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Oili Pulkkinen

The Labyrinth of Politics

A Conceptual Approach to the Modes of the Political in the Scottish Enlightenment

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ABSTRACT

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Taking the polit-vocabulary – politics, polity, policy, political and a politician – as a point of departure, this study reconstructs the idea of the political in the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment. A conceptual method – a particular mode of conceptual history – plays a crucial role in this study. The political is conceptualised by reading the spontaneous use of the polit-conceptions, metaphors and allusions of the political.

According to present interpretation, politics as knowledge was interrelated to ethics and jurisprudence as well as the political was subordinated to the social, or even synonymous with it. This study contemplates an alternative interpretation of the political as a particular sphere of human life and knowledge.

Three modes of the political can be reconstructed in the Scottish texts: the political as science, the political as a particular sphere of human life, and the political as prudent activity. The internal differentiation of moral science, especially elementary lectures on morals, reflected politics as a particular branch of moral science. The political as a sphere was reflected by the concept of a political society, which represented a particular mode of human life. The differentiation of the political sphere was constructed by histories of the origins of political societies and by revisions of contractarian theories. The political as activity, or as activity-oriented prudence, was separate from politics as science.

Scottish philosophers reflected the political by revising classical vocabulary of the political rather than by inventing new concepts and conceptions. However, the Scottish polit-vocabulary represented a departure from the Aristotelian unity of ethics, justice and politics.

Keywords: politics, Scottish enlightenment, conceptual history, political philosophy, moral philosophy, political society, political rhetoric.

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I owe a lot non-academic history teachers. During my history lesson I decided to study history. I, an 11-year old girl, was fascinated by the nature of history: a world which did not actually exist, but somehow existed between imagination and reality. I was lucky: I was greatly inspired by my previous history teachers, Anna and Ossi Sirola. I am likewise grateful to my family and friends for support during my studies.

Oili Pulkkinen

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Beattie J.

EMS	Elements of Moral Science

Blair H.

LRBL	Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres

Campbell G.

PR	The Philosophy of Rhetoric

Dalrymple J.

MGB	Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland

Dunbar J.

EHM	Essays on the History of Mankind in Rude and Cultivated Ages
IMP	Institutes of Moral Philosophy

Ferguson A.

APM	Analysis of Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy
CAF	The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson
ECHS	An Essay on the History of Civil Society
HPTRR	The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic
IMP	Institutes of Moral Philosophy
PMPS	Principles of Moral and Political Science

Home H.

SHM	Sketches of the History of Man

Hume D.

ECHU	An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
ECPM	Enquiry Concerning Principles of Morals
HE	The History of England
PE	Political Essays / David Hume

abbreviations of essays

AS	Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences
BG	Whether the British government inclines more to absolute monarchy, or to a republic
BP	Of balance of power
CL	Of civil liberty
Com	Of commerce
FPG	Of the first principles of government
IP	Of the in dependency of Parliament
OC	Of the original contract
OG	Of the origin of government
PG	Of parties in general
RA	Of refinement in arts
RC	Of remarkable customs
Sc	That politics may be reduced to a science
THN	A Treatise on Human Nature

Hutcheson F.

SIMP	A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy
SMP	A System of Moral Philosophy

Millar J.

HVEG	An Historical View of the English Government from the Settlement of the Saxons in Britain to the Accession of the House of Stewart
HVEGSSBR	An Historical View of the English Government from the Settlement of the Saxons in Britain to the Revolution in 1668
ODR	Origin of the Distinction of Ranks

Reid T.

BW	Birkwood Collection, Reid Papers
IHM	An Inquiry into Human Mind
LNT	Lectures on Natural Theology
RL	Practical Ethics Being Lectures and Papers on Natural Religion, Self- Government, Natural Jurisprudence, and the Law of Nations

Robertson W.

HA	History of America
HI	An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge which the Ancient had of India
HRC5	History of the Reign of Charles the Fifth
HS	History of Scotland
NI	Notes and Illustrations
PSE	The Progress of Society in Europe

Smith A.

CAS	The Correspondence of Adam Smith
LJ	Lectures on Jurisprudence
TMS	The Theory of Moral Sentiments
WN	An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations

Steuart J.

IPPO	An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy

Stewart D.

DMEPP	Dissertation: Metaphysical, Ethical and Political Philosophy, Since the Revival of Lettres in Europe
EPHM	Elements of the Philosophy of Human Mind
LPE	Lectures on Political Economy
LWAS	Life and Writings of Adam Smith
OMP	Outlines of Moral Philosophy

Stuart G.

HDC	An Historical Dissertation Concerning the Antiquity of the English Constitution
HERR	The History of the Establishment of the Reformation of Religion in Scotland

OCPL	Observations Concerning Public Law
VS	View of Society in Europe in its Progress from Rudiness to Refinement or Inquiries Concerning the Law Government and Manners
Turnbull George	
PMP	The Principles of Moral Philosophy
Wallace Robert	
VP	Various Prospects of Mankind Nature and Providence

CONTENTS

1 FROM POLITICS TO THE POLITICAL

> **…**we are led to conclude with Mr. Hume that *Politics may be reduced to a science*, which in the reasonings and conduct of too many at the present seem a *philosopher's stone* or *a perpetual motion*, the pursuit of wild theorist or artful projectors. Those vain attempts in chemistry and mechanics contributed, however indirectly, to the advancement of the sciences which supplied their materials; and in political disquisition and exertions, to possess moderation in temper, and discretion in change, if not the same thing, is better that to realize *the idea of a perfect Commonwealth*.[1]

This reference to David Hume characterised the nature and necessity of political science in the late 18th century. However, politics and the political were far more ambiguous concepts in the Scottish philosophical vocabulary: although they were common terms, Scottish thinkers did not consider these terms as problematic.[2] Scottish thinkers never focused especially on questions such as what made things political or how to define the political. Only short definitions were given to politics as a branch of moral science. The use of the polit-vocabulary was spontaneous rather than reflected, based on the assumption of a shared understanding of what was meant by the concept of politics and by other polit-conceptions. The starting point in this study is the discrepancy between the obvious importance of the polit-vocabulary and the intuitive use of politics and its derivations. The aim in this study is both to analyse the special character of politics and to examine the political as a separate branch of human life.

The classical origin of the (Scottish) term politics as knowledge was acknowledged by Scottish thinkers. This customary definition of politics as knowledge ignores the other variants of the political in the Scottish texts. The assumption as a point of departure in this study is that the variants of the use of the polit-vocabulary reflected the collective understanding of the idea of politics and the political. This collective understanding of the political was compounded of various conceptions of the political; this study reconstructs the

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1 Pseudonym H-R in *European Magazine* November 1795, 320.

2 Political has been used as a noun in this study.

conceptual web of the political as a group of conceptions rather than one concept of politics.

This study is based on the idea that politics and the political were multidimensional concepts, or rather a group of conceptions, which originated from the different traditions of the understanding of politics and the political. Scottish enlightenment philosophers combined both tradition and change in their concepts. Politics and the political were partly reflected by the Aristotelian vocabulary of politics and by the concepts connected to the Aristotelian vocabulary during history. Another feature, which was characteristic to the Scottish enlightenment, was that both the ideas of the social contract and republicanism were revised by Scottish thinkers. In other words, Scottish thinkers created a conceptual web of the polit-vocabulary, in which the old, Aristotelian, republican, contractarian or divine right views on "politics" no longer appeared as plausible concepts, and thus the re-conceptualisation of both meaning and vocabulary was ongoing.

The Scottish conception of the political can be defined as a special branch of moral science, as a sphere and as an activity of a politician and a statesman. These conceptions constituted the multidimensional phenomenon of the political describing different aspects of it. The political sphere – or a political society – was often analysed separately from political science. The third aspect of politics – the descriptions of politics as particular wisdom – was different from politics as science, and sometimes this wisdom and political science were contrasted to each other.

Scottish enlightenment philosophers and historians were scholars and thus, this study first focuses on politics as knowledge or science. In Chapter 2 the special focus is on the explicit definitions of politics as a special branch of moral science and philosophy; in this sense it focuses on the scientific boundaries of the political. Another approach to scientific unity was the differentiation between art and science in Adam Ferguson's lectures on moral science. Chapter 2 thus reviews the unity and diversity of moral sciences.

Chapter 3 conceptualises a political society by analysing the criteria of the political and by reflecting these criteria in Scottish anticipated histories of political societies. This chapter analyses the nature and character of a political society different from any other society. The main focus is on the variants of the theories on the origins of a political society, the social contract critique and historical explanation of the origins of a political society. The variants of the theories of the origins of a political society, whether contractarian, military or historical, show that a political society was not "somehow gradually established".

The third aspect of politics was politics as a special form of activity. Chapter 4 returns to politics as knowledge, but not as a science or a branch of moral philosophy. This chapter analyses the Scottish interpretation of political wisdom as the special mode of *prudentia*, the Scottish reflection of *reason of state* philosophy, and eloquence as speech in connection with politics and polit-vocabulary. In Aristotelian vocabulary, politics referred to particular knowledge. Chapter 4 also introduces the fragmentary references of politics a as

activity and a politician as an actor. This study follows a chronological order; first by taking Aristotelian politics as a point of departure, and then focusing on the post-Aristotelian conceptions of the political as science, as a sphere of human life and as an activity.

The age of the Scottish enlightenment preceded the revolutionary period in the history of political and social concepts. The period has been called *Sattelzeit* by Reinhart Koselleck and others. *Sattelzeit* concerned political concepts outside Germany. During and after the enlightenment many words and concepts were re-conceptualised and new conceptions, references, meanings and connotations were invented for classical political and social concepts – also in the case of the concept of politics. Thus, the problem in this study is that we should neither project posterior conceptualisations to the analysis of the Scottish texts nor assume that they continued to use the old political languages.

The conceptual method plays a crucial role in this study. Because Scottish philosophers never reflected *politics* and *the political* as problematic, this study is more or less experimental as a conceptual history, and reviews the main principles of the methods of conceptual history. This study maintains that also spontaneously used concepts are worthy of closer investigation and that even the fragmentary references and the spontaneous use of words reflected a specific kind of understanding of the phenomena of the political.

The conceptualisation of the political is based on the assumption that the use of the polit-vocabulary reveals shared problems, characterisations and assumptions as well as variants in the anticipated collective understanding of the political. In other words, this study follows Rudolf Mattjis Verburg in maintaining that crucial themes, problems and questions were in some measure the same throughout the Scottish enlightenment, but philosophical solutions and answers to these questions varied.[3]

The characterisation of the Scottish enlightenment as a uniform philosophical movement is always problematic. This study reviews Scottish enlightenment philosophers, but the aim is not to re-construct a synthesis between these philosophers; rather, the aim is to analyse individual thinkers separately, and note the similarities and differences between them.

The political world changed during the age of the Scottish enlightenment. Scottish political theory reflected enlightenment politics, commercial empire of Britain and enlightened revolutions in France and America. Scottish political theory reflected these changes. However, the main concern is not to conceptualise Scottish political theory but to consider other possibilities to conceptualise politics and the political.

This study concerns the collective understanding of the political and the variants of it among Scottish philosophers and historians Rather than to define the term politics, the aim is to analyse the conceptual web of the polit-concepts and conceptions such as politics, policy, polity, political science, political art, politician and political society. The focus is on three separate aspects: how the

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3 Verburg 1991, 39.

political was defined, established and characterised by the polit-conceptions. Methodologically, the aim is to contemplate an alternative reading of the political in the Scottish texts.

1.1 The Political in the Scottish Enlightenment Studies

The political theory of the Scottish enlightenment has been a topic of intense study. Scottish philosophy has been depicted as a step from political philosophy to the science of politics. Thus, methodological approaches and political science have been crucial topics of interest since Duncan Forbes' *Hume's Philosophical Politics* (1975). Characteristics to Scottish studies have also been several successful attempts to reconstruct the connections between philosophy and politics, especially between natural law and politics and between moral theory and politics.

Scottish philosophers have also been regarded as political actors during their own time. Special effort has paid on revised republicanism and commercial empire, especially since J.G.A. Pocock's *The Machiavellian Moment* (1975) and *Virtue, Commerce, and History* (1985). In Scottish studies political theory has usually been reconstructed by polarisations and conceptual hybrids, such as legalism versus participation or politics as ethics and jurisprudence. The special focus has been on political philosophy and political theory, not on the concept of politics or the political. The following examples characterise the customary conceptions of the political in the Scottish studies: the political in connection with the social theory and politics as science.

I The Social as the Political

The political has often been implicitly associated with the social theory of the Scottish thinkers. Although Scottish philosophers did not regard themselves as sociologists, but civil moralists, they have often been regarded as the forefathers of modern sociology.[4] This assumption is derived from their conceptions of history, especially the four-stages theory, as a sociological theory on the uniformity of human / economic behaviour between particular societies during the (anticipated) history.[5] The "sociological" interpretation of Scottish philosophy has been based on the Scottish criticism on social contracts and the idea of naturally social men. One reason to regard Scottish philosophers as sociologists or Whig historians, has been the emergence of the concept of civility.[6] Scottish social philosophy, as "pre-modern sociology", has commonly been regarded as an obvious progress in human sciences. It has been interrelated to classical political philosophy, especially to republicanism and

4 Dwyer 1987, 3.

5 Eriksson 1988, 173, 193, 211.

6 Kidd 1993, 119, passim.

contractarian theories, or to the historical critique of each of them. This assumption concerning Scottish philosophy introduces only vague references to the special history of politics, and thus, the political has been regarded as subordinated to the social and even replaced by the social in the contributions. This study maintains that these modes of interpretation do not sufficiently consider politics as a separate and refined part of moral philosophy, and the political as a special domain of human sciences and life.

In connection with the sociological approach to Scottish philosophy the definitions of the terms *civil* and *civil society* are crucial in reviewing politics and the political. Scottish thinkers explicitly defined a society as a union of men or men bound together. Alternatively, Scottish thinkers did not define the meaning of those concepts at all in some texts which defined the idea of civil society itself.[7] The following quotation describes the modern interpretation of the Scottish concept of civil society: "It is synonymous with 'human society', with 'civil government' with the state, indeed with 'human society' in general."[8] The quotation indicates the customary presumption that Scottish thinkers did not make any distinction between different modes of (artificial) human societies. The political context of the terms civil and civil society has diminished.

Scottish histories of civil society characterised the politico-economical development and civilisation process from the very first societies to contemporary commercial society. The political has been seen as interrelated with the social and the economical. The concept civil society has been regarded as a legitimacy of the new commercial ethics.[9] This commercial civil society has been described as an arena of social passions subordinated to historical tendencies.[10] The human sphere has been reflected as a social or economical sphere, not a political one.[11] Taking these interpretations as a point of departure, a number of problems and controversies existed in the Scottish concepts: the controversy between the stable socio-economical establishment and human behaviour in particular societies, the controversy between civil society as an artificial but a natural state of man, and the totality of historical progress or open-ended future.[12]

Conceptually, the existing variety of interpretations of the political suggests a possibility to re-read Scottish texts with a special focus on the political, attempting to separate the social, ethical and legal spheres from the political one. A modern reader has to be aware of the distinction between the Latin term, *societas civilis*, and the sociological connotations of civil society, predicting mainly the nineteenth-century theory of sociology. The Scottish civil society histories indicated these different connotations of the concept of civil

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7 Oz-Salzberger 2001, 65, 70. Oz-Salzberger has referred to Smith, Hume and Ferguson.

8 Ibid. 63–64.

9 Ibid.

10 Gautier 1993, 275, 276.

11 Swingewood 1979, 168–173.

12 Gautier 1993, 299; Oz-Salzberger 2001, 65, 79.

society. On the other hand, a politico-sensitive reader has to be careful with the (possible) political differences between the terms *political* and *civil* in the Scottish texts.

According to Koselleck, enlightened French societies were critical of the politics of a state, and these societies competed with the state and replaced it as a public arena in the Continent. Simultaneously, these societies created an egalitarian discourse arena for politics and politicking as the contrast to (absolutist) sovereignty. From this point of view, characteristic to continental enlightenment philosophy was that the social was interrelated with the political.[13] Koselleck has stated that the contradiction between a political state and an "ethical" society did not exist in Britain, and particularly in Scotland.[14] Despite this non-contradicted relationship between the ethical and the political, the political was defined separately from the ethical.

The concept of public has often been regarded as synonymous with the political. The public can be defined as a society, as a state and as a market.[15] In some measure these concepts defined the idea of public sphere in Scottish philosophy, but neither of these conceptions were necessarily political. The public was divided into non-political and political spheres. To define the political sphere, it is important to define the Scottish conceptions of the political public sphere, in other words, to define the modes of the political unions in the Scottish texts.

Originating from Latin or Roman jurisprudence *societas*, both the French and English/Scottish society concepts were different from the German ones; especially interesting is the difference between the terms *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*.[16] The variants of the concept translated as society – *societas*, *societas civilis*, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* – make the Scottish theory of a political union, as a state, a government, a body and a political society interesting. One might ask what kind of aspects of a society did the Scottish society concepts reflect, and how were the aspects connected to the political?[17]

From conceptual point of view the main problem of the social theory is that it does not make any distinction between the social, the ethical and the political. This study represents an alternative approach to the idea of the social or the political and deconstructs, rather than reconstructs, the idea of social theory. This study maintains that the customary definition of a society as a universal whole as men bound together by some undefined bond should be revised in order to re-conceptualise the political. This means also a possibility to re-think human sociability as a multidimensional phenomenon.

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13 Palonen 2002, 92.

14 Baker 1990,7; Goodman 1994,1–46 , 112–13 passim.; Koselleck 1959, 1988,1–8, 16, 53, 67, 94–96, 96, 144–158; Palonen 2002, 92.

15 Cf. Verburg 1991, 59.

16 Brunner 1980, 53, 87.

17 On French enlightenment philosophy and society, see, for example, Baker 1990, 20–21.

II Politics as Science

Politics as science dominates the recent interpretations of the political in the Scottish enlightenment. Political science has been analysed from the viewpoint of anticipated unity of moral science: as interrelated, dependent or synonymous with ethics and jurisprudence. According to this interpretation, Scottish thinkers did not make any distinction between ethics, jurisprudence and politics. The following quotation by Stefan Collini has described the customary conception of united morals:

> Politics was intimately connected with metaphysics and ethics because it is in the political union, and in the gradual improvement of which it is susceptible, that nature has made a provision for a gradual development of our intellectual and moral powers, and for a proportional enlargement in our capacities for enjoyment; and it is by the particular forms of their political institutions that those opinions and habits constitute the *Manners* of nations are chiefly determined.[18]

Collini has referred to Dugald Stewart's *Outlines of Moral Philosophy for the Use of Students in the University of Edinburgh* and to *Lectures on Political Economy*, and probably this quote reflects Stewart's conception of politics, not *Scottish* conceptions of politics.

The scientific method has been a crucial topic in the Scottish studies. Scottish philosophers tried to create methodological unity by introducing the Newtonian method into the moral sciences. From this "scientific" point of view two opposite interpretations of the history of political science have been represented: it has been regarded either a classical science or the *new* Newtonian science. The third alternative is that politics has been regarded a non-scientific science, because political principles were interrelated with moral ones from the classical age to the Scottish enlightenment.[19] Politics has been a part of "practical morals" or "applied ethics" subjected to morals or as an inferior part of ethics with no special importance to human life.[20] The sociological interpretation of the Scottish philosophy and the conception of moral science have been interrelated.

Contrary to these interpretations of subordinated political science at least a few explicit and implicit attempts to separate politics from the other branches of moral sciences can be identified in the Scottish texts. These attempts to differentiate the political sphere from the non-political are connected to my aim to revise the unity of moral philosophy both from the methodological point view and as human science combining separate branches of human knowledge. This question arises from the controversy between the anticipated unity of moral science and the explicit division given in the lectures of morals. These divisions or classifications could be regarded as a reflection of an internal differentiation of the Scottish moral science. Further, this study is not the

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18 Collini 1983, 26–27.

19 Cf. Diamond 1998, 339–340.

20 Diamond 1998, 337-338, 342 –343.

revision of the Newtonian method in politics, but this study concerns methods in connection with polit-conceptions.

Conceptually, the most difficult problem in Scottish studies is that the concepts of politics and morals (as well as justice) have been used synonymously and interchangeable. Scottish studies do not focus on the special nature of the political. The Aristotelian unity is not questioned.

1.2 Reading the Political: A Conceptual Approach in This Study

The political is conceptualised by the web of the polit-conceptions: politics, policy, polity, political science, political art and a politician. The purpose is to define the political as the particular sphere of human life. Taking this attempt as a point of departure, the aim is not to define the term politics but to re-construct various aspects of the political.

The use of polit-conceptions was spontaneous and descriptive rather than intentional and analytical. This study is based on the assumption that despite the spontaneous use of the polit-vocabulary and the fragmentary references to the political, the idea of the political can be depicted and conceptualised. The division of the political into science, sphere and activity arouses from the variants of the use of the polit-conceptions, especially such as politics, or political science, a political society, policy and a politician. This study describes and defines the similarities and variants of the polit-conceptions in the Scottish texts. These similarities and variants conceptualise the shared basis of the political.

In this study the use of polit-conceptions and the variants of it are matters of closer investigation.[21] The conceptualisation of the political is based on metaphors, dichotomies, contradictions, antonyms and inclusions and exclusions of the political. Different nuances in the polit-vocabularies must be distinguished from each other in order to conceptualise the different aspects of the political. Variants and rare formulations are thus important because these differences might have reflected the first drafts of conceptual changes in the history of the political, but especially because these variants implicated the disunity of the idea of the political. The point is, however, the shared basis of these variants.

The method of this study is a variant of *Begriffgeschichte* rather than the history of ideas, history of political languages, or a history of political debates.[22] This study differs from customary conceptual histories, and some main principles of conceptual history have to be revised to adapt the conceptual method to the aims of this study. Firstly, the strict difference between a word and a concept is impossible to make in this study because the political is defined by the use of polit-conceptions and other concepts in connection with

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21 Richter 1989, 72.

22 For an introduction to conceptual history and its principles, see Richter 1995.

polit-conceptions.[23] In this study the political is defined only by the use of polit-conceptions, and it is conceptualised through explicit distinctions, concepts regarded as synonyms, parallels, allusions and antonyms to the political. Thus, a method of this kind should be separated from reading a text as a political text or defining the political aspects in the texts. Secondly, in conceptual history a conceptual change is always a political act or an unintended consequence of a political act, which reflects social and political changes, and should thus be contextualised into political history. Although Scottish philosophers participated in actual political debates, as philosophers and academic writers they defined politics as a philosophical phenomenon. The concept of politics was a concept of an 18th-century science, not necessarily a matter of politicking in the Scottish texts. The conceptual change in an academic text indicates conceptual-philosophical change rather than participation in actual political debates or a conceptual change as a political act. Additionally, rather than intentional political acts of individual political writers, this study analyses the tacit understanding of the political among those philosophers analysed in this study.[24] Thirdly, a conceptual history of this kind has connections with the *histoire de mentalités*, but in this study mentalities and the conceptual history indicates separate modes of historical interpretation; *histoire de mentalités* is not subordinated to conceptual history or otherwise.[25] Academic culture can be regarded as the particular topic in *histoire de mentalités* with a specific character of its own. This thesis can be read as a conceptual history of the scientific language of the Scottish enlightenment. From this point of view, the language analysed here constitutes language as a communication system and a reflection of *histoire de mentalités* which was constituted by concepts, values and rules.[26]

Further differences between this study and other variants of conceptual history can be found. Because hardly any systematic changes could be analysed during the time period focused on this study, this study constructs the thematisations and conflicts of the use of the polit-conceptions rather than the moment of transformation.[27] This study (re)conceptualises the separate modes of the political. The polit-conception is analysed within the context in which that particular polit-concept was used. From this point of view a text genre plays a crucial role for understanding the political. For example, the lectures on moral philosophy, treatises, and histories can be defined and analysed as different text genres with a particular conception of the political. But the genre did not exclusively define the method of reading; academic histories can be read both as histories and descriptions of political situations in general. The differentiation of text genres was important. Each genre reflected separate aspects of the political with different connections to history and theory.

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23 Cf. Skinner 2002a, 162.

24 Cf. Farr 1989, 24–28, 35; Skinner 1989, 68–78.

25 For the *histoire de mentalités* vs. conceptual history, see Richter 1999, 21–23.

26 Richter 1995, 127.

27 Cf. Palonen 1997, 54.

A text, or rather polit-references, plays a crucial role in this study. Instead, the political is conceptualised independently from inter-, intra-, or contexts. The conceptualisation of the political is not derived from the explicit discussions or themes because the idea of the political was a more or less tacit aspect in Scottish philosophy.[28] For the same reason, the connections to Scottish moral philosophy are selective in this study.[29] This study revises only explicit connections between polit-vocabulary and Scottish philosophy. For example, crucial ideas such as natural law philosophy and republicanism had only tangential connections to the phenomenon and the concept of the political. The attempt is to describe the special nature of the political, not to conteptualise Scottish philosophy as the political. The focus is on how the boundaries between these and the political were constructed.

"The microscopic method of reading" differs from the customary methods of reading in conceptual history. This methodological choice has made the comparisons between English, German and French polit-vocabularies difficult, if not impossible. However, valuable attempts on translation of political concepts have been made by Fania Oz-Salzberger in *Translating Enlightenment: Scottish civic discourse in eighteenth-century Germany* (1995) and by Keith Tribe in *Governing Economy* (1988). In the case of "microscopic reading" the translation or comparison should combine all four stages of the text: vocabulary, text, context and genre, with special focus on vocabulary and genre, whereas text and context – although crucial for conceptual history in general – plays a minor role in this study.

A conceptual history of this kind has some limitations. Due to the spontaneous use of the polit-conceptions some questions remain unanswered for a modern reader. For example, one of the limitations of this study is that conceptualisation of Adam Smith's political science or politics is problematic. Of course he wrote about political issues in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, but conceptually, he wrote about economy not about politics. According to the commentaries, his "political theory" concerning the forms of government and other classical or traditional topics was fragmentary, especially in comparison to other political theories introduced in Scottish philosophy. As a political economist Adam Smith was an important, but conceptually ambiguous political philosopher. On the one hand, his economic theory has been described as a mechanical theory that focuses on natural, law-like principles of economics and on the other hand, his system of economics has been regarded as a "dynamic", "reflective" and "immanently social" system of symbolic exchange, in which the social and social relations were the "alibi" for politics. These controversies, among others, reflected the different methods of reading and interpretation of Smith's theory.[30] Despite the internal coherence of his philosophy, the explicit references to the political were rare and tangential.

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28 Goodman 1989,1–5.

29 Cf. Skinner 2002a, 59–60.

30 For example Shapiro 1993, 9–10, 102, passim. quoted concepts. Adam Smith has also been regarded as a teacher of governing and political economy.

Although Dugald Stewart referred to some kind of scheme and internal division of moral philosophy in Smith's lectures,[31] Smith did not introduce a systematic scheme of moral philosophy in his published works. Despite the rarity of polit-conceptions Smith's importance as a political theorist can not be exaggerated and therefore even rare polit-references deserve attention.

Despite the obvious problem of the fragmentary use of polit-conceptions the references were coherent and consistent enough to characterise the unity and variants of the understanding of the political concerning definitions as well as common criteria and the nature of the political. One of the solutions to this problem is that every single reference to the political plays a crucial role in constituting the political. As such this study constructs a kind of "minimalist" understanding of the political.

1.3 Sources

1.3.1 The Textual Corpus of the Scottish Enlightenment

The Scottish enlightenment was multidimensional cultural phenomenon.[32] The academic-philosophic culture and universities in Scotland faced several changes in the 18th century: the tutorial system had been changed into a professorial system, the classical curriculum of Greek language, logic, rhetoric and natural philosophy was reformed and secularised. Scottish thinkers used English instead of Latin in their texts.[33] Gershom Carmichael, one of the philosophers of the early Scottish enlightenment wrote in Latin, whereas Francis Hutcheson's lectures on moral philosophy were published in Latin and English.[34]

This study focuses on the academic enlightenment as a culture of "academic writing".[35] The definition "academic writing" and thus "academic writer" reflected Scottish enlightened self-consciousness. Academic writing described a particular method of writing in James Beattie's *Elements of Moral Science* (1790), although James Balfour wrote in his *Philosophical Essays* (1768) [I] *Of the Academical Philosophy* concerning only philosophy in general. Beattie referred to "academic writing" as a special textual genre with regulations of its own.[36]

The political was described in elementary lectures on morals, treatises, various histories and stadial theories. Francis Hutcheson, Adam Ferguson and

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31 Stewart, LWAS 1793, 1963, 414–415.

32 About church moderates, see Camic 1983, 87–88. For more information about the philosophers of this study, see Appendix 1.

33 Berry 1997, 15; Cairns 1991, 31–58 ; Camic 1983, 165–185 , passim.; Diamond 1998, 65–69; Gascoigne 1998, 7.

34 For context, see Cant 1982, 46–59; McNamara 1998, 33.

35 Despite his lack of professorial academic status, David Hume can also be read as an academic philosopher.

36 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, II, 5.

James Beattie wrote elementary textbooks on morals.[37] Elementary lectures were a crucial part of enlightened literature and the academic culture in both Scotland and Germany.[38] Textbooks based on lectures on moral philosophy were written for the use of university students as an introduction to moral science. Beattie's concept, "academic", characterised these textbooks on moral philosophy with contents and language of its own. One of the main aims in these textbooks was to define the proper terms of moral philosophy and the relationship of these concepts. The identification of separate branches of moral science was a crucial aim of these lectures, especially in the earlier works of Adam Ferguson, although the attempts to identify separate spheres of scientific knowledge was not only the Scottish attempt. For instance, Francis Bacon identified and classified both the spheres of scientific knowledge and the relationship between them.[39] As academic texts the Scottish lectures on moral science were different from the texts of the French Enlightenment. French philosophical texts were academic treatises, *discourses* or *dictionnaires* on philosophical topics; for instance, *Encyclopédie de Diderot et d'Alembert* was a noteworthy compilation of existing knowledge.[40]

The change of academic language was problematic in the study of law because laws had close connections to Latin jurisprudence and to classical rhetoric, but the ancient traditions did not serve the practical purposes of legislation.[41] The study of law and morals were institutionalised as separate disciplines in the university curriculum. However, laws and politics were interrelated in the Scottish texts.

This study concerns academic English in Scotland from George Turnbull's *The Principles of Moral Philosophy* (1740) to Dugald Stewart's philosophical works and lectures around 1800. Most of the Scottish thinkers have been regarded as "great names" in the history of philosophy, such as Adam Smith, David Hume or Thomas Reid.[42] This study analyses these elementary texts of the Scottish enlightenment. The boundaries of this study are, however, more or less relative; some philosophers in this study has been regarded as philosophers of only minor importance in Scottish philosophy, such as Gilbert Stuart, James Dunbar and James Beattie. Most of the enlightenment thinkers were professors of moral philosophy, professors of law or historians such as John Millar and William Robertson. The list of sources contains lectures on moral philosophy, or lectures on various branches of moral philosophy, philosophical treatises and histories, but also some "non-philosophical" sources such as letters. The polit-vocabulary is the primary criterion of sources.

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37 Reid, BW 2131/4/II/6.

38 Davie 1994, 59. In Germany Tribe 1988, 11–12.

39 Bacon 1623, 1861, 1963, IV, 79. Cf. Pufendorf's *On the Duty of Man and Citizen* (1673) and William Paley's *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1785) to Scottish textbooks.

40 About the political interpretation of *Encyclopédie*, see Richter 1989, 71–88. Cf. Voltaire *Dictionaire philosophique* 1764, 1967.

41 Cairns 1991 31–35; Verburg 1991, 74–75.

42 See Appendix 1.

1.3.2 Secondary Literature

Scottish enlightenment studies have a rich tradition. A kind of expansion of Scottish studies occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. After this revolution Scottish enlightenment studies have been specialised into (normative) philosophy, political theory, political history and the social and cultural history of the enlightenment.

One reason for the expansion was the invention of natural law philosophy as political philosophy. Since the expansion of Scottish studies Scottish political philosophy has been analysed from various frameworks such as enlightened moral philosophy, Protestantism, or as a part of polite-literati culture. Another characteristic feature has been a kind of transfer from purely philosophical politics to practical politics. Sometimes these aspects have been interrelated: Scottish practical politics has been connected to paradigms of natural law philosophy and classical republicanism. The former, as philosophy of rights (and duties), and the latter, as a philosophy of participation, have often been regarded as incompatible.[43] This study does not deny these relevant approaches to the Scottish enlightenment, but rather offers an alternative reading of the political instead of political principle or discussions.

The social theory of the Scottish enlightenment and (a civil) society had been a matter of intense study. Three of these contributions can be taken as an example of the method of defining the social and the civil. Christopher Berry's *Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment* (1997) is a valuable contribution that focuses on different aspects and principles of human sciences. Fania Oz-Salzberger's contribution, *Civil society in the Scottish enlightenment* (2001), is a good example of how the civil has been read as a society in general. Many scholars have reflected the Scottish critique to contractarian theories. From my point of view, one of them, *Hume's critique of the Contract Theory* (1981), written by Stephen Buckle and Dario Castiglione, has special value. Political wisdom or statesmanship is quite an uncommon topic in Scottish research. However, it has connections to the ideas of conflict and unintended consequences, both of them crucial topics in Scottish studies.[44]

Histories with special focus on the science of politics have been quite rare. Burrow´s, Collini's and Winch´s *That Noble Science of Politics* (1983), which consists of linked essays that mainly focusing on nineteenth-century political science, and the Scottish enlightenment has been regarded as a starting point for the later progress of politics as science Collini has interrelated morals, moral science and social science. He has used these terms as well as philosophy and science interchangeably and synonymously throughout the study.[45]

Scottish studies concerning political science, and especially David Hume's political science, have focused on the method and reasoning processes as in Duncan Forbes's *Hume's Philosophical Politics* (1975) and *Hume's Science of Politics*

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43 Geuna 2002, 177–180.

44 Francesconi 2001; Hamowy 1987; Hill 2001.

45 Collini 1983, 1–14.

(1977) and James Farr's *Political Science and the Enlightenment of Enthusiasm* (1988). Among the others, these contributions have described the idea of the new science and the transformation of method from plain observation the towards experimental method in politics.

