President's. More and more during the fall of 1945 I came to feel that in his role as Secretary of State Byrnes was beginning to think himself as an Assistant President in full charge in foreign policy. Apparently he failed to realize that, under the Constitution, the President is required to assume all responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. The President cannot abdicate that responsibility, and he cannot turn it over to anyone else. A Secretary of State should never have the illusion that he is President of the United States. Some Secretaries of State have had such illusion, but they would never admit it. There have been some Presidents, of course, who acted as if they were Secretaries of State. They are not and cannot be, and they will get into trouble if they try. The function of the Secretary of State is to be President's personal adviser on foreign affairs.⁹⁸⁶

Truman's view regarding the inalienability of the President's powers in foreign policy seems somewhat conflicted especially when compared to the statements of 1945, in which Truman was looking for a professional in foreign policy and often showed his full support of Byrnes. In his memoirs Truman also refers to the fact that it really was a question of a lack of confidence, which was caused by Byrnes's high-handed behavior, brought to a head at the start of January 1946 after the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers:

A President cannot tolerate a Secretary of State who keeps important matters away from him until five minutes before a decision has to be made. Certainly a President cannot permit a Secretary of State to make policy decisions for him. The Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945 produced a situation that made it necessary for me to make it plain to Byrnes that he was not carrying out the foreign policy I had laid down and that, in effect, he was assuming responsibilities of the President.⁹⁸⁷

⁹⁸⁵ For example: Byrnes 1958, pp. 346–347; Curry 1965, pp. 188–190; Ward 1979, pp. 75–76.

⁹⁸⁶ Truman 1955a, p. 547.

⁹⁸⁷ Truman 1955a, p. 547. On the other hand, Truman later implied that Byrnes's appointment as Secretary of State was certain reconciliation for the Democratic vice presidential nomination in 1944. From this point of view Truman himself had actually put all foreign policy on Byrnes's shoulders who apparently wanted to rap Truman on the knuckles with his unlimited power in foreign policy. This point of view has been emphasized by e.g. Gaddis 1997, p. 285.

Based on Truman's memoirs, despite his promise Byrnes had not been actively in contact with the President who had remained at home, but had worked based on State Department guidelines, which he himself had drawn. For a large part the problem seems to have been the question of atomic energy, the revelation of which to the Soviet Union had been not clearly agreed upon between Truman and Byrnes. In the light of Truman's memoirs, what had been most offensive was the publication of Byrnes's Moscow communiqué bypassing Truman. According to Truman, Byrnes had later blamed his staff, who had neglected to inform the President. Truman considered the events of Moscow to be a dangerous demonstration of high-handed foreign policy: "After studying the entire record, Byrnes had taken it upon himself to move the foreign policy of the United States in a direction to which I could not, and would not, agree. Moreover, he had undertaken this on his own initiative without consulting or informing the President."⁹⁸⁸

According to a view by David Robertson, the foundation for the conflict between Truman and Byrnes had partially been laid in the nomination of vice presidential candidates under Roosevelt, and the rift only grew deeper during 1946. Although according to Robertson, Truman still had faith in Byrnes's abilities and possibly in his maneuverability when the situation called for it, top-level politicians like George Kennan and Clark Gifford, who demanded a tougher stance on the Soviet Union, largely influenced Truman's thinking.⁹⁸⁹ After all, Kennan's "long telegram" had drawn the guidelines for the Iranian crisis becoming the practical example of the Soviet Union's expansionist policy in the eyes of the United States. On the other hand, during the spring of 1946 Byrnes had become more careful especially with regard to the question of atomic energy. In his letter to Bernard Baruch, he emphasized the President's role in defining foreign policy, requesting his former aide at the OWM to participate in the process as an informal adviser. Afterwards Byrnes himself considered the letter to be evidence to counter the claims that his resignation was based on political differences with President Truman. Despite Truman explicitly telling him not to, Baruch had in March sent a copy of his classified report to Byrnes, which should not have been given into the hands of the State Department.⁹⁹⁰

According to a view presented in his memoirs by special aide to Byrnes Charles Bohlen, the basis for the conflict lay in the situation following the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in 1945, in which Byrnes had stepped on Truman's toes by acting too independently. Bohlen felt Byrnes was accustomed to working with a small group of close advisers, which he considered himself a part of, but at the same time bypassing Truman, who was his junior in the inner hierarchy of the Democratic Party.⁹⁹¹ Nonetheless, the

⁹⁸⁸ Truman 1955a, p. 550.

⁹⁸⁹ Robertson 1994, pp. 458–459.

⁹⁹⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F8. Atomic Energy. From Byrnes to Baruch, 19.4.1946; Note; B1:F10. Bernard Baruch to Byrnes, 13.3.1946.

⁹⁹¹ Bohlen 1973, pp. 256–257.

emphasis put on the personal conflicts between Truman and Byrnes seems exaggerated and also contains considerable changes taken from later events.⁹⁹²

In 1948, a clear deterioration in the relationship between Truman and Byrnes took place when Byrnes, who had declined the presidential nomination, did not actively participate in Truman's campaign nor did he speak of his former superior in an admiring tone. Actually, Byrnes had even unofficially supported the nomination of the then Governor of South Carolina Strom Thurmond for the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party. This may have been a desire to support a candidate from back home, but also a desire to provide an alternative to Truman, who had embarked upon the campaign from a difficult starting point. The deciding factor of the election turned out to be the issue of race, when the whites of the South objected to Truman's legislative attempts at improving the rights of black Americans. The South was at a political cross-roads, and the single-party domination of the region was about to collapse permanently.⁹⁹³

During the same time, the left wing of the Democratic Party was dispersed, as Wallace, who had strongly criticized Byrnes and the US foreign policy in the fall of 1946, had been moved aside. In addition to their own presidential candidate who viewed the racial segregation of Mississippi and Alabama positively, the presidency was also pursued by the progressives of leftist Democrats, sitting President Truman and Republican Thomas E. Dewey. This confusing setting brought surprising results. As the Democrats in favor of racial segregation, like Byrnes, detached themselves from the Democratic Party line, many of those who had traditionally voted for Republicans gave their support to Truman. Truman was able to remain in the White House by a narrow margin.⁹⁹⁴

In his memoirs Truman felt that he had been accused of withdrawing from the Rooseveltian New Deal policy, for which he mainly blamed Roosevelt's sons, Elliott and James, but also Byrnes and Harold Ickes who had acted in the Truman administration, and liberal Senator Claude Pepper. In Truman's opinion, the press had also spread a false image of his success and thus weakened his chances of winning the election.⁹⁹⁵ Truman clearly referred to Southern Democrats the likes of Byrnes when stating that in the election he had to object to the principles of the dixiecrats, even at the cost of losing votes:

⁹⁹² George Curry has admitted that certain conflicts between Byrnes and Truman had arisen but Curry thinks that those disputes were temporary by nature when set in the context of Stuttgart Speech. Curry 1965, pp. 315–316. A clear breach developed much later and the reason related to domestic policy. Curry 1965, pp. 300–301.

⁹⁹³ The South was extremely shocked by Truman's civil rights message to Congress, which called for the enactment of a Federal Fair Employment Practices Act, an anti-lynching law, an anti-poll tax bill and anti-segregation legislation. Byrnes had been strongly against the anti-lynching bill of 1938 and he considered the maintenance of white supremacy as "the very soul of the South"; Cochran 2001, pp. 24–26.

⁹⁹⁴ Messer 1982, p. 222.

⁹⁹⁵ Truman 1955b, pp. 183–185. The term Dixiecrat is a portmanteau of Dixie, referring to the Southern United States, and Democrat, referring to the Democratic Party. Truman eschewed some views of Dixiecrats, especially their attitude toward minorities and especially toward blacks.

I never did believe that the great mass of Southerners had the same viewpoint as the minority Dixiecrat contingent. I was raised amidst some violently prejudiced Southerners myself, and I believe the vast majority of good Southerners understand that the blind prejudices of past generations cannot continue in a free republic.... I was confident that the voters would see that the Dixiecrats were trying in vain to build a platform on an issue that was not a reality but fiction.⁹⁹⁶

In the next election in 1952 Byrnes no longer had to hide his choice. With Truman out of the race Byrnes announced that he would support the election of Republican General Dwight D. Eisenhower.⁹⁹⁷ By renouncing the National Democratic Party and throwing his support behind Eisenhower, Byrnes had given the impetus toward a two-party system in the South. Eisenhower was elected with a clear margin against Democratic candidate Adlai E. Stevenson.⁹⁹⁸ In his memoirs of 1958, Byrnes seemed to feel the need to justify his choice, which in no way was connected to the recent publication of Truman's letters. Although the move of a Democrat from South Carolina to support a Republican candidate was according to the proverb supposed to make ancestors turn in their graves, no unusual sounds could be heard from the cemetery the morning after the election.⁹⁹⁹ Indeed, independent Democrats had otherwise widely supported Eisenhower, who was considered to be a war hero. However, sounds from the cemetery may have been heard 16 years later, when Byrnes visibly supported Richard M. Nixon's election as president over Lyndon B. Johnson, whom he abhorred.¹⁰⁰⁰

Perhaps one of the reasons leading to Byrnes's resignation was the difficulty he had in meeting the expectations set by the top level of foreign policy after Roosevelt. Byrnes's tight connection with Roosevelt was evident in his way of negotiating and in his confidence in the Soviet Union, which during Truman's term no longer worked. The closed club politics of Roosevelt's term - as often mentioned by Stalin - had ended when the era of the meetings of Foreign Ministers had begun. However, Byrnes held on to old methods too faithfully and for too long, which was apparent in the impossibility of achieving the solidarity of Roosevelt and Stalin on the one hand, and in the increase in his own watchdogs on the other. Despite influences from many quarters, Byrnes's idealism led to a peace process and to the creation of treaties which had at times seemed impossible. In a personal letter to Byrnes in January, John Foster Dulles was likely referring to this by saying "I know that you have been carrying on at real personal risk and that you will welcome the release".¹⁰⁰¹

Byrnes's 562 days as the Secretary of State of the United States ended almost the same way they had begun. Publicly, the change of Secretary of State did not signal a change in foreign policy, but rather the continuance of a policy

⁹⁹⁶ Truman 1955b, p. 184.

⁹⁹⁷ Byrnes 1958, p. 416.

⁹⁹⁸ Kero 1991, p. 445.

⁹⁹⁹ Byrnes 1958, p. 417.

¹⁰⁰⁰ The Democratic Party of South Carolina had adopted a resolution in 1952 stating that in the election for president and vice-president "all are free to vote for the candidates they prefer." Brown 1992, pp. 398-399.

¹⁰⁰¹ BP: Series 5: State Department Materials, B18:F5, From Dulles to Byrnes, 9.1.1947.

based mainly on the Atlantic Charter and the Yalta resolutions. Nonetheless, the continuance of this policy meant revising its foundation for interpretation to better correspond with the actions of the Soviet Union. This had been done with Stettinius giving way to Byrnes and now with Byrnes stepping aside for Marshall. The change of personnel was in Byrnes's case clearly symbolic. Its significance towards foreign countries was highlighted with the peace process still ongoing, but internally the change was clearly an attempt to eradicate Byrnes's Soviet policy, which was both hard and soft at the same time, as well as the difficulties it had caused in bipartisanship. Byrnes was also surely aware of this. He had, as a lawyer and as an eternal realist, embarked upon foreign policy during one of the most difficult periods in the history of the United States.

Acting in accordance with the will of the people seems to have often convinced Byrnes of the justification of his policy. This may have carried weight in domestic policy, but from a foreign policy perspective it only carried weight within the justifications defined by Byrnes himself. Over the course of time, Byrnes's foreign policy was more and more closely tied to domestic policy, in which the Secretary of State was extremely experienced. Ultimately, this phenomenon can be described by the degree to which the Monroe Doctrine was rejected. For Byrnes, the end of isolation policy fused with the establishment of the United Nations, and not with the need to dismantle the Monroe Doctrine due to the Soviet Union. Byrnes was aware of the risks and was unofficially paid for taking them with the position as Secretary of State. In this regard Byrnes's risk was not methodological, diplomatic or even political but purely practical. From Truman and a group of many top-level US politicians, only Byrnes, who had seen it all, could afford to pay the full price.

5.3 Reconsidering the Byrnes era

5.3.1 From Byrnes to Marshall - the need for a new foreign policy?

Based on Truman's memoirs, the pastoral letter he had sent to Byrnes in January 1946 did not directly cause the resignation of the Secretary of State a year later, but Truman does suggest he wanted a new man for the job. Truman depicts the situation following the pastoral letter rather vaguely in his memoirs:

Byrnes accepted my decision. He did not ask to be relieved of express a desire to quit. It was not until some months later that he came to me and suggested that his health would not allow him to stay on. He agreed to remain through the negotiations of the peace treaties that were to grow out of his Moscow commitments. Throughout the remainder of 1946, however, it was understood between him and me that he would quit whenever I could designate his successor. I knew all that time whom I wanted for the job. It was general Marshall. But the general was on a vital assignment in China that had to run its course before the change in the State Department could be carried out. My memorandum to Byrnes not only clarified the Secretary's position, but it was the point of departure of our policy. 'I'm tired of babying the Soviets,' I had said to Byrnes, and I meant it. I had hoped that the

Russians would return favor for favor, but almost from the time I became President I found them acting without regard for their neighboring nations and in direct violation of the obligations they had assumed at Yalta. The first Russian leader I had had the opportunity to talk to was Molotov, and it had been necessary, even then, for me to speak bluntly and plainly. I was sure that Russia would understand firm, decisive language and action much better than diplomatic pleasantries.¹⁰⁰²

At least in the Senate, the change of Secretary of State was seen to be a clear message about a change in foreign policy. A speech by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and one of Byrnes's watchdogs, referred to the reasons for the change as a distortion caused by the dominance of the Democratic Party. According to Vandenberg the one-party policy had come to the end of the road:

In any event, partisan politics, for most of us, stopped at the water's edge. I hope they stay stopped - for the sake of America - regardless of what party is in power. This does not mean that we cannot have earnest, honest, even vehement domestic differences of opinion on foreign policy. It is no curb on free opinion or free speech. But it does mean that they should not root themselves in partisanship. We should ever strive to hammer out a permanent American foreign policy, in basic essentials, which serves all America and deserves the approval of all American-minded parties at all times.¹⁰⁰³

Senator Claude Pepper, who had emphasized a Soviet-favorable policy, posited that Vandenberg was right in the fact that there were differences even in the Senate and that "the Senate owes it to the world to let it be known". With this Pepper was mainly referring to the satisfaction Vandenberg had brought to light in his speech towards the newly assembled Chinese National Government, which included no communists, and the elections promised for the following Christmas. In the situation regarding China, Vandenberg had sworn that "our own far-eastern policy might well now shift its emphasis". Emphasizing the cooperation between the Chiang nationalists and communists could, according to Vandenberg, "encourage those who have so heroically set their feet upon this road, and discourage those who make the road precarious". According to Pepper, these statements were peculiar, for Senator Vandenberg had been closely and continuously cooperating with Byrnes and Senator Connally at the top of foreign policy after the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers. Pepper emphasized that Vandenberg was not speaking for the entire Senate, but first and foremost for himself. In his speech, Pepper considered it to be a positive thing that the recently appointed Secretary of State Marshall had similar views on China as Senator Vandenberg had. In his report, Marshall had stressed the rehabilitation of the situation in China with "a splendid group of men" and not with direct support to the Chiang nationalists as Vandenberg had suggested. Pepper called for corresponding impartiality:

¹⁰⁰² Truman 1955a, pp. 605-606.

¹⁰⁰³ Claude Pepper's quote from Arthur Vandenberg's speech in the Senate. CR. America's Foreign Relations. Mr. Pepper, January 15, 1947. Congressional Record - Senate. 80th Congress, 1st Session, Vol 93, pp. 368-369.

As I have said, I merely wish it understood that neither the American Congress, or the American Government, has committed itself to give support to the corrupt, the reactionary, or the feudal element of China, any more than we would propose to give our support to the irreconcilables in the Communist Party, whom general Marshall, with equal and impartial severity, has condemned. Mr. President, it must not be understood in any part of the world that America is associating itself with the reactionary, the corrupt, or the backward looking elements where the people are endeavoring to find a new highway for prosperity and peace for the people in those lands.¹⁰⁰⁴

China had clearly become the last fortress of US interests in the Far East, and her slipping to the communist camp was to be prevented. However, Byrnes's attitude towards China had been largely defined by expert reports, which highlighted the relationship between the Soviet Union and China instead of the threat of Communism. The rift in the Soviet-Chinese relationship caused by the Manchurian issue had been noted as a positive development by the State Department. Byrnes's objective seems to have been the creation of a good relationship with a China that was independent of the Soviet Union, rather than interfering in the country's own political line. This view had remained the same since December 1945, when Byrnes had defined the US policy on China in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The short-term objectives presented by the Secretary regarding "military integration of several political groups" against a common enemy had turned into the long-term objective of a unified and democratic China. As a promoter of democracy, the alternative of Chiang Kai-shek's national government was considered to be the best, but its base was to be broadened with communists and other groups. The United States did not wish to interfere with the internal developments of Chinese domestic policy, but its progression could be guided within the boundaries set by the power-political agreements. In the opinion of the Americans, the legal framework set by the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Agreements and the Chinese-Soviet agreements - the Chinese party to which had been the national government of China - guided its development.¹⁰⁰⁵

In this regard Byrnes's thinking seems congruent with Henry Wallace, who represented the progressive line. In his speech *The Way to Peace* in September, Wallace had emphasized the special significance of China due to its long border with the Soviet Union. From the perspective of world peace, keeping China out of all political or economic spheres of influence was vital in the opinion of the then Secretary of Commerce.¹⁰⁰⁶ Byrnes restated in December, that the American battle forces still stationed in China were not to remain in the country permanently, but were there only to ensure the Japanese terms of surrender in the region. Although the Chinese National Government had

¹⁰⁰⁴ CR. America's Foreign Relations. Mr. Pepper, January 15. 1947. Congressional Record - Senate. 80th Congress, 1st Session, Vol 93, pp. 368-369.

¹⁰⁰⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B15:F6. China - Policy and Information Statement, 1.10.1946; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B2:F5, Memorandum for The War Department, December 9, 1945; U.S. Policy Towards China, December 8, 1945.

¹⁰⁰⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, Madison Square Garden, New York City, 8 p.m., September 12. 1946, *The Way to Peace*; Byrnes 1947, p. 239.

invited the American troops into Northern China, Byrnes saw no conflict in the situation. According to Byrnes, the United States had made it clear that the American troops would not in any way participate in the internal conflicts of China. Nonetheless, the Secretary of State hoped that all countries would join the efforts for a unified and democratic China and help prevent the development of a civil war. In Byrnes's opinion a free and independent China was an important component of world peace, and the United States would not tolerate any attempts to stop this development.¹⁰⁰⁷

Although Marshall had acted in China as the moderator of the cooperation between Chiang and Mao, in the background of his statements was the need to keep the communists' power in check. On the other hand, the meetings organized by Marshall between the Chinese leaders had now and then been broken off mainly due to Chiang's resistance, and during 1947 had more broadly lead to the strengthened communists moving from a guerrilla war to a broader front-line war. In Pepper's view, China became one of the reasons for the change in foreign policy. The situation was problematic also due to the conflict that Pepper had brought to a head between Marshall and Vandenberg:

Surely, Mr. President, it cannot be helpful to the new Secretary of State in trying to find the policy which will lead to harmony in this hemisphere, to have it already declared by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee before the new Secretary has taken office, that the present policy of the State Department is wrong and that another should be put in effect.¹⁰⁰⁸

However, both Pepper and then resigned Henry Wallace represented the minority. In the light of public opinion, the need for a change in foreign policy does not come in to question. This reflected on domestic policy and was highlighted particularly after the November elections in 1946. The speculative question of whether Byrnes would have had to resign if the Democrats had maintained the majority in both houses of Congress inevitably produces answers which differ from each other greatly. It is difficult to estimate the effect of foreign policy on the result of the elections. More radical politicians like Pepper were correct in that their thinking was also broadly supported in the United States. In Pepper's opinion, the unanimity of foreign policy was largely relative, for even the statements of Senators Connally and Vandenberg, for instance, in no way represented the joint view of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¹⁰⁰⁹

Five days after Wallace's inflammatory speech, Kennan brought to light the concept of "containment" for the first time when speaking to the personnel of the State Department. In Byrnes's eyes the new containment policy brought the United States back onto the road of a re-fashioned "dollar-diplomacy", with

¹⁰⁰⁷ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F18, Address by The Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, Before Plenary Session of General Assembly of The United Nations, New York, December 13, 1946, No. 9.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁹ BP. Confidential material B2:F8. From Claude Pepper to Thomas G. Corcoran, October 4, 1946.

which the spread of Communism was to be prevented by large military assistance programs during peace time and as well as with the Marshall plan. On the other hand, the United States had during Byrnes's term already started to support the war-torn regions with loans and grants, the recipients of which by the end of 1946 included few countries in the "so-called Russian sphere countries". The clearest example was declining the loan application from the Czechs in October 1946. Even then Byrnes did not accept talk of "the Russian sphere countries", nor did he admit to the distortion in the assistance policy, even though the amount of the support to Greece, Italy and Turkey was at the same time significantly broadened. Instead, the Secretary of State emphasized that all loans were ultimately loans offered by taxpayers to underprivileged countries, who would pay back their loans.¹⁰¹⁰

With regard to approving the loans Byrnes had to execute the policy carefully. In October of 1946, J.O. Boyd had warned Byrnes regarding loans approved on political grounds and suspected they would further the fragmentation of the world rather than promote its communality. According to Boyd, strict standards were required for the granting of the loans, which would convince the public of the apolitical nature of the loans. He was also convinced that an indiscriminate loans policy would inevitably lead to criticism and would hinder the repayment of the loans. In Boyd's opinion, the United States ought not to propagandize the Soviet Union with the loans policy, nor seek to change its ideology in general.¹⁰¹¹

From a territorial perspective, the focus of foreign policy was clearly changed. By the start of 1947, the situation in the Balkans had developed in a direction in which it was difficult for the United States to interfere. Roosevelt's legacy played a part in this, according to which the United States had resigned itself from interfering in the fate of Eastern Europe permanently. With regard to the situation in China, during 1947 the resolutions had not yet been settled, but the development leading to communist China had undeniably started. Instead of being on these regions, the spotlight of foreign policy was directed on the Mediterranean region, especially on Turkey and Greece. For his part, Byrnes defined the foreign policy of his entire term in an event organized by the Institute of Cleveland Council on World Affairs on January 11. According to Byrnes the battle for peace was an endless battle for law and justice. Byrnes thought the numerous conflicts that appeared during the era of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be natural. By again comparing nations to people the Secretary of State reminded the audience that both people's and nations' concepts of right and wrong vary. This is why openness in the discussions regarding conflicts was in Byrnes's opinion the only way to prevent conflicts

¹⁰¹⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F7, From Ethridge to Byrnes, 24.9.1946; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F13, Memorandum of The Press and Radio News Conference, Tuesday, October 22, 1946. Byrnes took the concept of "the Russian sphere country" with a grain of salt, but used it because Byrnes was asked about possible aid for "Russian sphere countries" by a reporter in the press conference.

¹⁰¹¹ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F8, From Boyd to Byrnes, 21.10.1946.

between points of view from escalating into a war. As a continuing process, the work towards peace is in his thinking apparent as public disagreements, which would be judged by an enlightened public opinion. However, this would never be achieved if freedom of opinion was not be considered a quality of democracy everywhere. He referred to what was to come quite radically by returning to the locution of power politics:

The present power relationships of the great states preclude the domination of the world by any of them. Those power relationships cannot be substantially altered by unilateral action of any one state without profoundly disturbing the whole structure of the United Nations. Therefore, if we are going to do our part to maintain peace under the law, we must maintain in relation to other states, the military strength necessary to discharge our obligations. Force does not make right, but we must realize that in this imperfect world power as well as reason does affect international decisions.... We have demonstrated our capacity in war. We must demonstrate our capacity in peace.¹⁰¹²

Byrnes clearly wanted to demonstrate that during his term as Secretary of State the world had not irreversibly divided, but nonetheless urged his successor to work for strictly set objectives. The innuendo regarding the possibilities of military force referred to the desire to signal that Byrnes's foreign policy had always been based on the policy of firmness and patience, which was surely slightly exaggerated. In fact, Byrnes was now able to instruct and criticize foreign policy from the same position as, for instance, Vandenberg and Connally had done during his term in office. Also, in this regard Byrnes benefited from a position in which he no longer had to meet the internal and external challenges of foreign policy.¹⁰¹³

From a power-political perspective, the interpretation Byrnes presented in his speech according to which the relationships formed by superpowers would exclude "the domination of the world by any one of them" was peculiar. According to the Secretary, the UN guaranteed this and the commitment to the UN would prevent all unilateral attempts to change the power balance. From a power-political perspective it was the duty of the United States to "maintain in relation to other states, the military strength necessary" so that the Americans could fulfill their duty and do their part in maintaining the peace based on law. According to the Secretary's view, the acceptance of the Charter was a sign of the superpowers' desire to transfer responsibility over to the United Nations, for the superpowers had the military force to maintain peace, "if they have the will". No superpower alone could break the peace if all others stood united behind the Charter. Confidence in the unity of the Charter is demonstrated in Byrnes's thinking as the hope for the birth of an international law. However, the

¹⁰¹² DAFR 1947, Address by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) before the Institute of the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, January 11, 1947. Volume IX, pp. 2-6.

¹⁰¹³ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F19, Address by the Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, At The Twenty-First Annual Institute of The Cleveland Public Music Hall, 10:00 p.m., E.S.T., Saturday, January 11, 1947.

history of international laws had shown itself to Byrnes only as an attempt to draft rules for war, not for peace.¹⁰¹⁴

Hopes for an international law were largely rhetoric. The talk of “common fellowship, common interests and common ideas among the peoples of this earth” must be understood as more eloquence than a true belief in realities. Byrnes had already concluded that the differences in mind-set between the Russian and American cultures made mutual understanding of concepts such as democracy impossible. By referring to the Atomic Energy Agreement in the case of international law, the Secretary of State considered it necessary to solve international problems with agreements between sovereign nations. With this example he wanted to clearly refer to the Soviet Union’s inability to be in line with international decision-making let alone international law. As an ideal example of solidarity, the Secretary of State again brought forward the Chapultepec Pact and the friendly neighbors policy of the American nations. The question of Argentina which had previously shone an embarrassing light on inter-American cooperation no longer bothered Byrnes, who emphasized that solidarity did not require identical ways of thinking and ways of life. It was more a question of tolerance and the ability to accept the differences of others.¹⁰¹⁵

Differing from earlier speeches, Byrnes also brought to light questions of world economy. According to Byrnes, the problem of rejecting isolation policy had been the fact that the United States had not rejected its economic isolation. From the perspective of world peace, the rehabilitation of world trade was important in the Secretary’s view. Removing barriers for the movement of goods was in his opinion the first step to the free exchange of ideas and knowledge between peoples. Like Wallace, Byrnes advocated for the eradication of artificial barriers to trade and supported the International Trade Organization (ITO)¹⁰¹⁶, which was in the planning stage. The Secretary of State

¹⁰¹⁴ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F19, Address by the Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, At The Twenty-First Annual Institute of The Cleveland Public Music Hall, 10:00 p.m., E.S.T., Saturday, January 11, 1947.

¹⁰¹⁵ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F19, Address by the Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, At The Twenty-First Annual Institute of The Cleveland Public Music Hall, 10:00 p.m., E.S.T., Saturday, January 11, 1947. Since October United States’ Argentine policy was widely criticized as futile and disruptive of hemisphere relations. Acheson 1987, pp. 189-190.

¹⁰¹⁶ In the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 the need for a comparable international institution for trade (the later proposed International Trade Organization (ITO)) to complement the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank was recognized. Its goal was to produce a multilateral agreement for the reciprocal reduction of tariffs on trade in goods. In July 1945 the United States Congress had granted President Harry S. Truman the authority to negotiate and ratify such an agreement. At the proposal of the United States, the United Nations Economic and Social Committee adopted a resolution in February 1946 calling for a conference to draft a charter for an International Trade Organization. The talks ended in 1950, but the agreement never came into operation. The ITO Charter, which was repeatedly submitted to the US Congress, was never approved. The most common argument against the new organization was that it would be involved in internal economic issues. On December 6, 1950 President Truman announced that he would no longer seek Congressional approval of the ITO Charter.

thought organizations like the ITO could prevent trade wars between nations and the creation of economic blocs. The latter he thought to be the most severe threat to the creation of political blocs.

As a whole, the foreign policy situation of the United States in January 1947 was hardly so concerning that it required a change in policy or even a change in the Secretary of State. Both Truman's and Byrnes's memoirs give their own view of the events, but the question of a need for change in foreign policy should scarcely be examined purely from the perspectives of inevitability or necessity. Instead it is more fruitful to consider if Byrnes would have received a vote of no confidence from Congress had he been operating under direct parliamentary responsibility. Obviously this was not possible in the United States, but it gives an artificial picture of the effects of the new Congress on foreign policy. During the fall of 1946, no strong arguments were made in Congress which would have demanded a change in the Secretary of State – it was a question of the fine tuning of foreign policy at most. A statement made by new Secretary of State Marshall in his first official press conference on February 7, 1947 strengthens this view:

It has been the President's and Mr. Byrnes's policy, as it will be mine, to make the influence of this country felt in international affairs by doing all that can be done to strengthen and perfect the United Nations as an instrument for the discussion of international problems and the maintenance of international peace. Along with this policy goes that of taking a full and active part in the working out of peace settlements which will form a lasting basis upon which the United Nations can perform its functions.¹⁰¹⁷

On the level of rhetoric, Marshall wanted no attention with a new foreign policy. In practice, the real reason for the change in the Secretary of State remained as unclear as it had been 18 months prior when Stettinius had made way for Byrnes. On the other hand, the Republican specialists in foreign policy, Vandenberg and Dulles, regarded the change on the Secretary of State differently. According to a view presented by Byrnes at the end of January 1947, Vandenberg had not made any public statements which could be considered as a sign of a partisan change in foreign policy. Instead, two speeches given by Dulles were in the Secretary's opinion clear indications of the Senator's intentions to extract from foreign relations some "political capital" for the Republican Party. When speaking to the New York women's organization of the Republican Party, Dulles outlined his own foreign policy agenda particularly with regard to Germany and hinted that his views were in accordance with those in party leadership. The setting was also awkward for Truman, since by supporting Dulles's views the President would have had to accept the Senator as a kind of leader of public opinion in foreign policy. Had Truman publicly objected to Dulles's views, the Senator would have, in Byrnes's thinking, become an even harsher critic of foreign policy, and the US foreign policy position regarding Germany would have come across as divided.

¹⁰¹⁷ DAFR 1947. Statement by the Secretary of State (Marshall), Washington, February 7, 1947. Volume IX, p. 6.

In Byrnes's view, Dulles seems to have become the most difficult critic of foreign policy, whose authority he attempted to undermine even after his resignation. Byrnes was especially concerned about which Republicans were to be chosen for the UN General Assemblies and he suggested that Truman change the line-up. Byrnes thought that this kind of action would make Dulles "less political" and would make him speak more for the whole government. Truman took this suggestion seriously and announced that he would adhere to Byrnes's policies together with Secretary of State Marshall.¹⁰¹⁸

Considered afterwards, the difference between the two Ministers of State was real. Byrnes was more eager to question the reciprocal nature of the President-Secretary of State relationship than Marshall. General Marshall was meticulous in that when the door of his airplane closed, the command passed. He even on occasions asked for instructions when a wholly novel and unexpected point arose. Byrnes was inclined occasionally to give State Department instructions while he was away from Washington. Perhaps Truman wanted a new leader for foreign politics who would be more immune to domestic partisan policy. Apparently the President estimated that General Marshall could shield the State Department from partisan attack better than Byrnes and he could be counted upon to work closely with the President, in which Byrnes had obviously failed.¹⁰¹⁹

5.3.2 Byrnes's inner circle and a question of the State Department's competence

When talking about the authority of Byrnes and his inner circle of US foreign policy there is reason to emphasize the conditions defined by the state of emergency caused by the war and the perhaps slightly undemocratic traits left in foreign policy by President Roosevelt. In principle, the group formed by Byrnes, Charles Bohlen, Ben Cohen and H. Freeman Matthews continued the foreign policy of a small caucus, previously personified in Roosevelt and his special aide Harry Hopkins. The arrangement was not unusual as such, as it was on the one hand supported by the Republican Party which had for the time being adjusted to bipartisanship, and on the other hand by a kind of mandate given by President Truman at Byrnes's inauguration, where he had placed the responsibility of foreign policy on Byrnes's shoulders. The development of the State Department was also Byrnes's responsibility.

Returning from war policy to normal policy could be considered as one of the most important themes of Byrnes's term. The thought process behind the reorganization of the State Department by subjecting the administration of particularly occupied territories to the State Department instead of the War Department comes across as idealistic from the perspective of democracy and the normalization of international relations. However, drawing the boundaries

¹⁰¹⁸ BP. Series 6: Interim Materials, B22:F7, From Byrnes To Truman, 31.1.1947; From Truman to Byrnes, 14.2.1947.

¹⁰¹⁹ Acheson 1987, p. 138.

had proved to be difficult, for example in the case of Japan when political power had been given to the Far Eastern Commission as a civil body, but the administrative powers remained with military leaders. In November of 1945 President Truman had once again expressed to General Eisenhower his desire to transform the German military administration to a civil one. The US headquarters of the German military administration considered the situation to be confusing. At no time did the military administration wish to receive instructions from State Department representatives, they were to come through the War Department.¹⁰²⁰ Patterson was extremely upset by an interpretation according to which the State Department alone had the right to make and execute decisions, calling for the separation of administrative and executive powers as an established principle. In his letter to Byrnes, Patterson reminded Byrnes about the nature of the State Department as a political organization, and considered it to be far too overburdened to be able to effectively handle additional issues.¹⁰²¹

By the end of January 1946 it was clear that as the situation stabilized the United States would support the organization of a civil administration. According to Byrnes the army would have no role in this process. He considered France to be the only problem, as it had not yet accepted the idea of the organization of a German central government.¹⁰²² With regard to the occupied zones, Byrnes attempted to clarify the inflamed situation with a directive given in April 1946 which emphasized the status of the coordinating body between the State Department and the defense forces, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, in US policy towards Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea. As a lawyer he limited the central concept of the directive, "United States Policy" to encompass all procedures which would be born from the cooperation. The War Department was allowed to continue to answer for the administration and execution of policy in the occupied zones.¹⁰²³

Differences regarding the extent of the State Department's competence plagued the State Department's relationship with the War Department during all of Byrnes's term. The most central problem hotbed in this regard was Germany, whose administrative authority was in what was meant to be a temporary way solidifying into the military administration of occupied zones. In September of 1946, Under Secretary of State Russell had to intervene in the authority issue by warning Robert Murphy, the US adviser on German issues, about General Lucius Clay's desire to intervene in the work of the committee that organized German administration. Russell emphasized, however, that the State Department as a political organization had no right to administratively

¹⁰²⁰ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B8:F10. Incoming Classified Messages. From Office of Military Government for Germany (US) to War Department, 17.11.1945.

¹⁰²¹ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B8:F10. Patterson to Byrnes, 22.12.1945.

¹⁰²² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B17:F6, Memorandum of The Press and Radio News Conference, Tuesday, January 29, 1946.

¹⁰²³ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B8:F10. Directive on Organization and Procedure for the Development and Promulgation of United States Policy with Respect to Occupied Areas, 8.4.1946 (effective date).

intervene in German issues prior to the establishment of Germany's own local government. In addition to administrative and political power, the situation was complicated by questions of authority. Clay's possible interference in the contents of the Stuttgart Speech, for example, illustrates to the boundary of the use of power over which military and political intentions were on a collision course.¹⁰²⁴

Byrnes concrete connection to the State Department remained quite weak, which is understandable considering he spent 350 out of his 562 days as Secretary of State in international conferences. In his memoirs Byrnes believes he was left in the dark about the effects of the changes within the Department exactly for this reason, although he remarks that during his first months in office he strove to work against the attacks of the "worriers of the re-organization".¹⁰²⁵ In this regard the position of Under Secretary Acheson is particularly highlighted, as he acted as Interim Secretary of State during Byrnes's absences. On the other hand, Acheson's omission from Byrnes's inner circle from day one had given him an opportunity to work closely with Truman. Truman came to trust Acheson and talk to him regularly, and the proximity began to be translated into influence. Perhaps Byrnes had figured on the earlier distrust between Truman and Acheson and miscalculated Acheson's skills by appointing him to insignificant duties and keeping him uninformed about many foreign policy issues.

When examining the role of the State Department during Byrnes's term it is necessary to touch upon the development of the resources directed to it by the federal government. The just over 100 million dollars allocated to the State Department in 1946 grew to over 140 million dollars the following year. The increase was most clearly visible in operational expenses, which was understandably caused by the growing number of personnel in the State Department. Diplomatic and other representative operations abroad were also allocated more funds in 1947. In the development of the State Department's expenses however, a clear turning point seems to have been a change in the Secretary of State from Byrnes to Marshall which, particularly because of the Marshall Plan, almost doubled the allocation of funds to the State Department in 1948.¹⁰²⁶ The most notable expense was the fulfillment of "international obligations", which more than tripled its allocation from 28 million dollars to 101 million dollars. At the same time, some of the operational expenses were cut. Generally speaking, during Byrnes's term more attention was being paid to foreign policy in the form of increased financial contributions. However, it wasn't until Marshall's term as Secretary that the most considerable part of the

¹⁰²⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B8:F10. Political. Donald Russell to Robert Murphy, 15.10.1946; Lucius Clay to Donald Russell, 15.12.1945.

¹⁰²⁵ Ibid. In contrast to Byrnes, his successor Marshall was absent for 228 out of 633 days.

¹⁰²⁶ This was just the initial stage of the Marshall Plan. The total amount of funds channeled to target countries between 1948 and 1952 was 13,150,000,000 dollars.

State Department's expenses was formed by direct monetary support to foreign countries.¹⁰²⁷

Byrnes had considered the development of the Foreign Service of particular importance, as maintaining the embassies around the world complemented the regional committees he desired. One of the reasons for the growth of the appropriation to the Foreign Service and the growth in its significance was the passing of the Keen-Connally bill, the purpose of which, according to Byrnes, was to "improve, strengthen, and expand the Foreign Service". Based on his memoirs, it was the passing of this particular bill that had required Byrnes to return to the United States during the recess of the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Paris in the summer of 1946. Both Byrnes's and Donald Russell's lobbying in the House of Representatives and the Senate could have had a considerable effect on the confirmation of the bill in the Senate in August, but on a practical level the effects of the law to the efficiency of foreign policy were questionable. The law mainly enabled the posts at embassies to be opened to people with less means through the increase in salaries.¹⁰²⁸

The State Department's expenses were increased starting in 1946 by the Fulbright Act, which sought to increase the openness and bilateral information exchange between the United States and foreign countries by investing in education and research. The law, which was named after Senator William Fulbright, was based on the Surplus Property Act of 1944, which enabled using the foreign currency from the United States' foreign surplus trade for educational purposes like this. William Benton had a significant role in the preparation of the Fulbright Act, as was the case with the Foreign Service Act. With regard to the United States' ability to manipulate its public image abroad, the situation did not change significantly until 1948, when the Smith-Mundt Act placed the domestic and the foreign audience in different positions. The act had a significant role especially in the operations of information channels like the Voice of America, as programs directed overseas were not allowed to be broadcast domestically anymore.¹⁰²⁹

5.3.3 The observation post of the spring of 1947 and an intensifying of the War of Nerves

From Byrnes's perspective in the spring of 1947, the objectives of the Soviet Union contained little ambiguity. The Soviet Union's clear desire to increase its influence in the regions weakened by the war was, according to Byrnes, understandable purely through Russian history. Many points of contact in the diplomacy of the Bolsheviks and the Tsarist period were no coincidence, but

¹⁰²⁷ DAFR 1945-1946. Appropriations, Comparative Statement of State Department Appropriations for 1946 and 1947. Volume VIII, p. 62; DAFR 1947. Appropriations, Comparative Statement of State Department Appropriations for 1947 and 1948. Volume IX, p. 28.

¹⁰²⁸ Byrnes 1947, p. 247. Traditionally ambassadors and civil servants of the Foreign Service came from wealthy families so that they did not need monetary wages.

¹⁰²⁹ CUOHROC, Reminiscences of William Benton (August 9, 1968), on pages 162-163 in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection.

rather manifestations of Russian expansionism, whose latest guidelines had been defined by Karl Marx. According to Byrnes, for more than two decades Soviet-led Russia had achieved a territory that was only slightly smaller than the greatest Russia of the Tsarist period. His views were undeniably strongly influenced by the documents regarding the German-Soviet relationship which had been revealed after the war and which Byrnes had gone to great lengths to obtain and have translated right at the end of his term.¹⁰³⁰

It is clear, then, that expansionism is not an innovation of the communist regime. It is rooted in Russian history, only the persons and tactics have changed.¹⁰³¹

From the perspective of the Cold War, the idea did not get its real breakthrough until the Eisenhower term. After all, J.F. Dulles, whom Eisenhower had chosen to be his Secretary of State, had spoken about Communism as a filthy alliance of Marxist Communism and imperialistic Russia.¹⁰³² Byrnes sees an interesting point of contact with the Soviet Union's expansionist policy in its activities immediately before the start of the Great War and partially even in the reasons that lead to it.¹⁰³³ The toes of the Soviet Union and especially of Stalin had been trod on in the Munich agreement from the fall of 1938 and especially in the questions of the German regions in Czechoslovakia. The suspicions of Stalin, who had supported the Czechs, were confirmed the following spring and he was disappointed in the realism of both France and Britain, Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, who had been too understanding of the Western Countries, was replaced with Molotov. According to Byrnes, When the Western Countries had expressed their willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union, Stalin no longer had the need for western cooperation. A better alternative turned out to be the idea presented to Molotov by the German ambassador to Moscow regarding the non-aggression agreement and its protocols regarding the division of spheres of interest between Germany and the Soviet Union.¹⁰³⁴

In Byrnes's view the initiative coming from Germany, and Hitler agreeing to the agreement which was largely drafted by Molotov was at the very least a satisfactory outcome for Stalin. Therefore, when the non-aggression agreement was signed, Stalin would have been aware that Germany's campaign toward Poland lay ahead, which would lead to a favorable outcome for the Soviet

¹⁰³⁰ BP. Series 10: Books, B8:F5. From Mr. Neal to Mr. Byrnes, Documents Relating to Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreements, 1939; Selected Documents from German Foreign Office Files; Diplomatic and Economic Relations between Germany and the USSR. Development from 1922 to 1939. An actual report was finished at the end of November 1946. B8:F6; For the purpose of his memoirs, Byrnes had asked the research department of the State Department to find out all territorial expansions of Russia and the Soviet Union since 1853. The study was made in June 1946 by Llewellyn E. Thompson. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B11:F17, From Thompson to Byrnes, 11.6.1947.

¹⁰³¹ Byrnes 1947, p. 283.

¹⁰³² Kero 1991, p. 444.

¹⁰³³ Secret supplementary protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact went actually out when *Speaking Frankly* was published in October 1947. *The New York Times*, 15.10.1947. Arthur Krock "Byrnes Discloses Paris Resignation".

¹⁰³⁴ Byrnes 1947, pp. 283–285.

Union. According to Byrnes's reasoning, the non-aggression agreement gave some sort of guarantee regarding Hitler's objectives towards the Soviet Union, but at the same time it was also to act as a deterrent for the Western Countries to want to interfere with the situation in Poland after a possible attack. Even if Poland's fate had been intervened in from outside, according to Byrnes the power balance would have formed into such that the Soviet Union would have had ample time to train and reinforce its army. In addition to this, according to the division of spheres of influence in the supplementary protocols, Stalin could have integrated the Baltic countries into the Soviet Union without any real threat of war.¹⁰³⁵

All in all Byrnes had at his disposal a wealth of information regarding the connection between Germany and the Soviet Union. The impressions of the Soviet Union's expansiveness were strongly based on the Secretary of State's knowledge regarding the discussions between Hitler and Molotov in November of 1940, when a world dominated by Germany and the Soviet Union had been discussed. He knew the exact progression of the discussions and was convinced that Molotov's endless desire to get what he wanted led before long to Germany's attack on Russia.¹⁰³⁶ In Byrnes's view, the Soviet Union's objectives in post-war power politics were not much different to those which it had sought to achieve only a few years earlier with the help of Germany. The division of spheres of influence in the supplementary protocols, which had been created in the spirit of the non-aggression agreement of 1939, served the same purpose as the Soviet Union's claims of a need for a security zone in the post war negotiations. Byrnes suggests the difference between the Soviet Union's expansionism and the security guarantees to be obscure:

As to whether the Soviet Union seeks security or expansion, I suppose the Soviets themselves, in analyzing their motives, would find it difficult to tell exactly where security ends and expansion begins. And if they did know the dividing line, I am certain they would not admit it. In considering this question, I keep thinking of the kind of people –and many of us know them – who buy the house or farm adjoining theirs for protection. The difficulty always is that there is another adjoining house or farm. So it is with the Soviets who think the governments adjoining the Soviet Union or its satellites must be 'friendly governments' for their security. The chief difference is that the Soviets do not buy the adjoining territory and they have no scruples about violating laws and pledges to acquire the property they want for security.¹⁰³⁷

In the Buzanian sense, Byrnes observes the Soviet Union's objective to justify its expansive activities by securitizing everything questionable. The research of Melvin P. Leffler, who examined the United States' national security thinking after the Second World War, brings an interesting perspective to Byrnes's interpretation of the Soviet Union's expansion policy. Generalizing, Leffler considers the United States' views on the foreign policy intentions of the Soviet Union to be dependent on the general power-political atmosphere at the time.

¹⁰³⁵ Byrnes 1947, p. 285.

¹⁰³⁶ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F24, Interview of Pauline Frederick with Mr. James F. Byrnes, Spartanburg, S.C., Tuesday, October 14, 1947, 8:00 to 8:15 P. M., American Broadcasting Company.

¹⁰³⁷ Byrnes 1947, p. 294.

Although Byrnes's inner circle contained politicians such as Forrestal and Deane, who were skeptical of the Soviet Union's security thinking, the sincerity of its security objectives was almost unquestioned at the end of 1945. According to Leffler this included separating the role of ideology in the Soviet Union's politics which emphasized the Russians' suspicions towards foreigners. At the same time, there was concern in the United States about the Soviet Union's territorial objectives whilst still remaining optimistic about maintaining the ability to cooperate. Correspondingly, the Soviet Union's actions in Eastern Europe were deplored, but at the same time they were discussed as questions of power and influence.¹⁰³⁸

The public opinion of the West towards the Soviet Union's activities was researched during the war quite actively. The Soviet Union's clear desire to solidify its authority first in Eastern Europe and then the rest of the world was also evident in opinion polls. According to a survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Centre (NORC) in July 1945, 39 percent believed that governments like the Soviet Union would increase in other countries with 30 percent thinking the opposite. Out of those who had responded in the affirmative, 17 percent believed that other nations would voluntarily model the Soviet system, 14 percent assumed other nations would copy the Soviet Union's administrative systems, economy, trade practices and income distribution as it was, and 7 percent considered it possible that the Soviet Union would begin to actively "communize" other nations. A further 4 percent believed that the Soviet Union would impose political and economic pressures on other nations and establish its spheres of influence in Europe and its neighbors in Asia. Three percent of respondents considered it possible that other nations would admire the Soviet Union's success and believed that these nations would examine its system and would adopt at least parts of it into their own system.¹⁰³⁹

Generally, very little was known about the Soviet Union in the West, and what was known was usually based on the friendly view of a military ally, and not on political or ideological factors. The NORC's survey in July of 1945 had nonetheless asked questions about the Soviet government and its attitudes. When asked an opinion about the best possible form of government for the Soviet people, with the current form of government being one option and another form of government being the other, 64 percent considered the current form of government to be the best.¹⁰⁴⁰

A survey by Fortune (FOR) in August of 1945 approached the question of the democracy of Soviet politics by asking the respondents not only their own opinion, but also their estimate of the opinion of the Soviet people. From both perspectives only 16 percent believed that the Soviet government took the will of the people into account in its actions, whereas 68.4 percent of those who thought of it from a Soviet perspective and 67.6 percent of responses

¹⁰³⁸ Leffler 1984, pp. 365–367.


¹⁰³⁹ The Quarter's Polls. NORC July 1, '45, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 9, Issue 3 (Autumn 1945), pp. 386–387.

¹⁰⁴⁰ The Quarter's Polls. NORC July 8, '45, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 9, Issue 3 (Autumn 1945), p. 387.

representing the rest of the world thought that the Soviet government made decisions completely irrespective of the will of the people.¹⁰⁴¹

When examining the development of the opinion polls in the long term, it appears at least from the perspective of the confidence the Americans felt towards the Soviet Union that public opinion followed the guidelines of Byrnes's foreign policy during his term rather well. The question of the Americans' confidence in the Soviet Union's ability to cooperate with the United States in world politics, which was under ongoing monitoring by the American Institute of Public Opinion, had been quite level from the spring of 1942 until the end of 1944, after which the development showed clear spikes in both directions. During Byrnes's term in office, a clear reduction in confidence levels can be seen during the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September–October of 1945. This trend seems to be further enforced by the US policy on the Soviet Union, which toughened at the start of 1946, and in the spring of 1946, by the Iranian crisis.

FIGURE 1. The confidence of the Americans in the Soviet Union's ability to cooperate in world politics¹⁰⁴²



In the opinion polls of spring 1946, when divided according to political beliefs, education and age, the most confidence in the Soviet Union's ability to cooperate was shown by Democrats (37 percent), the most educated (54 percent) and veterans (45 percent). No great differences were observed in any

¹⁰⁴¹ The Quarter's Polls. FOR Aug. 31, '45, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 9, Issue 3 (Autumn 1945), p. 387.

¹⁰⁴² FIGURE 1. The Quarter's Polls. AIPO Sept. 4, '45, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 9, Issue 3 (Autumn 1945), p. 388; Quarter's Polls. AIPO Mar. 25, '46, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 10, Issue 1 (Spring 1946), p. 115.

of the groups. With regard to political beliefs, 33 percent of Republicans had confidence in the Soviet Union's ability to cooperate, whilst 57 percent of Republicans and 49 percent of Democrats held the opposite view. With regard to the level of education, confidence seemed to grow hand in hand with the level of education, and correspondingly decrease with the level of education. With regard to age, those over 30 held the most negative view, whilst both veterans and those under 30 held a more favorable view. In light of the statistics, the people's foreign policy seems to have been successful at least in the sense that there were no significant differences in any groups. From the perspective of the development of public opinion, the situation in the fall of 1946 would have been interesting, but confidence in the Soviet Union's ability to cooperate was not measured in the opinion polls.

The development in the US-Soviet relationship in the first half of 1946 is undeniably reflected in Melvyn P. Leffler's research. During the spring of 1946, which became a kind of watershed in US public opinion, the Soviet Union's expansion policy was re-evaluated in the United States. Already in January the Joint War Plans Committee predicted that the Soviet Union would seek to establish its predominance and spread its influence in Eurasia, which was supported by the escalating situation in Iran. During the spring the Soviet Union's objectives to conquer the whole world and to destroy the capitalist system were starting to be discussed.¹⁰⁴³ However, this formed only a narrow spike in the broader development of superpower relationships, which at least from Byrnes's perspective returned to the old ways after the Iran crisis was settled. Leffler's views support Byrnes's foreign policy insofar as the security thinking defined in Moscow spread in the way Byrnes had indicated around the Soviet Union and its satellites. However, for quite a long time Byrnes seemed to consider the UN and the publicity the Soviet Union's activities would gain along with it sufficient means of preventing her expansion.

Melvyn P. Leffler's views on the growing security needs of the Soviet Union in the beginning of 1946 are clearly borne out of the United States' own national security policy, which began to include the idea of a final rejection of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States had joined the war in Europe specifically as an ally, and after the war ended it had no need for a security policy like that of the Soviet Union. For quite a long time, the monopoly on the atomic weapon and a detachment from the problem regions in Europe were sufficient security guarantees for the United States. However, as the authority of the Soviet Union grew not only in its traditional security zones but also in the Far East and in all of Europe, the United States was forced to react to the situation. The Soviet Union's demands as such had not come close to the national security outlook of the United States, but they started to effectively fill the voids which had been open for a long time. Among other things, the place of Britain, which had left a significant power void, was being filled on both sides. From this perspective the Soviet Union's security policy of increasing its influence further away from its borders as depicted by Byrnes was seen in the

¹⁰⁴³ Leffler 1984, pp. 365–367.

United States not as intruding directly onto its own dominions, but onto those which the United States had rightly inherited from Britain.

Through Byrnes's eyes the security zone policy seemed to have started in the Soviet Union and had been largely defined by traditional security needs. It triggered a corresponding phenomenon in the United States. In the United States the Soviet Union's security needs were understandably seen as an accentuated expansive foreign policy, as in the case of the Soviet Union the security zones were easily justified with the theories of the Russia of the tsarist period and with clear borders with several countries. In the case of the United States, justifying security needs outside of North America could have proved to be more difficult. It was nonetheless clear that the bipolarization of the world, which had begun in the name of security policy, formed a distinct border on the world map between the East and the West, at least in Europe.

As Byrnes delivered the manuscript of *Speaking Frankly* for printing on July 1, 1947, the events of the spring had to some extent influenced his views. The superpowers still had not gained momentum for the creation of the peace treaties for Germany, Japan and Austria, and the fact that Greece had been driven into a civil war could not, in Byrnes's opinion, have been caused by anything other than the direct encouragement of the Soviet Union's satellite countries. In Byrnes's opinion, the problem in Greece had culminated in the elections of the summer 1946, in which the Greeks voted to reinstate the monarchy and the king as the only alternative to Communism. In addition to Greece, the same problematic situation was, in Byrnes's worst-case scenarios, to follow in Turkey, whose sovereignty was at the very least under the same threat. The question of military bases, which was closely linked with the question of the control of the Black Sea, had been in the Soviet Union's objectives ever since the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and Stalin had continued to demand it in Potsdam. Based on this historical development, Byrnes thought it necessary to arrange for some kind of loan for both Greece and Turkey in order to prepare for the Soviet Union's demands with regard to the strait.¹⁰⁴⁴

The developments of the spring of 1947 brought with them a 400 million dollar loan for Greece and Turkey to be used for military purposes. At the same time, the possibility of training some Greek and Turkish military personnel by American forces was being investigated.¹⁰⁴⁵ Supporting the region was largely left in the hands of the United States, as Britain withdrew its assistance to the region at the end of March.¹⁰⁴⁶ In Byrnes's opinion the skittishness of Britain was not the correct tactic against the spread of Communism. In the case of

¹⁰⁴⁴ Byrnes 1947, pp. 303–305; Greek immigrants in the United States had lobbied effectively for Greece. BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B4:F2, From Mr. Cokes to Byrnes, November 1946; From Byrnes to Mr. Cokes, 14.11.1946; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B6:F1, From Paul John Pappas to Byrnes, 23.11.1946; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B6:F2, From George E. Phillis to Byrnes, 13.11.1946; BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B6:F2, From Demetrius N. Protopapas to Byrnes, 5.12.1946.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Byrnes 1947, p. 307.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz 1956, pp. 110–111. Compare to: Byrnes 1947, p. 302. Byrnes did not want to misjudge the British because they had acted "nervously".

Turkey and Greece, it was in Byrnes's view purely a question of achieving the historical objectives of the Soviet Union, the pattern of which had always been the same. The same development which led to a difficult crisis in Iran was also threatening Hungary in addition to Greece and Turkey, where the election results had been disregarded under the direction of the Soviet government.¹⁰⁴⁷

During the spring of 1947, US foreign policy had also officially included a tougher stance on the Soviet Union in its agenda. President Truman's concerned message regarding the independence of nations like Greece and Turkey and measures to correct the developments were presented in a joint session of Congress on March 12. In May, a statute included in general law 75 was passed regarding the subsidizing and support of Greece and Turkey.¹⁰⁴⁸ In practice this meant that foreign policy started to follow the trend known as the Truman Doctrine, the core of which was directed at the containment of Communism and if necessary the suppression of any aggressions instigated by the Soviet Union. This policy seems to have been supported by Byrnes, who felt that the Soviet Union had consciously remained outside of international cooperation. Internationally, the Soviet Union was involved in the central bodies of the United Nations, but of the special organizations, the Soviet Union was only active in the WHO. David Robertson, who has examined Byrnes's relationship with the Truman Doctrine, connects the Truman Doctrine with Byrnes's foreign policy in the spring of 1946 more closely than other researchers. According to Robertson, the message Truman presented to Congress in March 1947, which led to the Truman Doctrine, contained many similarities and even quotes from a speech given by Byrnes during the Iranian crisis, in which Byrnes had warned the Soviet Union not to put pressure on other nations. However, according to Roberts, the connection between Truman's message and Byrnes's speech was not made public due to reasons of authority.¹⁰⁴⁹

In the light of Byrnes's personal experience, the Soviet Union's reluctance to cooperate was nothing new, but now it was to be made clear to the world who was to blame for the failures caused by the lack of cooperation. The future with the Soviet Union was largely dependent on the UN's ability to establish a common procedure and trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. This could not, in Byrnes's opinion, be solely reliant on "rules, something more than force, and something more than fear".¹⁰⁵⁰ In light of Byrnes's previous experiences and the newly launched Truman Doctrine, the last one of the wishes contains an incredible amount of optimism, though it is also a statement of the spirit of trust and consensus which was cultivated during Roosevelt's term. On the other hand, the almost unreserved support the Truman Doctrine received from Congress had an undeniable effect on the willingness of other top-level politicians to react. According to William E. Pemberton's research,

¹⁰⁴⁷ Byrnes 1947, p. 304.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz 1956, pp. 114–117; Robertson 1994, p. 490.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Robertson 1994, p. 491. The speech which it was referred to was Byrnes's speech on Overseas Press Club on 28. February 1946.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Byrnes 1947, p. 315.

Truman had been able to successfully quell the objectors to his Doctrine, of which Henry Wallace had already been excluded from the politics of the day.¹⁰⁵¹

In May of 1947 Byrnes was invited to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hear the first public presentation of the peace treaties. Vandenberg had wanted the former Secretary of State to be present because he considered them to be specifically Byrnes's treaties.¹⁰⁵² In his address Byrnes reminded those present of the Rooseveltian legacy:

Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or imperialism or power politics, may obstruct the paths to international peace. Let us not forget that the retreat to isolationism a quarter of century ago was started not by a direct attack against international cooperation but against the alleged imperfections of the peace. In our disillusionment after the last war we preferred international anarchy to international cooperation with nations which did not see and think exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfill our responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world.¹⁰⁵³

Idealism and an endless confidence in the supremacy of the American society were characteristic of Byrnes actions throughout his life. However, never did it spark such passion which would have superseded the foundation pillar of the citizen's freedom to choose. Byrnes's thinking was based on common sense spiced with progressive fundamental elements, whose supremacy could not be matched.

If my public service has taught me anything, it is that the teachings of Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln can bring greater happiness and satisfaction to greater number of people than the teachings of Karl Marx and Nikolay Lenin. Nowhere is there an ideology that surpasses in its power and in its potential appeal to all peoples the ideology contained in such a statement as this: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, and among these rights are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.'¹⁰⁵⁴

In the Soviet Union, *Speaking Frankly* was received as the memoirs of an "Unbridled Retired Secretary". According to *Pravda*, Byrnes had earlier established himself as a reactionary politician, which was emphasized by the deterioration in the status of the working people caused by Byrnes's economic policy. *Pravda's* views were influenced by the scathing review of the book by the *Times* in London, which said the book contained "an actual call to war". The paper interpreted Byrnes to have completely rejected the Rooseveltian course by "showing himself a frank preacher of reactionary imperialistic politics, inspired by American monopolies". The documentary references contained in the memoirs were considered to be fictitious and supporting only the interpretation of a cynical old man. As a whole, *Speaking Frankly* - as

¹⁰⁵¹ Pemberton 1989, pp. 96-97.

¹⁰⁵² BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F12, From Vandenberg to Byrnes, 17.2.1947.

¹⁰⁵³ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B19:F12, Mr. Byrnes by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9.5.1947.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Byrnes 1947, p. 315.

interpreted by *Pravda* - showed Byrnes's irritation caused by the desire of the Soviet Union to follow its own independent policy. According to the paper, Byrnes lived in a post-war illusion of building a world dominated by the United States. This failed with Byrnes trying to blackmail the Soviet Union. The Russians were most irritated by a statement made by the former Secretary of State regarding political reconsideration: "we must pray that the Soviet leaders will change their minds, and while we pray, we must use our best efforts to develop better bombs and more of them". In *Pravda* however, this sentence was taken out of its original context regarding the discussion on the security assurances of the atomic weapon. By changing their minds Byrnes was only referring to the reluctance of the Soviet Union in the questions regarding the international control of the atomic weapon.¹⁰⁵⁵

When examined in retrospect, Byrnes's view on the realities of world politics was based on experiences in the past, and a bipolar world order most likely did not exist in his fantasies. Henry Wallace was more interested in realities than Byrnes, Wallace did not hide his observations about a world socialized by the Soviet Union and democratized by the United States. In the fall of 1946 Wallace predicted that Russian ideas of "social-economic justice" are going to dominate a third of the world, with the rest remaining with "our ideas of free enterprise democracy". Idealistically, the then Secretary of Commerce believed the future to show the supremacy of ideologies and the development to lead in time to the rapprochement of both systems. Whereas Wallace wanted the world's power balance to develop in accordance with a natural process, Byrnes's thinking comes across as much more straightforward and US-centric. One can justifiably imagine that even Byrnes's foreign policy - because he had earned his spurs in domestic policy - was primarily defined by the interests of the United States and secondarily the world system.¹⁰⁵⁶

Byrnes did not have to walk away from the State Department disappointed or ashamed. Byrnes, whose trademark had been the people's foreign policy, received unreserved support and acted in the interests of the people. According to opinion polls in February 1946, 21 percent of Americans felt Byrnes's handling of foreign policy to have been excellent, 36 percent good, and 17 percent reasonable. Only 6 percent considered his foreign policy to be poor. According to party politics, the numbers were divided as 25 percent, 34 percent, 15 percent and 6 percent among Democrats and as 20 percent, 40 percent, 19 percent and 5 percent among the Republicans. Byrnes's popularity among Republicans seems to have been significant, considering that those who considered his foreign policy to be good, i.e. the largest group, was significantly greater than the numbers of Democrats.¹⁰⁵⁷

Appointing George Marshall as the new Secretary of State caused no resistance, which was indicative of the American public having accepted the

¹⁰⁵⁵ BP. Series 10: Books, B1:F10, From "Pravda", Oct. 18, 1947; Byrnes 1947, p. 275.

¹⁰⁵⁶ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, Madison Square Garden, New York City, 8 p.m., September 12, 1946, "The Way to Peace"; Byrnes 1947, p. 239.

¹⁰⁵⁷ The Quarter's Polls. AIPO Feb. 21, '47, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 11, Issue 2 (Summer 1947), p. 290.

health reasons Byrnes had publicly announced as the explanation of his resignation. Sixty-four percent of all Americans supported Marshall's appointment as Byrnes's successor with only 8 percent objecting to it. However, along with a new Secretary of State, a new tougher policy was called for. Only 19 percent thought it best for Marshall to continue on the path set out by Byrnes, whereas 51 percent demanded a tougher stance on the Soviet Union. Only 5 percent were in favor of a softer policy on the Soviet Union, which was clearly not the direction in which Truman's plans were heading.¹⁰⁵⁸ The opinion polls of spring 1947 gave a somewhat conflicting view regarding the Americans' real desires, as on the one hand they showed support for Byrnes work but on the other indicated a clear desire for a tougher policy. Of course, this could have in part be caused by the launch of the Truman Doctrine and with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the transition of the whole of Eastern Europe to communist power by the end of 1946. But the results also show the Government's well presented arguments regarding interfering when faced with the threat of Communism. Byrnes's resignation was received with trepidation, especially in Italy, as the exchange rate of the dollar rose in one day from 575 to 602 liras. Prime Minister de Gasperi was sure that the United States' "benevolent attitude toward Italy would continue unaltered".¹⁰⁵⁹

Whether Byrnes's resignation was ultimately caused by a deterioration in personal relationships or his views on foreign policy which conflicted with other top level US politicians, Byrnes's analysis of the situation in the summer of 1947 contains much criticism. When examining the future prospects of US foreign policy, Byrnes does not give his full support to the policy in place. The view is clearly reflective of a will to force even foreign policy back into its rightful place behind national interests.