The concept of politics has been a field of intensive study during recent decades. However, the references to the Scottish enlightenment have been rare, and not derived from the Scottish-specific point of view. The concept of politics – as *Begriffgeschichte* – was reviewed mainly in German historical dictionaries such as *Geschichtliche Grunbegriffe* (9 vols. 1972-1979) and *Historiches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (since 1971).[46] The metaphor of *policy* – as crucial to political prudence – has been omitted. The history of political prudence has often been interrelated to the history of political science. Ernst Vollrath and Gil Delannoi have introduced some approaches to political prudence, however, without any special focus on the Scottish enlightenment. The aspect of political prudence is rare in Scottish studies; only Peter McNamara has paid attention to wisdom in his *Political Economy and Statesmanship, Smith, Hamilton and the Foundation of the Commercial Republic* (1998).

This study attempts to define the special nature of the political different from any other branches; there are a few contributions with comparable attempts to separate the commercial and the social. In his contribution "*Civic or Commercial? Adam Ferguson's Concept of Civil Society* (1997), John Varty has characterised the distinctive principles of economic order and civil society, and re-constructed the relationships between them in Adam Ferguson's philosophy.[47] Rudolf Mattjis Verburg has explicated the distinctive fields of economy and sociology in *The Two Faces of the Interest. The problem of order and the origins of political economy and sociology as distinctive fields of inquiry in the Scottish enlightenment* (1991). According to Verburg, the tension between self-interested man and social man was resolved by creating two separate but interrelated fields of science: sociology and political economy. In other words, there was no all-embracing science of man and his life.[48]

1.4 The Conceptual Web of the Political

The polit-vocabulary in the Scottish texts consisted of politics, polity, policy, police, a politician, and political (with a noun). The Scottish vocabulary reflected the different connotations of the political derived from both the Aristotelian vocabulary and the variants of the eighteenth-century English vocabulary. This classical polit-vocabulary originated from the Greek *polis*, which had several connotations; as a union of citizens it was opposite to *oikos*, household, despotism and *asty*. These contradictions were based on the

46 Especially on *économique politique*.

47 Varty 1997, 30.

48 Verburg 1991, 34–36, 76, 242.

different spheres of power of a statesman, a master and a despot. [49] *Polis* had two derivations: *politikos*, and *politeia.* The term *politeia* usually referred to an order, a constitution, a particular form of government or to good polity, which was sometimes equivalent to *Bürgerschaft*. *Politeia* had republican connotations, as *res publica*. *Politeuma* referred to the political life of a citizen, or the basic element of a political union between citizens.[50] *Politikos* referred to those who exercise the art of statesmanship different from the monarch and the head of the household, but also to a constitution, a city, or a state and its constitution.[51] These terms had also Latin equivalents: *politica* to *Ta politika*, *societas civilis* or *civitas* to *politeia* and statesmanship *ars politica*.[52] Similarly *polites* and *civis*, meaning a member of a political union, were used as equivalents. The Latin and Italian equivalents to *politicus* as *civilis* and *civile* were used both in republican and legal context as civil law by the Renaissance and after, but also referred to *vita civile* a condition of human perfection.[53]

Politics was derived from Aristotle's *Ta Politika*, which concerned knowledge of the appropriate forms of *polis* in each political situation, whereas Plato's *Politeia* (*The Republic*) considered the best form of government and *Laws* as the second best of form of government. The pre-scientific discipline was not the only approach to political knowledge; Aristotle characterised political wisdom in *Rhetoric* and *Nicomachean Ethics* and Plato did so in his treatise *Statesman*. However, it is anachronistic to say that Aristotle (or Plato) had made the distinction between art and science comparable to art versus science in the modern sense.[54] Further, Aristotle divided politics to *Politike dunamis* (faculty of statecraft); *Politike arete* (capacity of politicians/statesman/*politikoi*); *Politike philosophia* (philosophy about the *polis*); *Politika dikaia* (things in the context of the *polis*), and politics as policy-making.[55] The Aristotelian reference of politics as *scientia politica* remained through the history of the political.[56]

Political wisdom, prudence, *phronêsis*, in Aristotelian vocabulary, *prudentia*, in Latin vocabulary, was contrary to *sophia* and *l'epistemé*.[57] *Prudentia* could be defined as skill, ability, experience, intelligence and cognition; it was *scientia…rei* with connotations to jurisprudence and legislation (*juris publici, juris civilis*) and rhetoric.[58] According to Aristotle, a statesman's intelligence

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49 Aristotle *The Politics* 1981, 54.

50 *Politeia* in Meier 1989, 1034–1036; *Polis* in Nippel 1989, 1031–1034; *Politeuma* in Nippel 1989, 1036 – 1037; *Politik* in Vollrath 1989, 1037–1072, all in *Historisches Wöterbuch der Philosophie*, band 7: *asty*, *despotism* and *oikos*, see Palonen 1987, 308.

51 Rubinstein 1987, 42.

52 Maddox 1989, 52; Rubinstein 1987, 41–56.Renaissance humanists used the term *civil science* to refer to Roman jurisprudence. See also Kelley 1987, 58.

53 Rubinstein 1987, 43–48.

54 Delannoi 1993, 22.

55 Aristotle, *The Politics* 1981, 207.

56 Rubinstein 1987, 54 passim.

57 Delannoi 1993, 10–12, 20.

58 Forcellini 1965 *prudentia*. Brückner has interpreted political prudence as personal, see Brückner 1977, 200, passim.

ruled over desire; the Aristotelian metaphor of a physician, which was still in use in the Scottish enlightenment, referred to a trained and skilled expert.[59] The political wisdom in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and in *Nicomachean Ethics* was different from the political knowledge in *The Politics*; it focused on political speech, and especially the art of future-oriented argumentation as a medium to aim purposes derived from free choice, not from chance or necessity.[60] Plato described the statesman as a weaver of a fabric; a statesman bound people together through speaking and argumentation. The *prudentia* of a statesman combined the arts of a military leader, judges and eloquence.[61]

Aristotle's theory united ethics, politics and jurisprudence. According to Condren, this unity still existed in political philosophy by the 18th century; it was difficult to separate religion, politics and law.[62]The classical theory of politics was often connected to the ideas of virtue and vice, common-wealth, republicanism, common good and civil law, which was Roman in origin. There was no difference between a state, a society and prosperity in general.[63] A modern reader can recognise the central concepts of the political as forms of government such as the idea of *vivere civile* in its different forms, virtue and vice, power, *potestas*, *polis*, the public, a political body, a state with different connotations *dominium*, tyranny and *imperium*.[64] It seems that the sphere of the political was transformed. According to Ferguson, the term *polished* had originally referred to the particular state of a nation respecting their laws and government, but the modern correspondence of the term referred to civilisation rather than to an organised *polis*.[65]

Scottish thinkers seldom defined the origins of various polit-conceptions, and thus only the context reveals the connotations. Only *polis* and *politeia* were explicitly regarded as the origins of the polit-conceptions, but. For example, *polity* was uncommon in the Scottish texts. Robertson wrote about church polity in the American colonies. In this sense the term was derived from its Hookerian origins.[66] Other references to *polity* varied in the Scottish texts. Francis Hutcheson used the term *polity*, whereas the more common terms such as *politics* or *policy* were uncommon in his texts. *Civil polity* was human *polity*, not derived from instinctive reaction.[67] *Polity* referred to civil organisations, to an order, to the administration of a state and the government or the particular form of government.[68] Hutchesonian *polity* referred to the historical,

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59 Aristotle *The Politics* 1981, 68, 204. Cf. also Plato, *Republic*, 1963, I, 271, 405a–405b.

60 Aristotle *Rhetoric* (*Rhetorica*) 1959 1354a, 1358b–1359a, 1418a.

61 Plato *Statesman*, 1952, 167–175, 304a–305d, 311c. Plato described the political fabric in *Laws* 1961, I, 349, 734e–735a.

62 Condren 1994, 41–43, 47.

63 The separation of civil law and private law was the first evidence of the separation of state and society, see Maddox 1989, 55.

64 Condren 30, 35–36, 44–46, 78; Skinner 2002b, 11, 12, 67, 120, 161, 135.

65 Ferguson ECHS 1767, 1978, 208.

66 Robertson HA 1800, IV, 275.

67 Buckle 1991, 229.

68 Baker 1990, 145.

philosophical and functional theory of a state compounded of the political society, form of government, rulers and ruled as well as to particular persons, but it could be interpreted as a political union as well. Countrymen were members of the same *polity*.[69] James Beattie derived polity from *politeia* and it was the proper formula of the terms *policy* or *civil government*.[70] Gilbert Stuart regarded the regulation of property as *polity*.[71] John Dalrymple used the term *polity* to mean *national polity* in his *Considerations on the Polity of Entails in a Nation*.[72] These examples show that there were some differences in the use of a shared concept.

Smith and Reid explicitly defined the term *police*. In his lectures on jurisprudence Adam Smith described the origin of the term *Police:*

> Police the word, has been borrowed by the English from French, to it is originally derived from the Greek politeia signifying policy, politics, or the regulation of the government in generall. It is now however generally confined to the regulation of the inferior parts of it. It comprehends in generall three things: the attention paid by the public to cleanlyness of the roads streets, etc. 2nd, security, and thirdly, cheapness or plenty, which is the constant source of *it*[73]

The French term *police* had a connotation to a constitution, in these cases it corresponded the English term *polity*.[74] Despite this explicit definition, which indicated that the terms politics, policy and police had the same origin, police was a multidimensional concept different from other polit-conceptions, and its relationships to politics, political economy and jurisprudence were investigated. The term had two contexts: the general regulation of a city and the economical regulation: market forces and human activities were regulated by police for the common security.[75] The sphere of *police* varied; for Reid police referred to inferior knowledge for wealth and security which were not essential to the existence of the state.[76] Henry Home regarded the *police* (of a city) as a governing, service of the state and economy; he excluded particular branches of *police* from the political sphere: taxation, wages of labour and charity.[77] Most often *police* referred to the internal, territorial regulation of a town, a village or a

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69 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 79–80.

70 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, II, 321.

71 Stuart HDCA 1768, 1770, 62 ; HERR 1780 I, (Malicious policy) 154, (Scheme …Policy) 255.

72 Dalrymple 1765, 1,2, 20, 35, 48, 61–62, 101.

73 Smith LJ 1763, 1978, 331.

74 Montesquieu 1748, 1958, 551. The French concepts were *La Politique* as knowledge, *L'etat politique* as a political state and *politique* as political, whereas the correspondence to the term politician was absent in Montesquieu's vocabulary, see ibid. 410,487, 549.

75 Cf. Pocock 1990, 139–140.

76 Reid RL 1990, 116. Police originally was a part of the section on politics but afterwards enclosed to the section on practical ethics Reid BW 2131/4/III/17.

77 Home SHM III, 1778, 1993, 116–133, Contents, both the Aristotelian approach of politics and reason of state focused on a city as a *polis*, free city, which was established for the common good and belonged to its citizens. See Viroli 1992a, 28, 36, 81, 189.

kingdom.[78] It corresponded to regulation or maintenance of public markets, communication, and "infrastructure", but it also included the modern idea of police as force.[79] For Reid the *police* meant regulation which concerned all the public branches of human life:

> By Police I understand those Regulations which are common to Different forms of Government for Promoting Religion, Virtue Education, Arts & Sciences Agriculture Trade Manufactures & for Regulating the Arms and Finances of the State and other Objects of that kind, which are not essential to the being of a State or Government but conducive to its well being and Security.[80]

Arnold Heidenheimer has analysed the connections between continental *policey* and *policy*, although these terms were not necessarily comparable. According to Heidenheimer, the English term *policy* had less regulative connotation than its continental correspondence, *policey*, and it was also applied to common people.[81] Heidenheimer has regarded Smith as a mediator between the continental regulative *police* and the British *policy* conceptions.[82] The comparison of the continental *policy* and English *policy* as equivalents is probably controversial because the English historic-philosophical context of *police* was different from the continental one. Both German and French political theory was based on administrative practices by French physiocrats and by the German discipline, *Polizeiwissenschaft*. German vocabulary was based on two aspects as *prudentia* of a sovereign and good *Policey* with connections to economy *Polizey*, also in juridical sense, and *Kammer* as *Kameralwissenschaft* referring to financial praxis, which was studied in connection with Aristotelian philosophy.[83] The governing and organising of a state was divided into three branches in German-speaking countries; *Oeconomie* concerning happiness, *Kameralwissenschaft* concerning the administration of a state, and *Polizeiwissenschaft* concerning non-juridical actions that focused on general order and regulations.[84] Scottish philosophers did not establish the systematic discipline of Police comparable to the German *Polizeiwissenschaft*, although Hume wrote the term with block letters in his essays, which referred *Police* as science. The Scottish *police* was introduced in connection with the theory of political economy and jurisprudence. The economic regulation was related to political economy, but the reference to the general order was introduced as a part of jurisprudence.[85] Although "wise police" might have been regarded as

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78 For example, Millar ODR 1771, 1806, 197.

79 Hutcheson SMP 1755, 1969, II, 265; Robertson HA 1800, II, 295; Smith LJ, 1763, 1978, 361–362, 404.

80 Reid RL 1990, 116.

81 Heidenheimer 1986, 3–16.

82 Ibid. 16.

83 Brückner 1977, 7, 61, 73, 80–89, 107, 266.

84 German case Stolleis 1988, 1998, 503–594; Tribe 1988, 35 –54, 91–118; Tribe 1995b, 8–28.

85 Young 1997, 194. Jeffrey Young has characterised political economy as related to the police branch of science of jurisprudence. Further, Young distinguished the laws of

"art" in practice, Scottish philosophers did not create any theoretical approaches to that practice. Despite its connections to legislation, politics and political economy, or Reid's and Smith's definitions, the sphere of *police* was rather an administrative instrument not a discipline or science.

As already mentioned, Greek politics focused on organised *polis* with citizens and the particular "systems of power" opposite to despotism. Scottish thinkers did not make a similar distinction between the political and the (des)-political. Although *de*spotism can be regarded as a logical counterpart to politics, in the Scottish enlightenment, despotism was regarded as one form of government; savage societies had "informal" (des)political governments, probably not so consistent and based on habits.[86] Despite the political nature of despotism, it was not the ideal form of governing. Beattie described this when he wrote:

> I shall now make a remark or two on DESPOTISM, where it prevails, the will of the prince is the law; and therefore the government must always be *bad*… A despotick prince is generally ignorant, sensual, and idle. He is therefore inclined to commit his affairs, not to many persons.[87]

Scottish thinkers often referred to non-European politics or despotical politics by the term *policy*; but its connections to *polis*-politics were ambiguous. Robertson illustrated particular principles of the caste system as a political system:

> The regulations of Indian policy, with respect to the different orders of men, must necessarily, at some times, check genius in its career, and confine to the functions of an inferior craft, talents fitted to shape in a higher sphere, But the agreements of civil government are made, not far that is extraordinary, but what is common: not for the few, but for the many. The object of the first Indian legislators was to employ the most effectual means of providing for the subsistence, the security, and the happiness of all the members the community over which they presided. With this view they set apart certain races of men for each of the various professions and arts necessary in all well ordered society, and appointed the exercise of them to be transmitted from father to son in succession. This system, thought extraordinary repugnant to the ideas which we, by being placed in a very different state of society, have formed, will found upon attentive inspection, better adapted to attain the end in view, than a careless observer, at first sight, is apt to imagine.[88]

The system of policy was related to the old civilisation of India, and it was regarded as comparable to Greek culture.[89] A similar analysis on primitive tribes can be found in Robertson's *History of America*. Further, he used the terms such as "arts of policy ", "political talents", "refined policy", "genius of Mexican policy", "Mexican police" and "civil government".[90] Robertson compared national manners in Peru and Mexico, so that small Indian tribes

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police and the laws of justice. I hesitate to agree with his definition of political economy as "clearly political economy is in the police branch of jurisprudence".

86 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 292; ECHS 1767, 1966, 1978, 85, 269, 272.

87 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, II, 390.

88 Robertson HI 1794, 1996 Appendix.

89 Idid. 236–237, 273.

90 Robertson HA 1800, II, 224-225; III, 2, 296, 297, 291.

were comparable to states or rather "political bodies" as well as forms of government. Despite the conceptual inconsistency as cultural and historical differences, Robertson regarded the Indian political system as comparable to European systems.[91] These examples described the departure of politics from its Greek origins.[92]

The term *policy* was crucial to the variants of the political. Despite the frequency of that term Scottish philosophers never defined the origin, the reference or the meaning of the term. However, the use of the term indicated that it had two connotations: policy as a scientific maxim and policy as a scheme of action in politics.[93] Usually the term *policy* referred to intentional activity or principles, but James Dunbar used that term exceptionally. He referred to instinctive and biological functions of man or animal by the term *policy of nature*; opposite to art, natural policies were necessary to survival rather than human activity.

For Scottish thinkers the polit-conceptions were universal concepts, which did not convey the idea of *polis* involved nor spatial or temporal boundaries. Scottish thinkers did not define the idea of the political or what makes things political or non-political. Inclusions and exclusions between the political and non-political were rare.

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91 Ibid. II, 111, 295; III, 270-271, 323.

92 Also international laws indicated this departure. The establishment of the laws of nations made international relationships political, and it was analysed as a special new branch of politics. See, Kitagawa 1995, 101–102; Koselleck 1959, 1988, 38–46. Also feudalism was regarded as a system of policy by the Scottish thinkers. See, for example, Robertson HS 1759, 1976, 98; Stuart VS 1778, 1792, 1797, 2–12, 68, 172–175.

93 Maxim in Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 438.

2 BOUNDARIES OF *POLITICS*

In Scotland, unlike in some European countries such as in Germany, politics had no an academic status. As a branch of knowledge it was a part of moral philosophy, civil history, logic and classical languages.[94] This chapter reviews the branch of politics within the lectures of moral science and defines explicit and implicit differences between the separate branches of this science.

2.1 Politics as a Branch of Moral Philosophy

According to the customary interpretation, ethics, human nature, justice, law and politics were interrelated, incorporated or even synonymous. From this point of view politics has been often regarded as ancillary or subordinated to ethical theory and consistent with jurisprudence.[95] However, this unified point of view can be questioned: Francis Hutcheson, Adam Ferguson and James Beattie defined ethics, jurisprudence, *o*economics and politics as separate branches of moral science in their elementary books of moral science.[96] In Scottish studies these classifications have often been interpreted as inferior and subordinated to other definitions of the morals.[97]

George Turnbull did not introduce any explicit differentiation within the sciences in general nor within moral sciences in particular. He incorporated politics, Christian ethics and the Newtonian method. There was no distinction between the branches of politics and morals.[98] Turnbull did not make any clear distinction between the objects and aims of ethics and politics; both of them were aimed at the happiness of subjects:

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94 Cf. Emerson 1992, 134–135, Appendix II and Appendix III.

95 Cf. Oz-Salzberger 2003, 163.

96 *Oeconomics* referred to household economics and thus the reference differs from *economics*.

97 Cf. McManmon 1979, 5; Ross 1995, 53.

98 Turnbull PMP 1740, 1976, contents, 445, 322.

> In Consequence of which it is that the science of politics consists in judging of the propriety and finest, moral and political, of means to bring about and promote the sole end of government, the happiness of subjects.[99]

Both Christian ethics and natural law philosophy have often been regarded as an argument for the unity of moral science.[100] Natural law philosophy itself was not regarded as a separate discipline of science, but as a philosophical background of philosophy in general creating a uniform a basis of philosophy.[101] Despite this presupposed unity of moral philosophy, Francis Hutcheson differentiated morals and politics in the introduction to *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*. Hutcheson divided classical sciences into three parts: logic, natural science and morals. Natural law consisted of the following branches: private rights, or natural liberty, *o*economics and politics, or rights and duties as laws concerning family members, and politics as the plans of civil government. The chapter headings of the text and the introduction were not consistent with each other; according to the chapter headings of *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, moral science was divided into ethics and natural law, which concerned jurisprudence and legislation, *o*economics and politics.

In *A System of Moral Philosophy* Hutcheson introduced a similar division of moral philosophy.[102] Politics, or *civil polity*, concerned the origin and nature of a government, different of forms of government, international relations, legitimate power and desire of power.[103] The notion of the formulation of politics as a right to power and methods of acquiring it was exceptional among Scottish thinkers. Despite the juridical connotations, it indicated that the central branch of politics was desire of power which indicated that Hutcheson's concept of politics had connections to politics as classical prudence.

Adam Ferguson introduced several classifications concerning the separation of the branches of moral philosophy. The first and the most specific classification was introduced in *Analysis of Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy*. There he divided philosophy into pneumatics, which focused on the nature of god and man, and moral philosophy, which concerned firstly "mind and happiness of man" and secondly "external condition and conduct, or… relations and duties of men in civil life ". The latter part of moral philosophy consisted of ethics, which was further divided into casuistry and jurisprudence, and politics, divided into public *o*economy and government.[104] Ferguson did

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99 Ibid. 200.

100 The earlier theory of natural law constructed pluralistic moral and political philosophy as a whole, see Tuck 1987, 99–119.

101 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 110–113, 139. On natural law cf. Forbes 1982, 186–204 and Haakonssen 1982, 205–221.

102 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, introduction; SMP 1755, 1969 I–II. According to Hutcheson, moral science concerned human nature, mind, happiness duties and rights towards others and virtue. Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 1, 63, 64, 79, 87.

103 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, Contents. Cf. to Reid "Obtain political power" in Reid BW 2131/4/III/21.

104 Ferguson APMP 1766, Chapter headings.

not introduce any division of science in his *Institutes of Moral Philosophy*, but the internal division of moral science was again introduced in his *Principles of Moral and Political Science*:

> … the separate departments of science, to which the study of morality refers under the titles of *jurisprudence, casuistry,* and *politics.*[105]

Moral science was divided into different "departments": ethics, jurisprudence and politics. Ferguson also analysed the origin of political society, and finally, in the introduction of the chapter 'Of Politics', Ferguson defined the particular objects of politics as follows:

> We have already considered society and government or national establishment, in respect to their origin and their progress, *we are now to consider them in respect to the good and evil of which they are susceptible, or the comparative advantage in respect which they are unequal. Under this notion we may treat Population, Manners, and Wealth, of Civil and Political liberty, with all its accompaniments in raising the character and genius of a people.*[106]

Here Ferguson implicitly differentiated the theories/histories of the origins of political unions from *Politics*, whereas according to Beattie, the origin(s) of political societies were a branch of *Politics*. Ferguson defined the branch of politics as population, manners, wealth and political liberty.

Thomas Reid's notions on the internal division of moral science were fragmentary in his published works, but the contents of lectures delivered in Glasgow University were comparable to other published textbooks of moral science. Reid divided his lectures into Pneumatology (science of man and God), Ethics, including parts of philosophy on jurisprudence, and Politics.[107] Reid explicated the aims of the speculative knowledge of politics as means to attain particular ends: a political society, in which virtue prevailed, in which there were no crimes, and which was ordered according to real merit.[108]

James Beattie defined the separate branches of human knowledge and ethics in detail. In his *Elements of Moral Science* he divided human knowledge into five branches: mathematics, history and philosophy, poetry and fable.[109] He further divided moral philosophy into seven branches: psychology, natural theology, ethics, economics, politics and logic, which included also rhetoric.[110] Beattie noted a difference between moral science and moral philosophy; science consisted of all these branches, but moral philosophy included only ethics, economics and politics, which were defined as:

> The first I call ETHICS threats of the morality of actions as arising from disposition of the agent and as tending to promote good in general, the second, called

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105 Ferguson IMP, 1769, 1994, contents; Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 115.

106 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 407–408. Emphasis mine.

107 Cf. Reid RL 1990, introduction by Haakonssen, 17, 20–21.

108 Reid RL 1990, 283.

109 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, IX-XV, introduction.

110 Ibid. Contents and advertisement.

> ECONOMICS, regulates human conduct so as to make it promote the good of that family of which one may be a member. The third, which may without impropriety be termed POLITICS, Explains the nature of political or civil society, and the duties and the rights of men with respect to it. A more minute, as well as more comprehensive, distribution of this science might be given, but considering the limits within which our academical rules oblige me to confine myself, this may be perhaps be thought sufficient.[111]

Thus, each of these branches had a special focus: in ethics as moral of actions, in economics as a household and in politics as a civil society. Beattie introduced the "more comprehensive" definition of politics according to which politics focused on particular forms of society:

> Secondly man is a social and political being, who wishes, not only to live in society, and convey his thoughts to others by means of speech, but also, that the society in which he lives should be moulded into a certain form, and governed by political institutions of laws.[112]

James Dunbar did not introduce the internal division of moral science in his *Institutes of Moral Philosophy*, but he defined the branch of politics. The chapter 'Of Politics' focused on the following topics: the origin and nature of political unions and states, history of rise and progress of civil government, forms of government, institutions of government, the laws concerning these institutions in detail, and the public economy as a one of the necessities of the state. The definition of politics was compatible with Ferguson's classification of *Politics* as wealth, manners, population and civil and political liberty in *Principles of Moral and Political Science*.[113]

Dugald Stewart did not define the strict boundaries for politics and other branches of moral philosophy: moral science was concerned on three questions: firstly, intellectual powers of men; secondly, active and moral powers of men and, thirdly, men as a members of a political body.[114] In contrast to other Scottish thinkers, Stewart constructed a synthesis of the separate branches of moral science. He not only incorporated ethics to politics, but also the theory of the human mind to politics, and natural justice to political economy and politics proper.[115] His main focus on politics was political economy, and thus a theory of government – as politics proper - was introduced in connection with political economy. On the other hand, he acknowledged a kind of internal division of moral philosophy by introducing Smith's division of the lectures of moral philosophy into four parts: natural theology, ethics, justice and politics or political economy.[116]

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111 Ibid. II, 5. Cf. introduction and chapter headings.

112 Ibid. II, 53.

113 Dunbar IMP 1789–1794, 1996, 41.

114 Stewart OMP 1877 I, 11.

115 For the connections, see ethics and politics Stewart LPE 1877, I, 17; human mind and politics EPHM I, 226; natural justice EPHM I, 231; political economy OMP 3, Appendix 5.

116 Stewart LWAS 1793, 1963, 414-415.

The main question for a modern reader concerning these divisions is the importance of these classifications: Did these classifications reflect the internal differentiation of moral science and politics as a special branch of it? Because these classifications were introduced in the elementary texts of morals, they characterised the established conceptions of moral science. From this point of view the disunity of moral science was evident, not a matter of debate. As an elementary part of moral philosophy during the age of Scottish enlightenment, these classifications did not, however, describe a progressive differentiation of moral sciences and politics as a process but they described the institutionalised status of politics within moral sciences in Scottish academic culture.

These explicit classifications can be read as short definitions of the separate aspects of moral sciences and separate aspects concerning human life. Despite the variety of the classifications, these short definitions implied at least some consistency about the nature of moral science as divided into several branches of knowledge, with politics as one of these branches. Despite the fragmentary nature of these classifications some remarkable similarities can be found. The contents of the separate lectures of moral philosophy were consistent and comparable to each other.[117] The continuum from man to God and from an individual to a society, from the natural to the artificial, can be ascertained in these lectures: politics was always introduced as the concluding chapter of the lectures on morals.

These definitions described the science of politics as a defined sphere of knowledge, but in other texts of the Scottish enlightenment the relationships between politics, political and non-political were gradually revised. Such phrases as *political view*, *political light(s)* and *political point of view* referred to a departure from politics as knowledge to the political as an aspect. These phrases were uncommon in the Scottish texts. In connection with religious and commercial viewpoints these polit-terms indicated that there was no religious, commercial or political sphere as such but relative aspects approaches as the political.[118] For instance, religious texts, such as The Koran, were read as political texts, referring to the command of a sultan, or canon law was *politically considered*. It was possible to *join* the *political frame* to religious one. Also despotism was related to religious contexts.[119] Non-Christian religious politics especially was related to despotism, barbarism and maintaining power by any – rude – means in domestic politics. Dugald Stewart distinguished between

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117 Cf. Dunbar IMP, 1789–1794, 1996, The table of contents.

118 Religious terms were connected to policy, such as *temporising system of policy* or ecclesiastical system of policy, political constitution in clerical context. Usually the term *policy* referred to intentional activity or principles, but James Dunbar used the term natural exceptionally, He referred instinctive and biological functions of man or animal by the term *policy of nature*, opposite to art. Natural policies were necessary to survival rather than human activity.

119 Ferguson HPTRR 1783, 1799, I, 12; Robertson HRC5 1856, I, 62; III, 144 –145; HVGSSBR 1818, I, 149–150, 173 –177,. III, 43–44, 124–142; HVEG 334–338; Smith WN 1776, 1981, 792. In the religious sphere, for example, in sermons, it was possible to incorporate political argumentation, see Robertson's sermons Speech on Roman Catholic Belief (1779), Sermon on the Centenary of the Glorious Revolution (1788) and Notes for the Feast Day Sermon on the American Revolution (1788).

politics proper and political economy, but this distinction was not enough: some subjects were not politics proper, but could be politically considered, such as marriage and wealth.[120] The contexts of these forms reveal that the alternatives to regard something as political were limited, and also the modern concepts of politicking and politicising were unknown.[121]

2.2 Science of Man, Human Nature and Politics

The science of man was a new science that originated in the 17th century, and it was established simultaneously with experimental philosophy. It was characterised as a science proper, and as a physical science, as a sphere of knowledge reflecting the unity and regularity found in human motives, passions and actions.[122] The lectures on moral science did not define the science of man as a branch of ethics. Because politics was regarded as a human science, it is relevant to ask how the science of man or human nature was connected to politics.[123]

The references to the science of man and politics or human nature and politics were only fragmentary.[124] On the one hand, the anticipated unity of the human sciences was established by Hume's statement on the science of man as the foundation of other (human) sciences.[125] Politics has been regarded as dependent or even subordinate to science of man.[126] The close connection between human nature and the science of man and politics seems to be self-evident;[127] according to Hume, all sciences were connected to the science of man:

> `Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and however wide any of them may seem to run of it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even *Mathematics*, *Natural Philosophy* and *Natural Religion*, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN, … And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences ...[128]

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120 Stewart LPE 1877, I 66.

121 An exceptional term in the Scottish polit-vocabulary was Ferguson's term *social policy*, see Distinction of Value and its Source in Existence, Unpublished Essays I, no 27, 103/ 16.

122 Hankins, 1985, 159–160. The science of man had political importance because it created a morally autonomous self; thus it was not a coincidence that it flourished after the Act of Union of 1707, see, Phillipson 1981, 22–23.

123 Cf. 17th-century philosophy on Raab 1964, 193, 197. Politics was based on experience or reason in the 17 the-century.

124 This chapter is based on references in the texts not to definitions, as in the previous chapter.

125 Hume THN 1739-1740, 1981, XVI-XVII.

126 McRae 1991, 27.

127 On uniformity, Berry 1997, 74, passim. The other version of uniformity was introduced by Barfoot " His science of man incorporated all other disciplines, Barfoot, 1990, 1991, 167.

128 Hume THN 1739–1740, 1981, XV introduction.

The phrase of the science of man as "a solid foundation for other sciences" characterised science as a human construction. It did necessarily not refer to united human sciences, nor the assumption that scientific knowledge would have been applied to science of man. Unlike Hume, Hugh Blair regarded human nature/science of man and politics as distinctive fields of knowledge. Politics was seen as a science of changes and human nature as a basis of actions:

> … human nature, and political knowledge, or acquaintance with government. The former is necessary to account for the conduct of individuals, and to give just views of their character; the latter, to account for the revolutions of government, and the operation of political causes on public affairs.[129]

It seems that although human nature was important in general, politics and the science of man constituted separate branches of science, each with own special focus. A tacit convention in Scottish studies has been reflection on the universality of human nature throughout history. Scottish thinkers, however, did not mainly reflect on the science of man or human nature through political history; rather they were concerned with the problem of time-neutral science and policies, but human nature has been regarded as consistent enough as a source for the science of man.[130] Human behaviour implied by only partial consistency indicated that the universal principles of human conduct, or human nature, were controversial. More particularly, neither the maxims of policy nor politics were derived from the principles of the science of man. It seems evident that although human nature as senses, emotions and primary needs were uniform, the expressions of these senses, emotions and needs varied according to culture and time. In 1790 James Beattie used the term *psychology*, which focused on the human mind.[131] The definition of *psychology* was compatible with the definition of science of man, and this definition explicitly separated knowledge of human mind from knowledge of politics.

To further differentiate the science of man and politics as *a written science*, political maxims seldom concerned human nature. There was only one political maxim "every man ought to be supposed a *knave*", which explicitly combined human nature and politics.[132] Human nature, emotions, especially happiness, were regarded as an important topic in politics, as Reid asked:

> What is the Form or Order of political Society which, abstractly considered, tends most to the Improvement and Happiness of Man?[133]

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129 Blair LRBL1783, 1965, II, 267–268.

130 Cf. Berry 1991, 6-7; Spadafora 1990, 268–269.

131 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, I, 1. See also Spadafora 1990, 135–179. Beattie was not the only one who used the term psychology, but he used it as a part of institutionalised academic language. The locus of Psychology varied in the map of human sciences. Reid divided pneumatics into psychology and supreme mind. Reid BW 2131/7/V/4 p. 2.

132 Hume PE 1994, IP 24.

133 Reid RL 1990, 277.

Thomas Reid defined the happiness and good of the governed as the proper ends of governing.[134] The political connotation was practical rather than emotional or psychological; political happiness often referred to wealth and security.[135] These practical ends of politics can also be found in Reid's polit-vocabulary. Reid differentiated primary and secondary ends of politics. The primary ends of politics or a political society were the preservation of the state and peace. Secondary ends of politics were the promotion of happiness, population, virtue, riches, arms and revenue.[136] Reid also defined the ends of political art as to form a model of the government, "larger or lesser political society", and preserve, alter and repair the existing government.[137] Emotions were hardly connected to the concept of politics as political theory.

The relationship between the science of man or human nature and politics was controversial for the Scottish thinkers. Politics was "somehow" connected to human nature and the science man, but these connections were never explicated. As written sciences politics and the science of man were separate branches of human knowledge.

2.3 Jurisprudence, Natural Law and Politics

Justice was a multidimensional concept: it had various connotations and connections. Justice reflected ethical principles, virtues, or rights and duties of individuals, juridical-legal norms or constitutional justice. In Scottish studies the strict distinctions between ethics, jurisprudence, law and politics have not been made, and politics has been regarded as a derivation of ethics and laws, so that ethical was not merely ethical, and there was no confrontation between politics and laws.[138] However, few text fragments constituted the different spheres of the juridical, jurisprudence and politics.