We are the world's greatest industrial nation. If we keep our own house in order, proving to the world that we learn from past mistakes; that our country is not one that booms and busts; and that we provide our people with the opportunity to live in expanding freedom and increased wellbeing, we can contribute immeasurably to the building of a politically free and economically stable world. During the past two years, there were many times when I was deeply discouraged. Our repeated efforts to achieve co-operation in a peaceful world seemed to be meeting only with constant rebuff. But we persisted in our efforts with patience and firmness. I have not lost hope, but today I would reverse the order and alter the emphasis. I would say that our policy should be one of *firmness* and *patience*.¹⁰⁶⁰

In the United States the policy of firmness and patience was undeniably applied in practice after George C. Marshall became Secretary of State. The regions of Greece and Turkey, as Byrnes had called for, became the first dollar-supported walls against the spread of Communism. This development continued in the late summer of 1947 with the European recovery program presented by the new Secretary of State, which, known as the Marshall Plan, doled out recovery assistance to Western European nations. Byrnes, who had followed the

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁹ *The New York Times*, 9.1.1947. Byrnes's Action Hits Market.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Byrnes 1947, pp. 315-316.

developments from the sidelines, could hardly do anything but show his support. According to Marian D. Irish, for reasons of solidarity, Byrnes was forced to show support for the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine on the outside for quite a long time, but was internally bitter regarding Marshall and Truman's true motives.¹⁰⁶¹

The policy of firmness and patience which Byrnes had demanded did not mean intentionally driving the situation to the verge of a superpower conflict. The unwavering confidence Byrnes had shown in Yalta regarding the political reconsideration of the Russians seems to have been put to the test towards the end of his term as Secretary of State, but was not exhausted. On the other hand, during the summer of 1946, Byrnes had started to gain an understanding that the problems plaguing superpower relationships were related to mutual attempts to change outlooks. In his letter to Senator Joseph H. Ball, Byrnes reiterated the impossibility of changing the mindset of the Russians: "Ordinarily when you can agree with one on a statement of facts you can expect to reach the same conclusion. That is not true when mental operations of people differ as widely as in the case of the gentleman who represents the Soviet Union and ourselves. Nevertheless, we must strive to bring out an understanding".¹⁰⁶² Already in summer of 1947 Byrnes became conscious of the danger of the policies heading towards permanently cooling foreign relations which were forged by Truman and Marshall:

There is no Iron Curtain that the aggregate sentiments of mankind cannot penetrate. I believe that. And I also believe there is a reasonable chance that we have enough time at our disposal to bring those sentiments to bear on the people and the leaders of the Soviet Union. I also have said that 'we must guard against the belief that delays or setbacks in achieving our objective make armed conflict inevitable'. It is one of the beliefs held by the Soviet leaders that makes our task so difficult. But we will never be able to rid them or the rest of the world of that belief if we ourselves become its victims. Neither is time necessarily on the Russian side in the non-Soviet countries.¹⁰⁶³

Byrnes's views largely resemble Wallace's progressive statements in the fall of 1946, but even then the optimism contained in the statements was strongly exaggerated. Even in the United States the Eastern European states were seen as more closely tied to the Soviet Union's sphere of interest, reinforcing the existence of the Iron Curtain. Further, it was believed more and more that a possible political reconsideration on the part of the Russians was not likely to happen. In an opinion poll conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion at the end of October 1947, clearly more than half of Americans considered Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania and Finland to be strongly tied to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence and even as her

¹⁰⁶¹ Irish 1948, p. 323.


¹⁰⁶² BP. Series 9: Speeches, B7:F21, From Byrnes to Ball, 22.7.1946.

¹⁰⁶³ Byrnes 1947, pp. 290–296.

satellite states. Only two percent thought that the Soviet Union had no influence over the countries in question.¹⁰⁶⁴

The poll results were no longer based on the earlier impossibility of intervening in the events of Eastern Europe, but above all was a demonstration of the Americans' conception of the Soviet Union changing from an ally and the political supporter of the Eastern European countries to a permanent political and ideological leader in the region. At the same time, the belief in the Soviet Union's motives as a mere builder of a security zone crumbled. In the same opinion poll, only 18 percent of Americans thought that the Soviet Union's actions were purely aimed at satisfying its security needs, whereas 76 percent considered its actions to be aimed at dominating the world.¹⁰⁶⁵

FIGURE 2. Americans' view on the status of Eastern European countries with regard to the Soviet Union in the fall of 1947¹⁰⁶⁶



Based on opinion polls, Byrnes's view of the ability of foreign policy to prevent future crisis is also called into question. Although Byrnes did not predict a direct conflict between the superpowers, a drifting towards the Cold War began to show in the American people's growing belief about a new war. From the figures of the summer of 1945, the number of Americans who considered it extremely likely that the United States would be involved in another war in the next 25 years had doubled, whilst the number of people considering it to be


¹⁰⁶⁴ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B20:F12, Madison Square Garden, New York City, 8 p.m., September 12, 1946, *The Way to Peace*; Byrnes 1947, p. 239; *The Quarter's Polls*. AIPO Oct. 31, '47, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Volume 11, Issue 4 (Winter 1947-1948), p. 683.

¹⁰⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁶ FIGURE 2. *The Quarter's Polls*. AIPO Oct. 31, '47, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Volume 11, Issue 4 (Winter 1947-1948), p. 683.

unlikely was halved. Due to the long time span of the estimate one can scarcely talk of an actual war psychosis, but the development in the fear of war in the years following World War II was immense. The world moving toward the atomic age played its part in this development, as did power politics, which had more and more clearly created strong juxtapositions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

FIGURE 3. Americans' beliefs regarding the United States being involved in another great war in the next 25 years¹⁰⁶⁷



In light of the statistics it would appear, that from the perspective of the spring and summer of 1947 Byrnes, who had always respected public opinion, had to settle for agreeing with the power politics Truman and Marshall engaged in. One can only ask what else the long-term leading figure of the Democratic Party could have done. After his term as Secretary of State, Byrnes clearly sought to refrain from publicly commenting on foreign policy or even actively participating in discussions. After *Speaking Frankly* was published, he viewed the risk of a war against the Soviet Union quite neutrally. According to Byrnes, neither nation wanted the war, but was more afraid of the role of the media as a provocateur of the war. Byrnes spoke of coexisting with the Soviet Union in his usual optimistic manner, and compared the situation to normal neighborly relations:

Many people have a disagreeable neighbor. His chickens scratch up your flowers. His boy bats a baseball through your window and insults your son. His dog keeps you awake. In general he is hard to get along with but we do not shoot him. We

¹⁰⁶⁷ FIGURE 3. The Quarter's Polls. AIPO Aug. 3, '47, Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 11, Issue 3 (Autumn 1947), p. 490.

exercise a lot of patience and warn him that if he exhausts our patience we will have him brought to court. In case of a nation we must say United Nations instead of a court. And to support the United Nations and make it effective we must increase our Army and Navy and adopt universal military training.¹⁰⁶⁸

Although the statement creates an image of a naive and humble politician, Byrnes's policy of friendly neighbors had its limits, after which he was ready for forceful action. Perhaps the biggest problem with Byrnes's foreign policy was in the Soviet Union's difficulties in distinguishing the point at which the humility and benevolence of the US Secretary of State would end and his firmness begin. Too often Byrnes turned the other cheek in issues in which he had previously taken a tougher stance. As a lawyer he would have needed an international law stronger than the UN, which would have exhaustively defined the limits which would lead to a trial. A clear turning point in this regard coincided with the deteriorating relationship with Truman. Still, in September of 1948 Byrnes showed allegiance to the Truman-Marshall policy by publicly reprimanding the Soviet Union for neglecting "nearly all" old agreements, but refused to criticize the policies of Roosevelt, whom he admired, as naive.¹⁰⁶⁹ However, in a speech given at Lee University in the summer of 1949, Byrnes was already critical of the policies. Now the roots of the criticism lay in both domestic and foreign policy. Byrnes criticized domestic policy from the perspective of a welfare state, but with regard to foreign policy he brought to light the permanent fundamental problems of the US-Soviet relationships. Nonetheless, according to the former Secretary of State, a military readiness and the continued manufacturing of atomic weapons should not remove the true pursuit of the policy of "firmness and patience". The acute question of the Soviet Union's reluctance to integrate its own occupied zone in the newly established Republic of West Germany showed the significance of an economically unified Germany, highlighted in the Stuttgart Speech, in a rather realistic light. The economy became in Byrnes's eyes the factor that increasingly defined the political dimension of the United States both domestically and abroad.

When I say we must be 'economically strong' it brings me to a discussion of some domestic problems. National and international problems are so intertwined that you cannot speak of one without speaking of the other. Our first line of defense is not on the Rhine. Our first line of defense is a sound, solvent American economy¹⁰⁷⁰

¹⁰⁶⁸ BP. Series 9: Speeches, B8:F24, Interview of Pauline Frederick with Mr. James F. Byrnes, Spartanburg, S.C., Tuesday, October 14, 1947, 8:00 to 8:15 P. M., American Broadcasting Company.

¹⁰⁶⁹ *The New York Times*, 7.9.1948. Lawrence E. Davies "Byrnes Hits Soviets for Pact Breaches".

¹⁰⁷⁰ BP. Series 6: Interim Materials, B22:F7, Address by Hon. James F. Byrnes at Bicentennial Celebration of Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, June 18, 1949. When it was relating to domestic policy, criticism was directed at President Truman's Fair Deal- program; *The New York Times*, 5.7.1949. Byrnes Disavows Any Political Criticism In His June Attack on "Welfare State".

At the start of 1950, Byrnes's views on Truman and the foreign policy at the time began to spill out into the public. In January the press blatantly pulled apart Truman's comment on Byrnes's intentions in running for the Governor of South Carolina: he is "a free agent who can do 'as he damn pleases'".¹⁰⁷¹ In the spring of 1952 Byrnes attacked Truman's recently published memoirs, *Mr. President*, which were from his perspective rather awkward, and "accused him of writing history to suit himself".¹⁰⁷² Byrnes continued along this line by stating in August 1953 that the Southern states had detached from the traditionally Democratic way of thinking and by praising the Eisenhower government.¹⁰⁷³ The debate surrounding the memoirs continued throughout the 1950s, heating up in the fall of 1955 when Byrnes asserted that he really was Roosevelt's choice among the candidates for Vice President in 1944.¹⁰⁷⁴

A final resolution to the dispute between Byrnes and Truman was never found. It is difficult to say whether Byrnes's line after 1949 was more the result of problems on a personal level rather than content-oriented questions of policy. The "closed club politics" of Roosevelt had been the legacy for Byrnes and Truman in the United States, but there was not enough potential for the cooperation of these two politicians let alone that of the closed club. On the other hand, after his time as Secretary of State, Byrnes became more interested in observing his own role in the public. The detachment of many of the Secretary's contemporaries from their positions led to many memoirs and interpretations of the past. When acting as Governor of South Carolina, Donald Russell examined and critically reported on several political memoirs and histories.¹⁰⁷⁵

Roosevelt's legacy left a power vacuum in the foreign policy of the United States, which in addition to Truman and Byrnes was filled by the Republicans. Some Republicans tried to exploit tensions between these two principal heirs. From this perspective the future development of power politics was largely affected by the internal disjointedness of the Democratic Party with Byrnes, Truman and Wallace gradually moving onto different paths. Particularly with regard to the Soviet Union, the alternatives in foreign policy were encapsulated between toughness and softness. In Byrnes's eyes, the Truman-Marshall tough foreign policy began to go awry after it failed in creating a more coherent and open world, but he no longer wanted to influence it directly. Byrnes's response to this foreign policy was to change his political colors and become the man behind the lines. On the other hand, Byrnes himself had to accept the necessary

¹⁰⁷¹ *The New York Times*, 22.1.1950. Arthur Krock "Truman-Byrnes Break Holds Political Threat".

¹⁰⁷² *The New York Times*, 18.4.1952. "Article By Byrnes Assails President". The revelation of Truman's admonishment letter was very disturbing for Byrnes. E.g. Hillman & Wagg 1952, pp. 18-23. Byrnes denied the existence of this letter.

¹⁰⁷³ *The New York Times*, 6.8.1953. W. H. Lawrence "Byrnes Says South Has Left The Party".

¹⁰⁷⁴ *The New York Times*, 4.10.1955. Harry S. Truman "Byrnes Disputes Truman Memoirs".

¹⁰⁷⁵ BP. Series 5: State Department Materials, B18:F11, From Russell to Byrnes, 28.5.1951; 30.5.1951.

change in a society that was returning to peace after a war where it was no longer necessary to maintain. The power-political harmony, which decreased after the war, also dissipated within the United States and the peace did not become a justification for becoming drunk on power in foreign policy as the war had. For Byrnes, power was deliberative, which after the war must be returned to the people:

Too many people are trying to transfer power to government. That is justified in war but not in peace. In time of peace the state must exist for the individual for the state. Power once transferred to government is difficult to recover. Power intoxicates men. When a man is intoxicated by alcohol he can recover, but when intoxicated by power he seldom recovers.¹⁰⁷⁶

¹⁰⁷⁶ BP. Series 6: Interim Materials, B22:F7, Address by Hon. James F. Byrnes at Bicentennial Celebration of Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, June 18, 1949.

6 REALPOLITIK AND THE COLD WAR

The record of James F. Byrnes was unquestionably one of the most successful of the time. However, behind the publicity and acclaim was a lawyer and politician whose career was often on the razor's edge. As Secretary of State, Byrnes's eighteen months could not have fallen during a tougher time. In power politics Byrnes and his advisors had to answer for the opinion of a whole nation that was influenced by the public and party politics. In conferences he was always caught in the crossfire of external and internal pressures, which became evident in necessary compromises. Even if as an observer Byrnes had disapproved Roosevelt's slack policy of compromise at Yalta, he too as Secretary of State had to resort to compromises. The same happened with quid pro quo politics, the total abandonment of which in spring 1946 seemed to be leading to an impossible negotiating atmosphere.

The death of President Roosevelt and Churchill's stepping aside from great power politics are usually considered to mark a transition from the classical diplomacy practiced by a small group to a mechanical foreign policy of the masses. On the other hand, the conferences based on meetings of the leaders of the Big Three had not produced significant decisions relating to the postwar period but had rather only served the essential needs of war. For instance, the grandiose guidelines issued at Yalta might become mere suggestions when they were dealt with in the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was not so much that the magnitude of the problems had changed, but typically old problems were shelved or replaced with new ones. According to the picture given by Byrnes in his memoirs, it was not a question of an insouciant, result-oriented and apparently successful politics of compromise; rather the phenomenon became to an increasing extent a consequence of the awkward attitude of the Soviet Union. As differences grew and hopes of final peace treaties degenerated into ever more imaginary fantasies, it is somehow understandable that Byrnes, too, had to try a different kind of tactics.

According to George C. Herring, policy-making changed dramatically under Truman's different style of leadership. Where Roosevelt had been comfortable with the ambiguities of diplomacy, the world of foreign relations

was unfamiliar to Truman. Herring sees President Truman as being in no way comparable to Roosevelt in stature but as an average politician who “shared the parochialism of most Americans of his generation, viewed people, races, and nations through the crudest of stereotypes, and sometimes used ethnic slurs.” Truman preferred blunt talk to the silky tones of diplomacy, but his toughness on occasion masked deep uncertainties and sometimes got him into trouble. In listing his many contrasts with Roosevelt, however, Herring overestimates Truman’s role in foreign politics. Lacking experience and knowledge, Truman had no choice but turn to experts. As Roosevelt’s “assistant president,” Byrnes was one of the most experienced politicians and had also been present at Yalta. With his much needed foreign policy expertise, Byrnes quickly became the real master of United States foreign policy. At the same time, politics between the great powers shifted from heads of states to ministers.¹⁰⁷⁷

The whole system of the Council of Foreign Ministers was generally seen as Byrnes’s special project, the failure of which could not be countenanced. However, the first meeting of foreign ministers in London in September 1945 became an acid test for the future of the system. The degeneration of the meeting into deadlock for unclear reasons put Byrnes’s negotiating skills to the test. The Soviet Union’s message regarding Japan, the Balkans and Trieste had become clear after the London meeting, and that message was in stark conflict with American virtues like self-determination, economic freedom and collective security. Even Molotov, who had been successful in excluding atomic diplomacy, benefited from Byrnes’s desire to satisfy public demands for progress in the peace negotiations. In rejecting the compromises presented by Byrnes, Molotov forced Byrnes to stretch his proposals to the extreme limit, which was determined on the one hand by public opinion and on the other by the “closed diplomacy” of his political watchdogs. For Byrnes, the London meeting represented the starting point of the “get tough” politics, which manifested itself in an endeavor to achieve peace and at the same time to maintain friendly relations with the Russians. However, in terms of the development of postwar superpower relations, this policy seems not to have been fully implemented until the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers meeting.

In Moscow, Byrnes used the quid pro quo politics that he had earlier eschewed but which seemed to work well after the London disaster. Byrnes had managed to exclude several difficult questions, like atomic energy and Trieste, but this was not enough to appease the claims of the most fervent advocates of power politics especially with regard to Balkan and Italian reparations. The labeling of Byrnes’s politics as appeasement and the probable disciplinary letter from President Truman in early 1946 forced Byrnes, at least outwardly, to change his foreign policy line towards a policy of “firmness and patience,” as he called it. Ostensibly, there were naturally no great changes because for Byrnes to admit to them would have meant surrendering to the critical voices. The only exception he made was with regard to the public sphere because,

¹⁰⁷⁷ Herring 2008, p. 599.

determined by public opinion as it was, it sometimes offered the sole justification for such a reassessment of his policy: the politics of firmness and patience was founded on Byrnes's perpetual trademark – the foreign policy of the people.

During the spring of 1946, the politics of firmness and patience was put to the test in the Iranian crisis. At the same time, Byrnes kept the still unsolved problems of the Balkan states and Italian reparations separate from the Iranian case, but they nonetheless caused growing distrust of the Soviet Union among the Americans. Over the course of time, Byrnes's "patience" began more and more to mean familiarizing the Russians with the notion that the United States would not bow to all Soviet wishes. According to Byrnes's view as presented in his memoirs, his loss of patience was justifiable on the grounds of Western democracy and solid faith. In the case of Iran, this justification was reinforced by economic considerations because the Americans were interested in Iran's oil resources. The problem was encapsulated in the position of the border province of Azerbaijan, and for Byrnes it was an essential question of liberty and self-determination which should be solved by resorting to the UN's negotiation machinery if necessary. In his memoirs, Byrnes was tight-lipped about the possible influence of oil resources and the paramilitary Schwarzkopf operation.

The firmness aspect of his policy was realized effectively through publicity, which Byrnes succeeded in exploiting even to the extent of using intimidation. The spring of 1946 brought the French back to the conference tables, which meant a new party to be taken into account in arriving at compromises. When the United States extended its influence to what had formerly been British areas of influence from the summer of 1946 on, the world began to divide into two. From Byrnes's perspective of the spring of 1947, the division represented a realistic reflection of the world after the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine, but it was a direct consequence of the Soviet actions and, ideally, it could still be returned to its former state.

Byrnes's bubble burst in the middle of the Paris Peace Conference, as can be seen in his Stuttgart Speech, which the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States exploded. The Stuttgart Speech did not represent an actual intentional change in the US foreign policy line; rather it was drafted so as to demonstrate mainly to the American people the adoption of a firmer attitude. In Byrnes's own view, the speech merely reiterated the Americans' known opinion about Germany's situation in the world. However, the speech included a lot of material that put the Soviet Union in a bad light, especially accusations that it was violating the Potsdam resolutions and aspiring to annex former German territories. Rhetorically, Byrnes touched on a nerve when he emphasized his concern for the economic survival of the German people, which he partly connected with the migration of people from the Soviet zone. On the other hand Byrnes, who spoke in favor of an economically united Germany, was also defending the United States' interests, which included the establishment of an economically strong Germany containing the industrial regions of the Ruhr and the Rhineland to cooperate with. From the perspective of the Stuttgart Speech's, the United States' willingness to accommodate French

requirements only with respect to the Saar suggests that Byrnes wanted to secure the economic power of Europe by bolstering Germany rather than France, which had become more and more politically unpredictable. Evidently, Byrnes was pursuing pure global economic interests without reference to regional policy or the existence of a balance of power in Europe. However, in Europe and Russia, the rise of a strong and unified German nation had been considered for a long time the product of the kind of economic unification that had started with the *Zollverein* of 1834. In the United States, the Stuttgart Speech nettled those who supported progressive and friendly policies towards the Soviet Union. Even though in the name of bilateral cooperation Byrnes received full backing for his line in Stuttgart, it became clear that sooner or later the bad atmosphere would have to be cleared permanently. In practice, this happened through Henry Wallace's resignation and also with the dethronement of Byrnes at the beginning of 1947.

During the fall of 1946, Byrnes's policies assumed the same kind of political features as Molotov's. Byrnes's adaptation to power politics seems to have been a long-lasting process, which developed from Rooseveltian politics of negotiation via *quid pro quo* politics to tactical maneuvers like the ruthless prevarication that Molotov used. In this development, Byrnes's problems were exacerbated by a late start and an uneven approach. While Molotov had maneuvered at the conference table in the same way since Potsdam, Byrnes's problem was that his actions were characterized by a fluctuation between firmness and softness and the fact that he finally on a fixed policy too late. Evidently, Byrnes had learned from the master, because during the summer and fall of 1946, he adopted Molotov's attitude, policies and tactics. In his memoirs, Byrnes expressed his satisfaction with his progress as a connoisseur of Molotov's tactics.

Byrnes hoped that after his period in office his successor would continue a foreign policy that set firmness above patience. However, Byrnes maintained that it should not be practiced in order to intentionally create conflicts between the great powers, but rather as a tactic for achieving worldwide cooperation. In his memoirs Byrnes leveled very little criticism against the foreign policy practiced after him, but later he became a harsh critic of Truman's politics. As the Cold War intensified, it was easier for Byrnes to criticize policies because the results became evident. On the other hand, during the Truman administration Byrnes's criticism focused strongly on the deterioration in personal relations and domestic policy. Since a return to the past without losing face was impossible, Byrnes supported the stricter version of the politics of firmness and patience. Certainly, the politics of firmness and patience marketed by Byrnes was behind projects like Kennan's containment policy, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, Eisenhower's domino theory and Dulles's massive retaliation. Dulles even rhetorically exploited the same kind of ideas about the risk of Communism that Byrnes had expressed six years earlier in *Speaking Frankly*. However, during Dulles's and McNamara's terms in the State Department in the 1950s and 1960s, policy drifted into brinkmanship, as Byrnes

had forewarned in his statements relating to the control and use of atomic energy in 1947.

Even if Byrnes was generally regarded as a determined person, his stance particularly concerning the Soviet Union was marked by considerable vacillation. The reason for this was his trademark, his adherence to the foreign policy of the people, which required quick adaptation to public opinion. Public opinion polls and mainly Republican groups that supported firmer Soviet policies could directly or indirectly invoke the foreign policy of the people and thereby exert an influence on Byrnes's foreign policy line. Frequently the process was initiated by the press or the critics and forced the Department of State to re-examine its views. As a result, Byrnes was unable to create at the conference table the kind of confidential and secure atmosphere that might have produced better results. Evidently, the more successful manipulators were Vandenberg, Connally, Kennan and Wallace, who took full advantage of Byrnes's foreign-policy maneuvers to reassert their authority in United States domestic policy. In addition, Byrnes had to implement annoying political measures, like Roosevelt's Far East Agreements, for which he was not originally responsible. The lack of an opportunity to work in peace and the Republican leaders' growing concern over foreign policy are manifested in Byrnes's memoirs as bitterness and even insinuations of intrigue behind his back. On the other hand, during the period of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the number and turnover of politicians in foreign policy began to grow as the significance of personal relations changed. Because foreign policy attracted great attention in postwar America, the action of a single politician or diplomat needed to have the whole-hearted endorsement of ever more people.

Byrnes's foreign policy of the people seems to have received slightly different emphases in different sources. In his memoirs, Byrnes's relations with Molotov and Bevin in particular are represented as private and often informal. The reasons that led to conflict situations are in the memoirs connected more to personal issues than they are in the classified documents of his correspondence or the State Department's press releases. In this respect, the interpersonal conflicts that developed during Byrnes's period in office cannot possibly be regarded as the real reasons for the problems, which were publically presented as objective facts. In the light of the official documentation, there seems to have been little reason for Byrnes to publicize the culpability of other politicians as some kind of personal provocation. On the other hand, entanglement in top-level personal relations would have seriously weakened the whole tenability of power politics and would otherwise have conflicted with the kind of independence enjoyed by diplomacy.

Thus from the perspectives described above, is it really justifiable to speak of Byrnes's own foreign policy? During his period in the State Department, Byrnes's embryonic idealistic foreign policy was metamorphosed through publicity and vacillating politics into the foreign policy of the people. Every once in a while, Byrnes did try to take the helm, but was brought back into line by his watchdogs, Vandenberg and Connally. This involved a breakaway from party politics that stigmatized Byrnes as a bipartisan politician for rest of his

life. Insofar as the United States foreign relations after the Second World War were marked by Byrnes's foreign policy, they involved a balancing act typical of *realpolitik* between the demands of publicity, party politics and foreign powers. It was also a politics of great changes, which were in many respects defined by the changing attitude toward the Soviet Union. During his tenure, the turning points in policy were the Moscow Conference and the Stuttgart Speech. From Byrnes's perspective, he had his own foreign policy, which was determined by the constitution and the concepts of democracy and justice, but not marked by any actual line. If there was some line, it was one that changed according to the foreign policy of the people on the one hand and as a reaction to the moves of foreign states on the other. Byrnes himself often emphasized his position as a subordinate to the President, but when acting in the Council of Foreign Ministers, he was often forced to make significant spontaneous decisions on behalf of the whole country. In his memoirs, Byrnes justified what he did in this respect by his unfailing belief in what was right, but refused to comment on Truman's admonishments brought about by his obstinacy.

For the reader of Byrnes's memoirs, the vacillation in his political line appears as the fulfilment of the ideals of democracy, whereby the politician acts according to the people's mind. However, the hypothesis of a two-way interplay between public opinion and the management of foreign policy involves the possibility that the practiced line did not represent only the will of the public. Since big decisions continued to be made behind closed doors, a politician in high places sometimes had an exclusive opportunity to embellish the picture of the conference proceedings that was presented to the public. According to his memoirs, Byrnes did not feel guilty when he, among others, tried to blackmail Molotov by threatening to publish Mark Ethridge's Balkan report and piggyback on Russia's bad publicity relating to the Iranian case in the United Nations. During the Roosevelt era, there was no need to indulge in such means, but when the atmosphere became less amicable the threshold for using tougher procedures was lowered. Clearly both the invocation of the Iranian crisis and the Stuttgart Speech were targeted not only at foreign powers but also at the ordinary Americans, to whom the world political situation had to be explained. In the Soviet Union, naturally no such of explanation was needed, although publicity later became virtually the only instrument in the war of nerves with which the Russians could never compete.

During the spring of 1946, US diplomats reported with alarm the political oppression that existed across Eastern Europe. The situation had become acute in the former Nazi satellites of Romania and Bulgaria, where the oppression was backed by the Red Army. As Thomas G. Paterson has noted, Eastern Europe provided some sort of litmus test of Soviet postwar behavior. Powerful Soviet influence raised fears about Stalin's aggressive methods and expansionism. However, despite all the alarming signs, Byrnes was not too apprehensive about the future. His reaction to Stalin's speech on February 1946, which Acheson later considered a major reason for the Cold War, was in no way exceptional. Byrnes's speech at the Overseas Press Club revealed the cruel world of "the war of the nerves," but it had little international significance.

About a week later, the former Prime Minister of Britain, Winston Churchill, delivered his Fulton speech, in which he discussed a divided Europe in terms of power politics.

It was typical of Byrnes's line that he avoided using the jargon of power politics. He clearly tried deliberately to disassociate himself from the conventional language of debate referring to spheres of influence, buffer states or power circles, which after the First World War had taken on pejorative connotations. Nevertheless, avoiding power-political jargon or accepting the existence of power politics altogether became awkward when the power game between the great powers became more tense on several fronts. Byrnes considered that the United States had its own history in South America, and that the Soviet Union was carrying on the expansionary tradition of imperial Russia in the guise of security policy. The differences between the states of the inter-American system and, for instance, Bulgaria and Romania were in many cases shaky. The alliance politics practiced by the United States in its own backyard compromised the best opportunities for criticizing the motives of the Soviet security policy. After the publication of *Speaking Frankly*, the Associated Press posited that Byrnes had in fact confessed in his book to having been a party to the power-political game behind the dispute between the the Soviet Union and Britain over the division of Greece and Romania in 1944. Even if Byrnes did not mention spheres of influence, he had to accommodate himself to decisions made before his term as a Secretary of State. The percentage agreement between Stalin and Churchill in 1944 was one such arrangement which Byrnes considered obligatory in order to maintain peace in unstable areas. On the other hand, the grounds for the distribution of influence were part of the quid pro quo-based trade-off politics, whose principles even Byrnes had to later adopt.¹⁰⁷⁸

Returning to the question of research, it would be reasonable to claim that Byrnes practiced realpolitik by rising above party politics and striving for fast practical decisions while securing his own back by invoking the support of the people. The fluctuation in Byrnes's Soviet political line in particular could also be regarded as a maneuver of realpolitik. On the other hand, it was also a matter of systematic opportunism in maneuvering between different demands. Only Byrnes's actions in the fall of 1946 could be described as a prologue to the Cold War, but it was strongly influenced by Republican pressures and the impact of Churchill's speech on public opinion. Evidently, Liebknichtian realpolitik and politics that intentionally chilled the atmosphere between the great powers could no longer be regarded as mutually exclusive in the fall of 1946. In fact, with time they became interdependent, and they combined to lay the foundations for future American foreign policy. In the light of *Speaking Frankly*, Byrnes's role in this interdependence remains, maybe for tactical reasons, one that was determined by fate and democracy. When writing his memoirs in the spring of 1947, Byrnes observed power politics as a former Secretary of State and saw himself not so much as an isolator but as a unifier of the world.

¹⁰⁷⁸ BP. Series 10: Books, B1:F4, For Release for Morning Papers of October 18.

However, the problem with Truman's containment policies was, in Byrnes's view, that it sought to isolate rather than to extend cooperation. In *Speaking Frankly*, this is manifested in a relatively moderate criticism, which was directed not so much at the methodology of Truman's policies but at a development that would probably lead to a dead-end.

Seen as a cluster of ideas like *Staatsräson*, *Primat der Aussenpolitik* and *Politik ist eine Kunst des Möglichen*, it is justified to regard the concept of realpolitik as a feature of Byrnes's politics. The national interest appears in his foreign policy strongly in the shape of the United States' endurance and security. The reinforcement of endurance also involved ambitions to achieve growing prosperity and authority. However, the national interest never became an public goal of Byrnes's foreign policy as a whole. Rather, Byrnes situated "national interests" in his parlance in second place, right after "common peace efforts." On the other hand, he interpreted the national interest more widely than earlier, from the the point of view of the world economy, and he emphasized the significance of the end of isolation with regard to economic isolation as well. However, the Wilsonian momentum that had occurred after the First World War had replaced the notion of a balance between individual states with an idea of collective security, which was crystallized in the principles of the League of Nations. On the other hand, the League of Nations could be considered an unsuccessful endeavour in that it failed to persuade the separate states to recognize that it was not in their national to use force against each other. Even if Byrnes could be seen in this respect as an inheritor of Wilsonian idealism, his foreign political ideas became more affected by realistic elements which were based on the horrible mistakes in economic and power policies made after the First World War. As a realist, Byrnes regarded power politics as consisting in a constellation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the composition of which was defined by the national interests of both sides. The United States' interests were defined most clearly by the promotion of inter-American relations and effort to internationalize waterways and generally expand free trade. According to Byrnes's reading, the Soviet Union's national interest was related to Marxist-Leninist world revolution, regulation and control. In this respect, the abjuration of power politics was mere rhetoric.