The main concern of Aristotelian politics as a "master-science" was "men united in society and dependent on each other". The Aristotelian concept of politics was well known in the Scottish enlightenment.[139] Hume reformulated the Aristotelian idea of politics; politics focused on "influence of forms of governments and laws in a society".[140] Hume's politics focused on the effects of laws and government in a society, whereas Ferguson constructed a closer connection to politics and legislation. According to him, there were particular *political* laws, such as statutes, customary laws or conventions, on which the political institutions were based in a particular society, and political laws of

134 Reid BW 2131/4/III/9.

135 Stewart LPE 1877 I, 24.

136 Reid BW 2131/4/III/10. Population, virtue, learning and riches also as a part of police and ends of government.

137 Reid BW 2131/4/III/3, p. 5.

138 Gobetti 1992, 141–143.

139 Hume THN 1739–1740,1981, introduction; Collini 1983, 14.

140 Hume ECHU 1748, 1958, 97.

nature, which expressed the natural and beneficial principles for the public institutions.[141] The legalistic conceptions reflected the ideal that constitutional laws should have been written according to scientific political maxims and principles. Since Plato the legislator had been the central character of political theory with various nuances. According to a famous Scottish phrase, politics was the science of a legislator, but not because a legislator would have been regarded as a political philosopher, but because laws given by the legislator should have been based on the scientific principles of political science. A politician as a scientist-philosopher formulated political maxims and lawgivers introduced political principles into public practises. This connection created coherence between political science and political laws. However, this kind of coherence did not create coherence between political laws and political activity. Ferguson differentiated the sphere of normative laws and politics because the legal system operated as a loose frame of political activity:

> The institution ascribed to those celebrated lawgivers did not put an end to the political operations of state; they only placed the members of society in situations to act with advantage for the preservation and welfare of their country.[142]

Ferguson thus separated the aims of laws and political activity. Further he made the distinction between the domain of political wisdom and laws, when he explicated a restriction of aggression and the maintenance of public peace, which:

> These are questions of political wisdom rather than of strict law, but are stated with advantage, when the laws to which they refer are under consideration.[143]

Laws did not reflect political wisdom or action, but norms of actions. Law would not be a sole guide to political action. Human behaviour was dependent on situations, not on laws. A common principle, which said that a prince was above laws, reflected the differentiation between political activity and the laws. Gilbert Stuart also differentiated between law and political wisdom, but he defined law as wisdom, and politics as a reflection of that wisdom.[144] Gilbert Stuart's conception of politics and legislation was thus entirely contrary to that of Adam Ferguson: wise political actions were derived from laws.

The relationship between laws and politics was parallel to the relationship between ethics and politics. As a historian and philosopher of law John Millar combined the practical discipline of justice, the history of legal institutions and law as a special branch of moral science. The practical aspect dominates his works; ideal laws were based on human experience.[145] In his lectures Millar also incorporated policy, ethics and justice, in this sense the principles operated as rules of actions:

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141 Ferguson IMP 1769, 1994, 283.

142 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, I, 264.

143 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 284.

144 Stuart VS 1778, 1797, 50.

145 Haakonssen 1996, 159–162

> One view of a policy, [which has sometimes induced legislatures multiply statutes] has been that of enforcing the rules of ethics as well as those of justice.[146]

Despite this unity of policy, justice and ethics, Ferguson and Millar differentiated ethical behaviour from the political in their historical writings. Both the ethical and the political were regarded as separate spheres of human life.[147] Ferguson stated that "the political" and "the moral" constituted different approaches to man or to a particular nation; general virtue and vice must be differentiated from the political as the abilities to maintain their political state:

> To distinguish the political from the moral character, we must recollect, that although a man may be virtuous or vicious in any situation, and conversant in materials, yet there are, in relation to circumstances and manner of life, certain habits which enable those who are possessed of them to give their virtues the proper effect in particular case, or in the treatment of matters, in which they are particularly concerned … Where habits proper to the political state are obtained, they constitute a value of a political character; or where the people are by contrary habits disqualified to maintain the political form of community, or to pursue the objects of state; their number may be great, but they are not of proportional value to the nations they constitute … the people in their political point of view is their fitness to reap to preserve, and to improve their own institutions, and to support their country in pursuits of its respective objects.[148]

Here Ferguson did not define the political as a discipline of politics, but as activity. He characterised the political activity as teleological activity, a pursuit for common interest and for the maintenance of the ideal state.

Legislation was a discipline separate from politics, but the explicit references to the relationship between politics and jurisprudence, politics and philosophical backgrounds of laws were rare. Francis Hutcheson and James Beattie defined rights and duties as topics of political science. Hutcheson's conception of politics as civil polity explicated a political-juridical state with rights and duties of its members. Beattie identified politics as a science of a civil society, rights and duties:

> POLITICS, Explains the nature of political or civil society, and the duties and the rights of men with respect to it.[149]

The chapter 'Of politics' in Beattie's *Elements of Moral Science* focused on "the origin and nature of Policy or Civil Government" starting with an introduction concerning the nature of godly and human laws, which were consistent to each others, promulgating also moral laws.[150] In the beginning of Chapter II, 'Of the Origin and Nature of Civil Government', Beattie made a conceptual move:

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146 Millar, MS Gen. 203, 28.

147 Cf. Reid RL 1990, 245, also Diamond 1998, 189.

148 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 413–414.

149 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, introduction and the chapter headings II, 5.

150 Ibid. II, 224–233.

> Having premised these few things concerning *the law in general*, I proceed to consider the *origin and nature of Civil Government*, and *laws the essential to the several forms of it*.[151]

The thematic change from the general juridical sphere to the political or juridical sphere based on political principles is clear in this quotation; thus, the text made the distinction between general laws and politics and particular political laws.

Despite the differentiation of ethics, laws and politics, the scientific ideal was that laws implied universal moral laws of human conscience and politics.[152] Smith defined the sphere of jurisprudence:

> Jurisprudence is the theory of the rules by which civil governments ought to be directed.[153]

Smith did not introduce any explicit definition concerning the relationship between politics, law and jurisprudence, but the context of his famous metaphor "politicians as insidious and crafty animals" suggested the separate realms of the skills of a politician and a legislator. A legislator was concerned with general principles "which are always the same", while a politician focused on "momentary fluctuations of affairs, such as changes of commerce and prices".[154] This famous phrase characterised legislation instead of jurisprudence, and politics as activity, instead of political theory. Here legislation represented what was regarded as universal, and politics as temporal. Further, Smith regarded legislation as a science and politics as a skill, but not as a science. A politician looked for temporal advantage whereas a lawyer-statesman looked for the anticipated natural order. These separate spheres and ends of activity were not mutually exclusive, but politicians and statesmen were motivated by different aims and ends. This distinction of politics as activity and legislation was parallel to the relationship between politics. According to McNamara, there were tensions between ethics and politics.[155] Despite the ethical ideal of interrelated ethics, laws and politics, there were similar tensions between laws and political activity.

Thomas Reid's vocabulary of jurisprudence/justice was exceptional among Scottish thinkers; he differentiated jurisprudential approaches by the concepts of private jurisprudence, *o*economical jurisprudence and political jurisprudence.[156] He also distinguished the science of morals (focus on systematising human rights and duties) from science of philosophy, or theory of morals (focus on the human capacity to distinguish right from wrong).[157]

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151 Ibid. II, 322.

152 Ibid. II, 228-229.

153 Smith LJ, 1978, 5.

154 Smith WN 1776, 1981, 468.

155 McNamara 1998, 19.

156 Reid RL 1990, 197. Reid also divided universal natural rights into oeconomical rights and political rights, see ibid. 113–115.

157 Dalgarno 1984, 16.

Reid maintained that it was not easy to make a difference between the *spheres* of "Ethicks and Politics" in contemporary commercial society; however, he proposed such as a distinction:

> It is difficult in this question to separate the *Provinces* of Morals and Politicks … In Politicks we do not enquire what is Right or Wrong, but what are the Causes that produce such or such *Events* in Society: or on the other hand what are the Effects and Consequences of that follow from such constitutions, But in Morals of which Iurisprudence is a part we enquire what is right or wrong in human Conduct, what conduct in us is consistent with the rights of our fellow Men & what inconsistent.[158]

The relationship between natural law and politics was not conceptually explicated. Reid only distinguished political jurisprudence, as rights and obligations "arising from" the political state or civil government, from *politicks proper*:

> Dr Hutcheson who … employs … on Questions that belong to politicks and not to morals. These therefore we shall entirely pass over leaving the Subjects treated them to be considered in their proper place in Our system of Politicks … All Questions belonging to Jurisprudence are questions rights and wrong. … are determined of our Moral Faculty. And those Moral Axioms … in the General part of Ethicks are the foundation of all our Reasoning. Politicks is quite different Science and built upon a different foundation. The intention of this Science is to shew from what the Causes the Different Kinds of Civil Government Whether Despotick Monarchical Aristocratical Democratical take their Rise how they are preserved or Destroyed. What Effects they produce with Regard to Liberty National Riches Commerce Learning Morals & Religion …. We do not therefore in Politicks any more than in Mathematicks or in Physics Enquire what is right or what is wrong either in the Conduct of States or in that of Individuals. And in this Science we Reason not from Moral Axioms but from axioms of a quite Different Nature … Having thus distinguished that part of Jurisprudence which threats of the Rights and Obligations belonging to the Political State from Science of Politics.[159]

Reid's political jurisprudence reflects the rights and duties of the particular political relationships such as a subject – a sovereign and fellow citizens, whereas politics focused on the models and functions of the political system as a whole. Reid's political jurisprudence transformed the ethic-legal into political. The parallel attempts in the Scottish enlightenment were rare: politics, and ethic-juridical constituted separate branches of their own as specific branches of science. Reid also rejected the connection between natural law and politics in his Lectures on Pneumatology, Ethics and Politics: "Politics has been long bounded with the law of nature, but this is im[proper]…"[160]

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158 Reid RL 1990, 162, passim. Diamond has formulated Reid's politics differently; politics did not concern what men ought to do, or what they may do, but what it may be expected they will do, and thus politics did not concern what kind of government ought to be or might have been, but what kind of government is possible. Diamond, 1998, 348.

159 Reid RL 1990, 245–246. According to Diamond political jurisprudence was transformative discipline, which transformed normative ethics and scientific politics together. Diamond 1998, 360–361.

160 Reid's *Lectures* 1774–1776, notes by Robert Jack MS Gen 116–118. Pneumatics was a science concerning God and man

In the lecture on politics Reid explained that only Machiavelli and Harrington had distinguished politics from natural law philosophy.[161] The separation of politics and natural law philosophy asserted the independence of politics as a science. It was no more an applied science of any philosophical idea *a priori*, like natural law philosophy.

These variants of explicit definitions between politics and other branches of human life reflected the differentiation of the social and the political, and more particularly, to the differentiation of separate approaches to man. The discussion about man as a social and political being was introduced as separate discussions about social man and political man. This separation can be constructed by the explicit references to different spheres of knowledge. Even the short and tangential definitions of politics and other branches of moral philosophy suggested that it was an independent field of knowledge.

2.4 From Oeconomy to Political Economy

Politics was not a uniform branch of science; political economy was a particular branch of politics. There are two interesting problems in political economy: political economy versus private economy, and the relationship between political economy and politics proper. This chapter concerns political economy as a branch of knowledge, as a historical phenomenon and as a definition of the political sphere. The main focus is on Smith and Hume.

Adam Smith did not give any systematic reconstruction of the branches of moral philosophy. Conceptually, it is very difficult to characterise Smith's economic theory and its connections to the political and the other branches of human life. Peil has characterised Smith's economic theory as systematic, rational, positive, normative and applied to politics.[162] Young has differentiated political action from economic action. Economic actions were self-interested, whereas political actions were motivated by self-interest, factions, corruption, social interests and public spirit. Young has further separated the social welfare as a result of governmental actions and the economic welfare as a result of intended consequences.[163] These characterisations define neither the criteria of the political nor the modes of the political in political economy but economics. The difficulty concerns not only Smith but also the Scottish enlightenment in general. The spheres of politics and economics and the connections between economics and politics seemed to be undefined or ambiguous.[164] For instance, Ferguson included the economics – wealth, revenue and population – to politics, whereas Stewart did not reconstruct any necessary connection between

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161 ibid. This claim was an interesting speculation, that as political scientists both Machiavelli and Harrington regarded politics as independent from metaphysical philosophy *a priori* setting the values of politics.

162 Peil 1999, 64.

163 Young 1997, 158.

164 Ferguson APM 1766, 46; Smith WN 1776, 1981, 637–688.

politics proper and political economy.[165] Most often Scottish thinkers introduced these spheres of politics separately in their texts. Although political economy changed some conceptions of classical politics, particularly the ideal of citizenship, it was not an alternative to Aristotelian politics: conceptually political economy and Aristotelian economics constituted separate spheres of political theory.

The distinction between economics and political economy was evident. Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* consisted of two separate branches of knowledge: economy, parallel to modern economics, and political economy as applied economy.[166] Smith never explicated the connections between politics and political economy. His theory of government served only the needs of his political economy and he never preferred any particular form of government. In *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* he focused on economic processes independent from forms of government.[167]However, as Winch has stated, he did not deny or object Aristotelian or Newtonian politics.[168]

Stewart analysed the theory of political economy and politics. According to his analysis, political economy was dependent on the principles of politics proper. Wise political systems tended to produce positive economic ends. These ends were not "necessary", but "natural"; thus the end of the wise form of government could vary.[169] His political theory was a theory of political economy in connection with a mixed form of government.[170] On the other hand, he agreed that in some cases political economy could be studied as an independent science because mechanical divisions of the forms of government did not reflect all of the aspects of modern politics, for often governments were not organised according to principles corresponding entirely to a particular form of government. Classical political theory was insufficient for the needs of modern political states.[171] Stewart constructed a synthesis of morals, politics and political economy.[172]

Dugald Stewart's characterisation of Smith's economic theory was an interesting contemporary explication of Smithian economics. Stewart regarded the basis of Smith's *policy of nation* not on justice (or ethics), but on expediency.[173] Expediency was a crucial criterion of classical political wisdom.

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165 An alternative, Cf. Oz-Salzberger 2003, 164.

166 McNamara 1998, 4, 55–56. Newtonian economics has been connected to the intervention of political arithmetic. The explicit references to political arithmetic or mathematicians in politics were, however, pejorative in the Scottish texts. According to Kames, mathematician were novices in politics, cf. Home SHM 1778, 1993, III, 251.

167 Smith WN 1776, 1981, 672; Tribe 1995a, 24–27. the form of government referred to the state of a society in the four-stages theory, MacCormick 1981, 250. The four stages were hunting, pasturage, farming and commerce. Spadafora 1990, 271.

168 Winch 1978, 187.

169 Stewart LPE 1877 I, 21–22.

170 Stewart LPE 1877, I, 11.

171 Ibid. II, 354.

172 Ibid. 16–17, 22–24; II, 348.

173 Stewart LWAS 1793,1963, 415, 484.

On the other hand, Stewart regarded Smithian economics as a scientific system.[174] Thus he combined the classical criterion of *prudentia* and Newtonian science.

The connections between economy and politics were described in connection with history and stadial theories but the prehistory of political economics was not systematically introduced. Economics had some political aspects in classical philosophy although it was excluded from politics proper.[175] Economics and private property had always been the political as matters of political and international disputes. According to Adam Smith, commerce and exchange were not novelties of a commercial society because commerce and exchange already existed in hunterian societies. In the commercial state of society many values and institutions were adapted to the needs of commerce; thus commerce was the constitutive element of that society.[176] The role of economics had changed from classical antiquity to the Scottish enlightenment and the change was well known. Hume regarded this change as the change of moral and political sentiments. According to Hume, economics was recently introduced to political science and political debates but he did not explicate this expansion of a political sphere.[177] The transformation was regarded as a crucial moment in the history of political theory because classical politics was criticised because it ignored commerce.[178]

These fragments did not characterise the political nature of a commercial state. The rise of political economy reflected the transformation of the concept of a state: political economy aroused from the conflict between feudal nobility and bourgeois society.[179] In the Scottish enlightenment political economy was interrelated to the development of a territorial state and the critique of cameralism.[180] However, a commercial state was not necessarily a step towards a modern state. Scottish philosophers defined a political union as men bound together, but they explicated these relationships in a commercial state.

According to Scottish vocabulary, private property was first regarded as the political, or a subject of polity, in a feudal state. Feudalism was regarded as polity, and the feudal property as the political. A land bound people together or it was a mediator between the master and the vassal.[181] The politico-social

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174 ibid. 464, 480. Prudentia is further explicated in Chapter 4.

175 Hume ECPM 1751, 1980, 184.

176 The difference between savage and commercial society was that commercial society was not based on external necessities such as, the pressure of population. Berry 1997, 97, 114, 151.

177 Hume PE 1994, CL 52.

178 Robertson NI 1794, 1996, 392, 394.

179 Howard 1989, 227.

180 Cf. Hébert 1987, 198; Hutchison 1988, 90; Outram 1995, 1999,102–106. On a territorial state and economy Tribe 1988, 19–54.

181 Stuart VS 1778, 1797, 27. passim. Stuart admired German feudal institutions, but Henry Home largely critiqued feudalism, Home SHM 1778, 1993, II, 198.

unions were based on property depending upon the different ranks of men.[182] The rise of political economy was connected to the reformation of princely states and absolutist monarchies towards a modern state. According to Quentin Skinner, the concept of a state familiar to us was introduced in the essays of David Hume.[183] Skinner has referred to the transformation of a state as a property of a prince to a state independent from a sovereign and his government. However, Hume's state was a renaissance state: In his essay 'Of the Origin of Government' Hume regarded a political society as the society of a prince.[184] A state was dependent on a sovereign; it was based on the mutual relationship between a sovereign and his subjects. Also Smithian economics was laid on the on the mutual relationship of a prince and the people, although economic theory itself indicated a modern state, which was (almost) independent from a sovereign and his property.[185] The idea of the modern state was separated from the debate on the government contract and introduced and developed in connection with: 1) the theory of laws of nations with connotations to area and boundaries and, 2) political economy with connections to infrastructure, population and wealth resources. In comparison to the second part of WN (book IV), the basis of political economy was the relationship of the ruler and the ruled as constituted by mutual duties. In practice, this ruler-ruled relationship expanded to the whole society and the empire. Only Stewart's political economy was based on the conception of an established state independent from sovereign's person. Although political economy reformed the conception of a state, the basis of it was still on mutual relationships.

The economic-political bondage between men consisted of the rights and duties of a sovereign (defence, justice, taxation and public works and institutions) and the rights and duties of citizens (support themselves). The new bondage was based on the principles of utility and the principle of enrichment of both the people and the sovereign.[186] The relationship between the sovereign and his subjects still remained as a classical relationship between the governor and the governed, although these governed had a peculiar role in the *o*economics of a state.

Scottish philosophers used the terms *o*economy and (political) economy interchangeable, which indicated the ambiguous relationship between the private economy and public economy. Steuart wrote it:

> What oeconomy is in a family, political economy is in a state with these essential differences, that in the state there are no servants, all are children. That a family may be when and how man pleases, and he may there establish what plan of economy he thinks fit; but states are found formed, and the economy depends upon a thousand circumstances. The *statesman* (this is a general term to signify the legislature and supreme power, according to the form of government) is either master to establish

182 The rank might have been based on natural qualities of men (especially Rousseau) or historical development, on Rousseau, see Viroli 1988, 54–57.

183 Skinner 1989, 123.

184 Hume PE 1994, OG 20–23.

185 Smith WN 1776, 1981, 428.

186 Ibid.; Haakonssen 1981, 1989, 127–128.

> what economy he pleases, or, in the exercise of his sublime authority, to overturn at will the established laws of it, let him be the most despotic monarch upon the earth.[187]

It seems that Scottish thinkers introduced the domestic into the political. The basis of economy was still in *oikos*. Economic-interested citizens were dependent on a sovereign; they were not self-sufficient citizens, but children. Although political power was different from the power of a master over his family, the relationships in the political sphere were neither free nor equal. On the other hand, citizens were not servants or slaves. The term child referred to biological necessities of political economy as the maintenance of life. The other consequence of political economy was that work, particularly labour, was intervened to the political sphere; politics required the special maintenance:

> National resources include every article that tends to constitute the strength of a nation or that may be employed for its *preservation*.[188]

The classical aim of politics was a self-sufficient life but the self-sufficiency was not possible without economic resources.[189] Political economy was not required for luxury and progress of wealth itself, but for the primary needs of self-preservation of a political union. Economic participation and revenues for public services created a new political arena of participation for free men as modern citizens in 18th century Scotland. Scottish political economy reflected the possibility to maintain British Empire. After the Act of Union in 1707 the classical forms of political (republican) participation were (more or less) renewed or restricted. Scottish thinkers created a new mode of economic-political participation.[190]

Wealth and property were politically ambiguous. According to Millar and Home, a political society was a remedy for economic controversies but economic "rank" was the constitutive element of political leadership and political society. Despite this, wealth was not necessarily political. According to Smith:

> But the person who either acquires, or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may … afford him the means of acquiring both, but the mere possession of that fortune does not necessarily convey to him either.[191]

Fortune was the (re)source of political power, but it should be transformed to political power by public processes, such as voluntary choice. The process of

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187 Steuart IPPO 1767, 1966, 1998, 16.

188 Ferguson IMP 1769, 1994, 165. Emphasis mine. "National recourses are the objects of public oeconomy." ibid. 264. Cf. Aristotle action vs. production, cf. *The Politic*s 1981, 65.

189 Smith LJ 1978, 7.

190 Reid RL 1990, 278, Diamond 1998, 346–347.

191 Smith WN 1776, 1981, 48.

change from personal to institutional power was described in his lectures on jurisprudence.[192]

The conceptual relationship between traditional politics and economics was ambiguous. On the one hand, classical politics and political economy were separate branches of political theory. On the other hand, political economy reflected continuity and change of the political.

2.5 Rhetoric of Science: Art versus Science?

Political economy has often been characterised as the Newtonian science. This chapter focuses on the particular conceptual approach to political science: the possible distinction between political art and science. The previous section characterises politics as a particular branch of moral science.[193] The following section questions the unity of politics as knowledge. The aim is not to revise the experimental method of politics, but to consider the modes of knowledge as they were connected to the polit-vocabulary.

Despite the distinction between popular and scientific beliefs, which had been clear since the 17th century, the intellectual and institutional status of (natural) sciences was weak in the late 18th century. The modern meaning of *science* as a discipline was invented in the 1830s in English, and it did not refer to a systematic body of knowledge or a discipline in the enlightenment. Several researchers have maintained that the terms *art* and *science* were synonymous before the invention of science as a discipline and both *art* and *science* corresponded to "knowledge in general" or "common sense".[194] Despite this unity of knowledge and science Scottish philosophers defined *art* and *science* as distinct modes of knowledge between "knowledge in general" and "a particular discipline".

In English sources, such as dictionaries, some attempts to separate *art* and *science* can be identified, and the Newtonian impact is evident in dictionaries. However, the distinction was not entirely introduced, and sometimes *art* and *science* were regarded as synonymous.[195] The tangential references to *art* and *science* in the Scottish texts indicated, however, that there were some differences between art and science, even in the case of politics.

There were hardly any differences between the meanings of *prudence*, *art* and *science* in *L' Encyclopédie de Diderot et d'Alembert*. Of course, these terms had their general references. In other words, *art* referred to literature, music and other fine arts, and sometimes to *artes liberales*, whereas *science* referred to the Baconian-Newtonian science of nature, especially physics, but these terms were

192 Smith LJ 1978, 402–405.

193 Evine 1993, 592; Miller 1980, 262.

194 For example, Jacob, 1988, 37; Outram 1995, 1999, 48–49. Brückner, for example, did not make any distinction between *ars* and *scientia*, or *prudentia* and *techné*, in German sources, see Brückner 1977, 154, 158.

195 Spadafora 1990, 29–33.

used interchangeably within moral philosophy. Furthermore, art was a branch of science: "La *science* se partage en quatre branches, qui sont l'inteligesse, la sagesse, la prudence & l'art.[196] The citation was a part of the chapter on Science in *L' Encyclopédie de Diderot et d'Alembert,* but in the chapter on *Art*, art was defined as a set of rules focused on *action*, while science referred to a "technically organised set of observations about an object merely contemplated in its various facets".[197] Although French philosophers interrelated experimental method and scientific argumentation to their political philosophy, they did not make any explicit distinctions between *art* and *science*.[198]

In the Scottish sources Adam Ferguson explicitly made distinction between art and science.[199] He divided human knowledge into three genres: history, science and art. He stated that history was knowledge of particularities, science was knowledge of general *principles* and:

> Art is a power founded on knowledge or habit, by which men perform certain functions of mind, or operate some external subject.[200]

The quotation indicates that science focused on general principles formulated as axioms and maxims, but "habit" and "perform" referred to informal knowledge.

Ferguson made a comparable differentiation of political (and commercial) art and politics in *Principles of Moral and Political Science*.[201] Although political science was close to physical science there still was a difference between them; physical science concerned "knowledge what is" and moral science "what ought to be". In other words, physical laws reflected physical nature, but moral principles reflected the ideal of human life.[202] Despite the differences between static physical nature with relative positions and the active political world, Ferguson reconstructed the unity between the order of nature and politics. He concluded the 'Of Politics' as:

> That the order of which they are susceptible is not merely, like stones in a wall or and arch, that of relative position and place, but of activity and of co-operation in different functions, or of balance, counterpoise, and mutual correction, where the operation of any single power might be partial and wrong, but the general result is salutary and just.[203]

'Concluding observations' in *Principles of Moral and Political Science* can be read as a change from moral philosophy and arts to politics as a *theory* of political systems. Ferguson introduced politics as an inquiry separate from political and

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196 *L'encyclopédie de Diderot et d'Alembert*, CD-ROM, See also Pocock 1999a, 224.

197 Spadafora 1990, 30. Emphasis Spadafora.

198 Riskin 1995, 61, 62.

199 For example, for Hutcheson moral philosophy was an art, see SIMP 1747, 1969, 1.

200 Ferguson APMP 1766, 3–4.

201 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, Contents; II, 407–408.

202 Ferguson APMP 1766, 3–7, 29–37.

203 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 511–512.

commercial arts, but also from the theories of the origins of a political society and the first establishment of political relationships. Ferguson made fragmentary references to the distinction between ancient religious philosophy and modern science. Thus he stated that there was a distinction between mere philosophy, and upgraded professional knowledge.[204] The distinction also characterised the difference between political art and political science: in the chapter, 'Of Politics', Ferguson was concerned with the particular principles of political theory and the political system as a whole. Minor differences between the concept of political art and science can be found in the vocabulary of Adam Ferguson. Political art originated from the inadequacies and defects of a human society. Political art (art of policy) was comparable to deliberation, eloquence and war.[205] Political art focused on the motivation of a political union and defects of the natural state, whereas politics reflected an advanced state or the ideal state.[206] The plural form *political arts* was uncommon in the Scottish texts. According to Ferguson's conceptions, *political arts* aimed at safety and better government.[207] In 'Of Politics', Ferguson tried to find the perfect order of a political society by reflecting on the policies of every state of a society.[208] Politics focused on:

> *What the citizen has to wish for his county* … that public good, … ought to reconcile every individual to his state in society, whether it be his lot to govern, or governed.[209]

Politics compared different political systems for their efficiency and expediency:

> …good and evil of which they are susceptible, or the comparative advantage in respect to which they are unequal.[210]

Thomas Reid also differentiated politics and political art. In his lecture notes originally written in Latin, he characterised the modes of knowledge as follows: purely abstract science independent from factual evidence, such as mathematics; less abstract sciences such as natural history or civil history, *Historia Civilis*, and finally the eleven arts including economics and politics. Here Reid used the Latin term, *politica*.[211] In Reid's system sciences were

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204 Ibid. II 401–402.

205 Ferguson EHCS 1767, 1978, 55.

206 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, I, 261.

207 Ibid. I, 206.

208 Ibid. II, 414, 512; policy reference, ibid. 428.

209 Ibid. II, 405.

210 Ibid. II, 407.

211 Reid RL 1990, 188–190. Haakonssen had translated civil history as political history. This two-dimensional conception of political knowledge acknowledged politics as scientific reasoning, politics as techné, and art. According to Haakonssen, Reid referred to politics as techné, not as an explanatory science: "as an expert Physician ought to understand the nature and Effects of Poisons as well as Medicines, so an able Politician ought to understand the nature & Effects of all kinds of government the bad as well as the good". Cf. Diamond 1998, 341–342.

comprehended under the arts, mechanics, chemistry and botany were also *arts*. Science:

> Concerned with laws to be elicited from phenomena. From the phenomena laws become known, which are either physical or moral.[212]

The distinction between civil history and political art as politics indicated separate modes of political knowledge, theory and experience or practice.

The explicit references to the distinctions between art and science were rare; the distinction between theory and experience was more often reflected, although not necessarily, in connection with the polit-vocabulary. Although theory versus experience was not comparable to science versus art, the distinction referred to a distinction between scientific knowledge and knowledge derived from history or practise.

Dugald Stewart reconstructed a synthesis between empirical and abstract reasoning; in politics, also abstract reasoning was derived from experience; political reasoning combined both experience and theory:

> … There are plainly two sets of political reasoners; one of which consider the actual institutions of mankind as the only safe foundation for our conclusions; and think every plan of legislation chemerical, which is not copied from one which have already been realized; while the other apprehend; that in many cases we may reason safely a priori the known principle of human nature combined with particular circumstances of times. The former are commonly understood as contending for experience in opposite to theory; the latter are accused of trusting to theory unsupported by experience; but it ought to be remembered; that the political theorist, if proceeds cautiously and philosophically, founds his reasoning ultimately on experience, no less than political empiric; as the astronomer, who predicts an eclipse from his knowledge of principles of the science, rest his expectation of the event of facts which have been previously ascertained by observation, no less than if he inferred it without any reasoning, from his knowledge as a cycle.[213]

As a philosopher of science Stewart preferred science to mere experience and general laws to particularities.[214] However, from a more general point of view, these different aspects of knowledge did not exclude each other: ideally theoretical knowledge and practical reasoning were combined because man had the abilities for the both.[215]

The inclusion "political art and science" was common in the Scottish vocabulary, but the spontaneous use of the paraphrase did not necessarily indicate that these terms were synonymous. Scottish differentiation of art and science was based on the awareness of different forms of knowledge based on habits or experimental reason. However, the distinction between art and science did not correspond to the distinction between *Kunst* and *Wissenshaft*.[216]

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212 Reid RL 1990, 190.

213 Stewart EPHM 1877, I, 220–221.

214 Haakonssen 1996, 243–244.

215 Stewart EPHM 1877, I, 219.

216 Tribe 1988, 8.

In his several essays David Hume implicitly explicated the relationship between historical time and political science. In the famous introductory sentence of the essay, 'Of Civil Liberty', politics was regarded as a written science.[217] Hume explicated that political writers established maxims, scientific principles of politics.[218] Classically political science was scientific writing for the future, quite opposite to speaking as political practice. The scientific ideal was the universal truth also in politics, and the usual problem in politics was the eternity of a particular political maxim, axiom or principle. Political science was science for a statesman and science for the future generations, as judges for the political maxims and principles. The problems and hypotheses of political science were derived from the contemporary present or past, but the solutions were future oriented, and more distant future oriented than present oriented:

> Legislators, therefore, ought not to trust the future government of a state entirely to chance, but ought to provide a system of laws to regulate the administration of public affairs to the latest posterity.[219]

However, there was a problem in this scientific future orientation in politics: Despite science, the future was unknown:

> IT affords a violent prejudice against almost every science, that no prudent man, however sure of his principles, dares prophesy concerning any event, or foretel the remote consequences of things.[220]

As a historian and a scientific sceptic Hume was not convinced the general validity of modern science in moral philosophy.[221] Hume and Stewart introduced scientific politics, which were based on facts and causal relationships.[222] The validity of political science was questioned in connection with political activity. However, Hume's attitude was positive; scientific knowledge would have been a possibility in human sciences:

> What would become of history, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind? How could politics be a science, if laws and forms of governments had not a uniform influence upon society? Where would be the foundations of morals, if particular characters had not certain of determinate power to produce particular sentiments, and these sentiments had no constant operation on actions?[223]

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217 Hume PE 1994, CL 51. The conception of time and political theory had multidimensional connection in the Scottish texts. The classical theory of the forms of governments was partly abandoned. Instead, a theory of the mixed form of government and administration did not reflect a similar conception of time as an orbit. Scottish philosophers also preferred duration or controlled progress to changes in the political. Politics was time-neutral.

218 Hume PE 1994, IP 24.

219 Ibid. Sc 10–11.

220 Ibid. BG 28.

221 The experimental method was ambiguous in human sciences, cf. Collini 1994, 15.

222 Hume ECHU 1748, 1958, 184.

223 Ibid. 97.

From this point of view, Hume's essay, 'That Politics May be Reduced to a Science', seemed to be an attempt to introduce the scientific conception of knowledge to politics. If not to a particular discipline the term *science* referred to a particular form of reasoning in moral philosophy and in politics. However, an ambiguity between scepticism and scientific prediction remained. Stewart also regarded the future as unknown: neither science nor history could predict the future. [224]

The scientific approach consisted not only of experimental epistemology, but also of the conception of time. The scientific conception of time was accepted in physical nature, but an attempt to introduce it into the human sciences led to the conflict of the two different conceptions of time: human and physical. The political world was artificial; it was the result of human creation: reason, will and passions. It was impossible to find eternal physical laws in the non-physical world, for the political sphere was not eternal, it was temporal.[225] This indicated the controversy between scientific politics and political life.

Political life was described as "capricious weather in political horizon or sky"; forecasting continued to be difficult, but necessary.[226] Disorders in the course of time and history broke the classical conception of time. Past experience did not correspond to the present or the present-future; past and present were not consistent enough for future predictions, although few notions on the cyclical conception of time still existed. Both Hume and Reid referred to the difficulties of foreseeing the future.[227] Science was an attempt to *re*create the lost predictability, to foretell an (un)known future. It was also oriented against *fortuna* or chance. Because of the nature of political activity, and especially unintended consequences, the attempt often failed.

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Scientific rhetoric was characteristic of Scottish texts on politics. In the context of the Scottish enlightenment this did not necessarily mean an absolute priority of the natural sciences, but an internal ranking order between the human sciences. The attempts to separate different branches of human sciences – especially within moral science – were strictly connected to elementary texts on morals and introductory parts of lectures. Elsewhere in the Scottish texts strict inclusions and exclusions between different branches of knowledge were rare. This differentiation took place before the institutionalisation of political science as an academic chair.