In terms of the primacy of foreign policy, Byrnes's realpolitik is beyond dispute. Even if he had won his spurs in domestic policy before his secretaryship, the United States' adandonment of isolationism and entry into the Second World War made foreign policy the most important sector of government. First and foremost, the primacy of foreign politics was manifested in the bipartisan cooperation to isolate protect foreign relations from domestic and party political associations. Byrnes wanted to work above the actual field of politics in the name of American foreign policy. The permanent primacy of foreign policy was not, however, in any way assured. The death of President Roosevelt, the end of the war and the development of the peace process began to undermine the dominant role of foreign policy. In addition, new domestic problems relating to the return to a peace footing occurred in United States, and

they began to claim increased attention. During Byrnes period of office, the State Department managed to shield foreign policy from external influences until the electoral campaign of November 1946. Before the electioneering, Byrnes and Vandenberg had sworn to keep foreign political issues outside of normal election debates. Nevertheless, there was considerable gap between Byrnes's actual foreign policy and his representation of it at home, which had been handed down from the Roosevelt era. Like President Roosevelt, Secretary Byrnes tried to be a realist and an idealist at the same time, but his political high wire act became increasingly risky.

As an art of the possible, Byrnes's foreign policy was defined on the one hand by the Wilsonian ideals of attaining a stabilizing balance in the world and on the other hand by the undisputable superiority of the United States. The latter way of thinking was reasserted by a Rooseveltian heritage, whereby Americans should not fear anything but fear itself. Even if the national advantage of the United States really was congruent with that of the whole world in Byrnes's view, the art of the possible has to be regarded as involving the ability to discern certain interfaces which the Americans could reach by means of their foreign policy. However, the art of the possible obviously had palpable limitations. No real efforts to utilize atomic diplomacy, for instance, were ever actually made. The apparent reason was the conflict between the character of atomic diplomacy and an open foreign policy. Methodologically, atomic diplomacy would have meant a return to old-fashioned "secret diplomacy," which might have meant a serious setback to the peace process if it were leaked to the public. Despite some moral restraints, the art of the possible was embodied at its best in *quid pro quo* politics, in which the great powers considered and traded their advantages.

At the time of Byrnes's secretaryship, foreign policy was still produced by elites who "carried on the specific work of policy formulation and policy advocacy," as Gabriel Almond has put it.¹⁰⁷⁹ Indeed, the many forces hostile to the Soviet Union among the United States' political elite made compromises impossible. On a partisan political level, Republicans like Senator Vandenberg were the major opponents of Byrnes's policy of compromise. On a personal level, Byrnes had to compete for influence over the President. Inside the Democratic Party, Byrnes had to get along with Wallace and Truman, who had inherited their own elements of Roosevelt's legacy. In addition to all this, the foreign political power of the Congress and the Senate was about to increase dramatically. During the War, the role of the Congress in foreign policy had been limited because of Roosevelt's superiority and wartime secrecy. The end of the war restored the Senate's traditional authority in the formulation of foreign policy. This study suggests that until the Moscow Conference Byrnes had practically had a free hand in determining the direction of foreign policy toward the Russians. Prior to the Moscow meeting, Byrnes had been selling a policy of co-operation and compromise with the Soviets to Truman and also to

¹⁰⁷⁹ Almond 1960, p. 6.

American public opinion. After the Moscow Conference, Byrnes's foreign policy was caught in the crossfire on both partisan political and personal levels.

When examined after the fashion of Daniel Yergin, the parturition of the Cold War manifests itself as congruous with the axioms that defined the United States' line of foreign policy. As heuristic instruments, the Riga and Yalta axioms unquestionably defined the limits within which policies could operate. The Rooseveltian dualism of acting according to Wilsonian tradition in the homeland and between times executing traditional power politics abroad was even harder to put into action during the war than during peace. According to Yergin, it became harder to apply the Yalta axioms because of their ambiguity than the Riga axioms, which provided a clearer framework for perceiving and understanding what was happening on the world stage. The perception of Soviet expansionism was at variance with the Yalta axioms and the American commitment to Wilsonism. The character of the Soviet system became clearer during the spring of 1946, but no drastic change took place in the State Department. Despite the breach between the Secretary and the President and the Iranian Crisis, the changes in US foreign politics were insignificant.

In the United States, realpolitik became a reaction to Soviet actions during 1946, and the emphases it was given in public were adjusted by the leaders of foreign policy as necessary. During Byrnes's period in office, international tensions became tangible mostly because of Soviet actions but also as a result of the activities of "third parties" and even the United States itself. The descent into a state of cold war, where one crisis culminated in another between the internationally imperialist communism of the Soviet Union and America's Western-style democracy was not a totally involuntary process in the West either. According to Byrnes's memoirs, the dangers of such a development were recognized, but because earlier measures proved to be ineffective, the Americans were forced to act more high-handedly. In doing so, the United States once and for all gave up the Monroe Doctrine and set itself up as the bastion of Western democracy. After Byrnes, the Truman Doctrine was clearly a continuation of the former's policy of firmness and patience, although the ineffectiveness of the policy to be patched up. From this vantage point, Byrnes's decision to support the Republican candidate Eisenhower in his presidential campaigning seems more understandable, particularly when the deteriorating personal relations between Byrnes and Truman are taken into account. Looking at the matter retrospectively, one can also discern the basis of Eisenhower's and Dulles's domino theory in Truman's inadequate doctrine.

Unquestionably, there was a lot in common between Byrnes's line and Truman's later containment policy or Eisenhower's domino theory, but comparing his views with those of later actors in foreign policy involves a fallacy resulting from the dimension of historical interpretation. It is not possible to compare the ideas behind an operation or the operation itself as a part of an action-reaction chain that defined the whole power-political field with those of some other time or place. The foundation for a Soviet policy was certainly created in the course of Byrnes's secretaryship, but at the time when *Speaking Frankly* was written there existed neither the Democratic Republic of

Germany, communist China nor the Soviet atomic bomb. However, the non-existence of these factors, which were later central elements in the Cold War, does not preclude the possibility that some minor elements of the Cold War arose as a part of some sort of slow-developing process propelled by a certain momentum. Obviously, Byrnes's period in office played its own important role in the process which eventually led to a state of cold war. Even so, when seen in its past context, that role appears to have been more a matter of testing the waters in an explorative manner than provocation or purposeful aggression.

The relevance of Byrnes to research on the origins of the Cold War is, nevertheless, indisputable. Byrnes's era as Roosevelt's "assistant president" and Truman's Secretary of State happened at a time when the development of the Cold War was already stringly under way. In the light of the present study, Byrnes's position in the game of power politics appears to have been just as strong as that of his antagonist Molotov. In other respects, too, the field of power politics during that period came to resemble a game in which there were only two players left. The significance of Britain and France's significance decreased to almost nil, or they moved according to the directions of their big brothers. This happened mostly because of the impossibility of playing chess with three or more players. As in the game that had been played out in Yalta, the standard rules of the game were applied, but all disagreements were decided by a majority vote. Alliances were made in the political power game for strategic reasons, but they were invariably broken. Instead of the tricky alliances involved in Yalta, the game was played in a straightforward way with only two players during the Byrnes's era.

According to the present study, and contrary to the radical view presented for instance by Anne Deighton, the British government did not play a major role in clarifying and even shaping American foreign policy. Byrnes's days in the State Department did not turn into "a time of uncertainty in Washington," which made the British influence possible. The opening of this game actually reflected an unsatisfactory configuration round the table. The first moves demonstrated that the character of power politics had turned into a tactical race to decide how the world should be arranged after the Second World War. Maintaining the status quo and a refusal to play the game were equally inconceivable in the spring 1946. If Byrnes's tyactics had been initially aimed at maintaining the status quo, Molotov was in most cases ready for minor moves in order to test Byrnes's reactions. This led to the Americans becoming more active and making new moves. There were attempts to achieve rapprochement in many areas, and open conflict was avoided right up to the end by prevarication. When Byrnes stood down in January 1947, that strategy could no longer be taken for granted.

The hypothesis of an organic initial process and increasing momentum described in the first chapter of this study is reinforced. Considered purely from the point of view of structure, the movement on the political game board which led to the Cold War started during Byrnes period in the State Department. That movement consisted of a series of openings to explore the state of play. In the light of concrete indications like opinion polls and crises, a turning point or

shift in the process can clearly be discerned in the spring of 1946. The foundations for this movement were established when real disagreements came to a head in the London Meeting of Foreign Ministers in September 1945 or even perhaps already in Potsdam in the summer. However, it is futile to extend the process back in time to include Roosevelt-style foreign policy or, for example, to the time of the Yalta Conference. At that time, the field was about to take its Cold War form, but the field itself and the room for maneuver that it offered were still comprehensively determined by the heads of state of the great powers. For this study, the replacement of Roosevelt with the Byrnes-Truman duo could be considered the earliest possible time for a shift in the momentum, although, the earlier development was certainly relevant to the preliminary stage posited in the above-mentioned hypothesis.

The moving force or momentum behind the origins of the Cold War origins did not end with Byrnes's removal from the State Department. Approaches and moves continued to be restrained for quite a long time even after Byrnes's period. Contrary to the view of classical Cold War studies, Byrnes's actions do not warrant our talking about some kind of preliminary phase of the Cold War in 1946 or 1947, although the processes leading to it were already in motion. In this respect, it is of minor importance whether the Cold War is categorized as a war or not according to the perceptible confrontations or their degree of severity. As a phenomenon, the Cold War never became the kind of real war that might have been predicted up to the 1980s whenever a crisis erupted right. This was only realized at the end of the 1980s in the spirit of glasnost and perestroika, when the preceding four decades could be considered a historically long and stable period of peace. The collapse of the Soviet empire in the early 1990s removed the old dividing lines and swept the pieces off the board. The Cold War ended in the most unlikely way, without a third world war or even the slightest armed conflict between the real antagonists. In many ways it ended with a Soviet reassessment of the situation of the kind that Byrnes had hoped for.

Postrevisionist Cold War research would later suggest that Byrnes's period in the State Department never became the force that finally moved the situation towards the Cold War because no real belligerent confrontations occurred in it. On the contrary, the positions on the power-political game board remained mostly as before. On the other hand, it has been possible for current researchers to examine the phenomenon totally from an outsider's perspective, and however incident-free the period before the Cold War seems from today's perspective, the existence of a certain process leading to it cannot be ruled out. This study shows that during Byrnes's secretaryship configurations in the field of power politics were created that could not subsequently be dismantled. Behind the birth of these configurations lay a new implementation of realpolitik, which in the real world was manifested in a dialogue between the Soviets' security policies and Byrnes's foreign policy. The fact that the Cold War remained cold right until its end does not nullify this hypothesis. On the contrary, it emphasizes the possibility that Byrnes's realpolitik matched the

Russians move for move and that as a result the Cold War did not develop into a real war.

The question of those who were to blame for the Cold War and the organic initial processes behind the actual momentum leading to it involves a lot of unnecessary speculation about who actually "pulled the trigger" first. The same truth seems to hold for the beginning of the Cold War as for the beginnings of wars generally: one side throws down the gauntlet, and the other accepts the challenge. Even if there were no duelists in political spheres, Byrnes's period in office was crucial in the development towards the Cold War. The elements of the Cold War were founded on the inevitable collision of the political realism of both sides, and the origins of these elements as a *primus motor* of the Cold War should, in the view of the present writer, be located in Byrnes's period as a Secretary of State. The moving force behind the Cold War process thus seems to have been more a product of historical destiny than a historical truth that inculpates or exonerates either side.

The purpose of this study is a analysis of James F. Byrnes's pursuit of power policies from the perspectives of the origins of the Cold War and the concept of *realpolitik*. The results show that the hypothesis of the existence of a moving force behind the process leading to the Cold War is a valid one. Compared with the situation that preceded it, this process involved various operational configurations that were determined by the two superpowers' interpretations of the possibilities of *realpolitik*. In practice, the actual confrontation between different interpretations of *realpolitik* took place in the Council of Foreign Ministers. Byrnes's activities in power politics created and reinforced the configurations involved in the process in a kind of stalled game from which the pieces could no longer be withdrawn. An interpretation of Byrnes's political actions shows the origins of the Cold War mostly as a kind of farce, in which both sides very naively believed in the ability of *realpolitik* to produce peace arrangements. Thus the process was defined above all by a drift into an irreversible situation in the field of power politics.

Even if the practical maneuvers of *realpolitik* began to be clearly set on a collision course, the belief of the great powers in cooperation was still founded on an illusion of some sort of sense of moderation. Byrnes's illusion was underpinned above all by atomic diplomacy and publicity. In the case of Molotov, the illusion was based totally on his desire, motivated by considerations of security, to test the limits of Byrnes's illusions. The origins of the Cold War as a phenomenon of *realpolitik* were defined by the execution of *realpolitik* on the one hand as the art of the possible and on other hand as the art of the impossible. When the illusions were shattered, there was no point in striving for the impossible, but then nor was it enough to settle for the possible as the field of power politics offered new dimensions, for instance, in shape of filling power vacuums. *Realpolitik* did not permanently adopt either a Liebknechtian or a Bismarckian guise on either side; in practice its manifestations were determined by the changing state of play in the game of power politics. The connection between Byrnes's actions, *realpolitik* and the origins of the Cold War becomes evident as a type of game theory. Since

becoming involved in the game meant at the same time drifting into the Cold War, realpolitik and the transition to the Cold War became mutually sustaining elements. Byrnes's actions in this field offer a reason for a re-examination of the Cold War especially with regard to its timing, structure and causes - not from the perspective of postrevisionism but in the context of its own time. It is on these matters that this study offers the above-presented views.

FINNISH SUMMARY

Yhteenveto

Kylmän sodan synty reaalipoliittisena ilmiönä - James F. Byrnes suurvaltapolitiikan pelikentällä Jaltasta Stuttgartiin 1945-1947

Aihe ja tehtävänasettelu

Väitöskirjatyöni tavoitteena oli tarkastella James Francis Byrnesin roolia tarkkailijana ja toimijana toisen maailmansodan jälkeisessä suurvaltapolitiikassa Jaltan konferenssista hänen eroonsa ulkoministerin tehtävästä tammikuussa 1947. Tavoitetta lähestyttiin neljällä eri tasolla: 1) Byrnesin ulkopoliitiikan luonteen, 2) Liittoutuneiden diplomaattisten ja poliittisten suhteiden, 3) Yhdysvaltain sisä- ja puoluepolitiikan sekä yleisen mielipiteen ja 4) kylmän sodan synnyn historiografian perspektiiveistä. Tutkimuksen erityisenä tarkoituksena oli selvittää ulkoministeri Byrnesin roolia prosessissa, joka johti sodanaikaisen suurvaltayhteistyön muuttumiseen kylmäksi sodaksi. Puuttamalla varsinaiseen poliittiseen toimintaan pyrittiin tätä roolia aukaisemaan syventymällä reaalipoliitiikan problematiikkaan, jonka kylmän sodan tutkimus on usein sivuuttanut varsin ylimielisesti. Tähän liittyi myös kylmän sodan alun laajemman aatehistoriallisen kontekstin huomioiminen.

Tutkimuksen ydinkysymyksellä, "reaalipoliittikkaa vai kylmän sodan esi- näytöstä?", haluttiin Byrnesin poliittinen toimijuus puitteistaa klassisista historian- ja diplomatiantutkimuksen konventioista poiketen reaalipoliittikka- käsitteen kontekstiin. Reaalipoliittikka-käsitteen hyödyntäminen heuristisena välineenä osoittautui varsin hyödylliseksi politiikan muutoksen tutkimisessa, vaikka käsitteen käyttäminen Yhdysvaltain ulkopoliitiikan luonnehtijana sisälsi paljon sisällöllistä painetta sen yleisen, hyvin lavean tulkinnan vuoksi. Vanha teleologinen näkemys korosti menestystä politiikan ainoana kriteerinä ja se synnytti pohjan Otto von Bismarckin Saksaan vahvasti rinnastetulle ajattelulle politiikasta mahdollisuuksien taitona. Käytännössä tällä siis tarkoitettiin politiikan päämäärien tehokasta muuntumiskykyä, jotta asetetut päämäärät tulisivat varmasti saavutettaviksi. Väitöstutkimuksen kannalta reaalipoliittikka-aspektin bismarckilainen tulkinta ei kuitenkaan tarjonnut ainoaa ja totaalisen tyhjentävää ratkaisumallia. Toisen maailmansodan jälkeinen uusi maailmanjärjestys, suurvaltapolitiikka sekä Yhdysvaltain ja Neuvostoliiton eturistiriitojen paisuminen lopulta kylmäksi sodaksi olivat asioita, joiden valossa yksipuolinen reaalipoliittikka ei puhtaasti mahdollisuuksien taitona olisi ollut enää mahdollista.

Valtatyhjiöiden täyttymisen ja kylmän sodan näkökulmista suurvaltapolitiikalla pyrittiin saavuttamaan enemmän kuin mahdollista. Tässä valossa reaalipoliittikka oli motivoitavissa yhtä lailla niin mahdottoman kuin mahdollisen taitona. Ulkopoliitiikan muutoksen tarkastelun kannalta yksiselitteistä oli siis reaalipoliitiikan luonne nopeasti muuttuviin olosuhteisiin vas-

taamaan pyrkivänä ja tuloksia vaativana toimintana. Reaalipolitiikan erottelu sen tavoitteiden mahdollisuuden ja mahdottomuuden dimensioiden perusteella sisälsi paljon rinnasteisuutta harjoitetun ulkopolitiikan kulloiseenkin kurssiin eli käytännössä niihin toimiin ja reaktioihin suurvaltapolitiikassa, joita ei enää voitu pitää ulkopolitiikalle asetettujen tavoitteiden rajoissa ja jotka lopulta johtivat suurvaltojen väliseen konfliktiin.

Tutkimustavoitteiden kannalta keskeisimmät lähteet olivat Clemson University Libraryn erikoiskokoelmiin sijoitettu Byrnesin yksityisarkisto *Byrnes Papers* sekä Yhdysvaltain ulkoministeriön ja kongressin lähdesarjat *Congressional Record*, *Senate Miscellaneous Documents* ja *Documents on American Foreign Relations*. Lähinnä puheista, konferenssimuistiinpanoista ja henkilökohtaisesta kirjeenvaihdosta koostuva *Byrnes Papers* edustaa materiaalia, jonka avulla Byrnesin poliittista toimintaa pyrittiin hahmottamaan myös henkilöhistorillisesti. Byrnesin vuonna 1966 Clemsoniin lahjoittama aineisto käsittää kaikkiaan 4,63 kuutiometriä erilaista henkilökohtaista kirjallista materiaalia, mutta myös paljon toisen maailmansodan aikaista ulkopolitiikkaa ja taloutta käsitteleviä virallisia asiakirjoja. Kongressin, senaatin ja ulkoministeriön dokumenttien merkitys oli tämän tutkimuksen kannalta huomattava jo sellaisenaan ja niitä hyödynnettiin rinnan *Byrnes Papersin* kanssa. Tässä tutkielmassa James F. Byrnes sitoutui edellisten lähteiden rakentamaan kontekstiin myös omien muistelmiensa, vuonna 1947 ilmestyneen *Speaking Franklyn* ja 1958 julkaistun *All in One Lifetime* kautta. Muistelmien tarkastelu nosti esiin aspektin oman tarinan kertomisesta suhteessa kollektiiviseen ja historialliseen kadottamatta silti yksilöllistä identiteettiä. Molemmista tapauksista omasta eletystä elämästä kertovan tekstin tuottaminen oli kiistatta aktiivinen poliittinen teko, jolla osallistuttiin kamppailuun muistista ja historiankirjoituksesta.

Tutkimuksessa hyödynnetty muistelmien narratiivinen lukutapa pohjautui ajatukselle, jonka mukaan elämäkerta on aina kirjoitushetkellä tuotettu tulkinta elämästä. Tästä näkökulmasta kieli on läpinäkyvä todellisuuden kuvausväline. Omasta elämästä kertominen on käsitetty tapahtuvaksi jossakin historiallisessa, kulttuurisessa ja yhteiskunnallisessa kontekstissa, jolloin kerrontatapa on suhteessa kontekstiinsa. Kun esimerkiksi Byrnesin muistelmia tarkasteltiin kirjoittajansa aktiivisesti tuottamina kertomuksina ja siten myös poliittisina tekoina tai siirtoina, liittyi kysymys tarinan realismista kertojan valtasuhteisiin. Kuitenkaan realismin ja tekstuaalisuuden välille ei omaelämäkertojen tapauksessa muodostunut niin suurta jännitettä, etteikö niitä olisi voinut pitää vakavasti otettavana historiallisten lähteiden lajityyppinä.

Byrnesin politiikan luonne

Väitöstutkimuksen valossa Byrnesin politiikka erityisesti Neuvostoliittoa kohtaan oli hyvin aaltoilevaa. Syynä oli osaltaan hänen tavaramerkkinsä kansan ulkopolitiikka, joka vaati nopeaan mukautumiseen kansan yleiseen mielipiteeseen. Mielipidemittaukset ja lisäksi myös kovempaa Neuvostoliiton politiikkaa kannattaneet pääasiassa republikaaniset tahot pystyivät suoraan tai epäsuoraan vetoamaan kansan ulkopolitiikkaan ja siten muokkaamaan Byrnesin linjaa.

Usein prosessi käynnistyi lehdistön tai kriitikkojen kautta pakottaen ulkoministeriötä linjansa tarkistamiseen. Tästä näkökulmasta tarkastellen Byrnesin oli mahdollonta synnyttää luottamuksellista ja turvallista kokousilmapiiriä, joka vakiintuessaan olisi saattanut johtaa maltillisempaan tulevaisuuteen. Työrauhan puute ja erityisesti republikaanien johtohahmojen kiinnostus ulkopoliittikkaa kohtaan ilmeni Byrnesin muistelmissa katkeruutena ja taustalla jopa epäsuorina arvailuina vehkeilystä hänen selkänsä takana. Toisaalta ulkoministerikokousten aikakaudella suurvaltapolitiikan vaikuttajien määrä ja vaihtuvuus kasvoi, jolloin henkilökohtaisten suhteiden merkitys muuttui. Osansa oli myös sillä, että suurvaltapolitiikka siirtyi valtionpäämiehiltä alemmas ministeritasolle. Yhden henkilön toiminnalla piti laajalti huomiota saaneessa politiikassa olla yhä useampien varaukseton kannatus.

Kansan ulkopoliittikalla vaikutti eri lähteiden valossa kuitenkin olleen hieman erilaisia painotuksia. Muistelmissa Byrnesin henkilösuhteet erityisesti Molotoviin ja Beviniiin korostuivat muita dokumentteja syvemmin yksityisinä, varsin usein asiakysymysten ulkopuolisina, tulkintoina. Ristiriitatilanteisiin johtaneet syyt sen sijaan näyttäytyivät Byrnesin omissa teksteissä paremmin yksittäisiin henkilöihin sitoutuneina, kuin esimerkiksi ulkoministeriön lehdistötiedotteissa tai salaiseksi luokitellussa yksityiskirjeenvaihdossakaan annettiin ymmärtää. Tältä osin Byrnesin ulkoministerikaudella huipputason henkilökontakteissa kehittyneitä ristiriitoja ei voi perustellusti osoittaa asetetun asiakysymyksiin julkisesti tiivistettyjen ongelmien todellisiksi syiksi. Muiden dokumenttien perusteella sellaiseen olisi tuskin olisi ollut perusteltuja syitä, mutta mahdollisuuksia jonkinlaiselle henkilökohtaiselle provokaatiolle kylläkin löytyi. Toisaalta julkinen takertuminen huipputason henkilösuhteisiin olisi heikentänyt vakavasti koko suurvaltapolitiikan kestävyyttä ja muutoinkin asettunut ristiriitaan diplomatian luonteeseen kuuluvan riippumattomuuden kanssa.

Ainakin ulkoministeriuransa alkuvaiheessa Byrnesillä oli oma poliittinen linja, joka julkisuuden ja puoluepolitiikan myötä muuttui kansan ulkopoliittikaksi. Kuitenkin aika ajoin Byrnes yritti ottaa ohjat käsiinsä palaten taas ruotuun erityisesti senaattori-vahtikoiriensa Vandenbergin ja Connallyn avustuksella. Tämä taas edellytti osittaista irtautumista puoluekentästä, mikä jätti Byrnesiin ikuisen kahden puolueen miehen leiman. Mikäli Yhdysvaltojen ulkomaansuhteita sodan jälkeen leimasi erityinen Byrnesin ulkopoliittikka, oli se sitten reaalioliittista taiteilua julkisuuden, puoluepolitiikan ja ulkovaltojen ehdoilla. Se oli myös suurten vaihtelujen politiikkaa, jonka suurelta osin määritteli suhtautuminen Neuvostoliittoon. Byrnesin uralla ulkopoliitiikan käännepisteet osuivat Moskovan ulkoministerikokoukseen ja Stuttgartin puheeseen. Byrnesin näkökulmasta hänellä oli oma perustuslain, demokratian ja oikeuden rajaama ulkopoliittikka, muttei varsinaista ulkopoliittista linjaa. Jos joku tietty linja olisi ollut, olisi se ollut toisaalta kansan ulkopoliitiikan tai toisaalta ulkovaltojen toiminnan määrittelemän kehysten vaihteleva linja. Byrnes korosti usein asemaansa presidentin alaisena, mutta toimiessaan ulkoministerikokouksissa joutui hän väkisin tekemään huomattavia spontaaneja päätöksiä koko maan puolesta. Itselleen Byrnes oikeutti tämän muistelmissaan vankkumattomalla

uskollaan oikeaan, mutta kieltäytyi kommentoimasta niistä ajoittain aiheutuneita presidentti Trumanin nuhteluita.

Byrnesin muistelmien lukijalle hänen linjansa vaihtelu näyttäytyy mielipidemittausten myötä demokratian ihanteiden täydellistymänä, jossa politiikko toimi kansan mielipiteen mukaisesti. Oletus yleisen mielipiteen ja ulkopoliittikan johdon välisestä kaksisuuntaisesta vuorovaikutuksesta sisältää kuitenkin mahdollisuuden, ettei harjoitettu ulkopoliittinen linja ollut pelkästään alhaalta ylöspäin suuntautunutta kansan ilmaisemaa tahtoa. Kun suuria päätöksiä tehtiin edelleen hyvin suljettujen ovien takana, oli merkittävässä asemassa olevalla poliitikolla joskus jopa yksinoikeutettu mahdollisuus muokata julkisuuteen konferensseista vietävää kuvaa. Muistelmissaan Byrneskään ei tuntenut syyllisyyttä esimerkiksi pyrkiessään kiristämään Mark Ethridgen Balkanin raportin julkaisemisella Molotovia tai hyödyntämään Neuvostoliiton Iranin politiikan saamaa julkisuuskuvaa YK:ssa. Rooseveltin aikaan tämänkaltaisia mahdollisuuksia tuskin tarvitsi käyttää, mutta ilmapiirin kiristyessä kynnyks hyödyntää demokratian menettelytapoja laski. Selvästi sekä Iranin kriisi että Byrnesin Stuttgartin puhe olivat ulkovaltojen ohella yhä suuremmassa määrin suunnattu myös tavallisille amerikkalaisille, joille viestitettiin sodanjälkeisen maailman tilannetta. Neuvostoliitossa tälle ei ollut tarvetta, mutta julkisuudesta tulikin lähes ainoa hermosodan väline, jossa se jäi lopullisesti jälkeen.

Toisaalta Byrnesin ulkopoliittiselle linjalle oli leimallista voimapoliittisten puhetapojen välttely, jotka ainakin Rooseveltin mukaan oli haudattu jo Jaltassa. Selkeän tietoisesti Byrnes pyrki julkisuudessa irrottautumaan vaikutusvaltakenttiin, valtatyhjiöihin, valtapiireihin ja puskurivaltioihin liittyvistä puhe tavoista ja viittauksista, joilla oli jo ensimmäisen maailmansodan jälkeen ollut huono sävy. Kuitenkin voimapoliittisen puheen välttely tai itse voimapolitiikan olemassaolon hyväksyminen vaikeutui suurvaltojen välisen valtapelin selkeytyessä eri rintamalla. Yhdyvalloilla oli oma historiansa Etelä-Amerikassa ja Neuvostoliiton tiliin lukeutui ainakin Byrnesin silmin keisarillisen Venäjän ekspanssiivinen perinne sekä Neuvostoliiton turvallisuuspolitiikkaansa verhoama valtapolitiikka. Interamerikkalaiseen järjestelmään kuuluvien valtojen erot esimerkiksi Bulgariaan ja Romaniaan osoittautuivat monin paikoin kiusallisen häilyviksi. Ainakin Yhdysvaltain omalla takapihallaan harjoittama liittoutumispolitiikka söi terävimmät aseet Neuvostoliiton turvallisuuspolitiikan kritiikiltä. *Speaking Franklyn* ilmestymisen jälkeen The Associated Press tulkitsi Byrnesin tunnustaneen kirjassaan voimapoliittisen pelin, jonka taustalla olisi ollut Britannian ja Neuvostoliiton Kreikan ja Romanian jakamisesta vuodelta 1944. Vaikka Byrnes ei kirjassaankaan maininnut mitään suoranaisesti vaikutusvaltapiireistä, joutui hän omassa politiikassaan kiistatta sopeutumaan myös omaa ulkoministerinuraansa edeltäneisiin voimapoliittisiin järjestelyihin. Näihin kuului myös Churchillin ja Stalinin välinen prosenttisopimus vuodelta 1944, jota Byrnes piti epämuodollisena ja välttämättömänä toimena saavuttaa järjestystä sekavilla alueilla. Toisaalta vaikutusvallan jakoperusteet olivat osa *quid pro quo* -perusteista vaihtokauppapolitiikkaa, jonka periaatteet myös Byrnes joutui myöhemmin omaksumaan.

Reaalipolitiikan näkökulma

Tutkimuksen valossa osoittautui, että Byrnes harjoitti reaalipolitiikkaa nousamalla puoluekentän yläpuolelle ja pyrkimällä nopeisiin käytännön päätöksiin turvaamalla taustansa kansan tuella. Reaalipolitiikan eri aspekteja ilmensi myös Byrnesin linjan aaltoilu erityisesti suhtautumisessa Neuvostoliittoon. Toisaalta Byrnesin toiminnan aaltoilu taas oli järjestelmällistä opportunistia erilaisten vaatimusten miellyttämisen välillä. Kylmän sodan esinäytökseksi Byrnesin toimintaa voisi kuvailla vain syksyn 1946 tapahtumien osalta. Toisaalta siihen oli paljon vaikutusta republikaanien painostuksella ja keväisen Churchillin puheen heijastumilla yleiseen mielipiteeseen. Selvästikään reaalipolitiikkaa ja tavoitteellista viilenevään suurvaltailmapiiriin suuntaavaa politiikkaa ei enää syksyn 1946 osalta voi pitää toisiaan poissulkevinä suuntina. Oikeastaan niistä tuli ajan mittaan yhä enemmän toisistaan riippuvia ilmiöitä, joiden yhteydellä oli keskeinen merkitys Trumanin presidenttikauden loppuajan ja tulevien kylmän sodan presidenttien politiikassa. *Speaking Franklyn* näkökulmasta Byrnesin rooli tässä riippuvuussuhteessa jäi kuitenkin, kenties taktisesti, lähinnä kohtalon ja demokratian määräämäksi. Vuoden 1947 kevään perspektiivistä suurvaltapolitiikkaa entisenä ulkoministerinä tarkkaillut Byrnes ei niinkään nähnyt itseään maailman eristäjänä vaan yhdistäjänä. Kuitenkin Trumanin patoamispolitiikan ongelma oli Byrnesinkin näkökulmasta enemmänkin juuri eristävä kuin yhteistyötä laajentava. *Speaking Franklyssa* tämä ilmeni suhteellisen heikkona kriittisyytenä ja silloinkin vain sen todennäköisesti umpikujaan johtavan tulevaisuuden – ei niinkään metodologian vuoksi.