Although the politics might be called as discipline, its *locus* was not only disputed, but also degraded discipline or sub-discipline. As my subtitles and the discussion in each of the chapters indicate, politics was mainly considered as a residual part of either moral sciences or jurisprudence. However, political

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224 Stewart LWAS 1793, 1963, 479–482.

225 Cf. Howard 1989, 230.

226 Ferguson CAF 1995, II, 419, 447.

227 Reid RL 1990, 280. "Yet so limited is the Wisdom of Man, so short his Foresight".

science consisted of separate approaches to the political: the political economy was a new contender, and its defenders began to attribute a place to politics proper in the margins of their own disciplines. The attempts to construct an independent political science as a science of government can be detected.

3 CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPHERE

The definition of politics as science did not include other aspects of the political, such as the political as a special sphere of human life. The political as a sphere was introduced by the concept of a political society and its variants. A commercial state was only one mode of a political state. Because the variants of political unions were crucial the Scottish vocabulary, the classical conception of a political society as men bound together – the definition that originated from Roman jurisprudence – is worthy of further revision.

3.1 The Variants of *(a) Society*

The concept of a society is both important, and in some measure, controversial in Scottish studies.[228] The term society has been defined as one universal and institutionalised human construction: "Society will be seen as a complex of institutions and as an institutionalised *whole*."[229] A society thus constituted "an interlocking whole" with integrated chance and change.[230] It has been regarded as a natural mode of human existence, which was based on the universal sociability of human nature. According to this principle, particular modes of societies were subordinated to this universal sociability. Hardly any distinction was made between different modes of human associations. This conception was also introduced in *L' Encyclopédie de Diderot et d'Alembert*:

> Le bien commun doit être la régle suprême de notre conduite … L'esprit de sociabilité doit être universel … La sociabilité étant d'une obligation réciproque … Mot nouvellement introduit dans la langue, pour désigner les qualités qui rendent un

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228 According to traditional interpretations, Scottish moral philosophy indicated a change and new meaning of the history of society, see *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*: Gesellschaft, p. 461, sect. 4.

229 Pocock 1985, 1986, 92. Emphasis mine.

230 Berry 1997, 114.

> homme utile dans la société. … Dans l'état de nature … depuis l'establishment des *sociétés* … *société* civile.[231]

This conception of a society, as well as its synonyms such as *le bien commun, la societé humaine*, … *collectif*, was based on the assumption that human life was a collective experience. Various modes of societies were derived from the same origin, from the common sociability of men. This "natural" conception of human sociability was in contrast to theories that suggested that the social contract was a basis of societal life.[232]

There is also another way to conceptualise societal life and human associations: societies as particular societies, for example, a political society as a combination of several smaller societies.[233] As Baker has noted, the concept of a society was divided into two distinct conceptions of societies: universal human existence as a society and other societies, each of them representing a separate sphere of human life.[234]

The Scottish vocabulary of society concepts reflected both conceptions of societies: society as universal society and societi*es* as particular societi*es*. Singular and plural forms (society -society/ies/ys) and the unspecified and specified forms (-/ a / the society) constructed several conceptions of society with different connotations for the political. Plural forms, "societys" and societies, were common; these forms referred to the separate human associations or unions. Sometimes "society", without any article or definition, referred to a general society or mankind as whole, but sometimes the term "society" was used as an abbreviation to refer to a particular form of society, and the attribute was implicitly explicated in the text. These different forms indicated the differences between universality and particularity.

In the beginning of the age focused on in this study, George Turnbull used terms such as "a community", "a union", "all society", "friendship", "mankind in general", but he did not establish any conceptual distinction between these terms or between other modes of societies.[235] Rraditionally only a family society and civil society were tangentially regarded as particular modes of societies.[236]

After Turnbull, Scottish thinkers reformulated the idea of universal sociability and its connections to the concept of a society. The conceptual dichotomy natural vs. artificial was one example of this reformulation. This

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231 Emphasis according to *L'encyclopédie***.** Additionally "Différentes sortes de sociétés formées entre les hommes" referred to particular societies. *Encyclopedié,* articles SOCIÉTÉ s.f. (*Morale*), SOCIETE, (*Moral. Droit natur.*), SOCIETE, (*Jurispr.*) and SOCIAL. Adj (*Gramm.*)

232 The etymology of German concepts *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* were derived from *Raum*, *gesellen* and *gemeinsam*, but the two aspects can be separated as *handeln* and *handlung*, see Riedel 1975, 801–862, Ges*chichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 2; Gesellschaft, Gemeinschaft, I Einleitung, Wört- und Begriffsbestimmungen.

233 Rousseau *Discourse on Political Economy* 1755–1756,1997, 7. English translation.

234 Baker 2001, 84, 87, 97.

235 Turnbull PMP 1740, 1976, I, 174–175.

236 For context, see Riedel 1975, 803–805, Ges*chichtliche Grundbegriffe,* 2 Gesellschaft, Gemeinschaft, II Traditionelle Gesellshaftstheorie, 4. Naturrecht und Gesellschaft.

dichotomy, which was widely used in the Scottish texts, reconstructed two separate spheres of human life that were different in nature. In contrast to the idea of a society as one institutionalised whole, also different modes of societies were represented in the Scottish scientific language.[237] Universal sociability as a basis of a society was replaced by a variety of bases of human life such as biology, emotions, economics, etc. There was no one universal reason to establish a society; different societies had different bases and different forms of utility and unity.[238]

The distinct conceptions of one universal society and particular human societies did not exclude each other.[239] For instance, Francis Hutcheson's vocabulary reflected both the universal phenomenon of sociability as mankind and particular societies. Hutcheson wrote about the necessity of social life in general and used the term society in reference to mankind.[240] Despite this he also used the plural form societies and referred to societies as separate systems.[241]

If we define the idea of a society as "an institutionalised whole", then one universal society might have existed in the early history of Ferguson's civil society:

> In rude ages, under the appellation of *a community*, *a people*, or *a nation*, was understood a number of men; and the state, while its members remained, was accounted entire.[242]

Societal life was regarded as a natural and inborn aspect of humanity and human association was regarded as necessity for human survival.[243] Scottish philosophers reflected genealogical interpretations of human history; a society was the result of natural historical tendencies. Thus, they denied the idea of a society as a free choice of an individual: the solitary state of man was regarded rather as a historical exception than a possibility in human life. Scottish philosophers introduced the maxim that man had to live in connection with others was universal in mankind. By Fergusonian concepts, "the solitary state" was uncommon because a man was always a member of a family or some larger society: "… he is a father or child, the member of a family or some larger

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237 Hutcheson 1755, 1969, II, 212. Blum has pointed out the multiplicity of different associations,"… members of all existing societies were bound to a multiplicity of partial associations, such as families, communities, economic, social, and religious groups", Cf. Blum 1986, 110.

238 Civil society, see Yakimenko 1994, 15, 17.

239 Gobetti 1997, 2, 177.

240 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 246.247; SMP 1755, 1969, I, 280; II, 104.

241 Ibid. I, 10.

242 Ferguson EHCS 1767, 1978, 228. Emphasis mine.

243 See, for example, Hume ECPM 1751, 1980, 202. Godly origin of the social nature of man, see Brückner 1977, 43.

society..."[244]Because man was always a member of some society, at least a family society, man could not be independent from any society, a free rider.[245]

The social nature of man originated from the first society of man, from a family, which was his first experience of societal life. A family-society, which was regarded as a primary condition of human and social life, was based on biological bondage as a relationship between a parent and a child, emotions and a marriage contract as a relationship between husband and wife.[246] Originating from biological necessity, a family society was comparable to animal societies. But, human societies were superior to animal societies in some respects: human beings were able to communicate, and they were able to develop political relationships and hierarchies because they had sense of authority.[247]

Scottish thinkers did not make clear distinctions between separate modes of political unions. A political society referred to distinct communities, or to a village; the union of distinct societies constituted a kingdom with a sovereign government, constitution and law.[248] A society was also used as a synonym for a state, a community, a nation and a corporation.[249] A political body not only referred to a state, but also to any political construction, such as a kingdom, an empire, a principality, a dukedom, a country, a republic and a free town. The only criterion of a political body was mutual dependence.[250] A political body was constituted of several smaller (political) bodies which were based on different interests. The interests bound them as bodies.[251] Scottish thinkers did not make any clear distinction between different conceptions of public unions, such as corporations collectives and a political society in particular.[252] Further, Smith did not make a clear difference between any economical association, guild or university; all these were societies.[253] All these societies were associated by different bonds instead of the (social) contract.[254] In some cases a bond and a contract were separate aspects of the same of mode of a society. A good example for this was a family with various relationships: parent-child was a biological relationship (a bond-aspect), which was enforced by law (a contract-aspect).

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244 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 265.

245 See Connolly 1993, 53–55. The idea of an egoistic free rider was introduced in Scottish vocabulary by other concepts, see Herzog 1985, 179. The egoistic free rider collides with the customary interpretation of man as a social and a political being with primarily social and societal purposes. Cf. Skinner 1990, 296.

246 Haakonssen 1981, 1989, 13.

247 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, II, 324; Ferguson PMPS 1972, 1975, I, 21.

248 Millar ODR 1779, 1960, 262–263. This "placed leadership" is opposite to military or despotical leadership as "taken leadership".

249 See, for example, Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 148; Smith LJ 1978, 84, 106, 200, 237.

250 Hutcheson SMP 1755, 1969 II, 238-239.

251 Hume PE 1994, PG 36.

252 See Baker referring to Otto von Gierke concerning the difference between *societas* and *universitas*, Baker 2001, 95.

253 Smith WN 1776, 1981, 149, 668.

254 Baker 2001, 95. The example, Locke 1689, 1960, 1964, 340, Esp. "Society betwixt man and wife, parents and children".

The theory of a society was extrapolated from a family society to a political society. The physical was subordinated to the political; the political indicated a triumph over biological resources and primary needs. A society or societies based on physical needs preceded artificial societies: familial, marital and economical societies preceded political societies. The term mankind was used in reference to the nature of man in general and the universal human society. A society referred to a family, a tribe, a particular group of people, a nation and an empire.[255]

Ferguson emphasised the distinctions between societies in his *Principles of Moral and Political Science*. He first compared animal groups to human societies, then he characterised human life and societies in general, and finally he described the first steps into civil and political society. Finally he focused the ideal system of politics (in 'Of Politics').[256] The hierarchical advancement of sociality was comparable to the course of life. Man was necessarily born in a family society, and later he joined other societies:

> The members of this family become a member of this society, before they become members of a state [257]

Hume described man's "growth" from a family society towards a political society:

> MAN, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society, from necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit. The same creature, in his *farther progress*, is engaged to establish a political society.[258]

The development of an individual was comparable to the establishment of different societies in the history of mankind.

In the essay 'Distinction of Value and its Source in Existence', Ferguson compared the nature of the "Animal of Man to that of other Species in the Animal Kingdom" and concluded that human nature was a reason for advanced human societies:

> In human society there is yet more powerful incitements to active Exertion more signal occasions of calling every human Faculty in to cooperations or *opposition of Parties* or even individuals more to be learned from mutual communications & the records of ages and the discussions of Legal National & Political Concern than could have resulted from the whole Physical System on which this Being is involved.[259]

A political society originated from the human faculty to create divisions and co-operation between the members of a society. The history of the advancement of societies was a triumph over the non-biological sphere; a political society was

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255 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, I, 24.

256 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, Contents I-II.

257 Dunbar EHM 1780, 24.

258 Hume PE 1994, OG 20.

259 Ferguson *Unpublished Essays* I, no. 27, 106/ 22–23. Emphasis mine.

not based on biological, immediate needs or instinct. Francis Hutcheson had formulated this:

> When many of the ancients speak of man as species naturally fit for civil society they do not mean that men as immediately desire a political union, or a state of civil subjection to laws, as they desire the free society of others in natural liberty or as they desire marriage and offspring, from immediate instinct. [260]

According to Hutcheson, people naturally preferred a state of freedom to political societies. The natural indicated that people originally referred a state without any institutionalised political society; they joined a political society because of (artificial) necessity. The choice between a state of freedom and a political society was already made in the past, but a state of freedom still was an ideal state Although a political society was natural, it was not inborn or self-evident.

In some measure Dugald Stewart and James Dunbar ignored the establishment of a political society as a part of their political philosophy. According to them, men *had* always *been* members of a political union. This interpretation re-united the conception of political society with mankind as a society as a one whole, but this was exceptional in the Scottish texts.

3.2 The Civil as the Basis of the Political

As already noted, the conceptual pair natural versus artificial was a crucial element for the conceptualisation of the political. A similar conceptual pair was natural versus civil. It also defined the first stages in the differentiation of the political from non-political spheres.

Originating from Greek philosophy as *fysis –nomos,* the dichotomy natural versus civil was used by Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Scottish thinkers had different connotations for this conceptual pair. It referred to "animal" versus "human".[261] Civil as political had the connections to Latin *Societas Civilis sive politica*. [262] Hutcheson introduced the variants of natural versus civil. He contextualised society conceptions by following dichotomies; natural state of men versus adventitious state of men; natural liberty versus a civil society; a domestic society and a civil society, and society in general versus a civil society with the connotation of *societas civilis*. He made a distinction between the state of natural liberty and the state of civil society by laws.[263]

Both a domestic society and a civil society were artificial or adventitious; Hutcheson did not call them unnatural, or contrary to nature of man. Natural – unnatural -artificial and domestic-civil-political operated in distinct levels in the

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260 Hutcheson SMP 1755, 1969, II, 212

261 Berry 1997, 53.

262 Ibid. 30.

263 Hutcheson SMP 1755, 1969, II, 212. Society of love in ibid. I, 149, 161; II, 104.

philosophy of Hutcheson.[264] The civil focused especially on the governor – governed relationships, citizens' relationships to a state, and administration.[265] Adam Ferguson used the term civil society as a synonym for a state, which also included the spheres of economy, militia and law.

Ferguson's conception of the civil reflected the contrast between the barbarous and the civil societies. "Barbarous societies" were ambiguous: according to Gilbert Stuart, feudal societies, such as barbarous societies, were also political societies. Feudalism was comparable to any other form of government.[266] In his *Sketches of the History of Man* Henry Home contrasted man independent from a society and man in a civil society. Thus, a political society was the (only) mode of societal life. These fragmentary examples defined the political sphere as well as the moment of transformation from the non-political to the political.

The civil was often used as a synonym for the political in the classical polit-vocabulary. This synonymy connection was partly re-defined. The and/or exclusions and inclusions of civil and political, which can be found in the Scottish text, indicated the different connotations of those terms. The political referred to the theory of the forms of government and the civil referred to men united together under a particular form of government. The term political society referred to a union of men subject to laws which were derived from the particular principles of politics.[267]

Francis Hutcheson defined civil society as: "…a society of free men under one government for their common interest … owned by all."[268] The republican aspect of the civil was evident in the definitions of civil society or government because the Latin and Greek vocabulary were combined. For Reid a political union and the state of civil government were synonymous:

> By a civil government we understand the Union of Nation or of a Great Number of Men under the same Laws and Government for the sake of Common Utility. To the Body thus united the Romans gave the Name of Civitas or Res publica. [269]

In connection with power a civil society was also the opposite of despotism or the power of a master over his servants.[270]

To conclude, the civil had several connotations which reflected both the classical, *societas civilis,* as a political society, and a polished state of mankind. However, these references were not assimilated.

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264 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 279.

265 Hutcheson SMP 1755, 1969, II, 149.

266 For example, Stuart VS 1778, 1797, 15, 83.

267 Here we have to keep in mind that political society and thus political or civil government did not exist in the rudest, most savage and barbarous state of society.

268 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 283.

269 Reid RL 1990, 245.

270 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 283.

3.3 Constructing a Political Society

Scottish thinkers did not give any comprehensive definition of a political society, except men bound together. However, Scottish descriptions of political unions reflected some common denominators for a political society. This section reconstructs a political society, first by defining these denominators and then by reflecting the anticipated origins of the political sphere.

3.3.1 Describing a Political Society

As a special form of a society, a political society was regarded as a voluntary union of men, free men bound together or a union of free men: the primary condition of a political society was voluntary choice. On the other hand, Scottish philosophy and history reflected a natural tendency to live in a political society. For example, according to Reid, Nature had intended people to live in a society.[271] The tendency of sociability, on the one hand, and free will, on the other hand, did not exclude each other: Scottish philosophers re-contextualised the voluntary choice of a political union as well as the political union itself. The following section described the particular nature of political societies.

I Temporality and Spatiality

Scottish thinkers described (civil) history as stadial, conjectural development as a train of change and chance.[272] Despite this theoretical approach to history, a complete universal history of a civil society was not written.[273] Scottish did not wrote universal histories of the political society, because there was no universal political history.

Different from mankind as a society, a political society was always a spatial and temporal experience. According to Ferguson, a contemporary form of a political society was derived from the collective human experience: man was always a member of some political society, he was a member of that particular political society to which was born:

> Society was the natural state of men, and political society is the natural result of his experience in that state of society *to which he is born.* This is not the experience of single persons, or of singleages. It is an experience, which began with the commencement of every society, and can end only with its final extinction. Political establishments, accordingly, which to be formed in the first and the simplest ages, continue in a state of gradual formation, as the experience of every age directs, to the latest period as which states or communities, in the course of things, are allowed to arrive.[274]

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271 Reid LNT 1780, 1981, 47.

272 Berry 1997, 114.

273 This claim is introduced by. Pocock 1999b, cf. 270–281.

274 Ferguson PMPS 1792,1975, II, 268. Emphasis mine.

Ferguson incorporated both ancient 'mythical' history of the origin of society and the future, unavoidable end of that society. All people had some political experience, but these experiences varied according to time and place. "To which he is born" indicated that a political society was always that particular society, not general universal society.

A political state was a spatial and temporal experience of men: a political society was always somehow established and it had an end. People also had the option to join a state or to dissolve the state contract. From this point of view Reid's concept of a society was quite modern, not a particular state of human history. The origin of a state was derived from the intentions of the sovereign:

> The Contract between Particular King or civil Magistrate & his people began when he exercises that office.[275]

The problem was the possible break of the political contract made by the king himself, and thus the legitimacy of sovereignty.[276]According to Reid, the contract continued "untill the State be dissolved".[277]

II A Conflict

Despite the denial of the pre-social state human nature, and despite the introduction of laws, asocial behaviour was characteristic to the Scottish descriptions of a society, especially to earlier states of society.[278] For Ferguson the first states of human societies were the societies of natural men and fortune. Both men and fortune were subject to control during the advancement and institutionalisation of a political society.[279] Despite this control "natural animosities" were characteristic to the political sphere, from the ancient past to the modern period. A political society was not based on the latent or potential sociability of human nature only, but on the need of order and regulation. But there were tensions between conflict-oriented political activity and laws. Hume's multidimensional analysis of a political society and public societies also concluded with the metaphor of traffic and the usefulness of regulations for common interest:

> We may only learn from it the necessity of rules wherever men have any intercourse with each other. They cannot even pass each other on the road without rules. Waggoners, coachmen, and postilions have principles by which they give the way;…Sometimes also they are arbitrary, at least dependent on a kind of capricious analogy like many of lawyers.[280]

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275 Reid RL 1990, 243.

276 Ibid.

277 Ibid.

278 Berry 1997, 42-44.

279 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, I, 258.

280 Hume EPCM 1752, 1980, 206 'Of Political Society'.

The metaphor indicates that although a political society was once established, the possibility of conflict still existed, for example, between self-interested men and laws, or between political activity and laws. Conflicts were a part of the nature of political activity in Scottish philosophy whereas, according to Rousseau, a well-ordered political society was a solution for disorder as complex relationships and conflicts, which were derived from egotism with different forms.[281] The Scottish philosophy of self-interested man, and Smith's self-interested commercial man at the primitive stages of society, or Millar's statement on conflicting interests made the conflicts typical to a man in all states of history. A contract was regarded as a remedy for conflicts.

III A Contract

Scottish theorists criticised social contract: the theories, in which a political society was based only on a contract (Hobbes and Locke) and a theory, in which a political society was the result of an historical process and a contract (Rousseau), the latter as the most interesting from Scottish point of view. Rousseau first introduced his idea of *pacte fondemental* or *Contrat sociale* in *Le Discours* of 1755, and later in his treatise *Economie politique* and *Du Contrat Social*. This first agreement was motivated by social and economical security".[282] In contrast to this pre-political versus political interpretation Rousseau described man in the natural state and man in the social state, in the state of nature men were primitive and also politically uncivilised. As a historical phenomenon the state of nature belonged to the human past. *Du Contrat Social* can be divided into two separate parts, of which the first part focused on the origin and nature of a social state of man and "prehistory" and the first moments of human society; the second part described civilised human society, and principles of political science.[283]

The Scottish critique of a social contract is well known. The reasons for contractarian critique varied. Hume rejected it for two reasons: for the lack of

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281 Viroli 1988, 2,30, 95-101, 107–109.

282 Jack 1989, 104, 164 The concept "pre-political society" is used by Jack. He compared Mandeville and Rousseau:" Natural life and political life were distinguished so that the benefits and advantages of one could be recognised over the other. In spite of the constancy of human nature, natural man and political man would have characteristics of their own features prominent in natural condition would play a lesser role in civilised life; features merely latent in nature would come to the fore in society". Ibid. 163-164. For the general context on this topic the dichotomy created by social original contract can be characterised by the following counterparts state of nature vs. civil society, war vs. peace, ahistorical vs. historical, asocial vs. social, amoral vs. moral, non legally bound vs. legally bound, implied bond to individual vs. practical bond Gilje 1989, 41–43, 88–91.

283 Rousseau 1762, 1960, 234, 272. A parallel structure can be found in *Second Discours* in which the first part focused on the state of nature and the second the development of it. Goodman 1989, 110 passim. Goodman reconstructed the historical continuity in which the natural state of man and family society, as a first period of civil society, were apolitical states of men: the political state of men was the latest period in this continuum. Goodman 1989, 110–115.

any historical or experimental, concrete evidence, and secondly as Berry has noted:

> Hume … proceeds to argue that the Contractarian claim to base the duty of allegiance on the duty of fidelity (promise-keeping) is a conceptual redundancy. We keep our promises and also obey our rulers because both are necessary for social life. That necessity is sufficient explanation.[284]

The contract theories were based on the virtues of promise-keeping, allegiance and obligation. For Hume these virtues were artificial, and artificial virtues were not able to presuppose a civil society. Ferguson did not accept the idea of pre-social or non-social man having only potential for sociability in the state of nature.[285] Dunbar criticised the state of nature as a state of war, because war itself presupposed a society, and further, man was always a member of some society.[286] Man was always social in the sense that he was a member of a community and united to others by biological relationships, language, intercourse, commerce and social, or even asocial passions.[287] Reid rejected the contractarian dichotomy of the state of uncivilised nature – the state of civilised society, for all the states of human life were natural to men, because as stadial theories and history shows, all the states of man were natural to man.[288] According to some interpretations, the idea of a social contract was illogical, because a contract presupposed language and language was the first contract between men. The relationship between language and society was ambiguous; "society for language or language for society?"[289]

Despite the philosophical critique of a social contract, the Scottish thinkers did not deny the idea of the first contract. The concept was used with different connotations; thus Scottish philosophers re-contextualised the conception into Scottish interpretation of human history. In the Scottish system, the idea of the first contract was connected to actually existing political systems or to the change of a government. The establishment of an existing political state arose from the separation of the two contracts, the contract between a political society of men and the political contract of government. Scottish thinkers differentiated the ideal-philosophical, actual and historical establishment of a political union as a society and government and the gradual advancement of the political institutions after the establishment.

Unlike the normative social contract theories by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the Scottish theories of the first or the original contract explicated the

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284 Berry 1997, 33. See also Buckle & Castiglione, 1991, 457–480. Especially the claim that people maintained a tacit or implicit contract because the institutions established by a contract were necessary. Buckle and Castiglione made the distinction between social and political contract, but they did not make a distinction between a society and a government.

285 Berry 1991, 5; Berry 1997, 32–33; Jack 1989, 124.

286 Dunbar IMP 1789–1794, 1996, 42.

287 Ferguson ECHS 1767, 1978, 57.

288 Reid BW 2131/7/VII/5 p.1–2.

289 Berry 1997, 26. On the origin language on Blair, see Hundert 1994, 100.

origins of existing political societies or states. Rather than as a society these theories explicated the origins of a political society as a state.

Reid's polarisation of natural liberty versus state constructed the contradiction between the pre-state stage and the state stage. Reid did not use the term social contract at all, but the original contract or the first contract referred both to society contract and government contract. In Britain the first contract was a contract between the king and the House of Commons and the House of Lords, it was not tacit or implicit but an actual and real contract.[290]

Both similarities and differences can be analysed between the first contract, particularly Rousseau's formulation of it, and the Scottish theories on the (very) first contract. Self-preservation and private and public utility generally justified these theories.[291] The crucial and neglected difference is the lack of general will, "ultimate will", which "endows the body as a moral being", which implicated the extended will of the men united together.[292] Rousseau's concept of general will operated as common good: it was not comparable to Reid's conception of united will of citizens derived from the majority.[293] Despite the contingent idea of political body as one person a political society without an ultimate will was no more no less than the public union of free and self-interested individuals. The unity of a political society was thus based on the anticipated, but real, unity of aims of its members. Thus, the aims of a contract were different in the social contract and in the first contract, despite the formulations referring to the unity of political union, and society. The unity of political union is limited by human will; on the other hand, general will was a medium of the control of citizen's actions, passions and wishes in Rousseau's theory, but this aspect was absent in the Scottish political theories.[294]

Among the Scottish thinkers the normative social contract theories by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau were regarded as absolute and indisputable contracts. Ferguson explicated the difference between these modes of contracts as:

> Absolute contracts are constituted by a simple promise and acceptance.
> Conditional contracts express promise and acceptance under a condition.[295]

The idea of legitimacy by an ancient contract was replaced by the idea of the legitimacy by the long possession or by present conditions. Neither the first nor the original nor any other political contract could be justified philosophically based on *a priori* principles. According to Berry, the Scottish analysis of history had led to a situation in which nobody, neither king nor citizens, believed the idea of contract as an explanation and legitimisation of contemporary

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290 Cf. Reid RL 1990, 241.

291 The French debate, cf. Baker 1990, 142.

292 Quotations and Social contract in French debate, see Baker 1990, 136–139, 272.

293 Reid RL 1990, 181. On Rousseau, Maihofer 1990, 281.

294 Blum 1986, 108–119; Jack, 1989, 106.

295 Ferguson IMP 1769, 1994, 208. Also Hume, on government in THN 1739–1740, 1981, 550.

government.[296] Hume and Reid introduced the principle that political systems were justified according to the present conditions:

> When there is no form of government establish'd by *long* possession, the *present* possession is sufficient to supply its place, and may be regarded as the second source of all public authority.[297]

In his essay, 'Of the Original Contract', Hume also criticised the people who tended to accept the king as a legal sovereign despite the factual violent origins of kingship.[298]According to Hume and Reid, (real) political societies were justified by the acceptance of the present circumstances; this was a tacit or implicit contract. This opened a new arena for political discussion and choices

The idea of a social contract was transformed to a contract about membership of a political society, especially a state. From this point of view, Scottish theories of a contract were different from those of Hobbes and Locke.[299] The tension between natural freedom and membership in a political union was transformed to a question of pre-modern citizenship:

> The Political Person is a Human Work. The Political Union of a Community is framed by Men and may be dissolved by Men. The individuals of which it consists may be disjoyned from it and lose their Relation to the Body politick others may acquire this Relation who had it not before. Hence there are many Questions of Right relating to the Formation and Dissolution of Political Bodies or States, many Questions relating to the Adopting new Members into the Political Union or excluding those that are members which cannot be considered in treating of Rights of Individuals.[300]

Reid's formulation was quite uncommon. In contemporary society no one was outside the boundaries of a civil society/state, and the possible outsiders were rather theoretical exceptions in the historic-anthropological past than a realistic alternative. Outsiders could not maintain themselves. There was a theoretical possibility to choose freedom from society, but the choice of a political society was made for the sake of its utility.[301] The contract was not enough; it had to be maintained by regulation and law.

IV Regulation

A political society was characterised as a legalistic society with a government. Its members were bound together by law and government. Emotions and attraction were regarded only as secondary bonds between the members of a

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296 Berry 1997, 32.

297 Hume THN 1739–1740, 1981, 557.

298 Hume PE 1994, OC 186–194.

299 Palonen 2000, 127–134.

300 Reid RL 1990, 196. Short note "When a State is dissolved of Banishment. When one ceases to be a Member of a State", ibid. 276.

301 Hume PE 1994, OC 194.

political society.[302] Adam Ferguson differentiated between the state of natural liberty and a political society:

> Distinction between Society & Political Union Men of a State of Natural Liberty have no Superior to Earth. They are accountable for their Conduct onely to God and their own Consciences. They have the Absolute disposal of their own Property as well as their Actions, and are to bound by no law but the Laws of Nature. Whereas every Citizen or Member of State is bound by the laws of that State as well as by the Laws of Nature he subjects himself, his Property, his Family, his Life itself to the Laws and the Judicatures of the State.[303]

The state of natural liberty was not the state of nature in the social contract sense, but rather the state of non-legalistic society controlled and governed by human conscience. From the second point of view, the quotation differentiated the two forms of responsibility. In general (or from ethical point of view), people were responsible to themselves and God, whereas as members of a political society they were subordinated to the laws of the state. A political state was legalistic union:

> The system of law, in every country is divided into that part which regulates the powers of state, considered as a corporation or body politic, and that which regulates the conduct of several members of which this corporation is composed. The former is the government, the law which *constitutes*; the latter, the law which is *constituted*. The former may with propriety, though not in that common acceptation be called the *public*; the latter the *private* law.[304]

A political body was also understood as a juridical person which had particular rights and duties defined in laws or by laws of nations, these laws did bind individuals:[305]

> A state constituted in this manner becomes as one person in law, holding rights different from those of several members; and under obligations, Which bind no individual, and committing to certain persons or councils the management of its common interests.[306]

Thomas Reid explicated the effects of the ideal form of a society as follows:

> First that the most effectual Means be used/to Strengthen in the Minds of the Citizens the Principles of Virtue and true Religion & to enlighten them in what is right & wrong, honourable and dishonourable. Secondly That the Temptations to wrong and criminal Conduct be as few as possible, and Thirdly that publick Esteem, Honour and Rank be proportioned as exactly as possible to real Merit.[307]

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302 Ferguson 1792, 1975, II 496; Kames SHM 1778, 1993, II, 220–221

303 Reid RL 1990, 246.

304 Millar HVEGSSBR 1818, IV, 285.

305 Political body as a juridical one, see Reid RL 1990, 177, 181–182, 195. According to Aristotle laws were the results of political art, see Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, 1972, 269–276, 1181a–1181b.

306 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 79,114, 139, 282, 228; SMP II, 1755, 1969, 105.

307 Reid RL 1990, 283.

Governmental regulation and participation have been contrasted in the Scottish studies: these aspects of political theory excluded each other.[308] Governmental regulation had two faces in Scottish philosophy, for the most often it referred to politico-conditional laws, but also fragmentary references to judicial regulation were introduced by Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid and Adam Ferguson. [309] As Hutcheson defined governmental regulation:

> … there is included a right vested in some person or council to decide all controversies arising large numerous bodies, to direct the actions of all for common interest, and to compell all by force to obey their orders.[310]

On the other hand, political power and the right to judge and punish, were separated by Smith:

> …the form of process in criminall causes is always very different from that in civil. The process of criminall causes is always very short … Criminall causes were determined by judges merely as mediators to make up the quarrell, and civil ones either by mediators of arbitars chosen voluntarily, and in every case not with the strong hand as it is when government is more established.[311]

The possibility of regulation was connected only to internal relationships of a political society, not to the relationships between separate political societies, in connection with other political societies. A political society was a society independent of other societies:

> the Law of Nations is that by which the conduct of States *or Independent Political Societies ought to be governed*.[312]

A political society was thus regulated by political laws, which were derived from the science of politics. A political society was comprised of domestic and international laws. The laws maintained a political society. Next we can ask how this maintenance proceeded.

V Natural Tendency Versus Subsistence and Labour

Characteristic to a political body was its anticipated unity; men with the same values, motives and aims acted with the same goals:[313]

> A community acts in one direction, and as a one person, by agreeing that the will of majority, or of a certain proportion greater than the majority, as two thirds, or three fourths, shall determine the whole. If not for this, communities could never act but when they are unanimous; which in political manners is not often expected. - In all

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308 Geuna 2002, 179.

309 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 237, 279.

310 Ibid. 279.

311 Smith LJ 1978, 276, 278. Also for Smith civil was against different forms of force, ibid. 126. In detail, political power can be divided into military power and civil power, Smith WN 1776, 1981, 48.

312 Reid RL 1990, 182. Emphasis mine.

313 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, II, 328–329, 333.

> just governments, the interest of the sovereign and of the people are the same; publick good being the aim of the both.[314]

Despite the explicitly mentioned naturalistic tendencies, the internal coherence of a political system was questioned. The unity of political body did not reflect the political reality. However, Scottish thinkers based their theory about governmental issues on the anticipated unity of a body. A political body was regarded as a person with (moral and) legal responsibility, but because a political body and a human body were different by their nature, Reid made a distinction between human and political bodies as moral agents.[315] In classical political philosophy a society was also an organised body; it was organised according to education and the natural talents of men. A body was a classical public symbol consisting of fellow citizens, magistrates and subjects.[316] According to Ferguson, the establishment of a political body was derived from the natural order:

> The common duties of all subjects must easily appear from the nature and origin of civil power and the political union, their peculiar duties arise from their several stations, relations, and offices in a state.[317]

A political body transformed the relationships between the free fellow citizens into and unequal relationship according to the natural rank of men. The first ranks in a society were based on opinions and differences between people, and the first differences in the forms of government were derived from different opinions of the founders of civil society. During a long process these opinions were confirmed and institutionalised by the constitution and law.[318] The concept of "rank" as hierarchy or inequality, incorporated economical and political aspects of inequality and replaced the idea of talents and education as a basis of a position in a political body, but the term "a political rank" was an unknown conception. In Millar's lectures the term rank was the basis of political order: "… all their different ranks formed one great political body."[319]

Opposite to these tendency-oriented descriptions, a political union required active maintenance as support and services for a political body:

> Political establishments cannot subsist without the support of their members, contributing either by their means of by their personal services to the public defence, or to the natural arrangements which may be necessary for public prosperity. In every nature of political society, therefore, a convention to this amount is implied.[320]

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314 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, II, 333, Cf. ibid. 328–239.

315 Reid RL 1990, 196. Emphasis mine.

316 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 294–296.

317 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 331.

318 Dunbar IMP 1789–1794, 1996, 42–43.

319 Millar MS Gen 179, 203. Division of labour can be regarded as separation of individuals according to property hierarchy or activities, see Gautier 1993, 280, 289, 291, 194.

320 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 385,

Political institutions also maintained political union by control. The crucial point was that a government was personified as a wise politician, who "subdivided" power:

> The reasons for property, from the general interest of society requiring diligence would not hold if a wise political constitution could compel all men to bear their part in labour, and then make a wisely proportioned of all that was acquired, according to indigence or merit of the citizens.[321]

Duties, rights and constitutional and criminal legislation established the relationships in a political/civil society. The advancement of a political society was often regarded as a result of active civil polity, establishment juridical government and the distribution of justice.[322] According to Ferguson, the unity of a political body required active actions, but the final order was a result of natural order or even inborn features of man:

> Prior to any political institutions whatever, men are qualified by a great diversity of talents … soul … actions … passions. Bring them together, each will find his place.[323]

Despite the natural tendencies to establish a particular form of a political body or wise political institutions, people also had to maintain it. The advancement of a political society was a result of man's labour rather than a mere tendency.

> … the people in their political point of view is their fitness to reap to preserve, and to improve their own institutions, and to support their country in pursuits of its respective objects.[324]

The unity of a political body was an ambiguous question; it was a result of naturalistic tendencies, but it also required human acts. For Reid a membership in a political body was human destiny:

> The Materials of the Political Fabrick [men] must be formed to fit the places for which they are destined. Without this there can neither be beauty nor Stability in the Building.[325]

Sometimes this maintenance of a political union failed and there was no a political union of free men, just sovereigns and subjects:

> … the people, at the distance from the throne and having profound veneration for the sovereign, consider themselves, not as a members of body-politic, but as a subjects merely, bound implicitly to obey.[326]

The internal coherence of political unions varied:

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321 Hutcheson SMP 1755, 1969, I, 322.

322 Cf. Oz-Salzberger 2002, 205–206.

323 Ferguson ECHS 1767, 1966, 1978, 63.

324 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 414.

325 Reid RL 1990, quote 288–289; also 281–182.

326 Kames SHM 1778, 1993, II, 273.

> Thus every kingdom was composed of a great variety of parts, loosely combined together, and for several centuries may be regarded as a collection of small independent societies, rather than as one great political community. The slow advances which were afterwards made by the people towards a more complete union …[327]

Sometimes Scottish thinkers, especially Thomas Reid, regarded the basis of a nation as its maintenance and labour. In this sense a nation was regarded as analogous to family; thus a nation was a biological society, or "a political family".[328] Scottish vocabulary reflected the tensional relationship between natural tendency and the continuous threat of dissolution. This was avoided by activity and labour. In contrast to these naturalistic tendencies some Scottish thinkers regarded a political society as a non-patrimonial society.

VI A Non-Patrimonial Society

Most Scottish philosophers denied Sir Robert Filmer's theory of the origins of a political society and power as expended paternal authority and a family as the origin of a political society. According to Hutcheson, a political state was always a contracted state between people, and not derived from natural parental authority.[329] For the non-patrimonial origins of a political state, sovereignties were not regarded as property, sold or divided according to the will of a sovereign:

> SINCE therefor all the authors who plead that certain civil sovereignties are *patrimonial*, so that they may be sold, divided, or any way transferred at the pleasure of the sovereign, suppose also that they are generally founded in conquests; what is said above shows that such power has no just foundation.[330]

Here Reid opposed Filmer's conception of political power which derived from unlimited paternal authority. Both a state and sovereignty originated from a contract: "No patrimonial States. All Sovereignty unalienable but by the consent of a people."[331]

Denial of a paternal state also indicated a political society as a union of free men. Reid's reference to Emmerich de Vattel indicated that (the) people had a right to choose their sovereign; they were not his (private) property.[332] Paternal power as a political power was denied, with exceptions. Military force was comparable to paternal power; it collided with the idea of freedom as a basis of a political union.

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327 Smith WN 1776, 1981, 273.

328 Reid RL 1990, 283.

329 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 139.

330 Ibid. 313.

331 Reid RL 1990, 271. Cf. Filmer 1631–1642[?], 1996, 7–35.

332 Vattel 1758, 1982, 25.

VII A Non-Military Society

The historical fact that conquests and war preceded political societies have led to an interpretation that the origin of a political system was violent and unjustified in the Scottish philosophy.[333] Ideally, political systems or governments and intercourse were based on contracts; written, tacit or implicit. The fact of violent and military origins of a political society seemed to refute the principle of voluntary choice. There seemed to be a discrepancy between the ideal explanation of the origins of that particular society such as the first contract, intentions of nature or god's creation,[334] and the military-oriented explanations of political societies, or further, between the gradual advancement of a political society and the military origins of a political society.[335]

Hume introduced the controversy between military-violent origins of a political society and the contracted origins of a political society, or military origins of a political society and progress. According to Hume, the original contract did not exist among savages, but people intended to elect a king, to establish a political society, and a government. Hume explicated two versions of the origins of political systems: the first based on voluntary choice, the other based on military force. In the essay, 'Of the Origin of Government', Hume explicated the voluntary choice that a prince was chosen for his personal qualities, such as valour, force, integrity and prudence, and after that the criteria of kingship were birth rank and station.[336] The alternative to this voluntary, but useful choice, was either foreign war or civil war, sooner or later.[337] Contrary to this explication, the military version of the origins of a political union was introduced in the essay 'Of the Original Contract'; the original contract was the first contract between the military leader and subjects.[338] Military leadership was only one method of establishing power by force; first military leaders were also political leaders, but military leadership was not political leadership by its nature.[339] The character of a military leader exemplified the controversy. A military leader tried to manipulate the people to agree to an original contract; he tried to manipulate the political freedom of the people to make choices:

> When an artful and bold man is placed at the head of an army or faction, it is often easy for him, by employing sometimes violence, sometimes false pretences, to establish his dominion over a people a hundred times more numerous than his partizans.[340]

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333 Short notions to Millar, Reid and Hume Haakonssen 1996, 113, 162, 210.

334 See Reid RL 1990 introduction by Haakonssen, 70.

335 Buckle & Castiglione 1991, 459

336 Hume PE 1994, OG 21.

337 Hume THN 1739–1740, 1981, 540 –541, 554; ECPM 1751, 1980, 202–203.

338 Hume PE 1994, OC 190; see also Kidd 1993, 118.

339 The classical conception of Aristotelian *polis*- constitution versus military pact, see Aristotle, *The Politics* 1981, 196.

340 Hume PE 1994, OC 190.

Despite the admiration of the political prudence of a military leader such a character collides with the political ideal: people could not exercise a voluntary decision. In the case that a military commander succeeded in usurpation and conquests, the original contract transformed the nature of military leadership into the political one. The contract stabilised the system and people had a right and a possibility to re-establish the freedom of a political union: they had a right to resist the established government.[341] The contract after a conquest transformed and reformed the military force to political power, or at least, it should be done by a contract. Hume's explication of every original contract indicated, that the original contract limited absolute political power:

> The doctrine, which founds all lawful government on an *original contract*, or consent of the people,… nor has the most noted of its partizans, in prosecution of it, scrupled to affirm, *that absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all*;… [342]

The principle characterised political power as limited power by its nature. Military force as unlimited power was comparable to absolute monarchy. The doctrine of contracted power was also introduced in the militaristic version of a political society.

A political society and the government constituted partly distinct aspects of political systems and, in some measure, separate processes in history. In the Chapter 'Of Political Society' Hume analyses the utility of a political society whereas in 'Of the Origin of Government' and 'Of the Original of Contract' Hume focused on government, the contract between conqueror and subject, not on a union between free men. Hume's interpretation of the theories of the classical original contracts regarded those contracts as the government contracts.[343] Thus the original contract after a conquest, explicated the establishment of a new, government, not a society. Reid explicated it clearly; he calls it the "overturn " of an old government: "That when ancient Government is overtuned, either by Conquest or by internal Disorder."[344] Thus military leadership re-established government, not the political society as whole. This conceptual move was a step towards a modern state.

These conceptions from a spatiality and temporality to the denial of patrimonial power characterised political societies in the Scottish texts. Scottish thinkers did not reconstruct any systematic list of criteria of political societies, but the anticipated histories tangentially reflected these criteria of political

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341 Buckle & Castiglione 1991, 464–477.

342 Hume PE 1994, OC 200. Emphasis Hume

343 Hume THN 1739–1740, 1981, 542.

344 Reid RL 1990. 279–289. Here Reid referred to the tradition of Reason of State: "That when ancient Government is overtuned, either by Conquest or by internal Disorder, the safest way to establish a new one, is to keep as much as possible the old Forms of Procedure and the old Names of Offices … It is not with an Old Government, as with an old House, from which the Inhabitant, who desires a new one, may remove with his Family and Goods till it be pulled down and rebuilt. If we pull down the old Government, it must be pulled down about our Ears, and we must submit to the danger of having the New built over our Heads."

societies. The political sphere especially was constructed by the references to the pre-history of a political society. Thus the next section reflect these criteria of the political as Scottish thinkers introduced them in their anticipated histories on the origins of political societies.

3.3.2 Two aspects of the Histories of the Political Societies

This chapter introduces few elementary conceptions for the section 3.3.3. Scottish philosophers described both human sociability and the establishment of political power and institutions as historically.[345] Although Scottish histories of the origins of political societies varied, characteristic to all histories were that they were comprised of the two aspects of the origins the philosophical theory of the origin and the characterisation of that process in practice, whether historical or ahistorical, but factual, by its nature. Historical explications combined both the philosophy of a political society as a union of free men bound together by a contract and the Scottish knowledge of history whether anticipated anthropological histories of the early states of the human society or scientific histories of political events. This philosophical scheme was not originally Scottish. For example, John Locke, in *The Second Treatise on Civil Government,* introduced his version of the original contract, not only as the origin of a civil government and a civil society, but also the general process of the establishment of a political union.[346] Scottish thinkers introduced several fragmentary explications concerning the early states of a political union separately: history of political societies were a synthesis of the philosophy of politics and history.

The Scottish theories described the origins of political societies as the contracted societies or the transformation of the family and tribe societies into political societies. Characteristic to the Scottish theories was that histories of political societies were constructed from two separate points of views: as a union of free men, as the union of fellow citizens, and as a ruler ruled relationship.[347] Political philosophy and anticipated histories of political unions indicated this dualism of political theory. The following section revises these dualistic approaches to histories of political unions.

3.3.3 Histories of the Political Societies

Scottish philosophers introduced the theoretic-philosophical histories concerning the origins of the political as a transformation or a change from the non-political to the political. The following section analyses the political in these histories. This section introduces the various criteria of the political (as

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345 Cf. Berry 1997, 25–31. In case of Adam Smith, it is a worthy of speculation if an invisible hand as a philosophical superstructure also explained the origin of human sociability. Cf. Berry 1997, 44–46.

346 Locke 1698, 1960, 1964, 337.

347 Cf. Reid RL 1990, introduction by Haakonssen, 68–74.

explicated in the section 3.3.1) in Scottish histories. Because of the great variety of these histories the best way to analyse them is to consider them separately.

Francis Hutcheson

Francis Hutcheson did not make any clear distinction between a state, a civil and a political union or civil society and civil polity. He used these terms interchangeably.[348] A proper origin of a political society was a deed or a convention between men. Here Hutcheson used the term "original contract". He denied the violent origin, and its derivation, of military leadership as an origin of political society:

> To alledge that men were first compelled by force to submit to civil power, must be very incredible; as no one man could be supposed to have strength or force sufficient to compel considerable numbers into such submission; and if he had the assistance of others in this compulsion, these others must have been previously subjected to his civil power: and thus a political union must have been subsisting before any considerable force could have been used to compel men into subjection.[349]

Thus, a political society was the result of voluntary joining, originally for common security. At the first steps of a political society there was no violence or military leadership. Hutcheson regarded political power and parental authority as entirely distinct; civil power was power over adults, the role of a prince or sovereign was different from any parent and civil society was established forever, while family society was a temporal society.[350] On the other hand, he described sovereigns by the phrase "fathers of their people", and according to him, a good sovereign resembled a parent.[351] This did not refer to a pure Filmerian paternal society because a sovereign was chosen by a contract, and only after that he became a father of his people.

Hutcheson's second version of the origin of a civil society was purely contractarian. According to him, three contracts were needed: 1) a union-contract between people, 2) a government-contract, and 3) a contract between the governors and the governed.[352] The theory combined the union aspect and ruler-ruled aspect. There was a conceptual difference between *A System of Moral Philosophy* and *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*: in the latter he used the term first contract. The *first contract* established a society to be governed by one counsel, the second contract formulated the plan of government and governors, and the third contract was of obedience and "faithful" administration. When a political entity or body was established according to this order, it was called a state and civil polity.[353] Here Hutcheson wrote about the origin and institutions

348 Hutcheson SMP 1755, 1969, II, 212–213.

349 Ibid. II, 224.

350 Hutcheson SMP 1755, 1969, II, 224–226, the contract was a remedy for corruption and produced the greatest happiness for the people, see also Leidhold 1985, 235, 247.

351 ibid.

352 Hutcheson SMP 1755, 1969, II, 227.

353 Hutcheson SIMP 1749, 1969, 286.

of a state. Conceptually, natural law and the original contract did not negate each other, nor did these conceptions exclude each other in Hutcheson's conceptual universe.[354] The similarities to Gershom Carmichael's texts were clear; according to Carmichael, a civil society based the union of heads of the family as citizens and the rulers-ruled contract with two parts, the first one the contract concerning the form of government, and the second one the contract concerning the person of the governor. According to Carmichael, these contracts were made at the same time, and then, the contract was named as the first contract. Especially on the republican form of government the rulers-ruled contract evolved into the union-society contract.[355] Unlike Carmichael, other Scottish thinkers seemed to make a distinction between the establishment and institutionalisation of a political society and the establishment of the sovereignty. Hutcheson defined these contracts separately and the common idea that political leadership was often derived from military leadership indicated that a political society and sovereignty were established separately. During the process a political government institutionalised both the order of a society and sovereignty.

David Hume

Sometimes the early origin of a political union of free and equal men and the origin of a government were introduced separately. David Hume made an explicit distinction between a political society and a political government.

> But tho' it be possible for men to maintain a small uncultivated society without government, 'tis impossible to they shou'd maintain a society of any kind without justice, and the of those three fundamental laws … concerning the origin of government and political society. When men have once experienc'd the impossibility of preserving any steady order in society, while every one is his own master, and violates or observes the laws of society, according to his present interest and pleasure, they naturally run into the invention of government, and put it out of their own power, as far as possible, to transgress the laws of society. Government, therefore arises from the voluntary convention of men; and ´tis evident, that the same convention, which establishes government, will also determine the persons who are to govern,…[356]

A society and a government were separate stages of the establishment of a political society; people first united themselves to a society and then established the government. Hume made the same distinction in his essays:

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354 Hutcheson SMP 1755, 1969, II, 302.

355 Carmichael, 1724, 2002, 147, 151.

356 Hume THN 1739–1740, 1981, 541, 554. See also ibid. 530–540, 550–551. Hume continued: "But when government has been establish'd on this footing for some considerable time, and the separate interest … has produce'd a separate sentiment of morality, the case is entirely alter'd, and a promise is no longer able to determine the particular magistrate; since it is no longer consider'd as the foundation of government. We naturally suppose ourselves born to submission;" ibid. 554–555.

> … but their own consent could, at first associate them together, and subject them to any authority …[357]

Thus men first entered into a union of men and then subjected themselves to power. Government is regarded as a mere institution established by people.[358] People were subject to authority because they could not be associated without it:

> The skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer are different from those of a man of quality: So are his sentiments, actions and manners. The different stations of life influence the whole fabric … and these different stations arise necessarily … of principles of human nature. Men cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without government. Government makes the distinction of property and establishes the different ranks of men. This produces industry, traffic manufactures.[359]

Hume's theory of a political union reconstructed the historico-philosophical continuity from "general society" to" a political society" and "a political government". Political government often was an immediate result of voluntary association. The government was established by the direct consent of men or by choosing a sovereign, who then established a government. General society referred to an uninstitutionalised state of men; this was not a permanent form of life. Because of the injustice and disorder of general society, a political society, with (obviously implicit, unwritten) laws, had to be established.

Henry Home

Henry Home's theory of the origin of political society was dualistic, there were internal and external reasons to establish a political society, and thus the idea of the origin of society was philosophically different from any other variant of the origin of a political society. According to Henry Home, the transformation to more extensive societies, from a tribe to a state, was revolutionary. Primitive tribes were not political societies; they had no *patria* until they faced had a common, foreign enemy. A political society was based on the mutual attraction between its members, on a common territory and an enemy. Emotions were not seen as a motivation of a political society the Scottish texts.

According to Home, the first leaders were military commanders, and the leadership actualised only in the cases of external crises, in the state of peace there were no leaders. Later the authority was extended and probably lasted also during peaceful periods. Military leadership was established in advanced societies because the very first forms of government were simple: people were equal and military leaders were private persons during peace. Only disorder made people desire a strong despotic sovereign. The first strong leaders were chosen according to their age, experience and learning. This period of despotic sovereignty gradually led to a more democratic course of different forms of

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357 Hume PE 1994, OC 187.

358 Hume THN 1739-1740, 1981, 550.

359 Hume THN 1739–1740, 1981, 402.

government. This version of the origins of a political society reflected the origin of sovereignty; but Home also introduced another explanation of political union, which posited the origins of a political society as a union of free men. The invention of money also introduced hierarchies, and increased asocial passions and conflicts or at least the possibilities for such conflicts, and thus the power of a temporary commander had to be established and consolidated as a permanent condition.[360]

Henry Home used the metaphor of revolutionary change, which described the transformation of power from military leadership to political power and the transformation of familial/tribal societies towards a political society. Home combined philosophical theory with written and conjectural histories in his analysis of the origins of a political society.

John Millar

In his *The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks*, John Millar explicated the origin and advancement of a political society within the context of his stadial theory.[361] Millar first referred to a political society in the chapter focusing on pastoral ages, in village and shepherd societies. According to Millar, a political government first existed in the very early state of man; even a savage tribe had a government.[362] The first precondition for a political society was the enlargement of a family tribe, for the political sphere was synonymous with public, or in other words the ancient *polis*.[363] Secondly, property was the source of authority and government. The establishment of a political society was not directly connected to commercial society; as a phenomenon commerce was preceded a political society. The wandering life of shepherds had had an effect on property and thus government. The advancement of a political society, and perhaps the original reason for its historical establishment, was derived from the conflicts. According to Millar, village people and shepherds had different political interests.[364] The results of this conflict were migration, quarrels and conquests. Millar explicated the first political conflict, which derived from wealth/economics. The conflict motivated a political order, and thus, a political society. Despite the invention a political society, the conflicting nature of the political sphere still existed. The ideas of political conflicts and the need for order were primary motives of political societies for the Scottish philosophers.

However, neither military leadership nor disorder explained all the aspects of the origin of a political society. Some tangential formulations referred to the expansion and the transformation of a family society to a political society,

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360 Kames SHM 1778, 1993, II, 174–175, 222–223, 312. According to Smith particular societies could be maintained without mutual attraction, cf. McNamara 1998, 38.

361 The four-stages theory can be understood as a philosophical argument for the contemporary economic development and conjectural history, cf. McNamara 1998, 46.

362 Millar MS Gen 180 I 24.

363 Millar MS Gen 289-191; MS Gen 289, I, 45–49.

364 Ibid. Also MS Gen 180 I, 24.

and especially the shift from *patria potestas*, to a political society. For instance, Millar's *The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks*, indicated the conceptual distinction between the early origin of political leadership and the formation of early connections of a society.[365]
Millar described the origin of the Roman empire with the connection of increased wealth, the establishment of political sovereignty, military leadership and the tendency of disintegration:

> Particular chieftains or heads of families became great and powerful in proportion to their wealth, which enabled them to support a numerous train of retainers and followers. A great number of these were united under a sovereign; for the different parts of a Roman province … fell naturally into the hands of the same military leader, and were erected into one kingdom. But, in a rude age, unaccustomed to subordination, the monarch had little authority over such wide dominions.[366]

For Millar political power proper was the opposite of oppression and unlimited power.[367] In a political society *patria postestas* was limited by regular government and law, which were established when several family societies were united into a larger society, and thus domestic authority was transformed into public jurisdiction. Still, home remained the sphere of the master of his family.[368]

James Dunbar

According to James Dunbar, man was always a member of a society and a government; during the earliest periods of history a government was whether a family government or a tribal government. Dunbar's theory was Filmerian; he did not make any distinction between *oikos* and *polis*, and he thought that paternal authority was political power as well. The first public governments were patriarchal and military; thus the equality of primitive societies disappeared. The origin of a political society was naturalistic; before the establishment of a regular government, political relationships were based on the natural talents of men. Dunbar described the state before the establishment of a legal-based political society as a state of injustice and violence.[369] The political society was thus an extension of paternal power and based on inborn differences, whether physical or psychological. Dunbar described the difference between natural society and political society as growth and sometimes a violent series of changes:

> But as Natural society is coeval with man, political society grows out of it by slow and often by insensible degrees.[370]

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365 See especially the chapters on rude and political leadership and the establishment of a government, Millar ODR 1779, 1960, 219, 254–255, 262–263, passim.

366 Ibid. 210.

367 Ibid. 229.

368 Ibid. 229, 238, 243.

369 Dunbar IMP 1789–1794, 1996, 42.

370 Ibid.

Dunbar used the term "state "as a synonym for a political society. He referred to a community with a government and public concerns, such as manufactures, arts, commerce, alliances and military treaties.[371]

According to Dunbar, a human being was always self-interested, also in the private sphere; marriage, love and mutual affection indicated only a temporal disruption of self-interest.[372] For Dunbar, the dominance of self-interest was a natural, not pejorative, phenomenon; both physical and moral imperfection were essential to societal life; because in those situations man was in a state of total individuality and independence and a society was thus an impossibility. The Mandevillean principle of private vices as public virtues (in the political arena) was gradually transformed to the private sphere, and it became increasingly acknowledged, if not a morally accepted principle.[373] In his lectures on morals Dunbar was more conventional. He claimed that man was always sociable, and that legal systems and political laws were based on original law and universal moral duty.[374] Despite the entirely self-interested nature of man he always lived in a society because it increased the freedom and generosity of men. According to Dunbar, the establishment of a political society was spontaneous. Society was never established by fear, but for necessities of human life, and thus a society of self-interested men superseded natural man.[375] It seems that Dunbar did not base his theory of the origin of a society on military leadership, but rather on human needs.

James Beattie

James Beattie analysed the aspects of a union of men and the establishment of the government interchangeably.[376] The origins of a civil society were in remote history. In the natural state, which preceded the "institutionalisation of government", men were free, independent and equal. There were two reasons to establish a political society: the psychological and physical differences between men and inconveniences of the natural state, Some people inclined to subordinate themselves because of their weakness, they:

> would look up for advice and assistance to those of who were able to assist and advice them...[377]

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371 Ibid. 2, 42.

372 Dunbar EHM 1780, 10.

373 For example, Hume on Sir Robert Walpole in the essay 'Character of Sir Robert Walpole', first published in 1742, here in Hume *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary* ed. Miller 1985, 1987, 575. It is interesting to note that the nature of man as "private virtue public vices is directly comparable to small states with virtuous domestic politics and vicious" and violent abroad, ibid., 576.

374 Dunbar IMP 1789–1794 1996, 31.

375 Dunbar EHM 1780, 5–17, 335. On temporal unions 1780, 430; Kames SHM 1778, 1993, II, 214, Dunbar regarded society as a theatre, as a scene of human freedom. EHM 1780, 5.

376 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, II, 327.

377 Ibid. II, 326.

The second explanation was typical of to the 18th-century philosophy: inconveniences of the natural state focusing on motivation or reason of a political union, people "mistake" and "disagree" about rights, and the law was established to decide these situations.[378] Beattie explicated the basis of power relationships and governments separately.

According to Beattie, all governments were in some measure illegal because governments limited the natural liberty of men.[379] This principle had its origins in the absence of the idea of the very first contract. Beattie considered a family as the basis of civil society.[380] The very first power relationships between men were comparable to those of a parent and a child, which were different from any other relationships.[381] A parent and a child relationship was entirely based on dependence; it was not a voluntary union. Thus, Beattie reconstructed the history of political society on a Filmerian, uncontracted, basis with the connotations of biology.

Adam Ferguson

Adam Ferguson did not provide any explanation about the origins of political society in his first lectures on moral philosophy, but rather he analysed civil or political contracts between fellow-citizens and contracts between a sovereign and his subjects separately.[382] In his *Institutes of Moral Philosophy*, Ferguson stated that men had always acted together as troops and companies for their own and public good, but he did not explicate the process by which these troops became nations or states.[383] He only shortly noted that political governments were informal among savages.[384]

In his *Principles of Moral and Political Science* Ferguson separately analysed both the paternal and contractarian version of the origins of political society. The paternal version founded on the internal unity of family and human societies in general. Political institutions were established gradually:

> Families may be considered as the elementary forms of society, or the establishments the most indispensably necessary to the existence and preservation of the kind. As families may exist apart, and without any necessary communication of one group with another, so they still continue to be formed, in whatever numbers mankind may be leagued into larger communities: They are the nurseries of men; the basis of empires, as well as nations and tribes; and the compartments of which the greatest fabrics of political establishments are composed ... whether voluntary of forced.[385]

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378 Ibid. II, 324–327.

379 Ibid. II, 343.

380 Ibid. II, 124.

381 Cf. Berry 1997, 27–28.

382 Ferguson IMP 1769, 1994, 219, 226.

383 Ibid. 262.

384 Ferguson EHCS 1767, 1978, 186-198, passim.

385 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, I, 27.

The quotation does not introduce any clear point about the transformation from the paternal state to the political state. Following the Filmerian tradition a political union was an immediate result of a family society. Ferguson introduced the contractarian version of the origin of political society in which people associate themselves to the political society by a contract. Civil society was a contracted society, into which men entered intentionally:

> Civil society is not improperly termed a state of convention; for, although men are actually in society together, before they enter into any form of bargain or compact; yet, every step that is made … tends to convention … But we now cease to enquire in what form civil or political compact is ratified … Under every political establishment, there is a relation of *magistrate* and *subject* and the relation of *fellow citizens* … essential to the political society itself.[386]

The "paternal version" and the "contract version" were introduced separately because they reflected separate modes of the origins of a political union. The theories were separated because power derived from paternal authority was different from power derived from a contract.

Thomas Reid

Thomas Reid also introduced two separate versions concerning the origins of a civil or a political society. Reid's vocabulary reformed the traditional conceptions of the state of nature and state of society as *societas civilis sive politica*. Reid first reconstructed a transformation form an unsocial or a solitary state to a social, commercial and a political state. Here Reid focused on commerce and exchange between the members of a political society.[387] The other version combines history and theory of the establishment of a kingship, civil government and a political state.[388] In the early primitive states of human societies and extended family societies men chose one wise and virtuous man, who *became* a king and a *father* of the people, and a government was thus established by the king. The explanation indicated that although paternal political societies were logical impossibilities, the ideal of political authority resembled paternal authority. The first kings were tyrannical, absolute, and their rule was unlimited and comparable to that of a marriage that originated from a rape. Despite the possible violent origin of the political union it was based on a mutual voluntary contract and trust between the king and the people. According to Reid, this relationship was the first contract.

The contract had been an historical contract, not in the ancient mythological past, but in written history.[389] All states, whether past or contemporary, had a contractual origin; Rome was established by the contract

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386 Ibid. II, 270-271.

387 Reid RL 1990, 160, 161, 162, 164.

388 Ibid. 173.

389 Ibid. 238–243. Gilde has divided social contracts into hypothetical, or implicit and historical, see Gilje 1989,VIII. The French translation as primitive contract is interrelated with history, see Gautier 1993, 46.

between the people and *decemvirs*, and in the history of England the contract was made between king and the senate. The relationship between a king and the people was regarded as an oath of allegiance that could entered into or dissolved by a vote.[390] Reid's focus on actual history was the difference between the other Scottish first contract theories and other contract theories, including Rousseau's version in which social contract preceded political society.[391]

Reid's concept of a political society and government with contracted origins was connected to the idea of a classical *polis*:

> The Political Compact in the first Stages of Civil Government its onely among Masters of Families. They are properly the onely citizen; their Wives Children & Servants, are rather the Goods and Chattels of the Head of the family than the Subjects of the State. The Master of the Family is answerable for their Conduct towards the State & towards the other citizens. They are not under the Government of the State, but the Head of the familly. If he is guilty or Cruelty towards them. The State is to Blame…the Origin of the Patria Potestas & of Servitude in Ancient States. The political compact is gradually extended to Wives and Children & Servants & then they become more the Subjects of the State & less the Subjects of the Pater familias[392]

The phrase "master of families" did not refer to the continuity between paternal and political power, but to the conception that masters of families (not necessarily fathers) were equal and free to unite themselves. This quotation shows explicitly that, although unlimited power was the origin of political authority, in fact, it was not the ideal origin of political leadership and union.[393] According to Reid, the political sphere expanded into the private sphere, and wives and children partly entered to a political society, when they were subject to and protected by public laws.

Thomas Reid compared the "conquested" origin political society to a marriage which originated from a rape.[394]According to Reid, after a rape marriage *society* was established by a contract, without a marriage contract there was no a marriage union at all. Similarly, after a conquest a political society was established only by a contract. The contract legitimated the state. Despite the illegal usurpation the union of free men – a political society – had no illegal origins.

Reid described the tribal state without political government as the ideal mode of life. The union was established because of the need of discipline

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390 Reid RL 1990,238–241, see also Hume's short defence of parliamentary legitimacy of sovereignty THN 1739–1740, 1981, 563–566.

391 Reid RL 1990, 238–241; Mäki 2000, 87–88.

392 Reid RL 1990, 233. Oz -Salzberger also refers to a contract between masters of the families as the origin of civilisation and economic- juridical development of a civil society, but Oz-Salzberger did not make any distinction between (a) society, government, a state , a nation, human society or mankind, see Oz- Salzberger 2001, 63–64.

393 Naturally paternal power was unlimited power over his family but it was limited by a political government.

394 Reid RL 1990, 240, 278: Cf. Introduction by Haakonssen, 71.

criminal punishment. Alternatively, primitive tribes needed a commander, who united them through warfare.[395]

The pure form of the origin of a political body was this transformation of paternal power to the political one, from *oikos* to *polis*. The transfer from *pater familias* into *polis* was also a personal process in men's lives. Both a political society and a political government were established out of necessity and utility; to avoid the imperfection of virtue and wisdom. [396] A government had its origins in the distribution of justice and the legal system.[397] The origin of a political society thus consisted of a voluntary union of men and the subsequent regulation of it.

A political society was first based on the contract between free men, which indicated a voluntary choice of men, men freely united.[398] Reid compared a political union to a ship's crew:

> If we should suppose a ships crew to lose their master & mate upon a voyage. They will very naturally chuse a master and submit themselves and their ship to his direction because its absolutely necessary to their preservation that they should be under some government…to keep united...[399]

Reid described the paradox of a political union. On the one hand, it was not necessity. On the other hand, it was at least temporarily necessary. People temporarily united themselves because it was necessary for human survival:

> What really and in Fact was and must have been the Origin of the Various States and Civil Governments that have been established. Or what reasons did actually induce those who first framed them to enter into this political union … To the first question 1 Not necessity./ If we should suppose a ship crew to lose their master &mate upon a voyage. They will very naturally chuse a master and submit themselves and their selves, because it is absolutely necessary to their to their preservation that they should be under some government. If they should be cast away upon some unknown Island or coast, and found it necessary for their common safety either against wild beast … But is they should be cast upon some desert Island were every could provide for his own subsistence independent of the rest; their political union may probably cease, and every man would chuse to live after his own way. Nor does there seem to be any need for a political Union in such case … many tribes have lived without law and government…[400]

The existence of a political society can be described as a tension between free will and necessity, voluntary association and the maintenance of a political

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395 Ibid. 174.

396 Hutcheson SMP 1755, 1969, II, 212, 225–226.

397 Reid RL 1990, 190–191. "The chief Inducements that lead Men at first to Unite one Government or Society, are either their Defence against common Enemies, who … may be rested & overcome by a great Number united under one Government; or secondly their protection against injuries from another, which is most effectual provided for when all agree to refer their Differences to common Judges or Magistrates …. In the first Periods of Civil Government Judges are chosen of those who have the highest Reputation for Wisdom & Integrity."

398 French debate. Cf. Baker 1990, 123.

399 Reid RL 1990, 173. Cf. Aristotle's metaphor of a ship, *The Politics* 1981, 179.

400 Reid RL 1990, 247.

union once established. But the quotation above indicates that the independent state of a man was the ideal and most natural to a man.[401]

Although political societies were ideally organised according to natural order, men had no natural, immediate desire for a political society and subjection of laws; they wanted to live in natural state or "free society of others in natural liberty". If possible, people tended to live a state without a political union, a government, and a leader, although nature intended people to live a societal life.

Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart

The anticipated histories were the most crucial source in the conceptualisation of the political society as a special mode of human life. Some philosophers did not concern the topic in connection with polit-conceptions. Adam Smith did not introduce any explanation of the actual origin of political society or the idea of the origin of a society, except minute references to a need of protection as the motivation of the union between subjects and sovereign and to governments in pastoral and agricultural ages.[402] We can only say that obedience was based on self-interest and respect for authority not on the first contract in the establishment of a political society.[403] The internal order and the distinction of ranks was based on authority, which was derived from "a natural disposition of men `to go along with all the passions of the rich and powerful".[404] These fragments characterised the unavoidable naturalistic tendency to live in a society, but Smith did not reflect the transformation from the non-political state to a political state.

Dugald Stewart did not make any conceptual distinction between mankind, a society and a political society.[405] The societal and the political were assimilated; the idea of the political state of a man as a particular state of men was diminished.[406] The political and the social were the aspects of the same phenomenon, the society.

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The "sociological" interpretations of the Scottish enlightenment theories thematised the concept of society or mankind and *political* was only an attribute of the broader concept of society. However, Scottish thinkers seemed to regard the political as an indispensable sphere of human life. The main dividing line goes between the views that linked the political with the military and the barbarian, as opposed to the civilising power of commerce, and views that

401 In Reid's political vocabulary a political union may refer either to a union between free men or a union between people and government.