Sellaisten reaalipolitiikan traditioon liittyvien ideoiden, kuten *Staatsräson*, *Primat der Aussenpolitik* ja *Politik is eine Kunst des Möglichen*, perspektiiveistä tarkasteltuna reaalipoliittisuus oli Byrnesin politiikalle perusteltu ominaisuus. Kansallinen etu näyttäytyi hänen ulkopoliitikassaan vahvana Yhdysvaltain säilyvyyden ja turvallisuuden muodossa. Selviytymisen vahvistamiseen liittyivät myös pyrkimykset tavoitella vaurauden ja vallan kasvua. Kansallinen etu ei kuitenkaan noussut ulkopoliitiikan ulkoiseksi päämääräksi. Sen sijaan puhetavoissaan Byrnes sijoitti kansalliset edut toiselle sijalle yleisten rauhanpönistelijän jälkeen. Toisaalta hän tulkitsi kansallista etua aikaisempaa laajemmin maailmantalouden näkökulmista ja korosti isolaatiopolitiikan päättymistä myös taloudellisen isolaation osalta. Toisaalta ensimmäisen maailmansodan jälkeinen wilsonilainen momentum oli korvannut ajatuksen yksittäisten valtioiden etujen tasapainosta idealla kollektiivisesta turvallisuudesta, joka kiteytyi Kansainliiton periaatteissa. Osaltaan Kansainliiton saattoi Byrnesin silmin nähdä epäonnistuneen juuri erillisten kansojen vaikeutena tunnistaa kansallista intresseistään perusteita, jotka estäisivät niitä käyttämästä voimaa toisiaan vastaan. Vaikka Byrnesiä voikin tässä suhteessa pitää wilsonilaisen idealismin perillisenä, liittyi hänen ulkopoliittiseen ajatteluunsa yhä enemmän sellaisia realistisia aineksia, joiden perusta oli ensimmäisen maailmansodan jälkeen tehdyissä suurvalta- ja talouspoliittisissa virheissä. Realistina Byrnes ymmärsi Neuvostoliiton ja Yhdysvaltain varaan rakentuneen suurvaltapolitiikan konstellaationa,

jonka koostumusta määrittivät kummankin osapuolen kansalliset intressit. Yhdysvaltain intressejä määrittivät selkeimmin interamerikkalaiset suhteet, vesireittien kansainvälistäminen ja laajemmin vapaan kaupan laajentaminen. Neuvostoliitossa kansallinen etu liittyi ainakin Byrnesin tulkitsemana marxilais-leninistiseen maailmanvalloitukseen, sääntelyyn ja hallintaan. Tässä suhteessa irrottautumisella voimapolitiittisista äänenpainoista oli pelkästään retorinen merkitys.

Ulkopolitiikan ensisijaisuuden suhteen Byrnesin reaalipoliittisuus oli kiistatonta. Vaikka Byrnes olikin ansioitunut ennen ulkoministerin uraansa Yhdysvaltain sisäpolitiikassa, tekivät irtautuminen isolaatiopolitiikasta ja liittyminen maailmansotaan ulkopoliitikasta tärkeimmän osa-alueen. Ennen kaikkea ulkopoliitiikan ensisijaisuus näkyy kaksipuolueyhteistyön korostumisena, jolla ulkopoliittikka rauhoitettiin sisä- ja puoluepoliittisista kytkennöistä. Poliittisen kentän yläpuolella Byrnes halusi toimia amerikkalaisen ulkopoliitiikan nimissä. Kysymys ulkopoliitiikan pysyvistä ensisijaisuudesta ei kuitenkaan ollut millään tavoin varmaa. Presidentti Rooseveltin kuolema, sodan päättyminen ja edistys rauhanprosesseissa alkoivat vähentää tarvetta ulkopoliitiikan erillisaseman säilyttämiselle. Lisäksi amerikkalaisille alkoi ilmetä uusia rauhaan palaamiseen liittyviä kotimaisia ongelmia, jotka vaativat huomiota. Byrnesin ulkoministerikaudella ulkopoliittikka onnistuttiin rauhoittamaan vielä marraskuun 1946 vaalitaisteluun, jossa Byrnes ja Vandenberg olivat vannoneet puuttumattomuuttaan ulkopoliittisiin kysymyksiin osana vaalitaistelua. Silti Byrnesin ulko- ja sisäpolitiikan välillä oli huomattava kuilu, jonka hän oli perinyt Rooseveltin politiikasta. Kuten presidentti Roosevelt, myös ulkoministeri Byrnes yritti olla samanaikaisesti realistinen ja idealistinen, mutta Byrnesin poliittisesta nuorallatanssista oli tullut yhä riskialttiimpaa.

Mahdollisen taitona Byrnesin ulkopoliittikkaa määrittivät toisaalta wilsonilaiset ihanteet koko maailmaa stabiloivan tasapainon saavuttamisesta ja toisaalta Yhdysvaltain kiistaton ylivoima maailmassa. Jälkimmäistä ajattelua vahvisti rooseveltiläinen perintö, jonka mukaan amerikkalaisilla ei olisi muuta pelättävää kuin pelko itse. Mikäli Yhdysvaltain kansallinen etu todellakin oli Byrnesin mielestä yhtenevä koko maailman edun kannalta, oli mahdollisen taito tulkittava ominaisuutena hahmottaa rajapintoja, joihin amerikkalaiset voisivat ulkopoliittikkallaan päästä. Mahdollisen taidolla oli kuitenkin ilmeiset rajoituksensa. Todellisia yrityksiä hyödyntää esimerkiksi atomidiplomatiaa ei oikeastaan koskaan tapahtunut. Syynä oli mitä ilmeisimmin atomidiplomatian ja avoimen ulkopoliitiikan välinen ristiriita. Menetelmällisesti atomidiplomatia olisi merkinnyt paluuta vanhaan salaiseen diplomatiaan, jonka vuotaminen julkisuuteen olisi merkinnyt potentiaalista takaiskua rauhanprosessille. Moraalisista rajoitteista huolimatta mahdollisuuden taito realisoitui parhaimmillaan quid pro quo -politiikassa, jossa suurvallat punnitsivat ja vaihtoivat etuukseen.

Yhdysvalloissa reaalipoliitikasta tuli vuoden 1946 mittaan paljolti reaktiota Neuvostoliiton toiminnalle, jonka painotuksia julkisuudessa säädeltiin tarvittaessa ulkopoliitiikan huipulta. Byrnesin ulkoministerikaudella kansainvälinen tilanne alkoi jännittyä suurelta osin Neuvostoliiton, mutta myös Yhdysvaltain ja "kolmansien osapuolien" toiminnan aikaansaannoksena. Ajautuminen kyl-

män sodan tilaan, missä kriisit kasaantuivat Neuvostoliiton edustaman internationaalisen-imperialistisen kommunismin ja Yhdysvaltain länsimaisen demokratian välille, ei ollut täysin tahdosta riippumaton prosessi lännessäkään. Byrnesin muistelmien tarjoamasta perspektiivistä tämän kehitysprosessin vaarat oli tunnistettu, mutta aikaisempien keinojen osoittautuessa tehottomiksi Yhdysvallat oli pakotettu kovempiin otteisiin. Samalla Yhdysvallat irrotettiin lopullisesti Monroen opista tehden maasta maailman länsimaisen demokratian etuvartion. Trumanin opista tulikin Byrnesin jälkeen selkeä lujuuden ja kärsivällisyyden politiikan jatkaja, jonka tuli paikata sen tehottomuus. Tästä näkökulmasta katsoen Byrnesin siirtyminen republikaaneja edustaneen Eisenhowerin kannattajaksi saa heikentyneiden Byrnesin ja Trumanin henkilösuhteiden ohella lisäselvitystä. Olihan Eisenhowerin ja Dullesin dominoteorian perusta niin ikään tehottomaksi osoittautuneen Trumanin opin parantamisessa.

Kieltämättä Byrnesin ajatuksissa on paljon yhtäläisyyksiä myöhempiin Trumanin patoamispolitiikkaan ja Eisenhowerin dominoteoriaan, mutta hänen näkemystensä vertaaminen myöhempiin ulkopoliittikan toimijoihin sisältää paljon historiantulkinnan ulottuvuudesta johtuvaa harhaa. Toiminnan taustalla olleita ajatuksia ja varsinaista toimintaa osana koko kenttää määritellyttä aktio-reaktio-ketjua on mahdotonta rinnastaa mihinkään muuhun aikaan tai paikkaan. Byrnesin aikana luotiin kyllä pohja voimakkaalle Neuvostoliiton poliittikalle, mutta *Speaking Frankly* kirjoitettaessa ei ollut Saksan demokraattista tasavaltaa, kommunistista Kiinaa, Natoa eikä Yhdysvaltain atomi-asemonopolille näkynyt haastajia. Näiden kaltaisten kylmää sotaa myöhemmin määrittäneiden instituutioiden olemassaolo ei kuitenkaan sulje pois mahdollisuutta kylmän sodan aineettomien komponenttien syntymiselle tai teorialle sen alkamisesta eräänlaisen momentumin tuloksena. Byrnesin ulkoministerikaudella oli suurvaltasuhteiden kylmenemiseen johtaneessa kehityksessä oma merkittävä roolinsa, joka käytännön tasolla ja omaan menneisyyteensä peilattuna jää enemmänkin enemmänkin tunnustelevalle ja varovaisen reaktiiviseksi kuin provo-soivaksi tai tahallisen aggressiiviseksi.

Kylmän sodan alun tutkimukseen Byrnesin merkitys on joka tapauksessa kiistaton. Byrnesin aika presidentti Rooseveltin ”apulaispresidenttinä” ja Trumanin ulkoministerinä osuivat sellaiseen hetkeen, jolloin kylmän sodan kehitys oli voimakkaassa kasvussa. Mikäli Byrnesin taktiikkana tällä kentällä olikin aluksi stabiliteetti ja liikkumattomuus, oli Molotov valmis useimmiten pieniin siirtoihin tarkistaakseen vastapuolen reaktiot. Kokeilu johti Yhdysvaltainkin aktivoitumiseen ja uusiin siirtoihin. Lähestymisiä tehtiin monin paikoin, mutta avoimeen konfliktiin ajautumista vältettiin viimeisen saakka pyrkimällä jäädyt-tämään pelitilanne.

Vaikka reaali politiikan käytännön linjat alkoivat ollakin selkeällä törmäyskurssilla, perustui usko suurvaltojen yhteistoimintakykyyn illuusion jonkinlaisesta kohtuullisuudentajusta. Byrnesin illuusiota tukivat erityisesti atomidiplomatia ja julkisuus. Molotovilla illuusio perustui lähes täysin turvallisuusajattelun motivoimaan kokeilunhaluun Byrnesin illuusioiden asettamia rajoja kohtaan. Kylmän sodan syntyä reaali poliittisena ilmiönä määritteli oikeastaan juuri reaali politiikan siirtäminen käytäntöön toisaalta mahdollisen toi-

saalta mahdottoman taitona. Illuusioiden hajotessa mahdottomaan ei kannattanut pyrkiä, mutta toisaalta mahdolliseen tyytyminen ei riittänyt pelikentän tarjotessa vielä uusia ulottuvuuksia esimerkiksi valtatyhjiöiden täyttämisen muodossa. Reaalipolitiikka ei pysyvästi asemoitunut kummaltakaan puolelta sen enempää liebknechtiläiseen kuin bismarckilaiseenkaan lähtöasetelmaan, vaan käytännössä sen funktioita määritteli suurvaltapoliittisen kentän muuttuva pelitilanne. Byrnesin toiminnan, reaalipolitiikan ja kylmän sodan synnyn yhteyttä leimaa juuri eräänlainen peliteoria. Kun peliin ajautuminen merkitsi samalla myös ajautumista kylmään sotaan, tuli reaalipolitiikasta ja siirtymisestä kylmään sotaan toisiaan vahvistavia elementtejä. Byrnesin toiminta tässä pelikentässä antaa aihetta kylmän sodan alun tarkastelemiseen uudelleen ainakin sen ajoituksen, rakenteen ja syiden osalta – ei uudelleenharkintaa pursuavan jälkirevisionismin vaan ajanjakson omien ehtojen sanelemasta näkökulmasta.

REFERENCES

Primary sources

Archives

- BP: Byrnes Papers. Mss 90, James F. Byrnes Papers, Strom Thurmond Institute, Clemson University Libraries, Clemson, SC 29634.
- Series 4: War Mobilization Material. October 15, 1942 - April 2, 1945. Row 50, Shelves 9-11.
 - Series 5: State Department Materials. July 3, 1945 - January 21, 1947. Row 50, Shelves 12-15.
 - Series 6: Interim Materials. 1947 - January 1951. Row 50, Shelves 16-18.
 - Series 9: Speeches. Ca. 1910 - November 26, 1966; Undated. Row 44, Shelves 2-4.
 - Series 10: Book Materials. 1947, 1958. Row 44, Shelf 5.
 - Series 11: Posthumous series. 1969-1981, 1988, bulk 1972-1973.
- CUOHROC: The Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection. Butler Library, New York, NY 10027.
- TL: Truman Library, Oral History Interviews. Harry S. Truman Library and Museums. 500 W. US Hwy. 24. Independence MO 64050.

Printed documents

- CPD: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957.
- CR: U. S. Congress, *Congressional Record*. 79th through 80th Congress, Volumes 91-93. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1945-1947.
- DAFR 1945-1946: Raymond Dennet and Robert K. Turner (ed.), *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. VIII, July 1, 1945-December 31, 1946. Massachusetts: The Norwood Press, Norwood, 1948.
- FRUS 1944: Foreign Relations of the United States 1944.
Conferences of Malta and Yalta 1945. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1955.
- FRUS 1945: Foreign Relations of the United States 1945.
Volume I, General: The United Nations. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1967.
Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1967.
Volume V, Europe. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1967.

- FRUS 1946: Foreign Relations of the United States 1946.
Volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1970.
Volume IV, Paris Peace Conference: Documents. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1970.
- PPP: *Public papers of the Presidents of the United States; Harry S. Truman.* 1945: containing the public messages, speeches, and statements of the President, April 12 to December 31, 1945. Washington (D.C.): United States Government Printing Office, 1961.
- PWW: *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson.* (ed. Arthur S. Link). Vol. 46, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- THE QUARTER'S POLLS: *The Quarter's Polls* [AIPO, BIPO, NORC, FOR]. Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 10, issues 1-4 (1944-1946).
- SMD: U. S. Senate, *Senate Miscellaneous Documents.* 79th Congress, Second Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947.
- STALIN 1950: From the Pamphlet Collection, J. Stalin, *Speeches Delivered at Meetings of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District, Moscow.* Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950.

Memoirs

- ACHESON 1987: Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation – My Years in the State Department.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987.
- BOHLEN 1973: Charles Bohlen, *Witness to History: 1929-1969.* New York: Norton, 1973.
- BYRNES 1947: James Francis Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly.* New York: Harper, 1947.
- BYRNES 1958: James Francis Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime.* New York: Harper, 1958.
- TRUMAN 1955a: Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: 1, Years of decisions.* New York: Garden City, 1955.
- TRUMAN 1955b: Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: 2, Years of trial and hope.* New York: Garden City, 1955.

Print media

- THE EVENING INDEPENDENT: *The Evening Independent* 1945.
- THE NEW YORK TIMES: *The New York Times* 1945-1955.
- TIME: *Time*, 1943-1946.
- TRIBUNE: *Tribune*, Great Britain, London, 1941-1945.

Internet sources

- BYRNESSCHOLARS:
<http://www.byrnessscholars.org> (1.11.2011).

INTERNET ARCHIVE, UNIVERSAL NEWSREELS:

http://www.archive.org/details/universal_newsreels (1.11.2011).

REPORT BY JAMES F. BYRNES:

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/20th.htm> (1.11.2011).

U.S. CONGRESSIONAL ARCHIVES [U. S. C. A.]:

<http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/bibdisplay.pl?index=B001215>;
(1.11.2011); <http://www.lpitr.state.sc.us/byrnes.htm> (1.11.2011).

Secondary sources

- ADAMS 1993: R. J. Q. Adams, *British politics and foreign policy in the age of appeasement, 1935–1939*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.
- ALDCROFT 1977: Derek H. Aldcroft, *From Versailles to Wall Street 1919–1929*. Great Britain: Billing & Sons Ltd, 1977.
- ALMOND 1960: Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*. New York: Frederik A. Praeger, 1960.
- ALPEROVITZ 1965: Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam*. New York: Penguin books, 1985.
- ALPEROVITZ 1985: Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam : the use of the atomic bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet power*. New York: Penguin books, 1985.
- ARENS 2006: Olavi Arens, Wilson, Lansing ja Hoover – Amerika välispoliitika ja eesti riigi tekkimine. *Acta Historica Tallinnensia*, issue 10/2006.
- AUSTIN 1962: J. L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
- AUSTIN 1965: J. L. Austin, *How to do things with words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- BARDES, SHELLEY, SCHMIDT 1990: Barbara A. Bardes, Mark C. Shelley II, Steffen W. Schmidt, *American Government and Politics Today: The Essentials*, Third Edition. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1990.
- BEISNER 2006: Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson – A Life in the Cold War*. USA: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- BEMIS 1957: Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, fourth edition. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957.
- BEMIS 1959: Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Short History of American Policy and Diplomacy*. New York: Holt-Droyden Book, 1959.
- BEREZHKOV 1987: Valentin Berezkhov, *Näin tehtiin historiaa*. Neuvostoliitto: SN-Kirjat Oy, 1987.
- BERNSTEIN 1975: Barton J. Bernstein, “Roosevelt, Truman and the Atomic Bomb 1941–1945: A Reinterpretation”. *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. XC, Issue 1, Spring 1975.
- BEVIR 2000: Mark Bevir, Meaning and Intention: A Defense of Procedural Individualism. *New Literary History* 31.3 (2000).
- BORHI 2004: Borhi, László. *Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956*. Central European University Press 2004.

- BRINKLEY, CURRENT, FREIDEL, WILLIAMS 1991: Alan Brinkley et al., *American History – A Survey*, eight edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991.
- BROWN 1992: Walter J. Brown, *James F. Byrnes of South Carolina: a remembrance by Walter J. Brown*. USA: Mercer University Press, 1992.
- BULLOCK 1983: Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin – foreign secretary 1945–1951*. Suffolk: Bury St. Edmunds, 1983.
- BUZAN 1998: Barry Buzan, *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Boulder: Rienner, 1998.
- CLARK 1980: Stuart Clark, *Inversion, Misrule and the Meaning of Witchcraft. Past and Present*, No. 87 (May, 1980).
- COCHRAN 2001: Augustus B. Cochran III, *Democracy Heading South – National Politics in the Shadow of Dixie*. USA: University Press of Kansas, 2001.
- COLLINGWOOD 1951: R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea Of History*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951.
- CONOVER 1978: Denise O’Neal Conover, *James F. Byrnes, Germany and the Cold War, 1946*. Washington: Washington State University, 1978.
- COTTAM 1988: Richard W. Cottam, *Iran and the United States – A Cold War Case Study*. United States of America: Feffer and Simons, Inc., 1988.
- CULVER & HYDE 2000: John C. Culver, John Hyde, *American Dreamer: A Life of Henry A. Wallace*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000.
- CURRY 1965: George Curry, *The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy*, vol. XIV. New York: Cooper Square Publishers Inc., 1965.
- DALLIN 1947: Alexander Dallin, “America Trough Soviet Eyes”. *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. XI, Issue 1, Spring 1947.
- DEIGHTON 1990: Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
- DENNETT & HAUGELAND 1987: Daniel C. Dennet and John Haugeland, in R. L. Gregory, ed., *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*. Oxford University Press, 1987.
- DEWEY 2006: John Dewey, *Julkinen toiminta ja sen ongelmat*. Tampere: Vastapaino, 2006.
- DIAMOND 1943: William Diamond, *The Economic Thought of Woodrow Wilson. Studies in history and political sciences*, Vol 61, no. 4. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1943.
- DILULIO 1992: John J. Dilulio Jr, *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Autumn, 1992).
- DODD 1923: William E. Dodd, *Wilsonism. Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 38, No. 1 (Mar., 1923).
- DOLL 2005: Natascha Doll, *Recht, Politik und 'Realpolitik' bei August Ludwig von Rochau (1810–1873): Ein wissenschaftsgeschichtlicher Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Politik und Recht im 19. Jahrhundert*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005.
- DONNELLY 1965: Desmond Donnelly, *Struggle for the World: The Cold War and Its Causes*. London: St. Martin’s Press, 1965.

- EISENBERG 1996: Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line – The American decision to divide Germany 1944–1949*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- EMILIANI 2005: Alberto Emiliani, "On Mind and Sensations. G. H. Von Wright's Last Philosophical Journey". *Acta Philosophica Fennica vol. 77*. Helsinki: Hakapaino Oy, 2005.
- FEIS 1957: Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace they Sought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- FERGUSON 2006: Niall Ferguson, *The War of The World – Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West*. New York: Penguin Press, 2006.
- FLEMING 1961: Denna Frank Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917–1950*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961.
- GADDIS 1972: John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- GADDIS 1978: John Lewis Gaddis, *Russia, The Soviet Union, and The United States*. New York 1978.
- GADDIS 1987: John Lewis Gaddis, *Long Peace – Inquiries Into The History of The Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- GADDIS 1997: John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know – Rethinking Cold War History*. New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 1997.
- GADDIS 2005: John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War – A New History*. New York: Penguin Press, 2005.
- GARDNER 1965: Brian Gardner, *Toisen maailmansodan loppunäytös 1945*. Porvoo: WSOY, 1965.
- GARDNER 1994: Lloyd C. Gardner, *Spheres of Influence – The Great Powers Partition Europe, From Munich to Yalta*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994.
- GELERNTER 2007: David Gelernter, *Americanism: The Fourth Great Western Religion*. Bantam Dell, 2007.
- GIMBEL 1972: John Gimbel, "On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: An Essay on U.S. Postwar German Policy". *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. LXXXVII, No. 2., June 1972.
- GORRA 1995: Michael Gorra, "The Autobiographical Turn". *Transition*, No. 68 (1995).
- GRAEBNER 1962: Norman A. Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy. 1945–1960*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.
- GRAEBNER 1969: Norman A. Graebner, "Cold War Origins and the Continuing Debate". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 13, No. 1, Marsh 1969.
- GRELE 2007: Ronald J. Grele, "Oral History as Evidence". In book: *History of Oral History: Foundation and Methodology* (eds. Thomas L. Charlton, Lois E. Myers, and Rebecca Sharpless). Lanham (MD): Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
- GUARALDO 2001: Olivia Guaraldo, *The Concept of Objectivity in Max Weber*. In book *Dis-Embalming Max Weber* (eds. Pertti Ahonen & Kari Palonen). Jyväskylä: Kopijyvä Ltd., 2001.

- HALLE 1967: Louis B. Halle, *The Cold War as History*. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.
- HARBUTT 1982: Fraser Harbutt, "American Challenge, Soviet Response: The Beginning of the Cold War, February–May 1946". *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. XCVI, Issue 4, Winter 1981–1982.
- HARRIBY 1999: Alonzo L. Harriby, "Progressivism: A Century of Change and Rebirth," in *Progressivism and the New Democracy*, eds. Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999.
- HARTZ 1955: Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America – An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955.
- HASLAM 2003: Jonathan Haslam, "The Cold War as History". *The Annual Review of Political Science*, No. 6, 2003.
- HAUGSE & HILL 1952: Eugene Haugse, Norman Hill, "Our Bipartisan Foreign Policy". *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 14, Issue 3, Aug. 1952.
- HERKEN 1988: Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon, The Atomic Bomb in The Cold War 1945–1950*. Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- HERRING 2008: George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower – U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*. USA: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- HESS 1974: Gary R. Hess, "The Iranian Crisis of 1945–1946 and the Cold War". *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. LXXXIX, Issue 1, Mar. 1974.
- HILLMAN & WAGG 1952: William Hillman, Alfred Wagg, *Mr. President*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1952.
- HINTIKKA 1975: Jaakko Hintikka, *The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975.
- HIRSCHMAN 1991: Albert O. Hirschman, *The Rhetoric of Reaction*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991.
- HOLBORN 1960: Hajo Holborn, Bismarck's Realpolitik. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan. – Mar., 1960).
- HYRKKÄNEN 2002: Markku Hyrkkänen, *Aatehistorian mieli*, Tampere: Osuuskunta vastapaino, 2002.
- HYVÄRINEN 1998: Hyvärinen, Matti: *Lukemisen neljä käännettä*. In book Hyvärinen, M. & al (eds.): *Liikkuvat erot: Sukupuoli elämäkertatutkimuksessa*. Tampere: Vastapaino, 1998.
- IRISH 1948: Marian D. Irish, "Foreign Policy and South". *The Journal of Politics*, Volume 10, Issue 2, May 1948.
- JULKUNEN 2006: Jaro Julkunen, Lovejoylainen dekonstruktio 70 vuotta. *Ennen & nyt – historian tietosanomat*, Numero 1/2006.
- KARL 1976: John Francis Karl, *Compromise or Confrontation: James F. Byrnes and United States' Policy Toward the Soviet Union, 1945–1946*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto, 1976.
- KENNY 1969: Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will*. London: Lowe & Brydone, 1969.
- KERO 1991: Reino Kero, *Uuden maailman jättiläinen: Yhdysvaltain historia*. Helsinki: Otava, 1991.

- KISHLANSKY 1995: Mark A. Kishlansky (ed.), *Sources of World History*. New York: Harper Collins, 1995.
- KLEHR & RADOSH 1996: Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, *The Amerasia spy case: prelude to Mc Carthyism*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
- KOIKKALAINEN & SYRJÄMÄKI 2001: Petri Koikkalainen ja Sami Syrjämäki, Menneisyyden kohtaamisesta – Quentin Skinnerin haastattelu. *Niin & Näin*, 4/2001.
- KOIKKALAINEN 2008: Petri Koikkalainen, In book: *Politiikan nykyteoreetikkoja* (eds. Kia Lindroos ja Suvi Soininen). Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2008.
- KOLKO 1990: Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War*. New York: Pantheon, 1990.
- KUSCH & HINTIKKA 1988: Martin Kusch ja Jaakko Hintikka, *Kieli ja maailma*. Oulu: Kaleva, 1988.
- LAFEBER 1967: Walter LaFeber (ed.), *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1966*. New York: Wiley, 1967.
- LEFFLER 1984: Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–1948”. *The America historical Review*, Volume 89, Issue 2, April 1984.
- LEFFLER 1992: Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.
- LEFFLER 1999: Melvyn P. Leffler, „The Cold War: What Do `We Now Know`?“. *The America historical Review*, Volume 104, No. 2, April 1999.
- LEINONEN 2008: Jukka Leinonen, *Ulkoministeri James F. Byrnesin illokutionääristen intentioiden tarkastelu Stuttgartin puheessa syyskuussa 1946*. Unpublished Pro Gradu Thesis. University of Jyväskylä, Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, 2008.
- LEJEUNE 1995: Philippe Lejeune, *On autobiography. Theory and history of literature*; vol. 52. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, cop. 1989.
- LEVERING 1976: Ralph B. Levering, *American Opinion and the Russian Alliance 1939–1945*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1976.
- LIEBKNECHT 1976: Karl Liebknecht, *Gedanke und Tat: Schriften, Reden, Briefe zur Theorie und Praxis der Politik*. Frankfurt/M, Berlin, Wien: Ullstein Buch, 1976.
- LINK 1954: Arthur Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1910–1917*. New York, 1954.
- LINK 1964: Arthur Link, *Wilson: Confusions and Crises 1915–1916*. New Jersey: Princeton, 1964.
- LINK 1965: Arthur Link, *Campaigns for progressivism and peace, 1916–1917*. New Jersey: Princeton, 1965.
- LEITZINGER 2003: Antero Leitzinger, “Lyhyt Lännen historia”. *The Eurasian Politician*, August 2003.
- LUNDESTAD 2003: Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945 : from „empire“ by invitation to transatlantic drift*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

- MACDONALD 1996: Douglas J. Macdonald, „Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism“. *International Security*, Volume 20, No. 3, (Winter 1995 – 1996).
- MADDOX 1988: Robert James Maddox, *From War to Cold War*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1988.
- MADDUX 1980: Thomas R. Maddux, *Years of Estrangement – American relations with the Soviet Union, 1933–1941*. Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1980.
- MCALLISTER 2002: James McAllister, *No Exit: America and the German problem, 1943 – 1954*. USA: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- MEARSHEIMER 2003: John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003.
- MESSER 1982: Robert L. Messer, *The End of an Alliance – James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War*. North Carolina: Chapel Hill, 1982.
- MOORE 1975: Winfred B. Moore Jr, *New South Statesman: The political Career of James F. Byrnes, 1911–1941*. Dissertation. Department of History, Duke University.
- MOORE 1978: Winfred B. Moore Jr, “Soul of The South: James F. Byrnes and the Racial Issue in American Politics, 1911–1941”. *The Proceeding of The South Carolina Historical Association*. Lancaster: The South Carolina Historical Association, 1978.
- MOORE 1983: Winfred B. Moore Jr. “James F. Byrnes: The Road to Politics, 1882–1910”. *The South Carolina Historical Magazine*, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Apr., 1983).
- O’CONOR 1961: John F. O’Conor, *The Cold War and Liberation*. New York: Vantage Press, 1961.
- OFFNER 2002: Arnold A. Offner, *Another Such Victory – President Truman and the Cold War 1945 – 1953*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.
- OJAKANGAS 2001: Mika Ojakangas, Carl Schmitt: päätöksestä nomokseen. In book: *Filosofinen oikeus* (eds. Tontti ja Mäkelä). Suomalaisen lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja 2001. E-sarja, n:o 3.
- OLSON 1979: Keith W. Olson, *Biography of A Progressive*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1979.
- PAGE & SHAPIRO 1983: Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy”. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Mar., 1983).
- PALONEN 1998: Kari Palonen, *Das “Webersche Moment” : zur Kontingenz des Politischen*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998.
- PALONEN 2003: Kari Palonen, *Quentin Skinner: history, politics, rhetoric*. Cambridge: Polity, 2003.
- PALONEN 2007: Kari Palonen, *Re-thinking politics: essays from a quarter-century*. Helsinki: Finnish Political Science Association, 2007.
- PANKRAŠOVA & SIPOLS 1970: M. Pankrašova, V. Sipols, *Miksi sotaa ei ehkäisty – Neuvostoliiton, Englannin ja Ranskan neuvottelut Moskovassa vuonna 1939*. Helsinki: Utustoimisto Novosti (APN), 1970.

- PARTIN 1977: John William Partin, *“Assistant President” for the Home Front: James F. Byrnes and the World War II*. Dissertation. Florida: University of Florida, 1977.
- PATERSON 1975: Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*. Baltimore & London, 1975.
- PEKONEN 1991: Kyösti Pekonen, *Symbolinen modernissa politiikassa*. Nykykulttuurin tutkimusyksikön julkaisusarja 25, Jyväskylä 1991.
- PEMBERTON 1989: William E. Pemberton, *Harry S. Truman – Fair Dealer & Cold Warrior*. Boston, Massachusetts: Twayne, 1989.
- PINEO 2003: Ronn Pineo, *“Recent Cold War Studies”*. *The History Teacher*, Volume 37, Number 1, November 2003.
- PLOKHY 2010: Serhii Plokhy, *Yalta – The Price of Peace*. USA: Penguin Books, 2010.
- PRATT 1958: Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy*. New Jersey 1958.
- PUTNAM 1981: Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth, and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- REITZEL, KAPLAN, COBLENZ 1956: William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, Constance G. Coblenz, *United States Foreign Policy 1945–1955*. Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Company, Inc., 1956.
- REMINI 2006: Robert V. Remini, *The House – The History of the House of Representatives*. USA: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006.
- ROBERTSON 1994: David Robertson, *Sly and Able – A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994.
- RUOTSILA 2001: Markku Ruotsila, *British and American AntiCommunism Before the Cold War*. London: Frank Cass, 2001.
- SCHLESINGER 1969: Arthur Schlesinger Jr, *The Crisis of Confidence, Ideas, Power and Violence in America*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.
- SCHUMAN 1962: Fredrick L. Schuman, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962.
- SIHVOLA 1997: Juha Sihvola, *“Pelkkää retoriikkaa”*. *Niin & näin*, Spring 1/1999.
- SINCLAIR 1967: Andrew Sinclair, *A Concise history of the United States*. New York 1967.
- SKINNER 1969: Quentin Skinner, *“Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”*. *History and Theory*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1969).
- SKINNER 1970: Quentin Skinner, *“Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts”*. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 20, No. 79 Apr, 1970.
- SKINNER 1971: Quentin Skinner, *“On Performing and Explaining Linguistic Actions”*. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, No. 82 Jan, 1971.
- SKINNER 1972: Quentin Skinner, *“Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts”*. *New Literary History*, Vol. 3, No. 2, On Interpretation: I. (Winter, 1972).
- SKINNER 1988: Quentin Skinner, *“A Reply to my Critics”*. In book: *Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988.

- SKINNER 1997: Quentin Skinner, "Sir Geoffrey Elton and the Practice of History". *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th Ser., Vol. 7, 1997.
- SKINNER 2006: Quentin Skinner, *Visions of politics*, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- SPENCE & CHIN 1996: Jonathan Spence, Annping Chin, *Kiinan vuosisata, Sadan viime vuoden historia valokuvina*. Helsinki: Tammi, 1996.
- SYRJÄMÄKI 1999: Sami Syrjämäki, "Filosofia historia historiallinen rekonstruktio – Skinner, intentiot ja anakronismit". *Niin & näin*, Number 20, spring 1/1999.
- THOMPSON 1987: John A. Thompson, *Reformers and war – American progressive publicists and the First World War*. United States of America: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- THOMPSON 1981: Kenneth W. Thompson, *Cold War Theories, Volume 1, World Polarization, 1943–1953*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981.
- TILLI 2009: Jouni Tilli, Tiloja, linjauksia, retoriikkaa – historiapolitiikan ulottuvuuksia. *Historiallinen aikakauskirja*, 3/2009.
- TRACHTENBERG 1999: Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- VON WRIGHT 1967: Georg Henrik von Wright, *Historiallisista selityksistä. Historiallinen aikakauskirja*, 1967.
- WALLACH 2004: Jennifer Jensen Wallach, *Remembering Jim Crow: The Literary Memoir as Historical Source Material*. Dissertation. University of Massachusetts Amherst.
- WALLIN 2005: Risto Wallin, *Yhdistyneet kansakunnat organisaationa : tutkimus käsitteellisestä muutoksesta maailmanjärjestön organisoinnin periaatteissa*. Dissertation. Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2005.
- WARD 1979: Patricia Dawson Ward, *The Threat of Peace*. Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1979.
- WAYMAN & DIEHL 1994: Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl (eds.), *Reconstructing Realpolitik*. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1994.
- WEBER 1964: Max Weber, Science as a vocation. H.H. Gertz and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *Max Weber: essays in sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- WEBER 1968: Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. Heilbronn: Offsetdruckerei Gutmann u. Co., 1968.
- WEGS 1977: J. Robert Wegs, *Europe Since 1945 – A Concise History*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977.
- WIGHT 2004: Martin Wight, *Power politics* (eds. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad). New York: Continuum, 2004.
- WILLIAMS 1962: William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York: World Publishing, 1962.

- WILLIAMS 1992: Michael C. Williams, Reason and Realpolitik: Kant's "Critique of International Politics". *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1992).
- WILSON 1917: Woodrow Wilson, *Uusi vapaus: Kehoitus Kansan yleisien voimien vapauttamiseen*. Hämeenlinna: Karisto, 1917.
- YERGIN 1977: Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace – The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*. Bucks: Hazell Watson & Viney Ltd., Aylesbury, 1977.
- ZINK 1950: Harold Zink, *A Survey of American Government*. U. S. A: The Macmillan Company, 1950.

APPENDIX

**Speech by J. F. Byrnes,
United States Secretary of State
Restatement of Policy on Germany
Stuttgart
September 6, 1946**

I have come to Germany to learn at first hand the problems involved in the reconstruction of Germany and to discuss with our representatives the views of the United States Government as to some of the problems confronting us.

We in the United States have given considerable time and attention to these problems because upon their proper solution will depend not only the future well-being of Germany, but the future well-being of Europe.

We have learned, whether we like it or not, that we live in one world, from which world we cannot isolate ourselves. We have learned that peace and well-being are indivisible and that our peace and well-being cannot be purchased at the price of peace or the well-being of any other country.

I hope that the German people will never again make the mistake of believing that because the American people are peace-loving, they will sit back hoping for peace if any nation uses force or the threat of force to acquire dominion over other peoples and other governments.

In 1917 the United States was forced into the First World War. After that war we refused to join the League of Nations. We thought we could stay out of Europe's wars, and we lost interest in the affairs of Europe. That did not keep us from being forced into a second world war.

We will not again make that mistake. We intend to continue our interest in the affairs of Europe and of the world. We have helped to organize the United Nations. We believe it will stop aggressor nations from starting wars. Because we believe it, we intend to support the United Nations organization with all the power and resources we possess.

The American people want peace. They have long since ceased to talk of a hard or a soft peace for Germany. This never has been the real issue. What we want is a lasting peace. We will oppose soft measures, which invite the breaking of the peace.

In agreeing at Potsdam that Germany should be disarmed and demilitarized and in proposing that the four major powers should by treaty jointly undertake to see that Germany is kept disarmed and demilitarized for a generation, the United States is not unmindful of the responsibility resting upon it and its major Allies to maintain and enforce peace under the law.

Freedom from militarism will give the German people the opportunity, if they will but seize it, to apply their great energies and abilities to the works of peace. It will give them the opportunity to show themselves worthy of the respect and friendship of peace-loving nations, and in time, to take an honourable place among members of the United Nations.

It is not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world peace that Germany should become a pawn or a partner in a military struggle for power between the East and the West.

German militarism and Nazism have devastated twice in our generation the lands of German neighbours. It is fair and just that Germany should do her part to repair that devastation. Most of the victims of Nazi aggression were before the war less well off than Germany. They should not be expected by Germany to bear, unaided, the major costs of Nazi aggression.

The United States, therefore, is prepared to carry out fully the principles outlined in the Potsdam Agreement on demilitarization and reparations. However, there should be changes in the levels of industry agreed upon by the Allied Control Commission if Germany is not to be administered as an economic unit as the Potsdam Agreement contemplates and requires.

The basis of the Potsdam Agreement was that, as part of a combined program of demilitarization and reparations, Germany's war potential should be reduced by elimination and removal of her war industries and the reduction and removal of heavy industrial plants. It was contemplated this should be done to the point that Germany would be left with levels of industry capable of maintaining in Germany average European living standards without assistance from other countries.

The plants so to be removed were to be delivered as reparations to the Allies. The plants to be removed from the Soviet zone would go to the Soviet Union and Poland and the plants to be removed from the western zones would go in part to the Soviet Union but in the main to the western Allies. Provision was also made for the distribution of Germany's foreign assets among the Allies.

After considerable discussion the Allies agreed upon levels to which the principal German industries should be reduced to carry out the Potsdam Agreement. These levels were agreed to upon the assumption that the indigenous resources of Germany were to be available for distribution on an equitable basis for all of the Germans in Germany and that products not necessary for use in Germany would be available for export in order to pay for necessary imports.

In fixing the levels of industry, no allowance was made for reparations from current production. Reparations from current production would be wholly incompatible with the levels of industry now established under the Potsdam Agreement.

Obviously, higher levels of industry would have had to be fixed if reparations from current production were contemplated. The levels of industry fixed are only sufficient to enable the German people to become self-supporting and to maintain living standards approximating the average European living conditions.

That principle involved serious hardships for the German people, but it only requires them to share the hardships which Nazi aggression imposed on the average European.

The German people were not denied, however, the possibility of improving their lot by hard work over the years. Industrial growth and progress were not denied them. Being obliged to start again like the people of other devastated countries, with a peacetime economy not able to provide them more than the average European standard, the German people were not to be denied to use such savings as they might be able to accumulate by hard work and frugal living to build up their industries for peaceful purposes.

That was the principle of reparations to which President Truman agreed at Potsdam. And the United States will not agree to the taking from Germany of greater reparations than was provided by the Potsdam Agreement.

The carrying out of the Potsdam Agreement has, however, been obstructed by the failure of the Allied Control Council to take the necessary steps to enable the German economy to function as an economic unit. Essential central German administrative departments have not been established, although they are expressly required by the Potsdam Agreement.

The equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports has not been arranged, although that, too, is expressly required by the Potsdam Agreement.

The working out of a balanced economy throughout Germany to provide the necessary means to pay for approved imports has not been accomplished, although that too is expressly required by the Potsdam Agreement.

The United States is firmly of the belief that Germany should be administered as an economic unit and that zonal barriers should be completely obliterated so far as the economic life and activity in Germany are concerned.

The conditions which now exist in Germany make it impossible for industrial production to reach the levels which the occupying powers agreed were essential for a minimum German peacetime economy. Obviously, if the agreed levels of industry are to be reached, we cannot continue to restrict the free exchange of commodities, persons, and ideas throughout Germany. The barriers between the four zones of Germany are far more difficult to surmount than those between normal independent states.

The time has come when the zonal boundaries should be regarded as defining only the areas to be occupied for security purposes by the armed forces of the occupying powers and not as self-contained economic or political units.

That was the course of development envisaged by the Potsdam Agreement, and that is the course of development, which the American Government intends to follow to the full limit of its authority. It has formally announced that it is its intention to unify the economy of its own zone with any or all of the other zones willing to participate in the unification.

So far only the British Government has agreed to let its zone participate. We deeply appreciate their cooperation. Of course, this policy of unification is not intended to exclude the governments not now willing to join. The unification will be open to them at any time they wish to join.

We favor the economic unification of Germany. If complete unification cannot be secured, we shall do everything in our power to secure the maximum possible unification.

Important as economic unification is for the recovery of Germany and of Europe, the German people must recognize that the basic cause of their suffering and distress is the war, which the Nazi dictatorship brought upon the world.

But just because suffering and distress in Germany are inevitable, the American Government is unwilling to accept responsibility for the needless aggravation of economic distress that is caused by the failure of the Allied Control Council to agree to give the German people a chance to solve some of their most urgent economic problems.

So far as many vital questions are concerned, the Control Council is neither governing Germany nor allowing Germany to govern itself.

A common financial policy is essential for the successful rehabilitation of Germany. Runaway inflation accompanied by economic paralysis is almost certain to develop unless there is a common financial policy directed to the control of inflation. A program of drastic fiscal reform to reduce currency and monetary claims, to revise the debt structure, and to place Germany on a sound financial basis is urgently required.

The United States has worked hard to develop such a program, but fully coordinated measures must be accepted and applied uniformly to all zones if ruinous inflation is to be prevented. A central agency of finance is obviously necessary to carry out any such program effectively.

It is also essential that transportation, communications, and postal services should be organized throughout Germany without regard to zonal barriers. The nationwide organization of these public services was contemplated by the Potsdam Agreement. Twelve months have passed and nothing has been done.

Germany needs all the food she can produce. Before the war she could not produce enough food for her population. The area of Germany has been reduced. The population in Silesia, for instance, has been forced back into a restricted Germany. Armies of occupation and displaced persons increase demands while the lack of farm machinery and fertilizer reduces supplies. To secure the greatest possible production of food and the most effective use and distribution of the food that can be produced, a central administrative department for agriculture should be set up and allowed to function without delay.

Similarly, there is urgent need for the setting up of a central German administrative agency for industry and foreign trade. While Germany must be prepared to share her coal and steel with the liberated countries of Europe dependent upon these supplies, Germany must be enabled to use her skills and her energies to increase her industrial production and to organize the most effective use of her raw materials.

Germany must be given a chance to export goods in order to import enough to make her economy self-sustaining. Germany is a part of Europe and recovery in Europe, and particularly in the states adjoining Germany, will be

slow indeed if Germany with her great resources of iron and coal is turned into a poorhouse.

When the ruthless Nazi dictatorship was forced to surrender unconditionally, there was no German government with which the Allies could deal. The Allies had temporarily to take over the responsibilities of the shattered German state, which the Nazi dictatorship had cut off from any genuine accountability to the German people. The Allies could not leave the leaders or minions of Nazism in key positions, ready to reassert their evil influence at first opportunity. They had to go.

But it never was the intention of the American Government to deny to the German people the right to manage their own internal affairs as soon as they were able to do so in a democratic way, with genuine respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Potsdam Agreement, concluded only a few months after the surrender, bound the occupying powers to restore local self-government and to introduce elective and representative principles into the regional, provincial, and state administration as rapidly as was consistent with military security and the purposes of the military occupation.

The principal purposes of the military occupation were and are to demilitarize and de-Nazify Germany but not raise artificial barriers to the efforts of the German people to resume their peacetime economic life.

The Nazi war criminals were to be punished for the suffering they brought to the world. The policy of reparations and industrial disarmament prescribed in the Potsdam Agreement was to be carried out. But the purpose of the occupation did not contemplate a prolonged foreign dictatorship of Germany's internal political life. The Potsdam Agreement expressly bound the occupying powers to start building a political democracy from the ground up.

The Potsdam Agreement did not provide that there should never be a central German government. It merely provided that for the time being there should be no central German government. Certainly this only meant that no central government should be established until some sort of democracy was rooted in the soul of Germany and some sense of local responsibility developed.

The Potsdam Agreement wisely provided that administration of the affairs of Germany should be directed toward decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. This was not intended to prevent progress toward a central government with the powers necessary to deal with matters which would be dealt with on a nation-wide basis. But it was intended to prevent establishment of a strong central government dominating the German people instead of being responsible to their democratic will.

It is the view of the American Government that the German people throughout Germany, under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs.

More than a year has passed since hostilities ceased. The millions of German people should not be forced to live in doubt as to their fate. It is the view of the American Government that the Allies should, without delay, make clear to the German people the essential terms of the peace settlement, which

they expect the German people to accept and observe. It is our view that the German people should now be permitted and helped to make the necessary preparations for setting up a democratic German government, which can accept and observe these terms.

From now on thoughtful people of the world will judge Allied action in Germany not by Allied promises but by Allied performances. The American Government has supported and will continue to support the necessary measures to de-Nazify and demilitarize Germany, but it does not follow that large armies of foreign soldiers or alien bureaucrats, however well motivated and disciplined, are in the long run the most reliable guardians of another country's democracy.

All that the Allied governments can and should do is to lay down the rules under which German democracy can govern itself. The Allied occupation forces should be limited to the number sufficient to see that these rules are obeyed.

But the question for us will be: What force is needed to make certain that Germany does not rearm as it did after the First World War? Our proposal for a treaty with the major powers to enforce for 25 or even 40 years the demilitarization plan finally agreed upon in the peace settlement would have made possible a smaller army of occupation. For enforcement we could rely more upon a force of trained inspectors and less upon infantry.

For instance, if an automobile factory, in violation of the treaty, converted its machinery to the production of weapons of war, inspectors would report it to the Allied Control Council. They would call upon the German Government to stop the production and punish the offender. If the German Government failed to comply then the Allied nations would take steps to enforce compliance by the German Government. Unfortunately our proposal for the treaty was not agreed to.

Security forces will probably have to remain in Germany for a long period. I want no misunderstanding. We will not shirk our duty. We are not withdrawing. We are staying here. As long as there is an occupation army in Germany, the American armed forces will be part of that occupation army.

The United States favors the early establishment of a provisional German government for Germany. Progress has been made in the American zone in developing local and state self-government in Germany, and the American Government believes similar progress is possible in all zones.

It is the view of the American Government that the provisional government should not be hand-picked by other governments, but should be a German national council composed of democratically responsible minister presidents or other chief officials of the several states or provinces, which have been established in each of the four zones.

Subject to the reserved authority of the Allied Control Council, the German National Council should be responsible for the proper functioning of central administrative agencies. Those agencies should have adequate power to assure the administration of Germany as an economic unit, as was contemplated by the Potsdam Agreement.

The German National Council should also be charged with the preparation of a draft of a federal constitution for Germany, which, among other things, should insure the democratic character of the new Germany and the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its inhabitants.

After approval in principle by the Allied Control Council, the proposed constitution should be submitted to an elected convention for final drafting and then submitted to the German people for ratification.

While we shall insist that Germany observe the principles of peace, good-neighborliness, and humanity, we do not want Germany to become the satellite of any power or powers or to live under a dictatorship, foreign or domestic. The American people hope to see peaceful, democratic Germans become and remain free and independent.

Austria has already been recognized as a free and independent country. Her temporary and forced union with Germany was not a happy event for either country, and the United States is convinced that it is in the interest of both countries and the peace of Europe that they should pursue their separate ways.

At Potsdam specific areas, which were part of Germany, were provisionally assigned to the Soviet Union and to Poland, subject to the final decisions of the Peace Conference. At that time these areas were being held by the Soviet and Polish armies. We were told that Germans in large numbers were fleeing from these areas and that it would in fact, because of the feelings aroused by the war, be difficult to reorganize the economic life of these areas if they were not administered as integral parts in the one case of the Soviet Union and in the other case of Poland.

The heads of government agreed to support at the peace settlement the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Königsberg and the area adjacent to it. Unless the Soviet Government changes its views on the subject we will certainly stand by our agreement.

With regard to Silesia and other eastern German areas, the assignment of this territory to Poland by Russia for administrative purposes had taken place before the Potsdam meeting. The heads of government agreed that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, Silesia and other eastern German areas should be under the administration of the Polish state and for such purposes should not be considered as a part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. However, as the Protocol of the Potsdam Conference makes clear, the heads of government did not agree to support at the peace settlement the cession of this particular area.

The Soviets and the Poles suffered greatly at the hands of Hitler's invading armies. As a result of the agreement at Yalta, Poland ceded to the Soviet Union territory east of the Curzon Line. Because of this, Poland asked for revision of her northern and western frontiers. The United States will support revision of these frontiers in Poland's favor. However, the extent of the area to be ceded to Poland must be determined when the final settlement is agreed upon.

The United States does not feel that it can deny to France, which has been invaded three times by Germany in 70 years, its claim to the Saar territory, whose economy has long been closely linked with France. Of course, if the Saar territory is integrated with France she should readjust her reparation claims against Germany.

Except as here indicated, the United States will not support any encroachment on territory which is indisputably German or any division of Germany which is not genuinely desired by the people concerned. So far as the United States is aware the people of the Ruhr and the Rhineland desire to remain united with the rest of Germany. And the United States is not going to oppose their desire.

While the people of the Ruhr were the last to succumb to Nazism, without the resources of the Ruhr Nazism could never have threatened the world. Never again must those resources be used for destructive purposes. They must be used to rebuild a free, peaceful Germany and a free, peaceful Europe.

The United States will favor such control over the whole of Germany, including the Ruhr and the Rhineland, as may be necessary for security purposes. It will help to enforce those controls. But it will not favor any controls that would subject the Ruhr and the Rhineland to political domination or manipulation of outside powers.

The German people are now feeling the devastating effects of the war, which Hitler and his minions brought upon the world. Other people felt those devastating effects long before they were brought home to the German people.

The German people must realize that it was Hitler and his minions who tortured and exterminated innocent men, women, and children and sought with German arms to dominate and degrade the world. It was the massed, angered forces of humanity, which had to fight their way into Germany to give the world the hope of freedom and peace. The American people who fought for freedom have no desire to enslave the German people. The freedom Americans believe in and fought for is a freedom, which must be shared with all, willing to respect the freedom of others.

The United States has returned to Germany practically all prisoners of war that were in the United States. We are taking prompt steps to return German prisoners of war in our custody in other parts of the world.

The United States cannot relieve Germany from the hardships inflicted upon her by the war her leaders started. But the United States has no desire to increase those hardships or to deny the German people an opportunity to work their way out of those hardships so long as they respect human freedom and cling to the paths of peace.

The American people want to return the government of Germany to the German people. The American people want to help the German people to win their way back to an honourable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world.

INDEX

- Acheson, Dean G. 25, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 163, 168, 172, 181, 182, 183, 184, 187, 190, 191, 194, 195, 212, 217, 219, 229, 234, 241, 291, 292, 313, 324, 326, 328, 351
- Acheson-Lilienthal report 217
- Act of Chapultepec 167, 168, 213, 324
- Adams, Alva B. 54
- Aldcroft, Derek H. 276
- Aldrich, James 50
- Alexander, Harold R.L.G.A, 1st Earld Alexander of Tunis. 134
- Alger, Horatio Jr. 70
- Almond, Gabriel. 354
- Alperovitz, Gar. 32, 33, 128, 130
- Amerasia, espionage case 98, 121
- Americanism. 29, 67, 70, 71, 72, 263, 276
- Amir-Ahmadi, Sepahpod Ahmad 196
- Antonescu, Ion V. 180
- Antonov, Aleksei I. 117
- Arens, Olavi 63
- Attlee, Clement R. 113, 114, 115, 183, 184, 185, 190, 290
- Aucoin, Lionel A. 301
- Austin, John L. 45, 47, 283
- Azerbaijan 196, 197, 200, 348
- Ball, Joseph H. 340
- Barnes, Maynard 209, 210
- Baruch, Bernard M. 30, 52, 215, 217, 315
- Barzani, Mulla Mustafa 30, 196
- Bauer, Bruno 40
- Beisner, Robert L. 100, 105
- Belair, Felix Jr. 192
- Benton, William B. 98, 100, 102, 241, 303, 329
- Berezhkov, Valentin M. 126
- Bernstein, Barton J. 122, 127, 128
- Berry, Burton Y. 94, 145, 209
- Bevin, Ernest 86, 113, 114, 115, 136, 140, 141, 142, 146, 148, 149, 150, 154, 161, 162, 174, 175, 176, 177, 180, 194, 198, 199, 222, 223, 224, 247, 252, 286, 290, 292, 307, 308, 309, 311, 350
- Bevir, Mark 49
- Bidault, Georges-Augustin 139, 148, 151, 154, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 231, 235, 246, 250, 254, 307
- Bingham, George Barry Sr. 296
- Bipartisanship 248, 266
- Bismarck, Otto von 39, 40, 41
- Blum, André Léon 254
- Bogomolov, Alexander E. 223
- Bohlen, Charles E. 25, 74, 75, 77, 81, 93, 100, 101, 102, 108, 116, 120, 126, 136, 149, 150, 151, 172, 173, 205, 223, 308, 309, 315, 326
- Boley, Joseph 300
- Bór-Komorowski, Tadeusz 95
- Bowles, Chester B. 52, 58, 102
- Boyd, J.O. 301, 322
- Braden, Spruille. 102
- Briand, Aristide 207
- Brown, Philip M. 301
- Brown, Walter J. 18, 52, 53, 55, 59, 78, 99, 100, 101, 116, 117, 119, 122, 124, 125, 126, 141, 142, 145, 146, 147, 150, 152, 159, 190, 216, 317
- Bullock, Allan 114, 115, 309
- Burnham, James 30
- Busch, Maude 50
- Bush, Vannevar 173
- Buzan, Barry G. 267, 268, 269, 288, 289
- Byrnes, James F.
and Ku Klux Klan 58
and the Order of United American Mechanics .. 58
Herald-Tribune Forum Speech. 167, 172, 212, 215
Inaugural speech 97
People's foreign policy ... 16, 42, 43, 219, 265, 266, 281, 294, 303, 334, 338, 348, 350, 351
Speech about Communism and the Atomic Bomb 228
Speech after his return from meeting in Paris, May 1946 225, 234, 296, 307
Speech at Bicentennial Celebration of Washington and Lee University, June 1949 298, 343, 345
Speech at The American Club, Paris, October 1946 297, 298
Speech at the Institute of the Cleveland Council of World Affairs, January 1947 ... 304, 322, 323
Speech at the Overseas Press Club ... 30, 211, 215, 216, 218, 266, 274, 351
Speech at the Paris Peace Conference Plenary Session, August 1946 243, 244
Speech on radio in Paris, July 1946 236
Stuttgart Speech 48, 256, 257, 258, 260, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 283, 286, 288, 290, 291, 293, 294, 296, 311, 328, 343, 348, 349, 351
- Byrnes, Maude 57
- Calhoun, John C. 59, 60

- Callender, Harold 260
 Cannon, Cavendish W..... 144, 145
 Capper, Arthur 214
 Carlson, Harry E..... 204
 Carol II of Romania..... 180
 Carr, Edward H. 32
 Carr, Edward Hallet 40
 Catledge, Turner 56, 62
 Cecil, Robert (Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 1st Viscount Cecil of Chelwood) 207
 Chiang, Kai-Shek..... 83, 117, 119, 319, 321
 Chiperfield, Robert B. 241
 Churchill, Winston Sir. 18, 31, 65, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 82, 83, 89, 106, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 122, 124, 125, 126, 131, 134, 135, 161, 196, 202, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 245, 258, 270, 271, 274, 290, 293, 312, 346, 352
 Clark, David T. 85
 Clason, Charles R. 171
 Clausewitz, Carl P.G. von 38
 Clay, Lucius D. 195, 294, 327, 328
 Clayton, William L. 98, 99, 100, 108, 220, 229, 291, 292
 Clifford, Charles M. 298, 299
 Clifford, Clark M. 299
 Cohen, Benjamin V. 80, 100, 101, 102, 108, 120, 136, 148, 172, 210, 326
 Cokes, Mr. 335
 Collingwood, Robin George 49
 Collins, Joseph 31
 Colmer, William M. 241
 Communism 30, 35, 37, 47, 73, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 219, 227, 228, 270, 271, 272, 274, 275, 281, 296, 320, 322, 330, 335, 336, 339, 349, 355
 Conant, James B. 173
 Connally, Thomas Terry "Tom" 85, 183, 185, 203, 208, 219, 223, 224, 237, 241, 242, 247, 248, 266, 303, 319, 321, 323, 350
 Connor, Cassandra 101
 Conover, Denise 66, 252, 258, 259, 293
 Constantinescu-Iași, Petre..... 181
 Corcoran, Thomas G. 321
 Couve de Murville, Maurice..... 309
 Crowley, Leo T. 137
 Currivan, Gene 30, 196
 Curry, George 28, 134, 178, 192, 194, 199, 208, 243, 293, 314, 316
 Dairen 82, 116, 117, 118, 155
 Dardanelles..... 125, 218, 234
 Davies, Joseph E..... 95, 152, 153
 Davies, Lawrence E. 343
 Davis, John..... 305
 Davis, Kenneth S. 98
 Davis, William H. 55
 de Gasperi, Alcide 339
 de Gaulle, Charles A.J.M. 74, 75, 173
 de Robespierre, Maximilien F.M.I. 71
 Deane, John R. 95, 332
 Deighton, Anne 37, 86, 114, 162, 163, 253, 356
 Democratic Party 52, 57, 59, 60, 62, 69, 73, 96, 266, 290, 295, 298, 315, 316, 317, 319, 342, 344, 354
 Dennett, Daniel C. 49
 Dewey, John 88, 266
 Dewey, Thomas E. 60, 87, 88, 316
 Diamond, William 276
 Dilulio, John D. 67
 Dodd, William E. 63, 64, 66
 Dodecanese..... 156, 176, 231
 Doll, Natascha 41, 42
 Dönitz, Karl 106
 Donnelly, Desmond..... 31
 Dooman, Eugene..... 119
 Dulles, John Foster 86, 87, 136, 137, 152, 154, 156, 168, 173, 193, 216, 229, 230, 272, 273, 302, 317, 325, 326, 330, 349, 355
 Dunn, James C. 108, 119, 136
 Edelman, Murray J. 44
 Eden, Robert Anthony 74, 81, 82, 86, 109, 110, 113, 130, 161
 Ehrman, John..... 119
 Eisenberg, Carolyn 28, 36, 37
 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 60, 106, 313, 317, 327, 330, 344, 349, 355
 Elsey, George M. 103
 Emery, Owen C. 301
 Emiliani, Alberto..... 47
 Ethridge, Mark 172, 178, 179, 180, 209, 210, 296, 310, 322, 351
 Far Eastern Advisory Commission, FEAC 143, 174, 192
 Far Eastern Commission, FEC 173, 174, 186, 327
 Farrell, Mary 57
 Feis, Herbert 31
 Feurebach, Ludwig A. von 40
 Firey, Fran Paul 313
 Fiume (Rijeka) 307

- Fleming, D.F..... 32
 Fontaine, André..... 31
 Foreign Service Act..... 240, 241, 329
 Forrestal, James V. 56, 86, 95, 100, 104, 332
 Frankfurter, Felix 158
 Frederick, Pauline 74, 85, 172, 293, 331,
 343
 Fulbright, William J. 329
 Gaddis, John Lewis 34, 35, 36, 66, 128,
 262, 314
 Gallup, George H. 57
 Gelernter, David H. 71, 72, 276
 George, Walter F. 236, 237
 Gimbel, John 33, 36, 259, 260, 293, 294
 Gladstone, William E..... 180
 Glass, Carter..... 53
 Glifford, Clark M..... 315
 Gorchakov, Alexander Mikhailovich.... 31
 Gorizia 233, 280
 Gorra, Michael..... 21
 Gouin, Félix..... 254
 Gradisca..... 233, 280
 Graydon, C.T. 195
 Grew, Joseph C. 98, 99, 102
 Gromyko, Andrei A. 78
 Groves, Leslie R..... 124
 Groza, Petru..... 94, 145, 178, 208, 209
 Hackney, Sheldon 68
 Halle, Louis 31
 Hannegan, Robert E..... 305
 Harbutt, Fraser J. 203, 205
 Harriman, Averell W. 75, 95, 108, 117,
 118, 119, 159, 160, 161, 162, 173, 174,
 175, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 198,
 270
 Harrison, George L. 123, 124, 293
 Hartz, Louis 69, 70, 71
 Haslam, Jonathan..... 35
 Hatrich, Edwin 260
 Haugeland, John 49
 Hegeman, C.V. sr. 301
 Henderson, L.W. 86, 197
 Henig, Joseph..... 301
 Herken, Gregg 33, 122, 126, 128
 Herring, George C. 56, 71, 72, 217, 346,
 347
 Hess, Jerry N..... 299
 Heylton, Alan W. 301
 Hill, J. Lister 100, 156, 157, 302
 Hinshaw, John C. 241
 Hintikka, Kaarlo Jaakko J..... 17
 Hirohito 136
 Hirschman, Albert O. 67
 Hiss, Alger 35, 76, 77
 Hitler, Adolf 53, 66, 72, 106, 122, 146, 150,
 255, 267, 286, 330, 331
 Holborn, Hajo..... 40, 41
 Hoover, Herbert C. 96
 Hoover, J. Edgar..... 98, 292, 295
 Hopkins, Harry L. 75, 95, 96, 101, 116,
 249, 326
 Howard, Harry N. 197
 Hoyt, James A..... 59, 60
 Hroncich, Stanley..... 307
 Hulen, Bertram D..... 238, 293
 Hull, Cordell..... 86, 167, 169, 240, 305
 Hurley, Patrick J..... 118, 119
 Ickes, Harold 56, 100, 316
 Irish, Marian D. 340
 Isolationism 14, 62, 65, 66, 70, 88, 169, 270,
 337
 Isolation policy... 62, 63, 64, 69, 70, 160, 239, 242,
 248, 252, 256, 262, 263, 264, 265, 270, 278,
 280, 281, 297, 302, 305, 318, 324, 353, 354
 James, Edwin L..... 218
 Jebb, Gladwyn H.M..... 77
 Jefferson, Thomas 70, 337
 Joan of Arc 75
 Johnson, Luther A..... 201
 Johnson, Lyndon B. 317
 Johnston, Olin D..... 57, 145
 Joint War Plans Committee 334
 Jones, Jesse H..... 59
 Jonkman, Bartel J..... 241
 Józef Piłsudski Society..... 171
 Julkunen, Jaro 17
 Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich..... 261
 Kant, Immanuel 42
 Kee, John 241
 Keen-Connally bill..... 329
 Kellogg, Frank B..... 19
 Kelly, Hugh 172
 Kennan, George F. 86, 194, 200, 210, 211,
 215, 216, 219, 298, 299, 315, 321, 349
 Kenny, Anthony..... 47, 281
 Kero, Reino 59, 67, 68, 248, 272, 317, 330
 Keynes, John Maynard..... 76, 276, 278, 283
 King Carol II of Romania..... 180
 King Michael of Romania 180
 King Peter II of Yugoslavia..... 180
 Knopf, Alfred A. 214
 Kober, Charles B. 58
 Königsberg..... 155, 271
 Krock, Arthur 52, 53, 299, 330, 344
 Kuriles 155