402 Smith WN 1776, 1981 714; Berry 1997, 105; Castiglione 2000, 55; McNamara 1998, 46.

403 Kidd 1993, 118.

404 McNamara 1998, 25.

405 Stewart OMP 1877, 11–12.

406 Stewart EPHM 1877, 233.

insisted on the artificial character of the political society, as a transcendence over the merely natural. In this view the contractarian impulse was retained, although combined with an evolutionary theory of history. Also the old struggle between paternal and political power was actualised, although now in evolutionary, rather than in the teleological terms of the Filmer vs. Locke controversy.

The Scottish theory of society was multidimensional. On the one hand, there was mankind as a society, the uniform and universal experience of a human being; on the other hand, there was a multiplicity of societies, with different basis, origins, motives, and ends. The political sphere constituted a special sphere of its own. The political unions were differentiated from patriarchal and military unions, because of the different basis of power; legally regulated political power was separated from unlimited patriarchal authority or military force by a contract. Only Beattie and Dunbar reconstructed a theory without the idea of the explicit moment of contract during the transformation of a family society towards a political society. The political union was derived from expanded paternal power, but the actual transformation of the society was not explicated. Dugald Stewart reconstructed the final synthesis of a general sociability and the political. Despite the social contract critique the Scottish theories about the early histories concerning political society varied.

The Scottish conception of a political society – whether a body, an union or a nation, was purely temporal and spatial human experience with an origin, history and end, and as such it was different from the conception of mankind, which was more or less universal experience throughout times. Although a Scottish variant of a political society was a step towards a modern state, the feature that it was based on the mutual relationship between a sovereign and a subject, indicated the crucial difference between the Scottish conception of a state and a modern state familiar to us.

Scottish thinkers differentiated the aspects of political union as a society and as a ruler-ruled relationship. In the Scottish theories on the origins of a political society these aspects can be established separately. To summarise the Scottish conceptualisation of a political society, the discussion concerning the social contract was transformed to a discussion of a political society and political government for a (pre)modern state.

4 POLITICS AS ACTIVITY

The use of polit-vocabulary depicted politics as an activity although the activity aspect was introduced in polit-conceptions in the late 19th century and an intelligible thematisation of politics as activity was introduced in the 19th and 20th centuries.[407] This chapter focuses on *policy* or policy-making whereas Chapter 2 focused on politics as discipline. This chapter defines the nature of political wisdom and the (dis)connections between science and prudence.

4.1 The Political as Wisdom

The point of wise activity, political wisdom or *prudentia* has been regarded as an indistinguishable from the theory of politics as "in the heart of politics".[408] For a modern reader it first seems that there was no difference at all between political science that focused on the system of nature and political wisdom because the advancement of political wisdom and science was interrelated in the course of history. However, politics was depicted as activity or policy depicted values, motives and aims different from those of science: science and *prudentia*: referred to different aspects of knowledge. The distinction was not originally Scottish; for Hobbes science was cognition, whereas *prudentia* was inborn to man.[409] Scottish thinkers did not develop any systematic difference between science and practical prudence but some fragmentary references reflected two separate aspects of political knowledge. In some cases the differentiation of science and practical wisdom explains controversies of political knowledge.

Dugald Stewart most explicitly differentiated theory and practical wisdom. Stewart differentiated theory and practice and he preferred practical knowledge to theory. Theory was a kind of unattainable utopia because results

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407 Palonen 1985, 20–31; Palonen 1989, 43.

408 Kitagawa 1995, 65.

409 Hobbes 1651, 1685, 115.

of political actions were dependent on practical skills, not on a theoretical reasoning:

> …political theories, which attempt to delineate the principles of a perfect legislation. Such theories … ought to be considered merely as descriptions of the ultimate objects at which the statesman ought to aim. The tranquillity of his administration, and the immediate success of his measures, depend on his good sense and his practical skill.[410]

The variants of the dichotomy theory versus practice were common in Scottish philosophy. These aspects did not exclude each other, but were separate aspects of knowledge. The distinction was not derived from the emergence of Newtonian science; it probably enforced the distinction. According to Reid, political debates were either speculative or practical but concerned man. Practical politics was an art of modelling and directing, as Reid wrote:

> Model or direct the Government of a Nation actually existing, has to do with men who are not in the State of Nature, but who by Education, & by the State of Society in which they live have acquired Habits & Dispositions, which it is not in his Power to eradicate, and which may be called a second Nature. To this second Nature as well to the first his Principles of Government must be adapted [411]

Hume also reflected tensions between the practical and the theoretical, and the particular and the general. Philosophical politics or scientific politics concerned the political system, whereas laws concerned particulars of that system.[412] The distinction between practice and theory was parallel to the difference between jurisprudence and execution of justice. Although theory and practice were separate spheres of knowledge, science was regarded as an improvement to classical political theory and prudence. Hume described science as knowledge for the few as:

> Speculative sciences do, indeed, improve the mind; but this advantage reaches only to a few persons.[413]

Hume further differentiated science and *prudentia* and in the following quotation introduced the separate aims of theoretical reasoning and *prudentia*:

> When a man deliberates concerning his conduct in any *particular* affair, and forms schemes in politics trade and oeconomy, or any business life, he never ought to draw his arguments too fine, or connect too long a chain of consequences together… But when we reason upon *general* subjects… our speculations can scarcely be too fine.[414]

The advancement of practical politics and vulgar skills could not be separated, as Hume depicted:

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410 Stewart LWAS 1793, 1963, 498.

411 Reid RL 1990, 281. The first nature refers a man in the state of nature.

412 Hume PE 1994, Com 94.

413 Ibid. PG 33.

414 Ibid. Com 93.

> Laws, order, police, discipline; these can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reason has refined itself by exercise, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at least of commerce and manufacture.[415]

Hume described the advancement of *prudentia,* as foresight and subdividing power, parallel to the advancement of any other professions. Hume depicted the wisdom of politics as a separate branch of wisdom different from a philosopher and a lawyer:

> …in every art or profession, even those which most concern life or action, that spirit of accuracy, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them more subservient to the interest of society. And though a philosopher may live remote from business, the genius philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtility in subdividing and balancing power; the layer more method and finer principles in his reasonings.[416]

The dichotomy between *prudentia* and science explained a controversy about the use of history as a source of politics. Despite the Humean idea of history as a source of science, from the viewpoint of *prudentia*, history was problematic source of prudence: ancient maxims of war, for example, were more destructive than modern ones.[417] History was a useful source of a political science, but the ancient *prudentia* was not comparable to present and ancient maxims of policy should not be applied to modern politics. As Hume wrote:

> …whether sovereigns may not return to the maxims of ancient policy… I answer that it appears to me, almost impossible; and that because ancient policy was violent, and contrary to the more natural and usual course of things.[418]

Prudentia was not based on universal principles of man or a politics. The nature of the human mind varied according to history; but Hume also found consistency in political history which reflected the partial universality of the human mind:

> It may, however, be observed, that in civil history, there is found a much more greater uniformity than in the history of learning and science, and that the wars, negotiations, and politics on one age resemble more those another than the taste, wit, and speculative principles.[419]

However, Hume did not reconstruct the entire unity of the human mind throughout history: ancient wars were more destructive than modern wars[420]

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415 Ibid. AS 109.

416 Hume ECHU 1748, 1958, 7. It is also important to recognise that Hume made a distinction between a politician and a layer.

417 Hume 'Of Populousness of the Ancient Nations', here ed. *The Essays Moral, Political and Literary* 1974, 403, 412.

418 Hume PE 1994, Com 97.

419 Hume 'Of Essay Writing', here ed. *The Essays Moral Political and Literary* 1974, 98.

420 Hume,'Of Populousness of the Ancient Nations', here ed. *The Essays Moral, Political and Literary* 1974, 403; Moses 1989, 80–89.

William Robertson also explicated the nature of historical variation in politics, according to which politics and policy was more related to the state of society than to universal human nature or scientific principles, and policies varied throughout history:

> In every inquiry concerning the operations of men when united together in society, the first object of attention should be their mode of subsistence, Accordingly as that varies, their laws and policy must be different.[421]

Hume suggested that ancient maxims of political prudence were problematic for a contemporary sovereign because ancient maxims were violent.[422] Despite the preference of *prudentia* to science in particular cases, the ancient *prudentia* was not efficient in the modern world. Political prudence was time-related: what was regarded as prudent politics in earlier ages, was not that in the age of enlightenment.

According to two famous metaphors used by David Hume, politics as science was the science of writing, and required a philosophical eye.[423] These abilities characterised a philosopher-politician, not an actor-politician. As an essayist Hume was both a philosopher and a mediator between the learned and the common people.[424] Especially Hume conceptualised political science and wisdom in his essays. The following sections concerns of this controversy and the multidimensional character of political wisdom in genera whereas section 4.2 conceptualises the particular modes of a political wisdom

Mechanics versus skills and abilities

Mechanical terms were a particular variant in this theory versus practice controversy. The following examples express the possibilities of mechanical terms as descriptions of political systems. Since Plato a political system was described by the term 'fabric'.[425] It described complicated political systems, which could not be described by the term 'body', such as empires and colonial systems.[426] On the other hand, a political fabric was dependent on a sovereign: in critical situations which trembled the political fabric, a sovereign had to be a prop for a political fabric.[427]

Thomas Reid combined two classical terms – fabric and building – to reinforce stability; in this context fabric referred more or less to a mechanical fabric. A term building was a classical with two connotations: the first as

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421 Citation from Robertson's *History of America* in Berry 1997, 93. The quotation implicitly defined the two aspects of political society, laws and politics.

422 Hume PE 1994, Com 97.

423 Ibid. FPG 16; CL 51.

424 Hume 'Of Essay Writing' here ed. *The Essays Moral Political and Literary* 1974, 569.

425 Plato, *Laws* 1961, I, 349, 735a; Ferguson EHCS 1767,1978, 148. Cf. Demandt 1978, 289.

426 Dunbar EHM 1780, 268; Hutcheson SMP II, 1755, 1969, 307. Mother-country derived from Gibbon's description of the Roman empire, see Demandt 1978, 81.

427 Ferguson EHCS 1767, 1978, 148.

the role of a statesman as an architect a builder, and the second as a construction or citizens.[428] Reid described nature of a political system as:

> The Materials of the Political Fabrick [men] must be formed to fit the places for which they are destined. Without this there can neither be beauty nor Stability in the Building.[429]

Not necessarily strength and consistency were the criteria of a political system, but also beauty of a system: An ideal builder was also a connoisseur of politics.

Although descriptions of political systems in mechanical terms were uncommon in the Scottish texts, the references to political mechanics were neutral or optimistic; mechanics described the political world. A machine as *Machina Mundi* or a political system – as well a technical terms in general – it demystified a political body and enforced the predictability of the political system: a wise politician could foresee the acts of that body and could govern them.[430] Mechanical metaphors reflected political systems without the connotation to the course of life.[431] They characterised the political space as a one steady, stabilised system, literary: separate parts in the political machine should be harmonised, "equal wheels", and "a wheel within a wheel … in the GERMAN empire." would have been impossible.[432]The machine did necessarily not refer to a political society as a whole but to a particular part of it. Society was separated from political or administrative system as Robertson described it:" Such a state of a society in which the political machine was so ill adjusted."[433]This kind of reconstruction was also possible in classical body-language, there were collective bodies of administration within a political body.[434] As descriptions of the political systems a body and a machine did not exclude each other. [435]

A politician was characterised as a physician, who made a diagnosis, a prognosis and then prescribed a remedy or as an engineer operating the state-machine. The text fragment indicated the pre-scientific analysis of causal relationships in politics. The physician metaphor was often used with reference to foreseeing, as Reid wrote:

> …as an expert Physician ought to understand the nature and Effects of Poisons as well as Medicines, as an able Politician ought to understand the nature & Effects of all kinds of government the bad as well as the good.[436]

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428 Demandt 1978, 277, 287, 293. Cf. to the idea of *oikos* as house or *Gesetz*.

429 Reid RL 1990,281–282, 288–289.

430 Kitagawa 1995, 234.

431 For example, Reid BW 2131/4/III/3 p. 2.

432 Hume PE 1994, RC 182. Beattie used the term engine referring to money, which carried on political affairs. Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, II, 413.

433 Robertson 1762, 1769 HRC5, 114.

434 Ferguson IMP 1769, 1994, 306.

435 Reid BW 2131/4/III/3 p. 3.

436 Reid BW 2131/8/I/2.

According to Reid, by foreseeing the acts of a particular part of the body a politician could foresee the acts of the whole political body.[437] The art of the political engineer was described as follows:

> When the machine is out of order, it must be taken to pieces; and preparing and cleaning of the wheels and springs, there must be some interruption and derangement of its movements[438]

Despite the acceptance of political science, Stewart disagreed on the conception of a political wisdom as a mechanical skill. He first created the mechanical interpretation of Adam Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Here he preferred the natural course of human life to the attempts to change the course of life by political speculation. Dugald Stewart's comparison between a speculative legislator and an engineer politician and the following quotation shows that mechanics was not an adequate approach to the intentions of nature in political life:

> Man is generally considered by statesman and projectors as the materials of a sort of political mechanics. Projectors disturb nature in the course of her operations in human affair than to let her alone, and give her fair play in the pursuit of her ends, that she may establish her own design.[439]

Because a civil society was not a mechanical construction, a statesman should have been as "a speculative legislator".[440] The history of a society was progressive, but also threatened by self-interested men and temporal degeneration of the political institutions. An artful statesman could described as a stabiliser in this process. He had to compound different interests of the people to maintain the society and institutions.[441] Stewart described the tasks of a statesman and a politician:

> … to lay solid foundation for the science of politics, the first step ought to be, to ascertain that form of society, which is perfectly agreeable to nature and to justice, and what are the principles of legislation necessary for maintaining it…That the social order is… the result of the wisdom of nature, and not of human contrivance; and, therefore, that the proper business of the politician is not to divide his attention to among all the different parts of a machine, which is by far too complicated for his comprehension, but by protection the rights of individuals, and by allowing to each, as complete a liberty as is compatible with the perfect security of the rights of his fellow-citizens, to remove every obstacle which the prejudice and vices of men have opposed to the establishment of that order which society has a tendency to assume.[442]

In contrast to the scientific ideal, Stewart's politician could not understand the natural system of politics or even the functions of minor parts of it. As an actor

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437 Kitagawa 1995, 234.

438 Metaphors mentioned on the text in Ferguson CAF 1995, II. 447; Millar HVEGSSBR 1818, III, 439; Reid BW 131/4/III/03; Stewart EPHM 1877, 222.

439 Stewart LWAS 1793, 1963, 504.

440 Stewart EPHM 1877, I, 221–226.

441 Ibid. I, 227; LPE I 13.

442 Stewart EPHM 1877, I, 231–232.

a politician-statesman attempted to construct the ideal mode of society.[443] Stewart's politician was a statesman, comparable to a classical legislator-statesman, who not only introduced laws but also acted as a banister. In classical philosophy the art of statesman-lawyers was based not only on strict distribution of justice, but also on the art of eloquence. The knowledge of a banister-politician differed from the knowledge of political science, which concerned the political system as a whole. Stewart preferred ends to means in politics:

> … how often it has been happened in the history of mankind, that people, by losing sight of the end, in the blind pursuit of the means, have forfeited both the one and the other.[444]

Although science was often regarded as a possible improvement of political knowledge, the relationship between mechanical science and politics was, if not ambiguous, dualistic. Mechanical terms thus depicted a political reality correctly, but political activity was not a mechanical skill; political prudence required something more than applied political mechanics.

The knowledge of politics as prudence-art was not intentionally defined, only a few references were introduced. According to James Beattie, political wisdom consisted of three branches: reason [scientific knowledge], foresight [ability] and moral principles [ethics, as general principles]. The art of politics was the skill, which had to be studied.[445] Beattie united different cognitive skills together as political prudence:

> which one learns in no other way than studying it: it is the effect of reason, foresight and moral principle *united*…[446]

Despite the mentioned unity political wisdom had a sphere of its own with reasoning method, aims and ends of its own, As Reid defined:

> But in the noblest arts, the mind is also the subject upon which we operate. The painter, the poet, the actor, the orator, the moralist and the statesman, attempt to operate upon the mind in different ways and for different ends.[447]

The fact that a politician operated with the human mind made the results of wisdom unpredictable. According to Hume:

> All causes are not conjoined to their effects like uniformity. An artificer who handles only dead matter, may be disappointed of his aim, as well as politician, who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agent.[448]

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443 Ibid. I, 233.

444 Stewart LPE 1877, I 24.

445 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, II, 338; Millar HVEGSSBR 1818, III, 62.

446 Beattie EMS 1790, 1976, II, 338.

447 Reid IHM 1764, 1994, 97.

448 Hume ECHU 1748, 1958, 94. Vollrath has connected the idea of governing by opinion, which was also a Humean principle of politics, to political art.

Political wisdom was, if not professional wisdom, comparable to any other profession. The foresight, subtlety, subdividing and balancing power referred to the criteria of a wise politician in classical *phronêsis,* as Hume described:

> …in every art or profession … The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtility in subdividing and balancing power; the layer more method and finer principles in his reasonings.[449]

Hume defined politics as parallel to any art or profession. The idea of a profession is ambiguous in the Scottish texts. The expansion of academic education led to certain educated professions. Despite the advancement of education, administration and diplomacy, politicians could be defined as craftsmen. Reid divided human abilities into three categories: lower employment such as manual arts and traffic, then professions such as public instruction in religion and liberal arts such as physicians, lawyers, judges and those of higher degree who governed people by political or military skills or by eloquence.[450]Political actors were not professionally educated for some positions; rather the skills of politicians originated from personal qualities, abilities and general education.

Although Thomas Reid did not define political wisdom, he defined the resources of power, to which political wisdom was included as prudence, operative habits, skills...in arts and eloquence:

> 1 Riches… lowest and most & most despicable Species of Power. 2 Authority…1 from opinion of merit 2 from opinion of right…3… Memory Judgement Wit Good Manners…4 Prudence 5 Operative Habits and… Skills in Arts 6 Virtues Such as Courage, Temperance, Meekness Industry…7 Eloquence [451]

Reid differentiated theoretical knowledge from personal abilities to apply that knowledge. These resources of power were characteristics to a rhetorician.[452] Further, they also characterised a politician, if so, the skills and knowledge of a statesman were neither art nor science but rather, the combination of several arts, scientific knowledge and even non-cognitive abilities. The prudence was defined as a capacity for thinking concerning the ability to bring their purposes into effect, which was different from "mere knowledge".[453] The political wisdom of a statesman was consisted of personal abilities, skills, reason and knowledge in connection to that particular political situation. The language of wisdom reflected reasoning and action in politics interrelated. [454]

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449 Hume ECHU 1748, 1958, 7.

450 Reid BW 2131/8/V/1 also in Reid RL 1990, 18–19.

451 The original text is very descriptive as following Reid BW 2131/8/V/1,2. Also Reid RL 1990, introduction by Haakonssen, 19. With minor differences also in Kitagawa 1995, 64. Kitagawa has also enlisted science to this list and defined prudence as different from mere knowledge. Reid defined power as an instrument of virtue; political wisdom itself was not the focus.

452 Reid BW 2131/8/I/2.

453 Reid BW 2131/8/V/1

454 Dunbar EHM 1780, 2–3.

4.2 The Characters of Wisdom

Political wisdom was not a coherent theory of sagacity, whereas different modes of wisdom and sagacity were connected to activity.[455] Scottish thinkers did not write any systematic theory of wisdom or methods of wisdom. However, political actors depicted separate modes of political wisdom. The knowledge of a statesman and a philosopher were distinct and separate fields of knowledge.[456] There were four kinds of political actors a sovereign-prince, a philosopher–politician, an ambassador and a legislator. Further, there were three classical actors: Ferguson's warrior-statesman-citizen, a military commander, and Hume's banister-politician described in his essay of Eloquence. All of these could be regarded as statesmen in particular cases. The following list describes different modes of political wisdom.

I From a philosopher-politician to a statesman-politician

The classical image of a politician- philosopher as a Humean political writer who cultivated a science for instruction and enjoyment was suggested also by Millar:

> Their system of policy are thus rendered more comprehensive, and to the eye of the philosopher, present a richer field of instruction and entertainment[457]

A philosopher-theorist had a special eye for politics. The philosopher was contrasted to "speculative and political men"[458] In contrast to a philosopher-politician, a statesman-politician was also introduced in the Scottish texts. In Smithian vocabulary the ideal legislator was differentiated from politician-statesman, "that insidious and crafty animal who acted for momentary fluctuations of affairs".[459] Further, the ideal character of a sovereign-statesman was not the character of a trader.[460] The art of a statesman-politician was not based on mere utilitarian ethics, in economic terms he was not interested only "profits", Smith's political animal was interested in power, diplomacy, cabinet politics and distribution of justice. Millar's description of politics was consistent to a Smith's politician. Millar depicted politics as:

> …It is a great opiate which inspires political courage, and lulls reflection; which animates the statesman to despise the resentment of the people… [461]

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455 Ibid.

456 McNamara 1998, 17–22, 30–31.

457 Millar HVEGSSBR 1818, III, 3.

458 Stuart VS 1778,1797, 50.

459 Collini 1983, 31. Quotes by Smith.

460 Smith WN 1776, 1981, 819. The tasks of a sovereign ibid. 687–689, 707–709, 723.

461 Millar HVEGSSBR 1818 IV, 95–96.

The roles of a philosopher-politician and a statesman-politician were different: the latter was interested not only in theoretical constructions but he applied theory into practice. Politics was a joy to a politician. A legislator was a particular mode of a practical politician

II A Legislator

Since Plato a legislator had been a common character displaying political wisdom. Scottish political science has been defined as the science of a legislator in commentary sources, but the definitions of science varied from applied ethics to international law and to the analysis of history and contemporary commercial society.[462]

The wisdom of a legislator varied. Sometimes a legislator only reflected the wisdom of the eternal laws of nature and introduced them into practice; sometimes a legislator created the principles himself. In such cases, legislation was not merely applied science but a purely human task. Smith's legislator tried to find eternal maxims to be the foundation of political laws.[463] But a legislator could not always make the best choice to promote virtue, as Hutcheson wrote:

> Sometimes a good legislator is constrained to give no better laws, from the bad dispositions of his subjects which would bear no better.[464]

Hutcheson's legislator was based on the idea of choice for necessity: the ideal was not always attainable. In connection with the invisible hand,[465] Smith's ideal legislator was self-sufficient and left no possibilities to policy or reason of state, whereas Hutcheson's wise legislator demonstrated the prudence of consideration about reasonable laws in that particular situation.

The distinctions between a legislator and a prince politician were not clear. History showed several examples of a typical prince politician as a legislator, but the ideal legislator concerned on eternal principles whereas a politician concerned on temporal effects of actions.[466] Legislators must be differentiated from lawyers, who classically operated with speech.[467]

The Scottish version of the metaphor of a legislator reflected the gradual detachment from the classical connections between political education, political theory and prudence. A comparison with Montesquieu's *Esprit de Lois* reflects this departure. Montesquieu analysed education in the context of different forms of government; each form of government required a different education method as they prepared a young man to be a citizen.[468] It was a legislator's

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462 Bowles 1986, 238; Haakonssen 1996, 161–179; Jack 1989, 108.

463 Smith WN 1776, 1981, 648.

464 Hutcheson SIMP 1757, 1969, I, 260–261.

465 Smith WN 1776, 1981, 456.

466 Smith WN, 1776, 1981, 648: Caesar as a legislator Ferguson HPTTR 1753, 1799, V, 130.

467 Hume 'Of Eloquence' here ed. *The Essays Moral, Political and Literary* 1974, 102.

468 Montesquieu 1748, 1958, 261–262.

task to create such a political system, in which a form of government and education were adapted to each other. Although Scottish philosophers wrote about education, the connections between education and the theory of government were not explicated in such a detailed manner as in *Esprit de lois.* The Scottish approach to education might be called polite not political in its strict sense as if the Scottish legislator focused on politics and the polite public as separate fields of human life. This reflects a step from the political towards political theory. A sovereign was often described both as a legislator and a prince.

III A Prince

Scottish historians characterised politics as an activity of a sovereign. These characterisations of a sovereign reflected the wisdom of a prince-politician. In 18th-century literature, Hannibal, Caesar, Cromwell and Elizabeth were commonly admired as profound, wise and sound politicians amoral, immoral or impolitic they were. A politician was described as impolitic and cunning at the same time.[469] This dichotomy actually indicated the contrast between the normative and teleological criteria of politics; to attain the goals required efficiency, not morally acceptable actions. Described by these figures the activity of a statesman created a public spectacle and politics was regarded as a rational calculation contest of individuals: an arena of *fortuna*.[470] The characterisations of practical politics were all comparable; Politics was "courageous"" action that sometimes required "violence", wars, "animosities", "lying", "dark and crooked", acts or breaking of natural ties between family members and friends. [471] An Italian politician was described poor by his abilities, criminal, solicitations and intrigue; Italian politics was described as a labyrinth, complicated reconstruction of choices, possible and impossible methods to act.[472]

Scottish historians described the activity of a prince by the term policy. The policy of a prince was often illustrated by following attributes: fraudulent,

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469 Pulkkinen 1998, 26; Rubinstein 1987, 53–54.

470 "His own attention … to the state of politics in the city was never less remitted or flack … Caesar had shown himself in his political course a refractory subject and an arbitrary magistrate. The first Caesar was aggressor in he political contest, and forced his friends of the republic to defend their own rights, or to secure them against his invasion … Succeed to the some quarrel … rivals of his own ambition … and his competitors for the success …"Ferguson HPTTR 1783, 1799, II, 232, 248; V, 84. On Cromwell "But the talents of this profound politician, his enterprising spirits, and the extent of his designs. His great abilities, the success of all his undertakings, and the respect which he commanded from all the powers of Europe, seized imagination of Englishmen and were calculated to gratify national vanity" Millar HVEGSSBR 1818 III, 331, 369-370. On Hannibal " … real, was well-founded in wisdom and sound policy,, In this temporal stagnation of Hannibal's fortune …" Ferguson HPTRR 1783, 1799, I, 196, 160.

471 Ferguson ECHS 1767, 1966, 1978, 193; HPTRR 1783, I, 19; CAF 1995, II, 533; Millar HVEGSSBR 1818 IV, 95–96; Dalrymple MGBI 1771, 1970, III, 237; Robertson HS 1759, 1976, 262–263; Stuart VS 1778, 1797, 119; Stuart HERR 1780, I, 154.

472 Robertson PSE 1769,1972, 86–87. The characterisation of Ludovico Sforza.

malicious, rigorous, sound, sanguinary, wretched or good.[473] Policy referred to artifice, lying, pretending and surprise in politics.[474] Policy was often personified to the sovereign and thus (in these cases) the term policy was disengaged from the idea of scientific principle *a priori*, or at least in needed identified subject, thus because of many actors there were many different policies. The term itself was not a simple derivation of scientific principle, although it could have connections to particular maxims, but a plan or a schema or intended action as a result of political reasoning, actors' abilities and choices.[475] If the term was used as a scientific maxim, it was contrasted to contemporary politics only.[476] The policy of a prince was contrasted to policy as a scientific or normative principle. For example, Hume made the distinction in the chapter of 'Of political society' in *An Enquiry Concerning Principles of Morals* by describing the utility of international laws and the expediency of princely politics.[477] As a result of princely politics was as conflicts and wars. Policies were directed against something or for something.

Smith's political economy combined both the scientific policy conceptions and policies of nations with nuances of the sagacity and efficiency of sovereign's policy, expediency of political systems (rather than activity), education military force, trade and commerce. Thus, Smithian economics reflected both Newtonian science and classical *prudentia*.

Enlightened philosophers believed that the science of politics was greatly improved since ancient times. A remarkable turning point in the history of politics was Machiavelli, an ambiguous person both as a genial politician-theorist and as an immoral politician as an actor.[478] Machiavelli had been a step towards secular politics, whether positive or pejorative.[479] The philosophy of *The Prince* as mirror for the prince is often called Reason of State.[480] Reason of state can also be described as a special form of political prudence with the necessity of political preservation.[481] The Reason of State philosophy originated from 16th century Italy – and Botero's *Della ragione dello stato*. The philosophy spread to Europe in the 17th century. Maurizio Viroli has defined the main of it as "preserving the state … by any means, political life was not necessarily preserved by justice and virtue.[482] The Scottish character of a prince reflected the Machiavellian prince with a special wisdom connected to "reason of state".

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473 Ferguson HPTRR, 1783, 1799, I, 118, 120, 200.

474 Hume HE 1754–1762, 1983, V, 275.

475 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, II, 438, "The policy to which this Maxim refers..."

476 Ferguson HPTRR 1783, 1799, II, 42, Maxims of policy vs. the scandal of times.

477 Hume ECPM 1751, 1980, 202–203.

478 Collini, 1983, 15.

479 Raab, 1964, 214.

480 The classical Reason of State has an opposite connotation. On the history of the concept cf. Viroli 1992b, 473.

481 Delannoi 1993, 16.

482 Viroli 1992b; Viroli 1998, 67, passim.

Machiavelli agreed immoral methods; poisoning and assassination were seen as acceptable arts in political practices. Hume accepted some of these methods as expedient in politics:

> All politicians will allow, and most philosophers, that reasons of state may in particular emergencies dispense with the rules of justice, and invalidate any treaty of alliance…[483]

Machiavelli's prince was above laws.[484] The image of prince-politician was dualistic, on the one hand efficient and immoral on the other hand. The controversy between expediency and immorality was a problem which required explanation. The solution introduced was relative ethics, as Hume explicated:

> There is a maxim very current in the world, Which few politicians are willing to a vow, but which has been authorized by the practice of all age, *that there is a system of morals calculated for princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private persons*. `Tis evident this is not to be understood of the lesser extent of public duties and obligations… The meaning, therefore, of this political maxim is, that tho´ the morality of has the same *extent*, yet it has no the same *force* as that of private persons.[485]

A prince-politician was morally independent actor in foreign politics. Scottish philosophers reacted in two distinct ways to this liberty of action: they either accepted princely politics in particular situations or his maxims were often criticised as self-interested and short-sighted principles and they tried to interfere ethics in politics.[486]

Princely politics was distinct from scientific politics. By following characterisations Hume characterised the differences between scientific politics and prince's policy:

Science- education and humour of a sovereign and subject,
general laws –particular actions
general rule – sagacity
politics – reality, facts
real – personal
labour –passions [487]

Although the idea of princely politics for political preservation was acknowledged at least in the Scottish interpretations in history, the Scottish philosophers preferred status quo between princely politics and political

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483 Hume ECPM 1751, 1980, 203.

484 Millar HVEGSSBR 1818 II, 346; IV, 73. The latter reference " … maxim in the English government `that the king can do no wrong…".

485 HUME THN 1739–1740, 1981, 568–569.

486 Smith TMS 1759, 1976 217; Hume 'Of Study of History' here ed. *The Essays Moral Political and Literary* 1974, 562; PE 1994, Sc 9-10; Stewart 1877, DMEPP 42-46.

487 Hume, in several essays in PE 1994, cf. Sc 7; IP 24; AS 58; Com 99.

science. The ideal situation in the political sphere was the controlled passions represented by a prince politician and balance represented by scientific politics. In the ideal situation the political institutions controlled human will, passions, desire for power and abuse of power.[488]

Scottish political theory also had some connotations of preservation of power and reason of state and princely politics. Hutcheson's conception "obtaining" power was a legalistic answer to the vices of the Machiavelli's *Prince*: the desire for power was acknowledged and controlled by jurisprudence and legislation.

Reid most explicitly accepted the principle of Reason of State – or preserving the state by any means. Reid regarded despotism as politically useful. According to him, people can survive under despotism with pleasure; a unhappy state of people was justified by the preservation and maintenance of a state.[489] This degree of positive vice was between the medium of extreme virtue and vice; neither of them was politically ideal or reasonable because a certain degree of vice would have made government more or less stable.[490] He saw politics in despotism as a possible fight for survival and preservation, but even so under despotic circumstances people could have survived.[491] Despotism may cause a conflict and a fight between sovereign and subject. A despot and despotism were characterised and evaluated by separate criteria: a despot – or a tyrant – was morally and politically evaluated as pejorative, but despotism was regarded as useful, necessary and efficient in certain political situations.

Machiavelli was also characterised as a historian and political theorist who wrote against vices and promoted virtue.[492] These characters were logically opposite to a prince-politician. These two aspects – Reason of State and political theory – were comparable to the difference between *The Prince* and *Il Discorsi*. Viroli has analysed the (dis)continuity from *The Prince* to *Il Discorsi*; Machiavelli first focused on the princely politics in *The Prince*, and then in *Il Discorsi*, the transformation of a princely state into a lawful republic, in which the character of a prince was no more a political hero.[493] The princely policy indicated the separation of intellectual virtue and moral virtue or politics and ethics, but he never established immoral or amoral politics.[494] Although Scottish thinkers did not make a clear distinction between these distinct characters of Machiavelli, these characterisations were (implicitly) depicted as separate aspects of Machiavelli's theory. Especially David Hume's references to Machiavelli

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488 Cf. Gautier 1993, 191–197, 202.

489 Reid BW 2131/4/III/05, particularly p. 2. According to Vollrath the acknowledgement of despotism as one form of government was connected to politics as art and prudence, see Vollrath 1977, 15.

490 Reid BW 2131/4/III/09/ p. 5

491 Ibid. particularly p. 2. Reid contextualised despotism in the classical context, not in the contemporary question of enlightened despotism.

492 Smith TMS 1759,1976, 217; Hume 'Of Study of History' here ed. *The Essays Moral Political and Literary* 1974, 562; PE 1994; Sc 9-10; Stewart 1877, DMEPP 42–46.