- Kyrenaica 221
 LaFeber, Walter 32, 33
 Larreta, Eduardo Rodriques 168
 Lasswell, Harold D. 303
 Lawrence, W.H. 170, 343, 344
 League of Nations 42, 43, 63, 64, 70, 79,
 81, 82, 87, 88, 203, 248, 264, 265, 286,
 297, 307, 353
 Leahy, William D. 78, 95, 103, 105, 117,
 190
 Lee, Herbert P. 252, 286
 Leffler, Melwyn P. 29, 35, 36, 331, 332, 334
 Lejeune, Philippe 22, 23
 Lemke, William 99
 Lenin, Vladimir I. 63, 337
 Lequerica, Jose F. 168
 Leuchtenburg, William E. 65
 Liebknecht, Karl 39, 113
 Lilienthal, David E. 217
 Lincoln, Abraham 337
 Lindbergh, Charles A. 53
 Lindley, Ernest 169
 Lippmann, Walter 30, 216, 266
 Litvinov, Maxim M. 207, 330
 Lorenz, Alva K. 50
 Lovejoy, Arthur O. 17
 Lucas, Scott E. 242
 Lucas, Scott W. 237
 Lundestad, Geir 34
 Lyon, Frederick B. 292, 295
 MacArthur, Douglas 142, 157, 159, 160,
 174, 201
 Macdonald, Douglas J. 34
 Mackenzie King, William Lyon ... 184, 185
 Maier, Charles R. 34
 Maisky, Ivan M. 75, 76
 Manchuria 83, 118, 120, 121, 128, 136, 174,
 175, 201
 Manhattan Project.. 122, 123, 124, 141, 173
 Marshall Plan 14
 Marshall, George C. 14, 32, 79, 83, 169,
 175, 274, 299, 305, 313, 318, 319, 320,
 321, 322, 325, 326, 328, 338, 339, 340,
 342, 343, 344, 348, 349
 Marx, Karl H. 40, 68, 271, 330, 337
 Mason, Noah M. 157
 Matthews, H. Freeman 102, 108, 143, 173,
 220, 326
 Maybank, Burnet R. 145
 McAllister, James 36, 37
 McCarthy, Charlie aka Edgar John
 Bergren 157
 McCarthy, Joseph R. 214
 McCray, John H. 145
 McNamara, Robert S. 349
 Mearsheimer, John J. 40, 66
 Merrow, Chester E. 239, 240
 Messer, Robert 27, 28, 33, 52, 55, 56, 57,
 66, 76, 85, 89, 90, 96, 115, 121, 122,
 123, 128, 131, 132, 133, 139, 142, 143,
 154, 164, 165, 168, 173, 188, 248, 258,
 316
 Messersmith, George P. 301
 Minton, Sherman 54
 Mitterrand, François M.A.M. 252
 Molotov, Vyacheslav M. 24, 57, 65, 74, 78,
 80, 94, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 118,
 120, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135,
 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146,
 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155,
 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165,
 167, 168, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176,
 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185,
 187, 188, 190, 193, 195, 196, 198, 199,
 215, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226,
 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 244, 245, 246,
 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 257, 258, 259,
 279, 280, 283, 284, 286, 288, 307, 308,
 309, 310, 311, 319, 330, 331, 347, 349,
 350, 351, 356, 358
 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 335
 Monroe Doctrine 64, 162, 168, 203, 239,
 318, 334, 355
 Montgomery, Bernhard L. 106
 Montreux Convention of 1936 159, 197,
 234
 Moore, Winfred B. 43, 50, 51
 Morgenthau Plan 284
 Morgenthau, Hans Joachim 40
 Morgenthau, Henry Jr. 57, 255, 284
 Moser, Guy Louis 96
 Mundt, Karl E. 227, 329
 Murphy, Robert 258, 327, 328
 Napoleon Bonaparte 233, 267, 280
 Nietzsche, Friedrich W. 16, 44
 Nixon Doctrine 258
 Nixon, Richard M. 60, 258, 317
 Novikov, Nikolay Ivanovich 209
 Noyes, Charles P. 94
 O'Connor, Jack 214
 O'Connor, John F. 31, 32
 Offner, Arnold A. 33, 36, 37
 Olson, Keith W. 66, 68
 Ormsby, Alexander F. 169

- Orwell, George 30
- Page, Benjamin I. 26
- Palonen, Kari 17, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46
- Pan American Union 214
- Panuch, Joseph Anthony 104
- Pappas, Paul John 335
- Paterson, Thomas G. 351
- Patterson, Robert P. 104, 300, 327
- Pavlov, V.N. 126
- Pemberton, William E. 55, 56, 336, 337
- Pepper, Claude D. 203, 204, 292, 316, 319, 320, 321
- Perón, Juan Domingo 167, 212
- Petty, R. Moulton 301
- Phillies, George E. 335
- Pope Pius XII 60
- Port Arthur 83, 116, 121, 155
- Progressivism 29, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 264, 269
- Protopapas, Demetrius N. 335
- public opinion 15, 16, 17, 25, 26, 57, 63, 66, 67, 73, 83, 90, 145, 153, 177, 188, 202, 205, 209, 214, 216, 220, 224, 240, 244, 248, 256, 261, 262, 266, 291, 294, 303, 306, 310, 321, 323, 325, 332, 333, 334, 342, 347, 348, 350, 351, 355
- Putnam, Hilary 25
- Qavam, Ahmad 200, 202, 203, 205
- Quezon, Manuel L. 54
- Rabaut, Louis C. 241
- Ralea, Mihai 181
- Ramey, Homer A. 240
- Rankin, William H. 30, 212, 213, 214, 227, 228, 301
- Republican Party 154, 219, 266, 278, 301, 302, 325, 326
- Reston, James B. 24, 96, 138, 165, 182, 183, 208
- Rhineland 254, 255, 258, 259, 269, 286, 287, 288, 348
- Rice, Leon L. 254
- Richards, James P. 240
- Richardson, A.A. 58
- Ridgewood, Gerard A. Ryan 301
- Rigdon, William M. 74
- Robertson, David 28, 59, 128, 173, 200, 315, 336
- Rochau, Ludwig A. von 41
- Rockefeller, Nelson A. 102, 168
- Rogers, Edith N. 241
- Rogers, Will Jr. 305
- Roosevelt Boettiger, Anna 74
- Roosevelt, Elliott 316
- Roosevelt, Franklin D. 16, 18, 27, 31, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 64, 65, 66, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 128, 134, 135, 137, 143, 145, 147, 148, 155, 160, 164, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173, 177, 182, 194, 195, 196, 214, 233, 245, 249, 262, 265, 266, 269, 270, 287, 291, 292, 293, 295, 296, 297, 314, 315, 316, 317, 322, 326, 336, 343, 344, 346, 347, 351, 353, 354, 357
- Roosevelt, James 316
- Roosevelt, Theodore 69, 89, 168
- Roper, Sam W. 59
- Rosenberg, Julius 35
- Rowe, Leo S. 214
- Ruhr 251, 254, 255, 258, 259, 260, 269, 286, 287, 288, 348
- Ruotsila, Markku 30, 68, 272, 274
- Russell, Donald S. 100, 101, 104, 117, 295, 327, 328, 329, 344
- Saar 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 279, 286, 287, 288, 349
- Sabath, Adolph J. 241
- Sadowski, George G. 169
- Schlesinger, Arthur M. 31
- Schmitt, Carl 70
- Schuman, Frederick L. 32
- Schwarzkopf, Herbert Norman Sr. 199, 203
- Shapiro, Robert Y. 26
- Silesia 112, 251, 258, 285
- Skinner, Quentin R.D. 17, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 88, 275, 283
- Smith, Alexander H. 230
- Smith, Lawrence H. 170
- Smith-Mundt Act 329
- Soong, Tse-Ven 116, 118, 119, 121
- Speech at the Overseas Press Club 202, 336
- Stalin, Joseph V. 18, 24, 31, 35, 36, 65, 66, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 89, 95, 96, 101, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 134, 135, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 155, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 169, 177, 178, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 209, 210, 211, 215,

- 218, 219, 228, 245, 298, 317, 330, 331, 335, 351, 352
- State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee..... 104, 105, 174, 327
- Stefan, Karl..... 241
- Stettinius, Edward R. Jr. 56, 77, 78, 81, 83, 86, 93, 94, 98, 99, 129, 136, 168, 240, 318, 325
- Stevenson, Adlai E. 98, 317
- Stilwell, Joseph W. 117
- Stimson, Henry L. 56, 95, 100, 108, 122, 123, 124, 125, 163, 165, 250, 301
- Stone, Ellery W. 221, 279
- Stoychev, Vladimir Dimitrov 210
- Strawson, Peter Frederik Sir. 283
- Sullivan, John B. 158
- Sulzberger, Cyrus L. II..... 154, 226
- Surplus Property Act of 1944 329
- Tătărescu, Gheorghe I. 181, 209
- Thomas, J.W. Elmer 54
- Thompson, Llewellyn E. 31, 65, 107, 109, 110, 111, 130, 131, 272, 330
- Thors, Ólafur..... 204
- Thurmond, Storm J. 313, 316
- Tito, Josip Broz 94, 157, 180
- Tobias, Channing 98
- Tocqueville, Alexis de 31
- Trachtenberg, Marc..... 28, 29, 36, 37, 63
- Trieste 141, 221, 222, 223, 231, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 243, 246, 247, 280, 286, 287, 299, 307, 308, 309, 310, 347
- Tripolitania 141, 150, 218, 221
- Truman Doctrine.... 258, 260, 262, 336, 339
- Truman, Harry S. 18, 23, 24, 27, 30, 37, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 66, 87, 90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 145, 146, 147, 148, 154, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 170, 173, 175, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 200, 201, 206, 208, 209, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 224, 228, 229, 234, 238, 239, 270, 274, 279, 280, 284, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295, 298, 299, 302, 303, 304, 305, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 324, 325, 326, 327, 336, 337, 339, 340, 342, 343, 344, 346, 347, 348, 349, 351, 353, 355, 356, 357
- United Nations 20, 30, 42, 43, 56, 65, 66, 70, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 94, 102, 111, 112, 115, 120, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 138, 141, 151, 153, 156, 157, 161, 167, 168, 174, 175, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 192, 194, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 215, 221, 225, 239, 248, 264, 274, 279, 294, 298, 300, 301, 303, 304, 306, 309, 312, 318, 321, 323, 324, 325, 326, 334, 336, 343, 348, 351
- United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, UNAEC 30, 181, 185, 187, 206, 208
- United States Atomic Energy Commission, AEC.....184
- United States House Foreign Affairs Committee.....200, 213, 242
- United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 53, 85, 170, 183, 191, 200, 208, 219, 319, 320, 321, 337
- United States Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy185, 217
- Vandenberg, Arthur H. 85, 87, 137, 181, 182, 183, 185, 187, 190, 191, 193, 208, 214, 218, 219, 223, 224, 226, 229, 236, 238, 239, 241, 242, 247, 248, 266, 272, 288, 290, 302, 303, 305, 306, 319, 321, 323, 325, 337, 350, 354
- Vardaman, James K.190
- Vaughan, Harry H.190
- Vincent, John Carter119, 173
- Voroshilov, Kliment Y.....180
- Vyshinski, Andrey Januaryevich 94, 180, 181, 209
- Wæver, Ole268
- Wallace, Henry A. 56, 59, 60, 99, 114, 173, 179, 192, 204, 215, 216, 217, 228, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 277, 278, 288, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 301, 313, 316, 320, 321, 324, 337, 338, 340, 344, 349
- Wallace, Jack.....300
- Wallace, Julius F.....300
- Wallin, Risto88, 264
- Waltz, Kenneth Neal 40
- Ward, Patricia 26, 27, 33, 55, 57, 59, 60, 93, 95, 96, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 137, 140, 141, 154, 158, 163, 164, 173, 174, 178, 181, 188, 189, 192, 193, 194, 202,

- 216, 217, 220, 234, 236, 243, 247, 258,
291, 308, 310, 311, 314
- Warren, Lansing 97
- Watkins, T.H. 58
- Weber, Max 16, 17, 39, 44
- Weichel, Alvin F. 240
- Wight, Robert James Martin 87, 88
- Williams, William Appleman 34
- Wilson, Thomas Woodrow 42, 43, 51, 62,
63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 87, 91,
207, 248, 263, 264, 265, 275, 276, 277,
281, 287, 293, 297, 304, 307
- Wilsonism 14, 29, 33, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69,
70, 71, 72, 85, 87, 88, 89, 135, 263,
264, 265, 269, 276, 277, 278, 281, 282,
353, 354, 355
- Winant, John C. 161, 162, 194
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig J.J. 17
- Wood, Edward F.L, 1st Earl of Halifax. 162
- Woodruff, Roy O. 153
- Wright, Georg Henrik von 47, 48
- Yalta Axioms 33, 85, 86, 88, 89, 103, 110,
133, 135, 172, 264, 269, 270, 271, 355
- Yard, Lionel L. 300, 301
- Yergan, Max 98
- Yergin, Daniel 27, 28, 33, 37, 55, 63, 64, 66,
71, 76, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 102,
107, 108, 135, 172, 179, 181, 264, 270,
355
- Zhukov, Georgy 122, 126
- Zink, Harold 91, 92, 143

- 1 KOSTIAINEN, EMMA, Viestintä ammattiosaamisen ulottuvuutena. - Communication as a dimension of vocational competence. 305 p. Summary 4 p. 2003.
- 2 SEPPÄLÄ, ANTTI, Todellisuutta kuvaamassa - todellisuutta tuottamassa. Työ ja koti television ja vähän radionkin uutisissa. - Describing reality - producing reality. Discourses of work and home in television and on a small scale in radio news. 211 p. Summary 3 p. 2003.
- 3 GERLANDER, MAIJA, Jännitteet lääkärin ja potilaan välisessä viestintäsuhteessa. - Tensions in the doctor-patient communication and relationship. 228 p. Summary 6 p. 2003.
- 4 LEHIKONEN, TAISTO, Religious media theory - Understanding mediated faith and christian applications of modern media. - Uskonnollinen mediateoria: Modernin median kristilliset sovellukset. 341 p. Summary 5 p. 2003.
- 5 JARVA, VESA, Venäläisperäisyys ja ekspressiivisyys suomen murteiden sanastossa. - Russian influence and expressivity in the lexicon of Finnish dialects. 215 p. 6 p. 2003.
- 6 USKALI, TURO, "Älä kirjoita itseäsi ulos" Suomalaisen Moskovan-kirjeenvaihtajuuden alkutaival 1957-1975. - "Do not write yourself out" The beginning of the Finnish Moscow-correspondency in 1957-1975. 484 p. Summary 4 p. 2003.
- 7 VALKONEN, TARJA, Puheviestintätaitojen arviointi. Näkökulmia lukioikäisten esiintymis- ja ryhmätaitoihin. - Assessing speech communication skills. Perspectives on presentation and group communication skills among upper secondary school students. 310 p. Summary 7 p. 2003.
- 8 TAMPERE, KAJA, Public relations in a transition society 1989-2002. Using a stakeholder approach in organisational communications and relation analyses. 137 p. 2003.
- 9 EEROLA, TUOMAS, The dynamics of musical expectancy. Cross-cultural and statistical approaches to melodic expectations. - Musiikillisten odotusten tarkastelu kulttuurien välisen vertailujen ja tilastollisten mallien avulla. 84 p. (277 p.) Yhteenveto 2 p. 2003.
- 10 PAAANANEN, PIIRKKO, Monta polkua musiikkiin. Tonaalisen musiikin perusrakenteiden kehittyminen musiikin tuottamis- ja improvisaatio-tehtävissä ikävuosina 6-11. - Many paths to music. The development of basic structures of tonal music in music production and improvisation at the age of 6-11 years. 235 p. Summary 4 p. 2003.
- 11 LAAKSAMO, JOUKO, Musiikillisten karakterien metamorfoosi. Transformaatio- ja metamorfoosisprosessit Usko Meriläisen tuotannossa vuosina 1963-86. - "Metamorphosis of musical characters". Transformation and metamorphosis processes in the works of Usko Meriläinen during 1963-86. 307 p. Summary 3 p. 2004.
- 12 RAUTIO, RIITTA, *Fortspinnungstypus* Revisited. Schemata and prototypical features in J. S. Bach's Minor-Key Cantata Aria Introductions. - Uusi katsaus kehitysmuotoon. Skeemat ja prototyyppiset piirteet J. S. Bachin kantaattien molliarioiden alkusoitoissa. 238 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 2004.
- 13 MÄNTYLÄ, KATJA, Idioms and language users: the effect of the characteristics of idioms on their recognition and interpretation by native and non-native speakers of English. - Idiomien ominaisuuksien vaikutus englannin idiomien ymmärtämiseen ja tulkintaan syntyperäisten ja suomea äidinkielenään puhuvien näkökulmasta. 239 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 2004.
- 14 MIKKONEN, YRJÖ, On conceptualization of music. Applying systemic approach to musicological concepts, with practical examples of music theory and analysis. - Musiikin käsitteellistämistä. Systemisen tarkastelutavan soveltaminen musikologisiin käsitteisiin sekä käytännön esimerkkejä musiikin teoriasta ja analyysistä. 294 p. Yhteenveto 10 p. 2004.
- 15 HOLM, JAN-MARKUS, Virtual violin in the digital domain. Physical modeling and model-based sound synthesis of violin and its interactive application in virtual environment. - Virtuaalinen viulu digitaalisella alueella. Viulun fyysikaalinen mallintaminen ja mallipohjainen äänisynteesi sekä sen vuorovaikutteinen soveltaminen virtuaalitodellisuus ympäristössä. 74 p. (123 p.) Yhteenveto 1 p. 2004.
- 16 KEMP, CHRIS, Towards the holistic interpretation of musical genre classification. - Kohti musiikin genreluokituksen kokonaisvaltaista tulkintaa. 302 p. Yhteenveto 1 p. 2004.
- 17 LEINONEN, KARI, Finlandssvenskt sje-, tje- och s-ljud i kontrastiv belysning. 274 p. Yhteenveto 4 p. 2004.
- 18 MÄKINEN, EEVA, Pianisti cembalistina. Cembalotekniikka cembalonsoittoa aloittavan pianistin ongelmana. - The Pianist as cembalist. Adapting to harpsichord technique as a problem for pianists beginning on the harpsichord. 189 p. Summary 4 p. 2004.
- 19 KINNUNEN, MAURI, Herätysliike kahden kulttuurin rajalla. Lestadiolaisuus Karjalassa 1870-1939. - The Conviction on the boundary of two cultures. Laestadianism in Karelia in 1870-1939. 591 p. Summary 9 p. 2004.
- 20 Лилия Сибберг, "БЕЛЫЕ ЛИЛИИ". ГЕНЕЗИС ФИНСКОГО МИФА В БОЛГАРИИ. РОЛЬ РУССКОГО ФЕННОИЛЬСТВА. ФИНСКО-БОЛГАРСКИЕ КОНТАКТЫ И ПОСРЕДНИКИ С КОНЦА XIX ДО КОНЦА XX ВЕКА. 284 с. - "Belye lilii". Genezis finskogo mifa v Bolgarii. Rol' russkogo fennoil'stva. Finsko-bolgarskie kontakty i posredniki s konca XIX do konca XX veka. 284 p. Yhteenveto 2 p. 2004.

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN HUMANITIES

- 21 FUCHS, BERTOLD, Phonetische Aspekte einer Didaktik der Finnischen Gebärdensprache als Fremdsprache. - Suomalainen viittomakieli vieraana kielenä. Didaktinen fonetiikka. 476 p. Yhteenveto 14 p. 2004.
- 22 JÄÄSKELÄINEN, PETRI, Instrumentatiivisuus ja nykysuomen verbinjohto. Semanttinen tutkimus. - Instrumentality and verb derivation in Finnish. A semantic study. 504 p. Summary 5 p. 2004.
- 23 MERTANEN TOMI, Kahdentoista markan kapiina? Vuoden 1956 yleislakko Suomessa. - A Rebellion for Twelve Marks? - The General Strike of 1956 in Finland. 399 p. Summary 10 p. 2004.
- 24 MALHERBE, JEAN-YVES, L'œuvre de fiction en prose de Marcel Thiry : une lecture d'inaboutissements. 353 p. Yhteenveto 1 p. 2004.
- 25 KUHNA, MATTI, Kahden maailman välissä. Marko Tapion *Arktinen hysteria* Väinö Linnan haastajana. - Between two worlds. Marko Tapio's *Arktinen hysteria* as a challenger to Väinö Linna. 307p. Summary 2 p. 2004.
- 26 VALTONEN, HELI, Minäkuvat, arvot ja mentaliteetit. Tutkimus 1900-luvun alussa syntyneiden toimihenkilönaisten omaelämäkertoista. - Self-images, values and mentalities. An autobiographical study of white collar women in twentieth century Finland. 272 p. Summary 6 p. 2004.
- 27 PUSZTAL, BERTALAN, Religious tourists. Constructing authentic experiences in late modern hungarian catholicism. - Uskontotuturitit. Autenttisen elämyksen rakentaminen myöhäismodernissa unkarilaisessa katolisuudessa. 256 p. Yhteenveto 9 p. Summary in Hungarian 9 p. 2004.
- 28 PÄÄJOKI, TARJA, Taide kulttuurisena kohtaamispaikkana taidekavatuksessa. - The arts as a place of cultural encounters in arts education. 125 p. Summary 3 p. 2004.
- 29 JUPPI, PIRITA, "Keitä me olemme? Mitä me haluamme?" Eläinoikeusliike määrittelykamppailun, marginalisoinnin ja moraalisen paniikin kohteena suomalaisessa sanomalehdistössä. - "Who are we? What do we want?" The animal rights movement as an object of discursive struggle, marginalization and moral panic in Finnish newspapers. 315 p. Summary 6 p. 2004.
- 30 HOLMBERG, JUKKA, Etusivun politiikkaa. Yhteiskunnallisten toimijoiden representointi suomalaisissa sanomalehti uutisissa 1987-2003. - Front page politics. Representation of societal actors in Finnish newspapers' news articles in 1987-2003. 291 p. Summary 2 p. 2004.
- 31 LAGERBLOM, KIMMO, Kaukana Kainuussa, valtaväylän varrella. Etnologinen tutkimus Kontiomäen rautatieläisyhteisön elinkaaresta 1950 - 1972. - Far, far away, nearby a main passage. An ethnological study of the life spans of Kontiomäki railtown 1950 - 1972. 407 p. Summary 2 p. 2004.
- 32 HAKAMÄKI, LEENA, Scaffolded assistance provided by an EFL teacher during whole-class interaction. - Vieraan kielen opettajan antama oikea-aikainen tuki luokkahuoneessa. 331 p. Yhteenveto 7 p. 2005.
- 33 VIERGUTZ, GUDRUN, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Musikunterrichts an den Gelehrtschulen der östlichen Ostseeregion im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. - Latinankoulujen musiikinopetuksen historiasta itäisen Itämeren rannikkokaupungeissa 1500- ja 1600-luvuilla. 211 p. Yhteenveto 9 p. 2005.
- 34 NIKULA, KAISU, Zur Umsetzung deutscher Lyrik in finnische Musik am Beispiel Rainer Maria Rilke und Einjuhani Rautavaara. - Saksalainen runous suomalaisessa musiikissa, esimerkkinä Rainer Maria Rilke ja Einjuhani Rautavaara. 304 p. Yhteenveto 6 p. 2005.
- 35 SYVÄNEN, KARI, Vastatunteiden dynamiikka musiikkiterapiassa. - Counter emotions dynamics in music therapy. 186 p. Summary 4 p. 2005.
- 36 ELORANTA, JARI & OJALA, JARI (eds), East-West trade and the cold war. 235 p. 2005.
- 37 HILTUNEN, KAISA, Images of time, thought and emotions: Narration and the spectator's experience in Krzysztof Kieslowski 's late fiction films. - Ajan, ajattelun ja tunteiden kuvia. Kerronta ja katsojan kokemus Krzysztof Kieslowskin myöhäisfiktiossa. 203 p. Yhteenveto 5 p. 2005.
- 38 AHONEN, KALEVI, From sugar triangle to cotton triangle. Trade and shipping between America and Baltic Russia, 1783-1860. 572 p. Yhteenveto 9 p. 2005.
- 39 UTRIAINEN, JAANA, A gestalt music analysis. Philosophical theory, method, and analysis of Iégor Reznikoff's compositions. - Hahmopuustainen musiikkianalyysi. Hahmofilosofien teoria, metodi ja musiikkianalyysi Iégor Reznikoffin sävellyksistä. 222 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 2005.
- 40 MURTORINNE, ANNAMARI, *Tuskan hauskaa!* Tavoitteena tiedostava kirjoittaminen. Kirjoittamisprosessi peruskoulun yhdeksännellä luokalla. - Painfully fun! Towards reflective writing process. 338 p. 2005.
- 41 TUNTURI, ANNA-RIITTA, Der Pikareske Roman als Katalysator in Geschichtlichen Abläufen. Erzählerische Kommunikationsmodelle in *Das Leben des Lazarillo von Tormes*, bei Thomas Mann und in Einigen Finnischen Romanen. 183 p. 2005.
- 42 LUOMA-AHO, VILMA, Faith-holders as Social Capital of Finnish Public Organisations. - Luottojoukot - Suomalaisten julkisten organisaatioiden sosiaalista pääomaa. 368 p. Yhteenveto 8 p. 2005.

- 43 PENTTINEN, ESA MARTTI, Kielioppi virheiden varjossa. Kielitiedon merkitys lukion saksan kieliopin opetuksessa. - Grammar in the shadow of mistakes. The role of linguistic knowledge in general upper secondary school German grammar instruction. 153 p. Summary 2 p. Zusammenfassung 3 p. 2005.
- 44 KAIVAPALU, ANNEKATRIN, Lähdekieli kielenoppimisen apuna. - Contribution of L1 to foreign language acquisition. 348 p. Summary 7 p. 2005.
- 45 SALAVUO, MIikka, Verkkoavusteinen opiskelu yliopiston musiikkikasvatuksen opiskelukulttuurissa - Network-assisted learning in the learning culture of university music education. 317 p. Summary 5 p. 2005.
- 46 MAIJALA, JUHA, Maaseutuyhteisön kriisi-1930-luvun pula ja pakkojuutokaupat paikallisena ilmiönä Kalajokilaaksossa. - Agricultural society in crisis - the depression of the 1930s and compulsory sales as a local phenomenon in the basin of the Kalajoki-river. 242 p. Summary 4 p. 2005.
- 47 JOUHKI, JUUKA, Imagining the Other. Orientalism and occidentalism in Tamil-European relations in South India. -Tulkintoja Toiseudesta. Orientalismi ja oksidentalismi tamileiden ja eurooppalaisten välisissä suhteissa Etelä-Intiassa. 233 p. Yhteenveto 2 p. 2006.
- 48 LEHTO, KEIJO, Aatteista arkeen. Suomalaisten seitsenpäiväisten sanomalehtien linjapaperien synty ja muutos 1971-2005. - From ideologies to everyday life. Editorial principles of Finnish newspapers, 1971-2005. 499 p. Summary 3 p. 2006.
- 49 VALTONEN, HANNU, Tavallisesta kuriositeetiksi. Kahden Keski-Suomen Ilmailumuseon Messerschmitt Bf 109 -lentokoneen museoarvo. - From Commonplace to curiosity - The Museum value of two Messerschmitt Bf 109 -aircraft at the Central Finland Aviation Museum. 104 p. 2006.
- 50 KALLINEN, KARI, Towards a comprehensive theory of musical emotions. A multi-dimensional research approach and some empirical findings. - Kohti kokonaisvaltaista teoriaa musiikillisista emootioista. Moniulotteinen tutkimuslähestymistapa ja empiirisiä havain- toja. 71 p. (200 p.) Yhteenveto 2 p. 2006.
- 51 ISKANUS, SANNA, Venäjänkielisten maahan- muuttajapiskelijöiden kieli-identiteetti. - Language and identity of Russian-speaking students in Finland. 264 p. Summary 5 p. Реферат 6 с. 2006.
- 52 HEINÄNEN, SEIJA, Käsityö - taide - teollisuus. Näkemyksiä käsityöstä taideiteollisuuteen 1900-luvun alun ammatti- ja aikakausleh- dissä. - Craft - Art - Industry: From craft to industrial art in the views of magazines and trade publications of the early 20th Century. 403 p. Summary 7 p. 2006.
- 53 KAIVAPALU, ANNEKATRIN & PRUULLI, KÜLVI (eds), Lähivertailuja 17. - Close comparisons. 254 p. 2006.
- 54 ALATALO, PIRJO, Directive functions in intra- corporate cross-border email interaction. - Direktiiviset funktiot monikansallisen yrityksen englanninkielisessä sisäisessä sähköpostiviestinnässä. 471 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 2006.
- 55 KISANTAL, TAMÁS, „...egy tömegmészárlásról mi értelmes dolgot lehetne elmondani?” Az ábrázolásmód mint történelemkonceptió a holokauszt-irodalomban. - „...there is nothing intelligent to say about a massacre”. The representational method as a conception of history in the holocaust-literature. 203 p. Summary 4 p. 2006.
- 56 MATIKAINEN, SATU, Great Britain, British Jews, and the international protection of Romanian Jews, 1900-1914: A study of Jewish diplomacy and minority rights. - Britannia, Britannian juutalaiset ja Romanian juutalaisten kansain- välinen suojelu, 1900-1914: Tutkimus juuta- laisesta diplomatiasta ja vähemmistöoikeuk- sista. 237 p. Yhteenveto 7 p. 2006.
- 57 HÄNNINEN, KIRSI, Visiosta toimintaan. Museoi- den ympäristökasvatus sosiokulttuurisena jatkumona, säätelymekanismina ja innovatiivisena viestintänä. - From vision to action. Environmental education in museums as a socio-cultural continuum, regulating mechanism, and as innovative communication 278 p. Summary 6 p. 2006.
- 58 JOENSUU, SANNA, Kaksi kuvaa työntekijästä. Sisäisen viestinnän opit ja postmoderni näkö- kulma. - Two images of an employee; internal communication doctrines from a postmodern perspective. 225 p. Summary 9 p. 2006.
- 59 KOSKIMÄKI, JOUNI, Happiness is... a good transcription - Reconsidering the Beatles sheet music publications. - Onni on... hyvä transkriptio - Beatles-nuottijulkaisut uudelleen arvioituna. 55 p. (320 p. + CD). Yhteenveto 2 p. 2006.
- 60 HIETAHARJU, MIKKO, Valokuvan voi repiä. Valokuvan rakenne-elementit, käyttöym- päristöt sekä valokuvatulkinnan syntyminen. - Tearing a photograph. Compositional elements, contexts and the birth of the interpretation. 255 p. Summary 5 p. 2006.
- 61 JÄMSÄNEN, AULI, Matrikkeliteilijaksi valikoituminen. Suomen Kuvaamataiteilijat -hakuteoksen (1943) kriteerit. - Prerequisites for being listed in a biographical encyclopedia criteria for the Finnish Artists Encyclopedia of 1943. 285 p. Summary 4 p. 2006.
- 62 HOKKANEN, MARKKU, Quests for Health in Colonial Society. Scottish missionaries and medical culture in the Northern Malawi region, 1875-1930. 519 p. Yhteenveto 9 p. 2006.

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN HUMANITIES

- 63 RUUSKANEN, ESA, Viholliskuviin ja viranomaisiin vetoamalla vaiennetut työväentalot. Kuinka Pohjois-Savon Lapuan liike sai nimismiehet ja maaherran sulkemaan 59 kommunistista työväentaloa Pohjois-Savossa vuosina 1930-1932. - The workers' halls closed by scare-mongering and the use of special powers by the authorities. 248 p. Summary 5 p. 2006.
- 64 VARDJA, MERIKE, Tegelaskategoriad ja tegelase kujutamise vahendid Väinö Linna romaanis "Tundmatu sõdur". - Character categories and the means of character representation in Väinö Linna's Novel *The Unknown Soldier*. 208 p. Summary 3 p. 2006.
- 65 TAKÁTS, JÓZSEF, Módszertani berek. Írások az irodalomtörténet-írásról. - The Grove of Methodology. Writings on Literary Historiography. 164 p. Summary 3 p. 2006.
- 66 MIKKOLA, LEENA, Tuen merkitykset potilaan ja hoitajan vuorovaikutuksessa. - Meanings of social support in patient-nurse interaction. 260 p. Summary 3 p. 2006.
- 67 SAARIKALLIO, SUVI, Music as mood regulation in adolescence. - Musiikki nuorten tunteiden säätelyä. 46 p. (119 p.) Yhteenveto 2 p. 2007.
- 68 HUJANEN, ERKKI, Lukijakunnan rajamailla. Sanomalehden muuttuvat merkitykset arjessa. - On the fringes of readership. The changing meanings of newspaper in everyday life. 296 p. Summary 4 p. 2007.
- 69 TUOKKO, Eeva, Mille tasolle perusopetuksen englannin opiskelussa päästään? Perusopetuksen päättövaiheen kansallisen arvioinnin 1999 eurooppalaisen viitekehyksen taitotasoihin linkitetyt tulokset. - What level do pupils reach in English at the end of the comprehensive school? National assessment results linked to the common European framework. 338 p. Summary 7 p. Sammanfattning 1 p. Tiivistelmä 1 p. 2007.
- 70 TUUKKA, TIMO, "Kekkonen konstit". Urho Kekkonen historia- ja politiikkakäsitykset teoriasta käytäntöön 1933-1981. - "Kekkonen's way". Urho Kekkonen's conceptions of history and politics from theory to practice, 1933-1981. 413 p. Summary 3 p. 2007.
- 71 Humanistista kirjoja. 145 s. 2007.
- 72 NIEMINEN, LEA, A complex case: a morphosyntactic approach to complexity in early child language. 296 p. Tiivistelmä 7 p. 2007.
- 73 TORVELAINEN, PÄIVI, Kaksivuotiaiden lasten fonologisen kehityksen variaatio. Puheen ymmärrettävyyden sekä sananmuotojen tavoittelun ja tuottamisen tarkastelu. - Variation in phonological development of two-year-old Finnish children. A study of speech intelligibility and attempting and production of words. 220 p. Summary 10 p. 2007.
- 74 SIITONEN, MARKO, Social interaction in online multiplayer communities. - Vuorovaikutus verkkopeliyhteisöissä. 235 p. Yhteenveto 5 p. 2007.
- 75 SIJERNVALL-JÄRVI, BIRGITTA, Kartanoarkkitehtuuri osana Tandefelt-suvun elämäntapaa. - Manor house architecture as part of the Tandefelt family's lifestyle. 231 p. 2007.
- 76 SULKUNEN, SARI, Text authenticity in international reading literacy assessment. Focusing on PISA 2000. - Tekstien autenttisuus kansainvälisissä lukutaidon arviointitutkimuksissa: PISA 2000. 227 p. Tiivistelmä 6 p. 2007.
- 77 KÖSZEGHY, PÉTER, Magyar Alkibiadés. Balassi Bálint élete. - The Hungarian Alcibiades. The life of Bálint Balass. 270 p. Summary 6 p. 2007.
- 78 MIKKONEN, SIMO, State composers and the red courtiers - Music, ideology, and politics in the Soviet 1930s - Valtion säveltäjiä ja punaisia hoviherroja. Musiikki, ideologia ja politiikka 1930-luvun Neuvostoliitossa. 336 p. Yhteenveto 4 p. 2007.
- 79 SIVUNEN, ANU, Vuorovaikutus, viestintä-tekniologia ja identifiointuminen hajautetuissa tiimeissä. - Social interaction, communication technology and identification in virtual teams. 251 p. Summary 6 p. 2007.
- 80 LAPPI, TIINA-RIITTA, Neuvottelu tilan tulkinnoista. Etnologinen tutkimus sosiaalisen ja materiaalisen ympäristön vuorovaikutuksesta jyvaskyläläisissä kaupunkipuhunnoissa. - Negotiating urban spatiality. An ethnological study on the interplay of social and material environment in urban narrations on Jyväskylä. 231 p. Summary 4 p. 2007.
- 81 HUHTAMÄKI, ÜLLA, "Heittäydä vapauteen". Avantgarde ja Kauko Lehtisen taiteen murros 1961-1965. - "Fling yourself into freedom!" The Avant-Garde and the artistic transition of Kauko Lehtinen over the period 1961-1965. 287 p. Summary 4 p. 2007.
- 82 KELA, MARIA, Jumalan kasvot suomeksi. Metaforisaatio ja erään uskonnollisen ilmauksen synty. - God's face in Finnish. Metaphorisation and the emergence of a religious expression. 275 p. Summary 5 p. 2007.
- 83 SAAKINEN, TAINA, Quality on the move. Discursive construction of higher education policy from the perspective of quality. - Laatu liikkeessä. Korkeakoulupolitiikan diskursiivinen rakentuminen laadun näkökulmasta. 90 p. (176 p.) Yhteenveto 4 p. 2007.
- 84 MÄKILÄ, KIMMO, Tuhoa, tehoa ja tuhlausta. Helsingin Sanomien ja New York Timesin ydinaseuutisoinnin tarkastelua diskurssi-analyttisestä näkökulmasta 1945-1998.

- "Powerful, Useful and Wasteful". Discourses of Nuclear Weapons in the New York Times and Helsingin Sanomat 1945-1998. 337 p. Summary 7 p. 2007.
- 85 KANTANEN, HELENA, Stakeholder dialogue and regional engagement in the context of higher education. - Yliopistojen sidosryhmävuoropuhelu ja alueellinen sitoutuminen. 209 p. Yhteenveto 8 p. 2007.
- 86 ALMONKARI, MERJA, Jännittäminen opiskelun puheviestintätilanteissa. - Social anxiety in study-related communication situations. 204 p. Summary 4 p. 2007.
- 87 VALENTINI, CHIARA, Promoting the European Union. Comparative analysis of EU communication strategies in Finland and in Italy. 159 p. (282 p.) 2008.
- 88 PULKKINEN, HANNU, Uutisten arkkitehtuuri - Sanomalehden ulkoasun rakenteiden järjestys ja jousto. - The Architecture of news. Order and flexibility of newspaper design structures. 280 p. Yhteenveto 5 p. 2008.
- 89 MERILÄINEN, MERJA, Monenlaiset oppijat englanninkielisessä kielikylpyopetuksessa - rakennusaineita opetusjärjestelyjen tueksi. - Diverse Children in English Immersion: Tools for Supporting Teaching Arrangements. 197 p. 2008.
- 90 VARES, MARI, The question of Western Hungary/Burgenland, 1918-1923. A territorial question in the context of national and international policy. - Länsi-Unkarin/Burgenlandin kysymys 1918-1923. Aluekysymys kansallisen ja kansainvälisen politiikan kontekstissa. 328 p. Yhteenveto 8 p. 2008.
- 91 ALA-RUONA, ESA, Alkuarviointi kliinisenä käytäntönä psyykkisesti oireilevien asiakkaiden musiikkiterapiassa - strategioita, menetelmiä ja apukeinoja. - Initial assessment as a clinical procedure in music therapy of clients with mental health problems - strategies, methods and tools. 155 p. 2008.
- 92 ORAVALA, JUHA, Kohti elokuvallista ajattelua. Virtuaalisen todellisen ontologia Gilles Deleuzen ja Jean-Luc Godardin elokuvakäsityksissä. - Towards cinematic thinking. The ontology of the virtually real in Gilles Deleuze's and Jean-Luc Godard's conceptions of cinema. 184 p. Summary 6 p. 2008.
- 93 KECSKEMÉTI, ISTVÁN, Papyrusesta megabitteihin. Arkisto- ja valokuvakokoelmien konservoinnin prosessin hallinta. - From papyrus to megabytes: Conservation management of archival and photographic collections. 277 p. 2008.
- 94 SUNI, MINNA, Toista kieltä vuorovaikutuksessa. Kielellisten resurssien jakaminen toisen kielen omaksumisen alkuvaiheessa. - Second language in interaction: sharing linguistic resources in the early stage of second language acquisition. 251 p. Summary 9 p. 2008.
- 95 N. PÁL, JÓZSEF, Modernség, progresszió, Ady Endre és az Ady-Rákosi vita. Egy konfliktusos eszmetörténeti pozíció természetete és következményei. 203 p. Summary 3 p. 2008.
- 96 BARTIS, IMRE, „Az igazság ismérve az, hogy igaz”. Etika és nemzeti identitás Sütő András Anyám könnyű álmot ígér című művében és annak recepciójában. 173 p. Summary 4 p. 2008.
- 97 RANTA-MEYER, TUIRE, Nulla dies sine linea. Avauksia Erkki Melartinin vaikutteisiin, verkostoihin ja vastaanottoon henkilö- ja reseptiohistoriallisena tutkimuksena. - *Nulla dies sine linea*: A biographical and reception-historical approach to Finnish composer Erkki Melartin. 68 p. Summary 6 p. 2008.
- 98 KOIVISTO, KEIJO, Itsenäisen Suomen kanta-aliupseeriston synty, koulutus, rekrytointitausta ja palvelusehdot. - The rise, education, the background of recruitment and conditions of service of the non-commissioned officers in independent Finland. 300 p. Summary 7 p. 2008.
- 99 KISS, MIKLÓS, Between narrative and cognitive approaches. Film theory of non-linearity applied to Hungarian movies. 198 p. 2008.
- 100 RUUSUNEN, AIMO, Todeksi uskottua. Kansandemokraattinen Neuvostoliitto-journalismi rajapinnan tulkina vuosina 1964-1973. - Believed to be true. Reporting on the USSR as interpretation of a boundary surface in pro-communist partisan journalism 1964-1973. 311 p. Summary 4 p. 2008.
- 101 HÄRMÄLÄ, MARITA, Riittääkö *Ett ögonblick* näytöksi merkonomilta edellytetystä kielitaidosta? Kielitaidon arviointi aikuisten näytötutkinnoissa. - Is *Ett ögonblick* a sufficient demonstration of the language skills required in the qualification of business and administration? Language assessment in competence-based qualifications for adults. 318 p. Summary 4 p. 2008.
- 102 COELHO, JACQUES, The vision of the cyclops. From painting to video ways of seeing in the 20th century and through the eyes of Man Ray. 538 p. 2008.
- 103 BREWIS, KIELO, Stress in the multi-ethnic customer contacts of the Finnish civil servants: Developing critical pragmatic intercultural professionals. - Stressin kokemus suomalaisen viranomaisten monietnisisissä asiakaskontaktteissa: kriittis-pragmaattisen kulttuurien välisen ammattitaidon kehittäminen. 299 p. Yhteenveto 4 p. 2008.
- 104 BELIK, ZHANNA, The Peshekhonovs' Workshop: The Heritage in Icon Painting. 239 p. [Russian]. Summary 7 p. 2008.
- 105 MOILANEN, LAURA-KRISTINA, Talonpoikaisuus, säädyllisyys ja suomalaisuus 1800- ja 1900-lukujen vaihteen suomenkielisen proosan kertomana. - Peasant values, estate society and the Finnish in late nineteenth- and early

- and early twentieth-century narrative literature. 208 p. Summary 3 p. 2008.
- 106 PÄÄRNILÄ, OSSI, Hengen hehkusta tietostrategioihin. Jyväskylän yliopiston humanistisen tiedekunnan viisi vuosikymmentä. 110 p. 2008.
- 107 KANGASNIEMI, JUUKA, Yksinäisyyden kokemuksen avainkomponentit Yleisradion tekstitelevisiion Nuorten palstan kirjoituksissa. - The key components of the experience of loneliness on the Finnish Broadcasting Company's (YLE) teletext forum for adolescents. 388 p. 2008.
- 108 GAJDÓ, TAMÁS, Színháztörténeti metszetek a 19. század végétől a 20. század közepéig. - Segments of theatre history from the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century. 246 p. Summary 2 p. 2008.
- 109 CATANI, JOHANNA, Yritystapahtuma kontekstina ja kulttuurisena kokemuksena. - Corporate event as context and cultural experience. 140 p. Summary 3 p. 2008.
- 110 MAHLAMÄKI-KAISTINEN, RIIKKA, Mätänevän velhon taidejulistus. Intertekstuaalisen ja -figuraalisen aineiston asema Apollinairen L'Enchanteur pourrissant teoksen tematikassa ja symboliikassa. - Pamphlet of the rotten sorcerer. The themes and symbols that intertextuality and interfigurality raise in Apollinaire's prose work L'Enchanteur pourrissant. 235 p. Résumé 4 p. 2008.
- 111 PIETILÄ, JYRKI, Kirjoitus, juttu, tekstilementti. Suomalainen sanomalehtijournalismi juttutyypin kehityksen valossa printtimedian vuosina 1771-2000. - Written Item, Story, Text Element. Finnish print journalism in the light of the development of journalistic genres during the period 1771-2000. 779 p. Summary 2 p. 2008.
- 112 SAUKKO, PÄIVI, Musiikkiterapian tavoitteet lapsen kuntoutusprosessissa. - The goals of music therapy in the child's rehabilitation process. 215 p. Summary 2 p. 2008.
- 113 LASSILA-MERISALO, MARIA, Faktan ja fiktion rajamailla. Kaunokirjallisen journalismin poetiikka suomalaisissa aikakauslehdissä. - On the borderline of fact and fiction. The poetics of literary journalism in Finnish magazines. 238 p. Summary 3 p. 2009.
- 114 KNUUTINEN, ULLA, Kulttuurihistoriallisten materiaalien menneisyys ja tulevaisuus. Konservoinnin materiaalitutkimuksen heritologiset funktiot. - The heritological functions of materials research of conservation. 157 p. (208 p.) 2009.
- 115 NIIRANEN, SUSANNA, «Miroir de mérite». Valeurs sociales, rôles et image de la femme dans les textes médiévaux des *troubairitz*. - "Arvokkuuden peili". Sosiaaliset arvot, roolit ja naiskuva keskiaikaisissa *troubairitz*-teksteissä. 267 p. Yhteenveto 4 p. 2009.
- 116 ARO, MARI, Speakers and doers. Polyphony and agency in children's beliefs about language learning. - Puhujat ja tekijät. Polyfonia ja agenttiivisuus lasten kielenoppimiskäsityksissä. 184 p. Yhteenveto 5 p. 2009.
- 117 JANTUNEN, TOMMI, Tavu ja lause. Tutkimuksia kahden sekventiaalisen perusyksikön olemuksesta suomalaisessa viittomakielessä. - Syllable and sentence. Studies on the nature of two sequential basic units in Finnish Sign Language. 64 p. 2009.
- 118 SÄRKKÄ, TIMO, Hobson's Imperialism. A Study in Late-Victorian political thought. - J. A. Hobsonin imperialismi. 211 p. Yhteenveto 11 p. 2009.
- 119 LAIHONEN, PETTERI, Language ideologies in the Romanian Banat. Analysis of interviews and academic writings among the Hungarians and Germans. 51 p. (180 p) Yhteenveto 3 p. 2009.
- 120 MÁTYÁS, EMESE, Sprachlernspiele im DaF-Unterricht. Einblick in die Spielpraxis des finnischen und ungarischen Deutsch-als-Fremdsprache-Unterrichts in der gymnasialen Oberstufe sowie in die subjektiven Theorien der Lehrenden über den Einsatz von Sprachlernspielen. 399 p. 2009.
- 121 PARACZKY, ÁGNES, Näkeekö taitava muusikko sen minkä kuulee? Melodiadiktaatin ongelmat suomalaisessa ja unkarilaisessa taidemuusiikin ammattikoulutuksessa. - Do accomplished musicians see what they hear? 164 p. Magyar nyelvű összefoglaló 15 p. Summary 4 p. 2009.
- 122 ELOMAA, EEVA, Oppikirja eläköön! Teoreettisia ja käytännön näkökohtia kielten oppimateriaalien uudistamiseen. - Cheers to the textbook! Theoretical and practical considerations on enhancing foreign language textbook design. 307 p. Zusammenfassung 1 p. 2009.
- 123 HELLE, ANNA, Jäljet sanoissa. Jälkistrukturalistisen kirjallisuuskäsityksen tulo 1980-luvun Suomeen. - Traces in the words. The advent of the poststructuralist conception of literature to Finland in the 1980s. 272 p. Summary 2 p. 2009.
- 124 PIMIÄ, TENHO ILARI, Tähtäin idässä. Suomalainen sukukansojen tutkimus toisessa maailmansodassa. - Setting sights on East Karelia: Finnish ethnology during the Second World War. 275 p. Summary 2 p. 2009.
- 125 VUORIO, KAIJA, Sanoma, lähettäjä, kulttuuri. Lehdistöhistorian tutkimustraditiot Suomessa ja median rakennemuutos. - Message, sender, culture. Traditions of research into the history of the press in Finland and structural change in the media. 107 p. 2009.
- 126 BENE, ADRIÁN, Egyén és közösség. Jean-Paul Sartre *Critique de la raison dialectique* című műve a magyar recepció tükrében. - Individual and community. Jean-Paul Sartre's

- Critique of dialectical reason* in the mirror of the Hungarian reception. 230 p. Summary 5 p. 2009.
- 127 DRAKE, MERJA, Terveysviestinnän kipupisteitä. Terveystiedon tuottajat ja hankkijat Internetissä. - At the interstices of health communication. Producers and seekers of health information on the Internet. 206 p. Summary 9 p. 2009.
- 128 ROUHIAINEN-NEUNHÄUSERER, MAIJASTIINA, Johtajan vuorovaikutusosaaminen ja sen kehittyminen. Johtamisen viestintähaasteet tietoperustaisessa organisaatiossa. - The interpersonal communication competence of leaders and its development. Leadership communication challenges in a knowledge-based organization. 215 p. Summary 9 p. 2009.
- 129 VAARALA, HEIDI, Oudosta omaksi. Miten suomenoppijat keskustelevat nykynovelista? - From strange to familiar: how do learners of Finnish discuss the modern short story? 317 p. Summary 10 p. 2009.
- 130 MARJANEN, KAARINA, The Belly-Button Chord. Connections of pre-and postnatal music education with early mother-child interaction. - Napasointu. Pre- ja postnataalin musiikkikasvatuksen ja varhaisen äiti-vauva-vuorovaikutuksen yhteydet. 189 p. Yhteenveto 4 p. 2009.
- 131 BÖHM, GÁBOR, Önéletírás, emlékezet, elbeszélés. Az emlékező próza hermeneutikai aspektusai az önéletírás-kutatás újabb eredményei tükrében. - Autobiography, remembrance, narrative. The hermeneutical aspects of the literature of remembrance in the mirror of recent research on autobiography. 171 p. Summary 5 p. 2009.
- 132 LEPPÄNEN, SIRPA, PITKÄNEN-HUHTA, ANNE, NIKULA, TARJA, KYTÖLÄ, SAMU, TÖRMÄKANGAS, TIMO, NISSINEN, KARI, KÄÄNTÄ, LEILA, VIRKKULA, TIINA, LAITINEN, MIKKO, PAHTA, PÄIVI, KOSKELA, HEIDI, LÄHDESMÄKI, SALLA & JOUSMÄKI, HENNA, Kansallinen kyselytutkimus englannin kielestä Suomessa: Käyttö, merkitys ja asenteet. - National survey on the English language in Finland: Uses, meanings and attitudes. 365 p. 2009.
- 133 HEIKKINEN, OLLI, Äänitemoodi. Äänite musiikillisessa kommunikaatiossa. - Recording Mode. Recordings in Musical Communication. 149 p. 2010.
- 134 LÄHDESMÄKI, TUULI (ED.), Gender, Nation, Narration. Critical Readings of Cultural Phenomena. 105 p. 2010.
- 135 MIKKONEN, INKA, "Olen sitä mieltä, että". Lukiolaisten yleisönasotekstien rakenne ja argumentointi. - "In my opinion..." Structure and argumentation of letters to the editor written by upper secondary school students. 242 p. Summary 7 p. 2010.
- 136 NIEMINEN, TOMMI, Lajien synty. Tekstilaji kielitieteen semioottisessa metateoriassa. - Origin of genres: Genre in the semiotic metatheory of linguistics. 303 p. Summary 6 p. 2010.
- 137 KÄÄNTÄ, LEILA, Teacher turn allocation and repair practices in classroom interaction. A multisemiotic perspective. - Opettajan vuoronanto- ja korjauskäytännöt luokkahuonevuorovaikutuksessa: multisemioottinen näkökulma. 295 p. Yhteenveto 4 p. 2010. HUOM: vain verkkoversiona.
- 138 SAARIMÄKI, PASI, Naimisen normit, käytännöt ja konfliktit. Esiaviollinen ja aviollinen seksuaalisuus 1800-luvun lopun keskisuomalaisella maaseudulla. - The norms, practices and conflicts of sex and marriage. Premarital and marital sexual activity in rural Central Finland in the late nineteenth century. 275 p. Summary 12 p. 2010.
- 139 KUUVA, SARI, Symbol, Munch and creativity: Metabolism of visual symbols. - Symboli, Munch ja luovuus - Visuaalisten symbolien metabolismi. 296 p. Yhteenveto 4 p. 2010.
- 140 SKANIAKOS, TERHI, Discoursing Finnish rock. Articulations of identities in the Saimaailmiö rock documentary. - Suomi-rockin diskursseja. Identiteettien artikulaatioita Saimaailmiö rockdokumenttielokuvassa. 229 p. 2010.
- 141 KAUPPINEN, MERJA, Lukemisen linjaukset - lukutaito ja sen opetus perusopetuksen äidinkielen ja kirjallisuuden opetus suunnitelmassa. - Literacy delineated - reading literacy and its instruction in the curricula for the mother tongue in basic education. 338 p. Summary 8 p. 2010.
- 142 PEKKOLA, MIKA, Prophet of radicalism. Erich Fromm and the figurative constitution of the crisis of modernity. - Radikalismiprofeetta. Erich Fromm ja modernisaation kriisin figuratiivinen rakentuminen. 271 p. Yhteenveto 2 p. 2010.
- 143 KOKKONEN, LOITTA, Pakolaisten vuorovaikutussuhteet. Keski-Suomeen muuttaneiden pakolaisten kokemuksia vuorovaikutussuhteistaan ja kiinnittymisestäään uuteen sosiaaliseen ympäristöön. - Interpersonal relationships of refugees in Central Finland: perceptions of relationship development and attachment to a new social environment. 260 p. Summary 8 p. 2010.
- 144 KANANEN, HELI KAARINA, Kontrolloitu sopeutuminen. Ortodoksinen siirtoväki sotien jälkeisessä Ylä-Savossa (1946-1959). - Controlled integration: Displaced orthodox Finns in postwar upper Savo (1946-1959). 318 p. Summary 4 p. 2010.

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN HUMANITIES

- 145 NISSI, RIIKKA, Totuuden jäljillä. Tekstin tulkin-
ta nuorten aikuisten raamattupiirikeskuste-
luissa. – In search of the truth. Text interpre-
tation in young adults' Bible study conversa-
tions. 351 p. Summary 5 p. 2010.
- 146 LILJA, NIINA, Ongelmista oppimiseen. Toisen
aloittamat korjausjaksot kakkoskielisessä kes-
kustelussa. – Other-initiated repair sequences
in Finnish second language interactions.
336 p. Summary 8 p. 2010.
- 147 VÁRADI, ILDIKÓ, A parasztpolgárosodás
„finn útja”. Kodolányi János finnországi
tevékenysége és finn útirajzai. – The “Finn-
ish Way” of Peasant-Bourgeoisization. János
Kodolányi's Activity in Finland and His
Travelogues on Finland. 182 p. Summary 3 p.
2010.
- 148 HANKALA, MARI, Sanomalehdellä aktiiviseksi
kansalaiseksi? Näkökulmia nuorten sanoma-
lehtien lukijuuteen ja koulun sanomalehti-
tiopetukseen. – Active citizenship through
newspapers? Perspectives on young people's
newspaper readership and on the use of
newspapers in education. 222 p. Summary 5
p. 2011.
- 149 SALMINEN, ELINA, Monta kuvaa menneisyy-
destä. Etnologinen tutkimus museokokoel-
mien yksityisyydestä ja julkisuudesta. – Im-
ages of the Past. An ethnological study of the
privacy and publicity of museum collections.
226 p. Summary 5 p. 2011. HUOM: vain verk-
koversiona.
- 150 JÄRVI, ULLA, Media terveyden lähteillä. Miten
sairaus ja terveys rakentuvat 2000-luvun
mediassa. – Media forces and health sources.
Study of sickness and health in the media.
209 p. Summary 3 p. 2011.
- 151 ULLAKONOJA, RIIKKA, Da. Eto vopros! Prosodic
development of Finnish students' read-aloud
Russian during study in Russia. – Suoma-
laisten opiskelijoiden lukupuhunnan prosodi-
nen kehittyminen vaihto-opiskelujakson
aikana Venäjällä. 159 p. (208 p.)
Summary 5 p. 2011.
- 152 MARITA VOS, RAGNHILD LUND, ZVI REICH AND
HALLIKI HARRO-LOIT (EDS), Developing a Crisis
Communication Scorecard. Outcomes of
an International Research Project 2008-2011
(Ref.). 340 p. 2011.
- 153 PUNKANEN, MARKO, Improvisational music
therapy and perception of emotions in music
by people with depression. 60 p. (94 p.)
Yhteenveto 1 p. 2011.
- 154 DI ROSARIO, GIOVANNA, Electronic poetry.
Understanding poetry in the digital environ-
ment. – Elektroninen runous. Miten runous
ymmärretään digitaalisessa ympäristössä?
327 p. Tiivistelmä 1 p. 2011.
- 155 TUURI, KAI, Hearing Gestures: Vocalisations
as embodied projections of intentionality in
designing non-speech sounds for communi-
cative functions. – Puheakteissa kehollisesti
välittyvä intentionaalisuus apuna ei-kiellelli-
sesti viestivien käyttöliittymä-äänien
suunnittelussa. 50 p. (200 p.) Yhteenveto 2 p.
2011.
- 156 MARTIKAINEN, JARI, Käsitettävä taidehistoria.
Kualähtöinen malli taidehistorian opetuk-
seen kuvallisen ilmaisen ammatillisessa
perustutkinnossa. – Grasping art history. A
picture-based model for teaching art history
in the vocational basic degree programme in
visual arts. 359 p. Summary 10 p. 2011.
- 157 HAKANEN, MARKO, Vallan verkostoissa.
Per Brahe ja hänen klienttinsä 1600-luvun
Ruotsin valtakunnassa. – Networks of
Power: Per Brahe and His Clients in the
Sixteenth-Century Swedish Empire. 216 p.
Summary 6 p. 2011.
- 158 LINDSTRÖM, TUIJA ELINA, Pedagogisia merki-
tyksiä koulun musiikintunneilla peruso-
petuksen yläluokkien oppilaiden näkökul-
masta. – Pedagogical Meanings in Music
Education from the Viewpoint of Students
of Junior High Grades 7-9. 215 p. 2011.
- 159 ANCKAR, JOANNA, Assessing foreign lan-
guage listening comprehension by means of
the multiple-choice format: processes and
products. – Vieraan kielen kuullun ym-
märtämistaidon mittaaminen monivalinta-
tehtävien avulla: prosesseja ja tuloksia. 308
p. Tiivistelmä 2 p. 2011.
- 160 EKSTRÖM, NORA, Kirjoittamisen opettajan
kertomus. Kirjoittamisen opettamisesta
kognitiiviselta pohjalta. – The story of writ-
ing teacher. Teaching writing from cognitive
base. 272 p. Tiivistelmä 4 p. 2011.
- 161 HUOVINEN, MIKA, Did the east belong
to the SS? The realism of the SS demo-
graphic reorganisation policy in the light
of the germanisation operation of SS- und
Polizeiführer Odilo Globocnik. – Kuuluiko
Itä SS-järjestölle? SS-järjestön uudelleen-
järjestelypolitiikan realismisuus SS- ja poliisi-
johtaja Odilo Globocnikin germaanistamis-
operaation valossa. 268 p. Tiivistelmä 1 p.
2011.
- 162 PAKKANEN, IRENE, Käydään juttukauppaa.
Freelancerin ja ostajan kohtaamia journa-
lismia kauppapaikalla. – Let's do story
business. Encounters of freelancers and
buyers at the marketplace of journalism.
207 p. 2011.
- 163 KOSKELA, HEIDI, Constructing knowledge:
Epistemic practices in three television inter-
view genres. – Tietoa rakentamassa: epis-
teemiset käytänteet kolmessa eri
televisiohaastattelugenressä.
68 p. (155 p.) Yhteenveto 3 p. 2011.
- 164 PÖYHÖNEN, MARKKU O., Muusikon tietämisen
tavat. Moniälykyys, hiljainen tieto ja
musiikin esittämisen taito korkeakoulun
instrumenttituntien näkökulmasta. – The
ways of knowing of a musician: Multiple
intelligences, tacit knowledge and the art of
performing seen through instrumental
lessons of bachelor and post-graduate
students. 256 p. Summary 4 p. 2011.

- 165 RAUTAVUOMA, VEERA, Liberation exhibitions as a commemorative membrane of socialist Hungary. 251 p. Yhteenveto 3 p. 2011.
- 166 LEHTONEN, KIMMO E., Rhetoric of the visual – metaphor in a still image. – Visuaalisen retoriikka – metafora still-kuvan tarkastelussa. 174 p. Yhteenveto 1 p. 2011.
- 167 SARKAMO, VILLE, Karoliinien soturiarvot. Kunnian hallitsema maailmankuva Ruotsin valtakunnassa 1700-luvun alussa. – Carolean warrior values: an honour-dominated worldview in early-eighteenth-century Sweden. 216 p. Summary 11 p. 2011.
- 168 RYNKÄNEN, TATJANA, Русскоязычные молодые иммигранты в Финляндии – интеграция в контексте обучения и овладения языком. – Russian-speaking immigrant adolescents in Finnish society – integration from the perspective of language and education. 258 p. Tiivistelmä 9 p. Summary 9 p. 2011.
- 169 TIAINEN, VEIKKO, Vähentäjää vähentämässä. Tehdaspuu Oy puunhankkijana Suomessa. – Tehdaspuu Oy in Finnish Wood Procurement. 236 p. Summary 5 p. 2011.
- 170 STOLP, MARLEENA, Taidetta, vastustusta, leikkiä ja työtä? Lasten toimijuus 6-vuotiaiden teatteriprojektissa. – Art, resistance, play and work? Children's agency in a six-year-olds' theatre project. 79 p. (142 p.) 2011.
- 171 COOLS, CARINE, Relational dialectics in intercultural couples' relationships. – Kulttuurien välisen parisuhteen relationaalinen dialektiikka. 282 p. 2011.
- 172 SAARIO, JOHANNA, Yhteiskuntaopin kieliympäristö ja käsitteet – toisella kielellä opiskelvan haasteet ja tuen tarpeet. – The language environment and concepts in social studies – challenges and need of support for a second language learner. 290 p. Summary 7 p. 2012.
- 173 ALLURI, VINO, Acoustic, neural, and perceptual correlates of polyphonic timbre. – Polyfonisen sointiväriin hahmottamisen akustiset ja hermostolliset vastineet. 76 p. (141 p.) Yhteenveto 1 p. 2012.
- 174 VUOSKOSKI, JONNA KATARIINA, Emotions represented and induced by music: The role of individual differences. – Yksilöllisten erojen merkitys musiikillisten emootioiden havaitsemisessa ja kokemisessa. 58 p. (132 p.) Tiivistelmä 1 p. 2012.
- 175 LEINONEN, JUKKA, The beginning of the cold war as a phenomenon of realpolitik – U.S. secretary of state James F. Byrnes in the field of power politics 1945–1947. – Kylmän sodan synty reaali poliittisena ilmiönä – James F. Byrnes suurvalta politiikan pelikentällä Jaltasta Stuttgartiin 1945–1947. 393 p. Yhteenveto 8 p. 2012.