493 Viroli 1992a, 160–176.

494 Delannoi 1993, 13, 24–29, 53, 77, 79.

reflected this dualism of a theorist and a princely politics. However, princely politics and science did not exclude each other: even a prince-politician was capable of finding some eternal maxims in politics.[495]

Scottish philosophers did not characterise themselves as prince-politicians, statesmen, or men with desire of power. Sir James Steuart's treatise, *An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*, is an interesting exception, it was probably the only manual of knowledge of the art of governing in the political scene intervened by economy. Sir Steuart compared himself and Machiavelli:

> I have sometimes entered so heartly into spirit of the statesman, as to be apt to forget my station in the society where I live; and when as a private man I have read over the work of the politician, my natural plurality in favour of individuals has led me to condemn, as Machiavellian principles, every statement, approving the sacrifice of private in favour of a general plan …But I insensibly run into a metaphysical speculation, in order to prove, that in political questions it is better for people to judge form experience and reason, than from authority; to explain the their terms, than to dispute about words; and extend the combinations of their own ideas, than follow conceits, however decorated with the name of systems How far I have avoided such defects, the reader will determine.[496]

Stuart regarded himself both as a statesman and a political theorist. The long quotation indicates that politics was not only art of words without substance. Political reasoning should be applicable into practice. A statesman was creative, he had to "extend combinations". In this sense he was the weaver of a political fabric. Independent from authorities a politician based his reasoning only on experience and reasoning. In a (pre-)modern state prince-sovereign had servants.

IV An Ambassador as an artist of power

Foreign politics was not only politics of prince-politicians. Diplomacy expanded after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the invention of the laws of nations. Despite the fact that foreign politics was an important sphere of politics, a diplomat or an ambassador was a rare character in the Scottish texts. Ferguson described the international political scene as:

> The Dominion projected over the Forms of his own Species and the operations which take place on himself as a material on which the worth is also significant of Design & Goodness on the part of his maker. His Instinctive Formation into Groups and Societies of indefinite extent at once give raise to an Artist of Power and a Subject in continual need of his care or attention, Such is the political Scene exhibited throughout the various Devisions & their Respective Forms Throughout the political World. Constituted by the Human race The Combinations of number that take place in States and Political Compartments may oblige us to look back on the relations subsiating detail among their connections Individuals Forming their connections and the Influences & Ties by Which they are enabled to act in such bodies.[497]

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495 Hume PE 1994, Sc 9; CL 51.

496 Steuart IPPO 1767, 1966, 1998 10–11. According to Reid a private man was interested in friends and his family but politician focused on a state BW 2131/4/III/03 p.1, left margin.

497 Ferguson'Distinction of Value and its Source in Existence' in *Unpublished Essays* I, no. 27, 108/27–28,.Oz-Salzberger has analysed the term play, but politics as activity was

Ferguson's artist of power was a kind of diplomat-politician who tried to reconstruct the best possible situation by the means of negotiations and contracts.

The status of a diplomat was a part of the of the laws of nations in the Scottish enlightenment; Reid made tangential references to the public and private status of an ambassador in a foreign country, but Hutcheson described the status in detail.[498] In the resident state an ambassador was a hated person; as a representative of a foreign state he was looking for the good of a foreign sovereign.[499] Although the laws of nations set some legal bounds on an ambassador, these boundaries were only voluntary, from this point of view; an ambassador resembled a prince without moral bounds.

Theatre was a political arena of ambassadors; John Millar described the alteration and change in a political scene as follows:

> The political theatre, at that time exhibited a frequent repetition of the same parts by different actors. Those opulent individuals, who had formerly been in a condition to oppress their neighbours, and force them into a state of dependence upon the sovereign, were by a different combination of rival power, or by and alteration of circumstances, rendered on other occasions, incapable of maintaining their own independence; and being their turn, induced to supplicate the interposition of the crown in their own Favour, were obliged to purchase it by the same terms of submission.[500]

A theatre described the human or public sphere and activity derived from ancient *prudentia* as the practice of political situations, political evaluation and reasoning. It had two separate connotations by the late 18th-century the classical one describing self-conscious public action of men and the refined one with public actions approached from education, critique and sentiment.[501] A theatre depicted all of whole life, *theatrum mundi* referred to destiny or God as an actor.[502] The political scene was used in pejorative contexts, as a scene of continuous movement, repetition of deliberation, spectacle and intrigue.[503] In general, "a theatre" focused on great actions with more or less negative implications. According to French sources, England was a perpetual theatre of instant political passions and revolutions.[504]The metaphor of a political theatre referred to Continental politics, there was an implicit audience-actors aspect interrelated to the political theatre regarded as the European political arena.

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never defined described as play, and thus that term described the human life in general, see Oz-Salzberger 2002, 202–204.

498 Reid's references were not substantial see, Reid RL 1990, 267, 275.

499 Hutcheson SIMP 1747, 1969, 341–344.

500 Millar HVEG 1803, 156–157.

501 For the contexts, see Hundert 1994, 139–174, On *Theatrum Mundi* Hundert 2000, 36–47.

502 See Demandt's comparison of Plotin and Platon in Demandt 1978, 333, 345.

503 Ferguson HPTRR 1783, 1799, I, 65; Millar ODR 1771,1806, 296; Robertson 1856, 505. The metaphor of the political world was uncommon in the Scottish texts HPTRR 1783, 1799, II, 111.

504 Cohen 1985, 74.

These politicians had some kind official status or position in politics, whereas a leadership was not necessarily derived from status or appointment.

V A Leader

Although leaders were crucial in politics, a political leader was an uncommon metaphor in the Scottish sources, and thus quite difficult to define. Both statesmen and prince-politicians were special forms of political leaders, but in some cases political leadership was introduced without connections to sovereign-princes or statesmen. These fragmentary references often defined the origins of political leadership.

Political leadership was often characterised by the figure of a sovereign, who was a sovereign by birth, age, fortune or personal qualities such as (physical) strength, beauty, wisdom, virtue, prudence, justice, fortitude and moderation of mind.[505] Most often a political leader was elected. Only temporarily a military leader could have been an excellent political leader, as Hannibal had been. The basis of political leadership was not biologically determined; only Beattie and Reid referred to the biological basis of sovereignty.[506]The political leadership derived from biology reflected naturalistic and deterministic tendencies of political life; political order was based on inborn abilities not on human wisdom and as such it was indisputable, incontestable and unchangeable. Reid constructed the connection as follows:

> That Men should live in Political Society seems to be the intention of Nature 1 Because it is most advantageous 2 Because Some Parts of human constitution point that way.
> 1 We are fitted to live under Government. Foxes & Lions are not so Sheep and Cattle & Some Species of Dogs
> 1The different Capacities of men, fit them to be parts of one great Whole.
> 2 The Bulk of Men tame and naturally disposed to follow a leader
> 3 The qualities which produce this Submission and Respect in the Generality of men are to be found in a few & are Wisdom Valour Power, especially if transmitted through a long Race of Ancestors. The Stubborn Spirit of Independency of the Canadians, as well as the Servility of the Asiaticks the Effects of Custom and Education.
> 4 The Love of ones Country a Natural Affection & can have no Exercise without a Political Union[507]

Dunbar's principle of natural talents as a basis of the differentiation in a human society, and as a basis of "something like natural constitution" can be contextualised both in psychology and physiology.[508]

Governing people was characteristic to classical political prudence, thus, according to Vollrath, prudence was art proper, especially art of rhetoric, not objective science with logic, natural causality and progress, but described as

505 Smith WN 1776, 1981, 710–713.

506 Cf. Beattie p. 75.

507 Reid RL 1990, 249.

508 Dunbar IMP 1789 –1794, 1996, 42.

conditional, contingent, temporality, particularity and boundless.[509] Although military force was not political power in its proper sense, the military leadership was a particular mode of political leadership, and often connected to princely politics.

VI Two Characters of Soldiers

A soldier as a politician had two connotations in the Scottish enlightenment: a soldier-citizen and a sovereign-soldier. Military leaders were described as sovereigns, administrators, legislators, warriors and conquistador-politicians.[510] Military leaders were evaluated according to their military gallantry, and a true warrior politician was a political adventurer.[511] However, the knowledge of a warrior and a statesman were separate branches of political knowledge.[512] Warrior-politicians were characterised as thieves of as cruel leaders whereas statesman-politicians were characterised as virtuous. In the contemporary world these conceptions were impossible to combine, but in practise they supported each other.[513]Gilbert Stuart separated a politician-prince with legislative and civil wisdom, and warrior-soldier skilled in military arts.[514]

The classical character of a soldier-politician was the warrior-citizen of a small republican state participating in politics and military operations for the preservation of the state. The ideal was partly diminished during the advancement of the pre-modern state and the separation of military arts from the political arts.[515] If a soldier citizen was an historical ideal,[516] then common were a political- politicians or non -politicians in the Scottish philosophy.

VII Common man

The characterisations described above did not refer to people – common man – as political actors. Because political prudence and science were mystery to common man, [517]common men were governed people.[518]

Although man was defined as an individual self, a member of a family and a public man in the Scottish enlightenment,[519] common man was not

509 For example, Delannoi 1993, 106–107; Vollrath 1977, 11, 14–29, 31, 34, 37, 57–68, 122.

510 Ferguson HPTRR 1783, 1799 I, 13, 103; V, 144, 278.

511 Ibid. II, 424.

512 Ferguson 'History & its Appropriate Stile', *Unpublished Essays* II, no. 3, 38/ 19.

513 Ferguson, 'Of the Separation of Departments Professions and Tasks resulting from the Progress of Arts and Society', *Unpublished Essays* II, 15 97-103/11-12; 'Statesman & Warriors' III 1 4-22/1-36.

514 Stuart OCPL 1779, 152–153.

515 Robertson 1985, 203.

516 Especially to Adam Ferguson.

517 Millar HVEGSSBR 1818 III, 3.

518 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, I, 262.

519 Cairns 1992, 174. Also Steuart IPPO 1767, 1966, 1998, 11 " … every inconvenience which must affect certain individuals living under our free modern governments where ever a wise statesmen sets about correcting the old abuses , preceding from

regarded as an autonomous actor in politics. Smith's theory of morals and politics revealed the polarisation between a political man-statesman, and a speculative man – philosopher. Public spirit and autonomy characterised the statesman for political life required the self-control of the highest degree. According to Smith, every man:

> is in some measure statesman, and can form a tolerable judgement of the interest of society, and the conduct of those who govern it.[520]

The origins of a common statesmanship were laid by the classical conception of a democracy and popular statesmanship in small states.[521] The idea of a common man as a statesman characterised man as an active citizen, *vita activa*, not the modern, professional statesman or prince-politician.

Popular statesmanship was limited: political effects of the activity of a common man as an individual were not characterised as political. Common men did not act as individuals, but rather they acted within group of men, especially in Smith's economic theory, which can be reconstructed as a ruler-ruled theory. Common statesmanship was (latent) potential rather than actual politics: Reid has defined an individual and political events as:

> Every individual of human Kind has a certain *Sphere of power* and may produce effects that are not inconsiderable. But the grandest effects of human Power are these that are produced by the concurrence of many joined in Society. I call these Political *Events*.[522]

Reid characterised political activity as events produced by men united in society, not singular acts. Reid included to political events the establishment of a state, administration, wars and conquests, the promotion of a civil society and economy, and quite exceptionally, religion and virtue.[523] The power of people

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idleness, sloth or fraud in the lower classes, arbitrary jurisdiction in the higher, and the neglects in administrations with respect to the interests if both. The more any cure is painful and dangerous, the more ought men carefully to avoid the disease … Where there but one man upon the earth, his duty would contain no other precepts than those dictated self-love. If he to be a father, a husband, a friend, his self-love falls immediately under limitations: he must withhold from himself, and give to his children, he must now to sacrifice some of his fancies, in order to gratified now and then those of his wife, or of his friend. If he come to be a judge, a magistrate; he must frequently forget that he is a friend, or a father: and if he rise to be a statesman, he must disregard many other attachments more comprehensive, such as family, place of birth, and even, in certain cases, his native country. His duty here become relative to the general good of the society of which he is the head…" This citation implies, that a statesman was needed for injustice, because laws did not secure justice. Steuart's statesman was the most positive characterisation of different political actors. He forgot his private connections and ambitions; he was devoted to the public.

520 Quotation according to McNamara 1998, 17.

521 Ferguson PMPS 1792,1975, II, 412–413; Cf. Geuna 2002, 186.

522 Reid RL 1990, 115.

523 Reid RL 1990, 115. Also Reid BW 2131/7/V/4 p.15. It is interesting that Reid wrote about great political events, not processes, this might characterise the nature of political change and activities, ibid. 16. The same tendency of focus on great political

was not personal or personified power nor did it refer to individual activity. The debate about common man as a political actor can be interpreted as a debate concerning the political capacity of men. The idea of the political as capacity or resource of purely political action was almost unknown in the Scottish texts; there are only few references to political capacity of men. Gilbert Stuart regarded political capacity as the capacity of a man and citizen.[524] This did not mean, however, the establishment of active, modern citizenship.

Common man was in some measure primitive and ambitious man in every state of a society. The problem is that common man lacked public spirit, McNamara has depicted this as:

> This observation leads Smith to contrast the man of humanity who lacks public spirit with the man of public spirit who lacks humanity[525]

According to Hume, every man should have been regarded as superior in private virtue rather than public virtue.[526] Thus common statesmanship and self-interest of individuals, had to be controlled by public institutions and laws.[527] A statesman-politician had to: "make him [common man] operate to public good."[528] The public and government were established to be an instrument or mechanism to instil the long views instead of short-sightedness of men, to transform private interest to the public good.[529]

Anyone, or a common man, did not have a political capacity proper. According to Reid, the private man was interested in his family and friends whereas a politician was concerned with a state.[530] Strictly, common men were public men is some measure and private men in high measure, but common men were not politicians.

4.3 From Anticipated Limits to Free Choice

The characters of a prince and ambassador described in the previous section characterised the ethical freedom of political expediency and the controversy between moral and political evaluation of activity. The freedom of activity was further reflected by polit-conceptions as a necessity versus options: A politician acted the chosen policy because of the expediency. Alternatively, he acted

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changes was related to the metaphor of a political body; only periods of great development were remained in the life of political body.

524 Stuart VS 1778, 1797, 68. Debate on political capacity or political requiring the special mode of capacity was extremely rare, but the idea of moral capacity was under common concern in the eighteenth-century.

525 McNamara 1998,31.

526 Hume PE 1994, IP 24.

527 McNamara 1998, 17–22, 30–31; Whelan 1985, 30, 135, 247, 349.

528 Hume PE 1994, IP 24.

529 Pocock 1975,1987, 472.

530 Reid BW 2131/4/III/3, p 1, left margin.

according to chosen policy because of he just did want to do so without any moral or political necessities.

As a sovereign's activity politics was regarded as distinct from virtuous activity: "The policy of Elizabeth though judicious ... full of duplicity and artifice …".[531] Policy was contrasted to justice and honour:

> But *views of policy*, more than those of *justice* … That monarch, more swayed by political views than the point of *honour*.[532]

Despite the moralistic ideal, Reid made the distinction between political and private as the sphere of duties:

> The Duties of Humanity more Necessary in individuals than in States & therefore more practised… But they are no less amiable and Honourable in States than in individuals.[533]

Morals, duties and virtues were not the primary criteria of chosen policy. Policy was in some cases derived from necessity, and this necessity set some boundaries to policy and limited the number of reasonable choices. The modes and contexts of political necessity varied. The classical political necessity was the course of the forms of government as the establishment, advancement, and degeneration of the state towards rebirth.[534] This course of life as continuous rotation was unavoidable in the history of mankind but a wise politician might temporarily interrupt this course of life. Historical necessity explained past experiences and the conception of physical nature was based on law-like necessity.[535]

In the Scottish histories political necessity was not necessarily either of these necessities but rather a situation-related necessity with no voluntarity or option. In *History of England* Hume implicitly analysed political action or policies from the viewpoint of necessity versus freedom:

> As Charles was not able to redress so enormous grievance, he was led by *necessity*, and by turn of his character, to correct it by *policy* and to contrive some method of discharging into foreign countries this dangerous and intestine evil.[536]

Machiavellian expediency of political violence was a well-known principle in the Scottish texts. Hume's analysis of history described the legitimacy of political actions because of necessity as political expediency:

> These views of Henry are not exposed to much blame, because founded on *good policy* and even on a species of *necessity.*[537]

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531 Hume HE 1754-1762, 1783, IV 70. Elizabeth was a common example of a Machiavellian prince-sovereign "Elizabeth could not cover by any artifice the crookedness of her policy", see Stuart HERR 1780, I, 247.

532 Hume HE 1754-1762, 1783, II, 268,486. Emhasis mine.

533 Reid RL 1990, 262.

534 On unavoidable death Hume PE 1994, BG 31.

535 Goodman 1989, 155.

536 Hume, HE 1754–1762, 1983, II, 263. Emphasis mine.

Necessity had a dualistic role in political prudence. On the one hand, it limited the number of possible choices. On the other hand, political necessity, as efficiency, justified immoral political actions. Political acts were evaluated from the viewpoint of necessity throughout history, Millar described it:

> In the reign of Elizabeth, France had an opportunity of retaliating the vexation and embarrassment she had felt from her ancient enemy, by supporting of Mary, Queen of Scots, to the crown of England. The artful policy of the English Queen in order to counteract and disappoint the machination practices against her, has been supposed by many to throw an indelible … upon her character; and even When regarded in the most favourable point of view, can be justified only by its necessity.[538]

The connection between political necessity and *real politics* was evident. Robertson depicted it:

> A system, of conduct, pursued with so much success in Italy, was no long continued to that country a political refinement. The maxim of preserving a balance of power founded so much upon obvious reasoning, and the situation of Europe rendered it so necessary that it soon become became a matter of chief attention to all wise politicians: every step any Prince took was observed by all his neighbours.[539]

The necessity described above was situation-related necessity, similar to that of Machiavelli's idea of justified unethical actions for political purposes, and it derived from the maxims of a desire of power or the balance of power. The political necessity of this was always more or less relativistic, and thus different from a strictly causal relationship.

The attempts to introduce physical necessity into political theory were rare among the Scottish thinkers. Steuart defined political necessity distinct from physical necessities as:

> If we examine the state of many animals which have no appetites leading them to excess, we may form a very just idea of *physical necessary* …the nature of man furnishes him with some desires relative to his wants, which do not proceed from his animal oeconomy, but which are entirely similar to them in their effects. These proceed from the effects of his mind, are formulated by habit and education, and *when regularly established,* create another kind of necessary, which, for the sake of distinction, I hall call *political*. The similitude between these two species of *necessary*, is there fore the cause of ambiguity.[540]

Steuart's quote reflected a necessity which aroused from natural appetites, and was thus different from situation related political necessity. The oeconomy of a political body as " exportation of work is … pulse of the political body" combined the classical idea of a body as a political organism and modern political economy. Here Steuart tangentially reflected the image of a political body similar to Rousseau's character of a political body, which he introduced in

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537 Ibid. III, 6. Emphasis mine.

538 Millar HVEGSSBR 1818, III, 98–99.

539 Robertson HS 1759, 1976, 60.

540 Steuart IPPO 1767, 1966,1998, 269–270.

Economique politique.[541] Thus the branch of political economy was comparable to the natural and in some cases even assimilated to the natural.

Sometimes policy was based on free choice; it was not motivated by necessities, and policy itself was the only motive of action. Hume reflected this by following: "The House of Commons, from policy, rather than necessity", the commons had acted because of policy, not because they had to.[542]

Some political situations revealed an extensive number of choices, motivated only by passions, these policies were not derived from the idea of universal good, and thus resulted speculative ends. As Millar wrote:

> There was opened a boundless field to political projectors, in which they might range at pleasure and declaim without end or measure, upon their different speculative improvements.[543]

Activity and agency were criteria of action, also in the political sphere, which was, although a contracted sphere, also a sphere of contingency. According to Dunbar:

> Where there is no option, there is no agency; and within a contracted sphere, which separate acts of sagacity in various tribes, are so often observable, their concurring efforts are comparatively rare. [544]

Artful activity was based on free choice, man had this choice in a adventitious, artificial, political society, not in a society motivated by fulfilment of biological needs. In this case, policy referred to conscious actions, making decisions concerning free choices. Dunbar characterised choice free from reason in the case of the establishment of a voluntary and artificial society:

> Society is not, the sickly daughter of calamity, nor even the production of an aspiring understanding, but the free and legitimate offspring of the human heart.[545]

Thus, Dunbar's philosophy depicted social, self-interested man and a voluntary society: although man was self-interested he did enter to it.[546] This combination of voluntary choice and self-interested man indicated the aspect of policy as activity and it had connections the transformation of the aspect of the political from knowledge conception towards activity conception.

Universal principles were anticipated bounds for a political actor, but neither ethico-juridical norms nor scientific maxims universally corresponded to the reality of political activity. Rather, the personality of a politician set the boundaries of political choices: his personality, skills, artfulness, sense of

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541 ibid. 270–276.

542 Hume HE 1754–1762, 1983, V, 325.

543 Millar HVESSBR 1818 III, 334. This quotation indicated that political prudence concerned multilateral linguistic actions.

544 Dunbar EHM 1780, 10. Judgement was also a classical criterion of a prudent politician.

545 Ibid. 17.

546 Ibid. 10.

judgement and intellectual resources defined his political choices. On the other hand, the possibilities of chosen policy depended upon other actors, a situation, traditions, conventions and habits comparable to natural laws and necessities of power. The role of necessity was ambiguous; it forced particular action, but it also expanded the possibilities of action and justified immoral actions.

4.4 Science as Political Prudence for the Future

The Newtonian science of nature introduced new experimental methodology as well as created a new conception of nature as a mechanical system, which could be described by universal natural laws based on causality. Scientific causality made prediction of natural events possible.[547] The Baconian-Newtonian conception of science both found and created predictability in physical nature.[548]

Scottish philosophers attempted to introduce this concept of Newtonian science into politics and to find the order of nature in politics. The rhetoric of the new methodology was approved and applied to human science. However Scottish thinkers acknowledged that the human sciences were not natural sciences.[549] In the beginning of the time period focused on this study, George Turnbull discussed the methodological uniformity between natural and human sciences. According to him, the Newtonian method, as observation and experience, was a useful and reliable method in human sciences and politics.[550] The assimilation of Newtonian science and politics was a multidimensional process, which confronted the political regarding language, history and future expectations. The following three sections focus on the controversy between scientific language and particularities in politics, in other words two distinct conceptions of time.

I Language

Newtonian rhetoric in moral philosophy indicated an attempt to ascertain predictability in human sciences. The presumed predictability was founded on future-oriented cause and effect relationship. The connection of cause and effect was known in political reasoning even before Newtonian science,[551] but the Newtonian method enforced the importance of this causal relationship. The

547 Sometimes it is necessary to make the distinction between merely empirical science and a priori science, but rather than purely a priori science the moment of political science is the explicit future orientation in connection with Newtonian empiricism. Cf., for example, Fontana 1985, 23, 80.

548 Early 18 th century philosophy Reil 1986, 289–290.

549 About the problem of controlled experimentation in human sciences, cf. Collini 1983, 15, 34.

550 Turnbull PMP 1740, 1976, 9, 19–20.

551 Meinecke 1924, 1962, 2, 67.

following example by Reid indicates both the importance of the general causal relationship and secondly, the distinction between ethics and politics, the latter as a knowledge of the causes of events in a society:

> In Politicks we do not enquire what is Right or Wrong, but what are the Causes that produce such or such *Events* in Society: or on the other hand what are the Effects and Consequences of that follow from such constitution.[552]

The formulation expressed the causal relationship between two phenomena, for "every effect must have a cause" was a basis of natural sciences and scientific politics.[553] The political sphere of action was different from the physical; it was very difficult to formulate causal principles of moral science. For instance, Hume noted the difficult of multiplicity interrelated causes in politics.[554] Rather than direct references to induction and deduction the methodological context was expressed by other terms like synthetical – analytical in political science.[555]

The other problem of scientific language was scientific sentences. Scientific principles were expressed by universal axioms, maxims and principles. For Hume maxims and axioms were simplified extremes or propositions, which could not correspond to reality in the human sciences because human life was often between these extremes:

> All questions concerning the proper medium between extremes are difficult to decided, both because it is not easy to find *words* proper to fix this medium, and because the good and ill, such cases run so gradually in to each other.[556]

Maxims were derived from the masses of people or the great number of experiments, and scientific maxims were best applied to the behaviour of the masses not to particular persons:

> What depends upon a few persons is a great measure, to be ascribed a chance, or secret and unknown causes: What arises from great number, may often be accounted for determinate and known causes. [557]

Hume made a distinction between science-politics and knowledge of the particulars in politics, and the synthesis between these two seemed to be impossible:

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552 Reid RL 1990, 162.

553 For example, Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, I, 153.

554 Hume PE 1994, BG 28; Com 94.

555 Reid BW 2131/7/V/5.

556 Hume PE 1994, IP 27.

557 Ibid. AS 58. Also Reid BW 2131/4/III/3 p.5.

> Those principles or causes, which are fitted to operate on a multitude, are always of a grosser and more stubborn nature, less subject to accidents, and less influenced by whim and private fancy, than those which operate on a few only. The latter are commonly so dedicate and refined, that the smallest incident in the health, education or fortune of a particular person, is sufficient to divert their course, and retard their operation, not it is possible to reduce them to any general maxim or observation[558]

Although political science – with objectivity and systematic principles of reasoning – was regarded as an improvement of political knowledge in general, it was an inadequate approach to explicate political life, and Hume defended the classical *prudentia* instead of science, which was the relevant approach to analyse, for example, the particular acts in political history. However unpredictability remained:

> … that all general maxims in politics ought to be established with great caution; and that irregular and extraordinary appearances are frequently discovered in moral as well as in physical world. The former, perhaps, we can better account for, after they happen, from springs and principles, of which ever has, within himself or from observation, the strongest assurance and conviction: but it is often fully impossible for human prudence, before-hand, to foresee and foretell them.[559]

Despite the recommended caution in scientific politics, the future was unpredictable and unexpected. The political world was different from the nature. The difficulty in politics was the concept of time as universal and eternal in physical nature and as a link to the past, present and future in politics. The unknown future, scientific knowledge as science and future generations as judge of actions was a common conceptual hybrid with minor variations in the Scottish enlightenment texts. The classical *prudentia*, for example Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* referred to the difficulty and necessity of foreseeing the future. The future aspect in science was a long-term future as either future generations or the universality of principles whereas in classical prudence the future was connected to immediate results of actions.

The establishment of science occurred simultaneously with several changes such as the transformation of history from an eyewitness story to an objective scientific history and to the re-establishment of a causal relationship based on scientific reasoning.[560]

II Time

Physical nature and the political sphere each represented different conceptions of time. The conception of time in politics was connected to the conception of history. Classical political theories were based on the assumption of circular time: the course of life as birth, growth, maturity, degeneration and death of a political body. Political life was comparable to an orbis, a wheel or a circle.[561]

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558 Hume PE 1994, AS 59.

559 Ibid. RC 179–180.

560 Rossini 1987, 303–324.

561 Cohen 1985, 55. The circle or rotation was connected to *Nemesis* and *Fortuna*, see Demandt 1978, 248, 253–254.

Parallel also to the course of the seasons this continuous cycle made prediction possible in politics. This course of life was natural and inevitable although a wise politician might temporally interrupt the course of political life.[562] Despite this possibility to change the natural course in politics, future expectations were limited by past experience.[563]

The circular conception of political time was partly broken by the age of the Scottish enlightenment; only fragmentary references to course of life was used in the Scottish polit-vocabulary. Political theory or history did not characterise the political as a course of life although the metaphor of a political body was common in the Scottish texts. For instance, Ferguson's history was neither cyclical, acyclical, eschatological nor teleological; it had connotations to all of these conceptions of time as well as to periodical progress and processes.[564]

Economic history was differentiated from political history: economic development was analysed by stadial theories such as hunting, pasturage agriculture and commerce.[565] Stadial theories could not replace the course of life in political reasoning, rather they helped to analyse the past for the needs of political economy. Several commentaries referred to the fact that stadial theories did not predict the political future; rather stadial theories were used for retrodiction, for reflection, and to characterise what might have happened.[566] Strictly taken, stadial theories were not political histories of acts and events. Despite the stadial histories, political or societal history was not reconstructed by finite periods nor was it fixed in limited periods.[567] Smith's analysis of history was not based on the four-stages theory or materialistic explanations only, but it was open-ended and thus historical interpretation remained a role in politics and legislation.[568]

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562 Cohen 1985, 55.

563 Collini, 1983, 16. On the course of time in politics Koselleck 1979, 1985, 13–15. Koselleck 1989, 299-301. According to Livingston, within the progressive conceptual the past impressions and ideas and that of present were not comparable or analogous, and thus present political institutions were judged from the viewpoint of future perfection, see Livingston 1984, 91, 289–290.

564 Hill 1997, 689–699.; McDowell 1983, 541.

565 The stages were savage, hunting, agriculture and commercial or savage, barbarous and polished. Four-stages theories were formulated in the 1750's, describing principles behind the progress in society with modern scientific analogies. Bowles 1984, 17–25.

566 Bowles 1984, 26. Also Rousseau wrote retrospective history. According to Goodman: "Rousseau's hypothetical history lies squarely between poetic and historical narrative, for if history speaks of what has been and poetry of what might be, hypothetical history deals with what must have been". Rousseau's historical explanation was not based on causal relationships but coherence. Goodman 1989, 135–139. On the term "Conjecture" Allan 1993, 152-154. Scottish historians tried to establish scientific history, as an objective history contrast to eye-witness histories and thus criticised previous histories. However, a historian was regarded as a subjective public speaker, as a teacher or an orator, and this cultivated the idea of public virtue, Allan 1993, 185 –199, passim.

567 Hill 1997, 687.

568 McNamara 1998, 45.

Stadial theories had implicit connotations in Scottish polit-vocabulary. Such terms as the unsocial state of life, the lowest station of a life, a state of a society, the political state indicated also the stages of political development.[569] Also some analytical histories of the progress of forms of government reflected the attempt to re-construct predictability. One of these was Dunbar's analysis of Roman history as a three-stages development of history 1) from the origin of a society to full establishment of dominion, 2) from the dominion to the free and legal government and constitution, and 3) from that area to the final dissolution of civil liberty or the entire subversion of the ancient government.[570] This and other periodical histories described the political past, but Scottish thinkers did not confirm their validity as hypothetical political histories for future predictions. The explicit attempts to (un)predict the political future were uncommon except Dunbar's analysis of anarchy in France as a fatal threat to political life in Europe. If threat of destructive anarchy could have been avoided, enlightened politics might have succeeded in the Europe. However, the future was open, and France had a possibility to destroy the independent, but interrelated European states or save the European political system by the chosen policy.[571]

> Unacquainted therefore as we are with the stated returns of civil period, we may mistake the evening for the morning twilight…[572]

History taught that people could not predict the future.[573] Both four-stages and three-stages theory introduced a linear, progressive and inevitable/natural development through the history of mankind, whereas political history depicted the tumult of progress revolution and decline.[574]

III Unintended consequences

The explicit problems of the formation of universal scientific maxim and the tension between science and knowledge of the particularities indicated a more extensive controversy of political life and scientific theory of politics: the failure of future expectations in politics. This phenomenon characteristic to political life among Scottish thinkers had been explicated by the idea of unintended consequences. Berry has defined two forms of unanticipated consequences in general:

> The first is when a series of discrete purposive decisions by separate individuals produces an overall outcome that none of them individually intended, This case fits 'market', or 'economic' behaviour… The second type is when a particular intended

569 See, for example, Reid RL 1990, 129, 160–161.

570 Dunbar IMP 1789–1794, 1996, 46.

571 Ibid.

572 Dunbar EHM 1780, 186.

573 " … political observer would have predicted a very different issue of her reign" Robertson HS 1976,142.

574 Cf. Hill, 1997, 678-686, passim.

> policy sets in train a series of events that eventually produce events the opposite that originally planned.[575]

According to Hamowy, unintended consequences created both spontaneous order and development in society.[576] The human history with competition and conflicts was tended to create harmony and sociability in long run, and thus in the Scottish research the conflicts were interpreted as a necessary positive feature creating the social development in human history. From this point of view conflicts were a part of the development of public institutions and human personality creating mutual solidarity. According to Hamowy, unintended consequences explained the origin of laws and justice as "a result of human activity … not deliberately constructed by men". But neither history of institutions nor history of events necessarily led to spontaneous order.[577] History as a series of events reflected rather temporal disharmony as unintended consequences.[578] Both stadial theories and spontaneous harmony, if there were harmony, were depicted and analysed only afterwards by a historian; a politician could not base his future expectations for these theoretical approaches on history.[579]

In contrast to the tendency-oriented theory of unintended consequences, *fortuna* was classically regarded as the main cause of unintended consequences. *Fortuna* was unpredictable, uncontrollable and independent from even politicians' actions. The metaphor of *fortuna* referred to the inadequacy of political knowledge for analysing political ends. On the other hand, the idea of *the wheel of fortuna* included an implicit reference to the course of life, and thus predictability. Commerce changed the idea *fortuna*; it was not far from fortune in commerce.[580] *Fortuna* was also implicitly controlled by the active political economy. Despite this fortune as a result of (controlled) *fortuna*, the classical idea of *fortuna* remained in the Scottish enlightenment, and Dunbar expressed it as follows:

> Fortune governs events: and the magnitude of genius or capacity; in individuals or in tribes, cannot be fully estimated by the success of its exertions. Even the actual promoters of the most important interests of mankind have seldom anticipated, in idea, the progressive consciousness of their own plans. In estimating human attainments, their origin progress and perfection, must not totally ascribed to human wisdom … this judgement may be pronounced on all the arts, sciences and governments they have delivered to posterity … But if the policy of ancients had

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575 Berry 1997, 41. There was consensus about the importance and extent of unintended consequences in a society, see Herzog 1985, 207.

576 Unintended consequences have been a famous topic in research literature. My aim is to re-interpret unintended consequence from the viewpoint of *prudentia*. Peter McNamara interpreted Smith's political theory from the dichotomy of spontaneous order vs. legislation, see McNamara 1998, 12.

577 Quotation Hamowy 1987, 3–7,10–36; Hargraves 2000, 31; Hill 2001, 281–299; Varty 1998, 187.

578 According to Hargraves, passions and love created unintended consequences, as in the case of Queen Mary of Scotland described by Robertson, see, Hargraves 1999,196.

579 Dunbar characterised a historian as a spectator of a scene, Dunbar EHM 1780, 165.

580 Pocock 1975,1987, 78, 486, 503.

> been more generally directed to commercial objects, yet their maritime operations, we may observe, were necessarily circumscribed, and local advantages … become afterwards comparatively of small importance. [581]

People could not predict either the future or the importance of their actions in long run. Dunbar combined the conceptions of new political reality and the scientific idea of laws of motions, as uncontrolled and uncontrollable; thus revolutions were the scene of *fortuna*.[582]

From a polit-point of view unintended consequences were connected to the concept of *policy*. Political activity was motivated by future expectations: activity was intentional, although these intentions sometimes failed.[583] If political history was and is interpreted as a train of singular acts, the unintended consequences were not always positive, but negative: "But the barbarous policy failed of the purpose to which it was directed …"[584] Failing policies were common in Hume's *History of England*, here another example:

> All the arts of Cromwell´s policy had been so often practised, that they began to loose their effect; and his power, instead of being confirmed by time and success, seemed every day to become more uncertain and precarious…[585]

Sometimes the unintended consequences were results of policy derived from the principle of private vices as public virtues.[586] In Hume's *History of England* the unintended consequences of political activity described the occasional failure of prince-politicians.

A typical political situation described by policy-terms was a war or conflict between two sovereigns or nations. Conflicts were ambiguous phenomena: political history proceeded through conflicts, but conflicts created uncertainty in politics. Political conflicts were unavoidable and pejorative in human history; it was necessary to prevent disastrous conflicts by creating just political systems. The Scottish theory of political science, establishment of political institutions and artful governing, which would have been based on political science and laws, were regarded as a remedy against these disorders.[587]

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581 Dunbar EHM 1780, 175, 293. Classically Fortuna had been contrasted to virtue, but the contrast had been diminished in the Scottish enlightenment.

582 Dunbar IMP 1789–1794, 1996, 336.

583 Hume HE 1754–1762, 1983, II, 409; V 103.

584 Ibid. II, 135.

585 Ibid. VI, 111. The similar effect of uncertainty can be found in Montesquieu's analysis of the cause of the decline of the Roman republic and its inability to adapt to changing circumstances. Bowles 1984, 37.

586 Francesconi 2001 http:www.cromohs.unifi.it /6_2001/Francesconi.html (26.1.2002). Francesconi, Hamowy and Hill have regarded these unintended consequences as positive phenomena in history.

587 Ferguson PMPS 1792, 1975, I, 258–284. Kettler has derived Fergusonian conflicts from "contest" and "interplay with circumstances", more precisely, conflicts can derived from contrasting intentions. Further more he characterised: " The political world is a world of conflict not settled lawfullness". By the conflict Kettler referred to corruption and exploitation. Kettler regarded conflicts pejorative phenomenon and not as politics, conflicts should be avoided by wise choices and active and intentional political actions. The final aim was to avoid conflicts was to avoid (national) decline. See a short note in Kettler 1977, 450. My re-interpretation of political conflicts is

Science was considered an antidote to superstition and enthusiasm in religion, and party rages and zeal in politics.[588] But it was also a remedy against unintended consequences.

According to Delannoi, unintended consequences implied the lack or poverty of *phronêsis*.[589] Despite the different future-orientations in science and *prudentia* the strict contrast epistemology – *phronêsis* or historical change from *prudentia* to science were never explicitly established in the Scottish enlightenment; rather, both of the branches of knowledge co-operated as a remedy to unintended consequences.[590] However, unpredictability was a problem, especially for Reid and Hume.[591]

4.5 Language and Political Eloquence

The analysis of language was dualistic in the Scottish enlightenment: it was analysed as a socio-historical phenomenon and as a political rhetoric. The progress of languages and the progress of human societies were interrelated processes.[592] Language was a human phenomenon and distinguished human beings from animals. Although a language was first formed in the earlier states of human societies, it characterised a civilised state of society.[593] The connotations of politics as speech acts were uncommon in the Scottish texts although the modes of public speaking were crucial for the theory of rhetoric. Scottish language theories made it possible to differentiate between two modes of public speaking: polite speaking and political eloquence.[594]For instance, Blair analysed language as a grammatical phenomenon, as societal history, as poetry, and drama, history and political rhetoric. Eloquence or public speaking as political speech was separated from historical, epistolary and philosophical writing, poetry and drama.

Blair, Reid and Hume considered political eloquence. The rare references to political rhetoric were descriptive rather than analytical. These references were crucial because they described politics as distinct from science. Hume

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somewhat opposite, conflicts were natural, and thus, unavoidable, in politics, although science represented an attempt to create order by the means of laws to reject conflicting situations. Further active political actions caused conflicts, rather than hindered them. Despite the revolutionary characterisation of politics, Kettler's approach is moralistic.

588 McNamara 1998, 34.

589 Delannoi 1993, 20.

590 Dunbar used the classical threat of the end of the political course as a part of his political rhetoric towards French political instability, Dunbar IMP 1789–1794, 1996, 46.

591 Hume ECHU 1748, 1958, 7; Reid BW 2131/4/III/3.

592 Spadafora 1990, 196–197. More on this subject in Spadafora 1990, 179–210.

593 Blair LRBL 1783, 1965, I, 1–2, 100; Spadafora 1990, 182–185. Spadafora has characterised the differentiation of the theories by the terms intervention vs. invention.

594 Potkay 1994, 59–103.

regarded politicians and priests as sublime reasoners, this allusion referred to politics as speech acts.[595]

Political speech flourished in free governments and especially in Athens.[596] The Scottish approach was in some measure opposite to this classical conception, the danger of tyranny was concealed by political rhetoric; a control was thus required.[597] According to Reid, eloquence was also an engine for promoting the private ends of a speaker.[598]

In Britain the Parliament was a crucial arena of political speaking. Despite this Scottish thinkers theorised it as a political institution not as a domain of rhetoric.[599] The question about parliamentary eloquence was ambiguous. Admirers of classical rhetoric maintained that political rhetoric had disappeared from Parliament. Some statements indicated that political rhetoric had been transformed and modernised, but had not disappeared. Temporary political success did not require art of classical eloquence:

> For there public speaking was not a mere competition for empty applause, but a serious contention for that public leading, which was the great object both of the men of ambition, and the men of virtue … in every period we have had some who made a figure, by managing the debates in Parliament; but that figure was commonly owing to their wisdom, or their experience in business, more than their talents for Oratory; and unless, in some few instances, wherein the power of Oratory has appeared, indeed, with much lustre, the art of Parliamentary Speaking rather obtained to several a temporary applause, than conferred upon any lasting renown.[600]

A text fragment in Ferguson's letter described the annihilation of the classical ideal. According to Ferguson, there was "no place" for eloquence in the British system of politics, but in the ideal situation eloquence would have been an arm of political and moral wisdom.[601] According to Hume, the art of eloquence was not totally diminished, but the possibilities of artful rhetoric were limited by law and legalistic orientation of politics. The role of statesman-banister had changed. During the classical period many statesmen were "speculative" lawyers; as banisters they practised eloquence in courts. By the time of Scottish enlightenment the system of laws was entirely established and speculative statesman-lawyers had diminished. Due to the institutionalisation and

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595 Hume ECHU 1748, 1958, 181.

596 Potkay 30–31, 41.

597 Blair LRBL. II, 11-13. Reid BW MS 2131/8/I/2 p.15 passim 'Lectures on Eloquence'.

598 Reid BW 2131/8/I/7.

599 Reid is more or less sceptical of representative politics: "We know from long experience how such elections proceed, The poor electors must have their Bellies or purses filled, their burthens lessened or their Superiors mollified. The Rich must have their private Attachment and Friendship gratified …. Such are the Electors, who to be Candidates? It were to be wished that they should be the wisest & the best Men of the District. But this is rather to be wished than expected". According to Reid, candidates tended to support the majority:" Without this their pretensions would be laughed at". Reid RL 1990, 278.

600 Blair LRBL 1965. II, 10-12,39.

601 Ferguson CAF 1995, II, 491.

legalisation of politics, nature of Parliament as a political arena had changed, and the classical oratory did not lead to political victories.[602]

On the other hand, political arenas, especially Parliament, were arenas of disputes. A politician ought to reach his aims by any means, as Ferguson suggested, by making other politicians to think, discuss and dispute.[603] Ferguson implicitly defined politics as persuasion. Politics as "persuasion" differed both from the intelligible rhetoric of public good and moralistic evaluation of political activity.

As noted in the previous chapter, Reid combined eloquence and political wisdom. Reid's tangential notes on prudence showed the connection between speech and political action:

> Prudence strictly so called consists in the choice of proper means for the attainment of our Ends… As Speech is one of the Main Instruments of transacting Matters with our fellow Creatures a Capital Part of Prudence consists in the Right Government of Speech.[604]

Reid made a distinction between wisdom and prudence in these notes: wisdom referred to estimation, evaluation and sense of judgement. Rhetoric was one of the methods used to acquire authority and one of the means by which men could be governed:

> The Grand instruments of governm [ent] Authority acquired by the opinion of Wisdom of Goodness of Right Courage & Military Skill Eloquence …. some things of a Higher Degree the Government of Large Bodies of Men by mans of Political or Military Skill or Eloquence.[605]

Political eloquence did not explicitly refer to Parliamentary speaking as persuasion, but governing a body of people, which might have had several connotations such as princely politics and Cabinet politics. According to Hume, politicians and moralists tried to change the natural habits of people and the

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602 Hume 'Of Eloquence' here ed. *The Essays Moral, Political and Literary* 1974, 98–111. Also in Potkay 1994, 73–74.Despite the changes in the British political system, Scottish political theory did not dedicate special focus on the role of the Prime Minister or Parliament as politics or policy.

603 On Parliament Ferguson CAF 1995, II, 533. Sometimes letters described another sphere of the political, strictly connected to action. The polit-vocabulary in Ferguson's Letter to Lord Shelburne characterised political life as follows "I have … Encouraged. here with hopes that the Friends of the English Militia would support our Motions in Parliament … in danger of encroaching a little on the Art of Political Lying if I had not been sure of your Lordship to save me from that Reproach …. The next best thing to the procuring of Actual Political Establishments for this purpose is turning the Attentions & desires of men such Establishment & to make then think & dispute about them … We already see Some cause to rejoiced in the Zeal which is discovered by Numbers here, we shall see more if Politicians Elsewhere from Affection Candour /Remissness or Stupidity in which last they are not perhaps always wanting should suffer our Motion to be made & our Law to pass." Also interference and delays were the proper means of Parliamentary politics.

604 Reid RL 1990, 130.

605 Reid BW 2131/8/V/1.

natural course of things.[606] This might have referred to the classical purposes of a politician to reconstruct an ideal form of a political body.

Speech was an instrument of political prudence. Prudence in connection to eloquence referred to the means and methods of attaining ends, not just the ends themselves. Following the tradition of *prudentia*, Scottish thinkers did not reconstruct any systematic theory of political speaking different from theatrical speaking. Political rhetoric was not an independent branch of political theory either. Political speech was always connected into the ethical background and logical abilities of the speaker.[607] Thus, political eloquence proper required political knowledge; art and science. A political speech was an act, and for this reason the next section concerns the connections between the polit-vocabulary and activity

4.6 Politician as an Actor – a Prelude to Conceptual Change?

The characterisations of the sovereigns and the policy conceptions described politics as activity, whereas politics usually referred to politics as knowledge, philosophy or science. However a few politician-references seemed to reflect politics as an activity. Activity itself was not uncommon aspect of Scottish philosophy. The theory of ethics was, in a great measure, theory of right action, or in Reid's words: "It is evident that Nature intended us for action".[608]

In the classical polit-vocabulary politics and politician referred to knowledge. A politician was a philosopher of politics rather than an actor. During the 19th century the meanings of polit-vocabulary were also gradually connected to action in German and French languages.[609] Scottish sources indicate that this change occurred earlier in Scotland. The conceptual change was tangentially introduced through the whole vocabulary, but the term politician received an almost entirely new meaning, especially in the texts of David Hume, Ferguson's *Institutes of Moral Philosophy*, and Thomas Reid´s lectures.

Hume considered writing as a political act in his essays.[610] The metaphor of writing referred to science and scientific or philosophical writing was the opposite of speculative speaking. In his essay Hume wrote:

> I cannot but consider myself as a kind of resident or an ambassador from the dominions of learning to those of conversation.[611]

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606 Hume THN 1739–1740 1981, 500, 521, 523, 533–534.

607 Campbell, PR 1776, 1963 1969, introduction.

608 Reid RL 1990, 127.

609 See, for example Palonen 1993, 6–15.

610 Short note, see Haakonssen 1996, 100. Hume in several essays in PE 1994, 17, 24, 52, 93, 163.

611 Hume 'Of Essay Writing' here ed. *The Essays Moral Political and Literary* 1974, 571.

As an essayist Hume regarded himself as a teacher of a politics, not a politician. He was not a teacher of a prince, but a teacher of polite conversation. Implicitly many of Hume's essays introduced advice to a sovereign or to those who govern. Hume's letters introduces the third role of a political actor. Hume wrote in a letter to Alexander Carlyle in 1763: "I write no politics, having now become a politician".[612] Hume was a secretary of the British ambassador in Paris in 1767. According to Forbes, Hume made a distinction between politics as an entertainment and politics as a profession.[613] Probably Hume regarded himself as a professional politician, but the reference also reflected the conceptual transformation of polit-terms from knowledge to activity.

Reid connected conceptual change to the dichotomy of theoretical knowledge vs. practical. The practical politician, who operated within existing political systems, was the opposite of a speculative politician, who operated within political models and theory. Thus these speculative politicians, in Reid's vocabulary, were synonymous with philosophical politicians:

> The practical Politician who is to Model or to direct the Government of a Nation actually existing.[614]

This practical politics was art and a practical politician was a viewer-politician, who both organised and governed political bodies:

> Political is the Art of [forming] Modelling & governing Politickal societys of men so as to answer the end proposed by them[615]

A practical politician was not a theorist. The characterisation of politicians as "direct" connected practical politicians to politics as an activity concept. Reid's conception of a politician is quite consistent; he mentioned elsewhere that human action focused on different parts of human life, in different times, cultures and situations. In politics a politician ought to "prevent the bad" and "bring the good political events".[616]

Ferguson also reflected politics as an action although with no direct reference to a politician. For Ferguson politics was a collective action of a nation or a state, not an act of an individual politician:

> Among nations, the act of the sovereign, or those employed by the sovereign, is considered as the act of the nation. The act of any private person is not the act of the state, except so far as, in his action, he is protected or acknowledged by the state.[617]

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612 Hume 1932, letter 214. Before he wrote to Henry Home " I am a philosopher, and so, I suppose, must continue", letter 54 in 1747.According to Oz-Salzberger Hume's politician was always a philosopher, contrast to Smith's statesman or politician as political animals concerned on momentary fluctuations or affairs, see Oz-Salzberger 2003, 160–161.

613 Forbes 1975, 125–134; Pulkkinen 1998, 44.

614 Reid RL 1990, 281.

615 Reid BW 2131/ 4/III/1.

616 Reid BW 2131/7/V/4 p. 17.

617 Ferguson IMP 1769, 1994, 229.

The direct references to politics as activity did not exist. Only the terms policy and a politician reflected the conceptual change from knowledge to activity.[618] These fragmentary references were probably the reflections of the conceptual changes of polit-vocabulary that took place after the age of enlightenment in the English language.

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The analysis of politics as science and the political as a sphere did not reveal all the aspects of the political in the Scottish enlightenment. The analysis of the concepts of a politician and policy depicted politics as an activity distinct from, and even opposite to, mere moral or political principles *a priori*. The tradition of prudence was not replaced by the rhetoric of science, but was regarded as necessary so far as the concrete political world was concerned. The figures of both a statesman and a politician obtained some independent reflections, including the role of political eloquence, and the same is the case with policy both in the context of the freedom-necessity opposition and of the reason of the state. In the Scottish texts politics as an activity remained in the realm of princes, statesmen and diplomats. Named politicians, Prime ministers and the Members of Parliament had only marginal role in politics as an activity.

[618] Kari Palonen has defined this as *horizonshift*.

5 THE LABYRINTH OF THE POLITICAL

The aim of this study was to analyse the use of the polit-vocabulary in Scottish philosophy. Despite the fact that Scottish philosophers did not regard the polit-concepts as problematic, the use of polit-vocabulary reveals several possibilities to conceptualise the political. The use of the polit-vocabulary was unintentional and descriptive rather than intentional and analytical. However, a historian of concepts need not be content with questions, which had been only explicitly and intentionally represented in primary sources, but may also examine implicit questions that are worthy of closer investigation. In this study, the implicit level of history introduces supplementary, complementary or even alternative views of politics as science. The fact that polit-vocabulary was used spontaneously did not mean that politics was an ahistorical, unimportant or inferior sphere of human life. On the contrary, the spontaneous use of polit-vocabulary reflected the idea that, despite the variants of the political, it was more or less already institutionalised phenomenon.

The method of this study – as a variant of *Begriffgeschichte* – was more or less exceptional. In this study the conceptualisation of the political was based on the use of polit-vocabulary. Thus, the reconstruction of the connections between a concept and context was one of the challenges in this study because the idea of the political among Scottish thinkers was multidimensional and had many connotations.

One special challenge of this study was the interconnection between different text genres, between philosophic- scientific texts, histories and letters. The other was the evaluation of various nuances in different text genres. Sometimes minor sources, or non-philosophical sources, indicated different ways of conceptualising the phenomenon under investigation; as both Thomas Reid's manuscript and David Hume's letters considered the concept of politics as activity.

Somewhat surprisingly – if we consider the Scottish enlightenment as a Newtonian Enlightenment – Scottish thinkers did not invent new metaphors for politics and a political system or a political life; rather, they renewed traditional conceptions. The modern dimensions of the political as politicking or politicising were unknown in the Scottish polit-vocabulary. The renewal of the

polit-vocabulary was not a revolutionary change of vocabulary, but occurred as the gradual change in the meanings and nuances of certain concepts. The other interesting point is that, although the political constituted a separate branch of its own, Scottish thinkers seldom defined the branch and character of the political by inclusions and exclusions between the political and other branches of human life.

Politics was regarded as a concept of knowledge or philosophy as Ankersmit has noted:

> Before 1800 political presentation was oriented towards constitutional law and constitutional matters than towards everyday political problems in which, for that matter, pre nineteenth-century political philosophy did not have the slightest interest.[619]

Thus, political science was either a theory on the forms of constitution, or political philosophy. Political practices, especially parliamentary practices or elections were not theorised, but only tangentially considered; probably these issues were regarded as matters for legislation.

Although politics referred mainly to constitutional matters, the term did not reflect all the aspects of the political. The polit-vocabulary depicted three conceptions of the political: firstly, politics as a separate branch within moral philosophy focusing on the anticipated natural or best political order; secondly, a particular contracted sphere of human life, connected especially to the philosophy of rights, and thirdly, a special activity within this sphere.

The Scottish debate on science consisted of two separate aspects: the method of politics and politics as a particular branch of moral science. The Newtonian scientific approach changed the future orientation of politics from now-future orientation to distant-future orientation. Explicit references to the branch of politics separated politics as written science from ethics, law, jurisprudence and even science of man. Thus, human sciences or moral sciences were not one uniform field of knowledge despite the attempt to introduce the Newtonian method as a universal method of knowledge. Each of these branches of moral philosophy had a special object and focus within moral science.

As a sphere the political reflected the particular arena of human life different from paternal or military spheres, for example. The political as a sphere, whether a political society or a state, reflected the loosening connections to Aristotelian politics. From this point of view my study reviews the earlier interpretations of human society as a universal construction. Despite the fact that mankind was often regarded as the human society in a general sense, the differences between societies should be taken into account. In fact, the common paraphrases such as "men bound together", "the social nature of man" or "nature has intended men to society" were not sufficient characterisations of the variations of human societies, but all the different forms of societies had a specific role in human life. Further, Scottish thinkers explicated all these

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619 Ankersmit 1996, 34.

societies separately at the theoretical-conceptual level. Thus, we have to separate what was common to all societies and to all mankind, from that what was characteristic to the modes of a particular society. In other words, instead of universal sociability the Scottish concept of the social could be characterised as variants of the expressions of the social.

The Scottish critique of the social contract had been well known for long time. The explicit critique of the social contract had led to the interpretation that Scottish thinkers denied all kind of contracts as a basis of political societies and life, the contemporary political systems were based only on historical processes, and the tacit contracts had no great political relevance. The historical fact that existing societies were based on military force did not change the fact that all ideal political unions were based on contracts whether implicit or explicit. The tacit contract actually implied the transformation of military force to political power or the transformation of paternal power to political power. The Scottish philosophers denied the idea of social contract as a basis of human sociability; instead they said that a political society was (often) based on the first contract. The theories of the ideal or real origins of the political systems varied, but for most often political systems were said to be based on two theories: the union of men and ruler-ruled contract. Only Beattie and Dunbar introduced the theory without any contract, but as a continuity and expansion of paternal power. Derived from the dual origins of a political system, Scottish political theory was based on the idea of the voluntary union of free men and the union between the rulers the ruled. In other words, the modern conception of a state separated the two aspects of the political into a society and a government. A political society was regarded as an intention of nature or natural to men but it was not a consistent construction by its nature. Despite the lack of explicit metaphor of a free rider, people tended to disengage themselves from the bounds of a political society; thus a political society required continuous maintenance by laws and governmental regulation. Scottish thinkers combined the idea of the first contract, which replaced the natural state of man or civil war in Hume, and the historical explanations of the origins of a modern state, but also a state as a state of a prince.

The Scottish polit-vocabulary reflected different traditions of political knowledge or abilities; politics derived from classical Aristotelian-Platonian conception of knowledge and the variants of *prudentia* combined to the art of eloquence and the Renaissance reason of state tradition. The relationship between science and traditional *prudentia* was at least ambiguous. On the one hand, Newtonian science was a remedy to political zeal and the surest foundation of foresight was as one of the most important skills of a politician. On the other hand, prudence reflected particular wisdom independent from the principles of morals and political science. As an example of this controversy was the term policy: it had two connotations first as a scientific principle and second as a special, personal knowledge of a sovereign derived from the concept of *prudentia* of a statesman and reason of state. Political wisdom can be defined also by policy as purposeful actions. These purposes were oriented to the future and the maintenance of the society. The meaning of the concept

policy varied from science connected plans of activity to political necessity of action and finally voluntary action.

The injection of the activity aspect into the polit-vocabulary regarding mainly the terms of policy and a politician unites the Scottish political vocabulary with Continental conceptual changes from the late 18th century to the early 19th-century. During that period new conceptions were invented, new meanings were developed for traditional concepts, and concepts were temporalised. Further, conceptual change occurred with the increase of awareness of time and the institutionalisation of scientific history. At the same time political theory transferred from history-present-oriented theory to present -future-oriented theory. However, Scottish thinkers reacted to an unknown future rather than theorised it. Concerning the concept of the politician, the change of meaning referred to the transfer from a philosopher-politician to a professional actor, and from a spectator, whether impartial or not, to a participant. Concerning the term policy the change of meaning reflected the idea of activity separated from a particular established political maxim. There was not necessarily a connection between a particular political maxim and activity, but between an actor and activity. Dunbar's principle that agency was derived from option indicated this differentiation of policy from established principle. Concerning the political sphere the conceptual transformation called either *Sattelzeit* (in the British context) or a change from knowledge to activity indicated withdrawal from the Aristotelian unity of ethics, jurisprudence and politics.

The political world was a world of several tensions and conflicts between subjects and sovereign, changes and stasis, conflicts and harmony, war and peace, law and disorder, future orientation and unintended consequences, anticipated and unknown. Scottish political theory was a reflection and reaction to these tensions. Scottish thinkers attempted to create solutions to these problematic tensions both by the use of scientific language and the theory of a political society. The dual theory of a political union as a society was derived from mutual contract or consensus between independent members. On the other hand, historically oriented explanations of the origins of government as results of usurpation and conquest implied that violent or conflicted nature of political actions was more or less acknowledged, not as a philosophical ideal, but as an historical fact.

Voluntarity was connected to all the theories of the origins of a political society and a state: primitive people preferred the solitary state; if possible, a sovereign was chosen by voluntary contract. In military usurpation this voluntarity was manipulated. The legitimisation of a political system was a continuous voluntary decision; according to Reid, people had a right to live outside the political body and political actors.

Scottish conceptualisations of the political reflected the human world, in which the political constituted a special sphere of its own. As Koselleck has stated, there was no a contest between the society and the state nor the transformation of the social, the ethical or the juridical into the political

sphere.[620] Instead, Scottish thinkers analysed these spheres separately. Whether a branch of science, a human sphere, and activity and wisdom, the political constituted a branch of its own. Conceptually, Reid's political jurisprudence was an exception to this principle, it constituted a synthesis between the particular aspects of the political and of the legal.

One of the aims of this study was to offer an alternative possibility to read the political in the Scottish texts. We have two possible methods to reconstruct the political: we can either try to reconstruct a synthesis between politics and other spheres of human life, or we can reconstruct the analysis of the special characters of these branches, and define the political through these distinctions and similarities.

The fact that Scottish thinkers were academic writers – and the special focus was on academic texts – defines the concept of politics in this study. Although Scottish thinkers were enlightened political thinkers, it seems that polit-conceptions were not politicised as a topic of political debate. Nor did the conception of politics indicate the emancipatory aspects of the enlightenment politics, which did not mean that Scottish thinkers ignored these aspects of politics in general. Scottish thinkers had "enlightened political opinions", but these were not connected to the concepts of politics.

The anticipated unity of Scottish philosophy can be reviewed by conceptual methods. Conceptual changes were not always introduced by mainstreams of philosophy. The conceptual web was inconsistent and incoherent and sometimes philosophical problems remained unsolved. The principle that a text constitutes a world of its own was useful especially in reviewing Scottish theories on societies and especially political society. As history of continuities and discontinuities the conceptual approach can complete or revise the history of political philosophy.

620 Cf. Palonen 2002, 92.

YHTEENVETO

POLITIIKAN LABYRINTTI:
Poliittisen käsite skotlantilaisessa valistuksessa

Skotlantilaiset valistusvalistusfilosofit pohtivat teksteissään poliittisina pidettyjä kysymyksiä. He eivät intentionaalisesti analysoineet politiikan käsitettä tai poliittisen ilmiötä sinänsä, vaan käyttivät pikemminkin intuitiivisesti politiikkaan ja poliittiseen viittaavia käsitteitä. Tutkimuksessa hahmotetaan valistusfilosofien käsitystä politiikasta analysoimalla heidän tapaansa käyttää politiikkasanastoa ja politiikkaan viittaavia metaforia.

Työssä käytetään ensisijaisesti käsitehistoriallista lukutapaa. Työn metodologisena lähtökohtana on ajatus siitä, että myös ongelmattomiksi aikoinaan koetut käsitteet olivat keskeisiä aikansa ajattelulle, ja että niiden merkitys on problematisoitavissa. Intuitiivisesta käytöstä huolimatta valistusfilosofit käyttivät yleisesti politiikkasanastoa, ja politiikkaa tuleekin tarkastella yhtenä skotlantilaisen moraalifilosofian keskeisistä käsitteistä.

Tässä työssä huomio kiinnittyy poliittisuuden käytön eri variantteihin. Politiikkaa tai poliittista ei pidä skotlantilaisesta valistuksesta puhuttaessa ymmärtää yhtenä käsitteenä, vaan se koostuu pikemminkin erilaisista, osin toisiinsa liittyvistä, topoksista.

Skotlantilaisen moraalifilosofian tulkintoja on leimannut ajatus moraalifilosofian yhtenäisyydestä, jolloin politiikka ja poliittinen olisivat olleet alisteisia eettiselle ja sosiaaliselle. Tämä työ tarjoaa vaihtoehtoisen tavan tulkita poliittista. Tarkastelemalla 1700-luvun skottilaisen moraalifilosofian luentoja ja muita perustekstejä voidaan huomata, että moraalifilosofian kenttä oli tieteenä jakautunut etiikkaan, oikeusfilosofiaan ja politiikkaan. Samalla tavalla politiikka voitiin erottaa yleisestä ihmistieteestä ja juridiikasta sekä myöhemmin psykologiasta. Toinen keskeinen seikka skotlantilaisen moraalitieteen tulkinnoissa on käsitys baconilais-newtonilaisen tieteenfilosofian soveltamisesta ja hyväksymisestä ihmistieteisiin. Politiikan tieteellä pyrittiin parantamaan poliittisen elämän ennustettavuutta, mutta valistusfilosofit, kuten David Hume, pysyivät skeptisinä sen mahdollisuuksien suhteen.

Skottifilosofit hahmottivat poliittisen paitsi tieteenalana moraalitieteen sisällä niin myös elämänalana erottamalla poliittisen yhteisön muista yhteisöistä, kuten ihmiskunnasta ja perheyhteisöstä. Erityisen keskeisessä asemassa olivat tulkinnat poliittisen yhteisön alkuperästä. Poliittinen yhteisö ymmärrettiin aina spatiaalisena ja temporaalisena ilmiönä, tiettynä poliittisena yhteisönä. Poliittista yhteisöä rajattiin suhteissa luonnontilaan, paternaaliseen yhteisöön sekä (väki)-valtaan ja orjuuteen.

Kolmas poliittisen aspekti oli politiikka toimintaan liittyvänä viisautena, joka on erotettavissa politiikan tieteenalasta tai newtonilaisesta politiikan retoriikasta. Poliittinen viisaus, tai taito, kiteytyi toimijametaforiin, kuten lainsäätäjään, ruhtinaaseen ja diplomaattiin, jokaisella näistä oli omat erityispiirteensä. Erityisesti ruhtinas- ja diplomaattimetaforilla kuvattu politiikka

toimintana voidaan erottaa moraalin ja etiikan sfääreistä. Kyseisillä metaforilla kuvattiin tietyntyyppistä toimintaa, vaikka valistusfilosofien teksteissä ei vielä puhuta politiikasta omana toiminnan aspektina. Poliittisen retoriikan, parlamentaarisen puheen tai muiden poliittisten käytäntöjen ja tilanteiden analyysi politiikan käsitteillä oli vielä harvinaista, vaikka politiikan tiede olikin osa muutosta poliittisesta filosofiasta poliittisten käytäntöjen teoriaksi.

Yhteistä näille poliittisen eri topoksille on se, että ne ilmaisivat irrottautumista yhtenäisestä maailmankuvasta. Tapa jäsentää poliittista oli merkittävä osa skotlantilaista valistusfilosofiaa, eivätkä valistusfilosofit alistaneet poliittista muille elämänaloille, vaikka politiikan tieteen asema olikin näennäisen epäitsenäinen.

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APPENDIX

The philosophers and the Historians of the Scottish Enlightenment

Beattie James 1735–1803
Professor of Moral Philosophy at the Marischal College Aberdeen. Works include Dissertations Moral, Critical and Literary 1783, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth 1770,The Minstrel 1771 On Poetry and Music, as they affect the Mind. On Laughter, and ludicious Composition. On the Utility of Classical Learning 1776, Dissertations moral and critical. On Dreaming. The Theory of Language. On Fable and Romance. On the Attachments of Kindred. Illustrations on Sublimity 1783.

Blair Hugh 1718–1800
Minister of High Kirk and the first Professor of Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres since 1760. Works include A Critical Dissertation on the Poems of Ossian 1763 and Sermons 1777–1803.

Campbell George 1719 – 1796
Principal of Marischal College Aberdeen since 1759 and Professor of Divinity since 1771. Works include A Dissertation on Miracles 1762, The Philosophy of Rhetoric 1776 and The Nature, Extent and Importance of the Duty of Allegiance 1776.

Carmicheal Gershom 1672–1729
Professor of Moral Philosophy 1727– 1729. Works include Theses Philosophicae 1699 and 1707, Breviuscula Intriductio ad Logicam 1720, S Pufendorfii De Officio Hominis et Civis, Juxta Legem Naturalem, Libri Duo. Supplementis et Observationibus in Academicae Juventutis auxit et illustravit Gershomus Carmichael, Philosophiae in Academia Glasguensi Professor 1724 and Synopsis Theologiae Naturalis, sive Notitiae, De Extentia, Attributis et Operationibus, Summi Numinis, ex ipsa Rerum Natura haustae. Studiosae Juventutis usibus accomodata 1729.

Dalrymple John 172–1810
Baron of exchequer 1776–1807 with various interests.

Dunbar James 1742–1796
Regent at Kings College Aberdeen till retirement 1794. Works include De Primordiis Civitatum oratio, In qua agitur de Bello Civili inter M. Britanniam et Colonias nunc flagranti 1779.

Ferguson Adam 1723–1816
Librarian to Society of Advocates, Professor of Natural Philosophy at Edinburgh 1759–1764 and Professor of Moral Philosophy 1764–1774, 1776–1785. Secretary to North's American commission.

Home Henry, Lord Kames 1696–1782
Judge, Works include Essays upon several subjects concerning British Antiquities 1747, Historical Law Tracts 1758, Principles of Equity 1760, The Art of Thinking 1761,The Elements of Criticism 1762, Elucidations Respecting the Common and Statute Law of Scotland 1778, Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion 1751, corrected and enlarged edition 1779, Loose Hints upon Education 1781.

Hume David 1711–1776
A Philosopher and a historian, Librarian to Society of Advocates 1752–1757, Embassy Secretary in Paris 1763, under secretary in London 1767–1768. Works include The Natural History of Religion 1757 and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 1779.

Hutcheson Francis 1694–1746
Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow 1729/1730–1746, a natural law philosopher, a teacher of Adam Smith.Works include An inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue 1725, Reflections upon Laughter, Remarks upon the Fable of the Bees 1725–1726, Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense.

Millar John 1735–1801
Advocate and Professor of Law at Glasgow, appointment at 1761, a historian of law and philosophical historian.

Reid Thomas 1710–1796
Librarian of Marischal College, regent of King's College Aberdeen and Professor of Moral Philosophy after Adam Smith 1764–1780, a common sense philosopher. Works include Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man 1785 and Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind 1788.

Robertson William 1721–1793
A Presbyterian moderate, a historian, Principal of Edinburgh University.

Smith Adam 1723–1790
Professor of Logic at Glasgow 1751 and Professor of Moral Philosophy 1752–1763, Commissioner of Customs for Scotland and the founder of Edinburgh Review, a political economist. Works include Essays on Philosophical Subjects 1795, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres 1985.

Steuart James Sir 1713–1780
Baronet, several writings of political economy and stadial theorist.

Stewart Dugald 1735–1828
Professor of Mathematics at Edinburgh 1775, Professor of Moral Philosophy 1785, A pupil of Thomas Reid, a common sense philosopher. Works include the biographies of Adam Smith, William Robertson and Thomas Reid.

Stuart Gilbert 1743–1785
An essayist, A son of Professor of Humanity and Roman Antiquities.

Turnbull George 1698–1748
Works include A Discourse upon Nature and Origine of Moral and Civil Laws 1740, Treatise on Ancient Painting 1740, Observations upon Liberal Education 1742

Wallace Robert 1697–1771
Church administrative, Works include A Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind in Antient and Modern Times 1753 and Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature and Providence 1761.

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